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
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TURKISH POLITICAL LIFE

ŞENOL DURGUN



TURKISH POLITICAL LIFE

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Şenol Durgun



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Preface

The content of this book include various subjects related to Turkish political life. It consists of the published and unpublished academic articles by myself or with co-authors in a period of time. The articles give, from a historical point of view, an account of the nature of the statist tradition in Turkish politics and its relation to issues such as democratization, identity politics, nation-state, civil society, the nature of bureaucracy, media and music policy.

The reason of collecting those articles in a book is to provide the students of Turkish political life with an overview on such multidimensional and complex issues. I sincerely hope that the book would help students to go beyond cliché-ridden perspectives under very much effects of the Western-oriented reading of Turkish politics, which is usually found in many publications in Western languages.

Şenol Durgun
September 2014, Ankara

I.

Statist Political Tradition of Turkey in Retrospective*

Introduction

A state structure and a state-society relationship equivalent to those in the modern developed countries have not yet be formed in Turkey, which has been aching for modernization approximately for a period more than two centuries. Considering the present situation, the state appears as a separate existence from the society, i.e. it stands in front of us as searching assurances for its very own existence against the society and finding itself in struggle with the social basis on which it stands. The maintenance of this situation, which is hardly seen in democratized countries, but in countries not fully democratized such as ours, can be explained by the fact of the incompetence of political actors. The countries with far little democratic experience than ours have overcome similar problems respectively in a shorter time and reached a context of democratization at a certain level. The statist structure and tradition positioning its existence in a powerful way and pending over the society like the sword of Democles did not come out or see its institutionalization with the Republic. Historically, its source lies in various empires have contact with for a long time or established by the Turks. According to the statist notion, the state includes the basis for legitimacy within itself. Therefore, there is no justifying principle other than the state

* This article was published in G.Ü. İİBF Dergisi, c. 4, s. 1, Bahar 2002.

itself, and the state is legitimate because it is the state. Its existence and effectiveness is the final canon impossible to be questioned. The state is the creator of all values as the essential precondition of any virtue. Its permanency is deemed as the most sacred of all duties, because the permanency of the state is the precondition of all moral behaviors. Thus, it is not subjected to the principles rendering these behaviors meaningful (Sancar, 1997: 48-49). Those which are relatively innocent among these methods founded on this belief are the limitation of human rights even in the "ordinary" periods with the excuse of "the protection of the public order, national security, public benefit and morality". It is repeatedly focussed on the claim that the articles in the constitution cannot be interpreted in a way of damaging statism. The statism here means an integrated political world in which any dynamic within the society is liable to the inspection and observation of the state; in which any social development is evaluated according to the rule that the state gets higher benefits and; in which no autonomous legitimacy of any other social formation out of the state is recognized. The political world authorized by the state may in appearance adopt the democratic institutions. Even the society may support these institutions with resolution. However, it cannot be assumed that they have legitimacy over everything, especially, over the private interests of state. The anxiety about the permanency of the state is deemed superior to any social or human inquietude (İnsel, 1990: 3). As the democratization policies and efforts fill a short period of time within the long history of Turks, a conversion according to the axis of modernity in a society with a long history may not be easily expected, due to this deeply rooted old notion. Assuming that the state is structured within the modern criteria, it is rather difficult to argue that the state would promptly approach the society accordingly and change its mode of relations with it. It is this very important problem that the society continuously has to face. However, it should be stressed that the statist notion keeps its influence among not only the state officers or employers, but the people. This notion, founding the determining target of the political action and its legitimacy not on the society, but the state, considers the state as a target and a moral power on its own. In such a case, it becomes impossible to have doubts about the wisdom of the state. In an environment where all social behaviors capable of forming a democratic functioning, the guardianship of the state for all is preferred. The statist tradition seeks for an absolute hegemony over the society as it refuses the legitimacy of any conflict or differentiation unauthorized by the state. It perceives the society only from an abs-

tract point of nationality and can only imagine socialization under its own supervision. Accordingly, an important driving force of the problem comes from the attempts of those who have the state power, but face today that they are not any longer able to survive in the same fashion for silencing any endeavor aiming at the transformation of politics. The notion of "sacred state" preserves its strong existence in spite of modernization efforts going on for over two centuries.

Inheritance From The Pre-Ottoman Period

The roots of the statist notion are as old as the appearance of Turks in the world politics, going back far beyond the ages. Some elements of this tradition have reached our time from the ancient Asian states. Their transmission from the Central Asia especially into the Ottoman Empire and then the Republic of Turkey owed mostly to the Anatolian Seljuks. The Ottoman passed the inheritance onto the new state since the constituting agents of the Republic were former Ottoman statesmen. More or less, the same statist tradition was an integral component of their political viewpoint.

Three main roots supporting the statist tradition inherited by the Ottomans from the Anatolian Seljuks can be identified. They significantly distinguish the Ottoman Empire from the empires of the Western World, such as the Roman Empire, in many ways, e.g., especially in terms of concepts of hegemony and politics, of state structure, social structure, and their institutions and their features. These are: (a) the ancient Turkish political tradition; (b) the political tradition of classical Islam and; (c) the political tradition of the Byzantium Empire.

This order also represents the cultural spheres where Turks came into contact in accordance with the geographical areas they moved into. Indeed, Turks as the establishing element of the Ottoman state traveled throughout the history from their homeland the Central Asia to the Middle East, to the Islamic lands bearing the inheritance of the ancient empires after the adaptation of Islam, and finally conquered Anatolia. They had relations with the Byzantium Empire and eventually became its inheritor. During all this historical adventure, it was completely natural to become the inheritor of already existing states or political traditions and concepts. Besides, it was inevitable for the practice. For it was necessary for the state to dominate and make the people already living in the conquered land familiar with the new governing power without totally separating them from their practiced way of living, and therefore to justify their power. This was a common manner of all Turkish states in history. The oldest among all these

political traditions and hegemony concepts was doubtlessly the concepts of Turks themselves (Ocak 1998: 74). The concepts of state and hegemony come from the oldest periods before Turks accepted Islam as their religion. However, this very tradition clearly included the influences of neighboring political cultures, including India, China and Iran, as far as they melted these in their own experience. The ancient Turkish political tradition composes of three main typical points. They are: (a) hegemony and power in the ancient Turkish political tradition are based upon a divine origin; (b) this hegemony is directed to a universal target and; (c) it is based on a custom (*örf*) constituting of old traditions coming from and processing through the history, which is called rule (*töre*).

The researches based on historical proofs show that having a divinely rooted Sovereign (*Hakan*) was not a characteristic special to a certain Turkish clan or state in a certain time or place. It was not only *Hakan* as a person who had a divine origin, such as in the Roman context, but also the rank represented by *Hakan* was divine, therefore, sacred. This explains why the state was also perceived as sacred. This concept was nearly similarly existed in the old Chinese concept of hegemony (Ocak 1998: 75). The same concept of Turks also significantly appeared in the Ottoman practice, but it was melted with Islamic terminology.

The very natural result of this divine concept of hegemony was the notion of "world hegemony" (*cihan hakimiyeti*). This claim existed in nearly all Turkish states that left important traces in the history. It was symbolized in the Ottoman state as the ideal of "Scarlet Apple" (*Kızıl Elma*).

In the ancient Turkish political tradition, the legitimate authority for setting rule (*töre*) of *Hakan* comes from his divine origin. Because, the divine authority is granted to the great emperors retaining divine support, i.e., to those bearing the name *Hakan*. The emperors without this title could not establish rules. The rule in the Turkish tradition could not be thought separately from the notion of "hegemony granted by God". Therefore, a *Hakan*, especially the founder of a state, should definitely establish a *töre* in order to affirm his status (İnalçık, 2000: 21). The existing traditions and beliefs get vitalized only via the rules set by *Hakan*. This tradition continued in the states founded by the Turks, including the Ottoman Empire (Hassan, 2001: 179). It is said that nobody could be a *Hakan* unless God commands and the state exists. If he could, it is possible to make him step-down. This shows that *Hakan* has a sacred characteristic, i.e., a charismatic aspect, but not a extraordinary or godly identity

(Türkdoğan, 1996: 188). This rule setting would later become one of the significant basis of the traditional law (*örfi hukuk*) in the Ottoman Empire. The notion of hegemony based on a divine origin was described by Mehmet the Conqueror as “one person, one emperor in the world”, and constituted the state policy. In our opinion, here is the place where the roots of statist character, pressing even the Islamic elements, should be looked for (Ocak, 1998: 76).

Secondly, the Ottomans inherited the political tradition of classical Islam. The term “Islamic” in this tradition distinguishing the Ottomans from its counterparts is neither related to the theoretical aspect of Islam as religion nor to the political applications of the Prophet and the Four Caliphs. This term rather refers to the Islamic political theory formed in the classical age of Islamic history by the adaptation of the political traditions existing within the domination spheres of states of Umayyad and Abbasid and; also to the tradition developed in a parallel manner. In the Islamic political tradition, it is easy to trace the effects of the Eastern Roman, Sassani, and even ancient Indian political concepts. Although the core material of this synthesis is Islam itself, this is a highly different concept from the Islamic political perception formed in the period of the Prophet.

The political tradition of classical Islam constitutes of a rich classical literature brought into existence in a very large geography within the domain of Islam in different times. The literature receives attention by stressing mind, reason and knowledge, which are the characteristics of Indian-Iranian political tradition, instead of generosity and *töre*, the very elements of the ancient Turkish political tradition. The basic philosophy of the political tradition of classical Islam is based upon the ancient concept of politics originated from India in accordance with the Islamic concept of justice. This appears in the Ottoman political thought as the “Cycle of Justice” (*Daire-i Adliye*)*. Its principles determine the codes of relations between the society and the state. However, the state superior and great, meeting the needs of various groups in the society was important for the interests of the state. The state, in every opportunity, in each declaration and via numerous symbolic implementations would expand the ideals included in the Cycle of Justice as the guarantees for protecting its subject. The general belief was that justice was the main

* The context of the Cycle of Justice can be summarized as that: “the world needs justice to survive; justice is provided by the state; the state needs an Emperor; the Emperor cannot act without an army; the army needs treasure; the treasure is provided by the subject and; the subject prospers only with the guidance of a just Emperor” (Ocak, 1998: 77). For the same matter, see also İnalçık, (1990: 31).

factor balancing absolute authority (Barkey, 1999: 29). In a lifetime exceeding six hundred years, it could not be possible for a state to preserve the same model of structure. However, acting fairly towards the subject people with disregard of their race or religion had always been the dominant instinct. Its resource was the Muslim Arabic political (classical Islamic) tradition consisting of the ancient Turkish, Indian-Iranian and ancient Greek (Byzantium) political thoughts, which were kept together under the umbrella of Islam (Göyünç, 1999: 92). The Ottomans became the inheritors of this tradition mostly due to the Anatolian Seljuks. Their "just" approach to the subject people as long as they fully obeyed the central power and paid their taxes and; respectively the fair tax system need to be evaluated in this framework (Ocak, 1998: 77).

Lastly, the Ottomans had also been impressed by the Byzantium political tradition and the people of Byzantium, with which they were in relation in both war and peace during the foundation period. It is possible to take the starting point of this relation as back as when the Ottomans were only a small border principality. However, the significant effects of Byzantium on the Ottomans doubtlessly came out after Mehmet II conquered Istanbul. The effects can be traced in *timar* policy, the Palace organization, and most importantly in the concepts of power and hegemony. It is necessary to stress that Byzantium had its crucial imprint in the subjection of the *ulema* through the central bureaucracy and thus in taking the religion under the control of the state. It is impossible to disregard the role of the concept of Byzantium *imperium* (indivisible absolute authority) in the formation of classical type of the "Ottoman Sultan" (Ocak 1998: 78).

Founding Components Of The Ottoman Statism And The Reflection Of Political Traditions

The Ottoman statism, that was later to constitute largely the statist perception of the Republic, attached a great importance to those three components complying with and indicating its position. They were: (1) the State (*Devlet-i Aliyye*); (2) the Social Order (*Nizam-ı Alem*) and; (3) the Political Power (*Saltanat-ı Seniyye*). They were the indispensable basic properties of the political system, supported the concept of sacred state and made it widely being accepted.

1. The State (Devlet-i Aliyye)

Beside the state, its representative (*Sultan*) was attached divinity due to the equivalence of state-religion or Sultanate-Islam in the Ottoman Empire. The unity of the state and religion, i.e. Islam obtaining an institutional structure as an instrument of politics, was adop-

ted by the Ottomans in the fourteenth century by fusing it with the old Turkish political concept. This institutionalization after the Ottoman Empire obtained a complete central structure found its real place officially in the formulation of "the religion of the state" (*din-ü devlet*) and "the property of the nation" (*mülk-ü millet*). The inclusion of *Şeyhülislam* as the head of *ulema* class and of the fetwa institution within the central bureaucracy in the classical period eventually made the *ulema* a part of the state. Therefore, the *ulema* could not constitute a separate authority neither religiously nor scholarly from the central power. Therefore, the Ottoman state was able to prevent the religion from becoming an edge of opposition both by transforming Islam into the pioneering force of its official ideology and controlling it by the dependant *ulema* (Alkan, 1999: 133). It should be remembered that the term *mülk* did not mean the lands or wealth of the state, but sovereignty, authority, hegemony, and the right to rule and to power. This unity provided the ruler with a divinity, which had already had its root in the pre-Islamic period. However, this is not to say that the Ottoman Empire was an Islamic state. In the final analysis, the state ideology constructing its *raison d'être* with an Islamic language would focus upon the function attributed to the state.

The Ottoman state also related its sacredness to some worldly realities. For example, the plenteousness of wealth and soldiers, collecting fair taxes, governing the subject with fair laws and most importantly maintaining the reign of Islam. They necessitated the existence of the state and enforced its sacredness. Therefore, it was assumed that "the supreme Ottoman State" (*Devlet-i Aliyye*)* qualified by the virtues listed above and endorsed by divine will would be immortal. Accordingly, the concept of state, eternity and continuance (*devlet, ebed and müddet*) arose from here (Ocak, 1998: 83). This is why the Ottoman elite did not hesitate to name their system as "the supreme state, eternity and continuance" (*Devlet-i Aliyye-i ebed- müddet*). For they believed that their system basing upon this framework and evolving through centuries included in itself the mechanisms that prevented the economy from both expansion and recession or dispersion (Genç, 2000: 95-86). Though the Ottomans were not able to stay eternal, it is easy to grasp the substantial weight of belief in being eternal only if they obeyed the social order (*nizam-ı alem*). The persistent use of the term "state, eternity and continuance" by the Ottomans is the indicator of this strong belief. It was highly

* For the discussions about the Ottoman state naming itself, see Neuman, Christopher K.; "Devletin Adı Yok- Bir Amblemin Okunması", *Cogito- Osmanlılar Özel Sayısı*, Sayı: 12, Yaz 1999.

strong that even the Republic born in the changing atmosphere of modern world could not escape it and assumed that it would be eternal (*ilelebet payidar*). Being eternal also means preserving its relative power forever. Otherwise it is not possible to be so under the continuous damage of enemies and time. Therefore it seems natural to define "state-eternity-continuance" with not only contemporary terms but also a terminology symbolizing a time resistant power. Accordingly, the Ottoman state anxiously avoided from attaching a worldly name to itself and chose to be identified as *Devlet-i Aliyye*. The attributed superiority had linked the Ottoman order to the divine order. The secret of eternity was sought in a worldly power originated from a divine source (Mahcupyan, 2000: 175).

2. Social Order (Nizam-ı Alem)

The concept of state, eternity and continuance gave birth to another concept that greatly determined the place of state in the Ottoman statist notion and constituted the source of justification. This was the social order (*nizam-ı alem*), by which the eternity of state would only be possible. Therefore, the essential function of the Ottoman State was to maintain the social order, i.e. governing the subject people fairly and keep them in harmony with each other. This was the paramount concern. Accordingly, disturbing the social order was identified as the greatest crime. This is why the Ottoman Empire promptly intervened in cases when the social order had been disturbed or was about to be upset. The state violently suppressed any attempt by any person or group, for any reason, that could compete with, disturb or ruin the central authority. The Ottoman central power acted so in order to protect and secure its own existence. The infamous rule for the execution of fellow princes (*kardeş katli*) according to the Laws of Mehmet II (*kanunname*) should be interpreted within this framework of social order. Mehmet II shortly after his accession to the throne had his younger brother Ahmed executed just as his ancestors had had. It is remarkable that he included this old procedure in his laws and had the religiously support of *ulema* in the name of protecting Muslim people from anarchy (İnalçık, 2000: 35). The execution of brothers for political reasons was justified from the point of becoming a world state (Ayan, 1999; 174). This indicates the destroying superiority and ruthlessness of the state, revealing itself in even murdering the royal members in order to protect the state and social order when considered necessary, and the noncompetitive nature of the state in the Ottoman state ideology. This is why, the

state opted for the terms the supreme state* or the Ottoman supreme state (*Devlet-i Aliyye* or *Devlet-i Aliyye-i Osmaniyye*). This meant supreme forever and eternal (Ocak 1998: 84).

The superiority of the state was constructed against not only the members of royal family, but also the religion and human rights. Although the official ideology of the Ottoman state was based on belief displayed in each stage of its long history, the state itself was a subject of belief as much as religion and therefore sacred. This fact arose from the strong integration of the state with religion. No other state in the Islamic world had gone that far, including the Abbasid. Expressed schematically, the sphere of state was not separate from that of religion, but one in which the former completely encompassed the latter. In other words, the official Ottoman ideology meant a concept in which the state and the religion, or politics and Islam indispensably integrated with each other. The Ottoman official ideology found its basis in this association. Thus, it is possible to formulate this fact as "everything was for the state, so was the religion" (Ocak, 1998: 73). The Ottoman state did not give a role to Islam of integrating various ethnic and religious groups within its body, despite of its prevalent Islamic identity. Contrarily, this role was put upon "recognizing and obeying the Ottoman hegemony by paying taxes". Protecting and assuring the differences between different ethnic and religious groups (*millet*s) was a central function of the state. However, the state adopted an attitude of not arranging the relations between different *millet*s, but controlling them. Therefore, it was able to present itself as the representative of not only the Muslim *millet*, but all ethnic and religious groups, and above all, as the crossroad point. The meaning of the prototype Ottoman identity lies here. As a result of this perception, the state named itself as not the state of Islam (*Devlet-i İslamiyye*), but the supreme Ottoman state (*Devlet-i Aliyye-i Osmaniyye*). This term is the one used in the diplomatic documents. This is, Islam was not positioned out of the state or dominated it, rather it was under the strict control of the state and made dependent upon it. Islam did not have self-reliant material tools to utilize its spiritual power in this system. The institution of Caliphate did not chan-

* The Ottoman used this name until the nineteenth century. Accordingly, the terms *Devlet-i Aliyye* or "state, eternity, and continuance" had often been appeared in the official documents. Yet, upon the dispersion in the Balkans after the uprising of both Serbs and Greeks, the term Ottoman gained importance in order to indicate the compassing nature of the state and to gather different ethnic groups around the royal family. The terms Ottoman and the Ottoman state (*Devlet-i Osmaniyye*) took place and defined for the first time in the article 8 of Act of 1876 (*Kanun-i Esasi*) (Göyünç, 1999: 88).

ge this situation, yet it even gave more sacred nature to the authority of *Sultan* (Ocak, 1998: 95, 105). The Ottoman state was not only the owner of land, but also everyone and everything living on it, with some exceptions. Beyond some limits recognized by the state, there was no guarantee for owning property or fortune. The state had the right to confiscate movable or immovable goods believed to be excessive or earned by "deceitful" ways, no matter who was the owner. The state tried hard to keep a strict control over land, labour and capital until the Reformation period (*Tanzimat*). This was a central intention of the state (Genç, 2000: 87). In other words, economic activities were commanded by political concerns. It strictly inspected economic activities; created, controlled and manipulated cities and; limited the organized commercial and political activities* when considered necessary for the benefit of the state (Barkey, 1999: 43). Thus, social order for the Ottomans meant both an absolute reference point and an agenda for action. Change could be supported only if it would result in strengthening the existing order. Otherwise, any change was to be categorically wrong and harmful. It was doubtless that any social activity to disturb the receptive balance would expect to be intervened and violently suppressed by the state. This is, the concept of social order had a function of justifying the implementations of the state before the society (Mahçupyan, 2000: 174). Briefly, the politics (*siyaset-i sultani*) and restrictions of Sultan (*yasağ-i padişahi*) were the indicators of power, that was to arrange the apparent world (*alem-i zahir*) commanding its orders and that encompassed those which had been visual, known and performed (Hassan, 2001: 171).

3. Political Power (Saltanat-ı Seniyye)

Sultan in the Ottoman official ideology was the highest authority who in his personality represented the unity of religion and state. He occupied the highest rank as the head of political authority and of the institutionalized religion via *Şeyhülislam* and; as the representati-

* The most notable feature of the Ottoman society was the lack of "civil society" in Western terms. The state integrated various professional, religious or ethnic groups into its central administration by undermining mediator structures providing society with autonomy. The lack of private property was one of the most important aspect of this relationship. Intermediate structures similar to "united structures with autonomous sphere" "constituted the institutional basis for civil society in the West". Civil society can be reached by owning groups which both compass and limit the state. Though, civil society managed to develop the in West, the Ottoman Empire never experienced that. One of the most important progresses generating from this institutional basis in Europe was the appearance of relatively strong and autonomous cities contributing to the development of the West. The actors in the Ottoman story were different (Barkey, 1999: 42-43).

ve of Islam and Muslims with his Caliph-*Sultan* quality. Despite of all of his religious identities, he mostly stood for a worldly authority donated with traditional (*örfi*) authorization (Ocak, 1998: 85). As a result, *Sultans* always preserved their features recognizing no any other higher authority sharing power. Turkish emperors constructed the authority of state above all (İnalçık, 2000: 29). Thus, the Ottoman politics had always strictly stuck to this traditional consideration of maintaining everyone where they stood in the advantage of social peace and order. For this purpose, *Sultans* as the first thing realized the establishment of absolutism. They accomplished this by removing any piece of aristocracy in the conquered lands; by assigning only the palace-educated men to administrative positions and; by employing the *ulema* in their service. The values *Sultan* had to protect were security and social order based upon justice. That constituted the Ottoman notion of government (İnalçık, 1990: 31).

Since Mehmet II, the Ottoman *Sultans* accumulated three qualities in their personality: (a) being a *Hakan* as a heir to Oğuz Khan; (b) being a Muslim emperor as the *sultan* of classical Islam and eventually; (c) being an emperor of East Rome, by having the title of the conqueror of Istanbul, according with the Byzantium tradition. This is, the three political traditions represented in the Sultanate provided it with the needed justification (Ocak, 1998: 85; Hassan, 2001:164). Embodying the Islamic tradition and that of the ancient Turkish politics in the Ottoman Empire meant having a combatant power directed to worldly domination (*kelimetullah*), constructing all military, economic and political substructures in accordance with this dominant ideology and legitimating and making that permanent by the legal, upper structure. Islam, to an extent, went together hand in hand with *örfi* rules, but it also took into consideration the religious aspect of cultural tradition away from Islam. The concept of one-headed state of the Ottoman, which directly affected administrative implementations in e.g., preventing internal rebellions or providing the continuity of state, was not only valid then for the whole world, but was also a reflection of the Asiatic concept of state (Ayan, 1999: 174). The Ottoman *Sultans* used some titles indicating this structure. They especially wished to be legitimately recognized by all Turkish components in Anatolia by the use of titles *Khan* and *Hakan*. In decrees, on epitaphs or coins, the titles *Khan* and *Hakan* were often employed together along with the title *Sultan*, as the *Sultan ül Bereyn* and *Hakanü'l Bahreyn* (the Sultan of two lands, Anatolia and Rumelia and the sovereign of two seas, the Mediterranean and the Black Sea) (Hassan, 2001: 167). These titles used in various pe-

riods also explain the concepts of state and sovereignty and indicate the developmental periods of the state. The titles *khan*, *sultan* and emperor reflect the aforementioned traditions (the ancient Turkish, Islamic and Byzantium). Surely, new ones were added onto the list as the country and power of emperor had broadened, or their more sophisticated and original expressions were started to be used (İnalçık, 2000: 34).

The titles *Sultan*, *Khan* and *Hakan*, were ones binding the Ottoman *Sultans* to the classical tradition of Islam and legitimating them within this tradition. They were all especially used in correspondence (*name-i hümayuns*) with Muslim emperors and appeared on coins and epitaphs. The title emperor was usually used for few of the Ottoman *Sultans* not by themselves but by Greek and Western historians (Ocak 1998: 86). Although, the word passed onto the Ottomans via the Western world, historically it belonged to a common inheritance and had a claim of being universal. Since the first identified empire was the Roman Empire, it has discussed that the Ottoman Empire sustained a Roman ideology as it contained some Byzantium/Greek traditions and institutions (Ayan, 1999: 175). Yet, it was not a Western society, especially in its imperial age. The Ottoman Empire, just like Russia, was the inheritor of Byzantium and had the *Sultans* such as Mehmet II and Süleyman the Magnificent, who consciously initiated the notion of being empire (Neuman, 1999: 275).

The Islamic nature of the reign gained another basis by shifting of the Caliphate to the Ottomans in the first quarter of sixteenth century. Starting with Yavuz Selim, the Ottoman *Sultans* were to be called as *Hadımü'l-Haremeyni's-Şerifeyn*. This reinforced their place within the Islamic world along with being considered as the protector of Islam and the heirs to the Caliphate. *Sultan*, as being Caliph too, was the final authority in deciding the place of religion in worldly matters. Although the right to be caliph for the Ottoman *sultans* was disputable in terms of religion, being so was especially important in preventing the rise of another caliph or religious authority in the Ottoman dominated lands (İnsel, 1990: 34). As a result, the Ottoman *sultans* obtained much more sacredness and respectable position as being Caliph-*Sultan* and more responsibility before the Islamic law. The *sultan* now being the protector of Islam became the shelter of the world (*padişah-ı alem-penah*). Thus, he was the master of social order in the Islamic world and that of Pax Ottomanica in the Western Christian world (İnalçık, 1999: 35). The unity of religion favoring the state and a notion of state supported by the religion created a harmony that had no equivalent in the West. This harmony

meant both a world of consistency and peace yearned for, and a still and resistant mental state. As the religion was eternal and unchanging, so was the state. Since attempts for changing the religion meant to disobey the rules of God, the same was also valid for changing the qualities of the state. This referred to the sacredness of the state. The sacred state integrated and unified the statist ideology within its body. In other words, having provided legitimacy from the religion, the state identified itself and its relations in terms of its own interests. The state itself was the realizator, inspector, bearer and protector of social harmony. The functioning of the state as an entity, free of human weaknesses, donated it with qualities of competence and eternity assuring social order. Each period of the Ottoman history was dominated by a belief that there would always be a benefit in the implementations of state; that its doings could never be completely understood by mortals and; so that questioning the state would be meaningless. Besides maintaining social order, the state was also a part of it. This is why, the state became "an eternal existence" as long as it was purified from human faults. This kind of properties brought the state closer to divine might and gave it sacredness. It was a logical necessity for an eternal state, which know what was good and bad for society, to concentrate authority in a center and to form an indispensable power structure. Furthermore, common attitudes in the society contributed to this model and created a concept of state that is the most excellent and hardly reachable thing making everything around dependant upon its mercy. In conclusion, the society related its continuity and order to those of the state, and believed that its life was a grant and attribution by *sultan*, thus, by the state.

Efforts For Change In The Statist Structure And The Republican Statism

By the sixteenth century, the classical Ottoman functioning had to realize some changes, however, occurring problems had many times been overcome in the meantime and the state had to discover new means to command the society for its own benefit. This meant being in crisis for the state. Especially, the seventeenth century exposed the significant effects of the crisis. Despite some threats to the central authority experienced in this period, the state neither totally lost its monopoly, nor they caused a shift in terms of replacing the royal family. New methods of ruling and merging with the center were put into action. The state was obliged to adjust its various institutions to new conditions, though it never lost its grip over the society. The state, whose internal and external existence became dependent on new

conditions, had to face serious changes. Yet, the state officers were more interested in daily problems than in a general shift in governing principle, centralization or inspection policies. They took the most convenient decision in terms of dominating and controlling the center and rural places under the pressure of both external and internal circumstances. The greater targets related to the state formation had not generally experienced much change. What was unstable was the endeavors, changing from period to period and from region to region, for realizing them. The state followed policies offering temporary solutions and dealing with the crisis (Barkey, 1999: 59, 61).

Since the Ottomans had faced several defeats in wars with the European powers, the statesmen (not the society) developed interest in Europe. Yet, there is discussion on when such interest first took place. Going beyond Ahmet III, its initial concrete result was in the military with Selim III. Under the influence of renewal dynamic of the West, it was clear that change was inevitable. It was not easy for a state strongly believing in the existence of a solid harmony and claiming to have based its social structure upon it to accept such shift. Thus, a new context was added to the framework of political traditions aforementioned. This new period was called Europeanization, whose effect is still a significant subject of discussion. Starting with the military, it was expanded to social, political, and administrative spheres. What is to be underlined here is that these efforts were initiated by not the society, but the state. There was a problem, yet, it was not such kind that the society could comprehend, realize or solve. The prominent position and power of the state, despite all, required that steps for catching up with the world had to be taken by the state. Thus, it put first itself then the society into a process of change through *de facto* undertakings called "reforms" (Mahçupyan, 2000: 188). It is important to keep in mind that these reforms did not base upon an "aristocratic" or "bourgeois" structure as the inherited traditions or statism never let to such a formation. That is why the Ottoman reformism was bureaucratic, as was that of the Republic (Akyol, 1999: 213). That was a consequence of classical political tradition. This is because of this tradition the expression "father state" in public slang was used and the role of child to people (the children of country) was attributed (Tachau, 1999: 90). They are still in usage. This naming also reflects a governing philosophy. In other words, both a competent concept of authority under the leadership of *sultan*, and the perception of state as a protector correspond to the expectations of society for receiving material help from the state. That is why "the elder's business is not got into", "the elder know better what to do" and "the-ir wisdom is not questioned".

Accordingly, in the last periods of the Ottomans, the discussions about change and policies geared for the state to recover its power took place at the level of state. For the parties engaged in change, their objective was to find contributors or support not in the society, but in the state. The basic struggle of those categorized simply as "Westernists" and "Traditionalists" was to take control of the bureaucracy. This also meant gaining the control of the state. Therefore, the issues about change, society and state were all invested within the state.

As harmony in the Ottoman system meant basically the adaptation of oneself to the requirements of the state, no change was permitted without the approval of state. The only way of justifying any change was that it must be performed by the state. Change was always considered as a fact starting within the state and then expanding across the society. Change first caused conflicts within the state and then between the state and the groups having lost their old position. The state, once perceived as a power providing harmony, gradually became an existence disturbing it. However, the sacralization of state as a unique value independent of people produced a kind of opposition directed against the existing owners of state, while preserving statism. Changes in the Ottoman period were mostly matters of insignificance, despite of causing some differences in the statist structure. The fact that reforms could not immediately put into action was related to the competition of two rival groups, the "Westernist" and the "Traditionalist" within the state structure. As a result, the Ottoman modernization was identified as being a slow one by the Westernists. Yet, as they dominated the state power by the Independence War, modernization activities gained a much more radical movement. Although, the Republican period presented some laws and institutions as novel, most of them were inherited from the Ottomans. For example, constitutional activities, the foundation of a parliament, political parties, etc. entered into the Turkish political life before the Republic.

The Republican state, however, presents itself officially as a "new state" and claims that it is "very different from the past", it has, in fact, no significant difference in terms of statist structure and perception. Just like in Ottomans, two of the founding factors of the statist structure (state and social order) have continued to preserve their importance and influence in the new era. The essential difference between the Ottomans and the Republic in terms of statist quality showed itself in the filling of gap generated by the termination of *Sultanate*. With the Republic, it was the civil bureaucracy until the 1960s and, since

then has been the military bureaucracy that filled the gap. The military bureaucracy has stepped forward through the National Security Council (NSC) founded just after 1960 and pending over politics like the sword of Democles. Besides, we have here again a top-down approach in the state and society relations. Many observers and historians have discussed that the Republic of Turkey represents a political continuity with the Ottomans despite of having a cultural cut off. This is to say that the Republican state adopted the view and the mentality concerning the society from the Ottoman state. The state has created a different ideological myth from the past, but that did not result in producing a mental shift in politics. What can be said for the relatively short history of the Republic is that the state-society relations and generally the political tradition have not followed a parallel path with the cultural breakage, but has continuity with the past. Even, contrarily to all claims, it can be concluded that the state still tries to protect its own legitimacy before the society, since the modern state, despite of all changes, has attached itself to social order as firmly as the Ottoman state. Consequently, not only new bases have been produced to prove the absoluteness and accuracy of the new order, but also it has been asserted that the Republic would last forever. So that, social requests having an aim in modifying the existing system could be declared illegal by the statist forces. However, it may be thought that the state has been cleared off from its religious bound, it is still considered as sacred and great*. It is fetishized through turning it into a totem (Mahçupyan, 2000: 236). The Ottoman ideology with its elements about the continuity of the unity and the wholeness of the state and religion (*Din ü devlet*), the indivisibility of state power, the supply of peace and security within the borders (*nizam-ı alem*), displays a content adopted eagerly by not only the Republican state, but also any structure claiming to become a state. Moreover, altho-

* Here some examples from some political elite: "State is a magnificent institution. When the subject is state, one should not talk "recklessly". No matter what is the subject, go for it without hesitation, but do not peck the state (Süleyman Demirel, the ninth President of the Republic); Some groups criticize prolonged traditions of the state by even weakening the state" (the former Education Minister, Mehmet Sağlam), "The state is so enormous that it cannot get smaller. As there is no evidence, I cannot blame the state. The State is great, supreme and divine. I can never blame the state. If it is proven, one can talk about the responsibility of individuals; but the state cannot be guilty (Yekta Güngör Özden, the former President of the Constitutional Court); the former Home Minister, Mehmet Ağar, mentioned once that, relating to its role in the "Susurluk Affair", he did his duty "within the framework determined by the state". For more detailed information see Sancar (2000: 63-64). As seen above, the rule of law gets only the second place for high-ranked personalities owing to their statist mentality.

ugh, the Republic has overturned the *Sultanate* and the Caliphate, it replaced the institution of *Şeyhülislam* with the Directorate of Religious Affairs and put it under the state control. This represented a choice in accordance with the favour of the Reformation bureaucrats (Alkan, 1999: 134). Kemalists, who stuck firmly to the bureaucracy in order to preserve their unity, progressed in the way to Westernization due to policies formed in the center and realized by bureaucrats. The leaders believed in the accuracy of their choices and did not wish the reluctant masses to ruin them. Their attitudes were closely similar to those of the Ottoman administration (Turan, 1999: 135). The Ottomans used the religion to justify their political activities. Islam was something, maybe the only thing, shared between the state and the society. The society in theory could resist to an official considered to be "wrong and unjust" with reference to Islam and have him step down. Therefore, Islam did not only draw the frame of the relations among social actors, but it also created a space for freedom in terms of state-society relationship (Mahçupyan, 1986: 285). In the Republic, however, secularism has tried to replace the place of religion, constituting the new source for legitimacy. Surely, this attitude has weakened the justifying aspect of the state-society relationship. The former unity of the religion and the state has left its place to a different coalition. Yet, this has not changed much of its nature in terms of being feed by the state ideology, i.e. of being insensitive to social requests. Statism, besieged by the religion in the Ottoman world, has created its own rationality in the Republic and contributed to the state independent of and above the society. On the one hand, the state monopolized political power in a limited institutional frame and ideologically determined the "legitimate" cultural identity from the top. On the other hand, it expanded political power into the economic field, directed the social surplus into the center, and therefore, created an informal mechanism of distributing it. As social actors became dependent upon this mechanism and even opposing parts aimed to benefit from it, the state both ideologically and politically strengthened its position. This resulted in a history of a society being continuously subjected to taming by the state. Its method has been control and suppression. The modern Turkey has experienced this by passing from a communal structure, *Sultanate*, to a strict statism and passive citizenship. Around the new order defined as "modern and contemporary" it has been stuck to another stagnant model (Mahçupyan, 2000: 208-209).

When changes brought about by laws did not offer visual benefits for masses in a short period of time, the policies implemented

were subjects to opposition. Instead of reevaluating them, bureaucrats preferred to apply the use of force. To them, large masses of peasants were ignorant, backward, uncivilized and reactionary and, thus, they could not be let to take a part in the process of political decision-making (Turan, 1999: 153). Those who agreed with the state were considered progressive and received benefits, though reactionaries who were thought to be harmful to social progress were pressurized. The Republic, just like its predecessor, dealt with modernization from a "bureaucratic" point of view by putting "its own priorities" first and leaving the society behind. It acted normatively, i.e., in a political-value-laden way, and wished to shape the society according to its preferred way of life. Those who opposed the official view of state were called "perverted (*zındık*), unbeliever (*mülhid*) and evil (*kötü*)" in the Ottomans and; "reactionary (*mürteci*), backward (*geri*) and having foreign connections (*kökü dışarda*)" in the Republic in order to be blamed. The behaviours of social actors out of the official ideology are evaluated in terms of having "malice" intentions. That is why this deep distrust towards social movements and dynamics has created a suspicious temper, even paranoia within the state. Some real internal and external threats have fed this paranoia to a considerable extent (Akyol, 1999: 236). The result has been the strengthening of authoritative features of the state.

Kemalism, affected by authoritative reasoning, positions the state out of and above the society and believes that it is legitimate to shape the society in accordance with the state discretion. In the essence of this legitimacy lies the fact that the state as just being a state knows what is good and right not just for the society of today or of this place, but for all. The state is qualified with having the monopoly of truth. Thus, Kemalism reduces the society to the nation, the nation to the state and, therefore, clarifies the way for imposing a strict and coercive policy upon the society. The means of this policy are clearing the public field from unproved social claims and associating it with the state. The ideal world of Kemalism is based on an image of totally homogenized society "progressing" according to the "rational and scientific" preferences of the state, obeying to the hierarchy of the state and living in harmony away from any conflict or discrimination (Mahcupyan, 2000: 247). That is why statism had an authoritative and totalitarian attitude at the beginning of the Republic. This authoritative character, unified under the one-party regime, showed a tendency desiring to be involved in each field of the society, from culture to arts, from politics to economy. That was also seen necessary. The reason for it was the fear that the existence of

an autonomous field could interrupt the project in the action. In this respect, just as in the Ottomans, it is wished that all fields should be under the control of the state, or any change or force arising in the society should be in close contact with it. Otherwise, they would be evaluated as immediate and uncontrolled "events" and subjected to a convenient "procedure".

It is possible to recognize this attitude of the Ottomans in the Republic with some alterations. Considering the appearance of political differentiation, it is not surprising that it was first a result of inter elite conflict, rather than of some progresses in the society, e.g., the conflict between İnönü and Bayar. This differentiation, later to be called as left-right conflict, in fact, would cause an inaccurate differentiation according to the modern literature of politics, in respect of that in the West. However, this was a state-approved differentiation. With regard to what all these mean for Turkey, we come across quite a pessimistic picture. In a country where politics is framed on the basis of friend-foe discrimination and where talking about politics requires a indefinite concept of "foe", an "extraordinary" atmosphere would always dominate the scene as an "enemy" would always be present. Even the periods of time spent under extraordinary regimes declared in Turkey show that the political life bears a mark of "extraordinary" state of affairs. Both that and the indicative role of the concept of "foe" in the definition of politics have caused that the borders between ordinary and extraordinary situations are unclear and almost invisible. The most important consequence bond to the extraordinary situation in the state mentality is disregarding "the rule of law" and "legality" in the advantage of "order" and "final references of legitimacy". In this respect, one may talk about policies by which the state is able to create autonomous fields. It is not possible to say that this is conducted totally "in spite of the society". Contrarily, there is a considerable exchange between the state and an important part of the society to provide its reproduction in both mind and reality. This part of the society is mobilized by the state to "frighten and destroy the enemy" when necessary, even by disobeying the most essentials of universal principles and the necessities of legal setting. Breaking the laws is justified "in the name of the state and for the sake of the state". In this context "the interests of the state" are the final reference points for legitimacy. The function of laws is an unimportant detail that can be disrespected when necessary (Sancar, 2000: 96-97). Because of this tendency in politics, political parties function in a hostile environment as they try to survive within the boundaries determined by the state and are supposed to

leave their essential social preferences to the direction of bureaucracy. Therefore, the parties in the defend of statism, secularism and nationalism cannot possibly be called "leftist" as the term implies in the Western sense. Similarly, the case of so-called "rightist" parties representing a side of opposition in a sense to the bureaucracy and acquiring, to an extent, an autonomous manner of treatment, has led to an attitude that regards them as unauthorized formations against the state. The result is the reaffirmation of vicious circle in a rigid manner, i.e., the statist structure as in its history. This is valid for not only a certain part but all in the Turkish political scale*. The sta-

* The statist character will better be understood with regard to some political developments in the Republican history. In the beginning, the statist essence considered the Islamic part as the principal danger for the policies undertaken. Especially, during the one-party regime, the religious groups were primarily dealt with, although, other parts of the political scale also illustrated their opposition. For example, renowned poet Nazım Hikmet was obliged to flee the country and lost his citizenship. The struggle with the religious part was intensive especially during the time of the National Chief, İnönü, such as the brotherhood organizations of *Süleymançılık*, *Nurculuk* and *Ticani*, and the group of the Struggle of Big East under the leadership of Necip Fazıl, etc.. Similarly, these years also experienced clashes with Turanism. By the years of multi-party regime, the primary group to be opposed to for the statist essence was different. It was the Democrat party, which identified itself as liberal. It arose as a rival force within the circles of the state. Yet, it saw its end with the military takeover in 1960. Hence, an elected Prime Minister and his ministers hanged for the first time in the Turkish political life. But this event was reflected to the public opinion as an action of the left. The years between 1960-1980 were ones when the Turkish political life experienced more fragmentation and entered into chaos. In this period, leftist groups were the competitors to the statist essence. There was no need to change the style of combat, but a new target, the leftists, to be dealt with arrived in the scene. So the means for preventing the leftist groups by the statists were not belated. The statist action against the leftist movements, increasing both locally and globally especially in the 1960s, resulted in hanging of three leftist activists (Deniz Gezmiş, Yusuf Aslan and Hüseyin İnan). These executions are still subjects of a dispute from a legal point of view. Similarly, they were presented to the society as the revenge of the rightists against the leftists in reply to the previous acts. Yet, there had been no execution by the right or left in the country. For the statist essence, all represented dangers to be politically eliminated. The society was subjected to a different presentation each time. By the military coup in 1980, the leftists were also tamed. As in parallel with the increasing role of religion in the global scale, religious politics started to reappear on stage after the 1980s and Islamists became more effective than other groups. The arrows again turned to religious groups. The so-called "postmodern military coup" on 28 February 1998 meant their re-suppression. This is, the Turkish political structure has recovered its "order" and "peace" from the view of the statist groups.

As understood so far, political struggle in the Republican period has not been among various political factions, but between the state and them. The statist essence continuously attempts to preserve politics for itself as it has declared itself as the guarantor of modernity. In doing so, it presents any social or political event as being undertaken against the integrity and unity of the state with the society. It tries to vindicate its illegal and anti-democratic attitudes and applications in the name of "protecting unity and integrity and providing peace and order".

tist attitude has always been afraid of unplanned developments and treated them with suspicion. What has been quite adequate for it is controlling or eliminating them if possible. That is the reason why the state has wished all political organizations to be in close touch with itself. This means security for those accepting that deal. Otherwise, they should expect hostile, even illegal and illegitimate treatments. As a result, being leftist, rightist, Islamist or nationalist, etc., is only acceptable as long as statist attitude is approved and contributed to. Those refuse to be statist are considered as harmful and therefore have no right to exist. Accordingly, in societies where authoritarianism is the dominant feature of politics, political parties are unable to stand on their own feet, but have to lean on the state. In such cases when state is unable to keep up with social developments, they lose their ability of representation and become meaningless. A big field of political decision-making is laid on before persons or establishments rightly addressing to the state. One who climbs on the hierarchy in accordance with the recommendation of his/her protector is smoothly included in the decision-making circles effective on each unit of the state and the society. Briefly, real politics takes place within the state. As expressed above, factions leading to today's political parties are formed inside the state. Therefore, politics is perceived as a struggle in the inner circles of the state away from the society, which is supposed to obey whoever is the winner. This is, it is the state at where what is "public" should only be discussed and decided upon. This tradition has resulted in its identification with the state. Turkish society is completely remained foreign to a concept of public where social actors encounter each other at their own discretion (Mahçupyan, 2000: 274). The Republican politics, which is supposed to open and expand public sphere in the advantage of society, has unified "public" with the state and subjected social life to its norms. This is, the active force that feeds politics is the state itself. If we talk about pluralism that can only mean a statist pluralism and democratization. In other words, it is not possible to speak of a process of democratization in which social requests are reflected in the political area. Political actors and parties acting in accordance with their social basis are not welcomed. They are supposed to be state-centered and composing of such personalities conforming statism, as certain social norms brought about by the state, at the same time, impose a specific life style and morality. Those who adopt them can receive considerable material reward and secure political carriers.

"Turkish modernization" has defined the state as the sole politi-

cal actor to democratize and reform the society. It can be argued that all efforts geared for democratization have, in fact, aimed to maintain an unchanged state-society relationship and had an image of stagnant society. Hence, the legitimacy of state has become dependent upon itself. This is, any decision is "legitimate" if it is taken by the state. If the existence of the state is considered under threat, the rule of law can easily be put aside in "precautions" to be taken. The authority to determine whether such threat exists or not belongs to the National Security Council, that represents the core of the state and gathers all statist qualities within itself. Deciding that there exists a threat also means to declare that an "extraordinary" situation has been entered into. In brief, "Turkish modernization" meant only a change once in both the structures of state and society, and the owners of the state as the actors of this change realized a reform for enlarging their space of movement. As if the request for and the possibility of change terminated as soon as transforming the empire into a Republic and the perception of a religious legitimacy to a secular one, the Republican regime assumed that it recaptured an "eternal and endless" and "correct" social model. It returned to the principal of social order of the Ottomans in a different ideological framework with a modern appearance. The basic act of politics was once more decided as controlling social change and protecting the state power against the society. As a consequence, it is accredited that the state making laws "for the state and in the name of state" can violate them, though, it should also obey them. On the one hand, the state does not hesitate from breaking the laws "when necessary"; on the other hand, it requests a strict application of laws violating human rights. Yet, with regard to citizens, "the state" violating easily the laws becomes a firm operator of them and their repressive techniques without concession. Since "law is law and whatever it commands should be done". It even tries to legitimize "illegal proceedings" in terms of the "requirements of the laws".

Conclusion

Turkish modernization was not doubtlessly based on a strong intellectual preparation, such as in the West. We can also understand this situation from the evaluations of statesmen in the process of modernization. These changes, first defined as becoming French (Ottoman), were generally named Europeanization in both the last period of the Ottoman Empire and the first period of the Republic. In a country having no strong theoretical background and intelligentsia, it took the name of Americanization as close relations developed with

the USA with the beginning of multi-party regime. In the 1960s, the source of inspiration was not a specific country or continent anymore. The term "Westernization" as a more inclusive definition was mostly qualified until the 1980s. The real definition however was given after 1980 when the world started to discuss postmodernism. In other words, at a time when the period of two centuries was barely understood, the world began to talk about globalization. In such time, the state-oriented, authoritarian elite was extremely uncomfortable with autonomous social development. A similar discomfort shows itself also today. The Republican state, just like the Ottoman state, wishes to control every inch of social body. It becomes, therefore, impossible for it to adopt itself to global changes as needed.

As understood from above, the state means everything for the Turkish political tradition. Everything is determined by the state and for the state. Its existence means those of social order and society. If it does not exist none of these can exist. That is why its authorization is necessary for any development to be experienced. The essential has been always the state. Therefore, one can only talk about a nation of the state, but not a state of the nation. Similarly, it is difficult to talk about a settled official ideology. There is only a point of view changeably determined according to circumstances. The purpose is about providing the permanency of the state. The Republican period represents a direct continuity with the Ottoman past in terms of the position of state and its definition for itself. What is different is that the source of legitimacy is not contextualized out of the state, but in its own ideology. This approach broke one's perception about the unity of ordinary person with the state on the mental level in the Ottoman past, and put the individual and the state in conflict. Accordingly, as there was no settled pattern during the Republican history, it was not the official ideology but always the statist discourse that has altered under the influence of circumstantial waves. The one that is not changed is the statist essence. The tradition of strong state is firmly attached to. Therefore, any opposition is treated with suspicion, as it is believed that it weakens the authority and performance of the state. The principal of accepting the political legitimacy of "other", a requirement of democratization and pluralism, does not find place in this authoritative political attitude. Because not only the thoughts, but also the purposes and mentality of other are evil. The state always wants to face a weak society. In other words, the owner of the state is not the society itself, but a group separating itself from the society. As it is implied from time to time, the state has "secret owners". Since the statist tradition makes the society dependent

upon the state, these "owners of the state" also become the owners of the society. As a result, the society is accountable for reshaping itself according to the requirements of the state. In case of conflict, the liability belongs to the society. For example, when a shift occurred within the state in 1920s, it required the society to change as well mostly in cultural terms. As this requirement was not adequately responded, the society was faced severe punishment. Today, while the state stays still, the society keeps changing. This time, however, the state tries to punish the society since it changes at its own discretion. What is wanted is that the society should act according to the needs of state. Social movements opposing to the framework determined by the state have always been found threatening for the existence of state. Therefore, having a stagnant society is preferred. In other words, forces monopolizing the state power have continuously attempted to maintain a society with a monotonous military order and integrity where all differences are diminished. Since the state is considered as the sole agent of protecting unity and integrity, it is blessed and accepted as a supreme existence. Therefore, the statist attitude has always viciously treated any formation or potential situation out of the state control. The acting field of everything (individual, group, party, the institutions of civil society, etc.) can only exist by leaning on the state. Otherwise, there is no guarantee for right to exist. With regard to the point reached today, one may talk about a statist sort of pluralism and democratization, but not one that let social requests be reflected in the political field and organized. The boundaries of imagining a social order where pluralism is reproduced are designed by the boundaries of the essential structures of legal discourse formed by the existing state and its reflection in our minds. Democracy does not, though, refers to only a technique of political decision-making, but also a commitment to the principle that the hegemony of one group over the rest should be prevented. This means that those who desire to follow an alternative path other than the one imposed by the dominants may realize their ends.

Briefly, Turkish political culture includes various traditions of its predecessors. According to the old political tradition and that of the Ottomans, the state is the essential institution of the legal and legitimate authority. Those who legally hold this authority in their hands bear the responsibility of protecting social order and increasing general prosperity. What this implies is that the order provided by the state should be consistent and stagnant. Besides, there should be a natural differentiation between those who govern and those who are governed. The candidates for the governing class separates

themselves from the society and let themselves become dependent on the economic and political booty provided by the state. Consequently, they spent a considerable effort for not becoming an ordinary member of the society again. Accordingly, the state turns to be a mechanism that is not designed to meet social requests, but to shape the society in parallel to its requirements. In other words, the state performs as an agent of the owners of the state, who label themselves as "the state".

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II.

Issues with Turkish Democratization and Identity in The Process of Nation - State*

Introduction

Each state represents all kind of variations and cultures found in the society. If these variations that form a consensus are expressed in the state and the relation between the state and the society is founded by this argument, the state will become her people state and it can continue its existence. Since, all different groups, ideologies, communities and religious beliefs will be represented and the identity of society will develop naturally, there will not be a problem of disintegration or for all the different groups who live together. Because, the state is over the different groups and represents each of them. As a matter of fact, some advanced democratic countries resolved, at least, most of the main problems associated with this mentality. That is, each class and community is represented in the state and see themselves as a part of the state. On the contrary, our history of modernisation expresses the reverse. The issue arose in the last period of the Ottoman Dynasty was the problem of representation of the different groups in the state. The central state structure did not involve and represent these groups within the modernisation movement. This brought about representative crisis.

* This is the first publication of this article.

Historical Background

The problems of democratisation and identity crisis are not new issues. They have a historical background. Therefore, if we want to understand these problems we should analyse the last period of the Ottoman Dynasty. Especially, the Restoration Period (Tanzimat Period) as a mirror gives us important explanations. Because, the Ottoman Dynasty had collapsed at this period. At the same time, there were important social and political movements, that were reflected in the Republic of Turkey, for the protection of Ottoman Integration. That's why, while we analyse Turkey's identity crisis and democratisation problems, we should begin from the political movements of the last period of the Ottoman.

In Turkish history, until the Ottoman's last period there was no identity crisis. At the beginning period of the Ottoman Empire, the ruling class were concerned about ancient Turkish history and legends. They defined themselves through these legends and the history. After a short period, the Ottoman Dynasty was far away from Turkish sentiments and back to an Islamic identity. Of course, there were some reasons of that which we can sum up in three items. One of them was the conquest of Istanbul in 1453. This conquest was made Turks more conscious of an imperial, as a distinct from a merely tribal mission. Because, the conquest of Istanbul was very important for the muslim peoples. Secondly, the rise of the Turkish but Shi'ite power of Safavadis in Iran cut them off from the eastern Turkish world and flung them into bitter religious conflict with their nearest Turkish neighbours. Finally, the conquest of Syria and Egypt (1516-17) and of Iraq (1534) brought the ancient of the Islamic Empire under their rule. So that, the state's identity was won, not formally, Islamic and imperial characters. These characters continued, in particular, the Islamic side for Muslim peoples and imperial side for non-Muslim peoples, until the last period of the Ottoman Empire.

When the Ottoman Empire lost, firstly, some part of land by agreement of Kucuk Kaynarca, the ruling class began a new investigation. The first modernisation tendency was begun with the defeat of the army under Sultan Ahmet III. Ahmet III saw the problem only in the army. To him, Ottoman army was not as powerful as it had been. For that, it should be restructured to be like an existing western army in order to regain old power. Because of the position of the old army (Janissariy), this idea could not be implemented by his time. Since, despite Janissary's defeat in

battles, they had a lot of power in the structure of the state. The idea of modernisation was not favoured by them. That's why, restructuring or establishment of a new organisation was very difficult to achieve. But, the support for innovation movements had been increasing in the state apparatus.

During Selim III period, modernisation was also taken as a form like Ahmet III. Selim III also tried to implement same policy. But he was partly successful. Whatever he had not been able to abolish the old army organization (Janissary), he established as an alternative organisation which was called Nizam-i Cedid. So that, according to them, their decline would have been ended by establishing a new army, but the new army was not a solution. For that, they thought modernisation as was a matter of form only. Because, the modernisation in the army was not successful. The movement ignored its social and cultural roots. Therefore, in Sultan Mahmut II's period, we find many more reforms modernisation movements not only in the army, but also in social and cultural areas. He tried to introduce a western social and cultural mode of the life to the state. The janissary organisation, which had approximately 500 years history in the state, was abolished. Since then Sultan Mahmud II's policies and implementations have been evident in the society. The transformation of the society to western mode of life was, firstly, begun under his rule, such as changing the traditional dress with western mode, wearing fez, traditional arm music was changed with western band team etc... Secondly, we see same the policy in the Republic of Turkey, by Mustafa Kemal. So, Sultan Mahmut II had taken many reactions from the society. Most of the people called him as *gıaour* (non-muslim). Since the reforms did not base on consent of the people. On the contrary, they were made compulsory for the people. Everybody had to replace their traditional customs with new (western) customs. Thus, we see the first reactionary movement of the people against modernisation. Because, Mahmut II's policies were implemented in a very radical way. However, the decline of the state was continuing and it had been lost some part of her lands as a result of the war.

Until that period, there are two movements. One of them is westernisation and the other is traditionalism. In particular, westernisation movement in the empire provided a support non-muslim people of the dynasty. It increased their nationalistic emotions. Thus, by the decline of the empire, the separatist movements in the empire were increased. So, some Ottoman

thinkers (Ziya Pasha, Namik Kemal etc.) tried to develop a different consciousness for the protection of the Ottoman integrity. As said above, during early years of the decline, the state faced the problems that were mostly created by the non-muslim people. These people were, firstly, affected by the nationalistic movements. After a short time, these movements were seen as religious divisions in the society. For that reason, some statesmen or thinkers, who were also affected, had been trying to develop a new identity which was called Ottomanism. This identity was different from the old identity. Since the old identity (which was also called Ottomanism) was much more Islamic. Whereas, the new identity was based much on more citizens concept. As a result of the new identity, the integration of the Ottoman would have been protected and thus, non-muslim people would have been remained in the Ottoman Empire. But, by the time, this new identity (Ottomanism) did not provide a conciliation between the state and her people. The separatist movements (of non-muslim people, at the beginning) had continued and at the end, they reached their own nation-state. After the nationalistic movements, they began to think of themselves, not as Ottoman, but as Greeks, Serbs, Bulgars and Armenians. The struggle of the Christian people for national independence created a new bitterness between Muslims and Christians. Thus, Ottomanism did not provide a solution for the integrity of non-Muslim people. Since that identity- had, in particular, been thought for integration of non-Muslim people.

On the other hand, nationalist movements did not only affect non-muslim peoples of the Dynasty, but also its muslim people. Therefore, some thinkers and statesmen who defended Ottomanism tried to develop a different identity. One of them was Namik Kemal who was called the fatherland poet. When Namik Kemal felt the dawn of doubt as to the loyalty of the Arabs to the Ottoman Empire, he assured himself with thoughts of Islamic brotherhood and allegiance to the caliphate. His pan-Islamism, however, cultural rather than political-the way of uniting the people of Islam must be sought, not in political aims or doctrinal disputes but in the presence of preachers, in the page of the book (Holy Book).

During Abdulhamid II period, Pan-Islamism had become official policy. Then, the task was to drive out foreign invaders, abolish foreign concessions and immunities, restore the true Islamic faith- and reunite all the muslims in a single state under its law-

ful sovereign the Caliph. In this way, Abdulhamit's pan-Islamism was different from Namik Kemal's one, its identity also included political aims. But its task was obviously beyond the capabilities of the Empire. Since, Pan-Islamist policy which not only included Ottoman muslims, but also other muslim people who were outside of the borders of the Ottoman Empire. They thought that the lost land of the Ottoman (non-muslim's land) would have been won with participation of non-Ottoman muslim people. But this identity was also collapsed. Because, this did not also protect the integrity of the Empire. On the other side, the state was declining. Muslim people, such as Arabs, Albanians, were trying to form their own national state. Some thinkers observed what was happening and attempted to develop a reactionary attitude toward muslim people. From this we see a new identity developed which was called Pan-Turkism. Especially, the thinkers who defended the new identity came from Russia. They had very powerful nationalistic emotions because of Russian pressure. Their offer, neither Ottomanism nor Pan-Islamism, was only Pan-Turkism. According to the most famous of them: Gaspirali Ismail, Akcuraoglu Yusuf, Agaoglu Ahmet, neither Ottomanism nor Pan-Islamism provided independence or integrity. Independence could only be provided by Turkist ideals. The facts and events showed us that non-muslims people and some muslim people left the Ottoman state. And only then could we provide the independence based on the Turkist ideals. Wherever Turks live, their fatherland concept included these areas. In other words, the lost lands of the Ottoman Empire to non-muslim and some muslim people would have been won by Pan-Turkist ideals. But this Pan-Turkist identity did not prevent the disintegration of the Ottoman state.

On the other hand, with the further development of the modernisation idea, some bureaucrats, politicians (pasha) defended westernisation ideas more powerfully. To them, neither Pan-Islamism nor Pan-Turkism was the answer to the state's problem or to territorial problems. The prospects were in the West. The western world based its development on rational/scientific ideas. They believed that "if we want to protect our integrity and prevent the disintegration, we should follow their procedures. Otherwise the disintegration will be inevitable". These people were in-exile in western capital cities such as London, Berlin and Paris etc.. They were influenced by the western ideas. At the same time, the westernisation ideas were brought to the Ottoman state by them.

In brief, all these ideas were trying to achieve to power. Their aims did not win public opinion, but affected the statesman because the traditional state in Turkey was authoritarian. But this does not mean in the western sense. The authoritarian state in Turkey means that she does not have a democratic struggle and tradition in her past. Especially, in the rising period there was no distance between the state and her people. The state replied the demand of the people until the last period. So, in this way, the development of the traditional Turkish state differed from the western development. The state was accepted like a father by her people. The perception of the state was not aimed the participation of the people in democratic sense. The people were not seen as the way to the power in the last period. So that, all the supporters of the new ideas (Pan-Turkism, Ottomanism, Westernisation and Pan-Islamism) tried to obtain favour with the bureaucrats (civil, religious and military). Obtaining the support of the bureaucrats meant that the power was achieved. Therefore, it was very important to obtain support of the bureaucrats. That is, these ideas were Jacobenist. Their supporter (ideologist) did not try to influence the people because of the traditional authoritarian state. They only tried to win the support of the bureaucrats (statesmen). To them, they should, firstly, obtain the structure of the state. If they obtain completely the state control the people would then easily adapt to the new state's policy (ideology). We see the same mentality at the founders of the Republic. That is, all of them were top-down, not bottom-up. However, all these ideas influenced the founders of the republic at certain degrees. But the degree differed. Some of them were affected much more than others. Nevertheless they were all affected to some extent.

The Republican Period

When the founders established the state, they saw, firstly, the transformation of people as an important task, for be state. The new state refused to consider the traditionally mentality, they argued that they presented new ideas, new reforms to the people as in every civilized countries. That is, they believed that they had reached absolute truth. So, these ideas which were impose on the people without any displacement were very important for them. They waited absolutely obedience from the people without discussing or criticizing, but it could not be. Since, the reforms or the ideas had always seen a large reaction by the people. Because, these reforms or the ideas did not conform with tra-

ditional people's belief and customs. In spite of the people, they were taken. People's opinion had no effect on the reforms. They were top-down and their implementation as very radical based on compulsory. In addition, the state defined herself as a nation-state. As a known, nation-state based on centralisation, an absolute sovereign state and national homogeneity. We see these features in the republic state.

Especially, these features were a very useful instrument in order to transform of the people. Because, by the Republic, the founders of the state formed a new official ideology. That ideology was different from the all identities mentioned above, however, it was also affected by them. In particular, westernisation was the main part of the ideology. Thus, by the official ideology, we see that most important factor for the new state was to impose the ideology on the people. Since, it was believed that the development and civilisation would be provided by that ideology.

The most important feature of the new state is to have official ideology. This ideology introduced a new idea as the land of Turks. This idea was so new that the Turkish language had even lacked a name for it. On the one hand, language was seen only a common factor for the nation-state, nationality. On the other hand, people who speak the same language but outside of the country were not taken into account. Whereas, the language is not compulsory condition for the nation-state. Nation state can be established by other factors (religion, culture, economic etc...). Since the substance of the nation belongs to common features of the individual or people. For instance, In Germany, the race, the language of the people could be functionally for her nation-state, but in France it is different. Common culture and history of the people played a very important role in every nation-state.

That is, in democratic countries, the state which had taken into account her different social structure organized and the nation-state was established according to this rule. But, in Turkey, at the beginning of the republic, the state rejected different her social structure. Her aim was to form homogeneity or unite society through the official ideology whereas the society has different characters, cultural features in itself. At the same time the people with the different culture-different ethnicity supported the independent war or participated in it. All of them protected the country from the external enemy, no one thought to separate the state. But the structure of the state became source of the debate. That is, the state and the society came to oppose each other. Moreover

the nationalist movement involved in a different content from the pre-republic period. The nationalistic idea of the Republic bases on its homeland. This means that the territorial nation state based on the Turkish nation in Turkey. It was first appearance in the early days of the Kemalist Revolution. The national pact (Misak-i Milli) of 1919-1920 containing the basic demands of the nationalist in Anatolia. United in religion, in race and in aim in which full and undivided sovereignty is required. Mustafa Kemal soon made it clear that he was fighting for the people of Turkey and for any vaguer, larger entity beyond the national frontiers, whether defined by religion or by race. He explicitly rejected this kinds of movements as useless and dangerous.

For their Muslim and Turkish brothers elsewhere, the people of Turkey had the greatest sympathy and the warmest of feelings-but no more.

In spite of implementations, there were also some problems about the development. Whatever the state adopted western type of development, but she had same conditions and dynamics. As we know, in advanced western countries, bourgeoisie played important role in their development despite of negative results. But, in Turkey, at the beginning, there were no industry and no bourgeoisie. She had only two type of persons: civil servant and farmer. So, the remedy was in the state. The state would have been taken, temporarily, to the progress instead of bourgeoisie. At the same time, the protection of the reforms and the principles of the revolution were made necessary. To them, if the state did not dominate all areas, It could be faced a reactionary movement. Whatever the founders adopted western type of development, their policy implementations were different from the western advanced countries. Therefore, she desired to control the economic areas. Just as, first investors of the republic were bureaucrats who, at the same time, carried the official ideology to the people. So that, we see that the state won a total character and holistic perspective. These total character were in every area such as culture, social life, politics and economic areas. As a matter of fact, the later implementations of the state were corrected to this idea. For instance, in social area, the hat law in which everybody had to wear a hat; in the cultural area, we see letter revolution, until that time, Turkish people had used to Arabic letter. By the letter revolution, people have to use the Latin letter *hı* particular, this implementation plays important role for cutting historical links. So, historical experiments and accumulations of the

Ottoman were forgotten. In political area, there was one-party until 1950. However, at the end of the 1920 and early 1930 years, there were two experiments of passing the system of multi-party. But, they were not successful. Because, in the founders' eyes, these opposition parties had taken an anti-revolutionary character. Just as, after a short period, these parties were closed.

Meanwhile, we should take into account the conjunctural changes then. In the western world, some important changes occurred. In Europe, one-party implementations were increasing whereas the popularity of democratic regime was rapidly decreasing. In Turkey, as I said above, the western development was adopted. While the some western countries (like Germany, Italy etc.) turned to one-party regimes Turkey was also affected by that. Just as after Mustafa Kemal, founder of the Republic, Recep Peker who was the ex-prime minister in one-party period formed the principals of the Republic from Mustafa Kemal's speech. The principles called Ataturkculuk (Ataturkism) have been discussing in Turkey since then. Now every politician has to be adopted to the ideology. If one party wants to enter into political life it has to adopt Ataturkism to its own regulation according to the law of political parties.

Now, we can ask that why the official ideology was formed. The answer is simple; After the death of Ataturk the bureaucrats wanted to continue his domination over the society/the state. They wanted to use his charisma for their aims, for example 27 May 1960 military intervention was prepared by the civil and military bureaucrats. That is, they saw the official ideology as a remedy for themselves. At the same time the conjuncture was suitable to form an official ideology because of increasing one-party regimes in the Western Europe.

As we see, the state apparatus and the institutions did not turn to the people. The main political decisions were taken in order to transform the people. The politicians and the bureaucrats were like missionaries. If the state had been organized according to the people and the culture it could have been successful. On the contrary, the bureaucrats were alien to the people. At the same time their working procedures were not in modern or in Weberian sense. For instance, the army normally in modern sense is tasked to defence the country against the external enemies. So it should be organised to this idea. But, in Turkey, the army does not only defend the country but also protects the official ideology. It see itself as a guard of the official ideology. As

a matter of fact, when the official ideology fall in a danger, then the army may execute its role like 1960, 1971 and 1980 military interventions. This situations has led to much more troubles against democracy.

Because, the civilian politicians execute their decision under the shadow of the army.

As said above, the first modernisation movement occurred in the army, under Selim III reign. This tradition has been continuing in Turkey's political life. Because, every new movement was succeeded by the army. For example, the final victory of constitutional and representative principles came in 1908, as a result of threatening military rebellion. A decade later Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) and other generals transformed the Ottoman Empire into a modern nation-state. Thus, for nearly two hundred years, the soldiers have been the foremost modernisers of Turkey. That is ,the state has a militarian tradition. This character affects the political life. When we look at the history of the republic, until 1960 we cannot see any shadow of the army in the political life. Because, the first politicians came from the army. Most of them were generals or civilian guards (national heros) in the independence war. But, by the 1950, firstly we see different people and an opposition party (Democrat Party) against Republican People Party (that established the republic) in the political life. Within the opposition party came to power at 1950 by a democratic election the popularity/power of the civilian bureaucrats started to decrease. Until that time, they had seen themselves as dominant factor of the state. They were not civil servants in modern sense. They acted as missionaries against the Democrat Party. Just as, the 1960 intervention was made by civil servants who collaborated with military bureaucrats. However, the intervention did not prevent their decline. Since 1960, their decline has been continuing. Now, they do not have any power in the politics. On the contrary, the role of the army in the political and social life has increased. Especially, the intervention increased its power much more. As a matter of fact, the new constitution (1960) was prepared by them. The rules they desired were put into the new constitution. Moreover, by the new constitution, the National Unity Committee was formed as if it was over the legislative organ. Thus, the civil politics were entered more closely into control of the army. By this committee, they (the generals) stood up on the politics. Same institutions was brought up with the 1982 Constitution. That constitution was also prepared under the control of the army. But,

the National Unity Committee was transformed to the National Security Council. The decisions of the council, formally, are advisory, not compulsory. This means that, like a legislative organ, it takes some decisions about some territorial security questions and the legislative organ has to take charge of its "advisory decisions".

So far, it has not been seen any rejection of these decision by the legislative organ. All decisions was accepted and were seen as necessary.

On the other hand, by the creation of the Army Mutual Assistance Association (OYAK) in 1961 brought the armed forces directly into business and industry. Within the few years, OYAK had grown into one of the largest and most profitable conglomerates in the country, providing high dividends to its military investors. The generals had become a privileged group in the society and therefore had a major stake in maintaining the status quo. Their fortunes were no longer tied to those of a party or a leader but to the regime itself. Some institutions like OYAK which were established in military period are as hunchback in civilian democratic life . In short, there is the shadow of military over the democracy of Turkey. But, this situation creates many problems for social life. As a matter of fact, the social life in Turkey has not been far away from the chaotic atmosphere. The most important factor of the chaos is the state herself; the structure of the state and her attribute towards her people.

As explained above, while the state was establishing she tried to organize herself as a nation-state. The target of the founder was to catch up with the western advanced countries. As a result of this, they took some politic decisions and implemented some reforms. Some of them were imported from the Western countries without any change, such as the administrative structure and law was taken from France; the civilian law from Switzerland; the criminal law from Italy etc. whereas Turkey has a long history. Although she had established an empire lived for ages and has a sufficient historical accumulation and experiment as well as a strong state tradition, she was bom like a new baby, no history, no accumulating, no law. Yet the founders rejected Ottoman history and the Ottoman Empire. They looked for their roots in pre-Ottoman history,even in the ancient central Asia tribal Turks.So that they wanted to be legitimated in the public opinion.Whatever they refused the Ottoman state, its institution and its tradition; there is a fact that Turkey is a remainder of the Ottoman Dynasty.

The society with multi-ethnic, multi-culture, multi-language consists of the same people but at different variations and scales. The consciousness, attitudes and customs of the people are the same. The fact has not changed however the history was formally refused. The belief of the founders was to create a new nation-state. After the independent war there was also a fear among them about disintegration. Therefore, they thought that if they had recognized the multi-groups of the society the state would have entered into a process of disintegration. So, they rejected the multi-ethnic and multi-lingual society. They tried to create a new identity through the official ideology. This new identity was based on Turkishness. According to this, despite the people's roots, ethnicity, beliefs every person who live in Turkey was accepted as Turk except minorities, such as Greeks, Armenians, Jews etc., whose rights was determined by the international agreements. As known, Turkish population consists of a mosaic. Most of the people in Turkey came from Balkans, Caucasus, the Middle East, the central Asia etc. That is there is no homogeneity. To one claim, there are 28 ethnic groups in the population. To the another claim, it is much more than 30. Each person has their own languages, creeds and customs. The Republican state did not recognize these differences. By the official ideology/nationalism she tried to transform the society from multi-cultural structure to one. So that, the founders thought that the state should have one language, one culture, one society. Consequently, we see extreme centralisation, central administration in the state structure in order to achieve these aims. This policy/implementation has created a lot of doubles, not only ethnic but also religious. For instance, while a woman/man feels herself/himself as a Turk if she/he does not accept the official ideology, she/he is not a good citizen in the eyes of the state. On the contrary if somebody does not feel himself as a Turk or his ethnicity is different but he accepts the official ideology, that man is treated as a good citizen. So, most of the people who are Turkoman faced problems because of the official ideology. Within the Republic there was a distance between the state and the society and it has not completely closed yet. But recently, in spite of some troubles, there is a closer relationship. Since the 1980s the elimination process of the official ideology has been started.

Conclusion

The identity crisis in the Ottoman Empire firstly began when

the state faced some troubles with her people. The kinds of the offered identity had shifted from one to another over the time. They were Ottomanism as a upper level identity not based on the religious, races, ethnicities or communities; Pan-Islamism based on the religious; Pan-Turkism based on racial characters. Each of them was very popular under the well-defined conditions. Furthermore, there was also another identity.

The westernisation in which its philosophical roots came from the west not from the society. Despite the westernisation movement, the policies of the westernisation were taken as a form, such as replacing the traditional dresses by the western ones, because of especially not understanding of substance of the Industrial Revolution and French Revolution.

That is, all of them had total character. Their aims were to be dominant over the structure of the state, not win the supports of the people. All policies of them were top-down in character.

By the republic, we see different identity from the above. Each of them has affected this identity, however, its main parts consisted of mainly westernisation and particularly Pan-Turkism (Islam had an effect less than the other). This identity was different from the others and was called Turkishness. Since, Turkey was new conception and alien in form Turkish speaking Orthodox Christians from Anatolia were closed as Greeks and sent to Greece, children of muslim Bosniaks or Albanians, Kurds or Arabs settled in Istanbul were accepted as Turks. Significantly, religion still appeared, in some situation, on identity card and other official documents and the designation Turk was in common usage restricted to muslims; the rest were known as Turkish citizens but never as Turks. However, by this identity, the only character of the identity was seen as the language. Other factors, characters were forgotten. By the time, the language became a source of the many problems.

In terms of the democratisation, the history of the state tradition in Turkey has an authoritarian character. There were no power struggle among the various groups or the communities in the society. The state and the Dynasty were accepted as sacred. In the other words, they were accepted as a father. This perception has been seen as a barrier to the democratisation of the society. Other factors have been seen as the civil and the military bureaucrats. However the civil bureaucrats lost completely their old power they affected the political and social life until the 1960s. The army has had an important place since the Ottoman

period in the state structure and in the social life. Just as, the first modernisation movement was begun in the army. That is, the army was taking priority of the innovation. It has been the most popular institution in the society since the Ottoman Empire and there is still a myth of the army among the people. I think it plays a barrier role against the democratisation.

The Turkish society does not have a pluralistic consciousness but it has a pluralistic ground. There are not well-developed civil organisations. The existing civil organisations act as a state institutions because of strict control of the state. The participation of the people to politics is only provided through the ballot. As a result of this the army can easily intervene to the civilian politics.

Whenever they desired, they can direct the society. For that reason, the civilian groups should be powerful and their number should be increased in order to achieve the democratization and at the same time the army has to withdrawn to their barracks. They should not only intervene the civil political decisions but also not any comment on them. Moreover, the National Security Council stated over the legislative organ should be abolished. This Council is another negative factor for the democratisation in Turkey. Because, as known, sovereignty in the democracy is belong to legislative organ.

In short, the source of the problems in Turkey is the structure of the state, not the people. The people, by the Republic, was alienated from the state they established. Since, while the state was being established its structure did not form to the people. On the contrary, the state had tried to transform her people according to the official ideology. Of course, she has a historical roots. But the content of her adopted ideology was alien to the people. There were no historical links between them. So that, the official ideology created a distance between the state and the people. Because the structure of the state and the society were determined by top-down policies or Jacobenist mentality. In order to be a democratic state, the state should be formed by bottom-up policies and include all the different communities and the characters in the society. The homogeneity policy of the official ideology should be eliminated. The state should act as the representor of all the communities and the groups. If she acts in the favour of one of them then she becomes only the state of one group. Consequently, others would react against the state. For that, the state or the system should have a forum character for

the groups in the society. Since, in the last period of the Ottoman and in the history of the Republic, the dialogue between the different groups has never been able to be formed. Every group or the movement has lived in their world. There has been no discussion between them. All of them have written and talked about different concepts. Each group wants to come power and transforms the society in favour of themselves by top-down policies without taking into account the society. There are recently some changes in terms of the relationship between the groups, but it is so new. Before 1980 these groups were fighting in the street with each other.

In conclusion, if Turkey wants to achieve her social peace she takes into account the different groups and should not be organised according to her official ideology. It is inevitable for the state to abolish that ideology in order to achieve democratisation. She should be play a forum role among the various groups.

III.

Third Sector or NGO's as a Means of Social and Political Development in Turkey*

Conceptual and Historical Context

Following Western nations, Turkish civil organizations are regarded as the third sector along with the public and private sectors. They have also become a concrete focus of power in Turkey as the fifth power. Nevertheless, a broader scope beyond this distinction is that the third sector is a criterion for democracy and development. In general, many concepts are employed to define this sector and the foundations that belong to them. Today, different terms in Turkish terminology such as voluntary organizations (VO), civil society foundations (CSF), democratic mass organizations (DMO), federations, confederations, foundations, associations, syndicates, guilds, professional associations, cooperatives and clubs are used as well as the widely used expression "Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)", which was adopted from Western terminology. In history, such concepts as congregation, society, sect, guild and foundation were used to represent NGOs. The organizations which all these concepts refer to may be grouped under the title "Third Sector".

It is clear from the etymology of the term 'civil society' in Turkey is relatively new and puzzling, compared to its Western origins da-

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ting back to the sixteenth century. The present use of the term worldwide, on the other hand, indicates the institutions which voluntarily conduct activities for the good of the public without any aims of profit on a national or international platform; which is organized outside the state (and/or market); and which acts independent of the state, and having its own financial resources, Hudock (1999:1). However, apart from non-governmental organizations, the wide use of 'civil society' encompasses a vast array of organizations: economic, cultural, informational, and educational organizations; interest groups; developmental organizations; issue-oriented movements; and civic groups, Diaz (1993:56).

A quick look at the historical development and the current situation of the third sector in Turkey shows that the definition above gets blurred on all three grounds for many of the third sector organizations. In addition, apart from being affected by market conditions, there is no straight-cut dichotomy between the state and the civil society as some of the third sector cooperates with the state in the implementation of certain policies.

Compared to their European and American counterparts, it is observed that the NGOs in Turkey are weaker in their number of members, the activities they carry out and their influence on governments and the public as a pressure group. This is very much to do with the political culture of governments and the tradition whereby the public criticizes the ruling government and the way the society fights for its rights. The groups trying to act as independent entities are regarded as being in a dubious position. Governments have considered each formation of the independent centers of power as a threat against itself and struggled to stop their growth. In other words, the organization of the civil society has always been equated from the very beginning with "breaking away with government's rule, opposition to government and treason". Consequently, the state has generally preferred to keep NGOs under strict control as much as possible by imposing restrictions on them instead of providing them with the suitable grounds to flourish. In the periods when transition regimes emerged, it is observed that the heaviest pressure was exerted on NGOs. This, in turn, gave the state and its employees the opportunity to develop public policies as they wished.

Generally speaking, it is obvious that the state has not maintained a coherent perspective of civil society foundations. Nevertheless, as private enterprises' weight in the economy increases, both the state and the public's perspectives of civil society foundations have considerably changed and more developments that are positive have taken

place in favor of them since 1980. The state encouraged unions founded before the 1980s to support public foundations and to contribute to governmental services. School-family unions are a good example of this, however they bridged a good deal of distance. While providing public services such as family-planning, the state encouraged civil organizations, for it needed the participation of some civil society foundations. In this way, overcoming some political and administrative obstacles became easier.

There emerged a discourse aimed at strengthening the civil society against the state in the early 1980s, when the military government was in power and the field of politics was severely restricted. Setting the civil society as the field of expression of democratic rights and social demands contributed to the efforts to strengthen the civil society. However, the authoritarian practices of the military government and its dominant status over social and political practices, hindered the NGOs from articulating themselves actively, for the rule of law is a key element in sustaining a "strong" civil society as an intermediary phenomenon standing between the private sphere and the state. In this context, it must be noted that autonomy vis-à-vis the state and immunity from state intervention or from political hegemony are important to the activities of voluntary organizations. Factors like the type of political regime, political culture, the capacity of the state, the nature of relations, stability and international pressure have formative roles on establishing the political framework within which policies concerning the voluntary organizations are formed, Bayraktar Durgun and Beriş (forthcoming).

On the one hand, NGOs function within the framework of legal rules set by the political authority. The politics which has set the scene for the relation between the state and the civil society in Turkey can be described as the "art of obstructing possible", Kubicek (2002:762). The 1982 Constitution adopted following the military coup in 1980 imposed severe restrictions on voluntary activities, freedom of expression and freedom of organization. It forbade any kind of organization based upon regional, ethnic, religious or class identity. Society without classes, without differences was the rule for corporatist politics in Turkey. This marked continuity in terms of treatment of civil society from the viewpoint of the state or state elites. Civil society was historically perceived in Hegelian terms "a sphere of universal ego" to be closely controlled and shaped by the state initiatives," Heper (1985:16). Certain regulations like the Organization Law restricted and narrowed the field of activity of the NGOs. The encompassing authority of the state in the formation and the activities of voluntary

organizations caused a kind of boss-employee relationship between NGOs and the public authority. Indeed, these organizations forming the essence of the civil society were made subject to the will of the state.

On the other hand, being independent of political authority and capability of self-arrangement are related to the expanding of civil freedoms into the "political sphere," where the public discussion takes place, and with the capacity of participation in an effort to restrict the sovereign. The issues of political legitimacy, withdrawal of recognition or financial support, limited accountability and cooperation with the state play crucial roles in the rise and operations of civil organizations. Seeking political patronage has been one of the main features of the relations between the "corporatist state" and those parts of "civil society" created and guided by the state in Turkey. In a state structure, the formative status of the state in relations to a supposedly autonomous, self-regulating domain is not only an authoritative or externally imposed condition, but also a consequence of the relations that voluntary (or semi-voluntary) organizations set up willingly with the state or the government, Durgun (1997). For example, with reference to human rights advocates, women networks or think-tanks, it can be argued that there are those whose activities are favored or supported to a considerable extent, and those disfavored or humiliated. Financial support is very crucial for the activities of voluntary organizations, Bayraktar Durgun and Beriş (forthcoming). For example, a survey carried out on 339 civic groups in Turkey concluded that over half had budget of less than \$ 10,000, only 27 percent had over 1000 members and 65 percent had no means of publication, Ilik (2000). On the other hand, support does not only refer to financial matters. Under the same legal framework, support can also mean allowing freedom to and being soft on the activities of certain actors.

It should be emphasized that the term "NGOs" does not express homogeneous communities. Rather, the objectives of NGOs and the ways to define them vary. It is possible that they can have conflict among themselves. They can be working even with the aim of damaging the prestige of the opponent organization. For instance, those NGOs composed of the families of martyrs accused human rights organizations of being on the side of terrorist organizations. The activities of such groups, which can exist or continue to exist through state support, may include supporting policies or activities of the state through an inorganic cooperation tie, which may threaten the existence and maintenance of the civil society. However, it is evident

that the basic aim of NGOs is to serve the idea of a liberated society. Therefore, it is inevitable to have members holding different views and beliefs to be represented in the public platform. In this respect, the main function of NGOs is to contribute to the creation of an environment within which varying interests and expectations can be freely articulated, Bayraktar Durgun and Beriş (forthcoming).

Nonetheless, to a considerable degree, the strict state control over these organizations has prevented this goal from being fully realized in Turkey. As a consequence, the general attitude of most NGOs has not gone further beyond supporting the official state policies or they have remained silent. Whereas the conveyance of civil demands to the political centre, inspection of government activities and protection of individuals against the state are expected from NGOs, this is not always the case in Turkey. It is known that many NGOs, which are rightfully suspected, act on the basis of Turkey's own bureaucratic and military tradition and convey the demands of the state to the public rather than doing the vice versa. They try to justify the activities of the state rather than inspecting them. Instead of providing protection for the society, they tend to protect the state against the other segments of the society, Yildirim (2004:104).

Besides, in some cases, it is also likely that relatively larger and formerly institutionalized NGOs can hinder the functioning of later founded organizations. In a sense, they operate in a fashion described as the "iron law of oligarchy" by Robert Michels. Yet, some have searched for international pressure or financial support to gain or maintain their independence from the state. Even then, they must operate within the rules of the country. This, in turn, may jeopardize their existence to a considerable extent or obstruct their activities.

In parallel with the social and political developments in the world in the 1990s and owing to the wave of freedom, the number and activities of NGOs also increased in Turkey. The more the term civil society organization gained respect, the more organizations bearing the title civil society emerged. Particularly, the amendments made in the laws concerning unions during the 1990s lifted many restrictions pertaining to unions and enlarged the limits of freedom, granting them a wide-ranging array of activities. With the comprehensive amendments in union laws in 2005, which were based on the regulations of the European Union, all the obstacles in the way of unions were removed. In this way, a very positive step concerning NGOs was taken.

It is undeniable that the multi-vocalism of the 1990s characterized by a significant increase in the number and activities of mass

media provided these groups with unique opportunities to voice their views. A number of issue-based organizations drew people from various occupational backgrounds. For example, the activities of the TEMA (Foundation for fighting against erosion, promoting forestation and preserving nature) led by two businessmen became popular in a short time. Their fight against Turkey becoming a desert due to the problem of erosion gave impetus to environmentalist movements including the activities of Green Peace. The protests held by the villagers against the use of uranium to search for gold in areas near their village in Bergama-İzmir attracted many supporters, including environmental organizations. Suspension in the gold search showed that these demonstrations were functional in displaying the force of organized societies. The AKUT (Team for Searching and Rescuing), which is composed of a group of wealthy young people, was mentioned in the mass media following their considerable rescue activities after the earthquake in August 1999 in Turkey. Such organizations as the Human Rights Organization, the Human Rights Foundation and Mazlum-Der emphasized the human rights violations in the country and summoned public opinion and the authorities by setting up co-operations with international organizations like Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the Helsinki Citizens Assembly. While these organizations (e.g., the Organization for Liberal Thought and the Turkish Democracy Foundation) operated to form public opinion and to contribute to the development of a liberal democratic culture and participation in the European Union, another group called the "Arı" Movement (The Bee Movement, the youth organization of the Motherland Party which uses the bee as its symbol) tried to encourage youth involvement in politics. There are also NGOs which aim to safeguard Kemalism, the official ideology of the state. The Organizations for Atatürkist Thought organized in several places in Turkey are the best example for such groups. The number of leftist organizations engaged in global peace and anti-globalization movements also increased in the same period. For example, the Anti-Globalization Group held campaigns against the process of globalization. Some other leftist groups composed of university students and called the "Youth Initiative" organized activities aiming to contribute to world peace. Additionally, Islamist women movements gained strength in the 1990s. Nonetheless, neither leftist nor Islamist groups acted under the roof of an institutionalized body. Their activities were bound to international social movements, Bayraktar Durgun and Beriş (forthcoming).

Social, Political and Institutional Context of the Third Sector

Social policies are needed to support and maintain economic growth. In this vein, states utilize some methods to avoid or minimize unfair practices among groups when implementing its social policies. One of these methods is institutional services. Among the providers of these services in Turkey are such foundations as the Social Insurance Foundation, the Social Security System, the Unemployment Insurance and Turk-Employment Foundations. Particularly with the amendments to the Employment Act that took effect on the 10th June 2003, the norms adopted by the International Labor Organization were accepted. The academic staff and syndicates of employers and employees were involved in the process of making this act. In addition, legal arrangements were made in such a way that the opinions of NGOs, too, were integrated into them, thereby ensuring the support of these organizations.

The Social Security System is actually a kind of institutionalization that prevents people from going into poverty and the fear of not being able to guarantee their futures. It is also the most important issue in current social politics. Social aids are provided in accordance with the contemporary modern state's social responsibility to protect the poor classes. The state is obliged to implement aid programs because of its social state role. However, in some cases where the system does not or cannot fulfill these poverty obligations, the system creates its own means and, as a result, the social aids become privatized. These means are called civil society foundations in Turkey whereas they are called Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) in the other parts of the world.

In the modern sense, the emergence of social security starts with industrialization. As industrialization movements and the emergence of a working class started very late in the Ottoman Empire compared to Europe, Turks developed a social security system, in the modern sense of the word, rather late. As in the west, the idea of social security started with 'social solidarity' in the Ottoman Empire. However, there had not been a social security system in the modern sense until the Administrative Reforms in 1839. The movements for the legislation in the field of social security started 26 years after the declaration of the Administrative Reforms. Undoubtedly, these arrangements were quite restricted and temporary. Some acts concerning social security were also passed in this period.

Two important acts were passed in the period (1921-1923) between the establishment of the first Turkish Grand National Assembly

(TGNA) and the declaration of the Republic. One of them was the act dated 28.04.1921 and numbered 114 concerning the exploitation of the coal dust in Zonguldak and Ereğli reserves to the advantage of workers. The second was the establishment of the syndicates with the obligatory participation of employers and employees which envisaged compulsory health aid to workers. Afterwards, these syndicates got united under the name of Workers Union with the act numbered 151 and, thus the first social insurance in Turkey was founded, Tuncay (2002:65). However, these arrangements were kept limited to the miners of the Zonguldak region, where the system of industrial relations was fully-fledged in the modern sense.

In the period (1923-1961) between the declaration of the Republic and the Constitution in 1961, social security acts with narrow scopes were passed and the Foundation of Laborer Insurances was established. Although many partial acts relating to social security were passed, the important event of this period was that the first Labor Act was passed (the act numbered 3008). Although this act included many articles as to the establishment of social insurances, the establishment of social insurances became possible only after 1945.

From 1945 onwards, various social insurance branches were established. Accordingly, the 107th article of the Labor Act in 1936 with the number 3008 envisaged a gradual establishment of social insurances. In compliance with this, Industrial Accidents, Industrial Illnesses and Motherhood Insurances were established in 1945 with the act numbered 4772; senescence insurance in 1949 with the act numbered 5417; Health and Motherhood insurances in 1950 with the act numbered 5502; and Disablement, senescence and Life Insurances in 1957 with the act numbered 6900. Although the article 100 of the Labor Act numbered 3008 envisaged the establishment of Unemployment Insurance, no arrangements could be made until the establishment of Unemployment Insurance with the act dated 8th September 1999.

While these developments were taking place in the working class, having long been in disarray before, all syndicates and acts concerning retirees holding jobs that have public status were united with the T.R Retirement Syndicate Act dated 08.06.1949 and numbered 5434. Moreover, in the field of social aids, the act numbered 6972 concerning the Children in Need of Protection was passed on 15.05.1957; and the act numbered 7355 relating to the establishment of Institution of Social Services was accepted on 12.06.1959, Tuncay (2002:67).

The 1961 Constitution states that everybody has the right to social security. In this period, the most important act passed in the field of social security was, without a doubt, the Social Security Act

numbered 506, which was passed on 17.07.1964 and put into effect on 01.02.1964, arranging the social security of workers according to their contracts. The act unified other social security branches that had been established on different dates and portrayed a disorganized image, into one body to broaden their scopes. Nevertheless, many banks and insurance companies were not included within the scope of the act of private syndicates for commercial and industrial associations.

The admission of those who freelance and work independently to the system of social insurance, though quite late, came with the Act of Social Insurances Institution for Tradesmen, Craftsmen and Other Freelance Workers (Bağ-Kur), dated 02.09.1971 and numbered 1479. With this act, the senescence, disability and death risks of freelance workers were avoided. The arrangements concerning health risks, which consist of one of the important parts of social security, were done with the act dated 05.11.1985 and numbered 3235, and services of health insurance were included in the scope of Bağ-Kur. The most important act in the field of social aids was the one dated 01.07.1976 and numbered 2022, concerning Providing Salary for Destitute, Weak and Desolate Turkish Citizens over 65.

In addition, according to the Constitution in 1982, everybody has the right to social security (article 60). With the same provision, the Constitution gave the state a new responsibility, stating, "The state shall take necessary measures to ensure this security and establish an institution accordingly." Thus, the Constitution in 1982 restated the principle of the Constitution in 1961. Following the adoption of the Constitution in 1982, some important acts in the field of social security were passed in 1983. The Act of Institution of Social Services and Children Protection, dated 25.05.1983 and numbered 2828, assigned the duty of the implementation of social services and the protection of destitute children, elderly and disabled citizens to the Institution of Social Services and Children Protection, which was established with this act. On the same date, the Act Concerning the Uniting of the Services Subject to Social Security Institutions, numbered 2928, was passed. Later, the two acts, which were passed on 17.10.1983, endowed a wide portion of the people who work in the area of agriculture with social security, though with a narrow scope, Tuncay (2002:68).

The acts numbered 5434, 506, 1479 and 4792 have often undergone many alterations to this day. There are no other regulations in Turkish law that has undergone changes and renewals so often except for the regulations of social security.

Shortly after the unemployment insurance was put into effect on 08.09.1999, the Turk-Employment Institution was established for the protection and development of employment in Turkey with the proposal dated 24.08.2000 and numbered 617. This institution replaced Institution for Finding Job and Employee, which was established with the act numbered 4837. Reforming the structure of the institution with the aim of separating the insurance services and health services, the Institute of Social Insurances was named as Chairmanship of Social Insurances Institution with the proposal dated 24.08.2000 and numbered 616. Establishing the Social Security Institution with the proposal passed on the same date and numbered 618, it was aimed to ensure coordination and unity of norms and standards in social security practices among the Chairmanship of Social Insurances Institution, Bağ-Kur and General Administration of Turkish Employment Institution. Among the goals of this institution was to gather social insurance and social aids services under this institution in the future. The research into the reformation in this field is still in progress. This field still remains vacant as there have been no arrangements in place of the acts nullified, Tuncay (2002:69).

As it is understood from all these, the Turkish Security System consists of two major regimes. In one of them, the contribution of the person concerned is not in question. The major part of the contributions generally comes from the governmental fund or from voluntary private foundations. These are considered social aids and social services. This can be called a non-premium or non-contributory social security regime. Compared to the other, this regime occupies a very small place in our social security system.

The regime called premium or contributory social security regime constitutes the basis of Turkish Social Security System and is basically governed by three main institutions. These are the T. R. Retirement Fund, Social Insurances Institution and Social Insurances Institution for Tradesmen and Freelance Workers (Bağ-Kur). Considering some other institutions and foundations that provide social security services for bank clerks, insurance companies and trade and industry, which were established in accordance with the temporary article 20 of the Social Insurances Act numbered 506, the number of institutions increases. As could be seen from this example, the main characteristic of our social security system is that it is comprised of many institutions and foundations different from each other in terms of their ways of administration, aids they provide, their standards and their members. According to the Turkish law, one can be registered

only to one social security regime at the same time; that is, the principle of singularity is in practice.

Established with the T. R. Retirement Fund Act, dated 08.06.1949 and numbered 5434, the oldest of the main institutions is the T. R. Retirement Fund that meets the senescence, death and illness risks of civil and military personnel who work in public services and who are generally called officers. With this act, the aim was to provide social security for the public personnel, who worked in different institutions and were subject to different regulations, single-handedly within one act. By the year 1999, the number of the active contributors to the fund was 2.118.085 (it was 199.825 in 1950 and 1.250.000 in 1980); adding the family members of the contributors (8.729.238) and the salaried (1.239.314), the number reaches 13.074.328, covering %20.31 of the overall population. With the Government Officers Act numbered 657, officers and their relatives were granted health and nursery aids to a limited degree. The Retirement Fund gives its contributors salary on their retirement, common disability, duty disability, and widowhood and orphanhood; pay lump sum in case of death and provide loans. The contributors also get marriage and retirement bonus, and receive a last service raise, family aid and medical aid. As a result of the alterations coming with the act dated 25.08.1999 and numbered 4447, female contributors over the age of 58 and male contributors over the age of 60, both of whom have fulfilled 25 years of service, have the right to receive pension. In terms of services provided, it is the best institution in comparison to other social security institutions. In administrative terms, it is subject to the Treasury Department.

The main income of the fund consists of deductions from contributors and institutions. The fund also receives some contributions from the treasury. The salaries of contributors are charged a retirement deduction of 15% on a monthly basis. Those who have just started their official duties are charged a 25% deduction of admission over their main salary. The contributors are charged more deduction as their salaries increase. In addition to the deduction from contributors' salaries, their place of work is also charged 20% every month. Moreover, employers are charged deductions for students, retirement bonuses and contribution to administrative expenses, Tuncay (2002:60).

As for those who work in the private sector on a service contract, their risks of illness, caretaking, industrial accidents, job-related illnesses, disabilities, senescence and death are met with the Social Insurances Act, passed on 17.07.1964 and numbered 506. The act is

enforced by the Social Insurances Institution, established with the act numbered 4792. The institution was restructured and renamed "the Chairmanship of Social Insurances Institution" by the proposal dated 24.08.2000 and numbered 616. By the year 1999, the insurance covered 48.11% of the overall population with 6.355.639 active premium payers, 3.148.826 retirees and 21.469.875 family members. 974.035 people, who were members of the Institution in accordance with the Social Insurances Agricultural Workers Act, were included in this number. Thus, the largest social security institution in our country is the Social Insurances Institution.

The Act of Social Insurances Institution for Tradesmen, Craftsmen and Other Freelance Workers (Bağ-Kur), dated 02.09.1971 and numbered 1479, meets the senescence, disablement and death risks of freelance workers such as tradesmen, industrialists, architects, engineers, doctors, pharmacists, merchants and artists. The act passed on 05.11.1985 and numbered 3235 extended the scope of Bağ-Kur insurance in order to cover the health insurance of Bağ-Kur members' spouses, parents and the children under their own care. Thus, health risks were included among the risks that the act numbered 1479 covered. By the year 2000, the number of insured people who paid premium to Bağ-Kur was 2.424.049; the number of those who received pension was 1.151.582; and the number of family members of insured people was 7.787.715. The people who are included in the scope of the act of Agriculture Bağ-Kur numbered 2926, also pay premium to the same institution and are paid by the same institution as well. Among them, the number of those who are actively insured is 888.645 and of those who are passively, insured is 125.862. Thus, if we include the family members, the portion of the population subject to the acts numbered 1979 and 2926 comprise 22.31% of the overall population and are represented within the coverage of Bağ-Kur.

Also, with the Mukhtar Appropriation and Social Security Act, dated 29.08.1977 and numbered 2108, the mukhtars of villages and districts who were not attached to any social security institutions were included in the scope of Bağ-Kur numbered 1479.

Apart from all these acts mentioned so far, there are also some other private acts, institutions and foundations that provide separate and additional social security to some people. In addition, there are also social aids given directly from governmental budget; such as the aid given to poor citizens, desolate and destitute elderly citizens, disabled workers and destitute children, Tuncay, (2002:61-2).

Table 1: Distribution of the Population Groups within Social Security Institutions

SOCIAL SECURITY INSTITUTIONS	Number of the Insured	Number of the Salaried	Family Members	Total	Proportion to the Overall Population
Social Security Institution	6.565.167	3.339.327	22.541.181	32.445.675	48.16
Retirement Fund	2.163.698	2.300.868	9.257.675	13.722.241	20.37
Bağ-Kur	3.312.694	1.277.444	10.440.049	15.030.187	22.31
Funds Established by Law 506	118.485	59.940	128.341	306.766	0.46
TOTAL	12.160.044	6.977.579	42.367.246	61.504.869	91.28

Source: The Annual of Statistics of the Chairmanship of SSI, 2000; quoted by C.Tuncay (2002:62).

Despite all the efforts, there are still some serious complaints from different segments of the society against these three institutions known by the names "Retirement Fund, Social Insurances Institution and Bağ-Kur", which carry out activities in the field of social security in Turkey. The most important of the complaints is about the great differences in the rights each of these three institutions provide for their members and the principle of equality, which has great importance to democratic countries. The abundance of complaints in this and similar areas brought about some initiatives on new legal arrangements concerning these three institutions but no result could be reached. The economic crises breaking out in recent years have revealed that these institutions are likely to fall into such a situation that they will not be able to pay pension and retirement bonus to their members. In that respect, this subject was brought up at Stand-By meetings with the IMF and an agreement was reached on passing a new act in 2005 to unite social security institutions and straighten their fiscal structure as a precondition of signing a Stand-By agreement with the IMF. As a matter of fact, getting the opinions of the related segments of society and reaching an agreement on it, an act prepared within this frame was presented to the Great Turkish National Assembly in April 2005. The act is expected to bring the social security system, which has been criticized so much, to a better position and straighten out its fiscal structure.

The Legal Grounds of the Third Sector

The organizational structure of civil organizations is determined by the legal frame of the country in question. Parallel to that, the legal frame is determined by the regime of the country. It is observed that oppressive and authoritarian regimes approach civil organizations more negatively in comparison to democratic regimes. Civil organizations take their places in democratic societies with their very distinctive ways of organizations. The most widespread formal organizational patterns are associations, foundations, syndicates and cooperatives. The gathering of different kinds of people for a common cause causes the emergence of civil organizations; the spread of these organizations and increase in their functions bring about an organized society. A horizontal type of relation forms the basis for foundations that are similar to civil organizations in order to avoid hierarchical structures. Civil organizations pay special attention to not be equal or similar in any way to the apparatuses of official power.

There are arrangements in the "Turkish Civil Code", accepted by the Great National Assembly on 03.12.2001, numbered 4722 and published in the official gazette on 08.12.2001, concerning artificial persons, associations and foundations that comprise the legal grounds for civil organizations.

Moreover, in accordance with article 90 of the Constitution, when confirmed in due order, international treaties are treated as laws that cannot be taken to the Supreme Court in case of dispute. Thus, international treaties are legal rules in Turkish law that is at least as influential as law. According to an opinion, they are, in fact, considered as superior to Turkish law because of the provision that such related cases can not be taken to the Supreme Court. Thus, Article 20 of the Universal Human Rights Declaration, which was accepted by the UN General Assembly on 10.12.1948, entitled everybody to the right of gathering and founding associations.

Article 21 of this declaration also is related to this subject. According to it, every individual has the right to participate in governing public affairs of the country directly or through freely elected representatives. In addition, the right to gather and found syndicates and associations is stated in article 11 of the "Contract on Protecting Human Rights and Main Freedoms" which was signed on 04.11.1950 in Rome by the member countries of the European Council and put into effect in September 1953. Moreover, all the provisions of the European Human Rights Contracts that Turkey supports and the provisions concerning the freedom of gathering and founding associations will be supervised not only by member countries to the

European Union but also by the competent bodies of the European Union.

The judicial body for ensuring the right implementation of EU law is the EU Court of Justice. Realizing the absence of arrangements as to which rules Civil Organizations will be subject to, the bodies of the European Union started talks on the regulation proposals prepared by the commission, setting forth from a decision taken by the European Parliament in 1987. According to this regulation proposal, a definition of the "European Association" is made. According to the definition, the European Association is the continuous body formed by the aggregation of its members' information and activities for the benefit of the public of the member country, in accordance with the legal system, where it was registered or with the aim of developing its members' commercial or occupational interests directly or indirectly (Article 1(1)). It is emphasized that the profits derived from the activities of this association could not be distributed directly to the members but could be used for their aims (Madde 2(2)), Güngör (2005:2).

According to the Turkish Civil Code, associations are groups with legal persons formed by at least seven persons, either true or legal, in order to realize a common and specific goal, except for sharing profits, by joining their information and efforts. They can not be founded for illegal or immoral purposes. Also, everyone has the right to found an association without asking permission. Founding an association or becoming a member of them is acknowledged to be the basic right of an individual. In pluralistic democratic systems, this right is regarded as the "public freedom" and, as a rule; it is among the basic indispensable rights of an individual according to the Constitution. The most remarkable feature of associations is to promote and improve the rights and interests of their members. While aiming to meet various demands of their members, associations also work for representing and promoting their members' interests in the political system, Özer (2001:188).

As it is more practical than establishing a foundation, organization under the name "association" is more preferred and appears before us as the most widespread way of organization. In that respect, the organization of associations is arranged in two dimensions: the Constitution and laws. Article 33 of the Constitution titled the "Freedom to Establish Associations" arranges most of the civil organization. The influence of the arrangement was increased by the last clause of this article as it included foundations and foundation-like establishments.

Activities of associations were rearranged after the military coup of 12 September and many restrictions were brought against associations by the law passed in 1983 and numbered 2908. However, recent governments that took big steps toward the European Union with their efforts to become more civilized, fortified the structure of civil organizations and made new arrangements in the law numbered 2908, bringing even greater freedom for associations. Furthermore, the secretarial duty which was carried out by the Police Department was entrusted to the Chairmanship of Chamber of Associations, which was established in order to achieve this aim and was subject to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and became entirely subject to a civil authority. Despite the democratic and political stability, the establishment of some associations in order to carry out unfavorable activities against the state before 1980 could not arouse enough interest among the public because Turkey has a state-centered political culture. Although the domestic and foreign effectiveness of Turkish civil organizations are not like those in developed countries, governments have rapidly paved the way for civil organizations to develop themselves with some legal arrangements. Some of the arrangements are as follows:

For the first time in Turkey, civil organizations could take part in state institutions with the Protection of Consumer Rights Act, dated 1995 and numbered 4077, through some arrangements, some of which rely on laws and some do not.

The establishment of the Consumer Council by the article 21 of the Protection of Consumer Rights Act, numbered 4077 and put into effect in 1995, and by some other arrangements following it suggests that the state and civil organizations could properly solve the problems together. Likewise, almost half of the members of the Board of Advertisement, which was established by article 17 of the same act in order to set the principles for commercial advertisements and announcements and to punish those who do not comply with them, are comprised of civil organizations. In the same manner, some members of the Supreme Board of Internet are comprised of the representatives of civil organizations. A similar situation is valid for councils and supreme boards.

The whole of a possession, revenues that are expected or rights that have economic value can be devoted to a foundation. Foundations are property communities in which the rights and possessions of true or legal persons are dedicated to a common cause. The aim of a foundation must be specific, understandable and continuous and comply with laws. Generally, foundations cannot be established if they are

contrary to the main principles of the Constitution, specific features of the Republic determined by the Constitution, laws, morals, national unity and national interests or to support the members of a specific nationality or religious community. The property of the foundation must be adequate to realize its aim and must not hamper the aim of the foundation or make it futile. Moreover, true or legal persons can establish foundations. However, if the founder is a true person, he/she must have the activity license stated in the Turkish Code of Civil Law and there must be a provision that he/she can establish a foundation and donate his/her property to it. It is essential for the foundation administrators to be of Turkish nationality. Being legal persons belonging to a special law, foundations assume all the rights and authorizations that are specified in the Turkish Code of Civil Law. General Directorship of Foundations is the supervision office and not an office of guardianship. There cannot be membership in foundations, Yılmaz (2005:27).

When specifying a date for negotiations of membership to the EU became a priority, lifting some of the restrictions to minority foundations was also discussed. The new proposal prepared in this field stipulates the lifting of all existent restrictions in this field as in the field of foundations. The new proposal concerning foundations is expected to become a law in 2005. In order to protect and improve common economic and social rights and interests, the syndicates, which have legal persons of a special law, must be freely established without asking for any permission and must be independent of the state, political parties, chambers, other syndicates of workers or employers, religious foundations and also comply with the commercial and political prohibitions. In Turkey, the first legal arrangement concerning syndicate rights started with the "Act of Employee and Employer Syndicates and Syndicate Confederations" dated 1947 and numbered 5018. It has taken long struggles to obtain the right to establish syndicates and organizations. With the 1961 Constitution, an important step was taken to establish contemporary syndicates and organizations. The Constitution gave public staff the right to establish syndicates for the first time, and the "State Personnel Act" numbered 624 passed in 1965. Shortly after, unionization of 50% of state personnel was secured. Teachers achieved a strong union under the name "Syndicate of Turkish Teachers". The right of workers to unionize, which was ensured by the act, was regained after 6 years of implementation. The 1982 Constitution brought many anti-democratic prohibitions against the freedom and right to establish organizations and syndicates. The prohibitions on establishing syndicates, which

applied to state officers, have been broken in recent years and lots of efforts have been made in order to enlarge the legal grounds, Yıldırım (2004:139).

Laborer syndicates can be established by the employees working in the same sector and can carry out their activities throughout the entire country. More than one syndicate can be established in the same sector. Regulations of syndicates and confederations cannot contradict the features of the Republic stated in the Constitution or democratic principles. It is free to join syndicates. One cannot be forced not to join them. Equally, no one can be forced to join a syndicate. Employees or employers cannot be a member of more than one syndicate at the same time in the same sector. In such cases, later memberships are considered invalid. The amount of the dues to be paid to syndicates and confederations by their members is stated in their regulations. The amount of dues that employees pay to laborer syndicates cannot exceed their daily wages. The amount of dues that employers pay to employer syndicates cannot exceed the daily sum of wages they pay to their employees. Except for membership dues, syndicate regulations cannot insert any provisions stating that other dues will be extracted from the members.

The Syndicates of Civil Servants Act was passed in order to supervise the establishment of syndicates and confederations, their bodies, authorities and activities; to determine the rights and responsibilities of civil servants who work in syndicates and confederations; and to arrange the principles concerning the conduct of negotiations between the Board of Public Employers and authorized syndicates of civil servants in each sector and the confederations that they are subject to. The act applies to the civil servants without worker status who work in administrations with general, additional or private budgets which carry out public services of which the state or artificial public persons are in charge; in private city administrations, municipalities and public economic enterprises subject to them; in the banks and corporations, which were established relying on special acts or on the rights these acts provide, and foundations subject to them; and in other public institutions or foundations. Syndicates and confederations are established freely without any prior permission. It is sufficient to have been working as a civil servant for at least two years in order to be a syndicate founder. As in worker syndicates, it is free to become a member of a syndicate. Civil Servants can be a member of the syndicate established in the sector to which their work place belongs. Membership is gained through the acceptance of the application by the authorized body of the syndicate. Moreover, every

member can freely withdraw his/her membership. Withdrawal from membership is fulfilled by a prior notification to the syndicate.

In short, it is stated in European law and European Human Rights Contract law that civil organizations are independent; the same, according to Turkish law applies to associations and syndicates. It is essential to have freedom, independence and willingness, in other words the element of will, to establish organizations. Along with the affirmative meaning of the element of willingness, there is the negative implication of it, denoting that a person could not be forced to establish or be a member of an organization. The Turkish Constitution contains the provisions that "Nobody can be forced to join an association and to remain a member of it" and "Nobody can be forced to join a syndicate, to remain a member of it or withdraw his/her membership from it." These Constitutional provisions are important in terms of the freedom of organization because, the private area put aside, the public area is the plane of life that concerns both civil and political society. Civil organizations are molded on this plane where the power of the state predominates. The organizations which include the enterprises of private, autonomous nature and state-independent citizens have a public area. After all, organizations without such areas are not accepted as civil organizations. Naturally, it is important to provide their activities with legal assurance, Yıldırım (2004:158). In other words, there must not be any legal arrangements which make the establishment of organizations obligatory or hamper them. Presently, these organizations are established and they carry out their activities within the frame specified by laws. In recent years, there have been some legal amendments to reduce the regulations both at the stage of establishment and when carrying out activities.

When we look at the cooperatives which are separate from public and private sector foundations and are types of important foundations of the third sector, their history of organization goes far back. It is admitted that Ahi Unions (a type of historical commercial lodge), in particular, are one of the first organizations in history in this field. It is well-known that they meticulously practiced rules such as providing a job to everybody, solidarity, devotion, equal payment, and a policy of fair prices and education of its members.

However, it is admitted that the business of contemporary cooperatives in Turkey, in the modern sense, started with Homeland Funds. At the same time, the practice of institutionalized agricultural credit was initiated with these funds. Until the emergence of these funds, there was not an institution which gave farmers the loan they need to maintain the activities of their agricultural enterprises.

Consequently, it is the 1867 Regulations of Homeland Funds that constitutes the beginning of Turkish cooperative regulations. These regulations were in effect until Menafi Funds became the Agriculture Bank (1888). Apart from this, as a legal arrangement concerning cooperatives, we encounter the existence of a provision that stipulates the organization of Consumer Cooperatives in Coal Basins, which is stated in the "Act Concerning the Rights of Miners in Ereğli Coal Basin" numbered 1921/151. Due to the provision of the "Regulation of Production and Exchange Partnership Cooperatives", issued by the ministry of economy in 1923 before the declaration of the Republic, nearly 40 cooperatives of different types were created until 1928. The regulation provided cooperatives with aid from the budget of the ministry of economy and granted loans via the Agriculture Bank.

At the same time, due to the appendix added in 1924 to the Land Trading Act (1850), establishing cooperative companies was made possible. Later, the Trade Law, which was approved by the Grand National Assembly in 1926 and numbered 865, counted cooperative companies as one of the five kinds of trade companies. With this law, issues like solidarity and mutual help were included in the definition of cooperative.

As one of the most important civil organizations, the importance of syndicates' cooperative activities increases as they become disciplined organizations and have prior experiences in such activities. According to article 33 of the Syndicate Act, syndicates were authorized to help their members establish cooperatives and give credit to cooperatives on condition that it does not exceed 10% of the available cash. Since they can join economic partnerships, syndicates also can be shareholders of a cooperative on condition that they do not allot more than 40% of their available cash, Başbuğ (1996:117-9).

Since the anticipated advantages were not gained by the Prestige of Agricultural Unions Act, numbered 1924/498 and used in the field of Agricultural Credit Cooperatives, the Agricultural Cooperatives Act, numbered 1929/498, was passed five years later. Due to this act, 668 cooperatives were established in 2309 villages with 67332 members until the end of 1935. The Agricultural Loan Cooperatives Act No 2836, which was put into effect on 02.10.1935 to replace the aforementioned act. The act envisioned a wide exemption from tax. Nevertheless, nearly all the international cooperation principles were accepted as valid. However, 36 years later, the act numbered 2836 was replaced with the Agricultural Loan Cooperatives and Unions Act dated 14.04.1972 and numbered 1581. The act paved the way for agricultural loan cooperatives to break away from the administrati-

on and the control of the Agriculture Bank and work independently constituting their own superior bodies.

In 1935, an act was passed for agricultural sales cooperatives as well as agricultural loan cooperatives with the number 1935/2834. Having remained in effect for 49 years, this act, named the Agricultural Sales Cooperatives and Unions, was amended with the proposal numbered 238 dated 08.06.1984 and with the act numbered 3947 and dated 26.12.1993, which inserted new provisions to the act, numbered 3186 and dated 30.04.1985. Furthermore, the Tobacco Cultivation Sales Cooperatives Act, numbered 1196, was passed on 25.12.1969 for the farmers who deal with tobacco cultivation. The act stipulated a Central Union under the name "General Union of Tobacco Cultivation Sales Cooperatives".

In order to replace the trade laws that had been in effect since 1924, the Cooperatives Act, dated 24.04.1969 and numbered 1169 was passed, upon which all cooperatives, with the exception of the Agricultural Credit and Sales Cooperatives, were based. The act replaced the part of the Trade Law with 18 clauses titled "Cooperative Companies". The act was amended in 1971, 1981, 1987 and 1988 with the acts 1496, 2475, 3381 and 3476, respectively, Türkiye'de Kooperatifçilik (1997).

Among the Turkish Constitutions, the idea of cooperatives and the obligation of the state to take the necessary measures for the development of cooperatives were first expressed in the 1961 Constitution. In a similar way, the 1982 Constitution mentions cooperatives since it states that they have to be supported by the state, and it prohibits them to engage in politics and to cooperate with political parties. However, with an amendment made in the Constitution in 1996, the provisions that cooperatives are subject to state inspection and are not to engage in politics or to cooperate with political parties were nullified, Türkiye'de Kooperatifçilik (1997).

An Overview of the Current Situation

Evaluated with respect to the type of activities, the organizations of the third sector carry out their activities: (a) with the state or by attaching themselves to it; (b) keeping contact with the state but independent of it (only acknowledging it); (c) opposing the state and struggling with it; or (d) neither with a connection nor a struggle with the state. According to the strategies of positions that are adopted, the relationship between the state and civil organizations may be tense or mild. The dimension of this relationship is as effective as the breadth of the area of activity that a civil organization follows.

Civil organizations adopt one of the four alternatives depending on their will.

The civil society organizations in Turkey operate mainly with two different legal statuses, either "associations" or "foundations". What is crucial is the need on the side of either associations or foundations to carry out the obligatory legal procedures in order to earn an official recognition, Yayla et al. The determining role of the state is not only limited to keep the activities of the organizations under control. The state's authority to close down associations or foundations on the charge of operating illegally may give the public authority an upper hand in its relations with NGOs. The administrators can face legal punishment, Imamoğlu (2001).

The overwhelming majority of the civil organizations in Turkey have the status of associations because it is easier to set up an association than a foundation. It is sufficient for only seven founding members to complete the legal procedure and to apply for official recognition to the representatives assigned by the ministry of Internal Affairs. The basic condition to become a foundation is to dedicate by founding members a certain amount of movables and immovable to the aims of the foundation. In this context, the factor of financial and social support is more significant in foundations. A considerable amount of the organizations, which compose the majority of the civil organizations in Turkey, emerged with very general cultural and social objectives (65 %). Most associations are indeed in the form of "fellow countryman associations" with the goal of solidarity and aid to their members. A fellow countryman association is a unity which is formed by people coming from the same hometown living in a metropolitan city. In addition, religious organizations with the proportion of 20% have a significant place. The fact that people rather than the state build and meet daily expenses for running mosques in Turkey is among the fundamental causes for establishing religious organizations. Most of the remaining organizations are engaged in the activities related to sports.

The civil organizations may be categorized as: amateur/bureaucratic in terms of their employing salaried personnel; partnership-based/founder-based in terms of their having general assembly; open/closed in terms of participating in activities; self-serving/others-serving in terms of the services provided; closed/activist in terms of the circles it builds communication with; with project/without project in terms of service area and service method. In terms of the way they were organized in Turkish history, they may be divided into five categories: communities, foundations, associations, syndicates and occupational organizations (bars and chambers), Güngör (2005:3).

Although not as many as in the US and Europe, the number of civil organizations in Turkey has been on the increase to a considerable extent. In fact, according to a report prepared by the Ankara Chamber of Commerce relying on the data gathered from the Chairmanship of Associations Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, there are 80.757 associations, 38 associations for public use, 4.915 foundations, 58.414 cooperatives, and 14 occupational chambers. Occupational chambers are public unions in operation, such as the Turkish Union of Chambers and Stock Exchange (TOBB), the Turkish Union of Agriculture Chambers (TZOB), the Union of Notaries, the Union of Bars, the Union of Banks, the Union of Veterinarians, the Union of Doctors (TTB), the Union of Engineers and Architects (TMMOB), the Union of Pharmacists and the Union of Authorized Financial Consultants (YMMO). As the numbers indicate, there is an association for every 866 people. In comparison to the member states of the European Union, this seemingly big number is actually still inadequate. Indeed, the number of associations in EU countries is expressed in millions and the majority of the populations in these countries make it simpler for their governments by taking various responsibilities in civil organizations whereas many associations in Turkey work as pubs and restaurants under the name "association" by taking advantage of the loopholes in laws and acts. Besides, some of them maintain their existence as empty associations that just have signboards while others continue as associations in which the number of members is comprised of founders and their close friends, AB Kapisinda Sivil toplum Raporu (2004).

According to the report, there should be at least 300.000 civil organizations in Turkey in proportion to the population. However, 85.488 associations do not survive any more in Turkey, where the total number of associations established so far is 166.245. 23.330 of these associations have been abolished by general assembly decisions whereas 30.390 of them have disintegrated themselves. The number of the associations closed down by court decision is 206. According to the same survey, Istanbul has the largest number of associations. The number of the current associations in Istanbul is 13.670, whereas it is 6.986 in Ankara, 4.029 in Izmir, 2.965 in Bursa, 2.224 in Konya. When we look at these numbers, we see that there are more than 30.000 associations in the first five cities, which corresponds to 37% of the total number of associations in Turkey. The poorest city in terms of associations is Hakkari with 66 associations. The others are Kilis with 81 associations, Tunceli with 87 associations, Şırnak with 91 associations and Bayburt with 104 associations.

It is stated that there are 2.100.000 associations in Germany and 1.470.000 associations in France, which means that there is one association for every 40 people. In addition, four out of every 10 Frenchmen/women participate in at least one association, that is, 1/5 of the overall population is a member in at least two associations. According to the figures of 1998, the number of NGOs in the US is 1.200.000. 55% of the overall population is involved in voluntary activities. The number of volunteers who are over the age of 75 is 7 million. Accordingly, 110 million people, that is, nearly 55% of the adult population, work as volunteers. Considering that the number of NGOs in the US is 1.200.000 and the population of Turkey is one fourth of the US, the number of NGOs must accordingly be one fourth of the US; that is, 300.000. However, the total number of associations and foundations in Turkey is around 87-90 thousand at best, Betil (2005).

Influential as banking, technology and even public sectors in the US, civil organizations employ 7 million people full-time. The total number of civil organizations in the US and Europe is 11.8 million, whereas the total number employees in 6 major companies (Daimler-Benz, General Motors, Hitachi, Fiat, Alcatel Alsthom and Unilever) in the US is about 2 million. Although it is thought that the share of civil organizations in Turkey in the overall employment is so minor that it can be ignored (less than 2.000 people), there is not a survey or a statistical study that can shed some light on this field. It can be interpreted from Table 2 how the third sector is relatively small or weak in comparison to its Western counterparts. The absence of concrete research on the third sector makes any comparison extremely difficult.

Table 2: Third Sector in Numbers*

Field of Organization	No of Organization	No of Members	No of Full-time Employee	No of Part-time Employee	No of Membership to National Organizations	No of Membership to International Organizations
1. Family Planning	5	1656	154	15	7	16
2. Military	4	50000	40		4	2
3. Culture	123	389	9	5	4	1
4. Media	50	8205	12	5	3	4
5. Business	92	3553	26	6		1

6. Natural Disasters	60	150197	504	409	3
7. Education	270		160		
8. Social and Economic Development	10	1500	61	8	6
9. Artisanship	46				
10. Cooperatives	59144	8102513		459	3
11. Judiciary	31	124			
12. Human Rights	40	15900	13	1	1
13. Employee Trade Unions	163	2149958	197	162	5
14. Employer Trade Unions	7	21	24	7	4
15. Women Organizations	83	2656	8	3	7
Vocational Unions	295				

* These numbers concerning certain third sector organizations show the approximate size of the third sector in Turkey and partly gathered from *Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları Rehberi 2005*, Tarih Vakfı, İstanbul.

In order of activity, according to the report, associations of fellow townsmen, retirees, tradesmen, employers, officers, heads of villages/neighborhoods and sororities take the lead with 20.051 people. These associations are followed by school associations with a number of 15.583 and mosque building and Koran courses associations with a number of 14.403. Also, there are 9.881 sports associations in action in Turkey, which constitute 63% of all the associations. Moreover, according to the same report, citizens try to meet their own needs by establishing their own associations in places where governmental facilities fall short of performing public services. The number of such associations in action or associations that construct and maintain public buildings is 1.215.

There are 979 fraternal associations for businessmen-industrialists, 662 fraternal associations for tradesmen, 435 fraternal associations for officers, 319 fraternal associations for employees, 372 fraternal associations for heads of villages/neighborhoods, 487 fraternal associations for retirees, 199 fraternal associations for military personnel, 431 sororities, 863 associations for agriculture and stock-breeding and 7990 associations for fellow townsmen.

As for the field of art, there 11 associations for ballet, one association for opera, 10 associations for sculpture, 18 associations for painting, 18 associations for cinema, 38 associations for theater whereas there are 248 folklore associations and 303 music associations. Likewise, associations established for amateur sports are as follows: 3 for hockey, 5 for fencing, 18 handball, 26 for skiing, 28 for volleyball, 38 for aviation, 39 for swimming, 41 for gymnastics, 59 for wrestling, 66 for basketball, 73 for mountaineering and tracking. It is interesting to note that there are 4.892 football associations and 494 hunting and marksmanship associations, AB Kapisinda Sivil Toplum Raporu (2004).

According to the Directory of Civil Organizations (2005) prepared by the History Foundation, which does not include cooperatives, sports clubs or associations, beautifying associations, mosque/school building and maintaining associations and solidarity-based (fellow townsmen) associations, there are 1077 national and regional, and 2146 local foundations.

Among the third sector foundations, cooperatives have great importance because of their long historical existence and their contributions to society and the economy (See Tables 3, 4 and 5 below). The idea of solidarity and mutual help that cooperatives suggest goes far back in Turkish history. In addition, activities of cooperatives have a long history that dates back to the last period of the Ottoman Empire. In that respect, they are so experienced and deep-rooted in terms of increasing prosperity and social solidarity that other civil organizations cannot be compared to them.

Table 3: Cooperative Types and Numbers (by the end of 2004)

Related Ministry	Cooperative Type	Related Law	Unit Cooperative		Cooperative Unions		Central Unions	
			No.	No. of Partners	No.	No. Of Partners	No.	No. Of Partners
Ministry of Agriculture and Related Affairs	Agricultural Cooperatives	1163-3467						
		Agricultural Development Coop.	6080	608943	6	2674	4	63
		1163-3467						
		Irrigation Coop.	2280	283663	9	556	1	9
		1163-3767						
		Fishery Prod. Coop.	432	23843	10	129	1	8
		1163-3476						
		Beet Farmers Coop.	31	1592325	1	31		
		L 1581-						
		Agriculture Credit Coop.	1992	1464415	16	1992	1	16
		3223 and KHK 553						
	Subtotal		10795	4173189	100	5382	7	96

slowed down since the 1980s due to several factors. The cooperative system faced serious financial, administrative and organizational problems. Apart from lacking governmental support, the banking system does not provide agriculture-oriented cooperatives with enough loans, Er (2004:12-3).

Table 4: Numbers and Education of Members of All Cooperatives (by March 2005)

Type	Sex		Education					
	Female	Male	Reading Writing	Primary School	Secondary School	High-Vocational Schools	University 2-3 years)	University 4-6 years
Central Union	106	329	0	22	35	87	31	260
Regional Unions	161	668	0	64	74	235	62	394
Cooperatives	498	4073	3	329	493	2894	274	578
Total	765	5070	3	415	602	3216	367	1232

Source: Derived from the Statistics by the Ministry of Industry and Trade.

There are approximately 60 thousand cooperatives and almost 8 million partners in Turkey as of today. This shows that one in every eight persons in Turkey is a partner in some kind of cooperative. Ten thousand of these cooperatives with approximately 500 thousand members are not active. The number of unit cooperatives without economic power is large but the number of partners in these cooperatives is small. Although there is a large number of unit cooperatives and cooperative partners, there are few cooperative organizations. The number of Central Organizations is only seven. The vertical integration in the cooperative system is also not enough. Even if all of the central organizations have to unite under the roof of the Turkish

National Cooperatives Organization, the Cooperatives Law No. 1163 controls the horizontal and vertical integration of the cooperatives. Still, the National Organization has been established and the number of partners is extremely small, Er (2004).

Table 5: Farmers' Unions

Union	No of Farmer Associations in City	No of Regional Unions in City	No of Cooperatives Within Regional Union	No of Cooperatives Concerned in City	No of Members of Cooperatives in City
Köy-Koop		15	1269	5572	712201
Pankobirlik		1	31	31	1612245
Agricultural Credit Coop		16	2023	2023	1463915
Or-Koop		26	1241	0	57806
Tus-Koop		9	437	2256	267146
Sür-Koop		10	144	424	23203
Hay-Koop		18	312	5572	712201
Çay-Koop		7	52	0	0
Tar Koop		6	140	5572	712201
Union for Livestock Farmers		79	0	0	599150
Leading Farmers Association	11	0		0	910
Total	11	187	5669	10306	3312174

Source: Türkiye'de Kooperatifçilik, Türk Kooperatifçilik Kurumu, Ankara 2004.

Non-profit organizations need regular material resources in order to carry out their programs. They can carry out income-bringing activities. However, they cannot distribute their incomes or profits to their members and staff. They can spend them on their work which is directed to their aims. Their payment to their professional staff is not regarded as profit-making. Very few foundations in the world and in Turkey, which we may call waqfs in the true sense of the word, have funds whose real yield they can use for their fixed costs and program expenses. Third sector foundations other than waqfs benefit from service revenues, official appropriations and donations while constituting their material resources. Contrary to suppositions, the percentage of donations to the overall income is not very high. Likewise, the percentage of financial support obtained from official institutions is not very high, either.

Despite the fact that the majority of administrators of third sector foundations that are actively working in Turkey today regard the lack of resources as the major problem; the main problem is in fact the problem of mission. Third sector foundations do not make a clear statement of purpose in their official documents or in their rules and regulations. When their definitions of purpose are examined, it is noticed that they are written parallel to the priorities of the people who played certain roles in their establishment and their scopes are deliberately kept wide in order "not to leave out any titles" so that they could carry out activities in any field they wish. Although many years pass, the statements of purpose are not re-scrutinized or they are generally forgotten.

However, unlike profit-seeking foundations that have compelling criteria such as profitability, market share, market value and success, the most important criterion that third sector foundations can use is the distance they have covered on their way to their missions. The lack of a valid definition of mission makes performance evaluation impossible or, at least, inadequate. Encumbering success, it may also create irrecoverable weaknesses in many points such as creating resources, management of volunteers, relations with professional personnel-management board, communication and total efficiency. Programs and projects offered to the target mass are to third sector foundations what goods produced and services provided are to profit-seeking foundations. The problem of lack of resources, which is too often mentioned for the third sector, constitutes an excuse for not making the necessary expenses during the initiation or development of these programs. Today, we see that various programs are initiated without any adequate research or scientific preparation not only in our country but also in countries where volunteer foundations are much more developed both in quality and quantity. As mentioned before, these programs, which should be customer-oriented but are actually biased or administrator-oriented, may persist for years because of lack of concrete criteria for success, and scarce resources continue to be used inefficiently.

Human resources, vital for non-profit-seeking foundations and a critical factor in success, is composed of volunteer workers and professional staffs. Non-profit-seeking foundations may have different kinds of structures depending on their field of action, culture and historical development. There is a member-volunteer discrimination in these foundations. Membership in civil organizations portrays differences according to the organization's structure and objectives. Sometimes, conditions for membership to a particular organization

are not of the kind that everybody willing personally to join its activities can possibly fulfill. In some other organizations, the number of members is either frozen or fixed annually at a specific limited number. Foundations (waqfs), on the other hand, do not accept any members. There is an obligation to take on a task in an activity commission in some civil organizations. Those who would not like to do it prefer to remain as volunteers and support the organization in their limited times.

In some organizations, expectations of members and volunteers from the organization are quite different. For instance, whereas being physically-handicapped is a requirement for membership in an organization for physically-handicapped people, volunteers may not necessarily have any physical handicaps but still be the people who would like to help them. Volunteers could be seen more frequently in citizen enterprises and associations. In civil organizations, the principle of voluntary participation is crucial. Membership to civil organizations should not be compulsory or in return for a fee. They may employ professional staff on salary. Consequently, occupational chambers, in which membership is compulsory, are generally not regarded as civil organizations. No matter to what extent these civil organizations are different, it would not be false to say that every third sector organization is administered by a voluntary board of administration. Most people who have expertise in the third sector agree that the success of the board of administration plays a pivotal role in the success of the organization.

However, one of the most frequent serious mistakes in third sector organizations is the preference of boards of administration to control instead of administering. Boards of administration are expected to establish the mission and vision, organize the necessary programs and find the professional staff to realize them, however, pass most of their limited time discussing "urgent but trivial" issues. As self-criticism is still a taboo in Turkey, it is rare to encounter it in our organizations. In spite of interviewing candidates rigorously, new member selections are made mostly by applying objective criteria and according to the preferences of more influential members of the board of administration.

One of the issues that should inevitably be touched upon while mentioning foundations is the board of trustees. Founding and administering associations became more difficult with the amendments to law after the military coup of 1980, which resulted in the establishment of many non-profit foundations in the status of waqf, which should be established as associations. Many foundations cannot be

treated as waqfs in terms of their fiscal structure. They were established with the aim of obtaining the support of wider grass roots, thus the boards of trustees have 50-100 or even more people, which is very similar to the general committees in associations that consist of all members. Today, when we look at the boards of trustees of major foundations (waqfs) particularly in Istanbul, we see that most of the members of them consist of the same people. Boards of trustees generally remain as symbolic groups, for their members are accepted without any test of their belief in that particular foundation's mission. Members join these foundations through invitation and with no definition of mutual responsibilities. Most likely, members respond to these invitations only as a result of politeness.

The most important duty of the professional staff in third sector or civil organizations is to equip their voluntary workers with more qualifications in their activities. In other words, voluntary workers should both be trained and directed by the professional staff and be supervised and inspected by the administration board when need arises; that is to say, the relationship between the voluntary workers and the professional staff should be one of balance rather than partnership. It is important to note that there are serious weaknesses of the professional staff of the third sector foundations both in quality and quantity compared to those in other countries. Inadequacy of financial resources hinders many foundations from employing staff even at a minimum level while the aims of these foundations may include such challenging aims like "solving the country's problem of education" or "ensuring social and cultural development of a particular geographic region." The third sector is recognized as a field of career particularly by the young generation. Today, most foundations (waqfs) and associations are run by people who have retired from private sector foundations. Undoubtedly, these administrators make important contributions to these foundations with their experiences and skills. However, it is almost impossible to benefit from the dynamism of the new generation and train new administrators for the future.

As third sector activities are more institutionalized, it becomes relatively impossible for them to stick to a frame of non-official organization because it is necessary to constitute a permanent core in such organizations while, at the same time, not excluding voluntary activities. Due to the character of third sector style of working, this core comes directly from middle classes. The middle class has distinct characteristics and ideological tendencies. These characteristics and tendencies may prioritize ecological concerns, democracy,

emphasis on individual values or, conversely, becoming radical politically. Therefore, when individuals among the public take on tasks in the third sector, it is generally regarded as an opportunity to get access to the middle class. This situation is a genuine social promotion for them.

Conclusion

An important percentage of the NGOs cannot act with a civil and democratic understanding in their internal organizations or in their attitudes against others. In terms of obedience and authority, there are third sector organizations which operate like a small government. What is more, those NGOs that claim to act in conformity with the state are not within the limits of "civil". When NGOs in Turkey emerge not as civil but as political organizations, they do not serve the society itself in general but the political society in particular. The orderly army of democracy that acts in unity for a common goal cannot be called an NGO. Actually, this has an aspect that is directly related to the culture we possess because in Turkey, individual movements are treated as insolence, differences as antagonism and individualism as selfishness. However, the formation of a civil society is closely related to the replacement of "we" with "I"; that is, to individualization.

NGOs have their own dynamics to develop which are peculiar to them, the capacity to make institutionalized decisions and the ability to settle disputes. They express a social field which is independent of the state. In order to talk about the existence of NGOs, they should not be under the guardianship of the state. They are expected to have the skill to make decisions on their own, and determine the course of state policy or, at least, have influence on it. The most important function of NGOs is to penetrate the political power, decentralize it and to protect individuals against the authority, thereby guaranteeing a secure place against despotism.

The behavior of most NGOs in Turkey is like an officer waiting for his superior's orders; it is not as an "equal partner" of the official authority. NGOs' behavior includes: the immaturity of their skills to co-operate among themselves; the nature of their administration with limited democratic understanding; their inability to make potential members active members because of their lack of creativity; their backwardness in written communication; their negligence of the media and representation; their inability to activate potential financial resources; their lack of tradition of acting in a project-based manner; their lack of a stable and equipped center; their negligence

of the background information on the sector they choose to serve in; the absence of their effort to gain a global quality and to find proper staff for it all stand as serious obstacles on their ways to achieve development and survival. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that it is the works of the same third sector organizations that will possibly change Turkey's conditions for the better. According to the survey of the Chamber of Commerce in Ankara, it is emphasized that the number of NGOs should be elevated to at least 300.000 in order for Turkey to achieve democratic maturity.

When we look at the legal structures of NGOs, it is seen that establishing associations is by far the most frequent form of organization. Classified according to their aims, the leading NGOs that are established in the field of fraternity, education, economy and culture rank among the top. The top ranking associations are fraternity and economic-based ones. Among foundations (Waqfs), those which are based on education and culture come first. As for syndicates, they are mostly NGOs which originate from solidarity. The most volunteers are in associations and citizen enterprises. There is one paid person in 55% of the leading organizations, while 85% of these people are full-time.

The chief dynamic of the winds of change caught after the earthquake of 17 August were NGOs, but they seem to have lost the level of impetus reached by then. In order for NGOs to hold a more powerful status, nationally and internationally, individuals should make voluntary contributions and have the will to take on responsibilities. Besides, the state should encourage NGOs by incentives such as tax exemption and other certain privileges. Incentives should cover the fields of education, health, culture and science. It is only then that the democratic system is fortified and social development is ensured. The third sector in Turkey still waits for the individual and organizational leaders who could see the current needs and have the courage and stamina to achieve this task.

The fact that the state and governments are interwoven in Turkey yields the result that the state, to a considerable degree, is able to protect its autonomy and status against the other segments of the society. The NGOs have been affected from this inconvenient situation. While NGOs assume their places in the system as extra-governmental organizations, they arouse suspicion in Turkey because extra-governmental organizations are perceived as anti-statist. The obstacles in the way of the relationship between the state and civil society in Turkey also reflect the nature of democratization.

However, the number of NGOs must not be the only measure of this indicator. The improvement of these organizations' capacities

is directly related to their ability to gain the support of wide grass roots and to play important roles in decision-making mechanisms. The most important feature of NGOs is their ability to be the means of pressure. Becoming a means of pressure is possible through obtaining the support of the public and organizing the public. Those NGOs which are incapable of developing such a structure, unable to speak for the social opposition and unable to understand social expectations have limited services to offer to the society. In addition, the NGOs that are categorized within the frame of certain ideologies are unable to receive vast support from the society. In that respect, NGOs have the opportunity to become stronger only when they overcome this particular problem and develop an all-embracing rhetoric. In short, the idea of questioning the state and taking part in government with the condition of remaining within the boundaries of law stands out as the most important feature of contemporary democracies, which is possible only through third sector organizations.

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IV.

The Turkish Bureaucracy as a Guardian of Statist Tradition*

Introduction

Bureaucracy in underdeveloped countries, where traditional and modern state institutions fulfil their functions, does usually not emerge as a necessity of the society. In such countries, bureaucracy is adopted from a developed country, as a mirror copy. Therefore, peculiarities of the developed country's bureaucracy are transformed into the underdeveloped country's bureaucracy. There are either no state institutions which has not been involved in bureaucracy or, if there is, such institutions are powerless. Therefore, bureaucracy or the bureaucrats are put in a position where they may use power against a political system. The ability to use power against a political system may not only lead to development problems, but also puts bureaucrats into a disfunctional attitude in foreign policy. It is well known that bureaucracy is a secondary institution, exists to properly fulfill functions of the political institutions in a modern democratic system. In societies where bureaucracy has a dominant position, parliament may be tolerated by bureaucracy as a legitimizing force for political regime. But, the parliament will never be dominant over the society; it will never be considered as the primary organ.

When the issue is considered from the point view of Turkey, it

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can safely be said that the situation is the same, as above touched upon. The Ottoman bureaucracy which had significant effects on the conception of administration of the republican bureaucracy, used to have both political and administrative functions. In other words, there was a system which consisted of a mixture political and administrative systems that could not be separated from each other. This conception has also preserved its significance and priority in political life, in the republican period.

The Turkish bureaucratic system of administration, which was shaped in the 1930s, is a continuation of the 19th century Ottoman system of administration and it is like the Ottoman system. (Yalçındağ, 1970:20) Even though a transition from Empire to the Republic was experienced, traditions of administration and political culture passed into the Republican Period in an identical way. This means that political decisions have been influenced by the bureaucratic decisions, through the Republican era. Even though it is the purpose of this study to examine the recent approach of Turkish Public bureaucracy to the USA, it is also necessary to deal with the position of Turkish Public bureaucracy within the Turkish political structure. It is thought that without comprehending the position of bureaucracy and bureaucrats within the political system in Turkey, it would be extremely hard to understand how the bureaucrats perceive Turkish-American relations. Therefore, the first section of this study deals with the position of Turkish Public bureaucracy within the Turkish political structure. The results of the interviews and surveys will be examined after the first section.

The Historical Heritage

Due to her certain characteristics in the development period, the Ottoman Empire can be considered as a historical bureaucratic empire. The two major characteristics of a historical bureaucratic empire are: (1) in such empires bureaucracy gains excessive independence within the political system. (2) upper levels of bureaucracy do not only fulfil administrative functions, but also political functions. (Heper, 1974b:2) It is observed that Ottoman Empire used to have the two characteristics.

Bureaucracy had always preserved its importance and priority in the Ottoman Empire where political and administrative systems were not separated, interlocked each other.

The superiority of the political system to every field in society and, therefore, the non-existence of secondary instrumental institutions were the factors to strengthen the dominance of bureaucracy

that was representing the Sultan. Those bureaucrats, who acted on behalf of the Sultan as agents, behaved as if they were the sultans in nationality relations. Thus, there was a wide gap between bureaucracy and those citizens. Those representatives of the Sultan who had granted power to rule, adhered to the sultan's will on no condition. Likewise, they had the power to apply the sultan's will on no condition. They were exempted from a number of duties and responsibilities that the *raya* were subject to. (Berkes, 1973:31) The public employees in the Ottoman system were selected and trained in the "kul" system.* The reason for employing this system was that they were served in a stated that was not based on the society. Therefore, there was not any possibility for a public employee to be a member of the society. In other words, the employee selection and training system was used to prevent the members of the society to become a public employee in the Ottoman Empire. Even in the disintegration period, public employees were not members of the society and were neutralized from the public. They were the mass of people who became identical with the state. What they had adhered to was the Ottoman Empire, which was reflected in the sultan's personality. (Divitçioğlu, 1981:65)

Later the concept of administering the Empire in the name of the Sultan (kuls being subject to the sultan's authority) was replaced by a new concept in which professionals had authority in the administration of the country as responsible citizens. In this new period, those professionals made decisions independent of the Sultan by using their expertise. They did not send their decision to the Sultan for his approval. (Göçek, 1999:183) The reasons behind this conception were the demands to reshape bureaucratic center in conformity with Ottoman traditions and base the system on a new framework of an ideal harmony with the customs, during the 18th century and afterwards. Thus, following this period, a number of changes, concerning the issue, took place. Since the changes would increase the power of bureaucracy and would secure centralization, bureaucrats became reformist. The regular diplomatic relations with the West lead to the acceptance of the the Western thought, adoption of the Western institutions and Western technology to enter into the Empire. Since the

* "Kul" system may be defined as a system in which the children of especially non-muslim people and prisoners of war are trained specially and raised to work in administrative positions in state. This was fed by two sources in the Ottomans: one was the prisoners of war, slaves who were bought in return of Money or dynasties who were dependent on the Ottoman Empire. The other source was the children which were picked through the method of *gahtering* "devşirme" (Yalçındağ 1970: 20).

19th century transferring the institutions from the West, as mirror copies, one after another has become a fashion. (Weiker, 1973:101-102)

During the administrative and political reforms made in the Ottoman Empire (Tanzimat Period 1839-1876), whereas preserving the superior position of the Sultan in the system was supported, the authority to form a policy was used by the bureaucrats. To enable the bureaucrats to do so, they needed to have security. Consequently, the issue that the bureaucrats spent much of their working time was to establish the autonomy of bureaucracy. By getting out of the "kul" status, working in an environment that regulated by law that grants powers and rights where crime and punishment are justly regulated might put the bureaucrats in public employee status. Yet security was out of question for a person in the status of "kul". Throughout his life, his belongings and his life was subject to a decision of the Sultan. Thanks to such regulations the ultimate right to rule the state was transferred from the Sultan to the institutions where bureaucrats were active (Kalaycıoğlu-Sarıbay, 1986:13).

The cause which had forced the bureaucratic administrators towards modernist movements was the precaution to strengthen the bureaucratic centre. Efforts to create the new institutions influential over every aspect of the society became remarkable in order to take the above mentioned precaution. The reasons behind this attitude were to minimize the Sultan's direct interference, to set up a system of relations which had an inner functional coherence that was not based on individual relations, but rather legal rules. In consequence of the re-arrangements Bab-ı Ali took fully over the government of the country, the administering staff with more powerful, capable and influential bureaucracy, dominated over every field of the state. (Hanioglu, 1989:57) Although the Sultan was responsible for policy-making, the law-making function was fulfilled by various councils (Meclis-i Dar-ı Şuara-yı Bab-ı Ali, Meclis-i Vala-ı Ahkam-ı Adliye) which were above ministries. The members of those councils were civil bureaucrats (Lewis, 1988:99).

The characteristic feature of the bureaucrats in the Tanzimat period was that they appeared as a closed group who received western style education and who considered themselves as the only individuals with skills necessary for state administration. They regarded themselves at the service of the state rather than of the Sultan. Traditionally, they had the thought that the policy which was formed by them would be for the benefit of the public and would represent the general opinion in the best way. The most significant point that

they emphasised was to maintain political independence of the civil bureaucracy (Heper, 1974a:69-70). Indeed, the existence of practices of that period show that civil bureaucracy had come to a stage of forming policies, making proposals or producing alternative solutions from the stage of acting upon order (Aykaç, 1997:150).

The structure which had been formed by civil bureaucrats was totally reversed in the period of Abdülhamit II. The Sultan who desired the state to be represented in his personality, turned Bab-ı Ali into a sort of secretary office. In a similar way, instead of merit based public employment, which was tried to be realized in the Tanzimat period, a bureaucracy based on personal loyalty was tried to be formed. (Hanoğlu, 1989:57-58) Although the Tanzimat Bureaucrats were removed from their offices due to their dominance in the field of politics, the acquired tradition of bureaucratic behaviour continued and the bureaucrats became the main opposition against Abdülhamit.

Military bureaucracy co-occured with İttihat and Terakki Party in the field of politics as an influential element in the late 19th century. As a result of being close to İttihat and Terakki Party bureaucracy appeared to be politicized. The bureaucracy's distinctive character in this period was its closeness to the Party, rather than its technical ability. (Eryılmaz, 2002:36) In this period, both civil and military wings of bureaucracy shared a common point: Dominating over the society. Bureaucracy had made efforts to do so since the Tanzimat period. There were considerable amount of such efforts in the the first (I. Meşrutiyet) and second (II. Meşrutiyet) constitutional period. (Yalçındağ, 1970:50) According to those bureaucrats, problems that were existed in the society could only be solved by dominating over the society. Therefore, modernization and strengthening of bureaucracy were necessary. This conception also formed the foundation of the Republican Period bureaucracy. Because the fact that Republic regime aimed at creating a more homogenous and more modern society, made bureaucracy very effective with regard to the problems of the country as a whole. In this regard, bureaucracy had both administrative and political functions.

The Institutionalization of the Functionalist View and Early Republic Bureaucracy

The Republican Period has inherited, amongst others, the bureaucratic heritage of the Empire. Even though various changes in the administrative structure were experienced, it is still possible to see the traces of the 600 year old tradition of state administration, even in today's bureaucratic structure of Turkey. (Aykaç, 1997:161)

Bureaucracy lived its golden age in the period between the declaration of Republic (1923) and the year 1950, when Democrat Party came into power. In order to keep the society united, public bureaucracy considered the state to be necessary, both in the Ottoman period and the Republican period. Therefore, the Republican era bureaucracy had two basic missions at the stage of establishment. The first was to re-start and to continue the reforms which had started in the late periods of the Empire and was interrupted by the war. The second was to secure the pioneership of Public bureaucracy in the development of the country. Indeed, the mission to get the public to accept the reforms was solely given to public bureaucracy. The only party of the time, the Republican People's party (CHF), was also referred to in this regard. The CHF was under the control of military and civil bureaucrats in that period. For this reason, the CHF was later labelled as the party of bureaucracy (Bayraktar, 1993:143).

The status and prestige of the bureaucrats of that time appeared to be quite high. The close relations between the politicians who established the republic and bureaucrats lead to increase the statute of the bureaucrats. The need to conduct several basic services and functions via the public in early years of the Republic, when the numerical greatness of bureaucracy was lower, caused bureaucracy to expand rapidly. (Şaylan, 1989:299-300) The active power in this period was bureaucracy. The CHP, the only influential legal political power of the era, had large room for bureaucracy in its rows. (Şaylan, 1986:76) The CHP was also become a bureaucratic political party. Bureaucratic and political powers were merged like a device. Hence this device was able to impose on the public the desires of the officials. (Heper, 1974/b:74) Public governors began to deal with political matters as well as with their administrative duties. Thus, bureaucracy and politics became interlocked each other, in state administration, and no functional distinction was made between bureaucratic and political institutions. Those who would like to be candidates for political offices needed to be approved by the party's organizations and party administrators. Since the public governors were also the heads of local political institutions, they became politically powerful (Aykaç, 1997:163 - Eryılmaz, 2002:139).

Bureaucracy which became an integral part of politics, in the new era, accepted the duty of establishing the values and principles of the new state in the society (Heper, 1977:72). For this reason, leaning on the state was obligatory. Therefore, they could, only in this way, keep the status of being over the society. In return, the new state demanded the bureaucrats to be loyal to the aims of the Republic. Especially

in the single political party period, the functions of the Political Party were transferred to bureaucracy and fulfilling of the political party's functions was made the major duty of bureaucracy. (Heper, 1985:62-70) More burden than in modern democratic countries was put on the bureaucracy. When civil bureaucracy strengthened its ground in society and in the political system, and regarded the static – revolutionary principles as basic in its political attitude, the conception of bureaucratic administration reached the peak level, in the end of 1930s. The same years were also witnessed the end of cooperation of political and bureaucratic elites and emerging of social movements. to end the cooperation of political- bureaucratic elites began. Due to their increasing power and prestige, the bureaucrats desired to create or originate political policies rather than to apply the political decisions.

Although the likeness between the party and bureaucracy was tried to be loosened in the general assembly of the party that was held in 1939, the understanding of party-state union continued. When the bureaucratic elite in various positions in the state organization were given the political power, civil and military originated bureaucrats had the opportunity to be elected for the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM). When one looks at the occupational backgrounds of the members of the TBMM, in the single-party period, he sees that bureaucrats come first. When considered from this point of view, due to the single political party was based on elitist, statist and authoritarian values, public administrators benefited from significant opportunities, took high responsibilities, therefore, status of honor that had not been seen in the offices of the Ottoman Empire. Whereas the Ottoman public administrators conducted typical state duties such as protecting the public order and collecting taxes, the bureaucrats of the single-party period obtained the opportunity to participate in social and cultural services, economic development and improvement activities and the political processes in addition to other duties. They, obligatorily, played active roles in the formation and execution of public policies (Eryılmaz, 2002:139-142). Because a newly established state and a planned ideal society were in question. Since such a society had not come into existence yet, the bureaucrats inevitably considered themselves as the representatives of the “ideal society” and of the will of this society. (Bayraktar, 1999:157)

Liberal Expansion and Change in the Bureaucratic Tradition in the New Era

New political groups were emerged in the 1940s. They started to

influence political life by establishment of the Democrat Party (DP) in 1946. Therefore, single political party period was ended and multi political party period was commenced. In order to increase its seats, in the TBMM, in the approaching election, the CHP made limited concession from its previous policies. Therefore, it is observed that the CHP took on the leadership of bureaucratic elitist revolutionist. When CHP lost the election in 1950, bureaucracy began to believe that the mission of protecting "democracy" as well as revolutionists was their responsibility. When considered in this point, the leading problem in relation to the new political actors was to secure impartiality in civil bureaucracy. Thus, during the preparation of government program, before the 1950 elections, the DP followed a careful policy in order not to confront bureaucracy; and during its election campaign the DP focused criticism on the CHP instead of bureaucracy. It is also promised by the DP that bureaucracy would not be subject to legal inquiry, if elected, due to the bureaucrats' previous conducts. Despite all those efforts and promises of the DP, the bureaucratic elite did not consider both the people in Turkey and their politician to be appropriate for democracy. Furthermore, they did not welcome those who occupied political posts who came from non-elite population after the 1950. They thought that the DP was a threat to the republican values and institutions. Hence, they granted the mission of representing the country to themselves. Therefore, they assumed that they were legitimate. Naturally, they thought that administration was appropriate only for themselves. (Heper, 1985:77) That the understanding of the bureaucracy conflicted with the new political opinions and approach of the new political powers (i.e. Democrat Party). Because, the approaches of the new political actors were completely opposite to bureaucratic administration view.

In this new era, there was a demand for a bureaucracy which is subject to the party in power and which has no ties with the opposition party became dominant, in contrast to the bureaucracy of one-party period (Şaylan, 1989:305). A political approach which did not take the priorities of the previous period into consideration and which was sensitive to the demands of the masses could not have agreed with the policy-making conception which was based on prescriptive rules. The bureaucrats of that time were in pursuit of "protecting and preserving the revolutions", rather than maturing of democratic life. Civil bureaucratic elite tried to continue its political activities despite the new political elite. For this reason, that attitude of the bureaucratic administrative tradition was subject to serious criticism. However, removing the political activity was impossible despite the

tension being experienced. But efforts to weaken the political power of bureaucracy became more successful than in the past. Yet this attitude put the efforts to make bureaucracy active and productive to the secondary position (Heper, 1977:100). Democrat Party responded more sensitively to the local benefits and demands whereas it did not care much about the views of the bureaucratic elites. The DP did not wish to see them as the partner of the government. Therefore, the party aimed at ending the dominance of bureaucracy over the political system by entering a competition of powers against bureaucracy. In its 10 years ruling period, Democrat Party made all the efforts and tried to take precautions (Aykaç, 1997:170) "Bringing under the command of the ministry", "unvoluntary retirement" and putting legal barriers to bring the government's actions to Supreme Courts were examples of precautions. The aim was to limit activities of bureaucrats who had close ties merged with the former government. While the autonomy of bureaucracy was ruined through these activities, the rate of bureaucrat origin deputies in the Turkish Grand National Assembly reduced, and the rate of those who work on their names, businesspersons, notables etc. were increased (Şaylan, 1989: 305). Thus, bureaucracy, which lived its golden years between 1950 and 1960 in one-party period, began to experience regression. Obviously the most important change was that the monopoly of political power—which made it privileged- went out of its hands. Despite all these efforts, civil bureaucracy could not be reduced to an institution which applied only the political decisions.

The Counter Attack of Bureaucracy

The tension between bureaucracy and political power which began to be experienced with transition into multi-party period, even deepen financial weakness of bureaucracy, and losing of power and respect of bureaucracy forced it to oppose Democrat Party government. The application of the simplest principle of democracy had a stimulating effect on military and civil bureaucracy (which we call dominating political block) and other allied powers, and thus they considered this case as a serious threat to their power in history (Bilgin, 1997:27) Therefore, the military intervention of 27 May 1960 was a movement that those who wanted to restore their former happy days supported it, joined in and had great expectations for. For this purpose, through a constitution which was prepared in the intermediary period, precautions to limit the power of party-centred politics were taken and so some power and autonomy was given to bureaucracy. Now, parliament was no longer the only organ to utilize

the sovereignty of the nation; some autonomous organisations were formed. These organisations included, *inter alia*, the Constitutional Court, the Universities, the TRT (Turkish Radio and Television Association), the Council of National Security.. An important characteristic of these organisations was that the administering staff were either bureaucrats or of bureaucrat origins.

While the new constitution loosened political restrictions, it was, in fact, hugely limited the activities of the representative institutions, and caused them to share their powers with bureaucratic organizations. A preference was made to strengthen those who were appointed against those who were elected. If we consider the principles introduced by 1961 constitution concerning the operation of administration, public employees' rights and their union rights; we can see that the constitution facilitated the Turkish bureaucracy to be powerful enough to play roles in economic and social development (Yalçındağ, 1970:57) Through the regulations, military and civil administrative fields were separated and the wholeness of administration was spoiled. Two distinct and self-sufficient orders of bureaucracy, i.e. civil and military administrative orders, emerged. Both were capable of acting alone. The regulations that were made with 1961 constitution were putting bureaucracy and also the bureaucrats under protection against the local powers which were coming into existence. Besides, positions of institutions like the Constitutional Court and Court of Auditors were above both the power to make law and the power to govern the country. However, it is observed that, in this new period which was started by the new constitution, civil bureaucracy could not attain its autonomy again; as the military bureaucracy did. In addition to that, its status in the society deteriorated. Although the civil bureaucrats had their own profit making enterprises like State Employees Aid Society (MEYAK), as the military bureaucrats, they were not successful, in comparison with the military bureaucrats, in running the enterprises. They wanted to use their knowledge and expertise over the political power through the State Planning Organization, which was established to increase actives in the field of administration as well as in the field of economic and social opportunities (Bayraktar, 1993:153) In this way, they thought that they would gain important advantages and opportunities in the formation of public policies by employing the power of expertise over the political power. However, all these regulations could not increase the power of civil bureaucracy. The achievement of the Aid Society of Military Personnel (OYAK) brought it into a different status from the civil bureaucracy with regard to salaries and opportunities; besides

this caused a privileged status in front of the political power (Şaylan, 1989:305-306) Through all these changes, there was no longer parallelisms between the military and the civil bureaucracies in socio-economic issues as there was in cultural problems in the past. Yet, it is still hard to say that bureaucracy lost its effect on the Turkish political life completely in this period. Because the bureaucratic elites in the Ottoman Empire had not preserved their positions in the society only by leaning on the state authority. Since the problems with regard to treasury and diplomacy in the 19th Century and appreciation of Western civilization in the 20th Century got momentous, the bureaucratic elite became functional elite, as well (Heper, 1974/a:80)

In the 1960s, when socio-economic improvement issues became leading problems, bureaucracy also differed and the State Planning Organization as well as the other ministries and bureaucratic organizations related with socio-economic improvement began to abandon the former bureaucratic tradition gradually; but still groups which were preserving the statist view were available (Heper, 1973:115). However, it is said that in mid 1960s, bureaucracy began to be partisan and this case revealed a rentable, functional aspect within bureaucracy. By looking at the reduction of the political activity of bureaucracy and becoming partisan, it is not easy to say that there is a progress towards capability bureaucracy which is included in functional elite type (Şaylan, 1989:307). It is also claimed that the ice among bureaucracy, the political elites and various socio-economic groups was being melted and that the political activities against these groups are becoming political addictions (Heper, 1974/a:80) But bureaucracy is active in Turkey, within the framework of a logic whose rationality is disputable. The logic behind the current bureaucracy does not corrspond with Turkey's socio-economic structure.

Previous Constitutional amendments by which established a number of autonomous institutions amended one more, during the 12 March 1974 memorandum and henceforward, and lifted autonomous status of certain institutions. By doing so, against to those who wanted to take advantage of existence of such intuitions, the status of the state and, therefore, of bureaucracy was strengthened. Therefore, it was facilitated, in the society which had a low level of organization, for those who has close relations with bureaucracy and the bureaucracy to keep the state under control (Akan, 1995; 66).

An important development in this period was that bureaucracy had grown both in volume and in number. State in Turkey lost its energy to pioneer the mission of modernizing, in mid of 1970. When the coalition governments came into power in the period following

1973, they discharged and relocated the officials at a rate that had never been seen in the history of Republican Period and politicized them, and in this way they tried to put them under control. So, this period (1973-74) may be marked as the beginning of the end, in respect to civil bureaucratic elite administration. Following this period, bureaucrats mostly turned into people who transferred simple information to the executive organs. At that time, the activity of bureaucracy in politics and the tendency to consider themselves as the guardians of the state were weakened. Bureaucracy had become extremely partisan. This case was true of not only the upper positions at the bureaucracy, but also of mid and even lower positions at the bureaucracy.

In the 1980s, as a result of the changes that were experienced, globally, bureaucratic structure, its organization and fulfilling its functions appeared to be away from the ability to fulfill the functions in time and efficiently. It was also seen that it was not in a position to reestablish itself to comply with economic and social developments. In other words, bureaucratic structure was not able to keep up with economic and social developments and it was well behind (Karaer, 1987: 29). The system had been corrupted. Apart from this, the fact that bureaucratic elites had been unhappy by the tolerance of the centre towards the side, led to 1980 military intervention. With this intervention the increasing role of the military bureaucracy beginning with the establishment of National Security Board (MGK) in 1960 reached the peak level (Bayraktar, 1993; 157). The bureaucracy of the Turkish politics has been under the consideration of another wing of bureaucracy, i.e., military bureaucracy, since 1961. This case became evident especially after 1971 intervention. Main issues used to be discussed through conciliation with the military wing at that time, as in now. The political influence of civil bureaucracy was out of question. Representatives of the Army did not take part in the government, but they used to hold posts in a more autonomous organ. The most significant indicator of this was perhaps seen in the structure of the MGK. The powers granted to the members of the MGK were so great that no other civil bureaucrats had ever been granted. It is interesting to note that the granted rights put the military bureaucrats in a position where none of the civil bureaucrats, including public prosecutors, police officers, intelligent officers ever had. Those rights had never been granted to even the Grand National Assembly. Therefore, the military bureaucracy used to shadow the government and the parliament (Başbuğ, 1997; 294).

The New Right's Approach to the Public Administration and the Appointed - Elected Contradiction

The rapid global change in technology following 1980s made the structural changes in the field of administration obligatory. Since the bureaucratic structures were shaped according to the old technological conditions and working conditions were developed accordingly, satisfying the need to reorganize the bureaucratic was not possible. This global wide issue was also creating problems in Turkey. The discussions which started in the 1980s to meet such demands more rationally and more effectively began to be fruitful in the 1990s. Some changes and re-structurings which had been out of question up to that time was under discussion in our public administration. These were the superior board bureaucracies that were realized through the proposals and influence of IMF and the World Bank.

Securing the autonomy of administration and economy against to the politics, keeping these fields away from daily populist interventions, formation of autonomous structures to provide stability in administration and in economy, and facilitation of dominance of a rational conception in administration were aimed at rationalization of administration. Increasing productivity of the bureaucracy was also an aim. For this reason, there has been a rapid increase in the number of such institutions, in recent years. The first example of such institutions in Turkey is the Boards of Higher Education (YÖK). Later some others were included in the list; such as the Superior Board of Radio and Television (RTÜK), the Regulatory and Control Board of Banking BDDK, the Capital Markets Board, the Board of Sugar, etc. All of these boards have autonomous statutes, in respect of administration and finance.

Formation of a structure basing on superior boards in public administration is the result of an approach which aims to narrow the field of politics and to leave this field to technocrats. It is thought that such boards would make more "rational" decisions in their sectors. It is also taken into consideration in introducing such institutions that the government's populist policies that would be contradictory to the thought of "rational state" would be hindered (Eryılmaz, 2002: 162). However, due to their financial and administrative features and their powers, these boards are focuses of authority. The issues which the executive organs decided, executed or controlled were taken from those organs and given to these autonomous organs. Thus the fields of important public politics were transferred to bureaucracies which were organised in the form of "boards". Because these superior board bureaucracies would use their powers under their responsibilities independently, they thought that they would also have the rights to form public policy and to execute. Yet an autonomous structuring

can prevent politicians from intervening those fields; but can not stop these boards from politicizing (Eryılmaz, 2002: 163). Clearly the superior boards wish to use the public power and not to be subject to the public power (Dönmez, 2002: 8). When supervision and controlling of these boards are considered from the point view of the Constitution, it is seen that supervision of these boards is carried out by a committee. The Committee submits its report to the Grand National assembly once a year. This causes the parliament to fall out of the right of supervision (Karanfiloğlu, 2002: 9).

Because such a style of organising means the strengthening of the dominance of bureaucrat origin policies, this leads to the dominance of the appointed bureaucrats rather than the elected ones. In other words, strengthening the positions of the bureaucrats in the system may mean putting them out of the control of politics. In this way, there is an effort to preserve the politization and dominance in bureaucracy within the point of view of the "elitist". But the politization here appears to be the politization which is out of the political parties and which is away from the bottom. Recently this care has caused disturbance and created an issue of dispute in the public opinion. Therefore, the executive organs commenced to minimize the possibility of such institutions to act independently.

Bureaucracy's Approach to the USA and the Middle East*

Although Westernization has been, both in the Ottoman and Republican Periods, among the main policies of the State for over two hundred years, this policy has been, under the influence of the post-world War II conjecture, focused mostly on the USA. The defeat of Germany in the World War II, losing popularity of totalitarian administrators all over the World, shift from single political party to multi political party and expanding of multi political party forced Turkey where there was only one political party to make choice. Because Westernist policies were so called supra-politics and they were the policies which were turned into the major objectives of the State. Until the World War II, integration to the West was possible with a totalitarian approach of administration and without having a pluralist structure. Yet the conjecture charged due to the circumstances in the World War II. Becoming a member of politic, economic and secu-

* Information presented in this section comes from an evaluation of the data obtained from surveys and interviews. In this research approximately 60 bureaucrats (68.5 % males, 35.5 % females) have been used. Of those bureaucrats 14.8 % were high school graduates, 68.5 % were university graduates; and 13 % were doing post-graduate and doctoral studies.

rutiy institutions that were established in Europe was closely related to political structures of candidate countries. Turkey was intending to become a part of the West. Therefore, she obliged to reshape her political structure accordingly.

The demands of the Soviets during the Stalin period to acquire some cities in the East of Turkey, (i.e.Kars, Ardahan etc) and to have a base in the Bosphorus led Turkey to have security anxieties, and encouraged Turkey to pursue more close relations with the West, i.e.both Europe and the USA. Therefore, it became a passion for Turkey to take a place in a western supranational organisations or institutions at any case.. Consequently, the idea of acting in harmony with the West became a main policy, without taking into account the possible advantages and the disadvantages of such conducts. Turkey's sending soldiers to Southern Korea, because of a desire to act in accordance with the USA, should be clear evidence. The decision to send soldier abroad which has been subject to criticism for decades was absolutely the decision made by bureaucratic political circles. The loss of lives of the Turkish soldiers in Korea has still been discussed since the 1950s. But according to the bureaucratic political circles, a part of the objective of joining the western military and political organisations that had been aimed through the decision was achieved. According to them, as a result of the decision, Turkey became a member of the NATO and some other instutions, like the European Council. It is also claimed that due to the decision, Turkey has shifted her political structure from single political party to multi political party structure.

As can be understood, the attitudes of the state concerning foreign policy were not the attitudes of the public. These were the bureaucratic attitudes and policies due to statist conception. When bureaucracy is considered as a whole it can generally be said that it represent a statist approach. However, when it considered from the point view of individuals it can also be said that there are departures from the statist approach. In other words, bureaucrats individually have a distant and critising attitude towards the basic approach of the state concerning foreign policy. Bureaucratic side, however, think that their primary duty is to transfer the state policies to the public and to orient the public rather than to meet the expectations of the public. This general approach is also true of foreign policy. Thus, the bureaucrats tried to legalize and to make the public believe in the decisions and relations that they did not approve.

Despite all these, it can be seen that, when the bureaucrats are individually considred, there have been significant deviations from

the statist official policies. When the bureaucrats were asked about the relations with the USA, they mostly said that the existing policies were against Turkey. However, they carried on these policies due to their statist views. Despite the recent ups and downs in relations with the European Union and the United States, and in spite of the negative individual opinions of the bureaucrats, the desire to stay in this block is at a high level due to the benefits of Turkey. Even though the post World War II Soviet threat exterminated with the collapse of the Soviets and new opportunities are available to Turkey, thanks to the new Turkic Republics, bureaucrats believe that a harmony with the EU and the USA is necessary and Turkey should act together. Although there are cultural and etnical common values, there is a common belief that according to the real politics no activity is possible in this region without the EU and the USA. Only 35.2 % of the bureaucrats consider the new situation in the Central Asia as an alternative field. Remaining 65.8 % are for the continuation of being in the Western block ultimately in spite of some doubts. These opinions show us that whereas the bureaucrats hold the rational view of being in the western block, Turkey especially has emotional closeness towards the related geography (Central Asia, the Middle East, Caucasasia, the Balkans, etc).

The most sensitive, breakable point that was observed in the anti-American approach in bureaucracy following the invasion of Iraq was the American raid on the bureau of Turkish soldiers in Kerkük and their arresting the Turkish soldiers who were there in accordance with the Ankara Agreement. This activity aroused indignation against the USA not only in bureaucracy but also in every field. Hence, while 48,1 % of bureaucrats were not in favour of the Turkish – American relations, before the invasion, this figure increased 61,1 % after the invasion and the event took place in Kerkük. The increase in the number of those who negatively approach to the Turkish-USA relations is connected with the event in the Kerkük. This event did not only affect the approaches; but also caused to question the quality of the relations. The view expressed by bureaucrats claiming that the USA is a threat to Turkey's interests has increased to 55.6 %. Of the participants in the research 5.6 % thought that the USA was safe for Turkey's benefits. Those who saw the event dispassionately were 37 %. It seems that the rate of those who consider Turkish-American relations to be a threat went up over 90 % nowadays. This case also damaged the matter of strategic partnership with the US that had been emphasised frequently to show the public how close the relations had been. A considerable part of the bureaucrats believed that

the strategic partnership between Turkey and the USA did not have the same qualities as the one between England and the USA and that the concept was meaningless for Turkey. Above mentioned American raid and arresment of Turkish soldier in the Norther Iraq shaped the recent approach of bureaucrats which is not clear.

It is observed that the bureaucrats assume that "we would not have been subject to such a treatment if Turkey had been considered to be of strategic partner". Therefore, when they faced the question of whether Turkey should preserve the alliance with the USA or brake it up, the proportion of the given answers was almost the same (for preserving the alliance: 20.4 %, for breaking the alliance up: 18.5 %) due to the emotional atmosphere following the unwanted event. Nevertheless, because bureaucrats consider that they have the responsibility to administer the state, they were for the opinion that Turkey should quit the alliance only after setting up new alliances to secure Turkey (approximately the rate of this view was 29.6 %). However, it should not be ignored that this rate rose without taking psychological effects of the invasion and it bears conjentural elements. In spite of the existence of all the psychological factors and the anti-Americanist views both in the public opinion and in bureaucracy, the bureaucrats can look at the events in a more rational way. They think that even though the US does not accept generally the regional policies of Turkey, it had efforts to paralel Turkey's interests with the existing policies. They also think that the interests of Turkey can only be be protected in this way.

Turkish-American Relations in the Middle-East Quagmire

Owing to the fact that the region of the Middle East had been under the govereignty ot the Ottoman Empire until recently. Therefore, Republic of Turkey has, naturally, cultural and historical ties with the region. In the course of the region's history, the Turks were a dominant factor, for a long time. After the establishment of the Republic, the region did not occupy a significant place in Turkey's foreign policy for a long time due to the radical application of the westernist policies and due to some other factors. However, the Middle-East region entered the agenda of Turkey again because of some national and international events or changes after the 1980s; especially due to Turkey's concern about security. In consequence of security related factors and of Turkish economy's expansion, the formerly displayed attitude towards the region was abandoned and the interest of the state in the region increased. Now bureaucratic circles are aware of

the fact that a due care should be given to the region for the sake of benefits of the region, for the present and in the future. As the region has rich reserves of petrol, the superpowers have never given up the region since early 20th century. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the USA remained the only superpower. Consequently, it is observed that the USA did not hesitate to military employ force in this region, as in other regions of the world, without caring for the international rules. Although bureaucrats do, in general, not welcome the USA's policies, they display a realistic attitude in Turkey's policies concerning the Middle East. 55.6 % of the bureaucrats in the interview thought that Turkey should use its influence over the region to the benefits of the US; because Turkey could protect her interests in the region only in this way. Some 31.5 % of the bureaucrats thought that this would be impossible. Because Turkey was given the role of gendarme of the region and the USA would not allow Turkey to go beyond that role. The bureaucrats holding this view showed the American attitude towards Turkish benefits as an example: the establishment of the Kurdish state and the fact that Turkmens were not represented in the provisional council of Iraq although they were the majority in population.

Apart from that, the memorandum crisis which was experienced before and after Iraq war left traces in the view of the bureaucrats. In the first event of memorandum, it was believed that Turkish military observers had bad treatment in contrast to American view, which was a disappointment. As a result of preference on revising the relations mutually, American demand of Turkey to send soldiers to introduce stability in Iraq cause disputes in Turkish public opinion as in the first incident of memorandum. This time the government treated the case more strictly and the demand was satisfied by the approval decision of the TBMM.

The acceptance of the memorandum removed the American attitude towards Turkey following the first memorandum and was found satisfactory. However, this decision received opposition especially from the Kurdish members of the Provisional Iraqi council. Thus, the USA gave up his demand. This case reinforced the bureaucrat's doubts about the confidence in the USA. This also reinforced the view of the bureaucrats that the US wanted to orient Turkey under its influence and considered Turkey as a gendarme in the region.

The Middle East Issue as a Hindering Factor in Turkish-American Relations

It is alleged by some bureaucrats that one of the factors which

play a preventing role in Turkish-American relations is the existence of State of Israel. Anti-semitism has never existed in Turkey. It is out of question today to talk about such a thing for Turkey. Because, Turkey was a shelter to the Jews 500 years ago and in the Nazi period in Germany. Turkish people approached them with tolerance and hugged them in a friendly way at a time when they were dismissed from Europe. However, Turkish people have never welcomed the policies followed by the Israeli state, especially the ones concerning Palestinians. While the Turks have developed a counter response to the Israeli policies of the region, no such responses are available for the Jewish. This assessment and approach of the public is also true in bureaucracy.

The USA has been regarded, by the bureaucrats, as the most important defender of Israeli attitude of disobedience to the rules in international arena. According to the bureaucrats, this policy of the US towards Israel increases the distrust in the USA. It is interesting to note that 22% of those interviewed pointed out that America is in the Middle East to protect the Israeli benefits rather than the American ones. A very limited number of bureaucrats thought that the American aim is to establish the human rights and democracy in the region. This proportion is not significant when it is compared with the whole. Therefore, it is safe to say that the factor hindering peace in the Middle East is not only Israel, but also the USA.

Another factor hindering the development of Turkish-American relations has been the American policies concerning the ethnic communities –especially the Kurds– in the region. It is believed that the USA has been abusing the various communities in the regions by basing its reason to intervene on human rights, improving of freedoms, democracy etc. The abuses are not only welcomed by the people of the region, but also Turkey. While states in Europe and elsewhere have been integrating with each other by forming supranational unions, new states have been derived from the existing states in the Middle East under American leadership. This attitude of the USA not only extremely disturbs Turkey, but also other states alike. The American relations with the Kurds have been evaluated in this context. Turkey, after the Gulf War I, provided the Kurdish tribes escaping from Saddam pressure with security and protection, and approached the event from the aspect of human rights with the orientation of the USA. However, the result of these policies was an absolute disappointment for Turkey. Because in this process PKK attacks on Turkish forces increased, which put Turkish security into danger, and the establishment process of the Kurdish state accelerated, he-

sitations towards the USA increased. From that point on, the official statements and warranties given the US government have been met with hesitation.

The bureaucrats have a common belief that the USA has been acting in a way similar to forming city-states (such as Kuwait, Bahrein, etc) which were formed in early 20th century, to secure the existence of Israile state, to grasp the petrol of the region and to control the region in a beter way. However, this case causes anxiety on the bureaucrats. Some of the breaucrats stated that these American policies are threats to the security and unity of Turkey. Moreover thay said that America has indirectly preparing its own disaster. A considerable number of the bureaucrat allage that, in an attitude which apposed the peoples and states of the region, it seems impossible for American to stay in the region for long.

Conclusion

Bureaucracy has been playing an important role in political decisions, despite Turkey's modernization targets. Turkish public bureaucracy has a status in Turkey which is different from modern democratic countries owing to its statist tradition. Perhaps, this is most important feature of Turkish public bureaucracy. The statist character is activated in public bureaucracy, which provides bureaucracy with power that is lacking in modern democratic countries. This has been a significant factor in the imbalance and instability of the political system. Because, the political field has been shared between politicians and bureaucrats. Bureaucrats have signfinance in this respect.

As can be observed from bureaucrat view points, the discourse and views of the bureaucrats are statist. It is believed that if a Kurdish state is to be established in Northern Iraq, the Turkish-American relations will lead to a nonreversible edge. This point is perhaps the most fragile point in Turkish-American relations. Hence, the existence of the Kurdish state in body, even though not officially, has shaken the possitive perception of American relations. The strengthening belief that the USA could easily ignore Turkey and the partnership ruins the conception of alliance and strategic partnership.

To sum up, in view of the bureaucrats America is the only super power in the world. However, it is believed that Amerika making making mistakes in regard to establishing the control in tne region. The Picture of Turkey is evaluated thus in this perspective: Turkey has significant advantages in regions such as the Middle East, Central Asia, Caucasia, and the Balkans. The way of benefiting from those

advantages is to parallel the policies with those of the USA. However, the known attitude of Turkish people about these issues is one of the hindering factors in such relations. They believe that the USA should have more reasonable policies and should not appose the regional states. They think that Turkey can not be isolated in this case so easily. Even though they have an anti-American view, they believe that they should not be emotional for the sake of Turkey's future benefits and that the relations with the USA should be preserved despite all the negative factors.

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V.

Issues in Modernization and Turkish Musical Policy*

Introduction

The concept of what the state should be like has an important place in Turkish politics. This concept is accepted as the source of all values, the fundamental basis of all virtues. Because everything is defined by the state and for the state, this means that the existence of the state results in the existence of social order, society, and in short the existence of everything. It is thought that if there were no state, nothing would exist. As a result, the study of its nature is seen as the most holy of duties. It is from this point of view that all change and development in Turkey can only be realized together with the state or with its permission. When this is true, the owner of the state is not the society itself, but the select section of bureaucratic society that has separated itself from society and has established itself inside the mechanism of the state. And it is for this reason that, according to Turkish political understanding, the duty of the society is to always adapt to the state or to ensure the adaptation of the society to the state. If any problem occurs here at all, it is not the state that is guilty, but the society itself. However, when we look at the demands for change that result from the process of modernization, we see that these demands are not just societal but come from the state itself. The state has always been the one to decide when and how it is necessary to change. However this situation is not just an attitude

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peculiar to the process of modernization but is an attitude that has always existed throughout history. For in Turkish political culture, because the state has been functionalized to the point that it has been purified from human weaknesses, it is accepted to be equipped with prudence and eternity, which are characteristics that will ensure social order. There has always been a concerted effort to foster in Turkish political culture the general acceptance of the fact that there must be wisdom in the policies of the state, that normal people could never understand these policies, and that it is therefore meaningless to question the state. For this reason there is an obligation to act in a way appropriate to the needs of the state. Furthermore, there is no need to find any basis for this situation, for the state itself is an entity that has a reason for existence generally as well as in and of itself. For this reason, to the extent that the state maintains social order, the state becomes a part of the culture that it governs. This kind of thinking puts the state in an exalted and holy position. As a matter of course, nothing could be more natural than the state, which knows what is good and right for the society, bearing its own principle of legitimacy within itself. In the context of such a way of thinking, there is no search for any manner of legitimization external to the state itself. The decision for change and the amount of change is always made by the state itself. This *modus operandi* has always existed throughout the process of modernization. When the state wants to change itself, the society has requested change as well together with the state; whenever the society has not conformed to the change it has been punished by the state in the most severe manner. On the other hand, when the society has made it clear that it wants to change or wants to carry change beyond the desires of the state, the state, because it is forced to change without its own consent, has resorted to means of punishment. What is desired is for the society to move in accord with the attitude of the state. That is, Turkish modernization has identified the state as the only political player in the field of democratization and design of society. In other words, the efforts for democratization or change are being made in order to perpetuate the relationship between society and the unchanging government, and to perpetuate the dreams of an unchanging society. That is, the process of modernization results in change in both the state and the structure of society at the same time. Furthermore modernization has been viewed from a bureaucratic point of view and society has been evaluated from the perspective of the state. Consequently the state has always had a monopoly on what is right. While this attitude existed during the Ottoman period in a moderate

way, the Republic – especially in the early stages – began to apply this attitude in a more radical fashion. For this reason, the history of the Republic is a history of a society being subjected to domestication at the hands of the state. The method of this domestication has been control and pressure. Therefore it can be seen that during the short history of the republic, the state-society relationship and political tradition in general has not followed a course compatible with a cultural break from the past, but has shown continuity from the past to the present. The republic, which should be working toward opening the public arena to the society and widening it for the benefit the society, has instead incorporated the public sector in Turkey with the state and has made social life subject to the norms of the state. This means that the state is actual force that forms the basis of community politics. Consequently, the societal norms brought by the state impose a specific lifestyle and moral understanding, and gives preferential treatment to the part of society that adopts these ideals. Those who claim the ideals of the state gain social prestige and political careers. In this manner, we see that the state on the one hand monopolizes political power in a narrow institutional frame, and on the other hand ideologically designates a legitimate cultural identity from tip to toe. Therefore, since society is reduced to nation and nation is reduced to the state, the way is opened for harsh and severe politics to emanate downward from the state and be imposed on the society in every sphere. The basic political apparatus is to empty the public sector of unapproved societal desires and for this arena to become one with the state. The authoritative tradition, which continued on in the Republic in the form of a single party, interferes in every social sphere from culture to art, from politics to economics, and has become enveloped in a political attitude that demands that the public arena be emptied of all unapproved desires of society.

The most tragic development of the national modernization movement, which, we have tried to outline here, is the policies of the state in the field of music, beginning in the Ottoman period and intensifying with the rise of the Republic. During the 20th century, the history of Turkish music can be thought of as the history of the conflict of attitudes regarding where the kind of music places Turkey and Turkish people on the world map. The discussion of music as an arena where the East-West dispute occurs is clear from the discussions of Turkish style versus European style that started in earnest in the period of Ottoman reforms and later included the discussion of monophony versus polyphony. Even though this debate has lost some of its intensity, it can be seen to be still continuing today. The debates about whether

the appropriate methodology for music is Eastern music, Western music, Turkish music or universal music go in hand and hand with requests for state support and protection. One of the greatest adventures of the modernization effort in our society, which has lasted for over two hundred years, has taken place in the arena of culture and art (especially music). For this reason one begins to wonder: is music in Turkey dealt with on a basis separate from music history, the age it is in and the social environment in which it was created; or is it the most important part of societal change and progress, taught as the best method of explaining the colors of thought and society of the time period? These questions form the important problematic issues of this work.

Efforts for Change in the Ottoman Period

The policy of bringing in people from the outside, having them straighten out our problems and consulting with them is not a fashion that began with the Republic. After the attempts in the years following 1894, there is period of preparation beginning in the 1820's and continuing until the 1920's that is characterized by the opening of music to the West (Uçan, 1994:53). The first concrete result of this preparation period was when, during the time of Sultan Mahmut II, the Janissary military organization was removed and a new military organization (*Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye*) was installed. The new army needed a new music band, not the band of a traditional military organization (the *mehterhane*), and the *Mızıka-ı Humayun* (Palace Band) was instituted with this purpose in mind. Thus, by means of the army, Western music, even though in a limited fashion, became officially included in the multi-faceted cultural life of the Empire. After being directed by French citizen Moniseur Manguel for two years, Giuseppe Donizetti (1788-1856), the brother of Gaetano Donizetti, the famous opera composer of that period, was brought to direct the organization (Paçacı, 1999; 10). Six months later, Donizetti composed the march "*Mahmudiye*" in honor of Sultan Mahmut II. The palace and surrounding circles were pleased with Donizetti's work, and he was given the title *paşa**. Donizetti, who was now a general, then composed the march "*Mecidiye*" for Abdülmecit when he became the Sultan (Çetinkaya, 1995; 65). In this manner the field of music began to see the effects of the policy of change applied by the state by bringing people in from the outside. *Mızıka-ı Humayun* was an organization that was notable in regards to the use of musical instruments, its repertoire, the arrival

* In the Ottoman administrative structure, "paşa" was equivalent to army general.

of an Italian bandleader with broad authority, and the twenty years of labor on the subject of the use of musical notation. In time the characteristics changed according to the musical taste of the cultural center (the Palace and the Sultan), and came to the level of drawing the famous musicians of Europe especially during the time of Sultan Abdülmecit (the visits of important musicians such as Franz List, Luigi Arditi, August, Adelburg, and Vievatemps occurred during this period) and preparations began for the transition to the opera operetta culture and the tradition of the orchestra. However during this transition other European musicians took place as director. After the death of Donizetti, another Italian, Guatelli, was put in charge for leading the organization. Guatelli also gained the approval of the palace. And just like Donizetti, he too was awarded the title of general. After Guatelli, instead of another Italian, the Frenchman D'Aranda was brought to lead the *Mızıka-ı Humayun*. D'Aranda turned the band into a French type band, and because he carried out his work in a manner pleasing to the palace, he too was honored with the title of general. At the same time, he organized the sheet music library. In the following time period, we see Turks taking over the band leadership: Necip Paşa, Saffet Bey, Zati Arıca Bey, Zeki Üngör Bey, and finally Bekir Bey, who organized a tour of Europe in 1917 with these band members (İlyasoğlu, 1999; 70).

There was not much support for Western music during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz besides the strengthening of the band's organization; however during the time of Sultan Abdülhamit, we see that the band began to become part of various levels of the army and navy. Students trained in the increasing number of band schools began to be employed in civil institutions, thereby adding to the spread of Western music (Paçacı, 1999; 11). At this point European life and music had begun to slowly penetrate the society, entering first the life of the palace socialites and well-to-do families through the influence of the state. Instruments such as the piano, which came along with Western pleasures and manners of behavior, began to replace traditional instruments such as the *ud* and *kanun* in wealthy homes. The number of those among the enlightened and the palace society taking interest in Western music increased at the end of the 19th century. During this period, every young girl in an upper class family grew up playing the piano, especially in Istanbul (İlyasoğlu, 1999: 70).

While Western music came on the scene as a part of the state's modernization efforts and enjoyed the support of the state, at the same time there was no attitude of superiority that belittled or rejected traditional music. For example, during the time of Mahmut II, even

when European composers were called in, work on classical Turkish music continued on in the palace and Turkish musicians working in this field continued in their duties. One of the important personages of classical Turkish music, the famous composer Dede Efendi continued his service in the Palace (Çetinkaya, 1999; 90). However the process of modernization in the palace and the increasing preference and esteem of Western music and musicians over traditional music disturbed those who were in favor of traditional music; thereby began the debate on European versus Turkish style which later became a subject of discussion and continues even today in different forms and forums. Dede Efendi composed the famous work *Another Romance (Yine Bir Gülnihal)* with a structure of waltz in an attempt to dissuade the interest of the Palace in Western music, and to show that Turkish music is appropriate for composing/performing music suitable for Western lifestyle and forms of entertainment. This composition in one sense symbolizes the resistance to Western melodies that was becoming widespread in the Palace. However upon seeing that similar efforts gave no results and that the Palace's increasing interest in Western musicians and music, Dede Efendi left the Palace, saying, I have no enjoyment here anymore. It is said that this statement was a reflection of his emotional response to the interest shown toward the Italian composer Donizetti. In spite of this, it cannot be said that the Ottoman Palace completely closed its doors to traditional music. Even though during this period the forms are musically reduced and the form of the songs themselves comes to the fore, this encounter with Western music actually created more self-awareness. Although it can be said that the two types of music came face to face and that there was no clear guidance from the aspect of education or application, this is definitely a period where different modes of thought developed and the East-West debate increased. During this period, traditional music, which came into fashion in Europe especially after the second siege of Vienna and affected musical works in Western country, was dealt a severe blow when the state put an end to the long tradition of the *mehterhane* in 1826, and all musical instruments and accumulation of musical knowledge was threatened with being forgotten. After this event, the flow interaction was reversed, and under the leadership of the state, Turkish music came strongly under the realm of influence of Western music (Gedikli, 1999; 133). From this point on, this process of interaction continued in a strong fashion by means of various political and social events. The leader and symbol of musical modernization, the *Mızıka-ı Humayun* continued its efforts in this vein until the time of the constitutional

monarchy, at which time it was closed and in its place the *Dar'ül Bedayi* was founded (providing both theater and musical education). However, the *Dar'ül Bedayi* was not long lived. The reason for this was the harsh conditions of World War I. The institution was closed on March 14, 1916, and a new musical school opened in its place, the *Dar'ül Elhan*, whose name meant "House of Songs."

In contrast to the indifference of the Palace and the state to traditional music, musical associations such as the *Dar'ül Musiki Osmani*, the *Dar'ül Feyz-i Musiki*, the *Dar'üt Talim-i Musiki*, *Gülşeni Musiki* and the *Şark Musiki Cemiyetleri* hold an important place in musical history with their performance and education structures that increased the participation of the general public in the musical arena of traditional music. Traditional music, not finding interest in the Palace and moving to wealthy homes, became more popular in entertainment due to rhythmic fundamentals and song format appropriate for marketing; likewise, these civil associations met the musical needs of the public to an important degree in the period following the 2nd Constitutional Monarchy. Similarly, the dervish lodges gave opportunity for the branch of traditional music known as Sufi music to live on in full vitality in through the activities of these institutions until being closed in the Republican period (Tanrıkorur, 1998; 59).

Even though this duality in music, through the efforts of the state, slowly spread to society and created various areas of debate, there were some positive effects on traditional music at some points. The beginning of the publication of musical notation at the end of the 19th century and the spread of the Western system of musical notation allowed traditional music to enter a new period in regards to the writing and recording of music. This is due to the fact that most works created with traditional methods were in danger of being lost. Even though the Western system of recording was the subject of debate regarding whether or not it gave an accurate representation, the *meshk** method of education and application was not able to preserve the work of art in its original form, and as a result most works were lost.

* The education and transfer of Ottoman Turkish music depended completely on a method called *meshk*. *Meshk* was founded on the basis of imitation and repetition. The teacher would repeat the music in section by section and again as a whole; in this manner the student would memorize the piece. With the *meshk* method, the student did not just learn music theory, a musical instrument, a technique, or a teacher's style, performance or interpretation. When a student studied using *meshk*, he was primarily learning the piece itself. In the last four hundred years of the Ottoman Turkish music tradition, a few individuals invented their own notation system and

Changes that Occurred during the Republic

Even though the Republic was based on the rejection of old ways, it is still necessary to evaluate the new state on the basis of continuity. This is due to the fact that the leaders of the Republic came from a historical background and were influenced by various schools of thought previous to the Republican period. Although the population was more homogeneous when the Republic took over than when it was during the Ottoman period, there was further direction toward a single type of national identity during the founding of the nation state and the cultural makeup of the nation was being re-evaluated and redefined. In the first 10-15 years of the Republic, it can be said that a great amount of effort was spent in every field with the purpose of the forwarding this goal of establishing a national identity and the ideal of reaching the level of Western civilization. As an application of these efforts, the political arena was made to overlap with the social arena and it was necessary to implement of the goals of standardization and homogenization. For this reason, the cultural reform, which formed the most radical aspect of the Kemalist ideology, came to be understood by the leadership as the most basic element of complete progress. There were a series of attributes, both arising from the nature of music and those that were ascribed by the state which formed the basis of the state's conscious and systematic intervention that began in the 1920's and reached its peak in the 1930's. Alternatively, since music is an artistic device that most clearly arouses feelings and excitement in a collective manner, it was thought to therefore be the best vehicle to serve the purposes of the revolution. Moreover, it formed an appropriate showcase to gain visibility for the efforts to create a Western society. For this reason, in a period where the process of breaking from the Ottoman-Islamic past and various social transformations was gaining speed, the Kemalist leadership and its associated thinkers put into action the Music Reform set against a large branch of art which signified the aforementioned heritage. The first Turkish sociologist Ziya Gökalp had much influence in the formation of the music policies that started this reform. Even though Ziya Gökalp was not knowledgeable in the field of music, the music policy of the Republic in the early years largely took form as a result of the thoughts proposed by Ziya Gökalp. He did not see traditional Turkish Art music as being rooted in Turkish culture but as a mix of

used it for their own limited purposes. However, none of these musical notation systems gained any widespread usage, to the contrary they were rejected and excluded by the system (Behar, 1998; 14-15). The purported reason was that the use of a notation system would cause a loss in the richness of sound in Turkish music.

Byzantine, Arab and Persian music. However, although he does accept folk music as a part of Turkish heritage, he does not find any of it to be modern. According to him,

"We are up against three types of music today: Eastern music, Western music, and Folk music. Which of these belongs to us? Eastern music is diseased and is not a national music. Folk music is the symbol of our culture. Western music is the music of a new civilization." (And, 1999; 281).

As can be seen here, Gökalt not only identifies the origin of traditional Turkish music, he also prescribes direction for the new state with his classification of music.

"In that case our national music will arise from the marriage of Western music and the folk music of our homeland. Folk music has given us many melodies. If we gather these melodies and harmonize them with the Western method, we will have a music that will be both national and European. The music boards of the Turkish Societies are among those who will fulfill this duty. And so the arena of Turkish nationalist music will be essentially defined by these principles; the rest will be up to our national musicians. (Çetinkaya, 1999; 92).

These thoughts of Gökalt* defined the music policies of the Republic. The reforms of the new state in the field of music would continue in this manner from this point on, because Atatürk's musical understanding was based on the thoughts of Ziya Gökalt laid out above. Atatürk believed that the national music of the new state would only take shape in this manner. For this reason, in order to ensure the mixing of folk music with Western style music, the government made several decisions and began to apply them (These decisions have been a continual source of debate from that point on). First, the Palace Band (*Mızıka-ı Humayun*) was renamed as the state orchestra and was moved to Ankara in 1924. In the same year the Music Teachers Education School (*Musiki Muallim Mektebi*) was founded. This school was to form the nucleus of what was later to be founded as the State Conservatory. The closing of the dervish lodges in 1925 meant the end of the musical tradition, which was especially maintained in the Mevlevi, Bektâşi and Kadiri lodges. For in religious and non-religious forms, these foundations form one of the main sources of Turkish music through the application of their traditional forms of education, and hold an important position in our musical history (And, 1999; 281; Paçacı, 1999; 16). The making of this decision can also be viewed as drying up the source.

* Previous to Gökalt, Sultan Abdülhamit II had voiced similar thoughts.

In the process of gaining speed on the road to civilization laid out by the Kemalist administration, the clearest reflection of traditional values and symbols in the musical arena being purified one by one is the blow to the Dar'ül Elhan. In 1926 – based on the report prepared by Musa Süreyya ve Zeki Üngör – a telegraf came from the Istanbul Conservatory (formerly the Dar'ül Elhan) with the signature of Minister of National Education Mustafa Necati canceling Turkish music instruction, and giving permission for a Turkish Music Art Work Classification Committee to be founded one year later with the condition of “definitely not to be in the form of education-instruction” and giving permission for conservatory work to begin with the condition of not giving lessons. The same year, young musicians began to gather folk music pieces in order to take part in the task of implementing the state music policies. The basis of this work was put in place by compilers such as Adnan Saygun, Ulvi Cemal Erkin ve Halil Bedii Yönetken. One year later (1927), in order to continue the work in a more serious and scientific manner, specific capable young people began to be sent out of the country on government scholarships (And, 1999; 281). These musicians later returned home to take part in working toward the goals of the music politics.

The music reform also had an intention to create a national Turkish opera. The first examples of the goal of realizing a national opera came the same year as Atatürk gave his directives, with the appearance on stage of the national opera composed by Ahmet Adnan Saygun ve Necil Kazım Akses, of the “Turkish Five”*. However these operas were know for their ties with the government in power and were criticized by the press. As a result in order to create a foundation for the music reform, more precedence was given to infrastructure and institutional changes. First, Josep Marx was invited to Istanbul (1931) and began to prepare reports on the founding, management and education of the Istanbul Conservatory. Later, Paul Hindemith was called to Ankara in 1935 for the reconstruction of Turkish musical life. Subsequently, the Bulgarian Bela Bartok was invited to come. Bartok was primarily asked for an evaluation of Turkish folk music. This was followed by the arrival of Eduard Zuckmayer who was to work for years in the Gazi School for Music. Thus the change which the government was unable to make happen with its own musicians

* The “Turkish Five” chose their name in an imitation of the Russian Five. The Russian Five, after receiving Western music education in various culture centers in Europe, composed works inspired by their national folk music and brought their Russian music to the national modern music schools. The Turkish Five had the same goals, that of taking local styles and enriching them with Western structures.

was attempted by bringing in foreigners from outside the country, in an effort to benefit from the accumulation of experience in Western countries. Work that was done by the above mentioned experts and reports that were given to the government do exist. It can be observed that some of the recommendations given in these reports have been implemented, and others – for various reasons – have not been implemented.

During this time period when the effect of state policies in the field of music were felt very strongly, leaders in the government maintained an attitude of specifying direction. From October 2, 1934 to November 6, 1936, traditional Turkish music was banned from radio broadcasts based on a speech given by Atatürk.* If one takes into account the fact that radio broadcasts began in 1928, it is evident that the banning of the music broadcasts that the people wanted to hear caused a significant reaction, created serious debates and had negative effects** on Turkish cultural life. This prohibition, which went into effect by certain bureaucratic elements making reference to Atatürk, was not raised until 1936 with an order from Atatürk himself***; at that time traditional Turkish folk and classical music began to play on the radio again. However, the musical policies of the state followed the direction defined at the start. For this reason, institutional, theoretical and practical work continued without interruption. As a continuation of this, under the framework of the *Musiki Muallim Mektebi*, the law regarding the Ankara State Conservatory went into effect in 1940, thereby setting the foundation for orches-

* The opening speech given in Parliament by Atatürk in 1934 was announced the following day by the newspapers of the day with the following proclamation: "The Ministry of Internal Affairs, inspired by the guidance given by the Honorable Veteran (Atatürk) in the General National Parliament, announces that beginning this evening Turkish style music has been completely banned from radio programs and only pieces of music composed with Western technique and performed by artists that understand Western technique will be played." Based on Atatürk's statement in his speech: "What is presented to our ears today is not our music. It is a far cry from something that we can take pride in. We must gather sayings and manners of speech that will communicate our deep national feelings and thoughts and one day we must implement them primarily with the latest general principles of music," the decision was made to ban the broadcast of Turkish music from the radio (Ali, 1987; 162).

** This ban is still talked about today and is even pointed to by some as one of the reasons that arabesque music is so popular.

*** When he invited Vasfı Rıza Zobu from Istanbul to Ankara to recite *Dellazade's İsfahan Yörük Semai* in 1936, he stated, "I did not say to remove Turkish music and put Western music in its place. They misunderstood my statement and raised such an uproar that I was unable to say anything more about it." (described in the book by V.R. Zobu, *They Misunderstood: Views and Memories of Atatürk* (Yanlış Anladılar, Görüşler ve Hatıralarla Atatürk), according to Tanrıkorur, 1998; 42).

tral organizations. During these years there was no Turkish music education provided. While the law regarding the foundation of the State Conservatory was being discussed in Parliament, the recommendation to start education programs for Turkish music theory and Turkish music history were rejected as being contrary to the Republican reforms. Unfortunately, even though the policy loosened at a later date, during the period up until the 1950's, there was no opportunity to evaluate and seriously study Turkish music with a non-biased, objective and scientific approach. Even though the Istanbul Municipal Conservatory introduced Turkish music education for a shore period of time, this was short-lived. After this it was only until 1975 that Turkish music education really began with the opening of the Turkish Music Conservatory. Up until this time, for a period of about fifty years, traditional Turkish music and folk music education did not exist in official educational institutions. The debate still continues regarding this process that contained significant difficulties and began with the opening of the Turkish Music Conservatory in 1975.

The National Music Way of Thought and Its Effects

Culture has been an important function of the state through public policy. However, this has not been a smooth one. Even though the Republic was constructed on the basis of rejecting old ways, the debates in the musical arena that began in the Ottoman period also continued throughout the Republican period. The modernization that was experienced at this time was known as "national modernization. As described above, the manner in which the founders of the new state had projects to first of all create a nation. One of the basic foundations of this project was the formation of the culture of the people. Beginning in the early years of the Republic, the architects of this project seriously expected the compilation of folk dance and local music to ensure the gathering of a significant amount of material that would eventually create the national consciousness and resultant national music. It was for this reason that music culture and method of performance that fell outside the scope of the project were excluded by the government in order to preclude the stalling of the project. Consequently, the 1920's were the years when the dispute about Turkish-European style came to the fore in the music arena. This contradiction, which was an extension of the reform policy of Kemalist conception of identity, along with the resolution of the two parties, split the musicians into two irreconcilable camps based on their preferences in a process that extended until the 1930's. At that

time, the interest that the party in power had in searching for developments in the musical arena resulted in a search for a music which would be both appropriate to the spirit of the reform and an interpretation of the spirit of Anatolia, and in the final analysis a search to transform music from the auditorium and cell music to a music of the public arena. The ruling party, which was against the traditional Turkish music, besides the *mehter* music was generally an indoor music, was looking for a sound that would both transform the culture of the general population into a modern/Western fashion as well as a sound that would get the masses into action. This understanding, as one of the cultural impasses of the populism of the Republic, was closely related to the clash between a sincere but primitive people with its art, and the artificial but delicate art of the elite. This clash added a new dimension to the conflict between Turkish and European style in the debate on national music and created a state of confusion. Furthermore it caused traditional Turkish music composers and performers to criticize the experiments as a "melody of swashbuckler" (hero of southwestern Anatolian villages) (*zeybek havası*), and some of them defended the proposition that traditional Turkish music was open to being developed in a modern technique and style. On the other hand the fact that the music reform was trying to cause traditional Turkish music to lose favor impelled the traditional Turkish music community to attempt to legitimize and prove itself to the new political regime and search for a more civilized appearance by gaining a European concert format. In the context of this endeavor to adopt a modern appearance, in the 1920's and especially the 1930's there was an effort to help this kind of music, performed in certain places by the use of certain attire, a certain number of performances, and some standard models, gain prestige (Üstel, 1999; 44). For this reason attempts to perform folk songs and folk dances with an orchestra became more widespread. There were efforts to record folk songs with piano accompaniment or an unaccompanied choir, which has no place in the Turkish tradition.

The place of traditional Turkish music, which was previously under the protection of the Palace, was to be filled by the national music ideal under the order of the Republican bureaucrats. There was no room in this ideal for the old style of music. The supporters of the synthesis approach, which began to gain in numbers during the period of Ottoman reform and became politically active in the Union and Progress Party, looked negatively at all non-Turkish elements of the Ottoman culture and saw them as backwards remnants of the East. However, this was a positive sign of the imminent approach of

a new civilization, the West, which was not yet reached, but which we were soon to be a part of. The administration of the new Republic adopted the principle of this approach and also had the political will to make it happen. However as the music policy and related organizations created these ideals of synthesis, the new nation-state also defined its own cultural taboos. This taboo was the East. The synthesis was described with a three-pronged classification (Western culture, Folk culture and Eastern culture), with two of the three elements (Western and Folk) to be used as a basis for the synthesis and one element (Eastern) to be rejected (Tekelioğlu, 1999; 146). One of the direct results of the music reform of the 1930's was a solution in favor of European style over Turkish style. Due to the trial and error and grouping methods used in this enterprise, music came to be the most privileged of all branches of art, but at the same time was the field that was most open to intervention. To such an extent that this process, which continues even today, was used as an important criterion by the majority and opposition parties in identifying their enemies, and became a part of the progressive-reactionary debate. This period (the 1930's) was also a period when the institutionalization efforts of the one party administration, in what could be called gathering all power under one roof, reached a peak in regards to an attitude of organizing and directing the state's policies regarding culture. Consequently, the Kemalist administration, in attributing special importance to the field of music in the process of creating identity and belonging, and in the transition from a multi-nation empire to a nation-state, was working toward a reform that would be national and homogeneous as well as have a civilized tone. While the state maintained a policy of founding and protective state control, it sometimes crossed the line into destruction (Üstel, 1999; 49).

The interest shown by the government in folk music lay in the simple reality forced by the agricultural makeup and pastoral nature of the populace of Turkey. While the political powers and its intellectuals took interest in Anatolia –with the anxiety that comes with uncertainty – instead of leaving to its own multi-cultural heterogeneous makeup of the popular culture that they were faced with, which could easily slip out of their hands, they instead chose to profit from some parts of the culture and form a unit, in the end by nationalizing it (Üstel, 1999; 47). In order to attain validity in the eyes of the people for this effort, which was driven by the support of the state and became part of the politics of the state, all manner of support –material and otherwise– was being provided. In order for people to develop a taste for Western music, *Halkevleri* (Cultural Centers/ People

Houses) were opened in every corner of the country where amateur musicians were put in place, music lessons were given that supported the government's official policies, choirs were started, and small orchestras were formed. The state made much effort to acquaint the general public to orchestral music (İlyasoğlu, 1999; 73).*

The support of the government for Western music and style and the attempt to evaluate these in the national music policy allowed the supporters of Turkish style to accuse the musicians connected with the government of opportunism. Conversely, traditional Turkish music, finding no support from the government and having no place in state politics, began to lose honor in the face of the official policies. Traditional Turkish music was harshly criticized and belittled** by the Kemalist intelligentsia with names such as "Byzantine Movement", "Pub Music", "*Divan* (Classical Ottoman) Music", and "*Enderun* Music", and thereafter deprived of government support. In this way the policies of Westernization took over a rich Turkish music*** theory with a strong and extensive heritage and tried to implement the theories of Western music instead of traditional principles. However, in many ways the two could not be practically reconciled. According to some musicians, this theory based on wrong principles represents one of the most problematic areas even today (Tura, 1999; 97).

*The Republic continued the work of acquainting the public to Western music and orchestral music throughout its history. The result were announced as being negative by people personally working on the topic. One of these was an article in issue no. 62 of the Ankara Philharmonic Journal, written by Ergun Özyücel, a member of the Presidential Symphony Orchestra. He gave concerts with the Presidential Philharmonic Orchestra from 1958 to 1971 (13 years), touring from one end of Anatolia to the other, however, in spite of all this, in his own words, "because there were no trained ears, it was like chasing after the wind. All of the money that was spent just went in the gutter." (Tanrıkorur, 1994; 28)

** During later periods, similar kinds of belittling and excluding names would be applied to Arabesque music.

*** Turkish music has an important place among the types of music in the world; its history extends to very early periods (about 2500 years). It is known that in the ancient periods, rhythmical instruments were used by the Hun Turks to excite their soldiers. Thus the history of Turkish music extends to the era B.C. The Gök Turks had musical groups that resembled a regular military band. Similarly, the religious music carries the traces of the (pre-Islamic) religious ceremonies of the Turks of Central Asia. More over Turks were the ones in human history who practiced therapy with music. The long and significant history of Turkish music has had an effect on Western music and has been a source of inspiration in the composition of many classics of composed by Western musicians (such as Mozart, Beethoven, Handel, Haydn, Rossini and many others). Many of the titles of the works of these classic composers of Western music involve Turkish people (e.g. Turkish March, Abducting a Girl from the Palace, Zaide, etc.) (Çetinkaya, 1999; 238-Sungar, 2002; 69).

The national music ideal of the government and the stance taken against traditional Turkish music and folk music (such as banning radio broadcasts) caused public to begin listening to Arab music (and radio broadcasting) in a search for a familiar type of music. The desire of the Turkish people for music was met by Arabic radio as well as the, according to some sources, thousands of Egyptian films that were brought into Turkey between 1936 and 1948. The musical taste of the general public began to change as a result of the official embargo (Tura, 1998; 42). The extraordinary interest in films from Egypt caused the General Directorate of the Press of the time to prohibit the showing of music with Arabic lyrics in these films. However, like other prohibitions, this ban gave the opposite results of what was intended. During this time period Arab music written with Turkish words spread from one end of the country to the other, and even began to infiltrate the folk music of South East Anatolia. This change in music began a new period of implementation in Turkish music. The adaptation songs were the compositions in demand during this period (Tekelioğlu, 1999; 150). Some musicians arranged the Arabic words in the Egyptian film music with Turkish words, created new compositions in the same style, and thus obtained great fame and riches. The foundations of the Arabesque style and similar techniques that gained popularity especially in the 1970's were actually laid during this period (Tura, 1998; 42).

The picture that we see in the period up to the 1950's is that the people neither showed much interest in the orchestral works composed by Turkish musicians as a part of the synthesis effort, nor in the examples of classical Western music.* This shows us that the most significant deficiency in the concept of the East-West synthesis of music is the lack of taking into account the popular music dimension. The reforms at the beginning of the Republic and the related synthesis project were complete in regard to classical music; however, a popular form which would be easy to listen to and catchy to the ear was never thought of. One of the few works in this field that can be taken seriously are the operettas and localized tangos,

* Adnan Saygun, one of the Turkish Five, arrived to very unenthusiastic conclusions during his research of folk dance in Rize and the surrounding area. Saygun says, "The Anatolian villager has never had any enjoyment in singing songs in a group. They are not even used to several people singing a folk song together in one voice" (Tanrıkorur, 1998; 55) and points to the Islamic religion as the cause of this. However, the Gagavuz Turks are Christian, but they too have a monophonic understanding of music. That is, the attribution of the cause to religion by Adnan Saygun is not correct, since singing a folk song with a single voice is a practice that comes with the tradition of the bard (*ozan*) in Turkish music.

which did not win approval with the classical music aficionados who found them to be too common. These musical forms were lost within a short period of time, or in the language of the official circles, became "Turkish style (alaturka)" (Tekelioğlu, 1999; 149).

Democratization of Music

The 1950's are years where the Turkish political scene became a multi-party arena. The plurality in the political arena was also reflected in other areas and the governmental policies that had been heavily implemented up to this point began to slowly loosen. This change in the Turkish political climate was reflected in the field of music as well, and Turkish music quickly became more varied and richer; usage of Turkish music forms and melodies began to be more widespread.

In regards to the developments in the field of popular music beginning in the 1930's, the proof of the unsuccessfulness of the music reform planned by the 'serious' (classical) music synthesis is evident in the area of popular music. Even though the support of traditional Turkish Art music indirectly by the radios of this period may be surprising in the context of the music reform, it is the result of an inevitable development. This music, which reflected the taste of the city people but was rooted in the Ottoman tradition, gradually began to receive more broadcast time, and personnel openings were created for the artists of this music who began to be educated by the institution (radio) itself. The reason for this was the extraordinary interest shown by the public. In response to the changes that occurred in the Arab film and radio as well as the social arena, the government began to make some changes in harsh policies regarding the field of traditional music. This change in the side of government resulted in the opening of new fields of work for the religious musicians and composers who had become unemployed when the dervish lodges were closed. In this new trend, musicians who came from the Ottoman tradition began to create more commercially popular compositions and to create a new musical style. This became a large obstacle during the later years for the officially planned music project.

Changes that occurred in the social arena as a matter of course were reflected in music of the time. This trend was the free performance style. It was more than a synthesis; actually a form of modernity, yet at the same time gave us an indication of how tradition can change into a popular style in the musical and social arena. Most of all, because free performance made allowance for the musician's personal style, a new area of independence was created, both

in technical methods of composition and in performance. In the new paradigm, the singer now actually sang the song, that is, put forth his own interpretation. However, in the Ottoman tradition, the recital of the song was what was important. That is, the original form of the composition was repeatedly recited. Here, faithfulness to the original form of the work was fundamental. At this point, the relationship between the free performance and arabesque (which was to later have quite an effect on the Turkish music scene) becomes quite evident. Orhan Gencebay* indicates that he benefited significantly from his experience with the free performance in the formation of a new music style (Arabesque) (Tekelioğlu, 1999; 150).

The 1950's were also years where some developments occurred in regards to the opening of Turkey to the outside world. The goal of the administrators in this new period was to make Turkey a small America (the USA) in the region. The USA's effects were felt significantly in Turkey's social and cultural life as a result of the beginning of a period of a strong relationship with American popular culture, accompanied by NATO membership, the Marshall plan and Hollywood films, became a part of the city life of a new Turkey that was subject to a significant migration of people to the cities. This became evident in the new choices of entertainment and musical style available to the city residents. Hollywood stars began to be recognized, and certain pieces of American music began to play on the radios and be copied by local groups. Actually what was being listened to were examples of Western popular music ensembles and orchestras. However, the popular music stars of the period were the singers of free performance. That is to say, people in the city listened to and liked both types of music. A balance between Turkish and European style can be observed during these years. In the nightclubs, first the European style music was performed, and later the Turkish style performers took the stage (Tekelioğlu, 1999; 151). That is, important changes began to take place in the Turkish political and cultural spheres during this period, and the government's goal of creating a national music became a closed case never to open again. In the context of the political preferences and understanding of the period, the descriptive word "Turkish" (as in Turkish Art Music and Turkish Folk Music) showed that we already had national music.

The multi-party political system that began in 1950 was ended in 1960 with a military coup. A new constitution was written up, and the developing political movements, influenced by this conjuncture, found

* Accepted as the founder and theoretician of Arabesque music.

a new ally in the field of music. This movement, which is indirectly connected to the new nationalism and independent thinking, led to the rise of the interesting synthesis of music known as Anatolian pop. Anatolian pop is related to the concept of the government's classical music project, that is, the idea of combining folk music with Western ensemble techniques; the only difference is that this time, the synthesis took place in the field of popular music instead of with classical music. Many examples of Anatolian pop music contain political messages and these messages are directed to the general public. For this reason, Anatolian pop can be considered an East-West synthesis in the field of popular music. Perhaps if the administrators of the early period of the Republic had added this kind of popular music version to their music reform project, it would have produced more successful results.

The arrangements of this period (1960) were actually similar to the adaptation method of the 1930's, and came to the fore as a result of adjustment to the musical style of the 1950's. While Anatolian pop contained a political method and message, the arrangements were non-political in essence, and were therefore free of such a burden. Because they were formed with a Western and orchestral style, they were easily able to get the approval of the broadcast monopoly held by the state radio and television (TRT). TRT even gave this music a name (Turkish Easy Listening Music) and gave it a continual spot on their broadcast schedule (Tekelioğlu, 1999; 151). The fact that musicians were able to study in the foreign schools in Istanbul, travel and study abroad, along with the involvement of the middle class youth in radical politics in the 1960's, affected Turkey's cultural climate and allowed it to become more colorful. The identification of the youth with the anti-establishment culture of Europe and America aroused a strong desire to make a contribution to these movements from Turkey and to create a dynamic and radical anti-establishment music culture in Turkey.* When TRT gave permission for completely

* Anti-establishment attitudes added more fuel to the debate of the place of ignored or new types of music in regards to the government. Should the government be the supporter, protector and preserver of just a certain type of music, or should it also make room for other types of music? In this regard, the 1960's were years of much dispute and an increase in polarization among types of music. While types that are supported by the government are struggling to ensure that the government support does not expand to include other types of music, those types without government support are in search of acceptance and support from the government. In the interval period of 1971, while this debate was going on, Nihat Erim was Prime Minister, the Ministry of Culture was founded for the first time, and Talat Halman was brought in from America as the Minister of Culture. When Halman invited İtli,

un-original groups to appear on television, this added fuel to the fire of their idealistic feelings (Stokes, 2000; 161). Furthermore, the atmosphere of the period was conducive to such an attitude.

The 1960's were eventful and tumultuous years both internally and abroad. There were many consequences of the social movements of these years in the political, economic and socio-cultural fields. It is possible to see the evidence of this in Turkey. Many different variations and trends occurred in the music arena. Besides the origin of music types such as Arrangements, Anatolian pop and Turkish Easy Listening Music, another very successful East-West synthesis came on the scene at the end of the 1960's which was to create a new standard in popular music. The name of this music is Arabesque.

It is no coincidence that the entrance of Arabesque music comes at the end of the 1960's. Western music and orchestral music were recognized forms; arrangements and examples of Anatolian pop addressed a Turkish audience that did not know foreign language. However, these music forms were foreign in regard to the instruments that were used. The *saz* (a stringed instrument of traditional folk music) that was used in Anatolian pop still had only a decorative effect and had not completely synthesized with the music. What was really needed was a music with able to combine Western musical instruments with the free performance methodology. This is where synthesis developed by Orhan Gencebay came into effect (Tekelioğlu, 1999; 152). This synthesis is the arabesque movement that was to create debate years later in the circles of Turkish public opinion. The arabesque movement corresponds to a real musical East-West synthesis, because arabesque has a very important characteristic not found in the previous free performance method, and that is that this music has a structure that is conducive to Western musical instruments, interpretation and format. Whether it was because of misfortune or a mistake, this music called Arabesque offered a different musical expression to the public and became very popular. Together

one of the leaders of traditional music, to give a concert in a government institution (the Ankara State Concert Hall), an incredible uproar was started; arguments were started about whether the concert should be given or not; the intellectual community was divided in two and newspaper headlines turned into a battle zone. With a warning from former President İnönü, President Nihat Erim put pressure on Minister of Culture Talat Halman, and the concert planned at the Ankara State Concert Hall was cancelled. At this time there was a completely chaotic situation between the artists and intellectuals of the time. The world famous violin virtuoso Suna Kan made a threat, stating that "If İttri gives a concert in the State Concert Hall, I will give up cancel my title of state artist" (Tanrıkorur, 1998; 214). This is an interesting point that shows the extent of polarization of the period.

with its reflection of Eastern philosophy, it is a synthesis of Western music with the music that is rooted in the traditional Turkish Art Music and Turkish Folk Music that became a part of society in increasing levels ever since the latter Ottoman periods, and has recently reached the general public through pop music (Easy Listening Music). (Gedikli, 1999:33).

As soon as Arabesque appeared, it changed the structure of the music market and became very successful. Even though none of the composers or singers took no political stance, the music itself was perceived as a political message and was subject to various attacks. The name Arabesque* itself was given to the music by the intellectuals – this, apart from the identification given by the theoreticians of the music itself – as a name containing degrading connotations. The reaction to this music is actually proof of bankruptcy of the music reform that was attempted by the government. For this reason it was immediately prohibited by the broadcast monopoly of TRT, and distinguished people and intellectuals characterized the music as degenerate and began to do their best to prevent the music from being listened to. But these types of obstructive measures accomplished nothing more than to increase the influence of Arabesque and enable it to become the only popular music of the 1970's, with its own stars and creating its own cinema. At the end of the 1980's, the strong relations established between representatives of the music and the record-cassette producers and the music market resulted in an unbelievable popularity and large profits. When evaluating the large success of arabesque, one must keep in mind the effects of the production and sales of the new cassette technology in spite of the embargo.

In the beginning of the 1980's, the Turkish political atmosphere went on an obligatory vacation and democratic life was cut off by a military coup. Both the changes occurring on the global scene at this time and the internal changes and demands resulting from the post-military period put Turkey in a position open to and leaning toward integration with the outside world. This attitude brought change or at least a softening – as a whole – in the old style of politics and habits. This had been indicated by some changes in the institutional and social arena before 1980. The Turkish Music State Conservatory,

* The name Arabesque was given by select bureaucrats and intellectuals to this music – in spite of (Turkish) theoreticians and leaders of this kind of music. The goal, making reference to the anti-Arab sentiments which were attempted to be created by the government throughout the history of the Republic, was to cut off the public's interest in this music by creating the image that the music, which had no place in the state music policy and existed in spite of the state, was illegitimate.

which was founded in 1975 and opened for education in 1976, took the lead in these developments. As a matter of fact, the foundation of the conservatory and, in the following years, the opening of other conservatories for other types of traditional music are characterized as golden years because of the large investment of the government in Turkish style or local music. While some opposed the change in the state's music policies as being contrary to the music reforms that were a part of the reforms instituted by Atatürk*, others characterized this situation as the state leaving an irrational attitude and as the rebirth of local music (Tura, 1999; 99).

This change in the music policies of the state, the non-intervention and more tolerant approach to the developments occurring in the field of music, leaving the music field to its own natural flow of events and the entertainment culture of the 1980's, combined to break down the walls between Arabesque and musical arrangements with Turkish lyrics. The increase in personnel at TRT started by Özal resulted in an increasing preference of urban classical music over the Anatolian traditional music that the state had recreated, along with the appearance of series of Arabesque singers on live broadcasts on the state television channel (Stokes, 2000; 152). This caused a significant reduction in the difference between Arabesque and Turkish pop music, in favor of Arabesque, or conversely, the transformation of the world of Arabesque into the world of Turkish pop music. The new pop music that emerged with the changes started in the field of music during this time indicates that we are really dealing with an updated arabesque (Tekelioğlu, 1999; 155). The most important characteristic of the 1980's in regards to Turkey's cultural environment is popularization. In contrast to previous periods, the development of these methods of popularization made it possible for songs with local characteristics to have greater commercial impact in local music arena (Öztürk, 2002; 203). During this period, there was also a noticeable increase in the amount of research and publication in the field of Turkish music.

In the 1990's, the removal of the TRT broadcast monopoly that was a part of the Constitution, the founding of private radio and television stations, and the opening of associations working with various types of musical performance, all combined to aid in bringing down the walls that existed between the types of music in Turkey. It is

* Adnan Saygun, one of the Turkish Five, shortly before his death, in a speech given at the 1st International Music Science Symposium at Dokuz Eylül University, stated that, the introduction of Turkish music lessons in schools and the approach of such a possibility was "religious reactionism returning without its turban"

interesting to note that in the period following the 80's, a large portion of musical studies, in accordance with the popular style, began to show more interest in arrangements and ensemble performances. There was a significant increase in the number of attempts to synthesize what was local with what was foreign or "other". Another characteristic is that none of the musicians of the period had any claims or goals of creating a national music. On the contrary, localization and variety were more in demand (Öztürk, 2002; 204). In fact, when we look at the time period as a whole, we can see that the efforts to synthesize a modern music using traditional methods as a basis actually results in an increase in the number of different types of music. After this period (1980), we can see that every piece of pop music contains elements of Turkish style melodies; Arabesque singers can sing pop music; and the existing transitions and relationship between types of music are increased. Leaving imitation and copying behind, Turkish pop music gained a more original characteristic in style and literally exploded in the second half of the 1980's. The struggle between the state and traditional and arabesque music was over and now arabesque and other musicians of Turkish music were able to gain the title of "State Artist". We can see that the East-West synthesis progressed not in the direction that was laid out by the state, but in a natural course of events was realized in a most magnificent way under the name of Turkish pop music. For during the 90's, the youth of Turkey became caught up in the winds of new type of pop music. According to this group, music should contain all kinds of inclinations, in the same manner that political views leave their mark on the surrounding environment. To this extent, pop ended up containing all the different kinds of elements (Folk, Classic, Rock, Mediterranean, Spanish, Latin, Far Eastern, etc.) The fact that pop music was open to all kinds and styles in the field of music also affected the arabesque musician. They had their own share of these changes, and during the process of popularization Arabesque, too, came to lose the characteristics it had when it first appeared (Öztürk, 2002; 205). In spite of all these changes in the social arena, the effects of the negative of the state towards Turkish music were not completely erased. Even though several conservatories opened that were focused on education of traditional music, and even though these educational efforts have increased from 1980 until the present day, the East-West polarization, though it has decreased, still continues. It is true that the opportunity for cooperation among musicians working in these styles was limited and that the effects of certain prejudices were felt. However in these debates, the early attitude of

the state has no connection with the social arena, and generally in the changing Turkish society this type of mind-set is not looked upon very favorably.

Conclusion

Music, as in all forms of art, is a language that is spoken with the logic and semantics of its own culture. For this reason, no music is universal. Just as it is unacceptable to generalize bad examples of composers and artists and characterize any music as "primitive, behind the times, or bar-hall music in an attempt to cause it to lose favor among its own society, it is just as ridiculous to generalize a foreign music with its good composers and artists as "advanced, modern and universal in an attempt to establish it as a national music. It should be noted that there is no such thing as universal music and there can never be such a thing. There are peoples and nations in the world. For example, just as nations that speak Latin-based language (Italy, France, Spain, etc.) have different languages and literature, even though the theoretic principles may be common, their music differs in character. In view of this, the attempt to implement Turkish traditional music with the very different Western technique, claiming that traditional music can be advanced to a universal music level, is no different than trying to mix oil and water. This is because the system of sounds in Turkish music has a completely different structure from the system in Western music. That is why even with all of the government support behind it, the effort to make the two structures to conform each other ended up as a failure; the result was something that was unbearable for Turkish ears and for a foreigner seemed to be nothing more than an amateurish and unskillful imitation of no value. In the end, the products of the proponents of European music style produced throughout the history of the Republic never had any impact on the art world of the West. Years of government force and the large sums of money spent on making people listen to these experiments did nothing more that satisfy their insatiable ambition for a short period of time. Local music, seen as an integral part of the national state-national music way of thinking, was first perceived as a single type of Turkish folk music and was taken to be the basic ingredient of a modern national music. However, it has never been appropriate to consider the variety in local music traditions and differences in regional performance styles as a single type.

The harsh policies of the state in the field of music have always created disputes in the public opinion and have caused polarization in the social arena. Music was alienated from its history, its era and the

social environment in which it was created for a large part of the history of the Republic due to the new music policies that were formed. Music was treated separately from the social environment in which it resided. The true problem is not a matter of Turkish music versus Western music. In the same fashion, it is not a matter of Turkish style versus European style, or of saying "polyphony is modern, monophony is old-fashioned. There is no reason to place an art such as music that has the characteristic of being an international language in such a narrow and fruitless debate, and there is no value from an artistic viewpoint, either. Music is music. People will listen to whatever style of music that they prefer. Because every person has a free will, no one has any right to interfere with these preferences or criticize them in any manner, even the government. The most distressing thing is to try to force people to accept something. The history of the Republic is full of these compulsory acts, which were especially intense during certain time periods. The only thing that is needed is to show interest and to encourage art and artist alike, and to prepare a framework where they can freely develop and perform their activities. One cannot show them what direction to go by issuing political decrees. No one has a right to do this, and no one should have. No situation can justify intervention with art and artists. Of course, the artist, just as any individual in society is bound to the laws and regulations of that society and lives and works inside the structure that is laid. But the only law and regulation in the world of art is the law of the artist's free will and the laws of art itself. Even those laws can be surpassed and changed by the artist's will and creativity. Any interference with art and artist that comes from outside the framework of art is a death sentence for art and artists. It is in regard to this that the basic relationships in music are the relationships between composer, performer and listener. The healthiness of these relationships and the healthy interaction of these relationships is what makes a country's music atmosphere lively and productive.

The musical taste of Turkish society today is now completely varied and even the branches have many branches. There is no place in society anymore for a central music. As at the beginning of the Republic, there are not just two categories of music, today there are many types of music. Even in the first thirty to forty years of the Republic, the two types of music set forward did not even show singularity themselves. There were differences and distinctions both in types of music and styles of music even in those days, although the ideology of the day was able to cover up these disparities. These hidden differences began to surface along with the democratization of

music, this time accompanied by new types. This situation is obvious from the changes that have occurred from the middle of the 1960's until today. The changes that occurred in the social arena also forced changes in the policies of the government in this area. Traditional Turkish music forms that previously had no place in the normal education program began to become more varied for the first time with the Turkish Music Conservatory which opened in 1975. In the following years, similar schools continued to open, which included the other traditional types of music. This is a sign that a more rational view of music had begun to emerge: an artistic point of view instead of political machinations. The more rational view of the government in this area meant that music was being realized as a good method of communication, even though there were deficiencies in the teaching methods. This meant that the conflict between Turkish style and European style had been surpassed through changes both in the government and in the social arena; this conflict had been created by the process of Westernization and should have been considered a natural event, but became more pronounced due to the effects of the official ideology. This debate, which resulted from an incorrect method of dealing with the issues, has completely lost all meaning today. It has become invalid both from the aspect of musical art and in the eyes of the public. Even if various elements tried to restart the old polarization debate, this type of attitude would not be respected by the society as a whole. For the most notable development of today is the breakup of the musical center and the takeover of a pluralistic and complicated makeup. The different types of music all give and take from each other without rejecting each other. For this reason, the term "Eastern music vs. Western music" has become meaningless; these definitions have become useless. In other words, this society, with its own methods, resisted the forced synthesis ideology that was implemented in the political and cultural realms through the music policies of the state, and in the end was able to create its own synthesis through trial-and-error.

The culture policies regarding music in the early period of the Republic did contain a certain consistency, coordination and continuity. However, in all of these efforts, in spite of the tight control and support of the press and broadcast media, the orchestral Western music supported by the government and the similar works composed by Turkish composers were not approved of by the public and did not take hold. One of the most important reasons for this can be found in the basic premise of the modernization project of music. This premise, just as in other fields, is based on a select few exercising their

authoritarian power from above. The music that existed in the city was not considered important because it was Ottoman; in contrast, folk music (from the rural regions) was considered important as a source for new music. However, composers without rural heritage and ignorant of rural people were employed to create a mix of folk and Western music. All these efforts only decreased the variety of the music arena instead of creating a new movement. For this reason, the interference of the state should be removed from this arena. The conflict in the field of music due to terms such as Turkish style vs. European style, East vs. West, monophony vs. polyphony, and the resultant formation of enemy camps, has not been of any benefit to anyone, and has even caused damage. For this reason the differences between the types of music should not be characterized with any indication of superiority. For example, just as polyphony is no sign of superiority or civilization, in the same manner, the monophony is not a deficiency, shame or fault. Monophony or polyphony is only a characteristic, a manner of describing music. For this reason, composers should be completely free to use whatever manner of expression that they choose. There is no need for the state to interfere in this field or give direction. When we look back at history, it is clear that the music revolution, whose implementation was attempted from above throughout the time of the Republic, was nothing more than a fantasy. The efforts to transform local music showed that the application of supply and demand of the market conditions was at the fore and was more effective than official motivations and programs. That is, we are living in the transition from the guidance of a central authority to the guidance of market conditions and factors. It can even be said that this transition has been completed.

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VI.

The Turkish Mass Media as a Safeguarding Component of Status Quo and Its Approach to the Turkish-American Relationship*

In order to be able to understand the general outlook of the field of communication, an efficient evaluation of the political, economic and social developments that played a role in the shaping of communication field is necessary. Especially the form that the media took due to the effects of the political events on the communicative order in Turkey has been in accordance with the political attitudes of the state. Then, it is necessary to have a look at the relations of Turkish media with the state to understand the position of it and to analyze the broadcasting policy of it because the Turkish media found a ground for life at the very beginning with the confirmation of the state. Therefore, if the media's view about an event is to be discussed, prior to everything, the dimensions and structural features of its relations with the state should be known. Only in this way can it be possible to understand the real value of the "public opinion" that is formed by the media. Because a state-dependent media will naturally hold a statist view. For this reason, trying to find out the real agenda of the public opinion in such countries only by examining the general outlook of the media can be misleading. This case is true of Turkey. Only by looking at the institutional agenda in the media, catching the real agenda of the public about the decisions on internal and foreign policies can be difficult because the news that media employees carry to their media organizations may not be reflected as they are. To put it differently, the institutional view point of the media organization

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and the view point of the employee of the media organization may differ. Thus it is impossible to test the views of the media workers about America with the view of the media organization they work for. The individual view points should be studied. Only in this way can we mention the concept of the view of the media about a matter.

The Development of the Turkish Media

The beginning of media in Turkey was with the modernization movements arising in the Ottoman Empire, as in all other fields. The Republican era found some accumulation available before establishment also in this field. The formations and related activities in the field of media in the period of the Ottoman Empire, date back to the 1490s. The Jews escaping from Spain in this period (in 1490) and, taking refuge in the Ottoman Empire Published newspapers in Arabic and Turkish. Later the publications of other non-muslim communities followed (in Armenian in 1567, in Greek in 1627). Beside these occurrences the work and publications made by the foreigners in the late periods of the Ottoman Empire also laid the ground for the development of Turkish media.

In view of the power of the mass media, an organ of news media was needed in order to inform the public and the foreign countries about the 19th century Ottoman State and ideology, and to make them accept the ideology. On the other hand, the first newspaper published in Turkish was *Takvim-i Vekayi*. This first newspaper was published on November 11 1831 with the efforts of Mahmut II, a reformist Sultan.

And in the 1830s more than 30 Newspapers were available in the Ottoman Empire, but most of them were in foreign languages. Especially İzmir was the city where the newspapers in the languages of non-muslim communities came into life. We have very little knowledge about this media today; but it is obvious that the media of this period in İzmir had great importance for the social-political history of the Empire (Ortaylı, 1995:196-197). Because all these happenings made great contributions to the formation of the Turkish press. If we put *Takvim-i Vekayi*, which was published by the state and *Ceride-i Havadis*, which was published by an English citizen aside; the first independently published Turkish newspaper was *Tercüman-ı Ahval*. This newspaper, which had an important place in the formation of Turkish public opinion, was published first on October 20 1850. The newspaper had a life of about five and a half years (Ebuziyya, 1997:192). After that we observe an increase in the number of press organs publishing in Turkish.

Due to hard conditions that the Empire was experiencing, the press and publication organs of the period in general didn't suffice with only enlightening the public, but also did researches on foreign issues, state issues and by analyzing the issues, did orientations. This had been an unusual case in the Ottoman society up to then.

However, these developments in the press had become a case to be controlled for the Ottoman Empire, which had a conception of an authoritarian administration. When the diversity of the media brought the questioning of state policies and administrative conception into the agenda, a number of precautions to be taken were felt necessary. Especially the publications of non-muslim communities within the Empire made such a control vital for the Empire, which was in a difficult situation. Therefore, a series of legal measures were taken.

Thus, the first regulation on media was Basmahane Regulation (Press Regulation) which was made in 1857. The regulation contained such matters as how printing house can be established and the conditions for permission to open printing houses. And the regulation introducing the bans concerning the press was the criminal code enforced in 1858 (Topuz, 1996:27-28). Then other regulations followed.

Through the first legal measures that were taken, bans were introduced on writings contrary to the government, state and morality. In this way, with the emergence of the media the legal regulations of the state in this field also started. These first measures became the frameworks for the legal regulations to be made in the Republican era.

The Media in One-Party Period

Significant changes and transformations were undergone with the declaration of Republic in 1923. However, a socio-political heritage which was composed of a strong "centre" and a "periphery" which was not decomposed and not homogeneous was inherited by the New Turkish State. The modernization in the 19th century and the rationalization in bureaucracy didn't manage to remove the centre-edge contrast, and formed a ground for a new conflict between the notables –the representatives of the edge – and bureaucrats- the representatives of the centre. In this sense, a central administration that was isolated from massive effects to a large extent, and a structuring with a strong tradition were observed. Although an opposition against this strong structuring was allowed in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, it wasn't a long-lived one. Because in the eyes of the bureaucrats in the centre, "province-edge" was seen as a fact to be restricted and was considered as a potential field of disobedience

to the state. Therefore the new state (with its new regime) chose to give a nationalistic and social orientation to its ideology in order to remove such separations. For this aim, all the vehicles were employed. The media was also considered as a vehicle and was given a mission accordingly.

Thus, efforts were made to make considerable use of Media in the one-party period to impose the ideology and the revolutions of the period. In 1925, the opponents that were thought to be dangerous and the media were silenced to settle the Sheikh Said's riot. With the supreme courts that were set up, opposing persons within and outside the parliament and the institutions in the political and publishing fields were focused on. Hence, with a law enforced, the government was given the power to abolish the press organs who were opposing the imposition of the reforms, without waiting for the judge's decision; and significant steps were taken to bring the press organs under control by applying censorship and various pressures on them. Press law, first Turkish press congress and the establishment of press association were among the major steps.

When a new trial of pluralism, resulted in failure following the establishment of Free Republic Party in 1930, the first press law of the Republic period came into effect in 1931. Through the press law, press-which was thought to be an institution to be taken under control in one-party period, was silenced in general and the way for uni-vocalism was opened (Işık, 2002:139). Following this law, first Turkish Press congress was held on May 25 1935. With this congress, the decisions of the political authority were secured to be approved of by the press. After the congress, in 1938, Turkish Press Association was founded and the press was tied to such a professional organization. This association took on a mission to facilitate the control of the media by the political power, rather than to defend the occupational rights.

The application of pressure and censorship on the press by the political power (and the state) continued until 1950. Especially in the period of world war I, the pressure and control was increased and the Council of Ministers was given the right to abolish newspapers. In consequence, the press could only report on government bulletins, weather forecasts, and to a certain extent political news. This period, when the press was given an important mission in line with imposing a new identity and new values on the society, was recorded in history as an authoritarian epoch. The media was expected to serve to national interests.

After the second World War, Human Rights Declaration and the

press associations in foreign countries were examined carefully; and seeing that there were no such organizations, Turkish Press Association was terminated on June 18 1946. Over this termination, the transition from one-party to multi-party period was considerably influential.

Following the above mentioned happenings, another important development was observed. The newspapers *Hürriyet* on May 1 1945 and *Milliyet* on May 3 1948 came into existence. In this way, Turkish media set out to be the mass newspapers instead of acting as if they were the press organs of a certain party; and moreover, modern printing technologies were also brought into the country (Alemdar, 2001:201).

The Multi-Party Period and The Media

With the beginning of multi-party life through 1950 elections in Turkey, significant changes were gone through in press-government and state relations. Democrat Party of the epoch came into power in 1950 elections by receiving the support of the media; and in the following days DP carried out a number of regulations concerning the press. The press law that was enforced in 1950 and the law warranting the occupational rights of media employees in 1952 were among the regulations. Though the Turkish political life turned into a pluralist structure, the older habits did not disappear with the transition into a multi-party regime. So, shortly after coming into power, DP began to seek the kind of media that would be under the control of the ruling party and would not oppose the government just as in one-party epoch, instead of free media. That is to say, administrative mentality did not change. Some decisions were made to take the declarations of the media under control just after 1953. The meaning for this was that a depressing period was about to begin for a country which newly passed into a multi-party period. Because the notables of the one-party period had not accepted the new party and the new government willingly. By using the negative conditions arising from the conflict between the media and DP, they wanted to take advantage of the situation; which caused more political tension. This tension later caused the government to be taken over in an anti-democratic way.

When the National Unison Committee blocked the laws restricting the media, which had been enforced by the DP government, just after the military intervention on May 27 1960 (the media of the time was in alliance with the administrators of the intervention), comforted the press. However, this time the press began to act irresponsibly.

This behaviour of the media caused dissatisfaction in itself and in fields outside the press. Thus, on July 24 1960, with the participation of 42 newspapers, 18 magazines, 1 weekly newspaper, 6 news agencies, 8 journalist corporations, and 1 media employer association; Press Honorary Council was established and press law of morality was signed (Işık, 2002:146). The other document that was enforced in Turkey after the above mentioned law concerning the press morality was press morality rules for journalists. Having been approved also by the International Press Institute, this document was enforced in the general board of the Journalists corporation on February 14 1972. In this way, the media employees accepted to comply with these principles in executing their duties. Despite this, problems in media and the problem of self-control continued to be disputed. For this reason, second general assembly for Turkish Press was held.

After the 1980s, following the period of military intervention, Turkey underwent a number of structural changes. These included changes also in the field of communication. The laws that were enforced in the 1950s were revised within the framework of 1982 constitution in order to up-to-date them. The objective of the revisions was claimed to depoliticize the media, to put the media under control economically, and to apply pressure. The side of political power claimed that the legal arrangements had become inevitable because the media, which had indulged in sensation and irresponsible news giving, hadn't been able to establish a mechanism of self-control within itself.

Many changes have been made in press law number 5680 which came into effect in 1950 up to the present day. Changes that were made after 1980 aimed to correct the mistakes and errors which were observed in the previous periods; yet the changes in some articles of the law caused disputes claiming that there was interference in the essence of press freedom. Apart from that, also the law concerning the protection of Infants from Obscene Publications, number 1117, which came into effect on July 7 1927, underwent significant changes on March 3 1986 and on May 11 1998. Through all these changes, important contributions were made to the development of freedoms in the field of media in the process of entry to the European Union. Especially the search for receiving a calendar in 2003 for membership to the EU, improvements in politics and freedoms in Turkey were also reflected in the field of press. However, the significant problem of Turkish media is its structural features rather than the position of external factors directed to it.

The Structural Features of Turkish Media

Although Turkish media is not in the center of our political system, it tries to play a central role in practice. Just like the "intellectuals of the official ideology", it took on a mission. According to the media, common people are "community of ignorant masses who need to be enlightened and transformed". Therefore, the thing to be done for these "ignorant masses" is to change and direct the news in a way so as to "enter their world of meanings" instead of communicating the news and events directly. Because the political mission that the state possessed with the Republic became more strict in our country-which has a statist authoritarian ability-and acquired a dogmatic character. This mission gave the duty of acting and orienting within this framework. So, Turkish media is interventionist in people's way of looking at the events and in what attitude to take towards the events.

The media considers people to be incapable, incompetent and in need of protection. One of the best examples of this is that the anachronic writers and commentators setting out to protect people occupy the street corners of the media and act as if they were missionaries. This case displays to what extent the media is opposed to civil society, antidemocratic, reactionary, militarist, and detached from people. Instead of functioning as a tie between the political system and the people, generally Turkish media has a tendency to protect the status quo against the people. The view that is expected to be valid in the media is this view. The reserve view has a weak chance of living. The media taking such an attitude remains marginal or cannot have an opportunity to develop through the economic or political investments of the state. Therefore, the formation of a media on the side of the state's policies was encouraged all through the history of republic, but this case slightly changed after 1950. Whereas the barons of media had activities in the field of press, they varied their fields of activity after 1980. They began to do business in commercial and economic fields. So the institutions of media became vehicles to prevent harm to their activities. Obviously, this change of activities did not change their relations with the state because the state was still the biggest employer in Turkish society. It was impossible to operate by opposing the state. Hence, the media's view of people and its relations with the people were as in the previous years. That is, the media continued to keep Turkish people under guardianship. It did so through a two-phase control. First by deciding what the news is and manipulating this news, and then by reporting how to communicate this news to the people (Durgun, 1997:6).

Turkish political society remains to be composed of elites and Media. The boundaries of the political field can not broaden; democ-

racy and the institutions co-occurring in the same sphere can not grow; or rather can not get rooted. Media's tendency to see the citizens as the viewers of politics –and not as the actors- has a great influence over this case. Certainly media didn't manage to do this through purposeful action, but found the grounds where people remained out of politics ready. The fault of media was that it had contributions in not changing the situation and even reinforcing the case. In other words, it desired the field of politics to expand, and contributed to the continuation of distinction between the elites practicing politics and the people being subject to this policy, and to the expansion of the group of elites to such an extent that they were no longer elites. Because media preferred to identify itself within the group of elites via its members. For this reason in contrast to a dominant concept of legendary myth in our country that can never be accurately defined and whose composer is unknown, our media's narrative, enlightening attitude has never been in question. The people of media function as if they were the spokesmen of the "elites" and as if they were trying to legalize those elites who hid themselves in the concept of "State". The most significant indicator of this is the value that our media attaches to the official discourse (Durgun, 1997:7). Hence, rather than contributing to the establishment of a pluralized society and a democratic system, Turkish media has contributed to efforts to create a monotonous and homogeneous society which attaches importance to the official ideology and status quo for a long time. Therefore, it should be emphasized once more that Turkish media is a related structure whose boundaries occasionally broaden, but which ultimately conveys the contents that comply with the teachings of the official ideology to the people. In other words, the media has been constructing its own cultural framework in line with the expectations of the system by stressing some of the identities, has been forming a media culture, and has set a duty for itself to shape the society with this culture (Uslu, 2001:9). The significant political, social and technological changes that were experienced in recent years began to change the perception of state in people's mind; however, it didn't bring out an important changes in Turkish media's attitude towards the state. Still the position of Turkish media opposite the state has been one of its problematic sides. When the state is the subject matter, it is clear from the media's tendency to perceive every explanation coming from the state as "reality" that media's capacity of "doubt" –which is already narrow- has become narrower. Media reduces its function almost to a "microphone" conveying other people's voice. It can be said that the media that is desired here is the one which doesn't hurt the

state. To put this differently, the real duty of the media is to be skillful enough to be the media of the state. Thus, when it comes to the matter of "national benefits", the media may not perform its duty or may distort the news, according to the conception of media. However, in order to perform its duty in a real sense, the media should not show respect for such a conception; because whether something complies with national benefits or not is determined by history, not by the drafts of history (Görmüş, 2001:35). When we have a look at the past experiences of Turkish media we notice that the hardest attitude to handle is the attitude of "national benefit" for it. Because whenever the national benefits were in question, the media was observed to put the press morality laws aside. Thus, the problem originates from the fact that the elites having the power tend to see any ideological, religious or economic deviation as a threat to union and improvement rather than as the natural components of pluralist democracy. This reflex of the system, which has roots in the past, is also accepted by the media, the natural ally of the system. However, for Turkey—which has the target of becoming a part of the global world that is rapidly moving away from the Jakoben modernism- it is obviously inevitable to abandon such reflexes. A real liberalization including also the media, tolerance to social variations, changing from a submissive modernism into a new modernism which considers the society's values, and a new conception of media will also lead to a healthy social structure that is away from mental schizophrenia.

In brief, some elements of Turkish media can be thought to have left such functions as informing the society and serving to form a democratic order behind; and instead to have a function of dividing—or rather atomizing- the society. The fulfillment of this function in the context of the official discourse stands as a separate structural problem.

Turkish Media Employee's Views Concerning The United States

When the employees in Turkish media are considered individually, their perceptions of the US are different from that of the media organ they work for.*

In other words, a considerable distinction is observed between the institutional perspective and the individual perspective. The ca-

* Information presented in this section onward comes from the evaluation of surveys and interviews that were conducted on nearly 60 employees working in various media organs. 67 % of the subjects were males, 33 % were females. As for the level of education, 67.3 % were university graduates, 25 % were high school graduates; and 3.8 % were master's degree and doctoral studies students.

use for this is, as was explained in the first section, the activity of media's relations with the state in determining their conception of news-giving. That is to say, the news-giving conception of the media tends to form a public opinion in line with the state policy by transferring the state policies into the public; instead of reflecting the perspective of the public opinion. For this reason, the employees' individual views differ from the institutional view of the media organ that they work for; and the majority of the view points that are held by the employees can not shape the news-giving policy of the media organ. This case is also valid today. Turkish media –which is surrounded by a statist view and which is under the protection and patronizing of the state though the state's subvention- and the upper level employees of media (those determining the news-giving policy of the media) take an attitude as if they were the official employees of the state. Yet, in our observations and analyses we noticed that mostly the views of the employees didn't overlap with those of the media organs that they worked for. The media organs which don't have such a conception exist in Turkey, but they are marginal and are not as influential as the above mentioned kind of media organ in forming the public opinion (due to the lack of state's support or lack of finance, etc). Therefore in order to be able to analyse the relations with the USA with the perspective of media employees, it is important here first to present the state's perspective of the relations and then to compare that with the perspective of the media employees to see how much the two perspectives overlap.

The Turkish State's Perspective of the USA

Prior to the Iraq war, a belief had been formed in a considerable part of the public that a "no" answer should be given to the US about the war in order to keep away from the approaching crisis and that it would be the "indicator of Turkey's national honor and of independence". However, there was another side in the public opinion whose voice was not heard enough and who was claiming that the crisis would attract Turkey –regardless of Turkey's desire- into the centre and that Turkey could protect the national interests by sitting at the table.

Turkey's close relations with the USA, which had started after the second World War and which had been deepened under the roof of NATO, went up to the level of strategic partnership with the ending of the cold war. As well as helping Turkey, which became lonely in international relations, this case also facilitates the regional policies of, the US. For this reason, even if Turkey puts aside the American

demands in the last Iraq war, it is difficult for Turkey to remain out of the war owing to the national interests. Geography is an important data that countries need to take into consideration in making their policies. Thus, Turkey has always reckoned the possibility of joining this war in a way; because on the one hand Turkey argued that Turkmeps in Iraq shouldn't be oppressed and should take their seats in the new formation; and on the other hand even before the war started the Kurdish leaders in Northern Iraq began to threaten Turkey. This case makes it impossible for Turkey to remain impartial towards the ongoing events. Consequently, it seems obligatory for Turkey to indulge in this crisis in a way or another and to have a right to say a word after the war.

The political dividedness and lack of authority that Iraq has been experiencing nowadays have been an important problem for other countries as well as for the Middle East and for Turkey. This case gives the most harm to Turkey both in economy and in security fields. The fact that none of the warranties given orally by the USA during the first Iraq war in 1991 was fulfilled and that over 30 thousand Turkish citizens have lost their lives so far because of PKK terror due to the lack of authority in Northern Iraq led to a hesitant approach the American demands in the second Gulf War. This doubt about American demands is observed in every field. Moreover, the doubts applied considerable pressure over the present government even though the government was willing to give support to the US. Thus, despite the efforts of the government, the first memorandum was refused with a little difference of votes in the parliament and the US was not permitted to open the Northern Front through Turkey. The political, economic and security problems which had been caused by the US during the first Gulf War were influential on this consequence. Apart from that, the agreement crisis experienced with the US on the issue of opening the Northern front increased the anxiety of the public opinion. There were also other factors to contribute to the anxieties: The American side did not sign a text to release the worries and anxieties of the Turkish State, it didn't make any promises not to permit a Kurdish State, the issues that were sensitive and fragile for the Turkish side became the matters to make fun of or to humiliate in American media. Moreover, in meetings with the Kurds, Turkmeps were isolated and a federal Kurdish state was promised within two months in federal Iraq, which led to an increase in anti-American news-spreading in Turkish media. In other words, the US preferred Northern Iraqi Kurds to Turkey, the regional ally. This case, in return, gave harm to confidence in the USA. As a result,

in interviews with media members considerable differences in the views were observed when a division was made between pre-war and post-war. A minority group (3.8 %) considering Turkish-American relations beneficial for Turkey before the war stated that they gave up their views after the war. While media workers considered the relations beneficial for both Turkey and the USA mostly (at the rate of 42.3 %), a serious decrease was seen in the rate after the war: The rate came down to 9.6 %. In contrast, the rate of those who thought the relations to be harmful to Turkey increased: it was 25 % before the war; it went up to 51.9 % after the war. According to the analyses of the data, a great proportion of the media members in Turkey with 38.5 % think that the USA certainly threatens Turkey's regional benefits; 36.5 % think that this is true only in some cases while 5.2 % do not believe in such a thing. Naturally, America's indifference to Turkey's sensitivity in some matters, and eventually American Pressure on Turkish Soldiers serving in Northern Iraq as observed had great influence on this case.

It is evident that some differences in opinions as to Turkey should be in alliance with the US occur due to the above mentioned negative conditions. In general the employees in Turkish media are in favour of participation in the western block owing to the realist conditions. Hence, 40.4 % of the media members is for the cooperation with both the US and the European Union. 26.9 % is for the cooperation only with the EU; while 15.4 % support the cooperation with the world of Turkic (Central Asian Turkish States). Then opinions for other cooperations follow: cooperation with Russia, China and India 9.6 %, cooperation with Moslem countries 5.8 %. What is interesting here is that the majority of media members are in favour of the EU and the USA together. When considered separately the EU rates 26.9 % while the USA is at the rate of 1.9 %. The cause for so much loss of confidence on the part of the US was seen as the reflection of the recently experienced negative incidents on the media.

The U.S. In the Context of The Middle East

The factor that makes the region meaningful for the US is the fact that more than half of the oil reserves in the world is in this region and that the flow of petrol into other countries is maintained uninterruptedly here. The instabilities and uncertainties to be experienced in the Middle eastern countries will definitely affect the US, Japan and other western countries considerably because the petrol that is imported from the Middle East has a significant share in the energy production of these countries. Therefore, the majority of the

media workers (55.8 %) hold the view that the aim of dominating over sources of energy or keeping them under control forms the basis of American policies concerning the region. They think that with the incident of Iraq a step was taken by the US and that there is more to this. They claim that the next target will be Iran and that the signals are evident for this (for instance, the American announcement that Iran has been giving support to terrorism). Only 23.1 % of the media workers claim that the aim is beyond the energy sources. They say that the essential objective is imperialist sovereignty.

It should be pointed out that since the petrol pipeline passes within its borders and its income is dependent on Petroil, Turkey also has the same destiny as the western countries. However, as different from them, Turkey is located in the Middle East. The regional countries arming with the income obtained from petrol are in the neighborhood of Turkey. Turkey has to balance all the ongoing events in its neighborhood. While many countries are allocating sources for economic development and reducing defence expenditures due to the fact of globalization, Turkey can not do this owing to the regional conditions. Yet despite this, Turkey's policies have been an issue of dispute in the press. According to 48.1 % of the media members, Turkey has become the gendarme in the region serving to the US rather than pursuing its own benefits. Most of them point out that the American existence in the world cannot be neglected in foreign policy and that the objectives in foreign policy can not be achieved without paralleling them with American policies; however, according to the media workers, Turkey's foreign policy concerning the region is still too naive. According to them, even though Turkey wants to express that it wants to be the dominating element in the region through its policies, it still appears to be the gendarme of the region. This is dangerous for Turkey as there is a strong current of anti-Americanism among the peoples of the region. This case also brings anxiety that Turkey can also be the target because of its closeness to the United States.

Turkey's geopolitic reality indicates that Turkey can not remain indifferent to Iraq problem. The press dominantly holds the view that if Turkey is isolated in this matter, it will be affected more negatively. But the argument in the press is about the way of being concerned with the problem. Because especially in the first Gulf War Turkey had great losses in economic political and security fields; Turkey was forced to act hesitantly in such matters with the US. For this reason, most of the media employees (42.3 %) held the view that in the second Iraq war Turkey should join the war not with the US but under the

umbrella of the UN. 28.8 % thought Turkey should find its own solution –in which we can not talk of realistic conditions. While 15.4 % of the media workers are for full cooperation with solely the US, 13.5 % are in favour of forming a balance against the US by setting up cooperation with the EU in the region.

Turkey's geopolitical reality is important not only for Turkey, but also for the US. This case makes the US consider the factor of Turkey. Hence the media members also emphasise this fact. According to them, Turkey's value in the American perspective comes from Turkey's geopolitical position (by 53.8 %) rather than being a NATO member (by 28.8 %). Because Turkey is geographically at the crossroads of three continents (namely, Asia, Europe and Africa), and possesses a strategic value. It is located in the middle of a region where all the political, economic, ethnic, religious and cultural events are intensely experienced. So we observe that the media workers mostly hold the view that the US will always need Turkey. They consider this as a factor to strengthen our relations with the US.

One of the most significant factors in anti-American attitudes in the Middle East is the policies concerning Israel. Israel is just like a strategic island in the Middle of Moslems in the Middle East. The continuation of Israel depends on the weakness of Moslem Arabic States surrounding it. The Israel factor in the US intervention in the region is considered important. By disarming Iraq Israel will become the determining military force in the region, the US existence in the region and its presence will be guaranteed, the source of money that anti-democratic Arab regimes provide for the Palestinians will be cut and thus Palestine will be Persuaded into a Peace agreement in accordance with Israeli demands. Also the media members who claim that Israel will replace the role of Turkey in the region in the future are available at a high proportion: 55.8 %. Therefore, there is a common belief that by strengthening the policies with Israel, Turkey will be able to reinforce its power in the region and be able to improve its position in relations with the US. In other words, 32.7 % of the media members think that Turkey can strengthen its position in relations with the USA via Israel.

Obviously, the establishment of small city-states in the Middle East will be beneficial to the US and to the western block, and will enable Israel to maintain its existence powerfully in the region. Whereas supra-national formations are increasing all over the world, the states in the Middle East are being divided into smaller states. Because the divided pieces/peoples in the region will start a struggle of powers, the states in the region will become weaker and become

open to external interventions. This case will suit to the interests of bigger states and of Israel.

Besides Israel's policies concerning Northern Iraq during the Last Gulf War will create problems between Turkey and Israel. About 150.000 Kurdish Jews have been living in Israel. Israel has been searching ways to obtain a field of influence in the region by warranting the rights of Kurdish Jews in the state to be formed in Northern Iraq. Evidently, a Kurdish state to be established by dividing Iraq will suit to the interests of Israel because such a state will weaken the two opponent states to Israel –Iran and Iraq- and will stop Turkey from being an opponent to Israel. And in the long term, annexing a part of Turkey to the Kurdish state to be established will possibly be on the agenda. This case disturbs Turkey, but is considered important for the security of Israel. Consequently, Washington's determination to warrant the security of Israel and to put all the formations capable of threatening Israel out of struggle will play a hindering role in Turkish-American relations in the long term. The preventive action is the solution of Palestinian problem and not causing any changes in the region.

The Future of Relations with the USA

According to the statement of Turkish ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey's policies/objectives concerning Iraq can be divided into three parts. First, the preservation of the unity of lands in Iraq; that is to say, hindering the establishment of a Kurdish state there. Second, Turkey's demand that Turkey's legal concern of security should be taken into consideration; that is, stopping the PKK attacks coming from Iraq. Third, avoiding the oppression on the Turkmens in the region.

The strategic aim of Turkey's Northern Iraq policy is to prevent the establishment of a Kurdish state here because it is highly probable that such a state will demand lands from Turkey. Therefore, searches for closing the ways to the establishment of a such a state have always been available in Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Thus, one of the parameters in Iraq policy of Turkey is the the prevention of a federal Iraq. Turkey gives the example of Yugoslavia on this matter. This case is treated as a sensitive matter by the media employees. This is also a matter which will determine the future of Turkish-American relations. Therefore, 69.2 % of media workers think that the establishment of a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq by the US is the most important factor to damage the Turkish-American relations. This factor causes much more concern than PKK factor (by

17.3 %) which created problems from 1985 to 2000s in internal security. Because the increase in the size of PKK terror will put the land unity of Turkey under danger and this will lead to the establishment of such a state, according to the concerns. There is a widespread view that such policies of the US, which don't take Turkey into consideration, will hurt Turkish-American relations.

Currently, the sole people approaching the US warmly is the Turkish people. However, it is believed that due to American attitudes, the strong anti-American attitudes of the regional people will also spread in Turkey.

Apart from those, hostile feelings were created between Turkish and American Public opinions since Turkey did not open the Northern front. Besides, the American raid on Turkish soldiers' bureau, who were functioning as observers there upon the Kurdish groups' requests (Ankara Agreement), and the soldiers' being subject to bad treatment aroused anti-American feelings also in media workers. Anti-Americanism, which had been held by marginal groups, immediately became the widely held view in Turkey. In an interview it was observed that 44.2 % of the media members were for the revision of relations with the USA following the Suleimania incident. This group thought that these relations were important in today's world, but said that the Suleimania crisis was an honor hurting incident. A group of 17.3 % suggested that the relations should be re-defined due to the effect that was created by the Crisis in Suleimania. And a group of 30.8 % thought that the deteriorated relations should be re-established at any case. This group thought that the relations should not be tensed more.

Owing in to the above mentioned facts, 46.2 % of the media members think that the conception of Turkish-American strategic partnership is insufficient. A part of them (13.5 %) believe that this partnership conception gives harm to Turkey at any case. And 11.5 % of them claims that indeed there is no such a partnership, it is only written on paper. 9.6 % of them says that this is a unilateral relation and that this is only beneficial to the US. Those who believe the case is against Turkey is only 5.8 %. As can be noticed, media members in general don't believe in the idea of strategic partnership. They think that the conception of strategic partnership between Great Britain and the US is not formed between Turkey and the US, as can be understood.

It is clear that the US and Great Britain have cooperation in security, defence, international New World order matters; but they don't deposit their national interests to each other. As a result, they join

their distinct benefits in a shared action.

Britain, historically the planner of the Middle East arrangement, made the US accept its project concerning Iraq. While accepting the project the US took on the duty of arranging the relations with Turkey and took the risk for its operational benefits. However, Turkey, having experienced problems with the USA in foreign policy before the second Gulf War, lost the grounds for negotiations with the US. By handling the relations again, the two sides underwent a change in attitudes. The American change of attitude was in respect to suspending the plan that they had agreed on with Britain and in respect to Persuading Britain into favourable projections in Northern Iraq for Turkey. As can be understood clearly, by refusing the opening of Northern front, Turkey opposed the whole of the British Projects, but not all of the American Projects. Therefore, apart from the above mentioned factors, the course of Turkish-American relations will be dependent on the reflections of the US-British relations on Northern Iraq.

Conclusions

Turkish media, functioning as the protector of status quo generally, gives due care to comply with the policies of the Turkish State. Although this is not the main objective of the media, as a result of the negative events which occurred due to Iraq war, a negative view concerning the US became dominant in the media. Even though the news-giving policies of the media are dependent on the state, the media workers have their own individual attitude, and they are observed to have significant changes in their look at the US. That is, the US is evaluated negatively by them. For instance, where as the majority of them consider the US as the sole sovereign in the world (by 38.5 %), a part of them see the US as a threat to the world peace and humanity; and a part think that through its policies worldwide, the US is in fact preparing its own disaster (by 23.1 %).

Turkish media generally faces the west. This characteristic of it is also shown as proof of being dependent on the state. Although the recent incidents didn't stop the media facing towards the west, they brought about differences of emphasis in factors about the west. Thus when compared to the pre-war attitudes, the media workers began to emphasize the factor of the EU after the war instead of policies directed to the US. It is obvious that they have a negative assessment on the US. The US is perceived as an imperialist state which acts with an impulse to take the control of resources in the Middle East. Therefore, the media workers don't believe the American exp

lanation claiming that the aim was to free the Iraqi People in this war. While they consider the US as the sole super power, they also think that this case is signaling danger for the US. The anti-American movements becoming widespread all over the world is one such signal. This case makes the view that the US is a threat to the world peace and humanity quite widespread.

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The content of this book include various subjects related to Turkish political life. It consists of the published and unpublished academic articles by myself or with co-authors in a period of time. The articles give, from a historical point of view, an account of the nature of the statist tradition in Turkish politics and its relation to issues such as democratization, identity politics, nation-state, civil society, the nature of bureaucracy, media and music policy.



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