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THE HISTORY OF MONGOLIA



Edited by

DAVID SNEATH & CHRISTOPHER KAPLONSKI

THE HISTORY OF MONGOLIA

VOLUME I

THE HISTORY OF MONGOLIA



VOLUME I

**The Pre-Chinggisid Era
Chinggis Khan and the Mongol Empire**

Edited by

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GLOBAL
ORIENTAL

THE HISTORY OF MONGOLIA

Edited by David Sneath and Christopher Kaplonski

First published 2010 by
GLOBAL ORIENTAL LTD
PO Box 219
Folkestone
Kent CT20 2WP
UK

www.globaloriental.co.uk

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ISBN 978-1-905246-36-6 [3-volume set]

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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A CIP catalogue entry for this book is available from the British Library

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PREFACE



In 2005 Paul Norbury, head of Global Oriental, suggested that we put together an edited collection on the history of Mongolia. Although any anthology of this type is inevitably limited, we have done our best to assemble a set of works in English that readers might find helpful to have brought together in three volumes. Where we can, we have tried to use journal articles since these might be otherwise less accessible to readers than chapters from books explicitly devoted to Mongolian history.

These volumes are not intended to offer a single, integrated narrative history of Mongolia. Rather we present a selection of papers that reflect contemporary historical writings on the subject, arranged loosely in chronological order. No selection could, of course, do justice to such a vast topic, but we have tried to include a range of studies on Mongolian history, from classic articles to relatively little-known texts. For good or ill, the emphasis here is on the history of rulers rather than subjects. We concentrate on political, military and religious themes rather than social history; and this reflects, to some degree, both the interests of historians and the nature of the available historical texts.

The resulting collection will, we hope, appeal to those who wish to deepen their knowledge of the subject by beginning to study the specialist literature, as well as scholars of the region who may find it convenient to have a diverse set of materials collected into three handy volumes. Many of the pieces included are detailed studies of one or other aspect of a vast historical field. For those readers unfamiliar with the wider frame of Mongolian history into which these pieces fit, we have tried to provide a very brief overview of each of the historical epochs used as sections of this work, so as to place the detailed studies in some sort of context.

Inevitably, a collection such as this is bound to have its shortcomings. We have not been able to include as many translations as we would like, for example, and in some cases have had to include relatively short pieces on an important epoch, event or person. Despite its inevitable limitations, we hope the collection will serve as a useful anthology for those, like ourselves, who wish to know more about the history of this fascinating region.

NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

The many different authors included in this volume have followed different conventions for the spellings of names and transliteration of terms, so that even names as important as that of Chinggis Khan, for example, appear in different forms in different chapters (Chingis Khan, Chinggis Qan, Chingis Qan, Činggis Qan, Čingis Qa'an, etc.) and even within chapters there is some inconsistency. In general, we have had to leave the spellings as originally published. However, we have tried to identify alternative renderings of the same word in the index, so that readers can at least check the most important terms in this way, and in the newly translated sections we have tried to include other common spellings of transliterated terms in brackets for ease of recognition, particularly when there are significant differences, such as between classical and Cyrillic script spellings of the same word. As regards Chinese transcriptions, some chapters are in Wade-Giles and some in Pinyin and we have left them in the original version, but the index is in Pinyin.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS



Many people have helped make this volume possible and the editors are deeply grateful to them for their contributions. Firstly, we would like to thank Libby Peachey, our Editorial Assistant, whose hard work and organizational skills have driven this project forward from beginning to end. Secondly, we would like to thank all our colleagues at the Mongolia and Inner Asia Studies Unit, particularly Paula Haas, for her superb support and painstaking attention to detail, and Dr A. Hürelbaatar for his expertise. We would also like to thank Anne Henochowicz for her help with sourcing materials and Baasanjav and Sükhjargalmaa for their invaluable help with translation. A particular debt of gratitude is owed to David Blakeley for his professionalism, patience and persistence during the preparation of these volumes. Lastly, but certainly not least, we would like to thank Paul Norbury of Global Oriental, who first conceived of this collection and whose infectious enthusiasm has motivated us throughout.

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His Life and Times, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988, Chapter 7, 177–205

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PART 1



THE PRE-CHINGGISID ERA

INTRODUCTION

David Sneath



In 2006, the Mongolian Government commemorated eight hundred years of statehood, celebrating a history that stretched back to the foundation of Chinggis Khan's Great Mongol Realm (*Yeke Monggol Ulus*) in 1206. This was understandable enough, since the origins of the independent Mongolian state undoubtedly lie in the long history of political entities ruled by descendants of Chinggis Khan. But the empire founded by Chinggis was certainly not the first polity to rule the Mongolian plateau, and not even the first one to use the name *Monggol*, since the kingdom ruled by his great-grandfather Qabul Khan also used the name. Indeed, the Chinggisid empire emerged from ancient traditions of rulership and administration that date back to the earliest histories of the region.

Steppe peoples appear in Chinese records as early as the Zhou dynasty (1050–256 BCE) under generic names such as Rong, Di and Hu. Sometime before the fifth century BC steppe peoples had developed the mobile pastoral lifestyle so characteristic of later societies – living in felt tents, breeding horses and making use of different seasonal pastures for their livestock. They also developed a formidable military technology – the horse archer. Far more mobile than infantry, steppe warriors used powerful bows from horseback, and the combination of speed and firepower gave them unparalleled advantages in war. This military superiority was a constant cause of concern for the Chinese, indeed in 307 BCE the Zhou emperor Wuling demanded that his subjects learn the 'barbarian' art of horse-archery so as to be able to match their northern neighbours in war (Yü 1990: 119).

The first eastern steppe polity for which we have detailed accounts is the Xiongnu (Hsiungnu) empire of the third century BCE. A description of this great dynastic realm appears in the *Shiji*, the *Records of the Grand Historian*, credited to the 'Chinese Herodotus' Sima Qian (145–90 BCE). From Sima Qian we learn that the empire was divided into left (east) and right (west) wings, arranged like a vast army facing south. The Xiongnu emperor, the *chanyu* (shanyu), headed a hierarchy of aristocratic officials, the most senior of whom were the 'Wise Kings' (*tuqi*) of the Right and Left who acted as viceroys of the two halves of the empire (Di Cosmo 2002: 177). The empire had a well-developed administrative system, based on a series of decimal units that could raise a number of horsemen in time of war. The *Shiji* describes twenty-four hereditary myriarchs, holding the title 'ten thousand horsemen', whose titles suggested that they ruled a nominal ten thousand households, but in reality might rule as few as 4,000

(Atwood 2004: 595). Lesser lords governed units of a nominal one thousand, and appointed heads of one hundred who commanded the heads of groups of ten.

In 209 BCE, the Xiongnu emperor Touman was assassinated and replaced by his son, named Modun, who embarked on a series of conquests. The enlarged empire was vast, stretching from the Khingan mountains in the east to the Tarim basin in the west, and from Lake Baikal in the north to the recently completed Great Wall of China in the south. Archaeological excavations have uncovered some of the grand tombs and rich grave goods of the Xiongnu elite, and the remains of Xiongnu walled settlements have been found as far north as Siberia. While it remained united, the Xiongnu empire acted as something of a regional superpower, capable of fielding an army of anything between one and four hundred thousand cavalry, if Sima Qian's account is accurate. The Xiongnu emperors forced the Han dynasty to agree to treaties of 'peace and friendship' (*heqin*) and pay them a heavy tribute.

But the Han dynasty outlived its great northern rival. In the first century BCE the Xiongnu empire split into several factions, and although briefly reunified by the Chanyu Hudu'ershi in the first century CE, the Han dynasty gained the allegiance of the southern Xiongnu nobles and waged increasingly successful wars against the independent Northern Xiongnu, defeating and driving them west towards the end of the first century. Many of the former subjects of the northern Chanyu were resettled in northern China and the southern Xiongnu nobility remained a power to be reckoned with. In the early fourth century the descendants of the old Xiongnu imperial house founded the Xia and Liang dynasties, ruling parts of what is now western Inner Mongolia and northern China, before being eliminated by the Wei dynasty in the early fifth century.

The similarity between the name of the Huns who appeared on the eastern borders of Europe in the fourth century and the word Xiongnu has meant that many scholars, including Grousset (1970: 19) and Lattimore (this volume), considered them to have been the same people. Later scholarship has been more cautious about identifying two polities separated by considerable time and distance (see Sinor 1990: 177–179), but recent archaeological evidence has strengthened the case for connection (Atwood 2004: 595) and groups with similar names (Khions, Red and White Huns) also appear in Central Asia and northern India around this time. It is quite possible, then, that the defeat of the Xiongnu in the east led to conquest dynasties further west with derivative names, just as the Mughal empire, that reached the height of its power in the seventeenth century, derived its name from the Mongol conquests some four centuries earlier.

At the height of their power the Xiongnu had defeated the Yuezhi (Yueh-chih) people who had lived in the Tarim basin, and other steppe powers such as the groups known as the Wuhuan and the Xianbei who retreated into northern and western Manchuria. When the Xiongnu split, the Xianbei also attacked the northern Chanyu, taking over much of his former territories and many of his subjects. In the following centuries Xianbei influence spread across much of northern China. Their wealth and power is testified by the rich funeral objects found in Xianbei tombs; finely crafted luxury items, many made of gold. After the fall of the Han dynasty around 220 AD northern China entered a period of political disunity. In a pattern that we see repeated in later centuries, it was rulers from Manchuria that emerged to govern northern China. One of the Xianbei noble families, the Tuoba, established the Northern Wei Dynasty in 386 and ruled until the sixth century when Xianbei military commanders rebelled.

On the Mongolian plateau the Rouran (Juan-juan) Khanate emerged in the late fourth century and became a major rival to the Northern Wei. This was another vast

steppe empire; at its height it stretched from Korea in the east to the Tarim basin in the west. It fragmented as a result of a political crisis in the early sixth century, when the Rouran *qaghan* (emperor) Ch'ou-nu (508–520) was assassinated (Sinor 1990: 294). Rival claimants disputed the throne and in 552 it was seized by a former vassal of the Rouran – Bumin of the powerful Ashina noble house, who ruled territory near the Altai mountains (Atwood 2004: 478). The Ashina domains became known as the Türk empire, encompassing the territories of the Rouran and extending them. The western part of the empire, ruled by Bumin's brother Ishtemi, expanded rapidly over much of Central Asia, coming into diplomatic contact with the Sassanids in Persia and the Byzantine empire. The Türks made use of a unique runic script to write their language, and a number of inscriptions survive on stone monuments such as those found in the Orkhon valley, Mongolia.

The Türk empire was too vast to be ruled from a single centre, and was composed of several major administrative divisions under their own rulers. In the seventh century, rivalry between the eastern and western halves of the empire weakened both, and in 630 the Eastern Turkish Qaghan was captured by the growing power of the Chinese Tang dynasty, whose armies marched as far west as Persia, defeating the western Türks in 657. The western part of the Türk empire fragmented, giving rise to several smaller polities such as the Khazar Qaghanate that emerged on the north-western shores of the Caspian Sea in the seventh century. The Khazar rulers governed a diverse population including both settled and mobile pastoral subjects. Their court wintered in its cities and moved out to encampments on the steppe in summer (Golden 1990: 266).

In the eastern steppe, Tang control weakened towards the end of the seventh century and Türk power re-emerged. The Ashina ruler Ilterish Qaghan founded the 'Second Türk Empire' centred on Mongolia, and his sons expanded his conquests to the borders of Tibet in the south and into Central Asia in the west. However, divisions within the court led, once more, to political crisis. In 734 the Türk Qaghan was poisoned and problems of succession continued until 741 when the new emperor was killed by one of his officers who proclaimed himself Ozmish Qaghan (Groussett 1970: 113). Former subjects of the Ashina rebelled, led by the Uighur rulers of northern Mongolia under Qullig Boyla who by 744 had defeated the Ashina rulers and replaced them. Qullig Boyla founded his capital, Ordu-Baliq, in the Orkhon valley in Mongolia, the same region as had served as a centre for the Türk *qaghans* and the Xiongnu *chanyus* in their eras. The ninth-century Arab traveller Tamin Ibn Bahr, who journeyed to the Uighur capital in 821, describes a great walled town surrounded by cultivated land, and estimated that its rulers could raise an army of around a quarter of a million men (Minorsky 1978: I:283–285).

The Uighur empire extended over Mongolia, southern Siberia and parts of western Central Asia. The Uighur *qaghans* developed close links with Central Asia – in particular with the Sogdian merchants of Samarkand and Bukhara. From Sogdia they imported the Manichean religion and although the old Türk runic script remained in use, the Uighurs also introduced a modified version of the Sogdian script to write their language. The Uighur rulers established diplomatic marriage relations with the Tang. Indeed they probably saved the beleaguered Chinese dynasty from collapse when, during the An Lushan rebellion (755–762), they sent an army to defeat the rebels.

But early in the ninth century a combination of crises led to the collapse of Uighur rule. The empire already faced rebellions and murderous divisions within the Uighur court, when in 840 a harsh winter wiped out many of the khanate's livestock (Mackerras

1990: 319). A rebel Uighur general led an army from the neighbouring Kyrgyz khanate to capture the capital and kill the *qaghan*. The Uighur aristocracy fled, some to the east and some to regions such as Gansu and Turfan where they ruled until the thirteenth century.

Many of the Uighurs found refuge with their neighbours, the Kitans (Khitans), who ruled the eastern steppes and western part of what became Manchuria (Atwood 204: 561). Chinese histories suggest that the first Kitan polity was founded by an originally Xianbe family, the Yuwen, in the fourth century (Frank 1990: 402). Based in what is now south-eastern Inner Mongolia, they had sworn allegiance to the Türk *qaghans* and later to the Tang dynasty in the seventh century. But in the eighth century they were powerful enough to form an independent power in their own right and ally themselves with the Uighurs to their west.

Until the tenth century the Kitan ruler (*qaghan*) was elected by the eight senior lords of the realm, for a three-year period of office. But when a veteran general named Yelü Abaoji became *qaghan*, he abolishing the elections and installed himself as a hereditary monarch. Yelü Abaoji took the Chinese title of *huangdi* (emperor) in 916, and revealed truly imperial ambitions, taking control of most of Mongolia and conquering the neighbouring state of Bohai (Parhae, Po Hai) in Manchuria and northern Korea (Atwood 2004: 315). The Kitan empire was extended over much of northern China by his son, Yelü Deguang, who took the dynastic name Great Liao.

The Liao state introduced a dual system of government, ruling its northern steppe subjects using Kitan law, but continuing to use Tang law and the country-prefecture administrative system for its 'southern' Chinese and Bohai territories. At the top of the administrative system sat the Kitan aristocracy, principally composed of the Yelü royal family and the 'consort lineage' of Xiao. This, originally Uighur, noble family supplied marriage partners for the royal house. The Chinese history of the dynasty, the *Liao shi*, indicates the importance of the institution of the *ordo*, the palace establishment of a ruler, which certainly dates back to the eighth-century Orkhon Türk empire, and may have existed in Xiongnu times (Wittfogel and Feng 1946: 509). The Kitan *ordo* could be a huge establishment including tens of thousands of soldiers and the families, and the *ordos* of dead rulers were often maintained and made responsible for the upkeep of their mausoleum.

The Liao can be considered a 'nomadic' or steppe power in that the Kitan rulers remained committed to mobile pastoralism, and the court remained mobile, moving between seasonal camps on the steppe and the five provincial capitals. But they also promoted agriculture in the steppes, and established two hundred or more towns and cities in what is now Inner Mongolia. The more important of these were built to a distinctive plan with northern and southern sectors for the different categories of imperial subject (Kessler 1993: 93). The dynasty had two new scripts developed to write the Kitan language and also sponsored monastic Buddhism. Indeed, by 1078 there were as many as 360,000 Buddhist monks in the Liao realm (Atwood 2004: 318).

The fall of the Liao was the result, once again, of rebellion. One of the subject groups living in what became Manchuria were the Jurchen (Jurchid). In 1114 their ruler, Wanyan Aguda, rebelled against his Kitan overlords. Aguda had powerful allies. To the south of the Liao lay the Song dynasty, ruling most of inner China from their capital in Kaifeng. Intimidated by the superior Kitan armies, the Song had been forced to agree to a huge annual tribute of silk and silver in 1005, but they were watchful for any opportunity to topple their northern rivals. The Song supported Aguda and over the

next nine years the Jurchen ruler drove back Kitan forces and occupied their former territories declaring himself emperor of the Jin ('Golden') dynasty. The Song used the opportunity to recapture territory they had lost to the Liao, but soon found that the Jurchen rulers were even more formidable than the Kitans. The Jin claimed both the lands of the former dynasty and its annual tribute from the Song. In the ensuing war the Jin conquered much of the Song's northern territories, forcing the court to flee south of the Huai river and relocate their capital at Lin'an in 1127. The Jin empire stretched over most of northern China and by the late-twelfth century the dynasty ruled some forty million subjects. Most of these were 'southern', governed using the Chinese administrative system inherited from the Liao. We know that the northern steppe subjects had a different administrative structure, reminiscent of the ancient Xiongnu system. Subjects were organized into nominal units of a thousand households (*meng-an*), each made up of smaller units (*mou-ke*) supposed to raise 100 troops each in times of war. The division between northern and southern subjects was principally made on administrative, rather than ethnic grounds (Elliot 2001: 60). The northern *meng-an mou-ke* units were expanded to include a total of six million people, including Bohai and Chinese subjects living in the administered territories, and over a million slaves attached to Jurchen households (Franke 1990: 421).

Kitan rule survived the fall of the Liao in 1124. A Kitan prince named Yelü Dashi (1087–1143) fled from the advancing Jurchen with several thousand troops. He gathered some Kitan loyalist forces in western Mongolia and rode west to carve out a vast empire in Turkestan. This region had once been home to the Qarluq Khanate that emerged from the fragmentation of the western Türk empire. The Qarluq had been incorporated into the Qarakhanid empire that emerged in the tenth century and ruled most of transoxania. Yelü Dashi exploited Qarluq–Qarakhanid conflict to defeat the Qarakhanids and subjugated most of eastern Turkestan. By 1142 his rule extended from the Altai mountains as far west as the river Oxus. This new empire was called Qara-Kitai (Kara-Khitai) in Turkic and Western Liao in Chinese. The Qara-Kitan ruler was titled both a *gürkhan* or 'universal khan' in the Turkic tradition and an emperor (*huangdi*) in the Chinese one (Biran 2006: 67).

Looking back over the thirteen centuries since Xiongnu times, the Jin were the steppe-based rulers whose rule extended furthest into what we have come to think of as China. The Kitans, and before them the Xianbei Tuoba, had governed large parts of northern China, but the Jin empire stretched from Manchuria as far south as the Huai river. However, Jin power did not extend west as far as had the Kitans'. The Ordos and Gansu region was ruled by another dynasty, the Xia (Hsi Hsia), and much of what became Mongolia was beyond their control.

THE TEXTS

The history of pre-Mongol Inner Asia has often been cast in terms of a confrontation between two very different worlds, the agricultural and urban sophistication of China on the one hand and the savage, mobile might of 'the nomads' on the other. In this view of history the agricultural and steppe peoples are fundamentally distinct, natural rivals, with 'the nomad' cast as predator and 'the farmer' as prey. So Groussett (1970: xxvii) writes:

... as long as the nomad kept the soul of a nomad, he regarded the sedentary man merely as his farmer, and town and tilled land as his farm, both farm and farmer being open to extortion. He roved on horseback along the fringes of ancient empires, extracting regular tribute from those who complied with relatively good grace or, when the victim was ill-advised enough to refuse payment, plundering open cities in sudden raids. These men were like packs of wolves – and is not the wolf the old Turkic totem? – prowling round herds of deer, to fly at their throats or merely pick up stragglers and injured beasts. Whirlwind pillage alternating with the extraction of regular tribute ... was in general a regular feature of the relations between the Turko-Mongols and Chinese from the second century BC to the seventeenth of this era.

In this vein the Great Wall of China, completed by Emperor Qin Shi Huang (260–210 BCE) against the Xiongnu was taken as emblematic. The confrontation between the two giant empires of the Xiongnu in the north and the Han in the south was seen as so important in shaping the history of China that authors such as Thomas Barfield treat it as a sort of natural state. Barfield describes the history of the region as a 'political ecology' with cycles of growth analogous to a forest that is subject to periodic forest fires. After the great trees are burnt, smaller fast-growing species colonize the land, and eventually give way to a full mixed forest again. So he argues that the 'bipolar world of a unified China and a unified steppe which split the frontier between them was a stable climax state. No alternative political structure could emerge while they existed. The dual collapse of order within China and the steppe produced a highly unstable environment.' (Barfield 1989: 10). In this imagination, states ruling both steppe and sedentary territories, such as the Wei, Liao and Jin, become merely the small, opportunist plants of this political ecosystem; compact but self-sufficient political entities that are only able to expand when the giants collapse. This vision of a political ecology that reflects the geographical division between agricultural and steppe lands, is itself rooted in the older notion of nomads as essentially predatory and the 'nomadic state' as a means to extract tribute on a large scale.

It is to question some of these traditions that Nicola Di Cosmo examines the economic basis of ancient Inner Asian nomads in the first chapter of this collection. He brings together archaeological and historical evidence to show that mobile pastoralism was but one of several productive activities practised on the steppes of Mongolia since the earliest historic times, and that these included agriculture. In doing so Di Cosmo draws upon a wide range of literature and summarizes dominant trends in the understandings of steppe polities.

We follow this with a slightly edited version of Burton Watson's translation of chapter 110 of Sima Qian's *Shi Ji*, which gives an account of the Xiongnu's origins, history and administration. Although the account may reflect a certain sense of Chinese superiority over the barbarian, Sima Qian seems to admire some aspects of steppe life, and he is keen for his readers to learn from the Xiongnu. He relates the emperor Zhao Wuling's edict to adopt horse-archery and describes at length the admonitions of a Han eunuch named Zhonghuang Yue who defected to the Xiongnu and became something of an advocate for their ways.

In the following chapter Peter Golden sets out the main features of the pre-Chinggisid Türk tradition of state. Here Golden shows the important continuities in the forms of governance in steppe polities and the ways in which key concepts such as the heavenly mandate of the ruler can be traced back to Xiongnu times.

In his classic article, ‘The Geography of Chingis [Chinggis] Khan’, Owen Lattimore provides a sweeping overview of the history of the pre-Chinggisid steppe. The value of this piece is not, perhaps, in Lattimore’s reading of details of Chinese history, so much as his characteristically *longue durée* vision of steppe society, and the way he represents a tradition of scholarship that sought to use geographic and economic reasoning to identify broad patterns in the history of the region. In this sense Lattimore and Di Cosmo are engaged in similar projects, although in terms of data available it is clear that Lattimore was at an earlier stage. Writing in the early 1960s, Lattimore also attempts to respond to the questions of interest at the time – as to the ‘ethnic’ identification of the polities ruling the steppe as ‘Turkic’ or ‘Mongol’ in different eras.

1

ANCIENT INNER ASIAN NOMADS

Their Economic Basis and Its Significance in Chinese History

Nicola Di Cosmo*



Such non-Chinese people as the Rong, Di, and Hu are often portrayed in the traditional historiography of ancient China as greedy, aggressive, and acquisitive (Sinor 1978; Honey 1990). Chinese writings of the Zhou dynasty (c. 1050–256 B.C.) contain many instances of unflattering statements aimed at foreign peoples: the *Zuo zhuan* compares the Rong and Di to wolves (ZZ I: 209); the *Zhanguo ce* says the state of Qin shares the same attributes as the Rong and Di—the heart of a tiger or wolf, greed, and cruelty (ZGC II: 869; cf. Crump 1970: 436). Foreign peoples were often considered “have-nots” with an insatiable lust for Chinese goods, mainly silk, grains, and, later, tea. This stereotype, which developed in the historical sources along with the process of crystallization of the Chinese ethnocultural identity and codification of the written and oral traditions, was regarded as sufficient to account for otherwise complex social and political phenomena. In the course of time, with the historical development of powerful nomadic states confronting China militarily and politically, the attributes of “greedy” and “ravenous” stuck essentially to those people who “moved in search of grass and water”: the pastoral nomads.

Modern anthropological studies on the interaction between nomadic and sedentary peoples have provided considerable knowledge on their various patterns of coexistence. As a result, the “greedy” theory has been recently developed into what could be called the “needy” theory. The latter is based on the well-documented fact that pastoral nomadism does not normally exist in isolation from farming communities and that the pastoral nomadic economy cannot provide all basic necessities. Consequently, the nomads’ modes of contact and commercial exchange with—and dependency upon—settled people plays an important role.

Owen Lattimore, whose writings on the history of the relations between China and Inner Asia were extremely influential, saw Inner Asian nomads and Chinese agriculturalists as separated by a boundary that was at once ecological, economic, and political (Lattimore 1940: 328–34; 1961: 333). In his earlier works, Lattimore maintained that steppe nomads could be entirely self-sufficient (Lattimore 1940: 329; 1962: 253). This view was criticized by Anatoly Khazanov (1984: 81) on the basis of a large body of anthropological data that supported the notion of “non-autarky” of the pastoral nomads, convincing him that the lack of balance in their economic production was the cause of the almost permanent state of instability of nomadic societies (pp. 69–84). In an earlier study Khazanov had pointed out that “agriculture is practiced alongside

nomadic cattle breeding, but only as a subsidiary branch,” and that this type of production is regarded as characteristic of a semi-nomadic, rather than a purely nomadic, economy, which is the type of nomadic “economic form” most widespread in the Eurasian steppe (Khazanov 1978: 120). In a later article, Lattimore admitted that the steppe nomads’ demand for Chinese products, in particular grain, textiles, and ironware, exceeded the Chinese demand for steppe products (Lattimore 1979: 481). Trade was, according to him, allowed or denied by China on the basis of political considerations. On this account, Lattimore saw the establishment of the Xiongnu empire as a response to the unification of China and as a way to “force the Chinese to deliver for political reasons what they were unwilling to sell for an inadequate economic gain” (p. 484).

Building on Lattimore’s insight, various studies have attempted to apply that view of the economic relationship between China and the steppe to the entire history of China’s relations with northern nomadic peoples. They have sought the explanation for the aggressive behavior of the historical nomads noted in the written sources—the views of partisan observers almost invariably hostile to the nomads—not in the nomads’ *desire* for certain goods, but in their *dependency* on imports from China due to the unstable, nonautarkic nature of their economy. The pastoralists needed cereals and artifacts they could not produce themselves and, failing to obtain them from their sedentary neighbors through peaceful means, such as trade, they resorted to raiding and looting. Among the most outspoken supporters of the “needy” theory, Sechin Jagchid and Jay Van Symons reduce a variety of factors in the history of China’s relations with Inner Asian peoples to the single issue of nomadic dependency upon Chinese goods. In their words, “for a period of two thousand years, trade was the chief determinant of peace and war between the nomadic and the Chinese peoples along China’s northern border. The nomadic peoples were dependent on a few key products produced by the agriculturalist Chinese, particularly grain and cloth. When they were able to obtain these goods peacefully through the mechanisms of trade, bestowals, and court-to-court intermarriage arrangements, stability along China’s frontiers was possible, but when they were denied ready access to these essential commodities, war was almost a certainty” (Jagchid and Symons 1989: 165). This analysis ultimately combines under the single economic rubric of “trade or raid” a multifarious historical phenomenon that included distinctive political, diplomatic, military, technological, and social aspects.

This theory has been taken a step further and applied not only to the study of the historical interaction between China and the northern peoples but also to such questions as the formation of state structures among the earliest historical nomads. In this light, the creation of a “steppe empire” by the Inner Asian nomads is seen as the result of a conscious search for a more efficient means to extract from China the resources they could not produce. That basic internal economic imbalance provided the stimulus for the creation of wholly new political and military structures among the steppe nomads, enabling them to achieve military superiority against China and establish a stronger bargaining position. This concept has been developed most clearly by Barfield in his 1981 and 1989 works. Drawing largely on modern anthropological literature (cf. Honey 1992: 9–10), Barfield maintains that the Xiongnu developed a “supratribal” organization to extort from China the products they needed (Barfield 1989: 37). The idea of a “supratribal” political structure whose main purpose was to impose nomadic economic demands upon settled neighbors has also been shared by the late Joseph Fletcher (1979–1980). The cornerstone of this theory is the belief that the nomads of

Inner Asia could not obtain the cereals and silk they needed from anywhere other than China. This, however, would have been possible only if among the peoples of Inner Asia—outside the boundaries of Chinese administrative control—there were no agriculturalists at all and the nomads lived in a purely nomadic environment, or if the nomads chose to entertain economic relations (both commercial and predatory) only with China.

Support for the first point is usually sought in the commonly held view that the environment of the steppe does not allow for the existence of agriculture, and that from the end of the Neolithic period onward the steppe region north of China has undergone a process of desiccation, with increasingly lower temperatures, less rainfall, a shorter growing season, and a type of climate generally thought to be unfit for agriculture. Although these factors cannot be denied as a general trend of climatic change over a very long period, it is not true that agriculture was universally absent throughout the steppe region. Moreover, the notion that a more arid climate is an inherent obstacle to agriculture is questionable. According to recent studies, agriculture in China “would have begun in [the] open grassland-woodland semiarid setting” of north China (Li 1983: 28). In fact, grassland soil is fertile and there is no lack of water supply; the main problems are caused by insufficient levels of moisture and the short growing season, so that natural conditions are not sufficiently stable to make farming a reliable source of livelihood (Taaffe 1990: 33–37). This article will attempt to show that farming was carried out as a supplementary activity in various areas within the economic zones dominated by mounted nomads—in different manners according to relative economic composition and technological advances—well after the Neolithic period and with virtually no interruption down to our day. The nomads were able to make small-scale farming activities fit within their cycles of seasonal migration (Róna-Tas 1959). Among the Khalkha, richer families allowed poorer tribesmen to help with the farming and to watch the crops while the herders were away (Vreeland 1957: 46). This type of co-operation in farming between wealthier and poorer families is only one of the patterns found by Vreeland in his study of Mongol communities (1957). The Khalkha nomads relied on more primitive techniques than the Daghur of the Nonni River valley, who had a level of agricultural production both more extensive and more specialized. The indigenous farming by the Khalkhas of the Narobanchin territory studied by Vreeland is similar to that observed by Róna-Tas in the Selenga valley (1959). Moreover, drought-resistant crops, such as spring wheat, oats, and millet are known to have been cultivated in the steppe to counterbalance the lack of moisture and the shortness of the growing season (Li 1983: 53; Moyer 1937: 20). As we shall see below, archaeological evidence strongly suggests that agriculture was practiced in the steppe in the Bronze and Iron Ages, and that the process of climatic change did not bring a complete disappearance of farming. In addition, it is also clear that large nomadic unions, such as the Xiongnu (Yü 1990), incorporated under their political control numerous sedentary communities and states from the oases of the Tarim Basin to northern China (Xie 1972: 182) and to Manchuria.

The point that the nomads entertained economic relations of any significance only with China can be countered through the historical sources at our disposal. Here we find information that emphatically denies the existence of such an exclusive relationship. On the contrary, it provides abundant evidence of the complex network of economic, political, and diplomatic relations that existed between the Xiongnu, the sedentary states of the “Western Regions” (i.e. today’s Xinjiang), and other nomadic peoples,

such as the Xianbi and Wuhuan. In this connection we may recall that the Xiongnu, who appear in Chinese history as a united political body toward the end of the third century B.C., embarked on a series of campaigns both against other Inner Asian nomads (such as the Yuezhi and the Wusun) and against China. During the first half of the second century B.C. the Xiongnu became the major military power in East Asia, with their domains spreading from Manchuria to the Western Regions and as far north as Lake Baikal. In 133 B.C. Emperor Wu shifted from a policy of appeasement to one of military confrontation, and after several decades of wars that directly involved also Central Asian sedentary and nomadic states, the Xiongnu confederation broke up into two separate coalitions: the southern and the northern Xiongnu. The southern Xiongnu accepted formal submission to China in 51 B.C. The northern Xiongnu were repeatedly defeated militarily by Chinese armies, and eventually appear to have migrated westward (de Groot 1921; Yü 1990; Barfield 1981; Di Cosmo 1991). The relations between the Xiongnu—or any other nomadic group with a political representation—and China is therefore only one aspect (more or less important, depending on the historical phase we choose to examine) within a larger, multifaceted phenomenon. Clearly, since the sources we have are written by Chinese historians, the relationship with China holds a central position but, even so, it is never exclusive or unique.

Therefore, since neither of these two conditions can be regarded as true, we must assume that the historical reality of the relationship between China and Inner Asia was more complex than the bipolar antagonism found by reading the Chinese sources (a perception that undoubtedly reflects the views of those who wrote them) and carried over into modern historical studies. But no alternative model has been so far proposed—that is, a model that would not only take into account the relationship between China and Inner Asia, but also explore the relationship among different socioeconomic communities (or “cultures”) beyond the borders of China.

To start looking more closely at what happened “beyond the Great Wall,” it is necessary to go back to the time of the first contacts between China and nomadic peoples and investigate, on the basis of archaeological and textual evidence, the essential economic characteristics of those areas to the north of China—Manchuria, Mongolia, Xinjiang, and other regions—where pastoral nomadism was practiced, and which gradually came to be dominated by the Xiongnu nomadic confederation. Of course, later periods are equally important, but I have chosen to concentrate on the earlier period since the supporters of the “needy” and “trade or raid” theories have taken the military and political confrontation between Han and Xiongnu as a model of the “extortion” policy practiced by the nomads against China based on the assumption of their dependency on Chinese products.

In this article I try to identify those areas where nomadic and sedentary cultures seem to overlap and where, therefore, sources of agricultural products were available to the nomads outside the scope of Chinese political, military, or economic influence. I also attempt to show that the regions of Inner Asia to the north of China have long been characterized economically by the coexistence of both settled and nomadic peoples and that here, as in many other areas of Inner Asia, the “normal” economic environment included the coterminous presence of both agriculturalists and pastoralists. In the conclusions I present examples of how this different, nonbipolar approach may be used to tackle historical questions and overcome the rigid limits imposed by theories based on the economic dependency of the nomads, which ultimately deny validity to historical events that took place outside the Chinese political and economic orbit.


For the sake of convenience, I have divided those areas which came under direct or indirect Xiongnu rule into three broad geographical units: Manchuria and Inner Mongolia; northern Mongolia and south Siberia (inclusive also of Tuva and of the Trans-Baikal and Altai regions); and modern Xinjiang and contiguous regions, inclusive of the Ili region, the oases of the Tarim Basin, and part of Gansu.

MANCHURIA AND INNER MONGOLIA

In eastern Inner Mongolia and Manchuria agriculture existed long before the Xiongnu period. Archaeological research in Heilongjiang—an area connected with the Xiongnu culture of the Transbaikal region in the first century B.C. (Brodianskii 1985)—shows that hoe cultivation existed in 2000 B.C., and that stone tools remained predominant even during the Iron Age. The spread of iron implements was slow and patchy, and the first iron tools only appeared during the last centuries B.C. (Li and Zheng 1989). Findings of carbonized soybean seeds in Jilin Province also prove the existence of developed agriculture in the area of Yongji county in c. 600 B.C. (Liu 1987). A study on the use of the stone hoe in Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia has demonstrated that basically the same type of implement (with regional variations dictated by the type of soil) was used for several thousand years without undergoing substantial changes. The stone hoe was slowly replaced by metal hoe-heads during the Bronze and Iron Ages but continued to be used together with other lithic implements, such as axes, adzes, and plowshares. During the Bronze Age these stone tools were of better quality, and some were even covered by a metal sheet (Chen and Xu 1989). It is sufficiently clear not only that stone farming tools were used well into the Bronze and Iron Ages,¹ but also that relatively primitive farming communities continued to exist in Inner Mongolia and Manchuria, even in areas where pastoral nomadism became the dominant economic activity. On the other hand, in the more fertile lands of the northeast, such as the Liao River basin, agriculture prospered considerably, to the point that during the Warring States period this area had a highly developed metallurgy, and used a great variety of iron tools, such as hoes, shovels, sickles, and pickaxes (Lei 1980). In the same region and in the same period, we also find bronze objects usually associated with nomadic cultures, such as plaques decorated in the so-called “animal style,”² side by side with more primitive agricultural tools, such as stone pickaxes, adzes, and bone spades.

Early agriculture is also attested in areas, such as Shilingol, which are still inhabited by a mostly nomadic population (Cui 1983). These were excavated at Ningcheng county, in Inner Mongolia, where two different strata were found, a lower layer (older) and an upper layer (more recent). The lower layer points at a fully agricultural culture, with large numbers of hoes and spades, and is associated with the Lower Xiajiadian culture. The second, with elements representative of both nomadic and sedentary communities, is identified as the Upper Xiajiadian period (Zhongguo 1975: 130, fig. 13; p. 132, fig. 15). Among the agricultural artifacts of the Upper Xiajiadian culture, we also find a stone hammer-adze, stone mortar and pestle, a stone adze (*Shang Zhou kaogu* 1979: 220, n. 1, 4, and 5), a bronze hoe and a pickax (p. 222, fig. 183, n. 9 and 6).

According to recent studies the older layer (Lower Xiajiadian), approximately contemporary with the Xia and Shang dynasties (c. 1550–c. 1030 B.C.), is related to the southern culture of the Central Plains of that period and to the successive culture of the state of Yan (Su 1982). In Inner Mongolia archaeological investigation has shown that



Map 1.1 Present-day Mongolia and northeast China. Names in bold-face type indicate some of the archaeological areas with agricultural activity during the late Bronze and early Iron Ages.

the people of the Lower Xiajiadian culture who had settled to the south of the Sira Mören river were later replaced, during the Western Zhou dynasty (c. 1030–722 B.C.), by a more militant kind of people, who had inferior agriculture, but more developed metallurgy and weapons (bronze daggers, axes, and arrowheads). The ancestors of the Upper Xiajiadian culture have been identified with the Zhukaigou culture of the Ordos region, also contemporary with the Xia and Shang dynasties, which had strong ties with the Karasuk culture of Transbaikalia and of the Minussinsk Basin (Wu 1991). Some archaeologists therefore conclude that the people of the Upper Xiajiadian culture were part of the invaders who migrated to the south in the first quarter of the millennium, causing the displacement of the center of the Zhou dynasty, at the beginning of the Spring and Autumn period (722–481 B.C.), and then occupied the area of the Lower Xiajiadian culture (Liu and Xu 1981). The predominance of settlements (Wu 1991) and remains of pigs, incompatible with pastoral nomadism, together with a large increase in bones of herbivorous animals (cattle, horses, sheep) and bone artifacts has led researchers to see this stage as a transitional phase between a Bronze Age agricultural culture and full-blown steppe nomadism, which was to develop in the same areas in the late Spring and Autumn and early Warring States (480–222 B.C.) periods, characterized by a large number of remains of cart and horse fittings and weapons (Cui 1988). This clear-cut evolutionary pattern, however, cannot explain the numerous findings of a settled economy contemporary with distinct evidence of nomadic activities.

Probably the best example of this pattern is that revealed by the excavations at Xigoupan, a well-studied site in Inner Mongolia, Zhungaer Banner. Here archaeologists found both a Xiongnu graveyard of the Warring States period and ruins of contemporary agricultural settlements. Moreover, farming tools, such as an iron hoe, an iron adze (Yikezhaomeng 1981a, fig. 7), and stone implements, were found in the same tomb together with arrowheads and other typical Xiongnu objects. In the settlement, which has been largely covered by sand dunes, a layer dated to the Warring States period, contemporary with the Xiongnu graveyard, was discovered. In addition to the iron hoe and adze mentioned above, the objects unearthed include a large number of iron and bronze objects similar to those found in the Xiongnu tombs. The decoration in patterns of lines of pierced holes found on pottery jars is similar to that of the pottery found in the graves. Archaeologists have no doubts about the close relationship between the settlement and the graveyard (Yikezhaomeng 1981a; Guo 1981). Given the widespread use of farming tools in this region in an earlier period, it seems logical to assume that settlements continued to exist after the appearance of the nomads, as in the case of the Xiongnu settlements excavated by Soviet and Mongol archaeologists in northern Mongolia and Buriatia (see below). Possibly, farming communities developed not in isolation but in relative autonomy from China as a whole. Through a process of adaptation to local environmental and sociopolitical conditions, they became an integral part of a predominantly nomadic society, or coexisted with the nomads as separate but closely interacting groups in a fundamentally symbiotic relationship (Iwamura 1962: 50).

Chinese archaeologists, however, hold a different view and prefer to see both farming tools and pottery as being either the product of Chinese craftsmanship or the result of Chinese cultural influence upon the Xiongnu, since “we cannot exclude that the Xiongnu at this time could also master the Chinese techniques of pottery-making, iron-smelting, and farming” (Guo 1981: 37). Nevertheless, the existence of agriculture and fixed settlements among the Xiongnu is no longer questioned, although excavations of Xiongnu graveyards in Inner Mongolia have concentrated much more on the burials

per se than on the relationship between them and the surrounding environment. This is possibly the reason why, in several studies, only findings of “nomadic” objects, such as metallic weapons, ornaments, and horse fittings, are reported, even when circumstantial evidence, such as the large amount of pottery or the presence of stone objects (like scrapers), points to the existence of another, presumably sedentary, cultural component (Tian 1976; Ta and Liang 1980; Yikezhaomeng 1980; Yikezhaomeng 1981a).

Some scholars have argued convincingly for the presence of two separate cultures, one centered in the Central Plains and the other spread in the northern regions, that developed autonomously and effectively constituted two independent systems (Lin 1986). This is reflected in the presence of stone implements together with developed bronze and iron objects (Nei Menggu 1965a; Nei Menggu 1965b), and in the presence of different patterns of burials and of remains of pigs (Nei Menggu 1984).

One last point needs to be mentioned. From the numerous findings of Xiongnu graveyards at our disposal, it is possible to gain a more precise idea of the nomads’ geographical distribution in early historical times, as well as of their diachronic evolution. It has been argued, for instance, that Xiongnu tombs from the end of the Spring and Autumn and from the early Warring States can be distinguished from those sites of the late Warring States period. In this respect, sites judged to be earlier, such as Taohongbala (Tian 1976) and Fanjiayaozi, show an inventory of less variety and richness than later ones, such as Xigoupan, Yulongtai (Zhungaer Banner), and others (Tian and Guo 1980). Also, the findings of more or less numerous objects of Chinese origin (cf. Yikezhaomeng 1981b) in some burials point to a difference in the level of economic and cultural interaction with China between certain nomadic groups and others. It is important to note that already in the Warring States period objects were produced in the northern Chinese states to be exported to the Xiongnu, among them gold and silver vessels, clearly intended for the use of the wealthiest men of the nomadic community (Tian and Guo 1980). To a certain extent the relationship of the pre-Han Chinese states bordering on nomadic territory might be compared with that of the Greek cities of the Black Sea *vis-à-vis* the Scythians, as in the Greek cities precious objects of exceptionally high quality were produced for Scythian markets. The sites mentioned all show comparable objects, which may be taken as evidence of one broad cultural “umbrella,” but they also show variations reflected, for instance, in the shape of jewelry and in the construction of burials, which have induced some to hypothesize tribal differences among separate groups, each of which had control over a certain territory (Wu 1991). Accordingly, then, we may take the graveyards, as well as the settlements, to represent the political and economic centers of the tribal territories (Guo 1981). When looked at in this light, the often-quoted passage in the *Shiji* according to which the various Xiongnu and other nomads “each had their territorial divisions” (*ge you fen di*) (*SJ* 110: 2879) undoubtedly acquires a clearer and historically more precise meaning.

From the archaeological evidence it is apparent that the region to the north of the Central Plains during the pre-Han and Han periods (206 B.C.–A.D. 220) was far from being only inhabited by horse-riding pastoral nomads. A more complex picture is developing, one in which settled communities continued to survive even after the nomadic economy became predominant in the steppe and lived in close interaction with pastoral people. These settled communities appear to be rather sparse and in some areas fairly primitive. They certainly interacted economically with the nomads, providing them with agricultural products, pottery, and other items. Trade also existed between the

nomads and China, but it seems to have been limited to luxury products for the consumption of a restricted elite. In the written sources we find only a few mentions of trade between the Central States and the nomads. According to these, China imported horses, furs, and jade (*ZGC* I: 178, and II: 608; cf. Crump 1970: 55, 324; Debaine-Francfort 1989: 194). The nomads' imports from China are best documented by the Xiongnu tombs of the Han period, where Chinese luxury objects, such as lacquers, silk, and mirrors, are fairly common. The Xiongnu tombs at Noin Ula, which include a considerable amount of objects manufactured in China (Rudenko 1969), can be regarded as representative of this period.


NORTHERN MONGOLIA AND SOUTH SIBERIA

It is well known that agriculture has been practiced in Mongolia for a long time. It was known to the ancient Turks in the eighth century of our era (Lopatin 1940: 13), and the Arab traveler to the Uighur empire, Tamim ibn Bahr, reported the existence of cultivated fields farmed by "Turks" (Minorsky 1948: 283). Wheat, glutinous millet, and beans, according to the sixteenth-century work by Xiao Daheng, *Beilu fengsu*, were traditional crops in Mongolia, cultivated since ancient times (Serruys 1945: 141–42).

The study by Róna-Tas based on the observation of agricultural activities in the Selenga valley is helpful to understand the techniques traditionally used by nomads to till the land (Róna-Tas 1959: 443–65). Farming took place on selected strips of land near the river banks. The soil was opened by wooden plows, and then the clods were broken by the naked hand, after which wheat, barley, or rye seeds were sown. The nomads then left for their summer pastures, and came back to the farmed areas in autumn to harvest. According to Róna-Tas, cereals grown by Mongol nomads near Taryalang were usually picked by hand, without using sickles. Treading was done by animals such as horses or oxen. Then two or three people using wooden shovels spread out the crops to separate grain from chaff. That done, the leftover straw was used to line shallow pits (about 50 cm. deep and 50–70 cm. wide) where the grain was stored. Grinding stones were used for the mill, which was operated by horses.

This study is particularly important because it gives us the possibility to explain—or at least hypothesize—why in various areas of Mongolia and Tuva only seeds and grindstones have been found (Kenk 1986: 18; Maringer 1950: 196). Once it is taken into account that so many functions of farming, such as plowing, sowing, harvesting, and the dissemination of the crops, were carried out either by hand or by means of easily destroyed wooden tools, the absence of traditional farming implements is hardly surprising.

Molnár has shown that the traditional Mongolian plow was of Chinese origin (Molnár 1982). As for the dating of its introduction to Mongolia—whether it came directly from China or indirectly from Manchuria—we cannot say for certain. Molnár's identification of the early Mongol plow is based on a rock drawing from Bayan Khongor published in Nowgorodowa (1980, plate 217) (Molnár 1982, pl. 3). Lauer has shown that the petroglyphs from Bayan Khongor can be dated either to the "Scythian period," from the eighth to the third century B.C., or to the Tagar culture of the "Hun period" from the third century B.C. to the first century A.D. (Lauer 1972: 35–36). This dating, if correct, would indicate that plowing is a very ancient borrowing that goes back to the Xiongnu period and possibly to an even earlier time.



Map 1.2 Present-day Mongolia and contiguous regions. Site names indicate distribution of some Xiongnu settlements and fortifications, third to first centuries B.C.

But there is also harder evidence in support of the existence of agricultural activity in ancient northern Mongolia and Transbaikalia. Soviet studies have long shown the presence of developed agriculture in the region, with the use of iron plowshares already in the Xiongnu period, found together with grinding stones and a large amount of seeds (Davydova and Shilov 1953). This indicates that in the northern region from Manchuria to the Baikal there was not only primitive hoe farming, but also more developed plow cultivation with the use of animal traction (Okladnikov 1962: 427). Iron plowshares and hoes of the Xiongnu period have also been documented (Okladnikov 1962: 419–20; Davydova and Shilov 1953: 194, 197). Findings of stone plowshares in Manchuria (Okladnikov 1962: 428), and of a stone hoe from the Trans-Baikalia region (Grishin 1981: 27, fig. 1.1) during the Neolithic (c. 5000–c. 1600 B.C.) and Bronze Ages (1600–800 B.C.),³ imply that agriculture existed in the region from a very early period and then reached a relatively high degree of sophistication in the late Bronze and in the Iron Ages. Millet

seeds were found in one of the *kurgan* at Noin Ula (Davydova 1985: 68–69) together with a plow. According to Rudenko, the finding of a plowshare at Noin Ula is evidence that the Xiongnu generally practiced agriculture; he also maintains, however, that it must have been borrowed from China (Rudenko 1969: 103).

The question of agricultural development in the northern region is linked to the presence of permanent settlements. The excavations conducted by Russian and Mongol archaeologists have brought to light a number of Xiongnu fortified settlements. The most famous is the Ivolga *gorodishche*, a site that began to be excavated by Soviet archaeologists in 1928–29. Located about 100 km. south of Ulan Ude, and dated between the third and the first century B.C., the Ivolga complex is formed by a cluster of permanent settlements of varying sizes. This site has yielded invaluable information on the agricultural activities of the Xiongnu. The main economic activities were farming and handicraft, although raising domestic animals, hunting, and fishing also played an important role. The aforementioned agricultural tools form a rich inventory that includes plowshares, pointed shovels, hoes, and sickles (Davydova 1985: 99, table 8, figs. 25, 26). Grains of millet similar to those found in Noin Ula, as well as grains of barley and wheat (p. 70), were also found. Within the context of a nomadic economy, their function was to provide the pastoral people with products such as grains and various artifacts that they themselves either did not produce, or produced in very small amounts. Settlements such as Ivolga were, according to Davydova, “trading centers” which served “to overcome the narrow basis of nomadic economy” of the Xiongnu (Davydova 1968: 241). Interestingly, the inventory includes imported objects that indicate connections with both Central Asia and the Near East (p. 236). They illustrate the long range of cultural and commercial contacts enjoyed by the Xiongnu as well as their considerable achievements in areas such as engineering technology (Uchida 1951).⁴

Ivolga is by no means an isolated case. Several other sites of fortified settlements of the Xiongnu period have been excavated and studied in northern Mongolia and Siberia. Xiongnu settlements were found in the valley of the Selenga River (Tsunoda 1952: 256–57), mentioned previously in relation to the study by Róna-Tas, which therefore seems to have been an important agricultural zone from an ancient time. The excavations conducted by Dorjsüren in Mongolia between 1955 and 1957, and summarized in his major monographic studies of the Northern Xiongnu, show ample evidence of agriculture being carried out in permanent settlements. Although animal husbandry was the main economic activity, agriculture was an important auxiliary one together with hunting, fishing, and handicraft production (mainly pottery-making, metallurgy, and weaving) (Dorjsüren 1961: 59–72). These settlements, or fortified villages, are scattered throughout Mongolia; in 1957 ten such fortified villages were already located and excavated (Perlee 1957), and since then more traces of settled life have been found (see Ser-Odjav 1987: 58–81). These settlements include: in the Central province (Töb aimag) Gua Dob,⁵ on the Kherlen River (district of Nalaikh), Khüreen Dob, Tereljiiin Dörböljin⁶ and Bürkhin Dörböljin in the Möngönmorit district, and Öndör Dob in the Erdene district; in the Eastern province (Dornot aimag) Baruun Döröogiin Kherem and Bars Khot in the Tsagaan Oboo district; in the Khentii province we have Tsenkher Gol, on the border between the Jargaaltkhaan and the Delgerkhaan districts; in the Bulgan province the ruins of Shubuutai Gol in the Büreg Khangai district; in the Southern Gobi province (Ömnögobi aimag), the ruined settlement of Bayan Bulag, in the Nomgon district (Ser-Odjav 1987: 78).

Discoveries in the area of Bayan Tsagaan in the Central province, bordering on the

northern Gobi region, provide ample evidence that agriculture was practiced in the late Bronze Age. This is demonstrated by the presence of grinding stones, pestles, and other utensils typical of settled communities (Volkov 1964). These findings indicate that agriculture was rather primitive in this region and of a type similar to that carried out in the Tula River region between the seventh and the third centuries B.C. According to Volkov, agriculture, which had appeared in Mongolia at the end of the Neolithic period, did not vanish completely with the transition of its population to animal husbandry but continued to exist and develop, playing an auxiliary role in the economy (p. 71). Findings from a Xiongnu cemetery in the Darkhan district (Khentii province), dated from the second-first century B.C., have revealed the existence of textiles and a large quantity of millet grains (Grishin 1978). A study of nomadic burials dated to the early Iron Age period (seventh to third century B.C.) in the vicinity of the well-known necropolis of Ulangom (cf. Novgorodova et al. 1982) has revealed seeds of cereals that point to the existence of limited agriculture (Tsevendorj 1978). Taken together with the presence of different types of burials, these may indicate the coterminus existence of different communities. The fortified villages of Gua Dob and Baruun Döröögiin Kherem in Mongolia also exhibit the presence of agricultural and handicraft activities (Ishjamts 1994: 158, 163).

Moving from Mongolia and Transbaikalia to Kazakhstan, Tuva, and the Yenisei region, we find a similar pattern of scattered farming communities, permanent fortified settlements, and handicraft production centers interspersed with more evident signs of a mounted pastoral society. In Kazakhstan, findings of grinding stones and in burial sites are coupled with the presence of fortified villages, which Litvinskii interprets as military fortress and tribal refuges rather than as centers of economic activity (Litvinskii 1989).

In southern Siberia and Tuva the general picture is not very different. The ancient inhabitants of the Minussinsk region in southern Siberia during the Bronze Age practiced a mixed economy whose main activities were forest-type animal husbandry, metallurgy, and especially river floodplain agriculture, which was practiced also with bronze tools such as sickles and socketed celts (Martynov 1991: 45). Later on, in the beginning of the first millennium B.C., the transition to pastoral nomadism in southern Siberia apparently did not mean that agriculture disappeared altogether. Here we find settlements where the nomadic (or seminomadic) inhabitants sowed small-size fields in the spring and then came back in the winter to harvest (Askarov, Volkov, and Ser-Odjav 1992: 461).

The Tagar and Tashtyk cultures of South Siberia (sixth century B.C. to first century A.D.) were based on both pastoral nomadism and agriculture. This is revealed by the findings of pickaxes, bronze sickles, and containers for agricultural products (Grjasnow 1970: 238–39; Zavitukhina 1978: 78, 94). According to Kyzlasov, the Xiongnu conquest of the Khakass-Minussinsk region coincided with the transition from the Tagar to the Tashtyk period around the second century B.C. The former was characterized by a balanced economy where floodplain farming played the main role, followed by animal breeding and hunting-gathering. This equilibrium came to an end in the second-first century B.C. as a consequence of the nomadic invasions. The following Tashtyk period saw a sharper division of labor between cattle-breeders and cultivators, although farming remained the main economic activity. The number of animals grew substantially, while metallurgical production was practiced on a larger scale and became more sophisticated. Even at this time the increased presence (probably as a dominating power) of

martial, horse-riding nomads did not bring about the disappearance of farming communities. On the contrary, the level of interaction between nomadic and farming communities grew together with increased specialization (Kyzlasov 1960:178). Indeed, the evolution of the iron plowshare in the region from the second century B.C. to the tenth century A.D. (illustrated in Kyzlasov 1960: 181, fig. 62) shows that agriculture continued to develop into the Middle Ages, a fact further attested by the finding of cast-iron plowshares (Semenov and Kilunovskaya 1990).


In other regions of southern Siberia, such as Tuva, several findings of agricultural products, such as grains of barley and millet (Kenk 1986: 18; Grach 1980: 43), also point in the direction of a limited agriculture. According to Vainshtein (1980: 145–46) irrigation systems were already constructed in Tuva in the Scythian period, and in the Kokel' burial grounds of the Xiongnu period there have been findings of millet grains and also of hoes made of bone.

The archaeological data gathered from the Transbaikal region, northern Mongolia, Kazakhstan, and South Siberia concur in revealing the uninterrupted existence of agriculture in these regions down to the Xiongnu period. Different patterns may have existed, ranging from seminomadic communities that practiced limited farming together with animal husbandry, to a symbiotic relationship between separate but integrated communities. In this relationship the militarily superior nomadic groups wielded the political and military power over a region that included scattered farming centers that provided essential agricultural products. As Davydova has pointed out, the various settlements may have therefore functioned not only as nuclei of production, but also as regional trading centers. This does not exclude Litvinskii's hypothesis, namely, that some of them also functioned as fortresses for the nomadic tribal elite.

XINJIANG AND CONTIGUOUS REGIONS

Findings from the north-western regions of China show the existence of a close relationship between agricultural and nomadic groups. Due to the variety of environmental conditions of today's Xinjiang, which in the late centuries B.C. were even more favorable to a farming economy than they are today (Hoyanagi 1975: 95–96; Zhao and Xing 1984), we find areas with a strong agricultural settled economy, groups engaged in mixed economic activities, and pastoral nomads. More than other regions of Inner Asia, Xinjiang was characterized by economically diverse groups living in close proximity. The anthropological picture of ancient Xinjiang also shows a variety of different types, which may support the notion of Xinjiang as a crossroad of different peoples. Investigation of human skulls and bones from Wusun tombs and other sites has demonstrated the existence of various Europoid types: mesodolichocranial proto-Caucasoid in the Lob-nor region in the Bronze Age, brachycranial Caucasoid in the early Iron Age in the upper Ili region, dolichocranial Caucasoid in the Pamir region who later entered the Lob-nor region and mixed with the local people. At the same time we also have an Indo-Afghan or eastern Mediterranean type that infiltrated the Tianshan region (Han 1986; Han and Pan 1987; Han 1990; see also Keith 1929).

Written sources have documented the presence of settled people in north-western China since ancient times, even before archaeological investigations corroborated it. According to both the *Shiji* and the *Hanshu*, the majority of the states and peoples of Central Asia were sedentary and had trade and tribute relations with the Xiongnu. In



Map 1.3 Present-day Xinjiang and contiguous regions. Names in bold-face type indicate some of the archaeological sites showing agricultural activity during the late Bronze and early Iron Ages.

his survey of the agricultural and settled peoples of the Western Regions mentioned in early Chinese sources T'ang Ch'i shows, on the basis of the written sources, that the Xiongnu had access to agricultural products beside China (T'ang 1981). The author argues in favor of the existence of cities, agricultural settlements, and sedentary states within the Xiongnu empire, but he also believes that "economically, the Hsiung-nu empire was not self-sufficient. The Hsiung-nu people had to find material support, either through peace or war, from neighboring societies" (p. 114). Both of these apparently contradictory notions can be true: some of the less cohesive agricultural communities were probably simply incorporated under Xiongnu overlordship, whereas with those peoples who had a ruler and appeared as a politically organized state, the nomads established a sort of "tributary" relationship. In any event, the statements found in the sources, to the effect that the Western Regions were "originally subject to the Xiongnu" (HS 70: 3010), would support the view that the area was politically dominated by the nomads. This certainly provided a source of supply for a variety of nomadic economic "needs" that was external to China and probably was based more on an ancient pattern of mutual exchange than on crude imposition by military means.

Recent studies show that barley was cultivated in Xinjiang around 1000 B.C. (Wang 1989), long before the establishment of military colonies by Han Wudi (*tuntian*) in the first century B.C. The millet and barley grains found among the ruins of Chinese settlements of the Han period in Edsen Gol (Loewe 1967, I: 93-94) provide evidence that the Chinese colonists tilled the land, but not that these plants were imported to the border regions from central China. The archaeological evidence shows that they were known in these areas before the arrival of Han troops, and the notion that farming was imported from China should therefore be reconsidered even where Chinese presence is historically and archaeologically ascertained. Agricultural tools (Xinjiang 1985, figs. 34-37; Xinjiang 1983, sec. 3, figs. 13, 68) have been found in various areas of Xinjiang, which shows a degree of continuity in agricultural activity and in the use of farming tools even when animal husbandry and pastoral nomadism began to spread. In fact, a number of stone tools, previously thought to belong to the Neolithic and Aeneolithic periods, are now being attributed to cultures of the Bronze and Iron Ages (Debaine-Francfort 1988, 1989; An 1992: 331).

During the Bronze and Iron Ages we find vestiges of agricultural production in several areas. Millet seems to have been the main staple in Xintala, Gumugou, and Sidaogou. Wheat was cultivated in Xintala, Gumugou, Shirenzi, Kuisu, Lanzhouwanzi, Ranjiagou, and Qunbake; barley has been found in Alagou (Debaine-Francfort 1989: 207).

In the oases around the depression of the Taklamakan a number of "states" and settled communities flourished in the second half of the first millennium B.C. They had a relatively small population and the range of their political and administrative control is unlikely to have gone beyond the system of a single oasis or river valley. The scope of their economic—and, in particular, commercial—activities, however, must have been wider. Both the *Shiji* and the *Hanshu* in their respective chapters on the Western Regions describe several of these city-states and agricultural communities (see Hulswé 1979). Their cities had walls, and their inhabitants lived by cultivating fields and raising domesticated animals. In the 1930s the Swedish archaeologist Folke Bergman noticed the existence of limited agriculture among the ancient people of the Kingdom of Loulan (Kroraina) (Bergman 1939: 50). More recently archaeological evidence has demonstrated that in several areas of Xinjiang, such as the Turfan Basin and in the

oases, agriculture was practiced (Ma and Wang 1994: 213; Ma and Sun 194: 230). In the Loulan site at Lob-nor, however, people relied chiefly on domestic animals, fishing, and hunting; farming apparently did not occur, but grain was imported from neighboring areas (p. 212).

One of the most interesting dwelling sites from the pre-Han and Han periods are the remains of Niyä, in the northern part of Minfeng county (Xinjiang 1983: 64–68). Here the main economic activities consisted of agriculture, horticulture, and animal breeding. Permanent settlements stretched for several kilometers along both banks of the Niyä River. The residents of this settlement used developed iron agricultural tools and exchanged their farming products for woolen textiles produced by people specialized in animal husbandry (Ma and Sun 1994: 230–31). Other settlements discovered in Xinjiang include the ruins of Quhui, Shaerdun, and Xikeqin, respectively identified with the ancient states of Yanqi, Weixu, and Yuli (Xinjiang 1983: 68–69).

From the viewpoint of the study of the relationship between agrarianism and pastoralism in north-western China, an important element is the discovery of settlements and farming in prevalently nomadic areas from Gansu to the Ili region. Gansu and Qinghai were part of the vast Eurasian region where steppe nomadic cultures thrived, and they had close cultural ties with Xinjiang. Elements of the same culture can also be seen in Sichuan, indicating not only a horizontal “plane of development,” but also a vertical one (see Pirazzoli-T’serstevens 1988). A citadel similar to those found in Mongolia and Transbaikalia was unearthed in Minqin county in the Gansu corridor as part of a site known as Shajing culture. Crudely made stone tools and the presence of a permanent fortified settlement point to the existence of a settled society. At the same site a large number of bronze artifacts include ornamental plates, buckles, axes, knives, arrowheads, and other objects whose nature, shape, and style are usually associated with steppe nomads. The C14 date of the settlements is 560 (± 90) B.C., with a calibrated date (MASCA) given at 780 B.C. (An 1992: 330–31).⁷

At several sites in the eastern part of Xinjiang both metal and stone agricultural implements (sickles, millstones, and pestles) are found together with bronze “nomadic” elements. This pattern is common to several cultures spanning approximately from 1000 to 400 B.C., from which we can recall the Aketala culture (Shufu county), the Sidaogou culture in eastern Xinjiang, the Wupu culture (Hami region), and the Alagou culture in the Turfan Basin. In Kezierqieqia, a site associated with the Wupu culture, a plowing tool with a long handle was found, and also a body of Europoid type, with blonde hair and pronounced nose; the tattoos on his hands, arms, and upper back are similar to those of the body from the Pazyryk burials (Debaine-Francfort 1988: 19). The Alagou culture, dated around the fifth-fourth century B.C., is more typically nomadic. Here the presence of stone pestles and other implements points to the existence of limited agriculture (Mu 1984).

In the Hami area numerous bronze objects related to the Ordos cultural complex, which date from about 1000 B.C. (Wang 1986), have been recovered. Similar objects were found in neighboring areas of eastern Xinjiang, specifically the Balikun (Barkol) and Mulei (Mori) counties, which date, respectively, from the seventh and second centuries B.C. (Wang 1986). Although the findings seem to suggest an evolution in certain local cultures—such as Sidaogou (Debaine-Francfort 1988: 25)—from an earlier agricultural stratum (roughly comparable with the Lower Xiajiadian stratum) to a later nomadic stratum, this cultural and temporal divide is by no means as clear-cut as it is sometimes made to appear. In fact, in the Bronze and Iron Ages the stone tools are only gradually

replaced by bronze and iron ones, including technologically advanced iron plows (Chen 1990). In Xintala and Quhui, located to the south of the Tianshan mountain range, both stone and iron tools were used in an economic environment where agriculture still played the major role, although supported by stock-breeding, hunting, and fishing (Zhang and Wang 1989).

In the Ili region, an area associated in Chinese archaeological literature with the Saka and Wusun nomadic peoples (Wang 1987), findings indicate the presence of farming. The remains of earthen walls of dwellings and ancient irrigation canals in Tekesi county, together with bronze objects of nomadic people of the Warring States period (Wang 1962), is clear evidence of farming communities. Moreover, iron agricultural tools (such as an iron hoe) have been found in tombs of nomadic Wusun peoples (Mu 1984: 58; Zhongguo 1962). The excavation of Wusun tombs at Xifengou has brought to light a variety of agricultural iron implements that established not only the existence of agriculture but also its relatively advanced level of development (Lin 1988: 3). In the western part of Xinjiang the presence of Bronze Age stone agricultural tools, like sickles and hoes, which have been found in the areas of Aksu and Shufu, is also evidence of the widespread importance of agriculture in the region (An 1992: 331–32).

Another important feature of Xinjiang archaeology is metal production. Metal objects often play an important role in the identification of distinct nomadic cultures.⁸ Remains related to metallurgy, and in particular iron-casting and steel making, were found in both nomadic and sedentary areas. Although some mines have been dated from the Han dynasty, and have been associated with the arrival of Han colonists to the Western Regions (Xinjiang 1983: 69), it is clear that metallurgy had developed long before then. Two bronze mines were found in the early 1980s in Nileke county in the Ili region dating from 440 (± 75) and 650 (± 170) B.C. (Xinjiang 1985: 2). Furthermore, Soviet studies have established that iron artifacts and weapons were already commonly produced in the Altai region in the sixth century B.C. (Mogil'nikov and Mednikova 1985).

Therefore, the area roughly included in what is today Xinjiang and Gansu indicates various degrees of interaction between nomads and agriculturalists. As pointed out by An Zhimin, peoples in various areas of north-western China “enjoyed a settled life, with agriculture as their main economic basis obviously different from the nomadic life of the Ta Yüeh-chih and the Wusun” (An 1992: 336). The southern city-states and sedentary settlements in the Tarim Basin and Turfan region, with an essentially agricultural economy, had close commercial and political ties with the surrounding nomadic peoples, who were presumably organized in groups with a certain degree of social, political, and territorial cohesion. In addition to these there were smaller communities whose people practiced a mixed economy, in which agriculture and stock-breeding complemented each other. Examples of this can be found in the Loulan region and more generally in the eastern part of Xinjiang. Given the large number of bronze artifacts found in the eastern areas (in particular in Hami and Barkol), it is likely that nomadic people lived in close proximity with the local agro-pastoral communities. In the northern part of Xinjiang, particularly in the Ili region, we have a pattern more similar to what we find in south Siberia and in the Trans-Baikal region. Here was an essentially nomadic economy, with a highly developed metallurgy, and fortified settlements where limited farming was practiced. These nomads’ world was characterized by a cultural and material life remarkably similar to the nomadic Scytho-Sarmatian people of Central Asia and the Pontic Steppe (see below). As stylistic elements in their textiles and other

features reveal, this region also had cultural and possibly commercial links with the settled communities of Ferghana and Bactria (Sylvan 1941: 89–98; Debaine-Francfort 1987: 203).

FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS

The Written Sources

The wisdom of the written sources is seldom questioned by archaeologists and historians that research the Xiongnu and their relations with China.⁹ Indeed, passages from the *Hanshu*, the *Shiji*, and other sources are often quoted as ultimate authorities to prove or dismiss a point, provide ancient names for peoples and places, and furnish a basic historical framework in which to enplot the archaeological narrative. While remaining aware of the potential pitfalls of this method, it is also true that such sources—the only historical records in our possession—cannot simply be set aside under the pretense of their being entirely mendacious.

Although the nomads are usually represented as wandering from place to place in search of grass and water, without agriculture or fixed abode, several revealing passages refer to the existence of farming among the Xiongnu or in the territory controlled by them. Current literature on the Xiongnu has already pointed out and investigated the most important passages on Xiongnu agriculture (Hayashi 1983: 4–5, 12–15; Xie 1972: 174–86), and there is no need to repeat them here except as a general summary. The historical records document that various sedentary states of the Western Regions (*xiyu*) had surrendered to the nomads and were regarded by them as subject states. Furthermore, they refer to the presence of cities, the storage of grain, and farming in the territory controlled by the nomads. During Emperor Wudi's reign (141–87 B.C.), Chinese expeditions sent deep into Xiongnu territory appropriated Xiongnu grain and cereals to feed the troops (*SJ* 111: 2935). In 88 B.C., following a particularly critical situation in which many head of cattle died and people fell ill, the Xiongnu could not harvest their cereals (*HS* 94A: 3781). The *Hanshu* also records that during the time of Emperor Zhao (86–74 B.C.) the Xiongnu sent four thousand cavalymen to work the land at Jushi, and later Emperor Xuan (73–49 B.C.) sent a cavalry force to attack them. The Xiongnu who were working the land then fled, and the state of Jushi resumed relations with the Han (Hulsewé 1979: 185). This passage seems to indicate that the Xiongnu had the capability of creating *tuntian* garrisons similar to those set up by the Han, or, at the very least, that they could, if necessary, settle and live by tilling the land (cf. Loewe 1979: 47).

To be sure, the sources also say that the Xiongnu lived by raising animals and moved in search of grass and water. But are the two propositions mutually exclusive? I believe, on the basis of what we have said above, that the contradiction is only apparent. It is reasonable to suppose that the Xiongnu were mostly nomadic, warlike peoples whose main activities were indeed breeding animals, hunting, and engaging in military actions. It is not excluded that among them, at times of shortage of pasture, tribal wars, or natural disasters, some would revert to a mixed economy and to activities that included a limited amount of farming.¹⁰ These martial pastoral nomads, however, were not the only inhabitants of the region to the north of the Great Wall. In the intersecting ecological zones of grassland, desert, mountains, oases, and river valleys, settlements and

fortified cities emerged. Their inhabitants, as the remains of farming tools, stored seeds, and irrigation works prove, engaged as their primary economic activity in producing goods that supplemented and complemented those produced by the nomads.

Scythians of Central Asia

To help understand the economic make-up that characterizes ancient nomadic societies, it is perhaps not an idle exercise to look briefly at some aspects of the development of the Central Asian Scythians and of their internal and external economic relations.

Since Herodotus's "inquiry" into the life of the steppe peoples, it has been known that some Scythians were engaged in agricultural activities, called Georgi (Melyukova 1990). More recently, extensive archaeological research has shed much light on this question. It is now known, for instance, that a number of plants were farmed between the seventh and third centuries B.C. in Scythian settlements and fortified villages in the Crimea and in the Pontic region to the north of the Black Sea. Here wheat was cultivated prior to the arrival of Greek colonists (Shranko and Yanushevich 1985). According to Gavriliuk and Pashkevich, three different systems of farming existed in the northern Pontic area in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. In the steppe region a fallow system, with barley and millet as the main crops, emerged "in connection with shortage of food and forage in the winter season." In the forest-steppe region, where agriculture had a longer tradition, plowing tillage constituted the main branch of the economy. Finally, in the city-states of the Pontic region, where wheat was the main crop, there were plowing tillage, a two-field agricultural system, and soil fertilization. Agriculture became an essential factor in the economy of the Scythian steppe, a fact that is also reflected in the material culture of the fortified settlements of the lower Dnieper (Gavriliuk and Pashkevich 1991–92). The question remains whether the Scythian farmers of the Dnieper were actually Scythian, or whether they belonged to different non-Scythian autochthonous communities that existed before the appearance (either by invasion or cultural evolution) of mounted nomadism in those areas and eventually merged with the latter into a single culture (Bukowski 1977: 222–26). It is certainly true that in the Bronze Age the agricultural techniques in the steppe region were greatly advanced by the "widespread introduction of metal artifacts into all branches of production" (Dergachev 1989: 801), and during the early Scythian period (750–650 B.C.) a pattern of exchange prevailed in the relations between settled population and nomads that stimulated the development of agriculture and even provided a route for the diffusion of cultivated plants (Marčenko and Vinogradov 1989: 803). The whole development of the region became a single process in which various subsystems interacted. Nomadic steppe tribes, Greek states, settled and semisettled agro-pastoralists, and communities of the forest-steppe region were all interrelated at many levels (political, military, cultural, and so on). The first two subsystems were the most important since the Scythians retained a military superiority, whereas the Greek states were culturally more developed and economically prosperous (*ibid.*, p. 805). In a later period (650–475 B.C.) this situation developed into one in which the nomads completely dominated the settled population of the forest-steppe region, which was fully incorporated within their political and economic sphere. They exercised a form of political control through military pressure over the Greek states. The balance created in this way could be (and was) disrupted at the time of new nomadic invasions, but then, typically, new forms of equilibrium would be created.

It is noteworthy that the worsening of the relations between the new nomads (Sarmatians) and the Greek states that occurred in the third century B.C. is attributed by some to the destruction of a nomadic elite that had so far guaranteed peaceful relations within a "barbarian hinterland" that included both nomads and farmers (*ibid.*, p. 811). The nomadic invaders of Central Asia in the Kushan period, the Yuezhi, who were displaced by the Xiongnu from their eastern homeland,¹¹ likewise preserved the local farming communities. Archaeological data for the pre-Kushan and Kushan periods also "testify to the fact that the nomads maintained constant close contacts with the oasis inhabitants" (Bongard-Levin and Stavisky 1970: 42). Another case in point is the relationship between the agrarian culture of Namazga VI and the steppe nomads. Here the geographical "open fields" disposition of the oases favored contacts between the nomadic and seminomadic peoples of the steppe and the inhabitants of the oasis settlements of the piedmont belt. The interaction between these different groups created favorable conditions for the development of an economy that combined agriculture and animal husbandry (Vinogradova and Kuz'mina 1986: 147).

It is difficult not to draw a comparison between the North Pontic steppe in the seventh to third centuries B.C., when an essentially homogeneous Scythian culture became typical of the life of the inhabitants of the Eurasian steppe (Jettmar 1983: 224), and some of the areas we have examined above. The excavations of various burials in Xinjiang attributed to the Saka and Wusun nomads do not indicate that the inhabitants of these areas were engaged in agriculture—their most important economic activities were metallurgy and animal husbandry (Wang 1987). Here, before and during the Warring States period, we find a system of close interaction between pure mounted nomads, like the Saka or Wusun, the settled states based in the oases south of the Tianshan range, and communities that practiced a mixed economy with some pastoral activity. The basic equilibrium among these three elements was only temporarily disrupted by the Xiongnu conquest. The new nomads may have imposed heavier demands on the weaker subsystems, and "older" nomads, like the Yuezhi, were chased away. It is not unlikely that some of the defeated nomads, once their pasture and herds had been lost, became settled. But, in general, it seems more probable that the bulk of the nomadic inhabitants of the Western Regions simply accepted the Xiongnu as their overlords.

Nomadic Consumption of Agricultural Products

It is fairly clear that the pastoral nomad requires a certain amount of agricultural products, essential to his diet, which he cannot produce within his system (Khazanov 1984: 69–84). However, the amount needed (and, therefore, the extent of his dependency) is not clear. Could the need for cereals, for instance, be satisfied by the return from small fields sown in the spring and harvested in the fall by the nomads themselves? Could a limited degree of exchange between contiguous communities living in a sort of economic symbiosis¹² be sufficient to balance off pastoral production? Obviously there is no information available on the per capita consumption of cereals of the ancient nomads. We can, however, rely to a certain extent on two sources, archaeological data and studies of dietary requirements of contemporary nomads. In the first case, because of the limited evidence of agricultural production in the steppe well before any large-scale contact between nomadic and sedentary empires took place, one must conclude that the extent of cereals needed was equally minimal. In the Altai region, where there

was a highly developed nomadic culture, the indications of ancient agriculture are scarce (Rudenko 1970: 60; Grjasnow 1970: 11–12). Moreover, there is no evidence that cereals were imported from China before the Han dynasty. Although the idea of a very ancient caravan trade between China and the West has attracted much attention,¹³ the logistic problems make it impossible that any trade in basic commodities (such as staple food) was carried out between China and the Western Regions at that time¹⁴ or even after the opening up of Central Asia to Chinese commercial interests.¹⁵

If the theory of economic nonautarky of the nomads is accepted, then the lack of evidence of large shipments of grain from China forces the conclusion that the agricultural yield produced either by the nomads themselves or by small neighboring agrarian communities was sufficient to fulfill their needs. Xie Jian, in his in-depth study of the system of subsistence of the Xiongnu, argues convincingly for the existence of such communities in large portions of the territory that later came to be dominated by the Xiongnu. Both to the east and to the west of the Yellow River there is ample evidence that agriculture was practiced since the Stone Age and was not interrupted after the rise of the Xiongnu (Xie 1972: 169, 178). Ecological claims of the unfitness of these areas for agricultural production are not taken into serious consideration since they are denied by the archaeological remains and also because desiccation was a gradual phenomenon that went on over a long time (p. 186), and it is certainly possible that climatic conditions were then more favorable to farming than they are today. Even more important, on the basis of inscriptions on tiles, Xie shows that people on the borders between China and the Xiongnu either had a close friendly relationship with the nomads or were subject to their rule (p. 182). Compounded with the tribute received from the Western Regions (p. 176, n. 2), we can see that the Xiongnu were living in close proximity to a number of farming communities, a condition that allowed for considerable access to agricultural products above and beyond what the nomads could have produced themselves.

Recent anthropological studies on the system of nourishment of nomadic Khazaks have demonstrated that vegetables (unlike meat and milk) do not represent a staple in the nomadic diet but are a supplementary element particularly needed during the winter. Wild and cultivated plants—in particular barley and millet—are both used, but not in large quantities (Shakhanova 1988). Khazanov, from the study of dietary requirements of the Mongols and other Eurasian steppe nomads, concludes that meat and milk were the central staple food of the steppe nomads with an obligatory supplement of vegetable foods (Khazanov 1984: 52–53). Other anthropological studies show that nomadic dependence on farm products turns on many factors, such as climate, dietary habits, and type of animals herded. Middle Eastern nomads, for instance, were far more dependent on vegetable produce than Inner Asian nomads (Khazanov 1984: 52, 57). But even more important is the degree of specialization of the nomadic group. Some groups incorporate a considerable amount of agricultural production into their economy, whereas others are far more specialized, and consequently more dependent on products produced externally (Bates and Lee 1977). The current anthropological literature documents infinite variations that demonstrate a high degree of flexibility and adaptability due to the interaction of many concurring factors. Nomads do not have to stay nomadic or die—they can, under certain circumstances, cease to be fully nomadic and shift to a different form of subsistence, which might include limited farming, hunting, gathering, or other activities. A case in point is that of the Turkmens in the nineteenth century who were forced to seek an increasing amount of resources outside a pastoral nomadic

economy due to such adverse circumstances as desiccation of the steppe and attacks by other nomadic groups (Bregel 1981: 36–37).

Both archaeological data and anthropological research support the notion that consumption of vegetable products among the steppe nomads, although required, was not very high, and varied according to circumstances. Producers could be either the nomads themselves or sedentary people of neighboring farming communities with whom the nomads established a system of exchange. Since there is no evidence that the fully formed pastoral nomadic communities of the steppe extracted large quantities of vegetable stuff from China from the sixth to the third century B.C., we must assume that their requirements were satisfied by local farming communities, whose existence is confirmed by archaeological research.

Current Views on Xiongnu Agriculture

We should also look briefly at one last point: the interpretation that archaeologists have given of the settlements and other evidence of Xiongnu agriculture discovered in Buriatia, Mongolia, and northern China.

Chinese scholars have only recently begun to acknowledge the presence of farming in the steppe and are gradually moving away from the stereotypical representation of “external” pastoral nomadic tribes versus “internal” agricultural settled states of the Hua-Xia *oikumene* (and, later, the Chinese empire) common in their historical and archaeological literature. However, the presence of farming, metallurgy, and pottery making in the steppe is seen by them largely as the result of direct or indirect cultural influence from the Central Plains. In one of the most comprehensive surveys of Xiongnu agriculture by a Chinese scholar, Wu En analyzed the many settlements found in Transbaikalia and in Mongolia, with particular attention to the Ivolga complex and to the large quantity of material evidence of farming found there. While acknowledging the existence of agriculture in those regions, he also maintains that those areas were incorporated in the Xiongnu empire only during the period of their expansion, in the second century B.C. Only then the population of those settlements became mixed, inclusive of nomadic peoples, such as the Xianbi and the Wusun, and sedentary ones, such as those from China and from the Western Regions. According to Wu En, it was the Chinese who imported advanced farming and architectural techniques, as shown by the Chinese palace found in Abagan (Wu 1990: 416–19). The degree of Chinese influence over the agricultural settlements of the Xiongnu is therefore a debated issue. However, although it can be accepted that the increased amount of contacts during the period of the *heqin*¹⁶ relations between the Han dynasty and the Xiongnu resulted in increased exchanges in terms of technology and material culture, signs of direct Chinese presence or “influence” in the steppe before then are far less clear, and should be interpreted with great caution.

Another Chinese scholar, Lin Gan, has shown not only that nomadic peoples had an advanced agricultural production, with the use of a considerable number of iron implements, but also that the Xiongnu had a highly developed metallurgy, and that among them textile manufacturing also attained high standards of quality (Lin 1988: 3–5).

Soviet and Mongol archaeologists, basing their views on the large body of Scythian archaeology, have eventually reached a basic agreement in identifying fortified agricultural settlements in nomadic lands as autochthonous farming communities that

existed before the spread of mounted nomadism and continued to exist as sources of products required by the nomads (Davydova 1968). As mentioned above, there are many examples in Central Asia of Scythian agriculture, to which the Xiongnu settlements basically conformed. Nonetheless, Soviet and Mongol archaeologists do not deny the possibility that Chinese slaves, refugees, or prisoners of war may have been living in the settlements, some of whom possibly had important roles as architects or artisans, but they see this as a later development.

Summing up several decades of debate about the meaning and ethnic composition of the Xiongnu settlements, Hayashi (1983: 22–26) partly shares the misgivings of Soviet archaeologists such as Kiselev on the likelihood that war prisoners could have had the rights and the resources to create such fortified settlements, where we find up to four strata of pottery. He is also unconvinced by the argument formulated by some Soviet scholars that the settled people could have been impoverished Xiongnu, and denies that a class stratification of this type existed within Xiongnu society. In his view it is more likely that Ivolga *gorodishche* and other similar fortified settlements in the Baikal region were originally inhabited by northern enemies of the Xiongnu, such as the Dingling, and later occupied by the Xiongnu, who imposed their rule over a nucleus of pre-existing, ethnically different people.

From this summary discussion we may draw a few conclusions about the role of these settlements. It is undoubtedly possible that the Xiongnu, during the maximum expansion of their power in the first half of the second century B.C., conquered territories inhabited by sedentary and semisedentary people not only along the Chinese borders and in the Western Regions, but also in the north. The fact, however, that these settlements were not destroyed but continued to thrive into the first century A.D., shows that the Xiongnu rule was based on a symbiotic relationship with the settled population. Furthermore, it is very likely that the ranks of the settlers increased considerably due to the influx of large numbers of war prisoners converted into laborers, either in the fields or in workshops. If this is accepted—and clearly the mixed origin of artifacts and implements would lead us to think so—then we should come to the conclusion that the Xiongnu conquest brought an increment, rather than a decrease, of agricultural and handicraft production in the areas under their domination.

CONCLUSIONS

The evidence presented here must be regarded as representative of a much larger body of data that awaits further investigation, either by direct archaeological research or by comparative study of archaeological data from different areas. Nonetheless, it is sufficient, I believe, to draw some conclusions.

First, the economy of the regions north of China during the period of Xiongnu rule points strongly in the direction of a type of economy comparable to that found in the Scythian period in Central Asia. Here different types of agriculture (characterized by the fallow system, plowing tillage system, and fertilization according to different environmental and geographical conditions) normally coexisted with steppe pastoral nomadism in a symbiotic, interdependent, socioeconomic system.¹⁷

Animal husbandry was but one of the economic activities practiced in the steppe region. In the second half of the first millennium B.C. it was predominant in certain areas of the eastern steppe region, but never in an exclusive manner. Before and after the

establishment and expansion of the Xiongnu as a major political force, agriculture was practiced in Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, northern Mongolia, south Siberia, and today's Xinjiang. Although the general picture is still far from being fully understood, it is sufficiently clear that we can say that the gradual predominance reached by mounted nomadic pastoral peoples in the steppe cannot be equated with the disappearance of agriculture. The patterns of interaction between herding and farming varied greatly. In some areas certain characteristics, such as the presence of different burial types, seem to point to a situation in which more than one culture shared the same territory. In other areas we find communities practicing a mixed economy, with more or less extensive farming activities according to climatic conditions, level of technological advancement, and probably social composition. In some other places we have specialized groups (either pastoral or agricultural) living in proximity to each other, who possibly interacted by means of commercial exchange. In the latter case, political dominance of one group over the other is also possible. Indeed, from the eighth or seventh century B.C., mounted nomads progressively extended their political and military superiority over less specialized socioeconomic groups.

Hence, the resulting picture is by no means one of bipolarism between nomads on the one side of the Great Wall and farmers on the other. Rather, a third element is to be taken into account—the settled and seminomadic communities that had developed varied types of relations with the nomads on both the economic and the political levels. In this light, the notion that the Xiongnu required an amount of agricultural products larger than what could be obtained from areas that had been for a long time integral parts of the economic system of the steppe region, with all its far-reaching implications in the history of the Xiongnu relations with China, should therefore be at least reconsidered.

Second, I would like to briefly address some historical questions relative to the period of the rise and decline of the Xiongnu empire which, in my view, are directly affected by the foregoing discussion. The Xiongnu empire came into existence after decades of relentless Chinese expansion into the northern steppe. In the third century B.C., the northern Chinese states of Qin, Zhao, and Yan made very substantial territorial gains in the northern regions (*SJ* 110: 2885–86). After the unification by Qinshihuangdi, the whole of the Ordos region, inhabited by Xiongnu nomads, was conquered by Chinese armies, led by General Meng Tian, and the nomads were chased out and replaced with Chinese colonists (*SJ* 88: 2565–66). This expansionistic drive can be interpreted through Morton Fried's concept that "the state, to use a biological metaphor, is born with a ravenous appetite and will 'consume' less developed societies within its range" (Fried 1983: 475). According to the *Shiji*, the Xiongnu bore the brunt of the Qin expansion into the Ordos region. Their weakness seems to have induced other nomads, such as the Eastern Hu, to seek advantage from the situation (*SJ* 110: 2887–93). The shrinking of pastoral resources and displacement of nomads from their ancestral lands (in particular from the Ordos region) ignited a period of crisis that was characterized by violent internomadic struggles. From this struggle the Xiongnu gradually emerged as the winning side and, in the course of several decades, expanded their political power over the whole steppe region to the north of China, as far as Lake Baikal and Tuva, and to the west as far as the Ili region and beyond. During their expansion the Xiongnu incorporated both nomadic and settled communities that had different levels of cultural development, economic activity, and sociopolitical organization. Keeping in mind the basic phases through which the Xiongnu achieved their position of political and

military supremacy, the creation of the Xiongnu nomadic confederation does not seem to have started, as a historical process, as a result of any economic dependency, or inherent need for silk and grain, but rather as a defensive measure, and as a reaction to a critical situation caused by the loss of their source of sustenance: animals and pasture land. The nomads, as we have shown above, could and did survive without China but could no longer survive if China (or any other enemy) deprived them of their means of livelihood. It is also likely, however, that the economic revenues from the tributes paid by China and other (both nomadic and sedentary) states that had declared their submission to the Xiongnu buttressed the power of the upper echelons of Xiongnu aristocracy, and allowed them to support their personal armies, retinue, and, in general, to maintain a position of privilege. The extra revenues may have also served as a form of communal guarantee in view of the precariousness and volatility of nomadic economy. As pointed out by Khazanov, nomadic economy functions in cycles, and is subject to a high level of instability. Many factors, such as droughts, severe frosts, drying up of water resources, or increase in the animal and human population, may alter the delicate ecological balance in the steppe (Khazanov 1984: 72–74). The equitable redistribution of resources from the tribal elite to the commoners is often assumed to be a typical trait of nomadic polity. In fact, how and in what proportion the revenues from tributary relations were redistributed among the Xiongnu tribesmen are entirely unknown. One can only suppose that such revenues (as opposed to booty from raids) were appropriated by the aristocracy and “trickled down” to the lower echelons of nomadic society in the form of rewards. Control of revenues was therefore a crucial step in the establishment of a large nomadic political union.

Within this perspective it becomes clearer why the break-up of the Xiongnu power basis, achieved by China through Emperor Wu’s policies of cessation of tribute payments, seizure of the pasture grounds of the nomadic elite, destruction of rural settlements and urban centers in the steppe, replacement of the Xiongnu political and military rule over the Western Regions, and establishment of tight military control on the borders from Xinjiang to Manchuria, coincided with the end of the Xiongnu empire as a unified, centralized political entity, but did not cause the extermination of the Xiongnu as a people. Lacking the political prerogatives that would guarantee the flow of resources that made the tribal confederation militarily strong, politically united, and economically prosperous, the nomadic leadership was unable to stop a rapid decline toward a situation of economic instability that left the various tribes and segments of nomadic peoples to vie once again for the modest resources available in the steppe.

Thus, events narrated in the Chinese sources about the decline of the Xiongnu also acquire a more precise meaning. During the period the Han emperors started to displace the Xiongnu from the Ordos area and from the Western Regions, the written sources cite numerous instances of natural disasters and epidemics that brought incalculable economic damage to the Xiongnu. The economic damage was followed by the rebellion of peoples subject to the Xiongnu and by internal strife among members of the ruling Xiongnu elite. What the textual evidence points to, hence, is that the decline of the Xiongnu empire was not marked by any visible decrease in their need for grain and silk, or by an improvement in their economic balance, which would allow them to release their grip on China. In fact, the opposite occurred: through the loss of their source of extra revenues from China and from other dependent states, the Xiongnu were left more vulnerable to natural calamities. The only logical conclusion is that the mass of the

nomads simply went back, where possible, to a subsistence economy based on a pattern of modest economic interaction with other communities within their range of action. This pattern existed together with the “tributary” and “court-to-court” relations that took place in periods of “imperial” unity, and constituted the customary existence, relatively dangerous and uncertain, of the common nomads in the steppe.

NOTES

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- 1. In Xinjiang many of the prehistoric remains previously attributed to the Neolithic are now generally believed to date from the Bronze and Iron Ages (Debaine-Francfort 1988 and 1989; An 1992: 331).
- 2. On this expression cf. A. Salmony, *Sino-Siberian Art in the Collection of C. T. Loo* (Paris 1933).
- 3. I have based these datings on Watson 1971: 13 (after Okladnikov); Chernykh 1992: 3; Derevyanko and Dorj 1992: 171.
- 4. For a complete and detailed analysis of the various economic activities of the Xiongnu in Transbaikalia, see Konovalov 1976; for a summary of the findings related to agricultural production, see p. 210 and following.
- 5. *Dob* means “hill” in Mongol. According to Ser-Odjav, Gua Dob had mainly a religious function as a sacrificial site (Ser-Odjav 1987). Wu En (1990) maintains that, together with all the other settlements found in Mongolia, it served a military purpose.
- 6. *Dörböljin* in Mongol means “quadrangle,” and refers to the layout of the site, which was contained within walls erected on all four sides.
- 7. I have had the opportunity, courtesy of Ruth Meserve, to see the prepublication draft of An Zhimin’s 1992 article, where the C14 date is 650 B.C. rather than 560, as it appears in the published version. If 560 is a typographical error for 650, the difference between the C14 and the MASCA datings would then be considerably narrower, and, taking into account the margin of ± 90 years in the C14 dating, they would almost coincide (740 vs. 780).
- 8. For the description of some metallic findings previously ascribed to the Wusun and recently attributed to the Saka, see Wang 1987: 34–37.
- 9. It is impossible to assess the historical value of the written sources without a careful analysis of the historian’s intent. On the question of Sima Qian’s interest in and approach to Inner Asia, see Di Cosmo 1991, chap. 3.
- 10. On the question of the sedentarization of nomads, see Khazanov 1984: 198–202. Possibly the most thorough study of this aspect of nomadic life economy is Salzman 1980.
- 11. Apparently this occurred first in the Gansu corridor and may have extended at different times as far as the Ili and Altai regions. For a discussion of the homeland of Wusun and Yuezhi, see Hulsewé 1979: 214–15, n. 803.
- 12. A good example of this model is given by the Wakhi and Kirghiz communities of Afghanistan. The agriculture-dependent Kirghiz obtain products from the nearby settlements of Wakhi people, who practice a rather primitive form of high-altitude agriculture (Shahrani 1979: 109, 63; the map on p. 115 illustrates the distribution of the Wakhi settlements and Kirghiz campsites).
- 13. On the question of trade between China and Central Asia, Aurel Stein maintains that the Chinese expansion into the Western Region had been prompted by the need to find markets for the silk produced domestically (Stein 1921, I: 406). Frederick Teggart in his influential study (1939) of commerce between China and Rome contends that China fought with the Xiongnu for control over the trade routes (pp. 148–233).

14. On the historical and archaeological evidence about trade between China and the West, two excellent studies are Raschke 1978 and Ferguson 1978.
15. On the Chinese exploration of Central Asia, and in particular of Zhang Qian mission, see Loewe 1979. See also Gardiner-Gardner 1986 and Leslie and Gardiner 1982.
16. The *heqin* or “appeasement” policy was adopted by Han Gaozu after the crushing defeat suffered at Pingcheng (200 B.C.). It included the payment of a yearly tribute in silk, grain, and bullion to the Xiongnu.
17. For the view that a symbiosis of different modes of subsistence was created through the economic specialization of certain groups as a result of demographic growth, see David 1988.

LIST OF REFERENCES

Abbreviations

<i>ACRCO</i>	<i>L'Asie centrale et ses rapports avec les civilisations orientales, des origines à l'âge du fer. Mémoires de la Mission Archéologique Française en Asie Centrale, tome I. (Actes du colloque franco-sovietique). Paris: Diffusion de Boccard, 1988.</i>
<i>AOH</i>	<i>Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae.</i>
<i>AS</i>	<i>Arkheologiin Sudlal</i> (Studia Archaeologica Instituti Academiae Reipublicae Populi Mongoli) [Archaeological Studies].
<i>BSOAS</i>	<i>Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies.</i>
<i>CAJ</i>	<i>Central Asiatic Journal.</i>
<i>CAS</i>	<i>Central Asiatic Studies.</i>
<i>CHEIA</i>	Denis Sinor, ed., <i>Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia</i> . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
<i>HS</i>	Ban Gu. <i>Hanshu</i> . 12 vols. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1964.
<i>KG</i>	<i>Kaogu</i> [Antiquities].
<i>KGWW</i>	<i>Kaogu yu wenwu</i> [Antiquities and Cultural Relics].
<i>KGXB</i>	<i>Kaogu xuebao</i> . [Journal of Archaeological Studies].
<i>KGXJK</i>	<i>Kaoguxue jikan</i> [Journal of Archaeology].
<i>MRDTB</i>	<i>Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko.</i>
<i>NMGDXXB</i>	<i>Nei Menggu daxue xuebao</i> [Journal of Inner Mongolia University].
<i>NMGKGXB</i>	<i>Nei Menggu kaogu xuebao</i> [Journal of Inner Mongolian Archaeological Studies].
<i>NMGSHKX</i>	<i>Nei Menggu shehui kexue</i> [Inner Mongolian Social Sciences].
<i>NMGWWKG</i>	<i>Nei Menggu wenwu yu kaogu</i> [Inner Mongolian Cultural Relics and Antiquities].
<i>NYKG</i>	<i>Nongye kaogu</i> [Agricultural Antiquities].
<i>SA</i>	<i>Sovetskaia Arkheologiia.</i>
<i>SJ</i>	Sima Qian. <i>Shiji</i> . 10 vols. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1964.
<i>Unesco</i>	<i>History of Civilizations of Central Asia</i> . Ahmad H. Dani and V. M. Masson, eds., Vol. I: <i>The dawn of civilization: earliest times to 700 B.C.</i> Paris: Unesco, 1992. János Harmatta, ed., Vol. II: <i>The development of sedentary and nomadic civilizations: 700 B.C. to A.D. 250.</i> Paris: Unesco, 1994.
<i>WW</i>	<i>Wenwu</i> [Cultural Relics].
<i>ZGC</i>	<i>Zhanguo ce</i> . Annotated by Liu Xiang (Western Han), 3 vols. Shanghai: Guji chubanshe, 1985.
<i>ZZ</i>	Li Zongtong. <i>Qunqiu Zuozhuan jinju jinyi</i> [Annotated Edition of the Qunqiu Zuozhuan], 3 vols. Taipei: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1973.

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THE ACCOUNT OF THE XIONGNU

Sima Qian



From the time of the Three Dynasties on, the Xiongnu have been a source of constant worry and harm to China. The Han has attempted to determine the Xiongnu's periods of strength and weakness so that it may adopt defensive measures or launch punitive expeditions as the circumstances allow. Thus I made "The Account of the Xiongnu".

The ancestor of the Xiongnu was a descendant of the rulers of the Xia dynasty by the name of Chunwei. As early as the time of Emperors Yao and Shun and before, we hear of these people, known as Mountain Barbarians, Xianyun, or Hunzhu, living in the region of the northern barbarians and wandering from place to place pasturing their animals. The animals they raise consist mainly of horses, cows, and sheep, but include such rare beasts as camels, asses, mules, and the wild horses known as *taotu* and *tuoji*. They move about in search of water and pasture and have no walled cities or fixed dwellings, nor do they engage in any kind of agriculture. Their lands, however, are divided into regions under the control of various leaders. They have no writing, and even promises and agreements are only verbal. The little boys start out by learning to ride sheep and shoot birds and rats with a bow and arrow, and when they get a little older they shoot foxes and hares, which are used for food. Thus all the young men are able to use a bow and act as armed cavalry in time of war. It is their custom to herd their flocks in times of peace and make their living by hunting, but in periods of crisis they take up arms and go off on plundering and marauding expeditions. This seems to be their inborn nature. For long-range weapons they use bows and arrows, and swords and spears at close range. If the battle is going well for them they will advance, but if not, they will retreat, for they do not consider it a disgrace to run away. Their only concern is self-advantage, and they know nothing of propriety or righteousness.

From the chiefs of the tribe on down, everyone eats the meat of the domestic animals and wears clothes of hide or wraps made of felt or fur. The young men eat the richest and best food, while the old get what is left over, since the tribe honours those who are young and strong and despises the weak and aged. On the death of his father, a son will marry his stepmother, and when brothers die, the remaining brothers will take the widows for their own wives. They have no polite names¹ but only personal names, and they observe no taboos in the use of personal names.

When the power of the Xia dynasty declined, Gong Liu, the ancestor of the Zhou dynasty, having lost his position as minister of grain, went to live among the Western

Rong barbarians, adopting their ways and founding a city at Bin. Some 300 years later the Rong and Di tribes attacked Gong Liu's descendant, the Great Lord Danfu. Danfu fled to the foot of Mt. Qi and the whole population of Bin followed after him, founding a new city there. This was the beginning of the Zhou state.

A hundred and some years later Chang, the Zhou Earl of the West, attacked the Quanyishi tribe, and ten or twelve years later, his son, King Wu, overthrew Emperor Zhou, the last ruler of the Shang dynasty, and founded a new capital at Luo. He also occupied the regions of Feng and Hao, drove the barbarians north beyond the Jing and Luo rivers, and obliged them to bring tribute to his court at specified times. Their lands were known as "the submissive wastes".

Some 200 years later, when the power of the Zhou dynasty had declined, King Mu attacked the Dog Rong and brought back with him four white wolves and four white deer which he had seized. From this time on, the peoples of the "submissive wastes" no longer journeyed to court. (At this time the Zhou adopted the penal code of Marquis Fu.)²

Some 200 years after the time of King Mu, King You of the Zhou, egged on by his beloved concubine Baosi, quarrelled with Marquis Shen. In anger, Marquis Shen joined forces with the Dog Rong and attacked and killed King You at the foot of Mt. Li. Eventually the barbarians seized the region of Jiaohuo from the Zhou, occupied the area between the Jing and Wei rivers, and invaded and plundered the central region of China. Duke Xiang of Qin came to the rescue of the Zhou court, and King You's successor King Ping abandoned the regions of Feng and Hao and moved his capital east to the city of Luo. (At this time Duke Xiang of Qin attacked the barbarians and advanced as far as Mt. Qi; as a result he was for the first time ranked among the feudal lords of the Zhou dynasty.)

Sixty-five years later (704 BC) the Mountain Barbarians crossed through the state of Yan and attacked Qi. Duke Li of Qi fought with them in the suburbs of his capital. Forty-four years later the Mountain Barbarians attacked Yan, but Yan reported its distress to Duke Huan of Qi, who rode north and attacked the barbarians, driving them off.

Some twenty years later the barbarians rode as far as the capital city of Luo and attacked King Xiang of the Zhou; King Xiang fled to the city of Fan in Zheng. Previously King Xiang had wanted to attack the state of Zheng and had therefore married a daughter of the barbarians and made her his queen; then, with the aid of the barbarian forces, he had made his attack on Zheng. Having accomplished his purpose, however, he cast aside his barbarian queen, much to her resentment. King Xiang's stepmother, Queen Hui, had a son named Zidai whom she wished to place on the throne, and therefore Queen Hui, her son, and the barbarian queen agreed to cooperate with the barbarian attackers from within the capital by opening the city to them. Thus the barbarians were able to enter, defeat and drive out King Xiang, and set up Zidai as Son of Heaven in his place.

After this the barbarians occupied the area of Luhun, roaming as far east as the state of Wei, ravaging and plundering the lands of central China with fearful cruelty. The empire was deeply troubled, and therefore the poets in the *Book of Odes* wrote:

We smote the barbarians of the north.
We struck the Xianyun
And drove them to the great plain.

We sent forth our chariots in majestic array
And walled the northern regions.³

After King Xiang had been driven from his throne and had lived abroad for four years, he sent an envoy to the state of Jin to explain his plight. Duke Wen of Jin, having just come to power, wanted to make a name for himself as dictator and protector of the royal house, and therefore he raised an army and attacked and drove out the barbarians, executing Zidai and restoring King Xiang to his throne in Luo.

At this time Qin and Jin were the most powerful states in China. Duke Wen of Jin expelled the Di barbarians and drove them into the region west of the Yellow River between the Yun and Luo rivers; there they were known as the Red Di and the White Di. Shortly afterwards, Duke Mu of Qin, having obtained the services of You Yu,⁴ succeeded in getting the eight barbarian tribes of the west to submit to his authority.

Thus at this time there lived in the region west of Long the Mianzhu, the Hunrong, and the Diyuan tribes. North of Mts. Qi and Liang and the Jing and Qi rivers lived the Yiqu, Dali, Wuzhi, and Quyan tribes. North of Jin were the Forest Barbarians and the Loufan, while north of Yan lived the Eastern Barbarians and Mountain Barbarians. All of them were scattered about in their own little valleys, each with their own chieftains. From time to time they would have gatherings of a hundred or more men, but no one tribe was capable of unifying the others under a single rule.

Some 100 years later Duke Dao of Jin sent Wei Jiang to make peace with the barbarians, so that they came to pay their respects to the court of Jin. A hundred or so years after this, Viscount Xiang of the Zhao family of Jin crossed Mt. Juzhu, defeated the barbarians, and annexed the region of Dai, bringing his state into contact with the Huhe tribes. Shortly afterwards he joined with the viscounts of the Han and Wei families in wiping out their rival, Zhi Bo, and dividing up the state of Jin among the three of them. Thus the Zhao family held possession of Dai and the lands north of Mt. Juzhu, while the Wei family held the provinces of Hexi (Ordos) and Shang, bordering the lands of the barbarians.

After this the Yiqu tribes began to build walls and fortifications to protect themselves, but the state of Qin gradually ate into their territory and, under King Hui, finally seized twenty-five of their forts. King Hui also attacked the state of Wei, forcing it to cede to him the provinces of Hexi and Shang.

During the reign of King Zhao of Qin the ruler of the Yiqu barbarians had illicit relations with King Zhao's mother, the Queen Dowager Xuan, by whom he had two sons. Later the queen dowager deceived and murdered him at the Palace of Sweet Springs and eventually raised an army and sent it to attack and ravage the lands of the Yiqu. Thus Qin came into possession of Longxi, Beidi, and Shang Provinces, where it built long walls to act as a defence against the barbarians.

At the same time King Wuling of Zhao changed the customs of his people, ordering them to adopt barbarian dress and to practise riding and shooting, and then led them north in a successful attack on the Forest Barbarians and the Loufan. He constructed a defensive wall stretching from Dai along the foot of the Yin Mountains to Gaoque, establishing the three provinces of Yunzhong, Yanmen, and Dai.

A little later a worthy general named Qin Kai appeared in the state of Yan. He had earlier been sent as a hostage to the barbarians and had won their deepest confidence; on returning to his state, he led an attack on the Eastern Barbarians, defeating and driving them over 1,000 *li* from the border of the state. (The Qin Wuyang who took part

with Jing Ke in the attempted assassination of the king of Qin was this man's grandson.) Yan also constructed a long wall from Zaoyang to Xiangping and set up the provinces of Shanggu, Yuyang, Youbeiping, Liaoxi, and Liaodong to guard against the attacks of the barbarians.⁵

By this time China, the land of caps and girdles, was divided among seven states, three of which bordered the territory of the Xiongnu. Later, while the Zhao general Li Mu was living, the Xiongnu did not dare to cross the border of Zhao.

Finally Qin overthrew the other six states, and the First Emperor of the Qin dispatched Meng Tian to lead a force of 100,000 men north to attack the barbarians. He seized control of all the lands south of the Yellow River and established border defences along the river, constructing forty-four walled district cities overlooking the river and manning them with convict labourers transported to the border for garrison duty. He also built the Direct Road from Jiuyuan to Yunyang. Thus he utilized the natural mountain barriers to establish the border defences, scooping out the valleys and constructing ramparts and building installations at other points where they were needed. The whole line of defences stretched over 10,000 *li* from Lintao to Liaodong and even extended across the Yellow River and through Yangshan and Beijia.

At this time the Eastern Barbarians were very powerful and the Yuezhi were likewise flourishing. The *Shanyu* or chieftain of the Xiongnu was named Touman. Touman, unable to hold out against the Qin forces, had withdrawn to the far north, where he lived with his subjects for over ten years. After Meng Tian died and the feudal lords revolted against the Qin, plunging China into a period of strife and turmoil, the convicts which the Qin had sent to the northern border to garrison the area all returned to their homes. The Xiongnu, the pressure against them relaxed, once again began to infiltrate south of the bend of the Yellow River until they had established themselves along the old border of China.

Touman's oldest son, the heir apparent to his position, was named Maodun, but the *Shanyu* also had a younger son by another consort whom he had taken later and was very fond of. He decided that he wanted to get rid of Maodun and set up his younger son as heir instead, and he therefore sent Maodun as hostage to the Yuezhi nation. Then, after Maodun had arrived among the Yuezhi, Touman made a sudden attack on them. The Yuezhi were about to kill Maodun in retaliation, but he managed to steal one of their best horses and escape, eventually making his way back home. His father, struck by his bravery, put him in command of a force of 10,000 cavalry.

Maodun had some arrows made that whistled in flight and used them to drill his troops in shooting from horseback. "Shoot wherever you see my whistling arrow strike!" he ordered, "and anyone who fails to shoot will be cut down!" Then he went out hunting for birds and animals, and if any of his men failed to shoot at what he himself had shot at, he cut them down on the spot. After this, he shot a whistling arrow at one of his best horses. Some of his men hung back and did not dare shoot at the horse, whereupon Maodun at once executed them. A little later he took an arrow and shot at his favourite wife. Again some of his men shrank back in terror and failed to discharge their arrows, and again he executed them on the spot. Finally he went out hunting with his men and shot a whistling arrow at one of his father's finest horse. All his followers promptly discharged their arrows in the same direction, and Maodun knew that at last they could be trusted. Accompanying his father, the *Shanyu* Touman, on a hunting expedition, he shot a whistling arrow at his father and every one of his followers aimed their arrows in the same direction and shot the *Shanyu* dead. Then Maodun executed his stepmother,

his younger brother, and all the high officials of the nation who refused to take orders from him, and set himself up as the new *Shanyu*.

At this time the Eastern Barbarians were very powerful and, hearing that Maodun had killed his father and made himself leader, they sent an envoy to ask if they could have Touman's famous horse that could run 1,000 *li* in one day. Maodun consulted his ministers, but they all replied, "The thousand-*li* horse is one of the treasures of the Xiongnu people. You should not give it away!"

"When a neighbouring country asks for it, why should I begrudge them one horse?" he said, and sent them the thousand-*li* horse.

After a while the Eastern Barbarians, supposing that Maodun was afraid of them, sent an envoy to ask for one of Maodun's consorts. Again Maodun questioned his ministers, and they replied in a rage, "The Eastern Barbarians are unreasoning beasts to come and request one of the *Shanyu*'s consorts. We beg to attack them!"

But Maodun replied, "If it is for a neighbouring country, why should I begrudge them one woman?" and he sent his favourite consort to the Eastern Barbarians.

With this the ruler of the Eastern Barbarians grew more and more bold and arrogant, invading the lands to the west. Between his territory and that of the Xiongnu was an area of over 1,000 *li* of uninhabited land; the two peoples made their homes on either side of this wasteland.⁶ The ruler of the Eastern Barbarians sent an envoy to Maodun saying, "The Xiongnu have no way of using this stretch of wasteland which lies between my border and yours. I would like to take possession of it!"

When Maodun consulted his ministers, some of them said, "Since the land is of no use you might as well give it to him," while others said, "No, you must not give it away!"

Maodun flew into a rage. "Land is the basis of the nation!" he said. "Why should I give it away?" And he executed all the ministers who had advised him to do so.

Then he mounted his horse and set off to attack the Eastern Barbarians, circulating an order throughout his domain that anyone who was slow to follow would be executed. The Eastern Barbarians had up until this time despised Maodun and made no preparations for their defence; when Maodun and his soldiers arrived, they inflicted a crushing defeat, killing the ruler of the Eastern Barbarians, taking prisoner his subjects, and seizing their domestic animals. Then he returned and rode west, attacking and routing the Yuezhi, and annexed the lands of the ruler of Loufan and the ruler of Boyang south of the Yellow River. Thus he recovered possession of all the lands which the Qin general Meng Tian had taken away from the Xiongnu; the border between his territory and that of the Han empire now followed the old line of defences south of the Yellow River, and from there he marched into the Chaona and Fushi districts and then invaded Yan and Dai.

At this time the Han forces were stalemated in battle with the armies of Xiang Yu, and China was exhausted by warfare. Thus Maodun was able to strengthen his position, massing a force of over 300,000 skilled crossbowmen.

Over 1,000 years had elapsed from the time of Chunwei, the ancestor of the Xiongnu, to that of Maodun, a vast period during which the tribes split up and scattered into various groups, sometimes expanding, sometimes dwindling in size. Thus it is impossible to give any ordered account of the lineage of the Xiongnu rulers. When Maodun came to power, however, the Xiongnu reached their peak of strength and size, subjugating all of the other barbarian tribes of the north and turning south to confront China as a rival nation. As a result of this, it is possible to give an account here of the later Xiongnu rulers and of the offices and titles of the nation.

Under the *Shanyu* are the Wise Kings of the Left and Right, the left and right Luli kings, left and right generals, left and right commandants, left and right household administrators, and left and right Gudu marquises. The Xiongnu word for “wise” is “*tuqi*”, so that the heir of the *Shanyu* is customarily called the “*Tuqi* King of the Left”. Among the other leaders, from the wise kings on down to the household administrators, the more important ones command 10,000 horsemen and the lesser ones several thousand, numbering twenty-four leaders in all, though all are known by the title of “Ten Thousand Horsemen”. The high ministerial offices are hereditary, being filled from generation to generation by the members of the Huyan and Lan families, and in more recent times by the Xubu family. These three families constitute the aristocracy of the nation. The kings and other leaders of the left live in the eastern sector, the region from Shanggu east to the lands of the Huimo and Chaoxian peoples. The kings and leaders of the right live in the west, the area from Shang Province west to the territories of the Yuezhi and Qiang tribes. The *Shanyu* has his court in the region north of Dai and Yunzhong. Each group has its own area, within which it moves about from place to place looking for water and pasture. The Left and Right Wise Kings and Luli kings are the most powerful, while the Gudu marquises assist the *Shanyu* in the administration of the nation. Each of the twenty-four leaders in turn appoints his own “chiefs of a thousand”, “chiefs of a hundred”, and “chiefs of ten”, as well as his subordinate kings, prime ministers, chief commandants, household administrators, *juqu*⁷ officials, and so forth.

In the first month of the year the various leaders come together in a small meeting at the *Shanyu*’s court to perform sacrifices, and in the fifth month a great meeting is held at Longcheng at which sacrifices are conducted to the Xiongnu ancestors, Heaven and Earth, and the gods and spirits. In the autumn, when the horses are fat, another great meeting is held at the Dai Forest when a reckoning is made of the number of persons and animals.

According to Xiongnu law, anyone who in ordinary times draws his sword a foot from the scabbard is condemned to death. Anyone convicted of theft has his property confiscated. Minor offences are punished by flogging and major ones by death. No one is kept in jail awaiting sentence longer than ten days, and the number of imprisoned men for the whole nation does not exceed a handful.⁸

At dawn the *Shanyu* leaves his camp and makes obeisance to the sun as it rises, and in the evening he makes a similar obeisance to the moon. In seating arrangements the left side or the seat facing north is considered the place of honour. The days *wu* and *ji* of the ten-day week are regarded as most auspicious.

In burials the Xiongnu use an inner and an outer coffin, with accessories of gold, silver, clothing, and fur, but they do not construct grave mounds or plant trees on the grave, nor do they use mourning garments. When a ruler dies, the ministers and concubines who were favoured by him and who are obliged to follow him in death often number in the hundreds or even thousands.

Whenever the Xiongnu begin some undertaking, they observe the stars and the moon. They attack when the moon is full and withdraw their troops when it wanes. After a battle those who have cut off the heads of the enemy or taken prisoners are presented with a cup of wine and allowed to keep the spoils they have captured. Any prisoners that are taken are made slaves. Therefore, when they fight, each man strives for his own gain. They are very skilful at using decoy troops to lure their opponents to destruction. When they catch sight of the enemy, they swoop down like a flock of birds, eager for booty, but

when they find themselves hard pressed and beaten, they scatter and vanish like the mist. Anyone who succeeds in recovering the body of a comrade who has fallen in battle receives all of the dead man's property.

Shortly after the period described above, Maodun launched a series of campaigns to the north, conquering the tribes of Hunyu, Qushe, Dingling, Gekun, and Xinli. Thus the nobles and high ministers of the Xiongnu were all won over by Maodun, considering him a truly worthy leader.

At this time Gaozu, the founder of the Han, had just succeeded in winning control of the empire and had transferred Xin, the former king of Hann, to the rulership of Dai, with his capital at Mayi. The Xiongnu surrounded Mayi and attacked the city in great force, whereupon Hann Xin surrendered to them. With Hann Xin on their side, they then proceeded to lead their troops south across Mt. Juzhu and attack Taiyuan, marching as far as the city of Jinyang. Emperor Gaozu led an army in person to attack them, but it was winter and he encountered such cold and heavy snow that two or three out of every ten of his men lost their fingers from frostbite. Maodun feigned a retreat to lure the Han soldiers on to an attack. When they came after him in pursuit, he concealed all of his best troops and left only his weakest and puniest men to be observed by the Han scouts. With this the entire Han force, supplemented by 320,000 infantry, rushed north to pursue him; Gaozu led the way, advancing as far as the city of Pingcheng.

Before the infantry had had a chance to arrive, however, Maodun swooped down with 400,000 of his best cavalry, surrounded Gaozu on White Peak, and held him there for seven days. The Han forces within the encirclement had no way of receiving aid or provisions from their comrades outside, since the Xiongnu cavalry surrounded them on all sides, with white horses on the west side, greenish horses on the east, black horses on the north, and red ones on the south.⁹

Gaozu sent an envoy in secret to Maodun's consort, presenting her with generous gifts, whereupon she spoke to Maodun, saying, "Why should the rulers of these two nations make such trouble for each other? Even if you gained possession of the Han lands, you could never occupy them, and the ruler of the Han may have his guardian deities as well as you. I beg you to consider the matter well!"

Maodun had previously arranged for the troops of Wang Huang and Zhao Li, two of Hann Xin's generals, to meet with him, but though the appointed time had come, they failed to appear and he began to suspect that they were plotting with the Han forces. He therefore decided to listen to his consort's advice and withdrew his forces from one corner of the encirclement. Gaozu ordered his men to load their crossbows with arrows and hold them in readiness pointed toward the outside. These preparations completed, they marched straight out of the encirclement and finally joined up with the rest of the army.

Maodun eventually withdrew his men and went away, and Gaozu likewise retreated and abandoned the campaign, dispatching Liu Jing to conclude a peace treaty with the Xiongnu instead.

After this Hann Xin became a general for the Xiongnu, and Zhao Li and Wang Huang repeatedly violated the peace treaty by invading and plundering Dai and Yunzhong. Shortly afterwards, Chen Xi revolted and joined with Hann Xin in a plot to attack Dai. Gaozu dispatched Fan Kuai to go and attack them; he recovered possession of the provinces and districts of Dai, Yanmen, and Yunzhong, but did not venture beyond the frontier.

At this time a number of Han generals had gone over to the side of the Xiongnu, and for this reason Maodun was constantly plundering the region of Dai and causing the Han great worry. Gaozu therefore dispatched Liu Jing to present a princess of the imperial family to the *Shanyu* to be his consort. The Han agreed to send a gift of specified quantities of silk floss and cloth, grain, and other food stuffs each year, and the two nations were to live in peace and brotherhood. After this Maodun raided the frontier less often than before. Later Lu Wan, the king of Yan, revolted and led his party of several thousand followers across the border to surrender to the Xiongnu; they roamed back and forth in the region from Shanggu to the east, causing considerable disturbance.

After Emperor Gaozu passed away, Emperor Hui and Empress Lü in turn ruled the country. At this time the Han had just come to power and the Xiongnu, unimpressed by its strength, were behaving with great arrogance. Maodun even sent an insulting letter to Empress Lü.¹⁰ She wanted to launch a campaign against him, but her generals reminded her that “even Emperor Gaozu, with all his wisdom and bravery, encountered great difficulty at Pingcheng”, and she was finally persuaded to give up the idea and resume friendly relations with the Xiongnu.

When Emperor Wen came to the throne he renewed the peace treaty with the Xiongnu. In the fifth month of the third year of his reign (177 BC), however, the Xiongnu Wise King of the Right invaded the region south of the Yellow River, plundering the loyal barbarians of Shang Province who had been appointed by the Han to guard the frontier, and murdering and carrying off a number of the inhabitants. Emperor Wen ordered the chancellor Guan Ying to lead a force of 85,000 carriages and cavalry to Gaonu, where they attacked the Wise King of the Right. The latter fled beyond the frontier. The emperor in person visited Taiyuan, at which time the king of Jibei revolted. When the emperor returned to the capital he disbanded the army which Guan Ying had used in the attack on the barbarians.

The following year the *Shanyu* sent a letter to the Han court which read:

The great *Shanyu* whom Heaven has set up respectfully inquires of the emperor's health. Formerly the emperor broached the question of a peace alliance, and I was most happy to comply with the intentions expressed in his letter. Certain of the Han border officials, however, imposed upon and insulted the Wise King of the Right, and as a result he heeded the counsel of Houyi, Luhou, Nanzhi, and others of his generals and, without asking my permission, engaged in a skirmish with the Han officials, thus violating the pact between the rulers of our two nations and rupturing the bonds of brotherhood that joined us. The emperor has twice sent letters complaining of this situation and I have in turn dispatched an envoy with my answer, but my envoy has not been allowed to return, nor has any envoy come from the Han. As a result, the Han has broken off peaceful relations and our two neighbouring countries are no longer bound in alliance.

Because of the violation of the pact committed by the petty officials, and the subsequent events, I have punished the Wise King of the Right by sending him west to search out the Yuezhi people and attack them. Through the aid of Heaven, the excellence of his fighting men, and the strength of his horses, he has succeeded in wiping out the Yuezhi, slaughtering or forcing to submission every member of the tribe. In addition he has conquered the Loulan, Wusun, and Hujie tribes, as well as the twenty-six states nearby, so that all of them have become a part of the Xiongnu nation. All the people who live by drawing the bow are now united into one family and the entire region of the north is at peace.

Thus I wish now to lay down my weapons, rest my soldiers, and turn my horses to pasture; to forget the recent affair and restore our old pact, that the peoples of the border may have

peace such as they enjoyed in former times, that the young may grow to manhood, the old live out their lives in security, and generation after generation enjoy peace and comfort.

However, I do not as yet know the intentions of the emperor. Therefore I have dispatched my palace attendant Xihuqian to bear this letter. At the same time I beg to present one camel, two riding horses, and eight carriage horses. If the emperor does not wish the Xiongnu to approach his frontier, then he should order the officials and people along the border to withdraw a good distance back from the frontier. When my envoy has arrived and delivered this, I trust that he will be sent back to me.

The envoy bearing the letter arrived in the region of Xinwang during the sixth month. When it was delivered to the emperor, he began deliberations with his ministers as to whether it was better to attack or make peace. The high officials all stated, "Since the *Shanyu* has just conquered the Yuezhi and is riding on a wave of victory, he cannot be attacked. Moreover, even if we were to seize the Xiongnu lands, they are all swamps and saline wastes, not fit for habitation. It would be far better to make peace."

The emperor agreed with their opinion and in the sixth year of the former part of his reign (174 BC) he sent an envoy to the Xiongnu with a letter which read as follows:

The emperor respectfully inquires about the health of the great *Shanyu*. Your palace attendant Xihuqian has brought us a letter which states: "The Wise King of the Right, without asking my permission, heeded the counsel of Houyi, Luhou, Nanzhi, and others of his generals, violating the pact between the rulers of our two nations and rupturing the bonds of brotherhood that joined us, and as a result the Han has broken off peaceful relations with me, and our two neighbouring countries are no longer bound in alliance. Because of the violation of the pact committed by the petty officials, I have punished the Wise King of the Right by sending him west to attack the Yuezhi. Having completed the conquest of the region, I wish to lay down my weapons, rest my soldiers, and turn my horses to pasture; to forget the recent affair and restore our old pact so that the peoples of the border may have peace, the young may grow to manhood, the old live out their lives in security, and generation after generation enjoy peace and comfort."

We heartily approve these words. This indeed is the way the sage rulers of antiquity would have spoken.

The Han has made a pact of brotherhood with the Xiongnu, and for this reason we have sent generous gifts to you. Any violations of the pact or ruptures of the bonds of brotherhood have been the work of the Xiongnu. However, as there has been an amnesty since the affair of the Wise King of the Right occurred,¹¹ you need not punish him too severely. If your intentions are really those expressed in your letter, and if you will make them clearly known to your various officials so that they will henceforth act in good faith and commit no more violations of the pact, then we are prepared to honour the terms of your letter.

Your envoy tells us that you have led your troops in person to attack the other barbarian nations and have won merit, suffering great hardship on the field of battle. We therefore send you from our own wardrobe an embroidered robe lined with patterned damask, an embroidered and lined underrobe, and a brocaded coat, one each; one comb; one sash with gold ornaments; one gold-ornamented leather belt; ten rolls of embroidery; thirty rolls of brocade; and forty rolls each of heavy red silk and light green silk, which shall be delivered to you by our palace counsellor Yi and master of guests Jian.

Shortly after this, Maodun died and his son Jizhu was set up with the title of Old *Shanyu*. When Jizhu became *Shanyu*, Emperor Wen sent a princess of the imperial family to be his consort, dispatching a eunuch from Yan named Zhonghang Yue to accompany her as her tutor. Zhonghang Yue did not wish to undertake the mission, but

the Han officials forced him to do so. "My going will bring nothing but trouble to the Han!" he warned them.

After Zhonghang Yue reached his destination, he went over to the side of the *Shanyu*, who treated him with the greatest favour.

The Xiongnu had always had a liking for Han silks and food stuffs, but Zhonghang Yue told them, "All the multitudes of the Xiongnu nation would not amount to one province in the Han empire. The strength of the Xiongnu lies in the very fact that their food and clothing are different from those of the Chinese, and they are therefore not dependent upon the Han for anything. Now the *Shanyu* has this fondness for Chinese things and is trying to change the Xiongnu customs. Thus, although the Han sends no more than a fifth of its goods here, it will in the end succeed in winning over the whole Xiongnu nation. From now on, when you get any of the Han silks, put them on and try riding around on your horses through the brush and brambles! In no time your robes and leggings will be torn to shreds and everyone will be able to see that silks are no match for the utility and excellence of felt or leather garments. Likewise, when you get any of the Han foodstuffs, throw them away so that the people can see that they are not as practical or as tasty as milk and kumiss!"

He also taught the *Shanyu*'s aides how to make an itemized accounting of the number of persons and domestic animals in the country.

The Han letters addressed to the *Shanyu* were always written on wooden tablets one foot and one inch in length and began, "The emperor respectfully inquires about the health of the great *Shanyu* of the Xiongnu. We send you the following articles, etc., etc." Zhonghang Yue, however, instructed the *Shanyu* to use in replying to the Han a tablet measuring one foot two inches, decorated with broad stamps and great long seals, and worded in the following extravagant manner: "The great *Shanyu* of the Xiongnu, born of Heaven and Earth and ordained by the sun and moon, respectfully inquires about the health of the Han emperor. We send you the following articles, etc., etc."

When one of the Han envoys to the Xiongnu remarked scornfully that Xiongnu custom showed no respect for the aged, Zhonghang Yue began to berate him. "According to Han custom," he said, "when the young men are called into military service and sent off with the army to garrison the frontier, do not their old parents at home voluntarily give up their warm clothing and tasty food so that there will be enough to provide for the troops?"

"Yes, they do," admitted the Han envoy.

"The Xiongnu make it clear that warfare is their business. And since the old and the weak are not capable of fighting, the best food and drink are naturally allotted to the young men in the prime of life. So the young men are willing to fight for the defence of the nation, and both fathers and sons are able to live out their lives in security. How can you say that the Xiongnu despise the aged?"

"But among the Xiongnu," the envoy continued, "fathers and sons sleep together in the same tent. And when a father dies, the sons marry their own stepmothers, and when brothers die, their remaining brothers marry their widows! These people know nothing of the elegance of hats and girdles, nor of the rituals of the court!"

"According to Xiongnu custom," replied Zhonghang Yue, "the people eat the flesh of their domestic animals, drink their milk, and wear their hides, while the animals graze from place to place, searching for pasture and water. Therefore, in wartime the men practise riding and shooting, while in times of peace they enjoy themselves and have nothing to do. Their laws are simple and easy to carry out; the relation between ruler

and subject is relaxed and intimate, so that the governing of the whole nation is no more complicated than the governing of one person. The reason that sons marry their stepmothers and brothers marry their widowed sisters-in-law is simply that they hate to see the clan die out. Therefore, although the Xiongnu encounter times of turmoil, the ruling families always manage to stand firm. In China, on the other hand, though a man would never dream of marrying his stepmother or his brother's widow, yet the members of the same family drift so far apart that they end up murdering each other! This is precisely why so many changes of dynasty have come about in China! Moreover, among the Chinese, as etiquette and the sense of duty decay, enmity arises between the rulers and the ruled, while the excessive building of houses and dwellings exhausts the strength and resources of the nation. Men try to get their food and clothing by farming and raising silk worms and to insure their safety by building walls and fortifications. Therefore, although danger threatens, the Chinese people are given no training in aggressive warfare, while in times of stability they must still wear themselves out trying to make a living. Pooh! You people in your mud huts – you talk too much! Enough of this blubbing and mouthing! Just because you wear hats, what does that make you?"

After this, whenever the Han envoys would try to launch into any sermons or orations, Zhonghang Yue would cut them off at once. "Not so much talk from the Han envoys! Just make sure that the silks and grainstuffs you bring to the Xiongnu are of the right measure and quality, that's all. What's the need for talking? If the goods you deliver are up to measure and of good quality, all right. But if there is any deficiency or the quality is no good, then when the autumn harvest comes we will take our horses and trample all over your crops!"

Day and night he instructed the *Shanyu* on how to manoeuvre into a more advantageous position.

In the fourteenth year of Emperor Wen's reign (166 BC) the *Shanyu* led a force of 140,000 horsemen through the Chaona and Xiao passes, killing Sun Ang, the chief commandant of Beidi Province, and carrying off large numbers of people and animals. Eventually he rode as far as Pengyang, sent a surprise force to break into and burn the Huizhong Palace, and dispatched scouts as far as the Palace of Sweet Springs in Yong.¹²

Emperor Wen appointed the palace military commander Zhou She and the chief of palace attendants Zhang Wu as generals and put them in command of a force of 1,000 chariots and 100,000 horsemen to garrison the vicinity of Chang'an and guard the capital from the barbarian invaders. He also appointed Lu Qing, the marquis of Chang, as general of Shang Province; Wei Su, the marquis of Ning, as general of Beidi; Zhou Zao, the marquis of Longlu, as general of Longxi; Zhang Xiangru, the marquis of Dongyang, as general in chief; and Dong Chi, the marquis of Cheng, as general of the vanguard, and sent them with a large force of chariots and cavalry to attack the barbarians. The *Shanyu* remained within the borders of the empire for a little over a month and then withdrew. The Han forces pursued him beyond the frontier but returned without having been able to kill any of the enemy.

The Xiongnu grew more arrogant day by day, crossing the border every year, killing many of the inhabitants, and stealing their animals. Yunzhong and Liaodong suffered most severely, while in Dai Province alone over 10,000 persons were killed. The Han court, greatly distressed, sent an envoy with a letter to the Xiongnu, and the *Shanyu* in turn dispatched one of his household administrators to apologize and request a renewal of the peace alliance.

In the second year of the latter part of his reign (162 BC) Emperor Wen sent an envoy to the Xiongnu with a letter that read:

The emperor respectfully inquires about the health of the great *Shanyu*. Your envoys, the household administrator and *juqu* Diao Qunan and the palace attendant Han Liao, have delivered to us two horses, which we have respectfully accepted.

According to the decree of the former emperor, the land north of the Great Wall, where men wield the bow and arrow, was to receive its commands from the *Shanyu*, while that within the wall, whose inhabitants dwell in houses and wear hats and girdles, was to be ruled by us; thus might the countless inhabitants of these lands gain their food and clothing by agriculture, weaving, or hunting; father and son live side by side; ruler and minister enjoy mutual security; and all forsake violence and rebellion. Now we have heard that certain evil and deluded men, succumbing greedily to the lure of gain, have turned their backs upon righteousness and violated the peace alliance, forgetting the fate of the countless inhabitants and disrupting the concord which existed between the rulers of our two states.

This, however, is an affair of the past. In your letter, you say that "since our two countries have been joined again in peace and the two rulers are once more in concord," you desire "to rest your soldiers and turn your horses to pasture, in order that generation after generation may know prosperity and joy and we may make a new beginning in peace and harmony." We heartily approve these words. The sage, it is said, renews himself daily, reforming and making a new beginning in order that the old people may have rest and the young grow to manhood, that each may preserve his own life and fulfil the years which Heaven has granted him. So long as we and the *Shanyu* join in walking this road, following the will of Heaven and pitying the people, bestowing the blessing of peace on generation after generation without end, then there will be no one in the whole world who will not benefit.

Our two great nations, the Han and the Xiongnu, stand side by side. Since the Xiongnu dwell in the north, where the land is cold and the killing frosts come early, we have decreed that our officials shall send to the *Shanyu* each year a fixed quantity of millet, leaven, gold, silk cloth, thread, floss, and other articles.

Now the world enjoys profound peace and the people are at rest. We and the *Shanyu* must be as parents to them. When we consider past affairs, we realize that it is only because of petty matters and trifling reasons that the plans of our ministers have failed. No such matters are worthy to disrupt the harmony that exists between brothers.

We have heard it said that Heaven shows no partiality in sheltering mankind, and Earth no bias in bearing it up. Let us, then, with the *Shanyu*, cast aside these trifling matters of the past and walk the great road together, wiping out former evils and planning for the distant future, in order that the peoples of our two states may be joined together like the sons of a single family. Then, from the countless multitudes of the people down to the very fish and turtles, the birds which fly above, all creatures that walk or breathe or move, there will be none that fail to find peace and profit and relief from peril.

To allow men to come and go without hindrance is the way of Heaven. Let us both forget past affairs. We have pardoned those of our subjects who fled to the Xiongnu or were taken prisoner. Let the *Shanyu* likewise ask no further concerning Zhang Ni and the other Xiongnu leaders who surrendered to us.

We have heard that the rulers of ancient times made their promises clearly known and that, once they had given their consent, they did not go back on their words. The *Shanyu* should consider this well, so that all the world may enjoy profound peace. Once the peace alliance has been concluded, the Han shall not be the first to violate it! Let the *Shanyu* ponder these words!

When the *Shanyu* expressed his willingness to abide by the peace agreement, Emperor Wen issued an edict to the imperial secretary which read:

The great *Shanyu* of the Xiongnu has sent us a letter signifying that the peace alliance has been concluded. No action need be taken concerning those who have fled from one state to the other, since they are not sufficiently numerous to affect the population or size of our territories. The Xiongnu shall not enter within our borders, nor shall the Han forces venture beyond the frontier. Anyone who violates this agreement shall be executed. It is to the advantage of both nations that they should live in lasting friendship without further aggression. We have given our consent to this alliance, and now we wish to publish it abroad to the world so that all may clearly understand it.

Four years later, the Old *Shanyu* Jizhu died and was succeeded by his son Junchen. After Junchen assumed the title of *Shanyu*, Emperor Wen once more renewed the former peace alliance. Zhonghang Yue continued to act as adviser to the new *Shanyu*.

A little over a year after Junchen became *Shanyu* (158 BC)¹³ the Xiongnu again violated the peace alliance, invading Shang and Yunzhong provinces in great numbers; 30,000 horsemen attacked each province, killing and carrying off great numbers of the inhabitants before withdrawing. The emperor dispatched three generals with armies to garrison Beidi, the Juzhu Pass in Dai, and the Flying Fox Pass in Zhao, at the same time ordering the other garrisons along the border to guard their defences in order to hold off the barbarians. He also stationed three armies in the vicinity of Chang'an at Xiliu, at Jimen north of the Wei River, and at the Ba River, so as to be prepared for the barbarians in case they entered that area. The Xiongnu cavalry poured through the Juzhu Pass in Dai, and the signal fires along the border flashed the news of their invasion to Chang'an and the Palace of Sweet Springs. After several months the Han troops reached the border, but by that time the Xiongnu had already withdrawn far beyond and the Han troops were recalled.

A year or so later, Emperor Wen passed away and Emperor Jing came to the throne. At this time Liu Sui, the king of Zhao, sent envoys in secret to negotiate with the Xiongnu. When Wu, Chu, Zhao, and the other states revolted, the Xiongnu planned to cooperate with Zhao and cross the border, but the Han forces besieged and defeated the king of Zhao, and the Xiongnu called off their plans for an invasion.

After this Emperor Jing once more renewed the peace alliance with the Xiongnu, allowing them to buy goods in the markets along the Han border and sending them supplies and a princess of the imperial family, as had been done under the earlier agreements. Thus, throughout Emperor Jing's reign, although the Xiongnu from time to time made small plundering raids across the border, they did not carry out any major invasion.

When the present emperor came to the throne he reaffirmed the peace alliance and treated the Xiongnu with generosity, allowing them to trade in the markets of the border stations and sending them lavish gifts. From the *Shanyu* on down, all the Xiongnu grew friendly with the Han, coming and going along the Great Wall.

The emperor then dispatched Nie Wengyi, a native of the city of Mayi, to carry contraband goods to the Xiongnu and begin trading with them. This done, Nie Wengyi deceived them by offering to hand over the city of Mayi to the *Shanyu*, intending by this ruse to lure him into the area. The *Shanyu* trusted Nie Wengyi and, greedy for the wealth of Mayi, set out with a force of 100,000 cavalry and crossed the border at the barrier of Wuzhou. The Han in the meantime had concealed 300,000 troops in the vicinity of Mayi, headed by four generals under the imperial secretary Han Anguo, who was the leader of the expeditionary forces, ready to spring on the *Shanyu* when he arrived.

The *Shanyu* crossed the Han border but was still some 100 *li* from Mayi when he began to notice that, although the fields were full of animals, there was not a single person in sight. Growing suspicious, he attacked one of the beacon warning stations. A defence official of Yanmen who had been patrolling the area but had caught sight of the barbarian invaders had at this time taken refuge in the warning station, for he knew of the plan of the Han forces to ambush them. When the *Shanyu* attacked and captured the warning station, he was about to put the defence official to death when the latter informed him of the Han troops hiding in the valley. "I suspected as much!" exclaimed the *Shanyu* in great alarm, and proceeded to lead his forces back to the border. After they had safely crossed the border he remarked. "Heaven was on my side when I captured this defence official. In effect Heaven sent you to warn me!" and he awarded the defence official the title of "Heavenly King."

The Han forces had agreed to wait until the *Shanyu* had entered Mayi before launching their attack but, since he never proceeded that far, they had no opportunity to strike. Meanwhile another Han general, Wang Hui, had been ordered to lead a special force from Dai and attack the Xiongnu baggage train, but when he heard that the *Shanyu* had retreated and that his forces were extremely numerous, he did not dare to make an attack. When it was all over the Han officials condemned Wang Hui to execution on the grounds that, though he was the one who had engineered the entire plot, he had failed to advance when the time came.

After this the Xiongnu broke off friendly relations with the Han and began to attack the border defences wherever they happened to be. Time and again they crossed the frontier and carried out innumerable plundering raids. At the same time they continued to be as greedy as ever, delighting in the border markets and longing for Han goods, and the Han for its part continued to allow them to trade in the markets in order to sap their resources.

Five years after the Mayi campaign, in the autumn (129 BC), the Han government dispatched four generals, each with a force of 10,000 cavalry, to make a surprise attack on the barbarians at the border markets. General Wei Qing rode out of Shanggu as far as Longcheng, killing or capturing 700 of the enemy. Gongsun He proceeded from Yunzhong, but took no captives. Gongsun Ao rode north from Dai Province, but was defeated by the barbarians and lost over 7,000 of his men. Li Guang advanced from Yanmen, but was defeated and captured, though he later managed to escape and return to the Han. On their return, Gongsun Ao and Li Guang were thrown into prison by the Han officials but were allowed to purchase a pardon for their offences and were reduced to the status of commoners.

In the winter the Xiongnu several times crossed the border on plundering expeditions, hitting hardest at Yuyang. The emperor dispatched General Han Anguo to garrison Yuyang and protect it from the barbarians. In the autumn of the following year 20,000 Xiongnu horsemen invaded the empire, murdered the governor of Liaoxi, and carried off over 2,000 prisoners. They also invaded Yuyang, defeated the army of over 1,000 under the command of the governor of Yuyang, and surrounded Han Anguo's camp. Han Anguo at this time had a force of over 1,000 horsemen under his command, but before long even these were on the point of being wiped out. Relief forces arrived from Yan just in time, and the Xiongnu withdrew. The Xiongnu also invaded Yanmen and killed or carried off over 1,000 persons.

The Han then dispatched General Wei Qing with a force of 30,000 cavalry to ride north from Yanmen, and Li Xi to ride out from Dai Province to attack the barbarians. They succeeded in killing or capturing several thousand of the enemy.

The following year Wei Qing again rode out of Yunzhong and proceeded west as far as Longxi, attacking the kings of the Loufan and Baiyang barbarians south of the Yellow River, capturing or killing several thousand of the enemy, and seizing over 1,000,000 cattle and sheep. Thus the Han regained control of the area south of the bend of the Yellow River and began to build fortifications at Shuofang, repairing the old system of defences that had been set up by Meng Tian during the Qin dynasty and strengthening the frontier along the Yellow River. The Han also abandoned claims to the district of Shibi and the region of Zaoyang that had formed the extreme northern part of the province of Shanggu, handing them over to the Xiongnu. This took place in the second year of the era *yuanshuo* (127 BC).

The following winter the *Shanyu* Junchen died and his younger brother, the Luli King of the Left, Yizhixie, set himself up as *Shanyu*. He attacked and defeated Junchen's heir, Yudan, who fled and surrendered to the Han. The Han enfeoffed Yudan as marquis of Shan, but he died several months later.

The summer after Yizhixie became *Shanyu* the Xiongnu invaded the province of Dai with 20,000 or 30,000 cavalry, murdering the governor, Gong You, and carrying off over 1,000 persons. In the fall the Xiongnu struck again, his time at Yanmen, killing or carrying off over 1,000 of the inhabitants. The following year they once more invaded Dai, Dingxiang, and Shang Provinces with 30,000 cavalry in each group, killing or carrying off several thousand persons. The Wise King of the Right, angry that the Han had seized the territory south of the Yellow River and built fortifications at Shuofang, several times crossed the border on plundering raids; he even went so far as to invade the region south of the river, ravaging Shuofang and killing or carrying off a large number of the officials and inhabitants.

In the spring of the following year (124 BC), the Han made Wei Qing a general in chief and sent him with an army of over 100,000 men and six generals to proceed north from Shuofang and Gaoque and strike at the barbarians. The Wise King of the Right, convinced that the Han forces could never penetrate far enough north to reach him, had drunk himself into a stupor when the Han army, marching 600 or 700 hundred *li* beyond the border, appeared and surrounded him in the night. The king, greatly alarmed, barely escaped with his life, and his best horsemen managed to break away in small groups and follow after him; the Han, however, succeeded in capturing 15,000 of his men and women, including over ten petty kings.

In the autumn, a Xiongnu force of 10,000 cavalry invaded Dai Province, killed the chief commandant Zhu Ying, and carried off over 1,000 men.

In the spring of the following year (123 BC) the Han again dispatched the general in chief Wei Qing with six generals and a force of over 100,000 cavalry; they rode several hundred *li* north from Dingxiang and attacked the Xiongnu. All in all they succeeded in killing or capturing over 19,000 of the enemy, but in the engagements the Han side lost two generals and over 3,000 cavalry. Of the two generals one of them, Su Jian, the general of the right, managed to escape, but the other, Zhao Xin, the marquis of Xi, who was acting as general of the vanguard, surrendered to the Xiongnu when he saw that his men could not win a victory.

Zhao Xin was originally a petty king of the Xiongnu who later went over to the side of the Han. The Han enfeoffed him as marquis of Xi and made him general of the vanguard, sending him to accompany Su Jian, the general of the right, on a different line of advance from that of the rest of the expedition. Zhao Xin and the forces under his command were alone, however, when they encountered the *Shanyu's* men, and as a

result his troops were wiped out. The *Shanyu*, having accepted Zhao Xin's surrender, appointed him to the rank of Zici king, gave him his own sister as a wife, and began to plot with him against the Han. Zhao Xin advised the *Shanyu* to withdraw farther north beyond the desert instead of manoeuvring near the Chinese border. In this way he would be able to lure the Han troops after him and, when they were thoroughly exhausted, take advantage of their weakness to wipe them out. The *Shanyu* agreed to follow this plan.

The following year 10,000 barbarian horsemen invaded Shanggu and killed several hundred inhabitants.

In the spring of the next year (121 BC), the Han dispatched the general of swift cavalry Huo Qubing to lead 10,000 cavalry out of Longxi. They rode more than 1,000 *li* beyond Mt. Yanzhi and attacked the Xiongnu, killing or capturing over 18,000 of the enemy cavalry, defeating the Xiutu king, and seizing the golden man which he used in worshipping Heaven.¹⁴

In the summer Huo Qubing, accompanied by Gongsun Ao, the Heqi marquis, led a force of 20,000 or 30,000 cavalry some 2,000 *li* out of Longxi and Beidi to attack the barbarians. They passed Juyan, attacked in the region of the Qilian Mountains, and captured or killed over 30,000 of the enemy, including seventy or more petty kings and their subordinates.

Meanwhile the Xiongnu invaded Yanmen in Dai Province, killing or carrying off several hundred persons. The Han dispatched Zhang Qian, the Bowang marquis, and General Li Guang to ride out of Youbeiping and attack the Xiongnu Wise King of the Left. The Wise King of the Left surrounded Li Guang's army and came near to wiping out his 4,000 men, though he managed to inflict extraordinary damage on the enemy. Zhang Qian's forces came to the rescue just in time and Li Guang was able to escape, but the Han losses amounted to several thousand men. When the armies returned to the capital, Gongsun Ao was accused of having arrived late at a rendezvous with Huo Qubing and was condemned to die along with Zhang Qian; both men purchased pardons and were reduced to the rank of commoners.

The *Shanyu* was angry at the Hunye and Xiutu kings who lived in the western part of his domain because they had allowed the Han to capture or kill 20,000 or 30,000 of their men; in the autumn he sent them a summons, intending to execute them. The Hunye and Xiutu kings, terrified, sent word to the Han that they were willing to surrender. The Han dispatched Huo Qubing to go and meet them, but on the way the Hunye king murdered the Xiutu king and combined the latter's forces with his own. When he surrendered to the Han, he had a force of over 40,000 men, though it was commonly referred to as a force of 100,000. Having gained the allegiance of the Hunye king, the Han found itself far less troubled by barbarian invasions in the regions of Longxi, Beidi, and Hexi. It therefore moved a number of poor people from east of the Pass to the region south of the bend of the Yellow River known as New Qin, which had been seized from the Xiongnu, in order to populate the area, and reduced the number of garrison troops along the border west of Beidi to half.

The following year (120 BC), the Xiongnu invaded Youbeiping and Dingxiang with a force of 20,000 or 30,000 cavalry in each region, killing or carrying off over 1,000 persons before withdrawing.

In the spring of the following year (119 BC), the Han strategists plotted together, saying, "Zhao Xin, the marquis of Xi, who is acting as adviser to the *Shanyu*, is convinced that, since the Xiongnu are living north of the desert, the Han forces can never

reach them.” They agreed therefore to fatten the horses on grain and send out a force of 100,000 cavalry, along with 140,000 horses to carry baggage and other equipment (this in addition to the horses provided for transporting provisions). They ordered the force to split up into two groups commanded by the general in chief Wei Qing and the general of swift cavalry Huo Qubing. The former was to ride out of Dingxiang and the latter out of Dai; it was agreed that the entire force would cross the desert and attack the Xiongnu.

When the *Shanyu* received word of the approach of these armies, he ordered his baggage trains to withdraw to a distance and, with his finest soldiers, waited on the northern edge of the desert, where he closed in battle with the army of Wei Qing. The battle continued throughout the day and, as evening fell, a strong wind arose. With this the Han forces swooped out to the left and right and surrounded the *Shanyu*. The *Shanyu*, perceiving that he was no match for the Han forces, abandoned his army and, accompanied by only a few hundred of his finest horsemen, broke through the Han encirclement and fled to the north-west. The Han forces set out after him in the night and, though they did not succeed in capturing him, cut down or seized 19,000 of the enemy on the way. They proceeded north as far as Zhao Xin’s fort at Mt. Tianyan before turning back.

After the *Shanyu* had fled, his soldiers, mingling with the Han forces in the confusion, little by little made their way after him. It was therefore a considerable time before the *Shanyu* was able to reassemble his army again. The Luli King of the Right, believing that the *Shanyu* had been killed in battle, declared himself the new *Shanyu*, but when the real *Shanyu* gathered his forces together again the Luli king renounced the title and resumed his former position.

Huo Qubing had meanwhile advanced some 2,000 *li* north from Dai and closed in battle with the Xiongnu Wise King of the Left. The Han forces killed or captured over 70,000 of the enemy and the Wise King and his generals all fled. Huo Qubing performed a Feng sacrifice at Mt. Langjuxu and a Shan sacrifice at Mt. Guyan, gazing out across the sea of sand before returning. After this the Xiongnu withdrew far from the Chinese border, and their leaders no longer established their courts south of the desert.

In the territory beyond the Yellow River, from Shuofang west to Lingju, the Han established irrigation works and set up garrison farms here and there, sending 50,000 or 60,000 officials and soldiers to man them. Gradually the farms ate up more and more territory until they bordered the lands of the Xiongnu to the north.

In the campaign just concluded, when the two Han generals advanced north in great force and surrounded the *Shanyu*, the Han had succeeded in killing or capturing 80,000 or 90,000 of the enemy. At the same time, however, 20,000 or 30,000 Han soldiers lost their lives in the expedition and over 100,000 horses were killed. Thus, although the Xiongnu had withdraw far to the north to nurse their wounds, the Han, being short of horses, was unable to strike at them again. Following the advice of Zhao Xin, the Xiongnu dispatched an envoy to the Han court to use soft words and request a peace alliance. When the emperor referred the proposal to his ministers for deliberation, some of them spoke in favour of a peace pact, while others urged that the Han pursue the Xiongnu and force them to submission. Ren Chang, the chief secretary to the chancellor, announced his opinion, “Since the Xiongnu have just recently been defeated and their spirits broken, they should be treated as foreign vassals and required to come to the border in the spring and autumn to pay their respects to the Han.”

The emperor accordingly sent Ren Chang to the *Shanyu* with this counter-proposal.

When the *Shanyu* heard Ren Chang's suggestion, he flew into a rage and detained him in his camp, refusing to send him back to China. (Earlier, one of the Xiongnu envoys had gone over to the side of the Han and remained in China and the *Shanyu* therefore detained Ren Chang by way of retaliation.)

The Han then began to gather together a force of men and horses in preparation for another campaign, but just at that time the general of swift cavalry Huo Qubing died and so for several years the Han made no further attacks on the Xiongnu.

The *Shanyu* Yizhixie, after having ruled for thirteen years, died and was succeeded by his son Wuwei. This occurred in the third year of the *yuanding* era (114 BC). At the time that Wuwei became *Shanyu*, the Son of Heaven made his first imperial tour of the various provinces, and after that the Han armies were busy in the south putting down the rebellion in the two kingdoms of Southern and Eastern Yue, so no attacks were made on the Xiongnu. The Xiongnu for their part likewise made no raids across the border.

Three years after Wuwei became *Shanyu* the Han, having wiped out the kingdom of Southern Yue, dispatched the former master of carriage Gongsun He at the head of a force of 15,000 cavalry; they rode more than 2,000 *li* north from Jiuyuan, advancing as far as Fujujing before turning back, but they did not catch sight of a single Xiongnu. The Han also dispatched Zhao Ponu, the former Congpiao marquis, with over 10,000 cavalry to ride out of Lingju; Zhao Ponu proceeded several thousand *li*, reaching the Xionghé River before turning back, but he too failed to see a single Xiongnu.

At this time the emperor was making a tour of the border. When he reached Shuofang, he held an inspection of 180,000 cavalry soldiers in order to make a display of military might, at the same time dispatching a man named Guo Ji to the *Shanyu* to make sure that the Xiongnu were fully informed of the event.

When Guo Ji reached the Xiongnu, the Xiongnu master of guests asked him what his business was. Replying in very polite and humble terms, Guo Ji said, "I would like to wait until I am granted an audience with the *Shanyu* before stating my business."

When he was shown before the *Shanyu* he said, "The head of the king of Southern Yue hangs above the northern gate of the Han capital. Now, if you are able, advance and engage the Han forces in battle! The Son of Heaven has led his troops in person and is waiting on the border. But if you are not able, then turn your face to the south and acknowledge yourself a subject of the Han! Why this useless running away and hiding far off north of the desert in a cold and bitter land where there is no water or pasture? It will get you nowhere!"

When he had finished speaking, the *Shanyu*, livid with rage, ordered the master of guests who had ushered him in to be cut down on the spot. He detained Guo Ji and would not let him return to China; later he moved him to the shore of the Northern Sea (Lake Baikal). In the end, however, the *Shanyu* refused to be provoked into invading the Han border but turned his horses to pasture, rested his troops, and practised archery and hunting instead, sending envoys to the Han from time to time to speak with soft words and honeyed phrases and request a peace alliance.

The Han in turn sent Wang Wu and others as envoys to observe the Xiongnu. According to Xiongnu law, unless an envoy from the Han surrendered his credentials and allowed his face to be tattooed in black, he would not be admitted to the *Shanyu*'s tent. Wang Wu had been born in the north and was familiar with the barbarian customs, and therefore he readily gave up his credentials, submitted to the tattooing, and was able to gain admittance to the *Shanyu*'s tent. The *Shanyu* showed a great liking for him

and pretended to agree amiably with whatever he said, even with the suggestion that he send his son, the heir apparent to the position of *Shanyu*, as a hostage to the Han in order to secure a peace alliance. The Han then dispatched Yang Xin as envoy to the Xiongnu.

At this time the Han forces in the east had conquered the barbarian states of Huimo and Chaoxian and made provinces out of them, while in the west the Han had created the province of Jiuquan in order to drive a wedge between the Xiongnu and the Qiang barbarians and cut off communications between them. It had also established relations with the Yuezhi people and Daxia (Bactria) farther west and had sent an imperial princess to marry the ruler of the Wusun people, all in an effort to create a split between the Xiongnu and the states to the west which had up to this time aided and supported them. In addition, the Han continued to expand its agricultural lands in the north until the frontier had been pushed out as far as Xuanlei. In spite of all these moves, however, the Xiongnu did not dare to voice any objections. This year Zhao Xin, the marquis of Xi, who had been acting as adviser to the *Shanyu*, died.

The Han administrators believed that the Xiongnu had already been sufficiently weakened and could now be made to acknowledge themselves subjects of the Han and submit to Chinese rule, and therefore they had dispatched Yang Xin as envoy to the *Shanyu*. But Yang Xin was by nature very outspoken and unyielding and had never been high in the Han bureaucracy; the *Shanyu* showed no liking for him. When summoned for an interview in the *Shanyu*'s tent, he refused to surrender his credentials, and so the *Shanyu* had mats spread outside his tent and received Yang Xin there. "If you wish to conclude a peace alliance," Yang Xin announced when he had been shown into the *Shanyu*'s presence, "you must send your heir to the Han court as a hostage!"

"That is not the way things were done under the old alliance!" the *Shanyu* objected. "Under the old alliance the Han always sent us an imperial princess, as well as allotments of silks, foodstuffs, and other goods, in order to secure peace, while we for our part refrained from making trouble on the border. Now you want to go against the old ways and make me send my son as a hostage. I have no use for such proposals!"

It is the way with the Xiongnu that, whenever an envoy from the Han comes who is not a high court official, if he is the scholarly Confucian type, they assume that he has come to lecture them and they do all they can to squelch his rhetoric, while if he is a young man, they assume he has come with assassination in mind and concentrate on destroying his nerve. Every time a Han envoy arrives among the Xiongnu, they send an envoy of their own to the Han in exchange. If the Han detains the Xiongnu envoy, then the Xiongnu detain the Han envoy and will not release him until they have received what they consider just treatment.

After Yang Xin returned from his mission to the Xiongnu, the Han dispatched Wang Wu again, and once more the *Shanyu* began to talk in a mild and conciliatory way, hoping to be given a sizeable grant of Han goods. As part of the deception he told Wang Wu, "I would like to make a trip to the Han and visit the Son of Heaven so that face to face we may swear a pact of brotherhood!"

When Wang Wu returned and reported on his mission, the Han built a residence for the *Shanyu* in Chang'an. The *Shanyu*, however, sent word that "unless some important member of the Han government is sent as envoy, I cannot discuss the matter seriously."

Meanwhile the Xiongnu dispatched one of their important men as envoy to the Han. When the man reached China, however, he fell ill and, although the Han doctors gave him medicine and tried to cure him, he unfortunately died. The Han then sent

Lu Chongguo to act as envoy and to accompany the body of the dead Xiongnu back to his country, spending several thousand gold pieces on a lavish funeral for him. Lu Chongguo was given the seals of a 2,000 picul official to wear at his belt and bore assurances to the Xiongnu that "this man is an important official of the Han". The *Shanyu*, however, was convinced that the Han had murdered the Xiongnu envoy and therefore detained Lu Chongguo and refused to let him return to China. By this time everyone on the Han side was of the opinion that the *Shanyu* had only been deceiving Wang Wu with empty talk and in fact had no intention of coming to China or sending his son as a hostage. After this the Xiongnu several times sent surprise parties of troops to raid the border, and the Han for its part conferred on Guo Chang the title of "Barbarian Quelling General" and sent Zhao Ponu, the marquis of Zhuoye, to garrison the area from Shuofang to the east and defend it against the Xiongnu.

Lu Chongguo had been detained by the Xiongnu for three years when the *Shanyu* Wuwei died, having ruled for ten years. He was succeeded by his son, Wushilu. Wushilu was still young and was therefore called the Boy *Shanyu*. The change took place in the sixth year of the *yuanfeng* era (105 BC).

After this the *Shanyu* gradually moved farther to the north-west, so that the soldiers of his left or eastern wing occupied the area north of Yunzhong, while those of his right wing were in the area around Jiuquan and Dunhuang provinces.

When the Boy *Shanyu* came to power the Han dispatched two envoys, one to the new *Shanyu* to convey condolences on the death of his father, and the other to convey condolences to the Wise King of the Right, hoping in this way to cause dissension between the two leaders. When the envoys entered Xiongnu territory, however, the Xiongnu guides led them both to the *Shanyu*. The *Shanyu*, discovering what they were up to, was furious and detained them both. The Xiongnu had already detained over ten Han envoys in the past, while the Han had likewise detained a proportionate number of Xiongnu envoys. This same year the Han sent the Sutrishna General Li Guangli west to attack Dayuan (Ferghana) and ordered the Yinyu General Gongsun Ao to build a fortified city called Shouxiancheng, the "City for Receiving Surrender".

In the winter, the Xiongnu were afflicted by heavy snowfalls, and many of their animals died of starvation and cold. The *Shanyu*, still a young boy, had a great fondness for warfare and slaughter, and many of his subjects were restless under his leadership. The Xiongnu chief commandant of the left wanted to assassinate the *Shanyu* and sent a messenger in secret to report to the Han, "I wish to assassinate the *Shanyu* and surrender to the Han, but the Han is too far away. If the Han will send a party of troops to meet me, however, I will at once carry out the plot."

It was in fact because of this report that the Han had built the fortified City for Receiving Surrender. But the Han still considered that the chief commandant of the left was too far away to carry out his plot successfully.

In the spring of the following year the Han sent Zhao Ponu, the marquis of Zhuoye to lead a force of over 20,000 cavalry some 2,000 *li* north-west from Shuofang and make contact with the chief commandant of the left at Mt. Junji before returning. Zhao Ponu arrived at the point of rendezvous but, before the chief commandant of the left could carry out the assassination, his plot was discovered. The *Shanyu* had him executed and dispatched the forces from his left wing to attack Zhao Ponu. Zhao Ponu had by this time begun to withdraw, taking prisoners and killing several thousand Xiongnu soldiers on the way. When he was still 400 *li* from the City for Receiving Surrender, however, 80,000 Xiongnu cavalry swooped down and surrounded him. Zhao Ponu slipped out

of the encirclement during the night and went by himself to look for water, but was captured alive by Xiongnu scouts. The main body of the Xiongnu then pressed their attack on Zhao Ponu's army. Guo Zong and Wei Wang, two of the high officers in the Han army, plotted together, saying, "All of us, down to the company commanders, are afraid that, having lost our commanding general, we will be executed under military law. Therefore no one is anxious to return home." Eventually the whole army surrendered to the Xiongnu. The Boy *Shanyu* was delighted with his catch and sent a raiding party to attack the City for Receiving Surrender, but the city held fast. The party then plundered the border area and withdrew.

The following year, the *Shanyu* again set out to attack the City for Receiving Surrender, this time in person, but before he reached his destination he fell ill and died. He had been *Shanyu* only three years. Since his son was still very small, the Xiongnu appointed his uncle Goulihu, the former Wise King of the Right and younger brother of the *Shanyu* Wuwei, as the new *Shanyu*. This took place in the third year of the era *taichu* (102 BC).

After Goulihu had become *Shanyu* the Han sent the superintendent of the imperial household Xu Ziwei to ride out of the barrier at Wuyuan and range through the area from several hundred to 1,000 *li* or more north of the border, building forts and watch stations as far as Mt. Luqu. The Han also dispatched the scouting and attacking general Han Yue and the marquis of Changping, Wei Kang, to garrison the region, at the same time sending the chief commandant of strong crossbowmen Lu Bode to build fortifications along the swamp at Juyan.

In the autumn the Xiongnu invaded Dingxiang and Yunzhong in great force, murdering or carrying off several thousand persons. They also defeated several officials of the 2,000 picul rank before withdrawing, and destroyed the forts and watch stations that Xu Ziwei had built as they went along. At the same time the Wise King of the Right invaded Jiuquan and Zhangye provinces and carried off several thousand persons. The Han general Ren Wen, however, came to the rescue, attacking the Xiongnu and forcing them to give up all the spoils and prisoners they had taken.

This year the Sutrishna General Li Guangli defeated the kingdom of Dayuan, cut off the head of its ruler, and returned. The Xiongnu tried to block his return but could not reach him in time. In the winter they planned an attack on the City for Receiving Surrender, but just at that time the *Shanyu* died. The *Shanyu* Goulihu had ruled for only a year when he died. The Xiongnu set up his younger brother, Judihou, the former chief commandant of the left, as *Shanyu*.

At this time the Han had just conquered the kingdom of Dayuan, and its might filled the neighbouring states with terror. The emperor had hopes of carrying out the final suppression of the Xiongnu and issued an edict which read:

Emperor Gaozu has left us the task of avenging the difficulties which he suffered at Pingcheng. Furthermore, during the reign of Empress Lü the *Shanyu* sent to the court a most treasonable and insulting letter. In ancient times when Duke Xiang of Qi avenged an insult which one of his ancestors nine generations earlier had suffered, Confucius praised his conduct in the *Spring and Autumn Annals*.

This year was the fourth year of the era *taichu* (101 BC).¹⁵

After Judihou became *Shanyu* he returned all of the Han envoys who had not gone over to his side. Thus Lu Chongguo and the others were able to come home. When the new *Shanyu* assumed the rule, he was afraid that the Han would attack him and so he

said, "I consider that I am but a little child. How could I hope to equal the Han Son of Heaven? The Son of Heaven is like a father to me."

The Han dispatched the general of palace attendants Su Wu to present generous gifts to the *Shanyu*. With this the *Shanyu* grew increasingly arrogant and behaved with great rudeness, betraying the hopes of the Han.

The following year, Zhao Ponu managed to escape from the Xiongnu and return home. The year after, the Han sent Li Guangli with 30,000 cavalry north from Jiuquan to attack the Wise King of the Right in the Heavenly Mountains. He killed or captured over 10,000 of the enemy before returning. The Xiongnu, however, surrounded him in great force and he was barely able to escape; six or seven out of every ten of his men were killed.

The Han also sent Gongsun Ao north from Xihe; at Mt. Zhuotu he joined forces with Lu Bode, but neither of them succeeded in killing or capturing any of the enemy. The Han also sent the cavalry commandant Li Ling with a force of 5,000 infantry and cavalry to march north from Juyan. After they had proceeded over 1,000 *li* they engaged the *Shanyu* in battle. Li Ling killed or wounded over 10,000 of the enemy, but his provisions soon gave out and his men began to scatter and flee for home. The Xiongnu then surrounded Li Ling, who surrendered to them. Most of his men were wiped out, only 400 of them managing to return to safety. The *Shanyu* treated Li Ling with great honour and gave him his own daughter for a wife.

Two years later, the Han again dispatched Li Guangli with 60,000 cavalry and 100,000 infantry to march north from Shuofang. Lu Bode led some 10,000 men to join them, while Han Yue advanced with 30,000 infantry and cavalry from Wuyuan. Gongsun Ao proceeded from Yanmen with 10,000 cavalry and 30,000 infantry. When the *Shanyu* received word of their advance, he moved all his family and wealth far to the north beyond the Yuwu River. He himself, with 10,000 cavalry, waited south of the river and engaged Li Guangli in battle. Li Guangli's lines broke and he began to retreat, fighting a running battle with the *Shanyu* for over ten days. But when word reached him that his entire family had been wiped out as a result of the witchcraft affair,¹⁶ he and all his men surrendered to the Xiongnu. Only one or two out of every 1,000 men who set out with him managed to return to China. Han Yue did not succeed in killing or capturing any of the enemy, while Gongsun Ao, though he fought with the Wise King of the Left, was unable to win any advantage and likewise retreated. From all the parties that went out to attack the Xiongnu this year, among those who returned there were none to testify as to what degree of success the various generals had achieved and therefore no honours were awarded. An imperial edict had been issued ordering the arrest of the grand physician Sui Dan. He in turn gave out the news that Li Guangli's family had been exterminated and thereby caused Li Guangli to surrender to the Xiongnu.

The Grand Historian remarks: When Confucius wrote the *Spring and Autumn Annals*, he was very open in treating the reigns of Yin and Huan, the early dukes of Lu; but when he came to the later period of Dukes Ding and Ai, his writing was much more covert. Because in the latter case he was writing about his own times, he did not express his judgments frankly, but used subtle and guarded language.¹⁷

The trouble with the ordinary run of men these days who discuss Xiongnu affairs is that they seek only for some temporary advantage, resorting to any kind of flattery in order to have their own views accepted, without considering what the effect may be on all parties concerned. At the same time the generals and military leaders, relying upon

the vastness and might of China, grow increasingly bold, and the ruler follows their advice in making his decisions. Thus no profound achievement is ever reached.


Emperor Yao in ancient times, as wise as he was, was not completely successful as a ruler; the nine provinces of China had to wait until the reign of Emperor Yu before they knew real peace. If one would establish a truly worthy dynasty such as those of old, therefore, nothing is more important than selecting the right generals and ministers! Nothing is more important than selecting the right generals and ministers!

NOTES

1. The text says “no family names or polite names”, but the word “family names” is probably an error here. Polite names are names which are used in place of personal names to avoid the appearance of over-familiarity.
2. The penal code now comprises a chapter of the *Book of Documents*, where it is known as the code of Marquis Lü.
3. Sima Qian quotes from three different poems: “Bigong” of the “Temple Odes of Lu”, and “Liuyue” and “Chuju” of the “Lesser Odes”.
4. You Yu’s ancestors came from the state of Jin; he himself had been born among the barbarians but could speak the language of Jin. The barbarian king sent him to the court of Duke Mu of Qin, who questioned him closely on the customs, lands, and military strength of the barbarians. Duke Mu later succeeded in arousing enmity between the barbarian ruler and You Yu, and the latter finally fled to Qin and became the duke’s adviser on barbarian affairs. The fuller account is found in *Shi ji* 5, “The Basic Annals of Qin”, in vol. III.
5. From this it may be seen that the First Emperor of the Qin, in building the Great Wall, did not have to begin from scratch, as is often implied, but simply repaired and linked up the older walls of these northern states.
6. The Gobi Desert.
7. It is impossible to tell from the name alone what this title means. In later times, when these peoples invaded and conquered northern China, Juqu became a Chinese surname.
8. Sima Qian is inviting a comparison with the situation in China in his own day, when the jails were full to overflowing with men awaiting sentence.
9. These four colours are symbolic of the four directions in Chinese belief and, if the narrative is correct, in Xiongnu belief as well.
10. In his letter Maodun suggested that, since both he and Empress Lü were old and lonely, they might get together and console each other.
11. It is not clear what amnesty this refers to. The *Han shu* “Annals of Emperor Wen” records a general amnesty in the seventh year (173 BC), but none for the years between the Xiongnu attack and the date of this letter. Perhaps the letter should be dated in the seventh year. The whole statement about the amnesty is of course no more than a cleverly phrased assertion of the Han emperor’s sovereignty over the Xiongnu.
12. Bringing them within sight of the capital.
13. Following the reading in *Han shu* 94A.
14. Scholars have long speculated whether the “golden man” might not have been a Buddhist image. If so, this passage would mark the earliest record of Chinese contact with the Buddhist religion.
15. Sima Qian’s narrative probably ends somewhere around this point; the remainder of the chapter down to the closing remarks, a series of rather choppy notes, is most likely the work of Chu Shaosun or one of the other writers who undertook to make additions to the *Shi ji*.
16. In 91 BC the heir apparent, Prince Li, and his mother, Empress Wei, were accused of attempting to kill the emperor by black magic. Many high officials of the dynasty were implicated in

the investigations that followed, among them Li Guangli. But the battle referred to above took place in 99 BC, so the text is obviously out of order.

17. Sima Qian's purpose in making these seemingly irrelevant remarks about Confucius and the *Spring and Autumn Annals* is of course to warn the reader that he too is obliged to use "guarded language" in his discussion of the Xiongnu problem.



The Eurasian steppe and neighbouring regions in the late sixth century

THE TÜRK IMPERIAL TRADITION IN THE PRE-CHINGGISID ERA

Peter B. Golden



There have been a number of wide-ranging and detailed studies of Chinggisid rule and modes of governance.¹ Understandably, this era, given the fact that the Mongols created the greatest contiguous land empire in history, has a greater variety and depth of sources than any other steppe-derived empire. The sources stem from all of the literate societies with whom the Mongols came in contact. The same cannot be said of the earlier Turko-nomadic states and their traditions of governance, not to mention the numerous polities that did not form states at all.² Sources of the Türk era (c. 552–742, ending c. 766 in the western zone of the Empire), the first of the great, transcontinental Eurasian steppe empires, were somewhat less familiar with steppe folk – although there were already long traditions in China (and to a much lesser extent in Pre-Islamic Iran and the Graeco-Roman world) of close encounters with them, often of the unpleasant kind. Nomadic groupings in the post-Han (third–sixth century) era had imposed themselves on or created a number of statelets on the Sino-Nomadic borderlands and had evolved systems of dual administration there, e.g. the various Xianbi-derived states of Northern China (Barfield 1989: 88ff.; Graff 2002: 54ff.; Gumilëv 1998), the most famous of which was certainly the Tabgac/Tuoba Wei (Eberhard 1949). The Chinese sources have much to tell us about them, but nowhere nearly as much as they have to say about the Yuan rulers of China. The historiographic traditions of the Romano-Byzantine world³ and of the Muslim lands⁴ (especially for the ninth–eleventh centuries), acquired some, occasionally detailed knowledge about the steppe peoples, but the Mongol-era sources about the steppe peoples are richer and more detailed. Moreover, the Chinggisid Mongols, in addition to the traditional narratives, have also left behind official documents, something rarely encountered in the Pre-Mongol era nomadic polities. From the Türks proper, aside from the official inscriptions on the Orkhon (largely dynastic propaganda, but containing important data on military matters), and the odd coin from the West Türk and Khazar realms, we have, in effect, nothing of that nature. From the Khazars we have the remarkable Khazar Hebrew correspondence, c. 960, between the Judaized Khazar ruler Joseph and Ḥasdai b. Šaprūt, a Jewish courtier of the Spanish Umayyads (Kokovcov 1932; Golb and Pritsak 1982: 75ff.). Although the Khazar letter has survived in two redactions and clearly has been through one or more editorial hands, nonetheless, we do learn something about the Khazars as they saw themselves and wanted others to see them.

What do we really know about Pre-Chinggisid forms of governance? What was the

Steppe Imperial Tradition of which Chinggis and his descendants were the heirs? These traditions were still fresh in the minds of the early Qara Khitai rulers when they fled the Jurchens for Central Asia in 1124. Yelü Dashi (1124–1143) wrote to one of the Uighur rulers, Bilge, in 1130, reminding him that in happier times, when the Khitan (Qitan) were building their empire (early tenth century) and had taken the ancient Türk and Uighur royal sites, his ancestor, Abaoji, had offered the Uighurs (of Ganzhou) the right to return to their ancestral lands,⁵ which they had fled in 840 when the Qırğız overran and destroyed their empire. Abaoji, having viewed the earlier inscriptions even had a new stele erected in imitation of the Türk-Uighur tradition (Barthold 1963–1967: 498). The Mongols, although at a considerable temporal distance from the Türks, were aware of them and of the older traditions. At the very least, these ideas were filtered through the Uighurs (and later the Khitan and others) who staffed their bureaucracies, and perhaps through oral traditions – undoubtedly modified over the ages – dating back to the period when the Mongolic peoples, or at least some of them, were under direct Türk rule. Chinese and Sinicized bureaucrats in Chinggisid service brought with them the accumulated knowledge of the nomadic states found in the Chinese historical and governmental literature (Trepavlov 1993: 31–38, 46–47, 49–50, 67, 72–74, 96).

Given these influences and traditions, it should come as no surprise that Chinggisid technologies of governance may have echoed earlier Türk systems. We should also keep in mind, however, that the nomads were not unchanging. They learned from experience. Each new state or polity not only built on the traditions of its immediate predecessor, but modified those traditions to meet the needs of its time. We should view the steppe imperial traditions, which go back to the Xiongnu, and perhaps even earlier, to elements stemming from the Scytho-Saka and Yuezhi, in much the same way that we trace Roman traditions in Europe, bearing in mind that Carolingian or Ottonian notions of ‘Romanness’ – or even those of their clerical advisers – were quite different than even late Roman traditions.

The earliest nomadic states in Eurasia have their origins in the Chinese borderlands. They were largely mechanisms in response to Chinese expansion. The Xiongnu, whatever their ethnolinguistic affiliations may have been, are clearly an example of this.⁶ The formation and subsequent collapse of the Xiongnu polity (second century BCE–mid-second century CE) produced the first round of large-scale Turkic migrations westward, ultimately to the Pontic steppes (Golden 1992: 57–58, 85–91). The foundation of the Rouran (Asian Avar) state brought yet more Turkic groupings westward, in particular the Oğuric peoples, *c.* 463⁷; and by the early sixth century the Sabirs as well. The fall of the eastern Türk Qaghanate in 742 and the Uighur drive to power and consolidation produced yet another wave of westward migrations (*c.* 745–770s). None of these tribal confederations that had distanced themselves from the Chinese borderlands advanced to statehood in the steppes. The Khazar Qaghanate (*c.* 630–*c.* 965) was a successor state that devolved from the Western Türk Empire and was deeply involved with Byzantium (often as an ally) and the Arab Caliphate (often as an enemy – at least until *c.* 800) and subsequently played an important role in East-West and North-South trade. It remained a state closely based on the Türk traditions – although with some differences, in particular with respect to the role of a subsequently sacralized ruler (Golden, *in press*). The Khazar royal house was most probably of Ašina origin (Golden 1980: I, 219–20), the ruling house of the Türks. The name Ašina appears to be of Iranian or Tokharian origin and was originally associated with the modern Gansu or Xinjiang regions, an area that was populated by Iranian and Tokharian peoples.⁸ After the fall of Khazaria, the

nomads of the western Eurasian steppes (Pečenegs, Oğuz, Qipchaqs) did not create states in their home turf. Statehood was reintroduced to the region by the Mongols (Golden 1987–1991a: 41–81), in a pattern very similar to that of the Türk conquests some seven centuries earlier. The Turkic nomads who conquered lands inhabited by agrarian and urban populations, areas that were already organized as states, or parts of states, in particular in the Islamic world, simply grafted themselves onto the already extant political structures. On these, they superimposed their political traditions of succession (lateral and fraternal – and sometimes fratricidal) and the collective sovereignty of the ruling house over the conquered lands (the Qarakhanids are an example of this; Genç 1981). As a consequence, these states were not really ‘nomadic’; nomads just happened to rule them. The dynasties in question (e.g. the Seljuks) quickly sedentarized and did their best to make ‘good citizens’ of their unruly nomadic followers – often without great success.

The Turkic nomads, overwhelmingly stateless, nonetheless brought with them elements of the Türk imperial tradition and institutions that were part of the Eurasian, pannomadic, political tradition. This is seen in the titles (non-qaghanal grade) that their rulers bore. There are even flickering notions of *translatio imperii*, however muted the Türk imperial idea may have become after 840 (Golden 1982: 53–56; Trepavlov 1993). The eastern Türk Qaghanate was briefly replaced by that of the Ašina-led Basmils (742–744), who were quickly toppled by the Uighurs under the leadership of the Yağlaqar clan, their onetime allies in 742. The Uighurs ruled until 840 when they were crushed by the Qırğız, a people also led by a Qaghan (see below). The origin of the Qırğız Qaghanate is obscure. The Qırğız, however, constituted one of the longest, continuous Turkic polities (Fajzrakhmanov 2000: 5). The Uighurs were part of the Toquz Oğuz confederation, not all of whose members accepted the right of the Yağlaqar to supreme rule. A series of wars followed the 744 take-over, from which the Yağlaqar-led Uighurs emerged victorious by 754. The western steppe zone, now under a rapidly fading Western Türk house, provided refuge for groups fleeing the Uighur consolidation of power, granting titles, in some instances to those now within their sphere.⁹ In the east, thus, the *translatio imperii* was carried out by conquest.

In the western zone of the Türk empire, the process was slightly different. The Qarluqs,¹⁰ previously ruled by an *ilteber*, but elevated to *yabğu* status by the Uighurs, fled their former allies and went to the Western Türk lands in 745 or 746.¹¹ Here, their ruler continued to hold the rank of *Yabğu*, as we know from Ibn Khurdâdbih.¹² The Oğuz, who had many ‘lords’ (*arbâb*), as Ibn Faḍlân reports, had also retained their *yabğuluq bodun* status (a ‘people’ led by a *yabğu*; on *bodun*, ‘people’, see below), a rank which they, too, had also been granted while still allies of the Uighurs. The Oğuz *Yabğu* also had a deputy, or co-ruler, who held the title of *Kül Erkin/Kül İrkin* (Togan 1939: 10/20, 13/2, 15/28). All of these were titles and forms of governance (dual rule) that stemmed from the Türk state. We have brief and tantalizing remarks from Ibn al-Faḳīh (writing c. 903) and al-Masʿūdī (writing in the 930s) that after 840, the Qarluq ruler (of probable Ašina descent) claimed Qaghanal status and enjoyed considerable prestige in the steppe into the tenth century. Gardīzī (writing c. 1050, but basing himself on earlier traditions¹³) in a garbled account notes that after the fall of the Western Türks and Tūrgeš, the ‘paramountcy’ passed to the Qarluqs (Gardīzī 1984 [1363]: 549; Martinez 1982: 118–20). Qarluq claims can be interpreted as a *translatio imperii*.¹⁴ These notions may well have extended into the Qarakhanid era for whom a ruling house of Ašina origin has also been posited (Pritsak 1953–4: 22–23; 1950: 209; Togan 1970: 58, 430–31). The Qarluqs

were one of the key constituent tribal elements of the Qarakhanid state.¹⁵ Thus, notions of an *altan uruġ* (a 'golden line', i.e. a charismatic ruling clan) much popularized by the Chinggisids, probably did not begin with them. In any event, al-Mas'ūdī tells us that in his day the Turkic tribes, at least those closest to the Islamic borderlands, no longer had a Qaghan.¹⁶

Further to the north, however, in western Siberia, there was the sprawling Kimek state whose ruler claimed qaghanal status. According to the *Hudūd* (our only source for this) the Kimek 'king' is called 'khâqân' and had eleven lieutenants who held hereditary fiefs.¹⁷ The Kimek Qaghanate probably dates to the immediate post-Türk period (c. 745) and lasted until the first half of the eleventh century when it collapsed in a wave of nomadic migrations (Qun, Qay and others). It re-emerged as the Cuman-Qipchaq confederation, one ostentatiously lacking in central authority. Kimek origins remain obscure. They are not noted in the Orkhon inscriptions, a reliable catalogue of the peoples (Turkic, Mongolic and others) who came under Türk rule. Were they present in the Türk Qaghanate under another name? Were they beyond the boundaries of the Türk state? We do not know. Gardîzî recounts the tale that their ruling clan was of Tatar origin, descending from 'Šad' (شاد) the younger brother of their leader. He is later given the title of *Tutuq*. Both of these are Old Türk titles.¹⁸ Their creation – or retention (?) – of a qaghanate was undoubtedly connected with their extensive involvement in the trade in furs and other articles of the northern forests that drew the attention of Muslim merchants (Golden 1992: 202–205; 2002: 660–70; Senga 1997: 175–93; Kumekov 1972). This, perhaps, necessitated a strong governmental structure. Other than this fleeting notation of a qaghan and his underlings, we know little of their modes of governance.

In sharp contrast, it should be noted that the Qırġız, who were also involved in this trade, despite their Qaghanal traditions dating back to the Türk era (and recorded in the Türk inscriptions, and their recognition as a *bodun* by the Türks,¹⁹ a status that they had had reinforced by right of conquest [840] of the Uighur Qaghanate), are *not* noted as a qaghanal people by the Arabo-Persian sources of the ninth-tenth century. The Qırġız did not follow the traditional, Mongolia-centred qaghanal pattern. Indeed, there are no indications that they ever took anything more than momentary control of the region. Perhaps, as Michael Drompp has suggested, since their economy in the Yenisei region had strong sedentary and semi-sedentary elements, the transfer to Mongolia and adoption of a full, nomadic economy would have been too disruptive. In their Yenisei homeland, they enjoyed trading ties with China and the Islamic world. Mongolia, thus, had little commercial or economic attraction and its imperial, steppe-oriented traditions held little appeal (Drompp 1999: 390–403).²⁰

At this point, we should say something about how the Türk state was structured. According to the tenth century Chinese *Tang huiyao* (a compilation of government documents), there were eleven core tribes of the Türk union, each recorded with its *tamġa* ('livestock brand', a term that subsequently came to mean 'seal' in a variety of meanings). The first core tribe noted is that of the Ašina. It is interesting to note that the Ašina tribe has a different *tamġa* than the Ašina ruling clan. This points to some distinction that was made between the Ašina royal clan and tribe.²¹ Elsewhere (the Chinese epitaph of Qapaġan Qaghan's daughter), mention is made of the 'thirty tribes' (*sanshi xing*; Chin. *xing* denotes 'surname, clan, people' and often renders Turkic *oġuz*, 'a group of related people', which we may translate as 'tribe'). This appears to refer to the eleven tribes of the eastern Türks, the subject nine tribes of the Toquz Oġuz and the

ten tribes of the On Oq (Dobrovits 2004: 259–60). The state was termed *ellil*, a term with a wide range of meanings: ‘community, people of the realm, realm’ (Clauson 1972: 121); ‘imperium, state, state organization’ (Golden 1982: 50); ‘political power’ (Giraud 1960: 71). Historically and today, *ellil* can denote ‘people, persons, tribal union, foreigner, state, hegemony, power, subject population, country, peace, agreement, a swarm (of bees), army’ (Sevortian 1974: 339–41; Giraud 1960: 72–73). Abu’l-Ġâzî (d. 1664) uses the term to denote both the whole *Oğuz ili* (i.e. the Türkmen people) and the various constituent tribes (e.g. *Salor ili*).²² The earliest meaning of this much-travelled term may have been ‘pax’, i.e. the ‘peace’ that was established to bring together a tribal union – although this remains a disputed conjecture.²³ It may well be that the *pax* (Pritsak 1981: 13; 1988: 749–88) was a nomadic reaction to pressures coming from the sedentary world or from more politically advanced nomadic neighbours. It clearly retains this sense in Maḥmūd al-Kašgarî’s *Dîwân Luġât at-Turk* (written 1077), in which it is translated variously as ‘realm, province, peace’, as well as in other ways that most probably reflect homonyms (Kâšgarî/Dankoff 1982–1985: III, 21). His contemporary, Yûsuf Khâṣṣ Ḥâjib, in his *Qutadġu Bilig*, a ‘mirror for princes’ composed in 1069 for the Qarakhanids, uses it to denote ‘state, people’ (Genç 1981: 75–76). In Kašgarî, it is sometimes joined with *törü* (see below) in the sense of ‘realm’, as in *el törü el ilsün* (so that) ‘the realm [may] prosper’ (Kâšgarî/Dankoff 1982–1985: I, 135). Joined with the word *uç*, ‘extremity’, it denoted the ‘frontier of the realm’ (*uç el*). (Kâšgarî/Dankoff 1982–1985: I, 94). The ruler’s secretary in the Qarakhanid era was termed *elimġa*, deriving from *el* and *imġa*, the latter term recorded already in Türk times denoted some kind of bureaucratic fiscal or scribal official.²⁴ *Elġililġi* is the standard Turkic term for ‘ambassador, envoy’ (Clauson 1972: 129), perhaps also denoting ‘one who brings peace’. The word *yurt* in the Pre-Mongol era denoted ‘a camping ground’ (often abandoned) and then a ‘dwelling place’. It is only in the Chinggisid era and beyond that it takes on the connotation of ‘country’ or ‘native country’ (Clauson 1972: 958; Sevortjan *et al.* 1989: 254–55; Dadbaev 1991: 15–16).

The *el* was heaven-granted (KT, E25: *el berigme tengri* ‘heaven which gives the state’; Tekin 1988: 14). The word also figures in the term *elkün* or more probably *elġün*, a collective for ‘the people’, retaining that sense into the Qarakhanid era (Clauson 1972: 121; Genç 1981: 76). The *el* comprised and was often, at least in the early stages of state formation, identical with the *bodun*, a core grouping of tribes. This is another collective term, from *bod*, ‘clan’ in Old Turkic, sometimes used to denote ‘sub-tribe’ or ‘tribe’ in Middle Turkic (Clauson 1972: 296–97). In the lament for the destruction of the Türk polity after the fall of the first Qaghanate in 630 recorded in the Tonyuquq inscription (W3–4), the author says that the *bodun* ‘perished’ (*ölti*) and that its *bod* no longer existed (*bod qalmadı*).²⁵ Initially, then, the *bodun* was a grouping of clans (*uruġ*, *oġuś*, a social unit between a clan and a tribe; Clauson 1972: 96, 214–16), ‘an organized tribal community’ or ‘people’.²⁶ This did not necessarily imply homogeneity.²⁷ By the late eleventh century, at least in some Turkic dialects (Čigil) it had come to denote ‘subjects, commoners’ (the *qara bodun* of Old Turkic; Kâšgarî/Dankoff 1982–1985: I, 304), a lowering of the status of the term, though the *Qutadġu Bilig* uses it more neutrally as ‘people’ or even ‘persons’. In a non-imperial setting, the term appears to have been somewhat devalued. Another term used to denote ‘tribe’ was *oq* (lit. ‘arrow’).²⁸ Whether the term *oġuz* (which figures in the tribal names Oġuz, Toquz Oġuz [the ‘Nine Oġuz’ usually rendered in Chinese as *Jiu Xing*, the ‘nine surnames/clans/peoples’]) is to be derived from *oq* remains unclear.

The *ellil* 'state' or *bodun* 'people' were led by the Qaghanal, royal, charismatic house, the collective sovereigns of the realm. The ethnonym of the ruling tribe usually became the 'political' name of the confederation. These early, pre-Islamic and pre-Chinggisid ethnonyms do not appear to have derived from the names of earlier clan leaders or state founders.²⁹ Thus, the Türks did not take the name of their ruling clan, the Ašina (although the relationship of the Ašina and the Türks still requires elucidation). Were the Ašina simply the ruling clan of the Türk tribe or were they a group that had joined the Türks? The earliest inscription from the Türk state (582), at Bugut (Mongolia), written in Sogdian, according to the most recent reading notes the 'kings of the Turukit Ašinas' (*tr-'wkt' ('')šy-n's*),³⁰ pointing perhaps to two still distinct entities. The imperial *el* (or *pax*) consisted of a number of *boduns*, both nomadic and sedentary. Some of them, as the Orkhon inscriptions attest, had to be kept in the *el* by force. Just beneath the royal clan in the hierarchy were the inner tribes, whose loyalty to the ruling house either antedated the founding of the realm or was demonstrated very early on. Among these inner groupings were 'in-law' clans or tribes (Pritsak 1954: 178ff.) from whom the royal house often chose their wives. Among the Türks this may have been the Ashide (*Aštaq), the clan of the famous Counsellor of the Second Qaghanate, Tonyuquq.³¹ Beneath them were tribes that had freely joined or submitted to the royal clan and as a consequence were allowed to keep their local ruling houses – usually under the watchful eye of an official of the state – but their aristocratic clans were often replaced by groups coming from the tribe of the ruling clan. These were the 'inner' tribes. The 'outer' tribes comprised those who had been brought into the *el* by force. Their ruling clans were displaced and they were put under the direct rule of members of the ruling house. Further down this socio-political pyramid were the vassal, tribute-paying peoples, many of them conquered sedentary populations or other sedentary folk (such as the Sogdians) who had submitted to the empire. At the very bottom of the social scale were slaves (Golden 2001a: 27–56). Divided into two wings (see below), the various officers of state reflected this bipartite organization. There were east and west pairs of officials. *Tuduns* (see below) exercised oversight on the sub-confederal, tribal and urban level, on behalf of the central qaghanal authority (Golden 1982: 50–51; Eberhard 1970: 116–18; Pritsak 1981: 17–18; 1988: 749–88).

The notion of the exercise of political power was expressed with the word *erk* 'authority', the ability 'to impose one's will on others' and conversely 'free-will, independence'³² and its various derivatives (e.g. *erklig*) (Genç 1981: 81–82).

A key element in the traditional structure of the state was the *törü* which is, in effect, either established or ratified when a Qaghan founds a state: *bumin qağan ište mi qağan olur miş oluru pan Türk bodunı ilin törüsün tuta birmi ş iti birmi ş* (Tekin 1988: 8–9; İnalçık 1966: 268–69): 'When Bumin Qaghan and İstemi Qaghan took the throne, they took hold of the state/polity (*il*) and customary law and organized it.' *Törü* denoted the traditional, customary law of the tribes (*yosun*), now elevated to the level of an officially sanctioned juridical structure,³³ upon which the state and the social compact between the rulers and ruled rested – although it is never clearly spelled out anywhere precisely what this entailed.³⁴ The Kül Tegin inscription (Tekin 2004: 10/11; KT, E8) speaks of the Türks, while in Chinese service, having conquered other countries for their Tabğaç overlord: *tabğaç qağan qa ilin törüsün alibirmi ş*, using the combination of *il* and *törü* to denote the totality of another land's territory and legal structure, i.e. a defined political entity, as well as the well-being and security of its people with respect to their neighbours.³⁵ Kâşğarî cites the proverb *el qalır törü qalmas* which he translates as 'the realm

may be left behind but not custom. This is coined to advise a person to follow the custom of those who came before' (Kâşğari/Dankoff 1982–1985: II, 264). This highlighted the permanence of custom and tradition and the impermanence of political structures.³⁶ In the Qarakhanid court of his era, it may also have denoted 'traditional protocol'.³⁷ The *Qutadğu Bilig* also uses *törü* in the sense of 'justice', e.g. *idi edgü beglik taqı edgürek törü ol amı tüz yoritğu kerek*: 'A good thing is princely rule, but even better is justice which the prince must put into effect'.³⁸ *El törü* seems to have expressed the notion of the state and its full set of institutions. It appears repeatedly in this sense in the Orkhon inscriptions.³⁹ In the *Qutadğu Bilig*, the minister Ögdülmiş 'tells the prince how to govern the realm', a notion expressed with the words: *iligke il itgü törüsin ayur*.⁴⁰ Trepavlov has suggested that *törü* is not necessarily the equivalent of the Mongol *Jasa(ğ)/Yasa*, which he views as having a narrower scope. Rather, it involved the establishing of order or ranking among the subject peoples, the setting up of the bipartite politico-military organization, i.e. the right (*tarduş*) and left (*tölis*) wings (an identification, we might add that is by no means certain⁴¹), the institution of co-rulership, the lines of precedence and movement within state offices, the conquest of neighbouring peoples, the division and distribution of the spoils of war, domestic security, a just legal system and very likely other elements (Trepavlov 1993: 22, 38–41; 1991: 19–30 esp. 23),⁴² some of which would appear to indicate, not unexpectedly in the Qarakhanid realm, Islamic requirements. These ideas were further reworked during the Chinggisid era. The *törültöre* that subsequently emerged retained many of these characteristics, influenced, to some degree, by the continuing interaction with the Islamic sedentary world (Trepavlov 1991: 27).

It is very difficult to determine which of these institutions evolved within steppe society and which may have been borrowed or modified from practices in the non-steppe world. Barfield's 'Manchurian candidates' (Barfield 1989: 164ff.) states that with significant agricultural populations (often ethnically distinct) alongside of them, nomadic and forest/hunting peoples such as the Khitan, Jin (Jurchen) and ultimately the Chinggisid Mongols, developed separate, parallel administrative regimes for their nomadic and sedentary populations. These states were typical of the Chinese borderlands. The nomads to the north of China were also influenced culturally and perhaps in the shaping of their imperial ideologies by contacts with the Iranian and Tokharian city-states of modern Xinjiang (Frye 1989: 138). This may have also involved Indian ideological notions coming through the significant Indian colonies (e.g. Krorayina, Chin. Loulan or Shanshan, Soğd. Kr'wr'n [Krôrân]) in the region; interactions, it should be noted, that appear to have been mutual. The impact of the Kušan empire was also felt – although many issues regarding the extent of direct Kušan political power here and routes of transmission are still being debated (Vorob'ëva-Desjatovskaja 1992: 85ff.). Documents relating to Krorayina's administration mention some fifty different ranks bearing titles of Indic, Iranian and local provenance (Vorob'ëva-Desjatovskaja 1992: 94–98). These diverse influences, Kušan, Chinese, Iranian and Tokharian, are reflected in the imperial system of titulature, most of the terms of which are of non-Turkic origin, as we shall see. The Mongols, undoubtedly, were the most successful in blending and adapting nomadic institutions with those of the conquered sedentary peoples and utilizing personnel with a variety of backgrounds and skills throughout their empire (Allsen 1987; 2001a; 2002). The Rouran Qaghanate was probably the immediate base on which the Türk state was constructed. It had Xianbi and Xiongnu antecedents which, in turn, may well have been influenced by forms of governance of the

early Iranian and Tokharian peoples. For reasons that are not clear, the title of the supreme ruler of the Xiongnu, rendered as *Chanyu* (earlier transcribed as *Shanyu*) in Modern Mandarin, did not serve as the imperial title of later states. *Chanyu*, it has been suggested, was the Chinese transcription of **dabǵulyabǵuljabǵu* attested among the Kušans⁴³ and subsequently noted among various Turkic peoples; or of *tarqan*,⁴⁴ a title also widely known among the Turkic peoples (see below). The Chanyu was the military leader who also had diplomatic, judicial and sacerdotal functions. In his correspondence with the Han, he presented himself as ‘born of heaven and earth and ordained by the sun and moon’ (Watson 1961: II, 167, 171). Variants of this ideological posture are evident in the formulae of the Türk Qaghans who were ‘heaven-like, heaven-conceived’ (*tengriteg tengride bolmiš*) and are echoed in the Chinggisid formula of ‘by the power of the eternal heaven’, *möngke tengri kücündür*. The Xiongnu state was divided into left and right wings (under ‘wise’ kings) and a hierarchy of other ranks (some hereditary) following this bipartite schema. The military, as was typical of the steppe, was organized along decimal lines (Zuev 2002: 32–34). As a whole, the structure was geared to allow for flexibility, permitting autonomy on the local, clan level and unity of action when needed for political-military purposes (Barfield 1989: 41–42). Whether the Xiongnu polity constituted a state or was simply an ‘imperial confederacy’, as Barfield has termed it (Barfield 1989: 36ff.), remains the subject of discussion (Kradin 2001). In any event, here we see the outlines of many of the features of later Turkic and Chinggisid Mongol polities.

The Türks, like their predecessors, the Rouran/Asian Avars, were headed by a heavenly-mandated *Qaǵan* (Kollautz and Miyakawa 1970: II, 7ff.),⁴⁵ the title of the supreme ruler. The *Zhoushu* says that Bumin (Tumen in the Chinese sources) called himself ‘I-li kehan’ (**Ilig Qaǵan*) after he overthrew the Rouran in 552 and this title corresponds to the *Shanyu* of the Xiongnu. His wife took the title *qatun* (Chin. kehèdûn: EMC **k^ha ġa^h twən*⁴⁶ = *qaǵatun* ? > *qatun*).⁴⁷ It is unclear if the Türk-Ašina ruler had used this title previously. In the Türk world, *Qaǵan* designated powerful foreign emperors, such as the Tabǵač (China) and Tüpüt (Tibet),⁴⁸ as well as important subject peoples such as the Tūrǵeš (of the Western Türk confederation, cf. the inscriptions⁴⁹), the Qırǵız (see above) and a ‘subordinate Qaghan’ (*baz qaǵan*, in the Orkhon inscriptions⁵⁰). Al-Baladūri (d. 892) reports that the Sāsānid monarch Khusrau Anōšīrvān (531–578/9), designating various rulers in the North Caucasus, set up the ruler of ‘Sarīr’, a certain Wahrārzān Šāh, as *Khâqân al-Jabal* (Qaghan of the Mountains, i.e. Highland Daghestan; al-Baladūri 1959: 199–200).⁵¹ Why the title *Qaǵan* should have been given to him by a Persian ruler – albeit one with contacts with the Türk world – is unclear.

All of these constituted rulers of a clearly defined *bodun*. The title *Qaǵan* is first noted c. 265 A.D., among the Proto-Mongolic Xianbi (from whom the Rouran sprang) who had supplanted the Xiongnu as the dominant grouping in Mongolia (Taskin 1986: 213–14). Its origins are unknown and it has not been etymologized satisfactorily on the basis of Altaic or any other language grouping (Lazlo 1940: 1–4; Pulleyblank 1962: 260ff.; Doerfer 1963–75: II, 370; Clauson 1972: 611). Some scholars (e.g. Rachewiltz) have suggested that it was already present among the Xiongnu in the title *huyu* (<**hwax-hwax* : *ġwâ ġwâ*) or to be emended to *hugan* (**ġuo-kân* < *g’wâg-kân* = *qaǵan*), the second highest title after the Chanyu, and is of Mongolic origin (Rachewiltz 1989: 288–89, 293–94). Virtually all of the titles and offices, on the imperial level, of the Türk political apparatus (and very probably those of their Rouran predecessors), passed on to

the later Turkic states of Eurasia and the Middle East, are of non-Turkic (Iranian, Tokharian, Indic, Chinese) origin.

The Qaghan possessed *qut*, the heaven-sent vital force that legitimated his rule and rendered his person sacred. This was akin to (and perhaps a calque from) the Iranian concept of *xwârənalfarn/prn* 'royal glory', the 'divine charisma of kingship', etc. In the Iranian world, according to Frye, this charisma was associated with the kingly institution. In the Turkic world, it was more directly attached to the individual (Bailey 1989: 19–21).⁵² If it became clear that the ruler had lost his *qut*, manifested by a disaster befalling the state, he could be dethroned and killed.⁵³ This had to be carried out, however, without shedding his blood. This was usually done by strangulation with a silk cord. Indeed, a ritual of mock strangulation was part of the investiture ceremony. In any event, the sacral king had to be kept pure from corruption with blood (Hocart 1970: 161–70, 176–79). The custom of strangling deposed rulers continued among Turkic peoples into the Ottoman era (Köprülü 1983: 71–79; Roux 1983: 51–52; Akman 1997).⁵⁴

We should now take a closer look at Türk notions of the legitimation of rule.⁵⁵ The key element, as we have seen, was *qut*: 'heavenly good fortune, royal fortune, majesty, charisma'.⁵⁶ The earliest meaning of this term appears to have been 'vital principle, soul' (Mazao 1981: 59), corresponding to the Chinese *qi*, 'vivifying principle or aura, vital fluid'. The movement from the idea of 'vital principle' to 'good fortune' or 'heavenly fortune' mirrors a similar development in the Iranian conceptualization of *xwârənah*. According to Bombaci and Frye, the Iranian pattern influenced the Turkic. Similarly, Chinese, Indic and Iranian ideas of the ruler as 'son of heaven' (Chin. *Tianzi*, Indic *devaputra* and Iranian *Bagpur* [cf. NeoPers. *fağfûr*]) may have had an impact on the Türks as well (Bombaci 1966: 32–37; Frye 1989: 139–40). Aside from the data from the Eastern Türk inscriptions, there are Western Türk/Türgeş coins, dating to the seventh–eighth century, bearing the Sogdian inscription: *bgy twrkyš g'g'n*, 'divine Türgeş Qaghan' (Smirnova 1963: 265–66). Uighur rulers styled themselves 'heavenly Qaghans' (*tengri qağan*, in Chinese transcription *Tian kehan*) as well as *tengrim*, *tengri ilig* (lit. 'my Heaven/God', 'Heaven Prince'). Among the post-840 Uighurs, we find forms such as *tengri ilig quti* (lit. 'heavenly good fortune of the heavenly/divine prince' = 'his highness the heavenly ruler') or *tengri iligimiz iduq qut* (lit. 'our heavenly prince the [heaven]-sent good fortune').⁵⁷ The Uighur ruler of Qoço, usually titled *Xan*, *İlig Xan* or *Tengriken* could also bear such elaborate throne names as *kün ay tengride qut bulmuş uluğ qut ornanmış alpin erdemin el tutmuş alp arslan qutluğ kül bilge tengri xanimuz* (von Gabain 1973: 68): 'our khan, the *kül*,⁵⁸ possessed of heavenly good fortune, the brave lion who has taken the realm by bravery and virtue, who has been established with great heavenly good fortune, who has received heavenly good fortune from the sun (and) moon god(s).' The ruler's *qut* is noted at every turn. As in the Iranian imagery of *Xwârənah*, *qut* was associated with light, often depicted as a stream or beam of light. In Turko-Mongolian legends this denoted divine selection (Ögel 1971: 43, 83, 558). The ruler's *qut* brought good fortune to the state. His magical power could foretell events, as al-Mas'ûdî (d. 956) reports in the '*Ajâ'ib ad-Dunyâ*' (attributed to him) with regard to an unspecified 'Turk Khâqân' who 'does not show himself to the people. When he does appear, no one can stand before him.' Joined by shamans in a fire ritual, this ruler divines the future by the colours of a 'great face (that) rises up from the fire'.⁵⁹

The Qaghan was guarded by an imperial comitatus, the *böri* (lit. 'wolf'), whose name reflected the lupine ancestors of the dynasty proclaimed by the origin myth of the ruling Ašina clan.⁶⁰ How the *böri* were recruited is unclear. They may well have been akin to the

Chinggisid *nökörs*, ‘free-lance’ warriors who had forsaken their clan allegiance to join the personal service of the ruler.⁶¹ Györfy identified the Türk comitatus with the *buyruq* (Györfy 1983: 470). This is one of the few imperial political terms that clearly derives from Turkic (*buyur-*, ‘to command, order’) and appears to have designated an office or individual whom the qaghan ordered to carry out certain duties.⁶² The Uighur Terkhin (Tariyat) inscription speaks of sixty officials at the court (Morivasu and Ochir 1999: 170; Tekin 2004: II, 128), including a ‘head of the Buyruqs’ (*buyruq başı*, a certain Inanču Bağa Tarqan) and a ‘Grand Buyruq’ (*uluğ buyruq*, Toquz Bolmış Bilge Sengün). Ibn Falân mentions a *buyruq* – in the Oğuric form **buyriğ* (بويرغ not *wuyriğ*/*wuyruğ* [ويرغ] as in the text) – as the ruler of the Volga Bulğar subgrouping of the Suwâr.⁶³ In the Mongol era it was an important title among the Naiman (Rašid ad-Dîn 1373/1994: I, 126). Although this and similar guard institutions were widespread across Eurasia (Golden 2001b: 153–70; Woods 1999: 13–14) and can be found in earlier Indo-European formations, there is no continuity in nomenclature.

As already noted, the Qaghan who established the state also set the law code (*törü*) (Tekin 1988: 8–9; İnalçık 1966) and as a consequence, he and his descendants were the ultimate source of law and justice.

The question of succession to the throne was the most vexing of the domestic political issues in the Türk and Türk-derived polities. The ruling house was considered to be in collective possession of the state. Theoretically, succession was fraternal and lateral, going from older to younger brother and then to their surviving offspring. In reality, all males of the ruling house were potential Qaghans and the system of succession often became little more than ‘tanistry’, a system in which, as Joseph Fletcher has phrased it, ‘the most talented male member of the royal clan should inherit the throne, commonly by murder and war’ (Fletcher 1979–80). In effect, he who would rule would have to demonstrate his possession of *qut* by taking power by force. Once in power, a ruler was well-advised to keep most of his kinfolk occupied in state posts. Inevitably this created one or another variants of the appanage system (cf. Woods 1999: 19–23).

Chinese sources mention ‘small qaghans’ (*xiao kehan*) as opposed to the ‘great, i.e. supreme, Qaghan’ (*da kehan*). Michael Drompp has termed them ‘subordinate Qaghans’. Their precise relationship to those who held power is unclear. Few appear to have succeeded to the throne. As Drompp concludes, this may simply have been a device to deal with the ‘existence of too many claimants to the throne’ by providing an honorary status for those with few prospects of actually exercising power. The practice was not consistently carried out. As in so many other ways, the nomads sought flexibility. Too rigid a system might not allow for the best man to succeed to the throne (Drompp 1991). On the other hand, the system, if it can be so called, also produced periodic chaos and civil war. This problem was not unique to the Turkic world. Indeed, we see evidence for it across Eurasia (e.g. the Slavic world) (Golden 2004). Another aspect of the question of an excess of Qaghanal candidates is noted in the early ninth century *Tongdian*, which speaks of ‘house Qaghans’ (*Yi kehan* = **eblev Qağan*) who are the ‘great non-ruling families that remain at home’.⁶⁴ Were these some kind of sacral rulers, who were not permitted to actively govern? The Khazars, whose state was Türk-derived, in their later stages produced a form of sacralized kingship in which the Qaghan reigned, but did not rule. Were the ‘House Qaghans’ the prototype for this? Possibly, but, as I have suggested elsewhere, the Khazar form of secluded, sacralized kingship probably came about under Iranian influences associated with the

Khawārazmian Ors comitatus of the Khazar Qaghans (Golden, in press). Róna-Tas views it as a consequence of dynastic longevity (Róna-Tas 1999: 342–43).

There are hints, however, of similar developments elsewhere in the Turkic world. One example would be the unnamed 'Turk Qaghan' in Al-Mas'ūdī's *ʿAjā'ib ad-Dunyā*, who predicts the future in a fire ceremony (see above). There are some similarities here with the Khazar Qaghan in his later sacralized state, but this notice may be nothing more than a garbling of tales circulating about the latter. The Song envoy, Wang Yande, in the account of his embassy to the Gaochang (Turfan) Uighurs in 981–984, reports that the Uighur ruler, when he left one of his capital cities in summer, turned over the administration there to his maternal uncle who had the title *Ata Öge* (Father-Counsellor) (Hamilton 1955: 147; İzgi 1989: 63–64, 69–70). This was probably a temporary and apparently only local phenomenon. Gardīzī (mid-eleventh century) describes the Toquz Oğuz (=Uighur) Qaghan as secluded and surrounded by 1000 male attendants (*čākars*) and 400 *kanīzak* (concubines or female servants), who eat and drink with him three times a day. When he goes forth, a rare event, the road is covered with carpets and a herald precedes him, clearing a path. After he has dismounted, all bow down to his horse as it passes them (Gardīzī 1984: 569). Here again, there are enticing parallels with the late Khazar Qaghanate. The twelfth century anonymous *Risālah fī'l-Aqālim* (Ms. Köprülü, 1623) says of the Toquz Oğuz (= Uighur) kings that 'all the administrative affairs of the state were handled by wazīrs and chamberlains'.⁶⁵ It is unclear whether this was a temporary regency (see von Gabain 1973: 71–72), limited to one place or one particular ruler, or a movement towards a reigning but not ruling qaghan on the Khazar model, which it, *grosso modo*, resembles. Similarly unspecified are the 'administrative affairs of the state'. It is unlikely that Qaghans, in any circumstances concerned themselves with the bureaucratic aspects of governing. There does not appear to be much further evidence regarding what certainly would have been an unusual feature of governance that should have attracted more detailed commentary from contemporary sources. The accounts, moreover, may be nothing more than reworkings of the Khazar paradigm. The Khazar example, I suspect, may be unique.

Some Turkic rulers were sacral. Indeed, the constant references to their heavenly origins by the Türks and the use of holy titles such as *Idiqt*, *tengriken* (<*tengri xan*), *tengrim*, etc. by the Uighurs (cf. Von Gabain 1973: I, 69–71; Golden 1992: 165, 169–70), Basmls and others certainly points to sacral claims in early Turkic kingship. The Türk ethnogenetic myth with its lupine ancestor, birth in a cave (the place of contact with the supernatural world), the shamanic elements in the official investiture (described in some detail for both the Türks and the Khazars in nearly identical terms by Chinese and Muslim sources), and the bloodless murder of rulers who have lost their magical potency, all have numerous parallels with sacral kingships in other cultures (Roux 1995: 77, 86, 89–90; Czeglédý 1966: 14–26; Waida 1986: 180–88; Ludwig 1982: 133; Márton 1997: 72–79). Perhaps connected with this were the royal orchestras of Turkic rulers (Esin 1970: 94), as music played a role in shamanic trances. The 'Heavenly Qaghan' and notions of *tengri qut* had parallels that went back to the Xiongnu (Chen 2002: 289ff.) and Kušans,⁶⁶ among others (Pulleyblank 1966: 9–39; Maenchen-Helfen 1973: 272). According to the *Weishu*, the Tuoba/Tabgāč ruler Huan (267–305) was such a huge and awesome figure that 'no horse could carry him, and he usually travelled in a wagon drawn by great oxen. Once, when the emperor had suffered witchcraft poisoning, he had vomited, and at that spot, an elm tree grew up' – all the more amazing because elm trees did not grow there (Holmgren 1982).

The Qaghan also had to be in possession of certain holy lands, e.g. the Türk *Ötüken* Yiş (perhaps in the Xangai mountains), previously a sacred area for the Xiongnu and Rouran.⁶⁷ The possession of the *Ötüken* was an outward manifestation of the *qut* that the ruler enjoyed. The Uighur ruler set up his throne and 'stockade' (*čit*) in this sacred area (Morivasu and Ochir 1999: 170–71; Clauson 1972: 401–402). The *Zhoushu* reports that the Türk Qaghan resided at all times on the *Ötüken* mountain (Liu 1958: I, 10). The Kül Tegin Inscription states: *Türk qağan ötüken yış olursar ilte bung yoq* ('if the Türk Qaghan resides in the *Ötüken* Yiş there will be no grief in the polity'), *il tutsıq yir ötüken yış ermiş* ('the *Ötüken* Yiş was the place which controls the polity') (Tekin 1988: 2). The later Mongols conceived of this spiritual entity as a goddess of the earth, Etügen/Itügen.⁶⁸ A Uighur Manichaean document has the expression *il ötüken qutı*, which has been interpreted to mean that the *Ötüken* itself was the source of *qut* (Potapov 1972: 283–84). This is by no means certain. More likely is that possession of the *Ötüken* was an outward manifestation of the *qut* that the ruler enjoyed. Frye noted that this usage has parallels in Iranian forms (Frye 1989: 140). Chinggisid Qaraqorum was built in this holy region as well (Jagchid and Hyer 1979: 10; Allsen 1996: 116–35). The idea of a sacred refugium is found among the non-imperial, stateless Qipchaqs. These are the 'black' and 'blue' forests recorded in the Rus' sources (Pritsak 1982: II, 347, 354, 375; 1967: II, 1621–22).⁶⁹ Among nomads who had taken over states in the sedentary world, such notions appear to have faded.

The relationship of the Avar and Bulğaric title (Καυκάβος Καυχάβος) *Qapxan* and its relationship to the Türk name/title *Qapğan/Qapağan Qaghan* (reg. 691–716) is unclear. This was an important rank in the Avaro-Bulğaric world (Moravcsik 1958: 156–57; Altheim 1959–1962: I, 27, 204–11; Pohl 1988: 302–304; Rachewiltz 294–98). The Balkan Bulğars may have made use of Xiongnu connections,⁷⁰ real or imagined, to legitimate their qaghanal status.

The Türk Qaghanate was divided into two wings, eastern and western. The Eastern Qaghans, in theory, had a higher status than their western counterparts (the *Yabğū Qağans*). This bipartite principle remained a fixture in the structure of many medieval Turkic polities, among both those that were states (e.g. the Khazar, Qarakhanid and Seljuk realms) and those that remained tribal unions (e.g. the Pečenegs, Cumans, etc.). It may have been one of the elements provided for in the *törü* itself (Trepavlov 1991: 21).

The Qaghan's spouse was termed *qatun* or *xatun*, which also denoted 'lady'. It is a borrowing from Sogdian *χwat'yn* (**χwatên*) where it probably connected with *χwt'w* (*χwataw*) 'lord'.⁷¹

In addition to these imperial ranks, the *Zhoushu* and other dynastic annals, as well as the Türk inscriptions, note numerous titles and offices among the Türks (Liu 1958: I, 8–9, 41, 181, II, 498–99 n. 49).⁷² We cannot examine all of them here (a number remain problematic). Below are some of the most important ones, given in the order of precedence in which they appear in most of the Chinese sources:

Yabğuljabğū: a rank just below the qaghanal level. It was noted among the Xiongnu (depending on how one interprets the term *Chanyu*, see above), Wusun and Da Yuezhi/Kušans, Daxia (Bactria)⁷³ and Tokharians (**yapko* 'duke') (Pinault 1998: 11–12).⁷⁴ It appears to derive from Iran. *yam-* 'to control, command, lead'⁷⁵ or *yau-* (*yavuka*) 'to bring together' (Bailey 1985, VII: 32–33, 130).

Šadlšād: defined by Clauson as 'ranking prob. next after *xağan* and bestowed by the *xağan* on some close relative, younger brother or son'. In effect, the *šad* functioned

as a ‘viceroi’. The *šad* is also frequently noted as a military commander.⁷⁶ This is clearly their function in the Western Türk and Khazar state.⁷⁷ The title is Iranian in origin, cf. Old Pers. *xšāyaθiya*, *xšaita* (> *šāh*), Soğd. *’ğšyδ/xšēδ*, Saka *šao*. In Khazaria, it appears as *šad* (*šat*) in Movsēs Daskhurants’i [Dasxuranc’i], probably referring here to the Western Türks) and **Ayšād/Ebšād/Išād* (in the Islamic sources). It also became the dynastic name of the Ishšīdids, *ğulām* (‘military slaves’) of Transoxanian origin who ruled Egypt (935–969) for the ‘Abbāsids (Clauson 1972: 866; Golden 1980: 206–208). The title in this form is not attested after the eighth-century Uighur documents, nor has the Iranian form been found from which this was taken. The title *Šadapit*, which clearly derives from the same terms, perhaps referring to the retinue of the *šad*, is also only noted in eighth-century sources (Clauson 1972: 867).

Tegin: a term designating a ‘royal prince’ was also probably of non-Turkic origin (cf. the pl. form *tegit*).⁷⁸ Undoubtedly, it was part of the imperial apparatus taken over from the Rouran (Golden 1980: I, 186–87).⁷⁹ Altheim suggested that it derived from Iranian *dēhkân* (Altheim 1959–1962: I, 48, 51), a theory that has not found wide support. It is recorded as a name or title among the North Caucasian Huns under Khazar rule (Golden 1980: I, 186–87). It is also found as both a title and name-component among later Turkic peoples (cf. the Ghaznavid Sebüktegin) – in particular among *ğulāms* in caliphal service⁸⁰ – and passed into Mongol (*čigin*). By Kâšğari’s time, the title had become largely devalued. Kâšğari’s initial definition of it is as ‘slave’ reflects its common appearance in the names of Turkic military slaves. He notes further, however, that the word then became ‘a title pure and simple for the sons of the Khâqâniyya’, i.e. for the royal princes of the Qarakhanid house, and has a fanciful tale as to why that occurred.⁸¹

Kündü: Ibn Faḍlân (who was in Volga Bulğaria in 921–922) in his description of the Khazar monarchy says that they have a Great Qaghan, whose deputy, the Qaghan Beg (*xâqân bah*), commands the army and carries out the administration of the state. The Qaghan Beg, in turn, has a deputy called **Kündü*⁸² who also has a deputy, *jâwšîğr* (جاوشیگر, see below).⁸³ *Kündü* is not attested in Turkic, but is found in Mongol and Tungusic with the sense of ‘heavy, weighty, honor, respect, worth, authority’ (Starostin et al. 2003: I, 820; Cincius et al. 1975: I, 432). It appears among the Early Hungarians in the form *kündelkende* as the name for their sacral king, while the actual affairs of state are conducted by the *gyula* (from Bulğaro-Turkic **jila*, Common Turkic **jila*, an obscure Turkic title also noted among the Pečenegs at this time) (Ligeti 1986: 153–54, 484–85; Róna-Tas 1999: 343, 347). The Khazar personal name **Kündäčik* also derives from *kündä/kündü*.⁸⁴

Čurl’or: a high, imperial title probably on the level of ‘head of a small confederation’ (Clauson 1972: 427–28). In the Western Türk empire, each of the five tribal groupings that constituted the Dulo, the left wing of the *On Oq* (lit. ‘Ten Arrows’, in Chinese *Shi Xing*, the ‘Ten Surnames’) into which the confederation was divided, was headed by a *čur* (Chavannes 1941: 27, 34; Golden 1980: 180; Beckwith 1987: 209–10; Dobrovits: 2004: 258). It too, like *tegin* (originally ‘royal prince’), became common in *ğulām* (‘military slave’) names. Some sense of this may already have been apparent in Turko-Soğdian documents, where it appears to have denoted a member of the ruler’s personal comitatus.⁸⁵

İl-teber:⁸⁶ the title given to the ruler of a subordinate polity or territory, perhaps similar to the *čur*. He was often accompanied by a fiscal officer, the *tudun* (see

below).⁸⁷ The title also, apparently, came from the Rouran.⁸⁸ The Volga Bulğar ruler, a vassal of the Khazar Qagan, had the title *yil tawâr* (يلطور), the Oğuric variant of this title (Togan 1939: 1). The ruler of the North Caucasian Huns, also Khazar subjects, was *Alp *Il-tewâr* (*Alp' ilit'uêr* in Armenian transcription) (Golden 1980: I, 147–50) and an army commander (again probably the leader of a subject grouping) was named **Qadîr il-teber* (*Xat'irlit'bêr* in Armenian transcription) (Golden 1980: I, 197–98).

Irkin: title of tribal chiefs higher than a *beg*.⁸⁹ In the Western Türk state it was the title borne by the leaders of the five groups of the Nushibi (*Nu Šad[a]pıt), the rival subconfederation of the Dulo within the On Oq (Beckwith 1987: 210).

Tudun/todun: is a lesser, but important imperial title borne by an official who oversaw the collection of taxes (Clauson 1972: 457). By the eleventh century (Qarakhanid era), it merely denoted 'village chief; distributor of water'. (Kâşğarî/Dankoff 1982–1985: I, 305) There is no obvious Turkic etymology. The title is found among the European Avars and hence must be of considerable antiquity (Pohl 1988: 300–01).

After this the order is less clear. Among those mentioned are:

Küli čor/čur (Chin. *qulichuo*): a name or title found in both the Eastern and Western Türk state (Clauson 1972: 715). An inscription for the intrepid warrior Küli Čur was set up by the Eastern Türks (c. 721).⁹⁰

Yanhongda: perhaps the Chinese rendering of *Imğalar* (see above).

Tutuqltotoq: 'military governor' < Middle Chin. *tou tok* (Clauson 1972: 453).

Čabišlčavušlčawuš: the title of the army commander subsequently used to denote court officials in charge of the ruler's escort, etc. It continued to have this meaning up to the Qarakhanid era and only later, in the Chinggisid era, was it devalued to that of 'mace-bearer, herald', etc. (Clauson 1972: 399). The Khazar title *Jāwšīgr* may contain the title *čavušlčawuš*. Marcel Erdal has suggested that it may render *čavuš-yığar*, 'one who marshalled the ranks in battle' or was 'in charge of order at court' + 'one who assembles or convenes'.⁹¹

Bilge (lit 'wise'): the title given to the Counsellor of the Türk qaghans. It also appears frequently as one of the attributes of the Türk qaghans (e.g. Bilge Qaghan) (Clauson 1972: 340).

Beg: 'clanal, tribal or subordinate chief' (Clauson 1972: 322–23; Kljaštornyj and Livšic 1972: 80). A term of either Iranian (*bğyl/bağa*) (Altheim 1959–1962: I, 214–15; Chen 2002: 303) or Chinese (*po [pak]* 'head of a hundred men') derivation (Clauson 1972: 322–23; Kljaštornyj and Livšic 1972: 80). *Bağa* also appears in Türk names and titulature (Nadeljaev et al. 1979: 77). A derived (diminutive) form, *bekeč/begeč* is cited by Kâşğarî as a 'princely honorific' (Kâşğarî/Dankoff 1982–1985: I, 277).

Öge: a high counsellor (e.g. *el ögesi*). In Kâşğarî's time, it was just below a *tegin* and given to commoners who are 'intelligent, mature, and experienced in affairs' (Kâşğarî/Dankoff 1982–1985: I, 277; Clauson 1972: 101).

The *Qutadğû Bilig* lists a number of offices of state aside from those already noted, e.g. *Kök Ayuq*, *Inanč Beg*, *Čağrı Beg*, *Yuğruš*, *El Begi*, *Er Ögi*, et al.⁹² Of these, *yuğruš* is attested among the European Avars (*iugurruš*, *iugurgus*) (Pohl 1988: 292–300) and hence goes back to the oldest layers of Turkic titles. Among the late European Avars, it may have functioned as the lesser king under the Qaghan (Pohl 1988: esp. 293ff.).

Like *tegin/tegit*, there are a number of other titles that have non-Turkic plural forms such as *Īsbāra* (pl. *išbaras*) coming from Sanscrit *īśvara* 'lord, prince' via Tokharian (Clauson 1972: 257); and *tarqan* (pl. *tarqat*).⁹³ *Tarqan* and *bağatur* ('hero, heroic warrior') appear to go back at least to the Xiongnu. *Tarqan* is found among the European Avars (Clauson 1972: 313, 539–40; Sevortjan 1978: 82–85; Golden 1980: I, 155–56; Pohl 1988: 301–302). Their ultimate origins are unclear.


It was this empire that expanded into the Ponto-Caspian steppes in the late 560s, bringing its state structure to the Turkic-speaking nomads that came under its dominion. Thereafter, in this region, nomadic political traditions, however effaced over time, followed those first articulated here by the Türk Qaghanate (Golden 1982: 37–76). One has the impression that in the aftermath of the Türk Empire, there was a sense of Turkic or more precisely 'Türk' consciousness, to some degree, defined by shared, albeit perhaps differing memories of belonging to the Türk Empire, and by participation in the now Turkicized imperial tradition and a common linguistic heritage to which several script systems had been added, namely the runiform scripts, variants of which may be found throughout Eurasia (Róna-Tas 1991: 55–62; Németh 1966: 1–52; and Kyzlasov 1994). But, there was also a common imperial, nomadic, political tradition which was equally internalized by non-Turks, such as the Khitans and later the Mongols. Closely connected to this was a sense of the superiority of the nomad over the sedentary, expressed in military and political domination.⁹⁴ This sense of politico-ethnic identity arising, as was noted, to some degree, from the shared historical experience of the Türk Qaghanate, continued and was reflected in Kâşğarî's *Dîwân*, reinforced, perhaps, by their imperial neighbours, especially the Arabs, whose ethnographic tradition had come to term them all 'Turks'. In Kâşğarî's time, we see a Turkic political-military elite in close contact with and ruling over an Iranian, sedentary Central Asian population that was in the process of Turkicization (Kâşğarî/Dankoff 1982–1985: I, 83, 84). Turkicization extended to the nomadic world as well. Kâşğarî cites the Čömül, Qay, Yabaqu, Tatar and Basmlî who have a language of their own 'but also know Turkic' (Kâşğarî/Dankoff 1982–1985: I, 83).⁹⁵ A dramatic example of this consciousness may be seen when the conquest-era Mongols convinced the Turkic Qipchaqs, in their encounter in 1222, to break with their Iranian Alan allies, saying 'we and you are one people'.⁹⁶ The appeal was not to linguistic or ethnic ties (although Mongolic components had gone into the formation of the Qipchaqs), but to a common steppe imperial tradition in which both groups had participated.

The Turkic, nomadic states of Central and Western Eurasia were all 'secondary' or 'tertiary' developments, in some instances in keeping with conceptions of *translatio imperii*, stemming from the Türk (and ultimately Xiongnu and Rouran) tradition. They retained their state structures because of concrete political-economic circumstances centring on their relations with their powerful, sedentary, imperial neighbours: Byzantium, Sasanid Iran and later the Umayyad and 'Abbâsîd Caliphates. In post-Khazar Western Eurasia, the Pečeneg and Western Oğuz tribal unions remained stateless (Golden 1982: 63–68), as did the Qipchaq (or Cumano-Qipchaq-Qangli) union. After initial hostilities with Rus', and other sedentary neighbours, the Qipchaq union succeeded in integrating itself into the larger, regional political structure through a pattern of alliances with and occasional interventions into the affairs of their immediate neighbours – Rus', Georgia, Khwārazm and Hungary – while becoming a source of professional soldiers for the Islamic world (now dominated by Turkic rulers). In contrast to the Oğuz and their empires, there is no *Qipčaqnāma* to celebrate the

achievements of an eponymous 'Qipchaq Khan'. Indeed, Qipchaq origins were explained in the Oğuz tales in which Qipchaq played a clearly subordinate role.

The tribal and ethnic profiles of the Turkic nomads of medieval Eurasia were shaped by three major movements of peoples: the migrations of tribes touched off by the rise and fall of the Xiongnu polity, the migrations set in motion by the rise and fall of the Türk Qaghanate, the impact of the creation of the Mongol Empire. The Chinggisid era ushered in extensive changes in the steppe (Golden 2000a: 21–41) in which the old tribal unions were broken up, shuffled and scattered among different armies and outposts of the empire. The personal, provincial or regional army or troop formation replaced the tribe as the locus of political-military power. This was, in effect, the *nökör*-ization of the steppe nomads. The nature of political legitimacy changed. Chinggisids were the charismatic 'golden' clan and the presence of a Chinggisid, at least as nominal ruler, was required (cf. Aqsaq Temür/Timūr-i lang as the *küregen* 'son-in-law' and 'Great Amīr'; Manz 1989: 14, 57). With the increasing and deepening Islamization of the Turkic nomads, especially in regions not ruled by Chinggisids, the *qut*-based, sacral ideology became Islamized as well (Woods 1999: 4, 6, 9).

The tribes and clans displaced and reconfigured by the Mongol and Timurid upheavals, subsequently retribalized and crystallized into the Turkic peoples of today. With the breakdown of the old tribal system, the system of politonymy changed as well. The growing importance of dynamic, charismatic personalities came to the fore. We now find clearly identifiable anthroponyms, the names of ruling figures, becoming, in time, ethnonyms, e.g. Noğay, Osmanlı, Çağatay. The Turkic peoples had entered a new era of ethnogenesis and state-formation. In more modern times, the great sedentary empires, the Russian Empire in particular, would often be a contributing and sometimes determinative force in the shaping of Turkic peoples.



The Turkic World in the mid-tenth century (Golden 1992: 232)

NOTES

1. See, among others, Vladimircov 2002 [1934]; Spuler 1965, 1985; Allsen 1987; Endicott-West 1989; Farquhar 1990; Rachewiltz et al. 1993b; Trepavlov 1993: 19–30; Skrynnikova 1997.
2. Cf. Kyčanov (1997), based largely on Chinese sources with much comparative information on states and polities of nomadic origin; Giraud (1960: esp. 67–83), based on a close reading of the Orkhon inscriptions; Kafesoğlu (1987); Hassan (1985); the studies of the Qarakhanid state by Pritsak (1951: 270–300; 1953–54: 17–68; 1950: 209–28) and Golden (1982: 37–76; 1991: 132–57); and most recently Zuev (2002). A study of the various states that have been created on the territory of modern Uzbekistan is surveyed in Ziyā (2000).
3. Cf. Moravcsik 1958; and Bibikov 1999 [1981]: 5–152, which deals with non-steppe peoples as well.
4. Useful recent collections include: R. Şeşen 1985; Kmoskó 1997; and Göckenjan and Zimonyi 2001.
5. Wittfogel and Fêng (1949: 635–36), drawing upon the *Liao shi*, dates this to 1130. Bretschneider (1967 [1888]: I, 214–15), citing the same passages in the *Liao shi*, places the events in 1121.
6. On the formation of the Xiongnu polity, in part in response to Chinese movement into their territory, see Di Cosmo (2002). Elsewhere, Di Cosmo (1999: 1–40), argues for the importance of internal crises in nomadic society as the catalyst for politogenesis.
7. See discussion of these migrations in Czeglédý (1983: 25–125) and Irmukhanov (2003: 210ff.).
8. Ašina: cf. Khotanese-Saka, *âşşaina*, *âşşena*, ‘blue’; Tokharian *âşna* ‘blue, dark’. See Kljaštornyj (1994: 445–47), building on ideas put forward by Haussig (1979: 54–57) and Bailey (1985).
9. See most recently, Kamalov (2003: 77–90).
10. Sketches of early Qarluq history can be found in Ecsedy (1980: 23–37) and Salman (1981: 169–206).
11. The Tariyat (Terkhin) Inscription (S, 3): see Moriyasu and Ochir, 1999: 169, 171. Tekin (2004: 122–54, from his *Makaleler II*, and esp. pp. 127, 135) places the flight of the Qarlucs to the west in the *it yılıqa* (Year of the Dog = 746). For an outline of these events, see Golden (1982: 53–56); Pritsak (1951: 273–75).
12. Ibn Khurdādhbih 1889: 116; see also Pritsak (1951: 272–75).
13. See the important remarks of Czeglédý (1973: 257–67).
14. Pritsak 1951: 281–85. Tao Hua (1993: 96–102), in a critique of Pritsak, rejects the notion of a strong Qarluq Qaghanate in the early tenth century.
15. The question of which tribal grouping, Qarluq, Yağma or others (the Igdiş), provided the ruling core of the Qarakhanid dynasty remains problematic: see Togan 1970: 430–31; Golden 1992: 214–15; and Kochnev 1996: 352–57.
16. See Yāqūt (1955: II, 24–25) citing Ibn al-Faqīh (writing c. 903); and al-Masʿūdī (1966–1979: 155). The name Ašina is perhaps garbled in al-Masʿūdī’s rendering of the name of the Qarluq ruler as ‘Sāba’ (سَابَا) for سَانَا (*Sāna, perhaps a corruption, in turn of اشپنا Aš[ī]na).
17. *Hudūd al-ʿĀlam min al-Maṣriq ilāʾl-Maḡrib* 1962: 85; and *Hudūd al-ʿĀlam*. tr. Minorsky 1971: 99–100.
18. Gardizī 1984 [1363]: 549–50; Martinez 1982: 120–21. The Habibi text has اتع (ʿt) which should be تتغ (tutug). Šad, a borrowing from Iranian (see below) is usually associated with a prince of the royal family. *Tutuq* or *Totoq*, a borrowing from Chinese, denoted the much lower rank of ‘military governor’; Clauson 1972: 453, 866; and Golden 1980: I, 206–208.
19. Tekin 1988: 12/13, 14/15, 18/19, 22/23, 42/43, 44/45, 46/47; BQ, E20, KT, E25, N 13, 36; BQ, E17, 27, KT, E20, 35. Curiously, the surviving Turkic runic fragments from the lands of the Qırğız (Khakasiya and Tuva) do not note the title *qağan*. *Qan* and other titles found in the Orkhon inscriptions are mentioned; see Kormuş 1997.
20. It might be noted here that a Qırğız embassy to the Tang in 843 was met with some puzzlement by the Chinese. The Qırğız, apparently, had not been in contact with China for some

- time. The Chinese figured out who they were only after consulting historical sources; see Pan 1997: 86.
21. Dobrovits 2004: 258–60; Liu 1958: I, 453–54.
 22. Abu'l Ġāzi Bahadur Khan 1958: 37, 39 (in the Russian version, pp. 54, 55).
 23. See Doerfer 1963–1975: II, 194–201; and Sevortjan et al. (1974: 341–43), who notes some of the other viewpoints. On the Turkic notions of creating a *pax*, i.e. a subjugated area in which peace reigns, see, in brief, Genç 1981: 78. Starostin et al. (2003: I, 501) derive it from Proto-Altaic **ēlV*: cf. Tung. **elke*, ‘peaceful, silent’; Mong. **el*, ‘peaceful, relatives’; Turk. **ēl*, ‘peace, people, country’.
 24. Clauson (1972: 158) connects it with the *yanhongda* = Early Middle Chinese **jiam* *yəwng* *dat* (see Pulleyblank, 1991: 357, 125, 69). This title is noted in a listing of Türk titles in several Chinese sources: see Chavannes 1941: 15 (*Suishu*), 21 (*Jiu Tangshu*) and 164 n. 3 (*Tangshu*); and Liu Mautsai 1958: II, 557 n., 545 (drawing on Hu Sanxing [1230–1302], *Zizhi tongjian*). Clauson suggests that the Chinese forms mask (the plural) *imğalar*. This title is also found in Sogdian documents (as *amğa* or *imğa*); see Sims-Williams and Hamilton 1990: III, 23–28.
 25. Ajdarov 1971: 324. A better reading of the text can be found in Tekin 1968: 249.
 26. Clauson 1972: 121, 306. Starostin et al. (2003: II, 947) derive it from **múgdā*, ‘bank, earth’: cf. Tung. **megdilmugdī* and Mong. **muji* (‘territory, province’), Turk. *bodun*, but add that the ‘Turkic form may be alternately derived from **bod* ‘body’, in which case it may be unrelated to the other forms . . .’
 27. Lašuk (1968, 1: 101) shows that the later *Oğuz ili* (*il* here functioning much like a *bodun*) consisted of related tribes that had been joined by others. The Oğuz were frequently at war with one another, a theme reflected in even later works such as Abu'l Ġāzi Bahadur Khan (1958: 40–41/Russian, p. 56).
 28. Clauson (1972: 76); Dobrovits (2004: 257). As Dobrovits points out (pp. 257–58), Chinese used a number of terms to denote this social unit – *buluo*, *zhong*, *luo*, *bu* – commenting that it is ‘next to impossible to define their exact meanings’. The most widely used terms were *buluo* and *xing* ‘surname, clan, people’. The latter was used to denote ‘both “tribe” and “clan”’.
 29. See Németh (1991: 54ff.), who provides a lengthy analysis of the Turkic system of ethnonyms.
 30. Moriyasu and Ochir 1999. This differs from earlier readings, which omit the *Ašina*; see Kljaštornyj and Livšic 1972: 85.
 31. Liu 1958: II, 594–97; and Zuev (2002: 33, 86–88), who reconstructs the name as **Aštaq*. Cf. Pulleyblank 1991: 23, 283, 74: ‘*a ši tək*. Bailey (1985: 104) comments that it ‘resembles the Iranian **χšaita* “ruler”’. (See discussion of *šad* below.) An Lushan, who led the famous revolt against the Tang in 755, was of Ashide origin on his mother’s side (Liu 1958: I, 267).
 32. Clauson 1972: 220; Kāšgari/Dankoff 1982–1985: I, 93: ‘authority; power to act’ (*salṭana; nafād al-amr*).
 33. Giraud (1960: 71). *Yosun*, ‘manner, custom’, is a term which is found only in later Uighur juridical documents of the twelfth–fourteenth centuries (see Radloff 1928: 12–13), but is presumably considerably older. Clauson (1972: 975) viewed it as a loanword from Mongol, but Starostin et al. (2003: 1545–46) argues that Turkic is the primary form, which travelled thence to Mongol (*josun*) and Manchu (*joso*) < Altaic **jioso* ‘shape’.
 34. See discussion in Trepavlov 1991: 19–30. İnalçık (1966: 268–69) comments that the Qaghan must establish the *törü* immediately upon founding the *illel*. The *törü*, he argues, is based on the *yosun* to which the ruler has added his own regulations. As a consequence of its close ties to the *yosun*, the *törü* is binding on the ruler as well. Počekaev (2004: 534) also underscores the role of the ruler in creating law while at the same time being bound by it. In the pre-Chinggisid Mongol tradition, with its more weakly articulated political structure, *törü* was not created by the ruler, but took on a less concrete, more abstract character. It was Heaven-given and thus had to be followed by *xan* and commoner alike (see Počekaev 2004: 534–35; and also Skrynnikova 1997: 45). In the Chinggisid era, she argues, it was viewed as a ‘Higher Law which heaven manifests through the ruler’ (p. 117). On the further development of notions of *törü* among the later Mongols, see Humphrey and Hürelbaatar (2004: 464ff.).
 35. See also examples cited in Trepavlov 1991: 20–21.

36. See also discussion in Trepavlov 1991: 23; 1993: 41, 121 n.45. The most common meaning of the verb *qal-* is 'to remain', but it can also mean 'to be only, to continue to be, to stop, come to a halt, to remain behind' (Clauson 1972: 615–16). Clearly, it connotes the latter sense here.
37. Esin 1970: 78. Cf. Qaraxhanid *törü toqu* 'traditional ceremonies' or 'traditions and ceremonies' (Clauson 1972: 466).
38. *Kutadgu Bilig* 1979: 59; see also Yûsuf Khâşş Hâjib 1983: 54.
39. Giraud 1960: 71 (KT, E 8, 31; BQ, E, 3, 8, 18); Tekin 1988: 8/9–10/11, 16/17, 36/37–38/39, 42/43.
40. *Kutadgu Bilig* 1979: 543; and the translation by Dankoff (1983: 217).
41. For this identification, see Pritsak (1951: 273) and Pulleyblank (1956: 36).
42. For a differing view, see Skrynnikova (1997: 45–46).
43. Zuev (2002: 31) notes Chin. *xihou* (**xiəp-g'u*) = Kušan *yavugô*, which he views as a Tokharian title also known to the Xiongnu. He suggests that this title was brought by Yuezhi entering Xiongnu service. The title is also noted among the Wusun (Buju *xihou*: **pwo-dz'ioğ* = *Bhožakal/Bhojaka Yabğu*).
44. See Bailey 1985: 32; Menges 1968: 88; Pulleyblank 1962: 256–57. In Middle Chinese these two characters may have rendered **dzian-wua* (Pulleyblank 1991: 48, 381) or **žian-giwoł dian-giwo* (Karlgren 1996: 59 [147a], 44 [97a]).
45. On forms of this title as recorded in non-Turkic sources, see Bailey 1985: VII, 34–38.
46. Pulleyblank 1991: 173, 123, 84; Karlgren 1996: 19 [1a], 25 [15j], 128 [464p]: Archaic (Early Zhou) **k'ā*; Ancient (c. 600 A.D.) *k'ā*; Mod. Mandarin *k'o*; and for the other two: **g'algālho*, **twən.tuənlt'un*.
47. Liu 1958: I, 7, 181 (briefer account of the *Tangshu*).
48. Tekin 1988: 22/23 (KT, N12).
49. Tekin 1988: 12/13, 18/19, 42/43, 46/47 (KT, E 18, 37, 38, BQ, E 16, 27).
50. Tekin 1988: 12/13, 40/41 (KT, E 14, 16, BQ, E 12, 13) (in latter *yağığ baz qılmiş* 'subjugated the enemy').
51. al-Baladurî 1959: 199–200. See discussion in Testen (1994–1996: 3–21) who, contrary to the general view that this was an North Caucasian Avar ruler, emends the title وهرارزان (*whrârzan*) to وهرورزان (*whrwrrân*) = Iran. *Wahr-warz-ân*, i.e. 'armour-makers' = the Zirihkarân, the people of Kubači of today. These people are part of the Dargin grouping of North-east Caucasian languages. The toponym 'Kubači' derives from Turkic *kübeči*, 'maker of chain-mail' (< Turk. *kübe*, *küpe*, originally 'small metal ring'; see Clauson 1972: 687; Toparh et al. 2003: 166, 167). This 'state' was subsequently brought under the jurisdiction of the Şâhib as-Sarîr ('Lord of the Throne'), who took over the title of 'Shah of the Armourers'. On Sarîr, see Piotrovskij et al. 1988: 126.
52. Bailey (1985: VII, 103) attempted to derive Turk. *qut* < **qawut* from Iranian *kâva*. See also Bombaci 1965: 284–91; 1966: 13–43; and Frye 1989: 139–40.
53. This is noted, for example, with regard to the Khazar Qaghan as reported by al-Mas'ûdî (1966–1979: I, 214–15).
54. The Khazar Qaghans, the successors of the Türks in Western Eurasia, preserved these traditions as we know from the Arab sources. Blood could not be shed before them: see al-Mas'ûdî 1966–79: I, 214–15; al-Işṭakhrî 1870: 224; and discussion in Golden, 1993: 220ff.
55. See also the discussion in Roux 1959: 232–35, 237–39.
56. See discussion in Masao 1981: esp. 58ff.
57. Cf. Tuguševa 1991: 105, 117. For other examples of Uighur throne names/imperial titles, see Hamilton 1955: 139–44.
58. Possibly a title. See Clauson 1972: 715.
59. Arabic text is in Şeşen 1967: 32–33. Kumekov (1972: 110) notes this account in the *ʿAjâ'ib ad-Dunyâ* of Wasif-Şâh and in the *Jâmi' al-Funûn wa Salwat al-Makhzûn* of Şâbîb al-Kharranî.
60. Liu (1958 I: 9.181, 460) *fûli*: Mid. Chin. *buš^h liš^hllî^h*; Kljaštornyj (1964: 111). The term *böri*, in Kljaštornyj's opinion, may be of Iranian origin. This view is contested by Starostin et al. (2003: I, 343–44): Altaic **bîre*, 'a kind of predator': Tung. **birin*, Mong. **bër-*, Turk. **börü*.

61. On this sense of the term *nökör*, see Rachewiltz (2004: I, 257): 'Friend, mate . . . companion-at-arms, comrade . . . a young man or fully-fledged warrior who, of his own free will, declared his allegiance and gave his support to a chief, or prospective chief of another clan or tribe, thus forming with other liegemen like him a body of personal retainers bound in a relationship of trust to the chosen leader and enjoying special privileges.'
62. Clauson 1972: 387. Later, in Middle Turkic it simply denoted 'command, order', as in Modern Turkic.
63. Togan (1939: Arabic, p. 33/German, p. 75). Common Turkic *b-* in initial position is usually retained in Oğuric: see Scherner 1977: 1; and Tenišev et al. 1984: 182–84).
64. Liu 1958: II, 499 n. 49. Liu's conjecture may be somewhat forced, given the early Mid. Chin. Form *jwi* (Pulleyblank 1991: 366). Turkic *eblev* 'dwelling place, tent, house' (Clauson 1972: 3–4).
65. Şeşen (1967: Arabic text, p. 35, Turk. trans. p. 33n). See also Togan 1939: 263.
66. Cf. the β100-κεδo of Kaniška; see Aalto 1971: 31.
67. Kljaštornyj 1964: 34. In the Tariyat (Terkhin) inscription (see Moriyasu and Ochir 1999: 169–71) the *Ötüken* is placed around the Orkhon (*orqun ögüz*) [E,3]. The ruler sets up his throne 'here at the centre of the *Ötüken*, to the west of the river-head areas of Aš-Öngüz and Qan-Iduq' [S,6, W, 2]. The text also notes the 'western end of the *Ötüken*, in the river-head area of Tez' (W, 1, 5). In the east are the Qanyuy and Künüy. The southern zone seems to be the Altun mountains and in the west are the Kögmen mountains. The summer pasturages are north of the *Ötüken* [W, 5].
68. On this basis, some scholars view the *Ötüken* as a female deity in Türk times. On the identification of the *Ötüken*, see Pelliot (1929: 212–19). On *Ötüken* as a female deity, see Giraud (1960: 106) and Potapov (1973: 283).
69. Pritsak 1982: II, 347, 354, 375; 1967: II, 1621–22). The seventeenth-century Russian geographical treatise, *Kniga Bol'semu Čertežu*, notes a 'holy well', the 'Netrigus' in the Donec region, the old Cuman territory. Pritsak views this as a 'cryptic deformation' of Turkic *tengir su*, 'holy water'. See Serbina 1950: 76.
70. See discussion in Pritsak 1955: 37–38, 63–65.
71. Clauson 1972: 602–603; Gershevitch 1961: 5 #38; Smirnova 1970: 38ff. Rachewiltz (1989: 297) opts for a Xianbi or Tuyuhun origin based on the form *qagatun*.
72. See discussion in Drompp 1991: 93–94.
73. Recorded in Chinese sources as *xihou*; Kharoṣṭi script documents: *yavugasa*, *yauasa* (-*asa* being a genitive sing. ending) = **yavug*; Greek script: ZAOOY **jawu*(ǵ) or **zewu*(ǵ); and sixth century Hephthalite ιοπγο. It would appear to derive from Iran. *yam-* 'to hold, stretch out, control'. See Hulswé and Loewe 1979: 121 and n. 288; Frye 1962: 352–59; Pulleyblank 1966: 27–28.
74. The **yapko* coexisted with the king (*walo*).
75. Kljaštornyj 1964: 111. Litvinskij (1968: 21–22) also points to some problems in this construction.
76. Drompp (1991: 93) citing the *Jiu Tangshu* that they are those who 'command troops of other tribes'.
77. Cf. the *šad* noted in Daskhurants'i's account of the Western Türk/Khazar involvement in Herakleios' wars with Šasānid Iran (Dasxuranc'i 1961: 88). Türk ruler ['king of the North'] appoints his nephew, whom they call Šat 'in honour of his princely rank among them as' the leader of his army. The work attributed to Daskhurants'i is the product of several hands, the earliest stemming from the early to mid-eighth century and the last additions made in the late eleventh-early twelfth century (see Dasxuranc'i 1961; Smbatjan [translator of Dasxuranc'i, 1984: 16] places the last additions to sometime between 998 and 1003).
78. Clauson 1972: 483; Pulleyblank 2000: 64–65. Mistakenly copied into Chinese as *tele* (for *tejin*); see Drompp 1991: 93. Cf. also Bactr. *tagino*, *tigino*, 'dynastischer Name'; Sanskrit *tigina*; MPers. *tgyn*, *tgīn*; Khotanese *digyina*, *dagyini*, *dagyaina*, etc.: Rybatzki 2000: 215.
79. From Khazar it survived in Khazar-influenced Hungarian toponymy (cf. Tétény < *tétém < *tētem < *tühütüm < tigitim 'my tegins').

80. Cf. Takin al-Khazarî and Waşif Şawârtakîn at-Turkî al-Khazarî, both of Khazar origin; see Golden 2002–2003: 25. There are numerous examples among non-Khazar *gûlâms* as well.
81. Kâşğari/Dankoff 1982–1985: I, 314. He says that the Qarakhanid princes paid respect to their fathers by referring to themselves as ‘your slave’ when addressing them. ‘Afterwards this name was reserved for them (when uttered alone), while as a name for slaves it remained joined to some other element, so as to clearly distinguish the two.’
82. In the text, preserved only in Yâqût’s *Mu’jam al-Buldân*. See ms. forms in Golden 1980: I, 200. Almost always given as كندر (*kndr*) probably to be corrected to كندو (*kndû*).
83. Ibn Faḍlân/Togan 1939: Arabic, p. 43/Germ. trans. 98–99.
84. Golden 1980: I, 202–204: usually written كنداجيق (*kndâjîq*) or كنداج (*kndâj*) = **kündäč*. See also Ligeti 1986: 483.
85. Sims-Williams 1990: 182: ‘*cwr* = *čor*: ‘titre attribué vraisemblablement à quelqu’un faisant partie de la suite du souverain: antrusion, leude, page; nom de personne.’
86. The Chinese sources appear to render this as *silifa* and *xielifa* (Pulleyblank 1991: 341, 188, 89: E. *get lʰ puat*).
87. See Chavannes (1941: 263) as an example.
88. Clauson 1972: 134. A Turkic etymology has been proffered; see Hamilton 1962: 54 n.23: *ilæl* + *tab*- ‘posséder, être propriétaire de, disposer de’; ‘celui qui possède un état ou un peuple’. This, however, should probably be viewed as a popular etymology. The title is also found among the Khazars; see Bombaci 1970: 35–55; Golden 1980: I, 147–49. Mongolic may also be possible, cf. Proto-Mongol **teberi*- ‘to embrace, grasp’. Cf. also Proto-Tung. **têbe*- ‘to catch, to embrace’; Proto-Korean **təpir*-‘to lead, take smn. with’. See Starostin et al. 2003: II, 1418.
89. Clauson 1972: 225. On the complexities of the way this title is rendered in Chinese, see Hamilton 1955: 97–98; and Ligeti 1950: 170–72.
90. For the inscription, see Moriyasu and Ochir 1999: 151–53; Ajdarov 1971: 334–38. On the perhaps related Kül Čur in the western realm, see Beckwith 1987: 93, 118–20, 122, 124–25, 210 n. 3.
91. Erdal (in press). The recent suggestion by Kljaštornyj (1997: 22–23): *جاوشنقر *čavšun-qar* (*beg*) ‘head of the royal falcon-hunting’ or something similar is known to the Qarakhanids and others (cf. Turk. *čavh* ‘falcon’; Clauson 1972: 397). Requires a fuller argumentation.
92. *Qutadğū Bilig* 1979: 410.
93. See discussion in Clauson 1972: 539–40; and Kononov 1980: 89–90, 145–46.
94. In this respect, this consciousness was much akin to that of the Arab tribes in their newly won empire in the Near East. See Duri 1983: 41ff.
95. Kâşğari/Dankoff 1982–1985: I, 83.
96. Ibn al-Athîr 1966 (with different pagination than the Leiden edition of 1851–1876): XII, 385–86; Rašîd ad-Dîn 1994: I, 534. On the dating of these events, see Allsen 1987–1991: VII, 11–15.

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THE GEOGRAPHY OF CHINGIS KHAN

Owen Lattimore*



DICKSON ASIA LECTURE 1962

Because we print our maps with the north at the top, and because the general trend of the Great Wall of China is from west to east, we have always tended to arrange our ideas about the relations between the Chinese and the nomadic barbarians of Inner Asia in a geographical stratification from south to north: China itself; then the defended frontier of the Great Wall; then the adjacent frontier zone, usually an administered zone when China was strong, represented in recent centuries by Inner Mongolia; then the zone of maximum aridity, least touched by the climate of Siberia from the north and that of China from the south, which we call the Gobi Desert but which the Mongols think of, rather, as a series of 'gobis', each with its own name; then Outer Mongolia, land of the richest pastures; and finally the forests of Siberia.

From very early times, however, an east–west distribution of tribes, and east–west political and military movement, have been as important as this north–south geographical stratification. In the second and first centuries B.C., when China under the first Han dynasty resembled the contemporary Roman Empire in certain ways, the power of the Hsiungnu or early Huns was north of the Ordos loop of the Yellow River, in Inner and Outer Mongolia. West of them were the Yueh-chih, an Indo-European people—the tribe which, in the vast migrations of Indo-European-speaking peoples, drove farthest to the east. On the other side of the Hsiungnu, in what is today eastern Mongolia (Outer and Inner), were the Tung Hu. It is still being argued whether the Hsiungnu were 'proto-Turks' and the Tung Hu 'proto-Mongols', or perhaps 'proto-Tungus'. No clear answer is yet possible, but we do know that the Chinese always used 'Hu' as a term for northern pastoral nomads who fought on horseback. As a general term, Hu included the Hsiungnu; in fact, the Hsiungnu were 'the' Hu. Since Tung Hu means Eastern Hu, we can deduce that they seemed to the Chinese like enough to the Hsiungnu to be covered by the same general term, but different enough to require an adjective setting them apart as 'easterners'. More important than the ethnic differentiation among Yueh-chih, Hsiungnu and Tung Hu, however, is the fact that the Hsiungnu had to drive away the Yueh-chih on their west and break the Tung Hu on their east before they could muster their full strength against China.

A few centuries later, when China was under the T'ang dynasty (618–906)—the same era in which Muhammad initiated the Arab conquests that struck eastward through the

Iranian world and beyond, and westward to Morocco and Spain, and Charlemagne conquered the Saxons and set on foot the eastward movement of the Germans against the Slavs—the geographical distribution of peoples in Mongolia becomes clearer. More than half of the country, as far east as the Tuula River on which Ulan Bator (Ulaanbaatar) stands, was held by Turks. The tribal subdivisions of the Turks are confusing enough, but east of the Turkish realm the confusion is even more obscure. The tribal name 'Mongol' already appears, but designates only a minor group, not an important people. In the general area of what later became Eastern Mongolia and Manchuria it is as yet impossible to distinguish precisely which tribes should be called 'Mongol' and which 'Tungusic'.

As a guide to barbarian history in this age, differences of an economic character are more reliable than tribal names. In the west, in the Chinese Turkistan (Sinkiang) and Soviet Turkistan of today, people in the major oases were still speaking Indo-European languages. Their irrigated, intensive agriculture supported urban concentrations which were small in area—because the oases, being surrounded by desert or very arid steppe, could not be expanded—but high in cultural attainment. Influenced by these oases-in-the-desert, the Turks—Turks of the Orhon, Uighurs and others—created a mixed economy and society of oases-in-the-steppe. On such rivers as the Orhon, Selenge and Tuula (space being limited, it is enough to mention here that there were similar developments westward through Inner Asia), they established patches of irrigated and rainfall agriculture. It is impossible to say how much of the cultivation was done by Turks who had formerly been herdsmen, how much by captives who had been made slaves or serfs, how much by immigrants from the Turkistan oases and China who found life a little easier under barbarian overlords than under their own landlords.

It is possible, however, to discern some of the consequences. There was enough agriculture to induce rulers of Turkish domains to maintain fixed headquarters, and to reduce the tribal component of the new, mixed society from the status of followers to the status of subjects, but not enough to make the pastoral economy entirely subordinate to agriculture. There were also military consequences. In a pastoral society which has only a limited supply of grain, obtained by trade or, in some regions, from occasional catch-crops, the livestock are pastured entirely on the open steppe, with no prepared hay or other supplementary feed, even in winter. Horses bred under these conditions are extremely hardy, but cannot be ridden day after day. Moreover the horses are stunted in size by winter hardship in the years while they are still growing. The classic cavalry of nomads therefore consists of light-armed men, with plenty of remounts.

With their patches of relatively rich agriculture the medieval Turks of the northern river valleys of Mongolia were able to introduce a modification. The light nomad cavalry continued to be used, but the nobles, with headquarters in the cultivated land, were able to select good-looking colts, stall-feed them, and so produce much bigger, stronger horses. Riding these they were able to wear heavy defensive armour and to make themselves a new kind of 'knightly' military élite. (The heavy cavalry of the Parthians, the cataphracts, were a development of the same kind, under similar conditions. The term 'cataphract' being Greek it is, incongruously but not surprisingly, of naval origin; it means 'bulwarked'.)

The existence of these 'special' horses, the 'chargers' of individual champions, is attested both by grave-finds and in the famous runic inscriptions of the Orhon Turks, where the battle-chargers are named and their fate recorded if they fell in battle. This

glimpse of military history, however, is of more than military significance; it shows us the geographical outlines of a Turkish Mongolia in which tribal and feudal characteristics were mixed. Control of agricultural enclaves enabled tribal chiefs to begin transforming themselves into feudal lords. But feudalism is of two kinds, the centralized and the parcellated, and the map of Mongolia and of Inner Asia north of the desert oases made it difficult to achieve a centralized feudalism controlling a great area. Oases-in-the-steppe, like those of the Orhon Turks, furnished enough supplies to maintain strongholds, but they were too scattered to provide the base of a large pyramid of power. The subdivisions of the Turks could resist each other more effectively than they could subordinate each other.


Over the eastern part of Mongolia, where the true Mongol power was later to arise, there lies in this era the shadow of Manchuria. Around the north-east corner where the present Mongolia, Siberia and North Manchuria meet; along its eastern edge and extending far into central Manchuria; and around its south-eastern corner, where Inner Mongolia, South Manchuria and North China join, lies a terrain in which, over many centuries, a multiple differentiation of peoples was slowly worked out. On the north and north-east the differentiation was between steppe herdsmen, who were in time to become the Mongols, and Tungus tribes whose activities ranged from reindeer herding, forest hunting and fishing to village farming. On the east there was both the differentiation between Mongols and Tungus and the gradual differentiation between the Tungus ancestors of the Manchus and the tribes, related to the northern component of the Korean people, who then held much of eastern Manchuria. At the south-east corner there was a fluctuating distribution of territory between Chinese, ancestral Mongols, ancestral Tungus-Manchus and ancestral Koreans.

Despite lack of detail, the general outlines of 'Mongol' history in this period can be discerned. There was enough agriculture in Manchuria to support states of considerable power and sophistication, like Po Hai, which included a good deal of Manchuria and North Korea. The steppe tribes out of which the Mongols were formed were those which pastured between the agricultural zone in Manchuria and the zone of mixed agricultural and pastoral economy controlled by the Turks of central Mongolia.

In the Chinese historical material dealing with the Great Wall frontier we find over and over again that, when a tribe is first mentioned, it is so unimportant that it seems more or less an accident that its name was preserved at all. Sometimes a number of tribes are mentioned; a good many of them later disappear, but others are clearly of greater importance each time they are mentioned. It is in this way that the Khitan, a people of eastern Mongolia, gradually emerge into Chinese history to found, in the tenth century, the Liao dynasty which from 947 to 1125 ruled North China down to the Yellow River, controlled most of Manchuria and was overlord of most of Mongolia.

Under the T'ang dynasty, a powerful China had fronted northward against all the non-Chinese peoples from Sinkiang through Mongolia to Manchuria and Korea, and also westward against Tibet. With the fall of the T'ang, the north-west corner of China was occupied by a state of partly Tibetan origin, the Hsi Hsia or Tangut. The rest of North China was ruled by the Liao dynasty of the Khitan, and Yangtze China by a Chinese dynasty, the Sung. It was the Liao dynasty that began to prepare Mongolia for the rise of the Mongols from a cluster of weak tribes to a conquering nation.

In their Chinese territories the Khitan ruled through a Chinese bureaucracy, kept under control by the stationing of garrisons and the appointment of privileged Khitan officials to key posts. In their ancestral territory, which included a good part of eastern



Inner Mongolia and the plains of southern and central Manchuria, they kept up their old pastoral economy, but modified it by importing some Chinese cultivators and artisans and building a few small cities or towns. On balance, wealth was drained from their Chinese territory into their Khitan territory, and in theory the Khitan tribal manpower was available at all times for cavalry service; but the aristocracy, with town dwellings and positions at court, became much more detached from the tribal structure than they had once been, as warrior chieftains.

The Khitan military reserve was available not only for service in China if needed, but also for campaigning in Mongolia, to keep the tribes under control. In this kind of warfare the Khitan still had all the mobility of nomads, with an ample supply of cavalry remounts and sheep and cattle which could accompany an army in the field to supply a meat ration; but these traditional resources were now backed not only by a grain supply to furnish reserve rations, but by a supply of weapons, made by sedentary artisans. This gave them an advantage over the outlying, more barbarian tribes whose production of 'home-made' weapons was more meagre; the nomad smiths, with irregular access to raw materials and with only small, portable forges, could turn out only limited quantities of arrowheads and cutting weapons.

As a consequence, Mongolia now began to be transformed from a largely Turkish homeland into a Mongol homeland, and this transformation, because of the geographical position of the Khitan, was effected from the east rather than from the south. The Khitan, backed by agricultural and urban resources much larger than those of the Turks with their little oases-in-the-steppe, were able to extend their power far to the west. They were undoubtedly accompanied in their campaigns by 'Mongol' tribal auxiliaries, with the result that Mongols began to replace Turks in central and even western Mongolia; a process compounded by the 'turning Mongol' of many of the Turks who remained in Mongolia instead of withdrawing westward.

A difficulty here is that, the term 'Mongol' not yet being in general use, it is not always clear who was 'Mongol' and who was not. A major question is whether the Khitan themselves were or were not a Mongol people. Among scholars in Mongolia itself it is generally held that they were, and in the opinion of the late Paul Pelliot their language was probably a branch of the Mongol language. Mr Arthur Waley warns me that the linguistic question should be considered debatable; of the considerable 'Khitan' vocabulary that has been preserved in Chinese transcription, many words may have been 'international'—borrowed back and forth, that is, among speakers of Turkish, Mongol and Tungus languages.

Language, however, though very important, is only one factor in establishing the historical identity of a people, or a nation, like the Mongols. Other factors are: the geographical area in which the emergence of the people can be localized, the way in which (regardless of sudden conquests) they lived from day to day, and the degree in which they adopted and adapted institutions from outside their own geographical area, instead of merely submitting to them. In these respects it is beyond dispute that the Khitan period contributed to the formation of a Mongol people, distinct from Turks on the west, Tungus on the north-east and east, and Chinese on the south.

In Mongolia today, scholars assume a close connection between the Khitan period and the evolution of the group of tribes which in the twelfth century was to fuse together to become the Mongol nation. A leading expert on this period is Mr Ser-Odjab (Ser-Ojav), an associate Academician of the Mongolian Academy of Sciences, who is both a historian and an archaeologist. Study of some of his work, and conversations



Rock drawing on cliff overlooking Tuula river, northward towards Ulan Bator. Large figure, in twelfth century costume, is a 'beautiful woman'; lower right an elk-hind: hence Goa-Maral, 'Beautiful elk-hind', traditional ancestress-goddess of the Mongols. She is mentioned in 'Secret history of the Mongols' (A.D. 1240) but this is the first corroborative evidence that she was a genuine twelfth-thirteenth century figure.

with him and several of his colleagues (made possible by a visit to Mongolia in the summer of 1961 under grants from the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, of New York, and the American Philosophical Society, of Philadelphia) impressed on me the importance of the fact that the Khitan drove into Mongolia mainly from the east rather than by the traditional Chinese approach from the south.

This drive had many important consequences. It moved the Turks of Mongolia to the west, instead of hardening the stratification of tribes from the Great Wall of China northward to Siberia, and opened the way for a great expansion of the Mongol language at the expense of Turkish. It also carried with it Chinese cultural and institutional influences; and because the carriers, the Khitan, were themselves barbarians, they had already modified these influences so that they were more readily absorbed by the still more barbarian tribes of Mongolia.

The depth of Khitan east-west penetration was also much greater than the south-north penetration in periods of Chinese advance into Mongolia. A standard Chinese practice was to build long earthen walls north of the main Great Wall, thus creating what might be called patrol zones, with which they could associate the use of auxiliary tribes, attached to the Chinese interest by subsidy and trade. This kind of frontier policy accentuated the concept of 'inner' and 'outer' barbarians in an 'Inner' and 'Outer' Mongolia. The Khitan, going far beyond the system of defensive walls, established fortified outposts which had some resemblance to feudal castles. Some at least of these strongholds took advantage of little oases-in-the-steppe previously created by the Orhon and Uighur Turks. Garrisoned by troops, they were surrounded by cultivation which not only fed the garrison but, undoubtedly, provided a surplus of grain for trade.

Excavation at several of these sites is adding to our knowledge of technological as well as economic history: iron ploughshares give information on the state of Chinese metallurgy in the eleventh century. It is not clear how many of the cultivators came all the way from China, how many may have come from the oases of Sinkiang, and how many may once have been local pastoral nomads, but it is clear that there were supplementary activities like brick-making, and artisans who worked as smiths, tanners and carpenters. The quantity and range of the data can be expected to increase as work continues.

There then followed the final episode, and a most important one, in the history of Mongolia prior to the age of Chingis Khan. The Khitan were overthrown by a tribal rebellion, not in the steppes of Mongolia but in Manchuria, at the beginning of the twelfth century. The insurgents were the Jurchid, whose name was later corrupted, in its Chinese transcription, into Nüchen. Ethnically, tribally, and in language they were the ancestors of the Manchus. They had a mixed economy of hunting, fishing, agriculture, at least some pastoralism in the central plain of Manchuria and a few small towns. Because, probably, of this already mixed culture those of them who entered China were absorbed by the Chinese culture more rapidly than the Khitan had been.

In China, the Jurchid pushed farther to the south than the Khitan, at the expense of the Chinese Sung dynasty. In Mongolia, they withdrew from the advanced positions held by the Khitan in favour of a 'Chinese' policy of defensive walls and the use of auxiliary frontier tribes. The wall-systems in the extreme east of Mongolia and in western Manchuria are mainly their work, and excavation here can be expected to yield extremely important information about what was going on in the half-century between the end of Khitan rule, about 1125, and the birth of Chingis Khan, which was probably in 1167.

It is probable that along the Manchurian-Mongolian frontier the Jurchid began by favouring as auxiliaries the tribes which had been least friendly or loyal to the Khitan. They also practised, however, one of the elementary techniques of frontier control: when the subsidized chiefs of an auxiliary tribe seemed to be acquiring too much power, they switched their favour to another tribe, thus creating new tribal feuds, keeping old ones alive, and preventing tribal unity. We know how important this was in the personal history of Chingis Khan. A collateral ancestor of his had held a frontier appointment under the Jurchid, and when he fell out of favour had been betrayed to the Jurchid by the Tatar—also a Mongol tribe. This meant that Chingis was heir to enmity to the Jurchid and to a blood-feud with the Tatar. It also meant that he inherited other troubles, because on the death of the betrayed chieftain, Ambaghai or Ambaqai, a dispute about the chieftainship began in the tribe to which Chingis Khan himself belonged, which was divided into several subtribes or clans. Quite as important, perhaps even more important, is the fact that the little oases of cultivation in central Mongolia had been abandoned when the Khitan garrisons protecting them had been withdrawn. This meant that power shifted to the tribes which were most mobile and had the largest herds, and in war it meant that the swarm of light horsemen, with plenty of remounts, could no longer be challenged by an oasis-based élite with big, strong, grain-fed horses.

Here we have the full setting, geographical, social, economic and technological, of the rise of Chingis Khan. He was born in the north-east corner of Mongolia, where to this day the good pasture produces the best of the Mongol horses that are grazed on the open steppe, without winter shelter or supplementary grain feed. This was also the zone where, for centuries, power had shifted back and forth between eastern Mongolia and western Manchuria, with consequent regroupings of 'outer' or 'full-steppe' barbarians and 'inner' or modified frontier barbarians. From the beginning of the tenth century these shifts had included an alternating extension and retraction of power over the steppes by dynasties based in South Manchuria and North China. Chingis Khan was descended from a line of war chiefs, a kind of tribal aristocracy. His genealogy is partly mythical, and part of it is of a saga-like kind, based on real history but modified by folklore influences, but it enables us to say with certainty that though he was illiterate, he was not an ignorant savage. He was born to the habit of command, and also to the art of politics—both the tribal politics of blood-feud and alliance, and the much more sophisticated politics of manoeuvring sometimes in favour of overlord powers, sometimes against them. Finally, Chingis Khan belonged to a part of the Mongol complex of tribes that had been little affected by the partly agricultural economy of the Turks and the Khitan outposts. They had maximum mobility. In war they used light cavalry with herds of remounts and had no use for strong points or fixed positions. They did not mind abandoning territory if by doing so they could keep the initiative.

If all these factors are borne in mind, it can be seen that the geography of Chingis Khan's career shows a logical adherence to principles. In settling his inherited blood-feuds, he carefully collected allies, making it a principle to reward them so generously after each victory that they would be eager to follow him towards the next victory. He was unsentimental about priorities. In order to settle accounts with his hereditary Tatar enemies, he was willing to act as the subordinate ally of the Jurchid, against whom he had also inherited a feud. He even accepted a title from them. It was only a petty title, which shows that the Jurchid underestimated him, thinking him just another border freebooter.

Even when he had made himself the chief war leader among the eastern tribes along

the fringe of the Jurchid empire—its Chinese dynastic name was Chin [Jin] or Kin—he did not follow the ‘classical’ policy, which was also the classical mistake, of leading the frontier tribes to attack the frontier. That would have left the central and western tribes in a position to wait, follow him up later, and take from him the spoils of any victory he might have won. Instead, he turned his back to the imperial frontier and defeated, in succession, the tribes of central and western Mongolia. Nor was he beguiled by the barbaric splendours of tribal supremacy; as soon as he had enough tribal power, he used it to make the tribes powerless. In order to do this he created a bodyguard whose men and officers were drawn from any and every tribe, and he broke up defeated tribes, putting contingents of them under different trusted commanders.

He then made his most important geographical decision. With most of what is today Mongolia in his hands, he still considered that the Turkish tribes, from the western fringes of Mongolia to the Caspian and beyond, were potentially more dangerous than the great settled empires. Only they could raise cavalry armies capable of challenging his own. Before turning west he did campaign in China, but his purpose was not yet conquest. He wanted only to make sure that neither the Jurchid or Chin nor the Tangut or Hsi Hsia state in north-west China should be strong enough to attack Mongolia while he went west. His campaigns against the Turkish tribes led on to the conquests of Khwarezm and of Russia (which he did not himself reach). On his way back from Central Asia he overwhelmed the Hsi Hsia state, and it was here that he died, in 1227.

By this time Chingis Khan’s geographical concept of empire was clear. The Mongols should attack, as ‘targets of opportunity’, the great settled empires and draw tribute from them. In siege warfare they could and should use Chinese and Persian engineers and explosives. But the main body of the Mongols (with the nomadic Turks added to them), should stay in the grazing lands. They should maintain the pastoral economy and the traditional great autumn hunts or drives, which were a kind of ‘autumn man-oeuvres’. By so doing their young men would grow up to replenish the ranks of the mounted archers and would never be short of remounts bred on the open steppe. It was the disregard of this concept by his heirs, when they moved their capitals into China and Persia, that hastened the break-up of the Mongol Empire. It was the Mongols in Russia, the Golden Horde, who most nearly adhered to the principle of staying on the fringe and collecting tribute from within—and it was they who lasted the longest.

DISCUSSION

Evening Meeting 28 May 1962

Before the paper the PRESIDENT (Sir Raymond PRIESTLEY) said: The lecture tonight is the Dickson Asia Lecture, founded by Mr P. L. Dickson. The first of these lectures was given by Aurel Stein as long ago as 1924. Today we welcome from the United States another very distinguished Central Asian traveller and scholar, Owen Lattimore. He has the distinction of having already given us one Dickson lecture as long ago as 1928¹. He won the Cuthbert Peek grant for Central Asian travelling in 1930 and our Patron’s Medal in 1942. Owen Lattimore has done us the honour of coming specially from the United States to deliver this lecture. He lectures at Johns Hopkins University. We also welcome Mrs Lattimore. Following the tradition of Aurel Stein, he is also going to talk to us about Central Asia. His lecture will be based not only on extensive travels many

years ago, but on travels in Mongolia only last year. After his lecture Colonel Geoffrey Wheeler, another well-known specialist in Central Asian studies, will speak.

NOTES

- * *Mr. Lattimore then read his paper, and after a few words from Colonel Wheeler the PRESIDENT thanked the lecturer.*
- 1. 'Caravan routes of Inner Asia' by Owen Lattimore. *Geogr. J.* 72, 6 (1928) 497–531.

PART 2



CHINGGIS KHAN AND THE MONGOL EMPIRE

INTRODUCTION

David Sneath



The Mongol Empire founded by Chinggis Khan redrew the political map of Eurasia and went on to become the most extensive land empire in history, stretching from Korea in the east to Hungary in the west. Understandably enough, there has been greater Euro-American scholarly interest in the Chinggisid polity than earlier steppe empires, and a greater range of existent historical texts that describe it.

The most celebrated source on the rise of the Great Mongol Realm (*Yeke Mongghol Ulus*) is the *Secret History of the Mongols* (*Mongghol-un ni'ucha tobchiyan*). The *Secret History* provides an insider's account of Chinggis Khan's career and the early part of the reign of his son and successor Ögedei. It is thought to have been compiled by someone associated with Shigi Qutuqu the grand judge and adopted son of Chinggis Khan, and a member of the great ruler's inner circle. Written around 1228 (de Rachewiltz 2004: xxxiii) or 1252 (Atwood 2004: 385), the original Mongolian text was lost, but has been reconstructed from Chinese transcription. There are also extensive Chinese records, principally the hastily compiled history of the Yuan dynasty (the *Yuan shi*) with the *Veritable Records* (*shilu*) of the reigns of the pre-Yuan Mongol emperors Chinggis, Ögedei, Güyüg (Guyuk) and Möngke. Some Song (Sung) records also survive from the time when they had the Chinggisids as northern neighbours. Well-known Persian sources include Ala'ud-Din Ata-Malik Juvaini's *History of the World Conqueror* (*Ta'rikh-i jahan gusha*) in the mid thirteenth century, and the remarkable early fourteenth century *Compendium of Chronicles* (*Jami al-tawarikh*) by Rashid-ud-Din Fazl-ullah. There are also Latin sources, the most famous being the eyewitness accounts of the Franciscan monks John of Plano Carpini, who met Güyüg khan in 1246, and William of Rubruck who met Möngke in 1254. Descriptions of the Mongols at this time also appear in languages such as Arabic, Ibn-Battuta's *Tuhfat al-nuzzar fi ghara'ib al-amsar wa-'aja'ib al-asfar* for example, and Armenian as in the case of the *History of the Nation of Archers* attributed to Grigor of Akanc.

At the time of Chinggis Khan's birth (probably in 1162), the Mongolian plateau was divided between a number of polities. In the west, straddling the Altai mountains, lay the powerful Naiman Khanate, whose rule extended from the Irtysh river into what is now western Mongolia. The khanate emerged in the eleventh century, and for part of the twelfth it came under the overlordship of the Qara-Kitan emperors, becoming independent again in about 1175 (Biran 2006: 68). At around the time of the birth of Chinggis Khan the khanate was ruled as a single realm by Inancha Bilge Khan. Divided

geographically by the Altai mountain range, the khanate came to be ruled as two halves by Inancha Bilge Khan's sons Buyruq and Tayang. However, by 1204 Tayang seems to have become ruler of both parts (Atwood 2004: 397). North of the Naiman lived the Turkic Kyrgyz, living in the Yenisey river region, and the Oirats (Oyirats), a linguistically Mongolian people occupying the region between lakes Khövsgöl and Uvs.

To the east of the Naiman kingdom lay its great rival, the Kereyid khanate, ruling much of what is now central Mongolia – the region of the Onon, Kherlen and Orkhon rivers. The Kereyid had been occasionally rebellious vassals of the Kitans since the tenth century, but had become an independent power after the fall of the Liao in 1125. By the mid-twelfth century the Kereyid had become a powerful khanate ruled by Qurjaqus-Buyruq Khan. But after his death, Qurjaqus-Buyruq's realm faced internecine wars, divided as it was into the appanages of Qurjaqus-Buyruq Khan's many sons (Atwood 2004: 296). It was only by force and the use of non-Kereyid allies that the eldest son, Toghril later known as Ong Khan, managed to retain a fragile overlordship. The Kereyid rulers had converted to Nestorian Christianity at the beginning of the eleventh century, according to Syriac chronicles, and some took Christian names such as Marqus (Marcus). But they also made use of time-honoured steppe administrative systems. We know that, like the Xiongnu, Jurchen, and probably many other polities, the Kereyid administered their subjects in units of a nominal thousand (Atwood 2004: 139).

To the south of the Kereyid, bordering the Jin empire, were the Önggüd. These Turkic vassals of the Jin dynasty were charged with guarding the north-western frontier of the empire. The Önggüd appear, like their northern neighbours, to have converted to Nestorian Christianity, and ruled a diverse population including Chinese agriculturalists (Atwood 2004: 424). North of the Kereyid Khanate, in the lower Selenge region, lay the lands of the Merkid. The Merkid had a formidable military reputation (Thackston 1998: 52) and we know that in 1129 Merkid forces had supported Yelü Dashi in his conquest of the Qara-Kitan empire. In Chinggis Khan's time they were ruled by Toqto'a Beki.

To the south-east of the Merkid, in the region of the Onon and Kherlen rivers, were the Mongols. The Mongols had once been vassals of the Kitans but had formed an independent Khanate with the fall of the Liao. Under Qabul (Kabul) Khan they had made war on the Jin with some success, capturing a number of frontier towns, until agreeing a peace in 1147 in return for generous subsidies (Atwood 2004: 389). Qabul was succeeded by his cousin Ambaghai (Hambaghai), and then his son Qutula (Kutula), but in 1164 Qutula Khan was killed by Tatars loyal to the Jin. The khanate fragmented, and the Mongol nobles were forced to pay the Jin tribute. The Mongols were themselves a diverse political entity, including subject groups such as the Uriyangkhan and the Jalayir, who had once been rivals of the Mongols but had sworn fealty to Qabul's great-grandfather Qaidu Khan in the eleventh century. The royal lineage of the Mongols, the Borjigin, had itself become split into many rival houses, such as the Tayichi'ud, who were the descendants of Hambaghai Khan's father, and the Yürkin (Jürkin) who were the descendants of Qabul Khan's eldest son. Other powerful noble houses included the Jadaran, Mangghud and Barulus all of whom traced descent from Bodonchar, the ruler credited with the first, if modest, Mongol dominion over neighbouring groups.

The Tatars lived to the east of the Mongols, in the Hulun Buir region, and were far better known beyond the steppes than the Mongols. The Tatar had been an independent power in the tenth century, but had been subjugated by the expanding Kitans in 942, and were later enrolled as border auxiliaries (*jüiyin*) by the Jin dynasty (Atwood

2004: 529). At that time the Tatar lords ruled some 70,000 households or more (Thackston 1998: 43). Further east still lived the Onggirad (Qonggirad), located north of Lake Buir. They appear in Chinese records from 1126, as hostile to the Jin. Qabul Khan married an Onggirad as his principle wife and established close links with the Onggirad ruling lineages. Chinggis Khan's mother, Hö'elun Üjin (Ö'elün Üjin), was a noblewoman from one of these families, who had been in the process of marrying a leading Merkid when she was abducted and married by Chinggis Khan's father, the Mongol lord Yesügei (Yisügei) Ba'atur.

The empire of the Jin dynasty stretched north-east into what became Manchuria, but it did not extend far west. The Ordos and Gansu region was ruled by the Xia (Xixia) dynasty, Tangut rulers from the Sichuan-Tibetan region who claimed descent from the Xianbei (Kessler 1993: 122). The Tangut had occupied the Ordos in the time of the Tang dynasty and in the mid-ninth century, in return for aid in putting down a rebellion, the Tangut rulers were awarded the title of Dukes of Xia and the Tang imperial surname Li. The early eleventh-century Xia ruler Li Yuanhao expanded his realm by conquest and in 1038 declared himself emperor of the Great Xia dynasty. In the mid-twelfth century the Xia was a wealthy, medium-sized state ruling urban and agricultural subjects as well as 'nomadic' pastoralists.

Very roughly, then, this was the political landscape of the Eurasian steppes before the Chinggisid conquests that were to redraw the political map throughout much of Asia and Eastern Europe.

The life of Chinggis Khan (1162–1227), whose personal name was Temüjin, is in many respects a story of remarkable success against the odds. His father, Yesügei Ba'atur, was one of the grandsons of Qabul Khan who had been an ally of the Kereyid Ong Khan Toghril, and had helped him secure his throne. Yisügei campaigned successfully against the Tatar, capturing a number of their nobles including one called Temüjin Üge. Since his eldest son was born at the time of this victory, Yisügei named him Temüjin after his famous captive. When he was nine, Temüjin was betrothed to Börte, the daughter of an Onggirad lord named Dei Sechen. But on his journey home from making the match Yesügei was recognized by Tatars he encountered on the road, and was poisoned by them. Yesügei's Tayichi'ud vassals refused to follow his widow, Lady Hö'elün, and left her and her household to fend for themselves with only a few servants. Temüjin grew up facing the hardships of a dispossessed prince. He and his brother Qasar quarrelled with their half-brothers Begter and Belgütei, the sons of Yesügei's second wife, Suchigil. Temüjin and Qasar murdered Begter and, perhaps as a result, Temüjin was seized by the Tayichi'ud, who punished him by locking him in a huge wooden collar (cangue). But the young Temüjin escaped, with the help of one of the Tayichi'ud's subjects called Sorqan Shira, and set about regaining his patrimony. He fetched his betrothed, Börte, from her father Dei Sechen, and with her a sable cloak meant for his mother Lady Hö'elün. But Temüjin used this splendid gift to renew his father's alliance with Ong Khan of the Kereyid, and he found the old Khan grateful. 'In return for the sable cloak I shall unite for you your scattered people', he is recorded as saying (De Rachewiltz 2004: 30).

However, the Merkid had not forgotten the humiliation of loosing Lady Hö'elün to Yesügei, and around 1180 a detachment of their troops captured Temüjin's new bride, Börte. Temüjin called upon his patron, Ong Khan, and an old childhood friend and ally, Jamuga (Jamugha), ruler of the Jadaran. Together they assembled an army of four *tümen* units of a nominal ten thousand, made up of two Kereyid *tümen*, one from the

Jadaran, and one from Temüjin's subjects. We know that in the later imperial period these units of 'ten thousand' often contained fewer troops, and could number as few as three thousand (Hsiao 1978: 171). But even so, it is clear that this must have been a formidable force, much larger, for example, than William the Conqueror's army of around seven thousand at the Battle of Hastings. It also suggests, as De Rachewiltz (2004: 410) notes, that the Kereyids were organized using the ancient decimal system, and it seems that the Mongol contingents were too. The attack was successful, Temüjin found Börte and the allies plundered the Merkid and put them to flight.

The victory must have added considerably to the allies' wealth and power, and seems to have helped make both the Mongol leaders possible candidates for the vacant position of khan. Temüjin's alliance with Jamuqa did not last long. A year and a half after their victory they split amid growing distrust. Many leading noblemen sided with Temüjin, and three of his cousins, all leading contenders for the throne themselves (De Rachewiltz 2004: 453), declared him khan (*qan*) and swore oaths of allegiance. Others, including Temüjin's old enemies the Tayichi'ud nobles, sided with Jamuqa, and the rivalry soon led to a clash. Jamuqa mobilized a force of three *tümen* and Temüjin met him in battle, also fielding three such units. Temüjin was defeated, and retreated to a gorge by the Onon river. For some reason Jamuqa did not press his advantage and deal the killing blow, and, despite his military victory, Jamuqa's political support began to ebb. Several leading nobles deserted him for Temüjin. However, disunity had also begun to affect Temüjin's court and it was fortunate for him that at that moment, in 1196, news reached Temüjin of an opportunity to settle scores with his old enemies, the Tatar. The Jin emperor had become irritated at the defiance of one of the leading Tatar lords, and sent an army against him. Ong Khan of the Kereyid and Temüjin attacked in conjunction with the Jin army, defeating and plundering the Tatars. The Jin ruler was so pleased that he granted Ong Khan and Temüjin senior titles.

Temüjin now pressed ahead with his campaign to unite the Mongol khanate under his rule. He eliminated the powerful Yürkin nobles, the descendants of Qabul Khan's eldest son, and took over the rule of their subjects. In 1201, Temüjin's enemies united behind Jamuqa declaring him 'universal khan' (*gür qan*). The alliance included nobles of the Merkid, Tatar and Naiman as well as the Tayichi'ud, and some other Mongol noble houses. They marched against Temüjin and his ally the Kereyid khan, but this time Temüjin was victorious and was able to settle scores at last with his Tayichi'ud rivals – wiping them out to a man. Next it was the turn of the old enemies the Tatars, whom Temüjin defeated and whose male nobility he also slaughtered. But leading Kereyid nobles, in particular Ong Khan's son Senggüm, became jealous of the Mongol ruler's growing power. They persuaded his father to agree to a surprise attack to kill Temüjin, but the Mongol khan was warned by two horse-herders and escaped. In the battle that followed Temüjin was defeated and retreated with what was left of his forces, just 2,600 troops, to the shores of lake Baljuna in north-eastern Mongolia. Here he gathered those Mongol nobles that had remained loyal to him and some foreign supporters such as the Kitan prince Yelü Ahai (Atwood 2004: 30). Launching a surprise attack, Temüjin defeated the Kereyid khan in 1203, attaining a more powerful position than ever. The following year he defeated the Naiman in the west, and in 1206, having unified the entire Mongolian plateau under his rule, he took the reign name Chinggis Khan (Cinggis Qan) and established the 'Great Mongol Realm' (*Yeke Mongghol Ulus*).

Chinggis administered his steppe empire along familiar decimal lines, with ninety-five nominal units of a thousand (*mingghan*) ruled by a noble, each made up of units of a

hundred households (*ja'un*) divided into groups of ten (*arban*, *harban*). Each unit had a head and was required to raise the appropriate number of troops if required to do so. Some of the *mingghans* were organized into yet larger myriarchy units of a nominal ten thousand (*tümen*) under senior officials of Chinggis Khan's court. Senior positions were given to leading nobles that had supported him, such as Qorchi Noyan, but also to many *nökör* or 'companions', members of Chinggis Khan's own household such as his 'four steeds' – the trusted generals Bo'orchu, Muqali, Boroqul (Boroghul) and Chila'un. Many of the *nökör* were men of relatively lowly birth, who had proved their ability and loyalty to their khan. Bo'orchu, for example, had dropped everything to help the young Temüjin before his rise to power in a dangerous bid to regain some stolen horses. Another was Muqali, the son of a Jalayir noble, who had been sent to serve Temüjin when he was still a child. These became Chinggis Khan's right- and left-hand men, almost literally, since they were appointed to command the right and left wings of the army, respectively. Such appointments concentrated power in the hands of Chinggis himself, since such 'companions' were not themselves heads of powerful aristocratic houses and owed their positions to the khan. Grand new imperial institutions were established, in particular the ten-thousand strong imperial guard, the *keshig*. This was an expansion of an existing institution, the Kereyid Khanate had a royal guard of at least one thousand (De Rachewiltz 2004: 620, Atwood 2004: 297), and Chinggis had formed a smaller guard in 1203. The gigantic new force formed the core for Chinggis Khan's army and administration, staffed by officers he appointed and supplied by recruits from the *mingghans* governed by the other nobles.

Chinggis had already begun to project his power beyond the steppes. He had raided the Tangut state of Xia on his southern border before his coronation in 1206, and he invaded again in 1207 and 1209, forcing the Tangut ruler Li Anquan to pay him tribute. In 1211, the Uighur and Qarluq (Karluk) rulers swore fealty to Chinggis, and the same year his armies attacked the mighty Jin in the east. Over and over again, the Mongol armies destroyed larger Jin armies sent against them, and former vassals of the Jurchen, such as the Kitans, now deserted them for Chinggis Khan. In 1215, the Mongols captured the Jin capital of Zhongdu (now Beijing), and over the next nineteen years conquered most of northern China. In the west, the Qara-Kitan empire was affected by the new constellation of power on the steppes. A Naiman prince named Güchülük survived the Mongol victory and fled to Qara-Kitai with a significant force of Naiman refugees. But in 1211 he betrayed the Qara-Kitan ruler, Yelü Zhilugu. Taking him prisoner, he married his daughter and attempted to rule in his place. Beset with chaos at the centre and military pressure from Khwarazm in the west, the Qara-Kitan empire collapsed around 1213.

Khwarazm was a powerful state centred on the city of Urganch by the Aral Sea, ruling both Turkic pastoralists and Iranian-speaking farmers. Its rulers, the Khwarazm Shahs, had become the westernmost vassals of the Qara-Kitan emperor after their Seljuk overlords had been defeated by Yelü Dashi in the mid-twelfth century. But the Seljuk empire had fragmented and collapsed soon afterwards and the Khwarazm Shahs had extended their rule over much of Persia before formally rebelling against the weakening power of the Qara-Kitan emperors in 1209. The Khwarazmian ruler, Shah Muhammad, whose dominions now included most of Persia, Afghanistan and Central Asia, pressed east taking control of the former Qara-Kitan territories.

Güchülük the usurper hung on to power in Kashgar and Khotan, but was so unpopular that Chinggis Khan received a request from his subjects to remove him. In

1217, a Mongol army under the veteran general Jebe rode west to eliminate Güchülük and accept the surrender of Kashgar and Khotan. This brought the Mongols into contact with the expanding Khwarazmian empire of Sultan Muhammad. At first, Chinggis attempted to establish peaceful relations with the Khwarazm Shah, but his overtures were rejected and his envoys killed (Ratchnevsky 1991: 119–23). Mongol armies swept into Khwarazmian territory and met with brilliant success. By 1221, the Sultan Muhammad was dead and his armies scattered.

By the time of his death in 1227, Chinggis Khan's empire was vast, stretching from Manchuria, across northern China into central Asia and Persia. The four sons of Börte, his principal wife, were all potential candidates for his throne – Jochi, Cha'adai (Chaghadai), Ögedei and Tolui. But Chinggis chose his third son, Ögedei to succeed him as emperor of all the Mongol dominions, and two years later Ögedei was duly proclaimed Khan at a great *quriltai* (*kuriltai*) – the assembly of leading nobles. Ögedei set about consolidating the empire as a centralized polity as best he could. He constructed a capital city, Qaraqorum, in the Orkhon valley and seems to have systematized institutions such as the *jam* (*yam*) post-road stations that provided lodgings and remounts for messengers and those on official business. Decrees and judgements of Chinggis were recorded and formed a body of written precedents that his successors added to. This volume, known as the Great Jasag (Zasag or Yasa) became an important guide for Chinggisid rulers, but although some rulings and references appear in other sources, the original Great Jasag has not survived. Trade was encouraged, indeed the Mongol aristocracy made great use of the ancient institution of the *ortoq* ('partner') merchant, whereby traders and financiers, usually of Central Asian origin, were given capital and official backing to carry out long-distance trade and money-lending in return for supplies or a share of the profits.

The empire continued to expand militarily during Ögedei's reign (1229–41). The remnants of the Jin empire were conquered and Korea was invaded and partially occupied. In 1234, the Song empire of south China captured some former Jin territory, and in retaliation the Mongols declared war – beginning their advance south. Ögedei also ordered an army back into Persia in 1231, to consolidate and extend the conquest of the Khwarazmian empire, and by 1240 Georgia and Armenia were also under Mongol rule.

Chinggis had allocated territories and subjects to the different members of the imperial family, which they ruled as a personal domain or *ulus*. His four sons by Börte had particularly large appanages of this sort. As the empire expanded, new conquests were, at first, also divided between the princely houses. Jochi's *ulus* was divided between his sons Hordu and Batu. Hordu eventually received the lands from the river Irtysh to the Aral Sea, a realm which became known as the White or Blue Horde. (The word 'horde' derives from the old Türkic word *ordo* meaning the palace establishment of a ruler, and had been used by the Kitans.) Batu was given the right to conquer the lands west of the Volga and in 1235 Ögedei agreed to assemble a powerful army under the command of Batu and the brilliant veteran general Sübodei, who had served Chinggis Khan. The next year this army rode west, conquering the Turkic kingdom of the Bulgars (whose capital was near modern-day Kazan), and defeating the pastoral Qipchaqs or Cuman who lived on the southern Russian steppes. In the winter of 1237 Mongol forces invaded Russia and swept all before them – destroying towns and armies in their path. In 1241 Batu, Sübodei and the other Mongol commanders advanced through Poland and occupied Hungary, obliterating the European armies they encountered at Leignitz and Mohi.

To the fearful kingdoms of Europe it must have seemed as if only a miracle could stop the Mongol advance, but in 1242 the Khan's armies suddenly withdrew to Russia. Batu had received the news that Ögedei Khan had died and he withdrew from Hungary and moved his army back east, presumably to influence the expected struggle over the succession. Batu's realm came to be based on the southern Russian steppes, it included Russia and extended as far as Bulgaria in the west and the Caucasus in the south. His khanate became known as the Golden Horde, and Batu's successors ruled for the next century and a half before their power was broken by the warlord Timur Lenk (Tamerlane).

After much political manoeuvring, Ögedei's son Güyüg was finally enthroned as emperor in 1246, but died two years later. His widow, Ogul-Qaimish (Oghul-Qoimish), ruled as regent for three years until Tolui's son, Möngke, became emperor. Möngke Khan secured his position by executing most of the leading members of the house of Ögedei, including Ogul-Qaimish. He sent his younger brother Hülegü south-west with an army, to extend the empire in the Middle East. In 1258, Hülegü sacked the great Islamic metropolis of Baghdad and executed the Caliph. The following year his forces invaded Syria and in 1260 occupied Damascus. But the Mongol advance was halted by the death of the emperor once again (Jackson 2005: 116).

Möngke died in 1259 and the struggle for succession became an armed conflict between two of his other younger brothers; Ariq-Böke (Arigh Böke) based in the Mongolian homeland, and Qubilai (Khubilai), commanding the Mongol forces in northern China. Hülegü moved his army east to Azerbaijan in case he was drawn into the struggle between his brothers, leaving only a small force in Syria. The Mamluk Sultan of Egypt, Qutuz, seized the opportunity to attack the Mongol detachment, and mobilized a large army. In 1260, the two forces met at Ayn Jalut, near Nazareth, and the Mongols suffered their first significant military defeat since Chinggis Khan had begun his conquest of China. Ayn Jalut marked the high tide of Mongol expansion in the Middle East. Hülegü became the first of the Il-khans, the Mongol dynasty that ruled Persia and adjacent regions until the last of the line died heirless in 1335.

In 1264, Qubilai emerged victorious from the struggle with his brother, but did not inherit a unified empire. He was, in effect, the senior member and nominal overlord of a royal family that ruled relatively independent khanates in Russia, Persia, Turkestan and northern China. War had already broken out between Hülegü and Berke Khan, who had succeeded his brother Batu as Khan of the Golden Horde. A grandson of Cha'adai (Chagadai) named Alghu had consolidated his grandfather's *ulus* to form what was to be known as the Chagadai Khanate, ruling much of Turkestan and Transoxiana. Qubilai had his own power-base in northern China, and, after 1264, Mongolia. His capital was the old Jin seat of government of Zhongdu (now Beijing) known by the Turks as Khanbaliq (Khanbaligh), 'the Khan's city', which he later renamed Dadu ('great capital' in Chinese). In 1271, Qubilai founded the Yuan dynasty, and in 1274 launched a new campaign against the Song dynasty. By 1276, the Mongol armies had taken the Song capital, reunifying China for the first time since the fall of the Tang. Qubilai's armies pushed as far south as Java, but in 1281, the huge armada that the Khan sent to conquer Japan was destroyed by a violent summer typhoon (later called the 'divine wind' *kamikaze* by the Japanese), and the Mongols never attempted to invade the island again. Qubilai had formed an alliance with the Tibetan Phags-pa Lama, appointing him state preceptor in 1260, and in return the Khan was identified with figures in the Buddhist pantheon (Rossabi 1988: 144).

Qubilai died in 1294, the ruler of the most wealthy and powerful of the Mongol Khanates.

THE TEXTS

There have been many translations of the *Secret History of the Mongols*. Urgunge Onon's (1990) translation is more readable than the wonderfully scholarly work of Cleaves (1982), and has the advantage of additional insights into archaic terms provided by the translator's intimate understanding of Mongol culture and his knowledge of the Daur dialect of modern Mongolian. We include chapters one and two of the Onon translation of the *Secret History* to give readers a sense for his style. However, the most painstakingly authoritative and carefully documented translation to date is that recently completed by Igor De Rachewiltz (2004). We include chapters seven and eight of his translation, but with such limited space we have been unable to include his wonderfully detailed commentary on the passages. These extracts leave out much of Temüjin's early career, but we hope they will provide insight into the political world into which Chinggis Khan was born, and the nature of the state that he founded in 1206.

In the next chapter Igor De Rachewiltz explores the ideology of imperial rule in the Chinggisid era, emphasizing the continuity with earlier Türk traditions of state by which the emperor ruled 'by the will of heaven', and the similarities with Chinese concepts of the emperor as 'son of heaven'. Indeed, as Golden noted (this volume) notions of a heavenly mandate to rule can be traced back to the Xiongnu. The *chanyu* was 'born of heaven and earth and ordained by the sun and moon' just as the Türk Qaghans were 'heaven-conceived'. Similarly, Chinggis Khan's ancestors were described as 'sons of heaven'.¹ The concept of a heavenly mandate to rule can be seen as part of what Di Cosmo (1999: 20) described as the 'ideology in reserve' of steppe rulers, by which aristocratic houses could become imperial dynasties when the opportunity arose.

A detailed picture of the Chinggisid taxation and administrative system is provided by Herbert Schurmann's careful study of what he calls 'tributary practices'. Here Schurmann examines the particular institutions such as *alba* (the obligation to provide goods or service to one's lord) and *qubchiri* (a levy for a particular purpose), and traces their export to the regions subject to Mongol rule. This paper, some sections of which could not be included here due to space constraints, offers insights into wider Mongol society at this period, the power relations that made these extractions possible, and the nature of aristocratic rule. We return again to Igor De Rachewiltz in the next chapter, and his painstaking study of the nature of Chinggis Khan's 'Great Jasag' – the written judgements of the Khan. De Rachewiltz evaluates what evidence we have for this famous document, and considers to what extent we can consider it to have been a coherent body of law.

The next paper, by Peter Jackson, provides a brilliantly informative account of the distribution of subjects and territories between the many members of the imperial family, and the way in which this eventually led to the consolidated khanates of the late-thirteenth century. Jackson overturns the widely-held view that Chinggis Khan had placed one of his four sons as overlord of a section of his empire. In doing so he revises his own opinion on this point, which appears in an earlier publication that is included here as Chapter 13.

The account of John of Plano Carpini (Giovanni da Pian del Carpine) is a rich source


of information on the Chinggisid empire. John was a Franciscan friar who travelled as papal envoy to the Mongol court in 1246 in time to witness the coronation of Güyüg Khan. His eyewitness accounts of Mongol everyday and courtly life, military details and the *quriltai* assembly to elect the new khan are so interesting that we feel bound to reproduce them here, albeit in the truncated form of a few short extracts. John saw the Mongols (or Tatars as they were usually described) as a hostile and threatening force, and his account reflects his view that Christian rulers needed to find the unity and confidence to resist them. He did not enjoy much by way of hospitality from his Mongol hosts, probably because he did not have sufficiently rich and numerous presents to convince the many nobles that he met en route to the court to take him seriously as a senior diplomatic figure.

We could not resist including significantly longer excerpts from the extraordinary narrative of friar William of Rubruck who was sent by Louis IX of France to convert the 'Tatars' and discover the fate of German Christian captives given to a Mongol prince named Buri. William travelled to Batu Khan's court and then on to meet Möngke in the Mongol capital Qaraqorum in 1254. He left an account of his journey that must count as the best eyewitness description of Mongol society of the period that we have. We include here the sections of his work in which William describes Mongol (Tatar) food and housing, his meeting with Batu Khan, the peoples and religions of the empire, Möngke Khan's court, the city of Qaraqorum, and the ritual specialists he calls 'sooth-sayers' but whom contemporary scholarship would describe as 'shamans'.

The next chapter, by Thomas Allsen, provides a wonderfully detailed and concise analysis of the career of Möngke Khan, and details the central imperial administration that he inherited and developed. It is followed by a second paper by Peter Jackson, that carefully examines the disputes between the princely houses that led to the fragmentation of the Mongol empire, in particular the rivalries between Hülegü's Il-Khanate and Batu's Golden Horde. The final chapter of this section, by John Dardess, begins with the empire under Möngke, providing something of the economic and geographical context of the administrative and political developments described by Allsen and Jackson. Dardess then goes on to describe the conflict between Qubilai and Ariq-böke that was to split the Mongol imperial centre, and the nature of Yuan rule in Mongolia.

NOTE

1. Buqu Qatagi, Buqqatu Salji and Bodonchar Mungqaq were said by their mother to be 'sons of heaven' destined to 'become the rulers of all' see *Secret History of the Mongols* §21.



The Eurasian steppe and neighbouring regions in the late twelfth century

■ Chapters 1 and 2 first published in Onon, Urgunge (trs & ed), *The Secret History of the Mongols: The Life and Times of Chinggis Khan*, London, Curzon Press, 2001

■ Chapters 7 and 8 first published in De Rachewiltz, Igor (trs), *The Secret History of the Mongols: A Mongolian Epic Chronicle of the Thirteenth Century*, Leiden: Brill, 2006

5

THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE MONGOLS

Chapters 1 and 2 translated by
Urgunge Onon

Chapters 7 and 8 translated by
Igor De Rachewiltz



CHAPTER 1

[1] Chinggis⁶⁹ Qahan was born with his destiny ordained by Heaven above.⁷⁰ He was descended from Börte Chino, whose name means ‘greyish white wolf’,⁷¹ and Qo’ai-maral, the wolf’s spouse, whose name means beautiful doe, who crossed the lake⁷² and settled at the source of the Onon River at Burqan-qaldun,⁷³ where Batachi-qan⁷⁴ was born to them.

[2] The son of Batachi-qan was Tamacha. The son of Tamacha was Qorichar-mergen. The son of Qorichar-mergen was A’ujam-boro’ul. The son of A’ujam-boro’ul was Sali-qacha’u. The son of Sali-qacha’u was Yeke-nidün. The son of Yeke-nidün was Sem-sochi. The son of Sem-sochi was Qarchu.⁷⁵

[3] The son of Qarchu, Borjigidai-mergen, had Mongqoljin-qo’a as his wife. The son of Borjigidai-mergen, Toroqoljin-bayan, had a wife called Boroqchin-qo’a, a young man-servant called Boroldai-suyalbi, and two fine geldings,⁷⁶ Dayir⁷⁷ and Boro.⁷⁸ Toroqoljin had two sons, Duwa-soqor and Dobun-mergen.⁷⁹

[4] Duwa-soqor had a single eye in the middle of his forehead. Through it, he could see for a distance of three journeys.⁸⁰

[5] One day, Duwa-soqor climbed Burqan-qaldun with his younger brother, Dobun-mergen. Looking down from Burqan-qaldun, Duwa-soqor spied a group of people coming downstream along the Tünggelik.⁸¹

[6] He said: ‘Among those people moving camp towards us is a beautiful girl in the front seat of a black-covered wooden cart. If she has not already been given to anyone, let us request her for you, young brother Dobun-mergen.’ He sent his younger brother Dobun-mergen to take a look.

[7] Having reached the group, Dobun-mergen found a girl of true beauty and good reputation. Her name, Alan Qo'a,⁸² was well known; she had not yet been given to any man.

[8] Barqujin-qo'a, the daughter of Barqudai-mergen, Lord of the Kōl Barqujin lowland,⁸³ who had been given to Qorilartai-mergen, the Lord of the Qori-Tümeds,⁸⁴ was a member of the group. In the land of the Qori-Tümeds, at Ariq-usun,⁸⁵ Barqujin-qo'a, wife of Qorilartai-mergen, had given birth to the girl Alan Qo'a.

[9] Qorilartai-mergen had fallen out with his people when they banned each other from hunting sable, squirrel, and other wild animals in the Qori-Tümed lands. Because of this ban, they formed the Qorilar⁸⁶ clan. He deemed Burqan-qaldun, rich in wild animals and gazelles, a good place. Shинchi-bayan⁸⁷ established [shamanistic] deities as the spirit-lords⁸⁸ of Burqan-galdun⁸⁹ while he was travelling in the direction of Uri[y]-angqai. Alan Qo'a, daughter of the Qori Tümed Qorilartai-mergen born at Ariq-usun, was there requested [by Duwa-soqor] in marriage. This is how she came to be the wife of Dobun-mergen.

[10] Having joined Dobun-mergen, Alan Qo'a bore him two sons, Bүgүнүtei and Belgүнүtei.

[11] Duwa-soqor, the older brother, had four sons. Duwa-soqor died soon afterwards. After Duwa-soqor's death, his four sons no longer looked upon their uncle Dobun-mergen as kin, but despised him and moved away. They split into four clans that became the Four Peoples.⁹⁰

[12] One day, Dobun-mergen set out to go hunting on Toqochaq Peak. In a forest, he met an Uri[y]angqad[ai] man who had killed a three-year-old deer and was roasting its ribs and rectum.

[13] Dobun-mergen said: 'Friend,⁹¹ give me some of the meat, as my share.'⁹² 'I will,' said the hunter. Keeping the lungs, head, and skin,⁹³ he gave [the rest of] the meat of the three-year-old deer to Dobun-mergen.

[14] Dobun-mergen loaded up the three-year-old deer. While continuing on his way, he met a poor man leading his young son.

[15] Dobun-mergen asked: 'Who are you?' The man replied: 'I am a man called Ma'aliq of the Baya'uds and in distress. I will give you this son of mine in exchange for part of that beast's flesh.'

[16] On hearing those words, Dobun-mergen tore off one of the deer's hind-legs and gave it to the man. He then took the boy back to his yurt, where the boy worked as a servant.

[17] Not long afterwards, Dobun-mergen died. After his death, despite the loss of her husband, Alan Qo'a bore three more sons called Buqu-qatagi, Buqatu-salji, and Bodonchar-mungqaq.⁹⁴

[18] Belgүнүtei and Bүgүнүtei, the two sons born earlier to Dobun-mergen, talked together about their mother Alan Qo'a behind her back: 'This mother of ours has produced three sons, without [our father's] older brother, younger brother, or cousins⁹⁵ or any husband. Only the Ma'aliq Baya'ud man lives in this yurt. They are probably his three sons.' Alan Qo'a sensed what they were saying behind her back.

[19] One spring day, after boiling some dried mutton, she made her five sons, Belgünütei, Bügünütei, Buqu-qatagi, Buqatu-salji, and Bodonchar-mungqaq, sit down in a row. She gave each an arrow-shaft, saying: 'Break it.' They broke the arrow-shafts easily and threw them aside. Again, she took five arrow-shafts⁹⁶ and bound them together. She gave the five bound shafts to each in turn, saying: 'Break them.' Each tried, but none succeeded.

[20] At this, Alan Qo'a said to her two sons Belgünütei and Bügünütei: 'You have doubted me. You have talked together, saying: "Whose are these three sons that she has borne? Whence did they come?" It is right for you to be suspicious.

[21] Every night, a shining yellow man came into the yurt through the light of the smoke-hole and over the top of the door. He caressed my belly and his light sank into it. He [slunk] sheepishly away like a yellow dog by the light of the sun and moon.'

Why do you talk unwisely?
Evidently it is a sign
that they are sons of Heaven.
Why do you compare them
to the black-haired commoners?⁹⁷
When they become lords of all,
the common people must understand.

[22] Again, Alan Qo'a spoke with her five sons: 'All five of you were all born of this same belly. Alone, you can be broken easily by anyone. Together and of one mind, like bound arrow-shafts, none can easily vanquish you.' Not long afterwards, their mother Alan Qo'a passed away.

[23] After Alan Qo'a's death, the five elder and younger brothers divided the livestock and property among themselves. Four of them – Belgününte, Bügünütei, Buqu-qatagi, and Buqatu-salji – each took a share. Only Bodonchar Mungqaq got no share, for they thought him stupid and dull⁹⁸ and therefore did not count him as their kin.

[24] No longer counted as a member of the family, Bodonchar thought to himself: 'Why have I lived here until now?' He rode away on an off-white, fleet-footed⁹⁹ horse with a mangy tail and sores along its black-striped back. 'If I am to die,' he said, 'let me die. If I am to live, let me live.'¹⁰⁰ And he galloped off down the Onon River. On the island of Baljun, he built a grass yurt and lived there.

[25] While living in this way, he saw a young female hawk catch and eat a black pheasant. Using the tail hairs of his off-white, mangy-tailed, sore-ridden horse with the black-striped back as a snare, he captured the hawk and reared it.

[26] When he was without food, he would lie in wait and kill wild beasts that wolves had cornered at the foot of the cliffs and shoot and kill them. Together with the hawk, he would pick up and eat what the wolves had left behind. So as the year passed, he nourished both his own gullet and the hawk's.

[27] Spring arrived, bringing the ducks with it. He starved his hawk and flew it at them. He hung up the ducks and geese that the hawk caught until

bad odours rose
from every withered tree,

dank smells
from every dried-up tree.¹⁰¹

[28] From behind the northern side¹⁰² of Mount Düyiren, a group of travellers were moving camp along the Tünggelik Stream. After flying his hawk, Bodonchar Mungqaq was wont to visit them, drinking kumiss¹⁰³ with them in the day and returning to his grass yurt at night to sleep.

[29] These people asked for Bodonchar's hawk, but he refused to give it to them. They failed to ask Bodonchar whose son he was and what tribe he belonged to. He, too, did not ask them what people they were. Yet he kept coming and going.

[30] His elder brother Buqu-qatagi, thinking that his younger brother Bodonchar had gone downstream along the Onon River, came searching for him. He asked these people moving down the Tünggelik Stream whether they had seen such a man with such a horse.

[31] They answered: 'A man and a horse similar to those that you describe are here, together with a hawk. Every day he comes to us, drinks kumiss, and goes away. It is not known where he spends the night. When the wind rises in the northwest, the feathers and down of the ducks and geese that his hawk catches scatter like snow and blow across here. He cannot be far away. At around this time, he comes. Wait here for him.'

[32] After some time, a man rode slowly up the Tünggelik. It turned out to be Bodonchar. Buqu-qatagi recognised him immediately. With Buqu-qatagi in the lead, the two trotted off together up the Onon River.

[33] Bodonchar, trotting along behind his older brother, said to him: 'My brother, my brother, a body needs a head, a garment needs a collar.'¹⁰⁴ His words had no effect on Buqu-qatagi.

[34] He repeated the same words. Again, they had no effect; his elder brother remained silent. After travelling further still, Bodonchar said the same words yet again. 'What were you saying?' his older brother asked.

[35] Bodonchar replied: 'Those people camped along the Tünggelik do not distinguish between the great [lord] and the small [folk], between good and bad, between head and hooves.¹⁰⁵ Everyone is equal. They are a simple people, Let us plunder them.'

[36] His older brother said: 'If what you say is true, we will consult with our brothers when we arrive at the yurt and form a plan to plunder those people.'

[37] After reaching the yurt, the brothers talked the matter over and set out on horseback. Bodonchar himself was sent galloping ahead, as scout.

[38] On the way, Bodonchar captured a woman, four to five months pregnant.¹⁰⁶ He asked her who she was. She replied: 'I am a Greater¹⁰⁷ Uriyangqai woman of the Jarchi'ut tribe.'

[39] The five brothers attacked the camp and seized livestock, property, and people to serve them. They then settled down.

[40] The woman with child went with Bodonchar and bore a son who, as the son of a foreigner, was called Jajiradai. He became the founder of the Jadarans. Jadaradai's¹⁰⁸

son was called Tügü'üdei and Tügü'üdei's son was called Būri-bulchiru. Būri-bulchiru's son was called Qara-qada'an and Qara-qada'an's son was called Jamuqa. Thus the Jadaran clan came into being.

[41] The same woman bore a son by Bodonchar. As she was a captured woman, they named the son Ba'aridai. He became founder of the Ba'arin clan.¹⁰⁹ Ba'aridai's son was called Chiduqul-bökö. Chiduqul-bökö's wives were many, and his sons abounded. Thus the Menen-Ba'arin clan came into being.

[42] From Belgүнүtei came the Belgүнüt clan. From Bүgүнүtei came the Bүgүнüt clan. From Buqu-qatagi came the Qatagin clan. From Buqatu-salji came the Salji'ut clan. From Bodonchar came the Borjigins.

[43] To Bodonchar's principal wife¹¹⁰ was born a son named Barim-shi'iraju-qabichi. Bodonchar also took a concubine as part of the dowry of Qabichi-ba'atur's mother.¹¹¹ A son named Jewüredei was born to this concubine. At first, Jewüredei took part in the Jүgeli ceremony.¹¹²

[44] After Bodonchar's death, a man of the Adangqa¹¹³ Uriyangqad[ai] was constantly present in Jewüredei's yurt. Qabichi¹¹⁴ and others thought that this man might have fathered Jewüredei, expelled [Jewüredei] from the Jүgeli ceremony, and made him set up the Jewüreyit clan.¹¹⁵ He was the founder of the Jewüreds.¹¹⁶

[45] Qabichi-ba'atur's son was called Menen-tudun. Menen-tudun had seven sons – Qachi-kүlүk, Qachin, Qachi'u, Qachula, Qachi'un, Qarandai,¹¹⁷ and Nachin-ba'atur.¹¹⁸

[46] Qachi-kүlүk's son Qaidu was born to Mother Nomolun. Qachin's son was called Noyagidai, for he was, by temperament, lordly. From him stemmed the Noyakin clan. The son of Qachi'u was called Barulatai, because he had a big body and ate crudely. From him the Barula clan was descended. Qachula's sons also ate crudely and were therefore called Yeke-Barula¹¹⁹ and Üchүgen-Barula.¹²⁰ They, too, formed Barula clans – the Erdemtү-Barula, the Tödö'en-Barula,¹²¹ and other Barulas. Qarandai's sons had no leader to stir the millet porridge,¹²² and therefore formed the Buda'at clan. Qachi'un's son, named Adarkidai, was stubborn towards his elder and younger brothers and therefore formed the Adargin clan. The sons of Nachin-ba'atur, called Uru'udai and Mangqutai, founded the Uru'ut and Mangqut clans. Nachin-ba'atur's sons born to his principal wife were called Shiju'udai and Doqoladai. (Shiju'ud and Doqolad later formed clans.)¹²³

[47] Qaidu's three sons were Bai-shingqor-dogshin, Charaqai-lingqu, and Cha'ujin-örtegei. Bai-shingqor-dogshin's son was Tumbinai-sechin. Charaqai-lingqu's son was Senggüm-bilge. Senggüm-bilge's son was Ambaqai. They founded the Tayichi'ut¹²⁴ clan. Charaqai-lingqu's sister-in-law became his wife and bore a son named Besütei, from whom the Besüt clan was descended. From Cha'ujin-örtegei's sons came the Oronar, Qongqotan, Arula[t], Sönit, Qabturqas, and Geniges clans.¹²⁵

[48] Tumbinai-sechin's two sons were Qabul Qahan¹²⁶ and Sem-sechüle. Sem-sechüle's son was Bültechү-ba'atur. Qabul Qahan had seven sons. Ökin-barqaq was his eldest son. The rest were Bartan-ba'atur, Qutu[q]tu-mönggүr, Qutula Qahan, Qulan, Qada'an, and Tödö'en-otchigin.

[49] Ökin-barqaq's son was Qutuqtu-yүrki.¹²⁷ Qutuqtu-yүrki's two sons were Seche-beki and Taichu. From them was descended the Yүrki clan.

[50] Bartan-ba'atur had four sons – Menggetü-kiyan, Nekün-taishi, Yisügei-ba'atur, and Daritai-otchigin. Qutuqtu-mönggür's son was Büri-bökö. At the feast in the forest of the Onon, it was he who slashed Belgütei's shoulder.¹²⁸

[51] Qutula Qahan's three sons were Jochi, Girma'u, and Altan. Qulan-ba'atur's son was Yeke-cheren, lord of the two freedmen Badaï and Kishilig.¹²⁹ Neither Qada'an nor Tödö'en had children.

[52] Qabul Qahan ruled over all the Mongqols. Although Qabul Qahan had seven sons of his own, Senggüm-bilge's son Ambaqai Qahan¹³⁰ ruled over all the Mongqols after Qabul Qahan, because Qabul Qahan so wished it.

[53] Ambaqai Qahan gave his daughter to the Ayiri'ut-Buiru'ut Tatar people, on the Urshi'un River¹³¹ between Lake Buyur and Lake Kölen. While conducting her [to them], he was captured by the Jüyin¹³² Tatar people and taken to the Altan-qahan of the Kitads. Using a Besütei man, Balaqachi, as messenger, Ambaqai Qahan sent word to Qutula, the middle of Qabul Qahan's seven sons, and to Qada'an-taishi, one of his own ten sons,¹³³ to say: 'I became the Qahan of all, the Lord of the Nation.'¹³⁴ While escorting my own daughter, I have been captured by the Tatar people. Do not follow my example. Strive until the nails of your five fingers splinter and your ten fingers drop from your hands to avenge¹³⁵ me.' So saying, he dispatched the messenger.

[54] Yisügei-ba'atur was flying hawks on the Onon River when he met Yeke-chiledü of the Merkids, who was just starting out for home with an Olqunu'ut girl he had married. Craning his neck, he saw a woman¹³⁶ of unique colour and complexion. He galloped home to his yurt and returned leading his older brother Nekün-taishi and his younger brother Daritai-otchigin.

[55] Their arrival frightened Chiledü, who beat his swift dun horse on the thigh and fled across a hill pursued by the three men. Chiledü crossed the spur of the hill to his cart. Lady¹³⁷ Hö'elün, who was waiting in the cart, said: 'Did you see the look on the faces of those men? They wish to kill you. As long as you remain alive, there will be girls on the front seats of carts and women in the black-covered wooden carts. If you live, you will perhaps find a girl or a woman for yourself. If she has another name, you can call her Hö'elün. Save yourself. While you live, smell my fragrance.'¹³⁸ With these words, she removed her shirt. He leaned across his horse to take it. As he did so, the three men rounded the spur of the hill towards him. He beat the thigh of his swift dun horse and fled upstream along the Onon River.

[56] The three men pursued him across seven¹³⁹ hills before returning. Yisügei-ba'atur took hold of the tether¹⁴⁰ of Lady Hö'elün's cart]. His older brother Nekün-taishi led; his younger brother Daritai-otchigin walked beside the cart-shaft.¹⁴¹ As they proceeded, Lady Hö'elün said: 'My older brother¹⁴² Chiledü is one

whose hair has never blown
in the wind,
whose belly has never hungered
in the wild land.

What will now become of him?' Her two plaits¹⁴³ were flung now across her back, now across her breast, as she threw herself backwards and forwards. 'What is happening to me?' she cried. The Onon River churned and the forest echoed to the sound of her loud crying. As he walked alongside her, Daritai-otchigin said:

‘The one you embraced
has crossed many ridges.
The one you cry for
has crossed much water.
However much you cry,
from such a distance, he will not see you.
However much you search for him,
you will not find his road.

Be still,’ he told her. Then Yisügei brought Lady Hö’elün into his yurt. This is how Yisügei took Lady Hö’elün.

[57] As Ambaqai Qahan had named both Qada’an and Qutula, all the Mongqols and the Tayichi’uts gathered together in the Qorqonaq forest by the Onon and made Qutula their qahan. The Mongqols celebrated by dancing and feasting. Qutula was raised up as Qahan and they danced around the Many-Leaved Tree of Qorqonaq¹⁴⁴ until they stood in furrows up to their ribs and made wounds up to their knees.

[58] After becoming qahan, Qutula rode out with Qada’antaishi against the Tatars. Thirteen times they joined battle with the Tatars Kötön-baraq and Jali-buqa but failed to avenge Ambaqai Qahan.

[59] Then Yisügei-ba’atur plundered Temüjin-üge,¹⁴⁵ Qoribuga, and other Tatars. On his return, Lady Hö’elün was pregnant. They were at Deli’ün-boldaq on the Onon when Chinggis Qahan was born. At the time of his birth, he held in his right hand a clot of blood as big as a knucklebone. Born at the time of the capture of the Tatar Temüjin-üge, they thought to name him Temüjin.¹⁴⁶

[60] Yisügei-ba’atur had four sons by Lady Hö’elün: Temüjin, Qasar, Qachi’un, and Temüge. A girl was also born and named Temülün. When Temüjin was nine, Jochiqasar was seven, Qachi’un-elchi¹⁴⁷ was five, Temüge-otchigin was three, and Temülün was in the cradle.

[61] When Temüjin was nine, Yisügei-ba’atur decided to find a wife for him among the Olqunu’ut relatives of his mother Hö’elün, his mother’s brothers. They set out together. While travelling, they met Dei-sechen¹⁴⁸ of the Onggirats¹⁴⁹ between Chekcher and Chiqurgu.

[62] Dei-sechen said: ‘Yisügei-quda,¹⁵⁰ who will you see?’ Yisügei-ba’atur replied: ‘I am going to the Olqunu’ut people with my son to ask his mother’s brothers for a wife.’ Dei-sechen said: ‘This boy of yours has fire in his eyes and light in his face.’¹⁵¹

[63] Yisügei-quda, last night I had a dream. A white gerfalcon, holding both the sun and the moon, flew down and perched on my hand. I have not talked to the people about my dream. When we gazed in the past at the sun and moon, they were merely seen. Now this gerfalcon lights with them on my hand. The white one descends onto my hand. What good thing did this portend? Yisügei-quda, my dream foreshadowed your arrival, together with your son. I dreamt a good dream that portended your arrival among the Kiyat people.

[64] Since days of old, we Onggirat people with
the colour of our sisters’ children,
the complexion of our daughters,

have never disputed with other nations over land and people.

We make our fair-faced daughters
sit in the two-wheeled cart,
harnessed to a black camel,
for you who become qahans,
and send them off at a trot.
On the qatan throne
we make them sit together with you.

We have never disputed with other nations over land and people.

We have reared our fair-skinned daughters,
sat them on the cart's front seat,
harnessed to a dark-grey camel,
and sent them forth.
on the high throne,
we make them sit at your [majesty's] side.

From of old the Onggirat people have been

shielded¹⁵² by the qatun,
pleaded for by daughters,
because of the colour of our sisters' children,
because of the fair complexion of our daughters.

[65] Our sons are assessed by their camping places, our daughters are regarded for their fair complexion.

Let us go to my yurt, Yisügei-quda. My daughter is young, regard her, quda.' Dei-sechen took him to his yurt and made him dismount.

[66] When Yisügei saw Dei-sechen's daughter, there was light in her face and fire in her eyes. After seeing the girl, he kept her in his thoughts. She was ten years of age, a year older than Temüjin; her name was Börte. Yisügei stayed overnight and asked for the girl the next day. Dei-sechen replied: 'If, after numerous requests, I give her, I will be respected. If after only a few requests, I will be held cheap. It is not the fate of a girl to grow old in the doorway behind which she was born. I will give you my daughter. Leave your son here as my son-in-law when you go.' They agreed to the marriage, and Yisügei-ba'atur said: 'I leave my son as a son-in-law, but he is afraid of dogs. Quda, do not allow my boy to be frightened by dogs.'¹⁵³ After saying these words, he gave his spare horse as a gift and, leaving Temüjin behind as a son-in-law, departed.

[67] On the way, at Chekcher in the Shira-ke'er,¹⁵⁴ Yisügei-ba'atur came across some feasting Tatars. Being thirsty, he dismounted [to join] their feast. The Tatars recognized him. 'Yisügei-kiyan has come,' they said, recalling how he had once caused them insult by robbing them. Secretly wishing to harm him, they mixed poison [into his food] and gave it to him. On the way, he felt sick. On arriving at his yurt after three days' travel, his condition became worse.

[68] Yisügei-ba'atur said 'I feel sick inside. Who is at hand?'¹⁵⁵ 'I am nearby,' said Mönglik,¹⁵⁶ the son of the old Qongqotat man, Charaqa. Yisügei-ba'atur called Mönglik in. 'Mönglik, my child, I have small children. I left my own Temüjin as a son-in-law. On my way back, some Tatars secretly harmed me. I feel sick inside. I charge you to take care

of my small sons, who are your younger brothers, and of your widowed sister-in-law. Bring back my son Temüjin quickly, Mönglik my child.' With that, he passed away.¹⁵⁷

CHAPTER 2

[69] Rather than disobey the words of Yisügei-ba'atur, Mönglik went to Dei-sechen and said, 'My master Yisügei misses Temüjin greatly. His heart aches. I have come to take Temüjin away.' Dei-sechen said, 'If quda is missing his son, then let him go. After he has seen him, let the son swiftly return.' Father Mönglik took Temüjin back.

[70] That spring, the two qatut¹⁵⁸ of Ambaqai Qahan, Örbei and Soqatai, visited [the boundary of] the ancestors' land. Lady Hö'elün arrived late, for they had failed to wait for her. To Örbei and Soqatai, Lady Hö'elün said, 'Is it because Yisügei-ba'atur is dead and my children are not yet grown up that you think to keep from me a share of the ancestors' offerings, the bile'ür offerings and the sarqud offerings? Before my very eyes, you eat [without inviting me to join you]; without waking me, you intend to leave.'¹⁵⁹

[71] On hearing these words, the two qatut Örbei and Soqatai said,

'Do you have a special right to eat
[when we] summon you?
You have the right to eat
when you come by chance [on food].
Do you have the right to eat
[when we] invite you?
You have the right to eat
when you arrive [in time].

Is it because you thought [to yourself], "Ambaqai Qahan is dead," that even you, Hö'elün, speak against us in this way?

[72] 'We must find some way of leaving those mothers and [their] children behind in the camp when we set out,' they said. 'Do not take them when you go!' The next day, the Tayichi'ut man Tarqutai-kiriltuq, together with Tödö'engirte and others of the Tayichi'uts, set off down the Onon River, leaving behind Lady Hö'elün, the mothers, and the children. When Charaqa, the old Qongqotat man, chided them, Tödö'en-girte replied,

'The deep water has dried up and
The shining stone has worn away.'¹⁶⁰

[With these words, they moved off.] They said to the old man Charaqa, 'Why do you reprove us?' From behind, they struck him in the back with a spear.

[73] Wounded, the old man Charaqa returned to his yurt. As he lay down in pain, Temüjin came to see him. The old Qongqotat man, Charaqa, then said to Temüjin, 'All our people gathered together by your good father have been taken on a journey. When I chided [those who took them], they did this to me.' Temüjin wept and went out. Lady Hö'elün, who had been left behind when they set off, raised the flag¹⁶¹ and set out on horseback. She herself fetched back half the people. Those who had been persuaded to return, however, did not remain but set off again after the Tayichi'uts.¹⁶²

[74] And so the Tayichi'ut brethren set out and left behind in the camp the widowed Lady Hö'elün, her little ones, and the mothers and their children.

Lady Hö'elün, born a woman of wisdom,
 raised her little ones, her own children.
 Wearing her high hat tightly [on her head],¹⁶³
 hoisting her skirts with a sash,
 she ran upstream along the Onon's banks,
 gathering öliersün and moyilsun
 with which to nourish their gullets day and night.
 Born with gall, the Lady their mother,
 reared her fortunate children.
 Wielding a pointed stick of juniper,
 she dug up südün and chichigina and nourished them.
 With wild onions and garlic
 The sons of the noble mother were nourished,
 Until they became rulers.
 The sons of the patient noble mother,
 Were reared on elm seeds.¹⁶⁴
 And became wise men and lawgivers.

[75] With qoqosun and wild garlic
 the beautiful lady raised
 her admirable sons.
 They became high officials and fine men.
 They grew up to be good men.
 They became powerful and brave.
 They said among themselves,
 'Let us support our mother.'
 Sitting on the banks of Mother Onon,
 They prepared lines and hooks
 with which they caught
 maimed and misshapen fishes.
 Bending needles into fishhooks,
 they caught jebüge and qadara.
 Tying chilüme nets and gubchi'ur nets,
 They scooped up small fishes.
 [Thus,] they gratefully supported their mother.¹⁶⁵

[76] One day, when the four [brothers], Temüjin, Qasar, Bekter,¹⁶⁶ and Belgütei, were sitting alongside one another pulling in [their lines], they caught a bright fish. Bekter and Belgütei snatched the small fish away from Temüjin and Qasar. Temüjin and Qasar went to the yurt and said to their noble mother, 'A bright minnow bit the hook and was snatched away from us by our two brothers Bekter and Belgütei.' The noble mother said, 'Desist. Why do you, older and younger brothers, behave in such a way towards one another?

Apart from our shadows we have no friends,
 apart from our tails we have no fat.¹⁶⁷

Just when we are thinking of how to settle our score with our Tayichi'ut kinsmen, you behave as Mother Alan's five sons once did. Why do you not work together? You must cease to behave in such a way.'

[77] Temüjin and Qasar were not happy with their mother's words. They replied, 'Only yesterday we shot down a lark with a horn-tipped arrow and they snatched it away from us. Now they have done the same again. How can we live together?' Throwing aside the door-felt, they went out. Bekter was sitting on top of a small hill, watching over the horses, pale-bay geldings. Temüjin stalked up from behind while Qasar stalked up from in front. As they approached, aiming¹⁶⁸ their arrows, Bekter saw them and said, 'We are unable to endure the bitterness that our Tayichi'ut kinsmen have caused us and ask ourselves, "Which of us will settle the score?". Why make me to be dirt in your eye, a fish-bone in your mouth?'¹⁶⁹ At a time when

Apart from our shadows we have no friends,
apart from our tails we have no fat,

how can you think to do this thing? Do not extinguish my hearth-fire, do not forsake Belgütei!' Having spoken these words, he sat cross-legged and waited. Temüjin and Qasar shot at him¹⁷⁰ from in front and from behind, and then departed.

[78] They arrived at the yurt. As they entered, the noble mother, sensing from the look on their faces [what had happened], cried out, 'You destroyers!

Accidentally issuing from my hot [womb],
this one was born holding a black clot of blood in his hand.
Like the qasar¹⁷¹ dog gnawing on its own afterbirth,
like a panther attacking on a rocky mountain,
like a lion unable to control its anger,
like a monster¹⁷² out to swallow [its prey] alive,
like a gerfalcon attacking its own shadow,
like a pike swallowing in silence,
like a male camel biting the heel of its young,
like a wolf [stalking under the cover of] a snowstorm,
like the yellow falcon¹⁷³ eating its young, which it is unable to drive away,
like a jackal protecting his den when he is touched,
like a tiger that does not hesitate to seize [its prey],
like a long-haired dog rushing rashly [at his prey] – thus you have destroyed!
Apart from our shadows, we have no friends.
Apart from our tails, we have no fat.

At such a time, when our bitterness towards our Tayichi'ut kinsmen knows no limit, when we are asking which of us will settle the score, you think only about how we shall live [among one another], and you do this to one another.'

Citing old sayings,
quoting the words of old men,
she berated her sons violently.

[79] Not long after this, Tarqutai-kiriltuq of the Tayichi'uts led up his sentries and said,

The lambs are shedding their [fleeces],
the sheep are growing up.¹⁷⁴

The mothers and sons and the older and younger brothers took fright and built a barricade in the thick forest. Tearing down trees and dragging them together, Belgütei built a stockade. While Qasar countered the enemy's arrow-shots, the [other] three – Qachi'un, Temüge and Temülün – slipped into a narrow defile and battled on. Then the Tayichi'uts shouted, 'Send out your older brother Temüjin. We have no need for the rest of you'. [Hearing] Temüjin thus summoned, they mounted him on a horse and made him escape through the forest. The Tayichi'uts, seeing him, gave chase. On Tergüne Heights, he slipped into a thicket that the Tayichi'uts could not penetrate. So they surrounded the thicket and watched over it.

[80] Having spent three nights in the thicket, Temüjin decided to go out.¹⁷⁵ As he led his horse forth, its saddle worked loose and fell off. Turning round, he saw that the saddle-strap and the breast-strap were still attached, yet the saddle had come loose and fallen off.¹⁷⁶ He said, 'As for the saddle-strap, so be it, but how can the breast-strap have come loose? Could this be a warning from Heaven?' He turned back and spent another three nights [in the thicket]. As he set out again towards the entrance to the thicket, a white rock, the size of a tent, fell and blocked the opening. 'Could this be a warning from Heaven?' he asked himself. He turned back and spent a further three nights in the thicket. Finally, after being there for nine nights without food, he said to himself, 'How can I die without a name! I will go out!' Blocked by the white rock, the size of a tent, the opening was impassable, [so] he cut through the trees [around it] with his arrow-maker's knife and slipped his horse through. As soon as he emerged, the Tayichi'uts on guard [outside the thicket] captured him and took him away with them.

[81] After taking Temüjin away, Tarqutai-kiriltuq ordered his people to allow Temüjin to stay one night in each of their camps in turn. While this was happening, on the sixteenth day of the first month of summer, the 'red circle day',¹⁷⁷ the Tayichi'uts feasted together on the banks of the Onon, and dispersed at sunset. Temüjin was escorted to the feast by a weak young man. As the people left the feast, he pulled away the [rope of the] cangue¹⁷⁸ from the weak boy, struck him on the head, and ran. 'If I lie down in the Onon forest, I will be seen,' he thought. So he lay down in the torrent, with his head held back so that the cangue floated in the current. There he lay, with only his face above the water.

[82] The man who had lost him cried out in a loud voice, 'I have lost the hostage!' The Tayichi'uts, who had dispersed, reassembled. Under a moon as bright as day, they searched the Onon forest. Sorqan-shira of the Süldüs,¹⁷⁹ who was passing by, saw [Temüjin] lying in the torrent. He said to him, 'It must be because you are so clever that people say

There is fire in his eyes
and light in his face.

Because you are so clever, you have made your Tayichi'ut kinsmen jealous. Lie where you are, I shall not tell.' So saying, he went away. 'Let us return and search again,' the [Tayichi'uts] said to one another. Sorqan-shira said, 'Let us go back along the same paths and look where we have not searched, and then return [to this place].' They agreed to this suggestion and went back along the same paths, searching [as they went].

Sorqan-shira again passed by [Temüjin]. 'Your kinsmen are approaching,' he told him, 'sharpening their mouths and teeth. Lie down, be steadfast!' So saying, he passed by.

[83] Again, they said to one another, 'Let us return and search [again].' Sorqan-shira said, 'You Tayichi'ut nobles¹⁸⁰ have lost a man in the bright light of day. How can we expect to find him in the dark night? Let us go back along the same paths and look where we have not searched, and then return [to this place]. After searching, we disperse. Tomorrow, we reassemble and look [again]. Where can a man go with a cangue around his neck?' They agreed and returned to search. Sorqan-shira again passed by [Temüjin] and said, 'We have agreed to return. After searching [for you] in this way, we will look [again] tomorrow. Wait until we have dispersed. Then go and seek your mother and your younger brothers! If anyone sees you, do not say that you saw me or that you have been seen.' So saying, he left.

[84] When the [Tayichi'uts] had dispersed, [Temüjin] thought to himself, 'I was made to stay the night in each of their camps in turn. Yesterday, when I stayed in Sorqan-shira's yurt, his two sons, Chimbai and Chila'un¹⁸¹ felt badly in their hearts. On seeing me at night, they loosened my cangue, so that I was able to spend the night [in greater comfort]. Again, when Sorqan-shira saw me, he passed by without telling [anyone]. Perhaps he will now save me, in the same way.' With this idea in mind, [Temüjin] went downstream along the Onon River in search of Sorqan-shira's yurt.

[85] The mark of a yurt was that, after pouring the mares' milk, they churned the kumiss all through the night, until the break of day. 'As I proceed, I shall hear that sign,' [thought Temüjin]. He arrived, and heard the sound of the churning. When he entered the yurt, Sorqan-shira said to him, 'Did I not tell you to seek out your mother and your younger brothers? Why have you come here?' But his two sons, Chimbai and Chila'un, said, 'When the magpie hides¹⁸² in the bush from the sparrow-hawk, the bush saves it. Now that he has come to us, how can you speak to him in such a way?' Displeased by their father's words, they untied his cangue and burned it on the fire. At the back [of the yurt] was a cart full of sheep's wool in which they made him sit. They bade their younger sister Qada'an¹⁸³ care for him, and to tell no living person.

[86] On the third day, [the Tayichi'uts] said to one another that someone had perhaps hidden [Temüjin]. 'Let us search among ourselves,' they decided. Searching among themselves, they looked in Sorqan-shira's yurt, in his cart, and under the bed. Sitting on the cart full of sheep's wool behind [the yurt], they [began to] pulled the wool out. They were just about to reach [Temüjin's] foot when Sorqan-shira said, 'In such heat, who could bear [to hide] inside the wool?' The searchers climbed down and departed.

[87] After they had left, Sorqan-shira said, 'You almost caused me to blow [in the wind] like ashes! Go now and seek out your mother and younger brothers.' He put him on a white-mouthed, tawny barren mare, cooked him a fat lamb,¹⁸⁴ and prepared for him a small leather bag and a large leather bag [full of kumiss]. He gave him no saddle or tinder-pouch, but he did provide him with a bow and two arrows.¹⁸⁵ Having prepared these things [for him], he sent him on his way.

[88] After setting out, Temüjin reached the place where [his mother and brothers] had built the barricade. He followed tracks in the grass upstream along the Onon River and came to the place where the Kimurqa Stream enters it from the west. After getting this

far upstream, he met [his mother and brothers], then living above the Kimurqa stream on the Qorchuqi Hill of the Beder Spur.

[89] After their reunification, they went to camp by Lake Kōkō¹⁸⁶ on the Senggür Stream¹⁸⁷ on Qara-jirügen¹⁸⁸ Mountain in the Gürelgü [Mountains] on the southern side of Burqanqaldun [Mountain]. While there, they killed and ate marmots and field mice.

[90] One day, when the eight horses, the light bay geldings, were standing by the yurt, thieves came. Before [Temüjin and his brothers] realized what was happening, they stole [the horses] and fled. Being on foot, [Temüjin and his brothers] were left behind and could only watch. Belgütei had ridden off to go hunting for marmot on a bald-tailed chestnut horse. In the evening, after sunset, he returned on foot, leading the bald-tailed chestnut laden with marmots that swung to and fro. [Temüjin and his brothers] told him that thieves had taken the light bay geldings. 'I will chase after them!' said Belgütei. But Qasar said, 'You are not capable. I shall chase after them!' Temüjin said, 'None of you can, I shall pursue them.' He rode off on the chestnut horse, following the light bay geldings' tracks in the grass. Having spent three nights [in pursuit], the next morning he came across a strong, handsome youth milking mares in a large herd of horses. He asked the youth about the light bay geldings. The youth replied, 'This morning, before sunrise, [someone] drove eight light bay geldings through here. I will show you the path they took.' He bade Temüjin exchange the bald-tailed chestnut for a black-backed grey horse, while he himself rode a swift dun. Without even returning to his yurt, he hid his leather bag and bucket in the open field. 'My friend, you have exhausted yourself in coming here. All men suffer in common. I will accompany you. My father is known as Naqu-bayan.¹⁸⁹ I, his only son, am called Bo'orchu.'¹⁹⁰ They spent three nights and days following the tracks of the light bay geldings. On the evening [of the fourth day], when the sun shone on the hills, they arrived at a camp of people.¹⁹¹ They saw the eight light bay geldings grazing at the edge of the large camp. 'My friend, stay here,' said Temüjin. 'I shall drive out the light bay geldings.' But Bo'orchu said, 'I came as a friend. How can I stand by?' They rushed in and drove out the light bay geldings.

[91] The [camp-dwellers] started in pursuit of them, one after the other. One man, alone on a white horse and holding a pole-lasso,¹⁹² drew close. 'My friend,' said Bo'orchu, 'give me the bow and arrow! I will shoot at him.' But Temüjin said, 'I do not want you hurt for my sake. I will exchange arrows with him!' With those words, he swung round and fired arrows at the pursuer. The man on the white horse stopped and brandished his lasso at [Temüjin]. His companions caught up with him. But as they reached him, the sun set and dusk fell. Those remaining were lost in the darkness; they stopped and were left behind.

[92] After travelling throughout that night and the next three days and nights, [Temüjin and Bo'orchu] arrived. Temüjin said, 'My friend, without you, I could never have recovered these horses. Let us divide them. Tell me how many you will take.' But Bo'orchu said, 'I thought of you as a good friend when you [first] arrived exhausted, and I thought to help you as a good friend. I came as your companion. How could I think of profiting from these events? My father Naqu-bayan is well known; I am his only son. That which my father possesses is more than enough for me. I will take nothing. [Otherwise,] what sort of help will I have given? I will take nothing.'

[93] They arrived at Naqu-bayan's yurt. [Thinking that] he had lost his son Bo'orchu, Naqu-bayan was snivelling and weeping. On seeing his son suddenly arrive, he

alternately cried and scolded. His son Bo'orchu said, 'What is it? When my good friend arrived exhausted, I went as his companion. Now, I have returned.' He galloped off to the open field and brought back the leather bag and bucket that he had concealed. They killed a fat lamb for Temüjin and gave it to him to eat on the way. They fastened a leather bag [of kumiss] to the front of his saddle. As they did these things, Naqu-bayan said, 'You two are young. Look after one another. From now on, do not abandon one another!' After travelling for three days and three nights, Temüjin arrived at his yurt by the Senggür stream. His mother Hö'elün, Qasar, and his younger brothers, who had worried [about him in his absence], rejoiced on seeing him.

[94] Temüjin and Belgütei set off down the Kerülen River¹⁹³ to look for Lady Börte, [the daughter of] Dei-sechen, from whom [Temüjin] had been separated ever since visiting her when he was nine years old. Dei-sechen, the Onggirat, lived between the two [mountains] Chekcher and Chiquurqu. On seeing Temüjin, Dei-sechen rejoiced greatly and said, 'I knew that your Tayichi'ut kinsmen were jealous of you. I was troubled and in despair. But at last you are here [again]!' [Dei-sechen] then united him with Lady Börte and then set off with them. Dei-sechen accompanied them on their journey as far as Uraq-chöl on the bend of the Kelüren before turning back. His wife, Lady Börte's mother, was called Chotan. Chotan accompanied her daughter into the Gürelgü mountains and took her to [Temüjin's family], living at that time on the Senggür stream.

[95] [Temüjin] sent Chotan [home] and then bade Belgütei go to Bo'orchu and say, 'Let us be companions.' Bo'orchu welcomed Belgütei. Without saying [anything] to his father, he came together with Belgütei

Riding a chestnut horse with a hunched back,
tying his grey woollen cloak across [the saddle].

And this is how [Temüjin and Bo'orchu] became companions.

[96] From the Senggür stream they moved [their] camp to the source of the Kelüren River. Dismounting, they camped at Bürgi-ergi.¹⁹⁴ [Börte's] mother Chotan had brought a black sable jacket as shitkül.¹⁹⁵ The three of them, Temüjin, Qasar, and Belgütei, took the jacket and departed. In earlier days, [their] father Yisügei Qan and the Ong Qan of the Kereyit people¹⁹⁶ had agreed to swear brotherhood together.¹⁹⁷ 'He who has agreed to swear brotherhood with my father is almost as a father to me,' said [Temüjin to himself]. Knowing that the Ong Qan was living on the Tu'ula [River]¹⁹⁸ in the Qaratün,¹⁹⁹ [the two brothers] went there. When they arrived, Temüjin said to the Ong Qan, 'In earlier days you and my father agreed to swear brotherhood, so you are almost as a father to me.' Then he said, 'I have acquired a wife and brought you the *emüsgel*²⁰⁰.' Temüjin gave the Ong Qan the sable jacket. Greatly pleased, the Ong Qan said:

In return for the black sable jacket
I will bring together
the people who abandoned you.
In return for the sable jacket,
I will unite your scattered people.
[Let my thoughts]
be in the depths of my bowels
and in my backbone.²⁰¹

[97] On their way back, while on the banks of the Būrgi, an old man of the Uriyangqad tribe, Jarchi'udai, came from Burqan-qaldun with his bellows on his back, leading his son, Jelme.²⁰² Jarchi'udai said, 'When you were at Deli'ün-bolda on the Onon, when Temüjin was born, I gave [him] swaddling clothes of sable. I also gave [you] this my son, Jelme. Thinking, however, that he was [too] small, I took him away with me. Now let Jelme put on your saddle! Let him open your [felt] door!' With these words, he gave [his son to Temüjin].

[98] Early one morning, while they were camping at Bürgiergi at the source of the Kelüren, when the light of the dawning day was [still] yellow, Qo'aqchin, the old woman who worked in the yurt of Mother Hö'elün, rose up and said, 'Mother! Mother! Rise quickly! The earth is shaking! I can hear the sound of swift horses' hooves. Are the terrifying Tayichi'uts coming? Mother, rise quickly!'

[99] Mother Hö'elün said, 'Make haste to waken the children!' Mother Hö'elün [also] rose quickly. Temüjin and the other sons, also rising quickly, caught hold of their horses. Temüjin rode one horse, mother Hö'elün rode one horse, Qasar rode one horse, Qachi'un rode one horse, Temüge-otchigin rode one horse, Belgütei rode one horse, Bo'orchu rode one horse, and Jelme rode one horse. Mother Hö'elün took Temülün to her breast and placed her at the front of the saddle. They made ready one horse as a led horse.²⁰³ [Thus] Lady Börte was without a horse.

[100] While it was still early, Temüjin and all the brothers rode off towards Burqan. The old woman Qo'aqchin hid Lady Börte in a black covered²⁰⁴ cart with a wooden frame harnessed to an ox with spots on its back. [The two women] followed the Tünggelik upstream, in the glimmering light of dawn. Some soldiers trotted [past] and then turned back. 'Who are you?' [the soldiers] asked. The old woman Qo'aqchin said, 'I am Temüjin's [servant]. I came to shear sheep in the great yurt²⁰⁵ I am now returning to my own yurt.' The soldiers then asked, 'Is Temüjin in his yurt? How far is his yurt?' The old woman Qo'aqchin said, 'The yurt is not far away. I do not know if Temüjin is there. I rose and left from the back [of his yurt].'

[101] Hearing these words, the soldiers trotted off. The old woman Qo'aqchin beat the ox with the spotted back. As [she and Lady Börte] moved quickly off, the axle of the cart snapped. 'The axle is broken! Let us go into the forest on foot and run!' they said [to one another]. Straight away, however, the soldiers arrived at a trot with Belgütei's mother mounted behind [on one of the horses], her legs dangling. As they approached, they said, 'What are you carrying in this cart?' The old woman Qo'aqchin said, 'It is loaded with sheep wool.' The senior soldiers said, 'You juniors and boys, dismount and take a look.' The Juniors and boys dismounted. As soon as they removed the door of the closed cart,²⁰⁶ [they found] someone who seemed to be a [young] lady sitting there. They pulled the woman down from the cart, put both her and Qo'aqchin behind them on their horses, and rode off with them. Following Temüjin's tracks in the grass, they went up towards Burqan.

[102] They went three times round Burqan-qaldun in pursuit of Temüjin, but could not find him. Temüjin fled this way and that. In the sinking mud, the thick woods, and the dense forest, [they were like] gluttoned bears,²⁰⁷ unable to creep in. [Although] they followed behind him, they could not find him. The three Merkits [pursuing Temüjin] were Toqto'a of the Uduyit-Merkits, Dayir-usun of the Uwas-Merkits, and Qa'atai-darmala of the Qa'at-Merkits. These three Merkits, knowing that Mother Hö'elün had

been abducted from Chiledü, had now come to take revenge. The Merkits said to each other, 'To avenge [the abduction of] Hö'elün, we will carry off their women. We have taken our revenge.' So they came down from Burqan-qaldun and returned to their yurts.

[103] Temüjin wondered if the three Merkits really had returned to their yurts or were lying in ambush. He sent Belgütei, Bo'orchu, and Jelme the Merkit to find out. They followed the Merkits for three days until the Merkits disappeared and escaped. Temüjin then came down from Burqan and said, beating his breast, 'Because mother Qo'aqchin

hears like a weasel
and sees like an ermine,
she saved my life.
On the dotted tracks,
[I] followed the deer trails.
I made a yurt of willow.
I climbed Burqan.

On Burqan-qaldun,
my life was like that of a louse.
I managed to flee.
My only life was spared.
With only one horse
I followed the elk trails.
I made a yurt of twigs.
I climbed Qaldun.
On Qaldun-burqan,
my life was like that of a swallow.
I was protected.'

'I was greatly afraid. Every morning I shall sacrifice²⁰⁸ to Burqan-qaldun, and every day I will pray to it. The seed of my seed shall know this,' he said. Facing the sun, he draped his sash round his neck and hung his hat [by its cord] from his arm. He beat his chest with his hand. Kneeling nine times towards the sun, he gave offerings and prayers.²⁰⁹

Editorial note. Over the next two decades, Temüjin succeeded in recapturing his bride and defeating most of his major rivals in eastern and central Mongolia. In 1203 Ong Khan of the Kereyid, and his son Senggüm, turned against Temüjin and attacked him. However, Temüjin rallied his forces and defeated the Kereyid. The following chapters describe the period following this victory.

CHAPTER 7

[186] Thus Činggis Qa'an crushed and despoiled the Kereyit people, distributing them on all sides. He gave Taqai Ba'atur of the Suldus one hundred Ĵirgin *in reward* for his services. Further, Činggis Qa'an ordered *as follows*: Ong Qan's younger brother Ĵaqa Gambu had two daughters. The elder one, Ibaqa Beki, Činggis Qa'an took for himself. The younger one, Sorqaqtani Beki, he gave to Tolui. For that reason, saying that Ĵaqa Gambu and the personal subjects belonging to him should be kept together and be

regarded like the second shaft of a cart for himself, he showed favour to *Ĵaqa Gambu* and did not take *his people* away from him.

[187] Činggis Qa'an also gave the following order: 'Because of Badai's and Kišiliq's service, they shall have Ong Qan's golden tent *just* as it stands, with his golden bowls and vessels, together with the people who looked after them, and the Ongqojit Kereyit as their bodyguards. You, *Badai and Kišiliq*, enjoy *the privilege of* being freemen to the offspring of *your* offspring, allowed to carry quivers and drink the ceremonial wine!

When swiftly pursuing many foes,
If you get booty,
What you get you shall take away.
When *in a battue*
You slaughter wild beasts,
What you slaughter you shall take away.'

He further ordered: 'Because of the vital service performed by Badai and Kišiliq, and under the protection of Eternal Heaven, I crushed the Kereyit people and, indeed, gained the high throne. In future, the offspring of *my* offspring who will occupy *this* throne of mine must successively remember those *two* who performed such service!' So he ordered.

When *the Mongols* subjugated the Kereyit people, they distributed them among each other so that nobody went short. They distributed the Tümen Tübe'en¹ and they all took of them until they had plenty. They despoiled the Olon Dongqayit in less than a day. As for the brave Ĵirgin who *used* to strip the blood-stained clothing and possessions *from the enemy*, they divided and apportioned them, but could not give some to everybody. Having in this way annihilated the Kereyit people, Činggis Qa'an spent that winter at Abĵi'a Kōdeger.²

[188] Ong Qan and Senggüm escaped with their bare lives³ and went away, unwilling to submit to Činggis Qa'an. Ong Qan, who was suffering from thirst, was going *to drink* at Nekün Usun⁴ of Didik Saqal⁵ when he came across the Naiman patrolman Qori Sübeči. Qori Sübeči seized Ong Qan and although *the latter* declared, 'I am Ong Qan', *Qori Sübeči* did not recognize him and, disbelieving him, slew him on the spot.

Senggüm did not go to Nekün Usun of Didik Saqal, but bypassed it and entered the Čöl.⁶ While searching for water, he⁷ dismounted and stalked *some* wild asses that were standing *there*, plagued by gadflies. Senggüm's companion, the equerry Kōkōčü had his wife with him. With Senggüm they were altogether three of them. He⁸ gave his horse to his equerry Kōkōčü to hold. The equerry Kōkōčü led the horse away and started trotting back *home*. His wife said,

'When you wore gold-embroidered clothes,
And ate tasty dishes,

He⁹ called you "my Kōkōčü." How can you go away *now*, forsaking and abandoning in this way your lord Senggüm?" So saying, his wife stopped *there* and remained behind.

Kōkōčü said, 'Surely you have said to yourself, "I want to take Senggüm as my man!"' To these words his wife said, 'You call me "A woman with a dog's face;"¹⁰ *all the same* give him at least his golden cup – let him at least draw water and drink!' Thereupon the equerry Kōkōčü threw the golden cup back at him, saying, 'Take it!', and trotted off.

And so he came *to us*, and upon his arrival the equerry Kōkōčü said to Činggis Qa'an,

‘This is how I have come, leaving Senggüm in the Čöl’, and he related from beginning to end everything that had been said between *himself and his wife*. Činggis Qa’an then ordered: ‘To his wife I will show favour. As for the equerry Kōkōčü himself, who comes here having in this manner abandoned his rightful lord, who would now trust such a man and take him for a companion?’ He cut him down and cast away *his body*.

[189] Gürbesü, the mother of Tayang Qan of the Naiman, said, ‘Ong Qan was the great old *qan* of former days. Bring his head here and if it is really his we shall sacrifice to it!’ She sent a messenger to Qori Sübeči and had him cut off and bring back his¹¹ head. She recognized it and placed it on a large white felt rug. She had her daughters-in-law perform the rites *pertaining* to a daughter-in-law, ordered that the ceremonial wine be drunk and the *horse fiddle* be played, and, holding the cup, made an offering *to the head*.

The head, being then so honoured, laughed. ‘It laughed’, said Tayang Qan; he stamped on it *and crushed it* to pieces. Thereupon Kōkse’ü Sabraq said, ‘You have cut off the dead *qan*’s head and brought it here; the next *thing you do is to* crush it to pieces! This is not right. The sound of our dogs’ barking has turned nasty¹² Inanča Bilge Qan formerly said:

“My wife is young, but
I, her husband, have become old.
This *son of mine* Tayang
I begot *only* through magic.
Ah, *this* son of mine, born a weakling,
Has grown weak and emaciated:¹³
Will he be able to care for and control
My numerous, base and unruly people?”

So he said. Now the dogs are barking and this barking sounds as if *a calamity* is approaching. The rule of our queen Gürbesü has become harsh, and you, my *qan* Torluq Tayang, are soft. You have no thought or skill except for falconry and hunting.’

Being told so, Tayang Qan then said, ‘I hear that there are a few Mongols yonder in the east. These people with their quivers terrified the great old Ong Qan of former days, causing him to desert his own companions and perish. Do they now want to be rulers themselves? Even if there are two shining lights, the sun and the moon, in the sky above – both sun and moon are indeed there – yet how can there be two rulers on earth? Let us go and bring here those few Mongols!’

At that, his mother Gürbesü said, ‘What could we do with them? The Mongol people have *always* smelt bad and worn grimy clothes. They live apart, and far away. Let them stay *there*. But we might perhaps have their fine daughters and daughters-in-law brought here and, making them wash their hands, perhaps just let them milk our cows and sheep.’

On this Tayang Qan said, ‘If that is so, what do they have *for us to worry about*? Let us go to those Mongols and we will surely bring back their quivers!’

[190] To these words Kōkse’ü Sabraq said, ‘How boastfully you speak! O Torluq Qan, is this proper? You had better stop *talking*!’ Despite Kōkse’ü Sabraq’s warning, *Tayang Qan* sent an envoy called Torbi Taš to Alaquš Digit Quri of the Önggüt with this message: ‘I am told that there are a few Mongols yonder east. You be the right wing. I shall join you from here and we will take the quivers of those few Mongols!’

Alaquš Digit Quri replied to these words saying, 'I cannot be the right wing.' Having sent this message, Alaquš Digit Quri had the following communication conveyed to Činggis Qa'an through his envoy called Yuqunan: 'Tayang Qan of the Naiman is coming to take your quivers. He approached me saying that I should be the right wing, but I refused. Now I am sending you this warning, for I fear that if he comes you may be robbed of your quivers.'

Just at that time Činggis Qa'an was hunting in the Teme'en Steppe;¹⁴ he was encircling Tülkin Če'üt¹⁵ when Yuqunan, the envoy sent by Alaquš Digit Quri, arrived to deliver this message.

On receiving this message, and whilst *still* at the hunt, they at once discussed what to do. Many of the men said, 'Our geldings are lean, there is nothing we can do now.' To that Otčigin Noyan *retorted* saying, 'How can one make the excuse that the geldings are lean? My geldings are fat! How can we stay put when we hear such words *as these*?' Then Belgütei Noyan spoke: 'If, when one is *still* alive, an enemy is allowed to take away one's quiver, what is the advantage of living? Isn't it right for any man born that when he dies he should lie with his quiver and bow alongside his bones? The Naiman people are boastful, bragging that they possess a great country and a large population. If *now*, grasping the chance their boasts *afford us*, we set out on a campaign and remove their quivers, would *this* be *so* difficult? If we go forward, won't their numerous herds come to a halt and stay behind? Burdened with their palatial tents, won't they abandon them? Won't their many people depart and seek shelter in high places? How can we stay put and allow such *people* to keep boasting in this way? Let us ride against them at once!' Thus he spoke.

[191] Činggis Qa'an approved these words of Belgütei Noyan and, returning from the hunt, moved from Abjiqa Köteger¹⁶ and set up camp at Keltegei Qada, at the Or Bend of the Qalqa River.¹⁷ He counted his troops and on the spot formed units of a thousand *men*, appointing the commanders of a thousand, the commanders of a hundred and the commanders of ten. Thereupon he appointed as chamberlains¹⁸ Dödei Čerbi, Doqolqu Čerbi, Ögele Čerbi, Tolun Čerbi, Bučaran Čerbi and Söyiketü Čerbi. Then, having appointed these six chamberlains, he formed units of a thousand, a hundred, and ten *men*, and he chose and recruited eighty *men* to serve on roster as nightguards and seventy *men* to serve as dayguards. He recruited them from the sons and younger brothers of commanders of a thousand and of a hundred, as well as from the sons and younger brothers of mere ordinary people, choosing and recruiting those who were able and of good appearance.

Showing favour to Arqai Qasar, he then ordered: 'Let him choose himself his brave warriors and form a unit of a thousand to fight before me in time of battle; in the many *other* days of *peace* they shall serve as my dayguards.' He *also* said, 'Ögöle Čerbi shall be the commander of the seventy dayguards, *acting* in consultation with Qudus Qalčan.'¹⁹

[192] Činggis Qa'an further ordered: 'The quiverbearers, the dayguards, the stewards, the doorkeepers and the grooms are to go on roster duty in *daytime*. Before the sun sets they shall retire *to make way* for the nightguards;²⁰ they shall go out to their geldings and spend the night *there*. At night, the nightguards shall see that *those of* their *men* whose duty it is to lie all around *Our* tent do so, and they shall put on roster *those of* their *men* whose duty it is to stand at the door *to guard it*. The following morning, when We eat soup, the quiverbearers and the dayguards shall report to the nightguards; the

quiverbearers, dayguards, stewards and doorkeepers shall *all* carry out their respective tasks and take their *appointed* places. When they have completed their days of service, *consisting of* a three-day and a three-night turn of duty, and have passed the three nights exactly in the same manner,²¹ they shall be relieved, but the night *after their* relief, they shall *still* be on duty as nightguards, and shall spend the night lying down all around.' So he ordered.

In this way Činggis Qa'an, having formed the units of a thousand, appointed the chamberlains, recruited eighty *men* to serve on roster as nightguards and seventy *men* to serve as dayguards; he let Arqai Qasar choose the brave men,²² and set out against the Naiman people from Keltegei Qada, at the Or Bend of the Qalqa River.

[193] In the Year of the Rat, on the sixteenth day of the first month of summer (17 May 1204), *the day of* the Red Circle,²³ he consecrated the standard²⁴ and set forth. He rode upstream along the Kelüren River and sent Ĵebe and Qubilai ahead to reconnoitre. When they reached the Sa'ari Steppe, the Naiman patrol was *already* there, on the top of Mount Qangqarqan. Our patrolmen *and theirs* went in pursuit of one another. The Naiman patrol seized one of our patrolmen who had a white horse with a rather poor saddle.²⁵ When the Naiman patrol caught that horse, they consulted among themselves and said, 'The Mongols' geldings are lean!'

When our *soldiers* reached the Sa'ari Steppe they halted there and discussed what to do. Then Dödei Čerbi gave the following advice to Činggis Qa'an: 'It is we who are few *in number* and, in addition to being few, we have arrived *here* exhausted. So, let us indeed halt and set up camp, spreading over the Sa'ari Steppe here until our geldings have eaten their fill. Let every single one²⁶ *of us* each light fires in five different places and frighten *the enemy* with *all these* camp fires. They say the Naiman people are numerous, but they *also* say that their *qan* is a weakling who has not yet come out of his tent. While we keep them in doubt with the fires, our geldings will eat their fill. When our geldings are satiated, we shall chase the Naiman patrolmen and, pressing hard on them, we shall make them rejoin the main body *of the army*. If we engage them in combat in that confusion, won't we get the better of them?'

Approving these words of advice *from Dödei Čerbi*, Činggis Qa'an gave the following order: 'Things being so, let them light the fires!', and he proclaimed *it as* law to the soldiers.²⁷ Thus, they set up camp spreading over the Sa'ari Steppe and everyone²⁸ was made to light fires in five different places.

At night the Naiman patrolmen, seeing *so* many night-fires from the top of Mount Qangqarqan, said, 'Did we not say that the Mongols are only few in number? Their *camp* fires are more numerous than the stars!' They had sent to Tayang Qan the little white horse with the rather poor saddle; *now* they sent him this message: 'The Mongol troops have set up camp so as to cover the *whole* Sa'ari Steppe; they seem to increase daily, and their fires are more numerous than the stars.'

[194] When this news from the patrolmen reached him, Tayang Qan was at Qačir Usun²⁹ in the Qangqai Mountains. Upon receiving the news he sent word to his son Güčülük Qan: 'The geldings of the Mongols are lean, but *our* patrolmen say that their *camp* fires are more numerous than the stars. The Mongols are, *therefore*, many.

If we engage them *and fight them* to the end,
Will it not be difficult to disengage ourselves?
If we engage them *and fight them* to the end,

They will not blink their black eyes.
 Is it advisable for us
 To fight these tough Mongols
 Who do not flinch *even* if their cheeks are pierced
 And their black blood gushes forth?

We are told that the geldings of the Mongols are lean. Let us move, withdrawing our people across the Altai. We shall *then* reorganize our troops and lure them³⁰ after us as we go. We shall march until we reach the southern slopes of the Altai, fighting a dog's fight.³¹ Our geldings are fat: when we have made their bellies leaner and have exhausted the geldings of the Mongols we shall *turn back and* smash into their faces.' He sent this message.

To these words Güčülük Qan said, 'Again *that* woman Tayang! He speaks such words because he has lost courage. Where would this vast number of Mongols come from? Most Mongols, together with Jamuqa, are here with us. *That* woman Tayang,

Who *dares* not walk further than
 A pregnant woman *goes* to urinate;
 Who does not *even* venture so far as
 A wheel-tied calf *reaches* for its feed,

has lost heart and has sent me that message, hasn't he?

Güčülük Qan through the envoy had his words conveyed to his father to hurt and distress him; to these words, whereby Tayang Qan himself was spoken of as behaving like a woman, Tayang Qan said, 'May the strong and proud Güčülük not lose this pride of his on the day when we meet *on the battlefield* and slay one another! When we meet *on the battlefield* and fight to the end it will surely be difficult to disengage ourselves!'

Upon these words Qori Sübeči, a high official who held command under Tayang Qan, said, 'Your father Inanča Bilge Qan never showed a man's back or a gelding's rump to an enemy that was his match. Now you, how can you lose heart when it is *still so* early in the morning? Had we known that you would have lost courage in this manner, shouldn't we have brought your mother Gürbesü, even though she is *only* a woman, and given her command of the army? What a pity, alas, that Kökse'ü Sabraq should have become *so* old! The discipline in our army has grown lax! *This* is, surely, the *favourable* time and the destiny of the Mongols *decreed by Heaven and Earth*. We are finished! Ah, weakling Tayang, it looks as if you are quite powerless.' Thus he spoke and, having struck on his quiver, he trotted off *and went his* separate way.

[195] At this Tayang Qan grew angry and said, 'A life *means* to die, a body *means* to suffer: it is the same *destiny* for all! That being so, let us fight!' Moving from Qaçir Usun he went downstream along the Tamir River and crossed the Orqon. Passing along the eastern fringe of the Naqu Cliff he reached Čakirma'ut,³² where Činggis Qa'an's patrolmen saw him as he was approaching. They sent a message to Činggis Qa'an saying, 'The Naiman have arrived and are drawing near.'

When this news reached him, Činggis Qa'an said, 'The more numerous, the greater damage; the less numerous, the lesser damage.'³³ He rode against them and, having driven away their patrolmen, he arrayed his troops and together *with the army leaders* decided to advance in 'caragana' marching-order, to stand in 'lake' battle-formation and fight a 'chisel' combat.³⁴

Having spoken thus, Činggis Qa'an in person formed the vanguard, putting Qasar in

charge of the main body *of the army* and Otčigin Noyan in charge of the reserve horses. The Naiman withdrew from Čakirma'ut and took up position south of Naqu Cliff, along the mountain fringes. Then our patrolmen arrived driving away the Naiman patrolmen and pursuing them until they joined the main body *of their army* south of Naqu Cliff.

Tayang Qan saw them arriving thus in *hot* pursuit. At that time Ĵamuqa had *also* set forth with his troops and had come with the Naiman. As he was there, Tayang Qan asked Ĵamuqa, 'What sort of *people are* those, who are like wolves that come chasing a flock of sheep and pursuing them as far as the sheep-pen? What people are these, drawing near in such *hot* pursuit?'

Ĵamuqa said, 'My sworn friend Temüjin has been feeding "four hounds" on human flesh, leashing³⁵ them with iron chains. They are the ones approaching in pursuit of our patrol. Those "four hounds",

Their foreheads are of hardened copper,
They have chisels for snouts,
And awls for tongues;
With hearts of iron,
And swords for whips,
They advance feeding on dew
And riding on the wind.
On the day of killing
They eat human flesh, those ones;
On the day of battles
They make human flesh
Their provisions,³⁶ those ones.

Loosed from their iron chains – which had surely restrained them! – they are now full of joy and are approaching thus, slaverling *at the mouth*', he said. 'Who are those "four hounds"? They are Ĵebe and Qubilai, Ĵelme and Sübe'etei. Those are the four.'

Tayang Qan said, 'Let us then stay away from those vile *creatures*!' He retreated in haste and took up position astride the mountain.

When he saw them approaching from the rear and encircling them,³⁷ leaping in delight, Tayang Qan again asked Ĵamuqa, 'What sort of *people are* these, who are like foals let loose early *in the morning* – foals that after sucking their mother's milk are *always* gambolling around her?³⁸ Why are they approaching, encircling us in this manner?'

Ĵamuqa said, 'These are called the Uru'ut and the Mangqut:

They rush after men *armed* with spears
And strip them of their blood-stained clothing;
Chasing after men *armed* with swords,
They fell and kill them,
And take away their valuables and clothing.

Do they not rejoice now as they draw near, bounding thus in delight?'

Thereupon Tayang Qan said, 'If that is so, let us stay away from those vile *creatures*!' He took up position, retreating further up the mountain.

Tayang Qan *again* asked Ĵamuqa, 'Who is the one approaching from the rear, coming forward at the head *of the army* and drawing near like a greedy, slaverling falcon?'

Ĵamuqa said, 'The one approaching us is my sworn friend Temüjin. Over his whole body,

There is not a *single* chink
 Where a hard copper awl can drive in its spike;
 Nor a *single* chink
 Where a wrought-iron sewing needle
 Can insert its sharp point.

My sworn friend Temüjīn is indeed drawing near, slaving thus like a greedy falcon. Have you seen him? *You* Naiman friends used *to say that* if you saw the Mongols, you would not leave them even the skin of a kid's hoof. Behold *them now!*

On these words Tayang Qan said, '*This is* simply dreadful! Let us take position *further* up the mountain!' They climbed up the mountain and took position.

Again Tayang Qan asked Jamuqa, 'And who is the one that is approaching from the rear *as if* in a compact mass?' Jamuqa said, 'Mother Hö'elün has raised one of her sons on human flesh:

His body is three fathoms *high*,
 And he dines on three-year old cattle;
 Wearing a three-layered armour,
 He is pulled along *in his cart* by three bulls.
 When he swallows a man complete with quiver,
 It does not get stuck in his throat.
 When he gulps down a whole man,
 It does not fill his stomach.
 When he is angry and draws *his bow*,
 And releases a forked-tip arrow,
 He shoots and pierces ten or twenty men
 Who are beyond a mountain;
 When he draws *his bow* and releases
 A long-range thin arrow,
 He shoots and pierces through his enemies,
 The ones he fights
 Who are beyond the steppe.
 When he shoots, drawing *his bow* to the full,
 He covers nine hundred fathoms;
 When he shoots, drawing it *only* a little,
 He covers five hundred fathoms;
 Different from all *other* men,
 He was born a coiling dragon-snake.
 His name is Joči Qasar.

That is he!' Tayang Qan then said, 'If this is so, let us strive for the mountain heights and go further up!' They climbed *further up* the mountain and took position.

Again Tayang Qan asked Jamuqa, 'Who is approaching after him?' Jamuqa said, 'He is the youngest son of Mother Hö'elün. He is called Otčigin, the Easy-going. He is an early sleeper and a late riser, yet

He does not lag behind, *when the army is* in full array;
 He does not lag behind, *when the army is* in position.'

Tayang Qan said, 'If this is so, let us go up to the top of the mountain!'

[196] After speaking such words to Tayang Qan, Ĵamuqa separated from the Naiman and went off on his own. He sent *an envoy* to deliver a verbal message to Činggis Qa'an saying, 'Tell *this* to the sworn friend', and he said:

'At my words Tayang Qan has lost his head
And in panic he has scrambled to the heights.
Frightened to death by *the words from* my mouth
He has climbed up the mountain.
Sworn friend, take care!
Up they went, climbing the mountain,
And have lost the will to resist.

As for me, I have separated from the Naiman.' He sent *this* message.

Late in the day Činggis Qa'an surrounded the mountain of Naqu Cliff; he took up position *with his troops* and spent the night *there*.

That night the Naiman moved *from their position* and tried to escape. Tumbling down from the height of Naqu *Cliff*, they piled on top of each other; they fell breaking their bones and died crushing each other till they were *like* heaps of rotten logs.

The following morning Činggis Qa'an finished off Tayang Qan. Güčülük, who had been staying apart *from the rest* moved *from there* with a few men, abandoning his own companions. When *the Mongol troops* caught up with him, he set up a circular camp at the Tamir *River*, but unable to hold that camp he *again* set out and fled further away.

Činggis Qa'an utterly defeated and conquered the people of the Naiman tribe on the southern slopes of the Altai. The Ĵadaran, Qatagin, Salĵi'ut, Dörben, Tayiči'ut, Onggirat and other *people* who had been with Ĵamuqa also submitted on that occasion.

Činggis Qa'an had Tayang's mother Gürbesü brought to him and said to her, 'You used to say that the Mongols have a bad smell, didn't you? Why, *then*, did you come now?' And Činggis Qa'an took her *as wife*.

[197] In that same Year of the Rat (1204), in the autumn, Činggis Qa'an fought with Toqto'a Beki of the Merkit at the Qaradal Source. He dislodged him *from there* and subdued his tribe and *all his* people in the Sa'ari Steppe. Toqto'a, with his sons Qudu³⁹ and Čila'un and a few people, dispossessed of all but their bodies,⁴⁰ got away by flight.

When the Merkit people were thus being subdued, Dayir Usun of the Qo'as Merkit⁴¹ took his daughter Qulan Qatun with him and came to offer her to Činggis Qa'an. On the way he was hindered by *some* soldiers and met Naya'a Noyan of the Ba'arin. Dayir Usun said to him, 'I am on my way to offer this daughter of mine to Činggis Qa'an.' Detaining him, Naya'a Noyan then said, 'Let us go together to offer your daughter.' As he detained him, he said, 'In *this* time of disorder, if you go alone, soldiers on the way will certainly not leave even you alive, and your daughter too will be in *much* trouble.' And he held Dayir Usun for three days and three nights.

After that Naya'a Noyan took Qulan Qatun and Dayir Usun, and brought them together to Činggis Qa'an. Činggis Qa'an then said, 'Naya'a, why did you detain her?' He got very angry and, ordering that *Naya'a* be rigorously and minutely questioned, made *this case a matter of law*.⁴²

While they were questioning him, Qulan Qatun said, 'Naya'a said *to my father*, "I am a high officer of Činggis Qa'an. Let us *go* together to offer your daughter to the Qa'an. The soldiers on the way will be troublesome." So he warned us against *going alone*. Now,

had we met with other troops but Naya'a's, no doubt we would have been intercepted and would have got into difficulties. Perhaps our *chance* meeting with this Naya'a was good *for us*. Now that Naya'a is being questioned, the Qa'an may condescend to inspect my body, which my father and mother bore by Heaven's will.' She had this message conveyed to Činggis Qa'an.

When Naya'a was questioned he said, 'I have no other face than that *known to the* Qa'an.'⁴³

If I come across maidens and ladies
Of foreign people with beautiful cheeks,
And geldings with fine croups,
I *always* say, "They are the Qa'an's!"

If *ever* I think differently from this, let me die!

Činggis Qa'an approved of Qulan Qatun's testimony; then, that very day, he examined her accordingly and it turned out to be just as Qulan Qatun had stated.

Činggis Qa'an showed favour to Qulan Qatun and loved her. As Naya'a's words had been confirmed, he approved of him. He showed favour to him *too*, saying, 'He is a truthful *man*, I shall entrust him with an important task!'

CHAPTER 8

[198] After Činggis Qa'an subjugated the Merkit people, of the two wives of Toqto'a Beki's eldest son Qudu – Tögei and Döregene – he gave Döregene to Ögödei Qa'an.

Half of the Merkit people revolted and barricaded themselves in the Taiqal stronghold. Činggis Qa'an then gave orders that Čimbai, the son of Sorqan Šira, be put in command and sent him to attack the entrenched Merkit with the troops of the left¹ wing.

Unwilling to submit, Toqto'a with his sons Qudu and Čila'un – *only* a few men *altogether* – had escaped with their bare lives. Činggis Qa'an pursued them and spent the winter south of the Altai.

In the spring of the Year of the Ox (1205), he set out and crossed the Alai.² Güčülük Qan of the Naiman, after his people had been captured by Činggis Qa'an, would not submit and *with his companions* – a few men *in number* – went and made an alliance with Toqto'a of the Merkit. They came together at the Buqdurma source of the Erdis³ River and arrayed their troops.

When Činggis Qa'an arrived they fought. Toqto'a was struck there and then by a 'random' arrow and fell. His sons could not bury him, nor could they take his body away, *so* they severed his head and took that away *with them*. Then the Naiman and the Merkit were unable, even with their united forces, to keep up the fight and fled. When they moved away and crossed the Erdiš, most of them fell into *the river* and drowned. The few Naiman and Merkit that got through separated and went *in different directions* after completing the crossing of the Erdis.⁴ Güčülük Qan of the Naiman went off and, passing through *the country of* the Ui'ur⁵ and the Qarlu'ut, joined the *gür qan* of the Qara Kidat who was at the Čui River in the country of the Sarta'ul. The Merkit, led by Qudu, Qal⁶ and Čila'un, the sons of Toqto'a of the Merkit, went off and crossed *the country of* the Qanglin and the Kimča'ut.

After that, Činggis Qa'an turned back, crossed the Alai⁷ and settled in his base camp.

Čimbai utterly defeated the Merkit entrenched in the Taiqal stronghold. Then, with regard to *these* Merkit, Činggis Qa'an ordered that those to be killed were to be killed and the remainder were to be despoiled by the soldiers.

The Merkit who had submitted earlier rose again in rebellion *and tried to break out* from the base camp, but our servants in the camp brought them under control. Činggis Qa'an then spoke, saying, 'I had said that they be kept together as one *tribe*, but these same *people* have *now* revolted', and he had the Merkit distributed here and there⁸ down to the last one.

[199] In that same Year of the Ox (1205) Činggis Qa'an ordered Sübe'etei, who had *been provided with* an iron cart, to pursue the sons of Toqto'a headed by Qudu, Qal and Čila'un. When he sent him *on his mission*, Činggis Qa'an had the following verbal message conveyed to Sübe'etei⁹: 'The sons of Toqto'a having at their head Qudu, Qal and Čila'un left in fright and haste, *then* turned back, exchanged shots with us and went off like lassoed wild asses or stags with arrows *in their bodies*. If they grow wings and fly up into the sky, you, Sübe'etei, will you not fly up like a gerfalcon and catch them? If they turn into marmots and burrow into the ground with their claws, will you not become an iron rod and, digging and searching for them, catch up with them? If they turn into fishes and plunge into the Tenggis Sea,¹⁰ you, Sübe'etei, will you not become a casting-net and a dragnet, and get them by scooping them out? And again, I send you to cross high mountain passes, to ford wide rivers; mindful of the long distance *you have to cover*, you must spare the army mounts before they become *too* lean and you must save your provisions before they come to an end. If a gelding is *already* completely exhausted it will be of no use to spare it *then*; if your provisions have *already* completely run out, how can you save them *then*? There will be many wild animals on your way: when you go, thinking ahead, do not allow your soldiers to gallop after *and hunt down* wild animals, nor let them make circular battues without limit. If you make a battue in order to give additional provisions to your troops, hunt with moderation. Except on limited battues, do not allow the soldiers to fix the crupper to the saddle and put on the bridle, but let *the horses* go with their mouths free.¹¹ If they so discipline themselves, the soldiers will not be able to gallop on the way. Thus, making *this a matter of law*, whoever then transgresses it¹² shall be seized and beaten. Send to Us those who transgress Our order if it looks that they are *personally* known to Us; as for the many who are not known to Us, just cut them down on the spot.

Beyond the rivers
 You will perhaps lose courage,
 But continue to advance
 In the same way;
 Beyond the mountains
 You will perhaps lose heart,
 But think of nothing else apart from *your mission*.

If Eternal Heaven grants you further strength and power, and you capture Toqto'a's sons, there is no need *for you* to bring them back: cast them away there and then!¹³ So he ordered.

Činggis Qa'an said further to Sübe'etei: 'I send you on *this* expedition because, when I was small, I was frightened by the Uduyit of the Three Merkit circling three times

around Burqan Qaldun.¹⁴ Mortal enemies like these, now gone again, swearing oaths *against me*, you shall reach, *were you to go*

To the furthest limit,
To the bottom of the deep!

And so, in the Year of the Ox, he had an iron cart made to pursue them to the very end and sent *Sübe'etei* on his war mission with these *final* instructions: 'If you constantly think that even though We are out of sight it is as if We were visible, and even though We are far it is as if We were near, you will also be protected by Heaven Above!'

[200] When *Činggis Qa'an* annihilated the Naiman and the Merkit, *Ĵamuqa* was with the Naiman and his people were taken from him on that occasion. With *only* five companions he became an outcast. He went up the *Tanglu Mountains*, killed a wild sheep and roasted it. When it was time to eat it, *Ĵamuqa* there and then said to his five companions, 'Whose sons,¹⁵ having today killed a wild sheep, are eating it like this?' While they were eating the meat of that wild sheep, his five companions laid hands on *Ĵamuqa* and, seizing him, brought him to *Činggis Qa'an*.

When *Ĵamuqa* was brought *here* by his companions, he told *someone* to say to his sworn friend the *Qa'an*:

'Black crows have gone so far
As to catch a mandarin duck,¹⁶
Black skins¹⁷ and slaves have gone so far
As to raise their hands against their lord.
Qa'an, my sworn friend,
How can you be mistaken?
Grey buzzards have gone so far
As to catch a wild duck,¹⁶
Slaves and servants have gone so far
As to seize their own master,
Surrounding him and conspiring against him.
Wise sworn friend of mine,
How can you be mistaken?'

To these words of *Ĵamuqa*, *Činggis Qa'an* said, 'How could we let men live who have raised their hands against their rightful lord? To whom can such men be companions? Cut down to the offspring *of their offspring* these people who have raised their hands against their rightful lord!' So he ordered, and had the people who had laid hands on *Ĵamuqa* cut down in his¹⁸ very presence.

Činggis Qa'an then said, 'Tell *Ĵamuqa*: "Now the two of us are united. Let us be companions! If we become *each of us like* one of the two shafts of a cart, would you think of separating yourself *from me* and being on your own? Now that we are together *once more*,

Let us each remind the other of what he has forgotten,
Let us each wake up the other who has fallen asleep.
Although you separated from me
And went a different way,
You remain my lucky, blessed sworn friend.
On the day one kills and is killed, surely

Your heart was aching *for me*.
 Although you separated from me
 And went a different way,
 On the day one fights one another,
 Your lungs and heart were aching *for me*.

When was that? When I fought the Kereyit people at the Qalaqaljīt Sands you informed me of what you had said to Father Ong Qan.¹⁹ That was a service *you did me*. Then, the fact that you sent me a message *with the news* that you had frightened the Naiman people

Slaying them with your words,
 Killing them with your mouth,

and said to me that I could regard them as such²⁰ – that was *another service you did me*.”’

[201] After Činggis Qa'an had spoken, Ĵamuqa said, 'In early days when we were small, in the Qorqonaq Valley I agreed with *my* sworn friend the Qan to become sworn friends:

Together we ate food that is not to be digested,
 To each other we spoke words that are not to be forgotten,
 Together we were under our blanket
 Sharing it between us, *but*
 Stirred up *by someone*
 Coming between us,
 Pricked *by someone*
 Standing at the side,²¹
 We parted for good.
 Saying to myself that
 We had exchanged weighty words,
 The skin of my black face
 Peeled off *in shame*;
 And so I have been living
 Unable to come near you,
 Unable to see the friendly face
 Of my sworn friend the Qan.
 Saying to myself that
 We had exchanged unforgettable words,
 The skin of my red face
 Came off *in shame*;
 And so I have been living
 Unable to see the true face
 Of my sworn friend with a long memory.

‘Now my sworn friend the Qan shows favour to me and says, “Let us be companions!” But when it was the time for being companions, I was not one.²² Now, sworn friend,

You have pacified all *our* people,
 You have unified all other peoples,

and the *qan*'s throne has been assigned to you. Now that the world is at your disposal, of what use would I be as a companion to you? On the contrary, *o my sworn friend*,

I would intrude into your dreams in the dark night,
I would trouble your heart in the bright day,
I would be a louse in your collar,
I would be a thorn in the inner lapel of your coat²³

'I had many paternal grandmothers. When I became disloyal to my sworn friend I made a mistake. Now, in this life – *that* of the sworn friend and me – my fame has passed from sunrise to sunset. You, sworn friend, had a wise mother. You were born a hero, and as you had younger brothers, valiant companions and seventy-three geldings,²⁴ *you, my sworn friend*, excelled me. As for me, I lost my parents when I was small and had no younger brothers. My wife is a prattler, my companions untrustworthy. Because of this I was excelled by *my* sworn friend, whose destiny was *ordained* by Heaven. If you²⁵ *want to* show favour to me, let me die swiftly and your²⁶ heart will be at rest. And if you²⁵ condescend to have me put to death, let them kill me without shedding blood. When I lie dead, my bones *buried* in a high place, for ever and ever I shall protect you and be a blessing to the offspring of your offspring.

'In origin I am of a different birth, *and so* I was conquered by the august spirit of my sworn friend who is of higher birth. Do not forget the words that I have *just* spoken; think of them evening and morning and repeat them among yourselves. Now do away with me quickly!'

To these words of his Činggis Qa'an said, 'Although my sworn friend has parted *from me* and has been railing against Us, I have not heard that he has plotted harm against my life. He is a man who should learn *from experience*, but is not willing to. *However*, to kill him is not in accordance with the omens; to harm his life without *good* reason is not right. He is a man of high standing. Perhaps you should give him this reason: "Once, when Čoĵi Darmala²⁷ and Taičar stole from each other their herds of horses, you, sworn friend Ĵamuqa, wickedly stirred up rebellion *against me*. We fought at Dalan Balĵut and you forced me to take refuge in the Ĵerene Gorge. You frightened me then, did you not? Now, when I say, 'Let us be companions!', you refuse; when I *offered to* spare your life, you declined." Tell him that. Say to him: "Now, according to your request, you shall die without your blood being shed."'

He ordered that *Ĵamuqa* be put to death without his blood being shed and that his body²⁸ should not be abandoned in the open, but be given a fitting burial. He had Ĵamuqa executed there and then, and had his body buried *as arranged*.

[202] And so, when the people of the felt-walled tents had been brought to allegiance, in the Year of the Tiger (1206) they *all* gathered at the source of the Onan River. They hoisted the white standard with nine tails and there they gave Činggis Qa'an the title of *qan*. Then they also gave the title of *gui ong*²⁹ to Muqali. On that occasion too, Ĵebe was sent on a war mission to pursue *and seize* Güčülük Qan of the Naiman. Having *thus* completed the task of setting the Mongol people in order, Činggis Qa'an said, 'To those who sided with me when I was establishing *our* nation, I shall express my appreciation and, having formed units of a thousand, I shall appoint them commanders of a thousand.' So he decreed, and he appointed *the following* with the rank of commanders of a thousand: (1) Father Mōnglik, (2) Bo'orču, (3) Muqali Gui Ong, (4) Qorči, (5) Ilügei, (6) Ĵürčedei, (7) Qunan, (8) Qubilai, (9) Ĵelme, (10) Tüge, (11) Degei, (12) Tolon,

(13) Önggür, (14) Čülgetei, (15) Boroqul, (16) Šigi Qutuqu, (17) Güčü, (18) Kököčü, (19) Qorqosun, (20) Hüsün, (21) Quylidar, (22) Šiluqai, (23) Jetei, (24) Taqai, (25) Čaqa'an Qo'a, (26) Alaq, (27) Sorqan Šira, (28) Buluqan, (29) Qaračar, (30) Kökö Čos, (31) Süyiketü, (32) Naya'a, (33) Jungšoi, (34) Güčügür, (35) Bala, (36) Oronartai, (37) Dayir, (38) Müge, (39) Bužir, (40) Mönggü'ür, (41) Dolo'adai, (42) Bögen, (43) Qudus, (44) Maral, (45) Jebke, (46) Yuruqan, (47) Kökö, (48) Jebe, (49) Udutai, (50) Bala Čerbi, (51) Kete, (52) Sübe'tei, (53) Möngkö Qalja, (54) Qurčaqus, (55) Geügi (56) Badai, (57) Kišiliq, (58) Ketei (59) Ča'urqai, (60) Onggiran, (61) Toqon Temür, (62) Megetü, (63) Qada'an, (64) Moroqa, (65) Dori Buqa, (66) Iduqadai, (67) Širaqul, (68) Da'un, (69) Tamači, (70) Qa'uran, (71) Alči, (72) Tobsaqa, (73) Tungquidai, (74) Tobuqa, (75) Ažinai,³⁰ (76) Tüyideger, (77) Seče'ür, (78) Jeder, (79) Olar Güregen, (80) Kinggiyadai, (81) Buqa Güregen, (82) Quril, (83) Ašiq Güregen, (84) Qadai Güregen, (85) Čigü Güregen, (86, 87, 88) Alči Güregen *leading* the three Onggirat thousands, (89, 90) Butu Güregen *leading* the two Ikires thousands, (91, 92, 93, 94, 95) Alaquš Digit Quri Güregen of the Önggüt *leading* the five Önggüt thousands. Excluding the People of the Forest,³¹ the commanders of a thousand of the Mongol people appointed by Činggis Qa'an were ninety-five.

[203] 'Those ninety-five commanders of a thousand whom I have nominated, together with the sons-in-law', further said Činggis Qa'an, 'have been entrusted with units of a thousand and' – Činggis Qa'an declared – 'I shall *now* reward those among them who are *most* deserving.' And he said that the commanders having at their head Bo'orču and Muqali should come. At that time Šigi Qutuqu was inside the tent. When Činggis Qa'an told him, 'Go and summon them!', Šigi Qutuqu said, 'Have Bo'orču and Muqali been of greater assistance than others? Have they given better service than others? If you want to give rewards, surely I was not less useful, surely I did not give lesser service?'

From the time I was in the cradle
 And grew up at your noble threshold,
 Until this beard sprouted on my chin,
 I did not think of anyone else *but you*.
 From the time I had a piss-pot at my crotch
 And, being at your royal threshold, I grew up
 Until this beard sprouted at my mouth,
 I did not make a single false step.
 She³² let me lie at her feet
 And brought me up as her own son;
 She let me lie at her side
 And brought me up as the younger brother
of her children.³³

Now, what kind of reward will you give me?

To these words of Šigi Qutuqu, Činggis Qa'an said, 'Are you not my sixth younger brother? To you, my lateborn younger brother, the reward: you shall be allotted the *same* share as the younger brothers; furthermore, on account of your services, you shall not be punished for *up to* nine crimes.' So he ordered.

And he said, 'When, protected by Eternal Heaven, I am engaged in bringing the entire people under *my* sway, be

Eyes *for me* to see with,
Ears *for me* to hear with.³⁴

Divide up all the *subject* people and apportion them to *Our* mother, to Us, to *Our* younger brothers and sons according to the name of the people,³⁵

Splitting up those that live in felt-walled tents,
Separating those that live in dwellings with wooden doors. Let no one disobey your word!

Further, he entrusted Šigi Qutuqu with *the power of judgement* over all and said to him, 'Of the entire people,

Curbing theft,
Discouraging falsehood,

execute those who deserve death, punish those who deserve punishment. Furthermore, writing in a blue-script register *all* decisions about the distribution and about the judicial matters of the entire population, make it into a book.³⁶ Until the offspring of *my* offspring, let no one alter any of the blue writing that Šigi Qutuqu, after deciding in accordance with me, shall make into a book with white paper. Anyone who alters it shall be guilty *and liable to punishment*.'

Šigi Qutuqu said, 'How can a late-born younger brother like me take the same and equal share *as that of the others*? If the Qa'an *wants to* reward me, let him decide in favour of granting me *the people* from the towns that have walls of *pounded earth*.' So he requested, and to these words of his Činggis Qa'an said, 'You yourself have determined your own *part*; you decide!'

After he had made Činggis Qa'an favour him thus, Šigi Qutuqu went out and, calling the leaders with Bo'orču and Muqali at their head, let them into *the tent*.

[204] Činggis Qa'an then addressed Father Mönglik and said: 'You fortunate and blessed *man*,

Who at birth were born together *with me*,
When growing, grew up together *with me*,³⁷

how many times have you helped and protected me? Among those *was the occasion* when Father Ong Qan and sworn friend Senggüm deceitfully invited me to the betrothal feast and on the way I spent the night in Father Mönglik's tent.³⁸ Had you, Father Mönglik, not dissuaded me *then*, I would have gone right

Into whirling waters,
Into a blazing fire.

Recalling only that service *of yours*, how could *anybody* forget it until the offspring of *their* offspring? Recalling that service, I will henceforth let you occupy the seat at the very beginning of this side *in my tent*. Yearly and monthly I shall consult with you,³⁹ and I shall give you gifts and favours. I shall be attending on you, until the offspring of *your* offspring!' So he declared.

[205] Further Činggis Qa'an spoke to Bo'orču: 'When I was small I was robbed of eight horses, the light-bay geldings.⁴⁰ I spent three days and nights on the way pursuing them and, as I was going, we met each other. Then you said to me, "You came because you are in difficulties; I will join you as a companion!" and, without a word even to your

father in the tent, you who were then milking a mare, concealed your leather bucket and pail in the grass. You made me leave my short-haired chestnut horse and set me on a white horse with a black back, and you yourself rode a fast dun mare. You left your herd of horses without a master and in haste became my companion in the steppe. Again we spent three days and nights in pursuit before we reached the circular camp with the stolen light-bay geldings. They were standing at the edge of the camp. We stole them, drove them away and brought them back, the two of us. Your father was Naqu Bayan. You, his only son, what did you know *about me* when you became my companion? You became my companion because of your brave heart. Afterwards I kept on thinking about you and when I sent you Belgütei to ask you to join me *again* as a companion,

You jumped on your chestnut horse with the arched back,

You tucked your grey woollen cloak behind you, and came to join me.⁴¹ And when

The Three Merkit came against us and

Thrice circled Burqan Qaldun,

That mountain you circled with me.⁴²

And when, after that, we passed the night at Dalan Nemürges *with our troops* pitched opposite *those of* the Tatar people, the rain poured down incessantly day and night. Saying that I ought to get my night's rest, you covered me with your felt cloak so that the rain would not fall upon me and throughout the night you stood beside me shifting one of your feet only once. *This* was indeed a sign of your bravery. Other than that, what brave deeds of yours am I to mention? You two, Bo'orču and Muqali,

You urged me to carry out what was right,

You persuaded me not to do what was wrong,

and *in this way* made me gain this throne. Now you shall sit higher than all *the others* and shall not be punished for *up to* nine crimes. Bo'orču will be in charge of the ten thousand *men* of the right wing which extends *westwards* up to the Altai *Mountains*.⁴³ So he ordered.

[206] Further, Činggis Qa'an said to Muqali, 'When we set up camp near the Leafy Tree in the Qorqonaq Valley around which Qutula Qan used to dance,⁴⁴ because the words that a heavenly sign foretold to Muqali were a clear portent, I there and then, thinking of *his father* Gü'ün Qo'a,⁴⁵ pledged my word to Muqali. Accordingly, he shall *henceforth* sit upon a seat [above all others] and shall be *gui ong*⁴⁶ of all the people, *and so it shall be* until the offspring of Muqali's offspring.' He gave him the title of *gui ong* and ordered: 'Let Muqali Gui Ong be in charge of the ten thousand *men* of the left wing which extends *eastwards* up to the Qara'un Jidun *Mountains*.'⁴⁷

[207] Činggis Qa'an said to Qorči, 'You *once* made a prophecy *about me* and, from the time I was small until now, for a long time

When it was wet,

You suffered the wet with me;

When it was cold,

You suffered the cold with me.

Indeed, you have constantly been a beneficent spirit⁴⁸ *to me*. At that time *you*, Qorči, said, "If the prophecy comes true and if it is fulfilled by Heaven according to your wishes, let me have thirty women." Now, because it has come true, I shall favour you.

Look at the fine women and fine girls of the people who have submitted *to us* and choose thirty women *from among them*.' So he ordered.

Further, he ordered: 'On top of the three thousand Ba'arin *that he already leads*, Qorči, together with Taqai and Ašiq, shall *add to the number so as to* make up a full ten thousand with the Činōs of the Adarkin, the Tö'ölös and the Telengüt, and Qorči shall be their commander. Freely establishing his camp along the Erdiš *River* up to the People of the Forest, Qorči shall reduce the People of the Forest to submission and be in charge of the ten thousand.' And he ordered: 'The People of the Forest must not act this way or that without Qorči's agreement. Those who act without his agreement, he should not hesitate *to kill them*.'

[208] Further, Činggis Qa'an said to Jürčedei, 'Your *most* important service was at the time when we were fighting with the Kereyit at the Qalaqaljit Sands and were worrying *about the outcome of the battle*. Sworn friend Quyildar *then* made an oath but you, Jürčedei, carried out his task. In carrying it out you, Jürčedei, attacked and overcame the Jirgin, the Tübegen, the Dongqayit, Quri Šilemün⁴⁹ *and his* thousand bodyguards, the best troops – all of them – and, reaching the main body *of their army*, you shot an *učumaq* arrow into *one of* Senggüm's bright red cheeks.⁵⁰ Because of this, "the door was opened and the reins *were loosened*" *for me* by Eternal Heaven.⁵¹ Had Senggüm not been wounded, what would have become of us? That was indeed Jürčedei's *greatest and most* important service.

'When he separated from me, moving along the *river* Qalqa downstream, I constantly thought of Jürčedei as if he were the shelter *afforded* by a high mountain. He *then* went off⁵² and we arrived at Lake Baljuna to water *our animals*. When we set out again from Lake Baljuna, Jürčedei went ahead to reconnoitre. We took the field against the Kereyit and, with our strength increased by Heaven and Earth, we utterly defeated and subdued the Kereyit people.⁵³ The *most* important people⁵⁴ being cut off, the Naiman and the Merkit lost heart; they could no longer fight and were scattered.

'In the struggle in which the Merkit and the Naiman scattered, Jāqa Gambu of the Kereyit was *allowed*, by reason of his two daughters, to stay with his own subject people as a whole *group*. But when, for the second time, he became hostile and separated from us, Jürčedei lured him with a stratagem and, after seizing him, made an end of Jāqa Gambu who had broken with us for good. For the second time we exterminated and plundered the people of that Jāqa Gambu. This was surely Jürčedei's second service.'

Because, on the day one kills and is killed,
He disregarded⁵⁵ his life;
Because, on the day one meets death together,
He fought to the death,

Činggis Qa'an favoured Jürčedei and gave him Ibaqa Beki *as wife*. He said to Ibaqa, 'I did not say that you have a bad character and that in looks and appearance you are ugly. You, who have entered into my heart and limbs, and who have come to me taking your place in the rank *of my principal wives*, I present to Jürčedei in deference to the great principle *whereby services are duly rewarded*, to Jürčedei

Who, on the day we fought,
Was *our* shield,
Who against the enemy people

Was *our* shelter;
 He brought together the people
 Who had become divided,
 He united the people
 Who had scattered.⁵⁶

I have given you to him being mindful of the principle of *rewarding these* services of his. In future, when my descendants sit on Our throne, mindful of the principle *regarding* services that have thus been rendered, they should not disobey my words. Until the offspring of *my* offspring, they are not to abolish Ibaqa's *rightful* place *among my wives*.⁵⁷ So he ordered.

Činggis Qa'an said further to Ibaqa, 'Your father Ĵaqa Gambu gave you two hundred servants as dowry; *he gave you also* the steward Ašiq Temür and the steward Alčiq. Now you are going to the Uru'ut people; go, but give me one hundred out of your servants⁵⁸ and the steward Ašiq Temür to remember you.' And he took *possession of* them.

Činggis Qa'an spoke again to Ĵürčedei and, showing favour to him, gave the following order: 'I give you my Ibaqa. As to your four thousand Uru'ut, you will be in charge of them, won't you?'

NOTES

Chapter 1

69. *Chinggis* probably meant 'strong'. See the Introduction, p. 30.
70. This phrase is not exclusively used of Chinggis Qahan and could apply to any person and even to animals (see Sections 197 and 281). It is based on the Shamanist notion that every individual carries a heavenly spirit in his or her head.
71. Following the Chinese interlinear notes in the earliest surviving text of the History, most previous translators have rendered *börte* as 'bluish' (Cleaves 1982, p. 1), 'blue-grey' (De Rachewiltz 1971–1984, vol. 4, p. 118), etc. In fact, *börte* means 'greyish white'. Börte Chino was probably born in 758 (see Hua-sai and Dugarjab 1984, p. 271).
72. The original interlinear note indicates that a specific lake, Tenggis, is meant – a convention adhered to by previous translators (De Rachewiltz 1971–1984, vol. 4, p. 118; Cleaves 1982, p. 1), although some note the more general meaning of 'sea' or 'large lake'. In Orkhon Turkish and in the Uighur dialect, Tenggis has precisely this meaning, so I have rendered it 'lake'. According to Wang Tingdong 1981, the ancestors of the Chinggis Qahan moved to this huge area about one thousand years ago. The lake referred to was probably Khölön Na'ur in Khölön Buyur (Buyir). Other scholars believe that it was Lake Baikal (see, for example, Hua-sai and Dugarjab 1984, p. 1, no. 2).
73. Burqan-qaldun is a place name. *Burqan* was the plural form of *burqai*, 'great great grandfather'. (For *burqai*, see Section 180.) A more common word for great great grandfather is *quluncha*. After around 1260, when Buddhism started to penetrate Mongolia, the Mongols called Buddha '*burqan*'. In Dawr dialect, *burqan* (pronounced *barken*) is a Shamanistic term meaning 'the spirit of a Shamanist'. Qaldun (Qaldut in Section 164), an archaic form of the modern *qadun*, means 'rocky mountain' or 'cliff'. De Rachewiltz (1971–1984, vol. 4, p. 151) thinks that the mountain in question may be either Tsagaan Öndör (White Heights) or Khentei Qan, both in the Khentei Mountains of northern Mongolia.
74. Batachi-qan was probably born in 786, for which see Hua-sai and Dugarjab 1984, p. 271.
75. Some of the proper names in this paragraph have secondary meanings. For example,

Qorichar was a proper name, but *mergen* means 'good or wise hunter'. Qorichar-mergen is therefore 'Qorichar the good hunter'. *A'ujam* in *A'ujam-boro'ul* means 'wide'; Yeke-nidün means 'big eye'.

76. In the History, *külü'üt* means 'fine horses' or 'great heroes'. In Dawr dialect, however, *hüliig* (Külük) means a team of four oxen pulling a plough. It is common for people with four sons to say, 'I have one *hüliig*'. According to the History, Chinggis Qahan had four *külü'üd* (four great marshals, see Section 163) and four dogs, i.e. great generals (Section 195). It is possible that this meaning of 'four (items) in a team' was developing at around this time (see also Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 219).
77. 'Big,' 'old.'
78. 'Grey.'
79. More proper names: (1) Borjigin (as in Borjigidai) was the name of Chinggis Qahan's clan (see Section 42; Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 153). The suffix *-dai* indicates a male of the clan. (2) Mongqoljin qo'a mean 'the beauty of the Mongols'. The suffix *-jin* indicates a female of the clan (but not if attached to a proper name, e.g., Temüjin, as in Section 59. See also Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 257). *Go'a* means 'beauty' or 'beautiful'. (3) *Bayan* means 'rich', as Toroqoljin-bayan, 'Toroqoljin the rich'. (4) *Boro* (as in Boroqchin-qo'a) means grey; the suffix *qchin* is another female marker, today applied only to animals (see Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 153). (5) *Boroldai* (as in Boroldai-suyalbi) means 'grey bird' in Orkhon Turkish (cf. Mongol *boroldai-boljowwr*, 'sky pipit'). See Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 153. The meaning of *suyalbi* is unclear. (6) *Duwa* (as in Duwa-soqor) means 'to express good wishes' in Uighur. *Soqor* means 'blind' or 'one-eyed'. See Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 284.
80. One journey (*ne'üri*) was the equivalent of about ten miles, the 'journey' being that of the nomadic camp (see Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 135).
81. *Tünggelik* or *tönggelik* is an adjectival form; it appears as *tüngge*, in noun form, in Section 177. In the Oyirad dialect, it takes the form of *deresül/nl*, 'mat-thorn grass', i.e., *achna therum splendens* or *lasiagrostis splendens*. For details, see Eldengtei et al. 1991, pp. 441–444.
82. 'Outstanding beauty' in Orkhon Turkish.
83. *Köl* in the Orkhon Turkish dialect meant 'lake' or 'branch of a river'; Barqujun is the name of a large river flowing into Lake Baikal from the north-east. The word translated here as 'lowland' (*töqm*) means a hollow, valley, or basin. For further information on the area, see Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 217. De Rachewiltz identifies the area as a lowland region between the Selenga and Barguzin Rivers (De Rachewiltz 1971–1984, vol. 4, p. 153).
84. Tumad, Tümed.
85. 'Clean river'.
86. Orilar (Qorinar, Qorilar, Qorlos) is a clan name; *-lar* (or *-nar*) is a plural ending.
87. Shinchi: cf. *shinjigechi*, 'fortune-teller'. See Eldengtei et al. 1991, pp. 525–526.
88. Most previous translators have taken these two words (*burqan bosqaqsan*) to be a proper name, following the Chinese interlinear note. In fact, *bosqaqsan* is the past tense of a verb meaning 'to establish'. Among Buriyad Shamanists, the *gazaryn ejed* (lords of the land) are the spirit-owners of places. They usually originate in clan ancestors and can be contacted by Shamans.
89. The Sacred Mountain.
90. Dörben irgen.
91. *Nökör*, translated here as 'friend', indicates one of the two most important relationships in the History, the other being *anda* (see Section 96). As a noun, *nökör* can mean 'friend' or 'faithful follower', but it can also mean 'enemy' (see Sections 153, 267). It derives from a verb, *nökhökhü* (*nöqüqü*) meaning 'to match' or 'to patch things up'. For further information on *nökör*, see Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 140. The best translation of *nökör* is 'match' or 'contender'.
92. A man may demand a share of the meat before the hunter loads it onto his horse.

93. The head, innards, and skin of an animal were consecrated to the spirits. A hunter would not give these away to other people for fear that misfortune might befall him. The word *jildü*, here translated as 'lungs', actually extends to all the organs of the thorax – diaphragm, heart and lungs. It also has another form, *jüldü*, used in Section 214 to mean 'best achievement' or 'outstanding merits'. (For *jildü*, see Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 300; for *jüldü*, see Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 304).
94. Badonchar (or Bodonchar), 'the Fool' was probably born in 970; see Hua-sai and Dugarjab 1984, p. 271.
95. Literally, 'third cousins (on the father's side)'. The brothers refer here to the practice of levirate, whereby a widow is passed on to her husband's younger brother or some other male relative so that her offspring remains within the descent group.
96. Alan Qo'a's demonstration holds additional force in Mongol, since the word for an arrow-shaft (*müsü*) also means 'a straight line' and has moral overtones, like the English 'straight'. *Müsütei khün*, for example, means 'a man of integrity'. See Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 231. An arrow is also a sign of unity and authority.
97. Commoners wore no hats to cover their black hair.
98. *Mungqaq* means 'stupid and dull'. See also p. 42 n. 94.
99. *Oroq* means 'off-white'; *shingqula* (*shinggul*) means 'a dive or swift penetration'. I translate these two words as 'an off-white, fleet-footed horse'. Section 55 has *qurdun qubi*, meaning 'swift dun horse'. In both cases, *shingqula* and *qurdun qubi* are probably the names of the horses. For details, see Choiji 1984, p. 33, n. 3.
100. Literally, 'if die, its let die; if live, its let live', i.e. 'if (I) die, it (is fate)'s (wish to) let (me) die'. Other translators (e.g. De Rachewiltz, vol. 4, p. 122) think the passage should read: 'If he (the horse) dies, I shall die . . . '.
101. The words translated here as 'bad odours' and 'dank smells' (*qonqshi'ut* and *höngshi'üt*) literally mean 'the bad smells of burning fat and wild onions'. See Eldengtei et al. 1980, pp. 177, 198.
102. Direction was naturally important to the Mongols. The word translated here as 'rear' (*gerü*) also means 'northern side', i.e. the cold, sunless side, and the forests that grow on the northern side of a mountain. Similarly, *öbör* means the 'front side' or the 'southern side'. For *gerü*, see Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 203.
103. Literally, 'eating a sour thing'. Kumiss (fermented mare's milk) and the associated verb *esükchilejü* (used here) derive from *esük* (*ösög*) meaning 'sour'. See Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 104.
104. 'Collar' (*jaqa*) was used as a metaphor for a leader. (Possibly something larger, e.g. a cape, is meant here.) See Eldengtei et al. 1980, pp. 289–90. The gist of Bodonchar's utterance, explained more fully in Section 35, is that without a leader, any group of people would remain incapable of organizing its own defence. There is also the implication that some form of hierarchy is needed, under Bodonchar and his brothers.
105. Lord and commoners are meant by 'head and hooves'.
106. Literally, 'half-pregnant' (*dumda ke'elitei*), i.e. four to five months pregnant.
107. *Adangqan* should here be read as *nengdegsen*, i.e. 'greater'. Some say that the Adangqans were a sub-tribe of the Uriyangqais. In Chinggis Qahan's day, the Mongols called their nation *Nengdegsen yeke ulus*, the Greater Great Nation. For details, see Choiji 1984, pp. 40–41, n. 3.
108. Jajiradai.
109. According to Professor Būrinbatu, writing in the Academic Journal of the University of Inner Mongolia, no. 4 (1991), p. 32, the word *baa'ar* (or *ba'ari*) meant 'mixture'.
110. Other translators (e.g. De Rachewiltz) translate *ablin eme* as 'the wife (that Bodonchar) chose himself'. Actually, it means first wife or principal wife, the wife chosen for a boy in his childhood. Only the children of this wife were able to inherit their father's position and property. (See Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 87).
111. There were three forms of dowry at the time: (i) *Inje*, the word used here, included

- housemaids, livestock, and valuables such as gold and silver. The bride had absolute rights over this dowry. (Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 109.) (ii) *Shitküül*, which appears in Section 96, describes items given by the bride's parents to the groom's parents. The bride had no rights over these items. (Eldengtei et al. 1980, pp. 252–253.) (iii) *Emüsgel*, which also appears in Section 96, consists of items of clothing given by the bride to the groom's parents when she meets them for the first time. (Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 100.)
112. This ceremony consisted of hanging the complete skin, the head, and the hooves of an animal (ox, horse or sheep) on a pole as an offering to the ancestors. Jewüredei was the son of a concubine, so he could not inherit from his father. (See Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 305.)
113. Greater. See Section 38.
114. See Section 43.
115. This passage is rather confusing. Jewüredei should not have taken part in the *jügeli* ceremony; the implication is that Bodonchar may have wished to make him a full son, but this wish was rejected by Barimshi'iraju-qabachi after Bodonchar's death. The passage translated here as 'a man of the Adangqa Uriangqad[ai]' was constantly present in the yurt' has been taken by other translators, on the basis of the word *je* ('perhaps') at the end of the statement, to indicate that the man in question was Jewüredei's father. However, there is nothing to support this assertion, especially since Jewüredei could be excluded from the clan on account of his mother's status. The passage may simply mean that Jewüredei was in the wrong for encouraging a man of a foreign tribe to frequent a yurt where Bodonchar's widow and other women were living alone.
116. Jewüredei.
117. Qaraldai.
118. Menen-tudun means 'great chief', although it is here used as a proper name. It derives from the Mongolian *mene*, 'large' or 'many', and the Orkhon Turkish *tudun*, the title of a tribal commander. (See Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 224.) Qachi'un is also used here as a proper name, but it derives from an Orkhon Turkish word, *qatigun*, 'strong', 'solid', 'hard' (see Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 176).
119. 'Big' Barula.
120. 'Small' Barula.
121. 'Tiny' Barula.
122. I.e. they had physical strength but little intelligence.
123. *Noyamsiq* means 'lordly'; *baruq* means 'voracious', 'crude', 'uncivilized' (see Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 145); *buda'an* means 'porridge' (made of millet) (see Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 158). These words are thought by many Mongols to explain the clan names contained in this section. However, most scholars dismiss these explanations as exercises in folk etymology. The sentence within brackets is restored from Irinchin 1987, p. 28, n. 2.
124. The Tayichi'uds.
125. *Shingqor* (as in Bai-shingqor-dogshin) is a kind of falcon with white claws and a red beak. (In Orkhon Turkish, it means 'bird of prey'). *Doqshin* means 'furious', 'violent', 'wild'. Hence Baishingqor-dogshin means 'untamed falcon' (see Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 142). *Lingqu* (as in Charaqai-lingqu) was a Liao Dynasty (916–1119) title (*lingwen*) given to the chief of a small tribe (see Choiji 1984, p. 22). *Senggüm* was another Liao Dynasty title (*xiangwen*) given to the commander of a frontier army, while *bilge* was an honorary title from the Orkhon Turkish word for 'wise'. Hence Senggüm-bilge means 'the wise commander' (see Choiji 1984, p. 52, n. 5; Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 237). *Beki* (as in Seche beki) in Section 49 is another Orkhon Turkish title (used for both males and females) for a high-ranking official (see Eldengtei et al. 1980, pp. 237–238).
126. There are three rivers in Xölön Buyir (or Buir) – the Qabul, Talbur and Ken (or Kan). Qabul was the founding father of the Mongol tribe. Qabul represented the twentieth generation (and Chinggi the twenty-third).
127. Sorqatu-yürki. See Section 122.

128. Although *Nekün* (in *Nekün-taishi*) is here used as a proper name, in Section 200 it means a house-maid or servant (see Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 136). There are two explanations for *Taishi*: that it derives (a) from the Chinese *taizi*, 'prince', or 'crown prince' (see Jagchid-Sechin 1979, p. 44, n. 3) and (b) from the Chinese *taishi*, 'great master', an honorific title used by northern nomadic peoples after the Liao Dynasty (see Dorontib 1979, p. 22, n. 22). The latter explanation is more convincing, given that the crown-prince system was not established in Mongolia until after the enthronement of Chinggis Qahan. *Taishi* eventually became *taiji*, a general term in Mongol for male nobles. *Yisügei* derives from *yisü(n)*, 'nine'. Nine was considered to be an auspicious and lucky number by Mongolians; there are references in the History to 'nine horses' (Section 267), 'nine nights' (Section 80), and so on (see Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 308). *Ba'atur* means 'hero'. *Otchigin* (as in *Daritai-otchigin*) is a compound of the Orkhon Turkish word *ot*, 'fire', and *chigin*, a high-ranking official; it therefore means 'guardian of the hearth'. The Mongol *otgon* (*otqon*) derives from *otchigin* and refers to the youngest son of a family who inherits his father's possessions but not his title, and who could not represent the family at ceremonies at the ancestor's graves (see Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 117). *Büri* (as in *Büri-bökö*) means 'wolf' in the Orkhon Turkish dialect, while *bökö* means a wrestler or strong man. The incident here referred to is described in Section 139 (see Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 160).
129. *Kishilig*, here used as a proper name, means 'huge', 'broad-minded', 'boastful' in Orkhon Turkish (see Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 215). *Darqan*, translated here as 'freedman', is an Orkhon Turkish term and a title given to a commoner who achieves outstanding military merit. The privileges that went with the title included exemption from official taxes and immunity from punishment for up to eight crimes (see Eldengtei et al. 1980, pp. 277–278). The deeds of *Badai* and *Kishiliq* are recounted in Sections 169 and 170.
130. *Cleaves* wrongly asserts that the Mongols ignored *Ambaqai Qahan* in their dynastic chart.
131. The River *Urshi'un* flows from Lake *Buyur* (*Buir*) to Lake *Kölen* (*Khölön*). Today, it is called the *Urshun* or *Orshun* (see Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 122). *Kölen* means 'large lake' in Orkhon Turkish (see Eldengtei et al. 1980, pp. 217–218).
132. The *Jüyin* was a frontier army of the Jin Dynasty (1115–1234); it consisted of *Kitans* and *Tatars* in the *Khölön-Buir* area (see Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 305).
133. The message was sent through an intermediary either because it would have been politically inexpedient for the messenger to cross *Qutula's* territory without explaining his purpose or simply because *Qada'an-taishi* was too far away.
134. Although *ulus-un ejen* is correctly translated here as 'lord of the nation', 'lord of the people' would perhaps be a more realistic description, given the lack of overall political cohesion. This is the first of several occurrences in the History of the word *ulus* ('nation').
135. *Hachi*, translated here as 'vengeance', has (like *nökör*) two apparently contradictory meanings. On the one hand, it means 'favour', 'kindness', 'grace'; on the other hand, it means 'foe', 'hatred', 'vengeance'. A more neutral translation might be 'debt' or 'a thing that is owed' (see Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 191).
136. Usually, the History distinguishes between unmarried girls (*öki*) and married women (*qatun* in respectful usage, the wife of a *qan*). Here, the two words are compounded as *öki qatu*, indicating either that *Yisügei-ba'atur* was uncertain about the woman's status (see Dorontib 1979, p. 26, n. 4) or that she was newly wed.
137. 'Lady' is the usual translation for *üjin* (although *Cleaves* 1982 leaves it untranslated). The title is often said to derive from the Chinese *furen*, 'lady', pronounced *üjen* (*üjin*) in Mongol, which has no 'f'. (See Jagchid-Sechin 1979, p. 52, n. 1.) However, in the thirteenth century, the Mongols created a number of exclusive honorific titles. For example, *Hö'elün*, *Börte* (see Section 66), and *HuJa'ur Üjin* (see Section 177) were referred to as *üjin*, meaning 'lady' or 'queen'. *Temüjin*, after whom *Chinggis* was named, bore the title *üge*, meaning 'senior' or 'sir' (for *üge*, see Section 59, p. 31. See *Ü*).

138. 'Smell' means 'kiss' in 'smell my fragrance'. Hö'elün means that she wants him to remember her.
139. Just as nine was a lucky number for the Mongols, seven was unlucky.
140. Strictly speaking, *delbege* is not so much a tether as a rope attached to the bridle of a cart-pulling animal, used to whip the animal on (see Dorontib 1980, p. 17, n. 13, and Eldengtei and Ardajab 1986, p. 99, n. 2).
141. *Kiligü* [*Kilügü*], which used to mean a cart-shaft, now means a crosswise beam on a cart. See Eldengtei and Ardajab 1986, pp. 99–100; Eldengtei et al. 1991, p. 449; and Nei Menggu daxue Menggu yuwen yanjiushi 1976–1977, p. 166.
142. The text says 'older brother' (*aqa*), but this is simply a respectful reference by Hö'elün to her husband.
143. Most translators take this to be a reference to Childeü's plaits (*shibülger*), but actually it refers to Lady Hö'elün's plaits. At the time of the History, girls in Mongolia never cut their hair before marriage but plaited it instead into ten or more braids. On marrying, they combined these plaits into two large braids hanging behind their ears.
144. A *saqlaqar* is a willow-like tree with many leaves and hanging branches (see Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 233). Some translators (e.g., Cleaves and De Rachewiltz) assume that the passage refers to some particular tree, but it is not clear if the tree is special for some reason now forgotten or simply because of its association with Chinggis Qahan. (There are further references to the tree in Sections 117 and 206.)
145. The suffix *-üge*, as in Temüjin-üge, today exists only in the Dawr dialect of Mongol. Specifically, it means 'mother's older brother'. More generally, however, it is used of anyone who seems older than one's parents or is more than fifty years old, in the sense of 'elder' or 'senior'. See Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 130. Temüjin was born on the sixteenth day of the first month of the summer (the fourth lunar month), on the red circle day. For details, see Murakami 1970–1976, vol. 1, pp. 80–81. For the red circle day, see p. 70, n. 177 and p. 169, n. 435.
146. Chinggis Qahan's name derives from the Orkhon Turkish word *temür*, 'iron', with the suffix *-jin*, indicating agency; it therefore means 'blacksmith'. See Eldengtei et al. 1980, pp. 257–258.
147. Qachi'un is a proper name; the suffix *-elchi* was an official title in the Orkhon Turkish dialect meaning an ambassador of high rank or a prophet. It appears in this sense in Section 53 of the History (where it is translated as 'messenger'). See Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 102.
148. While the suffix *-üge* (p. 56, n. 145) meant 'mother's older brother', the prefix *dei-*, derived from an Orkhon Turkish word, meant 'mother's younger brother'. *Dei-* was, by extension, used of elders more generally (in the sense of 'sir' or 'senior'). *Sechen*, meaning 'wise, enlightened one', was also used as an official title. *Dei-sechen* therefore meant 'wise uncle'. At a later date, the name came to mean a queen's younger brother. See Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 280.
149. The Onggirats, a tribe frequently mentioned in the History, were located in the Khölön Buir area. They struck frequent marriage alliances with the Borjigins, Chinggis Qahan's tribe (see Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 114).
150. *Quda* was used to address affines. It derived from *qudaldaq*, 'to sell', showing the contractual nature of such marriages. See Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 186.
151. I.e. he looks intelligent.
152. Although *qalqatan* is here translated as 'shielded', it is actually a modification of the noun *qalqa*, a shield about 45 inches long and 30 inches wide, made of leather or willow branches. See Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 169. *Dei-sechen* describes the political expediency of marriage alliances in which the daughters of weaker tribes act as 'shields' against the more powerful tribes into which they marry. Some scholars believe that *qalqatan* and *öchilten* ('a pleader') were high-ranking titles.
153. The reference to dogs seems curious; there is no hint elsewhere in the History of Temüjin fearing them. The reference is probably to Yisügei-ba'atur's enemies (in which case, it was a

well-founded fear on Temüjin's part – see Section 67) and a warning to Dei-sechen to watch carefully over Temüjin.

154. Yellow Steppe.

155. This conversation happened in the year 1170.

156. *Mönglik* meant 'mole' (naevus) in Orkhon Turkish. See Eldengtei et al. 1980, pp. 224–225. Yisügei-ba'atur refers to Mönglik later in this section as *chaqa*, 'child' or 'infant' (see Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 312).

157. In 1270.

Chapter 2

158. Ladies.

159. This quite complicated passage has been translated in various ways. Most translators rely on the Chinese interlinear notes to make sense of the rather obscure terminology. *Yekes-e qajaru*, here translated as 'ancestors' land' (i.e., graves of the ancestors) is glossed in Chinese as 'in the big lands'. (See Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 306.) At the time of the History, women of noble families were not allowed to approach ancestors' graves unless dressed as daughters-in-law. The line or boundary around the graves was known as *inaru* (see Eldengtei et al. 1980, pp. 107–108). The Chinese text gave this word as *inerü*, which is meaningless, and left it unglossed (cf. De Rachewiltz, who translates *yekes-e qajaru* *inerü* as 'the sacrifice to the ancestors consisting of offerings of food burned in the ground'). It was the Mongol custom to offer food, kumiss and meat at the graves of ancestors (see Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 108, n. 2). *Bile'ür* ('the *bile'ür* offerings') basically means 'left-over food', but here it has the specific meaning of 'sacrificial meat' (see Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 150). *Sarqud* was an Orkhon Turkish word meaning left-over tea and food given to servants. In this context, however, it means the same as *bile'ür* (see Eldengtei et al. 1980, pp. 234–235). This is one of many instances in the History where a Mongol term and its Orkhon Turkish synonym are used together.

160. This passage means that everything has come to an end.

161. The flag was said to be the army's eye, the drum its ear. Chinggis told Shigi Qutuqu: 'Be my eye and ear.' See Sections 203 and 252.

162. Tayichi'ut.

163. I.e. the high hat (*boqta*, an Orkhon Turkish word) worn by Mongol noblewomen (see Eldengtei et al. 1980, pp. 151–152).

164. *Joos*, 'lilium concolor'.

165. Fruits and vegetables: *ölirsün* is a birch-leaf pear (Eldengtei et al. 1980, pp. 125–126); *möyilsün* is prunus mahaleb (Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 229); *südü* is the root known as sanguisorba officinalis (Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 244); *chichigina* is the root known as potentilla (Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 244); *qaliyarsun* ('wild onions') is allium victorialis (Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 169); *manggirsu* ('wild garlic') is allium senescens (Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 221); *qoqosun* is allium lineare (a wild leek or shallot). Fish: *jebüge* is a scorpion fish or white fish (De Rachewiltz translates it as salmon); *qadara* is a scad (salmo thymallus – Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 175). A *chilime* net was used for catching land animals (Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 316), while a *gubchi'ur* net was a large fishing net (Eldengtei et al. 1980, pp. 205–206). *Shülsü* ('gall', Section 74) means (as in English) courage or fortitude (Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 244).

166. Bekter, used here as a proper name, means 'armour' in Mongolian; it derives from the Orkhon Turkish word for armour and military equipment more generally. See Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 147.

167. The 'fat' referred to in this passage is the thick deposit of fat that builds up on the tails of Mongolian sheep (*chichu'a* in the Orkhon Turkish dialect); it is a store of food for the sheep (like a camel's hump) and a source of food for Mongol people. The Chinese interlinear gloss wrongly translates the word in question as 'whip' ('We have no whips but our tails'); both

- Cleaves and De Rachewiltz follow this translation. But even if we accept that *chichu'a* means 'fat', there are still two possible interpretations of the line: 'we have to rely on ourselves for food – no one will give it to us' (that given here); and 'we have no fat on our tails', i.e., 'we have no food'. The former is more in keeping with the tone of the proverb from which the phrase is taken. (See Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 317.)
168. The Chinese interlinear gloss has 'drawing out' instead of 'aiming at'. According to Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 234, however, the latter is the correct meaning of *sambaju*.
169. According to Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 242, the original *surmusun* (or *sorimusun*, 'eyelash') is a mistake for *sormusun*, 'filth'. *Qaqasun*, glossed in the Chinese note as 'thorn', actually means 'fishbone' (see Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 167). Hence, both impurities, which come from outside the body (a metaphor for 'from outside the family'), may harm the body. Quite why Bekter, Temüjin's half-brother, should feel ostracised and end up being killed while Belgütei, his brother, is fully accepted (see, for example, Section 131) is not clear.
170. The word *ötermelejü*, translated here as 'shot at', derives from the Orkhon Turkish *öter*, to beat or kill. Frequently in the History, actions by Chinggis Qahan that are in some way dishonourable or reflect badly on his character are treated elliptically or described in euphemisms or in non-Mongol vocabulary, as in this instance. Euphemisms can be found in Section 113, where *arbilabai* ('economized') is used instead of 'captured' or 'plundered' (i.e. Chinggis 'saved' the people) and Section 136 (see n. 154, chapter 4), where *büte'ejü* ('covering up') is used instead of 'suffocating'. (For *ötermelejü*, see Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 128).
171. Qasar, the name of Temüjin's brother, also meant 'wild or furious beasts'. However, according to a Mongol myth, two dogs were born from the two eggs of a phoenix, one called Qasar and the other Basar. (Qasar is today used as a nickname for yellowish brown dogs.) The two names, in the forms Hasaar and Basaar, also occurred in the sacrificial prayers of shamans in the Dawr area. For Qasar, see Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 173.
172. According to Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 221, *manggus* means 'monster' or 'bogey' (cf. *manggei* is the Dawr dialect). However, the Chinese interlinear gloss translated this word as 'boa'.
173. The text says *anggir* ('yellow'), which the Chinese interlinear note glosses as 'mandarin duck'. Since the mandarin duck is not particularly known for its ferocity or intolerance, 'yellow falcon' (*anggir shiba'u*) seems more appropriate.
174. Two words here require explanation. I translate *qoluqat* as 'lambs', since it clearly derives from the word *qoraqat*, 'lambs'. In Mongol, the letters r and l are often interchangeable. In the Dawr dialect, for example, people say *sanggal* instead of *sang-ger*, 'warehouse'. *Shiluget* means 'sheep' (plural). For details, see Choiji 1984, pp. 101–102. The basic meaning of this saying is that those who were once merely children (Temüjin and his brothers) are now grown up and present a threat.
175. In 1177.
176. A Mongolian saddle has two straps on either side.
177. The 'Red Circle Day' was the sixteenth day of the fourth lunar month, the first month of summer during which the pasture begins to grow again. It was therefore a time for celebrating.
178. *Buqa'u* ('cangue') was a wooden board, sometimes clamped around the neck, with fetters or holes to restrain the hands. See Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 155. When Temüjin's cangue is later removed (Section 85), the verb used (*chuchalju*) shows that the cangue was fastened with ropes that may also have restrained Temüjin. (For *chuchalju*, see Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 319.)
179. *Suldus*.
180. *Köüt*, used here to mean 'nobles', usually meant 'sons'. It referred in particular to the sons of the Tayichi'ut noblemen, the direct descendants of Ambaqai Qahan. (For this person, see Sections 47 and 52.) It is used in the sense of nobles in Sections 269, 270, and 272 of the History (see Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 216).
181. Chila'un later became one of Chinggis Qahan's 'four marshals' (see Sections 177 and 209).

182. Previous translators follow the Chinese interlinear note, which takes the verb *qorqobasu* to be causative, and translates it as 'to make (someone) hide'. In fact, it is a transitive verb (*qorqo* or *qorqa*) and means 'hide'. See Eldengtei et al. 1980, pp. 179–180.
183. Qada'an later became one of Chinggis Qahan's wives, the Queen of the 'Fourth Palace' (see Sections 146 and 219). For details of the Fourth Palace, see Li Zefen 1970, p. 182; for details of the First, Second and Third Palaces, see Li Zefen 1970, 165–175.
184. This 'fat lamb' (*tel*) was fattened on the milk of two ewes and therefore especially succulent. See Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 259.
185. Sorqan-shira refuses to give Temüjin a tinder-pouch so that he will not be tempted to start a fire and sleep at night rather than ride on until he finds his family. He gives him two arrows, so that he can protect himself in an emergency but not initiate combat. He gives him a mediocre horse and denies him a saddle, possibly so that if he is captured, there will be nothing to identify him with Sorqan-shira. For these ideas, see Dorontib 1979, p. 48, n. 12.
186. 'Blue Lake'.
187. After his marriage to Börte (Section 94), this camp became Chinggis Qahan's 'First Palace'. For details see Li Zefen 1970, pp. 173–174.
188. 'Black Heart'.
189. 'Naqu the Rich'.
190. Bo'orchu later became one of Chinggis Qahan's 'Four Marshals' – see Sections 202, 205, 209, etc.
191. This is a circular military camp, with carts arranged in a ring. *Güri'en*, the word for such a camp, appears again in Section 205; *güre'en* (a variation on it) appears in Sections 120, 122, 177, and 213; *gre'et* appears in Section 129. See also Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 207.
192. This lasso, used to catch horses, consists of a long pole with a leather loop on the end.
193. In 1178.
194. 'Muddy Banks'.
195. *Shitkül*, a kind of wedding present or dowry, has already been mentioned in Section 66 of Chapter 1. It is a present from the bride's to the groom's family. The word derives from *shitk*, to add, increase, or assist. See also Eldengtei et al. 1980, pp. 252–253. Later in this section, the jacket is referred to as *emüsgel*, another type of *shitkül*, in the form of clothing. The bride gives this jacket to the groom's parents when she first meets them. See Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 100. In this instance, however, Börte's mother brings it as a gift for Temüjin's parents.
196. To'oril qan does not actually become the Ong Qan until the events described in Section 134. Ong is a Chinese title meaning 'prince' or 'king'. The Kereyits were among the largest tribes in Mongolia at this time; some of their descendants still live in the Baarin of Inner Mongolia today. For more details, see Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 211.
197. *Anda*, 'sworn brotherhood', is one of the two main relationships in the History, the other being *nökör* (see Section 13 and Chapter 1, note 91). While *nökör* implies an unequal relationship, like that between master and retainer, *anda* implies friendship and mutual aid between equals or partners. Chinggis Qahan built his great empire on these two relationships and, to a lesser extent, on the *quda* relationship, i.e. marriage (see Section 62 and note 150). For more information on *anda*, see Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 87.
198. The Tu'ula River flows through the southern half of present-day Ulaan Baatar, capital of Mongolia, to join the River Orkhon. See Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 263.
199. 'Black Forest'.
200. 'New clothing'.
201. A literal translation of the last two lines of this poem would read: 'In the buttocks of my rectum, in the chest of my bones, be there.' For poetic effect, the subject and object of each line are reversed; 'be there' means 'may my thoughts be there'. Old men commonly expressed themselves in this way; the expression was based on the Mongol perception of the body as being divided into upper and lower halves. By citing both chest and bowels, Ong Qan is

implying wholeheartedness. The Chinese interlinear note mistakes *bökör-e* (in the bowels, in the lower half of the body) for *bö'er-e* (in the kidneys), a mistake echoed in subsequent translations. *Boko'or* means 'bowels' in the Dawr dialect; *cheker-e* should read *seker-e* (*seger-e*), 'in the thoracic vertebra' (ch- and s- are interchangeable in Mongol). I have therefore translated *sekere* as 'backbone'.

202. Jelme later became one of Chinggis Qan's four great generals.
203. I.e. either a baggage-horse or a horse that can be ridden occasionally to allow one of the others to rest or, if injured, to be carried. See Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 218. Although Börte could probably have ridden this horse, it is essential to the plot that she is left behind. As De Rachewiltz has pointed out (1971–1984, 4, p. 162), the horse brought by Bo'orchu (Section 95) would bring the family's total up to ten, not nine.
204. There is no Chinese gloss for the word translated here as 'covered [by a frame]', but the actual word used, *böken*, meant 'hunchbacked' in the Orkhon Turkish dialect. Here it refers to the 'ribs' of the frame that supported the cart's cover. See Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 158.
205. I.e. the 'master's yurt' or 'palace of the Qan'. See Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 307.
206. The 'closed cart' had a wooden door or barrier that was lifted in and out of place. *Qa'atai* ('closed') is not glossed in the Chinese and is taken by De Rachewiltz to be a proper name ('Qa'atai took off the door of the cart . . .'). See Eldengtei et al. 1980, p. 163.
207. Although the Chinese marginal note gives 'snake' instead of 'bear', *moqaiya* derives from the Orkhon Turkish *mokai*, a large male brown bear. See Eldengtei et al. 1980, pp. 227–228. In any case, 'glutted bear' would seem to make better sense than 'glutted snake'.
208. *Maliyasuqai*, 'sacrifice', was an Orkhon Turkish word. Cf. *mai*, butter or fat. *Maliyaqu* could also mean 'to serve or entertain'. For details of how the Mongols used butter and kumiss in celebrations and sacrifices, see Eldengtei et al. 1980, pp. 223–234.
209. The sash was a symbol of a person's power. To take off one's hat before praying was a sign of respect towards Heaven. The hat was also a symbol of power and authority; in Section 255, *yeke maqalai* (big hat) is used to mean 'mighty authority'. Nine, a highly auspicious number, appears frequently in the History.

Chapter 7

1. = Tümen Tübegün. Cf. above, §§ 170, 171.
2. I.e. 'Shrunk (?) Height (or Elevation)'.
3. Lit. 'with nothing other than their bodies'. Cf. above, § 109 and n. 3.
4. I.e. 'Slave Water (= Spring?)'.
5. I.e. 'Mud Beard'. See the Commentary.
6. I.e. 'the Desert' (= the Gobi).
7. Lit. 'Senggüm'.
8. I.e. Senggüm.
9. I.e. Senggüm.
10. I.e. a shameless bitch – referring to an unfaithful wife. See the Commentary.
11. I.e. Ong Qan's.
12. I.e. of bad omen.
13. Doubtful interpretation. See the Commentary.
14. Lit. 'Camel Steppe (or Plain)'.
15. I.e. 'Tülkin (?) Hills'.
16. The Abji'a Ködeger of § 187 above.
17. See above, § 175, n. 2.
18. *Čerbin*. See the Commentary, §§ 120 and 191.
19. I.e. sharing command with him. Ögöle = Ögele. See above, § 120 and com.
20. I.e. so as to be relieved by the nightguards.
21. I.e. as ordered.

22. See the Commentary.
23. I.e. 'of the full moon'. Cf. above, §§ 81, 118.
24. Cf. above, § 106.
25. I.e. a rather loose saddle.
26. Lit. 'every living person', i.e. every individual in the camp without exception.
27. See the Commentary.
28. Lit. 'every living person', i.e. every individual in the camp without exception.
29. I.e. 'Mule Water'.
30. I.e. the Mongols.
31. I.e. engaging in skirmishes.
32. I.e. 'Three-Year-Old Deer (?)'.
33. A popular saying, used here with reference to Tayang Qan's more numerous forces.
34. For these military tactics see the Commentary.
35. Lit. 'binding.'
36. I.e. as provisions for the road.
37. I.e. Tayang Qan and Ĵamuqa.
38. Lit. 'their mother.'
39. Cf. above, § 177.
40. Cf. above, § 109.
41. A mistake for U'as Merkit.
42. I.e. made a law to deal with such matters in the future.
43. I.e. 'I am sincere and loyal to the Qa'an.'

Chapter 8

1. Read 'right' (= 'west'). See the Commentary.
2. Arai in the text. See the Commentary.
3. = Erdiš. Cf. below and §§ 207, 264.
4. = Erdiš. Cf. above and §§ 207, 264.
5. Ui'urtai in the text. See the Commentary.
6. Qat in the text. See the Commentary.
7. Arai in the text. See above.
8. I.e. among other groups.
9. Written Sübētei.
10. = 'the Ocean'. See the Commentary.
11. Lit. 'removing the bit from the mouth', so that it hung free.
12. Lit. 'the law' (*ĵasaq*).
13. I.e. 'execute them on the spot'.
14. See above, § 103.
15. I.e. 'What (sort of) persons?'
16. For this simile, which is illustrated in the following two lines, see the Commentary.
17. I.e. lowly or common tribesmen.
18. I.e. Ĵamuqa's.
19. See above, § 170.
20. I.e. as frightened to death by the Mongols. See above, § 196.
21. Cf. above, §§ 127 and 177.
22. Lit. 'a companion to him'.
23. In short, 'I would be a constant nuisance to you.'
24. There is no mention of these geldings elsewhere in the SH.
25. Lit. 'the sworn friend'.
26. Lit. 'the sworn friend's'.
27. Called Joči Darmala in § 128 above.

28. Lit. 'bones'.
29. I.e. 'Prince of State'.
30. Read Ačīnai.
31. I.e. the forest tribes of the north and north-west. See the Commentary, § 207.
32. I.e. Mother Hö'elün.
33. See above, § 135.
34. Cf. above, § 138.
35. I.e. according to their importance and lifestyle (nomadic or settled populations).
36. I.e. into a permanent record.
37. Cf. below, § 211.
38. See above, § 168.
39. I.e. to seek advice.
40. See above, §§ 90–93.
41. See above, § 95.
42. See above, § 103.
43. See the Commentary.
44. See above, §§ 57 and 117.
45. The Gü'ün U'a of § 137 above.
46. For this title, see the Commentary.
47. See the Commentary.
48. *Nendü qutuq*. For this expression, see the Commentary. For Qorči's prophecy, see above § 121.
49. I.e. Qori Šilemün Taiši. See above, § 170.
50. For these events, see above, §§ 170–171, 174.
51. I.e. Heaven opened the way to Činggis' success.
52. On his mission to the Onggirat. See above, § 176.
53. See above, §§ 182–183, 185.
54. I.e. the Kereyit.
55. Lit. 'forsook'.
56. Cf. the words in §§ 96 and 104 above.
57. I.e. she would retain her former rank at court.
58. In the text *ingjes* for *injes*. See the Commentary.

SOME REMARKS ON THE IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CHINGIS KHAN'S EMPIRE¹

Igor de Rachewiltz



The political and military aspects of the Mongol conquests in the thirteenth century have attracted the attention of Western scholars since the first half of the eighteenth century² and much work has been done since. As a result we have today several good studies on the Mongol campaigns in Asia, the Near East and Europe.³

The first serious investigation of Mongol medieval society based on original sources is B.Ya. Vladimirtsov's masterly work *The Social Structure of the Mongols*,⁴ published posthumously in 1934, which is still the fundamental text on the subject. Its appearance gave rise to lively controversies among scholars, especially in the Soviet Union⁵ and Japan, where it was first translated in 1937⁶ and where numerous investigations of Mongol society have appeared in the last thirty years.⁷

As for the economic aspect of the Mongol conquest, several penetrating studies on the effect of Mongol rule in China, Mongolia, Iran and Russia have been contributed by scholars of various countries in the last two decades.⁸ In the field of Mongolian institutional history there are, moreover, a number of important monographs dealing especially with the legal and administrative system of the Yüan period.⁹

Although much remains to be done in all these fields, a good deal of pioneer research has been carried out already. The same cannot be said, unfortunately, of the ideological aspect of the Mongol invasion. I refer in particular to the ideology behind the empire-building policy of Chingis Khan which determined the later political doctrine of the Mongol emperors.

It is a well known fact that, whatever the real social and economic causes of the Mongol conquest, Chingis Khan himself motivated his military ventures in terms of an order received from Heaven (*tengri*; *tenggeri* in the *Secret History of the Mongols*). His successors followed his example and further elaborated on this politico-religious theme. From a number of imperial edicts and from official letters to the Pope and the monarchs of Europe issued by their chancelleries in Qaraqorum, China and Iran, as well as from numerous epigraphic and literary sources, it is possible to reconstruct the political doctrine of the first Mongol rulers. Efforts in this direction were made as early as the 1820s by the French scholar Abel-Rémusat.¹⁰ However, the only two really important contributions to the subject are the article by W. Kotwicz 'Formules initiales des documents mongols aux XIIIe et XIVe ss' published in *Rocznik orientalistyczny* in 1934,¹¹ and E. Voegelin's article 'The Mongol Orders of Submission to European Powers, 1245–1255', which appeared in *Byzantion* in 1941.¹² The latter study represents

a considerable advance on its predecessor. From a perceptive analysis of eight official documents dating from the reign of Güyüg to that of the Möngke, Voegelin has been able to reconstruct the rather sophisticated empire-building conception of these emperors.

According to this conception, the right to rule over the whole world had been conferred by Eternal Heaven (*möngke tengri*) on Chingis Khan and his successors, who were considered in this system as the counterpart of Heaven on earth. The khans of the imperial line ruled as universal sovereigns on the strength of their 'good fortune' and by the very power of Heaven. The universality of their rule is aptly described by the expression *dalai-yin qayan* found in the legend of the seal of Güyüg. Although many nations at the time were still *de facto* outside Mongol control, they were already *de jure* potential members of the Mongol empire-in-the-making. It followed that those peoples and nations that had not yet submitted to the Mongol court and who, by this very fact, had failed to accept the doctrine of the Mongol *oikoumenē* were regarded also as rebels (*bulya irgen*) against a divinely inspired social order.¹³ War against these nations was, therefore, morally and ideologically right and necessary, in exactly the same way as the thirteenth-century crusades against the heretics were right and necessary in the eyes of most contemporary Christians.

This explains why the Mongols until the time of Qubilai, i.e. two generations after Chingis Khan, could not conceive of international relations on the basis of parity with foreign countries, and why the tone of their letters to foreign leaders was that of an arrogant feudal lord to an insubordinate vassal.

Since the crime of turning a deaf ear to the Mongol court's order of submission was not, in the conception just described, merely an offence against the emperor, but an overt rebellion against Heaven's Decree, punishment for the offender had, of course, to be proportionate. Hence the frightful massacres and destructions, and the complete lack of pity towards the civilian population, which was often annihilated. Here again we find an exact parallel in the practice of the crusading armies.

The terse terminology of the Mongol orders contained in the imperial edicts and in diplomatic correspondence (later crystallized into stereotyped formulas through chancellery practice) rested on a set of equally terse injunctions governing all aspects of Mongol life which, according to tradition, were issued by Chingis Khan himself. These formed a code of laws known as *Ĵasaγ*, which in essence was a systematization and adaptation of tribal customary laws to the needs of the 'modern' military state founded by Chingis Khan in 1206.

The code as such is now lost, but quotations from and references to it are preserved in the works of Persian, Arabic, Syriac, Armenian and Chinese historians of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. These extracts confirm that the supreme authority proceeded from Eternal Heaven, whose power guided and protected the emperor.¹⁴

The basic concept of Heaven's protection of the Mongol ruler needs, I think, a closer scrutiny. Neither Kotwicz, nor Voegelin, nor any of the other authors who have discussed Chingis' attitude towards the Supreme Power, have dealt with it satisfactorily.¹⁵ The documents examined by Voegelin are, we must not forget, a production of the post-Chingiside period: they were issued between twenty and thirty years after his death. The surviving fragments of the *Ĵasaγ* are also found in works written well after the death of the conqueror in 1227. The only major contemporary source on Chingis Khan is the *Secret History of the Mongols*, the first redaction of which dates, in the present writer's opinion, from 1228. The portion of this text dealing with the life of Chingis Khan

represents a tradition evolved in his lifetime and reflects, therefore, as close an image of the man's personality and beliefs as we can possibly get.¹⁶ Now there are many passages in the *Secret History* that illustrate his views on Heaven and his own destiny.

First of all, Chingis claims to descend from a mythical animal – a bluish wolf – born 'at the order of Heaven Above' (§1). The direct involvement of Heaven in his family affairs is further evidenced by the conception of one of Chingis' ancestors, Bodončar, which occurred as a result of a contact between the ancestress Alan-qo'a and a spiritual emanation from Heaven in the shape of a 'golden man' (gold symbolizes, of course, imperial dignity) who visited her in her yurt, coming and going on a shaft of light (§21).

As a boy Chingis, escaping his pursuers, hid in a forest where he had three signs from Heaven warning him not to leave the woods. He did, in the end, and was captured (§80).

After his victories over enemy tribes and foreign nations, Chingis regularly ascribed his success to the strength and protection he had received from Heaven, and also from the Earth-goddess (§§113, 125, 187, 208, 260, 265, 267). Both 'strength' (*güčü*) and 'protection' (*ihe'ekde-*) are indispensable to ensure success (§§199, 256).

Heaven's favour is withdrawn both from the enemy, and also in cases of breach of friendship (§§143, 167, 246).¹⁷

Chingis ordered to pray to Heaven for success in a difficult expedition and thanked Heaven for special favours (§§172, 240).

In the *Secret History* we find also some important statements by Chingis claiming that he had been 'designated by the powerful Heaven' (*erketü tenggeri-de nereyitčü*) to win, and that he had subjugated 'all the people' (*gür ulus*) and gained the 'throne' (*ündür-ün oron*) by the strength and protection that he had received from Heaven (§§113, 187, 203, 224). Heaven had, moreover, notified the shaman Kököčü Teb-Tenggeri that Chingis should rule the empire (§244).

All these references indicate that Chingis had an unshakable faith in the power, or 'strength', of the Eternal Heaven, and that he regarded his fortunate career as pre-ordained by a sort of Divine Providence, which is nothing but the will of Heaven.¹⁸ In the *Secret History* and in later documents the special good fortune enjoyed by the emperor is called *su* (*suu*), from which we have the adjectives *sutu*, *sutai* 'fortunate'.¹⁹

We may then ask: where did Chingis Khan get these ideas from?

The Heaven that he claims increased his strength and lavished protection on him, assisting him in his great exploits, is of course the deified sky – the supreme Sky-god of the shamanistic Turco-Mongolian peoples of Inner Asia. The Heaven Above (*de'ere tenggeri*) and the Eternal Heaven (*möngke tenggeri*) of the *Secret History* are identical with the Blue Heaven Above (*üzä kök tengri*) of the Orkhon Turks of the seventh and eighth centuries A.D. (the Northern, or Eastern, T'u-chüeh of the Chinese authors). The very expressions found in the *Secret History* are very similar, and at times identical, with those of the Orkhon inscriptions. Like the Mongol Eternal Heaven, so does the Blue Heaven of the Turks preside over the ruler's destiny, infusing him and his followers with strength (*küč*) and ensuring their victory. Both heavens issue orders (Old Turkish *yarlıq*, to which corresponds the *Ĵarlıq* of the *Secret History*), confer dignity and, when angered, withdraw favour and protection. However, whereas the old Turkish inscriptions emphasize the Will of Heaven, the medieval Mongols lay stress on its Power. Both refer to the good fortune (Old Turkish *qut* = Old Mongolian *suu*) of the emperor. For both, Heaven is the king-maker, and the state a national monarchy based on divine right.²⁰

Now, the role of Heaven as king-maker is a special development of the original, early role of the Sky-god among the Turco-Mongolian nomadic tribes. This new function implies a whole conception of political unity and tribal organization which, as Barthold correctly says, under normal circumstances is quite alien to a nomadic people.²¹ Heaven-sanctioned kingship is a concept borrowed from a sedentary society. There is no doubt that the idea of khaghanship conceived as the rule of a supreme leader appointed, chosen or 'willed' by Heaven, over a powerful nomadic state which we find among the Orkhon Turks, is strongly influenced by the Chinese conception of the Son of Heaven (*t'ien-tzu*) and the Mandate of Heaven (*t'ien-ming*). The sinicization of the Eastern Turks is a well known fact, discussed by various scholars,²² and we shall not dwell upon it except to say that the same phenomenon is evident also in the history of the earlier barbarian confederations and empires, from the Hsiung-nu to the T'o-pa Wei, which to a greater or lesser degree were affected by the outlook of the Chinese imperial court.²³

Contact between tribal chiefs and representatives of Chinese culture was frequent, not only through the exchange of embassies and the mediation of other, already sinicized, tribal chiefs, but also through the actual defection of Chinese officials to the side of the nomads. Chinese and sinicized counsellors and scribe-secretaries were among the regular recruits of the successful tribal leaders. As far as the Eastern Turks are concerned, apart from the fact that they were under Chinese rule for half a century (630–680), we know that the real architect of the restoration of their empire in Mongolia was their chief minister, the 'Sage' Tonyuquq, who had received a Chinese education.²⁴

After the Turks we find the same combination of shamanistic beliefs of Altaic origin and imperial attitudes of Chinese origin in the courts of the Khitan-Liao and Jurchen-Chin dynasties (tenth to thirteenth centuries).²⁵

The tribe of Chingis Khan shared in the common religious patrimony of the Turco-Mongolian peoples of Inner Asia, and the *Secret History*, as we have seen, offers ample evidence of this. When, from the position of tribal chief, Chingis Khan aspired to become a world ruler, he and his successors (who inherited the unfinished task) were bound to adopt a political doctrine that could explain, and at the same time foster, their aspiration to world leadership.

So long as the Mongol political centre of gravity remained in Mongolia, the ruler could not be influenced directly by China, his nearest model, and become rapidly sinicized like the Khitan and Jurchen sovereigns. Chingis, like the Turkish khaghans, did not relinquish his native steppeland, and any influences that he received could only reach him indirectly, i.e. through intermediaries. There is, I believe, sufficient evidence to show that these 'cultural middlemen' not only existed at his court, but were also actively engaged in ideological propaganda.

As I have shown elsewhere,²⁶ Chingis Khan was early acquainted with Chinese society and culture through his relations with the sinicized Chin court and, chiefly, through Chin defectors who had entered his service well before his formal enthronement in 1206. From 1208 he had also as advisers Chinese scholar-officials from the Chin capital (Chung-tu/Peking), among them a member of the National University (*t'ai-hsieh*). From 1210 onwards a stream of defectors, most of them sinicized Khitans, rallied to him.

We know from a number of references scattered in the Chinese sources of the period that these defectors, many of whom were former high-ranking military officials and members of the Chin intelligentsia, were largely responsible for the rapid Mongol

conquest of north China and for the setting up of the early Mongol administrative system, based on the Chinese model.²⁷ But they went even further. One of the leading advisers in Chingis Khan's entourage was the sinicized Khitan Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai (1189–1243), who had joined the conqueror in 1218 as secretary and astrologer. It was especially in his capacity as astrologer that he gained favour with the emperor.²⁸

From the beginning of his career at the Mongol court, Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai endeavoured to legitimize and strengthen Mongol rule by invoking the age-old argument of the Mandate of Heaven. In a famous letter that Chingis Khan sent to the Taoist Patriarch Ch'iu Ch'u-chi (1148–1227), usually known as Ch'ang-ch'un *chen-jen*, in 1219, and which I believe was drafted by Ch'u-ts'ai, the emperor speaks in terms worthy of a Chinese sage-king of antiquity. The defeat of the Jurchen, he writes, is due to Heaven's displeasure with the extravagant behaviour and lack of virtue of their ruler. Because of this, Chingis 'had received the support of Heaven and obtained the supreme dignity'. The author of the letter adds strength to this statement by referring to the Mongols' military achievements of the previous seven years.²⁹ Although the letter was written in Chinese and in a literary style best suited to the aged Taoist master to whom it was addressed, its exact contents was beyond doubt known to, and approved by, Chingis Khan.³⁰

Ch'ang-ch'un made his epic journey across Mongolia and Central Asia, reaching Chingis' camp in Afghanistan in 1222. During the eleven months that he spent in the emperor's suite,³¹ he had ample opportunity to expound his philosophy to his exalted patron. One of the points that he emphasized in his sermons was the divine origin of emperors and kings, whom he calls 'heavenly beings exiled [from Heaven to live] amongst men', and who are destined eventually to return to heaven. He illustrated, with examples drawn from mythology and history, the operations of the Mandate of Heaven, Heaven's decree that the emperor, as Son of Heaven, should be the ruler of mankind, and the means to ensure the emperor's health and good fortune.³² Chingis took a liking to the Chinese sage, whom he admired also on account of his great age (Ch'ang-ch'un enjoyed the reputation of being 300 years old!), and conferred special privileges on him and his followers.³³

Also in 1222, Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai was engaged in the compilation of a calendar. In the memorial that he wrote for the presentation of this calendar to the throne, he reiterated the concept that Heaven had been responsible for Chingis' conquest of the empire, as such a great feat could have not been accomplished by human power alone.³⁴ Chingis had thus proved beyond question his right by victory.

No doubt arguments like these, very flattering to the conqueror's ear, pleased Chingis Khan, particularly as they proceeded from personages who enjoyed a semi-mystical aura. They confirmed the faith he already had in his own destiny and fanned his ambition of conquering All-under-Heaven, a task that was gradually turning into a grand mission especially entrusted to him and his 'golden clan' by Heaven.³⁵

The present writer's view is that Chingis Khan's own attitude (known to us chiefly through the *Secret History*) towards the universality of his rule shows the influence of the Chinese traditional concept of empire, and that the belief he held in his right to rule by the power of Heaven was inspired by the Chinese doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven. As we have seen, this phenomenon had occurred before among the other great nomadic peoples of Inner Asia that had been in close contact with China and her civilization – peoples with whom Mongol society of the twelfth-thirteenth centuries had in common both the geographical and cultural background. Without underestimating,

of course, the importance of this background (which accounts, *inter alia*, for the similarity of the 'language' of the Orkhon inscriptions with that of the *Secret History*), the present writer wishes to emphasize the fact that Chingis Khan's political outlook may have been influenced, to a large extent, also by representatives of Chinese culture within his immediate entourage.³⁶

NOTES

1. Paper read at the II International Congress of Mongolists, Ulan-Bator, on 3 September 1970.
2. The first important contribution in the West to the history of Chingis Khan and the Yüan dynasty is A. Gaubil's *Histoire de Gentchiscan et de toute la dynastie des Mongous*, published in Paris in 1739.
3. A complete and up-to-date bibliography on the medieval Mongols is unfortunately lacking. A useful guide to literature on the subject is D. Sinor, *Introduction à l'étude de l'Eurasie Centrale* (Wiesbaden, 1963), pp. 294–319. Cf. also by the same author the 'Bibliographical note' in R. Grousset, *Conqueror of the World*, tr. by D. Sinor and M. MacKellar (Edinburgh and London, 1967), pp. 293–300. The Russian contributions are listed in the useful bibliographies on Mongolian studies published by the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (1953, 1963 and 1966; cf. also the important bibliography of bibliographies issued by the Library of the Academy, Leningrad, 1962). For the Chinese and Japanese contributions see the *Meng-ku ts'an-k'ao shu-mu* (*Chung-hua ts'ung-shu* ed., Hong Kong, 1958), and the *Bibliography of Mongolia for 1900–1950* published by the Jimbunkagaku kenkyūsho (Kyōto, 1953). Most of the important books and articles on Mongolian history in Japanese are included in the yearly bibliographical volume of *Shigaku-zasshi* (May issue, devoted to Historical Studies in Japan).
4. *Obščestvennyi stroi mongolov. Mongol'skii kočevoi feodalizm* (Leningrad, 1934). French translation by M. Carsow, *Le régime social des Mongols. Le féodalisme nomade* (Paris, 1948).
5. Cf. A.Yu. Yakubovskii in *Očerki po istorii russkogo vostokovedeniya* (Moscow, 1953), pp. 82ff. See also N.P. Šastina's remarks in *Fifty Years of Soviet Oriental Studies (Brief Reviews)*, ed. by the Institute of the Peoples of Asia, Academy of Sciences (Moscow, 1967), section on 'Mongolic Studies', pp. 10ff.
6. *Mōko shakai seido-shi*, tr. by the Gaimushō chōsabu (Tōkyō, 1934). Reprinted in 1941.
7. The most recent work is Iwamura Shinobu, *Mongoru shakai keizai-shi no kenkyū* (*Studies in the Social and Economic History of the Mongols*) (Kyōto, 1968).
8. In particular the learned contributions of H. Franke, H.F. Schurmann, I.P. Petruševskii, A.A. Alizade, B. Spuler, G. Vernadski, G. Grekov, A. Yakubovskii and N.Ts. Munkuev should be mentioned.
9. See the works of C. Alinge, P. Ratchnevsky, V.A. Riasanovsky, P. Olbricht, Yanai Watari, Abe Takeo and Iwamura Shinobu.
10. J.-P. Abel-Rémusat, 'Mémoires sur les relations politiques. . .', in *Hist. et mém. de l'Inst. royal de France, Acad. des inscr. et belles-lettres* VI (1822), pp. 396–469; VII (1824), pp. 335–438.
11. *Rocznik orientalistyczny* (hereafter *RO*) X (1934). 131–157. Cf. also by the same author 'Les Mongols, promoteurs de l'idée de paix universelle au début du XIIIe siècle', *RO* XVI (1950). 428–434.
12. *Byzantion* XV (1940–1941), pp. 378–413. Cf. also P. Pelliot, 'Les Mongols et la papauté', *Revue de l'Orient chrétien* XXIII, 1–2 (1922–1923), pp. 22ff; A. Mostaert and F.W. Cleaves, 'Trois documents des Archives secrètes vaticanes', *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* XV (1952), pp. 482–495; and G.L. Seidler, 'The Political Doctrine of the Mongols', *Annales Univ. M. Curie-Skłodowska* VI, 7 (1959), pp. 249–274.

13. See Voegelin, pp. 402–413. The Mongol empire-in-the-making is aptly called by Voegelin 'imperium mundi in statu nascendi' (ibid., p. 404).
14. See G. Vernadsky in *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* III (1938). 345, and 'Ala-ad-Din 'Ata-Malik Juvaini, *The History of the World-Conqueror*, tr. by J.A. Boyle (Manchester, 1958), p. 26.
15. See, for instance, the cursory way in which the subject is dealt with in all current biographies of Chingis Khan.
16. On the textual history of the *Secret History* see my article 'Some Remarks on the Dating of the *Secret History of the Mongols*', *Monumenta Serica* XXIV (1965), pp. 185–206.
17. According to Juwainī and Rašīd al-Dīn, Chingis Khan prayed to Heaven before his campaigns against Chin and Khwarezm. See *The History of the World-Conqueror*, p. 80; *Rašīd ad-Din. Sbornik letopisei*, I/2, tr. by O.I. Smirnova (Moscow, 1952), pp. 189 and 263.
18. From the Chinese sources it appears that the Mongol chancellery employed formulas which emphasized the 'strength of Heaven' already in Chingis Khan's time. See Mostaert and Cleaves, p. 486. Cf. *RO X* (1934), p. 132.
19. On the origin of the term *su*, *suu* see Pelliot in *Revue de l'Orient chrétien* XXIV, 3–4 (1924), pp. 318, 320; Kotwicz, pp. 142ff., and his 'Contributions à l'histoire de l'Asie Centrale', *RO XV* (1949), pp. 193–195; N. Poppe and J.R. Krueger, *The Mongolian Monuments in hP'ags-pa Script* (Wiesbaden, 1957), pp. 72–76, 90–91. This term almost certainly derives from Chinese *tsu* 祚 'good fortune, blessing'. In Turkish mythology Earth, or the Earth-goddess, plays a secondary role and appears much less frequently than Heaven in presiding over man's destiny. See R. Giraud, *L'empire des turcs célestes* (Paris, 1960), p. 105. This is also the case with the Mongol Earth-goddess Etügen (~Ötügen~Ötegen~Itügen). She is usually called 'mother' (*eke*) or 'brown' (*dayir*). Cf. Old Turkish *yagız yir*, which also means 'the brown Earth'. Etügen is probably related to Ötüken, the sacred forest of the Turks. See Pelliot in *T'oung Pao* XXVI (1929), pp. 212–219. Cf. A. Mostaert in *Oriente Poliano*, ed. by the Is.M.E.O. (Rome, 1957), pp. 95–101.
20. See V. Thomsen, *Inscriptions de l'Orkhon déchiffrées* (Helsingfors, 1896), pp. 97ff.; Giraud, pp. 102ff.; and more recently L. Bazin in 'Man and the Concept of History in Turkish Central Asia during the Eighth Century', *Diogenes* XLII (1963, ii), pp. 92. Cf. also the entries 'küç' and 'qut' in the *Drevnetyurskii slovar* published by the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (Leningrad, 1969).
21. W. Barthold, *Zwölf Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Türken Mittelasiens* (rep. Hildesheim, 1962), p. 11. Cf. V.V. Bartol'd, *Sočineniya*, V (Moscow, 1968), pp. 22–23.
22. For recent discussions see Giraud, pp. 107–108; Bazin, pp. 92ff.; and J.J. Saunders, 'Le nomade comme batisseur d'empire: conquête arabe et conquête mongole', *Diogenes* LII (1965, iv), pp. 90–91. In the Orkhon inscriptions we find expressions like 'By a Mandate from Heaven above and from Earth below'. See Bazin, p. 90. The evidence for the Chinese cultural influence on the Eastern T'u-chüeh found in the Chinese sources is discussed by Liu Mau-tsai, *Die chinesischen Nachrichten zur Geschichte der Ost-Türken (T'u-küe)*, 2 vols. (Wiesbaden, 1958), I, 458–465; II, 751–754.
23. See W. Eberhard, *Histoire de la Chine*, tr. by G. Deniker (Paris, 1952), pp. 82–83, 144, 152–153, 158.
24. Cf. R. Grousset, *L'Empire des steppes* (Paris, 1948), pp. 154ff.; R. Giraud, *L'inscription de Bañ Tsokto* (Paris, 1961), pp. 59–64.
25. On Liao traditional beliefs and 'selective sinicization' see K.A. Wittfogel and Fêng Chia-shêng, *History of Chinese Society. Liao (907–1125)* (Philadelphia, 1949), pp. 4–7, 14–23, 206ff. Chin society and culture are still imperfectly known. On Chin shamanism see provisionally the *Ta-Chin kuo chih* (Wan-yu wen-ku ed.) 18.133. On the sinicization of the Jurchen see Wittfogel and Fêng, p. 8.
26. See my article 'Personnel and Personalities in North China in the Early Mongol Period', *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* IX (1966), pp. 88–144. It seems that

before Chingis Khan, his father Yisügei had already had contacts with the Chin court, which had bestowed on him an honorary title. This event is recorded *s.a.* 1147–1148 in the *Ta-Chin kuo chih* 12.99–100 (personal communication from Professor Herbert Franke, Munich). Relations between the Chin government and the Mongolian tribes in the twelfth century were more frequent than it is generally assumed and deserve closer scrutiny. Cf. Wang Kuo-wei, *Hai-ning Wang Ching-an hsien-sheng i-shu, kuan-t'ang chi-lin* 14.25b–32b; 15.4a–13b, for many interesting references to these contacts. The influence of the Khitan Liao on the Mongolian tribes and the role of the Khitans as carriers of Chinese culture also deserve investigation. See O. Lattimore's remarks on the subject in his article 'The Geography of Chingis Khan', *The Geographical Journal* CXXIX (1963), p. 5.

27. See de Rachewiltz, pp. 88–144.
28. See my article 'Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai (1189–1243): Buddhist Idealist and Confucian Statesman', in A.F. Wright and D. Twitchett, ed., *Confucian Personalities* (Stanford, 1962), pp. 194–195.
29. The text of the letter is found in Ts'ai Mei-piao, *Yüan-tai pai-hua-pei chi-lu* (Peking, 1955), p. 115. For E. Chavannes' translation see *T'oung Pao* IX (1908), pp. 299–302. In the subsequent correspondence between Chingis Khan and Ch'ang-ch'un, the Mongol emperor is again designated as 'Heaven-sent' (*t'ien-ch'i*). See *ibid.*, pp. 304 and 306. An argument very similar to that used in Chingis' letter was employed 150 years later by the Hung-wu Emperor to explain the defeat of the Mongol Yüan. See Wang Gungwu, 'Early Ming Relations with Southeast Asia: A Background Essay', in J.K. Fairbank, ed., *The Chinese World Order* (Harvard, 1968), pp. 34–35.
30. The careful drafting and checking of official documents by court secretaries under the khan's personal supervision is well known through the accounts of John of Pian di Carpine and William of Rubruck.
31. See the *Hsi-yu chi* (*Hai-ning Wang Ching-an hsien-sheng i-shu* ed.) A.44a–B.7b. Cf. A. Waley, *The Travels of an Alchemist* (London, 1931), pp. 100–119.
32. See the *Hsüan-feng ch'ing-hui lu* (*Tao-tsang* ed.), pp. 4bff. Cf. Waley, p. 24.
33. See the *Hsi-yu chi* B.7b, and 'fu-lu,' pp. laff. Cf. Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's version of these events in the *Hsi-yu lu*, *Monumenta Serica* XXI (1962), pp. 25ff.
34. See my 'Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai', pp. 208–209. The original text is reproduced in Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's collected works, *Chan-jan chü-shih wen-chi* (*Ssu-pu ts'ung-k'an* ed.) 8.15b–16a.
35. The early Uighur advisers and secretaries at the Mongol court may also have played a part in glorifying their master's charismatic power, as the Nestorian Uighurs were wont to do, according to the Franciscan narratives, at the courts of Güyüg and Möngke. However, we lack evidence to this effect for the reign of Chingis Khan. It is, indeed, difficult to determine what kind of religious influences (Nestorian? Taoist?) were at work in the *Secret History* statement (§268) that Chingis Khan 'ascended to Heaven' upon his death, an event which, as it has been claimed so far and perhaps incorrectly, was considered taboo by contemporary Mongols. It is perhaps also within the context of the Turkish cultural influence on the Mongols that one can explain the adoption of the title *qayan* by Ögödei. In Chingis Khan's time the Mongols used only the term *qan* to designate the chief of a tribe or confederation of tribes, and this term corresponds exactly to Chinese *wang* 王 'king'. Among the Turks *qan* had the meaning of 'king, ruler', while *qayan* was the term designating the person holding the supreme dignity, *i.e.* the Great Khan, the king of kings, the emperor. See the *Drevnetyurkskii slovar'*, *s.v.* 'qan' and 'qayan'; and L. Ligeti in *Acta Orientalia Hung.* XIX (1966), pp. 160, 161. In my opinion, it was under the Uighur-Nestorian influence of Ögödei's advisers that the title *qan* was replaced by that of *qayan* (pronounced *qa'an* in Mongolian) in the case of the emperor, while *qan* was retained for the princes of the royal family who ruled in their respective *ulus*'s. As *qan* had been the title borne by Chingis (he never assumed or used the title *qayan*), he continued to be referred to as Činggis Qan, and only much later this was changed to Činggis Qayan. Cf. H.F. Schurmann in *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*

- XIX (1956). 314–316, n.14. For a different approach to this problem see L. Krader, 'Qan ~ Qayan and the Beginnings of Mongol Kingship', *Central Asiatic Journal* I (1955), pp. 17–34.
36. No document from Chingis Khan's time that I know of actually calls him 'Son of Heaven' (*i'ien-tzu*). However, he was definitely referred to as such in the time of Güyüg and Möngke, as shown by the imperial edict brought back by the Dominican Friar Ascelinus in 1248 and by Möngke's letter to Louis IX of 1254. See Voegelin, pp. 389 and 391.

MONGOLIAN TRIBUTARY PRACTICES OF THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY

H. F. Schurmann



I. INTRODUCTION

II. TRIBUTE (*ALBAN*) AND LEVY (*QUBČIRI*)

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I. INTRODUCTION

The evolution of the Mongolian empires of the thirteenth century can be divided into three periods. The first period, which roughly encompasses the political life of Činggis Qan (1206–1227), is the period of the great tribal confederation of which the tribe of Činggis formed the central and ruling nucleus. During this period the confederation grew by the continuous inclusion of new nomadic tribes, Mongolian and Turkic, into an ever greater confederation. The armies of Činggis invaded China, Central Asia and Persia, reaching the banks of the Indus River. However, no permanent occupation of territory resulted, for once the enemy had been destroyed, the invaders retreated back into the steppe. The sedentary societies were regarded as sources of booty and technical specialists such as artisans. As yet, the Mongols did not conceive of any permanent exploitation of the conquered sedentary societies.

The second period begins, more or less, with the destruction of the Chin Empire in North China (1234). For the first time, the Mongols developed concepts of permanent exploitation of conquered territory. Lacking any organized state power for centralized administration, the Mongolian ruler detached whole provinces from the conquered territories and turned them over to members of the ruling Mongolian nobility as their personal appanages. At first, the Mongols thought not in terms of territory, but in terms of people; the ruler gave to the nobility not territory but classes of people; thus, subjection was personal rather than territorial. However, as the attached peoples of the conquered sedentary societies were permanently settled within a given area, this personal thinking soon became transformed into territorial thinking. The second period

may be considered a period when the ruling Mongols attempted to extend the principles of nomadic confederation to the conquered sedentary areas. Such was the case not only in China, but in Central Asia (the *ulus* of Čayatai), and in the Däst-i Qipčaq (the *ulus* of Joči) as well. This was a period of great confusion, for underneath the Mongolian overlay, the political and social principles of the conquered sedentary societies continued to operate. In China, the bureaucracy still continued to function, and in Central Asia, the Khwârazmian political system still operated in the oases of that region. It was during this period that the Mongols made their final great conquests. China was occupied down to the banks of the Huai River (historically, the conquest of the Southern Sung and the other Far Eastern ventures form a sort of anti-climax). Persia and Mesopotamia were conquered by Hülegü, and the Il-khanate was established. Russia and the Qipčaq were reduced, and the realm of the Golden Horde was established.

During this second period, the bonds between the component parts of the Mongolian Empire weakened. The khaghanate in China and Mongolia, the *ulus* of Čayatai in Central Asia, the Golden Horde in the Qipčaq and Russia, and the Il-khanate in Persia each developed into a separate, independent political entity. Thus the time of the next great political transition varied from place to place.

We can think of the third period as one of the resurrection of the traditional state power of the sedentary societies on a grand scale. This period began in China with the rise to power of Qubilai (1260), and in Persia with the enthronement of Ghazan (1294). It never came about in any other *ulus*, for there a tradition of absolute state power was wanting. The motives for this resurrection of state power sprang not only from a consciousness of the failure of the policy of the extension of the principles of nomadic confederation onto the sedentary societies, and from a desire to overcome the confusion and chaos thus produced, but also from a realization by the ruling Mongols that the traditional state of the conquered sedentary society provided them with a means of power that nomadic confederation could never give them. Partly, this new manner of thinking was brought about by a gradual alienation from the steppe. The civil war between Ariγ Böge, who dominated Mongolia, and Qubilai, whose center of power was China, further increased the dependence of the latter on China. Likewise, the continuing hostility of the houses of Čayatai and Joči left the Il-khans with Persia and Mesopotamia as their centers of power. The resurrection of state power not only provided the Mongolian rulers of China and Persia with new means of exploitation, but gave their rule a stability which heretofore it had not enjoyed.

The establishment of state power did not result in the ruling Mongols' losing their identity and fusing into the native ruling classes. No real Sinicization or Persianization took place. If we take China as an example, we can describe the process as follows: In China the ruling class traditionally consisted of three segments: the gentry (i.e. the land-owners associated with the economic center of power located in Central and South China), the bureaucracy (associated with the political center of power in North China), and the imperial family. The Mongols made no attempt to become a part of the Chinese gentry, nor did they attempt to usurp the property rights of the Chinese gentry (particularly after 1260). In their conquest of South China, they explicitly ordered the invaders to respect all property rights. On the other hand, the traditional Chinese bureaucracy was re-established with greater and more absolute powers than ever before. Mongolian elements were grafted onto this structure, giving it yet more strength and power. Its local basis remained Chinese, but the top was largely Mongolian (or foreign). Between the base and the top was established an intermediary structure (the various "mobile" [*hsing*

行] bureaus), composed of both Chinese and Mongols, which prevented the traditional alienation of the lower bureaucracy from the center. The imperial family and the allied and related nobility remained purely Mongolian, in language, custom, and culture. The new political system which arose after 1260 was Chinese in principle. The diverse and separate powers of the ruling nobility were abolished, and power centered in the throne. The *qayan* became an absolute emperor in the Chinese tradition. The lower and upper bureaucracy were unified and strengthened. The military power of the Mongolian rulers permitted a degree of centralization rarely achieved before in China. The gentry remained largely unaffected. However, just as the rulers remained Mongols in culture and spirit, they likewise retained all their basic prerogatives as Mongolian rulers, but to them they added the prerogatives of a Chinese imperial family. There occurred no real fusion of societies, for the Mongols and the Chinese remained separate and distinct to the end of the dynasty. However, the nature of the Chinese state was affected and changed. In effect, it was absolutized to a degree not known before. Specifically, it was the role of the emperor which took on a new form. Similarly, the administration—on the upper levels of the bureaucracy—was profoundly affected. On the lower bureaucracy and on the gentry, the effect was weaker and less permanent.

In Persia a similar process occurred. In Central Asia and in the Golden Horde the third stage was never reached, for the elements which would have permitted the establishment of a strong centralized state power were lacking. It is for this reason that we have no important body of historical literature from either the *ulus* of Čağatai or the *ulus* of Jöci. Only indirectly, through travelogues and foreign sources, through occasional documents and archival pieces, do we gain an insight into the workings of those “societies.”

Here we are concerned with the fiscal principles, and specifically with the modes of exploitation, operating within Mongolian society in all three stages of its evolution. First, there are those basic modes of exploitation which existed in the first stage, when the Mongols were only the central nucleus of a nomadic, tribal confederation. Secondly, there are those secondary modes of exploitation which arose when they entered the second stage, and permanently occupied certain sedentary societies. Lastly, there are those modes of exploitation which existed after the great rationalization and centralization coming with the resurrection of traditional, sedentary, state power. Just as the Mongols never abandoned their basic character during these three successive stages, neither did they abandon their original modes of exploitation. As the extent and nature of their power changed and grew, they grafted new modes of exploitation onto the old ones. The result was the fiscal systems of China, Persia, and the Golden Horde in the periods of the Mongols’ greatest power.

In this introduction, I shall anticipate the argumentation to be given below, and give a short outline of my views. If we analyze the fiscal structure of China and Persia in the third period, we can divide it into three parts: (1) those fiscal obligations which represented the traditional modes of exploitation within Mongolian society, specifically tribute and service due the ruler by his subjects, (2) those fiscal obligations resulting from control by the Mongols of commerce and production, e.g. the commercial tolls, and (3) the traditional fiscal obligations, taxes, tolls, and corvées of the conquered sedentary societies.

All three fiscal principles continued to operate during the high-point of the Mongols’ power in this third stage. However, the second and third modes of exploitation arose with the extension of conquests. As the Mongols seized the customs stations through

which commercial caravans proceeded, and the cities in which manufacturing took place, they acquired the power and prerogative to levy the traditional tolls on commerce and manufacturing (the well-known *tamya*). This source of revenue began as soon as they acquired possession of those segments of sedentary societies in which commerce and production took place. The fiscal obligations in the third category were acquired only after the Mongols had permanently taken possession of the sedentary societies, an event which had already occurred in the second period. In the third period, all these diverse fiscal obligations were rationalized and ordered into a unified fiscal system. The rationalization did not take place all at once, but grew up gradually toward the end of the second period. In the Golden Horde, no rationalization ever took place. There, as well as in Russia, only the confused multiplicity of obligations remained. However, in China and in Persia a unified fiscal system was set up.

In this picture, two of the three legs of this fiscal tripod are relatively well known: the commercial tolls and the traditional taxes. What is relatively unknown is the mode of exploitation within traditional Mongolian society, and secondly the process by which the rationalized fiscal structures of the Yüan and the Il-khanate came into being. Much confusion has existed in studies of Il-khanate and Yüan fiscal practices because writers have not attempted to analyze the evolution of these fiscal structures. Particularly, in the case of China, attempts have been made to relate certain Yüan fiscal practices with dubious Chinese precedents. Much of the confusion can be dispelled by a comparative study of the fiscal situation in each *ulus*, particularly those in China and Persia. That is precisely what I shall attempt to do.

The sources relating to the Mongols in the early thirteenth century are full of descriptions of innumerable exactions practiced by the invading armies. Too often writers have considered these exactions as nothing more than pillage and have failed to discern any social principle behind them. Such social principles existed, and, in fact, are known by name. They were the principles of tribute and service. Mongolian society was a hierarchical tribal society in which each individual was subject to his particular lord (*ejen*), the hierarchy culminating in the *qan* or *qayan*. The relations of servitude were personal rather than abstract or territorial. A subject was obliged to furnish his own ruler with whatever goods and services were necessary to enable his lord to carry out his functions as lord. No basic distinction was made between payment of goods and rendering of service, for a lord could demand either or both as occasion required. However, a distinction existed between the permanent, customary tribute or service which each subject regularly rendered, and the extraordinary demands of tribute or service arising from special situations such as war. For purposes of simplification, we shall call the former the *tribute*, and the latter the *levy*. The former was known in Mongolian as *alba* ~ *alban*, and the latter as *qubčiri* ~ *qubčirin*. Because of the linguistic diversity in each *ulus*, these Mongolian terms were often called differently in the various languages used. In Persia (or rather, in the Persian literature), they were known as *qalân* (Turkic) and *qubčûr* (Turkic, from Mongolian). The Chinese made no distinction between the two, calling them both *ch'ai-fa* 差發 (a term they had acquired from the Chin dynasty under which similar fiscal practices existed). In the Russian literature, they were known as *dan'* and *pošlina*. In the Golden Horde and in Central Asia, they were known as *qalân* and *yasâq* (Turkic). When these terms, and the fiscal practices they designate, are encountered in the literature, they usually relate to a much later period, when the early Mongolian fiscal practices had already undergone a systematization and rationalization. The evolved forms are so dissimilar to the early forms that only by analysis of the

evolution of the evolved fiscal practices can the connection be discerned. Thus the *qubčūr* tax of the Il-khanid period in Persia hardly resembles the early *qubčiri* levies mentioned in the *Secret History*, yet the evolution of the former from the latter is there and can be traced.

As a more ordered and systematic administration evolved in each *ulus*, specifically in China and Persia, the erratic and arbitrary tributes and levies began to change into fixed, permanent taxes. What changed was not their basic nature, for they still represented the source of revenue of the imperial family and the related and allied nobility. What changed was the form of the fiscal obligation. The manner of assessment was fixed in terms of rates. Individuals were henceforth subject to given yearly payments instead of an unlimited series of payments. Whereas the primitive tribute and levy was paid by individuals as a sign of subjection to their lord, the unit of assessment in some cases (as in China) became the household rather than the individual (such was the case in China in the early 1230s). Even in the early days, what mattered was that the quota decreed by the ruler (*e* 額 in Chinese; *muqarrar* in Persian) be filled. The manner of assessment or repartition of the quota amount on the population (*k'o-cheng* 科徵 in Chinese; *qismat* in Persian) was of secondary importance. Whereas exactions were arbitrary in the early days, they became more systematized as time went on. Out of the early tributes and levies, there developed the taxes of the second and third periods. However, before we can understand the nature of these evolved taxes, we must understand their origins in terms of the tributes and levies from which they arose in early thirteenth century Mongolian society.

We may formulate our views on the tribute and the levy in early Mongolian society as follows: The tribute was a formalized, permanent payment of goods and rendering of services which symbolized and actualized the subjection of a given individual or social group, such as a tribe, to its ruler. The levy was an extraordinary exaction, imposed by the ruler on his subjects, to fulfill some particular need. The criterion of exaction, both in the case of the tribute and the levy, was personal rather than material; i.e. payment of goods or rendering of services occurred on the basis of a given individual's or a given social group's subjection to his or its ruler. The nature of the goods and services used in the payment of the obligation, as well as the distribution of the quota among the members of a given social group, may or may not have occurred on the basis of the wealth possessed by the members; i.e. relative wealth may or may not have been a criterion in fixing the rate of payment. The nature of the assessment of payments varied from time to time, and from social group to social group. In some tribes, the tribute and levy payments took the form of "herd taxes," payment of which was made by giving a certain percentage of animals from the total herd possessed.

The kind of fiscal obligation known as a tax is to be associated with sedentary and not nomadic societies. Such taxes (as in China or Persia) are burdens, of limited or unlimited continuity, laid on persons or property for purposes associated with the functioning of the state. We shall not go into the question of the concept of the tax; we shall consider it here as a kind of fiscal obligation characteristic of sedentary societies. Some taxes undoubtedly have their origins in erstwhile tributes (the Han *suan-fu* 算賦 certainly was a kind of tribute). Some taxes are based on an individual's relationship to the state because of territory owned (e.g. the land tax). Other taxes are based on a personal relationship to the state (e.g. the poll tax). In sedentary societies, fiscal obligations tend to take on a permanent, fixed, rationalized character. Such an obligation we shall call a tax in this analysis. Extraordinary levies, if they exist, tend, within a short

time, either to disappear or to take the form of more regular obligations. It is my view that the early Mongolian tributes and levies tended to take on the character of taxes in the second and third periods mentioned above.

II. TRIBUTE (*ALBAN*) AND LEVY (*QUBČIRI*)

Our knowledge of the fiscal practices of the early Mongols derives largely from non-Mongolian sources: from the Chinese, the Persian, the Armenian, and the European literature which took note of the Mongols. Perhaps the most explicit description of Mongolian fiscal practices of the early thirteenth century is contained in the *Hei-ta shih-lüeh* 黑鞑事略, written in 1236, and containing observations which its two authors, P'ENG Ta-ya 彭大雅 and Hsü T'ing 徐筵, made several years earlier during their travels in North China and Mongolia:¹

Their collecting of taxes is called *ch'ai-fa* 差發. They rely on horses for milk; they require sheep for food. In all cases, they collect them (i.e. the taxes) on the basis of the size of the people's herds. It is like the 'provisioning of the ruler' (*shang-kung* 上供) of the Chinese [fiscal] system.² In regard to the system of setting up postal relays,³ it permits all [their] chiefs and leaders freely to determine the amount of time the sending of envoys takes.⁴ So far as the people of Han (i.e. North China) are concerned, with the exception of artisans, be they male or female, the annual tax is: adults in the cities, 25 *liang* of [silk] yarn, and, per ox and sheep, 50 *liang* of yarn—this means the sum wherewith they borrow Muslim silver to buy sustenance for the passing envoys;⁵ village cultivators, per individual, 100 *liang* of yarn. As concerns [husked] grain, regardless whether the acreage and crop be small or large, annually [each] household [pays] four stone. The silver transport convoys, taking all regions together, [carry] about 20,000 ingots annually.⁶ The way they [use] side roads and crooked paths to impose taxation defies description.⁷

This rather brief exposition is followed by the more expansive comments of Hsü T'ing:

In the desert area which [I,] T'ing, traversed, from the Tatar ruler, the pretended queen, crown princes and princesses, and [royal] relatives down, all have their domains. Their people all give forth oxen and horses, vehicles and weapons, laborers, mutton, and mare's milk as *ch'ai-fa*. Without doubt, in the steppe which the Tatars have split up [into domains] and administer, everyone gives forth *ch'ai-fa*. Noble and mean, there is not one who may be exempted. There is another matter, namely that each gives forth *ch'ai-fa* for the requirements within the postal relay [system] of each domain. Again, it is the same with high and low. This, thus, is the *ch'ai-fa* of the steppe. As far as the *ch'ai-fa* of the land of the Han (i.e. North China) is concerned, in addition to the fact that each adult of each household [pays] silver in commutation for yarn and floss, every time envoys pass by, they requisition food and implements for the army and cavalry. As far as all the expenditures of the ruler are concerned, moreover, they always calculate the total amount needed and levy it on the people. The people of all the conquered countries greatly consider it an affliction. Their imprecations reach Heaven. But in the end there is nothing they can do. The Tatar rulers, at unexpected times, dispatch officials from the steppe to the land of the Han to fix the *ch'ai-fa* [I,] T'ing, was in Yen-ching [when] the present commissioner Assistant Minister HU⁸ came. His financial outrages were yet more to be dreaded. Down to the guilds of classical teachers and beggars guilds as well, [all] gave forth silver to make up the *ch'ai-fa*. Within the Yen-ching guild of classical teachers, there was a poem: . . .⁹

In this way one can see what their system of collecting taxes was like.

In these two descriptions, we have as complete a formulation of early Mongolian fiscal practices as exists in the literature. P'êng Ta-ya visited the north in the years 1232–33; Hsü T'ing went later in the years 1235–36.¹⁰ Both P'ENG and HSÜ use the term *ch'ai-fa* to describe Mongolian fiscal practices. Although the term is Chinese, it was a term already current in North China during the Chin dynasty to describe a kind of fiscal obligation peculiar to the barbarians and not associated with China (*vide infra*). Both P'ENG and HSÜ divide the *ch'ai-fa* system into two types: that imposed on the Mongols themselves in the steppe, and that imposed by the Mongols on the conquered North Chinese. On the *ch'ai-fa* system among the Mongols, P'ENG states that the Mongols were assessed a certain percentage of their herds. He compares it to the Chinese *shang-kung*. The *shang-kung* was not so much a tax, as a certain quota of revenue (one part of a three-fold division of revenue) which was paid directly to the imperial court. Though first introduced in the T'ang, it was still practiced during the Southern Sung. Thus P'ENG means here that the “herd tribute” was paid directly to the ruler. Furthermore, the Mongols had to maintain the postal relay system, another obligation under the *ch'ai-fa* system. HSÜ adds to these remarks of P'ENG by pointing out that the “desert area” (i.e. Mongolia) was divided into a series of domains ruled over by the “Tatar ruler” (i.e. the *qan* or *qayan*),¹¹ the queen, the crown princes or princesses, and the various royal relatives. In other words, each member of the Mongolian nobility had his own area where he ruled. This apparent “feudalism,” one may remark in passing, is in reality a consequence of the Mongol system of inheritance, whereby adult sons split off from the family and established themselves independently upon marriage.¹² The people in each domain paid *ch'ai-fa* to the ruler of that domain. The *ch'ai-fa* consisted of a variety of things: oxen, horses, vehicles, weapons, labor service (in the form of laborers), mutton, and milk. All were subject to the *ch'ai-fa*. HSÜ adds, confirming P'ENG's statements, that all had likewise to give *ch'ai-fa* in order to maintain the postal relays (the *jam*) within their domains.

What P'ENG and HSÜ said amounts to this: all Mongols paid a permanent tribute to their personal ruler (whether *qayan*, or *qatun*, or sons or relatives of the *qayan*), based on the size of their herds. Furthermore, all were obliged to pay a considerable variety of goods and render services in fulfillment of their *ch'ai-fa* obligations. In addition to this, they were obliged to maintain the postal relay system within their domain (i.e. the domain to which they were attached).

A different form of the *ch'ai-fa* was imposed by the Mongols on the North Chinese, for here they dealt with peasants and artisans, not nomads. Each individual adult city inhabitant, male or female, with the exception of artisans (who paid the *ch'ai-fa* with their special products), paid an annual “poll-tax” of 25 *liang* of silk yarn; in addition, a “tax” of 50 *liang* per head of ox or sheep. Peasants paid an annual “poll-tax” of 100 *liang* of yarn, per individual. In addition, they had to pay an annual household tax of four stone of grain. HSÜ adds that the poll-tax on adults was usually paid in silver in commutation for silk yarn and floss. We know that already during the Chin, silver in ingot form had become the chief medium of exchange in North China. However, in addition to the regular *ch'ai-fa*, the Chinese had to suffer innumerable levies “every time envoys pass by.” HSÜ makes another important point: the Mongols assessed quotas in terms of their expenditures. These quota amounts were then levied on the people. The *ch'ai-fa* was in reality collected in silver, for annually 20,000 ingots (*ting*) of silver were sent north by the Mongols.

Here both P'ENG and HSÜ describe the two basic fiscal concepts of the Mongols: the

permanent tributes and the extraordinary levies. To the Chinese, both were known as *ch'ai-fa*. By the *ch'ai-fa*, they understood Mogolian exactions in general. Despite the appearance of similar terms during the Sung,¹³ the earliest occurrence of the term *ch'ai-fa* is attested for the Chin. The *Chin-shih* contains the following passage:¹⁴

In the ninth moon [of the fourth year of T'ai-ho 泰和] (July 29-Aug. 27, 1204), memorializers mentioned that the "property tax" (*wu-li-ch'ien* 物刀錢)¹⁵ of households which had fled, in Ts'ang-chou 滄州 of Ho-chien 河間, amounted to several thousands of strings [of copper cash]. However, as far as their *ch'ai-fa* is concerned, the authorities only collected from households actually [there]. It is felt that the people cannot bear this. An imperial edict was issued ordering the Examining Authorities to stop temporarily the "property [tax]" on mobile wealth, with the exception of the "property [tax]" on land which they were commanded to base on their [actual] property.¹⁶

In other words, the region of Ts'ang-chou was liable to the payment of a tax quota, imposed in the form of a tax on "property." Because many households had fled the region, the remaining households each had to bear a proportionately larger share of the tax burden. The memorial called upon the government for tax relief. From the context of the memorial, it is clear that the term *ch'ai-fa* was used to designate this tax quota. The "property tax" was an innovation of the Chin, a tax of non-Chinese origin. As it is stated in the *Chin-shih*:¹⁷

Property in land and gardens, houses and sheds, carts and vehicles, herd animals and crops, and the amount of money saved was calculated, and a tax in money levied at differing rates. This was called the "property tax" (*wu-li-ch'ien*).

During the Chin, two basic categories of taxes existed: (1) those payable by the Ju-chen, and (2) those payable by the Chinese. The Ju-chen were essentially subject only to one basic tax, namely a tax on oxen. The Chinese, on the contrary, were subject to two basic taxes: (a) the land tax, and (b) the "property tax" (in addition to other subsidiary taxes).¹⁸ The *wu-li-ch'ien* was introduced by the Chin and represented a special source of revenue for the Chin ruling family. This source of revenue was known as the *ch'ai-fa*. In other words, the tribute paid by the Chinese to the Chin ruler was known as the *ch'ai-fa*. The *wu-li-ch'ien* represented an evolved form of the early Chin tribute, in the same way that the *pao-yin* 包銀 and the *ssu-liao* 絲料 represented evolved and rationalized forms of early Mongolian tributes and levies.¹⁹ Both were known to the Chinese as *ch'ai-fa*. The *wu-li-ch'ien* disappeared completely from China after the Mongol conquest of the Chin. It disappeared probably because it was considered a special tribute payable to the Chin ruler, and identified with that dynasty. Likewise, the *ch'ai-fa* disappeared completely from China when the Ming took power, although the Ming emperor still accepted *ch'ai-fa* tribute from non-Chinese tribes on the northern frontier to whom he was the *qayan*. A faint remnant of the *wu-li-ch'ien* can still be seen in the first rationalized fiscal system introduced by the Mongols in China, that of Ögödei in 1236. At that time a system of graduated taxation (*k'o-cheng*) was introduced whereby people were taxed on the basis of individuals per household, the number of animals, and the grade of land.²⁰

The etymology of *ch'ai-fa* is not easy to explain. ABE Takeo (see note 19) seems to read it as *ch'ai-fa*, with *ch'a* meaning "differentiated." However, both the reading and the meaning *ch'ai* seem preferable. Paul PELLiot translated the term as "livraison officielle," "réquisition."²¹ The element *ch'ai* is used regularly during the Yüan in

various contexts and compounds. One of the most common is the traditional expression *ch'ai-shih* 差使, "to dispatch envoys (from the court or the government)." A Yüan vocabulary gives as the Chinese equivalent for *daruyači*, a civil governor, *hsüan-ch'ai* 宣差.²²

During the Sung, the term *ch'ai-ch'ien* 差遣 designated an official who performed the functions of an office whose actual holder did no more than receive the pay and rank concomitant with the office.²³ During the Northern Sung, the term *ch'ai-i* 差役 designated a gradated system of corvée decreed by the government. During the Sung and the Yüan, the term *ch'ai-po* 差撥 was often used in the sense of "to send."²⁴ None of these expressions bears any direct relationship to *ch'ai-fa*. Yet in each case *ch'ai* seems to have the connotation of something done by the government. Since *fa* obviously connotes levy or requisition, PELLIOT's rendering seems fully justified. However, it must be kept in mind that *ch'ai-fa* denoted a foreign innovation both during the Chin and the Yüan. Consequently, the "officielle" must be considered as referring to the foreign ruler, the *qayan*, and not to the legitimate, bureaucratic government of the Chinese. In this connection, it seems to me that "imperial" would be a better rendering for the *ch'ai* of *ch'ai-fa* than "official."

To the Chinese, *ch'ai-fa* designated all those obligations which the subjects of the Mongolian rulers, Chinese, Mongols, and others, owed to them. These obligations consisted essentially of a more or less permanent and customary tribute in goods and services, and of a series of extraordinary levies. Now, what did the Mongols call these obligations? And how were they called by the many other peoples who, like the Chinese, were subject to the same tributes and levies? Fortunately, there are in existence a considerable number of documents and inscriptions from each *ulus* which deal specifically with the matter of obligations of subjects to their Mongolian rulers. These are documents which are granted by one of the Mongolian rulers to a favored subject, exempting him from all or most obligations due the ruler. Erich HAENISCH, dealing with Sino-Mongolian documents, has termed them *Steuergerechtsame*.²⁵ Walther HINZ, dealing with similar documents in Turkic, calls them *Steuerbefreiungsurkunden*.²⁶ In medieval Russian literature, they have been called *tarkhannyje gramoty* ("tarkhan letters").²⁷ There are in existence such documents written in Chinese, Mongolian, Turkic, and Russian. In the *Yüan tien-chang* 元典章 and the *Ta'rikh-i mubârak-i Ghâzânî*, we have citations from prototypes giving us an idea of their form and content. They are all, regardless of the language in which they are written, so similar in form and content that often one can transpose whole sentences automatically into the language used in another document written thousands of miles away in an entirely different language. Their similarity derives to a large extent from the fact that the originals were almost always written in Mongolian or Turkic, and then translated into another language.

These documents form some of our most important sources for an analysis of fiscal obligations in existence in each *ulus*. In particular, due to the similarity in form and content, and to the similarity in motivation for the issuance of such documents, they provide us with the means of comparing the fiscal obligations of one *ulus* with those of another. Mostly, of course, these documents give us an insight into the nature of the tributes which the subject peoples owed their Mongol rulers. Similarities and correspondences in terminology enable us to see that what at first sight appears to be a divergence in terminology in East and West, is largely the fact that these tributes were called by different names according to the language in which the document was written.

These documents of tribute exemption (as we shall henceforth call them) were issued by the Mongolian ruler, whether *qayan*, *qan* (*khân*), *qatun*, or a member of the imperial nobility, to one or more of his subjects exempting him or them from all tributes (or such tributes as specified) due the ruler. In the thirteenth century society of Inner Asia, all peoples, whether Mongolian or conquered, became the subjects of one or another member of the ruling Mongolian nobility. Some were the immediate subjects of the *qayan*. These were usually called in Chinese the “government households” (*hsi-kuan min-hu* 係官民戶). Some were the immediate subjects of a given appanage-holder. These were usually called in Chinese the “distributed households” (*fen-po min-hu* 分撥民戶).²⁸ Each of the subjects was bound to render tribute and service to his ruler. If a subject rendered particular service to his ruler meriting reward, he was often exempted from these tributes and services, given a document or plaque attesting this fact, and received the title *darqan* (Turkic, *tarkhân*).

T'AO Tsung-i 陶宗儀, the author of the *Cho-keng-lu* 輟耕錄, an important work written during the last years of the Yüan, describes a *darqan* as follows:²⁹

The title *ta-la-han* (*darqan*) translated expresses the idea of a leader of a country being able to do what he wants. Unless he be a distinguished [person] or a relative [by marriage] (i.e. of the imperial family), it is not granted him. On the dragon flight days (i.e. when he first came to the throne) of T'ai-tsu (i.e. Činggis), the Court was set up in rough form, and the official system was simple and traditional. There were only assistants (*tso-yu* 左右), and myriarchs, followed by chiliarchs. The great-grandfather of Ha-la-ha-sun (Qarqasun),³⁰ Assisting Minister and *Chung-hsien wang* 忠獻王 of Shun-te 順德, [namely] Ch'i-hsi-li (Qišiliq),³¹ was well received because of his superlative ability. He was selected and appointed chiliarch, and granted the title *ta-la-han* (*darqan*). In the *jen-shen* year of Chih-yüan (1272–73), Shih-tsu (i.e. Qubilai), honoring the descendants of distinguished vassals, appointed [Ha-la-ha-sun] an official in the prince's night watch, with the hereditary title *ta-la-han* (*darqan*).

A Western writer, Abû'l-Ghâzî Bahâdur Khân, describes the *tarkhân* (= *darqan*) as follows:³²

The meaning of *tarkhân* is this, that they shall take nothing whatever from such an individual. Whether, as a fugitive, he comes to the gate of the Khân, no one shall prevent him [from entering]. He shall come, and he shall go [freely]. If he commit a crime, he shall not be questioned about anything up to nine [crimes]. Thereafter, he shall be questioned. It shall be such up to nine generations.

What this means is that the *darqan* (= *tarkhân*) was exempted from obligations, specifically the obligations of tribute to his lord, and was given a certain degree of juridical immunity. We know that this title was bestowed on people who had performed great service for their rulers; the title appears in every *ulus* from China to Russia. Tribute exemption was also generally granted the clergy of the diverse religions represented in the Mongolian realms. This policy of religious favoritism was followed in every *ulus*. Even when the rulers of the Golden Horde had already been converted to Islam, they continued to issue documents of tribute exemption to the clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church. It is not clear whether the exempted clerics received the title *darqan* (or *tarkhân*). This title is never mentioned in the Sino-Mongolian and Russian edicts of exemption issued the clergy of those countries. On the other hand, Naşîru 'd-Dîn Tûsî, in his celebrated work on finance, says that the title *tarkhân* was given to members of the clergy.³³ Whether the clergy received the title or not, the edicts of exemption gave them the same exemption from the tribute and the same juridical immunity as the non-clerical

tarkhân's received. We cannot go here into the reasons for this policy. In regard to the clergy, it probably had religious rather than political motivation. In return for the exemption, the clergy were always asked to invoke the blessing of Heaven or their own deities for the good fortune and long life of the Mongolian rulers. As to the other *tarkhân*, they generally were not members of the immediate Mongolian nobility. Tribute exemption was not only a means of rewarding them, but of making them into allies and friends. This *tarkhân* policy played an important role in every *ulus*. In China, it died out after the end of the Yüan. But in Central Asia, Persia, and Russia it continued as a policy under the successor dynasties. The *soyuryâl* policies of Ulûy Bêg and the Şafawids are a direct outgrowth of the Mongolian *tarkhân* policies.³⁴ In Russia, the *tarkhân* policies of the medieval *knjaz'ja* contributed to the development of the institution of church immunity.³⁵

Here we are not so much concerned with the policy itself, as with these documents as sources for determining the fiscal practices of the Mongols. Despite differences in language, these edicts were written in extremely stereotyped phrases which remained remarkably similar throughout every *ulus*. Even documents of tribute exemption issued by successor dynasties, like the Kazan and Crimean khanates, retain the form and even much of the content of the earlier documents. This in itself attests the continuation of the *tarkhân* policy beyond the Mongolian dynasties. Typical of the Sino-Mongolian edicts of exemption is the edict of 1276 issued by Mangala, third son of Qubilai and "prince" (*wang*) of the appanage of An-hsi 安西, to a Taoist leader. As in the case of similar edicts, this edict begins with a re-statement of the edicts of preceding rulers concerning tribute exemption to be granted the clergy. On the basis of this general policy, the edict granted the recipient similar exemption. This general policy is formulated as follows:³⁶

It has been said in the edicts of Ĵingis qan and the Qa•an (i.e. Ögödei) that Buddhist priests, Nestorian priests, Taoist monks, and Muslim clerics, not being subject to (literally, not seeing) any kind of *alba qubč'iri* except the land and commercial taxes, are to invoke Heaven and give blessings.

The Chinese version, adhering closely to the Mongolian and couched in the colloquial chancellery style found in the *Yüan tien-chang* and other collections of official literature of the period, contains as an equivalent for the phrase *aliba alba qubč'iri ülü üĵen* (literally, "not seeing any kind of *alba qubč'iri*"), the following phrase: 不揀甚麼差發休教當者, "do not cause them to be subject to any kind of *ch'ai-fa*."³⁷

Other Sino-Mongolian edicts of tribute exemption composed during the years between the middle of the thirteenth and the middle of the fourteenth century are written in a similar style, often using exactly the same words. In all these edicts, *alba qubč'iri* emerge as the principal obligations from which the recipients are freed. Likewise, in all of them we find *alba qubč'iri* translated by the Chinese term *ch'ai-fa*. It is difficult to say whether *alba qubč'iri* is to be taken as a single or a dual concept. However, comparisons with similar edicts issued elsewhere will show that we must take it as a dual concept, with *alba* and *qubč'iri* as separate words. Even though a single Chinese term (*ch'ai-fa*) is used to render *alba qubč'iri*, there is evidence from Chinese sources which indicates that we must understand *alba qubč'iri* in a plural and not in a singular sense. For example, when CH'U Ch'u-chi 邱處機, the Taoist leader better known under the name Ch'ang-ch'un chen-jen 長春真人, visited Činggis in 1223, he and his followers were exempted from "all *ch'ai-fa*, great and small" (*ta-hsiao ch'ai-fa*).³⁸

We can now say that the Mongolian terms *alba* and *qubč'iri* (in the Uighur script, *qubč'iri*) referred to those tributes and levies owed by a subject to his Mongolian lord, which the Chinese knew as *ch'ai-fa*. Although we have no explicit description of *alba* (or *alban*) in early Mongolian sources, such as the *Secret History*, the term and the institution played an important role in post-Yüan Mongolian society. VLADIMIROV, writing on Mongolian society of the “medieval period” (fourteenth to seventeenth centuries), states on *alban*:³⁹

Le premier devoir de chaque vassal par rapport à son suzerain—seigneur féodal de tel ou tel rang—est le “service, le recrutement” *alba* (*n*); *alban*, c'est le lien de base de la société féodale mongole, correspondant au “hominium et fidelitas” de l'Europe médiévale.

During the post-Yüan period, the “free subjects” among the Mongols were called *albatu* (i.e., [those] having *alba*). On the obligations of the *albatu*, VLADIMIROV states:⁴⁰

Le dernier des *arat* est *albatu* de son seigneur, mais les seigneurs eux-mêmes, mêmes les princes impériaux, peuvent être dénommés *albatu* par rapport à leur *ājān*, le *hagan* . . . L'*alban* d'un simple particulier vis-à-vis de son maître féodal comprenait en fait les éléments suivants: 1° redevances en nature, bétail et produits d'élevage (*alban qubč'ur*, *š'i'üsün*); 2° service dans le quartier en ce qui concerne la recherche du combustible (l'*argol*) (*argal tügükü*), etc.; 3° service dans la milice du seigneur et participation aux battues (*ayan aba*); 5° redevance des charrois, c'est-à-dire service postal, et ravitaillement des couriers seigneuriaux de passage (*ulağa š'i'üsü*); 5° participation aux procès devant les tribunaux en qualité de témoin (*gäräči*) et de juré (*siha'a*).

All individuals who owed obligations of servitude to a superior were called *albatu*. Slaves (*boyol*) were not called *albatu* because they were in a different social category from the “free” tribute-owing subjects, i.e. the *arad*. As VLADIMIROV shows, *alban* involved not only the payment of tribute in goods, but implied the rendering of a variety of services. His formulation of the *alban* closely resembles that given in the *Hei-ta shih-lüeh*. We find the term *alban* in the multilingual dictionaries of the Ch'ing.⁴¹ *Alban* alone is usually defined as *kuan-ch'ai* 官差 or *kung-wu* 公務, i.e. “government mission” or “official business.” However, in a slightly different context, *alba* is defined as *kung* 貢, “tribute.” ZAKHAROV defines *alban*, as used in the Manchu language, as “imperial or social service, tax in kind, direct tax, obligations, tribute paid to the court,” and adjectively as “crown, social.”⁴² KOWALEWSKI, in his Mongolian-Russian-French dictionary, gives all the above definitions plus another: “state treasury.”⁴³

If one attempts to reduce the different meanings recorded for *alba* ~ *alban* in these dictionaries to a common denominator, one might postulate the following hypothetical, general meaning: *alba* ~ *alban* designated imperial affairs relating to the collecting of tribute and service from tribes subject to the [Ch'ing] Emperor. In a given instance *alba* ~ *alban* might refer to all, some, or one of its different connotations deriving from the above general meaning. Thus in the expression *alba jarulyan-u jüil* (the Chinese rendering is *kuan-ch'ai lei* 官差類, “section on government missions”), which may be rendered as “section on imperial service,” its general connotation is expressed.⁴⁴ Another similar instance is the expression *alban-u sorqayul*, “imperial school.” On the other hand, in an expression like *alba barimui* (the Chinese rendering is *chin-kung* 進貢, “to present tribute”), which may be translated as “[one] brings tribute,” only one of its connotations, viz., the rendering of tribute, is expressed. Again, in the expression *alba-dur oroγulqu* (undoubtedly derived from the Chinese *mo-kuan* 沒官, “to confiscate”),

which may be rendered literally as “to cause to enter the crown [treasury],” *alba* assumes the connotation of crown or government.⁴⁵

In short, *alban* (or *alba*) meant not only the tributary obligations of a subject to his lord, but designated in general the relationship between subject and lord. In the case of *alban* used in the Ch’ing dictionaries, it designated the relationships of the Mongolian subjects to the Ch’ing Emperor, their *qayan*. This was because the rendering of tribute was not merely a financial transaction, but the expression of a bond of personal servitude on the part of a subject to his ruler.

If *alba* ~ *alban* designated the basic tribute (in goods and services) owed by a subject to his lord, what was the *qubčiri*? In the multilingual dictionaries of the Ch’ing, *qubčiyur* (a variant form of *qubčiri* [in ’Phags-pa script: *qubč’iri*], from which the Turco-Persian *qubčūr* is derived) is defined by the Chinese *fu* 賦, “tax,” and the Türkî *kharāf* (an Arabic word, derived from *kharāfā*, “to go out,” which traditionally designated the land tax).⁴⁶ Here we are dealing with an evolved meaning of the term, which is quite dissimilar to its primitive meaning. During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, *qubčiri* appeared frequently in Turkic, Persian, and Armenian texts of the West in its variant form *qubčūr*. The expression *qubčiri qubčir* occurs often in the *Secret History* in the sense “to levy a levy.”⁴⁷ This expression is regularly translated by the Chinese gloss *lien* 斂 or *k’o-lien* 科斂.⁴⁸ *K’o-lien* literally means “to impose [taxation] by categories and collect.” Although these glosses were made during the early years of the Ming, the compound *k’o-lien* is not a term peculiar to the Ming; it was used frequently during the Yän. A memorial complaining of injustices in the administration of the silver tax (*pao-yin*) speaks of corrupt officials in the following words:⁴⁹ “In imposing and collecting (*k’o-lien*), they do their utmost to get a surplus, [but] in paying [to the government] they secretly make deductions.” The *k’o-lien* actually refers to the assessment of a quota amount of taxes on the population. We know that the Mongolian fiscal system operated on the basis of fixed quotas (*e* 額, *muqarrar*). These quotas were decreed in accordance with the fiscal needs of the ruler. They were then assessed on the population. This assessment was usually called *k’o-lien* or *k’o-ch’ai* in Chinese, and *qismat* in Persian. Such assessment was used particularly when extraordinary levies were decreed by the ruler.

That *qubčiri* is associated with the concept of levy is shown by its use in a passage of the *Secret History*. When Činggis gave refuge to the fleeing and destitute Ong Qan, he, “levying a levy” (*qubčiri qubčijū*), gave [it] to Ong Qan, caused him to enter his camp, and nourished him.”⁵⁰ The Chinese translation formulates the incident as follows:⁵¹ “Ch’eng-chi-ssu (Činggis) thereupon had the people provide [for him].” It is clear from this passage in the *Secret History* that *qubčiri* designated a levy imposed by the ruler on his subjects to take care of some special need. The etymology of *qubčiri* is obscure. Ultimately, it may be related to the word *qubi*, “part, share.” The late Paul PELLIOU, in his detailed study of *qubčiri* and its variant forms, unfortunately suggested no etymology for the word.⁵² In the *Hua-i i-yü* 華夷譯語, the term *alban qubčirin* is glossed as *ch’ai-fa k’o-lien*.⁵³ This makes it clear that in the early Ming, the expression *alba qubčiri* was taken as two separate words. *Alba* ~ *alban* was taken in the sense of *ch’ai-fa*, and *qubčiri* ~ *qubčirin* in the sense of *k’o-lien*. Whereas the primitive meaning of *qubčiri* was “levy,” the later formalizations of the extraordinary levies into fixed taxes (see the “Introduction”) led to a change in meaning from “levy” to “tax.”

We can now say that the two basic concepts underlying Mongolian fiscal practices within nomadic Mongolian society itself were the concepts of *alban* and *qubčiri*. One

was the concept of the permanent customary tribute, in its widest, most inclusive sense. The other was the concept of the extraordinary levy based on quotas. Both were based on the concept of personal servitude. They were rendered by individuals to their lord. We must remember this point, for in the subsequent evolution of these two concepts (specifically their transformation from tribute-levy to tax), they always retained certain of their basic elements. Thus the *qubčûr*, even in its evolved form, remained a poll tax paid by individuals (or, as in China, by households) on the basis of fixed tax quotas. The Chinese of the Yüan used the generic term *ch'ai-fa* to describe *alba qubčiri* in general, both in its primitive and evolved forms.

III. MONGOLIAN TRIBUTARY PRACTICES IN THE WEST

The same fiscal obligations which existed in Mongolian society, and which the Mongols imposed on China, also came into being in the western regions which they conquered. The same tributes were collected, the same levies carried out, and the same service and subjection demanded from the population. There too we find a confusing welter of terminology, made more confusing by the fact that new and different languages were involved, i.e. Persian and Turkic. However, as we shall show, the *alban* and the *qubčiri* there too formed the basis of those fiscal obligations introduced by the Mongols.

1. Persia

After Möngke became *qayan* in 1253, the Mongolian armies again set in motion. In southern and western China, armies headed by Qubilai, younger brother of Möngke, carried on the war against the Southern Sung. In the West, other armies headed by Hülegü, the younger brother of Qubilai, conquered Persia. There, in 1258, Hülegü established a new *ulus* and assumed the title *ilkhân*. The Mongols introduced into Persia essentially the same practices which they had introduced earlier into North China. In China, the conquered population had been divided into two groups: (1) those who were the direct subjects of the *qayan* and (2) those who were granted by the *qayan* to the related and allied nobility. In Central Asia and Persia, a similar division took place, except that there the supreme ruler was the *khân* and not the *qayan*. There these two categories of people were called *dalay* and *injü* respectively.⁵⁴ In time, these terms came to designate not only the population groups, but categories of land as well. *Dalay* land was the immediate property of the ruler, the *khân*; *injü* property designated the appanages belonging to the relatives of the ruler. Along with the appanage system, the Mongols also introduced their fiscal practices into Persia.

The early accounts of the Mongolian invasions generally speak of the countless levies and requisitions practiced by the Mongolian armies and itinerant envoys. The Armenian account by Grigory of Akanc' speaks of "tribute known as *mal* and *t'ayar*," "tzyu, *mal*, *t'ayar*, *mal*, and *yp'c'ur*," and "*mal*, *t'ayar*, and *xalan*."⁵⁵ Each of these terms designated an important fiscal practice introduced by the Mongols. However, of these, *yp'c'ur* and *xalan* (or, as they appear in the Persian sources, *qubčûr* and *qalân*) represent the most important and basic of the group, as will be shown in the discussion below.

Edicts of tribute exemption were granted by the Mongolian rulers to clerics of the West as well as to those of China. Although, to my knowledge, none of the edicts

granted the Muslim clerics of Persia has survived, Rašidu 'd-Dīn has preserved an edict issued by Ghâzân Khân on the subject of tribute exemption to be granted the clergy. This edict contains the following passage:⁵⁶

And as the judgment of the Great Decree of Činggis Khân was such that [Muslim] judges, "wise men" (i.e. *mullâ's*), and the 'Alī'ites (i.e., Shi'ites) were not to pay *qalân* nor *qubčûr*. We (i.e. Ghâzân Khân) have decreed that in that manner they be exempted and freed, that one not collect either *mâl* nor *qubčûr* [from them], nor that one take relay animals and food⁵⁷ from them, nor that one take lodging in their houses, nor that envoys carry anything off, and that their *beneficia*, in the manner in which they are registered in the [tax] registers, be paid from year to year without fail.⁵⁸

The form and content of this edict closely resembles those of the Sino-Mongolian edicts discussed above. As in the case of the latter, the edict of Ghâzân first cites the general policy of fiscal exemption for clerics formulated in the "Great Decree" of Činggis, and then lists the contemporary obligations from which the recipient of the edict was freed. The two terms *qalân* and *qubčûr* thus must be the equivalents of the *alba qubčiri* and the *ch'ai-fa* of the Sino-Mongolian edicts. Since both the Persian and the Sino-Mongolian edicts refer to the same Mongolian institution, we are justified in regarding *qalân* as the equivalent of *alba*, and *qubčûr* as the equivalent of *qubčiri*.⁵⁹ Regardless of their ultimate etymology, we must regard *qalân* and *qubčûr* as Turkic words, because the principal language of the Mongols in the West was Turkic, not Mongolian. This is indicated by the fact that in the Persian sources of the period the overwhelming majority of foreign words relating to Mongolian institutions is Turkic and not Mongolian. As far as the terminology relating to Mongolian institutions in general is concerned, we must keep the following duality in mind: Mongolian language terms used in the East have their counterpart in Turkic language terms used in the West.

In the above edict, Ghâzân exempted the clerics from the payment of *mâl* and *qubčûr*. The *mâl* and *qubčûr* of the time of Ghâzân represent two of the major taxes of the period, amply described in the Persian sources.⁶⁰ As in the case of the *pao-yin* and *ssu-liao* taxes of China, the *mâl* and *qubčûr* of the time of Ghâzân evolved out of the original *qalân* and *qubčûr*, i.e. the original *alba qubčiri*, of the early period.

Unlike *qubčûr*, which, in Persia, came to designate a specific kind of tax during the latter part of the thirteenth century, *qalân* always retained the more vague and general sense of "tribute and service." Although *qalân* does not appear in the sections of the works of Rašidu 'd-Dīn dealing with taxation during the reign of Ghâzân, it appears in a number of other sections. In an edict of Ghâzân dealing with the fidelity of the ruler to contracts and treaties, it is stated:⁶¹

Repeatedly, he (i.e. Ghâzân) reprimanded the *amîrs*, the judges, and the *wazîrs* [saying] that every time people come with complaints against the *hâkims*, and the *mutaşarrîfs*,⁶² they accept their words with haste; he indicated that it was possible that those people had not given *qalân* before then and had placed their burden on others, that the *hâkim* brought them into the *qalân*, and that such people naturally complained.

Moreover, he ordered that:⁶³

You are to inquire of all the subjects who bear the *qalân* whether he (i.e. the *hâkim*) is cruel to them or not, and whether they (i.e. the subjects who pay the *qalân*) want him or not, so that the manner of his circumstances can be determined.

In another edict of Ghâzân dealing with the granting of special lands (*iqṭāʿ*) to the military, the revenues from which were to support them,⁶⁴ it is stated: “Know that these *iqṭāʿ* are to be assigned to men of the army who come into the *qalân* and who render service.”⁶⁵ Again, in another edict dealing with the brideprice for wives, it is stated: “If the money of the father be exhausted by bride-prices for wives, from whence are to come the means for the education of his sons, and the needs of their *qalân* and their labor [service]?”⁶⁶

In these edicts, *qalân* is used in the sense of obligations to the ruler. In the last two edicts mentioned above, *qalân* is associated with two words meaning “service,” namely, the Turkic *küç* and the Persian *kâr*. *Küç* basically means “strength, force”; however, at that time it was commonly used in the sense of service. *Kâr* basically means “labor,” but, like *küç*, also meant “service.” In China, we also find the term *ch’ai-fa* sometimes paired with *ch’ai-i* 差役, “imperial corvée,” where the former takes on the narrower meaning “tribute” and the latter the meaning “labor service.” In the Persian sources, the word *mâl*, an Arabic word meaning “wealth, goods,” is often used in contexts where one expects *qalân*. *Mâl*, which designated a tax during the period of Ghâzân and apparently evolved out of the *qalân* concept, may have been used to designate *qalân* in the specific sense of “tribute,” as opposed to *küç* or *kâr*, “service.”

The word *qalân* occurs several times in the Uighur documents from Central Asia studied by Radloff and Malov. One of these documents, addressed to the Čaṡatai’id ruler Toyluq Tämür (1348–1362/63) is a plea from *inǰū* gardeners (*inǰū bayčïlarï*), to the *Khân* complaining that they were being forced to pay *qalân* to the *Khân*. The *inǰū* domains were in fact appanages granted members of his clan by the *Khân*. The inhabitants of these domains thus became the direct subjects of these appanage-holders. Consequently, they owed their primary obligations to their appanage lord, and not to the *Khân*. As the document states, when tax officials of the *Khân* came through the area:⁶⁷

In imposing *qalan*, never was *qalan* imposed on the *inǰū* gardeners . . . we, from the time of these previous *khâns*, together with our elder and our younger brothers, have been cultivating our gardens; not subject to any other *alban* and *yasag*, we have continued to serve our *khâns*.

The document implies that the *inǰū* gardeners traditionally were subject to only one single obligation of *alban* and *yasag*, undoubtedly that owed to their appanage lord. However, in recent years, they had been forced to render *qalân* to the *Khân* as well, and complained to the *Khân* of their burden. This is the only document in the group wherein the term *alban* occurs. Given the frequent use of the expression *qalân yasag* in the documents, I feel that the Turkic *qalân* and the Mongolian *alban* essentially designated the same thing.

The terms *qalân* and *qubčûr* occur repeatedly in the Persian sources.⁶⁸ In one of his letters, Rašïdu ’d-Dîn exempts the properties (*amlâk*) of the people of Isfahân from “levies and divisions [of wealth?], *qalân* and *qubčûr*.”⁶⁹ In another letter, Rašïdu ’d-Dîn remonstrates with his son Maḥmûd for having plunged the inhabitants of Bam into poverty through state levies (*tafâwut wa taklîfât-i dîwânî*), a succession of “imperial assignments” (*hawâlât-i sulṭânî*) (i.e. fiscal documents granted by the *Khân* empowering the holder to collect a specified tax quota), *qalân* and *qubčûr*, military service (*čârîk*), and the expenses of his retinue (*ikhrâjât-i mutafarriqah*).⁷⁰ Rašïdu ’d-Dîn orders the following remedy:⁷¹

They shall not demand [anything] for a period of three years on the pretext of *qalân* and *qubčûr*, extraordinary levies and impositions [both] of the Dîwân of Kirmân and the Grand Ordo (i.e. the Court of the Il-khan), so that their ruined places and fallow fields again may come into a state of construction and cultivation.

In a letter dealing with fiscal problems in Khûzistân, *qalân* is qualified by the following words: “*qalân* for the *amîr*’s (i.e. the Mongolian military nobility) of the *Khân*, going and coming.”⁷² In the table following this item, *qalân* is indicated to be payable by a certain sum of *dînâr*’s. In this case, the *qalân* revenues were presumably destined to defray the costs of the missions of the ruler’s generals.

Qalân, whether used in the specific sense of “a tax” as above or in the general sense of “obligation,” basically designated the tribute, or the tribute and service, owed directly to the *khân* or to the nobles possessing *inǰū* land. *Qubčûr*, in the above contexts, may still have been used in the old sense of “levy.” However, in the Persia of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, as a whole it designated a tax in currency, or sometimes even in kind (*vide infra*). The dual term, *qalân* and *qubčûr*, as a generic term, designated the general tribute obligations of a subject to his overlord, whether *khân* or member of the nobility.

If *qalân* and *qubčûr* were the Il-khân’id equivalent of *alba qubčiri*, one may wonder if there is any etymological relationship between these terms. There is no doubt about the relationship of *qubčûr* and *qubčiri*, but what about *qalân* and *alban*? There is a distinct possibility that these two words may ultimately be cognates. There is a word in the *Liao-shih* which seems to be a cognate of the Mongolian *alban*. It occurs in two transcriptions: (1) *a-lu-wan*, and (2) *ho-lu-wan*.⁷³ This indicates that the word may have existed in two forms: (1) **alwan*, and (2) **qalwan* or **halwan*. PELLIOU has already shown that certain words with an initial q- in Turkic appear without the q- in Mongolian.⁷⁴ The word *qalân* cannot be readily explained on the basis of a Turkic etymology. It does not occur in the *Dîwân Luyâti ‘t-Turk* of Maḥmûd Kâšgarî, written in the year 1073. This makes it possible that the word is not of Turkic origin. In the early decades of the twelfth century, the realm of the Qara Khitâi arose in what is today Chinese Turkestan, founded by refugees of the Liao Dynasty. We know that many words relating to administrative and fiscal matters were introduced into Uighur and other Eastern Turkic languages by the Qara Khitâi. For example, the well-known *paiza*, from the Chinese *p’ai-tzū* 牌子, probably came into Uighur through the Qara Khitâi.⁷⁵ Consequently, it may be suggested that the word *qalân* was introduced into Uighur from the language of the Ch’i-tan through the Qara Khitâi.

The basic meaning of *alban* seems to involve the idea of giving. The Russian translation of *alban*, *dan’* (*vide infra*) is derived from the verb *dat’*, “to give.”⁷⁶ The words *a-lu-wan* and *ho-lu-wan* in the *Liao-shih* are described as meaning “to assist.” Since the language of the Ch’i-tan seems to be related to Mongolian, one would naturally look for some root word in Mongolian from which *alban* was derived. The only satisfactory root is the defective verb *ali*, which means “give it here!” There is, of course, the Turkic root *al-*, “to take.” However, there are no Turkic deverbal suffixes which would explain either the formation *alban* or *qalân*. Manchu and Tungus have a verb root *ali-* which means both to give and to receive, somewhat like the Chinese *feng* 奉.

Although the evidence is still insufficient to be certain, I should like to advance the following hypothesis: The Turkic word *qalân* and the Mongolian word *alban* both derive from a word **qalwan*~**alwan* which existed during the Liao. It was transmitted north to the Mongols (either directly or through the Chin) in the form *alban*, and westward to the

Turks (most likely the Uighurs) in the form *qalân*. Both derive from some Altaic root meaning “to give.” The idea of giving is basic to the tribute concept.

In the above discussion, I have suggested that the Turkic *yasag* was used in the same sense as *qubčiri* and *qubčûr*. Since the term *yasag* in a fiscal sense is used largely (though not exclusively) among the Turks of Central Asia and the Golden Horde, I shall discuss the relation between those two terms in the succeeding sections.

At this point, I shall not discuss the actual nature of the *qalân* and *qubčûr* as fiscal obligations practiced in the Il-khanate. Suffice it here to point out that *qalân* and *qubčûr* were the early tributes and levies known in Mongolian as *alba qubčiri*. Ultimately, the *qalân* developed into a kind of permanent, formalized tribute paid by individuals both to the Il-khan and to the nobility. The *qubčûr*, as we shall point out below, developed into a kind of poll tax which was collected from urban inhabitants in money, and from nomads in animals. In the latter form, it has been regarded as a herd tax by many scholars. However, that was merely one of its manifestations. Basically, it was a poll tax, the evolved form of early Mongolian levies. Both words have all but died out in Persia. However, a faint vestige of the *qalân* is still evident in the *qalûn* (in colloquial Persian *â* is usually pronounced *û*) of Kirmân Province, where it designates a kind of obligatory service to be performed by a peasant for his landlord.⁷⁷

2. Russia

After the conquest of Russia by the Mongols, the Russian princes (*knjaz'ja*) submitted one after the other to the invaders. With the formal establishment of the *ulus* of the Golden Horde in Saray-on-the-Volga in 1243, the Russian princes became the tributaries of the *Khân* of the Golden Horde. As elsewhere in their vast realms, the Mongols introduced their own peculiar fiscal practices into Russia. One of these was the policy of tribute exemption, or as it is called by Russian historians, juridical-fiscal immunity, granted the clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church.

The edicts of tribute exemption granted the clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church represent another important group of these edicts in existence. For over a century, many Russian historians were skeptical about the genuineness of these edicts; some even regarded them as forgeries of relatively recent date. This was due not only to the existence of several mutually contradictory texts, but also to the motivation behind the collection of these edicts by some unknown compiler early in the sixteenth century. An epilogue to the collection contrasts the favor shown the Church by the pagan Tatars with the then prevalent aggressions against the Church and its possessions by the Christian Russian princes.⁷⁸ Consequently, a number of historians were naturally suspicious about the validity of these documents.

During the early part of this century, M. D. PRISELKOV, one of Russia's great scholars of medieval Russian literature, published a detailed study of the textual history of these documents.⁷⁹ He indicated that there were two basic textual traditions, one which he called the “short collection,” and another which he called the “extended collection.” Indicating that the latter was based on the former, he set about reconstructing the original text of the “short collection.” A comparison of PRISELKOV's reconstructed texts with the texts of similar letters of tribute exemption written in Chinese, Mongolian, and Turkic reveals such extraordinary similarity in style, form, and content that no doubt whatsoever remains about the historical validity of these documents.

The collection consists of six documents, which PRISELKOV classifies as “two *jarlyks* and four letters.”⁸⁰ The earliest of these is a letter from Mängü Tämür, *khân* of the Golden Horde, to an unnamed Metropolitan of the Russian Church, probably Kirill. PRISELKOV dates the document as 1 August 1267 (Julian).⁸¹ Three of the documents are letters granted in the name of Taidula, called “empress” by the unknown compiler. The first of these (second in the “short collection”) was addressed to the Russian Grand Prince Semën IVANOVICH, and is dated by PRISELKOV as 26 September 1347 (Julian). PRISELKOV states the following about this letter:⁸²

“... [it] reveals to the attentive observer the history, hitherto completely unknown, of the relations and developments of princely power at the expense of the power of the metropolitans in the domain of mixed courts during the metropolitanships of Pëtr, Theognost, Aleksej, and Kiprian.”

The second of these (sixth in the “short collection”) is addressed to the Metropolitan Aleksej, and is dated by PRISELKOV as 11 February 1354 (Julian). This letter is a kind of safe-conduct granted the Metropolitan on the occasion of his journey to Constantinople for his investiture.⁸³ The third of these (fourth in the “short collection”) is a real letter of tribute exemption granted the Metropolitan Theognost, and is dated by PRISELKOV as 4 February 1351 (Julian). The last two are likewise documents of tribute exemption, and are the only ones which are specifically called *jarlyk* within the documents themselves. The first of these (fifth in the “short collection”) is a *jarlyk* from the *khân* Berdebek (Bärdi Beg) to the Metropolitan Aleksej, and is dated by PRISELKOV as November, 1357. The second of these is a *jarlyk* from the *khân* Tjuljak (Tulun Beg) to the Metropolitan Mikhail, and is dated by PRISELKOV in the year 1379.⁸⁴ These last two are almost exactly alike, word for word.

These six documents are of immense importance in the study of the rise of church power in medieval Russia, and the development of the institution of juridical-fiscal immunity. However, in this article, I shall merely treat of these documents as sources for the elucidation of the fiscal obligations which the Turco-Mongols introduced into Russia. Below, I present an integral translation of two of these documents, the letter of Mängü Tämür, and the *jarlyk* of Bärdi Beg.

The letter of Mängü Tämür:⁸⁵

By the power of the Supreme God, by the will [of] the Supreme Trinity. The word of Mengutemir.⁸⁶

To the civil governors and princes, and to the military princes. Also to the tribute-men, to the scribes, to the passing envoys, to the falconers, and to the leopardists.⁸⁷

The Emperor Çin-giz [said]:

“Whatever there be hereafter: tribute or comestibles, now they shall not take them. May they pray to God with true heart for Us and Our tribe, and bless Us.”⁸⁸

So saying,⁸⁹ and subsequent emperors in the same way favored the priests and monks: be it tribute or anything else that may be: the seal [toll] (i.e. the commercial tax), the plough [toll], [maintenance of] postal relays, war [service], no one shall demand anything. And [so] they spoke, [and letters] were given (?).⁹⁰ Who thus does not know this among Us? We all know it.

And We, invoking God, have not taken away their letters.

So saying, [We decree that] in the original way:

“Whatever tribute, or plough [toll], or [furnishing of] vehicle[s], or comestibles, whosoever it may be, let him not demand [such]. They shall not give [anything for the maintenance of] postal relays, war [services], the seal [tax].

“Or whatever church [possessions]: land, water, gardens, vineyards, mills, wintering places,

summering places, let them not seize them.⁹¹ And if they should take them, let them return them.

“And whatever church [people]: masters (i.e. artisans), let the falconers, leopardists, [and] whosoever it might be, not seize them, nor keep them under surveillance.⁹²

“Or whatever there be in their law: books or anything else, let them not seize [them] nor tear [leaves] out, nor destroy them.

“And whosoever slander their faith, that man shall exculpate himself and die.

“Those who eat the same bread as the priests and live in the same house, with whom there be brother or son, moreover unto them [be] favor in the same way, if they do not betake themselves from them (i.e. if they do not betake and separate themselves from the priests). If they should betake themselves from them, be it tribute or whatever else, let them thereupon give [it] to him (to the priest?).”

Now, the priests have been favored by Us according to the original letter:

“May Ye continue to invoke God and bless Us. But if Ye should not have a true heart in invoking God for Us, then sin shall be upon You.”

So saying, [We say]:

“If someone be not a priest, [such as] other people, but he (i.e. the priest) should have taken [him] unto himself, let him pray to God, so that he [too] shall be [included] in that.”⁹³

So saying, We have given the letter to this Metropolitan. Those who see and hear this letter shall not demand either tribute or anything else from the priests and monks, nor shall governors,⁹⁴ princes, scribes, plough[-toll] men, nor seal [-toll] men take [anything from them]. But if they should take [something], they shall exculpate themselves according to the Great Jaza and shall die.

“So saying, [this letter] was written in the year of the hare, the first month of autumn, on the fourth of the old [third of the month],⁹⁵ on the Tala.”⁹⁶

The *jarlyk* of Bärđi Beg:⁹⁷

By the power and grandeur of the Immortal God since [Our] fathers and grandfathers.

The word of Berdebēk. By the suggestion (i.e. memorial) of Mulabuga.⁹⁸

To the Tatar, the Ulus, and the Military Princes.⁹⁹

To [their] own district governors. And to the princes, and scribes, and seal[-toll] men, and [river] bank [control] men, and the passing envoys, and the falconers, and the leopardists, and the *buraložniki*,¹⁰⁰ and the post [guards], and the boat men, or whomsoever proceed on whatever task, to the multitude, and to all.¹⁰¹

The Emperor Čin-giz and subsequent emperors, our fathers, and for whom prayer-men and the entire caste of priests prayed, [decreed]:

“Whatever tribute there be, or custom, it is not necessary for them to observe it, so that they may invoke God in peace and repeat the prayer.”

So saying, they granted the *jarlyks*. And whosoever it might be, all [of the emperors ?], having known this, granted the *jarlyks*. And now, We, not changing the *jarlyks* of the original emperors, having thought [this] out, in the same [way] have favored the Metropolitan Aleksej, [and state]:

“As [he is] seated in Volodimir,¹⁰² prays to God for Us and Our tribe, and recites the prayer,” so We have spoken:

“Whatever tribute there may be, or custom, they shall not take [such] from them; nor vehicle[s], nor comestibles, nor food, nor levies,¹⁰³ nor honoring (?),¹⁰⁴ they shall not give [such].

“Or whatever church [possessions]: homes, lands, waters, gardens, vineyards, mills, they shall not take them [away] from them, nor do any violence upon them.

“And whosoever has taken anything, or whosoever take anything, let them give it back.

“And in their church houses, whosoever it may be, let them not establish themselves

therein, nor destroy them. But whosoever should establish himself [therein] or destroy them, they shall be in sin and shall die.

“And Thou, Aleksej the Metropolitan, and all your priestly caste shall repeat that we (i.e. the Metropolitan and the priests) have been thus favored. Indeed, whatever Thou doest through customary [law] unto church houses, lands, waters, gardens, vineyards, or unto church people, that is up to Thee. Or whosoever commit whatever [kind of] evil deed by thievery, murder, [and] lie, Thou shouldst not look upon it, but Thou thyself shalt know how to make rectification thereon. And pray for Us to God. Henceforth Thou [art] the leader, and We shall say nothing [about] that.”

So We have spoken. We have given to You the *paiza*¹⁰⁵ and the *jarlyk* with the crimson seal as confirmation.

[Written] in the year of the hen,¹⁰⁶ the tenth month, in [the year] 708, in the month of Sylgat,¹⁰⁷ on the tenth of the new [third of the month].¹⁰⁸

And the Court¹⁰⁹ was nomadizing on the Kaonga.

It was written.

Mulabuga, Usjain, Sarai, Jagaltai, Kutlubuga¹¹⁰ and the leading princes have presented a petition.

Seunč Temir Mjur Bakši has written [this *jarlyk*].”¹¹¹

The obligations from which the Metropolitan and his people were exempted are immediately recognizable as those existing in other parts of the realm: the tribute (*dan*'), the commercial tax (*tamγa*), the obligation to maintain the postal relay system (*jam*), the requirement to furnish envoys and soldiers with provisions, and the obligations to render military service. It is interesting to note that the clergy was also exempted from a plough tax, seemingly the Russian equivalent of the land taxes of other parts of the realm. However, the plough tax was not a real land tax. On the contrary, ploughs were regarded as a measure of wealth and levies were made accordingly.

The principal obligations from which the Metropolitan were exempted are summarized in the expression: “Whatever tribute (*dan*') there may be, or custom (*pošlina*), they shall not take [such] from them.” *Dan*' is a word designating an institution recorded in Russian sources for many centuries antedating the Mongolian period, and in precisely the same sense used during that time: a tribute paid by subject to ruler. *Pošlina*, however, is a different matter. The word *pošlina* appears quite frequently in the chronicles relating to the pre-Mongolian period, but usually in the sense of “ancient practice, custom, usage.” PREOBRAŽEN-SKIJ gives it an even wider meaning: “ancient law.”¹¹² It does not occur very often in the chronicles relating to the pre-Mongolian period in the sense of fiscal obligation or toll (which is the modern meaning). A letter of the Prince of Novgorod Vsevolod to the Church of John the Baptist (Ioann Predteča) of about 1136 is recorded wherein the priests of the church are granted in perpetuity the *pošlina* “from the merchants in the Rus’.”¹¹³

Two problems are involved here: (1) the semantic and institutional content of *pošlina* in the Russia of this period, and (2) the Mongolian or Turkic equivalent of *pošlina*, in view of the fact that these edicts are direct translations of a Mongolian or Turkic original. I shall deal with the second problem first.

Since Turkic was the official language of the Golden Horde, we are justified in regarding these documents as Russian translations of a Turkic and not a Mongolian original. From internal evidence in the Russian edicts, it is clear that *pošlina* was used to render a Turkic term *yasa-yasaq*. This can be seen from the following passages. The first is from the edict of Bärđi Beg:

“Indeed, whatever Thou doest through customary [law] (*pošlina*) unto church houses, lands, waters, gardens, vineyards, or unto church people, that is up to Thee.” Again, another passage from the letter of Taidula to the Metropolitan Aleksej:¹¹⁴

“Now whosoever hereupon commit violence, he shall explain himself on the Great Custom (*Pošlina*).” Again, in a passage from the edict of Mängü Tämür:

“But if they should take [something], they shall exculpate themselves according to the Great Jaza and shall die.”

There is no doubt that the phrase *po velicej jaze* refers to the “Great Yasa” of Činggis Qan. On the basis of the above-cited passages, it is clear that the phrase: *na velikoj pošline*, and the phrase *po velicej jaze* must refer to the same thing, namely the “Great Yasa.” Therefore, we are justified in asserting that *pošlina* in this instance was used to render the Turkic *yasa*. The word *yasa~yasaq* in Turkic, like *pošlina*, has a dual meaning in the Mongolian period. On the one hand, it is sometimes rendered by scholars as “law.” In view of Turco-Mongolian social structure, it would be more correct to render *yasa~yasaq* as a formulated or un-formulated customary law. On the other hand, as will be seen in the subsequent section on the Golden Horde, *yasa~yasaq* also had the meaning of fiscal obligation. In fact, the expression *qalan yasaq* or *yasaq qalan* occurs in contexts similar to the *alba qubčiri* of the Mongolian edicts.

In asserting the philological equivalence of *pošlina* and *yasa~yasaq*, I am not establishing an institutional equivalence. Before one can attempt an institutional comparison, one must go into the nature of both *pošlina* and *yasaq* in their respective societies.

As stated above, the word *pošlina* does not occur often in the chronicles relating to the pre-Mongolian period, in a fiscal sense. In the letter of Prince Vsevolod, it designated a toll, presumably in money, paid by merchants passing through the territory around Novgorod under the control of the prince. In one of the versions of this letter, we find the following passage:¹¹⁵

“... and give him (i.e. the *Statthalter* of the Grand Prince) 20 *pud* of honey for the sweetening of the pure custom (*pošlina*) according to antiquity.”

Although this phrase is difficult to understand, it is clear that *pošlina* was meant to designate some form of traditional payment, in other words an established fiscal obligation. This explanation thus provides a link between the basic meaning of *pošlina*, “customary [law],” and its derived fiscal meaning.

Although *pošlina* in the fiscal sense appears rarely in documents relating to the pre-Mongolian period, it appears frequently in the *jarlyks* and letters discussed above, and very often in the socio-economic documents of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. In both the *jarlyks* and letters of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and the documents of the fifteenth century, *pošlina* appears as a generic term for a whole series of obligations, ranging from the *tamya* (the commercial tax), a Tatar obligation, to purely internal fiscal obligations, such as the mowing of the prince’s grain and the feeding of his horses. As a whole, however, the category of *pošlinas* did not include the tribute (*dan*), which represented a category by itself. In general, in the documents of the fifteenth century, *pošlina* designates a series of fiscal obligations owed by individuals to their various rulers, obligations in theory permanent and not arbitrary. Some of these, such as the necessity to maintain the postal relay system (*jam*) or the requirement to construct city walls and fortifications (*goroda delati*) were undoubtedly a kind of *corvée*, carried out by actual labor or by commutation with a sum of money. Others, like the *tamya* and the *myt* (the transportation toll) were levied on individuals in terms of products. *Pošlina*, in fact, can be perfectly rendered by the English word “custom,” for

“custom,” in medieval times, meant both “customary service owed by feudal tenants to their lord, customary rent paid in kind or in money,” as well as “toll.” In a semi-feudal society, such as that of medieval Russia, fiscal obligations tended to be personal, reflecting personal loyalties and bonds, rather than material, based on land. Consequently, the similarity of the *pošlina* institution to the “custom” (or *consuetudo*) institution of medieval Europe is not surprising.

In the Russian *jarlyks* and letters, the terms *dan'* and *pošlina* occur as a unit summing up the fiscal obligations from which exemption was granted. I have already shown that *pošlina* is a rendering of *yasa-yasaq*. In the Turkic edicts, we find a similar dual expression in the form *qalan yasaq* or *yasaq qalan*, and I have already mentioned similar dualities for Persia, deriving from the Mongolian expression *alba qubčiri*. Consequently, we can state that the expression *dan' i pošlina* ultimately is a philological equivalent of *alba qubčiri*.

At this point it seems fit to inquire whether the various institutions referred to by these terms corresponded in actual practice. *Alba* and *dan'*, of course, correspond perfectly. Both designated tribute. *Qubčiri*, as I have indicated above, meant basically “levy.” It was a levy imposed on individuals in terms of wealth such as land or herds. Thus we may call it a poll levy. However, with the consolidation of the Turco-Mongolian conquests, institutions became stabilized and the irregular levies were transformed into regular taxes. Yet, even in its evolved form, the *qubčiri* remained a poll tax based on wealth, such as herds, textiles, etc. Since the word *yasa* ~ *yasaq* fundamentally meant [customary] law, we can assume that fiscally it designated some kind of permanent obligation, rather than an arbitrary levy. In other words, *yasa* ~ *yasaq*, in the Turkic documents of the Golden Horde, emerges as an institutional equivalent of the evolved concept, rather than of the primitive *qubčiri* concept.

The term *pošlina* in medieval Russia covered a considerable number of obligations, some of which were native to Russian society, while others were introduced by the Turco-Mongols. Suffice it to say that with the growth of the Muscovite state power, the multiplicity of *pošlinas* tended to be subsumed into fixed payments in currency, the *obroks*.

3. The Golden Horde

The Golden Horde, as it was known in the Russian sources (*Zolotaja Orda*) or the Khanate of Qipčaq, as it was known in the Islamic and Chinese sources, was formally established in the year 1243 by Batu, grandson of Činggis and conqueror of Russia and Eastern Europe. With its capital at Saray-on-the-Volga, the territory of the Horde stretched from Central and Southern Russia deep into the plains of Central Asia, covering the Plain of the Qipčaq (Däst-i Qipčaq), as that region was known in the Islamic sources. Almost as soon as the Horde was established, Batu carved out two major appanages and gave them to his brothers. To his elder brother Orda, he gave the region around the Aral Sea, which thenceforth received the name Aq Ordo, i.e. the “White Horde.” To his younger brother Saiban, he gave the region around the southern Urals, which thenceforth received the name Kök Ordo, i.e. the “Blue Horde.” The entire territory of Russia, however, remained under the direct jurisdiction of the Khan at Saray. The rule of the Golden Horde was marked by constant dissension and conflict between members of the ruling Turco-Mongolian nobility. Toward the middle of the fifteenth century, three new centers of power arose: (1) Kazan, (2) the Crimea, and

(3) Astrakhan. These new khanates were all founded by relatives of the khans of the Golden Horde, and most of their social and economic institutions were derived from the Golden Horde. Consequently, we must regard them as the last remnants of the great Mongolian Empire of the thirteenth century.

Like the rulers of other parts of the Mongolian Empire, the khans of the Golden Horde and the successor khanates carried on the policy of tribute exemption for the clergy and favored individuals. A number of edicts of tribute exemption, issued by the khans of the Golden Horde and successor khanates, are fortunately still in existence. These documents, which are all written in Turkic, are generally labelled *tarkhân* documents by scholars because of the invariable occurrence of a phrase like: *tarkhân bolsun tidimiz*, "we have said: let him become a *tarkhân*." In other words, in granting fiscal exemption to the favored individual, the khan bestowed upon him the title *tarkhân*.

The *tarkhân* institution thus played a great role not only in each Mongolian *ulus*, but in medieval Russia as well. The policy of tribute exemption toward the church, as shown by the issuance of "*tarkhân* letters" (*tarkhannyje gramoty*), was practiced both by the khans of the Golden Horde and the Russian *knjaz'ja*. It probably contributed greatly to the establishment of the institution of juridical-fiscal immunity for the church, a significant factor in medieval Russian history. After the destruction of the khanate of Kazan, the Russian czars continued to carry out the *tarkhân* policies of the former. Actually, with the fall of the khanate, the Czar of Russia became the successor khan, and is referred to as such in many documents. In the capacity of khan, he collected a fixed tribute, called the *jasak*, from his Asiatic subjects. When the Baškirs submitted to the Czar and became his subjects (*jasáč-nyje*), certain Baškir nobles were exempted from the *jasak* (though not from the requirement to render military service) and were given the title *tarkhân*. They thus formed a group whose social position lay somewhere between that of the *jasáčnyje inorodcy*, i.e. the Asiatic subjects of the Czar who paid the *jasak*, and the group of Asiatic retainers known as the *služylyje ljudi*, literally "people of service," who eventually became partially assimilated into their Russian counterparts.¹¹⁶

There is little direct historical material in existence relating to the Golden Horde. Most of the knowledge we have of the Horde and its successor khanates derives from travellers' descriptions, records in the Russian and Persian sources, and the few documents and letters that still survive. Among the latter, the six extant *tarkhân* documents form one of the most important sources for the study of the administrative and fiscal structure of that society. They are written in the same stereotyped manner in which similar documents were written throughout every Mongol *ulus*, although significant variations in terms and terminology do occur. These documents usually begin by enumerating the officials and persons of the realm concerned with fiscal administration, directly and indirectly, and enjoin them to observe the stipulations of the edict. Then they list, in greater or lesser detail, those obligations due the Khan from which the *tarkhân* is henceforth freed. Of these six, only two actually originated from the Golden Horde. The other four derive from the khanate of the Crimea.

Although the documents have been studied by a number of Russian, Turkish, and German scholars, the true meaning and content of many of the institutions described and mentioned have not been worked out. In general, the edicts free the *tarkhân* from the same obligations which are mentioned in similar edicts elsewhere: from the payment of tribute to the khan, from the obligation to feed and house his envoys and soldiers, from the necessity of maintaining the postal relay system, from the payment of the commercial tax, and from the payment of the land tax. In these edicts, the *yasâq qalân*

figure among the principal obligations from which the *tarkhân* was exempted.¹¹⁷ In the edict of the Crimean Khan Hâjji Gîrâi (1428?–1466), in lieu of the usual expression *yasâq qalân*, we find the expression *îsâq* (= *yasâq*) *albân*.¹¹⁸ Here we have convincing evidence that the Mongolian *alban* and the Turkic *qalân* are indeed equivalents. Nicholas N. POPPE has shown that the Mongolian language was known and used in the Golden Horde.¹¹⁹ Therefore, it is not too surprising to find a Mongolian word used in place of a normal Turkic expression.

These Turkic *tarkhân* documents differ much more in content and terminology than do the Sino-Mongolian and Russian edicts. Therefore, it is more difficult to evaluate the relative importance of the obligations mentioned in the former. However, the frequent mention of taxes connected with commerce makes it seem likely that commercial taxes, such as the *tamγā*, the *tartnaq*, and the *bâč*, formed one of the principal sources of revenue of the khan. In these edicts, the term *qalân* is never qualified or described, and although several types of *yasâq* are mentioned, the real nature of these different types remains unknown. Two kinds of *yasâq* are mentioned in the edict of Hâjji Gîrâi, namely the *bôyûnsa yasâγi* and the *qâldî* (?) *yasâγi*; Walther HINZ has not succeeded in explaining either one satisfactorily.¹²⁰ In the edict of Tämür Qutluq, the following expression occurs: *taban-liq qismat qubur yasâγi*. Neither I. N. BEREZIN, RADLOFF, nor Abdullahoğlu Hassan, three scholars who have worked on this edict, has been able to explain satisfactorily the meaning of the expression.¹²¹ On first glance it seems that three types of *yasâq*, namely *taban-liq yasâγi*, *qismat yasâγi*, and *qubur yasâγi*, are involved. All three scholars agree that *taban-liq* means “subjects” in the collective sense. *Qismat* is a common Arabo-Persian-Turkish word meaning “division.” In the Persian sources of the Mongolian period, *qismat* is often used in the sense of “repartition of taxes among the population.” Ann K. S. LAMBTON has this to say about *qismat*:¹²²

qismat (obs.), see *mu'âmaleh*. The term *qismat* may possibly have been used for a levy made for extraordinary purposes, or for the payment of the expenses of the administration, etc.

mu'âmaleh . . . In Seljuq times there was a special *dîvani mu'âmalât va qismat* which was presumably concerned with revenue derived from public contraction, i.e. revenue paid under agreements of the *muqâtā'eh* type.

As far as the word *qubur* is concerned, BEREZIN suggested that *qubur* may be an error for *qubčur*. The word *yasâq* passed into Russian in the form *jasak*. In later Czarist times, *jasak* designated a kind of fixed tribute paid the czar by some of his Asiatic subjects. It is possible that the *taban-liq yasâγi* may have meant something similar to the Russian *jasak*. In the Turco-Mongolian supplement to the *Muqaddimatu 'l-Âdâb*, the Mongolian cognate of *yasâq*, *jasay*, is explained by the Turkic word *salîγ*, which means simply “impost.”¹²³ It is possible that *yasâq* has this meaning in the above expressions. In any case, whereas only one type of *qalân* existed, there seem to have been several types of *yasâq*, as there were several types of *pošlinas* in Russia.

The *tarkhân* edicts generally list another category of obligations which do not have direct equivalents in other edicts of tribute exemption, namely *musammâ salîγ* or *salîγ musammâ*. HINZ has translated *musammâ salîγ* in the edict of Hâjji Gîrâi as “die sogenannte Kopfsteuer.”¹²⁴ However, the occurrence of the inverted form *salîγ musammâ* in one of the edicts makes it seem unlikely that HINZ’s rendering is correct.¹²⁵ The Turkic word *salîγ* clearly means impost. The Arabic *musammâ* means simply “named,” “mentioned.” Judging from the context of these Turkic edicts, both *yasâq* and *qalân* were

clearly defined obligations. That is to say that *yasâq* was a generic term used to designate several types of formalized taxes, and *qalân* designated the basic obligation of tribute and service. However, it is well known that the Turco-Mongols of the Golden Horde continued to carry out periodic levies over and above the fixed norms of the tribute-tax obligations. Consequently, it may be that the *musamá salîy* or the *salîy musammâ* belong to the category of such levies.

In these Turkic edicts, *yasâq* and *qalân* must be regarded as among the principal obligations of the Golden Horde and the successor khanates. Compared to the Sino-Mongolian and Russian edicts, and the extract of an edict of tribute exemption for the clergy in the work of Rašidu 'd-Dîn, these Turkic edicts are much later in time. Consequently, the institutional significance of many of the common terms may vary greatly from the original meaning in the edicts of the first Mongol rulers. *Yasâq*, in particular, seems to have taken on the more formalized meaning of tax. However, *yasâq* and *qalân* are the only expressions in these edicts which can be regarded as generically similar to the *alba qubčiri* of the Sino-Mongolian edicts.

4. Conclusions

The above discussion is based on the premise that the Mongols introduced the fiscal practices peculiar to their own society into every *ulus* which they founded. Specifically, they introduced the same system of tributes and levies, known to them as *alba qubčiri*, throughout their domains. Of course, as time went on these tributes and levies changed into various kinds of taxes and other types of fiscal obligations. However, regardless of such changes in form, the *alba qubčiri* remained direct sources of revenue for the Mongolian rulers and the related and allied nobility. Because of the linguistic diversity in the Mongolian Empire, *alba qubčiri* was called differently in the various languages concerned. On the basis of the above discussions, I suggest the following terminological equivalences:

Mongolian:	<i>alba (n)</i>	<i>qubčiri</i>
Chinese:	<i>ch'ai-fa</i>	
Persian:	<i>qalân</i>	<i>qubčûr</i>
Russian:	<i>dan'</i>	<i>pošlina</i>
Turkic:	<i>qalân</i>	<i>yasâq</i>

We have already shown the philological equivalence of *pošlina* and *yasâq*, but what is the relationship between *yasâq* and *qubčiri*? In the juridical documents from Central Asia mentioned above, we have an indication that *yasâq* and *qubčiri* were used in the same sense. Neither the word *qubčûr* nor any of its variants, to my knowledge, appears in texts of the Golden Horde. On the other hand, the word *yasâq* in its fiscal sense is used only rarely in the Persian sources, whereas the word *qubčûr* appears quite frequently. The Turco-Mongolian supplement to the *Muqaddimatu 'l-Âdâb* defines the Mongolian cognate of *yasâq*, *jasay*, as *salîy*, "impost." The word *yasâq* was derived from the common Turkic verbal root *yasa-*, "to fix," "to determine," whence its other meaning "law." In Persia, the word *qubčûr* came to designate a specific kind of tax. *Yasâq* in a fiscal sense was rarely used. However, in the Ankara inscription (*vide infra*) we have an instance of *yasâ* (a variant form of *yasâq*) used in a generic sense to include obligations of the *qubčûr* type. In the Turkic documents of the Golden Horde, the word *yasâq* occurs to

the exclusion of the words *qubčiri qubčūr*. In the Uighur documents from Central Asia, however, there are six occurrences of the word *qubčir* (another variant form of *qubčiri* ~ *qubčūr*) to only two of the word *yasâq*.¹²⁶ One of these documents contains the following passage:¹²⁷

“Tačadan, my word. To Tayinčaq:

“For your *qubčir* grain give three *kūri* of grain to this Šamış Tayışma. I am collecting the imperial *yasâq*.”¹²⁸

The occurrence of both *qubčir* and *yasâq* in the same passage indicates that there must have been some kind of relationship between the two. I have already noted above that in another one of these Uighur documents, both the words *qalân* and *alban* occur. It seems apparent that both the Turkic *qalân* and *yasâq*, and the Mongolian *alban* and *qubčir* were terms used by the Uighurs of Central Asia. Even today, a variant form of *alban*, *alwan*, is used in Eastern Tūrki, and another variant, *alman*, occurs in the speech of the Kirghiz.¹²⁹ In both of these documents, the terms *qalân* and *yasâq* seem to have been used in the sense of some specific obligation, whereas *alban* and *qubčir* are used in a more generic sense.

NOTES

1. *Hei-ta shih-lüeh* (*Kuo-hsüeh wen-k'u* 國學文庫 ed., vol. 25) (Peiping, 1936), pp. 47–116. The passage translated and the commentaries by WANG Kuo-wei can be found on pp. 75–78.
2. The “provisioning of the ruler,” *shang-kung*, represented one of the three divisions of revenue carried out during the time of the Emperor Hsüan-tsung 玄宗 of the T'ang. The revenue designated as “provisioning of the ruler” was paid directly to the imperial court. Cf. *Tōyō-rekishi daijiten* 4 (1937) .325a.
3. Cf. Paul PELLLOT, “Sur *yam* ou *jam*, ‘relais postal’ ” *TP* 27 (1930) .192–195.
4. The punctuated edition of 1903 breaks the sentence between the characters 定 and 差. I do not see how any sense can be made out of such a version.
5. This phrase appears in all texts in small print. I am not certain of the translation nor of the significance of the passage.
6. WANG Kuo-wei, in his commentary (pp. 77–78), has shown that this figure of 20,000 ingots accords with other figures given in other sources; this amount of silver was equal to 1,000,000 taels.
7. On page 1b of the errata of the edition of 1908, it is noted that the character 敷 may be a mistake for 歛.
8. WANG Kuo-wei, in his commentary on this passage (p. 78), states that the Assisting Minister HU of the text is the same as the Hu-tu-hu (also written Hu-t'u-hu) of other texts relating to this period. He may also be the same as the Šigi Qutuqu mentioned in the *Secret History* (cf. Erich HAENISCH, *Manghol un Niuca Tobca'an* [Leipzig, 1937], §260, p. 91). The phrase 見差胡丞相來 is unclear. In other contexts, Hsü often says: “when I was in such and such a place, I saw 見 etc.” Thus the phrase might be rendered: “[I,] T'ing, was in Yen-ching and saw [them] send the Assisting Minister HU here.” However, 見 is also used commonly in this period as the equivalent of 現, “present, actual.” Nevertheless, the general meaning of the sentence is quite clear.
9. The poem, consisting of eight verses, mentions that the guild of classical teachers was exempted from these levies, probably in accordance with Mongol policy favoring the clergy and learned institutions in general with tribute exemption.
10. On the dates of P'ENG's and Hsü's mission to North China, cf. WANG Kuo-wei's comments in the *Hei-ta shih-lüeh*, pp. 48–49.

11. Although these titles do not appear in the text, we may say a few words about them at this point. The titles *qayan* and *qan* occur early in the annals of Central Asiatic history. What interests us, however, in this article, is the relationship between *qayan* and *qan* during the Mongolian period. SHIRATORI claims that both titles were used indiscriminately during that period and were often confused. Cf. Kurakichi SHIRATORI, "A Study on the Titles Kaghan and Katun," *Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko* 1 (1926) .19–26. However, in my opinion, this is not so. It is true, as SHIRATORI points out, that *qan* was not used solely to designate "lords and subordinate kings." For example, one finds the following passage in the *Secret History*: . . . *Temüjin-i Činggis qahan ke'en nereyidcū qan bolıyaba* (cf. HAENISCH, op. cit., p. 25). This passage may be rendered: ". . . having named Temüjin Činggis qahan, [they] made [him] *qan*." The Chinese glosses of *qayan* and *qan* in both cases are *huang-ti* 皇帝. Cf. SHIRATORI Kurakichi, *Onyaku-mōbun genchō-hishi* (Tōkyō, 1942) 3.44a. The Sino-Mongolian vocabulary of the Chih-yüan period also renders *han* 室 (i.e., *qan*) as *huang-ti*. Cf. *Shih-lin kuang-chi* 事林廣記, "Chih-yüan i-yü" 至元譯語, Japanese edition of 1684–85 (*ts'ê* 7) 10.53b. Nevertheless, there is sufficient regularity in the use of the two titles during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries to justify the conclusion that they meant and designated different things. First of all, in the sections of the *Secret History* dealing with the period preceding the enthronement of Činggis, the ruler of the Chin is referred to as *Altan qahan*; in the section following the enthronement of Činggis, he becomes *Altan qan*. Cf. HAENISCH, op. cit., §53, §132. Ögödei, in the passages dealing with the period before his enthronement, is sometimes referred to as *Ögödei qan* (op. cit., §255, §269). The word *qayan* was regularly used during the Yüan to refer to the emperor of China. During the early Ming, the emperor of China was addressed as *qayan* in both Mongolian and Uighur documents. Cf. *Hua-i i-yü* 華夷譯語, "Ta-tan kuan lai-wen" 韃靼館來文, photographic copy of mss. in the library of the Kyōto Institute of Humanistic Sciences, pp. 19–20; also, "Kao-ch'ang kuan lai-wen" 高昌館來文, pp. 29–30.

In the Persian sources, the title *qa'ān* is used almost exclusively for the Mongolian rulers of the East, starting with Ögödei, but omitting Güyüg, the legitimacy of whose reign was questioned. In the period after the disappearance of the Il-khāns, the title *qa'ān* does not appear in the sources. As a matter of fact, even the Chinese emperor is addressed as *khān* in Persian tributary documents of the early Ming. Cf. *Hua-i i-yü*, "Hui-hui kuan lai-wen" 回回館來文, pp. 57–58.

It seems clear from a number of sources that SHIRATORI is correct in rejecting the idea that *qan* meant subsidiary ruler. In the Russian edicts of tribute exemption, the rulers of the Golden Horde are regularly referred to as *car'*. Likewise, in the Persian sources, the Il-khāns are usually referred to as *pādišāh*. In both cases, *car'* and *pādišāh* render *khān* and not *qa'ān*.

The problem is too complex to go into at this point. Nevertheless, I think that SHIRATORI's claim that *qayan* and *qan* were used indiscriminately must be emphatically rejected. All evidence points to the conclusion that in theory only one *qayan* could exist at a time. On the other hand, there always existed, in theory and in fact, more than one *qan*. The absence of primogeniture among the Mongols and other Central Asiatic peoples tended to divide rather than consolidate political power. The division of the realm into four segments after the death of Činggis resulted in the creation in each of an *ulus*, independently ruled by a *qan* descended from Činggis, but of whom only one, the third son Ögödei, assumed the title *qayan*. In addition to these, there also existed a number of other rulers subjected by or allied to the Mongols who bore the title *qan*. *Qan* seems to have been a title referring to the actual ruler of a people, to a king, emperor, noble etc. It is significant that the word *qan* is used in contemporary documents occasionally almost in the sense of government. In one of the Sino-Mongolian documents of tribute exemption, the phrase: *qan-u c'an amu*, literally "the warehouse (i.e. the land tax) grain of the *qan*," is rendered by the Chinese *kuan-liang* 官糧, "government grain." Cf. Erich HAENISCH, *Steuergerechtsame der chinesischen Klöster unter der Mongolenherrschaft* (Leipzig, 1940), p. 65. On the other hand, Zeki Velidi TOĞAN

has indicated that *qayan* was related to the function of preserving and transmitting the *töre*, the traditional Turco-Mongolian religious law. Cf. Zeki Velidi TOĞAN, *Umumi Türk Tarihine Giriş* [Introduction to a General History of the Turks] (Istanbul, 1946), pp. 106–108.

One problem arises because of an apparent discrepancy in the accounts of the *Secret History* and *Juwainī*. The former states clearly that Temüjin was given the name Činggis *qayan* at the time of his enthronement. The latter, however, states that he was given the name Čingiz-khân. Cf. *Ta'rikh-i Jahân-guşâ* [= *E. J. W. Gibb Memorial Series*, Volume XVI 1] (Leyden-London, 1912), p. 28. To my knowledge, the name Činggis *qayan* (i.e., in its Persian form) never appears in the Persian sources. Furthermore, in the Sino-Mongolian edicts of tribute exemption, only the form *Jingis qan* (= Činggis *qan*) appears. However, in the Sino-Mongolian inscriptions studied by Francis W. CLEAVES, we find the form Činggis *qayan*. Cf., e.g., Francis Woodman CLEAVES, "The Sino-Mongolian Inscription of 1362 in Memory of Prince Hindu," *HJAS* 12(1949). 98, note 26. On the other hand, *Juwainī*, in the section on the enthronement of Ögödei, states that Ögödei was given the name *qa'an* (*Juwainī* 1, p. 148). In the Persian sources, and in the Sino-Mongolian edicts of tribute exemption Ögödei is often simply referred to as *qa'an* (or its variants); similarly, in the Chinese sources, he is often called simply *ho-han* 合汗, i.e. *qa'an*.

Tentatively, therefore, I should like to propose the following:

Qan designated the supreme ruler in the political sense.

Qayan likewise designated the supreme ruler. However, the *qayan* may have been a ruler in some religious sense, in addition to being the supreme ruler in the political sense.

12. Mr. FANG Chaoying, in a lecture before the Berkeley Colloquium Orientologicum on February 29, 1956, advanced a most interesting and startling hypothesis concerning inheritance and succession among the early Manchus. He related the problem of imperial succession among the early Manchus with an original practice of ultimogeniture (indicated by the Chinese expression *wei-fen-chia-tzu* 未分家子). According to Mr. FANG, as the sons grew up and married, they moved out of the family with a share of the property. Division of property was relatively simple since it consisted mostly of cattle. This process eventually left the youngest son as the sole heir of his father's property. Mr. FANG further stated that similar forms of inheritance and succession existed among the Mongols, the Ju-chen, and probably even the Shang peoples. There is evidence to indicate that such a practice of ultimogeniture did in fact exist among the early Mongols. Cf. V. A. RIASANOVSKY, *Customary Law of the Mongol Tribes* (Harbin, 1929), pp. 70–71. Mr. FANG's theory of ultimogeniture, it seems to me, provides a better explanation of "nomadic feudalism" (VLADIMIROV's term) than any I have yet heard.
13. See notes 23 and 24.
14. *Chin-shih* (*Po-na-pen* ed.) 47.18b.
15. On the "property tax," *wu-li-ch'ien*, cf. OGAWA Yujin 小川祐人, "Kindai no butsurikisen ni tsuite" 金代の物力銭に就て ["Concerning the *Wu-li-ch'ien* of the Chin Dynasty"], *Tōyōshi-kenkyū* 5 (1940) .420–437; 6 (1940–42) .43–60; 193–217.
16. On these terms and on the general background of this passage, cf. *ibid.*, pp. 43–45.
17. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 420 ff.
18. *Tōyō-rekishi-daijiten* 2.283a.
19. Cf. ABE Takeo 安部健夫, "Gen-jidai no hōginsei no kōkyū" 元時代の包銀制の考究 ["Study of the *Pao-yin* System of the Yüan Dynasty"] *Tōhō-gakuhō* 24 (1954) .227–366; cf., also, Herbert Franz SCHURMANN, *Economic Structure of the Yüan Dynasty* (Cambridge, 1956), pp. 88–107.
20. Cf. SCHURMANN, *op. cit.*, p. 75.
21. Cf. PELLIOU, *TP* 37 (1944) .165.
22. Cf. *Shih-lin kuang-chi*, "Chih-yüan i-yü" 57a.
23. Cf. E. A. KRACKE JR., *Civil Service in Early Sung China 960–1067* (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), p. 80.

24. Cf. *Tōyō-rekishi-daijiten* 3.350c; also, ABE, op. cit., p. 237.
25. HAENISCH, op. cit.
26. See Note 118.
27. Cf. S. B. VESELOVSKIĬ, *Feodal'noje Zemlevladienie v Severo-vostočnoj Rusi* [*Feudal Land Tenure in the Northeastern Rus*] (Moscow-Leningrad, 1947), p. 132 f.
28. Cf. SCHURMANN, op. cit., p. 94.
29. *Cho-keng-lu* (undated Japanese printed edition of the Tokugawa) 1.23b4–9. I wish to thank Prof. CH'EN Shih-hsiang (Univ. of California) for some interesting references on the term *tzu-yu* 自由.
30. For the biography of Ha-la-ha-sun, cf. *Yüan-shih* 136. Shun-te, now located in Hopeh Province, became the domain, i.e., the appanage, of Qišīliq.
31. On the individual Qišīliq, cf. HAENISCH, op. cit., §187, p. 53; for another example of the name *Qarqasun*, cf. HAENISCH, op. cit., §275, p. 97.
32. Abū 'l-Ghāzī Bahādur Khān, *Şajara-i Turkiyya* (ed. of le Baron Desmaisons) (St. Petersburg, 1871), p. 55. The text, which is in a section concerning the individuals Badai and Qišīliq, is as follows:

Tarkhān-nīng ma'nī-sī bu turur kim ol kiši-din hič nāmārsā almaŷaïlar. Hār qačan khān ešikinā kilsa hič kiši man' qılmaŷaï. Ōzi kirgei; ōzi čiqŷaï. Agar gumāh iš qilsa, toquz-ŷa-ča sormaŷaïlar. An-dīn song soryaïlar. Ta toquz arqa bolŷunŷa şundaŷ bolŷaï

For a French translation, cf. Volume 2, p. 58.

33. Cf. M. MINOVI and V. MINORSKY, "Naşir al-Dīn Ẓūsī on Finance," *BSOAS* 10 (1940) .776.
 34. Cf. V. MINORSKY, *Tadhkirat al-Mulūk* (London, 1943), p. 27.
 35. Cf. VESELOVSKIĬ, op. cit., p. 391, ff.
 36. See N. N. POPPE, *Kvadratnaja Pis'mennost'* [*Square Writing*] (Moscow-Leningrad, 1941), p. 59 ff. The Mongolian text is as follows:
- (6) *Ĵin[gis] qanu ba qa'anu ba ĵarliqdur doyd ėrk'e-ud senşhiṇud daşmad* (7) *c'a [ŋ t'amqada]č'a buşi aliba alba qubč'iri ūlū ūjen* (8) [*dēn*]riyi ĵalbariṇu hiru · er ḡgun at' uqayi ge · ek'degsed aṇu (9) · uē.
37. Cf. Edouard CHAVANNES, "Inscriptions et pièces de chancellerie chinoise de l'époque mongole" *TP* 5 (1904) .376.
 38. *Ch'ang-ch'un chen-jen hsi-yu-chi chiao-chu* 長春真人西游記校汪 (*Hai-ning Wang Chung-ch'üeh kung i-shu* 海寧王忠愍公遺書 ed. [ts'ê 32]) "fu-lu" 附錄 1a.13–2a.2. Cf. Arthur WALEY, *The Travels of an Alchemist* (London, 1931), p. 158.
 39. B. Ya. VLADIMIROV, *Le régime social des Mongols* (Paris, 1948), p. 204.
 40. Ibid., pp. 204, 211.
 41. *Yü-chih wu-t'i ch'ing-wen chien* 御製五體清文鑑 5.1a.
 42. ZAKHAROV, *Man'žurski-russkij Slovar'* (St. Petersburg, 1875), pp. 38b–39b.
 43. KOWALEWSKI, *Dictionnaire mongol-russe-français* 1 (Kazan, 1844), p. 83a.
 44. *Mongŷol-un ūĵüg-ün quriŷaysan bičig* (mss. in the Naitō Collection in the Kyōto Institute of Humanistic Sciences) (ts'e 2), 70a–b.
 45. KOWALEWSKI, op. cit., 1.83a–b.
 46. *Yü-chih wu-t'i ch'ing-wen chien* 5.1a.
 47. Cf. HAENISCH, op. cit., §203, pp. 65–66; cf. also, Paul PELLLOT, "*Qubč'iri ~ qubč'ir et qubč'ür ~ qubč'ür*," *TP* 37 (1944) .153–165.
 48. Cf. SHIRATORI, *Onyaku-mōbun genchō-hishi* 5.12a.
 49. *T'ung-chih t'iao-ko* 通制條格 17.2a5–2b4: 科斂則務求餘。輸納則賠加折耗。
 50. *Ong-qan-a qubč'iri qubč'iju ḡgčü küre'en dotoro oro'ulŷu teĵi'eba*; cf. SHIRATORI, *Onyaku-mōbun genchō-hishi* 5.12a.
 51. Ibid. 5.12b.
 52. PELLLOT, op. cit.
 53. *Hua-i i-yü* (*Han-fen-lou pi-chi* 涵芬樓秘笈 ed.) (ts'e 27). 1.2a.
 54. Cf. TOĠAN, op. cit., pp. 278–279.

55. Cf. Robert F. BLAKE and Richard N. FRYE, "History of the Nation of the Archers," *HJAS* 12 (1949) .297, 313, 321; also, Francis Woodman CLEAVES, "The Mongolian Names and Terms in the *History of the Nation of the Archers*," *HJAS* 12 (1949). 442 ff.

56. *Jāmi'u 't-Tawārikh*, "Ta'rikh-i Mubārak-i Ghāzānī" (ed. Jahn = *GMS*, Series 2, XIV), (London-Leyden, 1940), p. 218:

*Wa ċūn ħukm-i yarlīy-i buzurg-i Ćinggīz-khān ċunānast ki qazāt wa dānišmand-ān wa 'alawī-ān qalān wa qubċūr na-dahand, farmūdīm ki bar ān mūjib mu'āf wa musallam bāšand. Wa māl wa qubċūr-i išan na-sitānand. Wa ūlāy wa sūsūn az išan nagīrand. Wa khāna-hāi-i išan nazūl na-kunand. We ilċi farū nī-ārānd. Wa idrūr ba-mūjib ki ba-mū'amarat wa dafātīr dar āmadē sāl ba-sāl bī qušūr mī-rasānand. For a Russian translation of this passage, see Rašid ad-Dīn, *Sbornik Letopisej* 3 (Moscow-Leningrad, 1946), p. 235.*

57. On *ūlāy*, cf. Francis Woodman CLEAVES, "The Mongolian Documents in the Musée de Téhéran," *HJAS* 16 (1953) .91, note 3. On *sūsūn*, cf. Antoine MOSTAERT et Francis Woodman CLEAVES, "Trois documents mongols des Archives secrètes vaticanes," *HJAS* 15 (1952). 441.

58. On *idrār*, cf. TOĠAN, op. cit., pp. 284–285. On these two types of tax books, see Walther HINZ, "Das Rechnungswesen orientalischer Reichsfinanzämter im Mittelalter," *Der Islam* 29 (1949).19. On *mū'amarat*, HINZ says: "Steuerpachtverträge mit Bürgschaft des Einhebers doch ohne Festlegung der Verausgabung des betreffenden Steueraufkommens." On *daftar* (plural: *dafātīr*), he states: "Band, in dem die Steuerpachtverträge, die der Divān mit den einzelnen Steuerpächtern schloss zusammengefasst wurden."

59. Cf. PELLIOU, *TP* 37 (1944). 153–165.

60. HINZ, op. cit., p. 134:

Das Reichshebebuch bestand aus zwei Büchern: einem für die "Produktionssteuern" und einem für die Handelssteuern. Das erste buchte vor allem die *māl* und *qubċūr* Steuern und das zweite die *tamga* Steuer.

HINZ regards both *māl* and *qubċūr* as "Produktionssteuern." However, this is incorrect. In the subsequent discussion, I shall show that *qubċūr*, at this time, had become a poll-tax, payable in money, which evolved out of the old Mongolian tribute-levy. I shall suggest that the *qubċūr* represented the principal source of revenue of the nobility as a whole. The *qubċūr* had nothing to do with production. The *māl* of the budgetary books which HINZ has so admirably studied could be one of two things. Either it represents all tax payments in cash, aside from the *qubċūr* (including *kharāj* payments in cash), or it represents the *qalān*, the tribute par excellence. There is no necessary contradiction between these two possibilities, for it is probable that all cash payments, save those of the *qubċūr* and the *tamgā*, were regarded as tribute, i.e. the personal revenue of the ruler. The edict on tribute exemption cited above would indicate that in the time of Ghāzān the *māl* had indeed become the imperial tribute, generally known as the *qalān*. In any case, neither *māl* nor *qubċūr* have anything to do with production.

61. *Ta'rikh-i Mubārak-i Ghāzānī*, p. 180:

Wa ba-karrāt wa marrāt umarā' wa yār'yūċī-ān wa wazarā'-rā našihat farmūd ki har waqt ki tā'ifa ba-šikāyat-i ħākīmī wa mutašarriḫī āyand sukhun-i išan-rā bar-faur qabūl mī-kunand; ċā yunkinu ki ān tā'ifa piš az ān qalān na-dādē bāšad wa bār-i khūd bar digar nihādē wa ān ħākīm išan-rā dar qalān awurdē bāšad wa ċunīn mardum albatta mutaššakī bāšad.

For the Russian translation of this passage, cf. Rašid ad-Dīn, *Sbornik Letopisej* 3.213. For an English translation, cf. A. K. S. LAMBTON, *Landlord and Peasant in Persia* (London-New York-Toronto, 1953), pp. 80–81.

62. The *ħākīm* and *mutašarriḫ* are often mentioned together in these contexts as civil officials concerned with fiscal matters. The *ħākīm*, then, as now, in Afghanistan, was a civil governor of a district or province. Cf. LAMBTON, op. cit., p. 429. HINZ, op. cit., p. 25, note 1, states relative to the *mutašarriḫ*:

Der Ausdruck *mutaşarrif* bezeichnet im Mittelalter nicht den Inhaber eines bestimmten Amts, sondern lediglich den Träger einer Finanzeinheit, etwa einer Provinz oder Stadt oder auch nur—wie hier—den Verwalter eines bestimmten Steueraufkommens.

63. *Ta'rikh*, p. 180:

Wa az 'ummûm-i ra'âyâ-i qalân-kaşî tafahhus namâyîd tâ û zdâlim ast yâ né, û-râ mî-khwâhand yâ né, tâ şûrat-i hâl-i û muhaqqaq gardad.

64. The problem of the *iqṭā'* under the Seljuqs and then the Mongols, and particularly its institutional affinities with China, and later with the *pomest'e* system in Russia, is one of the key historical problems of this period. For discussions of this question, cf. LAMBTON, op. cit., pp. 53–76; TOĞAN, op. cit., pp. 281–283, and Osman TURAN's note "İQTÂ'" in *Islam Ansiklopedisi*, the recent revised and supplemented Turkish version of the *Encyclopedia of Islam*.
65. *Ta'rikh*, p. 308: *Wa bi-dânand ki in iqtâ' bar mardum-i çärîk ki qalân dar âmadé and wa küc dehand muqarrar ast.* For a comment on this passage, cf. LAMBTON, op. cit., p. 81.
66. *Ta'rikh*, p. 324: *Wa çûn mâl-i padar ba-kâwîn-i zan mustahlak gardad wujih-i parwaraş-i farzand-ân wa mâ-yakhtâ'î qalân wa kâr-i îşân az kujâ bâsad?* For an English translation of this passage, cf. LAMBTON, op. cit., p. 81.
67. RADLOFF/MALOV, *Uigurische Sprachdenkmäler* (Leningrad, 1928), p. 28, lines 1–2: . . . *qalan käsip inçü bayçî-lar-ya qalan käsmiş yoy.* Also, lines 39–45: *Biz burun-qı bu [qan-]lar çayın-dın bärü ay-a ini-lärimiz birlä bay-ni ätläp özgä alban yasaq tutmayın [qa]n-larimiz-ya küc birip yordimiz ärdi.* (I have changed RADLOFF's system of transcription to one more current among West European scholars.)
68. Cf. LAMBTON, op. cit., p. 80 ff.
69. *Mukâtabât-i Raşîdî* [*Letters of Raşîd al-dîn Faḍl Allāh*] (edited by Khān Bahādur Moḥammad Shafī) (Lahore, 1947), p. 34. Cf. LAMBTON, op. cit., p. 94. The two words which I have rendered as "levies and divisions [of wealth?]," *taklifât wa tawzî'ât* are rendered by LAMBTON simply as "extraordinary taxes." This is wrong for levies are clearly implied.
70. *Mukâtabât*, p. 11; cf. LAMBTON, op. cit., p. 93.
71. *Mukâtabât*, p. 12: *Wa ba-'illat-i qalân wa qubçûr wa tayyârât wa taklifât-i dîwân-i Kirmân wa ôrdô-i a'zdam tâ muddat-i sé sâl az îşân [çizî] na-ṭalband tâ mawzî-i kharâb wa mazârî-i bâyyir-i îşân ba-hâl-i 'imârat wa zirâ't bâz âyad.* Cf. LAMBTON, op. cit., p. 90; she renders *qubçûr* as "taxes on flocks," which is wrong.
72. *Mukâtabât*, p. 123: *qalân ba-jihat-i umarâ'-i khân şâdiran wa wâridan.* Cf. LAMBTON, op. cit., p. 95.
73. The etymology of *alba* ~ *alban* is not easy to explain. There is no verb or noun in Mongolian to which this word can be traced. There are indications that this word was in use long before the thirteenth century. In the *Liao-shih* (*Po-na-pen* ed.) 46.18a the following passage occurs: "A-lu-wan 阿魯盤 Ordo was established by the Emperor T'ien-tsu 天祖. This was Yung-ch'ang 永昌 Palace. 'To assist' was called *a-lu-wan*." Cf., also, Karl A. WITTFOGEL and FÊNG Chia-shêng, *History of Chinese Society, Liao 907–1125* (Philadelphia, 1949), p. 546. By analogy with the word *ordo*, "court," which is regularly written *wo-lu-to* in the *Liao-shih*, one is attempted to reconstruct **alwan* from *a-lu-wan*. Since the alternation *w* ~ *b* occurs in several Altaic languages, one might see in **alwan* a cognate from of *alban*.

In the short vocabulary of Liao words given at the end of the *Liao-shih*, the word *a-lu-wan* in the text is transcribed *ho-lu-wan* 何 | |, which could be reconstructed as **halwan* or **qalwan*. In both cases, the Chinese rendering of the term means "to assist" or "the assisting." In the text, the Chinese expression *fu-yu* 輔祐 is used to define *a-lu-wan*; the character *yu* connoted assistance rendered by a superior to an inferior, such as assistance rendered by heaven to man. However, in the vocabulary, *ho-lu-wan* is defined by the expression *fu-tso* 輔佐; in this case, the assisting is, by implication, by an inferior of a superior.

Liao-shih 31–33 lists a number of other words ending in *-wan*, e.g. *yeh-lu-wan*, "to

prosper"; *p'u-* (or *po*) -*su-wan*, with a similar meaning; *wo-tu-wan*, "to grow." Although I cannot identify the words, it seems safe to assume that -*wan* represented a sort of verbal suffix in the Liao language.

A possible Altaic verb root from which the presumed word **alwan* with the general meaning of "assisting" derives is not easy to find. The verb root *al-* in Turkic clearly means "to take." Furthermore, Annemarie VON GABAIN does not list any suffixes resembling -*wan* in her *Alttürkische Grammatik*. In Mongolian, there is only the defective verb *ali* which has the imperative meaning "give it here." Cf. N. N. POPPE, *Asia Major* 1 (1924).777. In the Manchu and Tungus languages, the verb root *ali-* means both "to give" and "to receive," somewhat like the Chinese *feng* 奉. The word *alban* which exists in Manchu and was widely used during the Ch'ing seems to be a borrowing from the Mongolian, as does the word *alman* in Kirghiz, and *alwan* in Eastern Türki.

74. Paul PELLLOT, "Les formes avec et sans *q-* (*k-*) initial en turc et en mongol," *TP* 37 (1944).73–101.
75. Cf. TOĞAN, op. cit., p. 457, note 536.
76. BEREZIN long ago equated the Russian *dan'* (or as it appears sometimes in the chronicles, *dan' desjatinnaja*) with *yasâq*, and the *pošlina* with *qalân* (BEREZIN, *Vnutreneje Ustroistvo Zolotoj Ordy* [The Internal Structure of the Golden Horde] [St. Petersburg, 1850], p. 19). At another point, he defines *qalân yasâq* as *obročnyj jasak, jasačnyj obrok*. He states further that "in Russian ordinances (*v russkikh postanovlenijakh*) the tribute *dan'* صدق (yasâq) is differentiated from the *obrok* قلاق (*qalân*)" (BEREZIN, *Očerk Vnutrennjago Ustroistva Ulusa Džučijeva* [Outline of the Internal Structure of the Ulus of Džučī (= Joči)] *TVOIRAO* 8 [1864].471, note 2). Although BEREZIN does not state so explicitly, I suspect that he equates *dan'* with *yasâq*, and *pošlina* with *qalân* for the reason that both *dan'* and *yasân* tend to head the list of obligations in their respective edicts, with *pošlina* and *qalân* following. Furthermore, the word *yasâq* passed into Russian at this time with the meaning "tribute." However, as I shall indicate in the discussion, there are other, more cogent reasons for assuming the opposite. First *pošlina* is definitely used in the sense of *yasa ~ yasaq*, "law." Secondly, *dan'* and *alban*, as far as we can tell, seem to have similar etymologies, i.e. both derive from verbs relating to giving.

The word *alban* appears occasionally in Turkic documents of this period. To my knowledge, *alba ~ alban* does not appear in any documents from Persia of this period. Francis Woodman CLEAVES, in "The Mongolian Documents in the Musée de Téhéran," *HJAS* 16 (1953).31 (cf. also p. 91, note 4) identified one word in the documents as a variant of *alba ~ alban*, but I am not sure that I can agree with him. The lines in question can be found on p. 31, "Document III (Figure 29)":

- 1 . . . *ülemjï tusqu yuyul ulay-a alaba sawri gerige-yin*
- 2 *mör buu yuyutuγai*

The translation, on page 32, reads as follows:

"let them not request in great quantity provisions,¹ loans,² relay animals,³ contributions,⁴ service,⁵ and the usage of plaques."⁶

CLEAVES has identified the word *alaba* as a variant of *alba ~ alban*. *Alba ~ alban*, and its equivalents in other languages, was the principal obligation of subject to ruler. In almost all the listings of fiscal obligations from this period, *alba ~ alban* or its equivalents head the list with the other obligations following, more or less, in order of importance. The appearance of *alaba*, assuming it is *alba*, after *tusqu* and *yuyul*, two relatively minor obligations, is thus quite strange. Furthermore, I have not encountered the form *alaba* in any document. I suspect that *alaba* is either a variant of or a mistake for *aliba*. Consequently, I propose the following alternative translation: "let them not request in great quantity provisions, loans, relay animals, whatever service, and usage of plaques."

77. Cf. LAMBTON, op. cit., p. 332.

78. Cf. M. D. PRISELKOV, *Khanskije Jarlyki Russkim Mitropolitam* (*Jarlyks of the Khans to the Russian Metropolitans*) (Petrograd, 1916), pp. 61–63.
79. For a discussion of the textual history of these documents, see PRISELKOV, op. cit., pp. 1–18.
80. Ibid., p. 65.
81. Ibid., p. 83.
82. Ibid., p. 79; also, p. 81.
83. Ibid., p. 81.
84. For the dating of these three documents, see ibid., pp. 71, 69 respectively.
85. The text of this letter, as reconstructed by PRISELKOV, is given on pp. 58–59. I am indebted to Prof. P. BOODBERG for his assistance in interpreting these two documents. However, all shortcomings are my responsibility alone.
86. Invocations of this type are to be found in almost all Mongolian and Turkic edicts and letters of this period. Cf. Władysław KOTWICZ, “Formules initiales des documents mongols au XIII-e et XIV-e ss.,” *Rocznik Orientalistyczny* 10 (Łwow, 1934) .131–157; cf., also POPPE, *Kvadratnaja Pis'mennost'*, pp. 92–101.
Cf. PRISELKOV, op. cit., pp. 83–87. For a discussion of this letter, cf. ibid. Mängü Tämür ascended the “throne” of the Horde in 1266.
87. PRISELKOV has punctuated the beginning of this paragraph as follows: *ljudskim baskakom, i knjazem*. However, evidence from Turkic letters indicates that the *ljudskim* must be taken with both *baskakom* and *knjazem*. In the edict (*jarlyq*) of Mängü Giräi Khān I of the Crimea, we find the following introductory phrase: *İčki kânt-lârining dârûyâ bēg-lârîngâ*, which may be rendered as: “To the *dârûyas* and *bēgs* of the interior towns.” Cf. Abdullahoğlu Hassan, “Birinci Mengili Giray Han yarlıǵı,” *Türkiyat Mecmuası* 4 (Istanbul, 1934) .103. The word *dârûyâ* is the Mongolian equivalent of the Turkic *basqaq*. Both words are used concurrently in the literature of the Golden Horde, and both appear in the Russian sources. They derive from two roots, *daru-* and *bas-*, respectively, which both mean “to press.” The *darûya* and the *basqaq* were each civil governors. The above-cited Turkic phrase justifies the punctuation: *ljudskim baskakom i knjazem*. We see furthermore that *knjaz'* = *bēg*.

The *poločnyje knjaz'ja* have their counterpart in the *ming yüz on bēg-lâr* of the Turkic documents. Cf. Abdullahoğlu Hassan, “Temir Kutlug Yarlıǵı,” *Türkiyat Mecmuası* 3 (Istanbul, 1935), p. 213. The “military princes” must have been the military nobility of the Horde.

The Mongolian equivalents are revealed in the following passages *balaqadu[n] šilde·[e]dun daruqasda noyadda*, which POPPE translates as follows: *darugam gorodov i selenij, i nojonam* [“to the *darugas* of the towns and villages, and to the *nojons*”]. He cites, as support for this rendering, a similar phrase from the letter of Taidula to the Metropolitan Theognost: *i gorodnym i selnym dorogam*. Cf. POPPE, *Kvad. Pis'*, p. 106, note 6; cf., also, PRISELKOV, op. cit., pp. 59 and 99. However, the Turkic passage cited above shows conclusively that the Mongolian phrase must be translated “to the *noyons* and *daruqas* (= *darûyas*) of the towns and villages.”

These various passages permit us to assert the following Russian, Turkic, and Mongolian equivalences:

Baskak = *basqaq* = *darûya*
Knjaz' = *bēg* = *noyon*

POPPE states that the word *danščik* of this edict corresponds to the word *haran* of the edicts in 'Phags-pa script. (POPPE, op. cit., p. 105). POPPE understands *haran* in the sense of “commoner.” This equation is impossible. First of all, the commoners always appear at the end and not in the middle of these lists. Secondly, the *danščiki* have their equivalent in the *qalančī* mentioned so frequently in the Turkic edicts. Cf. Walther HINZ, “Zwei Steuerbefreiungsurkunden,” *Documenta Islamica Inedita* (Berlin, 1952), p. 214.

The scribes, *piscy*, have their equivalent in the well-known *bitikči* of the Turkic and the *bičigeči* of the Mongolian edicts.

The “passing envoys” have their equivalent in the phrase *yôûr išûr ilçi* of the edict of Mängili Giräi Khân I (see p. 103) and the phrase *yorčiqun yabuqun élčin* (e) in the ‘Phags-pa edicts. Cf. POPPE, p. 60.

The “falconers” and “leopardists” have as their Turkic equivalent the words *qûščî* and *barsčî* (cf. “Birinci Mengili Giray Han Yarığı,” p. 103) and the words *şibayučin* and *barsučin* of Mongolian texts (cf. Francis Woodman CLEAVES, “The Mongolian Documents in the Musée de Téhéran,” *HJAS* 16[1953].30).

88. Compare this passage with the Mongolian passage cited above in the section “Tribute and Levy (*Alban* and *Qubčiri*).” The phrase *dan’ ili korm* is curious. It corresponds to the *alba qubčiri* of the Mongolian texts. One would expect *pošlina*. It seems that in this early edict (1267), the word *korm* was used to render an original *qubčiri* or *yasaq*.

As I indicate below, the *qubčiri* originally was a levy which later evolved into a tax (conceptually speaking). *Korm* means “comestibles, provisions, fodder.” As we know from the sources, the early Mongolian levies often consisted of provisions and supplies for their armies. Consequently, it may have been that the Russian scribes translated *qubčiri* (or possibly *yasaq*) in the sense of [levy of] provisions. Later on the term *pošlina* arises as a generic term for a variety of fiscal obligations, and we find *dan’* and *pošlina* repeatedly associated as a fixed expression, more or less as an equivalent of *alba qubčiri*.

89. The phrase *tak molyja* is a literal rendering of a Turkic *tıp* or a Mongolian *kemen*. Both expressions are *converba*, deriving from the roots *tı-* and *keme-*, respectively, meaning “to say.” In these edicts, these *converba* function, so to say, as quotation marks for preceding direct and indirect discourse. Consequently, contrary to the rules of Russian grammar, the expression *tak molyja* must be taken as referring to the preceding rather than to the subsequent passage. This is demonstrated by the last *tak molyja* in the letter. Were the expression *tak molyja* to be taken as referring to subsequent passages, the last *tak molyja* would be left dangling.
90. The phrase *rekli byli dati* is unclear to me. PRISELKOV (p. 84) speaks of this phrase as follows:

Here the concept of “*dan*” of the Jassa has been broadened by *tamga*, *poplužnyj* (the plough[-toll]), by *jam*, and by *voina* (military [service]), and the concept of “*korm*” has been rendered descriptively: “*kto čego ni sprosît, i rekli byli dati*.” The latter, apparently, must be understood in such a way that the “*korms*” of officials in the time of the “first emperors” were determined by the *paiza*, which were given by the *khan* and [which] gave the words of the people who possessed them the significance and weight of the *khan* himself.

I cannot agree with this interpretation. Both the Mongolian and Turkic documents, when listing the obligations from which the recipient was to be freed, usually end the list with a phrase like the following: . . . *Ya-u k’e anu bulıju t’at’aju bu abt’uqayi ge-en bariju yabu-ayi bič’ig ögbeë*. Following CLEAVES, I translate this phrase as follows: “. . . let them not take their effects by robbing and expropriating; [so] saying, [We] have given a letter which he may go on keeping in his possession” (cf. Francis Woodman CLEAVES, “The Mongolian Documents in the Musée de Téhéran,” pp. 30, line 6, and 32, lines 14–15).

On the basis of this corresponding passage in a Mongolian edict we must understand the phrases *rekli byli dati* as referring not to *korm* but to the giving of the letter. We may understand the word *dati* either as an infinitive or as the nominative plural of the *participium preteriti passivi* of the verb *dat’ldavat’*, “to give.” I prefer to understand it in the latter sense. Since *rekli byli* is in the plural, we must associate it with the only other plural expression in the passage: *posledniji cari*, “subsequent emperors.”

Therefore, I propose the following rendering:

And [so] they spoke, [and letters] were given.

91. Cf. POPPE, op. cit., pp. 64–65.

92. I understand *steregut* as the 3d person plural of the verb *stereč’*, “to guard.”

93. I am not certain about the meaning of this passage. It may be that whosoever associates himself with the clergy for religious purposes likewise is to benefit from the exemption.
94. On *baskak*, see note 87.
95. *Vetkha* seems to be the genitive of a word *vetkho*, from *vetkhij*, “old.” The Mongolian month was divided into three parts, and *vetkho* may refer to the last third of the month. Cf. also the word *nova* (genitive of *novo*) in the next document.
96. *Tala*, in Mongolian, means “field” or “plain.” In this context it may just mean “steppe.”
97. For the *jarlyk* of Bārdi Beg, cf. PRISELKOV, op. cit., pp. 60–61.
98. Judging from the phrases at the end of the *jarlyk*, it seems clear that *mysl'* must be understood in the sense of “memorial.” Mulabuga, also mentioned at the end of the edict, may be an original Mullā Buya.
99. I am not certain whether in the phrase *tatarskim ulusnym i ratnym knjazem*, the first two adjectives should be taken separately or jointly. The absence of the conjunction *i* might indicate that they should be taken jointly.
100. In the edict of Tāmir Qutluq, we find the phrase: *borla tamyasī*, which may be rendered as the “vineyard seal[-toll].” Cf. “Temir Kutlug Yarlıǵı,” p. 217. It is possible that the word *buraložnik* may be related to *borla*.
101. For similar lists of officials, cf. HINZ and ABDULLAHOĞLU, op. cit.
 Re: *volostnym samym dorogam*. *Doroga* is but the Russian version of the Mongolian *daruya*, and means the same as *basqaq*, “governor.” The word occurs as late as 1483 in a treaty between the Grand Prince Ivan Vasil'evič of Moscow and the Grand Prince Ivan Vasil'evič of Rjazan'. Cf. *Dukhovnyje i Dogovornyje Gramoty Velikikh i Udel'nykh Knjazej XIV-XVI vv.* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1950), pp. 284, 288.
 The index to the *Akty Social'no-ekonomičeskoj Istorii Severo-vostočnoj Rusi* 1 (Moscow, 1952), p. 741, defines *volost'* as “administrative unit, often coinciding with the peasant commune (*obščina*).” In the letter of Taidula to the Metropolitan Theognost, we find the following passage: *i volostnym, i gorodnym, i selnym dorogam* (PRISELKOV, p. 59). In the similarly stereotyped mid-fifteenth century *dukhovnyje gramoty*, or wills and testaments of the princes, we usually find passages like the following: *A se daju s(y) nu svojemu, knjaz (ju) Dmitr'ju: [Možaesk so vsěmi] volostmi, i so [sely], i z bort'ju, i s tamgoju, i so vsěmi pošlinami* (Cf. *Dukh. i Dogov. Gram.*, p. 15). This passage may be rendered, “And I give to my son, the Prince Dmitrij: [Možaesk together with all] districts, and with the villages, and with the apiary [toll?], and with the seal [toll] and with all customs.”
 The *volost'* thus appears to be an administrative unit, the next largest unit after the towns and villages. The word *samym* undoubtedly indicates that the *daruya* was appointed by the princes, whether Tatar or Russian, rather than by the Court.
102. Re: *i kak v Volodimeri sěd*. In the section of the *Troickaja Letopis'* dealing with the removal of the Metropolitan from Kiev to the North, we find the following passage: *... i tako sěde v Volodimeri s klirosom i s vsěm žitijem svojim (Troickaja Letopis' [Moscow-Leningrad, 1950], p. 349)*. This may be rendered as: “... and so he settled in Volodimer (= Vladimir-on-the-Kljaz'ma) together with [his] ecclesiastical retinue and all his effects.”
103. Re: *zaprosov*. *Zapros* literally means “demand.” “Levy” in this context expresses the intended meaning of *zaprosov* adequately.
104. Re: *počestija*. I am not certain what *počestije* is. It is probably related to *počest'*, “honoring.” It may refer to the general obligation to send gifts to the Court on various and sundry occasions, or to the necessity of entertaining envoys.
105. For reproductions of Mongolian *paiza*, cf. POPPE, *Kvad. Pis'*, pp. 78 ff.
106. Re: *Tetiguja lěta*. PRISELKOV (p. 67) indicates that *tetiguja* derives from the Mongolian “*takhija*.” This is not certain. Though the Mongolian word for “hen” is *takiya*, the Russian word could just as well derive from the Turkic *taqıyu ~taqıqu*. Cf. VON GABAIN, *Alttürkische Grammatik*, p. 338. *Tetiguja* is probably an error for **tekiguja*, with the singular nominative **tekigu*. This brings it closer to the Turkic rather than the Mongolian word.

107. We have here a date given according to the Muslim reckoning. However, this date which PRISELKOV has equated with 12 April 1308 (Julian) (op. cit., p. 67), does not coincide with the reign of Bārdi Bêg. PRISELKOV attempts to explain this discrepancy of dates by suggesting that the edict of Bārdi Bêg, the edict of Tulun Bêg, and a non-existent edict of 'Azîz are all reconfirmations of an original edict issued by the *khan* Toqta to the Metropolitan Pêtr on 12 April 1308, and in recopying the old edict, the scribes forgot to change the date (pp. 67–69).

The word "Sylgat" is the Arabic *Zu'l-qa'dâ*, the eleventh month of the Arabic lunar year.

108. On *nova*, see note 95.

109. The word *Orda* must be translated as "Court" in conformity with its original meaning.

110. I suggest the following reconstructions for these obviously Tatar names: Mullâ Buyâ, Hussain, Sarai, (?) Jagaltai, and Qutluq Buyâ.

111. I suggest the following reconstruction of the name of the scribe: Sünč (?) Tāmir Mör Baqši.

112. Cf. PREOBRAŽENSKIJ, *Etimologičeskij Slovar' Russkago Jazyka* 1 (Moscow, 1910), p. 119a–b.

113. Cf. *Novgorodskaja Përvaja Letopis' Staršego i Mladšego Izvodov* (Moscow, 1950), pp. 508, 558–561.

114. Cf. PRISELKOV, op. cit., p. 61: *A kto paki silu učiniti, i on na velikoj pošlině peremolvitsja*

115. . . . *a dati im 20 pudov medu na podslastu čistogo pošliny po starině* (Novg. Let., p. 509).

116. *Novyi Enciklopedičeskij Slovar'* 20.510–522; cf., also, George VERNADSKY, *The Mongols and Russia* (New Haven, 1953), p. 337.

117. This may be seen from the following extracts from these edicts:

Basâ bū tarkhân-lâri-mîz-dîn yasâq qalân tîp tîl âmäsû âlmäsûnlâr (N. N. BEREZIN, *Khanskije Jarlyki* 2 [Kazan, 1851], p. 50).

Yasâq qalân sūsûn 'alûfah tîp tîlâmäsûnlâr (Abdullohoğlu Hassan, "Birinci Mengili Giray Han Yarlıgı," pp. 99–109).

Yasâq qalân salîy musammâ salmäsûn-lâr ('Abdu 'llâh Baṭṭâl, "Şâhib Girâi Khân Yarlıgı" *Türkiyyât Majmû'a-sı* 2 [1926]. 75–103).

118. Cf. Walther HINZ, "Zwei Steuerbefreiungsurkunden," p. 214:

37 . . . *bû kûndîn ilgârâ isâq albân*

38 *âlmäsûnlâr musammâ salîy sâlmäsûnlâr âlmäsûnlâr*

119. N. N. POPPE, "Zolotoordynskaja rukopis' na bereste" ["Manuscript of the Golden Horde on Birch Bark"] *Sovetskoje Vostokovedenje* 2 (1941) 81–136.

120. HINZ, op. cit., p. 216.

121. Cf. Abdullohoğlu Hassan, "Temir Kutlug Yarlıgı" ["The *Yarlıy* of Temir Qutluğ"], *Türkiyat Mecmuası* 3 (1935) .217.

122. LAMBTON, op. cit., pp. 437, 434.

123. N. N. POPPE, *Mongol'skij Slovar' Mukaddimat al-Adab* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1938), p. 203a.

The Mongolian *jasay* is defined as Turkic *salîy*. The latter appears frequently in Uighur documents of the Mongolian and pre-Mongolian period. It derives from the verb *sal-*, "to impose." POPPE translates it as *nalog*, which in Russian means exactly the same thing, viz., "an imposition," "an impost."

124. HINZ, op. cit., p. 216.

125. Cf. Abdullohoğlu, op. cit., p. 103.

126. Cf. Caferoğlu Ahmet, "Uygurlarda Hukuk ve Maliye Istılahları" ["Legal and Fiscal Terms among the Uighurs"], *Türkiyat Mecmuası* 3 (1935) .40.

127. RADLOFF/MALOV, *Uigurische Sprachdenkmäler*, p. 121:

Taçadan söz-üm. Tayînçaq-qa

Sâning qubčir tariq-ing-

da bu Šamîš Tayîšma-qa üç küri tariq birqıl. Qan yasaq tirär män

I have changed RADLOFF's transcription into a more current system. The value of some of the consonants of the proper names is not clear.

128. On the expression *qan yasaq*, see the Mongolian expression *qan-u c'aṅ amu* discussed in note 11.
129. I do not have the Eastern Tūrki reference at my disposal. For the Kirghiz, cf. *Kirgiz Sözlüğü* (Ankara, 1945), p. 29b.

SOME REFLECTIONS ON ČINGGIS QAN'S *ĴASAŲ*

I. de Rachewiltz



There has been recently a renewed interest in the so-called 'Great *ĴasaŲ*'¹ of Činggis Qan—the 'Great *Yāsā*' of the Muslim authors. While the subject is one of far-reaching significance, a problem arises as to the historicity or otherwise of a written code (*ĴasaŲ*) supposedly compiled in the time of Činggis Qan (?1162–1227), which embodied the conqueror's legal pronouncements, i.e. the laws which he issued on matters of state, administration of justice (rewards and punishments), military ordinance, diplomatic exchanges, tributary practices, etc., constituting the normative basis of Mongol governance.²

The most important recent contributions towards clarifying this problem are those of Paul Ratchnevsky (d. 1991), David Ayalon, David Morgan and Paul Heng-chao Ch'en.

Ratchnevsky devoted a substantial article to the investigation of the *ĴasaŲ* which he summarized in his excellent book on Činggis Qan.³ Having reviewed the information contained in the *Secret History of the Mongols*, the Chinese sources of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and the works of the Persian historians (see below), he reached the following conclusions: (1) the *ĴasaŲ* of Činggis Qan did not represent a legal code drawn up at one particular point in time; (2) it was not a homogeneous and systematically constructed document; (3) rather it was a collection of orders and decrees issued over the years by Činggis Qan, as circumstances required, and based on actual needs; (4) the collection of such *ad hoc* rescripts was edited and recorded in written form at the time of Ögödei's enthronement in 1229 (on which occasion Ögödei introduced the ceremony of the presentation of Činggis Qan's *ĴasaŲ*); (5) the written record of the *ĴasaŲ* was to set the established order introduced by Činggis Qan for ever, and was to serve as an unvarying guide and model for the government of his successors; (6) the *ĴasaŲ* gradually diminished in importance owing (i) to developments which took place within the Mongol empire through symbiosis with the settled cultures, and the conversion of the Mongol rulers to Buddhism or Islam; and (ii) to the law-enforcing activities of individual khans over their domains which led to the supplementation and modification of the contents of Činggis Qan's *ĴasaŲ* with the *ĴasaŲ* of a particular ruler; (7) as a result, the *ĴasaŲ* of Činggis Qan was eventually replaced by the *ĴasaŲ*s of later Mongol rulers and did not survive in its original form, especially since Činggis Qan's *ĴasaŲ* was a jealously guarded document, of which few copies were made, and access to which was restricted to the rulers of the Chingiside line (cf. the case of the similarly lost text of the imperial chronicle *Altan debter*); (8) what we know of the original *ĴasaŲ* is limited to

quotations preserved in the works of eastern authors who never saw the original themselves, which do not convey the words of Činggis Qan verbatim, and some of which may be either completely fictitious, or pertaining to the *ĴasaŲ* of later rulers.⁴

Further, from indirect evidence and what he assumes to be 'genuine' fragments of the *ĴasaŲ*, Ratchnevsky elaborates on the nature and contents of Činggis Qan's legislation, concerning in particular military organization, various offences (lying, adultery, infringement of religious taboos, etc.), and the duty of hospitality, emphasizing the distinction between the non-recorded common law of the Mongols (which continued to be observed according to tradition and custom),⁵ and the recorded *new* legislation of the *ĴasaŲ*. He also stresses the distinction between the *ĴarliŲ* 'order(s), decree(s)', *ĴasaŲ* 'law(s)', and *bilig* 'maxim(s)' pronounced by Činggis Qan, their respective legal weight, and the difference of opinion among scholars concerning their form.⁶

In a subsequent paper which appeared in 1987, Ratchnevsky surveyed the entire legal scene in the Mongol society of the twelfth to thirteenth centuries, systematizing data and results from previous studies, and adding new information, without, however, discussing further the problem of Činggis' *ĴasaŲ*. Ratchnevsky assumes here that Činggis' code of laws, the 'Great *ĴasaŲ*', was embodied in the 'Great Book of *Yāsās*' described by Juvainī.⁷

In his investigation of Činggis' *ĴasaŲ*, Ratchnevsky has drawn on all available Eastern and Western sources (among the latter, the reports of the Franciscan friars sent as envoys to the Mongol court), but most of his information derives from the works of Juvainī and, to a lesser extent, of Rašīd al-Dīn, as well as from Maqrīzī, al-'Umarī and Bar Hebraeus, all of whom quote sections or articles of the *ĴasaŲ*.⁸ However, in a series of fundamental articles analysing Islamic sources on the *ĴasaŲ*, written chiefly for the purpose of evaluating the latter's true status under the Mamlūks and the reliability of the Egyptian historian Maqrīzī's statements in this regard, Professor Ayalon has conclusively shown that *all* the Islamic sources on the *ĴasaŲ* derive directly or indirectly from a single authority, viz. Juvainī, whose *Ta'rīx-i jahān-gušāy* he describes as 'a very biased and partisan source'. Ayalon gives examples of Juvainī's looseness and ambiguity detracting from the trustworthiness or accuracy of his information on the *ĴasaŲ*.⁹ Now, since Juvainī remains our major source (and, virtually, the *only* Islamic one) on the subject, any study of Činggis' *ĴasaŲ* which fails to take Ayalon's criticism of the Persian historian into account appears to be vitiated or impaired from the start, which of course applies also to Ratchnevsky's investigation. It should be pointed out, however, that notwithstanding his serious reservations about Juvainī's testimony, Ayalon does not go so far as to deny the existence of a Mongol law embodied in a written code under Činggis Qan (see below).

Prompted largely by Ayalon's penetrating study, Dr Morgan published in 1986 an interesting and challenging article on 'The "Great *Yāsā* of Chingis Khān" and Mongol Law in the Īlkhānate,' the results of which are summarized in the section on 'Law' of his book *The Mongols* which appeared soon after.¹⁰

While accepting Ayalon's conclusion regarding the lack of validity of the Islamic sources deriving from Juvainī in proving the existence of a written legal code compiled under Činggis Qan, Morgan questions Ayalon's censure of Juvainī as an historian. According to Morgan, Juvainī's work should be excluded from the discussion not because of its unreliability as a source, but because Juvainī's chapter on 'The laws framed by Činggis Qan and the *yāsās* which he promulgated after his rise to power' in the *Ta'rīx-i jahān-gušāy* does not actually deal with the supposed written code of

Činggis, i.e. the 'Great *Yāsā*', but only with some of Činggis Qan's *yāsās* or regulations.¹¹ In Morgan's opinion, the exclusion of this chapter, which as he rightly says is 'usually regarded as an essential foundation for the study of the Great *Yāsā*,'¹² leads him to question the very existence of a written code, particularly in view of the fact that a source like the *Secret History of the Mongols* makes no mention of it but, like Juvainī, records only specific regulations and decrees issued *ad hoc* by Činggis Qan. Morgan comes to the conclusion that 'it is not feasible at this stage to state with certainty that the Great *Yāsā* did not exist: only that the sources which have so far been used to demonstrate the proposition that it did do not show anything of the sort'.¹³ And, in reply to Ayalon's remark that he (Ayalon) does not agree 'with the view of some scholars . . . that in the reign of Chingiz Khān there seems to have been no Mongol law embodied in a written code. For such a view much stronger proof must be found,'¹⁴ Morgan writes, 'In the nature of things, we are unlikely ever to be able to *prove* the negative; but in any case that is not where the onus of proof lies. The ball is firmly in the court of those who believe in the existence of a written *yāsā*; they must, if they can, find some evidence for it. Perhaps Ayalon, in the fuller version of his study which he promises, will be able to produce some such evidence. If he does, I shall happily recant. But it will need to be something other than those old but in this instance, unhelpful friends, Juwaynī, Rashīd al-Dīn and the *Secret History of the Mongols*.'¹⁵

In Ayalon's and Morgan's studies attention is focused primarily on the Islamic sources and, to a lesser extent, on the *Secret History*. Very little attention is paid to the Chinese sources of the thirteenth and fourteenth century, no doubt because they are poor in specific references to the *Ĵasay* of Činggis Qan. Furthermore, the Chinese material of this period is somewhat intractable and a specialized knowledge is required to handle it critically. Chinese scholars have collected virtually all the references to the Mongol *Ĵasay* and much of this information has indeed been used by Ratchnevsky in his earlier-mentioned publications. More recently, Dr Paul Heng-chao Ch'en has discussed the problem of the *Ĵasay* in Chinese documents within the framework of his investigation of the legal system in Yüan China.¹⁶

With regard to the first reference to the Great *Ĵasay*, Ch'en states, 'The *Ta cha-sa* 大扎撒 was known as the Great Code of Činggis Qan and seems to have been promulgated in 1229, when T'ai-tsung 太宗 (i.e. Ögödei Qayan—I.R.) was elected to succeed Činggis Qan.'¹⁷ This reference is very interesting. It is found in the *Yüan-shih*,¹⁸ the official history of the Yüan dynasty, the 'Basic Annals' (*pen-chi* 本記) of which are based on the *Veritable Records* (*shih-lu* 實錄) of each reign. As recorded in *Yüan-shih* 1, 29, one of the very first actions of the new emperor upon his enthronement on 13 September 1229 was to promulgate the Great *Ĵasa*(γ). The expression 'Great *Ĵasa*(γ)' (*Ta cha-sa*) is glossed in this text as *ta fa-ling* 大法令 'the Great Code'. In the Chinese nomenclature of the Yüan, as in earlier periods, the adjectives *ta* 大 and *t'ai* 太 (= Mo. *yeke*) 'great', 'grand', are regularly used with reference to the emperor or to the court.¹⁹ Furthermore, Mo. *yekes*, lit. 'the Great Ones', is a term designating the (royal) ancestors (= Chin. *tsu-tsung* 祖宗), so that *yeke* bears also this additional connotation of 'ancestral'.²⁰ In the *Yüan-shih* context, therefore, the 'Great *Ĵasa*(γ)' is, by definition, the 'Code (= [the body of] laws and regulations) of Činggis Qan'. The item recorded in the *Yüan-shih* follows various other measures taken by Ögödei upon his enthronement and is precisely dated. We may therefore take it that this is what actually happened, even though we still do not know the nature of the 'Great Code', nor in what form it was 'promulgated' by Ögödei. Can Juvainī refer to the same event when he writes: 'And he

[Güyük—I.R.] made a *yasa* that just as *Qa'an* (i.e. *Ögödei*—I.R.), at the time of his accession, had upheld the *yasas* of his father and had not admitted any change of alteration of his statutes, . . . ?²¹ We know from the same source that when *Ögödei* was elected, 'first of all he made a *yasa* that such ordinances and commands as had previously been issued by *Chingiz-Khan* should be maintained, and secured, and protected against the evils of change, and alteration, and confusion'. On that occasion he also decreed (according to *Ĵuvainī*) as follows: 'Every hasty speech which until the day of our accession hath issued from the mouth of any man, we shall pardon and cancel it; but if from henceforth any man shall set foot to an action that contravenes the old and new ordinances and *yasas*, the prosecution and punishment of that man shall be proportionate to his crime.'²²

From these accounts, it would seem to me that, as part of the enthronement ceremony, *Ögödei* not only pledged continued observance of his father's *ĵasays* (*yāsās*), but that he also promulgated them formally, i.e. he proclaimed them at the *quriltai*. The recital or declamation of Činggis' pronouncements on festive and formal occasions such as a *quriltai* is a well attested practice in the thirteenth century; and we know that other members of the qan's family, such as Čaγatai and Tolui had a reputation for possessing a particularly good knowledge of such pronouncements, which included *ĵasays* as well as *biligs* ('maxims').²³ According to a Chinese source of the fourteenth century, it was a Mongol practice to read the 'Precious Precepts (*pao-hsün* 寶訓) of T'ai-tsu (i.e. Činggis Qan)' at the *quriltai* that elected the qan, on the very day of his enthronement.²⁴ I shall return later to the question of the 'promulgation' of Činggis' legal pronouncements or laws, and their probable form.

Another interesting reference in the Chinese sources mentioned by Ch'en is an imperial edict of 10 September 1264, the text of which is preserved in both the *Yüan-shih* and the Chinese administrative code, *Yüan tien-chang* 元典章.²⁵ On that date, Qubilai Qayan (Shih-tsu 世祖, r.1260–94) decreed the change of reign-title from Chung-tung to Chih-yüan. In the edict as recorded in the *Yüan tien-chang* the emperor states: 'Since Bulγa, Quča(r), Toman, Aliča(r), Toγos and others had plotted to harm Our House, and have been duly executed in accordance with Činggis Qan's *Ĵasa*(γ), (We now) grant a general amnesty to the empire.'²⁶ The 'plot' in question is the 'rebellion' of Qubilai's brother Ariq Böke, which had been supported by the high officials named above. Following Ariq Böke's submission in 1264 they were tried and executed. The event in question is well documented and is described in detail by Rašīd al-Dīn, who mentions all those personages.²⁷ It is clear from this that in 1264, in cases of sedition perpetrated by Mongol princes and dignitaries, justice was still carried out in accordance with the *Ĵasaγ* of Činggis Qan, i.e. with the Great *Ĵasaγ*.²⁸

Further instances of the term *ĵasa*(γ) occurring in the *Yüan tien-chang* and other Chinese sources of the Yüan period are given by Ch'en,²⁹ but unfortunately they do not specifically refer to the 'Great' *Ĵasaγ* or to Činggis Qan and I, therefore, prefer not to consider them in the present discussion, which is only concerned with Činggis' *Ĵasaγ*. As noted by Professor Cleaves, at least some of those references appear to be to the Great *Ĵasaγ*; in the majority of cases, however, the term *ĵasaγ* simply means 'the law', i.e. Mongol (customary) law as updated, supplemented, and enforced by Činggis' successors.³⁰

Ch'en's conclusion is that the *ĵasaγ* 'was a collection of rules and instructions given by Činggis Qan in response to the needs of specific circumstances and was later formally promulgated in 1229. Although it was not a systematically organized legal

work, the *jasay* provided the Mongolian ruling clan with guidelines for the administration of government, especially in matters of military discipline and organization. The *jasay* did not apply universally as a code to all tribes under the Mongolian domination, but by virtue of its authoritative character, it did serve as a principal legal source in China for the period immediately following the fall of the Sung dynasty. Because Chinese society soon proved too complicated for Mongolian customary law to deal with, the application of the *jasay* to Chinese cases diminished gradually and by the end of the thirteenth century, the *jasay* as a source of law appeared to be of minimal importance.³¹

Commenting on Ch'en's discussion, Morgan states that Ch'en's remarks (especially those on pp. 4–8), 'while accepting the authority of Riasanovsky and being "pre-Ayalon"' on the *Yāsā*'s contents, do not seem to show that the evidence of the Chinese sources is irreconcilable with the arguments advanced in this paper (i.e. 'The "Great *Yāsā*"'—I.R.). Indeed, it has been said that the Mongol Yüan dynasty was unique in Chinese history in that it did not have a formal penal code. It is even suggested that the notion of such codes was meaningless to the Mongols, and that they preferred to rule through individual regulations and legislation in China. See J. D. Langlois, Jr., in Langlois, ed., *China under Mongol rule*, Princeton, 1981, p. 10, n.20, citing Uematsu Tadashi.³² In his book *The Mongols*, Morgan does not refer to Ch'en or to the Chinese evidence for the Great *Ĵasay*.

Although it is true that the Chinese sources supply scant information on the *Ĵasay* of Činggis Qan, what they tell us is, I believe, significant, particularly if we analyse it in conjunction with the evidence provided by the *Secret History*, a source which, in my opinion, deserves also closer scrutiny.

In the *Secret History*, the word *jasay* (= *ĵasay*) occurs nine times (§§153 [twice], 189, 193, 197, 199, 227, 257 and 278) glossed in Chinese as *fa-tu* 法度 'regulation, ordinance, law' in all cases except once in §153, where it is glossed *chün-fa* 軍法 'military ordinance'.³³ The glosses are, however, very late additions (end of the fourteenth century), whereas the text of the *Secret History* goes back to the first half of the thirteenth century.³⁴ It is necessary, then, to examine the context closely to determine the exact meaning of the term.

1 & 2. (§153, both instances with the same contextual meaning.) Činggis' *ĵasay* of 1202 is a military one with normative force: 'When we overcome the enemy, we shall not stop to plunder. When the victory is complete, the booty shall be ours, and we shall share it. If we are forced by the enemy to retreat, let us turn back to the point where we began the attack. The men who do not turn back to the point where we began the attack will be cut down.'³⁵ As usual with the *ĵasay*, punishment for contravention is mentioned (or implied).

3. (§189) Here *ĵasay* = 'law(s) issued by the ruler'—in this case by Gürbesü, the forceful mother of Tayang Qan of the Naiman, whose 'law' is described as having become 'harsh' (*qurča*, lit. 'sharp').³⁶ In the present instance, *ĵasay* is, therefore, virtually synonymous with 'rule, government', the meaning that this word still has in modern Mongolian.³⁷

4. (§193) Dodai Čerbi advised Činggis Qan in 1204 to the effect that, to overcome the more powerful Naiman forces, it was necessary to fatten first the lean Mongol geldings. In order to delay the Naimans' offensive and gain time to fatten the horses, Dodai proposed a clever scheme, viz., to make the Mongol soldiers light fires in different places at night, thus creating the impression that they were spread over a wide area and more

numerous than in reality. The text then says: *ene üge-yi jöbšiyejü Činggis Qa'an ĵarliq bolurun teyin bö'et qal-nu'ut tüle'ülütkün ke'en čeri'üt-te ĵasaq tungqabai* 'Approving these words (of Dodai Čerbi), Činggis Qa'an gave the following order: '(Things) being so, make them light the fires!', and he proclaimed the law to the soldiers (lit. 'at the moment when Č.Q. gave the order, saying '...,' he proclaimed the *ĵasaq* to the soldiers'). What Činggis did, then, was to issue the order and proclaim it as *ĵasaq*, i.e. as if it were a law, or with the full force of the law, meaning that in view of the critical situation facing the Mongols, any breach of this order would be dealt with with extreme severity as prescribed by the *ĵasaq*. In my opinion, this passage has been misunderstood by previous translators, who have incorrectly assumed that *ĵasaq* here means simply 'order'.³⁸ Now, the rather loose usage of the term *yāsā* when an 'order' or 'decree' (*firmān*) is meant in the Islamic sources is well documented,³⁹ but the Chinese and Mongol sources distinguish clearly the two terms, as shown by the consistency of the Chinese renderings (*fa-ling* 法令 *lfa-tu* for *ĵasaq* and *sheng-chih* 聖旨 for *ĵarliq*),⁴⁰ and by their regular usage in all the Mongol documents (epigraphies, edicts) of the Yüan in Uighur and 'Phags-pa scripts.⁴¹ In our passage, *ĵarliq* is also glossed as *fa-tu* 'law' in the Chinese interlinear version.

5. (§197) Činggis Qan, angry at Naya'a Noyan for his delay in delivering Dayir Usun's daughter Qulan (Qatun), and fearing a case of *lèse majesté*, wants to make such a breach a matter of 'law'. Date: 1204. Here *Ĵasaq* = 'normative law.' Cf. Cleaves' translation: 'I shall make [it a matter of] ordinance,' adding in a footnote, 'I.e., 'I shall make a precedent which shall serve as law for the future.' See also §§197 and 257 below for other instances of the application of the *Ĵasaq*.⁴²

6. (§199). Činggis gives a number of military directives in 1205 concerning the use of horses and hunting for provisions to be treated as 'law', with due apprehension and punishment of transgressors.⁴³ As in no. 5 above (§ 197), *Ĵasaq* = 'normative law'.

7. (§227) Further military directives issued in 1205 by Činggis Qan, here with regard to the companies of the Guard (*kešik* [= *kešig*]) serving on roster duty, again with prescription of punishment for defaulters.⁴⁴ *Ĵasaq* = 'normative law'.

8. (§257) Činggis, angry at his commander Toqučar's plunder of the border towns of Qan Melik (i.e. Amīn al-Mulk), thus causing the latter to turn against the Mongols (in 1220), intends to make a law to deal with such matters in the future, just as in no. 5 above (§197). Capital punishment for infringement is also mentioned.⁴⁵ Here too *Ĵarliq* = 'normative law.'

9. (§278). Ögödei re-proclaims (in 1229?) Činggis Qan's regulations concerning the organization and duties of the Guard as enunciated in §§227, 229 and 232, with some modifications. The context in which the term *Ĵasaq* is used is identical with no. 7 (§227) above,⁴⁶ *Ĵasaq* = 'normative law.'

Still in the *Secret History* we find one more occurrence of *Ĵasaq* in §74, as *Ĵasaqtan* (= *Ĵasaq* + poss. suff. -*tan*) with the meaning of 'lawgivers'.⁴⁷

Reviewing the above occurrences in the earliest Mongolian source, we notice that *Ĵasaq* is invariably used in the sense of a ruler's directive, as a legally binding precedent, a normative law the infringement of which entails severe (usually capital) punishment. Since *Ĵasaq* is the law of the ruler, i.e. the law of the state, it can by extension also mean 'governance, rule' (as in *Secret History* §189). Although one or more 'decrees' (*Ĵarliqs*) may be treated as, or constitute, a 'matter of *Ĵasaq*' if they are deemed important enough for the qan to decide so (as, e.g., in *Secret History* §§197 and 199), on no account can *Ĵasaq* be equated with *Ĵarliq* since the latter, even though also a ruler's

pronouncement, does not have *per se* the *normative* force of *Ĵasay*; and a *Ĵarliy* can never be understood in the sense of 'rule, governance' like *Ĵasay*.

In the *Secret History* we also notice the absence of any reference to the Great *Ĵasay*, or to any 'written' *Ĵasay*. The Law was certainly there in form of laws, prescriptions and rulings issued by the elected qan, but was it written down and codified in his lifetime? We know that Činggis Qan had scribes (*bičēčis*) who recorded his words, and instances of their 'recordings' are well documented in the Chinese sources of the period.⁴⁸ His chancellery included people with knowledge of the Uighur script and of Chinese.⁴⁹ The famous Šigi Qutuqu, about whom so much has been written, kept records of judicial matters and population distribution, no doubt written in Uighur script.⁵⁰ It is reasonable to assume that Činggis' 'laws' were set down in some form, but we cannot prove it, since it is not clear what is meant by the 'decisions on judicial matters' (*jarqu jarqulaqsan*) recorded by Šigi Qutuqu, and some scholars have suggested that they may have had nothing to do with the *Ĵasay*.⁵¹

When Ögödei 'promulgated the Great *Ĵasay*' in 1229, he must have intended to make known to the wider audience of the *quriltai* the principles of governance of Činggis Qan, i.e. those matters that were of primary concern for the security of the state, the ruling clan, the military and those affecting the subjects. The purpose of such a promulgation would have been threefold: the princes, the nobility and army leaders were to be reminded of their responsibilities; the subjects, of their duties; and the newly elected emperor, of his solemn acceptance of the principles and laws established by his predecessor, the founder of the dynasty. This acceptance implied the respect of Činggis Qan's will and the continuation of his policies. One may cite, in this connection, Juvainī's statement to the effect that when a qan is elected or the army is mobilized, or a *quriltai* is held, the *written code of Ĵasays* is produced, and the qan and princes govern their actions by it.⁵² This practice may indeed have begun at the great *quriltai* of 1218–19 which decided the Western Campaign, i.e. the war against Khwārazm (1219–24). Referring to the launching of the campaign, Juvainī says that Činggis Qan 'equipped and instructed his sons, the great emirs, the *noyans* and the thousands, hundreds and tens, disposed the two wings and the vanguard, proclaimed a new *yasa*, and in the year 615/1218–19 commenced the march.'⁵³ Rašīd al-Dīn, referring to the same event, writes: 'He (Činggis Qan—I.R.) convoked the assembly, held a *quriltai*, and established anew the guiding principles of the regulations (*āyīn*), the Law (*Yāsā*) and the former customs (*yūsūn*), and took the field against the country of the Xvārazmšāh.'⁵⁴ Now one of the most important regulations of the *Ĵasay*—for it affected the very life of the qan and the core of the Mongol military machine—concerned the organization of the Guard (*kešig*). That a breach of Činggis' ordinances on the Guard should constitute 'a violation of the *Ĵasay*' is specifically stated in §227 (see above, no. 7). This, of course, flatly contradicts Ayalon's statement that accounts of Činggis Qan's organization of the army and of his bodyguard in the *Secret History* are 'never . . . connected in any way with the making or with the contents of the Mongol law.'⁵⁵ Interestingly enough, these very regulations, albeit in slightly altered form, were re-proclaimed by Ögödei with specific mention of both Činggis Qan and the *Ĵasay* in §278 (see above, no. 9).⁵⁶ Thus we have here an important section of Činggis' *Ĵasay* proclaimed anew by his son and heir. Could this not be part of Ögödei's 1229 'promulgation' of the Great *Ĵasay* duly recorded in writing and hence preserved in the *Secret History*? I am of the opinion that it very probably is. It is now widely accepted that the main body of the *Secret History* (§§1–268) dealing with Činggis' ancestors and his own life was originally put down in

writing in 1228, the year corresponding to the one given in the colophon (§282).⁵⁷ Činggis' regulations on the Guard which are found in §227 were, therefore, also recorded in 1228 *at the latest*; they were then re-promulgated and again recorded a year later.⁵⁸ It is indeed regrettable that the section on Ögödei's reign in the *Secret History* is so short and fragmentary for the period of Ögödei's rule is extremely rich and interesting. A fuller record of his deeds would have undoubtedly contained additional information on the *ĴasaŲ*.

In addition to regulations concerning the Guard, the section devoted to Ögödei in the *Secret History* records provisions for the post-relay system (*ĵam*). It is almost certain that the latter originated under Činggis Qan, since the *ĵam* ordinance preserved in the *Yung-lo ta-tien* 永樂大典, which emanated from Ögödei although issued one month (15 January 1242) after his death, begins with the words 'In accordance with the issued *ĵasa*(*γ*) that We have received'—i.e. in accordance with Činggis Qan's *ĴasaŲ* that had already been promulgated (presumably in 1229).⁵⁹

Measures concerning the organization of the army and the Guard, and those insuring the efficiency of communications through the post-relay system were of paramount importance for the security and proper functioning of the state. It is therefore not surprising that they were protected by appropriate legislation, viz. by the *ĴasaŲ*. In spite of the recent demythologizing of the Great *Yāsā* as handed down by the Muslim authors, and the already mentioned ambiguity in the Islamic sources of the very term *yāsā*, there is no reason, in my view, to reject Ĵuvainī's statements on the *yāsā*(*s*) when they are supported, directly or indirectly, by independent sources. To this category belong those *yāsās* dealing with the Mongol army and with the *yam* (= *ĵam*) which are mentioned in the chapter on Činggis Qan's *yāsās* in the *Ta'riḫ-i ĵāhān-gušāy*.⁶⁰ The Mongol, Chinese and Persian sources all agree in connecting the regulations on such vital matters with the *ĴasaŲ* of Činggis Qan, and I have no doubt that they were. As I have already pointed out, Činggis' successors 'updated' the regulations that were sanctioned by the *ĴasaŲ*, but the guiding principles of the *ĴasaŲ* were, by definition, not subject to change. As Pelliot says, the *ĴasaŲ* was 'la loi arrêtee sous Gengis-khan'.⁶¹

As stated earlier, it has been claimed that the *ĴasaŲ* represented knowledge—either written or verbally transmitted—that was jealously guarded within the narrow ruling circle of the Chingiside princes, and that this may account for the fact that it did not survive as a *corpus*, and that we know so little about it. Whatever the truth of this claim, we know that the commands of the *ĴasaŲ* were made known to the leaders of the subjects, or potential subjects, of the Mongols so that they would 'respect and fear' the authority of the Mongol qan.⁶² In the famous letter of Güyüg to Pope Innocent IV we read: 'And if you keep to your word, thou, who art the great Pope, together with all the kings, must come in person to do homage to Us. We shall then cause you to hear every command (*firmān*) that there is of the *Yāsā*'.⁶³ These words, proceeding as it were straight from the qan's mouth, and not from a less than partial or unreliable historian, are most illuminating, and ought to dispel any lingering doubt in our minds about the existence of the *ĴasaŲ* as a code of laws. Furthermore, the letter to the pope was issued in 1246, immediately after Güyüg's enthronement; therefore, we can safely assume that Güyüg's *ĴasaŲ* was *essentially* the same *ĴasaŲ* that Güyüg had inherited from his father Ögödei and of which he was said to be such a strict observer: ultimately it was Činggis' *ĴasaŲ*, the Great *ĴasaŲ*.

داند و چنان در کند ما است و در
 و لا همارا که کاسی در است لای
 و رسای لای الحسار است و
 و اگر چنان سید منی ما را که لای لای
 و در ما سید و در ما لای سید و در
 و در که انداز ما در سید و در
 و ما که در و در ما که لای
 و در سید و در ما که لای

Figure 8.1 Section of Güyüg's letter to Pope Innocent IV (1246) containing a reference to the Yāsā (5th line from the top).

The Franciscan friar who brought back Güyüg's reply to Innocent IV was John of Pian di Carpine, whose *Historia Mongalorum* is a precious early account of the Mongols and their customs. As pointedly noted by Dr Peter Jackson in his recent review of Ayalon's book *Outsiders in the Lands of Islam*,⁶⁴ Friar John distinguishes between the *traditiones* or traditional customs, and the *leges et statuta*, i.e. the laws (lit, 'the fundamental and particular laws') issued by Činggis Qan.⁶⁵ The former must undoubtedly

refer to Mo. *yosun*, and the latter, I think, cumulatively to the *Ĵasay*. Certainly, the two examples of such laws quoted by Friar John fall within the purview of the *Ĵasay*, rather than within that of the *ĵarliys*. In particular, the first example concerning Činggis' 'injunction'⁶⁶ on the qan's election by *quriltai*, and capital punishment for anyone who assumes the supreme power arbitrarily, is confirmed by Ĵuvainī who refers to the inviolability of this procedure as one sanctioned by Činggis' *Yāsā*.⁶⁷

In carrying out the above survey, I have covered ground already traversed by several of my predecessors who have investigated the complex problem of the *Ĵasay*, and to whom I am greatly indebted. My purpose has been to put things in better perspective by probing somewhat deeper into the Chinese and Mongol sources in order to extract all the information they can yield. At the same time, I have not lost sight of what the Islamic sources, in particular Ĵuvainī, say on the subject, my concern being—in the case of the latter—not to throw out the baby with the bath water.

Thus, on the basis of all the information gathered from the *Secret History*, the Chinese historical and literary sources of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the historian Ĵuvainī (selectively), and additional documents whose reliability is undisputed, such as Güyüg's letter to Innocent IV, we can draw the following conclusions with regard to *Činggis Qan's Ĵasay*:

1. The existence of the *Ĵasay* is well attested for the period of Činggis Qan (as early as 1202 according to the *Secret History*).
2. The *Ĵasay* consisted of a number of binding injunctions and normative rules concerning matters of governance, military administration, the administration of justice, the division of spoils, etc., as formulated by Činggis Qan, to be handed down to, and implemented by, his successors.
3. The *Ĵasay* was elaborated over several years, its injunctions being determined by particular exigencies and circumstances. It was, therefore, an evolving *corpus* of laws, the core of which was apparently established by Činggis Qan in the period immediately preceding and following his election as qan in 1206. In its original form it was 'closed' at his death in 1227.
4. The *Ĵasay* was meant to be both a body of fundamental laws and a permanent institution to be carefully protected against change, and serving as the ultimate authority on policy decisions and judicial matters. In this respect it differed from other imperial pronouncements, such as the *ĵarliys*, which lacked those basic characteristics, being *ad hoc* prescriptions on specific issues.
5. There is no *direct* evidence that the *Ĵasay* was a written code. However, taking into account that (i) scribes and individuals with knowledge of Uighur script were in Činggis Qan's entourage from about the time when the *Ĵasay* is first mentioned in the *Secret History*, i.e. the first decade of the thirteenth century; (ii) one of these individuals (Šigi Qutuqu) was entrusted with recording administrative and legal matters in special books in 1206; (iii) we have the personal testimony of a Chinese witness (Li Chih-ch'ang) to the actual recording of Činggis' orders in 1222; (iv) the *Ĵasay*, being a collection of Činggis' pronouncements on vital issues, such as the qan's election, could not be entrusted to human memory alone, with its whims and failings; (v) there are (admittedly later) sources clearly stating that the 'ancestral' *Ĵasay* was *read*, not recited, on certain occasions; and (vi) the sections of the *Ĵasay* preserved in the *Secret History* were put down in writing at the latest in 1228, we may have good reason to assume that the provisions of the *Ĵasay* were almost

certainly recorded already in Činggis' time. We have, unfortunately, no way to determine whether they had yet been compiled into a proper code like, for instance, the traditional Chinese codes. In my opinion, it is quite likely that these provisions were *not* arranged and presented in a very systematic way, but rather in a somewhat loose fashion akin, perhaps, to the arrangement of some of the material found in the *Secret History*, but this is pure speculation.

6. After Činggis' death, his *Ĵasaγ* became known as the 'Great *Ĵasaγ*' (the first occurrence of this expression is in the *Yüan-shih* Annals, *s.a.* 1229).
7. Ögödei Qayan (r.1229–41) began the custom of 'proclaiming' the Great *Ĵasaγ* upon the qan's enthronement to confirm its validity and his adherence to it. Unfortunately, we also have little information on this custom, but its very existence (attested independently by both the Chinese and Persian sources) confirms the importance of the *Ĵasaγ* as an institution in the following reigns.
8. Beginning with Ögödei, the Great *Ĵasaγ* underwent some modifications to allow for structural changes in military organization, etc., as determined by the growth of the Mongol empire; these modifications, however, did not affect the fundamental thrust of the *Ĵasaγ*.
9. Although the enforcement of the *Ĵasaγ* pertained to the qan, who was its depository, and to specially appointed high officials—the (*yeke*) *ĵaryučis* or (Great) Judges—the provisions of the *Ĵasaγ* were made known to 'outsiders' for the purpose of making them comply with the Will of Heaven as expressed in the commands of Činggis Qan, in other words to exact obedience to Mongol authority. In this way, some of the contents of the *Ĵasaγ*, the original text of which is lost (as is the case of that other great book, the *Altan debter*),⁶⁸ has been preserved in other works beside the *Secret History*, such as the *Historia Mongalorum*, the *Ta'riḫ-i ĵāhān-gušāy*, and various Chinese documents of the Yüan period.
10. For reasons already (and amply) discussed by other investigators, the *Ĵasaγ* gradually lost its importance, the main causes of its decline being the political fragmentation of the Mongol empire, and alien (local) cultural influences. The very meaning of the word underwent a change. In the West, the *Ĵasaγ* was assimilated to the *yāsās* or 'commands' of individual rulers, thus often becoming indistinguishable from *ĵarlḡys*; in the East, it came to mean simply Mongol 'laws and regulations' as invoked in the case of serious crimes usually entailing the death penalty.⁶⁹ This interesting development is also a reflection of the differing legal traditions in the Muslim world and in China.

It will be seen that the above conclusions confirm, on the whole, those reached by Ratchnevsky; they support also, to some extent, the hypothesis proposed by Morgan, that 'There was probably believed to be a 'Great *Yāsā* of Chingiz Khān', derived in part from Chingiz himself and perhaps in part from earlier Mongol custom. But this *was not written down in any coherent form*, and it was therefore possible to attribute to it a wide variety of provisions, as was thought necessary or desirable. *In practice it may very well have been a gradual evolving body of custom, not only beginning before the time of Chingiz Khān but continuing after him.*'⁷⁰ From all the available evidence, I now think we can be more positive about the *existence* of this 'body of custom' (which I would rather call a 'body of laws'), and the likelihood that it was actually a *written* document, even if lacking 'coherence' from our point of view. Such conclusions have been reached through a somewhat long and convoluted process, but in my own experience with historical

research, especially concerning the Mongol period, it is seldom the case that solutions are neatly served to us on a platter.

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ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations are used throughout this article:

<i>BSOAS</i> :	<i>Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies</i> (London University)
<i>CAJ</i> :	<i>Central Asiatic Journal</i>
<i>HJAS</i> :	<i>Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies</i>
<i>JESHO</i> :	<i>Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient</i>
<i>JRAS</i> :	<i>Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society</i>
<i>MS</i> :	<i>Monumenta Serica</i>
<i>PFEH</i> :	<i>Papers on Far Eastern History</i>
<i>ROC</i> :	<i>Revue de l'Orient Chrétien</i>

NOTES

1. The Middle Mongolian form of the word is *Ĵasaq*, but *Ĵasaγ* is the regular Preclassical and Classical Mongolian form. To avoid confusion, I shall use the latter form throughout.
2. See G. Vernadsky, 'The scope and contents of Chingis Khan's *Yasa*', *HJAS* 3 (1938): 337–60 (and n.1 on p. 337 for the literature on the subject); the important note on *yasaq* in G. Doerfer, *Türkische und mongolische Elemente im Neupersischen*, I–IV (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1963–75), no. 1789; and the literature cited in D. O. Morgan, 'The "Great *Yāsā* of Chingiz Khān" and Mongol law in the Īlkhānate', *BSOAS* 49 (1986): 163–76, at 164, n.5.
3. P. Ratchnevsky, 'Die *Yasa* (Ĵasaq Činggiskhans und ihre Problematik', *Schriften zur Geschichte und Kultur des alten Orients* 5: *Sprache, Geschichte und Kultur der altaischen Völker* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1974), pp. 471–87; idem, *Činggis-khan. Sein Leben und Wirken* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1983), pp. 164–72 (ed. and English trans. by Th. N. Haining, *Genghis Khan. His life and legacy* (Oxford & Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1991), pp. 187–96.
4. See Ratchnevsky, 'Die *Yasa*', pp. 486–7; idem, *Činggis-khan*, pp. 164–5 (cf. Haining, *Genghis Khan*, pp. 187–8).
5. In Mongolian *yosun*.
6. See Ratchnevsky, *Činggis-khan*, pp. 165ff.
7. P. Ratchnevsky, 'Die Rechtsverhältnisse bei den Mongolen im 12.–13. Jahrhundert', *CAJ* 31 (1987): 64–110, at 84. In this, his last contribution to the subject, Ratchnevsky integrates the results of his previous investigations into the legal system of the medieval Mongols besides those solely devoted to the *Ĵasaγ*. See their titles in the 'Liste der zitierten Werke' on p. 110.
8. See D. Ayalon, 'The great *Yāsā* of Chingiz Khān. A reexamination', *Studia Islamica* 33 (1971): 97–140; 34 (1971): 151–80; 36 (1972): 113–58; 38 (1973): 107–57; reprinted in

- D. Ayalon, *Outsiders in the lands of Islam: Mamluks, Mongols and eunuchs* (London: Variorum Reprints, 1988). References are to the reprint.
9. Ayalon, *Outsiders*, IVa, pp. 133ff.
 10. See above, n.2; and D. O. Morgan, *The Mongols* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. 96–9.
 11. See Morgan, 'Great *Yāsā*', p. 168; idem, *Mongols*, p. 98. For the chapter on the laws of Činggis Qan in Juvainī's work see 'Ata-Malik Juvainī, *The history of the world-conqueror*, I–II, transl. J.A. Boyle (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958), pp. 23–34.
 12. Morgan, 'Great *Yāsā*', p. 168.
 13. Morgan, *Mongols*, p. 99.
 14. Ayalon, *Outsiders*, Introduction, p. x.
 15. D. O. Morgan, review of Ayalon, *Outsiders*, in *BSOAS* 52/1 (1989): 351.
 16. Paul Heng-chao Ch'en, *Chinese legal tradition under the Mongols. The code of 1291 as reconstructed* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. xiv, 4–10.
 17. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
 18. Sung Lien 宋濂 a.o., *Yüan-shih* 元史 (Peking: Chung-hua Shu-chü, 1976).
 19. Cf., e.g., the expressions *ta-fu* 大福 'the Emperor's Good Fortune', *Ta-tu* 大都 'the Imperial Capital', *ta tsung-cheng fu* 大宗正府 'the Imperial Clan Administration', *t'ai-tzu* 太子 'the Heir Apparent', *t'ai-miao* 太廟 'the Imperial Temple', *t'ai-i* 太醫 'the Imperial Physician', *t'ai-fu chien* 太府監 'the Imperial Treasury', etc.
 20. See the *Secret History*, § 70. Cf. F. W. Cleaves, transl., *The Secret History of the Mongols*, I (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), p. 19; E. Haenisch, *Wörterbuch zu Manghol un niuca tobca'an* (Yüan-ch'ao pi-shi). *Geheime Geschichte der Mongolen*, reprinted. (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner Verlag, 1962), p. 170. Thus the words *yeke erke* that are found in the Mongolian text of the Sino-Mongolian inscription of 1240 may mean 'the great (= imperial) power', or 'the great (= ancestral) power', i.e. the power of the imperial ancestors—as indeed embodied in the *Ĵasay*. Cf. I. de Rachewiltz, 'Some remarks on Töregene's Edict of 1240', *PFEH* 23 (March 1981): 53–61 (where, however, my interpretation must be revised). In a letter to me dated 7 March 1982, Prof. Ratchnevsky writes, '*yeke erke* refers probably to the Good Fortune of the forefathers. . . . My tentative translation of the passage is as follows: "If someone contravene this my command (word), should (might) he not be punished (by) the great power (of the forefathers?)?"'. The term *yeke* occurs also in the very name of the Mongol confederation—the future empire—of Čing-gis Qan: *Yeke Mongyol Ulus*. This expression has been variously rendered as: (1) 'peuple des grands Mongols' (P. Pelliot); (2) 'Grand empire Mongol' (W. Kotwicz, followed by N. Poppe, B. Ya. Vladimircov and L. Ligeti); (3) 'empire des Grands Mongols' (A. Mostaert and F. W. Cleaves). Several years ago I adopted Kotwicz's rendering and defended his interpretation against those of Pelliot, Mostaert and Cleaves. See I. de Rachewiltz, '*Qan*, *Qa'an* and the Seal of Güyüg', in K. Sagaster and M. Weiers, eds, *Documenta Barbarorum. Festschrift für Walther Heissig zum 70. Geburtstag* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1983), pp. 274–5. Professor Cleaves disagreed with my argument in his article 'A Mongolian rescript of the fifth year of Dgedü Erdem-tü (1640)', in *HJAS* 46 (1986): 191, n.4. In further support of my argument, and in addition to what I have said on the subject in my article 'The Mongols rethink their early history' (to appear in the *Rivista degli Studi Orientali*), n.44, I should mention a significant piece of evidence which has been hitherto ignored. I refer to the letter of Mangu Khan (i.e. Möngke Qayan, r.1251–59) to Saint Louis as recorded in Latin by William of Rubruck in 1254, where we read: 'Per virtutem eterni Dei per magnum mundum Moallorum preceptum Manguchan . . .' (A. Van Den Wyngaert, ed., *Sinica Franciscana, I: Itinera et relationes Fratrum Minorum saeculi XIII et XIV*, Quaracchi-Firenze, 1929; reprint ed., Quaracchi-Firenze, 1962), p. 308. I think there is no doubt that the 'magnum mundus Moallorum' to which reference is made in the letter is the *Yeke Mongyol Ulus*. Cf. E. Voegelin, 'The Mongol orders of submission to European powers, 1245–1255', *Byzantion* 15 (1940–41): 398. This would confirm the correctness of the rendering 'Great Mongol Empire (or Nation)' as opposed to 'Empire of

the Great Mongols'. As for the expression *Yeke Mongγol tout court*, which is at the root of the problem, it should be emphasized that it does not occur as such in any Mongol document or text of the Mongol-Yüan period and that, for that period, its existence is inferred only indirectly from Chinese and Latin sources. See A. Mostaert and F. W. Cleaves in *HJAS* 15 (1952): 486–91. My view is that the expression *Yeke Mongγol* or 'Great Mongols' was actually extrapolated from *Yeke Mongγol Ulus*; in other words, *after* the establishment of the Great Mongol Empire (better: Nation—in 1206), the members of the ruling ethnic group, i.e. the Mongols, became known as the Great Mongols.

21. Juvaini (as cited in n.11), p. 256.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 189–90 (my emphasis).
23. See Juvaini, pp. 40, 186, 205, 272; Rashid al-Din, *The successors of Genghis Khan*, trans. J. A. Boyle (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), Introduction, p. 13; pp. 18, 77, 155–6, 321; Ratchnevsky, 'Die Yasa', p. 481, n.55. Cf. also Juvaini's statement (p. 25) to the effect that 'Wherever a khan ascends the throne, or a great army is mobilized, or the princes assemble and begin [to consult together] concerning affairs of state and the administration thereof, they produce these rolls [of the Great Book of *Yasas* — I. R.] and model their action thereon.' I shall have more to say on this statement later.
24. Huang Chin 黃潛 (1277–1357), *Chin-hua Huang hsien-sheng wen-chi*, ph. repr. of the Yüan edition, *Ssu-pu ts'ung-k'an*, 1st series, 24, 3b. As already stated by Fang Ling-kuei 方齡貴, *Yüan Ming hsi-ch'ü chung ti Mengku yü* [Mongolian expressions in Yuan and Ming dramas] (Shanghai: Han-yü ta-tz'u-tien Ch'u-pan-she, 1991), p. 330, the 'Precious Precepts of T'ai-tsu 太祖' correspond to Činggis Qan's 'Great *ĴasaĬ*', and not to the *biligs* or maxims. Cf. F. W. Cleaves, 'The "Fifteen Palace Poems" by K'o Chiu-ssu,' *HJAS* 20 (1957): 428, n.10; 430, n.14. In the first of K'o's poems the expression 'Ancestral Precepts' stand for 'Great *ĴasaĬ*', as explicitly noted by K'o himself. See *ibid.*, p. 419. For 'Ancestor' = Činggis Qan, cf. what has been said earlier and n.20. The fact that the 'Precepts' were 'read' (*tu* 讀) deserves special attention.
25. Ch'en, *Chinese legal tradition*, p. 5. Ch'en does not discuss the nature and contents of the edict. For the *Yüan tien-chang* 元典章 see the ph. repr. of the Yüan edition of the National Palace Museum (full title: *Ta-Yüan sheng-cheng kuo-ch'ao tien-chang*) (Taipei: Kuo-li Ku-kung po-wu-yüan, 1976), 1, 2a. Cf. *Yüan-shih* 2, p. 99.
26. The *Yüan-shih* text has 'T'ai-tsu' (the temple name of Činggis Qan) instead of 'Činggis Qan'. Two names are also spelled differently: Tuman for Toman, and Toyus for Toyos. Bulya is the famous Nestorian minister Bulγai or Bolyai mentioned in William of Rubruck's *Itinerarium*. See Van Den Wyngaert, *Sinica Franciscana*, p. 584a; P. Jackson, trans. (introduction, notes and appendices by P. Jackson and D. Morgan), *The mission of Friar William of Rubruck. His journey to the court of the Great Khan Möngke 1253–1255* (London: Hakluyt Society, 1990)/OVER/p. 304b. Cf. P. Pelliot, 'Chrétien d'Asie Centrale et d'Extrême-Orient', *TP* 15 (1914): 629.
27. See Rashīd al-Dīn, *Successors of Genghis Khan*, pp. 263–4.
28. Cf. the case of 'Otegin', i.e. of Činggis Qan's brother Temüte Otčigin, who was put to death in 1246 'in accordance with the *yasa*'. See Juvaini, p. 255.
29. Ch'en, *Chinese legal tradition*, pp. 5–8.
30. Cleaves, *Secret History of the Mongols*, pp. 429–30, n.14. There are, for instance, numerous cases in Chinese documents where we find the expressions 'to contravene the *Ĵasa*(γ)' (*wei cha-sa* 違扎撒), 'to transgress the *Ĵasa*(γ)' (*fan cha-sa* 犯扎撒), and 'in accordance with the *Ĵasa*(γ) (he, they) will be judged and punished' (*chao-i cha-sa tuan-tsui* 照依扎撒斷罪), and the like, all of which imply a breach of the law as understood by the Mongols, and the effect of which for the Chinese was invariably severe punishment. See Fang Ling-kuei, *Meng-ku yü*, pp. 329–30; Ts'ai Mei-piao 蔡美彪 *Yüan-tai-pai-hua-pei chi-lu* (Peking: K'o-hsüeh Ch'u-pan-she, 1955), p. 9 and n.5. Cf. Ratchnevsky, 'Die Yasa', p. 475.
31. Ch'en, *Chinese legal tradition*, p. xiv. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 4–8.

32. Morgan, 'Great *Yāsā*', p. 170, n.24.
33. See Haenisch, *Wörterbuch*, p. 86; I. de Rachewiltz, *Index to the Secret History of the Mongols*, Uralic & Altaic Series, no.121 (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Publications, 1972), p. 246a.
34. On this question see I. de Rachewiltz, 'Some remarks on the dating of the *Secret History of the Mongols*', MS 24 (1965): 185–206; idem, 'Brief comments on Professor Yü Ta-chün's article "On the dating of the *Secret History of the Mongols*"', MS 37 (1986–87): 305–9.
35. Cf. Cleaves, *Secret History of the Mongols*, pp. 81–2.
36. Cf. ibid., p. 117; L. Ligeti, trans., *Amongolok titkos története* (Budapest: Gondolat Kiadó, 1962), p. 77: 'Fejedelemszonyunknak, Gürbeszünek kemény a törvénye'. Cf. §194: 'The order (= discipline: *jasal*) has become lax'.
37. Hence Onon's rendering: 'the rule of our Qatun, Gürbesü has become harsh'. See U. Onon, trans., *The history and life of Chinggis Khan (The Secret History of the Mongols)* (Leiden, New York, København, Köln: E.J. Brill, 1990), p. 93. The event in question must be dated 1203/04.
38. Cf. Ligeti, *A mongolok titkos története*, p. 79; Cleaves, *Secret History of the Mongols*, p. 121; Onon, *Chinggis Khan*, p. 96.
39. Cf. Morgan's remarks in 'Great *Yāsā*', pp. 165, 168. For *firmān* = *sheng-chih*/j*arliq* see Honda Minobu, 'On the *Hui-hui-kuan i-yü* (Chinese-Persian vocabulary),' *Hokkaidō Daigaku Bungaku-bu kiyō* 11 (1963), p. 171, no.1575. Cf. Doerfer, *Türkische und mongolische Elemente*, no. 1849. In the *Muqaddimat al-adab*, *jasag* is actually translated as *saliq* 'tax'! See N. Poppe, *Mongol'skii slovar' Mukaddimat al-Adab*, 3 vols (Moscow & Leningrad, 1938–39; reprinted., Westmead, Hants: Gregg International Publishers, 1971), p. 203a.
40. See Haenisch, *Wörterbuch*, p. 86; A. Mostaert, *Le matériel mongol du Houa i i iu de Houng-ou* (1389), I, édité par I. de Rachewiltz avec l'assistance de A. Schönbaum, *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques* 18, (Bruxelles: Institut Belge des Hautes Études Chinoises, 1977), p. 65. Cf. also the 'Phags-pa inscriptions, where *jarliq* invariably = *sheng-chih*. Cf., e.g., E. Haenisch, *Steuerrechtliche der chinesischen Klöster unter der Mongolenherrschaft* (Leipzig: S. Hinzl Verlag, 1940), p. 58, line 1 *et passim*.
41. The term *jasag* does not occur in any 'Phags-pa inscription that I know of, but we find frequent references to *jarliq* (=j*arliq*) in them. See N. Poppe, *The Mongolian monuments in hP'ags-pa script*, 2nd ed., trans. and ed. by J.R. Krueger, *Göttinger Asiatische Forschungen* 8 (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1957), p. 125a. As for texts in Uighur script, see for instance the inscription of 1362, where we find several occurrences of *jrly* (=j*arliq*) 'Imperial order', and one of *jasag* 'the law'. See F. W. Cleaves, 'The Sino-Mongolian inscription of 1362 in memory of Prince Hindu,' *HJAS* 12 (1949): 74a (Index). In the Mongolian version of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* by Čhos-kyi 'od-zer (ed. 1312), we find the expression *jasag-yabudal* 'code and conduct', i.e. the moral code (= observance) of spiritual practice (rendering Tib. *brtul zugs* and Skr. *vrata*). See F. W. Cleaves, 'The *Bodistw-a Čari-a Awatar-un Tayilbur* of 1312 by Čosgi Odzir', *HJAS* 17 (1954): 77, 78. Other examples could be cited.
42. Cleaves, *Secret History of the Mongols*, p. 130 and n.69 (where, however, '197' is a typographical error for '199').
43. Cf. ibid., p. 134.
44. Cf. ibid., p. 165.
45. Cf. ibid., p. 199. In the end, however, Činggis Qan did not execute Toqučar, but had him demoted.
46. Cf. ibid., p. 223.
47. Cf. ibid., p. 21.
48. The recording (*chi* 記, *lu* 錄) of Činggis' words, as well as of the words of other personages, by scribes at the Mongol court is confirmed by actual eyewitnesses such as the Ch'üan-chen monk Li Chih-ch'ang 李志常 (1193–1256) in the *Hsi-yu chi*, Haining Wang Ch'ing-an hsien-sheng i-shu ed. (Shanghai, 1940), A, 46a; B, 5b. Cf. A. Waley, trans., *The travels of*

- an alchemist. *The journey of the Taoist Ch'ang-ch'un from China to the Hindukush at the summons of Chingiz Khan, recorded by his disciple Li Chih-ch'ang* (London: George Routledge & Sons, 1931), pp. 102, 113. For the office of *bičēči* (= *bičigeči*), or scribe-secretary, see the important paper by Sechin Jagchid (Cha-ch'i Ssu-ch'in 扎奇斯欽), 'Shuo Yüan-shih chung ti "pi-che-ch'ih" ping-chien lun Yüan-ch'u ti "Chung-shu ling",' reprinted in Chach'i Ssu-ch'in, *Meng-ku shih lun-ts'ung*, 2 vols (Taipei: Hsüeh-hai Ch'u-pan-she, 1980), pp. 365–463 (esp. pp. 365–77). Cf. also I. de Rachewiltz, 'Personnel and personalities in North China in the early Mongol period', *JESHO* 9 (1966): 99–103; F. W. Cleaves in *HJAS* 16 (1953): 61, n.1; and Doerfer, *Türkische und mongolische Elemente*, no. 718.
49. Among them, the Uighur T'a-t'a T'ung-a 塔塔統阿 (*Tatar Toṇa?; appointed c.1204); the Kereit Šira Oγul (c.1206); the Khitans Yeh-lü Nieh-erh 耶律捏兒 (c.1210) and Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai 耶律楚材 (1218/19); the Kereit (or Uighur) Činqai (or Čingqai) 鎮稱海, a *čerbi* and *bičēči* (c.1220); etc. See de Rachewiltz, 'Personnel', pp. 100–2; I. de Rachewiltz, H. L. Chan, C. C. Hsiao, P. W. Geier, eds, *In the service of the Khan. Eminent personalities of the early Mongol-Yüan period (1200–1300)*, with the assistance of May Wang, *Asiatische Forschungen* 121 (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1993), pp. 95–111, 141ff.
 50. See P. Ratchnevsky, 'Šigi-qutuqu, ein mongolischer Gefolgsmann im 12–13. Jahrhundert', *CAJ* 10 (1965): 96–8; idem, in I. de Rachewiltz et al., eds, *In the service of the Khan*, pp. 79–80.
 51. Cf. Ayalon, *Outsiders*, pp. 135–7; Morgan, 'Great *Yāsā*', pp. 164, 174–6.
 52. Juvaini, p. 25.
 53. Ibid., p. 81.
 54. Rašid-al-din, *Sbornik letopisei*, 1/2, trans. L. A. Khetagurov and O. I. Smirnova (Moscow & Leningrad: Akademiya Nauk SSSR, 1952), p. 197. Cf. Morgan, 'Great *Yāsā*', pp. 165–6 (his translation is slightly different). Morgan finds it odd that 'the incident is not reflected in the *Secret History of the Mongols*' (p. 165). But the *Secret History* is not a complete record of Činggis' actions; it is an uneven and incomplete epic-chronicle, especially deficient for certain periods of Činggis' life and many important events, such as the Western Campaign, which is treated very superficially. There is nothing odd, in my view, about such an omission, given the nature of the work and the state in which it has been handed down.
 55. See Ayalon, *Outsiders*, p. 135.
 56. The modifications in question concern the appointment of the new commanders. In view of the substantial identity of the old and new regulations, the Chinese sectional summary of the *Secret History* §278 does not repeat them, but merely states that Ögödei Qa'an re-proclaimed Činggis' regulations concerning the duties of the day-guards and of the officers in conformity with the previous ones. See I. de Rachewiltz, transl., 'The *Secret History of the Mongols*, Chapter Twelve (= Suppl. II)', *PFEH* 31 (March 1985): 78.
 57. See above, n. 34. Among the scholars who accept the date 1228 are G. Doerfer, Š. Gaadamba, F. W. Cleaves (pers. comm.) and, more recently, M. Taube and U. Onon. Cf. also Ratchnevsky, 'Šigi-qutuqu', pp. 118–19.
 58. I say 'at the latest' because these regulations were, of course, issued much earlier, at the 1206 *quriltai*; and in view of what has already been said about *bičēči*s and the recording of Činggis' words, they may well have been written down before 1228.
 59. See Cleaves, 'Fifteen "Palace Poems"', p. 429, n.14 (my emphasis).
 60. See Juvaini, pp. 30ff.
 61. See P. Pelliot, *Les Mongols et la Papauté*, *ROC* 23 (1922–23): 20, n.3. Cf. idem, *Notes on Marco Polo*, 3 vols. (Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1959–73), vol.1, p. 336: 'The *yāsā* is the code laid down by Chinghizkhan, and the *yōsūn* (Mong. *yosun*) is the Mongol customary law.' On the inalterability of Činggis' *ĴasaŦ* see also Juvaini, pp. 189, 256, 573.
 62. Cf. the text of Güyüg's seal in A. Mostaert and F. W. Cleaves, 'Trois documents des Archives Secrètes Vaticanes', *HJAS* 15 (1952): 485–6.
 63. Persian text in Pelliot, *Les Mongols et la Papauté*, p. 17; French translation, *ibid.*, p. 20;

English translation by J. A. Boyle (followed here) in I. de Rachewiltz, *Papal envoys to the Great Khans* (London: Faber & Faber, 1971), p. 213; German translation in Doerfer, *Türkische und mongolische Elemente*, vol.4, p. 75. See Figure 1. Unfortunately, the Latin 'version' of the letter is different and to the words 'every command that there is of the *Yāsā*' of the Persian text correspond to the words 'nostram . . . responsionem pariter atque voluntatem'. See Pelliot, *Les Mongols et la Papauté*, p. 13. Cf. Voegelin, 'Mongol orders of submission', pp. 387–8.

64. See *JRAS* (1989): 327.
65. See Giovanni da Pian di Carpine, *Storia dei Mongoli*, a cura di P. Daffinà, C. Leonardi, M. C. Lungarotti, E. Menestò, L. Petech (Spoleto: Centro italiano di studi sull'alto medioevo, 1989), p. 264. Cf. Van Den Wyngaert, 64.
66. Lat. *mandatum*. This is the word that Friar John uses elsewhere in his *Historia* for this particular provision of Činggis Qan. See *ibid.*, pp. 284–5, and 293; cf. Van Den Wyngaert, pp. 84 and 93.
67. See Juvaini, pp. 573–4; and Jackson's pertinent remarks.
68. For the *Altan debter* described by Rašīd al-Dīn and its *Problematik* see P. Pelliot and L. Hambis, trans. & ann., *Histoire des campagnes de Gengis Khan. Cheng-wou ts'in-tcheng lou* (Leiden: Brill, 1951), vol.1, p. xv (not very reliable; see the following title, p. 478, n.104); W. Hung, 'The transmission of the book known as *The Secret History of the Mongols*', *HJAS* 14 (1951): 471, 474, 478, n.104 (Addendum), 481. Cf. Morgan, 'Great *Yāsā*', p. 169; *idem*, *Mongols*, p. 226 (Index).
69. Cf. n.30 above; and the Yüan handbook of official terms compiled by Hsü Yüan-jui 徐元瑞 (n.d.) entitled *Li-hsüeh chih-nan*, reprint ed. (Taipei: Wen-hai Ch'u-pan-she, 1970), p. 53, where 'Great *Ĵasay*' is defined simply as 'in accordance with the laws and regulations' (*i t'iao-li fa-tu* 依條例法度).
70. Morgan, 'Great *Yāsā*', p. 170 (my emphasis).

FROM *ULUS* TO KHANATE: THE MAKING OF THE MONGOL STATES c. 1220–c. 1290

Peter Jackson



Although authority and dominion ostensibly belong to one man, namely whoever is nominated *khan*, yet in reality all the children, descendants and uncles partake of kingship and property.¹

So wrote the Persian historian Juwaynī in c. 1260. The Mongol conquests were regarded not as the possessions of the emperor or Great Khan (*qaghan*, *qa'an*) but as the joint property of the imperial family (*altan orugh*) as a whole, including female members. The sources suggest that there were a great many family members to cater for. The Franciscan friar William of Rubruck, who travelled east across the steppe in 1253, commented on the number of Chinggis Khan's descendants, who 'are daily multiplying and spreading out over this vast wilderness'.² Indeed, they appear to have doubled even while Juwaynī was writing, since the number of Chinggis Khan's descendants is put at more than 10,000 early in his work, but towards the end is said to exceed 20,000.³ Such statistics hardly command confidence; though it is only fair to add that Rashīd al-Dīn, the great historian and wazir to the Mongol ruler of Iran in the early fourteenth century, credits Chinggis Khan's eldest son Jochi alone with approximately forty sons (of whom he was able to name, however, a mere fourteen).⁴

THE FOUR *ULUSES*

Provision had to be made for all these descendants. During his lifetime Chinggis Khan is believed to have granted to each of his four sons by his chief wife—Jochi (d. 1226/7), Chaghatai (d. 1242), Ögödei (d. 1241), his successor as *qa'an*, and Tolui (d. 1232)—a territory in the Asiatic steppe-forest zone (i.e. excluding, as far as we can tell, sedentary areas). These 'appanages' or 'domains' are denoted as *ulus* in the sources, and are to be distinguished, incidentally, from the *qol-un ulus*, or '*ulus* of the centre', of which the *qa'an* himself was master and which is examined in the work of Professor Buell⁵—not, in this case, an appanage or a principality, but a kind of 'royal demesne', to borrow the terminology of the Latin West. Around the time that Juwaynī wrote, however, momentous changes were taking place within the empire. The transfer in 1251 of the dignity of *qa'an* from the family of Ögödei to that of Tolui was followed by the suppression of most of the princes of the lines of Chaghatai and Ögödei who opposed the new

regime: these two middle branches of the imperial dynasty were drastically pruned and their possessions in large measure redistributed, so that the *ulus* of Ögödei virtually ceased to exist and that of Chaghatai survived only in attenuated form.⁶ The new qa'an, Möngke, then put his younger brothers, Qubilai and Hülegü, in command of operations in China and Persia respectively. After Möngke's death in 1259, Qubilai profited from his location in an area of valuable sedentary resources to make a successful bid for the imperial dignity in opposition to his brother Arigh Böke. Taking advantage of the civil war further east, a grandson of Chaghatai named Alughu succeeded in reconstituting Chaghatai's *ulus* in Turkestan, and Hülegü converted his own position into that of an *ulus*-holder on a par with the other major princes. Qubilai was recognized as qa'an only by Hülegü and his successors, the Ilkhans, in Persia.⁷

In the second half of the thirteenth century, then, the Mongol empire seems to disintegrate into a number of separate—and often mutually hostile—states. These were: (1) the so-called khanate of the Golden Horde, ruled by the family of Jochi and founded by Jochi's son Batu (d. 1255/6); (2) the khanate ruled by Chaghatai's line in Turkestan and Transoxiana; (3) the Ilkhanate in Persia and Iraq, governed by the descendants of Hülegü (d. 1265); and (4) the dominions of the qa'an in China and Mongolia, of the line of Qubilai (d. 1294), who as Toluids were more closely related to the Ilkhans than any other branch of the imperial dynasty. This pattern of four khanates, it should be noted in passing, was not materially affected by the opposition to Qubilai of Ögödei's grandson Qaidu in Central Asia, for Qaidu presided over what was essentially a magnified version of the Chaghataid polity.⁸ Nor did it make any difference when, after Qaidu's death, the Mongol world again acknowledged a single emperor, in the person of Qubilai's grandson and successor Temür Öljeitü, and the various khanates made peace with one another (1303–4), for the general reconciliation was shortlived. By this date the Ilkhanate was in practical terms autonomous, since Ghazan (1295–1304), who as a convert to Islam was eager to display his credentials as a Muslim sovereign, had deleted the qa'an's name from the coinage.⁹

From an early date, historians have grown accustomed to think of the Mongol world, at least until the collapse of Mongol government in Persia in the 1340s and the qa'an's expulsion from China in 1368, as consisting of these four states. Thus a fifteenth-century history of the Mongols, purporting to have been written by Temür's grandson Ulugh Beg, bears the title *Ta'rikh-u ulūs-i arba'a-yi Chingīzī* ('History of the four Chinggisid *uluses*'), by which are meant the powers listed above.¹⁰ It must be stressed that this framework corresponded more to the realities of the early fourteenth century than to those of Chinggis Khan's own era. Only two of the *uluses* allotted by the conqueror to his four sons—those of Jochi and Chaghatai—are recognizable in the khanates that emerged after 1260. Unfortunately, many modern historians tend to speak of the *uluses* of Chinggis Khan's four sons in such terms as to imply either that these were coterminous with the whole empire or that the subsequent development of four separate regional khanates was in accordance with the conqueror's own design. Thus Professor Allsen, in his splendid book *Mongol Imperialism*, writes: 'At Chinggis Qan's death in 1227, the empire was formally partitioned among his eldest sons.' Or similarly, to quote the late Professor Joseph Fletcher, 'Chinggis Khan had divided the territory of his realm into four "nations" (*ulus*), which he gave to his four sons.'¹¹ Professor Barfield has been an exception to this common tendency.¹² I, alas, have not;¹³ and in the following paper, I want to ask what an *ulus* was, to investigate how many major *uluses* there were, to examine the emergence of *uluses* and khanates, and to try to offer a fresh perspective.

ULUS AND RULERSHIP

There is admittedly a single piece of textual evidence in favour of the view that the creation of an *ulus* for each of Chinggis Khan's four senior sons amounted to a division of the empire as a whole. Referring to events as early as c. 1235, the *Secret History of the Mongols* distinguishes the princes who rule an *ulus* (*ulus medekün kö'üt*: rendered by De Rachewiltz as 'the princes in charge of a domain') from those who do not.¹⁴ The context is the despatch of princes to represent various branches of the dynasty on the great westward campaign of 1236–42 under Batu; and the list of princes chosen does suggest that those 'with an *ulus*' comprised simply the heads of the branches founded by Chinggis Khan's four sons.

And yet there is also a good deal of evidence that should discourage us from reading too much into this isolated passage in the *Secret History*. In the first place, our principal source for Mongol history after 1260, the *Jāmi' al-Tawārīkh* of Rashīd al-Dīn, is distressingly lax in its use of the term *ulus*. True, we read here of the *ulus* of Jochi or of Batu; but we also encounter the *ulus* of Batu's brother Orda, corresponding to the eastern territories of the Golden Horde and covering, apparently, much of western Siberia (the power tentatively labelled by modern historians 'the White Horde').¹⁵ In quite another direction, the language used of a great-grandson of Qubilai Qa'an named Örüġ Temür is striking, to say the least. The son of Prince Ananda, who at this time (the end of the thirteenth century) was still alive and held most or all of the Tangut region, Örüġ Temür is described as 'established and secure on the throne of rulership (*pādishāhī*) in his own *ulus*'.¹⁶ And Rashīd al-Dīn employs the term *ulus* with relative frequency of the domains held by the progeny of Chinggis Khan's younger brothers in what is now eastern Mongolia and Manchuria, representing the army 'of the Left Hand' (i.e. the east). Here he speaks of the *uluses* of Jochi Qasar and Qachi'un's son Elchidei;¹⁷ and tells us, too, that Taghachar, a descendant of the conqueror's youngest brother Temüġe, held 'a great deal of *ulus* and troops'.¹⁸

Regarding this last group of princes Juwaynī has little to say, mentioning only that Temüġe and others of his kin were stationed in northern China (*Khitāi*).¹⁹ But Rashīd al-Dīn defines their territories more fully. The branch of Jochi Qasar lived in the north-east of Mongolia, around the Arghun and Qailar rivers and the Külün Nor, and Soviet archeologists have unearthed two of its walled towns in Transbaikalia.²⁰ Somewhere to the south, near the Ulqui river, close to the Great Wall and adjoining the Chorche region (Manchuria), was the territory of the descendants of Qachi'un, who had died relatively young but whose son Elchidei appears as the head of his line when troops and camping-grounds are being distributed. And to the north-east lay the pasturelands of Temüġe, described as being situated 'in the furthest parts of Mongolia'.²¹

Moreover, to focus on the arrangements made by Chinggis Khan for his four sons by his chief wife is to ignore his other offspring. One at least of the conqueror's daughters seems to have possessed an appanage: Alaqa Begi was in charge of the affairs of the Önggüt, though it is possible that she owed this position to the fact that she was the widow of the late ruler.²² More importantly, we are told nothing of the appanage conferred on Kölġen, Chinggis Khan's son by a lesser wife. It would indeed be surprising if Kölġen had received no pasturelands, since Rashīd al-Dīn says that his father put him on the same footing as his other sons and that in the general distribution of troops he was given four 'thousands' just as they were (see below), and describes Kölġen's offspring as inheriting his station (*jāi*) and troops.²³

THE DISTRIBUTION OF TROOPS AND SPOILS

This brings us to the next question we have to address. What were the *uluses* in the early decades of the empire, and how did they come into existence?²⁴ The earliest general reference made in the *Secret History of the Mongols* to grants of property (*injū*) among the family of Chinggis Khan in c. 1206 relates to peoples, including both nomads and sedentary groups, and is surely anachronistic, since at that time the conqueror had yet to acquire any sedentary subjects.²⁵ But a slightly later passage carries more weight. Here, seemingly c. 1207, Chinggis Khan is shown apportioning a certain number of 'thousands' to his mother Hö'elün, his surviving brothers Jochi Qasar, Temüge and Belgütei, his nephew Elchidei, and his four sons by his chief wife.²⁶ Rashīd al-Dīn, writing just under a century after these events, provides different figures for the sons, and as we have seen gives in addition a number for Kölgen, who is not mentioned in the *Secret History* at all.²⁷ This is in some measure corroborated by Juwaynī, who speaks in vague terms of grants to Chinggis Khan's 'other, younger sons'. Juwaynī indicates that the distribution to the four more senior sons was made from the Mongols and the Naiman tribe together with 'all the troops' (i.e. nomads).²⁸ In time, these early grants were augmented by the gift of further population groups. Following a campaign in 1218–19, for example, by Jochi against the 'Forest Peoples' (*hoi-yin irgen*) such as the Oyirat (Oirat) and the Kirghiz, they too were granted to Jochi.²⁹

These grants were not, of course, territorial in the strict sense. Yet the requirements of a pastoral society dictated the allocation to the princes, princesses and commanders (*noyans*) of specified grazing-grounds for the various seasons of the year. According to Rubruck, each commander was familiar with his allotted pasturelands;³⁰ and a few years later Juwaynī tells us that every one of Chinggis Khan's descendants had his/her own station (*maqām*) and grazing-ground (*yurt*).³¹ By *maqām* Juwaynī presumably means *orda*: just how many such camps there were, potentially, emerges from the statement of the papal envoy Carpini (1247) that a prince's camp was never dismantled on his death but continued in existence and was run by one of his wives.³² This meant that in the Mongolian homeland the *ordas* of long-dead princes whose principal appanage had lain elsewhere still receive mention under Qubilai's reign.³³

Juwaynī's account of the territorial dispositions made by Chinggis Khan suggests that they occurred later than the first distribution of peoples; and we shall be reviewing his testimony below. As time progressed, and the Mongols encroached upon areas of sedentary culture, the fresh distributions of property came to involve more than merely pastoralist or forest-dwelling groups. Rubruck, passing through the Pontic steppe, notices that 'the great lords' owned villages to the south.³⁴ After Chinggis Khan's death in 1227, Yesüi Khatun, one of his wives, was given a large part of the Tangut people in the recently subjugated kingdom of Hsi-Hsia.³⁵ The possessions of a prince might embrace settled districts adjoining his particular *yurt* or grazing-grounds. Thus Jochi, for instance, was in 1221 given the city of Ürgench in Khwārazm, which lay on the fringes of the steppe territory under his authority;³⁶ and if we may believe a fourteenth-century author writing in the Mamlūk empire, Chinggis Khan also gave Jochi the regions of Arrān, Tabriz, Hamadān and Marāgha, south of the Caucasus.³⁷

Sometimes we find a prince enjoying lordship over specific groups among the conquered sedentary peoples, notably craftsmen and skilled artisans. When Samarqand fell in 1220, craftsmen to the number of 30,000 were distributed by Chinggis Khan among his sons and relatives.³⁸ These workers might well be tied to a particular workshop or

arsenal, referred to in the Persian sources by the term *kārkhāna*: we are not told what happened to the Samarqand prisoners, but many of them would have been transported to some distant location in the steppes of Mongolia.³⁹ This fate in any event befell the most famous among such enslaved craftsmen, the Germans captured in Hungary who were the principal reason for Rubruck's mission. They had belonged to the Chaghataid prince Būri and had been settled at Talas, but following his execution in 1251/2 they were handed over to the qa'an Möngke and moved to Bolad, some hundreds of miles to the east, where they were employed in mining and manufacturing weapons.⁴⁰ At Möngke's headquarters Rubruck met the Parisian goldsmith Guillaume Buchier, the creator of a magnificent mechanical silver fountain which spurted forth a different kind of alcoholic beverage from each pipe. Buchier had been carried off from Hungary in 1241–2 by one of Möngke's half-brothers and presented to the future qa'an's mother Sorqaqtani, passing on her death into the hands of her youngest son, Arigh Böke.⁴¹

In addition to pasturelands and subject peoples, members of the imperial family received shares in the booty and revenues of those conquered sedentary territories—such as China, Persia and Transoxiana—which overall were retained by the qa'an as part of the growing '*ulus* of the centre'. These regions were governed from c. 1241 onwards by officials at the head of large satellite administrations answerable to the qa'an himself; but individuals among the *ulus*-holders and other Chinggisids nevertheless had their representatives in the bureaucracy and were further granted rights within the region (the extent to which they enjoyed direct access to their revenues, or were simply dependent on the qa'an's officials to transmit to them what they were due, varied).⁴² Princes were naturally alert for opportunities to extend their own appanages at the expense of the centre, and sometimes succeeded: when Chaghatai treated part of neighbouring Transoxiana as his own property, Ögödei benignly overlooked the offence and even granted him the territory in question.⁴³

Occasionally the sources reveal a prince in possession of some city or fortress that he had captured in person, but which might well be far removed from his customary habitat. On his way back across the Caucasus, Rubruck came across an Alan fortress just north of Darband, which was the personal property of the qa'an Möngke, since it was he who had reduced the region in c. 1239 during Batu's invasion of eastern Europe.⁴⁴ There is evidence for this kind of arrangement in China also. In 1213 Chaghatai, accompanying his father on campaign against the Chin, received the plunder from the city of T'ai-yüan-fu.⁴⁵ This clearly gave him a more lasting proprietary association with the city, for when in 1236 the qa'an Ögödei divided up the populations of the recently subjugated Chin empire among his kindred, the inhabitants of T'ai-yüan-fu fell to Chaghatai's share.⁴⁶ Tolui had received the booty from Cheng-ting-fu, and it was presumably on these grounds that in the same distribution of 1236 the Qa'an gave Tolui's widow Sorqoqtani the town as an appanage (*fēn-ti*).⁴⁷

But the distribution of spoils from a conquered territory was by no means confined to those who had taken part in the original campaign of conquest; it extended also to those who had not. This practice must surely be connected with the representative character of the armies sent to garrison newly conquered territories, or to reduce new territories, which has been illuminated by M. Jean Aubin. The prince in command of an expedition would be accompanied by contingents representing, or perhaps led by, princes from each of the other Chinggisid lines. The system is found in operation as early as Chinggis Khan's great expedition against the Khwārazmshāh.⁴⁸ It applied also when Ögödei's son, the qa'an Güyüg, sent the general Eljigidei to Persia in 1247 and in Hülegü's

expedition of 1254–60.⁴⁹ Whether the principle of representative contingents obtained from the very outset in the Chinese campaigns, we do not know; though Juwaynī expressly informs us that the army with which Qubilai was sent against Yün-nan in 1252 was made up on this basis.⁵⁰

In this fashion Tolui, according to Rashīd al-Dīn, acquired rights over plunder and income not merely in northern China but also in the Qipchaq steppe—where he never fought in person—and elsewhere, and these rights were inherited by his offspring.⁵¹ And the same author describes the progeny of Kölgen as owning a *kārkhāna* in Tabrīz even in his own day.⁵² Outlining the situation in Persia in Ögödei's reign, the Delhi chronicler Jūzjānī wrote that Batu had his allotted share of every province in the country that had come under Mongol control, and that this share was duly taken away by his agents.⁵³ An early fourteenth-century chronicler of Herat furnishes precious corroboration of this when he describes the requisitions (transport animals, tents and an annual sum of 300 fine *dīnārs*) made upon the city on Batu's behalf by a local Mongol commander.⁵⁴

TERRITORIAL APPANAGES

It is necessary now to examine the location of some of the first appanages. Juwaynī describes the enormous tracts allotted to Chinggis Khan's three elder sons, lying at an increasing distance from the Mongols' original homeland according to seniority. Hence Jochi received the lands stretching from Qayaligh and Khwārazm as far as Saqsīn and Bulghār and 'from that side as far as the hooves of the Mongol horses had penetrated'; Chaghatai was given the land from the frontiers of the Uighur principality as far as Samarqand and Bukhārā, and resided in the vicinity of Almāligh on the Ili river; while Ögödei occupied the valleys of the Emil and the Qobuq. These last-named regions, of course, were Ögödei's personal appanage: when he was elected qa'an in 1229 (and consequently took over the *qol-un ulus*, 'ulus of the centre'), two years after his father's death, he transmitted them to his eldest son Güyüg.⁵⁵ We are not given specific information about the *qol-un ulus* which, according to the *Secret History*, was solemnly handed over to Ögödei.⁵⁶ But it evidently included Qaraqorum, which appears as the nucleus of Ögödei's seasonal migrations and of which Rubruck says that the Mongols regarded it as their 'royal demesne'.⁵⁷ The pasturelands of Chinggis Khan's fourth son Tolui will be considered below.

These territorial dispositions are problematic. Let us examine the description of the lands conferred on Jochi. Rashīd al-Dīn for the most part cites the conqueror's commission to his eldest son strictly in terms of the later territory of the Golden Horde, but at one point he supplies a different version. According to this, the prince was entrusted with all the territory and people (*ulus*) in the confines of the Irtysh river and the Altai mountains, and his pasturage (*yurt*) was on the Irtysh.⁵⁸ These territories lay, of course, further east—i.e. nearer the homeland—than those bestowed on the third brother, Ögödei; and the 'Forest Peoples' conferred on Jochi in 1218 (above) dwelt further east still. If Juwaynī is correct, Rashīd al-Dīn's details concerning the Irtysh and the Altai must surely refer to an earlier arrangement, and the edict (*yarligh*) authorizing Jochi to take possession of the 'Northern Countries' (enumerated as Ibir-Sibir, Bular/Bulghār, the Qipchaq steppe, and the lands of the Bashgird/Bashkir, Rus' and Cherkes/Circassians as far as Darband)⁵⁹ would have been promulgated later, doubtless in the wake of the expedition against the Khwārazmshāh. (It is naturally quite possible that

this passage represents a hindsight, for the decision to attack the Volga Bulgars, the Alans and the Rus', at least, does not appear to have been taken until Ögödei's reign, when Jochi's place had devolved upon his sons.⁶⁰ Nevertheless, Jochi's forces are found quartered in the 'Qipchaq steppe'—presumably the grazing-grounds of the Qangli—around the time of Chinggis Khan's homeward departure from Transoxiana in 1222–3.)⁶¹

In all probability, therefore, the details furnished by Juwaynī are misleading. They imply that the allocation of pasturelands to Jochi occurred at a single instant, when in fact it seems, rather, that Jochi's territory shifted over the years. There is nothing especially surprising about this. Not only is it conceivable that the grants took place at different stages as the respective sons came of age, but—if Juwaynī's indications that distance was related to seniority are trustworthy—the portion of the eldest son would have moved westwards, or at least outwards, as the empire expanded, in order to accommodate the grants of territory to his younger brothers.⁶² Chinggis Khan and his sons may even have envisaged that the centre of gravity of each primary appanage (i.e. those created in the conqueror's lifetime) would move away from the heartlands of the empire as the Mongol conquests continued to grow in future generations.⁶³ This is perhaps the significance of a remark by the ill-fated prince Būri, the owner of the German slaves who were the object of Rubruck's quest. According to the friar's informant, Būri had one day (while drunk) asked querulously why he should not move his livestock to the Volga and pasture there as Batu did: the remark subsequently cost him his life.⁶⁴ Būri may possibly have been articulating the belief that the conquests of Jochi's family on the empire's distant western frontiers made a transfer of their eastern grazing-grounds to their Chaghatayid neighbours somewhat overdue. But this must remain in the realm of surmise; *in vino veritas* is hardly the most reliable compass for the historian adrift in the Mongol empire. At any rate the Chaghatayids were to come off badly as a result of the territorial changes of the next decade or so, and to find themselves hemmed in by their kinsfolk, with little or no room for expansion. After the foundation of the Ilkhanate and the rise of Qaidu, we find the head of Chaghatai's *ulus*, Baraq (1266–71), expressing a sense of constriction and ill-usage.⁶⁵

What of the pasturelands held by the descendants of the fourth son, Tolui? Juwaynī is remarkably unhelpful on this score, because what he actually seems to say is that during Chinggis Khan's lifetime Tolui remained at his side.⁶⁶ The sources emphasize that according to Turkish and Mongol custom the youngest son (by the chief wife), known as the *ot-chigin* ('hearth-child' or '-prince'), inherited the original *yurt* of the father and, incidentally, the mother.⁶⁷ We can observe this principle at work in the case of Tolui's own youngest son, Arigh Böke, whom Rubruck in 1254 found occupying the *orda* of his mother Sorqaqtani and who inherited the major part of her property, including, as we saw, the most widely talked-about Parisian goldsmith of the Middle Ages.⁶⁸ Now it seems that on Chinggis Khan's death Tolui, as 'hearth-prince', inherited the Mongol homelands—the site of his father's residence (*takhtgāh*) and 'the great *ordas*'—in the valleys of the Onon and Kerülen rivers.⁶⁹ In so far as we have any evidence, however, concerning the patrimony of Tolui's offspring, it relates to a quite different region altogether. We should have expected the 'hearth-child' of Tolui and Sorqaqtani to have inherited the Onon-Kerülen region from his father. Yet Rashīd al-Dīn says that Arigh Böke had his summer-quarters in the Altai and wintered on the Ürünggü, and adds that Sorqaqtani too had lived there.⁷⁰ On the other hand, Rubruck's testimony indicates that Arigh Böke, and Sorqaqtani before him, and a *yurt* rather closer

to Qaraqorum.⁷¹ Nor, of course, can we discount the possibility that in both cases the grazing-grounds ascribed to Arigh Böke had been acquired only since the downfall of Ögödei's line in 1251. In the present state of our knowledge the question must remain open. I can do no more here than draw attention to the problem posed by inconsistent data; and it is impossible to discuss matters of this kind without remembering that it was Tolui's line which seized upon the imperial dignity in 1251 and that our vision of developments in the thirteenth-century empire is refracted, as it were, through the Toluid lens of our principal sources.⁷²

To recapitulate, then, the grazing-grounds conferred on Chinggis Khan's four senior sons do not represent the only grants of territory and peoples made to his family; nor do they prove quite as simple to define as we have sometimes assumed. The general effect of the principles I have described was to make an *ulus* more than just an assemblage of peoples and pasturelands: the *ulus* of a particular prince might be dispersed, in fact, over a far wider geographical area than just the territorial base—be it steppe or steppe-and-forest or steppe and steppe-agrarian frontier zone—which he occupied at the time. Throughout the empire there had arisen an extremely complex pattern of rights over tribal elements, colonies of enslaved subject peoples and grazing-grounds, with perhaps the addition of nearby cities and their agricultural hinterlands with entitlement to urban commodities and revenues from further afield. These rights, transmitted by Chinggis Khan's sons and brothers to their descendants, were gravely undermined by the events of the mid-to-late thirteenth century.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE KHANATES IN WESTERN AND CENTRAL ASIA

Möngke's accession and the overthrow of the lines of Ögödei and Chaghatai must be viewed as the first stage in this process. In Western Asia after 1251, resources appear to have been divided between Tolui's family and their Jochid allies. The great army sent westwards under Hülegü in 1253 was made up of representative contingents, as had been the pattern hitherto, but significantly no commanders are mentioned as representing Ögödei's family. Edicts of the new qa'an superseded previous territorial arrangements. The Mamlūk author al-'Umarī, for example, mentions at one juncture that Möngke allocated Tabrīz and Marāgha to Batu's brother and successor, Berke; and the later rulers of the Golden Horde seem to have based their claims to the Transcaucasus on Möngke's *yarligh*.⁷³ In Tibet, the influence of Ögödei's son Kōdōn (Kōten), which had hitherto been paramount, underwent something of an eclipse, and new appanages were created for other princes, notably Hülegü.⁷⁴ Evidence from the period when the Mongol world erupted in civil war ten years later provides a similar picture. At that time the revenues of the land west of the Oxus were divided into three parts. The details vary: in one account, two-fifths went to the qa'an, two-fifths to the army (the Mongol forces operating in Persia, presumably) and one-fifth to the house of Batu; in the other version, the three shares appear as equal thirds.⁷⁵ In Bukhārā at the same date, the skilled artisans belonged either to Batu's family, to Sorqaqtani (who was by now dead and must have been succeeded by Arigh Böke) or to the *dalāi-yi buzurg* (i.e. the *ulus* of the centre).⁷⁶ Apropos of all three regions the implications are clear: the shares of the two middle Chinggisid branches have largely been eliminated.

Qubilai and Hülegü were charged with particular tasks: the continuation of the war against the independent Sung dynasty in the one case, the overthrow of the Ismā'īlīs of

northern Persia (the 'Assassins') and perhaps also of the 'Abbasid Caliph on the other. What Möngke's longer-term aims were, we cannot know. There does appear to be evidence that Qubilai was regarded as a subordinate khan (*il-khan*) in China, on a par with his kinsmen who headed the other *uluses*. Regarding Hülegü the evidence is more tortuous. Rashīd al-Dīn claims that Möngke ostensibly made the commission a temporary one by ordering his brother to return to his original *yurt* in Mongolia once his task was accomplished, even though he privately intended Hülegü and his heirs to rule over Persia, just as they later in fact did. This looks rather like an attempt by the Ilkhanid historian to rationalize what had happened.⁷⁷ At any rate, there is no certain testimony that Hülegü assumed the title *il-khan* earlier than 1260.⁷⁸

The events following Möngke's death in 1259 and the outbreak of civil war between the brothers Qubilai and Arigh Böke produced a still more drastic simplification than that effected by the coup of 1251. The Jochids, headed now by Berke, were Arigh Böke's most powerful supporters. In Persia, Hülegü arrested and executed the leading Jochid princes and generals who had accompanied his expedition, and massacred their troops: the survivors fled eastwards to join the Jochid commander Negüder in present-day Afghanistan, where they came to form the independent Negüderis (or Qaraunas).⁷⁹ Alughu, switching his support to Qubilai from Arigh Böke, slaughtered the artisans in Bukhārā who belonged to the Jochids. Hülegü, Qubilai and Alughu were all successful in bringing under their control the bureaucracies which had been set up for their respective territories some twenty years previously and which had been designed to function on behalf of the '*ulus* of the centre'. In Alughu's case, it is quite clear that Chaghatayid authority was extended not only over some former Jochid possessions but over the cities of Transoxiana, which had hitherto been directly subject to the qa'an. Both Hülegü and Alughu received patents of legitimation from Qubilai, who needed their support in his own struggle with his brother's party.⁸⁰ But in Mongolia, at the same time, Arigh Böke seems to have appropriated the encampments of Hülegü's wives and sons, which are subsequently found in the hands of his offspring.⁸¹

Despite these profound changes, distribution of revenue continued in some measure, and certain of the assignments survived for a considerable time. With the conquest of Sung China in 1279, a fresh apportionment occurred, for Rashīd al-Dīn refers to Qubilai dividing 'the provinces of Nangiyas' among the princes.⁸² Chinggisid princes resident in Western Asia were still entitled to produce in kind from China, or to the revenues of certain districts there, in the fourteenth century;⁸³ though we are better informed about the transmission of goods and incomes to Persia, with whose Toluid rulers the qa'an was on consistently friendly terms. In 1298–9, when an embassy was sent by the Ilkhan Ghazan to the qa'an's court at Khanbaligh, it was noticed that the share owed to Hülegü's line had not been paid since Möngke's reign, and its equivalent in silk and fine garments was duly despatched back with the envoys.⁸⁴ Fourteen years later, Ghazan's brother and successor, Öljeitü, sent another mission, with instructions to collect the revenue that should have accrued in the interim.⁸⁵ The qa'an continued, of course, to demand his share of the plunder and revenue from Persia, and in the eyes of a European observer, at least, this drain on the Ilkhan's resources provided, interestingly enough (but probably wrongly), one reason for his desire for auxiliary troops from the Latin West.⁸⁶ But in some cases the arrangements for the transfer of revenue were sabotaged. Thus the Ilkhans were accused of withholding from the Jochids the revenue due to them from workshops (*kārkhānahā*) in Tabrīz and elsewhere.⁸⁷ And if Marco Polo is to be believed, one of the causes underlying the bitter conflict between Qubilai

and his enemy Qaidu was the qa'an's refusal to send Qaidu what was his due from China.⁸⁸

The *uluses* or khanates of the later thirteenth century were not the *uluses* of the first generation. They represented, by and large, an administrative rationalization, a consolidation and concentration of resources in the hands of fewer princes. Control of agrarian and urban wealth by the rulers of the newly emergent *uluses* in Persia and China, especially, may well have furnished them with a valuable leverage against their external enemies or a means of putting pressure on doubtful allies. The forfeiture of income and enslaved craftsmen in areas of sedentary culture, by princes who dwelt a considerable distance away and whose claims were hardly enforceable, reveals nomadic rulers at perhaps their most vulnerable, some decades before Mongol khans began to court a different kind of insecurity by abandoning the steppe to reside in nearby towns.

ULUS AND KHANATE IN THE FAR EAST

The rationalization and consolidation of resources I have alluded to occurred for the most part in Central and Western Asia. In the east, however, a parallel process is discernible slightly later. Qubilai's failure to destroy Qaidu and his confederates in Turkestan was offset by a major triumph at the expense of his relatives in eastern Mongolia and Manchuria. One of the flaws in the traditional view of the partition of the Mongol empire, as we saw, is that it takes no account of the branches of the imperial dynasty descended from Chinggis Khan's brothers. The distant location of their princely domains has condemned them to an obscurity which is only fitfully pierced by brief and occasional references in the Persian sources. In the account of Chinggis Khan's distribution of troops found in the *Secret History*, Temüge and his mother Hö'elün jointly received ten 'thousands'; Rashīd al-Dīn supplies separate figures of five 'thousands' for Temüge and three for his mother.⁸⁹ Whichever number we choose to trust, it is clear that the conqueror's youngest brother was at this time granted a larger number of subjects than any other member of the dynasty. An envoy from Sung China writing in c. 1221 singles out Temüge for special mention, noting that for the most part he commanded his own forces and perhaps thereby stressing his autonomy.⁹⁰ The Taoist patriarch Ch'ang Ch'un, who visited Temüge in the course of his journey from China to Chinggis Khan's headquarters in Afghanistan, was highly impressed by his encampment, which contained thousands of tents.⁹¹ Clearly this was no minor princeling.

Temüge was for a considerable time Chinggis Khan's favourite brother and enjoyed a higher rank than the rest.⁹² He appears in the *Yüan Shih* with the loftier title *kuo-wang* ('regional king', 'viceroy'),⁹³ and when Chinggis Khan set out from Mongolia on his seven-year campaign to Western Asia in 1218 Temüge was left in charge of 'the residence (*khāna*) and the *ordas*'.⁹⁴ On the conqueror's return in 1225, however, Temüge seems to have fallen from favour;⁹⁵ and thereafter his career went rapidly downhill. Following the death of Ögödei in 1241, he made a bid for the vacant imperial throne, but was foiled by the empress-regent Töregene; and on Güyüg's accession in 1246 he was arrested, tried and put to death.⁹⁶ His political miscalculation may have affected the position of his offspring. Garbled rumours which reached independent Delhi suggest that during the uncertain years after Ögödei's death some of Temüge's sons had fled to China;⁹⁷ and this branch of the family does in fact appear to have been demoted, since Rashīd al-Dīn asserts that in more recent times precedence among the descendants

of Chinggis Khan's brothers had belonged not to Temüge's line but to the posterity of Jochi Qasar.⁹⁸ Possibly the reversal of status can be traced partly to the great services performed for Qubilai during the civil war of 1260–4 by Qasar's son Yesüngge.⁹⁹

Whatever the ranking of the progeny of Chinggis Khan's brothers, there is no doubt that they all grew disaffected late in Qubilai's reign. In 1287 these princes rose under the leadership of Temüge's descendant Nayan, who has been immortalized by Marco Polo; and with the support of, among others, Kölgen's grandson Ebügen and the family of Ögödei's son Kōdön, they made common cause with Qaidu against the Qa'an.¹⁰⁰ Qubilai was victorious in the field, and Nayan headed those who were executed by the time-honoured method of being wrapped in a carpet and beaten to death. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, the princes' troops were taken from them and redistributed among the imperial family.¹⁰¹ We know from Chinese sources that Qubilai went on to suppress the agents (*darughachis*) appointed by these princes to superintend their assignments in China.¹⁰²

What was the reason for this relatively sudden and highly formidable opposition to the qa'an in the north-east? It is easy, perhaps, to understand the attitude of Kōdön's line, whose position in the empire appears to have deteriorated steadily since the coup of 1251. Kōdön himself had lost out in the course of events following Ögödei's death. At one time envisaged by Chinggis Khan himself as the next in line for the imperial throne after Ögödei,¹⁰³ he had first seen his brother Güyüg elected in his place and had then, as we noticed earlier, been obliged to relinquish his authority in Tibet after Möngke's accession. His sons, whose appanage lay in the Tangut region, may have nursed further grievances. Rashīd al-Dīn is noticeably coy on the subject, mentioning their participation in the 1287 revolt only once and everywhere else stressing the ties of friendship that bound Kōdön's line to the qa'ans Qubilai and Temür Öljeitü.¹⁰⁴ It may well be that this branch of the dynasty felt threatened by the creation in 1272 of a new principality at Nagan-si (Si-ngan) in Shan-si, ruled successively by Qubilai's son Manggala and grandson Ananda;¹⁰⁵ and certainly their survival is difficult to reconcile with the considerable sub-kingdom in Tangut over which Ananda clearly presided by the turn of the century.¹⁰⁶ As for Nayan, Chinese sources reveal a steady encroachment on his autonomy from 1284 as the Liao-tung region was brought more immediately under Qubilai's control.¹⁰⁷ This seems to be referred to only by Rashīd al-Dīn. When listing the major descendants of Chinggis Khan's brothers, he mentions three times censuses instituted on Qubilai's orders with a view to counting the members of these branches of the imperial dynasty. The context is actually the great number of princes and princesses which emerged from the inquiry.¹⁰⁸ But the census was the mechanism with which the Mongols traditionally prefaced the imposition of taxation upon the subject peoples, and its application here, in remote parts of Mongolia, would indicate some greater degree of centralization on the part of the qa'an, involving an end to the fiscal exemptions enjoyed by his kinsfolk.¹⁰⁹


CONCLUSION

I have tried to demonstrate that the *ulus* comprised more discrete elements than we have generally supposed. Nor was it static: the arrangements made for Chinggis Khan's eldest son Jochi, at least, appear to have changed over time. I have also argued that a greater number of major appanages existed than we have tended to believe. We occupy

no vantage-point that enables us to discern which *ulus*-holders were intended to have pre-eminence: it is only hindsight that has elevated the appanages of Chinggis Khan's four senior sons to the status of official divisions of the Mongol empire at an early date. In particular, the domains of Chinggis Khan's brothers have hitherto been left out of the reckoning, and I suggest that they should be viewed as *uluses* until the débâcle of 1287 and their absorption into Qubilai's Chinese realm. And lastly, whatever Chinggis Khan's intentions were for the future development of his empire, the events of the mid-thirteenth century constituted a disruptive twist, creating powerful new *uluses* and perhaps even in some measure fossilizing the organic growth that had been present in the system as a whole. We must not be mesmerized by these developments into assuming that they represented a natural progression from Chinggis Khan's own allocations of territory. The making of the Mongol states was almost as bloody and as tortuous a business as was the expansion of the empire itself for those powers and peoples that were its victims.

APPENDIX

Rashīd al-Dīn claims that Tolui received all the troops and peoples who remained after the distribution to the rest of his kindred.¹¹⁰ At one juncture they are said to have totalled 101,000 men, as against the 4,000 allotted to each of Tolui's older brothers.¹¹¹ This testimony, which is accepted by modern authors,¹¹² nevertheless places a heavy strain on our credulity. How was Ögödei supposed to govern his empire when the vast majority of his forces even nominally belonged first to his youngest brother and then, after Tolui's death, to his widow Sorqaqtani and her sons? Rashīd al-Dīn offers a somewhat feeble explanation—Chinggis Khan foresaw that Tolui's line would eventually attain the imperial dignity, and so deliberately made them more powerful from the outset¹¹³—which amounts to no more than an attempt to justify the Toluid coup of 1251–2. Professor Allsen has drawn attention to the way in which the *Secret History*, for instance, first composed in 1228 or 1240, underwent revisions in the wake of that coup.¹¹⁴ It may well be significant that even here Rashīd al-Dīn finds no corroboration; instead, the *Secret History* says plainly that Tolui was given four 'thousands' just as was each of his older brothers.¹¹⁵ Rashīd al-Dīn's information looks as if it was the product of still later doctoring of the facts. If his testimony regarding the 101,000 troops has any basis in reality, it can only refer to the army of the centre (*qol*), which would have been under Tolui's command during the interregnum preceding Ögödei's election in 1229 and then handed over to the new qa'an. And possibly a faint echo of this is to be found elsewhere in the *Jāmi' al-Tawārīkh*, where Rashīd al-Dīn seems to admit that Tolui's forces were subordinate to 'whoever rules the great *yurt* and station' (i.e. the qa'an).¹¹⁶



THE MONGOL IMPERIAL DYNASTY

(Qaghans in block capitals)

NOTES

1. 'Alā' al-Dīn Aṭā Malik Juwaynī, *Ta'riḫ-i Jahān-Gushā*, ed. Mīrzā Muḥammad Qazwīnī ([E.J.W.] G[ibb] M[emorial] S[eries], XVI. Leiden and London, 1912–37), I, 30–1, translation mine; cf. translation by J.A. Boyle, [*The*] H[istory of the] W[orld-] C[onqueror] (Manchester, 1958, 2 vols. with continuous pagination), p. 42.
2. Rubruck, 'Itinerarium,' XXII, 2, in Anastasius Van den Wyngaert, O.F.M. (ed.), *S[inica] F[ranciscana]*, I. *Itinera et relationes fratrum minorum saeculi XIII et XIV* (Quaracchi-Firenze, 1929), 222; tr. Peter Jackson, *The Mission of Friar William of Rubruck: His Journey to the Court of the Great Khan Möngke 1253–1255*, introduction, notes and appendices by P. Jackson with D.O. Morgan (Hakluyt Society, 2nd series, 173. Cambridge, 1990), p. 142.
3. Juwaynī, I, 32, and II, 68 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, pp. 43, 594).
4. Rashīd al-Dīn Faḍl-Allāh al-Hamadānī, *J[āmi'] al-] T[awāriḫ]*, II, ed. Edgar Blochet, *Tarikh-i Moubarek-i Ghazani* (GMS, XVIII/2. Leiden and London, 1911), p. 90; tr. J.A. Boyle, [*The*] S[uccessors of] G[enghis] K[han] (London and New York, 1971), p. 99.
5. Paul D. Buell, 'Kalmyk Tanggaci People: Thoughts on the Mechanics and Impact of Mongol Expansion', *Mongolian Studies*, 6 (1980), 43–4; see also his 'Tribe, *qan* and *ulus* in early Mongol China: Some Prolegomena to Yüan history', unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Washington, 1977), pp. 36 ff. I am grateful to Dr David Morgan for lending me a copy of this thesis given him by Professor Buell.
6. W. Barthold, *Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion*, 3rd ed. by C.E. Bosworth, with additional chapter tr. by T. Minorsky (GMS, new series, V. London, 1968), p. 483. P. Jackson, 'The Dissolution of the Mongol Empire', *CAJ*, 22 (1978), 202–6. David Morgan, *The Mongols* (Oxford, 1986), pp. 115–17. Th.T. Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism: The Policies of the Grand Qan Möngke in China, Russia and the Islamic Lands 1251–1259* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1987), pp. 22–44.
7. Jackson, 'The Dissolution', pp. 227–35. John W. Dardess, 'From Mongol Empire to Yüan Dynasty: Changing Forms of Imperial Rule in China and Mongolia', *M[onumenta] S[erica]*, 30 (1972–3), 126–32. Thomas T. Allsen, 'Changing Forms of Legitimation in Mongol Iran', in G. Seaman and D. Marks (eds.), *Rulers from the Steppe: State Formation on the Eurasian Periphery* (Los Angeles, 1991), 226–7.
8. The fullest survey of Qaidu and his empire is to be found in Michal Biran, *Qaidu and the Rise of the Independent Mongol State in Central Asia* (Richmond, Surrey, 1997). Cf. also the briefer account in W. Barthold, *Four Studies on the History of Central Asia*, tr. V. and T. Minorsky (Leiden, 1956–62, 4 parts in 3 vols.), I, 124–9; Paul Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo* (Paris, 1959–73, 3 vols. with continuous pagination), pp. 124–9; J.A. Boyle, 'Kaydu', *ET*², more generally, Dardess, 'From Mongol empire to Yüan dynasty,' pp. 130–1.
9. Allsen, 'Changing Forms of Legitimation', pp. 230–2, 235–6.
10. See, on this work, which is no longer extant, Barthold, *Four studies*, II, 136–8.
11. Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, p. 45. Joseph Fletcher, 'The Mongols: Ecological and Social Perspectives', *HJAS*, 46 (1986), 37, 48. See also Paul Ratchnevsky, *Genghis Khan: His Life and Legacy*, tr. Thomas Nivison Haining (Oxford, 1991), p. 207; D.O. Morgan, 'Who Ran the Mongol Empire?', *JRAS* (1982), 126–7. Not far distant is Professor Morris Rossabi's formulation: 'In 1229 the four Chinggisid lines effected a compromise, which eventually resulted in the first territorial division of the Mongol domains': *Khubilai Khan: His Life and Times* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1988), p. 8.
12. Thomas J. Barfield, *The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China* (Oxford, 1989), p. 212.
13. Jackson, 'The Dissolution', p. 228.
14. *S[ecret] H[istory of the Mongols (Mangghol-un niucha tobcha'an)]*, § 270, tr. Igor de Rachewiltz, chap. 12, *PFEH*, 31 (March 1985), 27 (and commentary at 61 *ibid.*); cf. the translation by Francis Woodman Cleaves (Cambridge, Mass., 1982), p. 210.

15. Thomas T. Allsen, 'The Princes of the Left Hand: An Introduction to the History of the *Ulus* of Orda in the Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries', *AEMA*, 5 (1985 [1987]), 5–40.
16. Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, II, 603 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, p. 326).
17. *Ibid.*, 1/2, ed. I.N. Berezin, 'Sbornik letopisei', *T[rudy] V[ostochnogo] O[tdeleniia] I[mperatorskogo] R[usskogo] A[rkheologicheskogo] O[bshchestva]*, 13 (1868), 89, 95; tr. O.I. Smirnova, *S[bornik] L[etopisei]*, 1/2 (Moscow and Leningrad, 1952), 52, 54.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 98 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, 1/2, 56).
19. Juwaynī, I, 32 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, p. 43).
20. S.V. Kiselev (ed.), *Drevnemongol'skie goroda* (Moscow, 1965), pp. 23–58, 325–69. Dardess, 'From Mongol Empire to Yüan Dynasty', p. 119.
21. Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, 1/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 13 (1868), 89, 95–6, 98 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, 1/2, 52, 54–5, 56).
22. Chao Hung, *Meng-ta pei-lu*, tr. W. Olbricht and E. Pinks, *Meng-Ta pei-lu und Hei-Ta shih-lieh: chinesische Gesandtenberichte über die frühen Mongolen 1221 und 1237* (A[satische] F[orschungen], 56. Wiesbaden, 1980), p. 24 (and see notes at pp. 31–3).
23. Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, 1/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 13 (1868), 130, and 15 (1888), 220–1 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, 1/2, 71, 276). We know from Chinese sources that Kölgen's son and grandson held the appanage of Ho-chien in Chih-li: Y[üan] S[hieh], chap. 107, ed. and tr. Louis Hambis, *Le Chapitre CVII du Yuan Che*, with notes by Paul Pelliot (*T'oung Pao*, 38, supplément. Leiden, 1945), p. 64; *YS*, chap. 108, ed. and tr. Louis Hambis, *Le Chapitre CVIII du Yuan Che* (Monographies du *T'oung Pao*, III. Leiden, 1954, vol. I only), p. 110. But this lies rather too far south of the steppe to be adjacent to his original *yurt*, and in the absence of further evidence the question must remain open.
24. B.la. Vladimirtsov, *Le régime social des Mongols*, tr. M. Carsow (Paris, 1948), pp. 124 ff., translates *ulus* as 'peuple-patrimoine'.
25. *SH*, § 203, tr. Cleaves, p. 143, and tr. De Rachewiltz, chap. 8, *PFEH*, 21 (March 1980), 27; for the anachronism, see De Rachewiltz's note *ibid.*, p. 49.
26. *Ibid.*, § 242, tr. Cleaves, p. 175, and tr. De Rachewiltz, chap. 10, *PFEH*, 26 (Sept. 1982), 46. The troops of Jochi Qasar, with whom Chinggis Khan fell out, were subsequently reduced to 1,400: Ratchnevsky, *Genghis Khan*, pp. 99–100 and 248 n. 35.
27. Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, 1/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 15 (1888), 220–1 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, 1/2, 276).
28. Juwaynī, I, 29–30 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, pp. 40–1).
29. *SH*, § 239, tr. Cleaves, pp. 173–4, and tr. De Rachewiltz, chap. 10, in *PFEH*, 26 (Sept. 1982), 44–5: see De Rachewiltz's note at pp. 64–5, on the conflation of two distinct campaigns in the *SH* tradition; but for a different view, see the editorial note in Ratchnevsky, *Genghis Khan*, pp. 254–5.
30. Rubruck, II, 1, ed. Van den Wyngaert, p. 172 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, p. 72).
31. Juwaynī, I, 32 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, p. 43).
32. John of Plano Carpini, 'Ystoria Mongalorum quos nos Tartaros appellamus', IX, 25, ed. Van den Wyngaert, *SF*, I, 115, and ed. Enrico Menestò et al., *Storia dei Mongoli*, Centro italiano di studi sull'alto medioevo (Spoleto, 1989), p. 315; tr. by a nun of Stanbrook Abbey in Christopher Dawson (ed.), *The Mongol Mission: Narratives and Letters of the Franciscan Missionaries in Mongolia and China in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries* (London and New York, 1955), p. 60.
33. Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, II, 396, 399, 438–9, 566–7 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, pp. 254–5, 256, 267, 312).
34. Rubruck, V, 1, ed. Van den Wyngaert, p. 179 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, p. 84).
35. *SH*, § 268, tr. Cleaves, p. 209, and tr. De Rachewiltz, chap. 12, in *PFEH*, 31 (March 1985), 25.
36. Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. 'Alī al-Nasawī, *Sīrat al-Sulṭān Jalāl al-Dīn*, ed. and tr. Octave Houdas (Paris, 1891–5), text p. 93, tr. p. 154; also tr. Z.M. Buniatov, *Zhizneopisanie Sultana Dzhalal ad-Dina Mankburny* (Baku, 1973), p. 137; 13th-century Persian trans. ed. Muḥtabā

- Mīnuwī (Tehran, 1344 Sh./1965), p. 62. Jochi appointed Chin Temūr as Mongol resident (*basqaq*) there: Juwaynī, II, 218 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, p. 482).
37. Ibn Faḍl-Allāh al-'Umārī, *Masālik al-Absār fī Mamālik al-Amṣār*, partial ed. and tr. Klaus Lech, *Das mongolische Weltreich: al-'Umārī's Darstellung der mongolischen Reiche in seinem Werk . . .* (AF, 22. Wiesbaden, 1968), Arabic text p. 15, German tr. p. 100; cf. also text p. 17, tr. p. 102, for Hamadān. But cf. below and n. 73.
 38. Juwaynī, I, 95 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, p. 122).
 39. For evidence of this kind of transportation, see Paul Pelliot, 'Une ville musulmane dans la Chine du nord sous les Mongols', *JA*, 211 (1927), 266; Louis Hambis, 'Notes sur Kām nom de l'Yénissei supérieur', *JA*, 244 (1956), 291.
 40. Rubruck, XXIII, 2–3, ed. Van den Wyngaert, pp. 224–5 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, pp. 144–6); and cf. Peter Jackson, 'William of Rubruck: a review article', *JRAS* (1987), 95–6. On the workshops, see I.P. Petrushevsky, 'The Socio-economic Condition of Iran under the Īl-khāns', in J.A. Boyle (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. V. *The Saljuq and Mongol Periods* (Cambridge, 1968), pp. 512–13.
 41. Rubruck, XXXII, 5, ed. Van den Wyngaert, p. 287 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, pp. 223–4). For Buchier, see Leonardo Olschki, *Guillaume Boucher, a French Artist at the Court of the Khans* (Baltimore, 1946).
 42. Buell, 'Tribe, *qan and ulus*', pp. 121–6, 149–52, 164–9. For restrictions on princely appanage-holders after Möngke's accession, see Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, pp. 80–1, 86–8; Elizabeth Endicott-West, *Mongolian Rule in China* (Cambridge, Mass., 1989), pp. 90–103.
 43. Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, II, 196 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, p. 156). The context of this episode is discussed by Paul Buell, 'Sino-Khitān Administration in Mongol Bukhara', *Journal of Asian History*, 13 (1979), 143–6.
 44. Rubruck, XXXVII, 17, ed. Van den Wyngaert, p. 318 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, p. 260).
 45. Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, II, 181 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, p. 146). This is Marco Polo's 'Taianfu'. For the date, see *YS*, chap. 1, tr. F.E.A. Krause, *Cingis Han: die Geschichte seines Lebens nach den chinesischen Reichsannalen* (Heidelberg, 1922), p. 32.
 46. *YS*, chap. 2, tr. Waltraut Abramowski, 'Die chinesischen Annalen von Ögödei und Güyük', *Zentralasiatische Studien*, 10 (1976), 132.
 47. Rossabi, *Khubilai Khan*, p. 14. For the grant to Tolui, see Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, II, 216 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, p. 165). This is Polo's 'Acbalect': Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo*, pp. 8–9. On the appanages in China, see Paul Ratchnevsky, 'Zum Ausdruck "T'ou-hsia" in der Mongolenzeit', in Walther Heissig (ed.), *Collectanea Mongolica. Festschrift für Professor Dr. Rintchen zum 60. Geburtstag* (AF, 17. Wiesbaden, 1966), 173–91; Endicott-West, pp. 89 ff.
 48. Juwaynī, I, 66–7, 113, 117 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, pp. 86, 143, 151). See generally Jean Aubin, 'L'ethnogénèse des Qaraunas', *Turcica*, 1 (1969), 65–94. Barthold, *Turkestan*, 464–5, seems to have been the first scholar to draw attention to this.
 49. Juwaynī, I, 211–12 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, p. 256). Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, III, ed. A.A. Alizade and tr. A.K. Arends, *Dzhami-at-tavarikh*, III (Baku, 1957), text p. 22, tr. p. 21.
 50. Juwaynī, III, 90 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, p. 607).
 51. Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, II, 216–17 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, p. 165).
 52. *Ibid.*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 13 (1868), 135, and 15 (1888), 221 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, table facing 72, and 276). Rashīd al-Dīn, *S[hu'ab-i] P[anjgāna]*, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi, İstanbul, MS. III Ahmet 2937, fol. 106b.
 53. Minhāj-i Sirāj Jūzjānī, *Ṭabaqāt-i Nāširī*, British Library MS. Add. 26189, fol. 255b: *wa-har wilāyat dar Irān ki dar ḡabṭ-i muḡhal āmada būd ūrā az ān diyār naṣīb mu'ayyan būd wa-gumāshtagān-i ū dar ān miqdār ki qism-i ū būd naṣīb mīburdand*. I have used this early fourteenth-century MS. in preference to the printed edition of 'Abd al-Ḥayy Ḥabībī (2nd ed., Kabul, 1342–3 Sh./1963–4), II, 176, which reads *naṣab būdand* for *naṣīb mīburdand*; cf. the translation by H.G. Raverty, *Ṭabaqāt-i Nāširī* (Bibliotheca Indica. London, 1873–81), p. 1172.

54. Sayf b. Muḥammad b. Ya'qūb Harawī (Sayfī), *Ta'riḫh-Nāma-yi Harāt*, ed. Muḥammad Zubayr aṣ-Ṣiddiqī (Calcutta, 1944), pp. 228–9.
55. Juwaynī, I, 31, 191–2 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, pp. 42–3, 236). See J.A. Boyle, 'The Seasonal Residences of the Great Khan Ögedei', in Georg Hazai and Peter Zieme (eds.), *Sprache, Geschichte und Kultur der altaischen Völker: Protokollband der XII. Tagung der Permanent International Altaistic Conference 1969 zu Berlin* (Schriften zur Geschichte und Kultur des alten Orients, 5. Berlin, 1974), pp. 145–51; repr. in Boyle, *The Mongol world-empire 1206–1370* (London, 1977). For Chaghadaī, see also Juwaynī, I, 226 (tr. *HWC*, p. 271), and Thomas T. Allsen, 'The Yüan Dynasty and the Uighurs of Turfan in the 13th century', in Morris Rossabi (ed.), *China among Equals: the Middle Kingdom and its Neighbours, 10th–14th Centuries* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1983), pp. 248–9.
56. *SH*, §269, tr. Cleaves, p. 209, and tr. De Rachewiltz, chap. 12, in *PFEH*, 31 (March 1985), 26 (and commentary at pp. 57–8).
57. Boyle, 'The Seasonal Residences'; Rubruck, XVII, 6, ed. Van den Wyngaert, p. 208 (*habent pro regali*; tr. Jackson and Morgan, p. 125).
58. Rashīd al-Dīn, II, 131 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, p. 117).
59. *Ibid.*, p. 107 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, p. 107); cf. also pp. 131, 132 (tr. *SGK*, pp. 117, 118).
60. Juwaynī, I, 224 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, pp. 268–9). Morgan, *The Mongols*, pp. 136–7.
61. Juwaynī, I, 110–11, 116 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, pp. 139–40, 149); cf. also I, 70 (tr. *HWC*, p. 90), where Jochi moves to the Qara Qum steppe, north of the Aral Sea (see Boyle, p. 89 n. 9 *ibid.*). Jūzjānī, II, 150 (tr. Raverty, p. 1101). A variant of Carpini's report, the so-called 'Tartar Relation', § 20, enshrines a vague recollection of Jochi's operations here: Alf Önnersfors (ed.), *Hystoria Tartarorum C. de Bridia monachi* (Kleine Texte für Vorlesungen und Übungen, 186. Berlin, 1967), p. 15. See generally Thomas T. Allsen, 'Prelude to the Western Campaigns: Mongol Military Operations in the Volga-Ural Region, 1217–1237', *AEMA*, 3 (1983), 11–14.
62. See further the discussion in Lech, *Das mongolische Weltreich*, pp. 209–10, n. 74, which is based, however, on the testimony of late and (for this purpose) unreliable Mongolian sources such as the *Altan Tobchi*. W. Barthold, *Zwölf Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Türken Mittelasien*, ed. and tr. Th. Menzel (Berlin, 1935; repr. Hildesheim, 1962), 164; *idem*, *Four Studies*, I, 112–13.
63. The notion appears plausible at least as far as concerns the West. In the eastern reaches of the empire, there was perhaps less scope; though Temüge was able to develop a suitably predatory relationship with the client kingdom of Koryō: W.E. Henthorn, *Korea. The Mongol Invasions* (Leiden, 1963), pp. 24, 28, 195, 202.
64. Rubruck, XXIII, 2, ed. Van den Wyngaert, p. 224 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, pp. 144–5).
65. Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, III, text p. 110, tr. p. 72.
66. Juwaynī, I, 31–2: *Tūlī nīz muttaṣil-u mujāwir-i ū būd*. Boyle, *HWC*, 43, rendered this as: 'Toli's territory, likewise, lay adjacent thereto.' The word *ū* however, refers not to Ögödei or his son Güyüg, who have just been mentioned, but back to Chinggis Khan, so that the translation should read: 'Toli in turn was near him and at his side.' This interpretation is confirmed by Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 13 (1868), 126 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 69). It is noteworthy that the corresponding phrase used by al-'Umarī (Lech, *Das mongolische Weltreich*, text pp. 14–15), who in this passage simply translated Juwaynī into Arabic, is *kāna waladuhu Tūlī muttaṣil^m bihi*, and Lech, like Boyle, was misled (tr. p. 100: 'An dieses Gebiet grenzte auch das des . . . Tūlī').
67. Juwaynī, III, 3 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, p. 549). Rubruck, VII, 4, ed. Van den Wyngaert, p. 185 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, p. 92). Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, I/1, ed. A.A. Romaskevich et al. (Moscow, 1965), p. 550, and tr. A.A. Khetagurov, *SL*, I/1 (Moscow and Leningrad, 1952), 193; I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 13 (1868), 47, 97 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 55; sentence omitted at 30); II, 2, 16, 213, 277 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, pp. 17, 30–1, 163, 202).
68. Rubruck, XXXII, 4 and 5, ed. Van den Wyngaert, p. 287 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, pp. 223, 224). See also Juwaynī, II, 256 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, p. 519).

69. Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, II, 218 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, p. 166). The site of 'the great *ordas*' is discussed by Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo*, pp. 330–53.
70. Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, II, 560–1 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, p. 310). This passage, which is corrupted in Blochet's edition, is amended by Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo*, pp. 341–2: for the correct readings, see the translation by Iu.P. Verkhovskii, *SL*, II (Moscow and Leningrad, 1960), 201.
71. Rubruck, XXXII, 6–7, ed. Van den Wyngaert, p. 288 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, p. 224).
72. See, on Juwaynī for instance, David Ayalon, 'The Great *Yāsa* of Chingiz Khān. A Re-examination. Part B', *Studia Islamica*, 34 (1971), 151–66; repr. in his *Outsiders in the Lands of Islam* (London, 1988). On the later doctoring of the *SH* by the Toluids, Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, pp. 36–42; Igor de Rachewiltz, 'Some remarks on the dating of the *Secret History of the Mongols*', *MS*, 24 (1965), 197–201, believes the entire section on Ögödei's reign was composed under Qubilai. The number of troops under Tolui's authority according to Rashīd al-Dīn presents a further problem: see Appendix.
73. Jamāl al-Dīn 'Abd-Allāh b. 'Alī Qāshānī [Kāshānī], *Ta'rikh-i Ūljāytū Sulṭān*, ed. Mahin Hambly (Tehran, 1348 Sh./1969), p. 146. al-'Umārī, ed. Lech, *Das mongolische Weltreich*, text pp. 20, 78, German tr. pp. 104, 143–4: this evidence was overlooked in Jackson, 'The Dissolution of the Mongol Empire', pp. 208–9, 219–20.
74. Luciano Petech, *Central Tibet and the Mongols* (Rome, 1990), pp. 10–12, 89–90. Turrell V. Wylie, 'The First Mongol Conquest of Tibet Reinterpreted', *HJAS*, 37 (1977), 117. The date of Kōdōn's death varies in the sources, and it is unclear whether he died in 1251 or was still alive in 1260: see János Szerb, 'Glosses on the Oeuvre of Bla-ma 'Phags-pa: II. Some notes on the events of the years 1251–1254', *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*, 34 (1980), 264 n. 7, 269 n. 22, 277. Juwaynī, I, 201 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, p. 245), has him die as early as the reign of Güyüg (1246–1248).
75. Quṭb al-Dīn Mūsā b. Muḥammad al-Yūnīnī, *al-Dhayl 'alā Mir'āt al-Zamān* (Hyderabad, A.P., 1374–80/1954–61, 4 vols. only published), I, 498, and II, 161: his source was the lost portion of the biography of the Mamlūk Sultan Baybars by Ibn Shaddād (d. 684/1285). Qirṭāy al-'Izzī al-Khazāndārī, *Ta'rikh Majmū' al-Nawādir*, Gotha Forschungsbibliothek MS. (Pertsch, no. 1655), fol. 79a; extract (wrongly attributed to Ibn Wāṣil) tr. in V.G. Frhr. von Tiesenhausen, *Sbornik materialov otnosiashchikhsia k istorii Zolotoi Ordii*, I (St. Petersburg, 1884), text p. 71, tr. p. 73.
76. Waṣṣāf (Shihāb al-Dīn 'Abd-Allāh b. 'Izz al-Dīn Faḍl-Allāh Shīrāzī), *Tajziyat al-Amṣār wa-Tazjiyat al-A'sār*, lithograph edn. (Bombay, 1269/1853), p. 51: this evidence is discussed in Barthold, *Turkestan*, pp. 516–17 n. 225; cf. also Buell, 'Kalmyk Tanggaci people', p. 53 n. 24.
77. Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, pp. 47–9: he assumes that Qubilai and Hülegü enjoyed the same status. Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, III, text p. 24, tr. p. 22. Jackson, 'The Dissolution of the Mongol Empire', pp. 221–2; but cf. Morgan, *The Mongols*, pp. 148–9.
78. Reuven Amitai-Preiss, 'Evidence for the Early Use of the Title *ilkhān* among the Mongols', *JRAS*, 3rd series, 1 (1991), 353–61. Allsen, 'Changing Forms of Legitimation', p. 227.
79. Aubin, 'L'ethnogénèse', pp. 79–81. Jackson, 'The dissolution of the Mongol Empire', pp. 239, 242–3.
80. Barfield, *Perilous Frontier*, p. 218. For Alughu, see Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, II, 419–20 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, pp. 260–1).
81. *Ibid.*, pp. 566–7 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, p. 312).
82. *Ibid.*, p. 453 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, p. 273). For Nangiyas (*nan-chia*, 'people of the south'), see Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo*, p. 275.
83. The evidence is summarized by Emil Bretschneider, *Mediaeval Researches from Eastern Asiatic Sources* (London, 1888, 2 vols.), II, pp. 11–14.
84. Waṣṣāf, p. 506.
85. *Ibid.*, p. 504.

86. Hugues Revel, Master of the Hospitallers, to Edward I of England, 30 Sept. 1275, in Ch. Kohler and C.V. Langlois (eds.), 'Lettres inédites concernant les croisades (1275–1307)', *Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des Chartes*, 52 (1891), 54 (*au grant Cham . . . qui voleit avoir conte de ce que Alahaou, son pere d'Abaga, aveit gahagnié en Perse et a Baudac et au Cayre et a Halape*). The insertion of Cairo (which the editors incorrectly take to signify *Carrae* = Ḥarrān) is an obvious slip.
87. Al-'Umarī, ed. Lech, *Das mongolische Weltreich*, text pp. 78–9, German tr. pp. 143–4.
88. Marco Polo, *Le divisament dou monde*, ed. and tr. A.C. Moule and Paul Pelliot, *The Description of the World* (London, 1938, 2 vols.), II, 447–8; and tr. A. Ricci, *The Travels of Marco Polo* (London, 1931), pp. 359–60.
89. Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 13 (1868), 98, and 15 (1888), 221, 223 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 55, 277). *SH*, § 243, tr. Cleaves, p. 176, and tr. De Rachewiltz, chap. 10, *PFEH*, 26 (Sept. 1982), 47. Barfield, *Perilous Frontier*, p. 195, suggests that the discrepancy in the figures can be explained by two separate allocations of troops.
90. Chao Hung, *Meng-ta pei-lu*, tr. Olbricht and Pinks, p. 24.
91. Li Chih-ch'ang, *Hsi-yü chi*, tr. Arthur Waley, *The Travels of an Alchemist* (Broadway Travellers. London, 1931), pp. 64–5.
92. Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 13 (1868), 98 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 55).
93. Hambis, *Le Chapitre CVII*, p. 23; and cf. also p. 150.
94. Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 15 (1888), 222 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 277).
95. *Ibid.*, p. 142 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 230).
96. *Ibid.*, II, 236–7 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, p. 178), for a slightly fuller version than that of Juwaynī, I, 199, 203, 210 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, pp. 244, 248, 255). Cf. also Carpini, V, 18, ed. Van den Wyngaert, p. 64, and ed. Menestò et al., p. 264 (tr. in Dawson, *The Mongol Mission*, p. 25).
97. Jüzjānī, II, 166 (tr. Raverty, pp. 1143–4).
98. Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 13 (1868), 87 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 51). For the demotion of Jochi Qasar and his line by Chinggis Khan, see n. 26 above.
99. Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 13 (1868), 88 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 52); II, 389, 392–3, 398 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, pp. 252, 253, 255). For his career, see Igor de Rachewiltz, 'Some Remarks on the Stele of Yisünger', in Walther Heissig et al. (eds.), *Tractata Altaica Denis Sinor sexagenario . . . dedicata* (Wiesbaden, 1976), pp. 493–5.
100. Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 13 (1868), 99–100 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 56); II, 533–5 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, p. 298). Marco Polo, tr. Moule and Pelliot, II, 192–201; tr. Ricci, pp. 103–9. For the chronology and other data from Chinese sources, see Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo*, pp. 788–9; for a full narrative, Rossabi, *Khubilai Khan*, pp. 222–4. Nayan's descent as given in Berezin's text of *JT* is in error: cf. the correct version in *SP*, fols. 103b–104a; also Paul Pelliot and Louis Hambis (eds.), *Cheng-wou Ts'in-tcheng lou. Histoire des campagnes de Gengis Khan* (Leiden, 1951, vol. I only), pp. 178–9.
101. Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 13 (1868), 90, 97 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 53, 55).
102. *YS*, chap. 14, cited in Hambis, *Le Chapitre CVIII*, p. 112. The allegation by Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 13 (1868), 100 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 56), that nobody of Temüger's line remained alive, should be treated with caution, since at least one of Temüger's descendants, Toqta, prince of Leao, is found holding an appanage in the fourteenth century: Hambis, *Le Chapitre CVIII*, p. 42. His precise ancestry is uncertain: Hambis, *Le Chapitre CVII*, pp. 35, 46 n. 31; Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, II, 503 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, p. 286). For the resettlement of (some of?) Nayan's surviving dependants, see Herbert Franke, *Beiträge zur Kulturgeschichte Chinas unter der Mongolenherrschaft. Das Shan-kü sin-hua des Yang Yü* (Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, XXXII/2. Wiesbaden, 1956), p. 82.
103. Juwaynī, I, 206 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, p. 251); a more definite assertion in Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, II, 243 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, p. 181).
104. *Ibid.*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 15 (1888), 219, 226 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 276, 278); II, 6, 226 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, pp. 21, 170).

105. Hambis, *Le Chapitre CVIII*, p. 88: Ananda received the title in 1282.
106. Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, II, 362, 593, 595, 597 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, pp. 243, 322, 323).
107. E.P.J. Mullie, *De mongoolse prins Nayan* (Mededelingen van de Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie voor Wetenschappen Letteren en Schone Kunsten van België, Klasse der Letteren, XXVI/3. Brussels, 1964), pp. 9–11.
108. Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 13 (1868), 97, 99, 102 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 55, 56, 57).
109. For Qubilai's gradual build-up of imperial authority in other parts of Mongolia, see Dardess, 'From Mongol Empire to Yüan Dynasty', pp. 132 ff.
110. Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 15 (1888), 224, 228 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 278, 279); II, 213–14 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, pp. 163, 164).
111. *Ibid.*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 15 (1888), 194–5 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 266); cf. also p. 215 (tr. p. 274).
112. E.g., Fletcher, 'The Mongols', p. 36; Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, pp. 60–1; Barfield, *Perilous Frontier*, p. 195.
113. Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, II, 214 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, p. 164).
114. Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, pp. 39–42.
115. *SH*, § 242, tr. Cleaves, p. 175, and tr. de Rachewiltz, chap. 10, *PFEH*, 26 (March 1982), 46.
116. Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 15 (1888), 228 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 279). An anecdote designed to illustrate Sorqaqtani's loyalty may also be linked. The qa'an Ögödei arbitrarily transferred some 'thousands' (the details vary in the two different versions found in the *JT*) which belonged to Sorqaqtani and her sons to his own son Ködön. Some *noyans* in the service of the Toluids protested vigorously to Sorqaqtani, who conceded that they were right but pointed out that all of them, including herself and her sons, belonged to the qa'an and it was his prerogative to do as he saw fit: *ibid.*, pp. 224–6 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 278); II, 223–4 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, pp. 169–70). The troops in question may have been part of the *qol* over which Tolui as regent had briefly wielded authority.

THE MONGOL MISSION

John of Plano Carpini



CHAPTER IV

OF THEIR CHARACTER, GOOD AND BAD, THEIR CUSTOMS, FOOD, ETC.

Having spoken of their religion, now we must speak of their character, which we will deal with in this way: first we will tell of their good points, then of their bad, thirdly of their customs, and fourthly of their food.

These men, that is to say the Tartars, are more obedient to their masters than any other men in the world, be they religious or seculars; they show great respect to them nor do they lightly lie to them. They rarely or never contend with each other in word, and in action never. Fights, brawls, wounding, murder are never met with among them. Nor are robbers and thieves who steal on a large scale found there; consequently their dwellings and the carts in which they keep their valuables are not secured by bolts and bars. If any animals are lost, whoever comes across them either leaves them alone or takes them to men appointed for this purpose; the owners of the animals apply for them to these men and they get them back without any difficulty. They show considerable respect to each other and are very friendly together, and they willingly share their food with each other, although there is little enough of it. They are also long-suffering. When they are without food, eating nothing at all for one or two days, they do not easily show impatience, but they sing and make merry as if they had eaten well. On horseback they endure great cold and they also put up with excessive heat. Nor are they men fond of luxury; they are not envious of each other; there is practically no litigation among them. No one scorns another but helps him and promotes his good as far as circumstances permit.

Their women are chaste, nor does one hear any mention among them of any shameful behaviour on their part; some of them, however, in jest make use of vile and disgusting language. Discord among them seems to arise rarely or never, and although they may get very drunk, yet in their intoxication they never come to words or blows.

Now that the good characteristics of the Tartars have been described, it is time for something to be said about their bad. They are most arrogant to other people and look down on all, indeed they consider them as nought, be they of high rank or low born.

For at the Emperor's court we saw Jerozlaus,¹ a man of noble birth, a mighty duke of Russia, also the son of the King and Queen of Georgia, and many important sultans; the chief also of the Solangi received no fitting honour from them, but the Tartars

who were assigned to them, however base-born they were, went ahead of them and always had the first and highest place; indeed they were often obliged to sit behind their backs.

They are quickly roused to anger with other people and are of an impatient nature; they also tell lies to others and practically no truth is to be found in them. At first indeed they are smooth-tongued, but in the end they sting like a scorpion. They are full of slyness and deceit, and if they can, they get round everyone by their cunning. They are men who are dirty in the way they take food and drink and do other things. Any evil they intend to do to others they conceal in a wonderful way so that the latter can take no precautions nor devise anything to offset their cunning. Drunkenness is considered an honourable thing by them and when anyone drinks too much, he is sick there and then, nor does this prevent him from drinking again. They are exceedingly grasping and avaricious; they are extremely exacting in their demands, most tenacious in holding on to what they have and most niggardly in giving. They consider the slaughter of other people as nothing. In short, it is impossible to put down in writing all their evil characteristics on account of the very great number of them.

Their food consists of everything that can be eaten, for they eat dogs, wolves, foxes and horses and, when driven by necessity, they feed on human flesh. For instance, when they were fighting against a city of the Kitayans, where the Emperor was residing, they besieged it for so long that they themselves completely ran out of supplies and, since they had nothing at all to eat, they thereupon took one out of every ten men for food. They eat the filth which comes away from mares when they bring forth foals. Nay, I have even seen them eating lice. They would say, 'Why should I not eat them since they eat the flesh of my son and drink his blood?' I have also seen them eat mice.

They do not use table-cloths or napkins. They have neither bread nor herbs nor vegetables nor anything else, nothing but meat, of which, however, they eat so little that other people would scarcely be able to exist on it. They make their hands very dirty with the grease of the meat, but when they eat they wipe them on their leggings or the grass or some other such thing. It is the custom for the more respectable among them to have small bits of cloth with which they wipe their hands at the end when they eat meat. One of them cuts the morsels and another takes them on the point of a knife and offers them to each, to some more, to some less, according to whether they wish to show them greater or less honour. They do not wash their dishes, and, if occasionally they rinse them with the meat broth, they put it back with the meat into the pot. Pots also or spoons or other articles intended for this use, if they are cleaned at all, are washed in the same manner. They consider it a great sin if any food or drink is allowed to be wasted in any way; consequently they do not allow bones to be given to dogs until the marrow has been extracted. They do not wash their clothes nor allow them to be washed, especially from the time when thunderstorms begin until the weather changes. They drink mare's milk in very great quantities if they have it; they also drink the milk of ewes, cows, goats and even camels. They do not have wine, ale or mead unless it is sent or given to them by other nations. In the winter, moreover, unless they are wealthy, they do not have mare's milk. They boil millet in water and make it so thin that they cannot eat it but have to drink it. Each one of them drinks one or two cups in the morning and they eat nothing more during the day; in the evening, however, they are all given a little meat, and they drink the meat broth. But in the summer, seeing they have plenty of mare's milk, they seldom eat meat, unless it happens to be given to them or they catch some animal or bird when hunting.

They also have a law or custom of putting to death any man and woman they find openly committing adultery; similarly if a virgin commit fornication with anyone, they kill both the man and the woman. If anyone is found in the act of plundering or stealing in the territory under their power, he is put to death without any mercy. Again, if anyone reveals their plans, especially when they intend going to war, he is given a hundred stripes on his back, as heavy as a peasant can give with a big stick. When any of the lower class offend in any way, they are not spared by their superiors, but are soundly beaten. There is no distinction between the son of a concubine and the son of a wife, but the father gives to each what he will; and if they are of a family of princes, then the son of a concubine is a prince just the same as the son of a legitimate wife. When a Tartar has many wives, each one has her own dwelling and her household, and the husband eats and drinks and sleeps one day with one, and the next with another. One, however, is chief among the others and with her he stays more often than with the others. In spite of their numbers, they never easily quarrel among themselves.

The men do not make anything at all, with the exception of arrows, and they also sometimes tend the flocks, but they hunt and practise archery, for they are all, big and little, excellent archers, and their children begin as soon as they are two or three years old to ride and manage horses and to gallop on them, and they are given bows to suit their stature and are taught to shoot; they are extremely agile and also intrepid.

Young girls and women ride and gallop on horseback with agility like the men. We even saw them carrying bows and arrows. Both the men and the women are able to endure long stretches of riding. They have very short stirrups; they look after their horses very well, indeed they take the very greatest care of all their possessions. Their women make everything, leather garments, tunics, shoes, leggings and everything made of leather; they also drive the carts and repair them, they load the camels, and in all their tasks they are very swift and energetic. All the women wear breeches and some of them shoot like the men.

CHAPTER VI

OF WAR, THEIR BATTLE ARRAY, ARMS, THEIR CUNNING IN ENGAGEMENTS,
CRUELTY TO CAPTIVES, ASSAULT ON FORTIFICATIONS, THEIR BAD
FAITH WITH THOSE WHO SURRENDER TO THEM, ETC.

Having spoken of their empire, we will now deal with war in the following manner: first we will tell of their battle array, second of their arms, thirdly of their cunning in engagements, fourthly of the cruelty they show to captives, fifthly of how they make assaults on forts and cities, and sixthly of the bad faith they show to those who surrender to them.

Chingis Chan ordained that the army should be organised in such a way that over ten men should be set one man and he is what we call a captain of ten; over ten of these should be placed one, named a captain of a hundred; at the head of ten captains of a hundred is placed a soldier known as a captain of a thousand, and over ten captains of a thousand is one man, and the word they use for this number means 'darkness'.² Two or three chiefs are in command of the whole army, yet in such a way that one holds the supreme command.

When they are in battle, if one or two or three or even more out of a group of ten run

away, all are put to death; and if a whole group of ten flees, the rest of the group of a hundred are all put to death, if they do not flee too. In a word, unless they retreat in a body, all who take flight are put to death. Likewise if one or two or more go forward boldly to the fight, then the rest of the ten are put to death if they do not follow and, if one or more of the ten are captured, their companions are put to death if they do not rescue them.

They all have to possess the following arms at least: two or three bows, or at least one good one, three large quivers full of arrows, an axe and ropes for hauling engines of war. As for the wealthy, they have swords pointed at the end but sharp only on one side and somewhat curved, and they have a horse with armour; their legs also are covered and they have helmets and cuirasses. Some have cuirasses, and protection for their horses, fashioned out of leather in the following manner: they take strips of ox-hide, or of the skin of another animal, a hand's breadth wide and cover three or four together with pitch, and they fasten them with leather thongs or cord; in the upper strip they put the lace at one end, in the next they put it in the middle and so on to the end; consequently, when they bend, the lower strips come up over the upper ones and thus there is a double or triple thickness over the body.

They make the covering for their horses in five sections, one on one side of the horse and one on the other, and these stretch from the tail to the head and are fastened to the saddle and behind the saddle on its back and also on the neck; another section they put over its hindquarters where the ties of the two parts are fastened and in this last-named piece they make a hole for the tail to come through; covering the breast there is another section. All these pieces reach down as far as the knees or joints of the leg. On its forehead they put an iron plate which is tied to the aforementioned sections on each side of the neck.

The cuirass is made in four parts. One piece stretches from the thigh to the neck, but is shaped to fit the human figure, being narrow across the chest and curved round the body from the arms downwards; behind, over the loins, they have another piece which reaches from the neck and meets the first piece encircling the body; these two sections, namely the front one and the back, are fastened with clasps to two iron plates, one on each shoulder; also on each arm they have a piece stretching from the shoulder to the hand and open at the bottom, and on each leg another piece. All these sections are fastened together by clasps.

The upper part of the helmet is of iron or steel, but the part affording protection to the neck and throat is of leather. All these leather sections are made in the manner described above.

Some of the Tartars have all the things we have mentioned made of iron in the following fashion: they make a number of thin plates of the metal, a finger's breadth wide and a hand's breadth in length, piercing eight little holes in each plate; as a foundation they put three strong narrow straps; they then place the plates one on top of the other so that they overlap, and they tie them to the straps by narrow thongs which they thread through the afore-mentioned holes; at the top they attach a thong, so that the metal plates hold together firmly and well. They make a strap out of these plates and then join them together to make sections of armour as has been described above. They make these into armour for horses as well as men and they make them shine so brightly that one can see one's reflection in them.

Some of them have lances which have a hook in the iron neck, and with this, if they can, they will drag a man from his saddle. The length of their arrows is two feet, one

palm and two digits. Since feet are not all the same,³ we will give the measurement of a geometrical foot; the length of a digit is two grains of barley, and sixteen digits make a geometrical foot. The heads of the arrows are very sharp and cut on both sides like a two-edged sword—the Tartars always carry files at the side of their quiver for sharpening their arrows. The iron heads have a pointed tail, a digit's breadth in length and this they stick into the shaft.

They have a shield made of wicker or twigs, but I do not think they carry it except in camp and when guarding the Emperor and the princes, and this only at night. They also have other arrows for shooting birds and animals and unarmed men; these are three digits wide; in addition they have various other kinds of arrows for shooting birds and animals.

When they are going to make war, they send ahead an advance guard and these carry nothing with them but their tents, horses and arms. They seize no plunder, burn no houses and slaughter no animals; they only wound and kill men or, if they can do nothing else, put them to flight. They much prefer, however, to kill than to put to flight. The army follows after them, taking everything they come across, and they take prisoner or kill any inhabitants who are to be found. Not content with this, the chiefs of the army next send plunderers in all directions to find men and animals, and they are most ingenious at searching them out.

When they come to a river, they cross it in the following manner, even if it is wide. The nobles have a circular piece of light leather, round the edge of which they make numerous loops, through which they thread a rope; they draw this up so that it makes a pouch, which they fill with their clothes and other things, pressing them down very tightly together; on top of these, in the middle, they put their saddles and other hard things. The men also sit in the middle and they tie the boat they have made in this way to the tail of a horse. They make one man swim in front with the horse to guide it, or sometimes they have a couple of oars with which they row to the other side of the water and so cross the river. The horses, however, they drive into the water, and a man swims by the side of one horse, which he guides, and the others all follow it; in this way they cross both narrow and wide rivers. The poorer men have a leather bag securely sewn—everybody is expected to possess one of these—and into this bag or satchel they put their clothes and all their belongings; having tied the sack tightly at the top, they hang it on to a horse's tail and cross in the manner described above.

It should be known that when they come in sight of the enemy they attack at once, each one shooting three or four arrows at their adversaries; if they see that they are not going to be able to defeat them, they retire, going back to their own line. They do this as a blind to make the enemy follow them as far as the places where they have prepared ambushes. If the enemy pursues them to these ambushes, they surround and wound and kill them. Similarly if they see that they are opposed by a large army, they sometimes turn aside and, putting a day's or two days' journey between them, they attack and pillage another part of the country and they kill men and destroy and lay waste the land. If they perceive that they cannot even do this, then they retreat for some ten or twelve days and stay in a safe place until the army of the enemy has disbanded, whereupon they come secretly and ravage the whole land. They are indeed the most cunning in war, for they have now been fighting against other nations for forty years and more.

When however they are going to join battle, they draw up all the battle lines just as they are to fight. The chiefs or princes of the army do not take part in the fighting but take up their stand some distance away facing the enemy, and they have beside them

their children on horseback and their womenfolk and horses; and sometimes they make figures of men and set them on horses. They do this to give the impression that a great crowd of fightingmen is assembled there. They send a detachment of captives and men of other nationalities who are fighting with them to meet the enemy head-on, and some Tartars may perhaps accompany them. Other columns of stronger men they dispatch far off to the right and the left so that they are not seen by the enemy and in this way they surround them and close in and so the fighting begins from all sides. Sometimes when they are few in number they are thought by the enemy, who are surrounded, to be many, especially when the latter catch sight of the children, women, horses and dummy figures described above, which are with the chief or prince of the army and which they think are combatants; and alarmed by this they are thrown into disorder. If it happens that the enemy fight well, the Tartars make a way of escape for them; then as soon as they begin to take flight and are separated from each other they fall upon them and more are slaughtered in flight than could be killed in battle. However, it should be known that, if they can avoid it, the Tartars do not like to fight hand to hand but they wound and kill men and horses with their arrows; they only come to close quarters when men and horses have been weakened by arrows.

They reduce fortresses in the following manner. If the position of the fortress allows it, they surround it, sometimes even fencing it round so that no one can enter or leave. They make a strong attack with engines and arrows and they do not leave off fighting by day or night, so that those inside the fortress get no sleep; the Tartars however have some rest, for they divide up their forces and they take it in turns to fight so that they do not get too tired. If they cannot capture it in this way they throw Greek fire; sometimes they even take the fat of the people they kill and, melting it, throw it on to the houses, and wherever the fire falls on this fat it is almost inextinguishable. It can however be put out, so they say, if wine or ale is poured on it. If it falls on flesh, it can be put out by being rubbed with the palm of the hand.

If they are still unsuccessful and the city or fort has a river, they dam it or alter its course and submerge the fortress if possible. Should they not be able to do this, they undermine the city and armed men enter it from underground; once inside, some of them start fires to burn the fortress while the rest fight the inhabitants. If however they are not able to conquer it even in this way, they establish a fort or fortification of their own facing the city, so as not to suffer any injury from the missiles of the enemy; and they stay for a long time over against the city, unless by chance it has outside help from an army which fights against the Tartars and removes them by force. While they are pitched before the fortification they speak enticing words to the inhabitants making them many promises to induce them to surrender into their hands. If they do surrender to them, they say: 'Come out, so that we may count you according to our custom,' and when they come out to them they seek out the artificers among them and keep these, but the others, with the exception of those they wish to have as slaves, they kill with the axe. If they do spare any others they never spare the noble and illustrious men, so we are told, and if by chance the unexpected happens and some nobles are kept, they can never afterwards escape from captivity either by entreaty or by bribe.

All those they take prisoner in battle they put to death unless they happen to want to keep some as slaves. They divide those who are to be killed among the captains of a hundred to be executed by them with a battle-axe; they in their turn divide them among the captives, giving each slave to kill ten or more or less as the officers think fit.

NOTES

Chapter IV

1. Yaroslav I, Grand Duke of Vladimir 1238–47. He died at Karakorum during John of Plano Carpini's visit, as related *infra*, p. 65.

Chapter VI

2. 'Darkness': see note on p. 26 above. John has confused 'duman' (darkness) with 'tuman', which means 10,000. Apart from this mistake, the whole of this chapter with its minute details of Mongol armaments and tactics is extremely accurate and well informed, as is also the following chapter with its account of the 'Tartar Yoke' in Russia during its earliest and most 'totalitarian' phase.
3. This is the old Greek foot, consisting of four palms and sixteen digits.

THE MISSION TO ASIA

William of Rubruck



CHAPTER II

THE TARTARS AND THEIR DWELLINGS

The Tartars have no abiding city nor do they know of the one that is to come. They have divided among themselves Scythia, which stretches from the Danube as far as the rising of the sun. Each captain, according to whether he has more or fewer men under him, knows the limits of his pasturage and where to feed his flocks in winter, summer, spring and autumn, for in winter they come down to the warmer districts in the south, in summer they go up to the cooler ones in the north. They drive their cattle to graze on the pasture lands without water in winter when there is snow there, for the snow provides them with water.

The dwelling in which they sleep has as its base a circle of interlaced sticks, and it is made of the same material; these sticks converge into a little circle at the top and from this a neck juts up like a chimney; they cover it with white felt and quite often they also coat the felt with lime or white clay and powdered bone to make it a more gleaming white, and sometimes they make it black. The felt round the neck at the top they decorate with lovely and varied paintings. Before the doorway they also hang felt worked in multicoloured designs; they sew coloured felt on to the other, making vines and trees, birds and animals. They make these houses so large that sometimes they are thirty feet across; for I myself once measured the width between the wheel tracks of a cart, and it was twenty feet, and when the house was on the cart it stuck out at least five feet beyond the wheels on each side. I have counted to one cart twenty-two oxen drawing one house, eleven in a row across the width of the cart, and the other eleven in front of them. The axle of the cart was as big as the mast of a ship, and a man stood at the door of the house on the cart, driving the oxen.

In addition they make squares to the size of a large coffer out of slender split twigs; then over it, from one end to the other, they build up a rounded roof out of similar twigs and they make a little entrance at the front end; after that they cover this box or little house with black felt soaked in tallow or ewes' milk so that it is rain-proof, and this they decorate in the same way with multi-coloured handwork. Into these chests they put all their bedding and valuables; they bind them onto high carts which are drawn by camels so that they can cross rivers. These chests are never removed from the carts. When they take down their dwelling houses, they always put the door facing the south;

then afterwards they draw up the carts with the chests on each side, half a stone's throw from the house, so that it stands between two rows of carts, as it were between two walls.

The married women make for themselves really beautiful carts which I would not know how to describe for you except by a picture; in fact I would have done you paintings of everything if I only knew how to paint. A wealthy Mongol or Tartar may well have a hundred or two hundred such carts with chests. Baatu has twenty-six wives and each of these has a large house, not counting the other small ones which are placed behind the large one and which are, as it were, chambers in which their attendants live; belonging to each of these houses are a good two hundred carts. When they pitch their houses the chief wife places her dwelling at the extreme west end and after her the others according to their rank, so that the last wife will be at the far east end, and there will be the space of a stone's throw between the establishment of one wife and that of another. And so the orda of a rich Mongol will look like a large town and yet there will be very few men in it.

One woman will drive twenty or thirty carts, for the country is flat. They tie together the carts, which are drawn by oxen or camels, one after the other, and the woman will sit on the front one driving the ox while all the others follow in step. If they happen to come on a bad bit of track they loose them and lead them across it one by one. They go at a very slow pace, as a sheep or an ox might walk.

When they have pitched their houses with the door facing south, they arrange the master's couch at the northern end. The women's place is always on the east side, that is, on the left of the master of the house when he is sitting on his couch looking towards the south; the men's place is on the west side, that is, to his right.

On entering a house the men would by no means hang up their quiver in the women's section. Over the head of the master there is always an idol like a doll or little image of felt which they call the master's brother, and a similar one over the head of the mistress, and this they call the mistress's brother; they are fastened on to the wall. Higher up between these two is a thin little one which is, as it were, the guardian of the whole house. The mistress of the house places on her right side, at the foot of the couch, in a prominent position, a goat-skin stuffed with wool or other material, and next to it a tiny image turned towards her attendants and the women. By the entrance on the women's side is still another idol with a cow's udder for the women who milk the cows, for this is the women's job. On the other side of the door towards the men is another image with a mare's udder for the men who milk the mares.

When they have foregathered for a drink they first sprinkle with the drink the idol over the master's head, then all the other idols in turn; after this an attendant goes out of the house with a cup and some drinks; he sprinkles thrice towards the south, genuflecting each time; this is in honour of fire; next towards the east in honour of the air, and after that to the west in honour of water; they cast it to the north for the dead. When the master is holding his cup in his hand and is about to drink, before he does so he first pours some out on the earth as its share. If he drinks while seated on a horse, before he drinks he pours some over the neck or mane of the horse. And so when the attendant has sprinkled towards the four quarters of the earth he returns into the house; two servants with two cups and as many plates are ready to carry the drink to the master and the wife sitting beside him upon his couch. If he has several wives, she with whom he sleeps at night sits next to him during the day, and on that day all the others have to come to her dwelling to drink, and the court is held there, and the gifts which are

presented to the master are placed in the treasury of that wife. Standing in the entrance is a bench with a skin of milk or some other drink and some cups.

In the winter they make an excellent drink from rice, millet, wheat and honey, which is clear like wine. Wine, too, is conveyed to them from distant regions. In the summer they do not bother about anything except cosmos. Cosmos [koumiss] is always to be found inside the house before the entrance door, and near it stands a musician with his instrument. Our lutes and viols I did not see there but many other instruments such as are not known among us. When the master begins to drink, then one of the attendants cries out in a loud voice 'Ha!' and the musician strikes his instrument. And when it is a big feast they are holding, they all clap their hands and also dance to the sound of the instrument, the men before the master and the women before the mistress. After the master has drunk, then the attendant cries out as before and the instrument-player breaks off. Then they drink all round, the men and the women, and sometimes vie with each other in drinking in a really disgusting and gluttonous manner.

When they want to incite anyone to drink they seize him by the ears and pull them vigorously to make his gullet open, and they clap and dance in front of him. Likewise when they want to make a great feast and entertainment for anyone, one man takes a full cup and two others stand, one on his right and one on his left, and in this manner the three, singing and dancing, advance right up to him to whom they are to offer the cup, and they sing and dance before him; when he stretches out his hand to take the cup they suddenly leap back, and then they advance again as before; and in this way they make fun of him, drawing back the cup three or four times until he is in a really lively mood and wants it: then they give him the cup and sing and clap their hands and stamp with their feet while he drinks.

CHAPTER III

THE FOOD OF THE TARTARS

As for their food and victuals I must tell you they eat all dead animals indiscriminately and with so many flocks and herds you can be sure a great many animals do die. However, in the summer as long as they have any cosmos, that is mare's milk, they do not care about any other food. If during that time an ox or a horse happens to die, they dry the flesh by cutting it into thin strips and hanging it in the sun and the wind, and it dries immediately without salt and without any unpleasant smell. Out of the intestines of horses they make sausages which are better than pork sausages and they eat these fresh; the rest of the meat they keep for the winter. From the hide of oxen they make large jars which they dry in a wonderful way in the smoke. From the hind part of horses' hide they make very nice shoes.

They feed fifty or a hundred men with the flesh of a single sheep, for they cut it up in little bits in a dish with salt and water, making no other sauce; then with the point of a knife or a fork especially made for this purpose—like those with which we are accustomed to eat pears and apples cooked in wine—they offer to each of those standing round one or two mouthfuls, according to the number of guests. Before the flesh of the sheep is served, the master first takes what pleases him; and also if he gives anyone a special portion then the one receiving it has to eat it himself and may give it to

no one else. But if he cannot eat it all he may take it away with him or give it to his servant, if he is there, to keep for him; otherwise he may put it away in his *captargac*, that is, a square bag which they carry to put all such things in: in this they also keep bones when they have not the time to give them a good gnaw, so that later they may gnaw them and no food be wasted.

CHAPTER IV

HOW THEY MAKE COSMOS

Cosmos, that is mare's milk, is made in this way: they stretch along the ground a long rope attached to two stakes stuck into the earth, and at about nine o'clock they tie to this rope the foals of the mares they want to milk. Then the mothers stand near their foals and let themselves be peacefully milked; if any one of them is too restless, then a man takes the foal and, placing it under her, lets it suck a little, and he takes it away again and the milker takes its place.

And so, when they have collected a great quantity of milk, which is as sweet as cow's milk when it is fresh, they pour it into a large skin or bag and they begin churning it with a specially made stick which is as big as a man's head at its lower end, and hollowed out; and when they beat it quickly it begins to bubble like new wine and to turn sour and ferment, and they churn it until they can extract the butter. Then they taste it and when it is fairly pungent they drink it. As long as one is drinking, it bites the tongue like vinegar; when one stops, it leaves on the tongue the taste of milk of almonds and greatly delights the inner man; it even intoxicates those who have not a very good head. It also greatly provokes urine.

For use of the great lords they also make caracosmos, that is black cosmos, in this wise. Mare's milk does not curdle. Now it is a general rule that the milk of any animal, in the stomach of whose young rennet is not found, does not curdle; it is not found in the stomach of a young horse, hence the milk of a mare does not curdle. And so they churn the milk until everything that is solid in it sinks right to the bottom like the lees of wine, and what is pure remains on top and is like whey or white must. The dregs are very white and are given to the slaves and have a most soporific effect. The clear liquid the masters drink and it is certainly a very pleasant drink and really potent.

Baatu has thirty men within a day's journey of his camp, each one of whom provides him every day with such milk from a hundred mares—that is to say, the milk of three thousand mares every day, not counting the other white milk which other men bring. For, just as in Syria the peasants give a third part of their produce, so these men have to bring to the orda of their lords the mare's milk of every third day.

From cow's milk they first extract the butter and this they boil until it is completely boiled down; then they store it in sheep's paunches which they keep for this purpose; they do not put salt into the butter; however it does not go bad owing to the long boiling. They keep it against the winter. The rest of the milk which is left after the butter has been extracted they allow to turn until it is as sour as it can be, and they boil it, and in boiling, it curdles; they dry the curd in the sun and it becomes as hard as iron slag, and this they keep in bags against the winter. During the winter months when there is a scarcity of milk, they put this sour curd, which they call *grut*, into a skin and pour hot water on top of it and beat it vigorously until it melts in the water, which, as a result,

becomes completely sour, and this water they drink instead of milk. They take the greatest care never to drink plain water.

CHAPTER V

THE ANIMALS THEY EAT, THEIR CLOTHES AND THEIR HUNTING

The great lords have villages in the south from which millet and flour are brought to them for the winter; the poor provide for themselves by trading sheep and skins; and the slaves fill their bellies with dirty water and are content with this. They also catch mice, of which many kinds abound there; mice with long tails they do not eat but give to their birds; they eat dormice and all kinds of mice with short tails. There are also many marmots there which they call *sogur* and these congregate in one burrow in the winter, twenty or thirty of them together, and they sleep for six months; these they catch in great quantities.

Also to be found there are conies with a long tail like a cat and having at the tip of the tail black and white hairs. They have many other little animals as well which are good to eat, and they are very clever at knowing the difference. I saw no deer there, I saw few hares, many gazelles; wild asses I saw in great quantities and these are like mules. I also saw another kind of animal which is called *arcali*¹ and which has a body just like a ram's and horns twisted like a ram's but of such a size that I could scarce lift the two horns with one hand; and they make large cups out of these horns.

They have hawks, gerfalcons and peregrine falcons in great numbers and these they carry on their right hand, and they always put a little thong round the hawk's neck. This thong hangs down the middle of its breast and by it they pull down with the left hand the head and breast of the hawk when they cast it at its prey, so that it is not beaten back by the wind or carried upwards. They procure a large part of their food by the chase.

When they want to hunt wild animals they gather together in a great crowd and surround the district in which they know the animals to be; and gradually they close in until between them they shut in the animals in a circle and then they shoot at them with their arrows.

I will tell you about their garments and their clothing. From Cathay and other countries to the east, and also from Persia and other districts of the south, come cloths of silk and gold and cotton materials which they wear in the summer. From Russia, Moxel,¹ Great Bulgaria and Pascatu, which is Greater Hungary, and Kerkis,² which are all districts towards the north, and full of forests, and from many other regions in the north which are subject to them, valuable furs of many kinds are brought for them, such as I have never seen in our part of the world; and these they wear in winter. In the winter they always make at least two fur garments, one with the fur against the body, the other with the fur outside to the wind and snow, and these are usually of the skins of wolves or foxes or monkeys³ and when they are sitting in their dwelling they have another softer one. The poor make their outer ones of dog and goat.

They also make trousers out of skins. Moreover, the rich line their garments with silk stuffing which is extraordinarily soft and light and warm. The poor line their clothes with cotton material and with the softer wool which they are able to pick out from the coarser. With the coarse they make felt to cover their dwellings and coffers and also for making bedding. Also with wool mixed with a third part horse-hair they make their

ropes. From felt they make saddle pads, saddle cloths and rain cloaks, which means they use a great deal of wool. You have seen the men's costume.

CHAPTER VI

HOW THE MEN SHAVE AND THE WOMEN ADORN THEMSELVES

The men shave a square on the top of their heads and from the front corners of this they continue the shaving in strips along the sides of the head as far as the temples. They also shave their temples and neck to the top of the cervical cavity and their forehead in front to the top of the frontal bone, where they leave a tuft of hair which hangs down as far as the eyebrows. At the sides and the back of the head they leave the hair, which they make into plaits, and these they braid round the head to the ears.

The costume of the girls is no different from that of the men except that it is somewhat longer. But on the day after she is married a woman shaves from the middle of her head to her forehead, and she has a tunic as wide as a nun's cowl, and in every respect wider and longer, and open in front, and this they tie on the right side. Now in this matter the Tartars differ from the Turks, for the Turks tie their tunics on the left, but the Tartars always on the right.

They also have a head-dress which they call *bocca*, which is made out of the bark of a tree or of any other fairly light material which they can find; it is large and circular and as big as two hands can span around, a cubit and more high and square at the top like the capital of a column. This *bocca* they cover with costly silk material, and it is hollow inside, and on the capital in the middle or on the side they put a rod of quills or slender canes, likewise a cubit and more in length; and they decorate this rod at the top with peacock feathers and throughout its length all round with little feathers from the mallard's tail and also with precious stones. The wealthy ladies wear such an ornament on the top of their head and fasten it down firmly with a hood which has a hole in the top for this purpose, and in it they stuff their hair, gathering it up from the back on to the top of the head in a kind of knot and putting over it the *bocca* which they then tie firmly under the chin. So when several ladies ride together and are seen from a distance, they give the appearance of soldiers with helmets on their heads and raised lances; for the *bocca* looks like a helmet and the rod on top like a lance.

All the women sit on their horses like men, astride, and they tie their cowls with a piece of sky-blue silk round the waist, and with another strip they bind their breasts, and they fasten a piece of white stuff below their eyes which hangs down to the breast.

The women are wondrous fat and the less nose they have the more beautiful they are considered. They disfigure themselves hideously by painting their faces. They never lie down on a bed to give birth to their children.

CHAPTER VII

THE DUTIES OF THE WOMEN AND THEIR WORK

It is the duty of the women to drive the carts, to load the houses on to them and to unload them, to milk the cows, to make the butter and *grut*,¹ to dress the skins and to sew them, which they do with thread made out of tendons. They split the tendons into

very thin threads and then twist these into one long thread. They also sew shoes and socks and other garments. They never wash their clothes, for they say that that makes God angry and that it would thunder if they hung them out to dry; they even beat those who do wash them and take them away from them. They are extraordinarily afraid of thunder. At such a time they turn all strangers out of their dwellings and wrap themselves in black felt in which they hide until it has passed over. They never wash their dishes, but when the meat is cooked, they wash out the bowl in which they are going to put it with some boiling broth from the cauldron which they afterwards pour back. The women also make the felt and cover the houses.

The men make bows and arrows, manufacture stirrups and bits and make saddles; they build the houses and carts, they look after the horses and milk the mares, churn the cosmos, that is the mares' milk, and make the skins in which it is kept, and they also look after the camels and load them. Both sexes look after the sheep and goats, and sometimes the men, sometimes the women, milk them. They dress skins with the sour milk of ewes, thickened and salted.

When they want to wash their hands or their head, they fill their mouth with water and, pouring this little by little from their mouth into their hands, with it they wet their hair and wash their head.

As for their marriages, you must know that no one there has a wife unless he buys her, which means that sometimes girls are quite grown up before they marry, for their parents always keep them until they sell them. They observe the first and second degrees of consanguinity, but observe no degrees of affinity; they have two sisters at the same time or one after the other. No widow among them marries, the reason being that they believe that all those who serve them in this life will serve them in the next, and so of a widow they believe that she will always return after death to her first husband. This gives rise to a shameful custom among them whereby a son sometimes takes to wife all his father's wives, except his own mother; for the orda of a father and mother always falls to the youngest son and so he himself has to provide for all his father's wives who come to him with his father's effects; and then, if he so wishes, he uses them as wives, for he does not consider an injury has been done to him if they return to his father after death.

And so when anyone has made an agreement with another to take his daughter, the father of the girl arranges a feast and she takes flight to relations where she lies hid. Then the father declares: 'Now my daughter is yours; take her wherever you find her.' Then he searches for her with his friends until he finds her; then he has to take her by force and bring her, as though by violence, to his house.

CHAPTER VIII

OF THEIR JUSTICE AND JUDGMENTS, DEATH AND BURIAL

Concerning their penal laws I can tell you that when two men fight no one dares to interfere, even a father dare not help his son, but he who comes off the worse may appeal to the court of the lord and if the other touches him after the appeal, he is put to death. But he must go immediately without any delay and the one who has suffered the injury leads the other like a captive.

They inflict capital punishment on no one unless he has been caught in the act or confesses; but when a man is accused by a number of people, they torture him well, so

that he confesses. Murder they punish by the death sentence, and also cohabiting with a woman not one's own. By one's own I mean wife or servant, for it is lawful for a man to use his slave as he will. Robbery on a grand scale they likewise punish by death. For a petty theft, such as one sheep, so long as a man has not been caught doing it often, they beat him cruelly, and if they deal him a hundred strokes, then they have to have a hundred rods. I am speaking of those who are beaten as a result of the court's sentence. Similarly they put to death false ambassadors, that is to say men who pretend they are ambassadors but are not; also sorceresses, of whom however I will tell you more later, for they consider them to be witches.

When anyone dies they mourn, wailing in a loud voice, and then they are free from paying taxes until the year is up. And if anyone is present at the death of an adult, he does not enter the dwelling of Mangu Chan for a year; if it is a child who dies he does not enter it for a month.

Near the grave of a dead man they always leave a dwelling, if he is of the nobility, that is of the family of Chingis, who was their first father and lord. The burial place of him who dies is not known; and always around those places where they bury their nobles there is a camp of men who guard the tombs. It has not come to my knowledge that they bury treasure with the dead. The Comans make a great mound over the dead man and set up a statue to him, facing the east and holding a cup in its hand in front of its navel. They also make pyramids for the rich, that is, little pointed houses; and in some places I saw large towers of baked tiles, and in others stone houses, although stones are not to be found there. I saw a man recently dead for whom they had hung up, between tall poles, the skins of sixteen horses, four facing each quarter of the earth, and they had put cosmos there for him to drink and meat for him to eat, and in spite of this they said of him that he had been baptised. Further east I saw other tombs, namely large areas strewn with stones, some round, some square and then four tall stones upright round the plot facing the four quarters of the earth.

When anyone is ill he takes to his bed and places a sign above his dwelling that there is a sick person there and that no one may enter. And so nobody visits the invalid except the one who looks after him. When anyone from one of the great ordas is sick, they place guards at a distance round the orda and they do not allow anyone to cross these bounds, for they are afraid an evil spirit or wind may come in with those entering. They summon their soothsayers as if they were their priests.

CHAPTER XIX

BAATU'S ORDA AND HOW THEY WERE RECEIVED BY HIM

The whole of the district from the west side of this sea [the Caspian], where are Alexander's Iron Gate and the mountains of the Alans, as far as the northern ocean and the Meotide marshes, where the Tanais takes its rise,¹ used to be called Albania.² Speaking of this country Isidore says there are dogs so big and so ferocious that they chase bulls and kill lions. What is true, as I learned from men who told me, is that there, in the direction of the northern ocean, they make dogs draw carts as if they were oxen on account of their size and strength.

Now at that spot on the Etilia to which we had made our way, there is a new village which the Tartars have established, partly of Ruthenians, partly of Saracens, and these

convey across the river the envoys going to and returning from Baatu's orda, for Baatu is on the further bank, towards the east, nor does he pass beyond that point when he goes north in the summer. He was already beginning to go south, for from January to August he and all the others go towards the cold regions, and in August they start coming back.

And so we sailed down in a boat from that village as far as his orda. From that place to the towns of Great Bulgaria in the north it is five days' journey. I wonder what devil carried the law of Mohammed there, for from the Iron Gate which leads out of Persia it is more than thirty days' journey across a wilderness following the course of the Etilia until one reaches Bulgaria, and on the way there is no city, nothing but some villages near where the Etilia flows into the sea. Yet the Bulgarians are the very worst kind of Saracens, clinging more firmly to the law of Mohammed than any others.

When I saw Baatu's orda I was overcome with fear, for his own houses seemed like a great city stretching out a long way and crowded round on every side by people to a distance of three or four leagues. Just as the people of Israel knew, each one of them, where they should pitch their tents in relation to the tabernacle, so these know on what side of the orda they are to place themselves when they unload their dwellings. In their tongue the court is called 'orda', which means the middle, because it is always in the middle of his people, with the exception that no one places himself due south, for the doors of the court open in that direction. But to the right and the left they stretch out as far as they wish according to the number of sites required, so long as they do not set themselves down right in front of or opposite the court.

And so first we were taken to a Saracen who did not provide us with any food. The following day we were taken to the court. Baatu had had a large pavilion set up, as his house could not hold as many men and women as had assembled. The man who was conducting us told us that we were to say nothing until bidden by Baatu, and then we were to speak briefly. He also asked whether you had ever sent envoys to them. I told him how you had sent to Keu Chan, and I said you would have sent neither envoys to him nor a letter to Sartach, if you had not believed that they were Christians, for it was not from any fear but in order to congratulate them because you had heard that they were Christians that you sent. Then he led us in front of the pavilion and warned us not to touch the ropes of the tent, which they consider take the place of the threshold of a house. We stood there in our habits, bare-footed and heads uncovered, and we were a great gazing-stock for their eyes. Friar John of Policarp³ had been there but he had changed out of his habit in order not to be despised, for he was an envoy of our Lord the Pope.

Then we were led in as far as the middle of the tent, and they did not require us to make any act of deference by genuflecting as envoys usually do. So we stood there before him for the space of a 'Miserere mei Deus', and they all kept the deepest silence. Now he was sitting on a throne, which was long and wide like a couch, completely covered with gold, and three steps led up to it and one of his wives was next to him. On his right the men were sitting spread about, the ladies on his left, and the space which was not taken up by the women on their side—for Baatu's wives alone were there—was filled by men. At the entrance of the pavillion was a bench and on it cosmos and large goblets of gold and silver, decorated with precious stones. He eyed us attentively and we did him, and he seemed to me similar in size to Sir John of Beaumont⁴ (may his soul rest in peace). His face at that time was very red.

At last he gave the command for me to speak. Whereupon the man who had brought us told us to kneel down and speak. I knelt on one knee as to a man. Then he signed me to kneel on both, which I did, not wishing to dispute about it. Then he bade me speak, and I, considering that I was praying to God since I was kneeling on both knees, took my opening words from a prayer saying, 'My Lord, we pray God from Whom all good things do proceed and Who has given to you your earthly possessions, that after these He will give to you the gifts of heaven, for the former without these are vain.' He listened attentively and I added; 'Know for certain that you will not obtain the gifts of heaven unless you are a Christian. For God says: "He that believeth and is baptised shall be saved, but he that believeth not shall be condemned."' At this he smiled gently and the other Mongols began to clap their hands in derision; my interpreter was struck dumb and I had to encourage him not to be afraid. Then when there was silence again I said, 'I came to your son because we heard that he was a Christian, and I brought him a letter on behalf of my lord the King of the French. He sent me here to you. For what reason you ought to know.'

Then he made me get up and he asked your name and mine, and that of my companion and the interpreter, and he had everything written down. He also asked against whom you were waging war, for he had learned that you had gone forth from your own land with an army. I replied, 'Against the Saracens who are violating the house of God at Jerusalem.' He also enquired whether you had ever sent envoys to him. 'To you,' I said, 'never.' Then he made us sit down and had some milk given to us to drink; they consider it a great honour for anyone to drink cosmos with him in his own house. And while I was sitting looking at the ground he ordered me to lift my head up, for he wished to have a further look at us, or perhaps it was because of witchcraft, for they hold it as a bad omen or sign or evil portent when anyone sits in their presence with head bent down as if he were sad, especially if he props his cheek or his chin on his hand.

Then we went out, and after a little the man who was conducting us came and, taking us to the lodging, he said to me, 'The Lord King asks that you be retained in this country, and Baatu cannot do this without the knowledge of Mangu, so you and your interpreter are to go to Mangu. Your companion, however, and the other man will return to Sartach's orda and wait there until you return.' Then Abdullah, the interpreter, began to wail, thinking he was lost, and my companion called to witness that they could sooner cut off his head than he would be separated from me; and I for my part said that I could not go without my companion and also that we had great need of two servants, for if one of them should happen to fall ill he could not be left alone. Then he went back to the court and repeated these words to Baatu, who gave the order: 'Let the two priests and the interpreter go, and the cleric return to Sartach.' The guide returned and told us the decision, and when I wanted to plead on behalf of the cleric that he should come with us, he said: 'Don't say any more, for Baatu has decided and I dare not return to the court.'

Out of your alms the cleric Gosset had twenty-six *yperperas*, and no more; of these he kept ten for himself and the boy, and he gave sixteen to Abdullah for us, and so we separated with tears from each other, he returning to Sartach and we staying where we were.

CHAPTER XX

THE JOURNEY TO THE COURT OF MANGU CHAN

On the Vigil of the Assumption [14 August 1253] Gosset reached Sartach's orda and on the following day Nestorian priests wore our vestments in Sartach's presence.

Then we were taken to another host, who was to provide us with lodging, food and horses. But as we had nothing to give him he performed everything badly. We travelled south with Baatu, following the course of the Etilia, for five weeks, and at times my companion was so hungry that he would say to me almost in tears: 'It seems to me as if I have never had anything to eat.' A market always follows Baatu's orda, but it was so far away from us that we could not go to it. We also had to travel on foot owing to the lack of horses.

At last some Hungarians who had been clerics came across us. One of them still knew how to sing many things by heart and the other Hungarians considered him as a kind of priest and he used to be called upon for the funerals of their dead; another had been taught grammar quite adequately, for he understood whatever we put down for him in writing, but he could not reply. These men were a great comfort to us, bringing us cosmos to drink and sometimes meat to eat. I was much distressed when they asked us for some books and I had none that I could give them, having nothing but a Bible and breviary. Then I said to them: 'Bring us some paper and I will copy for you as long as we are here.' They did this and I wrote out for each of them the Hours of the Blessed Virgin and the office of the dead.

One day a Coman joined us, greeting us in Latin, saying, 'Salvete Domini.' Surprised, I returned his salutation and asked who had taught him that greeting, and he said he had been baptised in Hungary by our Friars who had taught it to him. He also said that Baatu had asked him a great deal about us and he had described to him the nature of our Order.

I frequently saw Baatu riding with his crowd, and all the heads of families ride with him. According to my estimation they did not number five hundred men.

At last, about the time of the feast of the Exaltation of the Holy Cross [14 September], there came up to us a certain rich Mongol, whose father was a captain of a thousand, which is a very high rank with them, and said, 'It is my duty to take you to Mangu Chan and it is a four months' journey and the cold there is so intense that the rocks and trees split from it; see whether you can stand it.' I answered him: 'I trust in the power of God that we shall stand what other men can stand.' Then he said, 'If you cannot stand it I shall leave you on the road.' To this I replied, 'That would not be right, for we are going not of our accord but only because we have been sent by your master, and so, since we are committed to your charge, you ought not to abandon us.' At that he said, 'It will be all right.' He then made us show him all our clothes and what seemed to him unnecessary he made us leave in the custody of our host. The following day they brought for each of us rough goat-skin garments, trousers of the same and boots or footwear made in their style, with felt socks and fur hoods also, such as they wear.

One the day after the Exaltation of the Holy Cross we started to ride, we three having two pack horses, and we rode continuously in an easterly direction until the feast of All Saints. The whole of that territory and even more was inhabited by the Cangle who are akin to the Comans. To the north we had Great Bulgaria and to the south the aforementioned Caspian Sea.

CHAPTER XXI

THE RIVER IAGAT AND VARIOUS REGIONS AND RACES

After we had travelled twelve days from the Etilia we came upon a large river which is called the Iagat [Ural]; flowing from the north from the country of the Pascatur it empties itself into the aforementioned sea. The language of the Pascatur is the same as that of the Hungarians, and they are shepherds without any cities and their territory adjoins Great Bulgaria on the west. From that country eastwards on the north side there is not another city, so Great Bulgaria is the last region where there are towns.

From the district of the Pascatur came the Huns, later known as Hungarians, and this is the origin of Great Hungary. Isidore says that with ferocious horses they crossed the barriers erected by Alexander among the crags of the Caucasus to keep back the savage tribes, so that as far as Egypt tribute used to be paid to them. They also laid waste all the countries as far as France and so were more powerful than the Tartars are at this present time. The Blacs, Bulgars and Vandals came with them.

For it is from Great Bulgaria that those Bulgars came who are now the other side of the Danube near Constantinople. Next to the Pascatur are the Illac,¹ which is the same as Blac, for the Tartars cannot pronounce the letter B, and from them came the people who are in the Assan territory, for they call both of them Illac, the former and the latter.

The language of the Ruthenians, Poles, Bohemians and Slavs is the same as the Vandals' tongue; a multitude of all of these was with the Huns and nowadays, for the greater part, is with the Tartars, whom God has raised up from far distant regions to be a people which is no people and a foolish nation, according to the words of the Lord: 'I will provoke them'—that is those who do not keep His law—'with that which is no people and will vex them with a foolish nation.'² This is being fulfilled to the letter in the case of all the nations which do not keep the law of Christ.

What I have said about the land of the Pascatur I know from the Friars Preachers who went there before the arrival of the Tartars.³ From of old they had been conquered by their Saracen neighbours the Bulgars and many of them had become Saracens. Other facts can be learned from chronicles, for it is agreed that these provinces beyond Constantinople, which are now called Bulgaria, Blakia⁴ and Slavonia were provinces of Greece; Hungary was Pannonia.

And so we rode through the land of the Cangle⁵ from the feast of Holy Cross until the feast of All Saints [1 November], covering almost each day, as far as I can judge, the distance it is from Paris to Orleans,⁶ and some days more, according to our supply of horses; for sometimes we changed horses twice or three times in a day. Sometimes we went for two or three days without coming across a soul, and then we were obliged to go more slowly. Of the twenty or thirty horses we always had the worst since we were foreigners, for they took the better horses before us; me they always provided with a strong horse, as I was very heavy. But as to whether it went at a steady pace or not, this was a matter about which I dared not enquire, nor did I even dare to complain if it proved a bad mount, but each one had to put up with his luck. This was the cause of one of our most difficult trials, for many a time the horses grew tired before we came across inhabitants; then we had to strike and lash them, even to put our clothes on to other pack animals, to change our horses for pack horses, and sometimes the two of us had to ride on one.

CHAPTER XXII

OF THE HUNGER AND THIRST AND OTHER MISERIES THEY ENDURED ON THEIR JOURNEY

Of hunger and thirst, cold and fatigue, there was no end, for they gave us no food except in the evening. In the morning they gave us something to drink or some millet to take. In the evening, however, they used to give us meat, shoulder of mutton and ribs and as much broth as we could drink. When we had our fill of meat broth we were completely refreshed and it seemed to me a most wholesome drink and extremely nourishing. On Fridays I did not break my fast until the night time, drinking nothing; then to my sorrow and grief I had to eat meat. Sometimes we had to eat meat half-cooked or almost raw, on account of the lack of fuel. This was when we were sleeping in the open and alighted at nightfall, for we could not at that time very well collect the dung of the oxen and horses. Other fuel we seldom came across, except perhaps occasionally a few briars; also at some places on the banks of some of the rivers there are woods, but this is rare.

In the beginning our guide had the greatest disdain for us, and he felt disgusted at having to conduct such insignificant men. Later, however, when he began to know us better, he took us to the ordas of wealthy Mongols and we had to pray for them. If I had had a good interpreter this would have given me an opportunity of sowing much good seed. Chingis, the first Chan, had four sons who had many descendants, all of whom now have large ordas, and these increase in number daily and are spread throughout this vast wilderness, which is like a sea. And so our guide took us to many of them. They were exceedingly surprised that we had no desire to receive gold or silver or costly garments. They also made enquiries about the great Pope, whether he was as old a man as they had heard, for they had heard that he was five hundred years old. They asked about our country, whether there were many sheep, oxen and horses there. As for the ocean they could not grasp that it had neither limit nor shore.

On the vigil of All Saints we left the route leading east, for the inhabitants had already gone a good way to the south, and we directed our course due south across some upland pastures for eight days on end. In that wilderness I saw many asses, which are called *cula* and are more like mules; these our guide and his companions chased a great deal but with no success on account of their swiftness. On the seventh day some very high mountains began to loom into sight¹ towards the south and we entered a plain which was irrigated like a garden, and we came across cultivated land.

On the octave of All Saints we entered a town of the Saracens called Kinchat,² and the chief man came with ale and cups to meet the leader of our party outside the town. For it is their custom that the envoys of Baatu and Mangu Chan are met with food and drink from all the towns subject to them. At that time they were walking upon ice there, and we had had frost for the first time in the wilderness on the feast of St Michael [29 September]. I enquired the name of the province,³ since we were now in different territory, but they could not tell me anything except the name of that city, which was an extremely small one. A large river⁴ flowed down from the mountains, which irrigated the whole region wherever they liked to conduct the water, nor did it empty itself into any sea, but was absorbed by the earth and also formed a number of marshes. There I saw vines and twice drank some wine.

CHAPTER XXIII

HOW BURI WAS PUT TO DEATH

On the morrow we reached another village nearer the mountains, and I enquired about the latter and learned that they were the mountains of the Caucasus¹ which touch the sea on both sides from the west to the east, and I learned too that we had already passed beyond the aforementioned sea into which the Etilia flows.

I also made enquiries about the city of Talas,² in which the German slaves of Buri used to be, of whom Friar Andrew had made mention. I had indeed asked about them many a time at the courts of Sartach and Baatu and had succeeded in learning nothing except that Buri, their master, had been killed for the following reason: his pasture lands were not good, and one day when he was drunk he spoke these words to his men, 'Am I not of the stock of Chingis Chan, the same as Baatu?' Now he was a nephew or brother of Baatu. 'Why may I not go to the banks of the Etilia like Baatu to feed my flocks there?' These words were reported to Baatu, who thereupon wrote to Buri's men to bring their master to him, bound, which they did. Then Baatu asked him if he had said such a thing and he confessed that he had. However, he excused himself on the grounds that he was drunk, for it is their custom to pardon such; but Baatu gave answer, 'How dared you mention my name in your drunken state?' and he ordered his head to be cut off.

As for the Germans I could find out nothing about them until I came to the court of Mangu Chan, but in this village I did learn that Talas was behind us six days' journey in the direction of the mountains. When I came to Mangu Chan's orda, I discovered that Mangu had transferred them, with Baatu's permission, to the east, a month's journey from Talas, to a village called Bolac where they are digging for gold and manufacturing arms. This meant that I was not able to visit them either going or returning. And yet on my outward journey I passed near enough, perhaps three days' distance from that town. But I did not know and even if I had known I would not have been able to turn aside from my route.

From the aforementioned village we travelled eastwards following the mountains, and from that point we found ourselves among Mangu Chan's men, who everywhere came before our guide singing and clapping their hands, since he was an envoy of Baatu. For they show this honour to each other: Mangu's men receive Baatu's envoys in the manner described, and similarly Baatu's men the envoys of Mangu. However, Baatu's men are rather proud and do not carry it out with such diligence.

A few days after this we entered upon some upland pastures which used to be inhabited by the Caracathayans, and there we came to a large river³ which we had to cross by boat. After this we entered a valley where I saw a kind of ruined fort, the walls of which were made of nothing but mud, and the land there was cultivated. Next we came across a goodly town called Equius, where there were Saracens who spoke Persian, though they were a very great distance away from Persia.

The following day, having crossed these pastures, which were in the foothills of the high mountains to the south, we entered upon a most lovely plain having lofty mountains to the right, and to the left a kind of sea or lake⁴ fifteen days' journey in circumference. And the whole of this plain is well watered by the streams coming down from the mountains, which all flow into this sea. In the summer we returned by way of the north side of the sea, where there are likewise high mountains. In the plain I have

mentioned there used to be large towns but they had, for the most part, all been destroyed, so that the Tartars could feed their flocks there, for it is very fine pasturage.

We came across one large town there called Cailac,⁵ in which there was a market, and many merchants flocked thither. We rested in this town for twelve days while awaiting one of Baatu's scribes who was to assist the leader of our party in the business to be settled at Mangu's court. That country used to be called Organum and used to have its own language and script but now it has all been seized by the Turcomans. Also the Nestorians of those parts used to perform their services and write books in that script and language; and it may be that they get their name Organa from the fact that they used to be very fine musicians or organists⁶; so I was told. It was there that I first saw pagan temples, in which connection I must tell you there are many sects in the east.

CHAPTER XXIV

HOW THE NESTORIANS AND SARACENS INTERMINGLE, AND OF THEIR TEMPLES

First of all there are the Ugurs¹ whose country adjoins the Organum territory we have mentioned and is among the mountains towards the east, and in all their cities there are both Nestorians and Saracens, and the former have also spread in the direction of Persia in the Saracen towns. In the aforesaid town of Cailac they had three temples, two of which I went into in order to behold their foolishnesses. In the first I found a man who had a little cross of black pigment on his hand, which led me to believe that he was a Christian, in addition to the fact that to all the questions I put him he replied like a Christian. And so I asked him, 'Why do you not have a Cross and the figure of Jesus Christ here?' He replied, 'It is not our custom.' From this I thought that they must be Christians but did not have them owing to a doctrinal error.

There behind a kind of chest which they had in place of an altar and on which they put lights and their offerings, I saw a statue with wings like St Michael and others which looked like statues of bishops holding their fingers as if in blessing. I could not find the other temple that evening for the Saracens avoid the pagans to such an extent that they are not even willing to speak about them, and so when I enquired of them about the rites of these people they were scandalized.

The next day was the first of the month and the pasch of the Saracens, and I changed my lodging so that I put up near the other temple. For they receive envoys, each one according to the room he has or the number allotted to him. Then on entering the aforesaid temple I found pagan priests, for on the first of the month they open their temples, the priests dress themselves up, offer incense, light lamps and offer up the oblations of bread and fruit made by the people.

First I will describe for you the rites common to all idolaters and afterwards those of the Ugurs who are, as it were, a sect separate from the others.

They all adore towards the north, clapping their hands together and prostrating by kneeling on the ground and placing their foreheads on their hands. Consequently the Nestorians in these parts on no account join their hands when praying but pray with their hands extended before their breast. The pagans build their temples from east to west, and on the north side they make an alcove, projecting as a choir, or sometimes if the building is square it is in the middle of the building. On the north side they shut off an alcove in place of a choir. And there they put a chest, long and wide like a table, and

behind that chest they place their chief idol facing south: the one I myself saw at Caracorum was as big as St Christopher is depicted. A certain Nestorian priest who had come from Cathay told me that in that country there is an idol so large that it can be seen two days' journey off. The other idols they set all round; they are all most beautifully gilded. On the top of the chest, which is at the same time a kind of table, they place lights and their offerings. All the doors of the temple open towards the south contrary to the custom of the Saracens. They also have large bells like us; this I think accounts for the fact that the Christians of the east do not like to have them, though the Ruthenians and the Greeks in Gazaria do use them.

CHAPTER XXV

OF THEIR TEMPLES AND IDOLS AND HOW THEY COMPORT THEMSELVES IN THE WORSHIP OF THEIR GODS

All their priests shave their heads all over and their beards, and they wear saffron garments and observe chastity from the time they shave their heads; they live together, one or two hundred in one community. The days on which they go into their temple, they bring two benches and they sit on the floor facing each other, choir to choir, holding their books in their hands and these from time to time they put down on the benches. As long as they are in the temple they keep their heads uncovered, and they read to themselves and keep silence. When I went into one of their temples in Caracorum and found them sitting like this, I tried in many ways to provoke them to speech and was in no way able to do so.

They also have in their hands wherever they go a string of one or two hundred beads, just as we carry our rosaries, and they always say these words, 'On man baccam',¹ that is 'O God, Thou knowest' so one of them translated it for me and they expect to be rewarded by God as many times as they make mention of Him by saying this.

Around their temple they always make a fair courtyard which is well shut in by a wall and to the south they make a large gate where they sit and talk together. Above this gate they erect a long pole which, if possible, rises above the whole town, and by means of this pole one can tell that a building is a pagan temple. These things are to be found among all idolaters.

When, therefore, I went into the aforementioned temple I found priests sitting in the outer doorway. When I caught sight of them they looked to me like Frenchmen, with their shaven beards and wearing Tartar mitres on their heads. The Uigur priests wear the following dress: wherever they go they are always in saffron coats, quite close-fitting and with a belt on top, just like Frenchmen, and they have a cloak on their left shoulder hanging down in folds over the breast and back to their right side as the deacon wears a chasuble in Lent.

The Tartars have adopted their script. They begin to write at the top and continue the line downwards, and they read it in the same way and they increase their lines from left to right. They make great use of paper and characters for their sorcery, consequently their temples are full of short sentences hanging up. Mangu Chan is sending you a letter in the Mongol language and their script.

They burn their dead after the fashion of bygone days and enclose the ashes in the top of a pyramid.

And so when I had sat down by the side of the said priests—this was after I had been inside their temple and had seen their many idols, small and large—I asked what was their belief concerning God. They replied, ‘We believe that there is but one God.’ And I asked, ‘Do you believe that He is a spirit or something corporeal?’ They said, ‘We believe that He is a spirit.’ ‘Do you believe,’ said I, ‘that He has ever assumed human nature?’ ‘No,’ they answered. Then I asked, ‘Seeing that you believe Him to be but one and a spirit, why do you make statues to Him having a body, and why do you make so many? Moreover seeing that you do not believe that He has become man, why do you make statues to Him in the form of a man rather than of another animal?’ To that they replied, ‘We do not fashion these statues to God, but when any rich man among us dies, his son or his wife or someone dear to him has a statue of the deceased made and places it here and we venerate it in memory of him.’ To these words I answered, ‘Then you do these things for no other reason than to flatter men.’ ‘Not so,’ they said. ‘We do it in their memory.’

Then they asked me, as if jeering at me, ‘Where is God?’ In return I asked, ‘Where is your soul?’ They said, ‘In our body.’ Whereupon I said, ‘Is it not everywhere in your body? Does it not rule the whole and yet it is not seen? Similarly God is everywhere and governs all things; nevertheless He is invisible, for He is intellect and wisdom.’ Then when I wanted to argue more points with them, my interpreter, tired and unable to express the words, forced me to silence.

The Mongols or Tartars belong to their sect as far as their believing in only one God is concerned; they do, nevertheless, make out of felt images of their dead and they clothe these in most precious materials and place them in one or two carts; these carts nobody dares touch and they are in charge of their diviners who are their priests; I will tell you later about them.

These diviners always go before the orda of Mangu and other rich men; the poor, however, do not have them, only those of Chingis’ stock. When it is time for them to move they go before them as the pillar of cloud went before the children of Israel and they inspect the place where the camp is to be measured out and first unload their dwellings and after them the orda. Then when it is a feast day or the first of the month they bring out the aforementioned images and place them in order in a circle in their dwelling. Then the Mongols come, enter the dwelling and bow to the images and venerate them. And no stranger may enter there, for I on one occasion wanted to go in and was roundly rated.

CHAPTER XXVI

OF VARIOUS TRIBES AND OF MEN WHO USED TO EAT THEIR PARENTS

These Uigurs who live side by side with Christians and Saracens have, as a result, I imagine, of frequent discussions, reached the point that they believe in only one God. They were the first dwellers in towns to be subject to Chingis Chan, whence it came about that he gave his daughter in marriage to their king. Caracorum itself is, as it were, in their territory and around their lands is the entire country belonging to King or Prester John and Unc his brother. But the latter have their pasture lands towards the north, while the Uigurs have theirs among the mountains towards the south. This accounts for the fact that the Mongols adopted their script, and they are their chief scribes and almost all the Nestorians can read their script.

Beyond these to the east among the mountains are the Tangut,¹ very brave men. They took Chingis prisoner in battle, and when peace was made they set him free; afterwards he conquered them. They have very strong oxen with tails all hair, like horses, and hairy bellies and backs; they are shorter in the leg than other oxen but very much stronger. They draw the large dwellings of the Mongols and they have graceful long curved horns which are so very sharp that their tips always have to be cut off. The cow will not allow herself to be milked unless she is sung to. They are of the same nature as bulls for if they see a man wearing red they rush upon him and would kill him.

Next come the Tebec,² men whose custom it was to eat their deceased parents so as to provide them, out of filial piety, with no other sepulchre than their own stomachs. They have stopped doing this now, however, for it made them detestable in the eyes of all men. Nevertheless they still make fine goblets out of their parents' skulls so that when drinking from these they may be mindful of them in the midst of their enjoyment. I was told this by one who had seen them. They have a good deal of gold in their country, so if anyone needs any he digs until he finds it, and he takes as much as he needs, putting the rest back into the ground, for he believes that if he were to place it among his treasures or in a box, God would take away from him all that which is in the earth.

I saw men of this tribe who were much deformed. The Tangut men I saw were tall and swarthy. The Ugurs are of medium height like us. Among the Ugurs is to be found the fount and root of the Turkish and Coman languages.

Beyond the Tebec are Longa and Solanga.³ I saw their ambassadors at the court; they had brought more than ten large carts, each of which was drawn by six oxen. They are little men and dark like Spaniards; they wear tunics like a deacon's tunic with sleeves a little narrower, and on their head they have mitres like bishops. The front half of these is somewhat lower than the back and they do not go to a point but are square on top; they are made out of cloth stiffened with black glue and are so highly polished that when caught by the rays of the sun they shine like a mirror or a well-burnished helmet; and at their temples there are long strips of the same material stitched on to the mitre which fly out in the wind like two horns springing from the temples; and when the wind tosses them about too much they twist them together on top of the mitre across the middle from one side to the other, and they stay like a hoop across the head, forming a most attractive head-dress.

When their chief envoy came to the court he always had an ivory tablet, a cubit long and a hand-breadth wide, and very smooth. Whenever he spoke to the Chan himself or to any other important person, he kept his eyes all the time on that tablet as if he were reading there what he was saying and he looked neither to the right nor to the left nor at the face of him to whom he was speaking. Even when coming into the presence of the Chan and when retiring he looked nowhere save at his tablet.

Beyond these tribes are men, as I learned for a fact, who are called Muc and who have towns but possess no animals of their own. There are, nevertheless, many flocks and herds in their country which no one tends, but when anyone wants anything he climbs a hill and shouts, and all the animals hearing the noise gather round him and let themselves be handled like domestic animals. If an envoy or any stranger comes to that district, they shut him up in a house, providing him with all necessities, until his business is concluded, for if a stranger were to go about that district the animals on smelling him would take flight and become wild.

Next is Grand Cathay, the inhabitants of which in ancient times, so I believe, used to be called Seres. From them came the best silken materials, which are named Seric after

the people, and the latter get their name from one of their towns. I learned on good authority that in that country there is a town with walls of silver and ramparts of gold. In that land there are many provinces a number of which are still not subject to the Mongols. Between them and India lies the sea.

The inhabitants of Cathay are little men, and when they speak they breathe heavily through their noses; it is a general characteristic of all Orientals that they have a small opening for the eyes. They are very fine craftsmen in every art, and their physicians know a great deal about the power of herbs and diagnose very cleverly from the pulse; on the other hand they do not use urinals nor know anything about urine; I saw this myself, for there were many of them in Caracorum. It has always been their custom that whatever craft the father follows all the sons have to follow the same craft and that is why they pay such a large tribute, for every day they give the Mongols fifteen hundred *iascot*; a *iascot* is a piece of silver weighing ten marks, so that is fifteen thousand marks every day, not counting the silk materials and food-stuffs which they receive from them, and the other services they render them.

All these peoples dwell between the mountains of the Caucasus on the north side and the eastern ocean and the south of that part of Scythia inhabited by the Mongol nomads. They are all subject to the Tartars and are all given to idolatry; they invent numbers of gods, men who have turned into gods, and the genealogy of the gods, as do our poets.

There are Nestorians and Saracens living among them like foreigners as far as Cathay. There are Nestorians in fifteen cities of Cathay and they have a bishopric there in the city called Segin,⁴ but beyond that they are pure pagans. The pagan priests of these said people all wear wide saffron cowls. There are also among them certain hermits, so I learned, in the woods and mountains, and they are of wondrous life and austerity.

The Nestorians there know nothing. They say their offices and have their sacred books in Syriac, a language of which they are ignorant, and so they sing like our monks who know no grammar, and this accounts for the fact that they are completely corrupt. In the first place they are usurers and drunkards, and some of them who are with the Tartars even have several wives like them. When they enter a church they wash their lower members like the Saracens; they eat meat on Fridays and have feasting on that day after the Saracen custom.

The bishop puts off coming into these regions; he comes perhaps scarcely once in fifty years. When he does come, they have all the little male children, even those still in their cradles, ordained priests, consequently almost all their men are priests, and after this they marry, which is clearly contrary to the decrees of the Fathers, and they are bigamists, for when their first wife dies these priests take another. They are also all of them simoniacal, administering no sacrament without payment.

They look after their wives and children well, consequently they pay more attention to gaining money than spreading the faith, whence it comes about that when any of them bring up sons of Mongol noblemen, although they teach them the Gospel and the faith, yet by their evil life and greed they rather alienate them from the Christian religion, for the lives of the Mongols themselves and even of the *tuins*, that is the pagans, are more innocent than theirs.

CHAPTER XXIX

THINGS DONE, SEEN AND HEARD BY FRIAR WILLIAM AT MANGU'S COURT

Our guide returned to Baatu, first asking us for a carpet or mat which we had left at Baatu's orda at his bidding; we granted his request. He took leave of us in a peaceable manner, begging us to shake hands with him and acknowledging his fault if he had allowed us to suffer hunger and thirst on the road; we forgave him and in our turn begged his pardon and that of all his company if we had shown them any bad example.

We met with a woman from Metz in Lorraine who had been captured in Hungary and was called Paquette, and she made as big a feast for us as she could. She belonged to the court of the lady who had been a Christian whom I have mentioned before, and she told us of the unheard-of privations she had endured before she came to the court. But now things were going fairly well for her, for she had a young Russian husband by whom she had three lovely little boys, and he was skilled in making houses which is a profitable craft among them.

Moreover she told us that there was at Caracorum a certain master goldsmith called William, a Parisian by birth, whose surname is Buchier and his father's name Laurent Buchier, and he thinks he still has a brother on the Grand Pont called Roger Buchier. She also told me that he had a young man whom he had brought up, who was as a son to him and who was an excellent interpreter. But Mangu Chan had handed over to the said master three hundred *iascot*¹, that is three thousand marks, and fifty workmen to carry out special work and so she was afraid he would not be able to send his son to me. Now she had heard said to her at the court: 'The men who have come from your country are good fellows and Mangu Chan would gladly speak with them but their interpreter is no use.' And so she was anxious to find an interpreter.

Thereupon I wrote to the said master informing him of my arrival and asking him, if he could, to send his son to me; he wrote in reply that it would not be possible that month, but the following month his work would be finished and he would send him to me.

And so we stayed with the other envoys. They treat envoys differently in the ordas of Baatu and Mangu, for in the former there is a yam on the west side where all coming from the west are received, and similarly for the other quarters of the world; but in Mangu's orda all are together in one yam and they can visit and see one another. In Baatu's orda they remain in ignorance of each other and one does not know whether or not another is an envoy, for they are not aware of each other's lodgings, nor do they meet except at the court. And when one is invited another may not be, for they never go to the court unless they are summoned.

We came across a Christian from Damascus who said he had come on behalf of the Sultan of Mont Real and Crac² who wished to become a tributary and friend of the Tartars.

Also in the previous year, before my arrival, there had been a cleric from Acre there who called himself Raymond but in truth his name was Theodolus. He had started on his journey from Cyprus with Friar Andrew and accompanied him as far as Persia, and in Persia he purchased for himself some musical instruments from Armenia and he remained behind after Friar Andrew left. On the latter's return Theodolus set out with his instruments and reached Mangu Chan.

When questioned as to his reason for coming he said that he had been with a certain holy bishop, to whom God had sent a letter from heaven written in characters of gold and he had enjoined him to send it to the chief of the Tartars, for he was to be the Lord of all the earth, and also to persuade men to make peace with him. Then Mangu said to him: 'If you had brought with you the letter which came from heaven and your master's letter, then you would have been welcome.' Thereupon he replied that he was bringing the letters but they were with his other belongings on an untamed pack-animal which had escaped and fled through woods and over mountains so that he had lost everything. And it is certainly true that such mishaps frequently occur, and a man has to be most careful to keep hold of his horse when he is obliged to alight.

Mangu then asked the name of the bishop. Theodolus said he was called Odo; and he told the man from Damascus and Master William that he had been a clerk of the Lord Legate. The Chan next asked to whose kingdom he belonged and he replied that he was a subject of the French King called King Moles, for he had already heard about what had happened at Mansurah,³ and wanted to say that he was one of your men. Moreover he told the Chan that the Saracens were between the French and him and blocked the way; if only the way were clear they would send envoys and gladly make peace with him. Then Mangu Chan asked if he would take envoys to the King and the bishop. He replied that he would and also to the Pope.

Then Mangu had a very strong bow made, which two men could hardly draw, and two arrows with heads of silver, full of holes, which whistle like pipes when they are loosed. And he gave the following instructions to the Mongol he was sending with Theodolus: 'You will go to that French King to whom this man will take you, and you will present him with these things on my behalf. If he wishes to be at peace with us, we will seize the territory from the Saracens as far as his kingdom and we concede to him the rest of the world westwards; but if he does not wish peace then bring back the bow and arrows to us, telling him that with such bows we shoot far and strike hard.'

The Chan then dismissed Theodolus. The latter had as interpreter Master William's son and it was in his hearing that the Chan said to the Mongol: 'You will go with this man; investigate the roads well and the country, the cities, fortified places, the men and their arms.' The young man, thereupon, reproved Theodolus, telling him that he was making a mistake in taking envoys of the Tartars with him, for they were going for no other reason but to spy. He replied that he would put them on the sea so that they would not know where they had come from, or to what place they were returning. Mangu also gave the Mongol his golden seal, that is to say a plate of gold a handbreadth wide and half a cubit long, on which his order is engraved; whoever bears this can command whatever he will and it is carried out without delay.⁴

Theodolus got as far as Vastacius⁵ and wanted to continue his journey to the Pope and deceive him as he had deceived Mangu Chan. Then Vastacius asked him if he had a letter from the Pope seeing that he was an envoy and had been given the duty of conducting envoys of the Tartars. Since he could not produce a letter, Vastacius seized him and despoiling him of all that he had acquired put him in prison. As for the Mongol he fell sick and died there.

Vastacius sent back the gold seal to Mangu Chan by the Mongol's servants; I met them at Erzerum on the borders of Turkey and they told me of Theodolus' fate. Such impostors roam about the world and the Mongols put them to death when they can catch them.

The day of the Epiphany [6 January] was approaching and the Armenian monk, Sergius by name, told me that he was going to baptize Mangu Chan on the day of the feast. I begged him to do all in his power to enable me to be present so that I could bear witness of what I had actually seen, and he promised he would.

The day of the feast arrived and the monk did not send for me, but at midday I was summoned to the court, and I saw the monk coming away from there with some priests, and he had his cross and the priests a thurible and a Gospel-book. On that day Mangu Chan had made a great feast; and it is his custom to hold court on such days as his soothsayers tell him are feast days or the Nestorian priests say are for some reason sacred. On these days the Christian priests come first with their paraphernalia, and they pray for him and bless his cup; when they retire the Saracen priests come and do likewise; they are followed by the pagan priests who do the same. The monk told me that the Chan only believes in the Christians; however, he wishes them all to come and pray for him. But he was lying, for he does not believe in any of them as you will hear later; yet they all follow his court like flies honey, and he gives to them all and they all think they enjoy his special favour and they all prophesy good fortune for him.

We then sat before his court for a long time and they brought us meat to eat. I told them we would not eat there, but if they wished to provide us with food, they should supply it to us in our own dwelling. To this they replied: 'Well then, you can go home for you were summoned for no other reason than to partake of food.' We went back, therefore, by way of the monk, who was covered with confusion at the lie he had told me, and so I did not wish to oblige him to talk about the matter. Some of the Nestorians, however, wanted to assure me that the Chan had been baptized; I said to them that I would never believe it nor tell anyone else, seeing I had not witnessed it.

We arrived at our cold and empty dwelling. They provided us with some bedding and coverlets, and they also brought some fuel and gave us the meat of one thin little ram for the three of us to be our food for six days. Every day they gave us a dishful of millet and a quart of millet ale and they lent us a cauldron and a tripod for us to cook our meat; when it was cooked, we cooked the millet in the broth. This was our food and it would have been quite sufficient for us if they had allowed us to eat it in peace, but there were so many starving people who were not provided with food and who, as soon as they saw us preparing ours, bore down upon us and we had to share our meal with them. There I experienced how great a martyrdom it is to bestow bounty in one's own poverty.

The cold then began to increase greatly in intensity, and Mangu Chan sent us three cloaks of monkey skin which they wear the hairy side out, and we accepted them gratefully. They also enquired how we were faring for food and I told them we were satisfied with little but we had no building in which we could pray for Mangu Chan, for our hut is so small that we could not stand upright in it nor open our books when we lighted a fire. They took word back to him and he sent to the monk to find out if he desired our company and he replied with joy that he did. From that time onwards we were provided with a better dwelling and we took up our abode with the monk in front of the court where no one was lodged except us and their diviners; but they were nearer and facing the court of the chief wife, while we were at the far east end in front of the court of the last wife. We moved on the day before the Octave of the Epiphany.

The following day, namely the Octave of the Epiphany, all the Nestorian priests assembled before daybreak at the chapel and beat the board; and they sang solemn Matins, and put on their vestments and prepared a thurible and incense. While they were waiting in the court before the church, the chief wife, by name Cotota Caten—Caten is

the same as Lady, Cotota a proper name—entered the chapel with a number of other ladies and her eldest son Baltu and her other little children; and they prostrated, placing their foreheads on the ground after the Nestorian custom, and then they touched all the statues with their right hand, always kissing the hand afterwards; and then they proffered their right hand to all present in the church, for this is the custom of Nestorians on entering church. The priests then sang many things and gave incense into the lady's hand, and she put it onto the coals and then they censured her. After this, when it was now broad daylight, she began to take off her head-dress, which is called a *bocca*, and I saw her bare head. She thereupon ordered us to leave, and as we were going out I saw a silver bowl being brought. Whether they baptized her or not I do not know; but I do know that they do not celebrate Mass in a tent but only in a permanent church. At Easter I saw them baptize and bless fonts with great solemnity, a thing they did not do on this occasion.

When we had gone back to our lodging Mangu Chan himself came and went into the church or oratory, and a golden couch was brought on which he sat with his wife, opposite the altar. Then we were summoned, still ignorant of the fact that Mangu had come, and the door-keepers searched us to see that we were not carrying any knives. I went into the oratory holding the Bible and breviary before my breast; first I bowed to the altar and then to the Chan and crossing over we took our stand between the monk and the altar. Then they made us recite a psalm in our own manner and sing, so we sang the sequence '*Veni Sancte Spiritus*'. The Chan had our books, the Bible and the breviary, taken to him and he made a diligent enquiry as to the meaning of the pictures. The Nestorians answered him as well as they could, for our interpreter had not come in with us. The first time also that I had been in his presence I had carried the Bible before me, and he had had it brought to him and had had a good look at it.

He then left and his wife stayed behind and distributed gifts to all the Christians present. To the monk she gave a *iascot* and another to the archdeacon of the priests. She had placed in front of us a *nasac*, that is a piece of material as wide as a bed-cover and very long; and also a *buccaran*. As I was unwilling to accept them, they sent for the interpreter and he had them for himself. The *nasac* he took to Cyprus and sold for eighty Cyprian bezants, but it had got much spoiled on the journey.

Then the drinks were brought—rice ale, red wine, like the wine of La Rochelle, and cosmos. The lady, holding a full goblet in her hand, knelt down and asked a blessing, and all the priests sang in a loud voice and she drank it all. My companion and I were also obliged to sing another time when she wanted to drink. When they were all nearly intoxicated food was brought, the flesh of a sheep, which was immediately devoured, and after that some large fish called carp, without salt and without bread, and of this I ate a little. In this way they passed the time until evening. Then the lady, now drunk, got into a cart, while the priests sang and howled, and she went her way.

The following Sunday, which is when they read the gospel 'There was a marriage in Cana', the Chan's daughter whose mother had been a Christian came and behaved in like manner though with not so much solemnity, for she did not give any presents, but she provided the priests with drink until they were drunk and gave them roasted millet to eat.

The Nestorians fast for three days before Septuagesima Sunday⁶ and they call this the fast of Jonas, which he preached to the Ninevites; and the Armenians keep a fast of five days at that time which they call the fast of St Sergius, who is their greatest saint

and who, the Greeks say, was the model of what a martyr should be. The Nestorians begin their fast on Tuesday and end on Thursday, so on the Friday they eat meat.

At that time I saw the chancellor, that is the chief scribe of the court; Bulgai by name, make them allowances of meat on Friday, and they blessed them with great solemnity, just as the paschal lamb is blessed. He himself, however, did not eat of it; this is because of the teaching of Master William of Paris who is a great friend of his. The monk ordered Mangu to fast throughout the week, which he did, so I heard.

And so on Septuagesima Saturday which is, as it were, the Armenians' Easter, we went in procession to Mangu's dwelling, and the monk and the two of us, having first been searched to see if we had any knives, went into his presence with the priests. As we were entering a slave was going out, carrying away sheep's shoulder-blades which had been charred until they were as black as coal. I was greatly puzzled as to the purpose of this and when I enquired about it later I learned that the Chan does nothing in the world without first consulting these bones; consequently he does not allow anyone to enter his dwelling until he has consulted them.

This type of divination is carried out in the following manner: when the Chan wishes to do anything he has three of these bones brought to him before they have been burned, and holding them he thinks of that matter about which he wishes to find out whether he is to do it or not; then he hands the bones to a slave to be burned. Near the dwelling in which he is staying there are always two little buildings in which the bones are burned and every day these bones are diligently sought for throughout the encampment. When the bones, therefore, have been burned until they are black they are brought back to the Chan and he thereupon examines them to see if with the heat of the fire they have split lengthwise in a straight line. If they have, the way is clear for him to act; if, however, the bones have cracked horizontally or round bits have shot out, then he does not do it. The bone itself or the membrane stretched over it always cracks in the fire. If, out of the three, one is split in a straight line then he acts.

When we had come into the Chan's presence, having first been warned not to touch the threshold, the Nestorian priests took incense to him and he put it on the thurible and they censed him. Then they chanted a blessing on his drink and after them the monk gave his blessing and lastly we had to pronounce ours. When he saw us clasping the Bible he had it taken to him so that he could look at it, and he examined it most carefully. After he had drunk and the chief of the priests had handed him a goblet then they gave the priests to drink.

We then went out but my companion remained behind. When we were already outside and he was on the point of coming out after us, he turned towards the Chan and bowed to him, then hurrying after us he stumbled against the threshold of the dwelling. While we were hastening towards the dwelling of Baatu, the Chan's son, those watching the threshold laid hands upon my companion and compelled him to stop so that he could not follow us; then, calling a man, they ordered him to take him to Bulgai, who is the chief scribe of the court and tries those guilty of capital offences. I was in ignorance of all this. When I looked round and did not see him coming I thought they had detained him so that he could be given lighter garments, for he was weak and so much weighed down by the cloaks that he could scarcely walk. They then summoned our interpreter and made him sit by him.

We made our way to the dwelling of the Chan's eldest son, who already has two wives and who lives on the right of his father's court. When he saw us coming he jumped up from the couch on which he was sitting and prostrated, striking his forehead on

the ground in adoration of the cross; then rising he had it placed on a new cloth in an elevated position near him, showing it very great respect. He has as master a Nestorian priest called David, a great drunkard, who teaches him. He then made us sit down and had drinks given to the priests and he also drank after he had received their blessing.

Next we went to the court of the second wife who was called Cota and was a pagan, and we found her lying in bed sick. The monk made her get up from her couch and adore the cross, kneeling down three times and placing her forehead on the ground, and he stood with the cross on the west side of the dwelling and she on the east. This done they changed places and the monk went with the cross to the east side, she to the west; then, although she was so weak she could hardly stand on her feet, he insolently ordered her to prostrate again and adore the cross three times towards the east according to the Christian custom, and she did so. He also taught her to make the sign of the cross on herself.

She lay down on her bed again and when prayers had been said for her we next went to a third house which was that in which the Christian wife used to be. When she died she was succeeded by the young girl, who, together with the Chan's daughter, received us with joy, and all in that house reverently adored the cross, and she placed it in a prominent position on a cloth of silk, and she had food brought, that is to say, the flesh of a sheep; it was placed in front of the lady and she had it served to the priests. The monk and I, however, avoided eating and drinking.

When the meat had been eaten and a great deal of drink consumed, we had to go to the apartment of the young mistress Cirina, which was behind the large dwelling which had belonged to her mother. When the cross entered she prostrated herself on the ground and adored it with great devotion for she had been well instructed in this respect, and she placed it in a prominent position on a silken cloth; all these cloths on which the cross was placed were the monk's.

This cross had been brought by a certain Armenian who had come with the monk, so he said, from Jerusalem, and it was of silver weighing some four marks, and had four precious stones in the angles and one in the middle; it had no figure of the Saviour, for the Armenians and Nestorians are ashamed to see Christ nailed to the cross. They had presented it at the hands of the monk to Mangu Chan, who asked him what was his petition. The Armenian replied that he was the son of an Armenian priest whose church had been destroyed by the Saracens and he begged the Chan's help in the restoration of this church. The Chan then asked how much would be needed for it to be rebuilt, and he replied two hundred *iascot*, that is to say two thousand marks. The Chan ordered a letter to be given to him addressed to the official who receives the tribute in Persia and in Greater Armenia, telling him to pay him the said sum of money. The monk took this cross with him everywhere and the priests, seeing him collecting money, began to be envious of him. As I was saying, we were in the house of the young lady and she gave the priests a great deal to drink.

From here we went to the fourth dwelling, which was the last as regards both number and honour, for the Chan did not visit that wife and her house was old and she herself not at all attractive; however, after Easter he had a new dwelling made for her and new carts. She, like the second wife, knew little or nothing of the Christian religion but was a follower of the diviners and idolaters. Nevertheless when we went in she adored the cross in the way the monk and priests taught her to do. There again the priests had some drinks.

From that place we returned to our oratory which was nearby, the priests singing and shouting loudly in their drunkenness, which in that country is not considered reprehensible either in man or woman. My companion was then brought and the monk chid him very severely for having touched the threshold.

The following day Bulgai, the judge, came and made diligent enquiry as to whether we had been warned to avoid touching the threshold, and I replied: 'Sir, we did not have our interpreter with us; how could we understand?' He thereupon pardoned my companion, but never afterwards was he allowed to enter any of the Chan's dwellings.

It afterwards came to pass that the lady Cota, who had been indisposed round about Sexagesima Sunday, became sick unto death and the sorceries of the pagans did her not the slightest good. Then Mangu sent to the monk to enquire of him what could be done about her and he rashly replied that if she didn't get better the Chan could cut off his head. Having given this promise the monk summoned us and, laying the whole matter before us, begged us with tears to watch with him in prayer that night, which we did.

Now he had a certain root which goes by the name of rhubarb, and he used to cut it up almost to a powder and put it into water with a little cross he had from which the figure of our Saviour had been removed. He declared that he was able to tell by means of this whether a sick man was going to get well again or going to die; for if he was going to get well it would stick to his chest as if glued to it, otherwise it would not stick. At that time I still believed that the rhubarb was some sacred thing he had brought from the Holy Land of Jerusalem. He used to give some of that water to all ailing people to drink with the inevitable result that their bowels were all disturbed by so bitter a potion. This change in their bodies they put down to a miracle. Then when he was preparing to mix some of this water, I mentioned to him the holy water which is made in the Roman Church, for it is most efficacious in driving out demons and I had understood that she was troubled with a devil. At his request we made some holy water for him, and he mixed some rhubarb with it and plunged in the cross to soak all night in the water. I also added, in case he himself were a priest, that the Order of the priesthood possesses great power for driving out devils. He replied that he was a priest; however, he lied, for he had received no Orders, nor did he know his letters, but was a weaver of cloth as I learned afterwards in his native land through which I passed on my return journey.

And so the next day the monk and I and two Nestorian priests visited the lady, who was in a little house behind her larger dwelling. When we went in she sat up in bed, and adoring the cross placed it with due honour by her side on a silken cloth, and she drank of the holy water and rhubarb and moistened her breast with it and the monk asked me to read the Gospel over her. I read the Passion of Our Lord according to John. At last feeling better she cheered up and ordered four *iascots* of silver to be brought. These she first placed at the foot of the cross and then gave one to the monk and offered one to me; I was unwilling to take it; whereupon the monk, stretching out his hand, grabbed it. She also presented one to each of the two priests, so on that occasion she bestowed forty marks. Then she had wine brought and gave the priests to drink, and even I had to drink thrice at her hand in honour of the Trinity. She also began to teach me the language, twitting me because I was silent, not having my interpreter with me.

The following day we went back again to her, and Mangu Chan, hearing that we were passing by that way, made us go in to him, for he had learned that the lady was much better. We found him with a few members of his household drinking liquid *tam*, that is a food made of paste, for comforting the head: and in front of him were lying the charred shoulder-blades of a sheep. He took the cross in his hand but I did not see him kiss it or

adore it; instead he looked at it wondering I know not what. The monk then asked for leave to carry the cross on a lance raised on high, for I had previously discussed this matter with him, and Mangu replied:

‘Carry it in the best way you know.’

We took our leave of him and then went to the lady, whom we found well and cheerful, and she again drank of the holy water and I read the Passion over her. Those miserable priests never instructed her in the faith nor advised her to be baptized. I, for my part, sat there speechless, unable to say a word, though she did go on teaching me the language. Nor do the priests rebuke them for any kind of sorcery, for there I saw four swords drawn halfway out of their sheaths, one at the head of the lady’s couch, another at the foot, and the other two one each side of the doorway. I also saw a silver chalice such as we use, which had perhaps been taken or stolen from a church in Hungary, and it was hung up on the wall full of ashes and on top of the ashes was a black stone, and the priests never teach them that such things are evil. On the contrary they themselves do and teach the like. And so we visited her for three days until she was perfectly restored to health.

At that time the monk made a banner covered with crosses and sought out a long cane like a lance and we carried the cross raised on high. I honoured him as my superior since he knew the language, but he did many things which did not meet with my approval. He had a faldstool made for himself such as it is the custom for bishops to have, and gloves and a cap made of peacocks’ feathers with a little gold cross on top—this pleased me as far as the cross was concerned. He had coarse finger nails which he went to the trouble to ornament with unguents; and he also proved to be presumptuous in his speech. The Nestorians used to recite I know not what verses of a psalm, so they said, over two twigs which were joined together while being held by two men,⁷ and the monk himself used to be present at such things; and many other foolishnesses came to light in him which displeased me. Nevertheless for the honour of the cross we clung to his company. We carried the cross on high throughout the whole encampment singing ‘*Vexilla Regis prodeunt*’ and the Saracens were greatly surprised at this.

After our arrival at Mangu’s orda, he only moved camp in a southerly direction twice; after that he began to return northwards, that is towards Caracorum. One thing I noticed throughout the whole journey, which Sir Baldwin of Hainault who had been there had also mentioned to me at Constantinople, and this was that the ground here gave the strange impression that as one proceeds it always slopes up-hill and never down-hill. All the rivers flowed from the east to west either directly or indirectly, that is to say turning somewhat to the south or north. I questioned some priests who had come from Cathay and they bore witness to this fact.

From the place where I found Mangu Chan as far as Cathay, it was twenty days’ journey in a south-easterly direction; as far as Onankerule which is the Mongols’ own territory where Chingis’ orda is, it was ten days’ journey due east; and as far as this eastern district there was not a town to be found. There was, however, a tribe called Su-Mongol, that is Mongols of the water, for ‘su’ is the same as water. These men live on fish and by hunting, for they have neither flocks of sheep nor herds of cattle. Similarly towards the north there is no town, but a poor tribe who keep cattle and are called Kerkis⁸. There are also the Orengai there who bind polished bones under their feet and propel themselves over the frozen snow and ice at such a speed that they can catch birds and animals.⁹

There are several other poor tribes stretching towards the north as far as the cold permits, and in the west their boundaries touch the land of the Pascaver, that is to say Greater Hungary, concerning which I told you above. The extreme north point is unexplored on account of the great cold, for there are almost continual blizzards there. I made enquiries about the monsters or human monstrosities of which Isidore and Solinus speak. They told me they had never seen such things, which makes me wonder very much if there is any truth in the story. Since the aforementioned tribes are destitute of everything they are obliged to work for the Mongols; it was a decree of Chingis that no man should be free from service until he was so old that he could in no wise work any more.

On one occasion there sat by me a priest from Cathay, wearing a red material of a very fine hue, and when I asked him where he got such a colour from, he told me that in the eastern district of Cathay there are lofty crags in which dwell creatures having in every respect a human form except that they do not bend their knees but walk hopping I know not how; they are but a cubit high and the whole of their small bodies is covered with hairs and they live in inaccessible caves. When men go hunting them they carry with them mead which they can make very intoxicating, and they set traps among the rocks in the shape of cups which they fill with this mead (they have no wine as yet in Cathay, but are just beginning to plant vines; this drink, however, they make out of rice). And so the hunters hide themselves and these animals come out of their caves and taste the drink and they cry out 'Chinchin'; from this shout they got their name, for they are called Chinchins. Then they assemble in vast numbers and drink the mead and, becoming drunk, they fall asleep on the spot. At that point the hunters approach and bind them hand and foot as they sleep. Next they open a vein in their necks and from each one extract three or four drops of blood; then they let them go free; and that blood, so I was told, is most valuable for dyeing purple.

They also told me for a truth, though I do not believe it, that beyond Cathay is a country and whatever age a man be when he enters that country he remains at that age. Cathay borders on the ocean, and Master William told me that he had seen envoys of people called Caule and Manse¹⁰ who inhabit islands in the sea around which freezes in winter, so the Tartars can cross to them; they offered the Tartars thirty-two thousand *tumen iascot* yearly so long as they would leave them in peace. A *tumen* is a number consisting of ten thousand.

The ordinary money of Cathay is a piece of paper made out of cotton, a handbreadth in width and length, and on this they stamp lines like Mangu's seal. They write with a brush like those with which painters paint and in a single character they make several letters which form one word. The Tebec write as we do and have letters very much like ours. The Tangut write in the same way as the Arabs, from right to left, but they increase their lines from the bottom up; the Ugurs, as has already been mentioned, start at the top and go downwards. The ordinary currency of the Ruthenians is squirrel and ermine skins.

When we went to the monk he charitably urged us to abstain from flesh meat, saying that our servants could take meat with his domestics, while he would provide us with flour and oil or butter; we did this although my companion found it a great trial on account of his weakness. And so our food was millet with butter, or paste cooked in water with butter or sour milk, and unleavened bread cooked over the dung of oxen or horses.

Then Quinquagesima came, which is the Lent of all the Easterns, and the chief wife

Cotota fasted that week with all her suite; and each day she came to our oratory and gave food to the priests and other Christians, a great number of whom assembled there during that first week in order to hear the office. She presented me and my companion with a tunic and breeches of grey shot silk padded with silk wadding, for my companion had complained a great deal about the weight of the furs. I accepted them for the comfort of my companion, excusing myself however and saying that I could not wear such clothes. The things intended for me I gave to my interpreter.

The gate-keepers of the court, seeing such a great crowd streaming every day to the church, which was within the bounds watched by the *orda* guards, sent one of their number to the monk saying that they did not wish such a large crowd to assemble there within the confines of the *orda*. Whereupon the monk curtly replied that he would like to know whether they were issuing this command by Mangu's desire, and he also added threats implying that he was going to denounce them to Mangu. Then they, getting in first, accused him to Mangu of speaking too much and of assembling too large a crowd for his sermons.

As a result, on the first Sunday in Lent we were summoned to the court and after the monk had been searched for knives in a most objectionable manner, so much so that he even had to take off his shoes, we went into the presence of the Chan, who was looking at the charred shoulder-blade of a sheep which he was holding in his hand; and, as if reading from it, he began to rebuke the monk, demanding why, since he was a man whose duty it was to pray to God, he spoke so much with men. I, in the meantime, was standing in the background with head uncovered, and the Chan said to him: 'Why do you not uncover your head when you come into my presence, as that Frank does?' and he had me called nearer. Then the monk, covered with confusion, took off his cap contrary to the custom of the Greeks and Armenians; and after the Chan had said many harsh things to him, we went away. The monk handed me the cross to carry to the oratory, for he himself was unable to carry it for embarrassment.

A few days later he was reconciled to the Chan, promising him that he would go to the Pope and bring all the nations of the west under his dominion. When he returned to the oratory after this conversation with the Chan, he began to ask me questions about the Pope, whether I thought he would be willing to see him if he went to him on behalf of Mangu, and if he would provide him with horses as far as St James. He also asked about you, if you would be prepared to send your son to Mangu. I thereupon warned him not to make lying promises to Mangu, for the last error would be worst than the first, nor hath God any need of our lies that we should speak deceitfully for Him.

At that time there arose a dispute between the monk and a certain priest called Jonas, a well-educated man whose father had been an archdeacon, and he himself was regarded by the other priests as their master and archdeacon. Now the monk affirmed that man was made before Paradise and that the Gospel said this. Then I was called in to settle the argument. Not knowing that this was the point about which they were disputing, I replied that Paradise was made on the third day along with the other trees, but man on the sixth day. Then the monk started to say: 'Is it not true that on the first day the devil brought earth from the four corners of the world and making slime fashioned the human body, and God breathed into it a soul?' Hearing this Manichean heresy and hearing him thus publicly and shamelessly uttering it, I sternly rebuked him, bidding him put his finger on his mouth since he did not know the Scriptures, and take care not to say things which would bring guilt upon him. Then he started scoffing at me because I did not know the language, and so I left him and went to our dwelling.

It happened afterwards that he and the priests went in procession to the court, but I was not summoned because the monk was not on speaking terms with me on account of the rebuke I had given him and he did not wish to take me along with him as had been his practice hitherto. When they came into Mangu's presence, the latter, not seeing me among them, carefully enquired where I was and why I had not come with them. The priests, frightened, made their excuses, and when they returned they told me what Mangu had said and grumbled about the monk. After this the monk was reconciled to me and I to him, and I asked him to help me with the language, saying I would help him with Holy Scripture, for 'a brother that is helped by his brother is like a strong city'. [Prov. xviii. 19.]

After the first week of the fast the Chan's wife stopped coming to the oratory and giving us the food and mead which we had been having. The monk would not allow it to be brought, saying that in preparing it they put in mutton fat; he also gave us oil but seldom, so we had nothing except hearth cakes and paste boiled in water to drink as soup; the only water we had was melted snow and ice, which was very bad.

Then my companion began to suffer greatly, so I told David, the master of the Chan's eldest son, of the straits we were in and he passed on the word to the Chan. The latter gave orders for us to be given wine, flour and oil. Under no circumstances do the Nestorians or Armenians eat fish during Lent. Then a bottle of wine was given to us.

The monk said he did not eat except on Sundays, when the Chan's wife sent him a dish of boiled dough with vinegar to drink. However, he had by him, under the altar, a box containing almonds, a bunch of raisins, prunes and many other kinds of fruit, which he ate all the day long whenever he was alone.

We ate once in the day and this in the greatest discomfort, for as soon as they knew that Mangu Chan had provided us with wine, the Nestorian priests, who were drinking their fill all day long in the orda, the Mongols, and the monk's servants all rushed upon us in the most impudent fashion like dogs. Also the monk himself, when anyone came to him to whom he wished to offer a drink, used to send to us for wine, so that that wine brought us more trouble than consolation, for we could not refuse without giving scandal; if we gave we had not enough for ourselves, and when it was exhausted we dared not ask for more from the court.

About mid-Lent Master William's son came, bringing with him a beautiful silver cross fashioned after the French style and having fastened onto it a silver figure of Christ. He was to present it on behalf of his master to Bulgai, the chief scribe of the court. When the monk and priests saw the figure they removed it. On hearing what they had done I was much scandalized. The young man also brought the news to Mangu Chan that the work which he had commissioned had reached completion; this work I will now describe to you.

CHAPTER XXX

MANGU'S PALACE AT CARACORUM, AND THE FEAST OF EASTER

At Caracorum Mangu has a large orda close by the city walls; it is surrounded by a brick wall as are our priories of monks. There is a large palace there in which he holds his drinking festival twice in the year, once round about Easter when he passes by that way

and once in the summer on his return. The second is the more important for on that occasion there assemble at his court all the nobles anywhere within a two months' journey; and then he bestows on them garments and presents and displays his great glory. There are many other buildings there, long like barns, and in these are stored his provisions and treasures.

At the entrance to this palace, seeing it would have been unseemly to put skins of milk and other drinks there, Master William of Paris has made for him a large silver tree, at the foot of which are four silver lions each having a pipe and all belching forth white mares' milk. Inside the trunk four pipes lead up to the top of the tree and the ends of the pipes are bent downwards and over each of them is a gilded serpent, the tail of which twines round the trunk of the tree. One of these pipes pours out wine, another caracosmos, that is the refined milk of mares, another *boal*, which is a honey drink, and another rice mead, which is called *terracina*. Each of these has its silver basin ready to receive it at the foot of the tree between the other four pipes. At the very top he fashioned an angel holding a trumpet; underneath the tree he made a crypt in which a man can be secreted, and a pipe goes up to the angel through the middle of the heart of the tree. At first he had made bellows but they did not give enough wind. Outside the palace there is a chamber in which the drinks are stored, and servants stand there ready to pour them out when they hear the angel sounding the trumpet. The tree has branches, leaves and fruit of silver.

And so when the drinks are getting low the chief butler calls out to the angel to sound his trumpet. Then, hearing this, the man who is hidden in the crypt blows the pipe going up to the angel with all his strength, and the angel, placing the trumpet to his mouth, sounds it very loudly. When the servants in the chamber hear this each one of them pours out his drink into its proper pipe, and the pipes pour them out from above and below into the basins prepared for this, and then the cup-bearers draw the drinks and carry them round the palace to the men and women.

The palace is like a church with a middle nave and two side aisles beyond two rows of pillars and there are three doors on the south side; inside before the middle door stands the tree, and the Chan himself sits at the northern end high up so that he can be seen by everyone; and there are two stairways leading up to him, and the man bringing him his cup goes up by the one and comes down by the other. The space in the middle between the tree and the steps up to him is empty, and there the cup-bearer stands and also envoys who are bringing gifts. The Chan sits up there like a god. On his right-hand side, that is to the west, are the men, on the left the women, for the palace extends from the north southwards. To the south, next to the pillars on the right, are rows of seats raised up like a balcony, on which sit his son and brothers. It is the same on the left where his wives and daughters sit. Only one wife sits up there beside him; she however is not as high up as he is.

When the Chan heard that the work was finished he gave orders to the master to place it in position and get it in working order, and he himself about Passion Sunday went ahead with the small dwellings leaving the large ones behind. The monk and we followed him and he sent us another bottle of wine. He journeyed through mountainous districts, and there was a strong wind and severe cold and a heavy fall of snow. Consequently about midnight the Chan sent to the monk and us asking us to pray to God to lessen the cold and the wind, for all the animals accompanying them were in danger, especially because at that season they were with young and bringing forth. Thereupon the monk sent him some incense, bidding him put it on the coals as an offering to God. I do not

know if he did this, but the storm, which had lasted for two days and was already entering on its third, did abate.

On Palm Sunday we were near Caracorum. At dawn we blessed branches of willow, which as yet bore no sign of buds, and about three o'clock we entered the city, the cross raised on high with the banner, and passing the Saracen quarters, where the bazaar and market are, we went to the church. The Nestorians came to meet us in procession. On entering the church we found them ready to celebrate Mass; when this had been celebrated they all received Holy Communion and asked me if I wished to communicate. I replied that I had had a drink and it is not lawful to receive the Sacrament except fasting.

Mass having been said, it was now evening and Master William took us with great joy to his lodging to have supper with him. His wife, who was born in Hungary, was the daughter of a man from Lorraine and she knew French and Coman well. We also came across another man there, Basil by name, the son of an Englishman, who had been born in Hungary and knew the same languages. After supper they accompanied us with great rejoicing to our hut, which the Tartars had set up for us in a square near the church along with the monk's oratory.

The following day the Chan entered his palace and the monk and I and the priests went to him. My companion was not allowed to go because he had trodden on the threshold. I deliberated a great deal about my own case, what I ought to do, whether to go or not to go, and, fearing to give scandal by dissociating myself from the other Christians, and seeing that it pleased the Chan, and fearing lest the good I was hoping to be able to bring about might be hindered, I decided to go even though it meant that I should witness their acts of sorcery and idolatry. And there I did nothing but pray aloud for the whole Church and also for the Chan that God would direct him into the way of eternal salvation.

And so we made our entrance into that orda, which is very well laid out and in summer they convey streams of water in all directions to irrigate it. We next entered the palace, which was full of men and women, and we stood before the Chan having at our backs the tree I have mentioned which together with its basins occupied a large part of the palace; the priests brought two little blessed cakes of bread and fruit on a dish which they presented to the Chan after they had pronounced a blessing, and a butler took them to him as he sat there in a place very high and lifted up. He immediately began to eat one of the cakes and sent the other to his son and his younger brother, who is being brought up by a Nestorian and knows the Gospel, and he also sent for my Bible so that he could look at it. After the priests the monk said his prayer, and I after the monk. Then the Chan promised that the following day he would come to the church, which is quite large and beautiful, and the roof above is all covered with silk interwoven with gold. The following day he went on his way, sending a message of excuse to the priests saying he dared not come to the church for he had learned that the dead were carried there.

We however stayed behind at Caracorum with the monk and the other priests of the court to celebrate Easter there. Maundy Thursday and Easter Sunday were approaching and I had not got our vestments; I was watching closely the way the Nestorians celebrated and was much distressed as to what I should do, whether I should receive the Sacrament from them or celebrate in their vestments with their chalice and on their altar, or whether I should abstain entirely from the Sacrament. At that time there was a large crowd of Christians there—Hungarians, Alans, Ruthenians, Georgians,

Armenians—all of whom had not set eyes on the Sacrament from the time they had been taken prisoner, for the Nestorians were unwilling to admit them into their church unless they were re-baptized by them, so they said. However, to us they made no mention of this, on the contrary they acknowledged to us that the Roman Church was the head of all the Churches and that they would receive a Patriarch from the Pope if only the way were open. They freely offered us their Sacrament and made me stand at the door of the choir so that I could see how they celebrated, and also on Easter Eve I stood near the font so that I could see their way of baptizing.

They say they have some of the ointment with which Mary Magdalene anointed the feet of the Lord, and they always pour as much oil into it as they take away and with this they bake their bread, for all the Easterns put fat in their bread instead of yeast, either butter or sheep's-tail fat or oil. They also say they have some of the flour from which the bread was made which the Lord consecrated, and they always replace as much as they remove, and they have a room near their choir and an oven where, with great reverence, they make the bread they are to consecrate. With the above-mentioned oil they make a cake wide like the palm of a hand and this they break first into twelve pieces signifying the number of the Apostles, and these pieces they afterwards divide according to the number of people; and the priest gives the Body of Christ into each one's hand and then the man reverently receives It from his palm, and wipes his hand on the top of his head.

The Christians I have spoken of and the monk urgently begged us for the love of God to celebrate. Thereupon I made them go to confession, as well as I could by means of an interpreter enumerating the ten commandments and the seven deadly sins and other things a man ought to be sorry for and confess, all in public. They made excuses for thieving, saying that unless they stole it would be impossible to live, for their masters provided them with neither clothes nor food. Then I, deliberating as to whether they had taken goods and cattle without just cause, told them that it was lawful for them to take the necessities of life from their masters' possessions, and I was ready to tell Mangu Chan this to his face. Some of them were soldiers and excused themselves saying they were obliged to go to war, otherwise they would be put to death. I firmly forbade them to fight against Christians, or to do them any harm, rather should they let themselves be killed for them they would become martyrs. And I said if anyone wished to denounce me to Mangu Chan for teaching this, I was ready to preach the same in his hearing, for when I was teaching these things there were present the Nestorians from the *orda* and I suspected they might inform against us.

Then Master William had an iron made for us for making hosts, and he possessed some vestments which he had made for himself, for he had a little education and comported himself as a cleric. He had made a statue of the Blessed Virgin sculptured after the French fashion, and on the shutters enclosing it he carved the story of the Gospel most beautifully; and he made a silver pyx in which to keep the Body of Christ and relics in little compartments skilfully fashioned in the sides of the pyx. He had also made an oratory on a cart, which was very beautiful and painted with sacred stories.

I took the vestments and blessed them and we made most beautiful hosts after our fashion, and the Nestorians assigned to me their baptistery in which there was an altar. Their Patriarch has sent them from Baghdad a square piece of leather as a portable altar; it has been prepared with chrism and they use it in place of a consecrated stone. And so I said Mass on Maundy Thursday with their silver chalice and paten, which vessels were very large, and again on Easter Sunday. And I gave Holy Communion to the people with the blessing of God, so I hope. On Easter Eve the Nestorians baptized in

the most correct manner more than sixty people, and there was great common joy among all the Christians.

CHAPTER XXXI

MASTER WILLIAM'S SICKNESS AND THE DEATH OF THE NESTORIAN PRIEST

It happened that Master William then became seriously ill. When he was getting better the monk went to visit him and gave him some rhubarb to drink, so that he nearly killed him. When I went to see him and found him so very ill, I enquired what he had been eating or drinking, and he told me how the monk had given him the potion and he had drunk two bowlfuls, believing that it was holy water. I thereupon accosted the monk and said to him: 'Either go about like the Apostle truly working miracles by the power of prayer and the Holy Ghost, or act as a physician in accordance with the science of medicine. You give men, who are not prepared for it, a strong dose of medicine to drink as if it were something holy; if this came to the knowledge of the public you would incur the worst possible scandal.' At that he began to be afraid and beware of me.

It happened also at that time that the priest, who was like the archdeacon of the others, fell ill, and his friends sent for a Saracen soothsayer who told them: 'A thin man who neither eats nor drinks nor sleeps on a bed is angry with him. If he could obtain his blessing he would get better.' They understood this to refer to the monk, and round about midnight the priest's wife, sister and son came to the monk begging him to go and give him his blessing. They also woke us up to plead with the monk. When we asked him he said: 'Leave him alone, for he with three others, who like him will go the same evil way, formed a plot to go to the court and obtain from Mangu Chan that you and I should be expelled from these parts.'

Now there had arisen a quarrel among them, for on Easter Eve Mangu and his wives had sent four *iascot* and some pieces of silk to the monk and the priests to be divided among them, and the monk had kept one *iascot* for himself as his share, and of the remaining three one was counterfeit, for it was of copper; consequently it seemed to the priests that the monk had kept too large a share for himself, and it may be that they had talked about it among themselves and this had been reported to the monk.

When day came I went to the priest, who had a very severe pain in his side and was spitting blood, which led me to believe that he had an abscess. I then urged him to acknowledge the Pope as the Father of all Christians, which he did immediately, vowing that if God gave him his health he would go and fall at the feet of the Pope and would in all good faith see to it that the Pope should send his blessing to Mangu Chan. I also warned him to restore anything he might have belonging to another; he said he had nothing. I spoke to him about the Sacrament of Extreme Unction. He replied: 'It is not our custom, nor do our priests know how to administer it; I beseech you do for me according to what you know ought to be done.' I admonished him too concerning confession, which they do not frequent. He spoke briefly into the ear of one of his fellow priests. After that he began to be better and asked me to go for the monk. I went.

At first the monk did not wish to come, but when he heard that he was better, he went with his cross; and I also went carrying in Master William's pyx the Body of Christ which I had reserved on Easter Sunday at Master William's request. Then the monk began to tread on the priest and the latter most humbly embraced his feet. Then I said to

him: 'It is the custom of the Roman Church that the sick receive the Body of Christ as Viaticum and as a defence against all the snares of the enemy; behold the Body of Christ which I consecrated on Easter Day. You must declare your belief in It and ask for It.' Whereupon he said with great faith: 'I ask for It with all my heart.' When I had taken off the cover, with deep feeling he said: 'I believe that this is my Creator and my Saviour, Who gave to me my life and will restore it to me after my death at the general resurrection.' And thus, at my hand, he received the Body of Christ, consecrated according to the usage of the Roman Church.

The monk then stayed with him and gave him, in my absence, I know not what potions. The following day he began to be in danger of death, whereupon I took their oil, which they said was holy, and anointed him according to the form of the Roman Church as he had requested me. I had not got our own oils because Sartach's priests had kept them all. When I was saying the prayers for the dying and wanted to be present at his death, the monk sent to me telling me to leave, for if I were there when he died I would not be able to enter Mangu Chan's dwelling for a year. When I intimated this to his friends they said that it was true and begged me to go away so as not to hinder the good I might be able to promote.

After his death the monk spoke to me: 'Don't worry,' said he, 'I killed him by my prayers. He alone was educated and was opposed to us; the others know nothing; for the rest, we shall have all of them and Mangu Chan at our feet.' He then narrated to me the soothsayer's reply I have already told you; not believing it I enquired of the priest-friends of the dead man if it were true. They said that it was, but whether he had been primed beforehand or not, they did not know.

Later I discovered that the monk summoned the said soothsayer and his wife to his chapel and made them sift dust and divine for him. He also had a Ruthenian deacon with him who divined for him. When I learned this afterwards I was horrified at his foolishness and said to him: 'Brother, a man full of the Holy Ghost Who teaches all things ought not to seek answers or advice from soothsayers; and all such things are forbidden and those who pursue them are excommunicated.' He then began to excuse himself saying it was not true he sought such things. I was unable to part company with him for I had been put there by the Chan's command, and I could not transfer myself without his special order.

CHAPTER XXXII

CARACORUM AND THE FAMILY OF MANGU

As for the city of Caracorum I can tell you that, not counting the Chan's palace, it is not as large as the village of Saint Denis, and the monastery of Saint Denis is worth ten times more than that palace. There are two districts there: the Saracens' quarter where the markets are, and many merchants flock thither on account of the court which is always near it and on account of the number of envoys. The other district is that of the Cathayans who are all craftsmen. Apart from these districts there are the large palaces of the court scribes. There are twelve pagan temples belonging to the different nations, two mosques in which the law of Mahomet is proclaimed, and one church for the Christians at the far end of the town. The town is surrounded by a mud wall and has four gates. At the east gate are sold millet and other grain, which is however seldom

brought there; at the west sheep and goats are sold; at the south oxen and carts; at the north horses.

Before the Ascension we followed the orda; catching it up on the Sunday before the Ascension.¹ The next day Bulgai, the chief scribe and judiciary, sent for us, the monk and all his household, and all the envoys and foreigners who frequented the monk's dwelling. We were summoned one by one into Bulgai's presence, the monk first and we after him; and they began to enquire closely where we were from, for what reason we had come, what was our business. This enquiry was made because it had been reported to Mangu Chan that four hundred Assassins, disguised in various costumes, had entered the country, in order to murder him. About that time the wife we have spoken about above had a relapse and sent for the monk; he, not wishing to go, replied: 'She has again called pagans to her, let them cure her if they can. I will not go any more.'

On the Vigil of the Lord's Ascension we went into all the dwellings belonging to Mangu Chan, and I saw how, when they were about to drink, they sprinkled their felt idols with cosmos. I then said to the monk: 'What communication hath Christ with Belial? What part hath our cross with these idols?'²

As mentioned above Mangu Chan has eight brothers, three by the same mother and five of the same father. One of the former he sent into the country of the Assassins, whom they call Mulibet,³ and commanded him to kill them all; another went to attack Persia and has already entered it and is about to invade the country of Turkey, so it is believed, and from there he will send out armies against Baghdad and Vastacius; one of the others he sent into Cathay against some who are not yet subject to him; the youngest uterine brother, by name Arabuccha [Arik Buka], he has kept with him and he has the orda of their mother who was a Christian and Master William is his slave.

One of his brothers on his father's side captured Master William in Hungary in a city called Belgrade, in which there was a Norman bishop from Belleville near Rouen. At the same time he captured a nephew of the bishop and I saw him there at Caracorum. He gave Master William to Mangu's mother for she begged hard to have him; after her death Master William passed into the possession of Arabuccha along with all the other appurtenances of his mother's orda and through him he was brought to the notice of Mangu Chan, who, after the completion of the work I have described, gave this master a hundred *iascot*, that is a thousand marks.

On the Vigil of the Ascension Mangu Chan said that he wanted to go to his mother's orda and visit it, for it was not far away. The monk also said that he would like to go with him and give his blessing to his mother's soul. The Chan gave his consent. In the evening of Ascension Day, the wife we have spoken about grew very much worse and the chief of the soothsayers sent to the monk telling him not to beat the board. The following day when the whole orda moved away, the establishment of this lady stayed behind. When we came to the spot where the orda was to be set down, the monk was ordered to go further away from the court than was his custom and he did so.

Arabuccha then came to meet his brother the Chan. The monk and we, seeing that he would pass by us, went to meet him with the cross. He, recognizing us, for he had on occasion been to our oratory, stretched out his hand and made the sign of the cross towards us just like a bishop. Then the monk, jumping onto a horse, followed him, taking with him some fruit. Arabuccha alighted in front of his brother's orda, to wait for him until he should return from hunting. The monk thereupon alighted at the same place and offered him his fruit, which he accepted.

Sitting near him were two nobles of the Chan's court, Saracens. Arabuccha, aware of the strife which exists between Christians and Saracens, asked the monk if he knew these Saracens. He replied: 'I know that they are dogs. Why do you have them in your company?' 'Why,' said they to him, 'do you insult us when we have not insulted you?' The monk replied to them: 'I speak the truth; you and your Mahomet are vile dogs.' In reply they then began to utter blasphemies against Christ, and Arabuccha put a stop to them saying: 'Do not say these things for we know that the Messiah is God.'

At that hour a mighty wind suddenly got up throughout the whole countryside so that it seemed as if demons were rushing all over it, and after a short time the report came that the wife had died.

On the morrow the Chan returned to his *orda* by a different route; for this is one of their superstitions that they never return by the same way as the one by which they come. Moreover when an *orda* has been pitched in a place, after it has been moved on no one dares to pass the site where it had been, either on horse or on foot, so long as there is any trace of a fire which had been made there.

That day some Saracens, coming up to the monk on the road, provoked him and argued with him; and when they jeered at him because he was incapable of defending himself by reasoning, he made as if to strike them with the whip he was carrying in his hand; and he made such a to-do that his words and actions were reported to the court, and the command was issued that we were to stay down with the other envoys and not in front of the court as we had done hitherto.

CHAPTER XXXV

THE SOOTHSAYERS

Their soothsayers,¹ as the Chan admitted, are their priests, and whatever they order to be done is carried out without delay. Their function I will describe to you as I was able to learn it from Master William and others who gave me a plausible account of them. There are many of them and they always have a chief like a pontiff and he always sets his house in front of Mangu Chan's chief dwelling, about a stone's throw away. All the carts carrying their idols are in his care, as I said above. The others are behind the court in the places assigned to them, and there come to them men from different parts of the world who put their trust in their art.

Some of them are skilled in astronomy, especially their chief, and they foretell the eclipse of the sun and moon; when this is going to take place all the people lay in stores of food so there will be no need for them to go out of the door of their dwelling. During the eclipse they beat their timbrels and sound their musical instruments and make a great din and mighty noise. When the eclipse is over, then they spend their time in eating and drinking and they make a great feast. The soothsayers declare which days are favourable or unfavourable for carrying on any kind of business; consequently the Mongols never perform military exercises or go to war unless they have given the word; and they would long since have returned to Hungary, but the soothsayers do not allow it.

Everything that is sent to the court they pass between fires, and they get their due share out of this. They also purify all the bedding of the dead by taking it between fires; for when anyone dies everything belonging to him is set on one side and is not mixed

with the other things in the orda until they have all been purified by fire; I saw this carried out in the case of the orda of the wife who died while we were there. There was therefore a two-fold reason why Friar Andrew and his companions had to pass through fires, both because they were bearing gifts and because these were intended for one who had already died, I mean Keu Chan. No such things were demanded of me for I was carrying nothing. If any animal or anything else falls to the ground while they are thus taking them through the fires, this belongs to the soothsayers.

On the ninth day of the month of May the soothsayers collect all the white mares of the herd and consecrate them. The Christian priests are also obliged to assemble there with their thurible. Then they cast new cosmos on the ground and they make a great feast on that day, for that is when they count on drinking fresh cosmos for the first time, just as with us in some places they do with the wine on the feast of Bartholomew or Sixtus and with fruit on the feast of James and Christopher.

The soothsayers are also called in when any male child is born, in order to foretell his fate; likewise when anyone is ill they are summoned and they recite their incantations and pronounce whether the sickness is natural or the result of sorcery. In this connection the woman from Metz, of whom I have already spoken, told me a remarkable story.

On a certain occasion a presentation was made of some very valuable furs, which were placed in the court of her mistress who, as I have already said, was a Christian. The soothsayers carried them between the fires and took of them more than was their due, and the woman in charge of this lady's treasure accused them of this to her mistress who, consequently, reprimanded them. After this it happened that the mistress fell ill and began to suffer from sudden pains in various parts of her body. The soothsayers were called in and, sitting some distance away, they ordered one of the maids to put her hand on the place of the pain and draw out whatever she might find. The girl, getting up, did this and discovered in her hand a piece of felt or some other kind of material. They then ordered her to put it on the ground; placed there it began to crawl like a live animal. It was then put into water and it turned, as it were, into a leech, and they said: 'My lady, some witch has injured you with her sorcery.' And they accused the woman who had brought the accusation against them concerning the furs. She was led outside the camp to the fields and for seven days was beaten and tortured in other ways to make her confess. In the meantime the mistress died. The woman hearing this said to them: 'I know that my mistress is dead; kill me so that I can follow her, for I have never done her any harm.' As she would confess nothing Mangu gave orders that she was to be allowed to live.

The soothsayers thereupon accused the nurse of the daughter of the lady I have mentioned; she was a Christian and her husband was the most esteemed of all the Nestorian priests. She was led to the torture along with one of her handmaids to make her confess; and the maid confessed that her mistress had sent her to speak with a horse to ask for an oracle from it. The woman herself confessed that she had done certain things to make herself loved by her mistress and to do good to her, but she had done nothing which could possibly harm her. She was then questioned as to whether her husband was aware of this. She made excuses for him saying that she had burned the characters and writing she had done herself. Then she was put to death, and Mangu sent her husband, the priest, to his bishop in Cathay for sentence, although he had not been found guilty.

In the meantime it came to pass that Mangu Chan's chief wife gave birth to a son. The soothsayers were called in to foretell the child's fate, and they all prophesied good

fortune, saying that he would have a long life and would be a mighty lord. A few days later it turned out that the child died. Then the mother, in a fury, summoned the soothsayers and said to them: 'You said that my son would live, and see, he is dead.' Then they replied: 'My lady, we now see the witch, Cirina's nurse, who was put to death the other day. She has killed your son, and now we see she is carrying him off.' A full-grown son and daughter of that woman had remained in the camp, and the Chan's wife, mad with rage, immediately sent for them, and she had the young man put to death by a man and the girl by a woman in revenge for her son, who, the soothsayers had said, had been killed by their mother.

A few days after this the Chan dreamed about these children and in the morning asked what had become of them. His servants were afraid to tell him and he, more anxious, asked where they were, for they had appeared to him in a vision by night. Then they told him. Straightway he sent to his wife, demanding where she had got the idea from that a woman could pass sentence of death without her husband's knowledge, and he had her shut up for seven days and ordered that no food was to be given to her. The man who had put the youth to death he had beheaded and his head hung round the neck of the woman who had murdered the girl, and he ordered her to be beaten with burning brands through the camp and afterwards put to death. The wife also he would have put to death but for the fact that he had children by her; and he left his *orda* and did not return for a month.

The soothsayers also disturb the weather with their incantations and when in the natural course of things the cold is so intense that they are unable to apply any remedy, then they search out men in the camp whom they accuse of being responsible for the cold and, without any delay, these are put to death.

Shortly before I left, one of the concubines had been sick and ailing for some time and the soothsayers chanted incantations over one of her slaves, a German, who slept for three days. When she returned to herself they asked her what she had seen; she had seen many people all of whom, they declared, would soon die; and since she had not seen her mistress there they pronounced that she would not die of this illness. I saw the girl still suffering from a severe headache as the result of her sleep.

Some of the soothsayers also invoke demons and they assemble in their dwelling by night those who wish to consult the demon and they place cooked meat in the middle. The *Kam* who is performing the invocation begins to chant his incantations, and, holding a tympanum, strikes it heavily on the ground. At length he begins to rage and has himself bound. Then the devil comes in the darkness and gives him meat to eat and he utters oracles.

On one occasion, so Master William told me, a Hungarian hid among them and the demon stayed on top of the dwelling saying that he could not come in because there was a Christian with them. Upon hearing this the Hungarian made his escape with all speed, for they were beginning to search for him. These and many other things they do which it would be tedious to tell of.

NOTES

Chapter V

1. This is the first mention in literature of the Argali, *Ovis Ammon*, the great wild sheep of the Altai.

Chapter VI

1. Moksha, a Finnish tribe, who lived on the Moksha, a tributary of the Oka.
2. Probably the Kirgiz, who at that time lived in Siberia north of the Altai Mountains.
3. The text reads 'papionibus', baboons: possibly it refers to some Asiatic monkey like the *Rhinopithecus* of China and Tibet.

Chapter VII

1. Cf. *supra*, p. 99.

Chapter XIX

1. Sea of Azov. The Tanais (Don) falls into this sea: it does not rise there.
2. The ancient name of east Caucasia.
3. John of Plano Carpini.
4. The Chamberlain and companion of Louis IX in the Holy Land. See Joinville, *Life of St. Louis*, tr. R. Hague (Sheed and Ward), p. 14.

Chapter XXI

1. The Black Bulgars, the inhabitants of Great Bulgaria on the Volga.
2. Deut. xxxii. 21.
3. This was the mission of Brother Julian which took place c. 1235–6. It is described in a short treatise—*Relatio Fratris Ricardi*—which is printed in *Scriptores Rerum Hungaricarum*, vol. II, pp. 538–42. Budapest 1938.
4. Blakia: Wallachia.
5. The land of the Kankali: the Kirgiz Steppe. The distance covered was over 1,000 miles.
6. The distance from Paris to Orleans: over seventy-five miles.

Chapter XXII

1. The Tien-Shan Mountains.
2. Probably Chuguchat in Tarbagatai, south of Lake Zaisan.
3. The country with no name was the territory to the north-west of the modern town of Frunze, the capital of the Soviet Kirgiz Republic, on the border of Eastern Kazakhstan.
4. The Chu.

Chapter XXIII

1. The mountains were the Tien-Shan Mountains. The ancients often extended the name of the Caucasus to the whole of the great mountain barrier of Western and Central Asia.
2. The modern town of Talas is situated on the river Talas in a valley of the Tien-Shan Mountains, some two hundred miles north-east of Tashkent.
3. The Chu, or perhaps the Ili, which falls into Lake Balkash.
4. Lake Balkash.
5. Cailac: the ancient Quayaligh or Kayalig near the modern town of Kopal in Semiretchensk (Eastern Kazakhstan).
6. The country really acquired its name from its ruler, the Khatun Organa, the widow of the successor of Jagatay.

Chapter XXIV

1. See Introduction, p. xxii.

Chapter XXV

1. 'Om! Mani padme hum': 'Hail to the jewel in the lotus'.

Chapter XXVI

1. The people of northern Tibet who at this time had extended their power over Kansu and north-west China.
2. Tibetans.
3. Manchuria.
4. Perhaps Hsi-chin, the pre-Mongol name for Peking.

Chapter XXIX

1. 'A piece of silver weighing ten marks' (p. 144).
2. This was the Sheik of the western Ismailians in Syria, commonly known as the Old Man of the Mountain.
3. Where St Louis IX of France was taken prisoner, and his forces of the Crusade destroyed by the Mamelukes in 1250.
4. These tablets (*paitze*) were used extensively by the Mongols as marks of official status. Several of them are to be found in the Hermitage Museum at Leningrad—cf. Vernadsky, *The Mongols in Russia*, p. 128.
5. See note *supra*, p. 91.
6. In 1254 in the first week of February.
7. This was a form of divination.
8. Probably the Kirgiz who at that time lived in the Minusinsk Steppe.
9. Perhaps the Orochon or Reindeer Tungus of North-Eastern Siberia.
10. Caule is Kaorli or Korea. Manse is the Sung Empire of South China which had not yet been conquered by the Mongols.

Chapter XXXII

1. The feast of the Ascension fell on 21 May in 1254.
2. II Cor. vi. 15–16.
3. i.e. Mulahid, see note on p. 125. It was Hulagu who conquered both the Assassin strongholds and Persia. See Introduction, p. xxv.

Chapter XXXV

1. William's account of the influence of the diviners or *Kams* at the Mongol court is very important and shows how the enlightened views of the Great Khans, which aroused Gibbon's admiration, were associated with a very primitive type of Shamanism and magical practices.

GUARD AND GOVERNMENT IN THE REIGN OF THE GRAND QAN MÖNGKE, 1251–59*

Thomas T. Allsen



In the Mongolian scheme of things, Činggis Qan entered upon the task of creating the Empire of the Great Mongols (*Yeke Mongγol Ulus*) at the command of Eternal Heaven (*Möngke Tenggeri*), the sky god and supreme deity of the steppe nomads. The power and protection of Eternal Heaven guaranteed the ultimate success of his enterprise and accounted for the special good fortune—narrow escapes, timely warnings, unexpected victories on the battlefield, etc.—that accompanied his rise to power. The special quality of his good fortune (*su*) served to identify him as a ruler endowed by heaven with sovereign power upon earth.¹

The sovereignty conferred on Činggis Qan and subsequently bequeathed to his successors was universal in its character. In the orders of submission customarily sent to neighboring countries prior to initiating hostilities, the Mongols claimed to have the right, if not the duty, to extend their sway over the entire world. All peoples outside their frontiers were considered members of the Mongols' "World Empire-in-the-making," and all, after appropriate and formal notification, were required to acknowledge Mongolian suzerainty without hesitation or question. Since in Mongolian eyes their expansion was divinely sanctioned, anyone refusing to submit was thwarting the will of heaven and deserving of the harshest punishments. The Mongols therefore construed their military expansion as a legitimate and necessary means of chastising rebellious peoples, of "converting" all the potential members of their great imperium into actual and actively participating ones.²

These ideas, especially the concept of a heavenly mandate, echo, of course, well-known Chinese and Iranian views on sovereignty and sacral kingship, but Turkic parallels for all elements of Mongolian ideology can be found as well. The series of runic inscriptions erected in Mongolia during the period of the Türk Qayanate (552–741) clearly indicate that the early Türks also viewed good fortune (*qut*) as an essential attribute of sovereignty and that they saw their pretensions to universal dominion as sanctified by their sky-god, Tengri. Whatever the provenance of these notions, Chinese, Iranian or Inner Asian, it seems fairly certain that the Mongols learned of them through the mediation of the Turkic peoples, more particularly the Uiyurs, who were the direct political heirs of the Türk Qayanate and the initial political and administrative tutors of the early Mongolian *qayans*.³

While in theory the power wielded by a Mongolian sovereign was unlimited and

universal, in practice he had to delegate or share considerable authority in order to administer his realm. Given the immense size of the Mongolian empire, those to whom the *qayan* delegated authority often exercised it at great distance from the court. Opportunities for corruption and abuse, or for otherwise ignoring and frustrating the will of the emperor were always present. How, then, did a Mongolian *qayan* try to curb such assaults on his sovereign power and ensure that the authority he shared was used only as intended? This paper will attempt to answer this question by investigating the pattern of recruitment and utilization of high civil and military officials during the reign of one of the most successful Mongolian *qayans*, Möngke (r. 1251–59), Činggis Qan's grandson, who presided over the empire during a period of rapid expansion and centralized control. It is also hoped that this investigation will shed additional light on the general nature of the institutions of the early Mongolian empire, i.e., the reigns of Činggis Qan (1206–27), Ögödei (1229–41), Güyüg (1246–48) and Möngke.

MÖNGKE AND THE MONGOLIAN EMPIRE

In the summer of 1251 along the Kerülen River an assembly (*quriltai*) of princes and high officials for the second time enthroned Möngke, the eldest son of Tolui, as *qayan* of the Mongolian empire.⁴ At his first coronation, held in 1249 at Ālā Qamāq, an area somewhere to the south of Lake Balkhash, the princes of the rival Čayadaid and Ögödeid lines refused to attend, arguing that the election of a new *qayan* had to take place in the area of the Onan-Kerülen Rivers where Činggis Qan first had been proclaimed emperor. Bowing to the force of tradition, the Toluids and their Jočid supporters agreed to reconvene the *quriltai* in the Mongolian homeland. In the meantime, Möngke's family and allies made every effort to induce disaffected members of the imperial clan to attend the new assembly and to acknowledge their candidate's election in the interest of the unity of the empire. Their efforts achieved limited results: a few members of the lines of Čayadaid and Ögödei agreed to come, but most, for reasons of family loyalty, continued to reject the invitations repeatedly delivered by special messengers. Because of these ongoing attempts to win over the opposition, the *quriltai* to reaffirm Möngke's election was postponed for some time. Seeing that the opposition was only interested in forcing further delays, Batu, the head of the Jočid line and a firm supporter of Möngke, finally ordered the assembly to reconvene with or without the recalcitrant members of the imperial clan.

To no one's surprise, the gathering, held along the Kerülen in 1251, reaffirmed Möngke's elevation without a word of dissent. Those who boycotted the ceremonies, having been presented with a *fait accompli*, were now forced to take some positive action on their own behalf or simply acquiesce to Möngke's election. The descendants of Ögödei and their Čayadaid supporters accordingly came to an agreement among themselves, deciding upon desperate measures. Under the guise of coming to congratulate Möngke, Širemün, a grandson of Ögödei, and Naqu, a son of Güyüg, planned to assassinate the newly installed emperor and all of his backers. Unhappily for the conspirators, a retainer of Möngke's discovered their true intention by pure chance. Alerted to the danger by this miraculous stroke of "good fortune," Möngke dispatched troops to head off the two princes and their followers. Unaware that their plans had been exposed, the would-be assassins were surprised by Möngke's forces and quickly taken into custody.

Now firmly in power, the new *qayan*'s first order of business was to settle with the opposition. Many Ögödeid and Čayadaid princes, even those not directly involved in the assassination plot, were arrested, tried and punished by exile or death. Širemün, the Ögödeid's candidate for the throne, was among those executed. Möngke in addition sent special tribunals throughout the empire to ferret out disloyal elements in the army and the administrative apparatus. All government officials who had served under Ögödei and his son Güyüg were carefully screened, and many were charged and executed. Several local dynasts who had gained office under Ögödeid auspices met the same fate.

The purge brutally but efficiently completed, Möngke could now turn his attention to the affairs of the realm. At the time of his accession the Mongolian empire included within its frontiers the whole of the Eurasian steppe and large portions of the adjoining sedentary zone. The emperor and his immediate family exercised direct control over northern Korea, eastern Siberia, Manchuria, Mongolia, North China, Uiyuristan, Khurāsān and the Transcaucasus. West Turkistan and parts of East Turkistan were under the nominal authority of the Čayadaids, whose rulers, Mubārāq Shāh, a minor, and his mother, *Oryana, who served as regent, were both docile appointees of the Toluids. Möngke's closest allies, the house of Joči, held sway over western Siberia, the Rus principalities, Khwārazm and the North Caucasus. The administration of the Jočid territories (known later as the Golden Horde) was in practice a joint undertaking in which agents of the emperor and those of Batu collaborated on roughly equal terms.

Although his domains were already vast, Möngke had every intention of implementing the mandate of Činggis Qan to "conquer every country in the world."⁵ To this end he placed Khurāsān and the Transcaucasus under the princely jurisdiction of his brother Hülegü and ordered him to extend Mongolian (and Toluid) rule over Iraq and Syria. Qubilai, another of the emperor's brothers, was given a similar commission in East Asia. Granted princely authority over North China, Qubilai was directed to initiate a campaign in Southwest China to establish a base of operations in Szechwan and Yunan from which further assaults could be mounted against the Sung dynasty and Southeast Asia. Simultaneously with these massive operations in China and the Middle East (both of which commenced in 1252) smaller, but by no means minor, campaigns were organized against Korea and Kashmir.

At the same time he initiated this new round of expansion, Möngke energetically introduced a program of internal reform—"reform" in the sense of systematizing and regularizing the administration and finances of the empire. He instituted a unified system of assessing and collecting taxes; limited the right of appanage princes to summon or tax their subjects; restricted use of the postal relay stations (*jam*, pl. *jamud*) to official travelers; recalled all seals and badges of authority issued since the death of Činggis Qan; and brought the Muslim and Uiyur merchant companies (*ortaqs*) under control. In initiating these economic and institutional reforms, Möngke had one major objective: to maximize his access to the human and material resources of the empire—resources that were needed to fuel further conquest. The emperor well understood that waging war on the scale contemplated called for an administrative effort of comparable scope and intensity.

ADMINISTRATION OF THE REALM

Overall direction of the empire's administrative and financial affairs was entrusted to a Central Secretariat (*chung-shu-sheng* 中書省 in Chinese administrative terminology)⁶ based in Mongolia. Below the Central Secretariat there were three, or possibly four, regional secretariats, or administrations, whose main responsibilities were to govern the sedentary populations of the empire. The secretariats for North China, Turkistan and Iran, established during the reign of Ögödei and the regency of Töregene (1241–46), were taken over intact by Möngke, who may have added a fourth for the administration of the Rus principalities later in his reign.⁷

Unfortunately, the Mongolian terminology for the regional secretariats is nowhere given. In the *Yüan shih* the secretariat for North China is termed the *Yen-ching teng-ch'u hsing-shang-shu-sheng*, 燕京等處行尚書省 literally, the “Mobile Secretariat for Yen-ching and Other Places”; its counterpart in Turkistan is called the *Pieh-shih Pa-li* 別石八里 (Beshbaliq) *teng-ch'u hsing-shang-shu-sheng*; and that in Iran the *A-mu* 阿木 (Amu [Darya]), *teng-ch'u hsing-shang-shu-sheng*.⁸ In the Persian sources these same bodies are called the *dīvāns* (chancelleries) for Khurāsān (Iran), Turkistan, etc.⁹

In Möngke's reign the governor (*hsing-shang-shu-sheng-shih* 行尚書省事) of the administration of North China was the Khwārazmian Turk Maḥmūd Yalavač; Maṣ'ūd Beg, his son, was in charge of Turkistan; and the Oyirad Mongol Aryūn Aqa headed the secretariat in Iran. All three had previously held the same post under the Ögödeids and had managed to survive the change of regimes unscathed. To some degree this can be ascribed to their political acumen and to their experience and skill as administrators, but more important, I think, is the fact that none were identified exclusively with the former ruling house, in this case the Ögödeids, since their appointment to office had been made by the grand *qan* in conjunction with other princely lines. In theory and to some extent in practice, the heads of the regional administrations were representatives of the royal clan as a whole, not of a particular princely house.

There are various pieces of evidence that regional administrations were operated on a “joint” basis.¹⁰ The *Shu'ab-i panjgānah* of Rašīd al-Dīn, an unpublished genealogical supplement to his *Jāmi' al-tavārikh* (Collection of Chronicles), provides some interesting data in this regard. From the lists of ministers and officials that are appended to the genealogies of the grand *qans* and many of the regional *qans*, it is apparent that the heads of the regional secretariats served more than one prince at the same time. Maḥmūd Yalavač, for example, is listed among the *amīrs* (ministers) of Möngke and also among the *amīrs* of Qubilai, the *qayan's* younger brother, who as noted above, had been granted princely jurisdiction over North China around 1251.¹¹ In other words, Maḥmūd Yalavač, as the governor of the regional secretariat of North China, served, at least in principle, two masters simultaneously until his death in 1254—the grand *qan* in Mongolia and the regional *qan* over whose territories he had direct administrative authority. The same is true of Aryūn Aqa, who is counted as a minister of both Möngke and his younger brother Hülegü (r. 1256–65), the founder of the Īl-khāns of Iran.¹²

The staffing of the regional secretariats further underscores their character as “joint” administrations. Each princely house, including that of the *qayan* himself, could assign a personal representative of its own choosing to the staff of a regional administration. Thus, in China Maḥmūd Yalavač's chief assistants were the Mongol Buḡir,¹³ an agent of Möngke, and the Chinese Chao Pi 趙璧, who represented Qubilai's interests.¹⁴ In Iran Aryūn Aqa's assistants included the representatives of Möngke, his brothers Hülegü

and Ariγ Böke, their mother, Sorqaytani Beki, and Batu, the *qan* of the Golden Horde (r. ca. 1237–56).¹⁵

In addition to the “liaison officers” from various Činggisid lines, the staffs of the regional administration included many officials and clerks recruited from the native population who possessed an intimate knowledge of local conditions, languages, and administrative traditions. The Mongols themselves had neither the numbers nor the cultural background to provide personnel of this type. Within China native scholars and administrators were attached to Qubilai as advisers, and the emperor and his agents employed others. Yüehho-nai 月合乃, an Önggüd Turk who assisted Bujir, utilized numerous Confucian scholars as local leaders in Honan.¹⁶ The emperor appointed Chinese to a variety of local offices such as transportation commissioner, and one even held the title of *daruyachi*.¹⁷

To discharge their duties properly, the staffs of the regional administrations—aptly called “mobile secretariats” in Chinese—were constantly on the move in Möngke’s reign overseeing the implementation of imperial policy. On the local level they worked in close conjunction with the aforementioned *daruyachis*, or imperial agents, whom the *qayan* posted to all major population centers, courts of dependent states, and large military commands. Together they were responsible for generating sufficient supplies, war materiel, manpower and financial resources to sustain Möngke’s new campaigns of conquest. To accomplish this the regional secretariats and the local *daruyachis* carried out a census of the population of the empire from Korea to Novgorod, by which taxes were assessed and collected, troops and technical specialists recruited, corvée assigned, and useful natural resources identified. Despite the magnitude of the task, the regional administrations successfully completed their work of surveying and recording the resources of much of Eurasia before the end of Möngke’s reign.¹⁸

Given the make-up of the personnel of the regional secretariats, representing as they did various competing interest groups—the imperial court, the regional *qans*, other princely houses, and local elites—Möngke kept these bodies under continuous surveillance and scrutiny. The imperially appointed *daruyachis* (*basqaqs* in the Persian sources), who enjoyed the privilege of communicating directly with the throne, kept the *qayan* informed of developments on the local level, and thus effectively monitored the work of the regional secretariats from below.¹⁹ The representatives (*nököd*) of Möngke attached to the staffs of Aryun Aqa, Maḥmūd Yalavač, etc., monitored the regional administrations from within.²⁰ Ultimate responsibility for initiating and directing the work of the “mobile secretariats” (monitoring them from above) was in the hands of the central secretariat in Mongolia. It was through this institution more than any other that Möngke exercised his sovereignty.

At his second elevation along the Kerülen, Möngke’s senior officers were arrayed in order of precedence before the new *qayan*.²¹ According to the Persian historian Juvaynī, Menggeser, a Ḥalayir Mongol who held the title of chief judge (*yeke jaryuči*), was counted as “the leader of the *amīrs* of court and the most senior of the pillars of the state.”²² The Chinese sources confirm this, calling Menggeser (Mang-ko-su-erh 忙哥撒兒) chief judge (*Ta tuan-shih-kuan* 大斷事官) and senior minister of state (*ch’eng-hsiang* 丞相).²³ As Möngke’s second in command, Menggeser had an intimate relationship with the emperor and bore final responsibility for day-to-day operation of the imperial government. Through his subordinates he managed the religious communities, princely appanages (*fen-ti* 分地) and the treasury, and was responsible for publication of official edicts and the conduct of official ceremonies and sacrifices.²⁴

Next in seniority was Bulγai, a Kereyid Mongol who professed Nestorian Christianity. He was in charge of the secretaries (*bičēčis*) and chamberlains (*čerbis*), assumed direct responsibility for issuing imperial orders and scheduling audiences, received tribute, and recorded memorials concerning internal and external affairs.²⁵ When Menggeser died in 1254, Bulγai, a confidant of both the *qayan* and the deceased minister, was made right (i.e. senior) minister of state (*yu-ch'eng-hsiang* 右丞相), and, according to his biography in the *Yüan shih*, “subsequently . . . became responsible for state policy.”²⁶ In rising to the “premiership,” Bulγai retained his former duties as head of the secretaries, and also acquired Menggeser’s responsibilities as chief judge. Rubruck, who arrived at the Mongolian court in 1254, describes Bolgay (Bulγai) as “chief scribe (i.e. *yeke-bičēči*) and judiciary (i.e., *yeke-žaryučī*).”²⁷ Elsewhere in his narrative, the friar says that Bulγai “is the chief scribe of the court and tries those guilty of capital offenses.”²⁸

Combining as he did control over the administrative, financial and judicial organs of the state, Bulγai became the most powerful official in the empire. According to Rubruck, he had a great deal of influence with Möngke, who usually followed his advice in most matters.²⁹ Bulγai survived Möngke and subsequently supported Ariγ Böke’s claim to the throne. When Ariγ Böke finally surrendered to his rival, Qubilai, in 1264, Bulγai was put to death on charges of having incited the prince to rebellion.

Under the regimes of both Menggeser and Bulγai the central secretariat was divided into a series of subsections, each formed to treat with specific facets of administration. The *Yüan shih* records that there was an office in charge of the postal service, headed by a certain Jirwōdai (Chih-erh-wo-tai 只兒斡帶). The *ortoqs* (*wo-t’o* 斡脫) working for the imperial court were under the management of two officials, Po-lan 孛蘭 and Ho-la-sun 合剌孫. A special office dealing with sacrifices, shamans and fortunetellers also was established. The duties of its director, A-hu-ch’a 阿忽察, and his assistant, Alay Buqa (A-la Pu-hua 阿剌不花), quite likely were related to the officially sponsored veneration of Činggis Qan initiated by Möngke. Tekečük (T’ieh-ko-ch’ou 帖哥紬), a Uiyur, directed the imperial treasuries and arsenals. The security of the treasuries was the responsibility of the commander of the military garrison at Qara Qorum, Qongyur (Huang-wu-erh 晃兀兒), and his assistant, Alamdār (A-lan-ta-erh 阿蘭答兒).³⁰

Each of the senior officials had many aides and clerks to assist him in his duties; Bulγai, for instance, was assisted by two senior Muslim scribes and a number of Mongols.³¹ The support staff was quite large, since detailed records were kept of all government business. Rubruck notes that he was queried at length at the imperial court concerning his reasons for coming to the Mongols, and that court scribes, a Mongol and several Muslims, carefully took down everything he said.³² The volume of paper work was further increased because of the variety of languages in use throughout the empire. Juvaynī states that scribes knowing Persian, Uiyur, Chinese, Tibetan and Tangut were employed to render imperial decrees into the appropriate local language.³³ That all these languages were used in the secretariat is evidenced by the fact that in consequence of his stay at the imperial camp, Rubruck was able to describe with great accuracy the writing systems of the Chinese, Tibetans, Mongols, Tanguts, Uiyurs and “Arabs.”³⁴ Government documents, in whatever language, were written in a simple, direct style, unadorned with superfluous titles or formulas, and preserved in an “archive” (*khazāyin-i adraj va aurāq*, literally, “the treasuries of scrolls and documents”) at the imperial camp.³⁵

Owing to the large number of administrative and clerical personnel, a sizable part of Qara Qorum was set aside for their use. The capital, in Rubruck’s description, was

divided into a Muslim section that housed the bazaars; a Chinese section where artisans and craftsmen worked; and a third section, fitted out with large palaces, that was inhabited exclusively by court scribes.³⁶ It should be remembered, however, that as Möngke still followed a largely nomadic lifestyle, he was only in the capital for part of the year. The emperor spent the rest of the time in various “satellite” camps and hunting grounds that surrounded the imperial capital.³⁷ When on the move, a large portion of the imperial court and government traveled with him. In effect, the administrative center of the empire was any place the *qayan* decided to camp or hunt.³⁸

In concluding this section, one point deserves special emphasis. With the exception of a Turk or two, the senior officials of the central secretariat were exclusively Mongolian.³⁹ Chinese were conspicuous by their absence. Chinese did serve as scribes at Möngke’s court, but none are found at decision-making levels. Möngke had been persuaded by the noted scholar Kao Chih-yao 高智耀 to free the *ju* (Confucians) from corvée and to make more extensive use of them in the administration of Chinese territory, i.e. in the regional administration of North China,⁴⁰ but the emperor saw no need to employ them in responsible positions in the Central Secretariat. The Mongols had gained considerable administrative experience by this time and Möngke felt that the Mongolian empire, to the fullest extent practicable, should be run by Mongolian hands.

RECRUITMENT AND UTILIZATION OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL

Unlike the regional administrations, which represented the interests of the entire imperial clan, the Central Secretariat was a creature of the *qayan*. It contained no liaison officials or observers from other princely lines. Its officers, high and low, were bound by ties of personal loyalty and long friendship with the emperor and his family. Its main functions were to advise the ruler on all matters of state and to keep under close and continuous surveillance the activities of all lower organs of administration in the interests of the throne. It was, in short, the principal means by which Möngke made his will manifest.

The intensely personal character of this institution is clearly revealed in the way in which senior officials were recruited. By and large the personnel of the Central Secretariat, so far as their backgrounds can be traced, were all long-time servitors of the Toluids. In many cases they not only served Möngke, but had started their careers as members of Tolui’s household establishment. Such an establishment was built around the personal bodyguard (*kešig* in Mongolian, *su-wei* 宿衛 in Chinese) each prince of the blood was permitted to form. The core of this detachment, often obtained through inheritance, was normally composed of the sons and relatives of Mongolian noblemen and military commanders, but included as well individuals of different social and ethnic backgrounds who possessed some talent or skill useful to an aspiring prince. In other words, Möngke, in forming the Central Secretariat, simply drew upon his own and his father’s *kešigs* for key personnel. This is best illustrated by looking at the early careers of several of the *qayan*’s officials.

Menggeser and other members of his family began service in the household of Činggis Qan. Following the latter’s death, Menggeser entered the *kešig* of Tolui. Here he was soon put in charge of Tolui’s household and given control over the sedentary population attached to this prince’s appanage. After Tolui died, he continued in

Sorqaytani Beki's service and in 1235, when Möngke departed from Mongolia for the campaign in the Russian and Qipčaq lands, Menggeser accompanied him, acting in a variety of military and administrative capacities. Upon his return to Mongolia around 1241, Möngke placed the management of his household in Menggeser's hands.⁴¹ Another senior *amīr* whose career follows this same pattern of service is the Baya'ud Mongol, Qubilai, a *qorči* ("quiver bearer"), who successively attended Činggis Qan, Tolui, Sorqaytani Beki and Möngke.⁴² Šigi Qutuqu, Činggis Qan's first *jarγuči*, who enjoyed the status of "elder statesman" at Möngke's court, could also make a similar claim.⁴³

Others who began their official careers later could nonetheless boast long family association with Činggis Qan and the Toluids. Bulγai's father and uncles, for instance, served Činggis Qan as scribes before Bulγai first entered service as an officer in Tolui's guard.⁴⁴ The Süldüs, Jaran, a *bayurči* ("steward") at the court of Möngke, was the son of Toγril, who had served Činggis Qan, Tolui and Sorqaytani Beki.⁴⁵ Möngke also drew upon his guard and that of his father for lower echelon personnel of non-Mongol origin. Chang Shan 張善 and his son, Chang Li-tao 張立道, who were scribes (*bičēči*) at the imperial court, had held similar positions in Tolui's *kešig*.⁴⁶ While it is not known if another of Möngke's Chinese scribes, Chang T'ing-chen 張庭珍, was in the guard, his son Chang T'ing-shui 張庭瑞 definitely was a member.⁴⁷

Möngke obviously favored long-time family retainers for both senior and junior positions in the central secretariat. The personnel pool available to him was in part inherited from his father, but Möngke, of course, was free to add to it as he saw fit. Sali Noyan, who held an important military command in West Asia, was placed into the ranks of the *amīrs* in consequence of an act of military daring that Möngke witnessed when a young prince.⁴⁸ As emperor, he enrolled Liu Shih-chi 劉世濟 into the guard and made him a *bičēči* in 1255 on the request of the aspirant's father, Liu Min 劉敏, who was an assistant to Maḥmūd Yalavač.⁴⁹ Others, too, must have been added on the basis of demonstrated merit or recommendation, presumably from among persons unattached to any other princely house. So far as I can determine, of the thirty-four *amīrs* of Möngke listed in the *Shu'ab-i panjgānah*,⁵⁰ only one, Danišmand Ḥājib, seems to have served another Činggisid line, the Ögödeids.⁵¹

The way in which Möngke made use of his officials further affirms the intimate relationship between the Central Secretariat and the imperial guard. To make this connection clear, a few preliminary words concerning the functions of the *kešig* are necessary. The kinds of duties assigned to it were varied. When Činggis Qan formed his guard he included in its ranks, according to the *Secret History of the Mongols*, chamberlains, quiver bearers, stewards, doorkeepers and grooms.⁵² The chapter on military affairs in the *Yüan shih* indicates in addition that the guard handled matters relating to archery, falconry and storage of weapons, and provided heralds, scribes, writers of decrees, cooks, gatekeepers, equerries, herders, wagoners, musicians, and people who maintained the regalia of office and other garments.⁵³ Beyond providing security for the emperor, it is obvious from the above enumeration that the guard also functioned as a household establishment that looked after his personal needs and helped him mobilize and manage the economic resources of his realm.⁵⁴ In this connection, it is most revealing that Juvaynī, in his account of Möngke's Central Secretariat, combines together as "pillars of the state" officials in charge of assessing taxes, processing petitions, making personnel appointments and managing the arsenal with those responsible for clothing, hunting-birds and hunting-animals.⁵⁵

This failure to distinguish clearly between imperial household and imperial government is well reflected in the activities of senior officials. Menggeser, it will be recalled, was chief judge and senior minister of state. In his capacity as *yeke jaryučī* it was his duty to adjudicate all legal matters and to deal with the complaints of the people. He also held the title of *qorči* and headed the imperial guard.⁵⁶ This was not an honorary post, but an active command. When the plot of Širemün and Naqu was discovered shortly after Möngke had been enthroned, it was Menggeser who was dispatched to investigate the matter, and it was his troops (i.e. contingents from the *kešig*) who surprised and arrested the conspirators.⁵⁷ Immediately following their detention, Möngke, as a first step toward sorting out the entire affair, instructed Menggeser to bring to trial retainers of the rebellious princes. A hearing was immediately convened and after several days of subtle questioning, as Rašīd al-Dīn expresses it, the defendants confessed their traitorous intentions, thereby acknowledging the legitimacy of Möngke's claims upon the throne. In the end all were found guilty and most were executed.⁵⁸

In the course of this one episode we see Menggeser functioning in various capacities: as head of the guard he protects the person of the emperor, as chief judge he tries those accused of high treason, and as senior minister of state he sees to it that the "confessions" of the defendants help to confirm his sovereign's right to rule. In the abstract the individual offices Menggeser held had fairly specific duties, but in practice his numerous responsibilities tended to overlap considerably, if not at times merge indistinguishably into one another. For example, when he interrogated those involved in the assassination plot, was he acting as security officer, judge or political adviser?

The principal task of Bulγai, as the chief scribe and receiver of tributes, was to monitor the work of the regional secretariats. This he did by periodic examinations of the records of these administrations, particularly those relating to financial matters. In 1252 Bulγai carefully scrutinized Aryun Aqa's handling of the affairs of Khurāsān. In 1256–57 these accounts were gone over once again.⁵⁹ In addition to this rather demanding position, Bulγai also held an appointment as chamberlain, or *čerbi* (a household title), the duties of which office he actually performed. While visiting the tent of the imperial prince Baltu, a companion of Rubruck unwittingly stepped upon the threshold, a strong taboo among the Mongols. The transgressor was taken forthwith to Bulγai and the next day the chamberlain, as guardian of court etiquette and procedure, visited the friar's quarters to make "diligent enquiry" into the matter.⁶⁰ Apparently, too, his position as chamberlain involved responsibility for provisioning the imperial camp. This, in any event, would explain why Rubruck states that on one occasion he saw the worthy Bulγai personally doling out food rations to the Nestorian priests attached to the court!⁶¹ Empty, honorific titles, it seems, were infrequent in the early Mongol Empire.

At Menggeser's death, as previously noted, Bulγai, without relinquishing any of his earlier duties, was made chief judge and senior minister of state. From Rubruck's testimony it is evident that Menggeser's responsibilities in the area of security and counter-intelligence also were transferred to Bulγai. When rumors began to culminate in Qara Qorum that four hundred agents of the Order of Assassins were on their way to kill Möngke because the Mongols were preparing an attack on their forts in Iran,⁶² it was Bulγai, now in his role as commander of the guard, who personally interrogated Rubruck and his associates to determine if they might be party to or have knowledge of the plot.⁶³

Officials of less exalted rank, as well, continued to perform their older guard/household functions after assuming duties in the imperial government. Bala, a *jarγuči* who helped to investigate Širemün's abortive assassination attempt, doubled as a steward.⁶⁴ And the unnamed Mongolian official who escorted Rubruck to an inquiry concerning his mission to the east is described in the latter's narrative as one of the chief scribes of the court, and as the *qayan's* cup-bearer.⁶⁵

Once a retainer demonstrated his loyalty and competence as a member of the household, he could expect to undertake a diverse assortment of assignments in the course of his career. Tekečük, who managed the imperial treasury, was also in charge of the administration of princely appanages in East Turkistan.⁶⁶ 'Alamdār, the "standard bearer" (a household title), served his sovereign in numerous ways.⁶⁷ Originally a *bičēči*, he was sent to the Čayadaid princes between Möngke's two enthronements in an effort to persuade them to give up their opposition to the Toluid candidate.⁶⁸ Once in power, Möngke named 'Alamdār assistant garrison commander of Qara Qorum and its imperial treasuries. In 1257 the emperor dispatched him to Shensi to assess and collect taxes. As part of this assignment, he headed an investigation into the administration of Ching-chao 京兆, Qubilai's appanage (*fēn-ti*) in Shensi and Honan. The inquiry, prompted by complaints of corruption, resulted in the execution of the chief pacification officer (*hsüan-fu-shih* 宣撫使) of Shensi and the chastisement of his underlings.⁶⁹ Following this 'Alamdār returned to his post in Qara Qorum, and when Möngke died in 1259 he rallied to the cause of Ariγ Böke, serving the latter as political agent, military recruiter and army commander.⁷⁰

Mongolian officials, in brief, were generalists rather than specialists. Not only were their tasks multiple, since they normally held several offices concurrently, but the *qayan* in practice used his subordinates in any way he thought fit. Thus the range of activity undertaken by a given subordinate was determined as much by convenience and force of circumstance as by the functions of the specific offices he held.

MÖNGKE'S CENTRAL SECRETARIAT—ITS GENEALOGY AND GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

The Central Secretariat, as constituted under Möngke, has an institutional genealogy that can be reconstructed in some detail.⁷¹ In the early 1180s, in the course of retrieving horses stolen from his family, Činggis Qan acquired the first of his many *nököd* (companions), Bo'orču, a Mongol of the Arulad lineage.⁷² As was common practice, Činggis Qan, a Borjigin, had recruited Bo'orču from an "external" source: *nököd* were seldom if ever, members of an aspiring *qan's* own lineage, i.e. his kinsmen. And like Bo'orču, most of the subsequent recruits joined Činggis Qan's retinue on the basis of free association. In the majority of cases it appears they came from aristocratic families, but some commoners were included as well.⁷³ Loyalty and talent were perhaps the most important requirements for entry into the ranks of the *nököd*.

By the time he assumed the title of *qan*, around 1187, Činggis Qan had amassed a considerable retinue, which he now, as befitted his stature as a tribal chieftain, formed into a household establishment, granting his various companions appropriate titles—cook, steward, herder, chamberlain, etc.⁷⁴ By these appointments, although it is not so stated in the sources, Činggis Qan also laid the foundation for his personal guard, or

kešig, and created the kernel around which the later imperial administration would grow.⁷⁵

The formal organization of the guard took place in 1203, when Činggis Qan established a day watch (*turay*) of seventy men, a night watch (*kebtægöl*) of eighty men, and a detachment of braves (*bayatud*) numbering one thousand. He also used the same occasion to increase the number of his stewards and chamberlains.⁷⁶ In 1206, following his enthronement on the Kerülen, Činggis Qan greatly enlarged this body of "soldier-servants"⁷⁷ from 1,150 to ten thousand men.⁷⁸ Thus recast and expanded to shoulder the new administrative burdens placed upon it by the creation of the Mongolian state, this body, consisting of old retainers, their sons and brothers, hostages and recent recruits, functioned throughout the remainder of Činggis Qan's lifetime as security force, household establishment, elite military unit and imperial administration.

Upon his death the imperial guard passed to his designated successor, his third son, Ögödei.⁷⁹ Under the new *qayan* the *kešig* retained both its domestic and governmental functions. As the household establishment it provisioned the imperial encampments (*ordos*), organized hunts and maintained the emperor's personal possessions. In its role as the imperial government the guard administered justice, operated the postal relay system, and supervised the collection of revenue.⁸⁰ Principal responsibility for monitoring the activities of the regional secretariats was also vested in the *kešig*. This is borne out by the fact that Činqai, a chamberlain in the imperial household, who served concurrently as Ögödei's chief scribe (protonotary), countersigned, i.e. validated, all official documents issued by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, the head of the regional administration for North China.⁸¹

When Ögödei died his guard went to his son and successor, Güyüg, under whom it continued to function as the imperial government. Although Qadaq, Güyüg's childhood tutor (*atabeg*), now emerged as an influential figure at court, the experienced Činqai still retained his position as chief scribe and senior minister of state.

While the Ögödeids received the lion's share of the household troops, one unit of the guards, the elite "personal thousand" of Činggis Qan, came into the possession of the fourth son, Tolui.⁸² He inherited as well the extensive properties—camps, treasuries, herds, etc.—attached to his father's household. According to nomadic tradition, as the youngest son, the *otčigin*, or "prince of the hearth," all this was Tolui's rightful due.⁸³ At Tolui's death, c. 1233, this legacy passed to his widow, Sorqaytani Beki, and thence to her sons, Möngke, Qubilai, Hülegü and Ariy Böke.⁸⁴ It is not, therefore, surprising that the Central Secretariat of Möngke's day resembled in all essentials the *kešig* of Činggis Qan's; Möngke had, after all, received the core of his own guard/household establishment as a direct inheritance from his grandfather and father, and when he became *qayan* he merely converted it into an imperial administration.

The government of the early Mongolian empire, as Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing has pointed out, had a strong patrimonial flavor.⁸⁵ Patrimonial regimes, in Max Weber's formulation, arise out of the patriarchal household of a chieftan who acquires territories and subjects beyond his own domains. His retainers, who have hitherto been concerned solely with the management of their master's own household and properties, now fall heir to broader administrative responsibilities without, however, giving up their original domestic functions. Thus the household establishment, in terms of function, organization and personnel is virtually indistinguishable from the state apparatus.⁸⁶

Such a system of governance, as we have seen, grew out of Činggis Qan's household

and was bequeathed to his early successors. In Möngke's reign the identification of royal household and imperial administration was still very strong. Throughout his rule, it will be remembered, the offices of senior minister of state and commander of the guard, i.e. head of the household, were always vested in the same person. Officials, whatever the dignity of their posts in the imperial administration, regularly performed household functions, sometimes of an apparently menial nature. This meant, of course, that the *qayan* and his officials lived and worked together in a domestic setting; indeed it was expected that the emperor would maintain his companions/officials at his own table as part of their recognized remuneration. In consequence of such close and continuous association with his subordinates, it was possible for Möngke to exercise his authority in a direct and personal manner.

Quite naturally then, the primary delegation of imperial power in Möngke's reign was within his guard/household establishment. The loyalty of his officials was not open to question: their fidelity was of an intensely personal character, to the man rather than the office, and had been amply demonstrated through long service in the Toluid household.⁸⁷ Their competency for office had been established in similar fashion. Both Menggeser and Bulγai acquired their administrative credentials managing the properties and populations attached to the private domains of the Toluids in the years prior to Möngke's elevation.⁸⁸ As a household establishment, the bookkeeping and bureaucratic functions of the guard were extensive and important. This is reflected in the Mongolian practice of dating official documents and imperial decrees "by the day of the *kešig* of a given officer."⁸⁹

The household acted, therefore, as training ground, proving ground and recruiting ground for central government personnel in the reign of Möngke. And it supplied as well many of the officials at the lower levels of the imperial administration. Buḟir, Möngke's representative on the staff of the regional secretariat of North China and successor (c. 1255) to Maḥmūd Yalavač, was a long-time Toluid retainer. He was among the troops Tolui inherited from his father and later served as Möngke's legate in North China during the reign of Güyüg. In this capacity he investigated, in cooperation with agents of Güyüg, suspected irregularities in the administration of princely appanages in Hopei.⁹⁰ Background information on Naimadai and Turumdai, Möngke's representatives on the Khurāsān regional administration, is not available, but it is significant that Juvaynī, a contemporary, always refers to them, and any other deputies of the emperor, as *nököd*.⁹¹ In my view, these "companions" of the *qayan* were unquestionably members of the guard/household establishment. The same is probably true of the *daruyāči* who acted as the eyes and ears of the emperor at the local level of government.⁹² The chief *basqaq* of Harāt, Čaqu (Jāhū), is clearly identified as one "of the notables from the court of the Emperor Mānkū Khān," and the fact that his opposite number in Kīrmān, Qundughai, bears the title of *qorči* testifies to his household connections.⁹³ Important military commands, too, were given to members of the *kešig*. Uriyangqadai, the son of Sübēdei, who directed the campaign in Southwest China against the Sung, entered Möngke's guard sometime before 1245.⁹⁴ And Ked Buqa Noyan, the leader of the Mongol assault on the 'Abbāsīd Caliphate, was a *bayurči* in Toluid service.⁹⁵

These officials and military commanders were on a kind of detached service, that is, temporarily separated from their parent organization, the guard/household establishment, for purposes of carrying out an imperial commission. Although such an assignment might entail physical separation from the court for long periods of time, those so

detached always retained their status as personal servitors of the *qayan*; once their tour in the field was completed, officials were normally rotated back “home” to resume their regular household duties and to renew their all-important personal bonds to the *qayan*. As for officers closer at hand, Rubruck notes that *all* nobles stationed anywhere within a two-months journey of Qara Qorum were obliged to assemble each summer at the court in order that Möngke might drink and sup with them, bestow garments and presents upon them, and “display his great glory.”⁹⁶ In this manner the emperor was kept abreast of conditions in all corners of the empire and at the same time was afforded an opportunity to verify the competency and reliability of his subordinates.⁹⁷ The practice of reserving important or sensitive assignments for members of the household was not solely a matter of trust, however. Rank in the imperial guard endowed an official in the field with great prestige. In a highly personalized form of government, one’s access to “high places” is the principal measure of influence and power. By definition, the members of the guard, *kešigden*, had such access; in consequence, their authority was enhanced and their work facilitated.

To properly understand the political dynamics of the early Mongolian empire, the patrimonial character of its institutions must be borne in mind. There was, of course, no conflict between inner and outer court in Möngke’s reign, nor that of his predecessors, since the royal household for all practical purposes was the imperial administration. The Central Secretariat did, however, interact and contend with the regional administrations that represented the interests of the entire imperial clan. On the staffs of these regional secretariats, *nököd*, detached from various princely establishments, endeavored to defend and advance their own master’s particular sets of interests, often at the expense of another line. Conflicts of this nature arose soon after the creation of the regional secretariats in 1229. Ögödei and Čayadai quarreled over the latter’s unauthorized transfer of certain lands in Turkistan from Maḥmūd Yalavač’s jurisdiction to that of another official.⁹⁸ Möngke and Qubilai, as noted above, confronted one another over the administration of Ching-chao, the appanage of the latter. This conflict can be viewed as an ideological clash over how best to rule China, but institutionally it was a typical dispute between the household of the emperor and that of a regional *qan*.

The household establishments naturally played a vital role in the politics of succession. Since each senior Činggisid prince was a potential *qayan*, his guard, in essence a shadow government, was a potential imperial secretariat. Not surprisingly, in the struggles for the throne the retainers of the losing candidate were routinely accused of having incited their prince to “rebel” and punished accordingly. Thus the victorious candidate for the throne not only put his rival to death, but the latter’s household as well. When Möngke and his family deposed the Ögödeids, Činqai, Qadaq and other old retainers of Ögödei and Güyüg whom Širemün inherited, were virtually exterminated. Following Möngke’s death his household, almost to a man, sided with Ariγ Böke and when Qubilai emerged victorious most of them were charged with inciting rebellion and put to death.

These purges meant, in effect, that the personnel of the central government of the Mongolian empire were twice eradicated within a twelve-year period, i.e. in 1252 and 1264. Indeed, such bloody, abrupt and disruptive transitions were endemic to the Mongols’ highly personalized style of government. Since every official was by nature a partisan, attached by non-transferable ties of allegiance to a particular Činggisid line or prince, there could be no neutrals, no body of apolitical bureaucrats to carry on “as usual” when a succession crisis gripped the state.⁹⁹ In accounting for the breakup of

the empire in the mid-thirteenth century, this lack of administrative continuity at the highest levels needs to be taken into consideration.

The arguments presented here—that the Mongolian system of governance was one based upon patrimonial principles—applies to the first three generations of rulers; to what extent this pattern persisted into the Yüan is a problem of considerable interest. While no definitive answers can as yet be given, it is at least suggestive that Rašīd al-Dīn, in his list of Qubilai's senior ministers, included among them a falconer (*qušči*), a food-taster (*būke 'ül*) and an umbrella-holder (*sügürči*).¹⁰⁰ Moreover, it is not unlikely that in the absence of civil service examinations throughout the early Yüan, the *kešig* continued to function as a recruiting ground for high government officials. Further research into this issue is clearly desirable and can be expected to enhance appreciably our understanding of Yüan government and politics.

The central administration of the early Mongolian empire was not based upon nor inspired by Chinese bureaucratic models; it emerged from the guard/household establishment created by Činggis Qan from among his closest associates and boon companions (*nököd*) shortly after he first proclaimed his imperial ambitions. It served him concurrently as security force, royal household and imperial government. In Möngke's reign this pattern of governance was still in force. Like his grandfather, Möngke turned his guard/household establishment into an imperial government without any noticeable structural adjustment or change of personnel.

The authority he wielded over his officials *cum* domestics was immediate and personal, embedded as it was in the discipline and routine of the patrimonial household. The loyalty of his retainers, inculcated and tested by service in the guard, was reinforced by self-interest: their own personal advancement was inextricably linked to Möngke's success as prince or as *qayan*. These people, recruited from his own household staff, were the only individuals with whom Möngke ever willingly shared power.

NOTES

- * This article was first presented at the Conference on the "Evolution of Chinese Government, Tenth-Fourteenth Centuries," sponsored by the American Council of Learned Societies and the West German Academy of Science in Reissensburg, West Germany, in August 1982.
- 1. See Igor de Rachewiltz, "Some Remarks on the Ideological Foundations of Chingis Khan's Empire," *Papers on Far Eastern History* 7 (March 1973): 26–28.
- 2. E. Voegelin, "The Mongol Orders of Submission to the European Powers," *Byzantion* 15 (1941): 402–25, was the first to analyze the Mongolian concept of sovereignty, especially its pretension to universality. Cf. also Klaus Sagaster, "Herrschaftsideologie und Friedensgedanke bei den Mongolen," *CAJ* 17.2–4 (1973): 223–42.
- 3. For the Turkic parallels, see Peter B. Golden, "Imperial Ideology and the Sources of Political Unity amongst the Pre-Činggisid Nomads of Western Eurasia," *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* 2 (1982): 37–76; Alessio Bombaci, "Qutluğ Bolzun!", *Ural-Altäische Jahrbücher* 36 (1965): 284–91, and 38 (1966): 13–43; and Osman Turan, "The Ideal of World Domination among the Medieval Turks," *Studia Islamica* 4 (1955): 77–90.
- 4. This section of the paper summarizes chapters 2 and 3 of my Ph.D. dissertation, "Politics of Mongol Imperialism: Centralization and Resource Mobilization in the Reign of the Grand Qan Möngke, 1251–59" (University of Minnesota, 1979), pp. 15–62.
- 5. R. A. Skelton, et al., *The Vinland Map and the Tartar Relation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 90.

6. *Yüan shih* (Taipei: National War College ed., 1966), 3.15 and 124.1351 (hereafter *YS*); and Yao Sui, *Mu-an chi* (*SPTK* ed.), 13.9a.
7. The evidence for a regional administration in the territory of the Golden Horde is circumstantial and indecisive.
8. *YS* 3.15.
9. Sayf ibn Muḥammad ibn Ya'qūb al-Havarī, *Ta'riḫ nāmah-i Harāt*, ed. Muḥammad Zubayr al-Ṣiddīqī (Calcutta: Baptist Mission Press, 1944), p. 170.
10. Paul Buell, so far as I am aware, was the first to point out this characteristic of the regional secretariats, which he calls "joint satellite administrations," i.e. satellites of the imperial secretariat in Mongolia. See his "Sino-Khitān Administration in Mongol Bukhara," *Journal of Asian History* 13.2 (1979): 147. For further details see the discussion in Buell's Ph.D. dissertation, "Tribe, Qan and Ulus in Early Mongol China: Some Prolegomena to Yüan History" (University of Washington, 1977), pp. 121ff.
11. *Shu'ab-i panjgānah*, ms., Topkapı Sarayı Museum, cat. no. 2932, fol. 129L and fol. 131L. See Zeki Validi Togan, "The Composition of the History of the Mongols by Rašīd al-Dīn," *CAJ* 7 (1962): 68–69, for information on the discovery and contents of this important work.
12. *Shu'ab-i panjgānah*, fol. 129R and fol. 137R.
13. *YS* 122.1328, 123.1332, and 124.1352.
14. *YS* 159.1697–98.
15. 'Atā Malik Juvaynī, *Ta'riḫ-i jahān-gushā*, 3 vols., ed. Mīrzā Muḥammad Qazvīnī (E.J. Gibb Memorial Series, v. 16; London: Luzac & Co., 1912–37), 2.250 and 260 (hereafter Juvaynī/Qazvīnī); and 'Atā-Malik Juvaynī, *The History of the World Conqueror*, 2 vols., trans. John Andrew Boyle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), 2: 513 and 523 (hereafter Juvaynī/Boyle).
16. *YS*, 134.1435.
17. Wang Yün, *Ch'iu-chien hsien-sheng ta-ch'üan chi* (*SPTK* ed.), 54.12a; and *YS* 3.18.
18. Thomas T. Allsen, "Mongol Census Taking in Rus', 1245–1275," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 5.1 (1981): 32–53.
19. Sayf ibn Muḥammad, *Ta'riḫ nāmah-i Harāt*, p. 249.
20. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, 2:255–58; and Juvaynī/Boyle, 2:517–21.
21. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, 3:37; and Juvaynī/Boyle, 2:572–73.
22. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, 3:44; and Juvaynī/Boyle, 2:578. Rašīd al-Dīn also lists Menggeser as first minister in his *Shu'ab-i panjgānah*, fol. 129R.
23. *YS* 3.15, 124.1351.
24. Yao Sui, *Mu-an chi* 13.9a.
25. *YS* 3.15–16, in which his name is transcribed Po-lu-ho 孛魯合, and Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, 3:86–87, give precise and consistent accounts of his duties.
26. *YS* 134. 1447, where his name is transcribed Po-lu-huan 孛魯歡. His biography further records that his promotion was a result of a secret agreement with Menggeser. Apparently Menggeser recommended Bulḡai as his replacement prior to his death. No further details are given.
27. Christopher Dawson, ed., *The Mongol Mission: Narratives and Letters of the Franciscan Missionaries in Mongolia and China in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries* (New York: Sreed & Ward, 1955), p. 184 (hereafter *Mongol Mission*).
28. *Mongol Mission*, p. 165.
29. *Mongol Mission*, p. 150.
30. *YS*, 3.15–16.
31. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, 3:87; and Juvaynī/Boyle, 2:605.
32. *Mongol Mission*, pp. 188–90.
33. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, 3:89; and Juvaynī/Boyle, 2:607.
34. *Mongol Mission*, pp. 171–72. By "Arab" Rubruck probably meant Persian, which is written in the Arabic script.

35. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, 1:19, 3:175; and Juvaynī/Boyle, 1:27, 2:598.
36. *Mongol Mission*, p. 184. For further information on the layout of the imperial court, see the article of S. V. Kiselev and L. A. Evtiukhova, "Dvorets Kara-Koruma," in *Drevnemongol'skie goroda* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo nauka, 1965), pp. 138–66, with maps.
37. For more details, see J. A. Boyle, "The Seasonal Residences of the Great Khan Ögödei," in *The Mongol World Empire* (London: Variorum Reprints, 1977), pp. 145–51.
38. This was equally true of the Mongol rulers of Iran, Central Asia and Russia. On the movements of the latter, see M. A. Usmanov, *Zhalovannye akiy Dzhuchieva Ulusa XIV-XVI v.v.* (Kazan: Izdatel'stvo Kazanskogo Universiteta, 1979), p. 265.
39. By combining data provided in the *Shu'ab-i panjgānah*, fol. 126R and 127L, and the YS 3.15–16, it is possible to establish a composite list of 42 officials who served at the court of Möngke. Their ethnic breakdown is as follows: Mongols, 29; Muslim Turks of Central Asia, 3; Tanguts, 1; Uiyurs, 1; ethnic background not indicated, 8. It is of interest to note, moreover, that six of the eight whose ethnic origins are uncertain bear Mongolian or Turkic names.
40. YS 125.1358. See also Ch'en Yüan, *Western and Central Asians in China under the Mongols*, Monumenta Serica Monograph 15 (Los Angeles: Monumenta Serica at the University of California, 1966), pp. 19–20.
41. Yao Sui, *Mu-an chi* 13.9a; YS 124.1350–51; Rašīd al-Dīn, *Jāmi' al-Tavārīkh*, ed. B. Karīmī, 2 vols. (Tehran: Eqbāl, 1959), 1:414 (hereafter Rašīd/Karīmī); Rašīd al-Dīn, *Jāmi' al-Tavārīkh*, 2 vols., ed. A. A. Alizade (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo nauka, 1968), 1.1:142 (hereafter Rašīd/Alizade); and Paul Pelliot and Louis Hambis, *Histoire des Campagnes de Gengis Khan*, v. 1 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1951), pp. 367–69.
42. Rašīd/Alizade, pp. 467–68.
43. Rašīd/Karīmī, 1:413. For a study of his life, see Paul Ratchnevsky, "Šigi Qutuqu, ein mongolischer Gefolgsmann im 12.–13. Jahrhundert," *CAJ* 10 (1965): 87–120.
44. YS 134.1447.
45. Rašīd/Alizade, p. 453.
46. YS 167.1768.
47. YS 167.1790 and 1791.
48. Rašīd/Alizade, pp. 186–88.
49. YS 153.1640.
50. *Shu'ab-i panjgānah*, fol. 129R.
51. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, 1:162; Juvaynī/Boyle, 1:205; and Rašīd al-Dīn, *The Successors of Ghenghis Khan*, trans. John Andrew Boyle (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 215 (hereafter Rašīd/Boyle).
52. See Francis W. Cleaves, *The Secret History of the Mongols* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard-Yenching Institute, 1982), para. 191–92, pp. 119–20 (hereafter, *SH*).
53. YS 99.953. For a translation of the relevant sections, see Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing, *The Military Establishment of the Yüan*, Harvard East Asian Monographs, 77 (Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies, 1978) pp. 93–94.
54. That household officials, despite their unimpressive titles, actually controlled and mobilized vital resources on behalf of their master is pointed out by Sechin Jagchid and Paul Hyer, *Mongolia's Culture and Society* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979), p. 264.
55. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, 3:88–89; and Juvaynī/Boyle, 2:605–06.
56. Rašīd/Karīmī, 1:414; and Rašīd/Boyle, pp. 206–07.
57. Rašīd/Boyle, p. 209; Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, 3:44–45; Juvaynī/Boyle, 2:578; and YS 3.15. There are also several passages in Menggeser's biography in the YS 124.1351 relating to the suppression of the princes' plot. These have been translated by Francis W. Cleaves in his article, "Aqa Minu," *HJAS* 24 (1962–63): 72–74.
58. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, 3:47–48; Juvaynī/Boyle, 2:580–81 and 588; Rašīd/Boyle, pp. 211 and 215; and YS 124.1351–52.

59. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, 2:252–54 and 259; and Juvaynī/Boyle, 2:515–16 and 522.
60. *Mongol Mission*, pp. 165 and 167.
61. *Mongol Mission*, p. 163.
62. This concern apparently stemmed from a warning given to Möngke by an orthodox Muslim, who pointed out the Assassins' (Ismā'īlīs) success in killing important personages who opposed them. See Rašīd/Karīmī, 2:648–85.
63. *Mongol Mission*, p. 184.
64. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, 3:62; Juvaynī/Boyle, 2:590; and *Shu'ab-i panjgānah*, fol. 129L.
65. *Mongol Mission*, p. 188.
66. *YS* 133. 1447.
67. 'Alamdār's ethnic background and family connections are unknown.
68. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, 3:26–27; and Juvaynī/Boyle, 2:566.
69. *YS* 3.17, 126.1365, 155. 1662, and 163.1742. See also Hok-lam Chan, "Yao Shu," *Papers on Far Eastern History* 22 (September 1980): 27–28.
70. Rašīd/Boyle, pp. 248–49 and 254.
71. Hsiao, *Military Establishment*, pp. 34–38, provides an excellent discussion of the origins and evolution of the *kešig*, upon which I have drawn freely. See also Gunther Mangold, *Das Militärwesen in China unter den Mongolen-Herrschaft* (Bamberg: aku Photodruck, 1971), pp. 16–19; and Jagchid and Hyer, *Mongolia's Culture and Society*, pp. 341–46.
72. *SH*, para. 90, p. 30, and para. 93, p. 31.
73. For a discussion of the *nököd*, see B. Vladimirtsov, *Le régime social des Mongols; Le féodalisme nomade* (Paris: Librairie d'Amérique et d'Orient, 1948), pp. 110–18. While Vladimirtsov's pioneering analysis of this institution is still useful, a thorough reassessment of the *nököd*, with particular reference to their social backgrounds and conditions of service, is needed.
74. *SH*, para. 124, pp. 55–58.
75. The immediate model for Činggis Qan's guard/household establishment was undoubtedly the *kešig* of the Kereyid chieftain Ong Qan (To'orill Qan), Temüjin's early political benefactor and later rival. Paul Ratchnevsky, *Činggis Khan: Sein Leben und Wirken* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1983), p. 3, note 11. Such institutions seem to have deep roots in steppe history. For a discussion of analagous institutions among the Scythians and Huns, see A. M. Khazanov, *Sotsial'naiia istoriia skifov: osnovnye problemy razvitiia drevnikh kočevnikov evraziiskikh stepei* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo nauka, 1975), pp. 185–88.
76. *SH*, paras. 191–92, pp. 119–20.
77. It is interesting to note that the Mongolian word *nökör*, literally, "companion," had become so identified with service in the guard/household establishment that when it passed into various Turkic and Uralic languages in the course of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries it did so with its extended meaning of "soldier" and "servant," not its original meaning of "comrade." See Julius Nemeth, "Wanderungen des mongolischen Wortes Nökür, 'Genosse,'" *AOASH* 3 (1953): 7–11.
78. *SH*, para. 224, pp. 161–62.
79. *SH*, para. 269, p. 209.
80. *SH*, paras. 278–80, pp. 219–26.
81. P'eng Ta-ya and Hsü T'ing, *Hei-ta shih-lüeh*, text available in *Meng-ku shih-liao ssu-chung*, ed. Wang Kuo-wei (Taipei: Cheng-chung shu-chü, 1975), p. 483; and *Mongol Mission*, pp. 63 and 66.
82. Rašīd/Karīmī, 1:399; and *Shu'ab-i panjgānah*, fols. 105L–105R and 127R–L.
83. Rašīd/Karīmī, 1:555–56; and Rašīd/Boyle, p. 163. On the term *otčigin*, which derives from the Turkic *ot*, "fire," plus *tegin*, "prince," see Pelliot and Hambis, *Campagnes de Gengis Khan*, p. 176.
84. Rašīd/Karīmī, 1:413–14.
85. Hsiao, *Military Establishment*, p. 38. While not using the term "patrimonial," Paul Buell in

- his article, "Kalmyk Tanggači People: Thoughts on the Mechanics and Impact of Mongol Expansion," *Mongolian Studies* 6 (1980): 42 and 43–44, also argues that the imperial government evolved from the household establishment of Činggis Qan.
86. Max Weber's most extended discussion of the characteristics of patrimonial regimes is in his *Economy and Society*, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), pp. 1006–69. Stephen P. Blake in his important article, "The Patrimonial Bureaucratic Empire of the Mughals," *JAS* 39.1 (1979): 77–94, discusses Weber's model of a patrimonial state and applies it to the Mughal Empire of India.
 87. For a discussion of the importance of loyalty among the medieval Mongols, see Jagchid and Hyer, *Mongolia's Culture and Society*, pp. 144–45.
 88. The largest of the Toluid domains was Chen-ting 真定, a prefecture of eighty thousand households in Hopei, which Ögödei granted Sorqaytani Beki in 1236. *YS*, 95.915.
 89. See F. W. Cleaves, "A Chancellery Practice of the Mongols in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries," *HJAS* 14 (1951): 516–21. This procedure is attested in both Yüan China and İl-khān Iran.
 90. I have prepared a biography of Buĵir for *Yüan Personalities*, v. 1, ed. Igor de Rachewiltz and Hok-lam Chan, forthcoming.
 91. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, 2:255, 3:74–75; and Juvaynī/Boyle, 2:517–18 and 598.
 92. Buell, "Sino-Khitān Administration in Mongol Bukhara," pp. 132–33, points out that in Činggis Qan's day *daruḡači* were appointed from the royal household.
 93. On Čaqu, see Sayf ibn Muḥammad, *Ta'riḫ nāmāh-i Harāt*, p. 171. The word for "notables," *khavaṣṣ*, in the singular form, *khaṣaḥ*, also has the meaning of "guard." For the appointment of Qundughai, see Naṣīr al-Dīn Munshī Kīrmānī, *Simṭ al-'ulā al-hazrat al-'ulyā*, ed. 'Abbās Iqbāl (Tehran: Shirkat-i sinānī-i chāp, 1950), p. 33.
 94. *YS* 121.1310; and Rašīd/Alizade, pp. 383–84.
 95. Juvaynī/Qazvīnī, 3:72; and Juvaynī/Boyle, 2:596.
 96. *Mongol Mission*, p. 175.
 97. Jagchid and Hyer, *Mongolia's Culture and Society*, pp. 342–43, discuss the system of rotation and its ramifications.
 98. See Buell, "Sino-Khitān Administration in Mongol Bukhara," pp. 143–46.
 99. Cf. the comments of Joseph Fletcher, "Turco-Mongolian Monarchic Tradition in the Ottoman Empire," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 3–4, part 1 (1979–80): 240.
 100. *Shu'ab-i panjgānah*, fol. 131R and 131L; and Rašīd/Boyle, p. 297.

THE DISSOLUTION OF THE MONGOL EMPIRE

P. Jackson



In 1251 a three years' interregnum in the headship of the Mongol empire was terminated by the election as Great Khan (Mo. Qa'an < Qaghan) of Möngke, the eldest son of Chinggis Khan's fourth son Tolui. That this event represented a political coup of the first order is clear from the reaction which it provoked. Previously the dignity of Great Khan had remained in the family of Chinggis Khan's third son Ögedei (1229–1241), who had been succeeded, after a long interregnum, by his own eldest son Güyüg (1246–1248). This branch of the imperial dynasty now took up arms against the new sovereign, only to be ruthlessly suppressed. They and their cousins, the descendants of the conqueror's second son Chaghadaï, were for the most part deprived of their possessions and suffered exile or death.¹ By this means Möngke's supremacy in the eastern half of the empire was assured. In the west the power of the 'Golden Horde,' ruled by the house of Jochi, Chinggis Khan's firstborn son, was if anything enhanced: the chief of this branch, Batu, to whose support Möngke owed his election, exercised with the new Qa'an a sort of *condominium*, as may be seen from the narrative of the Franciscan William of Rubruck, who visited both princes in the course of his mission of 1253–5.²

Möngke followed the practice of his predecessors in launching a series of fresh military campaigns against those regions of Asia which remained unconquered. He himself devoted his main energies to continuing the subjugation of China, a process completed only in the reign of his brother Qubilai (1259–1294). Here we are concerned rather with events in Western Asia, where a vast expedition commanded by a third brother, Hülegü, overthrew the Assassins in their mountain strongholds south of the Caspian (1255–6), sacked Baghdād and murdered the Caliph (1258), and rolled onwards through 'Irāq into Syria. For a time it appeared that the entire Islamic world would succumb to this threat; then events further east supervened.

Within a space of three years, the Mongol empire was torn apart by two major wars between members of the imperial family. Möngke's death while besieging a fortress in China in 1259 unleashed a struggle for the succession on the part of Qubilai and Tolui's fourth son, Arigh-böke, of whom the former was victorious only after a five years' war which spread from Mongolia into Central Asia.³ At the same time the new Mongol power in Iran clashed with its neighbours beyond the Caucasus, the Golden Horde, now ruled by Batu's brother, the Muslim convert Berke (1261). The rivalry of these two westernmost divisions of the empire was to last, with intervals, for almost a century. Its effect on the Mongol advance in the Near East, which had already been checked by the

Mamlūk rulers of Egypt in two engagements, at ‘Ain Jālūt and at Ḥims, in 1260, was profound. Hülegü had withdrawn eastwards with the bulk of his army in order, presumably, to keep watch on the succession dispute in Mongolia, and these reverses were inflicted on the greatly depleted Mongol forces left in Syria and Palestine. In view of the threat from the Golden Horde, neither he nor the later monarchs of the dynasty he founded in Iran (the ‘Īlkhāns’) were ever able to concentrate their efforts on the overthrow of the Mamlūks, with whom Berke soon made an alliance (1263).

The following study is an attempt to explain the halting of the Mongol advance around 1260–2 in terms of the history of the Mongols over the preceding decades. If we are to seek causes for the loss of momentum in the Mongol assault on the Islamic world, still reeling from the destruction of the Caliphate, we must look rather at circumstances within the empire than at local military factors such as the reverses in Syria.⁴ The two civil wars I have mentioned were, each in its own way, decisive events in the history of the Near East and of Islam. Yet the exact connection between them, and their own relationship to the previous growth of the Mongol empire, stand in need of some elucidation.

I

Secondary authorities for the history of the Mongols in the west have relied most heavily on two of our Persian sources, the *Tārīkh-i Jahān-Gushā* of ‘Alā’ al-dīn ‘Atā Malik b. Bahā’ al-dīn Muḥammad al-Juwaynī (b. 623/1226, d. 681/1283) and the *Jāmi’ al-tawārīkh* of Rashīd al-dīn Faḍl-allāh b. ‘Imād al-dawla Abī’l-Khair al-Hamadānī (b. ca. 645/1247–8, d. 718/1318). Both these works were composed under the Īlkhāns by persons who ranked high among their administrative agents.⁵ We possess no source originating from the territories of the Golden Horde. The Īlkhāns’ régime maintained close contacts with the Toluid rulers of China, the victorious Qubilai and his descendants, whose influence is consequently to be discerned not only in the Chinese authorities (chiefly the *Yüan Shih*, the official dynastic history, compiled after the end of Mongol rule in 1368, but from contemporary documents), but also in the Persian accounts of events in the Far East. This is especially relevant, for our purposes, to the succession disputes in Mongolia: we have access to no source which drew its inspiration from the defeated elements in these struggles, whether from Ögedei’s family or from Arigh-böke.⁶ The pronounced bias of our principal extant sources from within the Mongol empire was noticed by Blochet and by Grousset, though neither proceeded to examine it in detail.⁷ This task was left to a more recent scholar, David Ayalon, who has exposed the partisan character of Juwaynī and shown how the Mamlūk sources, composed under a régime which was hostile to the Īlkhāns and allied to their enemies the Golden Horde, reflect a totally different bias and supply a much-needed corrective.⁸

Although Ayalon’s main concern is with the *Yasa*, or body of Mongol customary law as traditionally codified by Chinggis Khan, he has incidentally revolutionized our approach to the primary sources for the history of the Mongols in general. Juwaynī wrote only a few years after Möngke’s accession and the execution of most adult members of the lines of Ögedei and Chaghadaï: as Ayalon suggests, had the latter been victorious a very different picture of the personalities and the rights involved would have come down to us. But his argument may be extended. Rashīd al-dīn’s work, similarly, which is largely based on that of Juwaynī for the early period of the Mongol

hegemony, dates from a time when the rivalry of the Īlkhāns and the Golden Horde was already of forty years' standing. The Jochids find their only apologists in authors who were not most immediately concerned with Mongol history, namely the historians of Mamlūk Egypt and Syria. Of these, especial mention should be made at this point of Shihāb al-dīn Abū'l-'Abbās Aḥmad Ibn Faḍl-allāh al-'Umarī (b. 700/1301, d. 749/1349), who not only utilized Juwainī but also drew on a number of other sources, including oral information from Persian exiles who had arrived on Mamlūk soil during the upheavals of the 1330s.⁹ The same degree of neutrality may be attributed to the Delhi historian Minhāj al-dīn Abū-'Umar 'Uthmān b. Sirāj al-dīn al-Jūzjānī, who wrote his *Ṭabaqāt-i Nāṣirī* in 658/1260 for a court that was in touch both with Berke's Central Asian territories and with Hülegü in Iran.¹⁰ Finally, many details not found elsewhere, and which throw fresh light on the quarrels within the imperial family, may be gleaned from non-Islamic sources. The earliest of these is the *Manḡḡol un niuca tobca'an* (*Secret History of the Mongols*), most of which was written around 1228 but which contains later additions and may have been 'doctored' by the Toluids:¹¹ and for the greater part the *Secret History* must be regarded as upholding the same tradition as that represented by Juwainī, by Rashīd and by the *Yüan Shih*.¹² Of considerably more value, as we shall see, are the narratives of European visitors to the court of the Great Khans, Carpini (1245–7) and Rubruck (1253–5),¹³ and the Armenian historians of the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, who were not unduly concerned, it appears, to express the point of view of their suzerain the Īlkhān as against that of other Mongol potentates.¹⁴

In the following sections I shall offer certain conclusions of which Ayalon's study stops short; but they will be based, similarly, on a comparison of the data given by the two Iranian authors with these other 'independent' sources, even at the risk of undervaluing Juwainī and Rashīd.

II

The dissensions which tore apart the Mongol empire after the death of Möngke have endowed the era of the first four Great Khans with an appearance of harmony and stability. Hence the orthodox view of these first fifty years or so, as expressed by Grousset: 'Cette phase centralisée de l'empire mongol devait au moins durer jusqu'au décès du grand-khan Mongka en 1259'; and during this period, relations among the princes of the imperial family are supposed to have exhibited the characteristics of a *concordia fratrum*.¹⁵

This assessment is only partially correct. The Mongol conquests, it is true, were regarded not as the possessions of the Qa'an but as the joint property of the entire family of Chinggis Khan. Nevertheless, this ideal found concrete expression in the granting of local rights to individual princes, who were given not, of course, territorial appanages, but lordship over specified groups among the subject peoples: of such dependants, the skilled craftsmen might well be tied to a particular workshop or arsenal, referred to in the Persian sources by the term *kārkhāna*.¹⁶ Otherwise, the rights enjoyed by the princes appear to have consisted in the receipt of specified revenues or produce in kind: under this form the system survived longest in China, whence Mongol princes resident in Western Asia were still entitled to assignments on certain districts even in the fourteenth century.¹⁷ The concept of the indivisibility of the empire was expressed

likewise in the composition of the armies detailed to conquer fresh territories – the so-called *tama* system, which has been examined, with particular reference to the Indian borderlands, by Aubin.¹⁸ The prince in command of an expedition was accompanied by relatives drawn from every other branch of the family, each bringing his own contingent. In the case of lesser campaigns, this representative function was performed by commanders (*noyans*) of non-imperial extraction. Campaigns were to be planned at an assembly (*quriltai*) of all the princes, to which the Qa'an was responsible.

There were, however, two tensions inherent from the beginning in the political system bequeathed to his family by Chinggis Khan. Firstly, the requirements of a pastoral society dictated that each prince should enjoy the use of a wide and specific area of territory for grazing his beasts in both summer and winter.¹⁹ The tendency, therefore, was for each complex of herds and of nomadic peoples united in the possession of one prince to acquire a fixed territorial basis. The Mongol term for such an agglomeration – *ulus* – is often applied, *par excellence*, to the largest units, those in the control of Chinggis Khan's four sons by his chief wife and of his younger brothers: this, at any rate, appears to be the meaning of a passage in the *Secret History* which distinguishes between 'the princes who rule a territory' (*ulus medekün kö'üt*) and those who do not.²⁰ Juwainī defines the respective spheres of influence of Chinggis Khan's sons in terms whose precise significance will emerge later. For the moment it is sufficient to observe that this development was by no means in harmony with the *tama* system: it produced a situation in which a sizeable proportion of the troops quartered within the *ulus* of a particular prince owed allegiance not so much to him as to some external authority, whether the Qa'an or some other relative, with whom he might well be at variance. In other words, with the maintenance of the *tama* method of organization, the occasions for internal conflict were multiplied rather than diminished.

The second source of tension lay in the Turco-Mongol pattern of inheritance. The custom whereby the father's original seat (*ordo*) passed on his death to his youngest son by his chief wife²¹ was offset by at least an equal emphasis on seniority. This by no means corresponded to a law of primogeniture in the usual sense. Rather was seniority reckoned in terms of generation – of degrees of descent, that is, from a common ancestor. Only next, among members of the same generation, was the question of strict primogeniture taken into account.²² Now this pattern should admittedly not be equated with a series of rules; though it tended to strike contemporary observers in their accounts of steppe peoples forcibly enough for them to allude to it in such terms. Even the nomads themselves refer to this preference for the senior over the junior as a custom. So the inscription of the seventh century Turkish potentate Kül-tegin refers to his father's having been succeeded by a younger brother rather than by his son 'in accordance with the custom' (*törüdä üzä*);²³ and the succession of the Turkish *qaghans* in the sixth and early seventh centuries reflects a considerable attachment to the seniority principle.²⁴ Nor did this disappear in the later Turkish societies of Western Asia, being attested among both the Pechenegs and the Volga Bulgars.²⁵ And in the Far East the Khitan, the last steppe people to rule both North China and large tracts of Mongolia prior to the advent of Chinggis Khan himself, observed the same custom of inheritance, at least until their conquest of the Middle Kingdom.²⁶

It would, of course, be foolish to extrapolate from these scattered references to quite distinct nomadic peoples across the breadth of Asia the presence of a similar principle in the Mongol polity; but in fact the evidence for its existence there too is considerable. Chaghadai's *ulus* provides a whole series of examples,²⁷ though it appears that the

claims of seniority were undermined more swiftly in those Mongol states which arose in areas of traditionally sedentary culture, China and Iran, where a different practice obtained.²⁸ This pattern of inheritance was in part grasped during the last century by Howorth,²⁹ whose insights were nevertheless dismissed by Bartol'd on the grounds that among the nomads 'there can be no question of a regular order of succession . . .'.³⁰ Yet it was the Russian scholar who was further from the truth. The Mongols were extremely sensitive to questions of status and of hierarchy, and matters of precedence frequently gave rise to feuds among them, particularly at their feasts and assemblies. The importance of this sort of etiquette was just one facet of the very great weight attached to the whole issue of seniority, which exerted its most vital political influence in the sphere of inheritance and succession. This will be illustrated as we proceed; for the present one final general observation should be made.

Bartol'd appears subsequently to have modified his verdict, in that he distinguished between the rules for the inheritance of personal property (that is, ultimogeniture) and those determining political primacy;³¹ though he still omitted to formulate just what these latter principles were. Nevertheless, in drawing the distinction he was approaching the core of a major problem which beset the empire of Chinggis Khan: the efforts of successive rulers, from the founder himself onwards, to convert the dignity of Great Khan, or that of head of an *ulus*, into personal property, to be bequeathed to a descendant rather than thrown open to election by all the princes and passed to the next most senior member (*aqā*) of the family.³² Juwainī, it will be seen, gives on occasions some prominence to the seniority factor; Rashīd al-dīn, who wrote at a time when it had long been frequently swept aside, makes no allusion to it at any point where he might thereby seem, even by implication, to challenge the *status quo*.

III

Events during Chinggis Khan's own lifetime had presaged the dissensions which would follow his death. The conquest of Khwārizm in 617–8/1221 had been impeded by a quarrel between his two elder sons Jochi and Chaghadaī,³³ and after the fall of its capital Urgench in that year, they, together with Ögedei, are alleged to have tried to withhold from their father his share of the plunder.³⁴ The old conqueror's last years were clouded by an estrangement from Jochi, who was to predecease him by a matter of months without any reconciliation having been effected.³⁵ The Iranian sources give us fewer details of this dispute than does Jūzjānī, who asserts that Chinggis Khan's resentment against his eldest son was fanned by Chaghadaī.³⁶ It is most likely that what underlay Jochi's disturbed relations with his younger brothers was his own questionable legitimacy. He had been born soon after his mother's release from captivity in the hands of Chinggis Khan's enemies the Merkit, and it had always been open to doubt whether he was in fact Chinggis Khan's son. According to Rashīd al-dīn, Jochi had been taunted with the circumstances of his birth by his brothers, excepting Tolui, with whom he remained on good terms.³⁷ One reason for this harmony is to be found, in all probability, in the fact that Jochi's senior wife, Bek-tutmish Fujin, and Tolui's, Sorqaqtani Beki, were sisters.³⁸ The alliance, which extended to the children of both princes after their deaths, was to have important political consequences.

The effects of these personal antipathies, as also of the tensions which we noticed earlier, are visible from the moment of Chinggis Khan's death in 1227. They are to be

seen most clearly in the years of interregnum in the office of Great Khan, which together account for almost one-third of the total period between this date and the end of Möngke's reign (1227–1259).³⁹

Chinggis Khan willed his throne to Ögedei, his third son, ignoring the claims both of Tolui, the heir to his father's homeland, and of his own youngest brother, Temüge Ot-chigin,⁴⁰ who on the basis of the seniority principle was best qualified to succeed. Two years elapsed before the new sovereign could be elected. During this period, Tolui, by virtue of his status, exercised supreme authority as Regent. Juwainī and Rashīd portray him as working steadfastly for Ögedei's accession,⁴¹ but according to Chinese sources the Regent was unwilling at first to summon a *quriltai* and yielded only to pressure from Chinggis Khan's chief minister Ye-liu ch'u-ts'ai.⁴² When Ögedei was finally elected in 1229, one of the first problems confronting him was the dispute over a plundering expedition despatched by Tolui during the interregnum – and therefore without authorization by all the princes. He settled it in his customarily mild fashion, promulgating an edict (*yasa*) by which past offences were pardoned and forgotten.⁴³

Ögedei's reign (1229–1241) is represented universally by the sources as mild and beneficent. That his rule, however, was also firm, and in accordance with principles of justice, may be seen from his method of dealing with the one dispute in the imperial family which is known to have occurred in his time, and to which we shall return shortly.⁴⁴ After his death, and during the regency of his chief wife, Töregene, the tensions among the princes were expressed more openly, it seems, than in the previous interregnum. According to Rashīd, the Qa'an had designated as his heir his grandson Shiremün;⁴⁵ but the young prince's claims appear to have won very little consideration. The first to make a bid for the throne was Temüge Ot-chigin, who gathered troops and attempted to take it by force. He was beguiled by Töre-gene into abandoning this plan, and was later seized, tried secretly, and executed, not long before the arrival in Mongolia of Carpini and the enthronement of Ögedei's eldest son Güyüg (1246).⁴⁶

In so far as we are told much about Ot-chigin's attempted coup, we learn it mainly from Rashīd al-dīn. Juwainī makes only three obscure references to it;⁴⁷ and indeed, in view of his total silence concerning previous discord within the imperial line, such embarrassment is merely what we should expect. It is most prominent in the manner in which he treats of the rivalry between Güyüg and Batu.

Güyüg took part in the expedition of 1236–1242 in Russia and the Qipchaq steppe, under Batu's command, and returned to the east after his father's death. According to the *Secret History*, the two princes quarrelled during the campaign, and Güyüg left without Batu's permission – an act of insubordination for which he was severely reprimanded by Ögedei and sent back to be disciplined.⁴⁸ It is clear from this account that the dispute had arisen over the issue of precedence at a feast: over the question, that is, who should drink first from the cup. Güyüg, as the Qa'an's eldest son, must have resented being subordinated to Batu. But the words attributed to their cousin, Chaghadai's eldest son Büri,⁴⁹ who similarly deserted the army after insulting Batu, suggest that the quarrel was over Batu's right to command at all and involved the usual aspersions on his father Jochi's legitimacy. Possibly also this would explain why Batu, who with the death of Chaghadai in 1242 became senior of all the princes of the 'right hand',⁵⁰ was not elected Great Khan in 1246.

Juwainī says nothing of this, and glides very swiftly over Batu's failure either to participate in Güyüg's election or to attend his enthronement.⁵¹ That the old grudge still

rankled, however, is evident from the fuller version of Rashīd al-dīn, who ascribes the postponement of the *quriltai* for three years to Batu's tactics, and says that he was 'apprehensive because of the alarming nature of the past events'.⁵²

Once established on the throne, Güyüg prepared to overthrow his old enemy. An army was sent west under the general Eljigidei, whose instructions, according to Juwainī, were to reduce the still independent territories in Iran and the west, beginning with the Assassins: significantly, he was given charge particularly of Anatolia, Georgia and Aleppo 'that no one else might interfere with them'.⁵³ The Mamlūk writer 'Umarī, who made good use of Juwainī's work, gives here a fuller picture. He tells us that Eljigidei was ordered to arrest Batu's lieutenants in the Caucasus.⁵⁴ 'Umarī further states that at the time of his death Güyüg himself was moving west with a considerable army to attack his rival,⁵⁵ and we find confirmation of this in our European sources. Before Carpini's party left Russia on their return journey, says the author of the *Tartar Relation*, they heard that Batu was moving east against Güyüg and that a great quarrel had broken out between the two princes.⁵⁶ William of Rubruck, who – understandably, since he passed through Asia during the era of Batu's hegemony – was able to learn 'nothing definite' concerning Güyüg's death, confirms that hostilities had been imminent, and mentions the two rumours that have reached him: that Güyüg had been poisoned by Batu's agents, and that he had engaged in a drunken brawl with Batu's brother Shiban in which both were killed.⁵⁷

It is evident, therefore, that Güyüg's death averted a major war in Central Asia in 1248. Even Rashīd al-dīn goes so far as to say that Sorqaqtani Beki, Tolui's widow and the mother of the future Qa'an Möngke, suspected that Güyüg was moving against Batu and wrote to the latter to warn him.⁵⁸ But at this point Juwainī's reticence assumes absurd proportions. Not only does he say nothing of Güyüg's real intention or of Sorqaqtani's message, but he claims simply that Batu was on his way to court at Güyüg's request when he heard of the Great Khan's death.⁵⁹ In view of Juwainī's close ties with the Mongol administration, it is inconceivable that he should have been merely ignorant of the true facts. We must suspect him rather of concealing the truth in order to whitewash not only Sorqaqtani but Batu also. When the *Tārīkh-i Jahān-Gushā* was written, Batu, to whom Möngke Qa'an owed his throne, had been dead for some years, but the relations of Juwainī's patron, Möngke's brother Hülegü, with the Jochid princes were still outwardly friendly.⁶⁰ Juwainī consequently felt obliged to suppress any unfavourable mention of Batu by name. Nevertheless, his work contains a number of references suggesting that Batu had epitomised that lawlessness among the princes which Juwainī everywhere condemns.

According to Juwainī, the only members of the imperial family found, on Güyüg's accession, not to have encroached upon the Great Khan's prerogatives since the death of Ögedei were Sorqaqtani and her sons.⁶¹ Thus Batu is by implication accused of this infringement of the *Yasa*; and in a different context Juwainī does mention his extraordinary liberality in the issue of patents of authority (*yarlighs*) and of assignments of revenue.⁶² Such a threat to the imperial power in Western Asia afforded Güyüg the pretext he required for moving against his rival; and at the time his action must have seemed, to some at least, to be justified. What view Sorqaqtani and her sons held privately is open to question. Juwainī depicts them as having supported Güyüg's election,⁶³ and the princess's warning to Batu probably represents a timely *volte-face*. Juwainī's total failure to mention the confrontation of 1248 may further be attributed to the same factor which underlies his silence on earlier disputes within the imperial family.

He clearly saw it as one of his tasks to highlight the spirit of unity which bound together the Mongol princes in contrast with the rulers of former great empires.⁶⁴ He could hardly reveal, therefore, that Sorqaqtani, to whom he devotes such high praise, and Batu, who had placed her son on the throne, had collaborated against a sovereign who was endeavouring to reassert the central authority through which alone that unity could be maintained.⁶⁵

Nor do the new allies' subsequent actions show them in a more favourable light. Later authors refer to a tradition that the *quriltai* of 1246 had promised to keep the dignity of Great Khan in Güyüg's line.⁶⁶ Juwainī again makes no mention of this, but according to Rashīd the transfer of the Great Khanate now from Ögedei's family to Möngke was justified on the dubious grounds that Ögedei's will had already been contravened by his family a few years previously with the election of Güyüg in place of Shiremün.⁶⁷ The circumstances of Möngke's own election, however, suggest that there was some truth underlying the claims of Ögedei's family to retain the dignity of Great Khan. Custom demanded that the *quriltai* be held in the Mongol homeland on the Onan and Kerülen rivers, but Batu, whose right as *aqa* to convene the assembly appears to have been universally recognized, first summoned the princes to a gathering within the territory of the Jochids, in present-day Kazakhstān.⁶⁸ Shiremün and other members of Ögedei's family sent an envoy named Qonqurtaqai with instructions to abide by Batu's decision; while Güyüg's sons, Qucha (Khoja, Qocho) and Naqu, who were the first princes to arrive in person, left after a day or two, but appointed Temür Noyan as their representative, ordering him similarly to consent to any agreement reached.⁶⁹ We may infer from this both that Shiremün was confident of his own election from the outset, and that Naqu, who had been heir-apparent in his father's lifetime,⁷⁰ secured some sort of understanding from Batu that he, rather than Shiremün, would be proclaimed Qa'an. That these two grandsons of Ögedei were rivals at this stage is suggested by Juwainī's hint of a reconciliation between them after the illegal *quriltai* had announced Möngke's election.⁷¹ The news came to both as a total shock – witness the vigour of their protests⁷² – and drove them into an alliance.

When Möngke had been offered the imperial throne by a rump assembly consisting of the Jochids, his own brothers, and a handful of junior princes of the lines of Chaghadai and Ögedei,⁷³ he returned to Mongolia, according to Rashīd, with a large armed escort commanded by Batu's brothers Berke and Toqa-temür.⁷⁴ Fresh invitations were now sent out to all the princes, summoning them to an official *quriltai* on the Kerülen. The rival party, headed by Shiremün, the sons of Güyüg, and the head of Chaghadai's *ulus*, his son Yesü-möngke, now adopted tactics reminiscent of Batu's prior to 1246. They prevaricated, and in this manner delayed any final settlement, it appears, for at least a year and a half. Eventually Batu lost patience: orders were sent to Berke to proceed with the enthronement and to meet all opposition with force. On 9 rabī II 649/1 July 1251 Möngke was officially raised up as Qa'an.⁷⁵

There followed the bloodiest struggle within the imperial family so far. The official version which has come down to us in the works of Juwainī and Rashīd is in part reproduced by Jūzjānī and by William of Rubruck, both of whom, however, were in a position to obtain the story from the victorious party.⁷⁶ It runs as follows. In order to recover power, Shiremün, Naqu and other princes conspired to surprise Möngke and his adherents with an armed force while they were still busy with the celebrations which followed the enthronement. One of Möngke's falconers, however, came by chance upon the advancing troops, and on discovering their purpose hurried to warn the Qa'an.

Möngke was totally unprepared for such treachery and at first disinclined to believe the story; but under pressure from his supporters he agreed to investigate, and an army was sent to forestall the conspirators. They were surrounded and placed in custody. After an inquiry, a number of *noyans* were executed, and the strongest measures taken: an enormous force, numbering – if Juwainī and Rashīd are to be believed – ten *tümens* (100,000), was despatched west to link up with the troops of the Jochid prince Qongqiran, and another moved into the upper Yenisei region, so that a vast hunting-ring (*nerge*) might be formed and gradually tightened around those of the enemy who remained at large. As they arrived, each was immediately placed under arrest. The Chaghadayids Yesü-möngke and Büri were sent to Batu, who executed them both; Güyüg's widow Oghul Qaimish and Shiremün's mother were put to death in Sorqaqtani's *ordo*. With the exception of Qucha, who had made a timely submission on the advice of one of his wives and who was now granted a pasturage near the river Selenga, the conspirators were exiled by being sent with the army during the subsequent campaign in China. We know, however, that at least two – Shiremün and a Chaghadayid prince, Qadaqchi – died shortly afterwards, the former on Möngke's orders; and of the remaining exiles nothing further is heard. Their young sons were to participate in the conflict between Möngke's brothers a decade later.⁷⁷ Of the victors, Ögedei's sons Qadan and Melik were rewarded for their support, while Chaghadai's grandson Qara Hülegü replaced Yesü-möngke as the head of his *ulus*. But even he failed to reap the full profit, dying en route for Turkistān in obscure circumstances: the guardianship of his infant son and successor, Mubārak-shāh, a Muslim, was entrusted to his widow Orqina, who – significantly enough – was closely linked by marriage with both the Jochids and the line of Tolui.⁷⁸

There are aspects of the official version of these events which place the reader's credulity under a considerable strain. We are asked to believe, for example, that Möngke's party had taken no precautions and were utterly surprised by the news of the conspiracy, when their own actions had been of the kind precisely to arouse fierce opposition; and Rashīd's details of the large army which escorted the new Qa'an back to Mongolia on Batu's orders reveal that they were far from unprepared for a struggle.⁷⁹

Möngke and his supporters were able to retain their newly won position only by the slaughter of the more senior members of the lines of Chaghadai and Ögedei and by the bestowal of their possessions on others who were either of tender years or of inferior status.⁸⁰ In this manner was preserved the unity of the empire by which Juwainī sets such store. The Toluid seizure of power, however, was achieved at the price of weakening the Qa'an's authority. Möngke had been offered the throne by Batu, acting as *aqā*, and – it is important to note – only after Batu himself had declined it.⁸¹ It has been suggested that Batu hesitated to assume the sovereignty because of the stigma attached to his father's birth.⁸² However this may be, by remaining in the west he appears to have felt he was obtaining the better half of the bargain, as Jüzjānī at least was aware.⁸³ The elimination of their Chaghadayid rivals led to the extension of Jochid control over Transoxiana (Māwarā' al-nahr) and western Turkistān,⁸⁴ so that when Rubruck travelled through Central Asia a few years later he found the Mongol world divided into two great spheres of influence, Möngke's in the east and that of his benefactor in the west. Rubruck's own impression was that Batu's authority, if anything, was greater in the Qa'an's dominions than was Möngke's in the territory of the Jochids.⁸⁵ The Franciscan reproduces on more than one occasion Möngke's own words, emphasizing the spirit of harmonious coexistence in which he and Batu together ruled their vast

empire.⁸⁶ The arrangement was destined not long to survive Batu's death, which occurred about 1256.⁸⁷

The distant location of their *ulus* had afforded the Jochids a good deal of practical autonomy, a position which successive intervals in the office of Great Khan had enabled them to consolidate and to which Güyük's accession was the first challenge. This they had overcome, and in such a way as greatly to increase their power in Western Asia. Nevertheless, the respite they secured in 1251–2 proved comparatively brief. The great expedition which Möngke despatched westwards in 1253 under his brother Hülegü was to develop into the second challenge to the Jochid position, and they were to meet it without success. Before proceeding, however, to the origins of the conflict between Hülegü and the Golden Horde, we must examine the nature of that position, which the inherent bias of our principal sources has contrived to obscure.

IV

The later rulers of the Golden Horde based their aggression against Hülegü's descendants upon a claim to the territories south of the Caucasus, Arrān and Ādharbāijān, in which the Īlkhāns most frequently resided. That these regions had been the subject of negotiations between Batu and Möngke is suggested by a letter from Özbeg, khan of the Golden Horde (1312–1341), to the Īlkhān Öljeitü (1304–1316). Sending an embassy to Iran at the very beginning of his reign, in jumādā II 712/October 1312, Özbeg demanded the cession of 'whatever is ours by right of the *yarligh* of Mengü (Möngke) Qa'an.'⁸⁸ Blochet believed this claim to rest on concessions made by Möngke in return for Batu's support in 1252;⁸⁹ while other authors suggested that Arrān and Ādharbāijān had been ceded to Berke, later, as the price of the aid rendered by his troops in Hülegü's conquest of Iran.⁹⁰ The evidence favours neither hypothesis, since it is clear elsewhere that the khans of the Golden Horde rested their claims to these territories not merely on some edict dating from the reign of Möngke, but on the will of Chinggis Khan himself.

According to Waṣṣāf, Özbeg's predecessor Toqto'a (Toqta) had sent a mission in 702/1302–3 to the Īlkhān Ghazan, claiming that Arrān and Ādharbāijān belonged to Batu's line by virtue of Chinggis Khan's own division of the empire.⁹¹ In an earlier part of his work, Waṣṣāf goes into the history of this dispute between the two Mongol powers. Jochi, he tells us, had been allotted the territory as far as Derbend, and his descendants, who wintered beyond Derbend, had from time to time made inroads from that region into Arrān: hence they used to claim that Arrān and Ādharbāijān likewise formed part of their dominions.⁹² Now Waṣṣāf was writing under the Īlkhāns, and was doubtless obliged to exercise caution in his treatment of a delicate subject such as this; but his account reveals far more than the official chronicle of Rashīd al-dīn, who makes only the briefest mention of the embassy of 1302–3 and says nothing whatever about its purpose.⁹³ Moreover, the details in Waṣṣāf harmonize strikingly with the testimony of an independent authority, the Mamlūk writer 'Umarī, who informs us that Chinggis Khan had bestowed on Jochi 'the Qipchaq steppe and its appurtenances (*dasht al-qibjāq wa mā mā'ahu*), and added to it Arrān, Tabrīz Hamadan and Marāgha.'⁹⁴

That 'Umarī's statement is well grounded emerges from what we know of Chinggis Khan's territorial dispositions as a whole. According to Juwainī, Jochi received the territory stretching 'from the borders (*ḥudūd*) of Qayaligh and Khwārizm to the remotest parts of Saqsin and Bulghār and from that side (*az ān jānib*) as far as the hoof

of Tatar horse had advanced:⁹⁵ at first sight, an incontrovertible claim to the steppes of Western Russia, with Europe thrown in for good measure.⁹⁶ But do Juwainī's words fully reflect Chinggis Khan's own intentions? It is strange that the conqueror appears, on this definition, to have made no provision for the territory west and south of the Āmūya (apart from Khwārizm), when in 617/1220 his generals Jebe and Sübedei had begun a long campaign which took them round the southern shores of the Caspian, through the Caucasus, and back to the east via the Qipchaq steppe.⁹⁷ In view of Juwainī's phrasing, we should expect this whole area to have been incorporated in Jochi's *ulus*: 'Umarī, by naming as the regions added to it precisely those traversed by Jebe and Sübedei, confirms that this is what actually occurred.'⁹⁸

This raises a further question. If the territory immediately south of the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea was allotted to Jochi, what of eastern Khurāsān and the Indian borderlands, which had been trodden by the Mongol horses similarly during Chinggis Khan's own lifetime?⁹⁹ Now here a powerful objection may be raised: there is no evidence that China was ever assigned to any specific branch of the imperial family during these decades, and no reason, consequently, why regions of north-eastern Iran should not have remained a joint possession. But China was *par excellence* a region of sedentary culture and afforded no important steppe area for grazing.¹⁰⁰ The pasturelands south of the Āmūya, on the other hand, just like those of north-western Iran, were highly prized by the Mongols; and it is therefore all the more likely that Chinggis Khan should have bestowed them upon one of his sons and not left them unapportioned. But we might well infer from Juwainī – and still more from Rashīd al-dīn, who takes, significantly enough, no opportunity of reproducing even Juwainī's details on the extent of Jochi's *ulus*¹⁰¹ – that these territories, through a remarkable foresight on the part of Chinggis Khan, remained unattributed to any individual branch of his family, so that they should conveniently fall to the house of Tolui three decades later.¹⁰²

The improbability of this may be seen from the description of the division of the empire as given, again, by Juwainī. He tells us that Tolui, as the youngest son, remained at his father's side and 'that locality was the middle of their empire like the centre of a circle'.¹⁰³ The respective camping grounds of the older sons were arranged, as it were, in the manner of concentric arcs around this point. Hence Ögedei's pasturelands were in the region of the Emil and the Qobuq, while Chaghadai, as the second son, received the territory 'from the borders of the Uighur country as far as Samarqand and Bukhārā' – one degree further removed, that is, from the Mongol homeland.¹⁰⁴ The fact that the domain of Jochi and his heirs was the most distant of all from this point gave them a logically prior claim to the pasturelands of northern Iran. Nor was this simply a matter of political theory: the authority which, as we shall see, they enjoyed there indicates that the claim was recognized, initially at least, by their whole family.

V

The most outspoken statement regarding Batu's authority outside the regions generally acknowledged to have constituted the appanage of Jochi's sons is made by Jūzjānī, who says:¹⁰⁵

[Of] every province in Iran which had come under Mongol control, he had his allotted share, and his representatives used to take away [that] part in proportion to his share; and all the Mongol grandes and generals obeyed him.

From this remark it is clear that Jūzjānī regarded Batu as holding a special position in Iran relative to the other princes: had the chief of every branch of the family received so prominent a share in these conquests, the circumstance would not have been worthy of comment. We know that at a later date, during the reign of Möngke, the khan of the Golden Horde claimed the right to a sizeable proportion of the spoils from this region.¹⁰⁶ But it is evident from the context that Jūzjānī viewed the situation he describes here as obtaining not only since Möngke's accession but also prior to it. This picture is confirmed by a more detailed examination of local operations in Iran, and of its administrative history, during the three decades preceding Hülegü's invasion.

Our main source for the history of eastern Khurāsān in the Mongol period is the *Tārīkh-nāma-yi Harāt* of Saifī, who was writing around 1322. Although his chronology is somewhat unreliable for much of the thirteenth century, Saifī nevertheless supplies us with a detailed account of the local rulers and of their relations with different Mongol princes and *noyans*. It is he who describes most fully the recapture of Herat in 618/1221 by the general Eljigidei, who was appointed, according to Waṣṣāf, as the representative of Jochi in this region.¹⁰⁷ Eljigidei was still the military commander here in 637/1239–40, when Batu and Ögedei jointly sent officials to Herat to confirm the civil governors in their position.¹⁰⁸ This same joint authority is implied in the request made to Batu by a local *malik*, Majd al-dīn, that he be allowed to restore his town of Kālyūn.¹⁰⁹ Subsequently, Majd al-dīn extended his control over Herat, where he was noted for the preferential treatment he accorded Batu's envoys over those of the Qa'an,¹¹⁰ rebuffing also an attempt by the Chaghadayid prince Yesü-möngke to intervene in the affairs of the city.¹¹¹ His death in 640/1242–3 at the hands of a subordinate of Arghun Aqa, the new governor of Khurāsān and the nominee of Batu's enemies, was followed by the installation of his son Shams al-dīn Muḥammad on Batu's authority: but he in turn was killed on his arrival back from the Jochid prince's *ordo* in 642/1244–5.¹¹²

These few incidents recorded by Saifī reflect the degree of Batu's influence in eastern Khurāsān, so far removed from his headquarters in the Qipchaq steppe, and reveal that efforts were made after Ögedei's death to undermine that influence by those who were to oppose him in the crisis of 1250–1. This emerges still more clearly from the course of events further west during this period. Following Ögedei's first *quriltai* in 626/1229, the *noyan* Chormaghun had been sent to Iran at the head of a large army as the Qa'an's lieutenant. Simultaneously, the governorship of the provinces of Khurāsān and Māzandarān was entrusted to Chin-temür, a dependant of Jochi who had previously been governor (*basqaq*) of Khwārizm (Urgench).¹¹³ Chin-temür's position was challenged, however, by Dayir (or Tayir) Bahadur, a dependant of Ögedei whose claims were supported by Chormaghun; but the dispute was settled in 630/1232–3 by the Qa'an's decision in Chin-temür's favour.¹¹⁴ The latter's death three years later was the signal for further dissensions, although this time the situation was possibly complicated by factors other than personal allegiances. There may have been some antagonism between the civil and military branches of the administration, since Nosal, Chin-temür's immediate successor in the governorship, was the army commander, with which capacity he was eventually obliged by Ögedei's decree to remain content.¹¹⁵ Both he and his rival Körgüz, a Uighur secretary who had risen to be chamberlain and deputy to Chin-temür, were representatives of the Jochid princes,¹¹⁶ as was Edgü-temür, Chin-temür's son, who claimed the governorship by hereditary right.¹¹⁷ With Nosal's death in 637/1239–40 and the disgrace of Edgü-temür, the power of Körgüz was assured, but his overthrow followed closely on Ögedei's death two years later. Falling

victim to the rancour of the Regent Töregene, he was given over to be executed in the *ordo* of Chaghadai's widow, one of whose men he had insulted.¹¹⁸

Like Chin-temür before him, Körgüz, although he belonged to Batu, had defeated his opponents owing to the favour he enjoyed with the Qa'an; and it is noteworthy that Ögedei was ready to support him even against his own local representative, Kul-bolad, whom Juwainī describes as the mainstay of the opposition.¹¹⁹ When this protection was no longer available, he was completely exposed – as were Batu's protégés in Herat, whom we have just noticed – to the hostility of Ögedei's family and of their Chaghadayid allies. That the new governor appointed by Töregene, Arghun Aqa, succeeded in retaining his position throughout the vicissitudes of the next three decades¹²⁰ testifies to his skill in ingratiating himself with each branch of the imperial family. Having secured confirmation of his office at the accession of Güyüg, he was obliged to obey the instructions of Eljigidei, who arrived in Khurāsān shortly afterwards and set about refitting the armed forces.¹²¹ During a subsequent visit to Mongolia in 647/1249, while the throne was vacant, however, Arghun took care to make overtures to Sorqaqtani and to Möngke, simultaneously despatching Nizām al-dīn Shāh, the new secretary (*bitikchi*) on behalf of Batu, to the latter's *ordo*.¹²² By dint of these tactics, his humble demeanour at Möngke's court three years later, and a timely visit to Batu in person not long afterwards,¹²³ Arghun escaped the fate of so many notables during the troubled years preceding Hülegü's great westward expedition in 653/1255–6.

The central rôle played by Batu's subordinates in events in Khurāsān throughout this period is most illuminating. Early in his account, Juwainī names all four *noyans* appointed by Ögedei to represent each branch of the imperial family under Chin-temür,¹²⁴ but thereafter we hear nothing of Chaghadai's representatives, very little of Sorqaqtani's, and progressively less about those of Ögedei. Under both Körgüz and Arghun, the principal figure in the civil and fiscal administration was Sharaf al-dīn, who had originally accompanied Chin-temür from Khwārizm¹²⁵ and had by him been made chief secretary (*ulugh-bitikchi*) on behalf of Batu.¹²⁶ Deprived of any authority under the iron rule of Körgüz,¹²⁷ and eventually imprisoned,¹²⁸ he was released on Körgüz's downfall and reinstated as *ulugh-bitikchi* to Arghun,¹²⁹ who appears to have been powerless to prevent his exactions.¹³⁰ He died not long before Güyüg's accession. Of his successor as Batu's *bitikchi*, Nizām al-dīn Shāh, we are told that it was he who, when Ögedei conferred on Körgüz all the territory conquered by Chormaghun west of the Āmūya,¹³¹ had master-minded on Körgüz's behalf the assumption of control over 'Irāq, Arrān and Ādharbāijān out of the hands of Chormaghun's officers.¹³²

Let us turn finally to these lastnamed regions and to Anatolia, over which Güyüg, as we have seen, was particularly concerned to assert his supremacy at Batu's expense, and which he entrusted for this purpose to Eljigidei. By this time Chormaghun's forces were under the command of Baichu, who was now subordinated to Eljigidei's authority.¹³³ Baichu's career is problematical. According to Rashīd al-dīn, he had been appointed to the command on Ögedei's orders after Chormaghun's death;¹³⁴ though the Armenian chronicler Kirakos and the Saljūqid historian Ibn Bībī are agreed that Baichu received the Qa'an's commission when Chormaghun had grown incapacitated owing to some paralytic disease.¹³⁵ The Armenian sources further date his assumption of the command and his immediate move against the town of Karin in 1242, Kirakos specifying the early part of the year.¹³⁶ It seems more probable, therefore, that Baichu was nominated by Ögedei (who had died as recently as December 1241) – rather than by Töregene, as Pelliot suggested¹³⁷ – even if the orders reached him only after the Qa'an's death. But

this raises a difficulty. If the new commander was an adherent of Ögedei's family, why should Güyüg have sent out Eljigidei to supersede him? More importantly, why, if Baichu represented Ögedei's line, did he not share the fate of Eljigidei and of the other principal followers of Ögedei's heirs in 1251? Instead, he appears to have retained his position for some years more. He was summoned before Hülegü in 655/1257 and, after a stormy interview in which the prince criticized his independent attitude, was sent into Anatolia to raise troops for the coming campaign against Baghdād, participating in its capture a year or so later.¹³⁸

The answer to this question would appear to be that Baichu was the representative not of Ögedei or of any other member of his line, but of the Jochid princes. That this is so is indicated by references in two of our Mamlūk sources. The first is the great encyclopaedia of Nuwairī (d. 732/1332), *Nihāyat al-arab fī funūn al-adab*, where the army which invaded Anatolia in 641/1243, and of which Baichu is known to have been in command, is described as coming 'on behalf of Batu' (*min qibal Bātū*).¹³⁹ Nuwairī's source here may have been Ibn al-ʿAmīd (d. 672/1273), whose narrative shows that Batu at least imposed his own control upon Baichu, whatever the latter's original allegiance,¹⁴⁰ while we know from Ibn Bībī that after his defeat by Baichu at Kösedagh in muḥarram 641/June-July 1243 the Saljūq Sultan Kaikhusrau II was obliged to send envoys to Batu in Russia.¹⁴¹ The other Mamlūk authority is the *Zubdat al-fikra* of Baibars al-Manṣūrī (d. 725/1325). Reproducing, or at least summarizing, the letter sent by Berke to the Egyptian Sultan in 661/1262–3, he speaks of the conversion to Islam of – among other *noyans* – 'all those who had gone forth with Baichu' (*kullu man tawajjaha ṣuḥbata Bāijū*).¹⁴² In other words, these two authorities imply strongly that Baichu was Batu's man from the outset. This would explain why Baichu had been Chormaghun's second-in-command,¹⁴³ since it was natural that this rank should fall to the representative of the prince who exercised a joint authority in this area with the Qa'an himself. It certainly suggests that Batu seized his opportunity on Ögedei's death to make fresh conquests on his own account by means of the newly appointed commander.¹⁴⁴ And we can have little doubt that Baichu was the chief of those lieutenants of Batu whom Eljigidei, according to ʿUmārī, was sent to arrest, but without success:¹⁴⁵ of the various *noyans* mentioned in Armenian sources as operating in the Caucasus under Chormaghun and Baichu, the two of whom we know for certain from other authorities to which branch of the imperial family they were attached are both ascribed to Jochi's line.¹⁴⁶

This completes our survey of the practical outworkings of Jochid hegemony in Iran and neighbouring regions to the west. There remains one final question, however, before we proceed to examine the events which brought it finally to an end and gave rise to the conflict that was permanently to halt the Mongol advance in Western Asia. Earlier it was noted that Özbek of the Golden Horde appealed to some *yarligh* of Möngke as the basis, presumably, of his claims upon the Caucasus territories.¹⁴⁷ It may be, therefore, that Möngke's accession was followed by some agreement leading to a fresh delineation of spheres of influence. This is possibly the implication in Jūzjānī, who makes Batu renounce the imperial throne in 1251 on the grounds that he and his brother Berke already have so much territory in the west that the conquest and administration of Iran, Turkistān and China in addition would be too much for them.¹⁴⁸ Nevertheless, we may suspect this to be more in the nature of a rhetorical device, the context of which is, in any case, the headship of the whole empire. If we took it to mean that Batu was surrendering large areas of Jochid territory, we should be ignoring the testimony of

Rubruck, an eye witness, concerning the khan of the Golden Horde's enormous in the west, not least in Turkistān. There is, however, another possibility. At the beginning of his reign, Möngke called in all *yarlighs* and patents issued by Great Khans and princes alike as far back as the time of Chinggis Khan himself, and gave instructions that none of the princes should issue orders in matters pertaining to the administration of the provinces without consulting the imperial officials.¹⁴⁹ This may well have resulted in a reapportionment of the revenues from the areas of sedentary culture, including Iran; though we find the khan of the Golden Horde a few years later claiming from one-fifth to one-third of this wealth, the remainder being divided between the Qa'an and the troops (presumably the *tama* force – the army of occupation).¹⁵⁰ And in 1254 we find representatives of Batu and Möngke jointly assessing the territories south of the Caucasus for purposes of taxation.¹⁵¹ There is no evidence that the power of the Jochids in Iran had diminished at the time of Hülegü's advance westwards.

VI

Hülegü's invasion of Iran was the first expedition in this particular direction to be headed by princes of the blood. Significantly enough, Batu's relatives outnumbered the princes who brought contingents representing the other royal lines. From the *ulus* of Jochi came Balagha, Tutar and Quli;¹⁵² Hülegü was accompanied by his brother Sübedei, who died en route, Chaghadai's branch was represented by Tegüder, and no member of Ögedei's family is mentioned at all.¹⁵³ Hülegü's precise status does not emerge clearly from a comparison of the sources. Spuler's belief that Möngke Qa'an's intentions concerning Iran were made public from the outset¹⁵⁴ is not supported even by Rashīd al-dīn. What that most zealous apologist of Hülegü's line actually says runs as follows:¹⁵⁵

Although Möngke Qa'an had planned and determined privately (*darkhātir*) that Hülegü Khan should, with the troops he had been given, settle in and reign over the realm of Iran in perpetuity (*hamwāra*), and that this kingdom should be securely conferred upon him and his illustrious house (*orugh*), just as it [now] is, nevertheless he ostensibly (*zāhiran*) ordered him, when he should have accomplished these tasks, to return to his original camping-grounds.

In other words, the establishment of the dynasty of the Īlkhāns is given the sanction of the revered founder of the Toluids' fortunes. Just how necessary was this appeal to Möngke's *imprimatur*, even at the beginning of the fourteenth century, may be inferred from the account given by 'Umarī, writing thirty years after Rashīd al-dīn. Almost at the very commencement of his section on the Mongols, he refers to the claim made by the other Mongol rulers, as a counterblast to the Īlkhān's pretensions, that Hülegü had been merely his brother's representative (*mandūb*).¹⁵⁶ I shall examine this question later. For the moment, the importance of these words of Rashīd lies elsewhere. If the western regions were in fact simply Möngke Qa'an's, to be disposed of as he saw fit, why should he have felt obliged to conceal his purpose? This incidental reference by a Toluid propagandist is one of the strongest indications we possess that the position of the Īlkhāns in Iran was based upon an act of usurpation.

Causes of friction between Hülegü and his Jochid colleagues arose within a comparatively short space. While still beyond the Āmūya, he received a visit from the new *malik* of Herat, Shams al-dīn Muḥammad Kart, who brought complaints, according to

Saifī, concerning Balagha and Tutar. The *malik* had angrily rejected the demands of a local Jochid commander for the requisitions that had traditionally been levied on the city on behalf of Batu's *ulus*. Balagha, encamped at that time with Tutar in the Bādghīs region, had thereupon sent orders to the general Kit-buqa (later the celebrated Mongol commander at 'Ain Jālūt) to arrest Shams al-dīn. The latter, however, foiled Kit-buqa's troops, killing their ally the *malik* of Sīstān, 'Alī b. Mas'ūd, and at once made for Hülegü's head-quarters. In the course of his journey another attempt to arrest him was made by the agents of Balagha and Tutar, and was frustrated only by the arrival on the scene of Hülegü's own envoys. When Shams al-dīn reached Hülegü, the prince was furious that the Jochids had tried to prevent the *malik* from coming to his *ordo*, and had their agents severely punished.¹⁵⁷ We are not told of the immediate consequences of this incident, which must, nevertheless, have led to considerable ill-feeling even while the great army was moving through Iran.

It is probable, moreover, that a clash was greatly facilitated by the internal struggles in the Golden Horde which followed Batu's death in 1256, since Möngke appears to have gone to considerable lengths to prevent Berke succeeding as head of Jochi's *ulus*. First, Batu's son Sartaq, who was on his way to visit the Qa'an at the time of his father's death, was sent back with a diploma conferring the *ulus* upon him and, if the Armenian author Vardan is to be believed, extending the territory under his control.¹⁵⁸ Sartaq, a Christian, was soon at loggerheads with his uncles Berke and Berkecher, by whom he was poisoned, according to Kirakos, after a reign of less than two years.¹⁵⁹ An attempt was next made by Boraqchin, Batu's widow, to secure the throne for an infant grandson, to whom Möngke again gave his recognition.¹⁶⁰ Faced with the continued antagonism of Batu's brothers, she appealed for assistance to Hülegü in Iran, and even set out in person for his camp, only to be overtaken and murdered by her enemies before he could move to her aid.¹⁶¹ It seems that news of these struggles had even reached Delhi, where Jūzjānī speaks of the recent deaths of fifteen members of Jochi's line, all of whose possessions were inherited by Berke.¹⁶²

In this fashion the accession of Berke, who was Batu's oldest surviving brother, had been deferred for over two years in favour of junior members of his family, one of whom was still a minor. That these tactics reflect a vital concern on the Qa'an's part is further indicated by Kirakos, who describes Sartaq's premature death as a heavy blow not only to the Christians of Western Asia, but also to Möngke and Hülegü.¹⁶³ In the present context, this otherwise unobtrusive statement assumes no little importance.

It is very likely that Möngke's efforts to prevent Berke from obtaining supremacy in the Jochid *ulus* were based on the knowledge that he would be aroused by the attack on Baghdād. According to 'Umarī, the initial plan had been merely to crush the Assassins, but Hülegü prevailed upon his brother to countenance an invasion also of the Caliph's territory. He was forbidden to proceed further by Batu, to whom Berke had complained; but after Batu's death he was able to resume the offensive.¹⁶⁴ And Jūzjānī confirms that by 1260 rumours had already reached Delhi that the assault on the Caliphate had brought about an estrangement between Berke and Hülegü.¹⁶⁵ Hence it is clear that the transfer of power in Western Asia (remembering the *condominium* that had been in existence since 1252) to a devout Muslim, whose faith had even occasioned friction between him and Batu during the latter's lifetime,¹⁶⁶ was yet another factor in the dissolution of the Jochid-Toluid alliance.

This is not to say, however, that the assault on the Caliphate was the principal reason for the war, as certain later Mamlūk authorities claim.¹⁶⁷ Here we must bear in mind the

diplomatic realities of 1263, since the ultimate source of such information would have been Berke's envoys to the Egyptian Sultan. Once war had actually broken out, the khan of the Golden Horde would naturally have been keen to stress his rôle as a good Muslim: in the same fashion Hülegü and his successors, eager for an alliance with the Christian West, took pains to portray themselves as potential or actual Christians and to emphasize what a great opportunity for cooperation had been lost during the invasion of Syria in 1260.¹⁶⁸ Yet we may well doubt whether religious affiliations had been so important at the time. Prior to the outbreak of war between Hülegü and the Golden Horde, the dominant aim of the Mongols was to bring all the known world into subjection; and we can detect a certain anxiety, in fact, not to be identified with the religious of any of the subject peoples (which were also the religions of their enemies).¹⁶⁹ The religious factor should not be underplayed; but just how little weight it carried even with Berke, as regards the eventual cause of hostilities, may be gauged merely from the lapse of time. Baghdād fell early in 656/1258; whereas in spite of the pronounced obscurity which surrounds the chronology of the next few years, it is evident that war between Hülegü and the Golden Horde broke out at least three full years later.

The accounts given in the sources of the events immediately preceding the outbreak of hostilities vary considerably, Rashīd alone supplying three distinct versions. In his history of the Golden Horde, he tells us that Balagha was accused of plotting witchcraft against Hülegü and was returned to Berke, who sent him back to be dealt with at Hülegü's pleasure. Thereupon he was executed. The deaths of Quli and Tutar soon afterwards were attributed to poison and led to an estrangement between Hülegü and Berke.¹⁷⁰ Later, Rashīd repeats this story, but with the rôles of Balagha and Tutar transposed.¹⁷¹ And finally, he informs us that Berke presumed upon Batu's and his own rôles in the election of Möngke, and irritated Hülegü by constantly sending instructions to him in Iran. At first Hülegü endured this out of deference to Berke's status as the *aqā*, but the deaths of the three Jochid princes gave rise to open hostilities¹⁷² – a fairly obvious *non sequitur* on Rashīd's part. Grigor of Akner, on the other hand, who makes Quli die naturally some time prior to the execution of his colleagues,¹⁷³ supplies a fuller account of these events, to which we shall return later.

Two further circumstances intimately connected with the outbreak of the war are to be found in the Mamlūk sources. Firstly, according to Ibn Shaddād (d. 684/1285), the conflict arose from Berke's attempt to secure the revenues and spoils due to him from Iran: Balagha and Tutar are here mistaken for envoys recently despatched from the Golden Horde for this purpose, but the sorcery charge which led to their execution is repeated.¹⁷⁴ The division of the spoils is a highly important factor, of which our Persian sources make no mention whatsoever. The second such factor appears in the work of Abū-Shāma (d. 665/1267), reporting the arrival in Egypt in 660/1262 of refugee Mongol troops from Iran. According to their testimony, the war had been caused by the fact that in the struggle for the succession which broke out in Mongolia on Möngke's death Hülegü and Berke supported rival candidates:¹⁷⁵ this again is a crucial piece of evidence, which is corroborated by Kirakos.¹⁷⁶ Let us now turn to this conflict in Mongolia and its repercussions in the west.¹⁷⁷

VII

The civil war between the two brothers in Mongolia is described most fully by Rashīd al-dīn, who derived his information, however, from those who were committed to the existing régime in China.¹⁷⁸ For him, Arigh-böke is a rebel and Qubilai the legitimate heir. And the extent of his bias emerges from a number of scattered references in other, more nearly contemporary, sources. It is significant, in the first place, that Kirakos, in reporting Möngke's death, describes Arigh-böke as his successor, without at this stage any mention of Qubilai.¹⁷⁹ Arigh is asserted elsewhere to have been the heir on the grounds that he had been left in command at Qaraqorum on Möngke's departure for China.¹⁸⁰ However this may be, Rashīd greatly underemphasises both the extent and the value of the support that Arigh-böke enjoyed from the outset. By custom the guardianship of the hearthlands, and the regency, should have passed on Möngke's death to his youngest son by his chief wife. This was Urung-tash, who is admitted by Rashīd to have been one of Arigh's chief adherents, though without stressing his importance.¹⁸¹ We are given the impression in the *Jāmī' al-tawārīkh* that the princes who supported Arigh's election constituted a rump assembly; but in reality they included the heads of the other two divisions of the empire. Although Rashīd acknowledges that the princess Orqina, regent of Chaghadaï's *ulus*, was among their number,¹⁸² he nevertheless totally suppresses the fact that Arigh was upheld by Berke in the west.¹⁸³ The reason for this is not far to seek. Berke was now, as his brother Batu had been before him, the most senior member of the entire family.¹⁸⁴ If Batu's had been the deciding voice in Möngke's election (and the fact that Juwainī lays such stress on Batu's rôle indicates how far this, as opposed to any other consideration, had legitimized the transfer of power to Tolui's line), why should Berke in turn not have been allowed to dispose of the imperial dignity in 1259? Indeed, since news had reached Delhi of Möngke's death and of the *khutba* being read in Berke's name throughout Iran, Māwarā' al-nahr and Khurāsān shortly before Jūzjānī ceased writing in 658/1260,¹⁸⁵ it seems that the *aqā's* rights were recognized at least in the western half of the empire. And that Berke would have used his authority to confer the sovereignty on Arigh-böke was a revelation that Rashīd's informants could not afford: it would have been to deny the legitimacy of the existing order in China – and hence, as we shall see, of that in Iran also.

Qubilai's proclamation as Qa'an in the Chinese city of K'ai-p'ing, several hundred miles from the Mongol capital, in May 1260 was a denial of the principles on which the whole succession procedure was based;¹⁸⁶ and Arigh's subsequent enthronement at Qaraqorum appears as a natural defensive reaction.¹⁸⁷ Moreover, it was Qubilai who first attempted to subvert the established régimes in his own favour by sending Büri's son Abishqa to replace Orqina as head of Chaghadaï's *ulus*: the attempt miscarried, in fact, and Arigh-böke despatched the Chaghadayid Alghu to represent his own interests in Central Asia.¹⁸⁸ Yet in spite of such initial reverses, and of his lack of support in the empire as a whole, Qubilai was able to gain the upper hand, merely by virtue of possessing certain major advantages over his rival: a large army, quartered in a fertile country and with access to plentiful supplies. This enabled him, once he had concluded a temporary peace with the Sung,¹⁸⁹ gradually to secure the other principal economic centres – on the upper Yenisei and in the Tangut region – and to force Arigh to evacuate Qaraqorum and move into Turkistān.¹⁹⁰ The remainder of the war, culminating in Arigh's submission in 1264, does not concern us; rather must we now return to Western Asia.

Rashīd al-dīn implies that the report of Möngke's death reached Hülegü in the first months of 658/1260, around the time of the fall of Damascus.¹⁹¹ This is extremely unlikely on chronological grounds;¹⁹² and more probably the news which induced Hülegü to retire from Syria at this juncture was of the dispute between his brothers, as indicated in Mamlūk sources.¹⁹³ The stages of his journey eastwards are obscure. Rashīd mentions only his arrival at Akhlāt on 24 jumādā II/7 June,¹⁹⁴ and thereafter tells us nothing of his movements until the outbreak of war in the Caucasus. Possibly he continued to move east with the intention, as Kirakos informs us, of wintering in the plain of Hamadān.¹⁹⁵ His aims in the longer term are equally uncertain. Het'um claims that he was expected himself to be a candidate for the imperial throne and discontinued his march on learning of Qubilai's election;¹⁹⁶ and certainly it seems that rumours of such an ambition had reached the ears of the Franks in Palestine.¹⁹⁷ The impression, however, that Hülegü now played a waiting game is confirmed by a curious detail given by the fourteenth century Persian historian Shabānkārā'ī, who says that Hülegü was on the point of returning to Mongolia and had despatched a great quantity of treasure from Iran, but that on hearing of Möngke's death he immediately recalled it.¹⁹⁸ And his prolonged inactivity becomes more understandable if we remember how ill-defined was his status.

Earlier, we noticed that Rashīd al-dīn is suspiciously vague when speaking of Möngke's intentions in sending Hülegü west, and that 'Umarī describes him as having been merely his brother's representative in Iran.¹⁹⁹ 'Umarī later refers to Hülegü as Möngke's lieutenant (*nā'ib*), and points out that he and his successors continued to strike coins in the Great Khan's name and to accept a permanent representative of his at their court down to the time of Ghazan, who asserted his own sovereign status.²⁰⁰ This is in fact quite correct; though the coins of the early Īlkhāns bear only the Great Khan's title (*Qa'an al-a'zam* or *al-'ādil*) and not his name.²⁰¹ And that the style Īlkhān was itself indicative of some kind of subordinate rank appears to be borne out by the fact that Rashīd, writing under the first independent sovereign of Hülegü's line, Ghazan, who for him is nothing less than the *Pādishāh-i Islām*, scarcely employs the term even with reference to his master's predecessors.²⁰² There is some slight evidence, in fact, that the title Īlkhān was applicable to other Mongol potentates and not just to the early Toluids in Iran²⁰³ – a circumstance which would heighten the significance of Ghazan's action still further.

At another point, however, 'Umarī appears to contradict himself by telling us that after the fall of Baghdād Hülegü settled where he was, rebelled and declared his independence (*tamakkana wa 'aṣā wa istaqalla bi-nafsihi*).²⁰⁴ The two pieces of evidence are not irreconcilable. One other curious circumstance attached to the title Īlkhān is that Juwainī uses it even less than Rashīd (twice in all, and in both cases it is the reading of only one MS).²⁰⁵ This harmonizes well with the fact that it does not figure on Hülegü's coins until after Möngke's death: prior to that he styles himself simply Hülegü Khan.²⁰⁶ It seems fair to assume, therefore, that Hülegü's status underwent a change at some time later than 1259.

The fullest account we possess of this transformation is to be found in the chronicle of Grigor of Akner. He tells us that after the capture of Baghdād the Mongol princes in Iran fell out, whereupon Hülegü sent a message to Möngke that included the sinister statement: 'We sent back the old troopers and the *tamachis* (*femayč'ik*) from here.'²⁰⁷ The Qa'an wrote in reply that Hülegü was to have authority over the province. Summoned to a local *quriltai* by Hülegü, the princes were confronted with Möngke's

decree. While the others submitted with a good grace, the four Jochids did not.²⁰⁸ The three senior princes were strangled with the bowstring, but Mingqan, who had succeeded to his father Quli's command, was spared in view of his youth, and imprisoned on an island in Lake Urmia. A great slaughter of the Jochid troops ensued at the hands of Hülegü and his Georgian and Armenian allies: only two chiefs escaped with twelve thousand men across the river Kur to Berke, on which account, says Grigor, 'they wreaked much evil for ten years'.²⁰⁹ Simultaneously, secret orders were sent to Anatolia, as a result of which Baichu was probably executed about this time and his command transferred to Chormaghun's son Shiremün.²¹⁰

The one detail that fails to ring true in this account is the mention of Möngke as currently ruling in the Far East. The attack on the Jochid generals and their forces cannot have occurred in Möngke's reign, since it must have immediately preceded the outbreak of war between Hülegü and the Golden Horde. And that the war began only in 1261 is the testimony not merely of the Armenian sources close at hand,²¹¹ but of the Mamlūk authorities also. Baibars al-Manṣūrī informs us that the siege of al-Mawṣil (which fell to the Mongols in sha'bān 660/June–July 1262)²¹² was protracted for nine months because Hülegü had been obliged to withdraw troops from there for the struggle with Berke.²¹³ News of the internecine strife in Iran as a consequence of the Great Khan's death was reaching Mamlūk Syria early in 660/1262;²¹⁴ and we may assume, therefore, that the war broke out during the winter of 1261–2.²¹⁵

In these circumstances, the Qa'an to whom Hülegü appealed, and who responded by conferring on him a greater degree of authority in Iran, can only have been Qubilai; and it was most probably at this juncture that Hülegü first gave Qubilai his allegiance. There is no evidence, in fact, to support Rashīd al-dīn's constant implication that he had favoured Qubilai from the outset.²¹⁶ It is even possible, on the contrary, that he had supported Arigh-böke, since we find his eldest son Jumughur, who had been left in command of Hülegü's *ordos* in Mongolia in 1253–4, fighting on Arigh's side at an early stage.²¹⁷ The prince's recall by Hülegü, therefore, and his death en route for Iran must have occurred at this juncture, rather than in 662/1264 as Rashīd states.²¹⁸ This is all the more likely in view of the fact that Rashīd makes Jumughur's desertion coincide with Arigh's westward campaign against the Chaghadayid Alghu,²¹⁹ who had himself changed sides early in 1262, killing Arigh's representatives and transferring his allegiance to Qubilai.²²⁰ Yet a further link in this complex chain is that Rashīd at one point speaks of Qubilai's simultaneously despatching patents of authority to Hülegü and Alghu;²²¹ while at another he makes it clear that Hülegü had not long been in possession of such a diploma when he moved in person against Berke in jumādā II 661/April–May 1263.²²² Kirakos, finally, suggests that the revolts were connected, saying that Alghu wrote to Hülegü requesting his assistance, and that Hülegü sent his son and later successor, Abaqa, eastwards for this purpose.²²³ It is doubtful, however, whether the forces of Hülegü and Alghu actually collaborated: more probably the diversion in Central Asia, where Alghu set about expelling Berke's governors and massacring his dependants just as Hülegü himself had done in Iran,²²⁴ simply enabled the Īlkhān to prosecute the war in the Caucasus with greater success.

The precise chronology of these events must remain obscure: what does seem to emerge more clearly from the data we possess is that Hülegü seized his opportunity, at a point when the war in Mongolia had been under way for some time, to convert his position in Iran from being that of a mere representative of the Great Khan to the status of head of an *ulus* on a par with the rulers of the Golden Horde and of Central Asia. To

effect this, it was necessary to destroy the Jochid hold on northern Iran and to secure official confirmation of his new status from a legitimating authority in the Far East: and here his interests harmonized ideally with those of Qubilai, naturally anxious to neutralize his rival's principal supporter, Berke. This is not to deny that there were already other factors – notably religious affiliations – which contributed to the hostility between Hülegü and the Golden Horde. But the major cause of the conflict of 1261–2 was the successful misappropriation by the Toluid prince of the territories south and west of the Āmūya which had hitherto been regarded as part of the Jochid sphere of influence by virtue of Chinggis Khan's own edict: that this was the specific *yasa* of Chinggis Khan which Berke, in his correspondence with the Mamlūk Sultan, accused Hülegü of infringing²²⁵ seems an inescapable conclusion.

VIII

The consequence of this audacious move by Hülegü was the sudden arresting of the Mongol advance in the west on three distinct fronts: in Eastern Europe, in Syria, and in Afghānistān. Let us conclude by briefly examining each of these areas in turn.

There can be little doubt that Berke had been preparing for a major offensive against Europe. An invasion of Poland in 1259²²⁶ was apparently designed as a preliminary to the definitive subjugation of Hungary, whose king, Bela IV, received an ultimatum at some time early in that year: his appeal to Pope Alexander IV elicited only vague promises of help and a prohibition against entering into treaty with the Mongols, but Bela nevertheless prepared to resist.²²⁷ Neither this incursion nor the long awaited forward thrust through Germany, heralded by a letter demanding the submission of St Louis in the first months of 1261,²²⁸ ever materialized; and the reason is clearly the outbreak of dissension within the Mongol empire. We may in fact justly regard Möngke's death in 1259 and the civil wars that followed, no less than Ögedei's death eighteen years previously and the ensuing interregnum, as having been the salvation of large tracts of Central and Western Europe.

If Latin Christendom had good cause to be grateful for these events as regards the fate of its own heartlands, it was otherwise, at least in the long term, with its outposts in Palestine and Syria, where the Mamlūks were swift to take advantage of the new diplomatic situation. Detailed reports of the struggle that had broken out within the Mongol empire reached Egypt only with the arrival of fugitive Mongol troops on 24 dhu'l-ḥijja 660/9 November 1262.²²⁹ They were part of the Jochid contingent in Iran, who had been instructed by Berke to rejoin him or, failing this, to make their way to the dominions of the Mamlūk Sultan.²³⁰ They were warmly welcomed by Baibars, who had already written to Berke in the previous year.²³¹ A Mamlūk embassy to the Golden Horde left Cairo in muḥarram 661/November 1262,²³² and in Constantinople met Berke's own envoys en route for Egypt, where they arrived in rajab/May 1263.²³³ Thus began the alliance which was to be a corner-stone of the policies of both the Mamlūk Sultans and the khans of the Golden Horde well into the following century. It signifies the first occasion on which a Mongol prince was prepared to collaborate with an independent external power against fellow Mongols; and in this vital sense – remembering the claims to world-wide dominion that the Mongols had hitherto expressed – it may be said to signify the dissolution of their empire. The advantage that it brought the

Mamlūks in the Near East was considerable, and their enemies were ill-prepared to reap any corresponding benefit: Hülegü's readiness now to effect a *rapprochement* with the Latin West – clearly a reflex to Berke's agreement with Muslim Egypt – was treated with no little reserve.^{233a}

The new allies were unable, however, to undermine Hülegü's position in Anatolia, where the Saljūqid 'Izz al-dīn Kaikā'ūs II had quarrelled with his brother and co-regent, Rukn al-dīn Qilich Arslan IV, in ramadān 659/August 1261 and had been expelled by Hülegü's forces.²³⁴ Early in the following year 'Izz al-dīn wrote to Baibars for assistance, prior to taking refuge with the Sultan's Byzantine ally Michael VIII.²³⁵ Whether he was also in contact with Berke at this time we are not told. But we find the khan of the Golden Horde recommending him to Baibars as early as 661/1263 in the letter brought by his first embassy;²³⁶ while at a slightly later date Berke's forces rescued the Saljūqid prince from a Thracian prison, where Michael had consigned him in an effort, presumably, to placate the Īlkhān and to keep favour with both sides.²³⁷ Nevertheless, 'Izz al-dīn remained an exile until his death.

In eastern Iran and in the Indian borderlands, on the other hand, Hülegü's interests suffered a decisive check; and this requires to be examined in more detail. In 659/1261 the Jochid commander in this region, Negüder, acting on Berke's express orders, assisted a local chief, Tāj al-dīn, to recover the fortress of Mastung from Shams al-dīn Kart of Herat.²³⁸ The same year saw the expulsion of the latter's troops also from Sīstān by the new *malik* Naṣīr al-dīn Muḥammad b. Abī'l-Faṭḥ b. Mas'ūd, who had obtained a *yarligh* for his ancestral dominions from Hülegü in 657/1259 after some years of pleading at the *ordo*.²³⁹ It must have been both these setbacks which prompted Shams al-dīn, who had himself been in revolt against Hülegü in 658/1260,²⁴⁰ to become again his loyal supporter. Nor was an opportunity long in forthcoming. On the massacre of the Jochid forces in western Iran, some of the survivors fled into Khurāsān to join Negüder, with two of Hülegü's *noyans* in hot pursuit.²⁴¹ As he moved down from the Murghāb to Andkhūy in an attempt to cross the Āmūya and regain Jochid territory, Negüder learned of the advance of another army under Hülegü's son Tübshin, whereupon he hurried south into the (Awghān) country, but was overtaken in the vicinity of Shāl and Bīnī-yi Gāw by the combined forces of Tübshin and Shams al-dīn. His army, after a fierce resistance, was routed, and Negüder himself saved only by the timely arrival from Mastung of his client Tāj al-dīn, who fought an indecisive engagement with the pursuing Herat forces and obliged them to retire.²⁴² Negüder and his army then moved across the Indus.

The outbreak of hostilities between Hülegü and the Golden Horde had the effect of greatly reducing Mongol pressure on the Panjāb, where the frontiers of the Delhi Sultanate had been steadily receding since 1241.²⁴³ The reign of Nāṣir al-dīn Maḥmūd (644/1246–664/1266), far from meriting Jūzjānī's all too frequent panegyrics, appears to have witnessed a series of military and strategic disasters. In 651/1253–4 the Mongol general Sali had invaded India in an effort to install at Delhi the renegade prince Jalāl al-dīn Mas'ūd b. El-tutmish, the Sultan's brother, who had fled to Möngke's court requesting assistance. The invaders were in fact unable to penetrate further than Jainēr, and Jalāl al-dīn had to rest content with Lahore, Kūjāh and Sōdra, which were already subject to the Mongols.²⁴⁴ Not long afterwards we find the governor of Uchch and Multān, 'Izz al-dīn Balaban Kishlu Khan, accepting into his dominions a Mongol representative (*shahna*).²⁴⁵ Mongol influence in the Panjāb may have suffered somewhat as a result of Jalāl al-dīn's expulsion from Lahore by Nuṣrat al-dīn Shīr Khan, who had

similarly visited Möngke's court, but who now reached an agreement with Maḥmūd whereby his control was recognized over all the territories he had previously held.²⁴⁶ Consequently, a further appeal for help – this time from Kishlu Khan to Hülegü in person²⁴⁷ – elicited an immediate response. At the end of 655/ in the winter of 1257–8, Sali entered Sind in strength and dismantled the fortifications of Multān.²⁴⁸ During the next few years the Mongols continued to harass the frontier regions along the river Bēāh,²⁴⁹ while preparing, presumably, for their next forward thrust. That it never came Jūzjānī ascribes to an exchange of envoys between Maḥmūd's *nā'ib* and future successor, Ghiyāth al-dīn Balaban Ulugh Khan, and Hülegü's satellites on the frontier, leading to a mission on Hülegü's own behalf in the first months of 658/1260.²⁵⁰ He alleges that Hülegü, whose ambassadors were overawed by an impressive review of the Sultan's military establishment, ordered Sali to make no further incursions into Maḥmūd's territory.²⁵¹ In view of the increasingly precarious situation of the Delhi Sultanate at this time, however,²⁵² other factors must have been involved.

These events occurred at precisely the moment when Hülegü had received news of Möngke's death and the dispute between his brothers in Mongolia.²⁵³ Since not only Hülegü but Berke also was in diplomatic contact with Delhi in this year, it is possible that both princes were making overtures with a view to their impending struggle, the one seeking the cooperation of a fellow-Muslim, the other endeavouring to secure his rear with a promise of neutrality on Maḥmūd's part.²⁵⁴ But this must remain a matter of conjecture. More probably Hülegü simply called a halt to campaigning in this region, just as in Syria, prior to moving into Ādharbāijān and waiting upon events.²⁵⁵ We can have little doubt that the attack on the gravely weakened Delhi Sultanate would have recommenced shortly; but within three years Hülegü had lost control of the Indian borderlands altogether.

Rashīd tells us of Negüder and his army only that they seized the territory 'from the mountains of Ghazna and Bīnī-yi Gāw to Multān and Lahore'.²⁵⁶ Further details of their arrival in India, however, are given by Marco Polo, who narrowly escaped capture by the Negüderis while passing through Kirmān. Polo makes the fugitives traverse Badakhshān, the Pashāi and Kashmīr, until they reached 'Dilivar', which they wrested from its ruler 'Asidin Soldan' and where Negüder established his base.²⁵⁷ It is some time before we hear of his followers terrorizing Khurāsān and on occasion conducting raids into Fārs.²⁵⁸ But in the meantime, the Īlkhāns' attempts to extend their authority even over the regions Negüder had vacated were greatly hampered by the opposition of local dynasts who had been in league with the Jochids, notably Naṣīr al-dīn of Sīstān, who gave shelter to the Jochid commander *Junjudar in 663/1264–5 and defied every attempt to reduce him to obedience over the following decades.²⁵⁹ Hülegü and his successors were thus cut off from India at both the northern and the southern approaches through Afghānistān.

The establishment in the borderlands of a body of Mongol troops hostile to both the Īlkhāns and the Chaghdayids²⁶⁰ was a factor of the utmost importance in the history of the Delhi Sultanate, since it postponed for almost four decades the time when India was to experience the full weight of a Mongol invasion. These forces, engaged as they were in raiding the Īlkhān's territories as frequently as India, were small enough not to threaten the survival of the Sultanate (to whose centre the Negüderis seem never to have penetrated), and still sufficiently large to obstruct any expansionist tendencies in this direction on the part of the two neighbouring *ulus*. Jahn's view that the Persian Mongols were prevented from making good their claims to this region by the constant

need to defend their other frontiers²⁶¹ does not take full account of the situation that had arisen in Afghānistān. As for the Chaghadayids, Alghu's advance into the Indian borderlands, which resulted in the elimination of Sali also,²⁶² appears to have been merely temporary. In spite of Aubin's assertion that 'the impossibility of maintaining contact with the Golden Horde soon condemned the Negüderis to a change of masters which was already complete by 1270',²⁶³ we may well question whether the Chaghadayids did in fact assume effective control here at this time – still less retain it in the troubled years that followed.²⁶⁴ Not until the final decade of the century was a determined effort made from Central Asia to bring the Negüderis into subjection and to dominate the frontiers of India; and then the impact on the Delhi Sultanate was more keenly felt than at any time previously.²⁶⁵

If the Jochids had lost Iran, a faint echo of the authority they once enjoyed there nevertheless survives in a curious detail to be found in the Mamlūk sources. Beginning with Baibars al-Manṣūrī and Nuwairī, the Arabic authors ascribe to the head of the *ulus* of Orda, Jochi's eldest son, the style of 'malik of Ghazna and Bāmiyān'. For a long time it was assumed that the White Horde, as this branch of Jochi's family was designated, actually ruled over these regions – so far south of their known territory – into the fourteenth century.²⁶⁶ We may infer instead that the Mongol troops quartered here before the conflagration of 1261–2 belonged to Quli, Orda's second son, and that they persisted in a nominal allegiance to his relatives even afterwards.²⁶⁷

NOTES

1. On the attempt by Ögedei's family to recover power, and on their fate, see Sir H. H. Howorth, *History of the Mongols*, London 1876–1927 (3 vols in 4 & suppt), I, pp. 170–3; R. Grousset, *L'Empire Mongol (Ire phase)*, Paris 1941 (Cavaignac, Histoire du Monde, VIII/3), pp. 306–11; idem, *L'Empire des Steppes*, 4th ed. Paris 1965 [henceforward *Steppes*], pp. 338–41; V. V. Bartol'd, *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion*, trans. H. A. R. Gibb, 3rd. ed. C. E. Bosworth, London 1968 (Gibb Memorial Series, n. s., V), pp. 478–80.
2. For Rubruck's testimony, see especially *Turkestan* 1968, p. 480, & Bartol'd, *Four Studies on the History of Central Asia*, trans. V. Minorsky, Leyden 1956–62 (4 vols in 3), I, p. 121.
3. See Howorth, I, pp. 216–22; *L'Empire Mongol*, pp. 317–24; *Steppes*, pp. 352–3; *Four Studies*, I, pp. 122–3.
4. So runs the more recent verdict on 'Ain Jālūt: see Cl. Cahen, *La Syrie du Nord à l'époque des Croisades*, Paris 1940, pp. 710–1; Bernard Lewis, art. 'Ayn Djālūt' in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new ed. H. A. R. Gibb et al., I, Leyden–London 1954–60, pp. 786–7.
5. For Juwainī, see the introduction to the translation by J. A. Boyle, *The History of the World-Conqueror*, Manchester 1958 (2 vols), I, pp. xv–xxv: reference will be made occasionally to M. M. Qazwīnī's edition, Leyden–London 1912–37 (3 vols, Gibb Memorial Series, XVI) [hereafter Boyle and Juwainī respectively]. For Rashīd, see Boyle's trans. of part of the work, *The Successors of Genghis Khan*, London–New York 1971 [hereafter *Successors*], introd., pp. 3–5.
6. With the qualified exception of the *Mulhaqāt al-surāḥ* of Jamāl Qarshi, which was written in the Central Asian dominion founded by Qubilai's great rival Qaidu, but which provides only fragmentary data: extracts ed. Bartol'd in *Turkestan v epokhu mongol'skogo nashestviya*, St. Petersburg 1900 (2 vols), I, pp. 128–52. On this work, cf. *Turkestan* 1968, pp. 51–2.
7. Edgar Blochet, 'Moufazzal ibn Abil-Faza'il. Histoire des Sultans Mamlouks' [hereafter *Moufazzal*], i, in *Patrologia Orientalis*, XII, 1919 (pp. 343–550), p. 379, note, where the struggle between Qubilai and Arigh-bōke is under discussion; *L'Empire Mongol*, pp. 287–9.

8. D. Ayalon, 'The Great Yāsa of Chingiz Khan: a re-examination', B, in *Studia Islamica*, XXXIV, 1971 (pp. 151–80), pp. 152–66.
9. Ed. & trans. Klaus Lech, *Das Mongolische Weltreich: Al-'Umarī's Darstellung der mongolischen Reiche in seinem Werk Masālik al-abṣār fī mamālik al-amṣār*, Wiesbaden 1968 (Asiatische Forschungen, XXII); for 'Umarī's oral sources, see Lech's introd., pp. 29ff.
10. References are to 'Abd al-Haiy Ḥabībī's 2nd ed., Kābul 1342–3 sh./1963–4 (2 vols), and to H. G. Raverty's trans., *Ṭabaḳāt-i-Nāṣirī: a general history of the Muḥammadan Dynasties of Asia*, London 1873–81 (Bibliotheca Indica). On Berke's relations with Delhi, see Jean Richard, 'La conversion de Berke et les débuts de l'islamisation de la Horde d'Or', in *Revue des Études Islamiques*, XXXV, 1967 (pp. 173–84), pp. 175 (& n. 4) & 177. Delhi was visited by merchants from Māwarā' al-nahr as well as by official envoys: Jūzjānī, II, p. 215; Raverty, pp. 1287 ff. For Hülegü's embassy to Delhi, see Jūzjānī, II, pp. 83–8; Raverty, pp. 856–63, and section VIII below.
11. See G. Doerfer, 'Zur Datierung der Geheimen Geschichte der Mongolen', in: *Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, CXIII, 1963 (pp. 87–111), pp. 108ff.; Igor de Rachewiltz, 'Some Remarks on the Dating of the *Secret History of the Mongols*' in *MS*, XXIV, 1965 (pp. 185–206), pp. 198 ff. References are to the text in transcription of L. Ligeti, *Histoire Secrète des Mongols*, Budapest 1971 (Monumenta Linguae Mongolicae Collecta, I), and the translation by Erich Haenisch, *Die Geheime Geschichte der Mongolen*, 2nd ed. Leipzig 1948.
12. Cf. L. Hambis & P. Pelliot, *Histoire des Campagnes de Gengis Khan*, Leyden 1951 (vol. I only), pp. xi–xv, for the probable relationship of this group of sources and the lost Mongol chronicle *Altan Debter*; also *L'Empire Mongol*, pp. 565–80.
13. See generally W. W. Rockhill, *The Journey of William of Rubruck to the Eastern Parts of the World 1253–55*, London 1900 (Hakluyt Society, 2nd series, IV), introd., pp. xxii ff. Carpini's *Ystoria Mongalorum* and Rubruck's *Itinerarium* are both edited by Anastasius van den Wyngaert in *Sinica Franciscana, I. Itinera et Relationes Fratrum Minorum Saeculi XIII et XIV*, Quaracchi-Firenze 1929; and a variant account of Carpini's mission was ed. & trans. G. D. Painter, R. A. Skelton et al., *The Vinland Map and the Tartar Relation*, Newhaven-London 1965 [hereafter *Tartar Relation*].
14. For the Armenian authors Kirakos (d. 1272), Vardan (d. ca. 1270) and Grigor of Akner (d. 1335), see G. Altunian, *Die Mongolen und ihre Eroberungen in kaukasischen und kleinasiatischen Ländern im XIII. Jahrhundert*, Berlin 1911 (Historische Studien, XCI), pp. 93ff.; Boyle, 'Kirakos of Ganjak on the Mongols', in *CAJ*, VIII, 1963 (pp. 199–214), pp. 199–200.
15. *L'Empire Mongol*, p. 286.
16. For references to the *kārkhānahā*, see especially the passages quoted in *Turkestan* 1968, notes 225 (pp. 516–7), 247 & 254 (pp. 518–9). To this category belong also the German captives mentioned by Rubruck (Wyngaert, pp. 224–5; Rockhill, pp. 136–8). Rashīd describes the line of Kölgen, Chinggis Khan's son by a wife of inferior status, as possessing a *kārkhāna* in Tabrīz even in his own day: trans. O. I. Smirnova, *Sbornik lyetopisei*, I/2, Moscow-Leningrad 1952, p. 276.
17. For examples, see E. Bretschneider, *Mediaeval Researches from Eastern Asiatic Sources*, London 1888 (2 vols, Trübner's Oriental Series), II, pp. 11–14.
18. Jean Aubin, 'L'Ethnogenèse des Qaraunas', in *Turcica*, I, 1969 (pp. 65–94), pp. 74–6 & 78.
19. Cf. Rubruck's comment on the specification of pasturages for the 'captains': Wyngaert, p. 172; Rockhill, p. 53.
20. *Secret History*, § 270 (Haenisch, p. 136: 'Die Prinzen Staatsregenten'), in the context of the preparations for the campaign of 1236–42 in Russia and Eastern Europe: the term would appear to have excluded Kölgen (cf. note 16 above), who is known to have participated in this expedition.

21. Boyle, I, p. 186. Cf. also Rubruck's testimony: Wyngaert, p. 185; Rockhill, p. 78. For further references, see B. Ya. Vladimirtsov, *Le régime social des Mongols*, trans. M. Carsow, Paris 1948 (Annales du Musée Guimet, LII), pp. 60 & 66–7.
22. See, by way of introduction, Kaare Grønbech, 'The turkish System of Kinship', in *Studia Orientalia Ioanni Pedersen . . . dicata*, Hauniae 1953 (pp. 124–9), p. 128: 'We must think of the Turkish generations not as horizontal and absolute, but as vertical and relative'.
23. T. Tekin, *A grammar of Orkhon Turkic*, Bloomington 1968 (Indiana Univ. Publ. Uralic and Altaic Series), p. 234 (E 16: line 4): Tekin's translation (p. 266) of *törü* as 'state rules' is a trifle strong.
24. Cf. L. N. Gumilev, 'Udyel'no-lyestvichnaya sistema u Tyurok v VI-VIII vyekakh', in *Sovetskaya Etnografiya*, 1959, 3 (pp. 11–25), table p. 14. Later (p. 16) he quotes the statement attributed to the future *qaghan* *Chulohu in the *Sui-shu* that since the accession of *Moghan in 553 younger sons had been preferred to older and illegitimate to legitimate and hence the custom of his forefathers had been neglected: cf. Liu Mau-tsai, *Die chinesischen Nachrichten zur Geschichte der Ost-Türken (T'u-küe)*, Wiesbaden 1958 (1 vol. in 2. Göttinger Asiatische Forschungen, X), p. 54.
25. On the Pechenegs, see Constantine Porphyrogenitus, *De administrando imperio*, ed. Gy. Moravcsik & trans. R. J. H. Jenkins, Washington 1967 (Dumbarton Oaks Texts), text p. 166, tr. p. 167, where the succession is seen as passing not from father to son or even among brothers, but collaterally among different branches ('cousin' is a more reasonable translation of ἐξῷδελφος than 'nephew' as adopted by earlier scholars). On the Volga Bulgars, cf. A. Z. V. Togan, *Ibn Fadlān's Reisebericht*, Leipzig 1939 (Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, XXIV/3), text pp. 28–9 (*wa idhā māta minhum al-rajul warithahu akhūhu dūna waladihi*), tr. p. 64.
26. K. A. Wittfogel & Fêng Chia-shêng, *History of Chinese Society. Liao 907–1125*, New York 1949 (Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, XXXVI), pp. 398–400, for the pattern of succession among the chiefs of the I-1a tribe down to the foundation of the Liao dynasty by A-pao-chi; pp. 401ff. for events thereafter.
27. On his accession as Great Khan in 1246 Güyüg replaced Qara Hülegü, Chaghadai's grandson and successor (by Chaghadai's own will), with his uncle. Yesü-möngke (Boyle, I, p. 255). Qara Hülegü was restored on the accession of Möngke Qa'an, but soon died. His son Mubārak-shāh's claim to succeed was first set aside for the benefit of his father's cousin Alghu, and later contested by Baraq, whose father was Qara Hülegü's elder brother (cf. his words in Rashīd: *Successors*, p. 265). When Baraq died, his son Du'a had to wait through the reigns of two more khans, both senior to him, before ascending the throne himself (ibid., p. 154). Du'a's sons succeeded each other in turn during the period 1307–ca. 1335, with the exception of a brief interval in which, again, the throne passed to a senior relative: see *Four Studies*, I, pp. 127–35.
28. Even in Iran, however, it had its adherents: witness the success of Tegüder-Aḥmad's candidature in 1282 and of Gaikhatu's in 1291, and the number of plots against Rashīd's patron Ghazan (1295–1304) by, or on behalf of, senior representatives of collateral branches (*Cambridge History of Iran*, V, ed. Boyle, Cambridge 1968, pp. 364, 372, 381 & 385). Rashīd's silence on the brief reign of Baidu in 1295 strongly suggests that as a grandson of Hülegü his claim was superior to that of Ghazan, a great-grandson. 'Umarī's assertion that Mongol law as a whole was more regularly observed by the Chaghadayids and in the Qa'an's dominions than in the west (Lech, *Das Mongolische Weltreich*, text p. 41: 1–9, tr. pp. 118–9) may rest simply on the fact that he had access to more information on the two nearer *ulus*. Certainly the seniority principle was adhered to more closely in the Golden Horde in the last decades of the thirteenth century.
29. See especially Howorth II/1, p. 105: 'In the East a man's son succeeds . . . only when all his brothers are dead'.
30. *Turkestan* 1968, p. 60.

31. Ibid., p. 479; this view is expressed in the additional chapter published in English only in 1968 (in Russian: 1963), long after Bartol'd's death.
32. For the uses of *aqā*, which occurs more often in the sources with the meaning of 'senior relative' than in the sense of 'elder brother' (except when, in conjunction with *ini*, it forms part of a phrase translatable as 'the whole family'), see G. Doerfer, *Türkische und mongolische Elemente im Neupersischen*, Wiesbaden 1963–75 (4 vols, Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur: Veröffentlichungen der orientalischen Kommission, XVI, XIX, XX & XXI), I, pp. 133ff.
33. The quarrel is mentioned only by Rashīd (*Sbornik*, 1/2, p. 216; *Successors*, pp. 118 & 146–7) and by the anonymous work represented in Bodleian MS Th. Hyde 31 (Sachau & Ethé, *Catalogue*, no. 144), foll. 112r:9–112v: 1. On this work, cf. *Turkestan* 1968, p. 55, n. 4: it appears, in fact, to be based mainly on Juwainī, but the author has adopted a more rational arrangement of the material, which he supplements with details not found elsewhere. Juwainī himself makes no reference to the dispute (Boyle, I, pp. 124–8).
34. *Secret History*, § 260 (Haenisch, pp. 130–1); quoted by Ayalon, 'The Great Yāsa', B, pp. 175–6.
35. The estrangement is described, again, by Rashīd alone (*Successors*, pp. 118–9). Juwainī's brief reference to Jochi in these last years (Boyle, I, pp. 139–40) gives an exactly contrary impression.
36. Jūzjānī, II, pp. 150 & 168; Raverty, pp. 1101 & 1146.
37. *Successors*, pp. 97–8; and cf. n. 8 *ibid.* for references to the *Secret History*.
38. Ibid., p. 99: they were Kereyit princesses.
39. The years of interregnum were: 1227–9, 1241–6 & 1248–51. Cf. Ayalon's comments: 'The Great Yāsa', B, p. 163.
40. For *ot-chigin* ('hearth-prince'), see Doerfer, *Türkische und mongolische Elemente*, I, pp. 155–9 (no. 38).
41. Boyle, II, p. 549; *Successors*, p. 166.
42. *L'Empire Mongol*, pp. 286–7; *Turkestan* 1968, p. 463.
43. *Successors*, pp. 32–3. The corresponding passage in Juwainī (Boyle, I, pp. 189–90) mentions only the *yasa* without the particular dispute. Hence Rashīd alone refers to this campaign in 'Qūnqān' (otherwise unknown), which was sent by 'the princes and *amīrs* who had remained in the *ordo* of Chinggis Khan': if this is not a veiled reference to Tolui alone, then it must surely include him, as the foremost among them.
44. See, on Ögedei's reign, *Turkestan* 1968, p. 464. The Qa'an certainly did over-reach himself on occasions: cf. Rashīd's story of his misappropriating two 'thousands' of troops which belonged to Sorqaqtani and her sons and giving them to his own son Kōten: *Sbornik*, 1/2, p. 278; *Successors*, pp. 169–70 (the details vary slightly).
45. Shiremūn is asserted to have been Ögedei's heir by Rashīd (*Successors*, pp. 19, 120, 180 & 201), and he is described in the *Yüan Shih as t'ai-tseu* ('prince imperial'), a title reserved for the heir-apparent: L. Hambis & P. Pelliot, *Le Chapitre CVII du Yuan Che*, Leyden 1945 (T'oung Pao, XXXVIII, Suppt), p. 76. But Juwainī, significantly, states merely that a party favoured him (Boyle, I, p. 251). Even Shiremūn's genealogy is uncertain. Carpini lists him among Ögedei's sons (Wyngaert, p. 65), and Rashīd al-dīn, in his *Shu 'ab-i panjgāna*, MS Topkapı Sarayı, Ahmet III, 2937, fol. 124v, gives a Shiremūn as the Qa'an's fifth son as well as (fol. 125v) naming the grandson: on this work, the third volume in the later arrangement of the *Jāmī' al-tawārīkh*, cf. Togan in *CAJ*, VII, 1962, p. 68, & Karl Jahn in *CAJ*, IX, 1964, pp. 116 & 119.
46. *Successors*, pp. 178 & 182. Carpini likewise refers to his attempted coup, though not mentioning him by name (Wyngaert, p. 64): 'Unum [sc. statutum] est quod quicumque in superbiam erectus, propria auctoritate sine electionem principum, voluerit esse Imperator, sine ulla miseratione debet occidi. Unde ante electionem Cuyuccan propter hoc unus de principibus, nepos ipsius Chingiscan fuit occisus. Volebat enim sine electione regnare.'

47. Boyle, I, pp. 244, 248 & 255.
48. *Secret History*, §§ 275–277 (Haenisch, pp. 139–41). This account serves to explain the self-contradictory data in Rashīd, who says at one stage (*Successors*, pp. 61 & 69) that Güyüg's return antedated his father's death, since he left the Qipchaq steppe in the autumn of the year of the Rat/637/1240 and arrived back in that of the Ox/638/1241 (Ögedei died on 5 jumādā II 639/11 December 1241), but who in his chapter on Güyüg (*Successors*, pp. 176, 178 & 180) follows Juwainī (Boyle, I, pp. 240, 244 & 248). Güyüg's earlier return would then represent his desertion as recorded in the *Secret History*. Cf. also *Tartar Relation*, p. 81, for the report that Güyüg left Batu's army secretly on learning of Ögedei's demise: Painter (*ibid.*, p. 80, ¶ 26, n. 2) assumes this to be incorrect on the grounds that Güyüg returned only once, *before* his father's death.
49. So described in the *Secret History*, § 270 (Haenisch, p. 137). Later sources, following Rashīd (e.g. *Successors*, p. 138; *Shu'ab-i panjgāna*, fol. 118v), make Būri Chaghadaī's grandson, but he is similarly called his son by Carpini: Wyngaert, p. 66 ('Fili Chyaaday sunt: Burim, Cadan'; cf. p. 114: '... duces Burin et Cadan, qui sunt fratres carnales'). Carpini's editors have generally pointed to this as an error, as also to the fact that Qadan was a son of Ögedei; but the Franciscan is otherwise remarkably well informed on the names of members of the imperial house and on their relationship one to another. Moreover, he is the only other contemporary authority to give Būri's genealogy (Juwainī nowhere does so). It may well be that Būri's senior rank was deliberately obscured after his execution by Batu in 1252. Cf. note 45; and for another example of such tampering with genealogies, Pelliot, *Notes sur l'histoire de la Horde d'Or*, Paris 1949 [hereafter *Horde d'Or*], pp. 37 & 44, n. 1. 'Cadān' may in this instance be a son of Chaghadaī also, the prince called by Rashīd Qadaqai (*Successors*, pp. 135 & 144).
50. That is, of the descendants of Chinggis Khan himself; those of his brothers were 'princes of the left hand'. On Batu's status, see further note 68.
51. Boyle, I, p. 249.
52. *Successors*, p. 120, where Batu is said to have been on the point of setting out when the *quriltai* was actually convened; cf. also p. 180. The interregnum lasted in fact for more than three years: 1241–1246.
53. Boyle, I, pp. 256–7.
54. Lech, text pp. 15: 17–16: 7, trans. pp. 100–1.
55. *Ibid.*, text p. 16: 8–10, tr. p. 101. 'Umarī mistakenly places Güyüg's own move westwards after Eljigidei's arrest by Batu's officers and his execution in Batu's *ordo*; but Juwainī (Boyle, II, p. 590) says he was executed only in the reign of Möngke. Güyüg began to move west in the autumn of 1247 according to Chinese sources: see Pelliot, 'Les Mongols et la Papauté' [hereafter *Papauté*], iii, in *ROC*, XXVIII, 1931–2 (pp. 3–84), p. 57. Eljigidei had reached the Caucasus in July: *Papauté*, ii, in *ROC*, XXIV, 1924 (pp. 225–335), pp. 313–4.
56. *Tartar Relation*, p. 83, ¶ 30. This detail is not found in the other two versions of Carpini's mission.
57. Wyngaert, p. 241; Rockhill, p. 163. From Rubruck's account, it is clear that the alleged quarrel between Güyüg and Shiban was once again over the question of precedence in drinking from the cup: as a son of Jochi, Shiban was, like Batu, the Great Khan's *aga*. On the form of the name, cf. *Horde d'Or*, pp. 44–7.
58. *Successors*, pp. 120, 170 & 185.
59. Boyle, I, p. 267; on Güyüg's death, cf. also pp. 260–1, where Batu is not mentioned at all, & II, p. 557.
60. Or if they were no longer, Juwainī chooses not to say so. It is significant that for all the praise he lavishes on his infidel patrons (Möngke's favour towards Islam being especially commended: see Boyle, I, p. xxiii), he nowhere mentions explicitly that the other chief Mongol prince, Hülegü's later enemy Berke, Khan of the Golden Horde, had actually

become a Muslim. Instead, he contents himself with vague references to the conversion of a number of Chinggis Khan's descendants (Boyle, I, pp. 16 & 26), and with the unobtrusive statement that at Möngke's enthronement the Muslim slaughter-ritual was observed in view of Berke's presence (*ibid.*, II, p. 573).

61. Boyle, I, pp. 243–4 & 255–6, & II, pp. 551–2.
62. *Ibid.*, I, p. 267: Juwainī is here stressing Batu's generous character.
63. *Ibid.*, p. 251. Cf. the corresponding passage in Rashīd al-dīn (*Successors*, p. 181), where Sorqaqtani and her sons are not mentioned as favouring Güyüg.
64. Boyle, I, pp. 41–2 & 43, & II, pp. 593–4.
65. Ayalon's judgment of Güyüg as a 'weak ruler' ('The Great Yāsa', B, p. 163) is a trifle hasty: Güyüg has in fact suffered far more than have even the Jochids, through having no apologist whatsoever. But cf. Grousset's more favourable verdict: *L'Empire Mongol*, p. 305.
66. So according to Rashīd: *Successors*, pp. 181–2 & n. 18 (cf. also p. 215). Waṣṣāf too mentions the tradition that Ögedei's descendants were to retain the dignity of Great Khan so long as a single member should survive: it was employed by Qaidu as part of his propaganda in the 1260s when setting himself up in opposition to Qubilai; Waṣṣāf, *Tajziyat al-amṣār wa tazjiyat al-a 'sār*, lithog. ed. Bombay 1269/1853, p. 66:20–24; J. von Hammer-Purgstall, *Geschichte Wassafs*, Vienna 1856 (vol. I only), text pp. 132–3, tr. p. 126.
67. *Successors*, pp. 121 & 201. In Rashīd's history of the tribes, the *noyan* Elchidei, a supporter of Ögedei's line, is said to have been silenced by Möngke's brother Qubilai with the use of this argument: ed. A. A. Khetagurov, Moscow 1968, pp. 140–1; trans. *idem*, *Sbornik lyetopisei*, I/1, Moscow-Leningrad 1952, pp. 95–6.
68. For the secondary authorities on the events of 1248–52, see the references in note 1 above. Juwainī says that this first assembly was held at Ala-Qamaq (Boyle, I, pp. 263–4 & n. 3 on p. 263, & II, pp. 557ff.), a week's distance from Qayaligh. Jamāl Qarshī says that Batu enthroned Möngke in the environs of Qayaligh in ṣafar 648/May 1250 (though erroneously placing this after the overthrow of Ögedei's line): *Turkestan* 1900, I, p. 137: 1–5.
 Batu's status as *aga*, though well attested, is difficult to explain. He was Jochi's second son, and had succeeded his father as head of his *ulus* in place of the eldest, Orda (*Successors*, pp. 99–100 & 107). This is explicable on either of two grounds: Orda's mother may have lost her rank as chief wife after his birth; or he may have been her only son and so assumed the rights of the hearth-child rather than of the firstborn. The latter hypothesis is supported by the following facts: (1) Orda's *ulus* was plainly the kernel of Jochi's domain, and of all his sons' territories was most remote from its external frontier (i.e. the west); (2) he headed, within Jochi's *ulus*, the princes of 'the left hand', Batu commanding those of the right (cf. the position of Chinggis Khan's younger brothers); and (3) later authorities give him the surname *eken* ('master'), usually reserved for the hearth-child (Vladimirtsov, *Le régime social*, pp. 60 & 67), though Pelliot assumes he bore it because he was the eldest (*Horde d'Or*, pp. 32–3). The whole question is obscure, but in any case Orda was probably dead by this time, since it appears that his son Qongqiran, who is known to have succeeded him (*Successors*, p. 105), was then ruling his *ulus* (Boyle, II, p. 585).
69. Boyle, I, p. 264, & II, pp. 557–8. Rashīd conflates these details, making both Qonqurtaqai and Temür represent Güyüg's sons, who allegedly failed to attend at all (*Successors*, p. 200). Elsewhere (p. 170) he mentions that Batu was first summoned to a *quriltai* by Ögedei's family, who wanted Shiremün as Qa'an, but declined and demanded a meeting closer at hand because of his gout.
70. He is described as *t'ai-tseu* by the *Yüan Shih*: Hambis & Pelliot, *Le Chapitre CVII*, p. 85 (cf. note 45 above). Naqu was of course Güyüg's hearth-child, the younger of the two sons of his chief wife, the then Regent Oghul-Qaimish (*Successors*, pp. 20 & 175).
71. Boyle, II, p. 566. Rashīd omits this detail in the corresponding passage (*Successors*, p. 204).
72. Boyle, I, p. 265, & II, p. 562; *Successors*, p. 203.

73. It is significant that those members of the branches of Chaghadaï and Ögedei who did support Möngke were mostly 'have-nots' who had everything to gain by the downfall of their seniors. Juwainī mentions among those who participated in the second *quriltai* (Boyle, II, pp. 558 & 573) Qadaghan (Qadan) and Melik, who were both sons of Ögedei by a concubine and hence inferior in status (*Successors*, pp. 27 & 28); Mochi, who was Chaghadaï's eldest son but by a concubine (*ibid.*, p. 136); and Qara Hülegü, Chaghadaï's grandson and successor, who had been deposed in Yesü-möngke's favour by Güyüg (cf. note 27 above). There remains the family of Ögedei's son by his chief wife, Köten (Boyle, II, p. 568), who are said by Rashīd, however, to have been on particularly good terms with the Toluids (*Sbornik*, I/2, p. 278; *Successors*, pp. 21 & 170).
74. *Successors*, pp. 202–3. Elsewhere (p. 121) Rashīd speaks of this force as numbering 3 *tümens* (30,000) and commanded by Berke and Sartaq, Batu's son. Juwainī (Boyle, II, p. 563) mentions Berke and Toqa-temür simply as Batu's representatives, without any escort. 'Umarī names Berke alone and sets the escort at 100,000 (Lech, text p. 16: 14–16, trans. p. 101).
75. Boyle, II, pp. 567–8. Rashīd (*Successors*, p. 205) gives the year only in the Turco-Mongol animal cycle, that of the Pig (648–9/1251). From Juwainī's references to successive years or seasons, the interval clearly extended over the years 647–9/1249–51. Rashīd alone mentions Batu's message to Berke (*Successors*, p. 204).
76. Jüzjānī could have picked up this story either from Berke's embassy to Delhi or from Hülegü's envoys, who similarly arrived in 658/1260 (see note 10 above).
77. For the official version, see Boyle, II, pp. 573–92, & *Successors*, pp. 207–16, and cf. Rubruck's account (Wyngaert, pp. 241–2; Rockhill, pp. 163–4) and Jüzjānī (II, pp. 179–80; Raverty, pp. 1182–6). Rashīd sets the number of *noyans* executed at 77 (*Successors*, p. 212), Rubruck at 300. They included Eljigidei (Boyle, II, p. 590) and his sons (*Successors*, pp. 212–3), of whom Harqasun had participated in the Qipchaq campaign of 1236–42 and had insulted Batu (*Secret History*, § 275; Haenisch, p. 140; cf. Boyle, II, p. 587 & n. 117). As regards the fate of Ögedei's descendants, of which the *Yüan Shih* gives a slightly different version from that of Rashīd and Juwainī (see *Papauté*, iii, pp. 65–6), Rubruck reports the execution of both Shiremün and Güyüg's elder son (? Qucha). Rashīd dates the former's murder after Möngke's own arrival in China, i.e. in 1258 (*Successors*, pp. 21–2; for the date, p. 224 & n. 95). The genealogy of Qadaqchi is uncertain (*Turkestan* 1968, pp. 483 & 511, n. 152): it is unlikely that he was Buri's son, called by Rashīd Narin Qadan and clearly a different person (cf. *Successors*, p. 224), and hence he was probably a son of Chaghadaï (see note 49 above). Rubruck says that Güyüg's *ordo* was given to his infant son: this was probably not Naqu's son Chabat, as Bartol'd suggested (*Turkestan* 1968, p. 483, calling him 'Qanat'), but Güyüg's son by a concubine, Hoqu, who was living in this region ten years later (Bretschneider, I, pp. 160–2) and who bore the title of *Ta-ming wang*: Hambis & Pelliot, *Le Chapitre CVIII du Yuan Che*, Leyden 1954 (T'oung Pao Monog. Series, III), p. 108. On him, see *Successors*, pp. 20 & 175.
78. According to Rashīd, she was the daughter of the Oirat prince Törelchi by Chinggis Khan's daughter Chechegen: one of her sisters, Elchiqmish, married Arigh-böke, and another, Köpek, married Hülegü, in both cases as the chief wife (Khetagurov, pp. 222–5; *Sbornik*, I/1, p. 119; Rashīd gives variants, but cf. *Successors*, p. 149). Waṣṣāf says that she had a sister Beki who married Batu (Hammer-Purgstall, text p. 28: 18f., trans. pp. 29–30; lithog. ed., p. 14, omits the princess's name). Possibly the resemblance of this name to Sorqaqtani's surname led Jamāl Qarshī to make Orqina a relative of hers also: *Turkestan* 1900, I, p. 137: 10–13.
79. Cf. Ayalon, 'The Great Yasa', B, pp. 161–2.
80. See notes 73 & 77. The grim picture of the massacre of the Chaghadayids painted by non-Toluid sources (see *Turkestan* 1968, pp. 483 & 510, notes 150 & 151, and in addition to the authorities there cited, Waṣṣāf, p. 11: 22–24; Hammer-Purgstall, text p. 22, tr. p. 24) is

possibly exaggerated, but contrasts sharply with the clemency depicted by Juwainī and Rashīd.

81. Boyle, II, p. 559. Jūzjānī, II, pp. 176: 10–14 & 179: 3ff.; Raverty, pp. 1172 & 1177–81. Lech, text p. 16:10–13, tr. p. 101. Kirakos, trans. M. F. Brosset, *Deux historiens arméniens, Kirakos de Gantzac, XIIIe s., Histoire d'Arménie, Oukhtanès d'Ourha, Xe s., . . .*, St Petersburg 1870 (vol. I only), p. 172; trans. Éd. Dulaurier, 'Les Mongols d'après les historiens arméniens', i, in *JA*, 5e série, XI, 1858 (pp. 192–255 & 426–508), p. 457. Rashīd, less ready to ascribe the Toluids' assumption of power to Batu's self-denial, in view of their later enmity with Jochi's line, omits this important detail, though mentioning Batu's status as *aqā*: *Successors*, pp. 170 & 200–1 (cf. Boyle, II, pp. 557–8 & 561).
82. *Steppes*, p. 471.
83. Jūzjānī, II, p. 179: 5ff.; Raverty, pp. 1177–81.
84. *Turkestan* 1968, pp. 483 & 485.
85. Wyngaert, p. 225 (Rockhill, p. 138); cf. also p. 314, where Möngke orders his letters to St Louis to be submitted to Batu en route (Rockhill, p. 257: 'if he wished to add, strike out, or alter anything in them, he was to do so').
86. Wyngaert, pp. 251 & 299 (Rockhill, pp. 174 & 237–8).
87. On the date of Batu's death, which is incorrectly given as 650/1252–3 by Rashīd (*Successors*, p. 122), see *Horde d'Or*, p. 29. Both Pelliot and B. Spuler (*Die Goldene Horde*, 2nd ed. Wiesbaden 1965, pp. 31–2) opt for 1255. But the Armenian historians Kirakos (Brosset, p. 181; Dulaurier, i, p. 481) and Vardan (trans. Dulaurier, 'Les Mongols d'après les historiens arméniens', ii, in *JA*, 5e série, XVI, 1860 (pp. 273–322), p. 291) give the year 1256 (705 of the Armenian era), and are supported by Hamd-allāh Mustawfī: *Tārīkh-i Guzīda*, ed. E. G. Browne, Leyden-London 1910 (Gibb Memorial Series, XIV/1), p. 576:2f. (654/1256–7).
88. Kāshānī, *Tārīkh-i Uljāitū Sulṭān*, ed. Mahīn Hambly, Ṭehrān 1348 sh./1969, p. 146: 11–19.
89. *Moufazzal*, i, pp. 378, n., & 445, n. 5.
90. B. Grekov & A. Yakubovskiy, *La Horde d'Or*, trans. F. Thuret, Paris 1939, p. 76.
91. Waṣṣāf, p. 398: 13ff.
92. *Ibid.*, p. 50: 4–7 (Hammer-Purgstall, text p. 96: 13–16, tr. p. 93).
93. Ed. A. A. Alizade & trans. A. K. Arends, *Dzhami-at-Tavarikh*, III, Baku 1957, text p. 352, tr. p. 197; ed. K. Jahn, *Geschichte Ġāzān Hān's*, London 1940 (Gibb Memorial Series, n.s., XIV), p. 143. Rashīd dates the embassy in jumādā II 702/January 1303.
94. Lech, text p. 15:9f., tr. p. 100: 'Umarī is here citing Shams al-dīn al-Iṣfahānī, on whom see Lech's introd., pp. 32–4.
95. Juwainī, I, p. 31: 7–9; cf. Boyle, I, p. 42.
96. So Grousset (*L'Empire Mongol*, p. 380): 'Théoriquement, le prolongement occidental comprenait toute l'Europe'; cf. also *Steppes*, pp. 318 & 468–9.
97. On this expedition, see Boyle, I, pp. 142–9; *Sbornik*, I/2, pp. 226–9; and for the Chinese data, Bretschneider, I, pp. 297–9. The return of the two generals is mentioned by Rashīd as falling after Chinggis Khan's death and the accession of Ögedei (Khetagurov, p. 150; *Sbornik*, I/1, pp. 98–9); but this is clearly too late, and he contradicts himself with the statement that they had promised to accomplish their task in three years and in fact did so in two-and-a-half (Khetagurov, p. 557; *Sbornik*, I/1, p. 195). There is a much longer account of their campaign in Bodleian MS Th. Hyde 31 (foll. 119r–123v), where their return to Chinggis Khan's *ordo* is dated towards the end of 620/1223 (fol. 123r: 1).
98. This conclusion was adumbrated by Bartol'd on the basis of Juwainī's wording: see his articles 'Bātū-Khān' and 'Berke' in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 1st ed. Th. Houtsma et al., I, Leyden-London 1908–13, pp. 681 & 708.
99. On the warfare in this region in the years 1220–2, see *Cambridge History of Iran*, V, pp. 312–21.

100. As the Mongols realized: cf. *Yüan Shih*, ch. 146, quoted in R. P. Blake, 'The Circulation of Silver in the Moslem East down to the Mongol Epoch', in *HJAS*, II, 1937 (pp. 291–328), p. 323.
101. Cf. *Sbornik*, I/2, p. 68, & *Successors*, pp. 97–9. Later (*Successors*, pp. 107–8 & 117–9) Rashīd quotes Chinggis Khan's commission to Jochi, as also that of Ögedei to Batu and his brothers, strictly in terms of the later territory of the Golden Horde ('the northern lands').
102. So Howorth, II/1, p. 90: '... the country south of the Oxus, which was not disposed of by Jingis Khan's will, and which was apparently meant to be a joint possession shared by the masters of the three great Khanates'.
103. Juwainī, I, pp. 31: 13–32;2; cf. Boyle, I, p. 43, where *Tūlī nīz muttaşil wa mujāwir-i ū būd* is translated 'Toli's territory, likewise, lay adjacent thereto': I suspect, however, that *ū* refers not to Ögedei but to Chinggis Khan, and that the translation is 'Tolui in turn was near him and at his side'. 'Umarī in the corresponding passage (Lech, text pp. 14: 11–15: 1) has *kāna waladuhu Tūlī muttaşilan bihi*, which Lech renders (tr. p. 100) 'an dieses Gebiet grenzte auch das des . . . Tūlī'.
104. Juwainī, I, p. 31: 9–11; cf. Boyle, I, pp. 42–3. These arcs extend outwards, of course, only to the west: for a remarkable discussion of Chinggis Khan's strategy in building his empire, and his aims, see Owen Lattimore, 'The Geography of Chingis Khan', in *Geographical Journal*, CCXXIX, 1963, pp. 1–7.
105. Jūzjānī, British Library MS Add. 26,189, fol. 255v: 4–6: *wa har wilāyat dar Īrān ki dar ḡabṭ-i muḡhul āmada būd ūrā az ān diyār naṣīb mu'ayyan būd wa gumāshtagān-i ū dar ān miqdār ki qism-i ū būd naṣīb mīburdand wa jumlayi buzurgān o lashgarkashān-i muḡhul ūrā munqād būd*. I have used the MS in preference to the printed text (II, p. 176: 7–10), which reads *naṣb būdand* for *naṣīb mīburdand*; cf. Raverty, p. 1172. But the Berlin MS Petermann 386 (Pertsch, *Verzeichnis*, no. 367), fol. 146r: 18f., has *mutaşarrif būdand*.
106. See section V and note 150 below.
107. Waṣṣāf, p. 12: 10–13 (Hammer-Purgstall, text p. 23, trans. p. 24). Saifī, *Tārīkh-nāma-yi Harāt*, ed. M. Z. al-Ṣiddīqī, Calcutta 1944, pp. 76ff. Eljigidei is to be distinguished from his namesake, Güyüg's general in Iran in the 1240s: on his operations in Khurāsān, see *Cambridge History of Iran*, V, p. 316.
108. Saifī, pp. 122–3.
109. *Ibid.*, pp. 124–5.
110. *Ibid.*, p. 128.
111. *Ibid.*, pp. 127–8, with the date 639/1241–2, when Yesū-mōngke was not yet head of Chaghadaī's ulus.
112. *Ibid.*, pp. 136–9; on the death of his father Majd al-dīn, cf. pp. 132–4.
113. Boyle, II, pp. 482–3; *Successors*, p. 51. The history of Khurāsān in these years is summarized by Spuler, *Die Mongolen in Iran*, 3rd ed. Berlin 1968, pp. 38–9.
114. Boyle, II, pp. 485–7; *Successors*, pp. 52–3. On Dayir, see Khetagurov, pp. 423–4 (*Sbornik*, I/1, p. 168), where he is said to have belonged to Ögedei but to have been in attendance (*mulāzim*) on Chaghadaī; cf. also Boyle, 'The Mongol Commanders in Afghanistan and India according to the *Ṭabaqāt-i Nāṣirī* of Jūzjānī', in *Islamic Studies*, II, 1963 (pp. 235–47), p. 240.
115. The dispute is described by Juwainī (Boyle, II, pp. 488–9 & 492–3); cf. also *Successors*, p. 72. That Nosal (on the form of the name, cf. *Horde d'Or*, pp. 54–5) was simply a soldier is confirmed by Rashīd elsewhere: Khetagurov, p. 314 (*Sbornik*, I/1, p. 141).
116. Nosal had accompanied Chin-temür as Batu's representative: Boyle, II, p. 483; *Successors*, p. 51. The early career of Kōrgüz is described by Juwainī (Boyle, II, pp. 483 & 490–2). Saifī too links his name with Batu's (p. 128).
117. On Edgü-temür's conflict with Kōrgüz, see Boyle, II, pp. 494–500; that he had inherited his father's legal attachment to Batu is confirmed at p. 498. Cf. also *Successors*, pp. 72–4.

118. Boyle, II, pp. 502–5; cf. also I, p. 243. Ḥamd-allāh Mustawfī (*Tārīkh-i Guzīda*, p. 575: 7f.) dates his execution in 645/1247–8, which seems too late. That it was Ögedei who had ordered Körgüz's arrest just before his own death is a version found only in Rashīd: Khetagurov, pp. 318–20 (*Sbornik*, I/1, pp. 142–3); *Successors*, pp. 74–5 & 189–90. But elsewhere Rashīd follows Juwainī (*Successors*, p. 177).
119. Boyle, II, p. 496.
120. He died finally in 673/1275 (*Successors*, p. 309).
121. See above, sect. III & note 55. Juwainī here dates Eljigidei's arrival in Khurāsān after Güyüg's death (Boyle, II, p. 512): probably the general had withdrawn to the Bādghīs after his visit to the Caucasus in 1247. On Arghun's journey to Güyüg's court, see Boyle, II, p. 509; also I, p. 257.
122. Boyle, II, p. 513.
123. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 516–8 & 521.
124. *Ibid.*, II, p. 483.
125. *Ibid.*, II, p. 532.
126. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 533–4, for the appointment and Sharaf al-dīn's securing confirmation of it from Batu's *ordo* after Chin-temür's death; at p. 487, he is said to have been made *wazīr* on Batu's behalf.
127. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 494, 497 & 539.
128. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 502 & 536.
129. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 507 & 538. It is significant that at this juncture Sharaf al-dīn was summoned to Batu's *ordo* and narrowly escaped death there (see p. 538): presumably he had to account for his part in Körgüz's overthrow and his collaboration with Batu's enemies.
130. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 508 & 538 ff.
131. *Ibid.*, II, p. 499.
132. *Ibid.*, II, p. 501. For his appointment as *bitikshi* and his death while at Batu's court, cf. p. 513.
133. St Louis learned of Baichu's demotion from Eljigidei's envoys, who met him in Cyprus in 1248. See the letter of the Papal Legate Eudes de Château-roux to Innocent IV, dated 31 March 1249, in L. d'Achery, *Spicilegium sive collectio veterum aliquot scriptorum qui in Galliae Bibliothecis delituerant*, new ed. Étienne Baluze, E. Martène & L. F. J. de la Barre, III, Paris 1723, p. 627a ('Sed jam non habet tantam potestatem. Modo enim constitutus est sub potestate Erchelchai'): hence all subsequent authorities, beginning with Vincent de Beauvais, *Speculum Historiale*, ed. Straßburg 1473, xxxii, 93. Cf. also Kirakos: Brosset, p. 172; Dulaurier, i, p. 458. In spite of this testimony, both Pelliot (*Papauté*, ii, p. 315: 'La position exacte d'Älgigidäi par rapport à Baiju n'apparaît pas très clairement') and Spuler (*Die Mongolen in Iran*, p. 38: 'Allerdings wurde ihm [Baichu] nach sechs Jahren Älgigidäi als Gehilfe (mit nicht genau umrissenen Befugnissen) beigegeben') had their reservations. But cf. Pelliot's later view of Eljigidei's mission (*Papauté*, iii, pp. 33–4), as also Spuler's in *Die Goldene Horde*, p. 30.
134. Khetagurov, pp. 151 & 561 (*Sbornik*, I/1, pp. 99 & 195). For a summary of Baichu's career, see *Steppes*, pp. 328 & 420–4.
135. Ibn Bībī, *Al-awāmīr al-'alā'īya fi'l-umūr al-'alā'īya*, ed. A. S. Erzi, Ankara 1956 (Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınlarından, I. seri, 4a), p. 514: 6–8. Cf. the abridged version of this source, *Mukhtaṣar-i Saljūq-nāma*, ed. Th. Houtsma, *Histoire des Seldjucides d'Asie Mineure*, Leyden 1902 (Recueil des textes relatifs à l'histoire des Seldjucides, IV), p. 234: 6–8; trans. Herbert W. Duda, *Die Seltschukengeschichte des Ibn Bibi*, Copenhagen 1959, pp. 222–3. Duda misinterprets this passage: 'Dem Čormagun Nojan stand der Sinn danach, Erfolge zu erringen', reading *iflāḥ* ('success') for *iflāj* ('paralysis'). See also Kirakos: Brosset, pp. 130–1; Dulaurier, i, p. 243; though later Kirakos says first that Chormaghun's wife *Eltina was in charge during his incapacity (Brosset, p. 144; Dulaurier, i, p. 439), and then that Baichu took over on Chormaghun's death (Brosset, p. 156; Dulaurier, i, p. 450).
136. 691 of the Armenian era: Brosset, pp. 138–9; Dulaurier, i, pp. 426–8; Vardan in Dulaurier, ii,

- p. 287. The year 1239 (Arm. era 688) given by Grigor of Akner is incorrect, and the error is acknowledged by the editors: R. P. Blake & R. N. Frye, 'History of the Nation of the Archers (the Mongols) by Grigor of Akanc' in *HJAS*, XII, 1949 (pp. 269–399), pp. 307 & 387, n. 29. Spuler's statement (*Die Mongolen in Iran*, p. 37) that Baichu assumed the command a year earlier, in Jan.-Feb. 1241, is erroneous, being apparently based on the misprint in Dulaurier, i, p. 426.
137. *Papauté*, ii, n. 5 on pp. 247–8. Later (p. 304, n. 3) he quotes the Armenian author Het'um (Haythou) to the effect that Baichu was sent out by Ögedei, so reversing his judgement. But Het'um's account is unreliable: he clearly confuses Baichu and Batu under the form Bayto, making him Ögedei's second son; see *Flos Historiarum Terrae Orientis*, in *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades. Documents Arméniens*, II, Paris 1906, French text p. 158, Latin p. 292.
138. For Baichu's interview with Hülegü, see Alizade & Arends, text p. 39, trans. p. 31. Juwainī mentions simply that Baichu was sent ahead into Anatolia on Hülegü's arrival in Iran (Boyle, II, p. 609). In his history of the tribes, Rashīd speaks of Baichu's execution and the bestowal of his command on Chormaghun's son Shiremün (Khetagurov, pp. 561–2; *Sbornik*, I/1, pp. 195–6); but this must have occurred later (see below, note 210). For his part in the Baghdad campaign, cf. *Cambridge History of Iran*, V, pp. 346–8 & 350.
139. Nuwairī, MS Bibliothèque Nationale, Fonds Arabe 1577, fol. 25v: 13f.; V. G. Frhr. von Tiesenhausen, *Sbornik materialov otnosyashchikhsya k istorii Zolotoy Ordya*, I, St. Petersburg 1884, text p. 133, n. 1, trans. p. 154, n. 'Ainī (d. 855/1451) is still more explicit, mentioning Baichu by name (*ibid.*, text p. 476: 17f., tr. p. 504).
140. Ibn al-'Amīd, *Kitāb al-majmū' al-mubārak*, ed. Cl. Cahen, 'La "Chronique des Ayyoubides" d'al-Makīn b. al-'Amīd', in *Bulletin d'Études Orientales de Damas*, XV, 1955–7 (pp. 109–84), text p. 130: 9–12. He is followed by Ibn al-Furāt (d. 807/1405), whose immediate source here appears to be the lost work of Shāfi' b. 'Alī (d. 730/1330), *Naẓm al-sulūk*: see *Ta'rīkh al-duwal wa'l-mulūk*, ed. Hassan al-Shammā', V/I, Baṣra 1390/1970, p. 214: 3–7 (text reads *Tānjū* for *Bāijū*); cf. p. 210: 9.
141. Ibn Bībī, pp. 540–5; Houtsma, pp. 247–9 (Duda, pp. 236–7). For the date of Kōsedagh, cf. Duda, p. 227 & notes 196 & 199 on p. 335. Spuler's year 1244 (*Die Mongolen in Iran*, p. 43) is incorrect.
142. Baibars al-Manṣūrī, MS British Library Ar. 1233 (Add. 23, 325), fol. 60r:2f.; Tiesenhausen, I, text p. 77: 14f., tr. p. 99.
143. So called by Grigor of Akner: Blake & Frye, p. 303.
144. The invasion of Aleppo by a Mongol force under the *noyan* Yasa'ur in 641/1244 must have been part of the same fresh offensive: see Barhebraeus, trans. E. Wallis Budge, *The Chronography of Gregory Abū'l-Faraj . . . commonly known as Bar Hebraeus*, Oxford-London 1932, I, p. 409; idem, *Ta'rīkh mukhtaṣar al-duwal*, ed. A. Šālīhānī, Beirut 1890, p. 446. On Yasa'ur, cf. Boyle, 'The Journey of Het'um I, King of Little Armenia, to the Court of the Great Khan Möngke', in *CAJ*, IX, 1964 (pp. 175–89), p. 186, n. 96.
145. Lech, text p. 16: 1f., tr. p. 100.
146. A list of all the Mongol generals and officials mentioned in the Armenian sources is given by Altunian, *Die Mongolen und ihre Eroberungen*, pp. 113–5. The two commanders here in question are:
1. Qunan, mentioned by Grigor (Blake & Frye, p. 303), was commander of one of Jochi's four personal 'thousands': *Sbornik*, I/2, p. 274. Here, as in Khetagurov, p. 469 (*Sbornik*, I/1, p. 177), he appears as Qutan, but the form Qunan is confirmed by British Library MS Add. 7, 628, fol. 536v (new fol. numbering, 541 v), and by the *Secret History*, § 210 (Haenisch, pp. 98–9), where he is described as commander of a *tümen* under Jochi, & § 243 (line omitted in Haenisch, p. 114): see F. W. Cleaves, 'The Mongolian Names and Terms in the *History of the Nation of the Archers* by Grigor of Akanc', in *HJAS*, XII, 1949 (pp. 400–43), pp. 432–3.

2. Tainal, mentioned again by Grigor (Blake & Frye, p. 303), is referred to in the above-mentioned passage of Baibars al-Manṣūrī's *Zubdat al-fikra* (British Library MS Ar. 1233, fol. 60r:2, reads .ainal, which Tiesenhausen renders as Bainal) as having accompanied Baichu to Iran. On him, see Boyle, 'Some Additional Notes on the Mongolian Names in the History of the Nation of the Archers', in *Researches in Altaic Languages*, ed. L. Ligeti, Budapest 1975 (pp. 33–42), p. 41.

In conclusion to these remarks, it should be noted that even if Ögedei himself replaced Chormaghun by Baichu, this would not necessarily preclude his having been a Jochid agent: the Qa'an was quite capable of promoting Batu's people at the expense of his own, as we observed in connection with Chin-temür and with Körgüz.

147. See page 184 and note 88.
148. Jūzjānī, II, p. 179: 5–8; Raverty, pp. 1177–9.
149. Juwainī, III, p. 76; cf. Boyle, II, pp. 598–9.
150. See the testimony of the Arabic sources, Ibn Shaddād (as cited in Mufaḍḍal) and Ibn Wāṣil, quoted by Ayalon, 'The Great Yāsa', B, p. 174.
151. Brosset, p. 175; Dulaurier, i, pp. 460–1.
152. Balagha was a son of Shiban (see note 57 above), and Quli the second son of Orda; both were therefore grandsons of Jochi, while Tutar was a great-grandson: see *Successors*, pp. 104, 111 & 113. A certain Qadaghan is also mentioned by the Armenian sources, of whom Kirakos (Brosset, p. 183; Dulaurier, i, p. 486) ascribes him explicitly to Jochi's *ulus*; but whether he was a prince of the blood or merely a *noyan* is not stated. Possibly he is to be identified with the *qorchi* (guard) Ghadaqan, the official who had arrested Eljigidei and taken him to Batu (Boyle, II, p. 590), and more certainly with the *noyan* Qataghan who took part in the sieges of Baghdād and of Mayyā-fāriqīn (Baibars al-Manṣūrī, MS Ar. 1233, foll. 31r & 34 v). See further Cleaves, 'The Mongolian Names', p. 421.
153. The list is given by Juwainī (Boyle, II, pp. 607–8). Sübedei died near Samarqand in 653/1255 (ibid., p. 612). The Oirat chief Buqa-temür who accompanied the expedition was brother to Orqina, regent of the *ulus* of Chaghadaï (see note 78).
154. *Die Mongolen in Iran*, p. 62 ('Mit Hülägü's Vormarsch war die Oberherrschaft über den Kaukasus . . . endgültig an das südliche Mongolenreich übergegangen. Da indes bei dieser Neueinteilung der Wille Möngkes ganz offenbar maßgebend war, wäre ein Krieg wohl noch vermieden worden . . .'); *Die Goldene Horde*, p. 38 ('Nun sollte Hülägü nach Möngkäs Willen Herr dieses Gebirges sein' – referring to the Caucasus). These statements, of course, are based on the assumption that Iran had not so far been apportioned to any branch of the imperial family. Only Jūzjānī (II, pp. 188: 18f. & 189: 15–17; Raverty, pp. 1215 & 1226) says that Möngke entrusted 'Iran' to his brother; but this probably means simply that Hülegü was made the Qa'an's lieutenant here just as Chormaghun had been under Ögedei or Eljigidei under Güyüg.
155. Alizade, text p. 24: 3–7; cf. Arends' translation, p. 22.
156. Lech, text p. 2: 1f., tr. p. 91.
157. Saifī, pp. 228–33, is the only author to mention Shams al-dīn's original quarrel with the Jochids. He dates these events, including the *malik*'s visit to Hülegü (pp. 246–7), in 656/1258, but this is incorrect. The death of 'Alī b. Mas'ūd of Sīstān (Saifī, pp. 234–42) occurred in ṣafar 653/April 1255: see *Tārīkh-i Sīstān*, ed. M. al-Sh. Bahār, Tehrān 1314 sh./1935, pp. 398–9, where Shams al-dīn's visit to Hülegü is similarly described as immediately following the murder. This must be the visit mentioned by Rashīd (Alizade & Arends, text p. 25, tr. p. 23) as falling in sha'bān-ramaḍān 653/September–October 1255 (Saifī actually dates his return to Heart in ramaḍān: p. 247: 16f.). Kit-buqa, who had been sent on ahead of Hülegü (Boyle, II, pp. 596 & 610), had been operating in Sīstān since 652/1254–5, when 'Alī b. Mas'ūd had gone to wait on him (*Tārīkh-i Sīstān*, p. 398): Saifī's narrative suggests that Kitbuqa too may have been a Jochid dependant.
158. Dulaurier, ii, p. 291. On Sartaq, see *Turkestan* 1968, p. 484, where the Armenian authorities

- in particular are quoted extensively, & *Horde d'Or*, p. 34. For his journey to Möngke's court, which began in summer 1254, cf. Pelliot, 'Mélanges sur l'époque des Croisades', in *Mémoires de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres*, XLIV/1, 1960 (pp. 1–97), pp. 49–52. That Sartaq had Möngke's backing is evident not only from Kirakos, who says that the Qa'an wished him to enjoy an authority in the empire second only to his own (Brosset, pp. 181–2; Dulaurier, i, pp. 481–2), but also from Jūzjānī (II, p. 217; Raverty, p. 1291) and Juwainī (Boyle, I, p. 268).
159. His reign is put at 'one year and [some] months' by Nuwairī (Tiesenhausen, I, text p. 130:2, tr. p. 150), who also mentions his struggle with Berke and Berkecher (ibid., text p. 129: 7f., tr. loc. cit.). Vardan (Dulaurier, ii, p. 291) is less specific than Kirakos (Brosset, p. 182; Dulaurier, i, p. 482), and says he was poisoned by his 'brothers'. Jūzjānī alleges that his death came about through Berke's prayers, but quotes a rumour that he had been poisoned on Möngke's orders (II, pp. 217–8; Raverty, pp. 1291–2), a distorted version with an obvious kernel of truth. Rashīd (*Successors*, p. 122) says simply that Sartaq died on the way back from Möngke's court. It is always possible, of course, that he was poisoned by Möngke (cf. the strange fate of the Chaghadayid Qara Hülegü in 1252), though not for Berke's benefit – rather to secure the throne for some still more manageable prince. However, Kirakos' testimony (note 163 below) precludes this.
160. For the confused data on this child, called Ulaghchi in the Persian sources and Töde-möngke by Nuwairī, see *Horde d'Or*, pp. 34–44. What is important here is that Möngke was prepared to install a prince of this age as ruler: cf. especially Boyle, I, p. 268; *Successors*, p. 122; *Tārīkh-i Guzīda*, p. 576: 4–6 (with Tūqchin for Boraqchin in error).
161. So in Nuwairī (Tiesenhausen, I, text pp. 130: 2–11 & 131: 3–8, tr. pp. 150–1), the details of whose account are rejected by Polliot (*Horde d'Or*, pp. 43–4). Nuwairī certainly plays havoc with genealogies and dates, but in my view the only major detail to ring false is the suggestion that Hülegü could have been ready to aid Boraqchin at such an early juncture, i.e. about 1257–8 (on the approximate dates of Sartaq and Ulaghchi, see *Horde d'Or*, pp. 34–5; but cf. note 87 above). In the Georgian chronicle translated by Brosset (*Histoire de la Géorgie*, I, St. Petersburg 1849, p. 569), a very late source, there is mention of the arrival in Hülegü's camp of two princesses from the Golden Horde *after* the outbreak of war: one of the infants they brought was called 'Pharedjn' (Boraqchin?).
162. Jūzjānī, II, p. 218: 10–12; Raverty, p. 1292.
163. Brosset, p. 182; Dulaurier, i, p. 482.
164. Lech, text p. 17: 9ff., tr. pp. 101–2: the translation is somewhat misleading here, since 'Umarī is talking merely of intentions, and does not actually say that Hülegü began attacking the Caliph's territory until after Batu's death. Earlier, 'Umarī names the Kurds also as the objective of Hülegü's expedition: Lech, text p. 2: 3–5, tr. p. 91; cf. too Ibn al-'Amīd, ed. Cahen, in *Bulletin d'Études Orientales*, XV, p. 165. Nowhere is it in fact suggested that the actual destruction of the Caliphate was one of the original aims, and even the confused remarks in Rubruck (Wyngaert, p. 287; Rockhill, p. 222) are inconclusive. The supplement to Juwainī's work composed by Naṣīr al-dīn Ṭūsī on the fall of Baghdād indicates that the Caliph, who had submitted to the Mongols some time previously, was attacked because he first neglected to furnish a contingent for the campaign against the Assassins and then failed to attend on Hülegü in person to explain his conduct: see Boyle, 'The Death of the Last 'Abbāsid Caliph: A Contemporary Muslim Account', in *Journal of Semitic Studies*, VI, 1961 (pp. 145–61), pp. 151–3.
165. Jūzjānī, II, p. 198: 16–18; Raverty, p. 1257.
166. So according to Rubruck: Wyngaert, p. 209; Rockhill, p. 117. Pelliot suggests that Batu was simply resentful of Berke's appropriating gifts brought by Muslim envoys en route for the Volga, rather than that he was afraid lest Berke and they make common cause against him: *Recherches sur les Chrétiens d'Asie Centrale et d'Extrême-Orient*, Paris 1973, p. 104.

167. Khalīl b. Aibak al-Ṣafadī (d. 764/1363), *Al-wāfi bi'l-wafayāt*, British Library MS Ar. 1294 (Add. 23, 357), fol. 18r: 13: *wa min a'zam al-waqā'ī bainahi wa baina Hūlākū yakūmuhu qatl al-khalīfā*. Hence also Ibn Taghri-birdī, *Al-manhal al-sāfi*, MS Bibliothèque Nationale, Fonds Arabe 2069, s.v. *Barka*.
168. On Hülegü's opening diplomatic relations with the Latin West, see below, note 233a. On the Syrian campaign, cf. the palpable attempt by the Armenian propagandist Het'um to play down the Mongols' war aims in 1260 and to throw responsibility for non-cooperation squarely on the Franks: *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades. Documents Arméniens*, II, French text pp. 170 & 172–4, Latin pp. 301 & 303–5. In 1287 we find the Ilkhān Arghun using his imminent conversion as a bargaining counter to secure military aid from the West: see J.-B. Chabot, 'Notes sur les relations du roi Argoun avec l'Occident', in *Revue de l'Orient Latin*, II, 1894 (pp. 566–629), pp. 580ff.
169. Cf. Rubruck's account of the reaction to his calling Sartaq a Christian: Wyngaert, p. 205; Rockhill, p. 107. On the world-domination theme, see Eric Voegelin, 'The Mongol Orders of Submission to European Powers, 1245–1255', in *Byzantion*, XV, 1940–1, pp. 378–413.
170. *Successors*, pp. 122–3, with the date 654/1256–7: this is unlikely, since we read subsequently in Rashīd (Alizade & Arends, text p. 56, tr. p. 42) that Balagha was still with the army in muḥarram 656/January–February 1258 at Baghdād.
171. Alizade & Arends, text p. 77, tr. p. 54: here the deaths of all three princes are dated early in 658/1260.
172. *Ibid.*, text pp. 86–7, tr. pp. 59–60.
173. See Blake & Frye, p. 331.
174. This portion of Ibn Shaddād's work is no longer extant. It is quoted, however, by Yūnīnī (d. 726/1326), *Dhail mir'āt al-zamān*, ed. Hyderabad, Deccan, 1374–80/1954–61 (4 vols), I, pp. 497: 11–498: 15, & II, pp. 161: 11–162: 9 (on the variant recensions of Yūnīnī's work for these years, cf. Cahen, *La Syrie du Nord*, pp. 79–80, & in *Arabica*, IV, 1957, pp. 193–4); by Ibn al-Dawādārī (ca. 735/1335), *Kanz al-durar*, ed. Ulrich Haarmann, *Die Chronik des Ibn al-Dawādārī*, VIII, Cairo 1391/1971, pp. 92–3; and by Mufaḍḍal (*Moufazzal*, i, pp. 444–6; Tiesenhausen, I, text p. 177: 9–26, tr. pp. 188–9). Ibn Kathīr (d. 774/1373) simply ascribes the war to Berke's claiming the revenues and Hülegü's killing his envoys, with no further details: *Al-bidāya wa'l-nihāya*, ed. Cairo 1351/1932–n.d., XIII, p. 234: 24–26 (Tiesenhausen, I, text p. 272, tr. p. 275).
175. Abū-Shāma, *Al-dhail 'ala'l-rawḍatain*, ed. M. Z. al-Kawtharī, *Tarājim rijāl al-qarnain*, Cairo 1366/1947, p. 220: 17 ff. Hence Yūnīnī, I, p. 497: 1–5; Ibn al-Dawādārī, VIII, p. 91: 7–13; *Moufazzal*, i, pp. 443–4 (Tiesenhausen, I, text pp. 176: 7–177: 4, tr. p. 188).
176. Brosset, p. 192; Dulaurier, i, p. 504.
177. For a fuller examination of the war in Mongolia, particularly regarding Rashīd's evidence, than what follows, cf. my article 'The Accession of Qubilai Qa'an: a re-examination', in *Journal of the Anglo-Mongolian Society*, II/1, 1975, pp. 1–10.
178. For Rashīd's probable informant on these events, Bolad Chingsang, see Blochet, *Introduction à l'histoire des Mongols de Fadl Allah Rashid ed-Din*, Leyden-London 1910 (Gibb Memorial Series, XII), pp. 94–5; *Successors*, introd., pp. 10–11.
179. Brosset, p. 184; Dulaurier, i, p. 487.
180. Jamāl Qarshī, in *Turkestan* 1900, I, p. 138: 2f. Both Barhebraeus and Ibn al-'Amīd attribute this claim to him: Budge, *Chronography*, p. 439; *Ta'rikh mukhtaṣar al-duwal*, p. 491: 8–10; Ibn al-'Amīd, ed. Cahen, in *Bulletin d'Études Orientales*, XV, p. 173: 13–15.
181. *Successors*, p. 251: Urung-tash's authority is highlighted at p. 260, where he demands his father's great seal from Arigh and takes it to Qubilai in submission. He was the younger of Möngke's two sons by his chief wife Qutuqtai (*ibid.*, p. 197): that both he and his mother supported Arigh is confirmed by Waṣṣāf (p. 11: 5–7; Hammer-Purgstall, text p. 20, tr. p. 22: here the name is corrupted to Yurultash).
182. *Successors*, pp. 251 & 252.

183. Berke is alleged to have remained neutral (*ibid.*, p. 256), and the rumour that he supported Arigh is attributed to the latter's agents (pp. 251 & 253). But he struck coins in Arigh's name (*Die Mongolen in Iran*, n. 4 on pp. 61–2), a fact which led Howorth (II/1, p. 113) to reverse his earlier verdict on Berke's neutrality (I, p. 218).
184. Cf. Rashīd's incidental acknowledgement of the fact: Alizade & Arends, text p. 87, tr. pp. 59 & 60. This must also be the meaning of the phrase *kabīr mulūk al-tatār* used with reference to Berke by Ibn ʿAbd al-Zāhir (d. 692/1293): *Al-rawḍ al-zahir fī sīrat al-malik al-Zāhir*, ed. & trans. S. F. Sadeque, *Baybars I of Egypt*, O. U. P., Dacca 1956, text p. 28: 5 (tr. p. 113 as 'the great Mongol king' . . .); cf. Tiesenhhausen, I, text p. 46 (tr. p. 55 with same error).
185. Jūzjānī, II, p. 218: 15–18; Raverty, pp. 1292–3. This reference puzzled Richard ('La conversion de Berke', in *Revue des Études Islamiques*, XXXV, p. 176, n. 6). The territories named, of course, were all in the Jochid sphere of influence, as we have tried to show.
186. See Otto Franke, *Geschichte des chinesischen Reiches*, IV, Leipzig 1948, p. 326, for the date. On the legality of Qubilai's election, cf. Howorth, I, p. 218 (the passage dismissed by Bartol'd: *Turkestan* 1968, p. 60 & n. 1); *L'Empire Mongol*, pp. 318–9; *Steppes*, p. 352.
187. For the date in the *Yüan Shih*, cf. *L'Empire Mongol*, p. 320 (one month after Qubilai); this is confirmed by Jamāl Qarshī (*Turkestan* 1900, I, pp. 137: 28–138: 2), with shawwāl 658/Sept.–Oct. 1260.
188. *Successors*, pp. 138, 150 & 253, for Abishqa; on Alghu, cf. *Turkestan* 1968, pp. 488–90.
189. See Dietlinde Schlegel, 'Koexistenz oder Annexionskrieg? Kublai Khans Politik gegenüber dem Sung-Reich 1256–1276', in *Saeculum*, XIX, 1968 (pp. 390–405), pp. 392ff.
190. Cf. J. W. Dardess, 'From Mongol Empire to Yüan Dynasty', in *MS*, XXX, 1972–3 (pp. 117–65), pp. 128–31.
191. Alizade & Arends, text p. 70: 10–13, tr. p. 50.
192. For the date of Möngke's death (August 1259), cf. Franke, IV, p. 324; the news had reached Qubilai on 19 Sept. (*ibid.*; Schlegel, 'Koexistenz', p. 391).
193. Ibn al-ʿAmīd, ed. Cahen, p. 173: 11f. Baibars al-Manṣūrī, British Library MS Ar. 1233, fol. 37 v: 17: *lammā ittaṣala bihi min ikhtilāfin ḥaṣala baina ikhwatīhi*.
194. Alizade & Arends, text p. 70: 13f., tr. p. 50.
195. Brosset, p. 189; Dulaurier, i, p. 498.
196. *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades. Documents Arméniens*, II, French text p. 172, Latin p. 303.
197. See the chronicle of the Frisian abbot Menko (d. ca. 1275), ed. L. Weiland, in *Monumenta Germaniae Historica. Scriptores*, ed. G. H. Pertz, XXIII, Hanover 1874, p. 549: 'sperans se dominium suscepturum, ulterius non processit' (the context is the arrival in Syria of the news of Möngke's death).
198. Shabānkāraʿī, *Majmaʿ al-ansāb*, MS Yeni Cami 909, fol. 255r: 3–8. This episode is not mentioned in the other MSS of Shabānkāraʿī that I have examined, and it seems there have survived two recensions of the work. In this MS, which contains Faryūmadī's continuation, the current date is given as rabīʿ I 738/October 1337 (fol. 224v: 16): the accepted dates are 736 for the completion of the initial version, which was destroyed, and 743 for the later recension, which has come down to us in the majority of MSS (see C. A. Storey, *Persian Literature*, I/1, London 1927–39, pp. 84–5).
199. See above, section VI & notes 155 & 156.
200. Lech, text p. 19: 10–20, tr. p. 103: his source is Shams al-dīn al-Īṣfahānī.
201. S. Lane-Poole, *The Coins of the Mongols in the British Museum*, London 1881, pp. 10ff. C. M. Fraehn, 'De Il-Chanorum seu Chulaguidarum Numis', in *Mémoires de l'Académie Impériale des Sciences de Saint-Petersbourg: sciences politiques, histoire et philologie*, 6e série, II, 1834 (pp. 479–548), pp. 496ff. On the relations between the Īlkhāns and the Qaʿan, cf. Blochet, *Introduction à l'histoire des Mongols*, pp. 224–33.
202. Cf. Alizade & Arends, index s.v. (p. 683): as often as not, it is coupled with the adjective *buzurg*.

203. If Rashīd is to be believed: see *Successors*, p. 128 & n. 120, where the term is applied to Toqto'a of the Golden Horde. For a discussion of the meaning of this title, see Doerfer, *Türkische und mongolische Elemente*, II, pp. 207–9: Doerfer adopts the idea of subordination as the most plausible ('Friedensfürst, untergebener Fürst, gehorsamer Fürst').
204. Lech, text p. 2:3–5, tr. p. 91. His source is Niẓām al-dīn Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥakīm, on whom see Lech's introd., pp. 36–7.
205. Juwainī, III, pp. 130 & 136; Boyle, II, pp. 632 (& n. 55) & 636.
206. Lane-Poole, pp. 8ff., Fraehn, pp. 493ff.
207. The *tamachis* were troops of mixed extraction, specially picked out from all the 'thousands' and sent to a province to occupy it permanently, according to Rashīd's definition (Khetagurov, p. 151; *Sbornik*, I/1, p. 99). Although the phrase *az nasl-i dīgar* used by Rashīd certainly indicates that the troops were picked from different tribes (as Aubin, 'L'Ethnogenèse', pp. 74ff., takes it in the immediate context), a further logical corollary is that such forces represented different princes. I assume Hülegü's admittedly obscure wording (if reported correctly) to mean that the army already operating in western Iran had been sent on ahead ('back' in the sense of 'further out', not to their homeland), as indeed we know it had been (see Boyle, II, p. 609, where Baichu is sent west into Anatolia – he presumably returned there after the Baghdād campaign; also Brosset, p. 182; Dulaurier, i, p. 482), and that consequently the Toluid party was more free to act.
208. This includes Qadaghan (see note 152 above) as well as the princes listed in the Persian sources.
209. Blake & Frye, pp. 337, 339 & 341. There is a briefer account of the Jochids' execution and the massacre of their troops in Kirakos: Brosset, p. 192; Dulaurier, i, p. 504. Mingqan (cf. *Successors*, p. 105) is called Mighan by Grigor: for the etymology, which Cleaves had given as *miqan* ('meat' – 'The Mongolian Names', p. 423), see now Boyle, 'Some Additional Notes', in *Researches in Altaic Languages*, p. 37.
210. Blake & Frye, p. 339, for the message; and cf. note 138 above.
211. See Kirakos (Brosset, p. 193; Dulaurier, i, p. 506). Stephan Orbelian mentions an engagement between the armies of Hülegü and Berke in this same year (Arm. era, 710) in which a prince of his family was killed: trans. Brosset, *Histoire de la Siounie*, St Petersburg 1864–6 (2 vols), I, p. 233. Curiously enough, the year 1261 for the outbreak of the war is given also by Marco Polo, whose dates are usually some years out: Sir Henry Yule, *The Book of Ser Marco Polo the Venetian*, 3rd ed. Henri Cordier, London 1903 (2 vols), II, p. 494; A. C. Moule & P. Pelliot, *The Description of the World*, London 1938 (2 vols), I, p. 478.
212. Abū-Shāma, p. 219: 11–13. Barhebraeus says that the siege lasted from December until the summer (Budge, *Chronography*, p. 443) or spring (*Ta'rīkh mukhtaṣar al-duwal*, p. 495: 18f.). Rashīd says the city fell in ramadān 660/July–Aug. 1262, after 6 months: Alizade & Arends, text pp. 85–6, tr. p. 59.
213. Baibars al-Manṣūrī, British Library MS Ar. 1233, fol. 49v: 13f: *fa-ḥamalahum al-'ajz 'alā tasallumihā wa kāna Hūlākū qad arsala yastad'iyu'l-'askara'l-nāzil 'alaihā li-waq'a kānat bainahi wa bainā Barka*.
214. Abū-Shāma, p. 219: 13f. Hence Yūnīnī, I, p. 487: 3–5; Ibn al-Dawādārī, VIII, p. 87: 10f.; *Moufazzal*, i, p. 436.
215. Rashīd at one point (*Successors*, p. 123) dates the attack on the Jochid contingent in Iran in shawwāl 660/Aug.–Sept. 1262. But since he later places Hülegü's despatch of Shiremün against Berke's army in the Caucasus at the onset of this same month (Alizade & Arends, text p. 87, tr. p. 60), there is clearly some confusion.
216. His coinage, of course, gives us no indication at all, in view of the absence of the Qa'an's name (cf. above & note 201): Spuler's assumption that *Qā'ān al-'ādil* represents Qubilai's designation of *Sechen Qa'an* (*Die Mongolen in Iran*, p. 271 & n. 1) is groundless.
217. *Successors*, p. 253. Arigh's supporters claimed that he had Hülegü's backing as well as Berke's (*ibid.*, p. 251).

218. *Ibid.*, p. 259 (where Jumughur's death is not mentioned).
219. Alizade & Arends, text p. 9, tr. p. 17 (where his desertion is placed after Arigh's victory over Alghu), & text p. 106, tr. pp. 69–70 (where it is dated earlier, on Arigh's initial defeat).
220. See *Successors*, pp. 150 & 258: although Rashīd gives 661/1262–3 in the former place, a contemporary Chinese observer indicates that Alghu's victory over Arigh's van under Qara-buqa at the very beginning of the war in Turkistān (cf. *ibid.*, p. 259) occurred as early as 1262: Bretschneider, I, p. 162.
221. *Successors*, pp. 255–6.
222. Alizade & Arends, text p. 90, tr. p. 61: Alghu is here stated to be already dead, which must be incorrect.
223. Brosset, pp. 192–3; Dulaurier, i, pp. 504–5.
224. *Successors*, pp. 257–8. Waṣṣāf, in describing Alghu's revolt (p. 12; Hammer–Purgstall, text pp. 23–4, tr. pp. 24–5), makes no mention of the assault on Berke's position in Māwarā' al-nahr, which he ascribes instead to a campaign by Qubilai's own forces (p. 51: 2–5; Hammer–Purgstall, text p. 98, tr. p. 94); but most probably this is the same episode, and Alghu was acting on Qubilai's behalf.
225. See Ayalon, 'The Great Yāsa', B, pp. 167–73 & 176–7, reproducing the testimony of Ibn Shaddād and Ibn 'Abd al-Zāhir: Ayalon interprets these passages to mean that Hülegü was accused of violating an entire code.
226. Spuler, *Die Goldene Horde*, pp. 34–6: although the invasion is here dated 1258–9, the attack on Sandomir, at least, occurred as late as the end of November 1259: *Monumenta Poloniae Historica*, II, ed. A. Bielowski, Lwów 1872, p. 585 ('ante diem festi S. Andreae').
227. D. Sinor, 'Les relations entre les Mongols et l'Europe jusqu'à la mort d'Arghoun et de Bela IV', in *Cahiers d'Histoire Mondiale*, III/1, 1956 (pp. 39–62), pp. 58–9. For Alexander's letter *Tanquam bene sibi* of 14 Oct. 1259, see A. Theiner, *Vetera Monumenta Historica Hungariam Sacram Illustrantia*, Rome 1859–60 (2 vols), I, pp. 239–41. The invasion of Poland had served to guard the flank of the main force moving into Hungary in 1241.
228. See the *Chronica Minor* of the Minorite of Erfurt, ed. O. Holder-Egger, in *Monumenta Germaniae Historica. Scriptores*, XXIV, Hanover 1879, p. 202, s.a. 1262: since Alexander IV, to whom St Louis forwarded the Mongol envoys under guard, died in May 1261, the embassy clearly arrived early in that year. The correct date is substituted by G. Golubovich, *Biblioteca Biobibliografica della Terra Santa e dell'Oriente Francese*, II, Quaracchi–Firenze 1913, p. 394, who assumes the envoys came from Qubilai. But Berke is obviously in question: cf. G. Soranzo, *Il Papato, l'Europa Cristiana, e i Tartari*, Milan 1930, pp. 192–3.
229. The date in Ibn 'Abd al-Zāhir: Sadeque, *Baybars I of Egypt*, text p. 58:12, tr. p. 155. Hence Yūnīnī, II, p. 156: 1–4; Nuwairī, in Tiesenhhausen, I, text p. 142: 3f., tr. p. 164. The date 27 dhu'l-qa'ada/13 October given by Abū-Shāma (p. 220: 12f.) is that of their arrival in Damascus: hence Yūnīnī, I, p. 496: 9f.; *Moufazzal*, i, p. 442 (Tiesenhhausen, I, text p. 176, tr. p. 187).
230. Sadeque, text p. 58: 4–7, tr. pp. 154–5. Hence Baibars al-Manṣūrī, British Library MS Ar. 1233, fol. 61r: 12ff. (Tiesenhhausen, I, text pp. 78–9, tr. p. 100), who conflates this and the next body of fugitives s.a. 661; similarly Nuwairī, in Tiesenhhausen, I, text p. 141, tr. p. 163. It is noteworthy that Abū-Shāma (p. 220: 14f.) describes these Mongols as refugees from Hülegü's army after a recent defeat by Berke: hence Yūnī, I, p. 496: 11–14; Ibn al-Dawādārī, VIII, p. 91: 5f.; *Moufazzal*, i, pp. 442–3; Spuler, *Die Goldene Horde*, p. 44. This seems unlikely, though it would at least obviate the chronological difficulties posed by their arrival in Egypt so long after Hülegü's attack on the Jochid contingent in his army: nevertheless, Ibn 'Abd al-Zāhir's testimony that they were survivors of that contingent must be regarded as incontrovertible, in view of his position at the Mamlūk Sultan's court. For the subsequent career of these exiles, see Ayalon, 'The Wafidiya in the Mamluk Kingdom', in *Islamic Culture*, XXV, 1951 (pp. 89–104), pp. 98–9.

231. Baibars al-Manṣūrī says that the Sultan had written to Berke as early as 659/1261: MS Ar. 1233, foll. 51r: 16–51v: 2 (Tiesenhausen, I, text p. 77: 1–5, tr. p. 98). But the passage is clearly based on Ibn ʿAbd al-Zāhir's reference to a mission sent in 660: Sadeque, text p. 28: 5–14, tr. p. 113 (Tiesenhausen, I, text pp. 46–7, tr. p. 55).
232. Sadeque, text p. 60, tr. pp. 157–8 (Tiesenhausen, I, text p. 48, tr. pp. 57–8), for this mission and the meeting in Constantinople.
233. Yūnīnī, I, p. 533, & II, pp. 194–5; *Moufazzal*, i, pp. 452–3 (Tiesenhausen, I text p. 178:3ff., tr. p. 189). Ibn ʿAbd al-Zāhir says simply that news of their arrival reached the Sultan at Gaza, whence he returned to Cairo on 17 rajab: Sadeque, text pp. 77: 10f. & 81: 5–8, tr. pp. 181 & 187.
- 233a. Hülegü was announcing his desire for conversion to the Pope as early as 1263: cf. Urban IV's letter *Exultavit cor nostrum*, in O. Raynaldus, *Annales Ecclesiastici* . . . ubi desinit Cardinalis Baronius, III, Lucae 1748, pp. 63–4 (*ad annum* 1260); and for the date, see Richard, 'Le début des relations entre la Papauté et les Mongols de Perse', in *J A*, CCXXXVII, 1949, pp. 291–7. But the Mongols' record in Eastern Europe had made the West cautious. See generally Sinor, 'Les relations', & Richard, 'The Mongols and the Franks', in *Journal of Asian History*, III, 1969, pp. 45–57.
234. Yūnīnī, II, pp. 113–4; cf. also I, p. 458, & II, pp. 160–1; see also the anonymous *Tārīkh-i Āl-i Saljūq*, ed. F. N. Uzluk, *Anadolu Selçukluları Devleti Tarihi*, III, Ankara 1952, text pp. 54–5, tr. p. 36; Cahen, 'Quelques textes négligés concernant les Turcomans de Rûm au moment de l'invasion mongole', in *Byzantion*, XIV, 1939 (pp. 131–9), pp. 135–6.
235. See Sadeque, text pp. 50–2, tr. pp. 145–7, for the embassy to Baibars; also Baibars al-Manṣūrī, British Library MS Ar. 1233, fol. 54v: 9–17, who says that it left Anatolia before ʿIzz al-dīn was actually expelled. Cf. M. Canard, 'Un traité entre Byzance et l'Égypte au XIIIe siècle', in *Mélanges offerts à Gaudefroy-Demombynes*, Cairo 1935–45 (pp. 197–224), pp. 209ff.
236. Sadeque, text p. 81: 20f., tr. p. 188 (Tiesenhausen, I, text p. 50: 6f., tr. p. 59).
237. For a discussion of this episode, and of Michael's simultaneous detention of an embassy from Baibars to Berke, see Canard, 'Un traité', pp. 213–9.
238. Saifī, pp. 264–9; Aubin, 'L'Ethnogénèse', pp. 79–80. Mastung had been captured by Shams al-dīn from some kinsmen of Tāj al-dīn in 652, according to Saifī (pp. 201–5): this is probably too late, and it is noteworthy that Shams al-dīn's enemy, 'Alī b. Mas'ūd of Sīstān, had headed an expedition against it in that year (*Tārīkh-i Sīstān*, p. 398). On Negüder, cf. Boyle, 'The Mongol Commanders', pp. 242–3; Aubin, pp. 73–4.
239. *Tārīkh-i Sīstān*, pp. 399–400.
240. Waṣṣāf, p. 81: 10–18; Hammer–Purgstall, text p. 164, tr. pp. 154–5. Saifī makes no mention of this episode.
241. *Successors*, p. 123; cf. Aubin, pp. 80–1, for the correct interpretation of this passage.
242. Saifī, pp. 270–2. For Bīnī-yi Gāw, see Boyle, 'The Mongol Commanders', p. 247, n. 74; Shāl was near the present-day Quetta.
243. See generally A. B. M. Habibullah, *The Foundation of Muslim Rule in India*, 2nd ed. Allahabad 1961, pp. 204–22; U. N. Day, *Some Aspects of Medieval Indian History*, New Delhi 1971, pp. 31–41.
244. Waṣṣāf, p. 310: 10–18; hence Rashīd al-dīn, ed. Karl Jahn, *Rashīd al-Dīn's 'History of India'*, The Hague 1965 (Central Asiatic Studies, X), Arabic text p. 18:4–13, Persian text pp. 71: 10–72:7 & 116: 13–22; Kāshānī, pp. 184–5; cf. also Jahn, 'Zum Problem der mongolischen Eroberungen in Indien (13–14. Jahrhundert)', in *Akten des XXIV. Internationalen Orientalisten-Kongresses, München . . . 1957*, Wiesbaden 1959 (pp. 617–9), pp. 617–8. The Indian history of the Iranian authorities serves as a useful supplement, and even corrective, to the scattered and confused data on the Sultanate given for these years by Jūzjānī, who mentions only Jalāl al-dīn's flight from his *iqṭāʿ* of Budaon in 646/1248 (I, p. 482: 12–14; Raverty, pp. 683–4): the lengthy expedition to the north-west for some unspecified purpose

- that he describes *s.a.* 650–1/1252–3 (I, pp. 486–7; Raverty, pp. 692–3) must have been connected with Salī's invasion. Salī retired not because of the existence of some truce with the Sultan, as Habibullah suggests (pp. 217–8), but in the face of strong resistance (cf. Rashīd's Arabic version: *li-quwwat ahl Dihlī*).
245. Jūzjānī, II, pp. 38:24–39: 2; Raverty, p. 784.
 246. Jūzjānī, II, p. 44 (cf. also p. 34: 15–22); Raverty, pp. 792–3 (cf. also p. 768). This formula must have been intended to cover not merely Lahore, but also Sind, which Shīr Khan had earlier wrested from Kishlu Khan. Shīr Khan's party may well be the 'Indian envoys' who left Qaraqorum with Rubruck in 1254: Wyngaert, p. 306; Rockhill, p. 248.
 247. Jūzjānī, II, pp. 39: 25–40: 2; Raverty, p. 786.
 248. Jūzjānī, I, p. 494: 9–11, & II, p. 76: 1–5; Raverty, pp. 711 & 844 (where the year 653 is an error for 655).
 249. Jūzjānī, II, p. 79: 14f.; Raverty, pp. 850–1.
 250. Jūzjānī, II, pp. 83–4 & 86–8; Raverty, pp. 856–63. The envoys, who were received in rabī II/March, had arrived at the beginning of the year, when Ulugh Khan was about to depart on campaign against the Mēwāt (II, p. 79: 15ff.; Raverty, p. 851).
 251. Jūzjānī, II, p. 88: 3–7; Raverty, pp. 862–3.
 252. Maḥmūd's attempt to move against the Mongols after the collapse of Multān had been vitiated by the deliberate failure of two of his major *amīrs* to bring their contingents: they were chastized by a campaign under Ulugh Khan in the summer of 656/1258 (Jūzjānī, II, pp. 34–5 & 76–8; Raverty, pp. 768–9 & 847–9).
 253. Jūzjānī had at least heard of Möngke's death: II, p. 218: 14–16; Raverty, p. 1292.
 254. M. 'Azīz Aḥmad, 'Mongol Pressure in an Alien Land', in *CAJ*, VI, 1961 (pp. 182–93), pp. 183–4 & 185; Aubin, p. 81. For Berke's embassy to Delhi, see Jūzjānī, II, p. 218: 19 ff.; Raverty, p. 1292 & n. 3, confuses the issue unnecessarily.
 255. Hülegü's ultimatum to the Egyptian Mamlūks was clearly sent prior to his withdrawal: see Maqrīzī, *Al-sulūk li-ma'rifat duwal al-mulūk*, ed. M. M. Ziada, I/2, Cairo 1936, p. 427; Alizade & Arends, text p. 71, tr. p. 51. Kit-buqa was left in Syria merely to guard the new conquests.
 256. *Successors*, p. 123.
 257. Yule & Cordier, *The Book of Ser Marco Polo*, I, pp. 98–9; Moule & Pelliot, *The Description of the World*, I, p. 121. Polo's account is confused, and Yule rightly noticed (Yule & Cordier, I, p. 103, n.) that he conflates two distinct episodes, one involving the Jochid general and the other the Chaghadayid prince Tegüder: cf. Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo*, Paris 1959–63 (2 vols), I, pp. 190–5. The other proper names also present difficulties, but there can be little doubt that 'Asidin' is 'Izz al-dīn (as Pelliot, *ibid.*, I, p. 52, suspected) and represents Kishlu Khan at Multān: in this case, of course, Polo would be incorrect in locating 'Asidin' at Lahore (on 'Dilivar', cf. Yule & Cordier, I, pp. 104–5, n.; also Pelliot, *Notes*, I, pp. 195–6, & II, p. 626). Lahore was in any case restored by Ghiyāth al-dīn Balaban shortly after his own accession as Sultan, according to the Delhi historian Baranī: *Tārīkh-i Firūzshāhī*, ed. S. A. Khān, Calcutta 1860–2 (Bibliotheca Indica), p. 61: 4–8.
 258. The first raid mentioned by Rashīd fell in 677/1278–9: Alizade & Arends, text pp. 151–2, tr. p. 94; ed. Jahn, *Ta'rī ḥ-i-Mubārak-i-Ġāzānī . . . Geschichte der Ilḥāne Abāgā bis Gaiḥātū* (1265–1295), 's-Gravenhage 1957 (Central Asiatic Studies, II), pp. 35–6. Polo's experience in Kirmān would have occurred earlier, in 1272 (see Pelliot, *Notes*, I, p. 196).
 259. Aubin, p. 80, n. 3; *Tārīkh-i Sīstān*, pp. 400–1. The detachments from Herat left in Sīstān after the campaign by Hülegü's forces against *Junjudar were expelled in 667/1268–9 (*ibid.*, pp. 401–3), and peace between Naṣīr al-dīn and Herat was made only in 693/1294 (p. 407). Relations with the *Ilkhān*, apart from a brief interval in the reign of Tegüder-Aḥmad (pp. 405–6), were strained for rather longer: the fifteenth century *Tārīkh-i Jadīd*, a history of Yazd, by Aḥmad b. Ḥusain b. 'Alī al-Kātib, describes Sīstān as still not subject (*el*) in the time of Ghazan (ed. Īraj Afshār, Tehran 1345 sh./1966, p. 27: 7f.).

260. Polo confirms that the Negüderis were politically isolated: Moule & Pelliot, I, p. 121: 'He (sc. Negüder) makes war on all the other Tartars who dwell round his kingdom'; cf. also Yule & Cordier, I, p. 99.
261. Jahn, 'Zum Problem', p. 618: 'Die Ilchane waren eben durch die Ereignisse an den anderen Fronten ihres Reiches viel zu sehr in Anspruch genommen, um dem Südosten das gleiche Interesse wie Hülägü entgegenzubringen.'
262. Waṣṣāf, p. 12: 17–23; Hammer-Purgstall, text pp. 23–4, tr. p. 25. Aubin (p. 82) assumes that this represents an attack on the Toluid position, but it should be seen rather in the context of Alghu's war against Berke, with which Waṣṣāf clearly links it: possibly, therefore, Sali too had been operating on behalf of the Jochids, in spite of Rashīd's suspiciously frequent statements that he belonged to Hülägü along with all the booty and territory he had acquired, and that the rights over his troops who were still there had now passed to Ghazan (Khetagurov, pp. 188–9; *Sbornik*, I/1, p. 110, & I/2, pp. 279–80; Alizade & Arends, text p. 22: 2–4, tr. p. 21). For Alghu's alliance with Hülägü, see above, section VII & notes 223–4.
263. Aubin, p. 82.
264. On the civil wars in Chaghadaï's *ulus* after 1270, cf. *Four Studies*, I, pp. 126–7; *Steppes*, pp. 406–7.
265. For the Chaghadayid invasions of India between 1295 and 1307, see K. S. Lal, *History of the Khaljis A. D. 1290–1320*, 2nd ed. Calcutta 1967, pp. 124–52; *Steppes*, pp. 412–3; 'Azīz Aḥmad, pp. 186–8; Aubin, p. 84.
266. See especially Howorth, II/1, pp. 216–21. R. Cottevieille-Giraudet, 'Un dirhem inédit de la Horde d'Or. Contribution à l'histoire des Mongols', in *Revue Numismatique*, 5e série, II, 1938, pp. 89–104, even tried to identify a coin as belonging to this non-existent principality. The error is taken up by Spuler (*Die Goldene Horde*, p. 81). On Orda, see note 68 above.
267. Cf. Bartol'd, *Zwölf Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Türken Mittelasiens*, ed. & trans. Th. Menzel, Berlin 1935, p. 188. The statement that mention of this branch as ruling at Ghazna is first found in Abu'l-Fidā is incorrect: Baibars al-Manṣūrī (MS Ar. 1233, fol. 232v: 7ff.; Tiesenhausen, I, text pp. 93–4, tr. p. 118) and Nuwairī (MS Fonds Arabe 1577, fol. 32; cf. Tiesenhausen, I, addenda, p. 551) wrote some years earlier.

ABBREVIATIONS

CAJ	<i>Central Asiatic Journal</i>
HJAS	<i>Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies</i>
JA	<i>Journal Asiatique</i>
MS	<i>Monumenta Serica</i>
ROC	<i>Revue de l'Orient Chrétien</i>

Since this article was published, I have modified the opinion expressed here, to the effect that the Jochids had a claim to Iran in its entirety. I am still of the view, however, that they had been granted the pasturelands of north-western Iran and of Khurasan.

FROM MONGOL EMPIRE TO YÜAN DYNASTY: CHANGING FORMS OF IMPERIAL RULE IN MONGOLIA AND CENTRAL ASIA

John W. Dardess



I. TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE MONGOL EMPIRE, 1250–1260

On the eve of Qubilai's seizure of power as great *qaghan* in China in 1260, the Mongol empire may perhaps be characterized as a loose warrior hegemony imposed upon the entire Inner Asian steppe region together with a vast expanse of settled territory extending from Korea through Central Asia and Persia and as far west as Asia Minor and European Russia. Within this warrior hegemony, supreme power in all but the Qipchaq Steppes and Russia was concentrated in the hands of the great *qaghan* Möngke (r. 1251–59), whose main fixed base was the walled town of Qaraqorum in the Mongolian steppe homeland. From it, the *qaghan* ruled over the heterogeneous debris of a number of former sedentary empires and states. In some areas, the Mongols permitted the existence of local dynasties as long as they accepted the necessity of a subservient relationship to the *qaghan*. In the Uighur kingdom, Ferghana, and parts of Transoxania, for example, native ruling houses remained.¹ Elsewhere, as in the Tangut territory and in north China, the pre-Mongol dynasties had been completely destroyed at the price of much blood and ruin. Despite the enormous political and cultural diversities within the Mongol realm, Schurmann has shown that all parts of it were subject to an essentially uniform system of tributes and levies (*alba* and *qubchiri*) which derived from pre-imperial Mongol steppe practice.²

For the organization and direction of revenue collection, the *qaghans* after 1241 depended upon a tripartite secretariat headed mainly by men of Uighur or Transoxanian origin. In Möngke's time the three branches of this secretariat appear to have been located at roughly equal distances from each other: one in Peking (then known as Yen-ching 燕京); the second in Beshbaliq, capital of the Uighur kingdom; and the third somewhere in Transoxania.³ The secretaries were responsible for meeting revenue quotas and forwarding the proceeds, mainly in the form of precious metals and silk, to the *qaghan*. The *qaghan* in turn reapportioned these among the princes and leading men within Mongol steppe society. At least during Möngke's reign the Mongol fiscal system appears to have been a highly centralized one at its upper levels.⁴

By the time of Möngke's accession, the fiscal organization of the Mongol conquests had set in motion a massive flow of wealth from conquered sedentary territory into the steppe regions, and this new wealth had in turn stimulated a rudimentary form of steppe urbanization. The capital city of Qaraqorum, besides serving as a center of arms and other manufacture, also constituted something of a central point of revenue concentration, and some, if not all, tribute and tax income was gathered there prior to expenditure or redistribution. The city was first walled in 1235 by Ögödei, who also erected its principal permanent buildings.⁵ Since the walls were built of wattle and clay, materials unsuited for defense, they were probably intended only for purposes of police and customs control.⁶ The area enclosed by the walls was about 1,070 acres. Although described by William of Rubruck, who visited it in 1253, as being small even in comparison to the Faubourg St Denis, Qaraqorum was at that time far larger than any other city in the steppes or steppe margins outside of the areas of continuous cultivation.⁷ Only Shang-tu 上都, built after 1259, exceeded it slightly in size.⁸

The leading steppe princes like the *qaghan* also maintained fixed towns or residences which served as secondary centers of revenue concentration and probably also of crafts production. Two unwalled princely court complexes, an earlier and a later one, both located in the appanage of Chinggis Qan's younger brother Jochi Qasar and his descendants, have been excavated in the Transbaikal by Soviet archeologists.⁹ A walled residence belonging to an imperial son-in-law, and dating at least from Möngke's time, has been discovered on the Delger Mören, south of Lake Höbsögöl (Köbsügöl) in north central Mongolia.¹⁰ Politically more important than the owners of these residences, however, were those princes whose appanages lay in a more critical part of the steppe, west of the Altai and north of the T'ien-shan 天山, between Qaraqorum and its more far-flung economic dependencies in the Tarim and in Transoxania. There were at least four princely appanages here. The Chaghatai appanage had its princely seat at Almaliq, near present day Kulja (I-ning 伊寧); the town of Almaliq also possessed a native ruler of its own.¹¹ The appanage of Qaidu, established by Möngke in 1252, had as its center what Rubruck described as the "large town" of Qayaliq, probably to be located at the east end of Lake Balkhash, some 125 miles north of Almaliq.¹² The descendants of the *qaghan* Güyüg were allotted an appanage with a center, described by a Chinese account as a walled town (*ch'eng* 城) on the Emil River, variously identified as an eastern affluent of either Lake Balkhash or Lake Alakul.¹³ If located at Lake Balkhash, the town would have stood some 200 miles northeast of Qayaliq. With the possible exception of Almaliq, none of these places seems to have been sited or excavated; the identifications are therefore tentative. Finally, an appanage held by Orda's branch of the line of Jochi (the so-called White Horde) was positioned according to Barthold between Qaidu's domain at Qayaliq and the city of Otrar along the middle course of the Syr Darya.¹⁴ Where its walled center may have been appears to be unknown.

Neither the *qaghan* nor the princes, however, lived permanently in these towns. They did not closely associate themselves with sedentary urban culture, nor did they personally involve themselves in the continuous supervision of bureaucratic operations. Rather, they spent much of their time among their own herds and tents in the steppe areas allotted them, kept up the seasonal nomadic migrations and the hunt, and visited their fixed centers of wealth concentration only on occasion. In December 1253, for example, Rubruck found Möngke not in permanent residence in any of the buildings at Qaraqorum, but encamped in the grassland outside.¹⁵ When not in Qaraqorum,

Möngke posted commanders there to protect the imperial buildings and the store-houses.¹⁶ In their short summation of the life of Möngke, the Chinese historians of the *Yüan shih* pointed out that "by nature he loved the hunt; of this, he himself said that he was respecting the ways of his ancestors. He would not succumb to or imitate what other nations did."¹⁷ By retaining some of the original nomadic mode of existence, the Mongol rulers were able to give sustained personal attention to their military arm, the mounted cavalry upon whose swift mobility and murderous fighting capacity the foundations of the empire had been laid. In addition, it was often by rendezvous in the steppe zone that the *qaghan* maintained contact with and surveillance over the steppe princes; there is occasional mention in the *Yüan shih* of Möngke's assembling the princes for hunting expeditions, banquets, sacrifices, and the distribution of gifts.¹⁸

In sum, prior to Qubilai's rise to power in China in 1260, and the initiation of new and radical changes, the basic territorial ordering of the Mongol empire may be pictured as a composition of three loosely integrated parts. At the bottom were the conquered sedentary areas, centers of agriculture and crafts production and commercial organization. At the top were the Mongol rulers and their military forces, physically occupying the steppe interstices between the various subordinate areas of dense and continuous settlement.¹⁹ In between and linking the two economically were the Mongol court towns, controlled by the *qaghan* and the princes, and located in the steppes or steppe margins, where the wealth drawn from the settled areas by the *qaghan's* secretaries was stored and guarded prior to its consumption or redistribution. Though centralized at the top, revenue collection at the bottom was not undertaken by an elaborate bureaucratic machine under central control, but was instead farmed out by the secretaries to merchants and other private individuals.²⁰

The size of the Mongol empire under Möngke, however, tended to attenuate and jeopardize its structural order. In Möngke's reign the empire was not only vast in extent already; in the Middle and Far East, it was still expanding its frontiers. Within the imperial system of which Qaraqorum was only in a limited sense the capital, but a system with its power center generally located in Mongolia, the likelihood of political fragmentation tended to increase to the degree that new conquests were made at greater distances from the center. It indeed appears to be the case that the *qaghan* could only with difficulty maintain control over subordinate economic areas that lay much beyond a 900-mile radius from Qaraqorum.

There existed within this radius of 900 miles from Qaraqorum four major sedentary centers of agricultural and crafts production. These four centers may be plotted along an arc beginning in the upper Yenisei valley (Kemkemji'üd and Ilan) to the northwest of Qaraqorum and ending in north China to the southeast of Qaraqorum, with the Uighur kingdom and the former Tangut empire occupying two middle points along the arc. These centers all lay within a radius of 500–900 straight-line miles from Qaraqorum. The Yenisei area was 500 miles to the northwest, but probably further in actual miles owing to the ruggedness of the intervening terrain. Beshbaliq, capital of the Uighur kingdom, was 700 miles to the southwest; Ning-hsia 寧夏, capital of the former Tangut empire, was 650 miles southeast. In north China, the important border city of Ta-t'ung 大同 was 750 miles southeast, and the future Yüan capital of Ta-tu 大都 (Peking) was 900 miles southeast.

The economic importance of the remote upper Yenisei area is only dimly discernible from the traditional historical sources. Rashid ad-Din, for example, says of it only that it had "many cities and settlements and numerous nomads."²¹ The Taoist traveler

Ch'ang-ch'un 長春, although he did not visit the place himself, reported in the 1220s that it produced good iron, had agriculture, and that a thousand or so Chinese artisans were employed there in textile manufacture.²² Recent Soviet archeological investigation, however, shows far more clearly how highly developed the upper Yenisei area was in the Mongol period. Kyzlasov points out that this development appears to have been originally sponsored by the Western Liao 西遼 or Qara-Kitai empire, and was merely taken over by the Mongols and not originated by them.²³ Certainly the fact that in Mongol times cast iron was produced there in small blast furnaces with the use of coke would indicate that this important industrial technique, first developed in China in the Northern Sung (960–1126), was probably first transmitted to the Yenisei by the former Liao rulers who occupied northeast China in Northern Sung times, prior to their migration westward.²⁴ Both coal and iron ore were locally available, and the iron was worked by artisans into implements ranging from nails and knives to armaments and agricultural tools. Remains of local pottery, stone, salt, and textile production, the latter including woolens, crepes, brocades, and dyed materials have also been found.²⁵ Not the least striking was the high development of agriculture which also dated from pre-Mongol times. Kyzlasov reports that the remains of irrigation canals run for “tens of kilometers” along the northern side of the Tannu Ola range.²⁶ Wheat, barley, and millet were grown, fields were plowed with iron plowshares using cast iron mouldboards, and the crops harvested with iron sickles.²⁷

One of the means by which the ruler drew supplies and revenues from these subordinate economic areas to Qaraqorum was through the system of fixed relay stations (*jam*) that Ögödei first organized on a regular basis after 1229.²⁸ From at least Ögödei's time, some of the *jam* served not only as part of the imperial communications network, but were also supplied with animals and carts for the transportation of goods.²⁹ According to Rashid ad-Din, Ögödei established a string of thirty-seven such stations between Qaraqorum and north China in order that 500 cartloads of provisions might be brought to his storehouses daily for redistribution.³⁰ Many goods, however, appear to have been brought to Qaraqorum for marketing on an essentially non-official basis, and this the *qaghan* directly encouraged by using silk and bullion to subsidize trade, often paying private traders 10% more than the real market value of their goods, mainly on the grounds that such an extra margin was necessary to enable the traders to repay debts incurred en route. In this connection, Juvaini mentions Moslem traders from the Tangut and Uighur areas and from Persia as the beneficiaries of the *qaghan*'s bounty, and other traders from India, but none from north China.³¹ This fact would appear to indicate that the cost of goods transport from north China was already in part underwritten by the transportation facilities which the *qaghan* provided. As north China was beyond doubt the most important of the sedentary economic centers subordinate to Qaraqorum, it may be inferred that the volume of wealth forthcoming from the other three centers was not sufficient to warrant the organization of official transportation lines to them. Kyzlasov indicates that Moslem merchants handled the shipment of goods between the upper Yenisei and Qaraqorum, apparently without the benefit of transport relay stations.³²

For goods-laden animals, the time-distances of these production centers from Qaraqorum may be roughly calculated. Wassaf's figure of 14 days for the 400 miles between Almaliq and Beshbaliq, and Marco Polo's figure of 12 days for the 278 miles between Kan-chou 甘州 and Etzina indicate a steppe traveling rate of 24 to 28 miles per day.³³ Comparable rates would put each of the four economic regions

surrounding Qaraqorum at a distance of 25 to 35 days in travel time, i.e. approximately a month. Distances from Qaraqorum to its more far-flung economic dependencies in the Tarim Basin or Transoxania were considerably greater. Khotan, the leading town on the south rim of the Tarim Basin, was about 1,400 miles and two months away; Samarkand in the Zerafshan valley of Transoxania was about 1,800 miles and two and one half months away. Evidently the assignment of princes to appanages in the Central Asian steppe was done partly in order that goods and revenues from Khotan or Samarkand might, with the authorization of the *qaghan's* agents, be intercepted at Almaliq or Qayaliq rather than be forwarded all the way to Qaraqorum. Almaliq, for example, lay about 1000 miles southwest from Qaraqorum and within a range of 800 miles from Samarkand and 450 miles from Khotan. The Golden Horde princes, independent of Qaraqorum since Möngke's election, built the town of Sarai on the lower Volga at a point almost 2,500 miles and three months west of Qaraqorum. From Sarai, the Golden Horde rulers reduplicated almost exactly the system of dispersed economic dependencies centered upon Qaraqorum: Sarai was 700 miles from Moscow, 600 miles from Kiev, and in the opposite direction, 800 miles from its dependency of Khorezm.³⁴ For modern times, Lattimore has estimated an extreme limit of 800 miles for profitable China-Mongolia grain trade using camels.³⁵ There seems to be a strong indication that in Mongol times as well the cumulative costs of transportation made prohibitively expensive the economic integration of all but the nearest production regions into a power system radiating from Qaraqorum. The factor of distance alone ensured the real or potential political and economic independence of the princes appanaged outside the perimeter of Qaraqorum's immediate production areas. Distance also affected political integration: William of Rubruck noted that the effective range of seasonal personal contact between *qaghan* and princes had an extreme limit of two months in traveling time from Mongolia.³⁶

Under these circumstances, Möngke's dispatch of his brothers Hülegü and Qubilai to conduct operations on the far frontiers of the Mongol empire stretched the empire's already attenuated structure yet further. Hülegü set forth from Mongolia in great pomp and magnificence in the autumn of 1253, and traveling only in the favorable seasons of autumn and spring, took three years to reach Alamut in the Mongol frontier zone of western Persia, some 2,800 miles from Qaraqorum.³⁷ Qubilai's objectives were first the Ta-li 大理 kingdom in Yunnan, 1,500 miles south of Qaraqorum; and then, after the conquest of Ta-li in 1253, the Sung frontier in central China, which lay about 1,200 miles south of Qaraqorum. The *qaghan* Möngke chose to give his close personal attention not to Persia, but to China, which was closer and more intimately tied to the imperial revenue system. He took care to impose his own fiscal officers in Shensi, where Qubilai's princely entourage also had interests; and in 1258 he came south from Mongolia to China in order personally to conduct military operations in Szechwan.³⁸

Möngke died of cholera in Szechwan in July, 1259.³⁹ His death inaugurated a struggle for succession to the position of *qaghan*. His youngest brother Arigh Böke, left in control of Qaraqorum and Mongolia while Möngke was in China, made a spirited attempt to preserve the inherited political order by declaring himself *qaghan* there. Qubilai's rump election as *qaghan* at Shang-tu, however, constituted a distinct challenge to the proposition that the supreme rulership ought to maintain a permanent physical separation from the subordinate areas of sedentary production. The southward expansion of the frontier in China forced such a development, for at the same time that the factor of distance from Qaraqorum was stretching to the breaking point, the

Mongol forces also found themselves drawn deeper into a territory of dense and continuous agricultural settlement. Something other than a reduplication of the inherited system would have to result when the breaking point was reached, for there were no real steppe zones in China, no Dasht-i-Qipchaq to support a quasi-nomadic power establishment like the Golden Horde, which broke politically from Qaraqorum but still retained the older pattern of rule. Qubilai proposed to introduce an entirely new principle into Mongol conquest organization, the principle that the *qaghan* and his central military force ought henceforth to be established inside a major region of sedentary production and not within striking distance of several such regions as had earlier been the case.

Qubilai's innovating colocation of imperial power and conquered wealth was accompanied by crucially important administrative changes. The construction of a Chinese-style bureaucracy and dynasty (known from 1271 as the Yüan dynasty) made obsolete and eventually replaced the older system of tax farming, and permitted the ruler a much tighter degree of central fiscal control over the princes' revenue sources in China than had been possible previously. Since both Mongols and Central Asians were allotted leading positions in Qubilai's new centralized bureaucracy, Qubilai ensured that his new organizational moves would not bind him exclusively to local Chinese interests, at least for some decades. Qubilai was in fact able to use his bureaucracy to give substantial support to his efforts to reimpose control over the same parts of the Mongol empire that Möngke had once ruled from a more central vantage point. As of 1260, however, it was not at all clear how successful this new Mongol imperial effort, directed from a new center and using radically new methods, would prove to be. It was not clear whether Qubilai as *qaghan* in China could control either the steppe zones or the other economic areas which were closely subordinate to Qaraqorum up to 1259.

II. THE END OF MONGOLIA AS IMPERIAL CENTER, 1260–1264

The struggle between Qubilai and Arigh Böke for the position of *qaghan* involved basically a fight for the control of the sedentary production regions, and showed beyond a shadow of a doubt that neither contestant could support himself and his military forces solely on the resources of the steppes. The events of 1260–64 made it clear that the struggle between Qubilai and Arigh Böke was not at all a contest between pure sedentarization and pure nomadism, but rather a match to determine how the *qaghan* might best control the sedentary resources which he absolutely needed in order to maintain a Mongol imperial establishment which had already outgrown the ability of pure nomadism to support.

Qubilai's idea was that the Mongol imperial establishment might best be controlled from within its most important production region. His first move in the confrontation was to postpone the campaign against the Sung and secure north China against Arigh Böke.⁴⁰ A few months later, in the autumn of 1260, Qubilai defeated the supporters of Arigh Böke in the Tangut region and so removed it from Qaraqorum's control.⁴¹ The Uighur kingdom was also lost to Arigh Böke; although the native dynast appears to have been neutral during the struggle, the resident Mongol prince Qadan, who was assigned the Uighur capital of Beshbaliq as part of his appanage by Möngke in 1252, actively supported Qubilai and helped him in his seizure of the Tangut area.⁴² Thus in short order three of the four economic regions in the arc immediately surrounding

Qaraqorum fell away from Arigh Böke's control. The regular flow of grain and other supplies from the satellites to the ruling center was cut off, and as Rashid ad-Din's account makes clear, there was not enough materiel immediately at hand in Qaraqorum to feed or outfit Arigh Böke's army.⁴³ It is therefore not surprising to find that Arigh Böke fell back upon the upper Yenisei as his main source of support, for it was the only economic area within the immediate arc around Qaraqorum that remained available to him. After spending about a year in the Yenisei, from the fall of 1260 to the summer of 1261, he marched some 1,300 miles southeast in an attempt to seize back north China from Qubilai. With him were troops recruited mainly from the Oirad, a tribe whose native habitat was not far from the Yenisei area.⁴⁴ In the battle of Simultu (Simultai), fought in November 1261 somewhere near the China border, Qubilai decisively repulsed Arigh Böke.⁴⁵ There is no doubt that Qubilai could obtain more materiel in China than Arigh Böke could in the Yenisei, and moreover his supply lines were immeasurably shorter. These two factors undoubtedly helped ensure his victory.⁴⁶

After the Simultu battle, the struggle between Qubilai and Arigh Böke shifted west from Qaraqorum and its immediate arc of economic areas to Central Asia, a region of steppe and sedentary oases which had never been so directly and integrally attached to the Mongolian ruling center. By 1262, as a result of his defeat, Arigh Böke had to abandon Mongolia and the Yenisei to his rival Qubilai and migrate west into the Central Asian steppes in order to put himself in proximity to the more distant of the sources of supply originally subordinate to Qaraqorum. His move was, to be sure, unusual. The Central Asian region had all along supported what amounted to a separate combination of princely steppe power and conquered economic dependencies; and in fact, after periods of interregnum, it was usually necessary for a new *qaghan* to reassert forcefully his control over the Central Asian princes and their revenues.⁴⁷ Previously, the *qaghan* always had access to his own sources of supply while he punished offending Central Asian princes or made new princely appointments. Arigh Böke, however, did not enjoy this crucial advantage when he undertook his migration. Two years earlier, in 1260, he had assigned the Chaghatai appanage to prince Alughu, who at the time supported him against Qubilai. Yet owing to his pressing need for supplies, Arigh Böke had authorized Alughu to take direct charge of revenue collection in order to expedite the transshipment of supplies from the Central Asian oases to Mongolia. This step, provoked by an emergency situation, was highly irregular and it provided the means whereby Alughu could rebel against Arigh Böke, his *qaghan*. Having gained direct access to the taxes and levies of the Tarim and Transoxania, Alughu decided to keep rather than deliver the pack animals, weapons, and other supplies that he had collected. He killed Arigh Böke's own representatives in the oasis towns, and posted his own. With that act, the Mongols of Central Asia made an overt move toward realizing the possibility of political separatism.⁴⁸

As Arigh Böke, driven from his proper center in Mongolia, migrated west, he was able to defeat Alughu in the steppe zone north of the T'ien-shan range and position himself and his army in the area around the Chaghatai walled center of Almaliq. Alughu, meanwhile, withdrew from that sector and quartered himself and his army in the oasis cities of Khotan and Kashghar on the south rim of the Tarim, with Möngke's former secretary Mas'ud Beg now in his employ as chief tax collector in Transoxania. He was able to interdict the flow of revenue to Arigh Böke in the steppe center of Almaliq. Arigh Böke was restricted to what little was available locally together with what he could plunder from Alughu's baggage trains.⁴⁹ Once again, as in the case of Qubilai in China,

it proved impossible for Arigh Böke as *qaghan* positioned in the steppe to defeat or evict a dissident prince who was firmly established within the confines of a major economic region and who had an army in close physical proximity to a major source of supply. In these circumstances, Arigh Böke's army began to desert him, especially since the winter of 1263–64 was a hard one at Almaliq. In 1264, Arigh Böke dramatically surrendered himself and his men to his elder brother Qubilai in China.⁵⁰

By 1264, Qubilai emerged as sole *qaghan* over the Mongol empire, and Qaraqorum and its arc of sedentary economic dependencies fell into his hands. Central Asia and its more distant steppe and oasis zones were at the moment beyond his actual control, despite the fact that the Chaghatai prince Alughu had declared his allegiance to him after Arigh Böke's migration westward. As of 1264, however, it was still uncertain whether and to what extent a *qaghan* who had committed himself to China could continue to rule the other parts of the eastern Mongol empire. There is no doubt that as a Mongol *qaghan*, Qubilai felt himself committed to the imperial power goals beyond China which that ancient title implied. Yet Qubilai was also a *huang-ti* 皇帝, a civilian emperor in China and active executive head of its whole bureaucratic administration, as Chinese emperors were supposed to be. He could not, therefore, continue to lead a nomadic existence in the constant company of his steppe cavalry as his *qaghan* predecessors had done and still provide the day-to-day direction and supervision that his bureaucracy in China had to have. In point of fact, Qubilai spent his time in Peking or Shang-tu, where the centers of bureaucratic power lay. Only twice, in 1260–61 and in 1287, did he accompany his army on campaigns into the steppes. The methods by which Qubilai as sedentary *qaghan* in China attempted to extend his power over the other parts of the eastern Mongol empire were to a high and increasing degree bureaucratic, and involved the civil and military officials of the newly consolidated Yüan dynasty in basic level relief, reconstruction, and economic development projects in various areas outside China proper. Since the time of Ögödei, the *qaghans* had made sporadic efforts toward the rehabilitation of the conquered sedentary areas, exempting religious establishments from fiscal obligations and occasionally donating personal funds toward the rebuilding of some ruined village or town.⁵¹ Qubilai, however, initiated the pursuit of economic reconstruction on a much more systematic basis, using centrally appointed personnel engaged in reconstruction as an integral part of a larger attempt to extend his political and military control over the same parts of the Mongol empire once ruled from Qaraqorum. This policy was particularly evident in Central Asia.

III. THE LIMITS OF YÜAN CONTROL IN CENTRAL ASIA

From Peking in north China, the total distances to the three other economic regions once subordinate to Qaraqorum increased by 56%. The Yenisei was some 1,300 miles distant from Peking, as against 500 from Qaraqorum; Beshbaliq was now 1,400 miles from the ruling center as against 700 earlier. Only Ning-hsia, former capital of the Tangut empire, saw its distance from the ruling center decreased from about 650 to about 600 miles as a result of Qubilai's establishment of the imperial capital in China. As for Central Asia, Almaliq's distance from the ruling center increased from 1,000 to 1,850 miles; Khotan's from 1,400 to 2,000.

For roughly twenty years, Qubilai's chief extramural endeavor was directed toward bringing Central Asia into subjection, a policy which the *qaghans* of the steppe had

usually been at pains to pursue also. In the 1260s, however, Qubilai's efforts were as yet mainly on the personal level. Shortly after coming to power, Qubilai sent one Chaghatai descendant, Abishgha, to assume control in Almaliq, but Arigh Böke seized and killed the candidate and installed his own, Alughu.⁵² After Alughu's death in late 1265 or early 1266, Qubilai sent yet another Chaghatai prince, Baraq, to rule as regent alongside the young locally-elected Chaghatai ruler, Mubarakshah.⁵³ Once having appointed Baraq, however, Qubilai had no means to ensure his continued loyalty; and in fact as soon as Baraq gained control of the Chaghatai forces two or three years later, he turned against Qubilai.⁵⁴

For Qubilai, however, another movement was afoot in Central Asia which was ultimately more threatening to him than simple treachery. Under the leadership of Ögödei's grandson Qaidu, a coalition of princes was formed at the convention held on the Talas in 1268 or 1269.⁵⁵ Since the convention has been discussed by Barthold and others, only certain salient points about it need be recalled here.⁵⁶ Qaidu was able to get the attending princes to agree to revert to the nomadic existence in the steppe regions of Central Asia, and leave revenue collection to Qaidu's centrally appointed secretaries. Rashid ad-Din's account of the Talas meeting makes it clear that the Mongol princes were constrained to take this step at least in part because the previous policy of direct predation which some of them were following was causing serious damage in their own subordinate economic areas. The Talas meeting was immediately prompted by the fact that Baraq, then nominally on Qubilai's side, had plundered the city of Khotan during his battles against Qaidu, and was about to permit his army to pillage Samarkand after a defeat by Qaidu's coalition. Promised friendship and a generous portion of revenue by Qaidu, Baraq agreed to turn against Qubilai and participate in the convention.⁵⁷ Qaidu's "Medium Imperium," as Latin writers in the West sometimes called it, persisted until shortly after his death in 1301. His policy of physically separating the steppe rulers from their subject cities permitted a degree of spontaneous economic revival west of the Pamirs, directed by the secretary Mas'ud Beg or by various local notables and dynasts. This revival, however, was not one directly promoted and supervised by a centralized state apparatus.⁵⁸

This renewed policy of peace and order within the Mongols' Central Asian realm and the return of the princes to the steppe zone allowed the Medium Imperium to maintain preparedness and discipline among its steppe warriors. The princes as war leaders could give constant personal attention to their nomad cavalry. At the same time, supplies and revenues could be regularly drawn from their sedentary economic dependencies, since these were once again protected from casual pillage or irregular and excessive exactions. The military energies of the princes and their armies, no longer committed to plunder and internecine war at home, could instead be directed to war and plunder across the frontiers.⁵⁹

It was against Qaidu and his new princely coalition in Central Asia that Qubilai organized a counterthrust in 1271 that proceeded along two main lines of advance. One led from Mongolia across the Altai into the Central Asian steppe regions north of the T'ienshan where the appanages of the hostile princes lay. This line, under the command of Qubilai's fourth son Nomuqan (Nomoghan), was a kind of counter-coalition of steppe princes loyal to Qubilai and consisted entirely of Mongol steppe warriors.⁶⁰ The second line, meanwhile, advanced through the Kansu Corridor and out into the oasis cities of Central Asia. It consisted of garrison troops and supporting personnel. Qubilai's evident initial plan was to absorb all of Central Asia east of the Pamirs into a

system centrally controlled from Peking, but to obviate the need to support the entire operation from resources in China by extending westward a military vanguard through the steppes conjointly with a revenue-managing apparatus through the oasis cities so that, at least ideally, the whole effort would be self-supporting.

This twin progression developed unevenly, however. In 1271, Nomuqan advanced from Qaraqorum and positioned himself and his steppe forces at Almaliq, seat of the Chaghatai princely appanage. Qaidu and his allies withdrew west to the Talas.⁶¹ A supply line into the Tarim basin was then evidently made directly and at once, for in the same year 1271 the population of Khotan was registered, obviously for taxation and labor service purposes.⁶² Khotan was, as Marco Polo relates, an agglomeration of numerous towns and villages surrounding a capital city of the same name; it produced cotton, flax, hemp, wheat, and wine, and had a well-developed commerce and manufacture.⁶³ By 1274, the neighboring oasis complex of Yarkand was also brought into a supply link with Almaliq, for in that year thirteen "water stations" were established in both areas for the evident purpose of transporting supplies by the Yarkand and Khotan Rivers to the north rim of the Tarim basin near Kucha, and thence across the T'ien-shan to Almaliq.⁶⁴ This link was made before Qubilai had fully absorbed the territory lying between Khotan and the Kansu Corridor.

Of Qubilai's two lines of advance, the warrior component led by Nomuqan across the steppes proved much the weaker. The ties of loyalty binding the participating princes to Nomuqan and Qubilai were less substantial than those binding the Central Asian princes to Qaidu. This was partly for the reason that Nomuqan's coalition was hastily and arbitrarily assembled, and did not, like its opposition, have its freedom and independence at stake in the confrontation. Nomuqan's princely coalition in fact disintegrated in 1277 owing to restlessness and treachery from within rather than attack from without. According to Rashid ad-Din, who relates in detail a story mentioned only briefly and in embarrassment in the *Yüan shih*, the rebel princes kidnapped Nomuqan and his close supporters and delivered them to Qaidu and to Möngke Temür, ruler of the Golden Horde, in the hope of organizing an attack against Qubilai. When Qaidu showed himself disinclined to give active support to the princes' rash offer of a grand steppe alliance against Qubilai, the princes then made an attempt to make themselves independent in the upper Yenisei and in Mongolia.⁶⁵

Qubilai's successful defense of Mongolia against this move brings up a separate problem which will be deferred for the moment. What concerns us here is the effect the breakup of Qubilai's steppe contingent at Almaliq had upon his effort to control the oasis cities of Central Asia. When Qubilai found that he could neither trust nor control a nomad army led by princes and positioned 1,500 miles away from Peking, he conceded the steppe military advantage to Qaidu and did not attempt to recover his position at Almaliq.

At the same time, however, far from withdrawing from the Central Asian oasis cities, he increased all the more his efforts to control them. This involved a massive effort to secure and develop not only the oases themselves, but also all intervening territory, including especially the strategic Kansu Corridor area, once a part of the Tangut empire. The corridor stretched about 400 miles from Kua-chou 瓜州 in the west to Hsi-liang 西涼 in the east. It was a vital artery for the passage of commercial and official traffic, and was also the most direct passageway for the movement of garrison troops and supplies from China to the oasis towns of Central Asia. From the west end of the Corridor, the oases of the Tarim basin were all within a range of 1,000 miles or less;

hence its development as a producing area was necessary in order to obviate the costs of transporting supplies from the interior of China.

Agriculture was, however, a more precarious undertaking here than in the Ning-hsia portion of the former Tangut empire, and the government did little to promote the development of the Corridor until the late 1270s, when its programs at Ning-hsia were already well established. (The Ning-hsia sector, sited along the Yellow River, was oriented toward Mongolia rather than Central Asia, and will be discussed below.) Military Plantations were set up in the Corridor beginning in 1276, when a number of Chinese convicts were put to work at Kua-chou and Sha-chou 沙州 at its western end.⁶⁶ A "harmonious purchase" control office was set up in Kan-chou in 1279 for the official procurement of military rations and relief grain.⁶⁷ Population registration was undertaken beginning in 1279, and in 1283 a uniform tax rate of 3 piculs 右 per *ch'ing* 頃 (ca. 7.5 bu. per 16 acres) was set on new lands in the Kan-chou area.⁶⁸ In 1286, paupers were sent to develop vacant fields in Kan-chou and Su-chou 肅州; oxen, seed, and tools were issued to them.⁶⁹

Direct military exploitation of arable land was much more in evidence in the Kansu Corridor than in the Ning-hsia sector of the former Tangut state. Sometime in the late 1270s, for example, the Chinese commander Liu En 劉恩, en route to Central Asia with a garrison force, was ordered to survey the western end of the Corridor with a view to its possible colonization. He reported favorably. In 1280 the land and population at Sha-chou was registered and troops were put to work farming excess fields seized from the locally wealthy.⁷⁰ Liu En's own colonies, authorized by the government in 1281, had 2,290 households working 1,166 *ch'ing* of land under the supervision of the local military headquarters.⁷¹ Irrigation in the Kansu Corridor was a necessity owing to the scant rainfall, yet only one irrigation project in the area seems to receive mention. In 1281, a forced labor draft of soldiers and civilians, possibly under Liu En's direction, ditched and irrigated fields near the town of Su-chou.⁷²

Qubilai's first garrison reached Khotan in 1278, a year after Nomuqan's demise.⁷³ By 1279, Mongol and Chinese troops garrisoned at Khotan were issued horses, oxen, and sheep together with sufficient Yüan paper money to purchase more horses, plus asses, clothing, bows, arrows, and saddles.⁷⁴ A few months later, 3,000 more garrison troops (2,000 Mongols and 1,000 Tanguts) were sent into Khotan, followed in 1283 by an unspecified number of Chinese troops from Kan-chou in the Kansu Corridor.⁷⁵

At about the same time, Qubilai also moved to secure the intervening reaches of settled territory. In 1278, he began to defend and administer the whole of the Uighur kingdom north of the T'ien-shan, including the abandoned Uighur capital of Beshbaliq and the town of Janbaliq further west.⁷⁶ In 1280, the Chinese commander Chi Kung-chih 葛公直 was put in charge of the Yüan garrison in Beshbaliq; he was periodically supplied with paper assignats and military gear, and his original force was increased by 3,400 Chinese troops sent out from the Kansu Corridor between 1281 and 1286.⁷⁷ A Chinese garrison was further posted at Kucha in 1282.⁷⁸ Military-agricultural colonization at Beshbaliq was undertaken probably in 1281, and certainly by 1286.⁷⁹ The bureaucratic apparatus of the Yüan state was also imported into the area and tightly linked with the home government by a new and alternate chain of thirty relay stations stretching across the desert-steppe north of the Kansu Corridor.⁸⁰ In Qaraqojo in the southern part of the Uighur kingdom, a civilian Provincial Surveillance Office (*an-ch'a-ssu* 按察司) was set up in 1278, but was replaced in 1283 by a Pacification Office

(*hsüan-wei-ssu* 宣慰司) which combined the duties of military and civilian control.⁸¹ Its duties complemented and probably also overlapped those of the Beshbaliq Protectorate (*tu-hu-fu* 都護府), which was established in 1281.⁸² In 1279, local fields were surveyed and taxes imposed.⁸³ In 1282, a government ironworks was built in Beshbaliq for the manufacture of farm implements.⁸⁴ In 1280 and 1282, the Uighur territory was brought fully within the Yüan monetary system with the establishment of a paper money control bureau and later a treasury.⁸⁵ Yüan assignats were already in circulation before those dates, however, as 2,500 ingots were issued for famine relief in Uighur territory in 1278.⁸⁶

The early supply route between China and Khotan appears to have passed through Uighur territory and not by the highway through the Lop Desert that Marco Polo took in 1273 or 1274.⁸⁷ The oasis towns of Cherchen and Lop lying between Khotan and the Lop Desert are not mentioned until 1286, when a relay system was established to link them.⁸⁸ After 1286, however, the Lop Desert route was evidently in full use. In 1287, Qubilai set up military plantations in the Cherchen oasis; these were farmed by Chinese soldiers together with well-to-do civilian deportees from Ning-hsia and Kansu.⁸⁹ Military-agricultural colonies were apparently first established in Khotan and Kashghar only in 1288.⁹⁰

Qubilai's obvious purpose in occupying the Uighur kingdom and the Tarim oases after the breakup of his steppe force was to impose an economic blockade against Qaidu and his allies. He evidently hoped to bring the Central Asian princes to heel by gaining control of their revenue sources, just as the earlier Mongol *qaghans* had tried to do. This alone would guarantee to Qubilai some measure of dominance over his opponents, even though he was helpless against them in the steppes.⁹¹ The blockade, however, was not as tight as Qubilai may have intended it to be. Besides posting permanent garrisons, Qubilai also sent out expeditionary armies from the Kansu Corridor to Khotan and Kashghar on a seasonal basis from 1279 to 1284. The need to supply these campaigns was one of the chief reasons for the state-sponsored agricultural development of the Kansu Corridor area discussed above. Liu En, who was instrumental in that endeavor, himself commanded the Khotan campaign of 1281.⁹² These non-steppe armies, commanded by both Chinese and non-Chinese, engaged Qaidu's forces on the borders of Khotan and Kashghar and apparently succeeded in denying Qaidu entry to those cities. It is, nevertheless, evident that Qaidu was able to force the delivery of revenues, a fact which the *Yüan shih* attempts to conceal. In 1281, for example, we read that Liu En engaged Qaidu's army outside Khotan. Liu En was outnumbered, and so "withdrew with his army intact."⁹³ Yet since Khotan was not plundered, and since the Yüan was still in control of the city after that date, one can only conclude that Qaidu withdrew after he pressured the Yüan defenders into delivering revenues to him. Qaidu's maneuvers make no sense otherwise.⁹⁴

It is curious to note that the Yüan began to withdraw from Central Asia in the late 1280s, just when its developmental efforts were beginning to assume major proportions. Probably because Yüan face and prestige were heavily committed there, the withdrawal was drawn-out and piecemeal, and was never openly advertised as policy. Yet after 1288, references to Central Asia in the *Yüan shih* become exceedingly few, and they generally signal a Yüan retreat.⁹⁵

Several reasons may be adduced for this withdrawal. It first of all coincided with the outbreak of new trouble in Mongolia, which will be discussed presently. In the second place, since Qaidu could evidently pressure Qubilai's Central Asian cities into surrendering revenues to him at will, Qubilai's garrison troops and bureaucrats posted

in those cities ended in doing little better than serving as unpaid revenue collectors for Qaidu. And since Qaidu and his followers could extract these revenues without first submitting to or acknowledging the overlordship of Qubilai, Qubilai's whole attempt to impose himself as *qaghan* in Central Asia, either through steppe military superiority or through oasis revenue management, came to nought. Third, it would appear that the various official steps taken to increase production in the Kansu Corridor during Qubilai's reign (1260–94) did not suffice to make it self-supporting. Though crucial as a staging area for Qubilai's moves into Central Asia, the Corridor proved to be an unsatisfactory base. There is frequent mention of poverty and famine which the government was obliged in some measure to relieve. Kua-chou and Sha-chou, where Liu En's colonists were settled, had to be relieved in 1281.⁹⁶ In 1283, the government began making payments in paper cash ingots to those pauper households of Kan-chou that provided the army with sulfur.⁹⁷ In 1285, the government invested 12,400 ingots, presumably in local commerce, so that it might use the interest earnings to relieve poverty-stricken agricultural troops in Kan-chou and Su-chou.⁹⁸ Drought conditions in 1288 and 1289 made it necessary for the government to cancel taxes, issue 10,000 ingots in direct relief, and distribute grain among the starving Moslem community.⁹⁹

Despite the indifferent results obtained in the attempted economic development of the Kansu Corridor area, Qubilai had to make heavy use of it to further his power aims in Central Asia. By the late 1280s, however, the poverty of the Corridor contrasted markedly with the more favorable results obtained in the state-directed development of the Ning-hsia sector, which was oriented north toward Mongolia. This factor certainly helped to influence the crucially important strategic calculation which Qubilai made in the late 1280s, to abandon his activities in Central Asia in order to give full attention to the control and pacification of Mongolia.

IV. YÜAN CONTROL IN MONGOLIA

Unlike Central Asia, whose connection with China proper was in the main restricted to the narrow and not especially productive Kansu Corridor, the open steppes of Mongolia shared a border with agrarian China which stretched some thousand miles along the line of the Great Wall. The wealth of China could be forwarded into Mongolia from several points along the line, not just one. Occasional notices in the *Yüan shih* annals section suggest that there were two main production and storage areas along the China border, whose output or stores were often destined for shipment into one or another part of the steppe: one was the Ta-t'ung area in present-day Shansi, and the other the Shang-tu area, around Qubilai's summer capital.¹⁰⁰ A third such area, not really part of China proper, was that portion of the former Tangut empire that lay along the west side of the Ordos loop of the Yellow River, in and around the modern city of Yin-ch'uan 銀川 (Ning-hsia).

The development of the Ning-hsia region was a direct outgrowth of Qubilai's war against Arigh Böke in Mongolia; grain transport up the Yellow River to the steppe margin was put into operation as early as 1261.¹⁰¹ Water transport along the Yellow River was rapid and cheap. Grain boats could make the 400 miles from Ning-hsia to Tung-sheng 東勝 on the northeast part of the Ordos loop in four days and nights. At about 100 miles per day, this was four times faster than overland travel.¹⁰² In order to raise the agricultural productivity of the area however, it was necessary to restore its

ancient network of irrigation canals, and two of Qubilai's Chinese bureaucrats took the initial steps in this endeavor in 1264. They surveyed the area, discovered three main canal systems totalling some 800 miles in all, plus "sixty-eight large and small branch canals." These had lain damaged and silted since the fall of the Tangut state some forty years before. It was predicted that this canal system could, if restored, irrigate 90,000 *ch'ing* of land (ca. 2,246 sq. mi.).¹⁰³

The restoration of these canals took a surprisingly short time: the project was declared completed in 1266.¹⁰⁴ Whereas the government evidently had little difficulty recruiting the necessary labor for canal repair, it was hard-pressed to find enough people to work the reclaimed land. Officials put up posters along the roads urging those who had fled to the mountains during the earlier warfare to return and resume farming. Some 40–50,000 Tangut households were by various means regathered and resettled, and the government provided them with the necessary oxen, seed, and tools.¹⁰⁵ These official roundups of Tangut refugees were carried out in 1266 and again in 1271.¹⁰⁶ Local Mongols and Uighurs were allotted fields and put to work also.¹⁰⁷ As these were not enough, the government also undertook a program of compulsory immigration under which it moved a possible total of some 6,600 Chinese households into the Ning-hsia area between 1270 and 1275.¹⁰⁸ Some of the peasant farming households were put under ordinary civilian government, as two new counties (*hsien* 縣) were established for the jurisdiction of Chinese settlers in 1275. Others, however, were put into military or civilian agricultural colonies beginning in 1279.¹⁰⁹ These latter colonists were closely supervised in their work by special government bureaus; available figures indicate that by the 1280s there were 4,351 households working 3,744 *ch'ing* of land under one or another form of direct state supervision in the Ning-hsia region.¹¹⁰

Aside from these major producing regions, one may note also the existence of about a dozen walled towns, stretching from Etzina (I-chi-nai 亦集乃, Qara Qoto) in the west to Ying-ch'ang 應昌 in the east, which hugged the extreme northern margin of the zone of continuous cultivation. Alone and isolated in the west, the city of Etzina, 278 miles and twelve traveling days north of the Kansu Corridor, was a small island of population in the midst of open steppe and desert. It was formerly a part of the Tangut empire. Aurel Stein describes it as the "last place where caravans bound northward into the heart of Mongolia could secure supplies for men and beasts."¹¹¹ The earthen city walls, discovered by the Russian explorer Kozlov, enclosed about 40 acres; remnants of an interior street grid are still to be seen inside.¹¹² Marco Polo did not visit Etzina, but he reported of it that it produced camels, cattle, and falcons; it had agriculture, he said, but no trade.¹¹³ Although Etzina may not have participated in trans-Asiatic trade, it was a point where economic transactions with the nomad world took place. A Mongolian-language contract unearthed there, for example, shows that a nomad borrowed at no interest three piculs and seven "pints" (*sheng* 升) of wheat for three months, his guarantor to pay the lender double the amount in case of default.¹¹⁴ As for local agriculture, this was given strong official promotion. The government in 1267 undertook to pay the debts of the local people and issued to them oxen, seed, tools, and food relief.¹¹⁵ In the late 1280s, the government carried out an intensive developmental program; some 600 Chinese troops were moved in to dig irrigation canals and set up military plantations. A total of 92.5 *ch'ing* of land was thus brought under cultivation.¹¹⁶

About 500 miles east of Etzina, the next walled town on the steppe margin was Ching-chou 淨州, Marco Polo's Tenduc. It formed the seat of the appanage of the Turkish Onggud tribe, whose ruling family was a consort clan to the Mongol imperial

house. The site has attracted interest mainly because Ching-chou was where in the thirteenth century John of Montecorvino converted the Onggud ruler Korgis (George) to the Roman Catholic faith and founded the first church of that denomination in the Far East. Some preliminary excavation shows that Marco Polo was essentially correct in saying that Ching-chou was the chief town within a complex of numerous towns and villages.¹¹⁷ It lay about 100 miles north of the Ordos loop of the Yellow River in a part of the steppe that has two permanent streams flowing north out of the Yin-shan 陰山 into the Gobi. The area enclosed within the Ching-chou walls measured about 141 acres; the town was thus over three times larger than either Qaraqojo or Etzina (Qara Qoto). The remains of at least six satellite walled villages enclosing a few acres apiece have been found in the area also.¹¹⁸ In the centralized Yüan system of local government, Ching-chou was incorporated within the metropolitan province as a district (*lu*); subordinate to it was the county (*hsien*) of T'ien-shan 天山縣 which presumably had jurisdiction over the satellite villages.¹¹⁹ Marco Polo stated that animal herding, agriculture, crafts, and trade were carried on there. Ching-chou receives little official mention until the second and third decades of the fourteenth century, when large numbers of nomads descended upon it seeking relief.¹²⁰

About 100 miles directly south of Ching-chou, on the east end of the Ordos loop near modern T'o-k'o-t'o 托克托, lay the town of Tung-sheng, a site of agricultural colonization as well as a depot for grain shipments from the Ning-hsia area. In 1267, ten "water stations" were built along the river between these two points for the relaying of this grain.¹²¹ East and north from Tung-sheng, and within a radius of 100 miles, lay at least three more administrative frontier towns: Feng-chou 豐州, at modern Pai-t'a 白塔 east of Kuei-sui 歸綏 (Huhehot); P'ing-ti 平地, at or near the present town of Liang-ch'eng 涼城; and Yün-nei 雲內, possibly 30 miles due north of the city of Ta-t'ung.¹²² Perhaps writing in the period 1268–72, when he was a Censor, Wang Yün urged the establishment of military colonies at Feng-chou, an area of combined farming and cattle herding, where "the land was broad and the population sparse," and an estimated 4,800 *ch'ing* could be brought under cultivation.¹²³

About 60 miles north of Ta-t'ung, and twice that distance northeast of Tung-sheng, was the administrative frontier town of Chi-ning, which has been excavated in recent years. Its ruins lie about 15 miles southeast of the modern town of the same name. Its walls enclosed an area of about 178 acres, and artifacts found there show the usual pursuit of agriculture and crafts.¹²⁴ About 100 miles east of Chi-ning lay Hsing-ho 興和, near the present town of Chang-pei 張北. It had in 1270 a registered taxpaying population of 8,973 households and 39,495 individuals in the city and surrounding territory.¹²⁵ Shang-tu, which we have already mentioned, was about 120 miles northeast of Hsing-ho and 150 miles north of Peking. Its taxpaying population in the city and its numerous subordinate districts further south amounted to 41,062 households and 118,191 individuals in the year 1270.¹²⁶

Finally, about 70 miles due north of Shang-tu, on the shore of the lake Tari Nur (Dar Na'ur, Dalai Nur, etc.) stood the walled town of Ying-ch'ang. It was located within the summer pasture of the Qunggirad tribe, the leading consort clan to the imperial house. In 1270, the Qunggirad asked formal permission of the Yüan court to have the town built; it was previously the site of a settlement of peasants and fishermen.¹²⁷ Ying-ch'ang was, however, partly administered by centrally-appointed officials.¹²⁸ It served primarily as a grain depot and as a relay point for the shipment of grain from north China to Qaraqorum. Its local agricultural produce was extracted by compulsory purchase;

although in 1288 an official proposal was made to impose regular taxation, it is uncertain whether this was actually out into effect.¹²⁹

With some exceptions, as for example in Etzina, the government did not engage in any large-scale development in these administrative frontier districts. These districts appear to have served as centers of economic interchange between nomads and sedentary producers, and as sources of government-controlled relief and subsidy to the nomad world in times of distress. Positioned as they were outside the Great Wall line, the establishment of these administrative towns at more or less equal intervals along the frontier was apparently intended to make it unnecessary for the nomads to penetrate the Chinese interior, at least in ordinary circumstances.¹³⁰ The frontier districts were themselves incapable, however, of sustained agricultural production without frequent relief from the government in the Chinese hinterland inasmuch as their marginal location in a semi-arid zone of high rainfall variability made periodic crop failures all but a certainty.

* * *

The whole area outside this frontier, including Qaraquorum and its upper Yenisei dependency, fell to Qubilai after 1262. Qubilai immediately renewed the fiscal exemptions of Qaraquorum's religious establishments, and distributed relief to its destitute population.¹³¹ In the Yenisei area, Qubilai implemented a number of policies aimed at rebuilding its economy, which his rival appears to have over-burdened and damaged. In 1269 he issued 5,999 piculs of grain to the destitute Yenisei artisans.¹³² In 1270 he posted a Chinese bureaucrat by the name of Liu Hao-li 劉好澧 as Protector General (*tuhu* 都護) at Ilan 益蘭 in the eastern part of the Yenisei. Liu settled new artisans in the region and had them instruct the local people in the techniques of pottery manufacture, iron smelting, and boat-making; he also built official granaries and treasuries and established new post stations.¹³³ In 1272, one hundred captive Chinese soldiers were sent to the Yenisei along with oxen and tools to establish a military plantation (*t'un-t'ien* 屯田) there.¹³⁴ Archeology seems to confirm that important redevelopment did take place around this time, since around 1260 the old unwalled town of Ilan was abandoned and a new one built about 2.5 kilometers to the northeast on the opposite bank of the Elegest creek.¹³⁵ The new Ilan was probably actually built by Liu Hao-li in 1270.

The upper Yenisei district was, however, subsequently twice occupied by steppe forces hostile to Qubilai's Yüan dynasty. Between 1277 and 1279, the princes Sirigi and Togh Temür, having mutinied against Qubilai's son Nomuqan at Almaliq, seized the Yenisei area and its Protector General Liu Hao-li. Using the Yenisei as a base, the princes attempted to storm Qaraquorum. Their emeute was given rear support by a dissident Qunggirad named Jirwatai, who seized the walled grain depot of Ying-ch'ang in the name of the princely rebels. Yüan forces soon isolated and put down Jirwatai, and Yüan officials were again appointed to Ying-ch'ang in 1279.¹³⁶ Yüan field troops, commanded by Turks and Chinese rather than Mongol princes, and integrated into a centralized system of supply, promotion, and command, succeeded in defeating Togh Temür outside Qaraquorum, plundering his herds and wagons and preventing his seizure of that town.¹³⁷ By 1279 the princely rebel movement collapsed internally; some of its fragments surrendered to Qubilai, others submitted to Qaidu, and yet others went over to the White Horde.¹³⁸ The Yüan authorities clearly recognized this form of steppe dissidence

as outmoded. When one of the rebel princes left Qaidu to surrender to the Yüan in 1296 or 1297, an official remarked: "The reason why these princes rebelled was because of their fathers. Their generation is, however, young and weak and really knows nothing about it. Now that he has surrendered to us, we should forget the evil he has done in order to encourage those who have not yet come over."¹³⁹

The Yenisei was again occupied from about 1289 to 1293, this time by Qaidu, acting in conjunction with prince Nayan's revolt in Manchuria in 1287.¹⁴⁰ Qaidu was able to raid Qaraqorum from the Yenisei in 1289, but the Yüan forces pressed him back to the Altai frontier and in 1293 recovered the Yenisei area once again.¹⁴¹ Although the *Yüan shih* indicates that relief measures were implemented in the Yenisei area after its two previous occupations by Arigh Böke and by Sirigi, there is no further mention of the area after its recovery from Qaidu.¹⁴² It may be surmised on this evidence that owing to its great distance from China and to the successive occupations it had suffered, the upper Yenisei was written off by the Yüan government as an important region of sedentary production. In any event, the settled population of the Yenisei seems to have disappeared by the early fourteenth century.¹⁴³

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Qubilai and his successors Temür (r. 1294–1307) and Qaishan (r. 1307–11) were able to solidify their rule in Mongolia by gradually bringing the steppe region into the centralized bureaucratic system of government established in Peking. What helped make this possible was the fact that the bureaucracy, though organized on the traditional Chinese model, was controlled during these years by Mongol or non-Chinese bureaucrats whose loyalties and orientations were directed more toward the overall entity of the Mongol empire than toward China and its self-contained political and ideological tradition. The leading bureaucrats of the early Yüan period were not reluctant to help organize a massive outflow of Chinese money, grain, and other resources into the Mongolian steppes. Yet Chinese officials and military commanders also took part in Yüan operations in Mongolia; though they at times evidenced some dislike for the rigors of the steppe environment, dynastic loyalty and official duty forbade overt opposition.

The Yüan dynasty in China apparently commanded sufficient resources to manage and control either Central Asia or Mongolia but not both at the same time. Pressures from Nayan and Qaidu upon Mongolia in 1287 and after appear to have occasioned the Yüan decision to sacrifice Central Asia in order to secure a territory important to the Yüan dynasty not only for strategic reasons but sentimental ones as well. Loss of Mongolia would force the Yüan to withdraw to the Great Wall line, and would make the Yüan state in China vulnerable to nomad raids and incursions from outside. It would also deprive the dynasty and its legally privileged caste of Mongols in China of much of their sense of non-Chinese identity; even more, Mongolia contained the homeland and the tombs of the imperial founders, and the maintenance of dynastic prestige enjoined their protection and preservation.

The deepening extension of Yüan rule into the steppes and the consequent pacification and control of nomad society were slow processes, and because much of the evidence is highly fragmentary and many personal and place names cannot now be identified, it is also difficult to reconstruct. This difficulty stems in large part from the deliberate official restrictions placed upon information pertaining to the steppe regions

in the Yüan period.¹⁴⁴ Meager as the evidence may be, however, there is enough of it to indicate some of the basic processes involved.

One such process was the official stimulation of agriculture in those parts of the steppe that could be put under the plow. This was not an entirely new policy, but rather an intensification of a development which was already underway well before Qubilai's rise to power in China. There appear to have been three major spots in the steppes which were under cultivation both before and after the rise of Qubilai. One such spot is to be sought somewhere along the Kerülen River of northeast Mongolia; Chang Te-hui 張德輝, who traveled along part of the Kerülen in 1247, noted that an indigenous agriculture was carried on by a few Chinese and others living in sod huts on the banks, growing wheat and hemp, and ice-fishing in the wintertime.¹⁴⁵ A second place was around the "city of Chingqai" (Chingqai-balghasun), probably to be located southwest of the modern Mongolian town of Uliassutai (Jibhalanta), on the south side of the Qangghai (Khangai) range, about 250 miles due west of Qaraqorum. The Taoist traveler Ch'ang-ch'un, who visited this town in the 1220s, noted that millet was grown in the area and that the town had granaries plus a large population of Chinese artisans.¹⁴⁶ Most important, however, was the Qaraqorum area itself. According to Juvaini, the *qaghan* Ögödei instituted agriculture there for the first time; he writes that "there had been no agriculture in the neighborhood of Qaraqorum on account of the excessive cold, but during his [Ögödei's] reign they began to till the ground."¹⁴⁷ Radishes were planted first, followed later by wheat or millet. Ögödei encouraged this endeavor by paying inordinately high prices for the radishes, and by promising grain-growers monetary compensation in case of crop failure.¹⁴⁸ Chang Te-hui noted in the early autumn of 1247 that the residents practiced irrigation agriculture and had vegetable gardens, but found that their grain crop had been already ruined by frost.¹⁴⁹

Under Qubilai and his successors in China, steppe agriculture in these three places was much more systematically promoted. The *Yüan shih* makes occasional reference in this regard to what appears to be the Kerülen area, although the identification is by no means definite.¹⁵⁰ The further agricultural development of the Chingqai and Qaraqorum areas is, however, a matter of certainty. The first mention of Chingqai in the Yüan period seems to date from 1295, when 1,000 Chinese troops were sent there to establish a plantation.¹⁵¹ These troops were issued tools in 1296, and in 1297 the local artisan population was allotted 22,900 ingots for the purchase of their own farm tools.¹⁵² There is often mentioned in conjunction with the Chingqai colony a Wu-ho 五河 or Wu-t'iao-ho 五條河 ("Five Rivers") colony which was first developed in 1284 and was presumably located nearby.¹⁵³ Combined figures for both colonies for the years 1321–23 show a total of 4,648 colony households farming 6,400 *ch'ing* of land.¹⁵⁴ The low ratio of households to land suggest a less intensive variety of agriculture than that practiced, for example, at Ning-hsia. Although there are no figures on how much land was colonized at Qaraqorum, the indications are that a sizeable amount was worked by both private persons and troops. As early as 1279, plantation production at Qaraqorum was declared adequate for local consumption in normal years.¹⁵⁵ In 1283, a thousand oxen were sent from Ta-t'ung in north China to Qaraqorum for use on military plantations.¹⁵⁶ In 1297 the government authorized the expenditure of 80,000 ingots on compulsory grain purchase at Qaraqorum, and in 1309 the officials of the Pacification Office (*hsüan-wei-ssu*) were rewarded when their military colonies produced an exceptional harvest of 90,000 piculs.¹⁵⁷ That this was not, however, adequate for local consumption is evidenced by the fact that in 1303 the local troops alone required an annual allotment of

120,000 piculs.¹⁵⁸ In that year, a deficit of 50,000 piculs was covered by grain shipments from Ching-chou 靜州, Ta-t'ung, and Hsing-ho on the Sino-Mongolian frontier.¹⁵⁹

Various governmental offices set up in Qaraqorum had a direct role to play in the local economy. A Transportation Office and a Paper Money Treasury were set up in 1272, and a Price Stabilization Storehouse (*p'ing-chun-k'u* 平庫準) in 1283.¹⁶⁰ The evident high demand for grain in the steppes constituted a vital margin of leverage wherewith the Yüan government was able to exert control over the inhabitants of those areas. Since on the whole it seems clear that more grain was shipped into Mongolia than could be grown locally, and since the demand for grain in the steppes was rising faster than the legal supply, the instruments of bureaucratic control grew apace with the need to supervise the transportation and distribution of this increasingly vital staple commodity. Thus by 1288, official suspicion of theft and cheating at Ying-ch'ang caused the government to send officials to investigate grain management at that walled town.¹⁶¹ In 1290, the government increased its grain control staff at Ta-t'ung, since wealthy Mongols were posing as paupers and obtaining grain there under false pretenses.¹⁶² In 1301, the granary officials at Qaraqorum were indicted for illegal embezzlement of grain, and in 1302 the Chingqai colony grain was ordered to be subjected to close audit.¹⁶³ In 1303, one Fakhr ad-Din, evidently a government transport contractor, was indicted by the Censorate for having stolen 250,000 piculs of grain and 130,000 ingots in cash in the course of supplying grain for the Qaraqorum garrison.¹⁶⁴ In 1301 and 1302, the government took steps to prohibit the troops at Qaraqorum from using official grain to brew liquor for sale in the town, and in 1304 it established a liquor monopoly bureau in Qaraqorum in order to restrict its manufacture and derive income from its sale.¹⁶⁵ In 1303, a constabulary (*ping-ma-ssu* 兵馬司) was set up in Qaraqorum to enforce law and order.¹⁶⁶ In such ways was the complex bureaucratic apparatus of grain control introduced into the steppes and steppe margins.

The increasing trend toward the bureaucratization of Mongolia was crowned in 1307 by its reorganization as a province under civilian administration, on a level with the various provinces of China proper. Qaraqorum was made the provincial capital and also the seat of the district (*lu*) administration of the city and its environs. The main difference between this new Mongolian province (called Ling-pei 嶺北) and those of China proper was that the steppes were not further subdivided into the usual local administrative hierarchy of prefectures, subprefectures, and counties.

The establishment of Ling-pei province came as an explicit response to the problem of steppe overpopulation. Although some population growth probably came about by natural increase, much of it was brought on by a massive influx of nomad refugees who came flocking into Mongolia after the collapse of the various steppe opposition movements after 1279. Upon the surrender of the rebel prince Yomuqur, for example, the Yüan in 1297 sent additional Chinese troops to enlarge the Wu-tiao-ho plantation so that the proceeds might help support Yomuqur's destitute followers.¹⁶⁷ In the same year, the government issued seed to some of Yomuqur's people so that they might support themselves by engaging in agriculture at Qaraqorum.¹⁶⁸ In 1298, moreover, the government issued 100,000 piculs of grain to relieve other steppe refugees who had surrendered to the Yüan.¹⁶⁹ It was the breakup of the anti-Yüan princely coalition of Central Asia early in the fourteenth century, however, that generated a nomad refugee problem large enough to occasion the establishment of a provincial administration in Mongolia, as the debris of the Central Asian forces migrated into Mongolia to seek forgiveness and relief from the Yüan authorities.¹⁷⁰

The sources give some improbably high figures for the number of nomad refugees in Mongolia at the time of its establishment as a province in 1307. The biography of its first provincial Chancellor of the Left, Harghasun, states that there were “over one million individuals from various tribes” there when he came to take up his post.¹⁷¹ A *Yüan shih* annals entry of 1308 states that 868,000 refugee households were being issued grain at Qaraqorum; in order to end their having to petition the government individually for relief, the provincial authorities received permission from Peking to issue them 2,000,000 ingots cash so that they could make their own purchases of cloth and grain as they needed.¹⁷² Whatever the true refugee count, the problem of dealing with them occupied much of Harghasun’s time. Harghasun’s colleague, the provincial Chancellor of the Right *Yochichar, reported in a memorial of 1308 that there was insufficient pasture area in Mongolia to accommodate the surrendering nomads.¹⁷³ In these circumstances, the officials clearly did not hesitate to denomadize the refugees, putting them to work farming and fishing where they could. Harghasun distributed not only sheep but also oxen and fishnets among the nomads; he established two new relief granaries; and at Chingqai, where he ditched and irrigated new land, he distributed tools and had troops who knew farming teach it to surrendered nomads. He also opened a supply route to the Altai mountains, with ten cart-relay stations spaced at 300 *li* (ca. 100 mile) intervals, in order to provide distressed nomads there with grain, oxen, and sheep.¹⁷⁴

If as Professor Smith suggests, nomadism as a way of life is basically hostile to any form of political organization or political authority, the nomads of Mongolia proved themselves amenable, or at least quiescent, in the face of Yüan authority and made little perceptible effort to rebel or “decamp” as they seem to have done in Persia.¹⁷⁵ There are some scattered references to steppe “banditry”; in 1289, nomad commoners in the Qangghai rebelled against the relay station authorities, and in Temür’s reign the Yüan forces put down a group of some 3,000 “bandits” in the same general area.¹⁷⁶ However, the brunt of nomad resistance to the imposition of control seems to have been directed not so much against the Yüan authorities as against such steppe rulers as Arigh Böke, Sirigi, and Togh Temür, the very leaders who commanded resistance against the Yüan, for it was to a large extent desertion or decampment on the part of their dissatisfied steppe troops that brought these leaders down. Among the Yüan forces, the most serious case of mutiny and outright tribal decampment broke out in about 1287 among the steppe forces commanded by Qubilai’s son Nomuqan on the Tamir River just west of Qaraqorum.¹⁷⁷ Contemporary military thought, however, clearly viewed the nomad army and its tactics as both treacherous and inefficient. Qubilai’s commander Bayan, leading nomad forces on the Altai frontier against Qaidu, came under such heavy attack from his critics at court and among his own staff for following the steppe tactic of permitting the enemy to make deep raids that Qubilai eventually had to relieve him of his command.¹⁷⁸ Bayan’s opponents argued the contrary idea of permanent border defense, a strategy which explicitly demanded such anti-nomadic supporting activities as the establishment of military-agricultural colonies (*t’un-t’ien*), the organization of grain supply routes, and the construction of walled fortresses.¹⁷⁹

It appears that Chinese, Korean, and Jürched garrison and plantation troops came to assume an increasingly larger share of steppe peacekeeping activity, replacing the earlier levies of nomad forces that the authorities came to view as undependable.¹⁸⁰ Horses for these armies came to be almost entirely supplied from pastures within China, not Mongolia itself.¹⁸¹ The troops grew some of their own grain, but this always

had to be supplemented by grain shipped from the China border. The most burdensome obligation still imposed upon nomads was that of maintaining the postal and transport relay stations (*morin jam* and *tergen jam*); the Yüan government, however, usually tried to alleviate this obligation by issuing grain rations, sheep, oxen, and horses to the households involved, and assuming responsibility for repaying their debts.¹⁸²

In effect, therefore, the Yüan government seems to have established order in the steppes of Mongolia by imposing upon it a non-indigenous apparatus of control which was largely supported, directed, and supplied from outside. At the same time that it seems to have made relief in various forms readily available to the nomadic population, it placed only minimal obligations upon it. In any event, Mongolia gave the authorities very little trouble throughout the rest of the Yüan period. Toward the very end of that period, in 1361, an attempt was made by one of the Mongol princes to recruit a nomad cavalry in Mongolia with a view to seizing the Yüan throne; yet the Yüan court, beleaguered as it was at the time by rebellion within China, put this insurrection down with little difficulty.¹⁸³ As Ling-pei province, Mongolia became incapable of generating dissident steppe movements, or even of exerting any independent political influence within the Yüan system. The Yüan state in fact became simply one more dynasty in the Chinese sequence of dynasties, with the Mongolian steppes neutralized, pacified, and integrated into its centralized state organization as something of a minor appendage, an unimportant variation on the traditional spheres of occupancy of the great Chinese dynasties of the past.

V. CONCLUSION

The Yüan rulers' conception of territory was based on a premise different from that of the earlier Mongol *qaghans*. The pre-1260 Mongol empire was rather a multinational entity compounded of geographically non-contiguous producing areas. In contrast to this, the Yüan empire, founded within a major area of sedentary production, expanded not by loosely attaching new producing areas to its ruling system, but by integrally incorporating its territorial acquisitions as contiguous units, bureaucratically organized as provinces or at least protectorates. The two areas closest to China proper, the former Tangut empire and Mongolia itself, became established as full provinces within the Yüan empire in 1286 and 1307 respectively.¹⁸⁴ Protectorates were established for relatively brief periods in the Uighur kingdom and in the upper Yenisei, areas at too great a remove for full integral incorporation. By around 1300, however, the Yüan dynasty in effect gave up all claim to the two protectorates. The Uighur kingdom passed under the domination of the independent Chaghatai princes of Central Asia, while the Yenisei appears to have passed into oblivion as a site of sedentary production.¹⁸⁵ The Yüan empire became a unitary state, forming a single contiguous geographical unit behind recognized frontiers, all of it under centralized bureaucratic control from Peking.

Within the outward uniformity of the Yüan empire, one may still note the apparent effect of the same factor of distance that tended to place limits upon the real size of the older Mongol empire as ruled from Qaraqorum. The Yüan emperors were too distant from Central Asia to control princely successions there, despite Qubilai's early attempts in that direction. The Yüan also eventually yielded control over the Yenisei and the Uighur kingdom, two production regions which were within a radius of 700 miles

from Qaraqorum, but which more than doubled their radii from the ruling center after Qubilai established his capital in Peking. Yet if, as it seems, the cost of overland transportation remained a constant factor in the transition between Mongol empire and Yüan dynasty, subjecting both to the same order of spatial limitations, the new methods of rule exercised by the Yüan dynasty within these given limitations constituted on the whole a significant departure from earlier Mongol practice.

Both the earlier *qaghans* and the later Yüan rulers operated what economic historians sometimes refer to as "command economies," systems wherein central political authority attempts to dominate the collection and redistribution of some preponderant part of the wealth of its subject society; in some cases political authority may also attempt to dominate some aspects of production. In the earlier Mongol empire, all three elements of a command economy were present in at least rudimentary form. The early Mongol *qaghans* attempted to control crafts production by the forced removal of captive artisans to Qaraqorum and other places. The *qaghans* in Qaraqorum were also capable enough of gathering wealth and even of dominating and rationalizing the process of collecting it from their sedentary conquests. Redistribution was, however, a different matter. In contrast to collection, wealth redistribution from Qaraqorum to the sedentary areas was irrational and haphazard.¹⁸⁶ Hence for the *qaghans* the factor of distance was mainly unidirectional, affecting the cost and convenience of transporting taxes and goods from the sedentary areas to Qaraqorum but not the reverse. Not until the rise of Qubilai was the redistributive process also rationalized and systematized so as to generate a two-way movement of money and commodities by the state on a regular basis.

Qubilai's expansion of Yüan power outside the confines of China proper tended always to involve a combination of two new elements of the command economy, both of which were but poorly developed and quite unrelated to each other in earlier Mongol practice. When the Yüan state undertook control of outside societies, whose populations were small relative to China proper, it not only implemented the extractive element as the earlier *qaghans* had done; it also introduced both the direct state management of certain aspects of production and the redistribution of wealth through bureaucratically-directed relief efforts as complementary parts of its total apparatus of control.

Military and civilian agricultural colonies were the most important of the first of these new elements, state-managed production. Their output was generally intended for the supply of Yüan garrison and campaign armies. In developing these colony plantations, the state directly immersed itself in basic economic processes. It provided and organized labor, it issued the means of production, and it determined the kinds of crops to be planted and the amount and location of the land to be exploited. The state provided aid in money and in kind to the line bureaucratic agencies undertaking basic irrigation work and the establishment and management of plantations.

The second new element, redistribution, was most evident in the form of relief. In the Kansu Corridor, the military-agricultural colonies were themselves the chief recipients of government relief. In the Uighur kingdom and in the oasis towns of the Tarim Basin, however, this was not the case. Although the Yüan government was establishing colony plantations in those parts in the late 1280s, the *Yüan shih* mentions no case of their being relieved. Rather, the exclusive recipients at that time were native civilians, and the kinds of relief issued to them included not just money, cloth, and consumption grain, but also specifically seed grain and working oxen.¹⁸⁷ Apparently no relief of any sort was distributed in the Ning-hsia region.

One may infer an interconnection between state-managed production and state-controlled relief in the Yüan mode of territorial rule, even though there is far from enough evidence to show this fully. In the first place, the annexation of new territory into the Yüan state inevitably involved its fiscal integration into the centralized Yüan system. The Yüan government, issuing its paper assignats in all areas under its control, could not easily tolerate regional exceptions within an otherwise uniform fiscal and monetary system. At a lower level, neither could the Yüan state easily accept the anomalous dual economies that seem to have resulted when military-agricultural colonies were implanted in newly-acquired territories.¹⁸⁸ It was at least in part in order to obviate local dual economies that the state, in those places where it managed such colonies, also went a step further and attempted to control the native economies as well. The issuance of relief in the form of paper cash or in kind must have served to soften price differentials between the state-managed and native economies. Thus in the Kansu Corridor, where the colonies were in economic trouble, the state established offices for compulsory purchase from the native economy for the relief of the troops and colonists.¹⁸⁹ In the Uighur kingdom and in the Tarim oases, where the native population was in apparent straits and the colonies were only just being founded, the state dispensed its own relief probably in order to depress prices and protect its military-colonial investment. In the more heavily populated Ning-hsia area, the state evidently did not try to dispense relief; rather, it attempted to regulate the native economy by more coercive means.¹⁹⁰

In the earlier Mongol empire, all new acquisitions of sedentary territory within a 500–1,000 mile radius of Qaraqorum constituted a net source of profit for central political authority. In the earlier empire, a unidirectional flow of taxation wealth led from economic base to political center. In the Yüan empire, by contrast, new acquisitions within a similar radius from Peking, or from some other point on the China border, did not necessarily result in profitable revenues for central authority, because the primary economic relationship between them was not simply, or even mainly, extractive. That the acquisition of the Uighur kingdom and the Tarim oases constituted a net economic loss for the Yüan state seems likely. That Mongolia constituted such a net loss is certain. No doubt the Yüan authorities realized they could not afford to maintain two such liabilities, and so they sacrificed Central Asia west of the former Tangut country for the sake of retaining Mongolia. Had the Kansu Corridor proved to be a rich economic base, the chances of keeping at least some part of Central Asia might have been better, inasmuch as Beshbaliq in Uighur territory was within a range of 700 miles from Kan-chou, the chief city in the Corridor. The Corridor was, however, entirely too poor to support Yüan efforts in Central Asia. On the other hand, Mongolia's orientation toward the relatively rich economic base of north China was much more satisfactory than that of Central Asia toward the Corridor. Mongolia was more accessible to the exportation of the Yüan control apparatus of bureaucrats and economic managers, whose manipulation of Chinese wealth gave them a necessary degree of leverage over the resident population.

NOTES

1. W. Barthold, *Zwölf Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Türken Mittelasiens* (Hildesheim, 1962), pp. 189–190.

2. H. F. Schurmann, "Mongolian Tributary Practices of the Thirteenth Century," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 19 (1956), 304–389. For a revision of Schurmann's analysis, see John Masson Smith, Jr., "Mongol and Nomadic Taxation," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 30 (1970), 46–85.
3. Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing 蕭啟慶, *Hsi-yü-jen yü Yüan-ch'u cheng-chih* 西域人與元初政治 [Central Asians and Early Yüan Government] (Taipei, 1966), p. 47.
4. For Möngke's fiscal centralization at the expense of the princes, cf. Hsiao, p. 37; Abe Takeo 安部健夫, *Nishi Uguru kokushi no kenkyū* 西ウイグル 國史の研究 [The National History of the West Uighurs] (Tokyo, 1954), pp. 48–52; Igor de Rachewiltz, "Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai (1189–1243): Buddhist Idealist and Confucian Statesman," Arthur F. Wright and Denis Twitchett, eds., *Confucian Personalities* (Stanford, 1962), p. 214.
5. Paul Pelliot, "Note sur Karakorum," *Journal Asiatique* CCVI (1925), 374.
6. S. V. Kiselev, ed., *Drevnemongol'skie Goroda* [Ancient Mongolian Cities] (Moscow, 1965), p. 134.
7. W. W. Rockhill, ed., *The Journey of William of Rubruck*, The Hakluyt Society, 2nd ser., no. 4 (London, 1900), p. 220.
8. Shang-tu, largest and most important of the cities on the Sino-Mongolian frontier, was originally a campsite; it was built into a walled city by Qubilai beginning in 1259 and it became during his reign the seasonal summer capital of the Yüan emperors, the "Xanadu" made famous by Coleridge's poem. It enclosed an area of about 1,100 acres within its outer walls. Cf. *Yüan shih* 元史 [Yüan Dynastic History: hereafter YS] (Po-na-pen ed.), 58.8a; Lawrence Impey, "Shangtu, the Summer Capital of Kublai Khan," *Geographical Review* XV (1925), 591.
9. Kiselev, pp. 23–58, 325–369.
10. Yöngsiyebü Rinčen, "L'inscription sinomongole de la stèle en l'honneur de Möngke qayan," *Central Asiatic Journal* IV (1959), 130–138.
11. Barthold, *Four Studies on the History of Central Asia* (3 vols.; Leyden, 1956–62), I, 35, 48. For the location of Almaliq, cf. T. W. Thacker, "A Nestorian Gravestone from Central Asia in the Gulbenkian Museum, Durham University," *Durham University Journal* XXVIII (1967), 103.
12. Barthold, *Four Studies*, I, 50; Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo* (2 vols.; Paris, 1959–63), I, 126.
13. The Emil River is shown as an eastern affluent of Lake Balkhash by A. Herrmann, *An Historical Atlas of China*, 2nd ed. (Chicago, 1966), p. 40, and as an affluent of Lake Alakul by E. Chavannes in the map accompanying his *Documents sur les Tou-kiue (Turcs) Occidentaux* (Taipei, 1969). For the "walled town" of Emil, cf. YS 180.2b. In 1252, Möngke awarded the Emil area to a certain Toghto, a descendant of Ögödei through Qarachar, not Güyüg. In 1261, however, the town was in the possession of Güyüg's descendants. Cf. Louis Hambis, *Le Chapitre CVII du Yüan che* (Leiden, 1945), pp. 78–79. The town of Emil (Omyl), built by Ögödei, is also mentioned by the medieval traveler Plano Carpini; cf. Rockhill, p. 162 n. 2.
14. Barthold, *Four Studies*, I, 120.
15. Rockhill, p. 165.
16. YS 3.2b.
17. YS 3.11b.
18. YS 3.4b, 5b, 6b etc. Rubruck relates that Möngke's meetings with "all the nobles" took place each summer (Rockhill, p. 207).
19. In Central Asia, the Mongols took deliberate measures to ensure a sufficiency of steppe. Barthold reports that the Mongols thinned the area around Qayaliq as well as other tracts further west of their peasant population in order to provide pasturage for the Mongol armies. A settled village population was apparently allowed to remain only in the Chu valley. Cf. Barthold, *Four Studies*, I, 49, 122; also Barthold's article "Ču" in *Encyclopedia of Islam*, 1st ed., II, 881.

20. Schurmann, p. 368, and the same author's *Economic Structure of the Yüan Dynasty* (Cambridge, 1956), pp. 89–92.
21. Rashid ad-Din, *Sbornik Letopisei* [Collected Chronicles], translated by L. A. Khetagurov et al. (3 vols. in 4 parts; Moscow-Leningrad, 1946–60), I, i, 150.
22. Wang Kuo-wei 王國維, ed., *Meng-ku shih-liao ssu-chung* 蒙古史料四種 [Four sources on Mongol history] (Taipei, 1962), pp. 366–367.
23. L. R. Kyzlasov, “Srednevekovye goroda Tuvy” [Medieval cities of Tuva], *Sovetskaia Arkheologiia* no. 3 (1959), 75.
24. On Northern Sung developments, cf. Robert Hartwell, “Markets, Technology, and the Structure of Enterprise in the Development of the Eleventh-century Chinese Iron and Steel Industry,” *Journal of Economic History* XXVI (1966), 29–58. However, nothing in Wittfogel and Feng, *History of Chinese Society: Liao (907–1125)* (Philadelphia, 1949) would indicate that the Yenisei area was ever under direct Liao or Western Liao control.
25. Kiselev, p. 118.
26. Kyzlasov, p. 77. On the upper Yenisei in Mongol times, see also Kyzlasov's recent synthesis, *Istoriia Tuvy v srednie veka* [History of Tuva in the Middle Ages] (Moscow, 1969), pp. 130–172.
27. Kiselev, pp. 118–119.
28. Cf. Peter Olbricht, *Das Postwesen in China unter der Mongolenherrschaft im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert* (Wiesbaden, 1954), pp. 40–41.
29. *Yung-lo ta-tien* 永樂大典 (Taipei, 1962), 19416.7a. The *Yung-lo ta-tien* material on the postal system has been discussed by Haneda Tōru 羽田亨, *Genchō ekiden zakkō* 元朝驛傳雜考 [Studies on the Yüan postal system] (Tokyo, 1930), pp. 3–17. For the different kinds of *jam* in Mongol terminology, cf. Olbricht, p. 45 n. 101.
30. Rashid ad-Din, II, 41.
31. Juvaini, *The History of the World-Conqueror*, translated by John Andrew Boyle (2 vols.; Manchester, 1958), I, 214–226.
32. Kyzlasov, *Istoriia Tuvy*, pp. 169–171.
33. Cf. Wassaf, *Geschichte Wassaf's*, translated by Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall (Vienna, 1856), p. 24; Sir Aurel Stein, *Innermost Asia* (Oxford, 1928), I, 457. These are possibly optimum rates for ordinary travel with baggage animals. For asses, Pegolotti calculated 70 days for the roughly 1,100 miles between Almaliq and Kan-chou, or about 15 miles per day. Cf. Robert S. Lopez and Irving Raymond, *Medieval Trade in the Mediterranean* (New York, n.d.), p. 356.
34. For Sarai, cf. Bertold Spuler, *Die Goldene Horde* (Wiesbaden, 1965), pp. 264–267, 426–427.
35. Owen Latimore, *Studies in Frontier History* (Paris, 1962), p. 481.
36. Rockhill, p. 207.
37. Juvaini, II, 611–618. Also cf. Berthold Spuler, *Die Mongolen in Iran* (Berlin, 1955), pp. 48–50.
38. YS 3.8a-b; Tamura Jitsuzō 田村實造, “Aribuka no ran ni tsuite アリブカの亂について” [Arihō Bōke's rebellion], *Tōyōshi Kenkyū* 東洋史研究 XIV (1955), 174.
39. YS 3.11a-b; Rashid ad-Din, II, 147.
40. Tamura, pp. 175–182.
41. Tamura, p. 182; also cf. Rashid ad-Din, II, 161.
42. Abe Takeo, *Nishi Uguru*, pp. 69–70; Tamura, p. 182. Qadan was a son of Ögödei's; cf. Hambis, *Le chapitre CVII*, p. 72 n. 6. See also Saguchi Tōru 佐口透, “Kasei ni okeru Mongoru hōken ōkō 河西そそおけるモンゴル封建王侯” [Enfeoffed Mongol princes in the Tangut area], *Wada hakushi kanreki kinen tōyōshi ronsō* 和田博士還暦記念東洋史論叢 (Tokyo, 1951), 255–272.
43. Rashid ad-Din, II, 161, 164.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 163; YS 120–9b.
45. Rashid ad-Din, II, 162–163; YS 4.20b–21a.

46. Prior to the battle, Qubilai ordered his civil districts (*lu* 路) in north China to purchase and send 10,000 horses to Shang-tu, the chief staging site for Qubilai's counteraction (YS 4.9b). In addition, 15,000 troops were marched there from north China. Grain shipments totalling some 100,000 piculs (*shih* 石; ca. 285,200 bushels) were forwarded from north China to Shang-tu by hired camels; grain from the Tangut area was sent by specially built boats to the steppe margin north of the Ordos loop of the Yellow River (YS 4.9b, 11b, 16a, 18a; 134.4a–b). In 1261, Qubilai opened a Chinese-style “harmonious purchase” (*ho-ti* 和糴) office in Shang-tu for the procurement of locally-grown crops at prices set by the government (YS 4.19a).
47. It was necessary after Güyüg's accession in 1246, and especially after Möngke's in 1251. Cf. Juvaini, I, 255; René Grousset, *L'empire des steppes* (Paris, 1969), pp. 400–401; F. W. Cleaves, “Aqa Minu,” *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 24 (1962–3), 73–74.
48. Rashid ad-Din, II, 97, 163–164; YS 180.2b. The name Alughu is also often rendered as Alghu or Alghuy.
49. Rashid ad-Din, II, 97–98, 164–165; Abe Takeo, p. 75.
50. YS 5.20b; Barthold, *Four Studies*, I, 123.
51. The princes also engaged in such occasional charitable acts; witness Hülegü's donation of 1256 for the restoration of the town of Khabushan and its irrigation system (Juvaini, II, 617).
52. Rashid ad-Din, II, 97, 161.
53. Rashid ad-Din, II, 91, 168; Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo*, I, 75–76. For the correct reading “Baraq” (a. c. Boraq, Buraq, etc.), cf. F. W. Cleaves in *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 12 (1949), 111 n. 87.
54. Rashid ad-Din, II, 13, 91, 93; Barthold, *Four Studies*, I, 125.
55. On the question of the correct date of this convention, cf. Abe Takeo, p. 85.
56. Cf. Barthold, *Zwölf Vorlesungen*, p. 186; *Four Studies*, I, 47–48, 125–126; René Grousset, *L'Empire des Steppes*, p. 405.
57. Rashid ad-Din, III, 69–71. Cf. also the article on Baraq in *Encyclopedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., II, 1311–1312.
58. Andijan, for example, was entirely rebuilt in a new location and made the capital of the agriculturally rich Ferghana valley (cf. the article “Andidjan” in *Encyclopedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., I, 504–505; Guy Le Strange, *The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate* [New York, 1966], p. 478; Barthold, *Four Studies*, I, 50). Around 1283, Bukhara was repaired and repopulated by Qaidu's secretary Mas'ud Beg (cf. *Encyclopedia of Islam*, 1st ed., I, 781). The city of Tirmidh, famous for its Moslem theological studies, had been completely wrecked by the Mongols in 1220; it too was restored to a flourishing condition (*Encyclopedia of Islam*, 1st ed., IV, 795–796; Barthold, *Four Studies*, II, 4–7).
59. One of Qaidu's first acts was to encourage Baraq in his plan to invade and seize the district of Badghis in Khorasan, together with its main city of Herat. Rashid ad-Din explains that this campaign was launched because Baraq's troops were too many for the Central Asian realm to support; he needed this additional territory “so that the pastures, lands, and herds of his followers might be increased” (Rashid, II, 98; III, 71–72; Pelliot, *Notes*, I, 189). Baraq, however, was overambitious; he turned down the Ilkhan ruler Abagha's offer of peace and the cession of Badghis together with Ghazna and the Indus valley. He instead decided to battle Abagha in the hope of taking over the entire Ilkhan realm. Abagha, however, crushed Baraq in a great and memorable battle near Herat (Rashid, III, 72–81). Soon after this defeat of 1270, Baraq died, and his cattle and possessions were seized and redistributed by Qaidu (Rashid, II, 100; III, 85). It would nevertheless appear that despite Baraq's demise a surplus of warriors continued to overtax the resources of the Central Asian realm, and that in order to relieve this pressure, the princes were obliged to send or position large forces beyond the frontiers so that they might maintain themselves by plunder. Rashid ad-Din, for example, mentions that in 1288, 30,000 of Qaidu's horsemen plundered the Ilkhan towns of Balkh, Merv, and Shaburgan (Rashid, III, 117). In 1295, Central Asian Mongol raiders plundered

the Ilkhan provinces of Khorasan and Mazanderan (Rashid, II, 92; III, 167). A detached horde of Central Asian Mongols, commanded by two of the princes' sons, maintained a nomadic existence in the Ghazna area of modern Afghanistan and from it carried out periodic raiding expeditions both westward into Khorasan and southeast into India (Rashid, II, 14–15, 92–93; on the raids into India which continued until 1329, cf. Aziz Ahmad, "Mongol Pressure in an Alien Land," *Central Asiatic Journal* VI (1961), 182–193). These predatory wars along and beyond the frontiers resulted in a ruinous devastation of settled territory, something which the Central Asian princes tried to prevent at home. Rashid ad-Din offers a sad list of wrecked cities (Rashid, III, 308). Bukhara itself was ravaged twice, in 1273 and 1316, in the course of the princes' wars with the Ilkhans (Cf. *Encyclopedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., I, 1294–1295). In 1332, the traveler Ibn Batuta found the once famous cities of Balkh, Ghazna, and even Samarqand ruined and depopulated (*Encyclopedia of Islam*, 1st ed., II, 153; IV, 130.; 2nd ed., I, 1001; Le Strange, p. 465). Much of this evident nomad population pressure in Central Asia was relieved by migration into Mongolia, as is discussed in the text below.

60. For the correct order of Qubilai's twelve sons, cf. Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo*, I, 569.
61. On the obscure and controversial sequence of events leading to Nomuqan's expedition, cf. Abe Takeo, pp. 80–84. According to Abe, Qaidu raided Qaraqorum in 1268 and Nomuqan's advance was part of Qubilai's retaliatory action.
62. YS 7.11b.
63. Yule and Cordier, *The Book of Ser Marco Polo*, 3rd ed. (London, 1929), I, 188–191.
64. YS 8.8a.
65. YS 9.20b; Rashid ad-Din, II, 106, 168 ff. The princes who bolted against Nomuqan included Arigh Böke's sons Yomuqur and Melig Temür, whom Qubilai had earlier pardoned and assigned appanages in the steppe and forest districts of the Altai and upper Yenisei (Rashid, II, 201–202; L. Hambis, *Le Chapitre CVII*, 95–97); Sirigi, one of Möngke's sons (Hambis, pp. 108–109); and Togh Temür, a nephew of Qubilai (Rashid, II, 106; Hambis, pp. 88–89, 105). For the name Togh Temür (Tugh Temür, Togh Tömür), cf. Cleaves in *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 24 (1962–3), 72.
66. YS 9.4a.
67. YS 10.6a.
68. YS 10.25b; 11.4a; 12.23b–24a; 13.17a. For the conversion of Yüan measurements, I follow Amano Motonosuke 天野元之助, "Gendai no nōgyō to sono shakai kōzō 元代の農業とその社会構造" [Yüan agriculture and its social structure], *Jimibun Kenkyū* 人文研究 XIII (1962), p. 806.
69. YS 14.11b.
70. YS 11.4a; 166.7a.
71. YS 100.18a–b. Liu En's biography states that he obtained 20,000 piculs of grain from these colonies (YS 166.7a). Evidently a much higher tax rate than that in effect in the Kan-chou area (apparently outside Liu's jurisdiction) was in effect in Kua-chou and Sha-chou. Although 5,000 more Chinese troops were transferred to Kan-chou in 1281 to work military land, they probably could not have helped Liu En (YS 11.13a).
72. YS 11.11b.
73. YS 10.1a. The garrison commander, one 'Ala ad-Din, was supplied with 3,000 piculs of grain and 30 ingots 錠 in paper cash for expenses. The sum of 30 ingots seems too low; it may be in error for 3,000.
74. YS 10.17a.
75. YS 10.24a; 12.17a.
76. Abe Takeo, pp. 94–95; Cleaves in *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 12 (1949), 32, 50 n. 89, 86. In about 1270, the Uighur ruler (*idūq qut*) moved his court from Beshbaliq to Qaraqojo, apparently for better security.
77. YS 11.1a, 14a; 12.2a, 9a–b, 15b; 14.9b, 10a, 11a; 165.20a.

78. YS 12.11b, 17a.
79. YS 11.14a; 14.10a.
80. YS 11.12b.
81. YS 10.9b; 11.12b.
82. YS 11.11b.
83. YS 10.18b.
84. YS 12.6a.
85. YS 11.3b; 12.17a.
86. YS 10.10b. For Beshbaliq, which lay near the modern town of Urumchi, or Ti-hua 迪化, cf. Pelliot and Hambis, *Histoire des Campagnes de Gengis Khan* (Leiden, 1951), 105, and Cleaves in *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 12 (1949), 104 n. 55. The ruins of Qaraqojo lie about 45 km east of the present-day Turfan; it was a small city, enclosing only about 35 acres within its walls. Remnants of a Chinese style farming village have been found nearby; these may be the remains of one of the military agricultural colonies of the Yüan period. Cf. Aurel Stein, *Innermost Asia* (Oxford, 1928), I, 438 and sketch-plan no. 18 in vol. III. The Yüan ingot (*ting*) was officially equivalent to 50 ounces (*liang* 兩) of silver.
87. For the date of Marco Polo's passage, cf. Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo*, I, 422–423.
88. YS 14.1a.
89. YS 14.18a, 22a.
90. YS 15.9b–10a, 12a.
91. Resistance to Qubilai's moves in Central Asia was not slow in coming. Prince Hoqu, Güyüg's third and youngest son who had his appanage on the Emil, raided and plundered Khotan and Kashghar in 1274 or 1275; the future Nestorian patriarch Mar Yaballaha III, who was passing through at the time, witnessed the destruction (James A. Montgomery, *The History of Yaballaha III* [New York, 1966], pp. 34–36; Pelliot, *Notes*, I, 64–65, 207, 416–417, 423). Hoqu seems to have acted on his own; he is not known to have participated in Qaidu's Talas agreement of 1268 or 1269, which forbade such things. In any event, Nomuqan's forces seized back this loot when Hoqu's warriors returned to their appanage on the Emil. Qaidu denied to one of Qubilai's envoys any responsibility for the event (YS 134.4b–5a). After Hoqu's raid, Qubilai retook Khotan. Hoqu also raided the Ning-hsia area; cf. YS 132.7a; 162.7b. Hoqu's son Tügme (Tükme) later continued the predatory tradition of this princely line.
92. YS 11.7a; 123.4a; 133.10a; 166.7a.
93. YS 166.7a.
94. In 1275, two of Qaidu's allies – the Chaghatai prince Duwa and Busma (Busba), the fifth son of Baraq – besieged Qaraqojo, but withdrew after six months without wrecking the city when the Uighur king surrendered his daughter in token of submission, no doubt along with a generous payment of some sort also (Cleaves in *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 12 [1949], 32, 50 n. 92, 86; Pelliot, *Notes*, I, 127). Even after the Uighur king was forced to evacuate Qaraqojo in 1280 and take up residence in Qomul to the east, the Yüan officials and bureaucrats who took control of the Uighur kingdom continued to bend to this form of pressure (Abe Takeo, pp. 115–119; Cleaves in *Harvard Journal* 12 [1949], 33, 51 n. 96, 87; Liu Mau-tsai in *Central Asiatic Journal* IV [1958], 74). In 1280, Prince Tügme, a son of Hoqu's, plundered Qaraqojo's grain harvest and Qubilai had to cancel tax collections for the next three years (YS 11.5b; Rashid ad-Din, II, 114; Hambis, *Le Chapitre CVII*, tables 35 and 36, opp. p. 84). After 1283, the Uighur court abandoned Qomul and took up residence at Yung-ch'ang 永昌 in the Kansu Corridor. In 1286, Chi Kung-chih engaged Qaidu's army outside Beshbaliq and not only lost the encounter but was captured as well; yet the Yüan did not apparently lose Beshbaliq on that account, or at least not permanently, for new commanderies were set up both there and in Kucha in 1295 (YS 18.11b; 154.14b; 165.20a–b). On this period of Central Asian history, see also Saguchi Tōru 佐口透, "Gendai no Tārimu namben

chitai 元代のターリム南邊地帯” [The south Tarim in the Yüan period], *Kita Ajia gakuho* 北亞細亞學報 no. 2 (1943), 313–349.

95. In 1289, the Khotan commandery was ordered abolished (YS 15.22b–23a). In 1295, an elite Central Asian Guard (Hsi-yü wei 西域衛) was organized (YS 18.17b). Since such elite guards units were all stationed in and around Peking, it may be presumed that the Central Asian Guard were formed of Khotanese and others who withdrew from Central Asia along with the Yüan. Uighur refugees are mentioned in 1296 and 1301; some of them, escaping Central Asia, were ordered to plant military-agricultural colonies in north China (YS 19.3b; 20.15a). By 1305, both Uighur and Qomul refugees were in China apparently in some number, for special legal provisions were made to govern their lawsuits with the Chinese (YS 21.14b).
96. YS 11.12b.
97. YS 12.23b.
98. YS 13.19b.
99. YS 15.10b, 17b, 18a.
100. Cf. the use of these areas in 1260–1; YS 4.9b, 18a, etc.
101. Cf. note 46 above.
102. YS 164.6b.
103. YS 5.19a–b; 148.6a; 164.6b.
104. YS 6.7a; another canal-clearing project was undertaken in this area in 1286, however (YS 14.4a).
105. YS 148.6a.
106. YS 6.7b; 7.11b.
107. YS 6.7a; 11.2b.
108. YS 7.6b; 8.21a.
109. YS 10.15a; 134.13a–b.
110. YS 100.18a–b. Cf. also YS 15.18a; 170.15b.
111. *Innermost Asia*, I, 457.
112. P. K. Kozlov, *Mongoliia i Amdo i mertvyi gorod Khara-Khoto* [Mongolia, Amdo, and the dead city of Qara Qoto] (Moscow, 1948), p. 79.
113. Yule and Cordier, I, 223–225.
114. F. W. Cleaves, “An Early Mongolian Loan Contract from Qara Qoto,” *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 18 (1955), 24.
115. YS 6.12a.
116. YS 13–18b; 14.1b, 18b; 15.6b; 60.26b; 100.19a. Fragments of Yüan Chinese-language official documents unearthed at Etzina include pieces of land tax registers, tax receipts, reports from the canal bureau and penal bureau, and public granary accounts. The chief local crops were wheat, barley, and apparently millet. The local tax rate (3 *sheng* per *mu* 畝, or 3 piculs per *ch'ing*) was the same as that in Kan-chou in the Kansu Corridor. Cf. Henri Maspero, *Les Documents chinois de la troisième expédition de Sir Aurel Stein en Asie Centrale* (London, 1953), pp. 197–231. For the translation of plant names, I follow E. Bretschneider, “Botanicon Sincum,” *Journal of the North China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* XXV (1890–1), pp. 143, 145.
117. Yule and Cordier, I, 284–295.
118. Desmond Martin, “Preliminary Report on Nestorian Remains North of Kuei-hua, Suiyüan,” *Monumenta Serica* III (1937–8), 232–249; Egami Namio, “Olon-sume et la découverte de l'église catholique romaine de Jean de Montecorvino,” *Journal Asiatique* CCXL (1952), 155–167.
119. YS 58.9b.
120. YS 26.5b–27.16a, *passim*.
121. YS 6.11b.
122. Cf. H. Serruys, “Chinese in Southern Mongolia during the Sixteenth Century,” *Monumenta Serica* XVIII (1959), 13 n. 38 and map opp. p. 80.

123. Wang Yün 王惲, *Ch'iu-chien hsien-sheng ta-ch'üan-chi* 秋澗先生大全集 (Ssu-pu ts'ung-k'an ed.), 90.17a–b; YS 167.19a–22a.
124. Chang Yü 張郁, “Yüan-tai Chi-ning-lu i-chih ch'ing-li-chi 元代集寧路遺地清理記” [Report on the ruins of the Yüan district of Chi-ning], *Wen-wu* 文物 no. 9 (1961), 52–57.
125. YS 58.8a.
126. YS 58.6a. Taxpaying households averaged 4.4 members in Hsing-ho and only 2.8 in Shang-tu; if the given figures are correct, there would appear to have been a high rate of tax evasion in Shang-tu.
127. Cf. Cleaves in *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 14 (1951), 16; Serruys, op. cit., p. 4 no. 6. For a brief archeological report on Ying-ch'ang, see Harada Yoshito, ed., *Shangtu. The Summer Capital of the Yüan Dynasty in Dolon Nor, Mongolia* (in Japanese) (Tokyo, 1941), pp. 4–5. Ying-ch'ang's earth walls enclosed an area of about 123 acres.
128. YS 7.5a; 10.21b.
129. YS 15.5b–6a. There is one Yüan frontier district—Te-ning 德寧—that cannot as yet be precisely located, yet if one notes that from Ching-chou east to Ying-ch'ang all of the frontier towns that were also administrative seats were spaced at intervals ranging from 70 to 100 miles, with the exception of the 120-mile interval between Hsing-ho and Shang-tu, then perhaps Te-ning is to be looked for somewhere between those two localities. However, Wu T'ing-hsieh 吳廷燮, “Yüan Te-ning teng ch'i lu i fu k'ao” 元德寧等七路一府考 [The seven *lu* and one *fu* including Te-ning under the Yüan] *Hsüeh hai* 學海 I (December, 1944), 41–43 argues on textual evidence that Tening must have been located in the Onggud area north of the Yellow River bend.
130. It was from time to time prohibited for nomads to bring their herds south of the Great Wall where they damaged crops; cf. YS 9.20b.
131. Rashid ad-Din, II, 164; YS 4.16a.
132. YS 6.18a.
133. The relevant *Yüan shih* passages on this have been translated by F. W. Cleaves, “Qabqanas ~ Qamqanas,” *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 19 (1956), 402–3.
134. YS 7.17b.
135. Kiselev, *Drevnemongol'skie goroda*, pp. 113–117.
136. YS 7.5a; 10.21b; 120.10a; 128.15a; 132.2a, 5a; 135.10b–11a; 165.15a.
137. YS 10.3b; 162.7b, 12a. Cf. the corrections on Li T'ing's 李庭 biography in T'u Chi 屠奇, *Meng-wu-erh shih-chi* 蒙兀兒史記 [History of the Mongols] (Taipei, 1962), 99.9a–b. For Liu Kuo-chieh 劉國傑, another of the participating Chinese commanders, the best source is the epitaph in Huang Chin 黃潛, *Chin-hua Huang hsien-sheng wenchi* 金華黃先生文集 (Ssu-pu ts'ung-k'an ed.), 25.11b–12a.
138. The information in Huang Chin, 25.12a is largely confirmed by Rashid ad-Din, II, 169–171.
139. YS 121.19a. Cf. also YS 128.18a and Su T'ien-chüeh 蘇天爵, ed., *Yüan-ch'ao ming-ch'en shih-lüeh* 元朝名臣事略 [Biographies of eminent Yüan officials] (Peking, 1962), 3.9a for biographies of Tughtugha, one of the main participants in these events. Arigh Böke's son Melig Temür surrendered to the Yüan in 1292; cf. Cleaves in *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 19 (1956), 267–268.
140. On Nayan, cf. Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo*, II, 788–9. E. P. J. Mullie, *De Mongoolse prins Nayan* (reviewed in *Asia Major* XII [1966], pp. 130–1) is unavailable to me.
141. YS 15.21a; 128–17b–18a; 132.5b; 169.9a–b.
142. For relief measures implemented in 1281–83, cf. YS 11.13a, 15b–16a; 12.8a, 11b, 15a. The Yenisei area is last mentioned in an institutional connection in 1291, when six post stations were set up to connect the Kirgiz and the Oirad; cf. YS 16.22a and Cleaves in *Harvard Journal* 19 (1956), 404.
143. Cf. Kyzlasov, *Istoriia Tuvy*, pp. 135–138.
144. On this, cf. Wada Sei 和田清, “Gendai Mōko no hōkin ni tsuite 元代蒙古の封禁について” [Official secrecy over Mongolia in the Yüan Dynasty], *Shichō* 史潮 VI (1936–7), 165–178.

145. Wang Yün, *Ch'iu-chien* . . ., 100.7a.
146. Wang Kuo-wei, ed. *Meng-ku shih-liao ssu-chung*, pp. 283–286.
147. Juvaini, I, 213.
148. *Ibid.*, 213, 226–7, 236.
149. Wang Yün, 100.7b.
150. In 1272 a unit called the *badu* (*batu*) army 拔都軍 was ordered to the Ch'ieh-lu-nan 怯難鹿 (Kerülen ?) area to open canals and plow fields (YS 7.17a; T'u Chi 屠寄, 7.24a thinks Ch'ieh-lu-nan an aberrant rendering of K'o-lu-lien 客魯漣/Kerülen). In 1279, a *batu* army 拔突軍, possibly the same one, was issued oxen and tools (YS 10.17a). In 1288, the Ch'ieh-lieh river 怯烈河 was dredged so as to irrigate commoners' fields by K'ou-wen nao-erh 口溫腦兒 and Huang-t'u-shan 黃土山 (YS 15.6a). Although Ch'ieh-lieh is the usual Chinese transcription of the tribal name Kereid, T'u Chi (8.26b) thinks it a garbled version of Kerülen, and K'ou-wen nao-erh he identifies with the Gün-na'ur ("Deep Lake") southwest of the Kerülen bend. Pelliot, however, doubts whether Chinese "k'ou-wen" can phonetically deliver a Mongol *gün*, and does not try to locate the lake (*Notes on Marco Polo*, I, 325). Huang-t'u-shan (lit. "Yellow Earth Mountain") appears unidentifiable. Whatever its location, 2,000 troops were sent to dig more canals at that same lake in 1289, and in 1297 plow oxen were issued to the farming households of K'ou-wen (YS 15.20a; 19.9b).
151. YS 100.13b.
152. YS 19.2a, 11b.
153. YS 13.6b.
154. YS 100.13b. That the figures are for Chingqai and Wu-t'iao-ho may be seen from the parallel text of the *Ching-shih ta-tien* 經世大典 in Su T'ien-chüeh, ed., *Yüan wen-lei* 元文類 [Classified Literary Pieces of the Yüan Dynasty] (Taipei, 1967), 41.68b.
155. YS 166.8a.
156. YS 58.39a.
157. YS 19.11b; 23.2a.
158. YS 21.5b–6a.
159. YS 21.11a–b. Hsing-ho is here given its alternate name of Lung-hsing 隆興.
160. YS 7.17a; 12.23b. In 1281 the government invested 10,000 ingots, probably with Moslem *ortaq* merchants, in Qaraqorum commerce (YS 11.18b).
161. YS 15.5b–6a.
162. YS 16.10b.
163. YS 20.14a, 20a–b.
164. YS 21.9b.
165. YS 20.11b, 21a; 21.16a.
166. YS 21.8b.
167. YS 19.9b.
168. YS 19.12b.
169. YS 19.19a.
170. On the breakup of the Central Asian princely coalition, see, generally, Grousset, pp. 407–411.
171. Harghasun's YS biography is badly written at this point (YS 137.4b–5a). Much better is the epitaph included in *Yüan-ch'ao ming-ch'en shih-lüeh*, 4.6a. For the name Harghasun, cf. Cleaves in *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 24 (1962–3), p. 75 n. 80.
172. *Yüan-ch'ao* . . ., 4.6a.
173. YS 119.25a. For the name *Yochichar, cf. Cleaves in *Harvard Journal* 15 (1952), 26.
174. *Yüan ch'ao* . . ., 4.6a.
175. John Masson Smith, Jr., "Mongol and Nomadic Taxation," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 30 (1970), 65–67, 79–82.
176. YS 135.11b, 15a.
177. YS 117.4b–5a.

178. Cleaves, "The Biography of Bayan of the Bārin in the *Yüan Shih*," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 19 (1956), 268–9, 283.
179. All this is made explicit in a memorial of a minor Chinese official in the Qaraqorum Pacification Office; cf. Su T'ien-chüeh 蘇天爵, *Tzu-ch'i wen-kao* 滋給文稿 (Tientsin, 1931), 11.8b–10b (epitaph for Kuo Ming-te 郭明德).
180. Also Kirgiz; cf. YS 15.22a, 19.19b, etc.
181. On this, see S. Jagchid and C. R. Bawden, "Some Notes on the Horse-policy of the Yüan Dynasty," *Central Asiatic Journal* X (1965), 246–268.
182. Huang Chin, *Chin-hua Huang hsien-sheng wen-chi* (Ssu-pu ts'ung-k'an ed.), 24.19a–b. This information derives from Huang's epitaph for the Qarluq Dashman, wherein Dashman's son Mainu's tour of Mongolia as a censor ca. 1315 is given a detailed report.
183. YS 45.21a; 46.3a–b; 206.7a–8a.
184. The former Tangut empire became Kansu province in 1286, with its provincial capital at Kan-chou in the Corridor. Temporary provincial governments had been established at Ning-hsia at various times between 1261 and 1285 (YS 91.3a).
185. The usual *terminus post quem* for the full Yüan loss of Central Asia is 1327 or 1328; cf. T'u Chi, 36.10a; Liu Mau-tsai in *Central Asiatic Journal* IV (1958), 74. This date is based upon the date of the compilation of the *Ching-shih ta-tien* map, which shows all of Central Asia west of the Corridor under Chaghatai control.
186. Juvaini's anecdotes about that paragon of generosity, the *qaghan* Ögödei, well exemplify this. Ögödei liberally gave away wealth to any seeker or adventurer from a sedentary area who presented himself at his court in Qaraqorum, with the express idea that whatever he distributed to common people in this way he would eventually retrieve in the form of taxation. Cf. Juvaini, I, 201 ff.
187. In 1285, the Beshbaliq Protectorate received permission to issue 2 oxen and 2 piculs of seed to each household in Qaraqojo owing to famine there, and in addition it spent 116,400 ingots for the purchase of 60,400 piculs of grain, enough to provide outright food relief for four months (YS 13.22a). In 1286, 2,000 bolts of cloth were given the people of Qomul, and 16,200 ingots to the people of both Qomul and Qaraqojo for the purchase of more oxen and seed (YS 14.9b). In 1287, the Yüan government distributed 10,000 ingots cash and 10,000 bolts of cloth to relieve famine and poverty in Khotan (YS 14.12b–13a). In 1288, an unspecified amount of colony grain was issued in relief to Qomul, and in 1289 more grain (1,000 piculs) was shipped to Qomul from the Kansu Corridor (YS 15.12b, 16b). The *Yüan shih* states that the year 1287 was a famine year in Central Asia generally (YS 14.12b–13a).
188. The state-managed economy tended to be artificial, as crops were required for delivery to the state, not for sale on the market; moreover the state worked its plantations with labor that was involuntary and non-indigenous. Central Asia and the Tangut area had a developed commerce; the Yüan state even invested in it (cf. YS 13.3b).
189. YS 10.6a; 11.14a.
190. In the Ning-hsia region, the government found itself in competition with locally powerful native grandees and Buddhist temples for control of land and people (YS 6.7a; 7.6a; 8.7a; 12.10a; 17.12b). Wang Yün once impeached a Tangut official and local agricultural officer for his lax attitude toward the Buddhist establishment (*Ch'ü-chien* . . . , 86.9b). The state attempted by edict to stop the large-scale raising of commercially profitable crops, notably safflower (used as a dye and food additive) in place of the desired wheat. That the *hung-hua* 红花 of YS 17.12b is probably to be identified as safflower, cf. Berthold Laufer, *Sino-Iranica* (Chicago, 1919), pp. 309, 312.

THE HISTORY OF MONGOLIA

VOLUME II

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Yuan and Late Medieval Period

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GLOBAL
ORIENTAL

THE HISTORY OF MONGOLIA

Edited by David Sneath and Christopher Kaplonski

First published 2010 by
GLOBAL ORIENTAL LTD
PO Box 219
Folkestone
Kent CT20 2WP
UK

www.globaloriental.co.uk

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ISBN 978-1-905246-36-6 [3-volume set]

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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A CIP catalogue entry for this book is available from the British Library

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PART 3



YUAN AND LATE MEDIEVAL PERIOD

INTRODUCTION

David Sneath



The huge Yuan empire founded by Qubilai included China, Tibet and Manchuria, stretching north across Mongolia to the borders of Siberia. Having assembled this vast domain, Qubilai spent the latter part of his reign trying to consolidate it. There was a revolt in Manchuria in 1287, led by a Chinggisid prince named Nayan who may have been a Nestorian Christian, but Qubilai quickly crushed it. A more enduring threat to the Yuan's north-western territories was presented by Ögedei's son, Qaidu, based in Turkestan. But by 1310 the last powerful Ögedeid ruler, Chabar, had surrendered to the Yuan, and the frontiers of the vast realm, including the regions later known as Inner and Outer Mongolia, became relatively secure.

Qubilai inherited Mongol imperial institutions such as the *kesbig* imperial guard, large princely appanages, and the *ordu* (*ordo*) palace establishments of living and dead rulers and their wives. But he also made use of Jin administrative institutions to rule in China, and developed them. The imperial court itself was at the centre of government, with numerous departments and enormous resources. Civil administration was the responsibility of the Central Secretariat (*zhongshusheng*), control of the regular military was exercised by the Bureau of Military affairs, while the Censorate (*yushitai*) undertook the surveillance and supervision of official conduct. The population of the empire was divided into four categories, listed in order of eligibility for official positions: first Mongols, second *semuren* (literally 'people of various categories', but in effect non-Chinese from West and Central Asia), third *hanren* (northern Chinese), and lastly *nanren* (southern Chinese).

Despite its sophisticated bureaucracy, the Yuan state was not particularly centralized. The Mongol nobility held huge estates, and the Yuan emperors were only gradually able to increase the power of the central administration at the expense of the many princely appanages. The central state bureaucracy also struggled, with variable success, to limit the powers and profits of the *ortoq* partner merchants. But the central administration did issue paper money, which had been used by both the Song and the Jin, and tried to keep control of fiscal policy.

Qubilai took on the role of cultural patron, sponsoring painting, literature, astronomy and the arts, in particular the theatre. He directed the Phags-pa Lama to develop a new script, one that would be more suitable for all the many languages of his empire. The result was the Phags-pa or 'square' script, but it never really became widely used, despite imperial edicts to enforce its use (Rossabi 1988: 158). Qubilai's alliance

with Tibetan Buddhism was not to the exclusion of other religions. Many of the most senior positions were given to Muslims, such as the finance minister Ahmad who was assassinated in 1281 amid allegations of corruption, and Christians (such as the Venetian Polo brothers) also held positions of trust. Qubilai and other members of the Yuan court also made a point of showing their appreciation of Confucianism and the values of the Chinese scholarly elite.

Immortalized in Europe by Marco Polo's account of him, Qubilai died in 1294 and was succeeded by his grandson, Temür, who ruled 1294–1307. Temür concentrated on further consolidation of the Yuan within its existing borders, rather than military expansion. He was succeeded by his nephew Haishan, whose short reign (1307–11) saw a failed attempt at fiscal reform and a growing financial crisis for the Yuan court. When Haishan died the throne passed to his brother, Ayurbarwada, who reintroduced the Confucian examination system for the selection of officials, but with quotas whereby an equal number of official posts went to each of the four categories of subjects – Mongols, *semuren*, northern and southern Chinese (Atwood 2004: 608). When Ayurbarwada died in 1320 he was succeeded by his son Shidebala, but three years later the new emperor was assassinated and Yisün-Temür, a great-grandson of Qubilai, was placed on the throne. The bitter rivalries within the imperial house emerged again when Yisün-Temür died just five years later in 1328. A faction of the court, led by the Qipchaq El-Temür, seized power and placed Haishan's exiled son Qoshila on the throne. But barely a year later Qoshila was assassinated and his brother, Tuq-Temür, became emperor in his place. When he died, three years later, the Yuan throne passed to Qoshila's thirteen-year-old son Togan Temür in 1333.

The young emperor and his advisers faced a series of crises that were eventually to lead to the loss of virtually all the Yuan's Chinese dominions. Mongol rule had never enjoyed much support in the south, and there had been some minor rebellions. Plague, drought, flood and famine affected central parts of China and the dynasty also faced a financial crisis precipitated by a huge public works scheme to repair the Grand Canal used to transport grain to the capital. Piracy and banditry became increasingly troublesome and around 1351 a large-scale rebellion appeared in the Huai river region, led by the 'Red Turban Army' inspired by a mystic Buddhist sect. The revolt was put down by Togan Temür's chief minister, Toqto'a, who raised loyalist Chinese armies to defeat the Red Turbans. But the rebels began to gain support in other regions and the result was an increasingly militarized population and expanding areas of unrest. When Toqto'a's rivals in court managed to have him dismissed from office in 1355 the situation became yet more chaotic as commanders of some local armies became effectively independent and a number of rebel factions formed. The most successful of these were those of a former monk and bandit leader named Zhu Yuanzhang who eventually eliminated his rivals and took control of southern China. Far from being unified by the threat from the south, the powerful Yuan generals Bolad-Temür and Köke-Temür clashed for control of northern China. In 1368, Zhu Yuanzhang proclaimed himself emperor of the newly founded Ming. His armies marched north, defeating the divided Mongol forces, and captured Dadu. The Yuan court had to withdraw into its northern, Mongolian, territories, where it continued to rule. However, some of the Mongolian armies stranded in China defected to the Ming and became a significant element in the dynasty's military establishment.

In 1370, Togan Temür died and in Qaraqorum his son Ayushiridara succeeded to the throne of the Yuan (often now termed the Northern Yuan to differentiate it from the era

when the dynasty ruled China). Ming armies marched north in 1372 but their main thrust was turned back by the Mongols near the Tuul river. Ayushiridara died in 1378 and was succeeded by his son Toghus Temür, but the Ming became increasingly militarily successful, capturing Yunnan from the Yuan in 1382 and defeating Toghus Temür's army in eastern Mongolia in 1388. Toghus Temür was assassinated soon after his defeat and what was left of the Yuan empire was riven by rival claimants. The throne passed from one incumbent to the next every few years, with seven emperors ruling during the thirty-seven years from 1389 to 1426. The Ming attacked from time to time and, although they were not able to eliminate the Yuan, they were able to occasionally force them into damaging retreats.

During this time the power of the Oirat rulers in the western part of the Mongolian steppe was growing. The Oirats had sworn fealty to Chinggis Khan shortly after his rise to power. Their nobility had been appointed to senior positions in the empire and diplomatic marriages between the Oirat aristocracy and the Chinggisid imperial house had continued since that time. At the end of the fourteenth century Oirat rulers began to challenge the power of the fractious Chinggisid emperors of the northern Yuan. They came to play the role of king makers, installing compliant emperors and taking the title *taishi* (grand preceptor). With the Ming still doggedly hostile to the northern Yuan, the Oirats became increasingly powerful. The Oirat ruler, Esen, who had succeeded his father as *taishi*, attacked the Ming, subjugating parts of Manchuria and the Hami region in Turkestan. He invaded northern China and captured the Ming emperor. When attacked in 1452 by his nominal overlord, the emperor Togoo-Bukha, Esen defeated him and took the title of Great Khan of the Yuan for himself. But Esen's reign as Yuan emperor was short, one of his generals turned against him in 1454 and he was killed as he fled. The Yuan throne was recaptured by the house of Qubilai once more, and the Chinggisids had some success against the Ming in the Ordos. The Oirat descendants of Esen remained powerful in the west, and Oirats continued to hold the powerful position of *taishi*, but around 1480 a vigorous new ruler appeared to unite the Chinggisid noble houses.

Mandukhai Khatun was the younger wife of the Yuan emperor Manduul Khan. When the northern Yuan emperor Manduul Khan died in 1479 his grandnephew and potential heir, Bayan-Möngke Bolkhu, was killed around the same time, so there was no clear successor to the throne. The Oirat *taishi*, Ismayil, married Bayan-Möngke Bolkhu's widow and seemed set to rule as regent. But at this point Bolkhu's only son, Batu-Möngke, was kidnapped and brought to Manduul Khan's widow, Mandukhai. The thirty-three-year-old queen promptly married the seven-year-old Batu-Möngke and had him crowned the Dayan Khan, emperor of the Yuan. This was a bold step, since she was under pressure to marry the powerful Khorchin lord Bolad, a descendant of Chinggis Khan's brother Qasar. Mandukhai, ruling in effect as the young Khan's regent, rallied the Chinggisid nobles to confront the Oirats and defeated them in battle. His throne strengthened in this way by his extraordinary wife-regent, Batu-Möngke Dayan Khan grew up to become the most powerful Chinggisid ruler in more than a century. He did away with the institution of the *taishi*, centralizing power in his hands, unifying the Borjigin Mongol dominions and launching a number of large-scale military campaigns to press back the Ming. He divided his empire along familiar lines, with a left (eastern) wing, and a right (western) one, facing south. Each wing had three *tümen* units of a nominal ten thousand; in the west, the *tümen* of Ordos, Tümed and Yüng-shiyebü (including the units of Kharachin and Asud), and in the east the Khorchin,

Khalkha and the Chakhar – the last being the personal appanage of the northern Yuan emperor. Although the Mongol nobles had referred to themselves rhetorically as the ‘Forty Tümen’ since this was supposed to have been the strength of the old Yuan, in fact it was these Six Tümen that now represented the Borjigin-ruled Mongol domain, as opposed to the Four Tümen of the Oirats.

After his death, Batu-Möngke’s empire was effectively divided between Batu-Möngke’s many sons who had been assigned various domains. These tended to become more or less independent principalities and their rulers began to adopt the title of khan. One of Batu-Möngke’s sons had been placed as viceroy (*jinong*) of the western wing of the empire, and his son Altan (1508–82), inherited the rule of the *tümen* of Tümed, in what is today Inner Mongolia. From around 1524, Altan began to wage a series of successful military campaigns against Ming China, forcing them to open border markets for the Mongols on favourable terms. Altan’s importance rivalled that of his nominal overlord Bodi Alagh, the northern Yuan emperor, and he came to rule, in effect, the enlarged western wing of the empire. By about 1550 both he and his brother Baiskhal, who ruled the Kharachin, had become so powerful that the Bodi Alagh’s successor, Daraisun Khan was forced to grant them each the title of khan (Atwood 2004: 10). Altan Khan attracted Chinese to his realm, including members of the Buddhist White Lotus sect who faced persecution in Ming China, and encouraged their settlements in his Tümed territory. In 1572, he began the construction of a capital, Kökeqota (Hohhot) ‘blue town’, which is today the capital of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region (Charleux 2006: 193).

Altan is perhaps most famous for his sponsorship of Gelugpa Buddhism. He built two great monasteries and in 1578 Altan invited the head of the rising Tibetan Gelugpa ‘yellow’ sect, bSod-nams rGya-mtsho, to give him and his entourage religious instruction. At this meeting he conferred the title Dalai Lama (‘Oceanic Lama’) on bSod-nams rGya-mtsho, first naming the office that was to become so important in Tibet. In return he was proclaimed as a *cakravartin*, a universal Buddhist monarch, and a reincarnation of Qubilai Khan. Other Mongol monarchs, such as Abatai Khan who ruled much of central Mongolia, followed Altan Khan’s example and sponsored Gelugpa Buddhism. Abatai (1554–88) was ruler of one of the three eastern *tümen*, the Khalkha, who waged successful wars against the Oirats, driving them back west and extending his realm over much of what is today central Mongolia. Like Altan, he sought legitimacy in piety and in 1585 he began building the Buddhist monastery of Erdeni Zuu at the site of the old Mongol imperial capital of Qaraqorum. This period became one of royal patronage of Tibetan Buddhism, Gelugpa missionary zeal, and the widespread suppression of the older shamanic practices and associated objects such as the *ongghon* (*ongon*) idols. Monastic Buddhism was to have a profound impact on the written history of the region, as texts became more common and reflected Buddhist ideology.

By the time the last of the northern Yuan emperors, Ligdan Khan, succeeded to the throne in 1604, he was in effect only the ruler of his own appanage of Chakhar, with no more than nominal authority over the other Borjigid rulers. Ligdan (1588–1634) set about re-establishing imperial power in much the same way as Altan Khan had promoted his position. He campaigned against China and by 1620 had won an annual subsidy from the Ming. He formed an alliance with another Tibetan Buddhist order, the Sakya-pa (‘red sect’) of the Phags-pa lama once favoured by Qubilai. Temples were built and a capital established (Chaghan-Khota, ‘white town’) in eastern Inner Mongolia.

However, Ligdan faced the growing power of the Jurchen state based in what soon became Manchuria.

After the retreat of the Yuan, the Jurchen rulers had sworn fealty to the victorious Ming. But by the late sixteenth century they were effectively independent and in 1616 the overlord of the Jurchen nobility, Nurhaci, proclaimed himself khan (*han*) and revived the old name of the Jin dynasty (Di Cosmo 2006: 259). Ligdan seems to have become increasingly unpopular among the Borjigin aristocracy, whereas the Jurchen ruler had already had some success at winning over Mongol nobles; some Khorchin and Khalkha lords had formed alliances with him before he took the title of khan. In 1624, the Khorchin nobles split with Ligdan and allied themselves with Nurhaci. Ligdan attacked the Khorchin but was repelled with Jurchen support (Atwood 2004: 334). More Mongol nobles turned against Ligdan, who was defeated militarily in 1632 by Nurhaci's son and heir Hong Taiji, and the last Yuan emperor died in exile in 1634. By 1636, when Hong Taiji proclaimed himself emperor and changed the dynastic name from Jin to Qing, his vassals included most of the rulers of what became Inner Mongolia, some of whom were related to him by his marriage to three Khorchin princesses and two of Ligdan's former queens. As part of his policy to distinguish the new dynasty from the old Jin, Hong Taiji changed the name of his people from Jurchen to Manchu. He extended his control into China and in 1644 the Ming dynasty finally collapsed before the armies of the victorious Qing.

In the north, Abatai's Khalkha territories had come to be divided between three dynasties. In the west were the Zasagtu (Jasagtu 'ruling') Khans, descendants of Abatai himself. In the centre ruled the Tüshiyetu ('supporting') Khans, descendants of Laikhur – another prince of Khalkha who had assisted Abatai (Autai) in his campaigns against the Oirats and had also received the title of khan. In the east were the Setsen Khans, descendants of Sholoi Khan who also declared himself a khan. Buddhist authority became increasingly important for these rulers. In 1639, one of the Tüshiyetu Khan's sons, Zanabazar, was discovered to be a reincarnation of a senior incarnate lama and given the title of Jibzundamba (Jebdzundamba) Khutugtu, whose subsequent seven reincarnations (most of whom were found in Tibet) headed the Buddhist religion in Outer Mongolia until the twentieth century. Zanabazar is credited with many early Mongolian Buddhist sculptures and elements of monastic design.

However, the rise of the Jibzundamba Khutugtu attracted the disapproval of Galdan Boshogtu Khan in the west. Galdan was the son of Baatar Khung-Taiji, ruler of the Zünghar ('left wing') of the Oirats. He had received a Buddhist education in Tibet and, with the support of the Dalai Lama, returned to become ruler of the Zünghar and later to be proclaimed khan of the Oirats by the Dalai Lama. Galdan extended his control over much of Turkestan, so that this region came to be known as the realm of the Zünghar – 'Dzungaria'. Galdan was drawn into Mongol politics when the Tüshiyetu Khan Chakhundorji, brother of the Jibzundamba Khutugtu, failed to honour an agreement in a dispute with the Zasagtu Khan Shara, and Galdan took the Zasagtu Khan's side in the quarrel. Chakhundorji made a surprise attack on his rival and killed both Shara and Galdan's brother. In revenge Galdan invaded with an army of 30,000, defeating the Tüshiyetu khan in 1688 and occupying much of Khalkha (Atwood 2004: 193). In the face of this disaster the Khalkha nobles, led by the Jibzundamba Khutugtu, turned to the Manchu, swearing fealty to the Kangxi emperor in 1691, and opening a new chapter of the history of Mongolia as part of the Qing empire.

THE TEXTS

This section opens with Marco Polo's classic description of Qubilai (Kubilai) Khan. Although written up with the help of the romance writer Rustichello da Pisa, Polo's narrative is nevertheless an eyewitness account of the khan by someone who knew his administration well. Most historians agree that the numbers Polo quotes are often exaggerated – in his account of Qubilai's battle with Nayan, for example, he gives the size of the rebel army at 400,000, whereas it was more probably around 60,000 (Atwood 2004: 401). He is more accurate on other matters, though, his estimate of the size of the capital Dadu's wall is not far off that suggested by archaeological evidence (Rossabi 1988: 132). There are many details of Polo's narrative that we have no reason to doubt, and his account is wonderfully evocative of the grandeur of Qubilai's court and his style of government.

The second chapter is a scholarly assessment of the latter part of Qubilai's reign, from Morris Rossabi's masterful biography. This work contextualizes much of what is described by Polo in the previous chapter, such as the career and assassination of the finance minister Ahmad. This chapter also introduces some of the themes that would later prove so troublesome for Qubilai's successors, such as the public works on the Grand Canal, unpopular fiscal policies, and uneasy relations with the elites of the former Song territories.

The fine detail of Yuan administrative structure is examined in depth by David Farquhar in the next paper. He shows that rather than a tightly centralized bureaucracy, Yuan government was relatively indirect, beyond the royal domain itself, concerned with exercising control over the separate vassal states that surrounded the nuclear state of the emperor himself. The image of the Yuan as a highly centralized 'oriental despotism' is further dispelled by the next chapter, by Elizabeth Endicott-West, who carefully examines distinctive features of Mongol government, including the *quriltai* assemblies at which khans were proclaimed, and traces their links to earlier steppe traditions of state.

The next chapter is made up of three excerpts, one translated from Gongor's classic work *Khalkh Tovchoon* (*The History Khalkha*), and two from the recently published *Mongol Ulsyn Tüükh* (*History of Mongolia*) edited by A. Ochir et al. The first excerpt, by L. Jamsran, describes the growing hegemony of the Oirat 'Grand Preceptors' (*taishi*) and the era of Esen Khan; the second part, by D. Gongor, deals with the situation in Khalkha around the time of the reign of Batu-Möngke Dayan Khan; and the third section written by Sh. Natsagdorj and A. Ochir describes the Six Tümen of the Mongol Borjigid in the time of Altan Khan, and their rivals the Four Oirat in the west. Written from the perspective of Mongolian national history, these concise overviews provide overlapping accounts of the political and military manoeuvrings between the Mongol and Oirat nobility, and of their relentless rivalry with Ming China.

The next passage is an extract from Johan Elverskog's superb translation of the *Jewel Translucent Sutra* the Mongolian history of Altan Khan and his descendants. Here we include the part of the text in which Altan Khan meets the Dalai Lama, which gives a sense of the pageantry of the Khan's court, the dignity of the great lords of his entourage, and the rich conceptual vocabulary of Buddhist thought that became increasingly important elements of Mongolian elite culture from this period. The alliance between Altan Khan and the Dalai Lama is put into its wider context by Henry Serruys in the following paper. Serruys argues that rather than sponsoring the 'reintroduction' of

Buddhism to Mongolia, Altan Khan should be seen as promoting and extending a faith that had not died out in the region since the times of Qubilai. This is followed by an edited extract from Walther Heissig's painstaking study of Buddhist missionary activity, based on the translation of a biography of a missionary monk named Neyichi Toyin. Heissig also provides a fascinating insight into the 'shamanic' belief systems and practices vilified by the lamas and the ways in which they sought to suppress them.

In the final chapter of Volume II, Christopher Atwood provides a retrospective comparison between the political systems of the Chinggisid empire and the Oirat Zünghar principality. This not only reveals the continuities and common elements of a distinctive steppe tradition of statecraft, but also demonstrates the important differences between these political systems and the historical processes at work in each. In doing so, Atwood critiques the dominant vision of steppe societies as essentially uniform; societies whose political formations, severely limited by the imagined constraints of 'nomadism', are all variations on a single theme (Toynbee 1946: 193). Instead we can recognize systems of governance as complex and varied as those described for the 'sedentary' neighbours of Mongolia.

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THE TRAVELS OF MARCO POLO

Translated by
Ronald Latham



CHAPTER THREE

KUBILAI KHAN

I have come to the point in our book at which I will tell you of the great achievements of the Great Khan now reigning. The title Khan means in our language ‘Great Lord of Lords’. And certainly he has every right to this title; for everyone should know that this Great Khan is the mightiest man, whether in respect of subjects of territory or of treasure, who is in the world today or who ever has been, from Adam our first parent down to the present moment. And I will make it quite clear to you in our book that this is the plain truth, so that everyone will be convinced that he is indeed the greatest lord the world has ever known. Here, then, is my proof.

First, you should know that he is undoubtedly descended in the direct imperial line from Chinghiz Khan; for only one of that lineage may be Lord of all the Tartars. He is sixth in succession of the Great Khans of all the Tartars, having received the lordship and begun his reign in the year of Christ’s nativity 1256. He won the lordship by his own valour and prowess and good sense; his kinsfolk and brothers tried to debar him from it, but by his great prowess he won it. And you must know that it was properly his by right. From the beginning of his reign down to the present year 1298 is a period of forty-two years. His age today may well be as much as eighty-five years. Before he became Khan, he used to go out regularly on military expeditions and he showed himself a valiant soldier and a good commander.¹ But thereafter he went out only once; that was in 1286, and I will tell you how it came about.

The fact is that a certain man named Nayan, who was Kubilai’s uncle, found himself while still a youth the lord and ruler of many lands and provinces, so that he could easily raise a force of 400,000 horsemen. Like his ancestors before him, he was subject to the Great Khan. But, seeing that he was a young man of thirty with so many men at his command, he resolved that he would be subject no longer but to the best of his ability would despoil his overlord of the suzerainty. This Nayan, then, sent envoys to Kaidu, who was a great and powerful lord and nephew to the Great Khan, but had rebelled against him and was his bitter enemy. He proposed that Kaidu should attack the Great Khan from one quarter while he himself advanced against him from the opposite one, so as to despoil him of land and lordship. Kaidu welcomed the proposal and promised

to have his forces fully arrayed by the date fixed and to march against the Great Khan. And this he was well able to do; for he could put 100,000 horsemen in the field. What need of more words? These two barons, Nayan and Kaidu, made their preparations and mustered a great array of horse and foot to attack the Great Khan.

When the Great Khan got word of this plot, he was not unduly perturbed; but like a wise man of approved valour he began to marshal his own forces, declaring that he would never wear his crown or hold his land if he did not bring these two false traitors to an evil end. He completed his preparations in twenty-two days, so secretly that no one knew anything about them except those of his own Council. He had assembled 260,000 cavalry and 100,000 infantry. The reason why he confined himself to this number was that these were drawn from the troops in his own immediate neighbourhood. His other armies, which were twelve in all and totalled an immense number of men, were so far away on campaigns of conquest in many parts that he could not have got them together at the right time and place. If he had assembled all his forces, he would have had as many horsemen as he could possibly desire and their numbers would have been past all reckoning or belief. The 360,000 men whom he actually levied were his falconers and other members of his personal bodyguard.²

If he had summoned the armies which he keeps continually on guard over the provinces of Cathay, this would inevitably have consumed thirty or forty days. Moreover, the levy would have become common knowledge and Kaidu and Nayan would have joined forces and occupied strong and advantageous positions. But Kubilai intended by means of speed, the companion of victory, to forestall Nayan's preparations and catch him alone, because he could more easily defeat him alone than in conjunction with his ally.

This is a convenient place to record a few facts about the armies of the Great Khan. You should know that in all the provinces of Cathay and Manzi and in all the rest of his dominions there are many disaffected and disloyal subjects who, if they had the chance, would rebel against their lord. Accordingly, in every province where there are big cities and a large population he is obliged to maintain armies. These are stationed in the open country four or five miles from the cities, which are not allowed to have gates or walls so as to bar the ingress of anyone who chooses to enter. These armies the Great Khan changes every two years, and so likewise the captains who command them. And with this bridle to restrain them the people stay quiet, and cannot cause any disturbance or insurrection. Besides the pay which the Great Khan gives them regularly from the revenues of the provinces, these armies live on the immense herds of cattle that are assigned to them and on the milk which they send into the towns to sell in return for necessary provisions. They are stationed at various points, thirty, forty, or sixty days' journey apart.

When the Great Khan had mustered the mere handful of men of which I have spoken, he consulted his astrologers to learn whether he would defeat his enemies and bring his affairs to a happy issue.³ They assured him that he would deal with his enemies as he pleased. Thereupon he set out with all his forces and went on until after twenty days they came to a great plain where Nayan lay with all his forces, who were not less than 400,000 horsemen. They arrived early in the morning and caught the enemy completely unawares; the Great Khan had had all the roads so carefully watched that no one could come or go without being intercepted, and had thus ensured that the enemy had no suspicion of their approach. Indeed, when they arrived Nayan was in his tent, dallying in bed with his wife, to whom he was greatly attached.

What more shall I say? When the day of battle dawned, the Great Khan suddenly appeared on a mound that rose from the plain where Nayan's forces were bivouacked. They were quite at their ease, like men who had not the faintest suspicion that anyone was approaching with hostile intent. Indeed they felt so secure that they had posted no sentries round their camp and sent out no patrols to van or rear. And suddenly there was the Great Khan on the hill I have mentioned. He stood on the top of a wooden tower, full of crossbowmen and archers, which was carried by four elephants wearing stout leather armour draped with cloths of silk and gold. Above his head flew his banner with the emblem of the sun and moon, so high that it could be clearly seen on every side. His troops were marshalled in thirty squadrons of 10,000 mounted archers each, grouped in three divisions; and those on the left and right he flung out so that they encircled Nayan's camp in a moment. In front of every squadron of horse were 500 foot soldiers with short pikes and swords. They were so trained that, whenever the cavalry purposed a retreat, they would jump on the horses' cruppers and flee with them; then, when the retreat was halted, they would dismount and slaughter the enemies' horses with their pikes. Such, then, was the formation in which the Great Khan's forces were drawn up round Nayan's camp in readiness for the battle.

When Nayan and his men saw the troops of the Great Khan surrounding their camp, they were utterly taken aback. They rushed to arms, arrayed themselves in haste, and formed their ranks in due order.

When both parties were lined up in battle array, so that nothing remained but to come to blows, then might be heard a tumult of many instruments, the shrilling of fifes and sound of men singing at the pitch of their voices. For the usage of the Tartars is such that when they are confronting the foe and marshalled for the fray they do not join battle till the drums begin to beat – that is the drums of the commander. While they wait for the beat of the drums, all the Tartar host sound their instruments⁴ and join in song. That is why the noise of instruments and of singing was so loud on both sides alike.

When all the troops were in readiness on both sides, then the drums of the Great Khan began to beat. After that there was no more delay; but the two armies fell upon each other with bow and sword and club, and a few with lances. The foot-soldiers had cross-bows also and other weapons in plenty. What more shall I say? This was the start of a bitter and bloody battle. Now you might see arrows flying like pelting rain, for the whole air was full of them. Now you might see horsemen and horses tumbling dead upon the ground. So loud was the shouting and the clash of armies that you could not have heard the thunder of heaven. You must know that Nayan was a baptized Christian and in this battle he had the cross of Christ on his standard.⁵

What need to make a long story of it? Enough that this was the most hazardous fight and the most fiercely contested that ever was seen. Never in our time were so many men engaged on one battlefield, especially so many horsemen. So many died on either side that it was a marvel to behold. The battle raged from day-break till noon, and for a long time its issue hung in the balance; Nayan's followers were so devoted to him, for he was an open-handed master, that they were ready to die rather than turn their backs. But in the end the victory fell to the Great Khan. When Nayan and his men saw that they could hold out no longer, they took to flight. But this availed them nothing; for Nayan was taken prisoner, and all his barons and his men surrendered to the Great Khan.

When the Great Khan learnt that Nayan was a prisoner, he commanded that he should be put to death. And this was how it was done. He was wrapped up tightly in a carpet and then dragged about so violently, this way and that, that he died. Their object

in choosing this mode of death was so that the blood of the imperial lineage might not be spilt upon the earth, and that sun and air might not witness it.

After this victory all Nayan's men and barons did homage to the Great Khan and swore fealty to him. They were men of four different provinces named Chorchā, Kauli, Barskol, and Sikintinju.

After the Great Khan had won this victory, the various races of men who were there – Saracens, idolaters, and Jews, and many others who do not believe in God – made mock of the cross which Nayan had borne on his banner. They jeered at the Christians who were there; 'See how the cross of your God has helped Nayan, who was a Christian!' So unrestrained was their mockery and their jeering that it came to the ears of the Great Khan. Thereupon he rebuked those who mocked at the cross in his presence. Then he summoned many Christians who were there and began to comfort them. 'If the cross of your God has not helped Nayan,' he said, 'it was for a very good reason. Because it is good, it ought not to lend its aid except in a good and righteous cause. Nayan was a traitor who broke faith with his liege lord. Hence the fate that has befallen him was a vindication of the right. And the cross of your God did well in not helping against the right.' The Christians answered: 'Most mighty lord, what you say is quite true. The cross would not lend itself to wrong doing and disloyalty like that of Nayan, who was a traitor to his liege lord. He has received what he well deserved.' Such were the words that passed between the Great Khan and the Christians about the cross that Nayan had born on his standard.

After this victory over Nayan, the Great Khan returned to his capital of Khan-balik. And there he stayed, amid great rejoicing and merry-making.

As for that other rebellious baron, the prince whose name was Kaidu, when he heard of Nayan's defeat and death he was greatly perturbed and abandoned his campaign, for fear lest he might meet the same fate.

It was in the month of November that Kubilai returned to Khan-balik.⁶ And there he stayed till February and March, the season of our Easter. Learning that this was one of our principal feasts, he sent for all the Christians and desired them to bring him the book containing the four Gospels. After treating the book to repeated applications of incense with great ceremony, he kissed it devoutly and desired all his barons and lords there present to do the same. This usage he regularly observes on the principal feasts of the Christians, such as Easter and Christmas. And he does likewise on the principal feasts of the Saracens, Jews, and idolaters. Being asked why he did so, he replied: 'There are four prophets who are worshipped and to whom all the world does reverence. The Christians say that their God was Jesus Christ, the Saracens Mahomet, the Jews Moses, and the idolaters Sakyamuni Burkhan, who was the first to be represented as God in the form of an idol. And I do honour and reverence to all four, so that I may be sure of doing it to him who is greatest in heaven and truest; and to him I pray for aid.' But on the Great Khan's own showing he regards as truest and best the faith of the Christians, because he declares that it commands nothing that is not full of all goodness and holiness. He will not on any account allow the Christians to carry the cross before them, and this because on it suffered and died such a great man as Christ.

Someone may well ask why, since he regards the Christian faith as the best, he does not embrace it and become a Christian. The reason may be gathered from what he said to Messer Niccolò and Messer Maffeo when he sent them as emissaries to the Pope. They used from time to time to raise this matter with him; but he would reply: 'On what

grounds do you desire me to become a Christian? You see that the Christians who live in these parts are so ignorant that they accomplish nothing and are powerless. And you see that these idolaters do whatever they will; and when I sit at table the cups in the middle of the hall come to me full of wine or other beverages without anyone touching them, and I drink from them. They banish bad weather in any direction they choose and perform many marvels. And, as you know, their idols speak and give them such predictions as they ask. But, if I am converted to the faith of Christ and become a Christian, then my barons and others who do not embrace the faith of Christ will say to me: "What has induced you to undergo baptism and adopt the faith of Christ? What virtues or what miracles have you seen to his credit?" For these idolaters declare that what they do they do by their holiness and by virtue of their idols. Then I should not know what to answer, which would be a grave error in their eyes. And these idolaters, who by their arts and sciences achieve such great results, could easily compass my death. But do you go to your Pope and ask him on my behalf to send me a hundred men learned in your religion, who in the face of these idolaters will have the knowledge to condemn their performances and tell them that they too can do such things but will not, because they are done by diabolic art and evil spirits, and will show their mastery by making the idolaters powerless to perform these marvels in their presence. On the day when we see this, I too will condemn them and their religion. Then I will be baptized, and all my barons and magnates will do likewise, and their subjects in turn will undergo baptism. So there will be more Christians here than there are in your part of the world.' And if, as was said at the beginning, men had really been sent by the Pope with the ability to preach our faith to the Great Khan, then assuredly he would have become a Christian. For it is known for a fact that he was most desirous to be converted.

You have heard how on this one campaign Kubilai led his army out to battle. On all his other enterprises or campaigns he used to send his sons or barons; but on this occasion he would have no one in command but himself, so serious and so culpable did he consider the rebellion of this baron. Let us now leave this subject and return to a recital of the great achievements of the Great Khan.

We have told you of his lineage and his age. We shall now relate how he dealt with those barons who acquitted themselves well in the battle and how with those who showed themselves cowards and poltroons.⁷ Of the former, he promoted those who were commanders of 100 men to the command of 1,000, and commanders of 1,000 to the command of 10,000; and he gave them lavish gifts of silver plate and tablets of authority, each according to his rank. For a commander of 100 has a tablet of silver; a commander of 1,000 a tablet of gold, or rather of silver gilt; and a commander of 10,000 a tablet of gold with a lion's head. The tablets of command over 100 or 1,000 weigh 120 *saggi* apiece⁸, those with a lion's head weigh 220. On all these tablets is written a command in these words: 'By the might of the Great God and the great grace he has given to our Emperor, blessed be the name of the Khan, and death and destruction to all who do not obey him.' Let me add that all who have these tablets also have warrants setting forth in writing all the powers vested in them by their office.

As for the commander of 100,000, or the generalissimo of a great army, he has a tablet of gold weighing 300 *saggi*, with an inscription such as I have mentioned; and at the foot of the tablet is portrayed the lion, and above it is an image of the sun and moon. In addition he has warrants of high command and great authority. And whenever he goes riding he must carry an umbrella over his head in token of his exalted rank; and

when he sits he must sit on a silver chair. To these dignitaries the Great Khan also gives a tablet with the sign of the gerfalcon; these tablets are given to the very great barons so that they may exercise full powers equivalent to his own. When one of them wishes to send a courier or other emissary, he is authorized to requisition a king's horses if he wishes; and when I say a king's horses, this naturally implies the horses of any other man.⁹

Let me tell you next of the personal appearance of the Great Lord of Lords whose name is Kubilai Khan. He is a man of good stature, neither short nor tall but of moderate height. His limbs are well fleshed out and modelled in due proportion. His complexion is fair and ruddy like a rose, the eyes black and handsome, the nose shapely and set squarely in place.

He has four consorts who are all accounted his lawful wives; and his eldest son by any of these four has a rightful claim to be emperor on the death of the present Khan. They are called empresses, each by her own name. Each of these ladies holds her own court. None of them has less than 300 ladies in waiting, all of great beauty and charm. They have many eunuchs and many other men and women in attendance, so that each one of these ladies has in her court 10,000 persons. When he wishes to lie with one of his four wives, he invites her to his chamber; or sometimes he goes to his wife's chamber.¹⁰

He also has many concubines, about whom I will tell you. There is a province inhabited by Tartars who are called Kungurat, which is also the name of their city. They are a very good-looking race with fair complexions. Every two years or so, according to his pleasure, the Great Khan sends emissaries to this province to select for him out of the most beautiful maidens, according to the standard of beauty which he lays down for them, some four or five hundred, more or less as he may decide. This is how the selection is made. When the emissaries arrive, they summon to their presence all the maidens of the province. And there valuers are deputed for the task. After inspecting and surveying every girl feature by feature, her hair, her face, her eyebrows, her mouth, her lips, and every other feature, to see whether they are well-formed and in harmony with her person, the valuers award to some a score of sixteen marks, to others seventeen, eighteen, or twenty, or more or less according to the degree of their beauty. And, if the Great Khan has ordered them to bring him all who score twenty marks, or perhaps twenty-one, according to the number ordered, these are duly brought. When they have come to his presence, he has them assessed a second time by other valuers, and then the thirty or forty with the highest score are selected for his chamber. These are first allotted, one by one, to the barons' wives, who are instructed to observe them carefully at night in their chambers, to make sure that they are virgins and not blemished or defective in any member, that they sleep sweetly without snoring, and that their breath is sweet and they give out no unpleasant odour. Then those who are approved are divided into groups of six, who serve the Khan for three days and three nights at a time in his chamber and his bed, ministering to all his needs. And he uses them according to his pleasure. After three days and nights, in come the next six damsels. And so they continue in rotation throughout the year. While some of the group are in attendance in their lord's chamber, the others are waiting in an ante-chamber hard by. If he is in need of anything from outside, such as food or drink, the damsels inside the chamber pass word to those outside, who immediately get it ready. In this way the Khan is served by no one except these damsels. As for the other damsels, who are rated at a lower score, they remain with the Khan's other women in the palace, where they are instructed in needle-work, glove-making, and other elegant accomplishments. When some nobleman is looking for a wife, the Great

Khan gives him one of these damsels with a great dowry. And in this way he marries them all off honourably.

You may be inclined to ask: 'Do not the men of this province regard it as a grievance that the Great Khan robs them of their daughters?' Most certainly not. They esteem it a great favour and distinction; and those who have beautiful daughters are delighted that he should deign to accept them. They reason thus: 'If my daughter is born under a good planet and happy auspices, the Khan will be better able to satisfy her than I; he will marry her to a noble husband, which is more than my means would permit of.' And if she does not behave well or it does not turn out well for her, then the father says: 'This has happened to her because her planet was not propitious.'

You should know further that by his four wives the Great Khan has twenty-two male children. The eldest was called Chinghiz, for love of the good Chinghiz Khan¹¹ He was to have succeeded his father as Great Khan and lord of the whole empire. But it happened that he died, leaving a son named Temur; this Temur is now destined to be Great Khan and lord, because he is the son of the eldest son of the Great Khan. I can assure you that this Temur is a man of wisdom and prowess, as he has already proved many times on the field of battle.

By his mistresses the Great Khan has a further twenty-five sons, all good men and brave soldiers. And each of them is a great baron.

Of his sons by his four wives, seven are kings of great provinces and kingdoms. They all exercise their authority well, lacking neither prudence nor prowess. And for this there is good reason, for I give you my word that their father the Great Khan is the wisest man and the ablest in all respects, the best ruler of subjects and of empire and the man of the highest character of all that have ever been in the whole history of the Tartars.

You must know that for three months in the year, December, January, and February, the Great Khan lives in the capital city of Cathay, whose name is Khan-balik. In this city he has his great palace, which I will now describe to you.¹²

The palace is completely surrounded by a square wall, each side being a mile in length so that the whole circuit is four miles. It is a very thick wall and fully ten paces in height. It is all white-washed and battlemented. At each corner of this wall stands a large palace of great beauty and splendour, in which the Great Khan keeps his military stores. In the middle of each side is another palace resembling the corner palaces, so that round the whole circuit of the walls there are eight palaces, all serving as arsenals. Each is reserved for a particular type of munition. Thus, one contains saddles, bridles, stirrups, and other items of a horse's harness. In another are bows, bow-strings, quivers, arrows, and other requisites of archery. In a third are cuirasses, corselets, and other armour of boiled leather. And so with the rest.

In the southern front of this wall there are five gates. There is one great gate in the middle, which is never opened except when the Great Khan is leaving or entering. Next to this, one on either side, are two small gates, by which everyone else enters. There are also two more large gates, one near each corner, which are likewise used by other people.

Within this outer wall is another wall, somewhat greater in length than in breadth. In this also there are eight palaces, just like the others, and used in the same way to house military stores. It also has five gates in its southern front, corresponding to those in the outer wall. In each of the other sides it has one gate only; and so has the outer wall.

Within this wall is the Great Khan's palace, which I will now describe to you. It is the largest that was ever seen.¹³ It has no upper floor, but the basement on which it stands is

raised ten palms above the level of the surrounding earth; and all round it there runs a marble wall level with the basement, two paces in thickness. The foundation of the palace lies within this wall, so that as much of the wall as projects beyond it forms a sort of terrace, on which men can walk right round and inspect the outside of the palace. At the outer edge of this wall is a fine gallery with columns, where men can meet and talk. At each face of the palace is a great marble staircase, ascending from ground level to the top of this marble wall, which affords an entry into the palace.

The palace itself has a very high roof. Inside, the walls of the halls and chambers are all covered with gold and silver and decorated with pictures of dragons and birds and horsemen and various breeds of beasts and scenes of battle. The ceiling is similarly adorned, so that there is nothing to be seen anywhere but gold and pictures. The hall is so vast and so wide that a meal might well be served there for more than 6,000 men. The number of chambers is quite bewildering. The whole building is at once so immense and so well constructed that no man in the world, granted that he had the power to effect it, could imagine any improvement in design or execution. The roof is all ablaze with scarlet and green and blue and yellow and all the colours that are, so brilliantly varnished that it glitters like crystal and the sparkle of it can be seen from far away. And this roof is so strong and so stoutly built as to last for many a long year.

In the rear part of the palace are extensive apartments, both chambers and halls, in which are kept the private possessions of the Khan. Here is stored his treasure: gold, and silver, precious stones and pearls, and his gold and silver vessels. And here too are his ladies and his concubines. In these apartments everything is arranged for his comfort and convenience, and outsiders are not admitted.

Between the inner and the outer walls, of which I have told you, are stretches of park-land with stately trees. The grass grows here in abundance, because all the paths are paved and built up fully two cubits above the level of the ground, so that no mud forms on them and no rain-water collects in puddles, but the moisture trickles over the lawns, enriching the soil and promoting a lush growth of herbage. In these parks there is a great variety of game, such as white harts, musk-deer, roebuck, stags, squirrels, and many other beautiful animals. All the area within the walls is full of these graceful creatures, except the paths that people walk on.

In the north-western corner of the grounds is a pit of great size and depth, very neatly made, from which the earth was removed to build the mound of which I shall speak. The pit is filled with water by a fair-sized stream so as to form a sort of pond where the animals come to drink. The stream flows out through an aqueduct near the mound and fills another similar pit between the Great Khan's palace and that of Chinghiz his son, from which the earth was dug for the same purpose. These pits or ponds contain a great variety of fish. For the Great Khan has had them stocked with many different species, so that, whenever he feels inclined, he may have his pick. At the farther end of the pond there is an outlet for the stream, through which it flows away. It is so contrived that at the entrance and the outlet there are gratings of iron and copper to stop the fish from escaping. There are also swans and other water-fowl. It is possible to pass from one palace to the other by way of a bridge over this stream.

On the northern side of the palace, at the distance of a bow-shot but still within the walls, the Great Khan has had made an earthwork, that is to say a mound fully 100 paces in height and over a mile in circumference. This mound is covered with a dense growth of trees, all evergreens that never shed their leaves. And I assure you that

whenever the Great Khan hears tell of a particularly fine tree he has it pulled up, roots and all and with a quantity of earth, and transported to this mound by elephants. No matter how big the tree may be, he is not deterred from transplanting it. In this way he has assembled here the finest trees in the world. In addition, he has had the mound covered with lapis lazuli, which is intensely green, so that trees and rock alike are as green as green can be and there is no other colour to be seen. For this reason it is called the Green Mound. On top of this mound, in the middle of the summit, he has a large and handsome palace, and this too is entirely green. And I give you my word that mound and trees and palace form a vision of such beauty that it gladdens the hearts of all beholders. It was for the sake of this entrancing view that the Great Khan had them constructed, as well as for the refreshment and recreation they might afford him.

Let me tell you also that beside this palace the Great Khan has had another one built, just like his own and no whit inferior. This is built to be occupied by his son when he shall succeed him as ruler. That is why it is built in the same style and on the same scale as the Great Khan's own, which I have described above, and with walls of equal size. This is the residence of Temur the son of Chinghiz, of whom I have already spoken, who is destined to be Khan; and he observes the same ceremony and usages as the Great Khan, because he has been chosen to rule after the Great Khan's death. The bull and seal of empire are his already, though so long as the Great Khan is alive he does not enjoy them so absolutely.¹⁴

Now that I have told you about these palaces, I will go on to tell you of the great town of Taidu in which they are situated, and why and how it came to be built.

On the banks of a great river in the province of Cathay there stood an ancient city of great size and splendour which was named Khan-balik, that is to say in our language 'the Lord's City'. Now the Great Khan discovered through his astrologers that this city would rebel and put up a stubborn resistance against the Empire. For this reason he had this new city built next to the old one, with only the river between. And he removed the inhabitants of the old city and settled them in the new one, which is called Taidu, leaving only those whom he did not suspect of any rebellious designs; for the new city was not big enough to house all those who lived in the old.

Taidu is built in the form of a square with all its sides of equal length and a total circumference of twenty-four miles. It is enclosed by earthen ramparts, twenty paces high and ten paces thick at the base; the sides slope inwards from base to summit, so that at the top the width is only about three paces. They are all battlemented and white-washed. They have twelve gates, each surmounted by a fine, large palace. So on each of the four sides there are three gates and five palaces, because there is an additional palace at each corner. In these palaces there are immense halls, which house the weapons of the city guards.

I assure you that the streets are so broad and straight that from the top of the wall above one gate you can see along the whole length of the road to the gate opposite. The city is full of fine mansions, inns, and dwelling-houses. All the way down the sides of every main street there are booths and shops of every sort. All the building sites throughout the city are square and measured by the rule; and on every site stand large and spacious mansions with ample courtyards and gardens. These sites are allotted to heads of households, so that one belongs to such-and-such a person, representing such-and-such a family, the next to a representative of another family, and so all the way along. Every site or block is surrounded by good public roads; and in this way the whole

interior of the city is laid out in squares like a chess-board with such masterly precision that no description can do justice to it.

In this city there is such a multitude of houses and of people, both within the walls and without, that no one could count their number. Actually there are more people outside the walls in the suburbs than in the city itself. There is a suburb outside every gate, such that each one touches the neighbouring suburbs on either side. They extend in length for three or four miles. And in every suburb or ward, at about a mile's distance from the city, there are many fine hostels which provide lodging for merchants coming from different parts: a particular hostel is assigned to every nation, as we might say one for the Lombards, another for the Germans, another for the French. Merchants and others come here on business in great numbers, both because it is the Khan's residence and because it affords a profitable market. And the suburbs have as fine houses and mansions as the city, except of course for the Khan's palace.

You must know that no one who dies is buried in the city. If an idolater dies there, his body is taken to the place of cremation, which lies outside all the suburbs. And so with the others also; when they die they are taken right outside the suburbs for burial. Similarly, no act of violence¹⁵ is performed inside the city, but only outside the suburbs.

Let me tell you also that no sinful woman dares live within the city, unless it be in secret – no woman of the world, that is, who prostitutes her body for money. But they all live in the suburbs, and there are so many of them that no one could believe it. For I assure you that there are fully 20,000 of them, all serving the needs of men for money. They have a captain general, and there are chiefs of hundreds and of thousands responsible to the captain. This is because, whenever ambassadors come to the Great Khan on his business and are maintained at his expense, which is done on a lavish scale, the captain is called upon to provide one of these women every night for the ambassador and one for each of his attendants. They are changed every night and receive no payment; for this is the tax they pay to the Great Khan. From the number of these prostitutes you may infer the number of traders and other visitors who are daily coming and going here about their business.

You may take it for a fact that more precious and costly wares are imported into Khan-balik than into any other city in the world. Let me give you particulars. All the treasures that come from India – precious stones, pearls, and other rarities – are brought here. So too are the choicest and costliest products of Cathay itself and every other province. This is on account of the Great Khan himself, who lives here, and of the lords and ladies and the enormous multitude of hotel-keepers and other residents and of visitors who attend the courts held here by the Khan. That is why the volume and value of the imports and of the internal trade exceed those of any other city in the world. It is a fact that every day more than 1,000 cart-loads of silk enter the city; for much cloth of gold and silk is woven here¹⁶ Furthermore, Khan-balik is surrounded by more than 200 other cities, near and far, from which traders come to it to sell and to buy. So it is not surprising that it is the centre of such a traffic as I have described.

In the centre of the city stands a huge palace in which is a great bell; in the evening this peals three times as a signal that no one may go about the town. Once this bell has sounded the due number of peals, no one ventures abroad in the city except in case of childbirth or illness; and those who are called out by such emergencies are obliged to carry lights. Every night there are guards riding about the city in troops of thirty or forty, to discover whether anyone is going about at an abnormal hour, that is after the third peal of the bell. If anyone is found, he is promptly arrested and clapped into

prison. Next morning he is examined by the officials appointed for the purpose, and if he is found guilty of any offence, he is punished according to its gravity with a proportionate number of strokes of a rod, which sometimes cause death. They employ this mode of punishment in order to avoid bloodshed, because their *Bakhshi*, that is, the adepts in astrology, declare that it is wrong to shed human blood.

It is ordered that every gateway must be guarded by 1,000 men. You must not suppose that this guard is maintained out of mistrust of the inhabitants. It is there, in fact, partly as a mark of respect to the Great Khan who lives in the city, partly as a check upon evil-doers – although, because of the prophecy of his astrologers, the Khan does harbour certain suspicions of the people of Cathay.

Let me now tell you how on one occasion the Cathayans in the city actually did plan to revolt. It is an established practice, as will be explained below, that twelve men are appointed with full powers of disposal over territories and public offices at their own discretion. Among these was a Saracen called Ahmad, a man of great energy and ability, who surpassed all the rest in his authority and influence over the Great Khan. The Emperor was so fond of him that he gave him a completely free hand. It seems, as was learnt after his death, that this Ahmad used to bewitch the Emperor by his black arts to such purpose that he won a ready hearing and acceptance for everything he said; and so he was free to do whatever he chose. He used to make all appointments to office and punish all delinquents. Whenever he wished to cause the death of anyone whom he hated, whether justly or unjustly, he would go to the Emperor and say to him: ‘So-and-so deserves to die, because he has offended your Majesty in such-and-such a way.’ Then the Emperor would say: ‘Do as you think best.’ And Ahmad would thereupon put him to death. Therefore, seeing the complete liberty he enjoyed and the absolute faith reposed in him by the Emperor, men did not venture to thwart him in anything. There was no one so great or of such authority as not to fear him. If anyone was accused by him to the Emperor of a capital offence and wished to plead his case, he had no chance to rebut the charge or state his own case, because he could count on no support – everyone was too much afraid of going against Ahmad. In this way, he caused the death of many innocent people.

Furthermore, there was not a pretty woman who took his fancy but he would have his will with her, taking her as a wife if she was not already married or otherwise enforcing her submission. Whenever he learnt that someone had a good-looking daughter, he would send his ruffians to the girl’s father, and they would say: ‘What is your ambition? Well then, how about this daughter of yours? Give her to the Bailo (for Ahmad was called by the title of Bailo or Lord-Lieutenant) and we will see that he gives you such-and-such a post or office for three years.’ So the man would give him his daughter. Then Ahmad would say to the Khan: ‘Such-and-such a post is vacant, or will fall vacant on such-and-such a date. So-and-so is the right man for the job.’ To which the Khan would answer: ‘Do as you think best.’ And Ahmad would promptly install him. By this means, playing partly on men’s ambition for office, partly on their fears, Ahmad got possession of all the best-looking women as his wives and his concubines. He also had sons, some twenty-five of them, whom he installed in the highest offices. Some of them, under cover of their father’s name, used to practise adultery in their father’s fashion and commit many other crimes and abominations. Ahmad had also accumulated an immense fortune, because everyone who aspired to any post or office used to send him a handsome present.

Ahmad exercised this authority as governor for twenty-two years. At length the people of the country, that is the Cathayans, seeing that there was no end to the iniquities and abominations that he perpetrated beyond all measure at the expense of their womenfolk as well as their own persons, reached the point where they could endure it no longer. They made up their minds to assassinate him and revolt against the government of the city. Among their number was a Cathayan named Ch'ien-hu, a commander of 1,000, whose mother, daughter, and wife had all been ravished by Ahmad. Ch'ien-hu, moved by fierce indignation, plotted the destruction of the governor with another Cathayan named Wan-hu, a commander of 10,000¹⁷ They planned to do the deed when the Great Khan had completed his three months' sojourn at Khan-balik and had left for the city of Shang-tu, where he would likewise spend three months, and his son Chinghiz had also set out for his accustomed residences. At such times Ahmad was left to keep guard over the city: when the need arose, he would send word to the Great Khan at Shang-tu and the Khan would send back word of his wishes. The two plotters decided to impart their plot to the leading Cathayans of the country, and by common consent they made it known in many other cities to their own friends. The scheme was to take effect on the appointed day in the following manner. At the sight of a signal fire, all the conspirators were immediately to put to death any man wearing a beard and to pass on the signal to other cities by means of beacons that they should do the same. The reason for killing the bearded men was that the Cathayans are naturally beardless, whereas the Tartars, Saracens, and Christians wear beards. You must understand that all the Cathayans hated the government of the Great Khan, because he set over them Tartar rulers, mostly Saracens, and they could not endure it, since it made them feel that they were no more than slaves. Moreover the Great Khan had no legal title to rule the province of Cathay, having acquired it by force. So, putting no trust in the people, he committed the government of the country to Tartars, Saracens, and Christians who were attached to his household and personally loyal to him and not natives of Cathay.

Then Wan-hu and Ch'ien-hu, on the appointed date, entered the palace by night. And Wan-hu seated himself on the throne and had many lights lit in front of him. And he sent a courier to Ahmad, who lived in the old city, announcing that Chinghiz, the Khan's son, had just arrived that very night and summoned the Bailo to wait upon him without delay. When Ahmad heard this, he went immediately, greatly puzzled and not a little alarmed. On his way in through the city gate he met a Tartar named Kogatai, who was in command of the 12,000 men who kept constant watch and ward over the city. 'Where are you going at this late hour?' asked Kogatai. 'To Chinghiz, who has just arrived.' 'How is it possible,' asked Kogatai, 'that he can have arrived so secretly that I have heard nothing of it?' And he followed him with a detachment of his guard. Now the conspirators had said among themselves: 'If only we can kill Ahmad, we have nothing to fear from anything else.' The moment Ahmad entered the palace and saw it such a blaze of lights, he knelt before Wan-hu, mistaking him for Chinghiz; and Ch'ien-hu, who was there armed with a sword, cut off his head.

When Kogatai, who had stopped at the entrance to the palace, saw this, he shouted 'Treason!' And there and then he aimed an arrow at Wan-hu, who was seated on the throne, and shot him dead. Then, calling on his followers, he seized Ch'ien-hu. And he issued a proclamation throughout the city that anyone found out of doors would be killed on the spot. The Cathayans, seeing that the Tartars had discovered their plot

and that they were left without a head, one of their leaders being killed and the other captured, stayed quietly in their homes and hence could give no sign to the other cities to carry out their plan of rebellion. Kogatai promptly sent couriers to the Great Khan with a full account of everything that had happened, and received in reply an order to conduct a thorough investigation and punish the guilty according to their deserts. When morning came, Kogatai examined all the Cathayans, and put to death many whom he found to be ring-leaders in the conspiracy. And the same thing was done in the other cities, when it came out that they were involved in the crime.

When the Great Khan had returned to Khan-balik, he wanted to know the cause of this occurrence. He then learnt the truth about the abominable outrages committed, as already related, by the execrable Ahmad and his sons. He found out that Ahmad himself and seven of his sons – for they were not all wicked – had taken innumerable ladies to be their wives, not to speak of those whom they had possessed by force. Then he caused all the treasure that Ahmad had amassed in the Old City to be brought into the New City; and put it with his own treasure; and it was found to be beyond all reckoning. He ordered Ahmad's body to be taken from the grave and flung in the street to be torn to pieces by dogs. And those of his sons who had followed the example of his evil deeds he caused to be flayed alive. And when he called to mind the accursed doctrine of the Saracens, by which every sin is accounted a lawful act even to the killing of any man who is not of their creed, so that because of it the execrable Ahmad and his sons were not conscious of committing any sin, he utterly contemned it and held it in abomination. He summoned the Saracens to his presence and expressly forbade them to do many things which their law commanded. In particular he commanded them to take their wives according to the law of the Tartars and not to cut the throats of animals, as they used to do, in order to eat their flesh, but to slit their bellies. And at the time when all this happened, Messer Marco was in this place.

As for the Great Khan's guard of 12,000 men, you must know that they are called *Keshikten*, which is as much as to say 'knights and liegemen of the lord'. He employs them not out of fear of any man but in token of his sovereignty. These 12,000 horsemen have four captains, one over every 3,000. Each 3,000 in turn reside in the Khan's palace for three days and three nights and eat and drink there, and at the end of that time another 3,000 take their place, and so they continue throughout the year. By day indeed the other 9,000 do not leave the palace, unless it happens that one of them goes off on the Khan's affairs or on some urgent private business and then only if it is legitimate and he has his captain's leave. If he is faced with something really serious, such as the impending death of a father or brother or other near relative, or the threat of some heavy loss which would not permit of his immediate return, then he must get leave from the Khan. But at night the 9,000 are free to go home.

When the Great Khan is holding court, the seating at banquets is arranged as follows. He himself sits at a much higher table than the rest at the northern end of the hall, so that he faces south. His principal wife sits next to him on the left. On the right, at a somewhat lower level, sit his sons in order of age, Chinghiz, the eldest being placed rather higher than the rest, and his grandsons and his kinsmen of the imperial lineage. They are so placed that their heads are on a level with the Great Khan's feet. Next to them are seated the other noblemen at other tables lower down again. And the ladies are seated on the same plan. All the wives of the Khan's sons and grandsons and kinsmen are seated on his left at a lower level, and next to them the wives of his nobles and

knights lower down still. And they all know their appointed place in the lord's plan. The tables are so arranged that the Great Khan can see everything, and there are a great many of them. But you must not imagine that all the guests sit at table; for most of the knights and nobles in the hall take their meal seated on carpets for want of tables. Outside the hall the guests at the banquet number more than 40,000. For they include many visitors with costly gifts, men who come from strange countries bringing strange things, and some who have held high office and aspire to further advancement. Such are the guests who attend on such occasions, when the Great Khan is holding court or celebrating a wedding.

In the midst of the hall where the Great Khan has his table is a very fine piece of furniture of great size and splendour in the form of a square chest, each side being three paces in length, elaborately carved with figures of animals finely wrought in gold. The inside is hollow and contains a huge golden vessel in the form of a pitcher with the capacity of a butt, which is filled with wine. In each corner of the chest is a vessel with the capacity of a firkin, one filled with mares' milk, one with camels' milk, and the others with other beverages. On the chest stand all the Khan's vessels in which drink is served to him. From it the wine or other precious beverage is drawn off to fill huge stoups of gold, each containing enough to satisfy eight or ten men. One of these is set between every two men seated at the table. Each of the two has a gold cup with a handle, which he fills from the stoup. And for every pair of ladies one stoup and two cups are provided in the same way. You must understand that these stoups and the rest are of great value. I can assure you that the Great Khan has such a store of vessels of gold and silver that no one who did not see it with his own eyes could well believe it. And the waiters who serve his food and drink are certain of his barons. They have their mouths and noses swathed in fine napkins of silk and gold, so that the food and drink are not contaminated by their breath or effluence.¹⁸

Certain barons are also appointed to look after new-comers unfamiliar with court etiquette and show them to their allotted and appropriate seats. These barons are continually passing to and fro through the hall, asking the guests if they lack anything. And if there are any who want wine or milk or anything else, they have it promptly brought to them by the waiters. At all the entrances of the hall, or wherever else the Great Khan may be, stand two men of gigantic stature, one on either side, with staves in their hands. This is because it is not permissible for anyone to touch the threshold of the door, but all who enter must step over it. If anyone should happen to touch it by accident, the guardians take his clothes from him and he must pay a fine to redeem them. Or if they do not take his clothes, they administer the appointed number of blows. But if they are new-comers who do not know of the rule, certain barons are assigned to introduce them and warn them of the rule. This is done because touching the threshold is looked upon as a bad omen. In leaving the hall, since some of the guests are overcome with drinking so that they could not possibly exercise due care, no such rule is enjoined.

There are many instruments in the hall, of every sort, and when the Great Khan is about to drink they all strike up. As soon as the cup-bearer has handed him the cup, he retires three paces and kneels down; and all the barons and all the people present go down on their knees and make a show of great humility. Then the Great Khan drinks. And every time he drinks the same performance is repeated. Of the food I say nothing, because everyone will readily believe that there is no lack of it. Let me add that there is no baron or knight at the banquet but brings his wife¹⁹ to dine with the other ladies.

When they have fed and the tables are removed, a great troupe of jugglers and acrobats and other entertainers comes into the hall and performs remarkable feats of various kinds. And they all afford great amusement and entertainment in the Khan's presence, and the guests show their enjoyment by peals of laughter. When all is over, the guests take their leave and return each to his own lodging or house.

You must know that all the Tartars celebrate their birthdays as festivals. The Great Khan was born on the twenty-eighth day of the lunar cycle in the month of September. And on this day he holds the greatest feast of the year, excepting only the new year festival of which I will tell you later. On his birthday he dons a magnificent robe of beaten gold. And fully 12,000 barons and knights robe themselves with him in a similar colour and style – not so costly as his, but still of the same colour and style, in cloth of silk and gold, and all with gold belts. These robes are given to them by the Great Khan. And I assure you that the value of some of these robes, reckoning the precious stones and pearls with which they are often adorned, amounts to 10,000 golden bezants. Of such there are not a few. And you must know that the Great Khan gives rich robes to these 12,000 barons and knights thirteen times a year, so that they are all dressed in robes like his own and of great value. You can see for yourselves that this is no light matter, and that there is no other prince in the world besides himself who could bear such an expense.

On this royal birthday all the Tartars in the world, all the provinces and regions where men hold land and lordship under the Great Khan, give him costly presents proportionate to the giver and in accordance with prescribed order. And rich gifts are also brought to him by many others, petitioners for high office – which is awarded to applicants according to merit by twelve barons appointed for the purpose. And on this day all the idolaters and all the Christians and all the Saracens and all the races of men offer solemn prayers to their idols and their gods, with singing of hymns and lighting of lamps and burning of incense, that they may save their lord and give him long life and joy and health. So this day is passed in merry-making and birthday festivities. Now that I have fully described them, let us turn to another great feast which is celebrated at the new year and is called the White Feast.

The new year begins with them in February, and this is how it is observed by the Great Khan and all his subjects. According to custom they all array themselves in white, both male and female, so far as their means allow. And this they do because they regard white costume as auspicious and benign, and they don it at the new year so that throughout the year they may enjoy prosperity and happiness. On this day all the rulers, and all the provinces and regions and realms where men hold land or lordship under his sway, bring him costly gifts of gold and silver and pearls and precious stones and abundance of fine white cloth, so that throughout the year their lord may have no lack of treasure and may live in joy and gladness. Let me tell you also that the barons and knights and all the people make gifts to one another of white things. And they greet one another gaily and cheerfully saying, very much as we do: 'May this year be a lucky one for you and bring you success in all you undertake.'²⁰ And this they do so that throughout the year all may go well with them and all their enterprises prosper.

I can also assure you for a fact that on this day the Great Khan receives gifts of more than 100,000 white horses, of great beauty and price.²¹ And on this day also there is a procession of his elephants, fully 5,000 in number, all draped in fine cloths embroidered with beasts and birds. Each one bears on its back two strong-boxes of great beauty and price filled with the Khan's plate and with costly apparel for this white-robed court.

With them come innumerable camels also draped with cloths and laden with provisions for the feast. They all defile in front of the Great Khan and it is the most splendid sight that ever was seen.

On the morning of this feast, before the tables are set up, all the kings and all the dukes, marquises and counts, barons, knights, astrologers, physicians, falconers, and many other officials and rulers of men and lands and armies appear before the Khan in the great hall. And those who do not achieve this assemble outside the palace in a spot where the Khan can readily inspect them. Let me tell you in what order they are stationed. In front are his sons and grandsons and those of his imperial lineage. Next come the kings, then the dukes and then all the other ranks, one behind another, in due order. And when they are all seated, each in his proper station, up stands a great dignitary and proclaims in a loud voice: 'Bow down and worship!' No sooner has he said this than they bow down, then and there, and touch the ground with their foreheads, and address a prayer to the lord and worship him as if he were a god. Then the dignitary proclaims: 'God save our lord and long preserve him in gladness and joy!' And one and all reply: 'God do so!' Once again the dignitary proclaims: 'God increase and multiply his empire from good to better and keep all his subjects in untroubled peace and good will and in all his lands grant universal prosperity!' And one and all reply: 'God do so!' In this manner they worship him four times. Then they go to an altar, adorned with great splendour, on which is a scarlet tablet bearing the name of the Great Khan, and also a splendidly wrought censer. They cense this tablet and the altar with great reverence.²² Then they return, each to his place. When they have all done this, then the precious gifts of which I have spoken are presented. After this, when the Great Khan has viewed all the gifts, the tables are laid and the guests take their places in due order as I have already related – the Khan alone at his high table with his first wife, and the others each in his degree, and their ladies on the empress's side of the hall, just as I have described it to you before. When they have fed, the performers come in and entertain the court as before. Finally they return, everyone to his own lodging or home.

Next let me tell you that the Great Khan has ordained thirteen feasts, one for each of the thirteen lunar months, which are attended by the 12,000 barons called *Keshikten*, that is to say the henchmen most closely attached to the Khan. To each of these he has given thirteen robes, every one of a different colour. They are splendidly adorned with pearls and gems and other ornaments and are of immense value. He has also given to each of the 12,000 a gold belt of great beauty and price, and shoes of fine leather (called *canaut* or *borgal*) cunningly embroidered with silver thread, which are likewise beautiful and costly. All their attire is so gorgeous and so stately that when they are fully robed any one of them might pass for a king. One of these robes is appointed to be worn at each of the thirteen feasts.²³ The Great Khan himself has thirteen similar robes – similar, that is, in colour, but more splendid and costly and more richly adorned; and he always dresses in the same colour as his barons.

The cost of these robes, to the number of 156,000 in all, amounts to a quantity of treasure that is almost past computation, to say nothing of the belts and shoes, which also cost a goodly sum. And all this the Khan does for the embellishment or enhancement of his feasts.

Let me conclude with one more fact, a very remarkable one well worthy of mention in our book. You must know that a great lion is led into the Great Khan's presence; and as soon as it sees him it flings itself down prostrate before him with every appearance of

deep humility and seems to acknowledge him as lord. There it stays without a chain, and is indeed a thing to marvel at.

We will turn next to the Great Khan's hunting parties.

You may take it for a fact that during the three months which the Great Khan spends in the city of Khan-balik, that is, December, January, and February, he has ordered that within a distance of sixty days' journey from where he is staying everybody must devote himself to hunting and hawking. The order goes out to every governor of men or lands to send all such large beasts as wild boars, harts, stags, roebucks, bears, and the like, or at any rate the greater part of them. So every governor gathers round him all the huntsmen of the district, and together they go wherever these beasts are to be found, beating their coverts in turn and killing some of them with their hounds but most with their arrows.²⁴ That is how they hunt them. And those beasts that they wish to send to the Great Khan they first disembowel and then load on carts and so dispatch. This applies to all those within thirty days' journey, and their combined bag is enormous. Those distant from thirty to sixty days do not send the flesh – the journey is too long for that – but send the hides duly dressed and tanned, so that the Khan may use them in the manufacture of necessary equipment for his armies.

You must know also that the Great Khan has a plentiful supply of leopards skilled in hunting game and of lynxes trained in the chase and past masters of their craft. He has a number of lions of immense size, bigger than those of Egypt; they have very handsome, richly coloured fur, with longitudinal stripes of black, orange, and white. They are trained to hunt wild boars and bulls, bears, wild asses, stags, roebuck, and other game. A grand sight it is to see the stately creatures that fall a prey to these lions. When the lions are led out to the chase, they are carried on carts in cages, each with a little dog for company. They are caged because otherwise they would be too ferocious and too eager in their pursuit of game, so that there would be no holding them. They must always be led upwind; for if their prey caught wind of the smell they would not wait, but would be off in a flash. He has also a great many eagles trained to take wolves and foxes and fallow-deer and roe-deer, and these too bring in game in plenty. Those that are trained to take wolves are of immense size and power, for there is never a wolf so big that he escapes capture by one of these eagles.

Now that you have heard what I have to tell on this subject, I will tell you of the numbers and excellence of the Great Khan's hounds. You must know that among his barons there are two brothers in blood who are named Bayan and Mingan. They bear the title *kuyukchi*, that is to say, keepers of the mastiffs. Each of them has 10,000 subordinates, who all wear livery of one colour; and the other 10,000 all wear another colour. The two colours are scarlet and blue. Whenever they accompany the Great Khan in the chase, they wear these liveries. Among either 10,000 there are 2,000 of whom each one leads a mastiff, or maybe two or more, so that the total number is immense. When the Great Khan goes hunting, one of the two brothers with his 10,000 men and fully 5,000 hounds goes with him on one side and the other with his 10,000 and his hounds goes on the other. The two bands keep pace with each other exactly, so that the whole line extends in length over a day's journey²⁵ And not a wild beast do they find but falls a prey. What a sight it is to see the hunt and the performance of the hounds and the hunters! For you must picture that, while the Great Khan rides out hawking with his barons across the open country, then packs of these hounds are to be seen advancing on either side, hunting bears and stags and other beasts, so that it is truly a fine sight to

see.²⁶ These two brothers are bound by covenant to provide the Great Khan's court every day, beginning in October and continuing to the end of March, with a thousand head of game, including both beasts and birds, except quails, and also fish to the best of their ability, reckoning as the equivalent of one head as much fish as would make a square meal for three persons.

When the Khan has spent the three months of December, January, and February in the city of which I have spoken, he sets off in March and travels southward to within two days' journey of the Ocean. He is accompanied by fully 10,000 falconers and takes with him fully 5,000 gerfalcons and peregrine falcons and sakers in great abundance, besides a quantity of goshawks for hawking along the riversides. You must not imagine that he keeps all this company with him in one place. In fact he distributes them here and there, in groups of a hundred or two hundred or more. Then they engage in fowling, and most of the fowl they take are brought to the Great Khan. And I would have you know that when he goes hawking with his gerfalcons and other hawks, he has fully 10,000 men in parties of two who are called *toscaor*, which signifies in our language 'watchmen'. These men are posted here and there in couples, so as to occupy a wide enough area. Each has a call and a hood, so that they can call in the hawks and hold them. And when the Khan orders the hawks to be cast, there is no need for the casters to go after them, because the men of whom I have spoken, dispersed here and there, keep such careful watch that wherever a hawk may go they are always on the spot and if one is in need of help they are prompt to render it.

All the Great Khan's hawks and those of the other barons have a little tablet of silver attached to their feet on which is written the name of the owner and also that of the keeper. By this means the bird is recognized as soon as it is taken, and is returned to the owner. If the finder does not know whose it is, he takes it to a baron who is called *bularguchi*, which is as much as to say 'keeper of lost property'. For, I would have you know that, if anyone finds a horse or a sword or a hawk or anything else and cannot discover the owner, it is immediately brought to this baron, and he takes charge of it. If the finder does not hand it over forthwith, he is reckoned a thief. And the losers apply to this baron, and if he has received their property he promptly returns it. He always has his official residence, with its flag flying, at the highest point in the whole camp, so as to be readily seen by those who have lost anything. By this means nothing can be lost without being found and returned.

When the Great Khan goes on the journey of which I have told you towards the Ocean, the expedition is marked by many fine displays of huntsmanship and falconry. Indeed, there is no sport in the world to compare with it. He always rides on the back of four elephants²⁷ in a very handsome shelter of wood, covered inside with cloth of beaten gold and outside with lion skins. Here he always keeps twelve gerfalcons of the best he possesses and is attended by several barons²⁸ to entertain him and keep him company. When he is travelling in this shelter on the elephants, and other barons who are riding in his train call out, 'Sire, there are cranes passing,' and he orders the roof of the shelter to be thrown open and so sees the cranes, he bids his attendants fetch such gerfalcons as he may choose and lets them fly. And often, the gerfalcons take the cranes²⁹ in full view while the Great Khan remains all the while on his couch. And this affords him great sport and recreation. Meanwhile the other barons and knights ride all round him. And you may rest assured that there never was, and I do not believe there ever will be, any man who can enjoy such sport and recreation in this world as he does, or has such facilities for doing so.

When he has travelled so far that he arrives at a place called Cachar Modun, then he finds his pavilions ready pitched there and those of his sons and his barons and his mistresses to the number of more than 10,000; and very fine they are, and very costly. Let me tell you how his pavilion is made. First, the tent in which he holds his court is big enough to accommodate fully a thousand knights. This tent has its entrance towards the south and serves as a hall for the barons and other retainers. Adjoining this is another tent which faces west³⁰ and is occupied by the Khan himself. It is to this tent that he summons anyone with whom he wishes to converse. At the back of the great hall is a large and handsome chamber in which he sleeps. There are also other chambers and other tents; but they do not adjoin the great tent. Let me tell you how these two halls and the chamber are constructed. Each hall has columns of spicewood very skilfully carved. On the outside they are all covered with lion-skins of great beauty, striped with black and white and orange. They are so well designed that neither wind nor rain can harm them or do any mischief. Inside they are all of ermine and sable, which are the two finest and richest and costliest furs there are. The truth is that a superfine sable fur big enough for a man's cloak is worth up to 2,000 golden bezants, while an ordinary one is worth 1,000. The Tartars call it 'the king of furs'. The sable is about the size of a marten. With these two sorts of skin the two great halls are lined, pieced together with such artistry that it is a truly amazing spectacle. And the chamber where the Khan sleeps, which adjoins the two halls, is also of lion-skins without and ermine and sable within, magnificent in workmanship and design. The cords that hold up the halls and chambers are all of silk. So precious indeed and so costly are these three tents that no petty king could afford them.

Round these three tents are pitched all the other tents, also well designed and appointed. The Khan's mistresses too have splendid pavilions. And for the gerfalcons and falcons and other birds and beasts there are tents in vast numbers. What need of more words? You may take it for a fact that the number of people in this camp almost passes belief. You might well fancy that the Khan was here in residence in his finest city. For it is thronged with multitudes from all parts. His whole household staff is here with him, besides physicians and astrologers and falconers and other officials in great numbers, and everything is as well ordered as in his capital.

In this place he stays till spring, which in these parts falls about our Easter Day. Throughout his stay he never ceases to go hawking by lake or stream, and he makes an ample catch of cranes and swans and other birds. And his followers who are dispersed about the neighbourhood send in lavish contributions of game and fowl. All this time he enjoys the finest sport and recreation in the world, so that no one in the world who has not seen it could ever believe it; so far do his magnificence and his state and his pleasures surpass my description.

Let me tell you one thing more. No merchant or artisan or peasant dare keep any falcon or bird of prey or any hound for the chase within twenty days' journey of the Great Khan's residence; but in every other province and region of his dominions they are free to hunt and do as they please with hawks and hounds³¹ And you must understand, furthermore, that throughout his empire no king or baron or any other person dares to take or hunt hare or hart, buck or stag, or any other such beast between the months of March and October, so that they may increase and multiply. And anyone who contravenes this rule is made to repent it bitterly, because it is the Khan's own enactment. And I assure you that his commandment is so strictly obeyed that hares and bucks and the other beasts I have mentioned often come right up to a man, and he does not touch them or do them any harm.

After spending his time here in this fashion till about Easter Day, the Great Khan sets out with all his retainers and returns direct to the city of Khan-balik by the same route by which he came, hunting and hawking all the way and enjoying good sport.

It is in this city of Khan-balik that the Great Khan has his mint; and it is so organized that you might well say that he has mastered the art of alchemy. I will demonstrate this to you here and now.

You must know that he has money made for him by the following process, out of the bark of trees – to be precise, from mulberry trees (the same whose leaves furnish food for silk-worms). The fine bast between the bark and the wood of the tree is stripped off. Then it is crumbled and pounded and flattened out with the aid of glue into sheets like sheets of cotton paper, which are all black. When made, they are cut up into rectangles of various sizes, longer than they are broad. The smallest is worth half a small tornesel; the next an entire such tornesel; the next half a silver groat; the next an entire silver groat, equal in value to a silver groat of Venice; and there are others equivalent to two, five, and ten groats and one, three, and as many as ten gold bezants. And all these papers are sealed with the seal of the Great Khan. The procedure of issue is as formal and as authoritative as if they were made of pure gold or silver. On each piece of money several specially appointed officials write their names, each setting his own stamp. When it is completed in due form, the chief of the officials deputed by the Khan dips in cinnabar the seal or bull assigned to him and stamps it on the top of the piece of money so that the shape of the seal in vermilion remains impressed upon it. And then the money is authentic. And if anyone were to forge it, he would suffer the extreme penalty.³²

Of this money the Khan has such a quantity made that with it he could buy all the treasure in the world. With this currency he orders all payments to be made throughout every province and kingdom and region of his empire. And no one dares refuse it on pain of losing his life. And I assure you that all the peoples and populations who are subject to his rule are perfectly willing to accept these papers in payment, since wherever they go they pay in the same currency, whether for goods or for pearls or precious stones or gold or silver. With these pieces of paper they can buy anything and pay for anything. And I can tell you that the papers that reckon as ten bezants do not weigh one.

Several times a year parties of traders arrive with pearls and precious stones and gold and silver and other valuables, such as cloth of gold and silk, and surrender them all to the Great Khan. The Khan then summons twelve experts, who are chosen for the task and have special knowledge of it, and bids them examine the wares that the traders have brought and pay for them what they judge to be their true value. The twelve experts duly examine the wares and pay the value in the paper currency of which I have spoken. The traders accept it willingly, because they can spend it afterwards on the various goods they buy throughout the Great Khan's dominions.³³ And I give you my word that the wares brought in at different times during the year mount up to a value of fully 400,000 bezants, and they are all paid for in this paper currency.

Let me tell you further that several times a year a fiat goes forth through the towns that all those who have gems and pearls and gold and silver must bring them to the Great Khan's mint. This they do, and in such abundance that it is past all reckoning; and they are all paid in paper money. By this means the Great Khan acquires all the gold and silver and pearls and precious stones of all his territories.

Here is another fact well worth relating. When these papers have been so long in circulation that they are growing torn and frayed, they are brought to the mint and changed for new and fresh ones at a discount of 3 per cent. And here again is an admirable practice that well deserves mention in our book: if a man wants to buy gold or silver to make his service of plate or his belts or other finery, he goes to the Khan's mint with some of these papers and gives them in payment for the gold and silver which he buys from the mint-master. And all the Khan's armies are paid with this sort of money.

I have now told you how it comes about that the Great Khan must have, as indeed he has, more treasure than anyone else in the world. I may go further and affirm that all the world's great potentates put together have not such riches as belong to the Great Khan alone.

Let me tell you next of the magnates who exercise authority from Khan-balik.³⁴

You must know that the Great Khan, as already mentioned, has appointed twelve great and powerful barons to supervise all decisions concerning the movement of the armies, changes in the high command, and dispatch of troops to one theatre or another in greater or less force, as need may require, according to the importance of the war. In addition it rests with them to sort out the staunch and fearless fighters from the faint hearted, promoting the former and degrading those who prove incompetent or cowardly. And if anyone is captain of a thousand and has disgraced himself in any action, these barons decide that he has shown himself unworthy of his office and debase him to the rank of captain of a hundred. But if he has conducted himself creditably and with distinction, so that they judge him fit for a higher command, they advance him to a captaincy of ten thousand. In every case, however, they act with the knowledge of the Great Khan. When they propose to degrade anyone, they say to the Khan, 'So-and-so is unworthy of such-and-such an office,' to which he replies, 'Let him be degraded to a lower rank'; and so it is done. If they have it in mind to promote anyone in acknowledgement of his merits, they say, 'Such-and-such a captain of a thousand is fit and worthy to be captain of ten thousand'; then the Khan confirms the appointment and gives him the appropriate tablet, as previously described, and immediately orders him to be given presents of great value, so as to encourage the others to make the most of their abilities. This council of twelve barons is called *Thai*, that is to say 'Supreme Court', because there is no higher authority except the Great Khan himself.

Besides these there are twelve other barons to whom the Khan has committed authority over all the affairs of the thirty-four provinces. And this is how they are organized. Let me tell you first that they live in a palace in the town of Khan-balik, a palace of great size and beauty with many halls and residential quarters. For every province there is a judge and a staff of clerks, who all live in this palace, each in his own private residence. And the judge and his staff administer all the affairs of the province to which they are assigned, subject to the will and authority of the twelve barons. It rests with these barons to choose the governors of all the provinces. And when they have chosen men whom they consider competent and suitable, they recommend them to the Great Khan, who confirms their appointment and confers the appropriate tablet. They also supervise the collection of taxes and revenues together with their administration and expenditure and all else that concerns the imperial government throughout these provinces, except purely military matters. This Council goes by the name of *Shieng*, and the palace in which it is housed is also called *Shieng*.

Both the Thai and the Shieng are supreme courts, having no authority above them except the Great Khan himself, and enjoying the power to confer great benefits on whom they will. The Thai, however, that is to say the military court, is esteemed more highly and carries great dignity than any other office.

I do not propose to enumerate the provinces at this stage, as I shall be giving a full account of them later in the book. Let us turn now to the system of post-horses by which the Great Khan sends his dispatches.

You must know that the city of Khan-balik is a centre from which many roads radiate to many provinces, one to each, and every road bears the name of the province to which it runs. The whole system is admirably contrived. When one of the Great Khan's messengers sets out along any of these roads, he has only to go twenty-five miles and there he finds a posting station, which in their language is called *yamb* and in our language may be rendered 'horse post'. At every post the messengers find a spacious and palatial hostelry for their lodging. These hostelries have splendid beds with rich coverlets of silk and all that befits an emissary of high rank. If a king came here, he would be well lodged. Here the messengers find no less than 400 horses, stationed here by the Great Khan's orders and always kept in readiness for his messengers when they are sent on any mission. And you must understand that posts such as these, at distances of twenty-five or thirty miles, are to be found along all the main highways leading to the provinces of which I have spoken. And at each of these posts the messengers find three or four hundred horses in readiness awaiting their command, and palatial lodgings such as I have described. And this holds good throughout all the provinces and kingdoms of the Great Khan's empire.

When the messengers are travelling through out-of-the-way country, where there are no homesteads or habitations, they find that the Great Khan has had posts established even in these wilds, with the same palatial accommodation and the same supply of horses and accoutrements. But here the stages are longer; for the posts are thirty-five miles apart and in some cases over forty miles.³⁵

By this means the Great Khan's messengers travel throughout his dominions and have lodgings and horses fully accoutred for every stage. And this is surely the highest privilege and the greatest resource ever enjoyed by any man on earth, king or emperor or what you will. For you may be well assured that more than 200,000 horses are stabled at these posts for the special use of these messengers. Moreover, the posts themselves number more than 10,000, all furnished on the same lavish scale. The whole organization is so stupendous and so costly that it baffles speech and writing.³⁶

If anyone is puzzled to understand how there can be enough people to execute such tasks, and what is the source of their livelihood, my answer is this. All the idolaters, and likewise the Saracens, take six, eight, or ten wives apiece, as many as they can afford to keep, and beget innumerable children. Hence there will be many men with more than thirty sons of their own, who all follow them under arms. This follows from the plurality of wives. With us, on the other hand, a man has only one wife, and if she should prove barren he will end his days with her and beget no children. Hence our population is less than theirs. As to the means of life, they have no shortage, because they mostly use rice, panic, or millet, especially the Tartars and the people of Cathay and Manzi, and these three cereals in their countries yield an increase of a hundredfold on each sowing. These peoples do not use bread, but simply boil these three sorts of grain with milk or flesh and then eat them. Wheat in their country does not yield such an increase; but such of it

as they harvest they eat only in the form of noodles or other pasty foods. Among them no land is left idle that might be cultivated. Their beasts increase and multiply without end. When they are on military service, there is not one of them who does not lead with him six, eight, or more horses for his own use. So it is not difficult to understand why the population in these parts is so enormous and the means of life so plentiful.

Now let me tell you another thing which I forgot to mention – one that is very germane to the matter in hand. The fact is that between one post and the next, at distances of three miles apart, there are stations which may contain as many as forty buildings occupied by unmounted couriers, who also play a part in the Great Khan's postal service. I will tell you how. They wear large belts, set all round with bells, so that when they run they are audible at a great distance. They always run at full speed and never for more than three miles. And at the next station three miles away, where the noise they make gives due notice of their approach, another courier is waiting in readiness. As soon as the first man arrives, the new one takes what he is carrying and also a little note given to him by the clerk, and starts to run. After he has run for three miles, the performance is repeated. And I can assure you that by means of this service of unmounted couriers, the Great Khan receives news over a ten days' journey in a day and a night. For it takes these runners no more than a day and a night to cover a ten days' journey, or two days and two nights for a twenty days' journey. So in ten days they can transmit news over a journey of a hundred days. And in the fruit season it often happens that by this means fruit gathered in the morning in the city of Khan-balik is delivered on the evening of the next day to the Great Khan in the city of Shang-tu, ten days' journey away.

At each of these three-mile stations there is appointed a clerk who notes the day and hour of the arrival of every courier and the departure of his successor; and this practice is in force at every station. And there are also inspectors charged with the duty of going round every month and examining all these stations, in order to detect any couriers who have been remiss and punish them. From these couriers, and from the staff at the stations, the Great Khan exacts no tax and he makes generous provision for their maintenance.³⁷

As for the horses of which I have spoken, which are kept in such numbers at the posts to carry the imperial messengers, I will tell you exactly how the Great Khan has established them. First he inquires, 'Which is the nearest city to such-and-such a post?'; then, 'How many horses can it maintain for the messengers?' Then the civic authorities investigate by means of experts how many horses can be maintained in the neighbouring post by the city and how many by the local towns and villages, and they apportion them according to the resources available. The cities act in concert, taking into consideration that between one post and the next there is sometimes another city, which makes its contribution with the rest. They provide for the horses out of the taxes due to the Great Khan: thus, if a man is assessed for taxation at a sum that would maintain a horse and a half, he is ordered to make corresponding provision at the neighbouring post. But you must understand that the cities do not maintain 400 horses continuously at each post. Actually they keep 200 for a month, to sustain the burdens of the post, while the other 200 are fattening. At the end of the month the fattened horses are transferred to the post while the others take their turn at grass. So they alternate perpetually.

If it happens at any point that there is some river or lake over which the couriers and mounted messengers must pass, the neighbouring cities keep three or four ferry-boats continually in readiness for this purpose. And if there is a desert to cross of many days'

journey in extent, in which no permanent habitation can be established, the city next to the desert is obliged to furnish horses to the Khan's envoys to see them across, together with provisions for their escort. But to such cities the Khan affords special aid. And in out-of-the-way posts the horses are maintained partly by the Khan himself, partly by the nearest cities, towns and villages.

When the need arises for the Great Khan to receive immediate tidings by mounted messenger, as of the rebellion of a subject country or of one of his barons or any matter that may concern him deeply, I assure you that the messengers ride 200 miles in a day, sometimes even 250. Let me explain how it is done. When a messenger wishes to travel at this speed and cover so many miles in a day, he carries a tablet with the sign of the gersfalcon as a token that he wishes to ride post haste. If there are two of them, they set out from the place where they are on two good horses, strongly built and swift runners. They tighten their belts and swathe their heads and off they go with all the speed they can muster, till they reach the next post-house twenty-five miles away. As they draw near they sound a sort of horn which is audible at a great distance, so that horses may be got ready for them. On arrival they find two fresh horses, ready harnessed, fully rested, and in good running form. They mount there and then, without a moment's breathing-space, and are no sooner mounted than off they go again, taking the last ounce out of their horses and not pausing till they reach the next post, where they find two more horses harnessed as before. Then up and off again. And so it goes on till evening. That is how these messengers manage to cover 250 miles a day with news for the Great Khan. Indeed, in extreme urgency, they can achieve 300 miles. In such cases they ride all night long; and if there is no moon the men of the post run in front of them with torches as far as the next post. But they cannot ride as fast by night as by day, because they are delayed by the slower pace of the runners. Messengers who can endure the fatigue of such a ride as this are very highly prized.

Now let me tell you something of the bounties that the Great Khan confers upon his subjects. For all his thoughts are directed towards helping the people who are subject to him, so that they may live and labour and increase their wealth. You may take it for a fact that he sends emissaries and inspectors throughout all his dominions and kingdoms and provinces to learn whether any of his people have suffered a failure of their crops either through weather or through locusts or other pests. And if he finds that any have lost their harvest, he exempts them for that year from their tribute and even gives them some of his own grain to sow and to eat – a magnificent act of royal bounty. This he does in the summer. And in winter he does likewise in the matter of cattle. If he finds any man whose cattle have been killed by an outbreak of plague, he gives him some of his own, derived from the tithes of other provinces, and to help him further he relieves him of tribute for the year.³⁸

Again, if it should happen that lightning strikes any flock of sheep or herd of other beasts, whether the herd belongs to one person or more and no matter how big it may be, the Great Khan will not take tithe of it for three years. And similarly if it chances to strike a ship laden with merchandise, he will not have any due or share of the cargo, because he accounts it an ill omen when lightning strikes any man's possessions. He reasons: 'God must have been angry with this man, since He launched a thunderbolt at him.' Therefore he does not wish that such possessions, struck by the wrath of God, should find their way into his treasury.'

Here is another benefit that he confers.

Along the main highways frequented by his messengers and by merchants and other folk, he has ordered trees to be planted on both sides, two paces distant from one another. They are so large that they can be seen from a long way off. And he has done this so that any wayfarer may recognize the roads and not lose his way. For you will find these wayside trees in the heart of the wilderness; and a great boon they are to travellers and traders. They extend throughout every province and every kingdom.³⁹ Where the roads traverse sandy deserts or rocky mountain ranges, so that it is not possible to plant trees, he has other land-marks set up in the form of cairns or pillars to indicate the track. He has certain officials whose duty it is to ensure that these are always kept in order. Besides the reasons already mentioned, he is all the more willing to have these trees planted because his soothsayers and astrologers declare that he who causes trees to be planted lives long.

You must know that most of the inhabitants of the province of Cathay drink a wine such as I will describe to you. They make a drink of rice and an assortment of excellent spices, prepared in such a way that it is better to drink than any other wine. It is beautifully clear and it intoxicates more speedily than any other wine, because it is very heating.

Let me tell you next of stones that burn like logs. It is a fact that throughout the province of Cathay there is a sort of black stone, which is dug out of veins in the hillsides and burns like logs. These stones keep a fire going better than wood. I assure you that, if you put them on the fire in the evening and see that they are well alight, they will continue to burn all night, so that you will find them still glowing in the morning⁴⁰ They do not give off flames, except a little when they are first kindled, just as charcoal does, and once they have caught fire they give out great heat. And you must know that these stones are burnt throughout the province of Cathay. It is true that they also have plenty of firewood. But the population is so enormous and there are so many bath-houses and baths continually being heated, that the wood could not possibly suffice, since there is no one who does not go to a bath-house at least three times a week and take a bath, and in winter every day, if he can manage it. And every man of rank or means has his own bathroom in his house, where he takes a bath. So it is clear that there could never be enough wood to maintain such a conflagration. So these stones, being very plentiful and very cheap, effect a great saving of wood.⁴¹

To return to the provision of grain, you may take it for a fact that the Great Khan, when he sees that the harvests are plentiful and corn is cheap, accumulates vast quantities of it and stores it in huge granaries, where it is so carefully preserved that it remains unspoilt for three or four years. So he builds up a stock of every sort of grain – wheat, barely, millet, rice, panic, and others – in great abundance. Then, when it happens that some crops fail and there is a dearth of grain, he draws on these stocks. If the price is running at a bezant for a measure of wheat, for instance, he supplies four measures for the same sum. And he releases enough for all, so that everyone has plenty of corn to meet his needs. In this way he sees to it that none of his subjects need ever go short. And this he does throughout all parts of his empire.

Let me now tell you how the Great Khan bestows charity on the poor people of Khan-balik. When he learns that some family of honest and respectable people have been impoverished by some misfortune or disabled from working by illness, so that they have no means of earning their daily bread, he sees to it that such families (which may consist of six to ten persons or more) are given enough to cover their expenses for the whole year. These families, at the time appointed, go to the officials whose task it is to

superintend the Great Khan's expenditure and who live in a palatial building assigned to their office. And each one produces a certificate of the sum paid to him for his subsistence the year before, and provision is made for them at the same rate this year. This provision includes clothing inasmuch as the Great Khan receives a tithe of all the wool, silk, and hemp used for cloth-making. He has these materials woven into cloth in a specially appointed building in which they are stored. Since all the crafts are under obligation to devote one day a week to working on his behalf, he has this cloth made up into garments, which he gives to the poor families in accordance with their needs for winter and for summer wear. He also provides clothing for his armies by having woollen cloth woven in every city as a contribution towards the payment of its tithe.

You must understand that the Tartars according to their ancient customs, before they became familiar with the doctrines of the idolaters, never used to give any alms. Indeed, when a poor man came to them, they would drive him off with maledictions, saying: 'Go with God's curse upon you! If he had loved you as he loves me, he would have blessed you with prosperity!' But since the sages of the idolaters, in particular the *Bakhshi* of whom I have spoken above, preached to the Great Khan that it was a good work to provide for the poor and that their idols would be greatly pleased by it, he was induced to make such provision as I have described. No one who cares to go to his court in quest of bread is ever turned away empty handed. Everyone receives a portion. And not a day passes but twenty or thirty thousand bowls of rice, millet, and panic are doled out and given away by the officials appointed. And this goes on all the year round. For this amazing and stupendous munificence which the Great Khan exercises towards the poor, all the people hold him in such esteem that they revere him as a god.⁴²

There are also in the city of Khan-balik, including Christians, Saracens, and Cathayans, about 5,000 astrologers and soothsayers, for whom the Great Khan makes yearly provision of food and clothing as he does for the poor. These regularly practise their art in the city. They have a sort of almanack in which are written the movements of the planets through the constellations, hour by hour and minute by minute, throughout the year. Every year these astrologers, Christian, Saracen, and Cathayan, each sect on its own account, examine in this almanack the course and disposition of the whole year and of each particular moon. For they search out and discover what sort of conditions each moon of the year will produce in accordance with the natural course and disposition of the planets and constellations and their special influences: in such-and-such a month there will be thunderstorms, in another earthquakes, in another lightning and heavy rain, in yet another deadly outbreaks of pestilence and wars and civil dissensions. And so month by month in accordance with their findings. And they will declare that so it should happen in harmony with the natural and orderly sequence of things, but God may send more or less. So they will make many little booklets in which they will set down everything that is due to happen in the course of the year, moon by moon. These booklets are called *tacuum* and are sold at a groat apiece to anyone who cares to buy, so that he may know what will happen throughout the year. And those who prove to be the most accurate in their predictions will be reckoned the most accomplished masters of their art and will gain the greatest honour.

If anyone proposes to embark on some important enterprise or to travel somewhere on a trading venture or on other business, or has in mind some other project whose outcome he would like to know, he will consult the astrologers, telling them the year, month, hour, and minute of his nativity. This he is able to do, because in accordance

with their custom everyone is taught from birth what he must say about his nativity, and parents are careful to note the particulars in a book. They divide the years into cycles of twelve, each with its own sign: the first bears the sign of the lion, the second of the ox, the third of the dragon, the fourth of the dog, and so on up to twelve. So, when a man is asked when he was born, he answers 'in a year of the lion, on such-and-such a day or night, hour, and minute of such and such a moon', according as the time and the year-sign may have been. When they have completed the cycle of twelve years, they begin again at the first sign and repeat the series, always in the same order. So, when anyone asks an astrologer or soothsayer how his proposed venture will turn out and tells him the hour and minute of his nativity and the sign of the year, then the soothsayer, having ascertained under which constellation and which planet he was born, will predict in due sequence all that is to happen to him on his travels and what fortune good or bad, will attend his undertaking. Likewise, the inquirer may be warned, if he is a merchant, that the planet then in the ascendant will be hostile to his venture, so that he should wait the ascendancy of one more favourable; or that the constellation directly facing the gate by which he is planning to leave the city will be adverse to the one under which he was born, so that he should leave by another gate or wait till the constellation has moved past; or that in such a place and on such a date he will encounter robbers, in another he will be assailed by rain and storm, in another his horse will break a leg, here his trafficking will involve him in loss, there it will bring in a profit. So the soothsayer will foretell the vicissitudes of his journey, propitious or disastrous, according to the sequence of favourable or unfavourable constellations.

As I have already said, the people of Cathay are all idolaters. Every man has in his house an image hanging on his chamber wall which represents the High God of Heaven, or at least a tablet on which the name of God is written. And every day they cense this with a thurible and worship it with uplifted hands, gnashing their teeth three times and praying that the god will give them a long and happy life, good health, and a sound understanding. From him they ask nothing else. But down below on the ground they have another image representing Natigai, the god of earthly things, who guides the course of all that is born on earth. They make him with a wife and children and worship him in the same way, with incense and gnashing of teeth and uplifted hands; and to him they pray for good weather and harvests and children and the like.

They surpass other nations in the excellence of their manners and their knowledge of many subjects, since they devote much time to their study and to the acquisition of knowledge. They speak in an agreeable and orderly manner, greet one another courteously with bright and cheerful faces, are dignified in their demeanour, cleanly at table, and so forth. But they have no regard for the welfare of their souls, caring only for the nurture of their bodies and for their own happiness. Concerning the soul, they believe indeed that it is immortal, but in this fashion. They hold that as soon as a man is dead he enters into another body; and according as he has conducted himself well or ill in life, he passes from good to better or from bad to worse. That is to say, if he is a man of humble rank and has behaved well and virtuously in life, he will be reborn after death from a gentlewoman and will be a gentleman, and thereafter from the womb of a noblewoman and will become a nobleman; and so he follows an ever upward path culminating in assumption into the Deity. But, if he is a man of good birth and has behaved badly, he will be reborn as the son of a peasant; from a peasant's life he will pass to a dog's and so continually downwards.

They treat their father and mother with profound respect. If it should happen that a child does anything to displease his parents or fails to remember them in their need, there is a department of state whose sole function it is to impose severe penalties on those who are found guilty of such ingratitude.

Perpetrators of various crimes who are caught and put in prison, if they have not been set free⁴³ at the time appointed by the Great Khan for the release of prisoners, which recurs every three years, are then let out; but they are branded on the jaw, so that they may be recognized.

The present Khan prohibited all the gambling and cheating that used to be more prevalent among them than anywhere else in the world. To cure them of the habit he would say: 'I have acquired you by force of arms and all that you possess is mine. So, if you gamble, you are gambling with my property.' He did not, however, make this a pretext to take anything from them.

I will not omit to tell you about the behaviour of the Khan's people and noblemen when they come into his presence. First, all those who are within half a mile from the Great Khan, wherever he may be, show their reverence for his majesty by conducting themselves deferentially, peaceably, and quietly so that no hubbub or uproar may be heard, nor the voice of anyone shouting or talking loudly. Next, every baron or nobleman continually carries with him a little vessel of pleasing design into which he spits so long as he is in the hall, so that no one may make so bold as to spit on the floor; and when he has spat he covers it up and keeps it. Likewise they have handsome slippers of white leather, which they carry about with them. When they have come to court, if they are about to enter the hall at the Lord's invitation, they put on these white slippers and hand their others to the attendants, so as not to dirty the beautiful and elaborate carpets of silk, wrought in gold and other colours.

NOTES

1. R [Ramusio's Italian edition of the text] adds that for military skill he was reckoned the wisest and most experienced commander the Tartars had ever had.
2. The two following paragraphs occur only in R, which also adds that the troops levied were drawn from within a radius of ten days' journey from Khan-balik and that Kubilai set guards on the passes to prevent the news from reaching Nayan and Kaidu.
3. R explains that the astrologers performed their divinations before the whole army, and that this was a stock device of the Great Khans to encourage their troops. R's account of the battle is fuller than that of F, and some details from it have been included in the translation.
4. VB speaks of two-stringed instruments producing a pleasing melody (cf. p. 315).
5. R adds that, though he had been secretly baptized, he had not hitherto acted as a Christian; and that his army included countless Christians, who were all killed.
6. The remainder of this paragraph and all the next occur only in R.
7. R adds that the Khan has twelve wise barons, charged with observing and reporting on the military operations of the captains and soldiers.
8. The Venetian *saggio* weighed about $\frac{1}{6}$ oz.
9. R adds that he may commandeer a whole royal army as a bodyguard.
10. The following paragraph is taken mainly from R, which has a much fuller version than the MSS.
11. The name of Kubilai's son was actually Chinkim. R adds that he had been confirmed in his seigniorship during his father's lifetime. His son Temur succeeded Kubilai in 1294.

12. R gives a somewhat fuller description of the palace, of which some particulars have been incorporated in the translation. He mentions a third (outermost) wall, a square with each side eight miles in length, surrounded by a ditch; it has a gate in the middle of each side, through which enter the crowds who throng there, after which comes a space of a mile where the troops are stationed. This may refer to the city wall.
13. R adds that it abuts on the inner curtain wall to the north, leaving an empty space to the south where the barons and soldiers parade.
14. In the following section the translation is based mainly on R. which is fuller than the MSS and is the only source for the story of Ahmad (see Introduction, p. 25). For the sake of convenience the component parts have been rearranged in an order differing from that in R and still more from that in the MSS.
15. Possibly a reference to public execution.
16. One MS ([that is designated] FG) adds that silk, being cheap and plentiful, takes the place of flax, which is not grown here, and of cotton and hemp, which are scarce.
17. The titles *Ch'ien-hu* and *Wan-hu* (*Cenchu* and *Vanchu* in R) mean respectively commander of 1,000 and of 10,000.
18. The following paragraph is in R only.
19. One version (LA [a Latin MS]) says 'his first wife'.
20. This form of greeting is given by R only.
21. R adds that the horses, if not pure white, are mainly white; that white horses are very plentiful in these parts, and that whatever a province presents to the Khan, whether it be horses, pieces of gold or cloth, or anything else, the number given must amount to nine times nine.
22. In R's version it is the dignitary only who applies the incense, while the others do reverence.
23. R adds that each robe lasts for ten years, more or less.
24. The foregoing sentence is found only in R, but is implied by the following sentence in F.
25. V adds: 'and then they draw in towards each other'.
26. The rest of this paragraph is in R only.
27. R adds that when he is hawking he confines himself to two elephants or even one, so as to pass more easily through narrow defiles, and that he adopts this mode of transport because he suffers from gout.
28. V: 'twelve gentlemen and twelve ladies'.
29. R adds: 'after a long fight'.
30. L adds that there is direct access from one tent to the other.
31. Probably there is an omission here, so that 'they' does not refer to these commoners. According to R these three classes are forbidden to hunt or hawk anywhere in the Khan's dominions. Barons and knights are normally permitted; but within a certain distance of the Khan's residence, ranging from five to fifteen days' journey, they must be enrolled under the captain of falconers or possess a special privilege.
32. The preceding five sentences and a few minor details included in this section are found only in R. This account of Chinese paper money, apart from its general economic misconceptions, raises several technical questions that are still unresolved.
33. R adds that the traders are allowed a profit on the exchange, and if they come from regions where the paper money is not current, they invest it in other goods that have a value in their own countries.
34. Only R gives the following section in full; the MSS have a shorter version in which, apparently by an accidental omission, only one council is mentioned.
35. R adds that the Khan sends people to live at these places and till the soil and serve the posts, so that they grow into good-sized villages.
36. There is evidently some confusion about the foregoing figures. The following paragraph occurs only in R.
37. The three following paragraphs are based mainly on R, who gives a much fuller version than the MSS.

38. The following paragraph is in R only.
39. The remainder of the paragraph is in R only.
40. The remainder of the paragraph is in R only.
41. It is surprising that a Venetian should regard coal as a curiosity at a time when Londoners were already complaining of the smog caused by 'sea coal' from the Tyne.
42. The two preceding paragraphs are based mainly on R; the MSS have a shorter and rather confused version, omitting all reference to the teaching of the 'idolaters'. The following section appears only in R and (in part) Z [a Latin compendium MS].
43. This word (*spacciati* in R) may possibly mean 'dispatched by strangling'.

KHUBILAI KHAN: HIS LIFE AND TIMES

Morris Rossabi



CHAPTER SEVEN

MISMANAGEMENT AND THE CHINESE RESPONSE

The year 1279 proved to be a watershed in Khubilai's reign. Until that time, he had scarcely experienced any failures in his undertakings. Though he had not met with an unbroken series of triumphs, neither had he encountered a serious reversal. Before his accession to the throne, he had organized his appanage so smoothly that he had garnered the support of his Chinese subjects and had readily secured the taxes and other obligations he demanded from them. His campaign against Tai-li in Southwest China had been a resounding success. Having attracted to his domain a distinguished and dedicated group of advisers who helped design an appropriate government for his territory, he was prepared to rule an even larger realm. He had presided over and resolved an important Buddhist-Taoist debate. Thus, even before he became the Great Khan, he had met with successes as an administrator, as a military commander, and as a cultural arbiter, all of which would serve him well.

When he took the throne, he was relentless in pursuing his objectives. He crushed all opposition, including that of his younger brother. His advisers and he established a government based on Chinese models but not dominated by Chinese ideals and forms. His two capitals at Shang-tu and Ta-tu were well-planned, functional, and beautiful. He had, through a carefully considered policy, gained favor with most of the religious leaders in his realm. His armies had succeeded in asserting Mongol control over Korea and Mongolia, had somewhat dissipated the military threat of his chief enemy in Central Asia, and had conquered the rest of China. He had encouraged the creative arts and had recruited some of the ablest artisans in the land to produce exquisite craft articles for the court and the elite and for use in foreign trade. Khubilai's most conspicuous failure was the abortive invasion of Japan, but he could rationalize this defeat by blaming it on the natural disaster, the terrible storm, that devastated his forces. Moreover, he intended to avenge himself on the Japanese for what he perceived to be a temporary setback. The fiasco along the Japanese coast was, he believed, merely bad luck. All else in the first two decades of his reign seemed to be proceeding smoothly.

But appearances, in this case, were deceptive. Some difficult problems lay beneath the surface. They could erupt if the occasion arose, particularly if Khubilai suffered a

significant setback in any of his domestic or foreign policies. Some Confucian scholars, whose previously prestigious positions had been downgraded by Khubilai's policies, were not reconciled to this change in status. The dissatisfaction with Khubilai became even more pronounced with the amalgamation of the Southern Sung into the Yüan domains. The Confucian scholars in the North had adjusted to cooperation with foreign rulers because the Liao and Chin, both dynasties governed by foreigners, had dominated part or all of North China from the tenth century on and had employed Chinese bureaucrats to help them administer their domains. The scholars in the South, however, had not experienced foreign rule, and many refused to collaborate with the Mongols. They pursued nonpolitical interests and awaited the development of failures and weaknesses in the Mongol system that might lead to its downfall.

Khubilai himself began to slow down after 1279. Now in his late sixties, he was afflicted with health problems. Gout plagued him and made it difficult for him to walk. He grew heavier and was drinking heavily. These personal problems contributed to his political problems.

AḤMAD AND FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES

The most pressing problem he faced was finances. Khubilai's policies in the first two decades of his rule entailed great expenditures. The building projects he initiated, the construction of capitals at Shang-tu and Ta-tu, required vast outlays. Khubilai's patronage of the arts and his even more lavish entertainments, feasts, and hunts consumed a growing share of the court's and country's income.¹ The establishment of postal stations, the building of roads, the promotion of agriculture, and the maintenance of public work projects added to the court's expenditures.

Yet the cost of Khubilai's military campaigns was probably more worrisome. His sorties against his younger brother Arigh Böke and the rebel Li T'an were essential to his survival as the ruler of China. His military support for the Korean king and his dispatch of his son Nomukhan to combat the threat posed by Khaidu in Central Asia were vital to the defense of his borders. His conquest of the Southern Sung, which stubbornly resisted all his peace overtures and his demand to accept his authority, offered control over a vital region. These expeditions were expensive, but the political gains compensated for their costliness. The planned invasion of Japan was not as critical. And the expenses for this overseas campaign were not as easy to justify. Yet Khubilai, as a Mongol leader, had to avenge himself against Japan's blow to his prestige—its unwillingness to accept him as its nominal ruler. The combination of public works, construction projects, and military expeditions could not be sustained without additional revenues.

To obtain the needed funds, Khubilai sought assistance from the infamous Muslim finance minister, Aḥmad.² Khubilai here simply adopted the same policies as his predecessors Ögödei and Möngke, who had employed Muslims as financial administrators and governors. Little is known of Aḥmad's early life and career except that he was a native of Central Asia, having been born in a town not far from modern Tashkent.³ The Yüan dynastic history classifies him as one of the "three villainous ministers" (the others were Sangha and Lu Shih-jung), and Chinese and Western sources alike revile him for exploiting and oppressing the Chinese.⁴ Marco Polo believed that Aḥmad had "bewitched" Khubilai with his "spells." According to Marco, Khubilai's support

allowed Aḥmad to acquire a fortune and to indulge his sexual appetite. He tells us that

there was no fair lady whom if he [Aḥmad] wanted her, he did not have at his will, taking her for wife if she was not married, or otherwise making her consent. And when he knew that anyone had some pretty daughter, he had his ruffians who went to the father of the girl saying to him, What wilt thou do? Thou hast this daughter of thine. Give her for wife to the Bailo [Aḥmad] and we will make him give thee such a governorship or such an office for three years.⁵

In his defense, it must be said that Aḥmad knew that he would be judged by the amount of revenue he collected for the court. The more funds he raised, the greater his power, prestige, and income. According to the Chinese accounts, he abused his power and imposed an inordinate tax burden on the Chinese. He profited from his position, to be sure, but it must be remembered that his accusers (i.e. those who wrote the Chinese accounts) were officials unsympathetic to his policies.

Aḥmad's main financial goals, simply stated, were to register all eligible taxpayers, to impose state monopolies on certain products, and to increase tax revenues. From 1262, when he was appointed to the Central Secretariat, until his death in 1282, he directed the state financial administration.⁶ One of his first tasks was to enroll taxable households that had not been included in earlier tax lists. In 1261, some 1,418,499 households in North China were listed in tax registers; by 1274, the number had been increased to 1,967,898 households.⁷ A regular system of land taxation was instituted. In addition, the revenue from the taxes on merchants grew from 4,500 ingots of silver in 1271 to 450,000 ingots by 1286 (the first figure leaves out revenues from merchants in South China that the second figure includes; however, there was a significant increase in both the North and the South).⁸ Aḥmad also attempted to use the state monopolies for additional revenue. He established quotas for the monopolized goods that were to be turned over to the government. Chun-hsü chou in Honan, for example, had a quota of 1,037,070 catties (*chin*) of iron, 200,000 of which would be fashioned into farm tools and sold to farmers in return for grain.⁹ Revenues from the salt monopoly grew from 30,000 *ting* in 1271 to 180,000 *ting* by 1286.¹⁰ In 1276, Aḥmad forbade private production of copper tools, reserving that privilege for the government.¹¹ Even earlier, he had instituted state monopolies on tea, liquor, vinegar, gold, and silver, all of which were profitable. Control bureaus (*t'i-chü ssu*) were founded to supervise the laborers and merchants who worked on the monopolies and to prevent private trade in these products.¹² In short, Aḥmad's policies were lucrative for the state treasury.

However, the Chinese sources repeatedly accuse him of garnering handsome profits from these policies and of countenancing, if not actively encouraging, abuses. He had, according to these accounts, such awesome power that he could take advantage of his position for his own gain. Since there was no fixed price for gold and silver, he could manipulate the rates paid for the two metals for his own profit.¹³ He relinquished little in private transactions but received hoards of precious metals. His policies, including the repeated issuance of paper money, prompted many Chinese, as well as many foreigners in China, to hoard their gold and silver, provoking a loss of faith in the value of paper money.¹⁴ Such loss of faith inevitably led to inflation, as did the increased government printing of paper money. Prices for goods monopolized by the government rose throughout the 1270s, and Aḥmad capitalized on these fluctuations to enrich himself. Such abuses of the tea, salt, iron, and other monopolies were often blamed on Aḥmad.

It is difficult in the present state of research to evaluate these accusations against the Muslim finance minister. It may, in fact, be almost impossible to verify these charges. Even though these accusations were probably exaggerated, Khubilai's continued support of his finance minister harmed his standing among his Chinese subjects.

The Chinese sources also denounce Aḥmad for cronyism. Of the eleven men he chose to direct the state monopolies, four were definitely Muslims and one other may have been.¹⁵ Muslims and other non-Chinese dominated the major financial positions in government. Some Chinese were recruited into the financial administration, but they generally received low-ranking positions. One of the most damning accusations leveled at Aḥmad was that he attempted to place his inexperienced and perhaps unqualified and incapable sons in influential posts in the bureaucracy. He succeeded in having his son Mas'ūd appointed the *darughachi* of the commercial center of Hang-chow, a political plum that offered numerous opportunities for personal profit. But Aḥmad encountered opposition in naming his son Ḥusain as intendant in Ta-tu. The Minister of the Right, An-t'ung, objected that Ḥusain had no training for the position.¹⁶ This argument apparently failed to sway the court, and Ḥusain continued his climb in the bureaucracy, becoming an important official in Kiangsi by 1279. In 1270, Aḥmad sought to wangle a position as a military commander for another of his sons. The Confucian luminary Hsü Heng opposed this nomination, but Aḥmad succeeded in securing the appointment.¹⁷

Opposition to his policies provoked Aḥmad's vengefulness and resentment. He despised most of Khubilai's Confucian and Buddhist advisers, who had sharply divergent views on government policy. Shih T'ien-tse, Lien Hsi-hsien, and others among Khubilai's closest counselors repeatedly objected to Aḥmad's tax policies, arguing that the new levies were an intolerable burden on the Chinese populace. They accused him of profiteering and of having a "sycophantic character and treacherous designs."¹⁸ He, in turn, accused some of them of embezzling state funds and of unbecoming personal conduct. The Chinese sources assert that Aḥmad falsely accused one of his opponents named Ts'ui Pin, an official in Chiang-huai, of pilfering government grain and had the emperor order Ts'ui to be executed.¹⁹ Whether the source on this particular case is accurate or not, it is true that many of Aḥmad's opponents left government service in the 1270s. Unlike Ts'ui Pin, most were neither executed nor imprisoned; some retired of their own accord. Unable to limit Aḥmad's power, the Confucian scholar Hsü Heng retired from active involvement in court politics to become Director of the National College (*Kuo-tzu chien*). The Uighur Confucian Lien Hsi-hsien retired after Aḥmad accused him of embezzlement, adultery, and other improprieties.²⁰ Fortunately for Aḥmad, a number of Khubilai's advisers died of natural causes in the 1270s: Liu Ping-chung in 1274, Shih T'ien-tse in 1275, Chao Pi in 1276, Yao Shu in 1279, and Tou Mo in 1280. With the death of these opponents, Aḥmad became even more powerful at court. Aḥmad was hostile to Khubilai's non-Confucian advisers as well. He was not on good terms with the Buddhist and Taoist leaders at Khubilai's court. The death of the 'Phags-pa lama in 1280 thus rid him of still another opponent. Khubilai's edicts of 1281 circumscribing the power of the Taoists (which we shall discuss later) further bolstered Aḥmad's status.

The Persian accounts of Aḥmad's career and personality differ from the Chinese assessments. Rashīd al-Dīn writes that "Ahmad held the vizierate with honor for nearly 25 years."²¹ He is praised for promoting Chinese trade with the Muslim world and presumably for protecting Muslims within China. The Muslim records omit mention of

the charges of nepotism, exploitation, and profiteering leveled at Aḥmad in the Chinese sources. Viewed from a different perspective, however, the Chinese accusations appear less serious. Bringing relatives and like-minded associates into the government was perfectly sensible. In order for Aḥmad to overcome opposition and implement his policies, he needed to place his supporters in influential positions. The creation of such cliques was condemned by traditional Chinese thinkers, but Aḥmad recognized that he could not succeed without sympathizers, most of whom would be Muslims, in the bureaucracy. He may, in fact, have exploited the Chinese, as their historians assert, by imposing heavy taxes and high prices on essential goods monopolized by the government. But his position at court, not to mention possible promotions and rewards, depended on his ability to satisfy the seemingly insatiable revenue requirements of the Mongols. In his defense, one might say that he was merely an agent, albeit a dedicated and effective one, of the Mongol court, which had a considerable need for income.

This is not to say that he lacked interest in his own advancement and rewards. He tried, on several occasions, to increase his power and elevate his position. In 1262, he had been appointed to the Secretariat, and two years later he became a Vice Chancellor in that office. The Confucian scholars, who were apprehensive of Aḥmad's opportunity for his own aggrandizement, lobbied successfully with Khubilai to place an important figure in charge of the Secretariat. Finally Khubilai's son Chen-chin was granted jurisdiction over the Secretariat, in an attempt to prevent Aḥmad from using this agency as a power base. In 1271, Aḥmad again tried to expand his authority. He succeeded in being appointed Administrator of the Supreme Secretariat (*Shang-shu sheng*), but considerable opposition developed over the creation of this office.²² Within two years, the office was abolished, and the Secretariat was reinstated as the most important administrative agency in the government. Aḥmad no doubt sought, through his position, to increase his wealth. Many Chinese surely attempted to enrich themselves in the same way. Should Aḥmad alone be singled out for blame?

Aḥmad's financial policies had, in any case, aroused the opposition of some leading Chinese at court. Perhaps as critical, Chen-chin, who despised Aḥmad and objected to the prominent positions in government accorded to his sons and relatives, had joined the opposition. Others in the Mongol ruling elite who feared Aḥmad swelled the opposition to the Muslim financial administrator.²³ On the night of April 10, 1282, while Khubilai was in his secondary capital at Shang-tu and conveniently out of Ta-tu, a group of Chinese conspirators lured Aḥmad out of his house and assassinated him.²⁴ Shortly thereafter, Khubilai returned to the capital and executed the conspirators. Within a few months, however, Khubilai's Chinese advisers persuaded him of Aḥmad's treachery and corruption. Their charges rested partly on evidence uncovered after Aḥmad's death. A jewel that had originally been given to Khubilai for his crown was found in Aḥmad's house.²⁵ Was the precious stone planted there by Aḥmad's enemies? If not, why did his wife and son not transfer the jewel to a less conspicuous location? Why was it so easy for government officials to find it in his house? Why should Aḥmad have kept it in such an obvious place? The evidence against Aḥmad here is suspect. He may indeed have stolen government and imperial goods, but it is worth remembering that his accusers were the Chinese officials who had opposed his financial policies.²⁶ The evidence, nonetheless, impressed Khubilai, and the Great Khan had Aḥmad's corpse exhumed and hung in a bazaar at the capital; it was then placed on the ground and carts were driven over the head; finally, Khubilai's dogs were allowed to attack the corpse.

Several of Aḥmad's sons were executed, his property was confiscated, and most of the officials specifically appointed by Aḥmad were dismissed.

Yet the elimination of Aḥmad did not resolve Khubilai's financial problems. His revenue requirements became even more pressing after Aḥmad's death. Khubilai initiated several disastrous expeditions to Japan and Southeast Asia. He needed vast sums for these military campaigns, as well as for other public works projects that he began at the same time. The financial problems therefore persisted, and shortly thereafter Khubilai resorted once again to non-Chinese for help in fiscal matters. Simultaneously, by the early 1280s, Khubilai had experienced the great loss of his most faithful Chinese advisers, who died in alarming and rapid succession in the 1270s. Nearly all of the Chinese scholars whom he had so assiduously courted and recruited had died. Though the Chinese historical accounts undoubtedly overemphasize their roles and their influence on Khubilai, the advisers had clearly had intimate contact with the Great Khan prior to and during his reign. Their deaths left him bereft of reliable Chinese advisers. There were now few restraints on his non-Chinese counselors and on his own more capricious actions. Perhaps his advisers' demise also brought to mind intimations of his own mortality. Many of them were part of his generation, and quite a few were younger than he. His own death must surely have intruded on his thoughts. The sources agree that Khubilai became increasingly remote around this time. He began to lose interest in government, as he had fewer reliable counselors with whom to discuss policy matters. Particularly in the late 1280s he abdicated more and more of his responsibilities as a ruler. Officials, some of whom were not always scrupulously honest or capable, and members of Khubilai's family and retinue routinely made important decisions.²⁷

INTEGRATION OF THE SOUTHERN SUNG

Before he slowly started to relinquish his authority, Khubilai did attempt to deal with one of his most serious problems—incorporating the Southern Sung territories into the political and economic system he had organized in North China. Here, too, financial problems plagued him. The wars between the Mongols and the Southern Sung had damaged both lands and property in South China. The existing economic institutions of the Sung differed from those of the North and needed to be integrated into the Yüan structure. A truly unified and centralized China was essential if Khubilai wished to fulfill his other political and economic objectives.

Khubilai first sought to ingratiate himself with the Chinese in the South. He released many of the Sung soldiers and civilians whom his armies had captured. Several tens of thousands or perhaps as many as several hundred thousand prisoners received their freedom.²⁸ Khubilai was determined that the Sung Chinese perceive themselves not as a conquered people but simply as almost equal citizens or subjects to the Mongols of a unified China under Mongol rule. Reprisals against the Southern Chinese for opposing him would merely alienate them, without leading to the unification of the two divisions of China. His edicts and pronouncements aimed therefore at recovery of South China and at preservation of many of the traditional features of the Southern economy.²⁹ He prohibited, for example, his own people from hunting on the farmlands of the Southern Chinese.³⁰ He also established granaries in the South to store surplus grain and to ensure sufficient supplies in times of agricultural distress due to natural disaster, drought, or

other unpredictable forces.³¹ Here again he offered an indication to the Chinese of the South that he would not overturn their agrarian-based economy.

His most significant signal to the Chinese was that he did not tamper with the existing network of obligations and responsibilities. The new system he established did not, as one scholar has observed, "introduce fundamental social changes analogous to those in the North into South China."³² He did not generally confiscate land from the large estates of the dominant Southern landowners, and he confirmed those Chinese in their landholdings and in their authority on the local level. In return, he anticipated and generally received the cooperation of these landlords in maintaining order and collecting taxes. Khubilai and his government did not undermine the power of the landowners and the officials in the South; they simply added another layer—themselves—at the top of the hierarchy. The Mongols thus imposed fewer changes in the South than in the North. Large landowners were more prevalent in the South, and Khubilai found it to be in his best interests to prevent the alienation of this previously powerful group. He did expropriate some land, but much of it belonged to Chinese who remained truculently opposed to Mongol rule. Moreover, the land that was confiscated in this way was often used to benefit the entire population. On some of this land, the government founded military colonies (*t'un-t'ien*) as a means of protecting the South's borders.³³ Finally, Khubilai used part of the income from this land to pay the salaries of Southern officials.³⁴

The Mongols' economic demands on the population were also not onerous. The land taxes imposed on the Chinese were relatively mild and in times of distress were waived. As was true of their policy in the North, the Mongols emphasized the founding of *she* to promote the agrarian recovery of the South. The *she* of the South, like the ones in the North, operated charity granaries to protect the indigent—still another example of the Mongols' continuing efforts to win over all levels of Southern society.³⁵ Khubilai imposed monopolies in the South, as he had in the North. Salt, tea, and liquor, among other commodities, were monopolized by the government, but the resulting prices for these products were not burdensome.³⁶

A principal indication of Khubilai's desire to assist rather than to subvert the economy of the South emerged from his policy toward the paper money of the South. Sung China had its own system of paper money, which now needed to be integrated into the Yüan system. The conquest of the Southern Sung had undermined its paper currency, and, without some Mongol support for it, it would be virtually worthless. Yet the unification of the country necessitated one standard currency. The *hui-tzu* currency of the South could not coexist with the chung-t'ung currency devised by Khubilai and his advisers for the North. Some of Khubilai's advisers and cohorts recommended that he simply declare the Sung currency invalid. Such a policy would have caused havoc in the Sung economy and ruined many merchants and landowners, however, and Khubilai chose a course that did not damage the economic interests of the South. He allowed the Chinese of the Southern Sung to convert the *hui-tzu* for the currency of the North over a period of years.³⁷ The Northern currency would gradually supersede the *hui-tzu*. If the Mongols had refused to accept the *hui-tzu* or had demanded that it be taken out of circulation immediately, the Sung economy would surely have been disrupted. Khubilai prevented the economic chaos that might have engulfed the Sung.

Another indication of Khubilai's concern for the South's prosperity was his support for maritime commerce. His policy here did not diverge from his oft-expressed desire for expansion of foreign trade. As noted earlier, Khubilai increased the

number of Maritime Trade Superintendencies. He permitted the merchants of many overseas nations to come to the South China ports for trade. Trade developed rapidly and a variety of products reached China, contributing to the prosperity of the South.³⁸ Khubilai's and the Mongols' efforts were not altogether altruistic, for the government reaped substantial taxes from foreign trade as well as collecting useful and rare products for the court. Its support for the agrarian recovery of the South and its integration of the *hui-tzu* into the Yüan system of currency would eventually mean greater profits.

Despite Khubilai's efforts, the hostile feelings of some Chinese in the South toward the Mongols did not subside. Rebellions flared up in a number of Southern regions. Some Sung forces refused to surrender. In 1279, Ch'en Kuei-lung led remnants of the Sung troops, amounting to "several ten thousand men" according to the Chinese accounts, in Chiang-nan in a revolt against the Mongol forces. Two years elapsed before Khubilai and his soldiers crushed the rebellion, captured Ch'en, and beheaded (if we trust the Chinese histories) 20,000 of the rebel troops.³⁹ In 1284, a minor rebellion erupted in Kuang-tung, but only 10,000 or so men took part in the outbreak, which was quickly quelled. The next disturbance was not so easily suppressed. A rebel from Fukien led a more serious challenge to Khubilai's control in that region. One hundred thousand Mongol troops were needed to overwhelm these rebels and to assert Khubilai's domination over this area. This pacification of the rebels did not last long, for troublesome insurrections continued throughout Khubilai's reign. Many in the South were not reconciled to Mongol domination and persisted in resisting the foreigners. These continuing outbreaks compelled Khubilai in 1289 to prohibit ordinary people from Chiang-nan from possessing bows and arrows.⁴⁰ A decade after the submission of the South, Khubilai still found it necessary to eliminate as many weapons as possible from this so-called conquered territory. He was also forced to station garrison troops in the South, particularly in the cities.⁴¹ Despite all this opposition, Khubilai is cited as lenient to his enemies. According to the Chinese sources, he periodically released many of the captured rebel forces from his jails.

The Confucian scholar elite in the South was, as we have noted, ambivalent in its attitude toward cooperation with the Mongols. The intellectuals had the option of joining the Mongols and seeking to transform the so-called barbarians. Or, as loyalists, they could express their protonationalism by refusing to cooperate with Khubilai and his court. Opposing the Mongols on cultural or national grounds, they had a number of practical choices. Some retreated into their private activities, including painting, drama, and other pursuits. A few refused to serve the Mongols, feeling that the "barbarians" were uninterested in Chinese civilization and thought.⁴² Others founded special academies to pursue their own intellectual interests while simply avoiding involvement with the Mongols.⁴³ Still others actively resisted the Mongols. In sum, though a few Southern Sung intellectuals served in responsible official positions for the Mongols, Khubilai was unable to gain the allegiance of some influential, notable scholars in the South.⁴⁴ Though he permitted the Southern Chinese intellectuals great leeway as long as they fulfilled their tax obligations, he did not have mastery over and loyalty from them to the degree that he had it in North China.⁴⁵

THE GRAND CANAL

His efforts in the South having been partially stymied, Khubilai set about to fulfill the needs of his core territories. His most important concern was food supplies for the North, a perennial issue from the Sui dynasty (589–617) on. The North needed to import grain from the more fertile areas in the South. Having established his capital in Ta-tu and having organized an administration in that region, Khubilai was required to ensure a ready supply of grain for his new city. Boat transport from south to north was the best option, but two alternatives were possible. He could either transfer the grain along the eastern seacoast or he could send it via the Grand Canal, a time-honored route to the North. Each route had its proponents, and their differing proposals reveal some of the pressures on Khubilai and how he responded to these tensions in the last years of his reign.

With Khubilai's increased naval power and his support for foreign commerce, he would surely show interest in the sea route. Chu Ch'ing and Chang Hsüan, two Chinese pirates who had cooperated with Bayan in his campaigns against the Southern Sung, advocated the dispatch of rice by sea to the North.⁴⁶ In the winter of 1282, they were assigned the task of transporting substantial quantities of rice along the coast.⁴⁷ They departed from Yang-chou with one hundred and forty ships loaded with rice and sailed around the Shan-tung peninsula, arriving at their destination in the Northern port of Chih-ku by the spring of 1283.⁴⁸ Over 90 percent of the rice reached the North and only six ships were lost in the treacherous waters along the coast. Such a resounding success naturally improved the chances of securing Khubilai's support for the sea route. By 1284, Khubilai was calling for either the abolition of the government's Directorate-General of Grain Transportation (Ts'ao-yün ssu) he had established to explore the inland north-south routes or at the very least the reassignment to other positions of some of its officials.⁴⁹ Numerous court debates raged and intrigues of Byzantine complexity repeatedly surfaced before Khubilai issued an edict in which he relegated the inland waterways route to a lesser position. Khubilai was present at a few of the debates and asked some questions, but he does not seem to have played an active role in the discussions.

The sea route appeared thus to have emerged as the preferred means of transportation. In 1285, the two pirates Chu and Chang were granted a lucrative contract to bring the grain north from the South. They exploited their positions to obtain substantial profits, becoming "two of the wealthiest and most influential men in southeast China."⁵⁰ The court would probably not have objected to a degree of profiteering if sufficient grain had been received for the North, and in particular for the region around Ta-tu.⁵¹ However, bad luck in the form of a typhoon that wrecked part of the two pirates' fleet and flooding in the North that contributed to poor harvests plagued Chu and Chang and provoked the court's temporary dissatisfaction with the maritime route.

Khubilai's chief minister, Sangha, later classified as a "villainous minister," was ultimately responsible for the emphasis on the inland waterways. He proposed the lengthening of the Grand Canal almost as far as Ta-tu. This project entailed the construction of a 135-mile-long canal from Ch'ing-ning to Lin-ch'ing in Shan-tung province; from Lin-ch'ing, goods could be transshipped on the Wei river to Chih-ku, which was a short distance from Ta-tu. With such a project, grain could be transported from the Yangtze directly to Khubilai's capital. Sangha's support meant that the project would be initiated and concluded expeditiously. By February of 1289, the extension was

completed and the new canal, known as the Hui-t'ung, was opened to boat traffic.⁵² But the expenses were enormous. With about three million laborers taking part, the construction entailed a government expenditure of vast sums of money. Even so, once the canal was built, maintenance was costly; it was, in fact, not done properly, and large vessels could not employ the route. The downfall and execution of Sangha (which shall be described later), the principal patron of the inland waterway, in August of 1291 was an additional blow. Without a strong advocate at court, the resources needed for proper maintenance would simply not be provided. Khubilai, as we shall note, was by this time in failing health and scarcely able to take part in court deliberations. Only a decisive and powerful minister could see to it that his projects were implemented. In any event, the staggering costs no doubt contributed to the fiscal problems plaguing the Mongol court in the 1280s.

The two routes for grain transportation were thus extremely expensive. On the one hand, the sea route entailed large payments to Chu Ch'ing and Chang Hsüan for the purchase of grain in the South and for the use of their ships. The extension of the Grand Canal, on the other hand, required huge initial expenses for construction and additional heavy costs for maintenance. Such expenses naturally exacerbated the financial tensions of the Mongol court and made Khubilai ever more dependent on his financial advisers.

THE FISCAL POLICIES OF LU SHIH-JUNG

One of these advisers was Lu Shih-jung, who is reviled in the Chinese accounts. As one of the "three villainous ministers," Lu was associated in the Yüan dynastic history with the despised financial administrator Aḥmad. The hated Muslim is credited with offering Lu a position in the tea administration of Kiangsi.⁵³ Lu did survive after Aḥmad's death and disgrace. In fact, he received a promotion rather than being punished for his association with Aḥmad. Aḥmad's old position in the Secretariat would now be shared by two men so as to prevent the reputed abuses associated with the Muslim financial administrator. The Mongol An-t'ung was appointed the head of the Office of the Right in the Secretariat, and Lu became the head of the Office of the Left, with jurisdiction over much of the fiscal administration in Khubilai's domain.⁵⁴ In this capacity, his principal concern was to increase the government's revenues in order to meet the mounting costs at court. One way was to augment the government's income from monopolies. Lu proposed that the licenses to salt merchants be made more expensive.⁵⁵ Similarly, he protested that rich households were evading the government's liquor monopoly and brewing their own wines.⁵⁶ He demanded that the government monopoly on liquor be reimposed, assuring the court a larger share of the profits. Foreign trade, he believed, was another lucrative source of income, and he wanted the Maritime Trade Superintendencies to secure a larger share of the profits of this seaborne commerce.⁵⁷ Together with the monopolies on goods, Lu imposed government control on copper coinage and on silver, confiscating the copper coinage of the Southern Sung, for example. He also encouraged the issuance of paper money, a policy that the Chinese accounts claim fueled the inflation that characterized Khubilai's last years.⁵⁸

Lu had innumerable schemes to increase government revenues. One of them entailed the recruitment of idle Mongols into pastoral pursuits. Twenty percent of the products from the animals they cared for they would keep, and 80 percent would be used to clothe and feed the army. Lu also began to staff the tax offices of the government with

merchants, but many of them were accused of exploiting the populace and profiting from their positions.⁵⁹

Lu's economic programs engendered the same hostility as those of Aḥmad, his predecessor as financial administrator, and he received the same criticism that had earlier been directed at the feared and despised Central Asian Muslim. The Chinese sources accuse Lu of developing cliques within the government to support his policies. Like Aḥmad, he was accused of persecuting, hounding to death, and even executing his rivals and potential enemies. The accuracy of many of these charges is subject to dispute because the sources never give Lu's own version of events, only that of his opponents. In his defense it could be argued that like Aḥmad he simply attempted to raise funds desperately needed at court. Like Aḥmad, he was lambasted in the Chinese sources for his financial policies, and his efforts earned him the enmity of many of his fellow Chinese. His fate was sealed when Khubilai's son Chen-chin turned against him. Chen-chin, who had been one of Aḥmad's principal opponents, objected to Lu for the same reason that he opposed Aḥmad—he appeared to be exploiting the Chinese.⁶⁰ With Chen-chin's backing, the opposition to Lu swelled considerably until Khubilai had to dismiss him and then arrest him in May of 1285. His accusers charged him with profiteering, extorting funds from the people, and murdering some of his opponents. No one could save him at this point, and by the end of the year Khubilai had him executed.⁶¹ His removal from office and his death may have eliminated what the Chinese perceived to be an exploiter. Unfortunately, however, they did nothing to alleviate the mounting fiscal problems of the court.

SANGHA AND BUDDHIST ABUSES

Sangha (in Chinese, Sang-ko), the last of the triumvirate of "villainous ministers," was also granted great authority by Khubilai.⁶² Like Aḥmad, he derived from non-Chinese stock. His foreign origins did not endear him to the Chinese. Lu Shih-jung could at least seek to capitalize on his affinity with the people of China, but Sangha did not have the same option. He was thus in a more vulnerable position than Lu, whom he had supported. His ethnic origins are obscure. Historians have long assumed that he was a Uighur, though his biography in the Yüan dynastic history does not explicitly describe him as such.⁶³ The history does mention that he served as an interpreter of a variety of languages, including Tibetan. He may, in fact, have been, as a recent scholarly article by Luciano Petech suggests, a Tibetan whose family had assimilated some Uighur traits.

What is known of his early life and career also suggests a Tibetan origin. He was a student of Dam-pa Kun-dga'-grags (1230–1303), a learned Tibetan who had been granted the title of State Preceptor.⁶⁴ After the completion of his studies with the Tibetan erudite, he joined the staff of the 'Phags-pa lama as an interpreter. His talents were quickly recognized by the revered and influential lama, who repeatedly sent him on delicate missions to Khubilai. His successes enabled Sangha again and again to receive rewards and promotions. Khubilai apparently found Sangha to be capable and resourceful and decided to recruit him into government. Since the 'Phags-pa lama wished to return to Tibet, Khubilai had an opportunity to appoint a new official, who would be stationed in Ta-tu and would oversee the areas formerly under the lama's sole jurisdiction. Some time before 1275, he assigned Sangha to be the head of the Tsung-chih yüan, the office in charge of Tibetan and Buddhist affairs.⁶⁵ Until the 1280s, Sangha

appears to have been involved in Chinese matters only nominally. Aḥmad administered the financial affairs of China until his death in 1282, and Sangha confined himself to the limited areas under his jurisdiction. In 1280, for example, he left Ta-tu to lead an expedition to crush a rebellion in Tibet. The campaign was successful, and Sangha set about to consolidate Mongol control over Tibet. He stationed garrisons at various strategic locations in the capital and along the borders, and established an effective postal system to bring Tibet in closer touch with the rest of China.⁶⁶ Khubilai was no doubt impressed with Sangha's accomplishment in Tibet. When Sangha returned to China, Khubilai granted him ever-greater responsibilities.

With Aḥmad's death in 1282, a political vacuum was created, and Khubilai moved to fill it with Sangha. From 1282 to 1291, Sangha was the dominant figure in the government. As a result, he attracted much criticism from numerous officials and court advisers who resented his power. Even the Persian sources portray him in a harsh light. The Persian historian Rashīd al-Dīn, for example, accuses him of theft and of accepting bribes.⁶⁷ The Koreans accused Sangha of demanding Korean slave girls or concubines for his own household.⁶⁸ Numerous other aspersions on his character appear in the Chinese sources. Corruption, theft of Khubilai's and the state's property, and repeated efforts to satisfy his "disgusting" carnal appetites were the main criticisms of his private life. As with Aḥmad, it is difficult to judge the reliability of many of these accusations. Most were made some time after his downfall and execution, and some may have been later fabrications by his enemies. The incident that led to his downfall, the discovery of some purloined pearls, appears to be suspicious. The same anecdote was also used against Aḥmad. In the attack against each man, a search of the residence after the leader's disgrace and fall was an integral component. In Sangha's case, pearls were found; in Aḥmad's, it was stolen jewelry. Both incidents are highly improbable. In any case, why would a canny man like Sangha or Aḥmad leave incriminating evidence lying around his house?

Some of the most prominent men of the 1280s hurled damning accusations against Sangha. The renowned painter and official Chao Meng-fu opposed him and warned Khubilai of his nefarious intentions.⁶⁹ His fiercest opponent was the Minister of the Right, An-t'ung, who had also fervently battled against Sangha's ally and protégé Lu Shih-jung. An-t'ung, descended from one of the oldest and most distinguished Mongol families, resented Sangha's ascendancy in the government; as Minister of the Right he continually sought to undermine his authority. The tensions between the two officials intensified as Sangha proposed new ideas and pressed for their implementation. Sangha could not, however, assert his supremacy without having a more imposing title than director of the Tsung-chih yüan (Bureau of General Regulation), which in 1288 had a change of name to Hsüan-cheng yüan (Bureau of Buddhist and Tibetan Affairs). Khubilai now revived the title that Aḥmad had earlier attempted to claim as his own, but doing so drew so much opposition that he was forced to abandon the effort. In March of 1287, Khubilai appointed Sangha as Vice Minister of the Supreme Secretariat, and by December had promoted him to the Minister of the Right of that same body.⁷⁰ With this new position, Sangha would no longer need to abase himself in front of An-t'ung. He had his own secure post and could not be intimidated. This new position also enabled him to exercise more authority over all the ministries in the government.

Which of Sangha's policies attracted such hostility? One was his active support for men of the so-called Western Regions in China. He vowed to protect and advance the

interests of the non-Chinese at court and throughout China. He promoted, for example, the founding of an academy for the teaching of the Muslim languages, and in 1289 Khubilai decreed the establishment of the National College for the Study of Muslim Script.⁷¹ Sangha repeatedly served as a patron to Uighur scholars and protected them from hostile Chinese. He is credited, in particular, with sheltering a number of Uighur painters at court.⁷² As we shall note later, he also convinced Khubilai to halt a temporary and hastily organized anti-Muslim campaign in the early 1280s.⁷³ Again he appeared as the protector of the foreigners in China, a policy that did not endear him to the Chinese.

His financial policies, however, drew the sharpest reactions. Like his predecessors Aḥmad and Lu Shih-jung, he was constantly under pressure to raise additional funds for the court. Its revenue needs continued to be great, particularly with its military invasions in Southeast Asia and with a campaign against the rebellious Mongol prince Nayan in Manchuria. One way of increasing government income was to promote commerce and to tax some of the profits collected by the merchants.⁷⁴ He precipitated hostility by his call for higher taxes. He wished to increase taxes on salt, tea, and liquor among other goods, and a dramatic increase in the prices of these products surely generated even more antagonism against Sangha and his policies and led to accusations of his exploitativeness and profiteering. He was charged with seeking private profit rather than additional income for the state.⁷⁵ But his most notorious economic program entailed a reform of the paper currency. The system of paper money that was introduced at the beginning of Khubilai's reign was not in balance in the 1280s. The amount of paper money issued annually from 1260 to the mid-1270s remained relatively stable, but then, with the wars against the Sung and with the Japanese invasions, court expenditures rose dramatically, compelling a proportional growth in the printing of paper currency. A catastrophic inflation threatened to engulf the economy.⁷⁶ In April of 1287, to cope with this potentially devastating fiscal crisis, Sangha persuaded Khubilai to replace the existing paper money with an entirely new unit known as the *Chih-yüan ch'ao*, which was named after Khubilai's reign title, Chih-yüan. The old currency was converted on a five-to-one basis with the Chih-yüan notes, temporarily curbing the inflation afflicting the economy.⁷⁷ In the initial stage, the number of paper notes in circulation declined substantially, from 4,770,000 *ting* to 1,345,000 *ting*. Yet those Chinese who were forced to exchange their now less valuable old notes at less than satisfactory rates were incensed by what they perceived to be a decline in their net worth.

Like Aḥmad and Lu Shih-jung, Sangha was accused of cronyism and of persecution of his opponents. He gave many like-minded supporters promotions in their government positions, a not unnatural strategy for an official facing such relentless opposition. He executed a Censor named Wang Liang-pi, who, he claimed, had conspired against him. He intimidated and persecuted an official named Mai-shu-ting into committing suicide. Then he tried to replace these and other men whom he hounded or dismissed or executed with his own allies. Nearly all of his candidates for positions of authority were non-Chinese. He wanted the Persian Sha-pu-ting to be a prominent official in the province of Chiang-che, to supervise the coastal trade.⁷⁸ Later the Chinese sources would insinuate that he demanded and received bribes from these men to promote their careers. There is no independent way of verifying these accusations against Sangha, which blackened his reputation among the Chinese and diverted Chinese animosity from the Mongols and Khubilai to the khan's (literally) foreign ministers.⁷⁹

Sangha's reputation among the Chinese was damaged particularly by his apparent

sanction for the pillaging of the tombs of the Southern Sung emperors. Khubilai had welcomed and protected the royal family and ensured that his subordinates did not harm these former enemies. He wished in this way to ingratiate himself with the Chinese of the South. A repressive policy against them or harsh treatment of their rulers would not lead to amicable relations. The actions of a Buddhist monk named Yang Lien-chen-chia, supported by his superior Sangha, were not conducive to the improvement of relations between the khan and his officials and his Chinese subjects.

Yang, who derived from the Western Regions and may have been of Tibetan origin, had been appointed Supervisor of the Buddhist Teachings in Chiang-nan (Chiang-nan tsung-she chang shih-chiao)—or really in South China—almost as soon as the Sung dynasty had been toppled. In this office, he served under the jurisdiction of Sangha, who headed the Office of Buddhist and Tibetan Affairs for all of China. Yang could not have committed the outrageous deeds that he did without the support, or at least the acquiescence, of Sangha. Yang was interested in the aggrandizement of the Buddhists' wealth and power. With Sangha's sanction, he set about enriching the Buddhists by any means at his disposal. Since he had jurisdiction over a recently subjugated territory, he had considerable leeway to do as he chose.

Yang's first projects were the construction and renovation of Buddhist monasteries and temples in South China. Buddhist temples, formerly converted into Taoist monasteries by staunch Taoists, now reverted to their original functions, and Yang provided funds for their restoration. He also supplied the financial support for the renovations of the T'ien-i temple and the Lung-hua temple in the old Southern Sung capital.⁸⁰ The Sung rulers had used the Lung-hua temple for the ritual sacrifices to Heaven and Earth, and the Confucian Chinese in the South were naturally offended by its conversion to a Buddhist establishment. All in all, Yang is credited with restoring over thirty temples in the period from 1285 to 1287. Since many of the temples had been employed by other religions or cults, their conversion to Buddhist temples generated hostility.

Even more upsetting to the Chinese were the methods Yang used to raise funds for the construction and repair of these buildings. In 1285, he ordered his men to ransack the tombs of the Sung royal family for the valuables buried with the emperors and empresses.⁸¹ His subordinates plundered 101 temples and eventually extracted 1,700 ounces of gold, 6,800 ounces of silver, 111 jade vessels, 9 jade belts, 152 miscellaneous shells, and 50 ounces of big pearls.⁸² Yang used these precious goods to pay for the erection and restoration of the Buddhist temples. Some of the buildings in the tombs were razed, and in their place were erected Buddhist temples such as the T'ai-ning. The government even provided the building materials, including the wood. Yang then attended to the Sung palaces, which he quickly renovated and made available to the Buddhists. Some of the Sung buildings were turned into Buddhist temples and stupas. Yang justified what appeared to be desecration of the Sung tombs and palaces by pointing out that the Sung rulers had originated the practice. The Sung court had, for example, torn down the original T'ai-ning temple in the town of Shao-hsing and on its ruins had built a mausoleum for the Ning-tsung emperor. Yang was, in his view, simply restoring the site to its pre-Sung conditions. The Sung, not he, had caused the real damage.

Yang devised new economic arrangements for the construction and maintenance of the temples. To build the temples, he employed forced laborers. To provide revenues for maintenance Yang expropriated land and laborers from landowners and turned them over to the temples. The land was removed from the tax rolls, and the tenants

who farmed the land on behalf of the Buddhist establishments also received tax exemptions.⁸³ The Southern land-owners were infuriated by what seemed to them to be the high-handed expropriation of their land; they were similarly galled by the tax exemption granted to the temples. There were accusations that Yang himself benefited enormously from these policies. One account written after his downfall asserted that he commandeered or accepted as bribes 116,200 *ting* of paper money and 23,000 *mou* of land.⁸⁴ The same source reveals that Yang removed many individuals from the tax rolls; then, in return for a bribe, he registered them as tenants on the lands of the Buddhist temples. However, since his detractors and enemies were responsible for these accusations, their credibility is suspect.

Similarly, some of the other aspersions on his character must be evaluated with caution. He is reported to have demanded that the Chinese in the South provide him with beautiful young women in payment for whatever service they wished from him. The evidence for this claim is that he had several wives and concubines. Again, the case against him is not impressive, as it derives from the official histories.⁸⁵ A more serious transgression, also somewhat suspect, was the desecration of the corpses of the Sung royal family. The body of one of the last emperors, which was still well preserved, was allegedly exhumed and hung from a tree for three days. The decapitated body was then burned, and, as a final indignity, the bones were buried once again but amidst the bones of horses and cows. The Chinese condemned such disrespect.⁸⁶ The whole incident could not have provided a more perfect pretext for the Southern Chinese, who despised the intrusions of such foreigners as the Buddhist lamas, to vent their spleen. Similarly, Yang offered a perfect target for their aggression. It is difficult to determine how much credence should be given to these allegations. Yang clearly approved of the conversion of the Sung palaces and tombs into Buddhist sites, and he doubtless sanctioned the pillaging of some of the tombs, but there is no direct proof that he supported and participated in the desecration of the corpse of the Sung emperor. Why deliberately and needlessly provoke the wrath of the Southern Chinese with an act that violated Chinese sensibilities? Such a gratuitous deed seems senseless and scarcely credible. It seems likelier that the desecration was attributed to Yang after his downfall and served to justify the campaign of vilification leveled against him.

Yang's more positive traits and accomplishments can be gleaned only through inference. He was a devout Buddhist who tried to promote the interests of his religion in what he perceived to be the hostile environment of South China. There can hardly be any doubt about the sincerity of his religious views. Even his detractors acknowledge that "Yang might have seen himself as a missionary and a faithful follower of his creed, according to which the building of temples and stupas were acts of religious merit. But, being unfamiliar with Chinese ways and with Chinese ideas of loyalty and piety, he inevitably and inadvertently antagonized the population in Chiang-nan."⁸⁷ Buddhism did indeed flourish in the South during his era. For example, he provided the resources for the Fei-lai Feng rock carvings in Hang-chow, one of the most impressive Buddhist sites in China. By 1291, there were 213,148 Buddhist monks and nuns and 42,318 temples and monasteries in the country, due partly to his patronage.⁸⁸

Yet his abuses, of which there were no doubt some but not as many as the Chinese accounts would lead us to believe, rankled on the Southern Chinese and reflected on his patron Sangha. Both men were, from the standpoint of the Chinese, exploitative and oppressive. The Chinese sources repeatedly reviled them for their financial and personal misdeeds, and the accusations against Sangha by both Chinese and Mongol officials

finally compelled action. On March 16, 1291, Khubilai relieved Sangha, his most important official, of his responsibilities, stripped him of his ranks and privileges, and placed him under arrest. Khubilai delayed a judgment on his previously trustworthy minister while court officials debated Sangha's fate. They did so and quickly imposed a death sentence. Sangha was executed on August 17.⁸⁹ Some scholars have suggested that Khubilai tried to delay or even prevent the execution of his long-time minister and associate. A later Tibetan source asserts that he had grave misgivings about the death of Sangha: "The emperor [Khubilai] said: 'Now that my Sang-ko has gone this causes me great sorrow.'"⁹⁰

Though the Chinese sources overstate the case against the "three villainous ministers"—Aḥmad, Lu Shih-jung, and Sangha—Khubilai's standing with his Chinese subjects was damaged by his choice of these officials. In the early years of his reign, he had recruited numerous Chinese advisers, and some of the top officials at court and thus those with whom he had frequent dealings were Confucians. But by the 1280s the deaths of some of his leading Confucian counselors and his more pressing financial problems made him turn primarily to non-Chinese ministers. Even the Chinese officials, such as Lu Shih-jung, met with a hostile reception. The tasks these ministers faced in the 1280s were difficult and thankless, for they had to raise additional revenues for the state's needs. Whatever they did would have alienated the Chinese because they needed to impose stiff taxes on the populace. It appeared that the dynasty was careening out of control. One minister after another took charge, and each became the virtual ruler of the country. Yet within a few years each was challenged, accused of serious crimes, and eventually either executed or murdered.⁹¹ Was Khubilai, in fact, in charge? Was he aware of the empire's affairs and of his subordinates' actions? He seemed less and less in touch with the politics of his domains, pursuing policies that were on occasion diametrically opposed to those he had upheld earlier.

KHUBILAI'S PROBLEMS WITH RELIGIONS

The religious toleration that had been a cornerstone of his policies and a vital factor in the Mongols' success appeared to be abandoned. Problems with the religions of China intensified. It may seem surprising, for example, that Khubilai began in the late 1270s to issue anti-Muslim regulations. There were some justifications for these new policies. The Muslim Khaidu repeatedly threatened China's northwestern frontier lands. Farther to the west, Muslim states had thwarted Khubilai's Mongol allies and constantly challenged the Mongol governors of Persia. The Muslims had also generated hostility in China itself. Khubilai's Chinese advisers had repeatedly denounced the ambition and ruthlessness of the leading Muslim officials. Essays and popular anecdotes satirizing Muslim avarice, vulgarity, and "strangeness" started to appear at this time.⁹² Khubilai himself may have been concerned about the growing power of the Muslims in government. His own grandson, Prince Ananda, had been raised in a Muslim household, and as an adult had, according to Rashīd al-Dīn, converted most of the 150,000 troops under his command to Islam.⁹³

The Christian official known in the Chinese texts as Ai-hsüeh instigated additional anti-Muslim sentiment. Having held positions in the bureaus of astronomy and medicine, he had some influence in the Yüan government.⁹⁴ Rashīd al-Dīn accused him of inciting slaves and laborers in Muslim households to bring false charges against their

masters. And, according to Rashīd, Ai-hsüeh himself falsely accused Maulānā Burhān al-Dīn Bukhārī, one of the leaders of the Muslims in China, of a crime (unspecified by Rashīd) and had him exiled.⁹⁵

Rashīd also asserts that Khubilai, abetted by Ai-hsüeh and by his Chinese advisers, began in 1279 to adopt a harsher policy toward the Muslims. Late in that year, Muslim merchants from Central Asia arrived in court to offer gerfalcons and an eagle as tribute. Khubilai invited them to a banquet, but because the animals had not been slaughtered in the Muslim fashion they refused to eat the meat. Incensed by this refusal, Khubilai issued an edict in January of 1280 prohibiting the Muslim method of slaughtering sheep and imposing the death penalty on transgressors.⁹⁶ Khubilai demanded strict adherence to the *Jasagh* regulations on slaughtering. With encouragement from Ai-hsüeh and his followers, Khubilai also forbade the practice of circumcision. Finally, Rashīd concludes his list of accusations by noting that Ai-hsüeh and other Christians “sought to attack them [Muslims] by representing to the Qa’an that there was a verse in the Qur’an which ran: ‘Kill the polytheists, all of them.’” Obviously disturbed by this quotation from the Muslim Holy Book, Khubilai asked his Muslim advisers whether they considered him a polytheist. A Muslim sage from Samarkand finally calmed Khubilai by responding, “Thou art not a polytheist since thou writest the name of the Great God at the head of thy *yarlighs* [edicts]. Such a one is a polytheist who does not recognize God, and attributes companions to Him, and rejects the great God.”⁹⁷ Khubilai was apparently satisfied with this response, but, according to Rashīd, he was not deterred from his policy of restricting the Muslims.

Whether all the specific incidents recounted by Rashīd actually took place is difficult to tell, but the Chinese sources confirm that the court issued a series of anti-Muslim edicts. On January 27, 1280, it imposed the death penalty for anyone slaughtering an animal in the Muslim way.⁹⁸ Earlier it had levied taxes and demanded corvée labor from the Muslims.⁹⁹ Khubilai was apparently concerned about an overly powerful Muslim presence in the government and about a possible rebellion precipitated by the exactions of the Muslims. Khubilai’s repressive edicts thus were inspired more by political considerations than by hatred of Islam.

The anti-Muslim policy persisted until 1287. In that year, Sangha pleaded with Khubilai to reverse his policy toward the Muslims. He argued that “all the Muslim merchants have departed from hence [i.e. China] and no merchants are coming from the Muslim countries; . . . and all this because for the past seven years they have not slaughtered sheep. If it be so commanded, the merchants will come and go.”¹⁰⁰ If the court changed its policies, the revenues derived from Muslim merchants would increase. Rashīd asserts that several Muslim leaders bribed Sangha to champion their cause. Whatever Sangha’s motivation, Khubilai relented and dispensed with the anti-Muslim regulations; however, one incident recounted in the Chinese histories illustrates Khubilai’s less than welcoming attitude toward some Muslim traders. In 1293, a Muslim merchant sought to sell pearls to Khubilai, but the Great Khan declined this offer, noting that his money could be better spent to “relieve the people.”¹⁰¹

Yet Khubilai was not wholly consistent, for he did not forswear the recruitment of Muslims for his government. Undogmatic Muslims with administrative or fiscal skills were not ignored or discriminated against. Khubilai did, for example, select the Central Asian Muslim, Saiyid Ajall Shams al-Dīn, to govern the newly conquered territory of Yün-nan. This region, now a province in Southwest China, was the only land in China to be ruled by a Muslim. The motives underlying this appointment are puzzling.

Perhaps Khubilai looked upon Yün-nan as an important thoroughfare in trade with Burma and India, and, since the Muslims were the most significant merchants in the Mongol dominions, a Muslim governor for Yün-nan appeared logical. Or he may have perceived of Yün-nan as a fine territory in which to settle some of the Muslims whom the Mongols had moved eastward from Central Asia and Persia. Yün-nan was still sparsely inhabited, and its inhabitants were primarily illiterate non-Chinese peoples. Khubilai may have decided that it was more sensible to encourage the Muslims to colonize the region than to try to colonize with Chinese, who were more hostile to Mongol rule. Or the court may have simply delegated governing power to Saiyid Ajall because it considered him a loyal, trustworthy subject.

When he was appointed governor of Yün-nan in 1274, Saiyid's first objectives were to strengthen the military and economic control of the Yüan dynasty in the region. Before taking up his post, he studied Yün-nan's topography, economy, and customs. Once he reached the region, he sought to gain the confidence of the native non-Chinese peoples. Though he established guards and garrisons throughout the region, he instructed his soldiers not to provoke the "barbarians." When several of his officers deliberately attacked some native people, he executed them.¹⁰² With such fair and even-handed policies, he quickly won over much of the non-Chinese population. He also moved rapidly to create a postal system for communications, defense, and commerce. Yün-nan prospered under his policies. He encouraged the growth of agriculture, ordering his men to teach farming and forestry to the local people. Before his arrival, the people of Yün-nan "had no rice of any variety, no mulberry trees, and no hemp."¹⁰³ Probably Saiyid's most significant contribution to the economy was his promotion of irrigation projects in the Kun-ming region, some of which were still used in the twentieth century. He built reservoirs and dams, so that floods and droughts would not impair the farming season.¹⁰⁴ His Muslim subjects improved conditions of trade, and he permitted the use of the traditional cowry shells as a medium of exchange in order to inspire the local people to engage in commerce. Finally, he lightened the tax and corvée burdens on the population, making it easier for them to accept Mongol rule.

Despite his own background, Saiyid did not impose Islam on Yün-nan. Had Saiyid been a militant Muslim, Khubilai would surely not have entrusted him with the responsibility of governing. Saiyid introduced Chinese customs and culture in Yün-nan. He promoted the use of Chinese marital and funeral ceremonies, built Confucian schools, and made available copies of the Confucian classics. Though he constructed two mosques, he also built a Confucian temple and a Buddhist monastery.¹⁰⁵ In short, he intended to sinicize, not to Islamicize, Yün-nan, and the same was true for those of his sons who resided and became officials in Yün-nan. Saiyid died in 1279 (and in 1297 was posthumously awarded the title of Hsien-yang wang, or Prince of Hsien-yang). Two of his sons, Nāṣir al-Dīn and Mas'ūd, succeeded him as governors of Yün-nan,¹⁰⁶ and they continued their father's policies in the area. Nāṣir al-Dīn, in addition, participated in military campaigns in Burma and Annam and served as an official in Shensi and at the capital.¹⁰⁷ In April of 1292, however, he was accused of stealing 130,000 *ting* of paper money and then executed.¹⁰⁸ His four brothers were not implicated and continued to hold influential positions in Yün-nan, Kuang-tung, and Kiangsi, where they received numerous honors and rewards.

Despite Saiyid's accomplishments and the trust Khubilai showed in him and his sons, the Great Khan's relations with the Muslims remained unsettled and somewhat hostile throughout the 1280s. The earlier, balanced relationship was rendered askew. In former

times, Khubilai had taken great pains to ensure no officially sanctioned discrimination against the Muslims because he realized that serious difficulties would ensue if he alienated the small but influential Muslim minority in China. In the 1280s this tolerant and more balanced view was suddenly overturned, as Khubilai temporarily subverted one of his cardinal precepts.

Similarly, a crisis bedeviled his relations with the Buddhists and Taoists. The Buddhist-Taoist debates of 1258, over which Khubilai had presided, had presumably concluded the strife that had plagued the leadership of these religions. However, the underlying hostility repeatedly surfaced, and the incorporation of the Southern Sung intensified the animosity. The Taoists, instead of abiding by the decisions made at the 1258 debates, challenged the Buddhists at every opportunity.

A series of incidents involving the two groups culminated in a major confrontation in 1281. As early as 1276 Khubilai's son Manggala had cautioned the Taoists not to "commit unlawful deeds, saying they have a writ."¹⁰⁹ The Taoists apparently ignored this warning, for late in 1280 they, according to the Chinese accounts, deliberately started a fire at the Ch'ang-ch'un Taoist temple in Ta-tu and tried to place the blame on a Buddhist monk named Kuang Yüan.¹¹⁰ Khubilai assigned several officials to investigate this suspicious fire, and they reputedly uncovered the Taoists' scheme. The Great Khan did not show any mercy toward the guilty. Two of the Taoists were executed; one had his nose and ears chopped off; and six others were exiled.¹¹¹ This incident prompted the Buddhists to seek government investigations of other Taoist abuses and excesses. The court discovered, according to the Buddhist sources, that the Taoist texts that had been banned since 1258 were still circulating and that the printing blocks for these works had been preserved. Khubilai was enraged by this evidence of gross insubordination and illegality. Late in 1281, he ordered that all Taoist texts, other than Lao Tzu's *Tao te ching*, be burned and that the printing blocks be totally and irrevocably smashed and obliterated.¹¹² Similarly, he imposed restrictions on Taoist charms, incantations, and magic. The Taoists sold charms and amulets that promised enormous profits for merchants, longevity for men, happy marriages for men and women, and a bountiful posterity for all families.¹¹³ Khubilai, who disapproved of these claims, forbade the sale of the charms. Simultaneously, he forced some of the Taoist monks to convert to Buddhism. Finally, he dispatched emissaries from among the Buddhists to enforce these regulations.

Khubilai's policies did resolve his difficulties with the Taoists, though the Buddhists, who were now dominant, continued, as we have already noted and will document even further, to create problems for him and for the dynasty. Khubilai had not meant to suppress Taoism: his principal objective was to curb Taoist abuses. To manifest his support for the more responsible and less belligerent Taoists, he had deliberately recruited their leaders to participate in the investigation of their co-religionists. Chang Tsung-yen, the T'ien-shih or "Celestial Master" (often inaccurately referred to in the West as the "Taoist Pope"), was part of the delegation that pored over the Taoist books and decided which were forged and ought to be destroyed. Khubilai appointed Chang as the supervisor of Taoist affairs in South China.¹¹⁴ On several occasions, Khubilai sent gifts of silk and incense to the Taoist master in order to keep on good terms with this important leader. In return, Chang offered sacrifices for the dead, prayed for an end to a particularly severe drought, and practiced magic to change the weather or to cure illnesses.¹¹⁵

The Buddhists, who had gained a smashing victory in 1281, gloated over their defeat

of their religious rivals. Apparently they also abused their power. They had been favored by Khubilai from the early days of his reign, and after 1281 the Buddhist monks became increasingly assertive, even brazen. The Chinese sources offer detailed descriptions of the abuses of such Buddhists as Sangha and Yang Lien-chen-chia. Throughout the 1280s, the Buddhists acquired more and more wealth, land, and authority.¹¹⁶ As they persisted in their acquisitiveness, they began to alienate the Chinese, who saw them as foreigners. The Mongols, as foreigners, also were tarnished by their deference toward and support of the Buddhists, particularly those from Tibet or from outside of China.¹¹⁷

The conquest of the Southern Sung in 1279 was the high point of Khubilai's reign. But there was considerable hostility toward him in the South. Despite his solicitousness and his economic support, some Chinese scholar-officials in the South refused to cooperate with him. The 1280s witnessed a series of domestic disasters. Khubilai's need for additional revenues caused him to depend on three chief ministers—Aḥmad, Lu Shih-jung, and Sangha—who alienated the Chinese through their exactions. Khubilai, in each case, recognized the opposition of the scholar-officials and eventually dismissed, became disenchanted with, or executed all three ministers. Chinese hostility also contributed to a short-lived and damaging anti-Muslim policy. Khubilai's support of the Buddhists apparently gave rise to some haughty and exploitative behavior by its leadership. Moreover, none of the new leaders—the three ministers or the Buddhists—were able to resolve Khubilai's fiscal problems. Also by the 1280s, the most influential of the Chinese Confucians who had served as his advisers since the 1250s had died, making him ever more dependent on non-Chinese for counsel and creating more tension between him and the Southern Chinese in particular.

NOTES

1. Moule and Pelliot, *Marco Polo*, 220–36.
2. See Herbert Franke, "Ahmed: Ein Beitrag zur Wirtschaftsgeschichte Chinas unter Qubilai," 222–23.
3. Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo*, 1:10.
4. See his biography in *Yüan shih*, 4458–64.
5. Moule and Pelliot, *Marco Polo*, 214.
6. *Yüan shih*, 4558–59.
7. Franke, "Ahmed," 232.
8. Tamura Jitsuzō et al., *Ajia-shi kōza*, 282.
9. Ch'en Pang-chan, *Yüan-shih chi-shih pen-mo*, 30.
10. Tamura, *Ajia-shi kōza*, 282.
11. Franke, "Ahmed," 229.
12. Schurmann, *Economic Structure*, 147–48.
13. Franke, *Geld*, 43.
14. Yang Lien-sheng, *Money and Credit*, 7.
15. *Yüan shih*, 4560–61.
16. Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing, *Hsi-yü-jen yü Yüan-ch'u cheng-chih*, 67; Rachewiltz, "Muqali," 56–58.
17. *Yüan shih*, 4559–60.
18. Hok-lam Chan, "Wang O," 53; see also Chan's "Wang O's Contribution to the History of the Chin Dynasty (1115–1234)," in *Essays*, ed. Chan Ping-leung, 355.
19. Li Chieh, *Yüan shih*, 64; Ch'en Pang-chan, *Yüan-shih chi-shih pen-mo*, 30.

20. J. Deguignes, *Histoire générale des Huns, des Turcs, des Mongols, et des autres Tartares occidentaux*, 3: 152.
21. Boyle, *History*, 291.
22. *Yüan shih*, 4560–61.
23. Franke, “Ahmed,” 235.
24. Moule, *Quinsai*, 79–88, for a full account of this cabal and its plot to kill Aḥmad.
25. *Ibid.*, 80.
26. Olschki, *Marco Polo's Asia*, 411, offers a different, harsher assessment of Aḥmad's influence on government.
27. See, for example, *Yüan shih*, 3873.
28. *Ibid.*, 221–22, on one such release of prisoners; on Sung officials, merchants and soldiers who sold their women into prostitution, see Ratchnevsky, *Code*, 1: 136.
29. Schurmann, *Economic Structure*, 9–10.
30. *Yüan shih*, 210; Aritaka Iwao, “Gendai no nōmin seikatsu ni tsuite,” 957.
31. See *Ta Yüan ts'ang-k'u chi*, 1.
32. Schurmann, *Economic Structure*, 10.
33. *Yüan shih*, 213.
34. Schurmann, *Economic Structure*, 29–31.
35. Matsumoto Yoshimi, “Gendai ni okeru shasei no sōritsu,” 329.
36. Schurmann, *Economic Structure*, 146–212, for a more detailed analysis of these monopolies.
37. Franke, *Geld*, 53–55.
38. Schurmann, *Economic Structure*, 223–28.
39. Ch'en Pang-chan, *Sung-shih chi-shih pen-mo*, 1–3.
40. *Ibid.*, 3.
41. Hsiao, *Military Establishment*, 56.
42. On this, see the oft-cited work by Mote, “Confucian Eremitism,” in *Confucian Persuasion*, ed. Wright, and Fu Lo-shu, “Teng Mu: A Forgotten Chinese Philosopher,” among other works on these dissidents.
43. See Lao Yan-shuan, “Southern Chinese Scholars and Educational Institutions in Early Yüan: Some Preliminary Remarks,” in *China under Mongol Rule*, ed. Langlois, 107–33.
44. See the essays by Tu Wei-ming and John Langlois in *Yuan Thought*, ed. Chan and de Bary.
45. Chou Tsu-mo, “Sung-wang hou-shih Yüan chih ju-hsüeh chiao-shou,” 191–214.
46. On Chu and Chang, see *CILCY*, 4d and 136c, respectively.
47. *Hsin Yüan shih*, 6964–65.
48. A useful map of these sites is found in Lo Jung-pang, “The Controversy over Grain Conveyance during the Reign of Qubilai Qaqa (1260–94),” 262.
49. That office had been founded in 1282, according to *Yüan shih*, 247. The debate over the routes is recounted throughout Khubilai's annals in the Yüan dynastic history.
50. Lo, “Controversy,” 277.
51. For more on the sea route, see *Ta Yüan hai-yün chi*, 35–50.
52. *Yüan shih*, 319.
53. *Ibid.*, 4564.
54. *Ibid.*, 4564–65; see also Luciano Petech, “Sang-ko, a Tibetan Statesman in Yüan China,” 201.
55. Schurmann, *Economic Structure*, 170.
56. For his comprehensive program, see Ch'en Pang-chan, *Yüan-shih chi-shih pen-mo*, 45–46.
57. *Ibid.*, 46.
58. Franke, *Geld*, 72–74.
59. Ch'en Pang-ch'an, 47; Li Chieh, *Yüan shih*, 65.
60. *Yüan shih*, 271; Ch'en T'ien-hsiang was another of the officials who was not intimidated by Lu and continued to criticize him and his policies—see *ibid.*, 4569.
61. *Ibid.*, 276, 281.

62. Petech, "Sang-ko," 194, presents his view that Sang-ko, not transcribed Sengge as traditionally believed, was a Tibetan, and he uses Tibetan sources to provide the most comprehensive view of this man to date.
63. *Yüan shih*, 4570.
64. For a brief biography, see *ibid.*, 4519; see also Tucci, *Scrolls*, 1: 55.
65. Nogami Shunjō, "Gen no senseiin ni tsuite," 770–95.
66. Petech, "Sang-ko," 198–200; Herbert Franke, "Sen-ge: Das Leben eines uigurischen Staatsbeamten zur Zeit Chubilai's dargestellt nach Kapitel 205 der Yüan-Annalen," 90–92.
67. Boyle, *Successors*, 295–96.
68. Kuwabara, "On P'u Shou-keng," 63.
69. See Franke, "Dschau Mong-fu," 34–35.
70. *Yüan shih*, 301–302.
71. *Ibid.*, 2028; Otagi Matsuo, "Gendai shikimokujin ni kansuru ikkōsatsu," 44; Paul Ratchnevsky, "Rašīd al-Dīn über die Mohammedaner Verfolgungen in China unter Qubilai," 180, and Ratchnevsky, *Code*, 2: 21.
72. See Esin, "Miniatures," 14, 34.
73. Boyle, *Successors*, 294.
74. Uematsu Tadashi, "Gensho kōnan ni okeru chōzei taisei ni tsuite," 28–32.
75. See, for example, Franke, "Sen-ge," 94–100, for some of these accusations.
76. Schurmann, *Economic Structure*, 135; Franke, *Geld*, 57–59.
77. *Yüan shih*, 297.
78. *Ibid.*, 4572.
79. This was the same policy that Khubilai and the Mongols adopted in employing other foreigners in ruling China: "By serving as intermediaries between the Mongol rulers and their Chinese subjects, the Muslims performed valuable services but simultaneously provoked the wrath of the conquerors and the conquered. . . . The Mongols, consciously or not, used the Muslims as scapegoats, thereby diverting Chinese animosity from themselves. . . . By employing the Muslims as tax collectors and money-lenders, the Mongols ensured that the Chinese and the Muslims would frequently be at odds" (Rossabi, "The Muslims," 258–59).
80. Liu Kuang-i, "T'u-fan Fo-chiao yü Yüan Shih-tsu," in *Ta-lu tsa-chih shih-hsüeh ts'ung-shu*, 241–43.
81. Li Chieh, *Yüan shih*, 60–70.
82. Yen Chien-pi, "Nan-Sung liu-ling i-shih cheng-ming chi-chu ts'uan-kung fa-hui nien-tai k'ao," 28–36.
83. Herbert Franke, "Tibetans in Yüan China," in *China under Mongol Rule*, ed. Langlois, 324–25.
84. *Yüan shih*, 362.
85. *Ibid.*, 352.
86. On this incident, see Paul Demiéville, "Les tombeaux des Song méridionaux," 458–567, and his "La situation religieuse en Chine au temps de Marco Polo," in *Oriente Poliano*, 214.
87. Franke, "Tibetans," in *China under Mongol Rule*, ed. Langlois, 325.
88. *Yüan shih*, 354; Paul Ratchnevsky, "Die mongolischen Grosskhane und die buddhistische Kirche," 497.
89. *Yüan shih*, 344.
90. Petech, "Sang-ko," 207.
91. As we shall note, Khubilai was not, in fact, the guiding figure he had been in the past. He had abdicated many of his duties, and some sources suggest that one of his wives screened the affairs that were brought to his attention and often made decisions in his name.
92. One of the more interesting such satires, written in the late Yüan, is translated by Herbert Franke in "Eine Mittelalterliche chinesische Satire auf die Mohammedaner," 202–208.
93. Boyle, *Successors*, 323–28.
94. For more on Ai-hsüeh, see A. C. Moule, *Christians in China before the Year 1550*, 228–29.

95. Boyle, *Successors*, 294.
96. *Yüan shih*, 217–18; Heyd, *Histoire*, 2: 245.
97. Boyle, *Successors*, 295.
98. *Yüan tien-chang*, 763–64.
99. *Yüan shih*, 183, 3266; Erich Haenisch, *Die Geheime Geschichte der Mongolen*, 17.
100. Boyle, *Successors*, 294.
101. Joseph-Anne-Marie de Moyriac deMailla, *Histoire générale de la Chine, ou annales de cet empire: traduites du Tong-kien-kang-mou*, 10: 456.
102. H. M. G. d'Ollone, *Recherches sur les Musulmans chinois*, 68.
103. Ch'en Pang-chan, *Yüan shih chi-shih pen-mo*, 58.
104. Fang Kuo-yü, "Kuan-yü Sai-tien-ch'ih fu-Tien kung-chi," 48–49.
105. L. C. Goodrich, "Westerners and Central Asians in Yüan China," in *Oriente Poliano*, 8.
106. Hambis, *Le chapitre cviii*, 126, n. 4.
107. Olschki, *Marco Polo's Asia*, 333.
108. *Yüan shih*, 361; T'u Chi, *Meng-wu-erh shih-chi*, 80, 4b.
109. Poppe, *Mongolian Monuments*, 47.
110. Chavannes, "Inscriptions et pièces," 394; Kubo, "Prolegomena," 51–61.
111. Kenneth Ch'en, *Buddhism in China*, 425.
112. *Yüan shih*, 234; see also Igor de Rachewiltz, "The *Hsi-yu-lu* by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai," 1–3, for a useful summary.
113. Chavannes, "Inscriptions et pièces," 400–401.
114. Broeck and Tung, "Taoist Inscription," 12–13; Nogami, "Gendai Dō Butsu nikyō no kaku-shitsu," 258–59, takes a less sanguine view of Khubilai's policy toward Taoism.
115. *Yüan shih*, 232; Sun, *Yüan-tai Tao-chiao*, 43–46, 132, 181; for a more detailed English summary of Khubilai's patronage of the Taoists, see Sun's "Yü Chi and Southern Taoism during the Yüan Period," *China under Mongol Rule*, ed. Langlois, 212–53.
116. T'ao, "Yüan-tai fo-ssu," 0108–14.
117. On the influence of the Central Asian Buddhists, see Şinasi Tekin, *Buddhistische Uigurica aus der Yüan-Zeit*.

STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN THE YÜAN IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT

David M. Farquhar



We are so accustomed to hearing of the autocratic, highly centralized, bureaucratic character of governments in imperial China, that it is extremely difficult to view them in any other way, except during those periods of disintegration or disunion when serious talk about a central government is clearly impossible.¹ The Yüan dynasty of the Mongols, in particular, has been pointed out as a “tightly centralized régime” with a “centrally controlled bureaucracy.”² One writer has even said that the Yüan was a state in which “power was absolutely lacking at the local level; it lay only at the center. . . .”³ Centralizing and bureaucratic tendencies certainly existed in the Yüan government, but that is different from saying that the imperial government was a central government by design. In this essay I intend to examine the structure of this government, to discover its character and functions in the administration of the empire.

At first glance, the imperial government seems well served by the centralized model: it proclaimed itself superior over all local governments, chains of successively smaller units, each with its own chief officers; it was huge, complex, and rationally organized, and it seemed to cover every conceivable aspect of governing; it used laws and regulations, which it purported to generate for the entire empire; and most of its chief organs, if not all, had “constitutions” summarizing their purposes and functions and laying down their complements of officers and clerks.⁴

These constitutions, perhaps more than any other single factor, have influenced our conception of the nature of Chinese imperial governments. When we read in our sources that a certain organ of government was responsible for all governmental ordinances relating to the registration of the population, to taxation, and to land throughout the entire empire; that the management of the receipt and expenditure of tribute and tax revenues, the rules concerning the circulation of currency, the verification of stocks in government warehouses and treasuries, the regulation of the prices of goods, and the auditing of records of receipt and disbursement to determine their correctness—all of these—lay within the purview of that organ, the need to understand it as a modern national ministry of finance becomes overwhelming.⁵ When we discover that the staff overseeing these far-reaching charges consisted of only ten senior officers, eight service officers (*shou-ling-kuan* 首領官, who supervised the clerks and the office routine), and 136 clerks and other sub-officials, we might be inclined to change our assessment, but reading a bit further and noting this organ’s twenty-one subordinate agencies with *their* numerous subordinate granaries, yards, treasuries, works, banks and convoys, confirms

us in our original impression. After one has read a hundred such constitutional descriptions, the only analogues to fourteenth-century Ta-tu seem to be twentieth-century Paris or Tokyo.

I. ORGANS OF THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT

To begin a critical examination of this impression, it may be useful to give a survey of the Yüan imperial government's chief organs. The most important systematic source is the treatise on the official system in the *Yüan History* (*Yüan shih* 元史) (1370), which was based on the "institutes" of the Yüan dynasty, the *Ching-shih ta-tien* 經世大典 of 1332, now mostly lost.⁶ By 1332 the Yüan government may be said to have reached its mature form, having evolved very substantially since Emperor Khubilai (Shih-tsu) began to build a Chinese-style government in 1260, and it changed thereafter very little until the disintegration of the last few years of Mongol rule.⁷ In 1332, the imperial government consisted of 121 principal agencies which might be called independent or quasi-independent, to which were subordinated 474 other agencies, under which, in turn, were 398 and 211 agencies at a second and third level of subordination.⁸ I have organized the independent agencies and a very few of the more important subordinate ones under five rubrics, which in some measure reflect modern analytical requirements, the way in which people in Yüan times envisaged the functions of government, and the way in which the government is presented in the *Yüan History*. As in all governments, many organs had overlapping or dual functions and could be listed under two rubrics. Brief characterizations are given where the translated title seems insufficiently suggestive.

I. THE IMPERIAL ESTABLISHMENT

The emperor (*huang-ti* 皇帝, M. *khaghan*) was the capstone of the state, with the nominal authority to decide most political, administrative, legal, and moral questions. To rule and reign over such a huge empire with the proper magnificence required enormous resources of people and treasure. Agencies to dispose these can be divided into two groups:

- A. Agencies which met the physical and creature needs of the emperor, his court, the government buildings in the capitals at Ta-tu and Shang-tu and the capital cities themselves
 1. The Bureau for Imperial Household Provisions, *hsüan-hui yüan* 皇徽院. An enormous organization responsible for feeding the court.⁹
 2. The Bureau for Imperial Manufactures, *chiang-tso yüan* 將作院. Supervised workshops making textiles, clothing, jewellery and other precious things for imperial use.¹⁰
 3. The Court of the Imperial Stud, *t'ai-p'u ssu* 太僕寺. In charge of the state horse herds and provider of the emperor's mare's milk wine.¹¹
 4. The Court for the Imperial Tack, *shang-ch'eng ssu* 尚乘寺.¹²
 5. The Imperial Treasuries Directorate, *t'ai-fu chien* 太府監.¹³
 6. The Directorate for Animal Feeds, *tu-chih chien* 度支監.¹⁴
 7. The Directorate for Leathers and Furs, *li-yung chien* 利用監.¹⁵

8. The Directorate for Felt Manufactures, *chung-shang chien* 章佩監.¹⁶
9. The Directorate for the Imperial Accessories, *chang-p'ei chien* 東涼亭.¹⁷
10. The Directorate-General for the Imperial Residence at Tung-liang-t'ing 東涼亭, *shang-kung tsung-kuan-fu* 尚供總管府.¹⁸
11. The Directorate-General for the Imperial Residence at Chaghannaghur, *yün-hsü tsung-kuan-fu* 雲需總管府.¹⁹
12. The Office for the Supervision of Attendants, *shih-cheng fu* 侍正府.²⁰
13. The Ta-tu Construction and Protection Office, *ta-tu liu-shou ssu* 大都留守司.²¹
14. The Shang-tu Construction and Protection Office, *shang-tu liushou-ssu* 上都留守司.²²
15. The Directorate-General of Ta-tu Circuit, *ta-tu lu tu tsung-kuan-fu* 大都路都總管府. This and the following office formed the basis of the local government in Ta-tu.²³ a. The General Commandery of the Ta-tu Circuit Constabulary, *ta-tu lu ping-ma tu-chih-hui shih-ssu* 大都路兵馬都指揮使司.²⁴

B. Agencies which provided the emperor with advice and expertise, and organized for him religious, ideological, and intimate political functions

1. The Han lin and National History Academy, *han-lin (chien) kuo-shih yüan* 翰林(兼)國史院. A body of elite literary experts.²⁵
2. The Mongolian Han lin Academy, *meng-ku han-lin yüan* 蒙古翰林院. In charge of translating the emperor's edicts and preparing final copies of them; it also managed the Mongolian National College, *meng-ku kuo-tzu hsüeh* 蒙古國子學 in the capital, a school for the sons of Mongolian nobles and officials.²⁶
3. The Academy of Worthies, *chi-hsien yüan* 集賢院. A body of learned men which managed the Chinese National College, *kuo-tzu hsüeh* 國子學, and also watched over the Taoist clergy.²⁷
4. The Academy of Scholars in the K'uei-chang Pavilion, *k'uei-chang ko hsüeh-shih yüan* 奎乘閣學士院. The emperor's librarians.²⁸
5. The Academy of Calendrical Studies, *t'ai-shih yüan* 太史院.²⁹
6. The Institute of Astronomy, *ssu-t'ien chien* 司天監.³⁰
7. The Institute of Muslim Astronomy, *hui-hui ssu-t'ien chien* 回回司天監.³¹
8. The Imperial Academy of Medicine, *t'ai-i yüan* 太醫院.³²
9. The Directorate for the Diffusion of Confucian Texts, *i-wen chien* 藝文監.³³
10. The Archives, *mi-shu chien* 秘書監.³⁴
11. The Academy of Imperial Sacrifices and Rituals, *t'ai-ch'ang li-i yüan* 太常禮儀院.³⁵
12. The Bureau for the Imperial Cults, *ta-hsi tsung-yin yüan* 太禧宗禋院. Its main function was managing the financial affairs of the imperial monasteries and temples.³⁶
13. The Bureau of the Imperial Insignia, *tien-jui yüan* 典瑞院.³⁷
14. The Imperial Diarists, *chi-shih-chung* 給事中. Kept the official record of the emperor's activities.³⁸

II. GENERAL ADMINISTRATION

A. Civil Administration

1. The Central Secretariat, *chung-shu sheng* 中書省. Contained the emperor's most powerful and highest ranking councillors, and served as the empire's message center. Subordinate to it were six ministries:³⁹ a. The Ministry of Personnel, *li-pu* 吏部.⁴⁰ b. The Ministry of Revenue, *hu-pu* 戶部.⁴¹ c. The Ministry of Rites, *li-pu* 禮部.⁴² d. The Ministry of War, *ping-pu* 兵部.⁴³ e. The Ministry of Punishments, *hsing-pu* 刑部.⁴⁴ f. The Ministry of Works, *kung-pu* 工部.⁴⁵

B. Service agencies of the imperial administration

1. The Office of the Grand Supervisors of Agriculture, *ta ssu-nung ssu* 大司農司.⁴⁶
2. The Bureaus for Transmission Services, *t'ung-cheng yüan* 通政院. There were two, one in each capital. They operated the state postal system.⁴⁷
3. The Directorate of Waterways, *tu-shui chien* 都水監.⁴⁸

III. SURVEILLANCE AND JUDICIAL AGENCIES

1. The Censorate, *yü-shih t'ai* 御史臺. Investigated official conduct and the performance of government; had the power of impeachment.⁴⁹
2. The High Court for Mongols, *ta tsung-cheng fu* 大宗正府.⁵⁰
3. The Court of Justice for Uighurs, *tu-hu fu* 都護府.⁵¹

IV. THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

1. The Bureau of Military Affairs, *shu-mi yüan* 樞密院.⁵²
2. The Chief Military Commission, *ta tu-tu fu* 大都督府. Supervised four guards units made up mostly of Kipchaks.⁵³
3. The Armaments Court, *wu-pei ssu* 武備寺. Manufactured and stored weapons.⁵⁴

V. AGENCIES FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF FIEFS, FIEF-LIKE TERRITORIES, AND OTHER SPECIAL POPULATIONS

A. The Heir Apparent's Establishment

1. The Bureau for the Heir-apparent's Household, *ch'u-cheng yüan* 儲政院.⁵⁵
2. The Left Metropolitan Martial Guards, *tso tu wei-wei shih-ssu* 左都威衛使司.⁵⁶
3. The Right Metropolitan Martial Guards, *yu tu wei-wei shih-ssu* 右都威衛使司.⁵⁷
4. The General Commandery of the Guards-in-Waiting, *wei hou-chih tu-chih-hui shih-ssu* 衛候直都指揮使司.⁵⁸
5. The Office of Provisions for the Heir-apparent, *nei-tsai ssu* 內宰司.⁵⁹
6. The Directorate-General for the Management of Artisan-serfs⁶⁰ and Civil Artisans in the Original Appanages,⁶¹ Ta-tu, and Other Circuits, *kuan-ling*

pen t'ou-hsia ta-tu teng-lu ch'ieh-lien-k'ou min-chiang tsung-kuan-fu 管領本投下大都等路怯憐口民匠總管府.⁶²

7. The Directorate-General for the Management of Artisan-serfs and All Classes of Civil Artisans, *kuan-ling ch'ieh-lien-k'ou chu-se min-chiang tu tsung-kuan-fu* 管領怯憐口諸色民匠都總管府.⁶³
8. The Directorate-General for Civil Administration in Pien-liang and Other Circuits, *pien-liang teng-lu kuan-min tsung-kuan-fu* 汴梁等路管民總管領.⁶⁴
9. The General Commission for the Myriarchy of the Heir-apparent's Retinue, *chao-kung wan-hu tu tsung-shih-ssu* 昭功萬戶都總使司.⁶⁵

B. The Empress' Establishment

1. The Bureau for Services to the Empress' Palace, *chung-cheng yüan* 中政院.⁶⁶
2. Directorate-General for the Management of Artisan-serfs and Civil Artisans in the Various Circuits, *kuan-ling chu-lu ch'ieh-lien-k'ou min-chiang tu tsung-kuan-fu* 管領諸路怯憐口民匠都總管府.⁶⁷
3. Directorate-General for Revenue in Chiang-huai and Other Places, *chiang-huai teng-ch'u ts'ai-fu tu tsung-kuan-fu* 江淮等處財賦都總管府.⁶⁸

C. The Establishments of the Dowager Empresses, the Ordos. It was the Mongolian rulers' custom to leave their personal pastures and camping grounds (M. *ordo*) to their widows as estates. The subjects residing on them were included.

1. The Council for the Territories of the Four Ordos of Chinggis Khan, *nei-shih fu* 內史府. Five other agencies shared in the administration of these territories, all of the sort mentioned in V.A.6 above.⁶⁹
2. The Court for Khubilai's Ordos, *ch'ang-hsin ssu* 長信寺.⁷⁰
3. The Court for Wu-tsung's Ordo, *ch'ang-ch'iu ssu* 長秋寺.⁷¹
4. The Court for Jen-tsung's Ordo, *ch'ang-hui ssu* 長徽寺.⁷²
5. The Court for Ying-tsung's Ordo, *ch'ang-ning ssu* 長寧寺.⁷³
6. The Court for Ch'eng-tsung's Ordo, *ch'ang-ch'ing ssu* 長慶寺.⁷⁴
7. The Court for Ming-tsung's Ordo, *ning-hui ssu* 寧徽寺.⁷⁵

D. Bureaus for the Administration of Other Fiefs and Special Populations

1. The Directorate-General for the Hunters, Falconers, and Artisans of Various Classes in the Several Circuits, *sui-lu ta-pu ying-fang chu-se min-chiang tsung-kuan-fu* 隨路打捕鷹房諸色民匠總管府.⁷⁶
2. The Directorate for Mongolian Pastures, *ching-cheng chien* 經正監. Managed the assignment of grasslands among fief-holders in Mongolia and resolved legal conflicts which arose over pasture rights.⁷⁷
3. Directorate-General for Various Categories of Artisans in the Several Circuits, *sui-lu chu-se jen-chiang tu tsung-kuan-fu* 隨路諸色人匠都總管府.⁷⁸
4. The Directorate-General of the Mews, *jen-yü tu tsung-kuan-fu* 仁虞都總管府.⁷⁹
5. Princely administrations, *wang-fu* 王府 (also called the Preceptors to the Princes, *chu-wang fu* 諸府傅). There were forty-five of these established by and for princes with large fiefs to help them govern. The largest of them was the Advisariate to the Prince of Chou, *chou-wang ch'ang-shih-fu* 周王常侍府, in Yün-nan.⁸⁰
6. The Bureau of Tibetan and Buddhist Affairs, *hsüan-cheng yüan* 宣政院.⁸¹
7. The Office for Christian Clergy, *ch'ung-fu ssu* 崇福司.⁸²

In this system, the Central Secretariat (II.A.1) was the key bureau, integrating the three levels of local government into which the countryside was divided: The Circuits (*lu* 路, M. *chölge*) which were the seats of both military units (the Myriarchies, *wan-hu fu* 萬戶府) keeping order, and civil governments (the Directorates-General, *tsung-kuan-fu* 總管府) performing judicial, revenue, educational and welfare functions;⁸³ the Prefectures of various sorts (*fu* 府, *chou* 州, *chün* 軍);⁸⁴ and, finally, the Districts (*hsien* 縣).⁸⁵ These units integrated by the Central Secretariat formed the Metropolitan Province (Fu-li 腹裏), an area comprising modern Hopeh, Shantung, Shansi, and the eastern part of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region.⁸⁶ In the same manner, eleven other provinces were created throughout the empire by the establishment of replica central secretariats (*hsing chung-shu-sheng* 行中書省, usually called “branch” central secretariats), each of which tied together its own subordinate Circuits, Prefectures, and Districts.⁸⁷ An additional administrative unit of large size, the Region (*tao* 道), was created by instituting Pacification Offices (*hsüan-wei ssu* 宣慰司)⁸⁸ at key places within the provinces, coordinating many civil and some military activities between the Secretariat and the District.⁸⁹ The Regions were also the territories of the Regional Investigation Offices (*su-cheng lien-fang ssu* 肅正廉訪司), field bureaus of the Censorate, which watched over the conduct of government.⁹⁰

II. THE STRUCTURES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE BUREAUS

It seems reasonable to begin the exploration of the imperial government with the organs of general administration (II), since they were the most broadly conceived and had the clearest mandates to deal with the empire at large. The method I have chosen is to examine the subordinate bureaus of each and to note the division of functions and the geographical extent of its authority. Such information—it is often the only information we possess—gives a much better notion of the effective administrative authority of an agency than can fanciful imperial constitutions. As both an example of the method and a sample of a bureau in a modern central government with which Yüan bureaus can be compared, the Federal Trade Commission of the United States government in 1969 may serve; it had thirteen subordinate bureaus, seven of which were concerned with in-house management (General Counsel, Hearing Examiners, Program Review, Administration, Comptroller, and so forth), while six were operating bureaus designed to fulfill the Commission’s mission (Deceptive Practices, Economics, Industry Guidance, Restraint of Trade, Field Operations, and Textiles and Furs). The Field Operations Bureau coordinated the activities of the Commission’s eleven field offices, located in key cities in every section of the country; however, the Bureau of Textiles and Furs—clearly the busiest of the bureaus—maintained its own field stations in twenty cities. Such information, I would suggest, tells us, when properly pursued, as much about this agency’s character and its effective centralizing tendencies as does its formal charge “to prevent the free enterprise system from being stifled or fettered by monopoly or corrupted by unfair or deceptive trade practices.”⁹¹

In Yüan China, the Central Secretariat (II.A.1) was the paramount organ in the imperial government and, together with the Bureau of Military Affairs (IV.1) and the Censorate (III.1), was the most important in implementing the emperor’s will. Virtually every page of the compilation of administrative acts, the *Yüan tien-chang* 元典章, (*Compendium of Statutes and Sub-Statutes of the Yüan*)⁹² contains decisions which have

in some fashion gone through its hands and bear its name. It had been granted extensive powers by the emperors: all memorials to the throne had to come through it, unless the memorialist was in one of the privileged bureaus entitled to address the emperor directly (the Bureau of Military Affairs [IV.1], the Censorate [III.1], the Bureau for the Heir-apparent's Household [V.A.1], and the Bureau of Tibetan and Buddhist Affairs [V.D.6]);⁹³ it could make recommendations for official appointments to virtually all positions lower in rank than its own;⁹⁴ it could resolve legal cases involving capital crimes, and had a staff of judges (*tuan-shih kuan* 斷事官, *M. jarghuchi*) to help in this work;⁹⁵ it drafted administrative regulations to implement edicts, which it passed on to its sister central secretariats in other provinces; and it rendered decisions on hundreds of administrative problems submitted to it by other organs. However, it was, with its relatively small staff of fourteen councillors of various ranks, mainly an executive agency, not an administrative one. Its two subordinate offices, the Office of the Left, *tso ssu* 左司, and the Office of the Right, *yu-ssu* 右司, each elaborately subdivided, appear to have been primarily for record-keeping, since their complements of officers (six in each) and clerks (fifty-three in the Office of the Left and twelve in the Office of the Right) would hardly have allowed for many other activities.⁹⁶

What of the Central Secretariat's several ministries (II.A.1.a-e) which were supposed to help it to govern the empire? The Ministry of Revenue (II.A.1.b), whose charge I have summarized above, was indeed deeply involved in administration. Its twenty-one subordinate bureaus divide naturally into four areas: (1) state treasuries; (2) the currency; (3) taxes and their transport; and (4) industrial activities controlled by the government. In the first group were several treasuries, the officers of which had no other responsibilities than the obvious ones of guarding the contents and recording receipts and disbursements.⁹⁷ The desire to establish an empire-wide paper currency, on the other hand—as the Yüan emperors clearly desired to do by 1260—⁹⁸ required the development of a considerable administrative network, and the Ministry of Revenue had six agencies dealing with currency, the highest-ranking and most important of which was the Superintendency for Paper Currency in the Several Circuits;⁹⁹ but its area of concern seems to have been limited to North China, for identically or similarly named superintendencies were established in other parts of the empire—the southeast, west China, Turkestan, and Mongolia—none of which is included among the agencies of the Ministry of Revenue.¹⁰⁰ Under the Ministry of Revenue, the printing of paper currency was done by a special office, the Paper Currency Printing Treasury,¹⁰¹ but it cannot be established that it was the exclusive printer of currency and that the other superintendencies of paper currency did not have that right; at certain exceptional times, on the other hand, during the Mongol invasion of south China in 1276, and at the very end of the dynasty, paper currency was definitely printed elsewhere.¹⁰² The burning of worn currency was managed, according to our sources, by two Currency Disposal Treasuries,¹⁰³ but they served only the capital, since this function was otherwise managed by the regional investigation offices of the Censorates (*su-cheng lien-fang ssu*—see below)¹⁰⁴ or by the officials of the “branch” Central Secretariats.¹⁰⁵ Currency reached the public through exchange banks, at least 156 of which are known to have been established in all parts of the country; only six of these—those in the city of Ta-tu itself—are listed as part of the structure of the Ministry of Revenue.¹⁰⁶

In view of its deep interest in the collection of taxes, the Ministry of Revenue had very few subordinate bureaus concerned with tax management. The Ta-tu Commodity Tax Collection Superintendency¹⁰⁷ was exactly as area-specific as its name suggests: it

managed a number of markets in Ta-tu city, and did not even supervise all commodity or sales tax collections in the Metropolitan Province. The same was true of the Ta-tu Alcohol Tax Superintendency.¹⁰⁸ Similarly, no network of agencies regulated the empire's supposedly important state-controlled industries for the empire's wealth; the Ministry of Revenue's bureaus involved with them were insignificant and restricted in their activities to the Metropolitan Province: one gold-mining and iron smelting superintendency¹⁰⁹ and two salt distribution commissions;¹¹⁰ a third salt commission, the Salt Distribution Commission for Ho-tung, Shan-hsi and Other Places,¹¹¹ might appear from its name to have been located partly outside of the Metropolitan Province, but, by 1332 at least, its subordinate salt works were all in the area of modern Shansi province, and were thus in the Metropolitan Province. The only hint of a centralized function in government-regulated industry is the Commodity Voucher Printing Office,¹¹² which printed the forms which were claims for legal loads of state-controlled commodities like salt, tea, alum, and iron, for both the Metropolitan and the other provinces.

Two enormous bureaus subordinate to the Ministry of Revenue ran the vital business of transporting tax grain to the capital and the Metropolitan Province and storing it there,¹¹³ but only one of these, the General Grain Transport Commission,¹¹⁴ had concerns outside of the Metropolitan Province: it supervised some grain convoys in northern Ho-nan-Chiang-pei 河南江北 Province.¹¹⁵

The Ministry of Works (II.A.1.f) was even larger than the Ministry of Revenue, with fifty-two subordinate offices, which in turn had forty-four others subordinate to them; it was charged with regulating all manner of construction and manufacturing in the empire, the repair of fortifications, the regulation of artisans, and the evaluation of artisan officers in government ateliers.¹¹⁶ An examination of its subordinate agencies reveals a different picture, however. Only one of them, the Metropolitan Wall Repair Superintendency,¹¹⁷ could be said to be involved in public works, as that term is generally understood, and its concerns were restricted to the imperial capital at Ta-tu; all of the others managed government workshops which produced articles in metals, wood, leather, hair, fine textiles, and ceramics—in other words, the Ministry of Works differed little from the Bureau for Imperial Manufactures (I.A.2), the workshops of which made similar things for the emperor's personal use.¹¹⁸ Furthermore, all but three of the subordinate bureaus can with some certainty be identified as being located in, and having concerns restricted to, the imperial capitals or the Metropolitan Province. One of the exceptions was the Weaving and Dyeing Office of Ta-ning Circuit¹¹⁹ located in Liao-yang 遼陽 Province; two others, both called the Bishbalikh Office,¹²⁰ may have been located at or controlled artisan activities in the city of Bishbalikh in Turkestan.¹²¹ For an executive bureau for the empire, the Ministry of Works seems not to have been very significant: while it can occasionally be found making decisions on affairs outside of the Metropolitan Province,¹²² most of its activities were local, and the regulations governing its work were trivial.¹²³

The other ministries subject to the Central Secretariat present somewhat different profiles. One, the Ministry of Rites (II.A.1.c), had very restricted charges relating to ritual matters at the imperial court, which did not generally involve it in empire-wide administration,¹²⁴ although one of its bureaus, the Seal Manufacturing Office,¹²⁵ was indeed an example of the centralization of an imperial administrative function, for it produced all official seals used by Yüan officers.¹²⁶

Another, the Ministry of Punishments, was active in the drafting of the criminal law, but, like many high judicial bodies, including others in the Yüan government (III.2,3),

its work was carried on in a cloistered atmosphere, and did not require numerous subordinate bureaus: cases presented to it came through the normal district-prefecture-circuit-secretariat route.¹²⁷ A third, the Ministry of War (II.A.1.d), was an empty relic, a descendant of an ancient bureau which had lost its importance in Sung times; in the Yüan period, until 1320, its only significant duty was the control of the postal station managers in China proper, a responsibility traditionally ascribed to the military establishment, but thereafter even that passed to the Bureau for Transmission Services (II.B.2);¹²⁸ otherwise, it had nothing to do with military matters, which had long been taken over by the Bureau of Military Affairs (IV.1). Of its five subordinate bureaus, one handled the transport of grain to the two capitals, while four others administered groups of artisans, hunters, and falconers on territories which once belonged to princes.¹²⁹

The Ministry of Personnel (II.A.1.a) had no subordinate bureaus at all, not because it was unimportant, but because of the restricted character of its charges, which related to the nomination, appointment, transfer, evaluation, and promotion of nearly all civil officials occupying the empire's 26,690 positions, and the recording of their titles; the sub-officials as well were under its regulation.¹³⁰ The right to create and place officials and dispense titles and privileges has always been one of the most important powers of Chinese emperors, and the Yüan rulers cherished it; although they delegated the authority to appoint all but the highest officers, it was kept within the top levels of the imperial government.¹³¹ Indeed, there is good evidence that imperial control over personnel appointments was even more extensive in Yüan times than before; there are at any rate complaints by a Yüan scholar that those in local government were unable to select subordinates as officials in earlier times had.¹³²

Just as replicas of the Central Secretariat were established throughout the empire, so replicas of some of the ministries were also created for special purposes. A "branch" Ministry of Revenue (*hsing hu-pu* 行戶部) was created in 1263 in Shan-hsi 陝西 to take charge of that area;¹³³ another was established at Ta-ming 大名 in the Metropolitan Province to manufacture paper currency in preparation for the invasion of Chiang-nan in 1276.¹³⁴ Several "branch" Ministries of Works were created: one to build the capital at Ta-tu,¹³⁵ and another in 1307 by the Emperor Khaishan (Külüg, Wu-tsung) to build a new capital, Chung-tu 中都, in the Mongolian steppe (it was never completed).¹³⁶ The replication of bureaus in this fashion, a common feature of Yüan government, suggests that the administrative responsibilities of the parent bureau were both routine and local. Unlike the "branch" Central Secretariats, however, the "branch" Ministries never became permanent fixtures in the governmental landscape.

The Office of the Grand Supervisors of Agriculture (II.B.1) was a high-ranking bureau charged with the oversight of agriculture, sericulture, and water resources; it had its origins in an Office for the Stimulation of Agriculture, *ch'üan-nung ssu* 勸農司, which had been created already in 1261 to help restore the ruined condition of agriculture in North China.¹³⁷ With its reorganization in 1270 as the Office of the Supervisors of Agriculture (*ssu-nung ssu*), a genuinely centralized bureaucratic structure was created to carry out its mission. Adopting the Regions (*tao*) of the censorial system as its chief administrative units, subordinate Mobile Offices for the Stimulation of Agriculture (*hsün-hsing ch'üan-nung ssu* 巡行勸農司) were established in each to survey the local units of the system;¹³⁸ the latter were the "communes," *she* 社, units of fifty families headed by a commune chief, *she-chang* 社長, formed out of natural villages,

and intended to improve agricultural techniques, raise production, develop irrigation, organize charitable functions for the member families, and recommend lazy farmers to the local magistrate for discipline.¹³⁹ But by 1290, the Mobile Offices had been abolished and their duties transferred to the already overworked Regional Surveillance Offices (*t'i-hsing an-ch'a ssu* 提刑案察司) of the Censorate;¹⁴⁰ the bureaucratic link between local communes and the Grand Supervisors of Agriculture in Ta-tu was thus effectively severed.¹⁴¹

That the Office of the Grand Supervisors of Agriculture was a distinctly local bureau, concerned with the Metropolitan Province, or, at best, North China, is shown by the establishment in 1293 of a replica Office of the Grand Supervisors of Agriculture in Yang-chou to deal with South China after its conquest. The reason in this case was only marginally to revive agriculture, since the south had suffered little of the damage experienced by the north; instead, it was to control the powerful landlords who had been concealing their rent incomes and illegally occupying government land. The region and commune units were also introduced in South China, but there is some doubt as to whether the communes were ever really operative. In any case, the "Branch" Office and its apparatus were abolished three years later in 1295, not because the government wished to restore administrative control to the parent office in the capital, but because it was determined that "cases of [landlord] concealment were not numerous, and the [office] had become irrelevant."¹⁴²

A similar bureau, the Directorate of Waterways (II.B.3), was indeed occupied with water conservancy as its description in the *Yüan History* tells us,¹⁴³ and its activities are reported to an unusual degree in that source.¹⁴⁴ But examination shows that its work was restricted to the control of the Yellow River, which means that its activity lay mainly in the Metropolitan Province. Dike work in other provinces (and even in the Metropolitan Province, where conditions were exceptional) was performed by replica Directorates of Waterways (*hsing tu-shui chien* 行都水監).¹⁴⁵ In 1308, however, one such directorate in Chiang-che 江浙 Province was abolished at the request of the Secretariat there and the conservancy responsibilities were turned over to local officials at the circuit, prefecture, and district levels.¹⁴⁶ At various times between 1301 and the end of the dynasty there was established in Chiang-che Province a separate, related bureau, the Commission for Waterways and Land Management, *tu-shui yung-t'ien shih-ssu* 都水庸田使司, to deal with the dredging of the Sung and Wu Rivers and like matters, but it was at least some of the time under the control of the Chiang-che Central Secretariat, and hence not a part of the imperial government, although it was of course established by imperial edict. It seems to have been somewhat ineffectual, and, when abolished, its duties were given back to the units of local government, in particular to the Sung-chiang 松江 Superior Prefecture.¹⁴⁷

The two Bureaus for Transmission Services (II.B.2), one in Ta-tu and the other in Shang-tu, directed the movement of official papers, goods and baggage, and supplied those on official business with transport, food, and lodgings. These functions were obviously of great importance in holding together the empire, and the Mongols' understanding of this is indicated by their early concern for the system, which dates back to the times of Chinggis and Ögödei, the extensive regulations they designed for its management, and their efforts to keep control of it near the center;¹⁴⁸ the Central Secretariat itself had two sections which dealt with postal matters.¹⁴⁹ In 1292, after the conquest of South China, a replica Chiang-nan Bureau for Transmission Service (*chiang-nan hsing t'ung-cheng yüan* 江南行通政院) was established to manage

post stations there, but was abolished soon thereafter in 1303.¹⁵⁰ Despite this attempt at centralized direction, the postal system shows some of the defects of the organs previously discussed: it lacked effective intermediate-level overseers between the executive bureaus at the capitals and the post station officers (*chan-ch'ih* 站赤, M. *jamchi*) at the local level. It is true that the Mongols had early appointed Postal Relay Inspectors (*t'o-t'o-ho-sun* 脫脫禾孫, M. *todkhaghul*, **todkhosun*), high-ranking independent officers charged with searching out fraudulent use of the system, but they appear to have been employed only in important cities;¹⁵¹ the real middle-level supervisors were the local officials at the relatively high circuit level, the Directors-General (*tsung-kuan*) and their Mongol associates, the Agents (*ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* 達魯花赤, M. *darugha*, *darughachi*), the representatives of the Mongol imperial power, found not only at the circuit, but at all levels of government, wherever populations were directly administered and exploited. This was an effort to keep the postal system in responsible hands.¹⁵² Perhaps inevitably, and despite warnings, the post stations were given over to the prefects and to the district magistrates, and the higher authorities were unable to prevent abuse of the postal households (*chan-hu* 站戶) who provided the services and provisions, or abuse of the system by those using it. Attempts to remedy these faults may perhaps be found in the numerous reorganizations which the post underwent, sometimes being put under the Bureau for Transmission Services, sometimes under the Ministry of War (II.A.1.d), sometimes under both (Mongolian post stations with the former, Chinese stations with the latter).¹⁵³ Despite structural weakness and the strange dual bureaus, the purpose of which remains obscure, the postal system remains one of the few centralized governmental functions in the Yüan empire.

Other departments of the imperial government may be treated more briefly, since their charges did not involve them in large-scale administration. The fourteen imperial advisory bodies described under I.B were by their nature bound to the court, and their duties were generally confined to the capitals at Ta-tu and Shang-tu. Only two of them, the Imperial Academy of Medicine (I.B.8) and the Bureau for the Imperial Cults (I.B.12), had subordinate offices concerned with areas outside those cities. The former had a Superintendency of Medicine¹⁵⁴ to which were attached seventeen Superintendencies of Official Physicians¹⁵⁵ which supervised physician households in fourteen circuits and three other territories in the performance of their obligations to the government, and took care of their legal cases; fifteen of these were located in the Metropolitan Province, but two were in Liao-yang Province in the Northeast.¹⁵⁶ One must conclude either that the Imperial Academy of Medicine was intended to administer primarily the Metropolitan Province's physicians, or that, for some reason, it was unconcerned with physicians in the other provinces of China—which was not the case, for legislation was issued which affected them,¹⁵⁷ and Superintendencies of Official Physicians were found in Ho-nan-Chiang-pei, Chiang-che, Chiang-hsi, Hu-kuang, and Shan-hsi 陝西, although they were not part of the Imperial Academy of Medicine.¹⁵⁸ The Bureau for the Imperial Cults (I.B.12), on the other hand, is a rare example of a bureau which appears to have supervised a single function in all parts of the imperial realm; it was an umbrella for most of the state monasteries and temples, their landholdings, serfs, administrations, and endowment offices (*kuei-yün ssu* 規運司), which were found in Ho-nan-Chiang-pei, Chiang-che, Hu-kuang, and Ssu-ch'uan Provinces, as well as in the Metropolitan Province.¹⁵⁹

Of the sixteen organs which met the physical needs of emperor, courts, and capitals (I.A), only three controlled areas or activities outside the Metropolitan Province.

The enormous Bureau for Imperial Household Provisions (I.A.1) had twenty-eight subordinate offices, of which two were not in the Metropolitan Province: the Directorate-General for Agricultural Colonies and Hunting in Huai-tung and Huai-hsi,¹⁶⁰ which administered populations in Ho-nan-Chiang-pei Province; and the General Superintendency of Tea Groves in Ch'ang-chou, Hu-chou, and Other Places,¹⁶¹ which managed 23,000 households in Chiang-che Province. The Bureau for Imperial Manufactures' (I.A.2) Directorate-General for Precious Metal and Jewel Artisans in the Several Circuits¹⁶² had a sub-office, the Fu-liang Porcelain Office,¹⁶³ in Chiang-che Province; there was also a replica Directorate-General in Hang-chou in the same province, which was slightly lower in rank than the parent Directorate-General.¹⁶⁴ The Court of the Imperial Stud (I.A.3) did a good deal more than meet the emperor's personal need for horses and milk; it supplied horses for the imperial guards (under the Bureau of Military Affairs [IV.1,2]) and for the postal system. It had no subordinate bureaus, but it did obtain horses from areas outside the Metropolitan Province, mostly in the North: Korea, Shan-hsi, Kan-su, Yün-nan, and especially Ling-pei (Mongolia); there were fourteen such areas, nearly all of them fiefs of imperial princes, for whose subjects the providing of horses was a tax obligation.¹⁶⁵

The agencies included under the "fief-like" rubric (V) are really quite various. The numerous bureaus belonging to the heir-apparent and the empress (V.A,B) should perhaps be considered simply other parts of the emperor's own government, especially the very extensive holdings of artisan-serfs under the Bureau for Services to the Empress' Palace (V.B.1), which produced goods and services for the government. However, in some cases at least, income from these holdings remained under the control of the heir-apparent's or empress' chief bureau.¹⁶⁶ That seems not to have been the case with true fiefs (V.C; V.D.5),¹⁶⁷ where the rights of the fief-holders began to be restricted by the time of Emperor Ögödei (T'ai-tsung, r. 1229–1241). Quite quickly, they became much like the nobility in native Chinese dynasties—recipients of annual grants from the emperor, and thus stipendiaries rather than rent-collecting feudal lords.¹⁶⁸ Still, they retained considerable authority, for they were allowed to nominate the officials of their own administrations (if they had them) and the officials in the local governments in which their fiefs lay. These powers, too, were nibbled away gradually over the years,¹⁶⁹ as were the nobles' subjects, who either absconded or were put under the authority of local governments.¹⁷⁰

Virtually all of these agencies and their subordinate offices were confined to the Metropolitan Province or to areas immediately surrounding it. Of the twenty-six bureaus under the Bureau for the Empress' Palace (V.B.1), fourteen were within the Metropolitan Province, seven were at least in part outside of it (one in Shan-hsi and Kan-su Provinces, three in Ho-nan-Chiang-pei, one in Chiang-che, and two in Liao-yang), while five cannot be exactly located.¹⁷¹ The Directorate-General for Revenue in Chiang-huai (V.B.3) had seven subordinate offices in Chiang-che, one in Ho-nan-Chiang-pei, and one in Shan-hsi.¹⁷²

In the heir apparent's establishment, seven of its agencies had no interests beyond the Metropolitan Province (V.A.2,3,4,5,6,7,9); the Bureau for the Heir-apparent's Household (V.A.1) had had six offices which were located in Chiang-hsi, but all were abolished in 1322 or 1323.¹⁷³ The Directorate-General for Civil Administration in Pien-liang (V.A.8), with twenty subordinate offices, was entirely within Ho-nan-Chiang-pei Province.¹⁷⁴ The establishments of the dowager empresses (V.D) all seem to have been located in the Metropolitan Province, particularly the northern, Mongolian, part

of it, but one of them had 40,000 households assigned to it in the southern provinces, Chiang-che and Hu-Kuang.¹⁷⁵

The Bureau of Tibetan and Buddhist Affairs (V.D.6) represents a fusion in 1329 of the functions of two quite different organs established earlier, one for the local government of Tibet (which was largely in the hands of the Sa-skya family), and another for the regulation of the Buddhist clergy in China, the Buddhist Affairs Commission.¹⁷⁶ All but eight of the bureau's twenty-six subordinate offices were located in Tibet. Like many other important offices in the imperial government, this bureau had replicas of itself created as the need arose: in Tibet proper when military emergencies occurred, and in several places in South China after its conquest, but only one of them, that at Hang-chou in Chiang-che Province, became permanent.¹⁷⁷ There was a host of local offices throughout the land to handle legal cases involving Buddhist monks, but these were not parts of the Bureaus of Tibetan and Buddhist Affairs, and they were in any case all abolished in 1311, after such legal cases were referred to the local civil magistrates.¹⁷⁸ In a sense, then, control of Buddhist clergy became more centralized within the provinces, although not on an empire-wide level. For three short years, however, the Bureau of Tibetan and Buddhist Affairs had a structure which approached the model of the American bureau described earlier, and which is almost unique among important imperial offices in Yüan China. In 1331 there was established for it sixteen regional Directorates-General for Religious Affairs, *kuang-chiao tsung-kuan-fu* 廣教總管府, one in each region (or area of comparable size), in every section of the empire (only Ling-peï Province is not mentioned, and it was undoubtedly included in the assignment of one of the Metropolitan regional offices). The Directorates-General were high-ranking (3A), and had four officials each, including an Agent (*ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*), who were nominated to the emperor by the Bureau of Tibetan and Buddhist Affairs at Ta-tu. Because of the Directorates' short life (the reasons for their sudden demise are, as usual, unclear), no hints of their activities can be found in the record; they were replaced by a revived "branch" Bureau of Tibetan and Buddhist Affairs.¹⁷⁹

A similar profile is presented by the Office for Christian Clergy (V.D.7). From its creation in 1289 until 1315, it presided over seventy-two local Offices for the Management of the Christian Religion, *yeh-li-k'o-wen chang-chiao ssu* 也里可溫掌教司, the locations of which are unknown; but in the latter year all of them were abolished and their activities—probably the handling of legal cases involving priests—reverted to the parent office in Ta-tu. This may sound like the centralization of a governmental function, but it is more akin to the amputation of limbs from a body: the ten regular officers, three service officers, and seven clerks at Ta-tu could not be expected to exert much supervision over the empire's scattered Nestorian clergy without local representatives. One suspects in this case that the local bureaus were abolished as an economy measure because they had little to do in the first place, while the Office for the Christian Clergy continued, as it had from the start, to attend to the clergy in the capital and the management of the Christian cathedral there.¹⁸⁰

Of all branches of government, one would expect the military system to be among the most centralized and unified in its organization because of its intimate connection with the Mongols' conquest and the maintenance of their control, but that is only partially true. The Bureau of Military Affairs (IV.1) did have access to the imperial person and considerable independence, and it established norms for military units throughout the empire, but its direct administrative responsibilities were limited to thirty-five imperial guards units and other military organizations, all but three of which were located in the

Metropolitan Province (the three exceptions had some troops stationed in Ho-nan-Chiang-pei, Shan-hsi, and Liao-yang Provinces),¹⁸¹ the task of which was to maintain the security of the Metropolitan Province and the emperor.¹⁸²

In other provinces, military activities by the emperor's troops were controlled by replica Bureaus of Military Affairs (*hsing shu-mi-yüan* 行樞密院), at least ten of which are known to have been established at various times; they were often the first high-level Yüan administrations to appear in a newly conquered area. However, these "branch" bureaus were intended as temporary, to be abolished or replaced by "branch" Central Secretariats as soon as order had returned,¹⁸³ although some of them, like the Ssu-ch'uan "Branch" Bureau of Military Affairs, became permanent and apparently influential features of the governmental scene in West China until 1338, when all "branch" bureaus were abolished.¹⁸⁴ The natural habitat of the imperial troops thus seems to have been the Metropolitan Province and its fringes, and there they were indeed organized in a highly centralized manner. Military security in the other provinces, however, when no imperial troops were on duty there, was the responsibility of the myriarchies located at the circuit level, and these were under the control of the "branch" secretariats, not the Bureaus of Military Affairs; the Pacification Offices at the Region level also seem to have been influential in local military affairs, although they did not directly control troops.¹⁸⁵ The agricultural colonies (*t'un-t'ien* 屯田) which contributed to the support of troops in Yüan China were, in provinces other than the Metropolitan, also controlled by the "branch" secretariats; in the Metropolitan Province, most of them were controlled by the Bureau of Military Affairs, but some were under the Central Secretariat or other bureaus.¹⁸⁶

The Armaments Court (IV.3) was a local, not a national, agency, undoubtedly supplying the bows, arrows, and armor to the imperial troops in the Metropolitan Province and in adjacent areas. Of its thirty-nine subordinate offices with their subject artisans, only eleven were outside that province, six in northern Ho-nan-Chiang-pei, one in Chiang-hsi, and the rest in Liao-yang.¹⁸⁷ In the other provinces of the empire, arms manufacture was carried on as an activity of local government.¹⁸⁸

III. GENERAL FEATURES OF YÜAN RULE

Having surveyed virtually the entire Yüan imperial government, we now find it possible to make a few statements about its nature. First, it is clear that its bureaus were principally organs for the governance of the Metropolitan Province, and their administrative competence was overwhelmingly within that province's boundaries; where it exceeded them was in the two provinces to the north, Liao-yang and Ling-pei, thinly settled areas with largely non-Chinese populations and rudimentary official systems,¹⁸⁹ in the adjoining northern parts of Ho-nan-Chiang-pei and Chiang-che provinces, and in a few other spots in North China. This characteristic—the intimate involvement of the imperial government with the administration of a particular territory within the empire—distinguishes it greatly from modern central governments, and makes it resemble the government of a royal domain instead. With the important exception of the appointment of officials, its engagement in empire-wide administration was at best transitory or limited to very restricted activities. In yet another way is it unlike a central government: it did not simply manage a group of techniques, institutions, and facilities to assist the units of local government in the administration

and exploitation of the population, but was itself directly involved in such administration and exploitation, and its subjects were governed by special bureaus, not by the usual district magistrates. Of the seventy-six most important primary government bureaus¹⁹⁰ twenty-one or 27.5 percent directly governed subjects as their principal activity;¹⁹¹ of the remaining fifty-five which did not, nineteen (or 34.5 percent) had bureaus at the first level of subordination which governed subjects, and these numbered ninety-nine or 20.8 percent of all first-level subordinate bureaus.¹⁹²

The elaborate division of labor which appears in the list of bureaus of the emperor's government is only partly real; there is much duplication of function, a fact which was not lost on contemporaries. One Wang Chieh 王結 (1274–1336) noted:

"We have a Ministry of Revenue [for financial matters], and yet we have an Office of the Grand Supervisors of Agriculture, too; we have a Ministry of Rites [for ritual matters], and yet we have an Academy of Imperial Sacrifices and Rituals, a Court for State Wine Affairs, *kuang-lu ssu* 光祿寺, an Office for State Ceremonial, *shih-i ssu* 侍儀司, and a College for Foreign Reception, *hui-t'ung kuan* 會同館; we have a Ministry of War [for postal affairs, official transport, and remount service], yet we also have the Bureau for Transmission Services, the Court of the Imperial Stud, and the Court for the Imperial Tack; [we have a Ministry of Punishments] [for legal matters], yet we have the Grand Judge, *i-k'o cha-erh-ku-ch'i* 伊克扎爾固齊 (M. *yeke jarghuchi*), too;¹⁹³ we have a Ministry of Works [for construction and manufactures], yet we have a Bureau for Imperial Manufactures, an Armaments Court, a Directorate of Palace Workshops, *shao-fu chien* 少府監, a Directorate for Felt Manufactures, and a Directorate for Leathers and Furs, too. . . . In the circuits outside [the Metropolitan Province] we have the 'branch' secretariats, but we also have Pacification Offices and Directorates-General."¹⁹⁴

The emperor's device for extending his authority outside of his domain was the creation of replicas of his own metropolitan bureaus. These are often termed "branch" or "local" bureaus by modern writers, but they were not true branches, for they had their own independent officials, and ranks equal to, or only slightly lower than, the prototypes at Ta-tu, and they were no more local than their parent bodies. With two exceptions—the "branch" Censorates and Central Secretariats discussed below—all were considered temporary expedients, and all but a few were eventually abolished. This means that the "branch" Central Secretariats were virtually the only significant conduits for imperial power into provincial territories; but, in fact, as we have seen, the emperors gave them enormous powers in all sectors of government. Furthermore, the "branch" secretariats created, with imperial approval, their own administrative bureaus much as the imperial government did. Some examples are the Maritime Trade Superintendencies in Chiang-che Province, which collected the maritime customs revenues,¹⁹⁵ the Kuang-tung Salt Tax Superintendency in Chiang-hsi Province,¹⁹⁶ and the Ssu-ch'uan Tea and Salt Distribution Office in Ssu-ch'uan Province.¹⁹⁷

The late Maeda Naonori has correctly observed that the "branch" secretariats were not organs of local government like the circuit (*lu*) bureaus of Sung times, but governments of external territories, separate vassal states surrounding a nuclear state, the emperor's domain—an idea of political order which he traces to the pre-dynastic period of the Mongols' history.¹⁹⁸ This view is given further support by the writings of two contemporary visitors from other cultures, Rašīd al-Dīn of Iran and Marco Polo of Venice, who often prefer to call the provinces of China "kingdoms" or "countries."¹⁹⁹ Rašīd noted, too, that the provinces did not all bear the same relation to the emperor: some, like Korea, Kan-su, and Yün-nan, were "separate" countries, much more

independent of his authority than the others.²⁰⁰ Thus the provinces, while internally centralized and integrated by their powerful Central Secretariats, were only loosely bound to the imperial province, and were liable to dangerous regional and separatist forces—forces which ultimately appeared and brought down the dynasty.²⁰¹

The emperor had several devices at his disposal to fight these forces. Some of the most important derived from his traditional constitutional supremacy: his power to appoint and remove officials, to issue edicts with the force of law on any topic, and to act as a court of last resort in all criminal or administrative matters. He also exploited ethnic solidarity, reserving all important posts for Mongols and for his Central and Western Asian allies.²⁰² He promoted the organs of his government as the supreme normative bodies of the empire, but, as we have seen, gave them too little administrative machinery and personnel to be effective beyond the Metropolitan Province. He tried to make the “branch” central secretariats inferior by having them address him through his own Central Secretariat, and by sometimes refusing to appoint their top officials.²⁰³

The only agency of the imperial government which helped the emperors to counter the decentralization which the “branch” central secretariat system brought, was the Censorate (III.1). It has been called monolithic, centralized, and an example of extreme integration,²⁰⁴ but it seems to fall far short of that because it embodies the same pattern of prototype and replicas which we have encountered before. Still, the Censorate organization did transcend the provincial system, for it divided the country into only three areas instead of the usual twelve. The Censorate at Ta-tu reserved for itself the Metropolitan Province, Ho-nan-Chiang-pei, and presumably Liao-yang and Ling-pei.²⁰⁵ A Shan-hsi “Branch” Censorate covered Shan-hsi, Kan-su, Ssu-ch’uan, and Yün-nan Provinces,²⁰⁶ while the Chiang-nan “Branch” Censorate looked after Chiang-che, Chiang-hsi, and Hu-kuang.²⁰⁷ Each of the Censorates had subordinate to itself an Office of Surveillance, *ch’a-yüan* 察院, with from twenty to thirty-two investigating censors assigned to it,²⁰⁸ and from four to ten regions (*tao*) under its jurisdiction, in each of which was a Regional Investigation Office, *su-cheng lien-fang ssu*,²⁰⁹ with several Investigation Commissioners.²¹⁰ Although all three Censorates were of equal rank, the Metropolitan Censorate seems to have assumed general management of the others.²¹¹ With its extensive powers of investigation and impeachment, its privileged relations with the emperor, and its relatively integrated structure, the Censorate, along with the Central Secretariat and the Bureau of Military Affairs, was among the most important imperial bureaus.²¹²

It is widely believed by students of late imperial Chinese history that the Ming and Ch’ing epochs embody a greater tendency towards centralization, autocracy, and bureaucratization than is to be found in Sung times or before. The origins of the new trend have sometimes been attributed to the Mongol presence in China, but support for that view seems hard to find, at least among the formal political institutions. Ming T’ai-tsu’s abolition of the “branch” Central Secretariats in 1376 was a much more important step in the centralization of political authority in China than was the Mongols’ creation of them.²¹³ The Ming reorganization of the Ministry of Revenue also exemplifies an important step towards the development of an authentic central governmental bureau. It had thirteen subordinate offices to deal with the fiscal administration of the empire, one office for each of the thirteen provinces.²¹⁴ Among the hundred-odd chief bureaus of the Yüan imperial government, there is not one which reflects in its structure a concern for empire-wide administration to this extent.

NOTES

1. This essay is based on research for a comprehensive survey of the institution of Yüan government which I am presently preparing. The American Council of Learned Societies and the Humanities Foundation of the University of California supported some of this research with grants, for which I am grateful. In addition to the members of the Conference on the Yüan Dynasty, who gave me valuable criticism, I would like to thank Professor Okada Hidehiro 岡田英弘 of the Tōyō Bunko 東洋文庫 for suggesting some of the ideas developed here, and colleagues and students at U.C.L.A. who criticized an early version of this paper, especially Professors Philip C. C. Huang and Richard Baum. These persons should not be held responsible for any errors of fact or interpretation in this paper.
2. See, for example, John W. Dardess, *Conquerors and Confucians: Aspects of Political Change in Late Yüan China* (New York and London, 1973), p. 21, and the same author's "From Mongol Empire to Yüan Dynasty: Changing Forms of Imperial Rule in Mongolia and Central Asia," *Monumenta Serica*, 30 (1972-73), pp: 117-165; Charles O. Hucker, *The Censorial System of Ming China* (Stanford, 1966), p. 25.
3. Ch'ien Mu 錢穆, *Chung-kuo li-tai cheng-chih t'e-shih* 中國歷代政治得失 (Hong Kong, 5th printing, 1968), p. 97.
4. These are described most fully in *Yüan shih* 元史 (Peking: Chung-hua Shu-chü, 1976, hereafter YS), *chüan* 85-92.
5. This is a paraphrase of the constitution of the Yüan dynasty Ministry of Revenue (II.A.1.b. in the list of bureaus given below), YS 85:2126, translated by Paul Ratchnevsky, *Un code des Yuan* (2 vols., Paris, 1937, 1972), I, pp. 127-128.
6. The imperial government is dealt with in YS 85-90; I have found no entry in these chapters postdating 1332. See Herbert Franke, *Geld und Wirtschaft unter der Mongolen-Herrschaft* (Leipzig, 1949), pp. 17-18, 20-23.
7. Changes in the governmental structure after 1332 are discussed in YS 92.
8. There are many difficulties in making such enumerations and in identifying degrees of dependence and independence. The *Yüan shih* occasionally uses expressions like "sub-ordinate to [this organ] were five bureaus . . .," but usually one must rely on the indenting used in the first edition of the *Yüan shih* to infer independence or subordination; in some places it appears to be in error and I have adopted the suggestions of K'o Shao-min 柯邵忒, *Hsin Yüan shih* 新元史 (Tientsin, 1922).
9. YS 87:2200; Ratchnevsky, *Un code*, I, pp. 143-146. In presenting this list I give only minimal citations: the main YS entry and one translation or discussion in a modern work when it exists.
10. YS 88:2225.
11. YS 90:2288; Paul Ratchnevsky, "Über den mongolischen Kult am Hofe der Grosskhane in China," in Louis Ligeti, ed., *Mongolian Studies* (Amsterdam, 1970), pp. 420-421.
12. YS 90:2289; Ratchnevsky, "Über den mongolischen Kult," pp. 420-421.
13. YS 90:2292; Ratchnevsky, "Über den mongolischen Kult," p. 430 n. 74.
14. YS 90:2292; Francis W. Cleaves, "Bökesün-bökegöl," *Ural-Altaische Jahrbücher*, 35D (1964), p. 384.
15. YS 90:2293.
16. YS 90:2294; Ratchnevsky, "Über den mongolischen Kult," p. 430 n. 75.
17. YS 90:2294.
18. YS 90:2299.
19. YS 90:2300.
20. YS 88:2224.
21. YS 90:2277.
22. YS 90:2297.

23. YS 90:2300.
24. YS 90:2301.
25. YS 87:2189; Ratchnevsky, *Un code*, I, pp. 148–149.
26. YS 87:2190, 2191; Ratchnevsky, *Un code*, I, pp. 149–151, II, pp. 22–23.
27. YS 87:2192; Ratchnevsky, *Un code*, II, pp. 23–26.
28. YS 88:2222; Ratchnevsky, *Un code*, II, pp. 33–34.
29. YS 88:2219.
30. YS 90:2296.
31. YS 90:2297.
32. YS 88:2220; Ratchnevsky, *Un code*, II, pp. 46–47.
33. YS 88:2223.
34. YS 90:2296.
35. YS 88:2217; Ratchnevsky, *Un code*, II, p. 1 n. 5.
36. YS 87:2207.
37. YS 88:2218.
38. YS 88:2225.
39. YS 85:2120–2121; Ratchnevsky, *Un code*, I, pp. 117–118, 122–124.
40. YS 85:2125–2126; Ratchnevsky, *Un code*, I, pp. 126–127.
41. YS 85:2126; Ratchnevsky, *Un code*, I, pp. 127–128.
42. YS 85:2136; Ratchnevsky, *Un code*, I, p. 128.
43. YS 85:2140; Ratchnevsky, *Un code*, I, pp. 130 ff.
44. YS 85:2142; Ratchnevsky, *Un code*, I, pp. 131 ff.
45. YS 85:2143; Ratchnevsky, *Un code*, I, pp. 132 ff.
46. YS 87:2188; Ratchnevsky, *Un code*, I, pp. 189–191.
47. YS 88:2230; Peter Olbricht, *Das Postwesen in China unter der Mongolenherrschaft im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert* (Wiesbaden, 1954), p. 44 ff.
48. YS 90:2295; Ratchnevsky, *Un code*, I, pp. 267–268.
49. YS 86:2177; Ratchnevsky, *Un code*, I, pp. 153–161.
50. YS 87:2187; Ratchnevsky, *Un code*, I, pp. 52–56.
51. YS 89:2273.
52. YS 86:2155; Ratchnevsky, *Un code*, I, pp. 140–141.
53. YS 86:2175.
54. YS 90:2284; Ratchnevsky, “Über den mongolischen Kult,” p. 431 n. 76.
55. YS 89:2243.
56. YS 89:2248.
57. YS 89:2249.
58. YS 89:2250.
59. YS 89:2250.
60. It is difficult to find satisfactory translations for the term *ch'ieh-lien-k'ou* 怯憐(怜)口, M. *ger-ün köbegüd*; in an early thirteenth-century Mongolian environment, it meant “domestic slave,” a meaning which it undoubtedly continued to have in Mongolia for the next century (see *Yüan-ch'ao pi-shih* 元朝秘史, ed. B. I. Pankratov, *Iuan'-chao bi-shi* (Moscow, 1962), par. 232, p. 459, where *ger-ün kö'üd* is defined as *chia-jen* 家人); in Yüan times in China, however, the term developed a quite different meaning: displaced and other declassé persons who had been rounded up and forced to work at various artisan tasks. My translation is based on this meaning. See YS 89:2254: “In 1264, it was ordered that displaced persons, freed slaves, Buddhist and Taoist monks who had returned to the lay condition, and other kinds of households, be assembled together to practice various sorts of arts and crafts. There was established a directorate-general for the management of *ch'ieh-lien-k'ou* to supervise their manufactures.” On the identity of *ch'ieh-lien-k'ou* and *ger-ün köbegüd* see Francis W. Cleaves, “The Sino-Mongolian Inscription of 1335,” *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 13 (1950), pp. 51–52 n. 170.

61. The original appanages were the appanages of the descendants of the fourteen tribal cheftains who had helped Chinggis Khan in the conquest years. The tribes were the Barulas, the Uriyangkhan, the Besüd, the Uriyangkhadaï, the Arulad, the Jalayir, the Üüshin (Hüüshin), the Süldüs, the Urughud, the Mangghud, the Khonggirad, the Ikires, the Önggüd, and the Uighur. See Murakami Masatsugu 村上正二, "Genchō ni okeru tōka no igi 元朝に於ける投下の意義," *Mōkogakuhō* 蒙古学報, 1 (1940), p. 183.
62. YS 89:2257.
63. YS 89:2252.
64. YS 89:2259.
65. YS 89:2262.
66. YS 88:2230.
67. YS 89:2258.
68. YS 89:2260.
69. YS 89:2266–2667, 2270, 2269, 2267, 2257, 2268.
70. YS 90:2289; Yanai Watari 箭内互, *Yüan-ch'ao ch'ieh-hsüeh chi o-erh-to k'ao* 元朝怯薛及斡耳杂考, Ch'en Chieh 陳捷 and Ch'en Ch'ing-ch'üan 陳清泉, trs. (Taipei, 1963), pp. 72–78, 117–118.
71. YS 90:2290; Yanai, *Ibid.*, pp. 78–79, 90.
72. YS 90:2290; Yanai, *Ibid.*, pp. 79–80.
73. YS 90:2291; Yanai, *Ibid.*, p. 91.
74. YS 90:2291; Yanai, *Ibid.*, p. 78.
75. YS 90:2291.
76. YS 89:2271.
77. YS 90:2295.
78. YS 89:2254.
79. YS 34:768, 44:921–922.
80. YS 89:2272–2273; *Hsin Yüan shih*, 60:22b.
81. YS 87:2193; F. W. Cleaves, "The Sino-Mongolian Inscription of 1346," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 15:1–2 (1952), p. 41, n. 39.
82. YS 89:2273.
83. YS 98:2507–2508; 91:2316 ff, trans. P. Ratchnevsky, *Un code*, I, pp. 34–36 n. 6.
84. YS 91:2317–2318.
85. YS 91:2318.
86. For the political geography of Yüan China, see Albert Hermann, *An Historical Atlas of China* (revised edition, Chicago, 1966), p. 41.
87. These were: the Ho-nan-Chiang-pei 河南江北 Secretariat (modern Honan, Hupeh, Kiangsu, Anhwei); the Chiang-che 江浙 Secretariat (modern Chekiang and Fukien); the Chiang-hsi 江西 Secretariat (modern Kiangsi and eastern Kwangtung); the Hu-kuang 湖廣 Secretariat (modern Hunan, Kwangsi, and parts of Kwangtung and Kweichow); the Shan-hsi 陝西 Secretariat (modern Shensi); the Ssu-ch'uan 四川 Secretariat (modern Szechwan); the Liao-yang 遼陽 Secretariat (modern Liao-ning and Chi-lin); the Kan-su 甘肅 Secretariat (modern Kansu); the Ling-pei 嶺北 Secretariat, which was not broken into administrative units (modern Mongolian People's Republic); the Yün-nan 雲南 Secretariat (modern Yunnan); and the Cheng-tung 征東 Secretariat (modern Korea). The territories comprising these provinces were not settled until after 1287. See YS 91:2305–2308.
88. The term is a collective one; there were eight different types of pacification offices used in different parts of the empire, each with its characteristic name. See YS 91:2308–2310.
89. YS 91:2308.
90. YS 86:2180–2182; Ratchnevsky, *Un code*, I, pp. 169–170, 179.
91. From *United States Government Organization Manual, 1969–70* (Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records, General Services Administration, Washington, D.C., 1969), pp. 440–445, 617.

92. *Ta-Yüan sheng-cheng kuo-ch'ao tien-chang* 大元聖政國朝典章 (Shen Chia-pen 沈家本 ed., Taipei, 1967, 2 vols.), hereafter *Yüan tien-chang*.
93. *Yüan tien-chang*, 2:2a; Yang Shu-fan 楊樹藩, "Yüan-tai-ti Chung-shu-sheng 元代的中書省," *Yu-shih hsüeh-chih* 幼獅學誌, 6:2 (1967), p. 8. The heir-apparent's bureau is called the *hui-cheng yüan* 政徽院 in this passage.
94. There were exceptions: the Bureau of Military Affairs (IV.1), the Censorate (III.1), the Bureau of Tibetan and Buddhist Affairs (V.D.6), and the Bureau for Imperial Household Provisions (I.A.1) could select their own officials, as could some of the vassal lords. YS 22:486; Ratchnevsky, *Un code*, I, p. 145 n. 1; Yang Shu-fan (see n. 93), pp. 8–9.
95. YS 85:2124.
96. YS 85:2123; Ratchnevsky, *Un code*, I, pp. 122–125. The Office of the Left was divided into six departments, with thirty-one sections spread among them; the Office of the Right had four departments, with sixteen sections spread among them.
97. YS 85:2127–2128.
98. Herbert F. Schurmann, *Economic Structure of the Yüan Dynasty* (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), p. 133 ff.
99. *Chu-lu pao-ch'ao tu t'i-chü-ssu* 諸路寶鈔都提舉, YS 85:2128.
100. See Maeda Naonori 前田直典, "Gendai ni okeru shō no hakkō seido to sono ryūsū jōtai 元代に於ける鈔の発行制度とその流通状態," in his *Genchōshi no kenkyū* 元朝史の研究 (Tokyo, 1973), pp. 50–55. The exact number of these is difficult to decide; Maeda feels that there were four outside of the Metropolitan Province, but there may have been more.
101. YS 85:2129, *yin-tsao pao-ch'ao k'u* 印造寶鈔庫.
102. YS 9:183; Maeda, "Shō no hakkō seido," pp. 49–55.
103. YS 85:2129, *shao-ch'ao k'u* 燒鈔庫.
104. Ratchnevsky, *Un code*, I, pp. 169–170.
105. YS 93:2370; Schurmann, *Economic Structure*, p. 140.
106. Maeda, "Shō no hakkō seido," pp. 59–66; YS 85:2129; Ratchnevsky, *Un code*, I, p. 254, n. 1. Banks were called *p'ing-chun k'u* 平準庫 or *hsing-yung k'u* 行用庫.
107. *Ta-tu hsüan-k'o t'i-chü-ssu* 大都宣課提舉司, YS 85:2129. The term "commodity tax" translates *k'o-(ch'eng)* 課(程), which included taxes on products under some sort of government control, as well as sales taxes, *shang-shui* 商稅. See *Yüan tien-chang*, 22:1a; Schurmann, *Economic Structure*, p. 219.
108. *Ta-tu chiu-k'o t'i-chü-ssu* 大都酒課提舉司, YS 85:2130; Schurmann, *Economic structure*, p. 210.
109. YS 85:2134.
110. YS 85:2134, trans. Ratchnevsky, *Un code*, I, p. 258 ff.; and YS 85:2135, trans. Ratchnevsky, *Un code*, I, pp. 260–261.
111. YS 85:2135, trans. Ratchnevsky, *Un code*, I, p. 261, *ho-tung shan-hsi teng-ch'u chuan-yün yen shih-ssu* 河東陝西等處轉運鹽使司.
112. YS 85:2130, *yin-tsao yen ch'a teng yin chü* 印造鹽茶等引局.
113. YS 85:2130, trans. Ratchnevsky, *Un code*, I, p. 270 ff; YS 85:2132, trans. Ratchnevsky, *Ibid.*, p. 273.
114. *Tu ts'ao-yün shih-ssu* 都漕運使司.
115. YS 85:2132.
116. YS 85:2143; Ratchnevsky, *Un code*, I, p. 132 ff.
117. YS 85:2148, *t'i-chü tu-ch'eng so* 提舉都城所.
118. YS 85:2144–2152.
119. YS 85:2151, *ta-ning lu chih-jan chü* 大寧路織染局.
120. Ys 85:2149, 2151, *pieh-shih-pa-li chü* 別失八里局.
121. It is not usually necessary to guess about the geographical extent of the authority of most subordinate agencies since the area is often mentioned in the agency's name.
122. *Yüan tien-chang*, 58:15a.

123. *Yüan tien-chang*, ch 58–60; those relating to bridge-, road-, and dike-building are of some importance, *Yüan tien-chang*, 58:1a–4a.
124. YS 85:2136; Ratchnevsky, *Un code*, I, pp. 128–129.
125. *Chu-yin chü* 铸印局, YS 85:2140.
126. Yüan dynasty official seals are invariably inscribed “manufactured by the Ministry of Rites of the Central Secretariat.” See David M. Farquhar, “The Official Seals and Ciphers of the Yüan Period,” *Monumenta Serica*, 25 (1966), pp. 362–393.
127. YS 85:2142–2143; Ratchnevsky, *Un code*, I, p. 131 ff; *Yüan tien-chang*, ch. 41–57. The ministry had only two small subordinate offices, a Prison, *ssu-yü ssu* 司獄司, and a case review office, *ssu-chi so* 司籍所, both located in the capital. YS 85:2143.
128. YS 88:2230; Ratchnevsky, *Un code*, I, p. 277; Olbricht, *Postwesen*, pp. 46–47.
129. YS 85:2140; Ratchnevsky, *Un code*, I, p. 130 ff; YS 85:2141–2142.
130. YS 85:2125–2126; Ratchnevsky, *Un code*, I, pp. 126–127. The number of officials, from the year 1317, is recorded in *Yüan tien-chang*, 7:38a.
131. See n. 94 above.
132. Wu Lai 吳萊 (1297–1340), *Wu Yüan-ying chi* 吳淵穎集 (*Ssu-pu ts'ung-k'an* reprint of 1352 ed.), 12:9b–10a. On this man, see Lien-sheng Yang, “Ming local administration,” in Charles O. Hucker, ed., *Chinese Government in Ming Times* (New York, 1969), p. 10; and the essay in this volume by J. D. Langlois.
133. YS 5:90.
134. YS 9:183, 157:3697.
135. YS 90:2277; it was abolished in 1282. This was probably the same “branch” Ministry of Works which, in 1274, was given charge of runaway slaves whose masters could not be found; YS 8:158.
136. YS 22:484; Dardess, *Conquerors and Confucians*, p. 24.
137. YS 93:2354; Schurmann, *Economic structure*, p. 50; Ratchnevsky, *Un code*, I, p. 188.
138. *Ta-Yüan kuan-chih tsa-chi* 大元官制雜託 (Kuang-wen Shu-chü ed. under title *Shih-liao ssu-pien* 史料四編, Taipei, 1972), pp. 61–64; Schurmann, *Economic Structure*, pp. 47–48.
139. YS 93:2354–2355; Schurmann, *Economic Structure*, pp. 46–53. There is a substantial modern literature on the *she*; see especially Yang Ne 揚訥, “Yüan-tai nung-ts'un she-chih yen-chiu 元代農村社制研究,” in Ts'un-ts'ui hsüeh-she 存萃舉社, ed., *Yüan-tai she-hui ching-chi shih lun-chi* 元代社會經濟史論集 (Hong Kong, 1975), pp. 1–18.
140. These were later called Regional Investigation Offices, *su-cheng lien-fang ssu*. The Censorate is discussed below.
141. *Ta-Yüan kuan-chih tsa-chi*, pp. 62–64; Schurmann, *Economic Structure*, p. 54. The date given in YS 93: 2356 is 1292.
142. *Ta-Yüan kuan-chih tsa-chi*, pp. 59–61.
143. YS 90:2295; Ratchnevsky, *Un code*, I, p. 267 n. 2.
144. See, for example, YS 14:297, 17:362, 64:1588 and *passim*.
145. YS 21:459, 29:655, 140:3368.
146. YS 22:494.
147. *Ta-Yüan kuan-chih tsa-chi*, pp. 64–67; YS 29:657, 39:833, 92:2335.
148. YS 101:2583–2594; *Yüan tien-chang*, ch. 36 and 37; *Chan-ch'ih* 站赤 (Taipei, 1972), 9 *chüan*, are the important sources. Secondary studies, besides Olbricht, *Das Postwesen*, are the still valuable article by Haneda Tōru 羽田亨, “Genchō ekiden zakkō 元朝駅傳雜考,” in his *Haneda hakase shigaku rombunshū* 羽田博士史學論文集 (Kyoto, 1957), I, pp. 32–114; and Yüan Chi 袁翼, “Yüan-tai-ti chan-ch'ih 元代的站赤,” in his *Yüan-shih yen-chiu lun-chi* 元史研究論集 (Taipei, 1974), pp. 236–265.
149. Ratchnevsky, *Un code*, I, pp. 124–125; Olbricht, *Das Postwesen*, p. 44.
150. YS 21:448, 88:2230. YS 24:538 says it was abolished in 1311.
151. YS 91:2318; Olbricht, *Das Postwesen*, p. 82; Haneda, “Genchō ekiden,” pp. 70–71. On the term *t'o-t'o-ho-sun* see A. Mostaert and F. W. Cleaves, “Trois documents mongols des

- Archives Secrètes Vaticanes,” *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 15:2 (1952), pp. 436–437. The term *jamchi*, “post station officers,” includes those low-ranking managers of stations bearing the Chinese titles *i-ling* 驛令, “postal manager,” and *t’i-ling* 提領, “director.” Olbricht, *Das Postwesen*, p. 60.
152. Haneda, “Genchō ekiden,” pp. 59 ff. On the Agent, see Meng Ssu-ming 蒙思明, *Yüan-tai she-hui chieh-chi chih-tu* 元代社會階級制度 (Peking, 1938, reprinted Hong Kong, 1967), pp. 39–40; Jagchid-sechen 札奇斯欽, “Shuo chiu Yüan-shih-chung-ti ta-lu-hua-ch’ih 說舊元史中的達魯花赤,” *Wen-shih-che hsüeh-pao* 文史哲舉報, 13 (1964), pp. 293–441; Igor de Rachewiltz, “Personnel and Personalities in North China in the Early Mongol Period,” *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, 9 (1966), pp. 134 ff.
153. Haneda, “Genchō ekiden,” pp. 63, 52 ff.
154. *I-hsüeh t’i-chü-ssu* 醫舉提舉司, YS 88:2222.
155. *Kuan-i t’i-chü-ssu* 官醫提舉司.
156. YS 88:2222.
157. See *Yüan tien-chang*, 32:2a ff. Some of these orders affecting provinces in the South and elsewhere do not mention the Imperial Academy of Medicine.
158. YS 91:2312.
159. YS 87:2207, 2208–2213. Some state monasteries were administered by the Bureau of Tibetan and Buddhist Affairs (V.D.6).
160. *Huai-tung huai-hsi t’un-t’ien ta-pu tsung-kuan-fu* 淮東淮西屯田打捕總管府, YS 87:2204–2206. This office had sixteen subordinate offices.
161. *Ch’ang-Hu teng-ch’u ch’a-yüan tu t’i-chü-ssu* 常湖等處茶園都提舉司, YS 87:2206.
162. *Chu-lu chin-yü jen-chiang tsung-kuan-fu* 諸路金玉人匠總管府, YS 88:2225.
163. *Fu-liang tz’u chü*, 浮梁磁局 YS 88:2227.
164. YS 88:2228.
165. YS 100:2555–2558. The Court also obtained horses by purchase and outright requisition. Jagchid-sechen and C. R. Bawden, “Some Notes on the Horse-Policy of the Yüan Dynasty,” *Central Asiatic Journal*, 10:3–4 (1965), pp. 254–263.
166. See, for example, YS 94:2394, trans. Schurmann, *Economic Structure*, p. 199, where certain tea districts in Chiang-hsi 江西 were declared in 1308 to be an appanage of the empress, the taxes from which were to go directly to the *hui-cheng yüan* 徽政院, a bureau at that time controlled by the empress, although at other times it was controlled by the heir apparent. The histories of these two establishments are the most complicated and confusing in the Yüan government.
167. I am here using the term “fief” to cover a large number of different Chinese and Mongolian terms: *fen-ti* 分地, land grants; *ying-p’an* 營盤, M. *nuntugh*, territories; *shih-i* 食色 or *t’ang-mu* 湯沐色, fiefs (usually to females); *kuo* 國, M. *khari*, *gui*, principalities; *pu-lo* 部落, *chih-erh* 枝兒, *ai-ma* 愛馬, M. *aimagh*, tribes; *wei-hsia* 位下, *t’ou-hsia* 投下, appanages (these last two terms referred originally to the grantee, but were also used for their holdings). The very broad Mongolian term *khubi*, “share,” included fiefs. On this complicated matter see Meng Ssu-ming, *Yüan-tai she-hui*, pp. 101 ff, 115; Paul Ratchnevsky, “Zum Ausdruck ‘t’ou-hsia’ in der Mongolenzeit,” *Collectanea Mongolica, Festschrift für Professor Dr. Rintchen* (Wiesbaden, 1966), pp. 173–177; Murakami Masatsugu, “Genchō ni okeru tōka no igi,” pp. 169–216; Erich Haenisch, *Wörterbuch zu Mongol un Niuca Tobca’an (Yüan-ch’ao pi-shi)* (Wiesbaden, 1962), pp. 62, 120. These grants included both lands and peoples.
168. YS 95:2411, trans. Schurmann, *Economic Structure*, pp. 19–20.
169. *Yüan tien-chang*, 9:9a–17a; Murakami, “Tōka no igi,” p. 204.
170. YS 95:2414 and *passim*.
171. YS 88:2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237–2238, 2238. Through an error YS 88:2239–2240 recopies subordinate bureaus of the Bureau for the Empress’ Palace which it has already recorded on YS 88:2234–2235.

172. YS 89:2260–2261. A few other bureaus and sub-bureaus, the locations of which cannot be determined, may have been outside the Metropolitan Province.
173. YS 89:2246–2248.
174. YS 89:2259–2260.
175. This was the Court for Jen-tsung's Ordo (V.C. 4), YS 27:610.
176. *Kung-te shih-ssu* 功德使司, YS 87:2193–2194, trans. Ratchnevsky, *Un code*, I, pp. 151–52; YS 33:744. YS 36:802 mentions the separate reestablishment of the Buddhist Affairs Commission in 1332, but no trace of its activities can be found.
177. YS 87:2194; 16:350. YS 24:538 mentions the abolition of a Chiang-nan “Branch” Bureau of Tibetan and Buddhist Affairs in 1311, which I take to be a different bureau from the one at Hang-chou, since the latter was abolished in 1326 (YS 30:672), only to be reestablished again in 1342 (YS 92:2335).
178. YS 24:539, *Yüan tien-chang*, 33: 1a ff. These local offices included the Buddhist Registry Offices, *seng-lu ssu* 僧錄司, and others.
179. YS 35:776; 92:2335; 38:820. In 1342, the Chiang-che “Branch” Bureau of Tibetan and Buddhist Affairs established bureaus called *ch'ung-chiao so* 崇較所, which resolved legal cases involving monks, but nothing is known of their number or distribution. YS 92:2335, 142:3407.
180. YS 89:2273, 15:320.
181. These were, respectively, the General Myriarchy of Mongolian Troops in Ho-nan-Huai-pei, *ho-nan huai-pei meng-ku chün tu wan-hu-fu* 河南淮北蒙古軍都萬戶府; the Directorate-General for Hunting in Yen-an Colony, *yen-an t'un-tien ta-pu tsung-kuan-fu* 延安屯田打捕總管府; and the Hunting Office for the Colonies at Ta-ning, Hai-yang, and Other Places, *ta-ning hai-yang teng-ch'u t'un-t'ien ta-pu-so* 大寧海陽等處屯打捕所. YS 86:2166, 2169–2170. The Chief Military Commission (IV.2) had one myriarchy with some troops stationed in Ho-nan-Chiang-pei Province. YS 86:2177. For this discussion of the Bureau of Military Affairs I have depended, unless otherwise indicated, on the dissertation of Gunther Mangold, *Das Militärwesen in China unter der Mongolen-Herrschaft* (Bamberg, 1971), pp. 4–15.
182. Mangold, *Das Militärwesen*, pp. 4–5.
183. YS 86:2156; Mangold, *Das Militärwesen*, pp. 5–7, which describes the five most important branch bureaus (others which preceded them are also included).
184. YS 86:2156; Mangold, *Das Militärwesen*, p. 6. The order abolishing the branch bureaus of military affairs mentions, besides the Ssu-ch'uan bureau, three others in Ho-nan-Chiang-pei, Chiang-hsi, and Chiang-che. YS 39:843. A branch bureau was established in Ling-pei Province in 1329, but there is no record of its abolition. YS 86:2157.
185. Mangold, *Das Militärwesen*, p. 9 ff.
186. YS 100:2558–2579; Mangold, *Das Militärwesen*, pp. 37–43.
187. YS 90: 2284–2288.
188. See *Yüan tien-chang*, 35:12ab, trans. Mangold, *Das Militärwesen*, pp. 228–229.
189. I cannot agree with John W. Dardess, “From Mongol Empire to Yüan Dynasty,” p. 156, that any substantial bureaucratization of Mongolia (Ling-pei) occurred in Yüan times, despite the governmental activities there which he describes. He writes, “The main difference between this new Mongolian province . . . and those of China was that the steppes were not further subdivided into the usual local administrative hierarchy of prefectures, subprefectures and counties.” But surely such subdivision lies at the very heart of bureaucratization.
190. I exclude the forty-six princely administrations (V.D.5).
191. This can be determined in several ways: the descriptions in the *Yüan shih* may specifically state as much, giving the number of households; it may be clear by the name of the bureau (V.D.1 for example); or by the presence of an Agent (*ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*) in the list of officials.
192. In making this determination, I do not include forty-four military units, although technically they meet the criteria mentioned in the previous note.
193. The words “we have a Ministry of Punishments” (*yu hsing-pu* 育刑部) have been inadvertently

- omitted. The Grand Judge was the chief of the judges attached to the Central Secretariat (II.A.1).
194. Wang Chieh, "Shang Chung-shu tsai-hsiang pa-shih shu 上中書宰相八事書," *Wenchung chi* 文忠集 (*Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu chen-pen*, first series, ed.), 4:7b, quoted by Meng Ssu-ming, *Yüan-tai she-hui*, p. 156. Some of the bureaus mentioned in this passage later became absorbed by others or subordinated to the Ministries (II.A. 1. a–f). On Wang Chieh, see *Hsin Yüan shih*, 208: 10a–12b.
 195. *Shih-po t'i-chü-ssu* 市舶提舉司, YS 91:2315, trans. Ratchnevsky, *Un code*, II, p. 175 n. 3; YS 94:2401–2403; Schurmann, *Economic Structure*, pp. 230–236.
 196. *Kuang-tung yen-k'o t'i-chü-ssu* 廣東監課提舉司, YS 91:2314, 94:2392, trans. Schurmann, *Economic structure*, pp. 185–186.
 197. *Ssu-ch'uan ch'a-yen chuan-yün-ssu* 四川茶監轉運司, YS 91:2314.
 198. Maeda Naonori, "Genchō kōshō no seiritsu katei 元朝行省の成立過程," in his *Genchōshi no kenkyū*, pp. 145–202, especially pp. 182 ff. The Mongols called the nuclear state the *ghol-un ulus*, the vassal states *khari*.
 199. See John Andrew Boyle, trans., *The Successors of Genghis Khan* (New York, 1971), pp. 281–284, 323; and A. C. Moule and Paul Pelliot, *Marco Polo, The Description of the World* (London, 1938), I, p. 275.
 200. Boyle, *The Successors*, pp. 282–283, 325–326.
 201. See Dardess, *Conquerors and Confucians*, p. 119 ff.
 202. This theme has been extensively treated by Meng Ssu-ming, *Yüan-tai she-hui*, pp. 25–67.
 203. See the tables of provincial officials in *Hsin Yüan shih*, *chüan* 32, which often show the Chief Councillor's (*ch'eng-hsiang* 丞相) position empty. See also YS 91:2305–2306.
 204. Charles O. Hucker, "The Yüan Contribution to Censorial History," *Chung-yang yen-chiu yüan li-shih yü-yen yen-chiu-so chi-k'an* 中央研究院歷史語言研究所集刊, 4:1 (1960), pp. 219–227, and his *Censorial System*, pp. 25–29.
 205. YS 86:2178; Ratchnevsky, *Un code*, I, p. 179. Neither Liao-yang nor Ling-pei were organized into Regions (*tao*), the key subordinate territorial units of the censorates, although there had at one time been a Region established in Liao-yang called Hai-hsi Liao-tung 海西遼東. Hucker, "The Yüan Contribution," p. 221; Ratchnevsky, *Un code*, I, pp. 169–170.
 206. YS 86:2179; Ratchnevsky, *Un code*, I, p. 162.
 207. YS 86:2179; Ratchnevsky, *Un code*, I, p. 161 f.
 208. YS 86:2178, 2179, 2180; Ratchnevsky, *Un code*, I, pp. 175–176.
 209. YS 86:2180; Ratchnevsky, *Un code*, I, pp. 169–170, 179.
 210. YS 86:2180.
 211. Hucker, "The Yüan Contribution," p. 223. See YS 86:2178.
 212. See Sa Meng-wu 薩孟武, *Chung-kuo she-hui cheng-chih shih* 中國社會政治史 (Taipei, 1968, 4 vols.), IV, pp. 187 ff.
 213. Charles O. Hucker, "Governmental Organization of the Ming Dynasty," John L. Bishop, ed., *Studies of Governmental Institutions in Chinese History* (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), p. 39.
 214. Ray Huang, *Taxation and Governmental Finance in Sixteenth-century Ming China* (Cambridge, England, 1974), pp. 15–17. It is worth noting, however, that the Ministry of Revenue in Ming times had no regional offices in the provinces. It was also woefully understaffed by modern standards.

IMPERIAL GOVERNANCE IN YÜAN TIMES*

Elizabeth Endicott-West



Mongolian rule in China in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries has often been characterized as contributing directly to the development of a strong autocratic tradition in late imperial China. In the spirit of critically examining certain basic assumptions that continue to dominate the field of Yüan history, this article will address the question of the Mongols' role in the building of such an autocratic tradition.

One theory in particular has influenced much historical writing on the Yüan: Karl A. Wittfogel's theory of "oriental despotism."¹ In the attempt to establish the existence of a peculiarly non-Western system of despotic power, Wittfogel's analysis, as others have noted, remains on a very high level of abstraction; that is to say, it is essentially ahistorical.² In fact, Wittfogel's approach to the question of despotism reflects a Hegelian understanding of China by implying that the nature of despotic power changed little through several centuries of China's history.³

During the decades since Wittfogel's book first appeared (1957), historians have sought to plot the historical stages in the development of despotic power in China, their assumption often being that despotism was a progressive, snowballing process of development. The period of Mongolian rule in China (in *sensu lato* 1206–1368) generally has been perceived as contributing to the growth of imperial power, and as leading directly to the harsh rule of the first Ming dynasty ruler, Chu Yüan-chang (Ming T'ai-tsu). Wittfogel himself described the Mongols' rule of China as "one of the most terrifying examples of total power,"⁴ and Professor F. W. Mote has described the Yüan period as contributing to the growth of despotism by destroying "much of the restraint inherent in a highly-civilized atmosphere" and by the government's use of "blind and meaningless terror."⁵

Historians of the early Ming, in their attempt to explain the horrifying excesses of Ming T'ai-tsu, have understandably looked to the preceding Yüan dynasty for clues.⁶ The question of exactly what contribution the Yüan rulers made towards the increase in the powers of the monarchy, an increase which became apparent in Ming times, has yet to be definitively settled. Indeed, the question of whether the Mongols might have introduced various non-autocratic practices into the Yüan court and thereby produced a peculiarly Mongolian institution should also be addressed. It is certainly possible, as both John D. Langlois, Jr. and John Dardess have observed, that the first Ming emperor tightened up control over his court ministers and the larger bureaucracy in reaction against what he correctly perceived as the very inefficient, abuse-ridden, and loosely

ruled bureaucracy which existed in Yüan times.⁷ In other words, while providing certain precedents which Chu Yüan-chang deliberately followed, the Yüan monarchy may also have provided negative models which the first Ming Emperor strove to avoid.

In defining the limits and expression of imperial power in the Yüan period, one must settle upon certain indicators of that power. In the following pages, three such indicators in the realm of imperial decision-making and personnel management in Yüan times will be examined: (1) the early Yüan method of selecting a *qaγan*/emperor at an assembly (*quriltai*) and the Emperor's role at *quriltai* that were convened to discuss policy matters, (2) the early Yüan use of special agents in newly conquered territories and the evolution of these agents into members of a regular civilian bureaucracy under Qubilai, and (3) the practice of court beatings in Yüan times.

The *quriltai*, an early Mongolian institution, was a conference or council of princes and nobles at which a new ruler was acclaimed. Temüjin, for instance, was given the epithet "Činggis" and proclaimed *qan* at the *quriltai* of 1206. In a pastoral nomadic economy and society in which a wide dispersal of people and herds was ecologically necessary, it is not surprising to find the existence of a consultative institution which brought together people from great distances. The occasional meetings of *quriltai* thus assumed enormous importance as the only legitimate forum for political and military issues. As will be shown, much of the politicking over the succession took place before the actual *quriltai* met, and thus the issue of succession was probably in most cases decided before the princes and nobles assembled. Yet even if the *quriltai* was not strictly speaking an elective assembly, its central importance is reflected in the fact that a boycott of the *quriltai* by one or more members of the leading Mongolian clans could prevent the assembly from meeting, and thereby delay the resolution of the succession issue for months, or even years.⁸ The use of delay as a tactic may be seen as a "constitutional" means of expressing dissent.

The type of *quriltai* at which rulers were selected, then, was an assembly of acclamation, and was considered a necessary ritual. A second, equally important type of *quriltai* was the assembly at which the leading Mongolian princes, nobles, and generals discussed and decided upon military strategies and campaigns. The existence of both types of *quriltai* suggests that a conciliar, deliberative style of decision-making existed among the early thirteenth-century Mongols. The question of whether this style of decision-making continued to exist throughout Yüan times will be discussed later.

It should be stressed that the Mongols were not unique among non-Chinese conquest peoples in their use of an institutionalized leadership assembly. The Hsiung-nu in Han times held three annual assemblies, in the first, fifth, and ninth moons. At these assemblies, which included a large number of people from different tribes, ancestor worship was practiced, tribal affairs were discussed, and at the autumnal assembly, a census of people and horses was taken.⁹ In a broad sense, these tribal assemblies may be viewed as early predecessors of the Mongols' *quriltai*.

The historian of Yüan dynasty institutions—whether the military or civil bureaucracy, or the monarchy—is often drawn back to the Liao and Chin Dynasties in the search for institutional precedents. In the case of tribal assemblies to select leaders, one finds an interesting system of rotating leadership among the early Khitan people. The *Chiu wu-tai shih* 舊五代史 describes the traditional manner in which the early Khitans selected their leaders, and the manner in which Yeh-lü A-pao-chi 耶律阿保機 ended that system in 916:¹⁰

Prior to this, the ancestor of the Ch'i-tan, he of the Ta-ho 大賀 clan, had forty thousand victorious troops (*sheng-ping* 勝兵) which he divided into eight tribes (*pu* 部). In each of the tribes, he designated a commander (*ta-jen* 大人). Within [the tribe], they [themselves] selected one person as leader (*chu* 主). They set up banners and drums in order to honor him. Once every three years they listed his name in succession (*ti ch'i ming* 第其名) in order to replace him. And when A-pao-chi became a leader (*chu*), then as he depended upon force and audacity, he would not be displaced by the sundry lineages (*chu-tsu* 諸族), and consequently he pronounced himself prince of the realm (*kuo-wang* 國王).

The *Liao shih* 遼史 contains a similar description:¹¹

The commanders (*ta-jen*) of the eight tribes (*pu*) by regulation were regularly replaced once every three years. When Yeh-lü A-pao-chi of the I-la 迭剌 tribe set up banners and drums, he himself established a tribe, and unwilling to be displaced, he proclaimed himself prince (*wang* 王), and took over the entire Ch'i-tan dynasty (*Ch'i-tan kuo* 契丹國). . . .

The military origins of the Khitan custom of assembling tribes for discussion is also evident in another passage from the *Liao shih*: "Whenever there were mobilizations or warfare, then the sundry tribes all assembled together; in hunting, then the tribes could go independently."¹²

The Jurchen people, although not a nomadic people as the Khitans and Mongols were,¹³ also made use of a deliberative assembly of military personnel in which not only generals but also common soldiers participated. The absence of hierarchical distinctions within the Jurchen military is striking in the following excerpts from the *Ta Chin kuo-chih* 大金國志 and the *San-ch'ao pei-meng hui-pien* 三朝北盟會編:¹⁴

Whenever the Chin dynasty used soldiers in military campaigns, at the top [ranks] from the great military commanders (*ta-yüan-shuai* 大元帥), at the middle [ranks] from the myriarchs (*wan-hu* 萬戶), down to the lowest [ranks] of the centurions (*pohu* 百戶), when they drank wine and assembled to eat, generally there were no distinctions (*chien-pieh* 間別) [among the different ranks]. Among fathers and sons, elder brothers and younger brothers, and others, as to the means whereby they communicated from above to below, there was no worry about obstruction.¹⁵ When the dynasty encountered matters of great importance, they would go into the countryside and sit in a circle (*huan-tso* 環坐). They discussed matters by drawing in the ashes [of their fire]. They started the discussion from the lowly [in rank], and when they were through discussing, they would erase them (the lines in the ashes). One could not hear a sound. Such was their secrecy. When they were about to mobilize their troops, they would convene a great assembly (*ta-hui* 大會)¹⁶ and drink. They would have people present [alternative] proposals. The head general would listen and select one of them. Those who were in agreement then in the capacity of leaders would take responsibility for those affairs. When the army returned, there would again be a great assembly (*ta-hui*) at which they would inquire as to those who had merit, and in accord with the degree of merit, they would reward them in gold. They would raise a certain amount [of gold] in order to show the multitude. If some considered it too little, they would augment it.

While it is often assumed that the traditional tribal structure of decision-making among Khitan, Jurchen, and Mongolian rulers gradually disappeared during the long process of their conversion into Chinese emperors, vestiges of tribal and nomadic traditions can be documented. The Khitans, for instance, continued to conduct government business at four different temporary camps to which the emperor and his court nomadized according to the season of the year. The institution of *na-po* 捺鉢 (seasonal migrations or seasonal residences) represented a carry-over of a pre-dynastic custom into the Liao dynastic era.¹⁷

One specific example of a continuation of the early Jurchen military councils well into the Chin dynasty may be found in the *Chin shih* 金史 under the year 1197;¹⁸ the issue at hand was what to do about the threat which the Mongols posed on the borders:

On the *hsin-ssu* 辛巳 day [of the eighth moon of the second year of the Ch'eng-an 承安 reign period: September 23, 1197], because border affairs were not yet peaceful, there was an imperial decree [ordering that] officials of the sixth rank and above assemble at the Secretariat of State Affairs 尚書省, and inquire into the strategies of attack and defense.¹⁹ As for participating ministers and officials of the central and outer [government offices], without regard to the greater or lesser eminence of their official status, if any of them had strategies and were talented in military affairs, or if any of them excelled in tactics, each of those was to recommend three to five men as prospective appointees; and there was to be no indecision caused by peripheral considerations that might keep them from expressing their true feelings. Within five days, they should seal their memorials (*feng-chang* 封章) in order to present them [to the throne]. Those who deliberated altogether numbered eighty-four; those who spoke in favor of attack numbered five; those in favor of defense numbered forty-six; those who favored both attack and defense numbered thirty-three. They were summoned to present their ideas at the Jui-ssu-tien 睿思殿 (a palace hall),²⁰ where they discussed and debated for a long time.

The above passage suggests that access to the emperor by officials of the sixth rank and higher was not highly restricted. The fact that eighty-four court officials expressed views on an important military policy is at odds with notions of a progressive growth of autocracy in this period. It is doubtful whether Chin emperors would have been constrained to act only in accordance with the result of such advice, but at the least the means to propose policy to the emperor were available and were used.

There are other examples of formal assemblies to select leaders and to discuss policy among other non-Chinese rulers of China both before and after the Mongols. The Tanguts, for example, who like the Jurchens were primarily a sedentary, not a nomadic people, also had a military assembly which is described briefly in the *Sung shih* 宋史 monograph on the Hsia Dynasty (*Hsia kuo* 夏國):²¹

Each time they mobilized troops, it was required that all the tribal heads participate in a hunt; if they made a catch, then they would dismount from their horses, sit in a circle (*huan-tso* 環坐) and drink; they would cut up the fresh kill and eat; each would report what he had seen, and they would select their leaders [for battle].

The seventeenth-century Manchus also tended to rely on consultation in military planning. During the Ch'ing campaigns against the Oyirad ruler, Galdan, for instance, the K'ang-hsi emperor openly called for proposals on strategy: "I told the senior officers—Manchu, Mongol, and Chinese—to meet together by Banner and discuss how we might anticipate Galdan's movements and how we should deploy our own troops. Even the most casual suggestions were to be collected and reported to me."²² And, again on the campaigns against Galdan: "But again, the exact procedure was a fit subject for debate, and I asked for the views of some generals, and sent guards officers Mao and Lasi to sound out others, thus obtaining seven different alternatives on how to proceed."²³

We may conclude that consultative institutions were a feature of Inner Asian tribal societies regardless of their degree of nomadism. The Mongols undoubtedly relied on earlier precedents in their particular formulation of the *quriltai*, and they in turn bequeathed elements of their decision-making procedures to the Manchus.

A description of precisely how the *quriltai* of the Mongols functioned would seem to be indispensable to an understanding of patterns of decision-making at the imperial level in Yüan times. Unfortunately, because the affairs of government discussed at the *quriltai* were treated as top secret, we can piece together from the *Yüan shih* 元史 and from the Persian historians Juvaini and Rashīd al-Dīn only a fragmentary picture of the *quriltai* and its internal proceedings. However, even such a fragmentary description may yield important information.

The *quriltai* at which Ögödei was elected *qayan* in 1229 presents a convenient starting point. Both Persian historians, Juvaini and Rashīd al-Dīn, make it clear that before Činggis Qan died, he had designated Ögödei as his successor. Rashīd al-Dīn states that Činggis “held a private meeting and made [Ögetei] his heir, settling the throne and the Khanate upon him.”²⁴ Be that as it may, two years elapsed between the death of Činggis and the convening of the *quriltai* at which Ögödei was acclaimed *qayan*. Rashīd al-Dīn records a meeting among various Mongolian princes taking place directly after the mourning ceremonies for Činggis in the Onon-Kerülen region in 1227:²⁵ “All the princes and emirs then consulted together regarding the kingdom and departed each to his own place of residence, where, as had been agreed, they took their rest. For nearly two years throne and kingdom were deprived of a king.” One wonders why, if the succession after Činggis’ death was as clear-cut as Juvaini and Rashīd al-Dīn describe it, the *quriltai* was delayed for two years. Perhaps there was a division of opinion over the successor to Činggis.

The *Yüan shih* account of the Great *Quriltai* at which Ögödei was pronounced *qayan* is very brief and offers no insight into reasons for the delay:²⁶

On the *chi-wei* 己未 day of the eighth moon of autumn [September 13, 1229], the imperial princes and the sundry officials held a Great *quriltai* (*ta-hui* 大會)²⁷ at the Ch’ieh-lü-lien 怯綠連 (Kelüren, i.e. Kerülen) River, at the place [called] Ch’ü-tiao a-lan 曲雕阿蘭 [where] in accordance with the decree (*chao* 詔) left behind by T’ai-tsu 太祖 (Činggis), the emperor (Ögödei) ascended to the throne at K’u-t’ieh-wu A-la-li 庫鐵烏阿剌里 (Küd’ü Aral).²⁸

Rashīd al-Dīn describes this Great *Quriltai* as beginning with three days of “pleasure, conviviality, and merrymaking,” after which those present (the imperial princes and “great men of the army”) convinced Ögödei, who politely attempted to decline, to succeed to the throne.²⁹ What is of particular interest in the Persian historians’ descriptions of the *quriltai* of 1229 is the theme of unanimity, a theme which reappears in accounts of later *quriltai*. Rashīd al-Dīn writes that the princes insisted “in one voice” that Ögödei accept the position of *qayan*, and Juvaini similarly writes that “all the princes with an unanimity unmingled with evil or strife” called upon Ögödei to become *qayan*.³⁰

Of course, unanimous acclamation may have been a convention of historical writing, and an after-the-fact means of legitimizing a *qayan*’s rule. The theme of unanimity appears also in the accounts of the far from harmonious *quriltai* at which Möngke was elevated to *qayan* in 1251. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, two years after Güyük’s death (1248), the supporters of Möngke sent a message to the sons of Ögödei and Güyük and to Yesü-Möngke, the son of Čayatai, who through procrastination were preventing the *quriltai* from meeting:³¹

Most of the family of Chingiz-Khan have gathered together and the business of the *quriltai* has been delayed until now because of you. There is no more time for excuses and

procrastination. If you have a mind to concord and unity you must come to the *quriltai* in order that the affairs of the realm may be dealt with in unanimity.

When the *quriltai* finally took place in the summer of 1251,³² the emphasis on unanimous support of Möngke is again present. Rashīd al-Dīn records that "... the kingship had by the unanimous resolve of all the princes been entrusted to him."³³ This claim of unanimity is especially ironic in light of the fact that the grandsons of Ögödei, including Širemün and Naqu, were poised several miles away from the site of the *quriltai*, preparing to storm the assembly. It was only by chance that one of the *quriltai* attendants, looking for a wayward camel, stumbled upon the armies and wagons of provisions and arms that were approaching the *quriltai*, and warned Möngke.³⁴

Much of the politicking on behalf of potential *qayans* did take place before the actual *quriltai* met. In the case of the 1251 *quriltai*, Rashīd al-Dīn writes that Möngke's mother, Sorqaytani-Beki, "began to win over kinsmen and relations with acts of courtesy and attention and to invite them to the *quriltai*."³⁵ Obviously, the distance which separated *quriltai* participants could work to the advantage of those who wished to delay the proceedings. If one could not be assured that one's own candidate would be selected, then it was still possible to prevent the other candidate from becoming *qayan* simply through boycotting the *quriltai*. The *Yüan shih* records the state of affairs after Güyük's death:³⁶

In the *wu-shen* 戊申 year [1248], the Emperor Ting-tsung 定宗 (Güyük) died. The court for a long time did not establish a ruler, and [as a result] within and without there was apprehension. All set their hopes upon the emperor (i.e. Möngke, the emperor-to-be), and those who were looking forward to him were numerous; [but] the deliberations were not yet settled.

The supporters of Širemün, the grandson of Ögödei, continued to stall, while as Rashīd al-Dīn writes, Möngke and his mother tried desperately to convene a *quriltai*.³⁷

Möngke Qa'an and Sorqoqtani Beki continued to send messages to each of [those princes] and to tread the pathway of consideration and friendliness. But since their admonishments and exhortations produced no effect upon them, they sent message after message to them, now cajoling and now threatening them.

As mentioned earlier, when the 1251 *quriltai* finally met, Širemün and his supporters were obviously not a part of the "unanimous resolve" whereby Möngke was elected. The *Yüan shih* account of Möngke's accession includes the observation that "Shih-lieh-men 失烈門 (Širemün) as well as various younger brothers [including] Nao-hu 腦忽 (Naqu) and others could not quiet their ambitions and had private words."³⁸ One of Möngke's first tasks as *qayan* was to eliminate those who had not supported him, notably Širemün and Širemün's mother.³⁹

If governing by council was typical at the uppermost levels of the thirteenth-century Mongols' government, one may also find a similar Mongolian style of decision-making at the local level throughout Yüan times. The local government system as it developed in the Yüan demanded daily participation by all ranked local officials in a conference. Failure to attend this daily conference carried serious consequences—the first instance was punishable by a monetary fine, the second and third instances by a beating, and missing more than three conferences was punishable by dismissal from office.⁴⁰ The *Yüan tien-chang* 元典章 contains provisions dating from the fourteenth year of the Chih-yüan reign period (1277–1278) concerning the daily conference.⁴¹

The officials of the capital, prefectures (*fu* 府), subprefectures (*chou* 州) and counties (*hsien* 縣) gather together every morning. They sit in conference (lit. sit in the round: *yüan-tso* 圓坐), [where] they deliberate upon legal cases, and examine into official business.⁴² Except for those to whom it is appropriate to grant leave, [the others] must not be remiss in their duties (i.e. in attending conference). As before, every day they must sign in in the official conference register (*kung-tso wen-pu* 公座文簿). Those who are absent on official business will be marked down above.

These daily conferences constituted a cornerstone of the Yüan local government. A local gazetteer compiled in the early 1330s notes the way in which this system worked and remarks with a clear hint of regret that such a system of collective responsibility departed from practices of earlier times when a single prefect was permitted to run his office on his own:⁴³

Although they were called “subordinate officials” (*ts'an-tso* 參佐), yet all [officials, including the subordinate ones] sat together in conference (*yüan-tso*). No matter whether an affair were great or small in the *fu* 府 (i.e. the *tsung-kuan-fu* 總管府), it had to go up from the commissioner of records (*p'an-kuan* 判官) for each, one by one, to affix his official signature and seal (*shu-ya* 署押) (i.e. the *t'ung-chih* 同知, *tsung-kuan* 總管, and *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* 達魯花赤 each had to sign documents). Only then could it be put into effect. This [practice] was not like [that of] the prefects (*tz'u-shou* 刺守) of earlier times who held sole responsibility in office.

A local gazetteer of Ming times stressed the importance of local officials reaching a unanimous opinion while in conference:⁴⁴

From the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* on down (i.e. including the *tsung-kuan*, *t'ung-chih*, *chih-chung*, and *p'an-kuan*), those who sat in the hall [of the *tsung-kuan-fu*], whenever the locality had government business, were required to confer together as to whether or not [such business] could be expedited. In all cases, the senior office-holders were not to discharge their duties with undue haste or act on their own opinion. They had to gather together and reach a unanimous opinion (*chung-ssu* 眾思).

The absence of a local official from a conference or the failure of a senior local official such as a *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* to delegate the authority to use the seals of office to a subordinate in his absence could cause government business to grind to a halt in the same manner that the refusal by important princes to attend a *quriltai* could delay the selection of a *qayan*/emperor by months or even years. Thus, the conciliar, deliberative style of decision-making which the leading Mongolian clans practiced in the thirteenth century clearly helped shape the procedures of local government as they were regularized in Yüan times.⁴⁵

Before leaving the topic of the *quriltai*, a few words must be devoted to the second type of *quriltai*—an assembly not convened to select a leader but rather one in which military and government affairs were discussed. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, two such *quriltai* were held during Ögödei's reign—one in 1234 at which Ögödei and the Mongolian princes discussed military campaigns and affairs of state and one in 1237 at which military strategies in the campaign against the Russian principalities were discussed.⁴⁶

The 1234 Great *Quriltai* (*ta-hui* 大會) over which Ögödei presided is important as an occasion when new regulations were handed down by the *qayan* to the princes and military leaders who were present. Everything from behavior and etiquette of participants at a *quriltai* to “parking regulations” for the horses of participants was dictated by Ögödei himself, as well as more general regulations concerning sumptuary laws. The

following passage from the *Yüan shih* merits translation as one of the few such descriptions of *quriltai* regulations in Chinese sources of the thirteenth century.⁴⁷

In the fifth moon of summer [of the sixth year of Ögödei's reign: May 30—June 27, 1234], the emperor (Ögödei) was at the place [called] Ta-lan Ta-pa 達蘭達葩 (Dalan Daba(n)).⁴⁸ He assembled the imperial princes and the sundry officials at a Great *Quriltai*, where he decreed [the following] articles and ordinances (*t'iao-ling* 條令), saying: "Whenever a *quriltai* is being held and there are those who do not attend but instead hold private feasts, they should be decapitated. As for all who go in and out of the imperial restricted quarters, each has [his] attendants. [Whether] men or women, they may have only ten people as attendants, and they must not mix with each other while going in and out. In the army, for every ten men, there should be appointed a chief of ten (*chia-chang* 甲長).⁴⁹ They are to obey their military commanders; those who act improperly on their own authority will be sentenced to punishment. As for a chief of ten (*chia-chang*) who because of [official] business comes to the imperial quarters, he must then [in his absence] appoint one person as a temporary assistant and one person in charge of external affairs, and the two people must not improperly without authorization come and go.⁵⁰ As for those who violate [this ordinance], punish them. As for government matters, if a person ought not to speak of them but does speak, box his ears. If he again breaks [this ordinance], beat him with the light stick (*ch'ih* 答). If he breaks [this ordinance] for a third time, beat him with the heavy stick (*chang* 杖). If he breaks [this ordinance] for a fourth time, sentence him to death.⁵¹ As for the sundry chiliarchs (*ch'ien-hu* 千戶), if one should exceed [the authority of] the myriarch (*wan-hu* 萬戶) by walking in front of him, shoot him with a wood-tipped arrow. As for the centurions (*po-hu* 百戶), the chiefs of ten (*chia-chang*), and the sundry troops, if they violate [this ordinance], their punishment shall be the same. As for those who do not comply with this law (*fa* 法), dismiss them. From this time onward, if the number of troops who have come to a *quriltai* is insufficient, make up the number from nearby wings (of the army). Common people whether at home or in the army are prohibited from making a noisy clamor. In all cases when coming to the *quriltai*, use one tethering rope for [every] fifty fine horses; five men as guards; three men to feed emaciated horses; and three men to look after the place where one dismounts from horses (*ch'i-lieh-ssu* 乞烈思/Mongolian: *kirēs*).⁵² If but one or two horses are stolen, then sentence [the thieves] to death. As for the common people's horses which should not be tied at the place where one dismounts from horses (*ch'i-lieh-ssu*), forthwith confiscate them and give them to the people who care for the tigers and leopards (*hu-pao-jen* 虎豹人)⁵³ for feed. As for women who make clothes for the *chih-sun* 質孫 (*Jisün*) feasts⁵⁴ which are not in accordance with the [sumptuary] regulations, as well as [women] who are jealous (*tu-che* 妬者), they shall be sentenced to the punishment of riding a cow bareback around the center of the capital, and then they shall have their property collected in order that [the husband] may remarry."

Another interesting example of a non-elective *quriltai* is the one of 1259 at which Möngke consulted with imperial princes and officials over what to do about campaigning during the summer months in Southern Sung territory:⁵⁵

On the first day, the *i-ssu* 乙巳 day of the first moon in spring of the *chi-wei* 己未 year, the ninth year [of Möngke's reign: January 25, 1259], the emperor (Möngke) halted north of Ch'ung-kuei shan 重貴山, [where] he set up a feast and held a Great *Quriltai*, and then inquired of the imperial princes, the imperial sons-in-law, and the sundry officials, saying: "At present in the territory of the Sung, the heat of summer has now arrived. Do you say that we may stay there or not?"

T'o-huan 脫斡 (Toγōn) of the Cha-la-i-erh 札剌亦兒 (Jalayir) tribe said: "The southern lands are malarial. The emperor should return north. As for the people whom we have taken (i.e. the conquered Southern Sung people), it would be convenient to commission officials to govern them."

Pa-li-ch'ih 八里亦 (Balčiq) of the A-erh-la 阿兒剌 (Arla[d])⁵⁶ tribe said: "T'o-huan (Toyōn) is a coward; I am willing to go and stay there."

The emperor was pleased by this.⁵⁷

The pre-Qubilai *quriltai* then was not merely a festive occasion (though festivities were always a part of the proceedings), but rather a basic institution of Mongolian government. Although much of the decision-making process in the case of selecting a new *qayan*/emperor was carried out before the princes actually assembled, unanimous acclamation at the *quriltai* gave legitimacy to the new ruler. At *quriltai* which met during a *qayan*'s reign, the princes, military and civilian officials present do seem to have debated issues. More information on the numbers and identities of participants would be helpful. For instance, are we to take literally Rashīd al-Dīn's description of the colossal amount of food (two thousand wagon-loads of wine and koumiss, three hundred horses and oxen, three thousand sheep) brought to the *quriltai* on a *daily* basis when Möngke was made *qayan* in 1251?⁵⁸ That amount of food must have been intended to feed the armies which were sent to the *quriltai*. Rashīd al-Dīn mentions in passing that Batu sent "an army of three *tümens*," i.e. up to thirty thousand troops, to the Onon-Kerülen site of the 1251 *quriltai*.⁵⁹ Similarly, Rashīd al-Dīn lists twenty-six people who attended Temür Qayan's *quriltai*, following the death of Qubilai, and his list trails off with "and other princes, emirs, and princesses, such that it would be impossible to enumerate them all."⁶⁰

During Qubilai's reign, the *quriltai* inevitably faded as a political institution. The legitimacy of the *quriltai* at which Qubilai himself was selected in Shang-tu was questionable, since it was apparently as hurried and ill-attended as the *quriltai* at which Ariγ Böke, Qubilai's younger brother and rival, was made *qayan* in Mongolia.⁶¹ By the 1260s, the Mongols were no longer constrained by the dictates of a pastoral nomadic way of life; the descendants of Činggis Qan were by then living in sedentary societies (China, Persia, Rus') and devising their own separate systems of governance in those societies. Furthermore, as the struggle between Qubilai and his younger brother demonstrated, empire-wide unanimity was no longer possible to achieve either in selecting a *qayan* or in other areas of policy-making. The celebratory aspects of the *quriltai* seem to have survived, however, in the form of such yearly festivals as the summertime three-day *chih-sun* 質孫 or 只孫 (*jisün*) or *cha-ma* 詐馬 feasts in Shang-tu.⁶² It is not clear whether these feasts included any substantive political or military discussions or policy-making sessions. While the institution of deliberative assemblies fell into disuse at the imperial court level of Yüan government, on the local level, the peculiarly Mongolian conciliar style of decision-making was perpetuated throughout Yüan times.

The early Yüan use of special agents in newly conquered territories may also be seen as an indicator of imperial power, insofar as the evolution of such agents into salaried, ranked members of a regular bureaucracy reflects the formation of a new relationship between ruler and officials. When the Mongols first conquered parts of North China, they appointed *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* 達魯花赤 (Mongolian: *daruyachi*),⁶³ an official with counterparts in other areas under Mongolian domination—notably the Russian principalities and Persia. The initial role of these imperially commissioned agents, as both the *Secret History of the Mongols* and the *Yüan shih* make clear, was to act as military overlords. They were sent out to maintain control over newly conquered cities and territories.

The *Secret History of the Mongols* §263, for instance, reports that after Činggis Qan had finished his campaign against the Sarta'ul people, he appointed a father and son of the Qurumši clan of the Sarta'ul, Yalawači and Masqud, as *daruyas* in Central Asia and China because they were "skillful in the laws and customs of cities."⁶⁴ In other words, Činggis Qan, himself unfamiliar with sedentary, urban customs, delegated the authority to manage cities to men who were well-versed in such affairs. Činggis Qan evinced an ability to delegate authority to "experts," an ability that the later Mongolian emperors of China also demonstrated. Rather than master all facets of civilian rulership, the Mongols out of necessity developed a talent for identifying "experts" and delegating authority to them. This willingness to let others manage sensitive areas of government has been demonstrated by Morris Rossabi in his account of the Mongols' use of Muslim and Tibetan financiers at the court in Ta-tu.⁶⁵ Needless to say, there were obvious risks in delegating authority on a large scale—the misuse of power by Muslims at the Yüan court and the misuse of authority by document routers (*shou-ling-kuan* 首領官) and clerks on the local level of government are prime examples of this. The devolution of decision-making authority downward to the lower levels of officialdom and to clerks in Yüan times is well attested in the writings of critics of Yüan government practices, including those by Yeh Tzu-ch'i 葉子奇, K'ung Ch'i 孔齊, and Hu Chih-yü 胡紙通.⁶⁶

The evolution of the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* from its pre-Qubilai form to its fully developed form under Qubilai is in itself an indicator of a change in the power relationship between ruler and subordinate.⁶⁷ Before 1260, the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* were unsalaried, as were all other officials in the gradually emerging Yüan bureaucracy. The office was usually handed down from father to son or from elder brother to younger brother, in keeping with the Mongols' preference for hereditary transfer of office. Under Činggis Qan, meritorious military service as well as defection to the side of the Mongols could earn one the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*. Military and civilian duties were undifferentiated during the years of the conquest of North China, as is reflected in titles such as "military-civil head *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of Ho-nan and other areas" (*Ho-nan teng-ch'u chün-min tu-ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* 河南等處軍民都達魯花赤).

While the civilian and military aspects of governance continued to remain within the realm of regional and local *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* under Ögödei's, Güyük's, and Möngke's reigns (1229–1241; 1246–1248; 1251–1258), the task of reconstructing North China's devastated economy assumed major importance among the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*'s many duties. A very informative epitaph of one such *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* named Meng-ku Pa-erh 蒙古巴爾 (Mongγo[l] Bar ~ Bars) who served as *daruyachi* in four different localities in North China between 1236 and 1274 shows him reopening markets closed by merchants who feared rampaging soldiers, catching and punishing rebels, exempting from taxes those people who returned to their deserted homes, and conducting legal investigations.⁶⁸

Qubilai's reign (1260–1294) has justly been characterized as a period when government was rationalized, Chinese advisers heeded, and Chinese elements of legitimacy (a dynastic title, calendar, traditional Chinese rites) adopted.⁶⁹ As regards the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*, they became salaried officials in 1261, and those *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* appointed to office in the routes (*lu*), prefectures (*fu*), sub-prefectures (*chou*), and counties (*hsien*) were fully incorporated into the ranked civilian bureaucracy. Yet, Qubilai's attempts to disengage the military from the civilian sphere were not entirely successful, as Mongolian military officers were not always willing to acknowledge civilian jurisdictions of authority. The

appointment of military officers to civilian posts and vice versa throughout Qubilai's reign undermined the emperor's stated goal of separating the two bureaucracies; an imperial decree issued in response to a 1287 Central Secretariat memorial states this goal very clearly: "Those who serve as military officials are prohibited from overseeing the people; those who serve as civil officials are prohibited from overseeing the military."⁷⁰ Yet Qubilai's attempts to keep civilian and military personnel from interfering in each other's realms were never fully realized.

As part of Qubilai's effort to systematize and standardize the territorial and administrative jurisdictions of civilian and military officials in China, a system of dual staffing of the senior offices at each level of the local government was instituted: the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* was paired with the general administrator (*tsung-kuan*) at the route (*lu*) level, with the prefect at the level of the prefecture (*fu*), with the subprefect at the subprefectural (*chou*) level, and the magistrate at the county (*hsien*) level. At the level of the prefecture, for instance, the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* and the prefect shared all their duties. In this peculiarly Mongolian system of shared responsibility, neither the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* nor the prefect could act independently without the other's participation—both had to be present when the seals of office were in use. Similarly, both participated in the daily conferences of local officials. Thus, this system of dual staffing helped to reinforce the consultative tradition which had its origins in the pre-conquest social order of the Mongols.

Qubilai had envisioned a system in which the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* would be filled by Mongols, or in the absence of Mongols, by Western and Central Asians, while the offices of the population overseers (*kuan-min-kuan* 管民官), i.e. the offices of the general administrators, prefects, subprefects, and magistrates, would be held by the *Han-jen* 漢人 (Northern Chinese, Khitans, Jurchens, and other inhabitants of the territory of the former Chin Dynasty). In reality, and in spite of Qubilai's later reputation as the most effective of the Yüan emperors, his many decrees ordering various offices restricted to certain ethnic groups were often ignored.⁷¹

In fact, some of Qubilai's decrees as they appear in the colloquial documents in the *Yüan tien-chang* reflect a sense of frustration at his inability to remedy the corruption and negligence of local officials. For instance, in an undated decree of Qubilai's concerning the failure of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* and other local officials to maintain order, the colloquial language is almost sarcastic:⁷²

In all areas among the common people there are the Surveillance Bureaus (*An-ch'a-szu* 按察司), the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*, the population overseers (*kuan-min-kuan*), and the community leaders (*she-chang* 社長). [Yet] if rebellions occur in places such as Chang-te 章德 and I-tu 益都, [then] what are those offices doing? Hereafter, if that kind [of rebellion] occurs, let the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*, the population overseers, and the community leaders of their respective areas be punished.

One is left with the impression after reading decrees issued during Qubilai's reign as they are preserved in the *Yüan tien-chang*, the *T'ung-chih t'iao-ko* 通制條格, and the *Yüan shih* that the imperial aspiration towards greater systematization within the emerging civilian bureaucracy after the 1260s met resistance at the local level.

One obstacle that was built in to the very fabric of the Yüan civilian administration was the Mongols' willingness to delegate and disperse authority. Contrary to the popular notion that the Mongols were great centralizers, it is evident from studying both the *quriltai* and Mongolian patterns of personnel management on the local level that fragmentation of civil authority was the norm in Yüan times. Without entering into a

discussion of the complex issue of the *t'ou-hsia* 投下 and other forms of population and land grants to members of the imperial family and meritorious officials, it should be mentioned that even within the imperial household authority was splintered. In spite of numerous imperial princes' attempts at rebellion, the Yüan emperors never abrogated the princes' right to semi-autonomous territories in which the princes were permitted to appoint certain of their own officials. Thus, the monarchy itself remained vulnerable to coups, and the intense factionalism at the Yüan court has justifiably been criticized by later historians as an impediment to good rule.

Finally, one other indicator of the perimeters of imperial authority is the use of court beatings (*t'ing-chang* 廷杖). Strictly speaking, court beatings were extralegal, i.e. outside the codes and regulations of the legal system. In a sense, the frequency of court beatings could be seen as an indicator of the strength of an emperor's arbitrary will in any particular reign.

As other historians have pointed out, neither Ming T'ai-tsu nor the Mongols in Yüan times were the inventors of court beatings.⁷³ One scholar has attempted to trace this brutal practice back to Han times, pointing out that although the beatings were not carried out by the imperial guard in the audience chamber, yet Emperor Kuang-wu 光武帝 (r. 25–58) and Emperor Ming 明帝 (r. 58–76) of the Later Han had court officials flogged.⁷⁴

Court beatings often seem to have been simply an expression of the emperor's anger. Thus, in the Liao dynasty, the refusal by two recorders to show Emperor Tao-tsung 道宗 the *Diaries of Activity and Repose* (*Ch'i-chü-chu* 起居注) in 1076 led the emperor to order that each be beaten with the heavy stick two hundred times and dismissed.⁷⁵ There are many other instances of high officials being beaten in Liao times. Yet, the Khitans were not innovators in the use of corporal punishment. There are numerous examples of T'ang dynasty local officials being beaten by their superiors for offences committed.⁷⁶ Indeed, the Sung dynasty appears exceptional in the absence of corporal punishment of officials, when compared to both the preceding and later periods.

Still, many scholars point to the conquest dynasties as being the period when court beatings became a commonplace feature of official life. While a more thorough study of the frequency and nature of court beatings would be necessary to substantiate this thesis, it is true that the dynastic histories of the Liao, Chin, and Yüan contain several mentions of high court officials being flogged. Jing-shen Tao writes that approximately fifty people of various ranks from high ministers to a cook were flogged at the court of Hai-ling Wang (r. 1149–1161).⁷⁷ The most vicious use of *t'ing-chang* in Chin times occurred under Hai-ling Wang, who was the most sinicized of the Jurchen rulers. Now, one of the elements of traditional Chinese governance most admired by non-Chinese steppe peoples was (as they perceived it) the firm control over their court which Chinese rulers demonstrated. Thus it is entirely possible that Hai-ling Wang, who admired Chinese dress, literature, and customs, was attempting to emulate what he perceived as a Chinese mode of governance in his exaggerated use of *t'ing-chang*.

Rather than ascribe court beatings to the "barbarity" (i.e. unfamiliarity with Han culture) of the Khitans, Jurchens, and Mongols—or in the case of the Mongols to their origins in the steppe⁷⁸—we may follow more productive lines of inquiry. In describing the early military assemblies of the Khitans and Jurchens and the *quriltai* of the Mongols, we have found reason to emphasize the non-authoritarian aspects of the societies of such non-Han peoples.⁷⁹ The sanctity of holding high office and high

officials' immunity to beatings seemingly fell victim to the less authoritarian social practices of the Khitans, Jurchens, and Mongols. Professor Herbert Franke has referred to the Jurchens' failure to exempt high officials from floggings as evidence of an "egalitarian tendency."⁸⁰ In Yüan times one finds both local officials and high-ranking censors and ministers being flogged.⁸¹ All officials regardless of rank were fair game for corporal punishment under the Liao, Chin, and Yüan dynasties.

Connected to the issue of court beatings is the assumption that a greater distance between the emperor and his court ministers developed in Yüan times. While on the one hand it may seem unlikely that the Mongols, with their conciliar, deliberative style of decision-making at all levels of the government from the *quriltai* down to the daily local conferences, were responsible for widening the gap between monarchy and officialdom, on the other hand, the Mongolian emperors' refusal to carry out punctiliously Chinese court ritual made their behavior less predictable and controllable in the eyes of Chinese court officials. The Yüan emperors were criticized by later Chinese historians for their lack of attention to Chinese (though not Mongolian) court ritual.⁸² Ignoring prescribed ritual was one way for the Mongolian rulers to maintain a liberating distance from Chinese court ministers. The atmosphere at the Yüan court was considered by the Chinese to be alarmingly informal. According to the late Yüan-early Ming observer, Yeh Tzu-ch'i, the Mongolian rulers of China did not even observe the use of taboo names at court.⁸³ Perhaps this informality worked to distance the Mongolian emperors from Chinese protocol and Chinese officials while keeping Mongolian ministers in a closer collegial relationship. Undoubtedly, the informal atmosphere derived from the fact that in earlier times, as Thomas Allsen has shown in his study of the reign of the Grand Qan Möngke, the state apparatus and household staff were one and the same at the *qayan's* court.

In future research, the perplexing question of what relationship events and developments at the imperial level of politics had to life on "the ground floor of history" deserves to be explored. It is legitimate to ask whom the growth of "autocracy" from the tenth to fourteenth centuries in China affected outside the circle of court ministers, whose lives admittedly became increasingly subject to the whims of the emperor. One must question the link which historians tend to posit between the powers of the monarchy and the notion of "centralization of power" in an empire. As Ray Huang has pointed out, even in Ming times, a county, which was the lowest level of government penetration down into local society, might consist of one thousand square miles, have a population of up to a quarter million people, and be governed by three to six salaried officials who were assisted by six to twelve unpaid clerks and functionaries.⁸⁴ Obviously, the modern concept of "centralization" is inapplicable to a large, pre-modern empire in which transportation, communications and other technological problems made control of the countryside very loose at best.

The overall picture of the Mongolian rulers of China which emerges does not support the notion of enhanced despotism. Concentration of power in the hands of one person was not the traditional Mongolian means of governance. Such a mode of rulership could not have worked in a steppe, tribal society. The Mongols brought with them to China their own peculiar ideas on rulership, and remained true to those ideas making fewer compromises than any other non-Han conqueror of China had ever made.

Unfortunately, the conciliar mode of decision-making at the imperial and local levels in Yüan times was not terribly effective. The tendency towards overlapping jurisdictions of authority (military versus civilian; *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* versus his local counterparts), the

devolution of authority downward into the hands of document routers (*shou-ling-kuan*) and clerks, and the proliferation of contradictory and complex administrative regulations in Yüan times in all probability convinced Ming T'ai-tsu of the need to strengthen imperial authority. The Yüan legacy in terms of governance was largely a negative one: how not to govern China.

NOTES

- * An earlier draft of this article was presented at the Conference on the "Evolution of Chinese Government, Tenth-Fourteenth Centuries," sponsored by the American Council of Learned Societies and the West German Academy of Sciences in Reischberg, West Germany, in August 1982. I would like to express special thanks to Professors Francis W. Cleaves, Herbert Franke, and F. W. Mote, all of whom offered helpful suggestions on translations. I take full responsibility for any remaining errors.
1. See Karl A. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power* (1957; New York: Vintage Books, 1981 reprint).
 2. For an excellent critique of Wittfogel's and other scholars' theories of despotism, see F. W. Mote, "The Growth of Chinese Despotism," *OE* 8 (1961): 1-41. See also S. N. Eisenstadt, "The Study of Oriental Despotisms as Systems of Total Power," *JAS* 17 (1957-1958): 435-46.
 3. See, for example, Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism*, p. 420, where he states: "Hydraulic society is the outstanding case of societal stagnation. Probably originating in several ways and under favorable circumstances developing semicomplex and complex patterns of property and social stratification, hydraulic society did not abandon its basic structures except under the impact of *external forces*" (Wittfogel's italics). And, under the sub-section entitled "Stagnation, Epigonism, and Retrogression," (p. 422), Wittfogel writes: "In terms of managerial action, personal freedom, and cultural creativeness, most hydraulic societies of the late 'Empire' period probably operated on a lower level than that reached during the days of regional and early 'Empire' florescence." This is reminiscent of Hegel's comment in his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* that China's culture, art, and science—all its intellectual activities—were "as far advanced in every respect two thousand years ago as now." See Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, trans. E. S. Haldane, 3 vols. (London: Trübner & Co., 1892), 1:3.
 4. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism*, p. 105.
 5. Mote, "The Growth of Chinese Despotism," pp. 17-18.
 6. Wu Han 吳晗, for instance, cast the Yüan rulers in the role of scapegoats. He blamed the Yüan for providing the precedent for the Ming Dynasty institution of court beatings (*t'ing-chang* 廷杖), writing that the Mongols introduced arbitrary, summary punishments for court officials who committed errors. Wu Han also believed that during the Yüan an unprecedented gulf between the emperor and his ministers developed. This idea is open to question; see below, pages 489-90. See Wu Han 吳晗, *Chu Yüan-chang chuan* 朱元璋傳 (Hong Kong: Chuan-chi wen-hsüeh she, 1976), p. 189.
 7. On Chu Yüan-chang's belief that the Yüan rulers had been lax in instituting ritual and law and that the complexity of Yüan laws had allowed clerks undue latitude in manipulating government affairs, see John D. Langlois, Jr., "Ritual and Law in the Legitimation of the Ming Dynasty" (unpublished paper presented at the Conference on Legitimation, Asilomar, California, June, 1975), pp. 57-61; and Langlois' comments in his "Introduction," *China under Mongol Rule*, ed. Langlois (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), pp. 14-15. See also John W. Dardess, "Ming T'ai-tsu on the Yüan: An Autocrat's Assessment of the Mongol Dynasty," *Bulletin of Sung and Yüan Studies* 14 (1978): 6-11. For several examples

of Yüan bureaucrats' malfeasance, see chapters two and three, *passim*, of my *Regional and Local Government in Yüan China*, forthcoming.

8. For example, when Ögödei Qayan died, Batu, then Qan of the Golden Horde, claimed to be suffering from gout and used this as an excuse for not being able to travel to a *quriltai*. The Persian historian, Rashīd al-Dīn, records that "... because of his absence, he [Batu] being the senior of them all, the question of the Khanate was not determined for nearly 3 years." John Andrew Boyle, trans., *The Successors of Genghis Khan: Translated from the Persian of Rashīd Al-Dīn* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 120. Actually, Batu was not in fact the senior member of Joči's line; his elder brother, Orda, was still living at this time.
9. Yanai Wataru 箭内互 cites several examples of assemblies among non-Chinese peoples in pre-Yüan times in his "Mōko no kokkai sunawachi kurirutai ni tsuite" 蒙古の國會即ち「クリルタイ」に就いて (originally published in *Shigaku zashi* 28.4, 5, 7 (1917); republished in his *Mōkoshi kenkyū* 蒙古史研究 (Tokyo: Tōkō shoin, 1930), pp. 361–447, esp. 363–71. On the Hsiung-nu, see Yanai, p. 366.
10. *Chiu Wu-tai shih* 舊五代史 (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chū, 1976), 137:1827–28.
11. *Liao shih* 遼史 (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chū, 1974), 63.956. I have consulted and slightly modified Wittfogel and Feng's translation of this passage in the *Liao shih*. See Karl A. Wittfogel and Chia-sheng Feng, *History of Chinese Society: Liao (907–1125)* (1949; Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1970 reprint), p. 472, and 398–402 for a discussion of A-pao-chi's rise to power between the years 907–916. A-pao-chi was first named a "leader" in 907, but refused to be displaced in 910, 913, and 916.
12. *Liao shih* 63.952. I have again consulted and slightly modified Wittfogel and Feng's translation of this passage. See *History of Chinese Society: Liao*, p. 471.
13. The necessity of differentiating the pre-dynastic way of life of the Jurchens from a nomadic economy and polity such as those of the Mongols has been pointed out by Jing-shen Tao among others. See his *The Jurchen in Twelfth-Century China: A Study of Sinicization* (Seattle: The University of Washington Press, 1976), pp. xii, 6–9, 16. See also M. V. Vorob'ev, *Chzhurchzheni i gosudarstvo Tszin' (Xv.–1234 g.)* (Moscow: "Nauka," 1975), Chapter One, pp. 19–108.
14. Yü-wen Mou-chao 宇文懋昭, *Ta Chin kuo-chih* 大金國志 (Shanghai: Kuo-hsüeh chi-pen ts'ung-shu, 1936), 36:278–79. This passage appears under the topic heading, "Military Institutions" (*ping-chih* 兵制). Hsü Meng-hsin 徐夢辛, *San-ch'ao pei-meng hui-pien* 三朝北盟會編 (1878; Taipei: Wen-hai ch'u-pan-she, 1962 facsimile reproduction), 3.6b–7a. The first eight lines of the passage below appear only in the *Ta Chin kuo-chih*; the remaining lines may be found in both the *Ta Chin kuo-chih* and the *San-ch'ao pei-meng hui-pien*. Since the *San-ch'ao* text is a fuller version of the last lines, I have used it for the latter half of the translation. Professor Herbert Franke has translated the *San-ch'ao* text in his article, "Chinese Texts on the Jurchen: A Translation of the Jurchen Monograph in the San-Ch'ao Pei-Meng Hui-Pien," in *Zentralasiatische Studien* 9 (1975): 145–46. We differ in our interpretations at a few points. Professor Franke's article also contains striking examples of other egalitarian customs common among the early Jurchens: Jurchen rulers and their subjects bathed together and ate together.
15. From this point on, I have translated from the *San-ch'ao* text.
16. *Ta-hui* 大會 is the term which is often used in the *Yüan shih* 元史 to refer to a Mongolian "Great *Quriltai*."
17. On *na-po*, see Wittfogel and Feng, *History of Chinese Society: Liao*, pp. 131–34.
18. *Chin shih* 金史 (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chū, 1975), 10.242. This passage from the *Chin shih* is mentioned by Herbert Franke as an example of a Jurchen tribal council custom continuing into late Chin times in his "The Chin Dynasty," draft chapter for vol. 6 of the *Cambridge History of China*, pp. 50–51.
19. *Chin shih* 97.2160 records the same meeting of officials in the year 1197, but records that they were of the *fourth* rank and above: "In the second year of the Ch'eng-an 承安 reign period

- [1197], the border towns were not peaceful. The emperor was in a private room, and summoned court officials (*ch'ao-kuan* 朝官) of the fourth rank and above to come in for a discussion." I-la I 移剌益 then spoke in favor of a policy of defense against the Mongols, since an aggressive campaign against the Mongols "would arouse the enemy's (i.e. the Mongols') intention to invade."
20. The *Jui-ssu-tien* is a palace listed under the heading *Hsüan-hui-yüan* 宣徽院 in *Chin shih* 56.1264.
 21. *Sung shih* 宋史 (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1977), 485.13993. See also Ruth Wilton Dunnell, "Tanguts and the Tangut State of Ta Hsia," (Princeton University Ph.D. dissertation, 1983), p. 121.
 22. Jonathan D. Spence, *Emperor of China: Self-Portrait of K'ang-hsi* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974), pp. 18–19.
 23. Spence, *Emperor of China*, p. 20.
 24. Boyle, *The Successors*, p. 18. See also Juvaini's description of Ögödei's succession: John Andrew Boyle, trans., *The History of the World-Conqueror by 'Ala-ad-Din 'Ata-Malik Juvaini*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), 1:182–88.
 25. Boyle, *The Successors*, 29.
 26. *Yüan shih* 元史 (hereafter *YS*; Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1976), 2.29.
 27. The term *ta-hui* 大會 in this context in the *YS* refers to a "Great *Quriltai*." The analogous Mongolian term would be *yeke quriltai*. The term *yeke quriltai* occurs in §282 of the *Secret History of the Mongols*.
 28. Küde'ü or Köde'e Aral, where Ögödei, Möngke, and Yesün Temür were acclaimed *qayan*, has been identified as a site in Delgerkhan sumon of Kentei aimak in the Mongolian People's Republic. See John Andrew Boyle, "Sites and Localities Connected with the History of the Mongol Empire" (originally published in *Proceedings of the Second International Congress of Mongolists*, Ulan Bator, 1972), in Boyle, *The Mongol World Empire 1206–1370* (London: Variorum Reprints, 1977), p. 75.
 29. Boyle, *The Successors*, pp. 30–31. Rashīd al-Dīn writes that the participants set out for the *quriltai* in early spring of 1229, and Juvaini records the *quriltai* as actually convening in the spring of 1229. Boyle, *The History of the World-Conqueror* 1:184–85. *YS* 2.29, however, gives the date of the *quriltai* as September 13, 1229.
 30. Boyle, *The Successors*, pp. 30–31; Boyle, *The History of the World-Conqueror* 1:185.
 31. Boyle, *The Successors*, p. 204.
 32. *YS* 3.44 records the date of this *quriltai* as the sixth moon of the *hsin-hai* 辛亥 year (June 21–July 20, 1251). Likewise, Juvaini dates it July 1, 1251 (Boyle, *The History of the World-Conqueror* 2:567). Rashīd al-Dīn, however, gives the date as February–March, 1251 (Boyle, *The Successors*, p. 205).
 33. Boyle, *The Successors*, p. 217.
 34. Boyle, *The Successors*, pp. 207–08.
 35. Boyle, *The Successors*, p. 202. On the important role which Sorḡatani-Beki played in these deliberations, see Morris Rossabi, "Khubilai Khan and the Women in his Family," in *Studia Sino-Mongolica: Festschrift Für Herbert Franke*, ed. Wolfgang Bauer (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1979), pp. 153–80, espec. 165–66.
 36. *YS* 3.44.
 37. Boyle, *The Successors*, p. 203.
 38. *YS* 3.44.
 39. Boyle, *The Successors*, p. 215; Rossabi, "Khubilai Khan and the Women in his Family," p. 166.
 40. See *Ta-Yüan sheng-cheng kuo-ch'ao tien-chang* 大元聖政國朝典章 (hereafter *YTC*; Taipei: Kuo-li ku-kung po-wu-yüan, 1976 reprint of the Yüan ed.) 13.2a–2b on the regulations concerning the Yüan conference. See also, Endicott-West, *Regional and Local Government in Yüan China*, chapter 2.

41. *YTC* 13.2a. This has also been translated by Paul Ratchnevsky, *Un code des Yuan*, 3 vols. (Paris: Librairie Ernest Leroux, 1937), 1:36.
42. An imperial decree of 1264 which establishes the regulations for “granting leaves of absence” (*chi-chia* 給假) contains very similar language: “The officials of the capital, prefectures, sub-prefectures, and counties every day sit in conference (*yüan-tso* 圓座), [where] they deliberate upon legal cases, and examine into official affairs.” This decree is in *T'ung-chih t'iao-ko* 通制條格 (Peking: Kuo-li Pei-p'ing t'u-shu-kuan, 1930), 22.4a, and also in *YTC* 11.3a. Ratchnevsky, *Un code des Yuan* 1:36, incorrectly dates this decree 1265.
43. Yü Hsi-lu 俞希魯, *Chih-shun Chen-chiang chih* 至順鎮江志 (1863; Taipei: Hua-wen shu-chü, 1968 facsimile reproduction), 15.12a-12b.
44. *Hui-chou fu-chih* 徽州府志 (compiled in 1502), in Wu Hsiang-hsiang 吳相湘, comp., *Ming-tai fang-chih hsüan* 明代方志選 (Taipei: Taiwan hsüeh-sheng shu-chü, 1965), 4.23b.
45. Also, to the best of my knowledge, the Yüan institution of daily conferences of ranked local officials and document routers (*shou-ling-kuan* 首領官) was a departure from the practices of previous Chinese dynasties.
46. Boyle, *The Successors*, pp. 53–54, 59. Batu, Güyük, and Möngke among others were present at the 1237 *quriltai*, but it is unclear whether Ögödei himself was there. The Basic Annals (*pen-chi* 本紀) of the *Yüan shih* do not mention Ögödei convening an assembly that would correspond to the date which Rashīd al-Dīn gives. Juvaini describes a *quriltai* of 1234–1235, but does not mention one in 1237. Boyle, *The History of the World-Conqueror* 1:196–200.
47. *YS* 2.33. Parts of this *Yüan shih* passage have been translated by Paul Ratchnevsky, *Un code des Yuan* 1:viii–ix.
48. Rashīd al-Dīn gives this place name as “Talan-Daba.” See Boyle, *The Successors*, p. 54. Boyle transcribes this name as Dalan Dabān (“Seventy Passes”) in his article, “The Summer and Winter Camping Grounds of the Kereit” (originally published in *Central Asiatic Journal* 17, 1973), in Boyle, *The Mongol World Empire*, p. 108.
49. Ratchnevsky, *Un code des Yuan* 1: ix translates *chia-chang* as “les chefs de dix.”
50. Professor James T. C. Liu suggested to me that his second temporary appointee, referred to as only *chia-wai i-jen* 甲外一人, may have been appointed to keep an eye on the first temporary appointee. Dual appointments were very common among the Mongols, as the discussion of the *daruyaci* below will make clear.
51. This ordinance is of interest in light of the Mongolian rulers' attempt to keep certain matters—especially Mongolian customs and institutions and the military—secret. This concern for secrecy in government surfaces occasionally in documents in the *Yüan tien-chang*; see for instance the imperial decree of 1292 in which Qubilai forbade the organization of Mongolian troops into “communities” (*she* 社) under civilian administrators, since civilian officials would thereby know the number of Mongolian troops, and, as the decree states, the number of troops “is the business of the military and the Dynasty, and should be kept confidential.” *YTC* 23.5a. The fact that there are four degrees of punishment for speaking indiscreetly about government affairs, with death as the final punishment, may reflect a widespread problem. Perhaps “leaks” of sensitive, government business, even *quriltai* business, were common. On punishment by the light stick and the heavy stick, see Paul Heng-chao Ch'en, *Chinese Legal Tradition under the Mongols. The Code of 1291 as Reconstructed* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 49.
52. This is the *kirü'ese* of the *Secret History of the Mongols* §131. See Francis Woodman Cleaves, trans., *The Secret History of the Mongols* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard-Yenching Institute, 1982), p. 61, note 5. See also Paul Pelliot and Louis Hambis, *Histoire des campagnes de Gengis Khan: Cheng-wou ts'in-tcheng lou* (Leiden: Brill, 1951), pp. 171, 187–188, note 15, where the forms *kirēs* < *kiries* are given. Igor de Rachewiltz has a brief note on this term which he translates as “horse station” in his “The Secret History of the Mongols,” *Papers on Far Eastern History* 10 (September 1974), p. 73, note 131.

53. *Hu-pao-jen* 虎豹人 is probably a reference to the *barsčîn* or *barsučîn*, the keepers of tigers (*bars*). See, for example, Francis Woodman Cleaves, "The Mongolian Documents in the Musée de Téhéran," *HJAS* 16.1 and 2 (June 1953), p. 30, where the term *barsučîn* appears in a document. Professor Cleaves has translated this as "those who hunt with cheetas."
54. On the term *chih-sun* (*jisün*), see the extensive note by Francis Woodman Cleaves, in his article, "The 'Fifteen 'Palace Poems' " by K'ò Chiu-ssu," *HJAS* 20 (1957), pp. 446–47, note 90. *Jisün* referred to "one color," i.e. "garments of a single color," usually worn during palace feasts by everyone from the Emperor down to his palace attendants. See *YS* 78.1938.
55. *YS* 3.53.
56. For the name Balčiq, see Pelliot and Hambis, *Histoire des campagnes*, pp. 350–51. On the two variants Arulad/Arlad, see Pelliot and Hambis, *Histoire des campagnes*, p. 345.
57. This discussion concerning the summer heat may seem like a matter of peripheral importance to us, but to the thirteenth-century Mongols, who were not accustomed to such hot temperatures, it was quite important. See, for example, §259 of the *Secret History of the Mongols*, where it is written that in 1219 while on campaign in Western Central Asia, Činggis Qan sent messengers to Tolui, telling him that the armies were pitching camp because of the hot weather.
58. Boyle, *The Successors*, p. 207.
59. Boyle, *The Successors*, p. 121.
60. Boyle, *The Successors*, pp. 320–21. According to the *Yüan shih*, after Qubilai's death on February 18, 1294, Temür, his grandson, came to Shang-tu on April 28, 1294, where "the bureaus of the left and right and the imperial princes all met together." He ascended to the throne on May 10, 1294. See *YS* 17.376 and 18.381.
61. On Qubilai's accession, see *YS* 4.63, and Boyle, *The Successors*, 252; on Ariq Böke's *quriltai* in Mongolia, see Boyle, *The Successors*, pp. 250–52. For a detailed treatment of the continuing struggle between Qubilai and Ariq Böke between 1260 and 1264, see John W. Dardess, "From Mongol Empire to Yüan Dynasty—Changing Forms of Imperial Rule in Mongolia and Central Asia," *MS* 30 (1972–1973): 128–32.
62. On the *chih-sun* or *cha-ma* feasts, which were held periodically in the sixth moon in Shang-tu, as well as on imperial birthdays and at New Year's, see Yanai Wataru, "Mōko no saba'en to shison'en" 蒙古の詐馬宴と只孫宴, in his *Mōkoshi kenkyū*, pp. 945–56.
63. The role of the *daruyāci* as the top local official at each level of the administration from the *lu* down to the *hsien* has been dealt with at length in my *Regional and Local Government in Yüan China*, *passim*. For a discussion of the etymological and philological background of the words *daruyaldaruyāci*, see Francis Woodman Cleaves, "Daruyā and Gerege," *HJAS* 16.1 and 2 (June 1953): 237–46.
64. Cleaves, *The Secret History of the Mongols*, pp. 203–204. Thomas Allsen has kindly shared with me his unpublished biographies of Yalawači (Maḥmūd Yalavach) and Masqud (Mas'ūd Beg), in which he argues that the *Secret History of the Mongols* §263 reference to this father and son team is anachronistic and belongs to a later date. In the case of Masqud, who died in 1289, his appointment as a *daruyāci* around 1219 would indeed be improbable.
65. See Morris Rossabi, "The Muslim in the Early Yüan Dynasty," in *China under Mongol Rule*, pp. 278–83, on the Muslim financier Aḥmad to whom Qubilai delegated so much authority, and p. 294 on Sengge, a Tibetan financial adviser.
66. On the commonplace accusation of Chinese scholars in the Yüan period that clerks were guilty of corruption and misuse of authority, see chapter five of my *Regional and Local Government in Yüan China*.
67. The following pages on the office of *Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* present a condensed summation of a few major points in my forthcoming book, cited above. Rather than further encumber this article with annotation, I would refer the reader to chapter two of the book, where full documentation may be found.

68. Hu Chih-yü 胡紙遊, *Tzu-shan ta-ch'üan-chi* 紫山大全集 (Taipei: Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu ed., 1973), 15.19a–23a.
69. See Hok-lam Chan, "Liu Ping-chung 劉秉忠 (1216–74), A Buddhist-Taoist Statesman at the Court of Khubilai Khan," *TP* 53 (1967): 99–146.
70. *YTC* 11.2a.
71. See, for instance, *YS* 6.106, 6.118, 10.216, 82.2038, translated in chapter 3 of my *Regional and Local Government in Yüan China*, pp. 130–31.
72. For full annotation of this translation, see chapter 2, notes 154–56 of my *Regional and Local Government in Yüan China*.
73. See Chuang Lien 莊練, "Ming-tai t'ing-chang chih-tu shuo-yüan" 明代廷杖制度溯源, in his *Ming Ch'ing shih-shih ts'ung-t'an* 明清史事叢談 (Taipei: Hsüeh-sheng shu-chü, 1972), pp. 1–16; Charles O. Hucker, *The Ming Dynasty: Its Origins and Evolving Institutions* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Center for Chinese Studies, 1978), p. 68; and John D. Langlois, Jr., "Introduction," in *China under Mongol Rule*, p. 19.
74. See Chuang Lien, "Ming-tai t'ing-chang," p. 3. Chuang Lien does not refer to these early floggings as *t'ing-chang*, but rather as *ch'ui-p'u* 捶撲.
75. *Liao shih* 23.278; Wittfogel and Feng, *History of Chinese Society Liao*, pp. 468, 503.
76. Chuang Lien has culled several examples from T'ang sources; see his "Ming-tai t'ing-chang," p. 7.
77. Tao, *The Jurchen*, pp. 45–46.
78. Wu Han ascribes the Mongols' use of corporal punishment to their nomadic, militaristic origins. See *Chu Yüan-chang chuan*, p. 189.
79. More research on the pre-conquest Mongols, and on nomadic polities in general, needs to be done before generalizations on nomadic patterns of rule can be tested. Thomas J. Barfield's interesting thesis that the Hsiung-nu "imperial confederacy" was "autocratic and statelike in foreign affairs, but consultative and federally structured internally" may be applicable to other nomadic polities. See Barfield, "The Hsiung-nu Imperial Confederacy: Organization and Foreign Policy," *JAS* 41.1 (November 1981): 45–61; esp. 47. Barfield's research as an anthropologist among nomads in Afghanistan has given him the opportunity to test various concepts concerning nomadic peoples' patterns of decision-making and internal organization. See his *The Central Asian Arabs of Afghanistan: Pastoral Nomadism in Transition* (Austin: The University of Texas, 1981).
80. Herbert Franke, "Jurchen Customary Law and the Chinese Law of the Chin Dynasty," *State and Law in East Asia: Festschrift Karl Büniger*, ed. Dieter Eikemeier and Herbert Franke (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1981), p. 232. See also Professor Franke's hypothesis concerning possible reasons why Liao punishments were quite harsh, in his "The 'Treatise on Punishments' in the Liao History: An Annotated Translation," *Central Asiatic Journal* 27.1–2 (1983): 9–38, esp. 12.
81. For example, see *YS* 12.255, 19.412, 28.621.
82. For examples of this, see Herbert Franke, *From Tribal Chieftain to Universal Emperor and God: The Legitimation of the Yüan Dynasty* (München: Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1978).
83. Yeh Tzu-ch'i 葉子奇, *ta-tzu-ts'ao* 大子草 (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü 1959), 3B.59. See also the memorial of the Privy Council (*Shu-mi-yüan* 樞密院) dated February 6, 1308, which says that since the time when the Emperor Shih-tsu (Qubilai) ascended the throne, many people have violated the taboo on the use of the characters of the Emperor's personal names; in *YTC* 28.6b–7a.
84. Ray Huang, "Institutions," *Ming Studies* 2 (Spring 1976): 6–9.

THE CRISIS OF THE FORTY AND THE FOUR

L. Jamsran



(I) ATTEMPTS TO OVERCOME A CRISIS OF STATE: THE OIRATS GAIN IN STRENGTH

The Mongolian imperial state could not contain the rebellions in China, and retreated into its homeland around 1368. The ‘Red Turban’ rebels went on to establish the Ming dynasty with its capital in Nanjing.

In this period, Mongolian lands were divided into three parts: the ‘central’ division, comprising East Mongolia; the West, or Oirat, Mongolia; and the South-Western part, the Uriankhai frontier.

After the collapse of the Yuan in China, emperors and rulers of the ‘Golden Lineage’ [of Chinggis Khan] (*altan uruq*, *altan urag*) still sought to re-establish their rule of China, and the Ming empire maintained a hostile policy towards the Mongol state, attempting to eliminate it and annex its territory. The result was continuous warfare; large forces of Chinese troops would penetrate deep into East Mongolian territory, killing and capturing the local population and plundering their property. The heartland of the ‘golden lineage’ thus became a particularly vulnerable region. The local population struggled to resist not only Chinese attacks, but were faced with Mongol aristocrats who had become accustomed to a luxurious sedentary lifestyle having spent several decades ruling China and who, by retreating into nomadic Mongolian territory, endangered the land.

Civil war broke out, as nobles ruling their subjects in Mongol localities struggled to become independent of the [Yuan] emperor (*Yeke Qaghan*, *ikh khaan* – ‘great emperor’). The situation was complicated both by relentless struggles between aristocrats who hoped to regain control of China, and by continuous Chinese attacks. These were the internal and external factors that led to political disintegration in Mongolia. After the Mongolian political centre moved back to its homeland, the cradle of the ‘golden lineage’, East Mongolia became the focus of armed conflict.

In comparison with East Mongolia, Oirat or Western Mongolia had a good level of internal unity, at first, and was less subject to military attack. Consequently, the Oirats used their political unity and economic superiority to try to unite all the Mongols. Having been just four *myangan* (*mingghan* – units of a thousand) in the times of the Great Mongol Empire, the Oirats, who had been subjects of the Mongol emperors, had grown to four *tümen* (units of ten thousand).

In the late fourteenth century, when East Mongolia had become a site of continuous political crisis and struggle, Ugechi Khasakha the lord of the Khoit, re-established the League of the Four Oirats, that had been dissolved a century before, and became its khan, organizing the Oirat into the Baatuud, Barga, Buriad, Khori, Tümed and Choros divisions. Breaking away from East Mongolian rule, Ugechi Khasakha began to challenge the political authority of members of the Golden Lineage. At that time a Taiyu (Teivei) [from the Chinese *taiwei* – senior military official] named Khuukhai served as the representative of the Four Oirats in the court of the Mongol Great Khaan (emperor), Elbeg the Compassionate, who ruled from 1393 to 1399. Elbeg had Khuukhai executed, but when he learned that the charges against him had been false, he was filled with remorse and told the victim's son, Batula (also known as Makhamu [Makhmud], 'I executed your father as a result of a false accusation. Now let me make you Minister of State (*chingsan*). You will govern the Oirat jointly with their ruler Ugechi Khasakha.'¹ Elbeg also married his daughter, Samar, to Batula. Ugechi Khasakha was furious at the royal decree, declaring 'This emperor has established a luckless state, killed his younger brother (Prince Kharkhutsag), wedded his bride (Khungoo) and made her queen, slew my official Khuukhai Teivei lawlessly, being deceived by his bride, then became ashamed and gave the Oirats to my subject Batula, while I the rightful lord am still alive.'² He began to muster his military forces. The newly appointed Batula was also looking for a chance to take revenge on Elbeg Khaan for the killing of his father. The effect of Elbeg's appointment was to help unite both these hostile parties against him, and in 1399 Ugechi Khasakha and Batula jointly attacked Elbeg Khaan and killed him. In one way or another, Elbeg's lawless approach had accelerated the independence of both the unruly Oirats, who were using all their means to break away, and of some East Mongolian nobles.

Indeed, from this period on, a civil war developed between the Mongol emperors and the aristocrats that was to continue for a long time. The social and political causes of this conflict developed in the time of Elbeg Khaan. Although Elbeg's eldest son Güntömör (1377–1402) inherited his father's throne in 1400, Ugechi Khasakha had him assassinated in 1402, and supreme power in Mongolia passed to the Oirats. In 1402, with the support of some East Mongolian aristocrats such as Arugtai Taish (Taishi), Ugechi Khasakha assumed the imperial throne, taking the title of Guilichi Khaan and making Ölziit his queen. This lady was, in fact, the first wife of Elbeg Khaan's younger brother. When Elbeg had his younger brother killed, at the instigation of Khuukhai Taiyu, and married his bride, Ölziit was pregnant. She bore a baby boy who was named Ajai (1400–?), and she later took revenge on Khuukhai Taiyu by convincing her husband to have him executed. Ugechi Khasakha, however, did not reject her son Ajai, but treated him as his own.

The Mongolian sources give only a sketchy account of Ugechi Khasakha's elevation to the imperial throne. But the Chinese sources provide some information on him, under the name Guilichi Khaan. For example, the sources record that he abandoned the dynastic name of Yuan and took instead Dadani (Tatar). For this reason East Mongolia was referred to by the term 'Tatar' during the Ming. Ugechi Khasakha's homeland was beyond Gansu and Ningxia. On ascending to the Mongolian throne Guilichi Khaan sent a letter to the Ming emperor requesting 'the exchange of envoys, improved relations and living in peaceful happiness as one family'.³ In return, the Ming emperor sent Guilichi Khaan and his ministers a decree of appreciation and precious gifts. Guilichi Khaan appointed Markhasan and Arugtai of Asud as Ministers of State (*chingsan*) and

allowed them an important role in state affairs. This antagonized Batula [who had been appointed *chingsan* by Elbeg], who before long raised an Oirat force to attack Guilichi. When it became clear that Batula would be the victor, Arugtai Taish (Taishi) of Asud betrayed him in 1408, ousting him from the imperial throne and sending him into exile. Guilichi died shortly after returning to his homeland in the west.

Arugtai now searched for a suitable descendant of the Golden Lineage to place on the throne, and travelled to the city of Bishbalyg (Besh-Baligh) in the Chagaadai (Chagadai) Khanate and supported Tömör Khaan. From there he invited the youngest son of Elbeg Khaan, Buyanshir (Buniyashir 1379–1412), and in 1408 proclaimed him emperor with the reign title Ölzii-tömör. Arugtai made Khar-Khorin (Qaraqorum) the capital city and assumed the rank of *taish* (*taishi* – ‘grand preceptor’), becoming the supreme military commander. Arugtai Taish’s homeland was in the Khölönbuir (Hulun Buir) region.

As this situation unfolded, Batula, Batbold and Taivan of the Oirat led their troops against the new emperor and his *taish*. At the same time the Ming emperor Chu Di (Zhu Di) sent an envoy with a letter to Ölzii-tömör that included the threatening passage: ‘Recently the descendants of the Yuan have become emperors once more. Your survival depends upon you following humbly the correct path. Be very careful.’⁴ Buyanshir (Ölzii-tömör Khaan) was not intimidated, however, and continued to act independently. The Ming responded by granting imperial titles to three of the Oirat leaders, thus initiating the policy of dividing and weakening the Mongols. In May 1409, the Ming Emperor bestowed the title of ‘Loyal Peaceful Prince’ (*ong, van*) upon Makhamu (Mahmud) of the Oirat.⁵ On hearing of this, Ölzii-tömör Khaan was furious. He had a Ming envoy killed in June the same year, and launched a military campaign against the Oirat lords. This failed, however. Defeated in battle, he was forced to retreat to the Herlen river. The Ming emperor took this opportunity to advance with an army of 500,000 troops, who fought their way as far as the river Onon in 1410.

The beleaguered Mongol emperor and his *taish* could not agree on where they should retreat. Ölzii-tömör wanted to take refuge in Bishbalyg (Besh-Baligh) where he had lived, while Arugtai would not leave the homeland for a foreign land, and proposed going east to Khorchin *aimag* (*aimaq*, province/administrative unit). So they separated. Ölzii-tömör did battle with Ming troops near the river Onon, was defeated, and escaped to Oirat territory with a few followers. But at this time the conflict between the eastern and western parts of Mongolia began to deepen. In 1412, Batula Chinsan (*chingsan*) poisoned Ölzii-tömör Khaan, who was travelling to Bishbalyg with his few followers, seized the imperial seal of the Yuan dynasty, and captured Khar-Khorin. Meanwhile in Khorchin, Arugtai Taish had regained much of his strength and began intensive preparations for war against the Oirat Batula.

At that time the Ming were concerned that the Oirats should not grow too powerful. When Arugtai became aware of this he appealed to the Ming court, saying that should they launch a campaign against Batula Chinsan he would ‘willingly mobilize his subjects and become the vanguard of your troops’.⁶ The rules of politics of the time dictated that only a descendant of Chinggis Khan’s Golden Lineage could ascend the Mongol imperial throne. For this reason the Oirat lords did not dare to claim the title of emperor themselves, but would rather first enthrone princes from East Mongolia who were not strictly of the Golden Lineage, so as to clear the way for themselves in the future. Mahamu of the Oirat enthroned Delbeg (1395–1415), the son of Ölzii-tömör Khaan in 1412. Batula, while using Delbeg Khaan’s name in his preparations for war against Arugtai, also sent envoys to the Ming demanding military assistance. But the

Ming court did not wish to see the Oirats becoming too powerful, and took steps to ensure that neither parts of Mongolia became stronger than the other. The Ming made overtures to Arugtai Taish, bestowing on him the title of 'Obedient Prince' (*henani van*), and 'Prince of Khar-Khorin' in 1413, along with a golden helmet, a horse with saddle and bridle, silk, various precious things and 3,000 *dan* (hundredweight) of grain. Many of his subject lords were also given titles.

When war broke out between the Oirat and the East Mongols, 500,000 Ming troops fought alongside the East Mongol army when the forces clashed at a place called Hulan (Ulaan) Khoshun, located somewhere to the east of present day Ulaanbaatar, in 1414. The Oirat army was routed. The same year Delbeg Khaan died. This was not a natural death; he was killed in a coup by Esekhi, the son of Ugechi Khasakha, who then proclaimed himself emperor, and was later known as Oiradai Khaan.⁷

The internal political situation in Mongolia became extremely unstable. In 1416, the Oirat and Mongol forces clashed again somewhere to the east of Khamil (Hami), in a place called Bor Nokhoin Zoo (now in present-day Xinjiang). The battle began with a single combat between Shigüüstei (Shüüstei) Baatar of East Mongolia and Guilanch 'Mergen Kharvaach' (champion archer) of Oirat who fought in front of their armies. Shigüüstei slew Guilanch, and in the following battle the Oirat army was also defeated. When Batula fled, Arugtai Taish ordered him pursued, and in 1416 Batula was captured and killed. Shortly after defeating the Oirats, Esekhi Khaan passed away.

In 1425, Arugtai, along with some East Mongols, enthroned Adai from Khorchin, who had fought against the Oirats. [The Khorchin princes traced descent from Chinggis Khan's brother, Khasar]. Arugtai himself became the state Taish once more. [In the years before his enthronement] Arugtai Taish had presented Adai with Batula's wife, Princess Samar, the daughter of Elbeg Khaan, along with her son Bahamu. Adai married Samar and made her queen, but her son he gave back to Arugtai Taish. Arugtai told the boy of how he had been captured as a child by Batula Chinsan and made to serve him. He said 'In the past, your father Batula Chinsan not only made me carry a basket for dried dung (*arag*, *aruq*) and collect dung, but he also named me Arugtai, thus insulting me.'⁸ Arugtai put the boy into a cooking pot upside down, naming him 'Togoon' (*toghoghan* – cooking pot) he made him work in his household. Bahamu, who was of Oirat aristocratic descent, was mortified. When his mother became aware of her son's bitter circumstances she asked Adai to send him back to his homeland, saying 'My Khaan, though you have elevated me by making me your queen, why have you given my son to someone else to herd sheep and do the worst jobs? If he has not committed an unpardonable crime, please forgive and release him.'

Adai did as she asked and ordered Togoon be sent back to Oirat lands guarded by two envoys. Although some of his court, including Arugtai Taish, opposed this step, the emperor would not change his mind. Back in his homeland, Togoon feasted and honoured the envoys, giving them gifts. He also made a point of remarking on Adai Khaan's compassion in their presence and promised to visit the emperor personally with costly gifts. But his true intentions were to become clear later. As Batula Chinsan's oldest son, Togoon inherited his father's position as Chinsan in 1417, ruling the Four Oirat Tümen (ten-thousand units). In 1418, he also inherited the title of Shun Nin Van ('obedient peaceful prince') granted by the Ming to his father, and he followed a peaceful policy towards the Ming. When those who had taken part in the assembly of Oirat lords asked Togoon Chinsan 'How is the emperor and the conduct of the empire?' to find out about the situation in East Mongolia, Togoon declared '(Because) Adai Khaan

is rude, incompetent, and only pursues idle pleasures, Arugdai is actually in charge of state affairs. Although Arugdai is a reasonable man and understands the situation, he is already old, his mind is not sharp, and he has begun to envy wise men and shun them. His intentions have not changed. He excludes those ministers who understand state matters, and he rides his war-horse indoors. He entrusts the state to unlearned men. . . Mongolia under his rule is like a herd of camel-cows without the bull-camel, like cows without the bull, like horses without the stallion, like sheep without the ram.” He began to make preparations for war against East Mongolia.

In order to attract and incorporate neighbouring Sartuul, Uigur and Khar Yogor nations of Khamil, in the 1420s Togoon Chinsan wedded his own daughter Nugandashir to Bushir, the Prince (*van*) of Khamil, thus establishing marriage ties. Khamil was an important place for the Uigurs, as it served as a crossroads between the West and the East. At this time, Adai Khaan and Arugdai Taish were in contact with the East Chagaadai Khanate, trying to revive Yuan rule. If they were to succeed, Uigur independence would become impossible. It was particularly important, then, for Togoon to be on good terms with Khamil and, if possible, attract it to his side. In addition, although Togoon tried to forge links with the lords of Mongol provinces such as Shachjou, Khandun and Chigin (Chijin), these regions were not very interested in good relations with the Oirats, since they had good relations with Ming.

Togoon subjugated the Uriankhai in the east and established relations with the Zürchid (Jurchen). On the one hand, this was a consolidation of his power and the first steps towards the unification of all Mongols. On the other hand, he was maintaining good relations with Ming. At that time the Mongolian imperial throne was occupied by a descendant of Khasar [Adai Khaan], not a member of the Golden Line of Chinggis Khan. So, in his war preparations, Togoon was keen to find an appropriate candidate for the throne, a noble of the Golden Line. Was Oirat Togoon really trying to preserve the Chinggisid Mongol political tradition, or was he simply using it for his own ends? We cannot know.

Togoon Chinsan quietly found a suitable boy. When his mother, the lady Ölziit, had been forced to marry Elbeg Khaan, she was already pregnant, carrying a child in her womb. However soon after her marriage Elbeg Khaan was killed and the lady Ölziit was captured by Ugechi Khasakha. Ölziit gave birth to a son, who was named Ajai, in the palace of her captor. It was the eldest son of this Ajai, by the name of Totobukha, who was chosen by Togoon to be the claimant to the throne. Ajai's three sons Totobukha (Togtokh Bukhaa), Agvarjin and Mandukhai all survived Ugechi Khasakha, who died in the power struggle between aristocrats for which he had become famous.

The two oldest boys, Totobukha and Agvarjin, were taken by Togoon to his palace, since they could be useful to him in the future. When Togoon eventually became friendly with the boys he revealed them his plan to oust the descendant of Khasar from the throne and put Totobukha in his place, as a descendant of Khubilai Khaan of the Golden Line. On hearing this the brothers expressed their gratitude and promised that, should their plan succeed, they would make Togoon the most influential *taish* and place him in charge of the army. They intensified their secret preparations for a rebellion against Adai Khaan. Among the conspirators were also the sons of Togoon – Esen and his younger brothers. Esen was an experienced warrior who had begun his military career on the battlefields of the war against the Chagaadai state. In 1418, after having fought more than sixty battles, he eventually defeated Vais, the lord of Mogolistan (Moghulistan), which was the eastern part of the Chagaadai state.

The Oirats used both military might and subterfuge in their war for unification with East Mongolia. One example of this was when Togoon Chinsan sent two of his envoys to the palace to tell the emperor that he, Togoon, would himself soon arrive bearing gifts of gratitude. Emperor Adai, was pleased and allowed the envoys to stay in the palace. However, their real task was to spy on the emperor and his palace, to meet the troops that were secretly advancing, and to carry out sabotage.

His preparations complete, in 1438 Togoon made a surprise attack on Adai Khaan. The Oirat army was led by his son Esen. When the soldiers burst in, Adai Khaan and Arugtai Taish, taken by surprise, narrowly escaped from the palace. Pursued by Togoon and Totobukha, the emperor and his *taish* divided their troops, and each led his own unit against the pursuing forces. But they were eventually defeated. Arugtai Taish was hunted down and killed near Tsagaan Nuur (white lake) of Mon mountain by picked troops led by Esen. When Esen joined Togoon and Totobukha they together surrounded the troops of the emperor and his general Dorjbai.

Meanwhile the Ming court, taking advantage of conflict among the Mongol rulers, promised Adai Khaan and Dorjbai titles and invited them to become foreign officials of the Ming. However, Adai Khaan refused to accept the proposal and the Ming quickly sent an army against him. Dorjbai was killed during the joint Oirat Chinese attack. When Adai Khaan was taken prisoner and brought before Togoon he said, 'Today you have seized me, but do not forget my kindness. I have made your mother a queen, saved you from Arugtai Taish and sent you home accompanied by people.' To which Togoon replied furiously 'You killed my father making me fatherless, you took away my mother's rights. Can I ever forgive you?'¹⁰

The sources record that Adai was executed in 1438. The same year Togoon sent gifts and horses to the emperor of Ming as an expression of his gratitude. In reply, the emperor sent him fifty rolls of silk and a letter with the following words 'You have fulfilled the hopes of your predecessor lords, I understood your boundless loyalty when I saw your envoys and the horses that were sent as gifts. You showed that you have succeeded in taking your revenge on Alutai (Arugtai); vengeance that has been passed down from one generation to the next. I have heard that you have found the imperial seal and were going to bring it (to me). This is also a correct thought. But before this time many states existed and lasted many years not because they had seals. Therefore Prince (*van*), if you found that seal, keep it for yourself.'¹¹ The royal seal was a symbol of potential Yuan revival. Perhaps the Ming emperor refused it because Togoon meant the seal of the Yuan to be used in its place of origin.

When Togoon declared war in the name of the Golden Line, he gathered support from other Mongols. He killed the Khasar-lineage emperor and gained control of almost all of Mongolia, but he did not hurry to proclaim a new khan. The sources explain this delay somewhat differently.

Some sources suggest that Togoon himself ascended the throne, others indicate that this is what he intended but that he never managed to do so. It seems that the latter account is somewhat closer to the truth. Although Togoon was thinking of proclaiming himself emperor during a ceremony of worship to Chinggis Khaan due to take place in Ordos in the spring of 1439, instead he apparently began boasting and brawling at the shrine (*ongon*, *ongghon*), calling out, 'Is the Golden Line of Chinggis Khaan really that honourable? I am the offspring of Sutai, descendant of a renowned Oirat house. I am not lower than you.' As those around tried to stop him, Togoon continued to remonstrate. Suddenly, a rattling noise came from the golden quiver of Chinggis [one of the

relics at the shrine], and an arrow flew out, wounding Togoon in the back. Togoon, in great confusion, called his son Esen and said to him 'I did not listen to the advice of the many lords, [but] insulted the sacred spirit of the Holy Lord, so I was punished. You must learn from this bloody lesson.'¹²

Togoon, not being of the Golden Line of Chinggis himself, attempted to break with the Mongol tradition that only those of the Golden Line could become emperor. Of course, at that time this could not simply be changed through negotiation or agreement. He did not hurry to reunite Mongol domains by force, preferring to use peaceful means and marriage alliances. He would support princes (*taijnar*, *taiyji-nar*) for the throne, rather than descendants of the emperor. In this way he himself could become a *taish* with great power and authority. During a meeting of the lords of many *aimags* (provinces/'tribes') in 1439 he made the participants proclaim Totobukha as *khaan*, who took the reign title of Taisun. Taisun Khaan kept his promise and appointed Togoon as the *taish* in charge of the army. The emperor also made his own younger brother viceroy (*jinyinljinungl jonon*), ruler of the western part of the country. Togoon Taish appointed his son Esen as his second in command (*tuslagch*, *tusalaqci*), so that father and son controlled the Mongol army.

At that time, the palace of Taisun Khaan was located in Khar-Khorin. As his first wife, the daughter of Togoon Taish, did bear him a child, Taisun Khaan married Altgana (Altgaljin, Altjin), the daughter of Tsavdan, lord of Gorlos *aimag* in East Mongolia. A year later she gave birth to a boy who was named Molon. When Molon reached the age of two Taisun Khaan's first wife, daughter of Togoon, bore a boy who was named Abadin.

Togoon Taish and Taisun Khaan intensified their efforts to attract the Uriankhai, Onniud [Ongni'ud], Zürchid, and Khorchin who had originally been under the rule of Great Mongol empire but had later begun to break away. The Ming court was wary of such developments, and constantly kept an eye on its neighbour's external relations, thus simultaneously shaping its own policy. Nevertheless, the Ming continued to exchange envoys and conduct trade. During the reign of Taisun Khaan and Togoon Taish it seems that the internal struggle for power abated for a time, and there was some stabilization of the state. It was the emperor's father-in-law who dominated the state affairs, rather than *khaan* himself.

But the times were to test the strength and effectiveness of this Mongol-Oirat administration based on family bonds; the structure devised and put in place by the Oirat Togoon.

(II) THE *KHAAN* AND THE *TAISH*, WORKING HAND-IN-HAND TO PUT THE COUNTRY IN ORDER

Before his death, in 1439, Togoon Taish said to his son Esen 'Since I was but a year old I have gone to war; did away with enemies; cleared a way for your future. There is only one man I could not be rid of. That man is Mönkhbat, the younger brother of Arugdai. On the day of victory offer his head to my soul.'¹³ Such was his testament. In this way Togoon Taish passed on to Esen the need to continue his struggle, since the unification and revival of the Yuan had not yet been accomplished. At this time almost all the Mongol regions, except Mongoljin and Uriankhai, had been unified. Taisun Khaan, following Togoon Taish's will, appointed Esen to the post of *taish*, granting him his

father's title of '*huai van*' ('cherishing/sympathetic prince') and placed him in charge of the army.

Esen, like his father, made his own son his second-in-command (*tuslagch*). The sources, however, do not mention his name. Scholars referring to sources state that Esen had two sons, the eldest named Bornagal and younger Esmed. He also had a daughter, Tsetseg. But, as it was mentioned before, it is not clear which of the boys was his aide (*tuslagch*).

The Inner Mongolian scholar Odon in his monograph *Esen Khaan* writes: 'In comparison with his father, Esen Taish was a more farsighted, hard-hearted and courageous person. After having been appointed to the position of *taish* he did not reveal his ambitions for the throne immediately. He had learned the hard lesson taught to his father who had failed to become *khaan*, and was careful to arouse no suspicion among the Mongolian aristocracy. Along with Taisun Khaan he devoted all his energies to putting the realm in order and relentlessly consolidating his power and influence. Eventually he managed to gather military power into his own hands.' Such is Odon's assessment of the early part of Esen's career.

Taisun Khaan ruled the eastern part of the country, while Esen was in charge of the Four Oirat *aimags*. Esen married his daughter to Kharkhutsag Taij, who was assisting his father, Viceroy Agvarjin, ruler of the western part of Mongolia. At this time the region of Uriankhai, the part of East Mongolia bordering on Ming, was a disputed land that attracted Ming interest. The same could be said of Khamil (Hami), which was adjacent to Oirat lands in West Mongolia and had been ruled by Yuan ministers (*said*, *saiyda*) and inhabited by Mongol tribes (*aimags*). The Mongolian *khaan* and his *taish* made it their priority to protect the country and control these areas since they served as important staging posts connecting the East with the West.

The Uriankhai were the descendants of Zelem (Jelme), one of Chinggis Khaan's generals. Originally they lived in the region of the Onon and the Kherlen rivers, but afterwards moved to the south and settled near the Luukha (Lao Ha) river next to the Ming province of Liao-dun (Liaodong). Their contact with the Ming dates from the early fifteenth century, trading cattle and raw materials for agricultural products and tools. During this time one part of the Khorchin, who had lived on the western side of the Khyangan (Khinggan) range, moved to the eastern side and settled near the Nun (Non, Nonni) river, thus becoming Non Khorchin, among whom there were also people of the Gorlos. This region was also inhabited by the Onniud, the descendants of Bulgüütei (Belgütei), Chinggis Khaan's younger brother. As these Mongol lands bordered Ming territory, Mongol *khaans* and *taishs* had to keep a watchful eye on them and take necessary steps to contain Ming influence. Taisun Khaan took as a secondary wife Altan (Altjin), daughter of Tsavdan, lord of the Gorlos, and Esen Taish also married the daughter of Jüch, the lord of the Onniud, as a secondary wife. We can see that the Mongolian *khaan* and *taish* used the bonds of diplomatic marriage as important means for the consolidation of the state.

The Ming, of course, did not observe this and just stand idly by. They made use of various ploys such as enticing Uriankhai aristocrats with titles and gifts, persuading them to spy for them, defy Mongol policy and so forth. Esen would contain such moves on every occasion. For example, when one of the Uriankhai aristocrats called Nairbukha rebelled in 1444, Esen Taish immediately sent his younger brother Prince Abubekh with troops to Uriankhai territory, putting down the rebellion and ousting Nairbukha.¹⁴ Although the Ming sent troops into the Uriankhai region in 1444, they

were unable to conquer it. In general, the Uriankhai did not want to split away from Mongolia. They would send gifts and inducements received from the Ming directly to the Mongol *khaan*.

During the time of the Great Mongol empire the Zürchid (Jurchen) had come under Mongol rule. Esen Taish kept the Zürchid under his control, using both peaceful means, and by resorting to military force, as shown by the events of 1444, when, in alliance with Jüch, lord of Onniud *aimag*, he put down a rebellion. These uprisings could involve large numbers of people, so that, for instance, in 1446 Esen had to send an army of four *tümen* (units of ten thousand) to suppress rebellions by both the Uriankhai and the Onniud. When the people of Ujeed *aimag* fled to the river Non, Esen attacked the north-eastern Zürchid and 'took under his control three *tümen* of Water Zürchid (*usni zürchid, usan-u jurcid*)'.¹⁵ In 1448, Esen also sent an envoy to the Zürchids living to the east of the Uriankhai, saying 'In the times of Chinggis Khaan and Setsen Khaan (Qubilai Khan) your ancestors had titles bestowed on them, mindful of the past, assist us by making ready pack animals, carts and grain.'

Having strengthened the eastern border in this way, the *khaan* and his *taish* focused their attention on Khamil in the west. In order to subjugate Khamil, Shachjou (Shazhou, Dunhuang), Chigin Mongol and Handun, areas that had once been under the control of the Yuan, the Ming established there 'Vei' (*wei*, Chinese – 'guard') watch-posts, and made every effort to entice their rulers by giving them titles and gifts. After bestowing the title of prince (*van*) upon the lord of Khamil, the Ming established a 'Vei' watch-post there in 1409, explaining this step as being a necessity for the protection of trade relations and merchants from the western border and Central Asia travelling to Ming territory. In order to subjugate the western borderlands in this way, the Ming first had to win over Khamil. However, its ruler had marriage ties with Esen Taish, indeed the Prince (*van*) of Khamil, Duvaadashir, was Esen's nephew. In 1443, Esen Taish invited his elder sister Nugandashir, the mother of Davaadashir, to Taisun Khaan's palace. Not long after this Duvaadashir visited his mother in Khar-Khorin, along with his wife and younger sibling, and spent several months there before returning home. From that time on the prince of Khamil was a frequent visitor in Khar-Khorin, staying there for as long as he wished. The Ming were far from pleased that this relationship was growing so close. But Duvaadashir took little notice of Ming disapproval and continued to receive political advice from the *khaan* and *taish*.

Through Khamil, Esen Taish was able to establish contact with the western part of the Chagaadai state, or rather at this time, with the Timurid Khanate. Envoys and merchants would occasionally come from Samarkand to Khar-Khorin. But as the Chagaadai state split into two parts, western and eastern, and civil war broke out inside the Timurid empire, Esen Taish was not able to communicate with these regions to the extent he wished. There was one more place that attracted the attention of the *khaan* and his *taish*, and this was Shachjou, in what is now Gansu province of China. Since the Ming were gradually extending their control of the region by relocating the local Mongol population within China, in 1444 the Mongol *khaan* and his *taish* sent an envoy to the rulers of Shachjou, bestowing titles and positions upon them, and bringing Gansu province under the control of the Mongol state – including the Mongol lands of Shachjou, Handun and Chigin.¹⁶

The Ming reacted by trying to move the local population of the borderlands and settle them in China. But as the bulk of the population wished to remain in Oirat territory, the operation was not very successful. Despite this the Ming court continued

to argue that 'The lineage of Chinggis and the Yuan has come to an end. The Oirats are free nomads of the northern Mongol lands. Nowadays, those who wilfully proclaim themselves to be descendants of Yuan are making false claims.'¹⁷ This was the ancient tactic of 'using a Mongol to suppress a Mongol'.

However, although they strengthened control of their eastern and the western borders, the Mongol *khaan* and *taish* were, generally speaking, on reasonably good terms with the neighbouring Ming. But the situation was very changeable. In the days of Togoon Taish Mongolia had friendly relations with the Ming and the neighbours carried out a good deal of trade. But in the reign of Taisun Khaan and Esen Taish, the Ming imposed a series of restrictions on trade, designed to weaken Mongolia economically. Before that time, Mongol envoys would go with their gifts to the Ming court once a year, trade for several months in the capital city and in Datong, and return home along with Ming envoys who in their turn would stay in Mongolia until their replacements arrived. Both sides were responsible for the food and accommodation of these guests. These sorts of relations continued without interruption for nearly thirty years at the beginning of fifteenth century. Although the Ming attempted to put restrictions on the number of Mongol envoys, and to reduce the amounts of gifts and the volume of the trade, from 1436 onward the number of Mongol messengers had, despite this, actually increased from several tens of persons to several thousand.

It became increasingly difficult for the Ming to provide all these diplomatic guests with food, gifts, fodder and accommodation. At the same time, the Mongols started to bring underfed horses and demand high prices for them. Conflicts flared up between the two sides and began to deepen further. The Ming wanted to exchange small numbers of envoys and restrict trade to small quantities of goods. At this time, the annual number of Mongol envoys to the Ming was usually a few tens of persons, and at most did not exceed two hundred. The number of horses given did not exceed one thousand. Various precious furs were also included in the list of gifts, and the Ming would present in return gold, silver, silk, cloth, precious stones and ornaments. Restrictions were also applied to the number of Mongol messengers allowed to come to Beijing, which was to be between three and five, the rest were kept in Datong. Those left in Datong were allowed to trade with the locals. However, the trade of tools was strictly forbidden. The Ming court had a policy of blockading Mongolia both politically and economically and maintained these restrictions unchanged.

In spite of all these restrictions, however, during the times of Esen Taish, Chinese officials, aware of the great demand for Mongol horses and raw materials, increased not only the quantity and the quality of gifts to be sent and received, but also raised the number of Mongol envoys, exceeding the limits set by the Ming court itself. Taisun Khaan and Esen Taish increased the number of annual envoys to the Ming to one thousand. Good horses were presented to the Ming emperor, and a quantity of gold, silver, silk and cloth of equal value was received in return. Mongol envoys on their way back would trade with the locals in the borderlands, and on returning home they would sell these goods for high profits.

The Ming court would occasionally send letters on these matters to Taisun Khaan and Esen Taish. For instance, in 1442 the Chinese emperor ordered that the number of Oirats 'must not exceed three hundred . . . let only the permitted number (of envoys) pass the border, and keep the rest outside . . .'¹⁸ which made Esen Taish furious. Nevertheless, Esen Taish increased the number of precious gifts to the Ming. Sometimes he would send as many as 800 horses annually, and great quantities of sable and white

squirrel fur. Eventually the numbers increased to 4,000 horses and 12,000 furs. Even Ming ministers and officials came to be delighted with such gifts. As a result the laws restricting trade were not observed in practice.

Although Mongols were interested in purchasing weapons, the Ming court strictly forbade this. Since many Chinese civilians and servicemen were keen to obtain good horses, in the times of Esen Taish, horse trade with locals from Ming borderlands was organized; in return Mongols received not only agricultural products but also secretly supplies of weapons. Ming frontier guards started to exchange their state-issued equipment, such as bows, arrows, armour, helmets, spears and swords, for horses.

Not only would Chinese craftsmen gather on the routes used by the Mongols and make weapons to exchange for livestock, but local Chinese aristocrats would also hand Mongol envoys bows wrapped in cloth, and arrows hidden in cases of wine. Indeed, a eunuch called Van Chen (Wang Zhen), a senior official at court who dealt with Mongol relations, made a secret trade agreement with Esen Taish. He ordered the governor and the chiefs of Datong to produce great quantities of arrows and weapons all year around, and secretly organized their delivery to Mongolia, receiving good horses from Esen Taish as payment.¹⁹

Although Taisun Khaan and Esen Taish tried to maintain good relations with the Ming, tensions resulted from, on the one hand, the various trade restrictions and deceptions on the part of the Ming, and, on the other, Ming foreign policy designed to undermine the Mongol borderlands.

During this period, we see that the Mongol state ruled a vast territory stretching from the Dzurchid lands in the east to Khamil in the west, (including the Yultus [Yulduz] river basin that was even further west), and from the Yenisei river basin in the north to the Great Wall in the south. This was the result of a struggle for unification waged by Mongolian political power-holders of the time.

NOTES

1. Byamba (Jamba). 1960. *Asragch Nertiin Tüükh*. Ulaanbaatar: 50–51.
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THE TWELVE TÜMEN OF THE AGLAG KHÜREE KHALKHA MONGOLS

Gongor



Although the empire that had, as a result of Chinggis Khaan's conquests, brought so many countries of Asia and Europe under a unified rule had fallen apart with the demise of the Yuan dynasty in China in 1368, the national state of the Mongols that was born in 1206 did not collapse. For this reason the downfall of the empire and the destruction of the Mongolian feudal nation-state should be approached separately.

In our view, the unified, central Mongol feudal state continued to exist after the Yuan dynasty, well into the later stages of feudal society as such. For this reason, our historical chronicles made a point of carefully distinguishing between the sixteen *Ikh Khaad* (*Yeke Qaghad*, Great Khaans) from Chinggis to Togoontömör whose reigns encompassed Mongolia, China and many other countries of Asia and Europe from 1206 to 1368, and the twenty-one *Baga Khaad* (Lesser Khaans) from Bilegtu to Ligden, the dynastic rulers who held sovereignty over the Mongolian people in their native land from 1370 to 1634. Or, in other words, the chronicles differentiate between the imperial overlords and those who came in their wake. Also, some of the historical sources identify Mongolia in the second half of the fourteenth century as *Ar Yuan Uls* (*Aru Yuwan Ulus*, the Northern Yuan) and describe the period as 'the time of the *baga khaad*'. This could be viewed as proof of the fact that the rule of the Mongol khaans in this period no longer extended over the many Asian and European countries as it had in the imperial times and was confined to the limits of their native country and her people, and, on the other hand, that the Mongol nation state was not entirely destroyed after the empire.

A true picture of the period from the second half of the fourteenth century to the seventeenth century would be one of rampant feudal strife, which drained the *khaans* of their strength and authority, and at times made the *khaan*'s throne a trophy in the hands of one contentious prince or another. However, it is also true that this period saw the emergence of such powerful *khaans* as Esen, Batmönkh Dayan Setsen and Tümen Zasagt, who were able to unify all Mongols. And it is to this period that our history books ascribe 'the coming of the Forty and the Four under the rule of one *khaan*'. Hence, the end of the Mongol feudal nation-state came about not with the demise of the Yuan dynasty but only with the establishment of Manchurian dominion over the Mongols in the seventeenth century.

The period from the second half of the fourteenth century onward marked notable changes in the situation of the Mongol feudal state. In the times of the empire, the

eastern Mongols or the Eastern Wing numbered forty *tümen* (units of ten thousand) while the western Oirat Mongols or the Western Wing were made up of four *tümen*, all collectively known in short as ‘the four and forty pair’ (*döchin dörvön khoyor*). But after the fall of the Yuan dynasty, the eastern Mongols, *döcin dörbän qoyar* became the Six Tümen or Six Great Realms (*Ikh Uls*, *Yeke Ulus*) and western Mongols the Four Tümen or the Four Oirats, described in some sources as the Ten Tümen.¹

The suzerains of feudal states used a method that they deemed to be a practical means of enforcing their rule by distributing land and serfs to their kin and to officials who had served well in government, to use for one generation. Over time these shares acquired the character of hereditary property belonging to feudal princes who began to have second thoughts about their loyalty to the central power, and would rather follow their own wishes. The suzerain soon had no option other than accommodating his now powerful vassals. Such is the logic underlying the disintegration of the feudal system.

The same logic applied equally to the feudal relations that took root on Mongolian soil. The land and serfs once handed out by Chinggis Khaan to the princes and other members of the Golden Lineage (*altan urag*), some loyal comrades, ministers and commanders who had served the state well, had gradually turned into hereditary fiefdoms, thus laying the ground for the crumbling of the feudal system.

This protracted process of disintegration that gained momentum in the second half of the fourteenth century, corroded Mongolia’s national independence and eventually became a cause of her subjugation to Manchurian domination and of economic and cultural humiliation.

The circumstances mentioned above had led the Eastern Wing of Mongolia to fall apart into the Six Tümen or the Six Great Realms of East Mongolia, one of which was the Khalkha Tümen or the *Khalkha Uls* (*ulus*, realm).

Some historical writings describe the East Mongolian Six Tümen also as *tüg tümen*² (multitude) where the word *tümen* meant not the unit of ten thousand mounted troops of imperial times, but a feudal fiefdom that included tens of thousands of people and sprawled over an enormous land area. So it would be a mistake to conceive of the Khalkha *tümen* of the second half of the fourteenth century as an emulation of the system of military organization of the imperial past. It is for precisely this reason that historians such as Sagan Setsen imbued the words *uls* and *tümen* with one and the same meaning and used them interchangeably.

The East Mongolian Six Tümen were divided into eastern and western wings, each comprising three *tümen*, with the Khalkha figuring as one of the *tümen* in the eastern banner. Among these six *tümen*, seniority was assigned to the three *tümen* of the eastern wing, including the Khalkha. This fact is mentioned in one Mongolian historical source as follows:

With hearts loyal to the khan,
With the power to sustain our lives,
With the strength coming from togetherness,
The beloved Three Eastern Tümen.³

Among the Six Tümen, the Khalkha *tümen* was the central or core *tümen*. It occupied a territory roughly matching that of the Mongolian People’s Republic. Historical sources refer to ‘the heartland of the Mongol country or the Khalkha country’.⁴ Our own historical writings tell about ‘the Aglag Twelve Khüree Khalkha’,⁵ ‘the Twelve Khalkha’,⁶ ‘the Twelve Khalkha *otog* [administrative divisions]’.⁷ This, first of all,

testifies to the existence of twelve Khalkha *otog*. The meaning of the term '*aglag*' occasionally applied to the Khalkha, seems to indicate the remoteness and the emptiness of the land that the Khalkha, the core of the Mongol ethnic groups, did indeed inhabit.

Historical sources contain frequent references to the relations – now warring and then peaceful – between different Mongol groups and the Ming dynasty in the period from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century. However, mention of the Khalkha is rare in the Ming chronicles of the seventeenth century. Only a few record that 'the Khalkha, who are separated by the great Gobi sands, have not been observed near the Ming state'.

As for the term *khüree Khalkha*, it is apparently an echo of the name of the pattern of movement and form of military organization of the ancient Mongols or, in other words, it is a nod at *khüree* [*küriyen*, *güre'en* – large circular defensive encampment] as a form of organizational structure used in the past by the Mongols.

After the fall of the Yuan dynasty, the Khalkha and the Oirat periodically came to blows and the Ming dynasty used every opportunity to sow the seeds of discord between the two in pursuit of its own policy of weakening both by supporting the Khalkha against the Oirat, and then propping up the Oirat to prevent the East Mongols from growing powerful. The Ming emperor Yun-Le (Yongle) (1403–24) sent a hundred thousand troops into Mongolia in 1409 to help the Oirat attack the Mongol army on the Onon river. When the Oirat ruler (*ezen*, *ejen*) Mahmud led the Oirat to the Kherlen River in 1413 as part of his war with a Khalkha prince Aruga, the same emperor changed his mind and in 1414 helped the Khalkha drive the Oirat to the river Tuul. Their land having been turned into a battlefield, the Khalkha could not help but suffer great losses.

Togoontömör Khaan was succeeded by his sons (Ayushridar) Bilegt (1370–78) and Tögstömör (Usgal) (1378–88) who ruled over the Khalkha from their capital at Khar-Khorin. Usgal Khaan had three sons Enkh Zorigt, Elbeg the Merciful and Dүүren-Tömör *khuntaij* (*khung-taiji*, crown prince) who sat on the Khalkha throne in an orderly succession with Enkh Zorigt reigning from 1388–92, then Elbeg the Merciful 1392–99 and Dүүren-Tömör *khuntaij* (?–1399).⁸

Historical sources throw little light on Crown Prince Dүүren-Tömör and the Khalkha lands of his time but what is available allows us to conclude that the country suffered much at the hands of east and west Mongol princes who warred incessantly for power, serfs and herds.

Prince Dүүren-Tömör was succeeded by his son Ajaa Taij [*taiji*, prince/nobleman] (1400–39?) who managed to increase his power so as to ally with Adai Khaan and Arugtai Taish and defeat the Four Oirat, advancing into the Oirat lands in the locality of Jilmen Khan.⁹ Judging by the fact that in 1412 the Ming Emperor granted Arugtai Taish the title of *Khenin van* or *Kharkhorum van*, Khar-Khorin still retained its political role in those times.

Ajaa Taij had three sons Taisun, Agvarjin and Manduul.¹⁰ The imperial throne was inherited by Taisun (1439–52). Taisun Khaan and the Oirat Esen Taish joined their forces and brought the three Zörchid (Jurchen) *tümen* of the river basin under their rule. The role of the Khalkha is not clear in the attack on the Ming that Esen Taish launched in 1449 with joint Oirat and East Mongol forces and that resulted in the capture of the Chinese emperor In-zun [Zhengtong] (or Jindei in Mongol sources). In 1452, Esen and Taisun Khaan clashed in the Khalkha heartland with Taisun suffering defeat and fleeing to the Kherlen region, only to die at the hands of his father-in-law Tsevdin of the

Gorlos. Tsevdan was keen to take vengeance on Taisun who had disowned his betrothed wife Altaikhan by sending her back to her father.

It appears that when Taisun Khaan was alive his brother Agvarjin (1439–53) was named *jonon* (*jinon*, viceroy) and ran the affairs of the Khalkha.¹¹ Agvarjin Jonon was known for his craving for power and his lack of both political talent and reason. He is said to have asked ‘When does the male antelope mature and when does the deer shed his antlers?’,¹² demanding the throne for himself. He is also known to have resisted Taisun Khaan’s efforts to consolidate a unified Mongol state.

The Oirat took advantage of Agvarjin Jonon by deceiving him into believing that they would place him on the imperial throne if they could but defeat the eastern Mongols in battle. At a place called Uurkhai, the Oirat exterminated ‘thirty-three *örövlögtön* [‘feathered ones’ perhaps a noble or official rank], forty-four *otogs* (administrative divisions) and sixty-one *khegeerten*¹³ [standard bearers, probably]’. From this, as both the Great and Lesser Golden Chronicles (*Ikh, Baga Altan Tovch, Yeke, Baga Altan Tobci*) claim, came the saying ‘the death of princes is in the meet, the death of dogs is in the heat’.¹⁴ The aftermath of Agvarjin Jonon’s ill deed was the century or so of mutual animosity between the Khalkha and the Oirat which ended only with the emergence of Abtai Sain Khaan of the Khalkha.

Esen Taish ruled as *khaan* for the period of 1452–55. The historical sources note that these were the times of the ‘unified rule of the four and forty pair’, in other words the forty Mongol *tümen* and the four Oirat *tümen* were brought together under the rule of one *khaan*. In 1455, when Esen *taish* fell victim to the conspiracy of feudal lords, the Khalkha and the Oirat again went their separate ways.

Although some sources criticize the historians of the time for failing to leave behind accurate accounts of the many *khaans* that succeeded one another in the period of 1455–70,¹⁵ it appears that in this particular period of time the throne was held by Kharakhutsag Taij¹⁶ and his son Bayanmönkh¹⁷ (1455–70). Kharakhutsag opposed his father Agvarjin Jonon who had betrayed the cause of a unified Mongol state to seek favours from the Oirat, and fully supported the policy of his uncle Taisun Khan.

Bayanmönkh was born of Esen Taish’s daughter Setseg, the wife of Kharakhutsag Taij, in the dark times of feudal strife, compounded by Oirat attacks on the Mongols amidst calls to ‘kill the seed of the Borjigin’¹⁸ and to ‘braid the hair if it is a girl, break the spine if it is a boy’.¹⁹

An Oirat by the name of Ügüdei Taibo, had led his troops in battle thirteen times but had not been given proper recognition by Esen Taish. He broke with his overlord and, together with three (or thirteen according to the *Precious Rosary*) other heroes (*baatar*), including Bayandai of the Khalkha *otog* of Sartaul, brought the three-year-old Bayanmönkh (Bayan-Möngke) to his mother’s birthplace (*ug törkhöm*) of Gurvan Saikhan in Khalkha. His uncle Manduul Khaan (1463–76) bestowed on Bayanmönkh the title of ‘Bolokh Jonon’ (Able Viceroy) or, according to some sources, ‘Ariun Jonon’²⁰ (Pure Viceroy) extolling him as the heir (‘seed’)²¹ that would ensure the continuation and accomplishment of the Borjigin lineage.

Uruuch Shigüshi of the Urud of a Khalkha *otog* of Uriankhai, betrothed his daughter Shikher to Bayanmönkh.²² Sources say that ‘Manduul Khaan and the Bolokh Jonon together led the Six Tümen’,²³ which confirms the influential role played by Bayanmönkh’s Khalkha *tümen* among the eastern Mongols. The chronicles also refer to the ‘three powerful Mongol provinces which are named Khalkha, Tsakhar (Chakhar) and Oirat’.²⁴ In those times the Khalkha Mongols defeated the Four Oirat *tümen* at

Khüngüi and Zavkhan as retribution for the massacre of eastern Mongol princes by the Oirat feudal lords under the command of Agvarjin *jonon*.²⁵

Bayanmönkh was succeeded by his son Batmönkh (Batu-Möngke) who ruled from 1470 to 1544. Batmönkh was not only the leader of the Khalkha but a truly great *khaan* who was able to unite and rule all the Mongols. The story of the eventful life of this khan who worked hard to restrain the feudal strife that had disrupted the Mongol territories for years on end and restore the unitary monarchy, is of special interest.

In the 1560s Bayanmönkh Bolokh Jonon and his uncle Manduul Khaan were provoked by feudal lords into fighting an unsuccessful war. They retreated to a place called Khutgan Tasartai (or Khutagt Derestei), and Bayanmönkh's wife, princess Shikher gave birth to a boy named Batmönkh.²⁶ As noted above, his grandfather was Uruuch Shigüshi of a Khalkha *otog* of the Uriankhai. When Batmönkh was but a toddler, a group of nobles of the Yünsheebüü [Yüngshiyebü, one of the most powerful *tümens*] killed his father and kidnapped his mother, Princess Shikher. The orphaned boy grew up wandering among the homes of the Tangud *otog*.

The two threats to his life²⁷ that the sources say Batmönkh escaped were, firstly, cystic echinococcosis (*beteg övchim*), which he contracted but was cured of, and his rescue from the waters of the Khulgar river, in which he fell and nearly drowned when he was seven. In those times there was no one save the tiny boy Batmönkh who could lay claim to the Mongol throne as a direct descendant of Chinggis Khan and could continue his lineage. The princes of the Khabat Khasar lineage, led by Prince (*van*) Noyonbold whose fief lay by the Onon river, attempted to take advantage of the situation and snatch the Mongol throne by approaching Mandukhai the Wise (*setsen*), the younger princess of Manduul Khaan, and offering to 'light the fire at her home and allot the land that is hers'²⁸ [i.e. to make her his wife]. This met with a strong opposition from Khalkha Mongol princes and especially Mandukhai the Wise herself, who resisted the machinations of prince Noyonbold. Mandukhai was a daughter of Tsorosbai Chinsang of the Engüd *otog*.

Saying that 'The lineage of Master Chinggis is at stake and it is true that this prince (*van*) belongs to it. But we hear there is a direct and legitimate heir of the Almighty Master, a lad Batmönkh No shame can come to me for entreating him. . . .'²⁹ adding that she would 'rekindle the fire of the Master's hearth',³⁰ Queen Mandukhai made her famous oath.³¹

The treatment of the relationship between Queen Mandukhai and Batmönkh often-times acquires quite a mythical character. According to the sources, the seven year old Batmönkh was born in the year of the Monkey (1464), and was wedded to the thirty-three year-old Mandukhai (who was born in 1438, the year of the Water Horse). At the wedding a nobleman of the house (*geriin noyon*) by the name of Mengen Yaruu performed the ritual of offering. And in the year of the White Tiger (1470) she accorded her husband the title of Dayan Khaan and raised him to the throne so as to ensure 'unthreatened life, unyielding power, correct deeds and sovereignty over all'.³²

The historical sources describe wise Queen Mandukhai's central role in Batmönkh Khaan's ascension to the throne, noting that 'in her effort to ensure the prosperity of the Golden Lineage of Holy Chinggis, and the continuation of the tradition of the Yuan dynasty, she was led by her stately, just and benevolent mind'³³ and that 'she raised her long braids and folded them on her head, sat the Dayan Khaan in his *ükheg* (cabinet/covered carriage) and steered the course from her saddle'.³⁴ We know of two such '*ükhegt*' (cabinet/carriage) *khaans* that is, very young *khaans*, one of them being

Margures, who ruled in 1455, and the other being Batmönkh Dayan Khaan. It is said that there is an inscribed stone monument that dates from the time of Batmönkh Dayan Khaan in the territory of Ömnögovī *aimag* (province) of the Mongolian People's Republic.³⁵

Batmönkh Dayan Khaan's rule began when the Khalkha and the Oirat were fighting each other and the Six Tümen of East Mongolia were likewise engaged in mutual animosities. Around 1470, Queen Mandukhai herself led the eastern Mongolian army to thwart the separatist ambitions of the Oirat princes whom she routed at Tas Bürd and she then introduced a rigorous set of laws.³⁶ When Batmönkh Dayan Khaan reached adulthood, she summoned an assembly of princes and ministers in the year of the White Snake (1475) and turned the reins of government over to him, saying 'Taking care of the lineage of Master Chinggis, and dealing with errant subjects, I have run the affairs of the ailing state with faith, in the mercy of the Heavenly Sky. Sovereign *khaan* thou hast grown tall to hear the will of thy people and officers. Let the *khaan* and ministers govern. There is no more need for women like me.'³⁷

Batmönkh Khaan was able to bring to heel the wanton princes and establish his rule over the whole of Mongolia. Our historical sources praise the reign of Batmönkh Dayan Khaan as one of 'unity and the pleasure of peace among the Six Tümen', a peaceful time 'to stretch out arms and legs' [to recline and rest] brought about by 'Dayan Khaan whose age, fortune and origin are all blessed in equal measure'.³⁸ Nevertheless, there are also remarks such as 'how firm our faith is in the times',³⁹ which may very well indicate that the feuding had not been altogether eliminated.

Of the available information on the life and geographical location of the Khalkha in the times of Batmönkh Dayan Khaan, the most detailed is given in the Mongol Wang Gun's (Gong) *Iltgelt shasdir* (Comprehensive Chronicle) which reports that 'Dayan Setsen Khaan, the fifteenth generation descendant of the Yuan emperor Taitszu, had his home at the foot of the mountains north of the Gobi'⁴⁰ and time and again it mentions Batmönkh Dayan Khaan's elder sons, who crossed the Gobi to settle in the south, and his youngest son Gersenz, who stayed behind in his native Khangai mountains. This gives us grounds to believe that Dayan Khan's politics was rooted in the Khalkha region. Luvsandan's *Altan товч* (Golden Chronicle) also says that Batmönkh's headquarters was in the basin of the Kherlen river.⁴¹ In that period, the Khalkha people took an active part in the effort to restore the unified Mongol state and put an end to internal dissent. When Dayan Khaan appointed his second son Ulasbolod the *jonon* (viceroys) of the Three West Tümen, Ibarii Taish of Yünsheebüü and Mandulai *akhla-khui* (chieftain) of Ordos voiced their opposition with the words 'There is no need for us to have a master. It is our privilege to decide who our leader should be. [But] let us put up with this lad for now',⁴² and later they led an uprising which killed Ulasbolod. Batmönkh retaliated, bringing the Three East Tümen to battle with the Three West Tümen at Dalan Tergüün. In this battle the twelve Khalkha *otogs* (administrative units) formed a single *khüree* (circular formation) composed of twelve *tümen* and attacked by deploying the *tümen*. As the Uriankhai *tümen* had deserted the alliance in the wake of the combat, Dayan Khaan brought the Khalkha *tümen* together with the Tsakhar (Chakhar) and, with the help of the west *tümen* defeated the Uriankhai at Zörgolynzoo, ending the campaign with a ban on the remaining five *tümen* to use the *tümen* as a [administrative/military] formation.⁴³ The Khalkha served as the mainstay of Dayan Khaan's forces in other campaigns as well, such as the routing of the Mongoljin *tümen*'s uprising at the River Türgen, and a revolt led by Ismen Taish of the Yünsheebüü.

Thus the Khalkha *tümen*'s active support of Dayan Khaan in his campaign to end feudal strife and establish centralized rule had made a positive contribution to the national consolidation.

After Dayan Khaan, the struggle for the throne flared up again when Barsbolod of the Three West Tümen took advantage of the young age of his nephew Bodi-Alag (Bodi Alagh), the legitimate heir to the throne, to seize power. The Three East Tümen rose up to oust the usurper and restore Bodi-Alag to the throne.⁴⁴ For this reason some of our historical records name Bodi-Alag the 'Khalkha *khaan*'.⁴⁵ Such chronicles as *Altan erkhi* (The Golden Rosary), *Myangan khegeest* (A Thousand Spokes) and *Gangyn Ursgal* (The Flow of the Ganges) also tell the story of how the Khalkha and the Tsakhar of the Three East Tümen also raised troops to stop Alchibolod from usurping the khan's throne.⁴⁶ This period of internecine feuding, which had revived again after the rule of Dayan Khan, is described in historical records as 'the time when many princes came to call themselves the *khaan* of Mongolia'.⁴⁷

In the times of Batmönkh and his grandson Bodi-Alag (1544–47), the Khorchin princes proposed on two occasions that the Three West Tümen be integrated into the Three East Tümen thus merging the twelve Khalkha *otogs* (i.e. territories [*nutags*]) with the twelve *tümen*. This idea had to be abandoned since the Three West Tümen could not be overpowered. After Bodi-Alag the throne was passed to Daraisun (1548–57), Tümen (1558–93) and Buyan (1593–1603) who merited his great grandfather Batmönkh's title *dayan setsen* (great, wise). In these times, the Khalkha continued to play a key role in the efforts to maintain the unity of the Mongol state. Historical writings refer to the rule of these *khaans* as periods that 'pacified the state, united the kin and gave peace to the six great *ulus* (realms)'⁴⁸ and lead one to believe that feudal strife had been brought under control throughout Mongolia, including Khalkha, and that once again there ensued a period of relative peace.

Buyan Setsen Khaan was succeeded by his grandson Ligden (1592–1634) who assumed the Mongol imperial throne in 1604 when he was only thirteen years old. Ligden was a defender of Mongolia's national independence and gave his life to this cause while fighting to resist Manchu aggression. Ligden Khaan was able to bring together and rule, albeit only for a short period, all six east and west *tümen* of Mongolia. As he came from the Tsakhar *tümen*, some historical books call him 'a Tsakhar subject of Khalkha origin'.⁴⁹ However, one has to bear in mind that Ligden's rule in Khalkha was fragile and brief. The information on Khalkha in that period can be found in Mongolian primary sources, many chronicles, and genealogical records and apart from these, in Manchu sources.⁵⁰

The sixteenth century saw the rise of the Manchu militaristic feudal state in East Asia. Its conquest and colonization of countries such as Mongolia, China and Korea played an extremely adverse and repressive role in their histories. When toppling the Ming dynasty in China, the Manchu emperors had a hostile and suspicious view of Mongolia and Korea. A decree issued in the eighth year of the Heavenly Empire (1623) reads 'Heaven has given us the land of Liaodun [Liaodong] . . . In the south-east there is Korea, and Mongolia is in the north. These two states are hostile to us and should we depart, this notwithstanding, to win the Ming country, the northern issue, extremely pressing as it is, shall give us no peace of mind.'⁵¹ This text shows that Ligden Khaan, who had established contacts with the Ming dynasty, did not waver in his policy of resisting Manchurian aggression. In their turn, the Manchu also vigorously carried out a policy that aimed at setting different Mongol *aimags* and peoples against the Tsakhar

and Ligden Khaan, and of breaking up the forces of national unity. Another decree of the sixth year of the Heavenly Empire (1621), was a direct reminder of the need to isolate the Khalkha from Ligden Khaan by 'bringing the Khalkha *beis* [*beise* – a noble rank, roughly equivalent to a marquis] to Tsakhar [Chakhar] and killing him there, separating families and driving away the serfs (*albat*).'⁵²

The long-running feudal strife in Mongolia was clearly a problem in Khalkha as well. A document of the Manchu Heavenly Empire points out that 'Having no supreme ruler, the Mongol princes have come to live following their own will.'⁵³ However this does not support the view that the princes had completely broken away from the rule of the central *khaan*. Although hypocritical words to the effect of 'as waging wars with sharp swords is unwise and the reciprocation of animosities will have no end, there is no alternative but to stop the warring'⁵⁴ are often found in Manchu *khaan*'s decrees, in reality the Manchu rule over the Mongol Khalkha and other Mongols was established by force of arms. This point will be examined in the following section.

Now let me offer a few words on the internal situation of Khalkha in the period of the fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries. The previous sections have already talked about the concentration of Mongol nations (*tuurgatan*) around the Khalkha and the revival of the Mongol nation-state. This heightening of the Khalkha's role as guardians of the Mongol hearth, and keepers of the homeland with its centre in Khar-Khorin, had come with the ousting of the feudal governors installed in the foreign dominions of the Mongol empire created by Chinggis Khaan, and the decline of Mongol authority and military power by the second half of the fourteenth century.

The central role that the Khalkha had come to play among the Mongol tribes reflected the fact that the Khalkha lands lay in the heart of the Asian continent and the Mongol territory. This geographical location offered both good communication with the different wings of Mongol territory, and the necessary protective distance from the sedentary feudal states. A military attack on Khalkha would have represented a mortal danger to the whole of the Mongol nation, and so this served as yet another factor that contributed to the consolidation of all the Mongols around the Khalkha. Furthermore, the Khalkha land, which abounded in the grasslands and water crucial to pastoral livestock-breeding, made an important contribution to the feudal economy based on animal husbandry and allowed comparatively higher levels of social development. This was also a territory where different nomadic states had emerged in succession ever since the times of the Huns two thousand years ago. The unified Mongol state of the thirteenth century was established here, where Mongol ethnicity, language and culture took shape, thus turning it into a symbol of statehood, national sovereignty and identity.

After the fall of the Yuan dynasty, the Mongol feudal princes continued to raid China, unable to give up their hopes of regaining control over that country. The Ming state had rebutted them and the resulting wars had lasted into the 1380s and caused great losses to the Khalkha. The Ming sent large contingents into Khalkha in 1372 and 1380, reaching as far as the Orkhon river and taking hundreds of thousands of horses and other livestock in the first case, and, in the latter, breaking into Khar-Khorin, ruining the city, killing its people and vandalizing its cultural artefacts. The incessant inroads of Mongol feudal princes into China had led the Ming dynasty to protect its borders by reinforcing the Great Wall with the so called '*esõn khyazgaar*' or nine large defence outposts, manned with strike forces, and there is little doubt that the Khalkha land and her people had paid the greater part of the military and economic costs of these hostilities.

After their retreat into the homeland, the Mongol feudal lords lost the large-scale tribute that China had paid, and the result was an ever-increasing level of exploitation of their native subjects. The 'Horse Fairs' and re-opening of cross-border trade in the post-Yuan period mostly benefitted the Mongols living along the Mongol-Chinese border while, in the hinterland, the Khalkha had little opportunity to participate. As research on this topic confirms, Chinese traders were not present in Mongolia until the early seventeenth century.⁵⁵ In that period, nomadic livestock breeding remained the basis of the Khalkha economy and the main source of livelihood for her people.

Except for the fact that horses were important for feuds, hunting and raids, and that for these reasons horse-breeding was given priority, we have almost no further information on animal husbandry. In Khalkha, the sixteenth century evidently saw the birth of such practices as the use of a silver nose-peg for the sire-camel or a silver horse brand to celebrate the growth of a herd to one thousand or ten thousand head, and the use of a steel trivet. Obviously only a few well-off livestock owners rather than herders en masse could afford to have these items.

In those times clothes, leather accessories, felt, wooden *ger* parts, chests and *ükheg* (cabinet) carts, buckets and other such necessities were mostly produced by the households themselves. Each and every trooper was required to make himself and maintain a bow with a certain number of arrows. All this turned the households into isolated units of primitive natural economy.

Although the ordinary folk had a few farm animals and some simple tools, they had no right to own land. Some academics hold that farming the land had declined in Khalkha in the fifteenth to sixteenth centuries but no specific information can be found to this effect.

In the period described, the Khalkha people suffered massively from the adverse effects of the strife between eastern and western Mongol feudal princes and the contention among the six eastern Mongol *tümen* themselves. Feudal duties in those times were paid mainly in the form of produce and unpaid labour. One of the most widespread forms of feudal exploitation was the forcing of subjects to perform various forms of work for feudal lords. '*Khia*' (an attendant to the lord, an overseer of supplies for the lord's household), '*khöttöch*' (a servant-guide), '*saal'chin*' (milkmaid), '*khon'chin*' (shepherd), '*aduuchin*' (horseherd), '*süregchin*' (herder), '*zarts*' (servant), '*bool*' (slave, serf, bondsman) are a few of the words used in the historical documents to describe the roles performed by the subjects of a feudal master. These also tell of a '*gööröönii alba*' ('deer duty') which the population had to pay in the second half of the sixteenth century to the *khaan* in addition to the duties they paid to their own feudal masters.⁵⁶ Provision of the livestock for the *örtöö ulaa* (the system of horse-relay stations) and a feudal lord's household consumption was one of the heaviest of the feudal duties. There were reportedly 119 *örtöö ulaa* relay-posts maintained in the time of the Yuan dynasty,⁵⁷ and by the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries these had largely changed from being a chain of well-established stations into a system of the random replacement of horses lassoed from the ordinary people's herds. Herders also had to provide their feudal masters with dairy cattle and a requisite number of other livestock in addition to such products as felt, *airag* (fermented mare's milk) and various dairy foods.

The process of assimilation and merging of many Mongols clans (*ovogs*) and tribes (*aimags*), and the emergence of new tribal or inter-tribal formations also took place in the Khalkha region.

In the post-Yuan dynasty period, the Khalkha *tümen* had acquired the features of a

large feudal fiefdom complete with its own territory, subjects, army, administration and law. However, it cannot be viewed as a unit outside the unified Mongol khanate. Depending on the nature of the times, the Khalkha *tümen* was – as well as being subject to the central *khaan*'s reign – ruled by a *khuntaij* (crown prince) or, in line with Mongol tradition, the youngest royal prince (the 'guardian of the hearth').

The Khalkha *tümen* was divided into twelve *otog* and since each *otog* owned its land, the *otog* leaders exercised the rights and responsibilities of real rulers. B. Ya. Vladimirtsov described '*otog*' as a word of Turkic origin meaning 'a territory', and some historical documents use the words '*otog*' and '*nutag*' (territory, land) interchangeably.⁵⁸ It is interesting that they describe Khalkha as '*arvan khoyor otog buyu nutag uls*' that is, twelve territories or provinces. In other words, this description may reflect the spatial division of the Khalkha *tümen* into territorial units, termed *otogs*, as well as the nature of each of these *otogs* as a separate fiefdom.

Apart from describing Khalkha as being divided into *otogs*, such writings as '*Zaya bandityn namtar*' (*Biography of Zaya Pundit*), '*Khalkha juram*' (*The Khalkha law*), '*Dõchin dõrvõn khoyoryn ikh tsaz*' (*The Great Law of the Four and Forty Pair*) make special mention of '*ikh nutag*' (great territory) and '*nutag*' (territory) and charge the local lords with the responsibility for keeping their subjects within the confines of the allotted territories.

In Khalkha of the fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries, an *otog* could be inhabited by either a great tribe (*aimag*) related by common descent such as Jalair, Uriankhai, Baarin or Khongirad [Onggirad], or by a mixture of separate clans (*ovogs*) and tribes with the character of a gathering (*khüree*) or patchwork. Since the general characteristics of an *otog* were a common territory, religion, administration, a population of kin families, and its independence as an economic unit; it could be understood to be the basic rural community of the Mongols. The word '*khoshuu*' ('banner') appeared in the historical documents starting from the sixteenth century, first denoting a military formation and later becoming a name for a territorial and administrative division.

The role of the Khalkha *tümen* as an independent unit of military organization was most evident in the time of Batmõnkh Dayan Khaan. The Khalkha princes played an important part in sustaining the rule of the great *khaans* by contributing troops to the army and participating in the assemblies to decide the crucial issues of war and peace. These are some aspects of the social organization of Khalkha of the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries.

NOTES

1. *Gangyn ursgal* [Flow of the Ganges]: 63–64.
2. *Gangyn ursgal*: 55–56, 63.
3. *Myangan khegeest* [A Thousand Spokes]: 94.
4. Damdin, Sh. *Altan Devter* [The Golden Book]. Translation from Tibetan by Ts. Dorj. Chapter I, Section 12. The Institute of History, The Manuscript Fund.
5. Rashpuntsag. *Dai Yuan ulsyn bolor erkhi* [Crystal Rosary of the Dai Yuan]. Vol. 5. The State Library, manuscript.
6. *Khuraangui Altan Tovch* [The Concise Golden Chronicle], 101. Luvsandanzan. *Altan tovch* [The Golden Chronicle].
7. Sagan Setsen: 211.
8. *Galdan Erdeniin Erhi* [The Galdan Precious Rosary], UB, 1960: 47. *Shar Tuuj* [The Yellow

- Tale]: 58. Sagan Setsen, 158–59. *Altan Tovch* [The Golden Chronicle]: 127–29. NB: The (Luvsandanzan) Lu-*Altan Tovch*, an abridged version of *Altan Tovch*, describes Dūüren-Tōmōr as the son of Elbeg Khaan. Also, in some sources Dūüren-Tōmōr is called Kharakhutsag, which should not be confused with another Kharakhutsag, the son of Prince Agvarjin.
9. Sagan Setsen: 167; *Shar tuuj* [The Yellow Tale]: 62; Sh.Damdin. *Altan devter* [The Golden Book] Chapter 4.
 10. *Shar tuuj* [The Yellow Tale]: 63.
 11. According to Sagan Setsen, Agvarjin was the viceroy (*jonon*) of the western *three tümen*. Although this may very well be true, there is factual evidence that Agvarjin also ruled the Khalkha.
 12. *Khuraangui altan товч* [The Concise Golden Chronicle]; Lu-*Altan Tovch*: 136.
 13. *Khuraangui altan товч* [The Concise Golden Chronicle]: 66; *Asragch nertiin tüükh* [A History by Asragch]: 55; *Shar tuuj* [The Yellow Tale]: 64–65; Lu. *Altan товч*: (2): 140–41; Galdan. *Erdeniin erkhi* [The Precious Rosary]: 86; Historian Ts.Nasanbaljir, Notes on the History of Mongolia Recovered from Barga, The Institute of History: 39; Darmaa. *Myangan Khegeest* [A Thousand Spokes]: 41; Lomii. *Mongol borjigid ovgiin tüükh* [History of the Mongol Borjigid Lineage]: 56.
 14. *Khuraangui altan товч* [The Concise Golden Chronicle]; Lu. *Altan Товч*: 140–41.
 15. In 1455 Margus or Margures and in 1456–57 Molun *taij* became *khaans* while it is not known who held the throne in 1458–63. The period of 1463–67 was the rule of Manduul khan and in 1468–70 Bayanmōnkh *bolokh jonon* seems to have been in power.
 16. The dates of life of Kharakhutsag *taij* are not known.
 17. Bayanmōnkh *bolokh jonon* was born in 1440 and ruled the Khalkha in 1455–70.
 18. Sagan Setsen: 187; Lomii. *Mongol borjigid ovgiin tüükh* [History of the Mongol Borjigid Lineage]: 61.
 19. *Khuraangui altan товч* [The Concise Golden Chronicle]: 80–81; Sagan Setsen: 186; Rashpuntsag. *Dai Yuan ulsyn bolor erkhi* [Crystal Rosary of the Dai Yuan]: Vol. 9; Galdan. *Erdeniin erkhi* [The Precious Rosary]: 86; Lomii. *Mongol borjigid ovgiin tüükh* [History of the Mongol Borjigid Lineage]: 58.
 20. Sagan Setsen: 195; Lomii. *Mongol borjigid ovgiin tüükh* [The History of the Mongol Borjigid Lineage]: 67.
 21. Galdan. *Erdeniin erkhi* [The Precious Rosary]: 86; Lomii (ibid.).
 22. *Shar tuuj* [The Yellow Tale]: 60–65.
 23. *Khuraangui altan товч* [The Concise Golden Chronicle]: 82; *Shar tuuj* [The Yellow Tale]: 679; Sagan Setsen: 196; Lu. *Altan товч*: (2) 1, 54; *Mongol borjigid ovgiin tüükh* [History of the Mongol Borjigid Lineage]: 47; Wedding of the Youth as Bequeathed by Dalai Lama or the History of Khaans, The Institute of History: 23.
 24. *Iltgelt shasdir* [Comprehensive Chronicle]: Book 17, 4.
 25. *Shar tuuj* [The Yellow Tale]: 68; Galdan. *Erdeniin erkhi* [The Precious Rosary]: 86.
 26. *Khuraangui altan товч* [The Concise Golden Chronicle]: 84–85; Lu. *Altan товч*: (2) 156; Sagan Setsen: 198; *Shar tuuj* [The Yellow Tale]: 69–70, *Asragch nertiin tüükh* [A History by Asragch]: 57.
 27. *Khuraangui altan товч* [The Concise Golden Chronicle]: 89; Lu. *Altan товч*: (2) 160; Sagan Setsen: 199.
 28. Lu. *Altan товч*: 166; *Asragch nertiin tüükh* [A History by Asragch]: 59; Rashpuntsag. *Dai Yuan ulsyn bolor erkhi* [Crystal Rosary of the Dai Yuan]. The State Library, manuscript Vol. 9.
 29. *Khuraangui altan товч* [The Concise Golden Chronicle]: 87; Sagan Setsen: 199.
 30. Sagan Setsen: 201; Sh.Damdin. *Altan devter* [The Golden Book] Chapter 4.
 31. *Asragch nertiin tüükh* [A History by Asragch] gives Queen Mandukhai's oath as follows:

The boy of thy flesh and blood is too young,
 Should I have chosen a man from faraway?
 But here I am at thy Golden palace,
 Leaving my fears behind.
 Could thy wide door be mistaken for narrow?
 Could its tall threshold be mistaken for low?
 Could my choice be made for Noyonbold?
 The reins in thy hands are long,
 Thy counsel is wise,
 Stop me!
 If thy boy is not to be deposed for his youthfulness,
 Stop Noyonbold!
 These words of mine are the utter truth,
 As truly as seven lads and a lass merit thy mercy.

32. Sagan Setsen: 200–202; *Shar tuuj* [The Yellow Tale]: 70–72; *Asragch nertiin tuuj* [A History by Asragch]: 60; Darmaa. *Myangan khegeest* [A Thousand Spokes]: 45; Sh.Damdin. *Altan devter* [The Golden Book]: Chapter 4; *Zahuusyn khurim* [Wedding of the Youth], The Institute of History: 23.
33. Rashpuntsag. *Dai yuan ulsyn bolor erkhi* [Crystal Rosary of the Dai Yuan]: The State Library, manuscript Vol.9, at the bottom.
34. *Khuraangui altan товч* [The Concise Golden Chronicle: 86; Sagan Setsen: 202; *Shar tuuj* [The Yellow Tale]: 72.
35. Ts.Damdinsuren. *Mongolyn uran zohiolyn tüükh* [History of Mongolian Literature]. People's Printing House of Inner Mongolia. 1957: 244.
36. Sagan Setsen: 202; *Shar tuuj* [The Yellow Tale]: 72.
37. Rashpuntsag. *Dai yuan ulsyn bolor erkhi* [Crystal Rosary of the Dai Yuan]: The State Library: Vol.9.
38. Sagan Setsen: 215; *Shar tuuj* [The Yellow tale]: 73; Jambadorj. *Bolor toli* [The Crystal Book]. The State Library, manuscript Vol.12: 45.
39. Sagan Setsen: 207.
40. *Iltgelt shasdir* [The Comprehensive Chronicle]: Vol.45.
41. Lu. *Altan товч*. Last vol.: 165.
42. Sagan Setsen: 205.
43. Sagan Setsen: 215.
44. Lu. *Altan товч*: 176–177; *Asragch nertiin tuuj* [A History by Asragch]: 62.
45. Gombojav. *Gangyn ursgal* [The Flow of the Ganges]: 39.
46. *Mongol orond shashin tör togтson yosnyг saitar ögüülсen tungalag uhaant zaluusyn khooloin chimeг, tunamal gerelt altan erkhi* [The Glowing Golden Rosary Which Relates Well the Establishment of Religion and Statehood in the Mongol Land and Embellishes the Necks of Clear Minded Youth], Library of the Gandan-degchlen Monastery: manuscript 66; Darmaa. *Myangan Khegeest* [A Thousand Spokes]: 47; Gombojav. (ibid.).
47. Jambadorj. *Bolor toli* [The Crystal Book]. The State Library, manuscript: (12) 31.
48. *Asragch nertiin tuuj* [A History by Asragch]: 61–63.
49. *Iltgelt shasdir* [Comprehensive Chronicle]: Vol. 53, 4.
50. 2 *Manj ulsyn ünen magad khuuli* [The Absolute Law of the Manchu]. The Institute of History, the Manuscript Fund; *Taitszu khuandiin bogd surgaal* [The Percepts of Taitszu huandi]. Vol. 2; *Gadaad Mongolyn töriг zasakh yamnyk khuuli zuiliin bichig* [The Institute of History, The Manuscript Fund. Legal Documents of the Ministry of State Affairs of Outer Mongolia]; *Bogd baatarын биег дайлсан темдгел* [The State Library, manuscript Notes by Bogd Baatar]; *Züüngaryн газрыг түвшитгэн тогтоосон бодлогын бичиг* [The State Library. Policy paper on the pacification of Dzungaria].

51. *Taitszu khuandiin bogd surgaal* [The Sacred Percepts of Taitszu huandi]: Vol. 1, 7. The Institute of History, The Manuscript Fund.
52. *Taitszu khuandiin bogd surgaal* [The Sacred Percepts of Taitszu huandi]: Vol. 1. 26–27. The Institute of History, The Manuscript Fund.
53. *Taitszu khuandiin bogd surgaal* [The Sacred Percepts of Taitszu huandi] Translation by L. Dendev. Institute of History, manuscript: Vol. 1, 26–27.
54. Ibid. 70. xs.
55. M. Sanjdorj. 1963. *The Development of the Chinese usury in Khalkha*. Ulaanbaatar.
56. The Yellow Tale: 107.
57. The Yuan Chronicles: Book 101.
58. *Khuraangui altan товч* [The Concise Golden Chronicle]: 85, 99, 101; Lu. *Altan товч*: Last Book. 159, 173, 175.

SIX TÜMEN

Sh. Natsagdorj & A. Ochir



3. THE SIX TÜMEN OR SIX REALMS

During the period of empire large numbers of Mongolians followed their lords abroad, as subjects, and later remained there, being absorbed into the various local populations. Maintaining their ‘ancestral hearths’ [continuity/traditions], the majority of these Mongolians were spread widely over a huge area from Southern Siberia to the ‘ten thousand league’ Great White Wall (Great Wall of China), from the Khyangan (Khinggan) mountain range to Tenger mountain (Tian Shan). Oirats dwelt in the territories to the west of the Altai mountain range, and the *ar* (back i.e. ‘outer’) and *övör* (front/south i.e. ‘inner’) Mongolians lived in the territories of that are today Mongolia and Inner Mongolia.

The phrase ‘*döchin dörvön khoyor*’ (the four and forty pair) derives from the old notion of the forty *tümen* of East and the four *tümen* of the West Mongols. However, in the post-Yuan period East Mongolia was described as the ‘Six Mongol Tümen’ while the older term, the ‘Four Oirat Tümen,’ was retained. During the reign of Batmönkh Dayan Khaan the Six Tümen of Eastern Mongolia was internally divided into two parts, the East Three and the West Three. Chakhar, Khalkh, Uriankhai were the three eastern *tümen*; Ordos, the ‘Twelve Tümed (Tümet)’, Yünsheebü (Yünsheebüü), Asud and Kharchin were all in the west *tümens*. The eastern *tümens* were ruled by the *khaan* himself, the western *tümens* by a *jinon* (viceroys) or ‘*khuan-taiz*’ (*khung-taiji*, crown prince) – a princely title that seems to be the equivalent of the Yuan Dynasty’s ‘*tszin van*’ (*ching wang*).

Batmönkh Dayan Khaan defeated an attack by the Uriankhai *tümen* and in order to reduce the number and strength of independent and ungovernable feudal lords, he divided the *tümen* into smaller units and gave these to other *tümens*. His successor Bodi-Alag Khaan (1521–47) also wished to divide the Three West Tümen and join them to the eastern *tümens*. During the reign of Tümen Zasagt Khaan (1558–92) there was an attempt to establish the centralized administration of the Realm of the Six Tümen. Unfortunately, we lack materials and information on this curious event, although it is of tremendous importance. In any case, Tümen Zasagt Khaan ‘assembled the Six Tümen to make a great code of laws (*ikh tsaaz*) and established a government consisting of lords from both the western and eastern *tümen*’. The West Tümen Altan Khaan (1508–82) and Tümen Zasagt Khaan bolstered their authority over their subordinates, reinforced the administrative apparatus and strengthened the army by supporting and

developing Buddhism, and using it as an ideological weapon. They understood very well that by promoting the 'two rules' (*khoyor yos*) or in other words by 'combining state and religion' they could stabilize their own dominance.

It is not clear what happened to the élite *khishigten* (*kheshig/keshig* imperial guard). However, it seems that the *Khishigten otag* of Chakhar *tümen*, that was the mainstay of the East Three *tümen*, were the descendants of former *Khishigten*. During this period it seems that around the *khaan* there appeared a set of companions and bodyguards called the 'thirty-three paladins' (*guchin gurvān örlögton*) and the 'sixty-one standard bearers' (*jaran negen khiirten*) along with other nobles of the house (*ger*), servants and companions (*nökhörs*). Within the entire army of the state, the *khaan* (emperor) and the *khans* (rulers) of the *tümens* each had their own separate armies. For example, Altan *khan* had three *tümens* of picked troops.¹ In the periods when the emperor was powerful the *khans* of the *tümens* or lesser *ulus* (realm) *khans* would obey the emperor's orders to mobilize troops and go to war. However, when the emperor's power weakened, there were cases of subordinate rulers refusing to take part in his wars.

Altan *Khaan* all but forced the emperor Bodi Alag to give him the title '*shidau*'. Later he received the title 'Tüsheet *Khan*' [*tüshiyetü khan*, 'supporting king']. The title *shidau* appears to be the same as the title '*shad*' [viceroy] used by the ancient *Türks*. During Altan *Khaan* period the old *Türk* title '*yavagu*' [*yabghu*, a rank just below that of emperor] was used and from this it seems likely that the title *shidau* was also an ancient *Türk* one. The other title '*tüshee*' [support, pillar] is undoubtedly from the thirteenth century. In 1547, after the death of Bodi Alag *Khaan*, his son Daraisun *Khaan* (1548–57) was chased out of his territory by Altan *Khan*, who almost became, in effect, the *khaan* of the whole of Mongolia.

Historians have written about the Six *Tümen* and Six 'Great Realms' [*ikh ulslyekhe ulus*] of this era, but rather little is known of the period. It is not at all clear exactly when the above-mentioned Six *Tümen* and Realms were established, although it is likely that they dated from the period just after the Yuan Dynasty, when the Mongolian Great *Khaans* returned to reign over Mongolian territory.

The Six *Tümen* were not units of the old clan (*ovog*) and tribe (*aimag*) structure, or military Thousand units, they had a civil, administrative character. The territory referred to as the 'Khalkh *Tümen*' was the original source of the emperors' wealth; on the other hand it acted as Mongolia's rearguard or shield. The Chakhar *Tümen* was the emperor's personal appanage (*aimag*) and played the role of the former *khishigten* [imperial guard]. It is no accident that within the Chakhar *aimag* there was a division called the *khishigtenüüd*. In general the term '*chakhar*' is an equal term to *khalkh*, but it does not occur in thirteenth-century historical written resources. *Chakhar* is from '*chakir*' [Persian for bodyguard or household servants] a Middle Eastern term for imperial guardsmen, and it is interesting that the Mongolian rulers later used it for their own military. One of the three East *Tümens* was the Uriankhai *Tümen*, and in times of war the Uriankhai would be used to scout ahead of the imperial army when crossing the Gobi desert, locating and sinking wells for water. The West *Tümen* of Ordos was originally a Yuan Dynasty *tümen* responsible for keeping Chinggis *Khan*'s shrine (*ongon*, *ongghon*). According to our calculations these twelve *tümens* were the remnants of the western or Right Hand (*Baruun gar*) *tümen* of the Chinggis *Khan* period and they were in charge of looking after and protecting the twelve passes of the Altai. *Yünsheebü* may derive from the Chinese word for a heroic tribe of bowmen and they seem to be the remnant of the five honoured *aimags* named 'the five *tüshee* [pillars]' of the Chinggis

Khan period. The Asud was one of these 'heroic' *aimags*. The Kharchin used to provide the emperor with *airag* (fermented mare's milk) during the Yuan Dynasty, and thus received the name *kharchin*, since *khar airag* (black/clear *airag*) probably meant a type of specially distilled high quality *airag* made from pure milk.

It is interesting to note the ways in which the feudal state structure of the Six Tümen or Realms differed from earlier periods. The Züün Gar Tümen (eastern/left hand *tümen*) was ruled by the *khaan* himself; the Baruun Gar Tümen (western/right hand *tümen*) was headed by a younger brother or viceroy (*jinon*). The *khaan* and *jinon* thus ruled the Six Tümen by dividing it. As the proverb says, 'above the sun and moon amid the blue, below the *khaan* and *jinon* amid the green' and the saying originates from this period. The historical sources mention the Baruun and Züün Gar Tümen; however, there is no mention of a Töviin Tümen – a central *tümen* – that ruled over them. In our opinion, this central Töviin Tümen would have been the Khalkh, since it was the birthplace of the Mongolian state, the *khaan*'s home territory, occupying a special place among the Six Tümen and being ruled by the *khaan*'s youngest son. The Four Oirats did not belong to the Mongol Six Tümen. They were independent but would sometimes come within the Great Khaan's administration, as when the Mongol and Oirat came together and 'the Four and Forty pair became one state' as the sources say. However, the Oirat aristocracy did not want to be under the rule of the Mongol *khaan* and constantly pressed for independence. For this reason the orientation of the Six Tümen was generally directed at preventing an Oirat attack from the rear. And while Mongol emperors continued to take levies and taxes from the Six Tümen, they could not tax the Oirat.

In Western Europe, during the feudal period the prince (sovereign) represented the main force for the unification and control of a given state, in this sense playing a progressive role in preventing internal conflict and promoting unity. In the Mongol case, however, in this period of internal feudal conflict, the Oirat *taishs*, the *jinons* of the western *tümens* and other small khans constantly tried to shrug off the rule of the Great Khaans. We can see that in a period when the Ming Dynasty was trying various means to subjugate Mongolia, these separation movements played a negative role in Mongol history. It is evident from the historical materials that moves to resist the central authority of the Mongol Great Khaans weakened the unity of the Mongol state. Although we consider the Great Khaan to have been the only force capable of uniting all the territories of Mongolia and independent Mongol states under one administration, we also have to acknowledge the fact that, during the period under discussion, no economic centre had formed in Mongolia to unite the separated kingdoms. The absence of such an economic centre, the dominance of nomadic livestock husbandry and the undeveloped nature of the cities and sedentary settlements, all meant that conditions were not conducive to ending the Mongol political factionalism and uniting the many small kingdoms within a common economic structure. Generally, when faced with a common enemy or the prospect of foreign subjugation, the Mongol kingdoms would temporarily unite under one of the stronger or more capable khans; however this unity never lasted for long.

4. THE FOUR OIRAT

In the first half of the fifteenth century the Oirats tended to emerge as winners in the struggle with the East Mongols. The main reason for this was the strong internal unity

and organization of the Oirats, in contrast to the ongoing internal power struggle among the East Mongol lords, and the weakening of their central power. In the beginning of the fifteenth century Oirat power increased to reach impressive levels, and during the reign of Togoon and Esen the old Oirat structure and territory began to change. In the first half of the fifteenth century, the historical sources describe the structure of the Four Oirat as follows: 'the Choros, Torguud (Torghud) and Khoshuud (Khoshud) form one Oirat;² the Khoid and Baatuud (Baatud) Tümen formed another Oirat;³ the Barga and Buriad (Buriyat) formed an Oirat;⁴ and the Ör Mongol [probably a term for East Mongols] formed one Oirat'.⁵

The Choros were initially descendants of Dobu Sokhor (Dobu the Blind) from the line of Börte Chono [primogenitor of the Borjigid]. The lords of Khoshuud were descendants of Khavt Khasar [Qasar – Chinggis Khan's younger brother]. In the 1420s, the seventh generation descendants of Khasar, Arigtömör and Örögtömör fought over the control of subjects and Örögtömör took his subjects from the west of the Khinggan range near the Hölönbuir (Hulun Buir) region and joined Togoon Taish. The name Khoshuud derives from the first half of the thirteenth century as part of the Mongol military structure, and later became the name of an *aimag*.

The aristocrats of the Torguud traced descent from the Khereid (Kereyid) Van (Ong) Khan. It seems that the word *turkhaguud* [those of *turkhag*] was shaped and formed into Torguud. The term *turkhag* or *turag* meant 'large-bodied'. In earlier times the imperial guards who protected a khan's palace and person were referred to in this way. Sometime in the 1420s, when Amgalan, lord of the Torguud came from the area of Bökhmörön and joined the Oirat Togoon Taishi, Togoon gave him fifty of his own subject households and his daughter's hand in marriage. Thus, in the beginning of the fifteenth century the Khoshuud and Torguud joined the Oirats. At first, since they lacked size and strength, they were attached to the Choros.

The lord of the Khoid was the descendant of Khutuga Bekh of the early Oirat. The sources mention that the offspring of Khutuga Bekh had married queens from Chinggis Khan's Golden Line for three successive generations, thus their 'bones (*yas* – lineage/descent) were whitened [elevated] and they became lords of the white standard (*tsagaan tug*)'. The Khoid consisted of four *otogs*: the Ikh Myangan, Öl Tümen, Alag Gulz and Tsagaan Tug.

Batuud is a shortened version of the plural form of the word *baatar* (hero). Initially this *aimag* was part of the military structure. The Tümed had lived next to Oirats from the end of the twelfth century. The historical sources state that they dwelt near the Altai region in the fifteenth century, and that some were part of the Oirat political structure. It is known that Togoon and Esen controlled the area from the mouth of the river Selenge to lake Baikal, and that the Barga and Buriads were also part of the Oirat establishment for some period of time. The term 'Ör Mongol' is the result of moving from the East Mongol region and joining the Oirats.

In the early fifteenth century the Four Oirat were divided into two 'hands' or sections; the Züün Gar (east/left hand) was controlled by Alagtömör of the Asud and the Baruun Gar (west/right hand) under Khatantömör of the Baatuud.

After the death of Esen Khaan, Alagtömör Chinsan of the Asud, who lived near the river Zavkhan with Esen Khaan's former queen Jimes and her eldest son Khorgodos, was defeated by his enemies and died not long after that. Esen Khaan's elder brother, Bat Van, took his descendants and subjects, and moved to pastures near Khami (Hami). However, Oshtömör, one of Esen's sons, ruled the rest of the Oirat population, living in

the Altai mountain region. Oshtömör set out to control the route from his domains to China, trying to reinvade the regions of Ordos and Khökh Nuur, which had once been controlled by the Oirat, and clashing with East Mongol lords. He died in 1478. After Oshtömör, the Oirat were ruled by Kheshig Örlög (*örlög* – paladin/marshal), who tried to make contact with the ‘Three Guards’ Uriankhai and died in 1486. He was succeeded by Arkhan. However, a group of nobles proclaimed a rival, named Ashig, as ‘Grand Preceptor of All’ (*khamag taish*), and the two rulers clashed militarily. This led to Arkhan Chinsan invading the Barkhöl region.

One of the Choros lords, together with a noble named Bürenayalguu, conquered the lands of Tsagaan and Aldar. They named the subject *aimag* that they had conquered ‘Ööld’. It is thought that the term Ööld meant ‘expanded’ or ‘large-bodied’. In this way a separate Oirat *aimag* split off from the Choros. Some East Mongol *aimags* (described as the Ör Mongol) that had been forced to join the Oirat earlier, split away in the last half of the fifteenth century, as Oirat power began to weaken, and by the end of the century the Ööld began to be called the One Oirat (*neg Oirat*).

The internal warfare between Oirat lords for power and subjects increased and in the middle of the 1490s war broke out between the Ööld and Choros. In the early sixteenth century the Uighurs of Turfan took advantage of these internal conflicts to attack the Ööld, the majority of whom fled to the west. The sources record that ‘the Ööld. . . went without trace and disappeared into Kizilbashid’.⁶

The population and livestock of the Oirat Khoshuud and Torguud *aimags* increased in the sixteenth century. The economic power of the greater lords expanded, and they became increasingly independent, shrugging off the direct control of Choros rulers. On the one hand the centralized administration of the past began to weaken, and on other hand, the Oirats in the west began to become increasingly oriented towards the Middle East. This led to the Barga and Buriads breaking away from Oirat administration. The Khoshuud and Torguud, under the direct administration of Choros, also became independent. In addition, another of the sons of Esen Khaan, Borganal, split from the Choros, naming his own *aimag* the ‘Dörvöd’.



As their economic power and wealth in livestock increased, the Mongolian aristocracy became more and more determined to be independent and escape the control of others. The end of the sixteenth century saw these lords increasingly independent of central control, often moving to other pastures so as to be more independent. These movements reflected their desire to escape the continuing war and chaos, and a wish to focus on animal husbandry. Furthermore, during that period of turmoil aristocrats ran the risk of defeat and dispossession and were sometimes unable to pass on their property and positions to their children and succeeding generations. These concerns weighed heavily on the minds of the nobility.

At the end of the sixteenth and the start of the seventeenth century, the struggles between the Oirat and East Mongol intensified still further, the frequency of military clashes increased, and the Oirats were pushed towards the Altai by the resurgent East Mongols.

However, the Oirats were also under pressure from the west by the Kazakh *khaan* and his sultans, who began to mount military campaigns against them. The Oirats were divided internally into the West and East wings, and each of these wings divided into smaller estates under their respective lords. This could lead to fragmentation, and made

it difficult to simultaneously wage war on two fronts – west and east. This made the Oirats vulnerable to frequent attacks and increased their losses. Some historical sources state that, in the year 1587, Sholoi Ubashi, the ruler of the Baruun Gar (west/right hand) of the Khalkh, attacked the Oirat and chased them as far as the valley of the river Erchis (Irtys). In 1588 the rulers of Turfan attacked the Oirat and pushed them to the east, and furthermore, the Oirats were defeated in battle by the Kazakhs. Fleeing attacks in this way, the Oirat people were forced to migrate to distant lands and suffered great loss of life. Some scholars believe that the Choros, fleeing from attacks by Altan Khaan and Sholoi Ubashi in 1587, moved as far as the Erchis, the Ijil (Volga), and Khökh Nuur. The Khoids were dwelling in the Kunga river valley in 1552, but by 1587 they had already reached the Erchis river.

However, the Oirat's livestock wealth increased slowly but steadily and they became increasingly interested in expanding their pasture lands. They were unable to gain access to the Chinese and East Asian markets, and they were facing losses as a result of continuous resistance from Mogolistan (Moghulistan), as well as from Khazakh rulers. Furthermore, internal conflicts also intensified. These internal and external factors promoted chaos and instability in Oirat society. In this climate some of the greater Oirat lords tried to resolve the ongoing crises by moving away from the battlefield.

In the mid-1590s several Khoshuud lords took control of some Khami and Turfan territories, dwelling near Barkhöl (Barkol) and Ürümch (Urumchi). Kho Örlög of the Torguud, son of Buikhu Örlög, took his one *tümen* and five thousand households and, in 1607, moved to the area called Oryn Gags Mod to the north-west of the Khovog Sair (Hoboksar) and Emeel areas. Smaller lords who resisted the Choros rulers took their subjects and followed Kho Örlög, and so in a few years there were around forty thousand households under Torguud rule. Kho Örlög moved still further. When he reached the middle of the river Erchis he sent envoys to the Ijil river to explore the territory, and in 1620 moved again to the Emba on the Ijil. After this a number of Khoshuud, Züüngar (Zünghar), Khoid and Dörvöd lords took their subjects and also moved to the Ijil river to join the Torguud.

In the early seventeenth century Buddhism spread to the Oirat, and this began to have an effect on their ideological unity.

NOTES

1. *Van li khaany tsergiin gaviyaany temdegdel* [Notes on the military achievements of Van Li Khaan] L. Jamsran (trans.) UTNS: 41.
2. *Tod üsgiin dursgaluud* [Monuments in clear script]. Ulaanbaatar 1976: 379; *Oiradyn tüükhen bichmel* [Historical Writings of the Oirat]. Khökh Khot 1986: 307.
3. *Oirad tüükhen survalj* [Oirat Historical Sources]: 379.
4. *Dörvön oiradyn tüükh tuuj khemeekh tuuj orshiv* [Collection of historical documents on the Oirat] (clear script manuscript), ShUA, KhZ institute.
5. *Oirad tüükhen survalj* [Oirat Historical Sources]: 307; *Tod üsgiin dursgaluud* [Monuments in clear script]. Ulaanbaatar 1976: 337.
6. *Dörvön oiradyn tüükh tuuj khemeekh tuuj orshiv* [Collection of historical documents on the Oirat]: 337.

THE JEWEL TRANSLUCENT SŪTRA

Altan Khan and the Mongols in the Sixteenth Century

Johan Elverskog



- [794] When the Son of Heaven, majestic, great, brilliant Altan Khan,
[795] Heard that the unparalleled, meritorious Dalai Lama was coming,
[796] He rejoiced with supreme reverent faith.
[797] Immediately he sent his welcoming party of lords and officials.
- [798] From the Ordos Tümen Sechen Khung Taiji,¹ Sechen Daiching,² and Üijeng
Jongtulai;³
[799] From the Supreme Tümen, Namudai Sechen Khung Taiji, Lord Dayan,⁴
Lord Bayuud⁵ and Daiching Ejei;
[800] And especially from the Yüngsiyebü's Kharchin, Bargu⁶ Sechen Daiching
Taiji,⁷
[801] Were sent, and the welcoming parties proceeded in succession.⁸
- [802] [Altan Khan sent] all those lords, worthies and officials to meet [the Dalai
Lama],
[803] And gave them jewels, gold and a silver mandala,⁹ with
[804] A perfection of gifts of many goods and chattels,
[805] Which were placed on horses with golden saddles and bridles.
- [806] Immediately the vanguard welcoming party arrived at Khaluun Usun.
[807] Then the middle welcoming party arrived at Gün Ergi.
[808] Then the last welcoming party arrived at Khaluun Usun.¹⁰
[809] [They] offered their gifts to the majesty of the evenly All-knowing Dalai
Lama, and prostrating themselves they said,
- [810] "To all the samgha and especially the famous, protector, meritorious Dalai
Lama,
[811] The satisfier of sentient beings' desires,¹¹ the glorious
[812] True essence of all supreme knowledge respected by all two-legged beings,¹²
[813] An emanation by which you help everyone with everything.
- [814] The monks and samgha in all its divisions,

- [815] Thinking benevolently to help beings, and being compassionate in this direction,
 [816] Oh, indeed, have you come in this direction without delay,
 [817] Without suffering, indeed peacefully, stable and properly?"
- [818] The All-knowing Dalai Lama spoke thus,
 [819] "With the protection of the wonderful Three Jewels we came peacefully.
 [820] Are the Khan, Queen and greater and lesser lords well?"
 [821] After having met one another and inquired about their health,
- [822] The Dalai Lama said to Dayan Kiya and the translator Bombu Sanding,
 [823] "When you arrive at the Supreme Great Khan speak my words thus:
 [824] 'My sign of us two meeting one another with pleasure,
 [825] Is that we meet together on a good day, the fifteenth day of the fifth month,' " then sent them off.
- [826] When the dispatched envoys came they explained fully to the majesty of the Khan,
 [827] The words of the Clear Holy Dalai Lama.
 [828] The Perpetual Khan and Queen leading the Great Nation approved [to meet]
 [829] On a good day, in particular, the fifteenth day of the fifth month of the Wu Tiger Year.¹³
- [830] To the east of Kökenuur and west of Chabchiyal Monastery,
 [831] Reverently the All-knowing Meritorious Dalai Lama and the incarnation of Sodnam Dagma,¹⁴
 [832] Together with all of the Buddha Samgha as desired arrived.
 [833] Dharma Altan Khan and Queen Jönggen arrived, leading the Five Colored Nations,
- [834] With minds overflowing with faith and belief,
 [835] [They] worshipped and prostrated themselves with absolute unshakable reverence,
 [836] To the vajra-emblazoned sole of the Crown Jewel Holy Dalai Lama's foot.
 [837] Continuously offering many types of alms, they said,
- [838] "All-knowing Holy Dalai Lama, who is at the head of all,
 [839] Indeed, all the divisions of Buddhist Samgha,
 [840] Whose holy mind never fears returning, nor never tires
 [841] Of thinking of helping all beings, peace be on you."
- [842] The one whose wisdom and merit are perfect,
 [843] In the three infinite eons,
 [844] The incarnation of Ārya Avalokiteśvara,
 [845] The Incomparable Meritorious Dalai Lama spoke.
- [846] "With the blessing of the Three Supreme Jewels,
 [847] In order to spread the unparalleled religion of the Buddha,

- [848] Not being exhausted, tired, or anything else,
 [849] We meet one another in stable peace.”
- [850] The Alms-master and the Offering-site met one another!
 [851] The tenets of their minds were entirely in harmony!
 [852] They celebrated with very joyous Dharma festivities!
 [853] Seeing and hearing this, beings were amazed and shared the enjoyment!
- [854] On that occasion the Khan’s body became a little bit feverish.
 [855] Because they requested it, the All-knowing Dalai Lama
 [856] Immediately deigned [to give] an empowerment of the Immeasurably
 Accomplished Queen Mother.¹⁵
 [857] Thereupon he gave the empowerment of four deeds: peaceful, expanding,
 powerful and fearsome.¹⁶
- [858] In order to repulse the curse and demons,
 [859] To satisfy the minds of all the protectors who support the Dharma,
 [860] The outstanding beneficial Ganjur and Danjur at the head of all the
 scriptures were recited.
 [861] Then threw away the torma of the wonderful Maiden Goddess.¹⁷
- [862] Also simultaneously many other actions were taken.
 [863] When the joyful Khan’s fever abated,
 [864] In body, speech and mind, he had great faith.
 [865] Rejoicing, all the Great Nation also began to believe.
- [866] At that time, the All-knowing Holy Dalai Lama and
 [867] Those incarnated lamas and all the monks together
 [868] Gave blessings and preached the Three Vehicle¹⁸ Dharma without hesitation,
 [869] Until they sounded forth in the ten directions like the sound of dragons.
- [870] The Khan and Queen together with the Five Colored Nations presented, a
 gold mandala made of one hundred staters,
 [871] A wonderful silver bowl made of a thousand staters and other things;
 [872] And offered jade, crystal and various types of jewels, gold, silver, and many
 garments.
 [873] And offered large and fine western horses appropriately equipped with gold
 saddles and bridles,
- [874] At the head of innumerably many numbers of camels, horses, mules, oxen
 and sheep,
 [875] That had been selected. Offering in the numbers of hundreds, thousands,
 and ten thousands;
 [876] and offering the perfect alms of all kinds of utilities;
 [877] [Thus they] had [their] father and mother, at the head of all beings blessed in
 the holy direction.
- [878] From the Dalai Lama the Khan, Queen and the entire Great Nation,

- [879] Immediately heard of the benefits of the precepts and vows.
 [880] And heard of the teaching power of the Supreme Sūtra, Tantra and History Vehicles;¹⁹
 [881] Of the many benefits of hearing, thinking and contemplating [the Dharma].²⁰
- [882] Faith and reverence was produced in everyone led by the wonderful Dharma's Altan Khan.
 [883] Then the errors of the non-Buddhist spirit dolls and fetishes²¹ were burned.²²
 [884] The mad and stupid shamans were annihilated and the shamanesses humiliated.
 [885] The State of the Supreme Dharma became like a silk protection cord.²³
- [886] From his own Golden Clan, he had the son²⁴ of Bayud Taiji,²⁵ with
 [887] One hundred and eight²⁶ from the great Twelve Tümeds be ordained as monks and novices.²⁷
 [888] When they decisively entered into the religion with a truly firm mind,
 [889] Then the Forty Tümen Mongols revered the Dalai Lama and each one individually entered into [the religion].
- [890] Meeting each other at Chabchiyal Monastery on the fifteenth day of the fifth month,²⁸ and respecting the religion,
 [891] They presented up for distribution an infinite amount of perfect alms.
 [892] Truly entering into the white merits,²⁹ the greater and lesser lords issued laws,
 [893] and made many people become monks and novices,
- [894] The All-knowing Sodnam Gyatsho, the Meritorious Dalai Lama,
 [895] Who with his wonderful holy speech, like one thousand beams of light,
 [896] Opens the lotus flower of the mind's darkness and ignorance,
 [897] And contracts as a lotus flower the hostile heresy and the wrong. With the incarnation of Sodnam Dagba, and
- [898] The Lama, an incarnation of Manjusri,³⁰
 [899] And all together the vast assembly of the Buddhist Samgha.
 [900] Together with the Foremost Altan Khan of the Dharma, with the greater and lesser lords,
 [901] Surely just as before they had honored each other with titles of Alms-master and Offering-site,
- [902] The Khan, with all the lords, glorified the All-knowing Dalai Lama
 [903] As Wonderful, Vajradhara, Good and Glorious, Meritorious Ocean,³¹ and presented him with a golden seal.³²
 [904] The outstanding incarnated Lama of Tongkhor Lama was offered the title Mañjuśrī Khutugtu.
 [905] And indeed the incarnated Lama of Sodnam Dagba was offered the title Maitreya Khutugtu.
 [906] Saying, "For long ago doing the pure meritorious deed of initiating the recollection

- [907] of the religion,” Asing Lama was given the title Father Lama.
 [908] And because he led the effort of inviting the very Holy Dalai Lama,
 [909] Taglung Nangso was treated with benevolence and given the title Daiching Darkhan Nangso.
- [910] The Holy Dalai Lama, and the other three Holy Ones, presented to the
 Supporting Altan Sechen Khan the title
 [911] All-Brahma, Great, Powerful, Cakravartin King of the Dharma,³³ and
 presented him with a silver seal.
 [912] They bestowed the title Ārya Tāra, incarnation of the Bodhisattva Tāra, on
 the Destined Queen Noyanchu Jönggen.³⁴
 [913] They collected in writing all the titles and ranks given to each of the lords
 of the Three Tümen.
- [914] And, Bayan Bagsi, was titled “Trilingual in Sanskrit, Tibetan and
 Mongolian,”
 [915] And for interpreting and translating the joyous Buddha’s Dharma,
 [916] Bagsi Ayushi³⁵ received the title Ānanda Mañjuśrī Güüši, and was made first
 among the teachers.
 [917] Also because he set in motion without mistake the actions of the Dharma
 and the world,
- [918] Kitadai received the title Üijeng Sechen Khonjin, and he was made the first
 among ministers.
 [919] Since he had done his best for the religion, by inviting the Truly All-knowing
 [920] Holy Dalai Lama, the Buddha Samgha, Ganjur and Danjur, scriptures and
 the Buddha,
 [921] Sarmani³⁶ received the title Uran Tangarag³⁷ Dayan Kiya, and was made a
 Great Darkhan.
- [922] Because Üijeng Jaisang had passed away doing his best for the religion,
 [923] Of his many sons, Sering, with great tenderness received the title Üijeng
 Jaisang.
 [924] And because he had continued to do his best while inviting the Dalai Lama,
 [925] He received the title Sambudhara, and was made a Great Darkhan.
- [926] By the blessing of previous merit,
 [927] They met one another in order to spread the religion like the rising sun.
 [928] Once again they became Alms-master and Offering-site, and
 [929] Thus it was that they bestowed titles on one another.³⁸
- [930] The Supreme, Vajradhara, Good and Glorious, Meritorious Dalai Lama
 spoke,
 [931] “By the power of previously accumulated merit and blessing,
 [932] And [by] the blessing of the powerful Juu Sakyamuni,
 [933] We two have now met. In order to achieve the two customs
- [934] We need to offer up a mandala before Juu Sakyamuni.”

- [935] The Great, Blissful, Powerful Cakravartin Altan Khan and everyone else
 [936] Produced a great faith and reverence and therefore agreed.
 [937] [They] then made a splendid mandala of a thousand staters.
- [938] The famous Brahma, Very Mighty Cakravartin Altan Khan of the Dharma
 sent
 [939] Father Lama, named Asing, and Dorje Bagshi to give
 [940] Perfect alms of every type
 [941] To the majesty of the Pure Tathāgata Juu Sakyamuni.
- [942] Afterwards, the Perfect, Brahma, Very Mighty Cakravartin Altan Khan of
 the Dharma said
 [943] To the majesty of the All-knowing Vajradhara Dalai Lama,
 [944] “Oh, Vajradhara Dalai Lama who knows all things equally, deign to
 consider [my question].
 [945] Is not the Buddha Teacher’s preaching of sūtras and tantras innumerable?
- [946] If this is the case, is there any [teaching] that collects in one the true nature of
 all
 [947] Teachings and gives one the blessedness of a Complete Buddha³⁹ quickly?”
 [948] Then the All-knowing Vajradhara Dalai Lama replied,
 [949] “[Indeed], the teachings preached by the Completely Victorious Buddha
 Teacher are innumerable!
- [950] Ah! Yet in this case the Buddha’s blessedness can be found on the short path.
 [951] This is the unparalleled pure Secret Tantra Vajrayāna.”⁴⁰
 [952] Altan Khan said, “We’ve heard that previously Phagpa Lama
 [953] Bestowed on our Supreme Sechen Khan the empowerment of the famous
 Hevajra mandala.”⁴¹
- [954] To what does the Hevajra empowerment belong?”
 [955] The Evenly All-knowing Holy Dalai Lama responded,
 [956] “The Hevajra empowerment that you speak of
 [957] Is an empowerment of the unparalleled Secret Tantra Vajrayāna.”⁴²
- [958] Altan Khan then with his pure faith and reverence spoke respectfully,
 [959] “Oh! All-knowing Vajradhara Dalai Lama, since according to tradition
 [960] Previously Phagpa Lama bestowed the famous Hevajra
 [961] Empowerment on our Supreme Sechen Khan,
- [962] Will you now bestow it on me?”
 [963] The Supreme All-knowing Vajradhara Dalai Lama replied,
 [964] “Mighty Great Khan, your statement is very correct.
 [965] It is true that before Phagpa Lama bestowed the Hevajra empowerment on
 Sechen Khan.
- [966] Being able to guard this vow as you would protect the pupil of your eye,
 [967] Marvelously spreading the Buddha’s religion,

- [968] Evenly organizing the state of the world,
 [969] In this way we will accordingly become Alms-master and Offering-site.
- [970] Therefore, now for you Great Khan, I will perfect myself for
 [971] The empowerment of the unparalleled Secret Tantra Vajrayāna,
 [972] And bestow it on the Khan, Queen and all the believers.”

NOTES

1. Sechen Khung Taiji (1540–1586), also known as Khutugtai Sechen Khung Taiji, was the eldest son of Khoua Taiji, a grandson of Gün Bilig Mergen Jinong. He was involved in many campaigns, particularly against the Oirad (in 1562, 1572, 1574), and also against northern Tibet in 1566. It was during this campaign into Tibet that the *ET*, written by his grandson Sagang Sechen, reports that Sechen Khung Taiji was reportedly converted to Buddhism; however, the veracity of this claim is dubious since it seems his interest began earlier. Nevertheless, it is clear that Sechen Khung Taiji was a Buddhist and as an advisor to his uncle Altan Khan did become involved in Tibeto-Mongol relations. Yet he was also engaged in Sino-Mongol relations, thus during the 1570 peace negotiations, Noyandara Jinong sent Sechen Khung Taiji to the court of Altan Khan in order to insure markets and tribute relations for the Ordos Mongols. On account of Wang Chonggu's 王崇古 argument in support of Ordos markets, the court conceded, and in recognition of Sechen Khung Taiji's work and vigilance in maintaining the peace he was made a Manager of the Market (Zhuzhang 主張). In 1571 he was given the rank *Zhihui qianshi* 指揮僉事, and in 1579 the rank *Longhu jiangjun* 龍虎將軍. In accordance with Sechen Khung Taiji's political life, he is also attributed as the redactor of the famous *White History*, a manual outlining the Tibeto-Mongol theory of rule through the two spheres of Religion and State (*DMB* 1128–1131; Serruys 1975: 251).
2. Sechen Daiching, also known as Bursai Sechen Daiching, is the second son of Buyanggulai-dugar Daiching, Mergen Jinong's fifth son. He was born in 1546 (*GTDDQ* 45–46; *AQTm* 112 n. 2).
3. Üjeng Jaisang, was the second son of Banjar-a Üjeng Noyan, Mergen Jinong's sixth son. He was a secretary-commandant and lived near Shenmu 神木. In 1590 he moved to the vicinity of Changning Lake 昌寧湖. He had six children (*GTDDQ* 58–59; *AQTm* 112 n. 3).
4. Lord Dayan, also known as Dayan Khung Taiji, is the grandson of Arsu Bolod, Dayan Khan's fourth son (*GTDDQ* 45–46; *AQTm* 112 n. 5).
5. Bayuud Noyan (d. 1591) was Altan Khan's second son, from his first wife Yeke Khatun. His appanage was the Bayuud, a small clan among the Tümed. He had his pasturage northwest of the borders of Yanghe 陽和 in the Datong 大同 district. He also had a market at Shoukou Fort 守口堡. He had one son Bayuud Baatur Taiji (see note 18) (*GTDDQ* 70; Heissig 1962: 24; *AQTm* 112 n. 6).
6. The Barga are a clan within the Yüngsiyebü (*AQTc* 109 n. 7).
7. Sechen Daiching Taiji is Engkeder Daiching's son, the son of Bojidara, Altan Khan's younger brother (*AQTm* 113 n. 1; *AQTc* 109–110 n. 8).
8. This tri-partite division of the welcoming parties is also recorded in the two other major sources for these events, the *ET* and the *DL3*. In these two sources the groups consisted of the following: (*AQTj* 348; Okada 1992a: 646)

ETS

#1 Yüngsiyebü's Baryu Dayicing
 Ordos' Qatan Bayatur
 Tümed's Maqacin Baysi

DL3

Bar-khu Tha'i-ji
 Bā-thur of the Yöng-sha-bu
 Kha-tan Bā-dur

#2 Ordos' Cing Bayatur

Tümed's Joriy-tu Noyan

#3 Ordos' Secen Qong Tayiji

Tümed's Dayan Noyan

Se-chen Hong Tha'i-ji of the Ur-bsdus

Da-yan No-yon of the Mthu-mid

Jo-rug-thu Tha'i-ji

Ching Bā-dur

It is therefore clear that all three sources are in disagreement, and it is therefore uncertain as to how these parties were actually organized. Perhaps the *ETS*, being the oldest source, is the most accurate.

9. The *DL3* records that Altan Khan gave the Third Dalai Lama a silver mandala made of 500 srang of silver (*AQTg* 291).
10. Jürungga has identified each of these three locations: Khaluun Usun "Warm Springs" is a place in Qinghai 青海 on the south bank of the Qushman River 曲什安河, called Wenquan 溫泉. Gün Ergi "Steep Bank," is the Haerji Range 哈爾吉嶺 on the northside of the Qushman River 曲什安河. The second Khaluun Usun, is another place named Wenquan to the southwest of Qinghai's Xinghai 興海 (*AQTm* 114 n. 2; *AQTc* 110 n. 2). However, as with the composition of the three welcoming parties, the two other sources *ET* and *DL3*, both offer different locations for each of these three stops (*AQTj* 347) and it is therefore difficult to determine where these events took place.
11. "The satisfier of sentient being's desires" is a description of one of a Bodhisattva's worldly activities (Skt. *upāya-kauśalya-pāramitā*), namely, ensuring the wealth and prosperity of Buddhist devotees (*AQTg* 293 n. 461).
12. This is a reference to a Bodhisattva's "skillful means," in that he adapts his teaching of the Dharma to the capacity of his audience, thereby ensuring that all will understand and respect it (*AQTg* 293 n. 463).
13. The Wu 戈 Tiger Year was 1578. Why the author here uses a Chinese calendrical term and not a color term, as elsewhere, is unclear. It may possibly derive from one of the sources, "the bits and pieces," the author used in writing this history.
14. Bsod-nams grags-pa (1478–1554) was the abbot of 'Bras-spung, and also of Dga'-ldan between 1529 and 1535. After he stepped down as abbot he lived at 'Bras-spung and was the Third Dalai Lama's teacher. His incarnation was Bsod-nams ye-shes dbang-po, who is most likely the one referred to herein (*AQTj* 350). In the *ETS* he is given the title Maitreya Khutugtu, yet this is not to be confused with the other famous Maitreya Khutugtu who came to Hohhot in 1604 (see section 5 n 58).
15. The deity referred to by the Mongolian title Queen Mother, *Eke Qatun*, is unclear; it could be the female Amitayus or Tāra.
16. The "four deeds" relate to virtuous activity (karma) that results in Buddha's grace, "synonymous with the virtue, merits or positive energy received through the blessings of Buddha and his teachings" (Rigzin 1986: 273). There are four types: activity of peace (*śānticāra*), activity of increase (*vipulacāra*), activity of power (*bhāgyacāra*), activity of wrath (*raudracāra*). Das (*TED* 854) records that the four kinds of religious service are "milder worship, abundant service, religious service to obtain power, and terrific methods in coercing a deity by charms" (*AQTg* 296 n. 478).
17. The "Maiden Goddess" refers to Dpal-ldan lha-mo, the chief guardian of the Tibetan Buddhist pantheon and the main protector of the Dge-lugs-pa lineage (Nebesky-Wojkowitz 1958: 22–37). The ritual being performed here involves capturing the evil spirit/demon/illness in a torma (T. *gtor-ma*), a ritual cake, through the recitation and performance of a particular ritual text (Kohn 1997).
18. The Three Vehicles refers to the classification of Buddhist teachings/traditions used by Tibetan Buddhist scholastics, Hinayāna (the "Little Vehicle"), Mahāyāna (the "Great Vehicle") and Vajrayāna (the "Diamond Vehicle"). In current usage, the derogatory "Little Vehicle" (< Ch. Xiaocheng 小乘) is more often identified as the Nikāya ("schools") tradition.
19. The identity of the "History Vehicle" (M. *tañjuji kölgén*) is unclear; however, it is possible to

conjecture that it refers to the *jātaka* and *avadana* tales that describe the previous lives of the Buddha and his disciples.

20. This refers to the three types of wisdom (T. *shes-rab rnam-pa gsum*): hearing (T. *thos-pa*), thinking (T. *bsam-pa*) and contemplation (T. *bsgom-pa*) (AQTj 355).
21. The spirit dolls (M. *ongyud*) and fetishes (M. *celig*) noted here are references to images used in pre-Buddhist Mongolian religious practices. These images were representations of sacred spirits of the earth (mountains, rivers, etc.) or humans (deceased shamans, ancestors, etc.) that needed to be ritualized in order to maintain social harmony, cure illness, etc. (Heissig 12–14; Tatár 1985).
22. This Buddhist “inquisition” is also recorded in the *DL3* (fol. 96, AQTg 299), and in 1578 after his meeting with the Dalai Lama, Altan Khan made a proclamation that outlawed all non-Buddhist religious practices (Schuleman 1958: 113–114), one that was incorporated into later Mongol legal codes (Riasanovsky 1965: 92; Heuschert (1998). In particular it banned the owning and performance of bloody sacrifices to the spirit dolls that were the seat of various spiritual beings. What these bloody rituals entailed is not clear, although Xiao Daheng 蕭大亨 in his *Bei lu feng su* 北慮風俗 of 1602, stated that they included the sacrifice of slaves and animals (Serruys 1945: 135). Subsequently, Buddhist monks in order to eradicate these practices engaged in violent purges of their own, especially the burning of these spirit dolls (Heissig 1953).
23. This phrase refers to the representation of the religious aspect (*śāsin*) of the Two Realms (*qoyar yosun*) as it is found in the *White History*. In this manual of statecraft, the two interrelated spheres of power, Religion and State, are described in the following terms:

The Root of the Supreme Teaching, the Lord of the Dharma, is the Lama.
The Head of the Great State, ruler of the World, is the Khan.
The law of the true Dharma is as indissoluble as a silken knot.
The law of the respected Khan is as invincible as a golden yoke. (CT83)

This passage thus reflects the fact that after a Buddhist State had been created, the Dharma acted as a silken protection cord for the empire (on the legal implications of this state of affairs, see French 1995).

24. This is Bayud Baatur Taiji's fifth son, who became a monk. He is known as Lama Taiji (GTDDQ 73; AQTm 122 n. 1).
25. Bayud Baatur Taiji is the son of Bayud Noyan, Altan Khan's second son. He lived north of Tiancheng 天城 and Yanghe 陽和. In 1573 he became an assistant commandant. He was also considered loyal to the Chinese and is said to have studied the *Zhongjing* 忠經 and *Xiaojing* 孝經. Nevertheless, after the Mongol Buddhist conversion, he apparently became a devout follower and sponsor of Buddhist works. He is recorded as the sponsor of the famous 1591 edition of the *Suvarṇaprabhāsa Sūtra* (PLB 31; Heissig 1971: 204–206) and in the same year a four-language *Mañjuśrīnāmasaṃgīti* (Heissig 1962: 23–24; Ligeti 1965: 130–156). Two steles at the Huayan Monastery 華嚴寺 (Grootaers 1995: 22, 41) also identify Baatur Taiji as a donor (GTDDQ 101–102; Serruys 1962a: 363 n. 1, 365–368).
26. How many were ordained at this time is not certain since the number 108 is standard sacred number in the Buddhist tradition (as seen in the 108 volumes of the Bka'-gyur, and 108 beads of the rosary, etc.). The *DL3* (fol. 97) notes that like Khri Srong-lde'u-bstan, Altan Khan had 100 princes ordained (AQTg 299).
27. The difference between these two titles refers to the ordination level of the monk. “Entry into the monastic *Sangha* is by two stages. From the age of seven or eight, a child can take the lower ordination, or ‘going forth’ (*pabbajjā*), so as to become a *sāmaṇera* (female, *sāmaṇerī*): a ‘little samaṇa’ or novice [M. bandi]. These undertake the ten precepts. When aged twenty (from conception), a person can take higher ordination or ‘admission’ (*upasampadā*) as a *bhikhu* or *bhikhunī* [M. toyin]” (Harvey 1990: 220). On these different ordination rites in Mongolia see Pozdneyev (1978:176–190).
28. Corresponds to June 19, 1578 (AQTg 300 n. 506).

29. The white merits are ten in number 1) not killing, 2) not stealing, 3) not indulging in sexual misconduct, 4) not lying, 5) not slandering, 6) not using harsh words, 7) not indulging in idle gossip, 8) not being covetous, 9) not harming others, 10) not holding the wrong view. (Rigzin 1986: 54).
30. Yon-tan rgya-mtsho (1557–1587) was the second incarnated lama at Stong-'khor Monastery in the vicinity of Xining 西寧 in Qinghai 青海, who was recognized as an incarnation of Mañjuśrī. He was appointed by the Third Dalai Lama to be a representative, or liaison officer, between 'Bras-spungs and Altan Khan's court during the Dalai Lama's absence (AQTc 119 n. 1; Schulemann 1958: 211; Shakabpa 1967: 96–97).
31. This is a translation of the Third Dalai Lama's Tibetan title, Rdo-rje-chang Bsod-nams rgya-mtsho dpal-bzang-po. Often the meaning of "Dalai" is interpreted as a metaphor for the lama's wisdom, which is as deep as the ocean. However, the Mongolian term Dalai, "ocean," is itself simply a direct translation of his Tibetan name (i.e. "Meritorious Ocean," M. buyan-tu dalai < T. bsod-nam rgya-mtsho).
32. The DL3 notes that the Dalai Lama was given a gold seal with a handle consisting of a five-clawed dragon, and inscribed in 'Phags-pa script with his title, *rdo-rje-'chang ta-la'i bla-ma'i tham-ka*, "The Seal of Vajradhara Dalai Lama" (AQTj 358; Schuh 1981: 5–7; Ou and Qimei 1991: 47).
33. The title King of the Dharma (M. *nom-un qayan*) is based on the Tibetan *chos-kyi rgyal-po*, itself a translation of the Sanskrit *Dharmarāja*.
34. In several Buddhist colophons Noyanchu Jönggen, who sponsored the translations, is also identified as an incarnation of Tāra (Heissig 1975: 362–365; Serruys 1974/75: 236).
35. Bagsi Ayushi, also known as Bayan Bagsi and Ayushi Güüsi, is well-known as the creator of the new *ali kali* (T. ā li kā li) alphabet and as a translator of Buddhist works. The *ali kali* alphabet, which was produced in consultation with the Dalai Lama during his visit to the Kharchins in 1587, arose out of the realization that the old Mongolian script could not accurately represent the Sanskrit sounds needed for *dhāraṇīs* to be effective. In order to remedy this problem Ayushi Guosi therefore invented many new graphs that could accurately transcribe all the Sanskrit and Tibetan phonemes (Aalto 1954: 40–41; Heissig 1954a: 106–107). In the colophons of the St. Petersburg manuscript Kanjur (Kas'jenko 1993), he is identified as the translator of eleven sūtras (AQTg 302–303). Heissig has also identified him as the translator of the *Sitāpatra Sūtra*, *Qutuγtu caγan sikūrtei orusiba* (PLB 29–30 #21; Heissig 1954a: 107; Walther Heissig 1957: 72); and *Qara kelen neretü sudur*, "Sūtra Against Slander," a work intended to take care of curses and fraud (BMN 0240; PLB 38 #41; Heissig 1954a: 108).
36. Sarmani is apparently the birth name of Altan Khan's adopted son, who is identified throughout this work and others simply by his title Dayan Kiya. Sarmani derives from the Sanskrit śrāmaṇa, "monk" (AQTj 362).
37. "Uran Tanggarig, literally 'crafty oath,' is the Mongolian name for Mgar stong btsan yul srang, the wise prime minister who served King Srong btsan sgam po of Tibet" (Okada 1992: 647). He is most noted for traveling to China to win the hand of Princess Wenchang for the Tibetan emperor. Herein, Dayan Kiya presumably receives the title for carrying out a similar task, namely bringing the Dalai Lama to Mongolia.
38. The ET (77v12–25) reports that the following titles were given: Altan Khan received the title *Mingyan altan kürdün-i ergigülgci zakravar-d secen qayan*, "Cakravartin Secen Khan who turns the 1000 [spoked] golden cakra;" Boshugtu Jinong was given the title *Zakravardi secen jinong qasi qan*; Khutugtai Sechen Khung Taiji was recognized as a reincarnation of Bimbisāra, the king of Maghada, and given his name as a title *Coycas-un jirüken secen qong tayiji* (< T. *Gzugs-can snying-po* (Mostaert 1957: 551 n. 48)). Sechen Daiching was given the title *Gsarjal [secen] dayicing*; Vcir Tümei Khonjin, the title *Gündinggüi ong qonjin*; Asing Lama, the title *Ecige Lama*; Sgumi Baγsi, the title *Bsoga qonjin*; and Ayushi Baγsi, the title *Ananda güisi*.

39. The translation “Complete Buddha” is based on the Mongolian *Tegülder Burqan*, however, the terms *tegülder*, *tuγuluγsan*, and *tegüsiügsen* all translate the Tibetan term *rdzogs-pa*, and thus this title refers to the “Completely Gone-Beyond Buddha” (*AQTj* 364).
40. A common theme in Tibetan Buddhism is that while all other Buddhist teachings can lead one to enlightenment, tantric practice can bring one enlightenment quickly: in one lifetime as opposed to thousands of rebirths. At the same time it is stressed that on account of this practice being powerful it is also very dangerous.
41. According to the biography of 'Phags-pa bla-ma this initiation took place at Khubilai Khan's court in 1258 (Schuh 1977: 91), and it is mentioned in the colophon of a short eulogy written by 'Phags-pa bla-ma dedicated to the goddesses of the *Hevajra maṇḍala* (Szerb 1985: 166). This initiation is often identified as the beginning of the Vajrayāna among the Mongols, however, we know from Si-tu paṇ-chen's *History of the Bka'-brgyud-pa Sect*, that Karma Pakši (1204 or 1206–1283/4) the second Black Hat (*Zhva-nag*) Karma-pa of the Bka'-brgyud-pa had initiated Möngke Khan into the Cakrasaṃvara mandala already in 1256 (*SI*: 109, I would like to thank Ramsey Fendall for this information). For a translation and study of the Hevajra Tantra, see Snellgrove (1959) and Farrow and Mennon (1992).
42. In the Bka'-'gyur the Tantric teachings are grouped in four classes (*kriyā*, *caryā*, *yoga* and *anuttarayoga*) based on differentiations of practice and focus. Action (*kriyā*) tantra focuses more on externally performed rituals, while Performance (*caryā*) tantra focuses on ritual activities in balance with meditative practices. Yoga (*yoga*) tantra, which is understood as being more advanced, involves mainly meditative and yogic practices, while Highest Yoga (*anuttarayoga*) tantra focuses on the control and purification of the mind (Skorupski 1996). In this work the *Hevajra Mandala* is identified as a teaching of the Highest Yoga Tantra.

EARLY LAMAISM IN MONGOLIA

Henry Serruys



[NB: Bracketed notes refer to List of Characters, pp. 566–8.]

It is usually said that Lamaism was first introduced into Mongolia during the Yüan Dynasty, then after the collapse of the Mongol Yüan House disappeared from Mongolia only to be reintroduced in the late 1570s by the Altan-qayan of the Twelve Tümed. This Twelve Tümed tribe roughly occupied that part of Suiyüan Province east of the Yellow River Bend (Ordos). The Altan-qayan invited the Third Dalai-lama from Tibet: they first met somewhere in Köke-nuur region, then after the qayan's death, the Dalai-lama visited Ordos and Tümed territories, established contacts with several Mongol princes and leaders from other regions, the Čaqar and the Qalqa, who accepted the new religion and began to spread it among their people. This in short is how we are told Lamaism took hold of Mongolia. W. Heissig speaks of a second conversion to Lamaism of the Mongols.¹

In this paper I propose to show that the “re-introduction” of Lamaism was less a re-introduction than a revival and a new expansion and consolidation of something that had never completely disappeared from Mongolia and was only waiting for the right opportunity to reassert itself. When the Altan-qayan and his great-nephew Qutuytai-sečen qung-tayiji of the Ordos invited the Tibetan Dalai-lama, they did so because they already knew Lamaism and for some reason hoped that certain advantages could be derived from such a visit.

During the Yüan, Lamaism undoubtedly had great influence in the capital, Ta-tu (modern Peking), especially at the court itself, but probably was never much of a power among the native tribes of Mongolia. Yet, however superficial Lamaism may have been in Mongolia proper, it must have had some influence upon the local nobility, in imitation of court circles of the capital, and even, although to a far lesser degree upon the common people. We may almost *a priori* presume that after the collapse of the Yüan Dynasty Lamaism never entirely disappeared from Mongolia until it was given new life by the visit of the Third Dalai-lama. Nor did Lamaism in Mongolia exist in a pure and undiluted form. We should bear in mind that Buddhism upon its introduction into Tibet had already absorbed many elements of the pre-Buddhist native religion; during the 17th century and later Lamaism was to do the same again in Mongolia proper, and we can be sure that whatever Lamaism existed in Mongolia in the 15th and 16th centuries, it lived side by side with Shamanism and most of the people probably practiced a mixture of both. Moreover it is my impression that wherever Lamaism was known it was but a

thin veneer, and it was Shamanism that had the greater influence and commanded the loyalty of the large majority of the people.

The Mongol chronicler *Sayang-sečen*, himself a member of the nobility of Ordos and a descendant of *Qutuγtai-sečen qung-tayiji*, never mentions the existence of Lamaism in Mongolia before the invitation of the Dalai-lama. He gives all the credit for introducing Lamaism to the Altan-qayan and *Qutuγtai-sečen qung-tayiji*. *Sayang-sečen* tells us how in 1566, *Qutuγtai-sečen* undertook a campaign against the Tibetans of the Three Rivers and destroyed their armies; and how immediately hereafter, he sent envoys to such Tibetan dignitaries as the Great Borsa Lama, Čanši Lama, Darqan Lama, Usungdur-sanjin, Altan-sanjin, and others, with the message that if they surrendered to him (i.e. *Qutuγtai-sečen*) the Mongols would accept the Tibetan religion (*šasin-nom kiy-a*). During the negotiations following this message, *Qutuγtai-sečen* is described as familiar with such magic as was often practiced by lamas. The result of the affair was that the Tibetans of the Three Rivers submitted to *Qutuγtai-sečen qung-tayiji* who brought bLargin Lama, Astuγ-sayin-bandi, and Astuγ-wačirtowanmi-sanggasba with him back to Mongolia and granted to the latter the title of *Güi-ong-qonjin*.² *Qutuγtai-sečen*'s campaign no doubt was conducted in the general area of Amdo, Köke-nuur, and perhaps Northern Tibet. Since the Yüan period, Mongols and Tibetans have lived intermingled in those areas and have greatly influenced each other.

Sayang-sečen speaking of the Altan-qayan himself, relates how in 1573, he too organized a campaign against the Black Tibetans. As a result of this campaign, the Altan-qayan came back with a large number of prisoners, the lamas Ariγ-Lama and sGümi-bsüge-baysi among them. According to the Mongol chronicler, Ariγ-Lama immediately began to explain to the qayan the essentials of the Buddhist doctrine of salvation, and the qayan, we are told, became slightly devout and began to recite the "Six-Syllable Formula."³

G.N. Roerich,⁴ judging from the name, believes that this Ariγ-Lama came from the Ariγ tribe in Southern Amdo, a tribe of Mongol origin but strongly tibetanized.

The Mongol historian then goes on to relate that *Qutuγtai-sečen qung-tayiji* in 1576 paid a visit to his great-uncle the qayan of the Tümed and on that occasion explained to him that no genuine prosperity was possible without religion, meaning of course, Buddhist religion in its Lamaist form, the only form known to him. Then he went on to tell the qayan that he had heard that in the southern regions of the Wide Snows "there was the perceptive, powerful, and compassionate Qongsim⁵ Bodhisadu-a in real person" and he suggested that the qayan, inspiring himself on the example of emperor Qubilai of the Yüan who invited the hP'ags-pa lama from Tibet to the Capital, also send a delegation to invite the Bodhisattva to come to Mongolia. The Altan-qayan approved of this plan and after consultation with the Three Western Tümen,⁶ both he and *Qutuγtai-sečen qung-tayiji* appointed a number of envoys to invite the "Saintly all-knowing bSowadnams-rgymts'o Qutuγtu."⁷ This was the Third Dalai-lama, as he would be known from this time on, and it is this invitation by the two Mongol princes which led to his visit to Köke-nuur in 1578 and to Ordos and Tümed in 1585. He died in Mongolia in 1588.

Just as in 1576 *Qutuγtai-sečen qung-tayiji* had recalled to his great-uncle the former relationship between the Yüan emperor and the Tibetan religious leader, so was he now to mention those earlier relationship to the Dalai-lama himself when he and the Altan-qayan met him for the first time; not however before the Dalai-lama himself had made a similar remark concerning the Yüan period.⁸

To continue with Sayang-sečen's narrative, on the occasion of this first encounter with the Dalai-lama at a newly built monastery in a place called Čabčiyal "narrow defile," the Altan-qayan related to him how lama prisoners in 1573 had taught him the rudiments of the Lamaist religion: on a previous occasion, an apparition had already warned him against the taking of animal life,⁹ which warning he could not understand, yet it could not fail to alarm him greatly, until the "Tangyud" Asiγ-lama made him familiar with the "Six-Syllable Formula", and the other lama, sGümi-bayši, instructed him in the use of the Buddhist rosary.¹⁰ After the Altan-qayan had related his story, his nephew recounted a similar experience.

Sayang-sečen unvariably suggests that the initiative came either from the Altan-qayan or from Qutuγtai-sečen. But this is not necessarily so. Tibetan sources point to a Tibetan initiative. For example, in 1571, a certain Dzoge-a-seng from Amdo visited the residence of the Altan-qayan and suggested that the qayan invite the Dalai-lama of Lhasa.¹¹

The facts suggest that long before 1566, 1571, and 1573, the Mongols had at least a rudimentary knowledge of Lamaism. And Lamaism must have had enough appeal to them to make the visit of the Dalai-lama possible and desirable. It would indeed seem improbable that a few lama prisoners of war, or an occasional visitor, could influence the Mongols so profoundly and bring about changes that were to affect the further history of their nation. We must also bear in mind that the visit of the Dalai-lama of Lhasa to the Ordos and Tümed Mongols was to have a profound significance for the Dalai-lama himself and his Yellow Sect dGe-lugs-pa as well. It was the prestige caused by this visit and the title Dalai-lama "Ocean, or Universal Lama" bestowed for the first time by the Altan-qayan, which were to consolidate both his spiritual and temporal power in Tibet.¹²

At the first meeting of the Dalai-lama with the Mongols, a number of laws were enacted to guarantee the status and privileges of the lamas, and regulations concerning fasts, abolition of the custom of grave escorts, and other things were promulgated. It is quite possible, even probable, that such laws were promulgated at the time, but as G. Schulemann points out,¹³ those statutes and regulations had been known for some time in Mongolia, at least outside the territories of the Altan-qayan, and most probably there, too. Indeed, Sayang-sečen relates how the great-qayan of the Čaqars, Tümen-qayan, came in contact with one Ildün-i ǰanggiduγči Garma Lama (G. Lama, who ties a sword!) and under his influence "entered the Gate of Religion," then after consultation with the Six Tümen, in 1576, promulgated a "Great Law" (*Yeke čayaǰin*). Tümen-qayan entrusted the execution of the law to the Čaqar Amudai qung-tayiji, the Qalqa Uǰeng-subuqai, the Ordos Qutuγtai-sečen qung-tayiji, the Asud Nomdara-qulači noyan, and the Tümed Čürüke qung-tayiji. These men represented every important tribe of the Mongol people, here called the Six Tümen. For this action, Tümen-qayan became known as Jasaytu-qayan, i.e. the Qayan-with-the-Law.¹⁴

Tümen-qayan's delegation of a number of noblemen from various tribes presupposes a definite interest on the part of the nobility in Lamaism. As has already been explained in the foregoing pages, Tibetan lamas had yielded great power at the Mongol court in Peking, and we are reasonably certain that under the Yüan in imitation of the court, such nobles as had continued to reside in Mongolia became interested in some measure in the Tibetan religion, even if the common people remained largely unaffected by this movement. It is quite possible that under the Yüan, influence of Lamaism, superficial as it was, gradually further decreased as one went northwards farther away from the urban

centers where monasteries could be found, although even in Upper Mongolia in such places as the Qara-qorum one could find monasteries and monks. The measures taken by Tümen-qayan, the delegation of noblemen to put the Buddhist law into effect in Mongolia, the invitation of the Dalai-lama by the Altan-qayan and Qutuγtai-sečen qung-tayiji, etc. indicate that the nobility of at least Southern Mongolia never completely lost the memory of Lamaism. At this particular time, Lamaism must have begun to have a new appeal for the nobles; the old Shamanism no longer satisfied them. We must bear in mind that everywhere it was the nobility who made the first move to reinstall Lamaism at the expense of Shamanism. The common people must have remained largely Shamanist and hardly touched by Lamaism until the nobles in the 16th century began to take measures to suppress Shamanism and make it give way to the newly favored religion imported from Tibet.

The memory of the close cooperation between Lamaism and the temporary power of the Yüan court certainly was of paramount importance in this renewed interest in Lamaism. The problem, however, remains why this interest should be revived precisely at this particular time. Here we are very poorly informed. I may venture to suggest that the Altan-qayan and his nephew and their other relatives of the Ordos and Tümed first had to organize a political power before they could feel the need for a religion with more ritual and ceremony, more cultural background than the native Mongol Shamanism was able to offer. Their proximity to China and their, be it superficial, knowledge of Chinese culture must have promoted such a need. Esen-tayisi of the Oyirad in the middle of the 15th century, much farther away from China, apparently did not feel such a need, although he had become paramount in Mongolia. We must add, however, that at that time, too, Lamaism was not completely unknown in ruling Oyirad circles, as we shall see below.

Ch'ü Chiu-ssu in his *Wan-li wu-kung lu*^{[1]15} devotes a short biographical note to Qutuγtai-sečen qung-tayiji. In this note we read that he was versed in literature and familiar with Buddhist writings. Indeed Qutuγtai-sečen is credited with a rewriting of the *Arban buyan-tu nom-un čayan teüke* "White History of the Doctrine of the Ten Meritorious (works)." originally ascribed to Qubilai.¹⁶ For a warrior like Qutuγtai-sečen, such literary activity is rather surprising and it betrays a more than superficial interest, and even some sort of tradition of reading and writing. In 1571, when the Altan-qayan finally came to terms with the Ming court and for the first time was allowed to present the tribute, it was Qutuγtai-sečen who wrote for him the necessary vassal-letter to be presented together with the tribute. And in connection with this vassal-letter, Ch'ü Chiu-ssu remarks that when this document was presented to Chinese border officials it had to be entirely rewritten in order to make it conform to the accepted style. One thing the Chinese officials objected to was that Qutuγtai-sečen's document was full of Buddhist expressions.¹⁷ We have every reason to believe that Qutuγtai-sečen qung-tayiji was a devout Buddhist long before his first contact with lamas from Amdo and Köke-nuur.

We have no indication that the Altan-qayan himself was literate, but his interest in Lamaist literature was no less than Qutuγtai-sečen's. Shortly after 1579, he had the *Suvarṇaprabhāsa sūtra* translated into Mongol, and from then on he had his sons would-be patrons of a large group of translators, both Mongols and Tibetans.¹⁸ Once again such wholehearted interest would never have been possible if the Mongol nobles had only recently been converted from Shamanism and had had no knowledge of Lamaism until their "conversion" in 1578.

Indeed throughout the Ming period we find, if not a large number, at least a few facts pointing to continued presence of lamas and Lamaism in Mongolia. First the fact that in 1431 a new edition of a collection of *dhâranî* in Sanskrit, Chinese, Tibetan and Mongol was printed in Peking; and that a second volume was put out the same year comprising sūtras in Chinese with an introduction in Mongol.¹⁹ Prof. Heissig presumes that such publications were intended for the many Mongols serving in the Ming armies in China. This is quite possible, but the inference is that a goodly number of them were Lamaists, and this again means that they were Lamaists when they crossed into China.

Then there are direct indications in the Chinese sources that there were lamas in Mongolia. Where they came from is not clearly indicated. I guess that most were Tibetans, who had entered Mongolia either directly from Tibet or by way of China. There were always many Tibetans in China as we shall see further on. This should not come as a surprise; just as the Ming always tried to exert a measure of influence over Mongolia and to keep informed about the state of affairs there, so too did they always work to maintain their ties with Tibet. The possibility, however, that there were Mongol lamas, too, must not be dismissed.

We shall review here a few passages from the *Ming shih-lu* which refer to lamas in Mongolia. On the date of April 27, 1407,²⁰ the *Shih-lu* has the following text:

"[The court] sent back the Tatar monks Erh-i-ch'ih, Yeh-erh-chi, Ni-erh-hui, and made them take colored satins to present to the Tatar *t'ai-shih* and Right *ch'eng-hsiang* Mar-haza,²¹ the chieftain Toyoči, and and others. [The emperor] sent a rescript to Ho Fu,²² commissioner-in-chief to the Left and commander-in-chief of Ning-hsia, and other border commanders: 'Erh-i-ch'ih, Yeh-erh-chi, Ni-erh-hui, etc., on their way home will have to pass through border towns: you should treat them well and let them pass; you should also provide them with an escort until they have crossed the borders.' [The emperor] also sent secret instructions to [Ho] Fu and Sung Ch'eng²³ (commander-in-chief in Kansu): 'Erh-i-ch'ih is Guyiliči's²² Master [of the Empire]; some say that it certainly is Guyiliči who has sent him. Guyiliči, indeed, intends to go westward to fight the Oyirad, and he wants to settle his family-dependents closer to the South, but he is afraid that governmental troops of border garrisons might attack them. Therefore he has sent [Erh-i-ch'ih] in order to prevent governmental troops from crossing the borders. Others say that Guyiliči intends to surrender but has not yet made up his mind: therefore he has sent [Erh-i-ch'ih] to sound out the court's feelings. Others again claim that the Caitiffs will soon follow [Erh-i-ch'ih] with border raids: you, gentlemen, must redouble your vigilance and be ready'."²³

The problem raised by this embassy for the Ming government need not detain us.

Erh-i-ch'ih, Yeh-erh-chi, and Ni-erh-hui are called "Tatar monks" but the names rather seem of Tibetan origin. Many Mongols in recent times bore Tibetan names, and the same was true already in Yüan and post-Yüan times. It seems more probable, I believe, that the three monks were Tibetans; they may have been called Tatar because they came from Mongolia and acted as envoys for Mongol princes.

Erh-i-ch'ih appears again under the date of December 30, 1407 (summarized): "The Ching-hsiu san-tsang²⁴ Master of the Empire, Erh-i-ch'ih; the Ching-chieh san-tsang²⁵ Master of the Empire, Pa-erh-ssu (Bars?), together with the Tatar official, Commandant Liang Shun-li,²⁶ and others; the vice *tu-kang* of Liang-chou, Shih-li-ts'an-pu, and others, all sent envoys to present a tribute of horses; they were given a proportionate amount of paper currency."²⁴ This time, although Erh-i-ch'ih did not travel personally to the capital on behalf of some Mongol chieftain, it is clear that he and the other lamas, whether Tibetan or Mongol, bearing Tibetan names, remained associated with Mongols

of the West. Liang Shun-li, in spite of his Chinese name, is a “Tatar official” that is a Mongol in the Ming service, most probably in Kansu.

Erh-i-ch’ih is mentioned a third time under the date of January 24, 1410:²⁵ “The Tatar official, commandant Chang Kuang-ching,^[7] the Ching-hsiu san-tsang, Master of the Empire, Erh-i-ch’ih, and others came to court to present a tribute of horses.” In view of the fact that in December, 1407, Erh-i-ch’ih had not come to court in person, it is not certain that he did in 1410. It is not always clear whether the formula “come to court and present a tribute” means that the persons mentioned are the ones who actually made the trip to Peking, or those who sent the embassy. I have found cases in the *Shih-lu* where the persons thus named did not go to the capital but sent their men. This question is of little importance here.

On February 23, 1413,²⁶ Erh-i-ch’ih’s son, Erh-i-nu, presented a tribute of horses. Whether this means that the Master of the Empire, Erh-i-ch’ih had died, is not certain. At any rate, no other Ching-hsiu san-tsang Master of the Empire was appointed by the Ming court until 1440.²⁷ And incidentally, the fact that Erh-i-ch’ih had a son shows that he belonged to an unreformed Lamaist sect.

On January 4, 1438,²⁸ the *Shih-lu* mentions another Lamaist dignitary acting as an envoy, this time for the ruling prince of the Oyrad. The text runs as follows:

“[The emperor] ordered Ha-ma-la-shih-li, envoy of Toyon, the Shun-ning-wang^[8] of the Oyrad, to become Tz’u-shan-hung-hua ‘Compassionate and good, widely civilizing’ Master of the Empire; Ta-tsang, to become Right Chüeh-i^[9] in the Central Buddhist Registry; Dalan-temür and others, to become commandants, chiliarchs, and commissaries, etc. Ha-ma-la-shih-li had previously declared that on several occasions he had come to court to present the tribute, and had received generous gifts and that he had requested an official title to facilitate his coming and going; the Ministry of Rites had reported on this, and hence the present order. Ha-ma-la-shih-li was presented with a monk’s robe, and Dalan-temür and the others with caps and belts [as symbols of their new ranks].”

This Ha-ma-la-shih-li seems to have served on several previous embassies. At any rate, in 1439–1440, he was a member of an Oyrad embassy sent by the qayan Toytô-buqa, then completely dominated by Toyon’s son, Esen-tayisi. On January 27, 1440,³⁰ he requested a silver seal from the Ming government. The request was granted. The granting first of a title and then of a silver seal lets us suppose that he was an important personality and may have had a number of ordinary lamas under him.

Another lama serving as envoy to China for the Oyrad ruler appears in the entry of February 15, 1438:³¹ “[The emperor] ordered the Oyrad envoy Wu-ssu-ta-a-li to be made a high-secretary-commandant; and the monk Yeh-k’o-ch’u-t’o-li-yeh (Yeke? . . .) to be made a *tu-kang*. They were given caps and belts, and [Yeh-k’o-ch’u-t’o-li-yeh], monks robes and other objects.” We may add that Wu-ssu-t’a-a-li and his party of five men had been in the capital since February 12.

High-ranking lamas cannot have been a very rare sight among the Oyrad since we find another one referred to in the *Shih-lu* entry of February 7, 1446, and once again he is a member of a tribute and trade mission:³²

“Esen, tayisi of the Oyrad, memorialized that the lama ‘Anointed on the head’ (*kuan-ting*) and Master of the Empire, Ch’an-ch’än,^[10] perfectly understood the religion of Śâ [kyamuni-Buddha], and he requested [the emperor] to grant him generously a title with a silver seal and a gold [-woven] gown together with a *kasaya* robe; [Esen] further demanded^[11] pictures^[12] and

statues^[13] of the Buddha of the Five Regions,^[14] bells and drums, sea conches with tassels, *chu-shih*,^[15] Law-food,^[16] and other objects used in Buddhist religious [ceremonies]. The matter was referred to the Ministry of Rites for discussion, and the Minister of Rites Hu Jung^[17] and others reported that after investigation they had found no precedent for this and they begged [the emperor] to make a decision. The emperor said: 'In controlling the Outer Barbarians, I take as sole rule the regulations established by my Ancestors; now since there is no precedent for acceding to Esen's unseemly demands, how could we [grant them and thus] encourage his greed? Don't grant [his request].'"

A similar request from Esen-tayisi, equally unsuccessful, came six years later. In the entry of December 13, 1452,³³ there is a long list of objects requested by Esen and other chieftains of the Oyrat. The last lines of the passage run as follows: "Esen made a separate request for his Master of the Empire San-ta-shih-li and the Tibetan (Fan) monks Saqui-temür and others, and asked for monks hats, monks garments, statues of the Buddha, tents, golden seals and silver bottles, offer vessels, and other things. All were refused."

The fact that those objects needed for the cult were refused does not mean that they were not available in China. Had they not been available, no better reason for refusing could have existed, and we would have been told. The fact is that all those objects were found in China. We have already mentioned that Tibetan lamas traveling to China were not a rare sight. There were always a number of them present at the capital. The *Blue Annals*, compiled between 1476 and 1478, mention many high-ranking lamas traveling to or returning from Peking during the Yüan period. The accession of the Ming does not seem to have put any major obstacles in the way of those relations. At first Sino-Tibetan relations slowed down, but by 1400 they became more regular again, and the *Blue Annals* refer to visits by several high lamas to Peking.³⁴ Moreover this information from Tibetan sources is amply confirmed by such Chinese sources as the *Ming shih-lu*. Many Tibetan tribute (or trade) missions were headed, or at least accompanied, by lamas; high lamaist dignitaries often visited Peking and other places and sometimes stayed there for considerable lengths of time. We may even believe that some of them remained permanently in China, for at times the Ming used them as ambassadors to Tibet just as they employed Mongols in their service as envoys to Mongolia and Koreans to Korea. In 1452, with the ever-growing tribute embassies from the Oyrat and the resulting expenses for the government, a *Shih-lu* passage mentions some officials whose stipends could be reduced. Among those receiving daily stipends from the Court of Imperial Entertainment (*Kuang-lu ssu*) there are Masters of the Empire, Dhyana Masters, and "monk-officials."^{34a} Chinese Buddhist dignitaries received no such stipends and only Tibetans living at the capital can be meant. Apart from the capital,³⁵ another famous place regularly visited by Tibetans was the Wu-t'ai-shan in Shansi province.³⁶ The tribute from Tibet usually comprised such objects as images or statues of the Buddha, reliquaries,^[18] and relics.^[19] The Ming court also regularly sent statues, sūtras, and other objects for the cult to Tibet as return presents for the presentation of the tribute.³⁷

Esen-tayisi's request thus can hardly have been a cause of surprise in Chinese governmental circles. They knew very well that there were a number of lamas in Mongolia. The objects requested by the Oyrat were available in Peking. Yet the Chinese court refused the request without proper explanation, apart from the excuse that there was no precedent for such a great one. Could the Chinese refusal by any chance mean that they were not interested in promoting Lamaism in Mongolia? – perhaps with a view to

preventing a rapprochement between the Tibetan rulers and the Oyirad who lately had caused so much concern to the Ming?

The case of the Master of the Empire Erh-i-ch'ih, mentioned in connection first with the Mongol ruler Guyiliči, then with Mongols from the Kansu area, is an indication of relations between Tibet and Mongolia. That Tibetan lamas visited Mongolia from time to time appears from the records. The *Blue Annals*³⁸ relate the visit of a Tibetan to Hsi-ning and Mongolia in the middle of the 15th century, and the *Shih-lu* entry of September 16, 1446,³⁹ confirms the lamas' abilities to travel far and wide:

"The Ministry of War reported that the Tibetan (Fan) monk Chia-shih-ling-chen from Ho-chou (Kansu) had been living for many years in Han-tung-wei^[20] and had gone as envoy to Esen of the Oyirad on behalf of the [Han-tung] high-commandant Pan-ma-ssu-chi to negotiate marriage and a close relationship. Now that the same monk has come to court [in Peking] it means that he intends to spy on Chinese affairs for the Outer Barbarians. This envoy must not be permitted to go back to his own country; instead, he should be sent to Nan-ching to settle in the Guard with Embroidered Clothes. This proposal was approved [by the emperor]."

Coming from Ho-chou which has always had a mixed population, there is little doubt that Chia-shih-ling-chen was a Tibetan lama. On a visit to the Oyirad, he seems to have been attached to an Oyirad mission to Peking.

This lama, we are told, had lived for a number of years among the people of Han-tung. A little farther to the north, in Qamil, if not Lamaism, at least Buddhism in its older form, was also very much alive, as we can gather from two *Shih-lu* passages. On October 16, 1463, "Nu'undasiri, mother of the Chung-shun-wang of Qamil, memorialized to recommend Pi-la-ya-shih-li to inherit his uncle's rank of Master of the Empire. The emperor answered: 'Master of the Empire is an important dignity used by the court to treat Tibetan monks: unless one's observance is outstanding one cannot measure up to this dignity. Who is this Pi-la-ya-shih-li that all of a sudden he aspires to this dignity? He may only be granted the rank of a *tu-kang*.'"⁴⁰ A few days later, on October 24,⁴¹ Nu'undasiri again presented a memorial to report that "Wu-tai-nu, a monk of our own country, has gone to Beg-arslan's place where he recklessly declared that in the year of the Sheep (*wei*: 1463) the capital city of our country is going to be destroyed, with the result that Beg-arslan believed it, raised troops and has besieged our city for two months. Now Beg-arslan is sending this monk to the capital to go to court and present the tribute. We beg that this monk be arrested and sent to the South." After due deliberation, the Ministry of War reported to the emperor that Nu'undasiri's request could not be granted without antagonizing the Outer Barbarians, and the emperor accepted this point of view.

This fragmentary information on the presence of Buddhist or Lamaist monks in Eastern as well as Western Mongolia, is further complemented by valuable though scanty information on the construction of Buddhist temples or shrines. Immediately after 1400, the Ming began to attract the Jürčed people into the Chinese orbit and by military and diplomatic means to influence the northeastern territories as far as the lower Amur. In 1411, a eunuch was sent to the Amur with over 1000 troops in 25 ships. In 1412, the same eunuch led a second expedition, and in 1413, a temple (*ssu*^[21]) was constructed with a statue of the Buddha, in a place where formerly there had been a Hall of Kuan-yin. On that occasion, a stele with an inscription in three languages was erected. The temple was even rebuilt in 1431, and a second inscription in Chinese set up.

Besides the ruins of the temple and the inscriptions, a bell was found there some time in the 17th century, although I have seen no later reference to it. N. Witsen writes:

"It was related there that some 30 or 40 years ago, Russian soldiers discovered a big bell, weighing some 660 pounds, Dutch weight, at about a two days' journey south from the mouth of the Amur and on the shore of the sea, on a spot which seemed to have been ploughed over, and there lay several stones there with Chinese writings carved on them. The natives living there said that a certain emperor of China had come with ships by sea and had left and set up there those bell and writings as a memorial. From which one can judge that navigation was possible out of the mouth of the Amur to China and also to Japan."⁴²

Ts'ao T'ing-chieh^[28] who explored those regions in 1885 describes the site as follows in his *Hsi-pi-li tung-pien chi-yao*^[29] ("Brief account of a survey in Eastern Siberia"):

"More than 250 *li* upstream from Miao-erh^[30] (i.e. modern Nikolayevski), in the T'e-lin^[31] region on the East bank of the Hun-t'ung-chiang^[32] (i.e. Amur), there is a rock ledge forming the edge of the river: it resembles a city wall, more than ten *chang* high. On top of it there are two Ming steles; one has an inscription commemorating the construction on imperial orders of the Yung-ning ssu;^[33] the second has an inscription commemorating the reconstruction of the Yung-ning-ssu in the sixth year Hsüan-te (1431). Both relate the expeditions of the eunuch I-shih-ha against Nu-erh-kan . . ."⁴³

These expeditions conducted by I-shih-ha (written Išīqa in the Mongol text of the inscription) did not lead to a military conquest in the strict sense of the word, nor to an occupation by Chinese forces. The local rulers were forced to recognize Chinese overlordship, were given Chinese military ranks, and for the rest were entrusted with the administration of their people in the name of the Ming. In other words, the area became a protectorate of Ming China. The term *ssu*, and the very words of the inscription make it clear that this was a Buddhist temple, not a native shrine for Shamanism or other native cults. On the other hand, the presence of the steles and the inscriptions, and the bell mentioned by Witsen leave no doubt that it was Chinese craftsmen who set up the buildings and carved the steles. Furthermore, the text itself states that even before 1413 there had been a shrine of Kuan-yin in this place. We have no indication as to its origin and date. It may well have dated from the Yüan.

The location of the 1413 temple was west of Nu-erh-kan, just to the east of a postal station called Man-ching.^[34] On September 19, 1412, eleven commanderies had been created in the Amur area, Nu-erh-kan and Man-ching among them.⁴⁴ This Man-ching must refer to the same place. Its status as relay station dated from the Yüan, but with the collapse of the Mongol empire, the relay system in these parts had fallen into disuse. It was restored, however, as soon as the Ming could make their influence felt again in these outlying regions: on November 19, 1412, 45 relay stations, Man-ching among them, were reestablished.⁴⁵ In modern Russian works, the place is called *Tyr*, corresponding, I guess, to Ts'ao T'ing-chieh's *T'e-lin*.

There is no doubt that the Chinese would not have built a temple so far out of the way if there had been no need for it among the native population. These people, however, were not Mongols. But the fact that Buddhism had penetrated that far to the northeast would at least help us to understand that similar circumstances could exist in Mongolia proper. In fact we have a comparable case from the West, namely the case of the Čigil Mongols in modern westernmost Kansu, who in 1443 requested Chinese help towards the construction of a Buddhist temple. In the 1440s, these Čigil Mongols as they

increasingly felt the pressure of the Oyirad, contemplated moving eastward and coming if not under direct Ming control, at least close enough to avail themselves of some measure of protection by the Chinese forces in Kansu. The entry of May 28, 1443, in the *Shih-lu*⁴⁶ says:

“Previously Čewang-šiga, *tu-tu ch'ien-shih* of the commandery of the Čigil Mongols had sent the commandant Badma with a letter to Jen Li,^[35] earl of Ning-yüan^[36] and military commander [of Kansu], [to inform him] that they (i.e. the Čigil Mongols) intended to move into the territory of Yeke-bulaγ, in order to avoid the Oyirad. [Jen] Li was of the opinion that this could not be granted because that territory was all too close to Su-chou. But Čewang-šiga had already memorialized [to the court] asking permission to build a temple (*ssu*) in the mountains of that area; he had also requested paints and craftsmen. The matter was referred to the Ministry of Rites which was of the opinion that the Barbarian Caitiffs were of a different race, and if permission was granted to build the temple they would certainly move into that area and occupy it, and it was to be feared that misfortune would follow later (through clashes with local Chinese?). [The officials of the Ministry] proposed to deny permission and the emperor followed this advice.”

This report by the Ministry of Rites shows how well the Chinese were aware of the role of a temple in the life of a Mongol tribe: once a temple was constructed on the proposed site, the Mongols would certainly follow. This sounds almost like an anticipation of the numerous complaints from the latter half of the 16th century by officials in Kansu: then it was the Tümed and Ordos Mongols who had built a temple in the Köke-nuur area (see below) and were constantly crossing Chinese territories on their way to or from that temple, until the Chinese burned it!

Another fact shedding further light on this interest of the Čigil Mongols in a Buddhist temple is that early in 1444, one of the officers of the Čigil Mongol commandery, together with a number of Tibetan lamas, presented a tribute of horses.⁴⁷ This can hardly be a coincidence; it must mean that here, too, there were lamas, if not all the time, at least intermittently.

This desire for a temple in the neighborhood of their settlements is further illustrated by a request from October 1446 made by the people of Sha-chou, neighbors of the Čigil Mongols, and who with the growing might of the Oyirad faced the same difficulties. As the people of Sha-chou apparently were rent by factions and the Chinese suspected that they would fall victim to Esen-tayisi's aggressiveness, they planned to have the whole tribe removed into Ming-controlled territory. Just at that time, the leading prince of Sha-chou expressed his intention to move and settle in the vicinity of the Little Po-ho^[37] temple of Su-chou.⁴⁸ The inhabitants of Sa-chou were a mixture of Mongols and Turkish-speaking people.

The fact that the Mongols needed Chinese craftsmen and materials for the construction of their temples is no proof for the novelty of Buddhist temples in the country and the rarity of such constructions. When in the 1570s, the Altan-qayan built his temple in Köke-nuur, he too needed many Chinese craftsmen,⁴⁹ and when immediately upon his return to Köke-qota (Kuei-hua-ch'eng) he wanted to set up a statue of Śākyamuni adorned with precious stones, gold and silver, the qayan needed “laborers,” no doubt Chinese.⁵⁰ In fact, throughout the Ming period the Mongols needed the services of Chinese laborers and craftsmen and building materials as well, as I have tried to show in an earlier publication.⁵¹ Even up to recent times, all Lamaist temples in Mongolia were unvariably built by Chinese craftsmen.

We are able to further supplement this information on Buddhism in Mongolia with

the widespread use of names with a Buddhist meaning by the Mongols and the Jürčed. In 1408,⁵² an envoy from the Oyirad ruler Mahmud bears the name of Nuan-ta-shih. This spelling of the name, however, is not the original one. We have to go back to an earlier spelling with *nan* < *nam* in the first syllable. Nan/nuan-ta-shih is Mo. *nomdaš*. This word indicated those who took Buddhist vows together with the emperor.⁵³ In 1425,⁵⁴ we meet with another Nondaš (~ Nomdaš), this time belonging to the Fu-yü commandery in the western part of modern Manchuria, and in 1428,⁵⁵ one of Aruγtai's envoys, in modern Chahar Province, is named Na-t'a-shih, probably another aberrant spelling for No(m)daš. A few years before, in 1414,⁵⁶ the same Aruγtai had sent an envoy by the name of To-erh-chi-ts'an-pu: Dorji-tsambu, a name of Tibetan origin: rDo-rje-Tsang-po (?). One other Ts'an-pu, a Mongol serving in Liang-chou, has already been mentioned in a text of December, 1407. There was also a Ts'an-pu in Chien-chou (Manchuria) in 1410.⁵⁷

One of the Jürčed chieftains around the middle of the 15th century was also named Dorji.⁵⁸ As has been pointed out, Tibetan names were already popular with the Mongols during the Yüan; they became particularly popular under the Ch'ing, but it appears that Tibetan names were not unknown in Mongolia under the Ming, and were even being borrowed by other tribes. In 1417, one of the officers of T'ai-ning commandery was named So-nan: bSodnams.⁵⁹

Another type of names, of Indian origin, is that in *shih-li*, Skr. *śrī*. Several individuals with names in *shih-li* appear in the foregoing pages. On November 7, 1431,⁶⁰ the *Shih-lu* mentions an envoy by the name of Sang-ko-shih-li, Sanggaśiri, Saṃgha-śrī "Fortune of the Congregation" who had been sent by king Ya-na-shih-li, Yānaśrī "Fortune of the Vehicle" of the Oyirad. The *Shih-lu* also mentions a Sang-ko-shih-li among the Jürčed in 1412.⁶¹ We find a Ta-na-shih-li in 1406, either a Mongol or a Jürčed,⁶² and a little later a Nu-ta-shih-li among the Jürčed of Chien-chou.⁶³ We must also mention here an individual with the name Saman-daśiri, Skr. Samanta-śrī, one of the leading Mongol chieftains of Sha-chou who wrote their famous Mongol letter to the Ming emperor in 1384.⁶⁴ In the first half of the 15th century, one of the influential chieftains of the Jürčed of Mao-lien bore the same name.⁶⁵

We have already mentioned the ruling prince of the Čigil Mongols in westernmost Kansu of the 1440s. His name was Ch'ieh-wang-shih-chia for Čewang-šiga. Čewang appears also as Čeben. Šiga is from Śākya.⁶⁶ At one time this Čewang-šiga sent an envoy to the Chinese court by the name of Badma, Skr. *padma*: Lotus flower.⁶⁷

In the middle of the 15th century, among the Jürčed chieftains there is a Shih-chia: Šiga<Śākya,⁶⁸ and one Ta-erh-ma, Darma, Skr. Dharma "Law."⁶⁹ In Chien-chou there was a Darmabal.⁷⁰ These names may have been borrowed from their Mongol neighbors as was this other one: Pu-erh-han, or Po-erh-ha: Burqa(n), the Mongol name for Buddha. Compare Po-lo-han, and Po-lai-han of the T'ai-ning Mongols: Borqan, Burqan.⁷¹

Moreover there exists an extremely large family of names with Buddhist connotation but Chinese in construction which means that these names must have been introduced from China. At this particular time, it is especially among the Jürčed rather than among the Mongols that we find those names. In an earlier paper⁷² I have attempted to describe how those names were liable to influence each other, how elements from one series of names could be substituted for parts of another series. In this way, as the original meaning became more or less obscured, Chinese characters with similar but not exactly identical readings were substituted for the original ones, etc. In fact, those names present

an almost endless list of variants, at any rate much too long for a complete discussion. Here I can do no more than list a number of examples found among non-Chinese.

In 1432, one of the Oyirad envoys in the tribute mission of that year bore the name Fu-chia-nu,^{[39]73} certainly an aberrant spelling for Fo-chia-nu^[40] “Slave of the Buddha’s Family.” This name, already well known in Yüan times, remained in use in Mongolia after the fall of the Mongol dynasty, and among the Jürčed as well: we find a Fo-chia-nu in Chien-chou, and one in another Jürčed tribe.⁷⁴

What is basically the same name appears also in a slightly different form: instead of the Chinese *Fo* (Buddha) we may have *Shih-chia*, or *Sha-chia*, from the Skr. Śākya. One of the ancestors of the Manchu imperial family was Shih-chia-nu^[41] “Slave of Śākya.”⁷⁵ The matter is further complicated by the fact that the same name is also spelled with *chia*^[42] “family.”⁷⁶ Indeed there exists such a long list of names comprising the elements *chia* “family” and *nu* “slave,” that it becomes easy to see how one spelling contaminated the other, and a spelling with *chia* “family” making better sense for ordinary people, came to be preferred to the original transcription *shih-chia*, *sha-chia* “Śākya.” But new combinations were possible involving other elements as well. Thus, derived from an original Śākya, we have such a name as Shih-chia-pao,^[43] lit. Protected by the Family of the Buddha,” but originally meaning “Protected by Śākya,”⁷⁷ the same name with a different spelling: Sha-chia-pao,^{[44]78} and in perfect Chinese translation: Fo-pao^[45] “Protected by the Buddha.”⁷⁹

In fact there began a real proliferation of names comprising such elements as “*pao*: protected” and “*nu*: slave” combined with names of deities and other words. Thus in 1415, an Oyirad envoy bore the Chinese name of Kuan-yin-nu: “Slave of Kuan-yin, i.e. Avalokiteśvara;”⁸⁰ and there is also one such name among the Jürčed in 1440.⁸¹ But then for some reason the original characters were often replaced by new ones so as to obscure the real meaning and the original pronunciation: Kuan-yin was reduced to *Kuan*,^[46] and *pao* may be reduced to *pa*, *p’a*, etc. Thus we come across such names as Kuan-yin-pao “Protected by Kuan-yin,” Kuan-pao, Kuan-yin-p’a, Kuan-yin-pa;⁸² also Kuan-nu with various spellings,⁸³ and Kuan-pao-nu “Slave protected by Kuan [-yin],”⁸⁴ and Kuan-pa-nu, with *pa* for *pao*.⁸⁵

The name of the deity may even be dropped altogether. Thus we have one Pao-nu “Protected slave.”⁸⁶ But another explanation is possible here: *pao*^[47] could well be a misspelling for *pao*:^[48] jewel, a term often used by the Buddhists. Pao-nu, then would mean “Slave of the [Three] Jewels.” Indeed, in 1468, the name of one of the envoys from the Mongols of T’ai-ning, is spelled San-pao,^[49] certainly intended for the “Three Jewels,”⁸⁷ and among the Jürčed the name San-pao-nu^[52] “Slave of the Three Jewels” seems to have been rather popular.⁸⁸ There is also a Pao-t’ung^[53] “Servant of the [Three] Jewels.”⁸⁹ These names have no meaning unless we take *pao*^[47] to stand for *pao*.^[48]

We may further list a few examples of other combinations along the same lines: Wen-shu-nu^[54] “Slave of Manju(śrī),”⁹⁰ and Kuan-chu-nu,^{[55]91} where *kuan* is for Kuan-yin, and *chu*^[56] probably stands for *shu*^[57] “Slave of Kuan-yin and Manjuśrī.” There is even a name Tai-pao-nu^[58] “Slave protected by Tai”⁹² and one is inclined to speculate that *tai* here is another incomplete writing of character *shu*,^[57] for Wen-shu: Manjuśrī. There exist more combinations comprising puzzling elements.

The name Chin-pa-nu^{[59]93} must mean “Slave protected by the Diamond” with *chin* being an abbreviation of *chin-kang*, and *pa* standing for *pao* as in the other examples listed above. The name Chin-kang-nu “Slave of the Diamond” was rather popular at an earlier period.

A purely Chinese name, with a Buddhist connotation, more used among the Jürčed than among the Mongols, though not unknown by the latter, is Chiao-hua^[60] "Civilized by Religion." The religion in question is Buddhism. The name Tan-pao-nu "Slave protected by Tan (?)" was known among the Uriyangqad Mongols and among the Jürčed as well.⁹⁴ One other interesting name in use among the Jürčed, Sang-ko-nu "Slave of the Sangga, Saṃgha," reminds us of a class of people in early Buddhism in China.⁹⁵

These combinations in fact are endless and it would be fruitless to continue listing them. Indeed more and more elements, not related to Buddhism, or without any meaning at all (at least no detectable meaning) are drawn into this system of name formations. Let us mention only one interesting name in use among the Jürčed of the 15th century: T'ien-pao-nu,^[61]⁹⁶ where *t'ien* stands for "Heaven."^[62] It will be remembered that in the latter part of the 14th century the two sons of the Mongol qayan Toγus-temür were called T'ien^[62]-pao-nu "Slave protected by Heaven" and Ti^[63]-pao-nu "Slave protected by Earth."⁹⁷ Here we seem to have an association of pre-Buddhist elements (Heaven and Earth) with a name formation originally combining only Buddhist, and in some cases Taoist, elements.

A fact even more interesting than names and testifying to the presence of Buddhism among the Jürčed of Chien-chou, is the erection in 1417 by the Ming of a local Buddhist Registry and the appointment of the "local monk" Darmabal (see above) as its chief.⁹⁸ That indeed there were local monks appears from a few passages from 1428, 1432, and 1434: the Nüchih monks Ch'o (~ Ch'u) Šiban and others from Chien-chou presented a tribute;^{98a} and just as in Mongolia there were also Tibetan monks as we see in a passage from 1440.⁹⁹

In the foregoing lines we have mentioned one Samandaširi and one Shih-chia-nu, both influential leaders of the Jürčed tribes, of Mao-lien and Chien-chou, respectively, and ancestors of the Manchu imperial house. Shih-chia-nu, in 1410, was granted the Chinese name Li Hsien-chung.^[68] His father was A-ha-ch'u, who during the Yung-lo period was given the name Li Ch'eng-shan.^[69] Samandaširi was a grandson of A-ha-ch'u, alias Li Ch'eng-shan, and a cousin of Li Hsien-chung. He, too, was known by the surname Li. Li Hsien-chung's son was a certain Li Man-chu,^[70] mentioned for the first time in 1426, who had at least four sons: Ku-na-ha, Tu-hsi, I-ti-ha, and Po-erh-ha-tai. Li Manchu and his son Ku-na-ha were killed in a clash with the Koreans, apparently in 1467 (the report is from the early days of 1468).¹⁰⁰

If the names Samandaširi and Shih-chia-nu show Buddhist influence, the name of Li Man-chu's son, Po-erh-ha-tai, looks so much like Pu-erh-ha, or Pu-erh-han (= Burqan) that it becomes almost certain that the name Po-erh-ha-tai, too, is derived from the name of the Buddha in Mongol. Among the Mongols, too, we find such variants as Po-erh-ha-tu, Po-erh-kan, Po-erh-ya-tu, Pu-erh-ha-t'u, etc., all in final analysis deriving from Burqan. (Many more Mongol names, with or without religious connotation, were borrowed by the Jürčed.) The natives may somewhat change the external appearance of the names, and the Chinese transcriptions are liable to further disfigure them. Since Buddhist names were definitely popular in this Li family of Chien-chou and Mao-lien, it is almost certain that (Li) Man-chu, too, is a Buddhist name: (Li) Manju(-šři). It is this very name which some time later was to become the name of the "Manchu" people.¹⁰¹

Now, nobody would claim that people whose names show traces of Buddhist (or Lamaist) influence, were all confirmed Buddhists. It is not even quite certain that the Mongol or Jürčed bearers of those names always understood their meanings. There may have been quite a bit of fashion or custom involved in this business of name giving. Yet

after what has been said about the presence of lamas and temples, those names once more tend to confirm Buddhism cannot have been unknown in Mongolia and in Jürčed territory. True, many aspects escape us: there may have been a strong Buddhist influence, but how strong was the Lamaist variety of Buddhism? Many factors point to Chinese influence, and thus to Chinese Buddhism. Other facts undeniably show Lamaist and Tibetan influence. For the time being we must leave this question unanswered.

It is at first glance surprising that from the middle of the 15th century to 1572, we find no more direct indications in the *Shih-lu* concerning Lamaism in Mongolia (at least judging from the Mongolia excerpts in the *Mindai Mammō shiryō*). This absence of information, perhaps is not so strange. Apart from personal names of Buddhist origin, most of the information on Lamaism and lamas in Mongolia came to us in texts regarding tribute missions. From 1450 on, tribute missions both from the Oyirad and the Eastern Mongols gradually became rarer, and in due time disappeared from the records altogether. Only the Three Commanderies of Döen, T'ai-ning, and Fu-yü on the border of Mongolia and present-day Manchuria continued to present the tribute regularly, but we have found no traces of Lamaism there, except for a few names. Now it cannot be pure coincidence that as soon as tribute and diplomatic relations were restored between the Mongols and the Ming, new indications concerning Lamaism reappear in the records.¹⁰² Indeed, in 1570 and 1571, an arrangement was reached between the Ming government and the Altan-qayan, whereby the Mongols promised to stop all border razzias and the Chinese agreed to a yearly tribute presentation by the Tümed and Ordos Mongols, and to establish trading facilities in a number of places along the border where the Mongols at regular intervals would be given the opportunity to exchange horses and cattle against Chinese goods.¹⁰³ With peace restored the Ming became very anxious not to give the Altan-qayan reasons for discontent when the latter from time to time requested favors from the Chinese court.

Thus in the entry of February 2, 1572,¹⁰⁴ the *Shih-lu* says:

"Altan, Shun-i-wang^[76] of the Northern Caitiffs, requested Tibetan (Fan) sūtras in gilt script and to send him Tibetan (Fan) lama-monks to spread the study of the sūtras and formulas (Dharani).^[77] The governor-general (of the military districts of Ta-t'ung, Hsüan-fu, and Shai-hsi) with the rank of a minister, Wang Ch'ung-ku^[78] reported on this request (to the court) and said that since the Caitiffs wanted to worship the Buddha and abstain from killing, they were showing repentance from evil and desire for good: in order to penetrate darkness with light and also to apply the policy of civilizing (i.e. sinicizing) the Barbarians, we must go along with his wishes and so implement the policy of tribute and trade. The Ministry of Rites too was of the opinion that the request must be granted, and the emperor followed this advice."

By the end of the year, however, nothing had been done apparently, and Wang Ch'ung-ku presented a new memorial on the subject: in the entry of November 12, 1572,¹⁰⁵ we read the following:

"Wang Ch'ung-ku, governor-general with the rank of a minister, memorialized: 'The Shun-i-wang Altan at the beginning of his surrender requested a seal; after the conclusion of the barter exchanges he repeatedly asked for sūtras and monks, and he obtained a promise from the court to grant them. Since [this seal]¹⁰⁶ will enable him to boast and show off in front of the Barbarians, it will greatly help us in breaking the customs of the Barbarians; since the Caitiff king knows how to turn a seal into a cause of pride he will show it to all the tribes: he will attach great importance to the observance of the agreements and for ever discharge the tribute duties. Since the Caitiff people know how to worship the Buddha and venerate the

monks, from now on they will strictly abstain from killing; and as they are seeking merits of happiness, they will not dare commit evil again. With this pledge of the court to give a seal and grant sūtras, we may be confident in the feelings of the Barbarians. I beg to turn it into an opportunity to civilize and teach [them]. It will greatly help to secure for ever the tribute and trade. Some advisors have pointed out that a seal must not be given lightly and that the religion of the Buddha is not an orthodox doctrine, and how then does one understand its ability to transform and subdue the Barbarians? It is a matter of record that the imperial ancestor by decree has founded the Temple of the Widely-civilizing, Illuminating Religion (Hung-hua ch'an-chiao ssu^[79] in the T'ao [-chou and] Ho [-chou region];¹⁰⁷ sūtras from the (Tri)piṭaka^{[84]108} were written in gold and given [to the temple] and we made [some of them Incarnate] Buddhas and Kings of the Law;^{[84]109} we sent the King of the Illuminating Religion and others out to control separately [the various sections of] the Western Regions,^[91] and there was none who did not follow [the local] customs and found a Religion. This is a precedent for sinicization of the Barbarians. Now the King of the Caitiffs ask for *Fan* sūtras in Tatar script¹¹⁰ in order to read them; it seems that we must grant them so as to illustrate the unifying influence of the Heavenly (Ming) Dynasty. [Should] these lama-monks from Tibet (Hsi-fan) succeed in teaching the Caitiff people and turn savages into good men, their merit would not be inferior to that of killing or capturing (an enemy). We must give everyone [of those monks to be sent] a rank in the Central Buddhist Registry, and grant them Dhyana garments, monks hats, sitting cushions, and other such objects, so as to delight the Caitiff people in order to make all the Caitiffs feel grateful for those favors and follow their religion: then the tribute agreements will be much better observed and the borders will be at peace for ever'. The Ministry of Rites in its reply [to the emperor] suggested to follow Wang Ch'ung-ku's request, but there were no sūtras [available] that could be sent."

Nothing was done until April 20, 1573, at least that is the date on which the sending of Tibetan (Fan) sūtras is mentioned.¹¹¹ No names of the sūtras forwarded are given; nor does the text say that any Tibetan monks were sent to Mongolia. Yet from a subsequent passage it would appear that the sūtras were not actually sent then, for in the entry of May 8, of the same year,¹¹² we are again informed that the Altan-qayan had memorialized concerning the selection of Fan sūtras in gilt script and lama-monks to read the scriptures. The Ministry of Rites proposed to send three (sets of) sūtras in gilt script printed in Shun-t'ien-fu (i.e. Peking), four old (sets of) sūtras in gilt script, and five (sets of) sūtras in black letters. The Tibetan monks selected (for this mission) were ordered to return soon, and not to tarry in order to avoid incidents. The emperor approved.

It is evident that the "Fan seng" repeatedly mentioned in the foregoing passages were Tibetans. As has already been pointed out, there always were a goodly number of them at the capital, some of them practically residing there permanently. We may be sure that the sūtras they took along with them, whether printed or manuscript, were Tibetan. It is quite possible that the Altan-qayan had had in mind sūtras in Mongol, but it is extremely doubtful that the Chinese had any available. Although as we have seen, the Ming in 1431 had published a text in Sanskrit, Chinese, Tibetan, and Mongol, it is not probable that the Chinese had continued to publish Mongol sūtras. The 1431 publication must have been a reprint of a Yüan book. Other Yüan translations certainly existed, but one cannot see as time went on what demand there could have been for keeping those Mongol works in print when there hardly were any relations except warlike ones with Mongolia. In May 1573, twelve sets of works were sent to the Altan-qayan. If they were Mongol, one cannot understand where they would have come from, and why Tibetan monks were sent to read them; and if Mongol sūtras were easily

available in China at the time, why after 1579 the southern Mongol princes displayed such an eagerness to have Tibetan texts translated into Mongol.

At the same time, however, Mongol translations of Chinese books of a more classical nature, first made during the Yüan, seem to have remained in print. How many such works were sent to Mongolia is not known, but it is certain that in 1441 a set of the Mongol version of the *Hsiao-ching*^[92] (Classic of Filial Piety) was sent to the great-qayan Toytô-buqa,¹¹³ and some time in 1580 a set of the Mongol translation of both the *Chung-ching*^[93] (Classic of Loyalty) and the *Hsiao-ching* was sent to Mongolia especially for the benefit of Baya-ači and Baya'ud tayiji, both grandsons of the Altan-qayan.¹¹⁴

If it is extremely improbable that the Ming had translated or printed Buddhist sūtras in Mongol, there are many interesting evidences, besides the one in the aforementioned *Shih-lu* text from May 8, 1573, that the Ming had printed Tibetan books for the benefit of the numerous lamas coming to the capital. Thus in 1415, 1416, 1417, and 1460, pictures, images, sūtras, and various objects needed for their religious ceremonies were presented to lamas in Peking or sent to them through embassies.¹¹⁵ The *Shih-lu* does not say in so many words that the sūtras in question were in Tibetan, but the implication is clear enough. We must not assume that the Tibetan lamas were able to read Chinese. At the end of 1456, a large number of lamas were promoted to higher ranks as a reward for copying Tibetan sūtras.¹¹⁶ We have already mentioned the gift in 1460 of sūtras and texts copied by the Ta-tz'u fa-wang and others. This was done in Peking, and it is clear from the context that the copies of 1456 were also made at the capital. Towards the middle of the Ming period, Chinese high officials often protested against the exaggerated influence of Lamaism in higher circles and more in particular at the court itself. For example, a text from 1468 complains among other things that the wealth of the nation is being spent on printing magic formulas, copying Buddhist sūtras, and painting pictures.¹¹⁷ There is a similar complaint from 1476.¹¹⁸ It is not clear whether the sūtras referred to in those protests were Chinese or Tibetan, but since the source of the malpractice stemmed from all too powerful influence of some Tibetan lamas, it would be quite natural that Tibetan sūtras were copied or printed, too. In 1441, a number of lamas from Wu-ssu-tsang memorialized to the court to beg for alms towards the carving of blocks and the printing of the sayings^[94] of a bandida and secret formulas.¹¹⁹ The request was rejected, and whether the printing was intended to be executed in China or in Tibet is not stated, but the request itself does not seem to have caused any great surprise at the capital. The Ming court, then, must have had an abundant supply of Tibetan texts, and it was from those sūtras, printed or manuscript, that they sent a few sets to the Altan-qayan in 1573.

The Tibetan lamas scheduled to go to Mongolia must have left the capital shortly after May 1573, for on November 30 of that same year, we learn that at least nine Tibetan monks (Fan seng) were living among the Mongols, and two more were sent to bring a variety of objects to the Altan-qayan. Once again it was Wang Ch'ung-ku who had made the request, no doubt on the suggestion of the qayan himself, although this is not stated:

“Statues of the Buddha and Tibetan (Fan) sūtras were given to the Shun-i-wang, Altan; two Tibetan monks who proceeded to spread the sūtras were rewarded with Dhyana garments, sitting cushions, Tibetan monks clothes in silk with boots and stockings. Nine Tibetan monks actually living with the Caitiffs were given ranks, and also Dhyana garments, sitting cushions, and monks hats; four Tibetan “officials” (Fan-kuan) received [each] two inner and outer pieces of clothing of colored satin, and two bolts of cotton cloth.”¹²⁰

Judging from those awards, the Chinese seem to have greatly approved of the activities of the Tibetan monks in Mongolia. That the Chinese were pleased with their work appears from a request from November 6, 1574, by the governor of the military district of Shansi, Fang Feng-shin.^[95] He wrote that

“... for a year now the king of the Caitiffs has been worshipping the Buddha and reading sūtras; full of remorse he is abstaining from killing. Since he has set his mind upon the practice of virtue we must display our intention of sharing these customs. Four men: the *chüeh-i* Cha-pa, the *tu-kang* Pan-ma, and the Tibetan ‘official’ Ma-ni-pu-la have gone across the border to spread the sūtras. They have proved themselves very efficient and meritorious. We submit that the *chüeh-i* Cha-pa, etc., all be made Masters of the Dhyana, with office above that of a *chüeh-i*; and that the *tu-kang* Pan-ma, etc., all be made *chüeh-i* with offices above that of *tu-kang*. We further submit that the Tibetan officials Ma-ni-pu-la and Ma-pan [*sic!*] be presented with colored satin, cotton cloth, and other objects.”

Fang’s suggestion was adopted.¹²¹ These lamas must have come back to Peking towards the end of 1574, or early in 1575, for the *Shih-lu* on the date of April 6, 1575, notes that the Altan-qayan requested Tibetan lamas, with the result that an interpreter was ordered to escort four lamas, one of them by the name of Chien-ts’an cha-pa to the qayan’s residence.¹²² Chien-ts’an cha-pa did not leave for Mongolia until early in 1576. We are informed that on March 27, 1576, Chien-ts’an cha-pa and others were ordered to take Tibetan sūtras back to their country (*kuei-kuo*); an interpreter was ordered to bring them to the headquarters of the governor-general of Hsüan-fu and Ta-t’ung who would see to it that they were escorted to the Caitiff camp.¹²³ This text seems to mean that the lamas were on their way to Tibet but were ordered to pass through the Altan-qayan’s territories from where they were to proceed probably to Hsi-ning or some other town in Kansu and so to Tibet. One doubts, however, if the sūtras mentioned here were not to be delivered to the Altan-qayan rather than be taken all the way to Tibet.

Later in the year 1575 we find traces of another aspect of Lamaism introduced in southern Mongolia. In the entry of November 13, 1575, the *Shih-lu* records a new request by the Altan-qayan for more statues, sūtras, and silks. And besides, he also requested that a name be given to the town and temple which he had constructed.¹²⁴ This request was forwarded to the office of the governor-general in Ta-t’ung who reported to the capital. The Ministry of Rites noted that the qayan had been scrupulous in observing the agreements and that his request could not be rejected. The emperor concurred with this opinion and gave the name “Kuei-hua:^[90] Return to Civilization” to the qayan’s town. As to the sūtras and the statues, the governor-general of Ta-t’ung was given permission to have the statues cast and have the sūtras copied and turned over to the Mongol prince. Many more presents were sent to him with the notification that he would receive similar presents every five years.

The Altan-qayan’s town, first known as Bayising (“House”) had been built by Chinese emigrants and refugees settled in Mongolia. It must have started as an agglomeration of houses constructed in Chinese fashion, hence the name Bayising. Some time before 1570, the Chinese had even constructed a “palace” for the qayan with high-sounding names for halls and gates in imitation of a Chinese imperial city. From 1575 on the town became known as Kuei-hua-ch’eng, and in Mongol the name Bayising was abandoned for Kōke-qota “Blue City”. Whether the Lamaist temple mentioned in the text of November 1575 was built at the same time as the qayan’s “palace” is not known. I would rather think that the temple had been recently constructed for the convenience

of the Tibetan lamas now regularly visiting his headquarters. It is a little surprising, however, that no title is mentioned for the temple.

Yet this was not the first time that the Southern Mongols began to feel a need to visit Lamaist temples: in the *Shih-lu* entry of February 2, 1575, we read that “previously Tatar-Caitiffs had crossed the borders and gone to the Hsi-na temple¹²⁵ to burn incense, and had requested rewards. The governor of Kansu, Liao Feng-chieh^[97] asked that permission be given to them to build a temple in a far away spot outside Chia-yü-kuan and have them burn [incense] and perform [their ceremonies there], so as to prevent their demands for rewards.”¹²⁶ This means that the Mongols already had taken up the custom of visiting temples, and took advantage of such visits to temples in Ming territory to importune Chinese officials with extravagant demands. The governor here is seeking a means to avoid all opportunities for such demands: a temple far away from Chinese territories, in his views, would solve the problem.

Visits by the Mongols were soon to grow into a major headache for the Chinese as we see from the following text under the date of May 15, 1575:¹²⁷

“Pin-t’u (Bingtü), Altan’s son, is nomadizing in the Western Sea (Region, i.e. Köke-nuur) and has subdued such Tibetan tribes as the Tso-erh-ko, the Pai-li, etc., then has had letters sent to the Tibetans and Chinese of Sung-p’an^[98] pretexting that he was meeting the Buddha and building a temple. News of clashes have frequently been spread as far as Ssuchuan. The governor Tseng Hsing-wu^[99] and the Provincial Surveillance Commissioner Kuo Chuang^[100] reported on the matter and thought that orders should immediately be issued to the governor-general of Shensi to notify the Shun-i-wang, Altan, strictly to restrain Pin-t’u from having designs upon the border areas which would result in destroying all the good effects of the agreements. But then the chief supervising secretary of the Ministry of War, Ts’ai Ju-hsien^[101] memorialized: ‘Pin-t’u has conquered the Tibetan tribes and destroyed our vassals (lit. hedges): his rebellious intentions are apparent. The reporters (Tseng and Kuo) without investigating want to send instructions to Altan and make him restrain Pin-t’u. But this chieftain (Altan) is exhausted with sickness and should have died long ago! How would he be able to bind all the chieftains, hand and foot? . . . Now concerning the trouble of Pa and Shu (i.e. Ssuchuan), it too started with that talk about [going to temples] to burn [incense] and practice [religion]! Indeed, if we permit [the Mongols] to build a temple, then there will be free access to the route to Tibet (Hsi-tsang); if we let them worship the Buddha, there will be unhindered contact between the Northern and the Southern tribes (i.e. Mongols and Tibetans). Do the wily Caitiffs really intend to practice virtue? It is not only Pin-t’u who makes use of tricks and devices and attacks nearby while making contacts far away . . .”

The question of building one or two temples, and where to build them, comes up again in the entry of September 18, 1575,¹²⁸ and here we learn who was the principal instigator of the idea of having a temple outside of Chia-yü-kuan:

“Previously such Caitiff chieftains as (Qutuytai-) Sečen qung-tayiji and others had requested to build temples in Köke-nuur territory and outside of Chia-yü-kuan in order to burn [incense] and practice [religion]. The matter was referred to officials of Shensi and Ssuchuan for deliberation. The Ministry of Rites replied [to the emperor]: ‘It has appeared from the deliberations that the Caitiffs have already gathered material and started building (outside of Chia-yü-kuan?) but we have demanded that they change the site to Wu-wang-ch’eng.^[102] Under the circumstances we cannot but acquiesce and therefore we must give permission in order to encourage them to practice virtue and thereby prevent a request [to build another temple] outside of Chia-yü-kuan. Indeed, China’s defense against the Barbarians rests on the preparedness of the border passes, but loyalty or rebellion of the Caitiffs does not depend on

whether this one temple is near or far away.' An edict ordered to follow the Ministry's advice."

Whether this temple was ever constructed in Wu-wang-ch'eng is not clear. But one thing is certain, namely that Pin-t'u early in 1576 proceeded to that area and caused considerable apprehension to the Chinese officials of Ssuchuan who were ordered to take appropriate military measures to forestall any surprise attacks.¹²⁹

We hear no more of a temple built or to be built in Wu-wang-ch'eng. But in the spring of 1577, we begin to come across mentions of a temple near Kōke-nuur. The *Shih-lu* on the date of April 4, 1577,¹³⁰ informs us that the Altan-qayan, intending to visit the Kōke-nuur temple near Hsi-ning and meet with Tibetan monks in order to perform religious ceremonies, wanted to make arrangements with the Chinese to organize a great horse fair and a tea fair (near the temple); he further requested a golden seal to facilitate his travels (over Chinese territory: Kansu). An official presented a memorial in which he proposed to reject the request for a tea fair (no mention is made of the horse fair) and a seal; all means ought to be used to prevent the Altan-qayan from going to the west. This official considered the possibility of building a temple in the qayan's own territory (there was one already!) and sending him Tibetan monks, but otherwise keeping a close watch on the situation in Southern Mongolia. The Ministry (of War?) replied:

"Last year, the Altan-qayan and Pin-t'u have requested the building of a temple near the Western Sea (i.e. Kōke-nuur) and the court has not refused to grant it a beautiful title and to assist with building materials. [The court] justly hopes to transform their ferocity and encourage them to become respectful and submissive. Now that the (Altan) plans to cross the borders and perform religious ceremonies, does that mean that he has ulterior motives? Should he request foodstuffs in order to perform the ceremonies, [officials] ought to accommodate him and provide them in order to soothe his feelings . . ."

The emperor approved this proposal. From this text it is clear that the Altan-qayan, just as he had done previously for his own town, had requested a name for the temple built on the shores of the Kōke-nuur. The emperor, it seems, had already given his consent but the title was officially announced on April 23 (1577): the temple was to be known as Yang-Hua^[103] "Looking up to China."¹³¹ There is no doubt that this is the very temple built near Kōke-nuur in the place called Čabčiyal "Defile" by Sayang-sečen for the meeting of the Third Dalai-lama with the Mongol princes.

The question of the qayan's trip to the west comes up again in the entry of September 13, 1577:¹³² the qayan wanted to make arrangements with officials of the three military districts of Ta-t'ung, Hsüan-fu, and Shanhsi for the presentation of the tribute during his absence; he also wanted an arrangement with the authorities of Hsi-ning for a market there, so he would be able to purchase tea. When these officials reported to Peking, Wang Ch'ung-ku, by now Minister of War, reported:

"Early in the spring of this year, Altan sent a letter to the border officials who forwarded it to me. It said that his brother's grandson (Qutuytai-) Sečen qung-tayiji, chief of the (Ordos) Bend had requested him to go to the Western Sea to meet and worship the Living Buddha. I had heard a long time ago that the Ordos prince year after year had been plundering the Tibetans but had never been able to carry out his ambitions. Now he wants Altan to take his army west and assist him to take revenge. But Altan is getting old in years and finds it difficult to travel far. Every time I have written letters to discuss these matters with the governor-general of Hsüan-fu and Ta-t'ung, he has dispatched interpreters to detain [Altan]. Recently [Altan] has secretly told the interpreters, and has written to thank me: he considers it a

great favor that I have detained him. Therefore, I know for sure that this trip to the West is not the Caitiff king's idea. According to a present report by the governor-general, the qayan's intentions are still loyal, therefore the authorities of all military districts must according to the circumstances soothe him while taking precautionary measures; while securing a doubly strong defense, they must display perfect sympathy, so that when the qayan goes nomadizing he has no reason to become suspicious and start a conflict; if he travels far, he can find no pretext to cause trouble. Should he desire to plunder the Civilized Tibetans, then we must secretly instruct the Tibetan tribes to avoid him and so display benevolent confidence [in him]."

The Altan-qayan must have set out immediately, for on October 16, 1577,¹³³ the *Shih-lu* relates that he had presented a letter to the military authorities of Kansu once again requesting a tea market. Most officials in the government seem to have been of the opinion that it would be bad policy to sell tea to the Mongols. The Tibetans, they argued, cannot live without tea now purchased from China; should the Mongols come into possession of a sufficient amount of tea, they might be able to draw the Tibetans into their own sphere of influence! The Ministry (of War?) perfunctorily acknowledged this line of reasoning and then went on to remark that the Altan-qayan would need tea for the ceremonies at the temple, and therefore it would be difficult to deny it; the Ministry thought that the Chinese must accede to the qayan's request and exchange horses for tea. On account of the circumstances, however, the amount to be sold was to be strictly limited, which was the decision finally adopted.

The Altan-qayan's meeting with the Dalai-lama is related in the following text from April 30, 1578:¹³⁴

"Cha-shih-tsang-po, son of the Illuminating and Civilizing King¹⁰⁴ of Wu-ssu-tsang sent a Tibetan monk to the Western Sea to visit his teacher-monk, the Living Buddha, who near the Western Sea was explaining the Law to the Shun-i-wang, to his sons and grandsons, and exhorting the mass of the Tatars to practice virtue. Then [Cha-shih-tsang-po] entrusted the Shun-i-wang, Altan, with the presentation of the tribute in his name and [through him] requested an imperial rescript and an [honorary] appointment. The Ministry of Rites replied [to the emperor]: 'the [Ancient] Emperors and Kings in order to control the I and the Ti [Barbarians] always took advantage of their requests as a means to establish control over them; always took advantage of their turning towards civilization (i.e. their desire to come under Chinese influence, or to surrender) to favor them with honors and rewards. Now Cha-shih-tsang-po and others, for the sake of such things as felt cloaks, know how to desire the honor of an imperial appointment, civilize their cruel and arrogant people, make them respect China and observe the agreements attendant on tribute and trade relations. The Shun-i-wang, Altan, has succeeded in causing them to submit and furthermore has presented the tribute in their names and has requested [permission for them] to come to allegiance. Even when the Miao [chieftains] came there was a pantomime with shields,¹³⁵ and when the [chieftains of the] Yüeh-shang^[105] came there was multiple translation:¹³⁶ this was not considered too much. Without following any precedent we should grant them ranks and rewards. The emperor said: 'The Tibetan monks come to civilization and [with their teachings] soothe the Caitiffs: their respect and submissiveness are praiseworthy. Therefore we appoint each one to such ranks as Dhyana-master-with-the Great-Enlightenment,^[106] *tu-kang*, etc., and we grant them monks hats, kaşaya robes, and proportionate gifts of inner and outer garments, food, tea, and colored satins'."

The "Living Buddha" both in this text and in the text of September 1577 is the Third Dalai-lama bSodnams-rgyamts'o as appears from the following passage dated March 2, 1579:¹³⁷

"The emperor ordered the Grand Secretary Chang Chü-cheng^[107] to accept presents [sent to him] by such tribute barbarians as the Wu-ssu-tsang monk bSodnams-rgyamts'o^[108] and others.¹³⁸ The monk bSodnams-rgyamts'o is the one whom the Caitiff chieftain, the Shun-i-wang, Altan, calls 'Living Buddha.' Last year, under the pretext of meeting with the Living Buddha, the Caitiff chieftain intended to carry out a plunder campaign in the west but [the Living Buddha] taught him to do good and abstain from killing, stopped his western plunder campaign and urged him to return to his lair . . ."

On March 14, 1579,¹³⁹ the court decreed honors and presents for the Tibetan monks for their beneficial influence upon the Mongols, but strangely enough, the Dalai-lama is not listed among them:

"Proportionate ranks and presents were granted to such tribute Barbarians as the self styled eldest son of the Illuminating and Civilizing King (Ch'an-hua-wang) of Wu-ssu-tsang, Cha-shih-tsang-po (see above), to his second son Cha-shih-chien-ts'an, to the monks from Tsang So-nan-chien-ts'an (bSodnams . . .), Hsing-chi-tsang-pu, and others. Presents were also granted to the Shun-i-wang, Altan, who had made the request in their names. Cha-shih-tsang-pu claimed to be the Ch'an-hua-wang's eldest son, but we know neither his father's name nor the year of this accession; besides, his statements do not agree with the date of tribute presented by the former (Ch'an-hua-)wang.¹⁴⁰ We should wait for an investigation, yet in view of their surrender and coming to allegiance and their merits in civilizing the Caitiffs, we must first grant them presents in order to soothe their barbarian feelings."

Late in 1580, the Altan-qayan must have come back from Köke-nuur, for on January 10, 1581,¹⁴¹ we are told, "The Shun-i-wang, Altan, offered his submission and came back to allegiance,¹⁴² therefore he sent barbarian envoys to request an imperial edict granting a name for the temple he had built and to promote the Tibetan monk Chüeh-i to the rank of Dhyana-master-with-the-Great-Enlightenment. The emperor granted the request."¹⁴³ For this entry, the *Mindai Mammô shiryô* gives also a variant text from another copy, slightly longer, in which among other things, the imperial title of the temple is given as *Hung-tz'u*^[109] "Far-reaching Compassion." Unfortunately, we are not told where this temple was constructed. But it will be remembered that when the Altan-qayan in 1575 requested titles for his town and the temple he had constructed, only one title was granted by the court for the town. Probably this new imperial title was intended for that same temple which had been overlooked in 1575. This seems the more logical explanation: the qayan had just returned from the west, and his request was presented through the office of the governor-general of Hsüan fu and Ta-t'ung, who handled all matters pertaining to the qayan territories. The qayan had been away so long and it does not seem probable that a second temple had been constructed during his absence. Besides, since his first temple had not been granted a title, there would have been little point in trying to secure a title for a second temple, if there was one.

Obviously these passages quoted from the *Shih-lu* do not give us a complete picture of the development of Lamaism in Southern Mongolia. Far from it. They are no more than incidental notes made in a number of reports on Chinese policy. Whether political measures taken at the time were well-founded must not detain our attention now. Yet we notice that the Ming were well aware of what was going on in Köke-nuur between the Mongol princes of Tümed and Ordos and the Tibetan Lamaist dignitaries. They knew about those meetings partly through the Altan-qayan himself who on more than one occasion intervened with the Ming government on behalf of the lamas. The Chinese, as we see from the texts, could not fail to be keenly interested in those affairs, and the possible results must have been a matter of lively debate at the court by officials holding

divergent views. The *Shih-lu* texts quoted above contradict Roerich's contention that Chinese diplomacy both at the headquarters of the Altan-qayan and in Lamaist circles of the Bras-spuñs monastery at Lhasa, that is the entourage of the Dalai-lama, was responsible for initiating contacts between the qayan and the Lamaist church which led to the qayan's invitation of the Dalai-lama to visit Mongolia.¹⁴⁴ Roerich quotes no Tibetan or other sources for his assertion, extremely doubtful anyway. Chinese diplomacy did not work towards those ends in Southern Mongolia, and I doubt whether such an action was started at Lhasa. The impression one gets from reading the *Shih-lu* is that as long as Lamaism in Southern Mongolia tended to make relations with China stronger; as long as the Ming controlled the dispatch of Tibetan lamas and sūtras, they were all for it, and expected beneficial results from it, especially in terms of converting the Mongols to a less violent way of life. But as soon as an occasion presented itself for the Mongols to establish direct and independent relations with Tibet, many Chinese officials began to have their doubts.

The *Shih-lu* presenting things from a strictly Chinese point of view help us very little to understand how these Mongol-Tibetan contacts were established. But what the *Shih-lu* do is to prove that Lamaism did not begin with the arrival of the Third Dalai-lama in Mongolia. No matter whether the initiative for a visit by the Dalai-lama to Mongolia came from the Tibetans or from the Mongols, the *Shih-lu* texts make it abundantly clear that long before 1578 there already existed a Lamaist tradition at least among the nobility; that there existed a Tibetan Lamaism in Mongolia coming from China before it came directly from Tibet. We may even assert that all the facts point to an uninterrupted Lamaist tradition in Southern Mongolia going all the way back to Mongol Lamaism of early Ming times and in final analysis to the end of the Yüan period.

NOTES

1. W. Heissig, "Zur geistigen Leistung der neubekehrten Mongolen des späten 16. und 17. Jhdts.," *Ural-Altäische Jahrbücher* 26, 1954, p. 101.
2. I.J. Schmidt, *Geschichte der Ost-Mongolen*, pp. 210–213. G. Schulemann, *Geschichte der Dalai-lamas*, 2d ed., 1958, p. 207. *Güi-ong* is of Chinese origin: *kuo-wang*. For a discussion of this term see Fr. W. Cleaves in *HJAS* 12, p. 96, n. 13. Čanši-lama in the Chinese translation of Saṅg-sečen's *Erdeni-yin tobči* (*Meng-ku yüan-liu chien-cheng* 6. 22b) is rendered as *ch'an-shih la-ma*:^[1] lama, Master of the Dhyana. The Mongol title is nothing but a loan word from the Chinese. For bLargin-lama, the Chinese translation reads *pa-k'o-shih*: baṅsi-lama.
3. Schmidt, *Geschichte*, pp. 210–211; Schulemann, *Dalai-lamas*, p. 207.
4. Y. N. Rerich (George Nich. Roerich), "Mongolo-Tibetskie otnošeniya v xvi i načale xvii v.," in *Mongol'skii Sbornik. Ekonomika, Istorija, Arxeologiya*, 1959, p. 193.
5. Qongsim is from Kuan-shih-yin, Chinese name for Avalokiteśvara.
6. After the fall of the Yüan dynasty, the Mongol nation came to be known as the Six Tümen (*tümen* means "ten-thousand," and indicates a military division; the word appears in several tribal names), or the Six Nations. The Three Western Tümen are usually said to comprise the Ordos, the Twelve Tümed, and a combination of tribes including the Yüngsiyebü, the Asud, and the Qaračin. There were also Three Eastern Tümen, namely the Čaqar, the Qalqa, and the Uriyangqan. See my "The Mongols in China during the Hung-wu period, 1368–1398," in *MCB* 11, 1959, pp. 47–50; also *MS* 19, p. 546 for some of the literature. The assignment, however, of a Mongol tribe to any of the Six Tümen must not be taken too literally. Even before the Yüan, Mongol tribes and clans had become widely scattered and the wars under

the Yüan and the Ming continued to intensify this dispersion. By the time of the Ming, representatives of every clan and tribe could be found in any part of Mongolia.

7. Schmidt, *Geschichte*, pp. 224–225, J. R. Krueger, *Poetical Passages in the Erdeni-yin tobči*, 1961, pp. 213–214, translates the first part of this passage, but with several serious inaccuracies. In the Urga manuscript, for bSowadnams-rgyamts'o, we read a simpler form: bSodnam-rjamso.
8. Schmidt, *Geschichte*, pp. 232–233.
9. For this episode, see Fr. W. Cleaves, "A Medical Practice of the Mongols in the Thirteenth Century", *HJAS* 17 (1954), pp. 429–432.
10. Schmidt, *Geschichte*, pp. 228–229. Asiγ-lama perhaps is the same as Ariγ-lama of the aforementioned passage of Schmidt, op. cit., pp. 210–211. P. S. Pallas, *Sammlungen historischer Nachrichten über die Mongolischen Völkerschaften*, vol. 2, p. 425, relates essentially the same facts with only minor variants, and interestingly enough notes that one of the two lamas belonged to the reformed Yellow Sect (of Tsung-k'a-pa, 1357–1419) while the other belonged to the unreformed Red Sect. Pallas' text is quoted in full by Cleaves, *HJAS* 17, pp. 431–132.
11. Roerich, op. cit., p. 194. The text referred to by Roerich is from a Tibetan biography of the Third Dalai-lama, also quoted by W. Heissig, *Familien- und Kirchengeschichtsschreibung der Mongolen* I, p. 68. The *Altan Tobči* (*Scripta Mongolica* I, 1952) II, p. 181 also mentions this lama and spells his name *mčova-degesdeng lama*. See W. Heissig, "Die Mongolischen Steininschriften von Olon Süme," *Central Asiatic Journal* I, 4, 1955, p. 279.
12. Saγang-sečen (Schmidt, *Geschichte*, pp. 236–237) gives the title as *Vajra-dhara Dalai-lama* "Universal Lama, carrying the Thunderbolt," and G. Roerich, op. cit., p. 194, says that the qayan presented him with a seal bearing the inscription *rDo-rje-č'añ Ta-la'i blama*, with the same meaning. The Chinese, too, knew the word *rDo-rje-č'añ*: to-erh-chi-ch'ang. On June 2, 1581 (*Mindai Mammō shiryō*, *Minjitsuroku-shō*, *Mōkohen* 8, p. 430 *abbr. Mok.*) the emperor decreed to give a patent-letter and a seal to the *rDo-rje-č'añ* (in Mo. Dorjičang) and his disciple Tai-kuei-ku-erh. This *rDo-rje-č'añ* certainly is the Third Dalai-lama. Strangely enough, however, the Ming later seem to have forgotten this title for on January 19, 1586 (*Mok.* 8, p. 546), the late Altan-qayan's son, Sečen-qayan and the Tibetan monk Dalai (-lama?) presented a tribute. Then again on November 6, 1587, the Sečen-qayan's successor, Čürüke, and others including the Tibetan lama-monk Chüeh-i Dalai (see note 29) presented a tribute of horses. Finally, a few days later, on November 11, when many promotions were granted, the Tibetan monk Dalai was once more granted the title (*müing-hao*) of To-erh-chi-ch'ang (*Mok.* 8, pp. 646, 647). Compare Wang Shih-ch'i, *San-Yün ch'ou-tsu-k'ao* 2. 38b–39a. The Fourth Dalai-lama, a great-grandson of the Altan-qayan's, was given the same title *rDo-rje-č'añ* in 1592. *San-Yün ch'ou-tsu k'ao* 2. 40b; H. Serruys, "Pei-lou fong-sou," *MS* 10, 1945, p. 139; *Genealogical Tables of the Descendants of Dayan Qan*, 1958, p. 69. I have found nothing concerning him in the *Mindai Mammō shiryō*.
13. Schulemann, op. cit., pp. 209–210.
14. Schmidt, *Geschichte*, pp. 200–201. "Garma-lama" as his name indicates belonged to the unreformed Kar-ma-pa sect. After writing these lines I found that the Kar-ma-pa sect had had earlier contacts with Mongolia. See H.E. Richardson, "The Karmapa Sect" in *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 1958–1959, esp. pp. 150 sq.
15. *Wan-li wu-kung lu*, preface 1612 (*Kuo-hsüeh wen-k'ü*, vols. 20, 24, 34, 38; 1936), 14, pp. 165–177.
16. See W. Heissig, *Fam. u. Kircheng.* I, pp. 17–26, with facsimile of the Mongol text.
17. No doubt the vassal letter had to be rewritten in standard form, and also translated. On this see my "Four Documents relating to the Sino-Mongol peace of 1570–1571," *MS* 19, 1960, pp. 52–53.
18. Heissig, *Ural-Alt. Jahrbücher* 26, esp. pp. 102–104. Also *CAJ* 1, 1955, p. 270.
19. Heissig, *CAJ* 1, pp. 268–269.
20. *Mok.* 1, pp. 322–323.

21. This man, possibly a Christian, with a Syrian name (< Mâr-hasiâ), was from around 1400 to 1418 an influential personality in Mongolia. He cooperated with Guyiliči (see next note).
22. Kuei-li-ch'ih, Guyiliči, according to most Chinese sources, for a while was supreme in Mongolia although he does not seem to have been a descendant of the Mongol emperors. It is hard to identify him with any person known through Mongol sources. He has been identified with Ugeči-qašaq. See W. Franke, *Addenda and Corrigenda to Pokotilov's Hist. of the Eastern Mongols*, SS. 1949, p. 22: 26, 18. He was murdered in 1408 by Aruytai. Sayang-sečen (Schmidt, *Geschichte*, pp. 154–155) mentions a person by the name Guyiliči, and Kuei-li-ch'ih must be a Chinese rendering of the same name, not the same person. See also *Sira tuŋji*, Shastina ed., p. 63, line 9, and other chronicles. Chinese sources give many variant spellings of the same name: Kuei-li, Kuei-lin, Wei-li-ch'ih, Hui-li-ch'ih, etc.
23. Erh-i-ch'ih's tribute mission, for such it certainly was, is not mentioned in the *Ming-shih*.
24. *Mok.* 10, Appendix on Tibet, pp. 56–57. The *tu-kang* was the head of a Prefectural Buddhist Registry. *Ming-shih* 75. 24a.
25. *Yung-lo shih-lu* 67. 7b. This passage is not in the *Mindai Mammō shiryō*.
26. *Mok.* 10, App. Tib., p. 62.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 143.
28. *Mok.* 2, p. 497; *Mok.* 10, App. Tib., p. 137.
29. *Chüeh-i*, one for the left and one for the right, are the fourth ranking officials in the Central Buddhist Registry. *Ming-shih* 74. 22 b.
30. *Mok.* 2, p. 593.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 507.
32. *Mok.* 3, p. 131; *Mok.* 10, App. Tib., p. 169.
33. *Mok.* 3, p. 445.
34. G. N. Roerich (trsl.), *The Blue Annals*, Calcutta, 1949–1952, vol. 2, pp. 508–509, 544, 643, etc.
- 34a. *Mok.* 3, p. 441.
35. E.g. *Mok.* 10, App. Tib., pp. 126, 136, passim. Roerich, *Mong. Sbornik*, p. 189. Many of those early visitors belonged to the Kar-ma-pa sect, the rival of the dGelugs-pa sect from which the Dalai-lamas were to come and which was to become supreme in Tibet. The Ming tried to consolidate their influence over Tibet while the Tibetan rulers or heads of sects or monasteries used their relations with China to improve their own position. In fact during the first half of the 15th century, the Ming favored the Kar-ma-pa sect over the dGe-lugs-pa which was not yet strong enough.
36. *Mok.* 10, App. Tib., pp. 54, 56, 169.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 57 (1408), 64 (1414), 66 (1416), etc.
38. *Blue Annals*, p. 551.
39. *Mok.* 3, p. 142; *Mok.* 10, App. Tib., p. 172.
40. *Mok.* 10, App. Tib., p. 227.
41. *Mok.* 3, p. 693.
42. N. Witsen, *Noord en Oost Tartaryen*, 1785, I, p. 67b “Daer werd verhaelt dat, omtrent derting of veertig Jaeren geleden, Russche krygslieden van by den mond van de Rivier, d'*Amur*, na gissing twee dagreizens Zuidwaerts, en aen den Oever van de Zee in een plaetze, die omgraven scheen te (68a) wezen, een groote klok, zwaer ruim 660 pond, Hollands gewigt, gevonden hebben: waer by verscheide steenen, daer op Sineesche schriften uitgehouwen stonden, lagen. De Inlanders, aldaer woonachtig, zeiden, dat'er in oude tijden zeeker Keizer uit *Sina* ter Zee, tot in de Rivier d'*Amur*, met schepen was gekomen, die aldaer deze klok en schriften, tot een gedenkteken, had nagelaten, en opgerecht. Waer men uit oordeelt, dat'er vaert uit de Rivier d'*Amur*, tot in *Sina*, konde zijn: als mede naer *Japan*.” The date of the discovery is to be calculated from Witsen's first edition: 1692. This would put the discovery around 1650–1660. Witsen must have obtained his information from “Spatarius” who corresponded with him (Witsen, op. cit., p. 101). This Spatarus, or Spathar, was a Greek in the service of the

- Russians, who call him Spafaryi. He saw the inscriptions 1675. They were rediscovered in 1856 (Baddeley, *Russia, Mongolia, China*, II, pp. 224, 229). The Chinese text of the 1413 inscription, as far as it is legible, is in Ikeucii Hiroshi, "Chōsen no tohoku kyō to Joshin to no kankei"^[22] in *Manšen chiri rekishi kenkyū hōkoku*^[23] 4, p. 321; also in parts in Wada Sei, "Minshō no Manshū keiryoku"^[24] in *Tōa shi kenkyū*,^[25] *Manshū hen*, pp. 353, 357. For the Jürčed text see L. Ligeti, "Les Inscriptions Djurtchen de Tyr; La Formule Oṃ Maṇi Padme Hūṃ" in *Acta Or. Hung.* xii, 1961, pp. 5–26. Ligeti gives a bibliography of the three versions. The Mongol text has recently been tentatively restored and translated by Osada Natsuki, "Nurukan Eineiji hi Mōko-Jochokubun shakukō"^[26] in *Ishihama sensei kōhi kinen Tōyōgaku ronsō*,^[27] Osaka, 1958, pp. 36–47.
43. Chinese original in Kurakichi Shiratori, "The Santan in the *Tōtatsu-kikō* (Travels in East Tartary)," in *MTB* 13, 1951, p. 27, and Wada, "Minshō no Manshū keiryoku," in *Tōashi kenkyū*, *Manshū hen*, p. 351.
 44. *Mindai Mammō shiryō*, *Manshū hen* 1, p. 263 (*Man.*).
 45. *Ibid.*, p. 264; Wada, *Tōashi kenkyū*, *Manshū hen*, p. 354.
 46. *Mok.* 3, p. 32. For particulars of the Čigil Mongols at this time see my "The Mongols of Kansu during the Ming" in *MCB* 10, pp. 309–316.
 47. *Mok.* 10, App. Tib., p. 159.
 48. *Mok.* 3, p. 144; October 1, 1446. The *Huang-Ming Pien-cheng k'ao* 4. 58b–59a indicates a Ta Po-ho ssu outside of Chia-yü-kuan, and a Po-ho ssu, presumably the Little Po-ho Temple inside the barrier. Also *Ibid.* 8. 1 b. Cf. *MCB* 10, p. 306. Now I believe *ho-po* to be the Turco-Mongol word *qap*: "bag, pocket." For this word see my note in *MS* 16, 1957, pp. 160–161.
 49. *Mok.* 8, p. 320; Roerich, *Mong. Sbornik*, p. 196; W. Heissig (ed.), *Erdeni-yin erike, Monumenta Linguarum Asiae Maioris, Series Nova* II, 1961, p. vi, n. 18 and 19. A similar request for artisans by Tibetans in 1449: *Mok.* 10, App. Tib., p. 159.
 50. Schmidt, *Geschichte*, pp. 236–237. Schmidt's translation is not very accurate.
 51. "Chinese in Southern Mongolia during the sixteenth Century" in *MS* 18, 1959, esp. pp. 54–65. See also Owen Lattimore, *Nomads and Commissars. Mongolia Revisited*, 1962, p. 54.
 52. *Mok.* 1, p. 339.
 53. Pelliot's note in L. Hambis, *Le Chapitre xvii du Yuan-che* (Suppl. au Vol. 38 du *TP*) 1945, p. 61. Pelliot's explanation comes from the *Shan-chü hsin-hua*.^[38] H. Franke's attempt (*Beiträge zur Kulturgeschichte Chinas unter der Mongolenherrschaft, Das Shan-kü sin-hua des Yang Yü*, 1956, p. 30, n. 4) to derive Nuan-ta-shih from a supposed *noyandaš* cannot be accepted. It fails to take into account that once *nam* began to be read *nan*, any other character with *-n* could easily be substituted.
 54. *Mok.* 2, p. 48.
 55. *Ibid.* 2, p. 147.
 56. *Ibid.* 2, p. 459.
 57. *Man.* 1, p. 246.
 58. *Man.* 2, p. 332.
 59. *Man.* 1, p. 290.
 60. *Mok.* 2, p. 242.
 61. *Man.* 1, p. 260.
 62. *Man.* 1, p. 204.
 63. *Man.* 2, p. 24.
 64. For this letter see *MCB* 10, pp. 250–252.
 65. *Man.* 1, pp. 414, passim.
 66. *Mok.* 3, p. 7 et passim.
 67. *Mok.* 2, p. 407; *Mok.* 3, p. 32.
 68. *Man.* 2, p. 343.

69. *Man.* 2, p. 366.
70. *Man.* 1, p. 287.
71. *Man.* 2, pp. 184, 334, 352, 356; *Mok.* 5, pp. 58, 78, 129, 132, sq.
72. H. Serruys, "Some types of names adopted by the Mongols during the Yüan and the early Ming periods," *MS* 17, 1958, pp. 352–360.
73. *Mok.* 2, p. 257.
74. *Man.* 1, p. 431; *Man.* 2, p. 328.
75. *Man.* 2, p. 109.
76. For ex. *Man.* 2, p. 396.
77. *Man.* 2, pp. 122, 305, 521, 554.
78. *Man.* 2, p. 495.
79. *Man.* 1, p. 510; *Man.* 2, p. 369.
80. *Mok.* 1, p. 467.
81. *Man.* 2, p. 71.
82. *Man.* 1, pp. 241, 264, *Man.* 2, pp. 71, 200, 315, 318, 332, 467.
83. *Man.* 2, pp. 331, 332.
84. *Man.* 2, p. 437.
85. *Man.* 2, p. 199.
86. *Man.* 2, p. 103.
87. *Mok.* 4, p. 126. The famous eunuch Cheng Ho,^[50] though a Mohammedan, was popularly known as "the eunuch San-pao."^[51]
88. *Man.* 1, p. 510; *Man.* 2, pp. 170, 331, 369.
89. *Man.* 1, pp. 241, 284.
90. *Man.* 1, pp. 64, 378; *Man.* 2, p. 217.
91. *Man.* 2, p. 319.
92. *Man.* 2, p. 332.
93. *Man.* 2, p. 312.
94. *Mok.* 1, p. 282; *Man.* 2, p. 97.
95. *Man.* 1, p. 460. J. Gernet, *Aspects économiques du Bouddhisme*, p. 96.
96. *Man.* 2, pp. 172, 200.
97. *Ming-shih* 327. 4 ab. With regard to this substitution of one *t'ien* character for another, we may refer to the title which Esen-tayisi of the Oyirad assumed in the early 1450s. In the *Shih-lu* (*Mok.* 3, p. 484) his title is written Ta-Yüan T'ien-sheng^[64] ta-k'o-han "Great qayan T'ien-sheng of the Great Yüan," and the text goes on to explain that *t'ien-sheng*^[64] is the same as "Heavenly-Saint."^[65] And his reign title is written *t'ien-yüan*,^[66] the same, no doubt, as *t'ien-yüan*,^[67] which had already been the reign title of an earlier qayan, Toyus-temür: 1379–1388. Cf. *MCB* 11, p. 389.
98. *Man.* 1, p. 287.
- 98a. *Man.* 1, pp. 406, 407, 476, 504.
99. *Man.* 2, p. 71. It sometimes happens that tribute missions from widely different countries are listed together in the *Shih-lu*. This is rather unusual and there is no reason to suspect that it happened in this case. The formulation of this passage clearly indicates that a number of lamas came from the northeast in the company of native Jürched.
100. The relevant passages in the *Ming shih-lu* are: *Man.* 1, pp. 246, 350; 2, p. 15, 34, 109, 167, 182, 470–471, 508.
101. Both the *Ch'ing-shih kao* and the new *Ch'ing-shih* (1960), following the *Man-chou shih-lu* 1. 15 a, state that one of Nurhači's ancestors made "Man-chou" the official name of the nation. But this is an anachronism. "Man-chou/Manchu" became the official name only in 1635, and its origin has long been debated. In 1777 (*Ch'ien-lung* 42), an imperial edict stated that "Man-chou" was derived from Chu-shen,^[71] the same as Su-shen,^[72] and Ju-chen, Nü-chen.^[73] Others derive it from the name Manjurśrī, e.g. (*Ch'in-ting*) *Man-chou yüan-liu k'ao* (completed in 1783; ed. 1904: 1.1b). Er. Hauer, *Handwörterbuch der Mandschusprache*, p. 641:

- "Manju: Abkürzung von Manjuširi," L. Gibert, *Dict. Hist. et Géogr. de la Mandchourie*, pp. 602–603, also lists this interpretation but doubts its correctness. The origin of the name seems to be that the Tibetans used to refer to the "Manchu" ruler as "the great religious king Manjušri." Hsiao I-shan, *Ch'ing-tai t'ung-shih*,^[74] 1927, vol. 1, pp. 46 (50, discusses the controversy and agrees that *Man-chou* comes from the name Li *Man-chu*, itself derived from Manjušri. In a later shorter version of his Ch'ing History, *Ch'ing-shih* (T'ai-pei, 1957, p. 9), Hsiao reverses his stand and derives *Man-chou* from Li *Man-chu*, but he says that "man-chu" means "chieftain of the Jürčed." In fact he is following Meng Sen's opinion (*Ch'ing-ch'ao ch'ien-chi*,^[75] 1930, pp. 1–5). Such an explanation *Man-chu* = *chieftain* seems absolutely unwarranted. The fact that the Manchus themselves sought an explanation of their name indicates that the word "Manchu," or "Man-chou" was not a native one. Several of these references I owe to Mr. Fang Chao-ying.
102. The only reference concerning supernatural events or religious activities among the Mongols during all those years, are two cases of divination by the Altan-qayan in 1546 and 1547: *Mok.* 6, pp. 445, 493.
 103. For a summary of this agreement see my "Four Documents relating to the Sino-Mongol peace of 1570–1571" in *MS* 19, 1960, pp. 1–66.
 104. *Mok.* 8, p. 55.
 105. *Mok.* 8, pp. 109–110.
 106. A seal had already been sent to the qayan a few months before. From this text it would appear that he had requested a second one.
 107. In 1442. Cf. *Mok.* 10, App. Tib., pp. 152 et passim. The temple was lavishly endowed with land, gardens, cattle, etc. The name here is given simply as Hung-hua-ssu. This temple was not associated with the Ch'an-chiao-wang, but with the Ta-tz'u fa-wang "Greatly Compassionate King of the Law"^[80] (King of the Law of the Greatly Compassionate?) (on him *Mok.* 10, App. Tib., pp. 104, 217, 152), who apparently was then residing in Peking. The Hung-hua-ssu is indicated on the maps of the *Huang-Ming pien-cheng k'ao* 1.7b; 3,64a; 5.50b.
 108. The sūtras referred to here must be those sent in 1460: six sets (*pu*) of the Hua-yen sūtra^[82] written with gilt letters, statues (?) and other objects, together with two collections (*tsang*) of sūtras completely written in gilt script by the Ta-tz'u fa-wang and others, and a sūtra of collected sayings^[83] written with vermilion ink to be deposited (in the temple). *Mok.* 10, App. Tib., pp. 217–218.
 109. The expression *Fa-wang-Fo-tzu* appears also in *Mok.* 10, App. Tib., p. 362. Besides the Ch'an-chiao-wang, and the Ta-tz'u fa-wan, there was a Ta-pao fa-wang "King of the Law of the Great Jewel,"^[85] Ta-ch'eng fa-wang^[86] "King of the Māhāyāna Law," Fu-chiao wang^[87] "King assisting Religion," Ta-te fa-wang^[88] "King of the Law of the Great Virtue," Ch'an-hua-wang^[89] "Illuminating and Civilizing King," Hu-chiao-wang^[90] "King protecting Religion," etc. Cf. *Ming-shih* 331. *Ming hui-yao*, 1957, pp. 1527–1533.
 110. "Fan" strictly speaking means "Tibetan" as I have translated above. In Ming texts, however, "Fan" is often used for the Mongols, too (= Barbarian), and since, according to Wang Ch'ung-ku's report, the qayan had asked for "Fan sūtras," in Tatar, or Mongol script, it would seem that he wanted sūtras in Mongol, or perhaps Tibetan sūtras translated into Mongol. All the monks sent to Mongolia were Tibetans, and it is not to be supposed that the sūtras they took with them were in Mongol. Perhaps Wang's expression is a lapsus for *chin-tzu fan-ching*: "Tibetan sūtras in gilt script," which would make better sense especially since the qayan had repeatedly asked for such sūtras.
 111. *Mok.* 8, p. 140.
 112. *Mok.* 8, p. 146.
 113. *Mok.* 2, p. 633.
 114. See *Wan-li wu-kung lu*, 8, p. 156; 9, p. 15. I have been unable to find anything concerning this in the *Shih-lu*.

115. *Mok.* 10, App. Tib., pp. 64, 66, 67, 217.
116. *Ibid.*, p. 208.
117. *Ibid.*, p. 250.
118. *Ibid.*, p. 270.
119. *Ibid.*, p. 144.
120. *Mok.* 8, p. 180.
121. *Mok.* 8, p. 211.
122. *Mok.* 8, p. 234. Chien-ts'an cha-pa could well be the same as the Ch'ueh-i Cha-pa of November 6, 1574. He reappears in a text of 1581. Cf. note 143.
123. *Mok.* 8, p. 271.
124. *Mok.* 8, p. 256.
125. The *Huang-Ming pien-cheng k'ao* 4.3 a (map), and 9.6 b indicates a little Tibetan tribe by that name west of Hsi-ning. It counted some 800 men and women. The Hsi-ma temple must have belonged to that tribe.
126. *Mok.* 8, p. 224. This habit of the Mongols of "demanding rewards" consisted in asking for special favors, gifts under all forms, outside the market periods. It would increasingly become a source of irritation for the Chinese.
127. *Mok.* 8, pp. 239–240.
128. *Mok.* 8, p. 251.
129. *Mok.* 8, p. 262.
130. *Mok.* 8, pp. 320–321.
131. *Mok.* 8, p. 321.
132. *Mok.* 8, p. 326.
133. *Mok.* 8, p. 333.
134. *Mok.* 8, pp. 346–347.
135. *Shu-ching*, Legge, *The Chinese Classics* III, Part I, p. 66.
136. H. Dubs, *Hist. of the Former Han Dynasty*, vol. 3, p. 64.
137. *Mok.* 8, p. 488.
138. Without special permission, officials were not supposed to accept presents sent to them privately by foreign dignitaries.
139. *Mok.* 8, p. 389.
140. For the Ch'an-hua-wang, see n. 109; see also *Ming-shih* 331.9b–12b. The first Ch'an-hua-wang seems to have been appointed by the Yung-lo emperor in 1406: *Mok.* 10, App. Tibb., p. 51.
141. *Mok.* 8, pp. 421–422.
142. This expression must refer to the Altan-qayan's return from the West, it cannot be understood as a new formal surrender, or agreement with the Ming.
143. The title *ch'ueh-i* probably refers to the *ch'ueh-i* Cha-pa from the passage of November, 1574: Fang Feng-shih had requested a promotion for him. Fang's request was granted by the court, but he was only made a Dhyana master, without the title *ta-ch'ueh*. He may well be Chien-ts'an cha-pa (note 122): on May 29, 1581 (*Mok.* 8, p. 429) on Altan-qayan's request, he was once more sent to Mongolia with order to come back as soon as his business was finished.
144. Roerich, *Mong. Sbornik*, p. 193.

LIST OF CHARACTERS

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2 何福	25 東亞史研究
3 宋晟	26 長田夏樹 女兒干永寧寺碑 蒙古女直文譯稿
4 淨修三藏	27 石濱先生古稀紀念東洋學 論叢
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45 佛保	69 李誠善
46 觀,官,管	70 李滿住
47 保	71 珠申
48 寶	72 肅填
49 三保	73 汝,女真
50 鄭和	74 蕭一山 清代通史
51 三保太監	75 孟森 清朝前紀
52 三保奴	76 順義王
53 保童	77 經呪
54 文殊奴	78 王崇古
55 官朱奴	79 弘化闡教寺
56 朱	80 大慈法王
57 殊	81 藏經
58 歹保奴	82 華嚴經
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60 教化	84 法王佛子
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93	忠經	102	五王城
94	語錄	103	仰華
95	方逢時	104	闡化王
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A MONGOLIAN SOURCE TO THE LAMAIST SUPPRESSION OF SHAMANISM IN THE 17TH CENTURY

Walther Heissig



8. THE RELIGIOUS SITUATION IN EASTERN MONGOLIA DURING THE 1ST PART OF THE 17TH CENTURY

When *Neyiçi toyin*, at the end of his clerical education in *bkra šis lhun po*, was directed to the East for future missionary activity by a divination of his tutor, the Pancen Lama *Blo bzaiñ č'os kyi rgyal mc'an* (1570–1662) (*D*, fol. 8 r.), the South Mongolian nations of the Ordos, Tümet and Tsakhar as well as the North Mongolian Khalkha had been reconverted to the Yellow Sect of Lamaism. Shamanism and other unorthodox creeds had been outlawed there since 1558(–1582) by the code of the *Dzasakhtu* Khan, by the religious bill of *Altan* Khan (1577)¹ and the corresponding requests of the *Siditü gabču* in Khalkha (c. 1587).² Certain undercurrents of a popular Chinese Taoist mysticism, known there under the name of Bon-po, as well as of the lamaist Red Sect had continued for some while,³ but at the time of the death of *Ligdan* Khan (1634) and the decline of his Tsakhar Empire the predominance of the Yellow Sect of Lamaism was well established in these parts of Mongolia.

The Uriyanghai Tribes, as the easternmost Mongols of *Liao-tung*,⁴ east of this territory, were called at the end of the Ming period, remained still untouched by the second wave of lamaistic conversion. In the early decades of the 17th century, when *Neyiçi toyin* arrived there, Shamanism was still the religion of these Mongol tribes living east of the Great Khinggan Range up to the old frontier wall of the willow-palisade. The *D*, fol. 88 v. reports . . . *ene kü doruna жүг-үн yeke uur Mongyol ulus-un orun. yirtinčü-yin ауауа küчүн ide erdem-iyer erkesigsen. imayta tngri ongyod čaliy ba böge udayan-i sitüged.* – ‘. . . in the country of the very important Mongol nation of the East, those dominated by the forces and qualities of this world venerated exclusively the *Tngri*, Ongghot images and penates as well as the Shamans and Shamanesses . . .’

It contains distinct information about the prevalence of Shamanism amongst the Ongnighut, the 10 Khortsin Banners, the Dörbet, Dzalait and Ghorlos. The Khortsin (*D*, fol. 46 v.) had . . . *endegürejü sitügsen buruуu üjel tü böge udayan* – ‘heterodox Shamans and Shamanesses who worshipped wrongly’; and the whole nation (fol. 53 r.) . . . *olan бүгүде ongyod-i takiyad böge udayan-dur duratai ајууу* – ‘. . . being in favour of the Shamans as well as the Shamanesses commonly worshipped the Ongghot’. The

same is reported about Dörbet and Dzalait, . . . *ene orun-a burqan-u šasin ese delgeregsen böged olan bügüde imayta böge iduyan-u qobus-tur bisirin sitüküi -eče busu* – ‘in this country the Buddhist faith had not been spread. They all believed in absolutely nothing other than in the magical capacity⁵ of the Shamans and Shamanesses . . .’ (fol. 49 r.). Thus a compact stretch, extending from the Ongnighut country up to the Nonni River at lat. 45°, was in the first part of the 17th century dominated by the *buruyū üjel*, the heterodox faith.⁶

While it is reported of the Dörbet and the Dzalait (*D*, fol. 49 r.) that . . . *blama burqan nom kemegči-yi tong medekü ügei ajuyu* – ‘the so-called Lamaist Faith was absolutely unknown’, an occasional contact of the Khortsin – situated farther to the southwest – with Lamaism is acknowledged; (fol. 53 r.) . . . *tere čay-tur. ene jüg-tür burqan-u šasin tedüi ese delgereged qaya yaya nigen noyad* [sic] *ba bayši nar üsüg taniqu-yin tedüi-eče busu* . . . – ‘at that time the Buddhist Faith was not so widespread in this region: none but an occasional nobleman or a savant⁷ knew (how) to distinguish letters . . .’. One Khortsin chieftain, the *jöriytu čin wang Uyšan* said in excuse of the superficial knowledge of Lamaism (fol. 55 v.), . . . *man-u ende merged čuqay boluyad šasin tedüi ese delgeregsen -u tula nomči nar ügei* – ‘. . . few savants have been with us; no one is versed in the scriptures in this country because the Faith has not been much spread . . .’. Some Khortsin princes even read for their pastime (fol. 54 v.) the *Mila-yin namtar* (*Milaraspa nam t’ar*) which only a few years earlier, in 1618, had been translated into Mongol by the *Güsi čorji* upon the request of the nobility of South and North Mongolia.⁸ The *D* (fol. 46 v.) mentions further the learning of *dhāraṇī*- spells by the population *busudača urida* – ‘from others before’. One of these had been *bSod nams rgya mc’o dpal bzañ po*, the so-called 3rd Dalai Lama who upon the invitation of the Khortsin Khan (!) had been to Khortsin as early as 1588, where he consecrated a monastery.⁹ This seems to be the Jehol monastery 溇仁寺 *Fu-jen-szu*, also known as *Sira süme*, which is regarded as one of the oldest convents in Jehol. According to tradition it was constructed by Khortsin princes already at the time of the Ming dynasty.¹⁰ *Neyiči toyin* was thus not the first lamaist missionary to come to the Khortsin.

This description of the religious situation among the easternmost Mongols corresponds with the information from other sources. Before the arrival of *Neyiči toyin* some incidental lamaist activity may be noted among the tribes south of the Khortsin. Beginning in 1626, lamaist monks appeared in the conduct of diplomatic missions for the Manchu. In 1627, a certain *Umsat čorji* (tib. *dbu mjad č’os rje*) Lama acted as go-between in the peace negotiations between the Naiman, Aukhan and Manchu.¹¹ This proves that Lamaism exerted a certain influence upon these tribes, which until then had been part of the converted empire of the Tsakhar. The fate of the *Ariyun mergen diyanči*, as related by the *D*, fol. 36 v.,¹² who after 1629 had become a much venerated lama among the Ongnighut, demonstrated that the military expedition of *Ligdan Khan* to the West had caused a certain eastward flight of South Mongolian and Tibetan Lamas. In the first decades of the 17th century two lamaist priests were likewise active among the eastern tribes. *T’ien-tsung* 4, 1630, a certain *Darqan nangso lama* was honoured for his proselyting achievements with an obituary stele in Manchu and Chinese near the town of Liao-yang north of the Lien-hua-szu.¹³ The second, an anonymous *Da blama*, who ‘*umara Mongyol ulustur yeke lama bui* – had been a great Lama among the Northern Mongol nation’, and at the time of emperor *T’ai-tzu’s* ascend, ‘*jaγun geriin Saqalqa-yi abun Mongyol noyad-ača salju* – breaking away from the Mongol chieftains, took 100 families of the *Saqalqa*’ and came to submission, was

also honoured in 1658 with an obituary inscription and the restoration of his burial site upon imperial order.¹⁴

But that Shamanism was still the common faith of the eastern tribes during the first decades of the 17th century and that Lamaism had not been finally established, is illustrated by the character of the ceremonies performed for the mutual confirmation of truth and alliances between the Manchu and certain East Mongolian groups. This entirely shamanistic ceremony, consisting of the slaughtering of a white horse and a black cow with offerings and proclamations to heaven and earth, is recorded as having been performed in 1597 by the Manchu¹⁵ and in 1624 by the Khortsin,¹⁶ independently of each other. At this time '*olan mal alaĵu onġod-i takĵu* – slaughtering many cattle and worshipping the Ongghot'¹⁷ had been outlawed for some decades in South Mongolia. In the same shamanistic way '*tngri-dü ċayan mori. yaĵar-tur qara üker alan* – by slaughtering and offering a white horse to heaven and a black cow to the earth'¹⁸ the alliances of the Khalkha in 1619,¹⁹ the Khortsin in 1626²⁰ and the Kharatsin in 1628²¹ with the Manchu were officially confirmed.

Uriyangqai, i. e. East Mongolia at the end of the Ming dynasty, is credited by Mongolian tradition with having been the home of powerful Shamans.²² A shamanistic chronicle *Ongyot qara sakiyusun teüke sudur biċig orusiba* – 'Book of the history of the Ongghot 'The Black Tutelary Spirit'', discovered in the Tsakhar country,²³ has preserved further evidence of the dominance of Shamanism in eastern Mongolia at the time of emperor *T'ai-tsung's* victory over *Ligdan Khan* of the Tsakhar (1634) and the subjugation of the Tsakhar by the Manchu (fol. 11 r.-12 v.):

'... *Ĉinggis qayan-aċa qoyisi ĵayisang Ligdan bayatur-un*²⁴ *Ĉaqar ayimaġ abċu ireged mügdüng qota-dur qayan siregen-e sayuĵu. Ĉaqar ayimaġ-un ċirig-i ĵakırıġad . . . qayan ĵarlıġ bayulıġı olan-ċirig-eċe qoyar mingġan ċirig songġun ilyaĵu abuġad tus tus noyan darıġa talbiġu ĵaqa kĵaġar-i ċaydan sergeyileĵü kegerelen yabuqu küriye ċirig kemen nereleĵü. kegerelen yabuġulqu tüsimel ċirig-tür junglao ċaling*²⁵ *ayulıan öġċü dolıġan nuur- aċa aru ĵaqa dayayulġu baraġun ĵüġ köke qota Tümed qoyar qosıġun-u ĵaqa kürtele sergeyilen ċaydaqu küriye ċirig sayulıġı ĵil on udayan bolġu amir töbsin sayuqui-ġin tula noyan ba ċirig Uriyangqai. Solongġun barıġ-aċa qoyar ayimaġ-aċa eme ökin-i gerġei bolıan abaċu ċirig-ün kümün bolbasu ĵırüke yeke tegün-ü qara sakiġus-aċa emiyekü üġei öngge ĵisü üġisküleng bolbasu udayun ökin-i ċu gerġei bolıan abumui. eyinkü ayumsıġ üġei eme bolıan abuġuġu.*

. . . A later descendant of *Chinggis Khan*²⁶ came and took possession of the Tsakhar Aimakh of *Ligdan Baghatur* (Khan). Residing as emperor at Mukden he commanded the warriors of the Tsakhar . . . The emperor gave the order and selected two thousand warriors from all the soldiers. Appointing officers and commanders for every task he made them guard and patrol the frontiers scouting across the steppes, and he named them *Küriye* troops. 'Official salary' was granted to the officers and men whom he made to scout across the steppes. They patrolled following the northern frontier from Dolōnor in a westerly direction up to the border of the two Tümet Banners of Köke Khota. Because they lived in peace and concord for years and years after the *Küriye* troops were founded, officers and men took for spouses women and girls from the Uriyanghai and Solonghu (Corean) clans, from both of these groups. Because they were soldiers and had a firm heart they feared not the 'Black Tutelary Spirit'²⁷ and thus also took the Shamaness girls (*udıġan ökin*) for spouses, as these were of beautiful face and complexion. Being in such a manner fearless, they took them for wives.'

The first contacts of the Manchu, the eastern neighbours of the easternmost Mongols, with Lamaism still remain obscure.²⁸ There is little evidence to sustain the

opinion of Hauer²⁹ that the Manchu took Lamaism over from the Mongols at that time. The Khortsin with whom contact existed since 1593/94³⁰ and more intensive relations since 1619,³¹ and who were even in contiguity with the Manchu since that time, were for the most part still adherents of Shamanism. With the more lamaized tribes within the Tsakhar empire less friendly relations existed.

It rather looks as if the first contacts of the Manchu with Lamaism were established by Chinese Lamas in the service of the Ming. The Ming dynasty had favoured Lamaism particularly during the last decades of its reign as an instrument of political understanding with the South Mongolian tribes. During the last years of emperor *Wan-li*'s predecessor (1571 sq.) the Ming court had begun to see possibilities for calming the Mongols by encouraging the predilections of *Altan Khan* for the new 'Yellow Faith'. According to the Ming-shih *Altan Khan* was even provided by the Chinese court, upon his request, with a lama and sacred books in Tibetan.³² Consequently, when the Manchu later became a menace to the Ming in the northeast, lama priests were sent to negotiate. In 1626, a Chinese Lama *Li* was sent as head of a delegation by the Ming governor of Liao-tung to express condolence for *T'ai-tzu*'s death as well as to congratulate the newly enthroned *T'ai-tsung*.³³ In 1627, the same Lama *Li* and another Lama *Wang* acted as go-betweens in the peace negotiations between Ming and Manchu, calling attention to their religious duty to preserve peace.³⁴ In his answer to the Ming government the Manchu emperor *T'ai-tsung* showed himself acquainted with the ethical conceptions of Lamaism: some lamaist advisers must have been at the Manchu court at that time.³⁵ In the same year, 1627, the first delegation of Tibetan lamas is recorded as having been received in audience by *T'ai-tsung*.³⁶ From that time on, lamaist monks also appear on the Manchu side as negotiators: *Umsat corji lama* in 1627 with Naiman and Aukhan,³⁷ the *Weiġeng (üġeng) Nangso lama* in 1632 even as imperial ambassador to the Ming.³⁸ A few years after Liao-yang had been taken by the Manchu, in 1621, the lamaist temple 蓮花寺 *Lien-hua-szu* was constructed there *T'ien-tsung* 4, 1630.³⁹

Lamaism must have increased its influence in the Manchu-occupied territory within a very short time; its abuses even made necessary an imperial decree in 1632, against unauthorized construction of lamaistic and buddhistic temples and particularly against the mendicant lamas who were regarded as equal with the 'sorcerers, fortune-tellers and astrologuers' operating among the Manchu, Mongols, Chinese, Tümet and Kharatsin.⁴⁰

But the strategic necessity of encircling the North Chinese position of the Ming brought with it the destruction of the independent Tsakhar empire of *Ligdan Khan* and a widening of the Manchu power to South Mongolia, thus flanking the Ming (1632–1635). In this struggle against *Ligdan* arose the first common interest between the Manchu and the Yellow Church, though each of them was opposed to *Ligdan* for different reasons.⁴¹ For the Manchu it led to the official recognition of Lamaism: to manifest their interest in the lamaistic religion of their newly acquired subjects, the Tsakhar, the *Sira süme* was built by the Manchu (1636–1638) in Mukden in honour of an image of *Mahākāla* Buddha, brought by the Lama *Mergen* from the subjugated Tsakhar to emperor *T'ai-tsung*, in February 1635. The stone inscription of foundation in the *Sira süme*, dated 1638, reports about this:⁴²

(lines VII–XI): '... *dayičing ulus-un ayuda örüsüyegçi nayiramtaqu boyda qayan Čaqar ulusi dayılaŋu oroŋulqui-dur Mergen lama maqa gala -yi abun oroŋu irekü-yi. boyda qayan ayiladduŋad. lama nar- iyar ıyıtıyulŋu. mügden qotayın barayun eteged bayıyulŋu bür-ün*

unduridduyči burqan kiged šasin-u sakiyulsun maqa gala-yi qamtu ber bayiylbasu jokimui kemen sedkiŋü. yaŋar-un sayin-i sinjilen üjegeđ. mügden qotan -u barayun eteged yurban güriin yaŋar-un üjügür-e. burqan-u orun. yurban beye-yin sitügen-i bayiyl kemen. üile-yin yabudal-un tüssimed-tür jarlıy bolju. ayui yeke süme bariyad . . .

. . . When the extremely compassionate pacificatory emperor conquered the nation of the Tsakhar, the emperor was informed that *Mergen* lama had come and brought the *Mahākāla* (-statue). He had him received officially by lamas. Having set up (the statue) in the western part of the city of Mukden, he thought it proper that the guiding Buddha as well as protecting genius of the Faith, *Mahākāla* should be installed by itself. He searched for a good site. Ordering the acting minister 'Construct a temple on the top of a site to three *li* in the western part'⁴³ of the city of Mukden and install three Buddha statues! he built the distinguished great temple . . .

From this transfer of an image and its installation in Mukden by the Manchu for political reasons, the Lamaists later created the legend about the saving of the wife of *Ligdan* Khan and his sons by this *Mahākāla*-statue, which had shown them the way when they had lost it while trying to escape the Manchu.⁴⁴

Mongolian tradition dates the establishment of official relations between the Yellow Church and the Manchu in that period, too. A certain *Ilayuysan Khutukhtu*, – a title conferred at this time by the 5th Dalai Lama on a certain Lama *Čečen* (*sečen*) *čorji*⁴⁵ was sent to carry out this task.⁴⁶

' . . . Manju Dayisu noyan-du elči bolyan jaruŋu burqan-u sasin erdeni-yi sedkil-degen ayulaqu keregtei učiri bičig beleg selte kürgegülen. mügden qoton-du manju yaŋar. mingya jiryuyan jayun yučin doluyan on-du ilegebei. Dayisu ülemji bayarlaŋu elči blama-yi öber-ün takil -un orun jingja qutuy tu kemen aldarsiyulbai. bančin erdeni dalai blama tan-a beleg ergün kürgegülen . . .

. . . he sent him as envoy to the emperor *T'ai-tsung*⁴⁷ of the Manchu, delivering presents as well as a letter, to wit, that it was necessary to install in his mind the jewel of the Buddhist Faith. He was delegated to the city of Mukden in the year 1637. *T'ai-tsung* was very much pleased and appointed the Lama envoy to his own chaplain, praising him as *lČaň skya Khutukhtu*. He had presents delivered to the Pancen Erdeni and the Dalai Lama . . .

A similar, though less definite inscription, in the Khalkha monastery *Amur bayasqulangtu süme*, dated Kienlung 1737, reads as follows:⁴⁸

'Tayidzu. Tayidzung -un čay-un öriine jüg-deki Dalai blama kiged Bančin erdeni degedü erdem küsen qalayıŋu ken-u urida-ača sedkil siyudqaŋu dayabai – In the time of T'ai-tzu and T'ai-tsung, the Dalai Lama as well as the Pancen Lama who lived in the West (Tibet), striving after higher virtue and not in accord with each other from old times, paid their reverence . . .

Although these missions marked the establishment of friendly relations and can be regarded as a kind of concordat with the Yellow Church, no general conversion of the Manchu itself was achieved. They remained '*. . . böge iduyan sitügeltei* – venerating Shamans and Shamanesses'.⁴⁹

These were the religious circumstances in eastern Mongolia and Manchuria about the time that *Neyiči toyin* decided to pay a visit to emperor *T'ai-tsung* . . . *šasin-i delgeregülkü-yin beleg jokiyaqu-yin tula*. – 'because of appropriate signs for the spread of the Faith' (*D*, fol. 41 r.).

9. THE FUNCTIONS OF 'PURE' SHAMANISM

The manifold shamanistic sources from Buriat Mongolia, Khalkha, Ordos and Tsakhar as described and collected by N. Poppe, the Shaman songs from eastern Khalkha collected by B. Y. Vladimirtsov, the shamanistic prayers and rituals presented by G. D. Sanzhhev as well as the ritual songs of present-day East Mongolian Shamans as traced out by the author⁵⁰ are not very suitable for the reconstruction of the basic conceptions of the pure Shamanism of the early 17th century. Being the products of more recent periods, they testify to the results of the lamaistic challenge only.

The aforementioned shamanistic chronicle from the Tsakhar country, *Ongyot qara sakiyusun teüke sudur bičig orusiba*,⁵¹ preserved older popular tradition which is free of the lamaistic superimpositions so typical of all later prayers and rituals. It shows Shamanism as developing out of the worship of the ancestors of a clan. This manuscript is quite a recent copy from an original that is presumably much older. It is undated; but as the brief synopsis of the rise of the Manchu to power, following in it (fol. 11 r.-16 v.) upon the legend about the origin of Shamanism (fol. 1 r.-10 v.), ends abruptly with the beginning of the reign of *Engke amuyulang*, i.e. *K'ang-hsi*, it is to be assumed that in this work shamanistic tradition of the early 17th century, contemporaneous with *Neyiči toyin* and relevant to the territory of his missionary activity, had been noted down.

This shamanistic legend of origin reads:⁵²

*'Aru qangγai-du nutuylajū*⁵³ *sayuγsan čaytur nigen Ingdaqai neretü kümün öber-ün ečige-yi yañıyū soloyai erdem-dür bolbasurayγan anu yেকে nebterkei medeltei boluγsan-u tula erdem-ün čidal-i yarγayγan ügei bolquı-dur ečige-degen ügülerün tan-u erdem čidal onol medeltei boluγsan tula olan amitan-i asaran nigülesküi sedkil-i egüskebesü sayın bui-ja kemen keleküi-dür ečige anu qariyū ügülerün.*

minu beye kedüi čidal medel-i oluγsan bolbaču nasun anu ötegüs bolju toγurın yabuquı-dur berkesiyemüi. ene nasun-u yabudal-i bütügejü jabduquı anu masi čiqula bi čimadur sakısuγai minu nasun ecüüsleküi-yin čay-tur mederel ügei dotura amisqul böküi čay-tur nigen sayın yaγar olju talbiγsan takıbasu qoyiči edür čimadur tusatai kereg bütügemüi jakıju keleküi-yi köbegün Ingdaqai kičiyen küliyejü abubai.

*tegüneče qoyisi nigen sarayın qoyına genedte ebüge ečige inu ebedčın yeke bolju ulam-ıyar kündürejü yekedeküi čay-tu köbegün-ıyen dayudan ügülerün minu jakıγsan üge-yi umartuγsan buyu kemen asaγubai köbegün anu öčiñü umartayγan ügei kemen üge keleküi-dür tere sayın kemejü amisqul degere bolju čirai(n)-u öngge sirui metü qubılañu quryu*⁵⁴ *qojoyıyan aman-u eteged bolγan doturaban buruγu sanaγa onol-i boduγu amisqul quriyaba.*

egün-dü köbegün anu ečige-yin jakıγsan yosuγar tegün-ü üküdel beye-yi mön kü čay-tur abču yabuquı-dur doturaban bodun sanañu yabuγsayaγ yaγča asqan ulayan qada-yin emüne engger-tür nigen qabtaγai čilγun degere talbiñu onγot sakıγus kemen ügüleñü tabıγlan takıju mörgüged bučiñu qariba.

*tegüneče köbegün Ingdaqai sinin nigen dolyan yisün-e nigen modun qoyıdaya*⁵⁵ *čai nigen modun qoidaya usun nigen modun qoyıdaya ariki ergüñü ügülen kelejü mörgügseger γurban jıl-ün emüne qoyına önggereküi-yin kiri-dü tere asqan ulayan qada-yin oroi-dur egülen manang čıylaran degdejü sarnıqu egülesikü yangğutai boluγsan qoyına köbegün anu nengčü süsüg töröñü jula küñi ergün yangγalajū mörgübei.*

tegüneče nasun-ača nöğčigsen ebügen-ü sünesü yaγar-un ejid nıbday sıbday tai neyilen nökečiñü jıl on udayad čidal nemegdejü arbis tarnı surayad ataγa tngri -yin sudur nom-i olju ilerkei medel čidaltai bolju börün möndür oroγulju ayangγa sumu bayulγan ayultu maγu anu būridüñü sara sibayı-yin malaγa tel-e kenggereg bütügen beledkegsen anu tere onγot qara

sakiyulsun nere oluy-san-aça inayşi daraçabar Ingdaqai -yin eke nasun-aça nöğçigsen-i köbegün anu mön kü qayučın yosuyar ulayan qada-yin emüne ongyolan takijü talbiba.

tere urida -yin ongyod sünesü sarnıysan ügei olan yayum neyilejü nöke-çigsed ulam çidal oluy-san tuçaitu ene emegen-ü sünesün tede-luça nökeçijü emegelji ejü udayun-u surtayun-i edügen egüskejü üiledün mayu -yin bolba-sural türgen tula. ene emegen emegelji ejü kemen sakiyus nere olba. ede bökün olan yayum neyilen nökeçijü ulam- iyar jıl on udayad küçün çidal olju keyilekü niskü egülen boruyan-i uriju oruyulqu ayangya çakilyan dayudaqu ayangya sumu-yi bayulyan çidaqu irigün möndür bayulyaqu eyimü ayumsıytu qour-yi üiledcü çidaqu- aça qadana kümün amitan mal adayusun kürtele qour kijü çisun-i sime kümün amitan-i qorlaçu tere yaçar-un oyira orçim⁵⁶ -un ayıl qorlal-aça ayuju jayılan negijü alay-a qola jayılabaçu tegün-ü çidkür ongyod-un aysan yaçar keyilen nisçü kürkü anu nidün irmekü -yin jayura kürçü iremüi.

eyinkü çidaltai boluy-san tula olan kümün jöblejü naribçılan keleşejü arya ügei qalqa uriyangqai qoyar ayımaç ulus neyilejü ulayan qada-yin jüg çai ariki usun-u degeji ergün sibsin jalbariju takıysan-u qoyına ayumsıytai qorlaqui anu nemeçibesü qay-a nigente osoldabasu nilqa köbegüd buyu ese bögesü kümün-ü sayın mori üker-tür qour-a talbimui esebesü ere eme kümün-dü orusin çöçijü eldeb yangjun-bar anasilaqu kelekü ügülekü terigüten-i üjügü-legsen-ü daraça-bar Bürgeü kemen neretei kümün-dür orusin çöçiyad bayuy-san-i olan-iyar üjijü qara ongyot kemen dayudaçu keleşekü-ben bayiju qara sakiyus kemen tabıysan-u qoyına qara öngge-yi çegerleju barayan⁵⁷ kemen kelemüi.

basa nigen ökin-ü nere anu Odqon keüken kemen dayudamui. tere ökin-dür emegelji ejü sakiyus orusiju çöçiy-san-i olan-iyar üjiged yayıqan keleş-çeküi-yi yayun ügülemüi.

tere qara ongyot. emegelji ejü uduyan qoyaçula genedteken nigen edür-e qamtu bayuju yangya-bar yangyalan çai ariki-yin serjim ergijü qara ongyot. uduyan keüken qoyaçula kei keyilen nisçü asqan ulayan qadan-u jüg keyilejü yabuyad. tere ulayan qada-yin oroi-du yaruyad tel-e kenggereg-ben olju abubai.

tendeçe tus tus-tayan tel-e kenggeregiyen deledün sara sibaçun-u öden malaya emüsçü kei nisçü ekebe qariju ireged.

öber öber-ün ger-tegen oruju kenggereg-ben deleddeju ügüleküi anu altan kenggereg -ben egüreju olan amitan-i tusalaqu-yin tula ataya tngri ner-ece bayuju yirtinçü-yin olan amitan-i tusalaqui-yin uçır-tu bayuy-san iregsen kemen kele-küi-yi olan kümün sonubaçu üjiged olan-iyar keleşejü yayıqamsıytu medeltei sakiyus kemen uçır siltayan asayuy-san -u daraça tere qoyar ongyot ejü-yin ügülekü anu çai ariki usun-u degeji ergün süsüg törön olan-iyar takıbasu ta bügün-i tedken çidamui kemen keleküi-dür olan kümün uridayın qorlal-yi medeju olan kümün ayun emıyeju böge. niduyan kemen nereyidcü sakiyus bolyan çai-u serjim arikin-u serjim usun-u serjim ergün takıqu bolba.

tegüneçe qara qurçun⁵⁸ -u arasu-bar beye kijü qara lüngdüng⁵⁹ -ber nidün kijü sakiyus ejü barayan sakiyus kemen sitüjü sitügen bolyan takıjuqui . . .'

A certain *Ingdaqai*, at the time when staying at the Aru Khangghai⁶⁰ (-Mountains), his father having advanced very far in the perfection of the erroneous and sinister knowledge, said to his father as he did not manifest his power, 'It certainly would be good if you would show a mind compassionate to all creatures because you have become so skilful in your power.'

Upon these words the father replied, 'Although I have found so much power, it is painful to walk around being of old age. With the termination of this life approaching, it is very important that I should protect you! If you, at the time that my life will come to an end, when I unfeelingly breathe my last, will find the right place and inter and worship me (there)-I shall perform things in later days which are of benefit to you!'⁶¹

The son *Ingdaqai* received these words attentively.

One month later the old father fell very sick all of a sudden; the sickness becoming

more and more serious, he called for his son and asked, 'Have you forgotten my instructions?' The son replied that he had not forgotten. Thereupon he said, 'That is good!', and his breathing stopped, the colour of his face changed into that of earth, he stretched his fingers up to his mouth, his mind became confused and he drew his last gasp.

Thereupon, in the way ordered by his father, the son carried away at the same hour the dead body, and after he considering (the order) had carried it away, all by himself he laid the corpse on the top of a flat boulder at the southeastern declivity of the Red Cliff⁶² which towered up there all by itself. He made an offering and worshipped, addressing him as 'Protecting Genius of the Ancestor!' Then he returned.

From then on the son *Ingdaqai* made offerings to him of one wooden bowl of tea, one wooden bowl of water and one wooden bowl of milk-wine brandy on the first, seventh and ninth day of each new moon, saluted and worshipped him. After a time of about three years had passed while he worshipped, clouds and fog gathered around the peak of the Red Cliff, rose and dispersed. The son showed devotion after it had clouded up in this way. He made offerings of lamps and incense and he worshipped driving away the obstacles.

Thereafter the spirit of the deceased old father allied itself in friendship with the masters of the place. The years passed and, his power increasing, he learned the incantation,⁶³ making his own the prayer of *Atagha Tngri*⁶⁴ he came to be of profound knowledge and power, making hail to fall, thunderbolts to descend and accomplished terrible evil. The hat from (the feathers of) the yellow bird and the drum with a (stretching) bar⁶⁵ were made by him.

Some time after the 'Protecting Genius of the Ancestor' had become famous, when the death of the mother of *Ingdaqai* occurred, the son interred her according to the old custom south of the Red Cliff and made offerings.

The earlier ancestor-spirits had not vanished, they had unified and allied themselves with many things.

Gradually acquiring a powerful nature the spirit of the old woman allied itself with these in friendship. This gave rise to the Shamaness doctrine of the *Emegeldzi edzi*, 'the very old Grandmother'. This old woman became well-known as the tutelary spirit *Emegeljī ejī*,⁶⁶ because evil spread rapidly.

Uniting herself with all things, with the years passing she gradually acquired power to mount into the air and to fly, to invite the clouds and the rain, to summon the lightning and the thunder, to make the thunderbolts to fall and drenching hail to fall. Aside from being able to do such dreadful harm she did evil to man as well as to animal, poisoning the blood of men and beasts. The households in the immediate vicinity of that place, afraid of this harm, took to flight and migrated away. And though they fled to far remote places, her demon flying from the place of its interment, arrived too within the twinkling of an eye.

Many people took counsel together discussing this thoroughly, because it had become so powerful. Inevitably the two Aimakhs of the Khalkha and the Uriyangkhai⁶⁷ became associated. When they, with invocations and exorcisms, had made offerings of the primes of tea, brandy and water at the site of the Red Cliff, after it had been expressed and stated that a remedy was to be found by various different means, that even if the dreadful evil were to increase, it should at least be compassionate and do no harm to infants and children but only to a man's good horses and cattle or even obsess a man or woman making them tremble. Thereupon it entered a man by the name of *Bürgeü* [so]

that he was shaking. This descent was witnessed by many people and they addressed it as 'Black Idol'. After having been worshipped as 'Black Tutelary Spirit' the mentioning of the black colour was forbidden and it was called 'The Dark One'.

There was further a certain girl called by the name 'The lastborn daughter'. The entering of the *Emegeldzi edzi* into this girl shaking her convulsively was seen by many, and astonished they argued what this be.

All at once one day, the 'Black Idol' (*qara ongyot*) and the Shamaness *Emegeldzi edzi* both entered into ecstasy, and by sprinkling (unsalted) tea and milk-wine brandy they exorcised the evil. Mounting into the air, the *Khara Ongghot* and the Shaman-girl flew to the site of the Red Cliff. They reached the summit of the Red Cliff and found their crossbar-drums and took them.

Each beating his own drum, the hats from (the feathers) of the Yellow Bird donned, they then mounted into the air and returned.

They entered tent after tent beating their drums and saying,

'For the aid of all creatures
Carrying the golden drums,
For the purpose of saving all creatures of this world
Have we descended from *Ataya Tngri*.'

Many of the people heard what they were saying and told each other that these must be wonderfully powerful tutelary spirits.

Having inquired about the situation, *Ongghot* and *Edzi*, these two said, 'We can protect all of you if you become pious and make sacrifices offering the primes of tea, milk-wine brandy and water!'

Upon these words all the people were aware of the former evil. All the people were frightened.

They called them Shaman (*böge*) and Shamaness (*niduyan ~ iduyan*) and made offerings by sprinkling tea, milk-wine brandy and water that protection be given.

Thereafter they fashioned images, making the body from the fur of a one-year-old black lamb and the eyes from blackberries and calling them 'Tutelary Spirit *Edzi*' and 'the Dark Tutelary Spirit' they made offerings to them . . .

The protection of man and his livestock against all perils of sickness and havoc caused by the ill will of evil force appears as the primary function of Shamanism. The spirit of the ancestor was worshipped because it had promised help against these dangers. Later the spirit was invoked through the medium of the Shaman because of its ability to counteract the dangers to life and property. The Shaman, in a wholly mediatory role, was the only means of communication with the forces to which all life was exposed. Hence he was the only medical help against diseases which were but manifestations of these forces. Thus the position of Shamanism and its interpreter – the Shaman – stems from the most urgent need of a primitive economic society for preservation and protection of the means of subsistence: health, fire, food, game and livestock as well as human labour, i.e. children.

Shamanistic legends of origin from Buriat Mongolia speak similarly of such a primary function of Shamanism. For instance, a legend about the Khori Buriat *Ongghot Qori-yin qoyar keüked*, reported by Sanzheev⁶⁸ relates how two sisters, the ancestors of the cult of that particular *Ongghot* in Buriat Mongolia, '... when their uncle contracted a sickness of the stomach, cured him with a bull (i.e. they made an offering of a bull) because their family was a shamanistic one . . .'

Shamanism in Buriat Mongolia came into contact with Lamaism in comparatively modern times,⁶⁹ this impact apparently leaving fewer traces than in Mongolia itself. Buriat Shamanism seems to have preserved more old shamanistic notions originating from South, East and North Mongolia,⁷⁰ as demonstrated by frequent references to an origin from Uriyangqai, as well as by the fact that lamaist influence during the early 17th century⁷¹ and the political disorder of the *Galdan* wars during the last decades of the 17th century caused refugees from South Mongolia and Khalkha to migrate to Buriat Mongolia.⁷²

The pledge of a newly initiated Buriat Mongolian Shaman, reported as still in use in 1836,⁷³ likewise testifies to this foremost function of Shamanism:

‘Bi nengde tengde jon-du yabužu eldeb-iyer üjemerlen kümün-ü ebedčin jobalang-i tusalaba –
Going to this and that people I aid against human sickness and pain by exorcising in various manners!’

The same Buriat Mongolian source explains Shamanism as ‘... *amitan-i tusaladaγ* ... *arya* – a method which aids the creatures.’⁷⁴ Yet Shamanism does not render this aid because of the conviction that this will be helpful in a future life. That lack of a moral incentive is one of the main arguments of Lamaism against Shamanism.⁷⁵

Aside from the lamaistic deities which were introduced later into the shamanistic prayers from Buriat Mongolia, South Mongolia (Tsakhar and Ordos) and Khalkha, as described by N. N. Poppe,⁷⁶ the shamanistic gods are invoked for the protection of material things only:

- A. They create and grant: food, property, booty, livestock (horses and cattle), long life, happiness, children, peace and union, domestic happiness;
- B. They protect against:
 - 1) pain, diseases, wounds, epidemics, scurf, reptiles;
 - 2) evil and death (*Erlig Khan*);
 - 3) obstacles (*jedker*), evil spirits (*ada*), devils and demons (*čidkür*), enemies, passions, sins, bad luck.

In many cases a particular deity is thought master over a particular disease, e.g. in the Buriat tradition: *Güjir günggür tngri* over the *Idegen kečig* – ‘food contagion’,⁷⁷ *Ata-a (Ataγa) tngri* over the horse plagues and *Godoli uluyan tngri* over the *Üker -ün kečig* – ‘Cattle plague’.⁷⁸

Further proof that the satisfaction of physical needs is the primary office of Shamanism can be seen in the fact, that in East Mongolian shamanistic prayers of recent times⁷⁹ a new pantheon, acquired under the influence of lamaism, is again invoked for medical help. The deities have changed, yet not the ends for which they are invoked.

The magical practices by which the satisfaction of these needs is sought are commonly called *bögelekü* and *üjemerlekü*. *Üjemerlekü* is defined⁸⁰ as ‘... *ongyot-i uriju irigüleged dotura-ban oroyulba kemen tere ongyon-u nereber bögelejšü bayiju üjemerlen keleküi bui* – to invoke the Ongghot and make it enter, then to shamanize in the name of this Ongghot, stating that it took possession, is called *üjemerlen* ...’ The chronicle of the Selenga Buriat calls Shamanism only *üjemer*.⁸¹ *Üjemerle* –, from the root *üje* – ‘to see’ (Ordos: *uDZimer* – ‘something worth seeing’, MDO II. 750), explained by Kovalevski, I. 545 *b* as ‘clairvoyancy, divination’, designates much more magical practices.⁸²

- a) Intercession in behalf of old or sick persons by worship and invocation of the particular Ongghon (*teyimü neretü ongyon*) to cease to afflict with sickness or death (*ebedgülkü ba ükügülkü jabduju*);
- b) Exorcism (*kögeju üledükü üledbüri*) of the evil doing demon (*qourlaju čidkür*). Exorcism was to be performed by 1) banishing into an effigy⁸³ (*žolij*; E. M. *DŽolä*)⁸⁴ which then was burned or 2) into a live animal which then was slaughtered;⁸⁵
- c) Expulsion (*γaryayal*), when harm is done to live or dead property (*ed tawar*);
- d) Divination from the scapula of a sheep (*qoni-yin dalu-yin yasun*);⁸⁶
- e) Pronouncing (*dalalya*) charms and spells over herds and children to protect them from contagious diseases and evil.⁸⁷

Using these ‘combinations of natural means to achieve supernatural results (Kombinationen diessseitiger Mittel um jenseitige Wirkungen zu erzielen)’⁸⁸ Mongol Shamanism presents itself basically as preventive and therapeutical witchcraft (Heil-Zauber).

It is not within the aim of this chapter to discuss the shamanistic pantheon which reveals a colourful variety from place to place. It is merely intended to show that all powers and forces represented in Shamanism, whether positive or negative, protective or harmful, were thought to be the souls of former living beings, originally only those of Shamans.

In confirmation of the conception presented in the above-quoted Tsakhar Shaman Chronicle, tradition preserved in a Buriat Chronicle⁸⁹ defines the origin of these powers: ‘*öni urida-ača qoyisida nöğčigsen böge iduyan-u süne-sün inu. ene tere ayula. youl γorqod. nayur. oi terigülen-dü. tedeger-ün ejid ongyod. čidkür bol žutedeger anu. amitan-i tusalaji ba qourlaji bayinam . . .* – the souls of the Shamans and Shamanesses who have died since a long time ago, becoming the masters, Ongghot and demons of these mountains, streams, brooks, lakes and forests etc. are helpful as well as harmful to creatures . . .’

A similar but even more distinct definition is found in another Buriat Chronicle which says:⁹⁰ ‘*. . . urida anu nöğčigsen böge niduyan ba. basa ču nöğčigsen kümün-ü sünesün ongyon boluyad kümün-e ebedčün kiged ükül boluyad jarim nöğčigsen kümün-ü sünesün čidkür boluyad kümün-e qowladaγ . . .* – the souls of the Shamans and Shamanesses who died earlier as well as the souls of other deceased persons became Ongghon causing sickness and death to human beings; the souls of other deceased persons became *čidkür* (demons) being the cause of harm to human beings . . .’

The *buumal* < mo. *baγumal* ‘descended’, appear to have a similar function. Buriat Mongol tradition⁹¹ speaks of them only as a kind of female spirits, ‘*tngri-yin ökid. ayui yeke buumal eke boroyčün terigülen 33 buumal-uud* – the heavenly virgin, majestic *buumal* mother *Boroyčün* and the other 33 *buumal*’. Recent-day East Mongolian Shamans speak of the *buumal* more broadly as the spirits of dead relatives, ‘*ečige bumbul, eke bumbul, abu-yin bumbul* – the father-*buumal*, the mother-*buumal*, the grandfather-*buumal*,⁹² and even as descending from the primogenitor of all of their Ongghot, the *Tang wang ejin*.⁹³

*Tang wang ejin-eče tarqaγu γaruγsan bumbul
taquul damsij-yi arilγayči ongyot
‘Ghost risen out of Tang wang ejin,
Idol which purges epidemics and contagion . . .’⁹⁴*

Intensification of shamanistic power was obtainable only through a long line of ancestors, whose spirits had gained mastery over many other souls, i. e. either beneficial

or harmful powers, and put them under obligation during endless past generations. The notion of the inheritance of an Ongghot is clearly related in the *D* (fol. 60 v.) in the words of the *Bingtü* Khatun, ‘... ene nigen ongyot kemegči inu ečige ebüge -eče inayši surbal-jılaḡu minu beye-dür kürčü ireged. minu beye ba keüked-tür ču gem ügei -yin tula tong tebčin yadamu ... – ... a so-called Ongghot came down to me from father and grandfather; I was unable to renounce it since it brought no harm to me and the children ...’

Exogamy⁹⁵ practised between the clans and nations was the reason for the spread of the various conceptions about the Ongghot, as well as for the fact that, aside from the real ancestors, a line of mythical Shaman-ancestors is remembered by the Shamans⁹⁶.

The evil forces, feared by the Shamanists and fought by the Shamans, are variously distinguished: *čidkür* – ‘demon, demoniacal obsession, devil’, *tüidker*, *jedker*. – ‘obsession, obstacle’, *ada* – ‘demon’, *eliye* – ‘birdlike fiend, will-o’-the-wisp’, *teyireng* (dial. *tireng*⁹⁷) – ‘demon’ etc.⁹⁸ To define their categories seems impossible, but apparently the *čidkür*, as the personification of the bad principle, is commonly thought to be the master of all the other negative forces. In connection with this, mention should be made of an old conception which has been preserved by one of the didactic sayings within the collection *Činggis qayan-u čadig*,⁹⁹ a compilation from the first part of the 17th century and approximately contemporaneous with *Neyiči toyin*. This rhyme distinguishes devil ~ obstacle and demoniacal fiends as originating from different directions:

‘*doruna-ača iregsen*
tudqar čedkür metü
emüine-eče iregsen
ada eliye metü –
 Like devils which
 have come from the East;
 Like demoniacal fiends which
 have come from the South.’

Basically this seems to be the same conception as that of ancient Indian medicine: that the spirit (*manas*) is afflicted with two defects, viz., *tamas* – ‘restraint (Hemmung)’, and *rajas* – ‘desire (Trieb)’.¹⁰⁰

Pure Shamanism, – i.e. Shamanism before its contact with Lamaism¹⁰¹ – had, as judged from the contents of the Tsakhar Shaman Chronicle, no conception of another world or a realm of death, to which the Shaman only had admission and which, adorned with many attributes of the lamaistic Hades, appears later in the more recent shamanistic incantations.¹⁰² In pure Shamanism the ghosts and spirits of the dead remained in this world at their burial sites. These sites developed into haunted places, being tabu to others because of fear, but to the Shaman who has power over these ghosts and spirits.

The evil forces were invisible; the positive and protective ones had figurative manifestations, inspired by the medium of the Shaman – the Ongghot idols.

The earliest obtainable reports about the popular religion of the Mongols invariably speak about their images of housegods ‘... made from felt and shaped like human beings’, which they had placed on stands at both sides of the entrances of their tents and of whom they believed that these gods took care of their flocks.

‘Other gods they manufacture from silken rags ... when such idols are to be made,

the older women of the neighbouring tents congregate and manufacture them in great devotion . . . The Mongols make to the above-mentioned idols offerings of the first milk of their sheep and beasts of burden; before they begin to eat and drink they make to them offerings of their food and drink . . .’ reports Plano Carpini.¹⁰³ There is a similar report by Marco Polo.¹⁰⁴

The Tsakhar Chronicle describes the manufacture of the Ongghot idols in much the same way, and then goes on to tell about these images being endowed with spirit (fol. 9 v): ‘*qara sakiyus-i tere beledkegsen qara quruγan-u arasun kürüg-tür orusiγulǵu takiqu bolba* . . . – then there was a prayer that the Black Tutelary Spirit should enter this image made from the fur of a one-year-old black lamb . . .’

This housegod was commonly called *Emegelǵı ejı* – ‘the very old Grandmother’, the Immegiljin of Pallas. Kovalevski, 215 *b* gives a description of this deity which accords well with that of Yüan times: ‘garden de la maison, de la famille et tous les biens. Chez les Shamans on le fait des peaux de moutons et de différents torchons de toile’. From Yüan times down to the lamaist missionary period, these protective images thus changed neither form nor office. The *D* reports (fol. 54 r.) them as existent and worshipped in the middle of the 17th century all over Khortsin and the adjacent East Mongolian territory. Because of the conception of these Ongghot being inspirited by the magical forces of Shamanism, the first action of Lamaism was everywhere an iconoclastic purge – as will be demonstrated later. Statuettes of lamaist deities, mostly of fierce appearance, were substituted for the housegods and treated by the Mongols in the same way as the Ongghot had been formerly treated.¹⁰⁵ The Buriat custom of painting the various Ongghot (Bur. *zurugtan* ~ Mo. *ǵıruγtan*) on silken cloths of various colours, as reported in 1875 by Yumsunov¹⁰⁶ and confirmed for more recent times by Sanzheev,¹⁰⁷ seems to be a later consequence of lamaist purges, to make the hiding and the transportation of the images easier.

The social position of the Shamans in the early 17th century was still one of influence on all members of the Mongol society. But in contrast with the situation in the 12th century, when the Shamans were the leaders of the tribes and members of an aristocracy in the making,¹⁰⁸ the Shamans of the 17th century must have been recruited from all social strata. The *D* presents as the typical representatives of the East Mongolian Shamans of that time one aristocrat, the *doγsin qobustu böge tayıǵı* – ‘a nobleman, being a Shaman of ecstatic magical capacity’ as well as an untitled woman, *üγemürči mergen udayan*.¹⁰⁹ Both show some of the common traits of the Shamans: ability to defeat the evil spirits of illness, power over natural forces like clouds, thunderstorms and rain, power to foretell the future. The *böge tayıǵı* rides a white stallion – which had been the particular privilege of the first Shaman¹¹⁰ of the Mongolian tribe.

The Shamans of that territory must have formed a kind of an organized, churchlike body since the *D* (fol. 53 r.) reports about an assembly held by them previous to the arrival of *Neyiči toyin*, where passive resistance against the lama missionaries was decided upon:

‘Before the venerable Lama set out and came to that region, these Shamans had conferred with each other, saying, “A great and sage Lama will come from the West. We shall not come when he arrives although he might invite us, because there is no place for us together with him!”’

No meeting took place later, although they had been invited.’

The similarity of conceptions and deities, which are recognizable as alike even in the modified prayers from lamaist times in South Mongolia, Tsakhar, Ordos, Khalkha and

Buriat Mongolia,¹¹¹ as well as in East Mongolia,¹¹² is proof for the existence of such an original body or school of shamanistic thinking. This so much the more, since shamanistic tradition still characterizes Shamanism as '*üsüg ču ügei nom . . . sudur ču ügei nom . . .* – a creed without writings, a creed without books too . . .'.¹¹³

To gain ground against this system of preventive and therapeutical witchcraft, Lamaism had to employ devices which satisfied the same needs and concerns even more convincingly.

10. A PATTERN OF BUDDHIST MISSIONARY APPROACH

About one hundred years ago, no less an authority than Max Müller¹¹⁴ attempted to explain the conformity between the Shamanism of Tibet, Mongolia, Siberia, Northern Asia and Northern Europe by assigning to each a common root in early Indian Buddhism. He regards Shamanism as popularized (abgesunkenen) Tantrism. In recent times it is becoming more and more evident that the development was in the opposite direction; – Mongolian and North Asiatic Shamanism as well as old Indian Tantrism and Shivaism are now regarded as offsprings of humanity's most archaic type of religion in which ecstasy and magic helped to obtain protective power from the local deities.

The history of Buddhism in India shows that for expansion and continuance, Buddhism was compelled to create and include the secret doctrine of Tantrism, using such popular archaic types of magic, because 'the petty citizen and peasant could do nothing with the products of the soteriology of the educated upper classes . . .'.¹¹⁵

Buddhism in its first approaches to China shows an understanding for these social factors: Buddhist thinking penetrated only gradually into the Chinese intellectual circles; the broader masses were won by a display of the magical powers of the early missionaries and by the efficacy of the Indian medicine. *Fo-t'u-teng*, converting the Sino-Hunnic border population of North China in the early 4th century A. D., won his followers by supernatural phenomena,¹¹⁶ recognizing that the profound doctrines would not be understood. Magic alone was regarded as evidence for the power of the newly propagated creed.¹¹⁷

Sanskrit inscriptions found in Yünnan, consisting mostly of tantric specimens provide further evidence that Tantrism was used as a primary penetrating force of the first Buddhistic mission in South China.¹¹⁸ The tantric spells satisfied the spiritual requirements of the peasant population for help against the demons.

Lamaism, during its competition with the local Tibetan Bon-po from the 7th to the 10th century A. D., included in its system many of the popular local conceptions of the Bon-po demonology.¹¹⁹ The use of popular notions and the terminology of the attacked faith was at that time nothing exceptional. At the time of the T'ang Dynasty in China, Manichaeism as well as Nestorianism used both Buddhist phrases as well as theological conceptions and names of gods taken from Buddhism, for the purpose of attracting the attention Buddhist believers it was seeking.¹²⁰ In the controversy between Lamaism and Bon-po the lamaist systematization of demonology, a pantheon enlarged by the inclusion of the old, familiar gods and, last not least, terrorism overwhelmed the older Bon-po and forced it to camouflage itself.¹²¹

While within the Lamaist Church, Tantrism had to submit to certain changes of position after the reforms of *Atiśa*, its importance remained for all missionary activities

of the Lamaists. The first lamaist conversion of the Mongolian emperors during the 12th century came about by proving the effectiveness of the magic¹²² and medicine¹²³ of the monks of the Red Sect. Marco Polo reports about the magical performances of these lamas at the Yüan court.¹²⁴ There they were in competition with official court-Shamans as late as in the 14th century.¹²⁵ The cult of the *doysid* – ‘terrible, fierce’ manifestations, particularly of *Mahākāla*, was propagated during this first lamaist conversion. During the last decades of Yüan rule over China, Tantrism in its most secret and devious form of Shaktism was of great influence at the Mongol court¹²⁶ and one of the final reasons for the decline of the Mongol leading circles in China.

The dominance of Tantrism in the missionary approach becomes more evident during the second lamaist conversion of the Southern Mongols. Anti-shamanistic regulations – the legal code of the *Dzasakhtu* Khan (1558–1582/3) and the religious edicts of *Altan* Khan (1577/8) banned the owning, and worship by bloody sacrifices¹²⁷ of the Ongghots and in their place were substituted the images of the six-armed *Mahākāla*,¹²⁸ i. e. a terrible manifestation. A subtle policy of substituting new lamaist prayers in the place of the old shamanistic invocations, incantations, consecrations, ban-formulas, benedictions, etc. began with this.¹²⁹ As demonstrated by some of these prayers collected from Inner Mongolia or Khalkha,¹³⁰ *Mahākāla*,¹³¹ *Hayagrīva*,¹³² *Vairocana* ~ *Bisman tngri*, *Tārā* and *Ökin tngri* were substituted for the former shamanist deities. It should be pointed out here that in all the known lamaist adaptations from North and Inner Mongolia, *Yamāntaka* appears only once, in a sutra from Ordos.¹³³

Dhāranī spells were propagated and taught instead of the outlawed shamanistic incantations. The popular collection of spells and prayers, the *gzuñs-bsdus* (Mong. *sungdui*) which is in daily use amongst the Lamaists, contains *dhāranī* for exactly the same needs of the Mongol nomadic and cattlebreeding society as formerly the Shaman had prayed for: for instance, *Qutuγtu qour-a-yi arilyaγči neretü arvis tarni* – ‘Sublime *dhāranī* which destroys the evil’, *Qutuγtu todqar-i arilyaγči tarni* – ‘Sublime *dhāranī* which destroys the demon’, *Qutuγtu ed mal-i sakın nemegülügči neretü tarni* – ‘Sublime *dhāranī* which protects and multiplies the livestock’, *Qutuγtu jedker-i tasul un teyin böged arilyaγči neretü tarni* – ‘Sublime *dhāranī* which brings to an end the obstacles and thus extinguishes them’, *Qutuγtu qara mahagala-yin morin-u tarni* – ‘Sublime spell of the Black *Mahākāla* for the horses’, *Qutuγtu morin-u qamuγ ebedčin-i sayitur amur-liyuluyči tarni* – ‘Sublime *dhāranī* which effectually alleviates the diseases of horses’, etc.¹³⁴ That the newly imposed lamaist formulas were only substitutes for the shamanist functions, and were constructed along the same psychological pattern, is illustrated by one *dhāranī* which is part of the Tibetan as well as of the Mongolian Kandjur,¹³⁵ and which was taken over in one of the Mongolian versions of the *gzuñs-bsdus*, the *Sira ebečin-i arilyaγči tarni* – ‘*Dhāranī* which effaces the bilious attacks’.¹³⁶

Sira ebečin-i arilyaγči tarni. γurban erdenis-tür mörgümü. Namō ha tu he gi svaha. debigür-iyer beye-yi debibesü süsün ebečin. nidün siralaquī ebečin. qabangγu ebečin kiged-i arilyayu. sira ebečin-i arilyaγči tarni tegüsbei. –

‘*Dhāranī* which effaces the bilious attacks. Salutations to the trinity. *Namō ha tu he gi* (?) *svaha*. If the body is fanned with a fan, then the bilious disease, jaundice (verbally: the illness which makes the eyes yellow) and hydropsy disappear. The *dhāranī* for overcoming bilious attacks ends (here).’

The similarity of the functions of the fan mentioned in the above *dhāranī* with that of the whip or drumstick of the Shaman should be pointed out particularly. The custom accompanying a popular lamaist incantation from the Ordos country¹³⁷ confirms this.

This spell against 'an enchantment in the form of an ailment' is pronounced while making loud noises. The exorcising lama, uttering *pat-* and *sot-dhāranī*, lashes out threateningly with a whip of braided straps and a handle of tamarisk which resembles the whip-like drumstick '*daytar eriyen moyai* – the scaly spotted snake' of the East Mongolian, Manchu and Tungus Shamans, the *amitai-yin tasiyur* ~ *sorbi tasiyur*¹³⁸ 'wand' of the Buriat Shamans.

The chanting of the old shamanistic songs and tunes was prohibited, too.¹³⁹ How rigorously this purge of shamanist deities and idols was carried out is demonstrated by the form in which some spells or prayers of shamanistic origin have been preserved by oral tradition. A *dalalya* for a successful hunt from Ordos, doubtless of shamanistic origin and once addressed to *Bayan mani*, the Ordos equivalent of the Buriat hunter-ongghot *Anda bars*,¹⁴⁰ was permitted to remain in use but without addressing any particularly named deity.¹⁴¹

Tsakhar and Bagharin were converted to Lamaism by lamas of the Tantric Red Sect previous to and during the reign of *Ligdan Khan* (1604–1634). The Tibetan-Mongolian inscription of *Ligdan* in *Čing čing čayan suburya*,¹⁴² dated 1626, gives evidence how this kind of Buddhism satisfied the old shamanistic concerns by propagating '*qoyar tüüdker arilyaqu-yin tulada* – for the destruction of the two obstacles' (line 16). Besides the lamaist deities *Vajrasattva*, *Birodzana* ~ *Vairocana*, *Mañjuśrī*, *Ökin tngri* and *Tārā*, particular mention is made of Sariputari as '*qamuγ tüüdker arilyačī* – destroyer of all evil obsession' (line 14). Even for the lamaist amulets worn around the neck, the familiar name of the shamanistic protective idols remained in use (line 7) '*... Ongyon utasun-i jégügčī -yin büse(n) üd -ün jaṅginaqu* . . . tying the band of thread with idols strung on. . . .'

A similar pattern of lamaist missionary approach is recognizable in the conversion of the northermost Mongols, the Buriats, during the last decades of the 18th century. Although Buriat tradition claims that many lamas lived at approximately the time of *Ligdan Khan*'s Kandjur translation (1st part of the 17th century) among the eleven clans of the Khorī Buriats,¹⁴³ Lamaism did not reach full bloom¹⁴⁴ there before 1712. This is the date reported for the arrival of the first lamaist missionaries, fifteen lama monks from Tibet, in the Selenga and Khorī districts, who then '*... nom ba em-iyer amitan-i tusaladaγ anu* – were of help to the people with prayers and medicine'.¹⁴⁵ The first lamaist monasteries were founded among the Selenga Buriats around 1730 when more than fifty Tibetan and one hundred Mongolian lamas were sent to this district.¹⁴⁶ From there the lamaistic activity was extended to the Khorī Buriats about 1741.¹⁴⁷ Up to 1788 there was not a single lama living amongst the Buriats of Agha who until then '*bügüde böge-e giγin mörgül -i sitüdeg aγsan aγyū* – were completely adherent to the Shamanist creed'.¹⁴⁸

By 1808, Lamaism had gained firm ground in the Khorī district because lamaist medicine and exorcism had proved more effective than Shamanism: '*basa sašin delgerejü em-ün nom-un suryayuli suralčaysan blama nar ebedčīn bodaγa taqul-i emnekü ba nom-i ungsijū boluγsayar kümün nügüd -ün eldeb ebedčīn- iyer ebedkü kiged čγ busu ükül-ün ayul-ača arčīlaydaγū* . . . – . . . moreover, the faith spread while lamas trained at the medical faculties, treating the diseases and venereal contagions¹⁴⁹ and reciting prayers relieved human beings from the fear of being afflicted by various diseases and of premature death . . .'.¹⁵⁰ Then, after 1819, the initiative was taken by a Cossack lama who '*ongyon-u düri dürisü bui bayıqu yaγumas tai-(y)i yaldaγsan* – having burned things of the shape of the Ongghon idols',¹⁵¹ a conventicle at *Čongyol barayibuu* (Tib. *bras-spuñs*)

Monastery decided on the iconoclastic persecution of shamanistic idols. From 1820 on ‘*Silingge. qori irinčin arban tabun ečige qasay-ud. baryuĭn suyisu. tungkin alayir kürtele. ongyon-u düri dürisü böge iduĭyan-u ĵebseg tei. čöm ĵal-dur tülibeĭ*. – Selenge, Khorĭ, the fifteen clans Irintsin, Khasakh, Barghutsin, Suisu (?) up to Tungkin and Alair put to destruction by fire all the Ongghot images, utensils and armours of Shamans and Shamanesses . . .’.¹⁵² Shortly after his conversion to Lamaism the *ĵasaĵul Ranča* of the Khorĭ ‘. . . *uridu sitüĵü bayiĵsan ongyodiĭyan uĵaryad* – foreswore his idols which before had been venerated’.¹⁵³

The Buriat chronicles mention nothing about terrorism accompanying these happenings, but oral tradition reflects it. A narration from the Khorĭ Buriats, related by G. Sanzheev,¹⁵⁴ tells how two shamanist sisters, descending from Mongolia, were exiled by lamas into the wilderness north of Lake Baikal upon being denounced by their scheming stepmother.

Amalgamations like ‘*Maqa galan darqan güĵir tngri – Mahākāla* as the chieftain and eldest of the 99 *tngri*’, which are to be found in more recent Buriat shamanistic invocations¹⁵⁵ prove that here again tantric ‘terrible’ deities have been propagated as substitutes for the shamanistic deities.

In Buriat Mongolia too, Lamaism intruded into all spheres previously governed by shamanistic customs and notions. In particular, during the first part of the 19th century, a certain *Blo bzah rdo rĵe*, vulg. *Dordzi Danzanov* directed treatises against Shamanism and some of its customs, as for instance, the slaughter of an animal for the offering¹⁵⁶ and consuming by the whole clan¹⁵⁷ and even against the ancient wedding customs influenced by Shamanism.¹⁵⁸

In the nomenclature of Mongolian lamaist literature, Shamanism though barely mentioned is clearly distinguished from *Bonbo* ~ *bombo* as *qayučin ba buruĵu üĵel* (*D*, fol. 13 v.) – ‘old and heterodox creed’, *buruĵu üĵel* – ‘heterodox creed’ (*D*, fol. 46 v.); *Dordzi Danzanov* or *buruĵu nom* – ‘heterodox doctrine’.¹⁵⁹ But *Bombo*, derived from Tib. *bon-po* here no longer designates the Tibetan Bon-po faith; it is applied rather to Taoism, the other enemy of lamaist expansion in Eastern Mongolia and the border provinces.¹⁶⁰

As demonstrated above, Buddhism, – the old Red Sect – and later the reformed Yellow Sect of Lamaism, both employed essentially the same pattern of missionary approach to a more primitive religion and society, viz.; the old shamanistic practices were absorbed and intensified by a theological systematization.¹⁶¹

This conclusion is confirmed by a recent formulation of the lamaist methods of approach by the famous Lama *Agvan dordchiev* ‘. . . the conversion of various nations has to be different; while the one will be converted by mere discipline, others are to be subdued by magic powers, i.e. terror’.¹⁶²

How far do the methods employed by *Neyiči toyin* correspond with this pattern?

11. THE MISSIONARY METHODS OF NEYIČI TOYIN

In the missionary activity of *Neyiči toyin*, two periods are clearly recognizable, in analogy with the above-outlined pattern:

- A. The persecution of Shamanism;
- B. The substitution of the *Yamāntakā* and *Guhyasamāja* worship for shamanistic notions.

A. The persecution period

All the persecutive and iconoclastic actions are reported by the *D* as having happened before the visit of the son of *Neyiči toyin* (fol. 58 v.) to emperor *T'ai-tsung* († 1643) at Mukden. Shortly afterwards (fol. 61 r.) there is a reference to the setting apart of many captured Chinese and Korean boys to the priesthood '*saya tulγur törü-yi toγtaγaqui-dur* – when the firm government was founded'. As this means the setting up of the Manchu government at Peiping on October 30, 1644,¹⁶³ a definite date is established for the end of this anti-shamanist period.

The *D* indicates the following anti-shamanist methods of *Neyiči toyin*: 1) display of greater magic power; 2) greater medical proficiency; 3) influencing the sovereign to interfere with the old religion by economic encouragement of converts; 4) iconoclastic purges of shamanist idols.

1) Display of greater magic power towards an Ongnighut Shaman (*D*, fol. 37 v.–40r.):

Tere čay-tur Ongniγud-un gege yekede čilerkeǰü. mergen blama nar ba. emči domči nar-tur üǰügülbegsü ber. ese ǰalaraγsan-dur. nigen tüsimel inu üǰüler-ün. man-u ene ǰaǰar-a nigen yeke mergen qobus tu böge tayiǰi bayǰı bui amu. tegün-i urıǰı gege-yin čilege üǰülbesü sayin bui-ǰa kemebesü. efü gege tüsimed bügüdeger masi jöbsiyefü. tere kü böge-yi urıra elči ǰarubai.

tere ǰabsar-a blama orud bitüǰü binyad erǰü ǰalaraγsaγar gege-yin ǰadana kürčü ireküi-dür. olan kümün uyılçaǰu (38 r.) barin amu. blama tedden-eče eyin asaγur-un. ta yaγun-u tula ene metü demeı üimečǰü. tede üǰüler-ün. manu qatun gege čilerkeǰü ebedčin inu yeke-yin tula sandurču bayin amu. blama či ebečin bariqui-yi mededeg buyu kemen inayǰı čınayǰı üǰüledün atala. nigen kümün dotura oroyad. tere inu gege ten-e eyin kemer-ün man-u ǰadan-a nigen ebügen blama ireǰü binyad ǰuyun amu kemebesü. gege üǰüler-ün. tere ebügen blama bögesü olan-i üǰegsen bui-ǰa. tegün-i ǰalaǰu dotura oroyul kemegsen-dür. blama-yi yaγaran türgen-e ǰalaǰu. barayun eteged debisker ǰaǰaǰu saγulγabası gege öčir-ün. üčüken minı beye ebečin-ü yeke ǰobalang-a bariγdaju teskü ügei-yin tula. blama aburan soyurqa kemebesü. blama barayun eteged-eče ǰabılaǰu aγsaγar gege-yin dergede odču (38 v.) adislayad ǰabılaγsaγar orundayan saγuqu ba. adislaqu büri ebečin inu amurliγsaγar odqui-dur inu gege terigüten bügüdeger yaγıqǰu mayad nigen yeke boyda-luγa uçırabai ni kemen. masi yekede bayasuyad blama-dur saγuqu örgöge ergüye kemeküi-dür. blama ǰarlıγ bolur-un. bi olan kümün-lüge qanıčıǰu sayun ülü čıdaju nadur qoruyana-ča ǰadana qola ger barıtıγai kemegsen yosıγar örgöge-yi qoruyan-u ǰadana aylaγ suγud ǰaǰar ergüǰü nigen kedün qonıγ ǰalaraǰu sayun atala. urıda ǰalaγsan tere qobus tu böge tayiǰi kürčü ireged. gege-yin čilege sayin bolıγsan uçır-i asaγabası. tedeger üǰüler-ün. nigen (39 r.) orud-i bitüǰü yabuqu ebügen blama uçıraǰu. ǰabılaγsaγar ireǰü adislaqu ba. adislaqu büri ebečin amurčaqu terigüten-i masi yaγıqǰu üǰüleged. bodataı burqan mön kemen bügüdeger alayaban qabsurun süsülen ǰalbarılčıqui-dur. tere maγu qobus tu böge tayiǰı sonusuyad. yeke atay-a töröǰü masıda ayurlan olan bügüde-dür eyin üǰüler-ün. tan-uqai tere blama. burqan mön busı-yi bi nigen edur tengsesügei kemegsen-ü qoyına.

nigen edür qobus tu böge tayiǰi čaγan aǰarγaban unıǰu. blama-yin saγuqu ordun-u ǰadaγtır qaskir-un ergıǰü dobtuluyad basa basa tere üiledügsen-dür. ǰüǰ ǰüǰ-eče salkin ködel-ün qara egüle üimečin (39 v.) čakılγan čakılan luus-un ayuqu metü doγsin dayun-i tačıǰınan dayurısqaǰu yeke qura oroqui-luγa. darui darui ayungγa bayuyad. üčüken udayasan-u qoyına. qura nöǰčiküi kiridu qobus tai tere böge tayiǰi aǰarγan-ača bayuyad. qurdun-a güyüǰü blama-yin egüden-i degesı qayaǰu orkiγad ireǰü nigen eteged saγuyad ǰı-a bi yambar bayınam. kemen asaγusγan -dur. blama müsiyen bayıǰu orkimǰön-dayan čurıγulun aburγsan ayungγa-yin sumun-i tegünü emüne čıdquǰu orkiγad činu küčün egüber baraydabai-ǰa kemen ǰarlıγ bolıγsan-dur. böge tayiǰi üǰüler-ün tegüber ülü baraydamı bi dakin tengsesügei kemegsen-dür. blama-yin aman-ača burqan-u ünẹn. nom-un ünẹn. bursang quwaray ud-un ünẹn kiged. ǰurban erdeni-yin ünẹn-ü adistid -un küčün tegüsügsen yogadzari buyu bi. či tengsegdeküi kemen ǰarlıγ bolımayča böge tayiǰi tatabalǰın unajı kelen inu ǰayurayad kelen yadan nidüben čayılabalǰın ǰar-ıyar (40 r.)

ĵirūken tus-ıyan kürgen kürgen ĵıyaγsan-dur. blama šabınar-tur ĵarlı bolĵu minu dergede abču ire kemeded abču iregsen-dür. oroı-ača γar-un abısıγ öggügsen ĵirūken-i tarnıdaγsan -dur. qabar-ača inu moyai γarbai. tedüi tayıĵi delerüged sayın bolĵu blama-ača ubası-yin sanwar abuγad.

tendeče qariqui-dur ıyan unuĵu iregsen čayan aĵaryaban ese tanıbai gekü.

‘At that time the royal princess of the Ongnighut fell gravely ill. When she did not get better after consulting learned monks as well as physicians and exorcists, a dignitary said:

“A great, wise and powerful Shaman-prince is living in this my country. Should he be summoned and the illness of the princess be examined, this certainly would be good!”

The imperial son-in-law, the princess, the dignitaries all consented heartily to what he had said. Therefore a messenger was sent to approach the Shaman.

Many people were crying when the Lama who in the meantime had been roving over the country and living by alms, came to the outside of the residence of the princess. The Lama asked them, “Why are you so alarmed?”

“Our princess has fallen ill”, they told him, “We are worrying because her illness is grave. Monk, do you know how to treat the disease?”

While they were talking in this way and that way, one man went inside. He reported to the royal princess, “An old Lama is outdoors; he came to ask for alms!”

“If he is an old Lama”, the princess thereupon said, “then he certainly has experienced many things. Invite him and show him in!”

Hastily the Lama was led in. When he had been seated, a cushion having been prepared for him at the right side, the princess spoke, “My inferior body”, she said, “has been stricken with pain. Grant relief, o Lama, as I cannot bear it!”

The Lama then proceeded with benedictions from the side where he was sitting cross-legged, towards the royal princess. With every benediction – both while sitting cross-legged at his place as well as while coming nearer – the disease receded. Marvelling, the princess and all the others said, “Have we not finally met with a truly great Saint?”

They felt very happy.

“We will offer a tent for the Lama, to stay”, they said.

“I cannot live in close community with many people”, answered the Lama, “you may set up the tent for me far outside of the camp!”

According to his words the tent was set up at a very remote place outside of the camp. When he had installed himself and had been living there for more than one day and one night, the Shaman-prince who had the magic power and who had been summoned earlier arrived.

Inquiring for the cause of the princess’s recovery, he was told, “Having met with a migrant old Lama he, after sitting cross-legged (near the bed of the sick), began to bless her and the disease receded with each blessing!”

This and other happenings they told him marvelling. Clapping their hands in pious prayer they said that this (must) be a Buddha incarnate.

When he heard of this, the Shaman who had the bad magical power became very jealous and, angered beyond all limits, said, “One day I shall prove to you that this monk is not a Buddha!”

After having spoken thus, once a day the powerful Shaman-prince galloped on his white stallion in circles around the outside of the Lama’s camp. And while he performed this again and again black clouds came swimming from all sides blown by the wind,

lightning flashed, torrential rain fell roaring like the wild, frightful song of the dragons, and with it thunder descended again and again.

After a little time had passed the powerful one, the Shaman-prince, dismounted from the stallion and at the very moment the rain ceased. Running hurriedly and pushing up the (tent-)door of the Lama, he came in and sat down at one side of the tent.

When he asked the Lama, "Aye, and what sort of a man am I?", the Lama smiling took a thunderbolt, stored in his (red) cloak, and threw it before him saying, "Herewith is your power brought to an end!"

Said the Shaman-prince then, "It is not suspended by this; I shall prove it again!"

Hardly had the words left the lips of the Lama, "I am a Tantric (Yogi) having obtained the power by the blessings of the true trinity, of the true Buddha, the true Faith and of the Community of the Believers. Dispute that!", when the Shaman-prince fell down seized by convulsions. His tongue stuck out, he was not able to speak, the whites of his eyes showed. When he pointed with the hand constantly towards his heart, the Lama said, "Bring him before me!" Then, when he [the Lama] had blessed him with his hand from the crown of the head on and bespoke the heart with spells, a snake left through the nose. The prince rose cured and received the consecrations of a layman from the Lama . . .

It is related that when leaving afterwards he did not take to his white stallion on which he had come . . .

2) Greater medical proficiency as shown in the cure of a Shamaness in the Khortsin Country (*D*, fol. 43 r.-44 r):

Tendeče boyda blama šabinar-lur̄a olan qosiyun-i kesüjü. beye šabinar-lur̄a eldeb briti qubilyan-i üjügülügsen ba eldeb jüil-iyer tusalaşsan kiged. eldeb nom-i üjügülüin nomlaşsan yabudal anu uciraşsan qosiyu büri-dür todor-qai böküi-eče öbere. Tüsiyetü qaγan-u dergede ireküi-dür. nigen ayil-un quduytur oyira bayuγad ger-iyen bariγulju saγubai.

tere çay tur Tüsiyetü qaγan-u ulus-tur nigen üjemürçi mergen udayan aγuyu. tedeger ber aliba üile (43 v.) üiledküi-dür. tere udayan-iyar üjügülbesü ülü endekü mergen tere udayan anu. qoyar nidüben ebedü aldayad tong yayuma üjekü ügei-yin tula. edüge bi qoyar nidün ügei amitu yabuqu. yaγun kereg ölberçü ükü sügei kemen ken ber qoribaçu ülü bolun ködege-dür odçu ölberin kebtgesen-i. boyda blama-yin qoyar šabi tere ayil-ača çai-dur neyilegüлкü sün yuyura odqui-dayan dayariju üjeged tere udayan-ača çai yaγun-ü tula ködege-dür kebtinem asayabas. udayan ükü sügei kemen kebtgesen siltayan uçir-iyen bürine tayalan kelegsен -dur qoyar šabi ügüler-ün. teyin bögesü udayan çai dēmei buu uqurçilaydaqui tan-u ende nigen yeke mergen blama irejü bayučam. tegüber üjügüljü sayin ülü bolqu buyu. bide sün yuyura tan-u ayil-dur ečinem kemegsen-dür udayan ügüler-ün.

teyimü bögesü ta namayi minü gerte abçituyai. tan-u kereglegsen-i bi öggüye. ta namayi abçıju tere (44 r.) blama-dur iyan uçirayul kemegsen tegünü üge-ber. tere qoyar šabi udayan-i ger-tür inu kürgejü eril-iyen oluyad. udayan-i mön kü kötölügseger odçu boyda blama-yin ordu-yin yadana kürbesü. blama-yin qoyulai jasaqu dayun-i toda sonusuşsan-iyar jirüken inu yekede ködelün süsüg töröbei.

tegün-eče ger-tür oroju blama-dur mörgüged adislayulurşan-dur. ulam degejigseger udayan-u qoyar nidü uyuyata arıju sayin bolurşan-u tula. udayan ünēn çing süsüg-iyer bisirejü öber-üneče Tüsiyetü qaγan-dur. boyda blama-yi yekede maytan yayıqajū ügülegsen . . .

'Thereafter the venerable Lama roaming with the disciples all over many banners, displayed with his disciples various magical transformations and gave help in various forms. He performed many prayers.

Besides these accomplishments, well-known in every banner, when he had come near the *Tüsiyetü* Khan he put up in the vicinity of a well, set up his tent and stayed there.

At that time a wise, fortune-telling Shamaness was living amidst the people of the *Tüsiyetü* Khan. Whatever matters they undertook, if the Shamaness had predicted them, she was never found to be wrong.

This wise Shamaness lost both of her eyes by sickness.

“What is the purpose of it”, she said, because she could not see anything at all, “that I should live without eyes? I shall starve to death!”

Two disciples of the venerable Lama, on their way to the hamlet to beg for milk to be mixed into the tea, passed and saw her – she had gone to the desert and was lying there starving, as she could not obtain enough though collecting everything. When they asked the Shamaness, “Why are you sleeping in the desert?” the Shamaness said, “I shall die!”

When she had related the circumstances of her sleeping there, the two disciples said,

“If it be so, Shamaness, do not give yourself up without reason. A great wise Lama has come and stays at your place. Let him look if (your eyes) can not be well again. We go into the hamlet to look for milk!”

“If it be like this”, she said when they had told her, “you might as well accompany me to my tent. I shall give you what you need. Let me meet your Lama accompanied by you!”

Upon these words the disciples brought the Shamaness to her home and received what they wanted.

The Shamaness then, while led her way, was stirred deeply in her heart hearing the sound of the Lama clearing his throat when she arrived outside of the Lama’s tent, and she developed faith.

Because the two eyes of the Shamaness were completely cured as she rose, after entering the tent and receiving the Lama’s blessing prostrated before him, the Shamaness believed with faith and of her own accord. praised the venerable Lama to the *Tüsiyetü* Khan . . .’

3) Influencing the *Tüsiyetü* Khan of the Khortsin to interfere with the old religion by encouraging the converts in a material way (*D*, fol. 46 r.-46 v):

Aqa degüü qoyar masida bisiren nom sonusçu şabi bolbai. uridu üile-yin açi-bar siltayan-aça barılduşu učıraqsan tegüs qubitu öglige-yin eñed-tür eldeb briti qubilyan-i üjegül-ün abisiş kiged ubadis-i soyurqaşu eldeb kölgen-i nomlan sedkil-i inu nomuyadqaşu uqaşan-i geyigülün nom-un kürdün-i orçıyuluyad.

endegüreñü sitügsen buruşu üñel tü böge udayan tngri ongyod-i (46 v.) anu jarlaşu čöm tebčigülüged. burqan-u şasin-i sayın delgeregülküi-dür nigü-lesküi-yin uran arıyabar uduridqu-yin tula. jarlayuluşan anu quriyangşui čigejelegsen kümün-dür mori öggüye. Yamandaga čegejelegsen kümün-dür üker öggüye kemegsen jar-i sonusuyad sača. ügegüs yadaşus arad čöm oyun-u činege ber nom čegejelebei. busud-aça urida čigejilegsed-tür jarlaşan yosuyar mori üker şangnaşu öggügsen-ü tula. ulam tere kü yosuyar-tayan dayuriyan. yeke baya nom ud-i čegejelegseger süsüg ten olan bolşu. şasin delgeregsen-ü qoyına Tüsiye tü qaşan şasalang-aça nögčijüküi.

‘. . . both, the older and the younger brother (= the *Tüsiyetü* Khan *Aoba* and *Jasaytu düğüreng Butači*) showed much devotion, listened to the prayers and became followers. Teaching various vehicles, conferring instructions and consecrations, showing various transformations to the fortunate almoners whom he (= *Neyiči toyin*) had met on the occasion of the retribution for former actions, he enlightened the knowledge and pacified the hearts, turning thus the wheel of faith. All these Shamans and Shamanesses of the heretical, idolatrous faith were made to renounce the propagation of (their) deities and idols.

To lead with charitable ingenuity to a good expansion of the Buddhist Faith he (= *Tüsiyetü Khan*)¹⁶⁴ made publicly known:

"I shall give a horse to everybody who memorizes the *Khuriyangghui*; I shall give a cow to everybody who memorizes the *Yamāntaka* (*-Dhāraṇī*)!" Thereupon, from the moment that the announcement was heard, all the poor and destitute memorized the prayers according to their mental capacity. As he, in accordance with the announcement, was presenting horses and cattle also to those who had learned (them) by heart from others before, there were many believers who, whilst memorizing great and small prayers complied with it by and by in such a way.

After having spread the religion, *Tüsiyetü Khan* left the woe of this world.'

4) Iconoclastic purges of shamanist idols (*D*, fol. 53 v.-54 r.):

Tendeče blama jarliḡ bolur-un. ta ene жүг-үн wang beyile beyise güng yeke baḡa noyad tegüs bisirel ten qola oyira-ača čiyuluḡsan bügüde erten-ü buyan ba ḡurban erdeni-yin adistid-un küčün-iyer čilüge uçaral tu sayin sitügen-i oluḡsan ene ḡayiqamsiy bögetele. neyite bügüde onḡyod-i takiḡsan-iyar ene nasun-dur tusa ügei-yin degere qourtu boluḡad. asidayin tonilquī-dur yeke tüidker bolqu-yin tula onḡyod-i takiquī-ban tebčijü. ilangḡui-a ḡurban erdeni-yi degejilen ergün takibasū. ene qoyitu qoyar -tur mayad tusa bolumu kemen jarliḡ boluḡsan-dur. wang-ud noyad yekede bisirejü jarliḡ-un yosuḡar öber öber-ün qariyatu elči kiged. blama-yin šabi niḡged quwaray selte-yi жүг-bürī-dür ulayḡ unuḡulun jaruḡsan tede ber. noyad ba. tüsimeḡ qaračus bügüde-yin gerte oroḡu (54 r.) onḡyod-iyar ḡarḡaḡu man-dur öḡ kemeküi-dür. jarim anu darui ḡarḡaḡu öḡgümüi jarim-ud öber-iyen ḡarḡaqui-ača ayuḡu tende bui kemen qostiyu-bar tügejü jiyarḡsan-i quwaray ba. elči ner tedeger onḡyod-i čurḡayulḡu abun bökü жүг-eče qurajū ireged. blama-yin ḡadana abču ireḡsen-i dörben qanatu ger-ün tedüi oboḡalaḡu yal-tur tüleged.

tere metü buruḡu üjel-i tasul-un burqan-u šasin-i kkir ügei bolḡabai.

'Afterwards the Lama said, "Whilst it is admirable that you regents, Beyile, Beyise and Güngs, noblemen of high and low rank of this region, true believers assembled here from near and afar have found faith and good protection by the power of the earlier merits as well as by the blessings of the Three Treasures, there is no benefit for that life and, far more, it is harmful that the idols are commonly worshipped. It will certainly be of benefit for both later if you, ceasing the adoration of the idols because this is a great obstacle to your eternal salvation, worship and offer to the Three Magnificent Treasures!"

Regents and noblemen became very faithful upon these words and, according to the urging, each of them sent his own representative envoy with each one monk of the Lama's disciples, on relay horses in every direction. When these, entering the lodgings of all noblemen, dignitaries and commoners alike, were saying, "Hand your idols to us!" some handed them over, the others too timid to remove them said (only), "Here are they!"

Dispersed all over the banner the deputed monks and envoys collected these idols and brought them together from all sides. What they had brought, they piled up as high as a tent of four gratings outside of the Lama's lodging, and they set fire to them.

The heterodox faith was thus brought to an end and the religion of Buddha became immaculate.'

The region affected by this iconoclastic purge was the Khortsin Country and its vicinity.

The size of the pyre built from the confiscated idols gives an indication how very large their number was. The average Mongolian tent is about two and a half yards high at its summit; the *qana*, its grated, folding wall units each extend 6–7 feet in length. The

measurements of these confiscated idols would not have exceeded those of some Ongghot still in use with the Buriat Shamans. Three of those are reported¹⁶⁵ as fitting into a wooden box of about 4.5 : 18 : 27 cm, i. e. a single image would not be higher than one span. The oldest available pictures of Sibi-ro-Mongolian Ongghot images, preserved by a European traveller from the end of the 18th century, confirm this size.

With regard to the motives for this *auto-da-fé*, it should be pointed out in addition, that according to the lamaist belief burning destroys any magic power of an object.

B. The substitution period

Analysing the lamaistic divinities propagated by *Neyiči toyin* in substitution for the outlawed shamanistic deities, throughout the whole biography we find mention of:

- a) *Čoytu včir ayuyuluyči* *Arban yurban burqantu včir ayuyuluyči*
 (*Śrī-vajrabhairava*) (*Vajrabhairava* with a retinue of 13 Buddhas)
- 

Yamāntaka
- b) *Niyuča quriyangyui* (*Unio Mystica*)
 (*Guhyasamāja*)
 - c) *Dzagra sambhara*
 (*Cakra-Samvara*)
 - d) *Včirdhara*
 (*Vajradhara*)
 - e) *Itegel včir satua*
 (*Vajrasattva*)

All five of these divinities belong to the *Vajra* group, those lamaistic Buddhas which use the thunderbolt (*vajra*) to dispel the demons.

Yamāntaka, *Guhyasamāja* and *Samvara* are regarded as the most essential divinities of the Tantric system within the reformed Tsongkhapa doctrine. Their services were conducted daily by Tsongkhapa himself.¹⁶⁶ *Yamāntaka*, the terrible (*doysin*) manifestation of *Mañjuśrī* was the personal guardian (*yidam*) of the reformer Tsongkhapa, and is taught to be incarnate in him.¹⁶⁷

With regard to the aim of this study, it is to be pointed out that *Mañjuśrī* is regarded amongst the Medicine Buddhas as the particular deity who cures contagious diseases.¹⁶⁸

Of this pentad it was the fierce, tantric manifestation *Yamāntaka* whose invocation and sacred spells in particular were taught by *Neyiči toyin* to every converted East Mongolian.

For this the following genesis is discernible:

Neyiči toyin, being mainly a theological disciple of the Pancen Lama (*D*, fol. 8 r.) whose first predecessor is regarded in lamaist hagiography as an incarnation of Tsongkhapa's favourite disciple *Mk'as grub rje*, designated himself a Tantrist (*Yogadzari*; fol. 39 v.). His personal guardian (*yidam*) was *Yamāntaka*. When *Neyiči toyin* arrived in Köke Khota at the outset of his ecclesiastical life (fol. 10 v.) he already had a particular way of invoking *Yamāntaka*, a method which was then contested as unorthodox. Later he developed (*D*, fol. 31 v.) '... *Urıda ügei Yamandaga-yin egüskel tegüskel-ün jerge* ... a procedure for originating (*egüskel*) and substantiating (*tegüskel*) of *Yamāntaka* which had not existed earlier'.¹⁶⁹ From this it might be assumed that *Neyiči toyin* continued to

develop the Bhairava Tantra system which, together with the special worship of Tsongkhapa after his death, had been propagated and spread by *Mk'as grub rje* (1385–1439).¹⁷⁰

The adoption of the *Guhyasamāja* and *Yamāntaka* spells by the broader masses was *Neyiçi toyin*'s particular concern. Aside from the example cited above regarding material inducements, the *D* contains another testimony to the intensified propagation of these divinities (fol. 74 r.-74 v.):

jug-büri yaĵar yaĵar-tur Yamandaga ċeġeĵelegsed-tür niĵeged lang altan kiged. niyuċa quriyang-quyin bütügel-ün arġa ba ündüsün-i ċeġeĵelegsed -tür-niĵeged niĵeged lang altan kiged mönggü yadanggi (74 v.) tan-a ed tawar kiged mal adayusun ab alin-i küseksen-u yosuġar öġgüksen-dür yerü Yamandaga niyuċa quriyangyui ċeġeĵileksen masi olan boluluġa. ilangyui-a dotuġadu nom-un öġlige kiged ġadaġadu-yin ed tawae-luġa qoyar ġüil öġlige aġui yekede tüseksen-iyer ċab aldar anu yaĵar degere büġün-e könggeristele aldarsin daġurisbai.

‘There were many who recited by heart the *Yamāntaka* and *Guhyasamāja* (spells) after he had given from all the gold, silver and other various treasures, silk, sable furs and all the other various goods which had been donated by the almoners, high and minor lords and many regents, one ounce of gold to everybody in every direction and every place who had learned by heart the *Yamāntaka*, and one ounce of gold and of silver each to everybody who learned by heart the method (*bütügelün arġa*, Skr. *Sādhana*) and the spell (*ündüsün*, Skr. *Dhāraṇī*) of *Guhyasamāja*, as well as goods and cattle to the paupers according to their needs.

For the intensive distribution of these two kinds of alms, the very spiritual alms of prayers and the material alms of goods, his fame was spread all over the country and he was loudly praised.’

The nobility was encouraged in a different way, by gifts of ‘sacrificial pyramids and suburghas of one ell height or more, cast from pure gold and silver’ which were covered with the ‘treasure of the spells (*Dhāraṇī*)’.

That *Neyiçi toyin* aimed primarily at a superficial attraction of the broader masses without concerning himself about a theological foundation, is clear from one of his answers (*D*, fol. 41 r.):

ken kümün mörgüre irebesü. teden-dür imayta niyuċa nom-i nomlan saġuqui-dur. yekes šabınar eyin öċirün. man-dur deġedü niyuċa-yi üġügülküi wang abisig üġei kümün-e buu üġüġül buu nomlan kemen ubadislaqu böġed. edüġe kümün büri-dür. niyuċa nomlaqu ene yambar yosun bolba kemen ayılad-qabası. blama ġarlıġ bolur-un. tan-uġai tere masi ġöb bui-ġa bolbaċu ede enggi-yin arad deġedü niyuċa-yi nigente nomlaġsan-iyar ken doturaban bay-taġaġu uġan aqu. töröl dutum-dur anu abıyas boltuġai kemen ċikin oroqu anu ġuturum bi kemen ġarlıġ bolġuqui.

‘... when someone came to worship and he sat down with him preaching the most secret doctrine, the intimate disciples asked, ‘You have instructed us when teaching the sublime Tantra not to preach, not to explain it to anybody without the consecration.’¹⁷¹ What means it that now you preach the secrets to everybody?’

Having been told this the Lama said, “Although you are right indeed, how are these simple¹⁷² people to understand the deepest mystery having it preached only once? I am anxious to win their attention, by telling them that striving be in every rebirth . . .”

How far-reaching the popularization of the *Yamāntaka* cult was is illustrated by an envious accusation against *Neyiçi toyin* which the *Saskya nom-un qaġan*¹⁷³ raised before the Emperor, *erten-u üile-yin barılduġa ese ġökılduġsan abıyas-un erkeber* – ‘with the strength of a passion resulting from rivalry in former actions’ (*D*, fol. 75 v.). With

regard to this accusation the fact should be stressed that in most of the tantric services the attending laymen usually know the particular spell for conjuring up the tantric god.¹⁷⁴

The charge against *Neyiçi toyin*, however, was (*D*, fol. 75 v.):

ene Neyiçi toyin blama aru Mongγol-dur yabuju öber-ün beyeber burqan metü qamuy šabi nar-tayan čayan Yamandaga. sira Yamandaga. qara Yamandaga. ulayan Yamandaga. noγuyan Yamandaga. caγan virodzana kemekü burqad-un neres-i öggün. basa burqan-u gün-eče gün. narin-ača narin niyuča nom včar tu kölgen Yamandaga terigüten nom ud-i sayin mayu kiged-i ülü ilyan. qobuγa tataγčın ba. arγalčın tülüyečın terigüten-eče degegsi bügüde-dür niγul ügei čegejelegülün ungsiγulba.

‘This *Neyiçi toyin* lama wandering amongst the Northern Mongols behaves himself like a Buddha bestowing on all of his followers Buddha names like White *Yamāntaka*, Yellow *Yamāntaka*, Black *Yamāntaka*, Red *Yamāntaka*, Green *Yamāntaka* and White *Vairocana*. He furthermore let everybody, from the carriers of cattle troughs, manure collectors and fuel-gatherers on, who are not able to distinguish the good from the bad, recite the *Yamāntaka* and other prayers, the most profound of the Buddhas and the most secret of the *Vajra* Doctrine.’

Emperor *Shun-chih* judiciously refused to decide in a theological case and referred it to the 5th Dalai Lama on the occasion of the latter’s visit to Peking in 1652. *Gabala güng*, the delegate of the Dalai Lama however, passed judgment against *Neyiçi toyin* and banished him with thirty of his oldest followers and thirty disciples to Kuei-hua (Köke Khota) which meant the termination of his activity in Eastern Mongolia. Today it is no more possible to decide whether *Gabala güng* was biased in his judgement because he was – *urida-ača yeke sayin* – ‘since earlier times on good terms’ with *Saskya nom-un qayan*. Seen in retrospect, *Gabala güng*’s decision seems theologically sound because initiation into the *Guhyasamāja* and *Yamāntaka* systems was never given before an applicant had reached a certain high degree of theological knowledge and maturity – as is shown by the course of studies taken by various high lamas.¹⁷⁵

Some decades later however, the lamaist church acknowledged *Neyiçi toyin*’s results and methods. The *Yamāndaga sudur*,¹⁷⁶ a Peking xylograph about the *Sādhana* of *Yamāntaka* states (fol. 43 r.):

*Ketürkei ya-ma-ndaga-yin yogadzari boyda. Neyiçi toyin-u gegen ber.
Kelekü šasin kiged amitan-u tusa jırγalang-i sedkiγü.
Yeke nigülesküi-ber amitan nuγud-un ilγaju tosburi – yin kelen-lüge jökildurγulbasu.
Ilerkei oyun-dur nom kilbere töröjü.
Imayta sedkil-dür anu tusa bolqui-a sedkiγü.
Ene orun-a ese aldarsiγsan gün narin niyuča tarni včir tü kölgen-eče.
Erketü včir ayuyuluyčı arban γurban burqan tu-yin büütügel-ün arγa-yi.
Eng olan-a nomlaγu šasin kiged amitan-u tusa-yi.
Endegürel ügei-e ayui yekede üiledkülüge.*

‘The Magi of the sublime *Yamāntaka*, the very reverend *Neyiçi toyin*

Desiring the welfare of the propagated faith and the happiness of creatures,

Distinguishing living beings in great clemency that he be adapted to them with individual tongues

To facilitate in distinct perception the further teaching,

With the intention in his powerful thoughts that there advantage be,

Has taught to everybody the *Sādhana* of *Śrī-Vajrabhairava* with a retinue of 13 Buddhas

Walther Heissig, A Mongolian Source to the Lamaist Suppression of Shamanism in the 17th Century



Figure 22.1 Portrait xylographed Ch'ien-lung 39, 1774 (British Museum, Mon. 75)



Figure 22.2 Portrait xylographed Ch'ien-lung 45, 1780 (British Museum, Mon. 76)

From the mystical tantric *Vajrayāna* System which (then) had not found praise in this country;

Infallibly and very much he promoted

The advantage of the Faith and of the creatures.'

Yet, in spite of this acknowledgement, the *Yamāndaga sudur* states that the final drafting of this ritual for the *Yamāntaka* cult was necessary because

Tegün-eče ulam ulam ĵerge-ber sudur bičig saluysayar osuldaĵu.

Tendeče ʔaĵar ʔaĵar-un ungsilya asuru üli neyilečeki-yin tula . . .

'after (*Neyiči toyin*'s activity) the written copies had varied more and more and become inaccurate and

the local versions had then not at all corresponded.'

By this superficial propagation, however, *Neyiči toyin* had satisfied the spiritual requirements of the broader and lower strata of the East Mongolian population who up to then had been adherents to Shamanism. The *D* (fol. 83 v.) particularly stresses the fact that after his death he was not only bewailed by the aristocracy¹⁷⁷ but *qobuĵa tataĵčin-ača degegsi arĵalčin tüliyeġčin terigüten büġüde qotalayar aman ačaĵan ĵoriĵ ügei-yi könggeristele dayurisqabai* – 'praised loudly by the mouth of all the common ones from the carriers of cattle troughs, manure collectors and fuel gatherers on'.

In propagating the tantric divinities and spells, *Neyiči toyin* had used methods in conformity with the above-outlined pattern of Buddhist missionary approach towards lower, primitive religions. The psychological approach of the *Yamāntaka* worship was the same with regard to Shamanism as that of other tantric circles. Where earlier in Shamanism the Shaman only, called up to this office by destiny, was able to ask the magical forces for a delegation of their powers, now each layman could join in beseeching the god 'to bestow his magic power'.¹⁷⁸ This particularly explains how *Neyiči toyin* gained such broad influence over all Mongolian social strata. For the lamaist missionaries after him, only the theological consolidation remained to be effected. As demonstrated above, the deity *Yamāntaka* had not left many traces in the lamaized pantheon of the 'new' Shamanism of the Khalkha and Southern Mongols where, during their conversion and the persecution of the pure Shamanism, other tantric divinities were apparently propagated. In the lamaist circles in Peking, which took the lead in the religious development of Eastern Mongolia, a marked interest in *Yamāntaka* is recognizable after *Neyiči toyin*'s death.

Three Mongol translations of works dealing with the invocation and cult of this particular deity were printed in Peking during the century after *Neyiči toyin*.¹⁷⁹ *Neyiči toyin* was granted a place in lamaist hagiography as one become incarnate. His incarnation lived in Kuei-hua.¹⁸⁰

The *Mergen diyanči blama-yin gegen Blo bzañ bstan pa rgyal mc' an*, an incarnation of the famous disciple of *Neyiči toyin*, *Mergen diyanči*¹⁸¹ further enhanced in the middle of the 18th century the subject of the *Yamāntaka* worship. His *gsun'bum* – 'Collected Works' –, printed between 1780–83 in Peking, contain various *Yamāntaka* prayers, all bearing special reference to the teachings of *Neyiči toyin*. At that time *Neyiči toyin* is included into the spiritual lineage of the originators and preachers of the *Yamāntaka* Cycle, *Čoytu včir ayuĵuluġči-yin ündüsün lamanar*.¹⁸² As his immediate precedessors in this spiritual lineage are named the Pancen *Blo bzañ č'os kyi rgyal mc'an* (1569–1662), the 5th Dalai Lama (1617–1682), the 44th abbot of *dGa'ldan (blo gros rgya mc'o*, born 1635), while he himself is called *qoyaduĵar bcongġaba neyiči toyin-u qubilyan beye boĵda*

lama – ‘the second *bcoñ k’a pa*, the holy, incarnate Lama *Neyiči toyin*’.¹⁸³ This epithet ‘Second *bcoñ k’a pa*’ shows how highly the missionary activity of *Neyiči toyin* was esteemed about 130 years after his death.

In the *Öljei badaraγsan sūme*, a monastery built in the Khortsin district by the *Qošoi joriγtu čin wang* of the Khortsin,¹⁸⁴ at that time a prayer containing an appraisal of his life, *Manjusiri dalai boyda Neyiči toyin-u čadig ba manduγulun γurban töröl boluγsan-u jalbaril. masi batu orusil-un silüg-lüge nigen-e mayad tuy-un oroi-daki erke-yin qaγan*,¹⁸⁵ a composition again by the *Mergen diyanči blama qubilγan*, was read by the whole congregation. It seems to be based on the *D. Neyiči toyin* is hailed therein for:¹⁸⁶

Manjusiri Lobsangrayba-yin jokiyaγsan jrum-i
Man-u (440 r.) Mongγol kelen-iyer ilerkei-e nomlaγsan . . .

– ‘having taught clearly in our Mongol tongue the rules inaugurated by the *Mañjuśrī blo bzai grags pa* (= *bCoñ k’a pa*) . . .’

In this devoted circle of the 18th century even the portrait of the *Boyda blama Neyiči toyin* has been preserved. The ‘Collection of daily prayers’ of the aforementioned Khortsin-monastery *Öljei badaraγsan sūme*, dated *Ch’ien-lung* 39, 1774 contains the one more artfully executed portrait (Figure 22.1), the other one is to be found in the ‘Collected Works of the *Mergen diyanči blama-yin gegen*’, vol. I, xylographed between *Ch’ien-lung* 45–49, 1780–1783 (Figure 22.2).

Both pictures show a lama-monk with fleshy features. This is in agreement with the tradition of the *D*, 46 r., where *Neyiči toyin* is reported as having referred to himself as *takimliy-un taryum bi* – ‘I am a corpulent monk’.

The final result was a new lamaized Shamanism rather than the extinction of the old religion. In Eastern Mongolia, likewise, Shamanism was camouflaged under a cloak of lamaistic trends, a development demonstrated by N. Poppe¹⁸⁷ and B. Y. Vladimirtsov¹⁸⁸ for North and South Mongolia.

The *contradictio in se* of the exorcistic prayer of a present-day East Mongolian Shaman thus becomes understandable:

. . . *Šambal sira burqan*
Šömbör aγulan-u orgil-dur
Burqan nom-un ordun-a
Böge bügüde bide ner jalbariγu bayina

– ‘To the Yellow Sambhala Buddha
 At the peak of Mount Sumeru,
 At the residence of the Buddhist Faith
 All we Shamans pray!’¹⁸⁹

12. THE DOMOΓ (1739) AND THE HOR Č'OS BYUŇ (1819 – HUTH TRANSLATION) COMPARED

Corresponding passages from the *Domoγ* and the *Hor č'os byuŇ*

Domoγ

Hor č'os byuŇ: (G. Huth, vol. II, Straßburg, 1896):

(Fol. 5 v.) *Ene orunača umara jüg asuru gola* .
. . . . *oyun anu masi* (fol. 6 r.) *qurča bölüge*.

(p. 253) Dieser Herr wurde
als Sohn
geboren
. . . und sehr scharfsinnig war,
(= Nearly verbally; date of birth is
missing in the *Domoγ*),

(fol. 7 v.) *ečiğe noyan anu* *Neyiči*
toyin kemen olan-a aldarsıysan aǵıru.

so gab ihm sein Vater den Namen
Neic'it'oyon.

(fol. 6 r. cont.) *tere ber olan nökür selte*
ablara odoysan-daysan
.

Einstmals veranstaltete er mit zahlreichen
Freunden eine Jagd
.

(fol. 7 r.) *sakiysan kümün nöküd inu*
almayıduyad ese üjibeı.

(p. 254) entfernte sich dabei weit,
ohne dabei von den Wachleuten gesehen
zu werden.
(= Nearly verbally.)

(Cont.) *tendeče ulam yabuǵu douradus-un*
düri-ber ögede bolǵu baraǵun ǵaǵar-tur
odqu

(Cont.) Da er hierdurch Gelegenheit zur
Flucht gefunden hatte, ging er nach dBus
.

. . . (fol. 29 v.) *tendeče blama-yin gegen öber-*
ün orun čoytu šumir aǵula-yin aǵuidayan.
edür söni-yin dörben qubi-yin yoga-dur
orustıyad
. . . *qoyar-i öbedegsi saran metü ulam ulam*
degegsıde arbidqan üiledčü

. . . (p. 256) So stellte er, in vielen
'Bergketten' umherwandernd, ununterbro-

chen den Yoga der vier Nachtwachen an;
. . . diese seine Thätigkeit wuchs dem
zunehmenden Monde gleich.
(= very abridged. For the sentence
(p. 256): 'Da warf ein Bon-po aus
Mißgunst Früchte auf den Lama; der
Lama aber sammelte die Früchte
und gab sie ihm' no equivalent is in
the *Domoγ*. This sentence seems to
be a poetical digest of the incident
with the arrogant *Ayusi güüsi*,
Domoγ, fol. 24–25. Also the sentence
(p. 255): 'Vor allem ließ er sich nicht
in den Schmutz der ketzerischen
Theorien der rNiŇma-Schule usw.
beflecken, sondern ' is not
corroborated by the *Domoγ*)

(fol. 29 v. cont.) *tere kü čoytu šumir aǵulan-a*
. (fol. 41 r.)
ǵuturum bi kemen ǵarlıǵ bolǵuquı, relating
the march to the East, conversion of an
Ongnighut-shaman, expansion of the Yellow
Faith amongst the Ongnighut.

(= missing.)

Domoy

(fol. 66 r.) *kiĵayar-taki Solun Sibe
yolĵin kürtele. burqan-u šasin-i yekede
delgeregüľjü. al sira-yin qubčisu tan-iyar
dügürgebei.*

(fol. 66 r. cont.) *basa wang noyad öber
öber-ün qosıyın -dur ĵalaĵu*

(cont.) *uridu-luĵa adali ayui yeke qurim*
.

(fol. 66 v.) *kemen yekede ĵayıqal-
dubai*, relating an incident with the young
monk *Ombu*.

(cont.) *tendeče Qaračin Šamba darqan beyile
Tümed beyise Ombu čökür noyan* (fol. 67 r.)
terigülen yeke baĵa noyad qatud
.

(fol. 67 r.) *süme bayiĵulsuĵai kemen ayilad-
qaĵsan-a ĵöbsiyebei.*

(fol. 67 r. cont.) *maĵtaĵal-ača*

(fol. 68 r.) *tegüni sira ĵam kemen
nerelebei*, relating a story about creating
a new ford through the *Sira mören*.

(cont.) *tendeče Nayiman qosıyın-u qung
baĵatur wang-un ĵadana olan bügüdeger
kürčü ĵaruĵad wang-un gerte. blama-yin
gegen* (fol. 68 v.) *ĵalarabasu*
*ĵurban erdeni ba quwaray-tur yeke süsüg tei
bolbai.*

(fol. 69 r.) *tendeče Auqan-u qoĵar wang-
luĵa*

(fol. 72 v.) *kemeged qaribai.*

(fol. 72 v. cont.) *tere čay-tur qabur dulaĵan-u
čay-tur bayan qosıyın-u keyid-e ĵalaraĵu
saĵuqui-dayan. olan -u bariĵsan altan*
(fol. 73 r.) *sayitur kečiye deki kemen
soyurqabai.*

(cont.) *basa begeĵing-deki nayiman qosıyın-
u*

(fol. 73 v.) *Darqan beyile-yin qosıyın-
dur kürču bariĵsan süme-dür ebüljebei*,
relating about gifts of statuettes given to the
nobility of the Eight Banners in Peking
as well as about spending the winter in
a monastery in the Darqan Beyile-Banner.

Hor čos byuñ:

er (das Land) bis zu den Solongwo's hin
mit den Trägern des saffranfarbigen
(Gewandes).

(= very condensed.)

(cont.) – Darauf beriefen ihn große und
kleine Fürsten samt ihren Unterthanen,

(= missing.)

(cont.) voran der Jasag der T'umed Sog,
'Ompwo C'wuhur, und der Jasag der Moñ-
golcin, Sampa
. . . er gestattete es, und so errichteten

sie im Lande der Moñgolcin ein Kloster und
übergaben es ihm.

(= condensed.)

(= missing.)

(cont.) — Einstmals, als der Lama in das
Zelt des Hw oñ Pāgat'wor Wañ der Nāiman
Šog kam.
(p. 259) . . . erstarkte der Glaube des
Wañ an die (in) dem Lama (vereinigten)
drei Kleinodien.

(= nearly verbally.)

(cont.) — Darauf folgte er der Einladung der
Jasag's, Großfürsten usw. der einzelnen Šog:
der 'Auhan gar weit.

(= very condensed.)

(cont.) – Danach, als er sich im Kloster
Pāyan Hošogon aufhielt, errichtete er aus
dem gereinigten Golde
und sagte: 'Bringet beständig eure Huld-
(p. 260) gung und Verehrung dar!'

(= nearly verbally.)

(= missing.)

Domoγ

(cont.) *tende-eče gančur bičiküi-e*
 *olan soyurqayṣan ajuγu.*

(cont.) *basa tuqai tursi*
 (fol. 74 r.) *naran urγuṣan metü*
geyigüljü.

(fol. 74 r. cont.) *olan wang ud yeke baγa*
noyad
 (fol. 74 v.) *Yamandaga niγuča quri-*
yangγui čigejilegsen masi olan boluluγa.

(cont.) *ilangγui-a dotuyadu nom*
aldar anu γaγar degere bügün-e könggeristele
aldarsin dayuris bai.

(fol. 74 v. cont.) *tere čaγ-tur Sakya nom-un*
qaγan
 (fol. 83 r.) *angqa anu.*, relating the
 theological controversy with *Sakya nom-un*
qaγan, the Dalai Lama's decision, march
 of *Neyiči toyin* to Köke khota, sojourn
 there and march back by imperial order.

(= missing.)

(fol. 83 r. cont.) *boγda blama-yin gegen yeren*
doluγan nasun-u . . (fol. 88 r.) . . *yosun-luγa*
neyilegülin orusiγuluγad sayitur orusiγulbai.

Hor čos byuñ:

(cont.) — Darauf kaufte er in der Stadt
 Mukden
 als Gegenstand der Verehrung.
 (= nearly verbally.)

(= missing.)

(cont.) — Ferner bescherte er nach allen
 Seiten hin den Armen
 . . . und Bhairava-Abhisamaya im
 Gedächtnis hatten.
 (= reversed, nearly verbally.)

(= missing.)

(cont.) — Der Ruhm seines Namens aber
 wetteiferte gleichsam mit dem Rollen des
 Donners.
 (= verbally.)

(= missing.)

(cont.) — Indem er auf solche Weise zahl-
 lose Bild-, Lehr- und Gnadensymbole her-
 stellte (p. 261) die Sonne aufgeht.

(cont.) — Zu Anfang seines 97. Lebens-
 jahres.
 . . . in einem Stüpa dauernd niederlegte.
 (= very abbreviated digest.)

NOTES

1. Schulemann, *Gesch. d. Dalailamas*. 113–114.
2. B. Y. Vladimirtsov, *IZV. I. V.* 1927. 218.
3. Vladimirtsov, *IZV. I. V.* 1926. 1279; *IZV. I. V.* 1927. 239; *Obshchestv. str. Mong.* (1948). 236–27.
4. D. Pokotilov, *History of the Eastern Mongols during the Ming Dynasty from 1368 to 1634*. (Engl. translation by R. Loewenthal.) *Studia Ser. Monogr.*, Ser. A., Nr. 1. Chengtu 1947. 58; W. Franke, *Addenda and Corrigenda to: Hist. of the Eastern Mongols etc.* *Studia Ser. Monogr.*, Ser. A, Nr. 5. Chengtu 1949. 14–16; F. Michael, *The Origin of Manchu Rule in China*. Baltimore 1942. 25–47.
5. *qubis-* lit. *qobusun*. Cf. Vladimirtsov, *Etnologo-lingvisticheskie issledovaniya v Urge, urginskom i kentejskom rajonakh* (Ethnological-linguistic researches in Urga, and in the districts of Urga and the Kentei), *Severnaya Mongoliya II*. 1927. 25, who explains its meaning as identical with mo. *ilbi-* 'Magical capacity'. (Cf. Kovalevski I. 305.) Vladimirtsov, *Sravitel'naya grammatika*, Moscow 1929. 271, 328 'capacity of transformation, the double

personality of a shaman'. This word probably has some relation, not explained in our dictionaries, to a Turkic root, as indicated by words like Osmanic *qowuŝ*- 'to chase, expel, pursue'. (Cf. W. Radloff, Versuch eines Wörterbuches der Turk. Dialekte. St. Petersburg 1899, II. 1318.)

6. For this term see section 10.
7. For the particular social position of the *baysi*- 'the masters, savants' during the 17th century cf. *Pei-lu feng-su*. Serruys. 140–141.
8. Section 6, note 36.
9. Huth II. 229.
10. Pozdneev, Mongoliya i Mongoly II. 220.
11. KKFL XI (Hauer. 180).
12. Section 4, note 19.
13. Oshibuchi Hajime, *Manshū ishibumi kikō*. Tokyo 1943. 61, 64–68 (Manchu and Chinese text).
14. Oshibuchi, op. cit. 68–73. – For *Saqalqa* cf. 116 sq.
15. Alliance between Manchu, Yehe, Hada, Ula and Hoifa tribes. KKFL II (Hauer. 29. 49).
16. KKFL VIII (Hauer. 125).
17. Yumsunov, *Qori-yin arban nigen ečige-yin ĵun-u uy iĵayur-un tuγuĵi* (ed. N. N. Poppe, Trudy I. V. IX. 63). The part dealing with shamanism, *Böge-yin mörgül-ün učira* was reproduced by Pozdneev, *Mongol'skaya Chrestomatiya*. St. Petersburg 1900. 293–311; recently Jorma Partanen gave an English translation of this: A Description of Buriat Shamanism, J. S. F. Ou. 51, 1941.
18. *Altan tobči III* (= Harvard-Yenching Institute, Scripta Mongolica I, 1952) vol. II. 192. – Zhamtsarano, *Mongol'skie letopisi v XVII veka*. 119.
19. KKFL VI (Hauer. 93).
20. KKFL VIII (Hauer. 136–137).
21. Corresponding Mongolian records exist concerning this incident in *Altan tobči III* (cf. note 103) and more detailed in *Borĵigid oboγ-un teiuke*. (Cf. Heissig, Zum Umfang der mongolischen Geschichtsliteratur. Mon. Ser. X. 218; translation of that passage Heissig, Bolur erike. Mon. Ser., Monogr. Ser. 10. Peking 1946. 95–97.)
22. In some Buriat Mongol conceptions about the origin of Shamanism reference is made also to *Uriyangqa*. (Cf. G. Sandschejew, Weltanschauung und Schamanismus der Alaren-Burjaten. Anthropos 22. 1927. 600, 603.) These, however, are the Uriyanghai from recent Tannu Tuva.
23. Discovered by the Royal Danish Geographical Society's Central Asian Expedition. Sub. Nr. 2080. 15 fols. text. I have to express my deepest gratitude for the use of this valuable document to Prof. Kaare Grønbech, Copenhagen.
24. Inserted by the author.
25. Chin. 俸綠 *feng-lu* 'Official salary', paid in cash monthly by the imperial treasury.
26. *Jayisang* is otherwise only used as a designation of rank.
27. Cf. Section 9.
28. Neither the historical survey of that particular period by Wada Sei, *Mindai no Mōko to Manshū*, Tōyō Chūseishi IV. Tokyo 1939. 445–510, nor Hashimoto Kohō, *Mōko no Ramakyō*. Tokyo 1942. 31–41 sheds any light on this problem.
29. Hauer, op. cit. The Mongolian version of a Japanese historical work by Aoki, Tomitarō, *Mongγol-un uysayatan kiged teiuke sudur*. (Maniĵab transl.). Kalgan 1943. 157 maintains too, that Lamaism reached the Mandju via the Mongols about 1588.
30. KKFL VI (Hauer. 93).
31. KKFL II (Hauer. 23).
32. Pokotilov – Löwenthal. 136.
33. KKFL IX (Hauer. 151).
34. KKFL X (Hauer. 165–166).
35. KKFL X (Hauer. 168–170).

36. KKFL X (Hauer. 171).
37. KKFL XI (Hauer. 180).
38. KKFL XVI (Hauer. 309).
39. Yano Jinichi, *Kindai mōkoshi kenkyū*. Tokyo 1940. 239.
40. KKFL XV (Hauer. 289–290).
41. Vladimirtsov. IZV. I. V. 1927. 236–237.
42. The Mongolian inscription consists of 24 lines on a rectangular stone ca. 89 inches high and 34 inches wide. Originally compiled in Manchu by Garin (cf. W. Fuchs, Beiträge, Index. 122.), superior of the *Ulus-un sudur-un yamun-u bičig-ün yabudal*, the inscription was translated into Mongolian by Kirbe, superior of the *üliger qauli-yi aldarsiγulqu yamun-u bičig-ün yabudal*. Lines I–V are the usual lamaistic preamble; lines V–VII relate the historical background of the golden *Mahākāla* statue; lines XI–XVI the arrangement of the divinities in the monastery; line XVII gives as date of construction 1636–1638; while the rest contain the colophon with the names of the workmen, the author and the translators. The Chinese, Manchu and Mongolian versions without the colophons are partly transliterated and translated into Japanese by Oshibuchi Hajime, *Manshū ishibumi kikō*. Tokyo 1943. 133–145.
43. Similarly in *Borjigid oboγ-un teiuke* (1721) (cf. Heissig, Mon. Ser. X. 214 sq.), vol. III. 9: . . . *maqagala burqan-i mügden-ü barayun qayalyan-u γadana sira süme bayiγulγad*.
44. About this legend cf. Mon. Ser. X. 218; Heissig, Bolur erike. Peking 1946.
45. Sarat Chandra Das, Contributions on Tibet. JASB 1882. 27.
46. Lombotseren, *Selenge-yin mongγol buriyad-un darqan tayiša danbi jilsan Lombočeren-ü jokiγaysan Mongol buriyad-un teiuke* (ed. N. N. Poppe, Trudy I. V. XII. 7–8).
47. As *T'ai-tzu* died, Sept. 30th 1626, it must read *T'ai-tsung*. The inscription by Kang-hsi on the pacification of Tibet (W. Rockhill, Tibet. JRAS 1891. 185) in agreement with other Chinese sources (Rockhill, op. cit. 72) dates this first contact *Ch'ung-te* 7, 1643. The statement of the Mongol text about the appointment of the envoy as *lČaṇ skya* is wrong: a *lČaṇ skya* Khutukhtu, *ṇag dbaṇ blo bzaṇ č'os Idan*, 'came first to the Manchu court at Peking in 1687 (*Čindamani-yin erikes*, 105 r.).
48. A. Pozdneev, Mongoliya i Mongoly I. 28.
49. Lombotseren. 8.
50. N. N. Poppe, Opisanie mongol'skikh 'shamanskikh' rukopisei Instituta Vostokovedeniya. Zap. I. V. A. N. I., 1932. 151–200; N. N. Poppe, Buryat-Mongol'skij Fol'klorno dialektologičeskij Sbornik. Moscow 1936. 21–33 (Agha dialect); 69–79 (Barguhuzin Dialect); 105–107 (Ekhirit and Bulghat Dialect). N. N. Poppe, Proizvedeniya Narodnoj Slovesnosti Khalkha-Mongolov. Leningrad 1932.; G. Sandschejew, Weltanschauung und Schamanismus der Alaren-Burjaten. Anthropos 22. 1927; B. Y. Vladimirtsov, Etnologolingvističeskije issledovaniya, Severnaya Mongoliya II. 1927. 28–32; W. Heissig, Schamanen und Geisterbeschwörer im Kuriye Banner. Folklore Studies III. 1944. 39–72; A Contribution to the Knowledge of Eastmongolian Folkpoetry. Folklore Studies IX. 1950. 153–178.
51. Cf. chapter 8.
52. Fol. 1 r.-7 r.
53. Ms. has *nütüglejü*.
54. Lit. *quruγu*.
55. Lit. *qomdaya*; Bur. *qongdaya* – 'the bowl of offering' of the Buriat Mong. shamanistic ritual. Cf. N. N. Poppe, Letopisi Khorinskikh Buryat. Trudy I. V. IX, 1935. 98.
56. Lit. *orčīn*.
57. Used as name for 'black' by all who observe the custom of name-taboo. Cf. A. Mostaert, Dict. Ordos. 51 b.
58. Lit. *quruγan*.
59. Loan word from the Tibetan. Cf. Ord. *Lont'on-* 'graines d'un arbre qui sont d'un beau noir'. A. Mostaert, Dict. Ordos. 447 a.
60. Phraseological for 'in the land of origin, once in ancient times'.

61. A European variant to this in the fairytale about the 'grateful dead'. Cf. Aarne-Thompson, *The Types of the Folk Tale*. Helsingfors 1928, FFC 74. 505–508.
62. Cf. *Niuca tobca'an* (Secret History), § 201, where *Jamuḡa* asks *Chinggis Khan* for the favour to have his 'lifeless corpse' buried 'at high place' for which he promises protection to the 'grandchildren of the grandchildren' of *Chinggis Khan*. Cf. E. Haenisch, *Die Geheime Geschichte der Mongolen*, 2. Edit., Leipzig 1948. 90. The example of the *Ulayan qada* (*Hung-shan*) near the town of Lin-hsi, Chi-feng hsien, where various strata of stone-age burials have been found, shows that elevated places stood in particular demand as sites for burials. Cf. *Archaeologia Orientalis*, Ser. A. Vol. VI, K. Hamada and S. Mizuno, *Hung-shan-Ho, Ch'ih-Feng*. Tokyo 1938. In Tibetan folklore too during an 'exorcism meant to avoid an impending calamity or to remove a disease' (Tucci, *Tibetan Painted Scrolls*. Rome 1949. II. 726) spirits abiding in red cliffs are prayed to (Tucci, op. cit. II. 740).
63. Lamaistic terminology: *arbis tarni* ~ *arvis tarni*. *Arvis*-Skr. *vidya* -Tib. *rig-snags* in differentiation to *gzuñs* (Skr. *dhāraṇī*).
64. Apparently one of the oldest and most widely known shamanistic deities, son of *etügen eke* (earth) and *dalai* (sea). In the Tsakhar country often identical with the *Möngke tngri*, the heavenly ruler etc. Invoked in this character in South Mongolia and Buriat Mongolia for food, horses, clothes, luck, peace, health and as saviour from death and evil. Cf. N. Poppe, *Opisanie* . . ., 105. 163–166.
65. *Tele kenggerge* < *telek* (Kovalevski, 1717) – 'pièce de bois transversale qui sert à tenir les voiles' < *tele-* 'to stretch something', *arusun-i tele-* 'to stretch a hide'. The drum must have been of the shape of the Tungus-Sibiric Shaman drums. Cf. Shirokogoroff, *Psychomental Complex of the Tungus*. London 1935. 297–299; E. Manker, *Die Lappische Zaubertrommel*. Stockholm 1938.
66. Kovalevski, 215 *b* 'gardien de la maison, de la famille et tous les biens. Chez les Shamans on le fait des peaux de moutons et de différents torchons de toile', which description agrees with that given in the Tsakhar Chronicle below.
67. cf. Note 107.
68. *Anthropos* 22. 1927. 602. Version *a*.
69. Section 10.
70. *Wangdan yüm čüing* (Yumsunov), *Qori-yin arban nigen ečige-yin ĵun-u uy iĵayur-un turuĵi* (ed. N. Poppe, *Trudy I. V. IX*. 92): '*manu qoĵim-un čay ud-tu mongĵol ĵaĵar-ača böge iduyan ulus nar ireĵü neylegsen. tere üye-dü böge ner-ün šasin būri delgeregsen bölüge* – A long time before our (time) Shaman and Shamaness clans have come from Mongolia and intermingled with us. At this time Shamanism was very flourishing.'
71. Sandschejew, *Anthropos* 22. 1927. 978, where the second primogenitor of a Buriat Mongolian Shaman is reported as having fled Mongolia in 1646.
72. Lombotseren. 12; Sandschejew, *Anthropos* 22. 1927. 601, 978.
73. Yumsunov. 107. Partanen. 25.
74. Yumsunov. I. c. Partanen. 25.
75. Tuyultur Toboev, *Qori kiged ayuyin buriyad nar-un urida-dayan boluysan anu* (ed. N. N. Poppe, *Letopisi Khorinskikh Buryat*. *Trudy I. V. IX*.) 21.
76. Poppe, *Opisanie*.
77. Yumsunov. 93. Partanen, 9, 'provider of food luck' seems untenable. For further variants of this deity cf. Poppe, *Opisanie*. 155; 165.
78. Partanen, 9⁶ suggests a derivation from *qotoli* 'luck' or *qoto* 'cattleyard'; it is, however, mo. *γodoli* 'Pfeil' as shown by Bur. *GoDl'i ulan tengr'i*, cf. N. Poppe, *Buryat-Mongol'skij Folkl. i Dialect*. *Sbornik*. Leningrad 1936. 24.
79. Cf. *Folklore Studies* III. 1944. 39–72; *Folkl. Stud.* IX. 166–175.
80. Toboev. 19.
81. Lombotseren. 33.
82. Toboev. 18–19.

83. Yumsunow. 109–110. Partanen. 28; Folkl. Stud. III. 53.
84. Folkl. Stud. III. 53. Poppe, Opisanie. 199.
85. Toboev. 19. There the *čidkür*. is banned into a black cow; Yumsunov. 109–110; Sandschejew, Anthropos 22. 934–938.
86. Yumsunov. 107. Serruys. 148. Partanen. 26.
87. Yumsunov. 112. Partanen. 31 sq.
88. W. Hellpach, Das Magethos. Eine Untersuchung über Zauberdenken und Zauberdienst. Stuttgart 1947. 40.
89. Yumsunov. 95. Partanen. 13.
90. Toboev. 19.
91. Yumsunov. 95. Partanen. 13.
92. Dzangdza böge; cf. Folkl. Stud. III. 64.
93. Cf. the legend of origin of their Ongghot as told in the *Küriye* Banner (Folkl. Stud. III. 49) which dates back into the 8th century and is similar to that told by the Manchu Bannermen. Cf. O. Lattimore, Wulakai Tales from Manchuria. Journal of Amer. Folklore, July–Sept. 1933; Mongol Journey. New York 1941. 118–119.
94. Lines 54–56 of the exorcistic prayer of the Shamaness *Tungčinggarbu* from *Küriye Ayil*. Cf. Heissig, Some Contributions to the Knowledge of Eastmongolian Folkpoetry. Folklore Studies. IX. 1950. 153–178.
95. Cf. Vladimirtsov (1948). 56; Serruys. 130.
96. Folkl. Stud. III.
97. Folkl. Stud. III. 62; Mostaert, Dict. Ordos. 663 a.
98. D. Banzarov, Chornaya vera (The Black Faith). Kazan 1846.
99. Peking edition 1925. 173.
100. Reinhold F. Müller, Grundsätzliches alt-indischer Medizin. Forschung. u. Fortschr. 24. 1948. 287.
101. Poppe, Opisanie. 153.
102. *Tungčinggarbu*, lines 116 sq.; Folkl. Stud. III. 63; Yumsunov. 93.
103. Fried. Risch, Johann de Plano Carpini, Geschichte der Mongolen und Reisebericht 1245–1247. 62 sq.
104. Yule-Cordier, I. 257. *Natigay* = *itügen*. Cf. further 257 sq., note 1.
105. *Pei-lu feng-su* (Serruys). 138. Cf. further Zhamtsarano, Ongony aginskikh buryat.
106. 107–108.
107. Anthropos 22. 600 sq.
108. Vladimirtsov (1949), 61; Sanzheev, Mongol'skaya povest' o Khane Kharangui, Trudy I. V. XXII. 1937. 11–12; Vladimirtsov, Gengis Khan (French transl. Paris 1948). 91. 67–71.
109. Fol. 38 v. sq.; 43 r. sq. Cf. Section 11.
110. *Niγuča tobča'an*, paragr. 216 (E. Haenisch, 2. Edit. 102).
111. N. Poppe, Opisanie. 151–200; Vladimirtsov, Severnaya Mongoliya II. 28–32.
112. Folkl. Stud. III; IX.
113. Dzangdza böge. Folkl. Stud. III. 64–65.
114. Essays I. Beiträge zur vergleichenden Religionswissenschaft. Leipzig 1879. 216–217. (English translation Oxford 1867.)
115. Max Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie II. Tübingen 1923. 254: '... der Kleinbürger und Bauer konnte ja mit den Produkten der Soteriologie der vornehmen Bildungsschicht nichts anfangen'.
116. A. F. Wright, Fo-t'u-teng. A Biography. HJAS 11, 1948. 353.
117. Op. cit. 339.
118. W. Liebenthal, Sanscrit Inscriptions from Yünnan I. Mon. Ser. XII, 1947. This view is confirmed by Ch'en Yüan, Buddhism in Yünnan and Kweichow at the end of the Ming Dynasty. Cathol. Univ. of Peiping, Book Ser. IV, 1.

119. H. Hoffmann, Gšen. Eine lexicographisch-religionswissenschaftliche Untersuchung. ZDMG 98. 1944. 348–349.
120. H. H. Schaefer, Der Manichäismus und sein Weg nach Osten. Festschrift f. F. Gogarten. Giessen 1948. 248–250.
121. H. Hoffmann, Bon-Religion. 222 sq.; 229 sq.
122. Cf. *Čindamani-yin erikes*, fol. 34 r.; there it is reported that with the bestowal of the *qota mandal* and the *Abhisheka* of *dkyes pa rdo rje* on *Khubilai Khan* and twenty-four other selected persons: . . . *yeke Mongγol-un orun-a včir tu kölgen-u niyuča tarni-yin nom-i ekilen oluγsan anu bui bolai* – ‘the Doctrine of the secret *dhāraṇī* of the *Vajrayāna* found its origin in the land of the great Mongols’.
123. About *Godan* e. g., it is reported for 1247: *Tere üye-dür qaγan ber yaγar usun-u qowlal-iyar beye čilegerejü bayiqu-dur. ene saskya pančün ber arsalang dayutu qomsim bodhi sadu-a-yin jāng üile-yin egüdenече. qaγan-i inu darui ebedčün-eče getül-gegsen böltüge*. – ‘When at that time the emperor fell ill from the poisonous influences of the earth and the waters, the *Saskya Pāncen* freed the emperor from the disease by the introduction of the ritual of the lion-voiced *Qomsim-Bodhisattva*.’ Cf. *Čindamani-yin erikes*, fol. 144 r.
124. Yule-Cordier, I. 301.
125. *Yüan-shih*, *Pen-chi* 33. 7.
126. O. Franke, Geschichte des Chinesischen Reiches IV. Berlin 1948. 534; Bolur erike, Kalgan-Edit. IV. 631. For the tradition of this particular fact cf. Herbert Franke, Some Remarks on the Interpretation of Chinese Dynastic Histories. *Oriens* III. 119.
127. The killing of slaves and animals for this purpose is testified too for the 16th century by *Hsiao-ta heng* in his *Pei-lu feng-su* (cf. Serruys. 135). Cf. f. *Grub mt’a šel gyi me loñ* (S. Chandra Das, JASB 1882. 69). *Čindamani-yin erikes* (fol. 206 v.) states that at that time: *Mongγol ulus-un onγyon-i takiqu -yin tuqai-du olan amitan-i qoruyaqu jirum-i simdan tasulaǰu. sira-yin šasin-u qauli yosun-i bayiyulbai*. – ‘The custom was suppressed of destroying many creatures on the occasion of worshipping the Mongolian Ongghot and that they have established the laws of the Yellow Faith.’ Similarly in the *Činggis qaγan-u tabiy*, compiled in 1869 after the Tibetan chronicle *Dpag basam ljon bzañ*, fol. 18 v. and in other Mongol sources.
128. G. Schulemann, Geschichte der Dalailamas. 113–114.
129. For various lamaist adaptations of the benedictions of the fire cf. N. Poppe, Zum Feuerkultus bei den Mongolen. *Asia Major* II. 131 sq. Some fragments of this kind of Mongolian writings were excavated by Japanese expedition at the site of *Olon süme* (about 18 miles NNE from *Peilingmiao*, cf. *Mon. Ser.* III, 242). Documents Nos. 6, 8, and 11 (cf. *Shiro Hattori*, The Mongolian Documents found at *Olon süme*; *Tōhō Gakuho* XI, July 1940, 264–267, 269–270, Plate 2) show particularly the quick expansion of this kind of texts.
130. N. N. Poppe, *Opisanie*. 166, 175, 186, 189.
131. Very often in the function of guardian of the horses.
132. Particularly invoked in all solemn services for the terribles, because of his power to ‘dispel demons’. Cf. *Lessing*, *Yung-Ho-Kung* I. 95.
133. Poppe, *Opisanie*. 190.
134. *Mong.* edit. *Sungdui terigünlnöğüge böltüg*. Peking xylograph 1727. Cf. L. Ligeti, *T’oung Pao* XXVII. 1930. 134 sq.
135. *Otani*, No. 681; Ligeti, *Catalogue du Kanjur Mongol Imprimé*. Budapest 1942–44. 157, No. 697.
136. *Qutuy tu tarnis-un quriyangγui zungγui kemegdekü yeke kölgen sudur orisiba*, undat. Peking xylograph, 452 + 8 fols. *Sira ebedčün* = *mk’ris pa’i nad* – ‘Bilious disease’.
137. A. Mostaert, *Textes oraux Ordos*. 265–269; French translation *Folklore Ordos*. 503–505.
138. *Yumsunov*. *Trudy*. IX. 101, 102.
139. G. Sanzheev, *Khan Khatangui*. 14.
140. *Id.*, *Anthropos* 22. 600.

141. A. Mostaert, *Folklore Ordos*. 503.
142. The Mongol and Tibetan texts together with a Russian translation reproduced, not altogether satisfactorily, by its discoverer, A. Pozdneev, *Mongoliya i Mongoly* II. 370–396, where details about the site of this inscription are also given (cf. further P. Pelliot, T'oung Pao 1922. 182; B. Vladimirtsov, *IZV. A. N.* 1927. 236). Nowadays the inscription is missing; Father J. Mullie could not locate it around 1920. Attempts by the author in 1941 likewise proved futile.
143. Yumsunov. 66. Russian peasants sent for colonization of Buriat Mongolia met the first *laba*, i.e. lama 1652, at the camp of a Buriat prince of the Selenge district. Cf. F. A. Ėudryavzev, *Istoriya Buryat-Mongol'skogo Naroda ot XVII v. do 60kh godov XIX v.* (History of the Buriat Mongolian Nation from the 17th century up to the Sixtieth of the 19th century). Moscow 1940. 138.
144. Yumsunov. 91–92.
145. Yumsunov. 67.
146. Lombotseren. *Trudy* XII. 19. According to official Russian documents 150 lamas were counted in 1741 (cf. Kudryavzev. 139).
147. Toboev. *Trudy* IX. 21.
148. Toboev. 32.
149. *budaya* < lit. *boduya*– 'venereal'. Prof. Poppe however, as he kindly informed me, reads it *budaya* 'small-pox'.
150. Toboev. 16.
151. Lombotseren. 34. *qasay* means in Buriat 'Cossack', The Selenga Cossacks were exclusively Buriats, as I am advised by Prof. Poppe.
152. Lombotseren. 34.
153. Toboev. 35.
154. *Anthropos* 22. 1927. 602.
155. N. N. Poppe, *Opisanie*. 155. 156.
156. *Üile üre-yin il'yal-i üjögülgüçi toli kemekü-eče buruçu üjel-ün erkeber amin tasuluγsan-u üile üre üjögülgüsen-ü jül orusiba* – 'Section from the mirror showing the distinction of the fruits of acts which illustrates the effects of killing as caused by the heterodox creed', 26 fols; *Miqa qurim kikü ba takil üiledküi terigüten-ü gem erigüü üjögülgüçi anu* – '(Book) showing the punishment of the sin of performing the meat-service and offering', 3 fols; *Mal alaqu miqa qurim üiledügsen-ü gem eregüü . . . etc. sudur-ača γaruγsan orusiba* – 'Excerpt from the Sutra about the punishment of the sin of killing animals and performing the meat-service', 2 fols. Cf. B. Y. Vladimirtsov, *Mongol'skie rukopisi i ksilografi postupivshie v' Aziat. Ross. Akad. Nauk., IZV. R. A. N.* 1918. 1561.
157. For the eating of the meat-offering in community, the *miqa qurim*, cf. Yumsunov. 103; 108.
158. Vladimirtsov, op. cit. 1559–1560.
159. Modern Mongolian dictionaries, f. i. Rasisengge, *Toγdam suruγčid-un toli bičig*, Hsinking 1942. 44 still designates Chinese taoists as *Bombo* = *tao-shih*; *bombo ekener* = *nükuan* 'Taoist nun'; *ubadistu bombo, ariγudqaqu bombo* 'Taoist mystic'.
160. Vladimirtsov, *IZV. A. N.* 1927. 1279.
161. H. Hoffmann, *ZDMG* 98. 1944. 348–349.
162. Grünwedel, Na-ro-pa. Leipzig 1933. 3. This raises the question of the existence of a lamaist school of fundamental missionary theology which might have governed the suitability of methods applied in Mongolia throughout the centuries. These methods were perhaps regulated by the example of *Padmasambhava* as set down in his widely distributed biography (cf. the translation with reproduction of the Tib. and Mongolian texts of 'the' essential parts in H. Hoffmann, *Bon-Religion*. 253–265).
163. A contemporary phrase for that incident. Cf. the inscription in the Khalkha monastery *Amur bayasqulangtu keyid* (A. Pozdneev, *Mongoliya i Mongoly* I. 28) dated Ch'ien-lung 2, 1787 in which it is said in connection with Emperor *Shi-tzu* '... *king gota-dur tulyur*

törü toytayaysan-u qoyina – ‘... after (*Shun-chich*) had founded his firm government at Peking’.

164. The change of subject is not expressed in the Mongol sentence, yet it is clear from the following ‘After having expanded the religion, *Tüsiyetü* Khan left the woe of this world’.
165. Sandschejew, *Anthropos* 22. 607.
166. Lessing, *Yung-Ho-Kung*. I. 91.
167. Lessing, I. c. 91.
168. R. F. G. Müller, *Die Krankheits- und Heil-Gottheiten des Lamaismus*. *Anthropos* 22. 1927. 979.
169. Fol. 31 v. : *urida ügei Yamandaga-yin egüskel tegüskel-ün jerge* . . . ; Huth II. 256 ‘Utsa- und den Sampanna (-krama) . . . der Dreizehn Bhairava Götter’.
170. Schulemann, *Dalailamas*. 90–119; Lessing, I. c. 76.
171. *wang abisig*, presumably Tib. *dbañ* – ‘Consecration’, Skr. *Abhisheka*, of which the Chinese transliteration also reads 汪 *wang*. Cf. note 264 below.
172. For *enggi-yin arad* / *eng-ün kümün* cf. Vladimirtsov (Paris 1948). 216, who refers to this passage here.
173. Perhaps *Sečen čorji* (Tib. *čos rje* = *Dharmarāja* = *Nom-un qayan*) who in 1637 or 1643 was sent as first ambassador of the Lamaists to the Manchu court. Cf. section 8.
174. Lessing, op. cit. 139.
175. *Čindamani-yin erikes*, as well as *Blo bzañ bstan pa'i ñi ma* Biography.
176. Undated, 44 fols. 10: 49 cm. Chinese marginal 部四卷 *Pei* 4. *chüan*.
177. For reasons of historical interest it seems appropriate to repeat the list of his aristocratic converts as given in the *D*, fol. 85 v.-86 v.:

- a) Chingiskhanides: *Čibten Wang* of the Bagharin; *Buta wang*, *Bandi wang* and *Mergen wang* of the Aukhan; *Včir darqan wang* of the Naiman; *Neyiči qan*, *Čenggibu* (*Čengbu*) *beyile* of the Eastern Dzarut; *Sabun* (*Subud*) *darqan bayatur beyile* and *Mani čing bayatur güng* of the Western Dzarut; *Manjusiri beyise* and *Jürčün beyise* of the Eastern Bagharin; *Laskibs beyise* of the Tümet; *Jasaγ Sodnam* of the Kesigten;
- b) Descendants of *Qabutu qasar*: *Tüsiyetü qan*, *Jasaγ tu dügüireng giyün wang*, *Butači*, *Badari tüsiyetü čin wang*, *Uysan joriγ tu čin wang*, *Manjusryi bayatur darqan čin wang*, *Jasaγ tu Bayasqal wang*, *efü Kitad wang*, *Butaru giyün wang*, *Bingtü qongγur giyün wang* and *Čorji beyile* of the Khortsin; *Mungqu-a darqan qosiyučü*, a *Beyise* of the Dzalait; *Sereng beyise* of the Dörbet; *Güng Angγa*, *Güng Jalbu* and *Güng Lamskib* of the two Ghorlos-Banners; *Juljaya wang* of the Aru Khortsin; *Mingyan sengge* and *Mergen tayiži*, the two *güings* of the Urad; *Dügüireng giyün wang* and others of the Ongnighut; *Beyile Šamba darqan* and others of the Kharatsin, etc.

178. Lessing, op. cit. 145.

179. a) the above-mentioned *Yamāndaga sudur orusiba*;

b) *Yama ndaga-yin dbang sudur orusiba*. 58 fols., ca. 45 cm: 10 cm. Chinese marginal 羊汪 *yang wang*;

c) *Čoytu včir aywuluyčü-yin amurlingγui γal mandal üiledkü yosun-u jang üile Čayan toli* (White Mirror, The Rites of Making the Appeasing Fire Mandala of *Srī-Vajrabhairava*). 60 fols., 56: 12 cm. Chinese marginal 慈國師法語六函 *Ts'u kuo-shi fa-yü liu-han*. (Vol. 6 of the Collected works, *gsuñ 'bum* of the [1.] *IČaṇ skya Khutukhtu*.)

More details in my forthcoming description of the lam. mong. xylographs printed in Peking between the 17th and 19th centuries.


180. Section 3, note 11.

181. Section 4. For details about him cf. my forthcoming book ‘Die Pekinger lamaistischen Blockdrucke in mongolischer Sprache’.

182. For the early development of the *Yamāntaka* worship and its propagators cf. *Deb t'er šhon*

po, Blue Annals, translated by G. N. Roerich, R. A. S. B., Monogr. Series VII. Calcutta 1949. 374–380.

183. *Gsuñ 'bum* of the *Mergen diyanči blama-yin gegen* II. 57 v.
184. *Mergen diyanči blama gsuñ 'bum* I. 51 v.
185. *Öljei badarayśan süme-yin qural-un aman-u ungsilya nom-un yabudal masi todorqai gegen oyutan-i qoγulai-yin čimeg čindamani'erke kemegdekü orusiba*. 443 r.–446 r.
186. Op. cit. 439 v.–440 r.
187. Poppe, Opisanie.
188. Vladimirtsov, Etnologo-lingv. issledov.
189. Lines 107–110 of the invocation of the Shamaness *Tungčinggarbu* from the *Küriye* Banner (about 190 miles NE of Fushin, Manchuria). Cf. m. A contribution to the Knowledge of Eastmongolian Folkpoetry. Folklore Studies IX. Tokyo 1950.



The Eurasian steppe and neighbouring regions in the mid-seventeenth century

TITLES, APPANAGES, MARRIAGES, AND OFFICIALS: A COMPARISON OF POLITICAL FORMS IN THE ZÜNGHAR AND THIRTEENTH- CENTURY MONGOL EMPIRES¹

Christopher Atwood



Generations of scholars, such as Rene Grousset, Owen Lattimore, Denis Sinor, John Masson Smith, Tom Barfield, and most recently Bat-Ochiryn Bold, have treated nomadic polities as essentially uniform, implicitly regarding each new nomadic polity as an exemplar of an unchanging form, until the form's final degeneracy under foreign rule in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Grousset 1970; Lattimore 1951; Sinor 1971; Smith, J. 1970; Barfield 1989; Bold 2001). By linking this unchanging form to pastoral nomadism, they have nourished a long tradition of ecological determinism in Inner Asian studies, one which sees virtually everything distinctive about Inner Asian culture and society as being a direct and unmediated response to the ecological necessity of dispersed nomadic livestock breeding. Yet recent work contrasting the relatively centralized Khazars and the virtually stateless Qipchaqs, for example, has shown that these two Turkish people had fundamentally different political structures, despite speaking the same language and exploiting roughly the same area of steppe with a similarly nomadic way of life (Khazanov and Wink 2001; cf. Atwood 2002).

Among the Mongol peoples, the well-documented thirteenth-century Chinggisid empire and the seventeenth and eighteenth-century Zünghar principality offer similar opportunity for comparison. The Zünghar confederated pattern, found also among the seventeenth and eighteenth-century Kalmyks and Upper Mongols, grew out of the Oirats' original fifteenth-century rise as a *quda* (marriage-partner)-*keshig* (imperial guard) dynasty linked to puppet Chinggisid khans. While both the Oirats and the thirteenth-century Mongol world empire showed strong class differentiation and tight control by the authorities over their people – myths of inevitably 'turbulent nomads' notwithstanding – these two powers thus displayed two contrasting 'ideal types' of Mongol polities, a single-lineage dominated unitary dynasty and a confederated pattern of several ruling lineages competing for domination, and linked by marriage alliance.

FROM CHINGGISIDS TO OIRATS: THE ZÜNGHARS IN INNER ASIAN HISTORY


Scholars have long recognized that the Chinggisid Mongol world empire of the thirteenth century marked a major change in Inner Asian political structures. As Peter Golden has described in his *Introduction to the Turkic Peoples*, the Mongol empire 'reshuffled' the previous tribal structures, merging or dispersing old tribal entities and creating new ones (Golden 1992: 292–93, cf. 6). At the same time, by promoting both Buddhist and Islamic conversion, the Chinggisid successor states from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century catalyzed the division of Inner Asia into a Buddhist and Mongolian speaking east and an Islamic and Turkish speaking west.

Perhaps the most obvious legacy of the Mongol world empire was the Chinggisid principle of sovereignty attaching only to the descendants of Chinggisids. Until 1335, this principle dominated the Mongol empire and its successor states. After 1335, however, this principle was frequently observed in the breach as new dynasties arose, such as the Suldus (Chubaniids) and the Jalayir in the Middle East, the Barulas (Timurids) and Dughlat (Dogholad) in Central Asia, and the Manghit (Mangghud) and Qongrat (Qonggirad) on the Qipchaq steppe. All ruling through Chinggisid puppets, these new dynasties shared an origin first in the prominent *nökör* families of Chinggis Khan and later as one of the four families in the *keshig* or imperial guard of the Il-Khanate, the Chaghatay Khanate, and the Golden Horde, respectively. Last but not least of these 'commoner' (i.e. non-Chinggisid) dynasties ruling through Chinggisid puppets were the Oirat Mongols in the east who under Toghoon Taishi and his son Esen in the fifteenth century came close to actually achieving the position of sovereign rule that the Timurids eventually achieved in Central Asia.

After the Oirats' domination of the Chinggisid Mongols broke down in the later fifteenth century, three new Oirat polities emerged in the seventeenth century: the Kalmyks on the Volga, dominated by the Torghud ethnîe, the Zünghar principality between the Altai and Tianshan mountains, dominated by the Zünghar ethnîe, and the Upper Mongols in Tibet, dominated by the Khoshud ethnîe. While no longer dependent on symbiosis with a Chinggisid line, these Oirat polities all bore distinctive features in their structures of rule which marked them as 'commoner' dynasties, ones dominated not by the Chinggisid lineage but by a coalition of ethnîes or sub-ethnic groups traditionally described as 'tribes'.² Comparing the Oirat polities, as exemplified by the powerful and well-documented Zünghar principality, with the government of the Mongol world empire will demonstrate how the confederal nature of the Zünghar polity contrasted with the pervasively monarchic nature of the Chinggisid empire. Thus while the confederated form has been seen as ecologically determined by the nature of pastoral nomadic polities, comparative study shows that 'confederation' is only one type of polity among the Mongols, by no means universal. Moreover 'confederations' are not, any more than the Chinggisid monarchic polity, based on any supposed 'egalitarianism' of nomads.

THE RULER

The nature and role of the ruler in the Mongol world empire and the Oirat polities were in some ways similar. In both the rulers were members of a single ruling lineage (the



Map 25.1

Table 25.1: Oirat polities, tribes, and ruling clans, from 1650 to c. 1725 (bold for leading tribe, italics for formerly leading tribe)

Upper Mongols (Kökenuur/ NE Tibet)	Zungharian Oirats (E. Turkestan)	Kalmyks (along Volga)
Khoshud	Zünghars	Torghud
ruling lineage: Ghalwas	ruling lineage: Choros	(ruling lineage unclear)
Zünghar	Dörböd	Dörböd
ruling lineage: Choros	ruling lineage: Choros	ruling lineage: Choros
Torghud	<i>Khoshud</i>	Khoshud
ruling lineage unclear	ruling lineage: Ghalwas	ruling lineage: Ghalwas
Khoid	Khoid	
ruling lineage: Tsaghaan Tug	ruling lineage: Tsaghaan Tug	
Khalkha Mongols	(attached Torghud)	
ruling lineage: Borjigid		
Tümed Mongols		
ruling lineage: Borjigid		

Borjigid Kiyan in the Mongol world empire, the Torghud ruling family³ among the Kalmyks, the Choros⁴ ‘bone’ [patrilineage] among the Zünghars, and the Ghalwas ‘bone’ of the Khoshud among the Upper Mongols; see Table 25.1). Succession was not, however, strictly by primogeniture, unlike the situation in the restored Chinggisid monarchy under Dayan Khan’s successors from c. 1510 to 1634. Within the dominant lineage, leadership frequently passed to brothers, uncles, and even more distant cousins.

A striking difference between the Chinggisid and Zünghar polities lay, however, in their monarchs’ titles. The Chinggisid rulers bore the title Khan (*qan* under Chinggis and *qa’an* after Ögödei’s coronation in 1229; see Rachewiltz 1983). As demonstrated by usage for other figures, such as the emperors of the Jin dynasty, the title *qa’an* was the supreme title of sovereignty in the Turco-Mongolian world, one which admitted of no superior. (The title *qan* continued to be used after 1229 as a subordinate title and as a term denoting a sovereign or monarch in the abstract.)

By contrast the Zünghar rulers only rarely bore the title of khan, and it was never hereditary. Thus as Junko Miyawaki has pointed out, the oft-used term ‘Zünghar khanate’ is quite inappropriate (Miyawaki 1987a; Miyawaki 1990). While usage seems somewhat inconsistent, the Zünghar ruler’s principal title appears to be that of *khung*

Map 25.1: The Oirat Polities in central Eurasia c. 1700.

Underline indicates sub-ethnic groups

Dö Dörböd ethnîe or sub-ethnic group

To. Torghud ethnîe or sub-ethnic group

Kh. Khoshud ethnîe or sub-ethnic group

** Tributary to the Qing Empire

* Tributary to both Russia and the Zünghar Principality

→ Direction of Kalmyk and Zünghar Raids



Great wall of China

taiji. This title, derived from the Chinese *huang taizi* ('crown prince, heir apparent'), was originally used for scions of Dayan Khan and his successors, but was later 'inflated' so as to take in increasingly remote descendants. Perhaps, as Junko Miyawaki has argued, as a result of the brief enthronement of a Khalkha Dayan Khanid prince as ruler over the Oirats, the title of *khung taiji* came to be used for the head of the Oirats. The title khan (*qa'an*) was received from the Dalai Lama by Galdan two years after his accession to the Zünghar throne as *khung taiji* (Ishihama 1992). Only from the time of Galdan-Tseren (r. 1727–1745) was the title khan regularly used, at least in retrospective histories such as Peter Simon Pallas's account of the Oirats and the 1825 history *Monggholiyin uq ekiyin töüke*, written among the Öölöds (the old Zünghars) of Monggolküre or Zhaosu (Badai, Altan'orgil, and Erdeni 1985: 314; Sühbaatar 2001: 142).

Of course if it was simply a matter of differing title this difference between *qa'an* and *khung taiji* would be trivial. Yet the difference was not merely cosmetic, since the title of khan/*qa'an* designating the supreme sovereign continued to be used in the Zünghar world, for figures ranging from the Tsar (*tsaghân khân*) to the Manchu emperor (*Bogdo Khân*).⁵ The Zünghar rulers thus carried a title which implied only a derivative sovereignty, one dependent on the Dalai Lama for elevation to full equality with the surrounding rulers.

As Junko Miyawaki has stressed, this less than sovereign rank for the Zünghar rulers is undoubtedly related to their non-Chinggisid status. For the Choros, this non-Chinggisid origin is linked with a different origin myth involving a child born from or abandoned at the world tree (Birtalan 2002). This contrast of ancestor legends forms a vital motif in the legend of the usurping Choros leader Toghoon Taishi's death at the Chinggisid shrine, the Eight White Yurts (Bawden 1955: §85; Sagang Secen 1990: 106). By contrast, the Khoshuds, who claimed descent from Chinggis Khan's elder brother Qasar, routinely took the title of khan, from Baibaghas to Galdan's immediate predecessor, Ochirtu Sechen Khan, during their dominance of the Oirats north of Turkestan. Yet the title khan could also be bestowed by outside forces, whether the Dalai Lama, or even the Russian Tsar, who appears to have at least confirmed the use of the title khan among the Kalmyks. Indeed it is unclear whether the Upper Mongols' Khoshud rulers always bore the title khan from Güüshi (r. 1642–1655) to Lhazang (r. 1698–1717) because they were Chinggisids of a sort, or in virtue of their close link to the Dalai Lama as their great patron.

THE RULER'S INNER CIRCLE

The ruler's inner circle, despite differences in terminology, seems to have been quite similar in the Chinggisid and Zünghar polities. In describing the ruler's inner circle in the Mongol world empire it is important to bear in mind the steady transformation of a cadre of 'new men' elevated by Chinggis into established aristocratic families. Thus the inner circle of the Chinggisid realm(s) in 1300 or even 1255 is significantly different from that in 1206. Further difficulties in interpretation come from the pervasive discrepancies of detail between the famous *Secret History of the Mongols* (Cleaves 1982; Rachewiltz 1972), dating to 1252, and the less frequently used but equally important *Jamī' al-Tawarikh* or *Compendium of Chronicles* of Rashid al-Din (c. 1304) and the *Yuan shi* ('History of the Yuan') compiled by a team under Song Lian in 1370.

Briefly, however, one can describe the ruler's inner circle under Chinggis Khan and his

immediate successors as composed of a series of institutions with overlapping membership: 1) the two wing myriarchs (Muqali on the left and Bo'orchu on the right); 2) command of Chinggis's personal 'thousand' (a military-administrative unit nominally containing 1,000 men and their families) (Rashiduddin/Thackston 1999: II, 272–73);⁶ 3) talented companions grouped in the *Secret History* in prestigious numbered categories (the four *külü'üd* including Muqali and Bo'orchu, the 'four dogs', etc.) and often given special military commands (*Secret History of the Mongols* §§163, 195, 209, 138, 243, 210, 216); 4) the *keshig* or shift guard, over which supreme authority was held by four shift commanders, rotating every three days (*Secret History of the Mongols* §§192, 224–234; Song 1370/1976: VIII/99, 2524; Hsiao 1978: 92–94); 5) the chief *jarghuchi* or judge;⁷ and 6) the chief *bichi'echi* or scribe (Cleaves 1951).

In later reigns, the khan's personal thousand disappears, while the numbered categories become fossilized as marks of ancestral prestige, not of favour with the current empire. Myriarchies multiplied tremendously, undermining their high status. By contrast the *keshig*, *jarghuchi*, and chief scribe (often renamed as vizier, *sahib-divan*, or *chingsang*) increase in importance. These institutions also begin to merge, so that the chief scribe becomes *ex officio* head of a *keshig* shift in the Il-Khanate and the late Yuan. In the western khanates, the *keshig*'s four shift captains in the later western khanates came to be fixed in dominant families who severely curtailed the khan's authority.⁸

The dynamics of the Oirat polities' inner circles are by comparison less well understood. The ruler had a privy council called variously the *yamu* ('office') among the Zünghars or *zarghu* ('court') among the Kalmyks. This privy council's members were called *tüshimed* ('ministers') among the Zünghars or *zaisang* ('officials') or *zarghuchi* ('judges') among the Kalmyks (Doronatib 1985: §§7–8, 17–18, 25, 33; Halkovic 1985: 69, 121; Khodarkovsky 1992: 44). The members numbered four at the time of the Mongol-Oirat Code (1640), but Galdan-Tseren (r. 1727–1745) expanded the Zünghar *yamu* by adding six *zarghuchis* to the existing four *tüshimed* (Tayama 1987: 47–49). A similar expansion took place among the Kalmyks where the number of *zarghuchis* was said to be eight in 1761 (Khodarkovsky 1992: 44–45). Despite these alterations, the continuing primacy of the four *tüshimed* among the Zünghars is demonstrated by the formula in Emperor Qianlong's 1758 description of the Oirat ruling apparatus as 'the many *zaisangs*, the four ministers (*tüshimed*), and the twenty-one appanages' (Krueger 1972: 67, 69).

The original number of four recalls both the four *keshig* shifts in the Chinggisid state and the canonical number of 'four Oirats' always used by the Oirats in their homeland despite all the tergiversations of the strengths of the component ethnies, such as the Torghud, Zünghars, the Dörböds, and the Khoshud. One might thus speculate that the *yamu* or *zarghu* was a development or imitation of the Chinggisid *keshig* and that the Oirats were numbered as four because there were four slots for membership in the ruling council, presumably occupied by the nobles of the four ethnies. Yet this appears to not be the case. As evidence below will show, the ruler's *yamu* was composed of commoners of the Oirat ruler's own ethnies, not of representatives of the four Oirats. The common numbering in four thus appears to be a coincidence, made more likely by the widespread use of this significant number in royal contexts (Hocart 1970).

In the 1640 law code, the four *tüshimed* were treated as commoners and hence were not members of the ruling lineages of their ethnies. In the Mongol-Oirat Code, the 'four

ministers of the court' or 'four ministers who handle administration' (*yamutu dörben tüshimed* or *jasag barigsan dörben tüshimed*) appear in one set of provisions alongside the *tabunang-ud* ('sons-in-law'), after the great, middle, and lesser nobles (*noyad*) but before the headmen of the *otogs* (camp districts). In other provisions, however, the four ministers appear alongside *tabunang-ud* but above the lesser nobles and *otog* headmen (Doronatib 1985: §§7–8, 17–18, 25, 33). Apparently, they belonged to the intermediate *tabunang* ('son-in-law') class, thus receiving wives from the dominant lineage within the dominant ethnies. Similarly among the Kalmyks, the *zarghu* was originally composed solely of 'personal subjects' (*amini albatu*) from within the ruler's own Torghud ethnies. When Catherine the Great ordered that the Kalmyk *zarghu* be transformed into a representative institution of seven members (three from the khan's Torghud subjects, one lama, and one each from the autonomous nobility of the Kalmyks' three ethnies, Torghud, Khoshud, and Dörböd), this sparked the great exodus of 1771 (Halkovic 1985: 69, 121).

Scattered pieces of evidence suggested other *ad hoc* leading bodies around the ruler. When Galdan Boshogtu Khan's nephew, Tsewang-Rabtan (r. 1694–1727), fled his uncle's wrath and then usurped the throne, he was assisted by a group that became known as the *dolân nökör* (Chinese *duolun nuku* 'r'; 'seven companions') and it is likely that these became powerful figures under his reign ('Yuzhi Zhunge'r quanbu jilue' 1791/1899: 7b). 'Big' and 'Little' Tseren-Dondug, for example, both members of the noble Choros bone that ruled the Zünghar ethnies and the whole Zünghar principality, appear often enough in the campaigns under Tsewang-Rabtan to be considered as something like professional military commanders.

TERRITORIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE

The structure of the Mongol clans after Chinggis Khan's unification of the Mongols is fairly clearly seen in the data of Rashid al-Din and the *Secret History of the Mongols*. Before Chinggis Khan, the Mongolian plateau was divided into a number of large polities (variously termed in Mongolian as *irgen* '[common] people', *qari* '[separate, but potentially allied] nation', or *ulus*, 'polity, people under a single rule'), such as the Naiman, the Kereyid, the Merkid, and Tatar. It is important to emphasize that these polities, like the ethnies of the Oirats I will describe later, were not consanguineal units in any sense, whether notionally or in reality. The original Mongol polity, before Chinggis Khan's conquest of the whole plateau, is known in great detail through Rashid al-Din's work (Rashiduddin/Thackston 1998: I, 79–112). This polity, a confederation of Mongol clans (*oboq*) occupying less than a fifth of the Mongolian plateau as a whole, constituted the largest unit of political action for Chinggis Khan's immediate ancestors. As Rashid al-Din makes clear, the pre-Chinggisid Mongols (excluding the Naiman, Kereyid, etc.) were divided into some thirty-six to forty-nine *oboq* or clans (depending on how one counted) which were the everyday unit of political action. These were as a rule themselves divided into separate consanguineous ruling and subject 'bones' (*yasu*). The ruling bones of the clans were each conceived of as belonging to one of two paired categories, the Kiyan or 'Backbone' (*Niru'u*) Mongols and the Negüs or 'Ordinary' (*Dürlükün*) Mongols.⁹ These two categories were ascribed differing origins and different identities, the Kiyan as symbolically male and falconers, the Negüs symbolically female and herders. In this way, sub-units


belonging to opposite marriage categories joined in criss-crossing ties of marriage alliance. It was these ties, and certainly not patrilineal descent, which defined the actual extent of the pre-Chinggisid Mongol polity. (It is worth noting here that the great ramifying genealogy in the first chapter of the *Secret History* links *only* those lineages in the Kiyan or 'Backbone' Mongol category, not those in the Negüs or 'Ordinary' category.) Some Negüs families were atomized subjects with little family identity, while others formed solidary clans, such as the Qonggirad, who were prosperous. But no Negüs Mongols were eligible to contend for leadership in the Mongol polity as a whole.

The unification under Chinggis Khan certainly ground up the pre-Chinggisid polities on the Mongolian plateau. The distribution of the Kereyid and the Merkid households to the victorious Mongols, for example, is described in the *Secret History of the Mongols* (§§187, 198), while the extermination of the Tatars described in the *Secret History* is shown in Rashid al-Din's account to have left a considerable number of Tatars scattered among the Mongols (*Secret History of the Mongols* § 154–156; Rashiduddin/Thackston 1998: I, 46–47). In their list of Chinggis Khan's 129 or 95 'thousands' (military-administrative units roughly corresponding in size to the old *obogs*), Rashid al-Din and the *Secret History* both mention that a number of over-sized 'thousands' containing (at least nominally) two to ten thousand households remained as corporate units, preserving their pre-Chinggisid name and identity¹⁰ Still such units were far smaller than the major pre-conquest polities on the plateau. Meanwhile, the ruling Kiyan or Borjigin were redefined much more narrowly as only the descendants of Chinggis Khan's father, Yisügei; the other one-time Kiyans were demoted to a single 'commoner' (*qarachu*) status, along with the Negüs, many of whom had achieved wealth and influence as non-Chinggisid officials.

While the Naiman, Kereyid, and Merkid subjects were divided up under meritorious Mongol commanders, the thousands of the decimal system mostly (but by no means always) embraced pre-existing clan (*obog*) units. The imposition of Mongol commanders and the creation of wholly new synthetic thousands certainly increased the diversity of 'bones' within some thousands. Others, however, such as the Önggür's Baya'ud, the Negüs clansmen of Narin To'oril, and the Suldus were reunited after their pre-Chinggisid dispersal and presumably formed largely consanguineal (at least notionally) units (*Secret History of the Mongols* §§213, 218, 219).¹¹ In the subsequent history of the empire, new military units such as the Qosha'ul thousand in China, the Qara'unas and Negüderis in Afghanistan, and so on, became multi-bone clan 'thousands' (Persian *hazaras*), while *keshig* guard forces frequently became new *tümens* (Rashiduddin/Thackston 1998–1999: I, 108, 227, II, 278; Aubin 1969; Shimo 1977; Mainz 1989: 33–34, 161–63). These groups were defined by their military and political role, not by consanguineality. Yet it is not unlikely that alliance ties quickly solidified the political unity between the component 'bones'.

Above the thousands under Chinggis was a division into either two or three wings: a right under Muqali, a left under Bo'orchu, and a centre under Naya'a of the Ba'arin (*Secret History of the Mongols* §§205, 206, 220), or else a right under the great *nökör* Muqali of the Jalayir and a left under Bo'orchu of the Arulad, with Boroghul as the *sütüküsün* (deputy) of Bo'orchu and Naya'a the *sütüküsün* of Muqali (Rashiduddin/Thackston 1999: II, 273, 275–76, 277). Yet while the traditional role as wing commanders is recorded for both Muqali and Bo'orchu's descendants (Su 1335/1962: I/1, 2a, I/3, 1a), these two divisions did not form the nucleus of territorial—

Table 25.2: Internal organization of the Oirat Mongolian polities: (| indicates power to command, || indicates flow of taxes)



administrative units. At no point is common political action by these wings recorded. The future division of the empire took place not between the subjects of Chinggis’s *nökörs* but between his sons. Chinggis’s sons and brothers received appanages (again the details in the *Secret History* and Rashid al-Din differ widely). As is well known, these appanages formed the basis for the division of the Mongol empire (Jackson 1999). Thus the disintegration of the Chinggisid empire took place not between differing tribes each headed by differing ruling bones, but by divisions within the ruling family. The Chinggisid state thus lived and died as a single-lineage empire and not a multi-lineage confederation.

By contrast, the Zünghar principality was divided into notionally four different ethnies or sub-polities, each under its own semi-autonomous ruling lineage or lineage branch.¹² Those of the dominant Zünghar ethnies who were directly under the ruling prince or *khung taiji* were divided into twenty-four *otogs* (camp-pastures) and nine *jisai* (ecclesiastical estates), while the rest of the Zünghar ethnies, along with the three other ethnies, were divided into twenty-one *anggi* or noble appanages (see Table 25.2 and Appendix 1).¹³

Of these ethnies, the composition of the Dörböd is best-known since by surrendering peacefully to the Qing in 1753 it preserved more of its original internal structure. Ethnographic surveys in the mid-twentieth century show that the Dörböd ethnies in western Mongolia consist of about fifty or so *yasu* (or patrilineal ‘bones’) of the most diverse Oirat, Mongol, Siberian Turkic, Turkestani, and Buryat origin.¹⁴ Indeed, it is important to remember that today’s separate ethnic groups (*yastan*) – the Bayad (presumably of Siberian Turkic origin, as the Bayad clan name is attested in Siberia from early times) and the Khotong (of Turkestani origin) – were subjects of the Dörböd nobility and not distinguished from the Dörböd until after the abolition of the feudal system in the 1920s. Over all these clans, whether in varying degrees of freedom or slavery (the Khotong were considered to be chattel slaves of the nobility under Qing –

and undoubtedly Zünghar – law), was the ruling Choros lineage (there was also a subject Choros lineage of uncertain relation to the ruling family of the same name). Similarly the Yeke Mingghan Khoid, who surrendered to the Qing and were deported to north-eastern Inner Mongolia, also included a body of subject Siberian Qirghiz, who maintained their Turkic language into the twentieth century (Janhunen 1996: 58–59, 111–13, cf. 83–84).

There is also evidence that like the twelfth-century tribes, the subject Dörböd lineages too were assigned to one of two exogamous marriage categories. In a legend collected around 1870 among the Dörböd ethnies of the Don Kalmyks, two brothers (of the Choros bone), Baakhan and Baatur, who ruled the Kalmyk Dörböds in the early eighteenth century had gathered all their people in the plain and suddenly rode through the people. Baakhan took those who scattered to the left and Baatur those who scattered to the right. Subjects of the resulting two categories constantly intermarried, and as in the paired marriage categories within the twelfth-century Mongolian polity, one was symbolically female and the other male: Baakhan's people 'by chance' included all the handsome men, and Baatur's all the beautiful women (Bormanshinov 1991: 49–52).¹⁵

I believe it is not unlikely that the division between the Bayads and the Dörböds of western Mongolia may also lie in this tendency to organize all the scores of component named clans or patrilineages into two broad categories that exchange women in marriage. The lists of the existing patrilineage names among the Bayad and Dörböd are remarkably dissimilar. Of the thirty-two Dörböd and thirty-four Bayad patrilineages found in Rinchen (1979) and Demberel (1997), only five bones are found among both people: the Choros, whose members ruled commoners of both peoples, the ethnonyms Dörböd and Khotong, and the Borluud, Burduud, and Shangas: a remarkably small number for groups that had been under one rule from at least the late seventeenth to early twentieth centuries. Indeed, of the latter three only the Burduud bone is relatively widespread among both peoples; the primarily Dörböd Borluud are found in only one Bayad *sum* (district), and the primarily Bayad Shangas are found in only one Dörböd *sum*. The divergence shows that the Bayad and Dörböd commoners within the Choros-ruled principality were linked, if at all, by marriage, not by shared lineage. It is also notable that whereas the Dörböd in the narrow sense appear to bear almost all native Dörböd patrilineage names unknown among surrounding peoples (whether Mongols proper or Turkic), the Bayad have numerous lineages of outside origin: Kharachin, Mergen, Monggolmuud (Mongol), Ghalzuud (Buryat), Khasag (Kazakh), Uriyangqan, Khoshud, Khoid, Khotoghoid – all non-Oirat ethnonyms. The Bayad thus give the appearance of a group collected by conquest around the Dörböd core; non-ruling but engaged in marriage exchange with the old, core Dörböd, both Choros and non-Choros.

The political-historical record shows that both before Galdan and during the Zünghar principality, the Oirat ethnies resembled those polities such as the Merkid or Naiman on the pre-Chinggisid Mongolian plateau in acting sometimes as a single political unit (for example, the Dörböds' common decision to desert the Zünghar principality), but at other times more as arenas of political conflict, such as in the longstanding feud between the Khoshud princes in the second and third quarters of the seventeenth century. In the course of the seventeenth-eighteenth centuries, political leadership among the Oirats of Züngharia shifted between various ethnies. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, Russian ambassadors described the Dörböd as most important. From about 1620 to 1676, the Khoshuds held the title of khan and at least at first had the largest army. The growing power of the Zünghar ethnies proper

within the overall polity was recognized by Galdan's assumption of the title of *khung taiji* and the deposition of the last Khoshud khan in 1676, and Galdan's assumption of the title of khan two years later (Miyawaki 1987b). After Galdan-Tseren's death in 1745, first rivals among the Zünghar ethnies' ruling Choros bone, and later Amursanaa of the Tsaghan-Tug bone and Khoid ethnies attempted to displace his heirs. Politically, the Zünghars (and the Kalmyks as well) thus presented the appearance of a classic confederal unity, with each unit being headed by its own ruling lineage. Dominance over the confederation as a whole might be vested in one ethnies and ruling lineage for a few generations, but was always at least potentially in play.

MARRIAGE ALLIANCE

The role of marriage alliance in structuring the polities into exogamous moieties has already been noted. What I would like to discuss here is the role of marriage alliance in relations between the noble and commoner classes.

In both the Chinggisid and the Zünghar empires, the bestowal of brides on subject 'commoners' created a new class of 'sons-in-law' (called *küregen* in the Chinggisid empire and *tabunang* among the Zünghars as well as among the Mongol nobility under the Qing). This class was intermediate between the ruling bone and the larger body of commoners. In both cases also there was at least some overlap between the 'son-in-law' class and the leading companions and officials who formed the guards and judges of the ruler.

Under Chinggis Khan and his immediate successors, however, the emperors established only occasional *quda* (marriage ally) links with their main *nököd* (companions) who staffed the primary central governmental institutions of the *keshig*, the judges (*jarghuchi*), and military commanders. Instead, *quda* ties principally linked the Chinggisid family to particular outlying, still semi-corporate, tribal/ethnic bodies, particularly the Qonggirad, the Ikires, the Baya'ud, the Oyirad, the Önggüd, the Qarlucs, and the Uighurs.¹⁶ Significantly, all of these *quda* clans, with the exception of the Baya'ud, were either organized into over-sized 'thousands' that incorporated two to five thousands under one ruler or else were foreign tributary states. These relations were all continued in the Yuan dynasty (Song 1370/1976: X/106, 2693–2704, and X/109, 2757–63; Hambis 1954.) The Chinggisids in the other successor states formed *quda* ties with some of these, such as the Qonggirad and the Baya'ud in the Il-khanate, and formed new *quda* links with other clans (such as the Kereyid in the Il-Khanate). The impression is that up to the early fourteenth century, at least, the khans avoided marital ties with their chief *nökörs* and military commanders. Shimo Hirotsoshi (1993) argued that the *quda* partners were the only consistently prominent families of the Il-Khanate. This is true, yet it is also true that many of the most powerful commanders at the Il-Khan court (Buqa, Ta'achar, Nawroz, Qutlugh-Shah, etc.) were generally not (at least until about 1310) of these clans. In general *quda* families appear to have had high prestige, but had less direct political influence.

Since the Chinggisids were all one family, marital links between the Chinggisids of the different realms (*ulus*) were impossible. Yet there were some cases of inter-*ulus* alliances being sealed indirectly by marriage ties. Thus, the rapprochement of the Golden Horde under Toqto'a with the Yuan dynasty was mediated by Toqto'a's commander-in-chief Salji'udai *Küregen* (d. 1301/2) of the Qonggirad marrying

Qubilai's niece Kelmish (Rashîd al-Dîn/Boyle 1971: 160). Yet the simpler and more direct path of linking the ruling dynasties of separate Mongol realms by marriage was blocked by exogamy.

In the fourteenth-fifteenth century, powerful *küregen* (son-in-law) dynasties arose, that united the position of son-in-law with domination of the *keshig* and/or the military to reduce the freedom of the khan. In differing forms this tendency can be seen among the Oirats, the Timurids, the Mangghud/Nogay, and the Crimean Khanate. After 1500 in the Mongol heartland, the revived Chinggisid dynasty of Dayan Khan and his successors can be seen as a reaction against this tendency. As such, the Dayan Khanids avoided the creation of powerful *quda* families. The political role of marriage alliance, as far as is known, was to tie purely local, small-scale, leading *otog* (camp-district) elders with their new Chinggisid noblemen (Okada 1972: 70–73). As for the line of Chaqar khans who held the title of 'khans of the Great Yuan', little or nothing is known of their marriage alliances.

Among the later Zünghars and the Kalmyks, the role of marriage alliance in high politics appears at three levels. First there are those sons-in-law associated with the ruler's *yamu* or *zarghu*, second there are the sons-in-law from the class of petty nobles, and thirdly there were frequent marriages between the ruling nobles of the dominant bones within each ethnîe (Miyawaki 1993). The first form seems to be a continuation of the linkage of the ruler with his privy council that became pervasive among the fourteenth-fifteenth century Chinggisids, although no Oirat son-in-law lineage ever challenged the ruling bones for power. The third form is a new structure of marriage alliance, one that was allowed to function by the multi-lineage nature of the Oirat ruling class. These marriages linked the various ruling bones within each of the three Oirat polities (Kalmyks, Zünghars, Upper Mongols), as well as linking the polities to each other through alliances of the three ruling bones: the Zünghars' Choros, the Khoshuds' Ghalwas, and that of the Torghud.

LOCAL ADMINISTRATION AND CLASS STRATIFICATION

Local administration under the Mongol world empire and the Zünghars shared a number of features. Both were based on a nested hierarchy of theoretically equal sized units. The grass-roots level nested units were headed by theoretically appointive commoners who were not considered part of the ruling class, while those at the higher levels were ruled by *noyad* (commanders or nobles) who were explicitly hereditary in their rule and seen as part of the ruling class. Yet the evidence indicates that even the grass-roots official positions were in effect virtually hereditary. Each nested unit occupied a particular defined pasture from which they were not allowed to move without permission. Officials were thus expected to return fugitives to their original units. The officials' main task was to transmit orders from above down to the ordinary subjects and at least in the Oirat polities had regular assemblies at the *noyan*'s palace tent that they were required to attend. Both the lower officials and the higher nobility received regular provision of pastoral products (and probably other services) from the commoners in their units. In both periods the government functioned through messengers (*elchi*) who had access to compulsory requisitions of food and mounts while on government service.

Law codes from the Oirats show a pervasively class-based judicial system with

finances based in various ways on the status of the offender and/or victim (Riasanovsky 1937/1965: 46–52). A similar system is not reported in the Chinggisid empire. The authority system in both polities was buttressed by a patriarchal and patrilocal family ideology that prescribed strict hierarchies of age and sex, subordinating daughters-in-law to their mothers-in-law, sons to their fathers, and wives to their husbands (Doronatib 1985: §§25–31; Riasanovsky 1937/1965: 101–102). Curiously the practice of including servants as part of the property transferred in noble marriages is not mentioned in the provisions of the Oirat law codes about *inje* or dowries (Doronatib 1985: §§33–37; Riasanovsky 1937/1965: 100). Still, such provisions existed under Chinggis Khan and were codified later under the Qing (Nayiraltu and Altan’orgil 1989: II, §§841–842; Lifan Yuan 1826/1998: 247–48; Zhang et al. 1998: §§832–834). Most likely, the dowries of the great lords were simply unregulated. They were the ones who would be likely to have human dowry and their dowries are not mentioned in the Mongol-Oirat Code.

In both polities, there seems to have been no distinction between subjects of the ruler in his public capacity and that of the ruler as a private noble. In other words, the Qing-era distinction of *sumun-u arad* and *khamjilga* appears in neither the Mongol empire or the Oirat polities. As far as one can tell, the same persons supplied all types of services, whether for the messengers of the supreme ruler, for their local nobleman’s public obligations (warfare, tribute), and his private needs (herding, gathering fuel, sewing, etc.). There was, however, a distinction of those directly subject to the supreme ruler, and those subject to nobles in some sense autonomous from the supreme ruler. In the Chinggisid empire, this meant a distinction between those thousands directly subject to Chinggis Khan and those under the khan’s mother, brothers, sons, and daughters. These later appanages were about 46% of the Mongol households according to the *Secret History* and about 22% according to Rashid al-Din (*Secret History of the Mongols* §§242–243; Rashiduddin/Thackston 1999: II, 272, 279–82).¹⁷ Under Ögödei this distinction was regularized among the sedentary subject peoples as well (Allsen 2001b). Among the Zünghars, this distinction was formalized under Galdan-Tseren, but undoubtedly existed earlier. Galdan-Tseren directly ruled thirteen ‘old’ and sixteen ‘new’ *otogs* (camp-pastures), while twenty-one other great nobles of the Zünghar and the other three ethnies (none more closely related to Galdan-Tseren than third cousin) each held *anggi* or appanages (‘Yuzhi Zhunge’r quanbu jilue’ 1793/1899: 8b–9b; Tayama 1987: 41–63). (The ‘Regulations of Galdan’ appears to refer to these *anggi* as *aimags*, opposing them to *otogs* as the two types of local units; see Doronatib 1985: Regulations of Galdan Khung-Taiji §4.) While the actual number of households in the *anggis* is not given in any source, the total number of Zünghar households is given as over 200,000. Since the number of households in the *otogs* totalled 88,300, that in the *anggis* should be somewhat over half of the total number of Zünghar households, giving an average size per *anggi* of about 5,000.

Given these striking similarities between the Chinggisid and Oirat local administrations, the differences of terminology and the nominal size of the units appears relatively insignificant. The Chinggisid system was divided by the famous decimal organization (ten-thousands, thousands, hundreds, tens), each headed by officials called *noyad*. Yet there was a clear distinction between the *noyad* of a thousand or ten-thousand, who were hereditary from the beginning and participated in the great *quriltais*, and the lesser *noyad* who were appointive figures and not members of the upper class (*Secret History of the Mongols* §§202, 224, 269; Hsiao 1978: 73). Among the Zünghars this distinction of

classes was more formal. The title of *noyan* was now restricted to hereditary ruling lineages. (What exact administrative role, if any, the close relatives of the *khung taiji* and the *anggi* nobles played is unclear.) Below the great *noyad* were the *otogs* nominally of 800 to 6,000 households (average 3,010 households), ruled by one to five *zaisangs* (earlier called *akhalagchis*, ‘elders’, in Galdan’s regulations). The *otogs* were divided into ‘forties’ (*döchin*), headed by *demchis*, and the ‘forties’ into ‘twenties’ (*khori*), headed by *shülengge*.¹⁸ Officials on these three levels were all commoners. Given what is known about the great divergence between nominal and real strengths in such decimal units, it is hard to assign too much significance to the differences between the unit sizes among the Chinggisid Mongols and the Zünghars (Allsen: 1987: 193–94).

LAW AND LAW CODES

The question of the *jasag* or law code of Chinggis Khan has been the topic of considerable debate in recent decades. Fortunately we now have the benefit of Igor de Rachewiltz’s balanced and thorough synthesis of the evidence (1993). The most important point to note is that the view popularized by Valentin Riasanovsky (1937/1965: 25–40), that Chinggis Khan proclaimed a fully formed law code in 1206, is now untenable. Instead, the *jasag* was an evolving series of *ad hoc* decisions, which after 1204 at least were written down, but which were never systematized into a single law code, at least during Chinggis Khan’s own life. Ögödei reaffirmed these precedents forming the *jasag* at his coronation in 1229, but still there is no evidence that this body of legal precedents was ever published as a single code, nor that abstract provisions were ever separated from the details of the precedents. Ögödei made new precedents, but after his reign few new precedents were added to the disparate body of decisions.

The contrast of this newly emerging picture with the legal practices of the Oirat polity is quite sharp. The Oirat and Khalkha aristocrats agreed consensually upon a single, relatively comprehensive law code at an assembly in 1640, more or less exactly the kind of abstract body of law promulgated on a single occasion that Chinggis Khan’s *jasag* was not. These were later supplemented by decrees of Galdan Khung-Taiji (later Boshogtu Khan) among the Zünghars and by Dondug-Dashi of the Kalmyks (Doronatib 1985: 1–16, 202–05, 230–36; Riasanovsky 1937/1965: 46–52). A similar law-code has been discovered for the Upper Mongols in Tibet, although it has not yet been published (Cerengbal 2002). Significantly, the Mongol-Oirat code of 1640 begins with provisions designed to create a ‘collective security’ regime among the semi-autonomous Khalkha and Oirat principalities (Doronatib 1985: §§1–4; Riasanovsky 1937/1965: 93). The formal promulgation of a code thus appears to be an aspect of the consensual (at the elite level) and aristocratic nature of the Oirat polity, as opposed to the almost purely monarchic and despotic Chinggisid polity.

RELIGION AND ETHNICITY

The empire of Chinggis Khan was famous for its policy of encouraging many sedentary religions and the restriction (at least according to some sources) of religious belief to the private realm, such that religious conversion did not affect a Mongol prince’s ethnic standing or mode of rule. Regardless of exactly how this policy is characterized, it is

clear that the early Chinggisid empire was not a confessional state. Nor was there any Mongol population of designated religious subjects attached to a temple, church, or mosque. Such populations existed and were recognized among the conquered peoples, but not among the Mongols. In the early generations after Chinggis, one finds many examples of Mongol princes adopting foreign religions without necessarily giving their realms or appanages a confessional character (Atwood 2004).

The Oirat polities, being heir to the triumphalist spirit of dGe-lugs-pa ('Yellow Hat') Buddhism, which was first cultivated in south-western Inner Mongolia, differed fundamentally from the early Chinggisid empire in their religious policy. The Zünghar, Kalmyk, and Upper Mongol polities were explicitly confessional states which wrote the protection and support of the dGe-lugs-pa clergy into the law code (Doronatib 1985: §§5, 13–16, 111; Dondog-Dashi's Decrees §§1–5; Riasanovsky 1937/1965: 92–93). For example, a text for sprinklings of first fruits (*sachuli-yin bichig*) for the prosperity of 'khans and nobles of the Oirats' is dedicated:

First to you the lord of the Yellow Faith in this era, Shakyamuni Buddha, and then to the buddhas and bodhisattvas of the ten directions and three times, to the holy lord Tsong-kha-pa of the Yellow Faith, fathers and sons [i.e. masters and disciples], who uphold their tradition, and to the whole assembly of *dakinis* [female protector spirits], heroic bodhisattvas with the eye of discriminating wisdom and heroic guardians of the dharma, we offer these first-fruits ... (Altan'orgil 1983: 85).¹⁹

The very legitimacy of the high titles held by the Oirat rulers usually depended on a grant from the Dalai Lama and the official correspondence of Galdan Boshogtu Khan regularly began with the phrase 'By the blessing of the Dalai Lama we are healthy and well' (*Dalai bLamayin adistidêr bide mendü amur*; Krueger 1969: 292–93). Among the Zünghars, by Galdan-Tseren's time, there were nine *jisai* or clerical appanages, with a total population of 10,600, of whom over 6,000 were lamas and the rest lay households supporting the lamas. Among the Kalmyks a similar religious estate existed.

Buddhist militancy was increased among the Zünghars and the Kalmyks by the reality that the two polities were not only surrounded by those of alien religion, but also included many non-Buddhist subjects. At their height the Zünghars ruled the Tarim Basin oasis cities as well as exercising some form of control over the Kazakhs and Qirghiz. According to the late eighteenth-century Torghud chronicle *Khô Örlögi-yin töüke* ('History of Khô Örlög'), the decree granting Sain Noyan Khara-Khula (d. 1634) rule over the Oirats left in Turkestan says, 'Let Khara-Khula *Noyan* be senior over his Khoshud, Khoid, Dörböd, and Torghud left here and rule his land; let him reign, supervising all the Kazakhs, Qirghiz (*Burud*), Turkestanis (*Khoton*), and Andizhanis (*Anjiyan*)²⁰ and collecting taxes' (Norbu 1983: 27–28; Sükhbaatar 2001: 165). Under Tsewang-Rabtan, deportations of Tarim Basin Turkestanis north to the Ili Valley, then the centre of the Zünghar principality, created the people later known as the Taranchis or 'Farmers'.²¹ In the early nineteenth-century Öölöd (Zünghar) chronicle *Monggholiyin uq ekiyin töüke* ('History of the Origin of the Mongols'), when Galdan Boshogtu Khan was asked to return to his homeland from Tibet, he first anxiously asked the oracle, 'Beyond the borders of my land are many infidels (*buru'u nomtan*); when I am begged to return may I do so?' (Badai, Altan'orgil, and Erdeni 1985: 310–11; Sükhbaatar 2001: 135–36). Likewise, the Kalmyks had to hold off Russian, Crimean Tatar, and later Kazakh pressure, and counted many Nogay Tatar

subjects. These were always willing to ally with the Crimean Tatars in attacks on their Muslim Nogays Kalmyk overlords.

In this situation, religion and ethnicity became fused in a militant solidarity against the alien. This link is illustrated by two juxtaposed chapters in the 'History of the Four Oirats', first written among the Kalmyks by Ghabang-Sharab in 1737 and improved in style and updated by Baatur Ubashi Tümen from 1801 to 1820:

How the Khans and Nobles of the Allied Four Oirat Increased Their Subjects. Güüshi Khan [r. 1642–1655] at first was ruling his five thousand households but defeated the heretical armies (*tersiyin tserег*) which had come to harm those in Tibet and became the alms-donor Khan of Tibet. The Torghud Daiching [r. 1644–1661] 160 households came here and then reached 100,000. Zorigtu Khung Taiji and seven men spread out and became 40,000. Luuzang²² split off with 70 households and in nine years they reached 8,000.

How the Khans and Nobles of the Allied Four Oirats Nourished Their People and Gave Them Food In Times When They Were Poor and Without Food. When his subjects were poor, Güüshi Khan nourished them on the wild carrots of the Altai Mountains. When they had fallen into the misery of living on *ireglöü*²³ and horse manure, separated from any food to live on, Örlög²⁴ nourished his subjects by invading the infidel (*buruu nomtu*) Jambulaq,²⁵ Turks, and Mangghad [Manghit or Nogay Tartars] and levying taxes on their livestock. Zorigtu Khung Taiji invaded the Kazakhs to support his poor subjects with their possessions. Ayuuki Khan [r. 1669–1724] invaded the infidels called Qıtay and Qıbchaq²⁶ and offered them to his subjects as nourishment (Pozdneev 1907: 35–36; Luwsanbaldan 1976: 387, 418–19; Badai, Altan'orgil, and Erdeni 1985: 197–98; cf. Ghabang Shirab's text in Tsoloo 1967: 86; Badai, Altan'orgil, and Erdeni 1985: 248).

Similarly, in the Kalmyk Jangghar cycle, alone among Mongol epics, the hero's defeat of his enemies is called 'bringing them into his religion' (*nom-daan oruul-*); these enemies include both the Türk khan and 'Fierce Black Kinaz' (from Russian *kniaz* 'prince'). In the ritual for sprinkling of the first fruits for the Oirat khans and nobles, the request to 'make our people and subjects (*ulus albatu*) many', is followed by a further request to 'In particular, deign to grind the Kazakh and Qirghiz enemies encountered by our six *sumus* and other enemies under our heel and to crush those whom we hate under the soles of our boots' (Altan'orgil 1983: 86). Of course, these feelings of hostility were returned and in Kazakh and Qirghiz epics it is always the Kalmyk (here meaning 'Oirat' and referring in particular to the Zünghars) who are the enemy (Hatto 1989). The fall of the Zünghar principality was accompanied by demoralizing Kazakh attacks on Oirat Buddhist monasteries. While such attacks were undoubtedly due at least in part to the Kazakhs' appreciation of 'where the money was', the 1825 *Monggholiyin uq ekiyin töüke* saw these attacks and the very fall of the Zünghars as punishment for their Oirats' own inadvertent defilement of Buddhist stupas (Badai, Altan'orgil, and Erdeni 1985: 315–16; Sükhbaatar 2001: 145).

Although without the religious edge, this consciousness of the fewness and vulnerability of the Oirats was also expressed among the Upper Mongols, when Törö-Baikhu Güüshi Khan called for more Oirats to join him in Tibet: 'Among these Tibetans as numerous as ants how could I dwell in solitude by myself?' (*Monggholiyin uq ekiyin töüke* in Badai, Altan'orgil, and Erdeni 1985: 309; Sükhbaatar 2001: 133). Here too, the fall of the Oirat polity was followed by the emancipation of its subject people, among whom the mGo-logs Tibetan nomads later conducted massive retaliatory raids on their former masters (Schram 1961: 65–66; Mi Yi-zhi 1996: 426–28, 653–54).

This ethnic and confessional exclusivism and demographic vulnerability accounts for the peculiarly embattled tone of Zünghar politics and foreign policy, despite the occasional bold forays into Mongolia and Tibet, a tone which contrasts sharply with the cosmopolitan confidence of Mongol political life under the great khans. The Kalmyk historian Ghabang Shirab, speaking in the voice of the Khoshud ruler in the Oirat homeland, Ochirtu Tsetsen Khan, after he had been deposed by Galdan in 1676, reflects anxiously on the Zünghars' vulnerability:

The Barga and the Buriats are becoming Russian, the Khoid are becoming Turkestanis (*Khoton*), my brothers [in Kōkenuur] are becoming Tibetan or Chinese, and I myself am being conquered (literally, 'eaten') by the nearby Zünghars. Who knows if the Zünghars will become Chinese or Turkestanis? Daiching's Torghud people are off in a corner and where will they go next? Will they dissolve among the Russians, or will they dissolve among those who clip their fingernails?²⁷ After this, who knows if they will disappear in a flash? (Tsoloo 1967: 82; Badai, Altan'orgil, and Erdeni 1985: 243; cf. Baatur Ubashi Tümen's more literary text in Pozdneev 1907: 33–34; Luwsanbaldan 1976: 385, 414; Badai, Altan'orgil, and Erdeni 1985: 194.)²⁸

CONCLUSION

These contrasts between the Chinggisid and Oirat polities can be subsumed into two broad areas: 1) strong monarchy in a single lineage state vs. weak monarchy in a multiple-lineage aristocratic state; 2) a non-confessional state seeking no legitimacy outside itself vs. a strictly confessional state seeking legitimacy from outside authority, particularly religious. At the same time, several broad areas of similarity emerge: the common structure of class stratification based on division of the commoners into nested units, the division of these units between first nobles and then commoner officials, and the confinement of the commoners within these units and their defined pastures. Politically one can also find numerous points of similarity in detail, such as the predilection for a privy council based on the number four, the formation of an intermediate 'son-in-law' class between the nobility and the commoners, and so on.

These observations underline how groundless is any analysis of nomadic polities based on ecological determinism. Structurally the Chinggisid and Oirat states were quite different, yet at the same time they culturally shared many terms and traditions. Ironically where similarities are found, it is precisely in that area which contradicts the oft-stated ecologically-based stereotype of egalitarian nomads. If Oirat history conforms to another stereotype, that of the 'turbulent nomads', it is not because they were, as the eminent British anthropologist of African nomadism, I. M. Lewis, averred about the Somalis, 'a fierce and turbulent race of Republicans' (Lewis 1961), but rather because every rebellious aristocrat could be sure of receiving the obedience of his subjects for whatever purpose he would put them to. Although Michael Khodarkovsky (1992) unfortunately structured his interpretation of Kalmyk history around the erroneous 'egalitarian nomads' concept, he offers not a single case of commoner resistance to even the nobility's most suicidal ventures, such as the disastrous emigration back to Xinjiang. Indeed, the paradox of very different political superstructures built on rather similar social structures calls to mind similar contrasts in the sedentary world, such as the monarchic Tsardom of Muscovy and the aristocratic Polish-Lithuanian Republic, both based on similar forms of serfdom (Pipes 1974: 85–111; Poe

2003; Davies 1982: I, 321–72). Future study of Inner Asian polities will, I hope, undertake not only the comparison of supposedly classic ‘nomadic’ polities with sedentary ones, but the comparison of the full range of nomadic polities with each other. In so doing, they will reveal the degree to which nomadic polities are not some aberrant, wholly other polity, but rather part of the continuum of broader Eurasian political formations.

APPENDIX 1

Organization of the Zünghar Principality in 1755 (‘Yuzhi Zhunge’r quanbu jilue’ 1979/1887–1899: 8b–9b; cf. Tayama 1987: 41–63; Tayama 1988: 63–76)

I. Otogs directly under the supreme ruler

A. Old Otogs

1. Urud (‘craftsmen’) (4 zaisangs [officials], 5,000 households)
2. Kharachin (1 zaisang, 5,000 households)
3. Erketen (1 zaisang, 5,000 households)
4. Keriye (2 zaisangs, 6,000 households)
5. Zuu-trug (1 zaisang, 3,000 households)
6. Büküs (1 zaisang, 3,000 households)
7. Abaghas, Khadan (1 zaisang each, total 4,000 households)
8. Obid (?) (1 zaisang, 3,000 households)
9. Öölödei (?) (2 zaisangs, 3,000 households)
10. Doghoruud (?) (1 zaisang, 4,000 households)
11. Kholbos (1 zaisang, 3,000 households)
12. Tsokhor (1 zaisang, 3,000 households)

B. New Otogs

13. Bardamud (3 zaisangs, 4,000 households)
14. Kötöchiner (‘grooms’) (5 zaisangs, 4,000 households)
15. Galzad (3 zaisangs, 4,000 households)
16. Sharas (2 zaisangs, 3,000 households)
17. Makhus (1 zaisang, 5,000 households)
18. Bükünüd (1 zaisang, 2,000 households) and Gölögöd (?) (1 zaisang, 500 households)
19. Urad (‘craftsmen’) (1 zaisang, 3,000 households)
20. Altachin (‘goldsmiths’) (1 zaisang, 500 households)
21. Zakhachin (‘border-guards’) (3 zaisangs, 2,000 households), and Buuchin (‘musketeers’) (3 zaisangs, 1,000 households)
22. Kirghis (4 zaisangs, 4,000 households)
23. Telengut (4 zaisangs, 4,000 households), Orchug/Orchuba (1 zaisang, 500 households), Urkhanchilan (1 zaisang, 800 households)
24. Mingghad (2 zaisangs, 3,000 households)

II. Jisai (ecclesiastical estates)²⁹

A. Old Jisai

1. Agba/sNgags-pa (‘Mantra’) (2 zaisangs, 4,000 households)

2. Laimrim/Lam-rim ('Graduated Path') (1 zaisang, 1,000 households)
3. Dulba/'Dul-ba ('Vinaya') (1 zaisang, 1,000 households)
4. Duisürüng (1 zaisang, 1,000 households)
5. Ike Ming-Khular (1 zaisang, 1,000 households)

B. New Jisai

6. Öndüsün ('Root/Tantra') (1 zaisang, 1,000 households)
7. Shambaling/Byams-pa-gling ('Island of Kindness') (1 zaisang, 1,000 households)
8. Sangdui/gSangs-'dus ('Guhyagarbha') (1 zaisang, 300 households)
9. Pinchen (1 zaisang, 300 households)

C. Lamas (over 6,000)

III. Anggis (appanages under noblemen)

A. Choros (=Zünghar) Tribe

1. Dawaachi
2. Dashi-Dawaa
3. Dorji-Damba
4. Galzang-Dorji
5. Namku-Chilger
6. Orji-Ubashi

B. Dörböd

7. Tsering
8. Dashi
9. Bagshi-Agashi

C. Khoshud

10. Shagdur-Manji

D. Khoid

11. Tarbaghachin: Sayin-Bodolog
12. Khotong-Emegen
13. Dolod-Shering
14. Dondug
15. Yeke-Mingghan: Bayar
16. Tsering-Banjur
17. Baatur-Emegen
18. Tsaghan Tug: Amursanaa
19. Bologhot: Taiji Nokhai-Chichig
20. Torghud: Taiji Baatur Ubashi
21. Dondub

NOTES

1. I would like to thank Johan Elverskog for his useful comment on an earlier version of this chapter.

2. The term 'tribe' is used traditional for the component parts of the Oirat confederacy but it should be understood that these 'tribes' are non-consanguineal, even in theory; in fact, their non-consanguineal nature is an essential part of their marriage or affinity-based political coherence. Moreover, after 1630 or so, these 'tribes' dispersed to the far corners of the Oirat world and no longer acted as unitary political units. The Torghud of the Upper Mongols in Tibet and the Torghud of the Kalmyks on the Volga had only the unfocused sense of common origin and occasional genealogical connection that one would find, for example, among ethnic Irish or Scotch in the United States and Australia. For these reasons and other considerations explained by David Sneath in his introduction, I find the use of the term 'tribe' very problematic. In Oirat histories, these units are called either *yasun*, 'bone' (e.g. Tsooloo 1968: 4, 38), a term with patrilineal kinship connotations, or else *anggi*, 'part', 'component unit' (Luwsanbaldan 1976: 379, 397; Badai, Altan'orgil, and Erdeni 1985: 182), a term without such connotations. The patrilineal connotations come not from any consanguineal kinship of all its members, but rather from being ruled by a single noble lineage; this noble lineage is often identified by synecdoche with the entire body of their subjects. This *yasun/anggi* has some similarity with German *stamm* (plural *stämme*, such as the Franks or Burgundians), which John Armstrong characterized as a 'conquest agglomeration' that first 'formed as a comitatus [or band of servants, fighters, and companions] around a single clan or family and adhering to its dynastic myth . . . only the [ruler's] genealogy counted' (Armstrong 1982: 86, cf. 27–37). Unfortunately, as Armstrong points out, the *stamm* term has undergone quite as much popular confusion as the English 'tribe'. I have thus used (or perhaps misused) Anthony Smith's useful appropriation of the French term 'ethnie' for a pre-modern ethnic group to designate these component parts of the Oirat confederation (Smith 1986: 13–16 and *passim*).
3. The name of the Torghud's ruling bone is unclear in the literature, but given its origin among the Kereyid tribe of pre-Chinggisid Mongolia may be Kereyid.
4. The variation between Tsoros and Choros in Oirat sources, contrasted to the constant pronunciation of Choras in Turkic sources, strongly suggests a non-Oirat, Turkic, origin of this ruling lineage.
5. Surviving letters of Galdan Boshogtu Khan do show the odd spelling of *tsaghân khan* for the Tsar, even though the Manchu and Mongol khans are written as *khân*. See Krueger 1969. Other Clear Script sources, however, use the expected *tsaghân khân* for the Tsar.
6. Not only is this thousand not described in the *Secret History of the Mongols*, but its commander, Chaghan of the Tangut, described as one of Chinggis's closest *nökörs* by both Rashid al-Din and the *Yuan shi*, is also completely omitted even from the list of commanders in *Secret History* §202. See Rashiduddin/Thackston 1998: I, 73–74; and Song 1370/1976: X/120, 2955–56.
7. The foundling Shigi Qutuqu is described as Chinggis Khan's *jarghuchi* in the *Secret History* §§203, 234 and in Rashiduddin/Thackston 1998: I, 47. In the *Yuan shi*, however, Chinggis Khan's brother Belgütei is described as the first judge (Song 1370/1976: X/117, 2905), a tradition alluded to in the *Secret History*'s §154, but unknown to Rashid al-Din.
8. The evolution and interrelations of chief scribe and *keshig* guards are treated in Chapter 5.
9. Unlike anthropologists or historians, the Mongols were quite imprecise about their terminology, often using the same name or term for maximal units, medium-sized, or minimal sub-units. Thus the term Kiyan (or Borjigin) can be used as a special term for the descendants of Chinggis Khan's father Yisügei, for the descendants of Chinggis Khan's great-grandfather Qabul Khan, for all the descendants of Chinggis Khan's tenth generation ancestor Bodonchar, or for the maximal category of all the descendants of Bodonchar's distant apical ancestor Börte Chino'a. Similarly, the term Negüs is used by Rashid al-Din for all the non-Kiyan (in the broadest sense) Mongols, but also appears in the *Secret History* as the name of a specific clan/*oboq*-sized unit (§§120, 129, 219).
10. These are: the Önggüd (five thousands in the *Secret History* vs. four thousands in Rashid

al-Din), the Oirat (ten thousands vs. four thousands), the Qonggirad (three thousands vs. one 'thousand' numbering five thousands and another numbering four thousands), Qorchi Noyan's Ba'arin (three thousands vs. two thousands), the Uru'ud (four thousands in both sources), Naya'a's Ba'arin (three thousands in Rashid al-Din), Muqali's Jalayir (three thousands in Rashid al-Din), or the Ikires (two thousands in the *Secret History*). See *Secret History of the Mongols* §§202, 207, 208; Rashiduddin/Thackston 1999: II, 274–78.

11. The Baya'ud and Suldus are listed by Rashid al-Din as Negüs clans (Rashiduddin/Thackston 1998: I, 93, 96). The 'Negüs brethren' gathered by Narin To'oril were, of course, only a small branch of the Negüs category, probably only his closer relatives and their dependents.
12. The Zünghar and Dörböd ethnies were ruled by separate branches of the Choros bone.
13. A similar list of Zünghar *otogs* is preserved in the Dörböd chronicle *Dörbön Oyirdiyn tüükei tuuji kemen oroshibo* (Luwsanbaldan 1976: 338, 364; Badai, Altan'orgil, and Erdeni 1985: 274–75).
14. Arash Bormanshinov planned to publish a list of the fifty or so *yasu* (bones) in the Don Buzava Kalmyks (of Dörböd origin), but unfortunately did not complete this task before his death.
15. Given the scale of these units, it is likely, as David Sneath has pointed out, that marriage with members of the other marriage category was preferred but not absolutely required. This division into two categories is thus similar to, but not exactly the same as, the anthropological concept of a moiety.
16. See the *Güregen* (i.e. *küregen*, sons-in-law) listed in the *Secret History of the Mongols* §202. Of the sons-in-law mentioned in this chapter whose clan origin is not mentioned, Olar was of the Olqunu'ud branch of the Qonggirad (see Rashiduddin/Thackston 1998: I, 87); Kinggiyadai of the Olqunu'ud (Rashiduddin/Thackston 1999: II, 273–74); Buqa of the Jedei-Baya'ud (Rashiduddin/Thackston 1998: I, 96); Quril Ashiq, probably a son of Qorchi of the Ba'arin (*Secret History of the Mongols* §207); and Chigü of the Bosqur Qonggirad or Qonggirad proper (Rashiduddin/Thackston 1998: I, 85, 218). Qadai *Güregen* is of unknown clan affiliation. Other sons-in-law are mentioned in the section in the *Secret History* describing the organization of the surrounding non-Mongol but Inner Asian peoples in §§235, 238, 239.
17. Here I exclude Rashid al-Din's implausible ascription of the entire remainder of the Mongols to Tolui.
18. These titles appear below those of the *noyad* and *tabunang* in the Mongol-Oirat Code, and below the elder of the *otog* in the supplemental regulations of Galdan: see Doronatib 1985: §§34–35; Regulations of Galdan Khung Taiji §1. Number of households in the *otogs* are from 'Yuzhi Zhunge'r quanbu jilue' 1979/1899: 8b–9a; cf. Tayama 1987: 41–42.
19. This text was collected in 1978 by the Inner Mongolian Jangghar researcher Buyankheshig among the Choros (Zünghar) Oirats of Zhaosu (Monggolküre) (see p. 5), where it was used for rituals of worshiping Galdan and the other Zünghar khans. Its current form is certainly post-1755, as a mention of the 'six *sumus*' indicates, the *sumu* being a purely Qing-era organization. Still, the geographical list of mountains and lakes only makes sense in a pre-1755 context and it presumably preserves older formulas.
20. 'Andizhani' was the general term used in the Tarim Basin for people from the Ferghana Basin; see for example, Kim 2004: 23, 26, 46, 56, 83, 90–91, 118, 167, 170.
21. This group was considered a separate ethnic group under Sheng Shicai's Sovietized administration, but after 1949 merged officially with the Uighurs.
22. One of Ayuuki Khan's sons and younger brother of Daiching, d. 1660.
23. I have not been able to find this word in any dictionary. Ghabang Shirab's original has *iraq lou*, which seems to be *iraq* (lobster, crawfish, from Russian *rak*) and *lou* 'dragon, water creature'. The idea would be the Kalmyks were reduced to eating crayfish and burning horse-dung (a bad fuel).

24. Khoo-Örlög (d. 1644), the founder of the Kalmyk realm on the Volga.
25. A tribe of the Nogay Turks, found as Yemboluk in Russian sources (Khodarkovsky 1992: 103, 249, etc.; Bennigsen, Boratov, *et al.* 1978: 280). Literally written Byu-Buuluq (Ghabang Sharab) or Byabuluq (Baatur Ubashi Tümen); the *by-* is a Tibetan-style device used to represent 'j' in personal names.
26. These two lineage names are widespread among Bashkirs (Bashkort), Kazakhs, Karakalpaks, Uzbeks, and Qirghiz (Bennigsen and Wimbush 1986: 244, 68, 111, 58, 79). The pronunciation implied here of Qatay and Qabchaq (literally Khatai and Khabshiq in Ghabang Sharab; and Khatai and Khabchiq in Baatur Ubashi Tümen) indicates the Bashkir pronunciation (Frank 1998: 109).
27. 'Daiching' is Shikür-Daiching, Khoo-Örlög's son and the Kalmyk ruler from 1644–1661. 'Those who clip their fingernails' (*khumusân kerciqsendu*) appears to be a euphemistic reference to circumcision; the verb *kercixu* 'to clip' is the general term for circumcision in nineteenth-century Bible translations. In any case, the Kalmyks' Muslim neighbors seem to be meant.
28. The reference to 'my brothers' becoming Chinese or Tibetan refers to how, among Tsetsen Khan's fellow Khoshud princes, Khoroli submitted to the Qing in 1686, which formed today's Alashan Mongols, while the Khoshud Khans of Tibet were pursuing an increasingly parochial Tibetan-oriented policy.
29. I would like to thank Elliot Sperling for his assistance with the Tibetan names. Duisürüng and Pinchen remain unclear.

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THE HISTORY OF MONGOLIA

VOLUME III

THE HISTORY OF MONGOLIA



VOLUME III

**The Qing Period
Twentieth-century Mongolia**

Edited by

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GLOBAL
ORIENTAL

THE HISTORY OF MONGOLIA

Edited by David Sneath and Christopher Kaplonski

First published 2010 by
GLOBAL ORIENTAL LTD
PO Box 219
Folkestone
Kent CT20 2WP
UK

www.globaloriental.co.uk

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ISBN 978-1-905246-36-6 [3-volume set]

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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A CIP catalogue entry for this book is available from the British Library

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
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PART 4



THE QING PERIOD



Frontier borders - - - - -

Aimag borders - . . . -

Present-day Mongolian border - - - - -

Mongolia in the late Qing Dynasty (1760–1911)

(Hovd = Khovd; Urianhai = Uriankhai; Hövsgöl = Khövsgöl; Hiagt = Khiagt; Herlen = Kherlen; Ih Hÿree = Ikh Khüree)

INTRODUCTION

Christopher Kaplonski



Volume III of this book – Parts Four and Five – deals almost exclusively with the independent country of Mongolia, which was known as Outer Mongolia during the Qing dynasty (1644–1911). From the seventeenth century onwards, the region known as Inner Mongolia became increasingly incorporated into the Manchu empire, much more so than was the case in Outer Mongolia. Indeed, forces from what would become known as Inner Mongolia played a role in the Manchu conquest of China, some Inner Mongolian groups having allied themselves to the Manchus prior to the proclamation of the Qing in 1636.¹ To the north of (Outer) Mongolia, in the region of Lake Baikal, the Buriats were subjected to increasing colonization and control by the Russian Empire, which was steadily expanding eastwards from European Russia during this period. To deal comprehensively with either of these regions then would require extended forays into the history of both the Chinese and Russian Empires, far beyond the scope of the present work. This focus also affects the choice of passages that are included here, a point we return to later.

POLITICS AND INFLUENCES²

The history of (Outer) Mongolia under the Qing can be dated officially to 1691, the year a number of Khalkh nobles, under the leadership of the First Javzandamba Khutagt (a ‘living Buddha’), submitted to the Manchus at Dooloon Nuur in Inner Mongolia. However, to understand how and why this came about, we should look back to earlier in the seventeenth century, and briefly consider the different Mongol groups on the steppe at the time. In addition to the different groups of Inner Mongolians, who previously had allied with or submitted to the Manchus, there were the Buriats, who were increasingly drawn into the Russian sphere of influence through Russia’s military expansion and conquest of Siberia, the Eastern Mongols (the Khalkh) and the Oirats, a label that encompassed a number of groups to the west.

The most powerful of these groups were the Zunghar, one of the main Oirat groups in Western Mongolia. Starting from the early seventeenth century, the Zunghars grew to be serious contenders for power in the region, establishing what was known as the Zunghar Khanate, and posing substantial challenges to the influence of the Qing and the growing power of the Russians in the region (Perdue, this volume). (For perhaps the definitive treatment of Zunghars and this period more generally, see Perdue 2005.) The

Western Mongols would mount a substantial challenge to other powers in the region until the end of the seventeenth century, and continue to a thorn in the side of the Qing until well into the middle of the eighteenth century.

In contrast to the rising power of the Zunghar, the mid- and late seventeenth century saw a continuous series of power struggles between the major Khalkh rulers in the central and eastern parts of the Mongolian steppe. The two major rulers were the Zasagt Khan, and the Tüsheet Khan, whose power struggles Galdan Boshigt, then leader of the Zunghars, was able to exploit. Galdan threw his weight into the disputes between these two, backing the Zasagt Khan, and invaded Khalkh Mongolia in 1688 (see Perdue, this volume). Galdan was closely allied with the Dalai Lama, and his intervention into the Khalkh dispute is seen by some as a move against the First Javzandamba Khutagt, who was growing in influence.

The Zunghars advanced as far as the monastery of Erdene Zuu in Central Mongolia, capturing one of the main religious sites in Khalkh Mongolia. A flood of refugees sought shelter in Qing lands, and Galdan's invasion led the Khalkh nobles to turn to the Manchus for protection. In 1691, this was formalized with their submission to the Qing at the ceremony at Doloon Nuur. The Khalkh made their request to be taken under the protection of the Manchus led by Zanabazar (1635–1723), the First Javzandamba Khutagt, a son of the Tüsheet Khan and recognized as a major Buddhist incarnation by the Dalai Lama. The Khalkh, it is reported, were not sure if they should turn to the Russians or the Manchus for protection against Galdan, but Zanabazar remarked that while both would provide protection and peace, only the Manchus supported Buddhism, and so it was to them the Khalkh should turn (Pürevjav 1978: 72).

Buddhism had been reintroduced into Mongolia in the mid- to late sixteenth century, first in Inner Mongolia by Altan Khan, and then Outer Mongolia by Abadai Khan. The first major reincarnation to be recognized in Mongolia was Zanabazar, the First Javzandamba Khutagt. Zanabazar was in essence, if not fact, to embody the 'Two Principles', a Buddhist political theology that provided the basis for a mutually reinforcing relationship of the religious and the secular. Although he never held political office, as the son of the Tüsheet Khan and thus a descendant of Chinggis Khaan, Zanabazar possessed a degree of almost automatic political legitimacy. This, coupled with his religious role, made him a natural locus of power and influence. His influence was further enhanced by the fact that, according to most reports, he was a talented and holy man, unlike of some his future reincarnations. The power of his position was thus reinforced by the force of his character.

So threatened were the Manchus by the potential for the future Javzandamba Khutagts to provide a competing point of allegiance that, after the death of the Second Javzandamba in 1758, who was the grandson of Zanabazar's elder brother, and thus also a descendant of Chinggis Khaan, (Atwood 2004: 268) they forbade future reincarnations to be found in Mongolia. Bawden notes that the Second Javzandamba died at a 'suspiciously early age of thirty-six', and is thought to have been killed by the Manchus (1989: 58). The next six Javzandamba Khutagts would be Tibetan, but this would not seriously affect their influence in Mongolia.

Zanabazar himself was not only a religious figure, but also a famed artist and sculptor (see Ichinnorov, this volume). Among other things, he is credited with the creation of the Soyombo, the national symbol of Mongolia, an alphabet, numerous sculptures, and the founding of an art style. He is also credited with the founding of what is today known as Ulaanbaatar, which was originally established as his monastery, and was a

nomadic city for over a century, until settling on its present location in 1779 (Pürevjav 1961: 19).

The submission of the Khalkh to the Manchus in 1691 meant that the Qing emperors claimed the right to bestow titles upon the Khalkh, as well as confirm successions to hereditary titles. They sought to link the Mongol nobility to the Manchu court through marriage to Manchu princesses, and lavish gift-giving, often in the guise of trade missions. Buddhist rituals were also deployed to this end (see Atwood 2000; Elverskog 2006). For commoners, at least initially, things were probably not much different than they had been previously. Another layer had been added to the hierarchy, and yet a few more obligations, but life would have continued much as it had.

The Qing did institute a new administrative structure, the banner system, but this was largely based on the pre-existing boundaries of the lands of hereditary nobles. The banners were divided into *sums*, and the people living in the sums were composed of *albat* (commoners) and *khamjilga* (in effect, personal retainers of the nobility). As Charles Bawden has noted, 'except that it put the majority of the population in feudal dependence on the Manchu Emperor rather than on their previous lords, the khans, the organization imposed on Khalkha by the Manchus . . . hardly affected the existing social order' (1989: 105). This is a point we will take up in more detail below.

This does not mean, however, that we can safely ignore all the changes in political structure and administration. The Qing period saw the adoption of the Khalkha Jirum first promulgated in 1709, but subjected to multiple revisions over time (See Riasanovsky, this volume). Largely a codification of customary law, this was eventually to be replaced by the Lifan yuan zeli, which over time brought Mongolian regulations and justice within the scope of broader Chinese law. From 1638 on, the Lifan Yuan (Court of Colonial Affairs), was responsible for both the administration of laws in Outer Mongolia (as well as elsewhere) as well as the appointment of *ambans*, the Qing resident administrators in Mongolia. The amban was the leading Qing official in Mongolia, in effect the district governor. The position of amban reflected the fact that Outer Mongolia, like other areas (Tibet and Xinjiang), was not incorporated into the main part of the Qing Empire, but rather existed as a dependency.

It should be understood that the Qing were not the only ones interested in Outer Mongolia at this time. Russian interest in Mongolia also grew, but with the Treaty of Khiakta, signed in 1727, the Russians recognized Chinese sovereignty in Mongolia (Tang 1959: 285). Russian interest remained largely at an economic and commercial level, with the first trading firm being opened in Ikh Khüree in 1860, a year before a Russian consulate opened (Tang 1959: 287). Yet they also played, if *sub rosa*, a role that would increase in influence starting at the end of the nineteenth century. Towards the end of the Qing period, Japan's interest in the region would also expand, with Japan and Russia declaring spheres of interest in the region as the Qing empire started to implode.

The submission of the Khalkh nobles at Doloon Nuur in 1691 did not spell the end of the Mongols as a power on the steppe. Although Galdan Boshigt was defeated in the 1690s, the Zunghars and other western Mongols were not fully incorporated into the Qing Empire until the late 1750s, after rebellions led by Amarsanaa and Chingünjav were put down. Amarsanaa was a Zunghar leader who, not satisfied with the rewards the Qing offered for his services against other Oirat groups, rebelled. At about the same time, Chingünjav, a Khalkh noble also rebelled, largely an opportunistic rebellion aimed at displeasure with Chinese traders. Chingünjav's rebellion, although not very successfully coordinated, did result in widespread unrest, with Chinese shops being raided and

destroyed. Both rebellions were eventually crushed, with Chingünjav being executed by the Manchus, and Amarsanaa dying of smallpox in Russia (see Bawden 1967). After these defeats, the Mongols were to remain relatively politically quiescent until the late nineteenth century, when increasing dissatisfaction with Chinese traders would become manifest in the increasing number of petitions of grievances and uprisings scattered across the country.

SOCIAL ISSUES

The Manchu period of Mongolian history is often portrayed as one largely consisting of social and political stagnation, with brief, if ultimately unsuccessful, interludes like Chingünjav's rebellion. However, as indicated by the recognition of the First Javzandamba Khutagt, starting in the early seventeenth century, Mongolia witnessed the flourishing of Buddhist belief and practice in Mongolia, and the expansion of the monastic system and in particular the *Ikh Shav'*, the estates of the Javzandamba Khutagts (on the *Ikh Shav'* see Tsedev this volume). This would continue during the Manchu period. As we shall see later, other aspects of Mongolian life and society were often under more flux than is usually credited.

While it is popularly held that the adoption of Buddhism by the Mongols was directly responsible for their decline in influence and power, as Bawden notes, 'it took the Manchus close on a century to quell the turbulent, but devout west Mongols, or Jungars [Zunghar] who more than once seriously challenged their power' (1989: 37). It was more likely that political infighting (doubtlessly encouraged at times by the Qing) as well as the pioneering of new military technologies (firearms) had a greater influence on the Mongolians' fate than the imposition of Buddhism. This is not to deny that Buddhism impacted social and political life in Mongolia, nor that the Qing consciously promoted Buddhism in Mongolia for political reasons, which we have briefly noted, but rather to call into question the decisive role often assigned to Buddhism as a limiter of Mongol power.

The expansion of Buddhism in Mongolia led to a commensurate increase in the influence and wealth of the Buddhist hierarchy, who by the early twentieth century were often to rival or exceed the secular nobility in their wealth and influence, becoming in effect religious nobility. During the socialist period in Mongolia, these two parallel structures were referred to as the *khar shar fyeodal* – the black (lay) and yellow (Buddhist) feudal lords. Despite the ideological bent behind these labels, they do indeed offer a roughly accurate guide of the influence and often wealth of the upper strata of the Buddhist hierarchy.

A large amount of the wealth and livestock of the country was tied up in the *jas* (*jisa*) – monastic funds or treasuries (Mongolian Academy of Sciences, this volume). Several *jas* would exist in each monastery, with each different division of the monastery having its own *jas*, as did prominent *khuvilgaan* (reincarnations) (see Murphy 1961: 440). There could also be separate *jas* for certain rituals and celebrations. Maiskii, writing in the early twentieth century, estimated that the monasteries held 17 per cent of all livestock (Maiskii 2005 [1921]: 356). It is not clear if this number would include the often substantial number of livestock owned by individual lamas, who themselves could own hundreds, if not thousands of animals.

The lamas also controlled a large part of the population, in the form of *shav'*. The term, which means 'pupil' or 'disciple', is in this context better glossed as 'serf'.

Although subject to various forms of taxation and corvee duty, the shav' or monastic serfs were exempted from military obligations imposed on commoners, who were also liable to taxation, corvee duty and a number of other obligations. As a result, although by no means an easy living, the life of a shav' was in many ways preferable to that of a commoner subject to the rule of the lay nobility. In the nineteenth century, to counter the popularity of such a move from secular to religious oversight, the Qing had to forbid able-bodied men from being shav' (Atwood 2004: 211). This had an apparent impact on the size of the *Ikh Shav'*, which reached its peak in 1830, with Tsedev reporting almost 84,000 people, a number which dropped to about 80,000 by 1858 and just over 42,000 by 1900 (1964: 91). (The highest number of livestock recorded was in 1773, at 118,610 (Tsedev 1964: 91).)

The institution of the shav' is indicative of Mongolian social and political structure under the Qing. Keeping in mind that this was – contrary to the received wisdom – a fairly dynamic time in Mongolia, we can still make certain generalizations about social and political structures, which were intertwined. Although some find it a contentious label, Qing era Mongolia is commonly, and in our opinion, not inaccurately, referred to as feudal (see Natsagdorj, this volume). The nobility, subject to approval by the Qing court, had the right to allocate pasture lands and grazing rights, which were technically held in common, rather than owned outright. Actual usage and even migration patterns were controlled by the rulers. Commoners could not nomadize outside of their assigned areas without permission, and were heavily penalized for doing so. Commoners were also responsible for a number of duties, including corvee, military duty and manning the *örtöö* (horse relay system). They also owed a percentage of their flocks to their nobles, and were expected to present offerings to them as well (for a concise overview of these obligations, see Atwood 2004: 507–509). There was also a small class of banner officials. The highest ranked of them would be nobles, but others could be either noble or commoner. These officials, by dint of representing the Qing dynasty, possessed a fair amount of power, which easily could be (and often was) abused. See Rasidondug and Veit (this volume) for one typical cataloguing of abuses.

This structure was mirrored to a large extent in the Buddhist hierarchy, where, as already noted, high-ranking lamas and incarnations were treated *de facto* if not *de jure* as nobility. Although they did not control access to grazing rights, lamas did accumulate livestock and shav', often as payment for rituals performed, or donations from the faithful. The Buddhist establishment, did, however, offer the advantage of social mobility. Unlike the lay hierarchy, one could advance through the ranks of the Buddhist church, regardless of social background. The monasteries also offered most of the few educational opportunities available, especially to commoners, although much of this was rote learning of Tibetan prayers, rather than a broader education, or even necessarily literacy in the Mongolian alphabet. (As late as 1935, less than 5% of the population of school age or above was said to be literate (Tserendorj 1976: 54).) These opportunities, along with a deeply held religious devotion, were doubtless responsible for the large number of lamas that existed in Mongolia. As a sign of devotion and to accumulate karma it was not unusual for families to send at least one son to a monastery. It is estimated that by the end of the nineteenth century, there were 80,000–100,000 lamas in Mongolia. Only a fraction of these, however, lived in monasteries, and many took only low-level vows, or left after being educated in a monastery but before being ordained, and spent their time as herders who had families.

The Qing period in Mongolia was also as a time of expansion of trade and resulting indebtedness for many Mongols. Forming the majority of permanent settlements in Mongolia at the time, monasteries became natural foci of trading centres, with a trading 'city' springing up near most major monasteries. By the mid- to late nineteenth century, for example, Ikh Khüree (present-day Ulaanbaatar) consisted of three parts – the main monastery, Gandan; Züün Khüree to the east of Gandan; and Maimaicheng – the Chinese trading city even further east. Khiakta, just across the Russian border from present-day Altanbulag (sometimes known as the Mongolian Khiakhta) in northern Mongolia, also increased in importance as a result of its strategic location at the juncture of the Qing and Russian Empires.

The seasonal nature of the Mongolian herding economy meant that many if not most Mongolians were heavily in debt to Chinese traders who would advance needed supplies at high interest rates. As the Mongolian historian Sanjdorj colourfully expressed it: 'The Chinese trading towns in Khalkh did not have a beneficial influence on the development of the Mongolian economy. Rather, they became places where the Mongols emptied their pockets, while the Chinese traders become rich and enjoyed life' (1980: 48). This indebtedness ran through all levels of society, but was probably most prominent among the nobles, who, in addition to the necessities of life, also indulged in luxuries. Their debt was often, if illegally, passed on to the commoners in the form of increased taxes. This would increasingly stoke resentment at both the traders and the nobility, leading to both petitions against the nobility and eventual violence against Chinese merchants. As an apparent indication of the widespread discontent, it was not unknown after for the ringleaders of a riot to escape punishment even if their identities were known (Bawden 1989: 174–5).

Despite Qing control of Outer Mongolia, it never became as fully colonized and settled by the Manchus as Inner Mongolia had been. The Manchus kept Outer Mongolia largely as a buffer state against Russian encroachment, even going so far as to prohibit permanent settlement by Chinese traders, and their marriage to Mongolians. The early Qing period saw even greater restrictions, including severe limitations or bans on trading in the countryside, although many of these were dropped or ignored as time went on. As Bawden has remarked, Qing policy in Outer Mongolia in many ways was almost the exact opposite of classic colonization policies and strategies as 'it aimed to prevent the economic penetration of exploitation of Mongolia from the homeland' (Bawden 1989: 82).

This would change towards the end of the nineteenth century, with the weakening of the Qing dynasty, and its attempts at reform to hold onto power. Qing policy would shift to one of explicit colonization in 1902, when restrictions against Chinese settlement in Mongolia were lifted. The increasing weakness of the Qing, the discontent at the new policies of settlement and exploitation along with the pre-existing anger at what were seen as exploitative trading practices and debt would lead to the declaration of Mongolian independence in 1911, which is taken up in Part V.

THE TEXTS

In choosing the texts for the current volume, a slightly different approach was adopted from volumes I and II. I have chosen where feasible to focus on Mongolian sources, mostly secondary, but with a few primary ones thrown in. I have done so because of a

strong desire to privilege, where possible, the Mongolian voice, which is still largely inaccessible to people who do not read Mongolian. In some instances, this has meant drawing upon sources already published in Western books or journals. In a few, we have been fortunate enough to be able offer new translations of excerpts. I have also shied away from presenting what I thought would be too overly technical or specialist pieces in this section.

This section starts off with Peter Perdue's 'Military Mobilization in Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century China, Russia, and Mongolia'. Perdue's account not only offers a detailed view into the dynamics of the Mongolian steppe in the seventeenth century, but nicely contextualizes the larger issues of ruling the steppe. A strong account of the Zunghar campaigns and their impacts on the steppe region and its neighbours, this piece, like Perdue's larger work, *China Marches West* (2005), is also notable for engaging Mongolian studies (although one wonders whether Perdue would consider himself a Mongolist) with larger regional and theoretical issues, and illustrates the importance of the region for understanding the history and politics of much of Asia.

The selection on Zanabazar from Ichinnorov's *Öndör Gegeen Zanabazar*, presents a readable account of the life and some of the deeds of the First Javzandamba Khutagt. It is also interesting for its repositioning of the politics of the Oirat – Khalkh conflicts and Zanabazar's role. In particular, what had been portrayed under socialism as a form of treachery – surrendering to the Manchus – has now become part of Zanabazar's dedication to the 'unification and well-being of the Mongols'.

Included in this volume are translations of passages from the *Khalkha Jirum* from Riasanovsky's classic *Fundamental Principles of Mongol Law*, along with a brief passage giving his view of the code. The Khalkha Jirum was first promulgated in 1709, and as Riasanovsky notes, reads very much like a codification of customary law, rather than a new set of regulations (the translation of *jirum*) laid down from first principles, or imported wholesale from the central Qing administration. It was modified and revised over time, but in addition to defining laws, punishments and sometimes rewards, it served to codify 'the preeminent role of the Gegeen [ie, the Javzandamba Khutagt] and evidenced the effort to enforce Buddhist norms' (Atwood 2004: 301).

Natsagdorj's article on the 'Economic basis of feudalism in Mongolia', is concerned with arguing that what took place in Mongolia was indeed feudalism; that is, his argument is that the fundamental nature of economic relationships in Mongolia was rooted in relations of land-rights, rather than being a simple matter of livestock ownership and material wealth. It argues against an overly romanticized view of the life of the Mongolian nomads, as simple, free and egalitarian, although one suspects at times that Natsagdorj swings the pendulum too far in the other direction.

This paper offers a Marxist argument, as we would well expect of a Mongolian academic writing under socialism, and builds on Vladimirtsov's work in the Soviet Union (e.g. Vladimirtsov 1934). One does not have to agree with the argument that Mongolian society had been resolutely feudal since the thirteenth century, and there are multiple reasons for using the term 'feudalism' with great caution in the Mongolian context. (These include, among others, the ideological baggage it is freighted with in a Marxist perspective; the wholesale transplanting of ideas from one historical time and place to another; and the debates over the nature, and even existence, of feudalism in Europe itself.) Nonetheless, as a quick gloss, feudalism does seem a useful term and, as Natsagdorj cites archival evidence in support of his case, one is able to make something of a judgement as to the appropriateness of his categories and labels.

Sanjdorj's chapter, 'The spread of trade to the countryside,' from his *Manchu Chinese colonial rule in Northern Mongolia*, is something of a classic in its own right. It pairs nicely with Natsagdorj's piece, representing two 'high Marxist' views of Mongolian history from two well-known Mongolian academics. Sanjdorj demonstrates the increasing oppressiveness of trade relations with the Qing, and the highly exploitative nature of the trading. But in doing so, he also portrays the situation as more complex than it is usually credited with being. While it seems to be generally assumed the Manchus either actively encouraged or at least passively tolerated the exploitation of the Mongols by the Chinese traders, Sanjdorj makes it clear that the Qing did take steps (if ineffectually) to curb the worse excesses and enforce regulations already on the books.

If Natsagdorj and Sanjdorj both present a picture of Mongolia under the Qing as largely stagnant or at best unilinear in its development (ever towards increasing oppression) Elverskog forces us to rethink our prejudices. 'Things and the Qing' takes issue with the oft-repeated view that the period of Manchu rule was one of stagnation on all fronts. This blinds us to what the Qing actually accomplished: '[B]y perpetuating the discourse of stasis first promoted by the Qing we ignore the actual changes and dynamism that actually made the Qing a success among the Mongols.' (Elverskog, this volume)

Instead of stasis, Elverskog demonstrates that 'Qing culture entailed a certain fluidity, with multiple discourses operative and accessible to its various constituents.' In doing so, he goes a step further to argue that not only was Qing (and Mongolian) culture fluid, but that they actively engaged in and utilized particular tropes of modernity. In doing so, he challenges the view that Buddhism, encouraged by the Qing, led to the stagnation and weakness of the Mongols.

Bawden's account of Amarsanaa's and Chingünjav's rebellions remains, after forty years, the standard account of the events of 1755–1757. In addition to the actual rebellion, which in some ways was made possible by the final collapse of Zunghar power (as Amarsanaa rebelled after helping put down the Zunghars), Bawden covers here the larger contexts of the time, rejecting the standard socialist Mongolia view of the movement as an independence movement, and highlighting instead the economic motivation. The piece also ties us back more explicitly to Buddhism and its political implications, with a discussion of the role and influence of the Second Javzandamba Khutagt at the time.

As outlined in the introduction, one of the hallmarks of the Qing period in Mongolia was the growth in size, wealth and influence of the Buddhist hierarchy. Following on from Bawden's discussions, the next three selections all deal with some aspect of Buddhism.

The excerpt from Tsedev's *Ikh Shav'* outlines the role and structure of the *Ikh shav'*, the estate of the Javzandamba Khutagts. At times almost overwhelming in its details, the passage also offers a telling look at the sheer size and complexity of the administration of the Buddhist hierarchy, and Mongolia more generally, at the time. There is a richness of description that comes through with the numbers and accounts that a more strictly expository narrative would miss. Although here dealing with the *Ikh shav'*, most of the issues raised here would apply to life for all the *shav'* and indeed, most commoners.

As the selection from the new *History of Mongolia* illustrates, the monasteries in Mongolia were an inextricable part of the larger economy. Not only did they have their own *jas* (monastic funds) but they served as centres of trade and transport as well. As

the selection notes, 'If in the beginning, the *jas* were primarily accumulating offerings given by believers and using them for various religious services, afterwards, along with the economic consolidation it turned into an independent economic structure engaged in cattle breeding, agriculture, trade, usury, and transportation.' Indeed, many, if not most, of the settlements in Mongolia prior to the twentieth century had developed around monasteries precisely for these reasons.

The selection is also noteworthy in historiographic terms, as it comes from a collaborative, five volume history of Mongolia published by the Mongolian Academy of Sciences. It can thus be taken as something akin to an authoritative historical voice, and the first volume does in fact have a Preface by the then-President of Mongolia. It is perhaps particularly interestingly since it still has something of a socialist tone (albeit rather toned down, compared to Natsagdorj and Sanjdorj).

The edited selection from Pozdneyev's *Mongolia and the Mongols* offers a detailed look at the city that is now Ulaanbaatar towards the end of the nineteenth century. By this time, it would have been a larger, more active settlement than it had been during the early Qing period, when it was in fact nomadic. In reality more of a collection of parts than a whole (or so it seems) the city combined the monastery and palace of the Javzandamba Khutagt, the monastery Gandan a bit further west, and Maimaicheng, the Chinese trading city to the east. This is fairly common knowledge. But Pozdneyev takes us beyond this to look at the slums and the outskirts of the town, and gives us a brief glimpse of the lives that unfolded in Urga as it is popularly (and, as Pozdneyev points out, incorrectly) known in the West. Although the sections reprinted here do not dwell at much length on Buddhism *per se*, even if they do cover the two monastic parts of Ikh Khüree, Pozdneyev does give us more insight into the lives of the lamas, even if in doing so he raises intriguing questions. Thus, we learn for example, that 'it frequently happens that some lama will persuade a prostitute to share his bed without payment'. While this does confirm what we read elsewhere about the morality of many of the lamas, it does also leave one wondering why the prostitutes would do so.

In his review of the English translation of Pozdneyev's work, David Farquhar writes 'his observations on the life of the Mongols are more thorough and precise than those of any foreign visitor of any period' (1972: 958). Such a claim should probably be taken with a grain of salt, but we can still recognize the value of Pozdneyev's contribution.

While the commoners and lower-ranking nobility and lamas were heavily taxed and burdened with numerous obligations, this does not equate with them merely being passive recipients of repression. As the documents from Rasidondug and Veit's *Petitions of grievances* demonstrates, people did file complaints with officials when they thought they had been excessively wronged. Yet it should also be kept in mind that, according to Charles Bawden, 'the aims of these petitions were limited to specific points raised in them' (1989: 176). The petition, like any such legal document, allows us to unpack much of the actually existing lives of the people involved, both in terms of what they were subjected to, and what they thought was excessive. In this way, one is reminded of Ladurie's unpacking of life in Mountaillou through the records of the Inquisition.

The document included here is of interest not only because it lists the injustices the plaintiffs feel they have suffered, but whom it is directed against. Togtokh, more often known as To Wang or Prince To, was a famous innovator in economic and cultural terms, and even tried to reform the running of the monasteries in his territory by condensing them. The footnotes Rasidundog and Veit provide offer a bit more

contextualization. Suffice it to note that people did not appreciate the additional burdens his demands placed on them.

Finally, for this section, Ewing's work on the situation in Mongolia in the period from 1900 to 1911 sets the stage for the revolution of 1911 and the twentieth century in Mongolia. It works nicely as a summing up, bringing us not only to the eve of the 1911 revolution in Mongolia, but reminding us of why the revolution came about. Doubtless the Mongolians were aware of the increasingly tenuous position of the Qing in China proper, but dissatisfaction with Qing rule had been ever increasing, and plans for revolt were laid earlier than the fall of the Manchus.

NOTES

1. I am using here the date of the establishment of Qing rule in Manchuria, rather than their conquest of the Ming in 1644 and their subsequent recognition as a Chinese dynasty, to underscore the links between the Mongols and the Manchus.
2. My divisions into subsections are somewhat arbitrary, as political influences would impact social life and structure, and so vice versa. Nevertheless, treated with appropriate caution, they can be useful heuristic devices.

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MILITARY MOBILIZATION IN SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY CHINA, RUSSIA, AND MONGOLIA

Peter C. Perdue



INTRODUCTION

From the mid-seventeenth to the late eighteenth centuries three agrarian states—Chinese, Mongolian, and Russian—struggled for power over the heartland of the Eurasian continent. Each had dynamic central leaders mobilizing agrarian surpluses based on drastically different ecologies, institutions, and military structures. When the dust cleared, by 1760, only two survived.

Why three? Everyone has heard of the expansion of the Russian state into Siberia, and many scholars know that at the same time the Qing empire, under Manchu rule, expanded in an unprecedented fashion into the oases, deserts, and steppes of Central Asia. But the third contender for power, the Zunghar state of the Western Mongols, is relatively unknown. Its expansion represented the last of a series of efforts at hegemony over the steppe by nomadic rulers which had begun at least as early as the Xiongnu confederation of the second century B.C. (Barfield, 1989).

The Great Game of the nineteenth century pitted the British and Russian empires against each other for domination of Central Asia at the cost of the indigenous peoples of Afghanistan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, and of the weakening Chinese state. Likewise, the collapse of the Soviet Union in the twentieth century will ignite new contests for power in this region, whose players include Russians, Chinese, Kazakhs, Iranians, Turks, among others. The eighteenth-century game played out a similar drama with a different cast. It deserves attention for several reasons: it marked the elimination of independent nomad power; it offers comparisons of forms of agrarian mobilization outside the European context; it was one of the last major international competitions based almost exclusively on agrarian, not industrial economies. (Cf. McNeill, 1982).

In 1644, the Manchu rulers of the newly established Qing dynasty (A.D. 1644–1911) took control of North China from the Chinese-ruled Ming (A.D. 1368–1644) as the first stage of their ‘Great Enterprise’. (Wakeman, 1985) From 1644 to 1683 they were preoccupied first with driving out the loyalists of the fallen Ming and secondly with suppressing revolts in South and Southeast China. (Struve 1984; Spence & Wills,

eds 1979). In 1674, the twenty-year-old Kangxi emperor, having thrown off the regency of his uncles, suppressed revolts by three enfeoffed Manchu nobles who had supported the conquest, but who subsequently created autonomous appanages in the South (the Three Feudatories Revolt). (Kessler 1976) He then put down the unruly peasantry of Taiwan who had found allies in seaborne merchant pirates, Dutch traders, and Ming loyalists. (Wills, in Spence & Wills, eds 1979; Shepherd 1993) Having secured the South-east, the Manchus turned their attention to the region which had constantly been the greatest threat to Chinese imperial security—the arid Northwest. Here a revitalized nomadic state-building project, led by the Western Mongol (Oirat, Eleuth) chieftain Galdan (r. 1671–1697), claimed control over the vast reaches of present-day Xinjiang, Inner and Outer Mongolia, and parts of present day Qinghai, Tibet, and Kazakhstan. Galdan drew on active support from the Tibetan Lamaist regime in Lhasa, at least passive acquiescence from most of the oasis-dwelling Turkish peoples of the Tarim Basin, and on varying degrees of personal, tribal, and ethnic loyalty from other Mongolian, Turkish, and Tibetan peoples extending from Hami and Kokonor in the East to Lhasa in the West.

Meanwhile, the rulers of Muscovy had engaged in constant warfare on both their Eastern and Western frontiers. In the East, the taking of Kazan and Astrakhan in the 1550s was followed by further attacks on the Tatars. Russians had also begun commercial and military expansion into Siberia after 1580. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, under Peter the Great (r. 1689–1725) and his successors, Russian rulers entered into contact with all the other players in the Central Asian Great Game: Kazakhs, Turkestanis, Chinese, Siberian tribal leaders, Mongols, etc. Treaty negotiations with the Chinese in 1689 (Nerchinsk) and 1727 (Kiakhta) had delimited the border in Siberia and Manchuria between the Russian and Chinese empires and ensured regulated border trade. (Mancall 1971; Foust 1969) These are still the ‘legitimate’ borders which the Chinese claim in principle today (a principle denied by the Russians).

In all three states, military expansion, increased ‘stateness’, and commercial expansion went hand in hand. Ultimately, however, the resources of men, food, money, weaponry, and prestige had to be extracted, purchased, or produced from the agrarian substructure. Each of these huge agrarian empires had to transform the production relations, trading networks, and extractive techniques of their peasantries in order to mobilize the maximum possible military force. Their mutual competition and negotiation significantly shaped the political and social evolution of all three regimes.

It was a life-or-death struggle. In the end, of course, only two states survived. The Zunghar state was crushed by an extended series of Chinese military campaigns, from the Kangxi emperor’s three wars against Galdan (1690–1697) to the Qianlong emperor’s campaigns of 1755–1760. The Zunghar state and people, perhaps one million of them, vanished from the historical stage, obliterated by a combination of starvation, battlefield death, Chinese massacres, epidemic disease, dispersal through flight, and enslavement to Chinese, Russian, Kazakh, and other overlords. Russian tacit acquiescence to the extermination of the Zunghar state was critical to Chinese success. Even though at times they offered refuge or material support to Zunghar state builders, in the end the Russians refused to intervene directly. The elimination of the Mongolian state gave the Chinese imperial rulers the largest area they ever had controlled, including the present boundaries of the People’s Republic plus the present-day Mongolian Republic, the Ili valley in Kazakhstan, part of Kirghizia, and parts of Siberia north of the Amur River. The Qing maintained nominal control of this region (although losing *de facto*

sovereignty over the Ili valley and other regions to Russia after 1870) until the collapse of the empire in 1911. This was the longest period in history of extended control by a unified regime over both the Chinese heartland and the Central Asian steppe.

Western social scientists have developed a sophisticated literature which analyzes comparatively and historically the linkages between state formation, military power, the rise of capitalism, and agrarian production. (Anderson 1979; Tilly 1990; Wallerstein 1974) Nearly all of this literature focuses exclusively on the European experience. Debates revolve around time-honored issues of Western sociology and history: the significance of class relations, the systematic interrelation of capitalist economies with state power; the nexus of war, economy, and power. Useful as it is, their perspective remains too narrow. Conversely, although historians of China have developed a rich fund of related concepts and narratives to examine the rise, fall, and rise of the Ming and Qing dynasties from the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries, they have nearly always examined China in isolation from the global context. Parallels to the Western European experience have been noted, but few convincing explanations found. Only a few bold 'world historians' have speculated on the links integrating global processes during this period. (Atwell 1982, 1986, 1988; Fletcher 1985; Goldstone 1988, 1991; McNeill 1981; Wakeman 1986) But empirical demonstration of posited parallels is still scarce.

Furthermore, even comparative study of China and Europe is too confining. The cores of both of these regions have long been dominated by settled agriculturalists. Nomadic pastoralism has, however, been the dominant social formation in the expanse of Central Asia roughly east of the Urals, north of the Iranian plateau, south of the Siberian forests, and north to northwest of the Great Wall. Although the heartland of China, North and South, has been based on settled peasantry, the interaction with nomadism, the looming presence and shadowy existence of an alien other, has always been crucial to China's social, political, and cultural development. K. N. Chaudhuri has recently argued that the entire history of Asia cannot be understood independently of the history of the steppe, and much the same can be said for Russia and Ukraine. (Chaudhuri 1990, 138–48; McNeill 1964; Ostrowski 1990; Vernadsky 1953) When we look at the seventeenth to eighteenth centuries, we see the last time when nomads and settled regimes interacted as equal, autonomous presences. After the mid-eighteenth century, nomads were reduced to a subordinate status as internal colonies of the Russian and Chinese empires—an equally fascinating, but different story. Analyzing this final phase of steppe-settled interaction leads to fresh insights about the relationships between agrarian and pastoral ecology and state formation.

The available secondary or theoretical literature on this particular time and place is not large. No satisfactory English-language synthetic account has ever been written of this process. Why has it been neglected? Several underlying preconceptions of both Western and non-Western history and social theory are exposed by this neglect. Eurocentrism, mentioned above, is only one. Sinocentrism, by both Chinese and Westerners, privileges the 'core' eighteen provinces of predominantly Han China, assigning the rest to a remote, peripheral frontier. Studies of modern Chinese history focused on China's 'response to the West' concentrate overwhelmingly on the maritime contact with Western Europeans, Americans, and Japanese, subordinating the equally significant and longer-lasting overland links with Russia and Central Asia. Orientalism, in its Chinese guise, past and present, sees nomads, Turks, Tibetans, Muslims, Mongols—all the diverse populations of Central Asia—as either irredeemably alien, or comprehensible only to the extent that they assimilate to Han Chinese categories ('cooked' barbarians).

(Gladney 1991; Crossley 1990) Central Asian specialists wrestle with individual pieces of a vast and confusing linguistic, religious, and geographic realm. For most of them, the Mongol empire of Chingis Khan and Kublai Khan is the high point; after that it is all downhill.¹

Finally, nationalist historiography, a product of the nineteenth century which pervades the historical writing of all contemporary nation-states, implies that the domination of Russia and China over this region was to be expected, a natural and inevitable product of a historical process driven by great leaders like Kangxi and Peter the Great. Losers are relegated to the dustbin of history.² For example, the chapter on the Northwest in the 'General History of the Qing' by the PRC historian Dai Yi begins with a quote from Mao Zedong: 'China is a country with a large population formed from the union of many nationalities', and continues: 'After the Qing dynasty established complete control over the entire country, the minority peoples distributed on our country's broad western and northern borders—Mongols, Tibetans, Hui (Chinese Muslims), Uighurs, Kazakhs, Burut, etc.—began to establish political and economic links with the central Qing government, and increasingly became inseparable members of our country's multinational state'. (Dai 1981, vol. 2, 136)

Necessity, totalization, and finality: these basically Hegelian principles of historical interpretation suited the era of the rising nation state. (Chartier 1988, 57) Today, however, contingency, fragmentation, and diversity seem like far more useful interpretive principles than the immanency, determinism, and monist politico-cultural unity of the nineteenth century. The collapse of the Soviet Union and its domination of Central Asia is only one example. The whole analysis of state-building world-wide needs greater attention to the contingent political and social construction of nation-states. We must subvert inherited nationalist historiography by discovering new organizing themes.³

Historians of technology, another field strongly marked by the classically Whiggish notion of inevitable progress, have offered several guidelines for undermining these assumptions: 1) pay as much attention to technological failures as to successes; 2) examine similar technological developments in several different cultural contexts; 3) look closely at the interrelationships of personality, political environment, technical determinants, and social structure. (Staudenmeier 1985; Smith & Marx, eds. 1994) Analogously, in examining the agrarian foundations of state-building, we need to focus now on the accidents of leadership (succession to power matters), failed efforts, and cross-cultural (especially non-Western) perspectives. Central Asia is an excellent place to look.

Of necessity, in this limited space, I can only sketch a few features. In what follows, I first provide a brief narrative account which emphasizes the global interactions between the three contending powers. Since the Russian and Chinese stories are much better known, I give more attention to the Mongolian state. Then I examine two critical links between state-building and agrarian ecology: grain provisioning and population mobility.⁴ I conclude with a discussion of the Chinese use of inscriptions in consolidating hegemony over Central Asia.

A Note on Scale: It is roughly 4000 kilometers from the Ural mountains to the Great Wall, and 2400 kilometers from the southern end of the Siberian forest to the northern rim of the Himalayan plateau. Central Asia, broadly defined, covers nearly ten million square kilometers, equivalent to the size of the entire People's Republic, Europe, or the United States. State-building here takes place on a continental scale, without any of the conveniences offered by water transport, or boundaries defined by valleys and mountain

ranges. Grasslands, forests, deserts, and high mountains define an extremely fragmented, inhospitable ecology. Chinese expeditions into the Northwest exceeded the distance of Napoleon's march on Russia, over much more hostile terrain. Nomadic state builders had nowhere near the concentration of resources available to their settled competitors, but all state builders in the steppe had to compensate for its poverty and fragmentation. (Christian 1994)

Historically, Central Asia had usually been fragmented. Only rarely did a nomadic empire builder succeed in unifying the vast disparate region, and these empires seldom lasted long. Chingis Khan's Mongol empire was a rare exception, as Thomas Barfield has argued. (Barfield 1989) Essentially, the resources of the steppe were inadequate to support a large imperial military or bureaucratic apparatus. Successful nomadic empire builders had to rely on resources from outside, extracting wealth through trade, tribute, or plunder.


I. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE ZUNGHARS

Galdan's father, Batur Hongtaiji (r. 1634–1653), began the building of the Zunghars into a major military power. Dominating the Tarbagatai and Urumqi region, he obtained weapons and livestock from the Russians, built a permanent capital, and embraced the Lamaist religion. On Batur's death in 1653, his son Sengge succeeded him, but was murdered in 1671. Galdan, learning of his brother's murder, returned from Lhasa in 1673 and soon gained authority over the Zunghar chiefs. By 1679 he had taken over Eastern Turkestan, Hami, and Turfan, and requested confirmation of his title of Bushuktu Khan by Kangxi.

Disputes among two Khans of the Eastern Mongols (Khalkhas) offered both Galdan and Kangxi opportunities to extend their influence into Mongolia. Galdan conducted a major expedition eastward in 1688, in which he crushed the 5,000 Khalkha troops opposing him. Reports of Galdan's men plundering and burning temples in Khalkha territory sent tens of thousands of starving refugees fleeing to ask for Kangxi's protection. The emperor generously provided relief supplies to the Khalkha refugees, but he was preoccupied with negotiations with the Russians to prevent them aiding Galdan. In 1688, he was prepared to take only defensive action, but by 1690/6, after the signing of the Treaty of Nerchinsk, he was prepared to launch his first personal expedition against Galdan. Kangxi's first expedition against Galdan was provoked by Galdan's effort to invade Outer Mongolia in search of booty for his troops. The decisive battle of Ulan Butong took place 300 kilometers north of Beijing, on 1690/8/1.⁵ Galdan's forces hid in the forests and used Russian cannon to put up stiff resistance, but Qing artillery damaged them badly. Galdan was allowed to retreat after negotiations mediated by the Dalai Lama's representatives. Although Galdan swore an oath of allegiance to Kangxi, the emperor clearly did not trust him. From this point on, Kangxi was determined to crush Galdan, but illness had forced the emperor to return to the capital on 7/24. After his defeat at Ulan Butong, Galdan retreated to the Khobdo region of Western Mongolia, 2500 kilometers from Beijing, well out of Kangxi's reach. There he was able to repress internal opposition and rebuild his forces. The vastness of the steppe and the Qing's logistical limitations were Galdan's major protectors. Kangxi's main strategy became one of luring Galdan closer to China so that he could strike at him again. For the second expedition, he spent over a year preparing three large armies which could

travel 1200 kilometers away from Beijing. By 1695/6 Galdan was on the move east again, driven partly by poor harvests in Zungharia. First he headed for Hami, then for the Kerulen River (near present-day Ulan Bator). Kangxi enticed him there with invitations from the Kolchin princes, who pretended to be on Galdan's side. Galdan's army arrived at the Tula River with nearly 20,000 men and horses. On 1695/10/3 Kangxi announced his intention to lead a second major expedition against Galdan. Noting that he had hoped to draw Galdan closer in, he nevertheless insisted on sending the armies far across the desert, despite objections from his generals. The Central Army, 37,000 men led by Kangxi himself, would travel from Beijing 1100 kilometers across the Gobi desert; the East Route army would leave from Shengjing (Fengtian) with 35,000 men and head for the Kerulen, a distance of 1300 kilometers; the West Route army of 35,000 men would set out from Guihua in Ningxia and travel a shorter route of 900–1100 kilometers to the Tula River (see map 26.1).

The armies gathered huge amounts of food, horses, donkeys, carts, armor, weaponry and uniforms in preparation for the decisive confrontation. The Central Route army set out from Beijing on 1696/2/29. Kangxi wrote detailed letters to his sons along the way describing the terrain, the supplies of water and grass, and the mood of the army. (Okada, 1979; Cimeddorji 1991) Rumors of a Russian army of 60,000 men supporting Galdan aroused strong objections to Kangxi's expedition, but he firmly rejected proposals for retreat. By 4/22, after 50 days of marching, the Central Army arrived at Kerulen. As planned, they had marched through the snows and arrived in time for the greening of the grasses in spring. The support troops were, however, slow in arriving with extra food supplies and baggage. Kangxi aimed to lure Galdan into battle and prevent him from fleeing before the West army had arrived at Tula to block his escape.



Map 26.1. Kangxi's second Zunghar campaign, 1696. Source: based on Tan Qixiang (ed), *Zhongguo Lishi Dituji* (Beijing, 1975), vol. 8.

By 5/7, worried about the lack of water in the region for his troops, he launched an intensive search for new springs. He had still found no traces of Galdan's camp. But in the next two days he discovered that Galdan, realizing the size of the Qing army, had fled in haste, abandoning much of his weaponry and gear. Kangxi, in hot pursuit, drove Galdan directly into the Western army of Feiyanggu, which destroyed the Mongol army at the famed battle of Jaomodo on 1695/5/13. Qing cannon shattered the Zunghar army of 7000 men because it had not had time to set up a fixed defense. Kangxi was greatly relieved, especially since food supplies were growing short for both the West and Central armies. He quickly returned to the capital, where he arrived on 6/9.

The campaign had lasted 99 days; a 3000 kilometer round trip for Kangxi. It was much longer in duration and in length than the first one, but Kangxi had ample time to prepare his army. The preparations for actual battle turned out to be nearly superfluous: his greatest achievement had been to equip three large armies and send them out directly into the steppe.

Galdan, nevertheless, escaped again, this time with only a few hundred famished followers. Meanwhile, Galdan's nephew, Tsewang Rabtán, took advantage of his absence to occupy the heart of Zungharia. With secret Qing support, he made it impossible for Galdan to flee West. Galdan's only option was to head for Hami and thereby to refuge in Tibet. Kangxi's third expedition was explicitly designed as a 'hunting expedition' for Galdan's head. He set out on 9/19 with a small force, lightly armed, carrying only small amounts of supplies. Galdan failed to obtain food supplies for himself and his 1500 men when he attacked the Qing garrison. Kangxi urged Galdan to surrender, pointing out that his cause was hopeless without food and men. The emperor crossed the frozen Yellow River and moved into the Ordos region by 11/25, but he turned back at this point for unclear reasons. A curious incident indicates that he may have been running short of supplies in the winter cold. A bondservant called out to Kangxi that the army must return, because food had nearly been exhausted. The furious emperor ordered the bondservant executed and vowed to eat snow if necessary to run Galdan down. Nevertheless, the army did turn back. This expedition lasted 91 days.

Galdan had still escaped capture, but Kangxi had prevented him from reaching Hami and moving into Tibet. All the Qing leaders realized that Galdan, isolated, deserted by his followers, short of food in the vicious winters of the steppe, had only a short time to live. Yet Kangxi, still unsatisfied, began a fourth expedition against him, rejecting the advice of his senior counsellors. He reached Ningxia, where he stayed for eighteen days before turning back on 4/1. Finally, in the middle of the fourth lunar month of 1697, he received Feiyanggu's report announcing Galdan's death.

Kangxi's relentless pursuit of Galdan went far beyond the bounds of strategic necessity. Each expedition put great burdens on the local people, burdens that Kangxi tried to alleviate, but not at the cost of calling off the expedition. Resistance to each expedition grew stiffer, clearly reflecting official concerns about alienating the local population besides their publicly expressed concern for the emperor's health. Kangxi's great force of will, and his endurance of harsh military conditions, have impressed all observers, but we may well suspect him of an excessive thirst for vengeance. Putting the conflict in such personal terms, aiming at the elimination of one leader, reveals Central Asian strategic thinking showing through his Confucian veneer. The Galdan campaigns combined the Chinese genius for logistic planning with a Central Asian thirst for personal vengeance. Hence they were large in scale, heavily burdensome to the local people, and strategically inappropriate.

The Yongzheng emperor's reign (1722–1735) forms an interesting interlude, which I do not have room to describe. Yongzheng is best known for his active promotion of institutional reform, including the full development of the Grand Council advisory body in preparation for a new frontier campaign (Bartlett 1991). Yet at the same time, Yongzheng was the only Qing emperor to lose a major battle to the Zunghars in 1731, when Mongol warriors eliminated all but two thousand of the fifty-thousand man Qing army. I believe it can be argued that, once again, logistical limitations combined with Yongzheng's excessive attention to internal affairs and neglect of preparation for frontier warfare were the main causes of this defeat.

Qianlong's Final Blows, 1755–1760

The remoteness of Zungharia and the limitations of Qing mobilization still protected the Zunghars. Their years of expansion were over, but they could doggedly survive until a much more massive Qing mobilization could reach them. Internal dissension, an endemic feature of nomadic polities, doomed the Zunghars in the end. After Galdan Tseren's death in 1745, disputes over the succession led to war between two rival princes, Dawaci and Amursana. Dawaci succeeded in driving out Amursana in 1753/5 and naming himself Khan, but Amursana sought Qing support to regain power. This was the opportunity Qianlong had been waiting for. In 1754/5 he decided on a major military expedition, the first of the Three Great Campaigns waged in Central Asia. Thirty thousand men in the Northern Route army set out from Uliyasutai, with Amursana as assistant commander, while twenty thousand men in the West Route army left from Hami and Barkul. They defeated Dawaci at the Ili River, captured him drunk, and delivered him to Qianlong in Beijing on 1755/10/17. Amursana, however, revolted against the Qing soon after, leading to Qianlong's second campaign, begun on 1755/6/28 and ending on 1757/6, when Amursana was driven over the Russian border and died there. The third expedition, from 1757 to 1759, extended Qing conquests into Eastern Turkestan.

This kind of narrative account could go much further. The story so far has been told through the eyes of two actors: the Chinese emperor and Mongol Khan, each used metonymically as representatives of the decision-making apparatus of the Qing and Zunghar states. By itself it does not really undercut the standard account at all, except that different narrative perspectives challenge each other. The conflict seen through the eyes of the Zunghar leaders, or by the Russian tsars, is not the same as seen through the eyes of the Chinese. We should also note the critical parallel role of the vigorous leaders in both acts of the drama: Galdan, Kangxi, and Peter I in the 1690s; Qianlong and Tsewang Rabtan in the 1750s. Without Kangxi's forceful advocacy, Qing armies would probably never have marched so far against Galdan or driven him to his death. The importance of personality undermines any confident assertions of necessity.

Other sources, other narratives can be brought to play. But we also need to go beyond narrative. The essential assumption of personal agency needs to be challenged. Comparable evolution of socio-economic structures in all three states undergirded the activities of the imperial leaders. Let us dig deeper.

II. SOCIO-ECONOMIC PARALLELS: THE SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY CRISIS

All three states were restructured after the seventeenth-century world crisis. The extensive series of economic, political, and social crises in seventeenth-century Europe included population decline, economic depression, fiscal crises, and peasant revolts. (Aston, ed. 1967) Other scholars have extended the idea of a seventeenth-century crisis to include the rest of the world, pointing out at least roughly analogous occurrences in China, Japan, and the Ottoman Empire. (Atwell, 1986; Wakeman, 1986) Although they have discovered parallel developments, the explanations for these parallels remain speculative and inadequate. Some posit a change in the global climate, but evidence of climatic change is lacking for much of the world. More convincing evidence exists for an alteration of currency flows, especially the movement of silver from New World mines, through Spain, Amsterdam, and England, into the large China market. A cutoff of this silver flow is credited with inflicting economic crisis on late Ming China. (Atwell 1982) Unfortunately, the volume of silver trade in relation to the entire monetized sector of the Chinese economy is too small to have had more than regional or temporary effects. Goldstone provides a more convincing general explanation in terms of population growth and mobility straining the fiscal, subsistence, and control resources of early modern states. (Goldstone, 1988, 1991) I explore briefly here the parallels between Russia, China, and Mongolia in this perspective.

During the early to mid-sixteenth century, Russia and China seemed to follow parallel tracks of increasing commercial prosperity and internal trade, rising populations, rising agricultural specialization and productivity. (Hellie 1971, 88) The expansion of Muscovy into the steppe began during this period with the capture of Kazan in 1552 and Astrakhan in 1556. During the second half of the sixteenth century trouble set in. Economic decline, depopulation of the center of Muscovy, famines, high taxes, Tatar invasions, the disasters of Ivan IV's Livonian War (1558–1583) and Oprichnina (1565–1572) all reversed the earlier favourable trends. They also set the Russian peasantry on the road to serfdom. (Hellie, 93) Ming China, too, faced rising tax burdens, increased frontier threats, exhaustion of productivity gains, decline of irrigation works, and a series of epidemics. These troubles culminated in the growth of the Manchu state in the Northeast, the rebellions in the West and South, eventually leading to the collapse of the Ming regime in 1644. Russia suffered the Time of Troubles succession crisis (1605–1613) the Bolotnikov peasant revolts (1606–1607), followed by the Smolensk War (1632–1634). The legal consolidation of peasant serfdom culminated in the Ulozhenie of 1649.

Old Russia's military forces, clearly inadequate when turned West, were much better suited to nomadic cavalry warfare. The successful expansion of the sixteenth century was interrupted by economic and political crisis. Russia could only resume the drive East after an implicit compact between monarchy, great nobles, and middle service class sealed the solidity of the absolutist regime on the backs of a securely enserved peasantry. (Anderson 1979; Hellie 1971) Likewise, the Manchu conquerors first had to negotiate a compact with the Chinese landed elite, ensuring their local dominance by maintaining Ming structures of taxation and bureaucracy, abolishing the late Ming surtaxes, repressing peasant revolt and rent resistance, in return for yielding the top authority to the Manchus. Once the domestic enemies were repressed, peace brought further economic expansion, the restoration of wasteland, surpluses in the treasury, and the revival of trade. Then the push to the Northwest could begin.

II. 1. Mobility

For all three states, the mobility of their agrarian subjects was a key concern. As they expanded their territories, the rulers faced the problem inherent in the dialectics of conquest of land-based empires: larger boundaries offered space for peasants to flee exploitation at the core by moving to the frontier. Unlike seaborne colonial empires, where movement was difficult, the Central Asian imperial rulers had no secure control of transportation routes. Also, since the areas they conquered were less populated than the core regions, a population density gradient pushed marginal settlers from the core to the periphery. In Russia, especially, there was no sharp cultural or ecological divide between core settlement areas of Muscovy and newly conquered frontier areas. In China, the boundaries were more sharply drawn on the Northwest frontier. Owen Lattimore has argued that the Great Wall was at least as much an effort to keep Han settlers within the boundaries of a settled civilized realm as it was an effort to keep nomads out. (Lattimore, 1962) Even so, this boundary was too porous, culturally and physically, to prevent substantial migration, trade, and even acculturation.

Rulers had ambivalent stances towards the increased mobility resulting from expansion. On the one hand, sponsored settlement could tame frontier regions by introducing settled agricultural life. On the other hand, these frontier regions were the least subject to control by the center and most likely to produce rebellions in times of hardship. The major rebellions which broke out in China from the mid-seventeenth to the end of the eighteenth century were all located in peripheral areas only incompletely subdued by the imperial bureaucratic apparatus – Taiwan, Gansu, Northwest Hubei, West Hunan, Guangxi (later the origin of the Taiping rebellion), etc. Likewise, in Russia, the great revolts of Bolotnikov (1606–1607), Stepan Razin (1670–1671), and Pugachev (1773–1775) flourished in the borderlands of Southern Russia—Ukraine and Cossack territory. (Anderson, 1979, 344) For self-preservation, these expanding regimes had to monitor and control the movement of their rural populations to the new frontiers.

The notorious Russian solution was, of course, serfdom. Richard Hellie traces the rise and consolidation of enserfment in parallel with the rising military power of the Muscovite state. (Hellie, 1971) He interprets serfdom as a solution to the control problems faced by an expanding military agrarian empire. The middle service class, created by the Tsars as the key military arm of the state, in effect were guaranteed unlimited personal power over their peasantry by the state in return for unconditional military service to it. From 1455 to 1649 the legal bonds on the peasant were progressively tightened as the state built up its military and bureaucratic apparatus and expanded its boundaries against its rivals to East and West.

Countervailing interests which might defend peasant freedom included the large magnates, who preferred mobility, because it allowed them to steal scarce labor from their neighboring landlords, and the peasantry themselves, heavily oppressed by increasing tax and labor burdens, who fled to underpopulated areas when given the opportunity. Notably, it was not the most destitute who fled, but the more well-to-do. Flight was well-organized, done in family units, clearly a consciously planned resistance to landlord oppression. Lords faced with the loss of their most productive farmers turned to the state to enforce increasingly rigid restrictions on mobility. The process was completely codified by the *Ulozhenie* declared in the General Assembly of 1649. Peter I, for all his radical reforms, built on the Muscovite legacy in several respects: increasing

the size of a bureaucratic and military structure totally dependent on the Tsar, and reinforcing the ties binding the peasant to the land. As the empire expanded further in the eighteenth century, it took serfdom with it.

The Chinese, by contrast, combined local control of population movement with officially sponsored migration over long distances to newly settled regions. State controls over local migration turned out to be surprisingly weak. Although the Qing rulers preferred local stability, they never enforced bondage to the land. Some scholars have argued that from the Song through mid-Ming (tenth–fifteenth centuries), bondage to the land was characteristic of Chinese rural society—an argument I do not accept. (Elvin 1973; cf. McDermott 1984; Wiens 1980) In any case, by the mid-seventeenth century at the latest, everyone agrees that bondage to the land, if it ever existed, had nearly vanished.

The *baojia*, a decimal registration of peasants in all villages into units of 10 and 100 families, increased the monitoring capacity of the state and enforced local militia service by its members, but it did not prevent migration. By the seventeenth century, unlike the fourteenth, taxes were levied individually by household, not collectively on the *bao* unit. Neighbors and fellow *baojia* members no longer suffered payment of increased burdens if one household left. *Baojia* registration was transferable for certain migrants to cities. (Rowe 1984) The *baojia* registration became increasingly ineffective as a check on population movement, although it became increasingly accurate as a measure of population size.⁶ The Russian state, by contrast, introduced communal tax responsibility independently but concomitantly with serfdom.

A second policy of indirect local mobility control was the famine relief system. Qing officials devised an elaborate complex of policies to encourage refugees uprooted by famine to return to their homes. They set up rice gruel feeding stations in towns for temporary relief and provided travel grants for refugees to return to their fields after the subsistence crisis had passed. (Perdue 1987; Wong and Will 1991) An empire-wide network of ever-normal granaries sold their supplies during high-price periods and restocked during low-price periods every year, thus levelling out annual price fluctuations. Often these efforts proved surprisingly effective, as case studies of a famine in North China in 1744 and in Northwest China in 1810 demonstrate. (Will 1990; Wong & Perdue 1983)

When effective, these policies, by ensuring rural stability, staved off threats of revolt by mobile, destitute peasant mobs. Is it merely coincidental that the great expansion in the scale of the empire-wide granary system begins in the mid-eighteenth century, just as the Central Asian campaigns are ending? Not if the relief system is seen as a response to the increased mobility made possible by the greatly expanded size of the empire.

Even these policies had their limits. Peasants were just as likely to use state travel grants to move on further in pursuit of better lands as they were to return to their ruined fields. By the early eighteenth century, the Yongzheng emperor expressed concern about long-distance migration of entire families who moved up the Yangzi river from the overcrowded Jiangnan delta to the new territory of Sichuan. (Perdue 1987) His ambivalence is revealing. His main concern was not peasant flight in itself; he mainly worried that the new arrivals to Sichuan would not find the land they sought, and turn to banditry instead. At the same time, aware of the increased demand for land by a growing population, he and his successor, the Qianlong emperor, encouraged the clearance of new lands on hillsides, the conversion of entire lakes to paddy fields, and the improvement of yields on existing lands. The Northwest conquest concluded in 1760 offered

grand new vistas for Han colonization. With military escorts and grants of seeds, tools, and animals, combined with intensive investment in irrigation, the Manchu rulers shipped out thousands of poor peasants from Gansu to the newly acquired territories in Xinjiang. They wanted a heavy Han presence in order to 'create facts on the ground'; a clear way to ensure that Chinese presence in this region would never retreat.

Xinjiang's oases had long been a terrain of shifting settlement. For many centuries great cities had grown and collapsed in the desert. In the early twentieth century, its ancient ruined cities attracted imperialist archaeological adventurers like Sven Hedin, Aurel Stein, and Albert von le Coq. No more. From the eighteenth century forward, state-sponsored settlement has ensured a large Han presence there. The same policy has been enacted in recent times in Tibet, with much less success. In 1982, civilian Han constituted eighty-five percent of Inner Mongolia, ten percent of Xinjiang's population, but only 4.8 per cent of Tibet. (Bannister, 325) Although China had stationed garrisons in Central Asia since the Han dynasty, mass state-sponsored civilian migration to the region began in the eighteenth century.

Nineteenth-century European scholars, of whom Marx is typical, enshrined an image of the static, unmoving, ignorant peasant, satisfied with his tiny plot and miserable dwelling, unwilling to move unless forced by desperation. He was polarized against the mobile industrial worker, seen as the source of dynamism. Modern demographic work on early modern Europe has sabotaged this image by revealing great mobility on all levels of rural society. (McCants 1992) Even a cursory look at China confirms the picture of a mobile peasantry, ready to seize on opportunities to improve its welfare. And even the Russian case can support this view. Only the combined weight of state, landlord, military, and legal apparatus could succeed in tying down the Russian peasant, to whom was ascribed an 'essentially nomadic nature' before enservment. (Hellie 1971; Blum 1961, 112–13, 155) Both empires aimed to control rural population movement in the interest of the preservation of class domination and state power, but each faced resistance and internal contradictions of enforcement.

Both empires virally replicated their social formations in newly conquered territories with similar ecologies. The Chinese agrarian formation of densely populated, irrigated, high-yielding commercialized agriculture proved viable even in arid steppe lands, but at immense cost to the state budget. The Russian regime—sparse population, low yield, shifting cultivation, vulnerable to subsistence crises—fit better the pre-existing steppe ecology, required little state investment in productivity, and blurred the cultural boundary between settler and nomad. In both cases, state-directed policies of settlement shifted the direction of agrarian development of Central Asia.

Mobility control also proved crucial in the struggle for Mongol domination. Nomadic federations face centripetal tensions because of the essential economic independence of their component parts. Tribal chieftains can always move away from exploitative demands of would-be Khans, if there is free pasture land available. The authority of a Khan is only personal; it cannot be translated into permanent bureaucratic authority unless subordinate chiefs' autonomous choice of pasture lands is controlled. The Zunghar state-builders recognized that they had to build bureaucratic apparatuses in order to protect themselves against their Chinese enemies. To do so, they had to extract resources from subordinate tribes and wrest from their chiefs the right to allocate seasonal pasturelands. But the Manchus could play this game too. The Qing successfully competed for Mongol support by offering their aid in settling disputes over pasturelands, thus winning many of the Eastern Mongols to their side. Khalkhas who

accepted the emperor's suzerainty acknowledged his right to allocate pastures and levy troops and horses from them, in return receiving honorary titles, access to marriage to the Manchu nobility, and food and economic goods. It was not a 'natural' sedentarization process but a strategic choice. Nomads resisting Zunghar or Chinese domination could flee into the steppe, but it became increasingly difficult to survive on one's own there. Perhaps increasing populations of men and grazing flocks put great pressure on grassland supplies, although evidence is slim. We do know that Chinese armies incorporated large numbers of nomad refugees whose food supplies had been exhausted. Food supply thus became a second crucial weapon in the war for the steppe.

II. 2. Food

Previous Chinese empires had repeatedly tried to mount large-scale military expeditions into Central Asia and repeatedly failed, because of the immense cost in money and food. Han expeditions of the second century B.C., including the search for the famous 'blood-sweating horses' of Ferghana, lost 60 to 70 percent of their troops and up to 100,000 horses in steppe campaigns. (Barfield 1989, 56) The Tang dynasty (A.D. 618–906) launched an aggressive expansion movement into the Northwest in its early years, but Chinese rule here remained unchallenged for only a short time. Neither the Northern nor Southern Song dynasties (A.D. 960–1279) even tried: they had enough trouble warding off threats to the North China plain. During the Ming dynasty, the Yongle emperor (*r.* 1403–1424) launched five major campaigns against the Mongols and died in the middle of the last one. (Franke 1945) But the last replay before the Qing of these sporadic expeditions ended in black comedy: one Ming emperor personally ventured west of Beijing in 1449 against the Mongol Esen Khan, and ended up being captured by Esen. Life went on as usual back home in Beijing until he was finally returned. (Mote 1974)


What made the Qing different? They were the first dynasty with its base in the heartland of China to pursue consistently relentless expansion into Inner Asia.⁷ The Manchu rulers of the Qing were much more oriented toward Central Asia than the Han-ruled dynasties of the Song or Ming. The Manchus, many of whom had close kinship links to the Eastern Mongols, understood the dynamics of steppe politics far better than their Han co-partners. In addition to military campaigns, they pursued a brilliantly successful diplomatic campaign to divide and conquer the rival Mongol tribes.

Equally fundamental, however, was the Manchus' ability to solve the logistical problem of steppe warfare. Ever since the days of the Scythians, the most effective nomadic military tactic when faced by vastly superior armies from settled empires was to withdraw further into the steppe. If the settled army pursued, it eventually outran its supply lines, making it vulnerable to devastating ambushes. If it turned back, the nomads simply recouped their losses. Nomadic warfare shares with guerrilla warfare the need to use geographic advantage to the utmost to counteract inferior strength in numbers and weaponry. Hence the Maoist slogans, 'When the enemy advances we withdraw . . .' apply equally well to nomads. The inability to stretch supply lines thousands of kilometers into barren territory and the necessity of feeding a large infantry with transported food constrained the ability of settled states to launch permanent expeditions into Inner Asia. The nomads, who lived off the grasslands, grouped in small mobile cavalry units, and moved their entire society with them, faced no such constraints. This long-standing stalemate forced the Chinese to adopt other techniques of

control, including trade and tribute relations (Yu 1967; Jagchid & Symons 1989) or the building of defensive walls (Waldron 1990).

Even the Kangxi emperor, in his campaigns against Galdan in the late seventeenth century, could not break through this logistical barrier. Reading his own accounts of the campaigns, in which he personally participated, reveals constant worries about supplies of food and water. On each of his campaigns, he could stay only about ninety days maximum away from home, the same time limit faced by his predecessors in the Han dynasty. (Barfield, 1981; Cimeddorji 1991; Okada 1979) He never did capture Galdan, who simply moved beyond his reach. Kangxi only won when Galdan died, probably of smallpox, after retreating from his last loss in battle. The story that Galdan committed suicide out of despair certainly salved imperial pride, but even the emperor, a stern empiricist, did not believe it. Not until the Qianlong emperor broke through the logistical barrier by constructing a supply route leading through the Gansu corridor into Xinjiang could the Chinese support large armies in the steppe for several years at a time. The campaigns of 1755–1760 included three main armies, totalling 50,000 men each, who stayed on each campaign for one to two years.

Conveying supplies to the troops depended on a chain of magazine posts set up along two main roads, one for the North Route army via Uliyasutai and one for the West Route Army via Barkul (see map 26.2). Gansu Governor-General Yong Chang prepared six months' worth of supplies for the twenty thousand men of the West Route Army: 11,200 *shi* of grain, 2.25 million *jin* of noodles, 750,000 *jin* of bread, and 20,000 *jin* of mutton.⁸ Animals also moved from Gansu markets to Hami: 40,000 oxen and 20,000 head of sheep bought in Liangzhou and Zhuangliang to provide 300,000 *jin* of dried meat in Hami, plus 30,000 head of sheep to be pastured in Hami. (Lai 1984, 219–22)



Map 26.2 Qianlong's Zunghar campaigns, 1755–1760. Source: Lai Fushun, *Qianlong Zhongyao Zhanzheng zhi Junxu Yanjiu* (Taipei, 1984).

Both armies needed large amounts of grain for their own rations and additional supplies to feed Mongol tribes who surrendered to the Qing. The North route army at Uliyasutai and the West Route army at Barkul both drew on supplies from Gansu, Shaanxi, Shanxi, and even Henan, but Gansu provided the largest amounts. Besides grain, Gansu also provided tea, essential for trade with friendly nomadic tribes. Garrison lands in Hami and Barkul became an increasingly important source of grain for the later campaigns, but the oxen to plow these fields had to come from Gansu. The demand for oxen clearly strained the local market: after four thousand head were purchased in Gansu, the official price of 4.4 taels (ounces of silver) per head had to be raised by two taels in order to provide enough.

Transportation of these supplies also relied heavily on the interior China markets. To cut down the demand for carts and mules, General Bandi planned to have the troops themselves carry three to four months of rations with them beyond the Great Wall. This meant over 55 kilos of raw millet, dried noodles, and dried meat, in addition to weapons, per soldier. No army could move quickly this way, so the requirement was changed to forty days of rations per soldier carried by himself, and eighty days by transport.

Transport costs escalated astronomically beyond the Great Wall. Interior overland transport costs were 0.2 taels per 100 *li* in the Northwest, very high by Chinese standards already. In the first Zunghar campaign, it cost 251,000 taels to carry 100,000 *shi* of grain from districts west of the Yellow River in Gansu to Suzhou in Gansu, a straight-line distance of five to six hundred kilometers. The route from Suzhou to Hami, by contrast, a straight-line distance of 600 kilometers, in actuality was over 1000 kilometers (1760 *li*) long, took one month to travel, and cost 7.7 taels per *shi*. Thus the total cost of moving 100,000 *shi* of grain from the core production areas in western Gansu to Hami was nearly one million taels, up to ten times the purchase cost of the grain itself. Furthermore, the mules, camels, carts, porters and rations for these porters had to be bought on China's interior markets, because population in the steppe was so sparse. During the second campaign, surpluses remained in Barkul from the first campaign, and officials made efforts to avoid transporting large amounts from the interior. They gave tea to troops in Urumqi to exchange for mutton and bread and supplied silver for purchases of grain, tobacco, and other goods. Even so, they needed to ship large amounts from Shanxi and Gansu. The third campaign once again required shipment of 100,000 *shi* of grain from Suzhou to Hami, using 3,800 carts. These figures indicate the enormous logistical problems for the Qing armies simply to move supplies from grain producing areas in the Northwest to the major military store-houses at Hami and Barkul. Travel conditions beyond Hami were even more difficult.

The ability to supply up to fifty thousand soldiers for several years with grain, meat, weapons, and horses transported over thousands of miles of steppe, desert, and steep mountains represented an amazing feat of organization. By contrast, European armies at this time wriggled instead of marching on their stomachs. As Martin van Creveld remarks of European armies before the nineteenth century: 'In no instance that I have come across is there any question of a force on the move being supplied solely by convoys regularly shuttling between it and its base, and it has even been claimed that the mathematics involved in this kind of operation were too sophisticated for the military commander of the age to tackle'. (van Creveld 1977, p. 25) Although Louis XIV's forces could exceed 100,000 men, he could move them only slowly, and he could not feed them from his own supply lines. Armies had to prey on the local population in order to survive. The Qing armies, by contrast, moved quickly across the vast reaches of the

steppes supported by relay posts which shipped rations to the men and fodder to the horses. The Qing commanders made careful efforts to spare the local population the burdens of military supply, either by having soldiers carry their rations with them, or by giving them money to buy grain at market prices. The real victory of the early Qing rulers was their ability to draw off the resources of a rapidly commercializing economy to serve national defense needs without inflicting excessive damage on the rural economy. The links they exploited between commercial growth and military supply explain why the Chinese empire at its apex led the world in both geographical and demographic size.

Are the Qing figures plausible? We know that figures in published Qing sources are based on detailed archival accounts, because the Qing commanders kept very detailed records of military supplies. Van Creveld's discussion provides only a few quantitative estimates, which emphasize the extreme difficulty of supplying eighteenth-century European armies in the field. In a typical army of 60,000 men and 40,000 horses, the soldiers consumed 120,000 pounds of bread and 60,000 pounds of other food per day, and the horses required a total of 800,000 pounds of fodder per day. Of the total consumption of 980,000 pounds per day, only 120,000 pounds could be stored in magazines or moved in convoys. European armies thus could only be fed as long as they did not stop for too long in one place. Napoleon's Russian campaign was in fact based on careful planning of military supplies, and he knew well that he had to avoid sieges and plan rapid strategic marches. But his most insoluble problem was the provision of fodder for his 250,000 horses. (van Creveld, pp. 40–74)

Rations for Qing troops, by these measures, seem small: an average of 1.08 pounds of bread and noodles and 1.85 ounces of meat per man per day, compared to more than two pounds of bread per day for European soldiers. But these were preliminary figures, to be supplemented by purchases of animal products on the markets after the army's arrival. Mongolian and Manchu soldiers in the Chinese army could get a substantial caloric supply from steppe products like mare's milk, horse's blood, horsemeat, and marmots. (Masson Smith, Jr. 1982). Most important, the enormous grasslands of Mongolia were more than adequate to feed the Qing army's horses. Estimates of the area needed to support a horse for one year vary enormously, for example, from seven acres in tenth-century North China to 25 acres in the Hungarian plain to 120 acres in nineteenth-century Mongolia and Turkestan. (Smith 1991; Lindner 1981; Sinor 1972) In Western Europe seven acres of green fodder could feed one horse for a year, much like North China. (van Creveld p. 34) In any case, the 1.5 million square kilometers (371 million acres) of Mongolian grasslands, which supported 1.15 million horses in 1918, could potentially provide grazing lands for a very large number of horses. Western Europe clearly had no such large pasture lands, and this was the major limitation on its armies' mobility. The Qing in these campaigns achieved an impressive and believable logistical triumph by combining careful exploitation of grassland resources with convoys shipped from the interior.

What allowed this great development of logistical support? The major change in the socio-economic structure of interior China in the eighteenth century was the extensive development of a commercialized agrarian economy on an empire-wide scale. Agrarian specialization, the spread of money, the multiplication of market towns, growing local and interregional trade, the proliferation of brokers, peddlers, and long-distance merchants, all began to knit together the villages and regions of China on a larger scale than ever before. We can test the degree of growing market integration in China at this

time by examining memorials which report the monthly prices of major grains in the 150-odd prefectures of interior China from 1746 to 1911. Correlations between price series from adjacent prefectures are remarkably high, even in the underdeveloped Northwest. (Perdue, in Rawski and Li 1992) Price correlations also define a recognizable marketing structure linking prefectures to each other. The campaigns of 1755–1760 drew most of their grain supplies from Gansu, and the army purchased its supplies on the market. The local effect was to drive prices up by a factor of three, but so far as I know at this point, no major subsistence crisis ensued. Mobilization of the ever-normal granary stocks, plus relief campaigns, combined with the more important impact of the private grain market to ensure regular flows of grain following established marketing links. In this way the establishment of the commercial grain economy of the Northwest served as the foundation for the conquest of Inner Asia.

The Zunghars, by comparison, were severely deprived of food resources. Nomads do not depend primarily on agricultural settlement, but they often combine pastoral and agricultural forms of production. A small population could survive on grassland production alone, but as the state grew, incorporating the oases of Turkestan and the lamaseries of Tibet and Qinghai, it turned more bureaucratic and more dependent on its settled bases. Russian and Chinese supplies through tribute and trade systems became increasingly critical components of the expanding state. The Zunghars replayed the dynamic of a nomadic empire symbiotically using a strengthened Chinese empire as their major resource arena, a repeated pattern seen in the parallel rise of Han and Xiongnu, Tang and Uighur, or Song and Jurchid. Unlike their predecessors, the Zunghars had a second empire (Russia) to prey on. But both the Chinese and Russians manipulated trade and food weapons to lure away allies from the Zunghars, and ultimately, to starve them into submission.

The Muscovite state faced similar problems of provisioning created by the expansion of its military and bureaucracy. In the region south of Moscow in the mid-seventeenth century, it solved them by settling soldiers on newly cleared agricultural lands, creating a series of provincial granary stores, and levying a household grain tax on the region. (Stevens 1995) All seem very analogous to Qing policies, but my current limited and rather chauvinist impression is that the Qing state was much more successful than Muscovy. Russian state provisioning remained almost exclusively military; there seems to have been no concern about sparing the civilian population the burdens of provisioning or with giving it regular relief. The Muscovite grain trade had such a low level of commercialization that market purchases only rarely proved possible. Agricultural yields improved in the southern region, but at the cost of the extension of serfdom. More work is needed to explain why similar imperatives of expanding agrarian states created different means of grain extraction.

Our discussion so far extends beyond personal agency to longer-term structural developments. But it remains rooted in material interests. Explanations to this point invoke only practical reason. But hegemony requires cultural as well as material resources. As the Chinese proverb has it, 'You may conquer the empire on horseback, but you cannot rule it on horseback.' Permanent control of Inner Asia required symbolic as well as material investment.

III. THE HEGEMONY OF INSCRIPTIONS

In the mid-1970s, Bruno Latour, a young French anthropologist, entered a scientific laboratory in the United States. (Latour & Woolgar, 1986; Latour 1987) There he found large numbers of people busily engaged in—writing. They created scientific papers, wrote down numbers seen on laboratory instruments, collected printouts of graphs, and tabulated numbers in charts. Eventually they published and distributed a small fraction of this written material, claiming that these inscriptions represented new ‘discoveries’ of ‘science’ about the ‘natural world’. Latour wanted to understand what beliefs characterized this community and what gave their beliefs such power over outsiders to the laboratory community that they compelled almost irresistible conviction. He concluded that the essence of the process was the mobilization of ‘inscription devices’; the entire array of scientists, technicians, administrators, secretaries, machines, buildings, publishers was aimed at the goal of producing inscribed knowledge. There was nothing mysterious about the process; it was simply a special form of the social production of knowledge.

What if an obstreperous outsider tried to resist the efforts of this community to convince him that they had discovered new facts about the natural world? First he would be shown a scientific paper, clotted with footnotes, charts, numbers, and impenetrable prose. The paper mobilized a community of references to past work and inscriptions obtained from laboratory devices against the questioner. Suppose he refused to believe some of the data cited in the paper? Then he would be shown further instruments of torture. The laboratory devices themselves are brought out: now, if you question their accuracy, you must either learn the technical details of the machinery or build yourself an equivalent machine. At each stage, the cost of resistance rises. If you push your skepticism farther, you will eventually have no choice but to build an entirely new laboratory yourself. Few people have the time, skill, or money to do this. Therefore, scientific communities in a given field, tightly bound by commonly understood rules, common training, and investment in costly laboratories, almost always achieve effortless domination over lay outsiders. For Latour, the ‘superiority of science’ lies not in special rules of scientific method (no specific rules can be devised that are not routinely violated in scientific practice), superior intellect of the scientific researcher (lone ranger scientific heroes are a media myth), or in unusually lawlike behavior of the natural world as opposed to the human. It lies in the near monopoly of inscription devices by the researchers and their consistent deployment to achieve domination over resisters.

Latour’s approach, part of a school studying the social production of scientific knowledge, has, unsurprisingly, generated heated controversy. (Woolgar 1988; Bunge 1991) Without wading into the midst of these debates, I return from this remote intellectual territory with a few nuggets of insight that may be of use to students of agrarian empires. Latour’s metaphors are explicitly military:

By and large, technoscience is part of a war machine and should be studied as such. . . . To fully grasp it, it is necessary to consider more generally the *mobilization* of resources, whereby I mean the ability to make a configuration of a maximal number of allies act as a single whole in one place . . . Most technoscience is concerned with facilitating this mobilization of resources. (Latour, 172; emphasis in original)

Latour gains intellectual leverage by applying the military terminology of combat, strategy, deployment, and organization, to the seemingly pacific terrain of the quest for

truth. Thus he produces a shock of estrangement, a necessary maneuver to uproot us from unexamined assumptions about the heavily science-laden culture we live in. Here I repatriate the military metaphors of Latour back into historical terrain in order to produce an analogous shock. I want to demonstrate that military conquest was not sufficient for Chinese domination of Central Asia. Long-term hegemony over the region depended on convincing both Han and non-Han subjects that the conquest was 'natural', foreordained, and irresistible. The Chinese state's military capacity could dominate the nomads in the short term, but it did not have decisive long-term superiority. Where the bureaucratic empires of China always had superiority was in their inscription apparatuses. The vast flow of written communications from the field to the capital and back tied together the Manchu, Han, and Mongolian servants of the Qing in a network of messages which presupposed a common exposure to a written language. They need not have been literate in classical Chinese: many official documents were issued in both Chinese and Manchu, some in Mongolian as well. It was the predominance of the written language, not the Chinese language in particular, that ensured Qing hegemony over the steppe.

The nomads, by contrast, relied primarily on oral communication, in, for example, the frequent conferences between Galdan and his allies. The unreliability of the Zunghar coalition was a result of its personal nature: the various tribal chiefs among the Oirats shared little of a common heritage in written form. The legacy of Chingis Khan was too distant to unite them. Oral traditions had faded. A Khan succeeded if his material gains in battle attracted followers to share the loot; but if he lost once, they dispersed.

The power of writing is demonstrated by the efforts of Central Asians to resist it. To resist the scientist you must build your own lab; to resist the Chinese bureaucratic empire you must design your own script. Almost all of the major steppe empires from the Turks of the seventh century forward created their own writing systems. The Turkish Orkhon inscriptions, the Xixia kingdom's script, the Uighur and Jurchen scripts, the Mongolian script, and finally the written Manchu language were techniques used to assure an autonomous governmental structure, regularize communications, and hold off the encroachments of the settled Chinese. We should not see the development of these scripts as the natural outcome of a general process of 'sedentarization' or assimilation. The goal of writing the Central Asian languages was not to become more Chinese, but to enforce the boundary. Here, of course, was the contradiction: how can you use the enemies' weapons to fight him off? This contradiction was faced in different ways by all of China's East Asian neighbors.

Some states adopted the Chinese character system, but created new characters for their language, like Vietnamese *nom* and the still mainly indecipherable Tangut script. The family history of Chingis Khan survives in a Mongolian version transcribed with Chinese characters used for their phonetic values only, as does the early Japanese poetry collection, the *Manyōshū*. A more successful approach in Central Asia was to adapt the syllabic script of Sogdian, the prime trading language of Central Asia in the medieval period, to the Manchu and Mongolian language. But devising a script did not create a literary tradition. Mongolian writings remained mainly family chronicles or biographies, private writings for personal genealogical use, not means of communication of a bureaucratic state. Manchu survived until the fall of the Qing as a translation language, but not a living scriptural tradition after the eighteenth century. The overwhelming weight of the Chinese classical tradition embedded in its script encompassed its rivals or pushed them to the periphery.

Note that the Qing state had the same advantage over its native Han peasant population. During the major uprisings of the mid-nineteenth century, the Manchu dynasty saved itself by enrolling the literate Han degree-holders to organize the local militia groups that fought off the mass Taiping armies. What held them together was their common background in the classical Chinese tradition, their school and family ties, and their mastery of the classical script. Once again, the Taiping rebels, too, tried to devise their own, similar script to counter the classical hegemony. They also experimented with wall-paintings and popular drama to bypass the scriptural communication system entirely. Communist party organizers used both tactics during the resistance war of the 1930s: scriptorial simplification and the use of drama and visual messages.⁹

Where the mid-Qing surpassed all its predecessors was in the density of its communication network. Even though the total size of the bureaucracy was not much bigger than 500 years earlier, the quantity of written communication was much larger, and constantly expanding. Beatrice Bartlett's magnificent new study demonstrates in great detail the intricate functioning of only one piece of this gigantic inscription machinery: the Grand Council. (Bartlett 1991) The inscription apparatus included officials, record keepers, scribes, paper makers, ink manufacturers, the buildings of the Forbidden City and ancillary institutions, and a whole array of artisans: special craftsmen to design the sandalwood boxes, the gold brocade, the vermilion ink, and stones for the emperor and his advisors.

This machinery created a nearly insurmountable obstacle for illiterate peoples who wanted to carve out autonomous cultural space. Message-passing was not merely a tool for transmitting orders to military conquerors. It aimed to create an all-encompassing symbolic space that reinforced the inevitability of Qing domination. In the final stage, paper inscriptions were transferred to stone, engraved in giant stele all over the country, demonstrating the universality of the imperial will which reached to every temple, school, government office, and *pailou* (memorial arch) in the country. The Qing rulers covered the country with multilingual inscriptions in Chinese, Manchu, Mongolian, Tibetan, Uighur Turkish, and other languages. They expanded on the precedent set by the last Yuan emperor, who ordered the construction of the famous multilingual arch at the Juyongguan gate of the Great Wall. (Waldron 1990, p. 146) Thus they reinforced their claim to encompass all cultural systems under one universal emperor with many faces.

The Qing mobilized other cultural battalions. Monumental architecture built in mid-Qing Beijing included Tiananmen gate in front and the Tibetan Dagoba behind the Imperial Palace. Multilingual lexicons asserted the Qing ambition to penetrate the knowledge of remote territories. Ethnography, another colonialist tool, flourished in the eighteenth century in the guise of encyclopedias of the customs of conquered non-Han peoples. It continues today in China in the guise of anthropology and minority studies. Anthropology is perpetrated by Han Chinese on minorities, but is not reflexively applied to the Han themselves. (Neither, of course, until very recently, has Western ethnography been turned back on Western society itself, as Latour has done.) (Clifford and Marcus 1986)

How distinctive was the Qing practice? I cannot say for sure at this point, but I have the impression that the Tsarist state used writing for bureaucratic and military communication, but seldom for cultural domination. Its presence in Siberia and Inner Asia was in the form of isolated garrison towns, and it did not aim to penetrate culturally the surrounding peoples until the nineteenth century. Its control was more coercive

than hegemonic. But this topic remains to be investigated comparatively. (cf. Slezkine 1994)

After the troops had left, the historians and archivists moved in. Hegemony over the past was the final act of naturalization of the contingency of conquest. Again, Latour's view of science can be applied here. While scientists are pushing the envelope, they are constructing new facts, interpreting readings that are inconsistent and ambiguous. After consensus is reached, however, the newly constructed 'fact' is inscribed as unquestionable, placed in a tradition of discovery, and—tragically for historians—nearly all traces of groping, argument, errors, wild surmises, and failed experiments, are erased. The new fact or theory now looks like a natural outcome, obvious to everyone. Those who resisted it now look deluded. The new knowledge is reproduced by being taught to beginning science students. If they are not 'stood up against a wall and shot', in Barrington Moore's brutal version of the reproduction of knowledge, they are at least forced to wade through very ponderous textbooks. Thus the juggernaut of science presents its relentless accumulation of knowledge.

Historians of science have, with much effort, succeeded in uncovering many of the eradicated paths. They pore through lab notes, diaries, unpublished memoirs, and oral histories in order to recapture the contingency that existed before the 'right' solution was found. They must struggle constantly against the Whig interpretation, endemic to the history of science more than any other historical field, which follows the inevitable unfolding of a path of reason.

The historian of China has an equivalent task before him. Nationalist historiography, Marxist or anti-Marxist, imposes the same Whig interpretation on the expansion of the empire. The conquest is made to seem inevitable, the resisters are turned into 'bandits', the boundaries are seen as sacred, the incorporated peoples as inescapable parts of modern China. This process of naturalization, however, did not begin with the twentieth-century formulation of modern Chinese nationalism. The eighteenth-century Qianlong emperor gave his nationalist successors a great head start. He had compiled collections of documents glorifying his Ten Great Campaigns (*Shiquan*). The imperially sponsored collection, *Pingding Zhunge'er Fanglüe* (Record of the Campaigns to Pacify the Zunghars), which covers the three Central Asia campaigns from 1716 to 1760, comprises 171 Chinese volumes (*juan*), 3000 pages in reprint, or approximately 1,400,000 characters. This collection is only the middle stratum of a huge documentary iceberg. At its base are the voluminous archival sources, and at its tip is the most widely read survey of the campaigns, Wei Yuan's *Shengwuji* (Record of Sacred Military Victories), and its popularized versions in movies, novels, and comic books today.

Inscriptions, scientific or historical, do not survive unless they are repeatedly cited, rewritten and incorporated into other accounts. Knowledge as a social process requires further transmission to other communities through the generations. New communities will inevitably change the message, misread it or deliberately distort it for their purposes. Other things equal, however, where contested accounts exist, the dominant one will usually be the one that mobilizes the largest community of literate people. Other versions will be relegated to folklore, underground traditions, or hidden transcripts.

James Scott has argued strongly against acceptance of the hegemony thesis. Even though a conqueror appears to have monopolized the space for symbolic expression in public, subordinated peoples always find, he argues, places 'off stage' or underground to express the 'hidden transcript' of resistance to domination. (Scott 1990) Even though the Qing rulers crushed the Zunghar state, exterminated the population, eradicated their

ethnic identity, and made strenuous efforts to broadcast the legitimacy of the conquest, we should not assume that all dissident voices disappeared. It is better to view Qing colonial activity as a hegemonic *project* with incomplete results than as a successful effort at total monopolization of cultural space. In fact, in the late nineteenth century, Russian visitors to Mongolia discovered folk poetry that praised the heroism of the Zunghar princes who resisted Qing rule. (Vladimirtsov 1927) Was this underground tradition kept alive for two centuries, or renovated in the late nineteenth century shortly before Mongolia regained its independence? The Zunghar resistance and its memory, in either case, was available as a cultural resource in opposition to the Chinese continual reaffirmation of the legitimacy of conquest. Recovering their history separate from the dominant Chinese tradition requires innovative methods: the use of folk poetry, oral tradition, or ethnography, for example. But the sheer bulk of the Chinese records alone allows many possibilities for reading against the record, multivocality, and deconstruction.

CONCLUSION: THREE VIEWS OF THE CONQUEST

We opened with a narrative sketch of the clash of aggressive imperial leaders. Secondly, we examined their necessary dependence on social and economic resources, interpreting the outcome as the result of longer-term processes transcending individual agency. Finally, we found inscription processes, sometimes used consciously, but often acting as unintended consequences.

Stephen Jay Gould cites the example of the panda's thumb as proof that natural evolution does not always lead to predetermined, functionally efficient directions. (Gould, 1980) It contains byproducts, evolutionary leftovers of particular contingencies of time and place. The great Chinese bureaucratic system, rationalized to its highest extent in the course of eighteenth-century military campaigns, survives to this day as one of the great incubi of China's modern development. But if it is a historical creation, its end as well as its beginning is delimited. And all historical resources, monumental or literary, are repeatedly subjected to reworking—witness the transformations of Tiananmen from 1644 to 1989. In a modern world of collapsing empires, revived ethnic identities, trans-national and sub-national challenges open new possibilities of diversity or tragic conflict. Rereading the past alerts us to the open-ended character of social processes. Hence the importance of paths not taken.

Acknowledgements: Versions of this article were presented at the Columbia University Seminar on Modern China, the Agrarian Studies seminar at Yale University, the History seminar at the University of Kansas, and the Conference on the Chinese Military at George Washington University. I am grateful for comments offered by the participants, especially Beatrice Bartlett, Sugata Bose, James Scott, Jonathan Spence, Carl Strikwerda, Hans van de Ven, Frederic Wakeman, jr., Joanna Waley-Cohen, and Donald Worster. I would also like to express appreciation for support from my colleagues in the History Faculty and Science, Technology, Society Program, and the Dean of the School of Humanities and Social Science, Philip S. Khoury.

NOTES

1. The chapter on the post-Mongol period in Denis Sinor's bibliography of Central Asia is entitled 'L'époque de la décadence'. (Sinor, 1963)
2. The resurrection of an autonomous Mongolian state in the twentieth century only partially disproves this tendency, since Mongolian historiography very closely follows the Russian Marxist-nationalist line. But it does have interesting variations, e.g. on the interpretation of the significance of Chingis Khan, and an even stronger anti-Chinese tone than in Russian historiography after the Sino-Soviet split.
3. Cf. a similar approach to the history of the Chinese revolution by Joseph Escherick (1995).
4. I do not mean to rule out other factors as less important. Others which deserve greater treatment are disease transmission, commercial integration, military technology, and religious-cultural change.
5. Dates are given in the following format: Western year/ Chinese lunar month/lunar day.
6. Our best annual statistics on the total size of the Chinese population cover the period from 1776 to 1850, when population registers were based on baojia records instead of tax rolls. (Ho 1959) Paradoxically, the less useful the baojia became for the imperial officials, the more useful they became for historians, because of the removal of incentives to distort the numbers.
7. Chingis Khan, of course, conquered both the steppe and China, but was never rooted in China. By the 1250s, his legacy had split into the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) based in settled China, and a separate entity centered on Karakorum in the steppe. (Barfield, 1989, 187–229)
8. One shi is approximately 110 liters of grain; one jin is approximately 0.6 kilos.
9. The recently discovered women's syllabic script of Hunan is another example: resistance to patriarchy by creating a separate written and oral domain of culture. (Silber 1994)

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Xizang Shehui Kexueyuan, 1990) compiles a huge amount of documentary sources. Chiba (1986), is an excellent popular Japanese account based on these two sources. Zhungeer Shilue Bianxiezu (1985, 1986) selects materials from the Qingshilu related to the Zunghars, and provides a short account based on these materials.

Recent Chinese studies include: Lai Fushun (1984), which analyzes military supply in all of Qianlong's ten great campaigns; Luo Yunzhi (1983) and Ma Ruheng & Ma Dazheng (1984). Other papers of mine (1989, 1990, 1991) examine other aspects of the campaigns. These will be incorporated in a forthcoming study of the expansion of the Qing empire into Central Asia.

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THE BIOGRAPHY OF ÖNDÖR GEGEEN

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One of the prominent figures in the history of Mongolia during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was the First Bogd Javzandamba Khutagt Luvsandambiijantsan, or in other words Zanabazar, also known among the people as Öndör Geegen. There is a legend: Avtai Sain Khaan personally worshipped the reincarnation of the Javzundarnat, and said the following, ‘in order to spread Buddhism, and to render all living beings happy in our Khalkh Mongol country, (I) would like to invite you, Javzundarnat Lama’. To which the latter replied, ‘I would like to go to the country of the Khalkh Mongols. But, as I have grown old, this time I can not go there. In the future, after finding a body I will come.’

Avtai Sain Khaan also happened to put a mark, considering it a good omen, on the spot where he had met with the Dalai Lama Sodnomjamts. Many years later, the TüsHEET Khan Gombodorj, searching for a new place to settle, came across a white bitch giving birth to puppies in a place called *Ikh Bulag Usan Züil* where his ancestor Avtai Sain Khaan had put a mark in commemoration of his meeting with the Dalai Lama. Considering this event a good omen he (i.e. Gombodorj) built his tent there, and on the 25th day of the last month of autumn in the year of the Pig (1635) a second extraordinary and good-looking son was born into the family of the TüsHEET Khan Gombodorj, the descendant of the Golden Lineage of Chingis Khaan. When the child was born a yellow light was emanating from his body, a rainbow of many colours appeared in the sky, and flowers of nine kinds grew on the spot of his birth. The place hence was named *Yösön Züil* (i.e. nine kinds). There is also a legend that a white flower appeared on the northern side of the brazier as high as its pillars in the *ger* of the khaan Gombodorj. The fact that Zanabazar was born in the year that coincided with the 50th anniversary of the establishment of Erdene Zuu was a really auspicious event. Holy Zanabazar was the great-great-grandchild of Avtai Khaan. His father Gombodorj, a sharp-minded and courageous man, had a good knowledge of religious as well as state affairs. His mother Khandjamts was an attractive noblewoman and a good mother with a mild disposition, fair in heart, and pious. Born to a khaan father and a queen (*khatan*) mother, the boy had distinguished fair skin, beautiful features, and beautiful, wide eyes. He became the joy of eyes, and happiness of hearts. At that time the queen mother was lacking milk, which came from the breast of a sixteen year old maid who was ashamed of it. The queen, having noticed this, said to her, ‘Do not be ashamed, when a noble woman gives birth to a child, sometimes it happens that another woman’s breast fills with milk.’ She

washed the maid's breast with mineral water (*rashaan*), applied some delicious stuff, and gave the baby boy to suck it. So the maid became the adoptive mother of the holy one. Sholoi Setsen Khan on hearing that an extraordinarily good looking boy was born into the family of Gombodorj Khaan was joyful and sent an iron cradle. The boy was placed into the precious cradle with three iron straps, sent by the holy Setsen Khan, and incense and offerings were continuously presented to the god day and night. One day when suddenly three *Azar* (a sort of wise teacher) appeared in the dwelling, the boy, on seeing them, became joyous and struggled towards them. The *Azar* disappeared as suddenly as they had appeared. Holy Sholoi Setsen Khan on hearing this event came and presented the boy with his own title of *gegeen* (holy). From that time on the boy of the TüsHEET Khaan Gombodorj was called the holy boy. As he grew his mind was also becoming clear. At the age of three while circling his *ger* while holding on to its ropes he began to utter everyday Indian and Tibetan spells such as Maani, Bazarvani, Jambalt-sanjid and Gandanlhamjaa. While playing he built monasteries and carried out religious ceremonies. In this way he was different from other children. In the year of the Tiger, in 1638, at the age of four he was ordained as a *genen* and given the name of Ishdorj or Zanabazar by *mergen toin* Jambal. At that time, when the great magic of his mind became obvious to the people, both monastic and lay, a messenger was sent to Lhasa, in snowy Tibet, to ask for a divination from the Banchin Bogd (Panchen Lama) and the Dalai Lama, who replied that the 15th reincarnation of Javzundarnat, the compiler of the history of Buddhism from the times of Buddha, had come [into the body of the boy].

In the year of the Rabbit, in 1639, when G. Zanabazar was five years old, in a place called Shireet Tsagaan Lake of the Mongol *els* (present day Bürd sum in Övörkhangai aimag), which is situated between the Big (*Ikh*) and the Small (*Baga*) Mongol mountains, the Khalkh Mongols gathered to enthrone the Bogd Javzandamba Khutagt, their religious leader, and set up the palace of the Bogd for the first time, which was to become the foundation of the present day city of Ulaanbaatar. On behalf of the *bensa бүрүлгүү* (a high ranking reincarnation) Luvsandanzanjanjantsanjants, Zanabazar was given the ordained name of Luvsandambijantsan. The first ever Danshig celebration to offer the Bat-orshil dedicated to the enthronement of holy Zanabazar took place in 1640 in the vicinity of Shireet Tsagaan Lake, where the palace of the Khutagt was set up.¹ This celebration gave rise to such celebrations as Doloон khushuu danshig, and Arvan zasgiin that came down to our time in the form of the state *naadam* (festival). The academician Natsagdorj wrote about that celebration: 'When Zanabazar was inaugurated as the first Bogd, it is interesting that for the first in history the people of the seven Khalkh *hoshuun* (banners) gathered together to perform the grand ceremony. This event had very important implications for the political life of Mongolia. From that time on Zanabazar became the most influential figure in the political and religious life of Mongolia.'

On the occasion of the enthronement, the TüsHEET Khaan gave Zanabazar 108 households headed by young men as *shav'* (disciples) which were to become the foundation of the *Ikh shav'* of the Bogd. The palace of Öndör Gegeen himself, as was mentioned before, became the foundation of the present day capital city. The hearth palace (*gal golomt örgöö*) of the Mongolian state that had its origin in the times of Chinggis Khaan was then transported from the Soyombo walls (i.e. walls with the soyombo letters inscribed on them) of Erdene Zuu, and set up to the west of the palace of the Khutagt, and began to be referred to as the Western Palace. The Western Palace had been

transported from one place to another more than thirty times along with the palace of the Khutagt. When the palace of the Khutagt developed into Ikh Khüree on the bank of the Tuul river in the valley of Khan Uul (mountain), the Western Palace stood to the west of the Yellow Palace of the Bogd, the political and religious centre, until the 1930s. This shows that the activities of Zanabazar encompassed not only the religious but the political sphere as well.

Zanabazar from his very childhood was curious to learn new things. He went to Tibet, the motherland of Buddhism, and paid a visit to the Dalai Lama and the Banchin Bogd (Panchen Lama). There he learned to perfection the eastern sciences of the sages. On returning home from Dashlhumbe, Öndör Gegeen Zanabazar led a busy life dedicating his time both to his education and works. In 1653, during a Danshig celebration in Erdene Zuu, the Khalkh khans, nobles and ordinary people who came there to participate in the celebration praised the works of Öndör Gegeen with admiration, and proposed to build a special workshop for him. The workshop in the form of temple, referred to as Dubkhan (working building), or Tövkhön, was set up in a place called Khangai Khaany Shiveet Ulaan, in the Khangai mountain range, which is one of the rare places in Mongolia, renowned for its beauty and landscape. There, unique works on literature, philosophy as well as works of art were created. Öndör Gegeen, while working in Tövkhön, did a lot of things to develop Mongolian state protocols, language and culture. He also adjusted the rules (*deg yos*) of Buddhist ceremonies for the Mongolian context, changed the shape of summer and winter hats of monks, and initiated the *ikh yörööl*, the *khural* and the *maidar* ceremonies. It is possible to classify his works into two main categories, namely those of literary works and art. Öndör Gegeen, while working in Tövkhön, spent more than thirty years creating the soyombo, the symbol of Mongolian independence which later became the national emblem of Mongolia, and the soyombo script which depicts the sun and the moon, symbols passed down from the first Mongolian state of the Hün-nü (Xiongnu). He accomplished these works in 1686. The soyombo, the national emblem of Mongolia, is a wonderful work combining Mongolian history, culture and *arga bileg* (wisdom and method). It is a work that will not fade away in the future.

Zanabazar was a unique artist who created many classic works such as sculptures, pictures and embossed figures that were the representations of philosophy, beauty and compassion. Among his creations are such famous ones as the statue of the Ochir Dari, which is the main deity of Khüree, the Maidar, the Janraisag carved of sandalwood, the five principle Buddhas, the Green Tara, the Twenty-one Taras, the Ayush, and the Ochir Dari with a pearl set on its forehead. The latter was in Makhgal Erdene Zuu in Baruun Khüree. In his biography it is written that, besides those already mentioned, there are many other statues that he made of pure gold. The Hero of Mongolia and the People's Artist Tsültem wrote that, 'the first Khalkh Bogd Javzandamba Khutagt Zanabazar was a genius, a man who is one of the few people who have created in their lives unique works that would be remembered for a thousand years'. Art experts rightfully evaluate Zanabazar's Green Tara as a unique piece of work equal to famous works of the Enlightenment. In this sense Zanabazar managed to bring Mongolian art to the world level.

Öndör Gegeen, while creating his literary as well as artistic works used the *arga bileg* (method and wisdom) to defy the five poisons of the mind: desire, envy, anger, ignorance and miserliness. The works of the Gegeen were an expression of a pure mind to overcome all obstacles and bad things, the praise of belief and beauty and the power for a

human being to purify himself/herself. Öndör Gegeen created all kinds of artistic things that were useful to people and combined art with progressive ideas.

According to the order of the Qing emperor Enkh-Amgalan (the Kangxi emperor), 100,000 *lan* (taels) of silver were allocated for the building of a uniquely beautiful monastery, without equal in the world, which showed respect to the perfect mind, unique talent and popularity of Öndör Gegeen. A location for the building site was chosen on the bank of the Iven river that runs through the slope of the picturesque Büren Khan mountain, in the territory of the Tüsheet Khan aimag. The monastery was built between 1726 and 1736 and named Amarbayasgalant. Rare objects such as his mantle made of eighty black fox skins and embroidered with pearls are kept in the palace-museum of the Bogd Khaan.

Öndör Gegeen personally participated in the building of many monasteries and other fine buildings. In doing so, he paid attention to the creation and development of the national style of the Mongol *ger* and tents. For example, the style of the main pagoda in Ikh Khüree, called Battsagaan, that he created, was to become the style used by later fine buildings in Mongolia.

The art works by Öndör Gegeen, which can be described as miracles of intellect and creativity, have been admired from generation to generation. Until now his works have been endangered twice. Firstly at the end of the seventeenth century during a time of disorder and wars, and then in the 1930s during the organized destruction. During the latter massacre more than 30,000 people were killed, nearly 900 monasteries that had been built from the start of the seventeenth century with great capital, labour and creativity were destroyed, and works of art by Öndör Gegeen lost forever.

It is important to investigate and to draw the correct conclusions concerning the reasons for the Ööld-Khalkh² conflict that split Khalkh Mongolia. It would be convenient to assume that Russia, who wanted to split Mongolia from within and take over its territory, as well as Tibet, which was drawn to the conflict due to the disagreement between the yellow and red sects (of Buddhism), were both involved in it.

The 1670s and 1680s were a period when both the internal and external positions of Mongolia were extremely unstable and troublesome. At that time unity and independence were the priority, and the encroaching danger worried not only the sages but all Mongols. We also should not deny the efforts of the khaans, lords and khutagt (reincarnations) who tried to regulate the problem without human losses. One indication of this is the meeting of Khalkh and Oirat lords held in 1686 in Zag Baidargiin Khüren Belchir (present day Zag sum in Bayankhongor aimag). Although the meeting was held with the joint purpose of consolidating unity and independence, and respecting the state and rules (*tör yos*), it is a pity that afterwards they did not stick to their decisions. From research it is seen that the activities of the Ööld Galdan Boshigt, who wanted to conquer the Khalkh Mongols with armed force, were directed against the Tüsheet Khan who had always headed Khalkh Mongols. The leading position of the Tüsheet Khan was a kind of law approved by all. It was not just a coincidence that the Tüsheet Khans had been responsible for keeping the hearth of the Mongol state inherited from Chingis Khan. The struggle began when the tradition was neglected and central Khalkh was attacked. In February 1688, in the year of the Dragon, the Ööld Galdan Boshigt, supported by Tibet, which handed him a sword to fight in the name of the religion of Zonkhava [Tsongkhapa, founder of the Gelugpa sect of Buddhism], attacked the territory of the Khalkh Zasagt Khan with his 30,000 troops thus unleashing a war. His troops, after defeating the troops of the Zasagt Khan, moved on passing

through the valley of Sharga Azargyn Nuruu, and dispersed the subjects of the TüsHEET Khan and the Zasagt Khan. During that disorder the subjects of the Zasagt Khan split into several groups and migrated to such places such as the southern slope of the Altai Mountains, Höh Nuur in China, the land of the Muu Myangan (a banner in Inner Mongolia), and Russia. When 2,000 households of the TüsHEET Khan, consisting of 40,000 people, along with 100,000 subjects of the Setsen Khan migrated to Inner Mongolia, the Khalkh lands came face to face with the danger of abandonment. At that time Öndör Gegeen Zanabazar, who was working in Tövkhön, took his shav' (disciples) along with 300 inhabitants of the palace of the TüsHEET Khan, and set out for the land of his paternal uncles in Inner Mongolia. On their way they went through the pastures of the Orkhon and the Tuul rivers, passed the Yöröö, the Aya and the Sharlon rivers, then climbed the Khentii Mountains, discovered the springs of Yöröö, Minj and Est, then spent some time at Khagiin Khar lake and Ögöömör and finally reached their destination. In September 1689, a meeting was held by Khalkh Mongol khaans, khutagt and noyons in a place called Ar Elstei, in the southern part of Sunid aimag, Inner Mongolia. At the meeting it was agreed to think of the possibility of accepting the protection of a foreign country in order to overcome the danger, to safeguard the people and the country, to gather the scattered Mongols, and to protect the language and traditions. At that time, the proposal of Öndör Gegeen to rely on a state (*tör*) that will decline, rather than one which will rise [in power] was approved, and the decision to submit to the Manchu Qing was ratified by the Doloonnuur Meeting in 1691. So began a sad history of losing independence and becoming part of a foreign country. The main reason that led to this situation was the internal struggle of the Mongols which began with the Oirat attack and the dispersal of the Khalkh Mongols. Although Öndör Gegeen had to leave his native land temporarily and to escape with his people from warfare, nevertheless it is a historical truth that he dedicated his body and soul for the unification and well-being of the Mongols. Until recently, under the influence of the wrong ideology, we were slandering Öndör Gegeen, being deprived of the power to objectively appreciate and evaluate his unique works of art and celebrate them. The English Mongolist Bawden said that nowhere in the world had Zanabazar been slandered except in Mongolia. I think we ought to take his words into consideration. Was it possible to gather scattered Mongols without resorting to a foreign country? What would have happened, had we followed Russia, as some nobles proposed? Many questions like these are waiting for an objective answer. Of course, if indeed there was no way but to rely on a foreign country, it was an extremely important task to choose which country to follow. The proposal of Öndör Gegeen to choose the Qing, after he had contemplated the religion and the characteristics of the Qing state, was accepted and a separate pact was made with Enh-Amgalan with the intention of saving Mongols.

Öndör Gegeen not only personally directed works related to printing various books, but also ordered the Ganjuur to be gilded, wooden moulds to be carved for such sutras as Jadamba, Sundui, Banzragch and Altan Gerel. He also created a collection, *Maniin Buteeliin Gүн Uvidas*, written on philosophical and linguistic topics.

In his biography it is written that he said: '(I) have an intention to make people live in happiness', and wrote a work entitled *Janlovtsogzolma*, also known as *Adistediin Deediig Örshöögch*, in 1696 with the purpose of eliminating the mutual vengeance between the Khalkh and Ööld that began in 1670. The book became a call to Mongols to live in unity and peace. From that time on the conflict between the Khalkh and the Ööld calmed down and has never re-occurred since.

Besides his works of art there are also precious and rare objects related to him. Just to mention some of them: The Jadambaa Sutra, compiled by the philosopher Nagarjuna in the second century BC and written on the leaves of Dala tree, presented to Öndör Gegeen by the 5th Dalai Lama Agvaanlubsanjamts (1617–82). This sutra is kept in the Central Library, in the fund of rare books. A hat, made of the leaves of Sandalwood glued together, was given to Öndör Gegeen Zanabazar by the Banchin Bogd in 1678. It is kept in the Museum of the Bogd Khaan. A chair carved from ebony with inlaid precious stones and mirrors, which was presented by the Qing court. The chair is in the museum of the Bogd Khaan. Beads made of *zurgaadai* (a type of wood) that he personally used are kept in Tövkhön, his workshop.

One of a pair of boots that Zanabazar wore in his childhood is kept in one of the monasteries in Dundgov' aimag. It has long been said that this boot belonged to Zanabazar. It had been kept by a lama called Ranjamba Dambiinyam from West Choir until the 1930s. Afterwards, till the 1990s, it was kept by a lama called Danzanjamba who gave it to a newly established monastery in Tsagaan Delger sum where it is kept now. This boot is one of the rare objects that were used once by Öndör Gegeen himself.

A tree named Norovbanzad which was planted by Öndör Gegeen stands out as a single tall tree among a bunch of trees growing on a small island on the left bank side of the Orkhon river. The island is located 5 km north of Khar-khorin sum in Övörkhangai aimag.

HOW ZANABAZAR WAS RAISED TO BE THE FIRST BOGD, AND HOW THE PALACE OF THE KHUTAGT WAS BUILT

Zanabazar, the second son of the Khalkh TüsHEET Khan Gombodorj, was raised to be the first Bogd, the religious leader of Mongolian Buddhism. His palace, Shar Büsin Ord, was built in the year of the Rabbit in 1639. Shireet Tsagaan lake of the Mongol *els* (sands) which is situated between the Big and the Small Mongol mountains, which are referred to as the umbilical cord of the Mongol lands, is the place where the foundation of the present day Ulaanbaatar, the capital city, was first laid.³

The pattern of the town of Shar Büs, the palace of the first Bogd, resembled that of a *khot ail* (encampment) with a monastery-palace that looked like a huge *ger* in the centre, surrounded by *ger*-shaped pagodas and nomadic dwellings. As the palace was surrounded by a yellow protection fence it was called Shar Büsin Ord (the Palace with Yellow Protection). The reason why Shireet Tsagaan lake of the golden yellow Mongol *els* was chosen as the place for building the palace is related to the historical tradition of governance as well as to ecological considerations. This place is situated in the valley of the Orkhon river where a political and religious centre has existed from the times when the first states emerged in Mongolia. The Big and the Small Mongol mountains, as well as the lake appear in legends and are believed to have their lords. These locations have been worshiped and respected by local people from long ago. This place is the historical cradle of the culture of the Orkhon valley and is situated in the territory of a banner of the Khalkh TüsHEET Khan, who had perpetuated the state tradition of the Golden Lineage of Chinggis Khaan. Shireet Tsagaan lake, where the foundation of the present day capital city was first laid, is the cradle of the Golden Lineage. The lake and the surroundings are a really picturesque place that contains all of the beauties of the Mongol land. One of the famous representatives of the Mongolian learned monks,

Agvaanchultemjamts (victimized during the 1930s on political charges), who was also known among people as Nomgony Dar-ekh lamtan, in his book entitled *Baruun Khüreenii Tüükh* described Tsagaan lake and its surroundings as the umbilical cord, which has the property of a golden dragon, of the Mongol land. This land is not only a beautiful place, but also has a rich historical and cultural heritage to be investigated and studied. This is a land which has so many place names that contain the word Mongol. Although there are some places here and there that bear the name of Mongol, nevertheless nowhere else does one comes across this name so frequently. Because of this, the above-mentioned place might be very interesting in the study of the etymology of the word 'Mongol'. It is important to make scientific proposals or conclusions concerning this matter. In 1993 a memorial pagoda was erected on the former foundation of the palace, on behalf of Bürd sum, Övörkhangaï aimag, near the Shireet Tsagaan lake that had served as the centre of political centralization since the palace of the First Bogd Javzandamba Khutagt was established there. The lake is located in the territory of the former shav' of Öndör Gegeen (the otog of Bökh Lama) in Tüsheet khan, present day Bürd sum in Övörkhangaï aimag. The Big and the Small Mongol mountains, covered with pleasant smelling juniper, and the nearby lake have been respected by local people as the place where the palace of Öndör Gegeen was once established and ceremonies held. Juniper, being believed to be consecrated by Öndör Gegeen himself, has also been used in various ceremonies of purification held in Erdene Zuu, Ikh Khüree, Gandan monastery or in private households. On the northern slope of the Big Mongol mountain there is a stone which was used as an incense-burner by Öndör Gegeen where he himself, people say, burnt incense and consecrated the land. The local people currently refer to the lake as Shireet Tsagaan. This coincides what is described in Erdeniin Erikh, an important historical source, according to which Tsagaan lake was named Shireet Tsagaan after Öndör Gegeen was enthroned.⁴ Although the palace of the Javzandamba Khutagt was established at the lake, nevertheless it was a nomadic establishment. The role of political centre passed to the palace, which did not stay in one place permanently. It used to move along the vast valleys of the Orkhon and the Tuul rivers, according to the traditions of nomadic people. In this way the palace moved more than thirty times, stopping in such places as Usan seer, Tamir, Jargalant, Iven river, Ugtaal, Burgaltai, Sögnögör, Terelj, Uliastai, Khüi mandal, Khuntsal, Üdleg, Ögöömör, Selbe and so forth.

The reason why the palace was constantly on the move can be explained in the following way. On the one hand, moving from one astrologically determined place to another while choosing the best and building tents were considered to be joyous events that would enhance the bravery and *khiimori* (good luck, good fortune) of Mongols and wake up the spirits of both humans and cattle. On the other hand, moving was a form of culture related to the Mongolian traditional life style. Internal conflicts, for example, the one between the Khalkh and the Oirats caused the palace to move many times, sometimes as far as the land of Inner Mongolia. As the palace was continuously expanding, it is observed in this respect that the sites of temporary locations were usually chosen along the routes of trade and international communications. In spite of the fact that the palace was on the move, important political activities continued to be carried out at Shireet Tsagaan. For example, in 1772, 130 years after the first Danshig naadam was celebrated in 1640, a meeting of the four Khalkh aimags was held where the permission was granted to the *shav'* (disciples) of the Bogd to move without restriction in the territories of the four Khalkh aimags. This shows that the lake was continuing to be a

place for important political activities. Shireet Tsagaan lake is also an interesting place from historical as well as geographical points of view. It has been the centre of Mongolia since the first Mongolian states emerged and land became a possession. It is the cradle (*ölgii nutag*) of the TüsHEET Khans who always had a leading place in Mongolian politics. By establishing the palace of the Javzandamba Khutagt, the foundation of Ulaanbaatar was laid, and the palace has perpetuated its urbanizing character ever since. If firstly the palace had predominantly a religious character, gradually its political character dominated. Let me tell you now about one important historical event which happened at Shireet Tsagaan lake.

When the Örgöö (palace), hearth of the Mongolian state, was transported from Erdene Zuu inside whose walls with pagodas it had been kept, and set up on the western (respectful) side of the palace of the Khutagt, the former became to be referred to as Baruun Örgöö (Western Palace). Baruun Örgöö, while perpetuating its functions of the hearth-palace where state ceremonies and veneration had been held from the times of Chinggis Khan, had to move constantly along with the palace of the Khutagt, and existed until the 1930s when it was finally closed and destroyed. The functions of Baruun Örgöö, or in other words the hearth-palace, have an ancient tradition. I believe that now, when the links of tradition are being revived, Baruun Örgöö will also be restored. The first Danshig naadam to present the Bat-Orshil to the first Bogd Khutagt was held in the year of the Dragon in 1640 at Shireet Tsagaan lake. This event is described in detail in an important historical source Erdeniin Erikh. According to this source almost all Khalkh Mongols participated in the naadam which afterwards turned into a recurring celebration recorded in history as Doloon Khoshuu Danshig (Danshig of the Seven Khoshuu) or the Danshig of the Bogd. The celebration was so called, because the Khalkh Mongols at that time consisted of seven khoshuus (banners) that included 40 tümen (a group nominally consisting of 10,000 people). The danshig naadam holds an important place in the historical development of the 'three manly games' (*eriin gurban naadam*). During the first Danshig naadam the titles for the top three winners were created, which were then applied to the 'three manly games'. From that time on naadam celebrations were held once every three years in the capital city (Örgöö, Ikh Khüree, Niislel Khüree) until 1924, when it was celebrated for the last time, and in 1925 according to the new Constitution it became the Holiday of the Revolution.

Although the palace was constantly moving from one place to another, nevertheless Shireet Tsagaan lake remained not only as a place of important political activities but also that of historical importance. When Zanabazar was proclaimed as the first Bogd, the TüsHEET khan gave him 108 households headed by young men which were the foundation of the Ikh shav'.

The High Bogd paid great attention to developing the palace into a khüree (town). As the Ribogjeilin monastery with a tsogchin (i.e. main) temple, built between 1654 and 1684 on the slope of Khan Khentii mountain, was destroyed by the troops of Galdan Boshigt, another tsogchin temple called Battsagaan was established in 1706 in a place called Erdenetolgoi, in Tsetserleg, which was afterwards developed into a khüree (town) and then ikh khüree (great town). The khüree at that time, however, was still moving from one place to another. As it was becoming more and more difficult to transport the ever expanding and growing establishment, in 1778 it finally settled down in a place called Khün Chuluuny Khongor, on the bank of the Tuul river, where it developed into the modern day Ulaanbaatar city. The reason for choosing this location between four beautiful mountains was that this place was where important trade routes connecting

the East with the West and leading to Khiakta and Chuulalt khaalga met. Since Ikh Khüree became settled in one place, the Doloon Khushuuny Danhig naadam began to be held in the centre of the town as well as in a place called Khüi Mandal. Along with the settlement of the khüree, a new stage of its development began. Ikh Khüree, or in other words the khüree of the Bogd as it was known among Mongols, was referred to as Da khüree in Chinese sources, and as Urga in Russian ones. So, when the khüree settled down its population began to grow. If the population in 1883 was 30,000, according to the records of Prejevalsky, then in 1910 according to the records of the Moscow expedition it reached 60,000. As the population was growing, trade also expanded turning the city into an important cross-point of international trade as well as a political, cultural and scientific centre of the country. When the theocratic Mongolian state was established after the abolishment of Qing domination, the second stage of its development began when it was renamed as the Nüisöl (capital) of Mongolia, and in 1924 as Ulaanbaatar (Red Hero), the capital city of the Mongolian People's Republic. Eighty years of development since the victory of the national democratic revolution in 1921 occupies an important place in the history of the capital city.

During this period the face of Ulaanbaatar has changed beyond recognition, and it is still developing as the political, economic, and cultural centre of the country as well as an important transit point in international relations. As Shireet Tsagaan lake is a historical place of importance where the foundation of Ulaanbaatar city was laid, works to immortalize its history began in the 1990s. On the occasion of the 355th anniversary of the establishment of Ulaanbaatar in 1994, and on that of the 360th anniversary of the birth of Zanabazar which was celebrated in 1995, the office of the mayor of Ulaanbaatar city along with the Cultural Centre of the capital city erected a monument at Shireet Tsagaan lake.

The words inscribed on the monument erected at Shireet Tsagaan lake are as follows: 'This monument is erected on the occasion of the 360th anniversary of the city of Ulaanbaatar, and for the commemoration of Zanabazar, the son of the Khalkh Tüsheet Khan of the Golden Lineage of Chingis Khaan, who in the year of the Rabbit (1639) was raised to be the first Bogd, the leader of Mongolian Buddhism, as well as for the commemoration of the establishment of Shar Büsüin Ord, the foundation of the capital city of Mongolia, in a place called Shireet Tsagaan lake.'

NOTES

1. Danshig and Bat-orshil are both ceremonies performed for the benefit of the Javzandamba Khutagts. Ed.
2. The author here is referring to what are more widely known as the Zunghar-Khalkh conflicts. Ed.
3. The monastery actually moved a number of times before settling in the present location of Ulaanbaatar. 'Foundation' should thus be read as more metaphorical than literal. Ed.
4. *Shireet* means table, or throne, and here refers to the fact that Mongolian khaans or Khutagt sat on a shiree, the Mongolian equivalent of a throne. Trans.

THE KHALKHA DJIRUM

V. Riasonovsky



The Khalkha Djirum, by the character of its provisions, is closely reminiscent of the Mongol-Oirat Regulations of 1640. This resemblance is based on the similarity of the cultures of the Northern and Western Mongols.

It is indisputable that the provisions of the Khalkha Djirum dealing with tribal life were customary in character. The wanderings of the Northern Mongols in hotons, ooloos and otoks subject to tribal chiefs (chiefs of ten, shulengas, demchis and darugas) was also of customary origin. The obligation to occupy definite campsites, the ancient division into tens, the recognition of relationship only through the male line and the patriarchal system of relations—all these were institutions of customary law.

The provisions governing mutual relations were permeated with the general principles of the Mongol customary law of solidarity, mutual help and support. Thus both Khans and commoners were forbidden, on pain of punishment, to refuse a night's lodging to a stranger, to abandon sick comrades in uninhabited spots, while the saving of perishing cattle and other property was rewarded.

The provisions dealing with cattle-breeding were essentially of a customary character, regulating the distribution of the natural increase in herds, treatment of strayed cattle, cattle dying of disease, etc.

The provisions of private law were also predominantly customary in nature.

The right of private property was not recognized. The land, for purposes of pastoral economy, was given over to the use of the tribal units—hotons, ooloos and otoks. Separate treatment was given to private property in movables, especially those acquired by the labour or exploit of the owner. In the sphere of obligatory relations we find a certain development of contract relations and a series of separate cases where compensation for damages was provided, these provisions being rooted in the social relations of the time. Here we meet also some mandatory provisions regulating trade and protecting the Mongols from undue exploitation at the hands of traders. The Family Law was based on the strong patriarchal power of the husband and father, on exogamous marriage with ransom for brides, and polygamy. All these are institutions of customary law. In the law of inheritance, inheritance in accordance with custom still predominated.

In the sphere of Criminal Law we meet in the Khalkha Djirum, just as in the Mongol-Oirat Regulations of 1640, not only punishments but also rewards, based on the principle of tribal and communal solidarity. Besides rare concrete cases there even exists

a general statement on this practice: 'If anyone, during a theft or robbery, commit a particularly good deed, let the Noyon reward him.' These encouraging rewards were of a customary character.

The system of punishments was also based on property fines calculated in nines of cattle and on flogging with the knout. The death penalty and deprivation of liberty occurred rarely. Persons of high rank enjoyed a great degree of protection. All these are institutions of customary law.

Many of the crimes enumerated reflected peculiar features of Mongol life. Thus, for instance, beating or insults by a ruling Sait 'with cause' went unpunished while the same actions done 'for sport' were punished. Refusal to provide a night's lodging and refusal to give a horse water was punished by a fine. Cutting off the tassel on the cap of a woman was punished by a fine of a nine of cattle; drinking the blood of a horse by opening the vein, cutting off the tail of a horse, by one nine, etc. Theft of military equipment and articles of household use was treated casuistically and in detail, reflecting the life of the Mongols. The theft of cattle was punished with especial severity.

The provisions dealing with juridical procedure also contained many elements of customary law, although here at the same time we witness the strengthening of the state-principle. For instance, the killing of a thief caught in *flagrant delit* was not yet punished, entailing only the cessation of proceedings against the victim.

It is necessary to note that the influence of canonical law was stronger in the Khalkha Djirum than in the Mongol-Oirat Regulations of 1640. Moreover, mandatory provisions (provisions of a legislative character) were here more strongly marked, including the regulation of trade, the protection of the Mongols from abuses by traders, struggle against epidemics among human beings and cattle, and also some administrative prescriptions. But all this did not change the essential character of the Khalkha Djirum which was customary-legal in nature.

APPENDIX

Collection of the Laws of Khalkha 'Khalkha Djirum'¹

'We worship the supreme Lama, our refuge and salvation, who concentrates (within himself) all the Buddhas of the ten lands; who is filled with the best omens; who nourishes with the seeds of the Teaching all living things; who has a pleasant voice and the heart of Bodhi which guides all things with impartial compassion!

'May the life of the High Lama, the crown of all living things, be everlasting as the diamond! May the Faith spread! May the lives of the charitable who exalt it be prolonged! May the State and Faith flourish! Let there not be heard even the name of evil things! Let the heart be tranquillized and good deeds multiply like a constantly running stream!

'After they had reported the matter to the dowager Khanna and she had given her consent, all the Noyons and Saites with Vachirai Tushetu Khan at their head² (gathered) on the Southern side of Burin-Khan mountain in the valley of the river Ibin-Gol, in the year of the Earthen Cow on the 28th day of the midsummer moon, on a good and favourable day, and did discuss (promulgate) the present Great Statute of the Three Hoshuns.³

Articles from the Great Statute of the Three Hoshuns

(Published in the year of the Earthen Cow, 1709).

Chapter I*On the messengers of the Hutukhtu Gegen*

Art. 1. Wherever the Hutukhtu Gegen may go let him have horses (carts-Ulaga) and victuals (Shigusu) without limitation, as was settled by the Seven Hoshuns some time ago.

In case of refusal of a cart and provisions, all the property (of the offender) shall be confiscated for the treasury (of the Gegen), and as for the offenders and their lives—let them remain at the disposal of their Noyon.

Art. 2. Should Noyons themselves refuse carts and provisions, let 300 head of cattle be taken from their personal herds.

Should the Noyon turn out to be poor and his cattle not reach 100 in number, then let up to 100 cattle be taken from his subjects and given up, on the basis of 50 horses and 50 head of horned cattle—the age of all to be four years.

Should a Taidji or Tabunang refuse, let all his personal cattle be confiscated. But if he be poor and the number of his cattle not reach 50, let it be supplemented by the cattle of his son on the basis of 25 horses and 25 head of horned cattle—the age of all to be four years (Hidzalan).

Should anyone refuse cartage and provisions on the plea of absence, then they must be forced to take the oath—a Noyon for a Noyon, and for a Haratzu—one of the Saits by election.

Art. 3. Wherever a messenger of the Hutukhtu may go, he has 10 carts and 2 Shigusu (i.e. two sheep). However, out of respect for the words of the Gegen who said: ‘Do not kill any living thing, yet also do not remain hungry for the night’, no animal should be killed on the pretext that it is needed as provision for a messenger travelling under the orders of the Gegen, yet also the messenger must not be left hungry for the night.

Should anyone refuse a cart or provisions, then (let him be fined) three nines (of cattle).

If the messenger is driving the Gegen’s property (cattle) he can use them in the measure of necessity for himself and his baggage. If he uses them beyond this, let the messenger be fined three nines; and the extent of each nine is to be 4 Boda, and 5 sheep. At the head of the Boda (large cattle) must be a Hidzalan (four-year-old).

A runner (messenger, summons-server) has 2 carts. For the night the householder must give him food, at his own discretion and whatever is available. If he does not provide him with provisions then (let him be fined) 1 Hul (Kul or Hul, a leg or rump), the size of the Hul to be 1 Shidulen (i.e. three-year-old).

Should anyone refuse a cart and provisions—(he is to be fined) a five, the extent of the five to be 2 Shidulen (3-year-old) horses or horned cattle, and 3 Shidulen sheep.

If anyone refuse a cart and provisions to these two messengers, on the pretext that he does not have them, then the Daruga of the Otok is to be put to the oath.

Art. 4. If anyone drive horses away from the paddock of a messenger (Elchi), then, however many offenders there may be, let there be taken from each the horse on which he rode together with the saddle, and also:

If the offender be a Noyon, one five. Be he a commoner (Haratzu) let him be given 50 Tashurs (strokes of the knout).

If the horses they are riding turn out to belong to others, then the truth must be established by means of the oath and the proper (his own) horse taken from the offender.

Art. 5. If anyone, hearing of the approach of an Elchi, drive away his herds with the aim of avoiding (the levy), a three-year-old horse must be taken from each such owner.

The Aldangi (fine for neglect, a mistake or accidental misdeed) is to be delivered to the treasury of the Noyon to whose Elchi performance of the duty was avoided.

As concerns the compensation (Ideshi) to the messenger of an official, it is the same; as regards the Ideshi of a victimized messenger, this is at discretion of his master.

(Otherwise: 'As concerns refusal of provisions ' etc.)

If people with the status of Tarkhan present as their own cattle which belong to people liable to the levy of cartage and thus unfairly defend them, then such Tarkhans must be fined a Hidzalan (four-year-old) horse; while a person concealing his herd in the herd of a Tarkhan is liable to the same punishment as that meted out for concealing one's cattle from a messenger.

If any man should say that he is an Elchi of the Gegen and thus use Ulaa (carts) and Shigusu (provisions) and if he should falsely invoke a Dzarlik (ukase), this is to be treated as equivalent to cases of refusal of carts and provisions during the journeyings of the Gegen himself.⁴⁾

The Great Statute of 1728

May the paths of the Supreme Lama, the concentration of all saviours, be firm!

He incessantly does good for the holy faith and living beings!

May the lives of the highly-placed connected with his teaching be prolonged!

May they bring happiness to all by their administration and righteous deeds!

May they spend days and nights in good deeds!

May all their deserving wishes fulfil themselves!

May they never hear the name of evil deeds!

And may happiness descend on all life spent in pure and proper well-doing!

In the year of the Earthen Monkey called 'Kalika' ('Kalaya' in the MS.), on an auspicious day of the mid-autumn moon—Vachirai Batu Tushetu Khan, assistant to the commander of the troops of the left flank of the Khalkha Chiang Chun Wang, and other Djassaks (ruling princes) met at the Order of the Highest at the arrow (confluence) of the Orkhon and Tola and compiled the present Great Statute.

If any man commit theft (robbery), let all the thieves, whatever their number, be confined for one year (in a well), the earth being dug to a depth and width of 4 Aldans (1 Aldan = 2 metres) in each direction.

The wife, children yurt and cattle of the chief thief are all to be confiscated and given to the owner of the (stolen) cattle.

The lesser thieves are to be fined 3 nines of Boda each.

After the release of the thieves from the well they are each to be given 100 Tashur and forced to collect firewood for three years. . . . In cases of full confiscation (Talahu – to ruin) and fines, a portion of the thief's property is to be left him.

The composition of a nine shall be: 2 horses, 2 cows, 2 three-year-olds (of horned cattle) and 1 yearling calf (Biragu, Burun in Siberia).

From a thief condemned to full confiscation there shall be taken for court costs (Gargagu) 1 selected (animal) and 4 four-year-old horses.

For the Tushimels and Elchis there shall be reserved 1 five-year-old horse and 1 four-year-old.

From the amount due from an accused second thief (i.e. accomplice) of 3 nines of cattle there shall be reserved for court costs: 1 horse, 1 bull, 1 cow, 2 three-years-olds, and 1 Burun. Of them there shall be reserved for court costs proper—1 horse, 1 cow and 1 three-year-old; and 1 Burun shall be divided between themselves by the Tushimels and Elchis as a fee.

However many three-nines (27's) there may be, this rule must be followed with respect to each three-nines. And whatever the quantity of the fine (Yal) the Hoshun Elchi of the guilty (wrong) party must not receive more than 1 three-year-old.

If a man have insufficient (property) for (the payment of) the fine, it is necessary that the fine be paid by taking his wife and children into the accounting. And if the Noyon or kinsmen of the guilty one shall wish to ransom (substitute for) him, then the price shall be in accordance with the Old Statute.⁵

Articles of the Statute of 1709

ON MARRIAGE AND INHERITANCE

One more article: If a Noyon give a princess (Abai) in marriage to a Tabunang who is already married to a princess, then from this Noyon shall be taken (he shall be forced to pay) Baa of 10 camels and 100 horses. And this Baa (voluntary fine) shall be taken (in favour of) the Administration.

Furthermore: If a ruling Noyon himself and in his own Hoshun give his princess in marriage to a Tabunang already married to a princess, then from the ruling Noyon shall be taken Baa of 15 camels and 150 horses. And this Baa is to be given to the Djassaks (ruling princes) participating in the compilation of this Statute of the Three Hoshuns. As for the Tabunang, he shall be fined 5 nines. And this cattle (taken as a fine) shall be given to the previous princess. She must return to her parents, taking away the dowry (Indji) which she brought with her.

One more article: If a princess shall herself, of her own will, marry a Tabunang married to a princess ('marry to a princess'—i.e. when the wife is living), then the second princess must be taken away and the Tabunang fined 5 nines. The cattle (taken as a fine) is to be delivered to the Administration. If his Djassak, knowing (this) beforehand, shall attempt to conceal it, let the ruling princes of the Three Hoshuns divided this cattle among themselves.

If a Tabunang abandon a princess, he must go away with only a whip in his hands; and the princess, having taken her dowry, must dispose of herself in her Hoshun. All the cattle and property confiscated from the Tabunang must be divided in half, and one half is to be taken to the Administration and the other given to the princess.

Furthermore: If anyone take himself to wife a woman of common degree (Haratzu) when he himself is married to a princess, let this woman be taken away and her commoner father be ruined (have all his property confiscated), while the Tabunang is to be given 80 strokes of the Tashur without (the alternative of) ransom. If a princess insulted in marriage shall leave a Tabunang (divorce him), then the commoner wife he

takes afterwards shall be taken away and the rest of the fine (Yal) be as prescribed. As for the princess, having taken her dowry and her herds and Yurt, let her dispose of herself in her Hoshun.

Furthermore: If Noyons, among themselves, take from each other their respective betrothed brides, then the fine shall be 3 families (households—Eruké) of people and 300 Andzo. Of these three families one is to be taken by choice, but not from amongst officials, while the other families let the Noyon give at his discretion. The betrothed (bride) taken away is to be removed.

One more article: If within the limits of the Three Hoshuns a Noyon shall take the betrothed bride of a man of common degree (Haratzu), let him give him one camel and an unbetrothed maid from his Hoshun (to wife) by choice (of the man whose betrothed bride has been taken).

One more article: If a Noyon go in to a princess (commit adultery) this is equivalent to violation of betrothal (i.e. the taking by a Noyon of the betrothed bride of another Noyon) between Noyons. If he have not sufficient for the Andzo, then let him himself be taken.

If a Noyon go in to the wife of a commoner, he shall be fined 50 Andzo.

If a man of common degree (Haratzu) go in to a princess, all his property shall be confiscated and he himself made a slave of a slave in the Hoshun. The position of Hatuns (Hatun—princess, the wife of a prince) and Abais (Abai—princess, the daughter of a prince) shall be the same.

Furthermore: If a man of common degree go in to the wife of another commoner, he is to be fined 300 Andzo with 30 rare things (Berké) at their head. If he has not sufficient (for the Andzo), he shall receive for each Boda 25 Tashurs, but the total number of strokes shall not exceed 100. The abduction of the wife or daughter of another (forcing her to run away) shall be considered equivalent to entering into carnal connection with the wife of another ('to going in to another's wife'). If anyone lay hold of the corner of a blanket—then 3 nines. If a woman crawls in to a man—3 nines.

Furthermore: If a Noyon, after the performance of the Horim (marriage feast) of his daughter, give her in marriage to another Tabunang, the fine shall be 55 Andzo with 5 rare things at their head. If the Horim has not yet been performed, he must return the cattle previously given.

Furthermore: If a Noyon give in marriage to another man the wife of a man of common degree who has had a Horim, then let him first inform the Noyon of that man who had the Horim. If he shall give her in marriage without warning, then she is to be returned to the original man having the Horim. If he does not return her, let him give Andzo of 100 animals (i.e. 100 head of cattle).

If anyone take to himself a maiden betrothed to another, having falsely declared to the Noyon that she was not betrothed, then she shall be taken away and given to her original betrothed (fiance). And half of the property and cattle of the liar shall be confiscated.

One more article: If a man of common degree (Haratzu) will betroth a princess who is the daughter of a man of Khan rank, then such betrothal shall only be recognized as valid if the betrothal gifts comprise: a white camel with a silver plate on its nose (Mongon Builatai), a white horse with a halter (trappings—Montzук), a silver cup

filled with wine (Araki) and a pearl without flaws (Subad Erdeni—a pearl of great price).

Furthermore: If Noyons shall betroth the daughters of Tabunangs, let such betrothals be considered valid when there are delivered: a silver cup, a pearl and wine. If these are absent, the betrothal must not be recognized.

Furthermore: If persons of common degree shall be betrothed among themselves, then let such betrothals be considered valid when there is (brought) wine and all the entrails of a sheep with the horns and hooves. And let it be recognized as valid when there are witnesses and the witnesses know this. But if there be no witnesses or should the witnesses not know it, it must not be recognized.

Generally: The terms of pregnancy of cattle given to a man giving a woman in betrothal: for camels—the last summer month, for mares—the last winter month, for cows—the last autumn month and for sheep—the mid-autumn month. In these months they may be considered pregnant (i.e. their pregnancy may be verified).

Generally: If anyone, having betrothed a woman and received the cattle due him (Kalim), will not give his daughter in marriage during many years, and a separation (annulment of the betrothal!) comes about on the initiative of the father of the maid, then he must return all the cattle for one (the past) year, and of that cattle which he received two years before he must return a half with increase (i.e. with young for each animal—Holbogatai). If three years and more have passed he must return all the cattle with their increase.

If a betrothal is annulled (a couple is separated) at the instance of the father of the bridegroom, he must take (back) only the cattle which he has given. A year consists of 12 months.

One more article: If a betrothed bridegroom or a betrothed bride dies before the marriage, the cattle given is to be taken back.

One more article: If anybody takes a wife without giving cattle (Kalim), entering (the family of the bride's parents) in the capacity of a worker son-in-law, but later himself betrays (them) and leaves, then let him give (his wife and her parents) 10 Boda and 30 sheep. And if he himself does not wish to go but his Noyon demands him insistently, then he must give 8 Boda and 20 sheep, the children not being ransomed. When he himself has betrayed, sons follow their father, and if there be girls (daughters), then let him ransom each girl (daughter) for 2 Boda.

One more article: If a Noyon give in marriage the wife (widow) of a dead man, then let this woman divide her cattle between her sons, whatever their number, and her new husband equally according to the number of souls, and let her children go out to their service (i.e. separate themselves to become independent taxable units). But if (she marries) without the permission (mandate) of the Noyon, then let her go forth with (only) a whip (Tashur) in her hand.

Furthermore: Elder and younger Djige cannot be accused in relation to their own Nagatzu (i.e. elder and younger grandchildren could not be accused in relation to their maternal grandfather: i.e. they did not pay Yal). If the Nagatzu (maternal grandfather) be no longer living, they cannot be accused likewise before his elder and younger sons (i.e. their maternal uncles).

Furthermore: Presents given to a Naidji (tutor, protector of the family, patron, middleman, godfather of a young couple, arbitrator between husband and wife, a

Shaman or Lama undertaking to defend a child from evil), when he comes with a sheep and wine (i.e. with ritual offerings of food) for a visit shall not require a gift in return (are not later collected, do not represent a debt).

One more article: Generally, let Noyons, when they shall hand over the inheritance (Umchi—property) to their children, report this to the Gegen and the Khan and register it with their ruling princes so that it may be sealed. If it does not bear this note and a litigation or objection arise, then the words of the children or the statement that ‘it was so’ or a document seen by no one must not be taken as proof. But in view of the fact that there is no distinction between children, the inheritance must be divided equally among them all with the exception of two: the generally known just and generally known unjust of the sons. If the own mother of the children who are parties to the litigation be still alive, then let her dispose (‘let her know’).

Furthermore: Generally, if a man of the rank of Khan himself bestow anything upon a man of common degree (Haratzu), or a man of common degree bestow anything upon a person of Khan rank, then this does not require any return. To say: ‘I took from an abandoned wife or from a household servant or slave’ is punishable by a fine (Yalatai Byi).⁶

Regulations of 1746

In the 11th year of the reign of Ch’ien Lung, on the 29th day of the last summer month, the following was sent from the Djisan (administration):

In the 11th year of the reign of Ch’ien Lung on the 12th day of the midsummer month, at a united session of the Seims in Urga with the participation of Jassaktu Khan, Setsen Khan, the President of the Seim—Ch’ing Wang Dechin-djab, the Ch’ing Wang Erintzin Dordji, the assistant of the Chiang Chun Shitzu, the assistant of the Chiang Chun Chun Wang, the assistant of the Chiang Chun Beile, the assistant of the Chiang Chun Gun and others, it was decided:

That any man committing robbery is, in accordance of the Old Statute of His Majesty (Degedu), to be executed (killed), and his Yurt, cattle, wife and children are all to be given to the owner of the (stolen) cattle.

That from an accomplice are to be taken 3 nines and given to the owner of the cattle, and he (the accomplice) is also to be given 100 Tashurs. Furthermore, if he shall not have sufficient cattle to pay the fine, then his Yurt, household utensils, cup, Tagan, etc. are to be taken in payment being equivalent to 1 nine, and if the man have children one child shall be equivalent to 1 nine and two children to 2 nines. But more than two children must not be given. If there are no children but only the husband and his wife, then she shall be given. If the man be unmarried, he himself shall be delivered up. If after having given his cattle and children and wife, some cattle will still be lacking to pay the fine, then in accordance with the Statute of His Majesty (the Sovereign’s Statute) let him be given 25 blows of the Tashur for each head of cattle (Mal—cattle, animal), but not more than 100 blows altogether.

‘If this is done, then thieves who misbehave will be taught better.’ Thus saying, they agreed and came to a decision as is noted separately. Furthermore, they agreed that in future, in all other affairs, they would be guided in all four Aimaks in the same measure.⁷

Regulations of 1724

A provision written in the year of the Golden Dragon in the last spring month on the 7th day.

If any man shall seek a debt, then, if the creditor and debtor dwell in the neighbourhood of the Great Kuren, the litigation is to be dismissed if the loan was contracted without the permission of the Khan, the Shanzotba and the Wang (without declaration to the Khans, Shanzotbas and Wangs), and must be considered only if it was so declared. In villages (Kudöns) the suit must be dismissed if the parties, being of the same Somun or Otok and of noble or mean degree (Khan Haratzu) belonging to the Otok have failed to declare the loan to their Somun Taidji and Ooloos (settlement) Tzangin or to the Daruga (of their Otok). If the parties are from different Somuns and Otoks, then such suits concerning debts must be dismissed as have not been declared to the Dzarikchis (administrative officials) of both sides. Suits shall also be dismissed in the case of the loan being declared by only one party, so that the Daruga or Tzangin only of the plaintiff knows of it, and the Daruga or Tzangin of the defendant does not know.⁸

NOTES

1. In view of the fact that the Khalkha-Djirum has never been published, the Author considers it necessary to present to the readers a translation of some excerpts from the code, so that they may form some idea of its general aspect.
2. Here follows a long list of persons participating in the drafting of the code, which is omitted.
3. This is a translation of the preamble to the Great Statute of the Three Hoshuns of 1709 (Barun Kuren copy).
4. The above is a translation of the first chapter of the record described above (on ppg. 57–58). under the number 1.
5. The above is a translation from the record described on pg. 58 of the present work under the number V.
6. The above is a translation from the record described on pg. 59 of the present work under the number VIII.
7. The above is a translation of the record described on pg. 59, under the number VI.
8. The above is a translation of the record described on pg. 60, under the number XVII.

THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF FEUDALISM IN MONGOLIA

By Academician Sh. Natsagdorj



TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

This paper was first presented by Academician Natsagdorj at the XIV International Congress of Orientalists at New Delhi in 1964. As it was presented in Russian, one of the internationally recognized languages at the conference, I have translated it here from the Russian text rather than the underlying Mongol original. The translation has been approved by the author.

This paper is important for several reasons. In the first place, it gives a balanced summary of much of the data and arguments in the author's *History of Khalkha* (see *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 1 Part 1, pp. 87–88), which will be available to only a limited number of readers outside of Mongolia. It is also important because, while it puts forward a Marxist interpretation of 'nomadic feudalism', the interpretation is based on a citation of facts—many of them little known in the theoretical discussion of nomadism—which non-Marxist readers are free to evaluate for themselves. These facts, moreover, can be applied to the comparative study of other nomadic societies. They are also of great potential value in the study of relations between nomadic societies and the agriculturally based societies of Asia.

In English, Academician Natsagdorj's work is known principally by his biography of the revolutionary hero Sükhbaatar, translated by me and my colleague Urgunge Onon, in *Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia*, Oxford University Press, New York and London, 1955.

In this translation, Mongol words have been transliterated in a manner that conforms to current Mongol usage, except for forms that have become conventionally recognized, like 'Khalkha', 'Tushetu', or 'arat'. Supplementary translations of Mongol terms, and explanatory remarks by the translator, are indicated by square brackets.—Owen Lattimore.

There are a number of points of view on the nature of feudal relationships among nomadic peoples.¹ The author of this report is of the opinion that among nomadic peoples land and livestock together constituted the fundamental means of production, with the land as the principal determining means of production. The author has expressed this opinion in his book on *The Arat liberation movement in the Khovd Region*, 1954,² and in later works.³ In the present report we shall briefly review the question of

the form and relationships of property in land and cattle in the nomadic society of Khalkha-Mongolia from the end of the seventeenth right up to the twentieth century, on the basis of newly discovered archive documents and other sources and the recollections of eyewitnesses.

A. THE FORM AND RELATIONSHIPS OF PROPERTY IN LAND

In the sources and in all official documents it is repeatedly stated that the existence of cattle depends on pasture rights. In 1717 the Tushetu-Khan Tsetsendorj of Khalkha wrote: 'a large territory is the means of life', and 'for the increase of the herds it is necessary to expand the territory for ample migration and grazing the stock'.⁴ It is obvious from this that the Mongols attributed great importance to pasture rights, regarding them as the principal condition of pastoralism.

What were the class relationships in respect to the ownership of land rights, if land rights were the principal condition of pastoralism? Only the feudal class disposed of pasture privileges, the right to allocate which belonged to them. Although the *arat* [common people] owned cattle, dwellings, and other property, they did not have the right to own land, but could only use it. The economic power of the feudal class consisted not only in the ownership of vast numbers of livestock, but also in the fact that they enjoyed a monopoly in the ownership of land rights, which provided the fundamental and unique condition for the viability of nomadic pastoralism. In regarding land and livestock as the economic basis of Mongol feudalism, we should particularly note that what is known as non-economic compulsion was an inseparable part of the complex.

The right of the Mongol feudal class to the ownership of land arose in the period in which, in 1206, Temujin (Chingis Khan), in founding his realm, bestowed lands and subjects on his military commanders. These commanders had the right to rule their territories, which means that they could allocate pasture rights to their subjects, and also revoke them. In the time of the rule of the Great Khans of Mongolia the whole territory of the empire was considered their personal property, and through their military commanders and the feudal rulers in the territories of Mongolia subject to them they collected levies from the population. After the disintegration of the Mongol empire and in the period of feudal dismemberment the land in Mongolia continued to be considered the property of the Khagans [Khans], but their rights and powers extended in fact only to their own immediate apanages.

In the period of Manchu rule the territory of Mongolia nominally became the property of the Manchu emperors, who enfeoffed the Mongol princes with fiefs [*hoshun*] with the right of hereditary rule. In the administrative documents of this period the *hoshun*-ruler [*jasag*] is called *nutug-un ezen* [lord of the domain] or *nutug-un-ezen jasag noen* [ruling noble lord of the domain]; that is, ruler of the territory of the *hoshun*.⁵ In a letter sent by the administrative office of the *hoshun* of Urjinjav, a *jasag* of Sainnoen *aimag*, dated 1877, it is stated: 'the grass and water of a territory may be managed and assigned only by the ruler and *jasag* of the said land'.⁶ The monopolistic right of a *jasag* to rule the territory of a *hoshun* is confirmed by the fact that he selected for himself the best tracts, especially winter pastures, with the best grass-cover. Areas for the winter and autumn moves of the *noen* [nobles] were designated well in advance, and markers were set up,⁷ forbidding ordinary *arat* to camp there; and special watch-posts might even be set up.

Thus the *jasags* of *hoshuns* were the owners, with full rights, of the territory of *hoshuns*, and could at any time appropriate any part of it for their personal use. Apart from the permanent and temporary pastures of the *jasag-noen*, the land was available to the population of the *hoshun* for use in common. From this, however, the conclusion must not be drawn that the *arat* could migrate without hindrance within the limits of the *hoshun* and make use of the pastures as they chose, because the right of allocation of pasture resources was in the hands of the *hoshun* prince. The *arat* could migrate only within the apportionments allocated to them and did not have the right to go outside the bounds of the *hoshun*.

In assigning pastures to the *arat* the feudal nobles, of course, took as their starting point the number of men in the family. In despatches about litigation between feudal nobles and *arat* over land awards the so-called *ere-in gazar* ['grown man's land'] is mentioned. [One *gazar* equalled 576 square metres.] For example, in a despatch from Gezebal, ruler of the Tushetu-Khan *aimag*, we read: 'In 1805, on account of insufficiency of pastures, the administration of the League [*aimag*] allotted to me "15 *ere-in gazar*"'; that is, land for 15 men. In certain northern *hoshun* of the same *aimag* we find the wording 'hay-meadows of X number of men'. It is not known, however, how much land was allotted to one man. It may be supposed that there was no firmly established measurement.⁸ Nevertheless it is indisputable that there existed a recognized system of land allocation according to the number of men.⁹ As a nomadic pastoral household moves frequently in the course of the four seasons, it is impossible to establish exact measurements for the land of each family, and accordingly their land was divided within the approximate bounds of administrative units.

The land assigned to *arat* was not always sufficient for their needs, and so they were obliged to live within other *suman* and *bag* [administrative sub-units] of their *hoshun*. The feudal nobles forbade such migration and from time to time carried out the measure called *nutug huriiahu* ['restraint of domicile']; that is, they drove the *arat* back to their previously allotted land. This was conditioned by two fundamental causes: the strengthening of administrative subordination, and the elimination of obstacles to feudal service [*alba*]. In order to drive the *arat* away from places where they had made long-term camps, the *hoshun* administrations sent men out on patrol in all directions at definite and rigidly enforced intervals; even in severe winter weather they drove the *arat* away from their warm winter quarters out into exposed country. There were cases of undisciplined behaviour by men on 'restraint of domicile' duty: they cut the outer bands which hold the felts on the tent-frame, stampeded cattle in all directions, etc. There were severe penalties in some *hoshun* for *arat* who on their own initiative left the areas assigned to them.¹⁰

In saying that the land of a *hoshun* was available for common use, we must take into account the fact that the summer and autumn pastures were utilized in common by the whole population, without special distinction between *bag* and *otog* [administrative units], whereas for the winter period the pastures were divided up not only among *otog* and *bag* but also among separate households, or *ail*. Each household occupied a definite allotment, called the *övöljöö* or winter quarters—its winter pasture with flooring for the tent. It is especially in this connexion that the rights of the feudal nobles in disposing of pastures and dividing them among their subjects are clearly revealed. Winter pastures were of two kinds: those where a supply of dry cattle-dung [for fuel] had been prepared in advance, and those with cattle-pens and sheep-folds. Proprietary claims to winter pastures arose out of the traditional principle that 'any place not occupied is mine'. In

due course, if the same family wintered in the same quarters for a long time, the spot automatically became their property. In some *hoshun* registers were kept of the winter quarters belonging to *arat*.¹¹ There were cases of the buying, selling, or renting of winter quarters. Hay meadows also took on the character of private property.¹²

Wells in the semi-desert Gobi zone had the same great importance as warm quarters in the Khangai zone. For this reason, the man who first dug a well or repaired it and brought it into use had the right to call it his property. This is confirmed by the fact that to this day there are wells which are known as 'So-and-so's well'. Most frequently, wells which were private property belonged to prosperous people who had large numbers of cattle. To one degree or another, the feudal laws recognized the property rights of those who had first dug or repaired a well.¹³

Although the land resources of a *hoshun* were nominally public property, this must not be supposed to mean that the division of them was communal. The best lands were in the hands of the secular and clerical feudal class. The Manchu Empire, for the purpose of breaking up the political unity of Mongolia, fragmented the *aimag* and *hoshun* into a multitude of petty feudal fiefs, established exact boundaries between *hoshun*, and strictly forbade migration into other *hoshun*. Simultaneously, large tracts of land were compulsorily set aside from the territories of the majority of the *hoshun* of Khalkha for the maintenance of *örtöö*,¹⁴ *kharuul*¹⁵ and the grazing of imperial and state herds. Entry into these lands was strictly forbidden to all.

The personal herds of the Bogd-gegeen and his *shav'* [shabi, serfs] had no special pastures set aside, but nomadized in many *hoshun* of all four *aimag*. This put many *hoshun*, which disposed of a limited amount of territory, in a difficult position. Consequently there were perpetual quarrels between the *arat* and the *shav'* of the Bogd-gegeen. For this reason, in order to avoid clashes, some *hoshun* divided their territory into two parts, in one of which the local *arat* lived while the *shav'* of the Bogd-gegeen distributed themselves in the other. In such cases, *arat* families were specially stationed along the dividing strip to form a buffer. After such a division there remained for the *arat*, especially those of *hoshun* which had a small territory, only insignificant, inadequate, and inferior pastures.¹⁶

By way of example we may cite a few lines from the deposition of the *arat* woman Dechin, in the administration of the *hoshun* of the *beise* [a noble rank] Tsedensodnam of Sainnoen *aimag*, dated 1876:

They do not allow me, the woman Dechin, to drive my few head of cattle to the salt-pans, and have assigned me to nomadize in the region of Ulaan-chuluut. In the stony hills of Ulaan-chuluut neither I nor my livestock can survive even to the end of the year. Permit me to nomadize with Choijin, the accountant of our *bag* [administrative sub-division] in this grassy tract so that I can save my remaining stock and stay alive...¹⁷

The *arat* did not have the right to set up their tents in places which were marked by notices reserving them for privileged persons. Offenders were subjected to cruel punishments. In 1878 the *arat*-commoners Jargal, Dorj, and others of the *hoshun* of the *gün* [a noble rank] Avirmid of Sainnoen *aimag* pitched their tents on the territory of the Gegeen-lama [minor 'living Buddha'] of the *hoshun*. The lama filed a complaint with the administration of the *hoshun* and demanded the immediate eviction of the *arat*. The ruling handed down by the *hoshun* administration stated:

A gegeen-lama is no common man, but equal in rank to a noble. The commoner Dorj and the other subordinate *arat* who dared to protest should be severely punished, and

after the carrying out of this order of punishment they should all be resettled, together with their relatives, in their old places . . .¹⁸

Comparatively good pastures were assigned by the feudal nobles only to prosperous, wealthy *arat*. The rich men were able to migrate frequently, picking out pastures with a good growth of grass, and the best winter quarters belonged to them, because they had sufficient means of transport. The poor *arat* were not able to migrate frequently for lack of means of movement; they owned for the most part small cattle [sheep and goats], not pack-animals. Thus in time of *zud* [natural disaster; sudden frost, drought, etc.] the weak *arat* had usually to stay where they were. Not infrequently the poorer heads of households had to migrate along with the rich ones and work for them, 'nipped in the hollow of their armpits', to use the *arat* expression.

Summing up what has been said above, we may come to the conclusion that in Mongolia the land was in fact feudal property, despite the fact that the pastures were held in common. The monopoly right of the feudal nobility to land and pasture, though its character was somewhat veiled, was nevertheless specifically the chief means for the exploitation of the *arat* by the feudal class.

B. FORM AND RELATIONSHIPS OF PRIVATE PROPERTY IN LIVESTOCK

Mongolia from of old was the cradle of nomads and the classical country of nomadic pastoralism. In the second half of the seventeenth century nomadic pastoralism was still, as always, the basic occupation of the population. It was not for nothing that the official documents used the expression, 'The Mongols live by the four kinds of cattle'. Livestock, the chief wealth of the country, was concentrated in the hands of the feudal class. Along with feudal property in livestock, the main mass of the *arat* also owned a comparatively small number of livestock. As with other nomadic peoples, the Mongol feudal class put out their livestock to be pastured by their subjects, and there is no doubt that this was one of the basic forms of feudal exploitation. There were two ways in which cattle were put out. The first took the form of aid to the needy, and the second was putting cattle out to be grazed; this latter form had the character of unpaid feudal labour, a special kind of *corvée*.

To begin with, let us briefly take up the first form. The economy of the nomads was completely at the mercy of nature. When a natural calamity occurred, especially in the form of a heavy fall of snow, the first to be ruined were the households which had only a few head of stock, and consequently they fell into the hands of rich herd-owners to become their exploitable bondsmen. In the 'Secret History' [of the Mongols; a thirteenth century document] there is a passage which tells how, in the reigns of Chingis Khan and his successors, there were occasions when help was offered to people in difficulties by providing them with a small number of cattle.

In documents of the subsequent period we not infrequently encounter facts of the same order. We may well suppose that the sharing of a limited number of stock [chiefly to provide milk] as a way of giving aid was not in the least governed by the humane feelings of the feudal class toward their subjects, but is rather to be explained as a measure of precaution on the part of the feudal class against all too possible uprisings of their starving subjects. Apart from that, it must be emphasized that the cattle given as aid by the feudal class were by no means their own property, but belonged to the *arat*.

The feudal class, as a rule, levied the cattle from the population in the first place, and then divided them out among the poor households. The so-called state fund for providing aid to the poor and the orphaned, as it existed in the time of Chingis Khan and Ögedei, was organized in precisely this way.¹⁹ It was the same in the period of Manchu rule when the Mongol princes collected cattle from the population, and then made a small quantity of them available for the temporary use of destitute *arat*. There were not infrequent cases in which impoverished herdsmen were handed over to rich herd-owners as domestic servants.²⁰ It must be noted however that aid of this kind was not available at all times, but was resorted to sporadically, under exceptionally difficult conditions. It should be noted moreover that the provision of milch-cattle by the feudal class to poor people was by no means a characteristic inherent in the feudal system alone; it drew its origin from the clan society [which in the Marxist scheme preceded the feudal order]. As is well known, mutual aid among the members of clans was a very widespread phenomenon of that age.

Now let us look over the other form of apportionment of stock by the feudal class to their subject *arat*—namely, the putting out of their own herds by feudal nobles to their *arat*-serfs to be pastured. This form of feudal labour requisition had in turn, two forms. Under the first form, the feudal class divided up their herds in small groups to be put out to families of *arat* serfs. This was called *sürüg talbikhu* [putting out the herds]; i.e. the dividing up of the herds to be pastured by *arat* households. Under the second form the feudal class kept their stock in their own flocks and herds and required their *arat* serfs to pasture the livestock near their own headquarters. Hence the term *khoroga khikhü* [to do headquarters], i.e. to work at the prince's headquarters. *Sürüg talbikhu* and *khoroga khikhü* were much more widespread forms of feudal exploitation than the so-called 'aid' described above.

Among the *arat* who received *sürüg* to graze, and who were called *sürügchi* and 'khoroga herdsmen', working close to the households of the feudal nobles, there were various distinctions. The *sürügchi* pastured the herds of the nobles as direct subordinates, fulfilling an exacted duty, and had no right to make use of the stock entrusted to them for such purposes as riding, transport, etc. They were also obliged to supply the owners of the *sürüg* yearly with fixed quantities of milk, meat and wool. In spite of this, however, they enjoyed a certain freedom, since they managed their own households, and worked independently, not under the direct supervision and orders of the owners of the livestock. It should be noted moreover, that they were more or less substantial people. The herds of the Javzandamba ['Urga Living Buddha'], the head of the Church in Mongolia, of the khans of *aimag*, of ruling princes [of *hoshun*] and other secular and clerical feudal personages were as a rule put out as *sürüg* only to prosperous *arat*, of the middle group at the very least, on the reckoning that they would be able to make good for losses of stock out of their own property and stock. The *sürügchi* had certain immunities; for example, they were exempted from labour services, and part of their stock [in some *hoshun* up to 80 head] were not subject to tax. As for the 'khoroga herders', in most cases they were *arat* with few livestock and the chief reason for assigning them as herdsmen was not that they had property, but more than anything else that they were personally experienced and skilled herders. The *khoroga* herders were called up to work at the prince's headquarters, not infrequently together with their families, for various periods of duty, usually up to three months. To the extent that they worked in the prince's immediate household, and under his own eye, they had little time to work for themselves.

In relation to what has been said above, the monastic economy—which, together with the households of the secular feudal nobles, owned an enormous number of livestock—stands somewhat apart. We are inclined to believe that it was not the secular nobles but rather the monasteries that provided milch kine for temporary use to needy *arat*. While the *arat* grazed the herds of the secular nobles for their immediate use, by way of feudal labour dues, the monasteries, when putting out their stock to needy *arat* to be grazed, allowed them to make use at their own discretion [within limits] of the milk and wool. Hence the fact that the *arat* were more interested in pasturing monastic livestock, because this allowed them some alleviation of their cruel existence. In so saying we by no means deny, of course, that in actual fact the putting out of stock by monasteries to impoverished households had the same character of feudal labour service as in the case of secular feudal nobles.

From what has been said above, however, the conclusion should not be drawn that livestock were the chief means of production and the sole means of exploitation. In the first place, as already noted, the immediate producer, the *arat*, as well as the major feudal stock-owner, did own some cattle, though not very many.²¹ Consequently, the main mass of the *arat* class was able to live principally by means of its own herds. In the second place, in spite of the fact that a huge quantity of cattle was concentrated in the hands of the feudal class who were a minute minority of the population, by no means every noble was able to put out cattle to his dependents. For example, the great majority of *taij* in general and petty *taij* in particular were not only not in a position to put out cattle to their *khamjlaga* or serfs, but had themselves to accept herds from the monasteries to be put out to grass, in order to provide themselves with a living. [A *taij* claimed descent from Chingis Khan. The senior lines inherited the rule of the territories called *hoshun* (usually mistranslated as ‘banner’, because of the Chinese term). The cadet lines, or ‘petty *taij*’ did not inherit territory, but unless they were very poor did have hereditary retainers—‘serfs’ in the Marxist terminology and also in the terminology of some non-Marxist European experts, e.g. Father A. Mostaert in his *Dictionnaire Ordos*.]

In the third place, while the putting out of small numbers of cattle to the *arat* by the feudal class was unquestionably one of the forms of feudal exploitation, it should not be considered as an economic relationship exclusively between the feudal class and the *arat*. Well-off people among the *arat* put out their cattle to be grazed by poor people in the same way as the feudal class, and this was a widespread phenomenon. *Arat* who had too few cattle or none at all got cattle from rich people under various conditions and for different periods of time, such as *shime khereglekh* [‘use of the nourishment’] and *khüch edlekh* [‘employment of the strength’]—that is, with the right to consume the milk, or to use the animals for transport purposes when migrating.²²

Fourthly and finally—and in our view this is a weighty argument against the contention that livestock was the chief means of production and the sole means of exploitation—there is the consideration that when enserfment was liquidated in the People’s Republic of Mongolia in 1921–24,²³ this measure was closely linked with the abolition of the monopoly right to land of the feudal nobility as a class, and particularly the annulment of the princely fiefs [the *hoshun*], and not with the confiscation of cattle from the feudal class. The latter measure was carried out significantly later, after some ten years. The former *van*, *gün* and *taij* [titles of nobility—the first two are conventionally rendered ‘prince’ (Chinese *wang*) and ‘duke’ (Chinese *kung*), while the third (Chinese *t’ai-tzu*) originally meant ‘crown prince’] in spite of the fact that their stock

had been left to them intact, were juridically completely equal with the *arat* before the law. They had no legal right to exploit the *arat* by putting out their cattle to be grazed by them as a compulsory duty, and still less were they able in any way to collect various kinds of tribute and levies from the population.

We by no means deny the fact that to the extent that cattle were an important means of production and a means by which the feudal class exploited the *arat*, the continuing possession of cattle by the former nobility prolonged the exploitation of the *arat* to a measurable degree; but it would be more correct to call this hidden exploitation, rather than open exploitation. The fact must be emphasized that the relationship between former nobles and former serfs had been radically changed. Here and there a few *arat*, at the request of their former lords, did pasture cattle for them, but in most cases not gratuitously, as before, but after demanding payment for their labour. As for the monasteries, they were obliged to make agreements with the *arat* herdsmen, under which the monastic corporation paid them for their labour. Moreover, still another feature must be taken into account: namely, that even in the first years of the people's power the feudal economic units, even if not those of the monasteries, were considerably cut down in size and divided among the family and relatives of the individual nobles; something that, in our opinion, was prompted in the first place by difficulties in their relationship with the labour force, as a consequence of the termination of feudal rights, and in the second place by the wish to evade payment of taxes.

The historical significance of the confiscation of the cattle of the feudal class, which was carried out by the Party and the Government in stages, beginning with the secular nobles and then going on to the monasteries, consisted in the fact that it was an important political and economic measure, and after the abolition of the feudal monopoly in the ownership of land it was the final, decisive blow to the economic basis of feudalism in Mongolia.

C. THE IMPERIAL ALBA

When they had conquered Khalkha Mongolia the Manchu imperialists declared the territory of Mongolia to be an imperial possession. Official documents began to use the term *ezen-u alban-y gazar*—‘office of the Emperor's treasury’. [Translation here involves problems of semantics. The Russian *imperatorskaya* goes back to the Latin meaning of a military commander, but the Mongol *ezen* means ‘owner’, and is not military in origin. *Alba* means ‘service’—originally, of course, tribal service, and later unpaid feudal service or imperial service. It then developed the secondary meaning of ‘tribute’, *gazar*, ‘land’, has in compounds the meaning ‘government office’. The significance here is that in Manchu times Mongol princes held their territories as fiefs granted personally by the emperor. Mongol territories were therefore quite different from bureaucratically administered Chinese provinces.]

The whole population of Mongolia including the regional feudal nobles, were obliged to pay a [feudal] rent, the *Degedu-in alba* [*alba* of the One-on-high]—that is, to provide various services and pay tribute to the Manchu Emperor. In the period of political independence [between the fall of the Mongol empire in China in 1368 and the Manchu conquest, beginning in Inner Mongolia in the sixteenth century] the Mongol feudal nobles had considered themselves the supreme proprietors of the land of Mongolia and had collected various tributes from the population. With the establishment of Manchu

rule, however, this right of the Mongol nobles had been significantly diminished. Although the Manchu Emperor granted the Mongol nobles feudal fiefs or *hoshun*, he did not give them the full right to dispose at their own discretion of the territory of the *hoshun*. *Hoshun* land was considered state land, and was not officially declared to be the personal property of the *jasag-noen* ['ruling noble'], the ruler of the *hoshun*. The rulers of *hoshun* did not formally have the right either to sell or to rent the land of the *hoshun*, and could not even put it under the plough without the permission of the Manchu authorities. As for their right to dispose of their own subjects, some of these were declared to be the subjects of the state, *suman albat* ['service men of the arrow'; the *sum* or 'arrow' was by origin a military unit, whose numbers defined the feudal military obligation of the ruler of a *hoshun*] whose chief obligation was in the fulfilment of [service] duties and the payment of tribute to the Manchu court. Others came to be called *khamjlaga* ['assistant'], and were put at the disposal of Mongol feudal nobles to be their personal serfs. The *khamjlaga* were obliged to serve their lords.

The Manchu authorities took suitable steps to see to it that on the one hand the *arat* carried out their Manchu duties and paid their tribute to the Manchu court, and that on the other hand the local nobles did not misuse their right to rule the *hoshun* and collect tribute from the population—especially from the 'state subjects'—for their personal needs, and by so doing interfere with the fulfilment, by the latter, of the duties assigned to them by the Manchu authorities. For this purpose the Manchu court instituted, in the first place, yearly grants, the *pun-lu* [Chinese *feng-lu*, an emolument granted to an official], to Mongol feudal nobles, according to office and rank, and in the second place established strict limits for the tribute which a prince [only ruling princes are in question here] collected from his subjects; in this respect the ruling princes were allowed to collect tribute for their personal account only from their own serfs, assigned to them according to the Manchu law. As far as the *suman albat* were concerned, they were to collect tribute from them solely for administrative purposes.²⁴ The Mongol feudal nobles, however, never reconciled themselves to these Manchu limitations and prohibitions, and continuously and consistently violated them. On this score a perpetual struggle went on between the Mongol princes and the Manchu authorities throughout the whole period of Manchu rule. The ruling princes considered themselves to be the lords and masters in full of the territories of their *hoshun*, and dealt with them as they saw fit.

As described above, they set aside sections of the *hoshun* as their private property. Trying to turn the land of the *hoshun* into a source of income, the princes collected dues in kind from the *arat* for permission to graze cattle;²⁵ though it is true that these were not collected from the *arat* of their own *hoshun*, but from the subjects of other *hoshun*. At that time it was not infrequently the case that the *arat* of a *hoshun* which had a small territory would nomadize in other *hoshun*, in spite of strict Manchu prohibitions, and *hoshun* rulers offered refuge to Chinese migrants in their *hoshun* and allowed them to plough the *hoshun* land, collecting rent from them.

Thus the feudal state was juridically considered the sovereign proprietor of the land in Mongolia, but in actual fact the proprietors, with full powers, were the *jasag-noen*. As for their relationship with their subjects, the rulers of *hoshun* in the first place contrived an increase in the numbers of their personal *khamjlaga* by various devices, at the expense of rich herd-owners, whom they transferred from the register of *suman albat*, exchanging them for poor *khamjlaga*; in the second place they expanded their power over the *albat* in every way they could, and in particular collected from them various

dues for their own use. When they took over the good pasture for their own livestock, the *arat* carried on a struggle against the rulers of the *hoshun*, especially in cases where the *hoshun* princes allowed herdsmen from other *hoshun* to come in and nomadize on the *hoshun* territory, thus decreasing the area available for their own subjects, while collecting, from the outsiders, dues for pasture use which they did not make over to the *hoshun* organization, but appropriated for themselves.²⁶

Autocratic disposal of pastures by the *jasag-noen* was considered illegal by the *arat*, because they regarded the land of the *hoshun* as a common possession, not the personal property of the prince. An especially stubborn struggle was carried out by the *arat* of those *hoshun* in which a great part of the territory had been set aside for the herds of the Manchu post-stations [*örtöö*, relay stations, each with its herd of remounts, quarters for despatch riders and staff, and herds to provide milk and meat for the establishment]. The *arat* drove their herds over the *örtöö* pasture to trample it, drove off the remount herds, destroyed the felt tents of the post-stations, beat up the staff, brought suits against them, and so on. [All this because the maintenance of the post-stations required heavy requisitions on the population.]

The struggle for pastures was not, however, the only direction taken by the *arat* movement. Cattle were, at the same time, an object of class conflict to the extent that the *arat* were at the same time fighting²⁷ to conserve their cattle, which went to pay off the numerous dues levied both by the Manchu authorities and by the local feudal class. These dues and taxes were, in the final analysis, the realization of feudal property in land—land-rent. The *arat* liberation movement became especially strong in the second half of the nineteenth century, when the tax burden and the exactions of Chinese usury capital reached their culminating points.

CONCLUSIONS

1. In pre-revolutionary Mongolia the means of production were land and cattle in conjunction. The basic, definitive means of production was the land, but cattle were also an important means of production.

2. Side by side with large-scale feudal cattle ownership the immediate producer, the *arat*, owned a comparatively small number of cattle. The right of disposal of pasture resources, however, was in the hands of the feudal class, and this was a condition of pastoralism. The feudal right of disposal of pasture resources was equivalent in fact to a right of ownership of the land.

3. Apart from individual tracts reserved by the feudal class, the remainder of the territory of a *hoshun* was formally available for use in common, and considered the property of the population of the *hoshun* as a whole. In the summer the *arat* customarily nomadized without regard to distribution of *bag* and *otog* [administrative sub-units based on a registry of people, not land], utilizing the pasture in common. In the winter each *ail*-household occupied a definite site, the winter quarters [*övöljөөн*], which not infrequently was handed on by inheritance. The use of pastures, however, was far from egalitarian in character. It was the feudal class and the rich people who got hold of the best tracts, especially for winter quarters.

4. The *arat* paid rent for the use of the pastures to the supreme owner of the land, the state, in the person of the Manchu emperor, and subsequently [after 1911] to the Mongol Khagan-bogd-gegeen [the 'Living Buddha of Urga'], in the form of *degedü-in*

alba [service of the One-on-high], and also to the immediate proprietor of the land of *hoshun*, the *jasag-noen* [ruling prince] in the form of *guvchur* [assessments].

5. The sources of class conflict in Mongolia in the period under review were pasture and livestock in combination.

NOTES

1. In recent years a lively discussion has been carried on among Soviet scholars on the character of feudal relations among nomadic peoples. The materials of the discussion were printed in the journal *Voprosy Istorii* (Historical Questions), No. 6, of 1954, Nos. 1 and 4 of 1955. Among Soviet authors, in connexion with this question the following should be noted: I. Ya. Zlatkin, *Novaya i noveishaya istoriya Mongolii* (Modern and recent history of Mongolia), Moscow, Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 1957; G. P. Batarin, *Istoriya agrarnykh otnoshenii v Yakutii* (History of agrarian relations in Yakutia, from the 1760's to the middle of the nineteenth century), Moscow, Acad. Sci., USSR, 1956; C. Z. Bumanov, *Obshchestvennii stroi Kazakhov pervoi poloviny XIX veka* (Social structure of the Kazakhs of the first half of the nineteenth century), Alma-Ata, 1958.
Among Mongol authors one may point to the work of Professor N. Jagmanal, *Zemelnye otnosheniya v MNR*, 1955 (Land relations in the Mongolian People's Republic). Among the works of foreign scholars one may point to the works of the well-known American scholar and orientalist, O. Lattimore: *The social History of Mongol nomadism*, (in *Historians of China and Japan*, ed. W. C. Beasley and E. G. Pulleybank), London, 1961; *Studies in frontier history, Collected papers 1928-58*, Paris, 1962. [To these could be added the review-article, 'Feudalism in History', which appeared in *Past and Present*, No. 12, November 1957]. Also the works of the Japanese scholar Tayama Shigeru, *The social structure of the Mongols in the period of the Ch'ing Dynasty*, Tokyo, 1955 (in Japanese).
2. Sh. Natsagdorj, *Aratskoe osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie v Khobdoskom raione* (The arat liberation movement in the Khobdo region), Moscow, 1954.
3. Sh. Natsagdorj, *Iz istorii aratskogo dvizheniya vo uneshnei Mongolii* (From the history of the arat movement in Outer Mongolia), Moscow. Acad. Sci., USSR, 1958.
4. State archives, 1-13-53.
5. State archives, 1-13-40 and 1-13-19.
6. Ibid., Proceedings of the *hoshun* of Prince Urinjav of Sain-Noen Khan aimag, for the year 1877.
7. As examples we may cite the wording on signs posted on the pastures of the Bogd-geegen ['Urga Living Buddha'] and of monasteries: 'Notice of the pasture of the horse-herd of His Highness the Javzandamba Hutukhtu year month' (State archives, 2-22-2) and 'Notice of the pastures for the horses, camels, cattle, and sheep of the monastery Sharavpilje, posted by order of His Holiness Ochir-Dar geegen' (State archives, 2-22-2).
8. Historical Institute, Acad. of Sci., MPR, MS. collection.
9. In the Manchu Code of Laws it is indicated that for each 15 men in Mongolia a strip of land was set aside, of a width of 1 *li* and a length of 20 *li* (Ta Ch'ing, *Dynastic Laws*, Vol. 140, p. 97). Some scholars consider this is a measure of land set aside for ploughing, which is quite probable, since it is inconceivable that on such a patch of land 15 families could live entirely by their livestock. If we take into consideration the lands that were allocated to the frontier posts [on the Siberian frontier] out of *hoshun* land, it is possible to establish approximate measures for the land assigned to them. For example, the 13 frontier posts east of Kyakhta had land assigned to them. Out of these the 30 families of the post of Bur had an allotment 35 *li* wide, 14 long, and 110 in circumference. Dividing this by 30, each family would have 5.4 sq. km. But the measures used for land allocated to frontier posts were not standardized, but depended on the geographical peculiarities of the district.

10. In the *hoshun* of Khebei-beil of Sain-noen *aimag*, in 1843, a code was worked out for punishments to be applied to *taij* and to *arat* guilty of migrating independently [i.e. not in accordance with *hoshun* regulations]. The penalty for a *taij* was five head of stock; for an *arat*, 40 lashes of the whip. (Library of Övör-Khangai *aimag*, copies of documents of the administration of the *hoshun* of Khebei-beil, Sain-noen *aimag*.)
11. Lamjav. Review of conditions in the former Tsetsen Sartuul *hoshun* of Zasagt-khan *aimag*.
12. For example, the *taij* Sonom, of the *hoshun* of the *gün* Luvsandash of Tsetsen-khan *aimag*, had for many years cured hay at a place called Khustai. When, once, the *arat* of this *hoshun* cut hay in the plot fenced off by Sonom, he took them to court and the *hoshun* administration handed down a ruling that the hay which had been cut should be returned to the *taij* Sonom. The grounds for the decision followed the rule that the hay had been on land previously fenced off—in this case, by the *taij* Sonom.
13. Qalqa-Jirum (The Khalka Code). Traduit en russe par Dr Zamcarano, Ulan Bator, *Studia Mongolica*, Tomus I, Fasc. I, p. 45.
14. The *örtöö* [post stations or courier stations] organized in most of the *hoshun* of Mongolia by the Manchus were allocated territories with a breadth of 33–40 and a length of 50–70 *li*, and for each sub-station there was allotted from 30 to 100 *li* of land. Besides the main Manchu *örtöö*, there were *suman örtöö* within the *hoshun*, which were allocated territories measuring from 28 to 32 *li* on one side.
15. In the North of Khalkha, along the frontier [frontier posts] with settled populations, for which large parts of the territory of many *hoshun* were set aside. For the 13 *karaul* stretching to the east of Kyakhta, there were set aside lands measuring [each] from 200 to 600 *li* in circumference. Into these lands the livestock not only of *arat*, but even of *noen* [nobles and officials] were not allowed to enter.
16. A great quantity of livestock of the Manchu emperor was to be found in the territory of Khalkha, and the entire region of Dariganga was turned over to the *sürüg* [flocks and herds] of the Manchu emperor. His camel-herds were distributed over many *hoshun* of the Gobi. Apart from that, a great number of the so-called State herds were to be found in almost all *hoshun*, and they were allotted the best pastures.
A clear picture of the regulations for the distribution of land in those times is given by a letter sent by the *hoshun* ruler Urinjav of Tushetu-khan *aimag* in 1785 to the head of the League [*aimag*], in which it is stated that the territory of the *hoshun* consists of five *sum*, rather thickly populated, and that for a long time the population of the *hoshun* has been short of pasture, inasmuch as it is crowded on all sides by *shav'* and by other *hoshun*, and moreover part of its territory is occupied by pastures for the camel herds of the Manchu emperor and by the allotments auxiliary to three *örtöö*, which in turn have an area of 60 to 70 *li* each. (State archives, 1–13–115.)
17. State archives, Transactions of the *hoshun* prince Tsedensodnom of Sain-noen khan *aimag* for the year 1876.
18. State archives, copies of documents of prince Avirmid of Sain-noen khan *aimag* for the year 1878.
19. *Sokrovennoe Skazanie* (Secret History [of the Mongols]), S. A. Kozin, Moscow-Leningrad, 1941, p. 197.
20. Code of the Chinese Office of Foreign Affairs, Book 27.
21. I. Maiskii, *Mongoliya nakanune revolyutsii* (Mongolia on the eve of revolution), 1959, pp. 302–3.
22. Materials on the numbers of the herds of the princes of Tsetsen-khan *aimag* for the year 1841. State archives. Fund No. 5, serial Nos. 534–536. Cf. I. Maiskii, Appendix pp. 300–3.
23. In Professor Dr Shirendyev's book *Narodnaya revolyutsiya i provozglashenie MNR* (The people's revolution and the proclamation of the Mongolist People's Republic), Moscow. Acad. Sci. USSR., the revolutionary measures put into effect by the Party and Government in the period 1921–24 are reviewed in detail.

24. The book '*Dörvön aimgiin alba tegshitgesen dans*' (Register of the equalization of the dues of the four *aimag*) contains the basic data for the chief Manchu feudal obligations for the years from 1739 to 1904. This book was edited by Sh. Natsagdorj and Ts. Khasanbaljir.
25. The levy for the use of pasture was called *ebesün tsuvun* ['assessment for the grass'] from the Manchu word *tsyfun*, 'assessment' [which in turn is a borrowing, with some change of meaning, of the Chinese *tse-feng*, 'personal expenditure'].
26. State archives, 1-13-33, 1-13-45, 1-73-69, 1-13-81, 1-13-100, 1-13-102, 1-13-115.
27. Cf. Sh. Natsagdorj, *Iz istorii aratskogo dvijeniya vo Vneshnei Mongolii* (From the history of the arat movement in Outer Mongolia), and the same, *Khalkhyn tüükh* (History of Khalkha), Ulan Bator, Acad. Sci. Mongolian People's Republic, 1963.

THE SPREAD OF TRADE TO THE COUNTRYSIDE

M. Sanjdorj



It is appropriate to consider the second half of the eighteenth century as the period in Mongolia history when Chinese moneylending capital began completely to dominate the economy. From that time, the number of Chinese traders in Khalkh increased further, moneylending activities expanded, violations of the laws and regulations established by the Manchus on Chinese trade increased, and the trade overflowed the Chinese trading towns and, like an unstoppable flood, penetrated the *khushuus* in the countryside.

The activities of high-ranking Manchu officials, assisting and encouraging the Chinese traders, stimulated this development. From that time on, the assistance of Manchu officials, both open and secret, spread and became much more powerful. For example, although the old laws and regulations to keep Chinese out of the *khushuus* were still in force, in 1758 the Khebei Amban* ordered that permits be issued to thirty Chinese to allow them to collect debts and trade in the *aimags* and *khushuus*.¹ Again in 1783, the judge of Khiagt gave protection to a group of Chinese traders who came from Kalgan without permits; in violation of the law, he allowed the traders to enter Khiagt to trade.² In 1780 the same judge had allowed Chinese farmers from the farming areas of Ibin† and Selenge to enter Khiagt to trade.³

With this kind of protection, how could Chinese trade fail to develop and expand? That it did so is apparent from the rapid increase in the number of Chinese traders in Khalkh, about which a document of 1759 says: 'There are now over one thousand Chinese traders in Khüree and several hundred farmers in Ibin. Apart from this, there are [many] Chinese traders from Kalgan and Khökh Khot who come to Khalkh to trade and are roaming through Khüree.'⁴

The great increase in the number of traders in Khalkh is made clear in a 1775 document of the Department in Charge of Outer Mongolian Affairs: 'Despite the laws and regulations issued in the 22nd year of the reign of Ch'ien Lung [18 Feb. 1757–7 Feb. 1758] to prohibit Chinese traders from trading in the *khushuus*, there are now many Chinese traders in the countryside.'⁵ Another indication of the flourishing of Chinese moneylending was the increase in official and private debts. After 1757, the official debts of the four Khalkh *aimags* grew quickly and by 1775 they had reached 200,000 *taels* of

* *Khebei* was a Manchu title for an adviser. See 'To Van and his Teachings', Ulaanbaatar, 1968, p. 174.

† Ibin = Ivin = Iven, the name of a small river in the northern part of present-day Selenge *aimag*.

silver.⁶ Private debts also grew large. Some feudal lords were heavily in debt and unable to pay, and a point was reached where they had to seek help from others. For example, in 1775 Beis Sündevidorj of Tüsheets Khan *aimag* was unable to pay a debt owed by his dead father and petitioned as follows: 'My honourable relatives of the *aimag*, please have mercy on our golden clan [descendants of the great Chingis Khaan] and help me to get out of debt.'⁷ Sündevidorj's entire debt was over 4,000 *taels* of silver. In 1776, Ruling Prince Sedev of the same *aimag* owed 300 *taels* to the Chinese shop Tseren in Peking, of which he was a 'client'; 1,270 *taels* to a Chinese shop Wu Shengho in Khökh Khot; and 1,979 *taels* to the Chinese shops Hang Taihou and Yi Ch'ing-k'uei of Khökh Khot, and shop-owners Jambaa, Tsagaandai and Bayandai.⁸

This was the general situation of the feudal lords' private debts, but the private debts of commoners were also far from small. For example, in 1775 in the Ded Darga *khushuu* of the Khan Uul League [Tüsheets Khan *aimag*] two commoners each owed 2 *taels* of silver; three commoners each owed 3 *taels*; others each owed 10 *taels*; one owed 30 *taels*, two each owed 31 *taels*, and so on. Altogether sixteen people owed 168 *taels* of silver to the Chinese Senge. Dashdondog was in debt to Senge, but also owed 2 *taels* of silver to a Chinese called Bayandai. Almost every household in the entire *aimag* owed about 1.6 *taels* of silver to one of the seven Chinese traders.⁹ In the fall of 1775 in the *khushuu* of Gün Tserendorj in Tüsheets Khan *aimag*, twenty-nine commoners borrowed 222 *taels* of silver from a Chinese trader from Kalgan, another five commoners borrowed 43 *taels* from another Chinese trader, and about fifty commoners of this *khushuu* borrowed over 470 *taels* from thirteen Chinese traders; all these traders had been passing through the *khushuu*.¹⁰

In this way commoners and feudal lords alike became indebted and, debt-ridden, fell under the Chinese traders' control. As the exploitation and oppression of Chinese moneylending capital grew and intensified, not only the commoners, but some of the feudal lords began to feel great resentment towards the Chinese. Some feudal lords opposed the actions of the Chinese traders. For example, Damiranjav, ruling prince of a *khushuu*, wrote to the office of the *aimag* chief in 1769: 'Despite the established laws and regulations, the Chinese traders never observe them. Would it be possible to stop this and make them observe the laws?'¹¹ In 1779, the Da Tüsheets Khan and a khebei gün wrote to the military governor: 'The Chinese traders of Khökh Khot came to the southern part of our *khushuu* with large numbers of livestock and camped there, but there is not enough room in the *khushuu* pasture for the Chinese also to raise their livestock there, and anything could happen because of disputes over pasture and water between the Chinese and the people. Therefore we should chase the Chinese out. It is proper for us three to report to the judge of the trading town at Khüree, just as many times in the past we have reported to the Imperial Residents and the judges about Chinese traders who took refuge in our *khushuu* and were then expelled. Therefore, we would like you to add your name to this report.'¹²

The growth of Chinese trade, which increased at one and the same time its oppression and the resentment of the Khalkhs, reached the point where the Manchus instituted a further set of measures in the 1770s to deal with it. First, in accordance with a decision by the Department in Charge of Outer Mongolian Affairs, a registration of the debts of the four Khalkh *aimags* was carried out in 1775. From this we see, as mentioned above, that the Khalkh debts exceeded 200,000 *taels* of silver. After carrying out the debt registration, the Manchus issued the following decision: 'The debts contracted before the thirtieth year of the Ch'ien Lung [21 Jan. 1765–8 Feb. 1766] should be reduced by

half and paid without any interest; the debts contracted between the thirtieth and thirty-seventh years [1765–72] should be reduced by one-third and paid without any interest; * the debts contracted after the thirty-eighth year [23 January 1773–10 February 1774] should be paid in full but also without any interest,' and the period for repayment of debts was extended to five years, having previously been three years.¹³

Beginning at the end of 1775, work was carried out in all Khalkh *khushuus* for repayment of debts. Apart from sending representatives and high-ranking officials to the *khushuus* to supervise the process of debt collection, measures were even taken to summon the creditor-traders specially from China. It is clear that during the repayment there were disputes between Mongols and Chinese over the price of livestock. Some feudal lords strove to establish firm prices in advance so as to prevent the Chinese traders from fixing the prices of livestock as they wished. Regarding this, the Tüsheets Khan wrote in a letter to Da Khoshoi Ch'in Van on the 24th of the last winter month of the 41st year of Ch'ien Lung [1 February 1777]: 'I have received a message from the Zasagt Khan and others saying that by the mercy of the Emperor the outstanding debts of the Mongols have been reduced and the duration of repayment has been extended. Furthermore, the interest on the debts has been cancelled. Because of this, the Chinese are very resentful and may further reduce the price of livestock when they buy. Therefore, we should firmly fix the prices. Since the Imperial Resident said that the four *aimags* could make suggestions on this matter, we should give a united opinion.'¹⁴ It is not clear whether the whole of Khalkh fixed uniform prices for their livestock in accordance with this suggestion, but this shows that there had been earlier disputes between the Mongols and Chinese over the price of livestock for repayment of debts. It shows too that the Mongols as a whole wished to struggle against the exploitation of the Chinese traders by establishing a fixed price for livestock.

Work was also carried out in 1776–81 for repayment of private as well as official debts, but it was accompanied by a considerable struggle. Some of the debtors ran away, while others insisted that they were not in debt and even took their cases to law. The Chinese traders who were debt collectors impoverished the debtors by mercilessly taking away anything they had, including livestock, property and clothing; in 1776 there was even an occasion when a Chinese trader named T'ien T' an-k'ung took away the wife of a commoner named Adarbandi in payment for debts.¹⁵

The five-year period established for repayment of debts ended in 1781 and progress was reviewed. According to some of the documents from this survey, twenty-four *khushuus* in the Tüsheets Khan *Aimag* alone paid off their debts and the accounts were closed.¹⁶ This meant that the majority of Khalkh *khushuus* were able to pay their debts, official and private.

While the work for repaying the debts was being carried out, the permits of the Chinese traders were closely checked, and as a result large numbers were found who either had no permits at all or who had permits which had expired. According to the Manchu government laws and regulations, the authorities should have expelled these traders from the *khushuus* to Khüree, Khiagt, Uliastai, Khovd, Tamir and Barkhöl (in Chinese Turkestan, about 500 km. south of Khovd), or expelled them completely from Khalkh; but it was not easy to force Chinese traders out of the *khushuus* and into trading towns or out of Khalkh. This was because the traders hid themselves wherever

* In an undated, personal communication received in July 1977, the author informed me that the word *khüügee* (with interest) in the text should have been corrected to *khüügügee* (without interest).

they were trading, operated underground, or made excuses and never left the *khushuus*. The offices of the seal in some *khushuus* were unhappy about this. In particular, the *khushuu* office of Ruling Prince Tsevegjav in Tüsheet Khan *aimag* complained in 1778 to the league of the *aimag* that the traders were making all kinds of excuses for not leaving his *khushuu*. The complaint was as follows: 'We have asked the petty officials who came here from Khüree this summer to investigate the matter and they told us to chase them away. We have chased them many times before, but they have not moved away. What should we do?'¹⁷ If a trader was expelled from a *khushuu*, he could take refuge in another one; and if he was expelled from there, he could find refuge in a third. Thus the Chinese traders were able to defeat the joint efforts of the Manchus and the Mongolian feudal lords to expel them from all the *khushuus* of Khalkh. The majority of Chinese traders were able to stay in a *khushuu*, no matter how many times they were put under pressure to leave.

The great efforts of the Manchu government to expel Chinese traders from the Khalkh *khushuus* were a continuation of its policy of stopping the penetration of Chinese trade in the countryside and of restricting trade there. From the second half of the eighteenth century, the Manchu policy of restricting Chinese trade in Khalkh changed slightly; namely, Chinese traders were restricted to the trading towns. But the permission given to traders to trade in Tsetsen Khan *aimag* was an obstacle to this policy, and became a precedent for demanding free trade in the *khushuus* of the other Khalkh *aimags*, as well as causing secret trade in the neighbouring *khushuus* of Tüsheet Khan *aimag*. Because of this, the Manchu government issued a decision regarding restrictions on the previously free trade in Tsetsen Khan *aimag*. The Manchus considered it proper to establish a trading town there, as they had done in the other Khalkh *aimags*, in order to eliminate trade in the *khushuus* of Tsetsen Khan *aimag* which were being used as a pretext for trade elsewhere. On the 15th of the middle winter month of the fortieth year of Ch'ien Lung [5 January 1776], the Imperial Resident of Khüree ordered: 'The territory of Tsetsen Khan *aimag* is very extensive and there is really no trading area. There are trading towns at Dolon-nuur and Khüree, but because of the long distances, this *aimag* cannot be compared with others . . . If trade in places such as Dolon-nuur is reliable for Tsetsen Khan *aimag*, this decision should be carried out immediately. If the *aimag* thinks this inadequate, a place should be chosen either in the *khushuu* of the Tsetsen Khan [i.e. the *khushuu* ruled directly by him] or in the *khushuu* of Prince Demchig, or another suitable place. Traders with permits from the Department in Charge of Outer Mongolian Affairs will no longer be allowed to trade freely in the *khushuu*, but only in the designated place. It will immediately become apparent if this idea proves helpful to the livelihood of the masses. Report to us . . . there is no reason for you not to memorialize with a request. Consult and reply.'¹⁸ In the latter part of the last winter month [21 January–18 February], the authorities of Tsetsen Khan *aimag* decided not to establish a trade town in their *aimag* and replied to the order: 'We respectfully report to you that the *khushuus* of this *aimag* have been trading for many years in places such as Dolon-nuur, Khökh Khot, Khüree, Khiagt, Lamyn Khüree* and Khailar [Hailar]. The commoners of the *khushuus* of the ruling princes of the *aimag* find it adequate to buy tea and cloth from the nearest trading place. Therefore, our *aimag* would like to continue to follow the old custom.'¹⁹

* Lamyn Khüree was located in the area of the Möron Sum of present-day Khentei *aimag*. For this area see Tsetsen Khan *aimag*.

The decision of the league of the *aimag* not to have a trading town established in its territory is partly explained by the Mongolian feudal lords' hatred of Chinese money-lending and by the considerable change in their relations. In the second half of the eighteenth century, debts increased and the pressure of Chinese moneylending capital intensified; not only the common herdsmen but most of the feudal lords fell into the hands of Chinese moneylenders. The position of the trader had changed from guest to master. It is said that a Chinese trader boasted: 'I am the master here, because the lord of this area owes me a lot.' This could only arouse the hatred of the lords. A few examples of how the latter were angered have already been cited. Thus the decision of the authorities of Tsetsen Khan *Aimag* not to establish a trading town in their territory was, on the one hand, support for Chinese trade and on the other, an expression of their hatred of the trade. By not having a trading town built in their territory they wished to keep debts low and wanted to protect themselves from the traders. The trade, previously carried on freely throughout the *khushuus* of Tsetsen Khan *aimag* as established by the Manchus, was stopped. The official debts of many *khushuus* throughout Khalkh had mostly been paid for the time being, and some illegal traders were expelled. But even after the adoption of these measures, the power of Chinese trade in Khalkh did not weaken but grew and spread. Chinese traders came to the *khushuus* to trade illegally as they had done previously, and never missed the smallest chance of doing so. For example, in 1780, when Russo-Chinese trade was re-opened in Khiagt, a large proportion of the traders who had permits to trade in Khiagt never arrived there, but instead traded in *khushuus* on their way and then returned to China,²⁰ and it is apparent that Chinese traders who had permits to go to Khüree and Uliastai did the same. To stop this practice, special routes were fixed: e.g. traders who went to Khiagt from Khüree had to go through Ulaan Khad and the River Yeröö [south of Khiagt].²¹ But despite this new ordinance, the traders still went into the *khushuus* along the way.

There were several reasons why Chinese traders made such efforts to go to the *khushuus* to trade. First, they could sell their goods at much higher prices there than in the trading towns, and could buy their livestock and raw materials much more cheaply; secondly, competition among Chinese traders was common in the trading towns, but non-existent or very unusual in the *khushuus*; thirdly, trade in the *khushuus* provided a chance to save money and reduce some of the expenses (e.g. housing, storehouses, stalls, and gifts and bribes for the judges, high-ranking officials and feudal lords) which were necessary in the trading towns; fourthly, almost all the *khushuus* in Tsetsen Khan *aimag*, and many in the other three *aimags*, were much nearer and more convenient for the distance-conscious traders than Khüree, Khiagt and Uliastai; and finally, the majority of traders who came to the *khushuus* to trade had either never had permits to trade or their permits had expired. Such traders were unable to trade freely in the trading towns, but were able to go to the *khushuus* to trade secretly. So it can be seen that trade was in many respects much more profitable in the *khushuus* than in the trading towns. Because of this the obstacles to trade in the *khushuus* broke down: the number of traders continually increased and by the 1790s had become very large. This is seen from the fact that in 1792, 214 expired permits had not been returned to the office of the magistrate in Dolon-nuur, which should have been.²² This failure to return expired permits meant that trade could proceed uninterruptedly with the expired permits, and that the holders of the expired permits mostly went to the *khushuus* to trade. Thus, around 1792 there were over 200 permit-holders from Dolon-nuur alone trading mostly in the *khushuus* (as

already mentioned, a permit allowed ten traders and twenty loaded carts of goods), and it is apparent that if Dolon-nuur issued over 200 permits, other places such as Kalgan and Khökh Khot certainly had as many traders in the *khushuus*. Thus there is no doubt that the number of traders in the whole of Khalkh, with and without permits, reached several thousand, and of these quite a large proportion were trading in the *khushuus*. In any case, by the end of the eighteenth century, although the old Manchu government policy of forbidding trade in the *khushuus* had not officially been abolished, in reality it was not observed and was not enforced in the *khushuu* trade, which the Manchus were powerless to stop.

The Manchu colonial apparatus and the high-ranking government officials in Khalkh Mongolia, instead of going to the *khushuus* to stop the trade, approved of it; or if they did not approve of it, they pretended ignorance. Thus, as trade was conducted freely in the *khushuus*, it became meaningless and unrealistic to restrict it by law as had been done previously. Under these conditions, free trade in the *khushuus* should have been officially approved, as trading towns at Uliastai and other places were approved in 1757. In fact, the newly-enthroned Chia Ch'ing emperor ordered free trade in the *khushuus* in the first year of his reign [9 February 1796–27 January 1797]. The Manchu government's decision read as follows:

The Mongolian steppes are unproductive, and therefore, by the grace of the Emperor, traders from inside China are sent there to trade. The bartering of goods is in reality mutually beneficial to all. Thus we have been sending such traders without restriction . . . You, the ruling princes, should allow any Chinese traders to trade in any *khushuu*, but you must restrict the traders from going near the frontier posts. Similarly, the traders should be allowed to trade within a given *khushuu*, but should not leave the *khushuu* to go to the frontier posts to trade . . . From now on, if there are Chinese traders in your *khushuus*, you ruling princes should gather them all together within the *khushuu* and let them trade only in places where Mongols are settled. If among the traders there are those who go to the frontier posts to trade, you should arrest them and send them to us. The Mongol commoners at the frontier posts should go to the trading place within the *khushuu* near their own frontier post to buy provisions . . .²³

Hence it is clear what great attention the Manchus paid to prohibiting Chinese traders from approaching the frontier posts to trade. This prohibition was made from fear that the traders would trade illegally with the Russians.

The official approval of trade in the *khushuus* in 1796 was no merciful gesture to the traders, but a privilege won by the power of Chinese moneylending capital. The Manchus had no choice but to bring their laws and policy into line with the existing situation.

The new trade laws and regulations, which were approved in 1798, showed the basic policy of the Manchus regarding Chinese moneylending capital in Khalkh. In one sense they formed the whole corpus of effective Manchu law on the subject. When discussing any question about Chinese moneylending capital, the Manchus based their decisions on the 1798 laws and regulations, of which the main clauses were written during 1811–15 and almost all included in the Regulations of the Department in Charge of Outer Mongolian Affairs published in 1816 [*Li-fan Yüan tse-li*].²⁴

Thus in order to carry out the classification of Chinese traders who go to Khüree, Khiagt, Uliastai and the four Khalkh *aimags* to trade and firmly follow the laws and measures—

- Item:* From now on, as before, Chinese traders should obtain Department permits from the Minister [*said*] of the Tsakhar *khushuus** or the *Meiren-zangi*† of Khökh Khot, or the Magistrate of Dolon-nuur.
- Item:* When issuing permits, the given office should clearly write names, surnames, the quantity of goods, the destination and the date of departure of the Chinese traders on a sheet of paper which should be attached to the permit and sealed with the official seal.
- Item:* After issuing the permits, the said office should immediately notify the offices of the Imperial Resident or high-ranking officials in the place to which the traders are going.
- Item:* In the three areas—the Tsakhar *khushuus*, Khökh Khot and Dolon-nuur—there is a lot of trade, as well as many shops. The market should be investigated beforehand and orders should be given to the officers, soldiers and business heads that if there are those who wish to trade at other places, the officers and soldiers should check them on their day of departure and then let them go.
- Item:* All decisions should be made in accordance with this code, regardless of the size of the business.
- Item:* If traders think they do not need a permit from the Department in Charge of Outer Mongolian Affairs and obtain a permit elsewhere and trade, they should be punished according to the law regarding lack of a Department permit.
- Item:* After the traders obtain their permits from the Department and reach their destination, the relevant office of the Imperial Resident should check and register them and send them back [to China] within the specified time.
- Item:* If some of the Chinese traders, after arriving at their indicated destination, want to go elsewhere to trade, their intention should be reported to the local office, permits should be issued and the office of the place to which they want to go should be notified.
- Item:* The ruling princes of Khalkh should control Chinese traders who go to the *khushuus* of the four *aimags*.
- Item:* Permit-holders should be allowed to pass. Non-permit-holders should be arrested, reported and punished in accordance with the laws on illegal traders.
- Item:* If, after the establishment of these laws, there are traders who freely trade without permits from the Department, they should be punished for intentionally violating the laws, by wearing the cangue for two months, being given over forty lashes and having half their goods confiscated. Then they should be sent back to their original homes in China.
- Item:* There are traders who have no permits, therefore, before enforcing these laws, there should be a year of grace, after which their registration should be checked. By the mercy of the Emperor, the period of grace is extended to two years.
- Item:* This is sent to the Chiefs of the Leagues of the four Khalkh *aimags* and Khüree and Uliastai, who should copy this document with the laws and measures which have been adopted and announce it to all.²⁵

It can thus be seen that the Manchus made a concession to the Chinese traders by allowing them to trade in the *khushuus*, but as before they continued to control those

* The '*khushuu* of Tsakhar' also refers to the area of Kalgan.

† The *Meiren-zangi* was a deputy general under the Manchu dynasty.

who came to Khalkh and restricted their business operations by banning illegal trade, allowing trade in the *khushuus* only in accordance with the laws and regulations, providing trade at frontier posts and permitting trade with the Russians only at government level.²⁶ Under the new system, before going to the *khushuus* to trade, Chinese traders had to be registered at the office of the judge in Khüree or Uliastai. If the office of the seal of a *khushuu* found that traders were not registered, they would not allow them to trade and would forcibly send them to the appropriate place to be registered. The main purpose of the system was clearly to prevent illegal trading in the *khushuus*.

After 1800, all Chinese traders in Khalkh Mongolia were registered. According to some scattered and incomplete material from the registration, the number living in Khalkh at the beginning of the century was very large. For example, there were 200 registered in the *khushuu* of Ch'in Wang Tsedendorj in TüsHEET Khan *aimag* in 1801; more than 100 in the *khushuu* of Gün Tseveendash in Sain Noyon Khan *aimag*; and twenty-seven in the *khushuu* of Beis Nyambuudorj in Tsetsen Khan *aimag*.²⁷ From this it is not too hard to estimate how many Chinese traders were in the Khalkh *khushuus* at the time. A large portion of them were still doing business illegally. For example, of the twenty-seven in the *khushuu* of Beis Nyambuudorj, ten did not have proper permits. Similarly, in 1799, thirty-four of the sixty-six shops in Khiagt had no permits.²⁸

By the end of the eighteenth century, the first major results of free trade in the *khushuus* were a great expansion of the operations of moneylending capital and its oppressiveness, and an increase in the debts of the Khalkhs. For example, in 1802 the private debts of the commoners and *taijs* of the *khushuu* of Ruling Prince GÜRjav in TüsHEET Khan *aimag* amounted to three horses, 219 cows, 36 sheep and goats, 828 squirrel furs, 5,689 *chin* of grain; 509 *chin* of flour, 21,272 bricks of tea, and 165 pieces of raw hide. Of that, one Chinese trader had a claim to 56 cows, nine sheep, 238 squirrel skins, 995 *chin* of grain and 22 pieces of fur from forty-four commoners in that *khushuu*.²⁹ By 1807, the private debts of the lamas in Khüree alone amounted to 25 million units of yellow tea* (at that time 150–200 units of yellow tea were worth one *liang* of silver); in other words they owed 160,000 *taels* of silver to the Chinese traders.³⁰ By 1804, over 300 commoners in the *khushuu* of Gün Tseveendash in Sain Noyon Khan *aimag* owed debts to traders.

The private debts of the Mongolian feudal lords and the high-ranking nobles also increased. For example, in 1804 Ch'in Wang Tserennamjil, Taij Dorjjav, Bat-ochir and other nobles were unable to pay their own private debts and asked for help from others.³¹ As these debts increased, the commoners suffered even more. For example, in 1804 Ch'in Wang Tsedendorj, apart from having his subjects pay his private debts, which amounted to 21,391 *taels* of silver, forcibly collected 412 head of cows, 2,160 sheep, 6,232 *chin* of butter and a large quantity of flour, grain, milk and felt from the commoners for his own use during 1801–4.³²

Because of the diverse burdens of the feudal lords imposed on the commoners and the exploitation of Chinese moneylending capital, the livelihood of the Khalkh people deteriorated more than ever. The majority of them had long since lost hope of ever freeing themselves from debt and paying the Chinese traders; they became common 'slaves', unrewarded herders who tended other people's livestock which was said to be their own (the Chinese traders could have taken it at any time as payment for debts). The

* One '*shar-tsai*', literally 'yellow tea', equalled one-eighth of a tea brick (although even regular bricks were of several standardized weights or values). *Shar-tsai* was an ancient unit of paper money.

Chinese traders mercilessly took anything they could get for their loans. For example, from the official orders of the commander of frontier posts in the two Eastern *aimags* and the deputy chief of the League of Tsetsen Khan *aimag*, we see that in 1801 a Chinese trader filed a lawsuit against a Mongolian woman called Dugar to obtain payment for the loan of a five-year old cow. The office of the seal of the *khushuu* ordered her to pay; Dugar at first denied owing a debt, but later took her belongings and fled to a hunter's cabin in a forest near the Minj frontier post (southeast of Khiagt) and while hiding there alone was captured. All her property was registered and confiscated to pay the debt, and the woman was left alone with nowhere to go, no clothes to wear and no food to eat.³³ The economy of the people was ruined and their livestock and belongings became the property of the traders.

Thus, the basis and character of Chinese moneylending capital at the beginning of the nineteenth century had drastically changed from a century earlier when it first penetrated Khalkh. Chinese trade in Khalkh had overcome all kinds of obstacles created by the Manchus to restrict it. By mid-century the scope of trade had expanded, but by the end of the century the Chinese had obtained the right to trade freely in the *khushuus*, and thus in every corner of Khalkh territory. Thereafter, Chinese traders centred themselves in the trading towns at Khüree, Khiagt, Uliastai, Khovd, Orkhon and Khar Us, spread their trade throughout Khalkh, and lent money. With the passage of time, the interests of the Manchus [serving as officials in Mongolia] came closer to those of the Chinese moneylending shop-owners. Both openly and secretly, the senior local Manchu officials helped and encouraged the Chinese shops in every way and protected their interests. The Manchu government also gradually relaxed its policy of restricting Chinese trade in Khalkh Mongolia. The Chinese shops in Khalkh developed even further, and by the beginning of the nineteenth century they occupied the decisive position in the Khalkh economy. This position was the source of the further development of Chinese moneylending capital.

AUTHOR'S NOTES

1. National Archive, Manchu Period collection, 1–8–13.
2. Ibid., 1–8–47.
3. Ibid., 1–8–63.
4. Ibid., transl. from Manchu, Folio [*khavtas*] 29.
5. Ibid., 2–4–5.
6. Ibid., 1–10–4.
7. Ibid., 1–10–47.
8. Ibid., 1–10–65.
9. Ibid., 1–10–44.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., 1–8–58.
12. Ibid., 1–8–55.
13. Ibid., 1–10–65.
14. Ibid., 1–10–45.
15. Ibid., Affairs of the Khüree Imperial Resident, Folio [*khavtas*] 11.
16. Ibid., 1–10–4.
17. Ibid., 1–8–56.
18. Ibid., 2–4–5.

19. Ibid.
20. Ibid., 1–8–22, 66.
21. Ibid., 1–8–69.
22. Ibid., 2–4–5.
23. Ibid., 2–4–1.
24. *Ulozhenie Palaty Vneshnikh Snoshenii* (Regulations governing Board of Foreign Affairs; i.e. *Li-fan Yüan tse-li*), transl. by Lipovtsev (from the Manchu text), 1828, Vol. II, pp.82–7.
25. Ibid., 1–8–10.
26. Ibid., 1–8–24, 70.
27. Ibid., 1–8–27, 38, 64.
28. Ibid., 1–8–10, 25.
29. Ibid., 1–8–49.
30. Ibid., 2–5–2.
31. Ibid., 1–10–61.
32. Ts. Nasanbaljir, *Manjiin üyeiin albat-sum ard* (The state subjects in the Manchu period). For details see Appendix B, p. 109, nos. 7 and 9.
33. National Archive, Manchu Period coll., 1–8–53.

THINGS AND THE QING

Mongol Culture in the Visual Narrative¹

Johan Elverskog



In his explication of the mind-spirit dialectic, Hegel famously proclaimed that in relation to the progressive teleology of Christian Europe the East was mired in stasis.² This idea has, of course, in recent decades come under relentless assault, yet old theories die hard, and the notion of the timeless East persists. It is used to sell vacations, travel books, art shows and everything in between. Moreover, as recent studies have made abundantly clear, rather than stasis and a unidirectional project of Othering, the formation of the contemporary world has been a process of representation and self-representation.³ Yet even with this in mind, it is often surprising how powerful the idea of stasis continues to be in the representation of the Mongols.⁴

Thus in popular discourse they are still employed as *the* representatives of remoteness, backwardness, and all the other tropes of timelessness. Indeed, it is this view of the Mongols that is perhaps the only shared idea to be found in the writings of Bill O'Reilly and Thomas Friedman. The Fox News show host O'Reilly thus unsurprisingly draws an analogy between the current presumed lack of social values in America and the 'Mongol hordes'.⁵ Friedman, the *New York Times* columnist and neo-liberal promoter of globalization, on the other hand, uses the opening of the Ulaanbaatar stock exchange as a proof of the inevitability of the new world order being defined by free market capitalism in even its remotest corners (2000: 153). Of course, in appropriating the Mongols in such a fashion these two commentators are not alone. In the recent *Star Wars* film, for example, the Khalkha-inspired headdress of Princess Amadala is used to signify radical otherness. Invariably, the pervasiveness of such representations, as well as our complacency in the face of them, reflects how the long history of unfavourable European and Middle Eastern discourses on 'the Mongols' have in fact become normalized. Even so, however, their continued commonplaceness can still at times be jarring. Such as when Gregor von Rezzori in his moving memoir about the ethnic nuances of the Bukovina, the easternmost crown land of the Austro-Hungarian empire, writes that the community of Kronstadt 'seemed to have retrenched in an act of stubborn self-protection against scimitar-swinging, slit-eyed, rattail-moustachioed Mongols'.⁶

The genealogy of this European orientalist view *par excellence* can rather easily be traced back through such works as those of Matthew of Paris, who first proposed the etymological link between Tartar and Tartarus, thus cementing the medieval notion that the Mongols emanated from hell (Figure 31.1);⁷ an infernal image that was later reconfirmed in the early modern period in such work as Giles Fletcher's widely



Figure 31.1 Tartars as depicted in the Matthew Paris manuscript. Reproduced by kind permission of The Master and Fellows of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, Ms 16, fol. 166r

influential Puritan eschatological tract wherein it was again ascertained that the 'Tartars' were in fact 'the most vile and barbarous nation of all the world'.⁸ In turn it was of course these stock images that eventually became fodder for the nineteenth-century 'civilizing' discourses of empire. The naturalization of all 'Inner Asians' as barbarous, remote and backward served well not only the politics of the 'Great Game', but also the project of expanding Euroamerican interests into the powerful Ottoman and Qing states.⁹ Thus while it is rather easy to surmise the underlying political, religious, cultural and moral logic shaping these earlier projections, it is quite another to say why these representations, especially in regard to the Mongols, still persist today.

One possible explanation for the perpetuation of the Mongols as mired in stasis is that above and beyond this long genealogy of representing the Mongols as radically other, there is the fact that on a profound level they encapsulate the nomad archetype. In both 'western' and 'eastern' representations, nomadism invariably encapsulates all the elements that are antithetical to the forces defining the march of progress towards urbanized civilization.¹⁰ In Levi-Straussian terms, they are raw. Moreover, in the case of the Mongols they are also the very people who bequeathed us not only the eponymous raw steak and tooth decay, but mental retardation as well.¹¹ It is therefore possible to argue that on account of the idea of 'the nomad' and its attendant tropes, particularly its timeless modality – one that is in particular outside the teleology of progress and modernity – that, as a result, the Mongols have virtually transcended the time-space continuum. In popular culture they exist either in the past, as the ruthless and cannibalistic warriors of Chinggis Khan, or in the future as their sci-fi apotheosis.¹² Past, present, and future – they are the same. In Hegelian terms, they are stasis defined. Or are they?

Of course, on one level we know that all of these representations are just that: projections serving various discursive ends. Rather than being static we know that the 'Mongols', Mongol history, Mongol culture, Mongol states, Mongol religion, Mongol art, etc., are all enormously varied, and have not only always been but continue to be. Yet, even so, beyond the realm of popular culture there are powerful discourses that perpetuate the notion of stasis, such as the romantic, and at times reactionary discourses shaping the field of Mongolian Studies, where early, especially Western, scholars not only often promoted the idea of stasis, but were also in fact situated within a larger framework premised on a narrative of decline. Thus for Mongols as well as scholars of

Mongolia there was, and at times continues to be, some imagined Mongol purity that is continually under assault from foreign influences, be they Chinese culture, Buddhism, communism, or Christianity. Of course, by framing issues of Mongol history and identity or even the study of the Mongols in such a way Mongolists are certainly not alone. Indeed, as others have pointed out the very legitimating logic of the humanities has been the narrative of decline. One in which 'culture' is 'dying in a modern wasteland where only a few select misfits still recall and preserve its fast-fading glories'.¹³ It is therefore this idea that not only helped shape Western notions of modernity and the trajectory of human 'cultures', but also defined the contiguous enterprise of modern tourism. In particular, the anthropologist and tourist's quests for marginal spaces, since it is only away from the ills of modernity and urban decay where it is believed authenticity survives.¹⁴

As a result it is not surprising that it is this very same logic that the Mongol tourist industry adopts and projects back to those rugged souls who seek to capture some of the authenticity, remoteness, and timelessness that has apparently been lost in the modern world. The websites and advertisements promoting tourism in Mongolia stress the timelessness of life on the steppe and play heavily on the unchanging nature of Mongolia, especially as manifested in its nomadic traditions. The enormous changes wrought by Qing regulations, communist communes, or the post-Soviet upheavals are, of course, never mentioned. Rather, the thrust of this representation is that Mongolian culture is not only authentic, a sort of Tylorian 'survival', but also an antidote to the stress inherent in our modern lifestyles.¹⁵

While the Mongols' promotion of this representation within the realm of globalized consumption today serves primarily financial ends, it is also important to keep in mind that it has, as noted above, deep roots in the Western tradition. The 'Orientalist gaze' has therefore clearly influenced this representation; however, it is important to recognize that it is not symptomatic of the 'Shangri-La prison' that Lopez imagines for the Tibetans (1998). Indeed, it is quite the opposite.¹⁶ The idea of nomadism and nomadic simplicity as a defining characteristic of the Mongols has long been part of their own tradition. Chinggis Khan was famously lauded as the ruler of the 'people of the felt-walled tents' (SH § 202). Numerous Mongol sources contain the popular saying attributed to Ögödei Khan in the *Secret History*: 'resting, their feet upon the ground, their hands upon the soil',¹⁷ which captures well a nomad's feeling of being sated and also Mongol cultural self-satisfaction.

This idea was indeed promoted in Rashipunsug's 1775 *Crystal Rosary* (*Bolur erike*) wherein he argued that the Mongols' practice of nomadism is easier, if not inherently better, than other peoples' modes of production. 'The people of other realms [*ulus*] make a living exerting themselves in manual labour such as farming, handicrafts, commerce, and so on. The people of our Mongolian realm [*Monggol ulus*] make a living herding livestock, living off of the yearly increase and in between using them for riding and transport and selling the excess to buy goods.'¹⁸ In pursuing this idea of nomadism as the high life, Rashipunsug even went so far as to connect the word 'Mongol' with *mungdasi ügei*, 'carefree'.¹⁹

A similar sentiment of the virtues of the 'nomadic ideal' is perhaps nowhere captured better than in the iconic works of the early twentieth-century Mongol painter Sharav (Figure 31.2). Works that are now prominently on display in Ulaanbaatar's Fine Art Museum powerfully reflect for both tourists and locals alike the idea of Mongol life on the steppe as incorporating the threads of simplicity, tradition and ultimately continuity.




Figure 31.2 Sharav's *August*

These images not only re-confirm the image of timelessness and the stasis of nomadism for foreign tourists, but also for Mongols seeking certain elements of continuity in a period of enormous social upheaval.²⁰ Thus, while Sharav's paintings may actually have been based on Wheel of Life paintings as well as portraits of sacred places and promoted the Buddhist teaching of the preciousness of human life; they also reconfirmed Mongol pride in their own traditions of nomadism. The paintings and their embedded discourse of stasis therefore resonate not only today, but also, curiously, came to be iconographic representations of post-1921 theories of communist revolution.

Indeed, counter to the rhetoric of change and social transformation inherent in most communist rhetoric, in the case of Mongolia, many theorists proclaimed that because

of its pastoral mode of production Mongolia could actually bypass the capitalist phase of development, and go straight to socialism (Figure 31.3). Thus oddly enough, counter to the modernist drive of Marxist-Leninist projects elsewhere and their inevitable and often violent rejection of the past, in Mongolian communist discourse, nomadism and stasis were in fact positive. On account of their very backwardness, as epitomized in the practice of nomadic pastoralism, the Mongols were actually the vanguard of the future; a sentiment that is well captured in the leading Daur intellectual Merse's 1923 *The Mongolian Question* (*Menggu Wentì*):

When you look at [Mongolia's] government, there is nothing to see but the flickering lights



Figure 31.3 Mongolia leaping over capitalism. Reproduced with permission from *Modern Mongolia: Reclaiming Genghis Khan* (National Museum of Mongolian History, Ulaanbaatar).

around its temples. When you investigate its politics there is nothing to study but the mutual flaunting of plumed hats. If you inquire of its cities and towns, then they will inform you of its mountain streams and fields. If you ask of its industry, then they will point to their horses, cattle, sheep and camels. Entering its borders there are no difficulties whatsoever with police or detectives, but robbers are nonexistent while harming living beings is considered as the utmost sin . . .

To have such a country in the world today, now! It is like having a utopia, a new crystallized formation of nihilism, something which could not have been expected in the present-day world of struggle and killing, stabbing and grabbing. But this is not a fable; Outer Mongolia before its second independence [in 1921] really presented this kind of scene (quoted in Atwood 2002: 495).

Moreover, the central idea that on account of their very timelessness the Mongols had actually been able to transcend modernity and the despicable accretions of bourgeois capitalism and instead be, in essence, natural communists, was articulated more fully by the propagandist Buyannemekhü in 1928. He and others argued that precisely because of Mongolian culture's stasis, the Mongols could actually leap over capitalism and go straight to communism.

Mongolia has not had big capitalists who exploit others. Those with a few head of livestock are automatically considered as rich capitalists. Not only is that not exploitative capital, but it even protects the national capital. If they are caught in a drought or a *zud* [a cold weather disaster] then they will become the poorest of the poor. From this we can see that we Mongols from the earliest times have never entered the path of exploiting and exploited capitalism, indeed it would be better to say we have been living in a socialist fashion. Thus we can now, with one step further, immediately enter communism . . . Our Mongolian lifestyle from the beginning did not have one exploiting the other; it would be better to say we have indulged in an easy living off the land. Therefore, the European countries can only enter communism after three or four steps, but we can set an example by moving into communism in one step. It would seem that while in Europe only the poor class can build communism, here the whole people at large can build our communism (Quoted in Atwood 2002: 496).

While this positive conceptualization of nomadism and stasis shaped early Mongol communist exegesis, over time the counter discourse of change did, however, become orthodox. In the 1940s industrialisation was emphasized, and in the 1960s pastoralism was something to be eradicated. Yet much as nomadism did not entirely disappear, nor did the discourse of stasis and its utopian visions of timeless nomadism.²¹

Nevertheless, this is not the place to explore these larger issues, nor is this brief overview of how the Mongols are perceived, and how they represent themselves, meant to be exhaustive. Rather, by providing a wide array of examples, from Puritan eschatology to the modern tourist industry, from Qing-period Mongolian histories to the discipline of anthropology, the aim has been to show how pervasive the idea of Mongol culture as static actually is. In addition, this overview is an attempt to highlight the fact that this representation is not only a Western, or Chinese, projection upon the Other: the hapless, 'Orientalized' barbarian. Rather, it is important to keep in mind that the Mongols have also engaged with the same tropes both positively and negatively for centuries. Yet even so, my aim herein is not to provide a genealogy of these various discourses, however valuable such an endeavour would be, but instead my more limited goal is to point them out as a heuristic device. By revealing the general pervasiveness of this representation it allows us to ask the important question: how much do these conceptualizations continue to shape our own scholarly interpretations of Mongol

history and culture? In particular, how do the tacit assumptions of stasis continue to shape and possibly distort our understanding of Mongol history during the nearly three-hundred year period of Manchu rule? The reason this question is important is because this period of massive social, political and cultural transformation is all too often subsumed within the rhetoric of stasis.

Thus anyone who travelled in Mongol areas will invariably have been regaled with the standard narrative of the Qing as a period of oppression and cultural stagnation. Built into this presentation is the idea that by retarding the natural development of Mongol culture and society, Manchu colonialism was not only able to rule the poor Mongols, but it also ensured that at the turn of the twentieth-century the Mongols were mired in regressive feudal and superstitious modes of being. And this view is not only maintained by the 'man on the steppe',²² but within all levels of society. Thus in the catalogue for the *Modern Mongolia: Reclaiming Genghis Khan* exhibit held recently at the University of Pennsylvania, it is not surprising to see that Altangerel of the London School of Economics states in her personal historical overview of Mongolia that 'when the Manchu Dynasty ruled over greater Mongolia. The Mongols continuously sought to gain independence . . . But they could not rid themselves of Manchu oppression for 275 years' (2001: 28–29). Or that Bumaa of the National Museum of Mongolian History asserts similarly that, 'despite the Manchu (Qing) Dynasty's 200-year oppressive rule of Mongolia, my people still retained our language, culture, and traditions' (2001: 32). Of course, the origin of this historical conceptualization of the Qing as oppressive, feudal, and backward-inducing can readily be traced back to the decolonization discourses of both Marxist and nationalist historiography, the twin engines that have driven Mongol socio-political culture for nearly a century. Both of these theoretical frames mandate a particular teleology, where by default, the Qing is equated not only with backwardness and cultural stagnation, but also imperialism and all its inherent forms of degradation.²³

Moreover, in accord with modernity and secular theory, the most common culprit for both the imperial project and Mongol turpitude is none other than religion. In post-1921 Mongol historiography especially, Buddhist imperialism is used to explain not only Manchu rule but Mongol backwardness as well. This sentiment is well captured in a pamphlet published in July 1929 in Dolonnuur, which warns the Mongols of the danger posed by the Panchen Lama.

From the latter period of our Mongolia's great Yuan dynasty, Buddhism (*Buddhyin shashin*) began to penetrate. About five hundred years ago, at the same time as Altan Khaan of the Tümeds had spread Buddhism widely among the Mongols, the Manchu Qing dynasty arose. Seeing it as a fine-tuned way to decrease the unparalleled brave and heroic nature (*khoos ügei baatur erelkheg chinar*) of the Mongols, they turned the Mongols towards affairs of emptiness like mercy and merit, sin and future incarnations, and made them fall completely behind in political knowledge and economic development. The might and glory of the ancient Mongols was already covered over and we preserved a gentleness like sheep, thus becoming food for the wolves.²⁴

This historical narrative only became more pronounced and virulent after the Japanese began to employ Buddhism in order to advance their own imperial project in Mongol areas.²⁵ As an early 1930s poster warns: do not present any offerings to the Panchen Lama since it will only be sent to Japan and used to finance the conquest of Mongolia (Figure 31.4).



Figure 31.4 Early 1930s poster warning Mongols not to give offerings to the Panchen Lama. Reproduced with permission from *Modern Mongolia: Reclaiming Genghis Khan* (National Museum of Mongolian History, Ulaanbaatar).

Yet, as is well-known, this view of Buddhist imperialism is not restricted to Mongol Marxist and nationalist pamphlets. Rather, it is also in many ways the operative paradigm employed in contemporary Western scholarship on Manchu rule of the Mongols.²⁶ The ‘Buddhist explanation’, namely the idea of the emperor as a bodhisattva and its successful application among the Mongols has become a standard refrain.²⁷ And I point this out not to suggest that these scholars are somehow wrong to highlight the Qing court’s use of the Dharma. Based upon the enormous Buddhist literary, architectural and artistic output undertaken by the Qing, it is quite clear that the Dharma played a profound role in the Manchu imperial project.²⁸ Moreover, based on the architectonic India-Tibet-Mongol-Qing Buddhist narrative found in all Qing-period Mongol sources it is also clear the Mongols themselves powerfully identified with the court’s Buddhist project. Indeed, throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the Mongols were stalwart defenders of the empire, precisely because the Qing had become identified as a multiethnic Buddhist empire. And as Shambhala became intertwined with Mongolia in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the Mongols came to see themselves as the elite vanguard protecting the future of this Buddhist ecumene, a realm that eventually needed to be defended from various ‘barbarians’, be they Hui Muslims, Taiping Christians, or European imperialists.

And in this regard it is important to recall that the Mongols heeded the call. This was most famously evidenced in the career of Senggerinchen, the Mongol general who defeated the British at Dagou Fort in 1859. It is also witnessed in the fact that in 1916–17 certain Mongols even attempted an imperial restoration (Serruys 1985). Of course, their reasons for defending the Qing are various and complex; however, as seen in

the explosion of Shambhala mythology in both textual and visual sources during the nineteenth-century, it is clear that Buddhism and its messianic mythology certainly played a role in this dynamic.²⁹ As a result, Buddhism was clearly not irrelevant in the success of the Manchu imperial project, yet what is problematic in the 'Buddhist explanation', is, that like the Marxist and nationalist projects it perpetuates the notion of stasis, since built into its very explanatory framework is the idea that Qing rule is simply a continuation of earlier models.

Rather than recognizing that Qing Buddhist rule was actually something new, or even the possibility of transformation between Qing 'Buddhist rule' and Altan Khanid 'Buddhist rule', the 'Buddhist explanation', much like Qing historiography itself, assumes the two are in fact inherently the same.³⁰ Of course, this idea of stasis was built into the very logic of the Qing narrative, since it was through such claims of continuity that the Manchu Buddhist state was in fact legitimated. Moreover, this rhetoric of stasis insured a patina of cultural continuity and tradition while obscuring the radical social engineering that was the reality of the Qing's 'Great Enterprise'. Yet, as seen above, this idea of continuity and stasis did not only serve the interest of the Qing, and modern scholars; it was also a fundamental component justifying the progressive movements of the early twentieth century. It was therefore precisely because the Manchu state was rooted in the past that the Mongols were backward and unfit for the modern world. And it is this idea of Qing Buddhist rule as inherently continuous and static that has taken on a new life in the Western academy. The 'Buddhist explanation' is not, however, only influenced by the trifecta of Qing, Marxist and nationalist narratives, it is also shaped by other discourses of the Western academy, such as the tri-partite model of Buddhist history,³¹ the Weberian 'ideal type' of Buddhist rule, as well as the larger phenomenological approach that has de-historicized the study of religion.³² The inevitable result of this conflation has been that, for very different reasons, the nature of Manchu Buddhist rule continues to be situated within the discursive of continuity and stasis first promoted by the Qing itself.

Unfortunately, however, the result has been the same. As the Qing master narrative itself intended, the radical ruptures inherent not only in the Qing formation, but also the unfolding enterprise of the Qing and its cultural production have often been subverted, or ignored. As a result, by perpetuating the discourse of stasis first promoted by the Qing we ignore the actual changes and dynamism that actually made the Qing a success among the Mongols. Yet it is precisely these dynamics that need to be explored if we are to better understand Manchu rule and the history of Qing Mongolia. To this end I would now like to turn to one simple component in the Qing court's vast array of imperial discourses in order to see what light it sheds on Qing Mongolia, namely, clothing.

DRESSING THE QING

Clothing and hairstyles are universally recognized markers of group identification; however, in imperial China they were also essential for the harmonious functioning of the state. As the Han dynasty historian Ban Gu (d. 92 CE) noted,

'the ancients used clothing for the purpose of distinguishing between the noble and the common and to illustrate virtue so as to encourage the initiation of good example.' Thus

proper clothing contributed to the harmony in socio-political-religious order and bore testimony to the civilizing authority of the state (Vollmer 2001: 18).

And on account of its importance as both an instrument of political control, and as a sign of the state's efficacy, it was required of each new dynasty to establish their own distinctive imperial attire. In this regard the Manchus were no different.³³

Already in 1636 Hong Taiji issued an edict requiring subject Han Chinese to adopt Manchu clothes and hairstyle, namely, the shaved forehead and queue.³⁴ 'All Han people – be they official or commoner, male or female – their clothes and adornments will have to conform to Manchu styles. Males are not allowed to fashion wide collars and sleeves; females are not allowed to comb up their hair [*shutou*] nor bind their feet.'³⁵ Two years later Hong Taiji reiterated this order, although he directed it at the Manchus, who were informed that they would be severely punished if they adopted Ming Chinese fashions. Once the Manchus had in fact defeated the Ming and taken up residence in Beijing they set about defining and refining the imperial wardrobe in earnest. In order to distinguish their new dynasty they first abandoned the Ming's imperial red in favour of yellow. In 1645, a year after the fall of the Ming, regulations were drawn up articulating the proper court hats and hat buttons designating rank. In 1652 the insignia badges were defined. The first eight ranks of nobles were assigned dragon badges. The nobility below the eighth rank and all military officials were given animal insignia, and birds indicated the nine classes of civil officials. In 1676 and 1683 the various shades of yellow signifying rank within the imperial clan were elaborated. And so it went until the Qianlong emperor commissioned a review of all previous clothing regulations in 1748. 'This review culminated in the promulgation of a comprehensive set of costume edicts in 1759. The *Huangchao liqi tushi* (*Illustrated Precedents for the Ritual Paraphernalia of the Imperial Court*) classified all the clothing and accessories used by the court to the lowest functionary.'³⁶

The fact that this compilation of clothing regulations filled eighteen volumes with six thousand illustrations detailing the differences in formal, semiformal and informal robes, hats and various paraphernalia for official travel, private audiences, and court entertainment, provides some evidence of how important clothing was within the Manchu imperial project. Indeed, the simultaneous production of the *Huang Qing zhigong tu*, an illustrated compendium of the subject people and their dress, supplies further evidence for the importance the court placed upon regulating, or at least identifying, all the clothing within the empire, if not the world, since this compilation also contained images of Central Asians, South Asians and Europeans.³⁷ Moreover, as is evident from all the available visual material, this Confucian-derived fashion orthodoxy defined the dress of all constituents within the empire, including that of the Mongols. And the Mongols not only wore these Qing-mandated clothes, but some, such as Rashipungsug and Gonchugchab, the authors of the *Crystal Rosary* and 1835 *Pearl Rosary* (*Subud Erike*) respectively, even echoed its underlying Confucian logic. In particular, they lamented the fact that Mongols during the Yuan had violated the imperial dress codes and pointed out its possible deleterious effects.³⁸

On account of proper clothing being so fundamental to the proper functioning of society and the state, it is therefore not surprising to find that this 'Qingification' of wardrobe even transcended time. In an eighteenth-century Mongolian version of the *Journey to the West* (*Xiyou ji*), even the famous Tang dynasty pilgrim Xuanzang is dressed like a Qing Mongol.³⁹ Similarly, in a late Qing illustrated manuscript of the

popular Molon Toyin legend, all of the figures are wearing not only the Manchu queue, but distinctive Qing period hats and robes (Figure 31.5). Unfortunately, however, it is precisely because of the iconic nature of the Qing dress code, in tandem with the notions of stasis outlined above, that this intense ‘Qingification’ of Mongol clothing has largely been obscured, or ignored.

It may therefore be unsurprising to argue, or even reveal, that pre-Qing Mongols wore different clothes. Yet, if we look at the few extant pre-Qing Mongol self-representations, such as the paintings at Maidari Juu (70 km west of Hohhot) and the Arjai caves in Otog Banner of Ordos, there are apparent differences, as Charleux has pointed out.⁴⁰ Both the hats and robes the Mongols are wearing in these images are not in accord with Manchu costume regulations. As a result, it is quite feasible to assert based on these representations that being a Mongol, as defined in one’s dress, and being a Qing Mongol are two different things.

On one level this is deceptively simple since, as outlined above, all new dynasties were required to stipulate new dress codes, on account of Confucian theories postulating that ‘court clothing forged a link between the needs of the human society and the universal order. When worn, both coat and courtier were transformed. The human body became the world axis, and the neck opening became the gate of Heaven, separating the material world of the coat from the realm of the spiritual, represented by the wearer’s head. Universal forces were activated, creating the harmony that was essential to the survival of the empire’ (Vollmer 1980: 19). As a result of this linkage it is therefore clear why clothing had to be changed by each new dynasty and thereupon continually regulated. It was simply one part of the emperor’s ritualized maintenance of universal order.

Unfortunately, however, in the case of the Mongols this transformation and the radical rupture it entails is very often subverted within the rhetoric of stasis and continuity. This is the case not only with the change in Mongol dress, but also in regard to the fact that Qing Buddhist ideology was not the same as pre-Qing Mongol conceptions. For the Qing project to be successful, in particular for Khorchin ‘shamanists’ to be



Figure 31.5 Illuminated nineteenth century Legend of Molon Toyin (Mong 417). Reproduced with the permission of the Royal Library, Copenhagen.

transformed into Buddhist Mongols of the Qing, changes in self-conceptualizations clearly needed to be made. But like the Qing master narrative itself, which by its very own logic needed to obviate this transformation in the discourse of continuity, it is precisely these changes that are most often overlooked as a result of the pervasive idea of Qing stasis. More importantly, however, this notion of stasis as manifested in the reified notion of the Dharma grafted onto the Manchu enterprise as encapsulated in the 'Buddhist explanation', has not only obscured the unfolding nature of the Dharma during the Qing, but also the multiplicity of discourses that actually made the Qing a success.

VISUALIZING THE QING

To reevaluate the nature of Qing Mongolia beyond the discursive of stasis and in terms of multivocality we can begin with the 1900 portrait of Nasantogtokh, the Khalkha Tüshiyetü Khan (Figure 31.6). This portrait, with its prominent inclusion of a western clock, is quite the antithesis of stasis.⁴¹ Rather, it is a fusion of high empire and modernity. It reflects a genre that may be labelled 'late imperial modern', which can be found in images of this period stretching from the Ottoman empire to Meiji Japan.

Most often these images were captured through photography and thus adopted European photo-portrait conventions: the seated pose with table and flower, which more than anything allowed the subject to remain stable during the long exposure time; as well as the clock, which asserted a specific temporality.⁴² Yet even though in such images Western conventions and clothes were adopted, as well as being documented in the very medium of European imperial representation,⁴³ most scholars argue that such acts of mimicry were actually modes of resistance.⁴⁴ And while this may be true, the portrait of Nasantogtokh is rather different. It is not a European style photograph; rather, it is a painting of a Mongol in 'native dress' that has been influenced by photographic conventions.⁴⁵ We therefore need to ask ourselves: what are the discourses shaping this visual culture? This portrait encapsulates neither stasis, nor the oft-repeated monologue of Gelugpa Buddhist orthodoxy as found in the 'Buddhist explanation'. So where does it fit?

While this portrait is certainly influenced by photographic conventions and possibly even Tibetan thangka formulaics,⁴⁶ its immediate antecedent is clearly the well known Sino-Manchu ancestor portrait (Figure 31.7). Of course, for Mongol nationalists and their Western romantic counterparts, any infiltration, especially from Han China, that dilutes or takes away from the greatness of some imagined 'Ur-mongolness', is nothing less than an abomination. Yet the 1900 portrait of the Tüshiyetü Khan Nasantogtokh parallels rather remarkably virtually all the ancestor portraits produced at the court.⁴⁷ Not only is the perspective the same, but so is the framing within two tables, the pose, and the carpet. There are differences, however. Rather than the formal court dress, the Tüshiyetü Khan is wearing informal dress. Moreover, instead of typically fondling the imperial rosary, the khan is holding in his left hand a pipe and tobacco pouch. Similarly, instead of being portrayed with the typical accoutrements of a Chinese scholar, the Khan has a clock, in addition to books and a snuff bottle.

On one level the inclusion of these items, the snuff bottle, pipe, as well as the Khan wearing not the formal robes required at court, but the 'local' informal robes, can



Figure 31.6 The Tüshiyetü Khan Nasantogtokh

possibly be interpreted as an assertion of some kind of ‘nativeness’, or ‘Mongolness’. However, the overall format with its roots in the ancestor portrait tradition requires that the painting also be situated within the larger visual culture of the Qing. And in doing so, a fundamental element that comes to the fore is the colours that are used in these respective paintings, namely yellow as used in the portraits of the imperial courtiers and deep blue in the portrait of the Tüshiyetü Khan. It is this same striking colour that is also found in the eighteenth century court-ordered portraits of the Choros prince Dawachi and the Dörbed prince Beise Gendün, now housed in Berlin (Figures 31.8, 31.9). While these portraits are themselves fascinating Qing-period hybrids – reflecting Italianate, Baroque style as well as the Tibetan requirement to capture the sitter’s ‘inner self’⁴⁸ – what is relevant here is their similar background colour to that used in the



Figure 31.7 Eighteenth–Nineteenth Century Portrait of an Unidentified Courtier. Reproduced with the permission of the Arthur M. Sackler Gallery.

portrait of Nasantogtokh. And in this regard what is essential to recognize is that this colour coding schema, yellow for imperial and blue/black for princes and officials, is a powerful signifier of the Qing's social order.

In the case of the Berlin images, the sitter's position within this hierarchical order is made even more explicit.⁴⁹ The Dörbed and Choros princes Tsering and Dawachi thus wear robes with four roundels with forward facing, five-clawed dragons (*long*), signifying their rank as first degree princes. Gendün Beise of the Dörbed on the other hand has the robes of a fourth degree prince: two roundels with four clawed dragons (*mang*) in profile. He also has a two-eyed peacock feather attached to his hat. The lower



Figure 31.8 Choros Prince Dawachi (Museum für Völkerkunde, Berlin).



Figure 31.9 Beyise Gendün of the Dörbed (Museum für Völkerkunde, Berlin)

ranked Dawa, a Choros duke, has the appropriate square insignia with a front facing, four-clawed dragon. It was these symbols embedded in Qing clothing that, of course, had been so assiduously regulated and catalogued in the *Huangchao liqi tushi*, and which all of these portraits readily confirm. As a result, while in all of these portraits one can trace various other influences, be it the Baroque or the accoutrements of ‘Mongolness’, these Mongol noblemen are all portraitured within the logic and clothing regimen mandated by the social hierarchy of Qing society. It is therefore less these other elements than the social order and its confirmation that define these paintings.

Moreover, it is important to note that none of these representations draw power,

or relate to the discursive practices of Manchu Buddhist imperialism. As seen in the portrait of the Tüshiyetü Khan, there is no imbrication with the Dharma, only a reification of his power and authority received through the graces of the Manchu emperor,⁵⁰ who through the bestowal of ranks, seals and robes legitimated the social position of the Tüshiyetü Khan. Unlike the earlier, purely Tibetan thangka-style portrait of the Tüshiyetü Khan's ancestor, Abadai Khan, who first established the 'priest-patron' relationship between the Khalkhas and the Dalai Lama – there is no connection made to the Dharma (Figure 31.10). As noted above this is primarily a result of the fact that during the late Qing the Tüshiyetu Khan's authority within Mongol society was no



Figure 31.10 Abadai Khan (MPR Central Museum).

longer derived from Buddhism, especially as manifested in his relationship with the individual of the Jebdzundamba Khutugtu. Thus while this relationship was the initial paragon of the 'priest-patron' relationship that is so often assumed to undergird Manchu-Mongol political discourse, it is well worth noting that it was precisely the Tüshiyetü Khan-Jebdzundamba Khutugtu alliance that held Manchu rule at bay until 1691; after which, not only was this powerful relationship systematically dismantled, but the nature of Mongol political authority was also redefined.

The nature of this new system can fruitfully be compared with Cannadine's *Ornamentalism*, in which he argues that the British Empire was based less on a discourse of race, than on one of class. He certainly does not discount the importance of race in the empire, yet by itself it does not fully explain the creation and ultimate dissolution of the British Empire. Instead he shows how British imperial discourse and practice was premised on a re-mapping of the subjects within an idealized version of their own class hierarchy. Thus in the settler dominions of Canada, Australia and New Zealand a new landed aristocracy was created, while in India the caste system was reinvigorated and legitimated by the Raj, and in the Middle East mandates, kings were anointed within the rhetoric of the noble Bedouin hierarchical tribal culture: ideas that came tumbling down with the rise of an educated, urbanized, and nationalized middle-class. Nevertheless, the vision of empire as premised on class or social hierarchy was encouraged and promoted through the production of aristocratic genealogies and the bestowal of titles, awards and baubles that created one vast interconnected world between the metropolis and the peripheries. As Cannadine argues, it was through these ritualizations that 'the theory and the practice of social hierarchy served to eradicate the differences, and to homogenize the heterogeneities, of empire . . . The result was the consolidation of a pan-British, pan-imperial elite that conquered and governed, unified and ordered, the empire for the first time' (Cannadine 2001: 10, 21).

As a result, the success of the British empire was not based so much on a racial and ethnic discourse, but through a systematic project of social hierarchical mimesis that integrated the vast domains into an integrated, ordered, titular and transcultural hierarchy subordinated to the monarchy. Two prominent modes of manifesting this system were the creation of local aristocratic genealogies paralleling the British *Peerage* and *Landed Gentry*, as seen in the 1895 *Colonial Gentry*, and the 1900 *The Golden Book of India*; and the highly elaborate imperial honours system that tied local hierarchical structures to the crown through a new rhetorical framework. Both of these modes obviously parallel projects carried out during the Qing, as evidenced in the Bureau of Colonial Affairs's (Lifan Yuan) genealogical record of the entitled Inner Asian nobility, the *Iledkil Sastir* (Ch. *Waifan menggu huibu wanggong biao*). Moreover, it was the elaborate bestowal of titles and ranks upon these elites recorded in this work by the Qing bureaucracy that materialized both their local power and also incorporated them within the discourse of the Manchu empire.

Thus while it is problematic to suggest that the Manchus had an idea of class that paralleled the British aristocracy, or even to transpose European class models onto the Qing, it is feasible to evaluate how the Qing imperial project was involved in creating and maintaining an imperial elite that transcended ethnic, racial, and cultural boundaries, as epitomized in the clothing regulations of *Huangchao liqi tushi*. Thus even though the Manchu court may have recognized and represented itself within local cultural systems, ultimately, as with the British, these local discourses were de-politicized and brought into the fold of the Qing enterprise through the creation of an imperial elite

shorn of its pre-Qing cultural logic. Diametrically opposite to the underlying notion of multiculturalism, the imperial project entailed the shattering of indigenous cultural, economic and political entities that were superscribed with the logic of the Qing state.

Thus in the case of the incorporation of the Mongols within the Qing, a fundamental feature of this enterprise was the destruction of pre-existing forms of political legitimization for the Mongol nobility. Although the Mongol social order was therefore generally kept intact, their authority was no longer tied to local systems of discourse, such as the cult of Chinggis Khan. Instead, their existence and authority were actualized and ritualized solely through the power and grace of the Qing emperor as manifested in the seals, titles, robes, hats, etc. bestowed upon them, as is well captured in the above portraits. Thus, as in the case of the British-recognized local elite, the social hierarchy often remained the same, but their authority was no longer tied to local discourses. Rather their authority originated in, and fundamentally connected them to the metropolis. Thus while these local religio-cultural signifiers could be appropriated in the imperial discourse, as was the case most spectacularly evidenced in the multiple guises, or 'masquerades',⁵¹ of the Qing emperors; more importantly, it was precisely these local discourses that needed to be shattered and replaced with the Qing political system. And as with the British, the intrinsic power of this radical transformation resided in the fact that it maintained a patina of tradition. The power of the Qing therefore lay less in the multivocality with which it indulged itself, but in precisely the displacement of the cultural institutions that gave power to local leaders, and their replacement with the imperial logic, titles, ranks, robes, and baubles that forged the unity of a ruling trans-ethnic Qing elite.

Unfortunately, how this process unfolded in Qing Mongolia has been greatly obscured not only by the Qing itself and the Qing elites who kept their power in the post-Qing period, but also by later theorists that have focused exclusively on the Dharma. In one measure this perhaps reflects the scapegoating of religion in all modern secular theory, where in accord with Enlightenment ideals, religion is solely personal, and if it enters the public sphere, it is invariably identified as a political and ideological smokescreen.⁵² But beyond that, the 'Buddhist explanation' also fixates upon the centre, and thereby circumscribes not only other possible discourses, but also the on-going dialogue and negotiation between the metropole and the periphery. Indeed this model may be symptomatic of histories derivative of Foucault that have postulated the perpetuation of social blinders within the imperial monopoly on power and knowledge; a theoretical monolith is now under attack by a new cadre of theorists. Scholars now aim to go beyond both the mandates of national, imperialist, and even postcolonial narratives as well as the monologue of the centre, in order to reveal history's complex and fragmented nature, which any master narrative, by its very nature, occludes.⁵³ Thus, in adopting such an approach we need to evaluate the process of Qing consolidation less as one of stasis and a central monologue, but as on-going and fragmented dialogue.

In so doing we therefore oddly come full circle back to Foucault, who in his later work asserted that within structures of power, there are spaces where a 'surplus' of meanings are constructed. 'Power comes from below; that is, there is no binary and all-encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled at the root of power relations, and serving as a general matrix – no such duality extending from the top down and reacting on more and more limited groups to the very depths of the social body. One must suppose rather that the manifold relationships of force that take shape and come into play in the machinery of production, in families, limited groups, and institutions, are the

basis for wide-ranging effects of cleavage that run through the social body as a whole.⁵⁴ And in many ways, the one area where this surplus can be excavated is in the visual and material record. By incorporating the study of these ‘things’, the textually bound identities and hegemonic textualities that have shaped the various historiographies of the Qing can be expanded. Incorporating visual and material culture can therefore help us better understand and redefine the dynamics that shaped Qing Mongolia.⁵⁵

DRESS, GENDER AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE

To this end I would like to return to the issue of clothing during the Qing. In particular, I want to highlight the apparent paradox that while the court was obsessed with uniformity, there was actually enormous variety. Again, as anyone familiar with early photographs of Mongolia can attest, there is anything but uniformity. This is especially the case among Mongol women, who, with their distinctive headdresses, robes, and jewellery, reflect quite the opposite of the court’s obsessional tyranny of conformity.⁵⁶ Rather, based on such images we need to accept the fact that the Qing actually engendered an explosion of difference.

Khalkha clothing and headdresses are not the same as those of the Chakhar, and neither of those is similar to Manchu-influenced Daur dress (Figures 31.11, 31.12). And among the Khalkhas, even the different Khanates had distinctive forms of dress for married women, as seen in the distinctive headdresses from the Tüshiyetü Khanate, and the Zasagtu Khanate (Figures 31.13, 31.14). Yet before investigating some of the possible reasons and implications of these specific differences it is first important to recognize that these distinctive clothes for Mongol women were actually cultural products of the Qing period.

Indeed, if we look at the available representations of Mongol women in both written and visual sources from the Empire period, there is no direct correspondence with what is found in the Qing period. This is especially the case with the tall hat, the *boqta* (Ch. *gugu*), that is so prominently featured in numerous Persian miniatures,⁵⁷ the portrait of Khubilai Khan’s wife Chabi now in the National Palace Museum,⁵⁸ the 1330–32 Vajrabhairava mandala,⁵⁹ and in numerous travel accounts, of which Peng Daya and Xu Ting’s 1237 *A Sketch of the Black Tatars* (*Hei Da shilie*) provides the most detailed description of Mongol dress of the period.

As for their headgear, they have disheveled hair and a small mallet shaped bun, with a hat in winter and bamboo hat in summer, while the females cap themselves with the *gugu*.

Ting saw the arrangement of their *gugu*: they use painted wood for the frame, wrap it with red silk fabric and gold and silk brocade, and on top of the summit, they use willow branches four or five chi long, or else iron beaten into branches, and wrap it with green felt. With those relatively higher in rank, they use our dynasty’s banners embroidered with kingfishers or five-colored silk to decorate it, thus making them flutter in the wind, while those of low rank, they use the down of wild fowl. The women are truly exotic, and use wolf dung to powder their face.

Their clothes overlap to the right and have a square collar and in old times used felt, furs, and leather, and in present time use ramie, silk, and gold thread, and for colors use red, purple, maroon, and green, which they pattern with the sun, the moon, dragons, and phoenixes. They do not have distinctions of noble and base ranks in their clothing.

Ting once investigated this, and it is exactly like the style of the ancient long robe;



Figure 31.11 Daur woman (National Museum, Copenhagen).

originally there was only the lowered collar, like the collar on our dynasty's Taoist uniform, and therefore they call it the square collar. If it is a four-cornered high collar, then it is in fact something the Han people made; the Tatar rulers and men of the high rank in the Secretariat have never worn it. Around their midriff they all secretly put on a very fine inner shirt,



Figure 31.12 Chakhar woman (National Museum, Copenhagen).

whose number of hems cannot be counted; if the long robe is sewn with only twelve lengths of cloth, the Tatar's inner shirt has more! They also use red and purple silk intertwined into a horizontal sash across their midriff, which they call a 'stomach sash'. They really want that on horseback; with their waist band tied tight it appears striking, admirable, and good looking.⁶⁰

In addition to fulfilling the narrative mandate of revealing the Mongols' uncivilized state by pointing out that they lacked a Confucian-based hierarchical wardrobe, Peng Daya and Xu Ting do provide us with a rather detailed picture of Mongol clothing and hairstyles of the period. Their ethnographic account largely coincides with all the other accounts from the period, and as such confirms the fact that Mongol clothing of this period was not the same as during the Qing.

This fact, however, leaves the long period between the fall of the Yuan in 1368 and the eventual submission to the Qing of the various eastern Mongol groups during the



Figure 31.13 Women of the Tüshiyetü Khanate (National Museum, Copenhagen).

course of the seventeenth century. What happened to Mongol clothing styles during this lengthy period of time? Unfortunately, as with so much else during this period, our available sources are scarce. However, based on the few images available from Maidari Juu and the Arjai caves, as well as those in Yu Xiangdou's late Ming encyclopedia, the *Santai wanyong zhengzong*,⁶¹ and two seventeenth-century Japanese ethnographic maps,⁶² it is clear that Mongol clothes had changed during this period. In particular, certain Yuan-period styles had been abandoned, including the *boqta* and the court overcoat. At the same time, these images also reveal that Mongol styles of this period were not the same as the distinctive and by now iconic styles mandated by the Qing state. As a result of this variation it needs to be recognized that the clothes and jewellery that are readily identified as 'Mongol', and those that are proudly put on today as markers of ethnic identity, are, like the *qibao*, actually cultural products of the Qing period.

Thus rather than confirming the tropes of 'Mongol' timelessness, these cultural products of the Qing period challenge directly this discourse of stasis. If anything, the enormous diversity in Mongol women's headgear, jewellery, and clothing reflect its opposite. Of course, this creative explosion was not wholly unmediated, since in general this diversity manifested itself within the strictures of the Qing bureaucratic apparatus,



Figure 31.14 Woman of the Zasagtu Khanate (National Museum, Copenhagen).

in particular, the localized identities created as a result of the banner system.⁶³ For the most part it was in fact these geographically-bounded, localized identities that were confirmed through a woman's clothing, jewellery, and headdress. The variations marked distinctions between the Daur, Chakhar, Tüshiyetü Khanate, etc., which were the new communal boundaries enforced by policies that forbid movement from one banner to another. Yet, this is not to say that the creation of these ornate items and their wide array of cultural signifiers were solely influenced by the Qing state. Clearly a host of other factors played a role, including Mongol notions of beauty, aesthetics, and social standing. Nevertheless, it was certainly not an accident that all of these concerns came to be borne by women, since with the male body and its dress completely circumscribed by the imperial bureaucracy, the female body and its presentation came to encapsulate

notions of local identities including 'Mongolness'. Thus, as is often the case, the female body and its presentation became not only the symbol and bearer of cultural identity, but also a symbol and a means of resisting the marginalizing and homogenizing narrative of others.

However, these women's clothes do not only provide a commentary on Mongol relations with the Qing state. They also reveal an interesting perspective on the dynamics of Mongol-Chinese relations, especially the Chinese influence among the Mongols. Of course, as noted above, it is a staple of Mongol historiography and national/ethnic identity politics to resist all things Chinese;⁶⁴ however, as pointed out in Boyer's extensive catalogue of this material, this was not the case during the Qing period. Rather, as evidenced in the use of 'Chinese' motifs, like the butterfly, the bat, and the eight auspicious signs of the Taoist immortals in Mongol jewellery, there was clearly some sort of cultural exchange taking place between Mongols and Chinese during this period.⁶⁵ More important, however, is the fact that the majority of this most distinctive of Mongol visual culture was largely produced by Chinese artisans. As Atwood has rightly noted, this close Mongol-Chinese artistic and cultural relationship throws into relief our common perception of these two groups as continually antagonistic. In particular, it challenges the standard presentation of the Mongols as solely the victims of the wily Chinese and their economic exploitation during the Qing dynasty, which was another fundamental component of Mongolian communist rhetoric.⁶⁶ Indeed, communist theoreticians blamed Mongol backwardness not only on Manchu Buddhist imperialism, but also on the ethnically foreign Chinese, who, since Mongolia had no middle-class came to be identified as the bourgeoisie. Accordingly, they were identified as the ethno-class enemies who had deviously, and with the support of the Qing imperialists, actually taken control of the Mongol economy.⁶⁷ Thus as is to be expected within this conceptualization, both the foreign, bourgeois Chinese and the Dharma, which had made the Mongols weak, docile, and stupid,⁶⁸ had to be swept away so that Mongolia could join the world as a modern nation (Figure 31.15).

Of course, it is now easy to mock the most egregious communist rhetoric from the early twentieth century, yet it is apparently harder to extricate ourselves from its theoretical shadow. Indeed, as these visual materials make evident, the Qing was anything but monolithic and static. And thus I would like to return to where we began, namely stasis and the 'Buddhist explanation'. As all of these examples (Chinese-Mongol artistic relations, the diversity of Mongol women's clothing, and the reification of social Qing status through portraiture) have shown, none of them fits either of these meta-narratives. Instead, what becomes apparent is that Qing culture entailed a certain fluidity, with multiple discourses operative and accessible to its various constituents. Indeed, in looking at these few visual representations, it becomes apparent that the Qing enterprise, and the success of its imperial consolidation, resided less in a stationary monologue of Manchu-Buddhist imperial rule than an on-going fragmented discursive practice. We therefore need to move beyond the monologue of the metropole and its theoretical refractions, and instead we should investigate the interstices, or 'spaces', especially the visual and material record, where different meanings were created within the Qing. For it is within these fragmented spaces and their 'surpluses' that a better understanding of Qing Mongolia and Mongol history resides – not in Hegelian stasis.



Figure 31.15 1928–1932 poster urging the masses to expel enemies of the people. Reproduced with permission from *Modern Mongolia: Reclaiming Genghis Khan* (National Museum of Mongolian History, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia).

NOTES

1. This article is based on a paper presented at the 2003 Association of Asian Studies Annual Meeting held in New York City, and I would like to thank the panel discussants Patricia Berger and Mark Elliott for their valuable comments. I would also like to thank *Inner Asia's* anonymous reviewers for their important suggestions. All erroneous interpretations and remaining errors are, of course, my responsibility alone. I would also like to thank all those who helped me secure permission to reproduce the images herein: Patricia Berger, Bumaa, Cory Grace, Paula Sabloff.
2. Hegel was a man of his time. As Porter has noted, the European view of the East and in particular of China, changed from one of powerful dynamism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, to one of unchanging, backward despotism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (2001). On the usefulness of this representation in justifying Euroamerican imperialism and the 'opening of China' to 'universal norms' and the modern market see Hevia 2003.
3. In the study of East Asia this model of mutual engagement has now been amply illustrated in a range of areas, such as music (Jones 2001), art (Screech 2002; Brown and Minichiello 2002), photography (Tucker 2003), architecture (Sand 2003), identity (Ching 2001), and science (Fan 2004).
4. On some of the implications of this discourse of stasis in regards to the study of China see Hostetler 2001: 25–30.
5. 'Either a society has morals or it turns into the Mongol hordes. The way the USA is going ...' (2003: 116).
6. von Rezzori 1989: 108.
7. Morgan 1986: 57. This image of barbarism is famously captured in the illustration of the

Mongols partaking in a human barbecue found in the Matthew Paris manuscript housed at Cambridge University (figure 31.1). This image has also been kept alive in the 'middlebrow' imagination (Bourdieu 1993: 125–31; Klein 2003) through its continuous reproduction in popular venues, such as *National Geographic* (Edwards 1996: 30; see also Marshall 1993: 138). On European views of the Mongols during this period see Bezzola 1974.

8. On the history and influence of Giles Fletcher's interpretation of the 'Tartars', their relation to the lost tribes of Israel, and how their conversion to Christianity and repatriation to Israel would inaugurate the new millennium in Jerusalem, see Cogley (forthcoming).
9. This project of representation was not, however, unidirectional, as seen most clearly in Meiji Japan, but also in the Middle East (Shatz 2003), Siam (Peleggi 2002), and among the Ottomans (Shaw 2003).
10. Although Deleuze and Guattari have promoted the idea of the nomad as a model of revolutionary action (1986), in general discourse it is more often the case that the 'nomad' and 'nomadic pastoralism', be it in regard to the Tuareg or the Mongols, signify stasis and the continuation of timeless traditions. Moreover, it is often this framework, with its impending narrative of demise as a result of state interference and other social, economic and cultural forces of modernity that shapes most contemporary studies of nomadism, as seen in the recent rhetorical title *The End of Nomadism?* (Humphrey and Sneath 1999).
11. For an overview of Western representations of the Mongols, especially regarding Down's Syndrome, see Stuart 1997, as well as Uradyn Bulag's review of it (2000). On the 'Eastern' use of these tropes in late imperial China, see Fiskesjö 1999; and in the visual culture of the PRC, see Heberer 1997.
12. The classic example of this projection of ruthless Chinggis-period Mongols into the future is the Klingons in the *Star Trek* series. While there are clearly numerous others, a most explicit example is found in Luc Besson's 1997 *Fifth Element*, wherein a group of hideous mercenary monsters are stymied when the hero, Bruce Willis, kills their leader because: 'they are unable to function without a leader'. Even when the Mongols are not being projected into the future, however, their representation in film often follows the formulaic trope of timelessness, as reflected in the Mikhalkov's *Urga* of 1990, and more recently in Byambasuren Davaa and Luigi Falorni's *The Story of the Weeping Camel* (2004). Curiously, the most unconventional cinematic representations of the Mongols are found in two early films: Pudovkin's 1928 propaganda masterpiece *Storm over Asia* (*Potomok Chingis Khana*), and the Mongol slave girl portrayed by Anna May Wong in the 1924 Douglas Fairbanks vehicle *The Thief of Bagdad*, see Elverskog (In preparation).
13. Manganaro (2002: 2) citing Bruce Robbins' *Secular Vocations: Intellectuals. Professionalism, Culture* (1993: 173).
14. While anthropology has certainly begun exploring complex, modern, urban environments, there still lingers a fascination with the 'pre-modern' (Bestor 2004: 12–13). On the inter-relationship of the 'primitive', anthropology and modernity see Stocking (1987), Barkin and Bush (1995), and Oksiloff (2001). On the traveller's quest for marginal spaces see MacCannell 1976; 1992.
15. See the official mongoliatourism.gov.mn (accessed 2/16/03), and also the photo galleries of major tour operators, such as boojum.com/photographs.html (accessed 5/3/04), gobiexpeditions.com, and samarmagictours.com. The USAID funded website travelmongolia.org, which promotes Mongolian tourism through local tour operators, even has a lengthy video clip *Art, Spirit and Adventure* (accessed 5/3/04).
16. On Mongol self-perceptions of backwardness see Atwood 1994: 149–212.
17. The phrase *köl anu köser-e qar anu qajar-a talbi'ulju*, alluding to the act of lying on one's back with outstretched arms and legs is first found in a speech of Ögödei Khan in the *Secret History* (§ 279 l. 11739; § 281 l. 11927, de Rachewiltz 1972). It is also found in the *White History* (*Cayan teüke*), the *Jewel Translucent Sutra* (*Erdeni tunumal sudur*) and all the other seventeenth century chronicles (CT: 111–112; JTS: 249; Cleaves 1982: 223 n. 103).

18. BE: 7, translated in Atwood (1994: 48). Goldstein and Beall have recorded similar views of nomadism as being easier and better than other livelihoods in contemporary Tibet. 'Look, it is obvious that we have a very easy lifestyle. The grass grows by itself, the animals reproduce by themselves, they give milk and meat without our doing anything, so how can you say our way of life is hard? We don't have to dig up the earth to sow seeds nor do any of the other difficult and unpleasant tasks that the farmers do. And we have much leisure time. You can see for yourself that in the summer scores of farmers come here to work for us, but do we go to work for them? As I have told you several times, the farmers' lifestyle is difficult, not ours' (1990: 48).
19. Atwood 1994: 88. Writing nearly a century later Injanashi apparently accepted the connections between the Mongols, nomadism and carefree living; however, he turned Rashipungsug's argument on its head. Rather than seeing carefree nomadism as positive, he argued that 'too much easy living' was actually one factor in 'the decline of our Mongols' (KS: 51).
20. On the value placed upon the nomadic ideal as reflected in the Mongols' contemporary fear of urbanization, especially in regard to how it impacts Mongol identity, see Bulag 2002: 209–210.
21. Today, however, the same idea of stasis and timeless traditions of nomadic pastoralism are used to explain contemporary political paradigms by portraying Mongol nomadic society, and even Chinggis Khan, as inherently democratic (Sabloff 2001).
22. One example revealing the pervasiveness of this view is found in the logic of a Mongol Christian convert who uses it to justify his decision: 'If my father had not been forced out of the monastery [during the 1930s], I would never have been born. If Mongolia had not been a nation of celibate monks, following a religion forced on us by the Manchus to keep us weak, we would be a strong nation of 40 million people today' (O'Donnell 1999).
23. See for example *Manchu Chinese Colonial Rule in Northern Mongolia* (Sanjdorj 1980). For a broader and more detailed overview of Mongol views of the Qing, Buddhism, development, and progress, see Atwood 2002.
24. *Bangcin Boyda-yin tuqai uqayulqu bicig*, quoted in Atwood 1994: 128.
25. On the role of Buddhism in the Japanese imperial project among the Mongols see Li 1998, 2003.
26. For example, 'the throne's relations with its Mongolian and Tibetan subjects proceeded in the idiom of Buddhist practice' (Zito 1997: 23). See also the parallel presentations in Crossley (1997: 113), Rawski (1998: 244), Hostetler (2001: 35), and Naquin (2000: 308–9). For other approaches to Qing rule among the Mongols, especially ones that do not highlight the Dharma, see the bibliographical overview in Tatsuo 1996.
27. This has been the case ever since Farquhar's seminal 1976 article, 'Emperor as Bodhisattva in the Governance of the Qing Empire.' For a bibliography and overview of this scholarship see Henss (2001a, 2001b), as well as Berger (2003).
28. See for example Heissig 1954, Chayet 1984, Charleux 1998, Foret 2000, and Berger 2003.
29. On the role of Shambhala in Mongol historiography, see Elverskog, forthcoming.
30. On the Qing transformation of Mongol models of Buddhist rule, see Elverskog 2000: 368–441.
31. Scholars like Bechert, Tambiah, Gombrich, and Obeyesekere have divided the history of Buddhism in South Asia into three periods: 1) canonical or early Buddhism 2) traditional or historical Buddhism 3) reformist, protestant or modernist Buddhism. One inevitable consequence of this periodization is that change only occurs in the colonial period. Prior to that 'traditional Buddhism' as an intellectual category is meant to encapsulate nearly 2000 years of history in widely different cultural areas stretching from Iran to Korea and Sri Lanka to Siberia. For some of the problems with this periodization, especially when dealing with the pre-modern period, see Blackburn 1995: 7–8. On the problem of studying Buddhism outside of history see Cohen 2002.
32. As Wasserstrom concludes in his study of the founders of phenomenology and their

- methodologies: 'the history of religions . . . must end up being a historical study or it may be no study at all' (1999: 238).
33. On the subsequent role of Qing clothing regulations in Chinese nationalist discourse see Gerth 2003: 68–121.
 34. As Kuhn (1990) and more recently Cheng (1998) have shown, the queue came to have a profound impact on Qing culture.
 35. Ko 1997: 16. On Hong Taiji's policies of 1645 see Wakeman 1985 vol 1: 646–50.
 36. Vollmer 2001: 22. Some of the illustrations presented to the Qianlong emperor that served as models for the woodcut-illustrated edition that circulated in 1766 are reproduced in Vollmer (2002: 99). On the development of the Qing wardrobe see the works of Vollmer and Garrett, as well as Mailey 1980 and Art Institute of Chicago 2000.
 37. The Qianlong emperor first ordered the painting of southern non-Chinese groups in 1751, and by 1757, 550 illustrations had been submitted to the court and compiled as the *Huang Qing zhigong tu*. 'This collection was added to later, namely in 1763 when the Afghans sent an embassy, in 1771 when the Turguts returned from Russia to China, in 1775 when Cheng-ch'ien brought tribute and in about 1790, after the Gurkhas had come to court in 1789. The first three of these events occasioned imperial postscripts to the *Huang Ch'ing chih-kung t'u*' (Walravens 1996: 398). The xylographic edition from the Imperial Printing Shop, now housed in the National Palace Museum, Taipei, is reproduced in Zhuang 1989.
 38. BEK 429–31; SE 20v.
 39. This manuscript is reproduced in Heissig and Müller 1989: 251.
 40. Charleaux (1999) includes photographs of Maidari Juu. Photos from the Arjai caves are reproduced in Solongyod (1999), and for more on this important monument see Wang et al. 1994, and Qasartani and Danzan 1997.
 41. Based on the prominent display of clocks in Mongol photographs up through the early twentieth century it is clear that the clock was not only an element borrowed from European photo-portrait conventions, but that it carried much greater cultural significance (e.g. Struve, forthcoming; Tanaka 2004). For other examples of the prominent display of the clock see Cabot 2003: 90, photo N35725 in the Lattimore Collection, and 490 in the Joel Erikson Collection.
 42. See for example Kuichi Uchida's 1873 photo of the Emperor Meiji in western dress (Tucker 2003: 54), and the portrait of an Istanbul woman in 'female indoor attire' (Quataert 2000: 152).
 43. Ryan 1997. On Western photography during the late Qing see Wue 1997, Thiriez 1998, Harris 1999, and Hevia 2003.
 44. See for example Peleggi's discussion of the visual culture of the Siamese court (2002), and Shaw's study of Ottoman museums, which she interprets as simulcra. 'These museums copied their European counterparts selectively, engaging in mimicry common in the negotiation between the imperatives of colonial domination and the tactics of local resistance . . . Standing at the geographic and political boundary of the several European discourses that constructed modernity, the West, and the links between them, the late Ottoman Empire used its museums to challenge this great divide of Othering while preserving and developing its right to speak its own histories and identities. Mimicry may be the highest form of flattery, but cultural camouflage can be the subtlest form of political resistance' (2003: 225).
 45. A most striking example of this cross synthesis is Sharav's 1912–23 painted portrait of the Eighth Jebdzundamba's wife (Berger 1995: 146). It is painted with photographic perspective and realism and thus looks like a partially colourized photograph; however, only her face is black-and-white, while everything else is coloured. It follows the European photo-portrait convention, but within a Tibetan thangka format – all immortalized by the clock on the left standing at 2:52.
 46. The early and continued relationship between Tibetan thangkas and Chinese ancestor

- portraits is still unclear, see for example Ching (2001) on the Tibetan influences on Ming imperial portraits.
47. On the development and history of Sino-Manchu ancestor portraits see the collected essays in Stuart and Rawski 2001.
 48. Patricia Berger, personal communication, 4/1/03.
 49. The Berlin images, now housed at the Museum für Völkerkunde, are reproduced in Heissig and Müller 1989: 83–84. The social ranking of the individuals portrayed in these four images is based on the chart ‘Court Insignia used during the Ch’ing dynasty’ in Vollmer 1983: 22–3.
 50. On the language of striving and grace, see Atwood 2001.
 51. While Wu Hung’s suggestion that the Qing imperial portraits should be seen as a ‘masquerade’ is important (1995), it is also relevant to keep in mind that these images of the emperors in various ‘guises’ were only for personal viewing, and not for mass consumption as is often assumed (Patricia Berger, personal communication 2003).
 52. On the theoretical issue of Enlightenment views on religion and politics see King 1999: 7–35, and on the role of religion in modernist nationalist discourse see van der Veer and Lehmann 1999, and Peterson and Walhof 2002.
 53. As Dalrymple has noted in his study of a British-Indian love affair and marriage in early nineteenth-century Hyderabad: ‘The Kirkpatricks inhabited a world that was far more hybrid, and with far less clearly defined ethnic, national and religious borders, than we have been conditioned to expect, either by conventional Imperial history books written in Britain before 1947, or by nationalist historiography of post-Independence India, or for that matter by the postcolonial work . . . It was as if this early promiscuous mingling of races and ideas, modes of dress and ways of living, was something that was on no one’s agenda and suited nobody’s versions of events. All sides seemed for different reasons, to be slightly embarrassed by this moment of crossover, which they preferred to pretend never happened. It is, after all, always easier to see things in black and white’ (2003: xlv).
 54. Foucault 1978: 94. As noted by Deleuze (1995: 109) this idea in many ways challenged Foucault’s earlier unidirectional notions of knowledge/power; nevertheless, it was carried forward in the last two volumes of the *History of Sexuality* (1988, 1990). On this ‘Later Foucault’ see Strenski 1998.
 55. Scholars have already used material and visual culture to greatly enhance our understanding of the Qing, such as Naquin (2000) and Meyer-Fong (2003); however, besides the recent interest in Mongol art and its exhibition and cataloguing (Halén 1987, Gentiletti 1993, Kelenyi 1995, Berger 1995, Ladislav 1998), few scholars have explored Mongol visual culture.
 56. On Mongol clothing and jewellery see Hansen 1950, Boyer 1952, and Cammann 1963.
 57. See for example the illustrations of Ögödei, Möngke, Tolui in the fourteenth century *World History (Jami al-Tawarikh)* of Rashid ad-Din (Bibliothèque Nationale, Ms. Sup. Pers. 1113, reproduced in Marshall 1993: 75, 164; Roux 2003: 37); and the fourteenth-century Diez-Albums (Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin-Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Orientabteilung, reproduced in Komaroff and Carboni 2002: 80, 82, 114, 116, 186).
 58. Reproduced in Marshall 1993: 206; Berger 1995: 34. There are other Chinese paintings of Mongols from the Yuan period, though like Liu Guandao’s 1280 *Khubilai Khan Hunting*, they focus on men, see for example Heissig and Müller 1984: 36; Komaroff and Carboni 2002: 20, 28, 73.
 59. This silk tapestry has in the lower left corner representations of Tugh Temür, Wendi (r. 1329–32), and his brother Khoshila, Mingzong (r. 1329). In the lower right corner there are also two women, both with ornate red and gold robes and the *boqta*. See Komaroff and Carboni 2002: 108–9; and Vollmer 2002: 44.
 60. Atwood 2000a. In *A Complete Record of the Mong Tatars (Meng Da beilu)* Zhao Gong offers a similar description, ‘The women commonly paint their foreheads with yellow powder, and they also pass on, through the generations, the old Han style of adornment, and it has not

changed until now. From the heights of Chinggis down to the citizens, they all shave in the style of *por jiao*, similar to how small boys in China leave three tufts of hair on the skull's fontanelle. When it has grown a little, then they cut it, and on the two lower parts, they bring together the little ends and hang them on their shoulders . . . What they [the women] wear looks like the Daoist costume in China. Whoever is the wife of one of their chieftains has the gugu hat. It is formed from iron and silk, has the form of a bamboo armrest, being a little more than three chi in length, and it is decorated either with red and green brocade and embroidery or else pearls with gold. On top of that, there is also a large stick, which is decorated with fine red and green woollen stuff. They have robes with large sleeves like crane feather outer coats in China, which are broad and long enough to trail on the ground, and when they walk two slave girls carry it' (Atwood 2000b).

61. 2000: 512
62. Reproduced in Heissig and Müller 1984: 30, 31. There is also a facsimile of the entire 1671 *Bankoku Sozu* 萬國總圖 in Kraft 1986.
63. On the influence of the banner system and its reorganizing of Mongol society see Farquhar 1960 and Aberle 1953.
64. On the impact of these ideas, especially in regards to the contemporary relations between the Mongols of the PRC and the Republic of Mongolia see Bulag 1998, 2004.
65. Boyer 1952: 181–4.
66. Atwood 1996: 105–6.
67. Atwood 2000c.
68. Although this notion of the Dharma as weakening the Mongols was a standard refrain in the argument of modernizers, it is found already in Ming dynasty arguments in support of promoting the Dharma in Mongolia. For these Ming debates see Serruys 1945; 1963: 202–213; and on the continuation of this idea into modern scholarship see Jagchid 1974, 1976.

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THE MONGOL REBELLION OF 1756–1757

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The drama of the long drawn-out struggle between the Manchu empire in China and the West Mongols, which began in the late seventeenth century and was not finally decided until the defeat of the Jungar leader Amursana in 1757, has tended to distract attention from the less spectacular topic of the relations between the Manchus and the Khalkhas, or Mongols of Outer Mongolia, after their formal submission to the emperor K'ang Hsi at the Convention of Dolonnor in 1691. As a result, the Mongol rebellion of 1756–1757, which was directed against both the Manchu power in Mongolia and Chinese commercial interests there, and which is associated with the name of Chingünjav, the prince of the Khotogoits of north-west Mongolia, has been almost totally ignored by Western historians, although it seriously weakened the Manchu position in Mongolia just at the time when the Manchu forces were being fully extended by the campaigns against Amursana. We find, for example, that so ambitious and authoritative a work on the history of China in the Manchu period as A. W. Hummel's *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period* ignores Chingünjav altogether, although it devotes a complete article to the Oirat Galdan and another to the Jungar Amursana. It only mentions the Mongol rebellion in passing, in the course of an article devoted to the pro-Manchu general Tsereng, and then as a 'minor revolt'. Elsewhere, in the article on Galdan, it states that after the Convention of Dolonnor the Khalkhas 'kept their word and never rebelled throughout the dynasty'. Maurice Courant did, it is true, briefly mention the rebellion in his monograph on Manchu-Kalmuck relations published in 1912;¹ but until Michel Pavlovsky drew attention to it in 1949 and to the unexploited documentary material concerning it to be found in the *Ch'ing shih-lu*, suggesting that its outbreak was a much more serious challenge to Manchu supremacy in central Asia than had hitherto been realized, the episode generally passed unnoticed, at least by Western scholars.²

In the last century A. M. Pozdnev, a pioneer in the exploitation of Mongolian historical material, succeeded in reconstructing a certain amount of the story, though his work has escaped general notice.³ In the course of commenting upon a popular west Mongol concerning a certain *Shadar chiang-chün* or 'General aide-de-camp' he noted that this title concealed the identity of the rebel Chingünjav. Basing himself on the chronicle *Erdeni-yin erike* and also on *Iledkel shastir*, Pozdnev published, at the time, all the information he could cull about the life of Chingünjav and his abortive rising. But apart from this, comparatively little is to be found in Mongol chronicles about this episode, partly because the most easily accessible chronicles antedate it, partly also

because of the pro-Manchu tone of much historical writing which copied its sources—which for this period were mostly official Manchu documents, without critical appraisal—and passed over Chingünjav's rising as a more or less discreditable episode. A note of deep disapproval is evident, for example, in both *Erdeni-yin erike* and in *Iledkel shastir*.⁴ The former refers to him as a 'rebellious bandit', while the latter, while describing his life in some detail, does so in the chapter concerning his father, considering him unworthy of an independent biography.⁵

The source material available to occidental scholars until very recently has been meagre, and would hardly have supported research into this neglected topic beyond what had already been done by Pozdneev. By contrast, Mongolian historians have in the past few years paid very close attention to the rebellion of 1756, an obvious reason for their interest being the fact that they have had access to rich contemporary documentation preserved in their own archives. They were also, during the 1950s, in a position to obtain photocopies of additional material preserved in Peking. From 1955 onwards the results of their research, mostly from the pen of a single scholar, Mr N. Išžamc, have been appearing in Ulan Bator.⁶ As might be expected, historical writing in Mongolia today is based on Marxist theory and tends to be directed towards exemplifying the correctness of the Marxist analysis as it simultaneously explores the events of the past. The rebellion of 1756 has no doubt attracted attention partly because of its intrinsic interest as one of the few dramatic episodes in an otherwise drab century, but also partly because it can be interpreted as displaying the beginnings of class consciousness in Mongolia, of a conflict of interest between the 'feudal' nobility and the 'masses', and as an example of a people participating in a national uprising in search of their freedom and independence from an aggressive foreign colonial power. Apart from its ostensible didactic value as demonstrating the will of the masses towards national independence, it appears also to be of especial interest to contemporary Mongol scholars in that it enables them to project backwards to the eighteenth century ideas of national self-consciousness and of a desire for independence from foreign rule which, in fact, probably never existed till the early twentieth century. In a word, it is an essential part of the Mongol national legend, and it is in this sense that it has been interpreted by Mr Išžamc. This is perhaps understandable, but it has produced a rather one-sided approach to the subject.

Mr Išžamc states his position unequivocally in his first essay on the subject, published in 1955: 'The movement of the Mongol masses in 1755–1757 was thus an armed uprising of the nature of a struggle for national freedom and independence, and had as its aim the smashing of Manchu imperialist oppression.'⁷ Elsewhere he quotes with approval the dictum of Marshal Choibalsang—dictator of Mongolia at the time of Stalin's régime in the USSR, and in no sense a scholar—that Amursana and Chingünjav were 'national heroes' and that the movement of 1755–1758 in Jungaria and Mongolia was 'an armed struggle waged for independence', and also a statement made by Tsendenbal, at present premier of the Mongolian People's Republic, and a politician rather than a scholar, that Amursana and Chingünjav were 'progressive feudal nobles' and that the events of the time were 'a great popular uprising' against Manchu domination.⁸ This uncritical acceptance of a tendentious evaluation made, by politicians, of events which ought to be examined from a less partisan viewpoint leads Mr Išžamc to prejudge the issue in the very titles of his articles. The last, and most important, is, for example, preemptively entitled: 'The armed struggle of 1755–1758 of the Mongolian masses for their independence.' Three debatable points are tacitly

assumed as axiomatic here. The first assumption is that the events in Jungaria from 1755 onwards and those of 1756–1757 in Outer Mongolia can be associated as part of a single ‘movement’. The second is that the moving force in these events was the ‘masses’, surely an anachronistic concept. The third is that the aim of the risings was to achieve independence, that is, as Mr Išžamc states elsewhere, national independence from the Manchus. It is not intended that the present article should turn into a critique of the work of another scholar, but since the articles by Mr Išžamc are the most important secondary sources for the subject under consideration it is necessary to point out that their theme is not developed in an altogether unprejudiced manner. What is not in dispute is the fact of the uprising itself, its wide extent, its involvement of all classes of the population, and the savagery both of some of its manifestations and of the repression which followed. It is on the question of the interpretation of the nature and significance of the events of 1756 and 1757 that differences are likely to arise, and, in particular, the question whether the spirit behind the uprising was that of a national will to independence or one of rather ragged xenophobia.

Nevertheless, in spite of the partisan approach which, to some extent, invalidates his conclusions, at least for non-Marxist readers, the narrative part of Mr Išžamc’s articles provides for the first time a coherent and very illuminating account of what was going on in Outer Mongolia at the time, and he refers to, and quotes from, a representative range of original sources. In addition to this, a volume of selections from the Central Historical Archives of the Mongolian People’s Republic and from the archives of the Historical Committee of the Mongolian Academy of Sciences, was published in Ulan Bator in 1963.⁹ The documents of the latter group are, in fact, based on photocopies of originals in the national archives of the Chinese People’s Republic. In presentation this volume leaves much to be desired. All the documents have been printed in transcription into the modern Cyrillic script, and not a single facsimile reproduction has been given. Further, all those documents originally in Manchu are presented in recently-made translations into Mongol, unaccompanied by the Manchu texts. Hence it is not possible to check the accuracy of any document. Even so, this book, which contains sixty-six selections from contemporary archives, is immensely valuable, and together with Mr Išžamc’s studies, it offers a basis for a provisional assessment of the nature of the rebellion of 1756.

To appreciate why the rebellion should have occurred at all requires a brief retrospective look at the state of Mongol society. To suggest that the rebellion was a struggle for national independence implies that this was a meaningful concept at the time, and that a sense of national community prevailed distinct from feelings of loyalty to a particular lord. On the face of it, this is an anachronism: it suggests that the Mongols, a backward central Asian people, appreciated political concepts not effectively current amongst the more advanced countries of the West till the time of the American and French revolutions, and not a force to be reckoned with in Europe in general till the nineteenth century. This is not to deny that there were individual Mongol chroniclers and contemporary leaders who wrote and spoke on occasion of a Mongol nation. But in doing so they were not postulating the existence of a nation in the modern sense, but of a people solely in relation to its ruler or rulers. Their concept was an aristocratic, not a popular one. In this connection it is instructive to consider some extracts from an early eighteenth century chronicle written by the Kharchin Mongol Lomi, himself a member of the Mongol imperial clan, the Borjigit. In his chronicle, Lomi expressed enthusiastic loyalty to the Manchu emperors precisely because it was due to their efforts that the

broken unity of the Mongol aristocracy was restored at a time when internal discord had scattered the tribes of the Mongols. He writes: 'As generation succeeded generation, the succession came to Ligdan Khan (d. 1634), and the cohesion of the nation was broken, and all the tribes were scattered and dispersed, and were hard put to it to find peace. Then the lofty emperor T'ai-tsu (i. e. the Manchu Nurhachi) arose in the eastern lands and the imperial house, the regent and the nobles of the Mongol nation severally submitted with sincere intentions and were granted high and generous favours and enjoyed friendly treatment.' Lomi goes on to say that when the Khalkha khans were defeated by Galdan and pushed back in confusion 'the khans and their officers came to submit, and the gracious emperor K'ang Hsi granted them the favour of restoring what had collapsed and continuing what had been interrupted, and cherished and protected them . . . Can we say that this is not a great good fortune for us Borjigit that we have had the grace of the Holy Lord constantly bestowed upon us? . . . In my opinion, the fact that our Mongol nation, when about to collapse, was restored again, and when on the point of falling apart, was reborn, is in truth entirely due to the amazing mercy of the Holy Emperor.'¹⁰ Thus Lomi's outlook was a thoroughly pro-Manchu one, though his interests were Mongol. In his eyes, the interests of the Mongol nation were identified with those of its hereditary aristocracy, the Borjigit clan descended from Chinghis Khan, and the fact that the supreme overlord was a Manchu, and not a Mongol, was immaterial. What was of real importance was that the Manchus had restored peace and order to the Mongols and in so doing earned their loyalty.

Pozdnev, writing in 1880, did, it is true, make use of the term 'independence' in connection with Chingünjav and his exploits. But Pozdnev did not have in mind the national independence of the Mongol people, but something quite different, his actual words being: 'It is not in dispute that in all these actions Chingünjav was motivated by the ambitious idea of throwing off the yoke of the Chinese and making himself an independent ruler.'¹¹ If we can accept Pozdnev's analysis, it shows Chingünjav as the last, and by now, outdated representative of a long line of Mongol princes who had similar grandiose ideas of setting themselves up independently of the overlord of the time, and who were often able to achieve their ambitions as long as a weak emperor held nominal sway over the Mongols. He was not a precursor of those nobles who in 1911 did manage to free Mongolia from the Manchus and establish a unified state. What above all characterizes the history of the Mongols, after the expulsion of the Yüan dynasty from China in the late fourteenth century, is the tendency towards disunity and fragmentation. The imperial family continued to reign, but not to rule, until 1634, but for generations it had ceased to be a unifying factor in Mongolia. Local rulers were continually emerging, and setting up petty realms, some of which, like that of Altan Khan of the Tümet, hardly outlasted their rulers, others of which, like that of the Altan Khans of north-west Mongolia, survived for a generation or two, and yet others of which, like the khanates of Khalkha, continued to exist, though with little independent authority, till the present century. It is doubtful if Chingünjav had more in mind than setting up such a petty principality for himself, whatever he may have said publicly, and the popular legend that he planned a new capital in his own peripheral pastures, with the name of North Peking, only serves to confirm this separatist tendency. In any case, what was possible during the impotence of the last Mongol emperors was no longer feasible after a new and powerful overlord, the Manchu emperor, had accepted Khalkha submission in 1691, and if Chingünjav really did aim at securing independence from the Manchus he was swimming against the tide, and betrays himself as sadly incapable of judging the

temper of the times and his own insignificance in comparison with the Manchus. Moreover, even those Mongol princelings who had, during the seventeenth century, played with the idea of finding an alternative to submission to the Manchus, did not, with the exception of the powerful West Mongols, ever seem to envisage the possibility of total independence. Rather they considered the alternative of submitting to the Tsar of Russia. The Setsen Khan discussed this question with a Russian envoy in 1647, but died before any decision could be taken, and there is a familiar legend, recorded in both Mongol and Chinese sources, that in 1688 the Khalkha aristocracy debated whether to seek help against Galdan in submission to the Manchus or to the Russians.¹² Alliance with the aggressive Oirats was out of the question, but so, significantly, was continued independence.

Throughout the mid-seventeenth century a significant change in the relationship between the aristocracy of Khalkha Mongolia, on the one hand, and the Manchu emperor on the other, had been taking place, and this new situation was institutionalized in the years between 1688—when the Tushetu Khan and the Jebtsundamba Khutuktu requested the protection of the Manchus against Galdan—and 1691 when the subordinate position of the erstwhile rulers of the Khalkhas was publicly established at the Convention of Dolonnor. Ever since the establishment of the Manchu empire, which had been accepted in 1636 by the princes of Inner Mongolia, the three khans of Khalkha had, to some extent, been subject to the suzerainty of the new dynasty, though the relationship was an ill-defined one. In 1636 they offered tribute to the emperor, and from 1655 onwards the custom of offering annually the tribute of eight white horses and one white camel, the so-called ‘nine whites’, seems to have been established. However, the khans retained an effective freedom of action, as illustrated by the fact that until 1688 the most powerful of them, the Tushetu Khan, and his brother the Khutuktu, were in diplomatic contact with Moscow as well as with Peking. Moreover, when a bitter dispute between the Zasagtu Khan and the Tushetu Khan led to intervention by the emperor K’ang Hsi in 1686, the latter showed himself unwilling, if not unable, to arbitrate on his own account, but preferred to enlist the help of the Dalai Lama, in view of the latter’s great prestige among the Mongols. A final indication that the Khalkhas were not formally under Manchu suzerainty is an argument adduced by K’ang Hsi in 1688 for not immediately acceding to the Tushetu Khan’s plea for help against Galdan. The emperor suggested that both Oirats and Khalkhas had long been in tribute relations with him. Now that both were accusing each other of misconduct, it would be inappropriate for him to interfere on one side or the other, and such intervention would be justifiable only if the Khan were to bring his people over in formal submission to the Manchus.¹³ This is, in fact, what happened soon afterwards. The Khalkhas could no longer resist the Oirats by themselves, and, to use modern parlance, they surrendered their independence to the Manchu emperor in exchange for protection. The chronicle *Erdeni-yin erike* expresses this in the following way. In 1688, it says, ‘the Tushetu Khan Chakhundorji led the Khalkhas into submission to the rule of the emperor K’ang Hsi’.¹⁴ The new relationship was thus a personal contract, albeit a forced one, between two individuals. The rôle played by the Khutuktu, as head of the lamaist faith in Mongolia, was a similar one. Though strictly speaking he had no secular authority, and controlled only a number of personal subjects or *shabi*, he enjoyed universal prestige as a religious leader. K’ang Hsi recognized his importance by specifically appointing him ‘grand lama’¹⁵ of the Khalkhas and putting him at the head of the lamaist faith in Mongolia. This action was taken in response to the Khutuktu’s personal plea in the

summer of 1688, in which he asked the emperor to allot him new pastures and see to the restoration of his ruined lama-series.¹⁶ A memorial presented by the Li Fan Yüan in connection with the death of the Khutuktu in 1723 summarizes the import of what the Khutuktu had done at this time. In part it reads: ‘The Jebtsundamba Khutuktu is the principal figure in the Yellow Faith . . . At the time of the rebellion of Galdan he brought the seven tribes of the Khalkha back to their allegiance and gained much merit.’¹⁷

The loaded terminology of this passage is characteristic of the familiar sino-centric attitude of Peking to the peripheral peoples, neither ‘rebellion’ in the case of Galdan nor ‘brought back’ in the case of the Khalkhas being from the modern viewpoint applicable to the situation. But clearly what was involved was the personal submission of the khans and the Khutuktu to the emperor, and the recognition that their authority henceforth stemmed from him, notwithstanding their consciousness of being the descendents of Chingis Khan and members of the Mongol imperial clan.¹⁸ At Dolonnor the khans were confirmed in the control of their subjects, an authority which they had held in fact for a century, and the Khutuktu was confirmed in the position he had held ever since the Dalai Lama gave him the title of Jebtsundamba in 1650.¹⁹ In 1911 a group of Mongolian nobles proclaimed the independence of their country and Mongolia was constituted a theocratic monarchy with much of the apparatus of a modern state, with ministries, an army, and later a two-chambered assembly. In justifying this arrangement, which was evidently based on contemporary political thinking, the Mongols adduced a traditional argument. They maintained that while both Chinese and Mongols had temporarily been subjected to Manchu rule, with the fall of the dynasty both nations alike were released from their old obligations and were free to go their own way.

The Manchu emperors took care to foster the goodwill of their aristocratic partners in Mongolia and made no more than the minimum changes in the social and political order (the two being more or less identical) than was necessary to maintain good order there. Though as time went on a regular network of bureaucracy was built up, narrowing from its base in the *sumuns* and *bags*, or sub-banner units of Mongolia to the Li Fan Yüan in Peking, actual Manchu participation in the administration of Mongolia was minimal, and Chinese participation nil.²⁰ The bureaucracy was staffed mostly by Mongols, and except for communications with Peking, which were in the Manchu language, Mongol was the main language of administration. The reluctance of the Manchus to disturb traditional relationships accorded with their general purpose of keeping Mongolia as a buffer for China on the north and west, and using it as a reservoir from which mounted troops could be drawn to help in the control of China and in waging war when necessary. Briefly, as far as the ordinary people were concerned, this policy expressed itself in the strict regulation of the entry of Chinese into Mongolia, the isolation of Mongolia from contacts with Russia, and the organization of the people in a semi-military fashion. The nobility, on the other hand, was attracted to the imperial house by the distribution of titles, by the payment of salaries, by promotion to influential appointments, and by the bestowal of imperial princesses and other high-born Manchu ladies as wives.²¹

With an aggressive and internally unstable Jungaria periodically threatening Mongol as well as Manchu security, the interests of the Mongol aristocracy lay in their loyal support of a strong and vigorous dynasty in Peking. Self interest, and equally a sense of obligation and personal loyalty, attached them, with some notable exceptions, to

the Manchus, until the end of the dynasty. There even emerged minor 'dynasties' of Mongol nobles who not only succeeded from father to son in their rank and in the control of their banners, but also handed on from one generation to another the appointments they held. An early example of this process is to be found in the family of Tsereng (d. 1750). Tsereng was the first lieutenant general of Uliasutai, and was succeeded in this post by his two sons, Tsengünjav and Tsedenjav. Sanjaidorji, the first Mongol amban of Urga, was appointed in 1758. He was succeeded by his son Yündendorji who held the same post till his death in 1827.²² Sanjaidorji was a descendent of Shidishiri, younger brother of the Tushetu Khan Chakhundorji (d. 1699) and it was members of the line of the Tushetu Khan who held the position of amban of Urga in later years: one may mention the names of Sündüvdorji, Delegdorji (in office in 1852) and Puntsagtseren (in office in 1911).²³ The sentiments attaching the Khalkha aristocracy to the Manchu imperial family were thus strong ones,²⁴ but at the same time, being based on personal and family connections, they seem at times to have been vulnerable to the caprices of individual noblemen who for reasons not always clear, chose to abandon their allegiance without apparently having thought out how they were to act subsequently. The principal example of such a lapse from loyalty, a lapse which was to serve as a trigger for the rebellion of 1756, was the alleged treason of Erinchindorji, a member of the family of the Tushetu Khan, half brother of the second Khutuktu, and a grandson of K'ang Hsi. Erinchindorji's offence, for which he was executed in early 1756, was to connive at the escape from Manchu custody of the prospective 'rebel' Amursana, the Jungar leader.

As far as the common people and the lesser nobility were concerned, adverse economic conditions and high taxation, under which heading we may include liability to military service and the exhausting levies of men and animals made during the continual wars with the Jungars, were the factors which disposed them to revolt when Chingünjav's appeal in 1756 put a match to an explosive situation. The monopolization of Mongol trade by Chinese merchant houses was one result of the Manchu policy of trying to screen off Mongolia from the north and discourage penetration from the south. In the north a chain of watch posts along the Russian frontier was set up in and after 1727, and a special frontier zone established into which no Chinese traders were admitted at all. In the south the Manchus tried to regulate the entry of Chinese, especially of those elements such as traders, farmers and craftsmen, who were potentially disruptive of a nomadic culture by requiring merchants to obtain a licence, valid for one year only, before entering Mongolia, by forbidding them to stop overnight in Mongol tents, to set up felt tents of their own, to marry Mongol women, and so on.²⁵ Their intentions were not simply negative and obstructive, as some Mongol scholars imply, but in part were directed towards protecting the Mongols from exploitation by a commercially more active and astute race. The Manchus realized that such exploitation would arouse resentment and unrest among the Mongols, to which extent their policies were directed by self interest rather than altruism.²⁶ But they realized also that the Mongols depended for certain necessities of life, notably cloth and tea, on the Chinese merchants,²⁷ and allowed this trade under supervision. But because no competition from Russian traders was allowed on the one hand, and because the official regulations were easily and consistently evaded on the other, the economy of Mongolia soon fell completely into the hands of the various Chinese merchant houses and was thoroughly exploited. Much trade was carried on on exorbitant credit terms, so that both private individuals and whole banners fell into debts which it was impossible for them ever to

pay off. It was a novelty that Chinese traders came into Mongolia at all: until the end of the seventeenth century it had been Mongols who sent trading missions into China. Yet in less than fifty years, by the middle of the eighteenth century, the position had been reversed. Mongolia was deeply penetrated by Chinese traders, most of them operating in and near fixed settlements such as Urga and Kiakhta, but others going, illegally, further afield into the country districts. The practice of credit trading was established,²⁸ as was that of the *tungsh*. A *tungsh* was a Chinese firm which had built up a monopoly of trade in a particular banner, and also operated as a banker for that banner, so that as time went on many a banner became more or less completely mortgaged to its *tungsh*. Indebtedness to Chinese firms was perhaps not a major cause of the rebellion of 1756, but it provoked a dull resentment, and the fury of the rebellion, when it came, worked itself out largely in the plundering of Chinese shops and the killing or mishandling of the merchants and even of their Mongol assistants, since it was these who presented the most obvious, and also the most defenceless, target for mob violence.

What more than anything probably induced in the Mongols the mood in which they were ready to rebel was the burden of military service and of taxation for the Jungar wars.²⁹ Direct taxation paid to the emperor as tribute was not onerous at all, and was largely compensated for by the salaries paid out to *zasags*, but indirect taxation in the form of corvée and of supplies for the administration and army was by no means light. For instance, there was from 1727 onwards the system of watch posts to be maintained. Men had to be sent there, and their travelling expenses provided by the banner which sent them. Their services were lost to their home banner, and the allotment of pastures to the actual watch posts meant a considerable loss of good grazing ground to the frontier banners. Just as burdensome, if not more so, was the servicing of the relay stations, which, with their heavy demands for both men and animals, horses for riding and sheep for provisions, took up a considerable proportion of Mongolia's rather primitive herding economy. Over and above these corvées, which might be considered the basic 'feudal' duties owed to the emperor, and which continued to the end of the dynasty, we have to realize that the early eighteenth century was a period of chronic war between the Manchus and the Jungars, with much of the fighting taking place on Khalkha territory.

As early as 1688 the Khalkhas had been exhausted by Galdan's invasions, and had had to rely for their sustenance on relief supplies issued to them by K'ang Hsi.³⁰ Nevertheless, during the first half of the eighteenth century tens of thousands of Mongols were mobilized as soldiers, and colossal numbers of animals were requisitioned for mounts, transport and provisioning. These were, it seems, paid for, though at a low valuation, and one which decreased sharply in terms of silver between 1730 and the 1750s,³¹ but it was their withdrawal from use, especially from breeding, which meant a heavy capital loss to the Mongol economy, which drew its income almost entirely from the natural increase of its herds. The emperor Ch'ien Lung missed this point when, in an ostensibly patient reply to the grievances listed by Chingünjav in 1756 in his famous 'Mongol letter' he said, with reference to certain requisitions, that they had all been paid for, so that it was impossible that the people should have been inconvenienced.³² As more than one official request from local *zasags* for a reduction in the levies shows, the people were being reduced to destitution by the commandeering of their livestock and by having to sell off animals of one sort in order to buy others, to which they had been assessed, but which they did not have enough of themselves.³³

Mr Išžamc's solution to the question of why the Mongols as a whole preferred to

remain loyal to the Manchus and to hold aloof from the Jungars is to view the matter as a straightforward clash of class interests and to condemn the Tushetu Khan and the Jebtsundamba Khutuktu as traitors who 'sold out their fatherland to the foreign enemy'. Elsewhere he speaks of the Khutuktu as 'an inveterate spy and agent of the Manchu aggressors' and of several 'reactionary clerical feudal nobles' who were carrying out a policy of 'selling out' Mongolia to the Manchus.³⁴ Even when we make allowance for the intemperate language of this analysis and for the importation into the argument of irrelevant and anachronistic concepts such as that of the fatherland, it seems unlikely that this simple black and white view of the situation is likely to furnish an adequate explanation. Neither with Galdan nor with his west Mongol successors did the Mongols have a chance of reaching an accommodation, in spite of a tempting invitation issued by Galdantseren in 1731 to desert the Manchus and join him in the Altai. The flight of the Khalkhas from Galdan in 1688 was a realistic reaction to his invasion, and offered an example followed by other, non-Khalkha peoples, for instance the Khotogoits, Chingünjav's future subjects, who fled from their home by Ubsa nur to the river Selenge.³⁵ But the emperor Ch'ien Lung's contrary contention that the wars against the Jungars were being waged entirely for the benefit of the Khalkhas is equally fallacious. His predecessor on the throne, the emperor Yung Cheng, had received a serious warning during the Jungar campaigns of 1731 and 1732 that there was unrest among the common people and sedition abroad among several members of the aristocracy. Several powerful nobles deserted the Manchu army in 1732, amongst them the Zasagtu Khan who had received a special reward of 5000 taels the year before in recognition of his military services.³⁶ Nacagdorž gives a representative list of ten aristocrats who had either simply deserted the Manchu army, or actually joined the Jungars at this time.³⁷ Ch'ien Lung's explanation, intended at the time to win over the vacillating Khalkhas, is of more interest nowadays as evidence of the strict limits within which he was able to manoeuvre. His dealings with the Jungars, in particular his acceptance of the surrender in 1753 and 1754 of leaders like Amursana and the 'Three Tserens', on none of whom he could rely for sure, were as much dictated by an opportunist recognition of the limits of the possible as they were the realization of a deliberate policy.³⁸

When the great outbreak came in 1756 it came in conjunction with a renewal of the troubles with Jungaria. However, the interests of those involved, both in the case of Jungars and Mongols and in that of different groupings of Mongols themselves, while not contradictory or mutually incompatible, were not mutually complementary either, except in the negative sense that only a tightly united Mongolia, or better still a united Mongolia and Jungaria, could hope to stand any chance at all against the Manchus. A divided movement would be doomed from the outset. But it was precisely this element of solidarity which was lacking, and the most cursory glance at Mongolia's history over the preceding two centuries shows us that this was only to be expected. Mongols and Jungars, and Mongols amongst themselves, would make parade of national sentiments, would appeal to the name of the great ancestor Chingis Khan as a symbol of unity, and would talk of expelling the Manchus.³⁹ But when it came to the point of action there was always a fatal individualism, at worst a selfish ambition, which proved stronger than the fine ideals, and predictably and inevitably prevented the Mongols from doing anything but bring about their own ruin in the face of a determined enemy. The Jungars in particular seem to have been obsessively determined to allow their own internal jealousies and ambitions priority over their resistance to what to us nowadays might

seem to have been their obvious common enemy, the Manchus. Right up to the very end, in the late 1750s, they persistently and perversely turned aside from the struggle for their group survival to indulge in palace revolutions and civil war. Amursana was an extreme offender in this respect, now siding with the Manchus whom he invited into Jungaria in 1754–1755, now fighting against them. Mongol disunity was less obvious than this, but just as destructive. Weakened by Manchu threats and promises some aristocrats sided with Chingünjav, others actively opposed him and fought on the Manchu side, while the most influential of them all, the Khutuktu, maintained throughout an ambiguous attitude.

It was the execution of the Mongol prince Erinchindorji in the spring of 1756 which apparently brought the discontent in Khalkha to a head. In brief the background to this event is the following. In 1754 Amursana came over to the Manchus, and the next year, ostensibly a Manchu general, was in command of some 10,000 troops in the victorious campaign against Davachi, the *taisha* of the Jungars. Dissatisfied with the extent of his reward he made no secret of his intention to take the whole of Jungaria for himself, and the Manchu emperor summoned him to court as a precaution. On the way he escaped from his escort and for the next two years fought the Manchus and his own rivals alike until he died as a fugitive. Now, although during these two years there was no effective common action by Jungars and Mongols, there was, from the very beginning, a conspiracy between them. On the campaign against Davachi, Chingünjav, prince of the Khotogoits, had been a fellow commander of Amursana's, and they had planned a combined anti-Manchu uprising to take place simultaneously in Mongolia and Jungaria in the autumn. The Manchus suspected this, and removed Chingünjav to the far north to campaign against some rebellious Uriangkhai on the upper reaches of the river Ob. He warned Amursana that their purpose was suspected, and for this reason the latter slipped his escort. The threads of treachery led further than this. The commander of Amursana's escort was Erinchindorji, who was accused of conniving at, if not actually engineering, the escape.⁴⁰ Amursana had left his seal of office with Erinchindorji, telling him he wished to make a detour to visit his wife and would rejoin the escort later. When it was realized that he had taken a different road altogether there was an ineffectual attempt at pursuit which was not pressed. Erinchindorji was arrested and taken to Peking where he was executed.⁴¹ Traditions vary as to whether the Khutuktu, who was in Peking at this time, was compelled to watch his half-brother's execution, or whether he was summoned to see the corpse displayed. But in any case, this event, which the Mongol nobility viewed as a grave infraction of their rights,⁴² was a powerful factor in the outbreak of rebellion two months later, while disaffection was still further aroused by the rumour that the Khutuktu and the Tushetu Khan were being detained in Peking against their will.⁴³

Erinchindorji's execution was one of the main grounds for complaint made by Chingünjav in his insubordinate letter addressed to the emperor in connection with his desertion of his military charge amongst the Uriangkhai and his return with his troops to his own homeland amongst the Khotogoit in the summer of 1756 which marked the beginning of the rebellion. The tone of this letter was so abrupt that his Manchu secretary refused to deal with it, and Chingünjav had it drawn up in the Mongol language by one of his own men. It is hard, from the little we know about Chingünjav, to be sure what sort of a man he was. The only contemporary reference so far to hand is a remark made about him by a minor noble of the Khotogoit when testifying to his own behaviour. What this man said was: 'Our prince's nature is hard and fierce, so that

everyone is afraid of him. He has few intimates and now a lot of those people who did follow him are deserting him.' There are two versions of this account, which has been translated from Manchu into Mongol for publication, and the other describes Chingünjav in addition as rash or hasty, and this is perhaps the most significant thing about him.⁴⁴ It is not clear whether he was riding a popular wave of insurrection, for there were mutinies and attacks on the watch posts in the spring of 1756 before his uprising began and they continued for a considerable time after his death in early 1757, or whether the popular enthusiasm was crystallized by the prospect of the backing and leadership of the nobility as represented by him.⁴⁵ But what emerges with some clarity is that the rising was opportunist in nature, without plan or ultimate aim, except that a vague dream of 'abandoning the Manchus' was in the air, and that it was undertaken without the assurance that there would be any significant support for it amongst the leading nobles of Mongolia. Even the initial advantage of Jungar co-operation was lost. When Amursana rose in the autumn of 1755 Chingünjav was immobilized among the Uriangkhai. By the time he was ready to profit by the news of Erinchindorji's death, Amursana was a fugitive with the Kazakhs. The two were in communication again during the winter of 1756,⁴⁶ but by the time Amursana was ready to move again Chingünjav was already dead.

Chingünjav's previous history shows him to have been an erratic and unreliable subject. He had been confirmed as prince of the Khotogoit in 1738 and at the same time was made a lieutenant general in Zasagtu Khan aimak. In 1744 he was reprovved for slackness in the command of his troops and in 1752 he was cashiered and lost his noble rank of *beile* for failing to surrender a fugitive. In 1754 he performed meritorious service against the Uriangkhai and got his rank back, and in 1755 was again a general and was even in personal attendance on the emperor, a signal honour for a man with his record. He was supposed to take part in the campaign against Amursana in the autumn of 1755 but delayed till it was too late, and was then sent against the Uriangkhai. From this campaign he withdrew and raised the standard of revolt. What lay behind these repeated lapses from loyalty it is hard to tell, but they may well have been no more than the expression of an ambitious and irritable character, moved by personal rancour against the overlord, and finally erupting in open but unprepared rebellion.⁴⁷

Lack of a clearly stated aim, lack of planning, and lack of solidarity all doomed the uprising from the beginning. Most of the nobility remained loyal to the Manchus, and some of the work of repression could even be entrusted to Mongol generals, in particular to Tsengünjav. The Khutuktu failed to give a firm lead, though he was not unsympathetic to the anti-Manchu party, and is reported to have appealed to the Emperor for clemency for Chingünjav.⁴⁸ In secret he seems to have played an even more positive anti-Manchu rôle. In the summer of 1756, together with the Tushetu Khan, he engaged in conversations with Yakobi, the Russian commandant at Selenginsk, on the subject of secession from Manchu sovereignty and submission to the Tsar. It was not till October that Yakobi got authority to pursue the matter further, and by then it was too late, as the Khutuktu had been overawed by Manchu intimidation, and in his turn had exercised all his prestige to persuade the Khalkhas to return to their duty.⁴⁹

It seems safe to assert that Chingünjav, though the initiator of positive rebellion, was not the key figure in the crisis at all. Everything depended on the way the Khutuktu would move, and very probably Chingünjav's apparent dilatoriness was forced upon him by the need to wait and see on which side, if either, the Khutuktu would declare himself. It was well known at the time what a vital position the Khutuktu occupied, and loyal

Mongols had advised the Emperor of his key function. In the middle of September, Sanjaidorji, then a general in Tushetu Khan aimak, wrote to the Emperor:

Now if your slave follows orders and takes troops to suppress Chingünjav, it may have the unwelcome result that the Khalkhas as a whole will rally to his support, and it is my humble opinion . . . that it will be a setback to your Majesty's polity if by fear the Khalkhas are moved to disturbance. My stupid opinion is the following: The only person whom the Khalkhas trust implicitly is the Khutuktu, and the most advantageous step would be to extend favour towards him and get him to pacify the Khalkhas.⁵⁰

This was a correct analysis of the situation. Mongolia as a whole was waiting to see what direction the Khutuktu would take before committing itself. But the Khutuktu delayed, and allowed the initiative to escape him, till he was manoeuvred into a position of impotence and the rebellion collapsed under the weight of Manchu oppression.

The Khutuktu, who was known in Peking to have been agitating against the Manchus after his return from China in the summer of 1756 had, by October, been intimidated by Manchu agents. The Emperor had sent him a letter ordering him to do his best to persuade the nobility of Mongolia to restrain their subjects and bring them back to their duty, and this letter was circulated together with the Khutuktu's reply to it. Lamas were also sent round the countryside to preach loyalty to the Emperor.⁵¹ Further, in October 1756, the Emperor called a general assembly of the Khalkha leagues at which he was represented by the Buddhist 'metropolitan' of Peking, the Jangjia Khutuktu. The presence of this dignitary, and the appointment of Tsengünjav as general of Uliasutai, were sufficient to sway the Khutuktu and the aristocrats to swear an oath of loyalty.⁵² In face of this, the messengers whom Chingünjav sent one after another to the Khutuktu to try to persuade him to come out on the side of the rebellion achieved nothing. Nor did anything come of a meeting which Chingünjav hoped to hold in Urga in early October to organize a coherent campaign against the Manchus under the Mongol nobility. The reluctance of the Khutuktu, the hesitation of most of the nobility, and the realization that the Manchus were a determined opponent, all told against him and the meeting never took place. It is probably a true measure of Chingünjav's fatal impetuosity, and perhaps also of excessive egotism, that he did not try to discuss matters with the leading nobles of Mongolia until a good two months after he had disclosed his hand to the Manchus by deserting his post.

The sorry tale of vacillation continued after Chingünjav's elimination. A feeling persisted that when the next worship of the Khutuktu took place in Urga in summer 1757, the pontiff would lead the people over to allegiance to Russia. Everything depended on him, but he could not bring himself to take a definite step. The great meeting of 1757 came and went, the nobles dispersed, and the long awaited decision was never taken. This hesitancy must be considered partly responsible for the failure to do anything effective to dislodge the Manchus, but, when it came to the point, there must have seemed good reason to the Khutuktu for not encouraging a rising whose success was very doubtful, whose spread would involve the whole people in disaster similar to that overtaking Jungaria, and which at best would only mean the exchange of the suzerainty of the Tsar for that of the Manchu emperor. But the Khutuktu's equivocal rôle did not save him personally. It is generally believed that he was assassinated by order of Ch'ien Lung in 1758,⁵³ and that the deaths of other Khalkha nobles such as the Tushetu Khan and the general Limpildorji were no accident either. The Emperor had a fulsome eulogy of the Khutuktu published, enumerating all he had done to defeat the

traitor Chingünjav, evidently with the intention of concealing his real rôle, and it is from Russian archives that the other side of the story has to be pieced together.

Without support from the Khutuktu, the rebellion was doomed to fail. Chingünjav's lack of enterprise is amazing. He was under suspicion at least since late 1755, but by the summer of 1756 he had done nothing to prepare for rebellion. He recruited no initial force beyond those followers he brought back from the Uriangkhai campaign, who numbered about 800, and the most generous estimates never allow him more than some 2000 soldiers. From the first he was having to spend his private fortune. It was only after he had actually deserted his post that he began to try to win over other nobles, and only then did he send out a belated summons to action in which he reminded them of Manchu misdeeds, in particular of heavy taxation and of the insult of the execution of Erinchindorji, a member of the clan of Chinghis Khan. He called on them to desert the Manchus. Once again we note the appeal to the name of the great ancestor, and once again it proved an empty form of words. Few nobles joined the rebellion wholeheartedly, and even these operated in isolation from each other.⁵⁴ Chingünjav, having declared himself, should have struck at once while the Manchus were unprepared, but he seems never to have made a positive military move against them at all. As even Mr Išžamc admits, it is hard to see just what he was doing in the months immediately after he returned to his home pastures.⁵⁵ Chingünjav did call the soldiers in the watch posts and relay stations out in mutiny, with considerable success, but he himself seems to have remained inactive amongst the Khotogoit till forced to retreat further and further north. Finally, in January 1757 he was captured with the few faithful followers who had not abandoned him, and sent to Peking for execution.⁵⁶

The rebellion as a whole, though a violent outburst of popular feeling, was a ragged and disastrous episode. It was the general desertion of the watch posts and relay stations which caused the Manchus most anxiety,⁵⁷ but the latter acted with vigour and restored these essential posts to service by at first manning them with Inner Mongol soldiers from their own army. But even this mutiny, widespread though it was, was not a coherent national uprising, and enthusiasm for it was shaken by the Emperor's promise of leniency for those who resumed duty, and severe punishment for those who held out. There seem to have been no major clashes with the Manchu armies. Chingünjav, in the north-west, did try to recruit troops from the neighbouring Uriangkhai. Some joined him, but many of even these war-like chieftains, who were not even Mongols, refused, like some of his own Khotogoits, to rebel. Nor was Chingünjav able even to keep the loyalty of his own followers. As he was hunted further and further towards Russia, they fell away. When he had only 200 men left he had to suppress a mutiny in his own ranks. Then his forces dropped to 100. By mid-January he was on the Russian frontier with 50 men, amongst the Black Darkhads who sided with the Manchus. After a fierce final battle he was captured. As the Manchu commanders afterwards reported to the Emperor, in the end it had been the desertion of his own men which had told against him. 'We, your slaves, did not await the arrival of the army to catch the bandit, but his own subjects, even to his own kin, themselves abandoned him.'⁵⁸

Outbreaks of violence all over Mongolia directed against the Chinese merchants and their shops exercised the Manchus at the same time. These were undoubtedly stimulated by Chingünjav's call to rebel, but like the army mutinies they were unplanned and uncoordinated and seem to have had no objective beyond immediate plunder. For example, Kiakhta on the Russian border was taken and plundered by a force of 300 Mongols, but the victors seem not to have known what to do once their immediate aim

of 'eating Kiakhta' as they expressed it, had been achieved. They held the town for a couple of months, and were then, for the most part, taken prisoner by the imperial forces. Urga, too, was attacked, and the Chinese shops there plundered, but the raid was an insignificant and ephemeral affair with no long-term effect.⁵⁹ The bands of armed men who attacked the traders were often small, consisting of no more than half a dozen herdsmen, and the official archives refer to them slightly as bandits and robbers. Sometimes the troubles merely afforded individuals a chance to pay off old scores and had no more generous aim.⁶⁰ In other cases, we read of Mongols simply following the herd and attacking the Chinese merchants because they had heard that others were doing so.⁶¹ However satisfying such escapades may have been at the moment, they can have had no real result except to attract reprisals on the part of the much superior imperial forces. Nevertheless, 1756 was an exceptional year for violence, with outbursts occurring throughout Mongolia on an unprecedented scale, and the Manchus were obliged to deal severely with the unrest. Some bands of 'bandits' were of considerable size, running into hundreds of men, as at Kiakhta, and reports put in by the general Limpildorji and others show that these large bands were often led by members of the nobility or by officials of the *shabi*, the personal estate of the Khutuktu.⁶²

The suppression of the revolt was thorough and severe, though not as ruthless as in Jungaria, and the impression one derives from the published archives is that the weight of vengeance fell rather on those who had plundered the Chinese traders than on the mutinous troops. Special punitive units scoured Mongolia to deal with the rebels on the spot. How they set about their task can be seen, to take one example, from a report submitted to the throne by Huturinga and Dorji, two special commissioners who carried out much of the work of repression. Of one affair they wrote: 'Eleven bandits . . . were beheaded, and their heads displayed as a warning at the place where they made their raid. Nineteen secondary bandits . . . were also summarily executed to set an example to others. We propose to confiscate their tents and cattle and to allot their wives and children as slaves to deserving nobles in the aimak. Of 183 men who made raids in various places in the district of Khüi and elsewhere, 30 have now been executed, and as for the 153 who remain and have not yet been caught, we are ordering the authorities concerned to arrest them and convey them here for execution as a public example, without distinction of whether they are ringleaders or secondary offenders.'⁶³ The captors of Kiakhta were similarly dealt with, most of them being executed and their heads displayed on poles, while their families were dispersed into slavery. Chingünjav and his family were executed, as were several nobles who had supported him, and his immediate followers were severely punished though some of them were mere children, and they and others professed not to have known what was going on.⁶⁴ Some rebels were let off as 'stupid Mongols', but many were executed, while others, especially lamas, were banished on foot to distant, and for Mongols, unhealthy provinces of south China. Wives and children were enslaved to loyal nobles or were handed over as reparations to Chinese traders whose stocks had been plundered.⁶⁵ To judge by reports from Russian visitors to Mongolia at the time, the whole nation was reduced to beggary. Again and again they encountered beggars kneeling by the side of the road asking for charity, and with their own eyes saw women and little girls being loaded on to carts to be sent off as compensation to Chinese merchants.⁶⁶

The Manchus had little difficulty in suppressing the rebellion, as soon as they had recovered from the initial surprise. Chingünjav's inactivity gave them time to bring up reinforcements from Inner Mongolia, and they were able to restore the watch-posts and

relay-stations to service, to catch Chingünjav himself, and to deal with the marauding bands in the countryside, whose energy had been dissipated in plundering the Chinese traders, and who had no longer term objective. On the purely material side the rebellion collapsed because the Manchus were a well-armed, unified force, subject to central discipline, and mobilized against a far more dangerous enemy, the Jungars, compared with whom the Khalkhas represented a minor distraction. The Mongols were poorly armed, with, for the most part only clubs with which to face the hand guns and artillery of the Manchus. Their psychological handicaps were equally grave. The rebellion of 1756 was from the start undermined by a fatal disunity and reckless individualism. It betrays irresponsible haste, rash opportunism, lack of planning and coordination, and absence of a common purpose, at every turn. In general the Mongol aristocracy did not join Chingünjav. Reports submitted to the throne by loyal Mongol nobles overflow with gratitude for the imperial favours they had long been receiving, and even if we discount much of this as formal sycophancy, there is no doubt that the Mongol nobility did enjoy a privileged position in the empire. They can hardly have been disposed to jeopardize this by rising in rebellion against a powerful overlord at the behest of a minor chieftain who had no clear policy beyond a vague dream of 'independence' as it is now termed, but which at the time would have meant at best the exchange of one overlord for another, at worst, mere anarchy.

The rebellion was not an anti-feudal uprising. Once or twice we hear of a noble being robbed, or of a chieftain who tried to obstruct the rebels being put out of the way, but basically there was never a hint of an intent to change the social order or even of the realization that such a step might be within the realm of possibility. A negative xenophobia rather than a positive will towards national independence seems to be what inspired the rebels, and this lack of a feeling of solidarity and purpose manifested itself in the series of ragged outbursts of violence which were characteristic of the movement.

Contemporary Mongolian scholars view the rebellion as being an armed uprising of the Mongol people in a struggle for independence. Reasons for considering this an anachronistic analysis have already been given, but on the other hand the rebellion must be regarded as much more than a mere eruption of malcontents, however vaguely conceived, ill-planned and raggedly executed it was. In its extent and violence it no doubt exceeded the successful national movement of 1911, but the conditions of the time were very different. The noble conspirators of 1911 enjoyed the good will of Russia and even some calculating help too, while they had to deal only with the demoralized remnants of a dying dynasty which was itself faced with revolution at home. The rebels of 1756 had in Ch'ien Lung a far more ruthless and ambitious opponent, and were unable to develop their movement to the point where coherence might have been visible, even supposing that the will to concerted action in fact existed. Certainly at the ostensible head of the rebellion, that is Chingünjav, there was a declared will to desert the Manchus, though with what confidence it was expressed is doubtful, and in any case it was the Khutuktu, not the erratic minor prince of the Khotogoit, to whom all Khalkha, noble and commoner alike, looked for a lead. It is as the figure of a liberator that Chingünjav has survived in Mongol folk memory, but folk songs and legends are not the true stuff of history, and what Mongols recalled about Chingünjav in the late nineteenth century is not necessarily relevant to the realities of the mid-eighteenth century. The question to be answered is what the Mongols thought they were fighting for at the time, and what evidence we have is unreliable. The confessions of captured rebels are probably tainted evidence, since they were trying by minimizing their responsibility

to save their lives, so that probably a proper evaluation of this episode will rest on the interpretation of the broad facts we possess rather than what the actors said about themselves.

There would seem to be a real difference between the utterance of the slogan of independence or, as Chingünjav put it in a rather more negative way, and one betraying his noble origin and outlook, abandonment of the Manchu emperor, and the demonstration of an active will towards independence. There is little to suggest that any Mongol leader had any idea of an alternative to some form of foreign over-lordship: even the Khutuktu was speculating only along the lines of migrating to new pastures within the Tsar's dominions, not of setting up an independent state, and some groups of Mongols took the traditional way out of a difficult situation by migrating mostly northwards into Buryatia.⁶⁷ It is perhaps not too bold to suggest that it was the burden of the chronic wars with the Jungars which brought the Mongols to the point of rebellion, and once this burden was removed, and, what is more, the infectious example of a turbulent Jungaria for ever eliminated, there were no more stirrings of rebellion against the Manchus, except for sporadic riots on occasions during the nineteenth century, until the collapse of the dynasty provided a pretext for severing the historical connection with Peking.

The immediate effect of this unsuccessful rebellion upon Mongolia was little short of disastrous, especially as it had come after the exceptionally heavy winter of 1755–1756, when heavy frost and deep snow had caused great losses in cattle, and an epidemic of smallpox had cut down the population. However, the pacification policy of the Manchus was much less severe than the genocide they practised in Jungaria, and life soon recovered its old tenor. The Manchu administration was reinforced, especially with the development of Khobdo as the centre of government in the far west under a Manchu amban. Chinese traders continued to come in and to consolidate their position. The Emperor tried to relieve destitution by cancelling part of the official debt which the Mongols owed to the merchants, and by paying off part himself with a special grant,⁶⁸ but this was only a palliative, and by 1775 the official debt was a quarter as much again as it had been in 1756, and continued to grow. Even so, 1756 is a turning point in Mongol history. It exhausted the opposition to the Manchus, and it took another century and a half before the Mongol nobility, taking advantage of the decline of the imperial power, organized another, and successful coup. The one fundamental change the Manchus made was in the position of the Khutuktu. In order to avoid any repetition of the close family alliance between the Khutuktu and the powerful of the Tushetu Khan, it was decreed that with the third incarnation, the Jebtsundamba Khutuktu was to be 'rediscovered' only in Tibet. From the third to the seventh, partly for the reason that they were foreigners, brought in as children into a hostile political atmosphere, the Khutuktus failed to exert much influence, though it is an ironical conclusion to the story of Mongolia's subjection to the Manchus that it was a Tibetan Khutuktu, the eighth, who was partly responsible for the expulsion of the Manchus from Mongolia in 1911 and who ascended the throne as the first, and only, king of an independent Mongolia.

NOTES

1. Maurice Courant, *L'Asie centrale aux xvii^e et xviii^e siècles: empire kalmouk ou empire mantchou?* (Lyon, 1912).

2. Michel Pavlovsky, *Chinese-Russian Relations*, (New York, 1949).
3. A. M. Pozdneev, *Obrazcy narodnoj literatury mongol'skikh "plemen*, (St. Petersburg, 1880), pp. 152ff.
4. For an evaluation of *Erdeni-yin erike* see especially Joseph F. Fletcher, 'A source of the Erdeni-yin erike,' *HJAS*, XXIV, (1962/63), pp. 229–233. Discussing previous translations of the title *Iledkel shastir*, Fletcher, in his note 17, supplies the correct version: 'Genealogies and Biographies.'
5. *Iledkel shastir*, chapter 63.
6. N. Išžamc, *Manžijn darlalyg êsêrgüücsên Mongolyn ard түмний 1755–1757 онь зэвсэгт бослого*, [The armed struggle of the Mongol masses of 1755–1757 in opposition to Manchu oppression], (Ulan Bator, 1955): 'Mongolyn ard түмний 1755–1758 онь тусгаар тогтнолын зэвсэгт тэмцэл 'Amarsanaa, Čingünžav naryn boslogo,' [The armed struggle for independence of the Mongol masses, 1755–1758—the uprising of Amursana and Chingünjav], *BNMAU Šinzlêkh ukhaany Akademijn Médêê*, [Reports of the Mongolian Academy of Sciences], 1961, 4, pp. 61–72, Ulan Bator 1961: 'XVIII зууны үеийн Mongolyn ard түмний тусгаар тогтнолын тэмцлийн түүхнээс (Amarsanaa, Čingünžav naryn boslogo),' [From the history of the struggle for independence of the Mongol masses in the eighteenth century—the uprising of Amursana and Chingünjav], *Mongolyn түүх, ёртний судлал, угсаатны зүйн зарим асуудал* [Some questions of Mongol history, archaeology and ethnography], *Studia Historica*, II, 3–8 (Ulan Bator, 1962) pp. 23–31: *Mongolyn ard түмний 1755–1758 онь тусгаар тогтнолын зэвсэгт тэмцэл (Amarsanaa, Čingünžav naryn boslogo)*, [The armed struggle of 1755–1758 of the Mongolian masses for their independence—the uprising of Amursana and Chingünjav], *Studia Historica*, III, 3, (Ulan Bator, 1962), 129 pp.
7. Išžamc, 1955, p. 22.
8. Išžamc, 1961, p. 70, repeated in SH II, p. 30.
9. Ö Čimid, *Čingünžavaar удирдуулсан Ар Монгол дэх' тусгаар тогтнолын тэмцэл (1756–1758)*, [The struggle for independence in North Mongolia led by Chingünjav], (Ulan Bator, 1963), 163 pp.
10. Walther Heissig und Charles R. Bawden, *Mongyol Borjigid oboγ-un teüke von Lomi (1732)*, (Wiesbaden, Otto Harrassowitz, 1957).
11. op. cit., p. 155.
12. For this legend in Mongol dress see Charles R. Bawden, *The Jebtsundamba Khutuktus of Uрга*, (Wiesbaden, Otto Harrassowitz, 1961), p. 45. It is to be found also in Chinese in *Meng-ku yu-mu-chi* (Taipei, 1965), Chung-kuo pienchiang ts'ung-shu, vol. 1, p. 294. Here also the ultimate source seems to be a Mongol one. The reference, via a poem by the Khorchin Mongol Sung Yün (Hummel, op. cit. pp. 691/692), is to a reminiscence by Gejaidorji, grandson of Dondubdorji, the father of the second Khutuktu.
13. See S. Nacagdorž, *Khalkhyn түүх*, [History of Khalkha], (Ulan Bator, 1963), p. 45. The assertion is substantiated by a quotation from a Mongol version of *Shuo-mo fang-lüeh*.
14. Galdan, *Erdeni-yin erike* (Ulan Bator, 1960), *Monumenta Historica*, III, 1, p. 104a.
15. In Mongol *yeke blama*. For this episode see *Erdeni-yin erike*, p. 106a.
16. *Erdeni-yin erike*, p. 103b, the source apparently being, as indicated by a reference in Nacagdorž, p. 44, *Shuo-mo fang-lüeh*.
17. *Meng-ku yu-mu-chi*, p. 295.
18. The supreme authority of the emperor in Outer Mongolia is also demonstrated by his actual creation, in 1725, of the fourth khanate, that of Sain Noyon Khan, out of banners detached from the Tushetu Khan's khanate.
19. The relationship between the Khalkha aristocracy and the Manchu emperor shows certain features reminiscent of European feudalism, and Marxist historians of Mongolia take it as axiomatic that 'feudalism' prevailed at this time. However, it is dangerous to pursue the parallel too exactly. From 1691 the khans were, for example, no longer in any position of authority over those banners outside their own which nominally still belonged to their khan-

- ates. The *zasags*, or banner princes, were directly appointed by the emperor. No Mongol noble could alienate territory or subjects by enfeoffing a subordinate, though donations of laymen as *shabi* or retainers were made to high lamas.
20. The first Manchu officials to be appointed were the trade supervisors (*jarjuči*) at Urga and Khiakta in 1719 and 1727 respectively. After that, regular Manchu officials do not seem to have been appointed till 1761, when an *amban*, or resident, was appointed at Khobdo, and another at Urga as colleague to the Mongol *amban* already in existence since 1758.
 21. The policy of intermarriage had long been familiar in Inner Mongolia, but the first reference I can find to an occurrence in Khalkha is the marriage of Dondubdorji, a relative of the Tushetu Khan Chakhundorji, in 1697. Sanjaidorji, the first *amban* of Urga, was born of one Manchu princess and married another, and as a child was brought up in the imperial palace in Peking. (*Meng-ku yu-mu-chi*, p. 317).
 22. Nacagdorž, p. 89.
 23. C. Damdinsürên, *Günzijn süm*, The princess's temple, (Ulan Bator, 1961), *Studia Ethnographica* II, 3, p. 22.
 24. Thus Sanjaidorji, in a submission to the throne of 27th August 1756, stated: 'The *beile* Tsevdên [one of Chingünjav's noble supporters—C.R.B.] told me to desert with all haste, but as I saw it, our family had for three generations down to myself been receiving the generous and weighty favours of the emperor. If I deserted this would mean openly rejecting the weighty favours received from the emperor in these three generations, and casting in my lot with the Khalkhas.' See Čimid, p. 41.
 25. On the similar policies adopted by both the Tsars and the Manchu emperors to keep their nomadic vassals in a 'primitive' state so as to be able to use them in a military capacity, see Vladimirtsov, *Le régime social des Mongols*, (Paris, 1948), p. 245. An excellent study of the development of Chinese trade in Mongolia in the eighteenth century is M. Sanždorž, *Khalkhad Khjatadyn möngö khüülэгч khudaldaa nêvtêrč khölzsön n'*, [The penetration of Chinese usury trade and its expansion in Khalkha], (Ulan Bator, 1963), *Studia Historica*, III, 5. Sanždorž quotes from the Mongol state archives an interesting order of the emperor Chia Ch'ing, dated 1805, on this subject: 'From of old it has been declared policy to prevent cunning Chinese merchants from penetrating into and settling on the pastures of Inner and Outer Mongolia, to prevent the Mongols from abandoning their traditional pastoral economy, and by keeping the pastures virgin to have them stay there quietly, but for many years past, due to neglect, this has been evaded by cunning Chinese, and they have been allowed to move in and settle' (p. 40).
 26. Thus an order of 1798, quoted by Sanždorž, p. 39, draws attention to this point: 'If the merchants, seeking their profits, bring the Mongols more and more into difficulties by heavy interest charges . . . mutual disputes and complaints will arise.' Though this quotation is too late to be strictly relevant to our theme, it appears to draw attention to a chronic state of affairs. An addition to the Khalkha Code of 1709, made in 1726, attempted to limit the giving of credit to Mongols, ordering that all cases of credit trading be reported to the trade supervisor at Urga, who would take no cognisance of debts still uncollected by the time the particular trader's annual licence to enter Mongolia had expired. The reason given was that if the 'stupid people' were allowed to contract unsupervised debts, trouble was bound to arise. See C. Ž. Žamcarano and S. D. Dylykov, *Khalkha Džirum*, (Moscow, 1965), p. 91 and p. 320.
 27. A warning to the Khalkhas that to go on attacking the Chinese merchants in 1756 would lead to an interruption in the trade on which they depended was part of the Manchu propaganda directed against the insurrectionaries. 'This (robbery) is harmful to the Khalkhas too, and why? Because for many years now their everyday needs in cloth and tea have been satisfied by what those Chinese merchants have brought in, and now, if the Khalkhas deliberately plunder the traders and steal their goods, the traders will be afraid and will stop coming. And if the traders stop coming, will they still be able to get their cloth and tea? This will be a

serious matter for their livelihood.' The Manchus also looked beyond this to the possibility that indiscriminate plundering would lead to anarchy, with every man for himself. 'This would be a grave matter, and the Jungars afford a present example of this.' The local authorities were enjoined not only to stop the plunderings and punish the guilty, but also to see that the Chinese traders were recompensed, so that they would not be deterred from future trading in Mongolia. (See Čimid, p. 50.)

28. Sanždorž gives details to show that long-standing debts were already in existence around 1740, quoting examples of debts contracted in Setsen Khan aimak in 1735 which had still not been paid off by 1743. (p. 56.)
29. On this subject see the monograph by C. Nasanbalžir, *Ar Mongoloos Manž čin ulsad zalguulž baisan alba 1691–1911 on*, [Taxation paid to the Manchu, Ch'ing, state by North Mongolia, 1691–1911], (Ulan Bator, 1964), 186 pp.
30. Nacagdorž, p. 47.
31. Nasanbalžir, p. 97, states that horses and camels were bought up in 1753 for six and fifteen taels each respectively, compared to prices of eight and twenty five taels given in 1730.
32. Čimid, p. 27.
33. See Nasanbalžir, p. 97, for a submission by the *zasag* of a banner in Setsen Khan aimak in 1753 complaining of the ruination of his banner through the excessive demands made for horses, which had to be bought from elsewhere for camels. The situation was made worse by the eight preceding years of hard weather. Išžamc, SH III, p. 51, quotes an order of the emperor Ch'ien Lung dated 1756 in which it is recognized that several years of military operations and natural disasters had lowered the standard of living of the Khalkhas.
34. Išžamc, SH II, p. 24, and 1955, p. 7.
35. *Iledkel shastir*, chapter 63, fol. 3r.
36. Nacagdorž, p. 65 and Nasanbalžir, p. 95.
37. Nacagdorž, p. 143.
38. In an imperial order dated 16th September 1756 (Čimid, p. 52) Ch'ien Lung explains himself as follows: 'The Khalkhas have all for generations been receiving imperial favours, and I am surprised that they could have been taken in by the rumours recklessly spread by the wretched Chingünjav, and have acted like this. From what I hear you are upset because you are exhausted by military action. For whose good have I been using these soldiers? Was it not in fact for the benefit of all you Khalkhas? If previously I had not accepted the submission of the "Three Tserens" would they have brought over all their tents and belongings with them? Would it have been correct not to receive them? And if I had not received them, do you think they would have stayed quiet? It would certainly have meant the wilful plundering of you Khalkhas, and so for that reason I received them and settled them down. Though the Tserens remained quiet, in the matter of the cunning and wicked actions of Amursana, if I had not accepted his surrender, he certainly would have plundered you Khalkhas and taken possession of your pastures . . . That I have sent out my great army without regard to the expenses to the state, and reduced Jungaria, is all for the benefit of you Khalkhas.' The three Tserens, Tseren, Tseren-uvsh and Tserenmönkh, were Jungar leaders who deserted Davachi for the Manchus in 1753, and the expense incurred by the Manchus in provisioning them was one of the grievances held by Chingünjav. For this see an imperial letter of 22nd July 1756 quoted in Čimid, pp. 26–28.
39. See for example a letter sent by the Jungar leader Galdantseren to the Khalkha prince Lamjav in 1731 which stressed the previous good relations between the two peoples and reminded the Khalkhas of their imperial past. (Nacagdorž, p. 65.)
40. The Manchu view is succinctly stated in *Iledkel shastir*, chapter 63, fols. 31v–32r: 'Erinchindorji was to convey the rebel bandit Amursana to the capital. Though he knew that Amursana was intending to defect, he did nothing about it, and allowed him to flee before his very eyes.' Similar text in an imperial order quoted by Čimid, p. 33.
41. Išžamc, SH, III, p. 53, says that Erinchindorji was 'cruelly put to death'. *Iledkel shastir*,

- chapter 63, fol. 32r, *Erdeni-yin erike*, p. 119b, and Čimid, p. 33, suggest that he was allowed to commit suicide.
42. To the extent that Ch'ien Lung had to state specifically that he did not consider the members of the Mongol imperial clan exempt from punishment any more than his own relatives. *Iledkel shastir*, chapter 63, fol. 32v and Čimid, p. 33.
 43. I. Ja. Zlatkin, *Očerki novoj i novejšej istorii Mongolii*, (Moscow, 1957), p. 102.
 44. Čimid, p. 74 and Išžamc, SH III, p. 87.
 45. Išžamc, SH III, p. 58, shows that attacks on the watch-posts began in spring 1756 and continued at least till late 1758. However, it was generally recognized at the time that it was Chingünjav's summons which was responsible for the major mutinies. For a characteristic statement of this opinion see Čimid, p. 55, quoting an order by Ch'ien Lung prefixed to the Khutuktu's reply to the same: 'Amongst the *taijis* (i.e. nobles) and soldiers who are stationed in the watch-posts and relay-stations, some men, gulled by the reckless rumours spread by Chingünjav of the Khotogoit, have deserted their watch-posts and relay-stations and withdrawn to their pastures. In my opinion they are all stupid Mongols, and have gone off in obedience to him because they were taken in by reckless rumours. It is not that they have deserted deliberately and defiantly.'
 46. Zlatkin, 'Russkie arkhivnye materialy ob Amursane', *Filologija i istorija mongol'skikh narodov*, (Moscow, 1958), p. 309.
 47. Details of Chingünjav's life in Pozdneev, loc. cit. and in Išžamc, SH III, pp. 84 foll., based on *Iledkel shastir*, chapter 63. The Khotogoit were a west Mongol people living on the Russian border near Ubsa nur. See *Iledkel shastir* chapter 63, fol. 2r ff. for a brief account of their history. Chingünjav himself was a Khalkha, not a Khotogoit. See Išžamc, p. 85.
 48. *Iledkel shastir*, chapter 63, fol. 34r.
 49. For the negotiations with Russia see Zlatkin, *Očerki*, pp. 103 foll. It was assumed by the Russians that in the event of secession the Khutuktu would move into Russian territory, rather than that annexations of Mongol territory would take place.
 50. Čimid, p. 52.
 51. A text of this letter, addressed to the Setsen Khan Manibadar, is given in Čimid, pp. 54, 56. It makes plain the imperial policy of dividing the rebels by promising clemency to those who returned to their duty, but severe punishments for those who continued to resist after the order had been published: 'Wherefore I shall not condemn them blindly, but if amongst them there are those who, having seen the orders I have given, return to their respective watch-posts and relay-stations, I shall pardon them all and not punish them. If having seen my orders they still intentionally do not return to their appropriate watch-posts and relay-stations, after having investigated the matter thoroughly, I shall punish them severely.' The Khutuktu was charged with the duty of sending out lamas to preach loyalty to the Manchus, 'since you, Khutuktu, are the grand lama whom all the four aimaks of the Khalkha revere'. The Khutuktu, in his reply to the Emperor, paid lip-service at least to the principle introduced under Khubilai Khan of the special relationship of 'lama and patron' which existed between them, an interesting confirmation of the fact that this relationship, originally uniting the Mongol emperors of China with high Tibetan lamas, had been transferred to the Manchu emperors of China and the high lama of Khalkha.
 52. Išžamc, SH III, p. 75.
 53. For the rumour concerning the murder of the Khutuktu see Nacagdorž, p. 92 and p. 212, Zlatkin, *Očerki*, p. 107, and L. Cedev, *Ikh Šav*, [The Shabiestate], (Ulan Bator, 1964), *Studia Historica* VI, 2, p. 10.
 54. Thus Išžamc, SH III, p. 55, says that two chief conspirators, the duke (*güng*) Damiran and the *beile* Tseviden 'did not join in a unified uprising, but separated and each went off to his own pastures.'
 55. SH III, p. 66.
 56. *Erdeni-yin erike*, p. 122b, suggests that he was allowed to commit suicide.

57. Sanjaidorji, reporting to the throne on 14th September 1756, said: 'It is not just the rebel bandit Chingünjav alone, but all the Khalkhas who have deserted' and again a few days later: 'There are very great numbers of *taijis* and soldiers in many watch-posts who have failed to obey me and have abandoned their important watch-posts and deserted in every direction.' See Čimid, p. 52 and Išžamc, SH III, p. 56.
58. Čimid, p. 78, in a submission to the throne by Tsengünjav and others.
59. A report of this raid by forty men on eight Chinese shops in Urga is given in Čimid, p. 45.
60. For instance, a number of Mongols were arrested for killing a Chinese named Sangaa and his associates, among them six Mongols. One of the accused had a debt with Sangaa, and when the latter came to collect it he tried to put off the repayment by saying he was just going to shift camp and would pay later. It came to a quarrel, but Sangaa escaped with the help of some bystanders. Then the accused talked the matter over with some of his relatives, and they simply decided to join a band of marauders who had come to plunder the local Chinese. See Išžamc, SH III, p. 62.
61. See for instance evidence quoted in a submission by Huturinga: 'We all heard rumours that a big force of bandits was coming down from the north-west and had attacked the army relay-stations. Further, we heard that they had plundered the goods of the Chinese traders in various places. So we banded together and went off to plunder the goods and cattle of the Chinese traders in the same way, and it is true that we did plunder them.' Čimid, p. 109.
62. Čimid, pp. 44–49, gives a number of reports about bands of up to two hundred men, some led by *tusalagchis* (a *tusalagchi* was the chief official in a banner under the *zasag*) and *taijis*. For the rebellious activities of lamas see Išžamc, SH III, p. 97.
63. Čimid, p. 110.
64. Thus one of Chingünjav's noble supporters, the *taiji* Banjur, said: 'The prince never gave me any explicit commands, but as he was the general and prince of our aimak I could not but follow him. In particular I never understood that he was proposing to rebel.' Two young boys made the following confessions: 'Confession of Tögs: I am fourteen years old, a subject of Chingünjav. We had nothing much at home, so as Chingünjav was my lord I worked for him and stayed with him gathering dried dung for fuel to get my living. I don't know anything else about the matter. Confession of Lasran: I am thirteen years old, the grandson of Togd. It is true that I followed my grandfather Togd, but I don't know anything else about it.' The judgment was as follows: 'We have publicly executed Togd, Aravdan, Doolin and Dampil on the 14th of the month, and we propose that, as Tögs and Lasran are small children under fifteen who did not understand the matter, but were forced into following the bandits, they be pardoned from execution, and allotted as slaves to deserving nobles in other aimaks.' Čimid, pp. 93–100.
65. On slavery see especially Natsagdorž, 'Gerijn khüvüüdijn učir', [On tent-slaves], *BNMAU Šinzlêkh ukhaany akademijn mēdêê*, 1965, 2, pp. 83–88.
66. Zlatkin, *Očerki*, pp. 107/108.
67. Išžamc, SH III, p. 103.
68. Publicly contracted debts as distinct from those owed by individuals. For imperial assistance in repaying debts see Sanždorž, p. 64.

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION OF THE *SHAV'*

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Pre-revolutionary Mongolian society consisted of two classes, namely the feudal class, the oppressors, on the one hand, and the people's class, the oppressed, on the other.

The people's class, in turn, consisted of the *albat*, the *khamjlaga* and the *shav'*.¹ Of these the *albat* were under the jurisdiction of the *zasag noyon* (ruling prince), the *khamjlaga* under that of the *taij* and *noyon* (other nobles), while the *shav'* were under the control of the monastic feudals, that is, various reincarnated lamas.

The *shav'*, like other representatives of the people's class, were oppressed by their lords, the feudals, and had to carry out various duties. These so-called duties were either of physical character, or entailed payment in commodities and money. Duties as such were the source of enrichment for many monasteries and the monastic feudals as well.

1. THE DUTIES CARRIED OUT BY THE *SHAV'*

The subjects of the *Ikh shav'* [the estates of the Javzandamba Khutagt] had to carry out various duties for the *san* (lit. treasury) and monasteries of the Javzandamba Khutagt. The duties were of various kinds, all difficult and burdensome.

The main duties included, firstly to provide the Javzandamba Khutagt with food, cover the expenses of his palace and monasteries, supply the *khamba* (abbot) of Ikh Khüree and many *shanzov* (administrators) with food, as well as to cover the expenses related to various activities and occasions such as restoration of monastic buildings, occasional and regular religious ceremonies, meritorious acts performed after the death of the Bogd [the Javzandamba Khutagt], religious ceremonies dedicated to the finding of the next reincarnation and so forth. The *shav'* also had to provide many *elch* (envoys), appointed to bring the reincarnation of the Bogd from Lhasa (*Baruun Zuu*), with equipment for travel. It was their duty to provide for the relatives of the Bogd, cover the expenses related to the *danshig mandal* (offering) presented to the Bogd, and to pay off debts to the Chinese and other merchants.

Let us briefly discuss some of these duties, drawing on documents.

The physical as well as monetary resources of the *shav'* have been employed to a great extent in the construction and restoration of monasteries, temples, stupas and statues of Buddha. From 1799 to 1803 the outer wall of Erdene Zuu monastery was refurbished

and fifty stupas were built anew. All related expenses were met by the people of the *khushuu shav'* (banner shav'). Some Mongolian chronicles mention that the names of the patrons had been carved on a stone, then placed on the platform of a stupa. Indeed, it is still possible to come across many stones with names, inside and outside the walls of Erdene Zuu. The following is written on one document: 'The first stupa, counting in the direction from the central gates to the right, was created by the chief of the shav' of the Supreme Dansran, *shüüleng* Janchiv, and *shadar gelen* Tudev', the second was created by Erdene mergen, [who is] *gün* of Tusheet Khan aimag, *daichin* Lhasarandorj, *khatan erk* Budshir, and *toin* Luvsandorj, the fourth stupa was created by *gelen* Renzen of the shav' of the Supreme and Danzan, the fifth stupa was created by *shüüleng* Lhaajav from the shav' of the Supreme, and other people, the sixth stupa was created by a craftsman lama from the shav' of the Supreme, the twenty-third stupa was created by *gelen toin* Navaan from the shav' of the Supreme, as well as the brothers Jigjidjav, Tserenjav and Sanjaa, [who are] *taij* of Efu Vang banner in Tusheet Khan aimag, the twenty-fourth stupa was created by *gelen* Norov from the Choisuren banner in Zasagt Khan aimag and Narav, the thirty-seventh stupa was created by Sambu and Nansu from the shav' of the Supreme, the forty-fourth stupa was created by Luvsanbaldan, doctor in the shav' of the Supreme, the forty-sixth stupa was created by Luvsanjalzan, a subject of the shav' of the Supreme, Zeren and woman Namjil, the fifty-fourth stupa was created by *toin* Damdin from the shav' of the Supreme.'²

Ikh Khüree, the main monastery of the Javzandamba Khutagt and the centre of Mongolian Buddhism, was constantly moving from one place to another during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Work related to the movement of the monastery was carried out at the expense of the shav'. In the middle month of the summer of 1772 during the movement of the monastery to Mandal, the following was contributed by the *otog* of the shav': 1,024 camels with saddle-pads, 1,000 cows with saddle and rope, 973 people with enough provisions for a month. Also, when the monastery was carried from Mandal to the Selbe River the following was supplied by the shav': 1,032 saddled camels each with 2 mattresses and 2 ropes, 1,054 cows with saddles, 998 porters with road food enough for a month, 15 carpenters and 14 smiths with food enough for 2 months.

In a letter sent on 18 November 1866 from the Administration of Ikh Khüree (*Erdene Shanzoviin yaam*) to the *zorj gesgui*, *donir* and *zaisan* [various ranks of officials] of the temple of *Shashnig Badruulagch* (Inspirer of Religion) the following was mentioned: 'In the temple of Amarbayasgalant (which was built by the order of the Manchu emperor Enkh-Amgalan (the Kangxi Emperor) in dedication to the First and the Second Bogd) the stupas dedicated to *Öndör gegeen* [i.e. the First Bogd] and the Fourth Bogd are worshipped, the stupas dedicated to the Second, Third and Sixth Bogd are worshipped in the temple of the Shashnig Badruulagch, the stupas dedicated to the Fifth and Seventh Bogd are worshipped in the monastery of Gandantegchilen. During the course of time the above-mentioned monasteries and lamaseries have been considerably damaged by rain and wind. As all these places were worshipped equally refurbish them all promptly without distinction. In order to carry out this task 8,800 three year old sheep, that is 3,000 male and 5,800 female sheep, are to be collected from the shav'. The male sheep are to be sold and the money used for the refurbishment works, while the female sheep are to be breed and kept as refurbishment capital for the monasteries. Besides that, 1,500 male and 2,000 female three year old sheep are to be granted to Amarbayasgalant monastery, 1,000 male and 2,000 female three year old sheep are to be granted to

the monastery of Shashnig Badruulagch, 500 male and 1,800 female three year old sheep are to be collected in the land of Ikh Khüree and distributed among the following places: two monasteries with stupa located in the Gandantegchilen lamasery and the monastery of Gungaadejidlen on the Tuul river, established by the Fifth Bogd. The sheep are to be bred and used for the refurbishment works. The chiefs of various *otog* are to select the requested sheep that have to be good and fat, and deliver them to the relevant monasteries on time and without delay. This is not an ordinary duty. As this is dedicated to the monasteries, temples and important shrines that have been worshipped by all, merits can be expected until the achievement of Buddhahood. Do not shirk.'

Also, in 1880, during the refurbishment of Gandan and Amarbayasgalant monasteries 8,846 sheep were taxed from the Ikh shav'. The shav' also had to participate with their own transport in the refurbishment of the palace and temples of the Bogd. Thus, in 1886, various *otog* of the Manzshir, Mergen, Khicheengui and the Erdene Khutagts transported 7,200 *jin* (a measure of weight) of yellow ochre, that were to be used for the repainting of the Yellow Temple in the palace of the Bogd.

After every death of the Bogd Javzandamba Khutagt tens of thousands of *lan* (tael) of silver were collected and sent to Lhasa where the *manz* [a type of tea used in religious ceremonies] was cooked, meritorious acts performed, and religious services held to reveal quickly his next reincarnation. All this is clearly documented in the autobiography of the Bogd. The relevant documents are kept in the archives of the Ministry of Shav'. Let us cite some of them.

After the death of the Second and Third Bogd Javzandamba Khutagt 60,000 to 70,000 *lan* of silver were gathered from the four aimags of the Khalkh, the shav' and the herds of the Khutagt. In Lhasa the *manz* was cooked and meritorious acts performed.

Yet another document describes how after the death of the Third Bogd Javzandamba a delegation from the Khalkh headed by *yonzon nomon khan* Jambaldorj, *beis* Don-dovdorj, *taij* of the first rank Sampildorj, *gün* Myagvadorj and *zasag* Chogsomjav, along with 70,000 *lan* of silver, hundreds of bundles of silk and dragon-patterned brocade, various beautiful goods of Indian, Manchu and Mongolian origin arrived in Tibet, where they have performed the ceremony of revealing the next reincarnation as well as many other ceremonies in order to eliminate the obstacles on his way to rebirth.³

After the death of the Fourth Javzandamba Khutagt money for various meritorious services to the sum of 70,000 *lan* of silver was collected. From the total sum 40,000 *lan* were gathered from the subjects of the Ikh shav'.

In 1848, in relation to the death of the Sixth Javzandamba Khutagt, the chiefs of various leagues in the four Khalkh aimags along with the vice-*janjin*, the *khamba nomon khan* and the administrator of Ikh Khüree had a meeting where they agreed to collect 70,000 *lan* of silver, as before, and appointed *zorj lama* Gendendash, *soivon lama* Sonomdorj, *zasag* Ravdandorj and Zeveenjav in 1850 to lead the delegation of 133 men to Tibet in order to perform meritorious acts.

In the letter sent by the governor of Ikh Khüree to *nomon khan* Baldanchaimbol, abbout of Ikh Khüree, and Tserendorj, administrator of Ikh Khüree, on 23 July 1869 it was ordered to send to Peking 50,000 *lan* of silver in relation to the death of the Seventh Bogd and further meritorious ceremonies to be held in Lhasa. 10,000 *lan* had to be derived from the four Khalkh aimags and the remaining 40,000 from the shav'. All

money had to be packed in chests and wrapped with leather. Also, the chests had to contain 1,000 lan each, and the cargo guarded by soldiers along with a man literate in Chinese script, appointed from the shav'.

Upon revelation of the Javzandamba Khutagt in Tibet, to bring him to Mongolia was a very impressive measure requiring massive expenditure. For example, merely the collecting of money from the people would take from two to three years.

If we examine the historic documents we can see that the reincarnations of the Javzandamba Khutagt would come to Khalkh Mongolia as small children only at the age of five or six. On every occasion related to the invitation of the reincarnation to Mongolia, numerous delegations from the four Khalkh aimags and the Ikh shav' would go to Tibet. As the road was long and the only means of transportation were camels and horses, it would take almost two years to get to Lhasa and return.

In order to bring the Third Bogd 800 men, 800 horses, 400 of which were taken from the *san* (treasury) of the Khutagt and 400 from the four aimag, as well as 300 camels were employed. Among the men there were people such as the Zaya Pandida, *soivon toin* Erdene, astrologist *gelen* Darjaa, *gavj* Chultem, and *mergen gush* Choijamts.

To invite the Fourth Javzandamba Khutagt 600 men in total, lamas and lay people, were sent, including *chin van* Bazarsad, *khamba nomon khan* Tseveendorj, *da lama* Gendendarjaa, and *zasag* Sandivdorj.

In 1820, in order to bring the fifth reincarnation of the Javzandamba Khutagt from Lhasa 539 men set off on the journey, among them *chin van* Manibadar, and *nomon khan* Erenzenjav, with 1,634 horses, 843 camels, 395 of which were with saddles, carrying with them 19,664 lan of silver. Moreover, to welcome and meet the fifth reincarnation 5 officials, 30 *ulaach* (attendants with relay horses) with 10 spare horses, who had provisions for five months supplied by relevant aimag shav', as well as extra 800 horses and 300 camels were sent to Alshaan. Of them 400 horses, 150 camels, 2 guides, and 15 *ulaach* were supplied by the Ikh shav'.

According to the orders of the Manchu emperors, in 1820 the Fifth Bogd, and the Sixth Bogd Javzandamba Khutagt in 1848 on their journeys from Lhasa to Ikh Khüree had to pass Hōh Nuur, then Alshaan, and enter the country through the lands of present day Ömnögov' aimag. In the Khalkh lands, fourteen relay stations were set up along the way from Zusiin Zagaan Tolgoi in the south to Ikh Khüree. The first station was established in Zusiin Zagaan Tolgoi (the land of the present day Nomgon sum in Ömnögov' aimag); the second in Ehen Zag (in the land of Nomgon sum); the third station in Buuriin Ar Ōlziit hudag (the land of Argalant sum); the fourth station in Bazar (present day Bazar river); the fifth station in Hanin Doloon; the sixth station in Ongiin Ders (the land of the Mandal Ovoo sum); the seventh station in Tohom (in the land of Dundgov' aimag). The other seven relay stations until Ikh Khüree were set up by the people of the Ikh shav' in Sangiin Dalai, Bayankhushuu, Zeel Altan Devseg, and Altan Bulag respectively. Each relay station was provided with 15 amblers ($14 \times 15 = 210$), 45 nags ($14 \times 45 = 680$), 90 camels with saddles ($14 \times 90 = 1260$), 10 sheep for food ($10 \times 14 = 140$), 20 *ulaach* with horses ($14 \times 20 = 280$), 5 guides ($14 \times 5 = 70$), 5 ger with bedding ($14 \times 5 = 70$), 10 ger with kitchen equipment ($14 \times 10 = 140$), and 3 big tents ($14 \times 3 = 42$). Two chief officials along with two zaisan were also appointed to every station.

The Manchu government had a regulation according to which the Bogd, on his way from Lhasa to Ikh Khüree, had to be accompanied by many people including a guardian-minister. All expenses related to the transportation, wages, ger, tents and

provisions had to be covered by the shav'. In the State Archives some documents are kept relevant to the establishment of the above-mentioned relay stations, by the order of the Manchu emperor, for the *zangi* (commander) and *boshgo* (official) of the *zurgan* (bureau), whose duty was to accompany the Fifth Bogd from Lhasa in 1820, and the Sixth in 1848. According to the imperial order, the governor (*amban*) Va, the clerk, *zangi*, and *boshgo* of the *zurgan* had to accompany the Fifth Bogd on his way from Lhasa, arrive in Ikh Khüree in August 1820, enthrone the Bogd, perform the danshig to the Khutagt and then immediately return to Peking using the relay stations. Each of the fourteen relay stations in the Khalkh was also strictly ordered to keep ready 45 camels ($14 \times 45 = 630$) and 10 ulaach with horses ($14 \times 10 = 140$).

The sixth reincarnation was invited and enthroned in 1848. In a letter issued by the minister of Ikh Khüree in spring 1847, the order of the Manchu emperor was mentioned according to which the following people were appointed to the task of inviting the sixth reincarnation from Lhasa: van Erenzendörj, vice-khamba nomon khan Erenzenjav, Da Lama Birvaajav, Daramjav, taij of the first rank of Tsetsen Khan aimag Erentsenbal, taij of the first rank of Zasagt Khan aimag, and gün Lkhavandörj of Sain Noyon aimag. In the order it was also said to 'appoint 500 people in total, in order to avoid a possible shortage of men, and send them on 2 February 1847 through the Janchhuu (Kalgan) gates. Also, collect 10,000 lan of silver from the zasag khushuu of the four aimags as well as 1,000 lan of silver from various khan, van and zasag in order to contribute to the mission.'

In his order the emperor reveals his anxiety: 'The age of the Javzandamba Khutagt is young, unfortunately the distance between Lhasa and Ikh Khüree is great, my heart is not comfortable . . . It is prohibited to startle the Javzandamba Khutagt. Take care of the reincarnation of my Khutagt.' This letter is attached to the order.

The last, Eighth Bogd Javzandamba Khutagt was invited from Tibet and enthroned in 1874 at the age of six. More than 400 men were sent to bring him, including nomon khan Baldanchöimbol the khamba of Ikh Khüree, da lama Dashdörj, four taij from the four Khalkh aimag and many nobles. Sticking to the previous regulation 40,000 lan of silver were taken from the san of the Khutagt, 40,000 lan from the zasag of the four aimag and 1,000 from many khan, van, and zasag to cover various expenses such as cooking the manz in Lhasa.

1,247 camels, 823 horses, 7 *ger*, 108 tents, 95 rifles, 190 arrow-cases, 31 spears, 55 sabres were used during the journey to bring the Eighth Bogd.

When in 1874 a Manchu minister along with a *zangi* and a clerk were appointed by Peking to bring the Eighth Javzandamba Khutagt from Tibet to Ikh Khüree, in the shav' lands three relay stations were appointed to serve them, among which the 10th station was set up in Dund Zagaan Bulag, the 11th in Ugtaalın Jaran, the 12th in Ulaan Hudag. As it had been before, each relay station was provided with 3 *ger* with bedding, 2 fully equipped white *ger*, 10 tents with equipment, 185 camels with saddle, 71 horses, 85 ulaach with horses and 11 sheep. It is worth mentioning here that interesting plans existed concerning the routes by which to bring the Eighth Javzandamba Khutagt. At that time the Mongolist A.M. Pozdneyev was travelling in Mongolia, and here is what he wrote: 'The disorder that broke out in the western provinces of the Middle Land (China) and in the lands adjacent to Tibet caused great concern among the Khalkhs. The Khalkhs fearing "the white hats" who were plundering all the way along from Ikh Khüree to Tibet, were thinking of an alternative indirect route, so they had two roads in their mind. The first was to pass Siberia and Turkestan, travel in Russia, then through

Afghanistan and India to reach Tibet; the other was to pass across Siberia, travel in Russia, cross the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, across the Gulf of Suez, reach the city of Calcutta, and from there to proceed to Tibet. But, as the Chinese government convinced their subjects that it would not be dangerous to use the direct road, the emissaries of Ikh Khüree used the pass through the Tangad land as usual. This is what people say.' Also by the order of the Manchu emperor, forty elite soldiers from Setsen Khan aimag, who had been stationing in Ikh Khüree, were fully armed and sent to guard the Javzandamba Khutagt.

The expenses related to gifts for the relatives and assistants of the Bogd were also allotted to the shav'. Although it is possible to cite many documents, let us be content with just a few. Here is a fact concerning the gifts given to the Tibetan lama khamba nomon khan Luvsanjambal, teacher of the Third Javzandamba Khutagt. Hudrangaa, the Manchu minister residing in Ikh Khüree, sent a report to the Emperor on 27 September 1765, where he cited a letter that he had received from Sanjaadorj from the Administration of Ikh Khüree. Sanjaadorj wrote: 'Before, our office had invited a teacher lama from Lhasa. On his arrival we provided him with food enough for one year as well as property and cattle enough for a lifetime. Now, when the Holy Lord [the Manchu emperor] has appointed the great lama as the teacher of the reincarnation of our Khutagt, and as it befits to increase his [the lama's] property, in order to make things that he uses abundant, we, lamas and ordinary people all together, have discussed and decided to give him 10 ger, and to supply him with food such as rice, flour, meat, tea, milk, and butter for a period of one year, that is food worth 90 lan of silver per month. Next year when grass shows up, 500 horses, 80 camels, 200 cows, and 2000 sheep will be given from the san of the Khutagt as well as from many shav'. Also 20 families with their cattle will be appointed to look after the cattle of the nomon khan.' Here is one more extract from the letter of Sanjaadaorj: 'As this nomon khan is a famous lama in Lhasa, a man was sent there from Ikh Khüree to invite him. . . now when the Holy Lord has predicted the wishes of the Mongolian subjects and appointed this lama as the teacher of the Khutagt, our joy is immeasurable. . .' In the report a conversation held with the nomon khan was also attached, as follows: 'Nomon khan Luvsanjambal said the following to the subjects (the Manchu ministers): "I am an insignificant bandi (Buddhist novice) in Lhasa. The Holy Lord bestowed upon me the title of nomon khan, thinking that I am a good lama, and made me the teacher of the reincarnation of the Javzandamba Khutagt. This is indeed an extremely generous favour. I, a humble servant, believing in the favour of the Holy Lord will do my best to teach the reincarnation. The Khutagt, as I see, has already learnt *itgel*, *lamanchodov*, *darhi*, *beleg barmid namsangadi*, *baldaa*, *sansum*, *great ravmai* and two kinds of praise to Shakyamuni. As the sixteenth of September was an auspicious day, from the hour of the Horse I started teaching him *lamiran* and *dagdan*. Although the Khutagt is pretty young, he is uniquely intelligent. I, a humble servant, decided to teach the Khutagt, taking into account his age and mood, so I knelt in the direction of the Palace of Heaven with a *hadag* (ceremonial silk scarf) in my hands and worshipped the favour (bestowed upon me)."' The report finishes with the following: 'So, I am sending [the report] attaching the *hadag* given by the *nomon khan* Luvsanjambal.' When the report arrived, a reply was sent back on the fourth of October with the notice 'the report is received' written in red.

Also, one document is available concerning 5,092 head of livestock presented to the relatives and the Tibetan lamas who came together with the Sixth Bogd from Lhasa in 1848.

<i>Recipient</i>	<i>Camel</i>	<i>Horse</i>	<i>Cow</i>	<i>Sheep</i>
Father, mother, elder brother <i>Khamba lama</i> , little siblings	50	400	200	1,500
Gachin lama	200	100	700	
Gachin <i>soivon</i>	20	160	70	380
Doctor	15	120	70	380
Gudembe	10	110	60	330
Minor <i>soivon</i> lama	7	50	30	100
Total	132	1,040	530	3,390

The relatives of the last, Eighth Bogd Javzandamba on arriving in Mongolia have received 3,000 horses as well as the same number of cows. From a letter issued by the Administration of Ikh Khüree in 1882, it is seen that the wish of the Yonzon Hamba nomon khan, teacher of the Eighth Javzandamba Khutagt, was carried out and he was granted 500 lan of silver, 100 horses, 100 mares, 150 rams, and 150 ewes. Besides that his elder brother was also given 100 lan along with other goods worth 150 lan of silver.

Often, the Javzandamba Khutagt used to send gifts and money as well as other offerings to the Manchu emperor, the Dalai Lama and Panchen lama. Thus, for example, in 1822 on the occasion of the inauguration of the next reincarnation of the Dalai Lama a delegation of 108 men headed by zorj lama Luvsangonchig was sent carrying various gifts.

In 1912 the Eighth Javzandamba Khutagt sent 10,000 lan of silver to Lhasa with khamba nomon khan Jambasharav, who was about to go there on an important mission. The money sent was to be spent on the following meritorious deeds: to make offerings to the Panchen and Dalai Lama, to distribute alms to more than a hundred monasteries and to prepare manz.

In 1840 the Fifth Javzandamba Khutagt, during his visit to Peking, offered to the Holy Lord (i.e. the Emperor) the *yoson tsagaan* (lit. nine white) consisting of 72 white horses, 9 white camels, one black fox, a sable and 50,000 lan of silver. The offering called *yoson tsagaan* used to be made on various occasions. In a letter sent on 9 September 1908 from the administrator of Ikh Khüree and the Da Lama to the minister of Ikh Khüree the following was requested: 'The office of our Javzandamba Khutagt, following the law, is offering one white camel, eight horses as the *yoson tsagaan* to the Supreme (the Manchu emperor) as well as 4 horses to greet the Supreme. As the gift will be sent by zaisan lama Galdanjav, our messenger, please issue a document of the Three Letters (a pass written in Mongolian, Manchu and Chinese).' Also, in a letter written by the administrator of Ikh Khüree and the Da Lama on 7 September 1909 to the Manchu minister in Ikh Khüree a pass was requested for zaisan lama Navaadorj who was delivering the *yoson tsagaan* to the Supreme, consisting of one white camel and 8 horses. A letter for 15 September 1911 addressed to the Ministry of Outer Mongolian Affairs contains the following: 'The office of our Javzandamba Khutagt, following the law, annually offers the *yoson tsagaan* to the Supreme and also greets him with a hadag, along with a statue of Buddha and a horse. This year the duty of the *yosoon tsagaan* consisting of one white camel and 8 horses were sent with zaisan lama Danzan.' As the Khalkh gained independence from the Manchu at the end of the third year of the reign of Khevt

Yos (the Xuanton Emperor) (1911), possibly this was the last yoson tsagaan offered to the Manchu emperor.

From the documents dating back to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, kept in the Central Archives of the Mongolian People's Republic, it is seen that the Javzandamba Khutagt used to send to Peking thousands of cattle gathered from the shav'. In 1754, the Ministry of the Shav' sent 5,000 horses and 350 camels to the Manchu army. In 1895 the Eighth Javzandamba Khutagt sent 1,200 horses to the Chinese army during the Sino-Japanese war. The money, cattle and other goods sent to the army exceeded 90,000 *lan*.

Many reincarnations of the Javzandamba Khutagt were accustomed to visiting Erdene Zuu and Amarbayasgalant [monasteries]. The trip itself was an expensive measure. Thus, for example, in 1895 the Eighth Javzandamba Khutagt for his trip to the Erdene Zuu requested 6,415 sheep, 650 camels, 1,000 horses and 100 tents from various otog of the shav'.

The *san* of Javzandamba Khutagt would get filled with offerings of many pilgrims from various lands. According to A.M. Pozdneyev, Mongolian pilgrims would come not only from the Khalkh land, but also from Inner Mongolia, Barga, Ööld, Dörvöd, Tangad, Buriat and Kalmuk lands. The Kalmuks, citizens of Russia, began the pilgrimage from 1880 onwards, after a widow of an aristocrat first came to Ikh Khüree. From that time on, from four to ten Kalmuks would come to Ikh Khüree each year. He also wrote that during that period they had offered no less than half a million silver rubles, and purchased more than 1,500 statues of Buddha, 4 Ganjuur and 2 Danjuur in Ikh Khüree.

Each year the subjects of the Ikh shav' had to pay as tax a certain amount of livestock, livestock products and money to the san of the Javzandamba Khutagt as well as to many monasteries and Khutagt that were under his jurisdiction. For example, a document is available concerning the Khar Darkhad people, who were also shav' of the Javzandamba Khutagt, and who had to deliver many cattle to the san of the Khutagt annually. In a pass for 22 July 1787 issued by Gombojav, the first rank taij in charge of the watch-post adjacent to the Russian territory in Zasagt Khan aimag, it is indicated that 137 men in total, representatives of the Khar Darkhad including gesgui Banjuur and accountant Samdan, set off Ikh Khüree to deliver 100 camels, 1,155 horses, 242 cows and 1,700 sheep to the san of the Gegeen [the Javzandamba Khutagt]. . . .⁴ Similarly, all otog of the Ikh shav', in this way, had to carry out and deliver duties.

Here are some examples of the accounts related to the taxes and duties due to the san of the Javzandamba Khutagt imposed on the otog of the Ikh shav'. In 1848 the taxes and duties were imposed on all otog in the form of tea for worship, butter, money for the danshig and the yoson tsagaan offerings, wood, fodder, milk and curds. Thus, for example, the otog of Ikh Barga had to deliver 14 seveg (an accounting unit for taxes) of tea for worship, 163 jin of butter, and 6,376 yellow tea (*biyeer shar tsai* - an accounting unit of tea equivalent to approximately 40 grams), the otog of Merge had to pay 14 tea for worship, 206 jin of butter, and 13,770 yellow tea, the otog of Bishrelt 3 tea for worship, 58 jin of butter, and 3,870 yellow tea. Thus, 14 otogs, including that of Tangad and Yeven as well, had to deliver in total 705 tea for worship, 560 jin of butter, 45,761 yellow tea monthly. That year a certain 25 otog delivered 643 tea for worship, 775 jin of butter, 607,658 yellow tea and 103 jin of milk in total to the san. Besides that the Amarbayasgalant monastery has received 12 tea for worship, 355 jin of butter and 5,460 carts of firewood. Similar taxes were also imposed on other otog.

According to the account for 1909, for example, the following taxes were imposed on the otog of Baruun Khüree: 62 seveg of tea for worship, 4,147 jin of butter, 34 dairy cows, 10 sheep for food, 19 camels with saddle as a part of the yosoon tsagaan, 3 guides to go to Peking on the yoson tsagaan mission and 48,780 yellow tea to be used for seven different measures such as converting them into money for the danshig and the yoson tsagaan. These are the taxes and duties imposed only on one otog. The others had also to pay the same taxes, but the amount was the subject to change due to the number of the cattle they had in possession.

In 1916, six kinds of duties were defined according the accounts showing the distribution of the taxes and duties. Thus, the otog of Baruun Khüree had to pay 27 tea for worship, 5,849 jin of butter, 21,630 yellow tea and 11,035 lan of silver. 133 otog and 24 bag all together had to deliver 611 seveg of tea for worship, 134,841 jin of butter, 477,977 yellow tea and 188,019 lan of silver.

Besides the above-mentioned taxes, the shav' had to deliver extra livestock and products from time to time. During the harsh winter of 1891–92 many livestock died in the storm, which affected the whole population. The livestock of the Manchu emperor also decreased that winter. In spite of this, by the order of the Manchu governor in Ikh Khüree 200 horses were taken from each otog to restock the livestock of the emperor, thus nearly 14,000 horses were gathered from the Ikh shav'.

The shav' also had to pay the debts for various luxurious goods purchased by the Bogd from Chinese companies. This also resulted in extra taxes. For example, in 1900 the san of the Bogd paid 50,000 lan of silver, taxed from many otog of the shav', to nineteen companies, as is shown in the following table:

<i>Company</i>	<i>money (in lan of silver)</i>
The Naidan company	845 lan
The Nagoon company	7,907 lan
The company of Maa	3,426 lan
The western branch of the Buduun company	6,772 lan
The eastern branch of the Buduun company	2,311 lan
The Har Horhoi company	339 lan
The Huuz company	3,280 lan
The northern branch of the Peking Sodnomdarjaa company	438 lan
The southern branch of the Peking Sodnomdarjaa company	1,000 lan

Some otog of the Ikh shav' used to pay taxes in the form of fur and meat. A report, sent in the first month of spring 1917, to the Bogd from Tüshee Gün Naidanjav, governor of the Uriankhai of Lake Khövsgöl, said: 'This year, according to the rules, the humble servants have offered skin of 200 sables, 79 lynx, 5 otters and 2 wolves, in full, as the fur tax to the Supreme.'

In 1914, the otog of Khüühen Noyon (chief Lhasüren) was requested to send a pig, while the otog of Yoroo (chief Galsandarjaa) and that of Khaminagan (chief Sereeter) two pigs each. All pigs were then offered to the Bogd. However, the pigs sent by Galsandarjaa and Sereeter were rejected on the ground that they were thin. So, new fat and good pigs were requested immediately.

The shav' had to prepare fodder and saltpetre for the horses of the Bogd using their

own transport. In a note sent on 18 October 1919 from the Administration of Ikh Khüree to zaisan Batsuur and door-keeper khia the following was ordered: 'This year, for the harness horses, we have ordered to be mown and fodder prepared in Tunkheliin Am, located in Baatar Van khoshuu in Tüsheet Khan aimag. Now, appoint many otag to bring the 3,922 carts of ready fodder to the san immediately.' At the end of the note the number of required ox driven carts was indicated along with the names of the otag that were to provide them. Thus, the otag of Shadar had to send 29 carts, the otag of Tungalag Belegt Khutagt 102 carts, the otag of Chandmani 20, the otag of Baga Barga 21 carts, the otag of Noyon Nomon Khan 105, the otag of Nomch Nomon Khan 78, the otag of Noyon Lama 159, and the otag of Baruun Khüree 230, in total 3,922 carts.

The monasteries awarded by the *san* of the Javzandamba Khutagt or by the order of the Manchu emperor had their own fields. Fields began to be granted from 1775 onwards. In a report sent in the first year of the emperor Hevt Yos from the Administration of Ikh Khüree to the Manchu governor the following was mentioned: 'The total area of the fields such as Yeven, Burgaltai and Bor-nuur, where the crop of the *san* of the Bogd is grown, is 881 *chi*, 97 *müü*, and 40 *ald*; Usan Seer and Burgaltai, fields of the Amarbayasgalant monastery, which was under the jurisdiction of the Javzandamba Khutagt, have 168 *chi*, 80 *müü*, and 126 *ald* of land; the fields of the Boroo and Yeven rivers, possessed by the temple of Shashnig badruulagch (Reviver of Religion) have altogether 242 *chi*, 92 *müü*, and 190 *ald*; Bor-nuur, where the crop of the Buyan Yoroolt monastery is grown, has 102 *chi*, 41 *müü*, and 236 *ald*; places such as Usan Seer belonging to the monastery of Örshööliig Soyogch have 70 *chi*, 60 *müü*, and 126 *ald*; the monastery of Sainig Badruulagch has fields in Zagdal, Uhaa Hushuu and Biluut of the Kharaa river, that all together have 24 *chi*, 80 *müü*, and 80 *ald*; Burgaltain Narst as well as another field located in the region of the Kharaa river which are the possessions the monastery of Buyanig Zalbiragch have 152 *chi*, 82 *müü*, and 100 *ald* in total; Shaazgai, Bayangol, Burgaltain Būdūūn, the crop fields of the monastery of the Orshooliig Hogjulegch have 410 *chi*, 86 *müü*, and 150 *ald* of land.'⁵

The *shav'* had to work in the fields on a compulsory basis. In the *Ikh shav'* there were some *otog* referred to as peasant (*tariachni*) *otog* that were engaged exclusively in field work. As to the origins of this business, during the Khalkh-Oirat war of 1688 the Öölds, who were captured, were given to the first Javzandamba Khutagt as *shav'*, divided into two *otog*, and settled in Boroo gol and Bor-nuur respectively. There they were requested to grow crops, for the *san* of the Javzandamba Khutagt, which were used for religious ceremonies and offerings in the monastery of Shashnig Badruulagch (the present day monastery of Dambadarjaa).

The *shav'* also had to supply the messengers of the Ikh *shav'* with relay transport as well as to provide the *jasaa* of the *san* of the Khutagt with horses. Let us mention here only a few facts. The *otog* of Erdene Nomon Khan of the *Ikh shav'* after preparing 170 horses reported about this to the *jasaa* of the *san* on 20 October 1912. The *otog* of Ornoi reported to the *jasaa* about having prepared 113 horses on 4 July 1913. On 20 April 1914 the *otog* of Toin Lama reported to the *jasaa* about 135 ready horses. The *otog* of Chandmani reported on 2 August 1916 about having 119 ready horses. On 23 August 1916 various reports were sent to the *jasaa* concerning 136 prepared horses; the *otog* of Hamnigan reported about having 83 ready horses, the *otog* of Zagaan Hohuul 16 horses, and the *otog* of Herh 37 horses.

On 14 September 1916 reports came to the *jasaa* from two *otog* of Baruun Khüree related to 136 prepared horses. Here is information on the people who then used the

horses: the *khamba nomon khan* took 3 horses, the *yonzon khamba nomon khan* 3, the vice-*khamba* 4, the *yonzon khamba lama* 1, a *noyon* (noble) from the Administration of Ikh Khüree 2, minister *chin van lama* 3, the *nyagt belegt lama* 3, the *gachin lama* 2, the *noyon nomon khan* 3, the *mergen khamba lama* 2, *soivon* Namhai 2, doctor Mend 2, *soivon* Sharav 2, officials from the palace and the banner office 4, the chief of the palace 3, a *zaisan* on domestic inspection 2, a *zaisan* on external inspection 2, a hat maker 1, a lama on his way to bring fodder for deer 4.

The abolition of Manchu rule and the establishment of Autonomous Mongolia turned out to be most profitable for the monastic feudals and lamas. During the period of the autonomy the high ranking monastic feudals tried to obtain the greater part of the feudal income. They would receive large amounts of money annually from the state treasury, under the name of various *punluu* (wages) and *khishig* (favours). For example, the minister *chin sujigt da lama* Zerenchimed would receive 2,000 *lan* each year, *zul khamba* Luvsansharav, elder brother of the Bogd, was entitled to 1,200 *lan*, *choijil khamba* Luvsangenden, elder brother of the Bogd, 1,200 *lan*, *gujir khamba* Chojin lama, younger brother of the Bogd, 1,200 *lan*, *khamba nomon khan* Punzag 500 *lan*, vice-*khamba* Sodnomdarjaa 300 *lan*, and Badamdorj, administrator of Ikh Khüree, would receive 500 *lan*.

During years of autonomy, in order to increase their power and influence, the monastic feudals encouraged children and young people to become lama.

In May 1911, the *khamba nomon khan*, administrator of Ikh Khüree, and the Da Lama issued an order to the officials of the thirty aimags of Ikh Khüree, other *khüree* and monasteries to gather children and young lamas in *otog* and *bag* of their residence, and report the number and the names of the youth through the chiefs and *shuulenge* (official assisting the *zaisan*) of relevant *otog* and *bag*, and all this in order to revive the religion and improve the monastic teaching. So, the chiefs of the *shav'* south to Ikh Khüree carried out the task through their subordinates, that is the chiefs of various *otog* and *bag*.

The holy Bogd and high ranking lamas explained that the difficult political and economic situation in Mongolia, the spread of various infectious diseases and natural disasters were all occurring because people were sinning too much. The only way of salvation proposed was through spreading Buddhism. So, the Bogd, along with his high ranking lamas, began to construct monasteries, make numerous statues of Buddha, and perform rituals of salvation. The historian L. Dendev, who himself witnessed that period, wrote that 'along with the independence of Mongolia many unnecessary expenses related to the construction of monasteries, making statues, and performing religious ceremonies has increased to an immense degree'.

A document kept in the State Central Archives shows that in the period between 1909 and 1910, according to the order of the Bogd, works related to the production of statues as well as construction of many monasteries to place them in was indeed intensified. All this work was carried out in the name of religion, state and many living beings. At the same time, great capital and money was also being accumulated for the same purpose.

In May 1909 an order was issued to send people with twenty camels to the Chinese city of Doloon-Nuur, where big statues of Buddha worth 20,000 *lan* of silver had been ordered from a Chinese workshop. Transport, road food, tents and camels were requested from the aimags and the *shav'*.

From 1910 onwards a great religious ceremony called '*hailan* of 10,000 *gelen*', held over a period of forty-five days, was introduced in the Gandan monastery by the order

of the Bogd. The expenses were met by the shav' of the Javzandamba Khutagt and the people of the four Khalkh aimags. On 12 May 1914 an order was issued by the government of Autonomous Mongolia to the khamba and the administrator of Ikh Khüree with the following content: 'Last year (1913) according the order from the Supreme our Ministry called 10,000 *gelen* and *getsel* [both ranks of lamas] for the hailan ceremony in Ikh Khüree. We have ordered to determine the number of *gelen* and *getsel* residing in Ikh Khüree. In case if the number were not sufficient we ordered 7,000 more *gelen* and *getsel* to be sent from the countryside monasteries of the four Khalkh aimags and the shav' lands. This year (1914) we call many *gelen* and *getsel*, residing in Ikh Khüree as well as in the countryside, to come to Ikh Khüree for the ceremony of hailan to be performed by 10,000 *gelen* and *getsel*. . . send them with transport, clothing and implements. . . on sending do provide the offices of the khamba and the administrator of Ikh Khüree with information containing the names, number, and the date of departure. This is a very important measure. Do not consider it an insignificant duty. If anybody fails to send the necessary number or fails to send them on time, we will announce to everybody that this is due to punishment.' In the aimag, banner and shav' lands this order was taken seriously and carried out precisely. The names and number of sent lamas as well as dates of their departure were informed to the Ministry of Shav'. Thus, the banner office in charge of the shav' of the late Erenzendorj Khutagt in Tsetsen Khan aimag has sent the following *gelen* such as, Dambiinyam, Gendensambu, Sanjaa, Sambuu, Gendendoo, Osor, Sharav, Sanjaajamz, Dagva, along with thirty-five *getsel* including Baldansambu, Luvsandeg, Luvsandash, Chultem, Darjaa, Tavhai. The banner office of the Tsetsen Khan hushuu in Khan Khentii Uul aimag in a report sent to the Administration of Ikh Khüree informed that ninety-three men including eighty-five *getsel* of the hushuu along with a specially appointed official departed on 8 June. 132 men including *gelen* Shirnen, Damba, Bayanjargal and Sodov were informed to be sent from the banner office of the Bishrelt Zasag hushuu in Tüsheet Khan aimag.

Here are some interesting facts related to the expenses used for the *hailan* ceremony. On 10 June 1914 in a letter sent from the Administration of Ikh Khüree to the government of Autonomous Mongolia it was explained that the money assigned to the ceremony had not been enough, moreover it was also asked that a measure be taken to find the necessary resources. In the letter it was mentioned that 'during the three years beginning from the year of the Dog (1910) when it was first agreed to perform the ceremony on the order of the Supreme (Bogd), every ceremony of the *hailan*. . . was attended by 10,500 men including 10,000 *gelen*, *getsel* and some 500 men of minor posts such as *tahilch* (lama in charge of sacrificial offerings), *duganch* (caretaker) and *usch* (water carrier).' During the forty-five days of the ceremony the following things were required every day: 175 pieces of tea for drinking ($175 \times 45 = 7,875$), 5,250 *jin* of millet for *zav* (lama's food) ($5,250 \times 45 = 236,250$), 500 *jin* of butter ($500 \times 45 = 22,500$), 400 pine-trees for firewood ($400 \times 45 = 1,800$), 10,500 *jin* of milk for *manz* ($10,500 \times 45 = 472,500$), 10,500 *jin* of curds for *zav* ($10,500 \times 45 = 472,500$), 2 *zaas* 50 *mongo* as payment for service to each ox-driven cart to transport water, 40 carts are required each day ($40 \times 2.50 = 100$), 50 *zaas* for each horse, 10 horses are required a day ($10 \times 50 = 500$), the total daily cost is 17,300 *chuluun* tea ($17,300 \times 45 = 778,500$), so in total 778,700 *chuluun* tea. This is equal to 8,036,450 *tögrög* in today's money.

This unnecessary hailan ceremony that required such immense expenditure was abolished in 1922 by a resolution issued by the People's government. The resolution says: 'When 10,000 *gelen* and *getsel* are forcefully called from many banner to the capital city

for the ceremony of *hailan*, the relevant banners have to provide them with transport and food which is quite burdensome. We announce that from this time on this forceful appeal for the *hailan* ceremony is abolished as well as the relevant annual taxes.' This was the first major measure aimed to limit the rights of the monastic feudals who had been exploiting the working classes. During the Autonomous Period, in addition to the the *hailan* ceremony they also used to make people participate and contribute to other numerous religious ceremonies thus imposing an extra burden. On 17 August 1912 a note with the following content was sent from the Administration of Ikh Khüree to the chiefs of many *otog* of the Ikh shav': 'Various *gürem* (ritual performed to repel sickness of misfortune), that were prescribed by many lamas and scholars for the benefit of the health of the Bogd as well as those to make the next winter and spring with little snow, are to be performed in this Khüree as well as in many other subject monasteries. Make sure that the *gürem* is performed in relevant monasteries and *jas* immediately.' A list containing the names of *nom* (scripture) to be read and the number of the *gürem* to be performed was also attached to the note.

Many *otog* of the Ikh shav' have reported back about having fulfilled the requested task. For example, Sereeter, the chief in charge of the eastern shav' of Ikh Khüree, and his vice-chief Namsrai sent a note to the Administration of Ikh Khüree on 6 November 1914, where the following was mentioned: 'We report that the requested rituals have been announced on 24 October this year to the monasteries, that are under our jurisdiction, and have been performed.'

On 10 October 1914 the Government sent the following order to the Administration of Ikh Khüree: 'the salvation *nom* (scriptures) such as *mandalshivaa* of the Tara, *seded*, *dogjir*, *ochirvaaniin ganshig*, *dogsom*, and *nyamba*, which are for the prosperity of our country and the peace for living beings, are to be distributed among the monasteries of the four aimag, shav' and five lands, and performed as soon as possible. On accomplishment inform the Government.'

Reports were coming to the Administration of Ikh Khüree from monasteries of many *otog* of the Ikh shav' confirming that the salvation *nom* had been chanted and performed in full. Dorjpalam, chief in charge of the northern shav' of Ikh Khüree, along with the vice-chief Luvsanjamyan reported: '(we) have ordered the *mandalshivaa* of the Tara to be read 10,000 times, *seded* 100,000 times, *dogjir* 100,000 times, *ochirvaaniin ganshig* 100,000 times, *dogsom* 100,000 and *nyamba* ten million times in places such as the monastery of Amarbayasgalant, the monastery of Örshööliig Soyogch (The Admonisher of Compassion) and the monastery of Dar Ehiin Sainig Badruulagch (The Inspirer of the Goodness of the goddess Tara). Now, these monasteries have carried out our order, performed the salvation *nom* in full and have informed us.'

As, since 1910, the eyesight of the Eighth Bogd Javzandamba Khutagt worsened, and the health of the queen, who was also called 'the mother queen of the state' or 'erdene tsetsen noyon', deteriorated, and particularly in order to improve the eyesight of the Bogd, various meritorious deeds were carried out, such as the chanting of various *gürem*, creating large and small statues to diminish sin and so forth. On 22 June 1911 the *nomon khan*, *khamba* of Ikh Khüree, together with the administrator of Ikh Khüree sent an announcement to the chiefs and *janjin* (lit. generals) of the gathering of the four Khalkh aimags. Here it is: 'As the eyes of our teacher Ochir-dari Bogd have deteriorated dramatically since last year (1910) many scholars in Ikh Khüree prescribed numerous salvation rituals, and the appropriate ones were announced to the people. During this time, however, his eyes have not improved yet, on the contrary they have even worsened.'

The fact that we, the Khalkhs, live in peace is all thanks to the teacher Ochir-dari lama. Now, as (we) fear that the people might be in danger . . . one of the ways of salvation requires from all people, lamas and lay people as well, to strengthen their faith, keep solidarity, worship, and read spells and prayers. We announce this to the people. Please carry this out.'

At that time the greatest of all things that were created to heal the eyes of the Bogd was the Megzedjanraisag, a statue 80 cubits tall, placed in a newly built temple in the Gandan monastery. Here are some facts relevant to the creation of the statue. First, in a letter sent on 29 May 1911 by *chin van* Khanddorj of the Tusheet Khan aimag to the *nomon khan*, administrator of Ikh Khüree, the following story was mentioned. When the holy Bogd told Khanddorj that his eyesight had been deteriorating, the latter asked him what should be done so that it could be improved. Then the Bogd replied: 'It would be the best if the four aimag and the five shav' lands create the statue of Megzedjanraisag 80 cubits tall.' The queen who was sitting there expressed her readiness to contribute 1,000 lan of her own money to the project. After that *chin van* Handdorj sent a letter to the heads of the Leagues (*chuulgun*) of the other three aimag and the Administration of Ikh Khüree writing that the Bogd might recover if the statue of the Megzedjanraisag were erected as the Bogd himself requested. In the letter he also enquired about a workshop that could build the statue and the expenditure if the statue were to be made completely of copper and gilded. So the statue itself was created for 100,000 lan and the temple for 230,000 lan of silver. . . .⁶

In 1912 a Buddha called the *Tumen Ayuuush*, consisting of 10,000 statues, was created. 1,000 of them were made in China (in the city of Dolon-nuur), the remaining 9,000 in Poland (in Warsaw). For each statue money equivalent to 23 ruble 60 kopek, the Russian currency, was paid.

A spring in the Bogd Mountain was also sought in the hope that its water would cure the eyes of the Khutagt. In 1914 the Government sent a letter to the Administration of Ikh Khüree referring to the order received from the Bogd. The content of the letter is as follows: 'This is the order of the Supreme. Find out if on the four sides, or on the top, or on the slopes of the Bogd Mountain there is any spring the beginning of which resembles the eyes of man, with the end where the streams join.' To carry out this order five officials and twenty soldiers with horses, transport, tents and provision were appointed from the four aimags and the Ikh shav'. Also many policemen as well as soldiers stationed nearby who knew the mountain well joined them.

It is without doubt that the feudal taxes derived from the shav' were the main source of income for the san of the Javzandamba Khutagt as well as his monasteries. It is also obvious that the property and wealth of the eight reincarnations of the Bogd Javzandamba, who was one of the largest feudals, had been increasing from year to year. Many Bogd owned large herds of cattle. According to the regulation of that time the cattle of the Bogd and his subjects were to be counted once every three years. From the relevant documents we see that in 1764 the Javzandamba Khutagt possessed 90,253 head of cattle, 118,610 cattle in 1773, 88,576 in 1782, 75,452 in 1792, 61,902 in 1803, 69,479 in 1822, 80,348 in 1833, 86,882 in 1849, and 59,280 in the year 1858. . . .⁷

The Mongolist A.M. Pozdneyev writes that in the *san* of the Bogd there were piles of precious silk, fur, and other interesting things such as a collection of various minerals. He also writes that in the account-book of the Khutagt for 1849 there were registered clocks and watches of various kinds, 974 in total.

In 1893 the Yellow Palace of the Bogd caught fire. In a report sent from the Adminis-

tration of Ikh Khüree to the Ministry of Outer Mongolian Affairs it was mentioned that the total damage had reached as much as 1 million *lan* of silver. Among the things destroyed in the fire there were a gilded statue of the Ayush worth 1,000 *lan*, a *mandala* worth 100 *lan*, a golden *naiman erdene* worth 80 *lan*, and many other precious items made of gold and silver. Also various hats, clothes with the linings made of the fur of sable, squirrel, black and red fox, lynx and beaver, as well as clothes and goods embroidered or decorated with gold and pearl were destroyed. Besides that, 111 volumes of the *ganjuur* with golden letters, 225 volumes of *danjuur* written in ink, as well as 110 volumes of other books written in gold were burnt.

In 1908 the Eighth Javzandamba Khutagt organized the gavj (a lamaist clerical degree) course in the Gungaaachoilon datsan (college) in Ikh Khüree, the cost of which came to 20,300 *lan* of silver.

The amount and variety of the taxes were increasing constantly. If in the eighteenth century money spent by the san of the Javzandamba Khutagt on various religious rituals would not exceed 20,000 *lan* of silver annually, then in the twentieth century the expenditure increased up to a million *lan*. As the taxes imposed on the shav' were constantly on the rise the living conditions of the people were continuously deteriorating. Even in 1785 among the shav' of the Khutagt there were 3,878 families, that is 21,964 people, without cattle. In a letter sent from the administrator of Ikh Khüree to the Tusheet han of the Khalkh it was mentioned that in the winter of 1796, when excessive snow fell on the lands where the shav' were spending winter, many cattle as well as people died, and 2,376 shav' families, or in other words 11,656 people, remained with empty hands.

In 1896 in a letter sent from the Ministry of Ikh Khüree to the Manchu emperor it was acknowledged that the shav' had been in a difficult economic situation. The letter notes: 'As the taxes imposed by the office of the Javzandamba Khutagt are enormous, the life of the shav' became unbearable. Before, the office of the Khutagt used to tax from 50,000 to 60,000 *lan* from the various otog taking into account the number of the cattle possessed by each otog, and use the money for religious ceremonies. Later, however, some rapacious merchants along with lamas increased the price for the goods, using various pretexts, thus increasing their profit by a hundred percent. (As the office) was fooled in this way, the kept goods disappeared quickly, so the taxes were increased. In the twenty-first year of the reign of Badaruult (the Guangxu Emperor) (1895) the taxes were imposed twice and 160,000 *lan* of silver obtained.' . . .⁸

The unbearable economic condition of the *shav'* is also clearly mentioned in many petitions and complaints sent from various *otog* to the Ministry of *Shav'*. In a petition sent on 2 February 1911 by the leaders of the *otog* of Ikh Barga to the Ministry of *Shav'*, it was mentioned that the local people had become impoverished to such a degree that they were not able to pay the taxes any more. A list containing the number of cattle of some poor families as well as the names of families without life-stock was attached to the petition. In the list eleven families have from one to three cattle, the other fifty-nine families are without any livestock. . . .⁹

The report sent in 1912 from the leaders, in charge of all *otog* and bag of the *shav'* south-west to Ikh Khüree, to the Administration of Ikh Khüree also confirms that the condition of people had worsened not just in a few *otog*, but in many *otog* and *bag*. Here is the report: 'The chiefs, *shüüleng* and *medeechin* of the Baruun Khüree and eighteen *otog* continuously complain that the people of their *otog* and *bag* have become impoverished due to excessive taxes, bad weather and various diseases that affect cattle as well as men. They also say that the people are not in a position to pay the taxes. Let alone that,

now, the whole population of many *otog* is becoming more impoverished being oppressed by the messengers sent from every direction to collect various taxes. People, unable to pay the taxes, have been diminished to such a condition that they have to sell their ger and stray around. Without horses to ride, cows to milk they drink black tea without milk during the hot summer. If anybody comes saying that the people are suffering, it is true. Moreover, in the last month of the spring beginning from the 30th it snowed continuously with a snowstorm for several days. The cattle of the *otog* of Baruun Khüree, Altanbulag, Dalai Eejii, Guyen, Chandmani, Olon Nuur, Govi, Erkhten, Buyanravjikh, Khüükhen Noyon, Shinin, Chukhal, that are under our jurisdiction, have seriously diminished. Thus, only one out of ten cattle survived. We would be extremely scared had not we reported the administrator of Ikh Khüree and the *Da Lama* about what we have seen and heard. So we request the following from you: please, take pity on us who have suffered the most among the people of this land, free us from paying the previous taxes that we have not paid in full, and on examining the present situation adjust the taxes accordingly. We are sending (the letter), asking for this.'

In 1914 Erdene, chief in charge of many *shav'* to the south-east of Ikh Khüree, in his letter to the administrator of Ikh Khüree also described the difficult conditions of the many people in the *shav'*. In the letter he wrote that the people of the seven *otog* of Hatgin were not able to pay the taxes as they had become completely impoverished. Moreover, he said, the chief Sharavdorj himself as well as the people of the *otog* were not found in their land.

Here is one more document showing that the people of the *shav'* were indeed impoverished and were not able to pay the taxes. On 7 July 1914 Puntsag, chief in charge of the *otog* south of Ikh Khüree, sent a letter to the Administration of Ikh Khüree. In the letter he wrote that he had appointed a *zaisan* official to various *otog* and *bag* to collect the taxes due to the *san*. Latter in the letter he passed on the statement of Dandar, chief of the impoverished Gov' *otog*, which says: 'when the specially appointed officials ordered me to pay the remaining taxes I in my turn demanded them from the poor subjects of the *otog*, but in vain. I could collect only 50 *lan* and sent it with *khia* Choivsuren. Our *otog* has to pay nearly 30,000 *lan* for taxes, including the old ones. In our *otog* there are more than a hundred families with ten or more members. The total number of the cattle of these families is 11 horses, 11 camels, 6 cows, and 154 sheep and goats. The loyal subjects no matter how hard they try can not pay the taxes. Instead of demanding the payment of the taxes, please instruct us on how to sustain all these poor people.' Puntsag continues in the following confirming manner: 'As it is true that all people of that *otog* became extremely poor, this time it would be very difficult to make them pay the taxes.'

The *shav'* who were not able to pay the taxes for religious ceremonies were punished. On 21 May 1914 Luvsantseren, chief in charge of the *shav'* to the south of Ikh Khüree, and his vice-chief Dagdan sent the following report to the Administration of Ikh Khüree: 'As it was ordered to impose punishment by beating with a truncheon those people, lamas as well as lay, who failed to pay the taxes in money and butter, and provide the names of the punished, we inform that the following people have been punished with 40 [blows from a] *banz* (a cudgel used for beating) each: 33 people from the Tavnan *otog* including Luvsan, Damchii, *gelen* Ish, Bazarsüren, *lama* Davaa, Luvsandamdin, Yad-maa, Jamsran, Nergui, Danzan, Shagdar; from the Erhten *otog* the chief of the *otog* Ochir, as well as his *shüülen* Jamsran; 9 men from the Herlen *otog* including Damchii,

Luvsantseren, *lama* Choimbol, and Luvsantseren; 20 men from the Zavil *otog* including the chief of the *otog* Sühee, also Dambii, Dendev, *getsel* Gombojav, *lama* Pürevjav, Nerendoo, Zerendash, Zerendoo, Tumenzagt, Nyamjav, and Dendev.'

The fact that during the autonomy the *shav'* were becoming more vulnerable as a result of rapidly increasing taxes is clearly seen from the documents of that period. In 1912 the *khamba nomon khan*, in charge of the religious ceremonies and monks in Ikh Khüree, the vice-khamba, and the administrator of Ikh Khüree wrote a joint letter to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The letter says: 'The number of the religious ceremonies to revive religion, as it was desired by the *Bogd Ezen* (holy lord), is constantly increasing. For example, prior to the ceremonies such important things as various offerings and food for the Bogd are to be prepared, and people from the *shav'* to be appointed. In Ikh Khüree alone, for ceremonies held in many monasteries the following is required annually: 300,000 *lan* of silver, 167,900 chuluun of tea, more than 200,000 *jin* of butter, 68,300 *jin* of curds, also 820 cows to use during spring, 500 mares, more than 500 big *luu* of *airag* (fermented mare's milk) and 7,000 horses for the service for officials and the servants of the Bogd. In addition, ceremonies are also held in other twenty-eight monasteries such as Amar Bayasgalant and Shashnig Badruulagch, and in the places of twenty-five *khutagt* such as Donhor *Khutagt*. In total the money needed each year is up to 800,000 *lan* of silver. Also, as the expenditure on implements used during the ceremonies, as well as on the construction of new monasteries, and statues has increased in recent years reaching tens of thousand of *lan*, the shortage of money and goods is felt. However, as it is forbidden to delay or neglect important ceremonies, we manage to carry them out by borrowing money from wherever we can find. The debts are being written on the name of the *san*. As the *shav'* became impoverished due to bad years, cattle diseases, and double taxes, we borrow money with interest to continue the religious as well official duties. In this way the debts have reached several million *lan*. . . The deadline for payment the debts to the Russians has already passed. To cover the debt extra 500,000 *lan* is required. We request your help in the payment of the debts and your support for the impoverished *san* and the *shav'*. We also confirm that all numbers here are correct without exaggeration.'

On 14 September 1912 the Bogd had no choice but to free the *shav'* from other taxes by issuing an order. Soon, in the same year the Bogd issued an order according to which a quarter of the income from the gold mines were to be given to the *san* of the Javzandamba *Khutagt* as a donation. The academician Maiskii wrote that in 1914, 61% of the state budget was spent on religious ceremonies, statues and offering made to the Bogd. This statement is not far from the reality. As carrying out religious ceremonies and creating statues of Buddha do not imply replenishment or regeneration, gradually these (activities) have led to the impoverishment of the people of the *shav'* and the shrinking of the *san* of the Bogd.

NOTES

1. *Shav'* most literally means disciple or student. In the present context, however, in terms of obligations, duties and restrictions, they were akin in many ways to serfs. Ed.
2. The Mongolian terms here are to various ranks of Buddhist monks and officials within the *shav'* administration. Ed.
3. *Beis*, *taij*, *gün* and *zasag* are all ranks of nobility. Ed.

4. The deleted passage merely references an appendix in the original not reproduced here. Ed.
5. The müü, chi and ald are all old units of measurement. The size of a müü varies with location and time, but one common measurement is approximately 0.165 acres, while the chi and ald are both smaller. Ed.
6. The deleted passage refers to appendices not reproduced here. Ed.
7. The deleted passage refers to an appendix not reproduced here. Ed.
8. The deleted passage refers to an appendix not reproduced here. Ed.
9. The deleted passage refers to appendices not reproduced here. Ed.

THE ECONOMY OF THE MONASTERIES

D. Dashbadrah and J. Gerelbadrah

Translated by Baasanjav



Beginning from the end of the seventeenth century, when Buddhism began to thrive in Mongolia, some changes occurred in the social structure as well as in the economy. A new economic establishment known as the '*jas*' appeared within the traditional economic structure that had dominated the country for many centuries.

The form of economic organization of the Mongolian monasteries is called *jas*. Along with the establishment of a monastery, an organization to look after its economy was also set up. Thus, the *jas* of the Khalkh Javzandamba Khutagt was set up in 1656. *Jas* is a Tibetan word connoting 'communal property' and the main task of this establishment was to meet the needs of the monasteries related to various religious activities.

A *jas* was headed by *daamal* (controller) and *zaisan* officials who were appointed by the administration of the monastery. The *demch* official and accountants of a *jas* were in charge of the economy and finances of their own *aimag* (here, a division within a monastery) and *datsan* (colleges within a lamasery). Each *jas* also employed a chief-accountant and one or two junior-accountants as well as *bicheech* (clerks).

The various *jas* in a monastery annually counted their cattle, defined income and expenditure and then reported to the administration of their monastery. The number of *jas* in monasteries was subject to change, mostly depending on the size and well-being of certain monasteries. Thus, if small monasteries had from one to two *jas*, large monasteries used to have from fifty to a hundred *jas*, some even more. In the beginning of the twentieth century, the total number of *jas* in the monasteries was approximately 7,000; thus, for example, in the *khüree* (large lamasery) of the Javzandamba Khutagt alone there were 244 *jas*.

The appearance of *jas* in large numbers is directly related to the increase in the number of monasteries and places of worship in Mongolia. The economic interest of lamas in increasing the number of their cattle, their wealth and to obtain profit also played an important role.

The basis of a *jas*, as a rule, was formed from cattle and other donations made by the congregation. There were also instances when aristocrats and high-ranking lamas, when establishing a new monastery, would set up a *jas* with money collected from their subjects. In some large monasteries, along with the *jas* there was also another financial-economic establishment called a *san* (lit. treasury), the task of which was to look after the private economy of a *khutagt* (high reincarnated lama).

Various *jas*, besides receiving gifts and donations from the believers would also take

taxes in the form of food from lamas with the purpose of using it during public religious ceremonies. Also, lamas engaged in business activities such as trade, transportation, agriculture had to give certain amount of their products to the *jas*.

The fact that the Mongolian monasteries were freed from the Manchu duties and taxes influenced the further rapid economic consolidation of the *jas*. Various *jas* expanded through accumulating wealth that exceeded the actual needs of the monasteries.

If in the beginning, the *jas* were primarily accumulating offerings given by believers and using them for various religious services, later, along with economic consolidation they turned into an independent economic structure engaged in cattle breeding, agriculture, trade, usury and transportation.

According to the doctrines of Mongolian Buddhism all property, including livestock, of a *jas* was considered to be that of all lamas and clergy. But in the course of further development, though its initial purpose remained the same, gradually all wealth came under the control of a few high-ranking lamas who headed the monasteries.

By the middle of the eighteenth century, when the monasteries had already found firm economic ground, a change occurred in the structure of the Mongolian economy. We assert that the economy of the monasteries had positive as well as negative impact on the whole economic structure and development of the country.

The economic foundation of the monasteries was based on traditional cattle breeding.

At that time, herding the *jas* cattle turned into one of the forms of cattle breeding. The cattle were herded by the subjects of *shav'* (here, monastic) lands or other people for free or for a low payment. This was a widespread way to increase cattle while spending relatively little, which was profitable for the monasteries.

As herding the cattle of the monasteries was seen as a kind of virtuous deed by the monastic herdsmen, their attitudes towards this job were pure-hearted in general.

It is possible to define this system of cattle herding as a purely economic enterprise rather than a form of exploitation, for it was economically profitable for both sides. From the one side, various *jas* would give away their cattle for herding on contract, on the other side it was possible for people to make their living through herding the cattle. There were people called 'head of ten' in charge of the cattle.

However, at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century it became a widespread practice that various *jas* began to give away cattle to herdsmen on a compulsory basis. The *jas* not only made people look after their cattle, but also began to demand milk products, wool, felt, skin and *airag* (fermented mare's milk), the quantity of which depended on the number of cattle given. At that time the previous economic balance between the *jas* and the herdsmen based on piety as well as on a voluntary basis was lost, and this form of cattle herding turned into a form of exploitation imposed by the monasteries, which became a burden for the herdsmen.

Beginning from the nineteenth century, a Chinese trade system based on usury, along with other foreign trade, such as Russian, and some commodity production began to penetrate into Mongolia, which changed to a great extent the way the monasteries ran their economy.

The *san* of various prominent *khuvilgaan* (reincarnations of high-ranking lamas) as well as the *jas* of the monasteries in addition to their traditional, domestic economic activities also began to engage in foreign trade, selling cattle, raw materials, buying

goods from abroad and reselling, transporting goods of the Russian and Chinese merchants; in some instances they even used to run joint ventures with the foreigners.

Agriculture as such comprised another important branch of the economic activities of the monasteries. Thus, the agriculture of various *jas* and *san* had managed to develop into an independent form standing alongside that of the Manchu government and the private enterprises run by ordinary Mongols. Large and well-off monasteries owned private fields to grow crops for their own consumption. There were also monasteries possessing fields to grow fodder for their livestock. Thus, in the twentieth century alone approximately seventy large and small monasteries already had private fields for both purposes. It is possible to divide the fields into the following two categories according to their affiliation: the first group belonged to the monasteries that were under the jurisdiction of various major *khutagt* (high reincarnated lamas), while the other belonged to the monasteries that were under the jurisdiction of *zasag khoshuun* (administrative units during the Manchu period).

In comparison with the monasteries of both 'khutagt granted with a seal' (*tamgatai khutagt*) and *zasag khoshuun* that grew their crop in their own lands, *jas* of other large monasteries that did not possess private land were engaged in agriculture in various fertile places, using their religious authority and privilege.

The foundation of the *jas* agriculture was laid back in the eighteenth century. Not every *jas* was involved in agriculture. This initial situation was influenced profoundly by the extreme climate as well as the geographical conditions of Mongolia.

At the end of the eighteenth century the Manchu state granted the monasteries of prominent high-ranking *khutagt* and *khuvilgaan* as well as those established by the Manchu emperors, permission to grow crops in other *khoshuun*. Thus, for example, the monasteries of the Khalkh Javzandamba Khutagt had a right to grow crops in the northern fertile parts of TüsHEET Khan aimag.

The fields belonging to *jas* of the monasteries and *san* of various *khutagt* were cultivated mainly by the subjects of *shav'* lands. Various *jas* would appoint their subjects as well as ordinary people to agricultural works. Growing crops was not like breeding cattle, a work to which all Mongols were accustomed, rather it was a special work requiring certain knowledge and experience as well as implements.

There were also instances when some monasteries would rent their fields to Chinese peasants, and take a certain amount of the crops thus spending almost nothing. In some monasteries in Mongolia special lamas and monastic peasant families in charge of agriculture were emerging. Thus, in Ulaangom monastery of Dörvöd aimag, Outer Mongolia, the lama occupying the post of '*sumya*' was in charge of agricultural work. There were several assistants under his command who looked after the crop fields. There were seven fields in all. The agriculture of the monasteries thus has influenced to some extent the agricultural development of Mongolia.

The *jas* of the monasteries, in addition to cattle breeding and agriculture, were also engaged in usury. The origin and development of this activity is closely related to the spread of foreign trade, especially Chinese trade based on usury.

The monasteries located close to the domestic markets and trade routes were lending money and receiving profit. Apart from that, some large monasteries and wealthy *jas* were competing with the Chinese usurers and trade companies in lending money at interest.

Various *jas*, besides lending money, would also lend tea which served both as a currency and an important commodity. The rate of interest varied from monastery to

monastery. Thus for example, the *jas* of Ikh Khüree of the Khalkh Javzandamba Khutagt would charge 25–36% per year for 1 *lan* (tael) of silver, though the rate had been continuously increasing and by the beginning of the twentieth century it reached 60%, sometimes even exceeding it. At the same time various *jas* and monasteries of Ikh Khüree were obtaining good profits and getting wealthier.

At that time the monasteries managed, to some extent, to satisfy the demand of the Mongolian aristocracy and ordinary herdsmen for money and tea that they could borrow for their living. However, as the profit of the monasteries was increasing the interest was also mounting, thus impoverishing people and making them debtors. The monasteries thus were gradually turning into exploiters. As the *jas* crossed the line of its main purpose [of supplying the needs of the monasteries], and began to exploit people, this contradicted the teachings and principles of Buddhism.

The *jas* of the monasteries were expanding and elaborating their activities as they were obtaining profit through usury. Financial techniques such as making the borrowers of tea and money find guarantors and taking something preliminary in pawn were widely employed. If the borrowers could not return the money with interest on time, then 'interest on the interest' had to be paid. From all this it can also be said that at that time the monasteries and the *jas* through usury were functioning, in some respect, as banks.

Usury eventually became a source of income of the monasteries, as monthly and yearly interest of money and tea was increasing and the sphere of usury was expanding. Moreover, various *jas*, using free money and tea at their disposal, imposed compulsory loans, so-called 'compulsory tea' (*shaalt tsai*) and 'compulsory money' (*shaalt möngö*), on the lamas. In addition, some monasteries were increasing their cattle through lending at interest. Thus in one year for one two-year old calf (*byaruui*) loaned out, two calves were demanded, for two sheep three.

Although the expansion of usury was profitable for the monasteries, it contributed, on the whole, little to the social and economic development of the country. Gradually it began to have a negative influence on the development of the country's productive forces as well as on the living standard of the population.

The other aspect of the economic activities of the monasteries was trade. Initially trade undertaken by the monasteries had a simple form. The monasteries, in the beginning, started to trade on the basis of barter, thus exchanging goods for other goods needed for various religious activities as well as for domestic use. As the barter trade of large monasteries and wealthy *jas* improved, they abandoned this mode of trade. The monasteries became involved in big business such as selling cattle and raw materials, buying goods and reselling them not only in the domestic but also in the foreign markets.

The fact that the trade activities of the monasteries developed rapidly from the eighteenth century onwards is related, to some extent, to the penetration of Chinese trade and usury and its subsequent development in Mongolia. Along with the appearance of commodity-monetary relations in Mongolia, under the influence of the foreign merchants new improvements and progress occurred in the trade of the monasteries.

From that time onwards commodity circulation increased, profits improved and trade became one of the sources of income for the monasteries.

The trade of the monasteries became an important impetus for the further development and increase of the national trade. Most of the wealthy Mongols were people who were under the jurisdiction of the monasteries. The trade of the monasteries itself had a

decisive place in the Mongolian national trade. Some monasteries used paper currency called *piu* or *tiiz*. In Outer Mongolia, nine monasteries used paper currency, such as Ikh Khüree, the lamasery (*khüree*) of Yalguusan Gegeen, the lamasery of Nomuun Khan, the lamasery of Daichin and Lamin Gegeen, the lamasery of Tüsheets Chin Van, the monastery (*khiid*) of Khutagt lama, the monastery of Doloon Shar Zag, the Dalai monastery of Gov' San. The paper currencies had different names and values, besides that they were used within the territory of certain monasteries. The usage of paper currency, though in a limited number of monasteries, shows that the monasteries had been drawn into the commodity-monetary relations.

The monasteries, in addition to their trade, also used to obtain large profits from the transportation business as well as from lending cows and camels for transportation purposes. Particularly at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth the transportation of goods and raw material for the foreign companies steeply increased.

At that time, when the Mongols became extremely impoverished as a result of various Manchu taxes and Chinese trade-usury, the monasteries were able to provide many cows and camels for transportation. Indeed, most of the transportation of raw material for the Russian and Chinese merchants was carried out by the monasteries. The Russian scholar A. N. Pozdneyev wrote, relying on his personal experience, that 'nowadays in Khalkh there are almost no people wealthier than lamas from monasteries. Thus when whatever Chinese merchant needs from fifty to sixty camels, his need is met by a monastery or the *san* of a *khutagt*.'

One of the most important sources of profit for the monasteries consisted of various offerings and donations made by people. There were donations offered with pure heart as well as begged forcefully by the monasteries on an organized basis from people.

From all this it is seen that the economy of the monasteries played an important role in the economic life of Mongolia. Unfortunately, income and wealth, that had far exceeded the actual needs of the monasteries, had not contributed much to Mongolian society or its economy.

Most of the national wealth was flowing away to a foreign country, Tibet. The wealth of Mongols was going out of the country on the pretext of various religious purposes such as finding in Tibet the next reincarnations of the Khalkh Javzandamba and Janjaa Khutagt of Inner Mongolia and bringing them to Mongolia, teaching lamas in the Tibetan monasteries, obtaining religious degrees, fulfilling pilgrimage to the motherland of the religion, and offering donations and gifts to the monasteries of the Land of Snows.

NOTE

1. A *tamgatai khutagt* was one that had more than 700 shav'. Ed.

URGA OR DA KHÜREE

A. M. Pozdneyev



VARIOUS NAMES OF URGА

Urga, or Da Khüree, the principal city of Northern Mongolia or Khalkha, is situated at a latitude of about 48° North at the confluence of the Tuula and Selbi rivers three hundred versts South of the Russian border city of Troitskosavsk and the more familiar Kyakhta. The Mongolian word örgöö, which means literally 'palace' or 'camp of an important person' and which the Russians have changed into 'Urga,' is almost unknown to the Mongols as the name of this city; it is used in this sense only by Europeans, and among Mongols it is familiar perhaps only to those who come into frequent contact with Russians. Undoubtedly, however, it was not the Russians who gave Urga this name, and it was quite natural for the Mongols in ancient times to call this monastery-city Örgöö to distinguish it, as the residence of the Hutuktu, from all the other monasteries of Mongolia. At the present time the Mongols most frequently call Urga by its official name of Da Khüree or Yekhe Khüree, that is, 'the great *küriyen*,' while in common parlance it is called Bogdo Khüree, or the Holy Khüree, and sometimes simply Khüree, a term by which they mean, in general, a group of buildings situated in a circle, and, in particular, any monastery, doubtless on the grounds that the cells of the monks living in a monastery must, by law, surround its temples, which is, in fact, their arrangement. Some Chinese authors, understanding the word *khüree* to mean 'fence,' have supposed that Urga received this name from the yellow wooden fence which is a distinguishing feature of the palace of the Jebtsun Damba Hutuktu, but we cannot accept this view, as it is known from history that Urga bore the name Khüree long before the Hutuktu was granted the above-mentioned distinction . . .

THE LOCATION OF URGА AND MOUNT KHAAN UULA

Thus, at the present time Urga is situated on the Selbi River. Generally described, its site presents the appearance of a hollow, surrounded on all sides by mountains, the exit from which is formed on the east and west by the narrow valley of the Tuula River. It can be understood that this site, which is advantageous to the population of Urga in that it offers them protection from the wind, does not offer any special advantages to the Mongols in a strategical sense since an enemy, by stationing himself at the two above-

mentioned passes, can contain the whole population of the valley in a sort of trap, depriving them of provisions or of a convenient exit.

Properly described, the city consists of three separate sections: (1) The Khüree of Urga, or the monastery in which Jebtsun Damba has his residence; (2) Gandan, or the separate section where the temples of tsanid are situated and where the lamas who study the advanced course in Buddhist dogmatics live; and (3) the Mai-mai-ch'eng, or market city. These three sections of the city are located on the right side of the Tuula River, about three versts from its banks, while the Selbi River, which flows from north to south through the very middle of the Khüree, passes to one side of the other part of the city. The site of Urga looks like an oblong plain, extending from north to south for a width of from six to thirteen versts in different places, and from east to west for a length of about thirty versts or perhaps a little more. This area is enclosed on all sides by mountains; on the south by the magnificent Bogdo uula, otherwise called Khaan uula; on the east by the Bain Khütül Mountains; on the north by the Chingiltu uula and Dalaan dabkhur Mountains, through which extends a gorge for which the Mongols have no name, calling it simply Khündüi, and by the Bain dzürükhe Mountains; and on the west by the Songina uula Mountains, which are almost contiguous with Bogdo uula, being separated from it at their southwest extremity only by the bed of the Tuula River. . . .

POPULATION OF THE KHÜREE

In turning now to a description of the life of the separate sections of the city, as they are today, I must say first of all that an exact determination of the population of any of these sections is quite impossible. Not to mention the Mai-mai-ch'eng, where the number of inhabitants continually varies with the seasons of the year due to the influx and exodus of both the Chinese merchants and the Mongol buyers; even in the Khüree, where the population is more stable, it is entirely impossible to find out the exact number of lamas. The Mongols themselves, when asked the number of lamas in Urga, usually reply 'tümen lama,' that is, 'ten thousand lamas' or, more accurately, 'a multitude of lamas.' I, too, can reiterate that the number is indefinitely large, but no doubt it exceeds ten thousand. During my last trip to Mongolia from 1876 to 1879, a certain official document came into my hands, namely, the account book of the treasurer (nirba) of the tsokchin temple where all the Urga lamas assemble on certain annual holidays to officiate at khurals, these lamas each receiving a portion of tea, flour, butter, and so on, from the tsokchin supplies as noted in the above-mentioned account book. This account book sets forth the number of a full complement of lamas according to their division into aimaks. As I now had knowledge of the existence of this kind of document, I attempted to find specimens on this trip as well, and my efforts were not without success. I secured this time from the same tsokchin nirba a new list of this sort which had been issued to him as recently as 1889. An inspection and comparison of this list with the old list not only showed me the approximate number of lamas in Urga, but also supplied evidence that the lama population of Urga had been gradually increasing, although not at an especially great rate . . .

[M]ention may be made of the following buildings on the central square at Urga. Just opposite the north wall of the temple of Maidari are the quarters of the only office to be found in the Khüree. This is the yamun of the shantsotba, who is today not only the chief administrator of the Khüree but has concentrated in his hand the supreme

administration of the entire department of the Jebtsun Damba Hutuktu. In its external appearance this office does not differ at all from the other Lamaist buildings, being like them a khashaan surrounded by a picket fence of logs with a red gate. But it is very easy to identify, on the one hand because its gate is always thronged with people nearly all day long, and on the other because directly opposite the gate is the yurt court, and by this place of justice one can always see criminals sitting in chains near the yamun or wearing heavy planks on their necks. All day long the gate of the yamun is open, and thus, if you stand nearby, you can always observe how a sentence is carried out in a Mongol court and hear the groans of the prisoners being punished or tortured. As the shantsotba, who is the supreme ruler of the shabinar, is at the same time the chief treasurer of the hutuktu's property, his yamun is divided into several departments or, physically, into four courtyards. In the first courtyard, as already mentioned, is the administrative headquarters of the shabinar; in the second, the office of the affairs of Urga proper and of the palace of the hutuktu. The shantsotba himself lives in the third and has here his private office. And in the fourth (Boro örgöö) is the administrative headquarters for all the property of the department of shabinar, especially livestock and arable lands. On the east side of the temple of Maidari and likewise directly opposite the palace of the gegen is the khashaan of the Urga Khambo nomun khaan, the supreme ruler of the Khüree, strictly in matters of faith. This khashaan differs from the others in that a number of trees have been planted in the courtyard. All their branches are hung with square scraps of red, yellow, white, and blue calico with the words of prayers and the *mani* inscribed on them. Similar scraps of cloth are fastened to ropes stretched over the fence, and all of them flutter and wave in the wind, automatically uttering prayers for the resident of the khashaan. On the west side of the temple of Maidari, paralleling the courtyard of the Khambo is the Urga Baariin khashaa or printer's courtyard. Here there is a special baishing for storing the wooden plates, with the xylographic type carved on them, of works printed, with a large yurt in which the printing itself takes place. At the present time, the Urga printery operates on a very small scale. It does not print more than twenty Mongolian works, of an exclusively religious nature, of course, and these are small brochures. A somewhat larger number of Tibetan works is published, approximately fifty brochures, but the majority of books printed here consists of Lamaist liturgical works. More attention was given to printing at Urga in earlier times. Under the fourth khubilgan the carving of plates for the Tibetan Kanjur was begun, and plates were carved for 72 volumes [of the 108 volumes of the complete edition of the Kanjur] but, with the death of the fourth khubilgan, this work was stopped, and to this day the Kanjur at Urga remains incomplete. More than that, many of the plates that were prepared have today been lost or broken, and others have been defaced through use, so that the Urga Kanjur may be regarded as almost nonexistent, although the poor monasteries of Khalkha still buy it, supplying the missing portions by hand.

In passing from these private observations to a general description of the life of the Khüree I should note first of all that its population at the present consists exclusively of lamas. The Chinese shops and merchant's dwellings, which have always been situated near the Khüree, have never been permanently situated in its midst, and this isolation of the Chinese settlements dates not only to the time of the Khüree on the Selbi and Tuula but to an even earlier period. Traces of the Khüree, which was camped in the vicinity of Seer in 1720, have been preserved to this day and bear witness to the fact that even at this time the Chinese merchants lived away from the lama city, though not at a very great distance. As concerns the Mongols, we have reason to think that they lived within the

Khüree. Thus in 1763, on the twelfth day of the fourth moon, an imperial edict was issued at Peking that had been elicited by a report from the Urga ambans and which decided various questions relating to the life of the gegen and of Urga. This order, among other things, said: 'It is impossible for men and women to live together in the Khüree, the residence of the hutuktu, and for this reason the residence of women in the Khüree must be prohibited, of which the amba Sanji Dorji is notified, that he may take action.' We do not know to what extent this order was enforced, but at the present time the population of the Khüree, as already noted, consists exclusively of lamas. To be sure, nearly every lama residence is sure to have its old woman or 'shibagantsa' (nun), whose duty it is to prepare tea, to cook food, and to perform a few duties in the lama dwellings, but these old women can hardly be counted among the population. They are individuals without individuality.

EXTERNAL APPEARANCE OF KHÜREE STREETS

The external appearance of the Khüree cannot seem otherwise than unattractive to the European. It is laid out in a circle, which is intersected by two broad streets (khüreenei üüde) in the form of a cross which meet at the center of the Khüree and form a broad square on which stand the temples of the Khüree, just described, that are not associated with aimaks, the palace of the gegen, and the yamun of the shantsotba and the buildings pertaining to it. Around the square are the aimak dugangs and the dwellings of the lamas belonging to them. All this space is dotted with small streets, lanes, and alleyways (gudumji), where sometimes not only will a carriage find it impossible to get through, but even three men abreast will have difficulty in passing. Following the general custom of Asiatics, the lamas do not build their houses on the street, and, when you enter the Khüree, you can see nothing but fences (khashaa) and gates (üüde). The fences, for protection against thieves, are always built very high of upended larch logs, and the small folding gate is always painted red and crowned with a tablet with the *om* carved on it, over which a wind-driven khürde is also attached. To make it still more difficult to climb over the fence, the rich constructs penthouse against it on the inside, and on the top of these penthouses they pile wood, so that a fence three and a half sages in height can by no means be regarded as a rarity at Urga.¹ Over the fences of important officials ropes are also stretched to which square quadrangular pieces of silk and cotton cloth are attached, bearing sacred maxims and the words of prayers, whose purpose is identical with that of the wind-driven khürde. On both sides of the gate at every house there are short wooden stakes driven into the ground for tethering the horses of visitors. This is the appearance of every street in Urga. Within the khashaa there are usually two Mongol yurts. This is the winter residence of the lamas and his kitchen. If a lama is rich, he also builds a wooden house (baishing) where he spends the summer. In Urga everyone attaches a wooden entranceway to his winter dwelling, the felt yurt, for protection from the wind (khüdzüübchi).

With a population and way of life of this sort in the Khüree, it is natural that one sees hardly any signs of life in the streets. Mongol pilgrims moving from one temple to another wander through the streets of the Khüree until perhaps 11 a.m., that is, before the services in the temples have been concluded and the gate of the gegen's palace has been closed. The gegen gives blessings in the morning, and after this time all the worshippers either sit in the yurts of their lama friends or spend the whole day in the market

place beyond the Khüree. It is here, too, that the majority of lamas pass their eternal leisure time. Thus the streets of the Khüree during the greater part of the day are so deserted that one may go through the entire Khüree without encountering more than five or six persons, in spite of the comparatively large population. A rather sizeable crowd of people always throngs the yamun of the shantsotba, but with this exception it is almost impossible to find anyone anywhere. The residents of the Khüree spend their whole day at the market.

THE KHÜREE MARKET

The Khüree market is situated on the west side of the Khüree and of the residences of the lamas. Formerly it was situated on the plain proper, beyond the lama city, but from the middle of the sixties the construction of Chinese and Russian shops began little by little to surround the marketplace from its western side, and, multiplying with each year, these shops had surrounded it from all sides by the 1870s and formed in themselves a good half of the Khüree. Today this part of the city has spread out even more. In the course of the last fifteen years, eight new streets have been formed, and they are all solidly taken up by the houses of the merchants, who now occupy almost all the area between the Khüree and Gandan. In the popular language of the Mongols, the part of the Khüree so described is called damnuurchin, a name that comes from the verb damnakhu, meaning 'to carry on one's shoulders.' It is not difficult to guess that this name has a historical foundation and clearly reflects the early times of the Khüree market when only dealers in small wares came here to trade, bringing their goods on their shoulders and withdrawing daily into the Mai-mai-ch'eng at sundown. Today this has all long since passed into the realm of tradition. The only remainder of the street-hawking that was practiced here at one time is the quadrangular square, which anyone not properly acquainted with the facts might easily take for the center of the Khüree proper, as on one side it adjoins Lamaist buildings. Today all the buildings of Russian merchants, who trade, live, or have property at Urga, face the square. Foremost among them all stands the building of the company of Kokovin and Basov, which is the best building and the only two-storied one in the market section of the Khüree. Next come the buildings of the Kyakhta citizens M.N. Lushnikov, K.R. Ogorodnikov, the merchant N.N. Shulyngin, the Kyakhta citizen L.A. Berezin, the company of the Batuyevs, and the merchant A.I. Vorob'yov, who does not live in Urga at the present time. Unfortunately it must be said that the external appearance of the Khüree market has considerably deteriorated during the last fifteen years and that this is the result of the circumstance that the number of Russian shops on the square has diminished almost by half. Thus Vorob'yov, Berezin, and Shulyngin have ceased trade altogether; the Batuyevs have only a small warehouse of goods in the square which they use exclusively for the dealings with the Mongols who deliver their tea. Hence the firm of Kokovin and Basov remains with the dealers Lushnikov and Ogorodnikov, who alone keep their shops open where they retail goods. To make up for the three Russian shops that have closed, the number of Chinese shops has increased here tenfold, if not more, while their location has so altered that they must today be regarded as completely separate from the Urga Mai-mai-ch'eng, which was formerly the center of Chinese trade at Urga.

PEKING SHOPS AND THEIR MODE OF EXISTENCE

The best shops in the Khüree from the point of view of their wealth and furnishings are the shops of merchants from Peking. . . . [I]n all there are nearly thirty-five Peking shops in the Khüree market. The mercantile houses of Chinese from Shansi may also be included in this category, though there are very few of these . . . Following the general custom of the Chinese, not a single one of the Peking shops enumerated is owned by any one merchant, but all belong to separate trading companies, while the owners themselves almost never live in the Khüree. In spite of their relative outward magnificence, all these shops have nothing substantial behind them, generally speaking, and at Peking their dealers belong in the majority of cases to the middle and even the lower class of merchants, who conduct their business beyond the gate of An-ting-men. When they intend to open a business in Mongolia and particularly at Urga, these merchants form a company before leaving Peking, obtain money or goods on credit from some rich man (ts'ai-tzu) and with these goods go to Urga to commence trade, attempting above all to lend their shops an external magnificence, which is expressed, among other ways, in the relative tidiness for which the Peking shops are noteworthy. The buildings of the Peking shops are constructed, of course, on the general model of Chinese mercantile establishments, a detailed description of whose plan and facade will be given somewhat later, in the discussion of the special mercantile section of Urga, the Mai-mai-ch'eng. Here let me say only that never in the shops of the Urga merchants does one see such outward trimmings, such carving, such fine designs, and such bright colors on the door and windows as one finds on the buildings which house the Peking shops. Their signs, which are also always artistic and clever, are invariably in two languages, Chinese and Mongolian. In Chinese, however, which the Mongols cannot read, there are only the three characters denoting the name, while in Mongolian the specialties of the shops are described in somewhat more detail: Here, for example, is the text of one of these signs: *Begeljin Batu-yin püüse egün-dür qudaldurᠠlaqu torᠢyan mangnuᠢ erdeni-yin jerge ed baray-a бүрin бүгед күмүн сидурᠢу nomuᠢun tölүb bolai* (The Peking Shop of Batu, selling silken cloth and woven damask and every sort of choice wares. The proprietors are well known for their honesty and easy dealing.) Inside, the Peking shops are always divided into two or three rooms, which are very tidy and elegant. Behind the counter, which is directly opposite the entrance, there are usually shelves built in tiers, upon which all kinds of small ware and bright knick-knacks are artistically displayed. At the sides of these shelves are whole piles of bolts of silken cloth, along both walls lower-quality silk and cotton fabrics are laid out on shelves, while in the free space ready-made clothing is spread out on benches, such as silk robes, khantadzas, and various sorts of jackets. The walls of the side rooms, which are either offices or living quarters, into which the most honored buyers are usually invited, are always hung with pictures and eulogistic inscriptions, sometimes in pairs, which have been presented to the shops by the Mongols as a sort of testimonial or a token of their special regard . . .

All these comparatively tidy and elegant furnishings cannot help but win over any customer, from the European to the Mongol, in favor of the Peking shop. With a favorable turn of events and with the fine profits to be made in Mongolia, a company soon becomes rich and independent. But it also frequently happens that, after five or six years of trade, it must close its doors and declare bankruptcy. It is remarkable, however, that even the day before it goes into bankruptcy, the Peking shop always maintains its customary elegance and can easily be distinguished from a Shansi shop, for example, by

its furnishings, wealth, and the condition of its goods. Among the products from China proper, you can always find in every Peking shop the best silk fabrics: k'ang-fa, sets of buttons, and light cloths such as fang-tzu, durdungs (yang-chou), ch'ih-ch'ü-ch'ou, and so on. The woollen and cotton goods in the Peking shops are for the most part of European manufacture. In addition to these things, they always have an abundance of the accessories pertaining to every aspect of Mongol life. These are manufactured in Peking and range from the furnishings of religious and public life to household objects and from a luxurious prince's yurt to the most modest kitchen. Thus, they sell all sort of religious musical instruments here, different accessories for worship and sacrificial vessels, all sorts of caps and ornaments of Lamaist priests, and so on. Here Mongolian princes can find all sorts of buttons and other external insignia of their rank and buy all the office supplies they need. Of household furnishings they can buy vases to decorate their rooms, lanterns, pictures, figurines, and similar knick-knacks. This latter department is always especially well stocked in the Peking shops, since its stock is not confined to Peking products alone, but is supplemented by European products as well. European watches, barometers, thermometers, vases, figurines, boxes, exotic mechanical and other toys can be found in a very large number of the Peking shops, if not in all. For the poor Mongol of the steppes they have here dombos, wooden, porcelain, and stone bowls or shaadzangs, various sorts of ladles and spoons, work-tools, and the like.

The Peking shops in the Khüree receive a general shipment of goods twice a year, in the spring and in the autumn, while small consignments are received at unspecified times, two, three, or as many as ten times a year, depending on the size of the shop and the style of life and way of doing business adopted by a given merchant.

It should be noted that the Peking shops usually maintain very large staffs. Even the smallest shops have five or six shop assistants, while the wealthy firms maintain forty, fifty, and even as many as eighty persons. . . .

The firms carrying on a successful business in Urga usually see to it that they have several shops. Thus the firm of Jen-ho-i has at the present time four shops in various places in the Khüree market. . . . This is done, of course, for the purpose of achieving a larger number of sales, for a Mongol, not having bought the goods he wishes in one shop, will go buy in another or in a third, without the least suspicion that these shops belong to the same company. Actually only a very small number of the Mongols, and these local inhabitants, are privy to this secret of the Chinese, all the more since the Chinese, the better to conceal this fact, even give their shops different names. The Peking shops are never known to the Mongols by their Chinese names – the Mongols give them their own nicknames, and this circumstance makes it considerably easier for the Chinese to achieve their purpose, as outlined above. Thus the oldest and largest shop, that of Jen-ho-i, is known to the Mongols by the name of Bain-münkü, while the second shop of the same firm, which is not more than two hundred paces from the first is called the shop of Buin-delger, the third is called the shop of Mishik, and so on.

The less prosperous Peking shops are today no longer situated in the square, but in the alleys. They do not have their own buildings and do business in rented baishings. In these cases the shop faces directly onto the street and is entirely open in the majority of cases. The wares are the same though in smaller quantity. On the other hand one can find in these shops fine articles of Peking manufacture, which perhaps he would not find even in the prosperous shops. Thus, for example, one comes across antique articles of falan, precious vases, and figurines, perhaps bought by accident by these merchants in the Peking secondhand market and brought to Urga.

SHOPS OF CHINESE FROM SHANSI

Among the Khüree shops belonging to Shansi merchants, the prosperous ones are nothing but retail departments of the lao-sir (i.e. Shansi) mercantile houses and warehouses in the Urga Mai-mai-ch'eng. The less prosperous and finally the very small-scale shops of the Chinese from Shansi doing business in the Khüree market, buy almost all their goods from the Urga Mai-mai-ch'eng. Outwardly the business of the small-scale shops seems very brisk, and they are always filled with customers. They almost never trade for silver or tea, but receive everything else from the Mongols in exchange for their goods: wool, hair, sheepskin, and felt, in short, every possible product of the Mongolian steppe. All these things are sent late every morning from the Khüree to the Mai-mai-ch'eng to the wholesale merchants there, in payment for the goods they have received on credit. For this reason one may see every day hundreds of two-wheeled carts drawn by mules, asses, or oxen on their way from the Khüree to the Mai-mai-ch'eng loaded with types of raw materials referred to above. I chanced to see an especially large number of hides, perhaps one-tenth of which are sent to Peking, all the rest going to Kyakhta. The shops mentioned have for the most part served to enlarge the Khüree, and the eight side streets which have appeared there in the last fifteen years are completely taken up by them.

URGA CRAFT AND INDUSTRIAL ESTABLISHMENTS

In addition to these dealers in small wares, on the side streets of the Khüree market are the following:

- (1) Confectionery shops, five in number, which deal exclusively in gingerbread and sweet rolls.
- (2) Two candle shops, with attached workshops where the goods sold in these shops in the form of red and white candles are manufactured.
- (3) Mu-chiangs, or carpenters and cabinetmakers, the total number of whose establishments in Urga exceeds forty. Their premises are always easy to recognize because their yards are piled with boards and lumber. Their work goes on every day since, in addition to filling orders, they also manufacture for sale Mongolian tables and benches, caskets in which Lamaist books are kept, little boxes, trunks, ash receivers for incense candles, and so on. The Chinese cabinetmakers at Urga come for the most part from Kalgan. In the Khüree, as it appears, none has his own home, and all of them live in rented quarters, paying from eight to twelve packages of brick tea a year for their lodgings.
- (4) T'ung-chiangs, braziers, and in general all those who work metals, have about twenty workshops here. Their main and perennial occupation at Urga consists in the manufacture of burkhans; they manufacture other articles only on order. The majority of braziers and burkhan makers at Urga come from Doloon nuur. The burkhans that they cast are notable for their beauty and elegance of ornamentation, but their prices, as they say, are considerably higher than those of burkhans from Peking or Doloon nuur; the truth of this statement I verified myself personally.
- (5) Painters, known by the Mongol name of dzuraachis, come to Urga mainly from

Shansi, especially from Wu-t'ai and Yin-chou. The total number of their workshops does not exceed seven, but even these make a very poor living. The only exception in this case are those craftsmen who succeed in securing a contract in the gegen's treasury. In this case, although their work is not paid especially well, at least they have permanent employment on contract. They paint burkhans on linen, paint and gild burkhans made of wood, clay, and papier-mache, and finally fill every other type of order in their craft. The quarters of the majority of dzuraachis are incredibly small and dirty: they are usually quartered somewhere in a rear courtyard and occupy baishings of no more than two chiang and for these lodgings pay about ten teas, i.e. approximately three rubles per month.

- (6) The gutulchin or shoemakers come from the most varied places in northern China, everywhere from Kan-ch'ou up to and including Ku-pei-k'ou. Their workshops are also small and in outward appearance are almost as dirty and wretched as those of the dzuraachis. The gutulchin almost never own their own shops, and the footwear they manufacture is usually offered for sale in the prosperous Chinese shops. They buy nothing but Russian hides at the Mai-mai-ch'eng and from the local Chinese merchants. Hides prepared in Irkutsk and Tomsk tanneries are in greatest demand, and of hides from Kyakhta only those of the Matreninskii tannery are in greater demand.
- (7) The eldüürchin, that is, curriers, live somewhat more prosperously than the gutulchin. They are engaged in the preparation of skins, and at the present time have twelve establishments. They all come from Shansi and, from the viewpoint of income, are perhaps even well-to-do, as all of them conduct business of no less than five or six thousand rubles. But, when one considers that their capital turns over only once a year, they do not assume any superiority over the other craftsmen. The chief materials for their manufactures are sheep and goat skins which they buy locally in the Khüree from the yargachin or butchers. Considering that no less than two hundred sheep and goats are slaughtered daily in the Khüree, while sometimes the number of animals required per day exceeds one thousand, it is easy to understand that the number of skins is entirely sufficient for twelve or even more establishments. Every eldüürchin maintains his own hired Mongol yargachin who sell the hides of the animals they slaughter to him alone. Thus every morning one may see the yargachin bringing whole bundles of skins to their eldüürchin. The eldüürchin collect skins throughout the entire year, but dress them only in summer. As the Urga authorities prohibit Chinese from polluting the water of the Tuula River, the soaking of hides in connection with their preparation is done in streams and tributaries. Hides dressed by the Chinese are considered less durable and warm than those tanned by Mongols, as the Chinese scrape the flesh side too vigorously, but on the other hand the hides dressed by the Chinese are infinitely softer and finer than those of the Mongols. The eldüürchin, however, sell an extremely small number of the hides they dress in their natural form, much more frequently cutting them out and making blankets and coats of them. In winter they take these wares of theirs to market, hang them out on poles and fences that they may be examined more easily, and recover from their sale all the capital they have laid out in summer in buying and dressing the hides.

Below is a list of those craftsmen who do not have business establishments.

- (8) Tailors ts'ai-feng, which the Mongols pronounce 'tsai-pung,' rarely live in the Khüree, mainly renting quarters in the Mai-mai-ch'eng. In 1892 only two tailors were living in the Khüree. Like the shoemakers they did not have their own shops and did not even entrust their products to the Chinese shops and only filled orders for the making of clothing for Chinese living in the Khüree. There is no doubt that the small demand for craftsmen of this sort accounts for their limited number, although the cost of tailoring is, comparatively speaking, very high. Thus for making a winter coat of fur or of quilted cotton they usually charge from ten to twelve bricks of tea, that is, from three rubles fifty copecks to four rubles twenty copecks, and from eight to nine bricks of tea for making a summer coat, i.e. from two rubles eighty copecks to three rubles fifteen copecks.
- (9) There is also an extremely small number of barbers in the Khüree – though they outnumber the tailors – and they are known by the Mongol name of üsüchin. They do not have public establishments and either perform their duties in their own lodgings or, what is still more common, at the residences of those in need of their services. All the Chinese merchants without exception maintain their own barbers on yearly contracts who are paid monthly the amount they have earned. In spite of this yearly contract and monthly payment, however, payment is by the job and according to the amount of work done. The usual agreement is as follows: the barber, hired by a given firm or a given household, must dress the hair of all the Chinese in this firm or household every five days, and in addition he must wash and shave their heads in the proper places every fifteen days in summer and every twenty days in winter; one hairdressing for each person is reckoned at six shara ts'ai under this system and for an individual hairdressing, with a shave and a haircut, they charge no less than half a brick of tea, i.e. fifteen, or as much as seventeen and a half, copecks.
- (10) Finally, the lowest-ranking craftsmen in the Khüree are the darkhan, or blacksmiths. living in the most out-of-the-way places in the Khüree market, they come out every day with their anvils to the market square and do there all the work that is needed: they shoe horses and oxen, repair trivets, axes, adzes, and similar household articles of iron, and sometimes manufacture new ones.

This is the present-day composition of the population and condition of the commercial section of the Khüree. As concerns the market square proper, it is the place where trade in very small wares is conducted. Its width is about three hundred twenty sages from north to south and about sixty sages from east to west. At night this space is completely deserted, but with the dawn the Chinese daily pitch from eighty to one hundred twenty movable felt tents (bükhek), which they sell every kind of small wares sent them from the large shops: chibouks, pipes, snuff boxes, toys, rosaries, pieces of cloth, cups, small mirrors, belts, and so on. These articles can, of course, be found in the large shops as well, but as the merchants declare, small wares are sold at much higher prices in these felt tents than in the main Chinese shops. These bükheks sometimes house the local gutulchins and their wares, and the latter sell ready-made footwear at a minimum of ten percent cheaper than they may be bought for in the shops. As for the Mongols living at Urga, they conduct trade on an even smaller scale. They do not even do business in tents, but right on the ground, on mats full of holes or on small pieces of lath, they display old clothes and every kind of junk which they buy up at the Mai-mai-ch'eng or from the lamas of the Khüree. Old snuff boxes, buttons, scraps of leather: these are the

articles over which they are continually bargaining. These businesses are conducted for the most part by women without homes who are unfit for more difficult work. A speciality of the women merchants are Mongolian caps, both women's and men's; this business brings in much greater profits, of course, but at the same time it is more difficult, as the manufacture of Mongolian caps requires considerable ability and skill. The chief articles of trade at Urga for the Mongols of the plains are as follows: milk and kumiss for the women and livestock for the men, especially horses and sheep, as necessities of life. The average price of an ordinary horse is from twelve to twenty rubles, depending upon the season and the requirements of the buyer: towards winter livestock is always cheaper, and in spring it is dearer. The cheapest season of the year for buying horses and large cattle is, in general, the months of January and February. As concerns sheep, their price remains almost invariable throughout the year, and depending upon the quality of the animal, fluctuates between two and three and a half rubles. The number of livestock driven to market at Urga is never large and in the market one usually sees about two dozen horses and one hundred fifty or two hundred sheep in small groups. Camels are sold only singly and infrequently, at that. The basic reason for this is that Urga, properly speaking, is not a livestock market where merchants gather to buy and sell animals as we see them doing at Doloon nuur or Khokhe khoto, for example. The neighboring Mongols drive their livestock to market here in small groups only if forced to by necessity and then again, this livestock is exclusively to satisfy the small everyday demands of the local population. In times of crop failure of forage grasses, or of cattle plague, there is sometimes no livestock on the Urga market square for weeks at a time and thus it is entirely impossible to regard Urga as a convenient place to buy cattle. They say that when the late Przhevalskii wanted to organize his expedition at Urga in 1882, he was unable to find a single suitable camel for two weeks. He was offered only camels that were exhausted from hauling tea and required prolonged rest and feeding; they were, in short, completely unfit for a long trip. If it had not been for an accidental circumstance that made it possible for our traveler, with the aid of Russian merchants, to take possession of a number of camels and to drive them from the Orkhon, from Erdeni Dzuu, he would have had to remain at Urga for an indefinite period. But the amount that he laid out for this purchase was simply incredible. He paid from forty to forty-five liang in yamb, i.e. the purest silver, which at that time equalled from one hundred twenty to one hundred thirty-five silver rubles for each camel. Ordinarily the Mongols would have easily parted with a camel for from sixty to eighty rubles, and with the purchase of the herd, for even less. At the same time an ox of average weight, and strength, ordinarily costing about twenty rubles, was sold for forty, and sheep weighing no more than a pood were to be had for from four to six rubles a head. In addition to livestock, the Mongols bring firewood and hay from the plains. They transport both of these on two-wheeled arabas drawn by oxen sometimes from a distance of fifty or seventy-five versts and in very small quantities, no more than thirty or forty cartloads daily. Not more than half a hundred sticks of firewood, one and a half arshins in length, costs about two rubles, and green hay, i.e. hay that had been stored since autumn, is never sold for less than fifty copecks a pood, although it is sometimes three times this dear. The so-called 'old stuff,' or last year's grass, is sold more reasonably. The Mongols gather it with rakes in the plains even in winter and bring it to Urga, pricing it here at about twenty to thirty copecks per pood.

There were no special inns or taverns at the Khüree market prior to 1878, and until that time ready-cooked food was sold only out in the open, right on the market square.

The selling of food was in the hands of Chinese soldiers exclusively, and they set up in the market something on the order of the rows of eating establishments of the old county seats of Russia. The kitchens of these rows of eating houses were set up by the Chinese right out in the open air. A trivet was set out on the square, and the fire was protected perhaps only by a piece of felt hung up to windward; here they cooked and sold roast mutton, meat pies, pastries and gingerbread. In the year mentioned, 1878, with the expansion of business near the Khüree and the increase in the number of Chinese shops, something resembling hostelrys where any private individual might get a prepared dinner, tea, order spirits, and so on, were established, and soon visitors, too, began to stop here. At the present time the number of such hostelrys in the market section of the Khüree has increased by five. As regards size, two of them are regular hotels, each containing more than fifty accommodations or separate rooms for guests, while the others are somewhat smaller. In spite of all this the Khüree hostelrys are quite unlike the Chinese tien common to all Mongol cities, merchants coming to Urga to trade almost never stop at them, and selling their wares here, as this is done, for example, at Uliyasutai, and in other cities, is out of the question. The Khüree hostelrys are occupied during their sojourn in Urga by petty officials and merchants who have come to the city to obtain some favor or on some matter of litigation and, last of all, by lamas. Thus, during my stay at Urga, one of the Khüree hotels was the residence of the Doloon nuur nirba, who had come to settle his accounts with the hutuktu's treasury and to receive maintainance from the department of the diet for the lamas living in Shara same at Doloon nuur. It should be noted that the construction and presence of these hostelrys did not cause the closing of the row of eating houses on the market square. The food business has continued there as before and, as it seems, without even the slightest decline. At least, around every trivet, today just as before, you always see a group of five or six Mongols from the plains sitting right on the ground and having a snack of hot pies. To complete the description of the market it must be added that close by these grassy plains there are usually wandering musicians sitting with violins, balalaikas, lutes, and other musical instruments, while blind men and wandering lamas read prayers, from time to time brandishing their staffs with their little bells, upon which the pious auditors hang large numbers of khadaks.

BEGGARS

Today, wandering beggars are scarcely to be seen at Urga; only now and then does one find some boy or old man reading a prayer aloud at the gate and thus soliciting charity. The most terrible period of beggary at Urga was, as it is said, the end of the 1860s and the beginning of the 1870s, when all of Mongolia was experiencing, directly or indirectly, the destructive force of the Dungan revolts and subsequently underwent still more destructive physical calamities. At that time there was a large number of beggars at Urga, and all of them without exception lived in the market square. It is related that the square at that time presented an extremely distressing spectacle. These beggars, sick and half-naked, lay about on the bare ground or on some kind of rags and from time to time died where they lay in the open air. In 1871 their mortality rate was so high that the yamun of shabinar charged one Mongol beggar with the duty of looking after the ill who were growing weaker and of taking them out of the city immediately upon their death. As a reward for this labor the Mongol received maintenance in the form of food

and clothing from the yamun. Later, in the second half of the 1870s, during my first visit to Urga, the number of beggars here was small, but, in the beginning of the 1880s, with the new physical calamities that visited Khalkha, it again increased. The beggars of this period were vagabonds, properly speaking, and were also to be distinguished by a special trait. Among them there were many persons who were not satisfied with alms in the name of Buddha, but lived openly by thievery, horse stealing, even by counterfeiting tea notes, and even more frequently by petty swindles, which caused great injury to the local inhabitants. The authorities, not knowing how to get rid of these homeless persons, took extraordinary measures against them, such as weekly roundups, following which the vagrants were immediately sent off to the hoshuns to which they belonged. This measure did not even half attain its goal because, first, there was always an influx of new vagrants and, second, even those sent away usually returned, for the most part, in the shortest possible time. A measure taken by the treasury of the Urga Hutuktu proved much more expedient: the beggars in sound health were provided directly with food and were made to do some kind of work, while something on the order of a hospice for the sick was constructed in the southwest part of the damnuurchins. From the beginning of 1884, when the prosperity of Khalkha somewhat increased, this food dole was discontinued, but a recollection of it remains today in the fact that all the Urga beggars now have their wretched quarters in the place where they formerly received food. Today this quarter in the southwest section of the city presents a terrible spectacle. These unfortunates have taken up residence amid piles of rubbish and all sorts of refuse. Those of them who are stronger and better off beg alms or gather worthless branches, knotted and crooked, which are strewn about the steppes, and construct huts from them, which they sometimes cover with grass, sometimes with rags of some sort. Those who have no strength at all, however, lie directly on the ground without shelter, naked and emaciated from starvation. Compassionate shibagantsas throw rags from their old coats over them, and this comprises the only shelter for the extremely impoverished of Urga, who, when they die, are not even buried but are eaten by dogs on the spot where they lay dying, in full view of their companions, who look forward to the same fate.

A POLICE UNIT IN THE KHÜREE

People begin to appear on the market square about 5 a.m. and remain there until sundown, when the felt tents are taken down and the petty merchants depart. In order to maintain order in the daytime, and especially at night, a guard (manaachi) of Chinese occupies a government sentry box, being dispatched from the Mai-mai-ch'eng by the dzarguchi's yamun. Their number is always quite variable and fluctuates at various times between three and six, though most of the time there are four. In the daytime these policemen are scarcely ever to be seen. They sit in their sentry box and busy themselves with housekeeping. In case of necessity a messenger is sent to fetch them, and it is only then that they put in an appearance at the scene of the event, but rather as judges of the lowest instance than as policemen. At night they are charged with the duty of maintaining night watches, with the number of guards set at five. In view of the importance that these police officials have arrogated to themselves, however, they have managed to exempt themselves from maintaining a night watch, and, for the protection of the city, the Khüree merchants maintain additional special guards, whose salary they pay themselves. Seven guards in all are hired, one of whom is regarded as the sergeant. The latter

has the duty of collecting payment from the merchants and distributing it in the form of salary to the guards. The Russian merchants at Urga also participate in these payments, paying fifteen teas per khashaan each per year. The night watches, who are known among the Mongols by the Chinese name chang, (?) consist of two policemen passing through all the streets of the Urga market, and, as evidence of their vigilance, beating a gong. The watches at Urga are divided in such a way that each round is made once every two hours, the first at 9 p.m., the second at 11 p.m., the third at 1 a.m., the fourth at 3 a.m., and the fifth at about 5 a.m. in the summer and at exactly 5:00 in the winter. Every watch is marked by an appropriate number of blows on the gong, the number of which is increased progressively in the following manner. The first watch is announced by one blow-one; the second by one, two; the third by one, one-two; the fourth by one, one-two, one; and the fifth by one, one-two, one-two. One must know this, inasmuch as in addition to the watch, the gong informs the inhabitants of all incidents that take place at night. If in making their rounds the watch comes upon thieves, to apprehend whom the help of citizens is needed, they begin a steady and measured striking of the gong. If they discover a fire, they strike it steadily with short strokes, and so on. For guarding the Khüree market in the daytime the yamun of shabinar, in addition to the dzarguchi's guards, also dispatches one khya, who is charged with the duty of seeing to the tidiness of the place, to suppress any kind of fight, and to apprehend thieves. In spite, however, of all this seeming solicitude and activity on the part of the Urga police, it would be difficult to describe everything that is done on the streets of Urga and on the market square. A sufficiently clear idea of their cleanliness may be supplied by the fact that Mongols of every age, sex, or calling never hesitate to relieve nature wherever they may be. Indeed, the Mongols living in the Khüree do not feel that they can empty out any sewage in their own yards and at once go out into the street for this. In spite of all the Mongol slovenliness, however, the air in Urga is comparatively pure, and nowhere is there the ordure or the stench that fill the streets of Chinese cities. This circumstance is aided, on the one hand, by the climatic conditions of the place and even more, one might say principally by the packs of hungry dogs that roam through the Khüree, and devour not only all ordure but even the bodies of their departed brethren. Not a single day passes without a fight on the square, and at the same time there are even murders not infrequently. Once, during a visit to the square, I chanced to observe the following scene. A lama had bought from another an orkimji (name of a type of lama's garment) for a two-tea t'ieh-tzu (banknote issued by the Chinese shops). The seller quickly found out that the t'ieh-tzu he had received was counterfeit and, having found that the lama who had bought the orkimji was still in the square, he began to demand that the lama exchange the note for a good one. The lama refused, saying that it was not the t'ieh-tzu he had given him. Unfortunately, however, witnesses to the fraud were found who gave the cheat such a thrashing that he died a quarter of an hour later. The dead lama was from the Khüree, and so three comrades from his aimak soon came and dragged him home. The Russian traders who were with me at the time in the Khüree doubted the fact of his death and told me that there are many rogues who, after a thrashing, feign death in order to escape further prosecution for their swindle, and in this case I will not maintain that the Mongol was actually killed. The fact remains that in the market square murder is entirely possible. I mentioned the fact that the body of the lama was quickly taken away since it frequently happens that persons who die or are killed on the streets and in the square have no friends in the Khüree and their bodies lie about for days at a time. On the same day that the murder of the lama took place as described

above and in the same square some impoverished Chinese died suddenly at about 7 a.m. An entire day passed before any of his friends or relatives could be found. As ill luck would have it the day was hot, and the face of the dead man turned quite black, blood flowed from his nose and mouth, and it was apparent that complete disintegration had set in, none of which prompted the Urga authorities to remove the body. It was not until late in the evening that some relatives appeared with a coffin. Kneeling, they read prayers over the deceased and then placed him in the coffin. For some reason or other this coffin was not removed the same evening, but left in the street until the following morning.

URGA SLUMS

To conclude my description of the public buildings of the Khüree, I must add that it also has its slums, which may be called public places too, though unofficially. Here one may see, for example, something on the order of our brothels, and there is also a type of inn, but they differ basically both from our establishments and from Chinese establishments of the same kind and have a unique character, mainly by reason of their unofficial nature. Both the brothels and the inns at Urga are maintained exclusively by Chinese. The former are run by the very poorest class of day laborers, while the latter are kept by the managers of the most modest small-wares shops, which deal for the most part in any kind of junk, but sometimes sell good wares of suspicious origin. The Chinese do not keep prostitutes in their brothels. They have only rooms where a man and a woman may stay privately. In addition the proprietors perhaps also serve the debauchees wine and some kind of snack. As generally happens, the man always seeks out a woman somewhere in the square, and, making an agreement with her, goes with her to this brothel. Sometimes and, of course, only for the wealthy, the Chinese proprietor of the house finds the women, but such cases are rare, although no doubt profitable for the Chinese, since then a considerable percentage passes into his hands from the woman he chooses, in addition to the agreed sum paid by the man. From their external appearance it is even difficult to term these brothels part of the slums, they are so crowded, dark, dirty, and repulsive. The entire quarters of the proprietor are limited to one single room, which, according to the Chinese custom, is half taken up by a k'ang. Space is provided for guests in this same room. It consists entirely of a bed which is partitioned off by boards on all sides all the way to the ceiling, so that it presents the appearance of a private stall into which one may climb through an opening about one and a half arshins high and one arshin wide, which is provided with a door, likewise of wooden boards. A dirty and tattered piece of felt, rolled up on one end to form the head of the bed, comprises all the bedclothes. The charge for staying in this stall is one-half brick of tea, i.e., from thirty to thirty-five copecks, in the event that the woman is receiving payment. But it frequently happens that some lama will persuade a prostitute to share his bed without payment, in which case the proprietor's only profit is that received from the sale of wine. The usual clientele of these establishments are Chinese from the large Chinese shops who still are in service as shop attendants, the sons of Mongol officials of the middle class, and the young lamas who are living with their relatives or teachers. As regards the inns of the Khüree, they are, as I mentioned, in the small shops and wine shops, which are open to guests and which carry on a retail trade in wine. Here, too, one may smoke opium. The shop assistants from the Chinese

mercantile houses frequently visit these inns because they are strictly forbidden by their landlords to smoke opium at home.

GANDAN

The second section of Urga, which also has a lama population, is Gandan. It is situated west of the Khüree on a low hill which divides the area of the Selbi River from the spacious and rocky valley of Chingiltuin tala, which extends west from this hill all the way to the Sangiin uula Mountains, and it is about one and a half versts from the Khüree. Today, now that the number of Chinese shops on the west side of the Khüree has increased, they almost touch Gandan on one side and on the other come within no less than 150 sagenes of it, so that, if we did not consider the Khüree to consist exclusively of the dwellings of lamas and Lamaist temples and we included the market, we might say that Gandan has almost merged with the Khüree. As Gandan was built exclusively for those pursuing the advanced course in Buddhist theology, its history is intimately associated in Urga with the fortunes of tsanid, by which name this subject is known. . .

In appearance Gandan is almost identical with the Khüree. There is the same quadrangular square, in the center of which are two large temples of tsanid similar to the temple of Maidari and the tsokchin temple in the Khüree; there is the same outer appearance of the palace behind its yellow wall, only here it is much less spacious, and at its sides one can see behind the walls two other buildings, like kiosks, in which the relics of the fifth and seventh gogens repose. On my earlier trip I was not allowed to visit these kiosks. First I was forbidden to enter them under the pretext that they were being remodeled inside and later on the pretext that they did not have the key, which was supposed to be in the hands of the hutuktu himself. This time I did not even try to visit these kiosks, as one can gain a completely accurate idea of them from the fact that they are all built in the same way, and I was able to inspect two similar kiosks at the monastery of Damba dorji. I shall include a description of them when I have occasion to speak of this khid (hermitage). The Lamaist buildings at Gandan are also laid out in a quadrangle, but fewer of them are to be seen on the south side, where the palace of the gegen is. The external appearance of the streets and the view of the courtyards from within are quite identical with those of the Khüree. On the west and north sides of Gandan there are twenty-eight white suburgans built by pious worshippers of Buddha for absolution from their sins and to ward off every kind of misfortune and disaster. The names of these builders have not been preserved for us either by legend or by the inscriptions on the suburgans themselves, nor have they been preserved in the annalistic accounts of the Mongols concerning Urga, its temples and its sights.

THE MAI-MAI-CH'ENG

The third section of Urga, like Gandan, is situated entirely apart from the Khüree and to the east of it at a distance of no less than five versts, the reason for which it represents an entirely independent city. This differentiation from the Khüree is also aided by the fact that it contains an entirely different population which lives a different life and has different interests. The name of this third and last section of the city is the Chinese

Mai-mai-ch'eng, which is translated as 'trade city.' There is no need to state the purpose of this section in the total make-up of the city; the name itself indicates its specialized character. The Urga Mai-mai-ch'eng is situated in the same oblong valley as the Khüree and Gandan, though the valley here has another name, Tuulain tala, that is, the valley of the Tuula River, which flows past about four versts from the city. Externally the Mai-mai-ch'eng presents the appearance of an almost perfect rectangle. There is no separate wall surrounding it, but the fences of the courtyards which form the outer part of all sections of the city are so close to one another and are so contiguous that it would not be difficult to mistake them for one continuous wall around the city. Leading into the Mai-mai-ch'eng from the direction of the Khüree are three wide streets, which are parallel to one another and have at their entrances wooden gates, which, by the way, are never closed. In fact, not all of them are equipped with doors. Beyond these gates the Mai-mai-ch'eng may be divided into two sections, one of which, the commercial section proper, which is inhabited by Chinese, occupies the very center and comprises the citadel of the city, so to speak, while the second section, the Mongolian section, is a sort of suburb surrounding the citadel on all four sides. The Mongols do not have separate names for these two sections of the city, and in order to designate the place more exactly they use only the words *dotoro* for the Chinese part and *gadaa* for the Mongolian section, which mean literally 'inside' and 'outside.' The basis for this distinction, no doubt, is the fact that there is a palisade around the commercial section of the Mai-mai-ch'eng, and thus the words 'inside' and 'outside' are adequate to indicate the place. The palisade of the Mai-mai-ch'eng which separates the inner section from the outer section, the suburb, has seven gates, three on the east, three on the west, and one on the south. All of them are of wood and following the customary Chinese regulations are closed at sundown, when all trading is halted: thus it is impossible to pass from one part of the city to the other at night. . . .

I have already stated that one part of the Mai-mai-ch'eng is inhabited exclusively by Chinese, while Mongols live in the other part, though not exclusively, since during the last decade a rather large number of Chinese houses and shops were built here, so that today Mongols live mixed together with Chinese in the Mai-mai-ch'eng suburb. The total population of the Mai-mai-ch'eng can be put at five thousand persons of both sexes, of which about eighteen hundred are Chinese and the rest Mongols.

STREETS OF THE MAI-MAI-CH'ENG

The streets of the Mai-mai-ch'eng, for the most part, cannot be termed narrow. The main ones, both in the Mongol and in the Chinese section of the city, may even be regarded as rather wide, but on the other hand almost all of them are crooked and irregular. The first curves; the second, broad in the middle, becomes narrow at the ends; the third, which begins wide at one end becomes so narrow at the other that it will hardly permit two carts to pass abreast. In spite of this there is not a single alleyway in the Mai-mai-ch'eng so narrow that one could not drive through it, as is frequently the case in the Khüree or in Gandan. The streets in the Mai-mai-ch'eng are unpaved, and thus in the rainy season or when the snow is thawing, they are extremely dirty, while in the summer they choke one with their dust, in spite of the fact that the Chinese very frequently pour into them their slops or their moist leavings from yesterday's meals or, finally, their own excrement and even, in extreme cases, imported water. In order to water the streets small

canals have been dug through the Chinese part of the city from the Uliyatai River, but, during the major part of the year, they are dry, as is the Uliyatai River itself, and do not fill with water until such a time that the streets themselves no longer want watering. Across these canals, which pass along either side of the streets, there are little bridges in front of each house, as is the case in the alleyways, where the canals cross the street. On the other side of the canals, extending right to the fences of the yards are also low clay sidewalks about three or four arshins wide which run along both sides of the street and which on the main streets are fenced off from the thoroughfare by posts. In two of the alleyways, the fences are bordered with scraggly rose willow trees set far apart.

Dwelling houses facing the streets, in the Chinese section of the Mai-mai-ch'eng as in the Khüree, are absent, and thus all the streets of the city, with the exception of several open shops, look as if they consisted of walls and gates. The Chinese do not provide their gates with wickets, probably because they have no need of them, as they keep the large gates open all day long.

TYPES OF CHINESE SHOPS

The Chinese section of the Mai-mai-ch'eng consists exclusively of shops, and the prosperous ones have the following external form: Their outer fence facing the street is constructed, as in the Kharee, of larch logs fixed upright, usually coated with clay, so that the entire Mai-mai-ch'eng has the appearance of being constructed of clay. In its very center a broad gate leads into the courtyard, the doorposts of which are sometimes pillars of brick and ornamented with pilasters, but more often simply wooden beams, set directly against the clay fence. The gate is always provided with a penthouse, the roof and cornice of which are usually painted in the brightest colors – red, green, dark blue, and so on. The combination of these colors gives the penthouse over the gate an extremely motley appearance, but from a distance it seems rather handsome, especially when the top is ornamented with carved or painted gilt representations of coiled serpents, dragons, or with other kinds of figures. At each house there are invariably affixed to the gate itself several inscriptions in characters, which are changed every year on New Year's Day and which consist of some congratulatory maxims chosen from the classics. In the case of the more well-to-do, the gates, like the penthouses over them, are painted and, in addition to the inscriptions affixed there, are also ornamented with figures of Chinese in their ancient costumes, in exactly the same form as we see them painted on tea chests or on Chinese vases. The Chinese also usually have large courtyards, although this is not apparent at first glance, and from the gate to the interior their courtyards are sometimes so small that it is difficult for a cart to turn into them. The reason for this is, on the one hand, that the courtyards are crowded with various furniture of the shops and the home and, on the other, the position of the buildings themselves. Almost at the gate itself and for the most part extending across the entire width of the courtyard is the building either of the shop proper or of its warehouses. Behind this main building, visible from the street, usually comes the much larger half of the courtyard, where the kitchens, outbuildings, storehouses, and so forth, are located. Thus, when one enters the gate of a Chinese shop, one always sees a small courtyard skirted on three sides by oblong one-storied buildings with rather narrow galleries, which are sometimes open and sometimes supported at the sides by columns which terminate at the top in a penthouse formed from the roof of the building itself. The extremities of the roof which

form the penthouse of the gallery are also ornamented with carving and painting resembling those over the gate. In summertime, in many shops, flowers and plants in boxes and pots are set out in the galleries, and sometimes similar flowers are arranged upon special stands and ladders in the middle of the courtyard. All this gives the courtyard a very pleasing appearance, especially after the monotonous and deserted Mongolian plain. In the winter, instead of flowers, small firs and other evergreens are displayed, and thus the Chinese shop is to a certain degree an eternally green and blooming garden. From the gate to the shops, the courtyards of the more prosperous firms are almost always paved with wooden planks which offer a rather clean flooring, while in the case of poorer merchants a path paved with planks leads all the way to the door of the shop. This entrance is almost never a folding door but is covered with either a curtain of felt edged with dark blue canvas, or is provided with a single-leaved door, the lower panel of which is solidly boarded up with wood, while the upper panel is open. In this upper panel of the door, frames are placed covered with paper, to admit more light into the shop. The windows of the shop are always situated on one side and face the front. Their frames are sticks of wood somewhat thinner than those one finds in Russian window frames and are arranged in the most varied combinations: circles, triangles, squares, octagons, and so on. The frames are ornamented with carving and painted on the outside while on the inside they are covered with paper which takes the place of glass. As the paper admits the passage of very little light, the Chinese are obliged to put windows over almost the entire wall, so that the walls of their buildings that face the courtyard, one might say, are only half built on this side, the upper of them being windows. As to the roof of the building, it is supported on this side at the corners by the side walls and by a small pier in the middle of the building, that is, where the door into the shop is situated. In some prosperous shops, panes of glass are also inserted along with the paper in sufficient number such that, if all these panes were combined into two windows of average size, I believe they would supply quite sufficient illumination for the shop; but the Chinese are so accustomed to their enormous windows covered with paper that to this day they have not considered the possibility of having more illumination and, at the same time, by leaving less space open, of avoiding excessive cold in winter. It might be supposed that, with their at times rather misplaced penchant for the elegant, the Chinese do not recognize real light when they see it coming through a pane and therefore make no use of it. Indeed, when a rich Chinese installs a pane in the frame of his window, he almost never leaves it clear, but invariably either sticks some picture on it or ornaments it richly with painted pictures of flowers, animals, scenes from the ancient life of his people, and so on. The shops usually contain a very small quantity of wares, as the local Chinese are in the habit of keeping their wares in store houses and warehouses, while in the shops they keep for display only the sorts of cloth and other manufactured articles that they have in stock, one and, in many cases, two samples of each. In addition they have small articles, haberdashery, toys, small toilet articles, groceries on display, confections, sugar, tobacco, and so on. All this reposes openly on the shelves, and perhaps only the most expensive articles are displayed on stands and in cupboards behind glass. The wares usually take up two walls, and on the third wall ready-made garments are hung out for sale, if the shop deals in this line. In the majority of cases, however, the third wall is left free and is appointed as the place for the entertainment of the buyers who tarry long in the shop. For this purpose a k'ang is built here, or a low but wide stove-couch, warmed by a stove from beneath. There is nothing on the stove-couch but the felts which cover it and two or three olboks (a thin pillow usually

made in the shape of a square from two or three pieces of quilted felt and trimmed with some kind of material) in front of a table about half an arshin high. In front of the table, however, there is always a brazier containing glowing coals, which is used in winter for heating and in summer for lighting pipes. Here, however, the Chinese entertain only customers of the second rank: rich buyers enjoy greater honor and are invited into a second, more remote section of the shop. Here there is a similar k'ang, two or three stools, scales are set out on the tables, and account books and an abacus are scattered about. Sometimes there are a few cupboards containing similar supplies, those of any business office. There are no goods in this room, and in their place the walls are decorated with mirrors, pictures, or oblong sheets of paper on which maxims from the classics are written in a bold and artistic hand. This is the usual appearance presented by the prosperous Chinese shops in the Khüree and the Mai-mai-ch'eng. All of them are arranged in the same manner, and perhaps the only difference can be found in the circumstance that some of them do not display goods at all and keep only open offices; in these shops everything demanded by the customer is brought from the warehouses.

The shops of the second rank do not differ so much from the rich commercial houses in their wares as in their arrangement, since almost identical merchandise can be found in them. Almost none of these shops have business offices in separate quarters and retain very small warehouses. This system and arrangement is in its turn due to the circumstance that they import their own goods from China and also that they receive a very small quantity of goods addressed to them from within the Great Wall, procuring them instead, if need arises, in the Peking shops doing business right here in Urga. The shops of this quality belong for the most part to laosirs, that is emigrants from western China. They are built facing the street and instead of a door have wide openings which, when the shop is closed, are covered with from ten to thirteen boards. About two paces inside the entrance to the shops is a polok (counter) behind which the goods are laid out on shelves; small wares such as tape, cord, bridles, ornaments for saddles, and harness are hung from the ceiling and so forth. From the shop there is an entrance into the proprietor's room, and here he has his office. Customers and strangers almost never enter here as this is not a room for receiving the public but rather something on the order of the living quarters of the proprietor and also because the customers come here to make retail rather than wholesale purchases, and, hence seldom remain long in the shop. For the most part, they conclude their transactions at the polok, that is, only two paces from the outer door.

The third and still lower rank of shops resembles the shops of the second order in their arrangement, differing from them mainly in the merchandise displayed inside. As everywhere else, the merchandise sold in these small-wares shops is of the most everyday sort, and its quality varies as infinitely as does the character of the merchants, their capital, the confidence of their creditors in them, the manner in which they obtain their merchandise, and the merchandise in demand. The shops of the first quality are located for the most part within the inner wall of the Mai-mai-ch'eng or, properly, in its Chinese section; shops of the second and third quality fill the Mongol section of the city, but even here the shops are not mingled with the dwellings of Mongols but are grouped apart from them around the palisade of the Chinese city. Thus, as one leaves the gate of the Chinese section of the Mai-mai-ch'eng and enters the Mongolian section, one again encounters Chinese shops, but these are situated out in the open. Here they exhibit greater activity and indeed there are always more people in these places than in the Chinese section.

In addition to shops there are also peddlers here. Meat sold by weight is displayed on trays. Geese, ducks, and sometimes hares are hung on the palisade – the surplus game of the Mongols, which they bring to the city to sell. Here, too, the Mongol women sell berries, butter, and other products that they have manufactured or raised, and some sit selling various kinds of belts, bibs, children's toys, caps, and so on. It should be noted, however, that the greatest commercial activity and life is concentrated in the western part of the Chinese Mai-mai-ch'eng and only at the central gate of its palisade; in other places the same trade is carried on, but much less briskly. The spot at the central western gate might perhaps be called the bazaar, only here there is neither square, nor any other of the things associated with such a market place, although, to be sure, the space in which the merchants assemble is somewhat wider than the street alone, as it is a place where several streets converge at the gate of the palisade of the Mai-mai-ch'eng.

DWELLINGS OF THE MONGOLS

Even from the street the dwellings of the Mongols differ from those of the Chinese. Their fences are not faced with clay and present the appearance of palisades of larch logs. The gates of every house, which are without the penthouses that the Chinese always have, are painted red with monotonous regularity and, in complete contrast to those of the Chinese, are never open. The Mongols never ride in carts, and it is for this reason, properly, that they have no need of a gate. They enter themselves or drive their livestock or lead their saddle horses through wide wickets, which are lacking in the Chinese houses. Behind the fence the Mongols always have a large courtyard, but they never build many outbuildings in them, and for the most part these are confined entirely to sheds along the fence, under which stand the carts if the proprietor of the house is in the carrier's trade, and, if not, boxes, vats, and so on are kept here. In the middle of the courtyard there are one or two yurts, exactly identical with those we saw in the dwellings of the lamas of the Khüree. Here the Mongols spend the winter. A baishing is built behind the yurts, in which the Mongol lives in summer. Well-to-do Mongols have two or three baishings, though it is unnecessary to give a description of them, as they are all built in the same style, both in the case of the Chinese and of the Mongols.

Passing now to a general description of the construction of the houses, I must say, first of all, that, in the Mai-mai-ch'eng of the Khüree, the houses are of wood. The buildings of the Chinese appear to be of clay, and from their outward appearance they might be thought to be constructed of the unburnt brick that the Chinese use in the construction of their dwellings, but, as I have mentioned before, they are only wood coated with clay, both to preserve the wood from rapid deterioration and for greater retention of heat within the building. Lumber used in the construction of the buildings is felled in the forest of Uliyatai (at the headwaters of the Uliyatai River); recently, however, it has become very scarce there, so that lumber is brought from various places northwest of Urga. Larch is mainly used for construction; the roofs of the houses, as well as the fences and every kind of outbuilding, are constructed of larch logs. The Mongols do not coat their fences with clay, but, on the other hand, like the Chinese, they plaster their baishings all over, including the roofs. Thanks to the clayey soil on which Urga mainly stands, there is quite enough of this material in the Mai-mai-ch'eng. Clay is to be found everywhere, and one sees pits right in the Mai-mai-ch'eng. The clay dug in the Chingiltu Mountains northwest of the Mai-mai-ch'eng, however, is regarded as the

best. It is used in the manufacture of pots, brick, and tile at Urga. The potter's trade is exclusively in the hands of the Chinese, and the Mongols take no part whatsoever in work of this nature. Bricks are manufactured in quadrangular wooden forms similar to ours, and, when they are fired they weigh from seven to nine pounds. The price of a fired brick is between sixty and sixty-five copecks per twenty-five; two hundred unburnt bricks may be had for the same price. Both burnt and unburnt brick is used only for stoves in the construction of houses, both by the Chinese and by the Mongols, although the former mainly use unburnt brick while the latter prefer fired brick. Some of the Chinese use tile for their roofs, but the majority construct them of larch logs. Generally speaking, the construction of a house at Urga is not especially expensive, and the chief difficulty encountered here is in the lack of skilled hands. The total number of carpenters at Urga is no more than thirty. The majority of them are Chinese, but they are hired with reluctance as the work of Mongol carpenters is considered more durable. All houses are built to order, and the average cost of a baishing three chien in size (the usual dimensions of a Mongol house) may be put at from ten to twelve bales of tea, which in our money is between two hundred twenty five and three hundred rubles. It goes without saying that not every Mongol builds a house for himself, and the majority of Mongols in the Mai-mai-ch'eng live in rented quarters. Yurts are rented, and the average rent for one of these, without heat or light, may be put at from two to three rubles in silver per month. Both the Mongol men and the Mongol women usually rent yurts in companies of two or three persons, and thus the rent for their lodgings totals some copecks per month.

The cost of living for Mongols in the Mai-mai-ch'eng, thanks only to the modesty of their tastes, is not especially high. Flour, meat, and tea are the three products which represent the daily requirements of the Mongols here. A brick of tea (dzuzaan) weighing two and one-half Chinese pounds costs from sixty to sixty-five copecks, and flour of the second grade, brought from the Selenga, Kalgan, Doloon nuur, or Biruu khoto, costs from nine to eleven copecks per Chinese pound. Rye bread and flour are not used at all in Mongolia, and the finest grade of flour is brought here in rather limited quantities, and it costs from twelve to thirteen copecks for a Chinese pound. The meat of various cattle is sold here with bones for from four to six copecks a Chinese pound. The Chinese, being more accustomed to delicacies of the table, use various sorts of greens as seasoning for their dishes, for which reason some of them cultivate small truck gardens right in the Mai-mai-ch'eng on the outskirts of the city, and their produce is sold in the Mai-mai-ch'eng itself. Thus, pumpkins are brought for sale here at half a brick of tea each, or from thirty to thirty-two copecks. Carrots, parsley, and radishes are sold by weight and from twenty-five to twenty-seven Chinese pounds may be had for one brick of tea. Up to thirty chin of Chinese cabbage may be had for one brick of tea. Potatoes are seldom sold by weight, and are usually sold by dry measure, which, as reckoned by the Mongols in the sale of groceries, comprises a row of potatoes the length of the distance between the fingers of the outstretched arms. This amount costs ten shara tsai, or about twenty copecks in our money. In addition, onions, garlic, and Chinese cucumbers are cultivated and sold, but the latter in very limited quantities. The houses are heated mainly by firewood of larch, pine, and sometimes birch, but the Mongols prefer argal to firewood and consume it in winter at the rate of seventy or eighty cartloads per yurt.

The principal occupation of the Chinese is commerce, and only the most inconsiderable portion of Chinese make a living at any trade. In the Chinese shops one can find hot Chinese and Russian merchandise. The latter is bought by the Chinese at Kyakhta and

at the Verkhneudinsk, Irbitsk, and even Nizhegorodsk fairs, while the former is brought from Peking, Khokhe khoto, and Kalgan. By the same route European merchandise or, properly, English manufactured goods are brought to Urga in abundance.

The Mongols living in the Mai-mai-ch'eng are mainly engaged in the transport of goods. They deliver tea and hides to Kyakhta and camel and sheep wool and Russian goods to Kalgan. They are hired both by the Chinese of the Mai-mai-ch'eng and by the Russian merchants living in Urga. The Mongols have no farms in the Mai-mai-ch'eng, leaving all their livestock on their pastures in the plains. Thus, in spite of the fact that some of the Mongols of the Mai-mai-ch'eng number their cattle in the thousands, hardly a hundred head of horses and not more than five thousand sheep are kept in the Mai-mai-ch'eng itself. Cows are very seldom brought into the Mai-mai-ch'eng, since it is more expensive to keep cows than to keep sheep, and to the Mongol mind sheep bring much more profit than cows. Butter – the only product a sheep cannot supply – is brought by the Mongols from the plains. However, they even get milk from the sheep and have wool from them in addition. Sheep are sheared once a year, in the autumn, and at this time they obtain from one to one and one-fourth pounds of wool from each sheep. This wool is usually not marketed, but goes into the manufacture of the felts that are so necessary in the household life of the Mongols. The manufacture of felts, as in general the production of all the necessities of life, is left exclusively to the Mongol women. A sheep produces one lamb a year and lambs only once a year. The poorer Mongols keep goats, but the Chinese raise only pigs, and even these in very small numbers – there are no more than thirty of them in the entire city. Cattle breeding on such a small scale in the city is, of course, mainly due to the high cost of keeping animals. The environs of Urga offer anything but luxuriant pasturage, and the Mongols of the Mai-mai-ch'eng are not accustomed to making hay for winter and keep their animals out to grass the whole year round. This is why in winter, by the time the grass is all eaten away, the Mongols are obliged to buy hay and pay dearly for this article. Hay is brought to the Mai-mai-ch'eng from the banks of the Khuntsal and Khara rivers, which are about sixty or seventy versts north of Urga. It can be understood that, if we consider the long journey alone, this hay cannot be cheap, and, for the Mongols who bring it here, it comprises one of the most profitable articles of trade. Instances of the price of one pood of hay being as high as two bricks of tea, i.e. one ruble twenty copecks or one ruble thirty copecks, are by no means rare. Of course, the Mongols do not pamper their animals with hay like this and buy 'old stuff' or last year's grass, which is collected in the winter with rakes. But even this is not especially inexpensive; a cartload of 'old stuff' weighing about four poods is also seldom sold for less than two bricks of tea. In general the maintenance of horses in the Mai-mai-ch'eng during a winter month, with the sort of stock raising to which the Mongols are accustomed, can never cost less than ten of twelve rubles, which to the Mongols represents a very considerable sum.

By religion the inhabitants of the Mai-mai-ch'eng may be divided, properly speaking, into two groups, Taoists and Buddhists. Only Chinese belong to the first group, and all the Mongols and a small number of Chinese belong to the second. In addition, about twenty Mongol shamans live in the Mai-mai-ch'eng, although they, properly, may be considered shamanists to the same extent that any Chinese may be considered a Taoist, Buddhist, or Confucianist. All the Urga shamans are at the same time Buddhists, and a very clear demonstration of this is that the old woman shaman with whom I first had occasion to become acquainted had even taken the vows of a shibagantsa (Buddhist nun). It must be said in general that in the Khüree shamanism exists, not as any kind of

religion, but as soothsaying or fortune telling, a trade plied by private individuals, out of a desire to augment their means of living in any way possible. Thus, in the Mai-mai-ch'eng only two faiths exist, Taoism and Buddhism, and the temples are built accordingly. There are only four temples in the Mai-mai-ch'eng: three Taoist in various places in the Chinese section of the city and one Buddhist temple built on the southwest side of the Mongol section. In addition to the public buildings described, there is also a theater in the Mai-mai-ch'eng opposite the temple of Geser, almost in the very center of the Chinese Mai-mai-ch'eng. There are no permanent troupes in the Urga Mai-mai-ch'eng, however, and the actors come only on short visits from Kalgan and Khokhe khoto. These visits occur about three or four times a year and of course cause great excitement in the Mai-mai-ch'eng.

THE CHINESE CEMETERY

Then the Chinese cemetery may also be included among the public places in the Urga Mai-mai-ch'eng. It is situated at the north end of the Mai-mai-ch'eng and is a spacious field surrounded by a fence of upended larch logs. On the south side of this field there is a baishing with an adjoining courtyard and outbuildings. These are the quarters of the cemetery watch. In the rear of the courtyard there is a large folding gate, which leads into the cemetery and through which the deceased buried here are conveyed. The total number of graves in the Chinese cemetery is comparatively small. Over the period of more than fifty years since the cemetery has been in existence, no more than two hundred tombs have been constructed here. The custom of Chinese families possessing their own land to prefer burying their members there is well known, and, in conformity with this custom, the majority of the Chinese who die at Urga are transported home to China beyond the wall by their relatives and only the poorest persons and even more frequently homeless persons without relatives remain in Urga. For their dead the Chinese usually make very large coffins, no less than a sagene in length and up to an arshin and a quarter in height, using boards of a thickness of no less than two and one-half and frequently three or as many as four inches. The coffin somewhat resembles ours. It is also wider at the head and narrower at the foot, while the board at the head is frequently made to curve outward and is always higher than at the foot. Thus, the cover of the coffin is always in an inclined position. This cover is usually wider than the coffin itself and has pins on its underside which fit snugly into the sides of the coffin. The top side of the coffin lid, however, is entirely smooth and often is even polished. Everything is constructed in this manner in order to protect the remains of the deceased from dampness and to enable the rainwater to flow easily off the coffin. The Chinese do not have graves in their cemetery and do not bury their dead in the earth, but enclose the body in the coffin, which they put in the cemetery directly on top of the earth, inscribing the name of the deceased, the place of his origin, his age, and the date of his death on the headboard. Persons who are more well-to-do and feel more compunction toward their dead sometimes also construct cases over the coffins on the ground, which look like wooden boxes overturned on the gave. It may be understood that, with this method of burial, the stench in the Chinese cemetery is sometimes simply unbearable, and in appearance the cemetery is anything but attractive. One can see bones, skulls, hair, and the dirty clothing of the dead from the coffins that have collapsed with age. Everywhere in the holes and puddles formed by the rains there gather some sort of reddish or

yellowish liquid, covered with grease. Wherever one turns his head there is everywhere the same loathsome foulness and stench.

Establishments for charitable purposes, as for example, hospitals, almshouses, poor-houses, and the like, do not exist in the Mai-mai-ch'eng. In spite of this, there are comparatively few beggars to be seen here, for the philanthropy of the Mongols sees that all who visit their yurts are cared for. Only those suffering from syphilis do not enjoy this protection, and incidentally there are large numbers of such persons living here. The celibacy of the lamas and the single, familyless life of the wealthy Chinese is no doubt the principal reason for the wantonness of the women, which exhibits itself at a very early age and to an extreme degree. Fathers and mothers not only take an indifferent view of the waywardness of their daughters, but even frequently bring about their downfall by selling them for one or, in many cases, two bales of tea (from sixteen to thirty-two rubles). Husbands part with their wives without a twinge of conscience, so long as they bring home their fee. It goes without saying that with the preponderance of the male population over the female population and the low level of the moral concepts existing at Urga, the presence of syphilis on an extremely large scale is a natural product of circumstances. Those who contract syphilis are treated by the lamas, and, if they manage to recover in the least, they go off into the plains. If they do not improve, however, they find themselves entirely without shelter, roaming feebly through the streets or lying on the ground by the fences at the outskirts of the city. Here they die, and usually their iniquitous bodies are torn to bits by dogs where they lie.

ADMINISTRATION OF THE MAI-MAI-CH'ENG

To a European this will seem most strange, and he will inevitably inquire: 'Doesn't anyone look after this city? Aren't there any authorities or city government?' The answer: there are authorities, and there is also a city government. The latter is charged with the duty of keeping order, but it considers the cases described above quite in the order of things and in its yamuns deliberates only on cases of thievery, robbery, violence, murder, fraud, and other transgressions of the law. Since it comprises one of the sections of the city of Urga, the Mai-mai-ch'eng is naturally under the central administration of the Urga ambans, but especially great importance in the Mai-mai-ch'eng is enjoyed by the dzarguchi, who has his residence here and his separate office, which goes by the name of the dzarguchi's yamun. The office of dzarguchi was established in the Urga Mai-mai-ch'eng in 1742. It has always been occupied by a Manchu and by law must have a new incumbent every three years. It is the duty of the dzarguchi to maintain order in the city. In addition all the subjects of the Chinese empire are immediately answerable to him, both those residing and conducting business in the Khüree and Mai-mai-ch'eng, and all those traveling for this same purpose within the boundaries of the aimaks of the Tüshetü Khan and Tsetsen Khan. The dzarguchi examines all cases in lawsuits between Mongols and Chinese, but is not fully independent in deciding especially important cases and must make a report concerning everything to the ambans. He alone is in charge in the dzarguchi's yamun and there are no officials besides him who are even entitled to lay down any decision whatever or are even entitled to a vote. Thus the dzarguchi's yamun is simply the office of the dzarguchi himself. It consists of fifteen clerks (*bicheechi*), five of whom are Chinese and ten Mongols. None of these clerks receives a specified sum as salary, but they profit from the revenues of the yamun,

consisting of imposts, levied by the Chinese for certificates granting the right to conduct business in a given place. These permits, which the merchants get from the dzarguchi's yamun, are granted to Chinese merchants on the basis of special decrees of the Ministry of Native Affairs in Peking. The highest charge for such a permit is set at six and one-half bales of tea, that is, about one hundred silver rubles. The average number of these permits granted by the dzarguchi's yamun varies between ninety and one hundred twenty, and hence the revenues of the yamun may be put at about fifteen thousand (sic-Translator). It is this money that the employees of the dzarguchi's yamun divide among themselves. These funds also provide for the maintenance of the messengers, of whom there are never less than eighty in the yamun. The dzarguchi himself receives a salary of only three hundred liang from the Chinese government. Nevertheless this post attracts a very large number of competitors as it is considered extremely lucrative: at Peking it is virtually never sold for less than five thousand liang in silver, that is, ten thousand rubles.

DZAKHA DEERE (ON THE OUTSKIRTS)

The sections of Urga already discussed do not constitute an exhaustive description of the city. The area between the Lama Khüree and the Mai-mai-ch'eng contains so many more separate buildings, that, if they could be grouped together into a single whole, it would no doubt form a city every bit as large as the Khüree or the Mai-mai-ch'eng. First of all, south of the Khüree marketplace there is a special commercial section of the city called Dzakha deere, which, literally translated, means 'on the outskirts.' Here, beyond the road of Maidari, is the Khüree food market, and here live the Mongols who do business in the market, for the most part butchers or yargachins. All of them are camped close to the market in yurts, near which they slaughter the animals they buy for selling, after which they take the hides to the eldüürchins, cut the meat into pieces, and carry it to the market, where it is displayed right out on the ground or hung on the fences. The more prosperous of these merchants, who slaughter ten or more sheep a day, transport the meat in carts and sell it from these carts. For Russian visitors to Urga, it should perhaps be noted in this connection that it is much safer to buy meat from these carts, for here one is less likely to be given spoiled meat than in the case of the poor merchants who hang their merchandise on the fences. Mutton is usually sold in the following cuts: the forequarters, which consist of the breast and the two forelegs, cost from two and one-half to four teas, and the hind quarters from four to six teas; one foreleg costs from one and one-half to two teas; one hind leg costs from two and one-half to three and one-half teas. Beef is always sold separately from the bones, with a pound of meat costing from two and one-half to three and one-half shara tsais or from five to seven copecks, and a pound of bones costing from two to two and one-half shara tsais or from four to five copecks. Here they also sell live sheep and oxen that are driven into the city: the price of the former fluctuates between ten and sixteen teas, and the price of the latter between thirty and fifty teas. In addition to meat, flour, groats, rice, and other varieties of grain are sold on the same market. The lamas of the Khüree engage in this business, buying the above-mentioned merchandise from the Chinese and then reselling it to the Mongols, with an additional margin of profit, of course, and with a decrease in the weight. It is remarkable that, in spite of this, the Mongols still prefer to buy flour from the lamas in the market rather than getting it from the Chinese merchants in the shops.

YAMUNS OF THE URGA AMBANS

Southeast of Dzakha deere are the yamuns of the Manchu and Mongol ambans. This is also a separate section of the city, which consists of no less than sixty courtyards (khashaan), along two streets. The southernmost part of this section of the city is taken up by the yamun. Its enormous courtyard, surrounded by a wooden palisade, is divided from east to west into three parts, with the building of the office itself being situated in the middle section. The guards and the servants live in the part on the west side, and the east side is reserved for the detention of criminals awaiting their turn to be questioned in cases being conducted concerning them. Here, too, there are baishings where instruments of torture and punishment are stored, a portion of the yamun archives, and warehouses containing yamun property. In the streets behind the yamun are the homes of the officials employed in the yamun and of the relatives living with them. The easternmost part of this section of the Khüree is occupied by a prison, surrounded by two high palisades, the tops of whose logs are hewn like pointed stakes. Its interior, which does not differ from other institutions of this nature, will be described in another place. Here I shall mention only that visiting the prison is a very simple matter for anyone who can gain access to the guards, negotiate with them for a few minutes, and then ask permission to give alms to the prisoners. It goes without saying that a present to the guard that acts as guide is also a necessity.

KHOROONS

The section of the city which is situated opposite the yamuns and southwest of the Dzakha deere is called the khoroon, that is, the 'townhouse section.' Here are the Urga residences of the Khalkha dzasaks who have them built and maintain them here for the visits to the city to worship the hutuktu, to attend the diet of princes, or, lastly, to serve their turn in the diet jisang of the aimak of Tüshetü Khan. Hence it may be understood that these buildings, once erected and maintained, are sometimes vacant for five or six years to perhaps the one month that they are occupied. The only permanent residents of these khoroons are their watchmen, though in recent times the Urga authorities have also introduced the custom of handing over criminals to the khoroon of their proper hoshuns to be transferred home. Today the number of these townhouses in Urga amounts to more than thirty, and none of them consists of a single house, but invariably includes three or four baishings enclosed by a fence and sometimes also surrounded by small gardens. . . .

THE NEW URGA FORTRESS

Besides those structures enumerated above, there are no other buildings beyond the southwest corner of the Khüree; to the east of Urga, however, approximately one and one-half versts from it in the area between the Khüree and the buildings of the Russian consulate, there stands today the new Urga fortress intended to quarter Chinese troops and built as recently as 1883. At that time Mongolia was quite unexpectedly declared to be under martial law, and Chinese troops were ordered from Hsuan-hua-fu to guard the city. This fortress reminds the Mongols to this day of the grievous oppression of the

Chinese government. In that terrible year there was first a drought accompanied by the inevitable lack of fodder, which was followed by a severe winter. The two eastern aimaks of Khalkha adjoining Urga were obliged to expend more than 600,000 liang for the outfitting, arming, and delivery of the troops required of them and in addition to serve the Chinese soldiery by extending to them every sort of accommodation, first on the list of which was the building of the fortress. For its construction 2,664 logs were demanded of the Mongols, the dressing and delivery of which, by decree of the Khaan uula diet, were made the duty of the five hoshuns adjoining Urga . . . Although they supplied the transportation for this lumber, the same hoshuns were also obliged to dispatch 100 mounted men especially for the construction of the fortress. The brick and clay required for covering the buildings and for constructing 150 stoves and couch-stoves in them could not be manufactured and mined closer than a distance of 10 versts from the fortress. Transportation for the delivery of the above could not be hired anywhere or for any price, and indeed the Chinese administration was not accustomed to hiring in this way. Therefore, all the ox caravans entering and leaving Urga, when their passports were visaed, were forced to deliver the required brick and clay for the camp within a set period of time. Unused to such work, the livestock, especially that of the Gobi, was brutally crippled and sometimes rendered unfit for further work in caravans. When the work of construction was completed, the Chinese government decreed that the Mongols were to be paid for the above mentioned work at a rate of 5 feng per log. Thus the entire construction of the fortress cost 130 liang, 2 ching, or in our money 260 rubles in silver, 40 copecks. Built in the shape of a square, with one gate on the south side, this fortress is about 240 Russian sagues in circumference. Its walls are built in the usual style of Chinese fortifications in Mongolia, the space between two upright larch logs in the palisade being rammed full of earth. In this way the thickness of the wall is as much as two arshins. Then the outer wall of the palisade is built up by brick laid on it, again in one tier. The wall of unburnt brick thus raised above the main wall acts as a parapet in which embrasures have been made, forty-five on each side of the fort; the merlons according to custom are equal to twice the width of the openings. Then this entire wall, the part of unburnt brick and the part of larch wood, is coated with clay both on the outside and on the inside.

The Urga fort is situated at the foot of a broad hill, in the middle of which are the buildings of the Russian consulate, and this position leaves it entirely unprotected. From the top of the hill one can see not only the inner arrangement of the buildings of the fort in minutest detail, but even individual soldiers moving about the streets. The entrance to the fort is guarded by the usual double-doored wooden gate, which does not differ in sturdiness from the gate of any shop or tea warehouse. As one enters the fort, the first space inside is occupied by two adobe baishings, where the soldiers on guard duty live. Extending north and south from these two baishings are two barracks, one opposite the other, in which the soldiers are permanently quartered. Going down the street formed by these two barracks, one emerges in a small square in the center of which stands the tall column which is usually placed before the yamuns and residences of the ambans. Farther on, on the north side of the square, in the same position as the barracks are two baishings, one of which, that on the west, houses the yamun of the fort and the other, that on the east, houses the officer's quarters. These baishings are set against a long building, likewise of adobe, constructed across the fort from east to west, which is the quarters for the amban in charge of the fort. The residence of the amban adjoins the sole main street of the fort and the remaining buildings are situated on it along the walls,

as follows. There are eight baishings which are used for soldiers along the western and eastern wall and two buildings along the north wall. The first of these two, in the very center of the north wall of the fort and exactly opposite the residence of the amban, is a grain storehouse. This is a large adobe shed with one door and without windows, the roof of which contains two dormer windows for ventilation. The other similar shed, though much smaller and with one dormer window in the roof, is used to store arms. This armory, it is said, has never been opened from the time the weapons were put into it in the first year the fort was built, and the key is kept by the amban. It may be understood that I did not succeed in getting into it to see the military stores, but from talks with the officers, I learned that eight cannon were put there at that time. My informants were unable to give me an exact description of these cannon, but, judging from the mobility ascribed by them to these cannon, one may suppose with sufficient probability that they are all eight-inch breech-loading weapons. It would also be difficult to state with accuracy the system of this weapon, but, judging from the construction of the lock, which apparently works transversely, one must suppose that it is of the Krupp system. Gun carriages were not supplied with cannon, except for one model, from which the local Mongol carpenters constructed the rest out of pine. The gun carriages, judging from their description, are stationary. At the same time, one thousand rifles were delivered to the fort and are kept in the same armory and are both Chinese smooth-bore rifles and rifle-barreled; I do not know of what system. Fifty small boxes of shells were bought, and all these have lain here for nine years, unopened and rot on the damp ground.

THE RUSSIAN CONSULATE

No more than half a verst east of this fort in the center of a low hill rise the buildings of the Russian consulate, which was built in the period between 1863 and 1865. Formerly, the residence of the Russian consul was situated somewhat southwest of this place, among the townhouses of the Mongol princes. The construction of this old residence dates to 1786, when according to the accounts in the chronicle *Erdeni-yin erike*, the Urga ambans submitted a most respectful report to the emperor, in which they requested permission to build six wooden buildings and to enclose them within a wooden wall 'like a prison,' in order that they, the ambans, might keep watch over the Russian envoys here (*gindan metü bügüde jirγurγan örgüge modun ger üiledcü, toγurin modun qasiγ-a bayrγulju Oros elči-ner-i sakiγului-a kemen*). Today, instead of a prison of this sort, the Urga consulate is, although only from the outside, undoubtedly the most handsome building in the city. Unfortunately, it is not situated in an entirely suitable place. Thus, because of lack of water, the residents of the Russian consulate have neither flower nor vegetable gardens, although no little effort, time, and money have been spent in cultivating both. The consulate consists of one large, two-story building of wood and plaster, with an iron roof and two wings. Immediately adjoining the main building there is also the small one-story building of the house chapel, the roof of which is graced by a small cupola. The upper story of the consulate is taken up entirely by the quarters of the consul, and the lower story houses the quarters of the secretary on the right and of the interpreter on the left, next to the chapel. Of the wings the left wing houses the Urga post office and the adjoining quarters of the postmaster, while it has been proposed to install quarters for a priest in the right wing. In addition, there are the following small buildings in the

courtyard of the consulate: accommodations for the psalm reader, for the pupils of the Urga school, for the Cossacks, and for the kitchen. All of these buildings, though of tolerable appearance from without, have fallen into great decrepitude, especially the wings containing the quarters of the postmaster and of the priest. On the east side of the premises of the consulate is the Russian cemetery, whose original laying out cost the Russian consulate no little trouble, as it is related. The difficulty was that, according to Lamaist regulation, the dead cannot be buried in a spot closer than ten li from the residence of the hutuktu; the Russian consulate, however, is only six li from the palace of Jebtsun Damba gegen. For this reason, as soon as the Mongols learned of the burial of the first Russian near the consulate walls, they immediately demanded the removal of the corpse. The first time the consul assured them that the body had been buried in the ground only temporarily and that, like the Chinese, the relatives of the deceased would no doubt remove it to his native land. The affair was hushed up at that time. Today more than twenty years have passed, in the course of which dozens of Russian graves have been added, and the Mongols, who have become accustomed to the burial of Russians, regard this with complete indifference, apparently having forgotten about their regulations. It should be mentioned, however, that apparently the Russians in Urga have also forgotten about their cemetery. Lacking a fence and uncared for, the cemetery is trampled by cattle, torn up by dogs and has become inconceivably bemired. Instead of Mongolian mounds it is now covered with pits, and there is not a trace of a cross or of a marker. It is said that a monument with an iron tablet was placed over the grave of a missionary here, Father Arkhip Pohkin, and that stones and other tokens of remembrance were placed over the graves of other departed persons. Today all these have been stolen by the Mongols, who even make away with the wooden crosses from the graves and use them for fuel. It goes without saying that they could have a Mongol guard here for a monthly salary of three rubles, but this, of course, would require some attention, and wanting this, the matter is usually discussed and then forgotten again. The cemetery continues in its ugly state, a sort of living reproach to the Russians, even as compared with the slovenly Chinese. I need not say that these are modern times, and today friction with the Mongols is a thing of the past. In former times, for example, the lamas demanded that the consulate lower its flag, since, flying from the top of a two-story building, it was higher than the takhiliin modo (a pole erected by the Mongols in front of the doors of temples and dwellings of the higher lamas, upon which offerings and lamps are placed) in front of the palace of the hutuktu. I do not know what motivated the refusal of the Russians at this time, but the Mongols tolerated it this time as well, though with dissatisfaction. At first there were a great many such petty demands and frictions at various times. The matter arose concerning the Russians' riding horses through the Khüree, of common pastures for Russian livestock, and so on. In this connection the Mongols always presented their demands with such vehemence and in such a form that it was thought that the Russians would not even be allowed to live there. They would have no place to pasture their livestock, no place to get hay, they would have to pay three times as much for fuel, and so on. But nothing of the sort happened. Once they had voiced their demands, the Mongols let the matter go, while the Russians continued to live as before, though, of course, much more comfortably and prosperously than the Mongols. To this day they mow their hay from Mongol fields and lay in a stock of winter firewood from Mongol forests, for payment of course. The Russians not only pay nothing for the common pastures for cattle in summer, but, once having chosen a good spot, they even exclude Mongols from it. All the above is true not

only of the consulate, but of all the Russians living in the Khüree. The Russian population here, however, naturally fluctuates from season to season, though it is never less than one hundred persons. . . .

Of the environs of Urga which are associated with the city, the ravine of Khundui should be mentioned. This ravine is noteworthy for the reason that it is here that the Mongols bring their dead. The Mongols do not have cemeteries and very seldom bury the bodies of their dead. Usually their method of disposing of the dead is very simple. Wrapping the corpse in some kind of rags, they take it out of the city and put it directly on top of the ground somewhere to the side of the road. The corpse, however, does not usually lie there long, nor does it infect the air with its decay; scarcely anyone ever sees it. As soon as the funeral party leaves the dogs come out of their holes in the ravine, tear the corpse to pieces and devour it, leaving absolutely nothing but the bare bones. This scene may often be witnessed from the windows of the second story of the Urga consulate, but walking around this cemetery is by no means safe by reason of the large number of dogs that live there, which by now are accustomed to human flesh. Cases have been known in which they have attacked living persons and dealt with them exactly as they do with corpses. The Russians in the Khüree, when describing the Mongol cemetery and its dogs, never fail to tell how a Buriat woman, a Russian subject, was eaten by these dogs in 1871. The dogs, attacking her, dragged her off the horse she was riding and devoured her. No one, of course, witnessed this, and only the horse, which came running to the consulate, and the bits of clothing found bore witness to the misfortune which had overtaken the Buriat woman.

NOTE

1. A sagene is an obsolete Russian unit of measurement, roughly 2.1 metres in length. Ed.

DOCUMENT 23: PETITIONS OF GRIEVANCES SUBMITTED BY THE PEOPLE



District: Sečen Qan Aimay
Date: 20th year Törü gereltü (1840)
Plaintiffs: People of the Wang Togtokhtör's banner
Defendant: The Wang Togtokhtör¹
Content: A petition submitted to the league-chief and the commanding general of Sečen Qan Aimay by the plaintiffs, accusing the defendant, Wang Togtokhtör, of levying too many taxes and involving them in the greatest difficulties.

People of the Daivan Sumun in the banner of the Ĵasaĵ törü-yin Chün Wang, (permitted) to attend at the Čzan Čimyan², including the Ĵalan-u Ĵanggi Ölzikhutag, the Taiĵis Dugaržav, Lut, Nerenkhüü, Gempil, Gendenžav, Lkhamžav, Erdene and Žamsran, the Sumun-u Ĵanggi Buyandelger, the commoners Tüdev, Šartolgoi, Dondov, Lutmönkh, Norov, Žantsan, Urtnasan, Nasan, Urtnasan, Mönkh, Geleg, Baast, Tsevegžav, Puntsag, Tulga, Mišig, Šagdar, Tsedendorž, Tserenpuntsag, Lasu, Dondov, Tserendaš, Togooč, Buyandelger, Galsan, Tseden, Dalantai, and Žigmid, submit this petition to the Hošoi Ch'in Wang, the loyal Kerülen bars qota league-chief, (permitted) to attend at the Čzan Čimyan, to the Beile, Deputy General of the south-army of Khalkha, and to the Tüsiy-e Güng, vice-chief of the league, to beg respectfully for judgement on the following:

According to the history of former generations, the seventh son of Sečen Qan Bavaa was Taiĵi Damba, the elder son of Damba was Taiĵi Dorž. During the period of Dorž's administration, he brought back the Ganžuur through his own efforts, and built monasteries at his native place Kholoit³ in our banner. Afterwards, Dorž's descendants, such as the Taiĵi lama Günge and others, had also built a monastery at a place named Bilgekh through their own efforts. Then, Luvsan, the Khamba lama of the same sumun, once again brought back the Ganžuur, also through his own efforts. Since the time of our ancestors until the present, over a hundred years, all the lamas and laymen of our Daivan Sumun, including Taiĵi Dorž, Taiĵi lama Günge and Khamba lama Luvsan, have built two monasteries by private efforts, and offered two sutras of the Ganžuur and rituals of our faith to pray for the longevity and prosperity of His Majesty. Then, all of a sudden, in the 17th year Törü gereltü (1837), an order was handed down from the banner-office, in which it said:

“Although we have planned to build a central temple under the auspices of the Boydo lama and others, the Wang and the Tusalaγčis cannot be responsible for carrying out the plan, unless it is the will of the people.”

Ĵakiruyči Khišiγt and the Kiy-a Balčin were sent to us without any official document proving that we should supply their relay-transportation. They just high-handedly troubled us by providing themselves with relay-horses. Since the chief lamas, the proctor lamas, the Taijīs, the Ĵanggis and the Kündüs agreed to unite in Tamsag, the eleven separate monastery treasuries of the banner were ordered to join and the lamas in the Sumun were ordered to report to the assembling place on the 27th of the 7th month. Meanwhile, Taiji Tümen and others who said that they had been sent from the banner-office, came and pulled down the main wooden hall of our temple in Kholoit and took away all the timbers and cloth-covers to Tamsag without any explanation. Later, all the timbers from the main hall of our temple in Bilgekh were also taken to Tamsag by the officials Bayart and Tsogt, who were sent from the banner-office. They said that all the timbers had been borrowed only temporarily. Next, the Taiji lama Dandar and the idle Ĵalan Tserendaš came and forced us to supply them with horses, food etc., even though they had no official authorization to do so. They not only removed the images of Buddha, the Ganžuur, the treasury and all the other things of our two temples, but also appointed 98 lamas by name, and commanded them to report to the specified place within the designated time. Meanwhile, all the Taijīs, officials, lamas and laymen of our Sumun stated their difficulties and asked to be allowed to keep the images of Buddha and maintain the temples as they had been originally, and also asked for leave of absence for the appointed lamas. However, the answer was “This predestined act cannot be prevented because it was divined by the Boydo lama and the wise of the west who said that it was better to unite the monasteries in one place and establish a central temple according to the religious rules. Besides, this matter has already been agreed to by the Ĵasaγ Wang, the Taijīs, officials and other people, therefore the appointed lamas have to obey the summons in the order issued.”

Since the majority of our people did not know what had been agreed internally amongst part of the Taijīs, Ĵalans, Kündüs and lamas of our Sumun, we protested against our two temples being pulled down and moved away all of a sudden. For more than one hundred years, we had recited the Ganžuur there twice a year and held the ritual of Maani Rilbū⁴ once in two years in order to pray for the longevity and prosperity of His Majesty. To this protest, the Wang’s answer was: “The establishing of a central temple seems to be contrary to the will of the people and also bodes no good for the omen, therefore it has been decided to give up this plan. All the lamas of your two temples will be permitted to return and do the Buddhist rituals for His Majesty as usual. If there is anyone who does not agree with the proposed action, let him complete a Maidar⁵ ritual by himself, in order to cultivate his mind for coming generations.” When this was settled, the other nine lama-institutes and temple treasuries which had been united in Tamsag were all returned to their original places and all the people of the banner were happy to return to their previous peaceful way of life.

Afterwards, the banner-office ordered the eleven treasuries to divide the payment of wages and costs for various expenses paid beforehand by the five of the other nine treasures on the occasion of establishing the central temple at Tamsag. It totalled 105.30 ounces of silver and 73639 pieces of brick-tea. The sum for our two treasuries in Daivan Sumun was 37.66 ounces of silver and 26140 bricks of tea.

We asked the banner-office to return the two complete sets of timber and one complete set of cloth-cover of the main halls of our temples to us, but the answer was: "This request cannot be considered, because the timber and clothcover have been previously used by yourselves. Furthermore, the earthen hall which was built here by your lamas has not been completed. Therefore, those lamas should be brought here to receive a lesson and your Taiji lama Legšid, Ravžaa and lama Liidev must also come here to finish the earthen building."

So, the lamas Dandar, Namdag, Dagva, Nompil, Senge and Nyam were taken away to be taught a lesson.

Later, other things happened. Four men of our Sumun, namely lama Čültem, the laymen Genden and Dansran and lama Damžan went somewhere without a certificate. Some of them went for subscriptions, some on business and some to worship. Meanwhile, Dagvatseren, a disciple of the Holy Jebtsundamba, came to our Sumun and waited for Čültem to return, because the quality of some silver which he had received in payment from the latter, was not good. Because Čültem and the other three men went on a journey without certificate and allowed a stranger (Dagvatseren) to stay in our Sumun without permission, each of them were charged a nine-animal fine (a unit of fine consisting of 2 horses, 2 oxen, 2 cows, 2 three-year-old bulls and 1 two-year-old calf).⁶ Because they were jointly responsible, Taiji Dugaržav, Taiji Tümen, Kündü Erenčin, the lamas Dandar and Kheiv were each fined one nine-animal unit plus one horse; the proctor lamas Togmid, Navaantseren and Šaravsenge were each fined five animals and Čültem was fined three animals in addition to his other fines. Among these people, Taiji Tümen and lama Kheiv were exempted from their fines because they were considered to be men of merits to both religion and the nation. Janggi Bayandelger was fined one nine-animal unit because the case of some fugitive was reported a few days late. Another order was issued by the banner-office which said: "In the 17th year (1837). Taiji Dugaržav and ten soliders of your Sumun were appointed to cut and transport willows in order to provide firewood for making tiles, but they did not finish the work on time.

Now they have to prepare firewood for 80 000 tiles. They should cut willowwood from the bank of the Urt river and transport it directly to Tamsag where the tiles are being made." Afterwards, Taiji Daš, Güržav and the Kiy-a Žamsran were sent to us by the officer-on-duty Bayasgalan. They made a nuisance of themselves with their relay demands and galloped back and forth six times, although they were not authorized to do so. They said: "The 98 lamas of your two temples who were appointed to join the central temple in the 17th year (1837) which was then abandoned, will be re-summoned, but this time they will be summoned successively in groups of 5 or 6 persons according to the register of their names." So the lamas were forced to run to and fro in groups of 5 or 6 persons in the way the Taiji Daš and Güržav had arranged.

We have discussed among ourselves the reasons of all these aforesaid matters and came to the conclusion, that, because our Sumun was the first to oppose the establishment of the central temple in 17th year (1837) and to openly show the reluctance of the majority of the whole banner, we had been deliberately oppressed by Wang Togtokhtör. At the same time as Čültem, Genden, Dansran and Damžig of our Sumun went on a journey without certificate, nine other people, including the proctor lama Čoimool of Janggi Badrakh's Sumun, also journeyed on business without certificate, but they were not fined as heavily as our sumun-people. Some of the nine people of Badrakh's Sumun were fined a three-year-old ox, some of them were given 25 lashes, but their own officials and proctor lama were not punished at all. There were officials in other banners

who had also been guilty of negligence in matters of public business. They were fined a three-year-old ox or were merely scolded, but our Janggi Bayandelger was fined one nine-animal unit. Wang Togtokhtör complained that we had taken back the cloth-cover of our Kholoit temple from Tamsag and that our lamas had not stayed in Tamsag. He fined our Taiji lamas Ligšid, Ravžaa, the lama Dandar, the proctor Šaravsenge and lama Liidev 3 animals each. As for the other lamas, Togmid was fined 5 animals, Žigmid 7 animals, Sodov 6 animals, and Dagva 1 three-year-old ox. Merely for the above mentioned reason, 126 horses and other animals were collected by the banner-office in revenge. The commoner Tüdev was accused because he was one of the people who had taken back the cloth-cover from Tamsag and had also failed to urge the Nirba Odser of our temple to go to Tamsag. Because Tüdev was poor and did not have the animals for the fine, he was shackled for 30 days and given 80 lashes in addition afterwards.

Since the 14th year (1834) Törü gereltü, the building of three new temples with their surrounding walls had been under construction. Our banner-people had worked with their whole strength to collect and transport all materials needed for the construction including pinewood, earth, bamboo and willowwood. In the 17th year (1837), when the banner people were transporting firewood to make tiles, many ox-carts were collected from the residents of the relay-stations, but they only made about 60000 tiles, although they worked as quickly as possible. Only ten soldiers and Taiji Dugaržav of our Sumun participated in this labour in the 17th year (1837). They were ordered to chop firewood from the far-off Urt river and transport it to Tamsag to make 80000 tiles. According to Tüdev's information, Taiji lama Dandar told Sambuu, the proctor lama of the east temple, that Wang Togtokhtör had sent the officer Bayan-amar from Uliasutai to bring an order which said: "The 98 lamas of Daivan Sumun, who were relieved of joining the central temple in the 17th year (1837), will be summoned again. If any one of them disobeys the order he will be punished by being made into a layman again." None of the lamas of other Sumuns have received such orders. This summons was carried out by Taiji Daš who was sent to us by the officer-on-duty Bayasgalan in the fourth month of the 18th year (1838).

Bayasgalan forced us to supply food and relay-services and ill-treated our lamas by making groups of them travel to and fro.

In the 5th month of the 19th year (1839), a dispatch issued by the Li fan yüan and handed down by the league-government, was sent to us from the banner-office as an urgent matter. The content of the dispatch quoted in the order was as follows:

"On the 4th of the 3rd month, 19th year (1839) Törü gereltü, our Ministry presented to His Majesty a report stating that Ardsed, the league-chief of Sečen Qan Aimaγ, recently forwarded a report from Wang Togtokhtör, chief of a subordinate banner, saying, that the latter had built a temple containing sixty rooms at Tümen Ölziit Ovoo by his own efforts, in order to pray for the prosperity of His Majesty, and that he requested a name be given to the new temple and certificates be given to ten lamas including the head-lama, assistant lama and the proctor lama.

"According to the law, if a banner, no matter whether it belongs to Inner or Outer Mongolia, built a temple with more than fifty rooms and requested a name, the Li fan yüan must draw up some names and present them to His Majesty. After His Majesty has decided upon one of the names, it should be sent to the Ministry of the Interior and the Mao khen dian⁷ to be documented, stamped with the imperial seal and then sent to the applicant.

"Since the above-mentioned law pertains to the Wang Togtokhtör who has built a temple

of over fifty rooms by his own efforts, we, the court officials, have carefully drawn up two names for the temple and present them herewith respectfully to His Majesty. After one of them has been decided upon, we will let the Ministry of the Interior and the Mao khen dian document it, seal it lawfully, and send it to the applicant. Regarding the certificates for the lamas, they will be issued by the Li fan yüan and sent to them directly.

“Soyolyg Badruulagč” (Culture Inspirer) was approved with the cinnabar autograph by His Majesty as the name of the temple. The Li fan yüan sent a copy of this autograph to the Ministry of the Interior to document it in Manchu, Mongolian and Tibetan, and to the Mao khen dian to document it in Chinese. After the imperial seal has been stamped on these documents, this dispatch will be sent to both the league-and banner-chief consecutively.”

The order, which was attached to the aforesaid dispatch of the banner-government, was quoted as follows:

“... In order to pray for the prosperity of His Majesty, the lamas of all temples in the banner should gather at the Soyolyg Badruulagč temple and remain there. This dispatch is sent to all the noble Taijis, Janggis and Kündüs of four Sumuns, the head-lamas, Nirbas, and proctor lamas of all the monasteries. They should send all the shrines, treasuries and lamas under their jurisdiction to the appointed place on the 19th of the 6th month this year. No delay is allowed. In addition, the lamas should be made to study the four kinds of doctrine.”

According to the dispatches mentioned above, we understood that the original matter of the dispatch was only concerned with a name for the newly-built temple, containing sixty rooms, and the certificates for ten lamas. There was nothing mentioned about the matter of uniting eleven monasteries, gathering together more than one thousand lamas of the banner and letting them study the four kinds of doctrine.

On the other hand, there were already more than fifty lamas dwelling in Soyolyg Badruulagč temple with their households.

Previously, there were four Sumuns in our banner, but in the 3rd year (1823), ours had been reorganized into a half Sumun by Janggi Ölziit because of the lack of male persons. Later, when more than one thousand un-registered lamas in the banner were recruited to do the same duties carried out by those who were registered, we put forward all the arguments we had and asked for the lamas who originally belonged to the temples of our Sumuns in Kholoit and Bilgekh to be allowed to remain in our temples. We strived and suffered much for this purpose, but now Wang Togtokhtör is squeezing us again and again with various oppressions and making it impossible for us to continue our living. Therefore, we present in detail the reasons of the matters which have exhausted our strength and state them item by item as follows:

(1) Item: In the 1st year (1821) of Törü gereltü, a Tibetan lama of the Altan temple was said to be the incarnation of the Takh’san lama who was worshipped by our banner formerly, and the Wang ordered the four Sumuns of the banner to assist the Tibetan lama with a given number of animals. The people and the two treasuries of our Daivan Sumun paid for this with 1 gelding, 2 female camels, 25 head of cattle and 100 sheep. When the Tibetan lama and his four pupils were sent to Dolon Nuur with 12 Kiy-as and grooms, we were forced to give them travelling expenses consisting of 18 camels for loading, 28 horses for riding, 223 ounces of silver for the rent of 3 tents, and 20 sheep plus 20.20 ounces of silver for their provisions.

(2) Item: In the same year, we were forced to settle a debt of 1000 ounces of silver with 200 ounces for interest. The pretext given was, that this sum was borrowed from a Chinese merchant Čan-lu-si in Peking and used by Wang Togtokhtör himself when he went to his inauguration.

(3) Item: In the 3rd year (1823), we paid 500 ounces of silver under the pretext that the money was given to the league-chief Sečen Qan whose debts had increased greatly.

(4) Item: In the 7th year (1827), when the Wang's wife Ilguusanmagad went to Urga to worship the Jēbtsundamba Qutuytu, we were forced to supply 17 camels for loading, 25 horses for riding, 262.50 ounces of silver for the rent of 2 tents, and 40 rams plus 130.40 ounces of silver for provisions.

(5) Item: In the 8th year (1828), under the pretext of repairing the general treasury of the banner's monastery, we were forced to give 32 horses, 105 head of cattle and 578 sheep.

(6) Item: In the same year (1828), when the league-chief Sečen Qan went personally to drive out the Chinese who came to Gūng Sonomdaržaa's territory to collect mushrooms, Wang Togtokhtör said, as a pretext, that he would receive Sečen Qan midway and present him with gifts, and we were therefore forced to give 7 first-class ambling horses, 18 common ambling horses, 13 Alašan horses and 5 castrated camels. Besides this, for the celebrations, we also had to give 3 rams, 101 sheep, 1 four-year-old stallion, 2620 bricks of tea, 6.35 ounces of silver for the cost of Khadags⁸, cakes, fruits and butter and 10 ounces for a horse which died from continually being ridden by the people during this time.

(7) Item: In the 9th year (1829), when league-chief Sečen Qan went personally to drive out the Chinese who entered Gūng Sonomdaržaa's territory to collect mushrooms, we were forced to offer a tribute of nine white animals; thus we gave 1 castrated camel, 3 ambling geldings, 5 ordinary geldings, 50 ounces of silver, 1 four-year-old horse, 4 sable furs and more than 10000 bricks of tea for the cost of various silk goods, cloths, Khadags, flour etc.

(8) Item: In the same year (1829), under the pretext of expenses for the performance of Buddhist rituals, which were granted by the Living Buddha Dagačara, and included the performing of religious ceremonies, building of a new Bumba⁹ consecrating the image of a Luvanzilbu¹⁰ deity, making an offering to the Boir Ovoo, building a small shrine containing an idol of a deity, and expenses for the wrestlers and archers during the celebrations, we were forced to give horses, camels, cattle, sheep and others. The cost of all these things calculated in silver amounted altogether to 372.35 ounces, and 3 three-year-old oxen and 6 sheep in addition.

(9) Item: In the same year (1829), under the pretext of sending the Wang's younger brother, Taiji Žalkhaazav, and the commoner Tsogt to Peking to study Manchu and Chinese, we were forced to give 8 camels with saddle-felt for loading, 4 other camels as substitutes and 148 ounces of silver for the cost of 2 tents with all the necessary articles. In addition to these, we gave 16 horses for riding, costing 10 ounces of silver each, and 88 ounces of silver plus 20 sheep for provision.

(10) Item: In the same year (1829), when it was the Wang's turn of duty to go to Peking, the banner was requested to give animals and other things. In addition, under the pretext of covering his expenses, the Wang sent official letters to the four Sumuns and levied 800 ounces of silver plus 20 geldings. Afterwards, these official letters were taken back to the banner-office, and the amount of money and number of horses was reduced by the Jālan Ölzii-khutag and the secretaries Čerenžav and Dašdondov.

(11) Item: Under the pretext that, starting from the 10th year (1830), the old temple would be repaired, the idle Jālan Tserendaš who was on duty in the banner-office, forced us to pay 3000 ounces of silver within a limit of five years.

(12) Item: In the same year (1830), the Wang said under a pretext that he would present gifts to the league-chief Sečen Qan and forced us to give 1030 two-year-old sheep which he took for his own use.

(13) Item: In the 11th year (1831), when the Wang went to Peking to take his turn of duty, he said as a pretext that he would build a house, and we were forced to give him 1000 ounces of silver, which he then used for himself.

(14) Item: In the 12th year (1832), the Wang forced us to pay 46.36 ounces of silver under the pretext that the price of the materials used for building the Bumba in the preceding year amounted to that sum.

(15) Item: In the 13th year (1833), the Wang pretended to go and present an offering to the Noyon Qutuγtu lama and forced us to pay 400 ounces of silver.

(16) Item: In the same year (1833), the Wang pretended that he would make offerings to the Khüükhen lama and the mendicant of Süteen Aimaγ and we were forced to give him 15 geldings and 100 ounces of silver.

(17) Item: In the same year (1833), the Wang pretended that he would present sheep to the league-chief Sečen Qan, and he forced us to give 900 two-year-old rams which he then took for himself.

(18) Item: In the 14th year (1834), the Wang bought 1000 horses from the Ĵebtsundamba Qutuγtu's herds. These horses were bought at 5 ounces of silver each on credit. Taiĵi Tümen, Taiĵi Žigmid, Kündü Danitseren and 12 soldiers were sent to drive the horses back, and our banner-people had to supply these 15 men with horses, camels, tents and provisions. After the horses arrived, the Wang selected 200 for himself and forced our banner-people to buy the remaining 800 at 10 ounces of silver each. In addition to the original cost of 4000 ounces of silver, he made 4000 ounces profit for himself. Our sumun-people paid 1900 ounces for this purpose. When we delivered the money to the banner-office, we were held up by the official runner Nokhoi Tsogt who maintained that our silver was short of weight and forced us to pay the deficiency of 64.30 ounces of silver.

(19) Item: In the 15th year (1835), when the Wang accompanied the Ĵebtsundamba Qutuγtu to Lhasa, all the necessary animals and equipment for the whole journey were supplied by banners of the Aimaγ. The Wang, for his own benefit, suggested that some necessities should be sent to Khökh Nuur in advance, ready for the further journey, and forced us to give a good selection of 40 castrated camels. The camels were sent to Khökh Nuur by Ĵanggi Dondov, with another man, and we supplied him with 2 geldings, 1 tent, 5 pieces of saddle-felt for the camel and 75 ounces of silver for the provisions.

(20) Item: The Aimaγ-office ordered our banner to supply the Wang with a coloured yurt for his journey to Lhasa. In addition to the original price for the yurt which was fixed by the superior authorities, the Wang made some extra profit for himself and forced us to pay 191.43 ounces of silver.

(21) Item: In the same year (1835) there was actually no need to send anybody to Doloon Nuur, but the Wang insisted that the Ĵakiruγči Khišigt and some others be sent there. He forced us to pay 20 ounces of silver for the rent of 5 horses which Khišigt and the others used for riding and loading.

(22) Item: The Wang, under the pretext of expenses for relay-runners during a religious ceremony performed at his summer-quarters, forced us to give 6 castrated rams, 13 sheep and 0.30 ounces of silver for the cost of tea.

(23) Item: In the 16th year (1836), when the Wang accompanied the Ĵebtsundamba Qutuγtu on the return journey from Lhasa, all the horses and loading-camels sent

to meet him were supplied by the banner. However, the Wang pretended that he was in need of money during the time when he was welcomed by the people sent to Khökh Nuur, and forced us to pay 550 ounces of silver for his own use. Besides this, we also supplied the money-carriers, Ĵanggi Ōlziit, lama Odser and two grooms, with 485.40 ounces of silver as the necessary expense for their camels, horses, tents and provisions.

(24) Item: In the same year (1836), when the Wang was returning from Lhasa, the idle Ĵalan Tserendaš and 15 other men were sent to Urga to welcome him. At his demand we were forced to give these 16 men 13 camels for loading, 30 horses for riding, 262.50 ounces of silver for the cost of three complete sets of tents and 15 sheep plus 68.40 ounces of silver for provisions.

(25) Item: In the same year (1836), Žalkhaažav, a second grade Taiĵi of the banner, suddenly ran away, taking with him two Bandis. They met the Wang by chance on his way back from Lhasa and were captured west of the Ĵebtsundamba Qutuĵtu's palace in Urga. The Wang ordered the soldier Ganžuuržav and some other men to bring the fugitives back and imprisoned them secretly. He did not report this incident to the proper authorities, nor did he make it public. Instead, he sent the Ĵakiruĵči Khišigt, the first grade Taiĵi Ganžuuržav and the Kiy-a Mendžargal one after another to Doloon Nuur and other places, pretending to look for the fugitives. Therefore, the Wang levied in advance from the banner-people 131.26 ounces of silver to cover the total cost and rent of horses, tents and carts for these dispatches.

(26) Item: A yurt was used by the Wang to discuss official affairs with his high-ranking officers. Usually, it was renewed every two years with 18 or 20 pieces of felt. In the 17th year (1837), when it was due to be renewed, we were suddenly forced to give 40 pieces of felt in addition to the normal 20 pieces, which the Wang then used himself. Furthermore, 54.77 ounces of silver for the price of Russian printed cloth, red and yellow velvet, plus 13 pieces of blue and white cloth were levied from us.

(27) Item: In the 17th year (1837), the Wang went to Peking to take his turn of duty. When he returned, in addition to the specified number of horses and other animals which we sent to Doloon Nuur to welcome him, he forced us to send him 16 camels which we rented for him at a cost of 88 ounces of silver. Using these camels, he brought back 800 pieces of purple cloth and 6 baskets of brick-tea and made a profit for himself.

(28) Item: In the 18th year (1838), in order to pay off the debt which the Wang had made himself, we were forced to give him more than 100 four-year-old oxen of best quality, which he also used for himself.

(29) Item: In the 17th year (1837), a Chinese merchant, Yan-khou-ši from the Ulaan-khad area, came to the Khalkha river in our banner to trade. He was unable to start business, because he did not have a licence from the Li fan yüan. He was beaten and injured and robbed of goods to the total of 280 ounces of silver by the bandits Gonsüren, Tögöldör, Döndgee and Töš who were captured and imprisoned by our banner-office afterwards.

In the 19th year (1839), four Chinese with official papers were sent from the office of Ulaan-khad to fetch the bandits. In order to suppress the case, the Tusalaĵči Gončigdaš, the idle Ĵalan Tserendaš and the Ĵanggi Galdan borrowed 99 ounces of silver from Odser, the Nirba of the treasury of the Yeröolt monastery as a loan at interest and bribed the four Chinese with the money. It was said that the interest on this loan had increased to the sum of 23 ounces of silver, and we were forced to pay 122 ounces altogether.

Regarding the idle ǰanggi Tserendaš, he even raised trouble in order to suppress the robbery-case by bribing the Chinese. In the 10th year (1830), he wore the fourth grade rank-button, saying that he was given the additional title of ǰalan-u ǰanggi, and he exempted half of his taxable livestock from tax, in the same way as the other registered officials did. People did not like him, because he used to make them suffer by oppression and to raise troubles of all sorts.

The junior banner-officer Erinčin and others brought the bandits to Ulaan-khad and falsified the quantities of the stolen goods, reducing the compensation to 30 ounces of silver, and said that the other goods were found ownerless in the open countryside. For the negotiations to resolve this case, a loan at interest of more than 700 ounces of silver was borrowed from the Chinese Nanžin in Ulaan-khad and given to the office of Ulaan-khad as a bribe. Finally, the case ended and the bandits were proven not guilty. Erinčin returned with the records, including a document from the Ulaan-khad office, stating the conclusion of the case, and a copy of the receipt in Chinese verifying the loan at interest. Our banner-office simply filed these documents without saying anything about it and released the bandits. Now, the Chinese creditor Nanžin has come himself, staying here in our banner to press for payment of the debt.

(30) Item: In the 18th year (1838), the Wang forced the treasuries of the temples and monasteries of the banner to give 1000 ounces of silver for his own use.

(31) Item: In addition to the fixed number of registered officials and Kiy-as of the banner, the Wang appointed extra ones. They were the fifth grade officials: Buyandelger, Ölziit, Galdan and Bayasgalan; the seventh grade officials: Dašžav, Bayan-amar and Daintseren, and the Kiy-as: Tsevegžav, Urtnasan, Lut, Deleg, Buyandelger, Bayantümen, Žamsrar, Tseden and Sükh.

(32) Item: In July of the 17th year (1837), ǰanggi Ölziit and lama Takhai came and told us that in the 11th year (1831), Taiži lama Dandar had ordered Čoibal to tie up Durgar's son, a nine-year-old lama boy, and he himself had beaten the boy with a whip causing severe swelling. Although the boy was afterwards nursed by proctor lama Nyam and attended by the lama-doctor Šarav, it proved no use whatsoever since the swelling and wounds became more and more serious. Finally the boy died. Regarding this matter, we were told that the Wang had said that the case was supposed to have been solved on the spot after the nun Iš, a younger sister of the Taiži lama Dandar, had discussed the matter with Buural, a relative of the dead.

(33) Item: In the 14th year (1834), the Wang sent the officer Myangan and others to transport goods to the Khövölzökh watchpost, which is in the direction of the Russian border, and let them do business for him there.

(34) Item: The Wang sent the proctor lama Nyam and others to transport goods to the Doosog watchpost, which is also in the direction of the Russian border, and let them do business for him there also.

(35) Item: Recently, the routines for the officials and the acting secretary, who used to stay at the banner-office in rotation, were almost completely discontinued and Bayasgalan and the so-called secretary Nokhoi Tsogt, who were supposed to be commoners, were appointed to stay instead. Although the same standard weights and measures should be used by both the recipient and the payer, if any official tax is levied in silver by the government, Bayasgalan and Tsogt now purposely exploit the people by causing their silver to be always short-weight and forcing them to pay up the pretended deficiency.

(36) Item: In the 18th year (1838), it happened to be the Wang's turn to go to Peking

on his duty of honour. In addition to all his necessities which we had already paid in accordance with the precedent for a Wang's official journey, the Wang took advantage of the opportunity and took his wife, his two sons their fiancées and two other common girls named Tsagaankhüü and Dolžin with him to Peking. Therefore, we were forced to pay for the expenditure of these idlers also. We paid 430 ounces of silver for the rent of 40 camels which were used for loading and riding, 50 horses costing 10 ounces each, which were only used for riding, and 1115.40 ounces of silver for provisions.

(37) Item: In the 6th month of the 19th year (1839), the Tusalaγči Taiji Gončigdaš of the banner lied that the Wang was coming back from Peking, and ordered supplies to be sent to Doloон Nuur to meet him. Therefore we were forced to give the Kiy-a Myanganbuu and the others appointed to deliver the supplies to Doloон Nuur, 3 equipped and 35 unequipped camels, 47 horses, 366 ounces of silver for the cost of a complete tent-set and 28 ounces of silver for their provisions. After a journey of a thousand miles, all the above-mentioned money and animals were either used or damaged, but the Wang did not return. Later, both in the 9th month of the same year (1839) and also in the 1st month of the 20th year (1840), we were forced to send horses and camels to meet him. Finally the Wang left Wu-tai in the first month of the 20th year (1840) and arrived in the third month.

(38) Item: At a relay-station, when the Wang was on his way back from Wu-tai, he beat the Kiy-a Balčin and the Sumun-u janggi Bayandelger cruelly with a whip and caused their death.

(39) Item: When any of the officials goes on an official journey, the people are forced to pay in cash for his transportation and provisions, i.e. 10 ounces of silver for a horse, 1.50 ounces for a castrated ram and 1 ounce for a sheep. If you offer a horse or some other animal instead of money, though it may be a good one, or even if you change it for a better one, the officials would reject it again and again until you are tired of running to and fro. If finally you agree to give them the money, then they will charge you 3 ounces more for each horse, 0.57 ounces more for each castrated ram, and 0.50 ounces more for each sheep. In order to make profits for themselves or for their favourites, they even hire horses or camels much worse than those they have previously rejected, to go on their official journeys. They ride these poor weak animals to death on the way, before business has even been completed. Then they come back and force the taxpayer supposed to be responsible for this matter to pay for all the damages. This is a very bad custom and ought to be eliminated.

(40) Item: The Tusalaγči Taiji Gončigdaš, Tsedenžav, Gonsüren, Guržav, Badam, Manžil, Lut, Žigmid, Rinčin, Daš, Dordakh and Urtnasan, the Sumun-u janggis: Badrakh and Dašdondov, the sixth grade officer Tsogt, the junior officers: Aranzan, Khumtseren and Baast, the Kiy-as Buyandelger, Tserenžav Myanganbuu, Bayan-amar, Urtnasan, and Baast, and the commoners Tümen, Gončigžav, Buyandelger, Lut, Žargal, Oyut, Sožid, Möökhüü, Čogdov, Šoodan and others, altogether about 170 persons, gathered together, disturbed the whole banner and robbed various people on the 3rd, 4th and 5th of the first month this year. The things which they took on these occasions amounted to roughly 170 horses, 16 yurts, 30 castrated rams, 1 basket of tea and other articles. The afflicted people, apart from lama Namdal who was beaten, were Taiji Dugaržav, Lut, the laymen Bayan-amar, Togmid, Deleg, Urtnasan, Šartolgoi, Amaržikh, Čoižil, Galdan, Yondon, Dovdon, Čültem, Genen, Garamtseden, Damči, the immigrant Amduu and the Tibetan lama's disciples Nödelč, Dagdan and Čogdov who actually belong to the temple of Altan.

On the 6th of the first month, Taiji Žigmid, the junior officer Rinčin, the commoners Gončigžav and Sonomdaš came to our Kholoit temple. Everybody, including Taiji Žigmid, heard Rinčin say: “Yesterday, I led about 20 men and got back with 8 castrated rams and 1 yurt from the people who are dwelling in groups along the Urt river. We and the Tusalayči Gončigdaš and the Ĵakiruyči Khišigt have eaten up the rams.” The people living along the Urt river moved away during the night, but nobody knows where they have gone.

Furthermore, other things seized by this group of officers and men list as follows: 1 castrated camel, 9 leather straps, 3 yurt-ropes, 3 cushions, 1 iron ladle, 1 whole piece of new felt, 4 fire-tongs, half a piece of felt for a yurt-wall, 1 wooden plate, 5 new bowls, about 80 carts of dry dung, more than 100 wooden vessels, poles and 1 knife. The names of the people who have lost the above mentioned articles are as follows: Taijis Damiran, Nasan, the laymen Urtnasan, Dovdon, Damčai, Bayan-amar, Deleg, Togooč, Čoinchor, Odser and Togmid. Lastly, we must add that we have already reported all the above mentioned matters as an urgent case to the banner-office.

(41) Item: We were forced to suffer the following: the Wang distributed the wool of his flocks of sheep to the four Sumuns of the banner and ordered the people to make felts for him. After they were finished, he grumbled that the quality of the felts was not good and that they were not big enough, and forced the people to compensate for it. Milk-cows were taken to the Wang’s residence to provide temporary nourishment; 200 carts of dry dung had to be transported every year from the four Sumuns to the Wang’s residence; every spring and autumn, we had to supply the return transport and other demands of those people who had been sent to Doloon Nuur or some other places to do business for the Wang’s personal profit; if animals of the Wang’s herds got lost, we had to supply mounts for the herdsmen to search for the missing animals; when messengers were sent back and forth, even merely to pay respect to some official or lama, we had to supply their riding-horses and provisions; thus we were forced to give a team of horses to each of the messengers for their use.

(42) Item: From time long since until the 13th year (1833) of Törü gereltü, more than seven generations, our former ruling Qans and Wangs always camped in yurts when they went with their officials to the Khalkha river in the summer, or to Khulstai Lao Gobi in the winter. Now, our Wang Togtokhtör suddenly changed the tradition and built a big house with double walls in the Chinese style in the north of Lao, a place only supposed to be a winter-quarter because it was unproductive and deficient in water. The house was built with black bricks and tiles, with five pillars inside, all painted with red colour and enclosed with a double wall. Most of the Taijis, Ĵanggis, officials and commoners, if not closely related, were forbidden to come inside the inner wall. On the west side of the house, a Maidar-temple and another separated wall were built. From the 14th year (1834) of Törü gereltü until the 18th year (1838), all sorts of materials, such as pine, bamboo, willow, tiles, bricks and lime were transported for these buildings. It was difficult to calculate the actual amount of carts, animals, food and tea levied from the people as well as the number of animals taken, and how much had been wasted, but it was certain that the losses of the people were very great.

Although our living conditions became worse and worse, we endured all these above mentioned hardships silently; but the Wang never showed us any consideration or sympathy. On the contrary, we had to suffer hardship again and again. Finally, our living conditions became more difficult and our grievances became more unbearable as we struggled to protect our religion and temples from destruction in order to continue to

pray for the prosperity of His Majesty. Therefore, we have listed more than forty proven items here and have requested the league-chief and other high-ranking officials, if possible, to have mercy on us, to prevent our hardship, to maintain our two temples, to refund the losses of our animals and other possessions and to restore the peaceful way of life which we had preserved for more than 140 years in the past seven generations, founded by the Ilden Wang.

For the same purpose, we had submitted our complaint twice before to the banner-office, but both were thrown back to us with indifference. Then, we submitted all the matters once again with detailed proof. They were again entirely disregarded and the Wang sent the headman of his bodyguard, Dašdondov, and the Taiji Lutmönkh to return our statement. Since our means of living were ruined by the Wang in this way, we have to report to you all our piteous conditions in detail in order to maintain our existence. At the same time, we have calculated roughly the amount of money, animals and other things levied illegally in the past, and they are as follows: 17400 ounces of silver in cash, including the cost and rent of horses and camels, 2800 sheep, 200 head of cattle, 100 horses, 40 camels, 87 700 bricks of tea, 4 sable-skins and 1 complete tent-set.

All the appropriate original documents issued by our banner-office on each occasion to force us to supply the above mentioned items are kept by us. Besides this, our sumun-people, e.g. Taijis Tümen, Daš, Erdene, Daš, the junior officer Renčin, the messengers Lasu, Žigmid, Žamsran, the commoners Tümen, Enkhžargal, Lasu, Dašdondov and Buyandelger know all the details of these matters. They also know some other secrets which they have discussed, but do not want to give as evidence here. The people of the other three Sumuns of our banner, e.g. Taijis Lut, Badam, Tsedenžav, Titsee, Žigmid, Güržav, Gonsüren, the Janggis Badrakh, Dašdandov, Ölziit, the junior officer Renčin, Baast and Khümtseren also know all these things in detail. At the same time, we would like to bring it to your notice that the original documents issued by the banner-office on each occasion to the other three Sumuns for all kinds of illegal levies are also held by them. Since our situation has become so difficult, we respectfully submit this petition and beg for guidance.

The 20th year (1840) of Törü gereltü.

(*Central Historical Archives, 35-2*)

NOTES

1. This is the famous To-wang (Wang Toktokhtör, 1797–1887), a well-educated, widely-travelled prince. “Within his banner he was an innovator who tried to run the territory as an integrated and diversified economic and cultural unit. . . . To-wang embodied his principles in various “Instructions” which he drew up, and which he circulated among the herdspeople of his banner. In these he provided practical advice based on traditional experience, which he had had the enterprise and ability to collect and codify, and he also tried to inculcate such basic virtues as frugality.” To cite Bawden’s comment on him in *History*, p. 180. To-wang failed, however, with the immediate cause of trouble being his plan to concentrate some one thousand lamas from eleven local temples into one new central temple in 1837 (q. v. the document in hand). This proposal met with opposition from all concerned, . . . (and) from this simple beginning there grew a five-year-long quarrel, which took a violent turn. . . . To-wang took the matter to the League authorities, who sent an officer to speak to the rebels.

They refused to obey the summons to go to the League headquarters. Thereupon To-wang informed Urga of the course of events, but Urga pushed it back to the League as quickly as possible. . . . (Finally) a forty-point accusation was presented to the League, but the bearers of it were arrested and soon after some of the plaintiffs withdrew their names. In the event the League sided with To-wang, disregarding the accusations against him, and when the matter was decided at Urga, the amban, too, sided with him (Bawden, *History*, pp. 182–183).

To-wang was lightly punished, and the temple project was cancelled, but the rebellious commoners were condemned to severe punishment. Judgement on To-wang has generally been rather negative. Bawden cites the Mongol historian Natsagdorž, who dismisses To-wang and his Instructions as attempts to increase his own exploitation of the people as much as he could (Natsagdorž, Tüükh, p. 225); for further evaluation cf. W. Heissig, *Geschichte der Mongolischen Literatur I*, Wiesbaden 1972, pp. 168–172, with excerpts in translation of the “Instructions”. To-wang’s Instructions have been edited by Š. Natsagdorž, *To wang tüünii surgaal* (To-wang and his instructions), *Monumenta Historica* V, fasc. 2, Ulan Bator 1968, with a historical introduction.

2. Full title: ch’ien ch’ing men hsing tsou (乾清門行走), Attaché to the Palace Gate, a title bestowed on Mongolian Princes; cf. Brunnert / Hagelstrom, No. 873e.
3. “Khooloit” is found in the manuscript both as Khuluit-Kholoit; note in the original Ardyn zargyn bičig, p. 74.
4. Tib. maṇi ril-bu (sgrub-pa); as far as this ceremony is concerned, cf. Luther G. Jerstad, *Mani-Rimdu, Sherpa Dance-Drama*, University of Washington Press, Seattle/London 1969.
5. Mo. for Maitreya, the Buddha of the future; what ritual exactly is meant here has not been possible to ascertain so far.
6. In theory, fines were regulated according to the offences; cf. Ts. Nasanbalžir, *Ar mongoloos Manž čin ulsad zalguulž baisan alba 1691–1911* (Corvées and taxes the North Mongols produced for the Manchu Ch’ing dynasty in the years 1691–1911), Ulan Bator 1964, pp. 88–89.
7. So far, the translators have been unable to identify this institution.
8. A long narrow piece of silk or other cloth especially made for presentation on formal occasions as a mark of respect, or for giving as a token of greeting or in commemoration of a special event. (Definition given in Lessing, *Mongolian-English Dictionary*, Berkeley/Los Angeles 1960.)
9. Vessel, container, specially for holy objects or holy water (Lessing).
10. Tib. Klu-dbañ rgyal-po; Buddha in his appearance as saviour of other creatures than man; for further details see A. Grünwedel, *Mythologie des Buddhismus in Tibet und der Mongolei*, Leipzig 1900, pp. 108–110.

CH'ING POLICIES IN OUTER MONGOLIA 1900–1911

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While China's response to Western imperialism during the closing years of the Ch'ing dynasty has been the subject of thoughtful and imaginative research, the history of China's frontiers during that period, by contrast, has received relatively little attention. This article attempts to survey briefly the impact which the transformation of Chinese politics, economics and society had on the frontier, Outer Mongolia in particular, and to examine the changes wrought by foreign imperialism and Chinese nationalism on the frontier policies of the Ch'ing government.

Surely the most central, and knotty, question facing every historian who writes about modern Mongolia is the degree to which events in that country have been shaped by internal forces developing naturally, or by direct Russian intervention. Until this question is answered—and the answer will be different for every period—the history of the Mongols in the twentieth century will never be properly understood. It has often been argued, especially by Chinese historians, that the revolution of the Mongols in 1911, when independence and the formation of a theocratic state was declared, was engineered by Tsarist agents.¹ The second objective of this article is to determine whether independence was indeed a Russian contrivance, or whether there were political and economic strains in Mongolia on the eve of the dynasty's collapse powerful enough to have generated an indigenous nationalist movement.

THE SETTING OF OUTER MONGOLIA

By the first decade of the twentieth century Mongolia, as eyewitness accounts and contemporary documents abundantly testify, was suffering from terrible poverty and social disruption. Although the situation could, and often did, vary strikingly from region to region, the general impression was one of massive destitution. At the end of the nineteenth century, for example, 80,000 inhabitants of the Tüsheet Khan and Tsetsen Khan aimags were identified in contemporary Mongolian records as indigents; this represented almost 40 per cent of their population in 1918.² There was a dramatic growth in the number of vagrants (*khermel tsagaachin*), who congregated around the monasteries and urban centers in search of work or charity. Most came to Urga, where, it was said, 'the stray dog grows fat and the sufferer finds happiness.'³

Of the many forces working to destroy the economy, none were more devastating than

the silver tax and Chinese commerce. Since the eighteenth century Mongolian arats (herdsmen) had been responsible to the Ch'ing dynasty for a variety of corvée duties (*alba*): manning the postal relays (*örtöö*), tending the imperial herds, providing for the needs of Ch'ing officials in Mongolia, and serving in the frontier pickets (*kharuul*) and the military.⁴ China's famous 'silver drain' and the parlous state of Ch'ing finances after the Taiping Rebellion (1850–64), however, led to the introduction of a silver tax on the Mongolian banners towards the end of the nineteenth century—silver which the Mongols were forced to obtain from Chinese moneylenders at exorbitant rates of interest; fines on banners also began to be collected in silver rather than in livestock.⁵

It was Chinese commerce, however, which must be held primarily accountable for Mongolia's impoverishment. Since the early part of the eighteenth century Chinese merchants, especially those specializing in wholesale trade and known—not always accurately—as Shansi merchants, had settled in Mongolia despite attempts by the Ch'ing government to regulate their movement and length of stay. By the beginning of the twentieth century there were perhaps 10,000 Chinese living in Urga, 2,000 or so in Uliastai and (Mongolian) Kyakhta, and somewhat less in Khovd (Uliastai, Kyakhta, and Khovd were virtually Chinese towns); Chinese firms were represented in every banner of Mongolia.

Because of the seasonal character of the Mongolian economy, many if not most purchases from the Chinese were transacted on credit at crippling rates of interest. In addition to their private liabilities, state arats—that is, herdsmen whose taxes were owed to the banner rather than to individual nobles—were responsible for the 'official debts' (*alban ör*) of the banners, or loans contracted by banner administrations with Chinese lending houses (Ch. *t'ung-shih*, Mg. *tünsh*). By around 1919 the official debt alone had swollen to around eleven million taels.⁶ As Mongolian archival records show, an unfortunate coincidence of rising banner debt (the consequence, as often as not, of a spendthrift prince) and harsh weather or livestock plague could impoverish a banner within months and lead to the flight of its population to more prosperous areas. There is evidence, moreover, that the size and quality of livestock herds throughout Outer Mongolia were declining rapidly, the result of large numbers of livestock being exported to Russia and especially to China.⁷

There were other factors, less decisive perhaps, that worked to estrange the Mongols from the Ch'ing dynasty. During the nineteenth century the offices of Military Governor of Uliastai and Viceroy of Urga, the senior Ch'ing representatives in Mongolia, were often sold to partially disgraced officials (who by the second half of that century were almost exclusively Manchus).⁸ This encouraged, of course, the spread of venality and corruption throughout the frontier administration, and especially the extortion of Mongolian princes, whose dependence on Ch'ing officials made them particularly vulnerable. Another grievance of the princes, and one which was regarded as serious enough to include in the July 1911 appeal to the Russians, was the loss of state salaries (Ch. *feng-lu*, Mg. *pünlūii*), probably around the end of the nineteenth century.⁹

As economic and social disintegration in Mongolia quickened after the mid-century, signs of unrest multiplied. Arats in the countryside were petitioning their banner and aimag governments—with greater frequency than before, it appears—protesting the illegal exactions of their princes. These petitions almost invariably included complaints about increased banner taxation, illegal corvée demands, the transference of state arats to the personal service of the princes, and, the most common of all, banner populations

being forced to redeem the private debts of their princes.¹⁰ It was in the towns, especially Urga, however, where restlessness after 1850 was most volatile. The Chinese presence—officials, troops, and merchants—was more visible there than anywhere else, and the proportion of refugees and paupers was increasing dangerously. In 1880 there was an insurrection of Mongolian troops at Uliastai; in 1881 about 300 or 400 Mongols (arats and lamas) in Urga beat up some Chinese merchants; in 1887 a group of Ch'ing soldiers in Urga was attacked; in 1900 there was another mutiny of Mongolian conscripts at Uliastai; in 1905 several Chinese shops in Urga were destroyed; and in 1907 more Ch'ing troops were assaulted in Urga.¹¹

Communist historians have described the disorders in the towns and banners in the second half of the nineteenth century as an anti-feudal, anti-Ch'ing 'arat movement' (*ardyn khödölgöön*). This term is unsatisfactory, it seems to me, since it implies greater coherency and coordination between the events than in fact existed. Their tempo, location, and aims were too disjointed to warrant the term 'movement.' Nevertheless, the existence of social turbulence in Mongolia is beyond doubt.

POST-BOXER REFORMS AND FRONTIER DEFENSE

It was not until China's defeat by Japan in 1895 and the 'scramble for concessions' two years later that the scholar-gentry was alerted to the urgency of comprehensive reform. The momentum of reform, although slowing after Empress Tzu-hsi's coup, picked up again in 1901 following the Boxer Rebellion, when the court ordered certain changes in the organization of the provincial and national governments, the modernization of the army, reforms in the examination and school system, and so forth. But it was Japan's victory over Russia in 1905, widely interpreted in China as the triumph of constitutionalism over autocracy, that spurred demands for real change.

Western imperialism and the post-Boxer reforms had touched off an explosion of nationalism among the Chinese. The political affairs of the nation excited keen interest, and the government was subjected to unprecedented scrutiny, in particular by the flourishing popular press. An increase in the number of national boycotts, especially the anti-American boycott which swept the country in 1905–06, reflected a sharpening reaction to Western encroachment. Nor did China's borders escape attention—indeed, if in the nineteenth century only individual Ch'ing statesmen were exercised by the frontier problem, by the turn of the next century it had become a matter of concern for the entire nation. The movement to restore internal economic and political sovereignty was paralleled by attempts to assert or recover sovereignty over all territory on the frontier. The Ch'ing government tried, for example, to strengthen its tenuous claims to Bhutan, Burma, and Nepal in response to an English threat; and at roughly the same time it sent an army into Tibet, ostensibly to quell a rebellion of Tibetans along the Szechwan border, but in reality to counter the English and Russians. This Chinese expedition and the Ch'ing edict in early 1910 angrily depriving the Dalai Lama of his title and reducing him to the status of an ordinary citizen did not go unnoticed in Outer Mongolia.¹²

On the western frontier Britain represented the greatest menace to China's sovereignty; in the north it was Russia. Between 1858 and 1860 the Russians had either intimidated or deceived the Manchus into relinquishing vast tracts of territory in eastern Siberia and along the seaboard. Events from then on could only intensify this

fear of Tsarist aggression: the Ili crisis in Sinkiang, building of the Trans-Siberian Railroad, occupation of Port Arthur and Dairen, railway construction across northern Manchuria and into Liaotung Peninsula, and the dispatch of troops into Manchuria in 1900. If before 1900 there had been some disagreement among Chinese observers regarding the seriousness of Russia's threat to China, by the first decade of the twentieth century Russia, at least as seen by the periodical press, appeared of all the Western powers to be the most conspicuously imperialistic.¹³ Indeed, the refusal of the Russians in 1903 to withdraw their troops from Manchuria according to the agreed timetable had excited one of the earliest mass demonstrations against Western imperialism.¹⁴

In comparison with Manchuria, which had been the focus of considerable Tsarist enterprise, the scale of interest and activity in Outer Mongolia by 1911 was negligible, limited to the Russo-Chinese Bank, which operated only briefly, and a gold mining company, Mongolor, near Urga. Mongolia was of academic interest and several scholars and explorers—Pozdneyev, Przheval'skii, Potanin, and others—visited and wrote about the country; some Russian doctors had also opened clinics in Urga.¹⁵ Nevertheless, by the turn of the century Mongolia was important to Russia only as a source of raw materials for its developing industries west of the Urals; there could not have been more than 700 or 800 Russians living in the country.¹⁶

The Chinese, however, were quick to interpret Russia's presence in Mongolia, despite its minuscule proportions, as evidence of a larger, more sinister design. The continuous and massive foreign threat to virtually the entire circumference of China's borders—Taiwan, Sinkiang, Tibet, Annam, Korea, Manchuria, Shantung—had worked a subtle change on Chinese thinking. By the end of the nineteenth century the frontier regions were no longer regarded as tributary states, but as vitally important 'shields' on which the very survival of China depended. These regions, however, were immense and sparsely populated, and then only by non-Han peoples whose loyalty to China was exceedingly doubtful. Nomadic and unlettered in Chinese, they were thought to be particularly vulnerable to foreign provocation and manipulation. Independence for them, according to one Chinese commentator, was inconceivable:

The Mongols in the past have been ignorant of the general situation [in Asia, and yet] there are still those who wish to call out for independence. This is like the young sparrow boasting that it can fly, or the young rabbit bragging that it can run. They will surely not escape the mouths of hungry vultures or ravenous tigers; or perhaps the sparrow's nest or the rabbit's burrow will be smashed by certain persons as a result of internal strife.¹⁷

Most Chinese observers feared—and the 'scramble for concessions' seemed to justify such fear—that China was in danger of being 'sliced up like a melon,' especially on the periphery. The key to the frontier question, it was widely believed, was unity: not simply political or economic unity—neither of course was ignored—but cultural unity, as the Governor-General of Manchuria, Hsi-liang, wrote in 1909:

The fact that Mongolia borders the Three Eastern Provinces and serves as a barrier for the northeast is important . . . The pressure of a strong neighbor [Russia] is growing daily. If we do not deepen the knowledge [of the Mongols], there will be no way to save them from destruction or form a plan for their survival. Until the languages [of the Chinese and Mongols] are the same, however, it will be impossible to strengthen and unify the culture [of China]. I suggest that the new learning (*hsin chih*) be introduced, although there is no choice but to transmit it through the discipline of the Chinese language.¹⁸

The prescription of every Chinese and Manchu, in or out of government service, for China's frontiers was the same. Fully convinced of the superiority of the Chinese culture, they believed that the Chinese civilization must be extended to the non-Han nationalities, not only for the benefit of China itself, but for the regeneration of the 'benighted' frontier peoples.

The nettle had to be grasped quickly and firmly, however. To accelerate the pace of assimilation, every obstacle to economic and cultural integration was removed. In 1902 Inner Mongolia and in 1906 all of Manchuria were opened to colonization. Inner Mongolia, in fact, like Manchuria, had never successfully excluded Chinese colonists. Since the eighteenth century the lands of such tribes as the Kharchins, Onniguts, Tümed, Aohan, Ordos were gradually being parcelled up into Chinese administrative units to accommodate the volume of immigrants,¹⁹ and since the 1890s there had been calls for the opening of Inner Mongolia to unrestricted colonization. The impetus for the development of Mongolia, it is worth adding, did not come solely from the Chinese. There were also Mongolian princes, such as the Kharchin Gungsannorov, who advocated building railroads and encouraging agriculture, industry, and commerce in Mongolia.²⁰

It was not until the Russo-Japanese War that the Ch'ing government in 1906 announced it would apply the New Administration (*Hsin cheng*), that is, the post-Boxer reforms, to Inner Mongolia. In that same year the Bureau of Dependencies (*Li-fan yuan*) was renamed the Ministry of Dependencies (*Li-fan pu*); within it two temporary offices were organized, the Office of Investigation (*Tiao-ch'a chü*) and the Office of Records and Reports (*Pien-tsuan chü*), which were responsible for such matters as the apportioning of pastureland, colonization, mining, timber, fishing, military training, and education.²¹ Almost immediately the Ministry sent Prince Su (Shan-ch'i) to make a first-hand investigation of the eastern part of Inner Mongolia and to submit a plan for the development of that region.²² The process of reorganizing banner lands into Chinese administrative units pressed forward.

SAN-TO AND THE NEW ADMINISTRATION

In November 1909 a Manchu bannerman San-to (Sandowa), an intelligent and experienced administrator, according to his contemporaries, but rather scornful of the Mongolian people,²³ was appointed Viceroy of Urga (San-to did not take up his duties until March 1910).²⁴ The choice of San-to for this office, it seems, was not a routine one. In August 1909, while serving as the Deputy Lieutenant Governor (*Fu tu-t'ung*) of Kuei-hua, he had submitted to the throne a scheme for the New Administration in Mongolia, measures which to a great extent actually were implemented between 1910 and 1911. San-to recommended that Inner and Outer Mongolia be divided into four regions with administrative seats at T'ao-nan, Suiyuan, Urga, and Uliastai; each government would be composed of twelve offices—general affairs, investigations, police, colonization, industry, finance, education, and others—to supervise the New Administration. 'The situation is becoming more urgent by the day,' he declared, 'and the foreign calamity is worsening. It is impossible to delay putting the Mongolian banners in order.' He also suggested that the expenses of the New Administration be shouldered by the Mongols: 'Use Mongolian money to rule Mongolian land; its wealth can bring peace to China and resist a powerful neighbor.'²⁵

The Ch'ing government had for some time been preparing the ground for the New Administration in Mongolia. In 1907 questionnaires were sent to the leagues of Outer Mongolia requesting information on the local economy, education, military preparedness, and the Chinese population; queries regarding the easiest passage for Chinese merchants and soldiers to reach Mongolia, and the most practical route for the construction of a railroad were particularly disquieting to the Mongols.²⁶ In April 1909 the Ministry of Dependencies had memorialized the throne recommending that Mongolian delegates to the National Assembly (*Tzu-cheng yuan*), scheduled to meet the next year, be appointed from amongst the ruling nobility.²⁷ And in September 1910 the court abrogated the old prohibitions against Chinese settling in Mongolia, Chinese and Mongols marrying, and Mongols using the Chinese language.²⁸

San-to had not been in Urga long before he was ordered immediately to begin the New Administration. He set about organizing around twenty offices dealing with such matters as the military, taxation (timber and freight), police, constitutional government, health, diplomatic affairs, commerce, industry, education, and colonization. (It appears, however, that few of these offices ever actually functioned.) The Mongols, as San-to had recommended earlier, were responsible for the expenses of these offices. A three-tiered system of schools was planned for Mongolia: normal schools in Urga and Uliastai to teach Mongolian, Chinese, and Manchu; aimag schools to teach Mongolian and Manchu; and banner schools to teach Mongolian.²⁹ The Ministry of Posts announced that Kyakhta and Urga would be linked by telegraph with Kalgan in Inner Mongolia.³⁰ In 1906 or 1907 (sources differ) branches of the Bank of the Ministry of Revenue (*Hu-pu yin-hang*), renamed in 1908 the Bank of China (*Ta-ch'ing yin-hang*), opened in Urga and Uliastai. Its chief role, apparently, was to combat Russian economic influence by encouraging the use of Chinese currency (the Russian rouble had in recent years become the standard medium of exchange) and by acting as a credit organization for Mongolian ecclesiastical (*shav'*) and banner administrations.³¹

A more ambitious enterprise was conceived for the construction of a railroad network in Mongolia comprising three routes: Kalgan to Kyakhta, Kalgan to Chin-chou (in Liaoning province), and Urga to Ili (in Sinkiang). The Chinese National Assembly ordered in January 1911 that work on the Kalgan-Kyakhta line, connecting the Peking-Kalgan railroad completed in 1908, be started immediately.³² San-to was especially eager for construction to begin, because, as he explained to the Peking government in March 1911, it would expedite the transference of troops to Mongolia and strengthen the northern border against Russia.³³ Although the route was apparently surveyed, the outbreak of revolution in China, technical difficulties, and inadequate financing halted the project. It was left to the Russians in 1956 to build the first trans-Mongolian railroad.

One scheme of interest to the Ch'ing government, and the object of a great deal of misinformation in the secondary literature, was the colonization of Outer Mongolia. According to many writers, the Ch'ing sought to check Russian aggression by creating a zone, stretching along the northern border from Manchuria to Sinkiang, inhabited exclusively by Chinese farmers.³⁴ This conclusion seems to have been inferred from the presence of Chinese colonists to the north of Urga. In fact, that area was, and is, some of the richest farming land in Mongolia; its proximity to the Russian border was coincidental. The actual extent of the colonization of Outer Mongolia by the end of 1911 is a second and related question. While the numbers of these colonists have been exaggerated, oftentimes to astonishing proportions,³⁵ the truth is that, although plans

for the colonization of Outer Mongolia were indeed formulated, it had proceeded very slowly. By 1910, according to Mongolian archival sources, only around 29,000 acres of this aimag were under cultivation,³⁶ and it was not until the fall of 1911 that San-to even announced to Peking his project for setting aside arable land of the Tüsheets Khan aimag for farming.³⁷

Military organization was a very important feature of the New Administration, especially because of reports for the last several years of a buildup of Russian troops along the entire northern frontier. In January 1911 Lieutenant Colonel (*Fu ts'an-ling*) T'ang Tsai-li, an adviser in the Ch'ing General Staff Council (*Chün-tzu ch'u*), arrived in Urga to head the Office of the Inspector-General (*Ping-pei ch'u*). T'ang was put in charge of the municipal garrison and the military affairs of the two eastern aimags, including their postal relays and frontier pickets.³⁸ But T'ang's principal assignment was to organize a Mongolian army of four companies (*tui*): two cavalry companies (conscripted from the Tüsheets Khan and Tsetsen Kan aimags) and two artillery companies (one composed of Chinese immigrants in Urga and the other of banner troops from Suiyuan).³⁹ Barracks with over 400 rooms were built to the northeast of the Chinese part of Urga (Maimaich'eng, present-day Amgalanbaatar khot) to house these troops.⁴⁰

CONCLUSION

The Mongols were deeply agitated by announcements of Ch'ing plans for administrative reorganization, immigration, railroad construction, and military conscription. It was reported in 1907, for example, that Khalkha princes had petitioned the Ch'ing government to prohibit colonization.⁴¹ And in 1910 the League Chairmen of the Tüsheets Khan and Tsetsen Kan aimags and the head (*Erdene Shanzudba*) of the Ikh Shav' petitioned the ambans of Urga and Uliastai stating that the people of Mongolia had sorrowfully received several orders to obey the New Administration:

The poor taij and arats of our aimags and shav', impoverished by the various taxes, have reached the point where they no longer have the strength to bear up. Among the many directives repeatedly issued, there is not one which benefits the Mongols. Consequently, we all desire that we be allowed to live in accordance with our ancient ways.⁴²

In the words of one Chinese observer, the Mongols, whose taxes had been increased to pay for the New Administration, 'were unable to bear their misfortune and followed one another in flight, emptying the banners near the city.'⁴³ The behavior of T'ang Tsai-li's staff and military escort, whose insolence and brutality outraged both Mongols and Chinese alike, only helped to aggravate the situation.⁴⁴

In July 1911, seven months after the arrival of T'ang Tsai-li, a small group of Khalkha nobles assembled in the hills overlooking Urga and resolved to declare independence. This was not a conspiracy engineered by Russian agents: it was a direct and unambiguous reply to an attack on the very survival of the Mongolian people. The New Administration, broadly conceived, was a bold program of national reconstruction aimed at restoring to the Chinese state sovereignty over its own affairs. On the frontier, where the threat of foreign aggression was the most immediate, the objective was twofold: economic development, as in the rest of China, and complete integration. But the Mongols understood integration as assimilation, and assimilation as extinction. Independence, they believed, was the only solution.

NOTES

1. For example, Peter S. H. Tang, *Russian and Soviet Policy in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia, 1911–1931* (Durham, 1959), p. 304; Ken Shen Weigh, *Russo-Chinese Diplomacy* (Shanghai, 1928), p. 160; Li Yü-shu, *Wai meng-ku ch'e-chih wen-t'i* (Taipei, 1961), P. I; Hu Ch'iu-yuan, *O-ti ch'in-Hua shih-kang* (Taipei, 1962), Vol. I, p. 148; Pi Kuei-fang, *Wai-meng chiao-she shih-mo chi* (repr. Taipei, 1968), p. 12; also George G. S. Murphy, *Soviet Mongolia* (Berkeley, 1966), p. 34.
2. Sh. Natsagdorj, *Manjiin erkhsheeld baisan üyeiin Khalkhyn khurangui tüükh (1691–1911)* (Ulan Bator, 1963), p. 205; Sh. Sandag, *Mongolyn uls töriin gadaad khariltsaa (1850–1919)* (Ulan Bator, 1971), Vol. I, p. 118. For the 1918 census figures see I. M. Maiskii, *Mongoliya nakanune revolyutsii* (Moscow, 1959), pp. 286–303.
3. L. Bat-Ochir, D. Dashjamts, *Damdiny Sukhe-Bator. Biografiya* (Moscow, 1971), p. 6. Also Natsagdorj, *Khalkhyn tüükh*, pp. 204–6. The horrifying conditions of the market place at Urga have been described by N. M. Przheval'skii, *Mongoliya i strana Tangutov* (repr. Moscow, 1946), p. 50, and James Gilmour, *Among the Mongols* (repr. New York, 1970), p. 238. For other descriptions of poverty in Mongolia see A. M. Pozdneyev, *Mongolia and the Mongols* (Bloomington, 1971), Vol. I, p. 302; A. P. Bennigsen, *Neskol' ko damnykh o sovremeni Mongolii* (St Petersburg, 1912), pp. 59–60; M. Philips Price, *Siberia* (London, 1914), p. 273; G. E. Grumm-Grzhimailo, *Zapadnaya Mongoliya i Uriankhaiskii Krai* (St Petersburg and Leningrad, 1914–1930), Vol. 3, p. 513.
4. For more on the taxation system in Mongolia during the Ch'ing see Ts. Nasanbaljir, *Ar Mongoloos Manj chin ulsad zalguulj baisan alba, 1691–1911* (Ulan Bator, 1964); L. Gombo, *Manjiin Uyeiin alban guvchuur (1650–1910)* (Ulan Bator, 1960). The best survey of Outer Mongolia during the Ch'ing is C. R. Bawden, *The Modern History of Mongolia* (New York, 1968), pp. 39–186. A valuable but more technical study is David H. Farquhar, 'The Ch'ing Administration of Mongolia up to the Nineteenth Century,' Ph.D. Thesis, Harvard University, 1960.
5. Natsagdorj, *Khalkhyn tüükh* p. 173; also Sh. Natsagdorj, *Ar Mongold garsan ardyn khödölgöön* (Ulan Bator, 1956), p. 33.
6. Maiskii, *Mongoliya nakanune revolyutsii*, p. 172. The size of this debt is independently confirmed by an estimate of the Mongolian Ministry of Internal Affairs in 1921 that the debt of the four aimags (excluding the ecclesiastical office of the Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu, the Shav' Yamen) was nine million taels. Natsagdorj, *Ardyn khödölgöön*, p. 55. It must be remembered that this figure did not include the private debts of the Mongols which, according to the estimate of Bennigsen, p. 57, exceeded the official debt by two or three times.
7. According to one document of 1870, nine Chinese shops exported to China 270,000 head of sheep, 6,700 horses, 1,000 head of cattle, and 6,000 camels. M. Sanjdorj, *Khalkhad Khyatadyn möngö khüülegch khudaldaq neverch khögjsön n' (XVIII zuun)* (Ulan Bator, 1963), p. 88. Bennigsen, p. 57, while travelling through Mongolia from 1909 to 1911, was told by Mongols that their livestock had decreased tenfold during the past decade. This is supported by the archives of the Shav' Yamen, which recorded a disastrous fall in the number of livestock, from a million in 1861 to around 12,000 in 1909. D. Tsedev, *Ikh shav'* (Ulan Bator, 1964), p. 91. And the Ministry of Dependencies (*Li-fan pu*) in 1909 remarked on the number of petitions from Khalkha aimags requesting that their taxes be remitted because 'the harvests had failed'; in 1911 it complained about the shortage and poor quality of horses bought by the imperial government from the Mongols. *Ta-ch'ing Hsuan-t'ung cheng-chi shih-lu* (repr. Taipei, 1964), Vol. I, p. 350, Vol. 2, pp. 1061–2.
8. Li Yü-shu, *Wai-meng cheng chiao chih-tu k'ao* (Taipei, 1962), p. 182. For a criticism of Ch'ing officials in Mongolia see a memorial from the Ministry of Dependencies in October 1911 in *Shih-lu*, Vol. 2, pp. 1061–2. According to one source, it would require 200,000 taels to

- secure the appointment of Urga Viceroy; on the other hand, the office could reasonably be expected to yield 500,000 taels. Ch'en Lu, *Chih-shih pi-chi* (Shanghai, 1919), pp. 244–5.
9. Svechnikov, p. 36; also *Bügd Nairamdakh Mongol Ard Ulsyn tüükh* (Ulan Bator, 1966–68), Vol. 2, p. 394.
 10. For a valuable collection of these petitions see Sh. Natsagdorj (ed.), *Ardyn zargyn bichig (XVII–XX zuuny ekhen)* (Ulan Bator, 1966); this volume has been translated by S. Rasidon-dug, *Petitions of Grievances Submitted by the People (18th-beginning of 20th Century)* (Wiesbaden, 1975).
 11. Tsedev, *Ikh shav*, p. 58; Natsagdorj, *Khalkhyn tüükh*, pp. 239, 265; *Ulsyn tüükh*, Vol. 2, p. 402; Natsagdorj, *Ardyn khödölgöön*, esp. pp. 35–52. See also Sh. Natsagdorj, *Khalkha dakh' ündesnii erkhe chölgöönii khödölgöön ba fyodalyg esergüütssen khödölgöön* (Ulan Bator, 1941), and his *Aratskoe osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie v khobdoskom raione* (Moscow, 1954).
 12. Chang Chung-fu, *Chung-hua min-kuo wai-chiao shih* (repr. Taipei, 1957), pp. 99–101, gives a useful account of this affair.
 13. Don C. Price, *Russia and the Roots of the Chinese Revolution, 1896–1911* (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), p. 165.
 14. Two recent and very useful books which explore the link between Western imperialism and the growth of Chinese nationalism are Edward J. Rhoads, *China's Republican Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass., 1975), and John E. Schrecker, *Imperialism and Chinese Nationalism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1971).
 15. For an interesting study of Russian academic and humanitarian activities in Mongolia during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries see B. Ligüü, 'Mongol-Orosyn soyolyn khariltsaa,' *Shinjlekh ukhaany akademiin medee*, No. 1 (1971), pp. 5–15.
 16. This figure is based on estimates by Svechnikov, pp. 27, 46; and Elizabeth Kendall, *A Wayfarer in China* (London, 1913), p. 284. The majority of these Russians were refugees who came to Mongolia apparently after the 1905 Russian Revolution and were described by the Kyakhta Frontier Commissioner in 1908 as criminal and political 'vagrants.' E. M. Darevskaya, 'Russkie revolyutsionery v Mongolii,' in *Proceedings of the 2nd Mongolist Congress* (Ulan Bator, 1970), Vol. I, p. 162. For more on the Russian community see Darevskaya, 'Russkaya promyshlennost' i naemnyi trud v dorevolutsionnoi Mongolii,' in *Trudy Irkutskogo Universiteta*, Vol. XXXI.
 17. Hsu Nai-lin, *Ch'ou-pien ch'u-yen* (repr. Taipei, 1969), p. 64.
 18. *Shih-lu*, Vol. I, p. 435.
 19. Hsieh Pin, *Meng-ku wen-t'i* (Shanghai, 1935), p. 39; John G. Hangin, *Köke Sudur (The Blue Chronicle)* (Wiesbaden, 1973), p. 18. Abbé Huc observed in the 1840s that many of the Western Tümed could no longer speak Mongol. *Souvenirs d'un voyage dans la Tartarie et le Thibet pendant les années 1844, 1845, et 1846* (Paris, 1868), Vol. I, p. 147.
 20. Yü Yuan-an, *Nei Meng-ku li-shih kai-yao* (Shanghai, 1958), p. 138.
 21. Hsieh Pin, *Meng-ku wen-t'i* p. 46. The best account of the constitutional reform movement in China during the late Ch'ing remains Meribeth E. Cameron, *The Reform Movement in China, 1898–1912* (Stanford, 1931). See also P'eng-yuan Chang, 'The Constitutionals,' in Mary C. Wright (ed.), *China in Revolution: The First Phase (1900–1913)* (New Haven and London, 1968), pp. 142–83; and Hsiao I-shan, *Ch-ing-tai t'ung-shih* (repr. Taipei, 1963), Vol. 4, pp. 2065–753.
 22. Yao Hsi-kuang, who accompanied Prince Su, published in 1908 a detailed set of recommendations for Inner Mongolia under the title *Ch'ou-Meng ch'u-i* (repr. Taipei, 1965).
 23. Ch'en Lu, *Chih-shih pi-chi*, p. 76. M. I. Bogolepov and M. N. Sobolev, *Ocherki russko-mongol'skoi torgovli* (Tomsk, 1911), cited without page in Sandag, p. 237; and H. G. C. Perry-Ayscough and R. B. Otter-Barry, *With the Russians in Mongolia* (London, 1914), pp. 105–6.
 24. *Shih-lu*, Vol. I, p. 431; Ch'en Lu, *Chih-shih pi-chi*, p. 177.
 25. *Shih-lu*, Vol. I, pp. 303–4.
 26. L. Jamsran, 'Manj tsin uls 'shine zasgiin bodlogo' gegchee Mongold kheregjüülekh gesen n',

Tüükhiin sudlal, Vol. X (1974), p. 95. My thanks to Fujiko Isono of Paris, France for providing me with a copy of this article.

27. *Shih-lu*, Vol. 1, p. 189.
28. *Ibid.*, Vol. 2, pp. 713–14.
29. *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, pp. 519–20; Jamsran, pp. 99–100.
30. *Shih-lu*, Vol. 1, pp. 182–3. In 1902 a Belgium firm won a concession from the Ch'ing government to build a telegraph line from Taku to Kyakhta via Urga. *Ulsyn tüükh*, Vol. 2, p. 371.
31. Ch'en Ch'ung-tsu, *Wai meng-ku chin-shih shih* (Shanghai, 1926), pien 2, p. 107; A. P. Boloban, *Mongoliya v eya sovremennom torgovo-ekonomicheskoy otnoshenii* (Petrograd, 1914), p. 40; B. Shirendev (Shirendyb), *Mongoliya na rubezhe XIX–XX vekov* (Ulan Bator, 1963), pp. 36–7; Svechnikov, p. 74.
32. *Shih-lu*, Vol. 2, p. 809.
33. *Ibid.*, Vol. 2, p. 864.
34. See for example A. Kallinikov, *Revolutsionnaya Mongoliya* (Moscow, 1925), p. 64; Grumm-Grzhimailo, Vol. 3, p. 473; *The China Yearbook: 1916* (London, 1916–21, Tientsin, 1921–28), p. 574.
35. Li Yü-shu, *Wen-t'i*, p. 2, claims that there were around 100,000 farmers in this region, and Perry-Ayscough, Otter-Barry, *With the Russians in Mongolia*, p. 128, were told by Russians that there were over 200,000 colonists. According to a March 1911 issue of *Golos Sibiri*, 20,000 Chinese were reported to have come to Urga in 1909 alone. Quoted in Sandag, *Mongolyn uls töriin gadaad Khariltasa*, p. 199. The Mongolian historian Sh. Natsagdorj, *Khalkhyn tüükh*, p. 259, writes that 4,905,000 *desyatina* (over 13,000,000 acres) of northern Mongolia were under cultivation. The origin of this figure is apparently A. N. Kropatkin, *Russko-kitaiskii vopros* (St Petersburg, 1913), who cites a 1911 article by A. Isaev, 'The Present Situation of the Russian Far East' (in Russian; I have been unable to identify either the author or the article), estimating that 4,905,000 *desyatina* of Mongolian land had been transferred to Chinese cultivators. Quoted in Jamsran, p. 98. It appears, however, that Isaev was referring to Inner and not Outer Mongolia.
36. Jamsran, p. 97. Kallinikov, p. 40, however, claims (without citing a source) that 70,000 *desyatina* (189,000 acres) were owned by Chinese farmers before 1911 in Outer Mongolia. This figure may include the cultivated land around Khovd and in the Tsetsen Khan aimag.
37. *Shih-lu*, Vol. 2, p. 1011.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 851; Hsieh Pin, p. 48. The Urga garrison was formed in 1905 with forty troops from Hsuan-hua and an equal number of Mongols from the two eastern aimags. In 1910 this force was doubled (apparently with reinforcements from China). See Jamsran, p. 87.
39. *Shih-lu*, Vol. 2, p. 983.
40. Jamsran, p. 88; Ch'en Lu, *Chih-shih pi-chi*, p. 179. It appears that the military costs of the New Administration were met, at least in part, by taxing Russian enterprises, especially lumbering and gold mining. See a January 1911 issue of *News of Mongolia* (*Mongolyn sonin bichig*), quoted in Sandag, p. 239; and a memorial from San-to in February 1911 in *Shih-lu*, Vol. 2, p. 850.
41. A. Popov, 'Tsarskaya Rossiya i Mongoliya v 1913–1914 gg.,' *Krasnyi arkhiv*, Vol. 6 (37) (1929), p. 4.
42. Natsagdorj, *Khalkhyn tüükh*, p. 261.
43. Ch'en Lu, *Chih-shih pi-chi*, p. 179, quoting Liang Han-nien, an official in Urga at the time.
44. *Ibid.*; Lin Wei-kang, 'O-Meng chiao-she shih-mo,' in Wu Hsiang-hsiang (ed.), *Min-kuo ching-shih wen-pien* (repr. Taipei, 1962), Vol. 3, p. 669.

PART 5



TWENTIETH-CENTURY MONGOLIA



Mongolian provinces during the late socialist period

INTRODUCTION

Christopher Kaplonski



Much as Eric Hobsbawm dated the start of the ‘short twentieth century’ in Europe to the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, we can perhaps date the start of twentieth-century Mongolia to 29 December 1911. This was the day the Eighth Javzandamba Khutagt was elevated to the throne of Mongolia, renaming the country *Olnoo Örgögsön*, ‘Elevated by All’. This instituted what is more popularly known as the Autonomous Period in Mongolia, also sometimes known as the Bogd Khaan (meaning ‘Holy Emperor’) period, after the title given to the Javzandamba Khutagt, which stretched from 1911 to 1921.

Untangling the Autonomous Period is one of the more complicated aspects of the often baroque history of twentieth century Mongolia, and highlights the role of the geopolitics that often dominated Mongolian history. We can only sketch the highlights here. Despite the declaration of independence in December 1911, and the institution of a new government, these steps were largely ignored by the international community. (Except, somewhat quixotically, Tibet. In a position similar to Mongolia’s in geopolitical terms, Tibet signed a mutual recognition treaty with Mongolia in 1913, which was promptly ignored by the rest of the international community. See Mehra (1969).) Rather than being welcomed into the international community, Mongolia was instead treated largely as a pawn in the game of Asian influence being played out between China and Russia (soon to be the Soviet Union), with Japan on the sidelines nearby, but eagerly seeking to join in.

Mongolia’s declaration of independence can be traced to two interconnected causes. The first was the shift of the Qing dynasty from keeping ‘Outer Mongolia’ as essentially a buffer state against the Russian Empire to actively permitting Chinese colonization. This fundamentally changed Qing approaches to Outer Mongolia, which had previously allowed traders, but no permanent colonization. This was coupled with the second cause, an ever-increasing degree of poverty and social unrest, to a large extent the result of the policies of the Chinese traders, but the discontent was also directed towards the nobility and Buddhist church both of which were often seen as corrupt. (See Ewing, this volume, Part IV, for a fuller description of the politics of the time. Bawden’s translation of *Old Man Jambal’s Story* highlights the rampant corruption among the administration and church more generally.)

In this atmosphere, Mongolian nobles held secret meetings on independence in the summer of 1911, when they gathered for ceremonies of worship of the Javzandamba

Khutagt (Onon & Pritchett 1986: 6). The Mongolians, with the support of the Javzandamba Khutagt turned to the Russians for backing, who, although seeking to balance China, were equivocal in their support. Nonetheless, the expulsion of the Qing *amban* (minister), Sando, took place with little violence, and the Mongolians declared independence in early December, 1911. A new government was formed, and telegrams announcing Mongolia's new independence were dispatched to the US, Great Britain, France, Germany and Japan among others (Baabar 1999: 103), although these were largely met with silence.

In contrast with the relatively peaceful expulsion of Sando from Ikh Khüree, in the western parts of Mongolia the Chinese were driven out only through fighting, at times quite heavy. In 1913, the military campaigns were expanded to Inner Mongolia in an attempt to create a Pan-Mongolian state. While these campaigns met with some early successes, they ultimately failed to achieve their goals. Even if the campaigns had succeeded militarily, it remains unclear how feasible actual reunification would have been, given Inner Mongolia's closer integration with Beijing and the rest of China, through previous Qing colonization policies.

Much of the Autonomous Period was, diplomatically at least, taken up with negotiations over Mongolia's exact status. Russia and China engaged, in effect, in wrangling over the status of Mongolia, which, after a number of other agreements led to the signing in 1915 of the Tripartite Treaty of Khiakhta, which recognized Mongolian autonomy under Chinese sovereignty, a far cry from Mongolia's own claimed independence. In the end, China was not to relinquish its claims on Mongolia until a plebiscite in 1946, and even then, the Taiwanese government refused to recognize Mongolia.

While there were reform efforts undertaken in multiple areas, political as well as social – including the building of secular schools, almost non-existent in Mongolia prior to this – Ewing claims they were 'generally superficial and ineffective' (Ewing 1980: 36). Bawden (1989: 202) makes a similar claim, and protests and court cases from the Autonomous period indicate how little actually changed for the average person in Mongolia (see Rasidondug and Veit 1975, Document 43). Yet despite this assessment, we should not simply ignore what was accomplished. Along with the new schools, a newspaper and journal were both published, and so people should at least be credited with having made the attempt at reform.

Even the limited degree of independence granted to Mongolia after 1911, however, was crushed in 1919, when the Chinese general 'Little' Xu Shuzheng, backed by an expeditionary force, forced the Mongolian leadership to 'request' to be taken be under Chinese 'protection'. Some sources attribute this to an actual request made by certain nobles, dismayed at the direction Mongolia was taking. Whichever may be the case, it is clear that there was dissatisfaction, resentment and splits within the government, with the Upper House of the Mongolian Parliament issuing the request.

At around the same time, and largely as a result, underground groups began to form, which would eventually give rise to the Mongolian People's Party. (Later to become the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, the leading force of the socialist period.) The two main groups were the Consular Hill group, and the East Khüree group. The East Khüree group was largely composed of low-ranking governmental officials, as well as Sukhbaatar, whom under socialism would be portrayed as Mongolia's Lenin. The Consular Hill group was largely composed of commoners, including Choibalsan, Mongolia's answer to Stalin. Under socialism, it would be Sükhbaatar and Choibalsan

who were credited with leading the revolution, but after 1990, this would undergo radical change as previously suppressed or reviled figures were brought to centre stage (see Futaki, this volume).

These groups turned to the Soviet Union for assistance against the Chinese, but there is little to indicate that the majority of them were True Believers in socialism. Although some probably harboured socialist sentiments, the Soviet Union provided the only viable opposition to the Chinese. The two selections here do a good job covering the intricacies of the groups involved, so we will pass over them fairly quickly, but simply note that eventually, the requests to the Soviet Union met with success, and intentionally or otherwise, Mongolia was set on the path towards socialism.

In 1920, the Russian Civil War spilled over into Mongolia, with the 'Mad Baron' Ungern-Sternberg invading Mongolia and driving the Chinese out of Ikh Khüree in February 1921. The Baron was a White Russian sympathizer, who, with a heavy Buddhist influence, sought to create a state in Mongolia and Siberia.

Ungern-Sternberg's capture of Ikh Khüree and the re-installment of the Eighth Jazvandamba Khutagt as the Bogd Khaan, was the goading the Soviets needed, and a socialist Mongolian army, with strong Soviet backing attacked the Chinese, established a Provisional Government in Khiakhta in March 1921, and drove the Baron out of Mongolia in July of that year, thus paving the way for the eventual establishment of the Mongolian People's Republic.

With the success of the Revolution, Mongolia was declared a constitutional monarchy until the Bogd Khaan's death in 1924. This was in recognition of the influence and popularity of Buddhism in the country, as well as the power of the Buddhist church. Later that year, the first socialist constitution was promulgated, the country was renamed the Mongolian People's Republic, and the name of the capital was changed from Ikh Khüree to Ulaanbaatar, meaning Red Hero.

Even the proclamation of the Mongolian People's Republic did not constitute a decisive shift to socialism. The 1920s and early 1930s saw the country adopt a number of shifting directions, and even some debates on whether Buddhism could be reconciled with socialism. The early and mid-1920s were characterized by a relatively laissez-faire approach to socialism, which saw the development of the economy, but little in the way of progress towards socialism. This was followed in the late 1920s and early 1930s by what was later to become known as the 'Leftist Deviation', now seen as largely the work of Comintern. The Leftist Deviation saw the first, unsuccessful attempt at collectivization and the expropriation of the wealth of the nobility. It also represented the first major, if unsuccessful, move against the Buddhist church. The trial the Diluv Khutagt (this volume) was involved in dates from this period. The Leftist Deviation came to an end in 1932, after a rebellion against the harsh policies, involving lamas as well as herders, and which had to ultimately be put down with the use of the military, including Soviet tanks and planes.

This led to the 'New Turn Policy', adopted in 1932, which encompassed a relaxed attitude towards private property, with Prime Minister Genden adopting a slogan, 'Get Rich!', and those cooperatives that been organized were disbanded. The relaxed attitude also extended to religion, with bans on the lamas being removed, leading to a re-expansion of the monasteries and the number of lamas. The New Turn, however, did not last long. In the mid-1930s, propaganda and other measures against the lamas and the remaining nobility were again stepped up. Along with propaganda, there were punitive measures such as excessive taxation, and prohibitions on youth joining the

monasteries. These were linked with attempts at winning over the poorer lamas through educational drives and other measures.

This propaganda and taxation was soon to be coupled with outright violence, as thousands of Buddhist lamas, political figures, ethnic minorities and others were arrested and executed, mostly over an eighteen month period in the late 1930s. Although the total figures may never be known, the most recent estimates by Mongolian historians give the total at about 36,000, of which nearly half were lamas. Almost every one of approximately 800 monasteries were razed in this period, and other cultural artifacts were destroyed as well.

Not coincidentally, the 1930s also saw Japan's increasing interest in Mongolia and the region more generally, with the establishment of the puppet state of Manchuguo in 1932. There were to be a number of skirmishes between the Soviet Union and Japan in the 1930s as they jockeyed for influence in East Asia, culminating in the battle of Khalkhyn Gol (Nomonhan), at the Mongolian-Manchurian border, where an encounter between a small Mongolian foraging party and soldiers from Manchuguo eventually grew into a confrontation involving tens of thousands of troops on both sides, as well as tanks and airplanes.

The 1940s in Mongolia are usually more or less glanced over, but in addition to Mongolian contributions to the Soviet war effort, during this period, the Cyrillic version of Mongolian officially replaced the traditional Mongolian script. Towards the end of the 1940s, there was also the beginning of a shift to a more explicitly Marxist view in ideology, with a textbook being recalled and criticized for being insufficiently critical of Chinggis Khaan from a Marxist perspective (see Party History Institute 1967: 326–8). Other party resolutions addressed the need for further Marxist indoctrination in literature and other fields as well.

The 1950s saw these initial steps sharpen into a movement against 'tradition' and the imposition of a more socialist lifestyle after the relative social quiescence of the 1940s. Even the replacement of the old Mongolian script by Cyrillic in the 1940s did not take full hold until the early to mid-1950s. The 1950s saw, among other events, the banning of the celebration of Tsagaan Sar (the traditional Mongolian lunar new year) in 1952 (following the death of Choibalsan, 'Mongolia's Stalin' on Tsagaan Sar that year), the 'cultural campaigns' intended to introduce such things as vegetables and Western/Soviet concepts of hygiene, and the successful collectivization of livestock in the late 1950s.

The creation of the *negdels* or collective farms (I follow here a fairly standard Mongolian practice of collapsing the technically different state and collective farms into the more general category of *negdel*), after the initial, aborted attempted thirty years previously, coupled with the cultural campaigns, led a more substantial shift in socialist lifestyles. The *negdels* did not mean merely that livestock was now the property of the state, but otherwise things continued much as they had before. Rather, although based on previous herding practices, they also were tied to attempts at increasing sedentarization and a more general attempt to instil a new socialist identity in Mongolia (see Kaplonski 1998).

The increasing tension between China and the Soviet Union in the 1960s spilled over into Mongolia as well, with Chinese workers being expelled in 1962, the same year which also saw a backlash against nationalist sentiment, largely taking the form of the condemnation of a previously approved celebration of the 800th anniversary of Chinggis Khaan's birth (see Boldbaatar, this volume). In fact, these are tightly linked,

an important, but often overlooked, point. It was to a large extent the Chinese decision to also celebrate Chinggis Khaan's anniversary that provoked the backlash against what were after all officially sanctioned commemorations.

The last few decades of socialism saw increasing industrialization in Mongolia, with the founding of the Erdenet copper mine, a joint Soviet-Mongolian venture, in 1975, as well as increasing urbanization with the rapid expansion of Ulaanbaatar. It was also a period of tighter ties with the Soviet Union, and much of the industrial development was geared towards exports to the Soviet Union. Tsedenbal, who ruled from 1952, was dismissed in 1984 at the instigation of Soviet leaders. His successor, Batmönkh would help usher in reforms patterned on those instituted in the Soviet Union by Gorbachev.

The long-standing practice of sending the best students to study abroad in the Soviet Union or Eastern European countries was to help pave the way for the democratic revolution that swept Mongolia in the winter of 1989–1990. (See Kaplonski, this volume, for a fuller account). Enabled by the reforms instituted by Batmönkh, the exposure of a generation of Mongolians to new ideas and experiences helped bring about socialism's demise. Zorig, usually portrayed as the key figure in the democratic revolution, was educated in Moscow, while Baabar, whose *Büü Mart* we excerpt here, was educated in Poland.

The democratic revolution, it is important to note, did not only lead to a change in the political system. Like elsewhere in the Soviet bloc, it was the transformation of an entire way of life and a whole belief system. Privatization, rapid and not very well executed, dismantled the *negdels*, not only giving herders a small number of animals or perhaps a tractor, but depriving them of institutional support they had come to depend on over the preceding decades. Factories closed as state subsidies disappeared. In-migration into the capital exploded, overburdening an already creaky infrastructure, and giving rise to increasing crime and alcoholism as more people competed for scarce resources in terms of jobs and services. The roughly one-third of the Mongolian GDP that had been provided by the Soviet Union was now being provided by foreign donor countries and international agencies.

The collapse affected not only herders, (Sneath, this volume) but also more basic aspects of life, including sociality and even trust (Humphrey, this volume). Its impact should not be underestimated.

THE TEXTS

We begin the section on the twentieth century in Mongolia with an excerpt from *Övgön Jambal Yaria* – Old Man Jambal's Tale – translated by Charles Bawden. It offers a first-person account of life among the lamas of *Ikh Khiiree* during the early twentieth century. This particular passage, while not dealing directly with key historical events, offers an insider's look into the lives, politics and gossip of the time. Widely taken at face value, Caroline Humphrey has pointed out that it is not entirely unproblematical (1994: 39–40). Even if some of the details are suspect, much of it does overlap with other contemporary sources, and so we have chosen to include it here.

Frans August Larson's 'The Lamas of Mongolia', was originally published in *The Atlantic Monthly*, and was intended for a wider audience, rather than specialists. Nonetheless, this doesn't mean we should overlook or downplay Larson. Precisely because he wrote for a general audience, the selection here includes good, brief summaries of a

variety of topics: the education of lamas, a naadam, and even a brief mention of the Mad Baron. Larson's account, if colourful, is rich in detail and offers a window into early twentieth century Mongolia by someone who not only travelled in the region, but knew some of the key figures personally. It is through Larson, for example, that we learn of the Bogd Khaan's penchant for practical jokes.

The 'Mad Baron' – Baron Ungern-Sternberg – who also is mentioned by Larson, is the subject of the excerpt from Ossendowski's book *Beasts, men and gods*. Ferdinand Ossendowski was a Pole who had been associated with Kolchak's White Russian forces in Siberia, and in his flight from the Bolsheviks ended up in the Baron's forces. Ossendowski's account is almost as colourful as the Baron himself, and came in for heavy criticism at the time it was published. See, for example, the reviews and discussion in the *Geographical Journal* (1923, 1925). Yet, as the original reviewer noted, 'It rings true on every page' (1923: 142). What we know of the Mad Baron is in keeping with Ossendowski's portrayal of him. The blend of mysticism, discipline, violence as well as the dread and awe he inspired all ring true. It is interesting to contrast his view of the Bogd Khaan with that provided by Larson's encounter. Here he is a mysterious, aloof mystic, revealing an aspect in marked contrast to Larson's inquisitive, fun-loving public figure.

Fujiko Isono's 'Soviet Russia and the Mongolian revolution of 1921' offers a version of the traditional understanding of the Soviet role in the 1921 revolution, and the formation of the Mongolian People's Party which had preceded it. For the most part, it draws upon relatively standard references, those that were available during the socialist period in Mongolia, although it does also make use of the scarce first edition of a history of the revolution by Choibalsan and two other early revolutionaries, Losol and Demid. Isono's article is useful not only for its understanding of the revolution itself, but the larger Sino-Soviet politics that helped shape it.

With the collapse of socialism in Mongolia, the standard interpretations of history began to crumble, and most events and major political figures underwent reevaluations, often as political in nature as the earlier historiography had been. Futaki's contribution, based on Dogsom's memoir, avoids these pitfalls, and instead leads us to a re-examination of the foundation of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party through its focus on an early memoir by one of the participants, written in a period pre-dating most of the falsifications of later histories. In addition to shifting the emphases on the different people involved, the memoir allows more insight into the actual groups and their dynamics than had been previously possible.

Drawing upon Russian sources, Robert Rupen's 'The Buriat intelligentsia' highlights the role of ethnic Buriats in the earliest stages of the Mongolian People's Republic. I would argue that Rupen exaggerates when he terms the 1920s 'the Buriat episode in Outer Mongolian history'. The early Buriat intellectuals, however, were influential, and at times resented for this. Even today they are sometimes referred to as 'the Jews of Mongolia', reflecting parallels between anti-Buriat and anti-Semitic stereotypes, in terms of what is seen as the over-influence of a small, educated elite. Whatever the reception accorded to the Buriats, their role reminds us of the connections between Mongolia, Inner Mongolia and Buriatia. These connections played out in various dynamics and tensions at both the national and individual levels. One is left with the impression that many Buriats and others in the early years of socialism performed a delicate juggling act between nationalism, socialism and other interests, and it was an act that too often failed in the end.

This article is also worthy of note as typical of much of the Cold War scholarship on Mongolia in that it relies almost exclusively on work in Russian, rather than Mongolian. Indeed, Rupen cites only two Mongolian language sources, and both appear to be rather references to sources, rather than actual citations using them. In part, this use of Russian sources is understandable, given the difficulty of access to Mongolian sources. Yet, despite the undeniable use of much of Rupen's work, one can not but be troubled by the exclusion of Mongolian-language sources and the implications that carries for attitudes towards Mongolians themselves.

Much like Old Man Jambal, the Diluv Khutagt offers us a first-hand account of early twentieth century Mongolia. The first section of his autobiography here covers, among other topics, the impact of early socialism on the Buddhist establishment, of which the Diluv Khutagt was a fairly prominent part. It gives a good, if brief, view of the unrest throughout much of Mongolia at the time. The second two deal with the trial of Eregdendagva, an accused counter-revolutionary, in which the Diluv Khutagt was also implicated. These are useful passages because they are, as far as I am aware, the only first-hand accounts of a trial of counter-revolutionaries in Mongolia. It should be noted, however, that in many ways the trial in which the Diluv Khutagt was a defendant seems to have been more open and contingent than later trials (see Kaplonski 2008).

This influence of the Buriats that Rupen writes about was to come back to haunt them, however, as the very education and experience they brought with them from Siberia would lead them to be targets in the Great Terror. The excerpt from Baabar's book is perhaps the best account currently available in English, although I would now suggest he underplays the role of the 'question of the lamas' in driving the terror and violence. He also errs in calling the trial on 18–20 October the first public trial, as there had been one earlier in October, directed against lamas. One of the early figures in the democratic revolution, Baabar's work is well-known in Mongolia, although not uncontroversial. Even if written by a non-historian, it is a good example of the general tendencies of much of the post-socialist rethinking of Mongolian history.

The selection by Badamkhatan on collectivization is a good example of high socialist writing. Not only does this particular passage give a good idea of what the structure of the negdels was like, but it is rich in ethnographic detail, as historical accounts too often aren't. Badamkhatan discusses not only the actual practice of animal husbandry in a negdel, but also links the negdels to the cultural and educational advancement of the herders, thus underlining the totality of influence and control that the socialist system aspired to.

Boldbaatar's chapter on the 'Eight-hundreth anniversary of Chinggis Khan' is now usually seen as the best treatment of the commemoration of Chinggis Khaan's anniversary in 1962 and the repercussions and recriminations that followed. In particular, Boldbaatar reminds us once again of the geopolitical balancing act Mongolia was – and continues to be – forced to undertake as a result of its two neighbours. But this chapter also reminds us that while the Mongolians were forced to take their neighbours (and particularly the Soviet Union) into account, they did not simply march lock-step with the Soviet Union, as is too often assumed.

Büü Mart! (Don't forget!) was an underground publication by Baabar, one of the early figures of the democratic revolution, leader of the Mongolian Social-Democratic Party and prominent essayist. Written in Moscow in 1988, it was first published in Mongolia in 1990, and is in effect a call to arms.¹ Undoubtedly reflecting what others thought at the time, Baabar's stridency and provocative style are notable given it was written a year

before the first public demonstrations that would lead to the end of socialism in Mongolia. His style may not seem particularly remarkable to Western readers, but it contrasts sharply with much of Mongolian writing, even today.

Given the nature of his arguments here, the need to protect national language and culture, it is more than a little ironic that during the mid and late 1990s, extreme Mongolian nationalists (such as O. Dashbalbar) viewed Baabar as too Western.

Kaplonski's account of the democratic revolution was the first substantial account in English, and to date, the most detailed. It is something of an oddity that, given the magnitude of the changes brought about by the democratic revolution, it remains almost completely unanalysed or discussed in Western scholarship. 'Democracy comes to Mongolia' recounts the institution of reforms in the late 1980s that helped make the revolution possible, as well as the revolution itself. In addition to being a fairly detailed examination of the revolution, it also draws upon not only interviews, but Mongolian newspaper accounts from the period of the revolution itself, again a unique feature. This chapter outlines some of the symbolic struggle over the past and Mongolness that came to the fore during the democratic revolution, but see also the following chapter, 'The symbols of democracy' in Kaplonski's *Truth, history and politics in Mongolia* (2004).

Caroline Humphrey's short, yet highly illustrative article 'Avgai Khad: Theft and Social Trust in Post-Communist Mongolia' is indicative of some of the trends that the collapse of socialism brought about. Written in 1993, the concern about theft and lack of trust in some ways were only forerunners to what many people now view as a more general collapse of social order and sense of community. In ways, the Mongolia, and in particular, Ulaanbaatar of 2008 is almost unrecognizably different from those of 1993. Yet in many other ways, there remain continuities, and Humphrey's narrative offers a snapshot from fifteen years ago that remains recognizable today.

'Producer Groups and the Decollectivization of the Mongolian Pastoral Economy', by David Sneath offers both a good assessment of the post-socialist situation in regards to the countryside in Mongolia, as well as a nice summary of the preceding herding practices. It thus complements the selection from Badamkhatan on collectives, as it provides further contextualization for the detail that Badamkhatan gives us. Sneath's piece also offers a concise overview of the economic devastation privatization and the collapse of socialism brought about, while reminding us of the importance of understanding institutional frameworks and support for making sense of post-socialist herding. In other words, herding, like other aspects of coping with 'the age of the market' in Mongolia, is about much more than simple economics. Social networks, institutional support, or its lack, and even concepts of obligation all play a role.

NOTE

1. There is no date indicating when, exactly, it was published in 1990, but there are a number of reasons to believe it was published within the first few months of the year.

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TALES OF AN OLD LAMA

Jambal

Translated by C.R. Bawden



WORSHIPPING THE HOLY MOUNTAIN¹

The Holy Mountain used to be worshipped twice a year. The Manchu Amban² went to the spring worship and the Mongol Amban to the autumn one. When the Mongol Amban performed the worship he stayed at Chuluut Valley³ for almost two months.

The herds of the Holy Mountain were made up of nearly two thousand geldings of white, bay, grey and chestnut coat-colours. The Mongol Amban used to count them. Once on the day before the Manchu Amban was to go and worship the Holy Mountain there was a heavy snow storm and there was a lot of trouble, and the Amban said: 'I am worshipping you because it is my duty, not because I want to. What do you think you are up to?' and he had the Holy Mountain given twenty lashes and condemned it to wear fetters, and wooden fetters were placed on its obo.⁴ That autumn it was also fined many horses, and the Manchu Amban confiscated these and drove them all down into China without exception. The Manchu and Mongol Ambans joined forces to misappropriate all these horses. The fining of the Holy Mountain and the confiscation of the geldings took place in the twenties of the Kuang-hsü period. At that time I was about twelve years old. The lady of the Mongol Amban, the Darkhan Vang, went to Ambarbayasgalant to worship in the year after the Holy Mountain's herd had been misappropriated and lost some gold and pearls there and had all the lamas beaten and interrogated. At that time the lady was pregnant, The next year she bore a blind child. There was a wise gavj called Navaan rabjamba⁵ in Setsen toin aimag. The noble and his lady asked Navaan rabjamba about the child, and he cast his dice and divined and said: 'If you do a mean thing a blind⁶ child will be born.' I saw this.

A temple called Dünjin Garbo⁷ had been built in Khüree by the O. Vang.⁸ As the Holy Mountain had the rank of a Tüshee Güng money used to be brought from Peking for its salary. In later times the Manchu Amban used to put just a couple of ingots on the Holy Mountain's obo and keep the rest for himself. There was a hole in a building by the Holy Mountain's obo. The money used to be thrown into it. The bow and arrows of Baatar Beile were in the building near the obo.

Baatar Beile was the greatest hero of Khalkha. Shijir Baatar was among his followers. Baatar Beile and Shijir Baatar were of the same generation and are said to have lived in the time of the Fifth Holy One.⁹

The Western Residence¹⁰ in Khüree was a residence for holding services and performing exorcisms when the temple dance was put on. This was called Baatar Beile's residence. Shijir Baatar's winter quarters were at the back of Shijir's Pass to the north west of Ulaanbaatar. Shijir Baatar and Baatar Beile went to the wars with the Ölet and went over to the Manchus, and Baatar Beile was rewarded with great honours. But they did not reward Shijir Baatar. So Shijir Baatar was annoyed and fumbled with the arrows on his back in order to shoot the Emperor, but he could not get hold of an arrow. Then the Emperor said: 'I am not giving you a reward. Take what you want from those Chinese of mine who have gone up north', and so Shijir Baatar made a living by plundering the Chinese merchants, and then died. According to what people said there were some Chinese merchants going along. One of them said: 'Shijir may be coming', and the other said boastingly: 'So what?' Then Shijir came on the scene and the boastful Chinese said in a panic: 'Shijir sir, shall I take my trousers off?'

Shijir Baatar's descendants were a poor banner known as Ilden Güng's or Ilden Vang's, and they lived at Khüi at the back of Shijir's Pass. They were a poor banner of sixteen households who furnished a single soldier when a thousand soldiers were mobilized from Tüsheet Khan aimag. People said that they did not flourish because of his once fumbling with his arrows at the Emperor.

A descendant of Baatar Beile's was the last Kharaagiin Baatar Vang. As Ilden Güng was poor, and his line was coming to an end, he took over a taiji¹¹ called Baldangombo taiji with his many children from the banner of Baatar Vang about a year before the Chinese revolutionaries came. In the sixteen households there was not one taiji of his own line. In the time of the Chinese revolutionaries an old man said to be the Ilden Güng came fleeing on foot to Khüree carrying a seal, with his wife accompanying him. Then the Holy One gave him a good tent.

Yünden Vang set out the words *Om Aa Khun* in white stones on the north side of the Holy Mountain so as to make the Holy One's drinking water pure.¹² Also there is a monument erected by him on Baruun Shiree peak of the Holy Mountain. Yünden Vang was of the line of the Amban Darkhan Vang. Yünden Vang had performed the meditation of Khajid together with the Fifth Holy One. The Khajid Temple which had been in front of the White Temple and south of the river is said to have been flooded out. It was altered and rebuilt at Zaisan valley.¹³ Responsibility for the equipment for the Khajid Temple was assumed for six months by the Holy One's treasury and for six months by that of the Darkhan Vang.

THE GAMES

Formerly the nobles of Khalkha used to hold the games when worshipping the Khentii mountains. Later on the two aimags of Tüsheet Khan and Setsen Khan together with the Shabi, the Three Divisions, held games known as the Ten Banner Princes' Games in front of the Holy One's residence. Three or four hundred wrestlers from the Three Aimags¹⁴ used to wrestle, and instead of horse-racing they shot at leather targets and leather balls. The official archery lasted three days. The Ten Banner Princes' Games were held each year. The Seven Banner Games in which the Four Aimags and the Shabi, the Five Divisions, took part together, were held once every three years.

As for the Seven Banner Games, when the Seven Banners of Khalkha got together in former times and raised Öndör Gegeen to the throne at the place called Shireet

Tsagaan Nuur they offered him a Danshig and so they called this the Seven Banner Danshig.

From then they began to offer the Danshig to the succeeding Holy Ones. The Four Aimags and the Shabi, the Five Divisions, used to offer a Danshig worth ten thousand ounces of silver. They also offered food worth a thousand ounces. This was offered at the Great Assembly Hall. After that, a thousand wrestlers and more would wrestle for seven days at the door of the Residence. The prizes for the wrestlers were as follows: for the champion and the runner-up, silk for a gown each; one hundred ounces of silver each; a basket of 'thick tea' each; a piece of Russian leather each, or, instead of the leather, five ounces of silver each; [a fox-skin each],¹⁵ or, instead of the fox-skin, one ounce and five cents; a camel each, or, instead of the camel fifty ounces of silver; a horse each, or, instead of the horse, eight ounces of silver; a sheep each, or, instead of the sheep, one ounce and five cents of silver; together with a huge amount of food and fruit. Thus nine gifts were given. Various prizes were given to the other wrestlers.¹⁶ I do not know exactly what was given.

After the wrestlers had been dismissed, the Bogd Khan Uul League¹⁷ assembly would be held. For this the Shabi erected a big pavilion-tent of eight wall sections and four pillars in the compound of the Shanzav's office. The Khans, Vangs, Güngs and Banner Princes of the Four Aimags assembled at the League assembly. Food and tea were set out for them ceremonially. Also kumis, arkhi, arz and khorz¹⁸ were supplied in great amounts. The Four Aimags appointed four fiddlers and four singers, and they performed four songs: *Tümnii ekh*, *Khuuryuyn magnai*, *Töriin товч* and *Övgön shuvuu*¹⁹ The Shanzav of the Shabi, the two Daa Lamas, the Zaisans of all the yamens²⁰ and the Holy One's chaplain all presented goblets at the presentation of the food and tea and the kumis and arkhi. When the assembly opened, what they said was: 'Shall we kick the anklebone or not kick it? Shall we split the radius bone or not split it?' People said that for the Shanzav of the Shabi and the Holy One's chaplain to present goblets meant celebrating the state. The horses for the Games were kept tied up at Khüi for a month or more. Yearling geldings known as the Gegeen's Swift Geldings were kept with various households. A reincarnated lama known as the Lama in Charge of the Horses was designated and appointed to venerate the Holy One. Four lamas for worshipping the Horse God²¹ and the Foremen of the Geldings went to Khüi and tied up the horses a month in advance. Gatekeepers from the Residence went out and from the various otogs²² they recruited as a service small children of a suitable age to ride the horses. They brought them in in ox-carts and had them ride all these horses. As for the children's food and additions to their tea, goat-meat, millet and roasted millet were supplied from the Shabi and given to them together with plain tea for a month.

At the beginning of the first month of autumn The Holy One proceeded to the Games Field at Khüi, and all the officials from Khüree and the Residence went there as a service, all taking their own tents with them. The Shabi otogs supplied the ox-carts for carrying them as transport service. The Shanzav of the Shabi, the Daa Lamas and the Ambans and many others went in the Holy One's suite. The Four Aimags and the Shabi, the Five Divisions provided pavilion-tents for the nobles and the Ambans. The same areas provided the carts for carrying these as transport service.

The Khambas, Tsorjis, Choijins²³ and Precentors went at their own expense. They took the travelling Yellow Temple, several meditation tents²⁴ for the Holy One, and all sorts of cloth tent with coloured designs. These had been provided of old by the Holy One. The various otogs appointed as a service the lamas who conveyed them. The Shabi

effected the transport as transport service. The Khans, Vangs and nobles of the aimags tied up their horses by their individual tents and camped with their cloth tents in the vicinity of Khüi.

Two gatekeepers from the Residence conveyed the fuel for the Games and green wood for the horse-tethering posts a month in advance, using carts belonging to the otogs near the Noyon Uul as transport service. The officials of the Manchu and Mongol Ambans had seventy tents respectively. Each man had two tents.

Before²⁵ the full-grown horses were started, they spread white²⁶ felt at the pavilion of the Manchu Amban, set up a high throne, lighted red candles and burned a paper with the Emperor's title on it, and burned incense, and all the nobles faced south and bowed three times three times, and guns were fired three times to worship the Emperor's tutelary genius. The sheep for their food were driven in from the Four Aimags and the Shabi, the Five Divisions. It was said that roughly speaking eight or nine hundred sheep came from each aimag. I do not exactly know how much was allotted to each individual, except that a man known as the *galdaa*²⁷ Nerenpun was allotted three and a half sheep per day, of which he took one as a sheep and the rest in the form of money. I saw how he got for provisions two 'thick teas', four candles, half a pound of salt and a pound of 'yellow butter' together with milk. What other people got I do not know.

Formerly there were races for three age-classes of horse, full-grown, medium and young. Later on the two categories of stallion and ambler were added, making races for five age-classes.

I heard that there were around six to seven hundred race-horses in each age-class. I do not know what the correct number was. If horses belonging to the banner nobles or the khans came in first, they presented those horses and the children to the Holy One. The Five Aimags²⁸ divided up the race-course between them, removing the stones, filling up holes and driving in posts on either side. The number of horses to be caught was decided on and the Five Divisions provided the horse-catchers. A door-clerk of the Shanzav's would catch the winning horse. When the horses were to race, ten men from each of the Five Divisions, fifty in all, were appointed to bring the horses out to the correct place and start them off.

When the Games had lasted for six or seven days, the Holy One arranged a General Worship²⁹ for the country people. Then the Games broke up. The Seven Banner Games were halted just before the Holy One ascended the royal throne, and after that Badamdorj put on games in his own name for some years. In continuation of that the Holy One's younger brother, the Oracle Khaidav, put on games for some years at Bökhög, and later, in continuation of that, the Army Games began to be held.

SHOOTING WALNUTS

Formerly the lamas used to play at the sport of shooting walnuts in Khüree every year from the twenties of the last month of winter till the end of the first month of spring, and the minor lamas on periodic duty in the Great Assembly Hall and the young lamas assembled in the colleges were especially keen to take part. The Eighth Holy One prohibited the walnut shooting and stopped it, and if anyone was found walnut shooting the Proctors of the Assembly Hall punished the players by beating and caning them and making them perform numerous prostrations at the services. Later on, when the great brawls between the lamas and the Chinese occurred, the Minister at Khüree, Sandovaa,

began the quarrel, saying: 'The lamas of your Holy One's Khüree are doing secret military training, such serious training that the fact that they do not miss a single walnut means that they would not miss a single human head.'

TARGET SHOOTING

Formerly, when I, Jambal, was young, as the old lamas used to tell, the Soivons³⁰ and Donirs or lama Zaisans of East Khüree,³¹ and also the high lamas of the Dününchor, Jüd, Emch and other colleges used to go target shooting. Later, when I was ten years old or more, it happened to be spring. The cooks of the Residence, and the staff of the Outer and Inner Treasuries covertly went target shooting at the west and east valleys at the Dambadarjaa Lamasery,³² and the Eighth Holy One got to hear about this and went there in person and confiscated the target set-ups and the name-boards and score-boards of the lamas who were shooting and brought those lamas back to the Shanzav's yamen under arrest, and had them put in the Shabi prison for three days and interrogated, and then fined the main participants or dismissed them from office. To recall some of their names, about three hundred men must have taken part, headed by the Daa Lamas Rinchin and Gochoo, the Proctor of the Main Assembly Hall Galsan, the Soivon Onondoo, the Donirs Damdin and Davaa, the attendants Luvsantseren and Dugarjav, Mishig who belonged to the Dününchor college, the office clerks Gombotseren and Luvsanchültem, the Zaisans Ayuur and Demberel, the aide-lama³³ Tsend, the bursars Tsend and Sandui, the stokers Dugarjav and Luvsantseren and the lamas without appointment Gürjav, Buidan, Samdan, Shijir, Mijid and Tanbaa the Hermit. After this the lamas of Khüree were strictly forbidden by the Holy One to go target shooting.³⁴ All their bows and arrows, targets and apparatus were confiscated and the bows and arrows were kept as ornaments of the guardian deities in the aimags, as I know well.

OBO WORSHIP

It is said that long ago the aimags of Khüree had the custom of obo worship. Later, when I, Jambal, was in my twenties, the Zoogoi aimag was the first to erect a stone obo in front of the chapel, and the lamas, proctors and precentors of the aimag used to worship it, with wrestling by children, foot races and so on, on one day from midday onwards, and after that all the thirty aimags of Khüree erected obos and made a general régime out of worshipping them and so on. The old lamas of Khüree seemed very disgruntled about this and many a time I heard them criticize it, saying: 'This never used to happen in our Khüree at all. It might be a portent that later on people will take these as marking the remains of the aimags.'

THE SEVEN KHUTUKTUS³⁵

The Bandidaa aimag used to stand on the north side of the Sün aimag in the Capital Khüree. This aimag was established by the Stone-fingered Ācārya. Stone-finger's object of worship was a bundle of Buddha images. It was in a certain household in those years and I have heard it is still there. The Nomon Khan of Baraivun Lamasery in Khentii is

said to be in the line of Stone-finger. Stone-finger is said to have been a man who came from India to Mongolia in search of Shambala. Stone-finger was one of the Seven Great Khutuktus of Khüree.³⁶

The Seven Khutuktus are:

1. The Manzshir or Donkhor Manzshir. He built a lamasery on the south side of the Holy Mountain³⁷
2. Saraidorj Nomon Khan or Ninji Dolbii Nomon Khan, a man of Erdene Vang's banner.
3. Erdene Khamba. Dwelt around Avzag banner, a man of Shüteen aimag.
4. Mergen Khamba. Lived permanently in the Capital Khüree. There was a Mergen Khamba aimag.
5. Baraivun Nomon Khan. Dwelt in Khentii. There was a Nomon Khan aimag at Khüree too.
6. Roloi Khutuktu. Dwelt in Khentii and also Dugar aimag.
7. Bamba-erdene Khuvilgaan (the Khuvilgaan aimag in Khüree originated with him).

THE HOLY ONE'S MARRIAGE

In his youth the Holy One took up with Norov, the wife of Tserendorj Güng, the father of Shirnen Vang. The remains of the Güng's compound and houses still stand at the foot of Gachuurt.³⁸ The Holy One consorted with Norov in complete secrecy. A daughter was born. She was a good-looking girl. She was married off to a noble in the eastern aimags. I saw that girl. She was a dark young lady, looking quite like the Holy One. She suffered from swollen intestines and died young. This happened before the Holy One ascended the throne.

About the twenty-fifth or twenty-sixth year of Kuang-hsü³⁹ the Holy One proceeded to Öndör Gegeen's lamasery, Amarbayasgalant, accompanied by the grandfather of the Jonon Vang Tsogbadrakh and his wife. Dondogdulam went as the lady's maid. The Holy One took up with her. Then the Holy One discarded the Lady Norov and consorted with Dondogdulam for five or six years. This all became public in the thirties of the Kuang-hsü period, and he married her, giving her the title of Tsagaan Dar.⁴⁰ When the Holy One became King⁴¹ the Tsagaan Dar was elevated to be Queen. It was said that the Tsagaan Dar Ekh became pregnant. But she never gave birth.

Later they adopted a child called Lamyaa from the younger sister of a lama called Ox-eye Luvsandondog, an ordinary man of the Erkhem aimag. They had him brought up in a tent covered with dragon-pattern carpet over at Khaistai. Sonomjamts Güng became foster mother and the lama Ononjamts of Sangai did the cooking. No one else was allowed inside. I heard tell that he was on a bed of yellow silk in the tent. The child called the Holy One Onjoo and the Ekh Dagina Alia. I saw how the Holy One had his own food conveyed to Lamyaa. He was that sort of privileged, pompous child. When it was warm in spring the Holy One used to go to Khaistai. There were two red goats there which Lamyaa used to put into harness. Lamyaa called one of them Sandalwood Khan with Sabre Horns and the other one Lofty Steed. These two goats were looked after in a compound behind the River Temple, now the Museum Temple.⁴² The two goats had similar carts which fitted them, and when Lamyaa visited the Holy One he would harness up his goats to go there. He was a nice looking boy with coal-black eyes

and long hair. Around this time the Ekh Dagina died. Until the child was ten or so the Holy One used to walk holding him by the hand. Apart from him there were two other children close to the Holy One, the Yalguusan Lama and the Chin Bishrelt Lama. These two knew the Holy One's private matters and kept his keys.

The Holy One took a new Tsagaan Dar. Shirnen Jonon Vang, Daichin Jonon Vang and Darkhan Vang (who had been the Amban) went to their own three banners and brought back the names of a number of girls and showed them to the Holy One, and he impressed his seal upon the name of the daughter of a rich family known as White-horseman of the Watch-posts⁴³ from the banner of Daichin Jonon Vang. Now she had been the wife of a wrestler. The nobles had advised: 'Holy One, you ought to have a companion', and he said: 'All right, you see to it', and accordingly they fetched this girl. It was around the tenth day of the last month of summer that they fetched her. She was a young girl, quite smart and shortish. She was a bit dissolute too. She wanted to become a *choijin*, and had another tent set up, and may have got up to this and that with the lamas. When she had a bit of a tiff with the Holy One she would fall down in a faint, and they would fetch a *choijin* and have him perform an incense-offering.⁴⁴ To begin with they used to bring in a Chinese hair-dresser to dress the Tsagaan Dar's hair⁴⁵ but later this was stopped. A young maker of sacrificial objects called Batsain who lived at Khaistai used the opportunity of dressing her hair to get off with her. After the Holy One had got married, one night in autumn he sent for the four Precentors of the Great Assembly Hall, the four Proctors, eight persons altogether, and had them come into his meditation tent. At that time the Holy One was lying in bed with his wife. He gave them some spirits and said: 'Having lost my companion, I have now fetched a young girl. I wanted to show her to you.' The old Precentor Galsan put his hand inside the Holy One's bedclothes and felt the girl, fondled her and said several times: 'Yes, yes, you are a fine girl. Make sure our Holy One is seen by the many Shabi for three years.' After this the Holy One lived through autumn, winter and spring and died on the seventeenth day of the first month of summer. The Precentor Galsan died two or three months after the Holy One passed away. After the Holy One's death, the new Tsagaan Dar, Chin Bishrelt Lama and Yalguusan Lama stayed in the River Temple, where they lived it up, and Bishrelt Lama slept with the Tsagaan Dar, so they say. When Yalguusan Lama heard of this he scolded him, saying: 'I am going to tell the Khamba⁴⁶ and the Shanzav. You and I have enjoyed the Holy One's generosity all these years and now that he has died and we are all upset, here you are sleeping with what used to be his wife.' The Chin Bishrelt Lama was distraught, took poison and died. This happened in summer, and his body turned black. This lama had come from Biziyaa aimag, so they came from that aimag and took his corpse away on an ox-cart and disposed of it.

When the Tsagaan Dar came she brought a girl of her own age with her. She was married off to Yalguusan Lama. After the death of the Holy One the Shanzav Luvsanbaldan went to the Upper Temple⁴⁷ and took charge of the Tsagaan Dar. He dealt pretty roughly with her. People also said that Luvsanbaldan lived with her. She was in her twenties when she came to the Holy One.

The People's Government set up a commission, and was going to confiscate the Holy One's effects and distribute portions to the children. As the Shanzav Luvsanbaldan tried to give a large amount to the new Tsagaan Dar, people said it was probably true that he lived with her. When the girl went back home she took eighteen loaded ox carts with her. These included a five-section tent, gold, silver, and a lot more. After that the Holy One's adopted children were dispersed. They were to be sent back to their parents

with a hundred ounces of silver and a cow with a calf. The boy Lamyaa was sent to Luvsandendev's with a hundred ounces of silver and a cow with a calf. There was the son of the Güng Sanjmyatav who held no appointment, and he was sent to his father with a hundred ounces of silver and a cow with a calf. There was an orphan called Erennyam who was given to Yalguusan Lama together with a hundred ounces of silver and a cow with a calf. The Yalguusan Lama was left with a compound and house, several tents and the girl-friend of the Tsagaan Dar. Later this lama was arrested and probably died in prison. Everything the Holy One left was confiscated by the commission of the People's Government.⁴⁸ The Tsagaan Dar is said to have gone home, where she had several children, and had her effects confiscated two or three times.

While the Holy One was alive and the River Temple was being built he wanted to get wood from the pastures of the Darkhan Vang's banner. The Güng Tserendorj hated him because he had left the Lady Norov and because he had paid no regard to the Güng, and he would not give any wood from his lands, and there was quite a quarrel, as a result of which the Güng lost his reputation and came near to being banished by the Manchu Amban. That Güng died of natural causes.

Rintchen is wrong in his novel *Ray of Dawn*,⁴⁹ when he says that the Holy One stole the Lady Norov and put the Güng in prison. There are a lot of things not right in that novel, such as that the Jalkhanz Khutuktu⁵⁰ and Legtseg the Soivon were contemporaries.

MÖRLEGTSEG SEMBEN OR SOIVON

Mörlegtseg Semben was a little younger than the Holy One and he used to cut the Holy One's hair. He used to act as the Holy One in the Holy One's presence, and they wore each other's clothes and were thick as thieves together. One day the Holy One and Legtseg galloped to Legtseg's tent in similar clothes and on similar horses, and Legtseg's mother said: 'Oh Holy One, our Legtseg's tent has got only a single covering. He needs another covering on top of it', and the Holy One gave him a tent.

In the end he began to sleep with the Holy One. Legtseg was a really smart lama. The Holy One had a splendid house built for him at Gandan. There was a great party for the house-warming and lots of lamas attended. This was in summer. So they gave the lamas kumis and so on, and plied them heavily with kumis. One poor lama said: 'I cannot drink' and Legtseg said: 'If you cannot drink, what did you come here for?' and gave him a good slap in the face. Legtseg was an extremely hot-tempered man.

The lamas used to say to each other: 'Poor chap, I wonder how long he will be in the Holy One's good books?' Then Legtseg beat up the Holy One, and smashed his front teeth in, saying: 'You are throwing me over and have been going round with the other lamas.' After that the Holy One's front teeth remained broken.

It may have been in the twenties of the Kuang-hsü period, one day in the last month of autumn, when the Holy One, together with two attendants, went to the Toin⁵¹ Shanzav's and had quite a talk with him. Then, after midnight, the Shanzav summoned his own gatekeeper, one Navaantseren who was nicknamed 'The Buryat' and told him to go immediately and summon a lama Zaisan and a lay Zaisan.⁵² (Navaantseren told me this himself.) So Navaantseren galloped off and summoned the two Zaisans and reported to the Shanzav, and the Holy One was there at the time. The Shanzav came out and instructed them: 'The three of you, go and arrest Legtseg the Soivon and put him

in prison.' It was just about dawn when the three men arrived at the door of Legtseg's compound and banged on the gate. When no one came out Navaantseren called: 'Legtseg, come out' and Legtseg, thinking that the Holy One might have come, came out with a red silk gown thrown over his shoulders. He said: 'Who's there?' and they said threateningly: 'It's me. Open the gate', and when he opened the gate Navaantseren put his arms round Legtseg and seized him, bound his hands behind his back and went off towards Selbe to take him to prison. Legtseg asked: 'Is the Holy One well?' and they said: 'Who knows? If you don't know, how should I?', and they put fetters on him and put him in prison.

The special prison known as the Shabi Prison consisted of twelve buildings in front of the present-day arsenal. It was a secure, strong prison. Legtseg was kept in prison for one or two months and was then banished to Do Vang's at Khölön Buir. I heard it said that nothing was heard from Legtseg and just as the Holy One was enquiring what was happening, the year after he was banished he got off with the minor wife of Do Vang (Dorjpalam) and was living with her more happily than did Do Vang himself.

Then the Holy One sent out a special messenger bearing a stern letter, and he was banished to another small banner. The noble of that banner buried Legtseg in the sand and killed him. He sent a letter to the Holy One to say that Legtseg had died on such and such a day of such and such a month. Hearing this the Holy One assembled the lamas of the thirty aimags and the ten colleges of Khüree in the Assembly Hall, and had a service of blessing performed, provided considerable shares and distributions⁵³ and had after-death ceremonies performed.

The Holy One issued a special 'Instruction' about this and proclaimed it to all the lamas. In it he wrote: 'A man with ten thousand sheep does not discard a scabby lamb as useless, but plans to get a beast out of it. So I banished Legtseg because he was harmful to the faith and the state. I have performed after-death ceremonies so as to improve his future life.'

I think the 'Instruction' about Legtseg and some special documents are with a particular household. After Legtseg's death the Holy One enclosed some things in a square box and put his seal on it, and had it taken to the Dambadarjaa Lamasery and deposited in a stūpa where the old robes⁵⁴ and so on of the various Holy Ones had been placed.

Much later, when he had been on the throne for two or three years, he said: 'There is such and such a box in the stūpa at Dambadarjaa. Go and fetch it.' He had the box of things fetched, and had his entire suite assembled in his meditation tent, and when they opened the box and looked, there came out a bandage all clotted with blood, dressings and so on. Then the Holy One said: 'Legtseg stabbed me in the thick part of the thigh and wounded me. If the Khambas, the Shanzav and the Ambans had seen this, we the Khalkha would have been in trouble. So I never said anything and kept quiet about it, bound up the wound myself and let it get better. You may have thought that after being fond of Legtseg I turned against him, had him banished to a frontier banner and killed him. But as well as harming me, he would also have brought great disaster on the state in time. I wanted to let you see this. I had this put in the stūpa in the north where no one would know where it was. Now we are free of the Manchus, so I brought it here to show you and then destroy it. It must be burned up and got rid of.' And he had it burned up.

Legtseg came from an area west of the Tuul and was a lama of the Zoogoi aimag.

BALDAN KHACHIN

Baldan Khachin was a toothless Tibetan lama. He had a single white tooth in his lower jaw and this was called the 'conch tooth'. When he was performing the meditation of Lkham he took seven jujubes a day as food. The Panchen Lama told him to go to Khalkha and sent him as Khachin to the Eighth Holy One. A Khachin is the man who performs the morning and evening ablutions.⁵⁵ A teacher for the Holy One used to come from the Dalai Lama. It was customary for the Panchen Lama to send the Khachin.

Baldan Khachin stayed for ten years and then asked the Holy One for leave to go home, and the Holy One said: 'You will surely come back.' He said: 'I am a monk' and he let him go, saying: 'A monk will certainly not tell a lie.' He went back to Tibet and stayed there for three years and more and was coming back to Mongolia but died on the way. His disciple Marzan Shar painted a portrait of him which is now in the State Central Museum.

NAMJILTUNSAG THE WAITER

There were sixteen waiters⁵⁶ who served the Holy One. They looked after the food, tea and offerings and so on. Eight of them were the Holy One's own actual waiters, and eight were called the Jalsrai Gegeen's waiters. The Jalsrai Gegeen was the main *Kālacakra Tantra*⁵⁷ lama of the Fourth Holy One and the Dalai Lama. His portrait was to be found in the shape of a brass Buddha image in the Dechingalba Temple in East Khüree. Those eight waiters had the right of entering the Holy One's meditation tent.

One day in the final years of the Kuang-hsü period while the Holy One and the Ekh Dagina had gone to the Yellow Palace in East Khüree, they bought four squares of good and very rare silk from someone. When that silk, which was rolled up, was stretched out it would roll up again by itself. The Holy One and the Ekh Dagina left that silk in the Yellow Palace and went to the River Temple. Two or three days later they went back to the Yellow Palace and found that the silk had been stolen and was no longer there. The sixteen waiters who had access to the Holy One's meditation tent, together with the two bursars of his personal treasury, made up eighteen persons. No one else ever went in. The Holy One assembled those eighteen men and had them sit down and made the following request: 'There is absolutely no getting away from the fact that one of you eighteen men took my silk. I asked someone for that silk in order to make a waistcoat for the Tsagaan Dar and have just managed to get it. Let whoever took my silk give it back. I shall not accuse him of theft but just overlook it.' No one said: 'I took it.' So the Holy One said to the gatekeeper Tseveenjalba (he was the father of Bortolgoi): 'Take these eighteen men to Baldan Khachin. Tell him to find out who stole the silk.' The gatekeeper Tseveenjalba went to Baldan Khachin's tent with those eighteen men. As he did so, Luvsanmör, the Shanzav's door-clerk, had come into the tent of Baldan Khachin. Luvsanmör told me what happened. The gatekeeper Tseveenjalba went in first by himself and explained things to Baldan Khachin and Baldan Khachin said: 'Of course. Send those men in.' The eighteen men went in and sat in two rows on the left-hand and right-hand sides. Luvsanmör served them tea and food. Baldan Khachin spoke respectfully to them, saying: 'Please sit down. Have some tea and something to eat', and so on. After they had sat down, Baldan Khachin glanced once along the

right-hand row and once along the left-hand row and said: 'Right. You may go.' Tseveenjalba and Luvsanmör stayed behind. Baldan Khachin said to Tseveenjalba: 'Report that it was the aquiline-nosed sunken-eyed yellow lama who was sitting one from the end of the left-hand row.' Tseveenjalba reported this to the Holy One. The Holy One called in the waiter Namjiltunsag and said: 'Well, the Khachin lama reports that you stole my four squares of silk. Give it back to me. I shall not make a fuss or accuse you.' He said: 'No. I did not take it.' So he sent him off, saying: 'Well, all right. Take him to the Shanzav's.' The Shanzav's people took him and interrogated him under torture and beat him. They questioned him for a day and a night, and in the morning he confessed⁵⁸ and said: 'It is true that I took it.' When they searched that lama's tent they found that under the continuous kang in the building felt had been laid down and sacks of flour put down on each side, and the flour was stuffed full of stone pipes, agate snuff-bottles and coral snuff-bottles. The space between those two sacks of flour was stuffed full of silk, brocade and crepe. All this was returned to the Holy One's treasury. That lama had been a waiter for seventy-four days, and he confessed that for seventy-two days he had been stealing every day. From then on the supervision of the things in the Holy One's treasury was very much tightened up, and the thefts stopped. The lama had to wear a cangue for a month and a list of what he had stolen was written on the cangue and he had to sit in the shop-fronts of the thirty aimags one after the other. At night he was put back in prison. Later he was unfrocked (made a layman). Not long afterwards he died.

THE MANZSHIR LAMA

For six days in the last month of winter, about the twenty-fifth year of Kuang-hsü (1899), the Manzshir Lama took a degree examination. At that time the Holy One had gone to Amarbayasgalant for fifteen days. The Manzshir Lama took his degree and became a gevsh⁵⁹ and through his authority as a Khutuktu he immediately went on to take the degree of gavj.⁶⁰ The gavj Tsend of Noyon aimag was the proctor.

The Manzshir Khutuktu wanted to take some young lamas and make them into gavj, but the Proctor Tsend, saying: 'Demons are disturbing the Buddha' reproved the lamas who were making trouble from below and wanting to take the examination with him. Then the Manzshir Lama threw his robe over his shoulders and went out, saying: 'The proctor is expelling me.' The Proctor Tsend scolded him, declaring: 'I did not expel you before, but I am expelling you now.' In the evening the Manzshir Lama called on the Khamba of Khüree, Baldanchoimbol, and put the matter to him, and he scolded him, saying: 'You are a great Khalkha Khutuktu. I am a Tibetan who has come from Tibet on the look-out for money. You too could hold this seal. What have you come fussing here for?' He sent him out, saying: 'The Holy One can decide this.' As soon as the Holy One came, the Manzshir called on him and put the same matter before him. The Holy One sat silent for a bit and then said: 'I do not deal in philosophy and the rules of the philosophy school. You are registered as one of the fifty lamas of Dechingalba. You should ask for leave to go. If I had been expelled like you I might go and ask the college proctor. It is not my business. Deal with it yourself.' So the Manzshir went again to petition the college proctor, attended the service, and became a gavj. This Manzshir was the final Manzshir. The gavj Tsend was my nephew. The next year he fell ill and sent for me and said: 'You could take over all my things. By rights the lamas of the college

should take them over. But why don't you have them?', and he gave me five cakes,⁶¹ a number of ceremonial scarves and a *kharanga* and a *magtaal* [eulogy] in a case. He instructed me not to go as a disciple to the Manzshir Lama, and so I did not become his disciple.

BADAMDORJ AND SHANZAV⁶²

Before the Manchu minister Gūi arrived, the Toin Shanzav Gombojav, the Daa Lama Badamdorj and the Daa Lama Rinchin were in authority over the Shabi.

There was a rich aide-lama of Sūn aimag called Dorgijav who was a great caravanner. Mörjav of Sūn and the bursar Mördonoi of Dandarlin and some other rich men went to Peking, and laid a complaint that the taxes on the Shabi had become too heavy, and after that the Amban Gūi came to examine the treasury. The Amban Gūi was called the Buddha Amban. The old Shanzav of the Shabi was known as sticky-fingered, short-tempered Dashdorj. He used to pasture at a place called Altanbulag to the south of Songino in the country. The Toin Shanzav sent for the attendant Dugarjav from Noyon aimag and said: 'Take this offering of sweetmeats to the honourable old noble Dashdorj.' He sent the sweetmeats off as a gift from the Holy One accompanied by a gatekeeper with a pair of horses. The Holy One did not know about this.

When the Amban had arrived, that Shanzav confessed all his misdeeds. They made up a plan to get rid of him. The Holy One knew nothing of this. They sent him off, saying: 'Do not stay the night. Come straight back.' When he wanted to leave he was given silk for a gown and a ceremonial scarf, and he was told: 'Sleep here', but he did not sleep there, but came away, saying: 'I am in a hurry.' That evening the Shanzav Dashdorj said: 'What have I got from the Holy One?' and he ate a sweetmeat and died on the spot. The members of my aimag tut-tutted, saying: 'Dugarjav will come to no good. He has done something awful.' Dugarjav was a very rich man. He was taxed to the number of eight baskets of tea. One basket was reckoned for eight hundred head of large livestock. Dugarjav was taxed at eight baskets, but within a day or two his tax was reduced to about twenty *shar tsai*. The *shar tsai* were a year's tax and for three years that was the unaltered tax he paid. Eight hundred *shar tsai* was the equivalent of one basket. Dugarjav finally got poorer and poorer and died in the twenties of the Kuang-hsü period.

Manaljav, the son of the elder sister of Dugarjav of Noyon aimag and Büoldög of Shüteen aimag had a fight one night and Böldög had his genitals cut off and he died on the spot. Manaljav's face was wrecked, and later on he died. People said: 'Nothing so nasty as this has ever happened in Khüree before.' And that was the end of that household. A year later there was great trouble when an infectious disease broke out. There had to be an investigation into the brawl, and the paraphernalia for the investigation were supplied by the shop of the agent Fat Luusan. A cloth tent was rented and set up for thirty tugrigs, a tent was erected for fifty tugrigs, with red silk to tie round it, haunches of mutton, two bottles of spirits and a hundred and fifty ounces of silver in bribes were given. They said he had cut his genitals off himself. Manaljav almost confessed that he had killed him, but he kept to the coroner's statement that he had cut them off himself, and he got away with it.

The Amban Gūi checked the treasury, and the Toin Shanzav, Badamdorj and the Daa Lama Rinchin were all dismissed from office. It came out that these three had filched a

lot of the property of the Shabi. When the effects of those three were confiscated and sold a curious thing belonging to Badamdorj came to light. This was a meat-mincer. Crowds of people came to see it and there was a lot of fuss. A black-whiskered lama of Anduu-nar aimag was appointed to the vacant post of Shanzav. A year or more later the Amban Gūi went back to China. He went back after making Dashzeveg and Gochoo Daa Lamas. These were Daa Lamas over the hundred thousand shabi. Of the two Daa Lamas, one was Daa Lama of Dambadarjaa and one was Daa Lama of Amarbayasgalant.

The Shanzav of Anduu-nar worked for six or seven years. He used to drink a root-wood bowl full of spirits every day. He went to the countryside and pastured at Toson Zaamart, and died during the period of the People's Government.

The Ekh Dagina appeared openly, and accompanied the Jalkhanz and the Holy One. The Chakhar Shagdar Güng came to be in attendance on the Holy One. The Precentor of the Assembly Hall Chimid also came to be in attendance, and the Shanzav disapproved of this. The Holy One went with these members of his suite to Dashzeveg's, the Anduu-nar noble, and having a meeting they drank spirits. Then the Anduu-nar noble kicked up a row, saying: 'Call her the Ekh Dagina? She was a maid of Jonon Beise's. When did she become an Ekh Dagina? Call yourself the Jalkhanz? You are an unofficial reincarnation from the western aimags. Why don't you stay there, instead of abandoning your shabi and living here? Are you acting like this because no-one could be found to be an attendant out of our hundred thousand shabi? You rustic Chakhar taiji, with no retainers! Do you mean no-one could be found to be an attendant from the hundred thousand shabi? You keep your place! I'll get you arrested and brought in.' The Anduu-nar noble heard that at that time Badamdorj had no post but was teaching the Holy One to read and write Mongol and was very close to him. He said: 'Oh Holy One, take my post of Shanzav of the Shabi away and make your Badamdorj Shanzav. Your Badamdorj couldn't succour the old crone Bujaa with a chunk off a tea brick, but maybe he could succour your hundred thousand shabi.' Badamdorj's elder sister, the crone Bujaa, used to earn her living over where the Meat-processing factory is today, watching the road and looking after travellers.

At this the Precentor Chimid, who was pretty drunk, pulled at his jacket, saying: 'Do calm down, do calm down, sir.' He scolded him saying: 'Who are you? Who am I? Why did you pull my jacket?' At that time it was against the rules for anyone to touch the jacket of a Shanzav who held a seal. The Holy One said: 'Quite right, what you said. Do excuse the Precentor Chimid', and he said: 'I am thinking this will be bad for the reputation of the clergy as a whole. I was not thinking about Chimid's reputation.' A month or so after this the Shanzav of Anduu-nar sent an urgent message to China asking to be relieved of his post (to take leave). While China was keeping him waiting Badamdorj heard of this, and sent Jambaldoo the Zaisan of Anduu-nar and gave some bribes, and after waiting some months Badamdorj became Shanzav. The Holy One was in the hands of the Manchu Amban. And so Badamdorj became Shanzav. From that year on he turned the Shabi quite upside down. In the year when he became Shanzav he took fourteen ounces per *shar tsai* of tax on one head of large livestock and pretty well ruined the Shabi.⁶³ The next year he took thirteen ounces and the Shabi collapsed, and the shops were ruined by giving a sheep for five cents. In the third year he levied⁶⁴ enormous numbers of four and five year old black, grey, chestnut and brown mares with regular manes and tails and drove them down into China. So the Shabi suffered a lot of damage.

Badamdorj was on very bad terms with the 'Grass-head' amban. That amban became General of Uliastai and gave an order for Badamdorj's arrest. The Holy One suppressed this and did not let him be taken. They were in dispute for several years and 'Grass-head' nearly won.⁶⁵ By means of a proclamation by the Holy One Badamdorj got impressions of the seals of many of the nobles of Khalkha, and then he wrote out a document on those pieces of paper and sent them to Peking and so got the better of the amban 'Grass-head'. Badamdorj's elder brother, a gavj lama, is said to have concocted this plan for preventing his younger brother from being done down by other people within the Four Mountains.⁶⁶

In the time of the Chinese revolutionaries Badamdorj was well in with them, and suddenly the noise of a motor-car was heard in front of the door of his compound. Badamdorj thought the Chinese revolutionaries had come, and opened the gate which had a gate-house and went out in his ceremonial robes, but it was not the Chinese revolutionaries but some children who had been assembled in the Assembly Hall and had run off. Those children had imitated the noise of a motor-car and brought Badamdorj out on false pretences. After that he had an order passed through the Proctor of the Assembly ordering the children to be strictly controlled. As I had the title of aimag proctor at the time, I knew all about this.

THE HOLY ONE'S CURIOS

In the last years of the Kuang-hsü period the Shanzav Badamdorj extracted great wealth from the Shabi by means of taxation, and the practice of thereby bribing the Chinese had been growing considerably. Some rich men headed by the bursar Mördonoï of the Büüvee otag of the Shabi, the aide-lama Dügerjav of Sün aimag and Mouse Mörjav of the same aimag opposed Badamdorj. So Badamdorj thought up a plan and set things in motion to present the Holy One with some curios.

Badamdorj addressed the Holy One as follows: 'Although the Khalkhas as a whole are under the authority of the Holy One, it is our Great Shabi who are the Holy One's true personal Shabi. Suppose we Shabi were to present the Holy One with a curio every day?' The Holy One immediately had an order issued expressing his approval. The office of the Erdene Shanzav proclaimed the Holy One's order, and documents with the order were sent out to all the people of the Great Shabi, and they had to present the Holy One with a curio every day.

No-one could check how much of the wealth which was collected for this purpose went towards finding curios, and how much of it was profit for Badamdorj. The bursar of the Inner Treasury found these curios and presented them. Little things worth five or ten ounces of silver may have gone for several hundred ounces.

I will give one example of this. Luvsantseren of Noyon aimag was the bursar of the Inner Treasury. One day that bursar offered various items but the Holy One rejected them and sent them back. It was getting late. A man came from the Holy One pressing for a curio to be found and given. The bursar had nothing to give and was worried, saying: 'What am I going to do?', and by then it was almost sunrise.

That day the residence sweeper, a lama called 'Lalga' Mörjav, was on daily duty in the residence. The bursar asked him if he had any curios, and he said: 'I haven't any curio, but I do have a very pretty thing.' 'What is that?' He said: 'I have a really pretty bronze pail. I am very fond of it. It is very valuable.' 'How much is it?' 'If you gave five

hundred ounces I would not be a happy man. But as you say you want to give it to the Holy One,⁶⁷ I will sell it for not less than 500 ounces.' 'All right, go and fetch it', he said and Mörjav went and fetched it. Luvsantseren said: 'I will take it away', and he said: 'Well, if you take it away you'll give me five hundred ounces, won't you?' He said: 'I'll get Sonom's shop to weigh it out for you. Don't worry.'

He conveyed that pail to the Holy One, praying to himself: 'I do hope the Lama will accept it.' When twilight fell, two men came riding from the Holy One's residence and he said: 'How are you? Did the Holy One accept the pail?' and they said: 'He accepted it. He was extremely interested and pleased and said you had sent a very curious thing.'

Then he got ten ingots from Sonom's shop for 'Lalga' Mörjav. Mörjav owed some-one five hundred ounces, and paid off the debt with this. As to the make of that pail: it was a roughly-made, ugly pail, narrow at the bottom and flared at the top, with a flower pattern on the outside. It had no cover. It had little handles on either side, and that was the sort of pail it was. There must be a pail like this today in some household or other.

The bronze pail which was one of the Holy One's curios was auctioned two years later and fetched twenty-five Russian banknotes. Many things went in that auction. One year the Holy One put a sheep's shin-bone up for auction. People bid for it and it went for over five hundred banknotes.

It was said that the bursars made a lot of money from this business of collecting curios. The bursar Luvsantseren of Noyon aimag was rich to start with, but became even richer. After the bursar Luvsantseren died, Badamdorj had ten thousand ounces paid into the Holy One's treasury on the grounds that Luvsantseren had been filching the Holy One's property. Luvsantseren's younger brother, the aide-lama Dandi, paid that money. This happened some fifty years ago, during the Kuang-hsü period. As an example of Luvsantseren's great wealth: The aide-lama Dandi sold a lama called Damdinsüren of Noyon aimag two hundred silk gowns. He sold just his Buddha images to the Zaisan Luvsanbaldan of Nomch aimag for five hundred ounces. That Luvsanbaldan became Minister of Finance during the Period of Autonomy and was a Shanzav noble during the period of the People's Government, and he was the very last Shanzav.

After the death of Luvsantseren curios stopped coming in to the Holy One each day, and instead of this the Shabi just offered five thousand ounces of silver each quarter. Just before the Holy One became King he stopped taking this money as a regular thing.

NOTES

1. Situated directly to the south of Urga.
2. Translatable as Minister of Resident.
3. One of the thirty-four valleys of the Holy Mountain (Namnandorj, p. 80).
4. Ritual cairn, erected at prominent features of the landscape and elsewhere, to serve as a dwelling-place for local deities.
5. A lamaist doctor of philosophy. Tib. *rab 'byams pa*.
6. There is a pun here on two meanings of Mo. *nüdgüi*, 'blind' and 'mean'. This episode, from the words 'The lady of the Mongol Amban' onwards, does not feature in the first edition.
7. Tib. *Dung skyong dkar po*, the 'White Shell Protector', the name of the protective spirit or spirit lord of the Holy Mountain. For a reproduction of the *tsam*-mask of this deity see Forman and Rintschen, p. 117.
8. At this point the first edition has the following text which is missing in the second edition:

‘There were a number of bronze Buddha images inside it. This was O. Vang’s shrine. O. Vang had set up the Vangai aimag. It was said that the spirit lord of the Holy Mountain inhabited this temple.’

9. 1815–1842. (Jamtsarano, p. 103, note 19)
10. This is presumably the Baruun Örgöö which was the residence of Abtai Khan of Khalkha who was responsible for bringing Buddhism to Northern Mongolia in the late sixteenth century. It was originally erected at Erdene Zuu, but was incorporated into Urga at the time of the First Khutuktu and moved to the site of Urga by the Selbe River in 1778. It is said to have been known as the Western Residence or Western Pavilion because it was pitched to the west of the Khutuktu’s palace. There is a photograph in Shepetil’mikov, p. 63.
11. A title of nobility held by descendants of Genghis Khan and his brother Khasar. Under the Manchus they were divided into four ranks.
12. Dendev, p. 41, claims to have seen an inscribed monument and a large incense-burner set up by Yündendorj (Yünden Vang) on Baruun Shireet (*sic*), one of the peaks of the Holy Mountain. For Baruun Shiree see Namnandorj, p. 80.
13. One of the thirty-four valleys of the Holy Mountain. (Namnandorj, p. 80). Dendev, p. 12, speaks of a Nar Khajid temple on the western slopes of Zaisan Tolgoi hill. This is to the south of Urga.
14. Possibly Jambal means Divisions (*gazar*) here.
15. There seems to be an omission in the text here.
16. Mo. *bökhüüd* here should read *bökhüüded* as in the first edition.
17. League assemblies, each corresponding to one of the four aimags, were established in 1728, and were given names with a geographical connotation. Tüsheet Khan aimag’s league assembly was known as Khan Uulyn chuulgan. (Sonomdagva, p. 50).
18. *Arz* and *khorz* were higher grades of distilled spirit, *arkhi*.
19. I have not identified *Törtin товч*, but the other three songs named are traditional ‘long songs’ (*urtyn duu*), and texts and music are to be found in the collection *Urtyn Duu*.
20. Possibly Jambal means aimags here. According to Pürevjav, p. 30, each aimag had amongst its officials one zaisan in charge of business affairs.
21. Mo. *dalkhaa*. This was interpreted by Mr. Haltod as Tib. *rta lhu*. It is possible also that the word may be derived from Tib. *dgra lha*, the ‘enemy gods’. So, for example, in two rituals entitled *Dalka yisün tngri-yin sang orusibai* which I transcribed in Ulaanbaatar it is the powerful *dayisun ingri*, or enemy gods who are invoked.
22. The Shabi were divided into units known as *otog*.
23. I am by no means sure what Jambal means here by *choijin*. Pozdneyev 1978, p. 229, describes the *choijin* or *nom-un lama* as having duties which are chiefly scholarly such as studying and commenting on the dogmas of faith, or working out the details of divine services. On p. 637, note 47, he goes into detail about another type of *choijin*, which he describes as ‘something half-way between the Buddhist magicians and the shamans’. Sambuu has an illustration of a lama appearing as a *choijin* or possessed by a *choijin* (*Choijin buuj baigaa lamyn zurag*) which shows a lama with a fierce facial expression dressed in coloured robes, wearing a crown surrounded by skulls and with a number of flags fixed to his back. I cannot take this matter further, and retain the word *choijin*.
24. Translation suggested by Mr. Haltod.
25. Mo. *ömnö*. The first edition has *öglöö*, ‘on the morning when’.
26. The first edition has ‘white and red’.
27. Name of a rank, from Manchu *galai da*.
28. Jambal evidently means the Four Aimags and the Shabi.
29. Mo. *delger mörgöl*. I do not know what this entailed.
30. Probably from Tib. *gsol dpon* (Chos kyi Grags pa, p. 940). Pozdneyev 1978, p. 234, says ‘the manager of a khutuktu’s personal staff’, and 1971, p. 497, ‘the head of a grand lama’s staff’. Das, p. 1315, under *gsol dpon*, has ‘lit. head cook, master-cook, ordinarily = a

private secretary who receives prayers and requests', definitions supported by Chos kyi Grags pa.

31. East Khüree was the area to the east of the Gandan complex.
32. Shown on the map situated behind a mountain pass due north of East Khüree. See also Pozdneyev 1971 for several references.
33. Pozdneyev, p. 234, defines *kiya lam* as the adjutants of khutuktus, but says that in his day the office had taken on the character of a title, given as a distinction to certain lamas.
34. Lamas had been forbidden to engage in archery long before this. According to *Ulaan Khatsart*, p. 30, item 75, a maker of cult objects (*takhilch*) and a gatekeeper (*khaalgach*) were dismissed from office and fined three times nine beasts each, and two lamas without appointment were fined two times nine beasts each for this offence in 1829.
35. A title conferred on reincarnated high lamas.
36. The legend of Stone Finger is told in some detail in the lives of the Jebtsundamba Khutuktus. Two *ācāryas* or holy men coming from India in search of the realm of Shambhala called on the First Khutuktu and asked him if they would attain their goal. He told them that on the way they would come across a great lake. If they dipped a finger in it and it remained unharmed, this would be a sign that they would be able to get across. Further, a blue bull would come out of the lake, and if they could catch it and ride it they would get to Shambhala. When they reached the lake the younger Indian laid down his carpet to cross it, as he had done before, saying 'After all, when we crossed all the lakes on our way here from India, how did we do it? We laid down our carpets and used to cross over them like bridges, and what does His Serenity, sitting in his land of Mongolia, know about it?' As he did so, he was overwhelmed by the water and died. The elder Indian stuck his finger in the water, whereupon it turned to stone and broke off. The bull emerged, but could not be caught, and the Indian returned to Urga, where he recounted the tales of King Vikramaditya, which were then written down. (Bawden 1961, pp. 63–4)
37. Manzshir Khiid. See Storey, pp. 127–8.
38. A place named Gachuurt is found on a few maps, about 30 km east of Ulaanbaatar (e.g. Storey, pp. 127, 128)
39. 1899–1900.
40. 'White Tārā', the name of a Buddhist female deity. She was also known as Tsagaan Dar Ekh ('White Tārā Mother') and Ekh Dagina ('Mother Fairy').
41. In 1911.
42. I take this to be the present-day Palace Museum, but may be mistaken.
43. Watch-posts, Mo. *kharuul*, were established along the border with Siberia, both east and west of Kyakhta, and in certain parts of the interior during the Manchu dynasty.
44. Mo. *san solkh*. For *solkh* see Mostaert, p. 582, as a prayer recited by lamas accompanying a *gurtumba* (a type of lama sorcerer) so that he can enter into ecstasy and become possessed. *Solkh* may derive from Tib. *gsol kha* (Chos kyi Grags pa, p. 940).
45. The text uses an unusual phrase *shirkheg niilüüldag* and glosses this with the more commonplace *üsiig zasuuldag*.
46. According to Pürevjav, p. 27, the administration of Urga consisted of the Khamba Nomon Khan, his deputy the Vice-Khamba, five *tsorj*, four *tsogchin gesgüi* or proctors, and four *ikh unzad* or senior precentors.
47. Perhaps the White Temple.
48. The newspaper *Il Tovchoo* for 20–31 August 1995 published a list of some of the possessions of the Khutuktu and the prices for which they were later sold.
49. *Üüriin Tuyaa*, 3 volumes, 1951–1955.
50. A khutuktu who played a considerable political role in the 1920s in Mongolia, and for whom see especially Brown and Onon, p. 750, note 56.
51. *Toin* was the title of a lama who held the rank of taiji.
52. Sonomdagva, p. 104, says that there were about sixteen lama zaisans and thirty-six lay zaisans in the Shanzav's Office. These served in rotation, and a shift would consist of four lama zaisans and one to three lay zaisans.

53. Mo. *pog zed*, perhaps Tib. *phogs* and 'gyed.
54. Mo. *navs*. The first edition has the similarly written *avs*, 'coffin', which might seem appropriate, but is an inferior reading.
55. 2. Mo. *jav'tii*. Tib. *byabs khkus*.
56. Mo. *soyog*, Tib. *gsol gyog*. (Das, p. 1315)
57. Mo. *Düinkhoryn jüdbiin lam*, Tib. *dus kyi 'khor lo*, 'Wheel of Time', plus, possibly, Tib. *rgyud pa*. Mr. Haltod suggested that *jüdbiin lam* was the equivalent of *ündüsün lam*, 'main teacher', and I am not sure.
58. Mo. *ulajj*. The first edition has *uilj*, 'weeping'.
59. Tib. *dge bshes*, a lamaist clerical degree.
60. Tib. *dka' bcu*, a superior degree to that of *gevsh*.
61. Mo. *dugui* is explained by Tsevel, p. 208, as 'some types of food of a round shape' and he gives an unexplained example *gavjiin dugui*, 'a *gavj*'s cake'. I cannot comment on this.
62. Portrait in Sambuu.
63. I am not sure of what Badamdorj did. From what is said just above, one basket of tea or 800 *shar tsai* was the tax for 800 large beasts. Hence one beast would be taxed at one *shar tsai*. It looks as if Badamdorj grossly overvalued each *shar tsai* at 14 ounces of silver.
64. The first edition has *tataj*, 'levied' at this point, and I retain it.
65. It seems that a whole line of the first edition, reading *Övsön tolgoi diilekh shakhakhad, Badamdorj Khalkhyn*, has been missed out here, and I restore it.
66. That is, in Urga.
67. Mo. *bügded* must be a misprint for *bogdod*.

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THE LAMAS OF MONGOLIA

Frans August Larson



I

I write this at evening time, by candlelight, seated on the floor in a white felt yurt. I am a guest in the encampment of a Mongolian family whom I have known for many years. My yurt is next in line above the ‘god’s tent,’ and my low writing table vibrates with the throb of moaning lama drums. Above the drums I hear the alto chant of lama priests repeating Tibetan prayers.

Chactar, my old friend, has not been well for many months, and priests have been called from a temple to hold a week of special prayer for his health. Chactar himself is a lama priest. So are his nephew and his grandnephew. The first-born sons of three generations — three males from a family that numbers but five males in all! That leaves one grown man and one small boy of three summers to fulfill the material duties of life.

An alarming percentage of the male population of Mongolia are lama priests. Custom requires that every first-born son shall be given to the priesthood, and as many more sons thereafter as possible. This is a great drain on a family, for it leaves so very few to carry on the work of caring for the herds and the flocks. But the more lama priests given by a family, the greater the virtue of that family. According to the religion which holds Mongolia in an iron grip, health, wealth, and happiness are dependent upon the dedication of many sons to the temple.

By strict regulations, lama priests are forbidden to marry. This has played an important part in the de-population of the country — although not all priests observe this rule. Demp-si, for instance, a lama priest related to the head of this family, was married a few months ago with much ceremony. Demp-si has always liked the ladies. His fondness for them has led him in past years to give away as gifts some of the best horses from the family herds, in addition to many cows, goats, and sheep, as well as felt and other trifles. The family have found this continuous drain an annoyance, so in council they decided that the best thing was for Demp-si to marry. His wife is a very pretty girl, who seems practical and sensible and likely to keep him in order.

Buddhism first came into Mongolia through the conversion of the wife of Kublai Khan by a priest from Tibet. The Mongols look upon Tibet as their spiritual home, and when traveling through Mongolia I continually come upon pilgrims either en route to Tibet or returning from there. Lamaism is a compound of black magic, nature worship, and Buddhism. It is the national religion of Mongolia, and numbers among its

adherents almost the entire population. Lama temples dot the whole country, from the borders of Russia to China. The maintenance of these lamaseries is a heavy tax on Mongolia. Not only are the building, furnishing, and keeping in repair of the temples expensive; but more than one third of the male population of Mongolia is drawn into them as lama priests and must be supported by the lay population.

Lamaseries are the only religious buildings in Mongolia, except for a few Christian mission houses. Some of the lamaseries number their inmates by the thousand. Others have a resident population of below a hundred, with a number of adherent priests who spend a part of the year in their homes in the country.

Children destined for the religious life are sent to the temple any time up to their eighth year. I have often seen children as young as two or three already inmates of a monastery. According to the regulations, a child entered for the priesthood should not have any physical blemish. There is no real medical examination, as we understand it, but it is called such in the book of rules. It simply means that a child with bodily disfigurement or an impediment of speech is not considered a suitable candidate.

In certain monasteries only novices from good families are admitted — that is, families whose reputation has been excellent for generations.

The child, after he has been accepted by the monastery, is handed over to the care of a senior priest, who is held responsible for the education, discipline, and morals of his pupil. If possible, a senior priest who is a relative of the child is selected; but if this cannot be arranged the matter is decided by consulting the child's horoscope. The teacher of a boy is presented with gifts by the child's parents at the time that he is taken over; these vary in accordance with the wealth of the family.

After a short period the senior priest takes his pupil before the assembled priests of the monastery and seeks their sanction for his protégé to enter the order. The boy is now classed as a novice — a probationer. After this, if he is small, he has one guardian who looks after his food and material needs and another who teaches him his religious texts. In return for their care he must perform for them such menial services as he can. When the boy has learned a certain number of Tibetan prayers by rote, — none of which he understands, as Tibetan is not his native language, — he is sent up for examination before the priests again. If he repeats smoothly and well what he is supposed to know, he moves up one step further. He is now supposed to be ready for higher education.

The tutor approaches the abbot of the monastery about this, sending in to him at the same time as valuable gifts as the boy's parents can afford to make. Provided all things are in order, the names of the pupil and his tutor are now entered in a higher register. Opposite their names their thumb impressions are put, and below the thumb impressions the seals of two citizens who vouch for them.

Until now the budding lama has worn his ordinary lay clothes. During the ceremony of entrance upon his higher education he has been dressed in all the finery that he could possibly afford — the most gorgeous robes of a layman; but at the end of the ceremony he is stripped of all his gay raiment and clad in the sombre attire of a priest, and a scarf is knotted about his throat. This signifies his renunciation of all material things and his entry into the serious world of religion. Many monks never pass beyond this stage, either because they do not have the necessary funds or because they are too dull to learn any more prayers. In the case of a rich student, bribery often makes up for dullness.

Once a monk has donned his priestly robes and equipment, he must dress in them; he cannot again garb himself in lay clothes. These priestly robes consist of a voluminous

skirt, a sleeveless waistcoat, a large serge scarf for covering the shoulders, and a cap. The color is either crimson or yellow, depending upon the sect of Lamaism the temple belongs to. Each priest also wears a rosary.

The next step is for the novice to apply to the abbot for permission to take part in the temple services, accompanying his request with gifts according to his means. If his prayer is granted, a favorable day is fixed for the ceremony. Early in the morning a brother priest shaves his head, leaving only a small tuft of hair on the top of the skull. At the hour of service in the temple, led by his tutor, he presents himself clad in beggar's rags to the assembled monks and says that he accepts the holy priesthood as his career by his own choice. The head lama of the monastery then cuts off the remaining tuft of hair.

Now the applicant is given a religious name by which he is henceforth known. The ceremony is concluded by the repetition of the formula, 'I take refuge in Buddha, in the law, and in the priesthood.'

The next celebration of service is called the ceremony of marriage with the Church. The young priest enters the temple holding a bundle of incense sticks and led by a monk who is called the 'companion of the bride.' The young priest places his incense sticks before the altar, lights them, and prostrates himself, promising never to make an earthly marriage, but to live in union with religion.

II

From this time on the novitiate enjoys many of the privileges of a fully ordained monk. After three or four years, according to his progress in his studies, he is given better quarters in his hostel, regardless of how thin his purse may be. Now he must memorize volume after volume of sacred books. If he slackens in his work his tutor does not hesitate to inflict corporal punishment, for should he fail in his examination the tutor is in danger of a beating himself by order of the higher priests.

From now on the novice may continue to pass periodical examinations, take part in public disputations, and commit books to memory as long as he cares to do so. It takes twelve years or more for a boy to become a full-fledged lama. No monk can reach this rank before the age of twenty, and in actual practice few ever attain it before forty. After this he has an opportunity to study metaphysics and the more abstruse works of Tibetan religious literature. Some novices take up the study of magic and leave their monastery with a degree which authorizes them to practice this art publicly. Others feel inclined toward care of the sick and learn how to treat illnesses according to the weird and wonderful lama theories. A few of these are really wise in the use of herbs and are very successful in treating diseases with the healing roots and leaves that they gather from the surrounding country.

The treatment of the sick, whether by magic or weird prayer or herbs, is the most lucrative profession in the priesthood. In time of bad health people will part with all their wealth to be restored to normal physical condition again. Unscrupulous priests take advantage of this: often after an epidemic all the good horses, camels, cattle, sheep, and goats from the surrounding families are the property either of a lamasery or of individual lamas.

At the head of each temple are an abbot and a lama of a high order in whose body dwells the spirit of a Buddhist saint.

When one of these lamas dies, the spirit of the saint that has dwelt in him enters the body of a child who is born at the instant the lama dies. After the death, a deputation consisting of other such lamas and learned lamas of rank search for the child in whom this spirit has been reborn. They are guided by the advice of astrologers, and proceed to the district indicated. Here the committee inquire for any newborn child whose entrance into the world has been marked by such omens as showers of shooting stars or the herds showing signs of unusual restlessness. Four or five such children may be discovered, and the names of all of them are written down.

Then, when the children are a few months old, the priests come again to each yurta where such a baby is and lay before him articles that belonged to the dead lama. If a child turns away from these things, the lamas go on to the next baby. And so on until they find one that greets the articles with pleasure. This they think is a sign that the reincarnated saint recognizes his own possessions. One meets such committees continually in Mongolia. I have talked with them many times, and their methods have not changed in the least since I first came to Mongolia.

When a person dies in Mongolia the lamas are sent for immediately. First they read prayers for the repose of the dead spirit, and then a priest versed in black magic selects a suitable place to lay the body. The priests mark out a plot with a rope and place the body there entirely nude, covered only with a white cloth. The lamas repeat prayers over it and it is left for three days.

During these three days the lamas feast in a yurta prepared for them by the deceased's relatives, reading prayers and holding services for the benefit of the spirit. No one goes near the place where the body has been left until the morning of the third day. Then, if the eagles and the wolves have devoured it, the Mongols are satisfied that the spirit has passed into Heaven. They consider the quickness with which the earthly body disappears an indication of the degree of virtue of the deceased person.

This is a gruesome practice which made horrible the territory just outside the city of Urga. Urga is the only place in Mongolia where a multitude of Mongols live close together. But no encampment is safe from the possibility that one of the family dogs may come in dragging a human leg or arm. Thirty-five years in Mongolia have not inured me to this. I shudder with horror every time it happens.

There are Mongols who cannot bring themselves to lay their beloved dead out for the wolves to devour or dogs to tear to pieces. Some few families burn their corpses and send the ashes to repose in a holy place, such as a niche in a Tibetan temple or the temple of Wu-Tai-Shan.

III

The Living Buddha was born in Tibet. When he was a baby, lama priests took him to Urga, saying that it had been revealed to them that he was a holy child sent to be God on earth to the Mongolian people. The Mongols accepted him. His training was entirely Mongolian, yet through him the Tibetan priests had considerable influence in Mongolian affairs. His fun-loving personality captured the hearts of the fun-loving Mongols. They not only worshipped him as divine, but eventually they appointed him Emperor. His political position in Mongolia, even before his coronation as Emperor, was analogous to that of the Popes of mediæval Christendom.

My first meeting with the Living Buddha illustrates how easily a foreigner can be put

into a foolish position by a slight knowledge of the language of the country into which he has newly come. It was in 1894, when I first went to Urga. I was at that time working very hard at the study of the language, and had a good teacher. One day when I had finished my daily lessons, and felt very much in need of exercise after a cramped two hours of writing instruction, I ordered my riding horse and went out alone.

I had not gone very far when I saw a party of lamas, dressed in flowing yellow robes and mounted on frisky horses, coming at a good pace toward me on the same road on which I was riding. I heard someone shout 'Bo!' As the only meaning I knew for *bo* was 'gun,' and I did not have a gun, I paid no attention. Suddenly I noticed that everyone was staring at me and shouting 'Bo! Bo! Bo!' Still I did not understand, and thought it very strange that all the people, save the lama party, had dismounted and were standing by their horses.

One of the lamas detached himself from the party and galloped up to me. He stopped at my horse's head and shouted right into my face, 'Bo!' I did not understand, and, returning his stare gravely, explained that I did not carry a gun. At that he, as well as the crowd, burst into laughter. He pointed to the ground and motioned to me to get off my horse.

I dismounted and stood meekly at my horse's head, and the lama turned his horse and dashed back to his party. They all galloped up past me, smiling and laughing in a manner that made me feel like a lunatic. As soon as they were out of sight I took the shortest way home and presented myself to my teacher. I told him what had happened — how I had been ordered to give up my gun when I did not have one and forced to get down from my horse while the party passed. He then explained that the word *bo* has several meanings and one of them is to get down from a horse. From my description he knew that the party of lamas must have been in attendance on the Living Buddha, also out for his afternoon ride. He told me that by the law of Mongolia every man, woman, and child had to dismount when the Living Buddha passed.

This incident roused my curiosity about the man whom my teacher told me was worshipped by all the people of Mongolia as a god who even in the eyes of kings and princes could commit no sin. Consequently I often chose a road past his palace for my place of exercise.

One day, shortly after my first sight of him, I found near the palace a crowd of several thousand jostling, laughing people, packed into every possible nook and corner; but as I am taller and stronger than most men, I succeeded in pushing my way well in to the centre of the good-natured mob.

I supposed that I should witness some religious ceremony; so you can imagine my surprise when a window in the upper story of the palace was flung open and a jolly man, dressed in a gown of glittering gold, appeared and flung out a lady's corset. It flew over my head. I caught it. My impulse was to fling it back at him, but before I could do so someone snatched it out of my hand.

My very fair hair made me a target in that crowd of dark men and women. The man at the window noticed my discomfiture and clapped his plump hands with delight. He hurled down a large bottle of perfume, which broke. The people sniffed the air and made faces at the odor.

A shower of watches followed — good watches of Swiss manufacture. There was a terrific scramble for these — men and women went mad, jumping on top of each other in their eagerness; but fortunately the Mongols are not only of the most amiable disposition, but strong and sturdy, so no one was actually hurt. After the watches came

clocks, all of foreign make, and of many types. Most of them were delicate, dainty things, such as ladies admire; but he heaved out one tall grandfather's clock, which fell with a thud and was broken to pieces.

Lamps followed the clocks; then more perfume. He disappeared from the window. The mob called him to come back. They cheered when he returned with his arms filled with Western ladies' dresses. These he threw out one at a time — evening gowns of silver lace, riding habits, walking costumes of tweed, and a very much beruffled wrapper that fluttered down like a balloon.

Hats which must have been designed to match a costume were tossed out as if they were so many cakes. Both men and women put these on over their own headgear. The Living Buddha even tried one, — a concoction of straw and ostrich feathers, — and thrust his head through the window for the admiration of the crowd before he threw it down.

Shoes came next — high-heeled shoes of leather and of satin. These were followed by a shower of face powder punctuated with fluffy puffs. There were even a pair of skates, a toy windmill, a Noah's ark, and a small sailboat.

He ended the afternoon's sport by scattering hundreds of horns and whistles and some Christmas-tree tinsel. Then he closed the window. The Mongols cheered, blew their horns, and whistled through their fingers, calling him out again. He threw the window open and thrust out his empty hands; then the people dispersed. All that afternoon and evening they rollicked through the streets on horse-back, blowing the whistles and horns like children on a circus day in Sweden.

Later, when I had come to know the Living Buddha as an intimate friend, I discovered that he had an insatiable curiosity concerning all Western things, and, since he could not go abroad, he used to send for catalogues from shops in Stockholm, Berlin, London, Paris, Rome, and New York. It was his custom to order each article that interested him, so that he had frequent consignments of foreign goods arriving at his palace on the Tola River.

To make room for new things, and also reasoning that it was silly to keep material objects that had already served their purpose by informing him as to what foreigners use, he would proclaim a day on which he would distribute Western goods from the palace windows, and the jolly crowd I have pictured would collect on each of these days. The performance gave a lot of pleasure to hundreds of fun-loving Mongols, and the Living Buddha enjoyed it immensely. I did too, on those occasions when I was asked to assist him.

IV

When I had lived in Urga some time, had made many friends, and had become familiar with the language, a young Mongolian duke, the eldest son of the Prince of Hanta, invited me to go with him to the Dolan Horsona Natam, or Festival of the Seven States. This was a festival held by the Living Buddha at a place some distance from Urga. People made preparations for it throughout three-year intervals by getting together the best possible outfit of clothes and by training the best race horses; and they looked forward to the absolution of their sins by the Living Buddha's personal blessing. It was by far the biggest show of splendor and of gayety held anywhere in Mongolia, and people flocked to it from all over the country.

The young Duke of Hanta had spoken to the Living Buddha about me and had asked for permission to bring me along, so I had the honor of being one of the Living Buddha's own party when he left Urga for the place of festivity. Consequently I went in company with the young nobles who escorted the Buddha when he went abroad on state occasions.

There were about twenty thousand people gathered for the fair from all the states in Mongolia. I did not see anyone at any time who was not dressed in silk of the best quality and of the most brilliant colors. All my friends changed their costumes several times a day, so I concluded that this was the general custom.

The women here, as in Western society, wore by far the most elaborate apparel; they were all in bright colors — never a pastel shade. But these bright hues suit the Mongolian type of beauty. They were heavy gold and silver headdresses made in the shape of crowns. All these crowns were jeweled, and many women had clusters of pearls that hung down to their waists. Lobsen Jensen explained to me that a woman's headdress might cost many thousands of dollars, and he pointed out to me one beautiful young lady who had the equivalent of a herd of five thousand horses on her head.

All the women had coral, the national ornament of Mongolia, somewhere in their headdresses; and they all wore riding boots, similar in pattern to men's boots, ornamented with designs in colored leather at the top.

At the festival everyone moved on a horse; no one seemed even to consider the possibility of walking the few yards from one tent to another. In fact, it would have been dangerous to do so, because no pedestrian was safe amid the galloping movement of the half-controlled horses. Hobbled horses stood before every tent, waiting the pleasure of the owners.

The horses, as is the Mongolian custom, were dressed almost as gayly as the men or women who rode them. Their bridles and their tail straps were all studded with silver and gold, or ornamented with gems, according to the fancy and wealth of a rider. The saddles were covered with scarlet and were also ornamented with silver and gold.

Over the tents flew the bright banners of the different tribes, and on them were sewn the royal colors, the inherited right of each noble family.

On the hillside and on the grassy plain surrounding the tents were horses for racing, mares and cows for milking, and flocks of sheep to provide fresh meat for each day. They were tended by herdsmen and shepherds dressed in flowing garments of brilliant color, with streamer hats.

The festivities lasted for eight days, which were principally devoted to the horse races. The Living Buddha occupied the place of honor at each day's race. He was always gorgeously robed in gold and surrounded by a brilliant escort of priests and princes who sat about his outdoor throne.

The races were for different types of horses on different days, and any horse bred in Mongolia could be entered. The prizes were not large, — a roll of silk or a little lump of silver, — but the honor of being the owner of a winning horse was very great. The Mongol owners bred their stock with this thought in mind, and entered their best in each contest. To us Westerners there would seem perhaps to be a drawback in the fact that each winning horse must be presented to the Living Buddha. But the Living Buddha was so looked up to by all the Mongol people that every man and woman considered it an extremely great honor to have reared and trained a horse fit for his herds.

The jockeys in all the races were children between seven and fifteen years of age. They were all dressed in small silk jackets and very short silk pants. A few saddles were used, but, as the Duke of Hanta explained to me, jockeys had been badly hurt and even killed at former festivals by having their saddles slip and being caught in them, so they were looked upon with disfavor by the owners, the crowd, and the jockeys. Consequently nearly all of the horses were ridden bareback.

The Living Buddha had a great many of his own horses at the festival. The Prince of Hanta and I looked them over together, as we were much interested in the one which had been the winner of the gelding race for the last three seasons. He was a beautiful animal, — a big bay with four white socks, and a white star in his forehead, — and appeared in very good condition. But we knew his age, and the Prince of Hanta said that two or three other horses would press him very hard for first place this time.

We went on to the inspection of a horse that a prince from the East was entering for the same race. It was a younger animal, of cream color, with long slim legs and well-developed running muscles. I was very much attracted to this horse from the instant I saw him, and gave little attention to the animals in the three or four other herds that we visited.

The hour of the race came. The horses got off in fine order. With the Duke of Hanta I rode to the rise of a hill from which we could watch the first part of the race, and then around to another hill from which we obtained a view of the open valley in which the last stage was run. It was very easy to follow the progress of the cream horse because of his light color. In the same way the white socks of the Living Buddha's bay marked him on the course.

These two entered the valley running neck and neck. The cream, my favorite, gained slowly inch by inch until the bay's nose was level with his tail. There was only a little way to go — I thought that the race was the cream's without a doubt, and relaxed the strain with which I had been leaning forward in my saddle. But something happened. I cannot be certain that the jockey pulled his horse to the left — the little boy must certainly have been too exhausted to do that after ten miles of galloping bareback on a strong horse. Still, the bay came in winner, filling out the circle of his fourth season.

At the end of each day's race the Living Buddha went back to his tent; then rows on rows of people knelt about the tent on the green grass, their bowed heads low on their hands. Prostrate and humble, these rich noblemen from all over Mongolia awaited the blessing of the little Tibetan boy, now grown to manhood, whom the lama priests had told them was sent to earth to reveal to them the will of God. He would come out of his tent and walk among them, touching each one gently on the head. Then they would rise and go back to their own tents.

When the hour of blessing was past they shook off their seriousness and were gay people seemingly interested in nothing beyond horses and frivolity. And the Buddha too, when he had done his duty, would be one of them in merriment.

Mounted on horses, all the people dashed about from tent to tent, visiting and feasting with their friends, the women as free and gay as the men. They made tests of horsemanship over the course where the races were run, dared each other to ride this horse and that, and sang songs and played flutes until all hours of the night.

V

From the day on which I was first introduced to the Living Buddha he was always exceedingly kind to me and most solicitous for my comfort. One summer, when it was unusually hot in Urga, he invited me to stay with him in his palace on the Tola River. I hesitated to accept, as I thought that the invitation was just an act of politeness; but he continued to send for me to come, so finally I went for two weeks. While I was there every possible thing was done for my pleasure and amusement. The Living Buddha saw to it that I had an interesting time; and his wife, who managed her large household with marvelous efficiency, looked after my material needs.

The Buddhist religion forbade the Living God to marry, but when he fell in love with a vivacious, handsome Mongolian girl the Mongolian people found a way. There was a most elaborate ceremony whereby she was created a goddess. And after she had become a goddess there was no reason at all why she was not a fit mate for a Living God. In fact, by all reasoning a god was the only person she could marry. The Mongols never spoke of her as a human being, but always as a goddess. She was a practical, sensible woman, and a splendid home-maker, driving from the Buddha's great palace any gloom that may have lurked in its many corridors before she came. She was a jolly companion, a good horse-woman, an excellent shot. The Buddha was exceedingly proud of her.

During the two weeks that I was at the palace she and I went every morning to the Sacred Mountain for target practice. One day the Living Buddha said, 'Now we must have a contest so that I can discover which of you is really the better shot.'

He ordered a target to be put up, then handed each of us a rifle. He especially stressed the fact that the one he gave me had come from France and was very expensive. His wife fired three shots and made as many hits in the mark. I then took careful aim, but registered three misses, to the Buddha's huge delight.

Upon examining my gun I noticed that the sight had been knocked to one side. I called the Buddha's attention to this. He laughed loud and long, and said, 'If you are really a good shot, you should have noticed the condition of your gun before you aimed.'

He was always fond of a practical joke. Some years after this, when I took him the first motor car that was ever seen in Urga, he connected the electric current with the body of the car, and then invited the highest lamas and nobles to come to tea. After tea he exhibited the car, and he asked his guests to feel the fine polish on the fenders.

The first man to touch the car drew back as though burned. The others laughed at his timidity. Then a second one put out a brave hand — and jerked it back. More laughter, led by the Buddha. He took the greatest pleasure in this tea party at which each of his friends received a shock, so that not one of them would consent to ride with him in his car — they all marveled at his own ability to sit in it and ride comfortably through the palace grounds.

The Buddha lived in a luxurious way and surrounded himself with every object that his fancy desired, fed on the richest and the most costly foods, drank expensive French champagne, and dressed himself and all his attendants in the most gorgeous apparel. But he was a very kind man. No poor person, priest or layman, ever came to him in trouble during all the years that I knew him and went away without the Buddha having done everything in his power to make the suffering one's lot easier. His charity extended

into the far corners of the country that knew him as the Living God. He also had infinite compassion for all creatures of the animal world.

To the south of Urga, near his palace, there is a fine mountain called Bogda-Col. During the Living Buddha's lifetime all hunting and killing of animals was forbidden on this mountain. Here one could see, any day of the year, big herds of reindeer, wild bears, wolves, foxes, mountain deer, and hundreds of kinds of birds, all quite tame and not at all afraid of man.

The Buddha constantly collected his animals from other places and had them freed in this paradise — apes, bears, rare birds, and even an elephant. Likewise in the River Tola, which runs by Urga, the Buddha forbade all catching of fish.

In 1911 the people of Mongolia sent the Manchu governor back to China and decided that their country would be better governed without further cooperation with China. A delegation of kings, princes, dukes, and commoners went to the Living Buddha and asked him to become Emperor. He consented. The inauguration of the new Emperor was a very impressive ceremony. The whole of North Mongolia flocked to Urga in festive robes, and the streets were paraded by Mongolian soldiers mounted on beautiful horses and dressed in rich uniforms.

The people presented to the Living Buddha, as a thank offering for his consenting to be made Emperor, three hundred white horses with yellow halters, each with a red fox skin tied about its throat, and one hundred white camels, each with a sable skin tied about its throat. These were led up to the palace and presented to him. Then the nobles, kings, princes, and commoners all promised allegiance to the new Emperor, after he had taken a solemn oath.

The Emperor soon selected ministers and officials. His government ran smoothly, and the best blood of Mongolia flocked around him. This was a prosperous time for Urga. Life was very gay, and hope ran high; it was a good season and wealth abounded. Chinese and Russian merchants did a fine business, and trade thrived throughout the Empire. There were no heavy taxes. The roads were filled with big caravans going and coming constantly, winding down across the plain through Kalgan to China, or northward into Russia. Mongolia prospered as she has never prospered at any other time during the years that I have lived among her people.

VI

The end of the régime was brought about because of the generosity and the goodness of the Mongols' character — a too great trust in all men, a simplicity which judges others to be as honest as they themselves are.

In November 1919, a Chinese general, Little Hsü, under pretense of protecting the border, obtained permission to bring an army through Urga. However, on getting his army to Urga he broke the Kiakhta Treaty and made himself master of North Mongolia. He was a shrewd and sharp little man and did his work quickly. Nobles who entertained him were thrown into prison, and he seized Urga in a cruel grip.

Two different parties of Mongols set out trustfully to Russia to get help against this army. One party went to Moscow and invited the Soviet authorities to come and help; the other party went to see Baron Ungern-Sternberg in the mountains to the east of Urga. The Mongols did not realize that Russia was then a divided country. In their eyes its inhabitants were simply the Russian people, a signatory party to the treaty that

had been broken — genial and just traders with Mongolia for more than a century. The Mongols knew nothing of 'Red' and 'White.' If they had heard the words, they did not comprehend them.

Baron Ungern-Sternberg was the nearer, and reached Urga before any authority in Moscow could act. He attacked and took Urga in February 1921 with his army of seven hundred and fifty Russians and as many more Mongols, destroying most of Little Hsü's army of fifteen thousand men. He was now ruler over Urga and North Mongolia. But, although he was a cruel soldier of fortune, he had great respect for the Living Buddha and treated him and the Mongol nobles fairly. The Living Buddha was treated as Emperor, but in reality had little power.

Baron Ungern-Sternberg was an energetic man. He opened a big tannery in Urga, installed electric light, and built and repaired many bridges. But he was obsessed by a hatred of all Jews, and put to death with terrible cruelty all the Russian Jews in Urga that he could lay his hands on, — men, women, and children, — despite everything that the Living Buddha and the Mongolian people could do. His régime was of short duration, for the Red Russians came in from the North and defeated and killed him.

The Russian Red Army entered Urga in July 1921. They again gave the Mongols assurance of their independence, and promised assistance in the fulfillment of the Kiakhta Treaty. But, as their political views were against emperors and princes, the Living Buddha never regained his former splendor or power, and all nobles soon disappeared from North Mongolia. Commoners, advised by Russians from Moscow, were the power in the new government. The Living Buddha sickened and died in 1924, and it seems that there will never be another Living Buddha in Mongolia.

The Living Buddha was always very kind to me. He made me many valuable presents, and bestowed upon me the Mongolian ducal decoration. When I took my friend, Sven Hedin, to visit him, he was a sick man. He was nearly blind, and his heart had been broken by the turn of affairs in Mongolia. But he did everything in his power to make Hedin's visit to Urga a success. He was not only the Living God who gave absolution for their sins twice weekly to Mongolian supplicants at Urga, but a great man who recognized genius in other men when he met it.

BEASTS, MEN AND GODS

Ferdinand Ossendowski



“DEATH FROM THE WHITE MAN WILL STAND BEHIND YOU”

The terrible general, the Baron,” arrived quite unexpectedly, unnoticed by the outposts of Colonel Kazagrandi. After a talk with Kazagrandi the Baron invited Colonel N. N. Philipoff and me into his presence. Colonel Kazagrandi brought the word to me. I wanted to go at once but was detained about half an hour by the Colonel, who then sped me with the words:

“Now God help you! Go!”

It was a strange parting message, not reassuring and quite enigmatical. I took my Mauser and also hid in the cuff of my coat my cyanide of potassium. The Baron was quartered in the yurta of the military doctor. When I entered the court. Captain Veseloffsky came up to me. He had a Cossack sword and a revolver without its holster beneath his girdle. He went into the yurta to report my arrival.

“Come in,” he said, as he emerged from the tent.

At the entrance my eyes were struck with the sight of a pool of blood that had not yet had time to drain down into the ground—an ominous greeting that seemed to carry the very voice of one just gone before me. I knocked.

“Come in!” was the answer in a high tenor. As I passed the threshold, a figure in a red silk Mongolian coat rushed at me with the spring of a tiger, grabbed and shook my hand as though in flight across my path and then fell prone on the bed at the side of the tent.

“Tell me who you are! Hereabouts are many spies and agitators,” he cried out in an hysterical voice, as he fixed his eyes upon me. In one moment I perceived his appearance and psychology. A small head on wide shoulders; blonde hair in disorder; a reddish bristling moustache; a skinny, exhausted face, like those on the old Byzantine ikons. Then everything else faded from view save a big, protruding forehead overhanging steely sharp eyes. These eyes were fixed upon me like those of an animal from a cave. My observations lasted for but a flash but I understood that before me was a very dangerous man ready for an instant spring into irrevocable action. Though the danger was evident. I felt the deepest offence.

“Sit down,” he snapped out in a hissing voice, as he pointed to a chair and impatiently pulled at his moustache. I felt my anger rising through my whole body and I said to him without taking the chair:

"You have allowed yourself to offend me, Baron. My name is well enough known so that you cannot thus indulge yourself in such epithets. You can do with me as you wish, because force is on your side, but you cannot compel me to speak with one who gives me offence."

At these words of mine he swung his feet down off the bed and with evident astonishment began to survey me, holding his breath and pulling still at his moustache. Retaining my exterior calmness, I began to glance indifferently around the yurta, and only then I noticed General Rezukhin. I bowed to him and received his silent acknowledgment. After that I swung my glance back to the Baron, who sat with bowed head and closed eyes, from time to time rubbing his brow and mumbling to himself.

Suddenly he stood up and sharply said, looking past and over me:

"Go out! There is no need of more. . . ."

I swung round and saw Captain Veseloffsky with his white, cold face. I had not heard him enter. He did a formal "about face" and passed out of the door.

"'Death from the white man' has stood behind me," I thought; "but has it quite left me?"

The Baron stood thinking for some time and then began to speak in jumbled, unfinished phrases.

"I ask your pardon. . . . You must understand there are so many traitors! Honest men have disappeared. I cannot trust anybody. All names are false and assumed; documents are counterfeited. Eyes and words deceive. . . . All is demoralized, insulted by Bolshevism. I just ordered Colonel Philipoff cut down, he who called himself the representative of the Russian White Organization. In the lining of his garments were found two secret Bolshevik codes. . . . When my officer flourished his sword over him, he exclaimed: 'Why do you kill me, Tavarische?' I cannot trust anybody. . . ."

He was silent and I also held my peace.

"I beg your pardon!" he began anew. "I offended you; but I am not simply a man, I am a leader of great forces and have in my head so much care, sorrow and woe!"

In his voice I felt there was mingled despair and sincerity. He frankly put out his hand to me. Again silence. At last I answered:

"What do you order me to do now, for I have neither counterfeit nor real documents? But many of your officers know me and in Urga I can find many who will testify that I could be neither agitator nor . . ."

"No need, no need!" interrupted the Baron. "All is clear, all is understood! I was in your soul and I know all. It is the truth which Hutuktu Narabanchi has written about you. What can I do for you?"

I explained how my friend and I had escaped from Soviet Russia in the effort to reach our native land and how a group of Polish soldiers had joined us in the hope of getting back to Poland; and I asked that help be given us to reach the nearest port.

"With pleasure, with pleasure. . . . I will help you all," he answered excitedly. "I shall drive you to Urga in my motor car. Tomorrow we shall start and there in Urga we shall talk about further arrangements."

Taking my leave, I went out of the yurta. On arriving at my quarters, I found Colonel Kazagranti in great anxiety walking up and down my room.

"Thanks be to God!" he exclaimed and crossed himself.

His joy was very touching but at the same time I thought that the Colonel could have taken much more active measures for the salvation of his guest, if he had been so

mind. The agitation of this day had tired me and made me feel years older. When I looked in the mirror I was certain there were more white hairs on my head. At night I could not sleep for the flashing thoughts of the young, fine face of Colonel Philipoff, the pool of blood, the cold eyes of Captain Veseloffsky, the sound of Baron Ungern's voice with its tones of despair and woe, until finally I sank into a heavy stupor. I was awakened by Baron Ungern who came to ask pardon that he could not take me in his motor car, because he was obliged to take Daichin Van with him. But he informed me that he had left instructions to give me his own white camel and two Cossacks as servants. I had no time to thank him before he rushed out of my room.

Sleep then entirely deserted me, so I dressed and began smoking pipe after pipe of tobacco, as I thought: "How much easier to fight the Bolsheviki on the swamps of Seybi and to cross the snowy peaks of Ulan Taiga, where the bad demons kill all the travelers they can! There everything was simple and comprehensible, but here it is all a mad nightmare, a dark and foreboding storm!" I felt some tragedy, some horror in every movement of Baron Ungern, behind whom paced this silent, white-faced Veseloffsky and Death.

THE HORROR OF WAR!

At dawn of the following morning they led up the splendid white camel for me and we moved away. My company consisted of the two Cossacks, two Mongol soldiers and one Lama with two pack camels carrying the tent and food. I still apprehended that the Baron had it in mind not to dispose of me before my friends there in Van Kure but to prepare this journey for me under the guise of which it would be so easy to do away with me by the road. A bullet in the back and all would be finished. Consequently I was momentarily ready to draw my revolver and defend myself. I took care all the time to have the Cossacks either ahead of me or at the side. About noon we heard the distant honk of a motor car and soon saw Baron Ungern whizzing by us at full speed. With him were two adjutants and Prince Daichin Van. The Baron greeted me very kindly and shouted:

"Shall see you again in Urga!"

"Ah!" I thought, "evidently I shall reach Urga. So I can be at ease during my trip, and in Urga I have many friends beside the presence there of the bold Polish soldiers whom I had worked with in Uliassutai and who had outdistanced me in this journey."

After the meeting with the Baron my Cossacks became very attentive to me and sought to distract me with stories. They told me about their very severe struggles with the Bolsheviki in Transbaikalia and Mongolia, about the battle with the Chinese near Urga, about finding communistic passports on several Chinese soldiers from Moscow, about the bravery of Baron Ungern and how he would sit at the campfire smoking and drinking tea right on the battle line without ever being touched by a bullet. At one fight seventy-four bullets entered his overcoat, saddle and the boxes by his side and again left him untouched. This is one of the reasons for his great influence over the Mongols. They related how before the battle he had made a reconnaissance in Urga with only one Cossack and on his way back had killed a Chinese officer and two soldiers with his bamboo stick or tashur; how he had no outfit save one change of linen and one extra pair of boots; how he was always calm and jovial in battle and severe and morose in the rare days of peace; and how he was everywhere his soldiers were fighting.

I told them, in turn, of my escape from Siberia and with chatting thus the day slipped by very quickly. Our camels trotted all the time, so that instead of the ordinary eighteen to twenty miles per day we made nearly fifty. My mount was the fastest of them all. He was a huge white animal with a splendid thick mane and had been presented to Baron Ungern by some Prince of Inner Mongolia with two black saddles tied on the bridle. He was a calm, strong, bold giant of the desert, on whose back I felt myself as though perched on the tower of a building. Beyond the Orkhon River we came across the first dead body of a Chinese soldier, which lay face up and arms outstretched right in the middle of the road. When we had crossed the Burgut Mountains, we entered the Tola River valley, farther up which Urga is located. The road was strewn with the overcoats, shirts, boots, caps and kettles which the Chinese had thrown away in their flight; and marked by many of their dead. Further on the road crossed a morass, where on either side lay great mounds of the dead bodies of men, horses and camels with broken carts and military debris of every sort. Here the Tibetans of Baron Ungern had cut up the escaping Chinese baggage transport; and it was a strange and gloomy contrast to see the piles of dead besides the effervescing awakening life of spring. In every pool wild ducks of different kinds floated about; in the high grass the cranes performed their weird dance of courtship; on the lakes great flocks of swans and geese were swimming; through the swampy places like spots of light moved the brilliantly colored pairs of the Mongolian sacred bird, the turpan or "Lama goose"; on the higher dry places flocks of wild turkey gambolled and fought as they fed; flocks of the salga partridge whistled by; while on the mountain side not far away the wolves lay basking and turning in the lazy warmth of the sun, whining and occasionally barking like playful dogs.

Nature knows only life. Death is for her but an episode whose traces she rubs out with sand and snow or ornaments with luxuriant greenery and brightly colored bushes and flowers. What matters it to Nature if a mother at Chefoo or on the banks of the Yangtse offers her bowl of rice with burning incense at some shrine and prays for the return of her son that has fallen unknown for all time on the plains along the Tola, where his bones will dry beneath the rays of Nature's dissipating fire and be scattered by her winds over the sands of the prairie? It is splendid, this indifference of Nature to death, and her greediness for life!

On the fourth day we made the shores of the Tola well after nightfall. We could not find the regular ford and I forced my camel to enter the stream in the attempt to make a crossing without guidance. Very fortunately I found a shallow, though somewhat miry, place and we got over all right. This is something to be thankful for in fording a river with a camel; because, when your mount finds the water too deep, coming up around his neck, he does not strike out and swim like a horse will do but just rolls over on his side and floats, which is vastly inconvenient for his rider. Down by the river we pegged our tent.

Fifteen miles further on we crossed a battlefield, where the third great battle for the independence of Mongolia had been fought. Here the troops of Baron Ungern clashed with six thousand Chinese moving down from Kiakhta to the aid of Urga. The Chinese were completely defeated and four thousand prisoners taken. However, these surrendered Chinese tried to escape during the night. Baron Ungern sent the Transbaikalian Cossacks and Tibetans in pursuit of them and it was their work which we saw on this field of death. There were still about fifteen hundred unburied and as many more interred, according to the statements of our Cossacks, who had participated in this

battle. The killed showed terrible sword wounds; everywhere equipment and other debris were scattered about. The Mongols with their herds moved away from the neighborhood and their place was taken by the wolves which hid behind every stone and in every ditch as we passed. Packs of dogs that had become wild fought with the wolves over the prey.

At last we left this place of carnage to the cursed god of war. Soon we approached a shallow, rapid stream, where the Mongols slipped from their camels, took off their caps and began drinking. It was a sacred stream which passed beside the abode of the Living Buddha. From this winding valley we suddenly turned into another where a great mountain ridge covered with dark, dense forest loomed up before us.

“Holy Bogdo-Ol!” exclaimed the Lama. “The abode of the Gods which guard our Living Buddha!”

Bogdo-Ol is the huge knot which ties together here three mountain chains: Gegyl from the southwest, Gangyn from the south, and Huntu from the north. This mountain covered with virgin forest is the property of the Living Buddha. The forests are full of nearly all the varieties of animals found in Mongolia, but hunting is not allowed. Any Mongol violating this law is condemned to death, while foreigners are deported. Crossing the Bogdo-Ol is forbidden under penalty of death. This command was transgressed by only one man, Baron Ungern, who crossed the mountain with fifty Cossacks, penetrated to the palace of the Living Buddha, where the Pontiff of Urga was being held under arrest by the Chinese, and stole him.

IN THE CITY OF LIVING GODS, 30,000 BUDDHAS AND 60,000 MONKS

At last before our eyes the abode of the Living Buddha! At the foot of Bogdo-Ol behind white walls rose a white Tibetan building covered with greenish-blue tiles that glittered under the sunshine. It was richly set among groves of trees dotted here and there with the fantastic roofs of shrines and small palaces, while further from the mountain it was connected by a long wooden bridge across the Tola with the city of monks, sacred and revered throughout all the East as Ta Kure or Urga. Here besides the Living Buddha live whole throngs of secondary miracle workers, prophets, sorcerers and wonderful doctors. All these people have divine origin and are honored as living gods. At the left on the high plateau stands an old monastery with a huge, dark red tower, which is known as the “Temple Lamas City,” containing a gigantic bronze gilded statue of Buddha sitting on the golden flower of the lotus; tens of smaller temples, shrines, obo, open altars, towers for astrology and the grey city of the Lamas consisting of single-storied houses and yurtas, where about 60,000 monks of all ages and ranks dwell; schools, sacred archives and libraries, the houses of Bandi and the inns for the honored guests from China, Tibet, and the lands of the Buriat and Kalmuck.

Down below the monastery is the foreign settlement where the Russian, foreign and richest Chinese merchants live and where the multi-colored and crowded oriental bazaar carries forward its bustling life. A kilometer away the grayish enclosure of Maimachen surrounds the remaining Chinese trading establishments, while farther on one sees a long row of Russian private houses, a hospital, church, prison and, last of all, the awkward four-storied red brick building that was formerly the Russian Consulate.

We were already within a short distance of the monastery, when I noticed several

Mongol soldiers in the mouth of a ravine nearby, dragging back and concealing in the ravine three dead bodies.

“What are they doing?” I asked.

The Cossacks only smiled without answering. Suddenly they straightened up with a sharp salute. Out of the ravine came a small, stocky Mongolian pony with a short man in the saddle. As he passed us, I noticed the epaulets of a colonel and the green cap with a visor. He examined me with cold, colorless eyes from under dense brows. As he went on ahead, he took off his cap and wiped the perspiration from his bald head. My eyes were struck by the strange undulating line of his skull. It was the man “with the head like a saddle,” against whom I had been warned by the old fortune teller at the last ourton outside Van Kure!

“Who is this officer?” I inquired.

Although he was already quite a distance in front of us, the Cossacks whispered: “Colonel Sepailoff, Commandant of Urga City.”

Colonel Sepailoff, the darkest person on the canvas of Mongolian events! Formerly a mechanician, afterwards a gendarme, he had gained quick promotion under the Czar’s regime. He was always nervously jerking and wriggling his body and talking ceaselessly, making most unattractive sounds in his throat and sputtering with saliva all over his lips, his whole face often contracted with spasms. He was mad and Baron Ungern twice appointed a commission of surgeons to examine him and ordered him to rest in the hope he could rid the man of his evil genius. Undoubtedly Sepailoff was a sadist. I heard afterwards that he himself executed the condemned people, joking and singing as he did his work. Dark, terrifying tales were current about him in Urga. He was a bloodhound, fastening his victims with the jaws of death. All the glory of the cruelty of Baron Ungern belonged to Sepailoff. Afterwards Baron Ungern once told me in Urga that this Sepailoff annoyed him and that Sepailoff could kill him just as well as others. Baron Ungern feared Sepailoff, not as a man, but dominated by his own superstition, because Sepailoff had found in Transbaikalia a witch doctor who predicted the death of the Baron if he dismissed Sepailoff. Sepailoff knew no pardon for Bolshevik nor for any one connected with the Bolsheviki in any way. The reason for his vengeful spirit was that the Bolsheviki had tortured him in prison and, after his escape, had killed all his family. He was now taking his revenge.

I put up with a Russian firm and was at once visited by my associates from Uliassutai, who greeted me with great joy because they had been much exercised about the events in Van Kure and Zain Shabi. When I had bathed and spruced up, I went out with them on the street. We entered the bazaar. The whole market was crowded. To the lively colored groups of men buying, selling and shouting their wares, the bright streamers of Chinese cloth, the strings of pearls, the earrings and bracelets gave an air of endless festivity; while on another side buyers were feeling of live sheep to see whether they were fat or not, the butcher was cutting great pieces of mutton from the hanging carcasses and everywhere these sons of the plain were joking and jesting. The Mongolian women in their huge coiffures and heavy silver caps like saucers on their heads were admiring the variegated silk ribbons and long chains of coral beads; an imposing big Mongol attentively examined a small herd of splendid horses and bargained with the Mongol zahachine or owner of the horses; a skinny, quick, black Tibetan, who had come to Urga to pray to the Living Buddha or, maybe, with a secret message from the other “God” in Lhasa, squatted and bargained for an image of the Lotus Buddha carved in agate; in another corner a big crowd of Mongols and Buriats had collected and

surrounded a Chinese merchant selling finely painted snuff-bottles of glass, crystal, porcelain, amethyst, jade, agate and nephrite, for one of which made of a greenish milky nephrite with regular brown veins running through it and carved with a dragon winding itself around a bevy of young damsels the merchant was demanding of his Mongol inquirers ten young oxen; and everywhere Buriats in their long red coats and small red caps embroidered with gold helped the Tartars in black overcoats and black velvet caps on the back of their heads to weave the pattern of this Oriental human tapestry. Lamas formed the common background for it all, as they wandered about in their yellow and red robes, with capes picturesquely thrown over their shoulders and caps of many forms, some like yellow mushrooms, others like the red Phrygian bonnets or old Greek helmets in red. They mingled with the crowd, chatting serenely and counting their rosaries, telling fortunes for those who would hear but chiefly searching out the rich Mongols whom they could cure or exploit by fortune telling, predictions or other mysteries of a city of 60,000 Lamas. Simultaneously religious and political espionage was being carried out. Just at this time many Mongols were arriving from Inner Mongolia and they were continuously surrounded by an invisible but numerous network of watching Lamas. Over the buildings around floated the Russian, Chinese and Mongolian national flags with a single one of the Stars and Stripes above a small shop in the market; while over the nearby tents and yurtas streamed the ribbons, the squares, the circles and triangles of the princes and private persons afflicted or dying from smallpox and leprosy. All were mingled and mixed in one bright mass strongly lighted by the sun. Occasionally one saw the soldiers of Baron Ungern rushing about in long blue coats; Mongols and Tibetans in red coats with yellow epaulets bearing the swastika of Jenghiz Khan and the initials of the Living Buddha; and Chinese soldiers from their detachment in the Mongolian army. After the defeat of the Chinese army two thousand of these braves petitioned the Living Buddha to enlist them in his legions, swearing fealty and faith to him. They were accepted and formed into two regiments bearing the old Chinese silver dragons on their caps and shoulders.

As we crossed this market, from around a corner came a big motor car with the roar of a siren. There was Baron Ungern in the yellow silk Mongolian coat with a blue girdle. He was going very fast but recognized me at once, stopping and getting out to invite me to go with him to his yurta. The Baron lived in a small, simply arranged yurta, set up in the courtyard of a Chinese hong. He had his headquarters in two other yurtas nearby, while his servants occupied one of the Chinese fang-tzu. When I reminded him of his promise to help me to reach the open ports, the General looked at me with his bright eyes and spoke in French:

“My work here is coming to an end. In nine days I shall begin the war with the Bolsheviki and shall go into the Transbaikal. I beg that you will spend this time here. For many years I have lived without civilized society. I am alone with my thoughts and I would like to have you know them, speaking with me not as the ‘bloody mad Baron,’ as my enemies call me, nor as the ‘severe grandfather,’ which my officers and soldiers call me, but as an ordinary man who has sought much and has suffered even more.”

The Baron reflected for some minutes and then continued:

“I have thought about the further trip of your group and I shall arrange everything for you, but I ask you to remain here these nine days.”

What was I to do? I agreed. The Baron shook my hand warmly and ordered tea.

A SON OF CRUSADERS AND PRIVATEERS

"Tell me about yourself and your trip," he urged. In response I related all that I thought would interest him and he appeared quite excited over my tale.

"Now I shall tell you about myself, who and what I am! My name is surrounded with such hate and fear that no one can judge what is the truth and what is false, what is history and what myth. Some time you will write about it, remembering your trip through Mongolia and your sojourn at the yurta of the 'bloody General.' "

He shut his eyes, smoking as he spoke, and tumbling out his sentences without finishing them as though some one would prevent him from phrasing them.

"The family of Ungern von Sternberg is an old family, a mixture of Germans with Hungarians—Huns from the time of Attila. My warlike ancestors took part in all the European struggles. They participated in the Crusades and one Ungern was killed under the walls of Jerusalem, fighting under Richard Coeur de Lion. Even the tragic Crusade of the Children was marked by the death of Ralph Ungern, eleven years old. When the boldest warriors of the country were despatched to the eastern border of the German Empire against the Slavs in the twelfth century, my ancestor Arthur was among them, Baron Halsa Ungern Sternberg. Here these border knights formed the order of Monk Knights or Teutons, which with fire and sword spread Christianity among the pagan Lithuanians, Esthonians, Latvians and Slavs. Since then the Teuton Order of Knights has always had among its members representatives of our family. When the Teuton Order perished in the Grunwald under the swords of the Polish and Lithuanian troops, two Barons Ungern von Sternberg were killed there. Our family was warlike and given to mysticism and asceticism.

"During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries several Barons von Ungern had their castles in the lands of Latvia and Esthonia. Many legends and tales lived after them. Heinrich Ungern von Sternberg, called 'Ax,' was a wandering knight. The tournaments of France, England, Spain and Italy knew his name and lance, which filled the hearts of his opponents with fear. He fell at Cadiz 'neath the sword of a knight who cleft both his helmet and his skull. Baron Ralph Ungern was a brigand knight between Riga and Reval. Baron Peter Ungern had his castle on the island of Dago in the Baltic Sea, where as a privateer he ruled the merchantmen of his day.

"In the beginning of the eighteenth century there was also a well-known Baron Wilhelm Ungern, who was referred to as the 'brother of Satan' because he was an alchemist. My grandfather was a privateer in the Indian Ocean, taking his tribute from the English traders whose warships could not catch him for several years. At last he was captured and handed to the Russian Consul, who transported him to Russia where he was sentenced to deportation to the Transbaikalia. I am also a naval officer but the Russo-Japanese War forced me to leave my regular profession to join and fight with the Zabaikal Cossacks. I have spent all my life in war or in the study and learning of Buddhism. My grandfather brought Buddhism to us from India and my father and I accepted and professed it. In Transbaikalia I tried to form the order of Military Buddhists for an uncompromising fight against the depravity of revolution."

He fell into silence and began drinking cup after cup of tea as strong and black as coffee.

"Depravity of revolution! . . . Has anyone ever thought of it besides the French philosopher, Bergson, and the most learned Tashi Lama in Tibet?"

The grandson of the privateer, quoting scientific theories, works, the names of scientists and writers, the Holy Bible and Buddhist books, mixing together French, German, Russian and English, continued:

"In the Buddhistic and ancient Christian books we read stem predictions about the time when the war between the good and evil spirits must begin. Then there must come the unknown 'Curse' which will conquer the world, blot out culture, kill morality and destroy all the people. Its weapon is revolution. During every revolution the previously experienced intellect-creator will be replaced by the new rough force of the destroyer. He will place and hold in the first rank the lower instincts and desires. Man will be farther removed from the divine and the spiritual. The Great War proved that humanity must progress upward toward higher ideals; but then appeared that Curse which was seen and felt by Christ, the Apostle John, Buddha, the first Christian martyrs, Dante, Leonardo da Vinci, Goethe and Dostoyevsky. It appeared, turned back the wheel of progress and blocked our road to the Divinity. Revolution is an infectious disease and Europe making the treaty with Moscow deceived itself and the other parts of the world. The Great Spirit put at the threshold of our lives Karma, who knows neither anger nor pardon. He will reckon the account, whose total will be famine, destruction, the death of culture, of glory, of honor and of spirit, the death of states and the death of peoples. I see already this horror, this dark, mad destruction of humanity."

The door of the yurta suddenly swung open and an adjutant snapped into a position of attention and salute.

"Why do you enter a room by force?" the General exclaimed in anger.

"Your Excellency, our outpost on the border has caught a Bolshevik reconnaissance party and brought them here."

The Baron arose. His eyes sparkled and his face contracted with spasms.

"Bring them in front of my yurtal!" he ordered.

All was forgotten—the inspired speech, the penetrating voice—all were sunk in the austere order of the severe commander. The Baron put on his cap, caught up the bamboo tashur which he always carried with him and rushed from the yurta. I followed him out. There in front of the yurta stood six Red soldiers surrounded by the Cossacks.

The Baron stopped and glared sharply at them for several minutes. In his face one could see the strong play of his thoughts. Afterwards he turned away from them, sat down on the doorstep of the Chinese house and for a long time was buried in thought. Then he rose, walked over to them and, with an evident show of decisiveness in his movements, touched all the prisoners on the shoulder with his tashur and said: "You to the left and you to the right!" as he divided the squad into two sections, four on the right and two on the left.

"Search those two! They must be commissars!" commanded the Baron and, turning to the other four, asked: "Are you peasants mobilized by the Bolsheviks?"

"Just so, Your Excellency!" cried the frightened soldiers.

"Go to the Commandant and tell him that I have ordered you to be enlisted in my troops!"

On the two to the left they found passports of Commissars of the Communist Political Department. The General knitted his brows and slowly pronounced the following:

"Beat them to death with sticks!"

He turned and entered the yurta. After this our conversation did not flow readily and so I left the Baron to himself.

After dinner in the Russian firm where I was staying some of Ungern's officers came in. We were chatting animatedly when suddenly we heard the horn of an automobile, which instantly threw the officers into silence.

"The General is passing somewhere near," one of them remarked in a strangely altered voice.

Our interrupted conversation was soon resumed but not for long. The clerk of the firm came running into the room and exclaimed: "The Baron!"

He entered the door but stopped on the threshold. The lamps had not yet been lighted and it was getting dark inside, but the Baron instantly recognized us all, approached and kissed the hand of the hostess, greeted everyone very cordially and, accepting the cup of tea offered him, drew up to the table to drink. Soon he spoke:

"I want to steal your guest," he said to the hostess and then, turning to me, asked: "Do you want to go for a motor ride? I shall show you the city and the environs."

Donning my coat, I followed my established custom and slipped my revolver into it, at which the Baron laughed.

"Leave that trash behind! Here you are in safety. Besides you must remember the prediction of Narabanchi Hutuktu that Fortune will ever be with you."

"All right," I answered, also with a laugh. "I remember very well this prediction. Only I do not know what the Hutuktu thinks 'Fortune' means for me. Maybe it is death like the rest after my hard, long trip, and I must confess that I prefer to travel farther and am not ready to die."

We went out to the gate where the big Fiat stood with its intruding great lights. The chauffeur officer sat at the wheel like a statue and remained at salute all the time we were entering and seating ourselves.

"To the wireless station!" commanded the Baron.

We veritably leapt forward. The city swarmed, as earlier, with the Oriental throng, but its appearance now was even more strange and miraculous. In among the noisy crowd Mongol, Buriat and Tibetan riders threaded swiftly; caravans of camels solemnly raised their heads as we passed; the wooden wheels of the Mongol carts screamed in pain; and all was illumined by splendid great arc lights from the electric station which Baron Ungern had ordered erected immediately after the capture of Urga, together with a telephone system and wireless station. He also ordered his men to clean and disinfect the city which had probably not felt the broom since the days of Jenghiz Khan. He arranged an auto-bus traffic between different parts of the city; built bridges over the Tola and Orkhon; published a newspaper; arranged a veterinary laboratory and hospitals; re-opened the schools; protected commerce, mercilessly hanging Russian and Mongolian soldiers for pillaging Chinese firms.

In one of these cases his Commandant arrested two Cossacks and a Mongol soldier who had stolen brandy from one of the Chinese shops and brought them before him. He immediately bundled them all into his car, drove off to the shop, delivered the brandy back to the proprietor and as promptly ordered the Mongol to hang one of the Russians to the big gate of the compound. With this one swung he commanded: "Now hang the other!" and this had only just been accomplished when he turned to the Commandant and ordered him to hang the Mongol beside the other two. That seemed expeditious and just enough until the Chinese proprietor came in dire distress to the Baron and plead with him:

"General Baron! General Baron! Please take those men down from my gateway, for no one will enter my shop!"

After the commercial quarter was flashed past our eyes, we entered the Russian settlement across a small river. Several Russian soldiers and four very spruce-looking Mongolian women stood on the bridge as we passed. The soldiers snapped to salute like immobile statues and fixed their eyes on the severe face of their Commander. The women first began to run and shift about and then, infected by the discipline and order of events, swung their hands up to salute and stood as immobile as their northern swains. The Baron looked at me and laughed:

"You see the discipline! Even the Mongolian women salute me."

Soon we were out on the plain with the car going like an arrow, with the wind whistling and tossing the folds of our coats and caps. But Baron Ungern, sitting with closed eyes, repeated: "Faster! Faster!" For a long time we were both silent.

"And yesterday I beat my adjutant for rushing into my yurt and interrupting my story," he said.

"You can finish it now," I answered.

"And are you not bored by it? Well, there isn't much left and this happens to be the most interesting. I was telling you that I wanted to found an order of military Buddhists in Russia. For what? For the protection of the processes of evolution of humanity and for the struggle against revolution, because I am certain that evolution leads to the Divinity and revolution to bestiality. But I worked in Russia! In Russia, where the peasants are rough, untutored, wild and constantly angry, hating everybody and everything without understanding why. They are suspicious and materialistic, having no sacred ideals. Russian intelligents live among imaginary ideals without realities. They have a strong capacity for criticizing everything but they lack creative power. Also they have no will power, only the capacity for talking and talking. With the peasants, they cannot like anything or anybody. Their love and feelings are imaginary. Their thoughts and sentiments pass without trace like futile words. My companions, therefore, soon began to violate the regulations of the Order. Then I introduced the condition of celibacy, the entire negation of woman, of the comforts of life, of superfluities, according to the teachings of the Yellow Faith; and, in order that the Russian might be able to live down his physical nature. I introduced the limitless use of alcohol, hasheesh and opium. Now for alcohol I hang my officers and soldiers; then we drank to the 'white fever,' delirium tremens. I could not organize the Order but I gathered round me and developed three hundred men wholly bold and entirely ferocious. Afterward they were heroes in the war with Germany and later in the fight against the Bolsheviki, but now only a few remain."

"The wireless, Excellency!" reported the chauffeur.

"Turn in there!" ordered the General.

On the top of a flat hill stood the big, powerful radio station which had been partially destroyed by the retreating Chinese but reconstructed by the engineers of Baron Ungern. The General perused the telegrams and handed them to me. They were from Moscow, Chita, Vladivostok and Peking. On a separate yellow sheet were the code messages, which the Baron slipped into his pocket as he said to me:

"They are from my agents, who are stationed in Chita, Irkutsk, Harbin and Vladivostok. They are all Jews, very skilled and very bold men, friends of mine all. I have also one Jewish officer, Vulfovitch, who commands my right flank. He is as ferocious as Satan but clever and brave. . . . Now we shall fly into space."

Once more we rushed away, sinking into the darkness of night. It was a wild ride. The car bounded over small stones and ditches, even taking narrow streamlets, as the skilled

chauffeur only seemed to guide it round the larger rocks. On the plain, as we sped by, I noticed several times small bright flashes of fire which lasted but for a second and then were extinguished.

"The eyes of wolves," smiled my companion. "We have fed them to satiety from the flesh of ourselves and our enemies!" he quietly interpolated, as he turned to continue his confession of faith.

"During the War we saw the gradual corruption of the Russian army and foresaw the treachery of Russia to the Allies as well as the approaching danger of revolution. To counteract this latter a plan was formed to join together all the Mongolian peoples which had not forgotten their ancient faiths and customs into one Asiatic State, consisting of autonomous tribal units, under the moral and legislative leadership of China, the country of loftiest and most ancient culture. Into this State must come the Chinese, Mongols, Tibetans, Afghans, the Mongol tribes of Turkestan, Tartars, Buriats, Kirghiz and Kalmucks. This State must be strong, physically and morally, and must erect a barrier against revolution and carefully preserve its own spirit, philosophy and individual policy. If humanity, mad and corrupted, continues to threaten the Divine Spirit in mankind, to spread blood and to obstruct moral development, the Asiatic State must terminate this movement decisively and establish a permanent, firm peace. This propaganda even during the War made splendid progress among the Turkomans, Kirghiz, Buriats and Mongols. . . . "Stop!" suddenly shouted the Baron.

The car pulled up with a jerk. The General jumped out and called me to follow. We started walking over the prairie and the Baron kept bending down all the time as though he were looking for something on the ground.

"Ah!" he murmured at last, "He has gone away. . . ."

I looked at him in amazement.

"A rich Mongol formerly had his yurta here. He was the outfitter for the Russian merchant, Noskoff. Noskoff was a ferocious man as shown by the name the Mongols gave him—'Satan.' He used to have his Mongol debtors beaten or imprisoned through the instrumentality of the Chinese authorities. He ruined this Mongol, who lost everything and escaped to a place thirty miles away; but Noskoff found him there, took all that he had left of cattle and horses and left the Mongol and his family to die of hunger. When I captured Urga, this Mongol appeared and brought with him thirty other Mongol families similarly ruined by Noskoff. They demanded his death. . . . So I hung 'Satan' . . ."

Anew the motor car was rushing along, sweeping a great circle on the prairie, and anew Baron Ungern with his sharp, nervous voice carried his thoughts round the whole circumference of Asian life.

"Russia turned traitor to France, England and America, signed the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and ushered in a reign of chaos. We then decided to mobilize Asia against Germany. Our envoys penetrated Mongolia, Tibet, Turkestan and China. At this time the Bolsheviki began to kill all the Russian officers and we were forced to open civil war against them, giving up our Pan-Asiatic plans; but we hope later to awake all Asia and with their help to bring peace and God back to earth. I want to feel that I have helped this idea by the liberation of Mongolia."

He became silent and thought for a moment.

"But some of my associates in the movement do not like me because of my atrocities and severity," he remarked in a sad voice. "They cannot understand as yet that we are

not fighting a political party but a sect of murderers of all contemporary spiritual culture. Why do the Italians execute the 'Black Hand' gang? Why are the Americans electrocuting anarchistic bomb throwers? and I am not allowed to rid the world of those who would kill the soul of the people? I, a Teuton, descendant of crusaders and privateers, I recognize only death for murderers! . . . Return!" he commanded the chauffeur.

An hour and a half later we saw the electric lights of Urga.

THE CAMP OF MARTYRS

Near the entrance to the town, a motor car stood before a small house.

"What does that mean?" exclaimed the Baron. "Go over there!"

Our car drew up beside the other. The house door opened sharply, several officers rushed out and tried to hide.

"Stand!" commanded the General. "Go back inside." They obeyed and he entered after them, leaning on his tashur. As the door remained open. I could see and hear everything.

"Woe to them!" whispered the chauffeur. "Our officers knew that the Baron had gone out of the town with me, which means always a long journey, and must have decided to have a good time. He will order them beaten to death with sticks."

I could see the end of the table covered with bottles and tinned things. At the side two young women were seated, who sprang up at the appearance of the General. I could hear the hoarse voice of Baron Ungern pronouncing sharp, short, stern phrases.

"Your native land is perishing. . . . The shame of it is upon all you Russians . . . and you cannot understand it . . . nor feel it. . . . You need wine and women. . . . Scoundrels! Brutes! . . . One hundred fifty tashur for every man of you."

The voice fell to a whisper.

"And you, Mesdames, do you not realize the ruin of your people? No? For you it is of no moment. And have you no feeling for your husbands at the front who may even now be killed? You are not women. . . . I honor woman, who feels more deeply and strongly than man; but you are not women! . . . Listen to me, Mesdames. Once more and I will hang you. . . ."

He came back to the car and himself sounded the horn several times. Immediately Mongol horsemen galloped up.

"Take these men to the Commandant. I will send my orders later."

On the way to the Baron's yurta we were silent. He was excited and breathed heavily, lighting cigarette after cigarette and throwing them aside after but a single puff or two.

"Take supper with me," he proposed.

He also invited his Chief of Staff, a very retiring, oppressed but splendidly educated man. The servants spread a Chinese hot course for us followed by cold meat and fruit compote from California with the inevitable tea. We ate with chopsticks. The Baron was greatly distraught.

Very cautiously I began speaking of the offending officers and tried to justify their actions by the extremely trying circumstances under which they were living.

"They are rotten through and through, demoralized, sunk into the depths," murmured the General.

The Chief of Staff helped me out and at last the Baron directed him to telephone the Commandant to release these gentlemen.

The following day I spent with my friends, walking a great deal about the streets and watching their busy life. The great energy of the Baron demanded constant nervous activity from himself and every one round him. He was everywhere, seeing everything but never interfering with the work of his subordinate administrators. Every one was at work.

In the evening I was invited by the Chief of Staff to his quarters, where I met many intelligent officers. I related again the story of my trip and we were all chatting along animatedly when suddenly Colonel Sepailoff entered, singing to himself. All the others at once became silent and one by one under various pretexts they slipped out. He handed our host some papers and, turning to us, said:

"I shall send you for supper a splendid fish pie and some hot tomato soup."

As he left, my host clasped his head in desperation and said:

"With such scum of the earth are we now forced after this revolution to work!"

A few minutes later a soldier from Sepailoff brought us a tureen full of soup and the fish pie. As the soldier bent over the table to set the dishes down, the Chief motioned me with his eyes and slipped to me the words: "Notice his face."

When the man went out, my host sat attentively listening until the sounds of the man's steps ceased.

"He is Sepailoff's executioner who hangs and strangles the unfortunate condemned ones."

Then, to my amazement, he began to pour out the soup on the ground beside the brazier and, going out of the yurt, threw the pie over the fence.

"It is Sepailoff's feast and, though it may be very tasty, it may also be poison. In Sepailoff's house it is dangerous to eat or drink anything."

Distinctly oppressed by these doings, I returned to my house. My host was not yet asleep and met me with a frightened look. My friends were also there.

"God be thanked!" they all exclaimed. "Has nothing happened to you?"

"What is the matter?" I asked.

"You see," began the host, "after your departure a soldier came from Sepailoff and took your luggage, saying that you had sent him for it; but we knew what it meant—that they would first search it and afterwards. . . ."

I at once understood the danger. Sepailoff could place anything he wanted in my luggage and afterwards accuse me. My old friend, the agronomer, and I started at once for Sepailoff's, where I left him at the door while I went in and was met by the same soldier who had brought the supper to us. Sepailoff received me immediately. In answer to my protest he said that it was a mistake and, asking me to wait for a moment, went out. I waited five, ten, fifteen minutes but nobody came. I knocked on the door but no one answered me. Then I decided to go to Baron Ungern and started for the exit. The door was locked. Then I tried the other door and found that also locked. I had been trapped! I wanted at once to whistle to my friend but just then noticed a telephone on the wall and called up Baron Ungern. In a few minutes he appeared together with Sepailoff.

"What is this?" he asked Sepailoff in a severe, threatening voice; and, without waiting for an answer, struck him a blow with his tashur that sent him to the floor.

We went out and the General ordered my luggage produced. Then he brought me to his own yurt.

"Live here, now," he said. "I am very glad of this accident," he remarked with a smile, "for now I can say all that I want to."

This drew from me the question:

"May I describe all that I have heard and seen here?"

He thought a moment before replying: "Give me your notebook."

I handed him the album with my sketches of the trip and he wrote therein: "After my death, Baron Ungern."

"But I am older than you and I shall die before you," I remarked.

He shut his eyes, bowed his head and whispered:

"Oh, no! One hundred thirty days yet and it is finished: then . . . Nirvana! How wearied I am with sorrow, woe and hate!"

We were silent for a long time. I felt that I had now a mortal enemy in Colonel Sepailoff and that I should get out of Urga at the earliest possible moment. It was two o'clock at night. Suddenly Baron Ungern stood up.

"Let us go to the great, good Buddha," he said with a countenance held in deep thought and with eyes aflame, his whole face contracted by a mournful, bitter smile. He ordered the car brought.

Thus lived this camp of martyrs, refugees pursued by events to their tryst with Death, driven on by the hate and contempt of this offspring of Teutons and privateers! And he, martyring them, knew neither day nor night of peace. Fired by impelling, poisonous thoughts, he tormented himself with the pains of a Titan, knowing that every day in this shortening chain of one hundred thirty links brought him nearer to the precipice called "Death."

BEFORE THE FACE OF BUDDHA

As we came to the monastery we left the automobile and dipped into the labyrinth of narrow alleyways until at last we were before the greatest temple of Urga with the Tibetan walls and windows and its pretentious Chinese roof. A single lantern burned at the entrance. The heavy gate with the bronze and iron trimmings was shut. When the General struck the big brass gong hanging by the gate, frightened monks began running up from all directions and, seeing the "General Baron," fell to the earth in fear of raising their heads.

"Get up," said the Baron, "and let us into the Temple!"

The inside was like that of all Lama temples, the same multi-colored flags with the prayers, symbolic signs and the images of holy saints; the big bands of silk cloth hanging from the ceiling; the images of the gods and goddesses. On both sides of the approach to the altar were the low red benches for the Lamas and choir. On the altar small lamps threw their rays on the gold and silver vessels and candlesticks. Behind it hung a heavy yellow silk curtain with Tibetan inscriptions. The Lamas drew the curtain aside. Out of the dim light from the flickering lamps gradually appeared the great gilded statue of Buddha seated in the Golden Lotus. The face of the god was indifferent and calm with only a soft gleam of light animating it. On either side he was guarded by many thousands of lesser Buddhas brought by the faithful as offerings in prayer. The Baron struck the gong to attract Great Buddha's attention to his prayer and threw a handful of coins into the large bronze bowl. And then this scion of crusaders who had read all the philosophers of the West, closed his eyes, placed his hands together before his face

and prayed. I noticed a black rosary on his left wrist. He prayed about ten minutes. Afterwards he led me to the other end of the monastery and, during our passage, said to me:

"I do not like this temple. It is new, erected by the Lamas when the Living Buddha became blind. I do not find on the face of the golden Buddha either tears, hopes, distress or thanks of the people. They have not yet had time to leave these traces on the face of the god. We shall go now to the old Shrine of Prophecies."

This was a small building, blackened with age and resembling a tower with a plain round roof. The doors stood open. At both sides of the door were prayer wheels ready to be spun; over it a slab of copper with the signs of the zodiac. Inside two monks, who were intoning the sacred sutras, did not lift their eyes as we entered. The General approached them and said:

"Cast the dice for the number of my days!"

The priests brought two bowls with many dice therein and rolled them out on their low table. The Baron looked and reckoned with them the sum before he spoke:

"One hundred thirty! Again one hundred thirty!"

Approaching the altar carrying an ancient stone statue of Buddha brought all the way from India, he again prayed. As day dawned, we wandered out through the monastery, visited all the temples and shrines, the museum of the medical school, the astrological tower and then the court where the Bandi and young Lamas have their daily morning wrestling exercises. In other places the Lamas were practicing with the bow and arrow. Some of the higher Lamas feasted us with hot mutton, tea and wild onions. After we returned to the yurta I tried to sleep but in vain. Too many different questions were troubling me. "Where am I? In what epoch am I living?" I knew not but I dimly felt the unseen touch of some great idea, some enormous plan, some indescribable human woe.

After our noon meal the General said he wanted to introduce me to the Living Buddha. It is so difficult to secure audience with the Living Buddha that I was very glad to have this opportunity offered me. Our auto soon drew up at the gate of the red and white striped wall surrounding the palace of the god. Two hundred Lamas in yellow and red robes rushed to greet the arriving "Chiang Chun," General, with the low-toned, respectful whisper "Khan! God of War!" As a regiment of formal ushers they led us to a spacious great hall softened by its semi-darkness. Heavy carved doors opened to the interior parts of the palace. In the depths of the hall stood a dais with the throne covered with yellow silk cushions. The back of the throne was red inside a gold framing; at either side stood yellow silk screens set in highly ornamented frames of black Chinese wood; while against the walls at either side of the throne stood glass cases filled with varied objects from China, Japan, India and Russia. I noticed also among them a pair of exquisite Marquis and Marquises in the fine porcelain of Sevres. Before the throne stood a long, low table at which eight noble Mongols were seated, their chairman, a highly esteemed old man with a clever, energetic face and with large penetrating eyes. His appearance reminded me of the authentic wooden images of the Buddhist holymen with eyes of precious stones which I saw at the Tokyo Imperial Museum in the department devoted to Buddhism, where the Japanese show the ancient statues of Amida, Daunichi-Buddha, the Goddess Kwannon and the jolly old Hotei.

This man was the Hutuktu Jahantsi, Chairman of the Mongolian Council of Ministers, and honored and revered far beyond the bournes of Mongolia. The others were the Ministers—Khans and the Highest Princes of Khalkha. Jahantsi Hutuktu invited Baron Ungern to the place at his side, while they brought in a European chair for

me. Baron Ungern announced to the Council of Ministers through an interpreter that he would leave Mongolia in a few days and urged them to protect the freedom won for the lands inhabited by the successors of Jenghiz Khan, whose soul still lives and calls upon the Mongols to become anew a powerful people and reunite again into one great Mid-Asiatic State all the Asian kingdoms he had ruled.

The General rose and all the others followed him. He took leave of each one separately and sternly. Only before Jahantsi Lama he bent low while the Hutuktu placed his hands on the Baron's head and blessed him. From the Council Chamber we passed at once to the Russian style house which is the personal dwelling of the Living Buddha. The house was wholly surrounded by a crowd of red and yellow Lamas; servants, councilors of Bogdo, officials, fortune tellers, doctors and favorites. From the front entrance stretched a long red rope whose outer end was thrown over the wall beside the gate. Crowds of pilgrims crawling up on their knees touch this end of the rope outside the gate and hand the monk a silken hatyk or a bit of silver. This touching of the rope whose inner end is in the hand of the Bogdo establishes direct communication with the holy, incarnated Living God. A current of blessing is supposed to flow through this cable of camel's wool and horse hair. Any Mongol who has touched the mystic rope receives and wears about his neck a red band as the sign of his accomplished pilgrimage.

I had heard very much about the Bogdo Khan before this opportunity to see him. I had heard of his love of alcohol, which had brought on blindness, about his leaning toward exterior western culture and about his wife drinking deep with him and receiving in his name numerous delegations and envoys.

In the room which the Bogdo used as his private study, where two Lama secretaries watched day and night over the chest that contained his great seals, there was the severest simplicity. On a low, plain, Chinese lacquered table lay his writing implements, a case of seals given by the Chinese Government and by the Dalai Lama and wrapped in a cloth of yellow silk. Nearby was a low easy chair, a bronze brazier with an iron stovepipe leading up from it; on the walls were the signs of the swastika. Tibetan and Mongolian inscriptions; behind the easy chair a small altar with a golden statue of Buddha before which two tallow lamps were burning; the floor was covered with a thick yellow carpet.

When we entered, only the two Lama secretaries were there, for the Living Buddha was in the small private shrine in an adjoining chamber, where no one is allowed to enter save the Bogdo Khan himself and one Lama, Kanpo-Gelong, who cares for the temple arrangements and assists the Living Buddha during his prayers of solitude. The secretary told us that the Bogdo had been greatly excited this morning. At noon he had entered his shrine. For a long time the voice of the head of the Yellow Faith was heard in earnest prayer and after his another unknown voice came clearly forth. In the shrine had taken place a conversation between the Buddha on earth and the Buddha of heaven—thus the Lamas phrased it to us.

"Let us wait a little," the Baron proposed. "Perhaps he will soon come out."

As we waited the General began telling me about Jahantsi Lama, saying that, when Jahantsi is calm, he is an ordinary man but, when he is disturbed and thinks very deeply, a nimbus appears about his head.

After half an hour the Lama secretaries suddenly showed signs of deep fear and began listening closely by the entrance to the shrine. Shortly they fell on their faces on the ground. The door slowly opened and there entered the Emperor of Mongolia, the Living Buddha. His Holiness Bogdo Djebtsung Damba Hutuktu, Khan of Outer

Mongolia. He was a stout old man with a heavy shaven face resembling those of the Cardinals of Rome. He was dressed in the yellow silken Mongolian coat with a black binding. The eyes of the blind man stood widely open. Fear and amazement were pictured in them. He lowered himself heavily into the easy chair and whispered: "Write!"

A secretary immediately took paper and a Chinese pen as the Bogdo began to dictate his vision, very complicated and far from clear. He finished with the following words:

"This I, Bogdo Hutuktu Khan, saw, speaking with the great wise Buddha, surrounded by the good and evil spirits. Wise Lamas, Hutuktus, Kanpos, Marambas and Holy Gheghens, give the answer to my vision!"

As he finished, he wiped the perspiration from his head and asked who were present.

"Khan Chiang Chin Baron Ungern and a stranger," one of the secretaries answered on his knees.

The General presented me to the Bogdo, who bowed his head as a sign of greeting. They began speaking together in low tones. Through the open door I saw a part of the shrine. I made out a big table with a heap of books on it, some open and others lying on the floor below; a brazier with the red charcoal in it; a basket containing the shoulder blades and entrails of sheep for telling fortunes. Soon the Baron rose and bowed before the Bogdo. The Tibetan placed his hands on the Baron's head and whispered a prayer. Then he took from his own neck a heavy ikon and hung it around that of the Baron.

"You will not die but you will be incarnated in the highest form of being. Remember that. Incarnated God of War, Khan of grateful Mongolia!" I understood that the Living Buddha blessed the "Bloody General" before death.

During the next two days I had the opportunity to visit the Living Buddha three times together with a friend of the Bogdo, the Buriat Prince Djam Bolon. I shall describe these visits in Part IV.

Baron Ungern organized the trip for me and my party to the shore of the Pacific. We were to go on camels to northern Manchuria, because there it was easy to avoid cavilling with the Chinese authorities so badly oriented in the international relationship with Poland. Having sent a letter from Uliassutai to the French Legation at Peking and bearing with me a letter from the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, expressing thanks for the saving of Uliassutai from a pogrom, I intended to make for the nearest station on the Chinese Eastern Railway and from there proceed to Peking. The Danish merchant E. V. Olufsen was to have traveled out with me and also a learned Lama Turgut, who was headed for China.

Never shall I forget the night of May 19th to 20th of 1921! After dinner Baron Ungern proposed that we go to the yurt of Djam Bolon, whose acquaintance I had made on the first day after my arrival in Urga. His yurt was placed on a raised wooden platform in a compound located behind the Russian settlement. Two Buriat officers met us and took us in. Djam Bolon was a man of middle age, tall and thin with an unusually long face. Before the Great War he had been a simple shepherd but had fought together with Baron Ungern on the German front and afterwards against the Bolsheviks. He was a Grand Duke of the Buriats, the successor of former Buriat kings who had been dethroned by the Russian Government after their attempt to establish the Independence of the Buriat people. The servants brought us dishes with nuts, raisins, dates and cheese and served us tea.

"This is the last night, Djam Bolon!" said Baron Ungern. "You promised me . . ."

"I remember," answered the Buriat, "all is ready."

For a long time I listened to their reminiscences about former battles and friends who had been lost. The clock pointed to midnight when Djam Bolon got up and went out of the yurta.

"I want to have my fortune told once more," said Baron Ungern, as though he were justifying himself. "For the good of our cause it is too early for me to die. . . ."

Djam Bolon came back with a little woman of middle years, who squatted down eastern style before the brazier, bowed low and began to stare at Baron Ungern. Her face was whiter, narrower and thinner than that of a Mongol woman. Her eyes were black and sharp. Her dress resembled that of a gypsy woman. Afterwards I learned that she was a famous fortune teller and prophet among the Buriats, the daughter of a gypsy woman and a Buriat. She drew a small bag very slowly from her girdle, took from it some small bird bones and a handful of dry grass. She began whispering at intervals unintelligible words, as she threw occasional handfuls of the grass into the fire, which gradually filled the tent with a soft fragrance. I felt a distinct palpitation of my heart and a swimming in my head. After the fortune teller had burned all her grass, she placed the bird bones on the charcoal and turned them over again and again with a small pair of bronze pincers. As the bones blackened, she began to examine them and then suddenly her face took on an expression of fear and pain. She nervously tore off the kerchief which bound her head and, contracted with convulsions, began snapping out short, sharp phrases.

"I see . . . I see the God of War. . . . His life runs out . . . horribly . . . After it a shadow . . . black like the night. . . . Shadow. . . . One hundred thirty steps remain. . . . Beyond darkness. . . . Nothing . . . I see nothing. . . . The God of War has disappeared. . . ."

Baron Ungern dropped his head. The woman fell over on her back with her arms stretched out. She had fainted, but it seemed to me that I noticed once a bright pupil of one of her eyes showing from under the closed lashes. Two Buriats carried out the lifeless form, after which a long silence reigned in the yurta of the Buriat Prince. Baron Ungern finally got up and began to walk around the brazier, whispering to himself. Afterwards he stopped and began speaking rapidly:

"I shall die! I shall die! . . . but no matter, no matter. . . . The cause has been launched and will not die. . . . I know the roads this cause will travel. The tribes of Jenghiz Khan's successors are awakened. Nobody shall extinguish the fire in the heart of the Mongols! In Asia there will be a great State from the Pacific and Indian Oceans to the shore of the Volga. The wise religion of Buddha shall run to the north and the west. It will be the victory of the spirit. A conqueror and leader will appear stronger and more stalwart than Jenghiz Khan and Ugadai. He will be more clever and more merciful than Sultan Baber and he will keep power in his hands until the happy day when, from his subterranean capital, shall emerge the King of the World. Why, why shall I not be in the first ranks of the warriors of Buddhism? Why has Karma decided so? But so it must be! And Russia must first wash herself from the insult of revolution, purifying herself with blood and death; and all people accepting Communism must perish with their families in order that all their offspring may be rooted out!"

The Baron raised his hand above his head and shook it, as though he were giving his orders and bequests to some invisible person.

Day was dawning.

"My time has come!" said the General. "In a little while I shall leave Urga."

He quickly and firmly shook hands with us and said:

“Good-bye for all time! I shall die a horrible death but the world has never seen such a terror and such a sea of blood as it shall now see. . . .”

The door of the yurta slammed shut and he was gone. I never saw him again.

“I must go also, for I am likewise leaving Urga today.”

“I know it,” answered the Prince, “the Baron has left you with me for some purpose. I will give you a fourth companion, the Mongol Minister of War. You will accompany him to your yurta. It is necessary for you. . . .”

Djam Bolon pronounced this last with an accent on every word. I did not question him about it, as I was accustomed to the mystery of this country of the mysteries of good and evil spirits.

“THE MAN WITH A HEAD LIKE A SADDLE”

After drinking tea at Djam Bolon’s yurta I rode back to my quarters and packed my few belongings. The Lama Turgut was already there.

“The Minister of War will travel with us,” he whispered. “It is necessary.”

“All right,” I answered, and rode off to Olufsen to summon him. But Olufsen unexpectedly announced that he was forced to spend some few days more in Urga—a fatal decision for him, for a month later he was reported killed by Sepailoff who remained as Commandant of the city after Baron Ungern’s departure. The War Minister, a stout, young Mongol, joined our caravan. When we had gone about six miles from the city, we saw an automobile coming up behind us. The Lama shrunk up inside his coat and looked at me with fear. I felt the now familiar atmosphere of danger and so opened my holster and threw over the safety catch of my revolver. Soon the motor stopped alongside our caravan. In it sat Sepailoff with a smiling face and beside him his two executioners. Chestiakoff and Jdanoff. Sepailoff greeted us very warmly and asked:

“You are changing your horses in Khazahuduk? Does the road cross that pass ahead? I don’t know the way and must overtake an envoy who went there.”

The Minister of War answered that we would be in Khazahuduk that evening and gave Sepailoff directions as to the road. The motor rushed away and, when it had topped the pass, he ordered one of the Mongols to gallop forward to see whether it had not stopped somewhere near the other side. The Mongol whipped his steed and sped away. We followed slowly.

“What is the matter?” I asked. “Please explain!”

The Minister told me that Djam Bolon yesterday received information that Sepailoff planned to overtake me on the way and kill me. Sepailoff suspected that I had stirred up the Baron against him. Djam Bolon reported the matter to the Baron, who organized this column for my safety. The returning Mongol reported that the motor car had gone on out of sight.

“Now,” said the Minister, “we shall take quite another route so that the Colonel will wait in vain for us at Khazahuduk.”

We turned north at Undur Dobo and at night were in the camp of a local prince. Here we took leave of our Minister, received splendid fresh horses and quickly continued our trip to the east, leaving behind us “the man with the head like a saddle” against whom I had been warned by the old fortune teller in the vicinity of Van Kure.

After twelve days without further adventures we reached the first railway station

on the Chinese Eastern Railway, from where I traveled in unbelievable luxury to Peking.

* * *

Surrounded by the comforts and conveniences of the splendid hotel at Peking, while shedding all the attributes of traveler, hunter and warrior, I could not, however, throw off the spell of those nine days spent in Urga, where I had daily met Baron Ungern, "Incarnated God of War." The newspapers carrying accounts of the bloody march of the Baron through Transbaikalia brought the pictures ever fresh to my mind. Even now, although more than seven months have elapsed. I cannot forget those nights of madness, inspiration and hate.

The predictions are fulfilled. Approximately one hundred thirty days afterwards Baron Ungern was captured by the Bolsheviki through the treachery of his officers and, it is reported, was executed at the end of September.

Baron R. F. Ungern von Sternberg. . . . Like a bloody storm of avenging Karma he spread over Central Asia. What did he leave behind him? The severe order to his soldiers closing with the words of the Revelations of St. John:

"Let no one check the revenge against the corrupter and slayer of the soul of the Russian people. Revolution must be eradicated from the World. Against it the Revelations of St. John have warned us thus: 'And the woman was arrayed in purple and scarlet, and decked with gold and precious stones and pearls, having in her hand a golden cup full of abominations, even the unclean things of her fornication, and upon her forehead a name written, MYSTERY, BABYLON THE GREAT, THE MOTHER OF THE HARLOTS AND OF THE ABOMINATIONS OF THE EARTH. And I saw the woman drunken with the blood of the saints, and with the blood of the martyrs of Jesus.' "

It is a human document, a document of Russian and, perhaps, of world tragedy.

But there remained another and more important trace. In the Mongol yurtas and at the fires of Buriat, Mongol, Djungar, Kirkhiz, Kalmuck and Tibetan shepherds still speak the legend born of this son of crusaders and privateers:

"From the north a white warrior came and called on the Mongols to break their chains of slavery, which fell upon our freed soil. This white warrior was the Incarnated Jenghiz Khan and he predicted the coming of the greatest of all Mongols who will spread the fair faith of Buddha and the glory and power of the offspring of Jenghiz, Ugadai and Kublai Khan. So it shall be!"

Asia is awakened and her sons utter bold words.

It were well for the peace of the world if they go forth as disciples of the wise creators, Ugadai and Sultan Baber, rather than under the spell of the "bad demons" of the destructive Tamerlane.

SOVIET RUSSIA AND THE MONGOLIAN REVOLUTION OF 1921

Fujiko Isono



I INTRODUCTION

On 27 June 1921 the Soviet Army crossed the border into Outer Mongolia, bringing the Mongolian revolution to rapid victory. This has led to the widely accepted theory that Soviet intervention was a straightforward invasion of Outer Mongolia in the course of Soviet expansionism. According to this view the request of the Mongolian People's Party for Soviet support was made at Russian instigation, and the capture of Urga (now Ulan Bator) by Ungern-Sternberg is interpreted as a mere pretext for the Russian invasion, as Ungern posed no real or substantial threat to the Soviet regime.¹ As George Murphy has written: the Soviet authorities 'were at the end of a victorious struggle and both their morale and their confidence were high', and 'the goal of Urga, and of acquisition of influence over the vast region of Outer Mongolia, seems to have been irresistible to the Soviet government'.² There is no doubt that the propagation of revolutionary ideas was a fundamental objective of the Bolsheviks, but when we look more carefully at both the internal and international situation of Soviet Russia in 1921, such a motive, even when linked to the supposed desire of Russia to secure and exploit the abundant natural resources of her neighbour, does not appear sufficient to account for an invasion of Outer Mongolia at this particular point in time.

In this paper, discussion will be focused on the reasons for the Soviet intervention of 1921, leaving the various ideological and political aspects of Soviet influence to be treated elsewhere.

II THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE MONGOLIAN REVOLUTION

In December 1911, with the 'eighth reincarnation' of the Urga 'Living Buddha' as bogd khaan (sacred emperor) of Mongolia, the territory of Outer Mongolia declared its independence of China. The Mongols reasoned that as they had at the end of the seventeenth century originally submitted to the Ch'ing (Manchu) emperor, recognizing him as their khaan, their allegiance to China naturally terminated with the fall of the imperial dynasty and the creation of a republic. A Mongol secessionist movement was, in fact, already in being, in response to the 'new policy' of Ch'ing China to bring Outer Mongolia under its direct control, thus depriving the Mongol princes of their rights to

rule within their own respective territories. A delegation of Mongol princes and high lamas had accordingly been sent to St. Petersburg in the summer of 1911 to seek Russian support for an independent Mongolia. In addition to this nationalist initiative there were the manifest grievances of the lower classes, who were either personally subject to the princes or the monasteries, or obliged to perform *corvées* for the Ch'ing dynasty. Being required to pay dues to their lords and the costs of administration, as well as their own personal expenses, they were deeply in debt to Chinese merchant-usurers. Clearly they too had ample reason to want to be free of Manchu-Chinese exploitation.

Though the Mongols thus aimed at establishing an independent Mongol state, uniting both Inner and Outer Mongolia, no other country recognized their independence; even Russia limited its support to Outer Mongolian autonomy, wishing neither to create international complications nor to take upon itself the difficult task of organizing the still underdeveloped Mongols into a state, which, as Foreign Minister Sazonov declared to the Duma, 'would involve great financial expense and enormous labour'.³

The Peking government was finally forced to compromise, and after the Russo-Chinese joint declaration of 1913, which recognized Chinese suzerainty over an autonomous Outer Mongolia, the status of Outer Mongolia was formalized by the tripartite agreement of 1915 between Russia, China and Mongolia, which effectively put an end to Mongol hopes for a united Mongol state. Nevertheless, because of internal disorder in China, Outer Mongolia did enjoy *de facto* independence until the end of 1919, long enough for some Mongols to realize that Manchu exploitation had simply been replaced by increased exactions by their own ruling classes. In this period the beginnings of modern education in Mongolia and the publication of newspapers in the Mongol language created a new type of secular 'intellectual'. After the Russian Revolution of 1917 many Mongols, even in the countryside, heard that the tsar had been overthrown and that the Russian people had 'become equal', and in Urga itself progressive Russians explained the new ideas to their Mongol friends.⁴

III THE EARLY SOVIET ATTITUDE TO MONGOLIA

In the summer of 1919 the Soviet government sent a message to the Mongol people and the autonomous government of (Outer) Mongolia, renouncing the Russo-Chinese joint declaration of 1913, and telling the Mongols that, 'as an independent country', they would be 'free to have direct relations with any foreign countries, without consulting either Petrograd or Peking'. The message ended with an invitation to the Mongol people to send delegates to meet the Red army.⁵ A message very much along the same lines, dated 25 July 1919 and known as the Karakhan manifesto, was sent also to 'the Chinese people and the governments of the south and the north'.⁶ The style and content of these messages suggest that they were a reflection of the optimism and idealism of the early Soviet leaders. Paragraph 6 of the text sent to China expresses the hope that the Chinese people, once liberated from foreign oppression, would give freedom to their minorities in much the same way that Soviet Russia had recognized the right of self-determination of its own minorities, even to the point of allowing their secession.


Even if the Soviet leaders had actually intended to entice the Mongols away from the Chinese, they were of course in no position to undertake any effective measures towards that end. In the summer of 1919 the Allied intervention in Siberia still posed a grave

threat, and the Japanese were consolidating their position in the Trans-Baikal region. Nor can it be argued that it was in response to the Russian message that the Mongol progressive-nationalists considered the sending of a delegation to ask for Soviet assistance, for the simple reason that the message itself did not actually reach the Mongol 'people', having been ignored by the bogd's government when a Mongol translation of it was eventually sent from Irkutsk to Urga by Boris Shumyatskii at the end of 1919.⁷

In fact, in the summer of 1919, far from achieving its independence, Outer Mongolia was in real danger of losing its autonomy. Taking advantage of the turmoil of the Russian Revolution the Peking government was increasing its garrisons in Outer Mongolia. The Mongol leaders, now deprived of tsarist support, were economically hard-pressed. And Semenov, a Cossack ataman officially backed by the Japanese, was threatening the bogd's government with a punitive expedition against Urga if it did not consent to participate in the Pan-Mongolian movement which he had sponsored. Already in early 1919 a rumour had begun to circulate that the Chinese high commissioner, Ch'en I, had entered into secret negotiations with some of the leading Mongol princes and officials for them to abrogate Mongolia's autonomy in exchange for guarantees of their privileges, and Chinese protection from both Semenov and the Reds.⁸

IV THE FORMATION OF THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S PARTY

It was in such circumstances that towards the end of 1918 two separate groups of Mongol progressive-nationalists were formed in Urga. The primary concern of both was to prevent the loss of Mongolia's autonomy. One of the groups consisted mainly of petty officials, but included Sükhbaatar, now called the 'father of the Mongolian



The Japanese and White presence in North-East Asia 1920-1

revolution'. Choibalsan, who was to occupy the post of prime minister from 1939 to 1952, belonged to the second group, which was led by Bodoo, a learned lama who had visited both Russia and China.

Choibalsan, with two co-authors, Losol and Demid, has left us his reminiscences of the Mongolian revolution in a remarkable work entitled *Monggol arad un ündüsün ü khubisghal un angkha egüs jü baighulughudagsan tobči teüke* ('A Concise History of the Origins and Organization of the Mongolian People's Revolution'). It is an extraordinarily frank record of the authors' experiences, many of which are not to be found in subsequent official histories. The following account is principally based on this document, which is little known outside the Mongolian People's Republic.⁹

As Bodoo was teaching the Mongol language at the Russian consulate in Urga, and Choibalsan had studied at Irkutsk until the outbreak of the Russian Revolution, it was the group to which they belonged that first established useful contact with the Russians – two men who soon revealed that they belonged to the clandestine revolutionary committee of Russian residents in Urga. Sükhbaatar's group on the other hand, tried at first to influence the bogd and also approached Orlov, the former tsarist consul-general in Urga, who now represented Kolchak. Though perhaps demonstrating their inexperience, this does not signify that the members of this group were merely 'nationalists', for in February 1920, apparently before they came to work with the other group, Sükhbaatar and Danzan, a customs official, tried to cross the frontier into Russia to observe developments there at first hand, and to find ways and means of securing Soviet assistance.¹⁰ Danzan had already heard something of the new ideas in Russia from a Buryat teacher called Dzhamtsaranov, and Sükhbaatar had been a non-commissioned officer in the army of the autonomous government, where some of the Russian instructors had also been influenced by progressive ideas.¹¹ In the small circle of intellectuals in Urga, members of one group had acquaintances in the other, but the first contacts between the two groups were cautious, with friends merely sounding out each other's opinions in the course of 'ordinary conversations'.¹² At the end of 1919 General Hsü Shu-cheng arrived from Peking and, brushing aside the more conciliatory negotiations of Ch'en I, forced the bogd's government to 'petition' for the abrogation of Outer Mongolian autonomy. This development persuaded the two groups to embark on a programme of joint action. They put up propaganda posters, proposing in one of them to replace the hereditary princes with elected leaders,¹³ and an unsuccessful attempt was made to assassinate Hsü. As an inevitable consequence of this co-operation Sükhbaatar's group also established contact with the two Russian revolutionaries in Urga.

One day in the spring of 1920 Bodoo and Choibalsan asked the advice of their Russian contacts on how best to promote their cause in the prevailing circumstance of a ruthless Chinese occupation. One of the Russians suggested that they should meet Sorokovikov, who was on the point of leaving for Irkutsk to report on the situation in Urga. He added that Soviet Russia was ready to assist weak and small nations under oppression.¹⁴

Some time in April five representatives of the two groups met Sorokovikov, who asked detailed questions regarding the aim and organization of their groups. Eager to impress Sorokovikov with their importance, they put the total number of their membership as 'several thousands'.¹⁵ Though the figure was clearly an exaggeration, it was not simply an idle boast on the part of the Mongols. At that time they had as yet no clearly defined idea of the meaning of the word 'party' in its political sense. The Mongol word *nam*

means 'a group, a section of the population like a class'.¹⁶ They were in fact attempting to give their estimate of the number of people who they thought would be sympathetic to their cause.¹⁷

After his return from Irkutsk as the Comintern representative, Sorokovikov met the various members of the two groups on 20 June 1920, and advised them to send a delegation to the Comintern's Far Eastern Secretariat. On 25th June, following another of his suggestions, the two groups merged to form the Mongolian People's Party, and adopted a party platform. The membership of the party at that time seems only to have been around twenty, and the smallness of this number is often cited as evidence against any significant Mongol initiative in the revolution. But, given that these were the original members of a clandestine revolutionary organization and that the total Mongol population of Outer Mongolia at that time can be estimated at barely 550,000, the number is not in fact significantly small, especially when we remember that all of the members lived in or near Urga, the Mongol population of which was only about 30,000.¹⁸ It is perhaps useful in this context to cite the parallel case of contemporary China, with a population well over a thousand times greater than that of Outer Mongolia, but where, at the First Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in July 1921, there was a membership attendance of only thirteen; the membership figure for the entire country at that time was a mere fifty-seven.

At their meeting of 25th June the newly-formed party decided to appoint the delegates to go to Soviet Russia, but the mission was clearly a perilous one and many dangers were to be expected on the way. 'No one volunteered, and no one dared say to another: "You should go".' They therefore drew lots to decide, and the choice fell upon Danzan and Choibalsan.¹⁹ The other members assisted with the preparations, supplying provisions and other necessities for the journey, and at the beginning of July, the two rode secretly out of Urga and headed for the Russian border.

V THE MONGOL DELEGATES AT VERKHNEUDINSK

Even the official history of the revolution published in the Mongolian People's Republic reads as though everything now went smoothly for the two Mongol delegates, as though they passed easily from the hands of one Soviet agency to another. What actually took place was very different.

After various adventures *en route* Danzan and Choibalsan crossed the Mongolian border and arrived in Russian Kyakhta. Once there, however, they walked the town for two days vainly trying to find the Soviet consul, Makstenek, as Sorokovikov had instructed them. They hesitated to ask their way, fearing they might arouse suspicion. They succeeded in locating Makstenek only when, finally and in desperation, they abandoned their caution and asked directions from the driver of a passing cart. When Makstenek was shown the letter of introduction given to them by the two Russian revolutionaries in Urga, he said that he had been expecting them, and made arrangements for them to proceed by steamer down the Selenga river to Verkhneudinsk (now Ulan Ude, capital of the Buryat A.S.S.R.).

In Verkhneudinsk, then capital of the Far Eastern Republic, they went to the place indicated by Makstenek. There, however, they were left completely alone, and locked up for the night, with nothing to eat or drink, and lacking even the most basic facilities. They feared they might have come to the wrong place and been made prisoner. When

morning came, a Buryat appeared, asked whether or not they had slept well, and apologized for having been unable to come sooner. After voicing their exasperation at such neglect and lack of consideration,²⁰ Danzan and Choibalsan were taken to a man of dignified appearance. When asked his name and office he replied, 'My name is Chervonnyi. What is the use of your knowing my office? You will find it out by and by.' He then asked them what they intended to do. The two Mongols refused to answer, saying that if he would not reveal his identity they could not be certain whether or not he was the man indicated by Makstenek, and it would be pointless, not to say rash, to tell anyone else of their mission. Chervonnyi then revealed that he was Boris Shumyatskii, head of the Far Eastern Republic. (Andrei Chervonnyi was his pseudonym.) Having heard what the Mongol delegates had to say, Shumyatskii said that he had been informed of the nature of their mission by Makstenek, but that he would have to consult with others before any decision could be made as to what should now be done. He told them they would have to wait for an answer. He also advised them to cut their braided hair and to wear Russian-style costumes, for there were many Chinese and Japanese in the city, and it would be dangerous to arouse their suspicions.²¹

A few days later the two Mongols paid a further visit to Shumyatskii, hoping to hasten the decision and to ask whether or not there was any news from Urga. There was no news. Shumyatskii counselled them to be patient, declaring that a revolution could not be achieved overnight: 'It might take months or years, or be achieved only during the lifetime of your children.' He then lectured them at great length on the history of the Russian Revolution and his own experiences in it.

Nearly twenty days passed without any answer. Choibalsan felt that his Russian was not good enough for him to negotiate directly with Shumyatskii, but Danzan then remembered the anti-tsarist Buryat named Dzhamtsaranov who had been teaching at a school in Urga, and Choibalsan himself then called to mind another Buryat called Rinchinov, whom he had known during his school-days in Irkutsk. As it seemed likely that either or both of these might now be actively involved in revolutionary work, they decided to ask Shumyatskii to summon the two Buryats to help them. When Choibalsan and Danzan next saw Shumyatskii he gave them a further lecture on the need for patience and the nature of revolution. The Mongols replied:

We understand very well what you have taught us. It may be true that a revolution cannot be achieved as rapidly as we would hope; but the situation in our country is fast deteriorating. For the sake of our people, our minds are troubled and we become impatient, placing all our hopes upon you. If such were not the case why would we bother you in this way?²²

Shumyatskii merely lectured them again, but at the end of the session, which lasted for some two hours, the Mongols finally mentioned their request to summon the two Buryats. Shumyatskii seemed greatly interested, asked for further details, and took down their names. The necessary arrangements were then made for Dzhamtsaranov and Rinchinov to join Choibalsan and Danzan at Verkhneudinsk.²³ Both Buryats were to play important roles in the Mongolian revolution, through their connection with the Mongol delegates, but in light of later interpretations of their influence, suggesting deliberate Russian attempts to coach and manipulate the Mongols, it is significant to note that the Buryats were initially assigned to the delegates as the result of a Mongol rather than a Russian initiative.

Following this meeting the Mongols sent a telegram to their comrades in Urga, asking them in secret code to secure for them an official letter of request for Soviet support,

bearing the seal of the bogd. On receipt of this communication their comrades in Urga enlisted the help of various sympathizers at court. After the humiliating capitulation to Hsü Shu-cheng, the court was favourably disposed to the idea of soliciting the support of other countries, and the bogd placed his seal on the letter addressed to Soviet Russia, as neither the United States nor Japan had responded to his similar appeals.

During their sixth visit to Shumyatskii, Choibalsan and Danzan were told that five other members of the Mongolian People's Party were coming from Urga to join them. These arrived in Verkhneudinsk on 10 August 1920, and included Sükhbaatar. Choibalsan and Danzan learned from them that after their departure a certain Borisov had been sent to Urga from the Comintern. As Shumyatskii had made no mention of this in his interviews with them, the Mongols said among themselves: 'They must have sent him [Borisov] to investigate the situation in Urga. Strange indeed are the ways of a foreign, developed country.'²⁴ The arrival of the second group, however, still did not produce any decision and a few days later Shumyatskii explained to them: 'This city is in the territory of the buffer state and it is not advisable to make any definite agreement here. The Japanese, Chinese and Whites keep watch with their spies, and we have to be extremely careful.'²⁵ Accordingly, and over a month after Danzan and Choibalsan had first arrived in Verkhneudinsk, the Mongol delegates were sent on to Irkutsk by train. Rinchinov and several other Buryats accompanied them, leaving Dzhamsaranov as liaison man.

VI THE FAR EASTERN REPUBLIC

In 1920 the situation of Soviet Russia in the Far East was still extremely unsettled. Contemporary evidence shows that in the middle of July, at the very time that the Mongol delegates first arrived in Verkhneudinsk, Shumyatskii was in a particularly difficult position. Though Kolchak's regime fell at the beginning of 1920 and the Allied intervention was officially ended by March, Japan and her protégé Semenov still occupied the greater part of the Trans-Baikal region. The most significant expression of Soviet weakness at this time was the creation of a buffer state, namely the Far Eastern Republic, to ward off the threat from the Japanese. In a telegram to Trotsky written on 19 February 1920 Lenin declared:

We must vehemently denounce the opponents of a buffer state . . . and demand that everyone in Siberia carry out the slogan: 'not a step farther east; all-out efforts to hasten the movement of troops and locomotives to the west, to Russia'. We would be idiots to allow ourselves to be drawn into a stupid movement into the heart of Siberia, permitting Denikin meanwhile to revive and the Poles to strike. It would be a crime.²⁶

The Far Eastern Republic was proclaimed at Verkhneudinsk on 6th April,²⁷ and was quickly recognized by Soviet Russia. Significantly its establishment was also welcomed by Japan,²⁸ for the Japanese were not without their own problems. In addition to the disapproval of the Allies, public opinion in Japan was turning against the protracted military operation in Siberia, which appeared to be leading absolutely nowhere. Moreover there was also the incidental danger of Bolshevik ideas penetrating the Japanese forces there.

The agreement of both Russia and Japan to accept the formula of a buffer state, however, did not completely resolve the situation. The Soviets naturally hoped to make

it as Red as possible, while the Japanese did their best to incorporate into the new republic the various 'governments' under their own protection. Within the republic itself things did not go smoothly. The provisional government headed by Krasnoshchekov wished to broaden the base of the republic by including Mensheviks and representatives of other parties, but his policy was opposed by the more radical members of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Communist Party, and these had the support of Moscow. Shumyatskii was appointed vice-premier and 'alternate' to Krasnoshchekov. As the two could not agree on policy, the latter journeyed first to Omsk, and then to Moscow, to put his own position.²⁹ This took place in June 1920, and when cease-fire negotiations with the Japanese were opened on 10th July at Gongota, a railway station between Verkhneudinsk and Chita, Shumyatskii was therefore acting head of the republic. A cease-fire was agreed on 15th July and a neutral zone marked out between the republic and the forces of Semenov and the Japanese. Though the territory of the Far Eastern Republic was to include that part of Siberia between Lake Baikal and the Pacific, Semenov still held Chita, less than three hundred miles to the east of Verkhneudinsk, denying the republic any access to the rest of eastern Siberia.

The appointment of Shumyatskii, a well-known Bolshevik, naturally made the Japanese suspicious of the extent of the republic's independence of Soviet Russia, and they decided to delay their evacuation of the Trans-Baikal region.³⁰ Also, the claim of Verkhneudinsk to be the seat of government of the new republic was not readily acceptable even to the Bolshevik members of the Vladivostok government, which also included many 'moderates'. Being far more experienced in dealing with the Japanese, they better understood the complexities of the situation. They sent a protest to Moscow, where Krasnoshchekov was attempting to convince the authorities of the need for compromise in the Far East. This time his view was endorsed, and on 13th August the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party decided to make the Far Eastern Republic a 'democratic republic'.³¹

In the middle of August the Red army suffered serious defeat before Warsaw, and Wrangel was strengthening his position in the Crimea. Krasnoshchekov undertook to effect a speedy peace in the Far East and to do his best to send as many divisions as possible to reinforce Russia's western front. At the end of August 1920, and only a few weeks after the Mongol delegates had left Verkhneudinsk for Irkutsk, Krasnoshchekov returned to Verkhneudinsk with full powers to construct a democratic buffer state which would be acceptable to the more moderate parties, as well as to the Japanese. Shumyatskii was immediately recalled from office.³²

These developments serve to illustrate the extent to which the Soviet leaders were being pressured to make concessions. In his report to the Eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets in December 1920 Lenin explained Russia's compromise in the Far East, which the more radical Bolsheviks found difficult to accept, in the following terms. In spite of the great sufferings of the Siberian peasants at the hands of the Japanese imperialists, he declared, 'we cannot go to war with Japan. On the contrary we must make every effort, not only to postpone such a war but, if at all possible, to avert it altogether, because, for reasons well-known to you, it is beyond our strength.'³³ Already the previous May a mission headed by I. L. Yurin had been appointed to Peking to try to secure China's recognition of the Far Eastern Republic, thereby putting pressure on the Japanese to evacuate Siberia.³⁴ And at the very time that Choibalsan and Danzan arrived in Verkhneudinsk, a Chinese military and diplomatic mission led by General Chang Ssu-lin was also there, awaiting permission to proceed to Moscow.³⁵ Such

circumstances explain why Shumyatskii was so desperately anxious to keep the presence of the Mongol delegates a matter of the utmost secrecy.

VII THE MONGOL DELEGATES IN SOVIET RUSSIA

On arriving in Irkutsk on 15 August 1920 the Mongol delegation was received by Gapon, the head of the Section of the Peoples of the East in the Siberian Bureau of the Russian Communist Party. When the Mongols presented the letter of request bearing the seal of the bogd, Gapon pondered a long while; he finally accepted it, saying that it might serve for future reference.³⁶ The delegates were then told to draw up their own letter of request and, in addition, to report on the aims and activities of their party. Evidently the bogd's letter was not quite what Gapon had expected. This precipitated the first open quarrel between the Mongol delegates. The official history simplifies the case, making it a conflict between progressive members on the one hand and, on the other, those reactionaries who maintained that the bogd's letter was quite sufficient for the purposes of their mission. Choibalsan's account, however, gives the impression that there was rather more to it than this. The delegates were finally reconciled by Rinchinov,³⁷ and agreed to prepare their own letter of request. It was a victory of the progressives over the conservatives, for in it they clearly stated that after the revolution they would leave the bogd as a limited monarch but, within a few years, when the Mongol people as a whole would be more sympathetic to such a course, they would carry through a second and more radical revolution.³⁸

In their answers to Gapon's questions the Mongols specified that what they required was financial aid and supplies of arms. They also asked for military instructors to train soldiers; but when asked whether they wanted direct armed intervention by the Soviet army, they answered in the negative, saying that, if sufficiently prepared, they would themselves be able to drive out the Chinese.³⁹ The interview with Gapon gave little immediate satisfaction to the Mongols, who were now told to proceed to Omsk. The Mongol delegates thereupon divided themselves into three groups: Danzan, Shagdarjav and Losol were to go to Omsk, accompanied by Rinchinov who would assist in the negotiations with the Soviet authorities; Bodoo and Dogsom were to return to Urga to activate party work; and Sükhbaatar and Choibalsan were to remain for the time being in Irkutsk for military and political instruction. Losol actually left for Omsk, but got on so poorly with his two colleagues, Danzan and Shagdarjav, that he returned to Irkutsk. In Omsk, Danzan and Shagdarjav were now told to proceed to Moscow, on the grounds that so important a decision could not be taken locally; but even after their arrival in Moscow the delays and frustrations continued, and they were obliged to wait in suspense for a further month. Though they were received by Lenin and other senior officials, including Shumyatskii who had by this time returned from Verkhneudinsk, no definite answer was forthcoming.

VIII THE SOVIET DILEMMA

It is difficult to know exactly what was taking place behind the scenes while the Mongol delegates awaited their reply but, given the position of Russia at that time, Soviet hesitation in acceding to the Mongol request for assistance is hardly to be wondered at.

Russia's western front was not yet secured. Disorder and discontent were spreading throughout the country. The Kronstadt rising of March 1921 was only months away.

No one who has any realistic idea of the internal situation of Mongolia in the 1920s can seriously imagine that the Soviet leaders would be sufficiently attracted by the prospect of economic gains alone to embark upon a military invasion of the country in 1921. The undoubtedly rich natural resources of Mongolia were as yet nothing more than a potentiality, scattered throughout a sparsely inhabited country with no modern means of transportation. Even in Russia itself the oilfields of the Caucasus, which were vital to the country's economic recovery, virtually ceased production until 1923, and in August 1922 the Soviet economy was actually on the point of collapse.⁴⁰ In 1959 J. N. Kunsten, fully bearing out the earlier prediction of Foreign Minister Sazonov to the Duma, wrote: 'For all of this material progress [in Mongolia] the Mongolians have at present given little materially to the Soviet economy in comparison to the amount expended on them.'⁴¹

Nor does it seem likely that Soviet Russia had any sufficient political reason for invading Mongolia. It is true that the fading hope of imminent revolution in Europe increased the importance of the Eastern peoples' struggle against imperialism. But the Mongols wished primarily to be freed from Chinese colonialism, and of the major powers in the East it was precisely China with whom Russia sought to establish cordial relations. In a circular released by Moscow about this time Trotsky wrote: 'The opinion of this government is: in delaying the war with Japan, we are trying to obtain at any cost the recognition of our power, the opening of commercial intercourse and the closest friendship with China.'⁴² As a result of the Mongol mission the Soviet leaders were in a difficult dilemma; it was an embarrassing conflict of interests. Though the Mongol delegates did not ask for direct Soviet military intervention, the arms and military instructors they had requested were clearly for the fight against the Chinese, and meeting the request would inevitably result in a deterioration in Russia's relations with China. If, on the other hand, Russia should turn down the Mongol request, it would not only alienate the Mongols but disappoint all the other small nations to whom she had openly promised support.

In an attempt to resolve this dilemma the Soviet authorities tried to reconcile the Mongol revolutionaries and the Chinese Nationalists. In Irkutsk Gapon told the Mongol delegates: 'We have our representatives in China, and are trying to secure a settlement of the Mongolian question by consultation with the Chinese "Lower Party".'⁴³ Gapon's advice is reflected in the letter that the Mongol delegates prepared in Irkutsk, for at one point it expresses the hope that the Soviet government would help the Mongols make contact with 'the party of the Chinese people'. The need for co-operation with the Chinese revolutionary forces is again repeated in the appeal by the delegates of the Mongolian People's Party to the Mongol masses, published in the first issue of *Mongolyn Unen*, the party paper printed in Irkutsk, on 10 November 1920.⁴⁴ When Danzan and Shagdarjav were received by Lenin they were told to abandon any thoughts they might have of totally destroying the Chinese in Mongolia, but instead to fraternize with them, to fight against both Chinese and Japanese imperialism and, above all, to struggle for their own economic and political independence.⁴⁵ Lenin may not have found Danzan a sympathetic listener, and also apparently made little impression upon him for, on his return to Irkutsk, Danzan told Sükhbaatar and Choibalsan that though in Moscow he had met with many important persons, he could not recall the names of any, except for that of Shumyatskii.⁴⁶

For the Soviet leaders, however, a reconciliation between Mongols and Chinese progressives was not enough. The more urgent objective was to establish formal diplomatic relations with the Chinese government, and this meant great tact in dealing with the Mongolian question. Later, in 1923, when Karakhan was in Peking, and though he had personal contacts with Sun Yat-sen, he refused to enter into formal negotiations with the south, because he 'did not want to consider questions which related to the internal affairs of China'.⁴⁷

Perhaps the theory of a Soviet-inspired Mongolian revolution gives too much credence to the efficiency and organizational ability of the Soviet government and the Comintern. What seems more likely is that the Comintern representatives in Mongolia, in their eagerness to propagate revolutionary ideas, gave the Mongols a more optimistic estimate of Soviet readiness to give support than was actually justified, whereas the various government officials in Verkhneudinsk, Irkutsk and Moscow, sensitive to the wider issues involved and the extreme delicacy of the international situation at the particular time, were necessarily more cautious in their pronouncements.⁴⁸ In October, 1920, however, a further development made it imperative for the Soviet leaders to come to a decision.

IX UNGERN-STERMBERG IN MONGOLIA

In Irkutsk, Sükhbaatar and Choibalsan, starved of news from both Moscow and Mongolia, were becoming frantic with impatience. When finally they received a secret communication from Bodoo and Dogsom, the two comrades who had returned to Urga, it was full of disquieting news about Ungern's invasion of Mongolia and the repressive measures taken by the Chinese, who feared an alliance between Ungern and the Mongols.

In August 1920 Ungern had separated from Semenov with an army of some three thousand men and, at the beginning of October, having ravaged the southern part of the territory under the control of the Far Eastern Republic, he retreated into Mongolia, hoping to make it his base for a full-scale counter-revolutionary operation. A. N. Kislov, serving with the Russian Fifth Army at the time, maintained that this apparently independent initiative by Ungern had in fact been pre-arranged with Semenov, but was disguised as a break with him in order to conceal the Japanese connection in the affair.⁴⁹

Joined by various Mongol princes who regarded him as the liberator of the Mongols, Ungern launched an offensive against Urga at the end of October. When news of this development reached Sükhbaatar and Choibalsan they sent a telegram to Danzan in Moscow urging him to do everything in his power to expedite negotiations with the Russians; they also wrote directly to the Narkomindel (People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs) urgently requesting Soviet armed intervention in Mongolia, and stressing not only the grave threat to their own hopes, but also the very real danger to Russian interests. The letter itself is dated 2 November 1920,⁵⁰ and the request does not appear to have been initiated by a Soviet agent, for Choibalsan complains that for some considerable time both he and Sükhbaatar had been left very much to their own devices by the Russians; even the Buryats had disappeared, rejoining them only after a decision had finally been made in Moscow.⁵¹

In Moscow meanwhile Danzan and Shagdarjav suddenly received the assurance of as much financial aid and as many arms as they needed. Any Soviet military intervention,

however, was to be limited to the eventuality of the Whites actually crossing the Mongolian border into Russia; the Mongols were expected to clear their country of their enemies by their own efforts. Though the exact date of this Soviet undertaking is not given, it is certain that it followed immediately upon news of Ungern's first attack on Urga. After their four long months of anxious waiting, the Mongol delegates were now told to return to Mongolia with all possible speed, and recruit more members to the party — 'in addition to the present five hundred' — in order to organize an effective resistance. Choibalsan writes: 'Even though these seven comrades [the Mongol delegates to Soviet Russia] had given a greatly exaggerated number of the party members' in their negotiations with the Soviets, in order to impress them and to achieve the rapid completion of their mission, 'there were in fact hardly more than twenty members who could at that time actively participate in party work. Moreover many of these had now been arrested by the Chinese or had fallen into the hands of Ungern.' Both Choibalsan's tone and the content of this passage strongly suggest that the Soviet side really did believe the figures given to them by the Mongols in Irkutsk.⁵² Nevertheless there was no time to lose. The delegates returned to Russian Kyakhta at the end of November, and Sükhbaatar and Choibalsan began to enlist the co-operation of the frontier princes and to recruit volunteers.

At the news of Ungern's attack on Urga the Soviet government sent two notes to China, dated 10th and 27th November, proposing a combined operation against Ungern, but this course was eventually rejected by Peking through their ambassador in London, the Chinese apparently responding with some relief to Ungern's failure to take the city.⁵³

X THE MONGOLIAN WAR OF REVOLUTION

Ungern, having increased the strength of his forces to about five thousand men, succeeded in capturing Urga at his second attempt at the beginning of February 1921, and thereupon restored the bogd to the throne and proclaimed Mongolia's independence. A number of Mongol nationalists also participated in the new government. Most of the Chinese who had been driven out of Urga, including the high commissioner Ch'en I and other officials, took refuge in the Chinese trading centre of Kyakhta, just across the frontier from Russian Kyakhta. The Chinese troops wrought havoc in the region by their policy of 'requisitioning', which in fact amounted to mere plunder, thereby reinforcing the willingness of the local people to rally to Sükhbaatar's army.

At this juncture the Mongol revolutionaries were to encounter the last of the many crises they had to overcome in their attempts to secure Soviet support. Makstenek told Sükhbaatar that as the Mongol princes had sided with Ungern it would now be difficult for Russia to provide the aid that had been promised; he emphasized that this was not merely his personal view but the position of his government. Sükhbaatar remained silent for a long while, deep in thought. He then assured Makstenek that those Mongol princes who had sided with Ungern were also the enemies of the masses for whom he and his comrades had been struggling.⁵⁴ For the Mongolian People's Party this incident was of decisive significance, marking the transition from nationalist rising to socialist revolution. With the replacement of the Chinese by Ungern, anti-Chinese feeling ceased to be the common factor in Mongol dissidence, and was replaced by a confrontation between conservative Mongols allying themselves with Ungern on the one hand, and

progressive Mongols supported by Soviet Russia on the other. For Russia the struggle took the form of a continuation of the civil war, which now spilled over into Outer Mongolia.

At this point, however, the Soviet leaders once again repeated to Ch'en I their proposal for a combined operation against Ungern; but Peking suggested that the Soviet advance be limited to within twenty miles of the border, while the Soviets insisted that any offensive they might undertake should at the very least be pressed forward to include the recapture of Urga. Negotiations between Russia and China finally broke off on 3 March 1921.⁵⁵

At the beginning of March also the Mongolian People's Party held a meeting in Russian Kyakhta. On 13th March a people's provisional government was formed, and on the 14th it was decided to liberate Kyakhta from the Chinese. The forces under Sükhbaatar, commander-in-chief of the Mongolian People's Army, at this time numbered about four hundred men. It is probable that the Russians allowed the Mongols to start an attack on the Chinese because of the failure of their negotiations with Ch'en I. The Russians, however, did not take any active part in the attack, and when the Mongols captured Kyakhta on 18th March, Ch'en I, together with all the Chinese who had managed to escape across the border to Russian Kyakhta, were assured by Makstenek of a safe passage to China through Siberia.

The people's provisional government now moved to the Mongol side of Kyakhta, renaming the town Altan Bulag. On 10th April the provisional government issued a formal request for Soviet military intervention, but though Siberian partisans and some Soviet military advisers were taking part in skirmishes with the Whites in the frontier zone, the Red army did not enter Mongolia until Ungern actually attacked Russian Kyakhta. At the end of May Ungern moved his main forces to the north. The Mongol prince leading the vanguard attack on Altan Bulag was defeated by the Mongolian People's Army; and on 15th June Ungern, who had moved his forces against Russian Kyakhta, was also beaten back.

On the very same day Chicherin once again impressed on Peking the urgent need for joint action, but Peking replied that such a course was no longer necessary, for China had taken independent measures and 'Chang Tso-lin was duly authorized to take appropriate steps against Ungern'.⁵⁶ The appointment of Chang Tso-lin doubtless alarmed rather than reassured the Soviet leaders, for Chang's connection with Japan was well-known and it was widely believed that he was in collusion with Ungern.⁵⁷ On 16th June the Politburo of the Russian Communist Party took the decision to extend their military operations into Mongolian territory in order to liquidate Ungern's forces, and on 27th June the Red army crossed the border.⁵⁸ Moscow justified the operation to Peking on the grounds of China's manifest inability to cope with the Whites. As soon as Mongolia was cleared of the Whites, Russia declared, the Red army would be withdrawn.

Together with the army of the Far Eastern Republic and the Mongolian People's Army, the Soviet forces marched on Urga, where Ungern had left only a handful of soldiers and officials. These fled at the approach of the Red army, and the bogd's government, left to its own devices, had no alternative but to meet the terms of the revolutionaries.⁵⁹ The people's provisional government now moved from Altan Bulag to Urga, and the bogd's government surrendered its power to the new regime; the bogd was retained as head of state, but with powers and privileges severely curtailed.

XI AN EVALUATION OF THE UNGERN THREAT

China's refusal to undertake joint action and her subsequent failure to hold Urga provided the justification for the Soviet military operation in Mongolia on the side of the Mongol revolutionaries. But it would be incorrect to assume that the threat posed by Ungern merely provided the Russians with a pretext for this invasion. In attempting a realistic evaluation of the Russian response it is necessary to take a broad perspective, and consider the wider aspects of the international situation in the Far East.

Clearly the threat from Ungern cannot be judged solely in terms of the numerical strengths of the contending armies — Ungern's few thousand motley troops, as compared with the Red army in Siberia, which of course greatly outnumbered them. Henry Norton has pointed out the heavy military and financial burden incurred by stationing troops along an extended frontier:

By the middle of 1921 it was apparent that if the menace of the reactionary forces could not be removed, their very existence, even without an attack, would drain the life-blood of the country [the Far Eastern Republic] and make it an easy prey.⁶⁰

And the fall of the Far Eastern Republic would have meant for Soviet Russia nothing short of renewed confrontation with the Japanese, who were still occupying the Maritime Province.

Ungern, in his 'Decree no. 15' dated 21 May 1921 and issued on the eve of his march to the north, clearly states that he was 'under the command of Ataman Semenov' and refers to Semenov's intended offensive in the Ussuri region, 'with Japanese support, or even without', adding that this offensive could not but succeed, based as it was 'on precise calculation and a comprehensive political plan'.⁶¹ And only a few days after Ungern's decree, there was in fact a widescale counter-revolutionary uprising in the Maritime Province. Officially the Japanese remained neutral, but it is virtually certain that Japanese forces in the area played some sort of role in this concerted offensive of the Whites. Fear of another war with Japan seems to have been the main preoccupation of the Soviet leaders in their assessment of the situation in the Far East. In his speech of 19th June, which was, significantly, delivered to the Third All-Russian Food Conference only three days after the Politburo's decision to undertake military operations in Mongolia, Lenin referred to the White counter-offensive as 'the intervention started by the Japanese in the Far Eastern Republic'.⁶² It is true that when the Red army entered Mongolia Ungern had already been badly defeated in his attack on Kyakhta, and that his forces were disintegrating rapidly. But this was not generally appreciated by his adversaries at the time. Moreover it was clear to the Russians that the Mongol revolutionaries were not themselves sufficiently strong to deal effectively with the White presence in Mongolia. Urga itself was still in the hands of the Whites and, to make matters worse, in the west of Mongolia other White generals were gathering their forces.⁶³ West Mongolia was a particularly vulnerable point for the newly established people's government, for most of the inhabitants there were not Khalkhas (the population of the main part of Outer Mongolia), and they could have been easily persuaded by the Whites to take part in operations against it.

On 13th July the Mongolian People's Government requested that the Red army remain in Mongolia until all counter-revolutionary threats to its existence had been removed. This time Soviet consent was readily forthcoming, although later the same month, after Ungern had crossed the border into Russian territory, the Mongolian

People's Army was informed that Soviet troops would thenceforth restrict their activities to the Russian side of the frontier, leaving the Mongols themselves to clear their land of the remnants of their enemies.⁶⁴

Ungern, however, retreated back into Mongolia. He tried to reach western Mongolia, hoping to establish there a new base of operations and to reorganize his forces, and he advised the bogd to escape to Uliastai. While on his way to the west Ungern was betrayed and captured by a Mongol prince, and delivered to the Soviet authorities. In September 1921 he was tried and executed at Novosibirsk.⁶⁵

XII SOVIET RUSSIA, JAPAN AND CHINA

Looking back with benefit of hindsight, Soviet fears of renewed Japanese aggression may well appear somewhat exaggerated. At that time Japan was far less expansionist in outlook than in later years, and though the army was clearly opposed to the evacuation from Siberia, the Japanese government could still control the military. Nevertheless Russian fears of Japan were not groundless. For example, Ya. M. Dvorkin, who was employed in the foreign ministry of the Far Eastern Republic about this time, records that in November 1920 Krasnoshchekov obtained and forwarded to Lenin a Japanese document written by General Tanaka, describing an extensive plan for the invasion of Russia.⁶⁶ It is true that Tanaka, who was the Minister of the Army, proposed a forward policy in Siberia in August 1919; but his proposal, at least at that time, was rejected by the cabinet.⁶⁷ Such a policy, however, doubtless retained considerable popularity among the Japanese officers in Manchuria and Siberia, and when the document fell into the hands of Krasnoshchekov, the Soviet leaders were soon convinced that it was the officially adopted plan of the Japanese government. Though it has been argued that Ungern had strong Japanese support, no substantial aid in fact ever reached Ungern from Japan, and the 'Colonel' Suzuki who is often cited as Ungern's Japanese adviser is now known to have been merely a minor officer with a rabble following of only some fifty men, which he had himself managed to recruit in Manchuria. Nevertheless it is certainly true that Suzuki and his men were in close contact with Japanese military intelligence officers in Manchuria and Siberia, and these seem to have made Ungern believe either that he was already supported by the Japanese or that he soon would be.⁶⁸ Soviet leaders were convinced that Japanese 'advisers' had assured Ungern that if he should succeed in forcing his way into Siberia, 'Japanese forces would come to his support'.⁶⁹

While Soviet fears of Japan may have been exaggerated, Russia may on the other hand have seriously underestimated China's reaction to their intervention in Mongolia. Yurin's mission to Peking, when on the very point of reaching an agreement, was totally disrupted by the news of the Soviet operation.⁷⁰ Moreover when, apparently at Soviet instigation, the Mongolian People's Government requested Russia on 10 September 1921 to be the mediator in regulating its relations with China,⁷¹ Peking would have none of it. And this position over Mongolia was adopted not only by the reactionary Peking government but also, to Soviet surprise, by Sun Yat-sen. Sergei Dalin, the Secretary of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Communist Youth International at Irkutsk, reported in 1922 that when 'asked if Sun would agree to Mongolian independence, Sun's reply was resoundingly negative'.⁷² In the Joffe-Sun communication of February 1923 Sun Yat-sen agreed not to insist on an immediate evacuation of

the Red army, but only after being assured of Soviet recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Mongolia.⁷³

At the Congress of the Toilers of the Far East in January 1922 Zinoviev deplored the fact that even among the leaders of revolutionary south China, 'men should be found . . . so reactionary on the Mongolian problem as to propose the return of Mongolia to Chinese rule'.⁷⁴ Only the Chinese Communist Party at its Second Party Congress in July 1922 advocated making Mongolia, Tibet and Sinkiang 'autonomous states' within a federated state of China. The Mongolian question proved to be the most serious of the obstacles faced by the successive Soviet missions sent to China, and when Karakhan finally succeeded in concluding an agreement with China in May 1924 it was conditional upon the rapid evacuation of the Red army from Mongolia, and Soviet recognition of Mongolia as an integral part of China.

Though by the time of the Soviet evacuation in March 1925 the People's Republic of Mongolia had already been proclaimed (November 1924), following the death of the bogd the previous May, formal recognition of Chinese sovereignty (not suzerainty) nevertheless involved a certain degree of risk for the Soviet Union. The united front between the Chinese Nationalists and Communists did not last long, and had Chiang Kai-shek succeeded in consolidating the Nationalist regime in China, the Soviet Union would have had great difficulty in retaining its influence over Outer Mongolia in the face of Chinese claims.

The subsequent course of events, however, enabled the People's Republic of Mongolia to enjoy *de facto* independence from China under the active tutelage of the Soviet Union, with Shumyatskii playing an important role.⁷⁵ In the early 1930s Japan began its invasion of China, eventually cutting off China's access even to Inner Mongolia. It thus became more imperative than ever for the Mongolian People's Republic to rely upon the Soviet Union, and the Mongolian People's Party became subject to the control of the Comintern in much the same way as the Communist parties of other countries. Since that time the Mongolian People's Republic has remained one of the Soviet Union's most reliable allies.

XIII CONCLUSION

When the Mongolian revolution is considered in its wider historical context it appears as not so much the result of a calculated Soviet conspiracy, but rather the welcome but largely incidental by-product of an extremely complex power relationship, in which Soviet leaders were motivated more than anything else by their fear of Japanese aggression.

Unless one accepts *a priori* the theory that Soviet Russia has been consistently and unremittently expansionist in outlook and policy throughout its history, it is difficult to fit the example of Outer Mongolia into any 'overall pattern of Soviet expansionism'. The petty khanates of Bokhara and Khiva, with which too sweeping a parallel has been drawn, actually represent entirely different cases; both had formerly been protectorates of tsarist Russia, were placed far from the arena of international conflict, and involved no encroachment upon foreign territory – though certainly their retention within the Soviet Union may be held to be at odds with the principle of self-determination professed by Soviet Russia in its earliest days.

The problem for Soviet Russia in central Asia was primarily internal, the result of

local antagonism between communist revolutionaries and Muslim nationalists. In Outer Mongolia, by contrast, the problems were essentially military and diplomatic. Soviet military intervention in Mongolia was designed to prevent Outer Mongolia being used as a base for counter-revolutionary activity. It was undertaken at the substantial risk of impairing Russia's relations with China, but it was a risk of which the Soviet leaders were fully aware and which they tried as far as possible to minimize by their repeated proposals to the Chinese for joint action.

NOTES

1. Baron Roman von Ungern-Sternberg (1887–1921) was born to a Baltic German family, and in his youth had spent a year or two in western Mongolia. He became a close friend of Ataman Semenov, whom the Japanese officially supported in the Siberian civil war, and was nicknamed the 'mad baron' for sadistic atrocities not only against Jews and Communists but also against his own men. In the summer of 1920 he left Semenov, who was dropped by the Japanese shortly after this rupture, to create an anti-Communist base in Outer Mongolia.
2. George G. S. Murphy, *Soviet Mongolia* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1966), pp. 7, 27. His theory of Soviet expansionism has been adopted uncritically by such later authors as Thomas T. Hammond; see his 'The Communist Takeover of Outer Mongolia: Model for Eastern Europe?', in T. T. Hammond (ed.), *The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers* (New Haven and London, 1975), pp. 107–44.
3. Gerard M. Friters, *Outer Mongolia and its International Position* (Baltimore, 1949), p. 66.
4. For a more detailed outline of the background, see Fujiko Isono, 'The Mongolian Revolution of 1921', *Mod. Asian Studies*, x (1976), pp. 375–94.
5. *Bügd nairamdakh Mongol Ard Ulsyn tüükh* [History of the People's Republic of Mongolia], 3 vols. (Ulan Bator, 1966–9), iii, p. 54; English trans. of vol. iii, by W. A. Brown and U. Onon, *History of the Mongolian People's Republic* (Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1976), pp. 53–4.
6. *Sovyetsko-Kitaiskie otnosheniya, 1919–1957: Sbornik dokumentov* [Soviet-Chinese Relations, 1919–57: Collected Documents], ed. I. F. Kurdyukov, V. N. Nikiforov and A. S. Perevertailo (Moscow, 1959), pp. 43–5.
7. L. Bat-Ochir and D. Dashjamts, *Damdingiin Sükhbaatar: Namtar* [Sükhbaatar, Son of Damdin: A Biography] (Ulan Bator, 1973), p. 68.
8. Li Yü-shu, *Wai Meng-ku ch'e-chih wen-t'i* [The Question of the Abrogation of Outer Mongolian Autonomy] (Taipei, 1961), p. 171. Ch'en I reported to Peking that he had received a visit from Tserendorj, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, on 17 January 1919. Ch. 8 gives a detailed record of the negotiations.
9. Kh. Choibalsan, G. Demid and D. Losol, *Monggol arad un ündüsün ü khubisghal un angkha egüs jü baighulughudagsan tobči teuke* [A Concise History of the Origins and Organization of the Mongolian People's Revolution], 2 vols. (Ulan Bator, 1934). The work is printed in the old Mongol script.
10. *Ibid.*, i, p. 69.
11. Bat-Ochir and Dashjamts, *op. cit.*, pp. 47–8.
12. Choibalsan, Losol and Demid, *op. cit.*, pp. 54–8.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 59–65. The text of this poster is in *Mongol Ardyn Khuv's galt Namyn tüükhend kholbogdokh barimit bichigүүд* [Source Materials Concerning the History of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party], 3 vols. (Ulan Bator, 1966–70), i, p. 9.
14. Choibalsan, Losol and Demid, *op. cit.*, i, pp. 88–9. See also G. Kungurov and I. Sorokovikov, *Aratskaiya revolyutsiya* [The Herdsmen's Revolution] (Irkutsk, 1957), pp. 83–4.
15. Choibalsan, Losol and Demid, *op. cit.*, i, p. 95.

16. Ya. Tsevel, *Mongol khelnii tovch tailbar tol'* [A Concise Explanatory Dictionary of the Mongol Language] (Ulan Bator, 1966), p. 366.
17. D. Dashjamts, *Marksizm-Leninizm Mongold delgeren kheregisen ni* [How Marxism-Leninism was Spread and Adopted in Mongolia] (Ulan Bator, 1974), p. 65.
18. I. M. Maiskii, *Sovremennaya Mongoliya* [Contemporary Mongolia] (Irkutsk, 1921), pp. 16, 104; revised edn., *Mongoliya nakanune revolyutsii* [Mongolia on the Eve of the Revolution] (Moscow, 1959), pp. 30, 100.
19. Choibalsan, Losol and Demid, op. cit., i, p. 103.
20. Ibid., pp. 110–26, gives a detailed account of their adventures until their first meeting with Shumyatskii.
21. Ibid., pp. 126–30, describes their interview with Shumyatskii.
22. Ibid., p. 137.
23. Ibid., pp. 132–7. The idea that the two Buryat intellectuals had been assigned beforehand to coach the Mongol delegates is widely held; cf. Murphy, *Soviet Mongolia*, p. 14.
24. Choibalsan, Losol and Demid, op. cit., i, p. 170.
25. Ibid., p. 173.
26. V. I. Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii* [Complete Works], 5th edn., 57 vols. (Moscow, 1958–69), li, p. 137; the English translation here cited is taken from V. I. Lenin, *Complete Works*, 4th rev. edn., 53 vols. (Moscow, 1955–70), xlv, p. 342.
27. For contemporary accounts of the creation of the Far Eastern Republic, see P. S. Parfenov (Altaiskii), *Bor'ba za Dal'nii Vostok* [The Struggle for the Far East] (Leningrad, 1928), pp. 148–58; S. Seryshev, 'Vooruzhennaya bor'ba za vlast' Sovetov na Dal'nem Vostoke' [The Armed Struggle for Power in the Far East], in *Revolutsiya na Dal'nem Vostoke* [The Revolution in the Far East], compiled by the Commission on the History of the October Revolution and the Russian Communist Party (Moscow and Leningrad, 1923), pp. 116–18.
28. *Nihon Gaikō Bunsho, Taishō 9 nen* [Japanese Diplomatic Documents, 1920] (Tokyo, 1971), bk. 1, vol. ii, pp. 660–86, 'On the Question of the Creation of a Buffer Zone in the Russian Far East'.
29. Parfenov, op. cit., pp. 223–4; see also P. M. Nikiferov, *Zapiski prem'era ministra D.V.R.* [Memoirs of the Prime Minister of the Far Eastern Republic] (Moscow, 1963), p. 214; B. M. Shereshevskii, *Razgrom Semenovshchiny* [The Destruction of Semenov's Faction] (Novosibirsk, 1966), pp. 160–2.
30. Parfenov, op. cit., pp. 229–31; *Nihon Gaikō Bunsho, Taishō 9 nen*, bk. 1, vol. ii, pp. 672, 675–8. Colonel Kurosawa repeatedly sent telegrams from Chita to his superiors, warning them that the government in Verkhneudinsk was 'nothing but another name for the Bolsheviks'.
31. Nikiferov, op. cit., p. 231.
32. Parfenov, op. cit., pp. 235–41. This passage gives a detailed account of the conflicts and negotiations which were taking place at that time between the various factions.
33. Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, xxxi, p. 435; Lenin, *Complete Works*, xxxi, p. 465.
34. M. I. Kazanin, *Zapiski sekretarya misii* [Memoirs of a Secretary of Mission] (Moscow, 1963), gives a vivid personal account of their negotiations with the Chinese authorities in Peking.
35. A. N. Kheifets, *Sovetskaya Rossiya i sopredel'nye strany vostoka, v gody grazhdanskoi voyny, 1918–1920 gg.* [Soviet Russia and Neighbouring Countries in the East during the Years of the Civil War, 1918–20] (Moscow, 1964), pp. 408–9.
36. Choibalsan, Losol and Demid, op. cit., i, p. 175.
37. Ibid., pp. 183–7. The whole question of the bogd's letter requires further study.
38. The text of this report is given in *Mongol Ardyn Khuv'sgal't Namyn tüükhend kholbogdokh barimit bichigiüd*, i, pp. 11–12. The general agreement reached after the quarrel is found in B. Shirendyev, *Mongol Ardyn Khuv'sgalyn tüükh* [A History of the Mongolian People's Revolution] (Ulan Bator, 1969), pp. 167–8.
39. Choibalsan, Losol and Demid, op. cit., i, pp. 178–80.

40. Antony C. Sutton, *Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1917 to 1930* (Stanford, 1968), pp. 18, 345.
41. J. N. Kunsten, *Outer Mongolia: A Study in Soviet Colonialism* (Hong Kong, 1959), p. 137.
42. *North-China Herald* [Shanghai], 5 Mar. 1921.
43. Choibalsan, Losol and Demid, op. cit., i, p. 178. Though the Chinese Communist Party had not yet been founded, the Comintern had already sent delegates to work in China, and Soviet Russia was in direct contact with Sun Yat-sen. Gapon must have been referring to these Chinese progressives in general.
44. *Mongolyn Unen* [Mongolian Truth], 10 Nov. 1920. The first issues of the party paper were published in Irkutsk with the help of the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern.
45. Shumyatskii's account of this interview, which was published in *Pravda*, 12 July 1936, is included in X. Eudin and R. C. North, *Soviet Russia and the East* (Stanford, 1957), pp. 203–4.
46. Choibalsan, Losol and Demid, op. cit., i, p. 245.
47. A. N. Kheifets, *Sovetskaya diplomatiya i narody vostoka, 1921–1927 gg.* [Soviet Diplomacy and the Peoples of the East, 1921–7] (Moscow, 1968), p. 281.
48. For the discrepancy between the policies of the Soviet government and the Comintern, see E. H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution*, 3 vols. (Harmondsworth, 1966), iii, pp. 330–1.
49. A. N. Kislov, *Ungerniig but tsokhiloo* [We Defeated Ungern] (Ulan Bator, 1972), pp. 16–17; this is a Mongol translation of his *Razgrom Ungerna* [The Defeat of Ungern] (Moscow, 1964).
50. *Mongol Ardyn Khuv'sgalt Namyn tüükhend kholbogdokh barimit bichigüüd*, i, pp. 12–13.
51. Choibalsan, Losol and Demid, op. cit., i, pp. 240–9.
52. *Ibid.*, pp. 247–9.
53. *Sov'yetsko-Kitaiskie otnosheniya, 1919–1957: Sbornik dokumentov*, ed. Kurdyukov, Nikiforov and Perevertailo, pp. 53–5. This rejection was received at the end of 1920, the delay having been due to the difficulty of telegraphic communication because of Ungern's attack on Urga.
54. *D. Sükhbaatarын тухай дурдатгалууд* [Reminiscences about D. Sükhbaatar] (Ulan Bator, 1964), pp. 81–4. The incident is described by L. Demberel, who accompanied Sükhbaatar at this interview with Makstenek.
55. S. T. Leong, 'China and Soviet Russia: Their Diplomatic Relations, 1917–1924' (Harvard Univ. Ph.D. thesis, 1972), pp. 275–6.
56. *Chung-O kuan-hsi shih-liao, Wai Meng-ku, Min-kuo 10 nien* [Historical Materials on Sino-Russian Relations, Outer Mongolia, 1921] (Taipei, 1975), pp. 103, 107.
57. Judging from the 'Letters Captured from Baron Ungern-Sternberg in Mongolia', copies of which are preserved in the Hoover Institution Lib., MS. DK 254 U7L65, at least Ungern seems to have tried to approach Chang Tso-lin. On the other hand G. McCormack of Leeds University, a specialist on Chang Tso-lin and the Japanese, tells me that he has found nothing to indicate Chang's connection with Ungern through the Japanese.
58. Kheifets, *Sovetskaya diplomatiya i narody vostoka, 1921–1927 gg.*, pp. 24–5; the date is taken from Kislov, *Ungerniig but tsokhiloo*, p. 64.
59. *Mongol Ardyn Juramt Tsergiin durdatgaluud* [Narratives of the Mongol Partisans] (Ulan Bator, 1961), p. 475, related by D. Nanzad.
60. H. K. Norton, *The Far Eastern Republic of Siberia* (London, 1923), pp. 227–8.
61. The Russian text of Ungern's 'Decree no. 15' appears in *Revolutsiya na Dal'nem Vostoke*, pp. 429–33.
62. Lenin, *Complete Works*, xxxii, p. 443.
63. I. I. Serebrennikov, *Velikii otkhod* [The Great Withdrawal] (Kharbin, 1936); chs. 7–10 give detailed accounts of the activities of White generals in western Mongolia, and chs. 5–6 are on Ungern.
64. *Mongol Ardyn Juramt Tsergiin durdatgaluud*, p. 539, related by B. Puntsag.
65. *Ardyn Juramt Tsergiin durdatgaluud* [Narratives of the Partisans] (Ulan Bator, 1969), p. 648:

- M. Yarin relates how, on his advice, Sundui, a Mongol prince who had sided with Ungern, betrayed and captured him.
66. Ya. M. Dvorkin, 'Iz vospominanii sotrudnika ministerstva inostrannykh del D.V.R.' [From the Reminiscences of an Associate in the Foreign Ministry of the Far Eastern Republic], in M. N. Atavin et al. (eds.), *Grazhdanskaya voina na Dal'nem Vostoke* [The Civil War in the Far East] (Moscow, 1973), p. 246. This proposal made by Giichi Tanaka is not the same as the famous 'Tanaka Memorial' attributed to him in 1926.
 67. Chihiro Hosoya, *Roshiya Kakumei to Nihon* [The Russian Revolution and Japan] (Tokyo, 1972), pp. 148–50.
 68. *Ungerun no Kuron Kōgeki* [Ungern's Attack on Urga], Appendix to the Documents on the Russian Revolution, May 1921 (Taishō 10): Archives of the Japanese Foreign Office, Tokyo, 1 *mon*, 6 *rui*, 3 *ko*. There are also related documents in the Japanese Army Archives.
 69. A. T. Yakimov, 'Politrabota v narodno-revolutsionnoi armii' [Political Work in the People's Revolutionary Army], in Atavin et al. (eds.), *Grazhdanskaya voina na Dal'nem Vostoke*, p. 312.
 70. A. S. Whiting, *Soviet Politics in China, 1917–1924* (New York, 1954), p. 163.
 71. The Russian text of this request is found in S. D. Dylykov et al. (eds.), *Sovetsko-Mongol'skie otnosheniya, 1921–1966* [Soviet-Mongolian Relations, 1921–66] (Moscow, 1966), pp. 10–11.
 72. Leong, 'China and Soviet Russia', p. 346.
 73. Friters, *Outer Mongolia and its International Position*, p. 194.
 74. *Novyi Vostok* [Moscow], i (1922), p. 389.
 75. S. Demberel, *Nert Khuv'sgalch B.Z. Shumyatskii* [The Renowned Revolutionary, B. Z. Shumyatskii] (Ulan Bator, 1975).

A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S PARTY, CENTRING ON DOGSOM'S MEMOIR

Hiroshi Futaki



D. Dogsom's memoir which was published in *Source Materials Related to the History of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party* (Ulaanbaatar, 1928) should be considered the most comprehensive account of the establishment of the Mongolian People's Party. This memoir records extremely important facts which were later deliberately excluded from the description of modern Mongolian history, such as the Mongolian nationalists' approach to the White Russian regime and their religious and ritualistic observance. The comparison of three main source materials, that is, Dogsom's memoir, Sorokovikov's accounts and the 1934 edition of the history of the Mongolian revolution, reveals that the hitherto accepted theory of the establishment of the Mongolian People's Party contains fundamental errors, including the date of the establishment of the party. Additionally 'the myth of Sükhbaatar' strongly influenced the 1934 edition of the history of the Mongolian revolution. This edition has been treated as the most reliable source material for the study of the 1921 revolution. It is difficult to agree with the accepted theory that on 25 June 1920 two groups gathered at Danzan's, adopted the party's manifesto and united into the Mongolian People's Party. This paper is intended to show it is very improbable that the meeting and decision took place on 25 June. The meeting at Dogsom's which was held in the second month of spring using the lunar calendar in 1920 should be regarded as the real turning point for the Mongolian revolutionaries in the development of the Mongolian People's Party.

1. INTRODUCTION

The study of the history from the abolition of autonomy in the autumn of 1919 to the establishment of a new government in July 1921 has been one of the most important subjects in the modern history of the Mongols. If we examine the process of revolution and the members of the new government, it is incontestable that the Mongolian People's Party played an essential role in the independence movement. Amongst the leaders of the People's Party, two who played major roles were S. Danzan (1885–1924),

who was elected chairman of the party at the first congress held in March 1921, and D. Bodoó (1885–1922), who became the prime minister of the provisional government a little bit later. Originally the Mongolian People's Party was organised by uniting Danzan's group with Bodoó's group. In 1919, 1920 Danzan's group was called 'the Civil Servants' Group (*tüsimed-iin nam*)' and Bodoó's group 'the People's Group (*arad-un nam*)' respectively. There was a third group, called 'the Noblemen's Group (*noyad-un nam*)', led by Khatanbaatar Magsarjav, Jalkhanz Khutagt and others.¹ The relationship amongst the three groups became a key factor in the struggle for power after the 1921 revolution.

Since the second half of 1988 the Mongolian version of 'Perestroika' has entailed re-examination of the country's history; the cult of Sükhbaatar as given in the official description of the 1921 revolution has been criticised. However it is extremely difficult to disregard 'the myth of Sükhbaatar', which took root in Mongolian society a long time ago and even now the phenomenon of a return to the cult is seen.² The image of Sükhbaatar as the founder of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, the primary leader of the Mongolian revolution of 1921, the commander of the Mongolian People's Army and hence the founder of the new-born Mongolian People's Republic has been inculcated through propaganda, education, the media and politically motivated rituals.

Because the so-called 'western' researchers studied the history of the Mongols without reference to 'the official opinion of the Mongolian history', in some cases, it could be said that their investigations yielded better results than their counterparts in Mongolia. Two examples of such an investigation are *Revolutionaries of the Steppe* (1973), written in Japanese by the Japanese scholar Tanaka Katsuhiko and *Between the Hammer and the Anvil? Chinese and Russian Policies in Outer Mongolia 1911–1921* (1980), written by the American researcher Thomas E. Ewing. These books were relatively free from the myth of Sükhbaatar, as they managed to refer to the book, *A Short History of the Original Birth and Establishment of the Mongolian People's National Revolution* (1934) which was co-authored by Choibalsan, Losol and Demid, as a part of their source materials; henceforth I will refer to this as *Short History* (1934).³ Another book, *A Short History of the People's Revolution of the Mongolian Nation*, was published in 1938 in the name of Choibalsan alone.⁴ This book was a concise version of the original publication of 1934 and did not reflect the importance of the roles of Danzan and Bodoó and attributed most of the achievements of the revolution to Sükhbaatar and Choibalsan.

However 'the myth of Sükhbaatar' had already begun in 1934. We can confirm the existence of 'the myth of Sükhbaatar' in *Short History* (1934) by comparing it to the book, *Source Materials Related to the History of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party* (1928), which I will use in this paper. This book, consisting of fourteen memoirs, should be acknowledged as the first study of the history of modern Mongolia and the first investigation of the Mongolian revolution of 1921. The first part of the book recounts the preparation and victory of the revolution, the middle part depicts the Second Congress of the party as the last stage of the revolution, and the final part describes the social change after the establishment of the new regime in Outer Mongolia.

The purpose of this paper is to re-examine the accepted theory about the establishment of the Mongolian People's Party and present a new opinion about this process. I shall be comparing the contents of Dogsom's memoir about the establishment of the

Mongolian People's Party, which was included in the above-mentioned book of 1928, with descriptions from books and personal memoirs relating the process of the revolution.⁵

Dansranbilegiin Dogsom was born in to a commoner's family at the Dalai Vang's Banner of the Setsen Khan Aimag district in 1884 and worked for the Ministry of Defence of the new Mongolian Government, which had been established in December 1911. After the 1921 revolution he served as mayor of Ulaanbaatar, Mongolian ambassador to Tuva and finally in March 1936 took the position of chairman of the Executive Committee of the National Small Council, which was considered to be the same rank as the chief of state. However he was arrested and sent to the USSR in a large-scale purge under Stalin's regime in July 1939 and was executed two years later in 1941.⁶

Due to political reasons Dogsom's memoir has been ignored and forgotten and almost pushed into the background of the *Short History* (1934). Yet this memoir is extremely important for two reasons. One is that it is the personal record by a leader of the revolutionary movement, who, notably, was a key member of the Civil Servants' Group, and uses his memory of the events, which took place eight or nine years previously. The other reason is that his memoir was written and published during the relatively liberal days when Mongolia had not been under the direct control of the Comintern and ultra-left policies such as full-scale attacks on pre-revolution powers.

2. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CIVIL SERVANTS' GROUP

As I mentioned above, the Mongolian People's Party was organised by uniting the People's Group (Bodoo's group or the so-called Hill of Consulate Group) with the Civil Servants' Group (Danzan's group or the so-called Khüree Group).

It could be said that Dogsom's memoir gives the most comprehensive account of the birth of the Civil Servants' Group, whilst *Short History* (1934) recorded a concrete description about the process of the establishment of the People's Group.

As I will mention below, the first members of the Civil Servants' Group were five people, namely Danzan, Dendev, Dogsom, Dugarjav and Sükhbaatar. Out of the five people, only Dogsom and Dugarjav recorded important accounts about the establishment of the group. The other three did not leave any historical records, because Dendev and Danzan were executed in 1922 and 1924 respectively, and Sükhbaatar died from disease in 1923. The account by Dogsom is of course his memoir published in 1928; later I will refer to a short account by Dugarjav.⁷

According to Dogsom's memoir, the core of the group was formed by the process in which Danzan recruited Dendev first and enrolled Dogsom later. Danzan emphasised to Dogsom the necessity of protecting the autonomy of Outer Mongolia in September or October 1919 when a plan for the abolition of self-government was argued by the Chinese governor-general Chen Yi and the Mongolian prime minister Badamdorj and a rumour of the Chinese army's approach had spread.⁸ The plan for the abolition of autonomy was initiated by a number of aristocrats and high-ranking monks. This provoked strong antipathy amongst officials of the middle and lower ranks, intelligentsia and officers because it would nullify the fruits of the independent movements of 1911 and annul the autonomy of Outer Mongolia guaranteed by the Kyakhta treaty which

was itself unsatisfactory for the Mongols. In those circumstances Danzan began to recruit fellow members and organised an opposition movement.

Danzan's level of education was limited to reading and writing in Mongolian and a little Russian, however his focus was directed towards how to abolish rule by feudal lords and free people from oppression, as he himself had been suppressed, unfairly punished and had his property confiscated by his lord.⁹

Three people, namely Danzan, Dendev and Dogsom gathered at Danzan's and discussed the possibility of sending a petition to the Russian Consul and in whose particular name it should be sent. They came to the conclusion that priority should be given to recruiting more members because they could not deny the probability of the white Russian Consul's connections with the Chinese authorities. At the meeting Dogsom proposed a strategy to enrol new members appealing to people's faith in Buddhism and respect for the king-reincarnation Jebtsundamba Khutagt.

After the meeting they tried to recruit more members but the result was far from perfect. Without revealing their real intention they approached Zaisan Jamiyan of the *Shabi* administration and some officials such as Lkhayajav, Nyamjav, Tsend, Togtokh, Dash and Galsan, and explained that if autonomy was abolished, the status of the king-incarnation and faith in Buddhism might decline.¹⁰

At the end of October 1919 Xu Shu-zheng, the governor of the North-western Province, 'the agent of Japan' arrived in Ikh Khüree.¹¹ He demanded that the Mongolian government abrogate autonomy using military pressure. On 15 November (on the 23rd day of the ninth month by the lunar calendar) the problem regarding the abolition of autonomy was discussed in the Upper and the Lower Houses of parliament.¹² After the resolution by the Lower House against the abolition of autonomy, the Upper House declared the nullification of the Lower House's right to the votes and adjourned parliament. That was the day when Outer Mongolia's autonomy was lost.

That evening Nyamjav, Dendev, Tsend, Dogsom, Danzan and Togtokh gathered at Zaisan Jamiyan's and decided to send a petition to the Russian Consul asking for help. After writing a draft of the petition five people (Jamiyan, Jigmeddorj, Dendev, Danzan and Nyamjav) went to the palace by the river (*Golyn süm*) to obtain authorisation from the king (Jebtsundamba Khutagt). However the king ordered them, through an aide, to wait until the appropriate time arrived.¹³

Two things may be realised from this episode. One is that the idea of seeking help from Soviet Russia did not occur at this moment and the other is even a person who should be classified as member of the People's Group went to the palace with members of the Civil Servants' Group. The first point could be explained by the facts that the anti-revolutionary White armies still maintained their influence in Siberia and the authority of Soviet Russia had not yet been established and therefore Mongolian nationalists had not had an opportunity to make contact with Soviet Russia in those days. As for the second point it could be said that even the People's Party had a civil servant as a member and in some cases the activities of the two groups had overlapped.

After the visit to the palace Danzan, Dendev and Dogsom actively tried to recruit new members and succeeded in enrolling Dugarjav, Sükhbaatar, Jamiyan, Balsanov, Yumtarov, Galsan, Togtokh, Dash, Tsend and others.¹⁴ The order of entry in the list of the new members recorded in Dogsom's memoir has its own meaning. In other words it is not accidental that the name of Dugarjav was placed first, Sükhbaatar second and additionally Dugarjav's memoir published in 1925 confirms that the list clearly shows the order of entry for each member of the group.

We four people, Danzan, Dendev, Dogsom and Dugarjav, united by the same objective, discussed and agreed to recruit new members and I, Dugarjav, first enrolled comrade Sūkhbaatar to the party. We five members burned incense for the 'Red Protective Deity' at the *Baruun Örgöö* [the West Tent] in the capital Khüree and swore to save the Mongolian people from their severe suffering and to return to a peaceful life and wrote auspicious phrases on the *khadags* [silk cloths for rituals] with milk and offered them to the deity.¹⁵

From Dogsom's and Dugarjav's accounts it is unquestionable that the fourth and fifth member of the Civil Servants' Group were Dugarjav and Sūkhbaatar respectively. Sūkhbaatar appeared on the 'stage of the revolution' at this moment. Therefore it could be said that *Short History* (1934), which states Sūkhbaatar recruited Danzan, Dogsom, Dugarjav and Dendev and also organised the group, is completely wrong.¹⁶

Another important piece of information gleaned from Dugarjav's account is that these nationalists swore an oath before the 'Red Protective Deity' at the *Baruun Örgöö* (the West Tent). Dogsom's account does not mention anything about the ritual attended by these five people, but he recorded that a similar ceremony took place when the Civil Servants' Group and the People's Group united.

'From now on we will never consider self-interest and devote ourselves to protect the Mongolian religion and the people and save the people from severe suffering. Please protect us.' Writing this vow with milk on the *khadag* and offering it to the Red Protective Deity with incense burning, we swore to struggle for this purpose to the last.¹⁷

The protective deity Jamsran, which had been known as the Red Protective Deity (*Ulaan sakhius*) because its entire body was red, was one of the most popular protective deities in Ikh Khüree.¹⁸ According to the legends, Jamsran had protected Jebtsundamba Khutagt I from horse robbers when his holiness was travelling in Eastern Tibet and also protected Jebtsundamba Khutagt II from a thunderbolt. At the *Baruun Örgöö* the service of thanksgiving to Jamsran had taken place every year.¹⁹ Ikh Khüree (present-day Ulaanbaatar, the capital of Mongolia) was a religious city which had originated from the monastery of the incarnation Jebtsundamba Khutagt, and Jamsran was the protector deity of the city.

The *Baruun Örgöö* was a shrine to Abudai Khaan, who had introduced Buddhism into Khalkha (Outer Mongolia) in the sixteenth century. He founded the distinguished TüsHEET khaan family and when the hearth was put into the tent-style shrine, it was considered the symbol of Mongolia. After the declaration of independence, in the summer of 1912, ministers, aristocrats and high-ranking monks pledged allegiance to their country before Jamsran at the yurt-shaped shrine.²⁰

The nationalists' pledge before the Red Protective Deity at *Baruun Örgöö* was a reflection of their intention to take over the independence movement and it could be said that their activities were concentrated on this purpose.

If we regard the day of their pledge before Jamsran as the date of the establishment of the Civil Servants' Party, then the party was established not far from the time of the session in the consultative assembly, that is, in the second half of November 1919.²¹

It seems to me significant that Jamiyan's name was entered after those of Dugarjav and Sūkhbaatar on the above-mentioned list. He was registered as a key member of the People's Group in *Short History* (1934) and even the 1985 version of the history of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party classified him as a member of the group.²² However it is natural to categorise him as a member of the Civil Servants'

Group if we consider the facts that he had contact with Danzan and the decision to send a petition to the Russian Consul was made in the meeting at Jamiyan's.

It is also relevant that two Buryat Mongolian names (Balsanov and Yumtarov) were added to the list of Danzan's group. In those days Balsanov worked as a translator in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Yumtarov served as an interpreter in the army at Khujirbulan.²³ Although the role of Buryat Mongols in the 1921 Revolution, especially that of Elbegdorj Rinchino and Tseven Jamtsarano, who joined with revolutionaries from Outer Mongolia at Verkhneudinsk in the summer of 1920, has been considered to be essential to the success of the revolution, little attention has been paid so far to the Buryat Mongols who lived in Ikh Khüree and joined the revolutionary activities from the early stages.

3. THE UNIFICATION OF THE CIVIL SERVANTS' GROUP AND THE PEOPLE'S GROUP AND THE ACTIVITIES THAT ENSUED

According to Dogsom's memoir, the Civil Servants' Group knew of the existence of the People's Group a little later than the pledge given by the five people before Jamsran and earlier than the grant of the decree by the President of the Republic of China (1 January 1920). The unification of the two groups was celebrated with the ritual which I have mentioned in the previous section.

Therefore I cannot agree with the opinions of Kungurov/Sorokovikov and Pürev/Dashnyam that they united in January 1920.²⁴

At the time of the two groups' uniting, Dogsom listed ten people: Bodoo, Choibalsan, Jigmed (= Jigmeddorj), Chagdarjav, Namsrai, Altangerel, Babuu, Losol, Bazarav and Bayar taij. They were members of the People's Group.²⁵

The situation in Outer Mongolia continued to degenerate after the unification of the two groups. In these circumstances, during a meeting at Dendev's they decided to ask the White Russian Consul for help and wrote a petition in the name of the Lower House and subsequently met the Russian Consul Orlov.

The delegation consisted of six people, that is, Dendev, Danzan, Bodoo, Dugarjav, Dogsom and Galsan.²⁶ It should be noted that all of them except Bodoo belonged to the Civil Servants' Group.

Consul Orlov's response was, 'It is impossible to recognise the Lower House as a parliament which represents the state, because the members of it were not officially elected in each district and all of them are government officials. If the document bears the seal of the Bogd Khaan [= Jebstundamba Khutagt], I may forward it to my government.'²⁷

Encouraged by the Russian Consul's answer, the group prepared another letter of petition to the Russian government. Selecting an auspicious day, that night five members of the group, Sühbbaatar, Danzan, Dendev, Dugarjav and Dogsom visited the Khaistai palace near the Tuul river in secret. Two members of the delegation, Danzan and Dogsom met the king directly and requested that he sign the letter. The king conferred with his aide Da Lama Puntsagdorj for a long time and finally, just like the previous meeting of November 1919, returned the letter and ordered them to wait until the appropriate moment.

Members of the second delegation to the king's palace consisted of leaders of the Civil Servants' Group and this suggests that even after the unification of the two groups each group continued its activities separately.

Perhaps the decision by the king, Jebtsundamba Khutagt, to defer asking the White Russian government for help was correct, because at the end of 1919 the Red Army took the offensive and the anti-revolutionary government of general Kolchak in Siberia was almost in a state of collapse.

At about this time Mongolian revolutionaries began to consider Soviet Russia as a possible ally. Yet their approach took a quite religious form at first. Dugarjav, Dogsom and others first asked a high-ranking monk of the Gandan Monastery, and then two fortune-tellers of the Züün Khüree whether making a request for help to Soviet Russia would be appropriate. They were given positive answers and they then visited a Buddhist oracle (*gütembe lam-a*) of the Vanggai *aimag* and asked advice about their future plans.²⁸ In a trance the oracle ordered them to achieve the *sor* ritual, a kind of exorcist ceremony. Dendev, Galsan, Danzan, Dugarjav, Dash, Jigmeddorj and Jamiyan collected money and asked Buddhist monks to perform the *sor* rite.²⁹ According to the Buddhist oracle's prediction, some omens should appear within three days after the ritual, but nothing happened and a large sum of money was lost in vain.³⁰

It should be mentioned that on this occasion all of the participants of the ritual were members of the Civil Servants' Group, except for Jigmeddorj.

After these events the nationalists tried to recruit new members and made plans to purloin armaments from the government's arsenal.

Dogsom's memoir suggests that the above-mentioned predictions and rituals occurred at the end of 1919, because the accounts of them are followed by the description of a ceremony (1 January 1920), in which Jebtsundamba Khutagt was obliged to kowtow to a picture of the President of the Republic of China in order to demonstrate his acceptance of China's suzerainty.³¹

The nationalists who had become interested in the revolution in Russia sent Danzan and Sükhbaatar to reconnoitre the Russian situation. Their journey began in the first month of the lunar calendar, New Year's day which was 20 February 1920. Although they managed to reach Kyakhta, the border town between Mongolia and Russia, they could not cross the border and had to return to the Mongolian capital. According to Dogsom's memoir, after the above-mentioned incident he became acquainted with two Russians, Kucherenko and Gembarzhevskii, who explained the Russian revolution to him, and Dogsom became convinced that only Soviet Russia could save Mongolia.³²

This episode seems to indicate that members of the Civil Servants' Group had begun to contact pro-revolutionary Russians in Ikh Khüree, because in other pages of Dogsom's memoir, he wrote that prior to the unification of the two groups, the People's Group had already made contact with Russian revolutionaries such as Kucherenko and Maslakov. In short, Dogsom's conviction arose from his meeting with the two Russians and therefore seems to suggest that the two groups had started to co-operate with each other from the spring of 1920.

In Dogsom's memoir, these events were followed by descriptions of the rule of the Chinese tyrant Xu Shu-zheng and Dogsom quotes the letter of protest which had been placarded on the wall of Xu Shu-zheng's residence.³³

4. A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE DATE OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S PARTY

The accepted opinion is that the Mongolian People's Party was officially established on 25 June 1920. This has been supported not only by Mongolian scholars, but also most foreign researchers.³⁴ No doubts have arisen about this date in recent reconsiderations of Mongolian history by Mongolian scholars.

The accepted theory states that on 25 June 1920 Bodoo's group (the People's Group) and Danzan's group (the Civil Servants' Group) met and officially became one party, by creating the party's manifesto entitled 'Pledges of party members'. This theory is based on the view that the party was established in June after a period of co-operative activities by the two political groups.

It is important to re-examine when and how this seemingly unquestionable theory was established. In Mongolian publications of the 1920s and 1930s I could not find any descriptions which give an exact date for the establishment of the party. Neither Dogsom's memoir of 1928 or *Short History* (1934) gives us the date of the party's establishment. Similarly the 1938 edition of the Mongolian revolution's history published in the name of Choibalsan omits concrete evidence. A text of the manifesto 'Pledges of party members' was contained in *Sükhbaatar, Letters and documents*, published in 1952, but it lacks the date of the pledges.³⁵ *History of the Mongolian People's Republic*, the first comprehensive history of Mongolia written by Mongolian and Soviet scholars, published in 1955 in Mongolian, just states that the Mongolian People's Party was established in June 1920 and does not mention a specific date.³⁶

As far as I am aware the date of 25 June 1920 was first mentioned in a book, *Arat-skaia revoliutsiia*, which was co-authored by two Russians, Kungurov and Sorokovikov and published in Irkutsk in 1946. It should be noted, however, that in the Russian book the date (25 June 1920) is not recorded in the description of the June conference of revolutionaries, but only appears in the attached chronological table at the end of the book.³⁷

The Russian revolutionary Sorokovikov, who liaised between Soviet Russia and Mongolian revolutionaries, left a short memoir about the incidents of 1920 which was published in a Soviet journal in 1965. In this memoir Sorokovikov also indicated 25 June 1920 as the date of the establishment of the Mongolian People's Party.³⁸

From this it would appear that Sorokovikov's accounts should be considered the most evidential for the theory that the party was established on 25 June 1920.

I would like to now reconsider the accepted theory regarding the date of the establishment of the Mongolian People's Party, by comparing three sources, that is, Dogsom's memoir of 1928, *Short History* (1934) and Sorokovikov's accounts.

a. The Date of the First Meeting of the Mongolian Revolutionaries with Sorokovikov

Dogsom's memoir states that the Mongolian revolutionaries met Sorokovikov on a day in the second month of spring using the lunar calendar.³⁹ This meeting, which was arranged by Kucherenko and Gembarzhevskii, can be dated to between 21 March and 18 April 1920. As for the date of the first meeting, the description in *Short History* (1934) is similar to that of Dogsom's memoir, simply stating that it took place in the second month of spring.⁴⁰ Sorokovikov's memoir is specific. He wrote he had met the Mongolian revolutionaries at Kucherenko's in the evening of 11 March 1920.⁴¹

This corresponds exactly with the 22nd day of the first month referring to the lunar calendar.

It should be noted here that Sorokovikov's memoir differs slightly from Dogsom's memoir and *Short History* (1934).

b. The Personal History of Sorokovikov

According to Dogsom's memoir, Sorokovikov was sent by Yanson, a high-ranking official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Soviet Russia.⁴² *Short History* (1934) states that he was sent by the 'Eastern Department' of the Comintern in order to explain the Russian revolution and investigate the Mongolian situation.⁴³

However the description in Sorokovikov's memoir is quite different from those of the above-mentioned two accounts. Sorokovikov states that he was sent by the Revolutionary Committee of Russian residents in Ikh Khüree, because the committee had been sought for help and advice by the Mongolian revolutionaries.⁴⁴ The account in *Aratskaia revoliutsiia* is more comprehensive: 'Choivan, chairman of the Revolutionary Committee told the Mongolian revolutionaries that Sorokovikov, a member of the committee, was just about to go to Soviet Russia and could report on the situation of Russian residents in Khüree to the Soviet Russian authorities.'⁴⁵

In short, Dogsom's memoir and *Short History* (1934) coincide in that Sorokovikov was sent to Mongolia on a mission and Sorokovikov's memoir states that he had lived in Khüree, the Mongolian capital. It is probable that he lived in Khüree at that time, because another source states that Sorokovikov had come to Khüree in the spring of 1919 and worked for a co-operative as an accountant.⁴⁶ According to Sorokovikov's memoir he went to Irkutsk and informed Yanson of the wishes of the Mongolian revolutionaries after meeting them in Khüree. The main difference between the Mongolian sources and the Russian source is that in the former Sorokovikov was sent by Yanson from Russia, while in the latter he went to Russia to meet Yanson. Therefore the three sources correspond in showing a relationship between Yanson and Sorokovikov.

However there is a fundamental difference between Dogsom's memoir which reports Yanson as a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and *Short History* (1934), which reports Yanson as a representative of the Comintern. As a matter of fact, it is anomalous to regard the events of the spring of 1920 as those related to the activities of the Comintern, if we consider the organisation of the Comintern in those days and the aims of the Mongolian revolutionaries.

Y. D. Yanson (1886–1939), a leader of the Siberian Bolsheviks worked as chairman of the revolutionary committee of the Irkutsk Prefecture from March to June 1920 and also served as head of the Siberian and Far-Eastern branch office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Soviet Russia in 1920 and 1921.⁴⁷

According to E. Rinchino's memoir, he proposed to Yanson the establishment of an organisation which would be responsible for Mongolian affairs and Yanson then sent a proposal to the Siberian Bureau of the Russian Communist Party. After studying the proposal, the Siberian Bureau decided to establish the Asian Bureau (*Aziatskoe biuro*) in Irkutsk, which would be attached to the Siberian Branch Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The head of the Asian Bureau was F. N. Gapon, but the majority of the practical activities were undertaken by Rinchino.⁴⁸ Accordingly the Asian Bureau was established in the spring of 1920.⁴⁹

In July of the same year the Bureau was re-organised into the Section of the Eastern Nations, attached to the Siberian Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. N. Burtmann was appointed head of the Section.⁵⁰ The Mongolian and Tibetan Department was set up in this Section and S. S. Borisov was in charge of the Department. Source material suggests Rinchino was working as a secretary in the Department.⁵¹

The Far-Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern was established in Irkutsk and evolved from the Section of the Eastern Nations. The resolution of the Russian Communist Party about the establishment of the Far-Eastern Secretariat was adopted on 5 January 1921 and the resolution of the Executive Committee of the Comintern was passed on 15 January of the same year.⁵² The head of the Secretariat was B. Z. Shumyatskii and Rinchino worked as the secretary of the Mongolian and Tibetan Department.

Thus the organisation for Mongolian Affairs was first established in Irkutsk and was attached to the Ministry of Foreign affairs of Soviet Russia. It was then re-organised and became attached to the Russian Communist Party and finally formed a department of the Comintern. Practical activities of these organisations were carried out by Borisov and Rinchino. As these three organisations had similar objectives and staff in common, they have very often been confused by researchers.⁵³

Now I shall return to the problem of the questions raised by Sorokovikov's personal history. He wrote that Yanson doubled as a representative of the Comintern and as a representative of the Foreign Ministry to Siberia and the Far East.⁵⁴ It might have been possible for Yanson to serve for the Comintern, but even if Yanson was a Comintern representative, it is difficult to affirm that Sorokovikov worked for the Comintern in the spring of 1920. The Comintern had just been organised in 1919 and its large-scale activities towards Mongolia began after the Second Conference of the Comintern in July and August in 1920, especially after the establishment of the Far-Eastern Secretariat. Therefore it seems improbable that Sorokovikov was sent by the Comintern, as *Short History* (1934) claims. I believe that Dogsom's memoir reflects the truth concerning Sorokovikov's activities.

c. Participants of the Meeting—the Myth of Sükhbaatar

According to Dogsom's memoir, Choibalsan, Dugarjav, Jigmeddorj, Bodoo and Yumtarov attended the meeting with Sorokovikov.⁵⁵ However *Short History* (1934) mentions Sükhbaatar, Choibalsan, Dugarjav, Jigmeddorj and Bodoo as participants in the meeting.⁵⁶ Sorokovikov's account is quite different and he states he met Choibalsan, Sükhbaatar, Bodoo, Danzan and Chagdarjav.⁵⁷

The comparison of Dogsom's memoir to *Short History* (1934) shows us that in the latter the name of Yumtarov was deleted and instead the name of Sükhbaatar was inserted and entered at the top of the list. Dogsom states that at the meeting, the opening gambit was made by the Mongolian side, that is Choibalsan, Dugarjav, Jigmeddorj, Bodoo and Yumtarov. Conversely, *Short History* (1934) claims that the first question was put by Sükhbaatar alone. In *Short History* (1934) it is possible to identify several falsifications which were intended to exaggerate the role of Sükhbaatar in the revolution and this is a typical example of it. Out of the five people who are listed in Dogsom's memoir, three people (Choibalsan, Jigmeddorj and Bodoo) belonged to the People's Group and two (Danzan and Yumtarov) were members of the Civil Servants' Group. It should be noted that both groups sent a member who understood Russian:

Choibalsan from Bodoo's group and Yumtarov from Danzan's group. If the Civil Servants' Group had sent Sükhbaatar instead of Yumtarov, no one in the group would have understood Russian. Also there would be no reason for Dogsom to deliberately delete the name of Sükhbaatar, who belonged to the same group as himself. Therefore I think Dogsom's memoir is correct and *Short History* (1934) is wrong. Out of the five people whom Sorokovikov claims to have attended the meeting, only two people (Choibalsan and Bodoo) were present and the rest (Sükhbaatar, Danzan and Chagdarjav) were absent.

d. Details of the Meeting

Dogsom's memoir and *Short History* (1934) give detailed accounts of Sorokovikov's questions and the Mongolian nationalists' answers. The comparison of the two accounts makes it clear that *Short History* (1934) duplicates Dogsom's memoir with slight amendments. There is even a phrase which does not exist in the original (Dogsom's memoir) but was deliberately falsified to misrepresent the truth. When Sorokovikov asked, 'What are those who exercised their powers in the ex-government doing now?' the answer was: 'All of those who exercised their powers before are now only thinking of getting posts and privileges, crawling to shrewd Chinese officials' (in Dogsom's memoir). On the other hand, in *Short History* (1934), the expression 'those who exercised their powers' is replaced by 'princes and living incarnations'.⁵⁸

When the abolition of autonomy in Outer Mongolia was argued in 1919, secular princes supported the abolition in negotiations with the Chinese representative Chen Yi, while the majority of high-ranking monks were against it.⁵⁹ Therefore it is inconsistent that the expression 'living incarnations' is recorded in the answer from the revolutionaries. Yet if we take into account the time when *Short History* (1934) was published, we can understand why the expression 'living incarnations' was deliberately inserted. This expression should be understood in a historical context as the powers of living incarnations were removed in the waves of ultra-left policies during the era between the late 1920s and the beginning of 1930s.

According to Dogsom's memoir, at the end of the meeting Sorokovikov advised the revolutionaries to send delegates to Soviet Russia immediately.⁶⁰ However *Short History* (1934) states that Sorokovikov advised them to send delegates to the 'Eastern department' of the Comintern.⁶¹ As I mentioned above, Dogsom's memoir should be considered correct and the title 'the Comintern' in *Short History* (1934) is therefore improbable.

According to Sorokovikov's account, at the end of the meeting, he said, 'I will inform the Soviet Russian government and the Bolshevik Party of the wishes of the Mongolian revolutionaries and return with an answer.'⁶²

The gap between the descriptions of Mongolian revolutionaries' accounts and those of the Russian revolutionary henceforth becomes wider.

e. Decisions after the Meeting and their Implementation

According to Dogsom's memoir, in the evening of the day when the revolutionaries had met Sorokovikov, they gathered at Dogsom's and made three decisions. First, to send Choibalsan and Danzan to Soviet Russia, second, to divide the remaining members into three groups and assign them tasks and third, to create the seal for the Mongolian

People's Party. Then Dogsom's memoir describes a secret pledge by some members of the group and the departure of Choibalsan and Danzan on 29 June.⁶³

According to *Short History* (1934) four events occurred after the meeting with Sorokovikov. First, the revolutionaries met at Danzan's, approved 'Pledges of party members', decided to create the party's seal and chose Choibalsan and Danzan as delegates to Russia. Second, they met at Bodoo's, approved the party's seal and decided to devise a secret code for communication purposes and to move Bodoo's tent. Third, Choibalsan and Danzan prepared for the journey to Russia and departed on 30 June 1920. Fourth, the revolutionaries were divided into three groups and each group attempted to collect information on the whereabouts of Choibalsan and Danzan who had not reported back to the group.⁶⁴

On the other hand, Sorokovikov's account is completely different from the previous two sources and can be summarised as follows.

Arriving at Irkutsk, Sorokovikov reported to Yanson the wishes of the Mongolian revolutionaries. Two months later at the beginning of June Yanson gave him instructions that he should go back to Khüree and invite them to Soviet Russia. On 20 June he met the revolutionaries for the second time and informed them of his journey to Irkutsk and invitation from Yanson. On 21 June the Mongolian revolutionaries decided to send delegates to Soviet Russia. In order to negotiate with Soviet Russia in the name of the party it was considered imperative to officially establish the party. On 25 June the 'Pledges of party members' were approved. These were thought equivalent to the party's manifesto and regulations. At a meeting of the executive committee Choibalsan and Danzan were chosen as delegates to Russia and they departed on 28 June.⁶⁵

As I have shown above, the three sources are quite different in their contents. First of all both Dogsom's memoir and *Short History* (1934) do not report the second meeting with Sorokovikov.⁶⁶ It is doubtful that Sorokovikov returned in June from Irkutsk and met the Mongolian revolutionaries again. But even if he did so, these meetings must have been very ordinary and were not considered worthy of recording from the Mongolian revolutionaries' point of view. According to Dogsom's memoir, after the departure of Danzan and Choibalsan, Borisov and Tseden-Ish arrived in Khüree from Irkutsk. Rinchino states he recruited Borisov and Tseden-Ish to the Asian Bureau and they visited Mongolia on the pretext of membership of the Central Association of Co-operatives.⁶⁷ After the arrival of the two revolutionaries, all members of the People's Party gathered by the river Tuul and argued about the establishment of their relationship with Soviet Russia and decided to send another five members to Russia; the five members were Bodoo, Chagdarjav, Dogsom, Sükhbaatar and Losol.⁶⁸ If Sorokovikov's account is correct, he should have been involved in this meeting, but he does not mention the name of Borisov and Tseden-Ish, or the meeting by the river Tuul. All of Sorokovikov's descriptions of the meetings on 20 June, 21 June and 25 June are very dubious and it is difficult to believe important decisions were made at these meetings.

The question is then what is the exact date of the resolution of the 'Pledges of party members', which have been believed to be adopted on 25 June 1920? In a note in the new version of *Short History* (1934), D. Dash, one of Mongolia's distinguished historians, states that the 'Pledges of party members' were approved at the meeting at Danzan's on 25 June.⁶⁹ However such an interpretation is only acceptable if it is recognised that the accounts in *Short History* (1934) are a combination of the two meetings with Sorokovikov. If we read the book straightforwardly, the meeting at Danzan's should be considered to have been immediately after the meeting with Sorokovikov, that is, in the

spring of 1920. In that case did the Mongolian revolutionaries really approve the 'Pledges of party members' at this meeting? Why does Dogsom's memoir lack a description of the pledges? To answer these questions we should compare the contents of the two meetings in detail: the meeting at Dogsom's as described by Dogsom and the meeting at Danzan's recorded in *Short History* (1934).

First it is necessary to consider what is common to the accounts of the meetings. Both accounts record the decisions to create the party's seal and to send Danzan and Choibalsan as delegates to Russia. Thus if this coincidence is true, then the two meetings described should in fact have been recorded as one.

Next, the differences between the two accounts of the meetings should be considered. On close examination of *Short History* (1934) in which the assignment of roles to collect information about Danzan and Choibalsan after their departure, it is possible to draw an equivalence to the description of the assignment of roles as given in Dogsom's memoir. The relationship between Dogsom's memoir and *Short History* (1934) in regard to the various groupings may be shown as follows.

Group A. Sükhbaatar, Bodoo, Yumtarov and Balsanov: To collect information on Russia through Kucherenko and Gembarzhevskii (Dogsom's memoir)

Sükhbaatar and Bodoo: To meet Kucherenko and Gembarzhevskii in order to collect information on Choibalsan and Danzan (*Short History*)

Group B. Losol, Jamiyan, Galsan, Altangerel and Dash: To examine the activities of aristocrats, monks and the Chinese authorities (Dogsom's memoir)

Jamiyan and Losol: To approach high-ranking monks in order to collect information on Choibalsan and Danzan (*Short History*)

Group C. Dogsom, Jigmeddorj, Dugarjav and Dendev: To approach Khatanbaatar Magsarjav, Jalkhanz Khutagt, Diluv Khutagt and Daa Lama Puntsagdorj in order to recruit them into the party and gain the king's seal of approval on documents (Dogsom's memoir)

Dogsom and Dugarjav: To meet aristocrats to collect information on Choibalsan and Danzan (*Short History*)

In analysing the constituent members of each group and their assignments it becomes clear that the two accounts were originally one only. In my opinion the assignment of roles recorded by Dogsom is accurate and that described in *Short History* (1934) is fictitious. Because the list of members and their tasks in Dogsom's memoir are more comprehensive than those in *Short History* (1934).

If the assignment of the roles described in *Short History* (1934) is false and Dogsom's memoir is true, then suspicion regarding their accuracy must fall on the 'Pledges of party members' as recorded in the history book. In Dogsom's memoir a secret pledge made by some party members after the meeting held at Dogsom's may be equated with the 'Pledges of party members' as given in *Short History* (1934); Danzan, Choibalsan, Bodoo, Dogsom and Chagdarjav made a secret pledge that they would not betray secrets of their activities for the party and if any one of them deliberately damaged the party, he should kill himself or should be executed by another member.⁷⁰ This pledge is very similar to Article Four of the 'Pledges of party members' but it is basically different from the 'Pledges' in that it was secretly made by some members, while the 'Pledges'

were unanimously adopted as the party's manifesto. Dogsom does not describe the pledges as being adopted by all members of the party.

Some other sources confirm that the 'Pledges' were not faked but really existed. According to the Mongolian historian Dash, apart from the original pledge which consisted of nine articles, there exists a thirteen-article version which was made later.⁷¹

The exact date of the adoption of the 'Pledges of party members' which are cited in *Short History* (1934) should be considered unknown at the present stage of the study. I have already explained why the classical theory about the date (25 June 1920) is not acceptable and would now reconsider the reliability of the accepted theory that the two groups were united into the Mongolian People's Party by adopting the 'Pledges of party members'. For example it is true that Article One of the 'Pledges', states the concrete aims of the party: 'The aim of the People's Party of Outer Mongolia is to justly strengthen, develop and protect the state and the religion by removing the enemies of the religion and the nation and recovering lost rights, to clean up domestic policies, taking into account the interests of poor lower-class people, and to permanently maintain internal administration and realise life without oppression and suffering.'⁷²

However these aims had already been basically expressed in the pledge made before 'the Red Protective Deity' and therefore were not new. On the other hand, the anti-feudal opinion that hereditary rule by feudal lords should be ended and governors ought to be chosen by election, which was mentioned in the letter of protest placarded on the wall of Xu Shu-zheng's residence, was not reflected in the 'Pledges of party members'.

In the history of the Mongolian party, the argument concerning the importance of the adoption of the 'Pledges of party members' should be taken into account with regard to the establishment of the party's organisations and especially the selection of the chairman and the executive committee. Even if the concept of the party was confirmed by the 'Pledges', the activities of the party could not be fully guaranteed without the advice of the executive organisations. As it is well known, it was at the meeting in March 1921 that members of the Central Committee were chosen and Danzan was elected chairman of the party.⁷³ I consider it is inappropriate to surmise that the adoption of the 'Pledges' was the only grounds for the establishment of the party without taking into account the election of the executive members.

I have re-examined the theory that the Mongolian People's Party was established on 25 June 1920, by comparing three sources, namely Dogsom's memoir, *Short History* (1934) and Sorokovikov's accounts.

It is clear that the theory is not acceptable and *Short History* (1934) and Sorokovikov's accounts are mendacious.

It may be assumed that there were four stages in the process of the establishment of the Mongolian People's Party: unification of the Civil Servants' Group and the People's Group (the end of 1919); adoption of the name of the Mongolian People's Party; approval of the 'Pledges of party members'; and election of executive members of the party (March 1921).

Out of the four stages it is currently impossible to identify the exact dates of the second and third stages. It is theoretically possible that the first and second stages were simultaneous – the name of the Mongolian People's Party was adopted when the two groups were united; however, there is no evidence to support this theory. The existence of the name of the Mongolian People's Party can be confirmed for the first time from the account of the meeting at Dogsom's where the revolutionaries decided to create the seal of the party.⁷⁴

The officially accepted theory on the date of the establishment of the party is based on the view that the third stage should be considered decisive and crucial. It is also possible to assume that hidden in the background of the theory is the intention to eradicate the religious factors and the evidence of the approach to anti-revolutionary Russian diplomats at the first stage. I believe *Short History* (1934) intentionally combined the adoption of the 'Pledges of party members' with the creation of the party's seal and interpolated them into the account of the fictitious meeting at Danzan's in order to emphasise the third stage.

If it is necessary to decide the date of the establishment of the Mongolian People's Party, the most appropriate date would be a day in the middle month of spring of 1920 using the lunar calendar; the day when the revolutionaries met Sorokovikov and a relationship with Soviet Russia became realistic, and when important decisions were made at the meeting at Dogsom's such as the selection of delegates to Russia, the assignment of roles of each member and the creation of the party's seal.

5. CONCLUSION

If we define the Mongolian revolution of 1911 as the first revolution of independence, we can call that of 1921 the second revolution of independence.

The original goal of the Mongolian People's Party which had played the leading part in this revolution was to recover the autonomy of Outer Mongolia which had been forcibly abolished by the Chinese military commander Xu Shu-zheng. Members of the party first asked the White Russian regime for help and then approached Soviet Russia, subject to the political changes in Russia, especially those in Siberia. From the end of the 1920s, when the USSR and the Comintern took control of Mongolia, the Mongolian party began to define the 1921 revolution as 'the People's revolution which was supported by the Comintern and Soviet Russia'. Additionally the party removed from history those details which did not fit their definition; it was therefore quite natural that Dogsom's memoir was disregarded in this process.

The historical drama which was played out by several forces on the stage of the Mongolian plateau from 1919 to 1921 is very complicated. Although the 1921 revolution is basically different from the 1911 revolution in that some revolutionaries of the former had opinions about social reform, the expression 'the People's revolution' which has been used to describe the 1921 revolution for several decades is too clichéd and an inappropriate characterisation of the events.

A really objective and unbiased study of the 1921 revolution of Mongolia has just begun. As I have shown above, *Short History* (1934), which has been considered the most fundamental source for study of the 1921 revolution, is in fact the first monumental work of falsification in modern Mongolian history and gives the credence to the myth of Sükhbaatar. I want to emphasise that researchers should be very careful in using this book.

Jadamba, vice-chairman of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, states in his introduction to *Source Materials Related to the History of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party* (1928) as follows.

It is useful not only for ordinary people and party members, but for the historians of the future to publish a book, which was written in plain Mongolian by the persons concerned, and which explains how the party was first established, how the People's government and the

Red army were organised, and how the party defeated its enemies, stabilised politics and extended the people's freedom.⁷⁵

We, 'the historians of the future', are in charge of the work of deciphering and analysing source materials published in the 1920s, including other memoirs contained in *Source Materials Related to the History of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party*.

NOTES

My thanks to Ms Louise Harvey-Freeman for reading this paper's draft, correcting and refining my English.

- Names of the three groups are confirmed by the list of secret codes which was devised in 1920. Dash, 1979, p. 281.
- O. Pürev, one of the well-known Mongolian scholars of Sükhbaatar studies, attempted to mythologise Sükhbaatar as an idol in society again in a series of articles published in newspapers in 1992 and 1993, in commemoration of the 100th anniversary of the birth of Sükhbaatar. Conversely, D. Dashjamts, another distinguished researcher in the same field, wrote an article (Dashjamts, 1993) which was intended to study Sükhbaatar more objectively. Onuki Masao's *Modern history of Mongolia* (1993) reproduced 'the myth of Sükhbaatar' and over-estimated the role of Sükhbaatar, even though the author had managed to incorporate some recent studies of the 1921 revolution.
- Authors of the 1934 edition of the history of the Mongolian Revolution were not Choibalsan, Losol, Demid, but G. Navaannamjil (an interview with academician Sh. Natsagdorj, November 1989). According to Prof. Natsagdorj, most books published in the name of Choibalsan were actually written by Navaannamjil.
- Choibalsan, 1938. The third version of this book was translated into many languages and false information was spread about the Mongolian revolution all over the world.
- Some parts of Dogsom's memoir were republished in *Memoirs of Sükhbaatar* (1965, pp. 35–38) and *Recollections of the Partisan Army* (1969, pp. 294–308). However, as some phrases were intentionally deleted or falsified, these can not be recommended as source materials to cite.
- For Dogsom, see Ichinnorov's article (1992).
- Prof. Tanaka states as follows: 'As for the Eastern Khüree Group [= the Civil Servants' Group, H. F.], members of the group did not leave any records, we don't have any other option but to rely on the description in the 1934 edition of the history of the Mongolian revolution written by Choibalsan and others.' (Tanaka, 1990, p. 88) This is incorrect because we have Dogsom's memoir which is a comprehensive account given by a member of the group.
- Dogsom, 1928, pp. 10–24.
- Ibid., p. 9.
- Ibid., p. 33.
- Dogsom's memoir states Xu Shu-zhen arrived in Khüree on the fourth day in the first month of autumn using the lunar calendar (29 August 1919). However Xu actually arrived in the Mongolian capital on 29 October 1919 (Li Yu-shu, 1961, p. 247). Hence 'the fourth day in the first month' in Dogsom's account should be corrected; it should be 'the fourth day in the last month of autumn' (28 October 1919).
- Dogsom, 1928, p. 34. Dogsom states members of the Upper and the Lower houses of parliament had their discussions on the 25th day in the ninth month (17 November 1919), but this date is incorrect; it should be the 23rd day in the ninth month (15 November 1919). On 17 November the petition for the abolition of autonomy of Outer Mongolia was submitted to the Chinese representative and on the 22nd of the same month the President of the Republic of China issued the decree regarding the abrogation of autonomy.

13. *Short History* (1934) does not mention this visit to the king's palace. On the other hand, citing Kallinikov's article (1928). Ewing gives almost the same description as that of Dogsom's memoir (Ewing, 1980, p. 167). It is possible that Kallinikov used Dogsom's memoir.
14. Dogsom, 1928, p. 40.
15. Dugarjav, 1991. Dugarjav's memoir was first published in the journal *Arad-un nam*, No. 7 (1925). Pürev and Dashnyam indicated the importance of this memoir and opened the way for other researchers to challenge the myth of Sükhbaatar (Pürev/Dashnyam, 1989).
16. *Short History*, 1934, p. 53.
17. Dogsom, 1928, p. 41.
18. Jamsran is of Tibetan origin: *lcam sring*. However some scholars state Jamsran was a pre-Buddhistic local deity of Mongolia and was changed into a protective deity of Buddhism when the Dalai Lama Bsod nams rgya mtsho visited Mongolia (Nebesky-Wojkowitz, 1956, p.88). For the belief in Jamsran in Ikh Khüree, see Pozdneyev, 1978, p. 47.
19. Bawden, 1961, 11 v., 35 r.
20. Dashnyam, 1990; Pürev/Dashnyam, 1989. For the location of the *Baruum Örgöö* see the following: (1) Tsultem, 1986, Plate, No.155, the painting entitled 'a bird's-eye view of Uрга [Ikh Khüree] in the middle of the 19th century', a yurt(tent) with 'wor gwuo in Tibetan characters, (2) 'the plan of the Gandan Monastery of Ikh Khüree' (Hashimoto, 1942, p. 197), a yurt with *baragon uruhe* in Japanese characters. However Hashimoto's explanation of the plan, 'the Gandan Monastery of Ikh Khüree' is incorrect and it should be read as 'the Züün Khüree'.
21. Pürev and Dashnyam assumed the pledge was made on 20 November, an auspicious day by the contemporaneous calendar (Pürev/Dashnyam, 1989).
22. *Short History*, 1934, p. 170; *History of the MPRP*, 1985, p. 25. However *History of the Mongolian People's Republic* describes Jamiyan as a member of the Khüree Group (*History of the MPR*, 1976, p. 68).
23. Dash, 1979, p. 294. The full-name of Balsanov is Badamtseren Balsanov and that of Yumtarov is Dorjdamba Yumtarov (Battogtokh, 1991, p.16).
24. Pürev and Dashnyam support the January 1920 theory, insisting that Kungurov and Sorokovikov submitted the theory on the basis of Choibalsan's confirmation (Pürev/Dashnyam, 1989); but I am not convinced by the Mongolian scholars' opinions.
25. Dogsom, 1928, p. 40.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 42.
27. *Ibid.*, pp. 43–44.
28. *Ibid.*, pp. 48–49.
29. *Sor* is of Tibetan origin: *zor*.
30. Dogsom, 1928, p. 56.
31. Dogsom states the ceremony of the official appointment was made on the seventh day in the eleventh month using the lunar calendar (29 December 1919); but it actually took place on 1 January 1920. Many books incorrectly state the ceremony took place on 19 February 1920 (Shirendev, 1969, p. 151; Tanaka, 1990, p. 71; Onuki, 1993, attachments, p. 15). They probably misunderstood 30 December as the thirtieth day in the twelfth month of the lunar calendar and calculated the date using the Gregorian calendar.
32. Dogsom, 1928, pp. 60–61.
33. *Ibid.*, pp. 61–65.
34. *Historical Path of the MPRP*, 1995, p. 10; *Mongolia in the 20th Century*, 1995, p. 36 Baabar 1999, p. 201. A. J. K. Sanders explains in his *Historical Dictionary of Mongolia* that the Mongolian People's Party was founded on 25 June 1920, under the entries of 'Mongolian People's Party' (Sanders, 1996, p. 136) and 'Sühbaatar' (p. 189), while curiously he states that the same party was founded in April 1920, under the entry of 'Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party' (p. 137) and in 'Chronology' (p. XXXI).

35. Sükhbaatar, 1952, pp. 27–30.
36. *History of the MPR*, 1955, p. 295.
37. Kungurov/Sorokovikov, 1946, p. 135.
38. Sorokovikov, 1965, p. 31. A Mongolian translation of the memoir was published in the journal *Namyn amidral* in 1961 (Sorokovikov, 1961); that is, the original Russian edition was published later than the Mongolian translation. The dates of the birth and death of Sorokovikov are unknown. But as his name is framed by black in the Mongolian journal, it confirms that he died a little before the publication of the journal.
39. Dogsom, 1928, pp. 66–67.
40. *Short History*, 1934, p. 87.
41. Sorokovikov, 1965, p. 30.
42. Dogsom, 1928, pp. 67, 71.
43. *Short History*, 1934, pp. 88, 92–93.
44. Sorokovikov, 1965, pp. 29–30.
45. Kungurov/Sorokovikov, 1957, p. 83.
46. *Encyclopedia for Children*, p. 20; Dash, 1967, p. 36. According to Onchukov's memoir, Sorokovikov had fled in the direction of Kyakhta with Choivanov and others just before the White army of Baron Ungern occupied Khüree in February 1921 (Onchukov, 1986, p. 102). Therefore it is clear that he had lived in Khüree at the beginning of 1921. Later in June 1922, after evaluating his intelligence activities in the Red Army, the Soviet Fifth Army sent Sorokovikov to Mongolia and appointed him as head of the Intelligence Department of the Mongolian Army, Chief of staffs' headquarters (Sorokovikov, 1980, pp. 127, 131).
47. Dash, 1979, p. 277.
48. Rinchino, 1998, p. 247. For Rinchino's proposal, see Genkin's article which was included in Eudin/North (Eudin/North, 1957, p. 202).
49. Dash writes the Bureau was established in March 1920 (Dash, 1967, p. 89).
50. Dash, 1979, p. 295.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 293.
52. Second Conference of the MPRP, 1974, p. 159. See also Dalin's memoir (Dalin, 1975, p. 27).
53. In the description of May 1920, M. Onuki refers to Borisov as the head of the Mongolian and Tibetan Department of the Far-Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern and also states that Shumyatskii was the leader of the Far-Eastern Secretariat in the account of August 1920 (Onuki, 1993, pp. 173, 176); however, the Far-Eastern Secretariat did not exist in 1920.
54. Sorokovikov states that on hearing his report 'Yanson established the Mongolian and Tibetan Department of the Secretariat of the Comintern (*Mongolo-Tibetskii ordel Sekretariata Kominterna*) and Gapon was in charge of the department.' (Sorokovikov, 1965, p. 30) However this departmental name is in itself strange and it is quite possible that Sorokovikov confused the Comintern's organisation with the Asian Bureau which had been attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
55. Dogsom, 1928, pp. 67–68.
56. *Short History*, 1934, p. 90.
57. Sorokovikov, 1965, p. 30.
58. Dogsom, 1928, pp. 72–73; *Short History*, 1934, pp. 94, 96.
59. Li Yu-shu. 1961, p. 181; Ewing, 1980, pp. 136–138.
60. Dogsom, 1928, p. 74.
61. *Short History*, 1934, p. 98.
62. Sorokovikov, 1965, p. 30.
63. Dogsom, 1928, pp. 78–80.
64. *Short History*, 1934, pp. 98–109.
65. Sorokovikov, 1965, pp. 30–31. The date of Danzan's and Choibalsan's departure is 28 June in Sorokovikov's account, 29 June in Dogsom's memoir and 30 June in *Short History* (1934), respectively.

66. In *Short History* (1934) the name of Sorokovikov appears for the second time in the account of August 1920: 'Sükhbaatar, Dogsom and Losol met Sorokovikov in Troitskosavsk again, and went to Ust'-kyakhta together.' (*Short History*, 1934, p. 167) This episode is not described in Dogsom's memoir.
67. Rinchino, 1994, p. 131; Rinchino, 1998, p. 247.
68. Dogsom, 1928, pp. 80–82.
69. Dash, 1979, p. 277.
70. Dogsom, 1928, p. 80.
71. Dash, 1979, pp. 277–280.
72. *Short History*, 1934, p. 100.
73. Sorokovikov states 'To ensure secrecy the Executive committee was not formed in June 1920; two months later the committee was organised with Danzan as chairman and Sükhbaatar as secretary.' (Sorokovikov, 1965, p. 31) However this account is inconsistent with his other account: '[in June] the Executive committee chose Choibalsan and Danzan as delegates to Russia.' Also his explanation that the Executive committee was not formed to ensure secrecy is a little illogical.
74. The account of *Short History* (1934) states the meeting was held at Danzan's; this should be considered incorrect. I think Dogsom's memoir is correct and the meeting was held at Dogsom's.
75. Jadamba, 1928, p. 4.

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THE BURIAT INTELLIGENTSIA

Robert A. Rupen



One of the important keys to understanding twentieth-century developments in Central Asia—especially in Buriat Mongolia, Outer Mongolia, and Tibet—is an appreciation of the important role played by the Buriat Mongolian intelligentsia. The Buriats, in the words of one of them, “. . . constituted the cultural *avant-garde* among the Mongolian tribes, introducing and leading the revolutionary ideas of our time . . .”¹

Buriat Mongolia, now an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of the Soviet Union, includes in its population less than 300,000 Buriats, roughly one-tenth of the total Mongolian population of the world.² From this small group, most of whom were illiterate before 1917, arose a group of intellectuals whose influence extended beyond the borders of their homeland to Outer Mongolia and Tibet, and to the smaller areas of Barga (in Manchuria) and Urianghai (incorporated in 1943 into the USSR as the Tannu Tuva Autonomous Oblast). This Buriat intelligentsia was particularly influential from about 1900 to 1930; in the thirties most of them were purged—killed or sent to concentration camps. The few Buriat intellectuals who exist today confine their activity largely to Buriat Mongolia itself. They can express only approved Communist doctrine, and must praise Russian domination. They dare not advocate Buriat separatism and Pan-Mongolism.³

Buriat intellectuals of the 1900–30 period were also in a sense Russian agents, instruments of Czarist and Soviet foreign policy. But the majority of them pursued aims which came to conflict with Soviet aims; they were “bourgeois nationalists” who worked for a Greater Mongolian State, a re-creation of a Mongolian Empire which could defend Mongolian integrity against Russian incursion from the north and Chinese invasion from the south.

Many of these Buriat intellectuals worked to establish a common Mongolian language, and they stressed the importance of harmonizing European science and learning with traditional Mongolian ways. They were not traditionalists, but rather, “liberal democrats” who would not ruthlessly destroy to impose some “new order” but insisted on evolutionary development, which they led in introducing.

Some facts are common to the lives of all of these men: their early years were spent in a typical Mongolian setting; the folklore and superstitions of their people were known to them, and even shared by them; they had excellent educations, most of them at the University of St. Petersburg, where they cooperated closely with leading Russian orientalists; they wrote scholarly (historical and philological) works in the Russian

language; they all spoke and wrote Russian fluently. They traveled widely in Siberia, Central Asia, and European Russia, and some of them even in Western Europe. Yet they always remained Mongols, with close ties to their native land.

Buriat intellectuals participated in the Russian revolutionary movements and parties of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. They were *narodniks*, and later Social Revolutionaries (SRs), for the most part, although many had close connections with the Constitutional Democrats, the Kadets. But Buriat political activity arose primarily from a strong reaction against Russian expansion into Buriat territory, and by the time of the 1917 Revolution, Buriats were thinking seriously of separating from Russia and building a Greater Mongolian State.

Buriats served Czar and commissar as bearers of Russian culture to Mongolia. They interpreted Russia to the Mongols, and Mongolia to the Russians. Many of them held high places in the Outer Mongolian government in the 1920s; indeed, they ran the country. They imposed on the Khalkhas of Outer Mongolia many changes in the direction of modernization and europeanization, but they did so with the aim of protecting Mongolia from assimilation, whether by russification or sinification.

The Buriat intellectuals were: 1) incipient nationalists; 2) Pan-Mongolists; 3) Russian (Czarist and Soviet) agents; and 4) serious scholars and educators. But the categories mix inextricably, the proportion of one factor to the others varying with each individual.

NATIONALISTS

Buriat “nationalism” was born of a strong reaction against Russian expansion into Buriat territory, a development which reached a critical point around 1900. It was “incipient nationalism” in that it did not suggest separation from the Russian Empire, on the contrary: “The Buriats seek to be citizens with full rights and, as such, to participate in the political life of the country together with other nationalities, but as a nationality they insist on the right to cultural self-determination.”⁴ The first decade of the twentieth century saw Buriats actively entering politics and writing polemical articles about the Russian threat to Buriat lands and to Buriat existence. Leaders in expressing opposition to threatened russification were: Batu-dalai Ochirov (1875–1934); Mikhail Bogdanov (1878–1919); Tsyben Zhamtsarano (1880–1940?); and El’bekdorji Rinchino (ca. 1885–1937).

Ochirov⁵ was educated in Buriat Mongolia and at Chita, and became the political leader of the Buriats in the critical days of 1904–05, when the Buriat steppes seethed at the new land and administrative arrangements, and the Russian Empire was fighting with Japan. He headed a deputation to St. Petersburg in 1905, to try to regain local self-government for the Buriats; this mission failed. He represented the Buriats in the Second State Duma, in 1907; he worked with Milyukov and the “liberals.” After the Duma was dissolved, he returned to his homeland and energetically led educational and other work among the Buriats. He had great faith in the co-operative movement to improve his people’s economic position; he founded the first co-operative in Buriat Mongolia, and translated into Mongolian many Russian articles on this subject. To increase his people’s awareness of political and economic matters, he translated into Mongolian not only the Kadet Party program⁶ but also land-settlement laws, and he arranged for a special study of the Aga Steppe—an especially important Buriat area near Chita—by the Chita Branch of the Imperial Russian Geographic Society; the result

is a book containing complete population, land, and other statistics, and a comparative analysis of the 1897 and 1906 censuses.⁷ This is an exceptionally thorough and valuable work. He also arranged stipends for Buriat students in Russian universities, and translated many of the fables of Krylov and stories of Tolstoy into Mongolian. For ten years an effective leader of the non-Russian peoples of Siberia, the *inorodtsy*, he was unfortunately killed in 1914 when his horse stumbled and fell on him. Shortly before his death he spoke of transferring his activity across the Russian border, to Outer Mongolia, where he intended to establish schools and credit and co-operative organizations—thus giving a hint of Pan-Mongolian sentiment.

Mikhail Bogdanov,⁸ the second of these Buriat leaders, was educated at Irkutsk, Kazan Teachers' Seminary, and Tomsk and St. Petersburg Universities. An active Social Revolutionary (SR), he went abroad to Berlin to study, and with other Russian students was forced to leave there and go to Zurich. By 1905 he had returned to Russia, and he led a congress of Buriats at Irkutsk. He formulated and published a plan for Mongolian "self-government" within the Russian Empire, and was described as "one of the best of the Buriat intelligentsia."⁹ At the time of the Civil War in Siberia, he led an exodus of over 2000 Buriats to Barga in Manchuria, but even there he did not escape the effects of civil war and intervention. Semenov, a lieutenant of Kolchak's who led some White Russian forces in Siberia, captured him and had him shot; his body was burned in the boiler of a locomotive. Bogdanov, along with Zhamtsarano (see below), wrote many political articles in Russian journals, attacking Czarist policies and demanding justice for the Buriats.¹⁰ He always stressed protection of Buriat land from Russian encroachment, and argued for continuation of the traditional common tribal ownership of the land. In addition to his political writings, he wrote one of the best histories of Buriat Mongolia in existence.¹¹ Aided by a knowledge of the German language unrivaled among the Buriats, he translated much German artistic, scientific, and political literature into Mongolian. He continued Ochirov's interest and participation in the co-operative movement, and also showed some Pan-Mongolian consciousness, visiting the Kalmyks in European Russia.

Tsyben Zhamtsarano and El'bekdorji Rinchino, both of whom had followed the leadership of Ochirov and Bogdanov, assumed leading roles after these two had died. Zhamtsarano,¹² who had attended a school for Mongols in St. Petersburg, the Irkutsk Teachers' Seminary, and the University of St. Petersburg, also wrote a series of political articles. At the same time he traveled extensively through Mongolia (Buriat, Outer, and Inner Mongolia) collecting and recording the oral poetry—the epics—sung by the Mongols. After the 1911–12 revolution in Outer Mongolia, when the so-called "Autonomous Mongolian Government" headed by the Jebtsun Damba Khutukhtu (the "Bogdo Gegen") was established,¹³ Zhamtsarano transferred his activities to Outer Mongolia and spent most of the rest of his life there.

Rinchino had also studied at St. Petersburg University; his career continually crossed and mixed with that of Zhamtsarano, but while Rinchino was more active in politics, Zhamtsarano devoted more of his time to scholarship. Rinchino remained in Buriat Mongolia through the period of the First World War and the 1917 revolutions, and soon thereafter he, too, went to Outer Mongolia. His obituary article on Ochirov (see note 5) reflects an interesting and very warm approval of the moderate Buriat leader, while simultaneously expressing bitterness toward the Czarist regime.

Thus these four—Ochirov, Bogdanov, Zhamtsarano, and Rinchino—all expressed themselves in action and in writing against russification and for recognition of Buriat

“rights” in the Empire. In the first decade of the twentieth century, the Buriat steppes seethed with unprecedented political activity, led by the intelligentsia. In meeting after meeting, the Buriats condemned the Czarist Government for changing the traditional forms of land ownership, and for giving Buriat land to Russian settlers. Riding on the back of the fundamental issue of land came a host of other issues: nomadic existence, clan and tribal organization, russification, self-government, the judicial system, military service, education, language, representation in a national Russian elective assembly, religion, socialism, universal suffrage, and women’s rights. But despite their intense dissatisfaction, the Buriats expressed themselves through Russian political parties and within the framework of the Czarist Empire: their aims were representation in the State Duma and local self-government. Separatism was not advocated by them before the revolutions of 1917.

PAN-MONGOLISTS

The same individuals who stressed Buriat self-consciousness and who were the “incipient nationalists” discussed above, recognized a common feeling, and to some extent made common cause, with Mongols outside Buriat Mongolia. There was a degree of promise, and a degree of threat, in the attitude of Buriat leaders vis-à-vis other Mongolian areas. It is significant that Ochirov spoke of transferring his activities to Outer Mongolia after the Duma had been dissolved and when Czarist repression of minorities was at a high pitch. There may have been an element of desire to increase Buriat influence by extending Buriat activity southward to show St. Petersburg that Buriats could be useful in spreading Russian influence, along with an implied threat of a Buriatia joining a Greater Mongolian State. In any case, the Buriat leaders did not intend to bow to russification. Zhamtsarano, for example, moved to Outer Mongolia in 1911, acted as interpreter for the Mongolian delegation to St. Petersburg in 1913, operated a secular school in Urga (now Ulan Bator), the capital of Outer Mongolia, and published a Mongolian-language newspaper there (*Šine toli kemekü bičig* [*New Mirror*]).

Rinchino, Zhamtsarano, and other Buriat nationalists tried to extract favorable treatment for the Buriats in return for their services in Outer Mongolia. After the Bolshevik Revolution, Rinchino noted when the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party published a Politburo decree guaranteeing Buriat autonomy and protection from the local administration and Russian population: “this has great significance to Mongolia,” and he stressed that the Communists must let Buriats have their land and protect them from the Russians who tried to take it from them.¹⁴ He accompanied a Mongolian delegation to Moscow, acting as interpreter, and soon assumed leading positions in the Outer Mongolian government. Zhamtsarano wrote the first platform (the so-called “Kiakhta Platform” of 1921) of the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party.¹⁵

Having returned to Urga from Leningrad in 1922, Rinchino soon (in 1924) arranged the elimination of the Mongolian leader Danzan,¹⁶ and from then until 1928 or 1929, he was *de facto* dictator of Outer Mongolia (since 1924 the Mongolian People’s Republic). Zhamtsarano continued his work in Outer Mongolia, concentrating on education and cultural affairs: he founded the Mongolian Scientific Committee, a state library, and a museum; arranged for publication of books and newspapers (including many translations into Mongolian of European literature); conducted archaeological investigations;

discovered important historical documents; and generally dominated Mongolian cultural and intellectual life.

Other Buriats occupied prominent positions in the government of the Mongolian People's Republic: Erdeni Batukhan, Minister of Education, and Dashi Sampilon, Minister of Economics and Trade, were most important. Indeed, I would term the 1920s "the Buriat episode in Outer Mongolian history." Outer Mongolia was brought into the communist orbit in large part through the agency of Buriats.

This extension of Buriat activity to Outer Mongolia is itself one face of Pan-Mongolism, but there are many others. Zhamtsarano's 1921 "Kiakhta Platform" of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, for example, included the following (Point II): "In view of the fact that the peaceful existence of the Mongolian masses, and their union with the culture and knowledge of enlightened peoples, require the organization of a self-governing independent State of the Mongolian nation, and not the enslavement and oppression by alien imperialists, our People's Party aims at the ultimate goal of the union of all the Mongolian tribes into a single self-governing State . . ."

At the Third Party Congress, Rinchino stated: "We must also keep in mind the fact that millions of our race, the 'Inner' Mongols, are groaning under the oppression of China." And in November of 1924, he told the First Great Khural: "We must be the cultural center for our races, we must attract to ourselves the Inner Mongols, Barga Mongols, etc . . ." Baradin told this same Khural: "Be firm in your work of uniting all Mongolian races . . ."

Similar hopes, shared by most of the Mongolian intellectuals, and especially strong among the Buriats, were well expressed by Ishi Dorji in an article published in Germany in 1929:

In earlier times, under the Khutukhtu, Urga, through the Gandang Monastery—which included a famous school of philosophy—was a religious center with great powers of attraction for the followers of northern Buddhism. Even with the distant Kalmyks on the lower Volga, continual contact was maintained. In recent years, this power of attraction has become yet stronger, now due to national rather than religious conditions. Independent Mongolia, with its highly developed national culture and its political-economic program, has great interest for the intellectuals and the young among the other Mongols outside Outer Mongolia. All who have an opportunity come to Ulan Bator to work and study in this national-cultural center. The importance of Ulan Bator for the partly russified Buriats, the half-sinified (in China, practically assimilated) Chahars and Tumets (of Inner Mongolia) is in this respect extraordinarily great. In the eyes of the Barguts (Manchuria) and the Mongols of Inner Mongolia, Ulan Bator and the Khalkhas appear to have achieved an ideal state of freedom and independence. Therefore emigration for political reasons has come to be of considerable importance. In Urga one now meets representatives of all the Mongolian tribes, from the Kalmyks to the Ordos Mongols who live on the banks of the Yellow River. Such an influx of intellectual power, of people who have received part of their education in Russia, China, and Japan, powerfully supports the work of cultural improvement, and it furthermore arouses and intensifies the idea of co-operation and unification of the various Mongolian tribes around the now independent Outer Mongolia. The present cultural activity of Mongolia is therefore doubtless also of great importance and usefulness far beyond the borders of what is now politically autonomous Mongolia.

Finally, the great enthusiasm with which the Mongolian people have gone about the strengthening and reconstruction of their state, amply justifies the assumption that the Mongolian people are approaching a renaissance. Naturally, their interest in technical progress and knowledge does not serve ideas of conquest, but aims merely at maintaining

themselves in their mountain-steppe homeland, in honorable memory of their glorious ancestors. . . .¹⁷

Rinchino follows this line in an article published in 1927 in *Revolutsionnyi Vostok* [*The Revolutionary Orient*], where he postulates an “ethnographic Mongolia,” with common interests shared by the majority of the population. Contemporary Mongolia, he argues, is a people and a country possessing all the elements necessary for building a national state, and he refers to the above-quoted “Kiakhtha-Platform” statement about the formation of a Pan-Mongolia, and emphasizes that this platform was approved by the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern.¹⁸

An important variant of Pan-Mongolism may be termed “Pan-Buddhism.” Its principal practical difference from Pan-Mongolism is that it adds Tibet to the Mongolian areas which are to be brought under unified control. Agvan Dorjeev (1853–1938)¹⁹ is the outstanding Buriat advocate of this idea. A lama, he studied in monasteries first in Buriat Mongolia, then at Urga, in Outer Mongolia, and finally near Lhasa, in Tibet. Being extraordinarily gifted, he quickly came to the attention of the Dalai Lama, and served as his political adviser, and often as his personal representative at the court in St. Petersburg. He accompanied the Dalai Lama in his flight from Lhasa to Urga, when the Younghusband expedition invaded Tibet from India (1904), and in 1912 he represented the Dalai Lama in Urga, and concluded the Mongolian-Tibetan Treaty of that year. Besides his important activities in Tibet, he became religious head—“Khambo Lama”—of the Buriat Church. It was he who conceived the idea of erecting a Buddhist temple in St. Petersburg some years before World War I.²⁰ In addition to frequent trips between Lhasa and St. Petersburg, he traveled extensively in Western Europe; he held Buddhist services in Paris, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome, and also visited India. He probably envisioned a Tibetan-Mongolian theocratic empire, to be headed by the Dalai Lama, under the protection of Czarist Russia. Many Lamaists believed in a legend of a messianic kingdom (Shambala—“Source of Luck”), and some identified the “White Czar” and Russia with this kingdom.

Another aspect of Pan-Mongolism involves the Kalmyks of the lower Volga and the Don. Dorjeev visited the Kalmyks; he established religious schools there, and generally made positive, if rather unfruitful, efforts to strengthen relations between the Buriats and Kalmyks. Close liaison never did develop between the geographically contiguous groups in Central Asia and the far-removed Kalmyks in European Russia—Pan-Mongolism as a political fact did not embrace the Kalmyks.

The Japanese made at least two strong attempts at exploiting Pan-Mongolism and its variant, Pan-Buddhism. At the time of the civil war in Russia, after 1917, when Japanese troops occupied parts of eastern Siberia, they broached an appeal to the Mongols through the Ataman of the Transbaikal Cossacks, Semenov (a Buriat). “Pan-Mongolism” became the slogan through which at least some Japanese thought they could win over all Mongolian groups and effectively separate the Buriats from Russia, simultaneously furthering Japanese influence in Central Asia. This movement crystallized at Dauria, at a conference in February 1919. A *khutukhtu* (the highest rank in the Buddhist hierarchy) from Inner Mongolia, Neisse Gegen, nominally headed the movement, which called for establishment of a “Greater Mongolian State” from Baikal to Tibet and from Manchuria to Eastern Turkestan. But when the Khalkhas of Outer Mongolia refused to participate, the movement was doomed, and the Japanese quickly disavowed all connection with Neisse Gegen and his associates.²¹

In the 1930s, when Manchukuo was established, the Japanese found it convenient once more to foster Pan-Mongolism,²² and it is apparent that the idea had grown into a potent political movement, counteracting Chinese pressure on the Mongols from the south, and Russian pressure from the north. Buriat leaders embraced it as a means of fighting russification, and Inner Mongolian leaders (e.g. Teh Wang), to fight sinification. The Japanese thus attempted to exploit it in both directions, against the Soviet Union and against China.

RUSSIAN (CZARIST AND SOVIET) AGENTS

Whenever Buriats did political or other work in Outer Mongolia or in Tibet, they tended, willingly or not, to extend Russian influence. As their ancestors had been Russian subjects since the seventeenth century, they had come to adopt many Russian ways. Their intellectual leaders were Russian-educated, and spoke and wrote fluent Russian. Wherever they went in the Mongolian world, they bore the stamp of Russia, as well as the stamp of Mongolia.²³ They were both related and foreign, and the Khalkhas (of Outer Mongolia) hated them.²⁴

Dorjeev, who had relations with the Russian General Staff and access to highly placed persons in St. Petersburg, was both a Pan-Mongolist (more accurately, a Pan-Buddhist) and a Russian agent. But he can not be simply dismissed as a paid spy, though he was undoubtedly often paid; he probably sincerely believed that a united Central Asian empire under Russian protection was both feasible and desirable, and he worked hard to bring such an empire into being.

Another Czarist "agent" and Buriat intellectual was Peter Badmaev (1851–1919).²⁵ After studies at the gymnasium-school in Irkutsk, he pursued Oriental studies at St. Petersburg University, and then took a step unique to this group of Buriats: he was converted to the Orthodox religion, his godfather being the Czar, Alexander III, himself. This imperial sponsorship opened many doors to him, and he came to be involved in many court intrigues. From 1875 to 1893 he served in the Asiatic Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, simultaneously being quite the rage of high society in St. Petersburg with his practice of Tibetan medicine. His Foreign Office activity encouraged him to dream of a grandiose project to join China, Mongolia, and Tibet to the Russian Empire in a grand confederation, and it is believed that he played a significant role in pushing the Russian expansive activity in Manchuria and Korea which led to the Russo-Japanese War. He was a friend of Rasputin, and *Krasnyi Arkhiv* [*Red Archives*] contains letters which Badmaev wrote to the Czar concerning Russian policy in Outer Mongolia. But even this "agent of Russian imperialism," converted to the Orthodox Church and living most of the time in St. Petersburg, made some important efforts to help his people, and his influence in ruling circles sometimes was used to their advantage. In 1895 he founded a gymnasium-level school for Buriats in St. Petersburg (which some of the other Buriats, including Zhamtsarano, attended), and a Russian-Buriat newspaper in St. Petersburg, for which he employed Buriat writers and technical staff. He arranged for many Buriats to visit the capital, and great numbers went there, especially for the coronation in 1896. But in 1897 the Government forced him to teach the Orthodox religion in his school, and not Buddhism; the students revolted, and the school closed. In 1902–03, he quarreled with Plevé and others, and managed to delay, though not reverse, an order which changed the traditional administration of Buriat

lands, and which was bitterly opposed by all the Buriats.²⁶ Thus Badmaev contributed to Buriat “nationalism”; his plans for a united Central Asian empire were Pan-Mongolist; he was clearly a Czarist agent; and he played an important role in Buriat education.

Rinchino, who has already been cited as a Buriat “nationalist” and a “Pan-Mongolist,” must also be reckoned among the Soviet agents; at the Third Congress of the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party, convened at Urga in 1924, he said of himself: “I have worked from the beginning of the existence of our People’s Party. I went with the representatives of our Party to Moscow. I worked in the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern (Mongolian and Tibetan Section) at Irkutsk. I led Mongolia to the Comintern, which supplied the Mongolian People’s Party with instructors and indispensable funds. Later the Comintern dispatched me to Kiakhta for work during the most critical moment of the existence of our Party and Government. . . . The Comintern has dispatched me here.”

Zhamtsarano, too, may be termed a Russian agent; when he ran the secular school and published the Mongolian-language newspaper in Urga from 1912 to about 1917, he was carrying out the ideas of Korostovets, the Russian Minister at Urga;²⁷ and when he wrote the platform of the Revolutionary Party and participated in the Revolutionary Government, founding and operating the Mongolian Scientific Committee, was he not to some degree acting as an agent of the Soviet Russians? Certainly his convictions were “patriotic” and honorable, but the Communists took the credit for his accomplishments, and pointed to the libraries and school as evidence of their contribution to Mongolia.

It is also true, however, that the Buriats owed their leading position in the Mongolian People’s Republic to the Red Army. Before Soviet troops entered Urga in July 1921, in the period of Outer Mongolian “autonomy” which lasted from 1911/12 to 1919, Buriats had no important place in the government. Instead, southern Mongols (from Inner Mongolia) dominated—the refugees from sinification carried out the Outer Mongolian revolution of 1911–12, which was primarily an anti-Chinese revolt. In the pre-Soviet period, Zhamtsarano ran his school and published his newspaper under the aegis of the Russian Consulate in Urga, with neither the support nor the approval of the Autonomous Mongolian Government. After 1921, however, he founded and ran the country’s official Scientific Committee, was influential in its educational system, set up its library, and “generally dominated intellectual and cultural activity.” But it was not by popular acclaim that Buriats ran the country.

In general, the Buriats represented a dangerous threat to the traditional Mongolian social order; they brought with them modernization and westernization—ideas and techniques which they in turn had learned from the Russians. Most leaders of the Khalkhas and southern Mongols (i.e. of the Mongols of Outer and Inner Mongolia) were traditionalists, aristocrats, who hated the Chinese, but wanted to do no more than preserve the old ways. The progressive Mongols were largely Buriats, and their progressiveness was due to Russian influence. Yet at the same time, few if any of these Buriat leaders were merely tools of the Czarist or Soviet government. They would modernize and westernize Mongolia, but simultaneously they attempted to forestall sinification and russification.

The Pan-Mongolism of the Buriats was inextricably tied to their *de facto* function as Russian agents. Willingly or not, they were living bridges between the two cultures.

SCHOLARS AND EDUCATORS

In varying degrees all of the members of the Buriat intelligentsia already mentioned—Ochirov, Bogdanov, Zhamtsarano, Dorjeev, and Badmaev—were engaged in scholarly or educational activity as well as in politics. Two other important Buriat scholars who also played a slight political role were Gombojab Tsybikov (1873–1930) and Badzar Baradin (1878–1937), and their names complete this roster of the politically significant twentieth-century Buriat intelligentsia. But before analyzing the scholarly contributions of these men, and the relation of their scholarship to their politics, two forerunners of the later Buriat “renaissance” deserve notice: Dorji Banzarov (1822–55)²⁸ and Galsan Gomboev (1822–63).²⁹

Banzarov is known as the “first Buriat scholar,” and the Scientific Committee of the Buriat-Mongolian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic is named in his honor. Gomboev was a lama. Both were educated at Kazan; at the gymnasium there, Banzarov studied Latin, French, English, and Turkish, as well as Russian. (Kazan in the middle of the nineteenth century was the cultural as well as the political forefront of Russia in Asia, and an important center of oriental studies.) Banzarov’s doctoral dissertation at Kazan University was a study of shamanism among the Mongols, the first scholarly study of the subject in any language; it was republished in 1891, and is still valuable.³⁰ The Lama Gomboev taught Mongolian at St. Petersburg University from 1855 to 1863, and translated many Russian works into Mongolian, including *The Rudiments of Christian Teaching*.

Since Banzarov and Gomboev, a Buriat intelligentsia always has existed, right up to and including the present, but as a group it possessed political significance beyond the borders of Buriat Mongolia principally in the period from 1900 to about 1930. Returning now to this group of twentieth-century representatives, both Tsybikov and Baradin were primarily scholars; both wrote much on the Mongolian language, and made significant contributions to Tibetan as well as Mongolian studies. Tsybikov learned Russian in his early schooling, and became, in 1893, the first Buriat to complete the Russian gymnasium at Chita. After having studied medicine for a time at Tomsk, he traveled to Urga, and then, from 1895 to 1899, transferred his studies to the Faculty of Oriental Languages at St. Petersburg. He then accompanied a Russian Geographical Society expedition to Lhasa,³¹ after which he became Lecturer of the Mongolian Language in the Oriental Institute at Vladivostok. Remaining there most of the rest of his life, his role in subsequent Buriat political developments was slight, but throughout his career he stressed the importance of a Mongolian language common to all Mongolian peoples,³² and such a view is part of the content of “Pan-Mongolism.”

Baradin was a lifelong friend of Zhamtsarano; they were born in the same area (Aga), they were at the University of St. Petersburg together in 1902, both lectured on Mongolian language at the University in 1908 and after, and they made many joint trips of scholarly investigation to their Baikal homeland. While Zhamtsarano headed the Scientific Committee of the Mongolian People’s Republic in the 1920s, Baradin headed the Scientific Committee of the Buriat Mongolian ASSR. Zhamtsarano’s scholarly interests, however, centered more on the collection of Mongolian folklore—the epic poetry of the Mongolian peoples, while Baradin paid more attention to linguistics (especially latinization of the Buriat alphabet) and to Tibetan and Lamaist studies.

The scholarly work of Zhamtsarano and Baradin (and also that, less important, of Rinchino) was financed and supported largely through the Russian Committee of the

Society for the Exploration of Central and Eastern Asia.³³ The Committee financed four years of Baradin's study of the Tibetan language, sent Zhamtsarano to Buriat Mongolia, Outer Mongolia, and Inner Mongolia (via Peking), and Baradin to Tibet as well as to Peking, and both Zhamtsarano and Baradin journeyed regularly between St. Petersburg and the Baikal region; the Committee also arranged for publication of their works. Supported by government subvention, the Committee played a very important role in Russian oriental studies generally from 1902 to 1917. Outstanding orientalists and prominent persons interested in Asiatic affairs participated in it: Radlov, Ol'denburg, Veselovskii, Barthold, Kotvich, Klements, Salemann, Rudnev, Korostovets, and Prince Ukhtomskii. Leading university professors and Academy of Science members sponsored, through this Committee, the studies, travels, and publications of outstanding Buriat intellectuals, along with those of students in other Central Asian and oriental fields.

The scholarly activities of the Buriat intelligentsia had definite political overtones. Emphasis on the Mongolian language, literature, and history, and on Buddhist studies, naturally led to increased consciousness of "Mongol-ness," and enhanced pride in belonging to a talented and gifted group. Buriat leaders stressed and were very active in education—they themselves, many of them, were teachers by training and experience, and were aware of the necessity to extend literacy among their people. They considered latinization of the Mongolian script important because it would make writing more flexible and easier to learn.

But concurrently with this emphasis on their Mongolian heritage, the Buriats wanted western learning. They aimed at universal education of their youth in both the Mongolian and Russian languages, and many of their publications were translations into Mongolian of outstanding western works, European and American as well as Russian.³⁴ On the one hand they presented detailed Lamaist studies and reproduced old Tibetan and Mongolian manuscripts, and on the other hand they wrote geographies embodying modern conceptions which demolished the Buddhist cosmology.³⁵ Mongolian folklore and western science were presented almost simultaneously.

The scholarship of this Buriat intelligentsia is, by and large, of a high order; their work remains a permanent tribute to themselves and to the pre-revolutionary school of Russian orientalists who trained them.

FATE OF THE BURIAT INTELLIGENTSIA

To follow the order in which they have been mentioned in this article, Ochirov died accidentally in 1914; Bogdanov was killed in 1919 by White Russian forces; Zhamtsarano was arrested in Leningrad in 1937 and was never heard from again; Rinchino was shot in Moscow in 1937; Batukhan, arrested in Leningrad in 1937, was exiled to the Ukhta concentration camp; Sampilon was killed in Buriat Mongolia in 1937; Dorjeev was arrested in Leningrad in 1937, and later died in prison in Buriat Mongolia; Badmaev died in 1919; Tsybikov died in 1930; Baradin was shot in 1937. Thus, none of the group survived the *yezhevshchina*—the 1937 Soviet purges.

Before they were killed or sent to concentration camps, Zhamtsarano, Rinchino, Batukhan, Sampilon, and Dorjeev had all been out of favor for some time: Zhamtsarano was ordered to Leningrad in 1932, and until his arrest he worked there at the Academy of Sciences. Rinchino had been forced to leave Mongolia in 1928, and from that time

until his death he worked at NIANKP (Scientific-Investigative Association for National and Colonial Problems). Batukhan, a former Minister of Education in the Mongolian People's Republic, taught the Mongolian language at the Leningrad Institute of Oriental Languages until his arrest; Sampilon had been forced in 1929 to leave his post as Minister of Economics and Trade of the Mongolian People's Republic, and to go to Buriat Mongolia. Dorjeev lived in the Buddhist temple just outside Leningrad for some years before his arrest.

The charges on which the Buriat leaders were arrested, exiled, and executed were apparently in most cases "bourgeois nationalism" and "Pan-Mongolism." There is certainly an element of truth in such charges, if these attitudes are considered criminal. Considering their fate from a non-Soviet point of view, one might say that independence of mind and sincere devotion to their people caused their downfall when a new generation of more supple instruments of Communist control was ready to replace them.

CONCLUSIONS

1. A strong, if not decisive, element in the growth of the political consciousness of the Buriat intelligentsia was the Czarist oppression which became serious around 1900 with its double-edged attack on Buriat traditional landholding: Russian and Ukrainian peasants moved onto land formerly held and exploited by Buriats, and the old tribal system of collective land ownership was prejudiced by institution of individual land ownership.

2. The Buriat attachment to collective land ownership resulted in a built-in sympathy for "socialism," and Buriat leaders tended to associate themselves with Russian political parties which strove for this form of economy and government.

3. The Buriats reacted to Czarist oppression by stressing the peculiarities of their culture and way of life: their folklore, their language, their religion, and their history.

4. When Czarist oppression was stepped up, the Buriats looked beyond Russia's borders for alternatives and support, and Pan-Mongolism grew increasingly attractive as a goal; separatism and Pan-Mongolism developed together.

5. Though vehemently opposed to russification, the Buriats could not help absorbing Russian cultural characteristics as part of a process of "westernization," and they extended Russian culture wherever they went, thereby furthering Russian "imperialism" in Asia.

6. They continued to play this role of Russian agents after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917; they were working to build up a stronger and more independent Mongolia while the Communists "used" them and took credit for their accomplishments.

7. Stalinism meant a new emphasis on conformity and an increase in centralized control from Moscow; the Buriat intelligentsia of the 1920s was too independent and too "bourgeois" to continue in power under such a regime. Since this intelligentsia had no appreciable independent strength at its command, it was simple for the Reds to "crack down" and eliminate it.

8. The scholarly achievements of the Buriats are continuing monuments to them and to their Russian mentors. Western specialists regularly employ books and articles written by these Buriats, and contemporary orientalist in the Red orbit make use of them too. Thus their work lives on after them.

9. Thanks to Russian contact and training, a relatively small group of Buriat intellectuals produced by far the most progressive indigenous leadership in Central Asia in the early twentieth century. Most of them were “liberals” and “men of good will” who would have been good democrats if they had ever had the chance. Czarist repression drove them to powerful intellectual and political activity in self-defense; communist suppression killed them. They could have formed an honorable part of a democratic Russia—but there is no democratic Russia, and the fate of the Buriat intellectuals is a part of this larger tragedy of our time.

NOTES

1. Arkhincheev, in *Zhizn 'Natsional' nostei* [Life of Nationalities], (1923). Important sources of information throughout this article are the significant writings of N. N. Poppe in *Vestnik instituta po izucheniyu istorii i kul'tury SSSR* [Journal of the Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR]: “Mongol'skaya Narodnaya Respublika” [“Mongolian People's Republic”], XI (1954), 7–24; “Polozhenie buddiiskoi tserkvi v SSSR” [“Position of the Buddhist Church in the USSR”], XII (1954), 35–46; and “Mongolovedenie v SSSR” [“Mongolian Studies in the USSR”], XIV (1955), 25–43, and relevant articles on the various individuals in the *Entsiklopedicheskii Slovar'*, *Sibirskaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya*, and *Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya* (1st ed.). The following two articles were unavailable to me: Galsan Tsirenov [Mikhail Bogdanov], “Rost' buryatskoi itelligentsii” [“Growth of the Buriat Intelligentsia”], *Sibir'*, XXXI (1914), and Kozmin', “Tuzemnaya intelligentsiya Sibiri” [“Indigenous Intelligentsia of Siberia”], *Sibirskaya Zhivaya Starina* [Siberian Living Antiquity], (1923).
Much of the research on which this article is based was done while the author was at the Russian Research Center, Harvard University, 1954–55. Professor Poppe of the University of Washington supplied much of the information not otherwise documented herein. Any errors of fact or interpretation, however, are of course the author's.
2. Mongols are found principally: in Inner Mongolia (including the Barga area of Manchuria), an integral part of China—less than two million; in Outer Mongolia, the nominally independent but heavily sovietized “Mongolian People's Republic”—fewer than one million; in the Buriat Mongolian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of the USSR—less than 300,000 Buriats; in addition there are perhaps 100,000 Oirat Mongols in Sinkiang. The 150,000 Kalmyk Mongols of European Russia have been dispersed, and many of them killed; the Kalmyk ASSR was dissolved December 27, 1943, because of alleged co-operation with the German invaders. More than five hundred Kalmyk refugees now live in Philadelphia and communities in nearby New Jersey.
3. The Buriats Garma Sanzheev and S. D. Dylykov, for example, both write extensively on Mongolian linguistics and affairs: see Poppe, “Mongolovedenie v SSSR,” and Sanzheev's letter in *HJAS*, XVIII (June 1955), 239–244. Dylykov wrote the recent *Demokraticheskoe dvizhenie mongol'skogo naroda v Kitae* [Democratic Movement of the Mongolian People in China] (Moscow, 1953), reviewed by Rupen, *FEQ*, XIV (Aug. 1955), 599–602.
4. Tsyben Zhamtsarano, “O pravosoznaniu buryat (k predstoyashchim obshchim reformam)” [“Concerning the Law Consciousness of the Buriats (on the Occasion of the Imminent General Reforms)”], *Sibirskie Voprosy* [Siberian Questions], II (St. Petersburg, 1906), 184.
5. Alamzhi Mergen [El'bekdorji Rinchino], “Batu Dalai Ochirov,” *Sibirskii trgovno—promyshlennyi ezhegodnik na 1914–15 gg.* [Siberian Trade-Industrial Annual, 1914–15], pp. 340–349.
6. *Oros gürün dotora albatu-dur čilüge-tei erke keregtei bolbaču oroi dayan uy-un qayan-tai-a bayıqu gegsen sanaltai bölgüm ulus-un ügülekü inu urid-ıyar ügülekü inu* [Preface to the Declaration of the Party which Promotes the Idea that the Subjects of the Russian Empire

Should Have an Emperor at their Head Although Freedom and Liberty Are Necessary to Them].

7. *Trudy aginskoi ekspeditsii. Materialy po izsledovaniyu Aginskoi stepi Zabaikal'skoi oblasti, proizvedennomu v 1908 g. Chitinskim Otdeleniem Imperatorskago Russkago Geograficheskago Obshchestva* [Work of the Aga Expedition, Materials for the Study of the Aga Steppe of Transbaikalsk Oblast', Collected in 1908 by the Chita Branch of the Imperial Russian Geographic Society] (Chita, 1911).
8. For Bogdanov's biography, see Kozmin's Introduction to *Ocherki istorii . . .* (see n. 11). Not available to me was P. Danbinov [Solbone Tüya] "Biografiya M. N. Bogdanova" ["Biography of M. N. Bogdanov"], *Golos Buryat-Mongolii* [Voice of Buriat-Mongolia] (1920).
9. Zhamtsarano, "O pravosoznaniy buryat," *Sibirskie Voprosy*, II (1906), 184.
10. Usually employing pseudonyms ("B. M.," "M. Bratskii," or "Galsan Tsirenov"), most of Bogdanov's (and also most of Zhamtsarano's) political articles appeared in the journals *Sibir'* and *Sibirskie voprosy* [Siberian Questions]. Practically all such articles were published in the years 1905–15.
- A bibliography of forty-eight items published from 1904 to 1918 appears in P. Khoroshikh, "Nauchno-literaturnoe nasledstvo M. N. Bogdanova" ["Scientific-Literary Heritage of M. N. Bogdanov"] along with a bibliography of twelve items about him, "Stat'i i zametki o M. N. Bogdanove" ["Articles and Notes about M. N. Bogdanov"]. These are both in the journal *Buryatievedenie* [Buriat Studies] (Verkhneudinsk), II (1926).
11. *Ocherki istorii buryat-mongol'skogo naroda* [Outline of the History of the Buriat-Mongolian People] (Verkhneudinsk, 1926).
12. A biography of Zhamtsarano which I have prepared is nearly ready for publication. See also Walter Kolarz, *The Peoples of the Soviet Far East* (London, 1954), pp. 139–149; Rupen, "A Soviet Historical Novel about Mongolia," *FEQ*, XIV (Aug. 1955), 553–557, and "Zhamtsarano" (Bibliography), *HJAS*, XIX (1956).
13. For details of this period, see Rupen, "Outer Mongolian Nationalism, 1900–1919" (ms., Univ. of Wash., 1954), p. 399 (Microfilm A54–1832, Pub. No. 8363, Univ. Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Mich.).
14. E. D. Rinchino, "Buryat-mongoly vostochnoi Sibirii" ["The Buriat Mongols of Eastern Siberia"], *Zhizn' Natsional'nostei* [Life of Nationalities] (May 28 and June 11, 1921).
15. Full Russian text appears in A. Kallinikov, "U Istokov mongol'skoi revolyutsii," *Khozyaistvo Mongolii* [Amidst the Sources of the Mongolian Revolution] [Economy of Mongolia], III, No. 10 (May–June 1928), 65–68, and also (though here Zhamtsarano is not mentioned as author) in Kh. Choibalsan, *Kratkii ocherk istorii mongol'skoi narodnoi revolyutsii* [Short Sketch of the History of the Mongolian People's Revolution], trans. from Mongolian (Moscow, 1952), pp. 41–43.
16. "The Third Assembly of the Mongolian People's Party, Urga," trans. F. Attree (unpub. MS.). All references to speeches at the Third Party Congress and First Khural of 1924 derive from Attree's translations at the Hoover Lib., of Stanford Univ.
17. Ischi-dorji, "Die heutige Mongolei, II: Kulturelle Aufarbeit in der Mongolei," *Osteuropa*, IV (1929), 408–409.

About Ishi Dorji, see Wolff, "Mongol Delegations in Western Europe," *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society* (Jan. 1946), pp. 80f, 86–87, 91.

18. Rinchino, "K voprosu o natsional'nom samoopredelenii Mongolii v svyazi s zadachami kitaiskoi revolyutsii" ["On the Question of the National Self-Determination of Mongolia in Connection with the Tasks of the Chinese Revolution"], *Revolyutsionnyi Vostok* [The Revolutionary Orient], II (1927), 65–78.

The whole structure of Pan-Mongolism was severely attacked in an answer to Rinchino written by Zhambolon, another Buriat: "Kak ne sleduet stavit' vopros a natsional'nom samoopredelenii Mongolii po povodu stat'i tov. Rinchino" ["How the Question of the Self-

Determination of Mongolia Should Not Be Put As It Is in the Article by Comrade Rinchino"] *Revolutsionnyi Vostok*, III (1928), 235–240.

19. One important source of information about this outstanding Buriat is L. B-n [Berlin], "Khambo Agvan Dorzheev (k bor'be Tibeta za nezavisimost')" ["Khambo Agvan Dorjeev (in Relation to Tibet's Struggle for Independence)"], *Novyi Vostok* [*New Orient*], III (1923), 139–156. See also Poppe's writings (note 1), and Korostovets, *Von Chinggis Khan zur Sowjetrepublik* (Berlin, 1926), pp. 207–210.
20. Quite an amazing outcry swept the Russian capital about this: a Buddhist temple in a Christian city! But Dorjeev's influential University friends, and the strong support of Prince Ukhtomskii, prevailed over the temporary hysteria, and the temple was built. When later, in the 1930s, Dorjeev was exiled by the Communists to Leningrad, he spent most of his time at this temple. Concerning this temple, and other aspects of Buddhism in Russia, see W. A. Unkrig, "Aus den letzten Jahrzehnten des Lamaismus in Russland," *Zeitschrift für Buddhismus und verwandte Gebiete*, VII (1926), 135–151.
21. The whole affair ended ignominiously when the Chinese garrison at Kiakhta captured Semenov's "brigade" in Jan. 1920: Neisse Gegen and twelve troop commanders were immediately shot by the Chinese, and 200 other prisoners were sent to Urga to do forced labor there. Buriat intellectuals like Rinchino and Zhamtsarano did not take any part in the Neisse Gegen movement.
Consult Kallinikov, "U istokov . . ."; Korostovets, pp. 294–295; and anonymous, "K sobytiyam v Mongolii" ["About Events in Mongolia"], *Russkoe obozrenie* [*Russian Review*], (Peking), No. 1–2 (1921).
22. Walther Heissig, *Das Gelbe Vorfeld: Die Mobilisierung der chinesischen Aussenländer* (Berlin, 1941); Paul V. Hyer, "Japaner und Lamapriester," *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, XXV (Aug. 1954), 474–479; and Hyer, "Lamaist Buddhism and Japanese Policy in Mongolia" (unpubl. M.A. thesis, Univ. of Calif., Berkeley, 1953).
23. When, for example, Zhamtsarano traveled in Inner Mongolia in 1909 and 1910, the Mongols there took him to be a Russian: ". . . a Russian who spoke perfect Mongolian, on a beautiful horse with a beautiful saddle of European manufacture . . . and he was extremely interested in everything that concerned the Chinggis Khan cult" (letter to the author from Father Antoine Mostaert).
24. I. Maiskii, *Sovremennaya Mongoliya* [*Contemporary Mongolia*] (Irkutsk, 1921), p. 94: ". . . the Mongols realize the cultural superiority of the Buriats, and know that they could not dispense with them, but they do not like the Buriats, considering them traitors to the historical heritage of the Mongolian race who have fallen under the power of alien influences. It is possible, and even likely, that in this dislike of the Buriats, the Mongolian church preaches a concealed hatred of them, instinctively sensing that European culture, of which the Buriats are conductors, bears with it the greatest peril to its own complete dominance." Professor Poppe from his personal experience confirms the general dislike of the Khalkhas for the Buriats.
25. For Badmaev, see V. P. Semennikov, *Za kulisami tsarizma. Arkhiv tibetskogo vracha Badmaeva* [*Behind the Scenes of Czarism: Archives of the Tibetan Doctor Badmaev*] (1925); B. A. Romanov, *Russia in Manchuria (1892–1906)*, trans. from the Russian by Susan W. Jones (Ann Arbor, 1952), p. 46; Korostovets, p. 186.
Martin Kilcoyne of the University of Washington has called to my attention the comments on Badmaev in René Fülöp-Miller, *Rasputin, The Holy Devil* (New York, 1928), pp. 125–129, and the bibliography of Badmaev's letters and reports, pp. 376–377.
26. Ts. Zham-tsarano Sharand [Zhamtsarano], "O tom, kak razvivalis' samosoznanie i pravosoznanie sibirskikh inorodtsev—buryat" ["How the Self-Consciousness and Legal Attitude of the Siberian *Inorodtsy*—the Buriats—Have Developed], *Pravo* [*Law*], XLVIII–XLIX (Dec. 4, 1905).
27. Korostovets, p. 158: "As director of my newspaper I named the Buriat Zhamtsarano, an

educated and hard-working man, who above all understood the psyche of the Mongols." On p. 244, Korostovets states: "I could not manage without the Buriats, since they have for a long time been the agents between us and the Mongols."

28. The considerable literature about Banzarov includes: G. S. Savel'ev, *O zhizni i trudakh Dorzhi Banzarova* [Concerning the Life and Works of Dorji Banzarov] (St. Petersburg, 1855), p. 38; F. A. Kudryavtsev, "Pervyi buryatskii uchenyi Dordzhi Banzarov (1822–1855 gg.)" ["The First Buriat Scholar, Dorji Banzarov (1822–1855)"], *Istoriya buryat-mongol'skogo naroda* [History of the Buriat-Mongolian People], pp. 232–240; L. A. Petrov, "Dordzhi Banzarov—pervyi buryatskii uchenyi" ["Dorji Banzarov—First Buriat Scholar"], *Istoricheskii zhurnal* [Historical Journal], No. 10–11 (1944); P. I. Khadalo, *Buryatskii uchenyi Dorzhi Banzarov* [The Buriat Scholar Dorji Banzarov] (Moscow, 1952), p. 24.
29. Concerning Gomboev, see P. P. Khoroshikh, "Buryatskii uchenyi Galsan Gomboev" ["The Buriat Scholar Galsan Gomboev"], *Buryatievedenie*, No. 3–4 (1927).
30. *Chernaya vera ili shamanstvo u mongolov i drugiya stat'i D. Banzarova* [The Black Faith or Shamanism Among the Mongols, and Other Articles of D. Banzarov], ed. G. N. Potanin (St. Petersburg, 1891), p. 129. Potanin's Introduction includes (xxxviii–xl) a list of Banzarov's writings (15 items).
31. In 1918 Tsybikov published an excellent record of this journey, complete with very fine and unusual photographs; his Introduction includes an autobiographical sketch, from which much of my information is extracted: G. S. Tsybikov, *Buddhist palomnik u svyatykh Tibeta (po dnevnikam, vedennym v 1899–1902 gg.)* [Buddhist Pilgrim at the Holy Places of Tibet (According to the Diary Kept in 1899–1902)] (Petrograd, 1918), p. 472.
32. See especially his *Mongol'skaya pis'mennost', kak orudie natsional'noi kul'tury* [Mongolian Writing as a Tool of National Culture] (Verkhneudinsk, 1928), p. 17.
33. Russkii komitet dlya izucheniya Srednei i vostochnoi Azii v istoricheskom, arheologicheskom, lingvisticheskom i etnograficheskom otnosheniyakh (Russian Committee for the Study of Central and Eastern Asia in its Historical, Archaeological, Linguistic, and Ethnographic Aspects); its serial publications included *Protokoly*, and *Izvestiya* (in Russian), and *Bulletin* (in French).
34. Zhamtsarano, for instance, translated into Mongolian works of Tolstoy, Jules Verne, Robert Louis Stevenson, Jack London, and others.
35. Čeweng [Zhamtsarano], *Darqad. Köbsügül nayur-un Uriyangqai, Dörbed. Qotong. Bayad. Ögöled. Mingyad. Jaqačin. Turjud. Qošud. Čaqar. Dariyangya. Altai-yin Uriyangqai. Qasaq. Qamniyan-nar-un arul ündüsü bayidal-un ügüel* [A Description of the Origins and Conditions of the Darqad, Uriyangqai of Lake Köbsügül . . .] (Ulan Bator, 1934), p. 216.

Zhamtsarano also published a geography (in Mongolian) in 1926; Unkrig comments: "Concerning the extension of modern astronomical knowledge among the Mongols, Zhamtsarano . . . performed the first service in this regard through publication of an illustrated geography. About half of this book of about 100 pages, as I remember it . . . deals with astronomical phenomena." W. A. Unkrig, "Das Programm des Gelehrten Comites der Mongolischen Volksrepublik," *MSOS*, XXXII (1929), 93.

THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE DILUV KHUTAGT

Diluv Khutagt



CHAPTER IV: 1922–1929

My thirty-ninth year [1922] was the one in which Ja Lama was killed and I resigned from office. In this year my successor at Uliastai, whose name was Lamjav, was implicated in the Danzan plot and arrested,¹ and I went back to Uliastai to take his place.

I don't know the details of the Danzan plot at first hand and can only repeat what was said at the time in Outer Mongolia. Danzan was one of the early revolutionaries, a man from Sain Noyon Aimag. He was at this time Commander-in-Chief of the Mongol Revolutionary Troops. He was a close friend of Lamjav, who was also a man of Sain Noyon Aimag, and an extremely able man. It appears that Danzan, although a revolutionary, wanted to be independent of the Russians, and for this reason he got in touch with the Japanese and the Chinese.

There is no doubt that this was true, but Lamjav did not take part in any plot. He was known as an old and personal friend of Danzan and some correspondence between him and Danzan was intercepted, in which Danzan hinted in a veiled way that he wanted Lamjav to join him. Lamjav replied in a way that showed that he did not quite know what was going on, but that he was suspicious and that he did not want to join. He was arrested, however, and taken to Khüree. He was not put in prison but was kept in detention, at first in a tent that was set apart for him. Later he was allowed to go anywhere in the city. After two years he was allowed to return to Northwestern Mongolia, but a year or two later he was accused of taking part in a plot for a rebellion in the Northwest, and he was imprisoned in Sain Noyon Aimag for the winter and later executed. I have no idea whether he was guilty or not. This plot was to separate Northwestern Mongolia from Outer Mongolia and join it to Sinkiang. But the help expected from Sinkiang did not materialize, and the rebellion was crushed when it amounted to only about five hundred lamas.

In my fortieth year [1923] I again gave up my post at Uliastai. There are many things I do not remember from this period; I had no more official duties of any kind, but I travelled about a good deal, reading prayers, and I also devoted much time to the reading of religious texts and other religious studies. This was not a peaceful time, however. The old order was changing and high officials and important nobles were disappearing from the scene all the time. It was difficult for anyone to hold high office

without being accused sooner or later of disloyalty or conspiracy. There were in fact a good many conspiracies, especially ones which took the form of trying to get in touch with the Chinese in various ways. For this reason I was very careful to restrict myself to my religious functions. Even in the old days when people came to ask my advice on political subjects or administrative problems I was reluctant to say anything that would look like meddling in other people's affairs; and now I was especially careful. One difficult problem I could not avoid was that the people of my own monastery territory looked to me for advice and guidance on everything connected with the new regime, and in their case, naturally, I could not avoid saying things that might be repeated or distorted. But apart from this I tried to keep out of everything except strictly religious affairs.

Part of the summer and early autumn of my forty-second year, [1925] I spent in the Erdene Van's Banner, where I had been invited to read prayers. In this period I also visited the Jonon Beil's Banner to read prayers, and the Naran Khutagt's monastery.

My forty-third year [1926] I spent almost entirely in my own monastery in prayer and religious study.

In the spring of my forty-fourth year [1927] I went to Uliastai. I went there on horseback, and from there I hired a Russian motor-car and went to Khüree. My purpose was to ask for permission to visit the Banchin Bogd, who was then in Mukden.

This was in 1928. In the meantime, in 1925, my monastery territory had been administratively joined together with the Banner on the north of it, whose old name was the Khoshuuch Beis's Banner. (This name had been dropped as being aristocratic in origin and a new geographical name was given to the territory from the snow-covered mountain called Otgon Tengri.²) Therefore the request for permission to go abroad had to go through the authorities of the new Banner administration, and they had forwarded the request to Khüree. I went there carrying this document with me, and stayed at the Gandan Monastery, which was a good place to stay because its standards were high. Outside the monastery on the four sides of it were the dwellings of four officials known as Tsagdaa. The day I went to the Gandan Monastery an order came from the new Red Government saying that if any pilgrims wanted to come into the temple to do reverence to me, they must not be impeded in any way, nor were they to be asked for money in return for permission to do so. Because of this the rumour spread throughout Khüree that I had great influence with the Red Government and that they would listen to my advice, and that things would be better, because up till then no high personages of the old order, either lamas or nobles, had been shown such a mark of deference.

After a stay of three days I went in person to the Ministry of Interior to ask for the permits I wanted to go to Wu T'ai Shan, Peking and Mukden. The Minister was not there, but I saw the chief of the Secretariat. He said to me, 'Have your photograph taken and I will conclude your business immediately. Tomorrow is Sunday so see if you can get the photographs today.'

I went at once to a photographer who lived not far away and had my picture taken. The next day, Sunday, a disciple of mine came and told me that the question of granting me a permit had gone up before the Party Committee and that on Monday I would get my permit.

At that time the Premier was Amar;³ the Minister of War was Jadamba. The Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Party was Dambadorj. The Commander-

in-Chief was Choibalsan. I saw most of these people, of whom Choibalsan was an old friend and asked me to come to see him. I did not see Dambadorj, who had gone to Russia. At this time I knew most of the important people in the Government.⁴

There was a Buriat named Tseveen Jamsrano. He had no special official position but he was a man of whom everyone asked advice. He was an old man and a professor. He was not a Red, but an old-time Mongol Nationalist. I had never met him before, but I had heard that he was anxious to meet me, so I went to call on him and we talked at great length. I found him to be a man of over seventy, and very sagacious. He said that he had heard about the journey I intended to make and he asked me if I were going to spend a long time or if I would be in a hurry to come back. I told him that my chief object was to make a pilgrimage to the Banchin Bogd and that I would return immediately. He said to me, 'If you were asked, would you accept a mission from the Government on your journey?' I said that my ability and experience were limited, but that if it were a mission I could carry out, I should, of course, accept.

He said, 'If you can wait a few days, we will see. The matter is not entirely settled yet.'

So I stayed in Khüree for more than a month.

Then the Minister of the Interior, Khainkhirva, sent for me, and when I saw him he said, 'We are doubtful about your proposed journey. Things are in great confusion in China,⁵ and we do not even know for certain where the Banchin Bogd is. We think it is probably better for you not to go. If the situation changes, it may be all right for you to go later.'

After this I saw Jamsrano again. He told me that there was a certain amount of disagreement in the Government,⁶ and that later on, if things were straightened out and it was considered desirable for me to go to China, they would even send a motor-car to my monastery to fetch me. Choibalsan was anxious to lend me a car to take me home, but he did not think it politic to do so openly. He therefore sent an officer to inspect the military school at Uliastai, and this officer took me in his car. At this time practically none of the people high up in the Government had shrines or religious images in their homes, but Choibalsan did and did not attempt to conceal the fact.

After returning home I was invited at the beginning of Autumn to hold religious ceremonies at the Targan Baatar Van's temple. The Targan Baatar Van was over six feet tall and extremely fat; indeed, his title means 'The Fat Hero Prince'. He liked to live in a very small round felt tent with a door that he could barely squeeze through. When he sat in this tent he could reach out and touch practically anything in it. This tent was kept spotlessly clean. He had a shrine in it and things for his daily use, but nothing else. He liked to read prayers in this tent. His wife was not allowed in it. He had a son who was allowed in occasionally, and a little daughter, of whom he was very fond, whom he allowed to run in and out as she liked. When he had to see people on business he went to another, larger tent. When he travelled he had a cloth tent, which was also so small that it looked ridiculous for his huge body. His mother was reputed to have been pregnant for three years before she bore him.

In my forty-fifth year [1928] in the autumn. I was invited to Zavakhan Tüshee Gün's Banner of Zasagt Khan Aimag, not far from my own monastery. I spent about a month there. After I came back I made a journey to Uliastai in a car belonging to the State Central Cooperative.⁷ I spent only three days in Uliastai, and then returned by car.

I had been at home only five days when a man came in with a report that the

Government was going to confiscate the land of nobles and important lamas, and in about two weeks two high officials came from the Ministry of the Interior in Khüree, accompanied by representatives of the Banner government. There were about ten of them in all.⁸

The confiscation was on the basis of the cattle unit known as *bod*. People with less than 100 suffered no confiscation. Property above 100 was confiscated, but people who had previously been rich were still left with 100 *bod*. At that time the *bod* consisted of one horse or one cow. Five sheep or seven goats were one *bod*, and a camel was two *bod*. (Later refinements were added such as taking into account the age of the animals). In this confiscation when a rich man was left with 100 *bod* he himself could choose the animals that made up five *bod*. The remaining 95 were determined by the local Banner authorities according to their judgement of the collective needs of the Banner community. At this time only personal property was subject to confiscation, and only the property of people who had held government office. Even rich men if they had not had official positions were left alone. The herds belonging to monasteries were also not subject to confiscation at this time.⁹ When the commission came they first went to the head of the *sum* sub-division of the Banner. Then most of them rode to the residence of the Narvanchin Khutagt, which was less than a quarter of a mile away. The head of the *sum* rode up alone to where I was staying, dismounted, tied his horse, and then stood still. I knew very well what he had come for. Then he came in to see me. With his finger he traced on the table, as if he were writing, the warning 'be careful'.

Then four people came in while the rest went to various parts of the monastery, and then to the residence of the Narvanchin.

This commission was headed by two people from Ulaanbaatar, one representing the Central Executive Committee of the Party, the other the Ministry for Internal Security. The former did not come the first time, but came later. They were accompanied by two secretaries from the Banner Office of Otgon Tengri Banner. When they came in I offered them tea. My disciple Gendün was with me. The Internal Security man said, 'It has been determined by law, as you doubtless know, that the property of rich feudal personages is to be expropriated.'

I had of course heard of this decree but I said that I had never heard of it, because I was afraid they might ask me from whom I had heard it. I also said that I did not know what they meant by the word 'Piodal' [feudal]. So they said 'Piodal' means 'rich people who under the old order have high hereditary or official rank'. There was in fact no word for 'feudal' in the old Mongol language.

They said that the law was to expropriate capital in excess of 100 *bod*, but only if the official personage were of high rank or had a bad record. He said, 'We are now going to seal up your store houses and possessions. We will let you take out anything you need for your immediate use.'

I said, 'There is nothing I need to take out. Here are my keys. You may see for yourself what I have.'

At that time there were forty people who had come on a pilgrimage to see me. They were due to leave that day, but they had not gone yet. Gendün was sent out to tell them to wait awhile before leaving. All gates of the monastery were to be closed and no one was to be allowed to go in or out. Gendün came back and reported that the pilgrims had left and that he had closed the gates. Then I went around the monastery with the commission and showed them everything. Boxes were opened, chests were opened, and

they looked in, but did not take things out. The chests were then closed and sealed and the doors of the buildings were sealed with cross strips of paper.

Then we all came back to my tent which was pitched in front of my winter building. On the altar in my tent were a number of silver butter-lamps, two big golden butter-lamps, and a big silver incense-bowl. I showed them these things and offered them the keys of everything in the tent that locked, but they returned the keys to me and did not seal up anything in the tent. Then the Internal Security man showed me the paper which gave him authority and which had the procedure for inspection and sealing all written down. This was shown to me so that I could not later complain that he had acted differently from the official procedure. Then he left.

After that they settled in one of the offices of the temple and waited for the other officials to come from Ulaanbaatar. (I had an inner office which looked after my most personal affairs, and in its buildings were stored things of small bulk and high value, such as silk, silver, etc. Then I had an outer treasury that looked after things that were also my personal affairs but of a more general nature.)

In 1925 I had made a division of everything that I had, giving half to the monastery and keeping half for myself. Between 1925 and 1929 I had received the following gifts from pilgrims and from the faithful: 36 camels, over 700 sheep, 135 horses, and 50 to 100 cattle. In 1925, when I had divided my property, I had divided my goods half and half, but I had given all my herds to the temple, as follows: more than 2,500 horses, keeping only 5 for my personal use; more than 300 camels; over 600 cattle and about 7,000 sheep.

After three nights, the second man came, the one who represented the Secretariat of the Central Executive Committee. The two Ulaanbaatar men then came in to see me. The newly-arrived man's name was Luvsansharav. The name of the first man was Luvsanjamba. Luvsanjamba means in Tibetan 'preeminently generous', but this preeminent giver was really a preeminent taker.

Luvsansharav said, 'Luvsanjamba has explained to you the law and the procedure. Do you have anything particular you want to say? Do you have any debts or credits? Who is responsible for looking after your property?'

I replied that I had no outstanding debts, and this was true, because I never liked to buy things on credit, and always settled my debts quickly. I had nothing due to me from others, because those who could afford paid their obligations quickly, and when people were poor I forgave them their obligations. I told the two men that I kept my own accounts and looked after my own possessions, although the truth was that this was done for me by Gendün and another personal disciple, a man who was later killed.

Then they said, 'All great aristocrats and high lamas have a treasury or office of their personal affairs. What about yours?'

I explained what I had done in 1925. I said that under the old order of things I had occupied a certain position in Society to fulfil which my wealth and possessions had been necessary. But in 1925, four years ago, I had realized that things were quite different and that I no longer needed to keep up my old estate. So I had made the division of my property which I have already described.

'So now you sit here in the middle?' they said.

This was an unfriendly question, because they meant that I lived between that part of my property which I had kept for myself and that which I had made over to the monastery, and thus really kept control over both. I said 'True, I sit here in the middle. This is because there was once a time when I was a man of great rank and reputation, and all that you see here was once mine. But now the times have changed, and I regard

myself simply as a man of religion attached to this place; and therefore I have given away what I have given away and retained those things I have shown you. I have kept the little winter house for myself because I have become used to living in a house in the winter.'

They said, 'You may continue as you are, but make sure that you commit no offence.'

The two men were correct in their manner and not overbearing or harsh. Luvsansharav later had a reputation for being terribly severe, but not when a man had a clean record.

After another night they assembled a number of the poor people of the region and held a meeting. This was only for people quite near the monastery and did not include all of the poor families of my whole territory. I do not know what they said during the first part of the meeting, but after it had been going on for a while, Luvsanjamba came and said, 'Come to the meeting and speak.'

I said, 'What should I say to the meeting?'

He said, 'What you say is your affair. Why should I tell you what to say?'

So I went to the meeting as I was told and spoke as follows:

'According to the law of the Government, they are expropriating property. This is not a question of myself alone, but of all high nobles and personages. I am very glad that this has happened. As you know I have always given to the poor. But this was something I could only do locally. Now the Government is taking wealth all over the country to improve the condition of the poor. I believe that by this means what I have given will increase my virtue and therefore I have no complaint to make. You should not be alarmed or consider that anything untoward has happened. Therefore if any of my clothes or possessions are distributed to you, understand that you may wear or buy or sell them freely.' I said this because according to the old practice things that had been worn or used by a high lama were considered to be holy and could not be used by ordinary men.

Luvsansharav then told me to write down everything I had said. This I did, and the paper was taken to Ulaanbaatar, where it made the authorities angry. They considered that what I had said was harmful to them, because of course they wanted the people to think that they were taking wealth from the rich who were unwilling to give it up, and thus that the credit belonged only to the revolutionary Government, and that I had spoiled this by morally approving the redistribution of wealth.¹⁰

In calling the meeting of the poor people the two men from Ulaanbaatar had followed the regular procedure. The purpose of such meetings was to see in what regions poor people were afraid of the rich or on bad terms with them.

That day the meeting dispersed. The next day the governor of the Aimag came in a motor car. He was a man born in my own native Banner. His family had been officials under the old order. The next day after he left the two men from Ulaanbaatar started to carry out the expropriation. Chests and boxes were carried out from the store room. Everything was opened up. Lists of contents were made up, values were estimated, and then the things were put back. For fairly new things of which everybody knew the market price they set the values themselves. For other things, especially things that had been stored a long time, they asked me to set values. This I was unwilling to do because I was afraid that for some things they would accuse me of trying to hide my wealth by setting values too low, while for other things they might accuse me of extravagance if I seemed to them to set values too high. So I kept saying that I did not know or had forgotten. All this kind of thing took more than a month.

Then they sold off a great many things at cheap prices. Gold and silver they took away to Ulaanbaatar. They left me a felt tent in good condition and four suits of clothing for the four seasons of the year, and these clothes were all in excellent condition. Then they allowed me to choose personal property to the value of a hundred *bod*, either in livestock or in goods. Here of course it paid me to choose goods that had been undervalued. As part of the whole business I had to sign thirteen lists or inventories and a statement that I had not kept anything back or hidden anything, and that I did not have any property elsewhere.

The valuation that they put on the possessions expropriated from me was over 200,000 *lan*. This included some of what I had donated to the monastery which they considered to be nevertheless my personal property; on the whole, however, they were reluctant to sell off things I had donated to the monastery. In livestock I took only six cows, seven horses and twenty sheep.

Just before the two men from Ulaanbaatar left I took to them the silver and gold things from my personal altar, and said 'What about these?'

They took the two golden butter-lamps, but left me the silver things. According to the legal decree, this was correct, because the law prescribed that treasures of great value might be taken, but that in general religious objects actually in use for religious purposes should not be taken.

While all this was going on, pilgrims kept coming all the time. I said to the two men from Ulaanbaatar, 'What shall I do about these pilgrims? Should I receive them or not?'

They said, 'Why certainly, that's religious business. You go on minding your religious affairs, and we'll go on with the expropriating.'

The pilgrims presented me with a good many things, in the old manner, including a great deal of money. I concealed nothing, but left it heaped up in the tent where the pilgrims had piled their offerings. Then when the two men were ready to go back to Ulaanbaatar I called them in and showed them all these offerings. 'What are you going to do about expropriating these?' I asked.

'That's none of our business.' They said. 'Our commission was to expropriate your wealth accumulated in the past. If we were to pay attention to the expropriation of pilgrims' offerings, we would have to keep a man here permanently. From now on, what pilgrims want to give you of their own free will is their business, and you may keep what you are given.' Later, of course, the authorities became much more strict about religious offerings.

Finally they left. Six days later, two motor cars arrived carrying representatives from Tannu Tuva on their way to Ulaanbaatar. [This name, Tannu Tuva, or Dewa, is the name from before the Russian times.] At the same time Luvsansharav came back. He told me that Ulaanbaatar had sent out an order that I was to report there in three days, and he told me that I could travel there with the two representatives from Tannu Tuva. This was on the 21st of the moon. I asked him if I could take a man with me. 'Certainly you may,' they said. So I chose Gendün to go with me. When I left there was much lamentation among the lamas of the monastery and the Narvanchin Gegeen tried to speak to me privately about it. We met in the temple where I had gone to pray before leaving, but he could not say anything because of his sobbing. Just before I left Luvsansharav saw me alone. He gave me a friendly hint. He said, 'The trouble is with that paper you wrote giving your speech to the meeting of the poor people. I had meant to warn you to be careful of your wording, but the governor of the province

carried it off before I had time. Now you will certainly be questioned about it in Ulaanbaatar.'

We left by car and got to Ulaanbaatar after four nights on the road. The Tannu Tuva delegates with whom we were travelling treated us well and gave Gendün and me the place of honour in the tent every night. Before we left, when I was alone with Luvsansharav, I had asked him whether I ought to take money with me on the journey. My intention of course was to find out indirectly whether I was going to be held in detention, in which case, I would not have to pay for private accommodations. He had answered that I had better take some money with me. I had asked 'How much – a thousand paper dollars?' He had said he thought five or six hundred would do. The day before I thought we were getting into Ulaanbaatar – actually we were a day longer on the road – I asked my companions if we were going straight to some government office, or if I should first look for a place for myself to stay. They replied that we would go first to the office of TüsHEET Khan Aimag and telephone from there. This office was outside of Ulaanbaatar and this was as far as the telephone reached in those days – about eighty miles from the city.

We got there early in the morning. The two delegates went off to see officials, Gendün and I stayed at the motor station, which was in charge of a youngster of about twenty. At first he was quite friendly. He ordered some tea made for us, and we ate the last of the cold meat we had brought along with us for the journey. About noon the two delegates came back. I asked them no questions. They went off again and this time did not come back until it was getting dark. The guest room had two stoves in it made out of oil drums and the manager told us to build up the fires to suit ourselves. When the delegates came back, food was prepared. Then the manager asked to see the travel orders of the party. He pointed out that these orders did not specify that the party was to be provided with food. They said that they were travelling under orders and had taken only a little food, expecting to get to Ulaanbaatar earlier, and now had no food left. But he would not feed them and consequently Gendün and I, travelling with them, also got no food.

At this point a party arrived from Ulaanbaatar, headed by a man named Norvsüren, belonging to the Ministry of the Interior. They were given quarters in another building. Their travel orders showed that they were entitled to food, and food was brought to them. Norvsüren talked with the members of our party, and found that we were not being given food. He suggested politely to the manager that after all we were traveling on official business, and it would do no harm for him to find some food for us. But the manager insisted that he had to follow the regulations strictly. The meaning of all this was that the manager was just a young fellow from the neighbourhood who had been ordered to take that job. Like most people, he disliked the new Government, and especially Party members. The only way such people had to show their resentment was to insist on sticking to regulations when the regulations happened not to be in favour of the officials. Finally the Tannu Tuva delegates had to go to the Party Office and bring back someone who would sign for the food as their 'guarantor', and only then was our party fed.

Gendün and I did not eat with the party. Norvsüren called me over for a talk. We chatted in a very friendly way and casually he got out a bowl and urged us to eat some of the food which had been provided for his party.

The food about which there was all this trouble was nothing wonderful – just noodles with bits of chopped meat.

The next day we left. I asked no more questions but just waited to see what would happen. Ulaanbaatar came in sight when we crossed a low mountain called Songiin Uul – ‘Onion Mountain’ – about seven miles away.

My companions then asked me where I intended to stay. I said I would find a place for myself. They asked if I were well acquainted in the city. I said I was not very well acquainted, but I would go to the Gandan Monastery to look for a lodging with someone I knew named Dambi so they let me off there. They noted my address and told me where they were going to stay, and said they hoped to see me again. I had thought it better not to try to stay with anybody important, so I had chosen this Dambi who was a lama in modest circumstances, born in the same Banner as myself. He was a man of such rank that I could without indignity ask him to go into town and do shopping and other errands for me. At Gandan Monastery there was also a lama named Yondon who was recognized as one of the most learned of his generation in the scriptures. He was born in the same Banner as I and was in fact a relative, his grandfather and my grandfather having been brothers. He helped to find very modest quarters for me. All the living quarters at Gandan Monastery in fact were simple and poor, this monastery being one primarily of religious learning. We stayed there a good many days. This delay was due to the fact that I was somewhat indisposed, though not really sick.

I did not have to report immediately to any Government office, as I should have if I had personally received a summons. But the situation was that an official had received orders to send me to Ulaanbaatar, and I had gone there in official company, so that they knew where I was and it was up to them to send for me. They did not do so, however, and so after two weeks I went to the Government of my own accord, and there I saw the Secretary General. I reminded him that I had been sent for and said that I was ready for whatever was wanted, had already been there half a month, but had not yet reported personally because of not being well. He said, ‘Did we send for you? I never knew about it. I’ll ask the higher officials about it. You just wait here.’ He went out and soon came back. ‘The Prime Minister’s office knows nothing about it,’ he said. ‘You had better report at the general headquarters of the Party,’ because the orders that I had been given at home told me that I was summoned by the Government, not the Party.

I stayed for another half month with no word of any kind. Then I wrote a letter in triplicate to the office of the Prime Minister, the Minister of the Interior, and the Party headquarters, asking for permission to go home. I referred to the fact that my property had been confiscated except for what had been left to me under the regulations, and that I had not had time to put my new affairs in order, and so wished to return home, unless my presence in Ulaanbaatar were specifically required. From the Prime Minister’s office and the Ministry of the Interior I received replies saying that they were not concerned with my affairs, and suggesting that I apply to Party headquarters. When I applied to Party headquarters for leave to go home I was told to report to the Baga Khural Central Executive Committee. I did so but got no reply of any kind, and so I waited another two months.

Finally I went to call on one of three General Secretaries of the Baga Khural at his home, not at his office. I remember that this man was Ööld and I think that his name was Badrakh, but I am not quite sure. I think that he was a Dörvöd of the Khovd Region, but in Ulaanbaatar Dörvöd, Torguud, and all people of that group of tribes were referred to by the general name of Ööld. In the same way all people from Inner Mongolia, such as Kharchin, were referred to in general as Tsakhar. This General Secretary of the Baga Khural said to me, ‘In our country now everything is decided by

committees and I as an individual cannot tell you anything.' He was a typical tough Party man.

I went to call on this man once again but he was not at home. In the same courtyard with him, however, there lived a man who had formerly been a lama but had now become a layman and now had a wife. This man counted as a disciple of mine. I went to see him to see if he knew anything about it. He told me that the Party was now having a Plenary Session.¹¹ During such a session the Central Executive Committee is suspended. At the end of the session some of the members may be elected while others may be replaced. Consequently it was hopeless at such a time to try to get anything out of the Central Executive Committee.

At Ulaanbaatar there were thirty monasteries. The jurisdiction of each monastery was called an Aimag. Gandan was a sort of religious university and it was divided into sections, one for each of the thirty Aimag. When I first stayed there I stayed in the Shüteen (situgen) Aimag, in the southwest quarter of the Gandan Monastery. Then I moved to the Sanga Aimag. By now I had sent Gendün home. (He travelled by the Government motor service but paid his own way as a private passenger.) I moved because without Gendün I would be imposing too much on my previous host, interfering with his religious duties. The new quarter in the monastery to which I moved had a number of people from my old region who would look after me.

At this time there was a struggle for political power going on. The Revolutionary Party had a nationalist majority. The Youth Party, however, was more radical and revolutionary.¹² Its members were all twenty-five years old and under. When they became twenty-six they could enter the People's Revolutionary Party. The Youth Party held its session first and passed on its resolutions to the session of the People's Revolutionary Party in such strong form that the Party thought that it had to give way and adopt a more radical policy. After the general assembly of the Party there was a third assembly consisting of delegates of the Youth Party, the Revolutionary Party, and popularly elected representatives who did not belong to either party. In this assembly the delegates of the Youth Party succeeded in getting more support than the Revolutionary Party.¹³

The Youth Party took a strongly anti-religious line and among those who suffered for this purpose were three high religious personages who had to be purged; myself, the Manjusri Lama, and the Yegüzer Lama. The Manjusri Lama's monastery was on the crest of the Bogd Uul, just on the northern side. The Yegüzer Lama's monastery was near the southern frontier of Khalkh, east of Dariganga and north of Ujümchin and Avganar, not very far from the Bandid Gegeen's monastery.

We three were selected not only because of our high rank but because in the southeast the Yegüzer Lama, in the Ulaanbaatar region the Manjusri Lama, and in the west I myself, especially since the Jalkhanz Gegeen in 1923, had acquired great personal reputations as religious leaders.

When the Youth Party resolution was passed on to the People's Party the Russians exercised a moderating influence, cautioning against too drastic an anti-religious turn on the ground that it would cause widespread popular resistance.¹⁴ Consequently this resolution never came up at all in the General National Assembly. In these circumstances I could do nothing but go on staying in Ulaanbaatar. These political reports of course I heard only by word of mouth. There were no public statements.

In this period I made the acquaintance of a Russian named Tuvinskii, who was a very good scholar and often came to see me to ask me questions of religion that he was

studying. I sounded him out, telling him that I was anxious to go home, and asking him if he thought I ought to make another move to ask for permission to leave Ulaanbaatar. After some delay he advised me that conditions were very difficult and he thought I better not make the move. Tuvinskii was not a Party man but he seemed to be quite influential. Some years later when I was in exile I heard that he had been killed by the authorities. I told him that it had been decided to have several people executed, and he said that he had heard that there had been such a decision, but it was not necessarily definite. I lived in great fear and uncertainty at this time.

CHAPTER V: ARREST AND EXAMINATION 1930–1931

About 15 June 1930, I had gone out for a walk in the East City of Ulaanbaatar. When I came back I went in by the back gate. At one side of it was sitting a lama who was a disciple of mine who had brought me a gift of some mare's milk and of some food wrapped up in a parcel. At the other side was sitting a young layman, a stranger to me, who had come on a bicycle, which was leaning near him. This gate had two keys, one belonging to the man with whom I was staying and the other to me. I went in and both men followed me. I knew that the stranger coming in meant something. There was a little room I lived in, a room the other man lived in, and a kitchen. I said to the lama as we passed the kitchen, 'Just wait here a moment, and I'll see if I have the key to my room.' The stranger kept following me. As I got to my door and opened it he took out a piece of paper and gave it to me. At this moment the lama also came in and gave me the things he had brought for me. The paper was from the Department of Internal Security and told me to report at that Department at noon on the 15th, and in the meantime say nothing to anybody. The man told me to sign the envelope in which this summons had been brought and give it to him as a receipt. At that time I did not know the new calendar well, so I asked the man, 'Is tomorrow the 15th?'

'Sure', he said and went away.

The Lama said to me, 'Is anything wrong?'

'Nothing particular', I said. I put my socks out to dry on the window sill, had a little to eat and drink, and went outside the monastery to the toilet. (There are no toilets inside a monastery precinct.) On the way back I was just going to call in on a friend when I saw the man on a bicycle again.

'Hey', he said, 'aren't you going to report?'

I said, 'I thought it was tomorrow. Do you mean it's today?'

He said, 'Of course it is, and it's past noon already.' I started to put on my socks and heavy boots. The socks were hot from being in the sun. There is a belief that putting on hot things suddenly gives you a headache. The man with the bicycle said in a friendly way, 'Don't put them on now. They're too hot. Bring them along with you and put them on when you get there.' But I put them on anyway and went along with him.

This friendliness I was always meeting from strangers was because from Ulaanbaatar to the westward all through Outer Mongolia everybody knew who I was and I had a good reputation. Of course I was not nearly so well known to the east of Ulaanbaatar. We went along until we came to the gate of the Ministry of Internal Security. There was a sentry posted at that gate; he told me to halt. The man who was with me said, 'He has come here on the orders of this office.' And the sentry without a word let me pass.

We went into a room in a two-storey building. This room had a big window and a long table from the window towards the door. At the near end was a chair, and the man told me to sit there, and went into another room. I sat there for some time. Then a stranger came in. He took a chair at the table and greeted me in an ordinary informal way. This man was young – under thirty. He had a perfect Khalkh accent, but I heard later that he was an Ööld. (He must have lived in Ulaanbaatar from childhood.) His name was Galin Dever. He lit a cigarette and sat for quite a while without saying another word. He looked as if he were bothered about how to begin questioning me.

Finally he asked me, ‘Do you know Taij Eregdendagva?’

I replied that I did not know him. As a matter of fact I had met him once. During the winter he had come once to see me when I was not there, and he had spoken to Gendün. Then he came again and saw me. He made an obeisance to me and laid a manuscript book on the table. I spoke with him a little and asked him who he was. I was a little suspicious of his appearance and thought he might be an informer. He was an old man with a rather pale face and a little beard. Under the old regime he had been in charge of a section of post stations. The old Imperial relay post (örtöö) from Ili in Sinkiang to Peking ran through Outer Mongolia. There were fourteen of these stations in the Khovd region, divided into two sections of seven stations each, each section under a Taij. There were twenty stations in Khalkh, divided into sections of five, each section under a Taij.

Eregdendagva asked me to read the manuscript he had laid before me. I looked at it. It was supposed to be his autobiography. In the section I looked at there was a story about a dream. He said that he had dreamed he was a hare, crouching in deep grass. A prairie fire swept through the grass. He looked about in terror. Then he saw an opening in the circle of fire and dashed through it. When he had escaped, he looked at his fur and saw that he had barely been singed. Then he awoke.

I read no more. Eregdendagva said that he had written it a long time ago, but he might have written it quite recently. Stories like this one about the dream might have been meant as political allegories. I was suspicious of the man, and suspicious of his autobiography. I returned it to him, telling him that I was too busy to read it, because what time I had for reading must be devoted to religious scriptures. He went away, and I did not see him again.

So when Galin Dever asked me whether I knew Eregdendagva, I replied that I did not.

‘He went to see you twice’ Galin Dever said. ‘What do you mean you don’t know him?’

I replied that many people came to see me but I could not always recall them.

‘You know him by name.’ Galin Dever insisted.

‘Yes, I know the name, but I cannot match the name with the person of someone I recall having met.’ The truth was that when Eregdendagva came to see me, he had not said who he was. In the autobiography that he showed me he translated his name from the Tibetan form to the Mongol form ‘Tokshin Igagol’, so I had guessed who he was. But I could rightly claim that I did not know him in the proper sense of the word.

‘His name has come up in a matter concerning the revolution,’¹ said Galin Dever, ‘and therefore you must know him’; – implying that I must be involved in counter-revolutionary activities.

‘In that case,’ I said, ‘I certainly do not know him and have never had anything to do with him.’

Then he asked me if I knew Lovon Shamar. (The name means 'red teacher'.)

I replied that I did not know him and had not heard of him, and this was true. (I learned later that he was eighty-two years old, came from Inner Mongolia, had lived in Khalkh for many years, and had once been a lama but had become a layman again and was now living with his wife who was over seventy.)

Then he asked me if I knew Donaijav. I said that I did know a man by that name. 'Has he been to see you?' Galin Dever asked.

'Yes, he has been to see me a couple of times.' I replied.

'What did you talk about?' he asked.

'Nothing special,' I answered.

'Do you mean that you just sat there saying nothing?'

'No, we talked about the price of food, and so on.' Donaijav was a layman whom I had known for a long time. When he was arrested and questioned, he confirmed that we had only talked of inconsequential things.

'Do you know Buuvei Gav'j?' he asked.

'No, I do not know him and have never heard his name.'

'Do you know Sööngö Sharav, the Gav'j?' he asked. Sööngö was a nickname meaning 'hoarse' – why he had this nickname I never knew, since he was not hoarse. I replied that I did know him.

'Have you been to see him?' he asked.

'Yes I have.'

'What did you go to see him for?'

'To play *mig-mang*.' (A kind of chess called in Chinese 'wei ch'i'. The game is exactly the same thing in Mongolia and Tibet but slightly different as played in China. The name *mig-mang* is Tibetan and means 'many eyes'. Most Mongols use the Tibetan name, but around Ulaanbaatar they use a Mongol name, Chuluu Tavin, meaning 'placing stones'.)

'What did you talk about?'

'Nothing particular.'

'Didn't you talk about going to Tibet?'

'No, never.'

This Sharav was well known as a man who had been in Lhasa six times and was now preparing to go again. He was a man who combined pilgrimages with trade, taking things from Mongolia to sell in Lhasa, staying in Lhasa for a time, and then coming back to Mongolia with things from Tibet to sell. He was famous for the fact that from childhood, no matter how cold the weather, when other people had hats with fur flaps pulled down around their ears he went around with just a little cap perched on top of his head and never seemed to feel the cold. He was also famous for his walking power. There are a number of circumambulations that are made for religious purposes at Ulaanbaatar. Every single day he would walk clear around the whole temple quarter of the city, a distance of several miles, then once around the Gandan Monastery where we were both staying, then once around an inner circuit of the monastery. I once did the circumambulation of the whole quarter and it took me more than three hours.

'Didn't he give you a *khadag* to seal an agreement that you would go with him to Tibet?' Galin Dever asked.

'No, he did not', I said.

'If you say that', he warned me, 'you will be suspected of lying in all your other answers, because we know perfectly well that he gave you a *khadag*.'

'It is quite true that he gave me a *khadag*', I replied. 'He gave it to me when he came to see me once, which is quite an ordinary courtesy, and there was nothing said about going to Tibet.'

Galin Dever did not press this question any further, which was lucky for me, as much earlier Sharav had once asked me, just in a conversational way, if I had ever thought of going to Tibet; and I had replied, just as casually, 'of course, sometime'. But if informers had tied up this harmless conversation with giving of the *khadag* I might have been in serious trouble.

During all this questioning Galin Dever had been taking down my answers. At the end he showed me his notes. 'Read this carefully', he said, 'and see if it is an accurate record of what you have said.' I read the notes and they were amazingly accurate. He had even used my exact expressions. I then signed my name to the notes, indicating my agreement. He took me out into the courtyard and into another room. In this room there were two men.

One of these men said to me, 'You must not talk to any one about being summoned here and questioned. You must not leave the city.'

The other one said, 'You must not leave the city.'

Ulaanbaatar is spread out in a straggling way, so I asked what he meant by 'city'.

'Oh', he said, 'the neighbourhood; let's say 40 *li*.' (This would have been about thirteen miles from the centre of town – a distance which, of course, took in a great deal of open country.)

It was now getting dark and I was allowed to go home. During the following month I was questioned nine times. Usually they would question me one day and then there would be an interval of two days before they questioned me again, and this, it soon became clear, was because on the odd days they were questioning others and checking their answers against mine. On two occasions they questioned me at night. The worst part of this was having to go home by myself in the dark. The city was a dangerous place at night. There were savage dogs around which sometimes injured people and occasionally killed them. Also I was nervous of the few people I saw at night along almost deserted streets. I remember that one time a man came past me dragging quite a heavy log under one arm and as he passed me he suddenly turned a flashlight on my face. I did not know what was going to happen, but nothing did happen. Never either by day or by night was a guard put over me as I returned to the monastery where I lived.

On one occasion I missed the messenger who was sent to call me for the next questioning. I had gone out to see the military sports. These military sports have replaced the great summer festivals which used to take place in the presence of the Bogd Gegeen when he was offered a Danshug. The military games included wrestling, horse races, and all the traditional sports.² When I got home I was told that the messenger had been there, and, not finding me, had left a message that I was to report for questioning the next morning at sunrise. It was odd that he left a word of mouth message like this since I had been strictly told not to tell anybody about the fact that I was being questioned.

The next morning at sunrise I was given a grilling and accused of trying to escape. I replied that I had merely been out to see the festival. They said 'But that's out in the country, and you were told not to leave the city'. I reminded them that they had said I could go anywhere within 40 *li*, the games were only just outside the city. They asked me why I went out to the games, and I said I had never seen them before and had wanted to

see them. I asked if I should get special permission to go so far, and they said that it was all right.

Just after this I was sick with stomach trouble and was not questioned for ten days or two weeks. Then I was questioned again for the last time in a rather short session. After that there was about a month in which nothing happened.

In all this questioning it was hard for me to make out the main thread that they were pursuing except that it was obvious that they were checking what I said against what was said by other people. Many of the questions seemed to be shots in the dark, hoping to catch me by surprise. I simply stuck to the truth and hoped for the best, knowing that I had in fact not been engaged in any plots, and hoping that other people trying to get themselves out of trouble would not succeed in shifting too deep a suspicion onto me. The questioning I had was not accompanied by threats or physical violence, nor was I subjected to the treatment of being kept without sleep.

Finally on the 23rd day of the first moon of autumn the man who regularly came to summon me turned up again. He had a document with him. This document summoned me, giving me my proper title as Diluv Khutagt, to appear before 11 o'clock the next morning as a witness in the case of Eregdendagva at the High Court.³

When the messenger came to summon me to the trial of Eregdendagva, I thought to myself that I certainly could not possibly be called as a witness and therefore this probably meant that I myself was going to be implicated and tried. So I prepared myself by getting warm clothes, as the weather was now turning cold. I sent out the man I was staying with to hire a cart so that I could ride to the trial the next morning. A woman who was the wife of a disciple of mine came and brought me a *khadag* and I told her that I should not be staying any longer and that she should take anything I left behind me and put it in her house for safe keeping. The *khadag* she gave me was eleven spans in length and must have come from the Bogd Gegeen's treasury, many of the contents of which had been sold in the city.

The next morning, warmly dressed, I drove to the High Court. To my astonishment, it was completely closed and there was nobody about whom I could even question. Not very far away, however, there was a huge crowd. This was gathered around a large circular building known as the People's House.⁴ I guessed that if this were such an important case perhaps they had moved the proceedings over there, so I pushed through the crowd asking questions. I soon found that this was in fact the case of Eregdendagva, but I could find nowhere to report myself. Finally I pushed my way right into the big building and started asking for the Kamindant (Commandant). This was the captain of about 300 troops who were at that time the special force of the Ministry of Internal Security. At last someone said, 'Come along with me', and took me out of the big round building and over to a small rectangular building which had a soldier at the door. I went in and there was the Manjusri Lama. I had met him before many years ago, but this was the first I knew that he had also been questioned about this case. We greeted each other but did not enter into conversation. Evidently he had not been imprisoned either because if he had been it would have been known around the city. They must have been making him come in occasionally from his monastery much in the same way that they questioned me.

Before very long a soldier came in with a short man whose right arm was bent rigidly at the elbow so that he could not straighten it. This was the Yegüzer Lama whose elbow had been broken in a fall from a horse and had never been properly set. I had never met him before. We waited and waited and nothing happened. There was nowhere to sit

down. Finally I went to the sentry at the door and asked him if he would go and bring the Commandant so that I could speak with him. He went off leaving us unguarded, and soon came back with the Commandant. I asked him if we couldn't have some tea to warm us on this cold day. He replied very apologetically that if we were in the Ministry of Internal Security he would be able to take care of us properly, but that here there were no facilities and he would not be able to get us any. I asked if it would be possible to send out and buy some tea, but he replied that nothing was being sold in the neighbourhood. After a while two more sentries were added. A little while later someone came and spoke to the guard and they moved us from where we were into a small one-room building close by. This was a shabby place. The windows were boarded up and the floor was in bad condition, with some boards broken through. Lying on the floor was a man dressed in red. I never knew who he was. After this day he disappeared, except that I had a glimpse of him on the last day of the trial. The three of us went in and the door was closed. After a while one of the soldiers came in and asked in a friendly way if we were feeling cold. We were all warmly dressed so I thanked him and said we were all right. Almost immediately he went out and another soldier came in who asked me in a harsh voice. 'Is Saaral a disciple of yours?' I replied that I had no disciple by that name, and he went out again. I wondered if he were looking for further evidence or if perhaps he had guessed the first soldier who came in was named Saaral and the other man suspected him of being a friend of mine.

After still more time had passed an officer came and we were taken into the big round People's House. This building was round inside like a huge Mongol tent, except that at the back there was a large rectangular recess. At the back of this the five examiners or judges sat in a row. In front of them a table was placed for the four secretaries. To the left of the judges and at right angles to them the five defence counsels sat in a row. To their right was seated an observer from the Ministry of War and in another row at right angles the three prosecutors and the Commandant. At the front of the main circular body of the hall the accused sat in two rows facing the judges. The total of accused on the first day of the trial was thirty-seven, but on the second day another defendant was added making a total of thirty-eight. Behind the two rows of the accused two rows of soldiers stood and behind the soldiers was the crowd. Note: See diagram of the situation of the High Court in the People's House.⁵

When we came in to take our places all the others concerned in the trial were already in their seats. Eregdendagva was on a stretcher. He was very sick and had been brought from hospital. Doctors were with him and gave him medicines from time to time. The President of the Court declared, 'Today we are to give judgement in the case of Eregdendagva and his clique (*büleg*).'

'We have brought the three Khutagt as additional witnesses.'

Up to this time I had known, like everybody else, that Eregdendagva and various other people had been arrested. I had guessed from my own questioning that the Yegüzer Lama was also involved in some way. But I had not realized that the Manjusri Lama was connected with the case in any way. Now in the court for the first time I was able to see the situation of each individual and the connections between individual cases.

'However', the President of the Court continued, 'we have decided to consider the three Khutagt not as witnesses in this case but as accused and therefore they are now under arrest. Namsrai has been appointed as the defence counsel for the three of you. Do you consent or do you want some one else?'

The other two spoke first and said immediately they had no objections. Then I spoke and said, 'I do not know Namsrai, but since he has been appointed by this court, I make no objection.' I spoke in this way in order to get it on the record that I did not know him, in case I should later want to raise an objection to his handling of the defence. Then they began the examination of Eregdendagva.

First they brought into court the written record of his examination up to this point, and read it out. The substance of this record was that he was very anti-Communist. He considered that the Communists were anti-religious and accused them of killing many people. He advocated appeal to China for military aid to overthrow the existing Government which he accused of being Communist-controlled. Russia was not mentioned directly but the frequent mention of Communism was of course anti-Russian by implication. This record mentioned that there were more than a hundred leaders of this group (although only thirty-seven were in court this first day and only one more was added later) and that they claimed wide support throughout the country. He was then asked who these one hundred leaders were. He replied that he had given one hundred simply as a round figure, thinking that he could later fill in the names, but that now he was unable to specify so many. He was asked if all the thirty-seven accused were included in his round figure of a hundred. He replied that some were and some were not. Being sick, he could speak only in a low voice. The Commandant of the troops of the Ministry of Internal Security stood beside him and repeated what he said so that the whole court could hear. He was doing this badly, so the President of the Court ordered him to stand aside and ordered Namsrai, the defence counsel, to take his place. There were loudspeakers for both the court and the accused.

The whole of this day was spent on the examination of Eregdendagva, and among other questions he was asked what my connection with him was; and he replied that there was absolutely no such connection. He was then asked why he had told Lovon Shamar that I was one of his supporters. He denied that he had said any such thing but he said that he had asked Buuvei the Gav'j to approach me but that he had not done so. There was no other evidence that concerned me.

When the court rose for the day the other prisoners were taken away separately to their place of detention and we three were marched off under a guard of twenty soldiers to the Ministry of Internal Security. On the way people crowded to see us and the troops did their best to halt all movement and to keep people at a distance. Many people wanted to see us because when the three of us were arrested it caused widespread unrest. When we got to the gates of the Ministry of Internal Security the guard left us. That day I was terribly thirsty. We were held waiting in a courtyard outside a small building. I asked the Commandant if we couldn't have some tea to drink. 'Right away, right away', he said. While we were standing there we were searched. Anticipating this, I had left at home all the little things I usually carried in my clothes. I was not even wearing an amulet around my neck. All I had was my prayer beads twisted around my wrist and these were not taken from me. The Manjusri Lama also had nothing on his person. The Yegüizer Lama had a pocketbook and other small things in the breast of his gown, and these were taken from him. It was a usual thing to take away from prisoners the girdles that held up their trousers, but this was not done to us. Finally we were ushered into a small room in which there was an electric light. The Commandant called up on the telephone and I heard him say, 'Are you all ready there? We are all ready here.' I asked if I could have a pillow for sleeping, and was told that one would be brought. Then the door was closed and we were left alone. This was not a regular prison. I do not

know if it was because the regular prisons were full or because we were being given special treatment. When I heard the telephone conversation about everything being ready I was certain that it meant that somebody had been planted to overhear everything we said.

There were already two people in the room, a Chinese and a young Mongol. The room had a bare wooden floor with no chairs, beds, or other furniture. There was a big glass window which had been boarded over. In one corner there was a big Russian-style brick stove. The young Mongol said that his name was Tsembel and that he had been arrested for deserting from the Army. He said that the Chinese could speak no Mongol and that he had been a worker of some kind in Siberia who had been arrested while trying to get back to China through Mongolia. I was certain that both men had been planted on us, and that the Chinese either understood Mongol or had been put there in case we three tried to talk with each other in Chinese. As a matter of fact none of us spoke a word of Chinese. I later convinced myself that the young Mongol deserter was just what he said he was and not a spy, and I felt very sorry for him. Both men were still there when we left, and I never knew what became of them. I still wonder sometimes what happened to the poor young deserter.

Finally they brought us some tea without milk but nothing to eat. The rule seemed to be breakfast in the morning and a meal at noon, but nothing to eat at night. On the other hand this may have been because we were lamas and because in Mongolia ordinary people, especially in rural districts eat their meal at night, while in monasteries the main meal is at noon and nothing is eaten in the evening. On this day, however, we had had neither food nor tea since the morning.

Tsembel recognized the other two lamas but did not know me and asked who I was. The Manjusri Lama told him. He asked me why I had been arrested, and, still thinking that he was a spy, I answered him just as I had answered under examination, saying that I had been arrested in connection with the Eregdendagva case but that although Eregdendagva had been to see me once in the winter I did not really know who he was, and so on. After a while someone rapped on the partition and asked 'What's going on in there?' Tsembel got up to go over and answer him, and I said in a low voice, 'Don't say anything about the three Khutagt' – so he answered through the partition, 'Three lamas have been added in here.' Then coming back he said, 'That's a man named Luvsan Nima who deserted at the same time I did. We were arrested together. He probably heard your name and he may be a disciple of yours.' This Luvsan Nima was in fact a disciple of mine who had once received a scripture from me. I did not know him well. Later he had been conscripted into the Army and quite a while previously, before I had come to Ulaanbaatar, had written to me at my monastery asking me to use my influence to get him out of the army.⁶

It was now long after dark and we had to sleep. The Yegüzer Lama had furlined clothes, so he was all right. I was wearing a heavy but not fur-lined yellow gown. I later gave this gown to Gendün and you will remember his wearing it in Peking. The Manjusri Lama and I were wearing wide heavy girdles wound many times around our waists. We took these off and twisted them up as something to lie on. It was warmer that way than if we had folded them flat. Our gowns were also very ample. Loosening our clothing we lay down on our girdles and huddled together for warmth. It was only autumn and the days were still warm, but it was cold at night, and Tsembel said that he had suffered from cold for several nights running. He was wearing only a summer uniform and a single-thickness red gown over it. I told him to come over and lie

on the other side of me, and I threw a flap of my gown over him. He slept like a log all night but the Manjusri Lama and I slept badly. I spent most of the time reciting prayers myself or worrying about the situation we were in. I had no feeling of fear, but I was worried.

In the morning Tsembel said, 'Thanks to your virtue I have slept wonderfully.' He had been in prison a long time and was covered with lice, with the result that from now on we were also swarming with lice. In the morning I was accustomed to use a tongue-scraper. I did not have one with me, and felt the lack of it, because cleaning the tongue this way is a monastery custom and you get so used to it that without it your mouth does not feel clean in the morning. The Chinese had one but he would not lend it to me.

In the morning they brought us water to wash our faces; then they brought us some tea with milk in it, and some meat broth with shredded meat in it. These things had been sent in by disciples of the Manjusri Lama, of whom there were many in the town. The Yegüzer Lama's town residence and the monastery where I had been staying were both quite far from the prison so our friends and disciples had not been able to send in anything. The Manjusri Lama's disciple had asked at the gate whether it was permissible to send in these things and had been told that it was all right. When Tsembel saw the tea and broth he said, 'You three are not in such bad trouble. You'll come out all right. If you were really in bad trouble they would never allow things to be sent in to you.' There was only one cup for the three of us, and of course we gave some of the tea and broth to Tsembel and the Chinese.

Then they came to take us to court again. On the first day in court I had worn a lama's scarf wrapped around me, with the end thrown over my shoulder. The night before they had tried to take this away from me but I had said that I needed it for sleeping. The second day I wore it to court again. Two days later the Commandant hinted to me that he thought it would be better for me not to go into court wearing this scarf in the manner of a lama going to a religious service. I suppose he meant this might look like defiance of the secular authorities, or else they may have suspected that we were hiding poison in the folds of our scarves and girdles. At any rate I stopped wearing the scarf in court; but it was not taken away from me at night. These scarves are called *orkhimj*. It was quite a distance to the court, and of course we had to go on foot.

On the second day of the trial the three of us had been allowed to see Namsrai, our defence counsel. While we were at court in the morning the Commandant had taken us out to a separate building where Namsrai was waiting for us. The Commandant left us alone with Namsrai. At this time I was still suspicious that Namsrai, while pretending to act as our defence counsel, might really be trying to get evidence against us. Namsrai told us that he had seen the whole record of our previous questioning by the Ministry of Internal Security. He asked us if we had anything to add that we thought would strengthen our own cases. I spoke first and the others then followed me saying that we had spoken the truth, had told all we knew, and had nothing to add. We returned to the court.

This second day they examined Chitarbal, a disciple of the Yegüzer Lama. This man was extremely well educated. I had never seen him before. Under the Bogd Gegeen's administration the Yegüzer Lama had been Commissioner of the South East Frontier. At that time I had seen some of the documents from his office which were extremely well written. I had assumed that he must be a very able man, something like the Jalkhanz Gegeen in the Northwest. It now turned out that the Yegüzer Lama, who was sixty-one

years old, was completely incompetent in worldly affairs and also not at all strictly trained in religious matters. He was in fact an easy going and irresponsible man. He was illiterate in Mongol and all his official documents had been drawn up for him by Chitarbal and another very able assistant. Chitarbal and Eregdendagva came from the same district, and it now turned out that the documents dealing with the plan to invite Chinese intervention had been drafted by Eregdendagva and revised by Chitarbal.

It turned out also that the Yegüzer Lama had brought Chitarbal with him to Ulaanbaatar when he had been summoned by the authorities. Then Chitarbal had been called away to the headquarters of his Aimag Government and been arrested there. Consequently the two had not been in touch with each other since they had been arrested. The evidence by the Yegüzer Lama was brought into court and it was shown that there were many discrepancies between his evidence and that of Chitarbal. At this point the Yegüzer Lama sitting at the side of the court, began to cough loudly – ‘Ahem, ahem, ahem.’ The chief prosecutor arose and said ‘The accused who is sitting over there is trying to give hints to the accused who is under examination.’

The President of the Court addressing the Yegüzer Lama said, ‘You have the right to sit there and observe what is going on, but not the right to take part unless called on; so keep quiet.’

Pretty soon, however, the Yegüzer Lama began to cough again. A guard standing behind him tried to hush him up, but never succeeded. During this examination, another man was added to the list of the accused; his name was Bodoo and he was a lama who was the Yegüzer Lama’s cook. The way he happened to be included among the accused was that on this very day at noon friends and disciples of us three had joined together to provide us with a noon meal. The meal was brought to us by Bodoo, and that was when they arrested him. The questioning now brought up the fact that Eregdendagva, after drafting one of the documents connected with his plot, had taken it to the Yegüzer Lama’s residence in Ulaanbaatar with the intention of giving it not to the Yegüzer Lama but to Chitarbal. When he got there he found that both of the two men had gone out together. He therefore left the document with Bodoo the cook, telling him not to show it to anyone else, but to give it to Chitarbal. The next morning when the Yegüzer Lama got up he saw Chitarbal reading this document and asked him about it. Chitarbal replied evasively. This was the only real connection that was established between the three men.

In my opinion the Yegüzer Lama had no more responsibility for the plot than this; but he was a man who always felt he had to show he knew about everything, and by trying to make himself more important than he really was he involved himself by his own answers deeper and deeper in suspicion.

I should add at this point that when the evidence taken from the earlier examination of Eregdendagva was read out in court it showed that the examiner had warned Eregdendagva to tell only the truth and not to try and hide anything. He was warned that if he tried to hide anything it would certainly come out in the end, but if he told the truth from the beginning it might lighten his count. It was my impression that both Eregdendagva and Chitarbal told the truth all the way through and that the discrepancies in the evidence were due to the Yegüzer Lama’s confusion, hesitation and self-involvement.

When we went back that evening to our jail, the Manjusri Lama and the Yegüzer Lama’s people had brought them food, and also a carpet each to sleep on. My friends had brought me food, but nothing to sleep on, so I shared the Manjusri Lama’s carpet.

At noon, in the little building near the court, we had been given our government food. It was stewed beef, roughly cut up. A guard ladled it out indiscriminately so that one man would get all meat, another all fat, and another nothing but bone. I asked him to let me ladle it out, so everybody would get a fair portion, and he let me do so. The three of us did not eat much of the beef, knowing that we would get mutton, brought by our friends, later. I took some of the beef back to the jail, and gave it to Tsembel and the Chinese. The Chinese produced from his pocket a knife he had made by flattening out a piece of pewter from a candlestick, and did the carving. From this time on the Chinese was very friendly.

On the way to court on the morning of the third day, the Manjusri Lama, who was fifty-eight years old and not well, dragged behind. Suddenly we heard people saying excitedly that he had fallen down. He was wearing a felt hat which fell off. A soldier prodded him with a bayonet while he was struggling to get up. When we heard this we waited. When he caught up with us we asked him how he was. The bayonet had torn his clothes and scratched his body, though not badly. I said to the soldier. 'When a man is weak and struggling to keep up, what do you mean by jabbing him with a bayonet?' The soldier, who was an Ööld, answered fiercely, 'What do I care how weak he is? He has committed a crime.'

I said. 'He is accused of a crime, but the court has not yet said he is guilty of a crime. What is to be done to him the court will say. It is not your business to kill him offhand.'

The soldier was silent.

(Ööld are known for their fierceness).

Chitarbal's examination was completed and checked over the morning of the third day. From time to time various people among the prisoners would be asked whether they confirmed or denied the evidence.

In the afternoon the Manjusri Lama was examined. He was involved because Lovon Shamar had been living in the country near his monastery and on an occasion when he wanted to have prayers said had asked for two lamas from the monastery. Eregdendagva had been present on this occasion and had paid a visit to the Manjusri Lama and had received a *khadag* from him. He was counted as a disciple of the Manjusri Lama, having once received a scripture from him. It was clear that the Manjusri Lama had not taken part in any plotting, but he was asked why he had not reported the comings and goings of Eregdendagva. The answer was, 'How should I know to whom to report about whom?'

He said that soon after Eregdendagva had been arrested he himself had been called to Ulaanbaatar to answer questions, and that he had been answering questions quite truthfully, but that he had known nothing about Eregdendagva's political activities, and therefore had had nothing to report beforehand and nothing to confess afterward.

The Manjusri Lama answered everything in the spirit of the Buddhist scriptures which sometimes made it difficult for one not trained in the scriptures to understand his full meaning. For instance, he was asked what he thought of Communist doctrine. He replied that he thought it was the consequence of the Will of Heaven. He was then asked if he thought that the actions of individual men were also the Will of Heaven. He replied that they were. The prosecutor then said, 'If you believe that these doctrines are the Will of Heaven and that the actions of individual men are also the Will of Heaven, why do you not believe in and support Communism? Are you the kind of man who fasts when good things are spread out to eat?'

The Manjusri Lama did not reply.

The day's procedure at the court ended with the questioning of the Manjusri Lama.

The next day, the fourth day of the trial, they examined Lovon Shamar. Two full days were spent in questioning him. The questioning often ran into complete contradictions as if they were asking about fire and he was replying about water. In one case they were questioning about the religious ceremony in which he had taken part with Eregdendagva. The name of this ceremony was Balgong Dongai Seregim or 'The Consuming of the Seventy-Five Delicacies'. On the record this was written down incorrectly with the word 'Dawa' instead of 'Dongai'. This led to all kinds of confusion.

Some of the exchanges became completely ridiculous, such as the following:

'What is this ceremony?'

'I don't know.'

'Then why did you perform this ceremony?'

'I had read these prayers over once before.'

'Then why did you perform the ceremony at this time?'

'I don't know.'

'If you didn't know what this ceremony was, why did you perform it?'

'I just went ahead and read the prayers anyway.'

In comparing different parts of his testimony that contradicted each other he would be asked, 'Did you say this?'

'Yes.'

'On another occasion you said something else.'

'Yes.'

'These two statements do not agree. Which one is right?'

'I don't know.'

'Why did you say different things at different times?'

'I have no answer.'

The real explanation, of course, was that because the poor man was eighty-two years old he could not stand all this close questioning. He simply became rattled. His voice was extremely feeble, and, as he sat at some distance from the judge's bench, Namsrai, the defence counsel, had to stand half-way between and relay the answers.

On the first day of the trial the court-room had been packed with spectators. Each day after that the trial got smaller and smaller. On the fifth day, the second day of the examination of Lovon Shamar, there was practically nobody in the hall when the sessions began. Then suddenly people began swarming in. The guards became alarmed and started to halt them, but they kept crowding in. I was frightened, because it looked as if a mob was forming and I was afraid that there might be an incident, and that if there were we might be killed.

That evening when the court closed, the main group of the accused were taken away as usual, but the three of us remained seated for a long time. At last we were taken out, not by the door which we regularly used, but by a side door. A big motor car was drawn up right against the door, and we were told to get into it. Soldiers got in with us. I thought then that it was all up with us. It looked as if the authorities were afraid of mob action in our favour and that we were going to be driven away some place where we could be killed immediately.

To my great surprise the car simply drove to our regular jail, where we were let out, and then the car drove off. After this for seven or eight days we were taken back and

forth between our jail and the court by car. I was very glad of this because I had painful blisters on both heels from walking back and forth all the time.

I heard later that as soon as the trial had begun there was a propaganda campaign all over the country to convince people that we were guilty and to create a demand for severe penalties. In Ulaanbaatar itself this campaign backfired as far as we three were concerned and there was in fact a danger of mob action to try to rescue us.

CHAPTER VI: TRIAL AND JUDGEMENT

On the morning of the sixth day they wound up the examination of Lovon Shamar. In the afternoon my own examination began. I had not known exactly when to expect this. We were simply taken to the court day after day and none of us knew when he might be called upon in connection with somebody else's testimony or when his own main examination would begin. When the afternoon session began there were a great many notables assembled behind the judges. Among them were Jigijav who was then the Premier, Genden, who was then, I think, the head of the Party, the Minister of Internal Security, who was Eldev-Ochir, who was from my own native Banner, the Minister of War, Demid, and Luvsansharav the man who had presided at the expropriation of cattle in my district. Just before this I had gone to the toilet, which was outside the building. On my way back Eldev-Ochir, whom I had known before, though never well, was standing by the path and took a picture of me.

When I saw all these notables in the hall I was sure that the trial was at an end and that judgement was about to be pronounced. Then to my great astonishment, I heard my own name called. I was at a disadvantage in answering questions, because during my period of confinement I had developed a troublesome cough. When my name was called I rose and went to the witness stand. To my astonishment everybody in the court also rose. This had not happened before. (I think they all rose in order to lean forward and listen intently). Apparently all the important people had come because it had been learned that I was to be questioned, and there was a great curiosity to know what would happen.

'What is your attitude toward the new Revolutionary Regime, and the Party?' I was asked.

'This Regime declares that it is in favour of the poor and "middle" people', I said. 'Everywhere in the world the poor and "middle" people are many and the rich and powerful are few. I am in favour of what is good for the many.'

'Then if you are in favour of what this Regime stands for, why have you joined this opposition group?'

'I have no connection with them at all.'

'Yes you have.'

'What connection do I have with them?'

'In Lovon Shamar's testimony he says that he was an intermediary between you and Eregdendagva.'

'He says so, but I do not admit it.'

'Then he is lying?'

'Yes he is lying.'

'Why is he lying?'

'How should I know why he is lying?'

‘There is no use in your trying to hide the truth. We know what your real attitude is. It would be better for you to tell the truth. That might reduce your guilt.’

‘What this Regime knows that I have done wrong. I do not know,’ I replied. ‘As far as I know, I have done nothing wrong. If you know what I have done that you think is wrong, it is you who must declare it.’

Hereupon this line of questioning stopped completely. The next questions were at random and were about such things as how long I had been staying at the Gandan Monastery, who had come to see me, and so forth and so on. It seemed that these were just random questions asked on the chance that they might turn up something.

The procedure was that the five examiners each took his turn in asking questions. One of the examiners was a woman.¹ Sometimes one examiner would write something on a piece of paper and pass it to the others. It seemed to me that sometimes the one whose turn it was to ask questions was being warned that the answers to the questions were running in favour of the accused. At other times it looked as if the slips of paper were being passed around in order to see if all were in favour of asking some particular question.

One of the questions I was asked was, ‘Is the Banchin Bogd a good man or a bad man?’

‘A bad man, probably, I think,’ I replied.

‘How do you know?’ I was asked.

‘I do not know him personally, but the news is constantly printed in the papers that he is trying to raise troops in China or looking for Japanese support to invade Outer Mongolia.’²

This line of questioning was then dropped.

‘Do you think that the new state of affairs is the Will of Heaven?’ I was asked.

The saying in the old books is that changes in the state of a nation occur when the Will of Heaven and the actions of man coincide. Therefore I answered that the new state of affairs in our country was as much a result of the action of men as it was the result of the Will of Heaven.

The questioning was done by the five examiners or judges; the prosecutors and the defence counsel asked questions only occasionally, and before doing so they asked permission from the bench.

The representative of the Ministry of War asked permission to ask a question. He asked me whether I had known Lovon Shamar for a long time. I replied that I had not. He then asked if there were any cause for one of us to try to take revenge on the other. I replied that on my side there certainly was not. He then said, ‘If you have not known each other for a long time, and there is no question of revenge between you, why should he give testimony that involves you?’

‘How could I answer that question?’ I said. ‘I have said that as far as I know there is no reason. If you think there is a reason you must ask him.’

Because of my cough my voice had been getting hoarser and weaker. The court could see that I was getting so tired that it was difficult for me to stand up. I asked if I could sit down for a rest, and the court then ordered a chair to be brought for me. Namsrai, the defence counsel, came and stood beside me, and relayed my replies for me when my voice was too weak. He was an extremely able defence counsel and helped me a great deal. He was closely connected with the group who were later accused of having traitorous connections with the Japanese. Because of this he escaped from Outer Mongolia in the spring of 1937. He came and stayed with me in Inner Mongolia in 1939.

When I left Inner Mongolia in order to get away from the Japanese and went to Chungking, he stayed on. In 1944 he was executed by the Japanese on the grounds of being a secret agent of Outer Mongolia.

The presiding examiner now said, 'You may question Lovon Shamar yourself.'

Lovon Shamar was then called to the witness stand. I said, 'Why should I question him? What questions should I ask him?'

The President of the Court said, 'You should know; that's for you to decide.'

I then said to Lovon Shamar, 'You have testified that you told Eregdendagva to ask me about my attitude toward this affair. He has testified that he did not ask me. Now will you say whether you think or do not think that I have really been involved?'

'I don't know.'

'Do you agree that we two never met each other in the past?'

'Never.'

'Then why have you involved me in your testimony?'

'I read the prayers of Balgong Dongai Seregim for Eregdendagva.'

'Will you please answer the question that I asked? What you have just said was not an answer to my question.' At this point I laughed, and so did everybody else.

The answer was, 'I don't know.'

The court then told him to return to his seat. At this point the important people who had come to watch the trial went out. There was some further questioning before the court rose for the day, but nothing serious.

The first question of the next morning was a perplexing one, and one which requires some explanation. It was the custom of monasteries in Mongolia to invite distinguished and learned lamas from Tibet. At this time there were residing at various monasteries in Outer Mongolia no less than thirteen lamas from Tashilumpo, the seat of the Banchin Bogd. Most of these had the rank of *Gav'j*, which is more or less equivalent to 'Doctor of Religion'. It is equivalent to the degree of *Hlaramba* granted at Lhasa in the great New Year competitive examinations. There are several other comparable degrees depending on the institution which grants them. Since at this time the Banchin Bogd was an exile from Tibet and there were many rumours about his political connections with the Chinese and the Japanese, these thirteen men of high religious rank from his home monastery were regarded with intense suspicion. In the Dalai Choinkhor Van's Banner, which was a Banner with a very large territory near my own monastery, they had a special monastery set aside as the seat of whatever *gav'j* had currently been invited from Tibet. Special serfs were set aside for the maintenance of this monastery, and the *gav'j* who was in residence there was regarded as the superior *khamba* of all the monasteries of that Banner. Although the monastery set aside for him was regarded as his official residence, he usually spent most of his time at the official Banner monastery. This was a great and wealthy monastery supported partly by the cultivated land around it. It was disestablished by State decree in 1932.

At this time the *Gav'j* of the Dalai Choinkhor Van's Banner was a man named Eregdel. It happened that there was another Eregdel who was a disciple of mine. He came from a Banner to the east of me near the main road from Ulaanbaatar, but he spent most of his time in the Khovd region, where he practised as a Gurtum, a lama healer who performs rites many of which resemble Shamanism. Because of this healing practice of his he received many gifts and became wealthy. As my monastery lay on the road he followed when he went back and forth from the Khovd region to visit his old home, he occasionally stayed with me.

I was asked, 'Do you know Eregdel?' And so I asked in return, 'Which Eregdel?' 'Eregdel Gegeen,' was the reply.

'Eregdel Gegeen from where?' I asked.

'The Eregdel Gegeen, presumably, from Terhi Tsagaan Nuur Banner,' they said, using one of the local names for the Dalai Choinkhor Van's Banner.

Then I began to understand. 'I don't know him,' I replied.

'What do you mean by saying you don't know him?' they said. 'He stopped at your monastery with a caravan carrying a lot of money, and it was reported that he was on his way to see his superior, the Banchin Bogd.'

'Oh,' I said. 'I do not know the Eregdel you mean. I do know another Eregdel, known as Eregdel Gurtum. This Eregdel acknowledges as his religious teacher a man named Darjaa.'

This man named Darjaa had been to Lhasa several times, and twice I had sent him on missions to the previous Dalai Lama. He had later lived in the Khovd region and still later had returned to his native Banner which was to the east of my monastery. Not very long before this trial Eregdel Gurtum had sent his elder brother, a layman, with gifts for Darjaa, and this man on his way from Khovd had stopped at my monastery.

I explained about the difference between the Eregdel about whom they were questioning and the Eregdel whom I knew, and the court then dropped this line of questioning.

Seeing that the questioning was coming to an end, I asked for permission to speak. I said that I knew that the new Government had a policy of aiding the poor and the people of medium wealth. I said that I agreed with this policy in general, but wished to state that the nobles and the wealthy were also members of the Mongol nation. Therefore although the national policy might favour people who were below them in rank and wealth, they themselves should not be attacked as individuals only because of their rank and wealth. No Mongol should be accused or condemned except on actual evidence of acting against the law.

There was no comment on this and I was told I could leave the witness stand and return to my seat.

The questioning then turned to Boodoo, the cook of the Yegüzer. He was questioned about the document which Eregdendagva had given him: whether he knew about its contents, what Eregdendagva had said to him, what he had done with the document before delivering it, whether the Yegüzer Lama knew about it, and so forth and so on. He replied that Eregdendagva had told him that nobody must know about the document, and that therefore he had hidden it. He was then asked where he had hidden it and why he had hidden it in that particular place. Since Eregdendagva had not been able to deliver the document personally because the Yegüzer lama and Chitarbal had gone out, he was asked if he knew where they had gone, and he replied that he did not. He had forgotten to give the document to Chitarbal that evening, but had given it to him the next morning. He himself had not been told what was in the document and could not read it because he was illiterate. The Yegüzer Lama did not know about the document. This conflicted with the Yegüzer Lama's own testimony that he had seen the document. It then came out that the Yegüzer Lama had come out of his room while Chitarbal was reading the document, and that was how he had seen it. This ended the questioning of Boodoo.

In the afternoon of that day the questioning of the Yegüzer Lama began. His questioning lasted the rest of this day, all the next day (the eighth day of the trial) and into the morning of the ninth. His answers were extremely confused and it was hard to

get straight, for example, which documents he knew about, which documents he had seen, which documents he actually knew the contents of, and so forth. One of the main questions affecting him was whether he had actually invited the Banchin Bogd to visit his monastery with a following of 1,000 men. The Yegüzer Lama's monastery had about 1,000 lamas and this number may have been confused in rumours that the Banchin Bogd was coming and bringing 1,000 men with him. The Yegüzer Lama at times grew very angry when answering questions, but these answers were all mixed up as to what he remembered and what he had forgotten. At times Chitarbal and Boodoo the cook were called back to give evidence to support the court's effort to pin on the Yegüzer Lama the accusation that he knew about subversive documents. By the end the Yegüzer Lama was hopelessly involved.

On the rest of the ninth day they questioned Donaijav and succeeded in involving him deeply. He and Eregdendagva had lived for some time in the same quarters and the aim of the examination was to prove that they had talked over everything and that Donaijav was an accomplice of Eregdendagva and knew about everything that was going on. Donaijav was a Party member and therefore his case was considered especially important. Namsrai and the other defence counsel, when they heard the evidence, refused to be responsible for his defence. I do not know for sure whether Namsrai was himself a Party member, but I think he probably was not.

At the end of the ninth day they began questioning Dashdendev. This Dashdendev was a close associate of the famous Badamdorj who had also been accused of plotting with the Chinese. Dashdendev, although a lama, had been granted the secular princely title of Chin Van by the Bogd Gegeen. He was requested to tell everything that he knew. He immediately said that he would do so, in order to try to save his own life. He then spoke very clearly and in great detail, recalling conversations, identifying people, and giving a minute description of the whole plot. He was asked if he had reported what he knew to the authorities before being arrested, and replied that he had. The only thing that was not clear to me was whether he had been assigned in the first place as a counter-agent to get in among the plotters, or whether he had perhaps at first participated in the plot and later decided to betray his accomplices. It was noteworthy that his evidence tended to show that the Yegüzer Lama was not really a member of the inside ring and that Eregdendagva had held back a good deal of information from him. Dashdendev was questioned very little. Most of what he said was his own uninterrupted statement.

The next person questioned was Buuvei Gav'j. He and his elder brother Choijin Nima, who was a layman, were contact men who went to various places to see people, carry messages, and make appointments. Several transactions in camels and travelling animals were involved.

The next defendant that I remember was Choijin, the Tsorj (an assistant in a monastery). He was asked as I had been whether he thought that the Banchin Bogd was a good man or a bad man. He replied that this was not the real Banchin Bogd. When asked what he meant he replied that the Banchin Bogd was a very holy person who could not possibly be implicated in the kind of things that were being reported about the Banchin Bogd from Peking and elsewhere. Therefore he thought that the man about whom these reports were being made must be an imposter. This reply angered the court. One of the examiners, not the President, said, 'You are obviously an adherent of the Banchin Bogd and you should be liquidated by the people.'

Choijin Tsorj was a man very learned in the scriptures who had a lot of disciples. He

was famous as a diviner. He did his divining by casting dice. He was very careful in his relationships with people. Questioning his disciples and followers revealed no dubious practices in his divining and all who were questioned asserted that he could not be involved in a plot. He came into the trial because Buuvei Gav’j had gone to him for divination, asking whether the enterprise in which he was engaged would be successful, without revealing what the enterprise was. Chojin Tsorj cast the dice and said, ‘You should give up the enterprise.’

In spite of this slight connection, Chojin Tsorj was given a sentence of ten years. After five years he was released but later he was arrested again and I heard that he was put to death. I never heard why he was arrested the second time but he was arrested at the same time as Genden and Demid, when more than seventy laymen and twenty-four or twenty-five lamas were condemned to death and executed. That was in 1935.³

Another man questioned was named Gombojitshin. Eregdendagva and the other main witnesses denied that he knew anything about the document, but the court identified some words of comment written at the beginning of the most important document, the one that had been delivered to Chitarbal, as being in his handwriting.

Gombojitshin was also questioned about some ammunition that he was accused of having concealed in his house. His reply was that he had at one time served in various military capacities, and had also been responsible for providing escorts for caravans to Lhasa; and it was in these ways that the ammunition had come into his possession. He claimed that this was ammunition that had been overlooked and not returned and was not in any way concealed ammunition.

The questioning did not follow up this point any further. The rest of the trial did not bring out anything new that was very important. The questioning mostly concerned little details of hearsay or second-hand accusation and considerable numbers of people were questioned each day.

For example there was a man named Dambar who was a Party member. He was more than fifty years old and rather stupid. One day Eregdendagva came to see him and mentioned that he was going on a journey. In the course of the conversation he said that ‘he had it in for those dirty rats’, and then he said that he wanted to present a *khadag* ‘to his teacher’. No mention of who the teacher might be. Dambar gave him a *khadag*. Later Dambar’s wife went to get medicine from a doctor named Jantsan Maramba. (Maramba is a title for a doctor of advanced learning.) Gossiping with the doctor, she told him about Eregdendagva coming to see her husband and borrowing a *khadag*. The doctor (a man whom I knew well) hushed her up and told her not to gossip about things that did not concern her.

Later a young man named Tsendsüren was questioned. He was also a Party member. He was a fine young fellow and spoke up in a clear voice saying that he was from a poor family and had joined the Party in all honesty, knew nothing about any conspiracy, and in fact did not know what it was all about until he had been brought into court, but in the meantime had been unjustly arrested and imprisoned for months.

The President of the Court said, ‘Never mind all that. Be quiet and sit down. We have a witness against you.’ (This was on the eighteenth day of the trial.) The witness was then produced. He was the man in red who had been lying in the room where we three had been put, the first day of the trial, as I mentioned before. I do not know his name. When he came in the President of the Court said to Tsendsüren. ‘You just said that you didn’t know anything about all this, didn’t you?’

In a changed voice, Tsendsüren said, ‘I knew nothing about it.’

The President of the Court said to the witness. 'What do you have to say about Tsendsüren and other men who are among the accused?'

The witness said that on a certain day and at a certain time when a lot of people had already been arrested, when it was not yet publicly known that Eregdendagva was among them, he had overheard Tsendsüren talking with two other men among the accused. They were asking him why people were being arrested, and he said to them that it was probably in connection with Eregdendagva.

The President of the Court then turned to Tsendsüren and said, 'Is this true and did you really mention Eregdendagva's name in this way?'

Tsendsüren admitted the truth of what the witness said. The President of the Court then told Tsendsüren he could sit down again. He was not questioned any further, and at the end of the trial was given a mild sentence.

On the nineteenth day, when the court assembled. Namsrai came to see us three in the room set aside for us outside of the court, and asked us if we had anything further of importance to bring out. We said we had not. He went out and then the President of the Court summoned us before him one by one. He also asked each of us if we had anything to add, and warned us that this was our last chance, as the inquiry was about to close. These interviews took place in private in a room near ours. The President of the Court took written notes. Then everybody was brought into the full session of the court. The President of the Court stood up and declared publicly that this was the last opportunity for anyone to add to his testimony. Two of the minor accused got up and added to their testimony, but there was no important new evidence. The prosecutors then made their summing up.

The chief prosecutor was Yadamsüren, a young man and very able. (I heard that he himself was put to death in some later purge, possibly in connection with the trial of Genden, but I am not sure of this report.) Yadamsüren analysed the prosecution's view of the importance of the case and demanded the death penalty for ten of the accused: The three Living Buddhas, Eregdendagva, Chitarbal, Gombojitshin, Donaijav, Buuvei Gav'j, Lovon Shamar, and Chojjin Tsorj. I had fully been expecting to hear a demand that the death penalty be decreed for me, so when I heard my name mentioned it was no extra shock.

Then Namsrai arose to present the defence for the same ten accused. The main outlines of his defence were; 1) That even if a plot had been proved no complete crime had been proved; 2) Eregdendagva was a sick man and not of sound judgement, and this was important, since he had been singled out by the prosecution as the leader of the conspiracy; 3) He refused to accept responsibility for the defence of Donaijav; 4) If Eregdendagva, the head of the conspiracy, was in poor health and not of sound judgement, the men who were accused of being under his guidance in the conspiracy could hardly be guilty of grave crimes actually committed. He pointed out finally that the twentieth anniversary of the Mongolian Revolution was at hand,⁴ and suggested that whatever penalties the court might decree, this would be a suitable occasion for amnesty.

When the presentation of the defence had been completed another prosecutor summed up the case against one group of the twenty-eight remaining accused, and a third prosecutor presented the case against those who were left.

The defence of the second group of accused was divided between two defence counsels. The first of them defended the accused who had been allocated to him by saying that they had been misled by some of the ten for whom the death penalty had been demanded, among whom he mentioned by name Eregdendagva, Chitarbal, and the

three Living Buddhas. I do not recall what the second defence counsel said on behalf of those for whom he was pleading.

Yadamsüren, the chief prosecutor, then arose again, to rebut the defence. First he said that the appeal to the twentieth anniversary of the Revolution as a justification for amnesty was not relevant. In any case, amnesty should be invoked only for minor crimes. In this case, the prestige of the law should not be lowered by granting amnesty. Then he said that Namsrai had pleaded that Eregdendagva was not of sound mind; but Eregdendagva's connection with the documents in the case had been fully proved and the documents did not indicate that they had been drafted by a man who had lost capacity for judgement. Furthermore Namsrai had pleaded that no crime had actually been committed; but Eregdendagva had been arrested after he had actually set out to carry his conspiracy into effect, and this was equivalent to commission of the crime. Finally, Namsrai had pleaded that the conspiracy had had no actual effect; but the defence counsel on behalf of another group of the accused had just pleaded that they had been misled by five of the principal accused and this inconsistency on the part of the two defence counsels proved that the conspiracy had in fact been effectual. The President of the Court then gave Namsrai fifteen minutes in which to elaborate or revise his defence.

Namsrai protested that in this short time he could not give a full presentation. The main point he wanted to make therefore was that it had been established that Eregdendagva, while serving in the Ministry of Finance during the period of the Autonomous Government, had been removed from office for being of unsound mind, and after that had wandered about for three years as a known lunatic. The Government could not maintain that he was not a sick man because he was being detained under medical care. When he was captured while setting out to get across the frontier to make contact with the Chinese, he was starting on a month's journey by camel, and yet he was openly talking to people and asking directions for the journey, and this had led to his arrest; and such proved that he was not of sound mind. The prosecution had made it a main part of their case that he was the head of the whole conspiracy. A conspiracy organized by such an unimpressive person could hardly be taken too seriously and therefore he renewed his plea that whatever might be considered to have been proved, this was a proper case for light sentences or amnesty, since a severe sentence could not properly be passed on a man in Eregdendagva's condition and therefore it would not be proper to inflict more severe sentences on others whose part in the conspiracy was not as important as Eregdendagva's.

The court then adjourned about noon. There was no session in the afternoon, but we were kept in our room near the court, and were not returned to our regular place of detention. At nearly midnight that night the court convened again. When we three Living Buddhas entered, the court was already crammed with spectators. Double ranks of soldiers separated the court from the spectators. In the part of the court occupied by the spectators there was no room for benches and all were standing. No prosecutors, defence counsel, or recording secretaries were present. Even the examiners and the President of the Court were not there. The only official person present was the Commandant.

There were no seats for us thirty-eight accused either. The Commandant gave an order to the troops to look well to their arms. The size of the crowd was almost certainly because of us three Living Buddhas. So great a number of people would not have crowded in for an ordinary political trial.

We were told that when the President of the Court came in we must salute him properly. Why should we who are about to die salute the man who pronounced the sentence? I thought. Then the President of the Court and the five examiners came in. We all bowed and the President of the Court bowed in return. The President of the Court then read out the sentences.

Seven were to be shot within twenty-four hours: Eregdendagva, Donaijav, Chitarbal, the Yegüzer Lama, Lovon Shamar, Gombojitshin, and Buuvei Gav'j.

Sentenced to ten years imprisonment was Choijin Tsorj.

Sentenced to eight years imprisonment was Choijin Nima.

Many sentences I cannot now recall, but the mildest sentences were those imposed on Tsendsüren, two months, and Eregdendagva's wife, six months imprisonment respectively.

Altogether twenty-three out of the thirty-eight people were convicted. The Manjusri Lama was sentenced to ten years imprisonment, but with sentence suspended.

I was sentenced to five years imprisonment with sentence suspended.

For the periods of our sentences the Manjusri and I were liable to be shot immediately if there should be any further cause for our arrest. Six of the accused were acquitted, besides the two of us who were put on probation. When the President of the Court came to the names of the eight set free and read off first the Manjusri Lama's name and mine, the crowd gave a sort of whistling gasp and started immediately to disperse without waiting to hear the other six names; but, of course, the crowd was so dense that it took time for them to get out.

When the President of the Court had finished reading the sentences he added in a low voice which contrasted with the loud clear voice in which he had read the sentences, 'Any appeals must be made to the Baga [Small] Khural tonight.'

The contrast of the tone of voice in which he made this announcement convinced me that he did not want the crowd to hear it.

The Yegüzer Lama, who was standing two paces away from me, leaned forward to ask me, 'When must we appeal?'

'Tonight,' I answered. I had no time to say more, because the Commandant then signalled to the troops to take away the eight of us who were to be released. We were brought to a space which had been cleared and the Commandant checked our names and told us we could go.

'Where shall I go?'

Startled, he replied, 'Go to the Gandan Monastery.' (This was the monastery where I had been staying before.) Then, as if realizing that he ought not to take the responsibility of telling me where to go, he added, 'Go where you like.'

The exits were still so jammed that it was difficult to get out, but I finally made my escape on the west side, and tried to go around to the front, thinking that people who knew me would be waiting for me there; but the crowd was so dense that I could not get through. I tried circling around the building again, but the few street lights were out, so that it was difficult to get my bearings. Finally in the darkness I ran into Dambar's wife, who had been released, and who was guiding the Manjusri Lama. I told her I was looking for my own people, but in a very agitated way she urged me not to try to find them; she tugged me by the sleeve and hurried me along.

The Manjusri Lama had formerly had quarters of his own in Ulaanbaatar, but these had been confiscated; therefore Dambar's wife was taking him to her home in the East City. Although I had never known her before this trial she insisted that, as it was so late

at night, I also should come along with them. In the darkness, however, she could not find the way to her own home. She lived in Bargai Aimag⁵ or quarter, which included three alleys, but we could not find the right one.

Then we ran into a man and a woman who looked as if they were also going home from the dispersing crowd. They peered at us in the darkness and recognized the Manjusri Lama. Although the woman seemed a little reluctant, the man urged us all to come, and we did so. They made tea and gave us everything to eat, and we all lay down to sleep. At dawn, before sunrise, I got up to leave and the man and his wife also got up and again made tea for me.

I went along to the place where there lived a former religious teacher of mine, a Khamba. He was not up yet, so as religious custom required, I made three prostrations before his door, and went on to my own quarters in the Gandan Monastery.

The sun was rising when I got there. The first man I met was a *gav’j* named Yondon, who was coming out early to make a circumambulation of the temples. Startled, he ran back in without speaking to me.

On the fringe of the monastery were a number of felt tents that had been set up for old and sick people. A man coming out of one of these recognized me and greeted me joyfully. He called another man, a disciple of mine from the Gov’ [Gobi] who had come to Ulaanbaatar on a pilgrimage. Hastily and joyfully this man borrowed a *khadag* with which to greet me. He was named Sodnomdorj and was a young man who had declared himself my disciple some years before. He later escaped into Inner Mongolia as a refugee.

When I got into my own quarters my people there were all asleep. They had vainly searched for me throughout the night and had just come back to lie down to rest. The first thing to do was to change all my clothes. They were full of lice. Then there came in a good friend of mine, Sodnom the Nyarav [Monastery steward], with a cup of mare’s milk and a long *khadag* to greet me joyfully. The news of my return had been spread by Yondon Gav’j when he ran back into the monastery.

Then I went out to make a tour of prayer around the three *datsan* or sub-divisions of the Gandan Monastery. As I went around, people at their prayers nudged one another and said, ‘The Diluv Gegeen has come,’ and I could see rejoicing everywhere.

My disciple Gendün, who had accompanied me to Khüree, returned to Narvanchin in Tsagaan Sar [Mongolian New Year] of 1930. In the autumn, he left Narvanchin to come to Khüree, but was arrested and taken to the headquarters of Sain Noyon Khan Aimag; and after two months of imprisonment, he was taken to Khüree, and was kept in prison for two more months. He was finally released in the last month of the old calendar year. He was not questioned about me, having been arrested simply on suspicion as a traveller.

I had been released in the middle month of autumn, and Gendün then joined me at Gandan. I had never thought of anything but to escape. Failure in attempt to escape would mean sure death; but if I returned home, sooner or later there would be a new excuse for arresting me; and by the terms of my probation, that would also mean a death sentence. This in fact happened to the Manjusri Lama. According to what I heard later, he was rearrested and executed at the time of the Genden-Demid purge. Suppose I were accused seven years later – that means two years after the termination of my probation period, if the accusation referred back to the five year probation period, I should still be liable.

I had horses and camels around Khüree, presented to me, which were in care of various persons. So we did not need to buy the animals necessary for our journey. Preparations for the journey could be made under the cover of going home. The main difficulty was selling sheep and horses to get Chinese silver dollars instead of the new paper currency. One could buy Chinese silver dollars only on the black market.

Our caravan consisted of eight camels, five men, each riding a camel, and one tent. There were myself, Gendün, a lay [not lama] *shav'* who later returned to Outer Mongolia because of his wife and children. There were also a lay friend of his, a recent disciple of mine, who later vanished, perhaps having gone back, and a lama, who was from Inner Mongolia and later went to Wu-t'ai Mountain. As that region became involved in the Japanese War, I do not know what became of him.

There were two roads from Khüree to Narvanchin: one was along the Khangai Mountains, with twenty post-stages, and the other went through the Gov' with twenty-five stages. We first took the Gov' road, which passed close to the Uliastai-Kalgan road. We travelled four days from Khüree following this road, and then took a little-used road toward the south. There were twenty post-stages in all to Inner Mongolia, entering it by the Banner of Dund Gүн. We passed right close to a frontier patrol post at night. We had taken a guide from Ülegei Khit, and took on water from the last well. We spent one day in deserted Gov' terrain. It was the 20th of Tsagaan Sar and there was no moon. We intended to march all through the night, in order to get well over the frontier, because if our tracks should be found, we could be pursued.

Our guide pointed out the way to safety and went back. We stayed all day in a hollow of the Gov', invisible except from the northwest. We set out again at night, Gendün leading the way. Following the guide's instructions, we came to a well, but it was frozen. We pushed on anyhow, Gendün said he smelled the smoke of a camp. So we bore away from it. Then dogs started barking. That meant a frontier post. We were just far enough away so the dogs stayed near the camp, and did not run out to attack us. Then we saw a light for a moment. That was the guard coming out of the tent, pushing the door flap aside so that we saw the glow of fire just for a moment. He must have stood and listened, but did not attempt to pursue. We heard later that there was only one man at that post. Later, the frontier security became much tighter.

The guide had indicated where we would have to scramble through rough going. There were only low Gov' hills, but there were boulders in the ravine, and it was hard going for the camels. There were three gaps, of which only one was practicable, but Gendün managed to find the right one. We kept on all night. When we first heard the barking of camp dogs in Dund Gүн Banner we detoured. This was, on one hand, to get our trail mixed up with local trails; and, on the other hand, because there might be informants in camps near the Khalkh border, and the frontier guards could still come raiding to catch us. After it became light, we found the camp of a small Chinese caravan merchant. We halted there and got our bearings.

NOTES

Chapter IV

1. In fact, Lamjav was implicated in Danzan's plot, which took place in 1924. (See Political Memoirs, p. 129 and notes.) In his Political Memoirs the Diluv gives the correct year. (p. 129) The Diluv's resignation from the office of Uliastai Said was accepted sometime in early 1922.

- Lamjav succeeded him in the office of Said, and the Diluv agreed to be his Ded (Vice-) Said. In the spring of 1923, the Diluv resigned from the office of Ded Said and was succeeded by Gürjav. See the Political Memoirs, p. 127.
2. The decision on changing the *shav'* organization was taken on 20 March 1925. In April, large *shav'* were formed into Banners, and small ones were incorporated in neighbouring Banners, which was the case with the *shav'* of Narvanchin Monastery.
 3. Tserendorj died on 13 February 1928, and Amar was elected Chairman of the Council of Ministers.
 4. This was the time when more moderate people were in power, but they were to be removed at the end of 1928 for Rightist Opportunism.
 5. In April 1927, Chiang Kai-shek staged an anti-communist coup, and in February 1928, he resumed the conquest of the North, holding both civil and military power in his hands. His troops entered Peking in June.
 6. At the VII Party Congress which took place from the end of October to 10 December 1928, the Rightists, including Jamsrano and Jadamba were removed from Party leadership.
 7. At the meeting of the Mongol delegates with Lenin in the autumn of 1921, Lenin advised them to develop consumer cooperatives. (Brown and Onon, p. 162). The Mongolian Consumer Cooperative was organized in April 1922. (op. cit., p. 182)
 8. The large scale confiscation of property belonging to high lamas started in the autumn of 1929. (See Brown and Onon, p. 252). According to his way of counting age, this must have been his 46th year, not 45th.
 9. Confiscation of monastery property would have meant stopping of religious service, which still played an important part in the life of the people. For this reason, a measure called '*Jas Campaign*' was organized in the 1930s to reduce monastic property gradually by taxes and transfer of monastic herds to the poor etc. (Brown and Onon, pp. 264–5)
 10. In fact, the Diluv's statement invited the suspicion of the Committee for Confiscation of the Feudalists' Property. Choibalsan, Chairman of the Committee, specially mentioned the Diluv in his report to the VI Ikh Khural (April, 1930) as an outstanding example of the feudalists who, while expressing their approval of the Government's policy of confiscation, were secretly preparing counter-revolutionary intrigues. Choibalsan's summary of the Diluv's statement is almost exactly like the version given by the Diluv himself (Choibalsan: *Works*, Vol. 1, pp. 72–3).
 11. This must have been the VIII Party Congress, which was convened in January 1930.
 12. This refers to the Revolutionary Youth League, founded on 25 August 1921, with seventeen members with Choibalsan as its leader. In contrast to the People's Party, which did not officially take the name of People's *Revolutionary* Party until 1925, the Youth League was called 'Revolutionary' from the beginning, though at first the word 'revolution' was translated by the traditional expression of 'changing the mandate of Heaven' (*boshgyg khalakh*), a literal translation of the Chinese *kê ming* 革命.
 13. This passage seems to refer to the VIII Party Congress, held from 21 January 1930 at which Mongolia was prematurely defined as having entered the stage of socialism. The Ikh Hural, or National Assembly of that year convened in April, however, was the Sixth and not the Third.
 14. For the intervention of the Comintern in Party conflicts, see the Political Memoirs, p. 132 and note.

Chapter V

1. For the Diluv's use of the word 'revolution,' see the Political Memoirs, IV p. 129 note 24.
2. Horse racing, wrestling and archery were the three traditional sports at religious festivals. Since the Revolution, they have become an important part of official celebrations, especially the anniversary of the Revolution.

3. The trial was opened in September 1930.
4. This building was later used for the Rural Economy Technical School until about 1950; but according to the general plan of modernization of Ulaanbaatar City, it was demolished in 1974, to make room for J. Sambuu Square (Mongol historians) Sambuu, born a serf, held many high offices, and in his old age was a revered elder statesman. His *Advice to Herdsmen* is being prepared for publication by Lattimore.
5. Unfortunately, the diagram was either never made or has been lost.
6. One of the first measures taken after the Revolution was to impose conscription on all men, except for lamas living in monasteries. *Shav'*, who had previously been exempted from military service, were also conscripted. (See Brown and Onon, p. 174).

Chapter VI

1. Women were given complete equality with men in the first Constitution of the People's Republic adopted in 1924.
2. There was a wide spread rumour at that time that the Banchin Bogd and a big Japanese army would come from the East and exterminate the 'Faction of the People.' (Pürevjav and Dashjamts, p. 67)
3. Genden and Demid were purged and liquidated in 1937. See the Political Memoirs, p. 139 and note.
4. Here the revolution refers to the Declaration of Independence in November 1911. The 20th anniversary may have been a slip of memory, for the trial is recorded to have begun in September 1930. Or, as it happened in some cases, the year in which the event took place may have been counted as the first year, thus making the 19th anniversary the 20th year after the event.
5. Here *aimag* refers to a monastic community within a monastery. The names of the twenty-eight *aimag* of Ikh Khüree and the number of the lamas are given by Pozdneyev, p. 52. The number of the lamas of Bargai Aimag at the end of the last century was about 200. See also p. 185.

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THE GREAT PURGE

Baabar



Chapter Twenty-One: The Great Purge

TASS officially expressed its condolences on Demid's death. In Ulaanbaatar, Choibalsan mourned the decease of "his only close friend in the world" by taking an oath of allegiance. After the burial ceremony, on September 2, Choibalsan became Commander-in-Chief and Minister for Defense. The next day he issued Order No. 366, which stated:

There are indications that among us are individuals and groups whose political consciousness has become so dull that they have fallen under the influence of Japanese spies and provocateurs and have become traitors of their native land.¹

Creating an impression of the omnipresence of spies and traitors and producing justifications for future arrests was part of the final psychological preparation for the Great Purge.

The technical preparations for the massacre were already complete. Many important things had happened in the few days between Demid's death and the day Order No. 366 was signed by Choibalsan. On August 13, 1937, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist (Bolshevik) Party chaired by Stalin decided to station the Red Army in Mongolia and to send a Bolshevik delegation there to implement the decision.² On August 24, 1937, a large delegation of the Soviet government arrived in Ulaanbaatar unannounced. It included Smirnov, Deputy Minister for Defense, Frinovski, Deputy Minister for Soviet Internal Affairs, and Mironov, the newly assigned representative in Mongolia. Apparently the delegation had not intended to meet with Demid in Mongolia, who had just been called to Moscow for the second time, but rather to present to Prime Minister Amar Japan's plan to take over Mongolia. The next day, the State Bag Hural and the Council of Ministers issued Decree No. 22, which was an invitation to station the Soviet troops in Mongolia:

We request that the Soviet government send military units of the Workers and Peasants' Red army as soon as possible to counter the direct threat and its possible consequences to the people's state of Mongolia in the current situation.³

The Soviet Army Arrives

At the moment this decree was issued in Ulaanbaatar, the Seventeenth Soviet army had already crossed the Mongolian border at Altanbulag and Ereentsav, and was heading to its assigned places. One day before the decree, Choibalsan called the chief of Dornod *aimag* to tell him not to be disturbed when Soviet troops entered the *aimag* territory. This decision, which both Genden and Demid had resisted, was put into effect immediately. The Soviet army, led by officers experienced in the Spanish civil war, was to transport its military equipment to the empty Mongolian steppe and to ship it later to the Chinese for the use in the Sino-Japanese War. The army was composed of two mechanized motor brigades, one ground troop division backed by artillery and automobiles, one cavalry brigade, a communications unit, an anti-landmine unit, an engineering unit, and transport, air, and automobile brigades.⁴ There were almost 30,000 Soviet troops.⁵

Even before this, several Red Army units had already been stationed in Mongolia. Even earlier, on January 25, 1936, Soviet military assistance was requested.⁶ Frinovski mentioned that one special tank unit and one armored tank unit, as well as an air unit, were stationed in Mongolia with no legal permission.⁷

Stalin had other reasons to send troops to Mongolia. He was eager to exert influence in the Sino-Japanese War which had started one month earlier and was, in his view, key to maintaining the security of Soviet interests in the Far East. But he needed to have full control in Mongolia to keep the Japanese at bay. Genden and Demid were too crafty for Stalin's liking, and had not proved to be the puppets he was looking for. He had to get rid of them and find a dictator the Mongols would fear, and who would in turn fear him. Choibalsan became that leader.

Stalin's intention was for China and Japan to fight each other and for the USSR to be a distant observer, but he was aware that the Chinese might retreat into Mongolia if they were defeated, possibly drawing the Soviets into the war. In fact, the downtrodden Chinese troops did retreat from the Heavenly Gates to the Mongolian border, and according to some sources, they approached the Soviets for permission to temporarily seek haven in Mongolia.⁸ So, Smirnov's wish came true, and Mongolia was turned into a supply line for Chiang Kaishek. Ironically, after the Soviet troops arrived, a study done in Ömnögov' *aimag* showed the impossibility of transporting military equipment across the Gobi sand dunes, thus making Xinjiang the primary transport route for the Soviet assistance.

At this time, Frinovski was Deputy Minister for Soviet Internal Affairs. Frinovski began his assignment in Mongolia by calling Chopyak, adviser at the Ministry for Internal Affairs, to a meeting. Tairov, who was the Soviet representative in Mongolia and had returned to Moscow a few days earlier, had been interrogated by Yezhov himself, who managed to extract names of some Mongols out of Tairov. But according to Frinovski, not enough names were on that list, and he demanded that Chopyak supply more from his reserve lists. Chopyak indicated that, although as a result of the Yonzon-hamba case, which he personally managed, and the torture of Pürev, Genden's relative, he had acquired a lot of new names, he was waiting for official instructions to launch the Great Purge.⁹

After that, Frinovski worked with Choibalsan for a few days to produce a list. Although Choibalsan later claimed that it was Frinovski who supplied him with the names of 115 persons participating in a plot, the list was devised by the two men

together. This list, which became the first register of the Great Terror victims, included leaders of the Mongolian state, the party, the military, trade and industry, and public organizations, starting from sixty-seven persons who had been implicated in the Lhümbe case years before to five persons whose names had appeared only five days earlier after Ölzii made a confession. Some days later, Frinovski produced a document which contained Genden's alleged confessions. However, the one hundred and fifteen-person list did not contain Demid's name. The precautions regarding Demid were related to the fact that his name was still popular among the military and the general public, and his posthumous denouement had to proceed slowly by way of confessions of the arrested persons.

Frinovski, in Ulaanbaatar after a trip to inspect military sites in Dornod *aimag*, had this to say at a reception hosted in his honor before his departure to Moscow:

I understand that in your country the counter-revolution is raising its head. It must be eliminated. This year, comrade Choibalsan has been alone in the struggle. Let me raise this toast in hopes that Prime Minister comrade Amar join in assisting comrade Choibalsan.¹⁰

Ironically, Frinovski himself did not survive. As soon as he returned to Moscow, he was implicated in the Yezhov case and was slated to be eliminated.

The Great Purge Begins

The Great Purge was launched on September 10, 1937. That night, sixty-five persons were arrested. Those who belonged to the Mongolian intelligentsia were the first to go—Mend, Yandag, and Elee. Along with them, members of the Central Committee, Lamjav, and Shirnen and members of the Presidium of the State Bag Hural, Ölziibat, Choidogsüren, Battömör. Also, members of the Council of Ministers, Deputy Minister Gombojav, Director of National Trade Ravdan, Director of Capital City Cooperatives Magsar, and Darizav, Malj, Gonchigsharav, Dashzeveg, Adiya, Nyanhuu, and Gombo, all leaders of the Army.

The next day, Choibalsan announced at a meeting of the central staff of the Ministry of Internal Affairs:

Japanese counterspies have been arrested in our country. The Genden group has continued what the counter-revolutionaries under Lhümbe did. At its head were Genden, Mend, Namsrai, Ayush. The state and the party instructed us to arrest these persons who have gone to the extreme . . . You must be resolute while conducting interrogations. You may start with the evidence provided in Genden's testimony. Start tonight. I order that you finish this work in twenty-five days. There is no need to take pity on them. Proceed to unmask them without mercy. They wanted to turn us into a Japanese colony! I tell you to work hard.¹¹

The leaders of the Ministry of Defense were invited in full regalia to visit the Ministry of Internal Affairs where they were led one by one into Choibalsan's cabinet, shown a warrant, arrested, and had their weapons confiscated. They were then transported to prison escorted by wardens.¹²

The Ministry of Internal Affairs performed two functions simultaneously: to investigate and prosecute, and to conduct trials. The Ministry's inexperienced staff was not prepared to handle such a crowd, and all the arrested were subjected to torture. With orders to complete the interrogations and extract confessions in twenty-five days, all kinds of pressure were applied. The methods of torture were modeled after

those tested for years by the NKVD. Under the instructions of the Soviets and with their direct participation, the arrested leaders were made to sit on hot ovens or chairs with nails sticking out of them, they were beaten, threatened, deceived, and their hair was pulled out. They were denied food and sleep for several days, they were kept in the cold and made to sign forged confessions, according to Dr. Vyshinski's "scientific discovery" that an admission of one's personal guilt is the ultimate proof of the crime committed.

Interrogators had to ask seven questions as formulated in a document by Kichikov, the trainer of the political department:

1. When and by whom were you enrolled in the counter-revolutionary organization?
2. What was the purpose of your counter-revolutionary organization?
3. What was your assignment?
4. How did you comply with your assignment?
5. Whom did you personally enroll?
6. What did you do as disruption activities?
7. How did you communicate with your accomplices?¹³

The Red Inquisition was extremely effective. Almost everyone admitted to having participated in the Genden-Demid case and to having been a Japanese spy. Choibalsan reported his successes back to Stalin. In his letter to Yezhov, he wrote:

So far I have arrested a large group of persons who belonged to the top leadership, Ministers and their Deputies, top military officers, important staff members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and other officials of lower ranks. All of them have admitted partially or in full to having been traitors and have revealed their contacts. One hundred and thirty more persons have been identified as the result of their testimonies, which I will study very carefully with all documentation provided. With the assistance of comrade Frinovski, another dimension of the above has been identified—the need to be resolute regarding the counter-revolutionary lamas. To accomplish this, three-person commissions have been set up to try the cases involving lamas' treason and espionage.¹⁴

Three-member commissions or *troikas* had been invented by Stalin to try "criminals" and issue sentences. On February 1, 1930, the first *troika* under the name of a Special Commission was created at the Internal Affairs Committee and included the Chairman Namsrai, Minister for Justice Dendev, and Choibalsan. That *troika*, which existed until March 21, 1955, held 184 meetings and discussed 5,728 person-cases and issued the death penalty to 385 persons. The Extraordinary Commission was the *troika* referred to in Choibalsan's letter to Yezhov, a separate organization created on October 2, 1937, to investigate and to try accused criminals. It included Choibalsan, Luvsansharav, Secretary of the Central Committee, and Tserendorj, Minister for Justice. The Commission was dismantled on April 22, 1939, having held fifty-one meetings and having discussed 25,785 political cases. On the Commission's verdicts, 20,099 people were shot and 5,739 were imprisoned.¹⁵ There were instances when the Commission discussed up to 1,278 cases at a time with all the accused being sentenced to death.¹⁶ The Supreme Court, the Special Commission at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Military Court, and the Extraordinary Commission sentenced a total of 29,198 persons for counter-revolutionary activities. Eight women were among them.¹⁷

The first trial was arranged as a public show on October 18 through 20, 1937, at the Central Theater. Fourteen persons appeared before the Commission with thirteen of

them sentenced to death. The group included Sambuu, Deputy Prime Minister; Lamjav, member of the Presidium of the State Bag Hural; Yadamsüren, State Procurator and Director of the Theater; and Malj, Chief of Staff for the Army. The accused were told that a public admission of guilt would reduce their sentences, which explains their rehearsed testimonies of espionage. Before the sentences were pronounced, the accused were bathed and fed. Later that night, Dogsom, Chairman of the State Bag Hural, attended a circus show where Lamjav's two sons, Natsag and Vangan were performing. Having liked their performance, he issued a Hural's decree to revoke their father's sentence of capital punishment.¹⁸ However, the sentence was carried out at midnight near Ulaanbaatar.¹⁹ The Soviets forced the remaining Mongolian leadership to attend the executions to instill horror in their hearts. Choibalsan, intoxicated, swaggered with his pistol, cursed and shouted revolutionary slogans. He personally directed the executions. In contrast, Prime Minister Amar silently shed tears.²⁰

The Great Purge became a routine. Stalin stepped back from control of the details in Mongolia once he felt that fear was sovereign. Among those who had fallen were twenty-five persons from the top leadership of the party and government, 187 persons from the military leadership, including sixteen chiefs of divisions, ten commissars, six chiefs of staff, twenty-six chiefs of regiments, ten regiment commissars, eight regiment chiefs of staff, two chiefs of corps, two corps' commissars, one corps of staff, four chiefs of brigade and one brigade commissar.²¹ Thirty-six of the fifty-one members of the Central Committee elected by the Fourth MPRP Congress, four of the seven members of the MPRP Auditing Commission, and four of the five members of the Investigation Commission of the party were killed in the purge. Choibalsan was the only surviving member of the Presidium of the Central Committee.²²

Then Choibalsan issued Order No. 221. It stated that military officers implicated in the counter-revolutionary plot could have their sentences of capital punishment reduced if they openly admitted their crimes. According to sketchy evidence, more than a thousand people made admissions of guilt in order to escape the extensive purge.²³ For show, a pardon was granted to the first few who "came out into the open." Later, all were shot in spite of their confessions. To survive, people resorted to strange means. Some committed rape and theft to get jailed for these offenses and thus survived the purge.

Stalin's plan was to have the Mongolian leadership and intelligentsia eliminated with no exceptions for separate individuals. This was why the arrested were tortured and pressured into revealing the names of others also to be arrested and forced to cooperate. It was at the core of the purge to produce an exponential increase in the number of people involved. Commonly, people spoke the names of others out of sheer terror. Mend, who was among the first group arrested, cooperated in naming a large group of persons, including his own relatives, and was fed better and put under special care as a result.²⁴ But even though Mend turned in all his acquaintances under the sun, he did not survive either. He was brought to Moscow for further interrogation and then shot to death by the Bolsheviks in July 1941.²⁵ The Director of the Industrial Combine, "Pürev the Red," also in the first group, cried out while facing the firing squad: "I admit that I committed a crime but there is a bigger one!" He delayed his death by naming a few more persons.²⁶ There were many cases like that. The purge worked by having the top leaders admit their crimes and name the lower ones.

When the Mongolian leadership was persecuted, their families, parents, brothers, and sisters were also victimized. Not only were Demid's father and brothers executed, his

pregnant wife Navchaa was killed. When Shijee was arrested in Moscow, his father, a simple naive herdsman, was arrested in Mongolia.

Lamas and Buriads Targeted

The purge of political leaders was relatively small. The main thrust of the terror was directed against lamas. Although the Soviets had demanded the eradication of lamas since 1924, the Mongolian leadership only verbally supported this policy. Their hearts were not in the elimination of the ecclesiastical class.

But in 1937 through 1938 alone, with Soviet help, 16,631 lamas were persecuted, mostly shot.²⁷ Golubchik, after conducting the purge, reported to Moscow in August 1938:

The top ecclesiastics have been eliminated. By July 20, out of 771 temples and monasteries, 615 have become ash heaps. Today only 26 are functioning. Out of a total of 85,000 lamas only 17,338 remain. Those who were not arrested have decided to turn lay.

He added:

The question of the intermediate-level lamas will be resolved in the next phase of the struggle against the clergy . . . I believe that the time has come to formally launch the campaign against the counter-revolutionary lamas.

The word “lamas” was underlined by Golubchik.²⁸

The plans against mid-level lamas became a reality. The lamas were arrested, interrogated, tried and then shot down in assembly-line style. In 1936 to 1937, three consecutive campaigns were launched against lamas who were then killed en masse. One investigator would interrogate ten lamas with orders to turn their cases in to the Special Commission within ten hours. Some investigators were even rewarded for exceeding the planned target numbers. Banzragch, religious investigator for the Ministry of Internal Affairs, excelled by handling sixty cases per day while on an assignment in Hövsgöl *aimag*.²⁹ Representative Bayarmagnai received the Polar Star medal for having managed several hundred cases in a week.³⁰ Some of the lamas who had turned lay themselves became especially cruel investigators. Haimchig, who used to read prayers in the monastery, came to be known as the “butcher of lamas.” One of the leaders of the purge, Luvsansharav, had also been a lama.

The method of questioning the clergy was routine. The name of a teacher lama would be extracted, then his students would be implicated in a plot headed by the teacher lama; when the names of students were extracted from a high lama, he was implicated for having allegedly enrolled them.³¹ So it was the poor clergy were forced to admit participation in counter-revolutionary activities and become the focus of the ever-vigilant revolution. Luvsansamdan, who worked for the Ministry of Internal Affairs and participated in the purge, admitted in 1962, “Because so many lamas were arrested, the prisons were unable to house them all. So, a campaign began to get rid of them . . . Once or twice a week there would be mass shootings of lamas. Each time two or three truck loads full of lamas would be killed.”³² And this was in Ulaanbaatar where less than ten monasteries and temples stood. There were approximately eight hundred monasteries and temples across the country. In 1992, historian M. Rinchin and others excavated a burial ground not far from Mörön in the Hövsgöl *aimag* where the remains of more than one thousand lamas were found. They were not shot; they were simply struck down with heavy instruments. Some had their necks twisted, and some were subjected to other

sadistic tortures. The bodies remained almost intact in the permafrost ground.³³ Apart from being arrested and killed in Mongolia, lamas were also sent to the Soviet gulag in large numbers. Some of them served in the disciplinary battalions during the USSR's Great Patriotic War; some survived and returned home many years later. In 1938, one of the officials of a Vorkuta Gulag sent a message to a trainer in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which referred to the lamas by saying, "The items you have sent are too old. Please send younger, healthier items."³⁴

Stalin held a special grudge against the Buriads and the Kazakhs who had left the USSR for Mongolia. So, the Buriads who had survived the Lhümbe case were rounded up this time. By 1939, in Selenge *aimag* only ten to twenty males were left among the Buriad communities there.³⁵ In 1940, in Dashbalbar *sum* of Dornod *aimag*, seventy families out of a total of one hundred became registered as families of counter-revolutionaries.³⁶ Choibalsan warned, "Among the Buriads, are many who came here as White Guards to escape the October Revolution. This is why we must be watchful about them being Japanese spies."³⁷ In 1938, a directive was sent to the Internal Affairs department of Hovd *aimag*, "To arrest immediately the Kazakh feudals and the Kazakhs who fled from the USSR," which led to the extermination of 2,000 males from a total of 21,000 Kazakhs from 4,300 families located in seventy-four settlements of two sub-provinces.³⁸ The Inner Mongols who established a People's Party in Inner Mongolia and then fled into Outer Mongolia were not left in peace either. Out of 140 Tsahars living near the Tushigtsaagan lake, only four or five males survived.³⁹

Choibalsan's Next Instructions

In the middle of the purge, Choibalsan was called to Moscow. A medical examination report signed by two Soviet medics, Berlin and Pokrovski, was produced saying:

As a result of comrade Choibalsan's physical and intellectual fatigue, his brain vessels have weakened, his heart arteries and the titan vein have also weakened, requiring that he be treated for three months in Mechest near Sochi in the USSR.⁴⁰

On August 30, 1938, Choibalsan departed Ulaanbaatar. Earlier, the infamous Golubchik had sent a report to Stomonyakov, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, in which he described the preparations: "Choibalsan is busy getting ready to go to the USSR. He is impatient to go to Moscow to have his heroic contribution duly assessed there."⁴¹ In Moscow, Choibalsan saw Yezhov and Voroshilov and reported on his work, then requested a meeting with Stalin. He was sent to Sochi with the promise of a meeting upon his return. In December, on his way back, he stayed for almost a month in Moscow and saw the two Soviet officials again, received their instructions, and paid a courtesy call on his "Godfather." He was told to visit Stalin together with a Mongolian student called Tsendenbal, whom neither he nor the Mongolian Embassy staff were able to find.⁴² Was it an ironic twist of fate? A few years before, when Prime Minister Genden was received by Stalin, Choibalsan served as his interpreter upon the recommendation of the Soviets. Choibalsan was then used to topple Genden. Was it his own turn now?

Choibalsan saw Stalin twice and received instructions regarding the next phase of the purge. Stalin issued an injunction to replace Prime Minister Amar; Choibalsan was to assume the position. Stalin, predator of the twentieth century, also instructed Choibalsan to keep his position of Minister for Internal Affairs and Minister for Foreign Affairs and he had Damba and Nasantogtoh removed from their respective posts of Minister of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.⁴³ In early 1939, on

the eve of Choibalsan's departure, Marshall Voroshilov, the Mongolian "expert" in Moscow, advised Choibalsan on how to implement the recommendations of Stalin. Voroshilov was frank: Amar had to be removed by Luvsansharav, Secretary of the Central Committee, by way of a government resolution saying that Amar had conducted poisonous activities against the state. The mood of the public should be prepared through propaganda and only then should Amar be arrested.⁴⁴ It was high time for Stalin to settle the score with Anandiin Amar, who was so well respected that the Soviets did not dare touch him.

After a five-month absence, Choibalsan finally arrived in Ulaanbaatar at the end of January 1939. As soon as he came back, he busied himself with implementing the assignment given him in Moscow. He did not divulge a word on the prospective changes in the leadership but immediately contacted Skripko, Deputy Head of the Soviet Embassy for more detailed instructions. Skripko, unaware of the plan to topple Amar, instructed Choibalsan to wait till he received a cable from Moscow and had scrutinized all the necessary documents. Skripko urgently contacted Beria, who had replaced Yezhov at the time. Beria, who was not informed on the Mongolian issue, sent a note to Voroshilov requesting clarification of the position that Skripko was to take regarding Choibalsan's questions.⁴⁵

Curiously, it was at this time that Skripko received an incriminating note from Choibalsan's personal adviser Kichikov. He wrote that Choibalsan did not trust Luvsansharav, that Choibalsan was conducting secret activities to have his Deputy Nasantogtohi removed and replaced by his relative Sharav; that his former wife was going to marry Dulamlha Huvilgaan and refused to have intimate relations with Choibalsan; that he brought his former wife a diamond pendant from Moscow worth 20,000 rubles; that he and Golubchik would help themselves to whatever they wanted, including cash, from the warehouse of the Ministry of Internal Affairs that was filled with property and personal belongings confiscated during the purge; that at least once Choibalsan and Golubchik were given 34,000 *tögrög* by the store manager Haimovich.⁴⁶ The facts revealed by Kichikov were all true, but the communication implied that Kichikov was unaware of Choibalsan's new assignment after his last visit to Moscow.

The End of Amar

Amar's trial started on March 6, 1939. A two-day campaign was launched to convince the public of his wrongdoings. An enlarged meeting of the Central Committee and the State Bag Hural was convened. Special passes were issued to the staff of the Ministry of Internal Affairs reading, "The purpose of this one-day pass is to place Prime Minister Amar under arrest. Date: March 7, 1939. Signed: Choibalsan, Minister for Internal Affairs, State Mighty Commander."⁴⁷ So, the Mighty Commander himself signed the order to arrest Amar. As was planned, Luvsansharav began the offensive against Amar. When at the end of his speech he proposed that a resolution be adopted to strip Amar of his membership in the Central Committee, Choibalsan seconded, "I fully support this proposal. A hypocrite who has shown a clean coating with a black soul underneath it corrupted by filth and slime, cannot be tolerated in the party, neither can he be in the Presidium. I move that he be removed immediately from the post of Prime Minister." When the Prime Minister was given the floor, he said:

I knew I would face this horrifying moment . . . My comrades have turned on me. I realize now with no grudge that as a son of a feudal, a former holder of the *beis* title, I had no

ground to stand on, no place to go once the class struggle began and the revolution developed . . . Although I believe in religion, the one thing that I believe in even more is that Mongolia should stand firmly on her feet to become an independent country. I love my country. I have shown this with my work. I have been among the first to devote myself to the cause of my country's development, and my heart is breaking to finally witness myself being called traitor and being subjected to castigation.⁴⁸

For Stalin, Amar was "big game," one of the last and most dangerous Mongolian leaders. The Soviets doubted whether the Mongols could conduct the interrogations successfully and secure the admission of guilt by Amar, who still possessed moral power as an extraordinary political personality. So during the meeting, the head of the Soviet mission, advisers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and trainers were hiding behind the curtains, taking notes, observing and directing the action on the stage with a young graduate of a Soviet institute interpreting for them.⁴⁹

Amar was arrested in the conference hall and transported to the USSR. In Moscow, Amar was handed over to two butchers, Vasiliev and Morozov, who displayed their finest skills in tormenting Amar alternately and finally getting an admission of all possible sins out of him.⁵⁰ Amar was kept in prison together with the very person who had arrested him, Luvsansharav! On July 10, 1941 he was tried by a Soviet *troika* and sentenced to death. It was the 20th anniversary to the day of the revolution in the puppet republic over which he used to preside.

In the speech he made before the court chaired by the infamous murderer Ulrich, he stated:

As for my sentence, I am not guilty . . . If the MPR is an independent country, then I refuse to understand why I am being tried by a Soviet court. I am citizen of the MPR, and I should be tried by a Mongolian court, not a Soviet one . . . It is a lie that I was instructed to eliminate Marshal Choibalsan. It is true that I hate him for organizing the murder of my people. I do not like the USSR, neither do I like the Communist Party. I love the Mongolian people just as I sympathize with the Russian people. I have always been distrustful of the Reds and their government because they have pursued a policy of colonizing Mongolia just like other big powers. I am against friendly relations with either the USSR or Japan for the two share a common border with us. I did try to establish relations with Germany, which is far from us. Till 1926 I maintained good relations with the German Minister for Foreign Affairs; we used to send our students there . . . In the MPR, we have not had any counter-revolutionary groupings . . . The investigations were conducted with such cruelty that many Mongols gave false testimonies, and the truth is that all were innocent.⁵¹

In his last words, Anandiin Amar said, "It is typical that when a big power colonizes a small country, its leaders are arrested and persecuted. My personal experience demonstrates this attitude of the USSR toward Mongolia."⁵² It is still not known where he was killed, nor where the body might be. Some oral evidence suggests that his body was thrown out of an airplane.

NOTES

1. Gombosüren, 1995a.
2. "Protocol of the interrogation of the arrested M.P. Frinovski, on June 19–20, 1939; Archives Investigation, Case #975181." *R. Yanjmaa's private archives.*
3. Agvaan, 1994: 66–31.
4. "Protocol of the interrogation of the arrested M.P. Frinovski, on June 19–20, 1939; Archives Investigation, Case #975181." *R. Yanjmaa's private archives.*

5. Bold, 1995.
6. Bold, 1993: 7.
7. "Protocol of the interrogation of the arrested M.P. Frinovski, on June 19–20, 1939; Archives Investigation, Case #975181." *R. Yanjmaa's private archives*.
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10. Tserendorj, 1989.
11. "From Minister of Internal Affairs Marshal H. Choibalsan's speech at the meeting of Internal Ministry Staff on September 11, 1937," *Üg*, 1993.
12. "Preparation is Completed," *Il Tovchoo*, No. 20, 1991.
13. Dumburai, 1994: 27–29.
14. Erdene-Ochir, 1991.
15. Badarch, 1990.
16. Agvaan, 1991: 58–59.
17. Dumburai, 1994: 102.
18. Gombosüren and Damdindorj, 1991.
19. [This was at Songinhairan, south of Ulaanbaatar. A memorial was erected in 1996. CK]
20. Bayasgalan, 1991.
21. Dorj, 1991.
22. Ichinnorov, 1989.
23. Agvaan, 1991: 60.
24. Lonjid, 1994.
25. *The Memorial White Book of victims of political repression*, 1993: 72.
26. Dumburai, 1994: 13–17.
27. Badarch, 1990.
28. Egshiglen, 1995.
29. Dumburai, 1994: 27–29.
30. Dumburai, 1994; 54.
31. Dumburai, 1994: 27–29.
32. Dumburai, 1994: 33–35.
33. "Report on the excavation conducted by the Political Repression Research Center in 1992, in Hövsgöl Aimag." *Archives of the Political Repression Research Center*.
34. Bayasgalan, 1991.
35. Dumburai, 1994: 39–40.
36. Sanjjav, 1988.
37. Bat-Ochir, 1995: 162.
38. Tsoodol, 1990.
39. Dumburai, 1994: 39–40.
40. Batsaihan, 1994.
41. Egshiglen, 1995.
42. Agvaan, 1991: 74.
43. Gombosüren, 1995d.
44. Gombosüren, 1995d.
45. Gombosüren, 1995d.
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49. Lhamsüren, 1989.
50. "USSR Supreme Court's decision." *Il Tovchoo*. No. 3, 1993.
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THE WAY OF LIFE OF CO-OPERATIVE HERDERS

S. Badamkhatan

Translated by Baasanjav



Involvement in labour in a communal enterprise has become an important criterion in evaluating individuals, as well as a condition for the occurrence of new relations between members of a modern family. The division of labour, which is the foundation of agricultural production, depends in collective livestock breeding and household economy (*ger akhui*) on the abilities, age and sex of the members of a family. Currently, when species-oriented livestock breeding techniques are used in collectives, the meaning of traditional terms such as horse herder, shepherd, and milker has changed. According to our survey in the *Gerelt Zam* (Bright Road) collective there are 66 horse herders, 88 cowherds, 225 milkers and 460 shepherds working. Here is the classification of the workers of the collective according their age (shown in the table opposite).

From the table we can see that people aged 18–44 comprise 66.5% of the workers. This shows that the number of young and middle aged people with proper education is increasing in livestock breeding.

Labour in livestock breeding is organized according to *suur* units, each of which specializes in breeding a single species. This gives the herders the opportunity to focus their potential and capabilities in a certain direction. One of peculiarities of collective herders is that in the contemporary situation members of the same family work together, correctly combining communal interests with private ones. If before, in the times of the folk economy (*ardyn aj akhui*), ordinary herders used to work hard to increase their private livestock, in our time they look after livestock concentrated in *suurs* and have a great responsibility to provide a certain amount of product to the state.

As techniques of livestock breeding are being developed based on the abundant experience of the people, a form of cultural heritage is seen clearly in the division of labour of the herders. For example, men in a *suur* are involved in various occupations that require physical strength, such as moving livestock to other pastures, looking after large cattle (*bod mal*), cutting hay and wood. Rearing young animals, looking after small livestock (*bog mal*), cutting wool and hair are work to be done jointly by all members of the family. Women are usually involved in household economic activities, such as milking state as well as private livestock, feeding them, making milk products and preparing meals, raising children (in which men also participate), sewing and so forth.

In organizing the labour of contemporary herders in social production, the principle of taking into account a person's abilities and assigning work to him or her accordingly is applied. The fact that enterprises are provided with additional help as needed during

Negeld ajillagsad – collective workers

<i>Branch of the Collective</i>	<i>Number of workers</i>	<i>Under 16</i>	<i>16–17</i>	<i>18–24</i>	<i>25–34</i>	<i>35–44</i>	<i>45–54</i>	<i>55–59</i>	<i>60–64</i>	<i>65 and over</i>
Animal husbandry: Total	916	1	25	208	178	230	132	85	37	20
Male	432	0	16	100	7978	98	66	40	19	14
Female	484	0	9	108	99	132	66	45	18	6
Auxiliary production: Total	140	0	3	8	36	50	34	8	1	0
Male	59	0	0	2	9	33	11	3	1	0
Female	81	0	3	6	27	17	23	5	0	0
Agriculture: Total	20	0	0	1	2	6	5	5	1	0
Male	13	0	0	0	2	4	3	4	0	0
Female	7	0	0	1	0	2	2	1	1	0
Administrative staff, personnel: total	20	0	0	0	1	4	5	11	0	0
Male	16	0	0	0	0	2	3	11	0	0
Female	4	0	0	0	1	1	2	0	0	0
Cultural sphere and service, total:	12	0	0	0	1	3	1	6	1	0
Male	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
Female	9	0	0	0	1	3	1	4	0	0
Collective workers, total	1108	1	29	220	226	291	188	95	38	20
Male	523	0	16	104	94	137	94	44	20	14
Female	585	1	13	116	132	154	94	51	18	6

hard seasonal work plays an important role in the development of cooperative labour and the further consolidation of the collective ideal and consciousness. Now, let us examine the division of labour in animal husbandry based on the example of *suur* herders who work in collective social production. Horse breeding is one of the hardest jobs for men, and requires that a horse herder have knowledge about all of the horses in his herd as well as special herding techniques. In 1974, Begz Sharav (thirty-nine years old), horse herder of Ölönt brigade was looking after 338 horses of his collective. His family consisted of six members – his wife B. Davaasüren (thirty-four years old) and four children, among them Choijisüren, a student in the fourth grade, Anhbayar (six years old), Anhtuya (five years old) and Sonombaljid (one year old). Begz, the head of the family, was a full-time horse herder in this horse breeding *suur*, while his wife Davaasüren was working as an assistant herder. They are in the habit of counting their horses by stallion-headed herds. Early in the morning, the horse herder arrives at the place where horses spent the night, counting them while they are calm and then gathers them.

Begz's *suur* spends the winter in Shivertai near a cow farm, the head of which is Sambuudanzan, living with them as *ail saahalt* (neighbours). In winter their horses are usually kept in the pasture. During that time Begz looks after and guards the horses along with the horse herder Petr. In the daytime it is important to put horses out to proper pastures, keep them calm and give them water twice. Davaasüren also has to check the horses frequently. During foaling time, as some mares happen to reject their foals, it is a woman's job to feed the rejected foals with milk from other mares. Woman sew belly-bands, horse-cloths and halters for new born foals; they also feed tired animals. During the winter shepherds are assigned to help watch the horses. Particularly when foaling time approaches, it becomes important to watch them constantly. Therefore the brigade's adviser makes a special schedule to provide horse herders with additional help for twenty-one days.

During the summer gelded horses are tended in open pastures in high lands where there are fewer flies and mosquitoes, while mares are separated and are kept outside the *gers*. Milch mares graze in the vicinity, joining the herd at night. The herd is not guarded at night. The horse herder leaves his *ger* at 4 or 5 a.m. to check on the herd. During the milking period, assistant herder Davaasüren keeps fifteen mares and milks them from seven to ten times between 7 a.m. and 8 p.m. every day.

In autumn horses should not be driven harshly and are supposed to be pastured in low places with plenty of water. The horse herder collects the herd in the evening and leaves them unattended at night to return the next morning at 5 or 6 a.m. During the day, the herder watches the herd from the distance, but occasionally may go to round them up. If the herd is nearby, a woman may also help; for example, she may separate the milch mares from the rest of the herd. In the autumn, pastures are not changed frequently. The herd, including mares, are pastured on salt marshes, which is usually seen as men's work. Horse herder Begz trains from seven to ten unbroken horses a year. Cutting the mane and tail is usually organized by the brigade and is carried out by a group of people.

Let us examine a small livestock (*bog mal*) *suur* based on the example of Galsantseren's *suur*, which has ewes and goats. In 1974 this *suur* looked after female animals and their lambs and kids. Out of a total of 1165 animals, 458 were females with offspring. The *suur* consisted of three families that had a total of six to eight working-age people, all of whom were members of the collective. M. Galsantseren was the chief of the *suur*,

and whose family consisted of eight members, six of them children. The oldest daughter Enkhtaivan, an assistant shepherd, had an incomplete secondary education, and the other three children were attending school. The family had eleven sheep, eight horses and five cows as their private livestock. The other members of the *suur*, namely the families of Jamyansüren and Chimeddorj also possessed private livestock. This *suur* has winter quarters with a warm *khashaa* (livestock enclosure) in a place called Baga Övöljööonii Am where it stays from the beginning of November until the middle of February. During the winter, the men take turns pasturing the livestock while the women feed weakened livestock and make preparations for the approaching lambing season.

At a distance of 10 km from the winter quarters there is a place called Ar Hush which serves as the spring quarters. This place is inhabited from the middle of February until the beginning of May. Besides a warm *khashaa*, there is also a shed consisting of three sections for young animals. Nearly 70% of the fodder that was prepared in the summer is stored in the spring quarters. During lambing time, which lasts for forty-five days, all members of the *suur* participate in lambing and work shifts. Lambs are reared by the *khöröv arga* method and it is the responsibility of the person on duty to follow the lambing ewes.¹ To look after sheep and goats is mainly a man's job, while women are usually involved in feeding livestock by hand and taking care of the young animals.

From the beginning of May until 10 June the *suur* of Galsantseren divides into two parts, each of which grazes livestock, covering small distances. During this time zoo-technicians and veterinarians stamp the left ear of the young animals and castrate the male ones.

In the middle of June the families of the *suur* re-join and move to the summer quarters. There they make a *khashaa* with light, thin boards to use during shearing as well as for milking. Women and children milk and make milk products. Any member of the *suur* may participate in shearing.

From the middle of July until the middle of October the shepherds graze their livestock in the summer and autumn pastures. In 1974, during this season Galsantseren, with his assistant Törbat, changed pastures frequently. They had with them two cows, three horses and a road *ger* (otrin ger).

When shepherds are away, their families live together, not far from each other. They are occupied with various daily tasks, such as looking after private and state livestock that had not been sent to pasture for different reasons and participate in hay-making and other useful activities for the collective. When the shepherds return home, the families separate and move to their own winter quarters.

Let us now have a look at the division of labour in a dairy farm, headed by D. Battsagaan of Khan-Öndör brigade. The 180 cows of the farm are attended by ten families. There are ten milkers, two cowherds and one calf herder in the farm. The chief, Battsagaan also works as a cowherd. The milkers milk and send the cows to pasture, following a special seasonal timetable. A milkmaid's work includes: giving additional fodder to calves, cleaning the *khashaa* and surrounding areas, stacking the dried cow dung in a pile, regularly changing the flooring of the calves and cows' pen that is made with packed dried dung, looking after the cows for which she is responsible, sewing, embroidering, and fulfilling the milking plan. At night the cowherds take turns looking after the cows in the pen. But during the daytime they continuously herd and water the cattle. The duty of a calf herder is to herd the calves and bring them back to the pen.

Thanks to such a division of labour in state enterprises, both communal and private interests of collective members are being developed equally.

In collectives, the labour achievements of herders are celebrated widely and winners of various competitions are rewarded materially as well as spiritually. For instance, in the *Gerelt Zam* collective the names of the foremost people who have worked there for a long time are kept in the Book of Honour. Herders who successfully fulfilled a plan are rewarded with various prestigious titles such as, Champion of Rearing Young Animals, Herdsman with a Good Herd, Champion of Wool and Hair and Hay-field Champion. In addition, there is a custom in the collectives to celebrate labour achievements of successful workers by rewarding them during holidays, meetings and brigade days, when they are given the privilege of holding the banner of honour, and are also invited to the table of honour.

For example, in 1977 three people in the collective received awards in the competition of rearing young animals at the national level, twenty-eight people received awards at the aimag level and 147 people at the sum level. Two *suurs* received certificates of Herdsman with a Good Herd and nearly ten people were awarded various state medals and governmental certificates of honour. In 1978 three state champion breeders of young animals, two aimag champion milkers, two sum-level 'herder with a sound herd', two sum champion-breeders of young animals and two sum champion-milkers worked in the collective.

The most important thing to improve both labour activity and the consciousness of collective herders is socialist competition. In order to improve production competitions began to be held among the brigades and *suurs*. The movement for socialist labour, which is the highest form of socialist competition, became widespread among herders. This movement is different from other socialist competitions in that it encompasses other spheres far beyond material production.

At the present time, in the *Gerelt Zam* collective there are nineteen brigades of socialist labour with 336 members and two brigades for socialist labour with twenty-five members, which exert an influence on the attitudes of the collective members towards labour, which, in turn, is an important part of the socialist life-style.

At the 17th Congress of the MPRP Comrade Tsedenbal noted the importance of 'all members of our society working and studying in accordance with the socialist principle and putting into practice the socialist lifestyle'. This decree finds reflection in the life of the members of the collectives. Participants in the movement assume obligations not only to improve production but also to improve their general as well as political education, to struggle with the remnants of the past and to live on a friendly and collective basis. The movement for socialist labour in *Gerelt Zam* is becoming increasingly widespread. One-quarter of all herders working there are already involved.

In order to understand how the movement for socialist labour develops, let us look at a dairy farm, of Bort brigade, headed by Janlav. Members of the brigade first gave themselves the goal of working together according to socialist principles. In doing so they undertook various obligations and instructions related to livestock herding, profits, rearing of young animals, fodder preparation and preventing diseases, all of which were fulfilled successfully with proper results.

The farm consults with *suur* herders about the timetable for using the winter, spring, summer and autumn pastures. Cattle are constantly moved to pastures and brought back to the pens, one of which is used during winter storms and situated in a place called Dologiin eh-Shanluu and the other, used during warm days, is located in

Havstgaitin am-Gulstgait. The two valleys behind the winter quarters are used during the calving period. Cowherds Pürevjav and Tömörchödör have improved their technique of looking after the cattle and thus managed to fatten their cattle beyond the average size. In Pürevjav's herd, 86.3% of new born calves survived, while the rate of calf survival in the herd of Tömörchödör is up to 92.1%. The following milkers managed to rear young calves safe and sound: Sügjlham reared fifteen calves from fifteen cows, Doljinsüren reared eight calves from eight cows, Lhamjav reared ten calves from ten cows and Dejidmaa also reared fifteen calves from fifteen cows. Milkers Sanjaa J., Lhamjav S., Doljinsüren J., Puntsagdulam L. over-fulfilled their milking plans. The farm fulfilled the plan by 97.3 %, receiving from each female yak 420.5 litres and 335.5 litres from each Mongolian cow.

The amount of hair and wool turned over to the state also exceeded the plan. Instead of the planned 166 kg of hair shed by cows, 226 kg were given to the state. Instead of 127.7 kg of hair from the mane or tail 134.8 kg were given. 313 grams were obtained per Mongolian cattle and 736 grams of shed hair and 520 grams of mane and tail hair were obtained per yak or cow.

In order to increase the amount of milk, the milkers benefited from the experience of a milker of the brigade, Jidhüü, an aimag champion, and began to massage the mane and give additional fodder to cows from fifteen to thirty days prior to calving time.

In order to eliminate various infectious and non-infectious diseases the herders followed the directions and advice of veterinarians and carried out the following measures: they bathed the cows three times, bathed the calves in the summer and autumn, and carried out the *düüst* treatment in the autumn. As a result mange was eradicated, and the rate of unnatural cattle deaths also decreased. The cows in the farm were inseminated artificially with 90% success.

A spring *khashaa* for young animals and fodder barns were constructed through cooperative measures. The following items were also made or prepared: eight troughs, six fences, fifty-six hashaa sections, ninety-four belly-bands (for new born animals), seven covering cloths for two-year old calves, four feeding-bottles, twenty-four kg of candles, seven lanterns, eighty-three calf-collars, 100 kg of ground barley, eight kg of bran, nineteen kg of salt, thirty kg of soda, sixty-five kg of silage, 400 black wood logs, three carts made of black wood, one building for young animals, one Red Corner [used for propaganda/recreation] made of tarpaulin, five straw brooms, eighty-seven kg of industrial oil, 575 marmot skins, 310 ground squirrel skins and 110 kg of antelope meat. Three of the seven men at the farm delivered the livestock for the state, while the other four remained behind to work. Each milker prepared from 70 to 120 kg of vitamin-enriched fodder.

Secondly, members of the brigade undertook an obligation to study. Here are the names of the people who assigned themselves the task of obtaining elementary knowledge (*baga medegch*): Ayushjav, Lhamjav; fair knowledge (*dumd medegch*): Myadag, Huvbor, Doljinsüren, Chimeddavaa, Dejidmaa; good knowledge (*sain medegch*): Garmaa, Hürlee, Lhamjav S., Dzomuu, Chojjav; 4th grade education: Tömörchödör, Sühhürel, Pürevjal, Janlav, Lhamragchaa, Punsaldulam, Sügjlham. As all members attended the *suur* school to improve their general knowledge and literacy; it had a good effect on their education.

All members of the brigade received basic knowledge of zoo-technology and veterinarian skills; they also built a sports ground and took part in different kinds of sport. In addition, everybody received basic training on the accordion and mandolin. A brigade

chorus was set up which has sung three times in the brigade centre and twice in sheep and cow *suurs*. This received general approval.

Each member of the brigade received notebook to write about books they read, songs they learned, films they saw and lectures they attended.

Thirdly, seven families received white outer coverings for their *gers*, every family received two or three small chairs, at least two iron beds and a sewing machine. Eighty percent of all members purchased a radio and many families repaired the wooden frame of their *gers*. The farm built a public bathroom in the winter quarters and some members learned basic skills in hair dressing and other professions as well.

Members of the brigade consume potatoes, turnips, and cabbage and they learned from brigade member Ayushjav how to bake bread.

From the above mentioned we can see what kind of division of labour there was among the milkers, what they did, how they worked and what achievements they have reached in cultural and educational activities. On the other hand, we can also see clearly that animal husbandry has evolved these days into a production process which entails many activities, encompassing much more than just increasing the number of livestock.

Although the method of livestock breeding in the *Gerelt Zam* collective is that of nomadizing, which was passed down from the times of the 'folk economy' (*ardyn aj akhui*), this method has changed not only in form but also in content. The peculiarity of labour in animal husbandry is that it has cycles during the year which are repeated the next year. The migration of herders has become more organized and regulated thanks to things such as the establishment of fodder bases in the collectives and the *suurs* having concrete winter and spring quarters, almost all of which have *khashaa* and shelters. As herders began to breed their livestock according to the characteristics and needs of each species and exploit pastures using scientific knowledge, this has brought about a prominent change in their labour activities.

NOTES

1. The khöröv arga method entails letting the lambs remain in contact with the ewes, rather than separating them. Ed.

THE EIGHT-HUNDREDTH ANNIVERSARY OF CHINGGIS KHAN

The Revival and Suppression of Mongolian National Consciousness

J. Boldbaatar



Mongolia experienced a particularly difficult period during the late 1950s and early 1960s, as an atmosphere of unpredictable self-criticism appeared following Stalin's death. Various views were aired on how to eliminate the ill affects of Stalin's and Choibalsang's so-called cult of personality, how to democratize Mongolian society, and how to further the economic development of the country.¹ During this era there was a revival of Mongolian national consciousness. Major Mongolian leaders, including Prime Minister Yu. Tsedenbal, were worried by this unexpected revival, because it threatened to grow into a national movement. The government's concern was best shown by the renunciation of the ideas and decisions of the fourth Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee Plenary Meeting (1956), which had suggested developing democracy and encouraging creative activities among the populace.²

The Mongolian government thereafter sought ways to suppress the national movement toward pluralism. For example, Tsedenbal first invited scholars and intellectuals from city, state, and public organizations, as well as from the universities and research institutions, to share their ideas on the MPR's future development. After labelling their views as "intellectual confusion,"³ however, the MPRP CC Politburo condemned these recommendations as "views incompatible with our Party policy," a decision that was then later "praised" at the fifth Party Central Committee plenary meeting.⁴ As a result, the thirteenth MPRP Congress also announced that these views were incompatible with Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism and condemned them as a "revisionist ideology" aimed at undermining the party's long-time policies.⁵

Although the national consciousness movement suffered a severe setback, especially when the MPRP CC passed a resolution blaming several well-known scholars—including writers and artists—for their "non-class" approach to Mongolian nationalism, it was revived in 1962 when the question arose of how to celebrate the eight-hundredth anniversary of Chinggis Khan. Using Chinggis as their symbol, Mongolian intellectuals and artists sought to reawaken a sense of national consciousness among the Mongolian people.

THE CONCEPTION OF THE CHINGGIS ANNIVERSARY

With the approach of the eight-hundredth Chinggis anniversary, Mongolian scholars and intellectuals began to debate how to celebrate the Great Khan's anniversary. It was unclear whether the government would agree to a public celebration, since that smacked of pan-Mongol nationalism, but during the summer of 1961, J. Tsedenjaw, Head of the MPRP CC Ideological Department, informed the historian, Sh. Natsagdorj, that a public celebration of the khan's anniversary had been approved. It then became possible for this question to be openly discussed among historians, journalists, and linguists.

In December, 1961, the eight-hundredth anniversary was discussed at a meeting of the Learned Council of the Institute of History, the Academy of Science. Several speakers noted that the celebration was both of historical and political importance, since it would promote proper appreciation of the Mongols' contribution to world history. Thus, the Council of the Institute of History passed a resolution to mark the anniversary during August 1962, drafted a plan, and handed it to President of the Academy of Sciences, B. Shirendew.

On January 8, 1962, D. Tsedew, the Director of the History Institute, wrote to Tsedenjaw, the then Head of Party CC Department, requesting a rapid resolution on the celebration of the Chinggis anniversary. The MPRP CC Ideological Department nominated B. Liguu and Tsedew to draft a Politburo resolution, which they soon did. After this draft resolution was issued, Tsedenjaw proposed an amendment to the resolution by attaching the MPRP CC Politburo's decision from October 27, 1949, entitled "The Teaching Situation of MPR History and Literature in Schools," which clarified that Chinggis was a feudal leader, and so not an appropriate role model for the MPR. Tsedew argued against this amendment, and at a February 8, 1962 Politburo meeting the following exchange occurred:⁶

Yu. Tsendenbal:	The erection of a Chinggis monument in Ulaanbaatar should be eliminated.
L. Tsend:	It is advisable to include into the agenda the reason for celebrating the Chinggis' anniversary, by explaining state policy at that time, his wars, and other questions.
D. Tömör-Ochir:	The Academy people think that it is best to show equally both the good and bad sides of Chinggis.
Yu. Tsendenbal:	They should be included.
N. Jagwaral:	There was an idea to define the party's view about Chinggis. During the meeting D. Tömör-Ochir read us the October 27, 1949, resolution of the Politburo.
Yu. Tsendenbal:	We should note the party position when passing a resolution on the eight-hundredth anniversary. But we should also say that the 1949 resolution was faulty.
B. Liguu:	We should pass the recently proposed resolution. It would be better to give our assessment after exchanging views with scholars.
N. Jagwaral:	The present resolution contradicts the 1949 resolution.

D. Tömör-Ochir: It should be mentioned that Chinggis was a founder of the Mongolian unified state who fought to overcome the disjointed feudal situation.

Yu. Tsendenbal: I think the ideological department should be assigned to make appropriate amendments to the previous resolution.

In this manner the MPRP CC Politburo approved the resolution entitled “On Celebrating the Eight-hundredth Anniversary of Chinggis.” This resolution included provisions on the date of the anniversary—June 10, 1962—and on the erection of a monument in Chinggis’s birthplace.

The ideological department was also requested to submit to the Politburo its views on amendments to the MPRP CC PB resolution No. 56/104 from October 27, 1949 on how to teach the history of Chinggis in schools. The anniversary program adopted at this meeting included the organization of a scientific conference, the creation of a monument in Delüün Boldog palace, the issue of a special series of “Chinggis Khan” postal stamps, and the printing of books and articles, etc.⁷

The actual celebration, however, clearly depended on prior approval from the Soviet Union and, to a lesser degree, the agreement of the People’s Republic of China. This was because both countries had formerly been invaded and dominated during the thirteenth century by the Mongols under Chinggis Khan; in Russian history this period was often referred to as the “Mongol yoke,” while in China it was called the Yuan dynasty.

Tsedew, the director of the Institute of History, contacted his counterpart in Moscow’s Institute of Oriental Studies, S.D. Dylykov, to inquire whether the USSR was planning to celebrate the Chinggis anniversary. Soon afterward, the academician Sh. Bira was sent to Moscow to study the situation. He discovered that most Soviet scholars, including the Academician L.M. Maiskii, Professor N. Ya. Merpert, V.T. Pashuto, and L. V. Cherepin, were against celebrating the Chinggis anniversary, and considered Chinggis simply as a conqueror and oppressor. Only L. Gumilev came out in support of the anniversary, but his views were generally suppressed.⁸

Ch. Dalai, the secretary of the Institute of History, traveled to China to assess their views. He discovered two prevalent opinions: 1) Chinggis and his successors were responsible for oppressing Asian people;⁹ and 2) the period of Mongol rule in China had hindered progress within Chinese society.¹⁰ Still, other opinions suggested that Chinggis had helped break down national boundaries, and by creating an enormous international empire, had played a positive role in Chinese history.

The government of the PRC quickly authorized a celebration of the Chinggis anniversary. It had a political goal, however, and this goal was discussed during February–April 1962 in China’s principal historical journal “*Lishi yanjiu*.” In one article, Shao Xunzheng, for example, argued that celebrating the Chinggis anniversary reemphasized China’s and the MPR’s historical relationship, and in so doing reaffirmed that the territory of Mongolia was “an inseparable part of China.”

Although the PRC’s interpretation of the Chinggis anniversary no doubt caused great concern among Soviet and MPR officials, refusing to celebrate the Chinggis anniversary in the MPR—while the PRC supported such celebrations in Inner Mongolia—was now out of the question. Therefore, planning moved forward and an Organizing Committee was soon formed to implement the resolutions of the MPRP’s Central Committee.

PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR THE CHINGGIS ANNIVERSARY

The Organizing Committee convened its first meeting on March 28, 1962, and determined that the Ministry of Culture should make a documentary about Chinggis's life, and that copies should be distributed internationally with subtitles in Russian, Chinese, English, and French.¹¹ The next day, it was decided that a commemorative stamp should be issued.¹² Finally, after an exhaustive study by Mongolian historians and astrologers at the Gandan monastery, who had collected documents in Mongolian, Chinese, and Tibetan, it was determined that Chinggis was really born on May 31, 1162, and the Politburo agreed that the formal celebration should be changed to May 31, 1962.¹³

The dating controversy was taken so seriously that both Tsedew and Dalai were upbraided for allowing the Institute of History to issue the wrong date. In fact, May 31 was an important anniversary in its own right, since it was on this day in 1924 that the USSR and China had formally opened diplomatic relations by agreeing that Mongolia might retain its autonomy, even though officially Outer Mongolia remained a part of China. Although it is difficult to know for sure, perhaps the MPR sought to remind Moscow and Beijing that Chinggis had already achieved Mongolian independence centuries before the Sino-Soviet treaty.

Once the date for the celebration was set, it was then necessary to determine what political spin the events would promote. This responsibility was initially given to the Academician Natsagdorj, who wrote a draft speech entitled "Chinggis: The Founder of the Mongolian National State." When the first draft was discussed it was decided to emphasize mainly the progressive characteristics of Chinggis, and simultaneously deemphasize his vicious personal nature. Later, additional changes were made to include more information about the Mongolian people who lived at the time of Chinggis's rule.

The final draft of this important document was discussed on May 22, 1962, just a week before the celebration. Most of the Politburo and government members, including L. Tsend, Ts. Dügersüren, Tsedenjaw, and Tömör-Ochir, agreed that the tribute should be published, but Tsedenbal—perhaps concerned about possible Soviet or Chinese criticisms—warned: "No doubt Chinggis was a great political figure of Mongolia, a capable leader and a founder of the Mongolian Unified State, but we shouldn't forget about his vicious activities. We should not forget that he caused hardships for people and destroyed human civilization. You should pay special attention to this in the article."¹⁴

As late as May 29, 1962, the Politburo was still fine-tuning the Chinggis tribute in an effort to temper anything that might embarrass or upset Russia or China. Thereafter, on the morning of May 31, just one hour before the speech was to be broadcast, the Soviet embassy passed on last minute changes that had just been received by radio from Maiskii in Moscow. According to Natsagdorj's account: "I made notes on the phone from Yondon [Tsendebal's secretary], including some ideas in my article although most of it was similar to mine."¹⁵

The tribute was finally ready. When it was published in the newspaper *Ünen* it bore the title "Chinggis Khan: Founder of the Mongolian Unified State." The title alone proclaimed to the USSR and China that Mongolia's independence dated back some eight hundred years. More importantly, in addition to timing the celebration exactly on May 31, 1962—the thirty-eighth anniversary of the Sino-Soviet Treaty—the final section of the tribute pointedly ignored this treaty by referring instead to the Mongolian revolution of 1921: "Forty years have passed since the establishment of a new socialist

Mongolia, [which] owes its principles of peace, friendship, and justice to the people's revolution instead of to the feudal state first founded by Chinggis. The Mongolian people are strengthening and developing unbreakable friendship and unity with the brotherly socialist countries with the same ideology and the same goals [based] on principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. They are fully determined to build socialism and communism in their Motherland."¹⁶

THE SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE

A second major issue during the anniversary celebration was where to hold the scientific conference honoring Chinggis. Three possible plans were discussed. The first was to hold the conference in the enormous hall of the Great Khural [Parliament], an act that implied government sponsorship of the event. The second proposal was to hold it in the public library in Ulaanbaatar, which implied a grass-roots campaign to honor Chinggis. The final proposal, and the one that was eventually carried out, was to hold the conference in the public library, but to have the Academy of Science be the official sponsor of the conference.

Shirendew, the President of the Academy of Sciences, formally opened the conference and his speech discussed how it was the responsibility of the conference participants to determine the true historical role of Chinggis. Natsagdorj, the director of the History Institute, then presented his tribute, in which he described Chinggis as wise, daring, an excellent organizer and leader, and an impressive military commander. However, Natsagdorj made it clear that even though the history of Chinggis was linked forever in the minds of Mongols with Mongolian independence, Chinggis was a feudal lord whose primary support came from the noble class; therefore, Chinggis should not be considered a true national hero.¹⁷

Even though the official line at the conference was that Chinggis supported Mongolian independence without necessarily supporting pan-Mongol nationalism, this distinction became somewhat blurred during the rest of the conference. For example, when Bira, a history Ph.D., presented a paper entitled the "Great Law of Chinggis," he made it clear that not only did this legal code include many different laws, but that these laws were compiled from a great number of sources: "[The] thirteenth century Mongolian unified state was a well-organized, civilized feudal state, with strong laws not only [from] Mongolian tribes."¹⁸

Later, Dalai, a senior researcher at the Institute of History, discussed how the historiography of the Mongol state under Chinggis encompassed a vast range of literature, including books written in Mongolian, Chinese, Arabic, and Persian.¹⁹ Academician Ts. Damdinsüren, in his speech on historical accounts of Chinggis, criticized several Russian historians for their generally negative accounts of Chinggis; in particular, he questioned one Russian historian's view that Chinggis was unclean, rode poor quality horses, and had married an ugly wife!²⁰ Meanwhile, N. Ishjamts, who later became an Academician, criticized China's claim that when Chinggis wanted to live longer, he turned to a Chinese doctor for help. Instead, Ishjamts said that this was merely a ploy to help extend Mongol rule over China: "When Chinggis invited the Chinese alchemist, the Daoist Changchun, [it was] not aimed at extending his life, [but was] only aimed at using his political authority and knowledge of all of China and to draw him to his side."²¹

Finally, the well-known historian and writer H. Perlee presented a paper on the importance of folk tales in studying the Chinggis legend. Since the conference professed to be a scientific meeting, even discussing folk tales smacked of Mongol nationalism. Perlee cautioned that historians needed to be careful when using folk tales, but if what the tales reported corresponded to actual traditions and beliefs then they could be an important source of historical information.²²

Soon after the conference was over, it was attacked by various groups as supporting Mongolian nationalism. One of the first criticisms came from the Soviet Embassy, which accused Natsagdorj of having said that Mongolia had been admitted to the U.N. not because of Soviet support, but because of Chinggis; Natsagdorj later defended himself by explaining that his speech never said this, but merely stated that once Mongolia was in the U.N. many countries' representatives knew that Mongolia's independence could be traced back to Chinggis. Other criticisms were leveled at Damdinsüren, because he had referred to specific Russian historians and to their biased descriptions of Chinggis. Perhaps the best proof that the MPR government considered the scientific conference to be subversive was that publication of the conference materials was forbidden.

THE CHINGGIS MONUMENT

Soon after planning for the Chinggis anniversary was undertaken, a team of three specialists—the historian D. Gongor, the sculptor L. Makhbal, and the architect W. Awirmed—were sent to Dadal Sum in Khentii province to determine where to build a monument to Chinggis. By this time, the Institute of History had already determined that Chinggis's birthplace was close to the junction of the Onon and Baljy rivers, close to Delüün Boldog, at east longitude 111° and northern latitude 49°. This three-man team's main job was to determine exactly where the monument should be built.

After investigating the area, this team selected a hillside just 2 kilometers from the center of Dadal Sum and only 211.20 meters from the legendary "Chinggis's heart" which was close to the middle of three lakes. The team listed several reasons for choosing this location, including the nearness to a conveniently placed guest house, the natural beauty of the local scenery, and the correspondence of this location to the setting in which local folk tales said Chinggis was born.

On April 9, 1962, the local party committee in Dadal Sum discussed the plans for a monument and passed a resolution entitled "Concerning the Place of Erection of the Chinggis Monument." In this resolution, the local party members noted: "From ancient times, local people have talked about how Chinggis's birth place was near the middle lake of the three lakes in front of Jantsonhoploo mountain. According to local legend and the advice of researchers from the Academy of Science, party members decided to erect the Chinggis monument on the north side of the middle lake and south of the central square of the rest house."²³

The sculptor Makhbal began the task of erecting the monument. It was not completed by May 31. Instead, it was unveiled at 10:00 a.m. on July 3, 1962. Hundreds of tourists and local people had gathered for the unveiling. Adiya, head of the administration in Khentii province gave the keynote speech, stating that because of Chinggis's abilities as a statesman, commander, and organizer, the various Mongol tribes united under his leadership into the independent Mongolian Unified State. As a result, he

said, Chinggis held an “important role in the development of Mongol society and the Mongol nation.” After the ribbon was cut, and the monument was unveiled, a plaque in the old Mongolian script on the front was seen to read: “Let my body be tired, but my state never be exterminated.” On the other side, the monument proudly proclaimed: “Erected on the Eight-hundredth Anniversary of Chinggis Khan.”²⁴

The Chinggis monument was the first public acknowledgment of the role Chinggis had played in creating the Mongol state. Not only did it express the Mongols’ pride in their long history of nationhood and national independence, but it quickly became a symbol for the revival of Mongolian national consciousness. Later, after the Chinggis anniversary had been condemned, Tsedenbal ordered the monument to be torn down. But the local administrator—Adiya—prevaricated, claiming that destroying the monument might also damage the nearby guest house. As a result, the monument remained unscathed.

THE AFTERMATH OF THE CHINGGIS ANNIVERSARY

The celebration of the eight-hundredth Chinggis anniversary was a very important event for developing a greater historical understanding of Chinggis and his times. It also contributed greatly to the growing sense among the Mongol people of their own national consciousness, as well as contributing to calls for a pan-Mongol reunification with other Mongols in the Soviet Union and China. This nationalist movement caused great concern in the MPR Politburo, however, since Mongolian nationalism was clearly in conflict with the chief principles of proletarian internationalism, which were challenged by heightening East-West tensions over Southeast Asia, Berlin, and Cuba. As a result, by August 1962, the tide had turned against the Chinggis supporters, and the MPR government began to take firm steps to forestall the nationalist movement.

On August 2, 1962, the MPRP CC Politburo discussed the special Chinggis stamps that had been printed to celebrate the anniversary. Some 25,000 stamps had been printed at a cost of 1,100,000 tögrögs. To avoid accusations from their socialist brethren, it was decided not to distribute the stamps further; stamps that had already been sent to capitalist countries, however, were allowed to remain there to be sold.²⁵ Tömör-Ochir was blamed for this debacle, and on September 10, 1962, a special MPRP CC Plenary meeting was convened to discuss his responsibility for the nationalist movement.

According to a letter sent out to party members after this plenum, Tömör-Ochir was accused of being a “vanguard” of the nationalist movement. His specific crimes included attempting to erect a Chinggis monument in Ulaanbaatar, wanting to have the conference in the Great Khural’s main hall, inviting the Politburo to attend the celebration, and trying to overturn earlier Politburo resolutions, such as the 1949 resolution on how to teach Chinggis history in schools. All of these actions showed that Tömör-Ochir supported “nationalist” ideologies in opposition to the “internationalist” philosophy of the party.²⁶

Other culprits were also identified, as the Politburo called in the other major organizers of the Chinggis anniversary to make self-criticisms of their actions. These included Tsedenjaw, the head of the MPRP CC Ideological Department, researchers like Tsedew and Dalai, and the Academician Natsagdorj. Finally, even the speakers at the Chinggis conference, such as Academician Damdinsüren, were questioned with regard to their nationalist sentiments.

The anti-nationalist repression instigated by the MPR sent a clear signal that the era of Mongolian national consciousness was over. This change closely corresponded to the Soviet Union's deepening problems on the international scene, most importantly the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962, and the ever-deepening tensions with China following the Sino-Soviet split. Clearly, the Soviet government felt threatened by the possibility that the Mongolian nationalist movement might also accelerate out of the MPR government's control. In the end, therefore, the energy and effort that were put into the eight-hundredth Chinggis anniversary were squandered.

THE MONGOLIAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

Although the immediate impact of the Chinggis anniversary was diminished, the Mongolian nationalist movement continued to be a factor of Mongolian life. In 1963, for example, the fifth MPRP CC condemned the CC's second secretary, Tsend, for attempting to apply wrong-headed lessons of the USSR's anti-cult of personality movement in Mongolia. Under the leadership of Tsendenbal, many important Politburo members were pushed out of power, including Tömör-Ochir, the former head of the party, and Tsend, the former second secretary. Tsendenbal clearly used the struggle between nationalism and internationalism to increase his own power.

By the mid-1960s Tsendenbal had overpowered his opposition and put himself firmly in charge of the MPR government. All thoughts of revering the Mongols' unique past ended, and even memories of the Chinggis anniversary began to fade. In the end, however, when the Mongolian government did finally fall, it turned out that the Chinggis monument had in fact outlived its opposition. Even though the nationalist movement in the early 1960s was crushed in infancy, it undoubtedly played a crucial role in keeping Mongolian nationalism alive, so that it could express itself yet again in the tumultuous events surrounding the Mongolian nationalist revival some thirty years later.

NOTES

1. Choibalsang was one of the leaders of the Mongolian Democratic Revolution in 1921. He later led the MPR's Ministry of Internal Affairs during the Stalinist political purges of the 1930s. Later, he was Prime Minister, 1939–52, and was called by the Mongol people the "Mass Leader."
2. Until 1990, the MPR only had one governing party. At the 4th plenum of the MPRP CC (1956), resolutions were passed supporting the USSR CP's 20th congress and calling for greater democracy and criticism of the government.
3. The Central Archives of the MPRP (CAP), F-4, D. 23, HM-21A.
4. *Mongol Ardyn khuwisgalt namyn tüükhend kholbogdokh barimt bichgüüd*, Vol. 2, (Ulaanbaatar 1967), p. 404.
5. *Mongol Ardyn khuwisgalt namyn XIII ikh khurlyn material*, (Ulaanbaatar, 1958), p. 104.
6. CAP. Fond of inside work/sorten FIW/HN-7–149, pp. 69–70.
7. CAP. f-4, d-26, hn-4.
8. I.M. Maiskii "Chinggis Khan" *Voprosy istorii*, 1962 (5), pp. 75–85; N.Y. Merpert, V.T. Pashuto, L.V. Cherepin, "Chinggis Khan and His Legacy," *History of the USSR*, 1962 (5), pp. 92–119; R.V. Viyatkin, S.L. Tihvinskii, "Some Questions of Science and History in the CPR," *Questions of History*, 1963 (10), pp. 3–20.

9. *Renminribao*, August 10, 1961; *Guangming ribao*, January 21, 1962.
10. Yu Yan, *Story of Chingis Khan*, (Shanghai, 1956), pp. 85–97.
11. CAP, f-4, d-26, hn-4.
12. CAP, FIW. t-2. hn-7–156, p. 149.
13. CAP, f-4, d-26, hn-5.
14. CAP, FIW, t-2, t-D, h-1, hn4–24.
15. Ibid.
16. *Ünen*, May 31, 1962.
17. CAP. FIW. t-D, h-1, hn-4–9.
18. Ibid., hn-4–10.
19. Ibid., hn-4–11.
20. Ibid., hn-4–15.
21. Ibid., hn-4–12.
22. Ibid., hn-4–16.
23. Ibid., hn-4–19.
24. Ibid., hn-4–22.
25. Ibid., hn-7–68, p. 204.
26. CAP, 4, hn-A1–15.

BÜÜ MART!

Baabar

Translated by Sühjargalmaa



A PERSON WHO'S FORGOTTEN HIS MOTHER

When I was a child, I came across an expression in a book. It said “Hungry enough to eat a whole horse”. Right! A famished one has got to imagine mountains of food.

Since then, depending on how hungry I am, I would find myself craving a sheep, a rhino with a horn on its nose, a water buffalo or even an elephant or a whale.

And then, in Mark Twain’s “The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn” I bumped into a funny expression that reads: “to be hungry is to be able to outrun a fox”. Why on earth outrun a fox? With so many bison roaming his country, wouldn’t he, if that hungry, want to gulp down a bison?

The translator of this book was Sh. Ochirbat. Fascinating he was, who later also “mongolized” such works as *The Good Soldier Schweik* and *Anna Karenina*. Thanks to him we Mongols started wishing, when hungry, to become so fast as to overtake anything instead of just swallowing something big. Eventually I learned that the rhino with a horn on its nose should be called just “rhino” (a camel’s hump or humps are taken for granted and we don’t say “humped camel”, do we?), and that the proper name for the water buffalo is *aramana*.

Every language has a logic of its own. This logic, used and perfected by many generations of people, is rooted in the given nation’s unique culture, history, traditions, economic activity, nature and environment and many other such factors, and hence has qualities of its very own.

This means that writing or uttering only Mongolian words and shunning any foreign word doesn’t necessarily make it truly Mongolian. There has to be Mongolian thinking behind all that. However, what we have become today is a people who are ready “to eat a whole horse” when feeling hungry.

The Mongolian chicken stopped go-googo-ing and started kukareku-ing (sounds like a real human word, doesn’t it?). A cow says “moo-moo” and a sheep says “be-be”, the translated books teach our kids. A Mongolian pig should say “hru-hru” and Mongolian frog only “kwag-kwag”, the low-minded *Zaluuchuudyn Ünen* (Youth’s Truth) newspaper

answers a reader's questions from its pages in a know-all manner. The mouse has been scraped from the list of the fearful animals to be replaced by the wise rabbit.

We are all now chattering about high development, high speed, high success, broad opportunities and if anyone dares to talk about poor success, slow speed, failed development, foul opportunity we all criticize. Of course, from a principled party standpoint.

In the end, there is nothing wrong with saying "to live on Peace Street", "carry out an examination" or "for the sake of our motherland". But saying a red tooth brush (teeth aren't red), a broken child's ear (a child can't be broken), or a single-fur/hair (*gants üstei*) robe (a fur usually has more than one hair) is funny, right?

"May I deliver the greetings of the day. Sorry, I'd like to ask you something. I happen to be a correspondent of the Mongolian television. You are golden-handed, your friends say. And you are also said to have asked for the hand of Altantsetseg, a top-notch worker at your shop.

Sorry, then we are requesting you to tell our TV viewers about this. Thank you".

No foreign smell coming from "children of zero to 1 year of age", "a pair of pants", "a blind coin", "adolescent farm animals", "the devil take you"? In your speech, do you use geographical terms for the directions, or do you say turn right or left?¹ When counting, do you start bending your thumb or the pinky? Do the corners of your mouth go down, arms sidewise and shoulders to your ears when you mean to say "I don't know"?

The very basis for any nation to claim it is a nation are the NATIONAL LANGUAGE AND NATIONAL CULTURE.

If these two are lost, a nation loses its right to exist. Any nation's language and culture are living organisms that are related through close or not so close ties to other languages and cultures, that evolve by absorbing all kinds of inflows from without and that send out flows of content and form from within.

But only because all this commotion is well-controlled to prevent overwhelming the unique national features, can we distinguish between "the language of that people" and "culture of that land", can't we?

If an inflow engulfs a nation, causing it to lose the ground under its feet, that nation is done away with as a NATION. Because the Egyptians (*Misir*), creators of a world's earliest civilization and statehood that strengthened and flourished on the banks of the NILE river, had lost control of the onslaught of the Arab language and culture, the modern Egyptians, their flesh and blood, have come to be perceived as Arabic people, speaking Arabic and with Arab culture. Only thanks to lone researchers who dug into the Egyptian tombs for dozens of years we are getting now an idea of the language and culture of the ancient Egyptians (*Misir*).²

Where are the Manchus who had been shaking the world in medieval times? Related to us through their language, culture and ethnicity, they could not withstand the Chinese's (*Nangiad*) "SLOW BUT STEADY" current and reportedly no Manchus could be found to populate the puppet state of Manchukuo created by the Japanese (*Jiben*) on the eve of the last world war.³

History furnishes many lessons proving that if a nation, despite the worst of the worst that may come to their lot, manages to preserve its NATIONAL LANGUAGE

AND NATIONAL CULTURE, the other things such as territory, statehood, freedom, independence, development, prestige, happiness can be regained, sooner or later.

Bulgaria, Czech, Croatia, the countries that had been wiped clean off the European map, look like they have been able to acquire their precious independence in this century thanks to the fact that their ordinary people have cherished, protected and passed down their native languages and cultures to their children.

The Jews, persecuted and discriminated, and living through a zillion sufferings, but preserving their language and culture, have built the state of Israel again after 2,000 (2,000! No less!) years. Therefore, apart from being things that provide identity, language and culture virtually vivify a nation.

There is a Mongolian tale that tells of an immortal iron hero. Neither an arrow shot nor tempered steel could cope with him. But a witch told his enemy about the weakest spot in the man. So, the enemy killed this unbeatable hero by striking through his navel, a place that once connected him with his mother.

Language and culture are exactly the navel. Hit and strike from all the sides to no avail at all, but try doing that to the navel. . . . This is something the Chinese have learned since long ago. Never good at combat, they would lose just like that in the battlefield, but poking “slow but steady” at the aggressor’s navel and draining him of vitality, they would emerge victorious.

A Chinese historian wrote “However gratifying had been the liberation of China from the hands of the Japanese by the allied forces at the end of the World War, this event was extremely negative from the perspective of our history. Had things remained as they were, in 100 years maximum even the Japanese themselves would have been gone, to say nothing of their aggression.” That’s how Chinese thinking goes!

So, it’s good the Yuan dynasty had come to its end. Otherwise there is no way of saying what would have happened to us! But to think of that, our ancestors were way smarter than us.

The point is that they took good care of the navel. They not only proclaimed Mongolian the official language and prohibited writing official documents in Chinese but also took numerous measures in order not to be absorbed in that culture. Later both Chinese (*Khyatad*) and Mongols came under the Manchus. It didn’t take the Chinese (*Nangiad*) too long to overcome the Manchus who were so careless about their navel.

But then why couldn’t they take out the Mongols, their traditional enemy with whom they were already sleeping? One factor was our boundless Gobi that held China and Mongolia apart and that couldn’t be crossed easily at the time for large parties to come and settle down.

On the other hand, the forever navel-seeking Chinese were well familiar to the Mongols who took care to protect the most sensitive spots. It was not for nothing that Confucianism was banned and religion was brought from as far as Tibet. The hairdos of married women, a child’s *soosgoi*, the [traditional] brazier and other things and legends and symbols have always reminded us of the need to protect the navel.

Thanks to you, our wise forefathers, we are still paddling and paddling on . . .

For centuries on end we have withstood the Chinese face to face, and developed the INSTINCT to protect ourselves.

But from the back . . .

Yes, the back has no navel. The enemy is taken on face to face and common sense starts working on its own to guard the soft spots. And how it is with the friends? You face your friend for an embrace, but do you protect against a friend?

WE TURNED FACEWARD TO OUR RUSSIAN FRIENDS FOR A MIGHTY EMBRACE.

For three hundred years they had been advancing from beyond the Urals to help the weak, underdeveloped folks to fight their enemies, embracing those folks and getting closer and closer to the heart of Asia. Thus came our turn.

4. “PEOPLE’S REVOLUTION”

I am putting these words into inverted commas on purpose. The reason is that whether a people’s revolution took place in Mongolia in 1921 is a disputable issue, to say the least. As mentioned earlier, the Chinese eliminated Mongolia’s autonomy and broke the Khiagt Agreement. This agreement in fact was detrimental to Mongolia in many of its aspects.

First of all, the independence found in 1911 was lost. The so-called autonomy resulting from this Agreement applied only to Outer Mongolia, not to the whole of Mongolia including Inner Mongolia. However, in some sense it was beneficial too.

Even if the attempt failed this time, an opportunity was taking shape to gain real independence with the help of Russians.

Having autonomy was much better than having nothing, and the distance with the eternally threatening Chinese (*Khyatad*) was growing bigger while that Russians were getting closer. So, the bad news was Chinese (*Nangiad*) malevolence, and the good news was Russian benevolence! But very soon events started taking an unexpected turn. Revolutions followed one after another in Russia and our hero, the Russian tsar was toppled from his throne. A civil war (this reminds me of a poorly translated term for the civil war. We keep forgetting that the word “citizen” used in it also has the meaning of “internal subject” or “Chinese person”.) broke out in Russia leaving no space for the Mongolia issue. Taking advantage of these developments the Chinese troops invaded Mongolia, putting an official end to her autonomy.

Who to turn to for help? The previous patron was gone. Ask the new Soviet government? Or the faraway Japanese country? Or the super powerful America on the other side of the ocean? Or . . . or the White Russians, deprived of power but still fighting? America was too far, and unbeknownst at that. Turning to the loser vagabonds was improper. So, the choice left was either Soviet Russia or Japanese.

It didn’t matter who as long as they were of help in getting us out of the hands of China (*Khyatad*). The interest of Japan (*Jiben uls*) was to create a PAN-MONGOL STATE. This state was supposed to comprise Buriatia, Barga and both Outer and Inner Mongolia. Why explain that for the increasingly strong Japan who was positioning herself on par with Western powers, gaining a well-controlled foothold between

China and Russia and thus harming both was an important strategic concern? But this option proved its attractiveness to the Mongols in Russia and China whose hope for independence was illusory rather than to Outer Mongols who were on the brink of either regaining or losing their independence. This is why the Barga and Buriads set up a pan-Mongol government in Chita with the help of the Japanese and without participation from Outer Mongolia.

Outer Mongolia was thinking along different lines. They understood that the idea of a Pan-Mongol state was too unrealistic albeit pleasant sounding. The two neighbours, powerful as they were and no matter what government they had, would've never allowed such damage to their interests. Such an ambition would've destroyed an opportunity for Outer Mongolia to have her independence. It would have left her with nothing!

The statement by Soviet Russia of her willingness to recognize Mongolia's independence resounded in Niislel Khüree [the capital, which would become Ulaanbaatar], fortifying high hopes.

Everybody from Bogd himself and down to the man in the street understood that this statement implied Soviet Russia's promise to help Mongolia free herself of China's hold. The leading intellectuals of Mongolia received this signal and started quietly forming their networks which these days we erroneously describe as "revolutionary", stopping just short of calling them "Marxist".

The extreme secrecy in which these networks operated was dictated not by a strategic vision to facilitate the debate on whether it was the fear amongst the lamaist clergy or rather the feudal lords of a potential popular government and thus facilitate the birth of science and culture in the future Mongolian People's Republic but by the anti-Mongol attitudes of the troops of the Chinese Republic who had broken in and held sway over politics in the country.

The Chinese equally well understood the implicit meaning of Soviet Russia's statement. But torn apart by the internal strife, they had too little capacity to reach across the Gobi and bring the Mongols to heel. If their troops, though numerous in number, were to be routed by some external force they wouldn't have been able to prop them up or send more troops. Therefore the occupationist contingent was all on its own to keep things in order in Outer Mongolia. And the Mongols had no option except to look beyond their borders for help.

Khiagt was the most probable entry point for foreign aid and therefore the most troops had been stationed there.

The idea of relying on foreign assistance emanated from Niislel Khüree and therefore any suspicious activity was under a strict ban there.

The ideological leader was Bogd Gegeen and therefore he was placed in isolation.

Liaison between Soviet Russia and Mongolia could be provided by ethnic Russians or spies under the guise of these, and therefore Russian immigrants were persecuted.

The Chinese expectations were correct and developments unfolded exactly the way they saw it. The only thing they failed to do was to carry out Beijing's orders.

The secret networkers established contacts with the spies among the immigrants, received orientations from them, wrote a petition on the instructions of Bogd Gegeen, had his seal stamped on it and made it to Russia via Khiagt.

The real masterminds of the “people’s revolution of 1921” met them in Irkutsk.

What was the essence of the scenario these masterminds had ready in their hands? The scenario reflected the twenty years of the struggle Bolsheviks waged against tsarist rule, the very process of the October Revolution, the culture of the relations with the colonies or the underdeveloped neighbours of the former Tsarist Russia, their policy towards the backward nations or ethnic minorities who were now subjects of Soviet Russia, the **RUSSIAN CHAUVINISM** ingrained in their blood and flesh, that is.

So, taking stock of it all, they set themselves the task of accomplishing a **REVOLUTION** in a year. However, unlike what they thought, the actors in this play were not a tribe small as the Khamnigan or the Tsaatan who could be fooled with a trifling thing and robbed of anything.

Who stood before them were the leading thinkers of a people who had a 2,000 year history of statehood, invented a whole new practice of state politics and stood at the beginning of the powerful Seljuk, Persian, Great Mogul, Turkic, Golden Horde and Khulegun [Il-khanate] empires.

But Russian politics was a tested thing, they had under their rule the Armenians with a 4,000 years old history. Forget about 2,000 years!

Bodoo, Danzan, Chagdarjav, Sükhbaatar, Choibalsan, Losol and Dogsom are the first seven. They were brought together by an overwhelming aspiration for national independence. They were the leading representatives of their people at the time. However different from the point of view of their origins, age, wealth, social status, temperament, education and personal beliefs, these seven people were not as different as our ideological amateurs would paint them, some of them immaculate like gods and others ugly and stupid clowns.

Doesn’t the explanation of the unconvincing attempts our ideologists still undertake to present Sükhbaatar and Choibalsan as the only leaders lie in the fact the rest were simply executed later on?

There was no select leader among these seven. They had only one goal of requesting assistance from Russia’s new government in saving their Mongolia from the hands of China! They were ready to agree to any condition to obtain this assistance. What was Lenin’s stance on the issue? Led by his firm belief that socialism would win sooner or later, that the victorious proletariat could provide the backward countries with a shortcut to it and the sooner the nations threw off the oppression by the ruling classes and headed towards socialism the better, he approved of the rules of the game devised in Irkutsk.

While the situation was taking shape in such ways, a Petrograd-educated Togoo of the Tagna Uriankhai tribe suddenly entered the scene with a proposal that the Uriankhai should join the Great Russia. Embracing this happy idea could not serve the image of the new Soviet Russia. Such a strong desire could surely find its fulfilment any time, later on, couldn’t it? For the time being let’s make the revolution in two places by leaving Mongolia independent of Russia and then **DIVIDING IT INTO TWO REVOLUTIONARY COUNTRIES**. This was the decision tabled by Irkutsk.

Our delegation agreed to it in return to the promise of assistance. **NOTHING COMES FOR FREE, NOTHING!**

Then something happened that demanded speedy action from Irkutsk. A White Russian force beaten by Red Russians and led by an ambitious Baron Roman Ungern von Sternberg had fled into Mongolia. His Russian chauvinism fuelled by an overblown ego and his mind upset by the defeat he had suffered from the Red Russians, this Baltic aristocrat of German descent declared himself a liberator of Mongolia. He was gaining quite a name among Mongols by driving the Chinese out of Niislel Khüree, setting Bogd Gegeen free of his home arrest and reinstalling him on the throne. Seeking favour with the Bogd Gegeen government and receiving from it asylum, he started patching up his troops with Mongol recruits with a far-reaching plan to strike again at Red Russia. He gave the grand name of “Asia Cavalry” that matched his ego to his troops and managed to forcefully recruit a considerable number of Mongols.

The fact that the Baron was winning greater support among Buriat and Barga Mongols rather than among Khalkh Mongols should be attributed to the geographic spread of the same Pan-Mongolistic ideology.

This turn of events by no means served the interests of Irkutsk. The Baron staying in a foreign country with the permission of its government and reinforcing himself for a counterstrike presented an immediate threat. Saving of Mongolia from the Chinese domination not by Soviet Russia but by White Russian left-over forces who were winning people’s recognition constituted a longer-term threat. And the ultimate threat would be a potentially hostile government that might be established independently of Russia in the neighbouring Mongolia!

Guided by these considerations Irkutsk accelerated the work of conceptualizing and organizing the people’s party. If the refugees formed a government in Mongolia’s territory and it “developed” into a Provisional Government and then it would formally turn to the Soviet Russia for help everything would have to go in compliance with the rules of international relations. What a nuisance!

The knowledge of international norms and standards in Irkutsk was such that it created a great confusion in the history textbooks of later days and in the heads of their readers alike. On the 18th of March of 1921 an event took place in Khiathta that puzzles people to this date.

What happened was that 400 Mongol troops armed with what might be called clubs and a mere four machine guns routed ten thousand Kuomintang troops, well equipped modern army forces as they were! And those 400 soldiers were not regular troops but mere herders from the border region.

The battle resulted in ten Mongolian casualties and the attack on the Chinese troops was not a surprise one. Instead it followed a ultimatum sent the day before. A miracle worth of a fairy tale, isn’t it?

The talk about Mongols being good at fighting and the sight of blood igniting them, and the Chinese being bad at fighting and the sight of blood making them lose heart, as well as the history of Chinggis Khan’s less than a million strong mounted troops trampling half the world underfoot, and the legend about the mightiness of a patriotic heart, the heroic feats of the Revolutionary Partisans, quick perception of Commander Sūkh [i.e. Sūkhbaatar], fantastic tactics of the Mongolian People’s Party and the cement-like alliance between the Party and the People that the official propaganda

brags about cannot convince a sound mind of what had supposedly taken place on that day.

The words that reach my ears to the effect that it was Russian troops clad in clerical outfits and ordinary clothes that Mongols had been able to collect in several months from the people along the border seem to be closer to truth.

My intention is not to prove a lie, only to remind us of the need to try to think logically. Well, anyhow the further developments took place all in accordance with the scenario.

The Red Russian troops led by Commander Tömörbaatar arrived at the invitation of the Provisional Government based in Khiathta to take care of the White Russian remnants. This “resulted” in the proclamation of a People’s Government in Capital Khüree on the 11th of July of 1921.

A month later a “people’s revolution” was won in the remote Uriankhai land and Tanu-Tuva, a state never heard of before, came into being.

In less than a year the red Russian troops completely did away with the White Russians scattered all over Mongolia and returned home. Whatever may be said on the matter, the Russians delivered us from Chinese [*Khyatad*] rule.

11. US

Eventually we came face to face with PERESTROIKA. Given the fact that not every generation of humans becomes party to a revolution, and that perestroika was helping to set our minds straight and that a golden opportunity was opening up to get ourselves out of a quagmire, WE WERE A LUCKY LOT. One who has suffered earns happiness, our ancestors used to say.

A shrub that’s eaten grows green again, the jaws that ate turn to dust, they also say. “Time has come to give people happiness” J. Badraa writes. Yes, we have come to light from a deep dark. We’ve seen suffering!

We were forced to rejoice in our happiness amidst our suffering and that proves that in addition we were made a laughingstock!

Yes, time has come to make our people happy. But how? is THE question. Finding the right answer to it would a real blessing.

Why have the Swedes had a stable government for the past fifty years while the Italians who live in the same continent and have the same faith, similar social organization and nearly identical constitution have dismantled forty governments in the forty years since the World War?

Why did the Mexican revolution result in a democracy that makes things happen according to the law and elections while Bolivia, also a Latin American country, has had 200 coups in 200 years?

Why does one part of the Korean people divided by war achieve tremendous development and emerge as a world leader in the production of sophisticated things like computers and other electronics and cars while the other part is yet to manage an adequate production of simple things like door locks or pens?

Why did the Hungarians stand up and find their way out of a horrific crisis of 1956 while Poland which was hit in the same year keeps on having crises every four to five years?

Why did the socialist revolution win so easily in Cuba and not so easy in Nicaragua, lose its way in Salvador and crashed in Bolivia?

Why does a socialist China produce a typewriter tape of good quality, a socialist Czechoslovakia one of so-so quality and a socialist USSR one of really bad quality?

Country Specifics

We also need to define our own country specifics and find a way that suits those specifics. Only thus can we **BRING HAPPINESS TO OUR PEOPLE!**

We need a development strategy that takes account of our geographical location, climate, nature and environment, social organization, economic capacity, our traditions and cultural levels, negative and positive experiences, history and other such objective and subjective factors.

In the absence of such a strategy we, copy-catting everything others were doing, had hit the wall many a time.

Several times more and nothing will be left of us! The Russian saying about measuring seven times and cutting once is true, believe me!

No arguing Russia's warm support and generous help

In 1921 they delivered us from China. In World War II they protected us from the imperialist invasion. Not a few times they acted as the guarantee of our independence. Often came to our rescue when we found ourselves in dire straits.

In the past seventy years they provided a truly immeasurable economic assistance. Unfortunately little had been made of it since we had built an economic system that held nothing, like a leaking pail.

Greatly contributed to making us, people who had been far removed from the civilization of the twentieth century, educated and cultured. Disregarding or negating all this would be an act too shameless and improper.

But ignoring that all this was imbued with Russian chauvinist ideology would also be an act of extreme blindness and innocence!

De Gaulle's words "A people doesn't have friends, it has only its best interest" may have a cynical ring to them but remembering the message, even if rarely, would not hurt.

For 500 years humanity has been debating the verity of Machiavelli's pronouncement to the effect that "politics and morality have nothing in common". What seems to be clear is that in its past history mankind hasn't come across politics of high morals. In any case the philosophers share an opinion that Machiavellism was, is and will be a political theory and practice of an undemocratic state.

Nowadays we are engaged in a critique of the mistakes made by Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev, and nodding our heads in a conclusion that were it not for these errors everything would've been spic-n-span. But the thing is that if viewed from Machiavelli's perspective. **THERE WERE NO MISTAKES EVER MADE!**

The policies they pursued in relation to the small, underdeveloped countries Mongolia included, contained no errors and deviations whatsoever!

It has been a purposeful, intended policy of Chauvinist Russia!

What is further to be expected, what will happen tomorrow? Who knows! One thing clearly to do seems to be the protection of our navel at all times.

The latest fad in Moscow is to laugh their heads away at jokes about Chukcha, a polar reindeer people. What a lot to be a silly, stupid, uncultured, primitive and backward Chukcha!

The conclusion prompted is:
They are stupid and we are smart!

But the Chukcha never rode their reindeer to hinder the traffic in the streets of Moscow. It's the Russians who broke the peace and calm of the Chukcha life, took away the reindeer pastures and willed to become masters of their land. Even American Indians whose fate is a recognized epitome of discrimination, have tribal lands of their own (of course, not the good ones – they were swindled of the best – but still their own) and if a white American wants to use those lands the issue is that of commerce and due compensation. Meanwhile the Chukcha have absolutely no control over their pastures and the issue is that of a Russian governor commanding them:

“Now move out, we are building a bitumen plant here!”

The jokes calling a people dark and stupid seem to be reflective of a specific national attitude.

There has been much propagandistic bragging about how these people were transported from a primitive kin society straight to socialism but the fact is that their national specifics and best interests were the last thing Russians ever cared for.

Whether in Moscow or Beijing, **LET THERE NEVER BE A FASHION TO SHARE JOKES** about a dying tribe called Mongols!

NO ONE EXCEPT US WILL EVER LOVE AND PROTECT OUR HISTORY, CULTURE, LANGUAGE AND THE TRADITION!

**NEVER FORGET!
OTHERWISE . . .?!**

Moscow, 1988–12–30

NOTES

1. In this section, Baabar is contrasting Mongolian and non-Mongolian practices. For example, directions are giving using “left” and “right” in Mongolian, but – which Baabar glosses over

- these also translate as “east” and “west” respectively: although to complicate matters. Baabar does write what could be translated more literally as “to the left hand” and “to the right hand”. Ed.
2. Bawden’s dictionary simply gives “Egyptian” as a translation of *Misr*, which the translator identifies as an Arabic word. Ed.
 3. Here Baabar uses “Nangiad” for Chinese, rather than *Khyatad*, the more standard word, which Baabar does use for the country China. “Jiben” for Japanese/Japan is a usage I can not document elsewhere. These are the words that are translated as “Chinese” and “Japanese”/“Japan” unless otherwise noted. Ed.

DEMOCRACY COMES TO MONGOLIA

Christoper Kaplonski



By most accounts, it was the very solidarity that was a trademark of socialism that brought about its end in the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR) in the winter of 1989–90. Following the Soviet Union in policy, as it had for almost seventy years, the leadership of the MPR faithfully followed it into the confusion and upheaval of reform and democracy. Sending students to study abroad in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the socialist regime had unwittingly sown the seeds of its own destruction on fertile ground. The students came back from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union not only with university degrees, but, having been exposed to the fledgling opposition, they also brought back ideas of democracy and freedom.

Ganbaatar, one of the founders of the MSDN (*Mongol Sotsial Demokrat Nam* – Mongolian Social Democratic Party) recalled the impact this had:

From the beginning of the 1970s, the people who brought back true information about the world were always students. During this period, I was a student. [The real situation] was completely opposed to what we had learned about European culture. During the seven years I studied [in Eastern Europe], my view of the world changed . . . When people of that time learned about European culture, they weren't satisfied with the Mongolian condition. They didn't sympathize with the one-party ideology.¹

This exposure to the situation in Eastern Europe was limited, but powerful in its effect. It was no coincidence that most of the key opposition leaders had been educated outside of Mongolia. In an ironic twist of fate, it was often their very positions as the children of intellectuals or Party functionaries that offered them the opportunity to study abroad.

Drawing in part upon the expectations of the former students, during the winter of 1989–90 the reform process that had been started by MAHN at the 19th Party Congress in 1986 erupted into open and vocal discontent. It was a heady time, but a frightening one as well. The protesters, led by young intellectuals and students, were not sure what would happen as they stood in the bitter winter cold, when temperatures of –20°F or colder are common. Tiananmen Square surely came to mind to some. Ganbat, a member of the Foreign Ministry in 1993, recalled the feelings of the time: “People were not used to this sort of thing. Almost everybody had [some] hesitation whether this government will arrest anybody. Everybody used to have some fear.”² Despite their fears, and the fact that the army was indeed called out to confront the protesters later in

the spring, democracy came relatively peacefully to Mongolia, and ultimately with the support of the ruling party. No shots were fired, and no lives were lost.

From the earliest stages of the process, the links between reform and the past were made clear. MAHN sought to distance itself from the excesses of the recent socialist past and new approaches to Mongolian history became not only permissible but even desirable. As most Western observers were quick to point out, the opposition also made early and visible use of historical symbols, especially Chinggis Khaan. While MAHN had opened the way for such discussions, they did not take decisive advantage of many of the opportunities afforded them, ultimately leaving it to the opposition to do so. Given the simple fact that Mongolia had no history of multiparty politics, it was far from clear who could and would most effectively lay claim to the past. MAHN was by no means to be written off at this stage. Indeed, given their power, influence and existing organizational structures, one would have been forgiven for expecting they would wield the symbolic upper hand.

Oddly enough, most works on Mongolia dealing with the post-socialist political and economic landscape pay scant heed to the democratic revolution itself. Bruun and Odgaard, in "A society and economy in transition," reduce the first five or so months of the democratic revolution to three sentences, which note the formation of the Mongolian Democratic Association, "a series of demonstrations in the capital," and the amendment of the constitution (1996: 28). The introduction to the section "Mongolia today" in Kotkin and Elleman's edited volume, *Mongolia in the Twentieth Century*, sums up the tension, fear and excitement of the democratic revolution by noting that "In 1990, Mongolia broke with the USSR, eliminated one-party rule, and embarked on a revolutionary path of political and economic liberalization" (1996: 183). Bulag's work on nationalism and identity (1998), which includes a discussion of the new national symbols and issues surrounding the adoption of the new constitution in 1992, only refers in passing to the "protests" of 1990.

Yet the scope and importance of the democratic revolution cannot be underestimated. The revolution was more than just "a series of demonstrations in the capital," although these were the most visible and prominent aspect. There was a storm of activity, uncertainty, debates, demands and counter-demands that took place during those few months of late 1989 and early 1990. While Ulaanbaatar was the focus of the activity, as the seat of the national government, the democratic organizations soon had branches in other parts of the country. The hunger strike in Sühbaatar Square in March is well known, but what is almost unknown outside of Mongolia (and probably not well known there, either) is that another hunger strike was staged in the city of Mörön, in the western province of Hövsgöl a few weeks later.³

For an understanding and a timeline of the events, one has had to either piece one together from various articles or be able to read Mongolian. I will thus spend some time discussing the democratic revolution itself, as it serves as a key point in Mongolian conceptions of history and identity. In doing so, I shall focus on the first few months. The first public protest took place in early December 1989, and by mid-March 1990, the reigning Politburo had resigned, and soon after, the first multi-party elections were announced. The key elements in the collapse of the old socialist system thus occurred within a four-month time-span. There was still much to be done after the spring of 1990, including actually holding the elections, the establishment of the new government and the writing of the new constitution. These events, however, are

generally not viewed as part of the democratic revolution itself, and so I treat them more cursorily. I end my discussion of the democratic revolution somewhat arbitrarily on 3 September 1990, when the democratically elected People's Great Hural opened its session. I will return to a discussion of history-related issues in government debates later in the book.

In the chapter that follows, I will continue this focus on the democratic revolution. There I examine some of the issues related to the unfolding of the events and their use of historically charged symbolism, such as the historical parallels that were used to discuss and frame understanding of the events, both during the winter of 1989–90 itself and in later reflections. This chapter will help to clarify and underline the point that the relationship between politics and history is mutual; that previous ideas about history are important in conceiving of and talking about political events, and in turn these events affect interpretations of the past.

THE EVENTS

As with any such series of events, it is impossible to put forward anything as definite as a single date for the starting point of the reforms. An outside observer could well argue for MAHN's 19th Party Congress in March 1986, which is where we will begin our account. It was at this congress that the need for change in socialism as it actually existed in Mongolia was officially acknowledged. As we shall see, while MAHN laid the groundwork, it was the protesters who brought about the most substantial changes. Although now imbued with a certain degree of coherence and purpose, accounts from the period reflect the uncertainty and hesitancy with which the changes were carried out. At the time, the outcome was far from certain. Something momentous was happening, but quite what it was wasn't always clear. Nor was it clear if it would end peacefully or in bloodshed.

Reform, paralleling *perestroika* and *glasnost* in the Soviet Union, began in the mid-1980s under J. Batmönh, the general secretary of MAHN and chairman of the Presidium of the People's Ih Hural (in effect, the head of the government). The 19th Party Congress, held in March 1986, addressed issues of openness, but within the socialist context. It was not intended to be the beginning of the end of socialism. It was rather a critique of the excesses of some of the phases of socialism; an ideological housecleaning, similar to Gorbachev's early reforms, or perhaps Khrushchev's move away from Stalinism in the late 1950s. As Batmönh phrased it in his speech at the congress when talking about the Party's "theoretical thinking:"

[T]heoretical cognition and generalization of the practice of socialist construction have fallen behind present-day requirements. It would not be an exaggeration to say that nowadays the development of social sciences in our country does not go beyond the framework of simple propagation of commonly known truths.

A new approach should be adopted to analyzing and generalizing the experience of socialist construction, studying and solving many social, political, economic and cultural issues arising from the country's life. It is high time to direct the efforts of social scientists and social science centers at moving over onto a more complex stage in the creative scientific quest. The method of creative discussions which facilitates finding a truth and acquiring an appreciation of theory should be intensified within the scientific community.

(Batmönh 1986: 97)

In this passage, we see hinted-at acknowledgements that things have to change, but, as of yet, not the abandonment of socialism itself. Indeed, up until almost the very end, MAHN and the government were to interpret reform as an attempt to save socialism and rejuvenate the economy, much in the manner of Gorbachev. This stance was to be maintained until the very end of the socialist period. In July 1989, official publications were still referring to the 19th Party Congress in the context of developing “Marxist-Leninist scientific ideology” (Altantsetseg 1989: 3). If the winds of change were blowing, it appeared – at least to MAHN – to be no more than a breeze.

This reluctance to abandon wholesale socialist rhetoric was not limited to MAHN. During the early stages of the democratic revolution, the goals of the protesters were also to be described in terms of socialism. While this may have been a tactical move, it is more likely a reflection of the fact that they did not necessarily foresee the eventual outcome of their protests, and were entering into the dialog in what they perceived to be the most effective manner. It was not necessarily that socialism itself was inherently untenable, but rather that the principles of socialism had been betrayed.

This spirit of reform-within-the-system was not unique to Mongolia. It mimics, if not consciously, much of the anti-colonial rhetoric in British India and elsewhere, where “the nationalist criticism was not that colonial rule was imposing alien institutions of state on indigenous society, but rather that it was restricting and even violating the true principles of modern government” (Chatterjee 1993: 74). This parallel is worth bearing in mind, for if the protests at first took the stance of arguing for true socialism, they would soon shift and expand to lay claim to the moral high ground of tradition and history, much as nationalists did elsewhere.

In addressing the changes instituted in 1986, MAHN later declared it had “embarked on a major overhaul of political, economic and cultural life in the country . . . Although socialism in Mongolia is firmly on its feet and had proved its viability, it has not yet revealed its full potential” (Namsray 1989: 34).⁴ Such an emphasis on the vitality of socialism was to continue throughout the coming events. Above all, what was taking place was supposed to be controlled reform: “The time is ripe for a *consistent application of democratic principles and public openness* in cadre policy. Naturally, this does not mean that we should let everything take its course” (Namsray 1989: 36, emphasis in original).

At this point, the changes instigated by MAHN were still being envisioned as having a fairly limited scope. The emphasis was on increased economic efficiency. In the publications of 1986, the term *öörchlön baiguulalt* (restructuring, the equivalent of *perestroika*) was not yet in use. The “Economic, [and] social development guidelines for 1986–1990” – the Central Committee draft for the 19th Congress – does not yet speak of “reform” or “restructuring.” It rather states a need to “perfect the methods, forms and mechanism of control of the economy and enhance the standard of management” (JPRS-MON-86-003: 11).⁵

In Batmönh’s speech to the 19th Party Congress, which runs to over eighty pages in the published (Mongolian) version, he uses the term *il tod* (openness, which came to be equated with *glasnost*) once, but he uses it in a more restricted sense than it would later come to have. Other phrases, such as *öörchlön сайруулах* (to improve) and *shinechlel öөрчлөл* (to renew) hint at the later terms, but again, this is intended to be a renewal within socialism and the Party, rather than a full-scale shift in social and political relations (see Losolsüren et al. 1986: 60, 61, 64, 73).

One of the first officially sanctioned, although still controlled, criticisms of the

socialist past was the critique of “Tsedenbalism.” Named after Yu. Tsedenbal, the ruler of Mongolia from 1952 until his removal by Moscow in 1984, the term refers to the economic stagnation of the 1980s. This critique of Tsedenbalism, which did not begin for another two years after the Party Conference (Sanders 1991: 72), was to mark the beginning of MAHN’s criticism of the socialist past, but it did not and would not totally repudiate it. Errors had been made, but the basic aim of perfecting socialism was not in question.

Between the 19th Party Congress in 1986 and the Central Committee Plenum in December 1989, when the pace of the changes accelerated, most of the steps taken by the government and MAHN were attempts at economic reform. There was, however, a gradual shift in and an expansion of the goals of reform as time went on, again paralleling the Soviet situation.

Reforms were officially expanded to include social life and history at the MAHN Central Committee Plenum held on 21–22 December 1988. (At about the same time, Baabar’s now-famous tract *Büii Mart (Don’t Forget!)* was being written in Moscow, although it was not to be published openly in Mongolia until 1990.) The secretary of the Central Committee, writing in 1989, said “Certain stages of [MAHN] history need to be critically and truthfully reassessed . . . If we have really adopted openness, it must also extend to history” (Balhaajav 1989: 52).⁶ Balhaajav was not suggesting a full reappraisal of all history. Rather, he was talking in particular about the cult of personality that had sprung up around Choibalsan, much like the one that had around Stalin in the Soviet Union, to whom Choibalsan was often compared.⁷ At this point, a parallel with Khrushchev’s Secret Speech of 1956 would probably be a more accurate view of the intentions of MAHN. Socialism had gone astray, but it was not fundamentally in error (yet). Another area to come in for early reassessment was the purges of the 1930s and the destruction of the monasteries. This may well have been an attempt by MAHN at “the boosting of Mongolian identity in reaction to decades of Russian cultural and linguistic influence” (Bruun and Odgaard 1996: 33), but, as we shall see, by and large, in the end MAHN was not credited with such accomplishments, which would be the realm of the protesters.

At the same time as the December 1988 Central Committee Plenum, the first protests took place. A small movement, by most accounts consisting of five to seven people, called *Shine Üe* (New Times) pasted up posters criticizing the government.⁸ According to one person, the five were soon caught by the Ministry of Public Security (the secret police), and released upon promising not to repeat their misdeeds. One of the members, reminiscing to a newspaper in 1997, does not mention this, but talks of similar actions in early January 1989: “The Ministry of Public Security put out a warning, and very quickly the majority [of the signs] were removed” (S. Amarsanaa, quoted in Dashzeveg 1998: 18).

They were apparently largely quiescent until the democratic movement of 1989–90. The founder of *Shine Üe*, Bat-Üül, later became a leader of the Mongolian Democratic Association. These protests, however, seem to have not entered the popular consciousness, and I did not hear of the group during either my 1993 or my 1997 trip. Most Mongols not directly involved with the events of the early 1990s were unaware of the existence of *Shine Üe* when I asked about the group in 1999 and later visits. Another group, largely a discussion group at first, known as the Young Economists’ Club, was founded in April 1989. The members of this group were later to form the nucleus of one of the early democratic groups (Dashzeveg 1998: 65).

Nor was MAHN inactive during this period. Even without a substantial repositioning of official policy, the dam had begun to crack, and the trickle of reappraisals of history was soon to become a steady stream, and then a flood. In a mood similar to, but more expansive than Balhaajav's, the then culture minister (and member of the Central Committee) B. Sum'yaa later took a swipe at Soviet domination when he wrote the following:

The 5th plenary meeting of the Central Committee (1988) oriented the party and the people on a restructuring of our society . . .

More attention is being paid to historical subjects. Artists are working enthusiastically to fill in the blank spots in literature and the arts and to open previously closed areas. This is borne out by the production of *Duchess [sic] Manduhai the Wise*, a feature film in four parts⁹ . . . as well as by the fact that work has begun on a feature film about Genghis Khan in several installments . . .

Still, it is not so much the subjects themselves as *new interpretations of reality that matter* . . . Our artistic intelligentsia no longer resembles an obedient schoolboy writing what the teacher is dictating (the way it was not too long ago).

(Sum'yaa 1989: 21–23, emphasis in original)

Soon it was to become the subjects that mattered. Although reaction to the film about Chinggis Khaan was mixed, the fact that it could be made was significant in itself. The opening up of history generally, however, did not win any new adherents to the socialist cause. In retrospect, MAHN failed to exploit this potential as well as they could have. Early articles praising Chinggis Khaan as the founder of the Mongolian state were not to be enough to associate MAHN with changing views on history for most people. They had created the space in which re-evaluations were possible, but never controlled it. As subsequent chapters will make clear, this reading of history was already commonplace. To many people, then, MAHN's repositioning would simply have been an official admission of what they already thought. In other words, MAHN was already playing catch-up with interpretations of history, even without organized groups opposing them.

At this stage, the emphasis in historical reassessment was still largely on the re-evaluation of the socialist period – criticizing the economic stagnation under previous leaders, and the “excesses” of earlier periods. Much of what was taking place could easily have been misread as just another “thaw” or shift in policy. There was no reason to expect it would develop into something more, although the degree of openness was fairly surprising.

A number of areas were opened up to examination; one of the main ones was the issue of political repression. Many of the newspaper articles of the period ran under the general heading of “*Tüüh söhvöl*” (“If we look to the past”). This was a careful, controlled and, most importantly, limited examination of the issue. Throughout 1989 and 1990, the full extent of the repression was not discussed. Those cases with a particular resonance, such as the repression of Genden, a prime minister in the 1930s, at the hands of the Soviets, were written about. This was part of MAHN's attempt to dissociate itself from a history that many people knew, but could or would not talk about.¹⁰

More importantly, people wrote into *Ünen*, the MAHN newspaper, with stories of injustice. One of the earliest that I am aware of was published on January 8, 1989.¹¹ Under the column heading of “In our mail,” there is an item entitled “Let us immortalize the reputation of the repressed partisans.” The author, who identifies himself as a teacher at the polytechnic in Darhan and *öndör nastan*,¹² writes that in 1938, on Choibalsan's

instructions, over thirty partisans of the socialist revolution in 1921 and their relatives were arrested and repressed. "The above people did not commit counter-revolutionary acts," the author explained, "but struggled for the freedom and independence of their motherland and their people against foreign invaders heedless of their own lives" (Tsend 1989). He goes on to call for a statue to be erected to the partisans, and notes that he and others are ready to make a contribution. Clearly, wronged partisans are a fairly safe bet in terms of issues to bring to light, but the fact that Tsend felt secure enough to do so in such a public forum speaks to the changing times and attitudes. Other historical topics and issues would crop up from time to time, but they continued to largely be a re-evaluation of socialist history. More generally, widespread debate and publication on non-socialist history and culture did not become common until the democratic revolution and especially after. With these discussions on pre-socialist history, discussions on socialism would largely disappear for several years.

Also in 1989, a series of articles, including some by K. Zardihan, a member of the Central Committee and a historian by training, appeared in *Namyn Am'dral* (*Party Life*), the magazine of MAHN, calling for an "end to dogmatic interpretations of Marxism-Leninism and to [MAHN's] political monopoly" (Sanders 1996: 217).¹³ Such a call, even in the context of a Party publication, is very telling. It can only be taken to reflect the growing desire for change and the increasing openness of debate. Whether this was a change designed to save MAHN and socialism, or bring about their end, is immaterial to a degree. It is the ability to make such criticisms without drastic repercussions that matters.

In addition to the attempts to reposition MAHN vis-à-vis what were now seen as the excesses of some aspects of socialist rule, much energy and space was devoted to addressing issues of restructuring more generally. My notes from reading the 1989 issues of *Ünen* say that "Every issue had at least one article on reform or restructuring, and many had multiple ones . . . [T]here were at least two irregular columns on the topic, *Shinechleliin sedveer yariłts'ya* ('Let's talk about the topic of renewal') and *Ulamjılal, shinechlel* ('Tradition, renewal')." Many of the articles in these columns probably fell on deaf ears as much of the rhetoric in the articles remained couched in the language of socialism.

One important development lay outside the realm of economics and history proper, yet must not be overlooked: the discussions concerning *Mongol bichig*. The old vertical script had been almost completely abandoned with the adoption of the Cyrillic alphabet (adapted from the Russian) in the 1940s. To reclaim *Mongol bichig* would soon be seen as instrumental in the repudiation of socialism, and a return to the "true" Mongolian way of life. This was particularly important as Chinggis Khaan was said to have ordered the adoption of the script in the early thirteenth century. However, even this move was co-opted by the opposition during their demonstrations. While the government debated the pros, cons and practicalities of the issue, the opposition stepped in and made the debates academic by simply *using bichig*. The fact that most people could not read the signs written in it was irrelevant.

The increasing openness facilitated by the political leadership continued to gather momentum. A number of secret meetings were held in late November and early December by various groups of students, teachers and others. These culminated in the announcement of the Mongolian Democratic Association (MoAH), which held its first public demonstration on December 10. The group's formation had been timed to coincide with the MAHN Central Committee Plenum, as well as International

Human Rights Day. The date was made into a holiday in 1996, although it was still a working day. In 1999, numerous celebrations and commemorations marked the tenth anniversary.

The first demonstration was held on the steps of the Youth Cultural Center, only a short distance from Sühbaatar Square. This was not as confrontational a location as the square itself or a more visible site would have been. The steps of the Center are somewhat tucked away, facing a small park and the Selbe river.¹⁴ An estimated 200 people attended the rally, which included chants calling for a multi-party system, a free press and respect for human rights. The two-person group *Honh* (Bell) performed what was to become the “anthem of the revolution,” “*Honhny duu*” (“The Bell’s Song”) (Dashzeveg 1998: 21). The event, although photographed, was not covered in *Ünen*. (The demonstrations and protests taking place in Romania at the time, however, did receive press attention.) Perhaps optimistically gearing themselves for international attention, the sign proclaiming the “Mongolian democratic association” is in both Mongolian and English.

Along with staging the protest, the MoAH issued a petition. The petition included demands for changes to the constitution, as well as for the following: the creation of a permanent standing parliament; an elected council for the protection of human rights; the abolishment of special privileges for the *nomenklatura*; economic reform; changes to the electoral system, including popular elections for the deputies of the People’s *Ih Hural* by the end of the first half of 1990; freedom of the press; the addressing of the issues of political repression and the large-scale destruction of the monasteries and repression of the lamas in the 1930s; and the recognition of MoAH as a legitimate political organization (Dashzeveg 1998: 21–22). These demands were radical and daring, but they were also not entirely without precedent. Many of the protesters, for example, would have been familiar with Zardiyan’s earlier call for electoral reform in his *Namyn Am’dral* article. Throughout the early stages of the democratic revolution, this was to be the protesters’ *modus operandi*. They would push for change, and push hard, but seldom were their demands completely without some degree of precedent. This would change in time.

The MoAH protests were to become a regular occurrence, with the second occurring one week later. This was held in front of the State Drama Theater, and was attended by about 2,000 people (Maidar 1991: 5). This moved the demonstration to a much more visible site. The theater is across from the State Library with its statue of Stalin (soon to be pulled down) and within a minute or two of Sühbaatar Square, which can be glimpsed from the theater.

All the subsequent protests were all held near the center of town, usually in Sühbaatar Square or Freedom Square, in front of the Lenin Museum.¹⁵ They were widely publicized, with fliers being made to announce them, at times with the tacit approval of high-ranking Party members.¹⁶ Sühbaatar Square itself fronts the main government building, and thus to demonstrate there, where May Day celebrations were also held, added a certain edge to the proceedings. Indeed, although it is absent from the reminiscences of the participants, the protests in the square itself were to develop into something akin to the violation of a sacred site.¹⁷ It is notable in this regard that when the military was called out in April, they were called out to surround and protect the government building, not to surround the crowds of protesters.

The most visible member of the MoAH was S. Zorig, the one man whose name would most be associated with the events taking place (see Figure 47.1). In many ways typical



Figure 47.1 S. Zorig, the one man most associated with the democratic revolution. He was both a charismatic and practical leader of the democratic movement. The statue was erected after his murder in October 1998. The murder has never been solved.

of the opposition leaders, he was young (in his late twenties), a member of the intelligentsia, and had been educated abroad, in Moscow. The Western press of the time delighted in drawing attention to the fact that he was also a lecturer in Marxist theory at the Mongolian National University. Baabar, another key opposition figure, noted that prior to 1989–90, people knew of Chinggis Khaan and his grandson Khubilai. Maybe they also knew of Sühbaatar, Choibalsan and Tsedenbal. Now Zorig was added to the list. “It does not mean that Zorig’s name is known throughout the whole world, but

today the name ‘Sanjaasürengiin Zorig’ has entered all the world’s large encyclopedias” (Baabar 1995: 130).

While important in the early stages of the movement, Zorig was to fall from prominence during the mid-1990s. Several people suggested to me in 1993 that his ethnic background (he was Buriat, and also part Russian – but identified by some simply as “Russian”) would have precluded him from high office. Despite this, he remained a Member of Parliament throughout the 1990s, and active in politics. He was also minister of infrastructure development in the late 1990s, and was rumored to be a candidate for prime minister, but was brutally murdered in October 1998 before this could be announced. The murder remains unsolved.¹⁸

Although the Mongolian Democratic Association and other groups (such as the Social Democratic Movement – ASH) have since become known as the opposition parties, the term must be understood within a certain context. What was originally at issue was largely the speed and degree of the reforms. The concepts of restructuring as put forward by the MAHN Central Committee were in general accepted by the early demonstrators. Both MoAH and later ASH repeatedly emphasized their willingness to work with the then leaders of MAHN to effect the changes they were championing. At one point during the spring, which I return to below, they requested Batmönh to remain in office after he had offered to resign. (Batmönh himself seems to have been sympathetic to the reforms, but also had to take into account more conservative factions of MAHN.)

From its earliest meetings, the Mongolian Democratic Association was peaceful although illegal, announcing its support of the moves by the Central Committee Plenum towards reform, while urging them towards even greater reform, criticizing the bureaucracy and demanding greater openness. At this point, the MoAH was still operating within a broader Marxist context, describing themselves as “a public and political organization which appeared as an objective law of social development” (*DR*, January 16, 1990: 8).¹⁹ One-party rule was criticized, but MAHN’s contributions to Mongolian history and development were also recognized. Despite this rather conciliatory attitude, the fact that protests and rallies were taking place at all was of signal importance.

Even as these moves were being played out, discussion on reform continued within the socialist framework for some time. In a late December 1989 speech, Batmönh said “I would like to note that the mistakes committed in the past did not derive from socialism’s essences, and were, in actual fact, linked with the distortion of the basic principles of socialism” (*DR*, January 19, 1990: 8). Nor did the opposition contest this. What was largely at issue at first was the form of socialism that was to be built. Later in the movement, a joint declaration by the opposition parties declared that they were working towards the “development of human democratic socialism” (*DR*, March 12, 1990: 9). At about the same time, Balhaajav, the secretary of the Central Committee, could still claim “that socialism is an early stage of communism, of that great historical process so natural for the development of humanity” (*DR Supplement*, March 14, 1990: 67). The debate was shaping up as a debate between democratic and communist socialism. The rhetoric largely belied the actions. Reform was under way, but the discussions around it still seemed more reminiscent of a repositioning within socialism than a total repudiation of it.

The increasingly vocal discontentment with the government and Soviet influence boiled over in late December. Gary Kasparov, the chess champion, commented in a

Playboy interview that the Soviet Union would solve some of its economic troubles by selling off Mongolia to China. Mongols, not unexpectedly, were outraged at this. According to articles in *Ünen*, petitions and letters signed by “many thousands” of Mongols were sent to the Soviet Embassy and the four consular offices (*Ünen* 1990a). A two-hour work-stoppage was called for, but apparently never took place. At multiple press conferences, a spokesman for the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed regret at the statement, and reiterated that this was not official Soviet policy. Clearly, the dissatisfaction that was being made public by the demonstrations was not confined to the pace of economic and social reform, whatever the rhetoric and position of the organizers.

Another demonstration took place in front of the Lenin Museum (about a kilometer or so from Sühbaatar Square) on January 14. One foreign journalist estimated the crowd at 4,000–5,000 (Southerland 1990), although Mongolian sources place the numbers at around 10,000 (Dashzeveg 1998: 25; Maidar 1991: 5–6). At this demonstration, the protestors were at pains to position themselves as not being explicitly against MAHN itself. Maidar quotes an unnamed demonstrator as saying “We are not against MAHN, but we are struggling to replace MAHN’s unlimited authority” (Maidar 1991: 6). If they were not already, the protests would soon be seen as a challenge to MAHN itself.

Other, less prominent demonstrations and meetings also took place during these months. For example, a demonstration was held on January 20 in front of the Yalalt movie theater (next to the Lenin Museum) by the Revolutionary Youth League of one of Ulaanbaatar’s districts, which was generally supportive of the changes taking place, although they called for them to be speeded up (Maidar 1991: 6). The day before, government officials met with MoAH members in a meeting that was broadcast on radio and television. The democratic revolution, in other words, was more than a string of disjointed public demonstrations. It was gaining force and momentum. Other parties and organizations formed and spoke out, and discussions were taking place between the different groups. The demonstrations also soon spread beyond Ulaanbaatar itself, a point not often appreciated, and the major groups acquired branches in the provinces fairly quickly.

It was the demonstration on January 21 that was to become seen as the watershed demonstration. This was the first one to take place in Sühbaatar Square itself, which greatly increased the confrontational nature of the gathering. Mongolian sources claim 20,000 people attended (Dashzeveg 1998: 26; Maidar 1991: 6), although Southerland (1990) puts the number at a mere 3,000. (Photographs of the demonstrations seem to give credence to numbers in the range of the Mongolian estimates, even if they are themselves perhaps a bit high.)²⁰ This demonstration, which took place in the bitter cold of the Mongolian winter, was notable for several reasons in addition to its location.

First, although MoAH (and the recently formed ASH) were regularly referred to as “unofficial” (*alban yosny bus*) organizations, this demonstration was the first to be staged after the local government had prohibited the holding of demonstrations and meetings on certain streets and squares. While even the existence of unofficial groups went against state policy, this demonstration was an openly defiant act.

Second, the direct opposition to MAHN and its policies seemed to be mounting. Unlike the first demonstration in December, where slogans were chanted but placards were lacking, subsequent meetings sported banners and placards. Among other slogans

were the following: “A new time has come: let’s awake!,” “Multi-Party System,” “Towards a legal [*erh züi*] government,” “Mongols – to your horses!,” “Tsedenbal – To the People’s Court,” and “If you are afraid, do not do, if you do, do not be afraid” (Maidar 1991: 6).

Third, the stakes were raised in other ways as well, most notably in terms of a contest to be seen as the true heirs of the socialist revolution. Sühbaatar’s grandson, Süh-Erdene, was present at the demonstration, and gave a speech in which he denied that the present-day MAHN was the heir to the Mongolian People’s Party founded by his grandfather. “Today’s MAHN cannot claim to be the successor to the Mongolian People’s Party founded by my grandfather” (Dashzeveg 1998: 21).

A very interesting event also took place at this demonstration. During the meetings, while a famous, state-honored singer, D. Sosorbaram, sang a well-known folk song, people performed a *hurailan* around Sühbaatar’s statue in the middle of the square. This involved circumambulating the statue in a clockwise direction before performing a ritual of beckoning good fortune (*dallaga*). The beckoning involves holding one’s hands out palms outward some distance from the face. They are then rotated in a clockwise fashion while calling out “hurai, hurai.” The ritual had been carried out throughout the socialist period, although not very openly. Although it is not clear why this was performed, people I have queried said it would not have been viewed as a challenge to the socialist government, but instead as a way of paying respect to Sühbaatar. In addition to the *hurailan*, as January 21 is also the anniversary of Lenin’s death, a moment of silence was observed during the demonstration. This, however, was later criticized by some as an overly deferential move.

Support was continuing to increase. At this demonstration, the leaders claimed the existence of nearly sixty branches and a membership of over 30,000 (MAHN, by way of reference, had about 90,000 members at the time) (Maidar 1991: 6).

On the same day, *Ünen* ran its first coverage of MoAH and the protests. The coverage, on page 3, included two articles. The first, “What do people think about M[o]AH?”, consists of several people being interviewed about the Mongolian Democratic Association in general and Zorig in particular. Each, a person of some authority, was asked a question about their respective areas. For example, the head of the State Committee on Science, Higher and Special Middle Education was asked:

Mongolian National University aspirant [doctoral student] S. Zorig and others have created the unofficial Mongolian Democratic Association. They have a leadership role for not a few Mongolian National University, polytechnic and Teachers’ Institute students. What you do think about this?

The questions seemed designed to invite critical responses. Despite this, the replies were not as universally critical as might be expected. People expressed confusion about the aims and goals of the protesters, but did not unequivocally condemn them. M. Dash, the person asked about Zorig’s influence on students, replied in part:

I see this as one side of the influence of contemporary democracy, the situation of openness [*il tod baidal*], and the climate of renewal. This isn’t something to criticize. But the MAH should only work with correct aims. If they turn in the wrong direction it will be very bad . . .

I am a member of MAHN. I am loyal to that party. It is necessary for people and students to understand the association’s goals just to participate in them . . .

I just don’t understand this democratic association very well. But I think the main idea

might contribute to reconstruction. Surely it's not necessary to talk about repressing or clamping down on the democratic association . . .

I won't tell the students not to listen to M[o]AH, not to go to the demonstrations. But what does this association aspire to? They should have a proper understanding of this, treat it wisely, to try to get to the bottom of it – this sort of thing I do tell them.

(Ünen 1990b)

His response is characteristic of the others as well. They express cautious support, or at least not outright opposition to the movement. We can be sure that the answers printed were carefully selected to present an image of MAHN and its members that reflected the particular view the Party leadership wanted to portray – one of cautious but open-minded engagement with the demonstrators. Even this is significant. Factions in MAHN were fighting for influence, yet the moderates seemed to be winning out.²¹ The demonstrations were to be engaged with, not fired upon.

The following day, “a government spokesman announced that it was prepared to recognize and cooperate with the new opposition, and guaranteed freedom of speech and assembly” (Sikes 1990). The government had already granted *de facto* recognition to MoAH by holding talks with its leaders, but this announcement went a step further, offering official recognition which MoAH had been seeking since it had first formed in December. A spokesman for the Ministry of Defense pledged that force would not be used against the demonstrators, although others in the government warned of the “inadmissibility” of the failure to observe the ban on rallies (DR, 26 January 1990: 12).

Throughout this period, the government often seemed not to know quite how to present itself, or how hard a line to take towards the opposition. On 24 January, the official news agency MONTSAME issued a statement denying the rallies had been banned:

In the recent past, foreign media distorted and misinformed the stand of the Mongolian Party and Government towards the Mongolian Democratic [Association] . . . I would like to state unequivocally and make it perfectly clear that the Mongolian Government has not passed any decision which bans any meeting or demonstrations. On the contrary, top-level party and government officials have entered into talks and dialogues with the leading members of the newly founded Mongolian Democratic [Association] . . .

[I]t is quite clear that the ban on holding meetings and rallies applies only to a very few designated places due to evident reasons, but does not in the least apply to the holding of any meeting whatsoever.

(DR, 25 January 1990: 8)

This seems to have been an attempt by the government (and MAHN) to keep the opposition parties from gaining too much of a strong advantage. It also was apparently an accurate statement, at least strictly speaking. Mongolian accounts describe the resolution in question as banning demonstrations and meetings in only certain areas, and the resolution had been passed by the local government, not the national one. Yet this is also a willful blindness to the effects of the resolution. While I have been unable to obtain a copy of the resolution, and thus do not have a list of the banned sites, the practical result was most likely to prohibit demonstrations in the very places they were being held. It seems highly unlikely that such prominent places as Sühbaatar Square would not have been included in the resolution.

At a more symbolic level, the statement was an attempt to give the government some breathing room. It could not afford to be seen as totally naysaying the demonstrations,

although the edict had already been issued. Confusion and factionalism within the government seems to have been increasing.

In a move that stepped up the intensity of the confrontation, banners alluding to Chinggis Khaan began to appear at some of the rallies.²² Hong Kong AFP noted “the demands [of the MoAH] have been accompanied by increasing nationalism marked by the rehabilitation of Genghis Khan, 13th century founder of the Mongol nation and long presented in Soviet-inspired books as a bloody and savage conqueror” (*DR*, 17 January 1990: 6).

The demonstrators remained understandably wary, and these banners had been absent from the January 21 demonstration, as some felt they were “too aggressive in tone” (Southerland 1990). Signs in *Mongol bichig* (unreadable to most Mongolians, but important as a rejection of socialist-imposed Cyrillic, and, by extension, socialism itself) were beginning to appear at the rallies as well. The demonstrations often also took on a more openly anti-Soviet (or perhaps more generally xenophobic) tone, with banners proclaiming “Mongolia for the Mongolians.”

This nationalist slant was to continue and develop more fully over time, becoming similar to what Wang (1996) has called in the Chinese case “restoration nationalism,” a version of anti- or post-colonial nationalism. Among the varied faces of restoration nationalism are “the recovery of sovereignty,” an emphasis on moral order, and a rediscovery of traditional values. There is also, Wang notes, a link to “the glorious past of a great empire” (1996: 8). It was these very elements that were to become increasingly important in the Mongolian fight against socialism. As we shall see in later chapters, various figures from Mongolian history (and Chinggis Khaan in particular) were reinterpreted in keeping with such a restorationist project. It was as if, as the culture minister N. Enhbayar noted in 1993, that Mongolia was moving in two directions at once, towards the future and the past.²³

Responding to the demonstrators, in February Batmönkh, the head of the state and Party, agreed to negotiate with MoAH, and a series of round-table discussions were held. Free elections, Mongolia’s first, were slated for April, although they were not actually held until late July. Batmönkh went on to say during a speech later that month that “at a period when democracy and pluralism are developing in this country, the creation of such an organization had neither been a sudden event nor a surprise” (*DR*, March 7, 1990: 16), again signaling *de facto* recognition of the opposition by the government. While recognizing these organizations, Batmönkh stopped short of openly welcoming them. Again, while the importance of even this step must not be overlooked, the government failed to capitalize on an opportunity to regain the ideological ground they were rapidly losing.

It is important to realize that however many supporters the demonstrators had, MAHN was not completely isolated. Letters and telegrams of support flooded in. On February 3, and again on February 10 (as well as at other times), *Ünen* devoted a whole page to letters in support of MAHN.

The support varied in its intensity and nature, but lined up behind the Party leadership. The views the writers took towards the MoAH and others also varied.²⁴ A herder from Hovd province in the west wrote in part:

We don’t require any other parties than MAHN. We don’t need “M[o]AH.”

It is not possible to hurry change and renewal in a short period of time. It is correct to do this very carefully. It is not permitted to profit from the name of “anti-authoritarianism.”

(*Ünen* 1990c)

Someone who identified himself as a senior Party member, and resident of Ulaanbaatar, took a more dismissive view of the protests:

Recently, in the name of the “M[o]AH,” some youths have been sticking various writings on the city streets and squares, holding meetings and demonstrations everywhere, attacking the people who lead the party and state, and have been carrying out activities opposed to party policy and the interests of socialist organizations.

(*Ünen* 1990c)

However plentiful such sentiments may have been, they could not stop the growing demands for change. Some of the protesters, emboldened by their progress, declared the formation of political parties. These organizations were more formal than the various associations and movements. The first of these to do so was MoAH, who on February 18, during their first congress and in response to the announced scheduling of elections, declared the formation of a political party, the Mongolian Democratic Party, that would take part in the forthcoming elections.

Yet the protesters balanced this opposition by continuing to work with MAHN where possible. Several ministers were invited to MoAH’s first congress, and Byambasüren, P. Ochirbat and Zardihan attended.

Another demonstration was held by the protesters – now calling themselves the “Four Forces” (*Dörvön Hүchniihen*), which encompassed the Mongolian Democratic Association, the New Development (*Shine Devshilt*) Association, the Social Democratic Movement and the Mongolian Students’ Association – in front of the Lenin Museum on March 4. They made a number of demands of the Central Committee and the People’s Great Hural, demanding an answer via radio and television by March 7. The demands included the resignation of the Central Committee, the separation of the Party and the state, and the creation of a People’s Provisional Hural, in which all political groups could participate equally (Dashzeveg 1998: 33). It was by now abundantly clear that whatever the rhetoric used – socialist or otherwise – the old system would have to go.

MAHN, in the guise of Ts. Namsray, a Politburo member and secretary of the Central Committee, as well as a member of the leadership of the People’s Great Hural, gave a response on radio and TV the evening of 6 March, and then again on the morning of March 7 (*Ünen* 1990d). Unhappy with the answers they received, on 7 March at 2 p.m., ten people began a hunger strike in Sүhbaatar Square. “In all, 33 people give their pledges to sit day and night on the cold stone square” (Maidar 1991: 10) (this number included supporters of the hunger strikers). Support came in from the countryside, including the cities of Darhan and Erdenet, where, by this time, MoAH had established branches.

The hunger strike lasted until March 9, and ended with the resignation of the Politburo. Although accorded relatively little importance in the accounts I collected in 1993, as the decade progressed, this came to be seen as the single most important event in the democratic revolution (see the following chapter). MAHN’s first response was to ask the protesters to end the hunger strike for humanitarian and health reasons, saying that their concerns will be addressed. The hunger strikers refused. In the afternoon of March 8, Byambasüren, a deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, went out to the square to talk to the protesters. He offered a round-table discussion, which would be broadcast live on TV. On the morning of March 9, the protesters and MAHN reached an agreement, and the strike ended. In a speech given the same day, J. Batmönh, general

secretary of the Central Committee and chairman of the Presidium of the People's Great Hural, noted that it was correct for the Politburo to resign, but at that point, it was merely the opinion of the Politburo. "This opinion has to be confirmed by the Plenum," which would be held shortly thereafter (Batmönh 1990). Batmönh, however, was also at pains to point out that MAHN had received "a great number" (*mash olon*) of letters and telegrams in support of the Party's policy. "This [the resignations engendered by the hunger strike] was the democratic revolution's first big victory" (Dashzeveg 1998: 50).²⁵

Batmönh himself, however, was to remain in his post at the request of the demonstrators themselves, who had come to term themselves "the democratic forces" (*ardchilsan hüchnüüd*). Highlighting his experience and ability to lead the country during this delicate period (and doubtless his moderate stance, although this was not made explicit) and appealing to the fate of the country, they asked that he stay on until "the political leaders of Mongolia are democratically elected" (quoted in Maidar 1991: 17).

In keeping with their earlier attempts to reposition themselves, the MAHN leadership rehabilitated several important socialist-era figures at this meeting as well. Four figures from the 1960s, Tömör-Ochir, Loohuuz, Nyambuu and Surmajav, were all rehabilitated at this meeting. Tömör-Ochir, who died in 1985, had been expelled from the Party in 1962 as a result of the events surrounding the aborted celebrations for the 800th anniversary of Chinggis Khaan's birth. Loohuuz, Nyambuu and Surmajav were all also repressed in the early 1960s as part of a case known as the "Intellectual's affair." (In an indication of the symbolic weight this case carried, *Ünen* had already run several articles on it in 1989 and earlier in 1990.)

On March 11, MoAH made an appeal to conceptions of Mongolian tradition by holding a rally for Buddhists at the Choijin Lama Monastery Museum, just south of Sühbaatar Square. Another religious rally was held on April 2, at the same site. These rallies were a particularly adroit move, for people link Buddhism to a wider conception of "Mongol-ness," viewing it as the traditional religion of Mongolia. To hold a rally for Buddhists then was to play a trump card, linking even further the opposition to some (vague) concept of traditional Mongolia, which was rapidly being constructed in opposition to socialism.

Further reflecting the upheaval the protests were causing MAHN and the government, G. Ochirbat was elected general secretary of MAHN on March 15, replacing Batmönh.²⁶ This was not a general election, but rather indicates a shifting of power from within the Party itself, and seems to indicate both the unease at the pace of reforms as well as an attempt by MAHN to maintain some sort of control over events. On March 21, Batmönh (who was also head of the People's Ih Hural) and Premier Sodnom²⁷ both resigned, and P. Ochirbat (no relation to G. Ochirbat) was selected as chairman of the Ih Hural. During this session of the Hural, election laws and the institution of a presidential system were discussed. It was also at this session that the constitution was amended to remove references to the leading role of MAHN, bringing an official, if not effective, end to one-party rule in Mongolia.

The Mongolian Social Democratic Party (MSDN) was founded on March 2, growing out of the Social Democratic Movement (*Ardchilsan Sotsialist Hөдөlgөөн*). Chaired by B. Batbayar (popularly known as Baabar, the vocal opponent of socialism), it held its first party congress on March 31. The MSDN took an interesting line towards the unfolding events. They were careful, at least at first, not to set themselves in direct opposition to MAHN, as they claimed the MoAH was doing. However, in their

Congress, they denied that restructuring (*öörchlön baiguulalt*) had been instituted from above in Mongolia, as it had in the Soviet Union, being instead a grass-roots movement (Ulaanhüü 1990: 12). They thus sought to establish themselves as a legitimate voice of the opposition and, by implication, the people.

In mid-April, an "Extraordinary Congress" (*Onts Ih Hural*) of MAHN was held. This was an apparent attempt to maintain some degree of control over a situation that was by now almost completely out of their grasp, as well as address issues that could not be ignored. The documents of the *Onts Ih Hural* make interesting and even contradictory reading (see MAHN 1990). There is a recognition of the need for change and that the political landscape has changed. Other organizations and political forces are openly talked about. Democracy is a much repeated word, and references to "real democracy" are rife. Respect for traditions, the development of *Mongol bichig* and the need to be free from dogmatic thinking are discussed. Much space is devoted to the issues of reconstruction and renewal. Yet large parts of the reports and resolutions read as if the Party leaders were in a state of denial. Economic plans are laid out much as they had always been, and social policies are discussed. Policies and trends are to be analyzed in keeping with Marxist-Leninist ideology and methodology.

It is unclear if the leaders truly thought they would remain in charge and if such plans could be implemented unchanged. Nonetheless, ultimately the fact that MAHN was acting in a changing environment, and that they could not avoid making adjustments, was clear to all. Despite the seeming confusion, many of the changes discussed were real and substantial.

During this congress, divisions within the Party manifested themselves when a splinter group of MAHN formed the group "For the Revival of Traditions and Renewal of the Mongolian People's Party." This faction was to have an interesting, if brief, life. A leader of the group, K. Zardihan, left to form the Mongolian Renaissance Party (MRP) in December 1991 with other MAHN radicals. In 1992, the MRP joined with various other parties to form MÜAN (Sanders 1996: 144). The MÜAN (*Mongolyn Ündesen Ardchilsan Nam* – Mongolian National Democratic Party) would eventually come to power as part of the coalition government that won the 1996 elections.

Tensions mounted in April. On April 7, just prior to the *Onts Ih Hural*, the leadership of the People's Great Hural issued a decree that required seven days' advance notice of demonstrations, and also demanded a host of information, including a timetable for the demonstration, attendance, names of organizers, the goals of the protest, and so on. On April 24, in response to this decree, the MoAH sent a list of demands to the People's Great Hural and the Council of Ministers. They demanded the revocation of this decree and then once again called for the creation of a People's Provisional Hural. They also demanded, in a move designed to underline the separation of Party and state, that MAHN vacate the government building and that MoAH be given a building to use. In response, the military was called out to protect the government building (Maidar 1991: 21). On April 28, another protest was held in front of the Lenin Museum, in which a reported 30,000–50,000 people took part. As a result of the demonstrations, P. Ochirbat hastily returned from China, where he had been on a state visit (Heaton 1991: 52).

In support of these demands, on April 28 a hunger strike was staged in Mörön, in Hövsgöl province in the western part of the country. Eighteen people, including four women, took part in the hunger strike, which lasted until May 7 (Dashzeveg 1998: 57).

Reacting to what was by now the inevitable, at the May 11 session of the People's Ih Hural, the constitution was amended "to allow a directly elected standing legislature

and legalizing political parties” (Sanders 1990: 26). All parties had to be officially registered, including MAHN. The chairman of the MAHN Central Committee, G. Ochirbat, registered his party shortly thereafter. The National Progress Party, headed by D. Ganbold and formed on March 14, registered a few days later. This was followed in turn by the Free Labor Party, the Mongolian Democratic Party (MoAN) and the MSDN.

At the session of the People’s Ih Hural, it was also stated that Mongolia would adopt a presidential system, and would create a *Baga* (Small) Hural to do much of the daily governmental work, thus finally acceding to the demands for a permanent, standing parliament.

At the end of July, the first free elections in Mongolian history were held, in which a reported 98 per cent of the people took part. As expected, MAHN retained a sizable majority in the People’s Great Hural, with 84.5 per cent of the seats. The MoAN won 3.8 per cent and the MSDN 1 per cent of the seats. The elections were generally considered fair, although reballoting took place in certain districts.

At the Ih Hural session in September 1990, the deputies elected a Social Democrat, R. Gonchigdorj, as vice-president, making him the first non-socialist in a position of power.²⁸ This, however, left Zorig, the chief coordinator of MoAN, out of the country’s leadership. P. Ochirbat, a member of MAHN, was confirmed as president of the country, and Ochirbat’s choice for premier, D. Byambasüren, was also approved.

There were also a number of smaller parties, such as the Mongolian Renaissance Party, the Green Party and the Mongolian People’s Party. Only the Mongolian Democratic Party, the Social Democrats and, of course, MAHN achieved major prominence and influence in the early 1990s.

The *Baga* Hural was convened in September 1990. There was much work ahead of them, including the writing of a new constitution and the overhaul of most of the country’s laws. Yet democracy had come to Mongolia. There would be hopes and fears and political arguments big and small still to come, but the revolution was over. As was hinted at in this chapter, historical imagery and appeals to tradition played an important role in the demonstrations. It is these factors that I take up in the next chapter. In Chapter 4, I look not only at the historical imagery the protesters used, but how they, and others, used history to understand what was happening around them.

NOTES

1. Unless otherwise noted, all quotations are from my interviews, and are my own translations from the Mongolian.
2. This interview, like some others, was conducted in English.
3. My own informal questioning of a number of Mongol friends reveals that none of them were aware of the Hövsgöl hunger strike.
4. Namsrai was at the time the secretary of the Central Committee and a member of the Politburo.
5. The *US Joint Publications Research Service: Mongolia Report*; “86” indicates the year, and “003” the issue number.

Compare Gorbachev’s address in February 1986 to the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union:

The policy of acceleration is not confined to changes in the economic field. It envisages an active social policy, a consistent emphasis on the principle of socialist justice. The strategy of acceleration

presupposes an improvement of social relations, a renovation of the forms and methods of work of political and ideological institutions, a deepening of socialist democracy, and resolute overcoming of inertness, stragglance and conservatism – of everything that is holding back social progress.

(Gorbachev 1986: 22)

The parallels are clear, as is the fact that the MPR was operating on a timetable slightly behind that of the Soviet Union.

6. Balhaajav had by this time replaced Namsrai as secretary of the Central Committee.
7. H. Choibalsan was the prime minister of Mongolia from 1939 until his death in 1952. Despite his role in the liquidation of at least 22,000 lamas, intellectuals and others in the late 1930s, he remains at worst an ambivalent figure to most Mongols.
8. One Mongolian book states the *Shine Üe* started their work “from 1989” (“1989 оноос”), but doesn’t give additional information (Erdenetuya 2000: 50). Other sources (see, for example, the entry for Bat-Üül in Sanders 1996) place the foundation of *Shine Üe* in early 1988, but I have been unable to confirm this.
9. The film was about eight hours long. A shortened version, of about four hours, was also released. Manduhai is usually referred to as Queen (*Hatan*).
10. One of the articles, from May 31, 1990, “*Helmegdsen nam*” (“The repressed party”), foreshadowed what would become MAHN’s official stance towards political repression later in the decade (see Kaplonski 1999).
11. Due to time and other constraints, I was not able to check the 1988 issues of *Ünen*. Given the timing of events, however, I would be surprised to find much discussion earlier than this letter.
12. The phrase *öndör natan* is most usually translated as “old person,” but it carries connotations of respect and authority conferred by age. The term has no real equivalent in English when used as it is in the present context, although perhaps “Elder” comes closest.
13. Unfortunately, I have not been able to see these articles myself.
14. The Chingis Khan Hotel is now located across the river from the Cultural Center, but it was not open at the time. It appears to have been under construction during the time of the protests, but I cannot be sure of this.
15. Apparently, the square in front of the Lenin Museum did not previously have a specific name. Dashzeveg dates the label of “Freedom Square” to a demonstration held there in early March 1990 (Dashzeveg 1998: 32).
16. For example, P. Ochirbat, the first democratically elected president of Mongolia, was a minister of foreign economic relations and supply during the democratic revolution. The Ministry had printing facilities and photocopiers, and some of the youth involved in the democratic movement asked permission to use them. Although official policy was to deny them access to such facilities, Ochirbat said he told them they could, but to do it after working hours.
17. I am indebted to Caroline Humphrey for this perspective.
18. Indeed, the murder has become something of a Rorschach test of Mongolian politics, with myriad theories and explanations being offered. Most commonly, Zorig is said to have been murdered by political forces who feared he would have exposed rampant corruption if appointed as prime minister.
19. The *Daily Report for East Asia*, January 16, 1990. The *Daily Report for East Asia* is a publication of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. The *Daily Report* is in essence a listening service, providing transcripts of broadcasts from Mongolia.
20. Unfortunately, I was unable to obtain copies of the most dramatic of these photos. I was working in the photo archives in 1999, while preparations for the 10th anniversary of the democratic revolution were in full swing. As an apparent result of other people’s interest in the same photos, the archive staff and I, after sifting through hundreds of negatives, were unable to find the ones for the photos in question.

21. Over dinner in 1999, P. Ochirbat confirmed that there were two main factions in MAHN. He was apparently referring to the early days of the democratic revolution, because he said of the two factions that one wanted to outlaw it by decree, and the other wanted to crush it by force.
22. Curiously enough, although all accounts mention the banners and slogans concerning Chinggis Khaan, I have never actually seen a photograph of one.
23. In August 1997, Enhbayar, no longer culture minister, was elected to the Ih Hural in the by-election for the seat left by Bagabandi (the new president). In 2000, he became prime minister.
24. A few people (see Becker 1993) have implied that at least some of these letters were made up. Judging, however, from the number of letters to the government in the archives surrounding other events, such letters were a fairly common occurrence. We may speculate about the motives behind the letter writing, but there is no real cause to doubt they are genuine.
25. P. Ochirbat credited Batmönh for leading the resignation when he realized the democratic revolution could not be stopped by decree.
26. Batmönh was to return to private life and a low profile after his resignation.
27. The premier was the chairman of the Council of Ministers – in effect the prime minister. This latter title was used at various periods, although premier is more common for the majority of the socialist period.
28. Gonchigdorj was head of the MSDN in the mid-1990s, and speaker of the Ih Hural from 1996 until 1998.

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AVGAI KHAD

Theft and Social Trust in Post-Communist Mongolia

Caroline Humphrey



In the 1970s a new object of worship appeared in the steppes outside the capital city, Ulaanbaatar. This is a large stone, said to be shaped like a sitting human being, called *avgai khad* ('married woman rock') or *eej khad* ('mother rock'). I write 'said to be' because, for reasons shortly to be explained, I have not actually been able to see Avgai Khad. However, the events of my abortive visit to this sacred rock revealed a strange configuration of social fear and trust in a society half turned away from its recent communist past.

Sodnom-Teacher and his wife Dulma, old friends with whom I was staying in the city, had told me about the stone years ago when it was still a clandestine object of worship (Sodnom is a lecturer at the University, though he grew up in eastern Mongolia in a herding family; Dulma is a housewife with a city background). Dulma had gone to Avgai Khad to make offerings in the hope of relief from her migraines. More recently the stone has become a publicly acknowledged shrine and enormously popular. This autumn (September 1993), the headaches still persisting, she wanted to visit again. As we made preparations for the journey my friends ran through again what they knew about the cult.

The stone had not been worshipped until, sometime in the early 1970s, a round boulder at the top was pitched off by some natural event like an earth tremor. Local people replaced the *tolgoi* ('head') and thereafter the rock began to grant boons to worshippers. After some years, the cult, though undercover, had become so popular that the district communist leader decided he must put a stop to such superstitious activities. He sent a large tractor to pull down the rock and raze the heaps of offerings. But as the tractor set out on its destructive journey something terrible happened: a child suddenly died – whether that of the leader or the tractor-driver no-one quite knows. Thereafter worship at the stone only intensified and no leaders dared challenge it.

When seen from the south Avgai Khad looks like a mature woman sitting facing towards the rising sun. People say they can see large breasts and a rounded belly as though she is pregnant. There is a crevice between her breasts and her belly where offerings were first placed, but they reached such amounts that an altar was provided and soon the entire area around the stone was taken up with them. People offer compressed bricks of tea, and thousands of these now form a semi-circular protective enclosure around the stone. The rock itself is swathed in yards of silk, and bottles of vodka, cheese and other dairy products, fruit, cakes, toys, crutches, clothes and incense

lie heaped around. People even give their jewels, gold and other valuables. 'It looks very beautiful', said Dulma. Worshippers make little rock heaps by placing stones on the boulders which lie in the steppe nearby. Going up to the main rock they lean their foreheads against it and tell the Mother in a whisper about what is wrong and what they want. Then they should walk three times clockwise round the rock. The main offering for the past year or two has been money. In these days of inflation money is often offered in packets of thousands of *tugriks* and countless packets are said to lie untouched at the shrine [350 *tugriks* = \$1 and the average monthly pay is around 6,000 *tugriks*]. A single brick of tea is worth 800 *tugriks*. A lorry driver who once took some of the tea and sold it was punished by a calamity in his family.

It is, however, possible for desperate people to borrow from Avgai Khad. This should be done only in cases of dire need. Vodka should be taken only by alcoholics (*arkhichin*). When borrowing from Avgai Khad people must make a vow to return the item at a certain date, and if they do not do this, misfortune is certain to happen to them. Most people will not take the risk. Thus, in this country where herders are desperately poor, are paid low prices for their milk and meat, and have to struggle to get money even to obtain basic foods such as flour, rice, or sugar, Avgai Khad remains as an open treasury, her vast wealth simply waiting to be tossed by the wind or destroyed by rain and snow. Sodnom-Teacher told me that he had seen a newspaper article by some city rationalist which suggested gathering up the money and paying it into a bank to create an 'Avgai Khad Fund' to be used for orphans. Needless to say, nothing had been done about this. As it was quite uncertain whether the Mother Rock would be pleased by the idea, prudence suggested it might be better to leave the money where it was.

The day for our visit dawned bright and cold, with a first smattering of snow on the slopes of Bogd Uul, the sacred mountain to the south of the city. We were to drive the 150 or so kilometres in Luvsandorzh's jeep, with his young son as driver. We locked the two doors of Sodnom's flat to the sound of hammering from downstairs, where his neighbour was also installing a second front door to deter thieves. Our offerings for the shrine were carefully hidden in the jeep; we remembered a previous journey in the steppes when a drunken gang had galloped up, stopped the car, brandished rocks, and peering inside had shouted for vodka or any western goods. 'I'll pay any thousands, I even offer my horse', one young man had yelled.

We drove out of the city and at the first mountain pass stopped to make an offering at the sacred cairn (*oboo*) for the success of our journey. There was now a strong wind with driving snow and Sodnom frowned as I hastily laid some incense on the cairn rather than replenishing it with stones and walking round first, as custom dictates. Such way-side *oboos* are important to travellers but considered less powerful than the sacrificial cairns (*takhidag oboo*) on the summits of the four high mountains which surround Ulaanbaatar. These have great annual public ceremonies with officiating lamas, though people also climb up at other times to make offerings for their own purposes. Generally, these four mountains are constantly remembered, as Mongols, wherever they happen to be, offer them the first best (*deej*) bit of any notable food or drinks, flicking tiny amounts into the air in the direction of the mountains. Many people have the idea that these mountains have, or in some way 'are' ruling spirits of the surrounding land. Each mountain has its own likes: Bayan Zurkh accepts all kinds of food and alcohol, but Chingeltei likes sweet things, Songino takes alcohol, and Bogd Uul will only accept products made of milk. Avgai Khad seems to fit in some ways with this general idea, but there are no seasonal or communal rituals at this shrine. The Mother Rock alone has

amassed an open treasury of offerings and welcomes women (the *oboos* are traditionally an entirely male affair). Avgai Khad now surpasses the ancient mountain sites in the immediacy and personal nature of her attention to human problems. She grants children to the infertile, cures disease, and ensures the success of marriages, but she can also cause misfortunes to those who offend her. However, the fact that people had put crutches even on the wayside *oboo* ('laid there in gratitude at recovery', Sodnom said) suggests that there is some continuity between petitions made to the *oboo* and the new cult of Avgai Khad.

* * *

As we jolted along the tracks further into the hills the snowstorm turned into a blizzard. Visibility was reduced to a few yards. A Russian Volga lurched into view, crammed with people. We discovered with relief that they were also going to Avgai Khad and followed them lightheartedly, laughing unsympathetically as children's heads appeared one by one out of the back window to be sick. After a while it became apparent that we were going in circles. The driver of the Volga ran over to our car and said the weather was too dangerous and he was turning back. 'He's just lost his head', was the reaction in our jeep as we pressed on into the howling wind. Some miles further on a small river suddenly appeared. Here were clustered two Volgas which had not dared make the crossing and a jeep stranded in the stream. Another jeep and two lorries shortly arrived. All were going to Avgai Khad, which everyone agreed must be not far away. Several hours now passed in which a car would only be hauled out of the river for another to get bogged down in it. Several of the cars were full of officials who sat tight inside in the warm, leaving the lorry drivers, Sodnom-Teacher and Luvsandorzh struggling to fix icy ropes and wedge stones under wheels in the driving snow. Then we looked round to see the lorries disappearing into the whiteness. There was now a heated discussion of good behaviour: the officials should have given some appreciation to the lorry-drivers, but on the other hand no-one should leave another human being stranded in a crisis. At this point two jeeps were stuck in the river, the two Volgas were beached alongside, and our jeep was the only vehicle capable of crossing the stream and pulling anyone out. It was getting late, the river had covered with ice and the storm was increasing in ferocity.

Sodnom-Teacher now told us that he had discovered the reason for this communal misfortune. In one of the jeeps was a high official with his son, whom we had seen ineffectually flapping round, tightly zipped into a modish anorak so that only his dark unhappy eyes were visible. Earlier in the summer this boy had stolen a car, got drunk, and had a road accident in which a young girl was killed. Ever since the boy had been in a deep depression, which was the reason the family was now going to Avgai Khad. 'It is the sins of the boy which are the cause of all this', Sodnom said, waving his arm at the blackening sky.

Furthermore, Avgai Khad, it seemed, had days on which 'she did not like to receive people'. This was one of these days. It was now generally decided to give up. We made our propitiation to Mother Rock, throwing generous bowls of vodka in what we guessed might be the right direction. But it was still required that we stay to help the stranded jeeps, though one of the Volgas now slipped away. We drove across the river and made numerous fruitless attempts to drag out the jeeps. I thought about freezing to death overnight. 'Why don't we take the people to the nearest settlement? At least we could save them, and the jeeps could be collected when the storm dies down.' I made this

suggestion expecting it would have no effect, and sure enough, Sodnom brushed aside this Western thinking. The fact was no-one would leave their cars, even if being frozen was a distinct possibility. They could not trust the very first passer-by, let alone a rescue-team, not to steal every movable part. In the end it was decided to send the remaining Volga in search of a nearby camp which might have a tractor to pull out the jeeps.

To my surprise, since the likelihood of finding such a camp seemed remote, this plan was a sign for Luvsandorzh immediately to decide that we should leave the scene. He explained, 'If they find a tractor it will use diesel. The Volga driver will certainly tell them our jeep also runs on diesel and the tractor-driver will not come out unless we provide the fuel. Let's beat it now, otherwise we will not have enough to get back to Ulaanbaatar.' Thus assuming the hard-heartedness of the unknown tractor-driver we made an elaborate excuse and set off. 'At least we are now free of the influence of that evil boy', said Sodnom-Teacher. But matters did not improve. After some 30 kilometres our engine failed. After a tense hour or two, and long prayers in Tibetan, the engine came haltingly to life. Soon, virtually in the dark, we came across a green Lada, almost buried in snow. The people inside were marmot-hunters and they had run out of petrol. The driver stumbled over to us, his hair covered in frost to the scalp and icicles dangling from his ears. He was shaking so hard he could barely speak. We offered a ride, but these people also refused to leave their car. They sent a young boy with us to call out a relative from the city to rescue them. Waiting even overnight and the probability of frostbite, were preferable to the *certainty*, assumed by everyone, that their car would be robbed of all removable parts and rendered useless if they left it.

As we approached the city and safety Luvsandorzh leant out of his window to throw a bowl of vodka to the *oboo*, and he said:

Oboony ikh n' tand
Ölnzii ikh n' nadad,
Öndöriin ikh n' tand
Öglögiin ikh n' nadad

The greatest of the *oboos* to you
 The majority of the luck to me,
 The highest mountain to you
 Most of the due wealth to me.

Arriving home we discussed this ill-fated expedition and why the people so obstinately stuck to their cars. Sodnom said, 'First of all, they knew they would not actually die. All Mongolians know that if you have petrol or diesel all you have to do is find a clump of *ders* grass. With fuel you can make it burn slowly down to the root-ball; you can sit on the heated earth and survive for some hours.' I said I had not seen a bit of *ders* in the entire journey and I was very glad we had not been forced to try this method. He laughed and said, 'Well, it is true that when I was young no-one would have behaved like this. We used to leave our tents unlocked and all our property unguarded for days. The only danger was from professional horse-thieves, who made raids from a long way away. Otherwise there was complete trust.' I asked when this idyllic state of affairs had ended, expecting him to blame the new relaxation of public control brought by democracy. However, his reply was more interesting. He said, 'Oh this mistrust started with collectivization in the early 1960s. As you know, virtually all our property, all our

herds, all things like buildings, cars and machinery, were taken over by the state. And that was all right to steal. It was “ownerless property” as we used to say. Even religious people somehow did not blame a person who took things from the state. In fact, almost everyone did it if they could get away with it.’

Socialist property was ‘ownerless’ but at the same time each bit of it was always the responsibility of some state-defined post or status. I began to understand that people got used both to theft and to endless precautions against theft, and to a concept of property that was depersonalized because the relation between people and things was conditional. It was refracted by an abstract idea to which people gave only partial acknowledgement. State property ‘for the benefit of all’ was detached; it was detached both from the producers, who rarely used their own products, and from the consumers, who had little knowledge of the source of goods.

In the pre-collectivized past there had been little factory-made or ‘unmarked’ property in Mongolia. Virtually all things were made by someone specific, in their own way. During the social life of things they were further marked by the patina of use, by the grime and scratches and worn patches made by particular owners. People knew who made bridles or wooden bowls or tent poles and they knew the patterns of different regions, often even those of particular makers. Even livestock was marked in a somewhat similar way, since herders recognized the characteristics of flocks bred by neighbours, and where the animals were too numerous there was a system of brands and ear-marks which both linked and differentiated the animals of each family. Theft was socially virtually impossible because all things were so closely associated with recognized owners. This is why Sodnom-Teacher stressed that the horse-rustlers had been both professional and from distant parts: they had to be specialists to be able to



Stranded jeeps, Mongolia, September 1993, photo by Caroline Humphrey

mount lighting raids from sufficiently far away for the brands not to be recognized. The victims had to be socially distant enough from the rustlers to be constituted as 'people from whom one could steal'.

Collectivized property and industrially produced goods were a new category, anonymous, easily appropriated and relinquished. The idea of state property for the benefit of all was always in competition with individual desires and needs. The property that was 'in my charge and yet not mine' was always subject to filching, as officials knew well. The system was maintained by means of a massive apparatus of police and interior ministry control, which encompassed thieving as part of regular practice and sometimes severely punished it.

During 1990–92 Mongolia turned towards the market economy. The state herds were virtually all distributed among private owners or companies and to a lesser extent so were buildings, tractors, cars, and so forth. However, this has not reconstituted the pre-collectivized relation between people and property. The legitimacy of how the items were distributed, who got what and why, is still a matter of tension, though it seems to be accepted as a *fait accompli*. It is true that people do not overtly distinguish between the few private animals they owned in the collective period and those they received later, but still we cannot speak of a relation of inevitable closeness in the way that Sodnom-Teacher described for the period of his youth. In fact, theft has increased in the past few years. Like elsewhere in the ex-socialist world it is most evident in the towns and in district-centre villages where underemployed young people gather and there are plenty of migrants. But even in the countryside, where everyone knows everyone else, people are robbed and many take part in theft, and there is no-one who is not on their guard against it. If in socialist times theft from the state was part of general practice – you suddenly needed a new tyre, or a sheep to kill to welcome a guest – this has now become theft from private householders with their equivocal newly distributed property. It is perceived as part of the fight of each man for himself (which everyone had been taught in school is intrinsic to capitalism) and it is all the easier now that the apparatus of control is no longer feared. The jealous guarding of cars epitomizes this situation. In Mongolia cars are extraordinarily expensive and almost no-one earns enough simply to buy one from their wages. Cars come to people by other routes. They are emblems of the kind of highly desirable property that is dotted infrequently over the social landscape, no doubt unfairly, as many people must think.

People are too poor for a robbery simply to be written off as of no account. For months afterwards people will search for a stolen item, calling unexpectedly at a suspect neighbour, or going to lamas and fortune-tellers to give them a clue. On the Mongolian–Tuvan border, where cattle theft is endemic, people have captured human hostages in order to get their animals back.

In this situation of social mistrust Avgai Khad is a curious phenomenon. In England such a place would have been robbed and wrecked almost before it got going. Why has this not happened in Mongolia? The idea is just as abstract as the concept of state property. Here people are reconstituting nature, in this case the rock, whose 'head' was put back, and giving to it, with the idea that the personification of nature (the 'wife' or 'mother') will enable them to live successfully. Human misfortunes are aligned with perturbances of nature. I heard of one woman whose son had suddenly died. She went to consult a lama, who said that this tragedy was her responsibility.

'You disturbed the stones of Avgai Khad', he said.

'No, I didn't', she replied in surprise.

‘Think more carefully’, he replied. She thought hard and apparently remembered that as a child she had toppled some stones to the ground in the vicinity of Avgai Khad. The lama advised her that prayer and offering at the rock would bring back calm and harmony to her life.

It was this nameless concept of nature that Luvsandorzh was addressing at the *oboo* on the way home (he refused to give it as definite an identity as a spirit of the land, *gazaryn ejin*). In this way of thinking nature must be tended so that it may tend us. I do not think that this is seen as definitely as an exchange, but rather that items are given as signs of homage to Avgai Khad, or a pledges of good faith, in the hope that this will be reciprocated by a force that is greater than human activities and encompasses them. The processes of reciprocation in nature are mysterious and unpredictable and also omnipresent (remember that our libation to Avgai Khad was made into the empty air when we had no real idea where the rock lay), but to make such an offering and a vow is to become part of these processes.

It is the idea of necessity which allows borrowing from Avgai Khad not to be considered as theft. Necessity, as I came to understand, is seen not just as a set of general conditions but also includes desires, things which may be necessary for me but not for you, if our human lives are to be lived as they should be. People I spoke to agreed that a man who borrowed a large sum from Avgai Khad to pay for his son’s college course was quite justified in doing so, as a good education in this case was a necessity. It corresponds with this attitude that the money ‘paid in’ to the Mother Rock is also a matter of the individual conscience. Dulma never told me, nor even Sodnom, how much she was going to offer when she made her petition to be rid of the migraines.

Perhaps there is something that is distinctively post-socialist (as well as very ancient) about the phenomenon of the Mother Rock. We could say from the outside that it has established a small area of economic mutuality in a world which is beset with lack of trust and that Avgai Khad is thus a social institution. But the people involved do not see it like this. For them it is a means of influencing the events in their own lives, a way of making wishes come true. Mother Rock, they say, has *real* power, like the power that brought about the sudden blizzard. Mongolians would absolutely refuse the idea that Avgai Khad is some kind of substitute for previous communal institutions. This is because its source is quite different. It is founded on an idea of interiorized conscience, in its own idiom of individual human relations with nature, rather than legal rules derived from an intellectualist theory about society. Avgai Khad has its place alongside the emergence of small Buddhist monasteries and nunneries, the success of evangelist missions, and the enthusiasm for all sorts of cults which is present in Mongolia these days.

PRODUCER GROUPS AND THE DECOLLECTIVIZATION OF THE MONGOLIAN PASTORAL ECONOMY

David Sneath



INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the decollectivization of Mongolian pastoralism, and analyses the types of groups and institutional frames within which economic activity was conducted in the collective, pre-collective and post-collective eras. The self-provisioning domestic group with small numbers of livestock is contrasted with large-scale pastoral institutions, two institutional settings that have been symbiotically related in the past. It is argued that while large-scale pastoralist operations can provide a number of benefits and economies of scale, institutions capable of providing these to the majority of pastoral households in the current climate are unlikely to emerge through the operation of market forces alone. It falls to policy makers to establish a climate that can support larger scale pastoral operations, or other institutions capable of providing equivalent benefits.

The first part of the chapter is historical and outlines the role of large-scale pastoral operations of the past. It describes the pastoral household and encampment, and the results of the policies by which pastoralists were incorporated into rural collectives during the state socialist era. There follows a description of the economic reforms launched in the 1990s, the decollectivization of the pastoral sector, and its effects. One of the results of reform was to expand the pastoral economies of individual domestic units at the expense of large-scale institutions. In the atomized pastoral sector that has emerged, establishing larger economic formations without material and institutional support from the state has been beset with difficulties. The next section examines the case of the *horshoo* (producers cooperatives) most of which have collapsed in recent years. The only large livestock holdings that appear to be expanding at present are those of wealthy households. The following section briefly describes the operation of one of the richest of these, and examines current trends in the distribution of herd-wealth between households. The conclusion reviews the contrasting fortunes of the cooperatives and the rich herd owner, and argues that both the household and historically successful large-scale pastoral operations relied upon a series of non-market institutions for their viability. It is argued that without this 'institutional depth' (stable social and political relations outside the narrowly

economic), new formations that support efficient large-scale pastoralist activities are unlikely to emerge.

HISTORICAL PATTERNS OF PASTORALISM

Pastoralism has been practised on the grasslands of Mongolia since ancient times. Much of the land is poorly suited to agriculture, but is used as grazing by pastoralists, most of whom are still mobile and move to different seasonal pastures as part of an annual cycle. The principal domesticated animals are horses, cattle (including yaks in highland regions), sheep, goats, and camels.

In the Manchu period, from the late seventeenth century until the twentieth, Mongolian society can be described as neo-feudal, composed of a ruling aristocracy and subordinate classes that roughly correspond to 'commoners', 'freemen', and a category of personal servants.¹ The Buddhist Church was a vast establishment with enormous wealth, ruling a number of districts and commanding its own servants and subjects. The principal administrative district was the *hoshuu* ('banner') ruled by the *Zasag*—the aristocratic prince of a secular *hoshuu*, or the *Hubilgan* (reincarnate senior lama) of an ecclesiastic one. Within the *hoshuu*, the herdsmen were assigned to subunits called *sum*, and within these to smaller units called *bag*.² Each of these units had officials responsible for them, and the herdsmen were usually required to use pastures allocated to these subunits.

Large numbers of the animals of a district were owned by the nobles or monasteries, and herded for them by their subjects.³ Most of the commoners also owned their own livestock, although the poorest households had few or none and worked for wealthier families to make a living. Although most households owned a range of livestock breeds, there were also specialists who would look after large herds of certain breeds (such as horses) for their noble or monastic masters. Large and small herds were commonly 'leased out' to a herding family who undertook their management in return for a proportion of the animal produce and offspring. The term used for these arrangements was *süreg tavih* (to 'place a herd'). This created a spectrum of pastoral activities, from the immense operations of the wealthy lords and monasteries, through a range of intermediate scale operations managed by more or less wealthy households, to the tiny herds of the poorest subjects. The smaller operations typically formed part of the larger systems. The poor tended to be attached to the better equipped households who were in turn part of the wider economy of the *hoshuu*, either actually herding livestock for the great estates, or simply as subjects of the local authorities who managed land use throughout the district.

There are a number of reasons for cooperation and coordination in pastoralism on the Mongolian steppe. There is relatively little forage available on much of the arid and semi-arid land on which yields are low.⁴ Historically large numbers of livestock could be successfully raised by moving them to different seasonal pastures to make use of the various ecological and climatic conditions that make them more or less suitable in a given season. Conditions are highly variable, so that being able to move livestock in response to changing climatic conditions is a key method of avoiding livestock losses. Pastoralism in Mongolia has, therefore, been based on institutional arrangements that permit flexible use of pastures over large areas.

A reconstruction of the pastoral system of an ecclesiastical *hoshuu* in what is now

Bayanhongor *aimag* (province) shows that the pre-revolutionary elites were able to organize highly sophisticated systems of pastoralism. The subjects of the monastery were divided into groups depending on the monastic livestock allocated to them. The groups were assigned different seasonal movement routes to make best use of pastures and conditions throughout the district. The camel herders, for example, made some of the longest movements, spending winter and spring on the slopes of Altan mountain in the Gobi, and summer 150 km north in the foothills of the Hangai range. The horse and sheep herders also summered in the Hangai, but used winter and spring pastures by the southerly Bogd mountain range, and spent autumn by Lake Orog. The cattle herders confined their movements to the valleys of the Hangai, near the monastery to which they supplied milk products. Specified amounts of livestock and produce were delivered to monastery officials every year. Other monastic subjects were assigned the task of raising crops in the more fertile areas, so the *hoshuu* also had its own supply of grain.

All pastoralists are not equally able to make use of high-mobility techniques. Poor households without transportation or draft animals have difficulty moving without assistance. In the past the amount of movement in which a household engaged depended on its wealth, and the institutional frames within which it worked. Poor households incorporated into the establishments of wealthier neighbours moved with them. Those herding large numbers of camels and horses for monastic or noble masters appear to have moved most (see Sneath 1999).

Livestock are separated into single-species herds (except in the case of sheep and goats which are herded together). In most conditions one or two herders can look after several hundred livestock as well as they can a few dozen, so pooling livestock into reasonably large herds can save labour. The most difficult time for pastoralists is generally the winter and spring, when the availability of natural fodder is at its lowest and the stress on livestock is greatest. This 'bottleneck' is eased by the supply of fodder, typically hay, although this did not become widespread until the collective period.

The Household and Encampment

In some respects the pastoral household has remained relatively unchanged since the Manchu period. In particular its division of labour and its organization of domestic space have altered very little. The principal property owning domestic group was and still generally is the *öröh* (family or household), with a head who has formal authority over its assets.⁵ The composition of this unit varies widely, but today it often consists of a nuclear or virilocal stem family (a couple, their unmarried children, and the nuclear families of their married sons).

One or more households camping together form an encampment known as the *ail*, *hot*, or *hot-ail*. The households composing an *ail* capture some economies of scale by herding their livestock jointly, and members help each other in numerous everyday tasks. Most pastoral encampments are composed of a number of nuclear and stem families, related in various ways. These may change from year to year, in line with changing interpersonal relations of the members, and in many cases they vary from season to season, so that the membership of an encampment at the summer pastures is often different from that at the autumn, winter, or spring pastures. In some regions, such as the Gobi, *ails* tend to be small, and are usually composed of a single family.

The large encampment cannot be considered a stable producer group. Often it is only the component parts (generally nuclear or stem families) that remain constant units

throughout the pastoral year.⁶ The encampment might be better conceived of as the manifestation of social relations in a residential form. These relations form a fluid and flexible network, based largely on kinship, but also on friendship, and sometimes employer–employee or patron–client relations. This pattern seems to date from the Manchu period, if not before. The pre-collective encampment described by Simukov in 1933 shows the same characteristics. It is the constituent households and the process by which these come together to form encampments that are persistent institutions, not each encampment itself.⁷

Collectivization

In 1911 the Manchu Qing dynasty collapsed, and Outer Mongolia declared its independence under the head of the Buddhist Church, the Bogd Khan—‘Holy King.’ The social order remained relatively unchanged until the 1920s, when a Soviet-backed Revolutionary Party took power, and began to dismantle the neo-feudal structures.

The new regime attempted to collectivize pastoralism in the late 1920s and early 1930s, but the policies proved to be so unpopular they had to be abandoned. In order to prevent further damage to the pastoral economy the regime had to allow the monasteries to continue to manage their livestock holdings (*jas*), although these had been reduced in size. By the end of the 1930s, however, the Church and nobility had been largely stripped of their wealth, and much of their livestock holdings distributed to poor households. The Mongolian state simultaneously increased its direct control of the pastoral economy, introducing compulsory state delivery quotas in 1941. In the late 1940s and 1950s collectivization was attempted again, using more gradual and less coercive methods and this time it was carried through successfully.

At the end of the collectivization process about 250 rural districts (*sum*) supported a single collective farm (*negdel*) which raised livestock in accordance with state planning. The pastoral *sum* generally consisted of a central settlement of a few hundred households and a large area of grassland in which something like the same number of pastoral households kept livestock, most of them living in mobile felt yurts. These pastoral families were organized into production brigades.

The collective not only owned most of the livestock of the district, it also controlled land-use. Although the new *sum* districts were generally smaller than the earlier *hoshuu* (banners), and in some regions there was some reduction in the distance of seasonal movements, in general the pastoralists remained highly mobile, moving to seasonal pastures throughout the year, and making additional movements if necessary. The collectives owned and maintained machinery for transportation and hay-cutting services that were used to support pastoralism. Herding households were generally moved by collective trucks on the longest legs of the annual migration, and hay was delivered to help feed livestock during the difficult months of winter and early spring.

Herding became highly specialized in the collectives. A given *suur* would be allocated collective livestock of a single species (except for sheep and goats, which were virtually always herded together), and often of a particular age or sex—such as mares, or one- and two-year-old lambs and kids.⁸ Alongside these collective livestock each *surr* herded a number of personal livestock (each household being allowed up to fifty, or seventy-five in some cases). These were generally of several different species so that they could supply families with meat, milk, and other products for domestic consumption.

Brigades generally assigned seasonal pastures and movement routes to the *suurs* depending on the collective livestock they had been allocated.

The collectives were designed to produce raw materials for indigenous manufacturing industry and export. Each *negdel* was set a five-year plan by the state, with a quota of products to be delivered at fixed prices. Much higher prices were paid, up to 50 per cent more, for production over the plan. About half the income of the collective was paid as wages to its employees, the rest being used for building programmes, maintaining water resources, and the purchase of hay, fuel, and other inputs.

In terms of pastoral management, the collectives can be compared with the largescale pastoral institutions of the past. They regulated access to pasture in a way that was comparable to the role of the pre-revolutionary banner authorities. They took ownership of almost all the livestock of the district, but allocated these to households to herd in a way that was not entirely dissimilar to older practices of *süreg tavih*. They also organized specialist herding of large, single-species herds, and extra pastoral movement, as had rich herd-owning agencies of the past; indeed the collectives developed an even greater degree of specialization. They can be seen as the most centralized and monopolistic form that such large-scale institutions have taken in the history of Mongolian pastoralism.

Macroeconomic Reform and Mongolia's 'Age of the Market'

The political changes that swept through the Soviet Union and its satellite states in the early 1990s thrust Mongolia into an era of economic reform. The government launched a series of policies designed to create a market economy based on private property. The economic advice that former Soviet-block nations received resembled the stabilization and structural reform packages recommended for poor countries by the IMF and the World Bank in the 1970s and 1980s (Nolan 1995: 75). It included price liberalization, cuts in state subsidies and expenditure, currency convertibility, privatization of public assets and the rapid introduction of markets.

These policy recommendations were based on the notion of a 'transition' from what was seen as an inefficient and moribund centrally planned economy to the presumed efficiency and dynamism of the free market. The aim of reform was to 'emancipate' the economy from the political structure, by introducing private property and the market. A bright economic future was predicted for Mongolia at that time—the government talked of the country becoming the fifth Asian Tiger within five years.⁹ In 1991 Mongolia began a huge programme to privatize state and collective enterprises through the issue of share coupons (*tasalbar*).¹⁰ In rural districts the reforms included the dissolution of the collectives (*negdel*) and later most of the state farms (*sangiin aj ahui*) which managed the bulk of pastoral and agricultural production.

The 'Age of the Market' (*zah zeeliin üye*) as Mongolians called the post-socialist period, saw Mongolia plunged into economic crisis. The worst disruption occurred in the early 1990s when incomes plummeted. The World Bank estimated that real wages halved between 1990 and 1992, and then declined by a further third in 1993.¹¹ Official figures showed that income-poverty increased from almost zero in 1989 to 27 per cent in 1994,¹² and a 1998 survey of living standards suggested that over 33 per cent of Mongolians were living below the poverty line.¹³ Social services were cut; real expenditure on health services decreased by 43 per cent from 1990 to 1992, and the education budget was cut by 56 per cent.¹⁴ Further reductions followed and social service spending has

remained low since. The official figures for unemployment increased rapidly in the early 1990s, and actual unemployment was estimated at 15 per cent in 1997.¹⁵ The rate of inflation shot up and stayed in triple figures from 1991 to 1993, only falling gradually thereafter.

In part this economic crisis was the result of the loss of Soviet aid (some estimates suggest this amounted to as much as a third of GDP or more)¹⁶ which was reduced in 1989 and stopped altogether in 1991. The Soviet trading block, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance also collapsed at this time, and Mongolian trade fell dramatically (exports declining from 832 million USD in 1989 to 370 million in 1991). However, the place of Russia as aid donor was taken over, to some extent, by western nations, Japan, and international financial institutions. Between them these donors provided support equivalent to about 15 per cent of GDP in 1991 and 1992.¹⁷ By 1996 this had risen to 25 per cent of GDP.¹⁸ Thus, the loss of Soviet aid can only be held partially responsible for Mongolia's crisis. As Griffin argues, one of the reasons for the severity of the economic collapse was the nature of the reform policies carried out at the time—in particular the rapid privatization programme.¹⁹

The situation stabilized to some extent in the mid-1990s, with GDP seeing some positive growth in 1994 and 1995, but stalling in 1996 when the prices of copper and cashmere (Mongolia's main exports) fell. A newly elected government embarked on an aggressive programme of economic 'shock treatment' to remove the last vestiges of the centrally planned economy, including liberalizing fuel prices and a campaign to privatize housing.²⁰ GDP growth was estimated at 2.4 per cent in 1996, and 4 and 3.5 per cent in 1997 and 1998.²¹

The Mongolian economy has become increasingly reliant on pastoralism, which in 1998 accounted for 88 per cent of the total output of agriculture. The relative importance of the agricultural sector increased as GDP as a whole declined and other sectors of the economy collapsed. In 1989 agriculture contributed just 16 per cent of total GDP, for example. By 1998 this had risen to 33 per cent.

The Decollectivization of Pastoralism

The dissolution of the collectives began in 1991 and was complete by 1993. The bulk of the livestock and other assets was divided between the members, and became their private property. What remained of the collectives were often redesignated joint stock companies (*kompani*), or cooperatives (*horshoo*).

The pastoral sector has emerged from the reforms composed of vast numbers of households engaged in small-scale pastoral production. Decollectivization eliminated the jobs of most of the workers in the *sum* centres. They were given a share of the collective's assets, in most cases livestock, with which to make their living, so that the number of people relying directly on pastoralism increased dramatically.²² The number of registered herders more than trebled in the 9 years from 1989 to 1998, from 135,420 to 414,433, from less than 18 per cent to 50 per cent of the working population.²³ This change appears to be an enduring aspect of reform. There is little prospect of growth in employment in other sectors of the economy. The number of jobs in manufacturing, industry, construction, transport, and communication have all declined by around 25–50 per cent since 1990. The only sector of the economy, other than pastoralism, in which employment has increased is trade and commerce. This sector remains small, accounting for 9.2 per cent of the national workforce in 1998.²⁴

The increase in numbers of pastoral households is affecting the patterns of pastoral land-use as many of these 'new herders' still have dwellings at the *sum* centre and tend to be much less mobile than the established herding households who were part of specialized herding brigades in the collectives. Some can place their livestock with friends or relatives among the remaining mobile households on a long-term basis, but other 'new herders' pasture their livestock relatively near to the settlement for some or all of the year. The effects of these changes on grassland ecosystems have yet to be seen, but recent research from Inner Mongolia and other regions where pastoralism has become sedentary suggests that lower livestock mobility is damaging to pasture land.²⁵

The dissolution of the old system has meant the loss of a number of important benefits that the collectives had supplied. Under the collectives, pastoralists were provided with a secure income with which they could buy basic consumer goods that were supplied to collective centres and to distant encampments by truck. The collectives also provided secure basic food supplies and flour was kept cheap and readily available. Since decollectivization the price of flour and other staple foods has increased much more quickly than the prices paid to pastoralists for their products (wool, meat, and milk) and supplies are often unreliable. This is of central importance to pastoral households, who have to have carbohydrates to balance their meat-rich diet, and who have few alternatives to flour. Mongolia used to be almost self-sufficient in grain production, but the grain harvest has declined dramatically since reforms began, from 718 thousand tons in 1990 to 195 thousand tons in 1998.²⁶ The shortfall has had to be filled with imported flour, and prices have risen accordingly.

In the past the cheap fuel that the Soviet Union supplied to Mongolia meant that mechanical transport, a key factor in such a huge and thinly populated country, was affordable and widely available. This was particularly important for pastoralists. As the price of petrol increased in the nineties, transportation became increasingly expensive and medical and veterinary treatment less accessible.

The collectives used to cut hay mechanically, and then distribute it by truck to pastoral households for use as winter fodder. Since decollectivization individual households have had to cut hay by hand, and transport it themselves—often using animal carts. This is physically demanding work, and households without active adult members or the money to buy hay find it difficult or impossible to gain sufficient winter fodder for their animals.

In the collective period pastoralists were often moved on the longest legs of their annual migration by collective truck, which greatly eased the difficulty of these distant movements. The dissolution of the collective motor pools and the increase in fuel costs have made seasonal movement much more difficult for most pastoral families, who have increasingly had to rely on animal transport. This is one of the reasons for a general decline in pastoral movement. There has also been a reduction in the regulation of access to pasture, which had been overseen by collective and state farm officials. Many herding families have become less inclined to make arduous, long distance moves between seasonal pastures for fear that their best pastures may be used by others if they vacate them. In addition to the regular movements between established seasonal pastures, the collectives also organized extra pastoral movement excursions called *otor*—a traditional technique by which livestock are repeatedly and flexibly moved over distant and lesser-used pastures at times of fodder shortage, as a method of intensively feeding them. This was usually done by a team of experienced herders living in tents away from the main encampments. *Otor* has now become less common since many households have

neither the labour-power nor the inclination to organize their own *otor* trips, and may or may not be able to place their livestock with herds that are still being taken on them.

Pastoral Production and Terms of Trade

Livestock numbers have risen since decollectivization as many rural households have come to rely upon their herds for their subsistence and seek the security of larger herds. As Fig. 51.1 shows, from 1990 to 1998 the national herd increased by over 20 per cent from 25.9 to 31.9 million head.²⁷ Goat numbers increased particularly rapidly, indeed goats alone account for most of the increase. This reflects the continued demand for cashmere, and the fact that pastoralists can increase their cashmere sales without slaughtering livestock.

Survival rates of offspring have fallen by around 10 per cent since decollectivization. However, the numbers of livestock consumed and marketed has declined even more dramatically (by about 20 per cent), so livestock totals rose nevertheless. But the new pastoral sector has proved to be more vulnerable to climatic variation than the relatively well supplied and coordinated collective system. Over 6 million livestock were lost in the harsh winters between 1999–2002, and the end of year livestock total had sunk to around 2b million in 2001—little more than the 1990 level. These trends have accompanied a decrease in the associated manufacturing and processing industries. From 1993 to 1998 carpet production fell by 64 per cent, felt production by 31 per cent, camel wool blankets by 46 per cent, and felt boots by 19 per cent. Leather goods have been




Figure 51.1 Livestock population of Mongolia, 1918–98

Sources: Statistical Office of Mongolia (1981: 178); Sheehy (1996: 46); Mongolian Ministry of Agriculture (1998).




Figure 51.2 Mongolian meat and livestock

Note: Data for 1994 are unavailable.

Sources: Statistical Office of Mongolia (1993: 78–79); National Statistical Office of Mongolia (1998: 140); WB (1994: table 5.1).

particularly badly affected, leather shoe, coat, and jacket production falling to a tiny fraction of their earlier levels.²⁸ Only cashmere sales have increased. Much of this is now being exported for processing in China.

In part the rapid contraction of these industries was a result of the dissolution of the Soviet trading block which led to a decline in demand for Mongolian finished goods. The surviving industries complain about the difficulties of obtaining sufficient supplies of animal products at prices that are competitive.²⁹ Although prices have fallen, the difficulties have also been the result of the collapse of the state procurement system including the state farms and collectives that used to supply particular factories directly. The collectives organized vast livestock drives which moved animals along designated corridors to the slaughterhouses in the capital. These operations disappeared with the collectives and livestock is now commonly purchased by relatively small-scale traders, often using a single truck.

Since decollectivization the pastoral sector has become much less able to supply produce for foreign markets. In the collective era Mongolia exported between 25–40,000 tons of meat, 25–30,000 tons of livestock, and over 60,000 head of horses each year. These exports declined in 1991, when the Soviet trading block stopped functioning, and almost collapsed entirely in 1992 when decollectivization was completed. Meat exports in 1998 amounted to only 7500 tons. Livestock and horse exports have become insignificant.³⁰ This is disappointing, particularly in view of Mongolia's rail links with China, as well as Russia, both of which represent huge markets for meat.

Early in the reform process it was seen that the new policies were not having the desired effects with respect to the marketing of pastoral produce. In 1991, for example, western economic advice led to the Mongolian government introducing a policy of freeing the price of milk. Liberalizing milk prices, it was thought, would increase the rewards to the producer and increase the supply. After letting milk prices float for six

months the price of milk in the cities had increased to nine times the original price, but the amount of milk available had halved.³¹ The dramatic increase in meat prices in 1991 also failed to improve meat supply.³²

Selling animal products can be difficult for pastoralists, particularly the more remote households. As a result of such difficulties a cash shortage developed in most rural districts. Inflation was in triple figures from 1991 to 1993, and although it has fallen since then, herding families are often understandably reluctant to use cash for their transactions. Many prefer to have the products that they require instead—flour, tea, cloth, tobacco, alcohol, candles, and salt. There has been a spread of barter trade, (traders taking livestock directly in exchange for consumer goods that they bring with them). In remote regions such as Hövsgöl pastoralists complained that opportunities to obtain consumer goods were rare so they ended up paying very high prices (in livestock) for traded goods.

It is difficult to calculate the changing 'terms of trade' for pastoralists because in the collective era pastoralists were paid salaries rather than relying on private sales. However, it is clear that changing prices have reduced the buying power of pastoral households with respect to subsistence items. The most essential foodstuff that pastoralists must purchase is flour. In 1990 the cost of flour was 1 *tögrög* (the Mongolian unit of currency) per kilo, while meat cost 5.9 *tögrög*.³³ In 1998 the cost of flour averaged around 300 *tögrög* per kilo, while mutton averaged around 500.³⁴ Meat was worth less than a third of its former value in terms of flour.

This is reflected in the budgets of pastoral households. My estimate of the average agricultural household's income in 1990 is 10,990 *tögrög*, which was then the equivalent of about 11 tons of flour.³⁵ In 1998 the average annual income of rural households was 1,009,660 *tögrög*. This could buy about 3.365 tons of flour.³⁶ It should be noted that these calculations are based on prices found in the *aimag* centre. Terms of trade are generally even more unfavourable in pastoral districts where transportation costs are usually higher. Indeed, in some remote regions flour may not be for sale at all. Families have to make their own arrangements to have it brought to them from elsewhere.

There seems to be little sign of the relative price of livestock products improving in the near future. A lowering of transportation and marketing costs would require investment in vehicles and trading facilities. The level of investment in rural districts is low and has declined steadily in recent years. The percentage of all bank loans granted to borrowers outside the capital city of Ulaanbaatar has fallen each year throughout the nineties, from 46 per cent in 1993 to 11 per cent in 1998.³⁷

There has been an increase in the activities of Chinese traders, and it is possible that increased competition between buyers will eventually begin to drive up the prices of pastoral products. However, the Mongolian pastoral sector has to compete with that of Inner Mongolia, which is a huge producer of identical pastoral products, much closer and better-connected to major markets in China. Another long-term possibility is that Russian demand might improve.

The thinking behind the decollectivization programme seems to have been that privatization would improve the efficiency and initiative of herdsman and release the state from the burden of subsidizing collective and state farms. The effect has been to create an atomized pastoral economy, composed of thousands of scattered households oriented primarily towards subsistence production, only a fraction in a position to supply their produce to the urban markets. The reform policies dismantled the state procurement system and the institutions oriented towards providing livestock produce

for the cities and export. Without the transportation arrangements of the official procurement system, selling milk and meat represents a good deal of effort for hard-pressed pastoral families who are no longer under any official obligation to sell.

The difficulties faced by the pastoral sector raise the question whether the dissolution of the collectives was an inevitable consequence of changing economic conditions, or whether, in a modified form, the collectives could have survived the withdrawal of Soviet aid.³⁸

Group Functions in the Pastoral Sector

It is difficult to separate 'internal' and 'external' factors that affect the operation of pastoral producer groups, particularly in the state socialist era when collectives formed part of an integrated national economy. (The terms of trade for the pastoral sector were relatively good, for example, because produce was directed to state factories and ring-fenced CMEA markets). Some of the key 'internal' factors that affect the functioning of pastoral producers, however, are rights to land-use, rights to livestock and other property, the ability to command labour, and the capacity to acquire and operate machinery. Different combinations of these determinants allow a greater or lesser amount of herd specialization, labour economies, and optimal use of forage resources in different ecological settings.

An examination of the recent history of Mongolian pastoralism suggests that the possible efficiency gains associated with groups involved in large-scale operations cannot be treated as functions that are somehow independent of their social settings. This is particularly clear with respect to the ability of a group to command labour and investment, and orient management strategies towards its continued existence. These are directly connected with the institutional context of the group in question, be it a household or a large official agency.

Historically, large-scale pastoral institutions combined rights to the flexible use of pasture, often widely dispersed; ownership of large numbers of livestock; and the ability to command labour. When working well they were able to capture considerable economies of scale, optimize land-use and supply large amounts of produce for sale. They were also able to take advantage of economies of scale in marketing pastoral produce and acquiring consumer goods. This was particularly true of the collective period when pastoral production was directed towards state industries and the collectives were large enough to be able to organize activities tailored to particular types of demand—such as the rearing of specialist breeds, large dairies, and livestock drives to slaughterhouses.

It is likely that reform of the collectives would have served Mongolia better than their dissolution, despite the unavoidable changes in the macroeconomic climate. A recent ODI study compared the pastoral sectors of Turkmenistan, where collectives were reformed, and Kazakhstan, where they were disbanded. The findings suggest that the conditions for pastoral households in Turkmenistan, although difficult, are still better than in Kazakhstan, which faces some of the same sorts of problem of atomization as Mongolia.³⁹ The principal reasons for the dissolution of the collectives in Mongolia seem to have been political. In 1990 an FAO workshop on Mongolian pastoralism concluded 'there is no reason why they [the collectives] should not survive an economic liberalisation programme, although probably with modified functions.'⁴⁰

The Institutional Frames for Pastoralism

Looking at the history of pastoralism in Mongolia one can identify two categories of economic groups, and their associated institutional frames. The first is the household; the focus of subsistence activities oriented towards satisfying domestic requirements. In the collective period this was represented by each pastoral family being allowed relatively small numbers of their own livestock (50 head in most regions). As these were the personal livestock of the family, not herded for others under contractual obligation, their products were used by the working household itself.

At the other end of the spectrum stood the large-scale pastoral operations organized by agencies with a large number of animals—usually a noble family, ecclesiastical institution, local government office, rich commoner, or (later) collective farm. These were characterized by the owning agency having herds cared for by other pastoral households, and often involved the specialized herding of large single-species herds. If the owning agency had the authority to do so, these operations might also rotate large single-species herds between widely separated seasonal pastures chosen for being particularly well suited for that species. In such arrangements the subordinate herders generally had contractual obligations to supply a certain quota of produce and retained only the surplus for themselves. Between the theoretical extremes of the vast holdings of a wealthy monastery or lord, and the tiny herd of a poor subject, there was a range of intermediate-scale pastoral operations conducted by more or less wealthy households.

These various economic formations not only differed in scale; the ends of this continuum represented institutional frames with quite different primary objectives. The domestic group's priority was the security, subsistence and provisioning of its members, while the large-scale specialist pastoral and herd-placing operations were undertaken to generate and supply a surplus of livestock and products to the owning agency.⁴¹ These two orientations were symbiotically related—large-scale operations depended on the subsistence of domestic groups, and domestic groups often also depended on large-scale operations to produce their subsistence reliably.

Subsistence pastoralists and wealthy surplus-oriented herd-owners did not necessarily have conflicting interests. The existence of specialist herding seems to have allowed smaller producers to place some of their stock with these larger herds, so benefiting from economies of scale. Wealthy commoners often attracted the labour of poorer households because they could offer such benefits.⁴² Furthermore, there were also benefits from participation in the wider politico-economic order of the district. In the neo-feudal period district authorities organized specialist activities of benefit to the whole community, such as the cultivation of wheat. Such activities were often an assigned feudal duty for specialist households.⁴³

One of the most important priorities for subsistence-oriented pastoralists is longterm food security, this frequently means they reduce offtake to a minimum so as to build-up livestock numbers in their herd. Figure 51.1 shows that the post-collective increase in livestock numbers is not unprecedented. A comparable increase occurred throughout the 1920s and 1930s, at a time when the large-scale pastoral operations of the aristocracy and monasteries were being dismantled by the new revolutionary government. Confiscated aristocratic and monastery livestock were redistributed among herding households. The surplus animals that would have been extracted by the old elite were now accumulated by pastoralists. Total numbers of livestock increased from 10 million in 1918 to over 25 million in 1940.

With the introduction of compulsory state delivery quotas in 1941 and collectivization in the 1950s, herd offtake increased and livestock numbers fell a little and stabilized. Both neo-feudal and collective systems managed to export large amounts of livestock. By the end of the nineteenth century Outer Mongolia was probably exporting at least one million sheep units of livestock to China each year—about 5 per cent of the total national herd.⁴⁴ In the collective era the Mongolian state was also able to procure and export large numbers of animals. State procurement in 1985, for example, was almost 207 thousand tons (live weight) of meat and livestock, and 87.4 thousand head of horses. Of this 63.1 thousand horses and 61.5 thousand tons of livestock and meat were exported—4.7 per cent of the national herd, by my estimate, which is rather close to the pre-revolutionary figure above.⁴⁵

COOPERATIVES (*HORSHOO*)

It was recognized at the time that the dismantling of the state procurement structures in the early 1990s would create a vacuum in the system for marketing pastoral produce. It was hoped that a number of different institutions would fill the gap. In many districts the former *negdel*, now reclassified as a Joint Stock Company, continued for a while to operate as the principal marketing organization. Alongside these some individual traders emerged to buy and sell pastoral produce, often to relatively small numbers of households. The large distances between pastoral households makes transportation a key feature of any such marketing operation, and a household's opportunity to trade with a given agent generally depends on whether or not it makes economic, social, or geographic sense for him to visit it. The personal networks of traders, their kin, and friends, means that most households can expect periodic visits and opportunities to market their produce in this way.

The government made provision for the formation of enterprises termed 'cooperatives' (*horshoo*) to be formed by members pooling their shares of the collective to gain joint ownership of some section of the old *negdel*. Some of these were medium-sized productive operations based on a former collective resource, such as a vegetable-growing or hay-cutting operation, or a small dairy. Most of these were classified as 'limited liability companies', 'limited liability cooperatives' or just 'cooperatives'.⁴⁶

An example of such a post-collective enterprise was the Bayan Tsagaan *horshoo* in Bayantumen *sum*, Dornod. Founded in April 1993, it was a relatively small organization composed of ten families, all of whom were kin. The cooperative was formed around a set of former collective assets: some vehicles, a large winter animal enclosure, some haymaking and potato fields. Membership was based upon the kin network of the man who was central to its formation, rather than any residential or neighbourhood group. Several members had come from some distance to join the cooperative that their kinsman had founded. Although all ten member households helped make hay together in the summer, most of them lived in different places for the rest of the year. The *horshoo* was described as a temporary and experimental formation, which might be disbanded if it was not seen to be working well.

By 1996 the Bayan Tsagaan had been disbanded. Indeed the majority of productive enterprises of this type have gone bankrupt or ceased trading, and the average number of staff and livestock holdings of the surviving enterprises has declined. Of the 370 that had been established throughout the country by 1992, less than half (173) still existed in

1998. Of these only 109 owned livestock, the average holding being a modest 1780 head.⁴⁷

A second type of rural cooperative also emerged immediately after privatization. These were small-scale voluntary associations of pastoral households, set-up to act as marketing organizations to sell their produce and deliver consumer goods in return. Several of these were established in almost every district in Mongolia, often one in each bag subdistrict. Virtually all of them collapsed within two or three years of their foundation. In two pastoral districts in Hövsgöl province, Renchinlhümbe and Hanh, for example, none of the *horshoo* that had been formed were still operating by 1996. In Hanh the privatization of the local collective began in 1990. Three cooperatives were formed, named Zul ('Lamp'), Bayan Uul ('Rich Mountain'), and Jimst ('Fruitful').⁴⁸ By 1994 they had all become bankrupt or had ceased to trade, although they retained a nominal existence in local government records.

The membership of the cooperatives coincided with administrative divisions, so that the clientele of the cooperative were generally the members of a given production brigade of the old *negdel*, now renamed *bag*. The Bayan Uul *horshoo* was formed in 1992 by a retired military officer named Batsuur. As a respected senior figure it was felt that Batsuur was someone whom local pastoral families could trust. Around thirty-five households were members of the cooperative, about half the total number of households in the subdistrict (*bag*). For two years the cooperative bought livestock products from member households and marketed it, bringing consumer goods that the households required in exchange. But in 1994 the cooperative went bankrupt and ceased to operate. The main problem, Batsuur explained, was a lack of capital.

There were a number of immediate causes of the failure of Bayan Uul. Produce had to be transported to the provincial centre of Mörön and consumer goods purchased there. At first it had been assumed that the *horshoo* could use the *usan zam* ('water road')—a regular ferry service that had run the length of Lake Hövsgöl from Hanh to Hatgal. However this service became increasingly expensive and unreliable, and instead the passage had to be made using the long and very poor road down the lake edge.

As a result of the increased costs, the *horshoo* soon found that its trading capital was exhausted. The prices paid to the member families for pastoral products in the first year of operation were disappointing. Moreover, the membership proved increasingly unwilling to supply produce on credit as required. They were themselves faced with a cash shortage, and many preferred to trust what produce they had with relatives or friends. The number of families prepared to market their produce through the *horshoo* dwindled to a group largely composed of Batsuur's family and friends.

Some of the other former members of the *horshoo* explained that it had begun to seem better to them to make use of personal contacts, family, and friends to sell and procure goods. They were obliged to see their close kin and friends anyway, and could trust them to bring back consumer goods if any could be found. Households in the sum centre villages, towns and cities typically stock up on *idesh* (food supplies) in early winter by visiting pastoral members of their networks to get meat and milk products. It has become very common for households to rely on their own networks of friends and relatives to procure commodities they need in this way, and as an outlet for livestock produce such as wool and cashmere.

It became increasingly difficult to persuade people to give up their time to administer and work on the *horshoo* operation, and there was no available money to pay them. In 1994 Batsuur declared the Bayan Uul bankrupt (*dampuursan*). All its assets had

apparently been expended in its last year of trading. The experience of Bayan Uul *horshoo* was not unusual. Both Jimst and Zul, the other cooperatives in the sum, had also ceased trading by this time.

Staff at the National Association of Agricultural Cooperative Members in the capital, Ulaanbaatar, explained that the principal reasons for the failure of the *horshoo* were: (a) High interest rates, which rose to 15–20 per cent per month as the government tried to control inflation. Although interest rates have declined since then, they still varied from about 30–70 per cent per annum in 1998, when inflation was around 6 per cent.⁴⁹ (b) Increased transportation costs, as both fuel and spare parts became rapidly more expensive. (c) The membership had alternative channels through which to market their produce. (d) It became impossible to raise trading capital. The banking sector as a whole was quickly accumulating a huge amount of bad debt and soon stopped providing much by way of credit to small enterprises.

Although the immediate causes of the failure of most *horshoo* was undoubtedly the adverse economic climate, this raises the question of the underlying ability of these organizations to weather financial storms or raise further investment from their membership or other sources. Their voluntary membership did not support the cooperatives with further investment or labour. Even in the case of the Bayan Tsagaan *horshoo*, rather than the cooperative having a firm institutional basis in its own right, the membership's commitment to it was mediated by their obligations towards their own immediate family and close kin. Members would withdraw from the cooperative if this ever seemed to be in the best interests of their household, family, and friends.

It might seem strange, at first glance, that both producer and marketing cooperatives have not been more successful, as there are undoubtedly economies of scale to be gained in a pastoral economy composed of so many distantly scattered producer households. However, examining the institutional frames of the various pastoral institutions that have operated successfully in Mongolian history, it is striking that they were all socio-political institutions, as well as economic. It was not simply the narrowly economic functions that the old collectives or their predecessors supplied that guaranteed their continued existence. Their depth (i.e. durability and significance) in social and political dimensions provided them with the stability and the command over labour that they needed. Unlike the cooperatives, membership was not conditional on short-term benefits.

Medium-Scale, Household-Based Pastoralism

Historically there have been two solutions to the problem of gaining sufficient labour to herd large numbers of livestock. One involved engaging additional labour under the direct management of the owner, often by expanding the household itself. A rich family might adopt children or include a son-in-law for this reason. Additional labour could also be attached to the family through the extension of the encampment. In the pre-communist period there were neo-feudal retainers or servants, (*har'yat* or *hamjlaga*) attached to noble families, and rich commoners might employ servants (*zarts*) in an analogous way. Another common form was for a wealthy family to attract poorer 'client' households who could be invited to join their *hot-ail* and pool their livestock with the larger herds. Since the work of herding was shared between households this allowed richer families to draw upon the greater amount of labour they needed to care for their large herds, while poor households gained access to carts, draft animals and

other benefits that the rich had.⁵⁰ The other type of arrangement was *süreg tavih*—the 'leasing out' of livestock to poorer households who herded them for the owner in return for a certain portion of the produce.

Since decollectivization some pastoral households have accumulated large herds of livestock, establishing larger pastoral operations and reaping the benefits of economies of scale and extensive systems of pastoral movement. In 1992 there were reported to be seven households with more than 1000 head of livestock. By 1998 this number had risen to 955, of which thirty-three had more than 2000 animals.⁵¹ The household with the most livestock in the country in 1996 was that of a man named Henmedeh who had 2358 animals at the end of 1995, and over 2800 in 1999.⁵²

The reasons for Henmedeh's success, apart from his undoubted herding know-how, can be traced to his position in the collective. He used to manage the horse-herding brigade, breeding and training horses that were entered in the national horse-races. Well-connected, and with responsibility for these valuable assets, Henmedeh had managed to accumulate 1008 head of livestock by 1992, and by 1994 he had more than doubled this to 2045. Henmedeh also owned both a truck and a jeep, and he sold his own produce directly to buyers in Ulaanbaatar. Another of the key factors was Henmedeh's location. He lives only a hundred kilometres or so from Ulaanbaatar and its huge urban markets. This allows him to get relatively good prices for his products and to buy the spare parts and fuel needed to keep his vehicles running.

In 1996 Henmedeh employed four herdsman, and by 1999 had expanded his operation to include seven herders, in addition to his two sons, who worked for him under contractual arrangements very similar to the historical *süreg tavih* relations.⁵³ He has been able to accumulate livestock because he has a lower relative rate of consumption and sale than his poorer neighbours. In 1995 the forty households of Henmedeh's subdistrict (*bag*) recorded average internal consumption of 5 per cent of their livestock. Henmedeh's consumption amounted to 4.3 per cent, including food supplies (*idesh*) given to his kin. In the *bag* as a whole, households sold an average of 13 per cent of their livestock in 1995, whereas Henmedeh sold only 7.7 per cent. (This district is so close to the Ulaanbaatar market that the average level of sales was considerably higher than that in more distant pastoral districts.⁵⁴

It has been argued that pastoralism has an innate tendency towards an equality of livestock holdings between households, on account of the increasing marginal difficulty of caring for large herds, and in some cases the tendency for richer households to consume more than poor.⁵⁵ This argument never appeared convincing when applied to Inner Asian pastoralism, particularly in view of the long history of very wealthy herdowners and the ancient practice of 'placing herds' with other households. Henmedeh's case also suggested that the wealthy could sell and consume a smaller proportion of their herd than their poorer neighbours. If this is a general trend we can expect to see the emergence of a stratum of wealthy herd-owners who make use of employee or client labour as poorer households fall below the minimum herd-size needed for subsistence. This already appears to be happening as the number of households with more than 1000 livestock has increased from 305 in 1995 to 955 in 1998.⁵⁶

An indication of the wealth differences that have emerged can be seen from the situation of one pastoral sub-district (*bag*) of Hanh sum, Hövsgöl. Figure 51.3 shows that the richest 20 per cent of the ninety-nine households in *bag* 2 of Hanh sum own almost half the livestock of the subdistrict. The richest five households in the *bag* have between 500 and 850 sheep equivalent units of livestock, which is still a relatively small




Figure 51.3 Proportion of total livestock owned by sections of the population of bag 2 *Hanh sum*, (sheep units per household)

holding in comparison with Henmedeh who had over 4500 sheep equivalent units at the end of 1995.

This distribution appeared to be fairly typical; data from a *bag* subdistrict in nearby Renchinlhümbe sum show a similar distribution, and both are in line with the national statistics for livestock distribution, which indicate that in 1996 the poorest 25 per cent of pastoral households owned less than 7 per cent of the national herd, whereas the richest 20 per cent owned more than half the total.⁵⁷

The hypothesis that large pastoral operators tend to have the incentive and ability to retain relatively wide systems of pastoral movement is borne out in Henmedeh's case. He and his employees move with their herds more than most other pastoralists, moving a total of about 110 km in a year, whereas the five other, poorer, *ails* in the vicinity, moved between about 30 and 70 km.

In time rich pastoral households may be able to expand their herds and pastoral operations sufficiently to reintroduce the economies of scale reaped by large herdowning institutions in the past. However, it may take a long time for such operations to become common enough to encompass the bulk of the pastoral sector. In 1998 of the 275,000 households owning livestock, fewer than 1000 owned more than 1000 head.

CONCLUSION

The decollectivization of pastoralism has seen a retreat to subsistence for many pastoral families, a reduction in the export and processing of their produce, the development of inequalities of wealth, and a loss of mechanization. Pastoralists, faced with economic crisis, have had to depend on networks of family and friends. The large-scale pastoralism of the collectives formed part of a politico-economic structure that supported manufacturing and processing industries. These declined together, leaving pastoral households to fall back on longstanding domestic systems of self-provisioning and

subsistence. The privatization policies were inspired by the notion of a latent but highly productive market economy that could be rapidly emancipated from a restrictive politico-economic system. However, dismantling the large-scale pastoral institutions simply led to the collapse of district-wide operations, and expanded the domestic subsistence operations of individual families that were poorly adapted to supply livestock products to manufacturing industry and commerce.

The pastoral economy to emerge from decollectivization presents something of a paradox. Many of the most obvious problems that pastoralists now face result from the loss of the economies of scale generated by collectives, both in production and marketing, particularly in mechanization and transportation. However, the numerous attempts to establish cooperatives to recapture some economies of scale have tended to fail. This paradox becomes comprehensible when one examines the nature of the institutional frames within which different economic groups existed.

Historically the spectrum of economic activities within Mongolian pastoralism has stretched from the smallest domestic subsistence activities of a poor household with a few dozen sheep, through to the largest collective or pre-revolutionary noble or monastery, managing tens of thousands of animals over a whole district. In the case of the household, domestic roles and norms provided the motivational underpinnings for the cooperation of its members. At the district level, the coordination of labour depended upon notions of duty and legal sanctions underpinning the conventional obligations attached to the status of common herdsman or collective farm member. Intermediate-scale operations were typically managed by wealthy families coordinating the labour of some clients or servants, and were founded on the household as an institution. They tended to make use of the morality of family and friendship (in the case of clients) and/or socio-political obligation (in the case of neo-feudal retainers).

The ephemeral nature of the *horshoo* cooperatives contrasts with the durability of the pastoral household and former large-scale pastoral operations and illustrates the importance of institutional settings for economic groupings and their viability. As the essential unit for pastoral residence and reproduction, the stability of the household and the commitment of its members to its economic success, was never in doubt. Similarly, the large-scale public pastoral operations supported by local authorities had a firm institutional setting, and a membership subject to the same authorities. In both cases the group's continued existence was beyond question, its economic activities being only one aspect of the wider social and political functions of the institution. Groups and individuals could assume, with a high degree of confidence, that members of these domestic and official institutions would fulfil their obligations.

The *horshoo* cooperatives, by contrast, had little by way of 'institutional depth', a voluntary and changeable membership, and very limited organizational precedent. Without any political authority to compel or guarantee the actions of others, the *horshoo* proved unable to draw on the resources or labour of member households, and were easily ruined by difficult economic conditions. Households could, and did, simply withdraw and use their own networks to provision themselves and market produce using kinship and friendship relations that had a strong social component and permanence beyond the purely instrumental. Pastoralists often agreed that the services that the cooperatives could supply were theoretically desirable, but saw little reason to risk the assets belonging to the groups they considered to be really fundamental—their households.

High interest rates and transportation costs played a central role in the failure of the cooperatives. More favourable conditions for credit and infrastructural investment in the national transportation system would have facilitated trade and eased the difficulties faced by pastoralists in marketing their produce and obtaining consumer goods. However, remote districts such as Hanh sum need marketing operations accessible to scattered pastoral households to be provided as a service. The marketing cooperatives attempted to provide this sort of inclusive service, but this placed them in a poor position to compete with private traders able to cherry-pick the most profitable customers and commodities, or with kin trusted with the sale of produce. In the short term at least, it is difficult to see how these conditions could be changed without legal or social sanctions to channel sales through the cooperative, or financial support such as low-interest credit or targeted investment for private trade.

Two of the conditions necessary for viable large-scale pastoral production operations are ownership of large numbers of livestock by a single agency, and access to large areas of land. These were key features of the collectives that were more or less successfully established in the 1950s, but they were also accompanied by the high levels of investment required to establish motor pools and mechanized hay production facilities. Equivalent investment in the present-day pastoral sector would have to be financed on much more favourable terms than those offered by commercial banks, and the success of any new enterprises of this sort would depend upon relatively secure markets for pastoral products. It may be that a more productive pastoral sector will require major investment, not only in infrastructure such as road and rail links, but in institutions capable of organizing specialized pastoral production on a sufficiently large-scale. This may be as essential as the large-scale investments that are needed in marketing if the pastoral sector is to be restored to anything like its previous role.

NOTES

1. The English terms are rough translations: the *albat* or *sumyn* and correspond roughly with 'commoners', *darhad* with 'freemen', and *hamjilga* and *spabi* with 'personal servants'. There were also some slaves (*bool*).
2. The *bag* was the usual secular subdivision, the subunit used in the ecclesiastical districts had a different term—*otog*.
3. The pre-revolutionary monasteries, for example, could own more than 60% of the total livestock in a district. Lattimore (1940: 97, fn. 50).
4. Average pasture yields are about 1–3 centners per hectare in Gobi regions, 3–4 in steppe regions, and 5–8 in mountain pastures. (A centner is a unit of 100 kg). See Purev in FAO (1991: 43).
5. The *öröh* is generally the unit of livestock ownership, and the head of the family is only 'in charge' of them. However, the head (*tergüülegch*, or *ezen*) is still much more personally associated with property than other members. Junior family members generally talk of the household and its assets as 'ours' (*manai*), but when talking about some other family's encampment or property they usually use the name of the household head (i.e. 'Damdin's horses' or 'Sodnom's ail').
6. Of 100 *ails* that I studied in Ih Tamir *sum* (district), Ar Hangai *aimag* (province), less than half retained constant composition throughout the year. This is not untypical. In the two pastoral districts (*sums*) of Hanh and Renchinlümbe, Hövsögöl *aimag*, about half the thirty-four encampments I studied in 1996 changed their composition during the year.

7. Simukov uses the term *hoton* which was more usual than the term *ail* or *hot-ail* (Simukov 1933: 22–3). He studied 100 hotons in what is now Ih Tamir *sum*, Ar Hangai *aimag*, and classifies them thus: ‘the *hotons* with constant composition 45%, the *hotons* of mixed character 25%, the *hotons* with inconstant composition 30%.’ In 1996, I made a study of 100 *ails* in the district where Simukov worked in 1932. The detailed results of this comparison will, I hope, appear in print elsewhere. Flexible and fluid though they may be, *hot-ails* are still clearly groups. However, property, income, and autonomy in decision-making are vested in the household, and where encampments are stable this is a reflection of underlying social relations (e.g. kinship), rather than the nature of the *hot-ail* itself as an institution.
8. Humphrey (1978: 142–52).
9. Odgaard (1996: 113).
10. Asian Development Bank (1992: 86–8); World Bank (1994: 9).
11. See World Bank (1994: 19); Griffin (1995: viii) estimates the decline in average incomes at around 30% over that period. IMF data suggest a smaller decline in average incomes of about 25%, see Griffin (1995: 5). UNDP and Asian Development Bank estimates suggested a decline of 34% in GNP per capita from 1989–92, see Griffin (1995: 25).
12. See Griffin (1995: 31–3); and World Bank (1994: 35).
13. The United Nations Systems in Mongolia (1999: 5).
14. World Bank (1994: 41).
15. The CIA World Factbook 1998 entry on Mongolia. (<http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/mg.html>). Official figures show unemployment increase from 10,300 in 1989 to reach 80,000 in 1996, but an article in the Mongolian daily *Ardyn Erh* suggested that the true unemployment total approached 90,000. (*Ardyn Erh*, No 193 (1411), 27 September 1996).
16. Bruun and Odgaard (1996: 26) give the estimate of 30%, while some estimates are even higher; the United Nations Systems in Mongolia (1999: 6) estimates that this assistance represented, on average, 37% of annual GDP.
17. Griffin (1995: 6).
18. Bruun and Odgaard (1996: 26).
19. Griffin (1995: 12–13).
20. United States Embassy (1999).
21. National Statistical Office of Mongolia (1999: 56). *The Mongol Messenger* (No. 28(313), 9 July 1997).
22. In RENCHINLHÜMBE *sum*, north Mongolia, for example, about half the working population were employed in non-pastoral occupations in the collective period. When the collective closed most of the residents became directly dependent on livestock for their subsistence—over 70% of the population were officially classed as herders in 1996, and over 20% were classed as unemployed. Only 6.5% of the *sum* population were employed in non-pastoral sectors.
23. National Statistical Office of Mongolia (1999: 95, 45); Statistical Office of Mongolia (1993: 6).
24. Statistical Office of Mongolia (1993: 7); National Statistical Office of Mongolia (1999: 45)
25. Tserendash and Erdenebaatar (1993: 9–15); Humphrey and Sneath (1995: 8–13); Williams (1996: 307–3).
26. *The Mongol Messenger* (No. 37(271)18 September 1996) and The Ministry of Agriculture and Industry of Mongolia (1998) and United States Embassy (1999).
27. National Statistical Office of Mongolia (1999: 83–4).
28. Leather shoe, coat and jacket production showed a 24, 33, and a 160-fold decrease respectively. Sheep skin processing also declined by fifty-five times and processed goat skin by fourteen times. Source—The Ministry of Agriculture and Industry of Mongolia (1998).
29. N. Davaa writes ‘Despite producing 30% of the world’s cashmere Mongolia still suffers shortage’. *The Mongol Messenger* (30 June 1999, p. 5).
30. National Statistical Office of Mongolia (1999: 144).

31. Campi (1994: 240–1).
32. Asian Development Bank (1992: 103).
33. Asian Development Bank (1992: 55).
34. National Statistical Office of Mongolia (1999: 161, 163). These prices varied by as much as 30% around the mean.
35. This was calculated for a household of five (the average rural household size in 1998) using 1990 national averages for the numbers of workers (1.8) and pensioners (0.4); and the average agricultural income (5400 T) and pension (2448 T). I have also included the allowances given by the state to mothers of five or more children, which represent another 159 T per household on average. National Statistical Office of Mongolia (1993: 9, 95).
36. National Statistical Office of Mongolia (1999: 159–61).
37. National Statistical Office of Mongolia (1999: 69).
38. World Bank (1994: table 9.5) As the collectives operated as part of the centrally-planned economy it is difficult to estimate the true level of subsidy that the state provided. The Asian Development Bank (1992: 54–6) calculates total subsidies amounted to 637 million *tögrög* in 1990, about 10% of total government spending, whereas the World Bank (1994: table 9.3) gives a much higher estimate 1746 million *tögrög*—26% of government expenditure. Using the higher World Bank estimates, the 1990 total for subsidies on energy, exports, agriculture, fodder transport, veterinary services, and the meat and milk subsidies that benefited consumers came to 964 million *tögrög*, about 14% of government spending. This figure represents the principal subsidies given to industry, agriculture, and pastoralism and amounts to about 9% of GDP, a little more than the 8% spent on social security. If subsidies on wood, coal, glass, felt, and bread are included the total is a little higher at 1049 million *tögrög*, 10% of GDP. See World Bank (1994: tables 9.5 and 9.3).
39. Kervan (1998: 10). She notes that international experts and donors could learn from this contrast.
40. FAO (1991: 7).
41. By the nineteenth century most of the Mongolian elite was in debt to Chinese merchant firms. Much of the produce of the districts ruled by the princes and senior lamas was expended on servicing this debt (see Sanjdorj 1980: 80). The orientation of such herd-owners was towards the Chinese market, mediated by their debts to merchants, and rich herd-owners had every reason to extract the maximum surplus from the livestock economy.
42. Simukov noted that wealthy households preferred to have two or three poor households in their *hoton*, and that grouping in *hotons* on the basis of property equality was very uncommon. Simukov (1933: 29).
43. Simukov (1936: 55–6) describes grain production organized by a monastery.
44. Sanjdorj (1980: 91) notes that in the late nineteenth century Chinese traders were taking 25,000 horses, 10,000 cows, and 250,000 sheep from the area of Ih H ree alone every year. This represents about 0.45 million sheep units. Considering that Uliastai and Hovd would have probably been engaged in comparable but smaller amounts of export trade and southerly regions are unlikely to have traded with China via Ih H ree, I think it is safe to assume that the total export was more than twice that of the Ih H ree figure. In 1917 the total herd wealth of Outer Mongolia was just over 20 million sheep units.
45. I estimate the total exports as equivalent to 2.1 million sheep units out of a total national herd of 45 million sheep units. See State Statistical Office of Mongolia (1993: 45, 82). I estimate the total state procurement to be 6.3 million sheep units using the average live weight of each species of livestock procured by the state in 1980 (see State Statistical Office of the MPR 1981: 221). Using the same average ratio between tons of meat and sheep units I estimate that 1985 exports represented 1.72 million sheep units of cattle, sheep, and goats; adding the 0.38 million sheep units for the exported horses gives the 2.1 million figure.
46. The term for limited liability company is—*Büren Bus Hariutslagatai Kompani* (BBHK), or *Hyazgaarlagdmal Hariutslagatai Kompani* (HHK). Although they called themselves

‘companies’ these enterprises were generally owned by the members who had pooled shares of the former collective, rather than external shareholders. There was no legal framework in place for the operation of Joint Stock Companies, so these enterprises were registered as cooperatives or limited companies. The term for limited liability cooperatives is *Büren Bus Hariutslagatai Horshoo* (BBHH).

47. Hōdōō Aj Ahyin Horshoologchdyn Ündesnii Holboo (National Association of Agricultural Cooperative Members) Statistical Department, Personal Communication, July 1999. Interestingly, very few *horshoo* were established in the immediate vicinity of Ulaanbaatar; the market being sufficiently close for many herders to have personal access to consumer goods and marketing opportunities—often through their personal networks.
48. This is a loose translation of a Mongolian term which is generally translated as ‘fruit-bearing’ or simply ‘fruit’.
49. National Statistical Office of Mongolia (1999: 68).
50. See Sneath (2000) and Simukov (1933: 29).
51. *Zasagyn Gazar Medeel* No. 2 (63) 1992; *Zasagyn Gazar Medeel*, I sar, II doloo honog, 1996.
52. These are end of year totals, the summer figures are higher. When I stayed with Henmedeh in August 1996, For example, he had over 3000 animals, including newly-born lambs, kids, foals, and calves. Most of these were sheep (2502), but he also owned 332 horses, 240 cows, and 39 goats. Some 500 of these animals were sold and slaughtered that autumn and winter.
53. In 1996 *tutu* employee households herded about 700 ‘leased’ sheep and lambs each. They kept the milk from these flocks and were paid 240,000 *tögrög* (436 USD) per year (about three times the now-miserable state pension). The wool and offspring went to Henmedeh. These families herded their own smaller holdings of livestock—about 60–70 sheep and goats, and 5–10 cattle. Since then Henmedeh has moved to a contract by which client households supply a quota of fifty newborn animals per 100 breeding females, and are allowed to keep additional livestock and all animal produce. In 1995 Henmedeh sold 300 sheep, 10 cattle, around 1500 kg of wool, the proceeds of which were about 6.3 million *tögrög* (11,450 USD), 30–40 times the average per capita income.
54. In remote Hanh, for example, among the 102 households in bag number 2, sales amounted to 10.7% and consumption 8.0%. The overall off-take, in both cases, being around 18%. In both cases households were selling more livestock than they were eating themselves, but most remained primarily concerned with subsistence production. They rely heavily on dairy products, and a large proportion of their livestock sales is to obtain flour. Figures were calculated from local government statistics which still record the number of animals sold and consumed by each household using the Mongolian sheep equivalent units (counting sheep as 1, horses as 6, cattle as 5, goats as 0.9, camels as 7).
55. See Dahl (1979: 279). Barth (1964: 76) in his analysis of pastoral Basseri society sites the ‘differential consumption rates’ of rich and poor as a check to the accumulation of livestock, among other factors.
56. National Statistical Office of Mongolia (1999: 96).
57. This is shown by analysis of figures given by National Statistical Office of Mongolia, (1999: 45).

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