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10 Ethnic business, ethnic communities, and ethno-politics among Turks in Europe

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Turkey's involvement in large-scale external migration is mainly a post Second World War phenomenon. It started with an experimental project to train 12 craftsmen, sponsored by the Chamber of Artisans of Hamburg in April 1957. In 1960 their number had reached 2700, in 1963 there were 27,500; ten years later 615,827. In 1988 there were 1,521,804 Turkish workers in Germany.¹

After the oil crisis brought labor recruitment in all European countries to an abrupt stop during the 1970s, family reunification programs spurred the growth of the alien population. Today, there are 2.5 million officially registered Turkish workers in Europe, of which 1.8 million are living in Germany.² Although at the beginning of the 1980s receiving countries attempted to encourage repatriation through financial incentives, the results were only partially successful. In Germany these special incentives encouraged in 1983 about 100,388 and in 1984 another 213,469 migrants to move back to Turkey. However, the instability of the Turkish economy, coupled with the authoritarian political climate, quickly caused the return flow to decline. In 1990, only 35,635 persons returned, while 84,346 Turks obtained the permission to settle in Germany as family members. The fact remains that the number of migrants from Turkey in Europe continues to rise through family reunification, asylum applications, illegal migration, and births. This trend is confirmed by statistical data: while there is a gradual decrease in the population of migrant workers coming from Mediterranean countries, the stock of Turks shows the largest increase. Their population showed an increase of 93,500 (19 percent) in Germany in 1990, followed by Italians with 27,200 (13.5 percent).³

The stabilization of the Turkish migrant population at high levels has also caused a significant change in the official vocabulary. In the 1950s foreign

workers were labeled as 'guestworkers' (*Gastarbeiter*). The word 'guest' emphasized the provisional character of their employment. Gradually, they became 'foreign workers' (*ausländische Arbeitnehmer*); after a substantial increase in recent years, some Germans started to speak about 'foreign population' (*ausländische Wohnbevölkerung*), to be followed in parliamentary debates by the concept of 'foreign co-citizen' (*ausländischer Mitbürger*), which underplayed the fragility of their legal rights. Finally, nowadays the written press often speaks about the 'hyphenated German' (*Bindestrich-Deutsche*), a pejorative term indicating a certain amount of discrimination and unwillingness to incorporate the aliens. Growing racism and xenophobia following the reunification has created a sharper distinction between natives, ethnic Germans, EU members, and the 'rest,' an expression used by the former German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt.⁴ By contrast, international bodies such as the Council of Europe are inclined to recognize the emergence of a multiethnic or multicultural society.⁵

Changing paradigms

These demographic trends also brought relevant changes in the field of academic research. While the 1960s were mainly preoccupied with the evaluation of economic cost-benefit effects, the 1970s focused on modalities of assimilation, adaptation, and integration. From the 1980s onward, more emphasis was placed on the formation of ethnic enclaves, collective organizations, and the interaction of immigrants with the host country. The watershed of 1989 which saw the beginning of the collapse of the communist regimes introduced a number of new paradigms into Western European thinking. The crisis of modernity, articulated in the form of looking for new societal models, the growth of transnational organizations, and the dismantling of nation states, as in the case of former Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and the demise of the Soviet Union, accelerated the debate about communal conflicts. The expansion of markets and improved communication increased contacts and generated competition among communal groups. This competition affected the attitudes of immigrants and resulted in a mobilization of self-initiatives, collective organizations, ideological, ethnic, and religious networks. Such complex processes no doubt found a repercussion in the conceptualization of scientific research. They are reflected in the ongoing debate between two major currents of thought: equilibrium (behavioristic) and historical-structural (conflict) schools.

Analytical frameworks based on macro-level theories have focused on economic forces and shifting market needs.⁶ Economists like Piore have substantially dealt with the emergence of 'global markets.'⁷ Social scientists

have emphasized global and systematic adjustments such as restructuring stratification in the case of population imbalances.⁸ Such systematic analysis embraces both sending and receiving societies and assumes that a two-way adjustment leads to a temporary equilibrium.

Researchers preferring the micro-level approaches take definable groups as a starting point. They attempt to inquire into the modalities which eventually lead to assimilation. In order to explain partial assimilation they use concepts such as 'cultural pluralism'.⁹ Others focus on non-integration. According to one interpretation, immigrant groups become an 'under-class,' in Marxian terms.¹⁰ A different interpretation maintains that these groups constitute the basis of a truly multicultural society, where ethnic variation is honored and encouraged.¹¹ Viewing labor migration as integral to uneven development has a very important secondary implication. It indicates that movements of labor and capital are bound up with class struggles and subject to control mechanisms of the state in the receiving country.¹² This explains why in recent years issues such as the political behavior of immigrants have increasingly attracted the attention of researchers.¹³

Other aspects of migration, such as the impact of ethnic communities and their political or religious organizations on the home country specifically, and on international relations in general, have entered the realm of migration studies. Thus migration suddenly introduces international legal and political considerations into the process, which had until very recently been based on state institutions.¹⁴ In recent years, studies conducted in the discipline of international relations and political science have revealed that the rising demands of ethnic communities and/or acts of violence have deep-seated effects on both the host country and the sending country. As a by-product of migration, racism, xenophobia, and discrimination not only are producing polarization, but are interrelated as well. These studies are closely linked to a reevaluation of the concepts of citizenship and nationality. Finally, the increasing importance of refugee studies and the implementation of international conventions and treaties based on the concept of human rights have provoked a constant articulation of minority rights and demands for recognition of identity rights of migrants, such as in the case of Islamic organizations of Asians in the UK, Maghrebians in France, and Turks in Europe, as well as the nationalist/secessionist demands of Kurdish immigrants and asylum seekers.

Thus one may state, as Abdelmalek Sayad defines it, that with the 'settlement of immigrants into an indefinable provisional,'¹⁵ new phenomena gain weight and deserve to be investigated separately. The three most important new developments, which have been partly created by the segmentation of the labor market,¹⁶ citizenship granting or denying policies of the host country, the spatial concentration or 'ghettoization' of immigrants,¹⁷ and the political demands oriented toward the host and home

country are as follows: immigrant enclaves and ethnic business; ethnic communities acting as mini-states; ethnopolitics, meaning radical politization of immigrants' associations, affecting international relations. The purpose of this chapter is to attempt to analyze some of these trends on the basis of the options adopted and initiatives implemented by the Turkish diaspora.

Ethnic business

Utilizing Piore's conceptual framework based on a 'dual labor market,' it is relatively easy to find, in almost all European urban areas with a high density of migrants, ethnic enclaves that tend to foster and encourage an economy of small tradesmen which offers immigrant laborers temporary, unattractive jobs, coupled with menial status and lower wages. Metropolitan cities with pronounced Turkish districts, such as Berlin with Kreuzberg, Wedding, Tiergarten, and Neuköln, Brussels, with S. Josse, and Paris, with Strasbourg-S. Denis, are striking examples of spatial concentration which combines settlement and economic activities. In Paris the centers of '*haute couture*' and 'ready made wear' are benefiting from the cheap and often illegal labor force, working at home or in sweat shops. Such economic activities are producing a large number of ethnic businesses which qualify as 'niches.' These niches defy adaptation. Instead of embarking on a road from initial economic hardship and discrimination to eventual socio-economic mobility, they offer immediate job opportunities based on kinship ties and communal solidarity. Here, a pattern emerges of selective assimilation based on individuals participating partly in the native culture. This pattern permits them to fully practice the customs of their homeland and speak the language of their original culture. The only compulsory requirement is to comply with the rules and regulations of the host country. In other words, 'ethnic enclaves' which enable the flourishing of ethnic business are examples for neither 'melting pot' nor 'salad bowl' models. Ethnic enclaves represent a different mode of adaptation.

Here, first-generation immigrant groups, preserving their culture, identity, and internal solidarity, are able to achieve economic success without any evidence of acculturation. In milieus with a sufficient number of immigrants of a given ethnic group and with sufficient supplies of capital and labor, ethnic business finds an appropriate climate to flourish. In such milieus new immigrants as well as second- or third-generation youth with poor educational records can thrive despite scant knowledge of the host culture and language. The examples given by Portes with regard to Koreatown in Los Angeles and Chinatown in San Francisco can be enlarged by citing 'Little Istanbul' in Berlin, where Turks in possession of a work and

residence permit or in collaboration with a 'straw boss' have created a segmented market primarily based on food, vegetables, fruit, and restaurants, which also permits undocumented illegal migrants to find provisional employment opportunities. A study carried out in 1984 by Wilpert and Gitmez revealed that in Kreuzberg, where about a quarter of the Berlin Turks live, 12 percent of the enterprises were in the hands of Turks and as much as 40 percent of the service sector was in Turkish ownership.¹⁸ A more recent study indicates that in Germany about 33,000 self-employed Turks have created about 125,000 job opportunities in 55 subsections. Although these businesses were scattered in various fields, food distribution, food catering, and mending and repair shops were the main focus. Food sales and fast food restaurants accounted for 37.8 and 17.6 percent respectively.¹⁹

Since the overwhelming majority of Turks are employed in manufacturing industries such as machine tools, motor vehicles, electronics, plastics, and construction services, the relevance of ethnic business is not so much related to job opportunities, but lies in the basis it constitutes for the setting up of collective organizations and eventually 'cultural' associations – which pursue home-oriented political goals. Turkish business in Berlin started with door to door sales of packaged foods, first to workers' dormitories, later in the form of home delivery. The predominant concern was to be able to obtain safe halal meat, which helped Turks enter commerce. This type of trade quickly spread all over Germany, especially to Munich, Stuttgart, and Frankfurt/Main, and concentrated on meat. It was followed by the import of canned foods from Turkey. Subsequently, Turkish music tapes and videocassettes were produced and imported from Turkey. But the real turning point occurred when large-scale chain stores were established. This permitted traditionally oriented entrepreneurs to establish close links with the home country. Between 1978 and 1984, for example, several wholesale Islamic business firms, such as Helal Gıda, Elif Gıda, and Hicret, took root in Germany.²⁰ These important religious-commercial chains established a variety of activities in addition to the distribution and sale of food items.

The large firms provide community services, such as travel agencies, funeral transportation to the home country, Koran courses, and sport clubs. As Wilpert and Gitmez observed,²¹ if one so desired, it would be possible to fulfill most of one's needs for commercial and social relations within the Islamic community, avoiding all contact with non-Muslims.

The business chains also became the arena for the religious and political struggles of various Islamic factions. While Elif and Helal attempted to expand their influence by adopting the 'national outlook' (*Millî Görüş*), thus becoming a grassroot organization of the National Salvation Party (MSP) in Turkey, a late comer, the Hicret group, stretched its aspirations further. With its more fundamentalist orientation this group approached the Islamic Bank in Saudi Arabia and secured some credit. Although the

mismanagement and bankruptcy of the group lead to its dissolution, such economic-ideological connections did not vanish from the scene.

At present, in almost all European countries with a significant spatial concentration of Turks, such as Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, and Sweden, there are various types of ethnic business centers. No doubt the emergence and successful implantation of former migrants or small businessmen with limited savings, capital, and know-how in developed economies must be acknowledged as a positive achievement and can serve as a model of high personal motivation or effective interdependence. Nevertheless, ethnic business represents a specific 'niche' and as such can be utilized as a bridge for the propagation of political programs or politicized religious worldviews. As witnessed in a significant number of countries, the growth of political Islam is substantially influenced by the economic infrastructure built up by ethnic business, which enables a close contact with its followers in foreign countries.

A recent hotly debated issue can serve as a good example. Prior to the local elections in Turkey on March 27, 1994, Turkish public opinion was surprised to find out that the chairman of the Welfare Party, Necmettin Erbakan, managed to obtain a special contingent of visas for 5000 pilgrims wishing to go to Mecca. Since Saudi Arabia has adopted a policy according to which each Muslim country is allocated a fixed quota for its potential pilgrims – the ceiling for Turkey being fixed at 60,000 – this exceptional grant created substantial discussion. Erbakan explained that this permission was given 'in order to enable Turkish workers and their families living in Europe to fulfill their religious obligations. This was a pure act of compassion and selfless love for my compatriots.'²² In reality, travel agencies based in Germany and Turkey, such as the Miraç Co., charged each pilgrim \$1700. The real price of such a trip was \$1300, and the remaining \$400 was split between the travel agencies and the Welfare Party.²³ In order to comply with the official quota, these travel agencies sent their passengers to Baku, Azerbaijan, Tehran, or Moscow and transferred them to a charter flight for Saudi Arabia.²⁴ This subject was discussed in great length in the Turkish parliament and resulted in the setting up of a special investigating committee.²⁵

Profit sharing among firms sympathizing with the Welfare Party constitutes only one aspect of the Islam-business connection. The former Royal Holding, now M-Y GmbH, which distributes food, vegetables, fruits, and cosmetics to the congregation of about 500 mosques in Germany through Selâm GmbH, is owned by close family members of Necmettin Erbakan. The general secretary of the German Islamic Council, Ali Yüksel, who recently declared himself Grand Mufti (Head of all Muslims), assumes the duties of general director.²⁶ These facts indicate how close the links are between ethnic businesses, political party financing, and party leadership.

Ethnic business will not disappear in the future. As Sassen correctly

indicates,²⁷ specialized and expanding service sectors in metropolitan cities held by migrant communities are structures or vehicles that maximize the benefits of individual investment. Thus, home repairs by multiple households become neighborhood upgrading, differences of language and food preferences create a captive market for ethnic shopkeepers. The expansion in the supply of low-wage jobs, particularly in global cities, can be seen as creating objective employment opportunities for immigrants even as middle-income, blue- and white-collar native workers are experiencing high unemployment. However, it should not be overlooked that expanding ethnic businesses constitute at one and the same time an important source of financing and support for political and religious associations whose focus is on the homeland. To assess ethnic business solely as a healthy sign of successful integration in the host society is a serious error. In the case of Turkish ethnic business, there is an undeniable close interdependence between lucrative commercial transactions, indoctrination through religious courses and social control over a major part of the community.

Ethnic communities

In addition to the emergence of visible ethnic enclaves involved in economic activities, ethnic communities of different size, concentration or organization are increasingly playing a determining role in the restructuring of the host society. Their willingness or refusal to integrate, the continuation of discrimination, and heightened tension between the local and foreign population eventually leads to new conflicts. From this point of view two aspects have to be examined: the parameters set by the policies of the receiving country and the composition of the migrant community. In the case of the latter, the nature of migration, spatial concentration, and ethnic and religious differences are playing a determining role. In Europe, the extensive informal networks and social institutions among the migrants, which benefit from existing democratic rights, deserve special attention. They can be partly explained by the conditions which initially triggered migration. In case of the Turkish migration, the model accepted at the beginning was built upon the premise that it would represent a 'temporary exchange of surplus labour,' based on the principle of rotation.²⁸ The first formal migratory wave was almost exclusively male and came predominantly from Turkey's three largest cities, Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir, as an outgrowth of internal migration.²⁹ However, in Germany and other European countries migrants recruited for short stays were able to prolong their residence and were also permitted to ask for nominal recruitment of their kin, relatives, and friends. In addition, preferential treatment was given to applicants from natural disaster areas as well as members of rural development cooperatives. Since all of these factors were related to geographical

conditions, it was not long before members of one single village or region were working in the same firm or living in the same city abroad. Such chain migrations, which are particularly noticeable in Scandinavian countries such as Sweden and Denmark, created social networks based on kinship bonds. Wilpert and Gitmez cite some striking cases of such chain migrations: 35 families consisting of 180 people from a few villages of Central East Anatolia (Malatya), 100 families from a single village of Erzincan with about 550 people, and over 250 non-Muslim Kurdish families of about 1850 members from South Eastern Turkey (Siirt).³⁰

Similar conditions are cited by Köksal and Alpay in Sweden,³¹ where almost half of the Turkish migrants living in Rinkeby, Stockholm, came from Kulu and its adjoining villages, a district of the Turkish province of Konya. Participation in chain migration not only permits the reconstruction of family and village networks abroad, but also permits the distant village community to exercise a certain social control abroad. Informal affiliations and ties are utilized effectively for the survival, socio-economic mobility, and mutual help of all sorts. This close relationship, however, instead of encouraging migrants to widen their horizons and adopt new orientations, leads them to claim identities based on regional, cultural, or religious affiliation. The claim for identity reveals itself mostly at the establishment of a new family. Sharp distinctions are drawn between Turks and Kurds, Alewites and Sunnis. Members of the same ethnic group but from another sect do not marry each other. Even today, prearranged marriages are prevalent. Case studies carried out in France illustrate this tendency. Riva Kastoryanu investigated three different Turkish communities in France: Bellegarde, Metz, and the district of Strasbourg-S. Denis in Paris.³² Bellegarde is a small town of 11,690 inhabitants in the department of l'Ain. Turks are the fourth largest foreign community. The Turkish population of 554 persons lives in a couple of streets of the old city. They have organized themselves and have succeeded in establishing strong solidarity bonds. According to the social workers, they constitute a 'universe in itself, difficult to penetrate.'

In Metz, a city of medium size with 120,000 inhabitants, there are about 3000 Turks. Here 200 Turkish families live in low-cost housing complexes (HLM) of the district Borny-Metz, near the Citroën factory. Their spatial concentration reflects the profile of a modern ghetto. The visibility of their presence underlines the Turkishness of their lifestyle. The women, knitting in front of their apartment buildings or shredding wool from sheep skin, wear their traditional costumes and diffuse information about their families. The men in their free time visit the coffee house around the corner. The three grocery shops sell halal meat.

Thus, a setting shaped in accordance with the rural milieu from which these migrants come has been faithfully reproduced. The findings of Yıldız Sertel in another Turkish community in France, Chamards in the town of Dreux, confirms this tendency.³³ In both Bellegarde and Borny-Metz the

intensity of the social relations among the immigrants prevents a more intensive interaction with the host society and reinforces the isolated lifestyle. However, in this case, due to the diversity of the ethnic origin of the community, there is a polarization between the associations created. For one part of these associations, religious issues carry the greatest importance, for others social and cultural aspects are more relevant. Thus a sharp divergence in the discourse of these associations hints at their different ideological orientations. The leaders of the associations try to enforce claims for a national or religious identity with a special accent on 'Turkishness' or 'Kurdishness'.³⁴ The question of whether they are part of the working class or only represent a sub-proletariat is a subject specifically studied by Gallissot *et al.*³⁵

In Paris and its Turkish district S. Denis, the prevailing strong social control encountered in Bellegarde and Metz has vanished; instead 'ethnic business' is replacing the close ties of a spatially concentrated ethnic community. In this case, the Turkish labor force is concentrated in the various sweatshops attached to the '*haute couture*' and 'ready made wear' sections of the fashion industry. Only half of the Turkish workers (48 percent) actually live and work in the district; others are scattered through the outskirts of Paris. However, the geographic distance among the members of the Turkish community has not affected sociability among the families, though the network of relations here is much more complex. In Bellegarde and Metz, Turkish associations also undertake initiatives which contribute to integration, such as seeking solutions to the educational problems of the second generation, but in Paris the ethnic enclave carries an outspoken economic character. Turks living in the French capital benefit from the anonymity of a metropolitan city and make and secure a sharp distinction between their private and public life. They are eager to retain their culture and identity at home, but are careful not to enter into conflict with their employers. In terms of political activities, instead of trying to influence governmental policies of the receiving country, the existing associations remain cloistered in the ideology they are defending. Their political action is almost exclusively oriented toward the home country or international forums such as the Council of Europe or the UN. In recent years, there has been a revival of ethnic nationalism or politicized ethnicity as well as a search for identity based on religious affiliation.

Social scientists have attempted to analyze bonds within ethnic communities. Clifford Geertz has defined them as 'primordial attachments,' meaning that cognify of blood ties, speech, and custom produces overpowering coerciveness.³⁶ Other social scientists define these bonds as situational or structural.³⁷ Either one of these concepts permits us to understand better the conflicts between different ethnic groups within existing or reorganized nation states and also the manifold activities and organizations constructed by migrants and communities. In the last case the

determining factors are the governmental policies adopted by the host countries, such as exclusion or inclusion of foreigners, the formal recognition or denial of ethnic minorities, the support furnished by local/national governmental organizations, the interdependence with political formations of the home country, the moral support furnished by the international community, and the dynamics of the ethnic groups. Considering that migrant communities are bound to remain in an asymmetric relationship toward the host country, it seems appropriate to investigate first the possibilities available for Turkish migrants through collective organization and associational activities.

Different patterns of collective organization among Turkish migrants

In Western societies organizing politically is a part of pluralist democracy. Immigrant groups are in fact organizing politically in order to make demands upon host countries. However, the outlook of the respective host societies toward migrant communities determines the impact of such organizational activities. In this respect the following typology can be made:

- 1 State-sponsored activities at national and local levels based on the recognition of 'ethnic minorities,' such as those applied in Sweden and the Netherlands.
- 2 State-sponsored activities, particularly at a local level, without recognition of minority status, such as those implemented in France.
- 3 Differential treatment of migrant associations without formal recognition, such as in Germany.
- 4 Migrants' associations as mouthpieces for individual demands and grievances, such as applied in Switzerland.

It is obvious that the impact of migrant communities on the shaping of public policy in the host country as well as upon the fostering of 'islands of isolation' depends largely on the types of policies adopted by the host states. Furthermore, even in the case of state-sponsored networks of support, the strong bonds of solidarity among a given group, particularly in chain migration, might not suffice to weaken such a network.

Sweden

In Sweden immigration is organized around the concept of 'ethnic minority communities.' Migrant associations are looked upon as acting as a liaison between the institutions of Swedish society and the migrant communities.³⁸

Migrant associations are funded by the national government and provide formal channels of participation at the national level through consultative bodies and advisory councils. Because each nationality group is expected to be represented by a national federation, the emergence of one umbrella federation is imperative.

The Turkish Federation (TF), founded in 1977, has thirty member associations nation wide with a membership of about nine thousand. In 1988, the TF had a budget of 2 million Swedish Kronor (SK) or US\$344,448. In addition, government subsidies are given for special projects, such as aiding migrant women and youth. The religious associations of migrants follow the same organizational model. The Swedish Muslim Association (SMA) works closely with the TF. Furthermore, Swedish immigration authorities sponsor for all new immigrants language programs, covering 240 hours, dispensed during working hours. Illiterate Turkish women are also offered literacy courses. Although the overwhelming majority of Turkish migrants attend these courses, open and disguised segregation processes in the labor market and the allocation of housing in communities with a large concentration of Turks have produced 'Ghettos in a welfare society,' such as Rinkeby in Stockholm, analyzed in detail by Sema Köksal.³⁹ Paradoxically, a sheltered and protected lifestyle in a well organized society, while facilitating adjustment into a new culture, actually hinders integration. The cultivation of traditional values continues, particularly in migrant centers of the lower-income class.

The Netherlands

The Dutch political system, known as the *Verzuiling* system, is based on a vertical structuring of interest groups in all spheres of public life and requires cooperation among different confessional/secular groups. In 1980, this tradition inspired the Dutch government to officially adopt a new policy, labelled as 'multiethnic.' It comprised three major goals: to promote the development and the emancipation of ethnic communities, to promote equality in the legal field, and to improve the economic and social position of ethnic communities.⁴⁰

The first goal emphasized the group rather than the individual. In this sense the teaching of the mother tongue in public and private schools was encouraged. In addition, it enabled the creation of private schools of whatever religious denomination, these schools being totally subsidized by the state. Thus in recent years about twenty Islamic and a few Hindu schools have been established. At present there are two Islamic Turkish primary schools in Rotterdam. Furthermore, parallel to the Swedish model, consultative assemblies for the major groups were established on both local

and national levels. The creation of immigrant associations was also sponsored by the state.

The second goal being equality before the law, members of ethnic minorities with a residence of over five years in the Netherlands were given the right to vote at local elections. As a result of the enlargement of political rights at the local election of 1990, 36 Turks were elected to municipal assemblies.⁴¹ The third goal of the multiethnic policy was the insertion of ethnic minorities into the economic and social mainstream society. This goal was not achieved, particularly with regard to unemployment: Turks at 21 percent and Moroccans at 36 percent unemployed were strongly excluded from the labor market. Due to the restructuring of the national economy, employment opportunities for minorities have diminished.

After ten years of practice, it became evident that a paternalistic attitude toward ethnic minorities, based more on social aid than economic participation, results in the marginalization of some migrant groups. This induced the Scientific Council to adopt a new plan in 1989. Based on economic and social integration, the new plan abandons the cultivation of minority languages and cultures and leaves these to the initiative of the members of the respective ethnic group.⁴²

At present the Turkish Advisory Council, consisting of about ten federations and associations, participates in the work of the National Advisory Council. The existing framework obliges a collaboration between the Turkish Islamic associations and the various political and civic Turkish associations. However, cooperation between migration issue oriented associations and others is mainly limited to the leadership, and there is not much interaction among the members of these associations. Nevertheless, all these associations are invited to present advisory reports on major governmental legislative proposals. In 1986 to 1987, six out of 14 were taken into account.⁴³

France

The French political system, built upon the concept of the unitary nation state, represented a 'refugee and immigration friendly' country with a 'neutral' policy approach until recently. However, the rapid rise of the rightist, anti-immigration *Front National* party of Jean Marie Le Pen, which obtained over 11 percent of the votes in 1983, caused an important change in the French nationality law. While previously citizenship, based on *jus soli* (place of birth), was automatically granted to the second generation, at present it only constitutes an optional right once the age of 18 has been reached. The official immigration policy has not changed since the beginning of the twentieth century. It is based on a categorical refusal to

recognize 'ethnic communities.' Instead, it facilitates the social integration of migrants by creating diverse social service networks at the local level and encouraging associational activities. However, the rapid arrival of large numbers of Muslim migrants – at present there are about three million in France – led to the emergence of organized Islamic communities using their religious affiliation as a bargaining power. This led, as Leveau succinctly remarks, 'to a collapse of the French system.' The immigrants' felt need to mobilize their communities and to accentuate their pressure on the central government increases their tendency to resort to the expression of cultural and religious identities. That strategy comes into conflict with the constitutional principle of state secularism.⁴⁴

Migrant initiatives proved to be very effective. First in 1973, on the occasion of a protest against rent increases at publically funded low-cost housing sites, workers from Turkey and the Maghreb started to negotiate with the managing company, Sunacotra. As a result, the company endorsed the workers' demands and converted TV and game rooms of these buildings into praying rooms, first in Bobigny-Paris, and later in other places with heavy Muslim worker concentrations. As Keppel notes, 'housing authorities tried to make amends for economic deprivation with spiritual compensation!'⁴⁵ The next step was taken in 1976, when the Maoist faction of the CGT (federation of French trade unions), in order to widen its membership, secured the installation of prayer rooms in the factory of Renault at Billancourt during Ramadan. This time, Islamic demands were granted at the workplace in order to assure social peace. Finally, in the mid-1980s, due to the mobilizing efforts of the *Harkis* – young Algerians born in France, who are thus French citizens – municipal authorities were compelled to permit the construction of mosques. Backed by the financial aid of the Islamic international missionary organization Jama'at al Tabligh and some French church organizations, they were able to implant 'one thousand and one mosques in France and emerge as a social partner!'

There is no doubt that these developments affected the Turkish migrants greatly. In 1966, Turkey signed a bilateral agreement with France. Prior to the agreement in 1962 there were only 111 Turkish workers registered. Their number rose to 50,860 by 1975. At the last census in 1991 they had reached 240,000.⁴⁶ The fast growth of Islam in France exercised its impact on the associational activities of the Turkish community. Similarly, in Germany, while the ideologically oriented political associations enjoyed the support of individual contributions and private international organizations, and are still exclusively oriented toward Turkey, a semi-official French institution, the *Fonds d'Action Sociales* (FAS), anxious to create a counter-balance against the proliferation of Turkish Islamic associations, decided to subsidize leftist, secular, and socio-cultural associations. This induced some of these associations to take a more active part in discussing governmental policies and open the way for integration.⁴⁷ But in other cases, ethnic,

religious, rightist organizations transformed themselves into 'cultural' associations in order to qualify for financial help. At present there are 76 in Paris, 51 in Strasbourg, 17 in Marseille, 59 in Lyon, and in all France a total of 203 associations.⁴⁸ These associations are constantly in the process of formation, dissolution, and remaking. While political/religious affinities draw them to the Welfare Party in Turkey, ethnic affinities cause them to break away. Kurds claim a separate ethno-national identity. Anxious to underline the 'Turkishness' or 'Kurdishness' of their members, they call themselves either 'Association des travailleurs turcs' (Association of Turkish Workers) or 'Association des travailleurs de Turquie' (Association of workers from Turkey). Thus associative activities are reconstructing political identities, developed and redefined in exile. At present, the most powerful associations in France are the Kurdish ones and the Islamic Union, which is an unofficial branch of the Welfare Party in Turkey. Both are oriented toward Turkey. The other local associations are rather instrumental; their function consists of creating a framework for rapid entry to French society.

Germany

More than thirty years have elapsed since Turkey signed its first bilateral agreement for the 'export of surplus workforce' with Germany on October 10, 1961.⁴⁹ While in 1961 their number was barely 7000, they reached 1,854,945 by 1992 and, at 28.5 percent, became the largest group of foreigners in Germany.⁵⁰ Although the number of foreigners in Germany has continued to rise over the years – 22.7 percent in 1980, 28.2 percent in 1990 – the Federal Republic adamantly refuses to be qualified as an 'immigration' country. This explains its refusal to grant foreigners the right to vote at local elections. Naturalization procedures are also slow: in 1992 only 1184 Turks were naturalized in Germany, while in France 14,773 Turks became French citizens.⁵¹ These figures underline the major goals of German immigration policy: to give priority for German citizenship to ethnic Germans from East Europe, to acknowledge free movement and settlement only to citizens of the EU, and to admit asylum seekers in conformity with the amended article 16 of the German Constitution.

Although there are advisory councils and aliens' assemblies, in essence these are not officially considered as bargaining partners. These characteristics explain why associative activities in Germany have developed very differently from in Sweden and the Netherlands. Turkish associations in Germany, at present numbering 1341, are fragmented and highly politicized. A breakdown indicates Münster (203), Stuttgart (179), Berlin (159), and Munich (131) as cities with a high concentration of associational life.⁵² It also has to be added that while there are federal funds for the integration of migrants, they are not allocated to umbrella organizations. Funding can

only be obtained at the local level. Thus collective initiatives depend to a large extent on individual contributions and financial support from other Islamic countries.

Turkish associations are pursuing two divergent paths. A significant group of migrants with a prolonged residence in Germany⁵³ continuously fight for political rights and dual citizenship. These efforts are backed by the integration-friendly 'Euro Turks.' However, the majority of Turkish associations represent nationalist, cultural enclaves with a minimal interest in German society. In particular, radical organizations with religious, ethnic, and radical right or leftist outlooks cast a different profile. The aggressive tone of the leadership indicates their unwillingness to establish a peaceful dialogue with the host society. This segment of the Turkish diaspora looks exclusively toward Turkey. It rallies around organizations with extreme rightist, nationalist, or leftist orientation, Islamic organizations devoted to a change of power in Turkey, or ethnic organizations such as the Kurdish association, which collaborates with terrorist organizations and harbors secessionist objectives. The growth of such associations that refuse integration has been partly influenced by the rise of racism and xenophobia after German reunification and the growth of asylum seekers. A brief look at the various Turkish associations gives the following picture.

Para-political associations

Extreme right-nationalist organizations

The Federation for the Turkish Idealist Associations of Europe (ATÜDF). This federation takes its roots from the neo-Fascist National Worker's Party (MÇP) of the 1970s, which established a number of local chapters in 1973 in Kempten. Following the violent, aggressive acts of its youth branch, the 'Grey Wolves,' these chapters were dissolved following a ban on the establishment of branches of foreign political parties in Germany. However, this ban was overcome by the establishment of a variety of associations such as the Greater Ideal Association (Büyük Ülkü Derneği), the Turkish Community (Türk Cemaati), and Turkish students and youth associations (Türk-Genç). All these associations became united under one umbrella to constitute the Federation of Turkish Idealist Associations in Europe (Avrupa Türk Ülkücü Dernekleri Federasyonu, ATÜDF). With its center in Frankfurt, it boasts 170 member associations in Germany. The federation cooperates closely with the renamed rightist party of Alparslan Türkeş, the National Action Party. The ideology of this federation is based on extreme nationalism which rejects integration in order to prevent Turks becoming a 'secondary race.'⁵⁴ Ücretsiz PDF Kitap Arsivi - <https://rantey.org>

Leftist organizations

The largest of these is the Federation of Migrants' Associations (Göçmen Dernekleri Federasyonu, or GDF). This federation incorporates the membership of the dissolved Federation of Workers Associations (İşçi Dernekleri Federasyonu, or FIDF), which was cooperating closely with the Turkish Labor Party in Turkey. The GDF has about 60 local chapters and some 15,000 members. This federation has an orthodox Marxist orientation. Since 1988 its influence has diminished.⁵⁵

Ethnic organizations: Komkar and Birkom

The large number of Turkish workers of Kurdish origin – an estimated 450,000 out of 1.8 million – in Germany produced a significant growth of ethnic associations. While a large number of splinter groups dominated by radical Alewites and Kurds, anxious to dissociate themselves from the 'schematic' leftists, have created independent associations such as the Federation of Democratic Workers Association (DİDF), the largest Kurdish organization in Germany is the Association of Kurdish Workers for Kurdistan, Komkar. This separatist federation has a large network in Europe, aims to develop collective consciousness, and wants to see an independent Kurdish state in southeast Turkey. Another Kurdish separatist and militant association is Birkom. Established by those who left Turkey in 1980 and who were close supporters of Abdullah Öcalan, Apo, leader of the secessionist guerilla group PKK, it is also not interested in integration. It is solely an organization for fomenting future rebellion and claiming to be a legitimate nationalist organization. Recently, the decision of some European governments to declare this group's efforts as 'terrorist action' caused serious clashes in Germany.⁵⁶ Following the lifting of the parliamentary immunity of pro-Kurdish deputies and their incarceration in Turkey, PKK supporters in Europe, particularly in Germany, blocked highways, set themselves on fire, and caused public unrest, urging the German government to suspend all military assistance to Turkey.

Religious and religious-political associations

Islamic Cultural Centers (İslam Kültür Merkezleri, or IKMB)

At the end of the 1970s and early 1980s, this organization represented the largest religious movement in Germany. Backed by the followers of the Süleymanlı sect, whose founder Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan (1888 to 1959) fought in the 1920s and 1930s against Atatürk's secular reforms, this

umbrella organization has its center in Cologne. In the 1980s, the organization controlled about 210 mosques, each with a congregation of approximately 300 members. At present the IKMB claims to have 20,000 registered members and 60,000 sympathizers. The most important characteristic of this organization is its negative attitude toward integration. It evaluates school subjects such as music, art and sport as 'un-Islamic' and prohibits all contact with 'infidel' foreigners.⁵⁷

The National Vision Organization of Europe (AMGT)

Established in 1976 as a branch of the National Salvation Party of Turkey – which dissolved in 1980, and then reemerged as the present Welfare Party – this organization is also headquartered in Cologne. With 30,000 registered and about 85,000 sympathizers, the organization currently represents the most powerful Turkish religious organization in Europe. The political agenda of this federation is to fight all modernization and westernization. All attempts at integration are defined as treason toward Islam. Any interaction with non-Muslims is discouraged; an intensive missionary activity focuses on the establishment of Koran courses. The federation vigorously supports the Turkish newspaper *Millî Gazete*, the leading news outlet for the Welfare Party in Turkey, also published in Germany. The AGMT implements elite training and offers generous scholarships for eligible Turkish students studying in Germany. The chairman of the Welfare Party, Erbakan, who is a professor of engineering who studied at German universities, utilizes the federation for his political agenda during his frequent visits to Europe.⁵⁸ The findings of a special investigating committee of the Turkish parliament indicate that 5.9 million Deutschmarks which had originally been collected as a special fund for the Bosnia-Herzegovina relief work went to the private account of Mr Mercümeke, a member of the Welfare Party headed by Erbakan.⁵⁹

The Union of Islamic Associations and Communities (ICCB)

This association, established in 1984 by Cemalettin Kaplan, represents a dissenting wing of the National Vision Association. Until 1980, Kaplan was a civil servant at the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs in Adana. After his move to Germany, he was suspended from his official duties because of his anti-secular and fundamentalist views. After losing his Turkish nationality, he became 'homeless,' settled down in Cologne and started to build up his own organization. Strongly influenced by the Iranian model and Ayatollah Khomeini's teachings, Kaplan's association advocates the creation of an Islamic Turkish Republic. In a self-drafted constitution, he pleads for the reintroduction of the *Sharia* and the replacement of the Turkish script by

the Arabic alphabet. For blasphemy, he demands the death penalty. Recently Kaplan declared himself the Caliph of the Islamic World Community. The ICCB has about 3000 members and 5000 sympathizers. It has established a boarding school for youngsters aged 16 to 18, operates a food import firm and a publishing house, and produces VCR tapes and a journal called *Tebliğ*. All members are obliged to contribute 2.5 percent of their yearly income and acquire bonds at a value of 1000 Deutschmarks.

The Union of Turkish-Islamic Cultural Associations (TIKDB)

This association represents the dissenting wing of the previously discussed rightist nationalist ADÜTDF. It focuses on the preservation of the national and cultural values of the Islamic faith. Politically, it supports the Motherland Party in Turkey, a right of center party founded by Turgut Özal in 1983 and currently the ruling party in the parliament.

The Turkish Islamic Union for Religious Affairs

While the above cited Islamic organizations try to establish contacts with Turkish political parties, Türkiye Diyanet İşleri Birliği (DİTİB) represents a governmental organization, created partly to counterbalance the spread of fundamentalist Islam in Germany. Linked directly to the Turkish ministry of the interior, this union is an umbrella organization embracing 700 associations with a membership of 90,000. The union functions with the support of 215 civil servants who are graduates of divinity schools.

While the influence of para-political and ethnic associations remains limited in terms of radiation, the organizational strategy extends to a much higher number of Turkish migrant families. These religious associations – which function in both Europe and Turkey – focus their activities not only on religious matters. There are activity fields for each cohort. The first generation is organized within the congregation of mosques, the second and third in sport associations, boarding schools, and Koran courses.

These associations – with the exception of the DİTİB – have the same goals: to increase the political power of Islam in Turkey, to change the political system there, and to reorganize private and public life according to the rules of Islam. The Koran courses have been widely discussed in Germany. When the curriculum was made public, it showed militant, non-tolerant Islam. This creates more problems with regard to coeducation. The wearing of scarves – in France and also in Belgium – transforms itself into a debate about the freedom of worshipping versus the freedom to develop one's personality. Parents refuse to allow their daughters to participate in swimming lessons and class sports. Gender segregation in all walks of life is

increasingly being advocated by these associations, thus contributing to a further self-imposed 'island-like' lifestyle.

Conclusion

Detailed research clearly indicates that Europe's largest non-EU immigrant population, the Turks, have passed through three new developmental phases: the expansion of ethnic business, the growing importance of collective organization forms of the ethnic community, and the fast growth of ethno-politics.

Reluctant to return to their home country, increasingly more Turks opt for self-employment. These initiatives have produced prosperous ethnic business enclaves. No doubt the presence of well organized enterprises securing new jobs for European or Turkish citizens constitutes evidence of a successful entry into the mainstream economy. Nevertheless, ethnic business mostly serves the consumers of the ethnic community. For migrants, operating within the realm of such enclaves helps to overcome social isolation. It helps to solve personal and financial problems and facilitates communication within the migrant community. In other words, ethnic business reinforces the structure of spatial or mental ghettoization. By presenting a potential labor market, such niches indirectly induce young immigrants to discontinue their vocational training. Furthermore, by being closely interlocked with religious associations, ethnic business prepares the ground to defend group interests based on religious identity. Thus, one may state that ethnic business becomes a pillar for the diffusion of political religious-tinted ideology by enabling the establishment of institutions such as Koran courses, boarding schools, and private radio and TV stations. Furthermore, ethnic business represents the cornerstone of an ethnic subculture. As a major element of religious associative organizations, it also contributes to the accentuation of polarization.

Similarly, ethnic communities living in spatially concentrated conditions, particularly in the case of chain migration embracing a large number of persons with similar origin, produce unwillingness to integrate. Varying according to the immigration policies of the host countries, the cooperation of immigrants with local authorities in order to obtain additional rights for the safeguarding of cultural values leads toward instrumental multiculturalism. Such a trend might under certain circumstances reinforce a kind of *de facto* apartheid.

Finally, extreme ethno-politics based on ethnic or religious identity, particularly in the case of complex networks, prepares the ground for revolutionary actions, such as movement toward establishing a Federal Islamic Republic in Turkey or the realization of Kurdish separatist demands. In both cases, associative initiatives may end in subversive actions,

violence, and armed conflicts. In such cases, immigration as a process leads to the emergence of new actors in the field of international relations.

Have these recent developments attracted sufficient attention among the academic community dealing with immigration studies? As Heisler correctly points out, new forms of migration, unusual foreign policy steps to deal with them, and fundamental shifts in global and regional international relations have converged. Considering these changes Heisler suggests an 'institutional political sociology.' Ethnic pluralism – multiculturalism, pluriculturalism, multiethnicity – have become core concepts in the current discourse on immigrant incorporation. Here, the following question arises: how far can one go in protecting particular cultural values without destroying the political community at both ends?

Another issue which deserves particular attention is the concept of social movements developed by Touraine. He argues that social change results from groups organized to promote conflict and develop alternative institutions. Following this perspective, immigrants must find their place in society as groups by organizing themselves. Here, again, the question arises: does the use of democratic rights include the right to ask for legal segregation on one side – the racist, xenophobic argument – and for changes in the borders and the political system of the home country on the other? These questions are vitally important given the fact that interdependence is constantly growing, that the claim for a more equitable citizenship will not diminish, and that the state of the law will not permit the denial to fundamental rights.

Notes

1. For 1960, 1963, and 1973 see Nermin Abadan-Unat, *Turkish Workers in Europe, 1960–1975: A Balance Sheet of Achievement and Failures* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1976), p. 13; for 1988 see United Nations, *International Migration: Regional Processes and Responses* (New York: United Nations, 1994), p. 23, table 1.2.
2. The breakdown of Turkish citizens working or living in Europe is as follows: 1,854,945 in Germany, 248,656 in the Netherlands, 240,000 in France, 150,000 in Austria, 84,935 in Belgium, 37,000 in Denmark, 65,000 in the UK, 10,000 in Norway, 50,000 in Sweden, 73,024 in Switzerland. Ministry of Labor (*Çalışma Bakanlığı ve Sosyal Güvenlik Bakanlığı*), 1992 Yearly Report (*1992 Yılı Raporu*), Ankara, 1993, p. 3.
3. Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, *Ausländerbeschäftigung 1980 bis 1990*, 1991, no. 10, p. 1471.
4. Helmut Schmidt, *Handeln für Deutschland* (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1993), pp. 160–2.
5. *Community and Ethnic Relations in Europe*, Council of Europe, 1991, MG-CR (91) Final, p. 9, paragraph 33.
6. See Alejandro Portes, 'Modes of incorporation and theories of labor immigration,' in Mary M. Kritz et al. (eds.), *Global Trends in Migration: Theory and Research*

- in *International Population Movements* (New York: Center for Migration Studies, 1981), pp. 279–97 and Saskia Sassen, *The Mobility of Labor and Capital: a Study in International Investment and Labor Flow* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
7. Michael J. Piore, *Birds of Passage: Migrant Labor and Industrial Societies* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
 8. See Hans-Joachim Hoffman-Nowotny, 'A sociological approach toward a general theory of migration,' in Mary M. Kritz *et al.* (eds), *Global Trends in Migration: Theory and Research in International Population Research* (New York: Center for Migration Studies, 1981), pp. 121–43; and Aristide R. Zolberg, 'International migration in perspective,' in Mary M. Kritz *et al.* (eds), *Global Trends in Migration: Theory and Research in International Population Research* (New York: Center for Migration Studies, 1981), pp. 3–27.
 9. See Frieda Hawkins, *Canada and Immigration: Public Policy and Public Concern* (Kingston, Ontario: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988); and Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot: the Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971).
 10. See Stephen Castles and Godula Kosack, *Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe* (London: Oxford University Press, 1973); Jonathan Power, *Migrant Workers in Western Europe and the US* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985) and Michael J. Piore, *Birds of Passage*, *op. cit.*
 11. See Hawkins, *op. cit.*; and A.H. Richmond, *Immigration and Ethnic Conflict* (London: Macmillan, 1988).
 12. Ayşe Öncü, 'International labour migration and class relations,' *Current Sociology*, 38, 2 (1990), 177.
 13. See Mark Miller, *Foreign Workers in Western Europe* (New York: Praeger, 1981); William Rogers Brubaker (ed.), *Immigration and Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America* (Washington DC: University Press of America, 1989); Marilyn Hoskin, *New Immigrants and Democratic Society, Minority Integration in Western Democracies* (New York: Praeger, 1991).
 14. Martin O. Heisler, 'Transnational migration as a small window on the diminished autonomy of the modern democratic state,' *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 485 (1986), 164.
 15. Abdelmalek Sayad, 'Les trois âges de l'immigration algérienne en France,' *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales*, 15 (1977).
 16. Piore, *op. cit.*
 17. Alejandro Portes, 'Towards a structural analysis of illegal immigration,' *International Migration Review*, 12, 4 (1978), 469–84.
 18. Ali Gitmez and Czarina Wilpert, 'A micro-society or an ethnic community? Social organizations and ethnicity amongst Turkish migrants in Berlin,' in John Rex, Daniele Joy and Czarina Wilpert (eds), *Immigrant Associations in Europe* (Aldershot: Gower, 1987), p. 99.
 19. Ismail Duymaz, 'Selbstständige Erwerbstätigkeit von Ausländern als Integrationsindikator,' *Zeitschrift für Ausländerrecht und Ausländerpolitik*, 2 (1988), 27–8; Zentrum für Türkeistudien, *Türkei-Sozialkunde* (Opladen: Leske+Budrich, 1994).
 20. Gitmez and Wilpert, *op. cit.*, pp. 105–6.
 21. *Ibid.*, p. 104. Ücretsiz PDF Kitap Arsivi - <https://rantey.org>

22. Necmettin Erbakan, 'Hac kontenjanini hayir için istedim,' *Cumhuriyet*, February 14, 1994, pp. 1 and 15.
23. Mustafa Balbay, 'RP'nin gerçek yüzü ve Hac ticareti,' *Cumhuriyet*, February 10, 1994, pp. 1 and 17.
24. Kemal Yurteri, 'Dinci şirketlerden sinir ötesi çalım,' *Cumhuriyet*, February 10, 1994.
25. The Saudi government is allocating each year to all Muslim countries a quota for the admission of their citizens wishing to fulfill their obligations of pilgrimage. The representative of the Van der Zee Company, Besir Darcin, a close friend of Erbakan, succeeded in overcoming these restrictive clauses by enabling in 1993 about 10,000 Turkish citizens living in Europe to obtain the required visa by sending them via third countries. Seen as a violation of the Saudi-Turkish intergovernmental agreement, this company was excluded in 1994 from benefiting from the allocation of quotas.
26. Necmettin Erbakan, 'Milli görüş ticaret hatti,' *Cumhuriyet*, March 23, 1994, p. 19.
27. Saskia Sassen, *The Global City* (New York: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 315.
28. Nermin Abadan-Unat, *Turkish Migration to Europe*, *op. cit.*, p. 17; R. Weber, 'Rotationsprinzip bei der Beschäftigung von Ausländern,' *Auslandskurier*, October 5, 1970, 10.
29. Nermin Abadan-Unat, 'External migration and social mobility,' in P. Benedict, E. Tümertekin and F. Mansur (eds), *Turkey: Geographic and Social Perspectives* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974), pp. 371 ff., table 4.
30. Gitmez and Wilpert, *op. cit.*, p. 95.
31. Sema Köksal, *Refah Toplumunda 'Getto' ve Türkler* (Istanbul: Kökaal, 1986), p. 126, table 22; Şahin Alpay and Halil Sarıaslan, *Effects of Immigration: the Effects on the Town Kulu in Central Turkey of Emigration to Sweden* (Stockholm: EIFO, 1984).
32. Riva Kastoryano, 'La présence turque en France,' *Hommes & Migrations*, 1172-3 (1994), 72-8; Hamit Bozarslan, 'Une communauté et ses institutions: le cas des Turcs en RFA,' *Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales*, 6, 3 (1990), 63-81.
33. Yıldız Sertel, *Nord-Sud: crise et immigration - le cas Turc* (Paris: Ed. Publisud, 1987), pp. 134-5.
34. Riva Kastoryano, *Etre Turc en France: réflexions sur familles et communauté* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1986).
35. This question is largely discussed in R. Lissot, N. Boumaza and G. Clement, *Ces migrants qui font le prolétariat* (Paris: Ed. Méridiens, 1994), pp. 93-104.
36. Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 259.
37. Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); J.D. Eller and R.M. Coughlan, 'The poverty of primordialism: the demystification of ethnic attachments,' *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 16, 2 (1993), 183-202.
38. E.L. Lithman, *Immigration and Immigrant Policy in Sweden* (Stockholm: The Swedish Institute, 1987), pp. 29-31.
39. Köksal, *op. cit.* Ücretsiz PDF Kitap Arsivi - <https://rantey.org>

40. J. Rath, 'Political action of immigrants in the Netherlands: class or ethnicity?' *European Journal of Political Research*, 16 (1988), 623-44.
41. Cities with Turks on the municipal assemblies: Almelo (1), Amesfoort (1), Amsterdam (17), Arnhem (3), Bergen op Zoom (1), Deventer (1), and Dordrecht (1).
42. Han Entzinger, 'L'Immigration aux Pays-Bas du pluri-culturalisme à l'intégration,' in K.A. Wierow (ed.), *Racisme et modernité* (Paris: Editions la Découverte, 1993), pp. 409-10.
43. Yasemin Soysal, 'Workers in Europe: interactions with the host society,' in Metin Heper, Ayşe Öncü and Heinz Kramer (eds), *Turkey and the West - Changing Political and Cultural Identities* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993), p. 230.
44. Rémy Leveau, 'Maghrebi immigration to Europe: double insertion or double exclusion,' *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 524 (1992), 176.
45. Gilles Keppel, *Les banlieues de l'Islam* (Paris: Seuil, 1987), p. 136.
46. Ministry of Labor, *op. cit.*, p. 66.
47. Riva Kastoryano, 'Être Turc en France et en Allemagne,' *op. cit.*
48. Ministry of Labor, *op. cit.*, p. 76.
49. Nermin Abadan-Unat, *Turkish Workers in Europe*, *op. cit.*, p. 6.
50. Ministry of Labor, *op. cit.*, pp. 16, 68.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
52. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
53. Out of 1.7 million Turks, 1.2 million have lived for over ten years in Germany, *ibid.*, pp. 13-14.
54. Nermin Abadan-Unat, 'Die politischen Auswirkungen der türkischen Migration im In- und Ausland,' *Orient*, 1 (1979), 2; A. Sezer and Dietrich Thränhardt, 'Türkische Organisationen in der BRD,' in Karl-Heinz Meier-Braun and Yüksel Pazarkaya (eds), *Die Türken* (Frankfurt/Main: Ullstein, 1983), pp. 119-51.
55. Dietrich Thränhardt, 'Patterns of organization among different ethnic minorities,' *The New German Critique*, 46, Winter (1989), pp. 16-19.
56. *Verfassungsschutzbericht 1987* (Bonn: Bundesministerium des Innern, 1988), p. 148.
57. Kurt Biswanger, *Türkisch-islamische Vereine als Faktor deutsch-türkischer Koexistenz* (Munich, 1988).
58. I. Halil Özak, 'Verflechtungen: Radikal-islamische Gruppen in der BRD,' *Entwicklungspolitische Korrespondenz*, 5/6 (1988), 32-6; *Hintergründe türkischer extremistischer islamischer Aktivitäten in Deutschland*, Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, 1988, no. 15.
59. The mismanagement of voluntary donations for relief work in Bosnia-Herzegovina and its transfer to the personal account of an influential member of the Welfare Party became the subject of a parliamentary investigative committee. According to the findings of this multiparty committee, a total of DM 5.9 million has been transferred to the Düsseldorf branch of the Yapı Kredi Bank in the name of Süleyman Mercümeke. The inquiry was carried out with the cooperation of the German judiciary, who charged that 'money laundering' with the purpose of political propaganda was carried out on German soil.