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The Socio-Economic Aspects of Return Migration in Turkey

*The Socio-Economic Aspects of Return Migration in Turkey*¹

This paper examines the various aspects of return migration from Europe to Turkey between 1973 and 1985. In spite of the recruitment stop of 1973, the size of the Turkish migrant population in Europe has increased, as a result of family reunion and the growing number of political asylum seekers following the military intervention of 1980.

Return movements have been realized in two forms:

- a. Officially encouraged definite return of migrants and all of their families,*
- b. Individual return due to personal preference and timing.*

In 1983 the Federal Republic of Germany and France adopted special policies providing financial incentives for return and enabling the restitution of the employer's contribution to social security funds. Although roughly 300,000 Turkish citizens took advantage of these incentives between 1983 and 1985, high unemployment and rising inflation in the home country constantly reduced the attractiveness of induced organized return.

The essence of the paper is devoted to the non-organized return of Turkish migrants, representing two types, the early and the late returning migrants. The first category represents predominantly the return due to failure. These migrants settle down in rural regions, they do not opt for active farming, but make their living through land leasing. The late returnees choose either a middle-sized town or large city in which to spend their retirement years, or in the case of younger returnees, to re-enter the labour-market as self-employed or as an industrial worker. The second group also comprises a significant number of second generation migrants who were in part obliged by their parents to return.

Comparing the reasons for return in the 70's and 80's, it becomes evident that the education and schooling problems of migrant children, the growing xenophobia and the increasing legal insecurity in prolonging their stay abroad, have been instrumental in the return decision of the 80's.

Those setting up an independent small business have generally not applied for additional credits. Their size remains small, with 40 percent employing not more than one to three persons. The continuity and change of values and attitudes of women migrants is also touched upon. The overwhelming majority of these women who were unemployed housewives prior to their departure became gainfully employed abroad. Only four percent re-entered the job market after their return. Reasons for non-integration in the host country, the impact of migration upon the decision-making process within the family and the place of the traditional role-model for women are also discussed.

The paper briefly evaluates the various governmental policies in Turkey such as low custom duties for returnees, financial support for weak enterprises, housing credit, and the creation of special German schools for migrant children.

By briefly touching on the political behavior of returning migrants, the low percentage of voting at frontier gates and the inability to participate in local administration in the host countries - except in Sweden and the Netherlands - the dominant attitudes of depoliticisation can be explained.

The paper concludes by stating that while the return process of the 60's and 70's represents a return of failure or conservatism, the 80's reflect a return for retirement and innovation. The second generation, who in many cases was compelled to return through parental authority, represents the group facing the greatest amount of difficulty in readjustment and re-integration.

Türkiye'ye Geridönüş'ün Sosyo-Ekonomik Yönleri

Makale, 1973-1985 yılları arasında Türkiye'ye yapılan dönüş göçünü ele almaktadır. Gerçi Avrupa ülkeleri 1973 ten sonra yeni işgücü istihdamına son vermişlerse de, Avrupadaki Türk göçmen işçi ve ailelerinin sayısı, ailelerin birleşmesi ve 1980 den sonra artan siyasal iltica talepleri nedeni ile artmıştır.

Dönüş göç hareketi iki biçimde ele alınabilir:

- a. *Resmi yollardan özendirilen toplu dönüş hareketleri olarak; bu yoldan göçmen işçi ve ailesi kesin dönüşe yönlendirilmektedir.*
- b. *Kişisel tercih ve zamanlamaya dayalı, bireysel dönüş hareketleri olarak; 1983 de Federal Almanya ve Fransa özel tazminatlar ödemek, ayrıca işverenin sosyal sigortaya aktarmış olduğu parasal ödentilerin iadesi yolu ile geniş çaplı bir özendirme politikası gütmüştür. Gerçi 1982-1985 yılları arasında toplam 300.000 Türk işçisi bu olanaklardan yararlanma yoluna gitmişse de anayurtta devam eden yüksek işsizlik ve enflasyon oranı, bu dönüş hareketlerinin hızını duyulur biçimde azaltmıştır.*

Makalenin özünü, bireysel dönüş hareketleri oluşturmaktadır. Bu alanda iki tip dönen işçi göze çarpmaktadır: "erken" ve "geç" dönemler. Birinci türe girenler, genellikle endüstri yaşamına uyum gösterememiş kişileri kapsamaktadır. Bunlar, daha çok kırsal bölgelere yerleşmekte, tarımla fiilen uğraşmamakla beraber, daha çok toprak rantından geçinen kişilerdir.

"Geç" dönemler farklı bir kategoriye oluşturmaktadır. Bunların bir kısmı, başarılı bir uyum göstermiş, emeklilik haklarını almış kişilerdir. Daha genç kuşağa mensub olanlar, Türk iş hayatına bağımsız bir iş kurmak veya endüstride çalışmak suretiyle dönmek isteyenleri kapsamaktadır. Aralarında ana babaları ile kesin dönüş yapma zorunluluğu karşısında bırakılan ikinci kuşak mensupları da bulunmaktadır. Bu ikinci grupta yer alanların önemli bir kısmı endüstrileşmiş bölge ve kent kesimlerinde uyumlu bir kaynaşma başarmışlardır.

Makalede 70 li ve 80 li yıllarda dönüşe neden olan başlıca etkenlere de değinilmektedir. 80 li yıllarda çocuklara eğitim olanakları sağlamak, artan yabancı düşmanlığından uzaklaşmak ve sürekli olarak yurt dışında yaşama isteğine rağmen karşılaşılan hukuki güvensizlik basit dönüş nedenleri arasında yer almaktadır.

Makalede dönen kadın işçilerin tutum ve değerlerinde gözlemlenen süreklilik ve değişme de ele alınmaktadır. Bu kadınların büyük çoğunluğu yurt dışına gitmezden önce ev kadını oldukları halde, yurt dışında bulundukları sürede hep ücretli olarak çalışmışlar, ancak döndükten sonra sadece % 4 ü yeni bir çalışma düzenine girmiş bulunmaktadır. Ayrıca gözlemlenen durumlardan hareketle dış göçün aile içi karar

verme sürecine etki yaptığı ancak geleneksel rol modelinde bir farklılık yaratmadığı hususlar da saptanmış bulunmaktadır. Yazıda dönen işçilere hükümet uygulamaları yolu ile gösterilen kolaylıklar - gümrük indirimi, işçi şirketlerine parasal destek, ev kredisi, çocuklar için Almanca dilinde öğretim yapan özel okulların kurulması gibi önlemler de ele alınmaktadır.

1987 genel seçimlerinde sınır kapılarında verilen toplam oyların sınırlılığı-sadece 49.800 oy - ve yurtdışında yaşayan işçilerin İsveç ve Hollanda hariç, hiç bir ülkede yerel yönetime faal olarak katılamamaları dönen ve kalan göçmen işçilerin yoğun bir depoliticizasyon süreci içinde bulunduklarını açıklamaktadır.

Sonuç olarak görüyor ki 60 lı ve 70 lı yıllarda yapılan dönüşler genelde bir başarısızlık ya da tutucu değerlere bağlı kalma özelliğini yansıtmaya karşın, 80 li yıllarda yapılan dönüşler başarılı biçimde emeklilik yıllarını geçirme ya da yenilikçi girişimleri gerçekleştirme gibi istekler içeren nitelikler taşımaktadır. Ayrı iki kültür çevresinde yetişen ve kendilerine farklı iki kural ve değer sistemi benimsetilmeğe çalışılan ikinci kuşak mensuplarının, bu dönüş sürecinde en büyük sorunlarla karşılaşan grup olduğu bu irdelemede ortaya çıkmaktadır.

Soziale und wirtschaftliche Aspekte der Remigration in die Türkei

In diesem Beitrag werden verschiedene Aspekte der Remigration zwischen 1973 und 1985 in die Türkei untersucht. Trotz des Anwerbestops seit 1973 hat die türkische Migrantenbevölkerung Europas durch die Familienzusammenführung und die wachsende Zahl derer, die nach der Intervention der Militärs 1980 politisches Asyl suchten, zugenommen.

Der Rückkehrprozeß vollzieht sich auf zweierlei Weise. Erstens gibt es die offiziell unterstützte endgültige Rückkehr der Migranten mit ihren Familien. Zweitens bleibt die Rückkehr oft ein individueller Entschluß, abhängig von persönlichen Vorlieben und Zeitplanungen.

1973 haben die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Frankreich zeitgebundene Rückkehrförderungsmaßnahmen inkraftgesetzt, und die Rückzahlbarkeit der von den Arbeitnehmern geleisteten Sozialversicherungsbeiträge ermöglicht. Zwischen 1983 und 1985 haben fast 300.000 Türken diese Maßnahmen in Anspruch genommen. Trotzdem hat die so geförderte organisierte Rückkehr ihre Attraktivität aufgrund der zunehmenden Inflation und der hohen Arbeitslosenquote im Heimatland verloren.

Im wesentlichen beschäftigt sich dieser Beitrag mit der nicht organisierten Rückkehr türkischer Migranten, die als frühe und späte Rückkehrer in zwei Gruppen gefaßt werden. Unter den frühen Rückkehrern sind viele, die in der industriellen Arbeitswelt nur schwer Fuß fassen konnten, und sich nach der Rückkehr in ländlichen Gebieten niederlassen - aber ohne den Wunsch, das Land zu bestellen. Sie

versuchen, als Landverpächter zu leben. Die späten Rückkehrer gehen in die mittelgroßen oder großen Städte, und leben dort von ihrer Rente. Die jüngeren unter ihnen arbeiten als Kleinunternehmer oder als Industriearbeiter. Zu dieser Gruppe zählen viele Jugendliche, die zum Teil mit ihren Eltern gemeinsam zurückkehren mußten.

Ein Vergleich der Gründe, die zur Rückkehr in den siebziger oder achtziger Jahren führten, macht deutlich, daß in den achtziger Jahren vor allem die Erziehungs- und Ausbildungsproblematik der Migrantenkinder, die wachsende Fremdenfeindlichkeit und die zunehmende Rechtsunsicherheit bezüglich der Aufenthaltsdauer für den Entschluß zur Rückkehr ausschlaggebend waren.

Diejenigen, die sich mit kleinen Betrieben selbständig gemacht haben, haben im allgemeinen keine zusätzlichen Kredite aufgenommen. Die Betriebe bleiben klein; bei 40 Prozent liegt die Zahl der Beschäftigten zwischen ein und drei Personen.

Auch die Kontinuität und der Wandel von Verhaltensweisen und Wertvorstellungen der Migrantinnen wird behandelt. In der Zeit vor der Arbeitsmigration waren die meisten von ihnen Hausfrauen, haben aber im Zuwanderungsland eine Erwerbstätigkeit aufgenommen. Nach der Rückkehr in die Türkei bleiben nur vier Prozent von ihnen erwerbstätig. Die Ursachen für die fehlende Integration im Zuwanderungsland, die Einwirkungen der Migration auf den Entscheidungsprozeß in der Familie und der Stellenwert des traditionellen Rollenverständnisses der Frauen werden erörtert.

Der Artikel evaluiert die verschiedenen Regierungsmaßnahmen der Türkei für die Rückkehrer, wie niedrige Zollsätze, finanzielle Unterstützung für Kleingewerbebetriebe, Kredite für den Hausbau und die Einrichtung von Schulen mit deutschem Sprachunterricht für die Kinder der Rückkehrer.

Das vorherrschend unpolitische Verhalten der Rückkehrer, ersichtlich an der geringen Wahlbeteiligung an den Grenzübergängen, wird damit erklärt, daß eine Beteiligung der Migranten an kommunalen politischen Entscheidungen in den Zuwanderungsländern bisher unmöglich war - eine Ausnahme bilden hier Schweden und die Niederlande.

Der Aufsatz schließt mit der Feststellung, daß die Rückkehrbewegung in die Türkei in den sechziger und siebziger Jahren in Anpassungsschwierigkeiten und Konservatismen begründet liegt. Die Rückkehrbewegungen der achtziger Jahre zeichnen sich eher durch das Phänomen des Ruhestands oder durch innovatives Verhalten aus. Die zweite Generation mußte in vielen Fällen mit den Eltern zurückkehren und wird möglicherweise erhebliche Anpassungsschwierigkeiten zu bewältigen haben.

Introduction

Among the sending countries of the Mediterranean, Turkey, a late-comer on the scene of international migration, is no doubt confronted with substantial returns of first-generation migrants who went to look for better wages and new chances in the early 60's, as well as an ongoing out-migration due to family reunion and limited job opportunities. In the space of fifteen years, from 1970 to 1985, the intensity, content and geography of migration from the Southern countries to the more industrialized countries in the North have undergone very substantial changes. These may be summed up as follows: a massive reduction in the transfers of permanent labour, an increase in flows of non-working population, a reduction in Greek, Spanish and to a lesser extent Italian emigration to North-West Europe.

In this respect, three types of regional migration can be identified:

- a. Countries with a falling migratory potential: Greece, Spain, Italy;
- b. Countries with an existing high migratory potential: Portugal and Yugoslavia;
- c. Country with a very high migratory potential: Turkey.

As *G. Simon* rightly points out, of all countries in OECD Europe, Turkey has experienced the greatest surge of emigration to Western Europe since 1970-1973 and has the highest departure potential of anywhere on the southern coast of Europe. The migratory thrust may be summed up in two figures: about 660,000 Turks in Europe in 1971-1972, over two millions in 1985. This threefold increase occurred against a theoretically discouraging background for migration and inspite of the return of over 400,000 migrants since the beginning of the 1980's. It reflects both the extent of family reunification and the high fertility of Turkish families abroad and also the ability of this new working-class emigration to adapt to an economic situation that had become difficult (*G. Simon*: 1987, p. 268).

Another proof of adaptability is provided by the development of other second-choice settlement centers. The increase in the Turkish population is noticeable in France (53,000 in 1975, 123,000 in 1982), where Turks are both the youngest community (one out of every two Turks is under 30) and the most recent arrivals (41 percent lived outside of France in 1975). Their dependency ratio 3.34 is the highest of all alien groups. Large increases were found in Belgium (80,000 in 1982) and the Netherlands (71,000 in 1975; 155,000 in 1983) as well as in Austria, Switzerland and Sweden. The numbers recorded in these countries increased by over 300,000 from 1975 to 1983. The extension and diversification of Turkish migration, which in 1970 was highly concentrated in the Federal Republic of Germany, are among the striking features of the new migratory trend. The spreading out of Turkish migration has partly been caused by the military intervention of 1980 and explains the relative high number of political asylum seekers. According to the official figures published by the Turkish Ministry of Labour in 1980, 57,913 Turks representing 53 percent of

the total number of asylum seekers, applied to the German authorities for asylum. Ultimately, this situation produced changes in the procedure of legal asylum seeking in the Federal Republic of Germany. It can be assumed that a substantial number of these asylum seekers used this method to secure employment, and thus, represent pseudo-asylum requests. Nevertheless, the radical changes which took place after the military intervention of September 12, 1980 in Turkey induced a significant number of political activists to apply for asylum abroad.

The major factors which make Turkey the main reservoir for potential migration can be summed up as follows: a high rate of natural population increase (average annual increase over ten years: 2.2 million), the saturation of the employment market (16.5 percent of unemployment and 58 percent of the working population being located in agriculture), an escalating inflation and the great discrepancy in the standard of living between Turkey and the host European countries.

This potential is depicted by the relative high presence of Turkish workers in oil-producing countries in 1984 (see Figure 1).

Figure 1

Number of Workers from Southern Europe in Oil-Producing Countries in 1984

Turkey	250,000
Yugoslavia	40,000
Italy	30,000
Spain	30,000
Greece	10,000
Portugal	10,000
Total	370,000

Source: J. Widgren, *International Migration - New Challenges to Europe*, Strasbourg, 1987, p. 10

Presently, there is a considerable outflow of returning migrant workers from the oil-producing countries, indirectly caused by the fall in oil prices and new restrictions in regard to immigration. As regards Turkey, migration to oil-producing countries reached a peak in 1981, and is now diminishing (see Figure 2).

Figure 2

Emigration from Turkey to oil-producing countries

1979	1981	1984
21,000	55,000	45,000

Source: *J. Widgren*, op. cit., p. 10

1. Return: Myth or Reality?

Considering only the diversified character of out-migration from Turkey, the nature of the return movement must be carefully assessed. According to German statistics, homeward flows surged in 1975 and 1976 (148,000 and 130,000 departures), then fell, levelled off in 1979 and 1980 (66,000 and 70,000) and picked up sharply again two years ago (86,000 in 1982, 100,000 in 1983, 90,000 in the first six months of 1985) (*Widgren*: 1987, p. 33).

However, even statistics like these hide the truth. Most returns are cyclical in their nature, and many of those who have returned, re-enter the country of immigration again after some time. Many enter the independent economic sector. This re-entry movement into the tertiary sectors of immigration countries also indicates a process of settling down permanently in Western Europe. Family reunification over the last ten years, childbearing in the host country, and the growth of new generations raised and educated in the host country have firmly settled these populations, making the idea of returning for good even more remote.

Thus, return movements have to be evaluated in view of present conditions, which are summarized by *J. Widgren* as follows:

the family reunion process of the guest workers of the 1960s and early 1970s was completed around 1980 and these guest workers and their children are gradually becoming permanent settlers; this is happening during a period of declining population growth in northern Europe;

the idea of permanent return to southern Europe has been replaced by life-long short-term commuting between countries of settlement and countries of origin;

the situation of ex-guest workers is characterized by higher living standards but also by high unemployment, considerable difficulties experienced by the 'second generation' in entering the labour market, and rising tendencies towards xenophobia; all this is occurring in spite of the recent economic recovery;

immigration to the most-industrialized European countries remains at a high level due to the general internationalization of European societies and to third world pressure, for example by asylum seekers;

the process of European integration has been reinforced and so the common labour market of the European community will gradually encompass large parts of southern Europe;

southern Europe is now increasingly experiencing immigration pressures from non-European countries to the same extent as northern European countries, and the classical dichotomy between receiving and sending countries in Europe no longer exists;

the 'employment safety-valve', which the expanding middle East oil-producing economies have provided for Mediterranean emigrants since the mid-1970s, is now being drastically reduced due to falling oil prices;

the whole OECD-area is increasingly experiencing third world migratory pressures in the long-term perspective, and immigration control measures have recently been reinforced in several countries (*Widgren: 1987, p. 6*).

2. Organized and Individually-Determined Return

With the sudden stop of recruitment on behalf of the European major industrial countries the problem of return, coined 're-integration' by administrators of host countries, became an extensively discussed, analyzed and, from politicians, an encouraged, alternative policy model. This trend obliges us to first distinguish between:

- a. Officially-encouraged, public policy related incentives for the definite return of the migrant worker and his family. These incentives have been implemented due to the closing of major industrial firms and have created an almost obligatory return situation;
- b. Individual or family scale returns as a result of personal preferences and timing.

In both cases, the most relevant role exercised during the decision-making phase is the evaluation and visualization of the economy of the home country. Although a significant number of personally motivated reasons might have induced the migrant to opt for a drastic change of his working and living place, the major push factor still remains the lack of available jobs; that is unemployment in the receiving country. The dream to achieve a major improvement in one's own standard of living, the hopes attached to owning a lucrative business after the return, have been the major motivations to go abroad. These economically oriented reflections, which dominate the working and savings attitudes of the migrants while abroad, logically play a determining role in regard to their intention to return.

During the very early stages of Turkish migration, the expectations of easily finding a proper job were relatively very high - 65 percent in 1963 (*Abadan*: 1964, p. 89), they declined however soon after the recession of 1966/1967 and have continued to be low, particularly in comparison with the other migrants in Europe. Investigating the degree of preference of the influx of foreigners, *Böhning* has drawn attention to the intriguing differences between migrant nationalities. In the Federal Republic of Germany nine out of ten Italian, eight out of ten Spanish, seven out of ten Greek, five out of ten Yugoslav and only three out of ten Turkish workers did return in the early 80's (*Böhning*: 1984, pp. 123-162).

2.1 Organized Return

The ongoing flow of remittances, although tending to diminish, reflect a potential return, since they are the result of decisions by individuals to put their money in the banks of the sending rather than the receiving countries. They also represent the attention and care devoted to the well-being of those left behind. The large sums sent to the home country for other purposes than to meet immediate needs did not by any means create new employment opportunities. This is why Turkey, with its constitutionally-anchored economic, social and cultural development plans, each covering a five year period, was the first country to attempt to channel remittances into productive projects.

A scheme for village development co-operatives was established as early as 1963, and in 1972 Turkey and the Federal Republic of Germany signed an agreement on assistance to the 'Arbeitnehmergesellschaften' (workers enterprises) of Turkish workers living in the Federal Republic of Germany and investing in Turkey. In 1975 Turkey founded the State Industry and Worker Investment Bank (DESIYAB), aiming at delivering credit loans to firms established by Turkish workers abroad. Up to now, more than 4,900 jobs have been created in this way, and a further 2,400 jobs as a result of loan-giving systems.

The development of measures of this kind in Turkey runs parallel to those undertaken in the Federal Republic of Germany. A new agreement between the two

countries provides for a special fund, which will make loans to former migrant workers. Moreover, in 1983 the Federal Republic of Germany enacted a law to promote the willingness of foreigners to return to their countries of origin. This law was unique in that it was intended to expire very quickly and did so on June 30, 1984. It provided for assistance for the return of foreigners who were either unemployed or threatened with unemployment. Each returnee received 10,500 DM plus 1,500 DM for each child. Altogether, 13,700 foreigners took advantage of this provision. In addition, Turkish (and Portuguese) workers were able to collect their employer's contribution to the social security fund: 120,000 foreigners (including 93,000 Turks and 14,000 Portuguese) took advantage of this. Repatriation assistance was also granted to those who had had part-time work for six or more months, some 16,833 foreign workers, of which 14,459 (86 percent) were Turks, applied for assistance under the scheme. Altogether, nearly 300,000 foreigners, mostly Turks, left the Federal Republic of Germany, taking advantage of the financial inducement policy.

France also tried to implement policies to encourage migrants to return, but these attempts have made little or no impact. The low amount of financial support offered was the major reason for its lack of popularity. The incentives adopted in 1977 took the form of a 10,000 FF grant to every migrant worker having resided more than five years in France, and 5,000 FF per member of the family. In 1984 a more substantial inducement to return was offered between 700,000 and 100,000 FF (*Seccombe et al*: 1986, p. 39).

Finally, international organizations such as the Council of Europe have also attempted, with the European Resettlement Fund, to reduce regional disparities by extending loans aiming at regional development and job creation. So far, the Fund has contributed to the creation of 40,000 jobs in sending countries, including 25,000 in Spain, 9,000 in Italy and 4,000 in Turkey.

With its low standard of living and its high unemployment rate, Turkey, more than other northern Mediterranean labour exporting countries, offers little incentive to return home. The percentage reduction in the number of Turkish workers employed in the EEC was only nine percent of the total employed in 1973, whereas the comparable percentage for Italian immigrant workers was 18 percent for Greeks 17 percent, for Yugoslavs 19 percent, Spaniards 12 percent.

In recent years, there has been an increase in the rate of return from the Federal Republic of Germany. In 1982, about 70,000 Turks returned home, 100,000 in 1983 and 120,000 in 1984. The increase in return migration reflects the continuing recession in Western Europe. By March of 1984 due to the growing unemployment in the Federal Republic of Germany, policy was centered upon the encouragement of return migration (*SOPEMI*: 1984, pp. 34-35).

However, it seems imperative to recall that the huge network of human and material bonds that has been established between receiving and sending countries has changed the guest workers of yesterday into the life-long short-term commuters of tomorrow; the first generation and to some extent the second too, *will live with one foot in both countries*. This tendency reduces the attractiveness of massive, induced, organized returns.

2.2 *The Non-Organized, Individual Return*

Although the percentage of returning Turks appears to be lower than the other foreign migrants working in Europe, there has been a continuing stream of returning migrants in recent years. Who are they? Do they represent different characteristics than the earlier returnees? What has been the choice of settlement, investment, mode of life?

At this point it should be recalled that at the very beginning of Turkey's planned 'export of excessive manpower', the assumption was centered around the hypothesis, that a temporary entrance into the world of highly organized industrial production would enable the Turkish worker to acquire new skills and knowledge and thus provide the Turkish economy, upon their return, with the necessary trained labour force. This assumption proved, to a very large extent, to be an unrealized myth. Neither the workers who went abroad and whose first ambition was to secure fast accumulations of savings, nor the type of employment offered within the European job market, could have secured the expected educational gains. Furthermore, the dream of almost every migrant worker to set up his own independent business upon his return was much stronger than the alternative to re-enter the industrial sector. A study carried out as early as 1967 (Kayser: 1967) following the recession in the Federal Republic of Germany, shows that during a sudden and massive economic crisis, Turkish workers preferred to take up refuge with their countrymen employed in sectors untouched by the recession, rather than return to the home country. They displayed a lack of trust toward the labour market in the home country and refused to identify themselves with the Turkish wage-earning class. This tendency towards a refusal to take up industrial occupation in the home country has been defined by Abadan-Unat as the 'proletarian/boss' role model. A model in which the migrant worker tries to overcome his frustrations and inferiority complex caused by his obligation to perform dirty, risky and prestigeless work abroad, by switching over to the role of land, real estate, or small-scale business ownership and renter at home (Abadan: 1972, p. 293).

Next to this psychological predisposition, the spatial background and the age group he belongs to play a decisive role in shaping his attitudes and orientation towards his own society. In reality, and this point should be stressed, returning migrants re-settle in a much more flexible and complex way than is generally realized within

what we may call the 'composite' Mediterranean economy, in which the individual, often of rural origin, simultaneously combines earnings from a small agricultural holding or a small business, with less-readily admitted earnings from undeclared work in a community where families have several forms of employment. Returning migrants prefer, it seems, to combine part-time farming and land-leasing with rural industry and commerce.

3. Two Types of Returnees: The Early and the Late Returning Migrants

3.1 *The Early Returnees*

The process of return, although a constant, elementary feature of the international migratory flow, demands a sharp distinction in regard to timing. There is a relevant difference between the relatively low, sporadic return of migrants, who went abroad in the early 60's and 70's, and the relative high number of returnees in the 80's. While the first wave was predominantly male, married but housed abroad in dormitories by themselves, the second group chose to return after family reunification had taken place. The first category represents the *early*, the second the *late* returnees.

In the case of the first category, as reflected in the various surveys (*Tuna*: 1966 *State Planning Organization S.P.O.*: 1971; *Abadan-Unat* et al.: 1975; *Yasa*: 1979; *Gitmez*: 1979), the migrants' dominant common trait appears to be an inability to adjust to industrial life and, for those of rural origin, to return to their original villages. Most of the *early* returning migrants declared to have returned for family reasons but in reality, individual disillusionment, and an inability to master the requirements of a rigid division of labour and time schedule, seem to have played decisive roles in their decision to give up the much-desired job abroad. Although a substantial majority wanted to set up a business of some sort, most have failed to do so. Those who put their savings in industrial joint ventures with a goal to set up a factory (and work in it) upon their return were mostly defrauded of their money while abroad. Those who went abroad through the agricultural cooperative scheme often failed to keep up their dues and few imported machinery under the concession scheme (*Abadan-Unat*). Without generalizing too much, one may say that this group bears the greatest resemblance to the return of failure or conservatism as described in detail by *F. Cerase* (1984).

The *early* returnees generally represent an unsuccessful attempt made by individuals born, raised and socialized in rural areas, who were unable to adjust themselves to an alien industrial urban environment, and thus preferred to return to where their roots lay - to the villages. This return enables some of them to regain prestige and respect among their peers and gain social status. However, this upward mobility

creates also envy and jealousy so that quite a few of these returnees finally opt to reside in some small towns in the same region, in order to escape intensive gossip and social-group pressure from the peers in the village of their origin. The survey of *Gitmez* of 1979 indicates that among returnees from the three central provinces of Anatolia, namely Afyon, Kirsehir and Bursa, 35 percent chose to live in a provincial center, 15 percent in provincial district town and 50 percent in villages (*Gitmez*: 1979, p. 175).

However, the relevant feature of this return to rural areas lies in the fact that these returnees are not interested in increasing agricultural production or mechanization, they are not desirous of working as farmers on the land they acquired. They prefer to lease their land. There is a clear-cut increase in regard to land ownership on behalf of returnees, but a decline in the numbers of active farmers.

A study on the impact of international migration on a district - Bogazliyan in the province of Yozgat, Central Anatolia, and its surrounding 38 villages (*Abadan-Unat et al.*: 1975) - indicated that return migrants have made no tangible contribution to the economic development of Bogazliyan by using training and experience acquired abroad; the majority of them departed from Turkey as unskilled workers in the agrarian sector and most come back without any new skills. The intensive flow of money into the district produced a significant improvement in the standard of living in migrants' households, manifested especially in a greater variety of better-quality foods, clothing and household furnishings. However, increased consumer demand, arising from additional purchasing power, had been particularly profitable for the old group of businessmen and only secondarily to return migrants (*R. Penninx*: 1983, p. 801).

Finally, almost three-quarters of all respondents in the above cited surveys were thinking of going abroad again, inspite of their first frustrating experiences.

3.2 The Late Returnees

Systematic efforts to encourage return migration as well as growing xenophobia in Europe resulted in a much larger return movement in the 80's. This movement has also been influenced by the anxiety of some very conservative families, who opted for a return in order to prevent the second generation, particularly their daughters, from entering into a mixed marriage or getting too settled down abroad. For this group, almost all of the seven categories mentioned by *Rogers*, such as positive changes in the country of origin, events at home requiring the presence of the migrant, dissatisfaction in the country of residence, family needs, realization that sacrifices made so far are too great, and the conviction that needs can be better satisfied at home, apply in order to explain their motivation for return (*Rogers*, 1969).

A very recent survey carried out by the University of Bursa in Bursa, a province representing Turkey's fastest-developing industrial center, indicated that among the new returnees one finds a relatively high percentage of migrants qualified for pension rights, representatives of the second generation who came back due to parental decision and authority - often against their will - and a significant group of persons belonging to the age category of 31 to 40 (24 percent), desirous to re-enter the job market in Turkey. The distinctive characteristic of this last group is a long stay abroad (42 percent over 10 years), a high skill-level (73 percent) and industrial work experience initially acquired in the home country (75 percent). These returnees have opted for very different alternatives upon their return, 44.26 percent have returned to industry and are at present wage-earning workers, 34.33 percent have founded an independent business of their own and 21.31 percent are benefitting from a retirement pension (*Bursa Survey*: 1986, Table 38).

Table 1

Status of Returnees and Willingness to Re-Emigrate (in Percent)

Do you want to become a migrant worker once more?				
	Status	Yes	No	Total
Worker in home industry		23.0	21.1	44.1
Enterprise owner		10.5	24.0	34.5
Unemployed or retired		13.5	7.9	21.4
Total		47.0	53.0	100.00

Source: *Bursa Survey*, 1986, Table 48

3.2.1 *The Occupational Status of Late Returnees*

The survey of Bursa of 1986 reflects the big change, which parallels the fast-developing trend of regional industrialization taking place in the Bursa area, where Turkey's automobile, spare parts and textile industries are concentrated. The degree of satisfaction, as compared to the alternative of re-emigrating, reveals an interesting split. The relatively high satisfaction lies in the fact that about 57 percent consider their savings as sufficient and 40 percent feel satisfied with their ability to make full use of their skills which they acquired abroad.

3.2.2 *Reasons for Return*

While the majority of the returnees in the 70's explained their return with personal reasons such as inability or unwillingness to adjust, illegal status, illness or accident, the *late* returnees of the 80's have been more affected by the structural factors pertinent to the receiving countries, as well as the concern with regard to the education and future of their children.

Table 2

Major Reason for Return in Bursa Survey 1986 (in Percent)

Unemployment in the receiving country	10.8
Xenophobia, hostile social climate	10.5
Collective decision of all family members	7.5
Nostalgia	8.9
Education and schooling of the children	23.0
Health and occupational illness	5.9
Setting up of personal business in Turkey	8.9
Return encouraging policies, acquisition of pension rights	4.3
Refuse of prolongation of work and/or permit	11.5
Total	100.0

Source: *Bursa Survey*, 1986, Table 32

The above cited reasons indicate that 38 percent is related to the host countries policies and attitudes affecting migrants. Analyzing the cited reasons further, it should not surprise that the education and schooling of children occupies such a relevant place (23 percent). The various difficulties faced by the second generation in Europe, in terms of achieving an upward mobility through the educational ladder and acquiring professional skills, are increasingly more understood by the parents, who themselves have created and lived in a kind of subculture, but do not want their children to remain in the enclave of the ghetto mentality or particularly, to belong to the working class.

The second relevant factor, unemployment, gains a different importance when measured with the time spend abroad, accordingly

- a. a prolonged stay abroad diminishes the impact of unemployment, whereas
- b. migrants with a short stay abroad or second generation migrants who want to enter the job market but not by exercising manual work, are more affected by unemployment. The younger generation especially has a very hard time when they are faced with the competition of indigenous teenagers.

The major reasons for returnees *for not wanting to re-enter* the labour market on a wage-earning contract basis are as follows:

- a. The determination to realize a change in social status;
- b. the image they will project on their peer groups;
- c. the acquisition of pension rights (at home or abroad) thus stepping outside of the job market;
- d. deteriorated health conditions due to hard working conditions abroad;
- e. high unemployment at home, low wages, insufficient accident - and professional illness prevention and heavy working conditions in the home country;
- f. the unwillingness of women with work experience abroad to re-enter the job market due to family obligations and a discouraging social climate.

3.2.3 Re-Entering Industry at Home

The reasons for a group of *late* returnees to function as industrial workers in their home country is reflected in the Bursa survey as follows:

- a. Insufficient savings (34.3 percent)
- b. Failure in setting up an independent business (7.4 percent)
- c. Obligation to take up wage work (41 percent)
- d. Desire to make use of the acquired professional skills and experiences (5.2 percent)
- e. Desire to work (9.7 percent)

Comparing the age groups with occupational status, we see that the bulk of the self-employed remains with the 41 and over group, while re-entering industry is divided equally among the 31 to 40 and the 40 and over group.

For those desirous to re-enter Turkish industry, the questions, how long of a stay abroad contributed to the acquisition of new skills and did this group contribute to the general development of Turkey's economy, were answered as follows: 60.5 percent were not able to use their professional skills and experiences in Turkey; 64.2 percent of the returnees were employed in similar institutions as before their departure. This means that the skill drain in boom periods in Europe led to a high drain of the skilled labour force, which consequently has not been utilized in occupations other than their first occupation at home.

Table 3

Distribution of Returnees According to Age and Occupational Status (in Percent)

Distribution of age	Status: Worker	Self-employed	Retired or job seeking	Total
20 or less	0.3	0.3	0.3	1.0
21 - 30	8.9	4.6	4.3	17.7
31 - 40	14.4	7.2	2.9	24.6
41 - 50	15.4	18.0	9.5	43.0
50 and over	5.2	4.3	4.2	13.8
Total	44.3	34.4	21.3	100.0

Source: *Bursa Survey*, 1986, Table 40

An additional obstacle for re-entering into the Turkish industry lies in the weak structure of the governmental job-recruitment institutions. The Turkish Labour Office spent most of its efforts in placing unqualified job-seekers in state economic enterprises and did not establish connections with the private sector. Thus, only

persons with determination, manifold connections and personal contacts have been able to find satisfactory employment on their own.

3.2.4 Self-Employed Returnees

Setting up an independent business has been a predominant choice for returnees at large. This tendency has been reinforced over the years due to the failure of the workers enterprises and the collapse of village development co-operatives (*Abadan-Unat*: 1986, p. 389). Particularly returnees with a long stay abroad and sufficient savings have adopted this alternative (34.3 percent). The size of these enterprises reveals their relatively limited impact in terms of creating new job opportunities.

Table 4

Channels of Job-Placement for Returnees

Turkish Labor Office	10.3%
Friends	28.1%
Personal efforts	40.7%
Personal relationship with employer	11.8%
Relative of employer	3.7%
Other	5.1%
Total	100.0%

Source: *Bursa Survey*, 1986, Table 58

These enterprises are concentrated in small industry; 21.4 percent are producing consumer items, 36.9 percent working with industrial part production; 7.7 percent investment commodities; the remaining 34.5 percent offer services. The major difficulties encountered by this group are as follows: obtaining credit 27.8 percent; securing a qualified labour force 27 percent; finding a suitable location 5.7 percent; primary material 4.8 percent; management 5.7 percent; marketing 12.5 percent; machine, equipment 2.8 percent; inflation 29.8 percent.

An interesting feature is the fact that almost two thirds of these enterprises have not applied for any credit (61.4 percent). This situation can be explained by the returnees' attitude of self-reliance and belief in being able to master the situation

without getting indebted. It also reflects a choice for labour-intensive projects and actually serves as a symbol of upward mobility. There are also other reasons such as a preference for small size, a negative attitude, actually a reticence for enlarging the enterprise, lack of information about the market situation due to a prolonged stay abroad and a lack of knowledge about the necessary amount of capital needed for the building up of a lucrative business.

Table 5

Size of Enterprises Set Up by Returnees in Regard to Personnel

No employees	22.1%
1 - 3 "	40.3%
4 - 6 "	19.2%
7 - 10 "	11.5%
10 or more "	6.7%
Total	100%

Another important problem resides with the problem of the scarcity of qualified labour. On the one hand, employers are unable to hire additional labour because the potential workers are asking too-high wages (27.8 percent) or dislike the working conditions (12 percent), on the other hand, qualified workers are not available (41.0 percent).

3.2.5 *Job-Seeking Retired or Unemployed Returnees*

The Bursa survey showed that within their sample about 10 percent were retired, 11 percent unemployed, both desirous to re-enter the job market. This group faced great difficulties; 57 percent had been searching over one year for a suitable job, 17 percent for 7 to 12 months and 25 percent around 0 to 6 months. Only 30 percent would be willing to take an unskilled job, around 61 percent were looking for a qualified job, preferably as a foreman. The most important obstacle for this group lay in the fact that about 73 percent of all open job ads indicate a maximum age of 35. Another relevant factor seems to be the tendency for joint ventures founded with foreign capital, high technology and know-how, to recruit their qualified labour force directly among migrants employed abroad. The interesting

point of this group of returnees, is that unlike the classical model of retirement, in which the persons are satisfied with a peaceful life chosen for their old age, these *late comers*, being too young for an inactive life style, are trying very hard to compete with their younger cohorts, while residing in a very fast developing urban setting. This group of persons, who have lived with great deprivations abroad in order to accumulate some savings and who find upon their return that they are not able to build up the imagined stressless existence they were hoping to achieve, represents the most disillusioned group.

4. Women Returnees

The majority of the literature dealing with women migrants has focussed on those female migrants leading the life of a housewife as well as those family members left behind (*Abadan-Unat*: 1984, pp. 111-131). Specific studies dealing with returned women migrants are just beginning to be undertaken. So far, an unpublished small survey carried out in two districts of the Turkish capital, Ankara, namely Demetevler and Yenimahalle, may shed some light on this topic. One of the distinctive characteristics of these women lies in the fact that over 80 percent of the returnees have selected the capital Ankara as their place of residence, a metropolitan city and often a city which was not their place of origin. This indicates that their families had specific reasons for selecting their new home. Indeed the major reasons of preference were the existence of a large number of relatives and friends, a more diversified job market and better educational opportunities for their children. About 68 percent of the respondents were under the age of 40, 86 percent were married, 52 percent had only completed primary school, 16 percent secondary school and 10 percent high school. The overwhelming majority of these women (90 percent) were unemployed housewives or students prior to their departure, had all been gainfully employed abroad, but only 4 percent had taken up a paid job following their return. The reasons for retiring from active work participation are health reasons (18.7 percent), no need to work (31 percent), dislike of work (18.7 percent), old-age retirement (2 percent) and childcare obligation (8.3 percent). The attitude toward work indicates that for the overwhelming majority of the women their stay abroad was seen as a transitional phase, comparable to a kind of compulsory military service, which enabled them to accumulate savings and permit them an ascendance in their social status.

Looking at the family structure of the respondents, 48 percent were living as a nuclear family prior to their departure, only 8 percent were members of an extended family. About 64 percent of these women went to the Federal Republic of Germany between 1967 and 1974, 32 percent, mostly second generation migrants, joined their family while staying abroad. In the Federal Republic of Germany 68 percent of these women were employed in industry, 28 percent in the service sector.

During their stay abroad these women led a rather isolated, segregated life. Their interest in regards to events happening in German society remained distant. Only 52 percent read Turkish newspapers, 34 percent watched TV programs. The mass consumption in regard to the media was that of Turkish video films, these programs were watched by 86.4 percent of the sample. The data indicates that in terms of developing ideas and values, the impact of mass media in the host society remained at an almost unnoticeable level, while reinforcement of the values of the home country continued to be infused in an uninterrupted way.

In regard to integration, 72 percent declared to have deliberately remained uninvolved with the German society. Among those who answered this question positively, fluency in speaking and reading German occupied the first place. Among the reasons given to explain the refusal to integrate into the host society, 35 percent indicated their unwillingness to change their habits and behavior, 54 percent confessed they had been unable to establish friendly relations with Germans and to accept the norms of German society. It seems relevant to emphasize that almost all respondents stressed the fact that all their efforts were directed to uphold their bonds to Turkish society and to resist efforts tending to 'Germanize' them. Yet the same group responded very positively on their experience abroad (90 percent); for 40 percent it was the opportunity to accumulate savings, for 51 percent it was the possibility to enlarge one's horizons, to get a new perspective on the world and new knowledge. The contradictory character of these answers can be explained by the anxiousness on behalf of these women not to give the impression that they had adopted lax and permissive heterosexual habits abroad, thus losing their reputation as faithful and devoted spouses and mothers.

In spite of the above cited contradicting responses and although the level of integration has remained at its low level, the impact of the migratory process seems to have created certain changes. Accordingly, 58 percent of the respondents want to share the decision-making process with their husbands, 62 percent are in favor of women working outside the home. Nevertheless, the traditional role model for women, namely, to be a mother and a homemaker, remains placed on a high pedestal. For 32 percent this status appears to be the primary way to achieve a full personality. Another dimension related to equality among spouses is reflected in the negative attitude of 94 percent about tolerating polygamy - a form of marriage outlawed in Turkey since 1926. Changing attitudes in regard to child education seems also to have taken root; 86 percent are in favor of asking the opinion of their children when intra-family matters are to be decided. The great value and importance attached to education is also reflected in an almost egalitarian preference for university education for boys (68 percent) and girls (66 percent).

In sum, it can be stated that the emancipatory impact of migration on women appears to be of limited scope, particularly in those cases where women joined their husbands later, remained under a strict marital control while abroad and did not re-enter the labour market upon return. Their position appears to be more conservative

than those left behind wives of migrants, who during their long periods of separation acquired a certain degree of independence in conducting their own affairs.

The majority of the married migrant women who returned have shown no strong motivation to develop their abilities and make use of the new knowledge and experience acquired abroad. Although women are showing a determination to shed certain traditional attitudes, the prevailing social control forces them to repress these changing attitudes.

The most important change seems to have taken place within the relationship among spouses and the decision-making process. The strong demand for upward mobility appears to lie predominantly in the sphere of conspicuous consumption, displaying expensive furniture, and owning little- or seldom-used electrical equipment.

5. The Re-Integration of the Turkish Second Generation

With an increasing number of returning migrant families, the problem of a successful insertion of Turkish migrant children who started their education abroad constitutes at present one of the most pressing problems in Turkey. The new type of '*Alaman-yalı*' family, similar to traditional families living in rural or '*gecekondı*' (squatter-houses) environments, are adamantly determined to secure for their children the chance of upward mobility. This explains why these parents are less inclined to place their children in vocational schools as often encouraged in the Federal Republic of Germany, but prefer to take them back to Turkey, and enroll them in lycées, which assure the transfer into the universities, provided they are able to pass the entrance examinations. At present, the Turkish government has set aside three German and Turkish teaching lycées in Istanbul, one in Ankara and another in Izmir, in order to grant a preferential treatment for the enrollment of children of returning migrants. The scarcity of Turkish teachers being able to teach in German has led to a bilateral agreement according to which the German government provided 90 German teachers, paid by German authorities, to teach in these schools and thus enabling the students to preserve and develop their acquired linguistic capacities. It is not an exaggeration to say that in the near future the graduates of these lycées, and those graduates who pursue higher education will be sought after by joint ventures established with German capital. Tourism establishments in Turkey dealing predominantly with foreigners will no doubt grant these youngsters better opportunities than establishments in the Federal Republic of Germany, where the demands of the German school system are very high, hard to satisfy and where the competition with young Germans is very tough.

Turkish parents are particularly aware that unless they return to their home country, the future of their children lies nowhere else than in vocational work-

this being the best solution since the majority of Turkish teenagers leave comprehensive schools abroad without a diploma (62 percent). This awareness induces them either to return collectively or to opt for a fragmented family. A significant group of Turkish parents want to compensate for all of the frustrations and deprivations they have experienced abroad by preparing a better life for their children, a life which is not that of an industrial worker.

Yet, the choice for a split return – mother and children in school age going back home, father and adult children remaining abroad – gives way to a number of new problems. The socialization process which started in Europe creates a noticeable cultural distance between parents and children, paired with a clash of values. Young migrants, who share the identity crisis of youth as a whole and the difficulties in communicating with adults, also suffer very often from a state of malaise created by the ambivalent relationship between the culture of their country of origin and their host country's culture. This relationship sometimes takes the form of cultural conflict due to the host country's attempts at passive assimilation and the active resistance on the part of the immigrant families, whose attachment to the culture of origin is often somewhat ritualistic.

One of the most frequent subjects of generational conflict is related to the relationship between the sexes and its evaluation. While according to Western standards teenagers have a right to establish close friendships, meet each other and spend vacations together, the traditional Turkish families, faithful to the social context of Islamic values related to chastity, attempt to exercise harsh control over all types of relationships, including even the breaking off of correspondence. This situation becomes even more dramatic when traditional families forge prearranged marriages resulting in the dropping-out of gifted young girls from school. After their return, they are bound to lead a very frustrated existence.

This firm parental control frustrates the second generation very much. In school, these teenage returnees feel isolated. They have a greater degree of self-confidence compared to their peers, they dress differently and the dominant feature of their character is imbued with strong individualism. Because of their distinct otherness they build networks among themselves. Their choice in regard to literature and music also differs. It is not exaggerated to state that growing up 'between two cultures' demands from the second generation greater sacrifices than it had from their parents. They are forced to internalize a partly unknown set of norms and value systems. In addition they have to familiarize themselves with new subject matters in school – history, geography, religion. Youngsters are accomplishing this process of integration in two opposed ways: either in the form of high adjustment based on strong identification with the Turkish nation or in the form of a simulated conformism paired with a rejection of the values of the home country. In the second case, the stay abroad is only positively looked upon and mostly idealized. In school, second generation returnees – unless they have been able to achieve a

successful entrance in mainstream Turkish society - have an extremely high desire to return to Europe.

6. Governmental Policies for Returned Migrants

Although Turkish politicians and administrators are repeatedly advising their compatriots to maintain strong effective ties with the home country while keeping their present jobs abroad, a series of measures for re-integration has been put into action over the years. The major facilitation migrant resettlement measures are:

lower custom duties and facilities for the import of household goods and imports of equipment for resettlement,

support and bailing out of workers enterprises, created by the migrants with the purpose of preparing work places for them upon their return,

fiscal and monetary incentives to invest in the country: sale of bond shares in privatized state economic enterprises or public institutions such as toll bridges and roads, accounts in foreign currencies, transferable interest-bearing accounts,

better material and family environment: housing aid, special credits in the buying of second homes in vacation areas, easier entrance in housing cooperatives, recognition of diplomas, creation of bilingual classes in schools giving priority admission to returning migrant children, facilitated re-admission of migrant children in normal schools.

Among the above cited measures the most commonly applied are:

- a. the utilization of accounts in foreign currency in Turkish banks, as interest rates in home country banks are almost double in comparison to European rates,
- b. acquisition of flats and summer houses built through governmental credit, to be bought in foreign currency.

According to a recent survey, 38.9 percent of returned migrants have foreign exchange deposit accounts with the Turkish Central Bank, another 42.9 percent have similar accounts in other Turkish banks. 85.2 percent have bought real estate such as houses and plots of land (*Central Bank Survey: 1986, p. 5*). The impact of this extensive wave of real estate investment has had a direct effect on rents which escalated very fast parallel to Turkey's undiminished rate of inflation in recent years. Thus the investment pattern of migrants can be looked upon as positive in

regard to boosting construction industry, while negative in regard to the raise of average rents and house prices.

7. Political Behavior of Returning Migrants

This is a vast topic, too broad to be discussed in this paper in detail. Nevertheless, it should be underlined that residency abroad encourages a foreign worker's political expression to be oblique and unorthodox. Unless they naturalize, migrant workers remain at least formal members of their native political systems. In the web of governmental and social institutions from the mother country and those native political, cultural and social practices that accompany foreign labour migration, it is to be found a fertile environment nourishing continued migrant political identification with the mother country and interest in political affairs there.

Sociological studies of migrant workers have indicated that migrant workers interact frequently with compatriots, thereby encouraging continued identification with their native country. The language barrier is another factor encouraging their interaction. The maintenance of identification with the native land lies in the creation of overlapping social, cultural and economic microcosmos of their native country. Their major reference points continue to be friends, the cuisine, culture, and associations from their native country and political development there (*M. J. Miller: 1981, p. 43*).

The great majority of returned Turks formerly living in the Federal Republic of Germany were subject to a deliberate policy of depoliticisation. So far, only Sweden, in 1975, and the Netherlands, three years ago, have granted foreigners the right to vote in communal elections. This explains why over time a significant number of Turkish migrants became involved with Turkish associations in the Federal Republic of Germany, which at the beginning served as surrogate trade unions, but later acquired clear cut political colors. These associations started to recruit members from cities and towns with a large Turkish concentration and became satellites of extremist rightist and leftist, and fanatically religious political parties in the home country. Thus, on the one side the fascist-leaning National Action Party, on the other side the ultra-conservative pro-Islamic National Salvation Party (today represented by the Welfare Party) did establish sections and private schools in the Federal Republic of Germany. While the branches of the rightist party were eventually dissolved, the schools remained. To what degree these small parties - at present not represented in parliament as well as the government and major opposition parties in Turkey continue to cultivate special links with returned migrants has not been assessed. Observations may lead to the conclusion that for the majority of returning migrants the present government party, ANAP (Motherland Party) which promotes a liberal, market-oriented program and strongly defends the merits of entrepreneurship, meets their political aspirations. Returning migrants living in a rather scattered way in Turkey's urban and rural settings, have so far not organized themselves into some kind of pressure group. Their existence passes

unnoticed during electoral campaigns at home the real target for political parties is the financial and moral support of the migrant groups abroad in view of influencing the left behind family members. Turkish citizens residing six months and longer abroad have been given the right to vote at any border crossing since November 1987. The political participation of this group has been very low - a total of 49,800 cast votes although six weeks prior to the general election voting booths were set up at all airport entries and frontier gates.

8. Re-emigration and Turkish Public Opinion

Return migration does not occupy a central place in Turkish public opinion. This attitude might be partly explained by the fact that returned migrants are usually better off and more highly regarded in the community than their compatriots who have remained at home. The majority of average Turkish citizens believes problems related to return should be solved on an individual level by rapid and unquestioning adjustment. Given the urgent priorities of the needs of Turkey's population, special privileges accorded to returnees seem to be out of place. A survey carried out in 1985 on behalf of the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation by SIAR involving 528 returnees indicates that this opinion is also shared by the migrants themselves. 77 percent of the respondents felt that all the problems which had emerged since their return could be handled personally. 73 percent of the respondents thought that a major part of these problems stemmed from the negative attitude displayed by their direct environment. 61 percent believe that all problems related to reintegration can be solved in the long run, 26 percent consider these problems as unsolvable (PIAR/SIAR, 1985).

9. Informal Networks Abroad: Their Impact on the Home Entry

The rural, family-centered, regional or religious socialization expresses itself through informal social networks and keeps up the migratory chain, particularly through matrimonial bonds. Turks of the Black Sea region or Kurdish, Arcassian origin marry exclusively within their own group. They do not permit their daughters to marry outside of their own group. The practice of endogamy is still the prevailing custom.

Thus, the participation in chain migration, by reconstructing a part of the family network abroad, keeps the migrant and his family in a close interaction with the country of origin. This enables the village community, although geographically distant, to exercise a certain degree, of remote social control on its members abroad and reinforces ethnicity ties (*Wilpert and Gitmez: 1987, p. 181*).

Summing Up

Turkish migration has no doubt led to the emergence of a new social stratum. Those living in Europe, regardless of their place of employment, are called *alamanyalı* ("those from Germany"). Those who migrated to Middle Eastern countries are labelled *migrating citizens*. Both types are rooted in two countries. Predominantly employed in Europe, they tend to behave as a privileged group at home. Their preference to live from rental income or small business produces a type one might call *the proletarian bourgeois*.

Returned migrants feel relatively secure due to their savings, purchasing power, life experience and pension. Their attitude toward the state, meaning the bureaucratic apparatus of various kinds, has changed. Instead of considering themselves subjects, they have learned abroad to become citizens. Although many of them were treated in a discriminatory way abroad, reduced to second class citizenship, they learned to insist on their rights and ask for fair treatment. This feeling of self-reliance becomes much more evident once they have returned to the home country, where lack of attention on behalf of public services quickly becomes a topic of grievance. Bitter experiences abroad have produced more-demanding citizens upon return.

The return process of the 60's and 70's represents rather a return of failure or conservatism, comprising legal or illegal migrants who failed to adjust to the highly industrialized world they entered. This first wave of returnees, unable to realize their primary aim, have mostly returned to the rural areas from which they came. Life since is slightly different from what it used to be before they left. The return movement of the 80's however represents both return for retirement and return of innovation. It also means a much better way of re-entering into Turkey's mainstream society. For a significant number of returnees who spent 15 or more years abroad, return means the beginning of the last stage of their life in more comfort and security than they ever possessed. For those who still feel themselves sufficiently vigorous, full of enterprising spirit and physically able, returning home means a new challenge, which might yield success and high prestige.

Assumptions which were strongly asserted at the beginning of the migratory process, such as migration will serve to train skilled industrial manpower, appears to be partly valid in regions with fast industrialization. However, a lack of foresight, adequate planning and efficient organization has led to a substantial waste of human and financial resources mainly triggered by local patriotism. The great willingness of Turkish migrants to contribute with their savings to the development of their own country in form of workers enterprises and village development co-operatives has not been sufficiently supported. Thus, direct benefits of their return accrues more in metropolitan areas and so far has created only a limited positive impact in rural areas.

The second generation returnees, who in many cases were forced to comply with the decision of their parents, represents the group facing the greatest amount of difficulties of readjustment. Most of them are confronted with a dilemma in terms of their cultural identity. The self-imposed isolation from the culture and even more, from the host country which they adopted created a counter-culture for those who were born and who grew up abroad and were socialized in the dominant culture. Their return implies such frustration and disillusionment, nevertheless for many it represents a less stressful, sometimes even superior entrance to higher education institutions. For those who are able to pass the hurdles of admission to the university, the input of their linguistic skills paired with a determination to excel might in the near future produce some key elements within the elites of tomorrow.

The first and second generation of *alamanyalı* represent a new generation in Turkey, those who dared to look for a future outside the national boundaries. Even if some of the returnees of today want to retain traditional values and customs and thus re-import the ethnic boundaries they have self-imposed during their stay abroad, a significant part represents a new synthesis. In this capacity they are exercising an increasingly, felt permanent impact on Turkey's economic life and political choices.

Note

- 1) Paper presented at the conference of the "International Migration of Middle Easterners and North Africans: Comparative Perspectives", May 19-21, 1988. Von-Grunebaum-Center for Near Eastern Studies, UCLA.

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