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HOW NOT TO BE GOVERNED

*Readings and Interpretations
from a Critical Anarchist Left*

edited by

Jimmy Casas Klausen and James Martel



How Not to Be Governed

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Contents

Acknowledgments	vii
Introduction: How Not to Be Governed <i>James Martel and Jimmy Casas Klausen</i>	ix
1 Anarchist Methods and Political Theory <i>Jacqueline Stevens</i>	1
2 An Anarchism That is Not Anarchism: Notes toward a Critique of Anarchist Imperialism <i>George Ciccariello-Maher</i>	19
3 Beside the State: Anarchist Strains in Cuban Revolutionary Thought <i>Katherine Gordy</i>	47
4 Kant via Rancière: From Ethics to Anarchism <i>Todd May</i>	65
5 Nietzsche, Aristocratism, and Non-domination <i>Vanessa Lemm</i>	83
6 Max Stirner, Postanarchy <i>avant la lettre</i> <i>Banu Bargu</i>	103
7 The Late Foucault's Premodernity <i>Jimmy Casas Klausen</i>	123
8 The Ambivalent Anarchism of Hannah Arendt <i>James Martel</i>	143
9 Emma Goldman and the Power of Revolutionary Love <i>Keally McBride</i>	157
10 "This Is What Democracy Looks Like" <i>Elena Loizidou</i>	167

Index	189
List of Contributors	195

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Introduction: How Not to Be Governed

James Martel and Jimmy Casas Klausen

ANARCHISM: IN OUR TIME?

In thinking about the relevance or possibility of anarchism in our time, we come up against a set of obstacles. First and foremost is the obstacle of temporality itself; there is the sense that anarchism belongs to the past and that it is therefore at best an anachronism or, alternatively, there is the notion that it never really took hold at *any* time and is thus at worst an idea completely divorced from reality. Perhaps just as important is the idea that anarchism is a problematical goal to pursue during a time when the state is under attack, when sovereignty is being eroded by a series of forces whether human, nonhuman, or superhuman. The growing threats of global and domestic terrorism, the juggernaut of globalization, resurgences of religiosity, transnational pandemics, global warming, profit-driven genetic modification of food supplies, international piracy and all the other aspects of early twenty-first-century life we're told to worry about suggest that it may be perverse to pursue a theory that opposes state power, regulation, and authority; after all, we seem to be living in a time when we desperately need the state to protect us from or at least coordinate responses to the various crises that we face. Finally, it seems that, in the United States at least, there are already a set of would-be anarchists doggedly pursuing the elimination of the state. These are members of the so-called Tea Party; their agenda, far from being an expression of the left (traditionally viewed as the home of anarchist tendencies), is to seek the "withering away" of the state from the far right end of the political spectrum. If we pursue an anarchist agenda, are we not in effect aligning ourselves with such a movement?

In many ways the first two arguments amount to different iterations of a single mainstream liberal conviction that however bad or overwhelming state power might be, it is the best and only truly viable practice for government. As the main articulation of political capitalism, liberalism came into being alongside the rise of the sovereign nation state. Although liberal thinkers will often fret about the ways that sovereign power can detract from genuinely democratic participation by individuals, liberal thought is marked above all by a commitment to the state in some form or other as a necessary corollary to the market. Thus the idea that anarchism is “out of time” is a reflection of the liberal conviction that time and progress itself are harbingers of an increasingly liberal political order—an idea of progress and history most strongly elaborated by neoconservatives after the dissolution of socialist states in Eastern Europe.¹ Similarly, the idea that we need the state to protect us from emergent contemporary threats reflects a conviction that without state regulation and sovereign power, “human nature” would condemn us to civil war and mayhem (a view often ascribed to Hobbes, among other early modern social contract theorists). Or, to put it in Foucaultian terms, even as there are current discourses that claim to identify and diagnose threats to contemporary societies and individuals, such a litany of threats shores up, rather than undermines, the idea of governmentality as security. Governmentality itself can support state sovereignty (with some friction, to be sure) rather than directly compete with it.

In this way, the usual judgment of anarchism, as impossible and undesirable, is generally contained within a liberal eschatology of time and order. Given the presumptions that liberalism has brought to the most basic understanding of human nature, politics, and temporality, we can see how easily a challenge like anarchism can be literally read out of the universe of political possibility. But to accept these presumptions may mean to reinforce liberalism itself; such views do not actually determine the possibility of anarchism. We should remind ourselves that insofar as anarchism is a radical alternative to liberalism, it has its own temporality, its own sense of possibility, and its own orders of desirability. Recuperating these alternative notions is a central part of what we are trying to do in this volume.

As for the third argument presented above, the idea that anarchism is already nascent in the Tea Party movement, it is worth spending some time distinguishing that movement from the varieties of anarchism we are discussing. It will be our argument that this movement has absolutely nothing in common with anarchism and that, in fact, the Tea Party is itself just another variant, albeit a radical one, of liberalism (taken in its classical rather than contemporary American sense). In looking at this and other movements, we focus on the American political spectrum because, situating itself at the center of the world’s global liberal network (at least for the time being), it is where we may see the logic of liberalism most clearly at work. We see the

basic commonalities that unite all liberal capitalists (broadly defined) even as these groups and movements also have an enormous amount of enmity for and opposition to one another. Considering the Tea Party as a variant of liberalism is instructive because it may seem to offer a critique of more mainstream variants and yet may not ultimately reject those variants' structuring assumptions. Perhaps particularly at the extreme "radical" end of the spectrum of liberal capitalism, we can see most clearly those aspects of liberalism that are common to all forms of its political expression.

The Tea Party Movement flashed onto the American political scene prior to "Tax Day" in 2009, the deadline in the middle of April by which residents of the United States must file federal income tax forms. Wielding teabags in tribute to the Boston Tea Party of the Revolutionary era, individual protesters coalesced as a semi-coherent group of American citizens intent on opposing what they perceived as a waste of federal revenue on an economic stimulus package. The teabag wavers' emergence as a forceful movement (not simply a fringe element) cannot be understood apart from a context wherein late modern economy and polity have both had to regroup their entwined powers as a result of the global economic recession, which reached a crisis stage in 2008. Tea Party supporters protest on behalf of freedom from the contemporary American behemoth state and its creatures: inefficient federal programs (whether motivated by a congressional stimulus bill or the maintenance of a welfare safety net), bureaucratic administration, national control of local affairs, and beltway insider politicians. Indeed, the Tea Party Movement not only shuns the American political establishment but also understands itself as deriving strength from its own inner antiestablishmentarianism: as a Tea Party website puts it, "An element of the Tea Party Movement that beltway insiders get red faced about is its self driven, true grassroots foundation. The Movement cannot be controlled, driven, directed, or even calculated."² Thus the Tea Party Movement not only takes a strong antiauthoritarian stance against the American federal government (the movement's adherents infamously have compared the Federal Stimulus Package to state socialism, even National Socialism) but also feels betrayed by the conservative establishment. Indeed, what seems admirable about the Tea Party is how its members have used ordinary, demotic affects to weld together associations in opposition to the supposedly cold calculations of conservative insiders and bureaucrats. Why then does holding such doctrines not make them anarchists? How are the associative practices of anarchists different?

Tea Party advocates are—probably self-avowedly—*not* anarchist in their thinking but are rather extreme libertarians. Though the Tea Party would make much of its fluidity, decentralization, and minimization of hierarchy and predictability, in fact they represent a set of hierarchies and assumptions that are recognizably capitalist. They want to roll back government, especially federal government, on the basis of two assumptions. First, the Tea Party

conception of freedom seems to amount to not much more than “negative” freedom, freedom from juridical impediments. Hence, private enterprise, markets, and the voluntary associative dimension of civil society would all positively flourish according to their own logics in the absence of government interference. Second, the Tea Party Movement defines “interference” melodramatically³; it assumes that state “interference” meddles only with a heavy hand, that polities demonstrate sovereignty only overtly (rather than, as is almost always the case in contemporary complex state administrative structures, shoring up sovereignty through oblique, indirect means). Hence, reining in governmental interference according to Tea Party definitions would willfully ignore the juridical landscape that makes markets possible, the military occupations that “open” new markets, the federal treasury transactions that in part drive currency and finance markets, or, most obliquely of all, the deliberate abstention from regulation of the trade in derivatives, which drastically magnified financial losses in the first place. In perhaps typically neoliberal fashion, then, for the Tea Party “no intervention” seems to mean no overt *ex post facto* intervention; it does *not* mean no oblique or constitutive intervention in markets or civil society by government. Hence, even if the Tea Party Movement wanted to call itself “anarchist,” it would not represent a very thoughtful anarchism but rather would simply effect a shift in emphasis from a large and open reliance on the state to a more unfettered market with the state acting only (but nonetheless still crucially) as a kind of external facilitator for the market.

The Tea Party thus mires itself in an uncritical double misrecognition. It divides the social field into polity and economy and then represents these two terms in specific ways. It represents the former as large-scale, overt, sovereign, federal governmental activity; it identifies the latter as a market that stabilizes and corrects itself, always tending in the aggregate and in the long term toward an equilibrium among economic forces as though by an invisible hand. The Tea Party thus views the government as a monstrous meddling bumbler in the delicately self-calibrating market and seeks to push the former drastically back (if not to abolish it at the federal level) so that the latter can return to the pure optimal functioning of its mechanism. In the cosmology of the Tea Party, the social universe is riven by a disordering and an ordering force. And what is the location of that order? It’s the economy, stupid.

But it is important to note that the Tea Party may do nothing more than offer the inverse and symmetrical cosmology of those who take a liberal (understood in the more contemporary, U.S. meaning of that term) view of the role of government. For many American liberals, the capitalist economy is the source of disorder and the federal government our best bet for order. Constitutive excess falls on the side of the market, according to this view, and any excesses on the part of government are merely aberrant and not constitutive. Thus we have two sides meeting each other as mirror images,

each valuing the opposite term of the other, affirming what the other would negate and negating what the other would affirm.

Moreover, in the middle of this symmetry, yet a third term has emerged: the American political center's response to the Tea Party; the Coffee Party, with its proposed slogan of "Meet Me in the Middle."⁴ The Coffee Party—which is "not the opposite of the Tea Party" since both "may want the same things"—also takes American polity and economy for granted but sees that both the government and the market as we now know them constitute excess. The Coffee Party's recipe for order is to more fully reinhabit grassroots participatory democratic government rather than forsaking the federal government altogether. Annabel Park, the founder of the Coffee Party, commented in the *New York Times*: "Our government is diseased, but you don't abandon it because it's ill." As she sees it, a federal government is "the only body we have to address collective problems."⁵ If economic firms do not abide by but rather overrun individual state boundaries, then there must be a federal government that can also work across state borders: "You can't bound government according to state borders when companies don't do that, air doesn't. It just doesn't fit with the world," Park concluded.⁶ However, national government qua grand coordinator and master checker of capitalist firms needs to be itself held in check, and the Coffee Party's vision for how this is done involves the resaturation at the grassroots level of the total national field by citizens participating in the majoritarian democratic process.⁷ This resaturation of national government, they maintain, will keep it accountable, and a reformed polity can ameliorate the effects of the unbounded economy. Participatory majoritarian democracy keeps the political system self-calibrating so as to supervise a capitalism prone to disequilibrium.

What does this symmetrical triptych reveal? We think it reveals a double inevitability that this essay collection aims to begin to challenge—a sense that politics is ultimately only defined and organized by statism and economics is ultimately only defined and organized by capitalism, that one of these is inevitably the problem to which the other is inevitably the solution, and that statism and capitalism, whether as problem or solution, owe their inevitability to the corresponding dogma that they can only be reformed or perhaps even revolutionized by emphasizing or deemphasizing the connection between them (without, however, eliminating that connection). In no case are both terms strategically or tactically evaded by Coffee Party, Tea Party, or mainstream political "solutions," nor are the actual micropactices of contemporary power—expressed obliquely in neoliberalism, governmentality, or biopolitics—subjected to any scrutiny.

We see in the "extreme" ends of liberalism (as libertarianism or full civic participation) then, a sense of the way that liberalism's relationship with the state and with capitalism can bend but it cannot break. Even at the wild

fringes of liberalism, the tether between the state and market cannot be broken. It is exactly this link that a critical anarchism sets itself out to oppose. The papers in this volume seek to reconsider the inevitabilities of the state for politics, the market for economics, and above all, the link between them for all conceivable forms of human organization.

THE ANARCHIST METHOD

When one tries to think about what an anarchist is, or does, one immediately seems to come up against a problem. Insofar as anarchism is, by definition, opposed to any overarching explanatory models, it becomes difficult to see how one could go about finding a standpoint from which one could judge what anarchism is and does (and also, what it is not or does not do). Insofar as many of the essays in this volume purport to describe various thinkers in the political theory canon as anarchist (or to show their anarchist sides), how do we even begin to make such a judgment? But here again, the conundrum that we appear to face is itself a product of the way that liberal capitalism teaches us to think about politics, about how we define a political movement, what it is supposed to do and what it is supposed to look like. To bring anarchism into view we need to break from liberalism's and capitalism's framing of the political world.

In liberalism, politics is generally thought to involve clearly defined, wholly explanatory systems. In part (arguably in large part), liberal political theory arose to make sense of the market mechanism to make it appear to be systematic. By analogy to the state—which is set as the explanatory fulcrum and regulator of a wildly incoherent market—politics as an idea is similarly meant to supply the solidity and substance to organize a chaotic life world (a world that is set into chaos by the market). The market is the elephant in the room when it comes to liberal political theory; it is not always mentioned directly but its effects are always there at work, requiring a “political science” to compensate for its own unpredictability. In this way, any political idea that avoids or sidesteps the need for some overarching explanatory narrative—any idea or practice that does not presuppose a clear system that has a built-in basis for determining and sorting the world that it explains—seems to be dangerous or irresponsible. Indeed, we would submit that the long-standing depiction of anarchism in liberal modes of thought as “chaotic” may be a projection of the hidden chaotic core of liberal capitalism itself. In its own anxiety to regulate a system that can't be regulated, to “protect” human life from the caprice of the market system that capitalism throws each of us into, liberalism can't abide by any thought or practice which denies or exposes its own basic premises.

One of our key arguments in these essays is that anarchism is not chaotic but only decentralized. Arendt's concept of isonomy (literally "equality before the law" but in Arendt's terms a system of "no rule") comes to mind here. As Arendt tells us, the Greek city states were marked by this system, wherein "the notion of rule (the 'archy' from *arkhein* in monarchy and oligarchy, or the 'cracy' from *kratein* in democracy) was entirely absent from it. The *polis* was supposed to be an isonomy, not a democracy."⁸

This decentralized form of self-governance has no "rule" (she tells us that it was "without a division between rulers and ruled") yet is not chaotic.⁹ On the contrary, such a system uniquely reflects both the diversity and coordination of an entire political community. For Arendt, such a system constituted one of the only truly free political practices in human history. What is absent from this system is not order but rather the superimposition of some limited idea of order onto a human plurality, thus denying the genuine and multiple bases of politics.

Given that Arendt shows us how an-archy can have its own form of order as isonomia, it would seem that the chaotic "Lord of the Flies" imagery that comes out when liberals think about anarchism has nothing to do with anarchism itself. The paradoxes that liberals project onto anarchism (how can it even speak its name? how can it be anything at all?) may in fact be projections of the chaos that constitutes liberalism at its own core.

Accordingly, we argue that anarchism can be, if not exactly defined, then at least articulated according to what we are calling an anarchist *method*. The method of anarchism enacts the very decentralization that we have been referring to above. Against the liberal preference or need for central nodes from which to explain and organize the political system, we argue that anarchism accepts and even constitutes a radical dispersion of these elements. Dispersion does not mean elimination; anarchists do not subscribe to a supposedly nihilistic denial of the political but rather to an appreciation for how the political can in fact incite (rather than overwrite) the myriad forms and capacities of human existence. The anarchist method holds that politics should encourage expressions of human diversity rather than seek to control and explain it; that political association and economic activity thrive by adaptability, contingency, and multiplicity; that these social units (which we have generically referred to as associations and activities) that the anarchist method itself frames are nonidentical. Thus, whereas liberalism tends to think that a theory that doesn't account perfectly for all of its components has a fatal flaw, a sign that the theory isn't working, anarchism expects and desires an enormous diversity of outcomes. Liberal theory tends to totalize the political or economic world by positing a master equivalence that thereby creates fungible, substitutable, and identical units (such as the individual, a right, a commodity). Moreover, as Talal Asad describes it, substitutability is a central feature not only of theory but also of liberal politics and economics

in practice: “more than a principle of electoral politics,” substitutability is “a social technique essential to bureaucratic control and to market manipulation” whose paradoxical effect is to constrain rather than to liberate the individual.¹⁰ By contrast, critical anarchism welcomes unexpected convergences and strange juxtapositions.

From a liberal perspective, anarchist method appears to be not a method at all. But as Paul Feyerabend notes in his well-known “Against Method”:

The idea of a method that contains firm, unchanging and absolutely binding principles for conducting the business of science meets considerable difficulty when confronted with the results of historical research. We find, then, that there is not a single rule, however plausible, and however firmly grounded in epistemology that is not violated at some time or other. It becomes evident that such violations are not accidental events . . . On the contrary we see that they are necessary for progress.¹¹

Feyerabend labels his own method “anarchism.”¹² While he is discussing a scientific method (and actually tells us that anarchism is “perhaps not the most attractive *political* theory”),¹³ his insights are valid for a theoretical method of political anarchism as well. Against the notion that anarchism has no system, it is our argument that anarchism *is* systematic but in ways that avoid totalizing and overwriting the populations that fall under their purview.

Systems do not have to be top-down, unified and regular but rather can function like Walter Benjamin’s notion of constellations. For Benjamin, the method of constellation consists in linking completely different, unlike items for the purposes of dislodging specific temporal moments and/or specific objects from the certainties and truths that generally contain and overwrite them. In his “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” Benjamin speaks of grasping “the constellation which [our] own era has formed with a definite earlier one.”¹⁴ He also says that “A historian who takes this as his point of departure stops telling the sequence of events like the beads of a rosary.”¹⁵ Items, moments, and events are not linked for Benjamin due to their physical or temporal proximity, nor are they related by the grand narratives of order and progress that constitute liberal forms of thinking. To form constellations then is to resist those grand narratives, to allow the strangeness of unrelated things to remove an object or event from such certainties: Benjamin speaks of a constellation’s achieving the “violent expulsion [of some historical object] from the continuum of historical process.”¹⁶ Benjamin’s method is thus inherently anarchic in that it welcomes and appreciates the strange, the unexpected, the unlike, the unaccountable. It is, however, still systematic in the sense that it insists on relationships, on engagement and ordering, just not the ordering that is dictated by what Benjamin calls the “phantasmagoria” that is produced by liberal capitalism.

By definition, Benjamin’s constellative method is multiple and pluricentric. No one mode, no one center can dominate insofar as the entire purpose

of the method is to decenter and dislodge. It becomes impossible with Benjamin's method to privilege one site, to produce hierarchies and standardized orderings. Constellations seem to invite perspectival shifts, too. So not only could a provisional center shift from within a single framing but also a wholly new set of images will emerge when the framing itself shifts. While liberal capitalism, through the mechanism of price, among other avenues, tends to relate and unite everything in the universe supposedly according to grand, standardizing models, the anarchic method of constellation does the exact opposite; it exposes those things that radically separate and differentiate one thing from another and, in so doing, reveals the anarchy of order itself. The point is not to abolish, destroy, or reduce order as such—but to allow other orders to emerge and to call to one another within the same spaces or across spaces, within the same time or across times.

Some of these same understandings can be seen in the workings of chaos theory. While, once again, we would resist the term *chaos* to refer to anarchism, we accept the organizing premise of this branch of science (which actually belies the name) that something that appears to be unstructured and unsystematic actually displays multilevel, multivalent systems and structures proper to it. To deny this is to seek to superimpose an imagined structure, preferred simply for its aesthetic orderliness, over the multiple levels and valences of complexity actually inhabiting the world.¹⁷ This is true as much in the world of the political as it is in science. Here, once again, we would argue that it is the market which is uniquely chaotic insofar as it reflects nothing but its own fetishism, its own “irrational exuberance.”¹⁸

When we understand that systems can operate in such alternative ways, that it is possible to be coherent and effective even without the regular and orderly formations that liberalism asks us to expect, we begin to get a glimpse of how the anarchist method functions. If we accept that anarchism is a method, it helps us to think in different ways about the terrain of our own time and context. This terrain is so familiar to us, and the liberal explanations that organize that terrain for us are so deeply rooted, that it becomes difficult to think about our situation in any way other than the way liberalism frames it for us. As already mentioned, we are given to see a world in which anarchism is “impossible” and “out of time,” to see that liberalism is “inevitable” and even “natural.”

J. K. Gibson-Graham's recent “anticapitalocentric” work inspires us in this regard: they have focused on questioning the triumphalist self-certainty of capitalism and are especially keen to counter the side effect of triumphalism that capitalism's very critics accede to; namely, inevitabilism. When they refuse capitalocentrism by exposing “the diverse economy,” Gibson-Graham show that there are myriad practical resistances to capitalism beneath or beside it as well as many noncapitalist activities on which capitalism proper is parasitical. According to Gibson-Graham, the first step in thinking and

acting beyond capitalism's self-certainty is to see (on its own positive terms) the infracapitalist and paracapitalist activities existing in tension with capitalism even while in the very midst of the capitalocentric order. For example, in addition to age-old black markets in contraband and the longstanding reliance of capitalist firms on gendered, nonremunerated housework for the reproduction of laborers, multinational firms benefit from illegal mining or logging on indigenous lands and newly corporatized forms of enslaved prison labor; these firms' executives take advantage of innumerable under-the-table perquisites and sometimes in turn support under-the-table transactions by hiring neighborhood adolescents to babysit or undocumented foreigners to clean house.¹⁹ Hegemonic capitalocentrism derives in great part in its ability to discount infra- and paracapitalist activities as *noneconomic*. In other words, we are bidden to ignore or refuse to see such activities as economic because of the way that "economics" is already regulated by a capitalist episteme. As our collective authors note,

the terrain is littered with half-hearted and defensive "economic" identities that are largely acknowledged as *social* identities—houseworker, giver of gifts, volunteer, cooperater, petty trader, home producer, artisan, member of a kin network, indigenous hunter, migrant, public servant, community worker, peasant, social entrepreneur.²⁰

Renaming these identities as *economic* identities is a simultaneously political, epistemological, and methodological act, a performative instance of anti-capitalocentrism.

Likewise, thinking and acting beyond the late modern state demands that we see alternative powers beyond and beneath the state amidst the state system. The challenge of thinking and acting beyond the state demands that we rename temporary autonomous zones, societies against the state, queer counterpublic mappings of social space, and anarcho-indigenisms as *political* rather than mindlessly acceding to their consignment to "merely" cultural, sexual, or ethnological domains.²¹ It takes a kind of methodological leap of faith to see the resistances implicit in these subjects' activities as something other than random and isolated acts of idiosyncrasy and/or reaction. Instead, we can see these nodes of resistance as occurring in conjunction with one another, as forming a constellation, an anarchist web or network.

The purpose of this volume, the purpose of what we are designating as *critical* anarchism, is to bring recognition and awareness to these myriad anarchist practices, to help make the constellation of resistances more clear to itself as such. By recognizing anarchism as a method and as a constellation of activities framed as a system, we seek to show how these acts and styles of resistance are not just saying "no" to liberalism, capitalism, or statism. They are, in effect, producing other forms of politics and economics; they repre-

sent viable positivities in themselves but positivities that themselves will benefit from intensification *in* constellation. A critical anarchism drawing on Gibson-Graham and others urges us to see that not only are capitalism and statism out of joint with the worlds they will to know but also that anarchism too is out of joint, though differently so insofar as it is critical.

THE POWERS OF ANACHRONISM

In thinking of how anarchism can resist a system of global liberal capitalism, it is one of our contentions that many of the negative ways anarchism is depicted by that system can actually serve to further resistance. For example, there is the idea, already discussed, that anarchism is untimely or anachronistic. From the perspective of the liberal capitalist way of the thinking, this is an ultimate fault; to be out of time is to be out of history, useless and irrelevant. But if we take Benjamin's analogy of constellation seriously, to be out of time is to be able to avoid being totalized by the kinds of understandings that a strong sense of history and time bring with them. The anarchist method welcomes anachronism as a way to defeat and decenter the certainties of what any particular moment in time (very much including our own) means, what is possible and what is not. From this different methodology, to be out of time is thus not a problem but an advantage; it is a key aspect of how anarchism can avoid being swallowed up by liberal capitalist narratives.

Another term that is often used against anarchism but which can be a strength is the idea of anarchism's weakness. Evocatively, Benjamin speaks of a *weak* messianic power that belongs to every generation. For Benjamin, this power is in fact part and parcel of the constellative method. (He tells us that it is "a power to which the past has a claim.")²² For Derrida, this weakness translates into a power that is not recognized as a power at all by grand narratives. He urges us to be

suspicious of the simple opposition of dominant and dominated, or even of the final determination of the forces in conflict, or even more radically of the idea that force is always stronger than weakness (Nietzsche and Benjamin have encouraged us to have doubts on this score, each in his own way, and especially the latter when he associated "historical materialism" with the inheritance, precisely, of some "weak messianic force").²³

Here, weakness is in fact an asset, a way to avoid detection even as it subverts and undermines the very grand narratives that subject it. In this way, weakness, decentralization, and anachronism, the very qualities that seem to relegate anarchism to the dustbin of history, are simultaneously its greatest strengths. This is why the question of methodology is paramount. To view

the world from a liberal capitalist sense of time, progress and order—or, in the words of James Scott, to see like a state²⁴—means to presume the failure of any alternative methods of political organization, including anarchism. But to take the anarchist method seriously is to reread the exact same set of circumstances and turn them inside out. It becomes possible, in this sense, to employ a double language in which the very terms that we use seem to be self-defeating but constitute, in fact, a form of “hiding in plain sight.” Because anarchism appears not to be a threat, not to be possible and not even to belong to our current temporality, it has a space in which it can function, subvert, and resist that won’t even be recognized as such. By the same token, all of those spaces, both political and economic, that are relegated to “culture” or other peripheral categories can also serve as sites where resistance can be engaged in without being recognized as such. Anarchism can thus draw on its own exclusion as a resource; it can benefit from an asymmetry whereby the forces it struggles against are clearly legible as powers and threats, whereas it itself is not. That is anarchism’s own “weapon of the weak.”²⁵

CRITICAL ANARCHISM

If contemporary anarchism’s anachronism puts it out of joint with neoliberal capitalism’s and the late modern state system’s temporalities, it puts it out of joint also with anarchism’s own nineteenth—and early twentieth—century forebears. This is so not least because what anarchism responds to and situates itself against today, moving into the second decade of the twenty-first century, is fundamentally unlike what Mikhail Bakunin or Max Stirner or Pierre-Joseph Proudhon or Emma Goldman reacted to in developing their anarchist theories; what goes by the name “anarchism” today necessarily differs from what went by that name a century ago. This seems an obvious deduction from the premise that political theories and practices emerge from, without being exhaustively determined by, historically and culturally specific contexts of power. Nonidentical theories crystallize in dissimilar settings; thus Petr Kropotkin is not Jacques Rancière.

The seductively simple deduction—distinct anarchisms for distinct times—must be extended; otherwise its key insight amounts to nothing more than a seeming truism. First, it is important to note that a distinct “time” does not mean a distinct date. So Ernesto “Che” Guevara and Hannah Arendt, though both writing critically around the same dates of both state power and certain revolutionary currents, write in different temporalities. Specific power configurations will generate contrasting temporalities even within the same delimited period of years. But we must emphasize that insisting on

multiple temporalities' unfolding in the same moment is not the same as saying that one might be more "modern" or "advanced" than another, for that is already to emplot these different temporalities into a larger overarching temporality of progress.²⁶ In this sense, contemporary anarchisms are out of joint among themselves: there is a mutual untimeliness between the anarchism of South American indigenous societies (societies against the state) and the anarchism of an American academic professional.

Moreover—and quite important for this volume in particular since several of the chapters within stage dialogues with prior anarchist theorists—just because distinct anarchisms emerge from and for distinct times does not mean that current anarchisms cannot learn from past anarchisms. As already mentioned, it is a key aspect of the constellative method to engage these disparate moments and modalities in order to avoid having any one era succumb to the grand narratives of its time. Present-day anarchisms can draw on the anarchisms that preceded them rather than merely leaving them behind. Contemporary anarchism may disserve itself by protesting too much in favor of sheer futurism; likewise it disserves both past and present to force a simple adoption of a traditional anarchist theorist for present-day anarchism. Both futurism and traditionalism serve to reduce temporal disjuncture—swallowing the present into past or future—rather than to inhabit this temporal disjuncture. This insight, too, can be extended in space: the mutual untimeliness of contemporary "Fourth" World and "First" World anarchisms, when drawn into a shared critical constellation, can mutually illuminate, challenge, and enrich one another theoretically and practically when each looks to the others' differences rather than affirming one another uncritically.

Crucially, then, the "critique" or critical function at work within "critical anarchism" involves something more than a straightforward taking apart, an intellectual decompounding maneuver, or speculative separation or segregating of component elements. Critique may often involve such analysis understood in a more or less Kantian sense. But the critical function of anarchism as we mean it here comes closer to synthesis—a drawing together of seemingly discrete elements—though this synthetic activity is probably less rather than more Kantian in a sense since the kinds of "drawing together" enacted in the following chapters are driven by counterpoint.²⁷

It is, after all, a contrapuntal synthesis that we refer to when we imagine a mutually enriching constellation of current anarchisms from multiple temporalities. What makes critical anarchism *critical* is enacted openness to tactical readings of one theorist or practice against another and therefore of each against itself. Anarchist theory performs its critical function by learning from and then being willing to displace its own necessary idols from the position of sovereignty within the practice of theory. We say "displace," for to claim to topple our own idols would—we realize after Arendt and Foucault—only reenact the gestures not only of statist sovereignty itself but also of the

sovereign-inspired willing and subjectivity of unreconstructed approaches to anarchisms of old.²⁸ Contrapuntal synthesis within critical anarchism, we could say, performs anachronism in space by making constellations of two or more mutually untimely theorists or practices. Yet it is also crucial to insist that forging constellations of two untimely theories will generate new untimelinesses when anarchisms inhabit these constellations as a truly new context. Critical anarchisms thus generate new historical contexts for themselves from which to emerge renewed and reoriented.

Counterpoint thus tries to put isonomia into practice as both an epistemological method and also a way of exercising power in concert with others. The form of synthesis we speak of here is not the predecided synthesis associated with dialectical thought, where thesis programmatically counters its antithesis in order to be sublated into synthesis. A dogmatic approach to dialectics such as this forecloses the possibility of an emergent “dialectic that is not a dialectic,” as George Ciccariello-Maher puts it in his essay. A contrapuntal synthesis by contrast allows for the refiguration, but not the destruction, of the context-emergent entities brought into relation. The counterpoint itself forges a new partial context that provokes the emergence of features in each given entity into the foreground so that newly different entities are separately synthesized from the counterpoint. Authority, understood both as knowledge and as power, is never total and decided once and for all; differences are never regulated according to a predetermined order. Anarchisms that meet each other through counterpoint are not thus assimilated to a fixed paradigm. So, “critical anarchism” does *not* mean that a Central American advocate of anarchoindigenism will or must meet a punk inhabitant of Copenhagen’s Christiania “in the middle” (as Coffee Party propagandists might put it). They might find some common ground, or they might reject each other; more likely, some of both will happen. The point, however, is not that they both now *are* “critical anarchism” but rather that critical anarchism is what each *does* when it repositions itself vis-à-vis the other. “Critical anarchism” is not meant as an overarching identity in itself but rather captures how discrete anarchisms can be provoked constantly to refresh their separate untimely relations with the contexts of their emergence. As Geo Ciccariello-Maher suggests below in his critique of the too-easy identification of Global North anarchists with self-declared Venezuelan anarchist groups, anarchisms are likely to stultify one another when they meet only to fantasize and reaffirm sameness.

Considering this apparent bid to constant “becoming” and affirmations of untimeliness and being “out of joint”—not to mention the constant references to contemporary continental theory—it is possible to align what we are doing with “postanarchism,” and indeed there are scholars, most notably Saul Newman, who argue explicitly on behalf of that term.²⁹ Newman’s work offers a convincing and productive analysis of both strong antiauthoritarian argu-

ments in the writings of major French poststructuralist theorists and also more explicit reconstruction of anarchism itself in light of poststructuralism. Some anarchist thinkers have decried Newman's strong advocacy of *post* anarchism.³⁰ From such a perspective, the *post* of postanarchism seems to lend itself too easily to the *post* of "postmodernism," and hence a particular avenue of academic thought that declares that anarchism is "over." Indeed, Newman's critics argue that his promotion of *postanarchism* depends on an unfair rejection of classical anarchism.³¹ Yet at the same time and *contra* Newman's critics, an association with postmodernism might be tactically advantageous for pushing renewed anarchist theoretical currents beyond the temporal progressivism central to a dominant strand of modernism.

As we see it, the debate over whether to prefix *post* to anarchism is itself fruitful in that it demands that anarchists critically confront the modernist orderings of time that neither liberal capitalism nor state socialist have sufficiently resisted. In her consideration of the possible afterlives the nineteenth-century *enfant terrible* Max Stirner could have, Banu Bargu lucidly articulates what could be at stake in meeting the postanarchist challenge: "Rather than write off postanarchism, it is our intellectual responsibility, I think, to respond to its provocations with robust reconceptualizations of anarchist thought that render its relevance more acute for contemporary politics."

In the following chapters, some contributors explicitly invoke postanarchism, and others do not. In order to accommodate and indeed to provoke interchange on the varieties of anarchist theory and practice—whether they be labeled *post*, *crypto*, or *classical anarchist*—we have opted to employ the term *critical anarchism*. True of the critical anarchist method more generally, we see this as a way to both engage with other moments, other contexts for the purposes of forming constellations, even as we engage very locally with our own specific and unique situations and our own multiplicity of sometimes mutually tense affiliations and inspirations.

THE CONTRIBUTIONS

With this methodology and nomenclature in mind, let us proceed to examine the contributions by our authors. In every case, the engagement takes place in a way that does not presume one common modality, one origin or standard that defines anarchism. And yet, it is also the case that each of these papers forms a node in a constellation, each connects with and reflects upon the other papers in a myriad of ways and thus forms a body of thought on something that, in its individual contexts, seems very disparate. We hope in this way not simply to describe and explain but to practice the anarchist

method; we seek to allow these essays to speak both for themselves and to one another.

We begin with an essay by Jacqueline Stevens which, appropriately enough, addresses the question of methodology. Stevens notes that some of the most important anarchist theorists, including Bakunin and Kropotkin, did not necessarily employ an anarchist methodology. Irreverently and quite paradoxically, she finds a more appropriate and commensurate anarchist form of methodology in the writings of Karl Popper, a figure whom many have considered politically reactionary. Stevens suggests that, despite his own problematic politics, Popper's method "provides a refreshingly open and even Nietzschean approach to knowledge and power," an approach that suggests perhaps another form of anarchist politics as well.

While Stevens urges anarchists to learn unexpectedly from Popper, George Ciccariello-Maher asks them to learn unexpectedly from Chavismo; that is, the political practices and thinking coalescing around Hugo Chávez in Venezuela. By passing anarchism through decolonial critique, Ciccariello-Maher's essay challenges anarchist theorists and practitioners to examine the continuing colonialism of contemporary radical political currents. Recovering Georges Sorel and Frantz Fanon in order to transpose the former's class analysis onto race and the latter's geopolitical analysis onto Third World national consciousness, Ciccariello-Maher criticizes the anarchist imperialism of dogmatic Global North anarchists' tendencies to favor self-declared Venezuelan anarchists who reject Hugo Chávez. Rather, Ciccariello-Maher asks anarchists to take a more radically dialectical view toward the state, especially in the decolonizing world; anarchists could thus learn much by siding with local Venezuelan militants who aim to *radicalize* the Bolivarian Revolution, not reject it outright. Ciccariello-Maher's provocative readings of Foucault and Rancière puts him in vigorous dialogue with the pieces by Todd May, Elena Loizidou, and Jimmy Casas Klausen following.

Similarly, Ciccariello-Maher's review of the difficult career of decolonial revolutions puts his piece in dialogue with Katherine Gordy's critical history of anarchism in Cuba. For Gordy, Cuba represents an example of anarchism with a "small-a." Although formal anarchism is almost nonexistent in Cuba today—indeed, capital-A Anarchists had been exiled in 1959—there nevertheless remain substantial currents in Cuban political culture that are neither in favor of the Castro regime nor of the encroachments of globalizing liberal capitalism. In the face of the twin burdens of statism and capitalism (in which, in the case of Cuba, there is at least some respite from the second), Cuba offers an example of how anarchism can coexist even with authoritarian states, how it can evolve and develop even without a formal or acknowledged existence.

A series of authors in our volume look at particular (and often canonical) thinkers in philosophy and political theory in order to denote and resuscitate

anarchist or anarchistic possibilities in their work. Not all of these thinkers would have embraced the label of anarchist (in fact some of them pointedly spoke against anarchism), and yet we try to show how their work advances our understanding of anarchism nonetheless when we read them against the grain.

Todd May's essay makes the at-once startling and yet modest proposal that Immanuel Kant can be read as an anarchist insofar as Kantian ethics stresses autonomy as nondomination and freedom as legislation by and for oneself. Engaging with the work of Jacques Rancière, May sees the importance of equality, especially the argument for equal intelligence in Rancière's *The Ignorant Schoolmaster*, as a presupposition of freedom akin to Kant's understanding. Ultimately, May recovers Kant for critical anarchism and radical democracy (or, perhaps more appropriately here, critical anarchism *as* radical democracy) and thus rescues Kant from the overwrought liberty/equality opposition bandied about by liberals like Rawls or libertarians like Nozick. Drawing on Rancière but putting him in dialogue with Kant, May highlights new aspects of this contemporary theorist's work that may meet or possibly deform the more critical readings of Ciccariello-Maher and Loizidou.

Vanessa Lemm looks at the work of another major German philosopher, namely, Friedrich Nietzsche. According to Lemm, Nietzsche embodies a fundamentally anarchist spirit, even in some of his most apparently hierarchical writing. In this sense, Lemm undertakes some of the hard work in retrieving Nietzsche as a figure for the left. In her analysis of Nietzsche's writings about aristocracy and a future "aristocratic culture," Lemm argues that we find not an analysis of domination and exploitation (as he is usually read) but rather an "aristocracy of spirit" that is linked to anarchist practices and understandings both of the self and the political.

Although less well-known than Nietzsche, the subject of Banu Bargu's chapter, Max Stirner, is sometimes considered a precursor to him. Bargu considers how innovative Stirner's incendiary book *The Ego and Its Own* is. Though it takes its mooring from the concerns of the Young Hegelians, Stirner's book, in Bargu's view, goes much further, offering trenchant critiques of essentialism, foundationalism, and humanism, as well as what she calls a "vagabond ontology" and an alternative materialist epistemology. Bargu sees in "Saint Max" not the joke that Marx and Engels sometimes make him out to be but rather a thinker whose unrelenting critique of identity and ideology might helpfully contour contemporary political struggles. Ultimately, Bargu asks us to find in Stirner's analyses the inspiration for a "politics of exodus": "By taking leave, [Stirner's] unique individual leaves the *status quo* without its fundamental support and renders it bound to collapse of its own weight."

Jimmy Casas Klausen (a coeditor of this volume), too, finds something like a politics of exodus in Foucault's late interest in "counter-conducts." Klausen begins with an exploration of the implications of Foucault's directive that political theorists "cut off the head of the king." In light of the recent translation and publication of Foucault's series of lectures at the Collège de France, we can see that Foucault took a great interest in the political-religious problems of the early modern period in Europe. Reading Foucault's analyses of Enlightenment critique and Reformation "counter-conducts," Klausen reconstructs a critical anarchist political theory that explicitly engages the challenge "how not to be governed in that way" from Foucault's late writings. He suggests that Foucault's interpretation of counterconducts and critique paves the way to the ethical writings on ascesis that Foucault composed before his death. Against Ciccariello-Maher's more critical reading, Klausen defends Foucault's oblique approach to resisting contemporary power formations.

James Martel (a coeditor of this volume) looks at the work of Hannah Arendt in a similar light. Arendt is not usually read as an anarchist, but in her interest in isonomy (the Greek practice of equality before the law) and in her criticism of sovereignty (which she sees as a usurpation of the political by arbitrary and particular phantasms of authority) we see Arendt in a more radical light. Martel argues that given her own position as a modern subject, Arendt distances herself from her own "pure" anarchism (which she espies in ancient Greece). Yet, even in her analysis of modern forms of authority, we find an anarchist tendency that resists and calls into question the grand organizing narratives of our time (and in particular, the narrative of sovereignty).

This discussion of particular readings of various theorists as anarchists (or at least as potentially contributing to anarchist thought) can also be extended to the related question of how anarchist thought can influence actual practice, including on the individual level. On this note we have two chapters that both contend with Emma Goldman—thus they focus on an individual theorist as do the several contributions preceding them, but uniquely both Keally McBride and Elena Loizidou focus on Goldman as an anarchist practitioner, not just a theorist. Moreover, insofar as both draw briefly on Arendt by way of contrast and comparison to Goldman, McBride's and Loizidou's contributions form a constellation with the essay by Martel that precedes theirs.

McBride writes about Goldman's feminism, and the role of female sexuality in furthering anarchist agendas. McBride offers that, for Goldman, the existence and persistence of a female sexuality, despite centuries of oppression, spoke to the possibility of a form of existence that was not automatically determined by norms and traditions. This relationship between bodies and pleasures allows McBride to think further about a way to base anarchist theory in material practices, in lived experience and in real bodies. Given that we so often experience the world around us as a constraint and obstacle to our theories and hopes for a better political practice, McBride shows how for

Goldman the material world itself contains the “hope” that we often seek in our own internal (and therefore phantasmic) projections.

Loizidou discusses Goldman by focusing on her comportment at her trial (with Alexander Beckman) on charges of opposing the draft during WWI. For Loizidou, Goldman’s statements during that trial can be understood as examples of the ancient Greek practice of *parrhesia* (an idea much explored by Foucault as she notes). Even as a trial is meant to be a moment when the subject is hailed as a production of law, Loizidou argues that, instead, Goldman produced herself as a political subject. This is a kind of materialist argument insofar as this self-production emerges from what Loizidou describes as the friction between the police functions of the state and the possibility and practice of politics itself.

NOTES

1. Most prominently, Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1992).

2. <http://taxdayteaparty.com/about/>, accessed 14 February 2010.

3. Cf. Lauren Berlant’s critique of sovereignty-talk and sovereignty representations among contemporary theorists as “melodramatic” in the piece “Slow Death (Sovereignty, Obesity, Lateral Agency,” *Critical Inquiry* 33.4 (summer 2007): 754–80.

4. Kate Zernike, “Coffee Party, With a Taste for Civic Participation, Is Added to the Political Menu,” *New York Times*, online edition, 1 March 2010, www.nytimes.com/2010/03/02/us/politics/02coffee.html?em, accessed 2 March 2010. All remaining quotations in this paragraph are from Zernike, “Coffee Party.”

5. *Ibid.*

6. *Ibid.*

7. See the website for the Coffee Party, <http://coffeepartyusa.com/content/about-us>, accessed 2 March 2010.

8. Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 30, *arkhein* and *kratein* appear in Greek in original.

9. *Ibid.*

10. Talal Asad, “Free Speech, Blasphemy, and Secular Criticism,” in Asad et al., *Is Critique Secular? Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speech* (Berkeley: Townsend Center for the Humanities, 2009), 24.

11. Paul Feyerabend, *Against Method* (New York: Verso, 2002), 14

12. *Ibid.*, 18.

13. *Ibid.*, 9.

14. Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” in *Illuminations* (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), 263.

15. *Ibid.*

16. Walter Benjamin, *The Arcades Project* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1999), 475 (Konvolute N: 10a, 3).

17. For a general overview of chaos theory see, for example, Richard J. Bird, *Chaos and Life: Complexity and Order in Evolution and Thought* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003).

18. The term comes from a speech Alan Greenspan made before the American Enterprise Institute on 5 December 1996.

19. See J. K. Gibson-Graham, *A Postcapitalist Politics* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), 53–78.

20. *Ibid.*, 77.

21. Hakim Bey, *T.A.Z. The Temporary Autonomous Zone, Ontological Anarchy, Poetic Terrorism*, 2d ed. (Brooklyn: Autonomedia, 2003); Pierre Clastres, *Society against the State*, trans. Robert Hurley and Abe Stein (New York: Zone Books, 1989); Michael Warner, *The Trouble with Normal: Sex, Politics, and the Ethics of Queer Life* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), ch. 4; Taiaiake Alfred, *Wasáse: Indigenous Pathways of Action and Freedom* (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2005), 45–46. A book that brings many of these concerns critically together is Elizabeth Povinelli, *The Empire of Love* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006).

22. Benjamin, “Theses,” 254.

23. See Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 55.

24. James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

25. James C. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).

26. Cf. Judith Butler, *Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable?* (New York: Verso, 2009), ch. 3.

27. Wendy Brown, “At the Edge: The Future of Political Theory,” in *Edgework: Critical Essays on Knowledge and Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 73–76. We go further than Brown in that we suggest here that bringing together two perspectives can produce something truly new.

28. Cf. Derrida’s attitude toward the authority of Marx in *Specters of Marx*; and “Marx & Sons,” in *Ghostly Demarcations: A Symposium on Jacques Derrida’s Specters of Marx*, ed. Michael Sprinker (New York: Verso, 1999).

29. See Saul Newman, *From Bakunin to Lacan: Anti-Authoritarianism and the Dislocation of Power* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2001); and *The Politics of Postanarchism* (Edinburgh, Scotland: Edinburgh University Press, 2010).

30. Gabriel Kuhn, “Anarchism, Postmodernity, and Poststructuralism,” in *Contemporary Anarchist Studies*, eds. Randall Amster et al. (London: Routledge, 2009), 18–25. Moving in a somewhat different direction, see John Zerzan, “The Catastrophe of Postmodernism,” in *Future Primitive and Other Essays* (Brooklyn: Autonomedia, 1994), 101–34.

31. Kuhn, “Anarchism, Postmodernity, and Poststructuralism.”

Chapter One

Anarchist Methods and Political Theory

Jacqueline Stevens

A world characterized by an ontology of hierarchical rules has troubled philosophers of science and politics alike, in particular those intent on establishing possibilities for change incompatible with a set, authoritative order of things. One might therefore expect that anarchist research methods and anarchist politics fit hand in glove, but this is not the case. This chapter compares the methodological commitments of anarchist political writers and actors, especially Mikhail Bakunin and Peter Kropotkin, with those of scholars who use anarchism as a philosophical tool, especially Robert Paul Wolff and Paul Feyerabend. The analysis reveals that there is no overlap between the methods on which Bakunin and Kropotkin relied and those proposed by Wolff and Feyerabend. The chapter suggests that this failure of correspondence among theorists who write under the same anarchist rubric is complemented by a surprising fit between the academic politics of postfoundationalism—an epistemology that is a contemporary if not vague moniker (as is any post-) for one spirit of anarchist inquiry—and the scientific method proposed by Karl Popper. One modest conclusion is that political commitments have blinded scholars on the right and left alike to the content of the methodological arguments they claim to be engaging. A more substantive claim is that Popper's method bears revisiting as it provides a refreshingly open and even Nietzschean approach to knowledge and power.

Theorists writing under the label *anarchist* are known for a range of political as well as methodological commitments. From radical individualists such as Max Stirner, who just wanted to be left alone,¹ to the Spanish anarcho-syndacalists of the 1930s coordinating collectives and expecting self-sacrifice on behalf of improving their society, including enhancing women's

power, the anarchist label has meant very different things, a phenomenon that has received a great deal of scholarly attention and is not discussed here.² Instead, the focus here is on the radically different methods offered as “anarchist.” The most extreme contrast is between the late nineteenth century writer-organizers, especially Mikhail Bakunin and Peter Kropotkin,³ on the one hand, and the late twentieth century scholars, exemplified by Paul Feyerabend, on the other.

THE SCIENCE OF ANARCHIST PHILOSOPHERS

Kropotkin, trained as a geologist and geographer, begins *Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution* by discussing Darwin.⁴ According to Kropotkin, anarchism’s best intellectual defense was evolutionary theory, the cloak of inevitability invoked perhaps to cover up anarchist theory’s appearance of being shocking and outlandish, and certainly to refute Malthusian inferences of the day. The late-nineteenth century English bourgeois establishment’s prejudices against nonviolence and equality were being confirmed by evolutionary theories regurgitated by “moral psychologists.” Kropotkin understood that if he wanted to make a persuasive case for a new political order based on ending government, he had to take on the neo-Hobbesian naysayers whose intuitions found some support in Darwin’s work.⁵ For those who already believed life was nasty, brutish, and short, a certain reading of evolutionary theory would come as no surprise. Kropotkin’s headings for “Chapter One, Mutual Aid among Animals” suggest an alternative evolutionary theory: “Struggle for existence—Mutual Aid—a law of Nature and chief factor of progressive evolution.—Invertebrates.—Ants and Bees.—Birds: Hunting and fishing associations.—Sociability.—Mutual protection among small birds. Cranes, parrots.”⁶ The book as a whole follows this line of analysis, finding regularities in animal behaviors of cooperation to argue for this as a natural imperative for human populations.

Kropotkin’s memoir provides some insights about his choice of method for expanding on his faith in anarchist ideals:

I gradually began to realize that anarchism represents more than a mere mode of action and a mere conception of a free society; that it is part of a philosophy, natural and social . . . I saw it must be treated by the same methods as natural sciences; not, however, on the slippery ground of mere analogies, such as Herbert Spencer accepts, but on the solid basis of induction applied to human institutions.⁷

Kropotkin liked the idea of evolutionary theory when it helped scientists understand observed behaviors consistent with Kropotkin’s beliefs and dis-

liked its appropriation by social scientists who were collecting ad hoc evidence to support inferences with which Kropotkin disagreed.

The empirical method radiated Kropotkin's being:

There are not many joys in human life equal to the joy of the sudden birth of a generalization, illuminating the mind after a long period of patient research. What has seemed for years so chaotic, so contradictory, and so problematic takes at once its proper position within an harmonious whole . . . And when the generalization is put to a test, by applying it to hundreds of separate facts which had seemed to be hopelessly contradictory the moment before, each assumes its due position, increasing the impressiveness of the picture, accentuating some characteristic outline, or adding an unsuspected detail full of meaning. The generalization gains in strength and extent; its foundations grow in width and solidity; while in the distance, through the far-off mist on the horizon, the eye detects the outlines of new and still wider generalizations.⁸

In content and form, Kropotkin embraced a fairly crude nonfalsifiable epistemology as a means toward anarchism and personal bliss.

Whereas Kropotkin's scholarship on anarchist theory displays what might be seen as a conservative method at odds with his progressive politics, Robert Paul Wolff's *In Defense of Anarchism* embraces a Kantian epistemology to rationalize a fairly conservative set of political views.⁹ Wolff claims he is turning to anarchism as the theory of the state consistent with Kantian ideas about morality and deduction, but really he is interested only in Kant and not anarchism. This is not a major revelation inferred from a close reading, much less an attack for inconsistency or hypocrisy, but a paraphrasing of Wolff's notes from the Preface. Wolff explains that he had called the manuscript he initially submitted "Political Philosophy"¹⁰ and then changed this at the suggestion of an editor who thought Wolff's title "pretty dull."¹¹ On his own account, Wolff set about a defense of political philosophy and ended up calling this a defense of anarchist politics.

According to Wolff, the overlap between Kantian ideas and a loose understanding of anarchism is the fit between Kantian critical thinking in general and anarchists' substantive questioning of the state:

That men accede to claims of supreme authority is plain. That men *ought* to is not so obvious. Our first question must therefore be, Under what conditions and for what reasons does one man have supreme authority over another? . . . Kant has given us a title for this sort of investigation. He called it a "deduction," meaning by the term not a proof of one proposition from another, but a demonstration of the legitimacy of a concept.¹²

Wolff equates "supreme authority over another" with epistemic authority and equates Kant's democratization of proof with a form of freedom. That one is obligated to abide by the state's knowledge as a matter of judgment and not

necessity takes one away from the natural imperatives for Hobbesian government as well as Darwinian order and into a terrain of critical thinking Wolff identified as anarchist.

Hobbes, not to mention G. W. F. Hegel and Max Weber, explain obligation to the state as a result of force. By contrast, Kant's mission of providing individuals resources for understanding of their own obligations as individuals—political freedom requires each of us to will a morally defensible outcome we might expect of anyone else—provides, Wolff believes, evidence of an anarchist political strategy. For instance, after observing the defining characteristic of the state is authority and that of the individual autonomy, Wolff states that a Kantian subject will “deny that he has a duty to obey the laws of the state simply because they are the laws. In that sense, it would seem that anarchism is the only political doctrine consistent with the virtue of autonomy.”¹³ Certainly one reading of Kant's focus on the individual as the first and last end of morality and politics might find in his thought an affinity for anarchism, but the inference is by no means necessary. Hegel, for example, found another way to square individual will and state obligation, claiming freedom was reconciling willing the union of law with subjective preferences. And more garden variety liberals such as John Stuart Mill also grappled with allowing political practices consistent with allowing individuals to exercise their autonomy. Neither Hegel nor Mill, nor of course Kant himself, claimed these views in order to oppose government coercion. Without resorting to a politics opposing state violence, scholars have nonetheless attempted to theorize making individual freedom compatible with obligation to a government.

The above examples suggest that if Wolff is attempting to discern a politics consistent with concerns about individual conscience and rights, the rubric of anarchism is underinclusive. And, much more of an obstacle to Wolff's analysis, anarchism entails one major substantive commitment at odds with Wolff's political vision. A basic tenet of just about any actual anarchist theory is eliminating war. Indeed perhaps one of the most brilliant insights of Mikhail Bakunin was that far from protecting individuals against violent death, states, by raising armies, caused these deaths.¹⁴ And yet Wolff's last chapter “Utopian Glimpses of a World without States” embraces the imperative for “national defense, territorial expansion, or economic imperialism.”¹⁵ Wolff even attempts to put wars of aggression on a firm practical basis by advocating voluntary conscription: “With regards to matters of national defense and foreign adventure, it seems to me that there is much to be said for the adoption of a system of voluntary compliance with governmental directives.”¹⁶ Wolff's Kantianism is in the service of nation-states at war, a position difficult to defend using any meaningful definition of anarchist principles.

The work of Bakunin and Wolff, two fairly prominent writers on anarchism and method, suggests that the path from a method to a politics, and vice versa, is not so straightforward as some, including these authors themselves, imagine. Bakunin's evolutionary theory may lack government as the crucial causal agent in the animal kingdom, of which people are one example, but natural selection and other so-called laws of nature still seem to suggest a universe of force impervious to individual conscience and will. Wolff's Kantianism does not require anarchism, and his substantive commitment to war absolutely precludes it.

ANARCHIST SCIENCE

[N]o doubt the spirit of Hitlerism won its greatest victory over us when, after its defeat, we used the weapons which the threat of Nazism had induced us to develop. But in spite of this, I am today no less hopeful than I have ever been that violence can be defeated.

—Karl Popper, "Utopia and Violence"¹⁷

One of the points on which I feel sympathy with Marxists is their insistence that the social problems of our time are urgent, and that philosophers ought to face the issues; that we should not be content to interpret the world but should help to change it.¹⁸

—Karl Popper, "Prediction and Prophecy in the Social Sciences"

In fact the author whose method may really come the closest to one that anarchists might embrace might be Karl Popper. This bogeyman for many leftist political theorists took as his mission using reason to end war—unlike Wolff, who thought reason might allow war to continue. If the early anarchists used evolutionary theory to provide some legitimacy for their political adventurism and Wolff called his work "anarchist" so it would not seem dull, what is the explanation for why a scholar promoting an "open society"¹⁹—a concept that seems to radiate anarchist aspirations and sympathies—would have his ideas met with such a dim reception by those who also might seem to embrace his key insights? More to the point of an "anarchist" methods discussion, why would Paul Feyerabend write *Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge* as a means of attacking Popper, rather than extending his insights?²⁰

One of the most familiar and enduring twentieth-century divisions in research approached within the field of political science is between what Sheldon Wolin calls the "the methodist" and "the theorist," a dichotomy that seems to hold for the social scientist and humanist more generally.²¹ The division states a disciplinary rupture, the nuances of which Emily Haupt-

mann thoughtfully renders in what she calls a “local history” of Berkeley’s political theorists’ alienation from political science.²² But, like the divisions in the Berkeley Political Science Department, these have more to do with different political agendas vis-à-vis the Cold War—and, today, even more ad hoc distinctions of left and right—than with thoughtful, substantive disagreements about research methods.

The key figure in this debate is an Austrian Jewish philosopher of science, Karl Popper, the man whose name is iconographic for asserting a demarcation between scientific and nonscientific claims. Popper’s *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* has a quasi-biblical status for social scientists interested in belonging to the same sect as natural scientists.²³ These social scientists’ goals, especially objectivity and generalizable claims about observed behaviors and attitudes, are not similarly prioritized by those whom academia calls, by contrast, humanists. According to Popper, for a claim to count as knowledge it has to be falsifiable, tested, and the tests must be reproducible. Assertions not meeting these criteria might be true, but truth and knowledge are not the same, a point resembling the one Kant made by distinguishing the noumenal (reality in itself) from the phenomenal (its appearance to minds). Kant suggested philosophers confine inquiry to the latter, and also proposed conventions of judgment for negotiating the relation between the particular and universal that Popper takes up in his method as well. Kant writes:

The reflective judgement which is compelled to ascend from the particular in nature to the universal, stands, therefore, in need of a principle. This principle it cannot borrow from experience, because what it has to do is to establish just the unity of all empirical principles under higher, though likewise empirical, principles, and thence the possibility of the systematic subordination of higher and lower. Such a transcendental principle, therefore, the reflective judgment can only give as a law from and to itself.²⁴

Kant is formalizing what is a fairly obvious heuristic problem: how do we coherently, rationally generate universal principles on the basis of particular observations and vice versa when a priori certainty of these relations is not possible? Popper’s distinction between a theory and the facts that may verify or falsify it follows directly from this framework and may be seen as one effort to operationalize Kant’s notion of reflective judgment.

Popper also emphasizes a difference between *scientific knowledge* and *knowledge of the truth*. Scientific knowledge requires that theories may be falsified and that any inferences must be verified. Both rules express Popper’s insistence that scientific theories may produce at best provisional knowledge, not transhistorical truths. Popper writes to enable scientific knowledge, not truth, a concept that Popper, following Kant, claims eludes human ascertainment. Popper provided a demarcation for claims that might contribute to knowledge, i.e., the ones adhering to his method, from all other

observations, regardless of whether they might be truthful. Kant and Popper do not deny truth's existence, only the possibility that humans might possess genuine knowledge of truth and not simply faith in a claim's veracity. Even though a claim might count as both the truth and knowledge, only knowledge can be scientifically proven. Few publications in the humanities would meet Popper's threshold for this definition of knowledge. But at least Popper would acknowledge that some work in the humanities might be intellectually intriguing, whereas according to Popper's criteria, virtually none of the most influential studies in the contemporary social sciences would count either as knowledge or even as interesting. Popper was brutal about the equivalent in his time, as we shall see below, and would have regarded the work of today's most feted economists, political scientists, and sociologists in major universities as pointless counting.

Popper's writings, in the tradition of Kant and anticipating strains of Hannah Arendt, are among the best sources for thinking about how to construct a research agenda that encourages imagination as well as the ability to convey insights to others so they can be intersubjectively assessed.²⁵ His insights have been ignored by those who think they are adhering to his method, as well as by those who are following his lead without knowing it. The person most at fault for this confusion is Popper himself, who rooted his epistemological commitments in his political worldview. Popper, similar to Jewish émigré philosophers across the political spectrum, including Arendt, was a fierce opponent of the Soviet Union. His book *The Open Society and Its Enemies*,²⁶ written in the early years of World War II, asserted parallels between Hitler's Germany and Stalin's USSR, and one might read Arendt's *The Origins of Totalitarianism* as its more nuanced complement.²⁷ According to Popper, in claims that appear throughout his oeuvre, "historicism and the myth of destiny" are not just found in the "chosen people" mentality of Israelites and Nazis, but appear among Marxists as well, not to mention Freudians and Adlerians.²⁸ Marxists are Popper's special concern: "My analysis of the role of prediction and prophecy could . . . be described as a criticism of the historical method of Marxism."²⁹ Popper acknowledges that others, including Hegel, also use this method, but writes, "Nevertheless, I have decided to speak as if Marxism were my main or my only object of attack, since I wish to avoid the accusation that I am attacking Marxism surreptitiously under the name of 'historicism.'"³⁰ Popper is very forthright about his own belief that there is a correspondence between political theories and method. His attack on Marxism is not "surreptitious," but overt. Popper—who dedicates the collection of essays in which these passages appear "To F.A. von Hayek," a luminary for free-market ideologues—observes a correlation between nonfalsification and Marxism, and therefore asserts that the way to Marxism's epistemological and thus intellectual comeuppance would be by way of his own theory of scientific investigation. Popper's

opposition to Marxism was based on its supposed revolutionary and therefore irrational fervor that presumably Popper would find among anarchist movements as well. The teleologies of Bakunin and Kropotkin share the same defects Popper finds in Marxism. But the anarchist movement had not established an empire in its name, and so Popper had no need to discuss them.

The result of Popper's own misguided equation of politics with method was that those who agreed with Popper's anti-Communism said they were using his method, even when they were not. And, those who rejected Popper's political mission appeared to think it necessary to reject his epistemology, even if the attacks were largely *ad hominem* and the substance of the disagreements hard to see.³¹ Today's social scientists fail to see that Popper's method does not accommodate their research, and humanists have not taken advantage of its possibilities for framing a rational critique of prevailing social norms. The following points from Popper seem useful for exploring the possibility of knowledge for social change. First, Popper is contemptuous of probability studies and all predictive work in the social sciences. Second, according to Popper, knowledge is provisional and can never be proven true. And third, Popper was extraordinarily sensitive to the importance of theories derived from the imagination or intuition, any source other than simple empiricism, for generating new discoveries. Popper's scientific worldview embracing contingency and imagination and rejecting timeless truths suggests a method many anarchists and others pushing against the conventional wisdom might find congenial to their agendas.

CONFUSING POPPER WITH BEHAVIORAL SOCIAL SCIENCE

The story about Popper's actual epistemological commitments is at odds with the expectations for the father of the natural scientific method, the one revered by those who swear by their datasets as well as reviled as a banal "methodist" in the well-known essay by political theorist Sheldon Wolin:

[T]here are inherent limits to the kinds of questions which the methodist deems appropriate. The kind of world hospitable to method invites a search for those regularities that reflect the main pattern of behavior which society is seeking to promote and maintain. Predictable behavior is what societies live by[.] [H]ence their structures of coercion, of rewards and penalties, of subsidies and discouragements, are shaped toward producing and maintaining certain regularities in behavior and attitudes.³²

Wolin is right to see these sentiments in the norms advocated by his political science colleagues at Berkeley. But this is because they are hacks and not because they are following Popper's scientific method.

Consider the following passage from Popper's *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*:

I think that [induction] is not needed; that it does not help us; and that it even gives rise to inconsistencies. Thus I reject the naturalistic view. It is uncritical. Its upholders fail to notice that whenever they believe themselves to have discovered a fact, they have only proposed a convention. Hence the convention is liable to turn into dogma.³³

Popper understood the implications for this for the social as well as natural sciences. His criticism of Marxists for inferring from their assumptions about present observations insights about the future are equally if not more relevant for conservative political scientists of this era as well. Popper dismissed the notion that the “task of the social sciences is fundamentally the same as that of the natural sciences—to make predictions, and, more especially, historical predictions, that is to say, predictions about the social and political development of mankind” (1963a, 338). He went on to explain that “long-term prophecies can be derived from scientific conditional predictions only if they apply to systems which can be described as well-isolated, stationary, and recurrent. These systems are very rare in nature; and modern society is surely not one of them.”³⁴ Indeed, Popper frequently makes the obvious point that history is contingent and its possibilities open-ended, exactly what is not the case in the natural world or that of the world constructed by people I think it is now fair to call so-called social scientists.

Popper would have no patience with so-called social scientists' addiction to statistics and probability, which Popper finds useless for making scientific claims about even nature. When so-called social scientists offer a hypothesis producing an independent variable having a 0.4 correlation with the dependent variable, for instance, then they believe their theory has been verified. And yet the variation in the outcomes of regression equations may mean that many of the observed cases directly falsify the theory. According to Popper, this means that the theory needs to be discarded: “Instead of discovering the ‘probability’ of a hypothesis we should try to assess how far it has been able to prove its fitness to survive by standing up to tests.”³⁵ Popper's arguments anticipate Stephen Jay Gould's condemnation of probability as a scientific method.³⁶ Popper writes, “If you cannot verify a theory, or make it certain by induction, you may turn to probability as a kind of ‘Ersatz’ for certainty.”³⁷ When the apple falls one million times out of one million, we verify Newton's theory of gravity. Newton took a very simple fact and asked a question about it that produced a generalizable theory for its answer. Newton's theory makes a very basic point, and yet a realization of the significance of this inviolable pattern was crucial for advancing theories of physics. If the apple landed on the ground only 40 percent of the time under controlled conditions,

then Newton's theory of gravity would have been falsified. Yet the equation of probability with verification that Popper dismisses remains the tacit standard for hypothesis testing in virtually all work published in today's journals of the so-called social sciences.

Second, unlike the so-called social scientists, Popper does not believe in timeless certainties about human nature, be they those of the Marxist, Freudian, or the rational choice theorist. Popper, like his student Feyerabend, discussed below, looks at the history of science and does not see eternal truths but provisional theory that may be verified at one point and then replaced, Popper writes, as "subsequent negative decisions may always overthrow it."³⁸ Theories may count as knowledge for long periods of time, but, Popper continues, "I never assume that by force of 'verified' conclusions, theories can be established as 'true,' or even as merely 'probable.'"³⁹ As mentioned earlier, the distinction that Popper develops is not truth versus belief, but scientific versus unscientific knowledge claims. Hence Popper does not say Freud is wrong but that Freud's work is solipsistic and does not allow for intersubjective standards of analysis. In fact, at various points Popper suggests that intuitively he finds Freud's claims persuasive, and even attempts to buttress Freud's analyses with his own research, writing that "most neuroses may be due to a partially arrested development of the critical attitude" in early childhood.⁴⁰ If people were not so neurotic, Popper suggests, they would be more amenable to the scientific method. In this sense, Popper's ideas share a family resemblance with those of Jürgen Habermas, who also sought to deploy imperatives of reason. (And both authors are somewhat tone deaf to the underlying and equally powerful forces of the unconscious that, whether or not verified, might undo their respective projects.)

Both Habermas and Popper, as opposed to some contemporary postfoundationalists, insist on intersubjective understandings that make the author's claims intelligible to her audience—the latter are reconciled to a world of potentially relentless solipsism. By insisting that scholars be responsive to questions about their claims, and not simply behave as artists creating new visions that the audience must take or leave, Popper is promoting a discourse that is more democratic and antielitist than the ad hoc claims advanced by so-called social scientists as well as those political theorists who confuse the assertion of personal opinion with theory.

In addition to Popper's views being dismissed by left political theorists because of his anti-Marxist politics, his own student, Paul Feyerabend, also disparaged the relevance of Popper's work to anarchist intellectual and political pursuits. In proposing his own "anything goes" approach as an alternative to Popper's method, Feyerabend explicitly promotes his own views as an "anarchist" corrective:

To those who look at the rich material provided by history, and who are not intent on impoverishing it in order to please their lower instincts, their craving for intellectual security in the form of clarity, precision, “objectivity,” “truth,” it will become clear that there is only one principle that can be defended under *all* circumstances and in all stages of human development. It is the principle: *anything goes*.⁴¹

Although his ostensible target here is Popper, the attack seems off mark. Feyerabend is not, despite his worst efforts, abandoning norms of reason and clarity, and Popper is not proposing that scholars must uniformly follow his method. Popper writes: “I do not care what methods a philosopher (or anybody else) may use so long as he has an interesting problem, and so long as he is sincerely trying to solve it.”⁴² Anything goes, as long as the research is interesting, which generally would preclude the work of Wolin’s methodists.

Curiously, Feyerabend’s claim to be offering an anarchist method is at odds with his own recognition of anarchists’ methodological predilections. Feyerabend’s first line in *Against Method: An Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge* states: “The following essay is written in the conviction that *anarchism*, while perhaps not the most attractive *political* philosophy, is certainly excellent medicine for *epistemology*, and for the *philosophy of science*.”⁴³ He explains, “[M]y thesis is that *anarchism helps to achieve progress in any one of the senses one cares to choose*. Even a law-and-order science will succeed only if anarchistic moves are occasionally allowed to take place.”⁴⁴ And then Feyerabend indicates that anarchists themselves rejected these ideas:

It is surprising to see how rarely the stultifying effect of “the Laws of Reason” or of the scientific practice is examined by professional anarchists . . . Occasionally the laws of scientific method . . . are even integrated into anarchism itself. “Anarchism is a world concept based upon a mechanical explanation of all phenomena,” writes Kropotkin.⁴⁵

Feyerabend clearly recognizes a gulf between Kropotkin’s anarchist politics in pursuit of freedom, on the one hand, and his epistemology, embracing “mechanical explanation,” on the other. Feyerabend expresses disappointment on this point and a desire to join the two. Feyerabend’s commitment to find an overarching unity between a political theory and a research method almost compels him to reject Popper’s views on knowledge. Feyerabend’s sense of betrayal is predicated on his unexamined and apparently axiomatic belief that political agendas ought to have corresponding research methods. This assumption also entails Feyerabend rejecting Popper’s research methods, his vivid anti-Marxist conservatism apparently negating the possibility that his method might expect thinkers to be flexible and see the world as contingent. For instance, in his preface to the first edition, Feyerabend describes the book as part of an ongoing dialogue with rationalist philosopher

Imre Lakatos, who “admired Popper” and “called me an anarchist and I had no objection to putting on the anarchist’s mask,”⁴⁶ a commitment also illustrated in *Against Method*’s closing remarks on how protests at Berkeley in the 1960s influenced his own thoughts on philosophy and method.⁴⁷

Not only does Popper offer a methodological openness closer to Feyerabend than the epistemology of anarchist practitioners, or even Wolff, Popper and Feyerabend also agree on the central finding from Thomas Kuhn’s sociology of science: theories that have been falsified will remain dominant for long periods of time; theories that may come to be verified later may early on in their invention be falsified because of poor heuristics, techniques, or other errors.⁴⁸ Popper describes scientists since antiquity trusting their imagination over impoverished dogmas, and quotes Galileo praising Aristarchus and Copernicus “precisely because they dared to go beyond this known world of our senses”: “I cannot,” he writes, “express strongly enough my unbounded admiration for the greatness of mind of these men who conceived [the heliocentric system] and held it to be true . . . , in violent opposition to the evidence of their own senses.”⁴⁹ Feyerabend concurs, pointing out that Galileo could not address concerns that perpendicular falls without swerves appeared to falsify Copernicus’ theory, quoting Galileo: “‘It is, therefore, better to put aside the appearance, on which we all agree, and to use the power of reason either to confirm its reality or to reveal its fallacy.’”⁵⁰ It is not even clear that Feyerabend’s provocative claim that Galileo’s scientific victories depended on his qualities as a “propagandist” would trouble Popper, who understood Galileo’s struggles against the preconceptions of his contemporaries.⁵¹ If a propagandist is someone who propounds his own well-contemplated theories against the proven dogmas of the moment, then claims by Nietzsche and Popper alike would seem to support this.

REAL DISAGREEMENTS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS

The serious methodological and not ideological difference between Popper and Feyerabend is one of focus; they are largely providing complementary views of knowledge formation. Popper wants more falsification, and Feyerabend wants to make sure that knowledge claims in falsified theories are not ruled out definitively. Popper takes this last point as a truism—hence his recognition of Copernicus’ accomplishments—but Popper is more concerned with the false generalization of particular observations than he is with the false particularization of observations that might be generalized with validity. Popper worries that Marx might see one example that fits his prediction and announce confirmation that his theory would hold true everywhere. Feyerabend is concerned that the prejudices of an epoch might lead to a theory’s

erroneous falsification and dismissal. Both concerns are valid, and they are not mutually exclusive. They emblemize the condition of inquiry into meaningful and difficult research questions.⁵²

The enmities between Popper and many of his critics are not rooted in irreconcilable methodological commitments, but the formal claim to methods disagreements are based on political differences. Indeed, the political commitments do not lead in directions that Popper and Feyerabend, and Wolin and the behavioralists, imagine. Popper does not appreciate the extent to which his own anti-Communist worldview was a justification for the use of violence and repression on at least the same scale and intensity as seen in the Soviet Union's actions in the name of Marx. Naomi Klein writes:

It was the Chicago Boys' vision of a total country overhaul that appealed to [Pinochet's] newly unleashed ambition, and, like Suharto with his Berkeley Mafia, he immediately named several Chicago grads as senior economic advisers . . . [Pinochet] called them the *technos*—the technicians—which appealed to the Chicago pretension that fixing the economy was a matter of science, not of subjective human choices. . . . This mutual claim to be taking orders from higher natural laws formed the basis of the Pinochet-Chicago alliance.⁵³

The inspirational figure for the Chicago School? Popper's hero, Hayek:

Much of this Puritanism came from Friedrich Hayek, [Milton] Friedman's own personal guru, who also taught at the University of Chicago for a stretch in the 1950s . . . According to Arnold Harberger, a longtime professor at Chicago, "the Austrians," as this clique-within-a-clique was called, were so zealous that any state interference was not just wrong, but "evil. . . . It's as if there is a very pretty but highly complex picture out there, which is perfectly harmonious within itself, you see, and if there's a speck where it isn't supposed to be, well, that's just awful . . . it is a flaw that mars that beauty."⁵⁴

The results of this fervor were policies implemented regardless of the harms caused to the target populations. In chapter after chapter, country after country, Klein documents the Hayekians' Platonic vision of the good and true coming undone by the actual effects of Friedman's policies.

Describing the effect of the Chicago School policies in Argentina after the 1976 military coup, Klein writes:

Once again, the human impact was unmistakable: within a year, wages lost 40 percent of their value, factories closed, poverty spiraled. Before the junta took power, Argentina had fewer people living in poverty than France or the U.S.—just 9 percent—and an unemployment rate of 4.2 percent. Now the country began to display signs of the underdevelopment thought to have been left behind. Poor neighborhoods were without water and preventable diseases ran rampant.⁵⁵

Friedman's theories were being falsified and, as is often the case in the social sciences, the methodists refused to believe this. They insisted something must be wrong with how the policies were implemented: "Like all fundamentalist faiths, Chicago School economics is, for its true believers, a closed loop . . . It follows ineluctably that if something is wrong within a free-market economy—high inflation or soaring unemployment—it has to be because the market is not truly free. There must be some interference, some distortion in the system."⁵⁶ In the face of their policies' failure, the model must be preserved; the people could be sacrificed. Instead of treating these episodes as experiments falsifying their theories, the Chicago School embraced Frances Fukuyama's (now-renounced) story of free markets as the "end of history," a narrative relying on the very Hegelian methodology Popper loathed.⁵⁷

Klein does a remarkable job of explaining how the International Monetary Fund and World Bank spawned death squads from Chile to South Africa, as kleptocrats pursued loans in exchange for wiping out the voices opposing radical privatization. Klein's argument is that torture and violence were necessary to impede the normal functions of democracy so that dictatorships might implement Friedman's programs. Elected politicians accountable to majorities would never impose these policies, and hence the democratically elected leaders from Argentina to Guatemala had to be assassinated and replaced by juntas. Or the majority could be disenfranchised altogether, as was the case in South Africa.⁵⁸

Even more ironically, the protégés of Popper's anti-Communist hero Hayek relied on the use of the most insane and brutal form of epistemologies ever invented: torture and brainwashing. In 1963 the CIA, fearful of Chinese mind control, produced a manual for the purpose of achieving this result themselves. The purpose of the MKUltra program was "not to research brainwashing (that was a mere side project), but to design a scientifically based system for extracting information from 'resistant sources.' In other words, torture."⁵⁹ The reverse-engineering of Chinese brainwashing techniques led to the U.S. appropriation of these practices. Communist and laissez-faire ideologues alike are susceptible to dogma and even to the violence that it may entail.

CONCLUSION

Popper's methodological incitements are suggestive but not dispositive. Popper himself was forced to admit, in a reply to a critique by Albert Einstein, that falsification using conceptual systems from incorrect theories may not be valid.⁶⁰ This concedes a significant question about Popper's method, one

Feyerabend raised as well. The Owl of Minerva might only seem to have landed; one cannot know at any point whether a theory has been falsified because it was wrong or because the investigator's heuristics or measurement tools were not up to the task and therefore could not yield accurate observations. But only if a theory is provisionally accepted can there be an effort to create the right tools for assessing it.

As political theorists increasingly explore and draw on contemporary events as the basis for their textual exegesis, Popper's theories may be a helpful resource for balancing structure and generalizability with openness. His work, supplemented by the insights from Kant's ideas about judgment, do not provide a means of categorically knowing whether a theory is true, but they do provide a space for intersubjectively deciding whether claims make sense. Political theorists today, for instance, are debating the extent to which U.S. institutions, discourses, and practices seem worse now than before, and provide examples of injustice. One might accept this scenario, or one might ask about competing scenarios. Renditions, torture, military tribunals, and the absence of due process seem to be new and extreme forms of injustice and illegality, a major revamping of Constitutional ethos, according to theorists inspired by Giorgio Agamben's reprising of Carl Schmitt's characterization of the state of exception and of emergency.⁶¹ But what about the early-twentieth-century Supreme Court's improvised and illegitimate decisions creating the category of a "territory" over which the U.S. government might be sovereign without allowing citizenship to its residents?⁶² Or even more fundamentally, what about slavery, the Mexican-American War, or the targeted nuclear annihilation of hundreds of thousands of civilians in 1945?

Popper's method provides a framework for scholarly conversation that is open enough to be useful to those with unconventional and unpopular views, and hence very useful for left scholars and serious enough to be helpful in advancing scholarly inquiry—also useful for left scholars. Unlike today's reigning quantitative analysts, Popper mandates no rules for excluding from evidence information that is not from large datasets. In fact, a probabilistically based claim about behavior can be refuted by a single example, a possibility today largely foreclosed by statistically minded researchers who would deride such a refutation as "anecdotal." Indeed, Popper seems agnostic on the sorts of observations that could be used for purposes of falsification. He is curious enough, it seems, to invite critical encounters of all sorts. Any example might be suitable for falsifying a theory, just as any imaginative intuition may invite further study.

It is Popper's awareness as well that new concepts may be necessary for producing new forms of knowledge, a sensitivity to the role of theory in changing worldviews, that affiliates his line of inquiry with one strain of Nietzsche's thought. Both Nietzsche and Popper reject axiomatic approaches to understanding and believe that new concepts facilitate new knowledge.

They also both believe that knowledge is liable to be regarded as true for long periods of time, even though founding assumptions may be overturned at any point by new ideas. Likewise Nietzsche and Popper privilege imagination in the creation of new knowledge. And Popper, like Nietzsche, write to cultivate individual free-thinking and to reject the call of tribal loyalties to ancestry or to ideology. Of course there are significant differences in the use to which the two writers put their insights, Nietzsche to further knowledge's artistry and Popper to support intellectual curiosity and depose knowledge's bullying authorities who rely on institutional prestige and ideology to buttress analyses obvious examples falsify. These practices are not sufficient to produce anarchist knowledge and politics, but they may be necessary.

NOTES

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1. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology* in *Collected Works of Marx and Engels*, vol. 5 (Moscow: International Publishers, 1976 [1846]).

2. See e.g., Martha Ackelsberg, *Free Women of Spain: Anarchism and the Struggle for the Emancipation of Women* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1991).

3. For a discussion of Bakunin's embrace of evolutionary theory, see Peter Singer, *A Darwinian Left: Politics, Evolution and Cooperation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).

4. Peter Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution* (New York: Cosimo Books, 2009 [1904]).

5. See Paul Rée, *Ursprung der Moralischen Empfindungen* (Chemnitz, Germany: E. Schmeitzer, 1877); Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic* (New York: Vintage, 1967 [1887]), preface; Jacqueline Stevens, "The Morals of Genealogy," *Political Theory* 31.4 (August 2003): 558–88, esp. 562.

6. Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid*, 1.

7. Peter Kropotkin, *Memoirs of a Revolutionist* (New York: Cosimo Books, 2009 [1899]), 403.

8. *Ibid.*, 226.

9. Robert Paul Wolff, *In Defense of Anarchism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998 [1970]).

10. *Ibid.*, xi.

11. *Ibid.*, xii.

12. *Ibid.*, 8.

13. Ibid., 18.
14. Mikhail Bakunin, *God and the State* (Mineola: Dover Press, 1970).
15. Wolff, *In Defense of Anarchism*, 79.
16. Ibid., 80.
17. Karl Popper, "Utopia and Violence," [lecture, 1947] *Hibbert Journal*, 46 (1947–48):109–16.
18. Karl Popper, "Prediction and Prophecy in the Social Sciences" in *Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge* (New York: Routledge, 1963).
19. Karl Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (New York: Routledge Classics, 2003 [1945]).
20. Paul Feyerabend, *Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge*, 3d ed. (London: Verso, 1993 [1976]).
21. Sheldon Wolin, "Political Theory as a Vocation," *American Political Science Review* 63.4 (1969): 1062–82.
22. Emily Hauptmann, "A Local History of 'The Political,'" *Political Theory*, 31.6 (December 2003): 34–60.
23. Karl Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (New York: Routledge, 1968 [1934]).
24. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, trans. James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), 18.
25. See esp. Alessandro Ferrara, *The Force of the Example: Explorations in the Paradigm of Judgment* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).
26. Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*.
27. Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt Brace, Jovanovich, 1951).
28. Karl Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations*, 3–4, 34–35.
29. Popper, "Prediction and Prophecy in the Social Sciences," 336.
30. Popper, "Prediction and Prophecy in the Social Sciences."
31. Paul Feyerabend's resentment in relation to his teacher Karl Popper is a symptom of how the antimethods camp is about friends and enemies, not ideas and knowledge. Feyerabend writes: "Popper's philosophy, which some people would like to lay on us as the one and only humanitarian rationalism in existence today, is but a pale reflection of Mill . . . We can understand its peculiarities when we consider . . . the unrelenting puritanism of its author (and of most of his followers), and when we remember the influence of Harriet Taylor on Mill's life and philosophy. There is no Harriet Taylor in Popper's life" (Feyerabend, *Against Method*, 34). Feyerabend's beliefs are largely complementary to those of Popper; Feyerabend's suggestion to the contrary has demarcated unnecessary enemy lines and impeded the development of knowledge in the social sciences. The inappropriate outburst directed against Popper's wife—to whom he dedicated *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*—raises questions about the family dramas fantasized by Feyerabend, the son in Popper's intellectual household. See also Feyerabend, *Against Method*, 23, 150, 154.
32. Wolin, "Political Theory as a Vocation," 1064.
33. Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, 58.
34. Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations*, 339.
35. Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, 251.
36. Stephen Jay Gould, *Full House: The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin* (New York: Random House, 1997).
37. Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations*, 57.
38. Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, 33.
39. Ibid.
40. Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations*, 49.
41. Feyerabend, *Against Method*, 18–19.
42. Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, Preface to first English ed., 16.
43. Feyerabend, *Against Method*, 8, emphasis in original.
44. Ibid., 18, emphasis in original.
45. Ibid., 12, quoting Peter Kropotkin, "Modern Science and Anarchism," in *Kropotkin's Revolutionary Pamphlets*, ed. Roger Baldwin (Mineola: Dover, 1970), 150–52.

46. Feyerabend, *Against Method*, vii.
47. *Ibid.*, 231, 266.
48. Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).
49. Karl Popper, "Three Views Concerning Human Knowledge," in *Conjectures and Refutations*, 97–119, 102 qtd. (no reference for Galileo passage).
50. Galileo Galilei, *Dialogue concerning the Two Chief World Systems* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958 [1632]), 256, qtd. in Feyerabend, *Against Method*, 66. If the earth were moving, then, anti-Galileans argued, birds would be falling out of trees. The ability of birds to remain perched while the earth moved was used as empirical evidence to falsify Galileo's theory.
51. Feyerabend, *Against Method*, 118.
52. For more, see Stevens, *States without Nations*, Conclusion.
53. Naomi Klein, *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2007), 79.
54. *Ibid.*, 53, quoting Arnold Harberger, interview, *Commanding Heights: The Battle for the World Economy*, PBS television series, aired 3 October 2000, transcript available at <http://www.pbs.org>.
55. Klein, *Shock Doctrine*, 89.
56. *Ibid.*, 51.
57. *Ibid.*, 183.
58. One subtle and important point Klein makes is that the one place these policies could not be implemented was the United States itself, which had a somewhat functional democracy that would never tolerate these policies. An excellent example of this is the Federal Reserve's and Congress's interventions in the housing loan crises. The IMF in the 1980s would never have allowed any of the policies that had been implemented by the Republican White House and Democratic controlled Congress, whereby individuals and financial institutions were being saved by government loans and subsidies, including a measure to extend the federal debt ceiling.
59. Klein, *Shock Doctrine*, 39.
60. Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, 466.
61. Giorgio Agamben, *State of Exception* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
62. *Downes v. Bidwell* (1901) and *Gonzales v. Williams* (1904).

Chapter Two

An Anarchism That is Not Anarchism: Notes toward a Critique of Anarchist Imperialism

George Ciccariello-Maher

What follows is a two-pronged critique of some prevailing currents and tendencies within contemporary anarchism—one which takes aim at both the rationalist, Enlightenment underpinnings of some contemporary anarchisms as well as the Eurocentrism and racism that frequently result from these—but I hope that the implications of this critique will exceed its object. While the first opens us up toward the relationship between anarchism and poststructuralism, we will instead approach the question of the Enlightenment through the “mythical” syndicalism of Georges Sorel. The second opens us toward a process of decolonizing anarchism, which I discuss through black revolutionary Frantz Fanon, and which in turn involves the confrontation with and destruction of a dangerous “anarchist imperialism” that threatens to draw us into dubious alliances and erase truly radical antistate voices and practices. In both gestures, moreover, it is not only the limitations of the Enlightenment that are surpassed, but equally those of the poststructuralist critique thereof.

THE BLACK FLAME OF CLASS REASON

The recently published syndicalist tome *Black Flame: The Revolutionary Class Politics of Anarchism and Syndicalism* is both welcome and dissatisfying.¹ What is laudable is the authors’ insistence that anarchism *is* socialist: despite the dubiousness of any attempt to fix the meaning of a concept or a set of ideas, this reinfusion of anarchism with a specifically *class* content is

welcome in political terms, against the proliferation of individualist and “lifestylist” variants of anarchism (although we will see that they are overzealous in this task, and this virtue becomes a vice). What is far less welcome, however, is another insistence, as firm and intransigent as the first but less politically justifiable: the attempt to anchor anarchism firmly and irretrievably in Enlightenment rationalism.

Resisting the classic image of the anarchist as raving, bloodthirsty, and irrational, *Black Flame* bends the stick much too far in the opposite direction, and in so doing reveals some very real difficulties of anarchism as a tradition that will mark our point of departure. Here following Murray Bookchin’s characterization of Spanish anarchism as a form of “radical popular enlightenment,” the authors of *Black Flame* push this argument further and broaden it to the entirety of the tradition, describing Mikhail Bakunin as “a rationalist and a modernist” and limiting the irrationalist impulse to thinkers—like Leo Tolstoy and Max Stirner—who the authors seek to exclude from that tradition entirely. In so doing, the authors seek to retrieve “the rationalist impulse in anarchism—which locates anarchism firmly within the modern world, rather than the premodern ones of moral philosophy and religion.”² This they do in part to facilitate their insistence on a *rapprochement* between anarchism and syndicalism—thus against arguments linking syndicalism to the “Revolt against Reason,” and thereby to French theorist Georges Sorel (whom we will discuss more extensively below).³

This effort to situate anarchism within the European Enlightenment tradition emerges most clearly in graphic form as a historical flowchart in which anarchism finds its origin in “Enlightenment ideas: Progress, rationalism, liberty, conscious design of society.”⁴ One wonders immediately why the second half requires the first, and why it is that the authors of *Black Flame* seek to root anarchism not merely in “progress,” “rationalism,” etc., but moreover in “Enlightenment” versions of the same, which is effectively shorthand for “European.” This slip reveals what it attempts to conceal: the Eurocentrism at the heart of this effort to reclaim anarchism. What is neglected in this insistence that anarchism is “rationalist” and “modernist” is the constitutive underside of this rationalism and this modernity, one which is by this point so well-documented that its exclusion is impermissible.⁵ For Enrique Dussel, to cite just one example, there was not one, but *two modernities*, and it is the systematic privileging of the later, eighteenth-century modernity that conceals its foundation in sixteenth-century modernity, which is to say, in the historical-political process of colonization.⁶ And just as with modernity, we find the same gesture of concealment with regard to reason: European rationality, in the form of the Cartesian *ego cogito*, rests on an unrecognized colonial basis that Dussel calls the *ego conquiro*, the conquering colonial man provided the most potent blueprint for Cartesian sovereignty.⁷ And lest we believe that the dangers of this neglect are limited to the

historical or the epistemological realms, Santiago Castro-Gómez has demonstrated how European rationalism and specifically what he terms “zero-point hubris” translated directly into the deployment of colonial racism.⁸

Hence we already see that the two sides of our critique are utterly inseparable and that between European Enlightenment rationality and the project of racialization and colonization there exists a relationship of fundamental complicity, as with two sides of a single sordid coin. If we will take different paths that deal tendentially with different subjects, we must bear in mind that they are not in fact separate. The implications of erasing this colonial history—all the more surprising coming from the South African authors of *Black Flame*—are serious, and strike at the very heart of this anarchism, whose task it then becomes to complete the “unfinished project of modernity.”⁹ This orientation—which assumes that the ideas of the European Enlightenment were fundamentally good and correct, but what was lacking was the execution, the practice—is one which simultaneously blocks the two forms of critique that we will turn to below: the poststructuralist (or loosely, “post-modernist”) critique from *within* Europe and the decolonial critique from *without*. Below, we will track these critiques in general terms via engagements with French syndicalist Georges Sorel and black revolutionary Frantz Fanon, but we must first see what particular implications the avowed Eurocentrism of *Black Flame* has within its own framework.

This is another way of asking how the authors of *Black Flame*, and anarchism more generally, deal with questions of race and colonization and how their limitations in this sense are rooted in their theoretical location of anarchism within the legacy of the European Enlightenment and their privileging of rationalism. To speak firstly, and in general terms, about anarchism and race, the historical failures are massive and well-known, and these are directly rooted in anarchist Eurocentrism: “Anarchism,” as Joel Olson bluntly explains, “has always had a hard time dealing with race,” choosing instead to emphasize a “critique of all forms of oppression.”¹⁰ This form of critique seems on the surface of things to be upheld in *Black Flame*, with the authors insisting that “the important point is that [racial, gender, etc.] equality was a *principle* of the broad anarchist tradition.”¹¹ For Olson, while there is something laudable about declaring oneself against all forms of oppression, this standard anarchist stance also bears within it significant dangers. Indeed, one thing that stands out about critiquing all forms of oppression is just how *easy* it is to do so. The harder work—that of grasping how the capitalist system operates and how it can be brought down through strategic action—remains, despite all our declarations of opposition. In other words, we might respond to the insistence on the anarchist *principle* of equality in the following terms: yes, but a principle is a very easy thing to have, whereas a *practice* of revolutionary equality is what concerns us, a rarer commodity indeed. Such a revolutionary practice requires understanding *how* that system operates, and

despite the fact that we can oppose a variety of oppressions as equally reprehensible on *ethical* grounds, this doesn't mean that those in power share our insistent intersectionality. As Olson puts it:

The critique of hierarchy . . . mistakenly blends a *moral* condemnation of all forms of oppression with a *political and strategic* analysis of how power functions in the U.S. The American state . . . was not built on animal cruelty or child abuse, however pervasive and heinous these forms of domination are. Rather . . . it was built on white supremacy.¹²

Hence what the critique of all oppressions entails is the erasure of the strategic centrality of certain oppressions.

But to return to our first point, we must ask what is the concealed theoretical foundation of this “critique of all oppressions” and this anarchist “principle” of equality. Once we scratch beneath the surface, we can see that this fundamental anarchist principle is fully compatible with the Enlightenment tradition that the authors of *Black Flame* wear so proudly. To insist on a “principle” of equality and an opposition to all oppressions is to do little more than the French Revolutionaries who emblazoned *Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité* on their banners while, for the most part, avoiding questions of colonial-racial domination.¹³ The abstract and formal universalism of Enlightenment thought is what conceals the failure of these three principles as merely a question of execution (as in the “unfinished project of modernity” argument) rather than one of inherent contradictions of *all* abstract principles, especially those rooted in the geopolitical practices of empire and colonization. In other words, the French Revolution and its nominal quest for absolute human equality did not simply fail, it failed for specific reasons. The belief that a *principle* of equality suffices for the establishment of a *practice* of equality is a desperately idealist one which would in and of itself fail to explain the failure of its own Enlightenment forbears to do the same.

However, the error of *Black Flame* is more egregious than this, more than a mere repetition of the general anarchist error that Olson associates with the “critique of all oppressions.” This is because the authors of *Black Flame* are not content to merely insist on a lazy intersectional argument, but instead seek to reinscribe *one* oppression as primary: that of class. Just as the authors’ effort to avoid the smear of anarchist irrationalism led them to bend the stick too far in the other direction, their critique of the evacuation of class from some anarchisms leads them similarly to reassert the centrality of class to a problematic degree.¹⁴ Here the virtue of *Black Flame* quickly becomes a vice; if the insistence on a class content for anarchism is in one sense an advance over “lifestyle” anarchism and individualist libertarianism, and even in some sense the “critique of all oppressions” as well, the ultimate effect is a doubling of anarchism’s Eurocentric baggage. After all, class-centrism is

itself Eurocentric, it speaks to specifically European conditions, and fails to grasp situations of historical social heterogeneity in which race frequently functions as a class category and the two are in many cases irretrievably intertwined.¹⁵ To here parallel our first point in other terms, the European class structure itself had a constitutive “underside” that too often goes unrecognized, as wage labor in Europe was but the flip-side of the coin of unwaged slave and *encomienda* labor in the colonies.¹⁶

Both of these seemingly contradictory errors—the critique of all oppressions and class-centrism—coexist in *Black Flame*: the first in the structural segregation of questions of race and colonialism and the second in the caricatured critique the authors offer of nationalism and race. As to the first, if we were doubtful of Olson’s claim that the “critique of all oppressions” tends to conceal the importance of race, then the very structure of *Black Flame* ought to convince us: after nine chapters, distributed into sections ranging from “theory and analysis” to “strategy and tactics,” we find, tucked under the heading “social themes,” a final chapter addressing “anarchist internationalism and race, imperialism, and gender.” And all this in one chapter, no less! While some will dismiss this structural positioning—where all “social themes” are tucked in as if contained to an appendix, as if prompted by an afterthought—as merely an ill-considered attempt at inclusion, a closer look at the content of the arguments shows that it reflects instead something deeply troubling about the “broad anarchist tradition” the authors attempt to salvage.

This emerges clearly in the authors’ unconvincing critique of nationalism and race, in which all nationalism is caricatured as essentialism and all “identity politics” is similarly caricatured as fragmentary. There is a general error of Eurocentrism here, in the assumption that all nations, and thus all nationalisms are the same, which emerges in particular form in the authors’ erroneous dismissal of the “particularly influential” “wages of whiteness” approach of David Roediger and the “race traitor” politics of Noel Ignatiev.¹⁷ The straw man of race and nationalism then comfortably established, these astonishing logical flaws are then capped with the following gem:

By contrast, anarchist and syndicalist class politics, with its potential to unite people of different races, offers a path beyond the endless spiral of perpetual conflict that nationalism and identity politics must invariably generate and perpetuate . . . The broad anarchist tradition stresses, on the contrary, mobilizing as many ordinary people as possible, across racial lines, to fight *in their own interests* for better conditions. This does not mean ignoring racial prejudice and discrimination.¹⁸

Race thus disappears without a trace into the category of “ordinary people,” but not without the polite insistence that the authors, of course, take the subject of racism very seriously. Two points are key here—one regarding race and one regarding reason—and they intersect in the question of the

dialectic. The first is quite straightforward: for equality to be possible, it is not sufficient to merely hold hands and state such equality as a fact, and surely the authors of *Black Flame* would not advocate such a course of action when it comes to the bosses.

Secondly, regarding reason, not only does their fidelity to Enlightenment rationalism obscure the importance of race, but it even confounds the authors' own efforts in their own terms: their historical subject, the "ordinary people" of the "popular classes" can only appear as unified and undivided, rationally aware of "their own [similarly unambiguous] interests" (and this against the far more complex constellation of subjectivities in the wages of whiteness tradition¹⁹). The implications of this are severe. Whereas much of the anarchist tradition sought to disrupt economism through a privileging of the intervention of the will, we return here to the blandest of economism. In other words, in their effort to establish anarchism as class-centered and rationalistic, the authors of *Black Flame* lose all capacity to convincingly explain mass action: if they cannot explain why it is that people take action, especially in so voluntarist a realm as anarchism, then they cannot so easily dismiss the role of the irrational in revolutionary politics.

These two points connect in the question of the dialectic, as it is precisely in the connection between rationalist idealism and the sidestepping of questions of race and colonialism that *Black Flame* becomes, to use an old-fashioned-sounding term, undialectical. By assuming that all references to race and all nationalisms are the same, *Black Flame* denies the importance of struggles around race and nationalism and their historical capacity to generate and feed other struggles (not to mention their necessity).²⁰ In the place of a dialectical dynamic, we find instead a caricature: identity and nationalism lead to an "endless spiral" of conflict, but one which does not lead to liberation. Thus the authors fail to apply their own understanding of Bakunin's economic principle—that, against individualist anarchisms, true freedom can only come *after* equality is established—in a consistent way across different spheres: to, e.g., race, nationalism, gender, etc. As we will see below, this is something that Frantz Fanon, in his ontologization of dialectical change, accomplishes, and as Olson clearly shows, it is possible to formulate an anarchist theory of the centrality of white supremacy which reproduces none of the caricatured elements as they appear in *Black Flame*.

In what follows, we will take this relationship between Enlightenment reason and Eurocentrism/colonialism/racism as the starting point for an ostensibly two-pronged critique which is actually just one. Put differently, our argument would appear two-pronged only to those we are critiquing, but it is precisely this fact, and our refusal to abstractly reject this view, that forces us into the language of the twofold.

ANARCHISM BY ANOTHER NAME

The two thinkers through whom we will approach this two-pronged critique share much in common: Both Georges Sorel and Frantz Fanon were influential theorists of what they called “violence”; both were sharp critics of Marxist orthodoxy, and both celebrated the potential importance of voluntarist interventions in revolutionary struggles. They share many of these elements with much that traffics under the name “anarchism,” but Sorel and Fanon share a peculiar in-betweenness in being *identified as* anarchist without themselves embracing anarchism as an identity. This in-betweenness will contribute to the ways in which both thinkers overcome the related errors of both poststructuralism and Eurocentric anarchism. Here, I will present a brief summary of Sorel and Fanon, their theoretical and historical relationship to one another, and their fraught relationships with the respective “anarchisms” of their times.

Any brief summary of Sorel’s thought begins from the category of ideology, one which marks Sorel’s prescience vis-à-vis not only poststructuralism but also later trends in the Western Marxism from which it emerged. This recognition of the power of ideology resulted directly from political developments that Marx himself did not generally foresee; namely, the potential for the socialist left to come to power through elections rather than through violent revolution and the potential impact this could have on the class war. Around the turn of the century, European Marxism was in many ways divided over the question of “revisionism”: the revisionists arguing that it was necessary to update Marxism to suit contemporary circumstances, the antirevisionists rejecting this position in favor of an orthodox insistence on Marxist doctrine. These debates over doctrine were not without their political implications, as the revisionists tended to argue that what failed in Marx’s doctrine was precisely the certainty of catastrophic revolution and that his teachings were to be updated to coincide with a gradualist socialist politics. The antirevisionists, on the contrary, blindly upheld the inevitability of the revolution even when their own reformist politics suggested otherwise.

Both revisionists and antirevisionists, however, tethered their Marxism to their politics through a degree of economic determinism. Whether the revolution was certain or not depended on the state of economic development and the degree to which this development reflected that described in the pages of *Capital*. It was on this terrain that Sorel would mark his difference from both sides with the aim of returning to “the *spirit* of Marx,” not the letter.²¹ This very invocation of spirit should tell us something. Sorel would reject both the blind orthodoxy of the antirevisionists (“the letter” of Marx) as well as the reformist gradualism that was assumed to go hand-in-hand with such a rejection. By emphasizing “spirit,” Sorel was able to break with the economic

determinism of both sides, making possible a revolutionary revisionism that would take into account the importance of ideology and the state to an unprecedented degree.

Sorel's critique of Marxism therefore centered on the assumption that society, in Marx's words, was divided into "two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other: Bourgeoisie and Proletariat."²² This was a far cry from Sorel's lived reality, in which class divisions had given way to the doctrine of social unity. For Sorel, as a result, there was no guarantee for the existence of class as something distinct from a merely individual condition, and the function of bourgeois ideology was precisely to *erase* class, undermining class division through a "social education" in the virtues of "harmony."²³ This critique of economic determinism therefore has several implications: if the existence of opposing classes is not guaranteed, nor is there then any guarantee of dialectical motion, since the conflictive fuel that powers its engine has evaporated. The idea of progress has therefore become little more than a bourgeois weapon with which to diagnose the end of history and the perfection of the liberal-democratic present. Rationalism (which here moves hand-in-hand with economic determinism) stumbles inevitably on these hard facts, leading to the reformist orientation of most Marxist revisionism.

Sorel's response was as radical as it was unorthodox: if class antagonism was disintegrating through the influence of ideology, then the only alternative was to *reassert* this antagonism, thereby breathing life again into class identity. Such a reassertion of nonobjective class oppositions thus could not be understood in strictly rationalistic terms, and Sorel would thus turn to the concept of the "revolutionary myth"—embodied in the syndicalist general strike—in an effort to provide a framework capable of explaining the seeming irrationalism of mass action. This myth, finally, was seen by Sorel as jumpstarting the frozen Marxist dialectic, driving it subjectively toward an as-yet indeterminate future.

Despite being heavily influenced by Proudhon as well as a close friend of the anarchist Fernand Pelloutier, Sorel nevertheless dismissed much of his contemporary anarchism as "*intellectually entirely bourgeois*," justifying the orthodox Marxist attack on anarchism with the insistence that "the most eloquent dissertations of revolt could produce nothing and . . . literature cannot change the course of history." But the anarchists, in turn, were correct to critique the Marxists for their participation in a corrupt and corrupting parliamentary system, which similarly blocked the path to revolution: "Experience was not slow in showing that the anarchists were right about this, and that, in entering into bourgeois institutions, revolutionaries have been transformed by adopting the spirit of these institutions."²⁴ Hence while Sorel would in many ways scorn and deride the beliefs of anarchists themselves, he nevertheless did look positively upon their impact.

This impact emerged specifically from those anarchists who decided to abandon their bourgeois individualism and enter into the syndicalist movement, and who thereby “did not [merely] apply theories which had been fabricated in philosophical coteries,” and who “taught the workers that they need not be ashamed of acts of violence.”²⁵ Violence here stood as the marker of absolute and irreconcilable opposition to the bosses and their state, and Sorel credits anarchist influence with reducing the tendency toward working-class assimilation and incorporation into structures of power, thereby counteracting the bourgeois ideology of unity and reinforcing class divisions.²⁶ In their hostility to institutions—or better put, to *institutionalization*, to incorporation into the institutions of the enemy—syndicalist anarchists (or as Sorel slyly calls them, “former anarchists”) were able to inject a crucial element into the proletarian struggle and were thereby responsible for “one of the greatest events that has been produced in our time.”²⁷

If Sorel was ambivalent toward anarchists, later anarchists would be similarly ambivalent toward Sorel, and astonishingly few are willing to reclaim him today. As we have already seen, the authors of *Black Flame* prop Sorel up as a foil for the reassertion of anarchism as rationalist, and anarchist anthropologist David Graeber—following Marcel Mauss (whose description of Sorel he seems to accept uncritically)—similarly dismisses him, but even in this dismissal, we can track moments which gesture toward our own inclinations. Graeber, for example, notes that “Sorel argued that since the masses were not fundamentally good or rational, it was foolish to make one’s primary appeal to them through reasoned arguments.” In other words, as we have seen, Sorel (rightly) critiqued both class essentialism and rationalism.²⁸ Misinterpretations and caricatures aside, we find a political reason to worry about Graeber’s Maussian anarchism: Mauss and, it would seem, Graeber advocate gradualist approaches to radical change, while Sorel was wedded to an unapologetically catastrophic vision. In terms of the anarchist appropriation of Sorel, the Italian Wu Ming collective stands here as an outlier in the effort to reclaim Sorel’s notion of myth for radical transformation.²⁹

While not a direct heir of Sorel, Fanon would refigure many arguably Sorelian themes in the process of transposing these onto different identities and different units of analysis. Specifically, Fanon’s work first *ontologizes* the Sorelian formulation of class—in *Black Skin, White Masks*—applying a similar understanding to racism as a process of excluding certain subjects from access to Being. Secondly—in *Wretched of the Earth*—he would then *globalize* this formulation by transposing it onto the broader international structures of the modern/colonial world-system.³⁰ Like Sorel, he would reject the objective basis for the identities—racial and national—that he would analyze. Like Sorel, too, he would reject a strict rationalism as the best path to attacking structures of oppression. Like Sorel, finally, this intersection of nonobjective identity and nonrational action would take the form of a mythi-

cal projection of identities—first black, later national—as the first step in jumpstarting the dialectical motion necessary to push beyond contemporary oppressive stalemates.

Just as Sorel rejected the caricatured anarchism of “propaganda of the deed,” so too would Fanon—writing in the context of the Algerian Revolution—dismiss a certain form of brutality as “counterrevolutionary, adventurist, and anarchist.”³¹ But he simultaneously recognizes the fact that the label *anarchist* was systematically deployed against truly revolutionary elements as a strategy by those attempting to control—and, as with Sorel, institutionalize—struggles: “At the first signs of a skirmish, the leaders are quick to call them juvenile hotheads. But because these demands are neither juvenile nor hotheaded, the revolutionary elements articulating them are rapidly isolated and removed. The leaders cloaked in their experience ruthlessly reject ‘these upstarts, these anarchists.’”³² As with Sorel, anarchism here appears as an accusation which reveals a real and radical critique of the dangers of institutions, one which is not taken on as an identity, but which, to borrow another Fanonian term, is “overdetermined,” or imposed on the radical subject who questions the path of moderation, the merits of reformism, and above all, the neutrality of enemy (or even one’s own) institutions.³³

Unlike Sorel, however, Fanon would not receive even a mixed hearing from anarchists, and this is due to precisely the difficulties we saw above with *Black Flame*; namely, the inability of many anarchists to think dialectically or in even a complex manner about race or the nation. After all, was Fanon not an ardent defender of Third World nationalism and the state that served as its practical vehicle? Fanon is therefore generally dismissed by anarchists as a racial essentialist or an apologist for nationalism, despite the fact that he rejected essentialism (“*It is the racist who creates the inferiorized*”³⁴) and was among the sharpest critics of African nationalism (“national consciousness,” he makes clear “is not nationalism.”³⁵). In what follows, we will trace the subtle thread which draws the two thinkers together, counterintuitively rendering Sorel’s antistate class consciousness compatible with Fanon’s antiracist national consciousness, opening up in the process an entire horizon that too often escapes contemporary anarchisms. The gesture that draws them together is suggested already in their hostility to institutionalization, a danger that exists as much within our movements as within the formal structures of the state and which as a result requires a more complex view.

The precise route of this gesture is opened up by the peculiar distinction that Sorel introduces into the concept of violence, distinguishing the (bourgeois) “force” that upholds the state from the diametrically opposed (proletarian) “violence” that destroys it: “the object of force is to impose a certain social order in which the minority governs, while violence tends to the destruction of that order.”³⁶ This definition of the state as a structure of minority governance introduces two elements into our analysis: it both further

specifies what it is we oppose in the state in terms of its content (the state as a structure of institutionalized inequality and minority governance) while simultaneously *broadening* the potential spheres in which this definition applies (by focusing on this content rather than on an abstract and universal antistatism or anti-institutionalism).

Fanon's ontologization and globalization of Sorel's class antagonism must be understood in this context. Once we do so, we can see that, while the terms have shifted, the fundamental egalitarianism remains, one which fears the corraling and domestication of the revolutionary energies of the masses. Whereas Sorel sought to cultivate proletarian identity against the institutionalized inequality of the bourgeois state, Fanon sought to cultivate first black and later national identity against the institutionalized inequalities of both white supremacy (on the domestic level) and European colonization and imperialism (on the international level). It is this opposition to minority rule that allows Fanon to be characterized, if not as an antistatist, then at least as an antiauthoritarian.³⁷ Both he and Sorel bring a powerful critique of institutionalized inequality in the state, but arguably even more crucially for our purposes, they provide the same within movement dynamics, demonstrating in their anxiety the perils of institutionalization of mass power and its corraling by leadership. In this, their complex positions on "anarchism" reveal sharp critiques of the dangers of institutions while their refusal to identify as such reveals their insistence on the need for institutions of some sort.

Put differently, the approach of Sorel and Fanon—by privileging the *content* of institutions over their mere institutional *form*—leads to a view which is more about liberation from inequality than the literal elimination of institutions. And if this marks their advance over certain forms of anarchism, it marks simultaneously their advance over certain variants of poststructuralist philosophy: the abstract and all-too-easy slide from critique to rejection which plays out frequently in anarchist politics (as a critique-rejection of institutions and the importance of race), is repeated in philosophical terms by poststructuralism (as a critique-rejection of reason, humanism, and the dialectic, just to name a few). This nonanarchist anarchism will prove central when we turn to discussing Venezuela, where the absence of any capital-A "anarchism" worth its salt means that we must look elsewhere, or to paraphrase Sorel's Marxism, we must look to the "spirit not the word." What will be preserved in this turn is instead a radically dialectical view: of race that is not race, humanism that is not humanism, reason that is not reason, science that is not science, and most importantly, a dialectic that is not a dialectic. It is therefore no coincidence that it is this anarchism which is not an anarchism that will lead us there.³⁸

Before turning to Venezuela, however, we will briefly outline the ways in which Sorel and Fanon contribute to the simultaneously internal and external critique of both anarchism and poststructuralism (each of which, in turn,

represent internal critiques of the European political and philosophical traditions).

ANTICIPATING POSTSTRUCTURALISM: GEORGES SOREL

The work of Georges Sorel simultaneously prefigures and surpasses later poststructuralism.³⁹ He prefigures poststructuralism in the critiques he shares with it—of reason, progress, determinism, optimism, objectivity, developmentalism—but surpasses it in the political insistence that, firstly, mere critique is insufficient, and that, secondly, such critique cannot lead directly to a rejection of the object of critique *in toto* (as such a critique would thereby remain necessarily abstract). In other words, the limitations of the broader poststructuralist critique of dialectics appears here as the general key to Sorel's methodological advance over post-structuralism, but again, his is not the sort of dialectic we might expect. Sorel's anticipation of post-structuralism remains largely unrecognized, due in no small part to his systematic disavowal in France and persistent but generally unfounded association with fascism. What else but such a tremendous blockage could explain the absence of an author who penned a text entitled *The Illusions of Progress* from entering into the annals of post-structuralism's prehistory?⁴⁰ In what follows, we will briefly trace but two ways in which this anticipation figures, vis-à-vis Michel Foucault and Jacques Rancière.

That Foucault was influenced by or even unconsciously reflected theoretical similarities with Sorel has been a contentious, if only sporadically debated, issue.⁴¹ Either as tacit admission of such or playful subterfuge, in his conversations with Duccio Trombadori, Foucault seems to openly endorse a view of Marxism as revolutionary myth that is quite similar to that of Sorel, but does so, in a way perhaps characteristic of many French thinkers, without citing Sorel openly. Not coincidentally, this endorsement of myth is provoked by Foucault's aversion to the sort of Marxism predominant in France, and even less coincidentally, the attraction of Marxism-as-myth emerges from his experiences in the Third World, and Tunisia specifically, where

everyone was drawn into Marxism with radical violence and intensity and with a staggeringly powerful thrust. For those young people, Marxism did not represent merely a way of analyzing reality; it was also a kind of moral force . . . And that led me to believe that without a doubt the role of political ideology, or of a political perception of the world, was indispensable to the goal of setting off the struggle.⁴²

Violence, morality, ideology, and a resistance to analytical dissection: all seem to explicitly echo Sorel's myth.⁴³ But this does not mean that Marxism-as-myth excluded the conservative possibility of Marxism-as-science, as

Foucault immediately adds that, even in Tunisia, “I could see that the precision of theory, its scientific character, was an entirely secondary question that functioned in the debates more as a means of deception than as a truthful, correct, and proper criterion of conduct.”⁴⁴

This “secondary” function of Marxism as deceptive science in Tunisia was, for Foucault, its primary function in France, and this explains in large part his own sharp critiques of and distance from his contemporary Marxists, and moreover reflects his more general hostility to reason as “science.” Foucault famously mobilizes the history of the concept of madness in an effort to reveal the constitutive underside of Western rationality: reason, he demonstrates, always relies in a fundamental way on its opposite, an opposite that must be both maintained and contained for reason’s operations to remain unquestioned.⁴⁵ After diagnosing this constitutive underside of Western reason (one which, we should note, remains incomplete in its limitation to Europe and its exclusion of colonization as a political and epistemological practice), Foucault turns his attention in a more sustained way to the *strategic effects* of reason in the guise of “science.” Here, his equation of power with knowledge—or the insistence that knowledge practices have power effects—gains a new dimension, as science becomes “the unitary theoretical instance that claims to be able to filter” knowledges, legitimating some and disqualifying others.⁴⁶

This hostility to science as a ruse of those attempting to seize power by way of knowledge will be directed squarely at the traditional dialectic:

The dialectic codifies struggle, war, and confrontations into a logic, or so-called logic, of contradiction; it turns them into the twofold process of the totalization and revelation of a rationality that is at once final but also basic, and in any case irreversible. The dialectic, finally, ensures the historical constitution of a universal subject, a reconciled truth, and a right in which all particularities have their ordained place. The Hegelian dialectic and all those that come after it must . . . be understood as philosophy and right’s colonization . . . of a historico-political discourse that was both a statement of fact, a proclamation, and a practice of social warfare.⁴⁷

The clear error here results from the phrase “*and all that come after it must,*” one which attempts not only to summarize the recent dialectical past but also to foreclose a potentially dialectical future, to block any reformulation of dialectics to suit liberatory purposes (such as he himself had already perceived in Tunisian Marxism-as-myth). Furthermore, it is worth noting the persistent surfacing of dialectical moments in Foucault’s own work, whether in his oft-overlooked insistence on strategy over mere tactics or his formulation of counterdiscourse.⁴⁸ As Foucault would reject the dialectic *in toto*, so too would he reject his own function as a European intellectual, embracing the “particular” intellectual without recognizing the “general” privilege that he himself enjoyed (and here our critique opens toward Fanon).⁴⁹

On both the question of reason and that of science, Sorel's anticipation of Foucault is pronounced, but Sorel's destination differs from that of Foucault. For Sorel, at the root of the rationality that underwrote European capitalism and tainted European socialism there lay the idea of progress, and much as Foucault drew out the historical connections between reason and power, so too does rational progress function, in Sorel's work, to tighten our chains rather than to break them.⁵⁰ It is here of course that reason and progress give rise to a particularly potent manifestation of knowledge as power: science. Here, Sorel shares many of Foucault's critiques of science as a centralizing, authorizing, and hierarchizing concept, but here too we find the gap that separates the two. Despite his own epistemological doubts, which notably extend even to the hard sciences, Sorel would refuse to "take refuge in skepticism," and thereby to abandon science to the "sorcerers, mediums, and miracle-workers," adding that:

Today, no philosophers worthy of consideration accept the skeptical position; their great aim, on the contrary, is to prove the legitimacy of a science which, however, makes no claim to know the real nature of things and which confines itself to relations which can be utilized for practical ends . . . To proceed scientifically means, first of all, to know what forces exist in the world, and then to take measures whereby we may utilize them.⁵¹

Confronted with the reactionary nature of science—which Sorel had identified as a mechanism of class inequality as early as *The Trial of Socrates*⁵²—mere rejection of that science will not suffice. Rather, skirting the fine strategic line between science and skepticism, Sorel seeks instead to reestablish the basis for a science of class violence in which knowledge is transitory and power-laden, yes, but also strategically indispensable.

This insistence is reflected on a macro level in the question of the dialectic, as the quotation above—in its insistence on knowing the balance of forces in the world—already suggests. Against the bourgeois ideology of unity which seeks to enthrone progress and halt dialectical motion, Sorel's mythical class violence intervenes to jumpstart that dialectic, which in the process sheds many of the worrying elements (teleology, unity, objectivity, totalization, science, etc.) that Foucault would grant as intrinsic.⁵³ Just as Sorel's critique of science entails its radical reformulation of the same rather than its abstract dismissal, so too do we find a proliferation of such paradoxical pairings which constitute Sorel's positive project: to a science that is not science, we can add a progress that is not progress,⁵⁴ a Marxism that is not Marxism, a violence that is not violence, a reason that is not reason, most importantly, a dialectic that is not the dialectic, and—in terms of the current study—an anarchism that is not anarchism.

Much as Sorel's work prefigured that of Foucault, so too would it prefigure that of French philosopher Jacques Rancière in at least two ways which

are relevant to our discussion. Firstly, like Sorel before him, Rancière's work seeks to undermine assumptions regarding the infrastructural basis for class society by reframing the question in cultural and ideological terms. However, Rancière's response to this absence of uniformity in class culture is strikingly different from Sorel's. Whereas the latter would briefly mourn the absence of objective (i.e., economic) class existence before moving swiftly into the political effort to mythically recreate class antagonism through the assertion of class identity in the struggle (what he calls "violence"), Rancière's response would be more ambiguous in both normative and political terms. First, in *The Nights of Labor*, Rancière presents a sort of celebratory ethnography of working-class cultural multiplicity in which workers rebelled against the very basis for their objective existence, transgressing the often porous borders that distinguished them as a class.⁵⁵ Second, this ethnography would be complemented by Rancière's inclusion of Marx himself within the critical volume *The Philosopher and His Poor*, published two years later, which insists that this central theorist of class antagonism was himself guilty of the effort to keep workers in their place.⁵⁶

While Sorel might be sympathetic to what is rescued in terms of working-class subjectivity and agency in both volumes, he would clearly disagree with the paradoxical limitations that Rancière seems to place on that agency. What Sorel fears is *precisely* this disintegration of the working class into a multiplicity, the precondition for the incorporation of the working class into bourgeois society: "Everything may be saved," he insists in a patently exhortative register, "if the proletariat, by their use of violence, manage to re-establish the division into classes."⁵⁷ If the proletariat have the freedom to spend their evenings crossing class boundaries and engaging in otherwise proscribed flights of aesthetic fancy, Sorel might enquire of Rancière, then what is it that prevents them from being equally capable of *choosing to be a class*? Such an option would seem, to Sorel, far more in keeping with the "immemorial interests of civilization" than the class mimicry Rancière seems to endorse and whose effect could be nothing more than a cessation of dialectical motion.⁵⁸

Secondly, both Sorel and Rancière are veritably obsessed with education, or better put, with the subtle dangers that a nominally "progressive" pedagogy can entail. Even Sorel's earliest works on the Bible and the trial of Socrates were, in effect, thinly veiled educational treatises which sought to reinvigorate the Third Republic through a pedagogy of radically egalitarian virtue.⁵⁹ By the time Sorel had turned his attention to syndicalism, however, the dangers of education had come to outweigh its potential benefits: education—in alliance with the ideology of progress—had become the primary vehicle for weakening class antagonisms to the point of dissolution in the "democratic morass."⁶⁰ Thus if class antagonism lacked an objective economic basis, it also found itself actively under siege by what Sorel veno-

mously dismisses as the “pontiffs of social duty” and “professors of ethics,” whose stated objectives were to educate away class conflict and reunite worker and boss under the unified framework of what Sorel venomously dismisses as “social harmony,” “social unity,” or put plainly, “society.” Society as such, in Sorel’s view, is a fantasy, but one which gains in reality insofar as ideological interventions successfully undercut class antagonism.

Rancière’s critique of pedagogy emerges from engagement with sociologist of education Pierre Bourdieu, whose diagnosis of exclusion appears to Rancière as a tautological circle which authorizes the sociologist’s diagnosis.⁶¹ Rancière’s response to the sociological diagnosis of exclusion is as striking as it is novel: “Equality is not given, nor is it claimed; it is practiced, it is verified.”⁶² Such a practice of equality dissolves oppositions into “a multiplicity of concrete acts and actual moments and situations, situations that erupt into the fiction of inegalitarian society without themselves becoming institutions.”⁶³ Two things are key here: a critique of institutions and an affirmation of multiplicity. As to the first, we can only repeat what we have said above: that Sorel and Fanon maintain a subtler view of institutions as necessary but threatening. Certainly, Rancière’s hero Jacotot had no school, but institutions are key nonetheless, whether these be informal educational institutions or working-class practice as pedagogy. As to the second, we find again Rancière’s paradoxical limitation of the very same working-class agency he seeks to rescue. If Marx is guilty of keeping the proletariat in its place, and if Bourdieu is guilty of fixing the excluded in their exclusion, Rancière’s only response is to tear down these walls of exclusion in a free play of multiplicity (in the practice of equality). Certainly, workers are capable of rejecting class in favor of multiplicity, and Rancière masterfully documents how many have done so. But they are also capable, in Sorel’s view, of insisting on dialectical oppositions, of insisting that they have an enemy, that that enemy is common, and that that enemy must be fought “violently” through the “mythical” collective action of the proletariat. In other words, proletarian agency is not limited to resisting inequality through recourse to multiplicity: for Sorel it involves instead the dialectical reply of unified action as a class. While this does not entail the use of existing institutions (educational or otherwise), which in fact threaten to dissolve this conflict rather than sharpen it, it does not refuse institutions entirely: the *syndicats* are its institution, the workplace its school.

The choice between multiplicity and dialectical rupture, moreover, is not one without consequences, and it reveals that Rancière’s practice of equality—viewed through Sorelian and Fanonian lenses—effectively puts the cart before the horse. Fanon’s analysis of race and critique of the Hegelian dialectic draws these implications out in the starkest of terms: Rancière’s insistence on equality as a practice is utterly incapable of grappling with the sort of ontological disqualification that Fanon diagnoses, in which equality *even as*

practice and verification requires a prior act which ruptures the racialized subject's exclusion from being. Equality is something to be won, not something to be practiced, and to insist on the latter is to lose sight of how it is that equality functions in the first place: it is *not ontological*, but itself a practice of power. Purportedly, ontological equality has already been divided by racialization as exclusion from Being, and for Fanon, access to the reciprocity of equality can only be gained through dialectical struggle.

It is in this reformulated dialectic that Sorel and Fanon surpass both post-structuralism and the flat sort of anarchism present in *Black Flame*, but the fullest insights of this dialectic for contemporary anarchism only emerge in the wake of the "decolonial turn" that Sorel himself—due to his own class-centrism (albeit one distinct from that of *Black Flame*)—would not complete.⁶⁴ In what space remains, we will turn briefly to Fanon before diagnosing the political dangers of contemporary anarchist responses to the Bolivarian Revolution currently underway in Venezuela.

AGAINST ANARCHIST IMPERIALISM: FROM FANON TO VENEZUELA

As we have said, Fanon's contribution is to transpose Sorel's framework of class identity first ontologically (onto race) and then geopolitically (onto Third World national consciousness). In so doing, he draws us beyond the necessarily Eurocentric sphere of class-centrism and links rationality more clearly to Europe and to racism as establishing the foundational basis for reason. But in contrast to the caricatured dismissal of race offered by *Black Flame*, we have also seen that Fanon emphasizes the *sociopolitical* importance of race while rejecting its biological basis. Here we see that *Black Flame*'s rejection of race for class betrays a double pretension: that class is more objectively "real" than race and that this means that the latter can and must be rejected in the political realm.⁶⁵ Again, to treat race in this manner repeats the dangerous slide from critique to rejection, one which, to repeat, is abstract and undialectical. Setting out from the recognition of this error, we will now turn from Sorel to a more explicit focus on Fanon, but we do not want to suggest that Fanon did not in any way anticipate poststructuralism: to some degree he did so, but to a greater degree he coincided with it as a persistently decolonial critic.⁶⁶ This decolonial critique, as we have seen, involves a general rupture with the abstract universalism of Enlightenment thought, and in more particular terms, critiques of reason, of essentialism, etc., which do not relapse into such universalist errors. To put it differently, if Foucault bound truth to power, Fanon's decolonial method would insist that

some truths yield specific historical constellations of power, of which colonialism is but the broadest example.

Just as Bakunin argued that freedom is only possible *after* equality (something overlooked by many individualist anarchists then and now), Fanon's critique of Hegel on the basis of race demonstrates something similar: that the revolutionary dialectic of recognition *requires a previous situation of equality and reciprocity*.⁶⁷ Put simply: I must first be recognized as human to be recognized as equal. The implications for the anarchism of *Black Flame* is twofold: firstly, Fanon shows convincingly that rationalism falls far short of being able to give racialized subjects access to humanity. Such subjects cannot "argue" their way to equality, and the "knife blades" of reason are not sharp enough to cut through the racism that is their very condition of existence.⁶⁸ Secondly, on a political level, we cannot merely wish away race in an idealistic fashion, organizing our struggles as though it did not exist: only autonomous action by racialized subjects can rupture the division of non-Being from Being and allow for a radical mutual recognition that must precede other struggles (around, e.g., class). Fanon's analysis, as a result, pulls the rug out from under the uncritical, abstract universalism of *Black Flame* by revealing the flawed ontological assumptions—that we are all already equal in political terms—it brings to the table, assumptions which we have seen as well in Rancière.

In *Wretched of the Earth*, which as we have seen represents a globalization of the Fanonian framework, the critique of progress that we saw in Sorel as in much poststructuralism acquires a new significance: against both the linear progressivism of Modernization Theory (in which the poor nations must merely follow in the footsteps of Euro-America) and the purportedly dialectical progressivism of orthodox Marxist stageism (in which the Third World must endure capitalism and the poor must form alliances with the national bourgeoisie), Fanon's theory here becomes explicitly antidevelopmentalist. This too finds some premonition in Sorel, who as we have seen rejected class mimicry,⁶⁹ but for Fanon, the mimicry to be opposed operates on the global level: "We have better things to do . . . than follow in that Europe's footsteps . . . Come, comrades, the European game is finally over, we must find something else. We can do anything today provided we do not ape [*singer*] Europe, provided we are not obsessed with catching up with Europe."⁷⁰ This turning away from Europe is also fundamentally a turning away from the slide from critique to abstract dismissal that we have been diagnosing throughout, and this appears most emphatically in Fanon's concept of sociogeny. This concept suggests that, after having critiqued the effects of social structures in generating various neuroses and deformations of humanity, it is wholly insufficient to either remain within that merely critical position or to turn one's back on the deformation entirely.⁷¹ Elsewhere, we have shown how this sociogenic imperative drives Fanon beyond

both Foucault and Rancière on questions of humanism and symbolic violence, respectively.⁷² With regard to both, we can do no better than to refer to the eminent “Foucaultian” Edward Said, who diagnoses Foucault’s failure in the following terms:

Ignoring the imperial context of his own theories, Foucault seems to actually represent an irresistible colonizing movement that paradoxically fortifies the prestige of both the lonely individual scholar and the system that contains him. Both . . . [Foucault and Fanon] have Hegel, Marx, Freud, Nietzsche, Canguilhem, and Sartre in their heritage, yet only Fanon presses that formidable arsenal into antiauthoritarian service. Foucault . . . swerves away from politics entirely.⁷³

Here we find a systematization of what for Sorel had been merely an orientation⁷⁴: the need to push through and beyond critique into the dirty work of politics. Following Enrique Dussel’s formulation of “transmodernity” against “postmodernity,” we could then characterize Fanon’s relation to post-structuralism as a sort of “trans-structuralism,” his alter-humanism a “trans-humanism,” and the path leading us to both a “transdialectical” progression.⁷⁵

Finally, and with regard to the question of our reformulated dialectic, Fanon’s extends his critique beyond those who—as in *Black Flame*—reject out of hand the importance of autonomous black or national struggles and in so doing brings us back to the question of both class-centrism and rationalism as European legacies. Fanon accuses Sartre, himself a supporter of contemporary black movements, of undercutting those very same movements by reinscribing them within a historical dialectic whose outcome is both rationally predictable and Eurocentric. For Sartre, black identity was but a “weak term” in the dialectical progression which ends with the proletariat, and Fanon’s response is stinging:

We had appealed to a friend of the colored peoples, and this friend had found nothing better to do than demonstrate the relativity of their action. For once this friend, this born Hegelian, had forgotten that *consciousness needs to lose itself in the night of the absolute*, the only condition for attaining self-consciousness. To counter rationalism he recalled the negative side, but he forgot that this negativity draws its value from an *almost substantive absoluteness*. Consciousness committed to experience knows nothing, has to know nothing, of the essence and determination of its being.⁷⁶

Thus it remains insufficient to recognize the importance of black struggles if these struggles are merely subsumed to a broader dialectic in which class predominates. But while Sartre’s betrayal is a dialectical one, Fanon—like Sorel before him—does not take the Foucaultian path of rejecting “the Hegelian dialectic and all those that come after it.”⁷⁷ Rather, he takes this as an opportunity to drive forward the radicalization of Sartre’s dialectical vision,

breaking with both its class-centrism and rationalism (and thus Eurocentrism). As we turn directly to the question of anarchism and contemporary decolonization efforts in Venezuela, we must bear these insights regarding the dialectical necessity for struggles around race in mind if we are to avoid falling into the characteristically anarchist errors outlined above. And we must also bear in mind the implications that such insights have for our understanding of the state and institutions more generally, an understanding which must be complex and oriented toward dialectical content rather than outward form.

When we turn to contemporary Venezuela, we find the peculiarity of a similarly absent anarchism and the concomitant danger of insistently privileging self-identified “anarchist” voices. We can agree wholeheartedly with the assertion by the editor of the massive tome *Anarchism in Latin America*—an assertion that continues to hold in the present—that “in Venezuela there was never an organized anarchist movement.”⁷⁸ Here, the rejection of Fanon by anarchists also speaks to something that *Black Flame* got right without meaning to do so: “anarchism” as a phenomenon that goes by that name is, by and large, a European-inspired phenomenon. Nowhere is this as clear as in Latin America, where the influence of anarchist ideas correlates directly to previous waves of immigration, specifically from Spain and Italy.⁷⁹ This is not to say that anarchism as a series of practices and ideas in opposition to the state has its origins singularly in Europe, nor should it suggest that local anarchisms have not flourished in a way that challenges Eurocentrism and assesses and transforms that tradition on the basis of local conditions (as José Carlos Mariátegui famously did with Marxism in Peru). Rather, what we want to insist is that antistate practices flourish in many places and through many means and that by insisting that these assume the name “anarchism,” we frequently *obscure* rather than reveal their importance.

This pernicious dynamic continues well into the present, making Venezuela a notoriously difficult subject for anarchists to even discuss, much less to discuss coherently and in a principled manner.⁸⁰ The danger arises from self-identified anarchists of wealthier countries identifying themselves automatically and uncritically with the self-identified anarchists of the Third World countries. This is something that I have observed on countless occasions: a U.S. anarchist visits Venezuela to get an understanding of the political process, seeks out Venezuelan “anarchists,” and thereby establishes a closed circuit in which what is learned about Venezuelan politics was what one sought out in the first place. This closed circuit makes Venezuela a difficult subject for anarchists precisely because, in the words of one anarchist observer, “events in Venezuela are not taking place within our Anarchist lexicon (oh, dear!) and so we are unsure of what to do when we’re expecting to see ‘liberation fronts’ and instead get National Reserves.”⁸¹

Here the military question reflects broader questions about institutions and the need to understand their *content* rather than dismissing all institutions *in toto*.

The two sides of this closed circuit together constitute what I call “anarchist imperialism,” but this phenomenon is not limited, as we saw as well in our discussion above, to the word “anarchism.” The first implication, as we saw above, is the danger of U.S. and European anarchists identifying *a priori* with the “explicitly anarchist viewpoint,” i.e., those who self-identify as “anarchists.”⁸² In the Venezuelan context, the danger of such a gesture is exceptionally potent: due in part to the relative absence of such self-identified anarchists, the mantle of “anarchist” belongs to a very small number, including the small group operating around the newspaper *El Libertario*, who—by virtue of the attention granted by foreign anarchists—enjoy far more influence internationally than their domestic organizing would merit. And beyond the group’s utter lack of a social base,⁸³ it is worth noting the reactionary positions they assumed in the past: while millions were pouring into the streets to organize popular resistance to the coup that briefly overthrew Chávez in April of 2002, *El Libertario* refused to support Chávez’s return to power (thereby driving out many of their more radical comrades).⁸⁴

This damning error of political judgment, moreover, was not accidental but was instead closely related to the “critique of all oppressions” logic dissected above. This is perhaps best expressed in the statement by an associate of *El Libertario* that “we are neither for Chávez, nor for Fedecamaras or the CTV or the Coordinadora Democrática.”⁸⁵ It is incomprehensible on either a theoretical or a practical level to draw any sort of equivalence between the Chávez government and its quasi-fascist opponents, but it should not surprise us when dogmatic anarchists insist on doing so. While the editors of *El Libertario* are quick to insist that their position of “uncompromising opposition to Chavismo is not simply the result of a mechanical application of anarchist theory,” this denial reveals more than it convinces.⁸⁶ What is necessary instead is, as we saw with the question of race, to understand the historical and strategic relationship between both sides and the potential to organize for revolutionary change.⁸⁷

Which brings us to a second and arguably more threatening face of anarchist imperialism. If we have seen that a fidelity to the word *anarchist* often leads U.S. and European anarchists into closed circuits of occasionally dubious allies, then the flip-side of this is the silencing of many truly revolutionary voices and the erasure of radical antistate practices. The best example of this in contemporary Venezuela is the “Tupamaro” phenomenon.⁸⁸ Put in the briefest possible terms, the Tupamaros are revolutionary neighborhood organizations and militias which simultaneously seek the radicalization of the Bolivarian Revolution and the assertion of local power and self-defense. Their view is one in which the state as it exists will be fundamentally dis-

mantled, and yet their voices are rarely recognized by anarchists in Venezuela or elsewhere, and this is because of their seemingly paradoxical relationship to the state and Chávez. As the leader of one such militia group, La Piedrita, explained to me: ferocious autonomy notwithstanding, he considers Chávez the “maximum leader” of the process and “the only one who can prevent a civil war in Venezuela.” But this is in reality no paradox: it is the expression of a strategic understanding of the path the struggle in Venezuela is taking, one which entails that revolutionary organizations offer their support (to quote Chávez’s own historic words against him) “for now.”⁸⁹

Thus the danger of what I call “anarchist imperialism” is one which is intimately connected with fidelity to anarchism as identity rather than as a series of practices which undermine and attack the state as a structure of inequality. In privileging nominally “anarchist” voices and erasing others, this approach can lead us to miss the antistate forest for the anarchist trees. But this is about more than just a name: it reflects the absence of a dialectical and dynamic view: just as *Black Flame* fails to see the dialectical impact of organizing around race and radical decolonial nationalism, so too do anarchists fail to see the radical potential of organizing around Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution, seeing only the looming threat of the bloated petro-state. And beyond merely neglecting the radical potential of Venezuelan national consciousness, they similarly neglect the fact that the target of this consciousness is not merely the transformation of the national state but also the transformation of that broader, global structure of inequality that is the modern/colonial world system and to which Fanon draws our gaze. In so doing, we must insist that this anarchist “imperialism” is more than merely metaphorical, since this view—like the imperialist wars of our day—seeks to spread the faith internationally by demanding that all struggles, regardless of context and conditions, assume the form it has chosen as preordained.⁹⁰

What anarchism requires in the present is a new, dialectical reason, but one unlike traditional, deterministic, closed dialectics, one which—to return to the dual object of our critique—both allows for the irrational function of identity while allowing that identity to assume the necessarily complex form that lies between essentialism and abstract rejection, thereby opening it up to social realities with material implications, like race and nation. Only with such a complex dialectical view might anarchism, to quote Fanon, abandon the “European game” of abstract and disembodied rationality and the blinders to race entailed by a similarly abstract “critique of all oppressions” (especially when this abstractness is compounded by a myopic focus on class which neglects the concept’s European origins).⁹¹ Only then can anarchism develop in a way which overcomes the “sterile formalism” of an abstract opposition to all institutions and all oppressions, and of an equally sterile fidelity to anarchism as a name rather than as a series of practices. Only then can anarchism effectively move beyond itself, becoming an anarchism that is

not anarchism, capable of truly transcending those institutions and oppressions in a manner more consistent with the term's etymology: *an-arche* as "beyond the principle" which governs the present.⁹² And only then can anarchism resist the temptation to "complete the unfinished project of the Enlightenment" and turn instead to the infinitely more revolutionary and generative global path of "completing the unfinished project of decolonization."⁹³

NOTES

1. Michael Schmidt and Lucien van der Walt, *Black Flame: The Revolutionary Class Politics of Anarchism and Syndicalism* (Oakland: AK Press, 2009).

2. Schmidt and van der Walt, *Black Flame*, 69.

3. Here as in other dismissals of Sorel's influence, the authors make much of his external position vis-à-vis the syndicalist movement, but this was more a result of Sorel's hostility to intellectual intervention in working-class movements (a hostility which he applied rigidly to himself as well) than a lack of political engagement. When combined with the incredible claim that Sorel sought the preservation of bourgeois society, a claim which fully misunderstands Sorel's understanding of the dialectic, the caricature is complete. See *Ibid.*, 149–51. Biography is here substituted for theory. The authors insist that it is Bakunin, not Sorel, who represents the intellectual father of syndicalism (*Ibid.*, 16).

4. *Ibid.*, 114.

5. Central texts here include Walter Dignolo, *The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, & Colonization* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003); Enrique Dussel, *The Underside of Modernity: Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty, Taylor and the Philosophy of Liberation*, trans. Eduardo Mendieta (New York: Humanities Press, 1996).

6. Enrique Dussel, "Beyond Eurocentrism: The World-System and the Limits of Modernity," in *The Cultures of Globalization*, eds. Frederic Jameson and Masao Miyoshi (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998).

7. See, for example, Enrique Dussel, *Ética de la Liberación en la Edad de la Globalización y de la Exclusión* (Madrid: Trotta, 1998), 68.

8. "Zero-point hubris" refers to "the imaginary according to which an observer of the social world can situate herself in a neutral observation platform that, in turn, cannot be observed from any point. Our hypothetical observer would be in a position to adopt a sovereign view of the world, whose power would lie precisely in being nonobservable and nonrepresentable. The inhabitants of the zero-point (enlightened philosophers and scientists) are convinced that they can acquire a point of view toward which it is impossible to have a point of view. This pretension—which recalls the theological image of the *Deus absconditus* (which observes without being observed), but also the Foucaultian panopticon—clearly exemplifies the hubris of Enlightenment thought." Santiago Castro-Gómez, *La Hybris del Punto Cero: Ciencia, raza e ilustración en la Nueva Granada* (1750–1816) (Bogotá: Editorial Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, 2005), 18.

9. In philosophical terms, this is most directly associated with Jürgen Habermas, see especially *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures* (Boston: MIT Press, 1990).

10. Joel Olson, "The Problem with Infoshops and Insurrection: U.S. Anarchism, Movement Building, and the Racial Order," in *Contemporary Anarchist Studies: An Introductory Anthology of Anarchy in the Academy*, eds. R. Amster, et al. (London: Routledge, 2009), 35–36.

11. Schmidt and van der Walt, *Black Flame*, 24.

12. Olson, "Problem with Infoshops and Insurrection," 37.

13. There were exceptions among the most radical Jacobins, who would denounce racism as the "aristocracy of the skin," but even these were driven more by events in the colonies and the autonomy of slave action than by their own principles. See C. L. R. James, *The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L'Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution* (New York: Vintage, 1963 [1938]).

14. The authors justify their class-centrism unconvincingly on the basis of its purported universality, a universality which experiences of colonization and slavery confound (Schmidt and van der Walt, *Black Flame*, 111).

15. As examples of this heterogeneity and the interpenetration of race and class, see James, *Black Jacobins*; Aníbal Quijano, "La Colonialidad del Poder y Clasificación Social," *Journal of World-Systems Research* 6.2 (summer/fall 2000): 342–86; George Ciccariello-Maher, "Toward a Racial Geography of Caracas: Neoliberal Urbanism and the Fear of Penetration," *Qui Parle* 16.2 (spring/summer 2007): 39–71.

16. After all, what did the waged workers of the Industrial Revolution consume in increasingly massive quantities, if not the energy-inducing cane products of the colonies?

17. Schmidt and van der Walt, *Black Flame*, 303–304.

18. *Ibid.*, 304–305.

19. Put briefly, we could say that this tradition, while insisting on an overarching working-class interest in fighting racism, nevertheless recognizes the very real benefits that white workers reap under a racist system. See David Roediger, *Wages of Whiteness*, rev. and expanded ed. (New York: Verso, 2007).

20. In this regard, see W. E. B. Du Bois' seminal *Black Reconstruction in America (1860–1880)* (New York: The Free Press, 1998 [1935]); Noel Ignatiev, *Introduction to the United States: An Autonomist Political History* (Denver: Final Conflict Publishing, 1992 [1980]).

21. Georges Sorel, *Reflections on Violence*, trans. Jeremy Jennings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999 [1906/1908]), 120, my emphasis.

22. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, trans. Samuel Moore (London: Penguin, 1967), 218.

23. Sorel, *Reflections*, 57.

24. *Ibid.*, 34, see also 222.

25. *Ibid.*, 35.

26. *Ibid.*, 59.

27. *Ibid.*, 35.

28. David Graeber, *Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology* (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2004), 18–19. It seems as though Mauss opposed anarchism for its purported association with Sorel, which is ironic since Sorel himself opposed anarchism fairly openly, as we have seen.

29. Wu Ming (Roberto Bui), "Tute Bianche: The Practical Side of Myth-Making (in Catastrophic Times)," *Giap Digest* 11 (19 October 2001).

30. For the modern world-system as simultaneously colonial, see Ramón Grosfoguel and Ana Margarita Cervantes-Rodríguez, eds., *The Modern/Colonial/Capitalist World-System in the Twentieth Century: Global Processes, Antisystemic Movements, and the Geopolitics of Knowledge* (Westport: Praeger, 2002).

31. Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Richard Philcox (New York: Grove Press, 2004 [1961]), 95. Fanon further attempts to distinguish revolutionary terrorists from "unbalanced anarchists" in *A Dying Colonialism*, trans. Haakon Chevalier (New York: Grove Press, 1965 [1959]), 57. It is worth noting here that Fanon does not endorse this as an accurate reflection of anarchism, but merely notes it as a literary construction.

32. Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth*, 77.

33. Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, trans. Richard Philcox (New York: Grove Press, 2008 [1952]), 95.

34. *Ibid.*, 73.

35. Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth*, 179.

36. Sorel, *Reflections*, 32–33; see also 209.

37. This is done, for example, by Edward Said, himself an opponent of the domestication of the Palestinian struggle by the aptly named Palestinian "Authority." See his *Culture and Imperialism* (London: Vintage, 1993), 336.

38. In practical terms, the debate over anarchist fidelity to a strictly anarchist tradition (one not coincidentally tied up with questions of race) contributed to the disintegration of the Love and Rage Revolutionary Anarchist Federation. See Roy San Filippo, ed., *A New World in Our*

Hearts: Eight Years of Writings from the Love and Rage Revolutionary Anarchist Federation (Oakland: AK Press, 2002).

39. This is not to mention the many ways in which Sorel falls undeniably short of poststructuralist and other insights, notably in his unshakeable fidelity to productivism.

40. Elsewhere, I have shown the weight of the disavowal of Sorel in France through the figure of Sartre, who took it upon himself to dismiss Sorel's "fascist chatter" on behalf of Fanon (*Wretched of the Earth*, xlix).

41. Miller, for example, is clear in suggesting as much. James Miller, *The Passion of Michel Foucault* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000 [1993]), 171; 177.

42. Michel Foucault, *Remarks on Marx*, trans. R. James Goldstein and James Cascaito (New York: Semiotext(e), 1991 [1978/1981]), 134, 137.

43. For Sorel, social myths are "unanalyzable into parts which could be placed on the plane of historical descriptions." Sorel, *Reflections*, 29.

44. Foucault, *Remarks on Marx*, 137.

45. See, for example, Michel Foucault, *History of Madness* (London: Routledge, 2006 [1961]).

46. Foucault's own genealogies, on the other hand, "are, quite specifically, antisciences . . . They are about the insurrection of knowledges" against the "centralizing power-effects" of scientific discourse. Michel Foucault, "Society Must Be Defended," Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975–1976, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003 [1997]), 9.

47. Foucault, "Society Must Be Defended," 58.

48. The first is to be found in Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1990 [1976]), 95–96, 99. Regarding counterdiscourse, it is arguably the case that Foucault's privileging of this concept in the "Society Must Be Defended" lectures, in which his critique of dialectics is front-and-center, effectively represents a transformed dialectic itself. Had these points been more consistently emphasized throughout Foucault's career, he might be more resistant to Sorel's critique of skepticism.

49. See George Ciccariello-Maher, "The Internal Limits of the European Gaze: Intellectuals and the Colonial Difference," *Radical Philosophy Review* 9.2 (fall 2006), 139–165.

50. John L. Stanley, "Translator's Introduction," in Sorel, *Illusions of Progress*, xii.

51. Sorel, *Reflections*, 180–81.

52. Georges Sorel, *Le Procès de Socrate: Examen critique des thèses socratiques* (Paris: Alcan, 1889). Sorel's indictment of Socrates turns largely on the latter's understanding of science, which Sorel viewed as necessarily hierarchical and inegalitarian.

53. Frederic Jameson, *Valences of the Dialectic* (London: Verso, 2009), provides some useful openings on the question of dialectics, demonstrating similarly that the poststructuralist critique is both insufficient and itself subtly dialectical.

54. "... it is not the idea of progress that Sorel detests, but, rather, the idea of progress . . . [with] its overtones of naturalness, normality, and necessity." Robert A. Nisbet, "Foreword," in Sorel, *Illusions of Progress*, vii.

55. Jacques Rancière, *The Nights of Labor: The Workers' Dream in Nineteenth-Century France*, trans. John Drury (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989 [1981]).

56. Jacques Rancière, *The Philosopher and His Poor*, trans. John Drury, et al. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004 [1983]).

57. Sorel, *Reflections*, 85.

58. Sorel, *Reflections*, 85. Sorel "cannot accept the idea that the historical mission of the proletariat is to imitate the bourgeoisie," and insists that the "greatest danger" threatening the proletariat is the temptation to "imitate democracy" and its bourgeois culture (171–172).

59. Georges Sorel, *Contribution à l'étude profane de la Bible* (Paris: Auguste Ghio, 1889); Sorel, *Le Procès de Socrate*.

60. Sorel, *Reflections*, 78.

61. Rancière addresses Bourdieu, however obliquely, in both *The Philosopher and His Poor* and *The Ignorant Schoolmaster*. Jacques Rancière, *The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation*, trans. Kristin Ross (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991 [1987]). As Ross describes it, Bourdieu's impact on French society resulted in equal part from the successes and the failures of May 1968: "the first granting his work the energy and posture

of critique, the second reinforcing in it the gravitational pull of structure.” Ross, “Translator’s Introduction,” in Rancière, *The Ignorant Schoolmaster*, x. This was similarly expressed by Rancière and the other members of the *Révoltes logiques* collective in the claim that Bourdieu’s work combined “the orphaned fervor of denouncing the system with the disenchanting certitude of its perpetuity,” thereby allowing simultaneously “the denunciation of both the mechanisms of domination and the illusions of liberation” (*L’Empire du sociologue*, 5, 7, cited in Ross, “Translator’s Introduction,” x, xi). Like Sorel, then, Rancière confronts the political implications of disillusioned Marxists for whom the revolution is rendered uncertain, be it by the Revisionist Controversy and parliamentary socialism or by the failures of May 1968, a disillusionment expressed as scientifically authorized sociological critique.

62. Jacques Rancière, *Dis-agreement: Politics and Philosophy*, trans. Julie Rose (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 137.

63. Ross, “Translator’s Introduction,” xxiii.

64. On the concept of the “decolonial turn,” see Nelson Maldonado-Torres, “Césaire’s Gift and the Decolonial Turn,” *Radical Philosophy Review* 9.2 (fall 2006), 111–38.

65. There is more than a small degree of bad faith, moreover, in the claim that the non-objective status of race renders it less important than class, or politically unimportant. This is because, viewed historically, the anarchist “critique of all forms of oppression” preceded the critique of race as an objective factor of human existence. Put differently, opposition to racial supremacy generally preceded and trumped opposition to race itself, and race as a political reality was rejected long before race as an objective biological fact was called into question.

66. See, for example, Fanon’s extended critique of the abstract Eurocentrism of Lacan’s “mirror stage” (*Black Skin*, 139fn25).

67. Fanon, *Black Skin*, 195.

68. This the subject of much of Fanon’s anguished phenomenology, in for example, *Black Skin*, 98. Here, Fanon follows Sartre’s analysis in *Anti-Semite and Jew* of anti-Semitism as fundamentally impermeable to reason.

69. Sorel, *Reflections on Violence*, 171.

70. Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth*, 236.

71. Fanon first outlines sociogeny schematically in *Black Skin, White Masks* (xv), before enacting its implications in the move from diagnostician (psychiatrist) to Algerian revolutionary. This move is documented in his 1956 “Letter to the Resident Minister,” in *Toward the African Revolution*, trans. Haakon Chevalier (New York: Grove Press, 1967 [1964]), 52–54.

72. In “The Internal Limits of the European Gaze,” I demonstrate Foucault’s failure to engage with and reformulate the concept of humanism, and the ways in which both Fanon and Aimé Césaire before him surpass Foucault in this task. Rancière makes a similar mistake in his diagnosis of Bourdieu’s symbolic violence, which paradoxically recreates the immobilizing elements of Bourdieu’s formulation. “Jumpstarting the Decolonial Engine: Symbolic Violence from Fanon to Chávez,” *Theory & Event* 13.1 (2010).

73. Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, 335–36.

74. Sorel’s hostility to intellectual intervention in movements, while to some degree laudable, is what in the end blocks this very transition. He cannot see beyond his own status as an intellectual, and therefore cannot act within movements in anything but an intellectual capacity.

75. Enrique Dussel, “World-System and ‘Trans’-Modernity,” *Nepantla: Views from the South* 3.2 (2002): 221–44.

76. Fanon, *Black Skin*, 112–13, my emphasis, translation modified.

77. Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended,” 58.

78. Cappelletti, “Anarquismo Latinoamericano,” in Rama and Cappelletti, eds., *Anarquismo en América Latina* (Caracas: Biblioteca Ayacucho, 1990), cli. That I say this statement holds in the present will surprise no one familiar with contemporary Venezuelan revolutionary movements.

79. The volume *El Anarquismo en América Latina* both reflects this limitation and exceeds it. This volume, despite being published in Venezuela, emphasizes European immigrants and grants disproportional weight to the Southern Cone. In this, it stumbles on the difficulties of the word *anarchism*, tending to apply it solely to heirs of the European tradition, and even characterizing other strains as “preanarchist” (cxii). However, in so stumbling, it also occasionally

escapes the limitations of the word, drawing into the orbit of its analysis various other strains of liberatory thought.

80. One promising exception to this tendency is Nachie from the Red & Anarchist Action Network, whose insights derive in part from the fact of being a “red” anarchist and having a keen nose for imperialism. Nachie agrees on the general difficulty anarchists face when dealing with the question of Venezuela, which on occasions approaches an “outright reluctance” to even discuss the subject, adding that “the libertarian tendency has been for the most part incapable or unwilling to deal with the Venezuela issue in any serious way.” Nachie, Red & Anarchist Action Network (RAAN), “Bolivanarchism: The Venezuela Question in Our Movement” (9 June 2005), www.redanarchist.org/texts/historical/bolivanarchism.html, accessed 3 July 2010.

81. Nachie, “Bolivanarchism.” This question becomes all the more difficult because, since Nachie’s piece was published, the transformation of the Venezuelan military has proceeded further, in the establishment of “Bolivarian Militias.” See the recent analysis by Alan Woods, “Venezuela: The People in Arms” (15 April 2010), www.marxist.com/venezuela-the-people-in-arms.htm, accessed 3 July 2010.

82. See Nachie, “Bolivanarchism,” who similarly identifies “imperialist overtones” in some anarchist discussions of Venezuela.

83. This was visible in an acute form in the group’s failed attempt to mount an “Alternative Social Forum” against the World Social Forum which was held in Caracas in January of 2006. Rather than contributing critically to and benefiting humbly from what were a multitude of incredibly vibrant workshops and panels, *El Lib* chose instead the vanguardist solution of dismissing the entire event as reactionary. The result was predictable: in contrast to the many thousands attending the official WSF, the “anarchist” alternative drew mere handfuls.

84. I have spoken at length with socialist feminist Jessie Blanco, a former member of the circle around *El Libertario*, about this moment, one which marked her departure from the group.

85. Cited in Nachie, “Bolivanarchism.”

86. “A Consistent Reply to Repeated Questions,” *El Libertario* 34 (September–October 2003).

87. Nachie nearly gets this right, correctly identifying the complexities of the role of the state, of popular institutions, and of the relation between the two, but the conclusion remains a confused one in which the errors of anarchism crop up visibly: “In either case, our only responsible course of action is to engage ourselves in the non-governmental expressions of the Revolution so that as a movement we are in a position to debunk it as necessary and defend it when needed.” The insistence on “non-governmental expressions” is a noble sounding one, but it is one which is unsustainable in practice within the Venezuelan revolutionary process (in part because it is difficult to identify what, precisely, constitutes a “non-governmental” expression).

88. See George Ciccariello-Maher, “Embedded with the Tupamaros: ‘We Are Not Terrorists,’” *Counterpunch* (25 April 2008); “Radical Chavismo Bares its Teeth,” *MR Zine* (18 April 2008).

89. The seeming paradox becomes more acute once we recognize the consistently serious tension that exists between Chávez and his governing allies and the Tupamaro organizations. Recently, Chávez even issued an arrest warrant for this same leader of La Piedrita, but even this does not damper the latter’s overall support for the process.

90. A slightly different phenomenon emerged in the aftermath of the Zapatista rebellion, one which—as is so often the case in other realms—combined imperialism with exoticism, only this time with an anarchist face: Zapatismo was taken up by European and American activists and theorists to be reimposed as the model for radical change. This was arguably present in John Holloway’s, *Change the World without Taking Power*, 2d. ed. (London: Pluto Press, 2005), although in the second edition he tepidly corrects this view in response to critiques on the basis of the Venezuelan experience (262fn49).

91. Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth*, 236.

92. Enrique Dussel, *Philosophy of Liberation*, trans. Aquilina Martinez and Christine Morokovsky (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 1985 [1976]), 58. The Argentine-Mexican philosopher of liberation, Dussel shares much with Sorel and Fanon in terms of being simultaneously critical

of anarchism and of the dangers inherent in all political institutions. Recently, Dussel has insisted both that the immediate destruction of the state foreseen by anarchism is, at least in the Latin American context, politically reactionary (as we have seen in practical terms in the Venezuelan case), and that all institutions embody a dangerous degeneration which must be confronted. See Enrique Dussel, *Twenty Theses on Politics*, trans. George Ciccariello-Maher (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008 [2006]). The phrase *sterile formalism* is one which Fanon applies to nationalism but which, in accordance with our method, can apply equally well to certain forms of anarchism (*Wretched of the Earth*, 144).

93. Nelson Maldonado-Torres, "On the Coloniality of Being: Contributions to the Development of a Concept," *Cultural Studies*, 21.2 (March 2007): 263.

Chapter Three

Beside the State: Anarchist Strains in Cuban Revolutionary Thought¹

Katherine Gordy

If few now turn to Cuba as a model of a successful socialist country, fewer would argue that the Cuban revolution has anything to tell us about anarchist political thought, beyond vindicating traditional anarchist concerns about the power of the state. Following the triumph of the revolution in 1959, the new Cuban government outlawed most independent political organizations and to this day, political activity not sanctioned by the state is severely limited. However, if the study of anarchist political thought includes not just those individuals and organizations working in its name, and if we understand it not just in terms of its critique of the state, but also in terms of a set of principles, practices and questions, it can be argued that anarchist political thought is part of the Cuban political landscape and has continued to develop, even after 1959. Removing the focus on the state actually allows anarchism to be seen in a different way.

Cuban intellectuals, revolutionaries, artists, and others interested in social change in Cuba have long rejected traditional party politics and attempted to forge alternative forms of political participation. They have been concerned with creating international solidarity and with using education and culture to express and encourage a variety of subjectivities. These thinkers theorize about and participate in politics in ways that do not necessarily challenge the state's right to exist but do call into question the centrality of the state for political practice. Thus, while the Cuban revolution, in the form of the Cuban state, has concerned itself with creating a politicized and educated populace, this populace is often not allowed to practice free expression. Such an approach thereby unintentionally inspires different and creative ways of being

“political,” not necessarily in opposition to the state, but beside it and even within it.

Looking specifically at Cuba in this way helps us to think about the following questions: Can anarchism flourish in spaces where the state is immensely present? Is the idea of power widely diffused necessarily incompatible with politics within the nation-state? Finally, how can we talk about direct action (politics not mediated by the state) in ways that neither accept uncritically the idea of civil society as the realm of the political nor trivialize the ways that the Cuban state limits the range of possible political activities?

CIVIL SOCIETY, ANARCHISM, AND THE WORLD

Contemporary anarchists tend not to pay much attention to Cuba. The left in general have shifted their attention to social movements in other parts of the Global South. What many note about these movements is that unlike traditional left-wing parties and earlier guerilla and Marxist movements, their focus is not on taking state power but rather on creating new political spaces and reworking existing power relations.² This shift in focus is clearly relevant to Cuba, and so it is worthwhile to review some of this literature.

The challenge for these movements is that neoliberal institutions often use the language and spheres of civil society and culture, including multiculturalism.³ As a consequence, successful social movements, such as the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN), have figured out creative and largely nonviolent ways to organize civil society and use new technologies in ways that challenge, rather than reinforce, neoliberalism's privileging of capital over all else.⁴ Ironically then, the globalization of capitalism and the fall of existing social states provided new opportunities for organizing against global capital.

For Arif Dirlik, these events forced Marxism to confront fundamental social and political problems and inequities that socialist societies left intact. Marxism continues to serve as an effective critique of capitalism, argues Dirlik, but its “vision of the future has been distorted by its internalization of capitalist spatiality and temporality” and thus has been unable to “provide a viable or desirable alternative to the capitalist mode of production.”⁵ Globalization itself, with its fragmentation of capitalism's spatiality and temporality “frees Marxism from the ties that historically have bound it to the capitalist mode of production” so that it can be used as a tool, one among many, in the project of liberation.⁶ Dirlik suggests using Marxism to address problems of material and social existence, but without allowing Marxist teleology and class essentialism to foreclose existing forms of resistance and produce new forms of domination. He recognizes that this is no easy task: “The problem,

of course, is that hegemony is hegemony, whether it's revolutionary or not, and the goal of liberation is to abolish hegemony, not to perpetuate it. Indeed, the greatest obstacle to liberation may not be hegemony of one kind or another but the very inability to imagine life without hegemony."⁷ According to Dirlik, anarchists have been the most consistent of all radicals in their critiques of hegemony, but also the least successful in "dealing with questions of power."⁸ This poses the following dilemma: "Without homogeneity, political struggle may be impossible; homogenization, however, reintroduces ideology—and hegemony."⁹ The challenge is thus how to think about "difference within rather than against unity."¹⁰ How, asks Dirlik, is it possible to recognize the importance of local sites of resistance without fetishizing the local and the traditional and thereby contributing to the fragmentation upon which global capital thrives?

One response to Dirlik might be that of anarchist and anthropologist David Graeber, who argues that if the twentieth-century focus on wars and grabs for state power made anarchist goals of creating nonhierarchical political forms seem irrelevant, the fact that this model of politics as violence is existentially unviable in the twenty-first century makes anarchism relevant once again.¹¹ The groups making it relevant again are not traditional sectarian anarchist organizations or what Graeber calls "capital-A anarchist groups," which have long existed and whose members accept platforms set down by their founders. Those at the forefront of anarchism's renewal are "small-a anarchists," because their primary concern is not with ideological conformity, but rather with creating alternative forms of organization and direct action.¹² An example of small-a anarchism can be found in what the corporate press erroneously refers to as the "antiglobalization movement," but which is in fact a movement against neoliberalism, as a form of "market fundamentalism" and in favor of globalization understood as the "effacement of borders and the free movement of people, possessions and ideas."¹³ The ideology of the movement is defined by its focus on "creating and enacting horizontal networks instead of top-down structures like states, parties or corporations; networks based on principles of decentralized, nonhierarchical consensus democracy."¹⁴ An ideology defined by a process aimed specifically at avoiding institutionalized domination does not reintroduce hegemony. Anarchist ideology, suggests Graeber, merges means and ends in a way that precludes the kinds of political compromises other leftist movements often have had to make. Recalling Dirlik's appeal to find difference within unity, one could argue that unity within the globalization movement is based on a commitment to "winning-ever larger spaces of autonomy" from state power in which people could pursue common goals, but also disagree.¹⁵ Hegemony might not disappear, but, as many anarchists have argued, domination resulting from a lack of a common power would be necessarily less harmful than institutionalized domination simply because it is less concentrated.¹⁶ While

resistance might still be local, in the sense that political activity takes place in a particular time and place, Graeber suggests that globalization's weakening of the nation-state means anarchists, and small-a anarchists in particular, no longer have to choose between, on the one hand, a commitment to anarchist principles and horizontal forms of organization, and, on the other hand, relevance and efficacy.

At first glance, Cuba would seem to have little place in this discussion. Cuba has not experienced the rise of neoliberalism in the same way as much of Latin America. Opposition to neoliberalism comes from the state itself, even as the state has had to increasingly adapt to and adopt certain market mechanisms in light of the termination of the Soviet trading block in 1991. In the early 1990s, Cuba went into an economic free fall that forced the Cuban government to adopt a variety of economic measures that saved the country from total collapse. These measures introduced new forms of inequality and exaggerated old ones, but the state's commitment to equality meant that fundamental social services such as health care, education, and food rations were compromised but never abolished.¹⁷

However, in Cuba, civil society is a no less controversial term than elsewhere. As we have already seen, civil society may not necessarily oppose global capital, and can enable its spread, but civil society can be used for more oppositional purposes. In Cuba, civil society, understood as a sphere relatively free of government interference, in which citizens are guaranteed, at least formally, the right to organize and freely express themselves, is severely limited. Many Cubans express frustration with the absence of these guarantees, and their absence has been one of the organizing principles of the island's diverse and increasingly vocal dissident organizations. At the same time, the expansion of civil society has also been the main focus of U.S. efforts to topple the Cuban government as other more direct efforts such as invasion and embargo have failed.¹⁸ This has placed Cubans, who are critical of the Cuban government but do not support the U.S. government's plans for Cuba, in a difficult position.¹⁹ The challenge they face is how to open spaces for the political that are not swallowed up by the dominant oppositional agendas of the U.S. government and the Cuban government.²⁰ As we shall see in the following brief historical account of the anarchist movement in Cuba prior to 1959, this is a dilemma Cuban anarchists in particular have long faced.

THE HISTORY OF CAPITAL-A ANARCHISM IN CUBA

One might sum up the history of Cuban anarchism as the constant struggle by anarchists to distinguish themselves from other political tendencies within

Cuba on both the left and right. During the nineteenth-century struggles for independence, anarchists like Enrique Roig San Martín opposed separatism, because of the separatist embrace of electoral politics and opposition to socialism and because anarchists believed that social liberty was far more important than independence.²¹

Most anarchists eventually came to support independence in recognition of the rising tide of support for it and to counteract separatist charges that Spanish-born anarchists were loyal to their native land.²² Cuba became independent in 1902, but the conditions of postindependence Cuba appeared to vindicate anarchist arguments that independence understood purely in political terms would not change the basic structures of Cuban society.²³ The sovereignty of the newly independent Cuba was contingent upon the state's supporting the interests of capital, much of it U.S. capital, over those of labor.²⁴ The Platt Amendment, repeated U.S. military interventions throughout the first part of the twentieth century, and a political system rife with corruption insured this.²⁵

In the first quarter of the twentieth century, anarchists were key participants in the labor movement.²⁶ Anarcho-syndicalism in Cuba, according to historian Kirwin Shaffer, was an important strand of the Cuban revolutionary tradition. Despite its "European" origins, anarchism, like socialism, was thoroughly indigenized and could not be dismissed as a foreign ideology that never took root in Cuba. Anarchism represented a broader countercultural movement that shaped Cuban life and contributed to the larger debate about what it meant to be Cuban.²⁷ Anarchists participated in creating alternative educational and medical institutions and practices and in questioning "hegemonic principles" such as electoral politics, capitalism, mainstream medicine, and Christianity.²⁸ According to Shaffer, they placed issues such as education, gender equality, internationalism, national identity, and health concerns on the Cuban national agenda long before the triumph of the Cuban revolution.²⁹ This suggests that anarchists "were the one uncompromisingly consistent political movement."³⁰ However, by Shaffer's own account, anarchists included a variety of currents, each with its own internal personal, political, and theoretical conflicts.³¹

Anarchists' ambivalence toward any form of state activity and their attempts to create alternative spaces did not always locate them clearly on the far left of the political spectrum. At times the logic of political decisionism placed them on the same side as conservative elites. Take the example of the Anarchist Rationalist Schools, established in Havana in the first quarter of the twentieth century in response to what anarchists believed to be the Cuban public schools' teaching of blind obedience to the flag.³² While the Rationalist schools aimed to counter this by educating children in critical thinking and anarchist principles, the latter sometimes came at the expense of the former, thereby illustrating the difficulty that anarchists too encountered

when it came to avoiding reasserting hegemony. Cuban anarchists found themselves on the side of Cuban elites who also resisted, successfully, attempts by the Cuban state to impose a more nationalistic, and in the state's mind, more egalitarian, agenda in private schools.³³ Anarchist principles too were sometimes conservative. For instance, Cuban anarchists emphasized the family as the source of communism, rather than the state, thereby buttressing traditional views about the importance of the nuclear patriarchal family and motherhood.³⁴ As Shaffer documents, Cuban anarchists were often critical of popular culture, which they associated with drinking and licentiousness. Thus, anarchists did not always escape from the puritanism and elitism of their own societies and the belief that the popular classes were in need of proper guidance.

The Cuban Revolution, like the Russian revolution, divided the international anarchist movement between supporters and critics. Some supported the revolution's strategic privileging of secrecy and armed struggle over consensus and democratic participation and justified it in light of the need to make a radical and decisive break with capitalism. Others within the international anarchist movement were concerned that the temporary measures justified by revolution would soon become the quotidian domination of the revolutionary state and instead supported continued anarchist efforts in Cuba to create new horizontal associations and transform society through culture.³⁵

Cuban anarchists, who were often part of the second group, felt betrayed both by the international left and by the Cuban revolution itself. The few books focusing specifically on the history of anarchism in Cuba convey this sense of betrayal while attempting to disassociate Cuban anarchists from right-wing exiles in Miami.³⁶ In his account of the movement, exiled Cuban anarchist Frank Fernandez points out that in spite of anarchist participation in the labor movement and in the urban armed struggle against Batista, anarcho-syndicalists were expelled from the Cuban Workers Federation following the triumph of the revolution in 1959.³⁷ After 1960, anarchist papers and organizations came under attack, unjustly suffering the same fate as other papers and organizations in Cuba that had played no part whatsoever in the struggle against Batista. Worse, members of the Cuban Communist Party who had cooperated with Batista were given key positions in the new government.³⁸ Those Cuban anarchists who failed to get in line went into exile, where they felt the wrath of both right-wing Miami exiles, who objected to their support of socialism, and the left in the United States who supported the Cuban Revolution and lumped Cuban anarchists together with right-wing exiles. With the consolidation of the 1959 revolution, and the eventual turn to Marxism-Leninism in 1961, argues Fernandez, the spaces for anarchism in Cuba were closed off to a degree previously unknown in Cuba:

In previous epochs, there were other routes. In the 19th century one could either opt for the separatist forces or keep out of the independence question. When Machado or Batista were in power, the libertarians could declare themselves anti-political or pass over to the opposition groups with the most affinity for anarchist ideals—left revolutionaries or liberal or social-democratic political groups. But the Third Republic, presided over by a budding dictator, offered only four alternatives: placing oneself under the dictator's control; prison; the firing squad; or exile.³⁹

For Fernandez, anarchism without the possibility of independent organizing could not exist. Any type of civil society was better than none. Cubans, he argued, were “instinctively inclined toward anarchism,” but Fidel Castro had taken them on a detour that would only end with his death.⁴⁰

Surely anarchists suffered both in Cuba after the revolution and in exile. However, Fernandez's conclusion that anarchism was silenced in Cuba, that Cubans are instinctively anarchists, and that Fidel Castro led the country away from its historical destiny reduces Cuban history to the crudest teleology.⁴¹ Cubans, in this account, have one true identity, one right set of beliefs, and one true destiny and that which does not fit is simply an unfortunate detour from the proper path to liberation. Such conclusions do not challenge the false choices between state socialism and liberal democracy and between economic equality and individualism, that anarchists supposedly reject. The conclusions also narrow the range of possibilities rather than opening up Cuban history to its participants.

It could be that the Cuban revolution has not squelched anarchism and has instead provided, perhaps unintentionally, a setting for the production of anarchist political thought and anarchist subjectivities that reject such potentially limiting binary oppositions as state/civil society and difference/unity. Ben Anderson has argued that during the nineteenth and early twentieth century, countries with right-wing regimes, such as Cuba, were actually most receptive to anarchist ideas because anarchist modes of political action were least vulnerable to state repression.⁴² This logic can be extended to revolutionary Cuba as well. Because independent political organizing not sanctioned by the state continues to be extremely difficult and costly, political actors have had to invent new vocabularies and ways of being political. This means that activities not usually considered political, such as consumption, can take on political significance.⁴³ Some of this inventiveness is directly related to the desire to avoid problems with the authorities. Jokes and the variety of code words and gestures (the famous beard tug to refer to Fidel Castro) are obvious examples. However, these do not necessarily represent outright rejections of the socialist project.⁴⁴

For some, the incentive to create new vocabularies and appropriate old ones is not just the desire to evade state censure, but also the desire to continue to participate as revolutionaries, and socialists, in deciding the country's future. In short, they are unwilling to grant the state monopoly

power over the revolution, but are also reluctant to ally themselves with dissident groups on the island, with the U.S. government and/or with other foreign governments. The example of the Center of the Study of America, to which I turn later, vividly illustrates this.

Moreover, the Cuban revolution's "achievements" in education, health care, and providing people with their most basic necessities have themselves created conditions that actually facilitate certain forms of direct action. One should be wary of glorifying scarcity and boredom in Cuba and in the Caribbean in general.⁴⁵ Free time and inventiveness in Cuba are partially due to unemployment/underemployment and lack of resources. However, most Caribbeans, Cubans are protected from some of the worst effects of poverty and deprivation and have a certain amount of cultural capital. This creates the conditions for a myriad of local community activities with varying degrees of authorization from the state. Even if many Cubans, especially in recent years, leave Cuba for economic, rather than political reasons, the desire to be an individual abroad does not translate into the desire to be a good neoliberal subject. Freedom does not necessarily mean the ability to accumulate wealth. Cubans abroad continue to operate in the informal economy while expressing frustration with the lack of free time life in other countries affords for them to pursue activities which are not monetarily rewarding.

These new forms of political praxis and the discourse surrounding them suggest a different framework for theorizing politics that moves away from the traditional state/civil society binary, around which many of the polemic debates about democracy in Cuba, and in general, revolve.⁴⁶ In Cuba, one sees at the level of theory and practice a break from the oppositions of public/private and state/market and instead attempts to create a variety of different spheres with their own logics, sources of unity, and modes of being. What follows are some examples.

SMALL-A ANARCHISM AFTER 1959

There is a growing literature documenting the diverse Cuban responses to the economic, social, and ideological turmoil brought about by the termination of the Soviet trading block in 1991.⁴⁷ Many of these accounts attempt to chart these responses in ways that take seriously Cuban criticisms of the Cuban state without contributing to a narrative of post-Cold War neoliberal triumphalism, in which all attempts to resist and evade state power and all critiques of the Cuban state serve as evidence that a Cuba free of state domination is a Cuba of possessive individuals.

In this context, the term *anarchism* appears to have made something of a comeback in popular culture. Just as Cuban anarchists struggled throughout

the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to distinguish themselves from dominant political positions, so too does anarchism now appear as a way of rejecting both the model of concentrated state power existing in Cuba and the neoliberal model touted by its enemies. The Cuban hip-hop group Los Aldeanos, for instance, references the term *anarchism* explicitly in its song “Abajo todos los presidentes del planeta.” The song begins:

In these times, where to be different from the rest of society is a crime, and to have your own way of thinking is a capital sin, we have no alternative but to make clear our position in respect to spheres of world power, we don't trust anyone, we represent millions and millions of people suffering in this world. Before so much sadness and neglect, here is our response.⁴⁸

The first part of the song appears to reference Cuba specifically, but the song goes on to criticize global inequalities in wealth, corruption, mass incarceration, and violence perpetuated by those in power. Liberal democracy is no solution, for elections are won by the wealthy, laws are made by the few to oppress the many, and one individual controls the fate of millions. What is needed, they sing, is anarchism. “Down with all the presidents of the planet. Anarchy. No more leaders or police on the five continents, death to the chief who lies and freedom for an innocent planet. No more people who speak for you, decide for you, distill things for you, think for you.”⁴⁹

The term *anarchism* also appears in the science fiction genre known as cyberpunk. According to Juan C. Toledano Redondo, Cubans used the cyberpunk genre in the 1990s to express the uncertainty of the future and the anarchist view of globalized oppression.⁵⁰ While the hero of 1970s cyberpunk was the new socialist man, whose sense of duty to Cuba and socialism served as the primary incentive to work and produce, a new, more ambiguous hero was introduced in the 1990s.⁵¹ This new hero was not a liberal bourgeois individual but rather a hero who critiqued both the commodification of labor, culture, and life by multinational corporations and also the commodification of individualism by the socialist state.⁵² The future of this new anarchist hero “depends neither on the state, nor big corporations, but on the individual,” who must struggle against not just one system, but two.⁵³ In Cuban cyberpunk, Toledano concludes, “the anarchist hero has defeated the new socialist man.”⁵⁴

Toledano is writing specifically about cyberpunk, but if this conclusion is taken beyond the bounds of science fiction literature, it runs the risk of reasserting the primacy of the opposition to socialism and thus risks placing anarchism, de facto, into the liberal and/or reactionary camp, which is precisely the space that many Cubans struggle to avoid, regardless of whether they explicitly identify as anarchists or not. Similarly, opposing the anarchist hero to the new socialist man in the same way that the new socialist man was

opposed to the bourgeois individual glosses over the similarities between anarchism and Marxism, both in terms of their strengths and weaknesses. While this reading of Cuban Cyberpunk as well as the larger literature on Cuban responses to Special Period Cuba suggests that liberalism does not have a monopoly on individualism and that the Cuban state does not have a monopoly on revolution, it also raises the larger question of what the actual ideological content of this anarchist hero is beyond a rejection of two unsatisfactory alternatives pushed either by the Cuban state or global capital.

The common critique of anarchism is that it too cannot avoid the problem of hegemony once it becomes a mode of engaging productively in the world and not simply a form of dissent or opposition to the status quo. In short, anarchism's strongest card is one that can be played against it, too. The history of capital-A anarchism in Cuba illustrates the ways that anarchism has been unable to avoid the problem of dirty hands. Yet, pointing to the dilemma laid out by Dirlik in the beginning of this chapter, that ideology and hegemony cannot exist without the other, is not as damning as critics of anarchism believe. It does, however, mean that anarchism and Marxism look less different. Usually the two are distinguished on the basis of means, with one willing to temporarily use the power of the state to achieve a particular set of ends and the other not. If anarchism is understood not negatively as opposition to the state and instead more positively as an attempt to create a society in which freedom of association and diversity is understood to exist in conjunction with rather than in opposition to equality, then the story changes.

Once the state is decentered, for instance, Che's "new man" is not so easily opposed to the anarchist hero. While his emphasis on taking state power and the importance of central planning appears to put him at odds with many anarchists, particularly in Cuba, his work on how to create socialism after taking state power also reflects an anarchist understanding of socialism, not just as state ownership of the means of production, but also as a mode of being in the world and interacting with others that is not necessarily a direct reflection of the mode of production.

As we have seen, some anarchists supported Guevara's revolutionary tactics.⁵⁵ Anarchists could be sympathetic to his emphasis on organizing the peasantry, working outside the confines of traditional political structures, rejecting Marxist objectivism, focusing on the subjective factors of revolution and political education, and setting an example of a new type of political praxis.⁵⁶ Following the triumph of the Cuban revolution, however, Guevara moved from challenging state power to participating in it, from guerilla warfare to state administration.⁵⁷ There was less for anarchists to sympathize with. In essays like "A New Culture of Work," "On the Budgetary Finance System," and "Socialism and Man in Cuba," Guevara deals with the question of how to construct socialism in light of Cuba's particular socioeconomic

and historical conditions and how to use culture to create new socialist subjectivities.⁵⁸

Guevara agreed with orthodox Marxists that material prosperity was key to the creation of a communist society.⁵⁹ Given Cuba's semicolonial conditions, capital flight, and its dependence upon raw materials from abroad, the country's greatest resource was its labor. The problem, however, was that the "masses building socialism" were "not pure" and carried "along with them a whole series of bad habits inherited from the previous epoch."⁶⁰ The "new society in formation," he argued, had to "compete fiercely" not just with past education and values but also with existing commodity relations, which only a few were capable of recognizing as relics from the past system. "The laws of capitalism, which are blind and are invisible to ordinary people," wrote Guevara, "act upon the individual without he or she being aware of it."⁶¹

Improved work techniques and greater efficiency would need to be achieved by raising "revolutionary consciousness," whereby workers were taught to view work not only as a material necessity but also as a moral necessity. The best way to do that was through emulation, which encouraged people to compete with another, but for nonmonetary rewards.⁶² Society, he argued, should be "converted into a gigantic school."⁶³ Guevara referenced *The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* as an example of a less scientific and more humanist Marx, who saw communism "as a conscious act" rather than simply the product of class contradictions.⁶⁴ This meant that some were more conscious than others. While the masses understood "the new values," they did not always do so "sufficiently," and thus the dictatorship of the proletariat had to operate "not only on the defeated class but also on individuals of the victorious class."⁶⁵

This, of course, was evidence for Bakunin's critique of Marx, that the dictatorship of the proletariat would quickly become a tool of the few to oppress the many.⁶⁶ Citing Bakunin's concern that "attempts to institute socialism by decree . . . leads (sic) inevitably to the enslavement of the people by the authoritarian State," anarchist Sam Dolgoff argued that attempts to build communism in Cuba "failed because 'the new socialist man' can be formed only within the context of a new and free society, based not upon compulsion, but upon volunteer cooperation."⁶⁷

My point is not that Guevara was a proto-anarchist or that his anarchist critics did not have abundant evidence of Cuba's repressive state apparatus. Rather, it is that the questions of what individualism might mean and what politics might look like beyond their liberal definition were ones with which both Guevara and Cuban anarchists struggled and one with which Cubans continue to struggle. Guevara recognizes, far more than his Cuban orthodox Marxist interlocutors, the ways in which means can easily be transformed into ends and the dangers of an economic determinism that stifles collective and individual initiative and narrows options for change.

Guevara challenged the idea that these “new men” would simply be carbon copies of one another. Individualism could not be viewed independently of society. “The individual under socialism, despite apparent standardization, is more complete. Despite the lack of a perfect mechanism for it, the opportunities for self expression and making oneself felt in the social organism are infinitely greater.”⁶⁸ Echoing Marx’s discussion of species being, he argued that freedom existed in relation to others and it existed when people could express themselves outside of market forces, not by having things but by doing them, by engaging the other senses of seeing, hearing, smelling, thinking, and feeling.⁶⁹ Work under socialism, argued Guevara, “becomes an expression of oneself, a contribution to the common life in which one is reflected, the fulfillment of one’s social duty.”⁷⁰ Communist consciousness was not bounded by nation. Cuban workers’ “responsibility transcends the borders of Cuba,” and their sacrifices provided a “living example” of “something new in Latin America.”⁷¹

Guevara’s concern with the masses’ “bad habits” recalls earlier Cuban anarchist concerns that the popular classes were lacking the proper morality. Like anarchists, Guevara believed education was fundamental to the transformation of society. Anarchists did not reject entirely the new type of subjectivity reflected by the ideal “new man,” but rather argued that such subjectivity could not come about under coercive conditions. “Moulding the ‘New Man’ according to totalitarian specifications,” argued Dolgoff, “connotes the process of training people to become obedient serfs of the state: and moral incentives becomes a device to enlist the participation of the masses in their own enslavement.”⁷²

The question of how to be part of the revolution without coercion and without losing one’s sense of self continue to be of major concern Cubans. For instance, recently a Cuban photographer, Javier Machado, posted a self-portrait on Facebook that immediately provoked a variety of responses from other Cubans living abroad. In the photograph, he has a small vinyl inner tube around his waist and is holding a set of oars, one of which is actually a giant spoon and the other a giant fork. The caption says: “Cuando el hambre aprieta, el hombre se va” [When hunger squeezes, man gets going]. Some read the photo as a commentary on how lack of food in Cuba, as opposed to the search for freedom, leads people to leave, often in large inner tubes known as balsas. Another photographer living in France responded that the hunger to which the photo referred was more complicated.

It’s the hunger to be a true individual and not another statistic, one thousand I don’t know how many go to school, one thousand I don’t know how many go to the hospital, one thousand I don’t know how many are members of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, one thousand I don’t know how many diplomas, that’s the hunger that makes us see *el morro* [a fortress located in Havana Harbor]

once a year when we are doing better [financially]. Here [in Europe] there isn't freedom either because it depends on money, but at least you aren't just another number in the fucking corrupted state bureaucracy of the island of never more. We are one thousand I don't know how many Cubans living abroad, suspects for having committed the crime of wanting to be different.⁷³

This passage is not simply another version of Reinaldo Arenas's famous line that while both the communist and capitalist systems "give you a kick in the ass, in the communist system you have to applaud, while in the capitalist system you can scream."⁷⁴ It has more in common with the sentiments of Los Aldeanos and the heroes of cyberpunk. The writer bemoans the inability to be a "true individual" and lambasts the "state bureaucracy." He does not, however, criticize free education and health care or even the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution. Instead, he criticizes the way that the Cuban state fetishizes these "achievements of the revolution" by separating them from the people who make them happen and the people who live them.

The passage also speaks to the experience of exile and specifically to the inability to be a Cuban (in Cuba) *and* an individual, or, more generally, to the longing to be different without having to give up the unity and sense of belonging that makes difference meaningful. How to understand difference within unity, rather than against it, is a question with which Cubans have long struggled, and it returns us to Dirlik's point raised at the beginning of this paper.

One way out of the seeming trap, whereby difference and unity constantly threaten to overrun one another, is to return to the model of different spheres. By theorizing Cuban society in terms of different spheres, it's possible to consider unity and difference as contingent temporally and spatially. Unity can exist within a particular context, but it need not be totalizing. Thus attempts to create spaces inside the state cannot be reduced to the model of civil society in capitalist society, nor do they embrace necessarily the argument that separate spheres are made redundant by socialism.

Take, for example, the case of the Center for the Studies of America (CEA), a Cuban research institute in Havana, which was granted NGO status in 1987.⁷⁵ Members of CEA responded to Raul Castro's 1990 "call" to all Cubans to join in nationwide discussions about the future of Cuban socialism.⁷⁶ Between 1991 and 1995, they produced a body of academic work, much of it objecting to the government's characterization of the crisis of early 1990s as purely economic, rather than also social and ideological. These academics called for a political opening, not to give the market free reign or introduce liberalism's brand of political pluralism, but to avoid these outcomes by empowering the Cuban populace politically to fight against the consequences of Cuba's increasing exposure to and use of market mechanisms.

While the leadership initially welcomed their contributions, on 23 March 1996, in a "Report to the Political Bureau on the political and social situation of the country and the corresponding work of the party," Raul Castro accused newly minted NGOs in Cuba, mentioning CEA specifically, of violating their original statutes and allowing the United States to use them to subvert the revolution in the guise of promoting civil society.⁷⁷ They did so, he argued, by publishing articles about Cuba that challenged official party position and disseminating those articles and ideas outside of Cuba. Academics, argued Castro, confused neutrality or ideological confusion with open-mindedness or freethinking.

Those living outside of Cuba who came to these academics' defense compared them to reformers in the Soviet Union and characterized their clash with the leadership as inevitable in a system where fundamental rights to freedom of expression and organization were not respected.⁷⁸ However, the CEA members did not defend themselves by appealing to the primacy of freedom of expression and thought, rejecting the fundamental importance of social justice, unity, and national sovereignty or dismissing the Communist party's role in advocating these principles. They also did not capitulate to the leadership's charges. Instead, they argued that the academic and political realms were distinct, but not because the academic sphere was apolitical and did not have a responsibility to the revolution. Their academic production was, they argued, guided by the same principles that guided the party. These principles, however, did not define the methods and vocabulary of academia. Evidence, logic, and theory played a much larger role.⁷⁹ The academic framework also meant that while the researchers were responsible for their political commitments, they were not responsible for the ways in which their work was received and used by colleagues outside Cuba. To impose such a standard, they argued, would have been to disqualify them entirely from the academic realm outside of Cuba while making academic production indistinguishable from political rhetoric. Such a fusion would not benefit the very revolution that the political rhetoric championed.⁸⁰

True commitment to the principles of the revolution meant staying true to the work inspired by those principles even when the leadership disagreed with it. Political unity was not about repeating official language regardless of time and place, disengaging from the international and national academic community, or refusing to debate either with friends or enemies of the revolution. Political unity, instead, involved maintaining a loyalty to principles of the revolution in spite of the circumstances in which one found oneself. Political unity involved debate and discussion in order to strengthen the revolution.⁸¹

What these examples illustrate is that state/civil society opposition does little to illuminate the ways that Cubans negotiate the political in Cuba both inside and outside the confines of the state. Each example represents a long-

ing for a different kind of politics, a space that is not utopian but already exists. It becomes real in the moment of practice rather than existing as a realm into which people step and behave according to scripts of which they themselves are not authors. Moreover, the desire to be an individual might be better defined as the desire to be different, but that difference should be understood not just in terms of a meritocracy or protest against egalitarian projects but rather as a way to eliminate hierarchies, including those existing in socialist societies.⁸²

NOTES

1. Thanks to the following people for comments on earlier drafts of this chapter: Sarah Burgess, Jimmy Klausen, James Martel, Keally McBride, Jeffrey Paris, Darien Shanske, and Megan Thomas. Thanks also to Calen Casteneda for research assistance.

2. See, for instance, Arif Dirlik, *After the Revolution: Waking to Global Capitalism* (Hanover: Wesleyan University Press, 1994); David Graeber, "The New Anarchists," *New Left Review* 13 (January–February 2002): 61–73; George Yúdice, *The Expediency of Culture: Uses of Culture in the Global Era* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003); and essays in Richard Stahler-Sholk, Harry E. Vanden, Glen David Kueker, eds., *Latin American Social Movements in the Twenty-First Century: Resistance, Power, and Democracy* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008).

3. For instance, Charles Hale argues that institutions of neoliberalism in Latin America embraced multiculturalism because it enabled them to separate "acceptable demands for cultural rights from inappropriate ones" that might challenge economic arrangements amenable to capital: Charles Hale, "Does Multiculturalism Menace? Governance, Cultural Rights and the Politics of Identity in Guatemala," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 34 (2002): 485–524. Similarly, George Yúdice argues that NGOs in Latin America filled the vacuum left by the state's withdrawal from the public sector: Yúdice, *The Expediency of Culture*, 107.

4. Yúdice, *The Expediency of Culture*, 97.

5. Dirlik, *After the Revolution*, 14–15.

6. *Ibid.*, 15.

7. *Ibid.*, 104.

8. *Ibid.*, 104.

9. *Ibid.*, 104–105.

10. Henry Giroux, *Border Crossings*, cited by Dirlik, *Ibid.*, 113.

11. Graeber, "The New Anarchists," 69.

12. *Ibid.*, 72n.

13. *Ibid.*, 62–63.

14. *Ibid.*, 70.

15. *Ibid.*, 68.

16. See, for instance, Max Stirner, *The Ego and Its Own*, ed. David Leopold (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

17. For an overview of Cuban economic policy in the 1990s, see Pedro Monreal, "Development as an Unfinished Affair: Cuba after the 'Great Adjustment' of the 1990s," *Latin American Perspectives* 29.3 (May 2002): 75–90.

18. See, for instance, Bureau of Western Hemispheric Affairs, *Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba* (Washington: U.S. Department of State, 2004); and USAID, Evaluation of the USAID Cuba Program, www.usaid.gov/locations/latin_america_caribbean/country/pubs/program_report/, accessed 18 June 2010.

19. One might add that this also places the Cuban government in a difficult position and, as Boaventura de Sousa Santos argues, means that “resistance has ended up taking precedence over an alternative,” even though the process of “rupture” is grounded in both: Boaventura de Sousa Santos, “Why Has Cuba Become a Difficult Problem for the Left,” *Latin American Perspectives* 36.3 (2009): 44.

20. Of course, neither the U.S. government or the Cuban government is monolithic, but U.S. policy toward the island has been consistent over many administrations, while the Cuban government has long claimed a monopoly on the revolution in Cuba.

21. Frank Fernandez, *Cuban Anarchism: A History of a Movement*, trans. Charles Bufe (Tucson: See Sharp Press, 2001), 25, 35.

22. *Ibid.*, 29.

23. Kirwin Shaffer, *Anarchism and Countercultural Politics in Early Twentieth-Century Cuba* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2005), 41.

24. *Ibid.*, 53.

25. Louis A. Pérez Jr., *Cuba under the Platt Amendment 1902–1934* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991).

26. Shaffer, *Anarchism and Countercultural Politics*, 7.

27. *Ibid.*, 1–2, 223. Early Cuban anarchists reconciled anarchist internationalism with Cubaness by adopting Bakunin’s distinction between nationality, as the bonds between people living in the same country, and nationalism, as a state-imposed dogma (*Ibid.*, 60).

28. *Ibid.*, 26.

29. *Ibid.*, 226–27.

30. Antoni Kapcia, “Review of *Anarchism and Countercultural Politics in Early Twentieth-Century Cuba*,” *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 26 (2007): 130–32.

31. Shaffer divides the anarchist movement in Cuba into anarcho-communism, anarcho-syndicalism, and anarcho-naturalism, which were united in their desire for anarchy but disagreed on means: Shaffer, *Anarchism and Countercultural Politics*, 3.

32. *Ibid.*, 174.

33. *Ibid.*, 187.

34. *Ibid.*, 216–19.

35. Astrid Wessels, “From Theater Groups to Bank Robberies: The Diverse Experience of Uruguayan Anarchists,” *Perspectives on Anarchist Theory* 8.2 (Fall 2004): 24.

36. Sam Dolgoff, *The Cuban Revolution: A Critical Perspective* (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1976); Fernandez, *Cuban Anarchism*.

37. Fernandez, *Cuban Anarchism*, 73–76.

38. The July 26th Movement, which overthrew Fulgencio Batista, did not initially have the support of the Cuban Communist Party and was criticized by them for being *putschist*. Their platform was not explicitly socialist.

39. Fernandez, *Cuban Anarchism*, 89.

40. *Ibid.*, 125.

41. It sounds a lot like the “Revolution Betrayed” genre, which dominated in the 1960s but still has its adherents. For examples of the genre, see Fulgencio Batista, *Cuba Betrayed* (New York: Vantage Press, 1962); Theodore Draper, *Castro’s Revolution: Myths and Realities* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962); Andrés Suárez, *Cuba: Castroism and Communism, 1959–1966*, trans. Joel Carmichael and Ernst Halperin (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1967).

42. Benedict Anderson, *Under Three Flags: Anarchism and the Anti-Colonial Imagination* (New York: Verso, 2005), 72.

43. Amelia Rosenberg Weinreb, *Cuba in the Shadow of Change: Daily Life in the Twilight of the Revolution* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2009).

44. Katherine Gordy, “‘Sales + Economy + Efficiency = Revolution’?: Dollarization, Consumer Capitalism and Popular Responses in Special Period Cuba,” *Public Culture* 18.2 (Spring 2006): 383–412; Sachiko Tanuma, “Post-Utopian Irony: Cuban Narratives during the ‘Special Period’ Decade,” *POLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review* 30 (2007): 46–66.

45. Consider Jamaica Kincaid’s scathing caricature of tourists’ naive and patronizing view of a life of leisure and inventiveness in the Caribbean in her book *A Small Place* (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1988).

46. The following represent a variety of approaches: Arnold August, *Democracy in Cuba and the 1997–98 Elections* (La Habana: Editorial José Martí, 1999); Carollee Bengelsdorf, *The Problem of Democracy in Cuba: Between Vision and Reality* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); and Peter Roman, *People's Power: Cuba's Experience with Representative Government* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001).

47. E.g. Sujatha Fernandes, *Cuba Represent! Cuban Arts, State Power, and the Making of New Revolutionary Cultures* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006); Gordy, “‘Sales + Economy + Efficiency = Revolution’?”; Adrian H. Hearn, *Cuba: Religion, Social Capital, and Development* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008).

48. Original version:

En estos tiempos, donde ser diferente al resto de la sociedad es un delito, y tener una forma propia de pensar es un pecado capital, no nos queda otra alternativa q dejar clara nuestra posicion con respecto a todas las esferas del poder mundial, no confiamos en nadie, representamos a miles de millones de personas sufridas en el mundo, ante tanta tristeza y desamparo aqui va nuestra respuesta!!”

Lyrics (all sic.) available at <http://thegangstazone.foroactivo.com/cerrado-ve-a-wwwforohiphoplinenet-f2/los-aldeanos-letras-t45.htm>, accessed 18 June 2010.

49. Original version: “Anarquía, ya no mas dirigentes, ni policías, en los cinco continentes, muerte al jefe q miente, y libertad, para un planeta inocente, no mas gente q hablen por ti, no q destilan por ti, no q piensen por ti”: (Ibid., all sic.).

50. Juan C. Toledano Redondo, “From Socialist Realism to Anarchist Capitalism: Cuban Cyberpunk,” *Science Fiction Studies* 32.3 (November 2005): 450.

51. Ibid., 442.

52. Ibid., 451.

53. Ibid., 453–54.

54. Ibid., 460.

55. See Ernesto Guevara, “Guerrilla Warfare: A Method (September 1963),” in *Che Guevara Reader: Writings on Politics and Revolution*, 2d expanded ed., ed. David Deutschmann (New York: Ocean Press, 2003): 70–84.

56. In this sense, Latin American Marxism shares some of the central concerns of classical anarchist political thought. At the same time, Latin American Marxists have also been less averse to nationalism than has orthodox Marxism, and this, as we saw in the instance of Cuban anarchism, has sometimes made anarchist/communist alliances more difficult. See, for instance, Jose Carlos Mariátegui, *Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1971); Carlos Fonseca, “Nicaragua: Zero Hour,” in *Sandinistas Speak: Speeches, Writings, and Interviews with Leaders of Nicaragua's Revolution* (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1982), 27–51.

57. One might surmise from Guevara's decision in 1965 to abandon Cuba and return to the battlefield in Africa and South America that he was never comfortable with his various ministerial positions.

58. For a discussion of its relevance to contemporary developments in and debates about the Cuban economy, see Helen Yaffe, “Che's Guevara's Enduring Legacy: Not the Foco but the Theory of Socialist Construction,” *Latin American Perspectives* 36.2 (March 2009): 49–65.

59. Ernesto Guevara, “A New Culture of Work,” in *Che Guevara Reader*, 145.

60. Ibid., 146.

61. Ernesto Guevara, “Socialism and Man in Cuba,” in *Che Guevara Reader*, 216.

62. Guevara, “A New Culture of Work,” 144.

63. Guevara, “Socialism and Man in Cuba,” 217.

64. Ernesto Guevara, “On the Budgetary Finance System,” in *Che Guevara Reader*, 185–86.

65. Guevara, “Socialism and Man in Cuba,” 219.

66. “Let us ask, if the proletariat is to be the ruling class, over whom is it to rule? In short, there will remain another proletariat, which will be subdued to this new rule, to this new state. For instance, the peasant ‘rabble’ who, as it is known, does not enjoy the sympathy of the

Marxists who consider it to represent a lower level of culture, will probably be ruled by the factory proletariat of the cities”: Michael Bakunin, *Statism and Anarchy*, in *Bakunin on Anarchism*, ed. Sam Dolgoff (New York: Black Rose Books, 2002), 330.

67. Dolgoff, *The Cuban Revolution*, 154.

68. Guevara, “Socialism and Man in Cuba,” 220.

69. “[T]he sensuous appropriation for and by man of the human essence and of human life, of objective man, of human achievements—is not to be conceived merely in the sense of direct, one-sided gratification—merely in the sense of possessing, of having. Man appropriates his total essence in a total manner, that is to say, as a whole man. Each of his human relations to the world—seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling, thinking, being aware, sensing, wanting, acting, loving—in short, all the organs of his individual being, like those organs which are directly social in their form, are in their objective orientation or in their orientation to the object, the appropriation of that object, the appropriation of the human world . . .”: Karl Marx, *The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, in *The Marx/Engels Reader*, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978), 87.

70. Guevara, “Socialism and Man in Cuba,” 220.

71. Guevara, “A New Culture of Work,” 149.

72. Dolgoff, *The Cuban Revolution*, 154.

73. Original version [all sic.]:

Es el hambre a ser un ser verdaderamente individual no una cifra mas, mil no se cuantos van a la escuela, mil no se cuantos van al hospital, mil no se cuantos son miembros del cdr, mil no se cuantos diplomas, eso es el hambre que nos hizo ver el morro una vez por año cuando mejor estamos, aca tampoco hay libertad por que depende del dinero, pero al menos dejastes de ser un numero mas en la jodida burocracia estatal corrompida de la isla de nunca jamas aunque somos mil no se cuantos cubanos que residen en el extranjero sospechosos de haber cometido el delito de querer ser diferentes.

74. Reinaldo Arenas, *Before Night Falls* (New York: Penguin Books, 1994), 288.

75. Centro de Estudios Sobre América, “Balance Político de las Tareas Cumplidas en el Quinquenio 1991–1995,” in Mauricio Giuliano, *El Caso CEA: Intelectuales e Inquisidores en Cuba ¿Perestroika en la Isla?* (Miami: Ediciones Universal, 1998), 163.

76. See Raul Castro, *El futuro de nuestra patria será un eterno Baragua: Llamamiento al IV Congreso del PCC* (Havana: Editora Política, 1990).

77. The report was published in the Party paper a week later. See Raul Castro, “Informe del Buró Político,” *Granma*, 27 March 1996: 5.

78. See, for instance, Alberto F. Alvarez García and Gerardo González Núñez, *¿Intelectuales vs. revolución? El caso del Centro de Estudios sobre América* (Montreal: Ediciones Arte, 2001); Mauricio Giuliano, *El Caso CEA*.

79. Centro de Estudios Sobre América, “Balance Político de las Tareas Cumplidas en el Quinquenio 1991–1995,” in *El Caso CEA*, 171, 176.

80. Centro de Estudios Sobre América, “Primera reunion de la Comisión del CC del PCC con el Consejo de Dirección, April 12, 1996,” in *El Caso CEA*, 184–189.

81. I deal with the case of CEA in greater detail in my book manuscript. Katherine Gordy, “Living Ideology: The Principles and Practices of Cuban Socialism.”

82. Boaventura de Sousa Santos calls these differences “equal differences” because they “celebrate social diversity as a way to eliminate hierarchies”: Santos, “Cuba: A Problem for the Left?”

Chapter Four

Kant via Rancière: From Ethics to Anarchism

Todd May

The name of Immanuel Kant has often been invoked in recent theories of democracy. His ethics form the reference point for political thought as diverse as that of John Rawls and Robert Nozick. Such an invocation is often a matter of historical or philosophical framing, although it does seem to suggest the appeal of philosophical pedigree as well. Since I am not above such appeal, I am also going to utilize Kant's ethics in framing a somewhat different view of democracy. In doing so, I will, in keeping with recent tradition, not go so far as to offer a transcendental deduction of political duties or rights of the kind found, say, in the *Metaphysic of Morals*. Instead, I would like to engage in what readers will all agree is the much less controversial, indeed the blindingly obvious, task of demonstrating that a proper reading of Kantian ethics has him issuing out on the political level as an anarchist.

In order to do so, I will, as it were, pass Kant's ethics through the political strainer of the contemporary French theorist Jacques Rancière. Many readers, I suspect, are not familiar, or at least not very familiar, with Rancière's thought. His works are just now beginning to receive the attention in the English-speaking world that they deserve. Therefore, I will try as I go along to offer a general framework of his thought. Roughly, however, the guiding idea here will be that Kant's ethics would lead us politically toward the presupposition of one another's equality, which in turn would lead us toward a deeply nonhierarchical politics.

Kant's own view of politics was not entirely nonhierarchical. It would probably not be overstating the case to say that, at the political level, Kant was not a radical egalitarian. His political concerns, especially in the *Metaphysics of Morals*, center on the preservation of freedom, which Kant seems

to see as largely a matter of freedom from coercion. "Right," he tells us, "is therefore the sum of the conditions under which the choice of one can be united with the choice of another in accordance with a universal law of freedom."¹ With this thought, Kant seeks to align his politics with his ethics. We might put the alignment roughly this way: that freedom is the supposition that must be thought to be the character of beings inasmuch as we take them as rational. This is because freedom is the ability to act rationally as opposed to being controlled by one's instincts and desires. To act rationally is, of course, to act in accordance with the categorical imperative (further explained below). Therefore, a political system of rational beings must be a system that preserves the conditions of the freedom; that is, the conditions under which it is possible for rational beings to act rationally. Fundamental to that preservation is noninterference with action.

This condition of choice can be preserved under a number of different political regimes, and there is nothing in the *Metaphysics of Morals* that would militate toward an egalitarian as opposed to a hierarchical form of government as the ground of preservation of choice. Kant's preferred orientation in that text is for a constitutional form of government, one that has more affinity with the liberal tradition than with the anarchism with which I am trying to align his ethics.

Those who have appropriated the Kantian ethical framework, although comfortable with his liberal orientation, have not followed him down the path of a transcendental deduction of political rights and duties. This, I think, has much to do with the character of the political world. It is thought by some that, at least in the case of ethics, one might cut, to one extent or another, one's moorings in the empirical world in order to derive or create an ethical system. This idea, of course, has been challenged by a variety of naturalisms, but it has a certain staying power that has not been true of political thought. One of the reasons for this is captured by the more recent work of John Rawls, in his compelling revisionary interpretation of the earlier work of the philosopher John Rawls. In *Justice as Fairness*,² for instance, he argues that any political philosophy that is to prescribe for a complex contemporary society must acknowledge at the outset the existence of reasonable but divergent worldviews, or what he calls "comprehensive doctrines." The implication here, in contrast to Kant's view, is that we cannot appeal to the character of reason divested of all empirical content in order to derive the proper rights and duties of a just political order.

One might want to argue here that Kant's principles can perhaps accommodate Rawls's diversity of comprehensive moral doctrines. That may be true, but it is not the point we are trying to focus on here. At issue is not the question of what political principles ought to be embraced by a particular political philosophy that is grounded in Kantian ethical content. For the moment, what I'm insisting on is that the structure of Rawls's later political

liberalism is distinct from Kant's in not being founded on a transcendental deduction from the necessary character of rational beings; that is, the conditions of possibility for a political order grounded in rationality. It is instead founded on the empirical observation that there are a lot of people out there with different moral frameworks who don't seem entirely unreasonable for all that.

Even if we accept this idea, or any number of others that will move us away from a transcendental deduction of political rights and duties, this does not mean that we need to abandon the specific rights and duties endorsed by Kant. However, it might help loosen the grip of another thought: that to accept a Kantian ethics commits us to accepting Kant's political view. For my purposes, that's all that is required. What I am going to propose here is that if we accept something broadly like Kant's categorical imperative with respect to people, particularly as it is found in the second and third formulations of the categorical imperative, then we should look, via Rancière, toward an egalitarian view of politics. I have no plans to argue that Kant's ethical view is right, but am counting on the idea that the general thrust of his thought—that we should treat others as ends and not simply as means and that we should think of ethics as envisioning a kingdom of ends—has at least a breezy plausibility with most readers, particularly those interested in an egalitarian politics.

Let us recall briefly the second and third formulations of the categorical imperative. The second formulation reads, "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means but always at the same time as an end."³ And the third formulation calls for rational beings to act in accordance with a kingdom of ends, a kingdom being defined as "a systematic union of different rational beings under common laws."⁴ We are familiar with the picture Kant is drawing here. To treat someone as an end rather than simply as a means is to treat them as having intrinsic value. But it is to do more than that. For why does one treat them as having intrinsic value? Or better, what is the intrinsic value that forms the ground on which to act toward them? For Kant it is, of course, rationality. Rational beings are to be treated not merely as a means but also as an end. Moreover, for Kant, rationality is not a matter of degree. One has it, or one does not. The implication here is that all those who possess rationality possess it in equal measure in this particular sense. They are in something akin to, although not exactly, what the philosopher Wilfrid Sellars would call "the space of reasons," the inferential space we navigate when we reason to ourselves or with one another.⁵ And if one is to be treated as having intrinsic value on the basis of one's rationality, one is to be treated—and to treat others—as equally possessed of such value. That is to say that one is to see others as having intrinsic value equal to oneself, since the

intrinsic value one has on the basis of which one is to be treated as an end is equal to that of other rational beings.

This thought leads naturally into the idea of a kingdom of ends. If everyone possesses rationality to the same extent, or better, if rationality is a binary category and so precludes the idea of extent, then every rational being is to be treated as an end. A society in which the categorical imperative was generally followed would be a union of beings each of whom treated all the others as ends. And, if we take the term *common laws* in a broad sense to refer to the ways these rational beings agree to live together, then the kingdom of ends is a society of rational beings treating one another equally inasmuch as they are all rational beings. And, since it is rationality that is at issue in matters of ethics, we might put this point by saying that, from the standpoint of ethics, the kingdom of ends is one in which everyone treats everyone else as an equal; that is, a moral equal.

For Kant, as we have seen, the political implication of treating one another as equals is the preservation of freedom negatively defined; that is, as free from interference. However, one might raise the question of whether in fact the preservation of negative freedom is a real preservation of freedom. And, indeed, we will raise this question in a bit, at the point, unsurprising as it is, where we briefly drag Robert Nozick's name into the discussion. Before turning there, though, I want to step away from Kant and into the thought of Jacques Rancière in order to remark on an affinity between his thought and that of Kant, one that has so far gone unnoticed in the literature. Of course, since the literature does not yet have a lot to say about Rancière generally, we should not be haunted by the existence of this particular scholarly gap.

In 1989, Rancière published a book entitled *The Ignorant Schoolmaster*. It is a biography of a French revolutionary, Joseph Jacotot, who flees to Belgium after the Restoration in France. He is hired as a teacher of French in a Flemish area in Belgium. Unfortunately, he does not speak Flemish. This pedagogical lack, however, does not deter him. Jacotot teaches his students from a bilingual text of *Telemachus*, having them follow along in Flemish while he teaches from the French. Eventually, he gives the students assignments on *Telemachus*, to be done in French, with only this bilingual edition as a reference point. As it happens, the students perform in ways that are not only passable, but indeed superior. Jacotot decides, for this reason and several others, that people are equally intelligent. The pedagogical problem to be overcome is not, in his view, that of intelligence but rather that of attention. If students are willing to attend to the material, they, or at least most of them, will be able to grasp it.

Jacotot tests this assumption by teaching courses he doesn't know anything about, such as painting and law. He figures that if people are equally intelligent, they do not need him to delineate the material for them, and so they should be able to learn something he doesn't even know. As with the

French course, the students excel in their various studies. With this, Jacotot believes that he has evidence that people are equally intelligent.

Rancière is not particularly interested in the question of what Jacotot has or has not proved, which is probably a good thing, since we're not all likely to sign on to the idea of equal intelligence based on Jacotot's pedagogical experiments. Instead, Rancière writes, "[O]ur problem isn't proving that all intelligence is equal. It's seeing what can be done under that presupposition. And for this, it's enough for us that the opinion be possible—that is, that no opposing truth be proved."⁶ For Rancière, what is interesting in Jacotot's story is not the evidence he might have provided for the view that everyone is equally intelligent, which, after all, is pretty thin pickings. It is instead the experiment itself. It is the idea that one might act, and perhaps act successfully, presupposing the equal intelligence of others.

What might this equal intelligence consist in? We will investigate this further as things unfold but might define it initially as the ability to construct a meaningful life alongside and in interaction with others. Or, to put the point in a Sellarsian fashion, it would be the ability to inhabit the space of reasons in regard to the creation of one's life. Now this way of putting things might seem a bit individualistic. One could wonder whether the ability to inhabit that space of reasons in regard to my own life would give me any purchase on social interaction. However, we should bear in mind that the space of reasons is not a private space but indeed a social one. To be immersed in it is to be able to engage in reflection and thought that one will share with others who inhabit that space. When Rancière asks what can be done under the presupposition of equal intelligence, I take it that something like this ability to engage in reflection and thought is the equal intelligence he is presupposing. And when he asks *what can be done* under this presupposition, he is interested not in proving it but rather in what might happen if we treat one another this way.

We will soon turn to the political implications of that presupposition, which is the arena in which Rancière ultimately sets it to work. Before turning there, however, I would like to linger over the affinities between Rancière's presupposition of equality and Kant's view of freedom. This will prove important when we turn to politics, because for Rancière the presupposition of equality is what a democratic politics expresses, just as for Kant politics preserves freedom first and foremost. As Kant tells us, "*Freedom* (independence from being constrained by another's choice), insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law, is the only original right belonging to every man in virtue of his humanity."⁷ The affinities between the two can be drawn on two levels.

At the structural level, both Kant and Rancière offer their respective concepts—freedom and equal intelligence—as presuppositions rather than as evidence or proof. For Kant, of course, freedom is the presupposition that

must exist in order for someone to be considered a rational being; that is, a being capable of conforming his or her actions to the requirements of the categorical imperative. Freedom, Kant writes in the *Groundwork*, “is a mere Idea: its objective validity can in no way be exhibited by reference to laws of nature and consequently freedom can never admit of full comprehension . . . It holds only as a necessary presupposition of reason in a being to believe himself to be conscious of a will.”⁸ (We should probably note in passing that the relation of freedom to the moral law is articulated differently in the *Critique of Practical Reason*,⁹ where freedom is grounded in the “fact” of the moral law, but the key point at issue—that freedom is presupposed rather than demonstrated—remains.)

Rancière’s approach to equal intelligence is also one of presupposition rather than demonstration. It is not a necessary presupposition in the same way Kant’s is; however, we might call it a necessary presupposition in another way. For Rancière, democratic politics, or what he sometimes simply calls politics, is defined as action under the presupposition of equality. He writes, “I . . . propose to reserve the term *politics* for an extremely determined activity antagonistic to policing: whatever breaks with the tangible configuration whereby parties and parts or lack of them are defined by a presupposition that, by definition, has no place in that configuration—that of the part that has no part . . . political activity is always a mode of expression that undoes the perceptible divisions of the police order by implementing a basically heterogeneous assumption, that of the part who have no part, an assumption that, at the end of the day, itself demonstrates the contingency of the order, the equality of any speaking being with any other speaking being.”¹⁰ We will return to the concept of policing below, but let us note two things for the moment. First, in Rancière’s view, we all live in police orders, and those orders operate hierarchically; that is, on the presupposition not of the equality but of the inequality of people’s intelligence. In order for a democratic politics to take place, then, it is necessary to presuppose the equal intelligence of what Rancière calls all “speaking beings.” Second, and related, the “part that has no part” consists of those who are viewed as not properly having a part to play in determining social arrangements. They can be workers, woman, blacks, or whoever is thought to be less than equal to those that are thought justifiably to have a part to play in making such determinations.

We might mark the limits of the analogy between these two presuppositions by noting that while both function as the central conceptual presuppositions of their political thought, for Kant the presupposition functions transcendently while for Rancière it functions performatively.¹¹ That is, for Kant the presupposition of freedom is a condition for the possibility of taking a rational being to be rational, while for Rancière the presupposition of equal intelligence is the condition for possibility of creating a democratic move-

ment. It is true that Kant seeks to ground particular political orders, inasmuch as they are just, on this necessary presupposition. And in that sense, there seems to be a performative aspect to his thought. Moreover, although we cannot pursue this point here, one might interpret the positing of certain beings as rational to be performative itself. However, the grounding of political orders is deduced from the character of rationality, however situated, rather than performed from the activity of asking where and how far we might go with the presupposition of equal intelligence.

In addition to their structural analogy, the two concepts share a certain similarity of content, although again they are not identical. For Kant, freedom, at the ethical level, is a certain capacity. It is the capacity to act in accordance with the categorical imperative. In the *Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant insists that, "Only freedom in relation to the internal lawgiving of reason is really a capacity; the possibility of deviating from it is an incapacity."¹² Likewise, for Rancière, equal intelligence is a certain capacity. It is the capacity to make decisions for oneself through what Jacotot would call "attention" and Sellars the "space of reasons," a capacity one shares with others and can recognize oneself as sharing with others. It is the capacity that one presupposes if one is to take part in the ordering of collective life rather than to have that life ordered for one by the work of the as yet undefined concept of the police. In both cases, the concept brought into play to ground politics is a capacity for choice: in one case choice of the moral law and in the other case choice of participating in the character of collective living.

The upshot of this is that Rancière's presupposition of equal intelligence is structurally and substantively similar to that of Kant's freedom. Now, structural similarities do not display convergences of thought. My point is a smaller one. Kant sees the preservation of a presupposed freedom as the central principle of any political philosophy. Freedom is the ability to act in accordance with the moral law. The moral law prescribes treating others as ends and not simply as means and envisioning a community as a kingdom of ends. Now, what happens if we substitute for the transcendently grounded concept of freedom a concept of the presupposition of the equality of intelligence? What happens is that we can still preserve the Kantian ethical thread while giving it an arguably more direct political orientation.

To see how, let's hold on to two ideas: the categorical imperative on the one hand and the presupposition of the equality of intelligence as a substitute for freedom on the other. What, then, would the transition from ethics to politics look like? The categorical imperative demands that we treat rational beings as ends rather than simply as means. Here, by rational beings we will mean beings that are equally intelligent in the sense we have discussed. And, in envisioning the kingdom of ends, we will be envisioning a community in which everyone presupposes the equal intelligence of everyone else, again in the sense we have discussed. A political community, then, would be a com-

munity in which this ethical framework was sustained by operating on the basis of the presupposition of everyone's equal intelligence.

Now what would that look like? In order to answer this question, we need to remain clear about what is being presupposed by equal intelligence. Rancière is not claiming that equal intelligence requires that we all can understand quantum physics or string theory. The presupposition of equal intelligence, in Rancière's handling of it, is a political concept. It implies that all of us, unless we are somehow damaged emotionally or intellectually, can envision meaningful lives for ourselves and sort out to one extent or another with others how to carry out or conduct those lives. We don't need anyone, particularly anyone in a position of political authority, to dictate to us what a good life would be or how we ought to go about creating our lives. We can figure that out for ourselves alongside, rather than beneath or above, others. Alongside others implies that we are not alone and that we can make mistakes. But those mistakes can be pointed out to us; they need not be forced upon us by a social or political authority.

From here, the question is that of what a politics that operates by the categorical imperative as filtered through the presupposition of equality would look like. I will spend most of the rest of this chapter trying to sort that out. As you can see from where we've gotten so far, that view is going to be more anarchist than what's standardly put forward in the name of a Kantian political theory. But before that, I'd like to look briefly at two objections that might arise from my linking of Kant to Rancière. The first might come from those of a more Rawlsian bent, and others by those in a more Nozickian frame of mind.

From Rawls's side, it might be argued that his appropriation of Kant is more faithful to Kant than what I have just put forward. After all, although Rawls does take on board the empirical recognition of reasonable pluralism, he tries to fit that pluralism back into a more nearly transcendental framework through his construction of the original position and the veil of ignorance in *A Theory of Justice*. We might read the latter as a method to recuperate a deduction of principles for political philosophy that operates from the Kantian idea that we must treat everyone as means rather than ends while at the same time conceding the fact of reasonable pluralism. This, I take it, is at least a plausible approach to the latter Rawlsian view.

We may well grant that what Rawls accomplishes here is closer to Kant in preserving something of the transcendental flavor of his thought. Just as Kant sees the connection of ethics to politics as requiring the preservation of freedom as the condition of possibility of a community of rational beings, Rawls sees the principles generated by the original position as those that must be ratified by rational beings inasmuch as they are rational, although with differing comprehensive doctrines. However, what is lost here, and is preserved by Rancière's thought, is the *equality* of those rational beings

within a constructed political order. Kantian ethics has a strong streak of equality, as we have seen. To treat another as a rational being is to treat him or her as equally rational to oneself; that is, as one's moral equal. In Rawls' case, the equality exists in the choosing of principles—since each is equally situated behind the veil of ignorance and each position must be taken equally into account—but not after those principles are chosen. He writes, "I have supposed that once the principles of justice are chosen the parties return to their place in society and henceforth judge their claims on the social system by these principles. But if several intermediate stages are imagined to take place in a definite sequence, this sequence may give us a schema for sorting out the complications that must be faced."¹³ These intermediate stages are the formation of a constitutional order, after which people really can return to their place in society. This return to one's place in society marks the end of the fully egalitarian moment in Rawls's thought. Of course, the principles and subsequent constitutional order that one has chosen is a product of equality. The order itself, however, delegates authority to some over others, and thus violates the more radical equality stemming from our political rendering of the categorical imperative.

One might want to argue here that it is not impossible in a political order for those in authority to treat those over whom they have authority as equally intelligent. I will grant that this is not logically impossible. I'm tempted to leave the matter there, and simply add the words, "Dick Cheney." But it seems to me that there is a philosophical point in the neighborhood, which is that inasmuch as people treat one another as equally intelligent, in the sense we're discussing here, then it is difficult to maintain the kinds of boundaries between those who govern and those who are governed that is characteristic of a constitutional order. If each is equally intelligent, then mutual governance is a more natural way to construct a community. This does not preclude a constitutional order, but it does militate against it.

At this point, one might want to turn from a Rawlsian Kant to a Nozickian one. Nozick, after all, has fancied himself one step from anarchism. And yet, the orientation of his thought is entirely different from that of Rancière's. Instead of stressing equality, he stresses liberty, reading in it a preservation of Kantian autonomy. His focus is on liberty and the enforcement of what he calls side-constraints (moral limits on one's behavior), explaining, "Side constraints upon action reflect the underlying Kantian principle that individuals are ends and not merely means; they may not be sacrificed or used for the purpose of achieving other ends without their consent."¹⁴

This way of taking up Kant has the virtue, if it is one, of retaining Kant's political focus on freedom as noninterference. Nozick's view of a side-constraint is very much in keeping with Kant's idea that any political system must first and foremost preserve freedom (although, let's recall that for Kant the point of political freedom is preservation of freedom in the sense of the

ability to act in accordance with the moral law). My complaint against Nozick's taking up Kant in this fashion is a common and unexciting one. The only thing it has going for it, really, is that it's true. The attempt to preserve liberty must be had, in our world, at the cost of increasingly making liberty a formal and empty concept. Liberty, in short, is for those who can afford it, for this reason. Liberty preserves autonomy by being a bar against intervention or intrusion. Each preserves his or her liberty, which is supposed to amount to the ability to determine one's life. However, determining one's life is not something one does outside particular circumstances. Those circumstances involve a particular distribution of food, shelter, and other goods, many of which one has little control over. I am going to make the assumption that in order to determine the shape of one's life it is better to have access to some such among these goods. If this is the case, however, then there is no necessary link between liberty as a negative right and the ability to determine the course of one's life. Liberty, by itself, is nothing more than the promise that your boat won't ram up against my boat, which doesn't do me very much good if I'm on a raft in the middle of the ocean.

One can see this problem clearly by looking at Nozick's own Wilt Chamberlain example. This is the example where Chamberlain and everyone else start with the same distribution (or some other favored distribution) and things wind up with Chamberlain having more than everyone else. If we extend this example to Chamberlain's offspring and then to the offspring of some Chamberlain fanatic who spent all his money going to Chamberlain games, then we can readily see that although the liberty enjoyed by Chamberlain's offspring will assist them in determining their lives, those of the Chamberlain fanatic will, in the absence of outside intervention, have not nearly as much use for their freedom from intervention.

Because of the nature of liberty/equality debates, the worry usually arises at a point like this that while liberty by itself may not be enough for some form of self-determination, neither is equality. After all, one can have material equality without any liberty, and that doesn't lead to any kind of autonomy, either. However, the equality Rancière is focused upon is not that kind of equality. It is not simply an equality of resources. In fact, it may not be an equality of resources at all. It is, rather, an equality of intelligence, of presupposing that one can construct a meaningful life alongside and in interaction with others. This is not a matter of goods, although it is likely to involve goods at some point. It is, instead, and in keeping with much recent anarchist thought, a matter of political process.

To presuppose the equality of intelligence in this sense is to presuppose that, in conducting lives together, people can engage in reasoning and discussion with others and can orient themselves in ways that would best allow each to conduct one's life as one sees fit. This does not mean that one can do what one wants. It is not a formula for noninterference. There will probably

be conflicts in the community. There will likely be disagreement about distribution of goods, allocation of positions, extent and character of particular rights, etc. These conflicts are not solved simply by appeal to a principle of liberty but rather by discussion and resolution through a process that respects the equal intelligence of everyone involved. I will leave to the side the question of how that process might go. My point here is only to emphasize that equality of intelligence is, as a political matter, tied to the question of process rather than to that of a particular distribution or allocation.

At this point, we may seem to have arrived at a position very close to that of Jürgen Habermas, where community norms are to be decided through discussion by those in the community. However, Rancière is not Habermas, either. He is, in a particular way, more empirical than that. Habermas offers us a process for thinking through norms that respects the equality of all participants. Rancière's starting point, by contrast, is more *in media res*. His question is not that of how one might conceive a politics based on Kantian ethics, starting from scratch. If we are to read Rancière in the light of Kant, then we must read him as asking not how to construct a political *system* that would reflect a Kantian ethics but instead how we might construct political movements and realities that would reflect a Kantian ethics from within the world in which we currently live. This displays the deeply empirical thrust of Rancière's work. It is not, we might say, a Kantianism for the world, but instead a Kantianism for our world.

I can only, of course, offer a quick sketch of Rancière's framework here, but I hope it is enough to suggest how his thought of equality is placed within a political context. Rancière contrasts what he calls, borrowing from Michel Foucault's lectures at the Collège de France, the term *police* that we saw earlier, with what he calls *politics*. "Politics," he writes, "is generally seen as the set of procedures whereby the aggregation and consent of collectivities is achieved, the organization of powers, the distribution of places and roles, and the systems for legitimizing this distribution. I propose to give this system of distribution another name. I propose to call it *the police*."¹⁵ The police, then, are not the guys in uniforms with truncheons. Rather, the police is broadly the set of hierarchical distributions and their justifications characteristic of a particular society. We do not need to linger over the specifics of this concept, since for our purposes it stands as the background for the more relevant concept of politics, or what I have called democratic politics.

Let's recall, then, Rancière's elusive definition of politics.

I . . . propose to reserve the term *politics* for an extremely determined activity antagonistic to policing: whatever breaks with the tangible configuration whereby parties and parts or lack of them are defined by a presupposition that, by definition, has no place in that configuration—that of the part that has no part . . . political activity is always a mode of expression that undoes the perceptible divisions of the

police order by implementing a basically heterogeneous assumption, that of the part who have no part, an assumption that, at the end of the day, itself demonstrates the contingency of the order, the equality of any speaking being with any other speaking being.¹⁶

This, I grant, is a bit of a mouthful. In order to unpack it, it is worth focusing on the term he uses twice: the part that has no part.

In any police order, there are various hierarchies. These hierarchies often differ in different societies, but it is difficult to find an example of a society without one. There are hierarchies of gender, of race, of sexual orientation, of class, of religion, of age, etc. One of the central functions of these hierarchies is to deny participation, or at least equal participation, to those considered to be on the wrong end of the hierarchy. Putting the matter in different terms, there are those who are considered by a society as having a part to play in its direction and maintenance, and those who do not have a part. In a complex society, such as ours, there is no single strict division between those who do and do not have a part, but instead a series of distinct but often overlapping or intersecting divisions. These divisions can work in two opposing directions at the same time; for example, with upper-class women who have a part because of their class that is often denied because of their gender, but nevertheless they operate by allocating roles that have to do with, in Rancière's terms, having and not having a part.

Politics, then, as he defines it, is a matter of members of a part that has no part in a given police order acting as though they indeed do have a part, acting as though the police order which has not allocated them a part is contingent, or better arbitrary, and indeed unjustified. It is a matter of those who do not have a part presupposing that they are equal to those who do and acting on the basis of that presupposition. As Rancière puts the point, they act on the presupposition of the equality of any speaking being with any other speaking being.

How might such a politics look? We must note first that one cannot define a politics of equality by speaking of a generic type of action. A strike, a demonstration, a protest of some sort or another, might or might not be an expression of the presupposition of equality. For instance, the recent demonstrations of immigrants, both illegal and legal, here in the United States was an example of such politics, particularly among the illegal immigrants, since they acted on the presupposition of their equality with U.S. citizens by publicly demonstrating. Alternatively, a demonstration against, say, equal rights for gays and lesbians would not so much qualify as politics in the Rancièrian sense. Whether an act or a campaign is one of such a politics is a matter of interpretation. Rancière notes, "Equality is not a given that politics puts into application, an essence incarnated in the law, or a goal that is to be attained.

It is only a presupposition that must be discerned in the practices that implement it."¹⁷

Second, this presupposition is instantiated not in what is offered to people by their governing institutions, which already presupposes a hierarchy between grantor and grantee, but instead by people acting on their own behalf, or in solidarity with those who act on their own behalf. This is where Rancière's politics displays its particular Kantian ethical flavor. The animating presupposition of equality is one that takes everyone to be equally capable of creating meaningful lives for themselves. Thus, in an act or movement of politics in Rancière's sense, one treats oneself and those around one as equals, as partners rather than as superiors or inferiors. Again, this does not entail that people cannot be wrong in their views. What it entails is the distinction between being mistaken and needing the authority of another. If I am mistaken, this will come out in our conversation or our interactions with one another. If, alternatively, I need the authority of another, it is because I am less capable than the other of getting things right; I am unequal to that other.

One simple example of politics as collective action from the presupposition of equality is the lunch counter sit-ins of the civil rights movement. Here blacks and whites sat together in the simple activity of ordering lunch at segregated lunch counters. There were, to be sure, requests being made: people, after all, were requesting lunch. However, that request was based upon an action that presupposed that everyone who sat down at a particular lunch counter was equal to everyone else who sat down at that lunch counter. And that presupposition is precisely a Kantian one: it treats everyone as not merely a means but also as an end, it does so by treating everyone equally, and in doing so it acts within a general vision of a kingdom of ends.

One might object here that, in fact, the motivation for the lunch counter sit-ins had nothing to do with the presupposition of equality. Rather, it was a tactic that was used to reveal the inequality suffered by African Americans in a particularly stark way. The participants in the sit-ins knew that they were going to be reviled and perhaps even attacked. They did not act on the presupposition of equality, then, but instead on a tactical understanding of what was likely to occur.

We should not think of the presupposition of equality, however, solely in psychological terms. Although mentally presupposing equality would often be a good indicator of the presupposition of equality at work, it can nevertheless be at work even without conscious awareness of it by the actors. That is what Rancière means when he speaks of discerning the presupposition in practices that implement it. Whether an act or a movement operates on the presupposition of equality is a matter of interpretation, and the actors themselves do not have exclusive privilege to decide on that either way. It is open to us, then, and I think it is right, to interpret the lunch counter sit-ins as

actions presupposing the equality of everyone regardless of any tactical decisions involved.

We are left, then, with the question of what all this might have to do with democracy. The traditional Kantian framework used by thinkers such as Rawls, Nozick, and Kant himself have an obvious connection to democracy that runs through a constitutional order. What these philosophers seek is to conceive a constitutional order that is democratic, a project that we can understand even where we disagree with it. Rancière, by contrast, offers us no vision of a political order at all. Instead, he characterizes a way of conceiving particular political movements. We may find this characterization attractive, but should we really use the appellation *democratic* to refer to it?

I hope it will not shock anyone at this point if I say that I believe that answer to that question is, Yes. Here's why. What is it that makes it seem as though what Rawls, Nozick, and Kant are after politically is democratic? It is precisely the equality that animates their thought. As Amartya Sen has written, "a common characteristic of virtually all the approaches to the ethics of social arrangements that have stood the test of time is to want equality of *something*—something that has an important place in the particular theory."¹⁸ For Rawls, that equality has to do with the situation of those who decide upon distributive principles, for Nozick it is the preservation of equal liberty, and for Kant the preservation of freedom. Were it not for the role equality plays in their thought there would be no temptation to think of these political philosophies as democratic ones. What motivates us to group them under the common category of democracy is precisely the fact that they center themselves on various conceptions of equality. I do not think it would be overstating the case to say that minimal requirement on a political order that wants to be called democratic is that it treats its members with equal respect, which is not identical, of course, with treating them all the same way.

If this is right, then what Rancière offers us is in keeping with these other thinkers, with this exception: he claims that if equality is the measure of democracy, then no constitutional order will, ultimately, be democratic. Rather, democracy lies with the people who act on behalf of the presupposition of their equality. Otherwise put, democracy is not a matter of distributive justice; it is a matter of egalitarian action. As Rancière puts the point, "Every politics is democratic in this precise sense: not in the sense of a set of institutions, but in the sense of forms of expression that confront the logic of equality with the logic of the police order."¹⁹ In short, a Kantian politics, a politics that seeks to ground itself in an ethics akin to the second and third formulations of the categorical imperative, is probably better realized in forms of radical egalitarian action than in a constitutional order. This is a thought that likely did not occur to Kant, and it is not, to my knowledge, a central tenet of current mainstream political philosophy. But that, to my

mind, has more to do with the trajectory and dominance of the liberal tradition in political philosophy than with the relation of ethics to democracy.

One might want to complain at this point that to view democracy this way is to lose its tie to any political order. Inasmuch as societies are in one way or another bound to constitutional or other legal orders, and there cannot be a truly democratic political order of this type, then we have lost something important in withdrawing the idea of democracy from these orders. If we cannot say of some constitutional or legal orders that they are more democratic than others, then we wind up painting them all with too broad a brush-stroke and failing to distinguish between more and less just orders.

There is something right in this thought, and something wrong as well. There are, of course, better and worse political orders, more and less just *police* orders, to use Rancière's terms. Those of us who have just endured eight years of the Bush administration would readily concede that. Moreover, there are political orders that are more or less nearly democratic, if we want to use that terminology. Put another way, there are political orders that more or less treat their members as equals. Rancière is quick to concede both that police orders will always be with us and that we can and should distinguish between the better and worse ones.

However, if we assimilate the idea of democracy to that of political orders that are, ultimately, hierarchical in their character, we risk losing the central idea that has come to be associated with democracy: that of equality. I believe the dominance of neoliberal theory and its purported link to democracy is recent evidence of that. It is not that we can do without police orders of one sort or another. Whether we can is a question, at least at this point, of speculation. I, for one, am doubtful, but maybe that's just me. Moreover, there can be better and worse police orders. None of this, however, should be confused with democracy as the presupposition of the equality of anyone and everyone. This is an idea that we must keep alive, one that we must not dilute in the hierarchies that are our ether.

One might object here that, just as the constitutional systems from which I am distancing the idea of democracy are never really bereft of inequality, neither is any movement of the kind Rancière describes. There are hierarchies in movements of equality: in civil rights movements, feminist movements, proletarian movements, movements of local or national emancipation. This, indeed, is often if not always true. What is distinct about such movements, however, and what gives them a better chance at instantiating or at least embodying more nearly the presupposition of equality, is that they are not hierarchical at the outset. Constitutional orders, even those grounded in more just liberal theories, distinguish between those who distribute and those who receive. There remains always the difference between those who play a part and those who do not, or who do not except every few years when they participate in choosing those who will play a part. Movements of the kind

Rancière frames are not precluded from a radical equality at the outset. The extent to which one or another movement can rise to the occasion is a matter always to be seen, and rarely to be fully seen. However, to one extent or another, and distinct from any order that requires a hierarchy, at least they've got a shot.

Rancière insists that, "Democracy first of all means this: anarchic 'government,' one based on nothing other than the absence of every title to govern."²⁰ This, I have argued, is the thought we should associate with a democratic politics and a thought we should associate with Kantian ethics. In a world where many vie for the opportunity to lead us, it offers a way of thinking that allows us to consider the possibility, to one extent or another and in the ways possible, of leading ourselves. It is a framework for bringing a dignity to politics, *our* dignity to politics, instead of allowing it to be the sad and ignoble affair it so often is. It is a framework that allows us to see one another as fellow human beings, worthy not simply of our business but, as Kant reminds us, of our respect. And although, as I have conceded, it may not ultimately supply us with a blueprint for a just social or political order, it has at least the virtue of reminding us of who it is that composes, sustains, and ultimately can challenge any political order and of the promise of democracy on which such a challenge can be based.

NOTES

1. Immanuel Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991 [1797]), 56. In discussion James Bohman and Kenneth Baynes have offered a more republican interpretation of Kant that sees him as interested in non-domination rather than liberty. Although an engagement with such an interpretation is beyond the scope of this paper, I am grateful for their comments. A republican interpretation of Kant of this sort would bring Kant closer to Rancière's concerns, but there would still be a break between them around the issue of democracy and constitutionalism discussed below.

2. John Rawls, *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001).

3. Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. H. J. Paton (New York: Harper and Row, 1964 [1785]), 96.

4. *Ibid.*, 100.

5. For the origin of this famous phrase, see Wilfrid Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997 [1956]).

6. Jacques Rancière, *The Ignorant Schoolmaster*, trans. Kristin Ross (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1991 [1987]), 46.

7. Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals*, 63.

8. Kant, *Groundwork*, 127.

9. Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Practical Reason*, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997 [1788]).

10. Jacques Rancière, *Disagreement*, trans. Julie Rose (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999 [1995]), 29–30.

11. I am grateful to Mark Lance for suggesting the idea of performativity here, which replaces an earlier and less helpful formulation of mine.
12. Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals*, 52.
13. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 196.
14. Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* (New York: Basic Books), 30–31.
15. Rancière, *Disagreement*, 28.
16. *Ibid.*, 29–30.
17. Jacques Rancière, *La Mésentente* (Paris: Editions Galilée, 1995), 57.
18. Amartya Sen, *Inequality Reexamined* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), ix.
19. Rancière, *Disagreement*, 101.
20. Jacques Rancière, *Hatred of Democracy*, trans. Steve Corcoran (London: Verso 2006 [2005]), 41.

Chapter Five

Nietzsche, Aristocratism, and Non-domination

Vanessa Lemm

Anarchism, as Saul Newman pointed out, is for Nietzsche the most extreme heir to democratic values, the most rabid expression of the herd instinct and of resentment which seeks to level the differences between individuals bringing everything down to the level of the lowest common denominator.¹ Erasing the pathos of distance between the master and the slave means erasing the sense of difference and superiority through which great values are created and hence, according to Newman, anarchism represents for Nietzsche the worst excess of the European nihilism, the death of values and creativity.² However, rather than rejecting Nietzsche's critique of anarchism, Newman uses it to unmask the hidden strains of resentment in the Manichean political thinking of classical anarchists overcoming their shortcomings and thus giving new life to what he calls "postanarchism."³ He understands postanarchism as an alternative conception of collective action developed from a rearticulation of the relationship between equality and freedom, a politics which refuses "to sacrifice difference in the name of universality and universality in the name of difference."⁴

This article wishes to contribute to the articulation of such an alternative politics by revisiting Nietzsche's conception of aristocratic culture.⁵ Nietzsche's vision of a future aristocratic society has frequently been interpreted as a striving for the realization of aristocratic culture by means of an authoritarian politics of domination and exploitation.⁶ In these interpretations, Nietzsche appears as a neoconservative thinker who looks "back to the social orders that developed in Europe between the Renaissance and the emergence of bourgeois political orders, and forward to a time when similar cultural aristocracies might be established."⁷ Against such interpretations, I argue

that Nietzsche returns to the past for instruction but not in order to find in the past a political order suitable for the future: "We 'conserve' nothing; neither do we want to return to any past . . ." ⁸ Against the Conservatives (moralists and political parties) of his time Nietzsche holds that "a *reversion*, a turning back in any sense and to any degree, is quite impossible." ⁹ Instead, Nietzsche is interested in the coming to be of a "new aristocracy," a "higher form of aristocracy," an aristocracy of the future which aims at the cultivation of practices of freedom and forms of sociability which can only be understood from a horizon which is beyond an authoritarian politics of domination and exploitation. ¹⁰ At the center of this vision of the future stands the untimely question: "What is noble? What does the word 'noble' still mean to us today?" ¹¹ I argue that Nietzsche's answer to this question also provides an answer to the question of "how not to be governed?" and that his vision of a future aristocratic society reflects an aristocracy of spirit which may be ascribed to the anarchist tradition.

In order to be able to appreciate the possible value of Nietzsche's "aristocratic radicalism" for postanarchism, it is essential that one understands that his aristocratism is not political but spiritual-cultural in nature. ¹² First of all, it stands for an alternative form of sociability that is, as in the anarchist tradition, directly opposed to the violence and cruelty of modern state politics. ¹³ This chapter reexamines the notions of responsibility (*Verantwortung*), reverence (*Ehrfurcht*) and order of rank (*Rangordnung*) found at the core of Nietzsche's aristocratic conception of culture. An analysis of these notions, furthermore, suggests that an aristocratic society, as Nietzsche imagines it, is a horizontal ordering of equally respected antagonistic powers whose struggle for and against each other is directed toward the ennobling elevation of the value and significance of the singular individual's responsibility. Nietzsche's vision of a "higher aristocracy" offers an idea of individual freedom which may be of value to postanarchism insofar as it is generated from the continuous resistance and overcoming of moral, social, and political forms of domination. Finally, Nietzsche's conception of an aristocratic society ordered by rank provides an idea of equality that stems from the recognition (reverence) of the other's irreducible difference and singularity, thus constituting a counterforce to the leveling and normalizing tendencies found in modern mass society irrespective of their political ideologies. ¹⁴

CULTURE & POLITICS: THE SPIRITUAL-CULTURAL ELEVATION OF THE SINGULAR INDIVIDUAL

Examples from Nietzsche's early and late work confirm that throughout his writing career he holds on to the idea that nobility reflects a highpoint of

spiritual power that manifests itself as the “courageous visibility” of singularity,¹⁵ and that the supreme aim of an aristocratic society is to attribute “the highest value and the deepest significance” to the irreducible singularity of its members.¹⁶ In *Beyond Good and Evil*, he claims that such an elevation of the human being “has so far been the work of an aristocratic society—and it will be so again and again—a society that believes in the long ladder of an order of rank and differences in value between human being and human being, and that needs slavery in some sense or other.”¹⁷ This passage from *Beyond Good and Evil* has typically been interpreted to mean that since “higher culture” rests on the “work of an aristocratic society” which “believes in the long ladder of an order of rank and differences in value between human being and human being,” the kind of politics which favors the “work of an aristocratic society” must itself reflect belief “in the long ladder of an order of rank,” etc. In other words, the realization of “higher culture” requires an authoritarian and elitist politics of domination and exploitation. In such a reading, the notion of an order of rank gets interpreted as a hierarchical political order which institutes inequality between human beings. Against this view, I hold that the notion of order of rank must be understood within the context of Nietzsche’s more general conception of aristocratic culture and cannot, as I will show below, be given the kind of political meaning illustrated by the reading of the passage concerning the features of aristocratic society cited above.¹⁸ In my account, the notion of order of rank is part of Nietzsche’s canon of noble values: it defines the noble individual and its way of evaluating rather than any given social or political order. Accordingly, the realization of noble values requires not the institution of an aristocratic political order but, on the contrary, the enhancement of aristocratic culture and education.¹⁹

Furthermore, the above reading of *Beyond Good and Evil* §257 misses the more general point that in Nietzsche culture and politics cannot be identified with each other, since he conceives them as opposed to each other: “Culture and the state—one should not deceive oneself over this—are antagonists. [. . .] All great cultural epochs are epochs of political decline: that which is great in the cultural sense has been unpolitical (*unpolitisch*), even *anti-political* (*anti-politisch*). . . .”²⁰ Nietzsche throughout his writing career holds onto the idea that culture is superior to politics:

The state takes it upon itself to debate, and even decide on the questions of culture: as if the state were not itself a means, a very inferior means of culture! . . . ‘A German Reich’ — how many ‘German Reichs’ do we have to count for one Goethe! . . . The great moments of culture have always been, morally speaking, times of corruption.²¹

According to Nietzsche, the state should not be involved in matters of culture. Even if it furthers the ennobling elevation of the human being, it does so only indirectly and despite itself. Even a *Kulturstaat*, as Nietzsche imagines it in his early writings, does not make culture “superfluous” in the sense of resolving problems of culture by means of politics.²² A similar point has been made by Emma Goldman when she gives priority to culture over politics because she believed that revolutions must be cultural as well as political.²³

Nietzsche does not—and this is remarkable—use the term *aristocratic politics* or *aristocratic state*. Nietzsche does speak of “aristocracy” in relation to the historical occurrences of aristocratic political regimes, as for example ancient Greek aristocracies and the aristocratic forms of government found in Venice and in seventeenth-century France,²⁴ but, interestingly, when he speaks of his vision of a future aristocracy, the latter is strictly opposed to the exercise of political power,²⁵ indicating that the individual does not draw its nobility from political power and that the possession of political power is not something that ennoble the individual because the spiritual power of the noble is antithetical to the political power of the state.²⁶

However, Nietzsche does use in aphorism 358 of *The Gay Science* the term *noble institution* in the context of a comparison between the modern state and the Roman Catholic Church:

Let us not forget in the end what a church is, specifically as opposed to any “state”: a church is above all a structure for ruling that secures the highest rank to the *more spiritual* human being and that *believes* in the power of spirituality to the extent of forbidding itself the use of all cruder instruments of force; and on that score alone the church is under all circumstances a *nobler* institution than the state.²⁷

Nietzsche recalls that what makes for an institution’s nobility is not violence and force, a so-called politics of cruelty²⁸, but a belief in the power of spirituality.²⁹ The repeated return of a nobility and spirituality that are opposed to the violence and cruelty of politics seem to confirm that Nietzsche’s “aristocratic radicalism,” as Brandes already suggested, is not political but spiritual-cultural in nature.³⁰

RESPONSIBILITY & FREEDOM: THE RIGHTS & DUTIES OF THE NOBLE INDIVIDUAL

If nobility and singularity belong together in the way I have been suggesting; namely, that the aim of an “aristocratic society” is to attribute the highest meaning to that in individuals which makes them irreducibly different and distinct, then this would explain why in Nietzsche the question “What is

noble? What does the word *noble* still mean for us today?" is immediately followed by the question "What is a noble human being?" or "What betrays, what allows one to recognize the noble human being?"³¹ It is important to stress that here nobility denotes neither the superiority of an aristocratic class in contrast to a slave class nor the superiority of a noble race in contrast to a slave race, but that nobility above all belongs to the specific character traits of an individual (noble type) and to its unique way of evaluating (noble morality). In other words, the term *nobility* as it is employed by Nietzsche is not a political, social, or racial qualification.³²

Interestingly, when Nietzsche speaks of nobility and of social classes, he finds "among the common people, among the less educated, especially among peasants . . . more *relative* nobility of taste and tactful reverence than among the newspaper-reading *demi-monde* of the spirit, the educated";³³ and that "stronger natures," the type "solitary," strive in the "lowest and socially most abandoned elements . . . more certainly than in the middle classes!"³⁴ Nietzsche does not link nobility to a "higher," supposedly aristocratic, class. On the contrary, he sees in the class of the workers the higher, i.e., nobler, class of the future projecting that the worker will learn to "feel like a soldier" and claim "an honorarium, an income" instead of "payment."³⁵ Whereas payment cashes out maximal utility, honorarium pays with respect to achievement, i.e., to the realization of will to power. Q. P. Taylor observes the same phenomenon in Nietzsche's early work:³⁶ Nietzsche applies the word *slave* or *slavery* to businessman, scholars, and scientist with greater frequency than to the "wage slave" or to physical servitude and, moreover, identifies the "lower class as a potential source of wisdom and virtue."³⁷

Nietzsche, like Dostoevsky, opposes the nobility of the lower classes (peasants and workers) to the vulgarity of the middle class. Dostoevsky, through the figure of Father Zossima in *The Brother Karamazov*, for example, calls for a spiritual alliance between the Russian monks and the Russian peasants. He believes that only such an alliance could save Russia from being overruled by the economical and political power of the rising bourgeoisie, on the one hand, and the "slavery and self-destruction" spread by bourgeois ideology based on the idea that to be free means to satisfy and to multiply one's desires, on the other.³⁸ The fact that Nietzsche identifies nobility with the lower classes might indicate that what needs to be brought out is the compatibility (rather than the incompatibility) of aristocratic culture with democratic politics in his political philosophy.³⁹ I will briefly return to this idea in the conclusion of this chapter.

Despite Nietzsche's insistence that he is interested in the specific character traits of the noble type and not in the political and economical power of the ruling class,⁴⁰ commentators have often politicized the relation between the noble and the slave in misleading ways; that is, as a hierarchical relation between rulers and ruled, interpreting the noble type as the type of a political

leader or despotic ruler.⁴¹ A passage from *Beyond Good and Evil* suggests that the noble and the slave types and their modes of evaluation, strictly speaking, do not correspond to a noble and a slave individual because the noble and the slavish, much like the Dionysian and the Apollonian, refer to powers which do not exist in isolation from each other but are always already involved for and against each other:

There are *master morality* and *slave morality*—I add immediately that in all higher and more mixed cultures there also appear attempts at mediation between the two moralities, and yet more often the interpenetration and mutual misunderstanding of both, and at times they occur directly alongside each other—even in the same human being, within a *single* soul.⁴²

The noble and the slave types and their modes of evaluation are inseparable: they are “mixed up” with each other, inseparably “enlaced with each other.”⁴³ Accordingly, Nietzsche holds that those who want to take on the question “What is noble?” and write about the “inner motives of the human being” should themselves have gone through the “most important stages of human development” and should themselves have been both “aristocratic and plebian.”⁴⁴

One of the main character traits assigned to the noble type is the pathos of distance.⁴⁵ Some commentators argue that this pathos of distance rests on the institution of “social strata” because the being at a distance of the noble type is dependent on the recognition of this distance by others.⁴⁶ Against this view, I hold that because the noble individual as a creator of values feels itself at a distance, it does not require these values (and its value) to be recognized by others. These values (and its value) remain at a distance: “the noble type of human being feels itself as determining values; it does not need approval from others (*sich gut heissen zu lassen*).”⁴⁷ Since the noble type is defined by its power to name, to create values, it follows that the noble type does not let itself be named (valued) by others. Recognition by others, in the form of the institutionalization of social or political privileges (inequality), for example, would offend the noble’s sense of its own distinction.

From the perspective of nobility, as I am trying to reconstruct it, privileges cannot be mediated by social or political institutions. Privileges are not given or assigned to someone by another, such as an institution, government, or state; instead, they arise from the duties and responsibilities that someone imposes on him or herself: “The rights a human being arrogates to itself are related to the duties it imposes upon itself, to the tasks to which it feels equal.”⁴⁸ In this sense, it would be interesting to pursue this notion of freedom and equality in Nietzsche in relation to Todd May’s recent discussion of Rancière’s notion of equality.⁴⁹ May distinguishes between passive and active equality: passive equality is found primarily in liberal egalitarianism

where equality reflects the equal distribution of, for example, rights to all individuals making up a society provided for by an agent, in general the state, other than the subject. In this constitution of equality, the subject remains passive and unpolitical. Instead, active equality reflects a process of subjectivation where the subject actively participates in equalizing him or herself with all others. Given that active equality is an act of the self without requiring the permission, consent, or recognition of others, it can also be understood to be an act of privileging oneself; that is, of assigning rights and duties to oneself.

In Nietzsche's aristocratic conception of privileges and of rights, since every right (*Recht*) is essentially a privilege (*Vorrecht*),⁵⁰ privileges are inseparable from responsibilities in the sense that every privilege affirms a responsibility. In other words, from the perspective of an aristocratic conception of freedom, freedom always also means greater power and greater responsibility.⁵¹ In a note from the *Nachlass*, Nietzsche speaks of "freedom under the law" and of "the nobility of obedience" in order to distinguish the noble sense of rights and duties from the slavish drive for freedom (of desire).⁵² The notion of "law (*Gesetz*)" as it is employed here is not a reference to the positive laws of any given state or institution, but to the laws (duties and rights) a noble human being imposes on itself, laws which may conflict with those of the state and its institutions.

Nietzsche's aristocratic notion of rights and duties is in this sense comparable to Kierkegaard's conception of responsibility. Aristocratic culture and morality in Nietzsche, like the sphere of faith and religion in Kierkegaard, rests on what Kierkegaard refers to as a "teleological suspension of the ethical."⁵³ In Nietzsche's terms, aristocratic culture "outlives" and "lives beyond" the established authority of a moral and legal order.⁵⁴ The tension between aristocratic culture and values, on the one hand, and established moral and legal authorities, on the other, explains why in Nietzsche, as well as in Kierkegaard and in Dostoevsky, the courage to affirm individual responsibility is inseparable from a belief (faith) that freedom entails a duty that is higher than the duty to obey the law (i.e., the established authority of a moral and legal order), and, moreover, that one is called to this duty and that no one else could respond to this call in one's place. The duty to "suspend" the law, but also at the same time to give a new meaning to the law, is in this sense the exclusive right of the singular individual; that is, a privilege that cannot be shared with others. Accordingly, it is no surprise that the figures of responsibility in all three authors—I am thinking of the figure of Abraham in Kierkegaard, the figure of Jesus in Dostoevsky, and the figure of Zarathustra and also perhaps the figure of the philosopher⁵⁵ in Nietzsche—are most often not only figures of faith but also figures of "criminals" and "law breakers" as well as of providers of new laws.⁵⁶

Nietzsche's aristocratic conception of responsibility as a privilege stands in opposition to both a hierarchical ordering of society by way of unequal rights as well as an egalitarian ordering of society by way of equal rights. Whereas the former conflicts with the idea that responsibility cannot be derived from above nor be delegated to a below, the latter conflicts with the idea that responsibility is a singling out of the individual and therefore cannot be shared, or equally distributed: "Sign of nobility: never thinking of degrading our duties into duties for everybody; not wanting to delegate, to share, one's own responsibility; counting one's privileges and their exercise among one's *duties*."⁵⁷ Nietzsche's aristocratic notion of freedom as responsibility conflicts with an egalitarian conception of freedom based on the belief that freedom can only be preserved under the condition of an equal distribution of rights. For Nietzsche, instead, freedom as responsibility is inherently anarchical: it is neither what one has by virtue of an instituted right nor what one is given by virtue of a mutual agreement, but always only what one fights for, what one conquers.⁵⁸ It is within this agonistic spirit that Nietzsche sees the true guarantor of individual freedom as responsibility. The idea that freedom presupposes struggle is one of the main insights Nietzsche finds lacking in modern political ideologies, whether socialist, nationalist, or liberal. It requires the cultivation of a society which affirms the irreducible difference between individuals (inequality) and sees in this affirmation (of inequality) not only a precondition for struggle and conflict (and hence freedom as responsibility) but also a guarantor of a plurality of values in a given society. In other words, agonistic freedom and responsibility are possible only in a society which upholds, like Nietzsche, the idea that the greatness of the human being is reflected in one's "range (*Umfänglichkeit*) and multiplicity (*Vielfältigkeit*), in one's wholeness (*Ganzheit*) in manifoldness (*Vielen*)."⁵⁹

ORDER OF RANK: THE RECOGNITION OF DIFFERENCE & EQUALITY

Nietzsche sees this freedom and plurality threatened by a society of equal rights, where equality names the universal identity of all rather than the universal respect owed to the singular distinction of each and every individual. While equality based on the recognition of a universal identity forecloses the possibility of struggle, and hence of freedom as responsibility, equality based on the recognition of difference generates freedom as responsibility. Nietzsche warns that an "'equality of rights (*Gleichheit der Rechte*)' could all too easily be changed into equality in violating rights (*Gleichheit der Unrechte*)".⁶⁰

I mean, into a common war on all that is rare, strange, privileged (*Bevorrechtigten*), the higher human being, the higher soul, the higher duty, the higher responsibility, and the abundance of creative power that entails being noble, wanting to be by oneself, being able to be different, standing alone and having to live independently.⁶¹

Against the normalizing and leveling tendencies inherent to a society based on an “equality of rights (*Gleichheit der Rechte*),” Nietzsche affirms what he calls an order of rank (*Rangordnung*).⁶² In this ordering, rank indicates “how far one extends one’s responsibility.”⁶³ In the light of Nietzsche’s agonistic conception of freedom as responsibility, an order of rank (*Rangordnung*) is neither a hierarchical order (at least not in the traditional sense of the term as an order closed onto itself), nor an order mediated by social or political institutions.⁶⁴

Nevertheless, some commentators hold that Nietzsche’s notion of an order of rank entails something like a “theory of nature” that he uses in order to justify a political theory, according to which society must be conceived along the lines of a hierarchy in which each social group is assigned privileges and duties appropriate to its social and political role.⁶⁵ In contrast to this view, I hold that Nietzsche’s aristocratic notion of an order of rank is not part of his conception and legitimization of the political. Rather, the political value of the notion of order of rank consists in counteracting the egalitarianism of modern mass societies in view of fostering the practice of individual self-responsibility. In other words, while I reject the reading according to which the notion of order of rank is part of institutional (aristocratic) politics, I defend the view that it is an important element in Nietzsche’s politics of agon self-responsibility.

By saying that the order of rank is not a hierarchical order in the traditional sense, I do not mean to say that Nietzsche rejects the idea of hierarchy altogether. On the contrary, he is particularly critical of ideologies that aim to overcome the distance between rulers and ruled. Once the differences between rulers and ruled are abolished the possibility of attaining genuine freedom is also abolished because freedom can always only be preserved through struggle against rule.⁶⁶ What is crucial, however, in the distinction between rulers and ruled is not an affirmation of power over others, but, as mentioned above, an affirmation of difference as a precondition for conflict and struggle. The distinction between rulers and ruled in Nietzsche is a distinction that is inherently contingent, and therefore always contestable and reversible. Those who are subject to rule today are always already potentially those who will rule tomorrow. As a consequence of this, the struggle of culture against rule in the name of freedom as responsibility has to be understood not only in the terms of an open-ended struggle, but also in terms of a

struggle over who will rule in the future. It essentially is a struggle that is directed toward the future, toward freedom as responsibility to come.

REVERENCE: SIGN & MEASURE OF NOBILITY

Nietzsche writes that what is decisive in the determining of rank is “an ancient religious formula” taken up in a “new and more profound sense”; namely, “some fundamental faith that a noble soul has about itself, something that cannot be sought, nor found, nor perhaps lost. *The noble soul has reverence (Ehrfurcht) for itself.*”⁶⁷ Reverence (*Ehrfurcht*) not only characterizes the noble type and its way of evaluating but also its way of relating to others. The individual’s sense of reverence (*Ehrfurcht*) before itself and before others is immediate and cannot be mediated (by, say, social and political institutions). The sense of reverence (*Ehrfurcht*) reveals that rank is exclusive. Rank belongs to the singular human being and to it alone; rank is intimate and concealed; rank points to an elevation, a distance, within and before the self that is difficult for others to access, even difficult to access oneself. All these features explain why “the search” of an individual’s rank, or what Nietzsche also refers to as “the ultimate value of a soul,” requires a very refined instinct for rank; that is, for reverence (*Ehrfurcht*), and also why the value of the human individual reflects an “unalterable, innate order of rank to which it belongs.”⁶⁸ The inalterability and the innateness of rank, in my view, refer to the irreducible singularity of the value of each human being. Rank is unalterable and innate because it can neither be assigned nor be taken away from the individual. Rank points to the inexhaustible value and significance of an individual’s singular responsibility.⁶⁹

According to Nietzsche, the “ultimate value of a soul,” its rank, can never be completely determined and fixed. For example, the value of “higher natures” rests on “being different, incommunicable, in distance of rank”: their value cannot be known, compared, and judged.⁷⁰ It has a singular value standard⁷¹ and hence can only be appreciated at a distance and in silence.⁷² When Nietzsche insists on the importance of an order of rank, of keeping one’s distance and of remaining silent before the value of the other (including one’s own), what he is concerned with is not the institution of inequality but the preservation of singularity through distance; that is, through a sense of reverence before oneself and before others.

From the perspective of nobility, values should not be compared, for to compare is to approach, to do away with distance and, thus, also to do away with the value and significance of singular responsibility. Nietzsche insists: “there is an order of rank between human being and human being, hence also between morality and morality.”⁷³ Accordingly, one should not, for example,

evaluate the value of the noble type from the perspective of the herd/slave type, and vice versa, because they each have their irreducibly singular value. The value of the slave type resides in the qualities that secure the survival of the human life form: it makes the human being strong, stable, and uniform. The value of the noble type resides in the qualities that develop (*fortbilden*) and elevate the human life form: it makes the human being weaker, but also nobler, more refined and more varied.⁷⁴ Instead, a “degeneration” of the animal “human being” occurs when the two types (noble and herd/slave type) are approximated to each other through, for example, moral comparison.⁷⁵ In that case, their differences are no longer appreciated, and their distance from each other is no longer respected.

Noble evaluation stands in direct opposition to the moral; that is, slavish. The evaluation for what defines every slave morality is that it always only evaluates the values of the human being in comparison to the value of others. Nietzsche refers to this kind of evaluation as “social evaluation” and claims that the practice of social moral evaluation “underrates, almost overlooks and almost denies” the value of the human being in itself.⁷⁶ Moral evaluation does “not even touch” on the question of the value of the human individual in itself because it reduces the value of the individual to an effect the latter has on others.⁷⁷ In this sense slave morality is inherently utilitarian, a “piece of barbarism”⁷⁸ concerned only with the maximal utility that it can draw from the individual. Against utilitarian morality, Nietzsche holds that the value of a human being “does not reside in its utility,” i.e., in how useful someone is (instrumental value, use value), how much someone costs (economical value), or what harm someone does (pleasure, no harm value), because the value of an individual is not dependent on whether it could be of any use to others or not. From the perspective of noble evaluation, the least useful ones (the nobles) are considered to be the most valuable (exceptional) ones.⁷⁹

ORDER OF RANK (CONTINUED): COMPETITION & FULLNESS OF POWER AS SIGNS OF NOBILITY

Whereas moral evaluation reflects a comparison of the difference in value between human beings according to their utility, an order of rank reflects a measuring of higher and lower, stronger and weaker powers for and against each other: “what determines rank, sets off rank is only quanta of power, and nothing else.”⁸⁰ An order of rank (*Rangordnung*) is thus not a political or social hierarchy but an ordering of will to power. Will to power is inherently agonistic; that is, inseparably involved with other wills against which it determines its rank: “will to power can manifest itself only against resistances; it seeks that which resists it.”⁸¹ In this sense, an order of rank is an ordering

of antagonists that is not stable, but essentially an order in permanent struggle.⁸² It points to a relation between powers where higher power does not oppress lower power and where lower powers do not submit to higher powers. Instead, in the relation between higher and lower powers, their respective differences are not given up but remain and resist one another. Consequently, the relation between high and low powers in an aristocratic society ordered by rank is not the site of a hierarchical ordering of ranks but of a horizontal ordering of equally respected powers involved for and against each other.⁸³

Horizontality is the perspective of antagonism *par excellence*: one looks before oneself at one's opponent. Nietzsche also describes the antagonistic drive in the human being as a hostility that looks down on others⁸⁴ but always only in view of then looking ahead of oneself at one's opponent. What makes of one's opponent an equal is not that he or she is equally strong or weak (since an equality of power is impossible in an ordering of wills in permanent struggle against each other), or that he or she shares the same rank, but that he or she is equally valued and respected as an irreplaceable and thus unique opponent worth competing with.⁸⁵ The following example of the "egoism belonging to the nature of the noble soul" illustrates that the horizontal perspective inherently belongs to the noble.⁸⁶

Nietzsche understands the "egoism" characteristic of the noble's psyche as an "unshakable faith that to a being such as 'we are' other beings must be subordinate (*unterthan*) by nature and have to sacrifice themselves."⁸⁷ This faith in one's privileges over others should not be confused with a political ambition to attain power over others for the good of oneself and one's kind.⁸⁸ Interestingly, it is precisely the egoism of the noble soul which stands in conflict with a hierarchical chain of command. Egoism prevents the noble from "looking up" with hopes of, for example, divine grace.⁸⁹ The noble "looks either *ahead* (*vor*), horizontally and slowly, or down: *it knows itself to be at a height*."⁹⁰ Being "at a height" is not a reference to the noble's placing itself above others, looking down on others, ruling over others. "Looking down" on others with depreciation or in the hope for self-elevation does not make for nobility, but it is characteristic of the kind of resentment found in slave morality. The downward perspective in the noble, in contrast to the downward perspective in the slave, is an expression of the noble's awareness of what it means (costs him or herself) to reach this height.

The noble's being "at a height" does not mean that he or she stands higher than others in the sense of being socially privileged or politically favored. On the contrary, height indicates the extent to which someone has realized his or her will to power. Will to power exists as a potential which under favorable circumstances comes to its (full) realization; that is, reaches its height and rules. Will to power as a potential indicates a "low" point of power, in contrast to will to power in its full realization as a "high" point of power.⁹¹

A human being who strives for something great considers everyone he meets on his way either as a means or as a delay and obstacle—or as a temporary resting place. His characteristic (*eigentümliche*) high-grade *graciousness* toward his fellow human beings (*Mitmenschen*) becomes possible only once he has attained his height and rules.⁹²

When nobility is at its height and rules, what stands in the foreground is “the feeling of fullness, of power that seeks to overflow (*überströmen*), the happiness of high tension, the consciousness of wealth, that would give (*schicken*) and bestow (*abgeben*).”⁹³ In the noble, this overflowing of power manifests itself as genuine hospitality:

There is a noble and dangerous carelessness that permits a profound inference and insight: the carelessness of the self-assured and over-rich soul that has never troubled about friends but knows only hospitality, and practices, and knows how to practice, only hospitality—heart and home open to anyone who comes to enter, whether beggar, cripple or king. This is genuine geniality: whoever has that, has a hundred “friends” but in all probability not a single friend.⁹⁴

If nobility at its height is genuine hospitality then, by definition, the rule of an aristocratic society must be characterized by its openness to the other. An aristocratic society must therefore be the opposite of an elitist (exclusive) society (of rulers or leaders) closed onto itself. Rather, as I hope to have shown, it is a form of sociability from which one can think how to overcome those forms of domination and exclusion that are found in modern mass societies and their political ideologies.

CONCLUSION

I would like to conclude by returning to two central motifs in Nietzsche’s conception of aristocratic culture and society. First, since, as I have shown, aristocratic culture in Nietzsche is not hierarchical in the traditional sense; it is also compatible with the horizontality of a modern democracy. Postanarchist thought, particularly in the figure of Pierre Clastres and recently in the work of Miguel Abensour, brings out the thesis that social antagonism can be understood as a means to prevent the formation of state sovereignty, or, once the latter is given, to dismantle it: this is the idea of “society against the state.”⁹⁵ Nietzsche’s conception of an aristocratic sociability essentially built around agonistic practices is therefore a fundamental addition to the project of a poststatist politics.⁹⁶

In today’s debate, the poststatist claims have been mainly carried out by the defenders of a politics of social movements, or “multitudes,” or by the defenders of a renewed (communist) militancy, as in Badiou.⁹⁷ In both of

these trends, the process of subjectivation tends to dissolve the individual into a “multitude” or a “cause” that is supra-individual and that, far from assuming responsibility for one’s freedom, demands that one surrender it. Aristocratic culture upholds an idea of freedom and equality that is not based on a politics of leveling and normalization but on the pluralization of singular responsibility. In this sense, Nietzsche’s aristocratic conception of culture, by cultivating the responsibility of singular individuals, provides an important counterforce to the radical egalitarianism argued for by these poststatist thinkers who come from the Marxist-Leninist tradition, and in that sense Nietzsche may once again be of use to those who wish to defend the reasons of anarchism against those of Marxism. This is why aristocratic culture, as Nietzsche understands it, is of value to democracy in a double sense: as a critical force and as providing a complementary idea of equality to the one of modern democracy.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS FOR NIETZSCHE EDITIONS CITED

- AOM *Assorted Opinions and Maxims*, in HH, vol. II.
 BGE *Beyond Good and Evil*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1989).
 D *Daybreak*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
 DS *David Strauss, the Writer and the Confessor*, in UM.
 FEI “On the Future of Our Educational Institutions,” in KSA 1.
 GM *On the Genealogy of Morality*, trans. Carol Diethe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
 GS *The Gay Science*, trans. Josefine Nauckoff (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
 HC *Homer on Competition*, in KSA 1.
 HH *Human, All Too Human*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
 HL *On the Use and Disadvantage of History for Life*, in UM.
 KSA *Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Bänden*, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: De Gruyter Verlag, 1988). (References provide the volume number followed by the relevant fragment number and any relevant aphorism).
 PTA *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, in KSA 1.
 SE *Schopenhauer as Educator*, in UM.
 TI *Twilight of the Idols*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin Books, 1968).
 TL “On Truth and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense,” in KSA 1.

UM *Untimely Meditations*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

WS *The Wanderer and His Shadow*, in HH, vol. II; also in KSA 2.

WP *The Will to Power*, trans. and ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1968).

Z *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Modern Library, 1995).

NOTES

1. Saul Newman, "Anarchism and the Politics of Resentment," in *I am Not a Man, I am Dynamite: Nietzsche*

and the Anarchist Tradition, ed. John Moore (New York: Autonomedia, 2004), 107–26.

2. See Nietzsche TI "Skirmishes" 34; A 57, 58; WP 42; GM II: 11; BGE 202. See list of abbreviations at the end of this article.

3. Newman, "Anarchism and the Politics of Resentment," 107.

4. Ibid., 123.

5. For an earlier treatment of Nietzsche's aristocracy, see Vanessa Lemm, "Nietzsche's Vision einer 'neuen Aristokratie,'" *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 56.3 (2008): 365–83.

6. Nietzsche's aristocracy is said to entail a "political programme of a new aristocratic legislation" where "the aim is to gain control of the forces of history and produce through a conjunction of philosophical legislation and political power ('great politics') a new humanity" (Keith Ansell-Pearson, *An Introduction to Nietzsche as Political Thinker* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994], 148, 55 and 42–43). For an interpretation of Nietzsche as a precursor of authoritarian and even totalitarian ideologies, see also Bruce Detwiler, *Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990); Frederick Appel, *Nietzsche Contra Democracy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999); Bernhard H. F. Taureck, *Nietzsche und der Faschismus. Ein Politikum* (Leipzig: Reclam Verlag, 2000); Domenico Losurdo, *Nietzsche, Il ribelle aristocratico. Biografia bilancio critico* (Turino: Bollati Boringhieri, 2002); and recently Don Dombowsky, *Nietzsche's Machiavellian Politics* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

7. Mark Warren, *Nietzsche and Political Thought* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988), 213, 210–11. However, Warren adds that Nietzsche's political views are "inconsistent" with his philosophy (ibid., 210) and concludes that at least his (moral) philosophy is compatible in principle with the values of liberal democracy such as individuation, communal inter-subjectivity, egalitarianism, and pluralism (Ibid., 247).

8. GS 377. In comparison, see Tracy Strong, who asserts that no matter how much Nietzsche admires the Greeks, he never advocates "returning" to the Greeks, nor making modern society over in their image (Tracy B. Strong, *Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration* [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975], 136).

9. TI "Skirmishes," 43.

10. WP 953, 866, 898; Z "Of Old and New Tablets," 12.

11. BGE 287.

12. I borrow the term *aristocratic radicalism* from Georg Brandes who describes Nietzsche's aristocracy as spiritual and not as political (Georg Brandes, *Friedrich Nietzsche. Eine Abhandlung über Aristokratischen Radikalismus* [Berlin: Berenberg Verlag, 2004], 71, 92). On this point, see also Emma Goldman, *Living My Life*, Volume I (New York: Dover Publications, 1970), 193–94 who claims that: "His [Nietzsche's] aristocracy was neither of birth nor of

purse; it was of spirit. In that respect Nietzsche was an anarchist and all true anarchists were aristocrats.”

13. The affinity between the critique of the modern state found in Nietzsche and in the anarchist tradition has been pointed out by a great number of authors, in particular see John Moore, ed. *I Am Not a Man, I Am Dynamite: Nietzsche and the Anarchist Tradition* (New York: Autonomedia, 2004).

14. For an extended discussion of Nietzsche’s political philosophy in relation to the political ideologies of his time, see Henning Ottmann, *Philosophie und Politik bei Nietzsche* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1987).

15. SE 3; HH 261; BGE 257; WP 933; TI “Skirmishes,” 37. In *Schopenhauer as Educator*, Nietzsche laments that it is precisely this “courageous visibility” of the singular one which is lacking in the cultural-political landscape of the Germany of his time (SE 3). He voices the regret that for the majority singularity (genius) ceases to be desirable because it involves too much struggle and effort: “Each of us bears a productive uniqueness (*productive Einzigkeit*) within him as the core of his being; and when he becomes aware of it, there appears around him a strange penumbra which is the mark of his singularity (*Einzigkeit*). Most find this something unendurable, because they are as aforesaid lazy, and because a chain of toil and burdens is suspended from this uniqueness” (SE 1). The task of aristocratic culture is to overcome laziness and lack of courage toward the cultivation of each and everyone’s singular genius. Aristocratic culture is liberating insofar as it frees the singular individual from forms of self-identity taken on by the individual under the pressure of the leveling resentment found in modern mass society (SE 1). See also in comparison HH 261; BGE 212; TI “Skirmishes,” 37.

16. SE 6; GS 377.

17. BGE 257. In an earlier text Nietzsche already identifies “as a cruel-sounding truth the fact that *slavery belongs to the essence of culture*” (*The Greek State*). Nietzsche describes the relation between slavery and culture in the Greek *polis* as follows: “Culture [*Bildung*], which is first and foremost a real hunger for art, rests on one terrible premise: but this reveals itself in the nascent feeling of shame. In order for there to be a broad, deep, fertile soil for the development of art, the overwhelming majority has to be slavishly subjected to life’s necessity in the service of the minority, *beyond* the measure that is necessary for the individual. At their expense, through their extra work, that privileged class is to be removed from the struggle for existence, in order to produce and satisfy a new world of necessities” (*The Greek State*). The Greek model of slavery should not be confused with the “new type of enslavement” Nietzsche refers to when he distinguishes his notion of a “higher aristocracy” of the future (GS 377; BGE 257). For reasons of space I will not be able to discuss the problem of slavery and its relation to “higher aristocracy” here. For an extensive discussion of the relation between culture and economy, see chapter 3 in Vanessa Lemm, *Nietzsche’s Animal Philosophy: Culture, Politics and the Animality of the Human Being* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2009).

18. BGE 257.

19. See also Thomas Fossen, who argues that Nietzsche’s thought is radically aristocratic, not because it proposes an alternative political theory but because it seeks to promote a radically aristocratic ethics (Thomas Fossen, “Nietzsche’s Aristocratism Revisited,” in *Nietzsche, Power and Politics*, eds. Herman W. Siemens and Vasti Rodt [Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 2008], 299–319, in particular 299).

20. TI “Germans,” 4; see also KSA 13:19 [11].

21. KSA 13:19 [11].

22. Friedrich Nietzsche, “Philosophy in Hard Times,” in *Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the Early 1870’s*, trans. Daniel Breazeale (New Jersey: Humanities Press International, 1979), 78. See also in comparison Nietzsche’s early writings, where he even envisages the formation of countercultural institutions as means to protect “higher culture” against politics and the “official culture” of the state (SE 6; DS 8; FEI and HH 224).

23. On Emma Goldman’s reception of Nietzsche, see Leigh Starcross, “‘Nietzsche was an Anarchist’: Reconstructing Emma Goldman’s Nietzsche Lectures,” in *I Am Not a Man, I Am Dynamite: Nietzsche and the Anarchist Tradition*, ed. John Moore (New York: Autonomedia, 2004), 29–39; Kathy E. Ferguson, “Religion, Faith and Politics: Reading Goldman through

Nietzsche,” in *Feminist Interpretations of Emma Goldman*, eds. Penny A. Weiss and Loretta Kensing (University Park: The Pennsylvania University Press, 2007), 91–107.

24. GM I: 16.

25. As in D 201; GS 31; KSA 11:32 [2], 7:14 [11], 7:89 [70], 7:14 [25].

26. On this point, see also “Adel” and “Aristokratie” in *Nietzsche-Wörterbuch*, eds. Gerd Schank, Paul von Tongeren, Herman W. Siemens (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2004), 36–44, 120–29, and especially 43–44.

27. GS 358.

28. Nietzsche defines the modern state as an “organized act of violence (*Gewalthätigkeit*)” (KSA 12:11 [252]).

29. This belief in the power of spirituality together with the awareness of the fragility of spirituality is also reflected in the “noble institution” of monasteries. In aphorism 61 of *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche emphasizes that the latter are “means for obtaining peace from the noise and exertion of *cruder* forms of government, and purity from the *necessary* dirt of all politics” (see also BGE 263). The affinity between the noble and the religious against the political seems to confirm that, as Leo Strauss puts it, in Nietzsche, “the fundamental alternative is that of the rule of philosophy over religion or the rule of religion over philosophy; it is not, as it was for Plato or Aristotle, that of the philosophic and the political life; for Nietzsche, as distinguished from the classics, politics belongs from the outset to a lower plane than either philosophy or religion” (Leo Strauss, *Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983], 176).

30. Taylor comes to a similar conclusion in his reconstruction of Nietzsche’s early thought. He claims that “while the imperative of culture and genius remain in the foreground, Nietzsche’s imprecations against the ‘political instincts’ of the Greeks, and his condemnation of their destructive impulse, provide strong support for a *non-authoritarian* reading of Nietzsche’s early politics” (Quentin P. Taylor, *The Republic of Genius: A Reconstruction of Nietzsche’s Early Thought* [Rochester: Rochester University Press, 1997], 44–45). Taylor quotes Nietzsche from “We Classists”: “To be a philhellene means being an enemy of brute strength and stupidity” (KSA 8:5 [91]) and argues that Nietzsche, insofar as he remains a “philhellene” throughout his productive life, remains an “enemy of strength and stupidity,” and hence also of authoritarian politics.

31. BGE 287.

32. This point is also made by Emma Goldman, *Living My Life*, 193–94; and Emma Goldman, “The Failure of Christianity,” in *Red Emma Speaks: Selected Writings and Speeches*, ed. Alix Kates Schulman (London: Wildwood House, 1979), 186: “His master idea had nothing to do with the vulgarity of station, caste or wealth. Rather did it mean the masterful in human possibilities, the masterful in man that would help him to overcome old traditions and worn-out-values, so that he may learn to become the creator of new and beautiful things.”

33. BGE 263.

34. WP 887/KSA 12:10 [61].

35. WP 763/KSA 12:9 [34].

36. DS 8; HL 7; FEI.

37. Taylor, *The Republic of Genius*, 45.

38. Fyodor Dostoevsky, *The Grand Inquisitor, with Related Chapters from The Brothers Karamazov* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993), 69 ff.

39. On the compatibility between democratic politics and aristocratic values in Nietzsche, see Herman W. Siemens, “Yes, No, Maybe So . . . Nietzsche’s Equivocations on the Relation between Democracy and ‘Grosse Politik,’” in *Nietzsche, Power and Politics*, eds. Siemens and Rodt, 231–68.

40. GM I: 5.

41. A fragment from the *Nachlass* shows that Nietzsche does not see in the noble, in “the great human being,” a political leader of the masses, but always only their opponent:

The best example of the degree to which a plebeian agitator of the mob is incapable of comprehending of concept of “higher nature” is provided by Buckle. The view he combats so passionately that “great man,” individual, princes, statesman, geniuses,

generals, are the levers and causes of all great movements—is instinctively misunderstood by him as if it meant that what is essential and valuable in such “higher man” were their capacity for setting masses in motion: in short, their effect. But the “higher nature” of the great man lies in being different, incommunicability, in distance of rank, not in an effect of any kind—even if he made the whole globe tremble” (WP 876/KSA 13, 16 [39]).

Kaufmann, in his edition of *The Will to Power*, adds in a footnote to this passage that “the misunderstanding attacked here is widespread among those who have attempted popular expositions of Nietzsche. Again and again, the view he castigates has been attributed to him” (Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, ed. Walter Kaufmann [New York: Random House, 1968], 468–69).

42. BGE 260.

43. Ibid.

44. KSA 8:23 [39].

45. GM I: 2; TI “Skirmishes,” 37.

46. For an example of this view, see Ansell-Pearson’s *Introduction to Nietzsche as a Political Thinker*: “Without the ‘pathos of distance’ created by the differences between social strata, Nietzsche is suggesting, the noble class would not feel that sense of rareness and uniqueness which, he believes, is necessary for it to engage in self-creative activity” (51). For a different view, see Daniel D. Conway, who argues that “[a]lthough he [Nietzsche] usually associates this *pathos* of distance with the aristocratic regimes he expressly admires, its existence is not dependent on any particular form of political regime” (Daniel D. Conway, *Nietzsche and the Political* [London: Routledge, 1997], 39).

47. BGE 260; see also GM I: 2.

48. WP 872.

49. Todd May, *The Political Thought of Jacques Rancière: Creating Equality* (University Park: Penn State University Press, 2009).

50. BGE 202.

51. SE 8; WP 936. It is worth noting that Nietzsche already in his early work thinks freedom as inseparable from responsibility. In *Schopenhauer as Educator*, freedom is described as a great burden and a heavy debt that has devastating consequences for those who do not know how to repay it: “That freedom is in fact a heavy debt which can be discharged only by means of great deeds. In truth, every ordinary son of earth has the right to regard with resentment a man favored in this way: only may some god guard him from being thus favored himself, that is from becoming so fearfully indebted. For he would at once perish of his freedom and solitude, and become a fool and a malicious fool at that, out of boredom” (SE 8).

52. KSA 10:3 [200].

53. Søren Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling* (London: Penguin Books, 1985), 83.

54. BGE 262; see also GM II: 2.

55. For Nietzsche’s vision of the “philosopher of the future” and the task of responsibility see BGE 61, 212, 213. For the figure of the philosopher as a lawgiver, see Yannis Constantinidès, “Nietzsche législateur, Grand politique et la réforme du monde,” in *Lectures de Nietzsche*, eds. Jean-François Balaudé and Patrice Wotling (Paris: Le Livre de Poche, 2000), 208–82; Roger Berkowitz, “Manu and the Art of Legislation,” *New Nietzsche Studies*, 6.3/4–7.1/2 (2005–06): 155–169; Tracy Strong, “Nietzsche and the Political: Tyranny, Tragedy, Cultural Revolution, and Democracy,” *Journal of Nietzsche Studies* 35–36 (2008): 48–66.

56. TI “Skirmishes,” 45. Since, in Nietzsche, the overthrowing of an established moral and legal order is inseparable from the constitution of a new moral and legal order (BGE 262), the figure of the genius of culture as well as the idea of competition (*agon*) lend themselves both to an interpretation which emphasizes their revolutionary potential (see Wendy Brown, “Nietzsche for Politics,” in *Why Nietzsche Still?*, ed. Alan D. Schrift [Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000], 205–223) as well as to an interpretation which emphasizes their constitutional potential (see Volker Gerhardt, “Prinzip des Gleichgewichts,” *Nietzsche-Studien* 12 [1983]: 111–33; Herman W. Siemens, “Agonal Communities of Taste: Law and Community in Nietzsche’s

che's Philosophy of Transvaluation," *Journal of Nietzsche Studies* 24 [2002]: 83–112; Paul von Tongeren, "Nietzsche's Greek Measure," *Journal of Nietzsche Studies* 24 [2002]: 5–24). For a recent interpretation of the figure of the criminal in Nietzsche, see also Friedrich Balke, "Die Figuren des Verbrechers in Nietzsches Biopolitik," *Nietzsche-Studien* 32 (2003): 171–205.

57. BGE 272.

58. Z: 4 "Of Old and New Tablets"; TI "Skirmishes," 38. Nietzsche saw an anticipation of this agonistic conception of freedom in Machiavelli's notions of *virtù* (TI "Skirmishes," 38).

59. BGE 212.

60. *Ibid.*, 202.

61. *Ibid.*, 212. In view of preserving freedom and plurality, Nietzsche contests both the despotic rule of the exceptional type (insofar as the later undermines the value of slave morality) and the despotic rule of the slave type (insofar as the latter tolerates no other morality). "What I fight against: that an exceptional type should make war on the rule—instead of grasping that the continued existence of the rule is the precondition for the value of the exception" (WP 894). This is why, for Nietzsche, hatred of mediocrity is unworthy of a philosopher. "It is almost a question mark against his 'right to philosophy.' Precisely because he is an exception he has to take the rule under his protection, he has to keep the mediocre in good heart" (*Ibid.*, 893).

62. For the notion of order of rank in opposition to the notion of equality of rights, see BGE 30; KSA 11:26 [353], 11:35 [43], 11:25 [298], 9:16 [3].

63. BGE 212.

64. Wendy Brown also emphasizes that "pathos of distance" and "order of rank" in Nietzsche should not be confused with hierarchical orderings: "This appreciation of distance—not simply hierarchy—as culturally invigorating emerges in Nietzsche's characterization of freedom as 'the will to self-responsibility' that 'preserves the distance which divides us' (TI "Skirmishes," 38). Thus, like Foucault, Nietzsche's complaint against modern politics is that it is excessive in its organization and institutionalization of human relations: it dissolves our separateness even as it fabricates us as 'individuals'; it throws us into proximity in a fashion that mutes our own capacity to express responsibility, creativity, and hence freedom" (Brown, "Nietzsche for Politics," 218).

65. See Ansell-Pearson, *Introduction to Nietzsche*, 41 and Warren, *Nietzsche and Political Thought*, 212.

66. See TI "Skirmishes," 37. Saul Newman is making a similar point in his critique of classical anarchism when he insists on the Foucaultian distinction between power and domination. Against the classical anarchist tradition he holds that: "To abolish central institutions like the State with one stroke would be to neglect the multiform and diffuse relations of power they are based on, thus allowing new institutions and relations of domination to rise up" (Newman, "Anarchism and the Politics of Resentment," 120).

67. BGE 287.

68. *Ibid.*, 263.

69. Nietzsche's notion of rank could in this sense be understood as complementary to the modern idea of human dignity. While respect of human dignity values those features of the human being that are universal, common, and shared by all individuals equally, respect of rank values those features of the individual that are irreducibly distinct in each and every individual. For a different view, see David Owen, "Equality, Democracy and Self-Respect: Reflections on Nietzsche's Agonal Perfectionism," *Journal of Nietzsche Studies* 24 (2002): 113–31.

70. WP 876.

71. GS 3.

72. This is why Nietzsche feels impelled to reestablish order of rank "in the age of universal suffrage, i.e., when everyone may sit in judgment on everyone and everything" (WP 854).

73. BGE 228.

74. HH 224.

75. WP 866/KSA 12:10 [17].

76. WP 878/KSA 12:9 [55].

77. *Ibid.*

78. WP 758.

79. TI "Skirmishes," 50; GM I: 2; WP 877/KSA 12:10 [31].

80. WP 855/KSA 13:11 [36]. Accordingly, the "determination of the order of rank of values," a task Nietzsche assigns to the philosopher of the future, cannot be achieved by means of moral comparison, but it requires the support of "physiologists and doctors" (GM I: 17). What is at stake in the determination of the order of rank of value is an investigation of life as will to power; that is, a determination of the order of rank of will to power.

81. KSA 12:9 [151].

82. KSA 11:36 [22].

83. The view that *agon* in Nietzsche should be interpreted as a horizontal, rather than as a hierarchical, relation between competing powers is also found in Lawrence Hatab, *A Nietzschean Defense of Democracy: An Experiment in Postmodern Politics* (Chicago: Open Court, 1995); Siemens, "Agonal Communities of Taste"; Christa D. Acampora, "Demos Agonistes Redux, Reflections on the Streit of Political Agonism," *Nietzsche-Studien* 32 (2003): 374–90. On the significance of will to power understood as a struggle between equal powers for Nietzsche's notion of life, see Barbara Stiegler, *Nietzsche et la biologie* (Paris: PUF, 2001), 55–56.

84. WP 936.

85. On the notion of agonistic respect, see Alan Schrift, "Respect for the Agon and Agonistic Respect: A Response to Hatab and Olkowski," *New Nietzsche Studies* 3.1–2 (Winter 1999): 129–44.

86. BGE 265.

87. Ibid.

88. Ibid.

89. Ibid.

90. Ibid.

91. Accordingly, in Nietzsche "high" and "low" are not necessarily vertically ranked. The same holds true for the notions of "over (*über*)" and "under (*unter*)" as they occur, for example, in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, where the movement of overcoming (*Überwindung*) and decline (*Untergang*) can also be understood as horizontal rather than vertical movements (as in the crossing [*Übergang*] of a bridge). For a reading of (self-) overcoming as a horizontal movement, see Lemm, *Nietzsche's Animal Philosophy*, 19–23.

92. BGE 273.

93. Ibid., 260. See in comparison, "The Noble Type: True graciousness, nobility, greatness of soul proceed from abundance; do not give in order to receive—do not try to exalt themselves by being gracious;—prodigality as the type of true graciousness, abundance of personality as its presupposition" (WP 935/KSA 13:23 [4]).

94. WP 939/KSA 12: 2 [1].

95. Pierre Clastres, *Society against the State* (New York: Zone Books, 1987); Miguel Aben-sour, *Democracy against the State* (London: Polity Press, 2010).

96. On Nietzsche as a superpolitical (*über-politischer*) thinker whose conception of will to power (antagonism) leads beyond (statist) politics, see Paul von Tongeren "Nietzsche as 'Über-Politischer Denker,'" in *Nietzsche, Power and Politics*, eds. Siemens and Rodt, 69–83.

97. Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, *Multitude* (London: Penguin Books, 2004) and *Empire* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000); Alain Badiou, *Saint Paul: the Foundation of Universalism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).

Chapter Six

Max Stirner, *Postanarchy avant la lettre*

Banu Bargu

“The raw and naked thought of Stirner is a barbaric act of rare ferocity, excessive, the classical elephant that with its pachydermic mass makes space for itself in the philosophical china shop,” writes Alfredo Bonnano.¹ A characterization more vivid and accurate has not been written about Stirner’s thought. Indeed, we have in the little book *The Ego and Its Own* (1844) the explosive thought of a giant, shattering the neatly placed, fragile, and precious china of the Western tradition of philosophy with the natural elegance of an elephant.² A unique creature indeed—one that does not wait for a space to be granted to him among the crowded shelves by the shopkeepers but simply claims his rightful place by his mighty presence. Wise and ferocious, he overwhelms the shop, overflows its internal ordering and boundaries, steps on and shatters others, and makes way for himself.

His self-assertion presents an unrefined, unadorned contrast to the sophisticated and beautiful artifacts that each represent the culmination of a specific mind. Stirner’s unsystematic and restless thought, his expansive and clumsy curiosity, and intemperate courage to go behind every conceptual category not only portray the placid rigidity of the china that surround him, but also his unruly, bestial allure calls into question the very idea of a china shop. Why does an elephant find himself constrained in a china shop to begin with? And is he really to blame for the destruction that follows? Perhaps it is those who impose and keep the china shop that are in the wrong, who have no rightful claim; their very idea is destructive. Stirner allows us to think and see the philosophical tradition from the point of view of the metaphorical elephant. Nothing is to be taken for granted, nothing is fixed, nothing sacred, nothing untouchable; in fact, nothing should be left untouched.

Though the literature on Stirner is rather scant, scholars have not failed to note the damage he causes in the china shop.³ Numerous studies point to how Stirner's thought upends predominant figures of Western philosophy, particularly Hegel, challenges his contemporaries, such as Feuerbach, Bauer, and Marx, and influences subsequent thinkers ranging from Nietzsche to Sartre to Foucault. Nonetheless, far from a steady increase, interest in Stirner has rather been cyclical, if not sporadic.⁴ The reason, at least in part, must be assigned to Marx's and Engels's famously harsh and derisive rebuttal in *The German Ideology*, in which they single him out among the Left Hegelians as their major polemical target and subject his work to a thorough and relentless deconstruction.⁵ Nonetheless, the extremity of Stirner's thought and his unembarrassed, partisan polemic for the egoist must surely have had something to do with the irregular reception of his work by posterity.

The past decade has witnessed the most recent wave of the rediscovery of Stirner's thought. Postanarchism, or postmodern anarchism, has liberated Stirner from relative oblivion by reclaiming his thought within the framework of an antiessentialist, posthumanist, poststructuralist matrix which attempts to meet classical anarchist critiques of the state, religion, and the market.⁶ Scholars have made significant contributions to the revival of anarchism by suggestive cross-fertilizations between anarchist concerns and the insights of continental critical political theory challenging foundational assumptions of a unitary, rational, and self-transparent political subject, the truth claims of metanarratives, and the centrality of the working class as the agent of emancipatory struggles. They have offered the possibility of deepening and revitalizing anarchist thought by the adoption of a more expansive and dynamic understanding of power relations not limited to the state and its apparatuses, the recognition of the importance of identity politics beyond class and the limitations of a politics exclusively based on identity claims, and the rethinking of agency through an appreciation of the discursively constituted nature of political subjectivities.⁷

Indeed, Stirner's thought is key in this endeavor. As Saul Newman has skillfully shown through a series of essays, Stirner anticipates and radicalizes postanarchy in important and fruitful ways.⁸ Not only does Stirner's thought sharply formulate classical anarchist themes, such as a critique of the state and capitalist relations, but it also goes beyond them by its critical philosophical acuteness and epistemological and ontological innovations. Through a critique of Hegel and Feuerbach, Stirner distances himself from humanism, unravels the idea of an unchanging, natural human essence as the basis of our identities, and scoffs at the moralizing call of various critical political projects, including those of Bauer, Hess, Weitling, Proudhon, and Marx, whose success is achieved at the expense of individual egoists. His embrace of the Unique, coupled with the epistemological and ontological underpinnings of the philosophy of egoism, puts poststructuralist concerns in the intellectual

horizon long before they find the ideological opening to rise up to their contemporary heights.

Situating Stirner within the framework of postanarchism requires a thorough evaluation of Stirner's thought and a careful reconstruction of different elements in accordance with postanarchism. This is undoubtedly an ambitious task. In this chapter, my aim will be rather modest, focusing primarily on those elements that have important implications for a politics of postanarchism. The question I would like to pose is this: What does it mean to read Stirner today? Alternatively, in keeping with the spirit of Stirner's own philosophy where the "egoist, you know, never takes trouble about a thing for the sake of the thing, but for his sake: the thing must serve him"⁹: How will reading Stirner serve us politically today? I am interested in highlighting some of Stirner's theoretical contributions that render his thought politically relevant and potent, particularly for contemporary radical movements. Here, my main focus will be on his trenchant critiques of state sovereignty and liberalism(s) and his positive category of insurrection, which is itself open to multiple interpretations. In the meantime, I would also like to indicate some affinities that his thought has with several critical, though nonanarchist, thinkers of the twentieth century, affinities that have gone relatively unrecognized by Stirner's contemporary interpreters. I will conclude by suggesting varieties of insurgent practice that a Stirnerite politics casts into vision, forms of *exodus* that the radical agents of our conjuncture must theoretically and politically confront.

PRE-POSTANARCHY

The relationship of postanarchism to classical anarchism is itself a matter of controversy. Is postanarchism simply a variant among many anarchisms?¹⁰ Is it a rupture and a movement beyond anarchism? Is it the selective radicalization of anarchism by the reconsideration of some of its outdated features that have become hindrances to its further development and intellectual relevance?¹¹ These are important and timely questions, especially in light of the recent criticisms directed at postanarchist thinkers who have at times been rather eager to overlook the diversity of thinkers in classical anarchism and the richness of their ideas.¹²

I agree with critics of postanarchist theorists that it is inaccurate to condemn the whole tradition as naïve, essentialist, humanist, and positivist, built on the assumptions of an objective material reality and of the rationality, peacefulness, cooperative inclinations, and sacrificial ethos of human nature. While perhaps early anarchist thinkers, such as Godwin and Proudhon, have given sufficient grounds for these arguments, nineteenth century anarchists,

such as Bakunin and Kropotkin, have a more sophisticated epistemological and political understanding than what they are given credit for. That being said, the critics of postanarchism also tend to project their hostility toward postmodern thought onto postanarchists, upholding a particular interpretation of classical anarchist thinkers as the “correct” reading and assuming that postanarchism is a betrayal of anarchism *tout court*. It is important to recognize that the revival of anarchist concerns within the framework of postanarchy is a welcome development for thinkers leaning left (broadly conceived), a provocation that may reverse the eclipse of anarchist thought, particularly in the second half of the twentieth century, and facilitate its convergence with the living practices of anarchism, in Seattle, New York, Athens, Istanbul, Toronto, and elsewhere. Rather than write off postanarchism, it is our intellectual responsibility, I think, to respond to its provocations with robust reconceptualizations of anarchist thought that render its relevance more acute for contemporary politics.

Now, Stirner anticipates prominent features of postanarchist thought in several respects. First, and most important, is Stirner’s critique of essentialism.¹³ The protagonist of Stirner’s thought is the I, the absolutely singular individual, with the multiplicity of characteristics that he “owns.” The I is the ego, one’s “whole being and existence.”¹⁴ The ego is the complex set of particularities that make up one’s individuality and thus the specific lens through which one orients and comports oneself in the world. The ego is the pure interiority of the self, but it also encompasses everything that is in the power of the self to achieve. The ego is therefore expansive and assertive; it extends itself to the world in whatever way the self has power to do so. It affirms its existence by exercising control, by creating itself at every moment while, at the same time, unmaking itself.¹⁵ The ego is the pure self when one strips it from everything external and held in common with others and when one takes ownership of what remains. The self is the autonomous, critically conscious, and dynamic mastery of the world through a constant process of enjoyment and riddance. It is a continuous process of creative destruction wherein the I is constructed and deconstructed as the Unique.¹⁶

This I is the only given, the only plausible starting point of philosophical reflection for Stirner. This I, moreover, far from being a fixed human essence, repudiates the very concept of essence by its singularity and fluidity. The I is irreducibly complex yet specific; it cannot be captured without violence by any generality. The most universalized version of the I, encapsulated by the concept of “man,” is nevertheless an abstraction that enslaves (wo)men in their singularity. It generalizes an essence that allegedly inheres in each individual, by abstracting from the particularities of each and pointing to what is present in common. This universal, abstract “man” thereby divides (wo)men into their “essential” and “unessential” selves, conducting a theoretical operation in which the former part is deemed the higher, the more

valuable, and the sacred, in comparison to the latter which is specific to each individual, unimportant, and almost superfluous.

A second feature by which Stirner approximates postanarchy *avant la lettre* is by his antifoundationalism. I have already mentioned that Stirner's starting point is the I as the only possible foundation of knowledge. The desires, needs, and experiences of the ego, its self-assertion and self-destruction, constitute the hypersubjectivist basis of Stirner's philosophy. The I is the foundation, but because the I is what remains outside any abstraction and that which constantly eludes conceptualization, it is, at the same time, an anti-foundation. Coupled with its inherent elusiveness is the constant possibility of change. Because the I is permutable, it is not possible to proceed with the assumption of the ego as a fixed principle or foundation that can become the building block of a holistic philosophical system. Such an anti-foundationalist tendency also obstructs the possibility of a unilinear and objectivist construction of truth, a trait which foreshadows the postmodern suspicion of metanarratives, particularly the notion of an absolute truth. Anticipating Nietzsche's perspectivalism, Stirner dismisses Truth with capital T, any absolute, fixed idea as metaphysical fiction. "Man, your head is haunted," he writes, "you have wheels in your head! You imagine great things and depict to yourself a whole world of gods that has an existence for you, a spirit-realm to which you suppose yourself to be called, an ideal that beckons to you. You have a fixed idea [*fixe Idee*]!"¹⁷ Ideas are idealized forms and, despite the fact that they are humanly creations, they become invested with the power to subordinate (wo)men to themselves. They do not give meaning to experience, but rather hinder the expression of one's individuality, and they demand actions that are against the interests of the individual. Although (wo)men create ideas, these idea(l)s turn (wo)men into the instruments of their realization or manifestations of their essence.¹⁸ They become the "master" of (wo)men, as it were, with the power to "possess" them. These ideas are manifestations of the I's alienation and must be done away with for any real emancipation.

One of the most pernicious of these ideas is that of "man." Stirner's attempt to demystify the idea of "man" comes most forcefully through his engagement with Feuerbach, which brings us to the third aspect of his postanarchism, his critique of humanism.¹⁹ In fact, Stirner may be the first anti-humanist in the history of philosophy.²⁰ According to Stirner, Feuerbach's move to secularize theology ends up anthropologizing God. Feuerbach argues that it is problematic to search for our essence in the realm of religion, but that in its stead, it can only be found in this world, as our human essence.²¹ However, Stirner believes that this theoretical move only enacts a displacement of God to Man, rendering the human divine: "To expel God from his heaven and to rob him of his '*transcendence*' cannot yet support a claim of complete victory, if therein he is only chased into the human breast

and gifted with indelible *immanence*. Now they say, the divine is the truly human!"²²

Because Stirner finds in Feuerbachian anthropology the assertion of a divine essence of humanity, he is quick to take distance from the philosophical standpoint of humanism that he suspects to be a new form of theology. Theological humanism, while substituting one divinity for the other, preserves the split and opposition between one's essential and unessential selves.²³ In this light, humanism is actually more dangerous, according to Stirner, because it appears under the guise of a secular orientation to the world. The sacralization of the human essence, replacing religion as the new source of morality, only serves to consecrate those who venerate this essence: "the sacred hallows in turn its reverer, who by his worship becomes himself a saint."²⁴ The humanism of Left Hegelians, Stirner contends, is as religious as the Protestantism of the most pious Christians.

"History seeks for *man*: but he is I, you, we. Sought as a mysterious *essence*, as the divine, first as *God*, then as *man* (humanity, humaneness, mankind), he is found as the individual, the finite, the unique one," argues Stirner.²⁵ If Stirner's point that "man" is always "Man" with capital M, namely a reified, crypto-theological concept, is warranted, it enables real (wo)men in their real particularity and irreplaceable singularity to burst into the domain of philosophy. In an interesting convergence with what contemporary theorist Giorgio Agamben calls "whatever singularity," Stirner speaks of these agents as the unique ones, whose multiple, dynamic, and transitory qualities refuse being reduced to one overarching and static generalization, however universal and encompassing.²⁶ At times, he refers to that part which renders us unique as the "un-man," "a man who does not correspond to the *concept* man, as the inhuman is something human which is not conformed to the *concept* of the human."²⁷ The Unique, as whatever remains outside the concept of man, that which cannot be abstracted from the individual in the concrete totality of his particular qualities, his "ownness," is precisely what must be redeemed: "Only the un-man is a *real* man."²⁸

Based on the conception of the "un-man," Stirner posits an ontology of the I, based on movement and change. I call this a *vagabond ontology*, one in which the I is unsatisfied to remain "within the limits of a temperate style of thinking."²⁹ Here, the I is always prior to itself; it exists before (as well as through) the specific qualities that may be attributed to it in order to conceptualize and characterize it. In contrast to an I that is constituted by the determinations of its qualities, Stirner puts forth a subjectivity which is not only not reducible to these determinations but is also in control of them. The I remains the "owner" of its attributes, at liberty to change and to dissolve itself.³⁰ In no way is the I "swallowed up in my quality—as the human too is my quality, but I give to man his existence first through my uniqueness."³¹ This ontology is one of movement, not simply an ontology of becoming but

also the unmaking of the self. "It is not that the ego *is* all, but the ego *destroys* all, and only the self-dissolving ego, the never-being ego, the—*finite* ego is really I. Fichte speaks of the 'absolute' ego, but I speak of me, the transitory ego."³² Self-dissolving, never-being, finite, transitory, singular, unspeakable, destructive, constructive . . . all describe a nothingness out of which the I emerges and into which it implodes. The ego is a "creative nothing" because it lacks "enduring form or substance; there is no one self which endures over a period of time, but a series of selves which appropriate within themselves and surpass the prior selves."³³ The series of self-creating, self-destroying selves render the ego into a vagabond always in search of itself. "I have rested my case on nothing" [*Ich Hab' Mein Sach' auf Nichts gestellt*]³⁴—such is the opening and closing line of Stirner's book, taken from Goethe's poem. Nothing is the void of plenitude, the space of vagabondage, the potentiality of existence limited only by the ego itself.³⁴ "I, this nothing, shall put forth my *creations* from myself."³⁵

These four qualities of Stirner's thought converge in a distinctive philosophical-political position that captivantly foreshadows contemporary postanarchist thought. Further, this position is carved out by a distinctive method, which in turn rests upon an alternative epistemology. This epistemology is another innovative feature of Stirner's thought, which constitutes a fifth and final affinity with postanarchism.³⁶ Stirner's method of critique, what he occasionally calls "undeification" or "desecration,"³⁷ can be read as the reversal of humanist criticism. The humanist philosophical method of the Young Hegelians generally proceeds by the inversion of the Hegelian predicate and the subject. By taking the Unique as his starting and ending point, Stirner's method enacts another inversion, but this theoretical maneuver, instead of reverting back to Hegel, culminates in the collapse of the predicate and the subject into one another.³⁸ In other words, the Unique *qua* subject is what remains when all those qualities, which have previously been posited as predicates of the Hegelian Absolute Idea and which have been turned into subjects by other Young Hegelians, are unraveled and dismantled.³⁹ Stirner's subject-predicate, then, is that which remains without any predicate, outside of any concept.⁴⁰ The Unique is one's bare singularity, the ungeneralizable remainder that cannot be subsumed under any concept. The remainder that falls out of the concept corresponds to what is particular to each person and to each person only. It constitutes one's ownness, that which eludes comparison, that which cannot be claimed as an essence, and that which is beyond language, beyond the Logos; hence, the "unspeakable."⁴¹

Underlying this critical method is the understanding that each concept, in effect, posits a commonality between different, incommensurate objects, grouping them together, if only under the rubric of its corresponding idealized category. Such a grouping does violence to the specific attributes of these objects that are deemed inessential in comparison with each other and

in light of those attributes that are held in common. Stirner sees that this is a totalizing and reductive operation, amounting to the positing of fixed ideas as ideals, standards by which individuals are then measured and judged.⁴² If concepts or generalities are always reductive of the material reality they claim to represent, then there is always a particular remainder of materiality that cannot be subsumed under the concept.⁴³ This view can be proposed, I think, without necessarily subscribing to Stirner's concurrent claim that the ego is the absolute nonconceptual. Seen in this light, Stirner's contribution indeed constitutes an extremely important materialist critique of epistemology, an effort that converges with Theodor W. Adorno's comparable attempt to develop a properly materialist epistemology in the *Negative Dialectics*.⁴⁴ Despite accusations of idealism, especially from Marxian quarters, Stirner's epistemology, too, remains grounded within materialism. This is because the violent relation is located between the signifier and the signified object and not in the discursive realm of signs. In this sense, it is a critique of representation that asserts the primacy and irreducibility of material existence, of the I, one that posits the nonidentity between the real I and its representation. According to Stirner, the I is not only misrepresented (conceptually and politically) by the way in which we construct our thought-systems but also ultimately unrepresentable because of its singularity.

So far I have identified five dimensions by which Stirner anticipates postanarchy: antiessentialism, antifoundationalism, antihumanism, vagabond ontology, and materialist epistemology. These features are important in their own right, but my main interest is to point to the ways in which they overdetermine the political implications of Stirner's thought. An important consequence of these attributes is that they direct us toward a dynamic politics based on philosophical materialism—the concrete, the unmediated, and direct expression of the I's, which are themselves moving and changing, doing and undoing. These attributes also call our attention to the limitations of static political identities and ideologies. Stirner suggests that no political identity can express our being completely, no ideology can sufficiently represent the claims, needs, desires of the I without doing it violence. By refusing to be judged by categories of identity based on commonalities, Stirner asserts the necessity of philosophical and political distancing from the realm of essences that enslave us. For Stirner, there is no difference between one essence and the other; in fact, the whole realm of essences is a world of ghosts, "spooks" that haunt and overpower men. In this sense, his philosophy implies and invites a postidentitarian, postideological politics. But this should not be taken to imply that he abandons classical anarchist concerns regarding liberty and insurgency. To these, I will now turn.

RUTHLESS CRITICISM OF ALL THAT EXISTS AND DOES NOT EXIST

The dimensions that render Stirner's thought ahead of his time feed into his politics by coalescing around a central and irreconcilable opposition that animates the whole text, the antagonism between the state and the I. Their antagonistic relation is modeled after the dialectic of recognition in Hegel between the lord and the bondsman. In Stirner's dialectic, the state, basing itself on its ability to command sacrifice, is able to secure the obedience of individuals who are not reconciled with their own egoisms and who succumb to the state's judgment regarding their own value. Such a construction enables the negative determinations of the one pole of this dialectic to serve as the basis of the positive determinations of the other pole. As Stirner critiques and tears apart the state, and with it the apparatuses of the state and ideological ways of relating to the state (i.e., varieties of liberalism), he sets down an intellectual path that leads us to the positive determinations of the singular I's and the intersubjective relations between the I's that constitute shifting unions of/in permanent insurgency.

Not unlike his anarchist contemporaries, and perhaps even more pronouncedly than they, Stirner is a theorist of sovereignty. His philosophy is built around the competition of two claimants of supreme power, two agents that are in an existential and irreconcilable conflict. The sovereignty of the state and the sovereignty of the I are fundamentally incompatible as these agents are the "deadly enemies" of each other.⁴⁵ Whoever is mightier subdues the other, but they "remain *enemies*, and always lie in wait."⁴⁶ The state of nature, equivalent to a state of war, is the generalized condition of human existence for which (political) society or sovereignty, à la Hobbes, is no panacea. In fact, "society is our *state of nature*."⁴⁷ In a proto-Schmittian argument, Stirner asserts the ever-present possibility of conflict as the existential condition that constitutes the fundamental political relation.⁴⁸

The ordering principle upon which the legitimacy of all political order rests is the sacrifice of the individual for the collective. The state in particular requires the "self-sacrificing" individual for its existence and reproduction. The state can only exist insofar as it denies egoism: "Only he who renounces his ego, who practices 'self-renunciation,' is acceptable to the people."⁴⁹ Instead of free-thinking individuals endowed with a critical consciousness, the state needs obedient and sacrificial subjects. It must mold the subjectivities of individuals, inculcating feelings and imparting thoughts in accordance with its aims and interests. In provocative resonance with Louis Althusser's famous argument regarding the role of the ideological apparatuses of the state in constituting individuals into subjects, Stirner contends: "The state wants to make something out of man, therefore there live in it only

made men; every one who wants to be his own self is its opponent and is nothing.”⁵⁰

In this sense, the sovereignty of the state is simply the index of the individual’s submission and negation of his ownness—his self-abnegation. According to Stirner, “The common weal as such is not *my weal*, but only the furthest extremity of *self-renunciation*.”⁵¹ “The state always has the sole purpose to limit, tame, subordinate the individual—to make him subject to some *generality* or other; it lasts only so long as the individual is not all in all, and it is only the clearly-marked *restriction of me*, my limitation, my slavery.”⁵² The existence of the state is predicated on the disparagement of the I’s ownness, under the guise of the common good and the collective will. All collectives “have to thank for their existence only the disrespect that I have for myself, and with the vanishing of this undervaluation they themselves are extinguished: they exist only when they exist *above me*, exist only as *powers* and *power-holders*.”⁵³ In reality, every collectivity exists in opposition to and by enslaving the individual; sacredness is a halo. With an allusion to Kant, Stirner claims that the egoist and the state are “powers in deadly hostility, between which no ‘perpetual peace’ is possible.”⁵⁴ Stirner ardently declares: “I am free in *no* state.”⁵⁵

However, the relation between the individual and the collective is mystified when it is perceived as grounded on right and obligation. Ideologies conceal the real content of the communal bond, which is always one of might. Stirner posits that only *might* makes *right*: “What you have the *power* to be you have the *right* to. I derive all right and all warrant from *me*; I am *entitled* to everything that I have in my power.”⁵⁶ There are no rights that can be traced to God, reason, nature, the state, or love, and hence, there are no obligations; entitlement derives from what the self is empowered to achieve, what it has in its power to assert. While Stirner views *any* permanent bond between the individual and the collective as a constraining “fetter,” he is especially weary of *political* collectives to which individuals give allegiance. Here, Stirner identifies three predominant ideologies of his time as forms of self-consciousness that articulate the relation of the individual to corresponding political collectives. The ideologies that make up the targets of Stirner’s criticism are three forms of liberalism: political, social, and humane. The political liberals exalt the state, the social liberals (socialists) exalt society, and the humane liberals (humanists/humanitarians) exalt humanity as the revered object/idea of belonging. They undertake the criticism of religion only to found a new religion of humanity instead. They want to overthrow the servile dependency and subjection of the individual, to liberate him from his inequality, but they make him even more dependent on society and humanity, which they exalt in place of the state.⁵⁷ In the exaltation of these collectives into the status of the sacred, Stirner finds the ideological extension of Christianity.⁵⁸

In his critique of varieties of liberalism, Stirner faults his radical contemporaries for not taking their critical attitude far enough. An important aspect of Stirner's polemic against the communists focuses on their formative assumptions. He reveals that these radicals are not immune to the liberal/humanist assumptions of an essential human nature, upon which they base their political projects. Instead of "Man," or as complementary to it, communists revere the "laborer" in every man, thereby reproducing the split subject of liberalism in yet a different way. In place of the liberal glorification of man as "citizen" through the state, the communists glorify man as "laborer" through society. Evocative of Hannah Arendt's skepticism of the Marxist valorization of "labor" and the conceptualization of human beings as primarily *animal laborans*, Stirner is critical of the communists' veneration of labor as the self-actualization of man.⁵⁹ Accordingly, by valuing the "laborer" in each individual in place of the individual as the Unique, communists impose on the individual a new "vocation," an inspirational "calling," another "faith," asking him, once again, to be a "man"; more specifically, the "laboring man," so that he can realize himself through labor.⁶⁰ Inasmuch as the contemporary state rests on the slavery of individuals *qua* citizens, the society sought by the communists will rest on the slavery of singular individuals *qua* laborers. Stirner's reference to the proletariat includes those sectors of the population most questionable to the conventional morality of citizenship instead of the working class.⁶¹ Thus, "the swindler, the whore, the thief, robber, and murderer, the gambler, the penniless man without a position, the frivolous man" as examples of the "immoral" masses, who have no security and no bonds, constitute, for Stirner, "the class of the unstable, restless, changeable, of the *proletariat*."⁶² Stirner's proletariat has nothing to lose, *not even their chains*.

Secondly, and as an extension of the first criticism, Stirner reprimands these radicals for being motivated by idealized concepts that demand the submission of men and require that they sacrifice themselves to these ideals: "He who refuses to spend his powers for such limited societies as family, party, nation, is still always longing for a worthier society, and thinks he has found the true object of love, perhaps, in 'human society' or 'mankind,' to sacrifice himself to which constitutes his honour; from now on he 'lives for and serves *mankind*.'"⁶³ But this transfer of allegiance from established collective units to more universally encompassing, less alienating, and more egalitarian collectivities is only the deepening of men's enslavement. The substitution of "humanity" in place of the "nation" as the ideal for which men strive and sacrifice, Stirner decries, is not a move toward emancipation but only the further entrenchment of the individual's subjugation. The new object of reverence functions much more insidiously; it nonetheless usurps the sovereignty of the individual but disguises this usurpation under an allegedly "worthier" cause more difficult to contest.⁶⁴ "That society is no ego at all,

which could give, bestow, or grant, but an instrument or means, from which we may derive benefit; that we have no social duties, but solely interests for the pursuance of which society must serve us; that we owe society no sacrifice, but, if we sacrifice anything, sacrifice it to ourselves—of this the socialists do not think, because they—as liberals—are imprisoned in the religious principle, and zealously aspire after—a sacred society, such as the State was hitherto.”⁶⁵ Hence, liberals of all stripes fail to recognize that all governments are the same, that their essence is despotism, that the ultimate battle should be directed at sovereign power itself.⁶⁶ The destroyer of the state is nothing but my “own will.”⁶⁷

A STIRNERITE POLITICS, THE POLITICS OF EXODUS

By indicting communists and humanitarians as liberals and their emancipatory projects as entailing sinister forms of subjection of the unique individual through their moral call for revolutionary sacrifice, Stirner by and large condemns the radical thinkers and movements of his time. The criticisms launched from the perspective of this individualistic, antiessentialist, anti-foundationalist, and amoral anarchism hit a vulnerable target with the insinuation that revolutionary communism shares the same theological imprint with ideologies justifying the *status quo*.

Marx and Engels both appreciate Stirner’s thought and find it deeply troubling as an intellectual challenge to their collectivist project.⁶⁸ Upon reading *The Ego and Its Own*, Engels writes to Marx: “This egoism is taken to such a pitch, it is so absurd and at the same time so self-aware, that it cannot maintain itself even for an instant in its one-sidedness, but must immediately change into communism. In the first place it is a simple matter to prove to Stirner that his egoistic man is bound to become communist out of sheer egoism.”⁶⁹ Following this line, it may be possible to reconcile both, and this is what Jacob Blumenfeld attempts to do when he argues, “Stirner’s egoism is Marx’s communism seen from the first person singular perspective.”⁷⁰ Despite the innovativeness of this view as an attempt to bridge anarchism and communism, it remains alien, I think, to the way in which Marx perceived his own communism. In this light, Engels’s rather nonchalant letter to Marx is swiftly transformed into an extensive rebuttal in the *German Ideology*, revealing a deep anxiety regarding the theological nature of the communist project, the freedom of the individual vis-à-vis collectivist principles, and the demand for sacrifice as the principle of political practice.

According to Stirner, egoists within existing society should direct their efforts not only against the state, but against any collectivity and collective project. Far from rendering the egoist apolitical, such efforts should facilitate

emancipation. Liberation must be an individual project of self-realization, an egoist end. Egoism is a matter of self-valorization, realizing the power that individuals already have and making use of it.⁷¹ The I's path to emancipation begins with the development of a critical self-consciousness, which requires a constant practice of desacralization. Questioning every category and rendering profane what is held to be sacred and untouchable pave the way toward a self-understanding that can develop in the direction of egoism. Realizing one's uniqueness and potential as an unbridled egoist opens up a constant process of self-creation and self-destruction.⁷² All manifestations of man's alienation must be done away with; all must be reappropriated into the ego, the continuous source of creativity.

What, then, would a Stirnerite politics look like? Against what must the egoist fight, with whom, and in what way? Abstractions and concepts come at the forefront of those things that the egoist must confront. The egoist must fight not only against transcendent, religious concepts, but also against all those ostensibly secular, immanent concepts that have only displaced the object of religious reverence into the "human breast."⁷³ Not only God, Christianity, the state, the nation, the law, the family, and morality, which are abstractions of the establishment, but also man, species being, labor, justice, truth, love, revolution, and socialism . . . should be subject to demystification, criticism, and deconstruction. Since the egoist is enslaved by *any* concept, generality, or collectivity, among which the state figures prominently, reclaiming oneself as the unique "un-man" is a necessary first step out of this enslavement toward self-assertion.

One such method of self-assertion is crime. Accordingly, "the egoist, in all cases where his advantage runs against the state's, can satisfy himself only by crime."⁷⁴ Criminality is a method of acting out one's individuality and acting against all that is posited against the ego as sacred. It unveils the relation of force between the state and the I. As the "irreconcilable enemy of every generality [*Allgemeinheit*], every *tie*, every fetter," the I enters into temporary coalitions only and coalitions that fit egoist interests. Instead of submitting to the state or to society, the egoist must transform them into his/her instruments: "I annihilate it, and form in its place the *Union of Egoists* [*Verein von Egoisten*]."⁷⁵ These unions are temporary coalitions of the "un-man," which must never relapse into fixed and unitary entities, for society is the "*corpse* of the union."⁷⁶

The ultimate appropriation of the egoist's alienated powers in existing society is through insurrection, that is, the disruption of each individual of any *status quo* by an uprising, a "getting up," a taking leave from the establishment. The "secession" of the individual is a rebellion and rising up; this act corresponds to an exodus.⁷⁷ The *exodus* of the ego is an unbinding.⁷⁸ By taking leave, the unique individual leaves the *status quo* without its fundamental support and renders it bound to collapse of its own weight:

Revolution and insurrection must not be looked upon as synonymous. The former consists in an overturning of conditions, of the established condition or *status*, the state or society, and is accordingly a *political* or *social* act; the latter has indeed for its unavoidable consequence a transformation of circumstances, yet does not start from it but from men's discontent with themselves, is not an armed uprising, but a rising of individuals, a getting up, without regard to the arrangements that spring from it. The revolution aimed at new *arrangements*; insurrection leads us no longer to *let* ourselves be arranged.⁷⁹

Thus, Stirner envisions that once individuals *except* themselves from the *status quo*, they will achieve emancipation. He expects that by the individual's "working forth of [oneself] out of the established," the status quo will "collapse," will die and "pass into decay." The distinguishing feature of insurrection as opposed to revolution is that this emancipation happens without any investment or plan for an alternative political project. Such a project seeks to reorganize material conditions in line with emancipatory goals but superimposes yet other alienating totalities upon individuals to do so. The absolute sovereignty of the egoist can only be claimed at the expense of the sovereignty of the collective, and the latter can only be dismantled by taking a radical exception from the sovereignty of the concept.

EXODUS TODAY

Stirner's insurgent politics suggests exodus as a plausible alternative in the direction of overcoming alienation and achieving emancipation. As with most of his other decidedly inflammatory claims that stand in the murky margins that connect philosophy with politics, thinking with practice, concepts with reality, Stirner's proposition of exodus is ambiguous, elusive, and intriguing. In lieu of a conclusion, I would like to suggest several concrete forms of exodus from contemporary politics as possibilities in tune with the spirit of Stirner's politics. While I do not mean to suggest that these forms of exodus are directly informed by Stirner's ideas, I do think that Stirner's understanding of the antagonism between the state and the I and the necessity of taking leave to disrupt and destroy the existing order of things shed important light on what these insurgent political practices may mean.

One form of exodus that is most common is secession. There is no better sign of the undesirability of the existing order than when a large group of people decide to split themselves from the collectivity to which they had hitherto given allegiance and to found one of their own. The drive to collective self-determination under a different identity has paved the way to many founding moments of nascent nation-states. The dissolution of the large

multiethnic and colonial empires in the early twentieth century has been the fertile ground for such secessions.

Another form of exodus is emigration. People who are discontented, who face persecution, whose life prospects are dim, choose to move away insofar as they have resources to do so. That this is the oldest and most widely practiced form of taking leave has ample historical and contemporary illustrations. The United States is the most obvious result of mass exodus from Europe at the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. However, there is perhaps no better demonstration of the lack of legitimacy (either never established or its loss suffered) by a state authority than the mass exodus of its people.⁸⁰ However, counterintuitively, Albert O. Hirschman suggests that while mass emigration out of countries increases their authoritarian character in the short run, it may in fact lead to the democratization and liberalization of the regimes in the longer term.⁸¹

Another form of exodus is defection—refusing to obey. Paolo Virno defines such exodus as an active, “engaged withdrawal (or founding leave-taking),” not simply disobeying a particular order or rule but putting into question the very ability of the state to extract obedience. He cites two important instances of such defection: the exit of North American workers out of the factory system to grab land from the Western frontier in the nineteenth century and that of the Italian workers toward flexible employment in the second half of the twentieth century.⁸² Indeed, the whole tradition of “autonomia” can be deemed as creating self-determining zones of life carved out of the mass refusal to work and act in accordance with the state and the capitalist market.⁸³ In this respect, we may consider Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s advocacy of the exodus of the multitude from Empire as a recent instance of such defection.⁸⁴

Finally, there is the lethal instance of exodus when individuals forge their lives into weapons in political struggle. These self-destructive acts of insurgence reveal, communicate with, and perform a response to the continuing presence of sovereign power, now increasingly biopolitical. In response to power’s ability to extend control over life itself, to the exclusion of death from the political, forms of necropolitical resistance, such as self-immolation, suicide attack or fasts unto death, allow individuals to depart from the tightening clasp of the existing order while, at the same time, violently disrupting the order itself.⁸⁵

Disparate as they are, such forms of exodus challenge the conventional repertoires of political practice while they interrupt the complacency of those who are left behind. It is unclear whether Stirner would have espoused and advocated any of these forms of exodus as his own, but they constitute real possibilities that his thought presents when it is taken to its logical conclusions. Contemporary radical movements cannot afford to ignore these alternatives of exodus but must come to terms with them both theoretically and

politically in order to develop cogent, convincing, and popular ways of exiting the existing order.

So let us end where we have begun: The elephant, after wreaking havoc in the china shop, takes leave. He takes us out of the domain of philosophy and into that of politics. As he leaves, he teaches us that the existing order is defined at its core by sovereign power and that we must, at every instance, consider our relation to the state as the keeper of this order. If this relation is continually mystified by liberal, socialist, and humanist universalisms that conceal the subjugation of individuals, it is the egoists' task to demystify and desacralize this relation by taking leave. Of course, today's insurgent I's will attempt to take leave in the ways most appropriate to their conditions of existence and their ownness. Nonetheless, the question of exit remains the most important *political* question with which Stirner's elephant leaves us among the ruins to consider. What kinds of exodus are already happening, and how do we recognize the subversive, Stirnerite spirit in these practices? What forms of exit are most plausible, most emancipatory, most egoist? And, finally, there is perhaps one other question that Stirner's elephant leaves behind: Where to go from here? This is our question, *après la lettre*.

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NOTES

1. Alfredo Bonanno, "The Theory of the Individual: Stirner's Savage Thought," *The Anarchist Library*, <http://www.theanarchistlibrary.org>, accessed 27 June 2010.

2. Max Stirner, *The Ego and Its Own*, ed. David Leopold (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

3. For an important introduction to Stirner's thought, see R. W. K. Paterson, *The Nihilistic Egoist: Max Stirner* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971).

4. Lawrence Stepelevich, "The Revival of Max Stirner," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 35.2 (April–June 1974): 323–28.

5. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology*, in *Collected Works*, vol. 5 (New York: International Publishers, 1976).

6. Famous articulations of anarchist thought with postmodernism include Todd May, *The Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism* (University Park: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994); Lewis Call, *Postmodern Anarchism* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2002); and Saul Newman, *From Bakunin to Lacan: Anti-Authoritarianism and the Dislocation of Power* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2001).

7. For a concise overview of the primary elements of postanarchism, see Gabriel Kuhn, "Anarchism, Postmodernity, and Poststructuralism," in *Contemporary Anarchist Studies: An Introductory Anthology of Anarchy in the Academy*, eds. Randall Amster et al. (London: Routledge, 2009), 18–25. For an analysis that takes up contemporary anarchist practices of resistance within the framework of postanarchism, see Dave Morland, "Anti-capitalism and Poststructuralist Anarchism," in *Changing Anarchism: Anarchist Theory and Practice in a Global*

Age, eds. Jonathan Purkis and James Bowen (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 23–38.

8. Saul Newman, “Max Stirner and the Politics of Posthumanism,” *Contemporary Political Theory* 1.2 (June 2002): 221–38; “Stirner and Foucault: Toward a Post-Kantian Freedom,” *Postmodern Culture* 13.2 (2003); “War on the State: Stirner and Deleuze’s Anarchism,” *Anarchist Studies* 9.2 (2001); “Politics of the Ego: Stirner’s Critique of Liberalism,” *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 5.3 (Autumn 2002).

9. Stirner, *Ego and Its Own*, 152.

10. Call, *Postmodern Anarchism*, 21–22.

11. Saul Newman, *The Politics of Postanarchism* (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 2010).

12. See, for example, the criticisms advanced by Jesse Cohn, “What is Postanarchism ‘Post’?,” *Postmodern Culture* 13.1 (2002); Benjamin Franks, “Postanarchism: A Critical Assessment,” *Journal of Political Ideologies* 12.2 (2007): 127–45; Allan Antliff, “Anarchy, Power, and Poststructuralism,” *SubStance* 36.2 (2007): 56–66; Simon Choat, “Power and Subjectivity: A Critique of Post-Anarchism,” Workshops in Political Theory, Sixth Annual Conference, Manchester Metropolitan University, September 2009, www.anarchist-studies-network.org.uk, accessed 15 June 2010; Jesse Cohn and Shawn Wilbur, “What’s Wrong with Postanarchism?,” <http://theanarchistlibrary.org>, accessed 1 July 2010.

13. Saul Newman, “Max Stirner and the Politics of Posthumanism.”

14. Stirner, *Ego and Its Own*, 143.

15. *Ibid.*, 38, 142.

16. *Ibid.*, 163, 207, 226–27.

17. *Ibid.*, 43.

18. In this context, Brazill argues, “in a mood similar to Rousseau’s, Stirner observed that the ego was born free, but everywhere it was in chains, because of the human tendency to self-alienation” by creating ideals and then subjecting oneself to them. See William J. Brazill, *The Young Hegelians* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1970), 215, cf. esp. 207–21.

19. For an extended discussion of Stirner’s critique of Feuerbach and other Young Hegelians, see David McLellan, *The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx* (London: Macmillan, 1969), 120–25; Brazill, *Young Hegelians*, 216–19; Sidney Hook, *From Hegel to Marx: Studies in the Intellectual Development of Karl Marx* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962), 165–73; Paul Thomas, “Karl Marx and Max Stirner,” *Political Theory* 3.2 (May 1975): 161–63; Paul Thomas, *Karl Marx and the Anarchists* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980); Lawrence S. Stepelevich, “Max Stirner and Ludwig Feuerbach,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 39.3 (July–September 1978): 457–59; Todd Gooch, “Max Stirner and the Apotheosis of the Corporeal Ego,” *Owl of Minerva* 37.2 (2006): 159–90; Gary K. Browning, *Hegel and the History of Political Philosophy* (Hampshire: Macmillan, 1999), 63–92; Widukind de Ridder, “Max Stirner, Hegel, and the Young Hegelians: A Reassessment,” *History of European Ideas* 34 (2008): 285–97; David Leopold, “A Left Hegelian Anarchism,” *The European Legacy* 8.6 (2003): 777–86.

20. On this note, Althusser fails to recognize Stirner’s role in bringing forth a posthumanist problematic. See Louis Althusser, “Marxism and Humanism,” *For Marx*, trans. Ben Brewster (London: Verso, 2005), 219–47.

21. Ludwig Feuerbach, *On the Essence of Christianity*, trans. George Eliot (Mineola: Dover, 2008).

22. Stirner, *Ego and Its Own*, 47.

23. Cf. Marx’s interpretation of the split subject, the bourgeois-citizen, which he expects will be reconciled in the “human.” See Karl Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” *The Marx-Engels Reader*, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978), 26–52.

24. Stirner, *Ego and Its Own*, 39.

25. *Ibid.*, 217.

26. Giorgio Agamben, *The Coming Community*, trans. Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993). Here, Agamben puts forth the idea of a subjectivity that refuses identity and which cannot be represented with respect to categories of belonging. The construction of “whatever singularity” is crucial for Agamben’s attempt to posit the possibility of a

community that refrains from assuming commonality of identity. Agamben thus gestures toward an anarchist politics in which he views singular individuals in a struggle against states, epitomized rather aporetically by the protests in Tiananmen Square.

27. Stirner, *Ego and Its Own*, 159.
28. Ibid., 163.
29. Ibid., 102.
30. Ibid., 258.
31. Ibid., 217.
32. Ibid., 163.
33. John P. Clark, *Max Stirner's Egoism* (London: Freedom Press, 1976), 18–19.
34. Stirner, *Ego and Its Own*, 163–64.
35. Ibid., 209.
36. Andrew M. Koch, "Poststructuralism and the Epistemological Basis of Anarchism," *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 23.3 (September 1993): 327–51.
37. Stirner, *Ego and Its Own*, 89, 165.
38. Hook formulates this somewhat differently: "Feuerbach taught that Man had created God in his own image; Stirner that the individual ego had created Man in his own image. One had dissolved the subject (God) into all of its predicates; the other had dissolved the predicate (Society) into the personal pronouns—I, me, myself." Sidney Hook, *From Hegel to Marx: Studies in the Intellectual Development of Karl Marx* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962), 171.
39. According to McLellan, instead of "attempting to replace Hegel's 'concrete universal' by any 'humanity' or 'classless' society," Stirner, choosing recourse to "no universal, only the individual, all-powerful ego," thus brings Hegelianism to its logical conclusions" (*The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx*, 119).
40. According to Hook, Stirner "came to fulfill the movement which was begun by Strauss, deepened by Bauer's and transferred to a new plane by Feuerbach. Strauss's concept of the absolute community had been declared religious by Bauer while Bauer's own ideal of critical self-consciousness had been revealed as anachronistic theology by Marx and Feuerbach. Stirner taught that the Feuerbachian worship of man was just as superstitious as the theologies which Feuerbach had exploded" (*From Hegel to Marx*, 165–66).
41. Stirner, *Ego and Its Own*, 164.
42. Koch notes that Stirner's critique of epistemology is an approximation of Nietzschean genealogy ("Poststructuralism and the Epistemological Basis of Anarchism," 331–33).
43. For this reason, Balibar calls Stirner a "radical nominalist." See Étienne Balibar, *The Philosophy of Marx* (London: Verso, 1995), 34.
44. Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, trans. E. B. Ashton (New York: Herder and Herder, 1973).
45. Stirner, *Ego and Its Own*, 161, 175, 179, 199, 227.
46. Stirner's egoists resemble individuals in the state of nature as depicted by Hobbes: "because each thing *cares for itself* and at the same time comes into constant collision with other things, the *combat* of self-assertion is unavoidable" (Ibid., 13).
47. Ibid., 271.
48. Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, trans. George Schwab (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1996).
49. Stirner, *Ego and Its Own*, 179.
50. Ibid., 201. Louis Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), 127–86.
51. Stirner, *Ego and Its Own*, 190.
52. Ibid., 201.
53. Ibid., 252.
54. Ibid., 175.
55. Ibid., 201.
56. Ibid., 161.
57. Ibid., 228.
58. Ibid., 158.

59. The distinction between work and labor is not developed in Stirner, but his emphasis on unproductive labor and the espousal of the Lumpenproletariat can be seen as related to the affinity I wish to indicate here. See Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

60. Stirner maintains: "As the communists first declare free activity to be man's essence, they, like all work-day dispositions, need a Sunday; like all material endeavours, they need a God, an uplifting and edification alongside their witless 'labour.' That the communist sees in you the man, the brother, is only the Sunday side of communism. According to the work-day side he does not by any means take you as man simply, but as human labourer or labouring man. The first view has in it the liberal principle; in the second illiberality is concealed" (*Ego and Its Own*, 110).

61. According to Thomas, Stirner's category of those who have nothing to lose corresponds to the "pauper" which he does not differentiate from the "proletarian"; pauperism, according to Stirner, is also one's own valuelessness, as produced by the state (*Karl Marx and the Anarchists*, 166).

62. Stirner, *Ego and Its Own*, 101–102.

63. Ibid., 215.

64. Thomas, *Karl Marx and the Anarchists*, 167–68.

65. Stirner, *Ego and Its Own*, 111.

66. Ibid., 202, 175.

67. Ibid., 175.

68. For an analysis of Stirner's influence on Marx's thought, see Paul Thomas, *Karl Marx and the Anarchists*, 125–74, and N. Lobkowitz, "Karl Marx and Max Stirner," in *Demythologizing Marxism*, ed. Frederick J. Adelman (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), 64–95.

69. Letter from Engels to Marx, 19 November 1844, Marx/Engels Letters, www.marxists.org, accessed June 9, 2010.

70. Jacob Blumenfeld, "All Things Are Nothing to Me: Stirner's Communism," paper presented at the annual international Historical Materialism Conference, New York, 14–16 January 2010.

71. Stirner, *Ego and Its Own*, 105.

72. Kathy Ferguson, "Saint Max Revisited: A Reconsideration of Max Stirner," *Idealistic Studies* 12.3 (1982): 279, 287.

73. Stirner, *Ego and Its Own*, 47.

74. Ibid., 212.

75. Ibid., 161.

76. Ibid., 161, 271, my emphasis.

77. Ibid., 192.

78. Ibid., 175.

79. Ibid., 279–80.

80. James C. Scott, *The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009). For a European example, see Albert O. Hirschman, "Exit, Voice and the Fate of the German Democratic Republic: An Essay in Conceptual History," *World Politics* 45.2 (January 1993): 173–202.

81. Albert O. Hirschman, "Exit, Voice, and the State," *World Politics* 31.1 (October 1978): 90–107.

82. Paolo Virno, "Virtuosity and Revolution: The Political Theory of Exodus," in *Radical Thought in Italy: A Potential Politics*, ed. Paolo Virno and Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 199.

83. See Sylvère Lotringer and Christian Marazzi, eds., *Autonomia: Post-Political Politics* (Los Angeles: Semiotext[e], 2007).

84. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000) and *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004). In this vein, Stirner's conception of the individual in his singularity arguably prefigures the configuration of the multitude as distinct from the "people" or the "proletariat" as collective political actors that subsume the individual.

85. For an extended discussion of the weaponization of life, see Banu Bargu, “Human Weapons: Biopolitics and the Death Fast in Turkey” (unpublished book manuscript, under review).

Chapter Seven

The Late Foucault's Premodernity

Jimmy Casas Klausen

To think the work of Foucault in terms of a critical anarchism would not seem to require an imaginative leap of faith.¹ He did after all utter the famous proposition-cum-accusation that “[i]n political thought and analysis, we still have not cut off the head of the king.”² And he went on to write in Volume I of *The History of Sexuality*:

Hence the importance that the theory of power gives to the problem of right and violence, law and illegality, freedom and will, and especially state and sovereignty (even if the latter is questioned insofar as it is personified in a collective being and no longer a sovereign individual). To conceive of power on the basis of these problems is to conceive of it in terms of a historical form that is characteristic of our societies: the juridical monarchy.³

To behead the king, to assassinate heads of state: these seem like the goals of a certain anarchism of the late nineteenth century in Europe. Such an anarchism—of fiction and stereotype but also of a strand of Euroatlantic history between the fall of the Paris Commune and the outbreak of World War I—advocated a “propaganda of the deed,” which entailed the possibility of terrorist acts against economic and political figures as a means to incite more widespread revolutionary action with the goal of overthrowing the state. Central to many *fin de siècle* anarchisms was a critique of the modern nation-state in Europe and America as fundamentally repressive to the essence of human beings. And so, as late modern critics have noted, the anarchism of old made fairly explicit humanist claims—specifically that the real vitality of human beings is manifest in (usually voluntary) associationist forms other than the modern nation-state or the economic structures of industrial capitalism.⁴ On this anarchist view, bureaucratizing nation-states, dependent on

their apparatuses of law and order, actively cramp individual freedom and prevent human flourishing both individually and by groups.

Foucault, of course, means something quite different by his provocation that political theorists cut off the head of the king. The injunction was not literal, of course, but rather admonished those who would really understand the workings of modern power to decenter the juridico-monarchical model of sovereignty as *the* core interpretant of politics. Hence, for him this decapitation does not serve as an instance of propaganda of the deed, not least because he did not foresee the result of such a deed as the unleashing of a repressed human essence. As seems quite clear from his 1971 debate with Noam Chomsky, Foucault was critical of an anarchist politics that turned on a repressive hypothesis—that is, of an anarchist interpretation of a universal, essential human nature as being repressed by the state.⁵ He would propose in his first Collège de France lecture for 1979, “instead of deducing concrete phenomena from universals, or instead of starting with universals as an obligatory grid of intelligibility for certain concrete practices, I would like to start with these concrete practices and, as it were, pass these universals through the grid of these practices.”⁶ Famously for Foucault, then, the injunction to cut off the head of the king in political theory would liberate an analytics of power from the old ruts of negative, repressive hypotheses and a statist, juridical view of power as prohibition. Power is not the possession of a person or class of people who run the state. “Power,” as Foucault understood it, “is everywhere; not because it embraces everything,” as would be the case in certain totalizing interpretations of the modern nation-state as saturating the entire field of the social, but rather, he insists, “because it comes from everywhere.”⁷

The first objective of this chapter, then, seems simple: to pose questions about what anarchism looks like after the repressive hypothesis has been fully digested and incorporated into radical theory. What features does a critical stance against domination take on when one accepts that domination does not emanate only or even primarily from the modern nation-state? We begin to see what makes Foucault’s insights into the plurality of power relationships so unique by contrasting him with the pluralist theories of G. D. H. Cole and Harold Laski.

This chapter has, moreover, a second objective. For it would be wrong simply to conclude that Foucault’s anarchism goes no further than an acephalous postjuridical analytics of power—that is, that Foucaultian anarchism remains solely and simply at the level of political analysis. So we must also ask, what does a practice of freedom look like in light of a Foucaultian anarchism?

As those acquainted with Foucault’s work will know, it would not follow that merely because the king is dead, everything will be permitted: to argue that power comes from everywhere does not amount to a declaration of total

and licentious freedom, whether with or without any "implication of disorder."⁸ Hence, Foucault's decapitation of the king does not bring on the negatively connoted anarchic consequences threatened by Thomas Hobbes, for example, in *Leviathan*. Nor does it bring about any dream of "universal reciprocity" upon the withering away of the state.⁹ Hence, Foucault is not dewy-eyed about the implications of his political analytics for anarchism as either a positively or a negatively valued possibility. Here, too, Foucault's intransigent yet oblique approach to practices of freedom emerges from a contrast—this time with the Situationist or Postsituationist critique of Raoul Vaneigem.

Ultimately, I argue, an anarchism that strives for criticality (and not all anarchisms need to do that) must necessarily change both its conceptual and its practical bearings in the wake of Foucault's acephalous analytics. Far from remaining confined to the level of analysis, though, Foucault's anarchism in fact extends, or at least can be read as extending, to a new theorization of anarchistic practice: his insights not only offer a "descriptive" account of how power now actually works but also sketch empowering political practices askew from an orientation to the late modern state or the individualizing conception of power that embodies domination in ruling classes. Indeed, this renovated theorization of anarchistic practices, primarily in his presentation of what he calls "counterconducts" in his 1977–1978 lectures at the Collège de France, necessarily follows from his acephalous analytics of power. The complexity of his acephalous analytics of power can renew anarchism as critical theory and practice.

Ultimately, understanding the acephalous analytics and the critical anarchist theory that follows from it will require a rehearsal of Foucault's explorations of pastoral power and the importance of the production and conduct of subjectivity from the sixteenth century in Europe. Moreover, following from the development in Europe of pastoral power as the governing of conduct in all spheres of life is what Foucault calls in several of his late writings and lectures the "governmentalization of the state." Therefore, before reckoning with the critical tactics (and ultimately strategies) of resistance proper to these modern strategies of power, it will be crucial to understand what Foucault means in saying that the state is an "effect" of power relations. What seems surprising is that Foucault took great inspiration from sixteenth century counterconducts and, more remarkable still, that he thought of them as a model for late twentieth-century struggles:

And nowadays, the struggle against the forms of subjection—against the submission of subjectivity—is becoming more and more important. . . . I suspect that it is not the first time that our society has been confronted with this kind of struggle. All those movements that took place in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, which had the Reformation as their main expression and result, should be analyzed as a great

crisis of the Western experience of subjectivity and a revolt against the kind of religious and moral power that gave form, during the Middle Ages, to this subjectivity. The need to take a direct part in spiritual life, in the work of salvation, in the truth that lies in the Book—all that was a struggle for a new subjectivity.¹⁰

It is the goal of the following sections of this chapter both to account for Foucault's declaration of admiration for critical Reformation and Counter-Reformation struggles and to make the case that these premodern struggles can serve as a viable model for a critical anarchist theory after Foucault.

FOUCAULT'S ACEPHALOUS ANALYTICS AND THE PLURALIZATION OF POWER

According to Foucault, then, political theorists must cut off the head of the king, and he means by this that if we are to develop a richer account of the *how* of power—its mechanics, procedures, technologies—then we must displace from our focus the juridical monarchy and its postmonarchic descendants. In part, this is a question of representation. Analysts of power have come to rely so much on (political) sovereignty as the truth of power that they have neglected to notice to what degree sovereignty necessarily implies other power relations: the political and, to import a term from Carl Schmitt, decisionist superiority that sovereignty implies is an effect of these other power relations. It is not the case that the state does not exist in Foucaultian theory. Rather, the state is produced as an effect of a plurality of power relations. However, as a result of an impasse of power-knowledge struggles whereby the multiplicity of nonstatist power relations in modern Western societies have come to be cast as something other than power, “power” itself then has come to be represented almost exclusively by the juridical monarchy, ultimately a mere synecdoche of the totality of power relations. An entire corporealized political theology—elaborated since the Middle Ages—has crowned the monarch as head of the body politic, that individualized bodily member that would consummate and lead the entire corporate being. And even though the body politic metaphor is ambiguous with respect to the supports of other powers internal to it¹¹—i.e., can a head effectively lead and act in the absence of internal organs and the motor powers of limbs?—nevertheless, the thematics of the body politic have survived the passing of the Middle Ages and even the advent of postmonarchical states. Except when we speak of a specific “head of state,” the head-function has become impersonal but no less captivating: that abstraction itself, the state, absorbs and represents the sovereignty formerly accorded to a monarch.

To pose all political problems in statist terms, then, is to subscribe, perhaps unwittingly, to the very logic of sovereignty. That is to say, the equation

of power and state effectively grants superiority and centrality to the state, thereby rendering other powers derivative (e.g., French *parlements* in the early modern period would thus be viewed as deriving power from the king rather than being a perhaps admittedly unequal antagonist in struggles with the king) or allowing them to be altogether eclipsed and rendered invisible. Moreover, the problem of state-centrism—of condensing the entire field of political intelligibility on the crown-function—manifests itself with full force even in many strands of leftist politics: anarchisms and Marxist and socialist parties of all stripes made the disruption and capture of the state central programmatic goals and therefore leave the entire discursive-representational system of modern power unquestioned; moreover, internal to the radical left was a vanguardism that effectively meant that party political programs were decided by a centralized authority and directed by party heads blessed with totalizing rather than particularistic vision.¹² It is precisely against such inadequate representations of power that Foucault would have future political theorists militate. In the interview “Truth and Power,” Foucault offered an explanation of how decapitating the king was meant as an incitement to pluralize the representation of power. “I don’t want to say that the State isn’t important,” he cautioned. Rather, he went on to say,

relations of power, and hence the analysis that must be made of them, necessarily extend beyond the limits of the State. In two senses: first of all because the State, for all the omnipotence of its apparatuses, is far from being able to occupy the whole field of actual power relations, and further because the State can only operate on the basis of other, already existing power relations. The State is superstructural in relation to a whole series of power networks that invest the body, sexuality, the family, kinship, knowledge, technology, and so forth . . . this meta-power with its prohibitions can only take hold and secure its footing where it is rooted in a whole series of multiple and indefinite power relations that supply the necessary basis for the great negative forms of power.¹³

In short, the state with its potent apparatuses may seem to enjoy a kind of sovereignty—a certain repressive-decisionist-prohibitionist superiority—but this is so only by dint of all the power relations that lie beyond the state’s own limits and that the state can neither saturate nor exhaust.

Foucault would pluralize, then, our understanding of power relations. Cutting off the head of the king allows us to see finally that state power survives the ages of revolution, empire, and capitalist transformations only by securing its sovereignty through multiple supports. These supports are, moreover, ambivalent because they do not straightforwardly or consistently promote statist power but may sometimes operate at cross-purposes with it. Nonetheless, though, in supporting the self-representation of the state as the culmination and terminus of power—as power itself—previous analysts and

activists willed their own ignorance of these multiple and ambivalent supports, these other exercises of power.

While challenging statist sovereignty as *the* concept of the political, the pluralization of power, whether by Foucault's acephaly or another analytics, may or may not yield any immediate positive value for an anarchist theory. Indeed, Foucault's pluralization of power significantly differs on precisely this point from classic pluralist theories: cutting off the head of the king does not result in a straightforward derepression of other power centers beyond the state and the flourishing of essential humanity within them. Contrasting Foucault, classic pluralist theory, and Carl Schmitt on the relationships between sovereignty, acephaly, pluralizing power, and anarchy is instructive here.

Notably, Schmitt lobbed a charge of anarchism at the theory of functionalist pluralism as set out by G. D. H. Cole and Harold Laski. What Schmitt meant by "anarchy" was the disorder of a state of nature, and he toed this stark Hobbesian line in response to the pluralists' critique of political sovereignty. The pluralists wanted to suggest that social order could arise without political sovereignty, while Schmitt insisted otherwise. Specifically, Cole had concluded that "the sovereign, if there is one, must represent and include, as far as possible, the whole of everybody," but because the modern state represents only *some* of the purposes common to the totality of its members and because these members pursue other social functions in other nonstate associations, then the state cannot lay sovereign and exclusive claim to represent the whole of their lives.¹⁴ Cole would no doubt have denied that his pluralism entailed any kinship with anarchism, and his fellow pluralist theorist Harold Laski explicitly denied anarchy (which he too understood only in the negative sense of disorder) as implied by pluralism.¹⁵ Schmitt, however, in his project to boost and safeguard sovereignty, made the connection explicit:

G. D. H. Cole's and Harold Laski's so-called theory of pluralism . . . consists in denying the sovereignty of the political entity by stressing time and again that the individual lives in numerous different social entities and associations. . . . These control him in differing degrees from case to case, and impose on him a cluster of obligations in such a way that no one of these associations can be said to be decisive and sovereign.¹⁶

Hence, pluralist theory, Schmitt concludes, "is either the theory of state which arrives at the unity of state by a federalism of social associations or a theory of the dissolution or rebuttal of the state."¹⁷ That is to say, on this Schmittian view, either the state achieves coherence as a unified entity from the federation of prior social associations or else the plurality of social associations and their equivalence to the specifically political entity of the state implies the suspension of sovereignty and therefore anarchy (negatively connoted).

Although, *pace* Schmitt, Cole would and Laski does deny that their pluralist theory implies anarchy in the negative sense, it seems hard to deny that an acephalous politics of pluralism implies anarchy in at least a neutral sense; that is, anarchy “without implication of disorder,” as the *OED*’s parenthesized double negation would have it.¹⁸ However, it is crucial to analyze the character of anarchism that different pluralizing theories offer; for Foucault differs substantively from classic pluralist theory. Cole, for example, views the dissolution of sovereignty as a positive development since the state only deserves as much of each person as it functionally represents. After all, freeing people from the despotism of a state that demands “the whole of everybody” but reflects back only a part of each would result in a more honest view of power and representation for Cole, and other functional associations could flourish in the anarchist vacuum left by the reined-in state. In short, pluralist theorists like Cole take a positive view of life after sovereignty. As is clear from earlier remarks, Foucault would, by contrast, find dubious any impulse to place much faith in powers beyond the limits of the state. The Foucaultian relationship between pluralized power and anarchy differs in two respects: one that puts him close to Schmitt and one that places him far from Cole.

First, if for Schmitt the concept of the political always safeguards war as its “leading presupposition,”¹⁹ Foucault stresses that domination and war persist underneath and beyond the state, so getting rid of the state would not produce peace. In his lectures and writings from the mid-1970s onward, Foucault begins to speak of politics, and therefore the state, in terms of a war analysis. Indeed, at the commencement of his lectures at the Collège de France for 1975–1976, “Society Must Be Defended,” he explains that it is necessary to invert Carl von Clausewitz’s notorious formula—that war is politics carried on by other means—in order to break ourselves of the habit of thinking power only as repression, and he refers to this inversion as “Nietzsche’s hypothesis.” (And this Nietzschean hypothesis, to be sure, comes out clearly enough in “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” published around the time of this set of lectures.) Hence, Foucault claims, it is politics that continues war by other means, not *vice versa*: “Politics, in other words, sanctions and reproduces the disequilibrium of forces manifested in war.”²⁰ In short, war and struggle are prior and primary—the war or struggle between non-isometric powers and knowledges. Even and especially during peace, then, politics and therefore the state—the state *qua* institution, not just a specific regime—stand as the products of a contingent balance of forces.

“Peaceful” politics, then, is not *a priori* sovereignty, obedience, right, and rational legitimacy; it is instead the (possibly temporary) domination and subjugation of some powers and knowledges by others.²¹ Politics involves, as we shall see shortly in the discussion of pastoral power, an “exercise of power [as] a ‘conduct of conducts’ and a management of possibilities.”

Hence: "To govern, in this sense, is to structure the possible field of action of others."²² To govern is to structure not just particular choices within a specific set of possible actions but the entire field of such sets. "Peaceful" politics as the forceful stabilization of forces renders—as proof and fruit of the "peace" that it declares—some forms of action, some possibilities *intelligible* and relegates others to impossibility and unintelligibility. Thus Cole's desire for a form of politics that does not (unrealistically) claim to capture all of a citizen's commitments is obviated by the fact that governmentality in any case pervades life beyond the state.

So when Foucault claims that the state is an effect of power, he means at least two things. First, as mentioned in passing earlier, the state is made efficacious as a result of other "nonpolitical" forces operative at the micro-level—family, sexuality, etc. ("Nonpolitical" *because* operative at the micro-level: our practical understanding of the political continues to presume its macro-importance, in other words, its sovereignty.) So the state is an effect of other powers—powers other than law, prohibition, sovereignty—but also the state power-effect has another meaning in terms of war analysis. Politics during "civil peace" is a reproduction and continuation of war wherein some forces and knowledges have temporarily succeeded in stably dominating and subjugating others. Hence, in such a case, the state and its politics can be interpreted as a "relationship of confrontation [that has reached] its term, its final moment (and the victory of one of the two adversaries)," for the moment "stable mechanisms replace the free play of antagonistic reactions." And such a stabilization of mechanisms that generates the state implies that "one can direct, in a fairly constant manner and with reasonable certainty, the conduct of others."²³ The modern European state is the product and continuation of such a stabilization of mechanisms by which the conduct of subject others can be directed.

This leads us to the second point—whereby Foucault's pluralization of power, far from placing him in the vicinity of a pluralist such as Cole, actually distances Foucault from the latter immensely. Cole advanced a theory of pluralism—which had positive anarchist implications—on the basis of a functionalist argument. The function that any particular association fulfilled for a person or group of people served as the standard by which to measure its force. To be sure, different associations might make claims on the same "part" of a person, but Cole foresaw no disorderly anarchic effects from these conflicts. On the whole, this strand of pluralist theory seems to take for granted that each association's circumscribed function would serve to rein in its force, especially once the state and its claims of sovereignty over the whole of everybody are out of the picture.

Foucault's war analysis, however, suggests that even the state's nonexistence or its successful reining-in would offer cold comfort because struggles of forces and wars of power continue to operate beside and underneath the

state. Indeed, Foucault sometimes referred to his theoretical project as the endless tracing of “infra-governmental” and “para-governmental” power.²⁴ So, absent the state, any number of other associations—for example, the Catholic Church—would make bids to enforce stable mechanisms in lieu of “the free play of antagonistic forces.”²⁵ So while one should *not* conclude from Foucault’s acephalous analytics that if the state did not exist, it would right away be invented, it does nonetheless seem clear that the absence of a state hardly means the liberation of voluntary consociation. In, around, and through such supposedly free consociations, there would still be war and struggle, and these would temporarily resolve into domination and subjugation with precisely such nonstate institutions and practices as their effects and relay mechanisms.

In short, Foucault’s acephalous analytics of power, which is an analytics of power in terms of war and struggle, most assuredly does not imply that humans are free to consociate beyond the state. Consociation would not be “free” precisely because “power is co-extensive with the social body” itself, and thus “there are no spaces of primal liberty between the meshes of its network.”²⁶ We would not necessarily and by default enjoy liberation in the spaces where the state does not reach us directly (e.g., in the spaces left over from the reined-in state that Cole advocates). In this light, Foucault’s statement that power is everywhere because it comes from everywhere may seem a frightful proposition. But his view of power does in fact allow for resistance—indeed, the analytics of struggle and war *presumes* resistance. However, resistance—what counts as resistance—becomes complicated. It becomes complicated because it surges in the very filigree of power.²⁷ And modern power, power as “we” know it and as it has developed in the Euroatlantic west since the late Middle Ages, is at present a descendant of pastoral power. So the resistance contemporary to this modern form of power will necessarily assume a specific novel form for critical anarchist theory.

PASTORAL POWER, GOVERNMENTALITY, COUNTERCONDUCTS

Foucault began in earnest to sketch the outlines of what he called pastoral power throughout his work of the middle to late 1970s. His most thorough articulation of pastoral power occurs in the lectures at the Collège de France for 1977–1978, “Security, Territory, Population,” and one of the more succinct delineations appears in “The Subject and Power.” Pastoral power arises as a form of power specific to Christianity and refers to the shepherd function that pastors assumed and elaborated over flocks of souls as Christianity developed through the Middle Ages. As “shepherds of men,” Christian pastors

exercised the government of souls. In “The Subject and Power,” Foucault offers four main features of pastoral power. First, precisely as a government of souls, pastoral power aimed to conduct individuals on the path of salvation in the next world. The pastoral thus presupposed and depended on Christians’ wanting or needing such salvation: it could not develop as a power absent the ritual practices that anchored beliefs about the soul’s requirements. Second, quite unlike sovereign power—for which the subject, but never the sovereign, might have to sacrifice herself if necessary—pastoral power instead risked sacrifice of the pastor, the shepherd, for his flock. Third, pastoral power involved power over all together and each, *omnes et singulatim*, which suggests that in certain cases the shepherd might have to risk not only himself but possibly even all the good sheep for the sake of one lost soul’s salvation. Moreover, this was an exercise of power over all together and each severally during the course of their entire lives. Finally, the government of souls necessitated “knowing the inside of people’s minds, . . . exploring their souls, . . . making them reveal their innermost secrets.” Pastoral power thus “implies a knowledge of the conscience and an ability to direct it”²⁸ toward the desired end of salvation; it thus derives its authority over souls on the basis of this claim to knowledge. It is, in short, a power-knowledge, a discourse of truth about each soul’s salvation.

And the rules of pastoral power’s discourse of truth, which became so firmly anchored in the ritualized self-revelation of confession, did not remain static but in fact intensified over the course of several centuries. In early Christianity, obligatory confession did not even belong to the ritual of penance.²⁹ The would-be penitent merely sought out a bishop to request the conferral of penitent status. Priests did not remit sins; rather, remission of sins remained an affair between God and the penitent, who visited (or had someone else visit) penalties upon himself or herself. Voluntary extreme penitence was replaced, around the sixth century, by a system of tariffed penance based on a Germanic or Celtic penal model, whereby a person of faith sought out a priest—or, later, the congregation as a whole—to confess a major transgression, which corresponded to and would be annulled by a catalogued “satisfaction.” However, tariffed penance rendered priests somewhat ancillary to the ritual: satisfactions were quasicodified, necessitating no priestly exercise of discretionary judgment; only major transgressions were at issue and, worse, were deemed thenceforth cancelled by the performance of the satisfaction; finally, sometimes the lay congregation stood in for the priest.

From the twelfth century onward, ecclesiastical power went on the offensive to win or regain authority, and the practice of confession became its battleground. Most crucially, the Church undertook a campaign to impose an individual obligation of at least annual confession. Hence, whereas prior practices of confession could be characterized as a reactive, occasional jurid-

ical mode in that officials were sought out only as conveyors of absolution after a major transgression, by contrast the newly obligatory confession produced a juridical regularity for priestly power. And this regularity not only arose from the year-to-year continuity of the obligation: priestly power also benefitted from the regularity of access to souls created by the exclusion of laity from the confessor role and the expanded dominion within each soul that resulted from the demand to confess exhaustively not only major offenses but seeming peccadilloes as well. The triple regularity of continuity, exclusivity, and exhaustiveness offered leverage for priests to direct the conduct of parishioners interested in salvation.

After the Council of Trent (1551) and through the Counter-Reformation, the technical training of confessors became even more refined so that this intensive direction of conduct turned more and more on the meticulous examination of conscience on the basis of an analysis of the flesh and its pleasures. Thus the regularity of a juridical mode of power over souls gave way to a pastoral governmentality, that no longer focused on discrete sinful acts and thoughts as impediments to salvation; rather than focus on already past sins, developed pastoral power drew attention to lingering or recurrent desires and pleasures, which were taken as evidence for a pattern likely to persist into the future, therefore imperiling salvation. This projected pattern was thought to reveal the state of a soul. In sum, over the course of centuries, pastoral power produced its very object and domain of governance: namely, subjectivity, which served as proxy for the soul. And the Christian pastoral could do all of this—could command confession as a window on the state of the soul qua generation of subjectivity—because it authoritatively claimed that conducting individuals' conducts was indispensable to saving their souls.

While pastoral power governed souls with a subjectifying power, the precursor to the modern state elaborated itself through the late Middle Ages, according to Foucault, in exercises of power primarily over land. Sovereign jurisdiction was exercised primarily over territory and only incidentally over the people who happened to find themselves on that territory. (This rings true even as late as John Locke's *Second Treatise of Government*.) Around the commencement of the long eighteenth century, however, the European state itself became governmentalized. By the odd formulation "governmentalization of the state," Foucault was suggesting that sovereignty-land-prohibition were supplemented by techniques and procedures borrowed from the pastoral government of souls. Hence,

It was a question no longer of leading people to their salvation in the next world but, rather, ensuring it in this world. And in this context, the word "salvation" takes on different meanings: health, well-being (that is, sufficient wealth, standard of living), security, protection against accidents. A series of "worldly" aims took the place of the religious aims of the traditional pastorate . . .³⁰

Sometimes this new pastoral power occurred directly through state apparatuses—for example, the police, who not only maintained law and order but also in the eighteenth century secured public hygiene and commercial circulation. However, sometimes the new agents of pastoral power were nonstate agents—Foucault mentions “private ventures, welfare societies, benefactors” but also “ancient institutions, for example the family.”³¹ So the state itself was governmentalized—seeking to look after the welfare of individuals and the population as a whole (through the developing sciences of demographics, statistics, and actuarialism) and no longer only or even primarily the land. At the same time, the modernizing state encouraged and relied on the governmentalization of other powers and institutions such as private enterprise and the family that elicited, governed, and promoted the welfare of individuals and populations. The entire complex of governmentalizations constitutes governmentality. And just as the traditional pastorate had developed its powers by producing subjectivities in order to conduct the conduct of souls, so does the modern governmentalized state also exercise power by relying on, redeploying, and reinvesting those subjectivities produced collectively and individually, *omnes et singulatim*, just inside or alongside its own margins, in the family, clinic, prison, etc.

So if, now, we can say that neopastoral power is everywhere because it comes from everywhere—because governmentality exceeds the limits of the state and allows the state to continue to function—we may conclude from this that resistance to neopastoral power (governmentality) effectively can come from anywhere. However, in light of governmentality’s conduct of conducts on the basis of the production of subjectivities, a critical anarchism that opposes governmentality would have to assume “that the political, ethical, social, philosophical problem of our days is not to try to liberate the individual from the state, and from the state’s institutions, but to liberate us both from the state and from the type of individualization linked to the state.” Hence: “Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we are but to refuse what we are. . . . We have to promote new forms of subjectivity through the refusal of this kind of individuality that has been imposed on us for several centuries.”³² So, for example, the overarching strategies of lesbian and gay liberation movements have been misdirected in affirming the identities and subjectivities negatively elicited by discourses of sexuality formed at the nexus of medicine, psychology, education, law, and family welfare. For Foucault, the tactic proper to resisting governmentality involved not pride in *being* gay or lesbian but rather “to *work at becoming* homosexuals.”³³

We can understand how such a puzzling proposition—to work at becoming ourselves anew rather than discovering what we are—might make sense by rehearsing Foucault’s analysis of critique and then contrasting it to a competing contemporary approach. The activity of critique arises historically

as a means of asking the question “how not to be governed?” (or, how not to be conducted?). For Foucault, the locus classicus of the critical attitude finds its center in Western Europe during the elaboration of governmentalization after the sixteenth century. To be sure, Foucault is careful to disabuse his audience of any easy anarchist solutions drawn from his analysis:

So, this governmentalization, which seems to me to be rather characteristic of these societies in Western Europe in the 16th century, cannot apparently be dissociated from the question “how not to be governed?” I do not mean by that that governmentalization would be opposed in a kind of face-off by the opposite affirmation, “we do not want to be governed, and we do not want to be governed *at all*.” I mean that, in this search for the ways to govern, we identify a perpetual question which would be: “how not to be governed *like that*, by that, in the name of those principles, with such and such an objective in mind and by means of such procedures, not like that, not for that, not by them.”³⁴

The attitude associated with the critical question, “how not to be governed?,” is not an anarchist posture as conventionally understood, since it does not intend complete refusal of governance: its intention is *not* to be governed not-at-all. Such an interpretation of critique, of this practice of articulating how not to be governed, fantasizes a position of exteriority with respect to power—it attempts to place resistance elsewhere, to found resistance to power altogether outside it.³⁵

Exemplary of such a conventional anarchist posture is the work of Raoul Vaneigem, who, as we shall see, bids us not to be governed at all so that we may discover what we (really) are. Vaneigem is a near-contemporary of Foucault, and their publications initially incited the French left at roughly the same time (later 1960s into the 1970s). Significantly, both theorized the political possibilities of subjectivity, and both explored late medieval and Reformation Christianities associated with Free Spirit movements, a diverse set of Christian groups driven by antiestablishmentarian and antinomian tendencies, many of which were designated as heretical by the Papacy and mainline Reformation Churches. However, Vaneigem and Foucault theorized subjectivity and oppositional Christianities to different ends.³⁶

In both the book that brought him to prominence as a provocateur of Paris's 1968, *The Revolution of Everyday Life*,³⁷ and his later study of Christian radicals, *The Movement of the Free Spirit*, Vaneigem's theoretical argument emerges rhetorically from a series of antitheses: subjectivity (or self) *versus* power, reality *versus* spectacle, life *versus* survival (or economy), authenticity *versus* role, experience *versus* appearance—and ultimately, immediacy *versus* mediation. Hence, for example: “The economy is everywhere that life is not: but however intertwined the two may become, they simply do not meld, and one can never be confused with the other.”³⁸ He notes that power and economy constrain human beings to see the world from

their deadening perspective, which tells humans that nothing else exists in this present world other than a survival occasionally led on by a fleeting “anguished satisfaction,” and that for purposes of survival humans must play certain roles (consumer, producer, citizen) that require renouncing dreams of pleasure and real living.³⁹ Consequently, work involves a division of the self and the subsequent repression of one half by the other—survival represses life.⁴⁰

Set in such stark terms, the antithesis begs the question: why would anyone submit to such repression? And the answer is implicit in Vaneigem’s perspectivalism: the perspective of power comes into focus as an *ideology*, which merely updates and secularizes the mythos of religion and is accepted as a harsh (but false) truth like the latter. Hence, on Vaneigem’s view, the state, whether characterized by a market or a planned economy, is the inheritor to the church; and state ideology, whether capitalist or socialist, has “perpetuated traditional Judeo-Christian forms of behavior: guilt, self-hatred, fear of pleasure, the hope for a future heaven on earth, and, above all, the contempt for the body and the earth.”⁴¹ Ideology differs from religion and myth, however, in that the first cannot offer the unitary vision of the world that the latter two did. Ideology suffers from fragmentation whereas myth/religion can make life seem whole, even if inauthentically so.⁴² Nevertheless, whether religion or ideology, the perspective of power works by occult and inauthentic enchantment that constrains human vision.

In combining perspectivalism with a dualist concept of ideology, however, Vaneigem’s view constrains itself—the *a priori* assumptions of its rhetorical oppositions force him to write in the vein of false or “mystified”⁴³ consciousness arguments: “We make our way forward in an upside-down world that many still persist in taking for reality—for the only reality.”⁴⁴ Nearly everyone else is or has been hoodwinked. From this review of Vaneigem’s theoretical orientation, I want to draw two conclusions relevant to a contrast with Foucault.

First, Vaneigem’s theory, as with many political theories organized by a strong concept of ideology, relies on a vanguardism of knowledge: some know and some don’t know; and those who have knowledge that ideology falsifies reality authorize themselves to help the others realize that their roles are mere products of conditioning rather than authentic life. Self-authorization on the basis of a claim of true knowledge amounts to authority; those who know delegate to themselves power to direct those who don’t know—and what validates their leadership over others is that they have not just any knowledge but, above all, knowledge of the truth. So, if those who have exhaustively adopted the perspective of power (ideology) cannot realize that their conditioning has *almost* entirely absorbed them into their roles, then they require external aid in achieving the reversal of perspective that will propel them down the path of “anticonditioning.”⁴⁵ Hence: “The task of a

coherent revolutionary group, far from being the creation of a new type of conditioning, is to establish protected areas where the intensity of conditioning tends toward zero."⁴⁶ These reservations insist on themselves as a "parallel society which can counter the dominant system" and eventually replace it.⁴⁷

Hence, as much as Vaneigem wishes to disarm hierarchy—which he sees as an effect of conditioning⁴⁸—and as much as he aims to counter domination, he nevertheless invokes hierarchy and domination in a new-old form: salvation. In itself reliance on soteriology need not fatally reproduce domination, as one could imagine a pluriverse of soteriologies, a multiplicity of competing metrics of salvation and consonant arts of self-conduct. In judging the damned and the saved, however, Vaneigem provides only one true (quasiscientific) standard for all conduct: those who have attained the reversed perspective can set themselves above others as universal arbiters of knowledge of what constitutes salvation and how to get there.

Second, the character of this project of salvation is curious: it is a project of salvation qua salvage. On Vaneigem's view, corruption is not primordial as with some versions of Original Sin thinking; rather, purity is primordial. Originally, there is an essential self which then gets hijacked from the outside by role-conditioning. The undoing of conditioning—the negation of the negation—allows for the positive flourishing of that essential subjectivity: "The end of roles means the triumph of subjectivity."⁴⁹ This primordialism is what leads Vaneigem to assert that the task of a revolutionary party is the protection and salvage of a preexisting pure essence from corruption. What Vaneigem's theoretical orientation amounts to in Foucaultian terms is a repressive hypothesis. Power for Vaneigem does not produce subjectivities but rather represses them. Hence, even if Vaneigem emphatically wills to revise the revolutionary objective of Socialist vanguardism when he argues that the proletariat (broadly construed) faces *not* "the problem of how to seize power," nonetheless his conception of revolutionary praxis relies just as much on the repressive view of power as does Lenin's when Vaneigem asserts that the practical goal instead is "to abolish Power forever."⁵⁰ Consequently, religiosity and the idea of God, too, would need to be abandoned or abolished.⁵¹ For religion is Power's minion, a tool of the State and also the alibi of survival: "gods are the absolute negation of life."⁵²

What then was the status of those premodern Free Spirit movements that Vaneigem lauds? If E. J. Hobsbawm would consider them instances of "primitive" rebellion for not (yet) achieving properly revolutionary character and tending toward mere millenarianism,⁵³ Vaneigem adopts the same parameters—a polarity between religiosity and revolutionary politics—but he reverses Hobsbawm's perspective. In other words, Free Spirit movements were not *really* religious: "The Holy Spirit was the antithesis of the Free Spirit."⁵⁴ Vaneigem's curious assessment derives from his antithetical struc-

ture of thought: if religion aligns itself with Power, then Power's enemy cannot be religion's friend; if Free Spirit is revolutionary, then it cannot be holy. Consequently he must perform some improbable interpretive moves—above all, dismissal of any religious element to revolutionary spiritualism.⁵⁵ Moreover, he must impute to Free Spirit adherents a form of consciousness inversely corresponding to false consciousness. Whereas, precisely because of religion and ideology, most people know not what they do—namely, that they survive rather than truly live—revolutionaries know what they really do but must dissemble their life-seeking motives. Hence: “*Beneath the name* Free Spirit were concealed the most unfathomable parts of life, those parts of living that could not be expressed in either economic or religious terms.”⁵⁶ Just as Hobsbawm sees millenarianism as not *yet* (politically) revolutionary, so Vaneigem sees true Free Spiriteers as not *really* religious and wills to distinguish “tendencies . . . that rejected religious forms altogether” from merely religious protest (i.e., opposition to Rome within the fold of Christianity).⁵⁷ The repressive hypothesis and antithetical structure of Vaneigem's thought force him to dismiss or devalue religiosity in the Free Spirit utterances he examines because truly *revolutionary* resistance cannot originate within Christianity but must be directed against it from outside.

By contrast to Vaneigem (and to Hobsbawm's Leninism), Foucault takes at face value the religious investment of political critique. After all, “critique is biblical, historically” since it involved how not to read scripture *like that*.⁵⁸ While Vaneigem viewed theology and scripture as monolithically irredeemable, Foucault's genealogy of critique recognizes that scripture always enjoins multiple and mutually tense exegeses, that any temporary peace in scriptural interpretation provokes new battles insurgent in the very filigree of peace—battles over interpretive authority and which church organs are invested with spiritual authority. Hence, since pastoral power and governmentalization originate in Western Christianity in the late Middle Ages and on through the Reformation, the resistances to it arise within the fold of Christianity as “border-elements.”⁵⁹ Such resistances do not represent “immediate” experience, external to or unmediated by Christianity; for “the struggle was not conducted in the form of absolute exteriority, but rather in the form of the permanent use of tactical elements that are pertinent in the antipastoral struggle, insofar as they fall within, in a marginal way, the general horizon of Christianity.”⁶⁰ Critique's “perpetual question” arises in contingent and specific historical circumstances: how not to be governed *like that*.

So it may seem strange, though ultimately it is not surprising, that Foucault takes as a model for forms of resistance proper to modern governmentality a range of sixteenth-century practices that he refers to as “counterconducts,” whose tendency was “to redistribute, reverse, nullify, and partially or totally discredit pastoral power in the systems of salvation, obedience, and truth.”⁶¹ These counterconducts opposed pastoral authorities by tactically

employing marginal elements within Christianity as the basis for one of three overlapping tactical reformations: for *re* conducting one's bodily self otherwise, as in asceticism; for governing collectivities by different principles, as with Radical Reformation communes such as the Anabaptists in mid-sixteenth-century Münster; or for reorienting mundane subjectivity to versions of otherworldliness unlike that endorsed by pastoralism, as with mysticism or eschatology.⁶²

A Foucaultian critical anarchism, then, would not abolish the State or Power itself so as to discover and unleash what we really are. Rather, recognizing that the "state is a practice" and itself the effect of practices of governmentality and pastoral technologies, Foucaultian anarchism would take another point of intervention. It would involve *re* forming practices of subjectivity. If "nowadays, the struggle against the forms of subjection—against the submission of subjectivity—is becoming more and more important" and yet, after all, "it is not the first time that our society has been confronted with this kind of struggle,"⁶³ then we can learn from that prior set of struggles how not to be governed in these ways, at those costs, by such principles. Hence, a critique of homophobic repression of sexuality would not entail a pure denegativizing and subsequent affirmation of homosexual subjectification but rather a more complex struggle over how to *re* form sexual subjectivities in inventive ways that are *not like that*: "a homosexual asceticism . . . would make us work on ourselves and invent—I do not say discover—a manner of being that is still improbable."⁶⁴ Foucault's late interest in asceticism, although considered almost entirely in a Classical and Hellenistic frame, ought to be seen as deriving in part from his admiration for sixteenth-century counterconducts.⁶⁵ Ultimately, in the wake of Foucault's insistence that models of power (the conduct of conducts) *and* resistance (counterconducts) include yet exceed the state, critical anarchists have considerably more to think and to do, many more interventions to make, and on themselves most of all.

NOTES

1. Indeed, other scholars have done so already: Todd May, *The Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), and "Anarchism from Foucault to Rancière," in *Contemporary Anarchist Studies: An Introductory Anthology of Anarchy in the Academy*, eds. Randall Amster et al. (London: Routledge, 2009), 11–17; Saul Newman, *From Bakunin to Lacan: Anti-Authoritarianism and the Dislocation of Power* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2001), ch. 4.

2. Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1978), 88–89. The formulation also appears in the interview "Truth and Power," *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 63.

3. *Ibid.*, 89.

4. See the discussion of anarchist humanism in Newman, *From Bakunin to Lacan*, chs. 2, 4. Some have objected that Newman sets up straw versions of his nineteenth-century anarchist forebears and thus that insisting on *post* anarchism is unconvincing: Gabriel Kuhn, "Anarchism, Postmodernity, and Poststructuralism," in *Contemporary Anarchist Studies*, eds. Amster et al., 18–25.

5. See Michel Foucault and Noam Chomsky, "Human Nature: Justice versus Power," in *Foucault and His Interlocutors*, ed. Arnold I. Davidson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 107–45.

6. Michel Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics*, Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978–1979, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 3.

7. Foucault, *History of Sexuality*, 93.

8. "Anarchy," *Oxford English Dictionary*, 2d ed., *OED Online* (Oxford University Press, 1989), accessed 6 August 2008. Entry 1.a. assimilates anarchy to a state of "political disorder," while entry 1.b. relegates positively connoted anarchy to the realm of idealism by emphasizing its "theoretical" nature: "A theoretical social state in which there is no governing body of person, but each individual has absolute liberty (without implication of disorder)."

9. Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon, in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon 1984), 85: "Humanity does not gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives at universal reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces warfare . . ." Foucault seems to be taking on both Marxist dialectics and (in the reference to the rule of law) bourgeois liberal statism.

10. Foucault, "The Subject and Power," *Power*, Essential Works of Foucault, 1954–1984, ed. James D. Faubion (New York: New Press, 2000), 331–32.

11. Sometimes ambiguous, but sometimes less so: See, for example, the twelfth-century text by John of Salisbury, *Policraticus*, trans. Cary J. Nederman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

12. Vladimir Ilych Lenin, *What Is to Be Done?*, ch. III, <http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1901/witbd/iii.htm>, accessed 10 March 2009. Rosa Luxemburg responds to Leninist centralism by saying that "the errors committed by a truly revolutionary movement are infinitely more fruitful than the infallibility of the cleverest Central Committee": Luxemburg, "Organizational Question of Social Democracy," in *Rosa Luxemburg Speaks*, ed. Mary-Alice Waters (New York: Pathfinder, 1970), 130. It is important to note, though, that Luxemburg still orients politics to a party, even if she trusts spontaneity more than would the centralist Lenin.

13. Foucault, "Truth and Power," 64.

14. G. D. H. Cole, *The Social Theory*, rpt. in *The Pluralist Theory of the State: Selected Writings of G. D. H. Cole, J. N. Figgis, and H. J. Laski*, ed. Paul Q. Hirst (London: Routledge, 1989), 100.

15. See Laski's two remarks rpt. in *Pluralist Theory of the State*, ed. Hirst, 191, 214.

16. Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, expanded ed., trans. George Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 40–41.

17. Schmitt, *Concept of the Political*, 44.

18. "anarchy," *Oxford English Dictionary*.

19. Schmitt, *Concept*, 34. The conduct of war presumes that a properly political decision has already been taken, so Schmitt's phenomenology of the politics/war relationship emphasizes the rupturing event (the political decision) that initiates the subsequent Clausewitzian continuity between war and politics.

20. Michel Foucault, "Society Must Be Defended," Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975–1976, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003), 16.

21. Foucault, "Society Must Be Defended," 27.

22. Foucault, "The Subject and Power," 341.

23. Foucault, "The Subject and Power," 346–47.

24. Michel Foucault, "Power and Sex," in *Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interview and Other Writings, 1977–1984*, ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman (New York: Routledge, 1988), 119.

25. Foucault, "The Subject and Power," 346–47.

26. Foucault, "Power and Strategies," 142.

27. My purple phrasing refers to Foucault's "War in the Filigree of Peace: Course Summary," trans. I. McLeod, *Oxford Literary Review* 4.2 (1976): 15–19. Also see Foucault, "Power and Strategies," 142: "resistance to power does not have to come from elsewhere to be real, nor is it inexorably frustrated through being the compatriot of power."

28. Foucault, "The Subject and Power," 333.

29. This and the following two paragraphs follow Michel Foucault, *Abnormal*, Lectures at the Collège de France, 1974–1975, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 2003), 171–91.

30. Foucault, "The Subject and Power," 334.

31. Foucault, "The Subject and Power," 334.

32. Foucault, "The Subject and Power," 336.

33. Michel Foucault, "Friendship as a Way of Life," in *Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth*, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: The New Press, 1997), 136 (emphases added).

34. Foucault, "What Is Critique?," *The Politics of Truth* (New York: Semiotext[e], 1997), 28.

35. See Foucault, "Power and Strategies," 142.

36. It may seem that in Vaneigem I pick an easy target from within the late 1960s French left: among the Situationists, Vaneigem's reputation owes more to persuasive sloganeering, while Guy Debord accorded himself the position of rigorous vanguard theorist. However, Vaneigem's rhetoric merely expresses in rawer form some epistemological problems that afflict Debord, too. For reasons of space and, more relevantly, because Vaneigem explicitly studies religious resistance, I discuss only him here.

37. Originally published in 1967, the book emphasizes a generational call to arms in its French title: *Traité de savoir-vivre à l'usage des jeunes générations*. Raoul Vaneigem, *The Revolution of Everyday Life*, rev. ed., trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (London: Rebel Press, 1993).

38. Raoul Vaneigem, *The Movement of the Free Spirit: General Considerations and First-hand Testimony Concerning Some Brief Flowerings of Life in the Middle Ages, the Renaissance and, Incidentally, Our Own Time*, trans. Randall Cherry and Ian Patterson (New York: Zone Books, 1998), 17.

39. Vaneigem, *Free Spirit*, 254.

40. Vaneigem, *Free Spirit*, 28.

41. Vaneigem, *Free Spirit*, 8.

42. Vaneigem, *Revolution*, 224.

43. Vaneigem, *Free Spirit*, 252.

44. Vaneigem, *Free Spirit*, 26.

45. Vaneigem, *Revolution*, 188.

46. Vaneigem, *Revolution*, 199.

47. Vaneigem, *Revolution*, 273.

48. "The function of conditioning is to assign and adjust people's positions on the hierarchical ladder": Vaneigem, *Revolution*, 188.

49. Vaneigem, *Revolution*, 216.

50. Vaneigem, *Revolution*, 218.

51. See Vaneigem, *Revolution*, 167.

52. Vaneigem, *Free Spirit*, 245; cf. pp 56, 9.

53. E. J. Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movements in the 19th and 20th Centuries* (New York: Norton, 1959), 57–59.

54. Vaneigem, *Free Spirit*, 93.

55. When an undeniably religious idiom creeps into the language of some self-identified Free Spiriters, Vaneigem must then distinguish the good expressions from bad. In some bad partisans, an inability to overcome religiosity warped expressions of the Free Spirit and thus led them into the authoritarian identification with God; others, however, successfully refused Godly despotism to develop authentic humanity. See Vaneigem, *Free Spirit*, 9.

56. Vaneigem, *Free Spirit*, 93 (emphasis added).

57. Vaneigem, *Free Spirit*, 116–17.

58. Foucault, "What Is Critique?," 30.

59. Foucault, *Security*, 215.

60. Foucault, *Security*, 215.

61. Foucault, *Security*, 204.

62. See Norman Cohn, *Pursuit of the Millennium*, revised and expanded ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970). Foucault seemed to admire this book inasmuch as he frequently cited it in his lectures at the Collège de France *Security, Territory, Population*. On the anarchism of the Brethren of the Free Spirit as offering an unabiding critique of Hobbesian sovereignty, see James Martel, *Subverting the Leviathan: Reading Hobbes as a Radical Democrat* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), chs. 6 and Conclusion.

63. Foucault, "The Subject and Power," 331–32 (quoted at greater length above).

64. Foucault, "Friendship as a Way of Life," 137.

65. In the interview published as "Friendship as a Way of Life," Foucault contrasts asceticism ("the renunciation of pleasure") with ascesis ("work that one performs on oneself in order to transform oneself or make the self appear"), but he knowingly invokes a stereotyped view of asceticism by suggesting that the definition he offers "has bad connotations" ("Friendship," 137). I would argue that he deliberately overstates the difference, and his research on fringe asceticisms yielded many examples where asceticism did not involve renouncing pleasure but deriving pleasure from pain, from allowing one's body to be at the will of others, etc. Cf. Foucault, *Security*, 204–205, 211.

Chapter Eight

The Ambivalent Anarchism of Hannah Arendt

James Martel¹

Can we legitimately consider Arendt to be an anarchist? The question is highly fraught. Arendt's politics are often the subject of great controversy, but it is undeniable that the kind of public action that she favors has little or nothing to do with the workings of states or traditional power systems. In the comparison that she makes in *On Revolution* between a form of rule based on "parties" (i.e., the kind of sovereign politics that are widely practiced today) and "councils" (the kind of spontaneous and anarchic bodies that develop during the early period of great political revolutions), we see a fairly straightforward endorsement of an antistatist anarchism (what she refers to as "isonomy" or "no-rule").² This is a form of government that has little to do with the sorts of chaotic or violent images that the term *anarchy* has long been saddled with. The fact that for Arendt such a politics seems tragically impossible in our own time should not deter us from recognizing the centrality of this vision of politics in her work. In her conflicted relationship to sovereignty and political authority, modernity and the problem of human volition, we see Arendt turning again and again to an anarchistic mode of (non-) governance as the only possible solution to our current political predicaments.

And yet, at the same time, Arendt's anarchism (if that is in fact what we should call it) is itself troubled by her tendency to defect from her own ideals. As we will see further, in her analysis of her much beloved American Revolution, for example, Arendt demonstrates a peculiar loyalty to the Federalists who, by analogy with her attacks on equivalent parties in the French and Russian revolutions, ought to be similarly condemned. This essay will explore why Arendt retreats from her own ideals of nonstate politics and what her adjudication between visions of pure anarchism and her attempts to work

within the confines of the state as a basis for politics ultimately contributes to a larger understanding of anarchism and anarchistic practices.

ARENDT'S TWO ANARCHIST STRANDS

At the heart of Arendt's anarchism lies her battle with the concept of sovereignty. Arendt's problem with sovereignty involves her basic opposition to an entire edifice of governance whereby the state is understood as somehow conveying or representing the will of its inhabitants. This formula seems natural or unavoidable at our present historical juncture insofar as politics itself seems unimaginable (at least from the way liberal capitalism has conceived of it) without sovereign notions of representation. Yet sovereignty is for Arendt a pernicious and uniquely modern development. Her objection is not only that the state cannot and should not represent the will of the people but even more profoundly that the very notion of will itself is a problematical category that can only reproduce sovereignty (and hence state rule) in its wake.

Yet, even given this resistance to sovereignty and state power, we find in Arendt a deep division, one that illuminates and troubles her contributions to anarchism. I would argue that in Arendt's work, we find (at least) two distinct strands of thought. One is a kind of pure, idealized anarchism, the other a more complex but perhaps more pertinent form of anarchism which contends with our contemporary context. The distinction between these two strands for Arendt come down to the question of representation. Her purer form of anarchism is explicitly antirepresentational (in all senses of that word) and sees "appearance" (the fact that human beings see and are seen by one another in ways that cannot be controlled by internal volition) as the basis for our political order. We could call this Arendt's "Greek" side. The other form is not antirepresentational but rather seeks to find within the confines of representation some way to preserve the essence of widespread popular participation in politics. It is tempting to call this her "Roman" side, although in fact it should be more accurately called her "modern" side insofar as it deals explicitly with questions of representation in a uniquely modern context. In laying out these two strands of Arendtian thought, we will see a series of paradoxes as well as an increasingly dark view on her part regarding the necessity of compromise with those forces that she opposes. In the end, I will argue, Arendt's refusal to perfectly resolve her conceptions about power and the state allow us to find in her work a useful and dynamic conception of anarchism that neither forgets its originary vision (as appearance) nor shrinks from contending with the "facts on the ground" of our time. Although the contention between these two strands of anarchism at times

deforms both her political theory and the fables that she tells us about history, we nonetheless find in this contention both a vision and a strategy for anarchism that serve as the grounds for further inquiry.

ARENDT'S PURE ANARCHISM

To begin with, let us sketch out the purest form of anarchism in Arendt. In this strand of her thinking, Arendt is opposed to all forms representation both in terms of representations of the self (as will) and in terms of politics (as sovereignty). The two forms of representation are deeply related in Arendt's work. For Arendt, representation, the reproduction or reinterpretation of another subject, is (in this mode of her thinking at least) truly pernicious to the practice of politics because, as a kind of symbolic economy, it interferes with the actual dynamic of human plurality itself.³ The fact of human plurality is too complex, too unconstrained, to be reduced to a representation; as such, even the best forms of representations necessarily limit the spontaneity and "reality" of a people in all of their diversity.

In *On Revolution*, Arendt tells us:

Freedom as a political phenomenon was coeval with the rise of the Greek city-states. Since Herodotus, it was understood as a form of political organization in which the citizens lived together under conditions of no-rule, without a division between rulers and ruled. This notion of no-rule was expressed by the word isonomy, whose outstanding characteristic among the forms of government, as the ancients had enumerated them, was that the notion of rule (the "archy" from *arkhein* [in Greek in original] in monarchy and oligarchy, or the "cracy" from *kratein* [in Greek in original] in democracy) was entirely absent from it. The *polis* was supposed to be an isonomy, not a democracy.⁴

In this view, even democracy is a form of "rule." (She tells us that it is in fact "majority rule, the rule of the many."⁵) Here, democracy too is a form of representative imposition (a precursor to the kinds of political sovereignties that dominate the modern era). It seeks to impose one particular vision of the "the people" onto everyone in all of their diversity. In isonomy (literally equality of law) there is no way to overshadow the diversity of a community with any semblance of itself. And, in clearly opposing isonomy both to "archy" and *kratein*, we see that Arendt is implicitly (although not explicitly) endorsing an an-archy, a form of no-rule.

We see then, particularly in her depiction of the Greek polis, Arendt presenting a society that seemingly has no representation at all. She tells us that whereas in modern times the idea of freedom is connected to the notion "I will," for the Greeks (and Romans as well for that matter), the idea of

freedom is best summarized by “I can.” The will, at least in the way we currently understand it, is for Arendt a uniquely modern phenomenon, with roots in Christian (and especially Pauline) doctrine.

The will’s central feature for Arendt is its interiority, reflecting the way that Paul conceived of the self in relation to others. She writes: “When we deal with experiences relevant to the Will, we are dealing with experiences that men have not only with themselves, but also *inside* themselves.”⁶ The will seeks to deal with the world around it by taking recourse into its own internality, and of necessity projecting itself into and onto the wider world. In other words, the will is a purely representative faculty. By contrast, she writes that Socrates spoke of the “two-in-one,” our conscience (which, Arendt tells us, is a “soundless dialogue . . . between me and myself”).⁷ Such a depiction of self, she tells us, is inherently more outward directed insofar as it is “not thematically concerned with the Self but, on the contrary, with the experiences and questions that this Self, an appearance among appearances, feels are in need of examination.”⁸ Herein lies the difference between modern and classical perspectives. Because it is a representative faculty, the will privileges its own position and treats itself as if it were not just one appearance among many (i.e., it represents other perspectives to itself but treats its own perspective as if it itself did not require similar representation). Accordingly, other people are “merely” appearances to the will. The Socratic notion of conscience denies this privileged perspective by seeing itself as “an appearance among appearances.” In this form of mutual appearance there are no foregone conclusions, no absolute certainties that result from privileging one’s own interior condition over that of others. This allows for the kind of isonomy, spontaneity, and freedom that Arendt ascribes to the classical age (and in particular to the classical Athenians).

In describing the relationship between interiority and exteriority in classical Greek thought, Arendt goes on to write that:

This mediating examination of everything given can be disturbed by the necessities of life, by the presence of others, by all kinds of urgent business. But none of the factors interfering with the mind’s activity rises out of the mind itself, for the two-in-one are friends and partners, and to keep intact this “harmony” is the thinking ego’s foremost concern.⁹

This internal harmony potentially leads to a larger, political harmony as well; when the dialogue between me and myself is in concord, there is no need for a violent overwriting of the external order, thus making isonomy itself possible. Such a state of being is sorely lacking from later, particularly Christian, notions of willing. She tells us that for Paul the “two-in-one” are “not friends or partners; they are in constant struggle with each other.”¹⁰ Whether inside

the mind itself or projected outward into the world, such a struggle leads to the desire to eliminate other viewpoints.

Turning to the more explicitly political version of this question, we can see how Arendt extends her hostility to the will's method of representation to the question of sovereignty itself.¹¹ It is helpful to connect various texts of Arendt (such as *Willing*, *The Human Condition*, and *On Revolution*), reading them in conjunction rather than separately. Arendt's antipathy toward representation (such as it is) emerges most clearly when you see it in both its individual and political guises (and in the way those forms are connected for her). In *The Human Condition*, she tells us: "Because of the philosophical shift from action to will-power, from freedom as a state of being manifest in action to the *liberum arbitrium*, the ideal of freedom ceased to be virtuosity in the [classical] sense . . . and became sovereignty, the ideal of a free will, independent from others and eventually prevailing against them."¹² Sovereignty is, for Arendt, the political form par excellence in modernity exactly because of the predominance of the will. The fantasy that the individual is "sovereign," all powerful and privileged as a site of representation, becomes projected outward, producing an illusion of collective power.

We see this sentiment echoed in *On Revolution* as well when Arendt describes the struggles between a politics based on councils and promises (i.e., a politics of anarchy) versus a politics based on parties and ideology (i.e., a party based on will and sovereignty). She writes:

The conflict between the two systems, the parties and the councils, came to the fore in all twentieth-century revolutions. The issue at stake was representation versus action and participation. The councils were organs of action . . . [the parties] knew well enough that no party, no matter how revolutionary it was, would be able to survive the transformation of the government into a true Soviet Republic.¹³

Here, we see fairly clearly that the party, an organ of representation, "represents" nothing but its own phantasms. The parties' only recourse is to destroy and coopt the councils which serve as a rival to and in fact a completely alternative form of politics from the parties themselves. Unlike the parties, the councils are not representative of anything but rather simply serve as sites for appearance, as zones of mutuality and action. Political representation, on the other hand, becomes an extension of the false representations inherent in the will.

In *On Revolution*, Arendt condemns Robespierre and Lenin for overwriting genuinely popular political movements with their own agendas. Their parties, the Jacobins and the Bolsheviks respectively, served as vehicles for their own personal ideologies which determined "what the people really want." In this way, they promoted a sovereign "will" that ignored and overwhelmed human plurality. The concept of representation in these cases al-

lowed a party to claim that it stood for the people, thereby bypassing and overcoming the genuine political expression of the particular communities in question.

Even if Robespierre and Lenin serve as extreme examples, they nonetheless tell us something true about all sovereign systems for Arendt. Ultimately, for Arendt a sovereign system of rule cannot even be properly called “political” at all since it prevents citizens from being active members in their own political existence. As we have already seen, “representation” is sovereignty’s answer to the lack of popular participation. Yet, given the way it conceptualizes “the people” as a projection of its own will and position, a turn to representation becomes an empty gesture. From this viewpoint, sovereignty seems to be an almost entirely pernicious force for Arendt. At best, we must hope that those who impose their order upon the rest of us will be relatively decent to us. But in no way would such a state of affairs approximate the value of having us involved in our own political existence (as isonomy allows). In her starkest commentary on the matter, Arendt concludes: “If men wish to be free, it is precisely sovereignty they must renounce.”¹⁴

ANARCHY AND REPRESENTATION

Such an unambiguous statement against sovereignty seems definitive for Arendt and it implies just as unambiguously a resistance to state power, to the trappings of politics associated with liberal nation-states and the most basic foundations of modern politics. This “pure” anarchism is certainly basic to Arendt, but it is challenged by another side of her work that is not as hostile to representation and which is also more accommodating to sovereignty (without, I would argue, ceasing to be anarchistic). Because of her own ambivalence on the issue of representation, we see a great deal of contradiction and paradox in Arendt’s work. Nonetheless, I would argue that such an ambivalence serves its own productive functions for her overall theory.

Even a surface perusal of Arendt’s work shows that she is not always against representation. The critical idea of “representational thinking” that she engages with in *Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy* suggests as much. In terms of more directly political questions, Lisa Disch notes that Arendt sees a great deal of nuance in the forms that representation can take and generally has a positive attitude toward it. In the case of *On Revolution*, Disch tells us:

Arendt presents Council governance not as direct democracy but as an “alternative for representative government” that, unlike the party system, fosters and depends

upon political participation. . . . To clarify, because Arendt's own polemics sometimes confuse the matter, she recommends Councils as an alternative *to* party systems *for* representative government, not an alternative to representative government *per se*.¹⁵

In Disch's view it is not representation *per se* that is at issue but a style of representation that Arendt opposes. In *On Revolution*, Arendt makes a distinction between two kinds of representation, the Federalist/Madisonian model whereby the people are represented "virtually" by their elected leaders and the Anti-Federalist/Jeffersonian model whereby the people are represented more "literally."

One might surmise that Arendt simply favors the Anti-Federalist position (and hence that style of representation as well), but Disch shows that this is not quite the case. Here things begin to get complicated. Arendt muddies her own distinction by depicting it as a choice between two problematic options, a choice between "representation as a mere substitute for direct action of the people [i.e., the Anti-Federalist variant] and representation as a popularly controlled rule of the people's representatives over the people [the Federalist variant]."¹⁶ She tells us that such a choice produces "one of those dilemmas which permits of no solution."¹⁷ In this reading, neither form of representation seems particularly desirable.

Yet, as Disch notes, when push comes to shove, Arendt seemingly (and surprisingly) comes down on the side of the centralizers, the Federalists. In the very same book in which she bemoans how parties have supplanted councils, thus suppressing genuinely anarchic (or isonomic) movements, Arendt notes that, with the Anti-Federalist view of "literal" representation, "government has degenerated into mere administration, the public realm has vanished."¹⁸

The idea that only a centralized government could provide a public realm flies in the face of much of what Arendt has been arguing in *On Revolution*. It ignores her own point that the councils themselves—those local political bodies—could remain intact and politically relevant and would themselves constitute a public realm that would only need to be coordinated at the "representational" level of government. Yet, for all of this, Arendt worries that with a government that is so reduced in terms of its own function:

there is no space either for seeing and being seen in action, John Adams's *spectemur agendo*, or for discussion and decision, Jefferson's pride of being "a participator in government" [or] Madison's "medium of a chosen body of citizens" through which opinions must pass and be purified into public views.¹⁹

Such a concern emphasizes once again the idea that seeing and being seen (politically speaking) must be orchestrated on a grand, national level to exist at all.

Does such a tendency evince in Arendt a secret (or maybe even not so secret) statism after all? Does her failure to renounce Madison and the Federalists as America's answer to Robespierre and the Jacobins reveal that, underneath her radical claims, Arendt favors sovereignty after all? We can see some (limited) evidence that Arendt is not always implacably hostile to sovereignty. Although she condemns sovereignty in *The Human Condition* (among other texts), there are also parts of the book where she accommodates it. At one point she writes, "Sovereignty, which is always spurious if claimed by an isolated single entity, be it the individual entity of the person or the collective entity of a nation, assumes, in the case of many men mutually bound by promises, a certain limited reality."²⁰ Here, Arendt seems to be backing off her absolute criticism of sovereignty. She suggests that sovereignty can be ameliorated or tamed when it reflects "the case of many men mutually bound by promises." Here, the faculty of promising, which is the hallmark of the council system (and thus exactly what a sovereign system sets out to destroy) can in some way alter the functioning of sovereignty. Promising, which is mutual and contingent, rather than unilateral and preordained, potentially renders sovereignty itself an instrument, rather than the usurper, of politics. She goes on to write that:

The sovereignty of a body of people bound and kept together, not by an identical will which magically inspires them all, but by an agreed purpose for which alone the promises are valid and binding, shows itself quite clearly in its unquestioned superiority over those who are completely free, unbound by any promises and unkept by any purpose. This superiority derives from the capacity to dispose of the future as though it were present, that is, the enormous and truly miraculous enlargement of the very dimension in which power can be effective.²¹

Here, we have gone from a vision of sovereignty that has been tempered in order to make political life possible to an idea of sovereignty as a collective capacity that actually improves public life. These divergent depictions raise the question of what Arendt actually thinks about sovereignty and why she seems so conflicted about this question.

ANARCHISM AND THE FUTURE

In Disch's view, Arendt's preference for Federalist models of representation is not so much evidence of a secret love of federalism but rather stems from Arendt's being duped by Federalist rhetoric. She writes:

Arendt takes the Federalists at their word. She lauds their fidelity to the "basic federal principle," faulting them only "for being inadequately conscious of themselves as innovators" . . . She defends as an accidental casualty of their timidity the

vision of small-scale republicanism that the Federalists deliberately and skillfully dismantled. In short, Arendt puts forward Anti-Federalist *arguments* while contributing to Federalist *ideology*.²²

Whereas for Bonnie Honig and Agnes Heller, Arendt's turn to fables allows her to alter and adjust the context and possibility for freedom, for Disch, Arendt's turns to fables actually made it more difficult for her to preserve what was best about the American practice of politics.²³ It is almost as if, once she buys into the strategy of using fables (in her own misrepresentations, for example, of the Mayflower Compact), she becomes susceptible to the very delusions and misrepresentations committed by Madison et al.

For my own part, I would argue that Arendt's peculiar relationship both to Federalism in this instance and sovereignty and state power more generally does not necessarily come from her being hoodwinked by Federalist rhetoric. Instead, I would argue that it reflects her basic ambivalence toward representation itself. The tenacity which Arendt, despite her clear reservations, displays toward representation (with its concomitant complications of her views on sovereignty and statism) may reflect her own sense of temporality, her judgments of the current political climate and what can and cannot be done in our time. As we have seen, Arendt's genealogy of sovereignty makes it a specifically modern phenomenon. As a modern herself, Arendt cannot avoid or overturn the will, nor its political expression, as sovereignty. Or, perhaps more accurately, she cannot overrule them by fiat. What we see in much of her struggle and contradiction throughout *On Revolution* and *The Human Condition* in particular (I read some of the essays in *Between Past and Future* as well as *Willing* as early and late examples of Arendt in her more "pure" anarchic mode) is an attempt to work out a way to address the problem of politics and sovereignty from within a contemporary context.

Although she lauds the freedoms and spontaneity of the classical age, Arendt shows her own allegiance to (or at least participation in) modernity when she addresses the will's fear of the future, of a loss of control, of too much spontaneity and unpredictability. This fear, which can be summed up by Arendt's notion of "the abyss of freedom" undermines any move to a pure anarchism because it suggests a total collapse of agency, of predictability.²⁴ This was a problem for the Greeks as well of course, but the presence of the will (in her genealogy) and its self-privileging perspective makes us moderns inherently more fearful of an unknown future.

Faced with the tendencies of her own age, Arendt reaches a compromise of sorts with sovereignty via her notion of promising, a faculty which helps to make the future less unknown, less out of our control. Arendt offers that promising allows for a context in which "certain islands of predictability are thrown and in which certain guideposts of reliability are erected."²⁵ As we have already seen, Arendt tells us that these promises enable us to "dispose

of the future as though it were the present.”²⁶ In other words, promises seem to bring the future into our current control (at least to some extent) offering, as we have seen as well, “a certain limited reality.” As she writes further in that passage, immediately following her discussion of this “limited reality”: “The sovereignty resides in the resulting, limited independence from the incalculability of the future, and its limits are the same as those inherent in the faculty of making and keeping promises.”²⁷ Here, we see, however strange it may seem, that sovereignty is not simply bound by promises but itself plays a similar role and function as promising itself. “Limiting . . . the incalculability of the future” enables the will to engage, at least to some extent, with politics. In this way, sovereignty changes from being the death of politics and becomes one of its possible features.

Such an accommodation might explain why Arendt sides with the Federalists, at least to some extent, since they seemed to promise more control, more security. But here we come to the crux of the matter. If this is the case, we can once again ask, isn’t Arendt a statist after all? Perhaps her anarchism is limited to her view of the classical age, a wishful thought for a time gone by. Yet we can only draw this conclusion when we try to enforce a coherence on her work (particularly on works such as *On Revolution*) which is simply not there. Arendt’s accommodation with sovereignty, if that is what it is, leaves us with a lot of questions. If it is true that sovereignty is itself an illegitimate, violence-based form of arbitrary force, not political at all, how can it be accommodated? Given that she shows that those anarchic systems based on promises are actually destroyed by party-based systems of rule that seek to impose sovereignty (and not just once in a while but each and every time), her own history seems to deny the kinds of accommodations between sovereignty and promising that she seems (at times) to favor.

I would argue that we seem to have in Arendt’s work not so much an accommodation per se so much as a battle. We see, even in a thinker who is dedicated to the exposure and defeat of sovereignty as a basis of political life, a tendency to succumb, at least at times, to sovereign solutions. But insofar as Arendt retains a clear view of an alternative form of politics (which becomes clearer the more one recedes in time), she continues to challenge the central conceit of sovereignty: that it has no alternatives.

Rather than condemning Arendt for capitulating to sovereignty (and hence arguing that she is not an anarchist after all), my claim is that Arendt is evincing a strategy of opposition, of seeking to lure the will back towards an accommodation with politics. She uses familiar guideposts, like promises, like sovereignty itself, as a way to restore an alternative form of politics (or to be more accurate, a form of politics full stop since sovereignty is the death of politics for Arendt). We can see in her stumbles (such as her failure to condemn Madison) the dangers of such a strategy. Yet when we look at the bigger picture, we can see that Arendt demonstrates quite clearly how sove-

reignty cannot be accommodated. Instead it must be subverted and altered beyond recognition. We could call her a stealth anarchist, someone who engages in somewhat familiar language (of order, control, predictability) in order to render a political order that has been read entirely out of our time viable once again.

In this we do not need to read Arendt as a tragic figure so much as a writer who demonstrates both how insidious sovereignty can be and how it must and can be resisted. Sovereignty has always established itself as the system that assuages fear: the fear of too much freedom, too much spontaneity, the violence of others. As we have seen, Arendt engages with this fear herself in order to return us, at least partially, back toward a nonsovereign politics. In doing so she moves away from the state and the power of the will and back toward a recognition of and an accommodation to the fact of human plurality—i.e., anarchism or isonomy itself.

CONCLUSION

If this is the case, we can see that for all of her ambivalence, Arendt offers the study of anarchism something critical, namely a sense of the tactics that may be required to turn us from fully “archic” subjects into something else. In her apparent compromises and accommodations, I would argue that Arendt does not give up on isonomy but merely seeks to reproduce (or at least approximate) it in a modern setting. By giving us a vision of the past (however “fabulous” it may be) in which sovereignty did not read out the possibility of politics and human plurality (which for Arendt are one and the same phenomena), Arendt makes a nonsovereign future similarly possible or at least conceivable. And, by attempting to preserve those aspects of sovereignty that modern subjects seem to be unable to live without (the sense of some control, the downplaying of a wide open future), Arendt may be luring us back toward the kind of political isonomy that she sees as necessary for freedom.

It may be that Arendt does not completely succeed in her project. Certainly, as Disch notes, her genealogies and even her political theory suffer from quite a bit of dissonance. Yet it would be a mistake to dismiss Arendt because of her many contradictions. Instead, we can come to a better tactical understanding of what is involved in making anarchism a possibility in our own time. Although she herself describes sovereignty as utterly compromising, and always victorious, she herself may demonstrate how one can seem to engage in such compromises without giving up on the possibility of subverting sovereignty.

For the purposes of this study, it may be that what Arendt shows us most clearly is the form that anarchism may need to take to remain viable in our own time. While her vision of ancient Athenian isonomy is certainly alluring, the main work that she does comes in her engagement with the problems of modern times. Arendt's genealogy shows us why archism has become the default political form for our time. Given that the will is so fearful, so in need of a sense of control and, given that sovereignty appears to give individual wills some form of power in its phantasmic notions of representation (so that individual wills can feel empowered through devices like voting, nationalism, party and/or group identity even when some other will is actually—and totally—in charge), we seem stuck with sovereignty just as we are stuck with our will in modern times. Yet Arendt does not give up on modernity; she seeks to understand the will, to give it enough of what (it thinks) it needs in order to make some kind of an-archism possible. She is often read as being deeply pessimistic, but I see an intransigent, anarchist aspect to Arendt's work that counters this perception. What some may see as a capitulation to archism, I read as a more complicated form of resistance. In her ambivalence and in her resort to fables and distortions of the text, Arendt helps to produce the kinds of resistance that are necessary for anarchism to survive the temporal traps that otherwise seem to have rendered it impossible, unthinkable. Even if Arendt herself does not always (perhaps ever?) succeed in "being" a modern-day anarchist, her text demonstrates how such an anarchism may be conceivable, even possible, despite the fact that it is currently neither of those things.

NOTES

1. Thanks to Karen Feldman, Nasser Hussain, and Jimmy Casas Klausen for help and advice with this essay. Earlier forms of parts of this essay appeared in "Can There Be Politics without Sovereignty? Arendt, Derrida and the Question of Sovereign Inevitability," *Law, Culture and the Humanities* 6.2 (June 2010): 153–66.

2. Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 30.

3. Using Hanna Pitkin's helpful categorizations of representation as a guide for which form Arendt is using, we can see that for Arendt, representation in this sense is "standing for," i.e., a symbolic overwriting. See Hanna Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 92–111. I am indebted to Jimmy Casas Klausen for this insight.

4. Arendt, *On Revolution*, 30.

5. *Ibid.*

6. Hannah Arendt, *Willing*, in *The Life of the Mind* (New York: Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich, 1978), 63.

7. *Ibid.*, 64.

8. *Ibid.*

9. *Ibid.*

10. *Ibid.*

11. I wrote an earlier essay on Arendt's opposition to sovereignty entitled "'*Amo: Volo ut sis*': Love, willing and Arendt's reluctant embrace of sovereignty," *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 34.3 (March 2008): 287–313.

12. Hannah Arendt, "What Is Freedom?," in *Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought* (New York: Penguin Books, 1968), 163.

13. Arendt, *On Revolution*, 273.

14. *Ibid.*, 165.

15. Lisa J. Disch, "How Could Arendt Glorify the American Revolution and Revile the French? Placing *On Revolution* in the Historiography of the French and American Revolutions," unpublished essay (cited with permission of the author), 4.

16. Arendt, *On Revolution*, 237.

17. *Ibid.*

18. *Ibid.*

19. *Ibid.*

20. Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 245.

21. *Ibid.*

22. Disch, "How Could Arendt Glorify," 17, citing Bonnie Honig, "Declarations of Independence: Arendt and Derrida on the Problem of Founding a Republic," *American Political Science Review* 85.1 (March 1991): 98.

23. See Honig "Declarations of Independence," 97–113; Agnes Heller, "Hannah Arendt on Tradition and New Beginnings," in *Hannah Arendt in Jerusalem*, ed. Steven Aschheim (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 19–32.

24. Arendt, *Willing*, 195.

25. Arendt, *Human Condition*, 244.

26. *Ibid.*, 245.

27. The passage goes on to say:

The sovereignty of a body of people bound and kept together, not by an identical will which magically inspires them all, but by an agreed purpose for which alone the promises are valid and binding, shows itself quite clearly in its unquestioned superiority over those who are completely free, unbound by any promises and unkept by any purpose. This superiority derives from the capacity to dispose of the future as though it were present, that is, the enormous and truly miraculous enlargement of the very dimension in which power can be effective (*Ibid.*, 245).

Chapter Nine

Emma Goldman and the Power of Revolutionary Love

Keally McBride

In my experience, there is nothing like reading Emma Goldman to convert normally idealistic eighteen- or nineteen-year-olds into world-weary pessimists.¹ After reading her essay, “Anarchism: What It Really Stands For,” a surprising number of students can accept the idea that organized religion, capitalist means of production, and the modern state all serve a role in reformulating collective and individual experience, in effect bending humanity toward their own institutional purposes. Students basically agree with her idea that “society” reformulates individuals and that living in the modern world is essentially a state of unfreedom.

Then the inevitable question arises: how can Goldman guess what we will be like without those institutional constraints and imperatives? Won’t different modes of hierarchy emerge? Maybe they won’t be based upon proximity to God, or wealth, or state power, but don’t human beings always find ways to oppress one another? It doesn’t matter if it is based on even entirely random criteria such as stars on one’s belly or the length of one’s nose, but human history suggests that hierarchies persist in all circumstances. How does she *really* know that the evil we do to one another is propagated, not mitigated, by these institutions?

It comes down to a question of imagination. How can we imagine a world order so radically different from the one we live in? How can we believe that human experiences can be fundamentally different than the ones we are having now? This is the conundrum of much of political theory, as I have explored in my previous work.² Idealists construct castles in the sky, gesturing toward them in repudiation of the world as it exists. But the anarchist tradition is defined in part by a critical engagement with the conditions of the

material world, even as it gestures towards a radical alternative. This dual commitment to imagining an alternative political order, while being grounded in this one, is a difficult tension to maintain.

Emma Goldman offers a very particular method of drawing attention to the existing world order while making arguments for alternatives in her writing. She combines unrestrained idealism with a detailed, even hypersensitive, attention to everyday human experience. Goldman's two-volume autobiography, *Living My Life*, intersperses the development and evolution of her political commitments with vivid descriptions of wrestling with how many dollars to spend on clothes, the length of her breaks at the factory, and the pieces of broken china on the floor after a fight with her lover. Goldman makes it clear that her vision of the future has developed from her experience, not in repudiation of it. But the question remains: how can she find inspiration for her idealized anarchist vision from her analysis of the grueling, punishing realities of the world she rejects? From the material in front of her, where does the hope for an alternative lie?

There is no direct resolution of this dilemma in her work, though she does place the conundrum of imagination and alternative orders squarely before her audience:

A practical scheme, says Oscar Wilde, is either one already in existence, or a scheme that could be carried out under the existing conditions; but it is exactly the existing conditions that one objects to, and any scheme that could accept these conditions is wrong and foolish. The true criterion of the practical, therefore, is not whether the latter can keep intact the wrong or foolish; rather it is whether the scheme has vitality enough to leave the stagnant waters of the old, and build, as well as sustain, new life.³

Goldman rejects any solution that accepts existing arrangements as given, and instead looks for alternative sources of vitality. What are the sources of energy, power, or inspiration that defy the existing conditions? What is the evidence that human beings can live according to different principles? Her language hints at what I have come to conclude is her answer to this question. Female sexuality specifically, or love more generally, is her proof that an alternative order can happen. Love is encouraged under very particular conditions by the current social order, such as maternal and filial love, and love within heterosexual marriage. Female sexual pleasure, on the other hand, is not sanctioned under any circumstance. In fact, Goldman argues in a number of essays that the state, the church, and marriage specifically target and try to destroy female sexual pleasure.⁴ Because it can still, despite all these forces, be experienced shows that there is an element of human experience which resists control. The fact that female sexual pleasure persists demonstrates to Goldman that it is a force stronger than the Herculean efforts to control it. Love and female sexuality are the material evidence of human possibility

outside of the current order; therefore. Goldman argues that they are the keys to building and sustaining new life, both biologically and politically.

In "Marriage and Love" Goldman details how the church, the state, and the capitalist have tried to capture the power of love, to be the gatekeepers to paradise and fulfillment by controlling access to it through licenses and liturgy. While recently political theorists talk about this dynamic by taking on biopolitics as a topic, Goldman is much more direct. Recent theorists look at how the body becomes mediated, while Goldman's description is more personal. The oppression she describes and is referring to in her argument is her mother's blows, the humiliation of factory work, or sexual harassment. Her directness may make contemporary readers uncomfortable with her flat assertions, even if they amount to more or less the same argument that appears in more detailed form in Foucault's *History of Sexuality*.⁵ The state, the church, and the capitalist all have a vested interest in the reproduction of the species, and accordingly seek to link marriage and procreation in order to make sure that reproduction is kept firmly subservient to the imperatives of social production. "The defenders of authority dread the advent of a free motherhood, lest it will rob them of their prey. Who will fight wars? Who would create wealth? Who would make the policeman, the jailer, if women were to refuse the indiscriminate breeding of children? The race, the race! Shouts the king, the president, the capitalist, the priest."⁶

In the interests of society, reproduction must be controlled and harnessed. Hence, the sexuality of women must be controlled and harnessed so that its direct effects can be used to propagate the interests of established authorities. For this reason, female sexuality is shrouded, feared, turned into a monstrous abnormality. Sexual activity is only condoned within the context of marriage, which Goldman argues, is an institution that denigrates women to such an extent it is hard to imagine that any woman can experience any form of self expression whatsoever. Ultimately, marriage tries to segregate female sexual experience from the privileged position of being legally attached to a man. "The institution of marriage makes a parasite of woman an absolute dependent. It incapacitates her for life's struggle, annihilates her social consciousness, paralyzes her imagination, and then imposes its gracious protection, which is in reality a snare, a travesty on human character."⁷ Because marriage dismantles the individuality of a woman, she experiences sex without it being a reflection of her own interior force and energy.

Goldman details the experience of shame, confusion, self-alienation that occurs as indoctrination into this social structure occurs. Again and again, she describes "options" given to women that alienate them. Honorable women are kept ignorant of their bodies and sexuality, condemning them to unhappy marriages:

The prospective wife and mother is kept in complete ignorance of her only asset in the competitive field—sex. Thus she enters into life-long relations with a man only to find herself shocked, repelled, outraged beyond measure by the most natural and healthy instinct, sex. It is safe to say that a large percentage of the unhappiness, misery, distress, and physical suffering of matrimony is due to criminal ignorance in sex matters that is being extolled as a great virtue.⁸

Those women who do learn about and embrace their sexuality are considered fallen, unfit for society, and denied the advantages given to their more respected married companions. There is always the alternative life of spinsterdom, which Goldman seems to revile above all. She describes unmarried life as “narrow and unendurable because of the chains of moral and social prejudice that cramp and bind her nature.”⁹

Women come to play a crucial role in Goldman’s theory because their experiences are presented as evidence that there is no freedom within the existing order. Men may also be stifled by the existing political order, but they obtain advantages from their complicity in it. Goldman outlines all three options for women to discover their sexuality and the power of their bodies in terms of marriage, sex outside of marriage, and celibacy, displaying all three as unacceptable. Complicity leads to alienation, not empowerment.

Similarly, Goldman argues that women are horribly misshapen by the few “advantages” society offers them. The church, traditionally a sphere for women, has “thwarted her nature and fettered her soul.” The accolades of the state for raising citizens and maintaining patriotism—Republican Motherhood as an ideology was particularly strong at this period in American history—means that she serves “the insatiable monster, war [which] robs woman of all that is dear and precious to her.” The home, that last vestige of alternative order so extolled by Alexis de Tocqueville and more recent communitarians as the fountain of virtue in a corrupt world, “saps the very life-energy of woman,—this modern prison with golden bars.”¹⁰ By focusing on the socially sanctioned positions for women, Goldman can make the case that there is no emancipation within even the nooks and crannies of the existing order. Even those spheres that offer sanctuary are deathtraps to be avoided. All the available roles ultimately misshape who you are.

Which is why it can come as a surprise that then Goldman also ends up pinpointing the hope for humanity in precisely that which is most denied: female sexuality. Of course, Goldman herself knew pleasure and other women that experienced it. One could cynically say it is a form of self-delusion to think that sexual pleasure or love can provide the scrim of empowerment in a toxic environment. But Goldman takes her experience and the experience of other women more seriously than that. *Living My Life* begins with an account of her awakening sexuality and her mother’s response to finding her touching herself. “One morning I felt myself torn out of sleep. Mother was bending

over me, tightly holding my right hand. In an angry voice she cried, 'If I ever find your hand again like that, I'll whip you, you naughty child!'"¹¹ Goldman was subjected to all the social conditioning to "protect" her virtue by alienating her from sexuality, and then married to a man she did not love at a very young age. When at last, she experiences lovemaking with a chosen partner, she describes the pain and joy that accompanied the revelation that sexuality could be an entirely different experience than she had henceforth imagined. She describes her passion "breaking through all that had been suppressed, unconscious, dormant."¹² Think of the layers of religious training, gender ideology, the medicalization and pathologization of sexuality that must be overcome in order for a woman to experience sexual joy. For Goldman, the fact that even despite all the efforts of society, we can enjoy sex and fall in love is proof of the interior life force that we carry inside of us. She recounts her awakening as proof that there is still some powerful aspect of human experience that lies outside of social conditioning. It is proof of individual agency outside the status quo; it is evidence that there is a spirit that transcends the current world. If such a thing as female sexual pleasure can survive against all the forces mitigating against it, then this is a clear demonstration of the generative, joyful life that exists within everyone. "Man has subdued bodies, but all the power on the earth has been unable to subdue love. Man has conquered whole nations, but all his armies could not conquer love. Man has chained and fettered the spirit, but he has been utterly helpless before love."¹³

This argument may seem like another variety on the feminist project to relate public and private spheres of existence, another manifestation of "the personal is political." Indeed, Goldman finds favor among feminists precisely because of her insistence that private life reinforces the values of public order and that it does not make sense to separate the two spheres. But feminist scholars have also wrestled with Goldman's personal history and more specifically, her sexual relationships. Candace Falk's biography, *Love, Anarchy, and Emma Goldman* examines the love letters that Goldman exchanged with Alexander Berkman, her promiscuous companion of many years.¹⁴ The intimate details of their relationship make contemporary feminists blush. How can she let him call her "mother"? Why does she forgive his insensitivity, infidelity? He seems the avenging angel of the doctrine of free love, sent to demonstrate that even the strongest women can be defeated by their attractions to men who undermine them. Under closer examination, the details of her private life seem to contradict her public positions. Though she preached free love and empowerment through sexuality, she had relatively miserable relationships with men who treated her badly. How can we take her as a model of the doctrine "the personal is political"?

Rochelle Gurstein has responded to Falk's biography in an article, "Emma Goldman and the Tragedy of Modern Love," arguing that contempo-

rary feminist consciousness makes Goldman's vision of the sanctity of the *experience* of love unfathomable, if not downright suspicious.¹⁵ Gurstein convincingly asserts that contemporary readers have difficulty with Goldman because the sources of her inspiration are so alien to us today. "It is precisely these dimensions of beauty—moral, emotional, and psychic—that have disappeared from modern consciousness, so that such an appreciation feels naive, even mawkish."¹⁶ Restated in the terms of this argument, I would argue that contemporary readers have a difficulty imagining a world outside that which is known. Perhaps what we suffer from is a supreme failure of imagination, which is a problem that Goldman might help us overcome, if we allow her to. But to open ourselves to Goldman's politics, we have to accept the vulnerability she exhibits in talking about the small and large pains of living, the breathless idealism she invests in love, and her delight in the unexpected joy that is possible through sexual sensation. This physical joy does not so much make up for or redeem the indignities of the world but suggests that there is a far greater existence that we can aim for.

If the idea is that the personal is always political has become predominant, Goldman offers an alternative. While the political and personal are not distinct in her analysis of the world as it exists, she believes that this does not necessarily have to be the case. The personal does not, in the end, *have* to be political and in fact we should fight for a world in which the personal can be personal. The fact that one can have experiences not sanctioned by the existing order demonstrates that the personal, the individual, remains a potent force even in the midst of an unjust social order. Once again, it comes down to a question of imagination. Goldman takes sexual experience as evidence of individual forces which resist socialization, while much contemporary feminist thought, like the students I mentioned at the start of this article, have come to be deeply suspicious of the notion that there can be any human consciousness or experience that is not mediated.

Another way of thinking about the relationship between love and politics is to consider how it changes human relations and whether the connections between lovers can serve as a model for an alternative political order. Such an argument pervades communitarian literature such as Michael Sandel's *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*, as well as feminist ethics of care arguments.¹⁷ Here the interconnections between those who love one another serve as a model for morality that is superior to liberal models of individual mutual regard and independence. Goldman would disparage such visions as hopelessly romanticizing the intimate sphere, ignoring the very real brutalities contained within private life, and the often denigrating aspects to the relationships among parents and children and spouses.

But I suspect she might pause in front of another model of the political potential of love found in Martin Luther King Jr.'s vision of "the beloved community." King argues that segregation is wrong because it is the legal,

social, and political institutionalization of asymmetrical recognition. The status of the white person is considered as fundamentally different from the object nature of the black person. "Segregation, to use the terminology of the Jewish philosopher Martin Buber, substitutes an 'I-it' relationship for an 'I-thou' relationship and ends up relegating persons to the status of things."¹⁸ The beloved community is able to overcome this relation when both members of the community recognize each other on the same terms. The I-it relationship is replaced by an I-thou relationship of mutual recognition. It is the assertion of love that allows the cycle of oppression to come to an end and redeems both parties in the community whose sense of self and morality has been damaged by the I-it relationship.¹⁹

Certainly, Goldman craves the kind of confirmation through engagement with others, and she expresses repeatedly her desire to be acknowledged in her whole existence as female, activist, person. The connection to others through sex clearly brought her into a new recognition of herself. However, I believe this vision of political redemption *through love* would not have been satisfying to her. This model assumes that the recognition itself redeems the parties involved and that this redemption is tantamount to creating a new order. Because the essence of political injustice is based upon the misrecognition of people, their recognition will defy the dominant terms of the order, making it immediately untenable.

Though it is clear that Goldman does agree that political order fundamentally misrecognizes and misshapes individuals, recognition is not sufficient for the development of a new order. Goldman's version of the political nature of love is not that it is redemptive, saving and transforming the world as it currently exists. Goldman did not find love and then settle down to lead a happy and peaceful life. Instead, being cherished and nurtured gave her the conviction that there are experiences and roles available other than those that are socially sanctioned. She took her experience of love as confirmation that inside of her there was a life force that the world—her mother, father, husband, the church, the state, the factory—had tried to capture but had been unable to extinguish. This knowledge gave her inspiration to change the world in such a way that such love would be more likely to blossom and more likely to persist, and that the pleasures of female sexuality would not have to be a miracle against all odds. In other words, rather than love changing the world, she concluded that she needed to change the world to make it safer for love.

One last distinction will help to establish Goldman's vision of how love relates to revolutionary politics. By saying that love defies the imperatives of the current social order, does it then become a dematerialized force? Is Goldman in effect losing the worldly element of her anarchist critique, and instead retreating toward an idealized alternative world order? In *The Human Condition*, Hannah Arendt makes the case that love is always antipolitical. She

argues that the passions of love separate the space between individuals, thereby eliminating the space of appearance which Arendt defines as central for politics. If there is no world in common, there is no way that people can come together. Arendt argues that the child that can result from love is the creation of a new world out of the worldlessness of the lovers. Interestingly, Arendt argues that the birth of the child in effect is the end of love, since it brings the lovers back into the world. The child, then, reinserts space between lovers which brings them back into the world. "Love, by its very nature, is unworldly, and it is for this reason rather than its rarity that it is not only apolitical but antipolitical, perhaps the most powerful of all antipolitical human forces."²⁰

While Arendt and Goldman agree on the power of love, where they disagree is where they see the origin of worldliness. Arendt sees people themselves as not necessarily material, only through connections with others do they become attached to the world. The body is intimate, not worldly in the sense of being in common. Yet what is sexual experience if not an interconnection between bodies? Why is space, not interconnection, the most crucial element for Arendt's paradigm? I am certainly not the first to point out that Arendt has difficulty with the more corporeal aspects of human existence. It is also important to point out the limitation in her assumptions that space itself is an empty form of materiality.²¹

For Goldman, nothing is more real than the experience of her body. If it can be experienced and felt, then it cannot be otherworldly. For this reason, grounding her alternative political order in the body puts it into dialectical relationship with the world as it currently exists. It is how she grounds her radical imagination in material, yet extraordinary, experience.

For Goldman, love proves that we do have better possibilities outside the current social structure than we have within it. It serves as the beacon of hope that there are great rewards for resisting and changing the world. This is not a testable hypothesis, nor is it a particularly convincing or comprehensive theory of social change, agency, or revolution. Other thinkers have more to offer in those regards. But maybe the vulnerability created by hope that Goldman is trying to inspire is just as important as some more concrete assurance that there is some edge to socialized consciousness that can be rounded. Love is not possible without vulnerability; nor is imagination, or revolution.

NOTES

1. I would like to thank Jenna Gustafson for her research assistance with this article. Thanks also to James Martel, Scott Lefever, and John Zarobell for their comments and conver-

sations about this topic, as well as the classrooms of students who have been patient with my fascination with Goldman and our response to her.

2. See *Collective Dreams: Political Imagination and Community* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005), especially ch. 1, "Politics and Imagination."

3. Emma Goldman, "Anarchism: What It Really Stands For," in *Anarchism and Other Essays* (New York: Dover Publications, 1969), 49.

4. See esp. "The Traffic in Women," "Woman Suffrage," "The Tragedy of Woman's Emancipation," and "Marriage and Love" in *Anarchism*.

5. Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1978).

6. Goldman, "Marriage and Love," in *Anarchism*, 237.

7. *Ibid.*, 235.

8. *Ibid.*, 231.

9. Goldman, "Tragedy of Woman's Emancipation," in *Anarchism*, 221.

10. Goldman, "Woman Suffrage," in *Anarchism*, 196.

11. Goldman, *Living My Life*, Volume One (New York: Dover Publications, 1970), 21.

12. *Ibid.*, 44.

13. Goldman, "Marriage and Love," 236.

14. Candace Falk, *Love, Anarchy, and Emma Goldman. A Biography* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1990).

15. Rochelle Gurstein, "Emma Goldman and the Tragedy of Modern Love," *Salmagundi* 135/136 (2002): 67–90.

16. *Ibid.*, 85.

17. Michael J. Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

18. Martin Luther King, Jr., "Letter from a Birmingham Jail," rpt. in *The Norton Anthology of American Political Thought*, eds. Issac Kramnick and Theodore Lowi (New York: Norton, 2009), 1312.

19. For an interesting recent discussion of the redemptive power of love in King's thought, see George Shulman's *American Prophecy: Race and Redemption in American Political Culture* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008).

20. Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 242.

21. See Henri LeFebvre's *The Production of Space*, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), for arguments about the social and political forces at work in our notions of and experiences of space.

Chapter Ten

“This Is What Democracy Looks Like”¹

Elena Loizidou

A democracy conceived in the military servitude of the masses, in their economic enslavement, and nurtured in their tears and blood, is not democracy at all. It is *despotism*—the cumulative result of a chain of abuses which, according to that dangerous document, the Declaration of Independence, the people have the right to overthrow.

—Emma Goldman, Address to the Jury, U.S. District Court, New York City, 9 July 1917

1.

On 27 June 1917, Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman stood trial in the District Court of the City of New York on charges of conspiracy relating to their anticonscription activities prior to and after the signing of the Selective Service Act 1917 (hereafter Conscription Act) on 5 June by U.S. president Woodrow Wilson. Their arrests took place on 15 June, the day Wilson signed the new Espionage Act, which rendered among other things any antidraft activities illegal. Goldman and Berkman were arrested in the offices of their respective magazines, *Mother Earth* and *The Blast* at 20 East 125 Street, New York. Their trial lasted from 27 June to 9 July 1917. Goldman and Berkman were respectively sentenced to two years imprisonment and fined \$10,000. Judge Julius Mayers, who presided over their case, recommended that at the end of their sentence they should be deported. In February of the same year Wilson had signed the Alien Immigration Act, which instructed the deportation of undesirable aliens (the defendants were resident aliens in the United States). Mayers had judged their offence as treasonable; he therefore consequently invoked the Aliens Act of 1917 in support of his deporta-

tion decision. Goldman and Berkman were eventually deported on 21 December 1919. Along with 247 other “undesirable aliens,” they arrived in Russia on 19 January 1920.

This trial is notable. The charges against them were criminal charges, conspiracy charges. Judge Mayers instructed the Grand Jury to take the case as a criminal case and not a political one.² Nevertheless, Berkman and Goldman decided to use the trial to “propagate”³ their anarchist beliefs. Goldman writes enthusiastically in her autobiography that in doing so it would have been the first time since 1887 that anarchism “raised its voice in an American Court.”⁴

The effects politicizing the trial are multifaceted. They reveal (a) the inability of law to contain subjectivity within a juridical framework. They reveal not only that subjects are not already moulded by the juridical order (by simply residing in a jurisdiction and being subjected to legal language) but also that even if they are called to be put on trial as criminals (as juridical subjects, that is) they may show us in that very process another facet of their subjectivization. They divulge also (b) that the propagation or demonstration of political subjectivity and politics springs at the moment of action. Berkman and Goldman were well-known anarchists. But *saying* that one is an activist or engaging in politics of a particular type does not alone make one a political subject. “Politics” shows itself when it comes into friction with what is not being recognized (particularly by order) as “politics.” In relation to the case in question, we learn that anarchist politics, and consequentially Berkman’s and Goldman’s subjectivity, emerge at the moment of *doing*, of disarming the juridical order, of showing how they were *not* criminals. Or, put otherwise, they reveal themselves as political subjects when they “propagated” (a form of *doing*) in court that they were not to be subjected to the hailing effect of criminalization. They disclose finally (c) that, as they emerge at the moment of demonstration and friction with an ordering rationality, politics and the political subject demonstrate that they are the effect of a certain art of living, or an ethics of existence in the Foucauldian sense.

This case is therefore important not just because it is a case that involves two of the most prominent U.S. anarchists of their time but also because it can make us see and understand how politics comes into being. As I already indicated above, politics and the political subject spring up when in friction with the apparatus of ordering (law, or the juridical order, being one order among many) and through an art of living. This understanding of politics is revealed when it goes *up against* order and *through* ethics, enabling us to see how it is different from what normally passes *as* politics—namely, either managerial government which has as its goal efficiency or/and policing government that has order as its goal. Mostly, though, this case provides us with a clearer vision of how the category of the political subject comes to being. It enables us to see why somebody that “resists” the accusation of

being a criminal by uttering the statement “I am innocent” is *not* a political subject, but rather a subject that gives itself to the juridical order, albeit by raising evidence against law’s categorizing terms. The political subject that reveals and makes itself audible when it goes *up against* order and *through* ethics shows that it is not mastered by an order. On the contrary, it exposes its self-mastery. It shows up order’s inability to manage itself and the production of subjectivity. It gestures toward a different way of living in the world.

It is also to be noted that this political subject is by no means superhuman. Not being superhuman means in this instance that it is not created out of nothing. On the contrary, this political subject is produced by an order (that calls it into being, i.e., interpellates it) as it rubs up against it and simultaneously through practices that will turn its life into a form of art. Moreover, this political subject is neither singular—understood here as being a unique and private—nor plural—the representation of a group, community, party, or even the people. Rather it is a friction between the two (singular and plural), an intensity, that carries with it both the concreteness of the subject in its temporality and a history that precedes it. In this instance, a political subjectivity is the outcome of a dynamic between Emma Goldman’s comportment, her “interpellative presence” in the court room, and Emma Goldman as a name (and all that comes along with it).

This long introductory note is intended to indicate the understanding of politics and the figuration of the political subject that emerges from my reading of the aforementioned case. A more detailed analysis of how specifically “politics” and the “political subject” emerge through the case will follow later on in the chapter.

To begin, I want to juxtapose the conceptions described above with Rancière’s formulation of politics as democracy or anarchy. Rancière is perhaps the first contemporary philosopher who extensively criticizes the opponents of democracy by pointing out that their claims are based on a misunderstanding of what democracy stands for. In his view, as we will see further, democracy is not a form of government, but rather a process, and its essence is dissensus. As Rancière explains:

The essence of politics is *dissensus* . . . It is the demonstration (*manifestation*) of a gap in the sensible itself. Political demonstration makes visible that which had no reason to be seen; it places one world in another—for instance, the world where the factory is a public space in that where it is considered private, the world where workers speak, and speak about community, in that where their voices are mere cries of expressing pain.⁵

Taking dissensus as the essence of politics, Rancière then explains democracy somewhat differently.⁶ In rereading Plato’s *Republic*, Rancière explains how democracy is anarchy. The details of his discussions will be laid bare later on. It is important, though, to forefront here that this formulation of

democracy is also his formulation of politics. As Rancière equates democracy with anarchy, I thought it would be salient to engage with his understanding in this chapter. In doing so I hope to contrast Rancière's understanding of democracy with the one produced by classical anarchists' "propagations." The difference arises primarily from Rancière's underplaying of the ethical attitude that surrounds such acts (i.e., propagation, demonstration) and how this contributes to the production of politics and the political subject.

As you may have noticed, my formulation of politics has as an important partner the art of living, an ethical practice. In my engagement with the trial of Berkman and Goldman, we will see that the political subject is revealed also through *parrhesia*, one of those practices that Foucault identified as constitutive of an "art of living." The effect of engaging with such practices is to enable self-mastery and equality. Self-mastery and equality are characteristics of democracy that Rancière, among others,⁷ undoubtedly talks about, but these writings seem to locate these phenomena entirely within the realm of politics. In turning to this formulation, I want to avoid the danger of turning the subject into some kind of superhuman entity, something that emerges or produces itself *ex nihilo*. I have already explained how the political subject emerges in my reading as not being one that is produced *ex nihilo*. Again, to repeat it once more, this subject is produced when it comes up against order and through its already practical existence; *parrhesia* is the manifestation of this practical ethics in this particular case that I am analyzing.

This chapter is also a contribution to postanarchism. The relation of this chapter to postanarchism is briefly unpacked in the next section. It suffices to say for the moment that one of the most important contributions that postanarchist theory can make to critical left theory is to turn to the biography of classical anarchy. In delving into the classical anarchists' archive we observe that their political practices coincide with the emergence of an international policing initiative, with new forms of interstate cooperation over intelligence gathering as well as a national intensification of intelligence compilation. This convergence is not a mere coincidence. In the international domain, the assassination of Empress Elizabeth on 10 September 1889 by a young Italian anarchist, Luigi Lucheni, resulted in calls for an Anti-Anarchist Conference which took place in Rome on 27 September of the same year and which discussed a pan-European State strategy on anarchist plots. As Richard Bach Jensen informs us, later on this conference gave birth to Interpol, the international police organization.⁸ Similarly, in the United States, the Bureau of Investigation, the predecessor of the FBI, increased its intelligence activities as a reaction to the assassination of President McKinley by Leon Czolgosz in 1901.⁹ One of the Bureau's early persecutors of anarchists was the first director of the FBI, J. Edgar Hoover, whom we know mostly for his anticommunist persecutions in the 1950s. By looking at this earlier history, we see

that the practices of anarchists have a lot to teach postanarchist theory about the confluence between their emerging politics and the modern forms of policing. If we take the proposition that what passes as politics today is policing, then perhaps we can learn from the early anarchists something about how we can counter such politics through ethics. My contribution here is just a beginning of the journey.

2.

Postanarchism or poststructuralist anarchism is an emerging cluster of theoretical work coming from disciplinary areas as varied as art theory and law and best exemplified by the work of Todd May and Saul Newman, among others.¹⁰ As Newman aptly puts it, this new direction in anarchist theory puts the traditional libertarian and egalitarian strand of classical anarchist theory in conversation with poststructuralist theory and aims “to broaden the terms of anti-authoritarian thought to include critical analysis of language, discourse, culture and new modalities of power.”¹¹ This pedagogic and academic endeavor takes place against the backdrop of a more recent entertainment of anarchist ideas and practices by global social movements and radical political groups.¹² Whether there is a direct feed from the activist realm to academic theoretical reflections or vice versa in such a way that we can confidently trace is not an issue for discussion in this chapter, though it is important to point out that such a genealogical project may be of both archival and political pertinence for the left in terms of political/aesthetic life. But still, what is noticeable so far in the writings of postanarchist thinkers is a particular *doing* of theoretical work—a *doing* that is invested in bringing together theoretical writings from classical anarchism and certain poststructuralist thinkers such as Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, and more recently Jacques Rancière. These postanarchist thinkers, in their diverse perspectives and theories, have critically engaged with authoritarianism in order to undo classical anarchism’s humanist tendencies while simultaneously undoing the practice-theory dichotomy.¹³ Postanarchism has spent less time unpacking practices of that period, such as giving lectures, magazine and pamphlet production, or even trials in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. At a methodological/theoretical level, so far postanarchist theory, because of the way it *does* theory, still holds onto the practice-theory dichotomy or the differentiation between the “what is” and “what ought.”¹⁴ This chapter supplements postanarchist thought by focusing on one particular practice, *parrhesia*, that I have identified as being integral to anarchism. The intention here is twofold: (a) to draw connections between the concept/practice of anarchism, democracy, and *parrhesia* by engaging with Rancière’s *Hatred of Democracy* and the

case of *Goldman [&] Berkman v. U.S.*; (b) to see whether this confluence can point toward a different organization of life than the ones that dominate the Western world in the twenty-first century.

3.

In *Hatred of Democracy*, Rancière provides us with a reflection on the problematic of democracy.¹⁵ The book opens with a series of contemporary dissatisfactions thrown upon this “form” of government by political parties and governments, left and right intellectuals. Citizens or subjects are seen as being infinitely demanding, constantly challenging constitutional, economic, and political givens. All challenges, whether they constitute reactions to the prohibition of wearing headscarves at schools by Muslim girls in France or the demand for the recognition of gay marriage, he argues, are blamed on democracy. This blame is branded with a particular flavor: it is the infinite “desire of individuals in modern mass society.”¹⁶

This hatred or dissatisfaction with democracy, as he correctly reminds us, is not new. In the past we had a variety of manifestations of this hatred. The Greeks, as we read in Plato’s *Republic*,¹⁷ were not felicitous to democracy, Rancière suggests,¹⁸ as it emphasized equality and lack of distinctions between experts and non-experts, that is, those who have traditionally been seen as capable of ruling a city and the ruled. In modernity an additional variation of hatred of democracy springs up. In our time, democracy is hated not only because it does not account for the elite knowledge bearers as the only group capable of ruling the state but also because it does not stand for private property or private economic interests. The American constitution is seen as exemplary of the latter manifestation of a hatred of democracy.¹⁹ In both situations democracy had to be limited by taking into account or making experts the rulers of the city, and in the second case by regulating private interest and property.

Contemporary criticisms of democracy, Rancière argues, show a new and different facet of discontent with democracy. Democracy has a double face. On the one hand it is hated internally. Why? Because of the existence of “excessive individualism” that manifests itself in protestations against the state for not catering to social, political, and legal “rights” or for failing to curtail the effects of unbridled private economic interests. This criticism, though, is not extended to the abuse exercised by those in power, the elite, nor to the greediness of the private economic world. And at the same time, its second face reveals that democracy is not hated or disliked if it serves the purpose of being exported abroad. Iraq and Afghanistan are the obvious examples here. As he summarizes it: “Democratic government . . . is bad

when it is allowed to be corrupted by democratic society, which wants for everyone to be equal and all differences to be respected. It is good, when it is allowed to be corrupted by democratic society.”²⁰

Once Rancière diagnoses our supposedly new formulation of discomfort with democracy, he turns to Plato’s *Republic* to explain why this formulation is as misguided as the old ones. Before we turn to Rancière’s critique of the critics of democracy, let us first briefly remind ourselves of Plato’s *Republic*, the dialogue between Socrates and a group of friends regarding the question of justice, its meaning, substance, application, and effects on individual and communal life. The exploration of these concerns leads to the articulation of a perfect society, one where common ownership of women and children, education for all, and common responsibilities for war and peace are its constituent parts.²¹ This perfect polity is also thought to be best governed by those who excel in both philosophy and military operations. Against the backdrop of the perfect polity, Socrates and his interlocutors discuss the imperfect societies, of which democracy is one. Democracy, we are told, comes into being when those who are not rulers in the oligarchic polity take over. In an oligarchic polity, characterised by an excessive interest in money making and dominated and ruled respectively by those who are most interested in making and conserving money, the money holders are gradually unable to provide a good life for the society. These rulers act with greed and unaccountability. As time goes on they become more and more careless and lazy in taking care of virtue and happiness. The poor begin to be discontented. Consequently they unite, arm themselves, and overthrow these “drones.”²² Plato tells us that “a democracy . . . comes into being when the poor, winning the victory, put to death some of the other party, drive out others, and grant the rest of the citizens an equal share in both citizenship and offices—and for the most part these offices are assigned by lot.”²³

As the dialogue progresses we find out that democracy comprises every different type of being and model of government; everybody is allowed either to be obedient to a master or to practice self-mastery and all that comes with it. As Socrates answers one of his interlocutors: “Democracy is like a marketplace where you can find all types of government.”²⁴ Democracy, as beautifully put in Book VIII, “is a noble polity, indeed! . . . and it would, it seems, be a delightful form of government, anarchic and motley, assigning a kind of equality indiscriminately to equals and unequals alike.”²⁵ Book VIII later discusses the democratic character and leads to an explication of how democracy turns into tyranny; the abundance of freedom present in a democratic polity becomes its demise.

To sum up then, we can say that a democratic polity in Plato’s *Republic* exhibits the following characteristics: (a) a diverse variety of governments; (b) no distinction made between people, no such thing as equals and un-

equals; (c) liberty; (d) independent speech or parrhesia; (e) no centralization of power.

Having reminded ourselves of the *Republic*, let us return to Rancière's engagement with this text. His rereading of democracy in Plato's *Republic* reminds us of two things. Firstly, the purpose of those who present democracy as an untamed horse that needs to be trained has always been to limit democracy, to limit what precisely it stands for, i.e., unlimited freedom. And in turn such a realization exposes the character of what presents itself as politics today; politics is policing or the limitation of freedom.²⁶

Second, democracy is not a *form* of government but rather, "the action of subjects who by working the interval between identities [Man and citizen], reconfigure the distributions of the public and the private, the universal and the particular."²⁷ This spectacle is for him the event of democracy.²⁸ Through acts of demonstration, let it be for being against the Iraq war or for recognition of gay marriage, the people show (via spectacle) not only how they don't want to be governed but that they are capable of governing themselves, of undoing the idea/practice that democracy can only be managed by experts. For Rancière this is another, radical, form of politics. Why? Because it subverts the logic/practice of police and arche (rule) sustained by the rulers.²⁹ This form of politics suggests that the people are equal to those that govern them, the oligarchs. Furthermore, in this we can see a reconfiguration of goods (identity and resources) and services (government). Democracy is therefore a one-off moment where equality and an abundance of freedom are made visible. As democracy for Rancière is not a form of government, it allows him to stage democracy and consequently politics as a spontaneous event, one that gets repeated over time but is not continuous. Here, the people (a cipher)³⁰ make themselves seen and heard. Their demonstration "places one world into another."³¹ The worker, for example, on the street shouting for his or her working hours makes visible and audible a world which the oligarchs or the logic of police and arche can't otherwise see. The effect of such action is that it breaks away from any suppositions of where the proper place of the factory or the office should be. It challenges the police logic that such locations should be hidden from view.

We can therefore sum up Rancière's figuration of democracy and politics as being both a critique of representational and institutional politics (and its operational policing that ultimately puts people in their place) and an exhibition of a politics without representation, an anarchic politics.³² He consequently offers the political subject as an anarchic subject.

4.

Rancièrian democracy as anarchy promises a different type of politics. It is a politics where the people are the central actors. The state and its apparatuses are not the protagonists. In setting up politics in this way Rancièr's work promises to address the issues of inequality, expert government, and elitism. These are themes that are familiar to political theory but may have not been addressed with a radical flavor before, even by a thinker as sophisticated as Hannah Arendt. Action and speech, life and not the good life,³³ dissent and not consent, spontaneity and not institutionalization: these are some of Rancièr's promises that he brings to our contemporary criticisms and discussions about what counts as politics. Undoubtedly he does open up the terrain of how one can begin to think differently about politics. Let's take for example one of the most utilized and intelligent understandings of politics, that of Arendt's, to see more clearly the opening that Rancièr brings to this discussion.

Arendt understands politics as a space "of self-making in which diverse individuals and groups interact to create themselves and shape their common world."³⁴ Like Rancièr, for Arendt, politics are constituted by action, both as speech action and physical action.³⁵ She includes dissent and deliberation in her understanding of politics.³⁶ In *The Human Condition*, we find that the good life is the common goal that enables the people to achieve a renewal of the world that they find themselves in. In other words, it enables people to act. Rancièr and Arendt share the idea of "action" as the central ingredient of politics, but they diverge on the idea of the common good. Rancièr points out that the ideal of a good life produces for Arendt a predetermined political subject, already determined by the goal, a political subject that is only recognized or revealed as such if it is placed in relation to the good life.³⁷ This is one of the radical differences that Rancièr offers political theory via his own understanding of democracy. If we make the idea of a common good the central goal of politics, we reduce politics to something predetermined and in return we may fail to recognize certain acts as political acts. They become reduced to the order of the "common good" without a critique of what is common.³⁸

Rancièr's criticism of Arendt and the differences between them falls short, however, if we look at some of her other work. In *On Revolution* Arendt stipulates that beginning something anew, the effect of revolutionary practices, and the core of her political theory more generally, take place precisely because people find themselves free from restraint and in a space between a past (monarchical) and a future (that is yet to be revealed to them). Free from restraint they shape their future in a present that is "captured" in freedom.³⁹ The institutionalization of newly found liberties, Arendt warns,

should not be confused with the revolutionary moment where freedom is free from restraint. Here the political subject is paradoxically free to invent what can restrain her in the future (through constitutions). Arendt's political subject and politics, if seen from the vantage point of her work in *On Revolution*, does not appear to be all that different from Rancière's.

Still, we can observe that their differences are sharper when Arendt tries to contain this revolutionary spirit in a constitutional framework, as already suggested. Here, her understanding of politics is haunted by her republican ideas of democracy,⁴⁰ of stabilizing, institutionalizing and thus limiting politics, which as Rancière identified are the essence of the "policing" mentality. Even when she talks about civil disobedience in her essay that bears that title, even when she clearly recognizes for example the anti-Vietnam War or civil rights protesters' actions as fulfilling her notion of politics, she still ends the essay by arguing for the containment of civil disobedience within a juridical framework.⁴¹ We can perhaps understand this tendency in Arendt's as being her way of "securing" the possibility of creating something new in perpetuity, her desire to ameliorate violence in its physical manifestation. There is no space here to explain the upcoming point further, but it is important to note that while Arendt acknowledges the violence that may be present in creating something new,⁴² Rancière appears to forget that the emergence of democracy (the creation of something new) in the *Republic* is bloody and violent and thus any repetition of such an event will similarly be violent. If we glance backwards for a second to where I quote Plato describing the burst of democracy, we can read that democracy's beginnings required the killing or exiling the oligarchs, a violent rupture with the past.⁴³

Rancière's special contribution to the field of critical thought and political philosophy, though, arises from the fact that he makes what for Arendt is a special moment (the aftermath of the revolution but still before a constituted polity is established) as something that occurs far more often in our lives. Such a moment even for Rancière is neither permanent nor can it be constituted. Indeed, he does not put this moment into an institution or a place or a specific constituent body, or any other body for that matter. This allows for the anarchic reading of democracy and politics that he offers.

Nevertheless, while we can see more clearly the radicality of his proposition or propagation of politics when he is juxtaposed with Arendt, we may also observe some other problems in his offering of anarchic politics. There are two types of problems in Rancière's work that I identify that make his reading somewhat limited and not as radical as often seems. The first relates to his reading of democracy in the *Republic*. Rancière's reading conflates the moment of uprising with the establishment of a democratic polity. In other words he saturates all that is revealed as being part of the democratic polity (diversity of polities, equality, liberty, parrhesia, and the absence of a centralization of power in the moment of the uprising or the dissent). The second

problem is inextricably linked to the first. Once he conflates the moment of uprising with the democratic polity, he becomes eclectic in his selection of features that get revealed in the emergence of an anarchic democracy. He omits any reference to the violence of the event. He neglects to point out the variety of polities or associations that can exist in this way of life. Indeed, he neglects to talk about democracy or anarchy being a way of life with one of its key constituent parts being parrhesia as well as equality, liberty, etc. Let us take these problematics that I identify in turn and see how they relate to each other.

The first problem concerns the conflation of the event of democracy with its effects. Let us turn our eyes to the paragraph in the *Republic* that is the focus of Rancière's analysis of democracy: "And a democracy, I suppose, comes into being when the poor, winning the victory, put to death some of the other party, drive out others, and grant the rest of the citizens an equal share in both citizenship and offices are assigned by lot."⁴⁴ What does Plato tell us here? He says that first of all we have a battle. The poor overthrow the oligarchic government. This is *not* democracy. Democracy comes afterward, with the killing or displacing of the oligarchs and granting equality and having government chosen by lot. And, as the story goes, then we have the emergence of a variety of polities, governed in anarchic fashion (with no centralization of power) and parrhesia.⁴⁵ In rereading the *Republic* we can see more clearly how Rancière takes the effects of an insurgency (what comes after) and conflates them with the presence of democracy. The very act of insurgency holds for Rancière all the aspects that we find in Arendt's aftermath of a revolution: freedom and equality, the ability to begin something anew. For Rancière this promise is demonstrated in the very event of insurgency; the mere demonstration of insurgency brings to the world something anew: anarchy.

In relation to the first problematic, I don't want to necessarily suggest that Rancière misread Plato's *Republic*. We may say that his reading of democracy is plausible. We can even understand why an event holds within itself all that unfolds later on. We can say that he compresses our vision or focuses it so we are able to recognize a political action for what it is. I am staging this as a problematic because I am perplexed as to why Rancière's understanding of democracy doesn't include some of the other attributes of democracy that I listed earlier. I am staging this here as a problem because I want to address the second problem; namely, why Rancière leaves parrhesia out of his discussion of democracy.

Plato uses the term *parrhesia* in Book VIII. Parrhesia is hailed as being an integral part of democracy. Later on, as he tracks the demise of democracy, he does not designate it to parrhesia but rather, to an excessive demand for liberty. Foucault contours the demise of democracy in a similar fashion. He explains that it comes about "when everyone wants his own manner of life,

his own style of life.”⁴⁶ Neither is parrhesia a practice that is attached to order or arche (and particularly the juridical order). Parrhesia as a practice aims at one and one thing only: it is a practice that allows one to reveal or establish oneself as a sovereign subject. Let us then turn to Foucault to try and answer why Rancière ignores this practice so integral to anarchist lives.⁴⁷

Parrhesia or “freely speaking”⁴⁸ is a practice that Foucault identified in Greek and Roman life, one of many such arts of living that included dietetics.⁴⁹ These practices revealed to Foucault that Greek life was mostly concerned with the care of the self, and moreover that Greek ethical existence was primarily concerned with the here and now and not some afterlife. The ethical self was concerned with mastering oneself and not subjugating oneself to a juridical order.⁵⁰ In doing so, one’s attention was turned away from traditional morality (concerned with the analysis and production of an authentic self) and toward the question of how the self emerges in “relation that one has to the creative activity.”⁵¹ So parrhesia, like dietetics, is concerned with turning one’s life into art by a self-mastering subject, an anarchic subject. More specifically Foucault tells us that the term *parrhesia*

refers both to the moral quality, the moral attitude or the ethos, if you like, and to the technical procedure or *techne*, which are necessary, which are indispensable, for conveying true discourse to the person who needs it to constitute himself as a subject of sovereignty over himself and as a subject of veridiction on his own account. So, for the disciple really to be able to receive true discourse in the correct way, at the right time, and under the right conditions, the master must utter this discourse in the general form of parrhesia . . . What is basically at stake in parrhesia is what could be called somewhat impressionistically, the frankness, freedom and openness that leads one to say what one has to say, as one wishes to say it, when one wishes to say it, and in the form one thinks is necessary to say it. The term parrhesia is so bound up with the choice, decision, and attitude of the person speaking that the Latins translated it by, precisely, *libertas*.⁵²

As we see, parrhesia is an embodied practice of speaking. Through it the subject reveals itself as being sovereign and true to itself. The practice does not concern itself with a proper way of speaking or proper modality but rather with saying a truth. It trains one to say what is necessary, to reveal, for example, one’s ability to master oneself, to reveal in speech that one is not to be ruled by anybody. We can see in this practice its anarchic traces, namely self-mastery and nonsubmission to an order. It is precisely this very practice that reveals one’s equality, that reveals one’s ability to say the truth about both his/her condition and simultaneously to show how one achieves self-mastery. It precisely frees one to speak outside the parameters of order, juridical or otherwise. For all of this, Rancière avoids any reference to parrhesia despite its anarchic traces. Why?

I think that we may identify two reasons for his avoidance of this concept. The first relates to his holding onto “democracy is anarchy” as a spontaneous act. If parrhesia is to be one of the features of his concept of democracy then his understanding of politics would lose one of its elements, spontaneity. Parrhesia is a practice after all. Second, if he takes parrhesia into account, Rancière would have to take account of the body, personal identity and its relation to politics. Parrhesia is a practice, as we have seen, that is exercised on the body in order to reach self-mastery and veridiction. As he explains in Thesis 8 of “Ten Theses on Politics,”⁵³ politics for Rancière “has no proper place nor any natural subjects.”⁵⁴ He warns us, therefore, that we should not identify the people with race or population.⁵⁵ Any form of representational discourse or practice would in turn put people in a particular body and place, into some form of order more generally. He is concerned with not presenting politics as an ordering machine, and he anticipates that a body, either in the form of a distinct identity (woman, for example) or in the grouping of a body or population, will denigrate politics into a type of desire for order and in particular the order that representational politics present to us. For example, if by a “woman” agent we mean the corporeal entity of a woman, then this designation may put “woman’s” political subjectivity at risk as she will be identified with the representation of a woman (rights, norms, symbolic investment) in such a way that this will limit her political agency. While this may be an interesting critique of representational politics, one that is familiar to feminism, nevertheless, by avoiding the problematic of the body, Rancière paradoxically traps himself in an order nonetheless. Rancière seems to fear the body as a naturalizing tautology, but nevertheless we see that parrhesia does not produce such an effect. Instead it shows the freeing of a body to speak the truth as it appears to him/her, to become equal and at the same time not to be subsumed to some (policing) order.

In dismissing the body Rancière only tells a partial story about politics. He does not explain how, for example, the demonstrators at Seattle were able to shout their veridiction: “This is what democracy looks like.” By ignoring parrhesia and the body, Rancière puts the body back into the closet of philosophy. The effect I would say of this analysis of politics lays in the failure to understand that “politics” reveals itself when it goes *up against* order and *through* ethics. This “propagation” does not happen *ex nihilo*, but rather takes place *through* practice.

5.

To bring this question finally back to the trial that began this chapter, we see that the world of Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman, the world of U.S.

anarchism in the early twentieth century, is a world of politics. That is, it reveals many of the features of politics that have been described above. Through action and speech these anarchists divulge a counter-world, a world contrary to the one that is beginning to institutionalize securitization and policing. It is clear that they tell us that they don't want to be governed at all by experts and guardians, by security, policing, and militarism. They say "We don't want to be governed in this way." In doing so, and this is a crucial point, they don't offer a blueprint for how one individual or a group should live their lives. Anarchist politics are not about utopia or the afterlife. Instead, their politics are of the here and now, of each choosing a line of action according to one's consciousness. Moving beyond the manifestos, theories, and publications, the trial reveals that Goldman's group of U.S. anarchists had a tradition of an art of living, or an ethics of existence. As we have seen, Foucault points to the way that the Greeks and Romans practiced an art of existence, an art that catered to life in the now, and an art that sought truth not in an inner self but which saw truth as the product of a set of practices one exercised in order to master oneself.

The purpose, as I indicated at the start of this chapter, is to remind ourselves that politics does not reveal itself just through being up against order but also through ethics, through the freedom to reveal the truth. If we are to understand how anarchism builds or demands a better life, then we need to pay more attention to anarchist practices and less to the way philosophy may think about anarchy. We need to delve into the way anarchists *did* things: the way they demonstrated, the way they used speech, the way they formed ad-hoc gatherings to discuss and act upon particular issues, the way they loved, the way they entertained themselves, the way they earned a living, the way they rested and battled with their consciousness, the way they ran their magazines—their quotidian lives generally. Anarchism has a life of its own, and by this I don't mean a history. It has that too. It has a whole breathing life, an ethics that we can find in the dusty archives of libraries.

Here I will just offer a snapshot of one such practice, one that might serve as an indicator of this life. Parrhesia is a type of speech that has no concern for flattery⁵⁶ or of convincing a public audience. Rather, it seeks to speak the truth. It is a type of honest speech that fears not to speak honestly. It seeks to speak of things as they are seen: without decorum and flowery language. If it has any effect it is one that enables each man and each woman to make decisions according to their own consciousness. If it has any echo today it may bring to our ears sounds that differ from those we hear on our radios, see on our televisions, computers, and iPhones, sounds of politicians explaining why we go to war in Iraq, for example, on the basis of expert evidence but bereft of any agency.⁵⁷ Anarchist lives can teach us that to demonstrate and organize demonstrations is not enough. If we want politics, or a democracy

that is anarchic, we need indeed to look also toward making our lives an art. And that may not mean that we may all make the same art.

I am drawing, as I already mentioned at the start of this chapter, from Goldman's and Berkman's trial. I am going to quote from two different parts of the trial to show how parrhesia was embedded in the lives of these anarchists. Berkman and Goldman were on trial on 27 June 1917, on the charge that they "unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly and feloniously did conspire together and agree between themselves" to encourage men between the ages of twenty-one and thirty who were subject to registration as demanded by Woodrow Wilson and Congress to "unlawfully and wilfully fail and refuse to present themselves for registration and to submit thereto, as provided by the . . . Act of Congress, approved on May 18, 1917."⁵⁸ The charges of conspiring against the draft were based on a variety of evidential material, which they both challenged or explained in court. One of the crucial elements of evidence against them was a lecture titled "We don't believe in Conscription," that they held at Harlem Casino on 18 May 1917, the very day that Congress almost unanimously passed the Selective Service Act.

The lecture was used as evidence against them to prove that they urged young men of draft age not to register. The prosecution repeatedly asked witnesses whether Goldman and Berkman urged men not to register and whether Goldman specifically urged people to react with violence against this particular legislation. Judge Mayers also made reference to the lecture in his speech to the Grand Jury. The lecture was presented as an illegitimate public forum challenging the Act. It was described as an undemocratic medium of dissent. Deliberative democracy, Judge Mayers reminded the Grand Jury, has its own procedures of dissent: any objections to legislation prior to its passing ought to be transmitted through one's legislative representative and any challenges against the constitutionality of an Act need to be made in the form of a juridical appeal and not through civil disobedience.⁵⁹ In the case itself, Goldman and Berkman stated that they were not aware of the passing of the Act when they were in the lecture. This may appear at first glance as if they legitimize the understanding of deliberative democracy that Judge Mayers offers to the Grand Jury. It may indeed sound as if Goldman and Berkman are saying, "If we knew that the Act had been passed we would not have given a lecture informing men of a draft age and any member of the population attending about the legal repercussions of not registering and the effects of going to war." On the contrary, by saying that they did not know that the Act was passed until after the lecture was finished, they were merely challenging the accusation of having such knowledge rather than legitimizing the form of democracy represented by Judge Mayers. Goldman's ending speech, which will be presented shortly, shows very clearly that for her there is a different way of doing democracy, one that she vehemently practiced.

The first example of parrhesia that I want to present here comes from the cross examination of a witness in the trial. The witness is a socialist who is thinking of converting to anarchism and is called as a witness for the defendants. The second example is from Emma Goldman's closing speech to the Grand Jury.

Pietro Allegra was a forty-one-year-old Italian immigrant, who had been in the United States for eleven years. He had been naturalized as a U.S. citizen.⁶⁰ He was a worker at the Novelty Factory Company on Long Island, and often gave speeches in Italian on labor issues. He attended the meeting at Harlem Casino where Goldman is accused of inciting violence. Goldman opens the direct examination herself. She asks Allegra to say whether she encouraged non-registration and violence in her speech. Here is what was actually said:

Q. You heard me speak?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Can you approximately remember the gist?

A. The which?

Q. Can you remember the gist? Can you remember my saying I believed in violence, we will use violence?

A. Never you say this.

Q. Can you remember parts of the address, the speech made by me that evening?

A. Yes. You talk against war, and about conscription, I was an anarchist and I would not tell what to do. It is unnatural, an anarchist would not tell people what to do.

Q. As an anarchist, I did not order people what to do?

A. Sure.⁶¹

When asked by Mr. Content, the prosecutor, whether he is an anarchist, this is what he says:

A. Well, if you answer, your tell something about it. Before, I was a Socialist; before this war; I am so disgusted about this war, it is enough to make a man an anarchist.⁶²

The Court is puzzled by his answer and asks him to clarify whether he is or not an anarchist. Allegra says:

A. I say, I feel I am to be an anarchist; I am so disgusted with this war; I find out everybody is a liar; I find it is a terrible struggle against the working people, because they are being antagonized in business.⁶³

Allegra's witnessing exposes what anarchism stands for: nonmastery over other people. Moreover, his broken English exposes to us a particular truth about World War I, how war produces death and suffering for workers and

business, and any glorification of war is veiled with lies (like what we see today in the UK in the Chilcot inquiry). Woodrow Wilson similarly knew the effects of the war on the United States.⁶⁴ His speech in Congress, however, veiled this truth. In the hope of whipping up Congress's support, he bracketed out such effects, and instead focused on the gift of democracy that his country would bring to Europe by entering this war.⁶⁵ While this is an important expression, what is particularly interesting in Allegra's testimony is that his politics shifts in his speech, as his own practice of the art of living reveals to him that socialism is not the answer to a better life. He is fearless against the law; he ignores its persistent demand for a clear-cut identity (are you an anarchist?), but at the same time he is also fearless in recognizing the failures of a cause that he supported till then.

Emma Goldman's speech to the Grand Jury shows both her understanding that democracy does not reveal itself through law and her strong belief that what she is saying in the courtroom is not meant to influence the judgment of the jury. She is making her case, not in order to convert the jury to anarchism, but rather simply because it is her conviction; it is what she worked for all of her life. Her speech is eloquent, fluid, passionate, but it is not rhetorical, if by rhetoric we understand the type of speech that wants to win an audience to a particular way of thinking. This is just a testimony, of how she lived her life:

Gentlemen of the jury, whatever your verdict will be, as far as we are concerned, nothing will be changed. I have held ideas all my life. I have publicly held my ideas for twenty-seven years. Nothing on earth would ever make me change my ideas except one thing; and that is, if you will prove to me that our position is wrong, untenable, or lacking in historic fact. But never would I change my ideas because I am found guilty. I may remind you of two great Americans, undoubtedly not unknown to you, gentlemen of the jury; Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau. When Thoreau was placed in prison for refusing to pay taxes, he was visited by Ralph Waldo Emerson and Emerson said: "David, what are you doing in jail?" and Thoreau replied: "Ralph, what are you doing outside, when honest people are in jail for their ideals?" Gentlemen of the jury, I do not wish to influence you. I do not wish to appeal to your passions. I do not wish to influence you by the fact that I am a woman. I have no such desires and no such designs. I take it that you are sincere enough and honest enough and brave enough to render a verdict according to your convictions, beyond the shadow of a reasonable doubt.⁶⁶

7.

Here is a question and a thought in place of a conclusion.

Here is the question: if politics needs an art of existence, an art of living, if parrhesia is a necessary ingredient for a democratic life, then the question that we have to address today is, how best can we make our lives into art?

And here is the answer: we may need to teach ourselves some good bad habits. Goldman and her fellow anarchists teach us that to turn your life into art requires practice; it requires the practice of speaking, of acting against the law, the practice of pointing out, no matter how ineloquently, not only how we do not want to be governed but also how we want to live. The policing mentality that monopolizes our contemporary governments may not withstand this pressure. I often think about the Portuguese Nobel Prize winner José Saramago. I often think of his Kafkaesque and humorous examples of blocking bureaucracies, governments, and messing up archives. And along with him I think honestly about the conditions of our contemporary life, the offensive managerialism that has taken over universities. I think about how citizens who walk home through anticapitalist demonstrations are beaten to death, about restrictive immigration rules, unemployment, the norms imposed upon being a woman, the judgmental glances if one “does” sexuality differently. I think of these things as a living prison.

I try to imagine what would happen if we all give up ourselves to be literally imprisoned. If we all woke up one day and said “life as it is now is a prison” so we may as well put ourselves in one. I smile at the thought that this act may bring the policing mentality to a halt. I smile at the possibility of police officers and prison guards, even ministers, being unable to handle the situation and give even themselves up to their neighboring prison. Perhaps it is worth a try. Shall we . . . ?

This chapter has also one silent reading companion, Judith Butler. Judith Butler’s work and particularly her understanding of the relation between law, ethics, politics, and aesthetics has enabled me to formulate the proposition that politics may reveal to us how it manifests itself when *up against* order and *through* ethics. While this is not explicated here, it will become the focus of later work. I want to thank here Arianna Bove, whose sharp vision and critical insight made this a better piece of work. Marika van Harskamp urged me to engage with anarchism and is one of my toughest readers and an encouraging friend, and for this I sincerely thank her. Critical comments were also provided by Anton Schutz and Sara Ahmed; gratitude is extended to both. Many thanks to James Martel and Jimmy Casas Klausen for their amazing editorial input.

NOTES

1. Popular slogan shouted by demonstrators in Seattle in 1999 during the protests against the World Trade Organisation meeting taking place there. *This Is What Democracy Looks Like*

is also a documentary about those protests. It is a coproduction of the Seattle Independent MediaCenter and Big Noise Films.

2. Goldman [*&*] Berkman v. United States, 1917 September 25, 429.

3. Emma Goldman, *Living My Life*, Volume Two (New York: Dover Publication, 1970), 615.

4. Ibid., 615. In 1887, the eight anarchists charged with the death of a police officer in Haymarket Square appealed their case to the Illinois and then U.S. Supreme Courts.

5. Jacques Rancière, *Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics* (London: Continuum, 2010), 38.

6. John Dewey also made the point that democracy is not a form of government following Plato's *The Republic*. He did not suggest that democracy is anarchy as Rancière does but rather that it is something akin to association. See John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (Middletown: Echo Library, 2007), 64–78.

7. For example, Jodi Dean, *Democracy and Other Neoliberal Fantasies: Communicative Capitalism and Left Politics* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009); Andreas Kalyvas, *Democracy and the Politics of the Extraordinary: Max Weber, Carl Schmitt, and Hannah Arendt* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Russ Castronovo, *Beautiful Democracy: Aesthetics and Anarchy in a Global Era* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).

8. Richard Bach Jansen, "The International Anti-Anarchist Conference of 1889 and the Origins of Interpol," *Journal of Contemporary History*, 16.2 (April 1981): 323–47.

9. Richard Bach Jensen, "The United States, International Policing and the War against Anarchist Terrorism, 1900–1914," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 13.1 (Spring 2001): 15–46.

10. Todd May, *The Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2004); Todd May, "Equality Among the Refugees: A Rancièrian View of Montreal's Sans-Status Algerians," *Anarchist Studies* 16.2 (2008): 121–34; Saul Newman, *From Bakunin To Lacan: Anti-Authoritarianism and the Dislocation of Power* (New York: Lexington Books, 2001); Benjamin Franks, "Postanarchism and Meta-Ethics," *Anarchist Studies* 16.2 (2008): 135–53; Lewis Call, "A is for Anarchy, V is for Vendetta: Images of Guy Fawkes and the Creation of Postmodern Anarchism," *Anarchist Studies* 16.2 (2008): 154–72.

11. Saul Newman, "Editorial: Postanarchism," *Anarchist Studies* 16.2 (2008): 101.

12. Ibid., 101–105.

13. May, *Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism*, 2.

14. It is important to note that Todd May has certainly indicated that the political practices of contemporary radical movements explicitly demonstrate how poststructuralist ideas have influenced the way they engage with the political, or moreover, how contemporary philosophers like Rancière engage with this new radical politics. Nevertheless, I would like to suggest postanarchist theorists, who are still attached to or heavily rely on the theoretical ideas of classical anarchists to promote postanarchism or to contribute something new to the field of research, show a bias toward a particular understanding of theory or what counts as theory even if intentions all around are all good. In analyzing the practice of *parrhesia* for example, I want to remind us of the rich reservoir of practices that we have at our disposal that can enable us to not only understand what is traditionally called theory but moreover to extract out of them parallel understandings of the world, politics, and political theory.

15. Jacques Rancière, *Hatred of Democracy* (London: Verso, 2006). For a useful philosophical exposition of Rancière's thought and *Hatred of Democracy*, see Peter Hallward, "Staging Inequality: On Rancière's Theocracy," *New Left Review* 37 (January–February 2006): 109–129; and Todd May, *The Political Thought of Jacques Rancière: Creating Equality* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008). For an avid criticism of Rancière's understanding of contemporary issues of democracy see Jodi Dean, "Politics without Politics," *Parallax* 15.3 (2009): 20–36. For an account of depoliticization of democracy that focuses on neoliberalism and neoconservatism, see Wendy Brown, "American Nightmare: Neoliberalism, Neoconservatism, and De-Democratisation," *Political Theory* 34.6 (December 2006): 690–714.

16. Rancière, *Hatred of Democracy*, 1.

17. I am relying on the following editions: Plato, *Republic: Books 6–10* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006); Plato, *Politeia*, vols. 1 and 2 (Thessaloniki: Zitros, 2009).

18. Rancière, *Hatred of Democracy*, 2.
19. *Ibid.*, 2–3.
20. Rancière, *Hatred of Democracy*, 4.
21. Plato, *Politeia*, vol. 2, 457c.
22. Plato, *Republic*, 459d.
23. *Ibid.*, 557a.
24. Plato, *Politeia*, vol. 2, 557d (my translation).
25. Plato, *Republic*, 558c.
26. Rancière *Hatred of Democracy*, 47.
27. *Ibid.*, 61–62.
28. See Alain Badiou, “The Lessons of Jacques Rancière: Knowledge and Power after the Storm,” in *Jacques Rancière: History, Politics, Aesthetics*, eds. Gabriel Rockhill and Philip Watts (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009), 43–44.
29. Rancière, *Dissensus*, 36.
30. For an excellent analysis of this, see Hallward, “Staging Inequality,” 109–129.
31. Rancière, *Dissensus*, 38.
32. Rancière, *Hatred of Democracy*, 41.
33. Rancière, *Dissensus*, 28.
34. Morris Kaplan, *Sexual Justice: Democratic Citizenship and the Politics of Desire* (New York: Routledge, 1997), 151.
35. Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 175–181.
36. Deliberation is the explicit term that Arendt uses when she talks about politics. Nevertheless, if we follow her work through we observe that she does not exclude dissent from her notion of politics. See for example, Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (London: Penguin Books, 1990), and “Civil Disobedience,” in *Crises of the Republic* (San Diego: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1972).
37. Rancière, *Dissensus*, 28.
38. For a fresh critique of the common, see Sara Ahmed, *The Promise of Happiness* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010).
39. Arendt, *On Revolution*, 33.
40. Kalyvas, *Democracy and the Politics of the Extraordinary*, 204.
41. Arendt, “Civil Disobedience,” 101–102.
42. Arendt, *On Revolution*.
43. We may argue that Rancière does not engage with the question of violence, as his politics or his understanding of democracy is not one based on the mode of embattlement. On the contrary, dissent is presented by him as a play. For more see Hallward, “Staging Inequality,” 109–129; and Yves Citton, “Political Agency and the Ambivalence of the Sensible,” in *Jacques Rancière: History, Politics, Aesthetics*, 120–39.
44. Plato, *Republic*, 557a.
45. Plato, *Republic*, 557b.
46. Michel Foucault, *Fearless Speech* (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2001), 84. Michel Foucault explains that in Plato’s *Republic* we observe that parrhesia becomes interrelated to a way of life. It is an attitude toward life, and as an attitude it can be both critical and hence of use to the city, or negative (thus of use in our own time).
47. For an analysis of parrhesia as politics, see Arianna Bove, “A Critical Ontology of the Present: Foucault and the Task of Our Times,” DPhil diss. (University of Sussex, 2004), 67. Part of her work appears at www.generation-online.org/other/acop/acopcontents.htm, accessed 29 June 2010.
48. Michel Foucault, *The Hermeneutics of the Subject*, Lectures at the Collège de France, 1981–82, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 373.
49. Michel Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress,” in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Penguin Books, 1991), 348.
50. *Ibid.*, 348.
51. *Ibid.*, 351.
52. Foucault, *Hermeneutics of the Subject*, 372.

53. Rancière, *Dissensus*, 27–44.
54. *Ibid.*, 39.
55. *Ibid.*, 39.
56. Foucault, *Hermeneutics of the Subject*, 373.
57. This suggestive comment is indebted to Hannah Arendt, “Lying in Politics,” in *Crises of the Republic*, 1–48.
58. *Goldman [&] Berkman v. United States*, 1917 September 25, 2–3.
59. *Ibid.*, 430.
60. Or as he characteristically answers the question about his citizenship to Mr. Content, the attorney for the prosecution, “I have the a paper, too” (*Ibid.*, 271).
61. *Ibid.*, 268–269.
62. *Ibid.*, 272.
63. *Ibid.*, 272.
64. Jackson Lears tells us that Wilson, at the end of his speech that convinced Congress to approve the United States’ entering into WWI was surprised by the enthusiasm that it provoked. He apparently turned to his aide Joseph Tumulty and said the following: “My message today was a message of death for our young men . . . How strange it seems to applaud that”: qtd. in Lears, *Rebirth of a Nation: The Making of Modern America, 1877–1920* (New York: Harper, 2010), 339. I think this demonstrates sharply the difference between parrhesia and rhetoric.
65. See Hugh Brogan, *The Pelican History of the United States of America* (London: Penguin Books, 1988), 491. For a more extensive analysis of how Wilson took the United States into WWI, see Lears, *Rebirth of a Nation*, 327–39.
66. Emma Goldman, Address to the Jury [delivered during her Anti-Conscription trial, New York City, 9 July 9 1917], <http://sunsite.berkeley.edu/Goldman/Writings/Speeches/170709.html>, accessed 25 March 2010.

Index

- acephaly, 124–126, 128–129, 130–131
 Adorno, T., 109, 120; negative dialectics, 109, 120
 Agamben, G., 13, 108, 119
 Allegra, P., 182; parrhesia, 182
 Althusser, L., 111, 119
 American revolution, 157
 Anabaptists, 139
 anarchism:: anachronism, xx; anarchist
 hero, 55, 56; classical, 123, 124,
 xx–xxiii, xxiv; critical, xx–xxiii, xviii;
 practice, xxvi–xxvii; Third World, xxiv.
 See also method, anarchist; Spanish
 anarchists
 anarcho-indigenism, xvii, xxii
 anarcho-syndicalism, 51, 62
 anticapitalocentrism, xvii
 Anti-federalists, 164, 149
 Arenas, R., 59
 Arendt, H., 25, 175, xv, xx, xxi, xxvi;
 “abyss of freedom”, 151; *Between Past
 and Future*, 151; *The Human
 Condition*, 161, 150, 151, **163**;
 isonomy, xv, xxii, xxvi, 154, 157, 159,
 160; *Lectures on Kant’s Political
 Philosophy*, 164; *liberum arbitrium*,
 161; love, **163**; *On Revolution*, 158,
 161, 162, 164, 149, 151, 152; polis,
 Greek, 160; politics, 175, 176, 186;
 promising, 150; sovereignty, 150, 151,
 152, 153, 157, 158, 161, 163, 150, 151;
 will, 158, 160, 162; *Willing*, 161, 151.
 See also Greece, ancient
 aristocratism, xxv. *See also* Nietzsche
 armed struggle, 52
 Asad, T., xvi
 ascesis, xxvi, 139, 142
 asceticism. *See* ascesis
 Bakunin, M., xx, xxiv, 4–5, 7, 20, 24, 36,
 57, 62, 63
 Benjamin, W., xvi–xvii, xix
 Black Flame, 19–24, 27, 35, 37, 38, 40
 body politic, 126
 borders/boundaries, xii
 Boston Tea Party, xi
 bourgeois individual, 55
 capital, 48, 51, 50
 capitalism, x–xi, xii, xiii, xiv, xvi–xviii, xix–
 xx, xxiii, xxiv, 48, 57, 123, 127, 136
 capitalist mode of production, 48, 59
 Castro, F., 53
 Castro, R., 59–60
 Catholic Church, 131, 132, 136, 138
 CEA. *See* Center for the Study of America
 Center for the Study of America (CEA), 53
 chaos theory, xvii
 Chávez, H., xxiv, 39–40
 Chicago School, 13–14
 Chomsky, N., 124
 Christiana, Denmark, xxii

- Christianity, 125–126, 131–139
 civic participation, xiii
 civil rights movement, 77, 79
 civil society, 48, 50, 53, 54, 59, 61
 class, 19, 22–23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29,
 32–35, 36, 37, 40; contradictions, 57;
 essentialism, 48
 Clausewitz, C., 129, **140n19**
 Coffee Party, xiii, xxii
 Cold War, 5
 Cole, G. D. H., 124, 128–131
 Committees for the Defense of the
 Revolution, CDR, 59
 Commodification, 55
 Communism, 51, 57, 59
 Communist Party, Cuba, 52, 60, 62
 conducts, 125, 128, 131–135, 138–139
 confession, 132–133
 constellations, xvi–xix, xxi–xxii, xxiii
 Copernicus, N., 12
 Counter-Reformation, 126, 133–135
 critique, 134–135, 138–139
 Cuba, xxiv
 Cuban Revolution, 52, 53, 56
 Cuban Workers Federation (FTC), 52
 Cyberpunk, 55
- Debord, G., **141n36**
 decolonization, 19, 21, 35–36, 37, 40
 defection, 117
 democracy, xiii, xv, xxv.: contemporary
 work on, 185; Plato on, 173. *See also*
 Stirner and democracy
 dialectic, 26, 31, 32, 34–35, 36–37, 40
 Derrida, J., xix
 Direct Action, 48
 Dirlik, A., 48, 49, 56, 59; global capital,
 48; hegemony, 48, 51; ideology, 48;
 homogenization, 48; Marxism, 48;
 Spatiality and temporality of
 capitalism., 48. *See also* capitalism
 Disch, L., 27, 164–149, 150, 151, 153
 dissidents, Cuban, 50, 53
 Dolgoff, S., 57
 Dussel, E., 20, 37, 40
- education, 26, 33–34, 51, 54
 Elections, 55; in Cuba, 62n46
El Libertario (Venezuela), 39
- emigration, 117
 enlightenment, xxvi, 19, 20–24, 40
 essentialism, xxv
 Eurocentrism, 20–24
 EZLN. *See* Zapatista Army of National
 Liberation
 equality, 56
- Facebook, 58
 Falk, C., **161**
 Fanon, F., xxiv, 19, 25, 27–29, 34–35–37,
 40
 Federalists, 157, 164, 149, 150, 151, 152
 Fernandez, F., 52, 53
 Feyerabend, P., xvi, 5, 10–12, 17
 Friedman, M., 13–14
 Freud, S., 10
 Foucault, M., x, xxi, xxiv, xxvi, xxvii, 123–
 142, 30–32, 36–37, 75; ethics of
 existence, 178; governmentality.; *See*
 governmentality; *History of Sexuality*,
 9.7; Nietzsche, 129; parrhesia., 170,
 178, 186. *See also* parrhesia; power-
 knowledge; repressive hypothesis
 foundationalism, xxv
 Fourth World, xx. *See also* anarcho-
 indigenism
 freedom: as license, 125. *See also* Kant,
 freedom
 Free Spirit, **135–138, 141n55, 141n62**
 FTC Federación de Trabajadores
 Cubanos.. *See* Cuban Workers
 Federation
- Galileo, G., 12
 gender equality, 51
 Gibson-Graham, J. K., xvii–xviii, xix
 global north, xxii, xxiv
 global south, 48
 globalization, ix, xxiv, 48; anti-
 globalization movement., 49. *See also*
 Graeber, D. anti-globalization
 movement
 Gould, S.J., 9
 Godwin, W., 105
 Goldman. E. and Berkman. A.: trial, 167,
 168, 181, 185; effects, 168; arts of
 existence, 180; parrhesia, 180

- Goldman, E., xx, xxvi-xxvii, 183; Arendt, **163, 164**; beloved community, **162**; female sexuality, **158, 159, 160, 161-162**; *Living my Life*, **158, 160**; love, **158, 160, 163, 164**; marriage, **158, 159, 160**; parhessiatic speech, 183
 governmentality, x, xiii, 125, 130-135, 138-139
 Graeber, D., 27, 49; anti-globalization movement., 49; capital-A anarchists, 49; consensus democracy, 49; small-a anarchists, 49
 Greece, ancient, xv, xxvi, xxvii
 Guevara, E. "Che," xx, 56-57, 58, 63; on the Budgetary Finance System, 56; education, 58; laws of capitalism, 57; A New Culture of Work, 56; Socialism and Man in Cuba, 56; Socialist New Man, 55, 56, 58; Work, 58
 Gurstein, R., **161-162**

 Habermas, J., 10, 75
 Hayek, F., 7; and Hayekians, 13, 14
 healthcare, Cuba, 50, 51, 54
 Hegel, GWH., 4, 14. *See also* Stiner, Hegel hegemony, 48, 51
 Heller, A., 151
 Herodotus, 159
 hip-hop, Cuban, 54
 Hobbes, T., x, 4, 125, 128, **141n62**
 Hobsbawm, E. J., 137-138
 Honig, B., 151
 human nature, x
 humanism, xxv, 123, 128, **139n4**

 ideology, 48, 49, 51
 immigration, 76
 incarceration, 55
 independence, Cuban struggle for, 50, 51
 individualism, 53, 55, 57; possessive individualism, 54
 internationalism, 47, 51
 isonomy. *See* Arendt, isonomy

 Jacotot, J., 68, 69, 71
 Jefferson, T., 164, 149

 Kant, I., 3-4, 6, 15; categorical imperative, 65, 67, 68, 69, 71, 72, 73, 78; *Critique of Practical Reason*, 69; democracy., 65, 78-80; duties, 65, 66, 67; equality, 65, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 77, 78; freedom, 65, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 78; *Groundwork*, 69; intrinsic value, 67; liberalism, 66; liberty, 73, 74; *Metaphysic of Morals*, 65, 66; politics, 65, 69, 71, 72, 75, 77; reason, rationality, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73; rights, 65, 66, 67. *See also* democracy; freedom; liberalism; politics; Rancière
 Kantian philosophy, xxi, xxv
 King, M.L., **162**
 Klein, N., 13-14
 Kropotkin, P., xx, xxiv, 2-3, 7

 Laski, H., 124, 128
 law, 123, 124, 130, 134
 Lenin, V.I., 137-138, **140n12**, 162, 163
 liberalism, x-xv, xvii-xix, 59. *See also* Stirner and liberalism
 liberal democracy, 53, 54, 55
 libertarianism (right), xii, xxv
 Los Aldeanos, 54, 59

 Madison, J., 150, 149, 152
 Mariátegui, J. C., 38, 63
 market, market economy, xii-xiv, xvi, xvii, 54
 Marx, K.: The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, 57, 64; The German Ideology, 104, 114, 118; species being, 58
 Marxism, 124., 25-26, 29, 30-31, 32, 34, 48, 55, 56, **140n9, 140n12**; Marxist objectivism, 56; Marxist teleology, 48. *See also* Popper, Marxists
 May, T., 10, 14., 185
 meritocracy, 61
 method, anarchist, xv-xix, xxi-xxiii, xxiv. *See also* Popper, method

 Middle Ages in Europe, 125-126, 131-133, 138
 mimicry, 33, 36
 modernity, 158, 154
 monarchy, 123-124, 126-127
 motherhood, 51

- multi-culturalism, 48, 61
 myth, 19, 26, 27, 30, 31, 32–34
- nationalism, 23–24, 28–29, 40
 National Socialism, xi
 necropolitical resistance, 117
 Newton, I., 9
 Nietzsche, F., xix, xxiv, xxv, 16
 Neoconservatism, x
 neo-liberalism, 48, 50; institutions of, 48; triumphalism, 54. *See also* liberalism
 Newman, S., xxii–xxiii, 104, 171
 nondomination, xxv
 Nozick, R., xxv, 73–74, 78; liberty, 73, 74, 78. *See also* Kant and liberty
- Olson, J., 21–22–23, 24
- parlements*, 126
 parrhesia, xxvii. *See also* parrhesia entries
 for Allegra, Goldman, and Berkman;
 Foucault
 pastoral power, 125, 129, 131–135, 138–139
 patriarchy, 51
 Paul, 160
 Platt Amendment, 51
 Pluralism, pluralist theory, 124, 128–131, 59
 police, 134. *See also* Rancière, police
 political theology, 126
 politics., 48, 61, 168; electoral, 50, 51; political subject, 169. *See also* Kant, politics
 politics of exodus, xxv–xxvi. *See also* Stirner, exodus
 Popper, K., xxiv: Arendt., 7. *See also* Arendt; anti-war, 5; communism, 13; Einstein, A., 14; Marxists, 7, 12; Marxists; method., 6–7, 9–12; method, anarchism; politics, 5, 8; psychoanalytic theory, 7
 Postanarchism, xxii–xxiii., 170, 171. *See also* Stirner and postanarchism
 post-structuralism, xxii–xxiii, 19, 25, 29, 30–34
 power, 123–139
 power-knowledge, 126, 129, 132
 probability, 15
 progress, x, xvi, xx, xxi, xxiii
 proletariat, dictatorship of, 57. *See also* stirner and Proletariat, Labor
 propaganda of the deed, 123–124
 Proudhon, J., xx, 105
- queer politics, xviii
- race, 21, 22–24, 27, 28, 29, 34, 35–36, 37, 40
 Radical Reformation, 139
 Rancière, J., xx, xxiv, xxv, 30, 32–34, 36–37, 65, 68, 69–72, 74, 75–77, 79–65; critique of, 176, 177, 179, 172, 186; democracy, 169, 172, 174, 175; dissensus, 169; equality, 71, 74, 77, 79; Plato's *Republic*, 169; police, 75, 76, 79; politics, 67, 70, 71, 75, 76, 77, 78, 80. *See also* Kant, equality; Kant, politics
 Rationalist Schools, Cuba, 51
 rationalism, 19–21, 22, 24, 26, 27, 31, 32, 35–36, 37, 40
 Rawls, J., xxv, 66, 72, 73, 78; A Theory of Justice, 72
 Reformation (Protestant), xxvi, 125, 126, 133–135, 138–139
 religion, 126, 131–139, **141n36**, **141n62**
 representation, 158, 160, 162
 repressive hypothesis, 123–124, 127, 137–138
 resistance, xvii–xix, xx, 125–126, 131, 134–139, **140n27**, **141n36**
 right, 123, 129
 Robespierre, M., 162, 163
 Roig San Martin, E., 50
 Russian Revolution, 52
- Sandel, M., **162**
 Sartre, J.-P., 37
 Schmitt, C., 6, 15, 21, 126, 128–129, **140n19**
 Scott, J.C., xx
 secrecy, 52
 Sellars, W., 67, 69, 71
 Sen, A., 78
 separatist movement, Cuba, 50, 51
 sexuality, xxvi–xxvii, 123, 127, 131, 134, 139

- science, 30–32
 Situationism, 125, **141n36**
 social contract theory, x
 socialism, 55, 56, 57, 127, 137, **140n12**;
 state socialism, 53, 55; socialist
 subjectivities, 56; New Socialist Man.;
 See Guevara, E.
 societies against the state, xviii, xxi
 Socrates, 160
 Sorel, G., 19, 25–35
 Soviet Union, 60
 Spanish anarchists, 1. *See also* anarchism
 Special Period in Times of Peace, 56, 62
 Stirner, M., xx, xxiii, xxv, 1; abstraction,
 6, 31, 106, 107; alienation., 107, 114,
 116; anti-essentialism , 104, 106, 110,
 113, 114; anti-foundationalism, 107,
 110; anti-humanism, 110; conflict, 111;
 desacralization, 114, 118; ego, 106,
 107, 108, 109, 113, 115; *The Ego and*
 Its Own , 103, 114; epistemology,
 109–110, 120; exodus, 105, 115, 116,
 117–118; Feuerbach, 104, 107, 108,
 119; generality, 112, 115; Hegel,
 (Young) Hegelians., 104, 108, 109,
 111; identity , 109, 110; insurgency,
 105, 110, 111, 116, 118; insurrection,
 105, 115–116; labor, 113; liberalism,
 6, 24, 105, 111, 113; Nietzsche, 104,
 107, 120; ontology, 108, 110;
 postanarchism, 104, 105, 109;
 representation, 109; sacrifice, 111, 113,
 114; secession, 115, 116; singularity,
 106, 108, 109; the state, 104, 105,
 111–113, 114, 115, 116, 118; theology,
 107, 108; truth, 104, 107, 115; the
 Unique., 104, 106, 108–109, 113, 114,
 115. *See also* Hegel; labor; liberalism
 subjectivity, 125–126, 133–139

 Tea Party, ix, x–xiv
 temporality, ix, x, xiv, xvi, xx–xxiii
 temporary autonomous zones, xviii
 terrorism, ix
 Tocqueville, A., 160
 torture, 14; brainwashing, 14; MKUltra
 program, 14
 Tupamaros (Venezuela), 39

 University of California, Berkeley,
 Department of Political Science, 5
 U.S. Government, 50, 53
 utopian, 61

 Vaneigem, R., 125, 135–138, **141n36**
 vanguardism, 127, 136–137, **140n12**
 Venezuela, xxiv, 29, 37–40
 violence, 25, 27, 28, 30, 32–33, 34, 36, 49,
 55
 Virno, P., 104

 wages of whiteness, 23
 war as mode of analysis, 129–131
 Wolin, S., 8–9
 Woolf, P., 3–5
 Wu Ming (Italy), 27

 Zapatista Army of National Liberation
 (EZLN), 48

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