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
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THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE MYTHS, REALITIES AND 'BLACK HOLES'

CONTRIBUTIONS IN HONOUR OF
COLIN IMBER

EDITED BY
EUGENIA KERMELİ and OKTAY ÖZEL



THE ISIS PRESS
ISTANBUL

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**THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE:
MYTHS, REALITIES AND 'BLACK HOLES'**

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TO
COLIN IMBER

with Respect and Affection
by his friends, colleagues and students

on
the occasion of his
retirement

CONTENTS

<i>Preface</i> by Eugenia Kermeli & Oktay Özel	9
"Colin Imber, Historian of the Ottoman State" by Colin Heywood ...	11
Colin Imber's Publications	17
 Contributions	
Rosemary Morris, "The <i>epoptês</i> Thomas at work"	23
Keith Hopwood, "Nicaea and her Eastern Neighbours"	39
Heath W. Lowry, "Some Thoughts on the Meaning of <i>Gaza</i> and <i>Akın</i> in Early Ottoman Usage"	47
Oktay Özel, "The Transformation of Provincial Administration in Anatolia: Observations on Amasya from 15 th to 17 th Centuries"	51
Kenan İnan, "On the Sources of Tursun Bey's <i>Tarih-i Ebu'l Feth</i> " ...	75
Evgeni Radushev, "The First Ottoman Conquest of Buda in 1526, and the History of a Jewish Family"	111
Leslie Peirce, "In search of the Harem. Sexual Crime and Social Space in Ottoman Royal Law of the 15 th and 16 th Centuries"	129
Christine Woodhead, "Scribal chaos? Observations on the Post of <i>Re'isülküttab</i> in the Late Sixteenth Century"	155
Linda Darling, "Mediterranean Borderlands: Early English Merchants in the Levant"	173
Gilles Veinstein, "Le statut de <i>musta'min</i> , entre droit et politique" ...	189
Rossitsa Gradeva, "On Zimmis and Church Buildings: Four Cases from Rumeli"	203
Nicolas Vatin, "Comment on garde un secret: note confidentielle du grand-vizir Sokollu Mehmed Paşa en septembre 1566"	239
Daniel Panzac, "De la guerre de Chypre à la guerre de Crète: un entracte en Méditerranée (1572-1645)"	257
Eugenia Kermeli, "Children Treated as Commodity in Ottoman Crete"	269
Colin Heywood, "The Shifting Chronology of the Chyhyryn (Çehrin) Campaign (1089/1678) According to the Ottoman Literary Sources, and the Problem of the Ottoman Calendar"	283
Edith Gülçin Ambros and Jan Schmidt, "A Cossack Adopted by the Forty Saints: an Original Ottoman Story in the Leiden University Library"	297
Palmira Brummet, "Ottoman Cartoon Maps: Imagining Space, Identity, and Nation in the Istanbul Popular Press, 1908-1913" ...	325
F. A. K. Yasamee, "Ottoman War Planning and the Balkan Campaign of October-December 1912"	347
Çiğdem Balım, "Writing Alternative Histories: Aitmatov's <i>The Day Lasts More Than a Hundred Years</i> "	367

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PREFACE

How to pay tribute to a scholar for his genuine contribution to his field? Should a devoted life with outstanding performance be acknowledged only when it is “too late”? The apparent and inherent answers to these questions in fact reveal the motives behind this volume.

In its modest form, a volume such as this may not, of course, be the only response to the first question, but it is definitely the most conventional. It is also the most relevant form of appreciation in view of the nature of the profession. While it is an echo of a life long devotion to the profession within the echelons of the larger academic community, it is a sign of warm reception both by the learned audience and fellow professionals of the overall contribution by the person to whom this volume is dedicated, manifest in a small way in the articles, each reflecting inspiration from and indebtedness to the works of a creative historian. Finally, this volume is a call to a high caliber historian who still has a lot to say. Therefore, this volume wishes to provoke him to delving deeper, torch in hand, into shady corners of the Ottoman past.

Colin Imber, the person, scholar, colleague and friend to whom this volume is dedicated, clearly deserves such an appreciation as he decides to retire from his teaching position at the University of Manchester, we hope, to carry on refreshed, with new vigor! We, his colleagues, friends and students, will enjoy tackling many more of the ‘black holes’ in the labyrinths of Ottoman history, led by Colin, gifted as he is with an uncompromisingly inquisitive mind capable of rare critical analysis.

It is ironical that Colin Imber’s biography is a black hole in itself. We know, only through rumors, not the concrete evidence that historians would like to work with, that he was born 8th March 1945, and graduated from King’s School, Canterbury to enter in the exotic worlds of Arabic and Turkish in 1963 at Magdalene College, University of Cambridge. He eventually emerged, as rightly pointed out by his colleague and namesake, Colin Heywood, as a “historian of the Ottoman State”. He was given a fellowship in 1969, and in the following year, he started working at the Department of Middle Eastern Studies, University of Manchester, where he is still teaching, even after his retirement a few months ago.

Ever since his PhD dissertation on “ships”, as his dear wife remembers, and we colleagues can verify from articles published in volumes of *Archivum Ottomanicum*, he has been teaching and writing on diverse

aspects of the kind of “statehood” the Ottomans developed. It is also said that he developed a serious phobia against the world of numbers emanating from his days of painful counting of the number of the ships in the Ottoman dockyards in the sixteenth century, and ever since, he took refuge in the mysterious world of words, trying to decipher the hidden truth behind the scenes colorfully narrated by Ottoman chroniclers or texts cleverly formulated by jurists. Based on such sources, Colin produced most of his works that still continue to provoke lively scholarly debates stimulating the minds of students of Ottoman history.

Little else is known about Colin Imber’s own life: his perennial jumper and corduroy trousers that goes with a pair of sport shoes, the bicycle with pride of place in his office and bicycle clips on his desk, are only a few colorful details engraved in the memories of the editors of this volume; and, of course, his sole request from Turkey would be ‘Lokum please!’ The rest is one huge “black hole” to be investigated by the next generation of historians!

Our first acknowledgment should be to the publisher of this volume Sinan Kuneralp who from the very start of this project almost four years ago embraced the initial idea with enthusiasm and has never ceased to tolerate our whims and delays. His devotion to the project allowed us to organise it and include a wide range of papers covering, we hope, most of the research interests of Colin Imber. We are indebted to all the contributors for their prompt response and their eagerness to participate in a volume dedicated to Colin Imber. We would like to thank Paul Latimer and Miss Chris Taylor for their suggestions improving the content and style of some papers and Mr. Polat Safi, Muhsin Soyudoğan and Emrah Safa Gürkan for painstakingly looking at footnotes. Çiğdem Balım and Colin’s dear wife, Keekok, have furnished us with Imber’s bibliography and the meager information we have for Colin’s life; we thank them for that. We owe a particular debt of gratitude to Colin Heywood who not only wrote a paper but also superbly placed Colin Imber’s work in the wider sphere of scholarship. We are also grateful to him for giving us guidance over and over again without complaining once. Finally we would like to thank Colin Imber who as a teacher and friend has taught us the meaning of modesty and the virtues of doubt.

Eugenia Kermeli & Oktay Özel
The Editors

COLIN IMBER, HISTORIAN OF THE OTTOMAN STATE

Colin Heywood

There is a story, recounted against himself by the late A. E. Housman, to the effect that being called upon by his university to compose a formal address to an eminent colleague, his first response was to sit at his desk staring in front of him and wishing for death.¹ Eventually, of course, the much-merited tribute was written. Similar feelings, I am obliged to confess, overtook me on being charged by its good-natured editors with the unlooked-for responsibility of writing 'a few pages' by way of introduction to this equally well-deserved collective sexagenary tribute to our friend and colleague Colin Imber.

My feeble plea to the editors to the effect that, although Imber and I had in truth been acquainted for a considerable stretch of time and were, indeed, friends (or, at least, certainly not enemies -- a considerable achievement in this field), our paths had crossed in the main only in our common attendance at this or that conference or symposium, or as a guest speaker at one or other of our respective departmental seminars, or through a fairly spasmodic and intermittent academic correspondence on matters of common interest or commination, failed to carry much weight. Occasionally, I was also forced to admit, there had occurred the despatch from one to the other of a recent offprint; also, a decade or so ago, there had been a single, one-off, editorial collaboration. Such excuses were all valid, but none proving convincing, they were brushed aside, and I was told that, in all truth, 'there is no-one else but you to do it', -- an observation which, I am convinced, is more a reflection of the depleted present state of Ottoman historical studies in the United Kingdom, than of any special merits or preeminent fitness possessed by this *bende-i fakir* for the task in hand.

How then to go about it? The rules of engagement prohibited any direct approach to the subject with a request for more information; nor did I wish to burden his many colleagues still active with a plea for assistance, or for the

¹ A. E. Housman to R. St. J. Parry, 3 Jan. 1920, Laurence Housman (ed.), *A. E. H.: Some Poems, Some Letters and a Personal Memoir* (London, 1937), 109.

telling anecdote which might ease the way of the unprofessional panegyricist. All right-minded critics would agree that a *Festschrift* should not resemble a bouquet bound around with barbed wire, but neither should an Introduction be simply a vehicle for bland collegial expressions of esteem. Something more critical and to the point, in keeping with the temper of the recipient, was called for.

I decided, therefore, that while I was not likely to be able to write much of value or interest on Colin Imber as a friend of long standing -- he is, in any case, essentially a private man, the duty of one historian when writing about another is to say something about that other as a historian, as a fellow-member of the profession in which we all work and have our being; to offer, perhaps, an assessment of his work, rather than an ill-informed attempt at biography; in the present instance, then, to place the tributes collected here in a context which might illuminate both tribute-bearers and recipient.

Colin Imber has not been the only Ottoman historian of note, working in the United Kingdom, never to have held a formal appointment in a department of history (Wittek, if one dare mention it, was another), and yet, if we were forced to choose between classifying Imber as a historian equipped with oriental languages, or as an orientalist who happens to write history, we would unhesitatingly -- and correctly -- place him in the former group.

This is not to say, that Imber's own definition of his field is not drawn somewhat tightly. Comparative history is not part of the equation: Imber's Ottoman history, like the Ottoman state itself for much of its history (and in much of its historiographic tradition) stands alone, in conspicuous 'otherness' from the polities, Christian or Islamic, which circumscribe it. Where, then, does his work fit in the historiography of the field, and in late 20th / early 21st century historiography in general?

We may say, with some justice, that his approach contains more of the spirit of the *Revue Historique* than of the *Annales*; more of the *English Historical Review* than of *Past and Present*, but it may not be an exaggeration to suggest that Imber is a member of no particular and identifiable school of history-writing. Of his two books which cover broad periods of Ottoman history one, *The Ottoman Empire 1300-1481* (1990), is densely factographic and linear, recalling, in its approach to the subject the now largely forgotten traditions of sound east European scholarship embodied in such works as Klyuchevsky's *Course of Russian History* or (albeit on a much larger scale) Hrushevsky's *History of the Ukraine*¹ (to invoke the

¹ Both works are now accessible in excellent English versions: Vasily Osipovich Klyuchevsky, *A Course in Russian History. the Seventeenth Century* (Chicago, 1968), and Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'* (Edmonton and Toronto, 1999 -- [vols. i, vii, viii -- the latter two of great relevance for Ottoman history in the first half of the seventeenth century -- have so far been published by] eprintsiz PDF Kitap Arşivi - <https://rantey.org>

ghosts of Hammer, Zinkeisen or Iorga here would be superfluous, and essentially incorrect: Hammer's protean work is cast in a more antique mould; while neither Zinkeisen nor Iorga were acquainted with any oriental languages). The other, *The Ottoman Empire 1300-1650: the Structure of Power* (2002), is largely topical in its approach, though it would perhaps be mischievous to see encased within it the ghost of a well-known work by Professor İnalcık which appeared more than thirty years ago in an English translation made by the subject of the present essay.

What then is Imber's 'view' of the Ottoman Empire that posthumously reified Etwas with which we all concern ourselves? 'The History of the Ottoman Empire': a simple concept but, in terms of the history of the Turks, one which may be misleading. History may be, as it has been suggested, no more than what historians have written about the past; the past, thus defined, *is* what historians have written about it. That the past has had an existence apart from the historians' recreation of it is indisputable, but it is an existence by definition inaccessible, and for the loss of which no amount of 'sources' can ever compensate. The idea which was put forward by the nineteenth-century French historian Michelet, that historians are the custodians, almost in a legal sense, of the dead, has much to recommend it, although for Michelet, who was writing the history of his native land from a plethora of sources, the past - all around him as he wrote - was still alive.¹ But how much more are historians custodians of the dead, with a special responsibility for them, when they come to speak of dead imperial structures, of a whole entity of governance and governed which has vanished from the land, leaving behind its monuments, its documents and its often dubious legacy.

Imber's approach to this legacy has been one of rational enquiry tempered by a scepticism further attenuated by a healthy disdain both for fashionable trends and for all-embracing monistic (or nationalistic) historical explanations. In this connection the short introduction which he wrote a decade ago to preface his invaluable collection of *Studies in Ottoman History and Law* (1994) should be required reading for all Ottoman historians who would take either themselves or their subject too seriously. In invoking the spirit of Sellars and Yeatman, he observes mordantly that "it is not the best work that defines the character of modern Ottoman historiography and gives it its direction. The best work tends rather to stand out in isolation and only rarely leads to serious debate and development. It is the bad and mediocre that is typical".

¹ J. Michelet, *Histoire du XIX siècle, ii, Le Directoire* [1872], Préface, in Roland Barthes, *Michelet*, tr. Richard Howard (New York, 1987), 101.

At one remove Imber, in his intellectual absolutism and refusal to compromise -- and for this he will probably strike me down -- is a Wittekian (as well as an anti-Wittekian of course), although it is doubtful how much of Wittek's essentially acerbic (and acerbic) attitudes were transmitted through the approach to Ottoman history of the late Susan Skilliter, Imber's Cambridge PhD supervisor and one-time Wittek student and devotee. "This apocalyptic state of mind [...], exceedingly productive of myths and stereotypes" a phrase which Imber deployed tellingly in another context, could well have been applied by him to Wittek's historical formulations, most notably confronted in his impassioned dissection of Wittek's notable construct of historical determinism on the course of Ottoman history in the first half of the fifteenth century, published half a century earlier in the late 1930s.¹ It is perhaps worth recalling that the genesis of that study was the holding of the first (and last) Wittek-Tagung at SOAS in 1984, where he and I shared a platform and where, perhaps, the formal break occurred between the hagiographers and the historians, the traditionists and the revisionists, over the Wittekian legacy and the ultimate nature of the Ottoman state. Since then, in what has at times seemed like a dialogue of the deaf, Imber has been a leading proponent of the revisionist approach, and his notable studies on "The Ottoman Dynastic Myth" (1987), "The Legend of Osman Ghazi" (1993), "Canon and Apocrypha in Early Ottoman History" (1994) and "What does *ghazi* actually mean?" (2000) have forcefully and persuasively taken the debate forward despite often failing to attract the cogent and informed response which their intellectual and historiographic merits deserve. In these articles; indeed, in all his published work, Imber has carried on the positive elements of the Wittekian tradition in terms of his professional style: meticulous in preparation (with texts); careful in wording; clear in phrasing; sharp (and often trenchant) in his criticism, and with his love of texts as the main (or nearly the only) source for historical writing, coupled with his dislike of and unreceptive attitude to other sources full of numbers (*tahrir defters*, for instance). In this respect he has always seen himself, self-deprecatingly, as 'old-fashioned' in his understanding and practice. But for him this also means distancing himself from the world of fancy theories with little substance. It may not be going too far to say that he is a true Wittekian in terms of the historian's craft, and in his criticism he has not tolerated even Wittek himself when he had the freedom of expanding his expertise from the texts to the realm of theories (if we can call Wittek's thoughts on ghaza 'theory' in the modern sense).

¹ "Paul Wittek's 'De la défaite d'Ankara à la prise de Constantinople'", *Osmanlı Araştırmaları*, V (1986), 65-81, reprinted in *Studies in Ottoman History and Law*, 291-304. Cf., of course, Wittek's own study, "De la défaite d'Ankara à la prise de Constantinople: Un demi-siècle d'histoire ottomane", *Revue des Études Islamiques*, XDE (1988), 1034.

In this context of scrupulousness towards the sources and an unwillingness to compromise or dilute his work in the interests of the current intellectual fashion, Imber's Cambridge connection appears to have been essentially an evanescent one. His disdain for establishment figures past and present -- a disdain strongly both Northern and Nonconformist, although Imber is neither a Northerner by origin nor (as far as I know) a practicing Nonconformist, but as a Mancunian by ancestry and a Northerner by upbringing myself I cannot believe that three decades of residence in Manchester have not left on him their indelible mark. One would wish to stress here, equally, Imber's disdain, expressed mainly in his reviews, for scholarship that appears to verge (no; let us say, that verges) on the bogus and the shabby. It would be invidious to go into detail but, as he once remarked apropos of one well-known publishing venture, "in the field of Ottoman history, the demands of commerce do not coincide with the demands of scholarship".

It was thus not without malice aforethought that I invoked at the outset the ghost of A. E. Housman, another Cambridge man and one equally at his ease in striking down those who failed to meet his own exacting standards. Imber's observation, in a review of a work that shall be left nameless, that "the editors (names omitted -- C.H.) have given the collection a spurious coherence by dividing it into two volumes.... Each volume also has an introduction which attempts to give a rationale to the whole. However, both of these, far from resolving the incoherence of the collection, tend rather to exemplify it.... The editors might also have paid more attention to correcting mistakes of detail....: for example, 'Aşıkpaşazâde died 'after 1484', not in 1480; Louis XIV was no longer alive in 1736; and 70 per cent of the timars in southern and central Albania in 1431/2 were most certainly not held by "Christian Albanians"', might well have come from the pen of Housman.

But to abandon Cambridge and to return to Manchester and the Northern tradition in scholarship, one sees in Imber's work a strong resemblance to that of another Manchester historian who was indeed both a nonconformist and a northerner, and a mighty provoker of the establishment: the late A. J. P. Taylor. Certainly Imber, in his work, is more Taylor than Trevor-Roper (Taylor would never have been fooled by the 'Hitler' Diaries, nor I suspect would have been Imber); and what was once said of Taylor, that he was "a technically outstanding historian, with two special qualities: intuition and a unique gift for making ordinary language carry extraordinary thought", could be equally applied in our field to Imber who, like Taylor in his, has been no friend to the long-entrenched certainties of the historical establishment. Like Taylor (for those old enough to remember), lecturing live

and scriptless half a century ago before the television cameras, Imber has the knack of delivering -- in his case in some memorable seminars -- lengthy and detailed papers, without notes but utterly word-perfect.

Equally, we must admire his technical expertise, evidenced at length in his long article on "The Navy of Süleyman the Magnificent" (1980), a contribution, together with its two linked shorter pieces on aspects of the same topic, which his friends will regret was never expanded into the monographic treatment from an Ottoman archivally-based standpoint from which sixteenth-century Ottoman maritime history would have so greatly benefited. His technical skills and intuition both are also greatly in evidence in his studies in Ottoman legal history. To this difficult and daunting field on which, before him, only the late, great Uriel Heyd seems to have made much of an impact, Imber has contributed much in recent years, not only in his magisterial and sympathetic study of the great sixteenth-century Ottoman jurist Ebu Su'ud, but in his many articles, always instructive, often entertaining and consistently forensic on such topics in Ottoman law as orchards and fruit trees, marriage annulment, and husband poisoning, displaying his mastery not only of the Ottoman *fetva* in its collected sources, but of the underlying corpus of Islamic jurisprudence dating back to the era of the 'Abbasid caliphate. Here, perhaps, one thinks more of Maitland than of A. J. P. Taylor.

It might be expected that Imber's uncompromising attitude to scholars and to scholarship might generate over a lifetime more enemies than friends. The existence of the present *Festschrift*, a bouquet of elegant and varied blossoms indeed, is an eloquent testimony to the falseness of such a view. I invoke, therefore, all the varied contributors to the present volume, in wishing Colin '*çok yaşa!*' -- with many more fruitful years, in which he will continue to illuminate his -- and our -- field even during his retirement, and to instruct and to entertain us and, thankfully, in this politically hyper-correct age, still to provoke and confound the establishment.

COLIN IMBER: PUBLICATIONS

Translation

Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson (1973), 258 (with Norman Itzkowitz).

Edited Volumes

(With C. J. Heywood) *Studies in Ottoman History in Honour of Professor V. L. Ménage*, İstanbul: Isis Press (1994).

(With Ç. Balım-Harding) *The Balance of Truth: Essays in Honour of Professor Geoffrey Lewis*, İstanbul: Isis Press (2000).

(With Keiko Kiyotaki) *Frontiers of Ottoman Studies. State, Province and the West*, vol. 1, London: I. B. Tauris (2005).

Books

The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1481, İstanbul: Isis Press (1990).

Bulgarian translation, as *Osmanskata Imperiya*, Sofia: Amicitia Publishing (2000).

Turkish translation of 'Introduction', "İlk Dönem Osmanlı Tarihinin Kaynakları" in Oktay Özel and Mehmet Öz (eds.), *Söğüt'ten İstanbul'a*, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi (2000).

Studies in Ottoman History and Law, İstanbul: Isis Press (1996).

Ebu's-su'ud: the Islamic Legal Tradition, Edinburgh/Stamford: Edinburgh UP/Stanford UP (1997).

Turkish translation: *Şeriattan Kanuna. Ebussuud ve Osmanlı'da İslami Hukuk*. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 2004).

The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650: the structure of power, Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan (2002) (Spanish and Turkish translations in preparation: Ediciones B; Bilgi Üniversitesi)

Contracts

Contract with Ashgate for *The Crusade of Varna, 1443-1444*. A translation of the three major contemporary sources on the Crusade of Varna: (1) The anonymous *Gazavat-ı Sultan Murad b. Mehmed Han*, (2) the memoir of Waleran de Wavrin, preserved in Jehan de Wavrin, *Anciennes Chroniques d'Angleterre*, (3) Michel Beheim, *Die*
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Türkenschlacht bei Warna, to be presented with other shorter sources: the Latin text of the 1444 Treaty of Edirne/Szeged, preserved by Ciriaco d'Ancona; the Ottoman-Karamanid Treaty of 1443; excerpt from *Cronaca Zancaruola* on the panic in Edirne, 1444; Murad II's victory proclamation

Contract with One World Publishers: *Süleyman the Magnificent*

Articles

- 'The costs of naval warfare: the accounts of Hayreddin Barbarossa's Herceg Novi campaign in 1539', *Archivum Ottomanicum*, IV (1972), 203-216.
- 'Turkish charts in the portolan style', *Geographical Journal*, 144 (1978), 529-9.
- 'Four documents from John Rylands Turkish MS no. 145', *Tarih Dergisi*, XXXII (1979), 173-86 + 4 facsimiles, Turkish summary.
- 'A note on Pliny's Iresia', *Classical Quarterly*, 29/1 (1979), 222.
- 'The persecution of the Ottoman shi'ites according to the *mühimme defterleri*', *Der Islam*, 54 (1979), 245-73.
- 'The wandering dervishes', *Mashriq*, I (1980), 36-50.
- 'The navy of Süleyman the Magnificent', *Archivum Ottomanicum*, VI (1980), 211-82.
- 'Zina in Ottoman law', *Contributions a l'Histoire Economique et Sociale de l'Empire Ottoman*, Collection Turcica III, Louvain (1982), 59-92.
- 'The status of fruit-trees and orchards in Ottoman law', *Tarih Enstitüsü Dergisi*, 12 (1982), 763-74, Turkish summary.
- 'Paul Wittek's "De la defaite d'Ankara a la prise de Constantinople"', *Osmanlı Araştırmaları*, V (1986), 65-81.
- 'The Ottoman dynastic myth', *Turcica*, XIX (1987), 7-27. Turkish translation in Özel and Öz, *Söğüt'ten İstanbul'a*.
- 'A note on "Christian" preachers in the Ottoman Empire', *Osmanlı Araştırmaları*, X (1990), 59-67.
- 'Süleyman as Caliph of the Muslims: Ebu's-Su'ud's formulation of the Ottoman Dynastic ideology', in Gilles Veinstein (ed.) *Soliman le Magnifique et son Temps*, Paris: La Documentation Française (1992), 179-84.
- 'Involuntary annulment of marriage and its solutions in Ottoman law', *Turcica*, XXV (1993), 40-73.
- 'The legend of Osman Gazi', in Elizabeth Zachariadou (ed.), *The Ottoman Emirate (1300-1389)*, Rethymnon: Crete University Press (1993).

- 'Why you should poison your husband', *Islamic Law and Society*, 1/2 (1994), 206-16.
- 'Canon and apocrypha in early Ottoman history', in Heywood and Imber (eds.), *Studies in Ottoman History in Honour of V. L. Ménage* (1994), 117-38. Turkish translation in Özel and Öz, *Söğüt'ten İstanbul'a*.
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THE EPOPTÊS THOMAS AT WORK

Rosemary Morris

*'What defined authority was, above all, the right to collect taxes.'*¹

Colin Imber's wise words, written in the context of his recent study of the Ottoman Empire, should also serve as guidance to anyone attempting to study the administrative history of Byzantium. As he himself has amply demonstrated, much of Ottoman state's administrative practice was derived from that of its predecessors. The *timar* system had its origins in that of the *pronoia*; some of its terminology was directly translated from Greek. The practice of making inventories after each conquest, a task carried out by a state-appointed surveyor who noted the taxable resources and how they were distributed into *timar*, *zeamet* and *hass* land and then sent his findings to the Land Registry Office in Istanbul, though associated by Imber with the Persian practices of the Ilkhans of Anatolia, also has distinct echoes of the 'bureaucratic surveillance' so characteristic of the Byzantine State.²

Although 'bureaucratic surveillance' was, in theory, ever-present in the provinces of the Byzantine Empire, practical circumstances such as unforeseen climatic events and the geographical remoteness of many settlements, coupled with political difficulties such as wars and internal dynastic and factional strife, often rendered it more theoretical than real. But the ability of the Byzantine administrative bureaucracy, lay and professional as it was, to rise above temporary difficulties and return, sometimes in extremely difficult circumstances, to the challenge of assessing and collecting the taxes and dues owed to the imperial power is one of the most remarkable aspects of that sense of continuity which characterised the Byzantine State in so many of its aspects. Emperors might come and go, the tide of war might ebb and flow, but Byzantine bureaucrats in Constantinople and their provincial representatives soldiered on.

Nowhere is this more true than in the region of Thessalonike in the mid-tenth century. This was an area subject to attacks by Bulgars, Magyars

¹ C. Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650. The structure of Power* (Houndmills, Basingstoke/New York, 2002), 190.

² Imber, *Ottoman Empire*, 190-191; PDF Kitap Arsivi - <https://rantey.org>

and Muslims; indeed, in 904, the city of Thessalonike itself was raided and sacked by the Muslim pirate, Leo of Tripoli.¹ Far more serious for the surrounding territory of the administrative area of the

theme (*thema*), however, were the campaigns mounted from the end of the ninth century by the Bulgarian Tsar Symeon, which only came to an end at his death in 927. In 918, in fact, Symeon had marched as far south as the Gulf of Corinth; more usually his forces ranged far and wide raiding and pillaging in Thrace and Macedonia even as far as Constantinople itself. The Magyars, though allies of Byzantium against the Bulgars for a time, frequently raided the Balkans in the tenth century.²

The effects of this period of warfare, coupled with the aftermath of a period of harsh weather in 928 and the famine which followed it, can be traced not only in imperial documents emanating from Constantinople, but also, almost uniquely, in a series of administrative documents issued by, or concerning, one particular provincial official, the *epoptês* Thomas Môrokoumoulos.³ The survival of these latter documents is entirely due to the fact that the lands concerned were of interest to, or later came into the possession of, the monastic houses of Mt Athos. The photographing and publication of the Byzantine archives of the Athonite monasteries has been one of the most significant advances in Byzantine studies over the last fifty years or so, and now that the enterprise is over half way to completion, with most of the earliest surviving documents now in print in modern scholarly editions, it has become possible to trace the activities of individual administrative officials through their appearance in a number of different archival contexts.⁴ Thus the *epoptês* Thomas himself issued three documents found in two different archives (those of the Great Lavra Monastery and of the administrative headquarters of the Athonite community, the Prôtaton) and is mentioned in another three (a further two from the archive of the Prôtaton and

¹ For Leo of Tripoli, see A. P. Kazhdan, *et al.* (eds.), *Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium*, 3 vols. (Oxford/New York, 1991) (henceforward *ODB*), vol. 2, 1216.

² See J. Shepard, "Bulgaria: the other Balkan 'empire'", in T. Reuter (ed.), *New Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. 3 (Cambridge, 1999), 567-85, for a succinct account.

³ For the position of *epoptês*, literally 'overseer', but in this context best translated as a 'fiscal officer', see *ODB*, vol.1, 725. The spelling of Thomas's surname, which only appears once, in *Actes de Xéropotamou*, ed. J. Bompaire (*Archives de l'Athos*, III, Paris, 1964) (henceforward *Xéropotamou*), no. 1 (April, 956), is given there as 'Morokamoulou'. A later 'Môrokoumoulos' family with Thracian connections is known, see H. Delehay, *Deux typical byzantins de l'époque des Paléologues* (Brussels, 1921), 84, so I have adopted this surname.

⁴ See R. Morris, "Mt Athos", in *Oxford Handbook of Byzantine Studies*, ed. E. Jeffreys *et al.* (forthcoming), for a discussion of the immense value of the Athonite archives to Byzantinists (and, indeed, Ottomanists!).

one from the archive of the Monastery of Xeropotamou).¹ By placing together all these pieces of evidence and by examining them against the background of legislative acts emanating from Constantinople, some progress can be made in answering three important questions of relevance to the 'bureaucratic surveillance' of the region in the mid-tenth century. Much ink and not a little passion has been expended over the years in discussing these documents, especially since they can be placed in a wider context of imperial concern with the welfare of two important elements of rural society in the tenth century: small landowners - the backbone of the Middle Byzantine fiscal system - in general and, in particular, the holders of *strateia* (estates with military service associated with them).² Here, however, we are concerned with the practical activities of the *epoptês* Thomas. What was he actually doing? How was he interpreting contemporary fiscal legislation and practice? Can we, in sum, make any observations about how he approached his job and how well he did it?

Two issues predominate in the documents: the selling of so-called *klasma* land and the establishment of boundaries, in this case the all-important 'frontier' of the monastic community of Athos, a subject of considerable dispute with its secular neighbours in the tenth century.³ The technical term *klasma* was given to abandoned land which was escheated to the state after it had been abandoned by its owner for 30 years and after it had also become clear that no fiscal revenues could be extracted from its working by third parties,

¹ Acts issued by the *epoptês* Thomas: *Actes de Lavra*: I, *Des origines à 1204*, ed. P. Lemerle, A. Guillou, D. Papachryssanthou and N. Svoronos (*Archives de l'Athos*, V, Paris, 1970) (henceforward, *Lavra*), nos. 2 (August, 941) and 3 (August, 941); *Actes du Prôtaton*, ed. D. Papachryssanthou (*Archives de l'Athos*, VII, Paris, 1975) (henceforward, *Prôtaton*), no. 5 (after May 942 and before August, 943). Acts mentioning the activities of the *epoptês* Thomas: *Prôtaton*, nos. 4 (May, 942) and 6 (August, 943) and *Xéropotamou*, no. 1 (April, 956).

² See G. Ostrogorsky, "The peasants' pre-emption right. An abortive reform of the Macedonian emperors", *Journal of Roman Studies*, 37 (1947), 117-26, esp. 122-6, dealing with the activities of the *epoptês* Thomas. Ostrogorsky saw corruption amongst imperial officials as a factor helping powerful landowners (*dynatoi*) to gain power over lesser landholders (*penetes* or *ptôchoi*). For my earlier thoughts on the so-called 'land crisis' of the tenth century, see R. Morris, "The powerful and the poor in tenth-century Byzantium: law and reality", *Past and Present*, 73 (1976), 3-27. More recent works include D. Górecki, "Land tenure in Byzantine property law: *iura in re aliena*", *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies*, 22 (1981), 191-210; *eadem*, "The *strateia* of Constantine VII: the legal status, administrative and historical background", *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, 82 (1989), 157-76; J. F. Haldon, "Military service, military lands and the status of soldiers: current problems and interpretations", *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 47 (1993), 1-67. The structures of rural landowning are discussed in A. Kazhdan, "State, feudal and private economy in Byzantium", *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 47 (1993), 83-100; J. Lefort, "Rural economy and social relations in the countryside", *loc. cit.*, 101-13 and, above all, in M. Kaplan's magisterial survey, *Les hommes et la terre à Byzance du VI^e au XI^e siècle. Propriété et exploitation du sol* (*Byzantina Sorbonensia*, 10, Paris, 1992).

³ See R. Morris, "Dispute settlement in the Byzantine provinces in the tenth century", in W. Davies and P. Fouracre, *The settlement of disputes in early medieval Europe* (Cambridge, 1986), 125-47, esp. 132-5 for a more detailed account of the disputes concerning the boundary of Mt Athos.

even if they had been granted an alleviation of tax (*sympatheia*).¹ In such a case, the state could retain, sell, lease or donate it. In the cases we are concerned with, it is clear that a decision had been made to re-sell the land and to bring it back into full agrarian and, more importantly, fiscal production.² The processes that surrounded both the designation of land as *klasma* and its ultimate disposal to new owners are described in two tax treatises which have been dated to the tenth and eleventh centuries respectively, the so-called *Marcian Treatise* (Venice, Marc. gr. 173, fols. 276v-281) and the *Zavorda Treatise* (St Nikanor, Zavorda, cod. 121), so one of the interesting questions we can ask of Thomas's activities is whether they conformed to the instructions provided in these manuals.³

Three documents which refer in some detail to Thomas's activities in selling off *klasma* land date from 941 and 956.⁴ In the latter, he is referred to as 'the late Thomas Mōrokoumoulos', so he had clearly died by then. In 941 he was acting under imperial instruction; both documents make reference to the instructions to sell *klasma* land issued by the emperors themselves.⁵ In the first document, issued, signed and sealed by Thomas himself, the *epoptēs* sold 1,800 *modioi* of *klasma* land on the peninsula of Pallene (also known as *Kassandra*) in the Chalkidike (800 *modioi* in the place known as *tôn Leukôn*

¹ For *klasma*, see *ODB*, vol. 2, 1132; for *sympatheia*, *ODB*, vol. 3, 1989. General discussion in N. Oikonomides, "Das Verfallend im 10. -11. Jahrhundert: Verkauf und Besteuerung", *Fontes Minores*, 7 (1986), 161-8, and 165-7 for discussion of the activities of the *epoptēs* Thomas; D. M. Górecki, "Land Tenure", pp. 202-5 and *eadem*, "Fiscal control of unproductive land in tenth-century Byzantium: policies and politics", in *Fontes Minores*, 7, (1998), 239-60.

² Górecki, "Fiscal control", 239, emphasises that for the Byzantine fisc, the concept of 'unproductivity' did not refer to land that produced no crops, but to land that produced no income for the state.

³ Text of the *Marcian Treatise*: F. Dölger, *Beträge zur Geschichte der byzantinischen Finanzverwaltung, besonders des 10. und 11. Jahrhunderts* (Leipzig, 1927; repr. Hildesheim, 1960), 113-56. *Zavorda Treatise*: J. Karayannopoulos, "Fragmente aus dem Vademecum eines byzantinischen Finanzbeamten", in *Polychronion: Festschrift Franz Dölger zum 75. Geburtstag*, ed. P. Wirth (Heidelberg, 1966), 318-334, Text at 321-4. Both treatises are translated in C. M. Brand, "Two Byzantine treatises on taxation", *Traditio*, 25 (1969), 35-60, *Marcian Treatise*, 48-57; *Zavorda Treatise*, 57-60. The ms. of the *Marcian Treatise* was copied after 1092, but the text probably dates to the tenth century; the *Zavorda Treatise* ms. dates to the 13th c., but the text was probably written about the middle of the 11th c. The *Marcian Treatise*, which is more detailed than the *Zavorda Treatise*, has been characterized as an instruction manual for prospective *epoptai*; the *Zavorda Treatise* is in the form of short questions and answers and may reflect actual practices of tax officials. They clearly both derive from a common body of source material; see Brand, "Two Byzantine treatises", 35-7.

⁴ *Lavra*, nos. 2 and 3 and *Xéropotamou*, no. 1. For summary and discussion, see P. Lemerle, *The agrarian history of Byzantium*, trans. G. MacNiocaill (Galway, 1979), 160-63.

⁵ A lost *prostaxis* (imperial instruction) for the sale of land on Pallene, issued by Romanos I Lekapēnos and his co-emperors Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos, Stephen and Constantine (Lekapēnos) is mentioned in *Lavra*, I, no. 2, ll. 1-8 and *Lavra*, I, no. 3, ll. 1-2. There is also, in both documents, a somewhat puzzling reference to a chrysobull 'concerning this kind of land (i.e. *klasma*)', issued by the same emperors, it is not clear to whom (see *Lavra*, I, no. 2, ll. 8-9 and no. 3, ll. 5-6). Perhaps this was a more general instruction to the *stratēgos* (provincial governor) to see to the selling of *klasma* in his area.

and 1,000 *modioi* at Ptelaia) to the hêgoumenos (abbot) Euthymios of the Monastery of St Andrew of Peristerai, some 20 km. east of Thessalonike. Of this, 1,200 *modioi* was cultivated land and 600 *modioi* had been abandoned.¹ Euthymios bought the land for 36 *nomismata* (gold coins) and was to pay his share of a tax of 12 *nomismata* payable on 'this sort of land'. The tax concerned was almost certainly that known as *libellikon dêmosion*, a tax payable on newly sold *klasma* lands which, according to the *Marcian Treatise*, was to be levied at the rate of $\frac{1}{12}$ of the original tax on the land concerned.² The price he paid was 1 *nomisma* per 50 *modioi* of land, regardless of its quality. This was an exceptionally low price, since fiscal treatises of the 11th century tell us that the price of land should be 1 *nomisma* per *modios* for land of 'first quality'; 1 *nomisma* per 2 *modioi* for land of 'second-class quality' and 1 *nomismata* per 3 *modioi* for land of 'third-class quality'.³

Thomas made a second sale of *klasma* land on Pallene at the same time.⁴ Its new owner, Nicholas, son of Agathon, was to share in the same *libellikon dêmosion* of 12 *nomismata*. This time, the amount sold was 100

¹ The *modios*, like all medieval measurements, varied from place to place, but was approx. 1,000 m². See J. Lefort, et al. *Géométries du fisc byzantin. Edition, traduction, commentaire* (Paris, 1991), 216-17. The Monastery of St Andrew of Peristerai had been founded c. 871 and was at this point still an independent house. It was later handed over to the Great Lavra on Mt Athos founded by St Athanasios, probably between August, 963 and May 964, which explains how its documents come to be found in that archive. See *Typikon* of St Athanasios the Athonite (973-7), trans. G. Dennis, in J. Thomas and A. Constantinides Hero, with G. Constable (eds.), *Byzantine monastic foundation documents*, 5 vols. (Washington, DC, 2000), vol. 1, no. 13, c. 51, 263.

² *Marcian Treatise*, ed. Dölger, 120, 123, trans. Brand, 54, 57. The *libellos* was the document, which transferred *klasma* land to its new owner, see Oikonomides, "Das Verfalland", 162. The tax of 12 *nomismata* must refer to that on all the *klasma* land sold in one 'batch' in Pallene and not to Euthymios's purchase alone, as 12 *nomismata* would have constituted one third of the cost – far too high a rate, see *Lavra*, I, 93. Kaplan (*Les hommes et la terre*, 534) estimated that the total amount of *klasma* sold on Pallene at this time was some 14,400 *modioi*, the majority of the arable land of the peninsula.

³ Oikonomides, "Das Verfalland", 165. 'First quality' land is defined in the 11th-century treatises on land measurement as 'rich', 'by a river', 'black', 'deep', 'arable' or 'hayfields'. 'Second quality' land included land 'not well irrigated', 'gravelly', 'sandy' or 'rough'. 'Third quality' land was 'scrubby or absolutely uncultivable' or 'rocky grazing', see *Géométries du fisc byzantin*, Texts: I, §4, 40; III, §52-4, 63. For a general discussion of Byzantine land prices, see J.-C. Cheynet, E. Malamut and C. Morrisson, "Prix et salaires à Byzance (Xe-XVe siècle)", in V. Kravari, J. Lefort, C. Morrisson (eds.), *Hommes et richesses dans l'empire byzantin*, II, VIII-XVe siècle (Paris, 1991), 339-74, 344-8. There is disagreement amongst scholars about the price of *klasma* land. Górecki, "Fiscal control", 246 and Kaplan, *Les hommes et la terre*, 478, consider it to have been $\frac{1}{12}$ of its original value; Oikonomides, "Das Verfalland", 162 thinks that it was charged at $\frac{1}{24}$ of the original value. As Kaplan points out, there is confusion in the *Zavorda Treatise* between sale price, original tax and *libellikon dêmosion*, probably due to corruption in the text.

⁴ *Lavra*, no. 3. Though printed after the sale to Euthymios of Peristerai in the publication of the Lavra archive, it has exactly the same date: August, 14th Indiction, a.m. 6449 = Aug. 941 and textual similarities confirm that the two documents were issued at the same time. Both documents were drawn up by Thomas, and both mention his seal. That attached to *Lavra*, I, no. 2, though photographed by Gabriel Millet *in situ* in the early 20th c., has now been lost; the same fate has also befallen the seal of *Lavra*, I, no. 3.

modioi of land at Prokoilos and the price charged was 2 *nomismata*, in other words, the same rate of 1 *nomisma* per 50 *modioi* of land. In addition, it is likely that, about the same time, Thomas also sold *klasma* land in the northern part of the Athonite peninsula (also, of course, in the Chalkidike) to the inhabitants of the fortified town (*kastron*) of Hierissos. A document preserved in the archives of the Prôtaton, dated to May of the 15th Indiction (942) which mainly concerns a boundary dispute between the Hierissiotēs and the monks of Athos (to which we shall return) mentions the sale of klasmatic lands to the townsmen 'some time ago'.¹ This could well refer, as Lemerle noted, to the same period of *klasma* sales in 941.² Unfortunately, in this case, neither the extent nor the price of the lands concerned is recorded and the documents, which actually transferred the properties, have been lost.³ This was not the first set of sales of *klasma* land on the Athonite peninsula; in the same document mention is made of lists of owners in 'the old *klasma* codices', almost certainly a reference to sales of *klasma* land which had taken place c. 883.⁴ The issue of the *klasma* lands sold in 941 was further raised in 942 and 943, though here the problem was still that of establishing boundaries. But a final document, which relates to the sales made by Thomas, dating to 956, raises the issue of the price, which he had charged. Here, the lands concerned were at Ozolimnos, near Hierissos and thus probably constituted part of the *klasma* sales, which had taken, place in 941.⁵ The *prôtospatharios* and *praipositos* of the *Chrysotriklinos*, John, who held the office of *meḡas chartoularios* of the office of the *Genikon* (essentially a high tax official — with two elevated court ranks to match — based in Constantinople), undertaking a tour of inspection in the region, declared that Thomas had sold the lands at too low a rate.⁶ For the 950 *modioi* he had sold he had charged some 19 *nomismata* per parcel of 50 *modioi* (therefore roughly $\frac{1}{3}$ *nomisma* [0.38 *nomisma*] per *modios*) and had fixed a rate of tax at 9 *miliaresia* and 12 *folleis*, that is to say $\frac{1}{24}$ of the price.⁷ The

¹ *Prôtaton*, no. 4, l.7.

² Lemerle, *Agrarian history*, 162-3.

³ *Prôtaton*, 189.

⁴ See discussion in *Prôtaton*, 47. Kaplan, *Les hommes et la terre*, 533, suggests that the whole of the Athonite peninsula had become *klasma* by the first half of the 9th c. and that the situation in the Chalkidike as a whole was not much better at that time.

⁵ *Xéropotamou*, no. 1 (April, 956).

⁶ For the bureau of the *Genikon*, essentially the fiscal administration of the Empire, see N. Oikonomidēs, *Les listes de présence Byzantines des IX^e et X^e siècles* (Paris, 1972), 313-14. The *meḡas chartoularios* was charged with the maintenance of the land registers of the Empire (including the lists of *klasma* land). He was the superior of the thematic *epoptai* such as Thomas, see Oikonomidēs, *loc.cit.*, 297-8. For criticism of Thomas, see *Xéropotamou*, no. 1, ll. 1-7.

⁷ *Xéropotamou*, no. 1, ll. 7-16 enumerates the names of the holders of 13 parcels of 50 *modioi* of land (or a multiple), making a total of 950 *modioi*. For the correction of the reading of the amount of tax payable from 9 *miliaresia* 11 *folleis*, to 9 *miliaresia* 12 *folleis*, see Oikonomidēs, "Das Verfalland", 165, n.19.

prôtospatharios John doubled the price and demanded that the additional 19 *nomismata* per parcel should be immediately paid to the state. By this move, he established the price of the land at just over $\frac{3}{4}$ (0.76) *nomisma* per *modios*, which is much nearer the norm of 1 *nomisma* per *modios* for first quality land established in the handbooks, though still an advantageous price. In fact, the matter became even more complicated because the parcels concerned became part of a land transfer to the recently founded Athonite Monastery of Xeropotamou, by which the Emperor Constantine VII and his co-Emperor, Romanos II, helped, at the request of the monks, to endow the house with some property.¹ Be that as it may, the issue that concerns us is the criticism of the *epoptês* Thomas and the accusation that he had not done as well as he could have done for the fisc.

In August, 941, as we have seen, Thomas sold *klasma* land on Pallene at 1 *nomisma* per 50 *modioi*; at about the same time he also sold land in the northern part of the Athonite peninsula between the land of the Athonite monks and that of the town of Hierissos at an unknown price and at Ozolimnos for $\frac{1}{3}$ *nomisma* per *modios*. Put in this context, Thomas seems to have established a much better price (and therefore subsequent tax) at Ozolimnos for the state, though, of course, we know nothing of the quality of the land in any of these cases. Nor do we know much about the existing cultivation arrangements when the sales were made. The difference in price could well have reflected the poor quality of the land on Pallene, or the fact that there were few takers for it, and, in contrast, the fact that he was able to gain a higher price per *modios* near Hierissos and, indeed, that a group of buyers could immediately be found for the Ozolimnos land, might reflect a much more buoyant and competitive land market in this area. But both regions were still, it would appear, recovering from the depredations of thirty years previously. The main aim of the *epoptês* was to bring back the land into fiscal 'production'; he therefore had to set the asking price for *klasma* extremely carefully. He obviously had the responsibility for gauging the level of the local land market and establishing what it would bear.² By 956, the situation had changed. While the transfer of the Ozolimnos lands to the

¹ The monks obtained an imperial *horismos* (instruction) to the *prôtospatharios* John, which instructed him to sell the land directly to them (and actually to add another 50 *modioi*, to make 1,000 *modioi* in all), provided that they paid the increased price. The fate of the existing owners is unknown; perhaps there was a 'new' sale at the new price and the monastery was allowed first priority. If the existing landowners remained, they presumably became dependant tenants of Xeropotamou. See *Xéropotamou*, 39 and Kaplan, *Les hommes et la terre*, 535 for further discussion.

² The process by which the sales took place is completely obscure. How were potential buyers alerted? How did they express their interest? Was there some kind of formal or informal auction or did the *epoptês* set the price, after, presumably, some kind of inspection of the land concerned or report by his officials on its extent and quality?

Monastery of Xeropotamou was, in fact, an imperial manipulation of the land market in the interests of patronage, nonetheless it is unlikely that the *prôtospatharios* John would have been able to double the original price had not the monks of Xeropotamou been more than willing to pay it. It is likely that the adjustment made by the *prôtospatharios* John, significantly after 15 years (the period of an indiction) had passed, reflected the improved productivity of the land and also indicates that the status of *klasma* was routinely reviewed from time to time.

In fact, what happened here may be echoed in another tenth-century document from the Athonite archives, by which another Constantinople-based official, the imperial *prôtospatharios* and *mezas chartoularios* of the *Genikon logothesion*, Constantine, sold 140 *modioi* of *klasma* land near Chrysoupolis in Macedonia to one Gregory Heptapsycho for 8 *nomismata*.¹ The price for land of first quality should, as we know, have been 1 *nomisma* per *modios*, and if the price for *klasma* land was indeed $\frac{1}{24}$ of its original value as the editors of this text, following Oikonomides, believe, here the price should have been at most only 5.8 *nomismata* per *modios* ($140 \div 24 = 5.8$), interestingly confirmed by the fact that Constantine levied a *libellikon dêmosion* of only $\frac{1}{4}$ *nomisma* which would confirm to the correct rate of $\frac{1}{24}$ of the previous value.² If the imperial official was indeed been able to ask an inflated price for the land in this case, his motives are unclear. There was, however, no long-term tax advantage to the state. To return to the *epoptês* Thomas, we are in no position to know whether he deliberately under-priced the Ozolimnos land; all that can be said with certainty is that he obtained far more for it than for property on Pallene, where 'rock bottom' prices clearly prevailed in the first half of the tenth century. It does, however, appear from these examples that imperial officials enjoyed some discretion when setting the price of *klasma* land in any given circumstance, though they might well be criticised for their actions later and that the price was subject to review.

While the jury must remain out on the question of whether Thomas acted in the best interests of the Byzantine fisc in his pricing of *klasma* land, there are certainly some grounds for doubting his efficiency when it came to undertaking another activity associated with the *epoptês*: the establishment of

¹ *Actes de Vatopédi*, I, *Des origines à 1329*, ed. J. Bompaire, J. Lefort, V. Kravari, C. Gros (*Archives de l'Athos*, XXI, Paris, 2001), no. 1, March, 2nd Indiction (?959). The imperial official Constantine has been identified with Constantine Karamallos who, as recorded in a document from the Monastery of Iviron, was *mezas chartoularios tou Genikou* a little before 958 and was, at that point, in the theme of Thessalonike, see *Vatopédi*, 66. For his title and functions, see n. 24, above.

² *Vatopédi*, no. 1, l. 7. The tax on the price he actually charged would have been $\frac{1}{24}$ *nomisma*. If however, one follows Górecki and Kaplan, the price should have been $11\frac{2}{3}$ *nomisma* ($140 \div 12 = 11.66$, in which case the buyer got a bargain and this case would again demonstrate the low price of *klasma* land).

property boundaries. The *Marcian Treatise* is quite clear about what he was expected to do. After the decision has been made to escheat land to the state, the *epoptês* 'separates into a special part the land pertaining to those parcels which have been made *klasma* and surveys it and inscribes it on the bureau's registers.'¹ The word 'survey' has been used to translate the Greek verb *periorizein*² which is linked to the noun *periorismos* ('boundary'), so what was involved here was the careful marking out of the boundaries of properties, a process which was often accompanied by the setting up of cairns, the slashing of tree trunks or the erection of crosses as markers. These, and topographical reference points such as streams, hills, or unusual groupings of trees or rocks are often cited at length in Byzantine documents associated with the transmission of property.³

In the three documents from the archives of the Prôtaton dated to 942 and 943 which deal with the establishment of the 'frontier' between the lands of the Athonite monastic community and their lay neighbours, there is much discussion of the activities of the *epoptês* Thomas and we are able to observe them from a number of different points of view. The earliest document is an agreement (*asphaleia/dialysis*) made between the representatives of the Athonite community and the landholders of the *enoria* (fiscal district) of Hierissos, both clerical and lay.⁴ It relates, in language directed at Thomas himself, how, when he had sold *klasma* land in the region 'some time ago' (probably, as we have seen, in 941), 'you did not establish the boundaries of what should be controlled by the purchasers and what by the Athonites'.⁵ As a consequence, a dispute had broken out about where the monastic territory should begin and both parties had eventually been summoned to Thessalonike to be heard by a court, which included the *stratêlatês* Katakālôn (the *stratêgos* or military governor), the thematic *kritês* (judge) Zoêtos, Archbishop Gregory of Thessalonike and the *epoptês* himself. The resulting agreement on where the boundary should lie was now being reported to the *epoptês* with the request that he should now formally confirm it 'and come to the place and mark the division we have agreed'.⁶

¹ Brand, "Two Byzantine treatises", 50 (ed. Dölger, 116).

² Dölger, 116, l. 13.

³ See, from many examples, *Lavra*, I, nos. 14 (1008), ll. 12-20; 14 (1010), ll. 5-11; 17 (1012), ll. 16-29.

⁴ *Prôtaton*, no. 4 (May, 942).

⁵ For a full translation of this document, see Morris, "Dispute settlement", 132-3.

⁶ For the duties of the *stratêgos*, see Oikonomidès, *Listes de préséance*, 341. The fact that Katakālôn is qualified in *Prôtaton*, no. 4 as a *stratêlatês* may mean that he was also, or had been, an active military commander, see Oikonomidès, *op. cit.*, 332. His seal is published in V. Laurent, *La collection C. Orghidian* (Paris, 1952), no. 211. For the thematic *kritês*, see Oikonomidès, *Listes de préséance*, 322-3. Archbishop Gregory of Thessalonike's seal is published in V. Laurent, *Le corpus des sceaux de l'empire Byzantine. V: L'église*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1963-72), I, no. 453; II, no. 1609. For a letter to him from Alexander, Metropolitan of Nicaea, see J. Darrouzès (ed.), *Epistoliers byzantins du XI^e siècle* (Paris, 1969), 76-9.

The second document (dating from between May, 942 and August 943) was issued by Thomas himself and gives a more detailed account both of the matter at issue and of the actions he had himself taken.¹ It was, in fact a report to the Emperors (Romanos I Lekapênos and his co-rulers), since, as we learn from this document, when arguments had first arisen about the boundary of Athonite territory, 'the monks asked the help of the Holy Emperors.'² Clearly, imperial intervention, which may have come in the form of the judicial *psêphos* (decision) of a well-known imperial jurist, the *magistros* Kosmas, raised the stakes in the dispute and galvanised the administrative officers of the region into action for 'as a consequence' of the Athonite appeal, the *stratêgos* Katakâlôn, as we have seen, summoned all parties to a hearing in Thessalonike, after which an agreement was reached.³ The details of the arguments put forward by both parties need not detain us (though it is interesting to note that both groups were acting as collectivities: one of 'all the Athonites' - not just the members of individual monasteries - and one of the land-holders of the fiscal district of Hierissos). But what is of great relevance to any examination of the work of the *epoptês* Thomas, is the emergence of the fact that no clear establishment of the boundaries of the *klasma* land he had sold between the territory of the Hierissiotēs and that of the Athonites had been established in writing or, therefore, noted in the *klasma* lists. But lest we accuse him of total incompetence, it does, however, appear that Thomas had 'delineated' the land which he had sold *within* the territory of Hierissos, in particular that which had subsequently been given as a gift to the monks of the Monastery of John Kolobos (just south of the town) and that which had been sold to the local lay cultivators.⁴

Why, therefore, did he not complete the job and establish, as he should have done, the boundary between the *klasma* lands and the territory owned (or

¹ *Prôtaton*, no. 5 (after May 942 and pre-Aug. 943).

² *Prôtaton*, no. 5, ll. 15-18. It is not clear whether a monastic delegation actually went to Constantinople, or whether the request for aid was made by letter.

³ As we know from an associated document, an imperial *prostagma* (instruction) to Katakâlôn to hold a hearing on the dispute was issued, see *Prôtaton*, no. 6 (2nd Aug. 943), l.1. In this document (l.7), a fleeting mention is made of the 'decision' of the *magistros* Kosmas. He probably held the post of *koiastôr*, the highest imperial judge and was almost certainly the drafter of two Novels concerning land transactions issued by Romanos I Lekapênos in 928 and 934, see N. Svoronos, ed. P. Gounaridis, *Les nouvelles des empereurs macédoniens concernant la terre et les stratiotes* (Athens, 1994), 242-4. He was also the author of two (possibly three) surviving *psêphoi* answering queries about land transfers, but neither Svoronos, *op. cit.*, 244 nor Lemerle, *Agrarian history*, 178, was convinced that it was to one of them that *Prôtaton*, no. 6 refers. But the reference to a ruling by Kosmas does indicate that advice had been requested from Constantinople on the relevance of the imperial legislation of 928 and 934 to the situation on Athos.

⁴ See *Prôtaton*, no. 5, ll.1-6. It is unfortunate that the beginning of the document is mutilated; more information about the sales of *klasma* in the region was probably related in the lost section.

claimed) by the monastic community of Athos? As the document succinctly puts it, 'it remained unclear what each party possessed, because of the non-existence up to now of an *epoptês*' decision and a record of the sale of the *klasma* (*diaprasis*).'¹ Why had the prescribed paperwork not been done? Thomas, somewhat apologetically, one feels, explained that 'nothing concerning the purchased klasmatic land [i.e. that bought by members of the community of Hierissos] and that of the monks of Athos was particularly examined by us, or taken any trouble over in the matter of the boundaries *because no strife had arisen about them*.'² This interesting comment at first glance seems to indicate that it was a matter of choice to the *epoptês* whether (and indeed, when) he performed the full range of surveying functions described in the *Marcian Treatise*: first of all the surveying of the *klasma* parcels (perhaps associated with the setting up of visible boundary markers) and the noting of them in the relevant *kôdikes* when the land was first escheated and then the describing of the extent of each individual sold parcel in the relevant *libellos* by which it was transferred to new owners. This may indeed be the case, but it is perhaps more likely that Thomas assumed (wrongly, as it turned out!) that since the boundaries of the properties concerned were well known (and also, perhaps, already marked), it was not immediately necessary to put them into writing. In the case of the parcels which ultimately ended up in the possession of the Monastery of John Kolobos, however, since a further transfer was immediately envisaged (or since the disposal of the *klasma* was by imperial gift rather than by sale) Thomas had already thought it best, in these more complex circumstances, to 'delineate' and therefore, most likely, to set down a written record. In the case of the *klasma* sales on Pallene, Thomas certainly went some way to clearly identifying in writing the properties concerned. Though neither of the documents concerned, both characterised as a *diaprasis*, contains a detailed *periorismos*, the villages and, in some cases the fields where the *klasma* properties lay are precisely named.³

There is also the possibility, too, that Thomas indeed planned to establish the boundaries of the *klasma* lands now owned by Hierissiotēs, but had not yet got round to it. If the *klasma* sales concerned did, in fact, take place around August of 941 (as did those on Pallene), then very little time had elapsed before conflict about them broke out, as by May, 942 settlements had already been reached. Indeed, the very fact of the sales may have precipitated

¹ *Prôtaton*, no. 5, ll. 10-11. Presumably no *libelloi* had been issued.

² *Prôtaton*, no. 5, ll. 11-15.

³ *Lavra*, I, nos. 2 and 3. A note on the *verso* of *Lavra*, I, no. 2 reads '*libellos* of the island (sic) of Elenis' [i.e. Pallene], so this document was clearly thought to constitute an official sale of *klasma*.

the crisis before any measurement could be made. For, as Thomas's own account relates, when the Athonite delegation appeared before the *stratêgos* at Thessalonike, the monks claimed that they had been assigned the whole of the peninsula of Athos 'in the old *klasma* lists (*kôdikes*)' and they also produced a *chrysobull* of the Emperor Basil I (867-86) which granted them possession of land 'from the *enoria* of Hierissos beyond', that is, southwards to the peninsula of Athos. Since they also declared (wrongly) that the *enoria* (fiscal district) of Hierissos only comprised the lands within the *kastron*, in other words within the walls of the town, then any move to sell off lands outside the walls, which was clearly what Thomas had been instructed to do, would have met with their immediate opposition. It looks very much as though, in this instance, either the *epoptês* Thomas had been overtaken by events (and especially by unexpected imperial intervention on behalf of one of the concerned parties) before he could get his paperwork done, or that he had been unaware of the long-running dispute firstly over the location of the Athonite 'frontier' and, secondly, over Hierissiot rights of access to the peninsula both for pasture and for refuge in times of danger. In either case, there is a certain defensive tone about his memoir of events.

The measure which he took to set matters right, however, doubtless with his superiors breathing down his neck, again illustrates the role of the *epoptês* as a land surveyor. His own account tells us that, 'after a great deal of argument, it was established by both parties where the boundary was to be traced.' This settlement took place, as we have seen, in Thessalonike. The parties then came to Thomas and requested him to 'come to the place and mark out the boundaries'.¹ This request was backed up by a formal instruction from the *stratêgos* and the Archbishop of Thessalonike, both to establish the details of the boundary on the spot and, most importantly, to give confirmatory documents to the parties concerned: *libelloi* with the details of their *klasma* holdings to the Hierissiot (in particular, presumably, the boundary of the 'outer' parcels with the land of the Athonites) and a *hypomnêma* (confirmation) and *periorismos* to the monks of Athos. This the *epoptês* and his team now did, Thomas having first of all insisted upon an oath from both parties that they would accept the agreement 'without alteration'.² In these actions Thomas was fully conforming, albeit belatedly, to the instructions laid down in the *Marcian Treatise* about the delineation of *klasma* land and its precise notation in *libelloi*.

What happened next gives some indication of the further difficulties even the most determined and professional *epoptês* might have to face. For

¹ *Prôtaton*, no. 5, ll. 17-18.

² *Prôtaton*, no. 5, ll. 38-47.

Thomas then had to deal with the appeals from both parties, unhappy with aspects of the solution: from the Hierissiotēs because their free access to the southern part of Athos was denied and from the Athonites who maintained that they had been ‘greatly troubled’ by the movements of lay people and animals into the peninsula. In the event, Thomas established a compromise: Hierissiotē wattle sheepfolds and beehives were now forbidden on Athonite lands and pasturing of flocks and flight in time of ‘barbarian attack’ was only to be allowed with the permission of the monks. But he was able to point out to the laity that ‘only poor and infertile land’ had been assigned to the Athonites.¹

At this point, the *epoptês* Thomas’s work seems to have been completed, though it was not, alas! finally accepted until the following year. For on 2nd August, 943, the *stratêgos* Katakālôn, the thematic *kritês* Zoêtos and Gregory, Archbishop of Thessalonike in the company of a large number of local dignitaries, both clerical and lay, personally retraced the border established by Thomas the year before and marked out the border again.² The references to *existing* cairns and marked trees indicate that the *epoptês* and his men had done a thorough job, though in this document (which was probably a formal response to the imperial orders emanating from Constantinople in 942), there is mention of the fixing of further markers (*synora*). There is also a detailed *diachôrismos* or topographical description of the boundary, but we should not assume from this that Thomas had previously failed to make one. His version would have been included in the land-transfer documents eventually held by each party to the dispute, which have since been lost.³

The fact that the *stratêgos* himself, an archbishop, a bishop, three distinguished *hêgoumenoi* and a large number of other named dignitaries (some fourteen in all), along with, we must suppose, a considerable entourage of fiscal officials and bodyguards, not to mention local land-holders, took part in what must have been a somewhat arduous trek across the Athonite peninsula, to ‘beat the bounds’ emphasises the fact that this was no ordinary boundary. Imperial patronage of the newly-established ‘community’ of Athos clearly added an extra edge to matters and it may well have been Thomas’s underestimation of the implications of this evolving relationship which caused him to leave the precise establishment of the boundaries of all of his sales of

¹ *Prôtaton*, no. 5, ll. 47-55.

² *Prôtaton*, no. 6, ll. 19-38. All three affixed their seals to the original document, which has survived with them, doubtless because of its immense importance to the evolution of the Athonite community. The *epoptês* Thomas was not present on this occasion, though some of his team surely must have been in order to guide the others.

³ It is referred to in *Prôtaton*, no. 5, l. 47.

klasma until somewhat late in the day when trouble had already broken out. But it is interesting to note that, unlike later references to his *klasma* selling activities, apart from his own *mea culpa*, no other document implicitly or explicitly criticized his action over the establishment of the Athonite boundary, either then or later.¹ Perhaps his own explanation was deemed to be enough or perhaps his absence from the boundary-establishing expedition of 943 (though not strictly necessary, as his earlier written *diachôrismos* must have acted as a basic itinerary) indicates that he was no longer in office! Apart from the retrospective mention in 956, he disappears from the Athonite archives.

Given the bitterness of the conflict over territory and access rights that had been simmering between the monks of Athos and the landowners of the district of Hierissos (particularly the Monastery of John Kolobos) since the end of the ninth century, the *epoptês* Thomas seems at best naïve, and at worst negligent, in not establishing the paperwork for his *klasma* sales near Athos with precision and rigour. In his defence, however, it can be maintained that he (and his superiors in Thessalonike) certainly made some efforts to respect the imperial legislation of the early tenth century which both established the rights of pre-emption of the members of rural fiscal entities to land (including *klasma*) that was sold in their area and that which limited the land-buying activities of the rural 'powerful' and, indeed, listed them.²

It is, however, uncertain what claim the *hêgoumenos* of St Andrew of Peristerai near Thessalonike had to be a fiscal 'neighbour' of village communes on the peninsula of Pallene (though perhaps the monastery already possessed lands in the region) and it is certainly the case that monastic *hêgoumenoi* were clearly listed in the legislation of 934 as being amongst the 'powerful'. But the low price that Thomas charged for *klasma* land there perhaps indicates that the need to bring the land back into fiscal productivity outweighed anxieties about the ultimate destination of the property.³ In the case of the lands south of Hierissos, however, even after imperial intervention on behalf of the Athonites, it is clear, firstly, that 'small investors' were very active in the land-market, since some of the land was sold off in parcels of

¹ One might have expected to find a criticism of Thomas's activities in the document (*Prôtaton*, no. 6), which clearly described a large body of extremely important people being put to the trouble of repeating work, which had been his responsibility. But there is no attempt there to apportion blame.

² For Romanos I Lekapēnos' legislation on pre-emption rights of 928, see Svoronos, ed. Gounaridis, *Novelles des empereurs macédoniens*, 46-71, text at 62-70. For the legislation of 934 and the listing of the 'powerful', against whom lesser landholders were to be protected, Svoronos, ed. Gounaridis, *op. cit.*, 72-92, text at 82-92; list of *dynatoi*, 84, c. 2, ll. 50-5. For English translations, see E. McGeer, *The land legislation of the Macedonian emperors* (Toronto, 2000).

³ Kaplan, *Les hommes et la terre*, 408, discusses the mixed blessing of *klasma* sales.

only 50 *modioi* and, secondly, that they do not seem to have been put off by their more powerful monastic 'neighbours', such as the Monastery of John Kolobos. So in this case, at least, there is evidence that, through the agency of the *epoptês*, the 'poor' were able to bid for and obtain *klasma* lands. If anyone stands accused of aiding the interests of the 'powerful', it is, perhaps the *prôtospatharios* John, who, in 956, following imperial instructions, dispossessed the previous holders of the Ozolimnos lands by re-selling them to the 'powerful' entity of the Monastery of Xeropotamou.

As for the boundary dispute, both Thomas and his superiors do seem to have responded to the appeals of the Hierissioties and, at the risk of incurring imperial displeasure, by no means granted the Athonites all that they were asking. In this they were, perhaps, attempting to follow the spirit of the imperial legislation of 928 and 934, which emphasised the importance of the rural communes as the backbone of the Byzantine state and emphasised imperial concern for the welfare of small landowners. Be that as it may, the 'frontier' of Athos was not placed where the monks would have liked it to have been and the rights of access of the laity to the peninsula in time of danger were re-affirmed, if in a somewhat circumscribed form. There is little evidence of the systematic bureaucratic corruption, which Ostrogorsky felt had characterised the activities of tenth-century imperial officials in the region.¹

Whatever one may conclude about the efficiency of the *epoptês* Thomas's activities in the Chalkidike in the mid-tenth century, and the evidence does not entirely acquit him of a certain lack of administrative acumen, the fact remains that he certainly epitomised the concept of 'bureaucratic surveillance' in the region. He was a vital cog in the mechanism of provincial administration; he took account of the prevailing legislative concerns of the central government and his actions were subject to supervision and review not only by his immediate superiors in Thessalonike, but also by visiting higher administrative officials sent periodically from Constantinople. That, in the mid-tenth century, the price of lands sold fifteen years previously at a small village in Macedonia should be of concern to a touring fiscal grandee and that the issue of the boundary between what was, at that early stage, merely a heterogeneous grouping of monastic communities and their lay neighbours, should have been raised in imperial circles in Constantinople, testify both to the long arm of the Byzantine state and to the detail and precision of its administrative procedures. What we might well term the 'Imber Equation': 'Authority = Collection of Tax' is amply demonstrated in the career of the *epoptês* Thomas Môrokoumoulos, who above all else, strove to keep the fiscal revenues, however slight, flowing from his outpost in the provinces to the all-consuming *dêmosion* in Constantinople.

¹ See Ostrogorsky, "Peasants' are exemption right", esp. 122.
 URL: <https://www.rantey.org/2012/02/01/peasants-are-exemption-right/>

NICAEA AND HER EASTERN NEIGHBORS¹

Keith Hopwood

The Nicene state is a conundrum: a transitional phase between the Latin capture of Constantinople in 1204, and the recapture of Constantinople in 1261. This transitional status accounts for its fascination and importance: it had to resolve political problems left by 1204, and its solutions shaped the Palaeologian future. Yet we must be careful. The state lasted for two generations: enough to create an air of permanence. For many of us, the 'Cold War' was a state of history that seemed unlikely to be superseded. Yet its duration was rather less than that of the Nicene state. We must therefore see it as a viable answer (possibly permanent) to the situation after 1204, not as an introduction to a later period, as W. Miller notoriously did in the old *Cambridge Medieval History*, entitling his chapter two 'The Empire of Nicaea and the Recovery of Constantinople'.²

My title might also lead to puzzlement. Surely the Nicene Empire had only one neighbor, namely the Seljuks of Rum. Technically this is true. The Seljuks had organized the Turkish peoples who had invaded Asia Minor after the battle of Manzikert in 1071, and formed a state, first at Nicaea, then at Ikonion/Konya.³ They had waged war briefly with the Byzantine state in the 12th century, but had largely remained faithful to their treaties, which culminated in a visit by the Sultan Kılıç Arslan II (551-588/1156-1192) to Constantinople in 1162.⁴ The Seljuks were clearly people the Byzantines could deal with.

¹ The transliteration of Greek is notoriously arbitrary. For commonly-known place-names and terms, I have used the Latinate form, hence Nicaea, not Nikaia. Others I have retained in directly transliterated form. For Turkish and Persian names and titles, I have used the form of transliteration used by C. Cahen, *The Formation of Turkey: The Seljukid Sultanate of Rûm, Eleventh to Fourteenth Century* (Harlow, 2001), hence Seljuk, not Saljuq.

² W. Miller, "The Empire of Nicaea and the Recovery of Constantinople" in J. B. Bury, J. R. Tanner, C. W. Previté-Orton and Z. N. Brooks (eds.), *The Cambridge Medieval History, Volume IV: The Eastern Roman Empire 717-1453* (Cambridge, 1923), 478-516.

³ On the Seljuks generally, see T. Talbot-Rice, *The Seljuks* (London, 1961); I. Kafesoğlu, *A History of the Seljuks*, trans. G. Leiser (Carbondale, Ill., 1988), and Cahen *The Formation of Turkey*.

⁴ On this visit, see Nicetas Choniates, *Historia*, 119-21; Cinnamus, *Epitome Rerum ab Ionna et Manuele Comnenis Gestata*, 204-8, and P. Magdalino, *The Empire of Manuel I Komnenos, 1143-1180* (Cambridge, 1993), 76-8.

There were, however, other forces in play. After the military defeat at Manzikert in 1071, the Turkish occupation of Asia Minor was left to the Türkmen semi-nomads.¹ Their raids into Armenia had provoked the disastrous attack of Romanos Diogenes (1067-71) on Alp Arslan (455-465/1063-1072), Sultan of the Seljuks of Iran, which culminated in Manzikert.² They were mounted, highly mobile, and both keen on the plunder of religiously-sanctioned opponents and resistant to the imposition of a state-structure by the Seljuks. Their raids on Byzantine territory provoked the fortress building and war of position that culminated in Myriokephalon in 1176.³ Thereafter Byzantine responses were raids into the headwaters of the Maeander where most of the Türkmen were gathered.⁴

As the Türkmen increased their hold on the headwaters of the rivers leaving the Anatolian plateau, they also developed into an important political force. Throughout the period of the Nicene Empire, they were developing into the base from which the future emirates of Aydın, Menteşe and Osman would evolve. This was partly due to their being driven to the fringe of the Seljuk state where a developing commitment to agricultural production meant that there was no longer any space for them to move their flocks.⁵ Their poverty turned them into keener raiders and this deprivation spurred them on to further social developments. Another factor affecting their progress was the victorious career of Genghis Khan (603-624/1206-1227). His conquests of Khwarezmia and the Great Seljuk state forced many Turkish peoples to take refuge with the Seljuks of Rûm.⁶ Of necessity, they entered the frontier zone.

The refugees also brought with them a new culture: the Islam of the steppes, invigorated by its contacts with Central Asian shamanism, and the

¹ On the nature of these people, see C. Cahen, "La première pénétration turque en Asie Mineure", *Byzantion*, 18 (1948); K. Hopwood, "Living on the Margin: Byzantine Farmers and Turkish Herders," *Journal of Mediterranean Studies*, 10 (2000), 93-106.

² S. Vryonis Jr., *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century* (Berkeley, Ca., 1971), 96-103.

³ See M. Hendy, *Studies in the Byzantine Monetary Economy, c. 300-1450* (Cambridge, 1985), 128-30; Magdalino, *The Empire of Manuel I Komnenos*, 95-8; Hopwood, "Living on the Margin", 98-9.

⁴ See J. S. Langdon, *Byzantium's Last Imperial Offensive in Asia Minor* (New Rochelle, New York, 1992); K. Hopwood, "The Emir Tzachas" (forthcoming).

⁵ For the complaints of the Türkmen, see A. Khazanov, *Nomads and the Outside World* (Cambridge, 1984), 266. This manifested itself in the later rebellions of Baba İshak and Baba Resul (see below).

⁶ On the Mongol invasions, see now D. Morgan, *The Mongols* (London, 1986). On the displacements, see F. Sümer, "Anadolu'ya Yalnız Göçebe Türkler mi Geldi?" *Belleten*, 24 (1960), 567-96. For their impact in Anatolia, see K. Hopwood, "Peoples, Territories and States: The Formation of the Begliks of Pre-Ottoman Turkey" in C. E. Farah (ed.), *Decision Making and Change in the Ottoman Empire* (Kirkville, Mo., 1993), 129-38.

political institutions of the threatening Mongol state.¹ The former was to lead to the creation of Sheiks and their followers, which led to a Türkmen rebellion in 1241, seriously weakening the Seljuks before their disastrous encounter with the Mongols at the battle of Köse Dağ in 1243. The latter led to acceptance of 'nökerlik', which enabled people of different faiths and cultural backgrounds to offer allegiance to charismatic rulers. The full resolution of this had to wait till the rise of the emirates in the 1280s, but the process was under way. This explains why the Türkmen hardened their attitudes to passing travelers during the period, as Michael Palaeologus (1225-1282) was to discover to his cost.

After the fall of Constantinople to the fourth Crusade, Theodore Lascaris (reigned 1204-1222) withdrew to Asia Minor and began to establish his despotate.² In effect, it was limited by the presence of crusader armies to the West and the presence of Türkmen groups to the East. The territory consisted of the former Optimaton Theme, the western half of the old Opsikion Theme and of the Thrakesion Theme: the Kibyrrhiote Theme had been largely abandoned. These old thematic armies were long gone: what was important was the possession of towns controlling the headwaters of the rivers. Nicaea itself was protected by Malagina in the Sangarios/Sakarya Valley,³ the Rhyndakos and Makestos were controlled by Lopadion/Ulubat,⁴ the Hermos by Philadelphia/Alaşehir,⁵ the Kaystros/Küçük Menderes by Pyrgi/Birgi⁶ and the Meander/Menderes by Laodiceia/Denizli. There were also frontier ports manned by 'akritai' who were paid by the Nicene state.⁷ These were small fortresses, commanding passes, which limited the movement of Türkmen into the agricultural lands of Nicaea. In the North, the mountain ranges limited a very narrow coastal plain round Nicaea and Prusa, to the South, Philadelphia was in the hands of Theodore Mangaphas, whose family

¹ On shamanism and Islam, see now I. H. Erünsal and A. Yaşar Ocak (eds.), *Elvan Çelebi: Menâkibu'l-Kudsiyye Fî Menâsibi'l-Ünsiyye. Baba İlyas-ı Horasânî ve Sülâlesinin Menakabevî Tarihi* (Ankara, 1995), and I. Mélikoff, *Hadji Bektach: un mythe et ses avatars. Genèse et évolution du soufisme populaire en Turquie* (Leiden, 1998). On institutions, see K. Hopwood "Peoples, Territories and States", 135; idem, "Osman, Bithynia and the Sources", *Archiv Orientalní, Supplementa, VIII* (1998), 155-64.

² Miller, "The Empire of Nicaea and the Recovery of Constantinople"; M. Angold, *A Byzantine Government in Exile: Government and Society under the Laskarids of Nicaea 1204-1261* (Oxford, 1975).

³ C. Foss, "Byzantine Malagina and the Lower Sangarius," *Anatolian Studies*, 40 (1990), 161-83.

⁴ F. W. Hasluck, *Cyzicus* (Cambridge, 1910), 78-83.

⁵ P. Lemerle, "Philadelphie et l'émirat d'Aydın", *Philadelphie et autres études, Byzantina Sorbonensia*, IV (1984), 55-68.

⁶ R. H. Ünal, *Birgi: Tarihî Coğrafyası ve Türk Dönemi Anıtları* (Ankara, 2001), 4-9.

⁷ On 'akritai', see A. Pertusi, "Tra storia e leggenda: Akritai e Ghâzi sulla frontiera orientale di Bisanzio", *Actes du XIVe Congrès International des Études Byzantines* (Bucharest, 1972), Vol. 1, 237-83. For the later period, see A. E. Laiou, *Constantinople and the Latins: The Foreign Policy of Andronicus II 1282-1328* (Cambridge, Mass., 1972), 76-84.

owned much of the area¹ and Laodicea was in the hands of Maurozomes, both of whom aspired to set up independent states. The Comneni had realized the weakness of this defensive line and had set up a system of "defense in depth"² based on fortresses like Poimaineon, Achyraous, Chliara, Pergamum, Anaia and Palatia. These would hold an attack from the East, but would be fatally weak should they be outflanked from the South (as Menteşe did in the 1280s).³

Theodore's first task, therefore, was to stabilize the frontier. It is important to note that his first problems were not with the Seljuks but with Byzantine men of power who had founded separatist states on his frontier. Mangaphas was easy to remove, but Maurozomes presented a more serious problem. He and Theodore Lascaris had been hosts to an exiled Seljuk Sultan –Gıyaseddin Keyhüsrev I, (reigned 588-593; 601-608/ 1192-1197; 1205-1211) and Maurozomes had prudently married his daughter to him.⁴ Now, as an independent ruler, he could count on support from his son in law, and held the lands of Laodicaea/Denizli and Khonai/Honas from the Sultan. A Byzantine dependent on the Seljuks controlled the crucial Meander headwaters.

According to Niketas Choniates (1155-1215), Lascaris marched against Maurozomes and defeated him (1205), but Ibn Bibi (fl. 1280) states that Comnenos (Maurozomes?) held on till c. 1230.⁵ A descendant, John Comnenos Maurozoma is attested as a Seljuk minister in the late 13th century.⁶ This defeat of a Byzantine renegade, not a Turkish ruler, was of such ideological importance that Lascaris had himself crowned as Emperor and so legitimated the Nicene state.

This decision attests to the significance of the eastern frontier. But it also attests to the centrifugal nature of power in the frontier zone. The Nicene state was itself one of the successor states of Byzantium: it had to face a Byzantine-led power in its eastern frontier. But this power rested on the support of Turkish forces in Laodiceia/Denizli and Maurozomes' relationship with Keyhüsrev. Elite interaction had long been a means by which Byzantine and Turkish cultures had merged in the frontier zone. As early as the 1090s, Tzachas/Çaka Beğ (c. 1090) had set up a state in Smyrna/İzmir. Tzachas had been a Turk captured in his youth and served a faction in the struggle for

¹ Angold, *A Byzantine Government in Exile*, 61.

² For the term, see E. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire from the First Century to the Third* (Baltimore, Md., 1976).

³ As argued in K. Hopwood "The Catalans in Asia Minor", *XIV. Türk Tarih Kongresi, Kongreye Sunulan Bildiriler* (Ankara, forthcoming).

⁴ Nicetas Choniates, *Historia*, 626.

⁵ Cahen, *The Formation of Turkey*, 44.

⁶ Cahen, *The Formation of Turkey*, 129; P. Wittek, "L'építaphe d'un Comnène à Qunya", *Byzantion*, X (1935-7). Ücretsiz PDF Kitap Arsivi - <https://rantey.org>

power that Alexios Komnenos (r. 1081-1118) had won. He had risen to high rank before choosing exile or being driven out. His followers consisted of Byzantines who followed their *protonobelissimos* and Turks who followed their compatriot and relative of the Sultan Kılıç Arslan I (485-502/1092-1109).¹

The importance of Maurozomes in the early 13th century is that he created a state in the frontier between the Seljuks and the Nicenes (just as Menteşe, Aydın and Osman were to do later).² It shows that the frontier zone would welcome charismatic leadership, which built on personal ties of loyalty/ protection and links with the other major rulers.

The 'Nicaean/Konya equilibrium' as celebrated by Vryonis,³ was established. But there were still more serious problems. Towards the end of the decade, Antalya/Attaleia fell to the Turks. Türkmen raids continued and the Nicenes and Seljuks drifted to war. Keyhüsrev attempted to revive Maurozomes' state and marched against the headwaters of the Meander. At Antioch on the Meander/Yenice, he was killed in an inconclusive battle.⁴ The Seljuks fell back, and a brief succession struggle ensued. Izzeddin Keykavus (644-647/1246-1249 negotiated peace with Lascaris and, with his western frontier secure, was able to overcome his rival claimants Alaaddin Keykubad (647/1249) and Key-Feridun.

The 'equilibrium' was marked by old-style wars of position and co-existence. The first decade of the 13th century also saw the construction of Caravanserays on routes to Laodiceia/Denizli and Nicene territory: Altnapa Han (1201),⁵ Kızılören Han (1205)⁶ and Kuruçeşme Han (1207).⁷ We also hear of Türkmen entering, and finding acceptance in, Byzantine lands. The traffic of conversion was not all one way. In later decades, we hear of Nicene wheat being exported to Konya.⁸

The frontier zone was made significant by other means. The mosque of Seyyit Battal Ghazi/Nakoleia is dated 1207.⁹ This seems to expand on an earlier shrine built on the site in 1092. The disputed land was being assigned

¹ A. Nimet Kurat, *Caka. Ortazamanda İzmir ve Yakınındaki Adaların Türk Hakimî*, (İstanbul, 1936); Vryonis, *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism*, 115ff.; Hopwood, "The Emir Tzachas".

² For state-formation, see Hopwood, "Peoples, Territories and States".

³ Vryonis, *Decline of Medieval Hellenism*, 130-3.

⁴ Cahen, *The Formation of Turkey*, 48-9.

⁵ K. Erdmann, *Das Anatolische Karavansaray des 13. Jahrhunderts* (Berlin, 1961), 29-32.

⁶ Erdmann, 45-9.

⁷ Erdmann, 33-6. Cf. Also B. Flemming, *Landschaftsgeschichte von Pamphylien, Pisidien, und Lykien im Spätmittelalter* (Wiesbaden, 1964), 12-5.

⁸ Gregoras, *Historia* 1, 42-3.

⁹ C. H. E. Haspels, *The Highlands of Phrygia: Sites and Monuments*, 2 vols, (Princeton, NJ, 1971), 258-60; K. Belke and N. Mersich, *Tabula Imperii Byzantini 7: Phrygien und Pisidien* (Vienna, 1990), 345-6. Ücretsiz PDF Kitap Arsivi - <https://rantey.org>

to Islam. Other monuments appeared also: South of Seyyid Battal Ghazi lies Kümbet where an archetypically Seljuk monument (undated) reuses Byzantine carving.¹ The main site, however, is Seyyit Battal Ghazi. There has been constant dispute as to the nature of the main building. Was it a monastery converted into a mosque, or a mosque built by Byzantines working for Seljuks or a Seljuk custodian heavily influenced by Byzantine ecclesiastical architecture? The point is that the blend of styles matches the cross-frontier blend of cultures and stories: the story-patterns of the *Battalname*² echo those of *Digenes Akrites*³ - a popular text at the Comnenian court. The frontier cultures were beginning to assimilate.

However, beyond the war of position, these were Türkmen raids. J. S. Langdon has described an attack by a full imperial army under Theodore's successor John Lascaris (1258-1261) as far as Laodiceia/Denizli. I have no doubt that such an attack took place, but I cannot agree with the description of it as a 'crusade against the Turks'.⁴ It was merely a response to Türkmen raids (as Langdon makes clear) and there was no will (or capacity) to retain control of Laodiceia/Denizli. The problem continued.

The situation was overturned by the defeat of the Seljuks by the Mongols at Köse Dağ in 1243. More refugees flocked into the frontier zone and the imposition of rule by pagans inflamed their (albeit heterodox) Islam. Mu'iniddin was appointed regent (*pervane*) over the young sons of Keyhüsrev.⁵ Faction fighting quickly broke out. Izzeddin Keykavus II (644-647/1246-1249)⁶ the son of the daughter of an Orthodox priest, upon the failure of his anti-Mongol policy, in 1256 fled first to the frontier Türkmen, then to Nicaea, where he was received warmly by the emperor and Michael Palaeologos, his rival. Within a year, Izzeddin was back in Konya with Nicene support, having ceded Laodiceia/Denizli to the Empire. Within a further year, he was joined by Michael Palaeologos, who sought refuge from John Lascaris.⁷ He held the Byzantine rank of 'kondestabl' in the wars against the Mongols. Such were the links at high level between Nicaenes and Seljuks.

¹ Haspels, *The Highlands of Phrygia*, 274-5; Belke and Mersich, *Tabula Imperii Byzantini* 7, 318-9.

² See now the edition by G. Dedes, *Battalname: Introduction, English Translation, Turkish Transcription, Commentary and Facsimile*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1996).

³ See the studies of J. Mavrogordato, *Digenes Akrites* (Oxford, 1956); D. Ricks *Byzantine Heroic Poetry* (Bristol, 1990); and R. Beaton and D. Ricks (eds.), *Digenes Akrites: New Approaches to Byzantine Heroic Poetry* (Aldershot, 1993). For a definitive modern edition, see E. Jeffreys, *Digenis Akritis* (Cambridge, 1998).

⁴ Langdon, *Byzantium's Last Imperial Offensive*.

⁵ Cahen, *The Formation of Turkey*, 176ff.

⁶ Cahen, *The Formation of Turkey*, 175-91.

⁷ C. Chapman, *Michel Paléologue, Restaurateur de l'empire byzantin* (Paris, 1926), 27-9; D. J. Geanakoplos, *Emperor Michael Paleologus and the West, 1258-1282* (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), 26-30.

The Türkmen were becoming a greater problem, despite the construction of Ak Han in 1253, a mere seven kilometers north of Laodiceia/Denizli.¹ Michael had been robbed of all his possessions. Izzeddin had restored them, but it was clear the pressure on the eastern Nicene frontier was growing.

In 1257, Michael returned to Nicaea, and usurped the throne as Michael VIII. Within four years he was to reconquer Constantinople.

But things were changing. Izzeddin's followers in Laodiceia/Denizli were seized and executed by a certain Mehmed Beğ (d. 660/1292). Aqsarayi (fl. c. 1320) describes him as 'beğ al-ucii'² - lord of the frontier. It is not certain whether he was a Seljuk official who became independent, or an independent ruler. He quickly conquered land from Denizli to Dalaman and hoped for recognition from the Mongols in Tabriz. He had, in effect, set up the first frontier emirate, of which Menteşe, Aydın and Osman were to be the heirs. His honesty or audacity undid him. The government in Tabriz asked the *pervane* to destroy him. He was no match for the Seljuk army.

Mehmet Beğ laid the way for future emirates. Building on the example of Maurozomes, he created a state of united Byzantines and Turks in the frontier zone, very much as later emirates were to do. During the period of the Nicene state the changes in frontier society, which ultimately led to the creation of the Turkish Anatolia, occurred.

The restored state in Constantinople had to face pressure from the West: this led to the downgrading of the defense of the Eastern frontier. Ottoman sources show that by the 1290s the castellan of Bilecik/Beloukome at least was paying tribute to the Seljuks.³ The loyalty of the frontier zone was no longer certain. Türkmen were well down the Maeander valley and could no longer be dislodged by imperial campaigns. Menteşe Beğ set up an emirate based on Köyceğiz and, although unable to defeat Byzantine forces in the field, could harry territory that the imperial army could not permanently defend. The campaign of Andronicus II which re fortified Tralleis was the last of these old style reprisals: Menteşe easily destroyed the refoundation and, with it, Byzantine control of the headwaters of the Meander. Within a decade, in the North, the Ottomans had formed themselves into a state processing a sufficient diversity of forces to defeat a Byzantine army at Bapheus/Koyun Hisar in 1301.

¹ Erdmann, *Das Anatolische Karavansaray*, 67-72.

² Aqsarayi, *Müsâmeret'ül Ahbâr*, 49.

³ *Tevârihi- Ali Osman*, ed. N. Azamat (İstanbul, 1992), 9.
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SOME THOUGHTS ON THE MEANING OF GAZA AND AKIN IN EARLY OTTOMAN USAGE

Heath W. Lowry

Among the many insights I have gleaned from the corpus of works published by Colin Imber,¹ none has been more valuable than his observation relative to the meaning of the *beyt* (couplet) in the early fifteenth century *İskendernâme* of Âhmedi where, in describing the reign of Orhan, the author wrote:

“*Kâfir üzre akdılar a’vân-ı dîn*
Andan itdiler gazâ adın akın”

“The helpers of religion flowed [over] the unbelievers
And that’s why they called *gaza* (Holy War) *akın* (raiding).”²

Imber argued (correctly in my opinion) that this *beyt* suggests that for the early Ottomans the operative term to describe their warfare was *akın* (raid), not *gaza* (Holy War). He went even further and suggested that the Arabic *gazi* (Holy Warrior) found in Âhmedi and other Ottoman texts was nothing more than a calque on the Turkish *akıncı* (raider).³

As I have shown in a recent work, *The Nature of the Early Ottoman State*,⁴ it was indeed the prospect of booty and slaves which inspired the early Ottoman *gazıs*, many of whom were not even Muslims.⁵ They were a plundering confederacy which was intent on ‘flowing over’ (from the Turkish verb: *akmak* = to flow) their enemies, rather than a religious brotherhood desirous of converting them to Islam. There can be little doubt but that in fourteenth-fifteenth century Ottoman parlance the terms *gaza/gazi* were

¹ Colin Imber, “The Legend of Osman Gazi,” in *The Ottoman Emirate, 1300-1389*, ed. E. Zachariadou (Crete, 1993), 67-76. For his analysis of the Âhmedi *beyt*, see 73-74 [Hereafter: Imber, 1993]. See also, C. Imber, “What Does *Ghazi* Actually Mean?” in *The Balance of Truth: Essays in Honor of Professor Geoffrey Lewis*, eds. Ç. Balım-Harding & C. Imber (İstanbul: Isis Press, 2000), 165-178. [Hereafter: Imber, 2000].

² Kemal Silay, “Ahmedi’s History of the Ottoman Dynasty”, *Journal of Turkish Studies*, 16 (1992), 129-200. For the *beyt* in question, see 137 & 147.

³ Imber, 1993, 73-74; Imber, 2000, 175-176.

⁴ Heath W. Lowry, *The Nature of the Early Ottoman State* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2003) [Hereafter: Lowry, 2003].

⁵ Lowry, 2003, 51-54. Ücretsiz PDF Kitap Arsivi - <https://rantey.org>

synonymous with *akın/akıncı*, nor that the Ottomans in that period viewed their activities primarily as raids rather than as Holy War.

What both Imber and I overlooked in our analyses of the meaning of these terms was a passage from the late fifteenth century *kanunname* (law code) of the ruler Bayezid II. Compiled in 1493, less than a century after Âhmedi penned his verses, this document sets forth the conditions under which the Ottoman sultans were entitled to receive one-fifth of the booty and slaves taken by their troops. The Ottoman term *pençik*, or fifth, was a corruption of the Persian *penç-yek*, and this document is titled the *kanunname-i penç yek*, or 'Law Code of the Fifth.' It begins:

“Uç beğleri, akıncı ve sâir yiğit ve yeğil [?] cem’ edüb
gazâ niyyetine dâr-ül-harb’e seğırtmek akındır.”⁶

“When the frontier commanders assemble their raiders (*akıncı*)
and other brave young men for the purpose of waging a Holy War (*gaza*)
against non-Muslim lands this is [called] a raid (*akın*)”

Hidden within this phrase is nothing less than confirmation of the message conveyed a century earlier in Âhmedi’s verse, namely, for the Ottomans the common term to describe those warriors who did battle with their Christian neighbors was *akıncı* (raiders), whereas the activity they engaged in, even when it was “for the purpose of waging Holy War (*gaza*),” was called *akın* (raiding).

This, no matter how later Ottoman writers were to spin it, was the fourteenth and fifteenth century Ottoman reality on the ground. As I have earlier demonstrated it was also what the Christian foes of the Ottomans observed.⁷ Fifteenth century writers, such as the Byzantine chronicler Doukas (whose career was marked by frequent close contacts with the Ottoman rulers Murad II and Mehmed II), described the Ottoman plan of conquest in the following passage:

“If they [the Turks] hear the herald’s voice summoning them to the attack --which in their language is called *aqın*-- they descend like a flooding river, uninvited, the majority without purse and food pouch and without spears and swords. Countless others come running, swelling the number of

⁶ Ahmed Akgündüz, *Osmanlı Kanunnâmeleri ve Hukukî Tahlilleri*, 2. Kitap (II. Bâyezîd Devri Kanunnâmeleri) (İstanbul, 1990), 128-134. See also Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr, “En Marge d’un Acte Concernant le Pençyek et les Aqıngı”, *Revue des Études Islamiques*, 37 (1969), 21-47 [Hereafter: Beldiceanu-Steinherr, 1969]; İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilâtından Kapukulu Ocakları*, Vol. 1 (Ankara, 1943), 86-90. For the date of the *kanunname*, see Beldiceanu-Steinherr, 1969, 22.

⁷ Lowry, 2003, 46-47.

troops, the majority of them carrying nothing but a club in their hands. They rush against the Christians and seize them like sheep.”⁸

Here too, we must not overlook Doukas’ description of what the Ottoman *akıncıs* do. They do not kill their Christian enemies, nor do they give them the choice of conversion to Islam or death. Rather, they enslave them (“*seize them like sheep*”), and, in so doing, Doukas once again reiterates the actual nature of the Ottoman enterprise in its early centuries. It was indeed a plundering confederacy, which, for its soldiery, provided an opportunity for enrichment by the amassing of booty and slaves. Once the Ottoman imperial chronicle tradition of the sixteenth century and thereafter emerges, it sanitizes the early centuries, by turning those who contributed to the growth of the state (*akıncıs*) into warriors for the faith of Islam (*gazıs*), and their raids (*akın*) into Holy War (*gaza*).

At this stage it is useful to recall the letter written by Ak Şemseddin, the tutor and spiritual mentor of the young Ottoman ruler Mehmed II in the weeks prior to the fall of Constantinople. Following a losing naval engagement on April 20, 1453, in the course of which the Genoese were able to penetrate the Ottoman defenses and deliver much needed supplies to the besieged Byzantine capital, Ak Şemseddin wrote to the ruler in an effort to bolster his resolve in the face of growing opposition from the peace camp headed up by many of his father’s former advisors. In one section of his letter he reminded the ruler, in no uncertain language, about the need to silence those officials who were undermining the war effort, lest in future they refuse to follow orders. He went on to describe the motivation which prompted the ruler’s irregular, i.e., *gazi* or *akıncı* forces, in the following passage:

“Bilirsiz, ekseri yasak müslümanıdır ‘Allah için canını ve başına koyan azdan azdır. Meğerki, bir ganîmet görelər, canlarını dünya için od’a atalar.”
 “As you know, most auxiliary troops are Muslim; therefore, the number who will actually put their souls and their heads on the line for God is less than none. However, if they see the possibility of booty, they will throw their souls into the fire for worldly goods.”

He leaves no doubt but that even in the course of the ultimate “*gaza*,” the conquest of the crown of Christendom, it was the promise of booty rather than a desire to spread Islam which provided the incentive for the Ottoman armies to fight. Ak Şemseddin’s *yasaks*, a Mongol/Persian term for auxiliary troops who served with their own equipment, were the Ottoman *gazıs/akıncıs*,

⁸ Harry J. Magoulias (Trans. & Editor), *Decline and Fall of Byzantium to the Ottoman Turks by Doukas* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1975), 133-134.
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whom he clearly states were unwilling to risk their lives for God but were willing to die for the sake of booty.⁹

This then was the political vocabulary of the early Ottoman state. In the same manner that it used a secular rather than a religious terminology to describe its conquests, its fighters were chosen on the basis of ability rather than faith. As I have previously demonstrated, even as late as the third quarter of the fifteenth century, the Ottoman *akıncıs* [sic. *gazıs*] summoned for a campaign against the Muslim ruler Uzun Hasan in 1472, included large numbers of Christians.¹⁰ They too, not unlike the Muslims referred to by Ak Şemseddin in 1453, were motivated by a quest for booty and slaves rather than a desire to spread Islam, a religion they did not even share.

⁹ Halil İnalçık, *Fatih Devri Üzerinde Tetkikler ve Vesikalar* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1954), 127, 217-219 & Plate 8. For Akşemseddin, see A. İhsan Yurd, *Fatih Sultan Mehmed Hanın Hocası Şeyh Akşemseddin (Hayatı ve Eserleri)*, (İstanbul: Fatih Yayınevi, 1972); Orhan F. Köprülü & Mustafa Uzun, "Akşemseddin," in *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, Vol. II (İstanbul, 1989), 299-302.

As anyone familiar with Ottoman Turkish will immediately recognize, the key question in this passage is the meaning of the phrase: '*ekseri yasak müslümanıdır*,' which I have translated as: '*most auxiliary troops are Muslims*.' Specifically, the problem stems from the word '*yasak*,' which, while from the context clearly refers to some form of soldier, is not known to have such a meaning in Ottoman Turkish. Neither standard dictionaries nor the *Tarama Sözlüğü*, provide any such meaning for this word.

For the meaning of this term we must turn to: Gerhard Doerfer, *Türkische und Mongolische Elemente im Neupersischen*, Vol. 4 (Wiesbaden, 1975), 78-79, where the term *yasak* meaning auxiliary troop is used in a variety of fourteenth-early eighteenth century texts. Doerfer sites J. Aubin's study "*Deux sayyids de Bam au XVe siècle. Contribution à l'histoire de l'Iran timouride*" (Wiesbaden, 1956), 79, in which the term '*yasaqiyan*' is used with the meaning of auxiliary troops; Samarquandi's late fifteenth-century: *Matla'i sa'dain v magma'i bahrain*. Edited by M. Safi. Lahur, h.1360, 1072, where *yasaqiyan* (auxiliary troops) are contrasted with *laşkariyan* (regular troops); and, V. Minorsky's publication of: *Tadhkirat al-mulūk: A manual of Safavid administration (circa 1137/1725)*. Gibb Memorial Series. New Series, No. 16 (1943), 34, where the term '*yasaqi*' is used with the meaning of a '*class of auxiliary troops serving, as it seems, with their own equipment*.' These are the clues which led me to accept this unique usage of the term in Ottoman Turkish as meaning: '*auxiliary troops*.' It thus appears that Ak Şemseddin is using the word '*yasak*' to refer specifically to that portion of Mehmed II's troops who were auxiliaries, i.e., the *gazılakıncı* component of his army.

Halil İnalçık, who initially discovered the Ak Şemseddin letter in the Topkapı Archives, where it is catalogued as (Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi No. E. 5584), has repeatedly stressed to me in conversation his view that the term '*yasak*' is referring not to the auxiliary elements in Mehmed's army but rather to his salaried standing army, the Janissary corps. Not only do I find this argument unconvincing in light of the examples cited by Doerfer, it appears to me as logically flawed. Specifically, to say that in the mid-fifteenth century the Janissaries were only willing to fight for booty, simply flies in the face of everything we think we know about the purpose of this body. Further, there is no known Ottoman text which supports the use of the term '*yasak*' for the Janissaries. In a recent newspaper article dealing with the Ak Şemseddin letter, İnalçık seemingly argues against his own interpretation when he claims that Mehmed II is being warned against Çandarlı Halil Paşa and his circle (those opposed to the conquest of the city), whom he terms '*yasak Müslüman*.' These were not the Janissaries, but rather so-called Turkish nobility, the very individuals Mehmed sought to replace with Janissaries throughout his reign. See Hürriyet, June 29, 2003, article entitled: '*Hocasından Fatih'e "Şahin ol" uyarısı*.'

¹⁰ Lowry, 2003, 51-54

THE TRANSFORMATION OF PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION IN ANATOLIA: OBSERVATIONS ON AMASYA FROM 15th to 17th CENTURIES

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Transition from pre-Ottoman regimes to those of the Ottomans in late Medieval Anatolia and the Balkans undoubtedly constitutes a major subject of inquiry for historians, although the existing literature on the issue does not reflect the significance of the matter. This is particularly so for the Anatolian regions. Fuad Köprülü's work on the Byzantine influence on Ottoman institutions was the first comprehensive historical treatment of the subject.¹ Though his aim was to disprove any direct Byzantine influence on Ottomans institutions, Köprülü's analysis of the *timar* system, in which, for instance, he emphasizes a direct continuity between the Seljukid *ikta* and the Ottoman *timar* as a military fief system, still constitutes the mainstream among Turkish historians on the transition debate in general. However, the origins and development of the Ottoman *timar* system from then on has produced a lively debate among the historians of later generations.²

Halil İnalçık's significant works on the transition of the socio-economic and fiscal-administrative structures in the Balkans were among the first scholarly treatments of the characteristics of the Ottoman administration

¹ See M. Fuad Köprülü, *Bizans Müesseselerinin Osmanlı Müesseselerine Tesiri*, Prefaced with notes by Orhan F. Köprülü (İstanbul: Ötüken Yayınları, 1981).

² For the most known contributions to this debate, see Ömer Lütfi Barkan, "Timar", *İA*; idem, "'Feodal' Düzen ve Osmanlı Timarı" in *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi Semineri* (Ankara: Hacettepe Ün. Yay., 1975), 897-904; Niyazi Berkes, *100 Soruda Türkiye İktisat Tarihi, Metinler/Tartışmalar*, 8 - 10 Haziran 1973, eds. Osman Okyar and H. Ünal Nalbantoğlu, vol. I (İstanbul: Gerçek Yay.), esp. 60-74; Mehmet Ali Kılıçbay, *Feodalite ve Klasik Dönem Osmanlı Üretim Tarzı*, Second Impression (Ankara, 1985), esp. 247-428; Taner Timur, *Osmanlı Toplumsal Düzeni*, Second Impression (Ankara, 1979), esp. 153-273; Nicoara Beldiceanu, *XIV Yüzyıldan XVI. Yüzyıla Osmanlı Devleti'nde Timar*, Trans. M. A. Kılıçbay (Ankara: Teori Yay., 1985); Halil Berktaş, *Kabileden Feodalizme* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yay., 1983); Halil İnalçık, "Timar", *EJ*². For the Ottoman Balkans, see Nedim Filipoviç, "Bosna Hersek Timar Sisteminin İnkişafı", *İ.Ü.İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, 15/1-4 (1953), 155-188; Halil İnalçık, "1431 Tarihli Timar Defterine Göre Fatih Devrinden Önce Timar Sistemi", *IV. Türk Tarih Kongresi Zaburları* (Ankara, 1952), 132-139; Vera P. Moutafchieva, *Agrarian Relations in the Ottoman Empire in the 15th and 16th Centuries* (New York, 1988).

in its provinces.¹ Based on the early Ottoman *tahrir* registers, his works clearly revealed institutional continuity, with certain adaptations under the Ottoman rule, while also demonstrating that the Ottomans only gradually eliminated the pre-Ottoman military and landed-aristocracy and, in some cases, partially incorporated them into its increasingly centralized provincial administrative system.

Leaving aside Speros Vryonis Jr.'s *Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor* and his other works focusing mainly on the transformation of the ethno-religious composition in the old Byzantine lands in Anatolia and the Balkans during Turkish colonization from the eleventh through fifteenth centuries,² the only detailed studies to date of the transition problem in the case of Anatolia were those by Nicoara and Irene Beldiceanu-Steinherr on the regions of Trabzon and Karaman,³ Anthony Bryer and Heath Lowry, again on Trabzon,⁴ and Margaret Venzke on the Dulkadirli region.⁵ Their works shed significant light on the debate concerning the continuation of certain pre-Ottoman fiscal practices in relation to property rights, taxation and military service in the Ottoman provinces of Rûm and Trabzon, Dulkadirli, and Karaman, thus showing that the Ottomans had in fact inherited certain earlier practices from the Byzantines, Seljuks and Mamluks, again with only slight changes. Among these, the Ottoman form of the pre-Ottoman practice known

¹ In addition to his articles mentioned in the previous note, also see Halil İnalçık, "İslam Arazî ve Vergi Sisteminin Teşekkülü ve Osmanlı Devrindeki Şekillerle Mukayesesi", *İslâmî İlimler Dergisi*, I/1 (Ankara, 1950), 29-46; "Stefan Duşan'dan Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'na: XV. Asırda Rûmeli'de Hristiyan Sipahiler ve Menşeleri", in *60 Doğum Yılı Münüsebetiyle Fuad Köprülü Armağanı* (İstanbul, 1953); "Osmanlılarda Raiyyet Rûsûmu" *Belleten*, XIII (1959), 575-610 [these articles are also published in H. İnalçık, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu. Toplum ve Ekonomi Üzerine Arşiv Çalışmaları, İncelemeler* (İstanbul: Eren Yay., 1993)].

² Speros Vryonis Jr., *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century* (Berkeley, 1971). For his other contributions to the subject, see Speros Vryonis Jr., *Studies on Byzantium, Seljuks, and Ottomans* (Malibu: Undena Publications, 1981).

³ Nicoara Beldiceanu and I. Beldiceanu Steinherr, "Recherches sur la province de Qaraman au XVI^e siècle", *JESHO*, XI (1968); Irene Beldiceanu-Steinherr, "Fiscalité et formes de possession de la terre arable dans l'Anatolie préottomane", *JESHO*, XIX (1976).

⁴ Nicoara Beldiceanu's argumentation in his "L'empire de Trébizonde à travers un register Ottoman de 1487", *AP*, 34 (1979), which I have not been able to see, on the continuity of certain local Pontic institutional practices under the Ottoman rule in the Trabzon region was partly criticized and revisited by Bryer, whose works are still among the most valuable on the Pontic Trebizond. For his contribution to the transition issue in the case of Trabzon, see the excellent collection of essays by Anthony Bryer and Heath Lowry (eds.), *Continuity and Change in Late Byzantine and Early Ottoman Society* (Birmingham and Washington, 1986). This book as a whole is an important contribution to the question of "transition" from late Byzantine to the early Ottoman periods, and also contains Heath Lowry's detailed analysis of the same problem in the same region, Trabzon, making extensive use of early Ottoman *tahrir* registers. For the contributions by both Bryer and Lowry, see particularly Chapter Two, devoted to the case of Matzouka / Maçuka Valley.

⁵ Margaret L. Venzke, "Aleppo's Mâlikâne-Divânî System", *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 106 (1986); idem, "The Case of a Dulgadir-Mamluk *Iqta*: A Re-Assessment of the Dulgadir Principality and Its Position within the Ottoman-Mamluk Rivalry", *JESHO*, 43/3 (2000), 399-474.

as the *mâlikâne-divâni* system, applied fully or partially in all of the above provinces, in fact was first studied in length by Ö. L. Barkan in 1939, followed in the 1940s and 1950s by the publication of his other pioneering works on Ottoman land and taxation systems.¹ Despite certain disagreements on the nature of property rights, it was mainly these historians who detailed in the case of Anatolian provinces the limitations of Ottoman imperial power while also pointing to the conciliatory nature of early Ottoman expansion, a point Halil İnalcık insistently refers to in his own works for the Balkan provinces. This was particularly so in the central and eastern provinces of Anatolia where late Byzantine, post-Seljukid, Mamluk and even Akkoyunlu administrative traditions survived to a certain extent for varying periods of time under Ottoman rule.² The development of Ottoman provincial law codes or *kânunnâmes* clearly manifests the inclusive and pragmatic character of the transition process.³ It is also well known that certain sub-state socio-political formations, such as the emirates, mostly based on varying local tribal (*aşiret*) structures in Kurdish provinces, similarly proved to be highly resistant to Ottoman central administration.⁴ Therefore, the Ottoman Empire was only able to establish its political suzerainty in such regions, particularly in South Eastern Anatolia and Northern Syria, by granting extensive administrative and fiscal autonomy under peculiar systems known as *ocaklık* and *hükümet*.⁵

Despite our expanding knowledge of such aspects of the issue of transition in early Ottoman history, both the origin and development of the Ottoman provincial administrative system in Anatolia remains still vaguely understood. The Seljukid connection is particularly weak despite the existence of a few studies on late thirteenth century practices, such as the works by

¹ For a collection of these articles, see Ömer Lütfi Barkan, *Türkiye'de Toprak Meselesi, Toplu Eserler*, 1, İstanbul: Gözlem Yay., 1980).

² For a similar observation in the region of Mardin, see Suavi Aydın, at.al., *Mardin. Aşiret, Cemaat, Devlet* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yay., 2000), esp. 115 ff.

³ See Ömer Lütfi Barkan, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Zirai Ekonominin Hukuki ve Mali Esasları. I. Kânunlar* (İstanbul, 1943). See also Neşet Çağatay, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Arazi ve Reaya Kanunnamelerinde İlhak Edilen Memleketlerin Adet ve Kanunları ve İstilahlarının İzleri", *III. Türk Tarih Kongresi, Tebliğler* (Ankara: TTK Yay., 1948); Halil İnalcık, "Süleyman the Lawgiver and Ottoman Law", *Archivum Ottomanicum*, I (1969); Heath W. Lowry, "The Ottoman Liva Kanunnames Contained in the Defter-i Hakani", *Osmanlı Araştırmaları*, II (1981), 43-74.

⁴ Suavi Aydın and Oktay Özel, "Tribe and State in the Ottoman Empire: a Historical Anthropological Approach" (forthcoming). For a recent discussion of the issue within the centre-periphery debate, see Suavi Aydın, "Paradigma'da Tarihsel Yorumun Sınırları: Merkez-Çevre Temellendirmeleri Üzerinden Düşünceler", *Toplum ve Bilim*, 105 (2006), 70-95.

⁵ For the latest contribution to the discussion of the special status of these regions, see particularly the two articles, both published in the same special issue of *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, 9/1-2 (2003): Tom Sinclair, "The Ottoman Arrangements for the Tribal Principalities of the Lake Van Region of the Sixteenth Century", 119-143; Mehmet Öz, "Ottoman Provincial Administration in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia: The Case of Bidlis in the Sixteenth Century", 144-156.

Osman Turan and Tuncer Baykara.¹ Their attempts at clarifying certain aspects of legal and military administration in Seljukid Anatolia are among rare examples with a relatively detailed treatment of narrative sources which provide only sporadic information, and a few scattered documents that survived to the present day. They, however, do not particularly discuss the issue in terms of transition, although Baykara provides a detailed list of Ottoman administrative units as seen through the late sixteenth century-*tahrir* registers. Claude Cahen's well-known work, on the other hand, masterfully presents a balanced panorama of Seljukid Anatolia, dealing also with similar aspects with a certain degree of detail.²

The only informative literature on the administrative transition from Seljukid Anatolia to that of the Ottomans is provided by the relevant parts of the introductory chapters of the defterological studies done for certain Ottoman provinces, collectively referred to as *sancak* studies. Many of these studies, mostly PhD dissertations, are available in libraries in Turkey and a number have been published.³ Combined, these provide a general idea of early Ottoman administrative divisions in provinces where the *timar* system was in force. However, they are mostly descriptive in nature and reiterate a common pattern detailing the course of events leading towards the Ottoman takeover of the area concerned, generally followed by the outline of the development of Ottoman administrative system as portrayed in the extant *tahrir* registers. What is lacking in most of these studies is a discussion of the peculiarities of the transition process and an analysis of the terminology employed in each case. There are of course exceptions, such as the works by Tayyip Gökbilgin, Bahaeddin Yediyıldız, and Mehmet Öz, all coincidentally about the same province in Anatolia, namely the province of *Rûm*, of which Amasya was a part.

In comparison with these works and in the light of new findings, I shall try in the following pages to highlight certain characteristics of the process of transition from the Seljukids to the Ottomans, providing further evidence for apparent continuities as well as the conciliatory nature of Ottoman domination in north-central Anatolia. In my analysis I will also include very briefly a later transformation, namely that of the Ottoman

¹ Osman Turan, *Türkiye Selçukluları ile İlgili Resmi Vesikalar. Metin, Tercüme ve Araştırmalar*, Second Impression (Ankara: TTK, 1988); idem, *Selçuklular ve Türk-İslam Medeniyeti*, Revised Third Edition (İstanbul: Dergah Yay., 1980); Tuncer Baykara, *Anadolu'nun Tarihi Coğrafyasına Giriş. Türk Devri İdari Taksimatı* (Ankara: TKAE Yay., 1988); idem, *Anadolu'nun Selçuklular Devrindeki Sosyal ve İktisadi Tarihine Ait Araştırmalar* (İzmir, 1990).

² Claude Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey: A General Survey of the Material and Spiritual Culture and History ca.1071-1330*, trans. J. Jones Williams (London, 1968).

³ For a useful overview of this literature with an extensive bibliography, see Adnan Gürbüz, *XV.-XVI. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Sancak Çalışmaları* (İstanbul: Dergah Yay., 2001).

provincial administration, as the Ottoman 'classical' forms of the imperial institutional basis entered the process of gradual dissolution in the seventeenth century. In doing this, I will draw parallels between the late thirteenth century conditions and those of the early seventeenth, both having certain similarities in terms of the nature of the transformation of provincial administrative systems.

An Ottoman classic: Amasya in 1576

In 1576, the Amasya region constituted a *livâ* (sub-province, also known as *sancak*), a military-administrative unit in Ottoman provincial administration. It was one of the constituents of the province (*eyâlet*) of Rûm which covered the region from Sivas in the East to Çorumlu in the West, from Divriği and Arapgir in the South-East to Samsun in the North¹ (see Figure I). At the center of the *livâ* was the city of Amasya, the fourth biggest in the province of Rûm, and governed by the *mîr-i livâ*, then Mustafa Bey with a *dirlik* (living) around 300,000 *akçes*.² As district governor, he was responsible for the overall law and order in his *livâ*, but at the same time, as commander of the provincial cavalry (*timarlı sipâhis*), he was the military commander of his district.³

The *livâ* of Amasya was made up of seven legal-administrative units (*kazâs*), among which was the *kazâ* of Amasya, the central focus of this study. Each *kazâ* was under the judicial administration of a judge (*kadı*) who was directly responsible to İstanbul. The *kadı* was the only judicial authority, with a variety of duties over virtually all aspects of daily life in his locality.⁴ Each *kazâ* was made up of a number of sub-divisions (*nâhiyes*), which seem

¹ For the changes in the composition of the province of Rûm from fifteenth to seventeenth century, see Tayyib Gökbilgin, "15. ve 16. Asırlarda Eyâlet-i Rûm", *Vakıflar Dergisi*, 6 (1965), 51-61; Ahmet Şimşirgil, "Osmanlı Taşra Teşkilatı'nda Rûm Beylerbeyliği", *Marmara Üniversitesi, Türklük Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 5 (1990), 289-299.

² TT245, f. 3b, the summary (*icmâl*) tahrir register of Amasya, housed in the *Kuyud-ı Kadîme* archive of the General Directorate of Deeds and Cadaster. Ayn-ı Ali Efendi, in 1609, also gave 300,000 *akçes* as the annual income of the *mîr-i livâ* (or *sancakbeyi*) of Amasya (see *Kavânin-i Âl-i Osman der Hütlâsa-i Mezâmin-i Defter-i Dîvân*, Prefaced by M. Tayyib Gökbilgin (İstanbul: Enderun Kitabevi, 1979), 23). It seems that Ayn-ı Ali had taken this figure from TT245, which was in fact the last proper *icmâl* register of the region.

³ İ. Metin Kunt, *The Sultan's Servants. The Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government, 1550-1650* (New York, 1983), 14.

⁴ For *kadıs* and their roles in Ottoman provincial administration, see Şinasi Altundağ, "Osmanlılarda Kadılarının Selâhiyet ve Vazifeleri", in *VI. Türk Tarih Kongresi, Bildiriler*, Ankara, 1967, 342-354; Mustafa Akdağ, *Türkiye'nin İktisadî ve İçtimâî Tarihi*, 2 vols. (İstanbul, 1977), vol. II, 83-92; İlber Ortaylı, "Osmanlı Kadısının Taşra Yönetimindeki Rolü Üzerine", *Amme İdaresi Dergisi*, 9/1 (1976), 95-107; R.C. Jennings, "Kadı, Court and Legal Procedure in 17th C. Ottoman Kayseri", *Studia Islamica*, 48 (1978); idem, "Limitations of the Judicial Powers of the Kadı 17th C. Ottoman Kayseri", *Studia Islamica*, 50 (1979), 151-184.

to have been of no particular importance in the Ottoman administrative division, other than being geographical sub-divisions of a *kazâ*.¹ However, we know that deputy judges (*nâ'ibs*) sometimes resided in the chief towns or villages (*nefs*) of the *nâhiyes*; in this case, a *nâhiye* could become a legal-administrative sub-division of a *kazâ*.²

This was the situation as seen from the last and the only surviving land and population survey (*tahrir*) of the province, which started in the late 1560s and was completed only in the 1570s.³ The *tahrir* register from this survey, dated 1576, illustrates yet another example of 'classical' Ottoman administrative structure in the provinces (see Figure 2, which is basically drawn on the basis of the situation portrayed in 1576). We see here the two-layer system, which corresponds to two main functions of the Ottoman administration in the provinces, military-fiscal and legal.⁴ However, it is also well known that the two administrators (the *mîr-i livâ* or *sancakbeyi* and *kadı*), were independently responsible to İstanbul, cooperating and collaborating in keeping security, law and order in the region, while providing a power-balance in the provinces.

There is no need to reiterate here the fact that the Ottoman provincial administration was closely linked, or more precisely interconnected, to the *timar* system, which produced the backbone of the Ottoman military organization, the provincial cavalry army.⁵ This system of revenue transfer (*havâle*), enabled the Ottoman government to allocate a certain amount of tax revenues as salary to individuals who performed military and administrative duties, from the lowest-grade *timar*-holder (*sipâhî*) to the highest-rank *beylerbeyi* or governor-general of the *eyâlet*. The provincial *tahrirs* were in fact executed primarily for the purpose of determining the human and economic resources of the provinces for the distribution of the tax revenue among these *dirlik*-holding military men and the members of the *askerî* class. As the main sources of information on the establishment and development of the Ottoman provincial administration, the *tahrir* registers enable us to

¹ See Tayyip Gökbilgin, "Nâhiye", *İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 9 (1964), 37-38. Hutteroth and Abdulfettah, in their study of Transjordan and Southern Syria in the late sixteenth century, similarly thought that, according to the *defters* they used, the function of the *nâhiye* was "a purely statistical or fiscal one, created in order to make the counting of villages and taxes easier". See Kemal Abdul Fettah and Wolf-Dieter Hutteroth, *Historical Geography of Palestine, Transjordan and Southern Syria in the late 16th century* (Earlangen, 1977), 19.

² Hutteroth and Abdulfettah, 19. See also Mustafa Akdağ, *Türkiye'nin İktisadî ve İçtimai Tarihi*, vol. II, (İstanbul, 1977), 374.

³ TD 26, housed in the *Kuyud-ı Kadîme* archive.

⁴ See Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire. The Classical Age, 1300-1600*, trans. N. Itkowitz and C. Imber (London and New York, 1973), 104; Yaşar Yücel, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Desantralizasyona Dair Genel Gözlemler, *Belleten*, XXXVIII/152 (1974), 665.

⁵ Nicoara Beldiceanu, "Recherche sur la réforme foncière de Mehmed II", *Acta Historica*, IV (1985), 27-39; Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire*, 104-118.

observe the process of the establishment and development of the Ottoman system. The earliest Ottoman registers in particular provide invaluable data about the pre-Ottoman picture, thus shedding significant light on the characteristics of the cases of transition in different regions of the empire.¹

Concerning the Amasya district, it would be useful to have a brief look at the the region before the Ottomans in order to provide a background for the analysis of the process of the transition of the provincial administration.

A flashback: Amasya under the Seljukids

Starting after the Mongol invasion of Anatolia, following the battle of Köseadağ in 1243, the pre-Ottoman history of the region is characterised by endless wars between the semi-independent petty emirates struggling for the expansion of their domination over north-central Anatolia, which was then under the overlordship of the İlkhānids.² The principal local powers were the Candaroğulları of Kastamonu in the north-west and the emirate of Eretna in the east, centred around Sivas. The latter, who had proclaimed independence from the İlkhānids in 1340, was replaced by the government of Kadı Burhaneddin whose control, if not complete domination, covered the greater part of the territories that were later to become the Ottoman province of Rûm. In between these two principalities was the small emirate of Amasya, governed by the Şadgeldi family.³ The *Emirs* of Amasya from this family ruled the region from the city of Amasya in the name of Eretna. After the death of Eretna Bey in 1352, they became independent rulers whose authority was recognised by the petty *emirs* of the Canik region in the north. In 1381, following the death of the *emir* Hacı Şadgeldi Paşa, Kadı Burhaneddin gained control of the region, although the wars, raids, killings and plundering among the emirates continued.⁴ Eventually, in 1392-93, together with many other local petty emirates, Emir Ahmed of Amasya peacefully recognized the

¹ For the value of early *defters* in various aspects of Pre-Ottoman and Ottoman history, see Halil İnalcık, "Ottoman Methods of Conquest", *Studia Islamica*, III (1954), 103-129; İrene Beldiceanu-Steinherr, "Fiscalité et formes"; Bistra Cvetkova, "Early Ottoman *Tahrir Defters* as a Source for Studies on the History of Bulgaria and the Balkans", *Archivum Ottomanicum*, 8 (1983), 133-213.

² For a general view of this period in Anatolia in general, see Osman Turan, "Anatolia in the Period of the Seljuks and the Beyliks", in *The Cambridge History of Islam*, eds. P. M. Holt, A.K.S. Lambton, and B. Lewis, vol. I (1970), 248-253; Mustafa Akdağ, *Türkiye'nin İktisadî ve İctimai Tarihi*, vol. I, Third edition. (İstanbul: Tekin Yay., 1979), 65-95.

³ For this family and their rule in the region of Amasya, see Hüseyin Hüsameddin, *Amasya Tarihi*, vol.3 (İstanbul, 1927), 61 ff.

⁴ For these struggles, see Aziz B. Erdeşir-i Esterabâdî, *Bezm ü Rezm*, Turkish trans. Mürsel Öztürk (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yay., 1990). See also Colin Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1481* (İstanbul, 1990), 39.

supremacy of the Ottomans whose expanding power towards the east was expected to provide a kind of protection against the attacks by Kadı Burhaneddin and the future threat of Timur's army which was approaching Anatolia from further east.¹

As for the provincial administration, in the absence of surviving registers,² fragmentary evidence about the administrative system in Anatolia under Seljukid rule presents us with certain elements of pre-Ottoman practices. First of all, we see the presence of the *kadıhood* as an institution in terms of legal affairs, with similar powers to the Ottoman *kadıs*. On the position of the *kadıs* in Seljukid Anatolia, Osman Turan provides an example where, in an undated appointment paper (*menşûr*) of Nizameddin Mehmed bin el-Nakîb as *kadı* of Samsun and its environs, all administrators and high-ranking officials of the region were ordered to recognize the *kadı* as the supreme regional authority (*hâkim*).³ It is, however, not clear in this example whether this meant that the *kadı* was the highest administrative authority in the region, even above *emirs* and *meliks* who also appear as provincial administrators and military commanders (*serleşker*, *sübaşı*, or *za'im*) in the Seljukid period.⁴ This is where one observes the well known practice through which these posts were connected to the system of military fiefs (*ıktâ'*), which operated on the basis of the *mîrî* (state-owned) land regime,⁵ again, similar to the Ottoman *timar* system. Considering this vague picture of the dual nature of the provincial administration under the Seljukids, one is tended to think that the *kadı*, as portrayed in the above case, represented only the highest judicial authority in the province, and was not hierarchically above

¹ For a detailed account of these events, see Esterâbadî, *Bezm u Rezm*; Hüseyin Hüsâmeddin, *Amasya Tarihi*, vol. 2 (İstanbul, 1329-32); Hüseyin Hüsâmeddin, *Amasya Tarihi*, vol. 3; Kazım Dilçimen, *Canik Beyleri* (Samsun, 1940); Mevlâd Oğuz, "Tâceddinoğulları", *Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi*, IV (1948); Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*; Yaşar Yücel, *Kadı Burhâneddin Ahmed ve Devleti* (Ankara, 1970); Idem, *XIII.-XV. Yüzyıllar Kuzeybatı Anadolu Tarihi. Çobanoğulları ve Çandaroğulları* (Ankara: TTK Yay., 1980); E. A. Zachariadou, "Manuel Palaeologus on the Strife Between Bâyezid I and Kâdı Burhân al-Dîn Ahmad", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, XLIII (1980), 471-481. See also Mehmet Öz, *XV - XVI. Yüzyıllarda Canik Sancağı*, Ankara: TTK Yay., 1999), 18-25.

² There is evidence that Seljukids and İlkhânids had registers similar to the Ottoman *tahrir defterleri*, or rather registers with similar functions to the Ottoman registers. It seems that the Ottomans, especially in the early registers, largely kept/copied the terminology and principles of these previous practices in Anatolia. For a general assessment of this matter, see Ö. Lütfi Barkan and Enver Meriçli (eds.), *Hüdavendigâr Livâsı Tahrir Defterleri*, vol. I (Ankara, 1988), 7-10; compare I. Beldiceanu-Steinherr, "Fiscalité et formes", 235.

³ See Osman Turan, *Türkiye Selçukluları Hakkında Resmî Vesikalar. Metin, Tercüme Araştırmalar* (Ankara, 1988), 42.

⁴ In various appointment papers, these posts were referred to as *emâret*, *ze'âmet* and *serleşkerî* and all used interchangeably (see Turan, 13). For more detailed information on the Seljukid administrative system and related terminology, see Tuncer Baykara, "Türkiye Selçuklularında İdârî ve Birim ve Bununla İlgili Meseleler", *Vakıflar Dergisi*, XIX (1985), 49-60.

⁵ Osman Turan, "Türkiye Selçuklularında Toprak Hukuku. Mîrî Topraklar ve Husûsî Mülkiyet Şekilleri", *Belleten*, XII (1948), 47-68.

other military administrators, one of which was perhaps acting as governor. If so, the similarity between the Seljukid and Ottoman practice of provincial administration is striking, based on both the division of military and legal authorities which were independently responsible to the *Sultan*. I will be content here with emphasizing that there are also similarities between the Seljukid and Ottoman practices in terms of other military, financial and legal offices and posts of provincial administration.¹ As will be seen later in the following section, they all add up to point to a large degree of continuity of an already established Seljukid institutional structure that the Ottomans inherited.

However, after the collapse of the Seljukid state and during the following period of petty emirates under the suzerainty of İlkhanids in Anatolia, this system of provincial administration seems to have been undermined, if not totally destroyed, in the course of events and to have become inoperative. For instance, there is evidence that, during the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, a considerable portion of the *mîrî* lands, or the taxes deriving from these lands, became private property (*mülk*) or were sold to rank-holders.² It would not be wrong to think, therefore, that this "privatisation" which was followed by what might be called, *vakıfisation*³ were largely accomplished by the time of the Ottoman takeover of this region. This must have caused considerable damage to, if not totally destroyed, the military dimension of the provincial administration, thus paving the way for the emergence of a local aristocracy. This process is, in fact, strikingly similar to what would occur in the seventeenth century under Ottoman rule, namely the dissolution of the *timar* system and the ensuing changes that basically caused great damage to the provincial cavalry in Anatolia. I will come back to this point at the end of the study.

As the early Ottoman *tahrir* registers show, when they took over the region, the Ottomans found in north-central Anatolia a well-established nobility, as well as former *emir* families, which, under conditions of continuing insecurity and chaos, were trying to maintain their power and holdings in their localities, whether in or around the castles and walled cities

¹ For these posts and offices, see the collection of various documents from the Seljukid period in Turan's, *Türkiye Selçukluları Hakkında Resmî Vesikalar*.

² This important point was first referred to by Osman Turan, in "*Türkiye Selçuklularında Toprak Hukuku*", by quoting Hamdullah Kazvini's work on the sale of state lands. He interpreted it as a mere sale of land (Turan *Ibid.*, 555-56). Referring to one of his later works, Beldiceanu-Steinherr points out that, he (O. Turan) later realised that the Seljukid rulers did not grant or sell the land itself but the taxes paid by *re'âyâ* (I. Beldiceanu-Steinherr, "Fiscalité et formes", 299. Compare with my "Limits of the Almighty: Mehmed II's 'Land Reform' Revisited", *JESHO*, 42/2 (1999), 226-246. This motion of granting and selling the rights of certain taxes to individuals as *mülk* or private property must have been, in fact, to do with the origin of the *mâlikâne-dîvânî* system that already existed in pre-Ottoman Anatolia.

³ Mustafa Akdağ, *Türkiye'nin İktisadî ve İçtimai Tarihi*, vol. I, third edition (İstanbul: Tekin Yay., 1979), 24-27.

or in the countryside.¹ The testimony of contemporary sources such as Esterabadi's *Bezm ü rezm* also confirm the extraordinary conditions of this period and give an impression that there was no basis for any effective operation of a systematic provincial administration. One could even dare to say that under such conditions in the region, what the Ottomans inherited was in fact a non-system. As will be seen below, it took a long time for the Ottomans to establish a reasonably functioning administrative system in the region by experimenting extensively with what was left of the late Seljukid/ilkhanid administrative practices and terminology. This may well be considered as another manifestation of Ottoman pragmatism.

On the basis of the information deriving from the extant *tahrir* registers, I will now take, in the following pages, a closer look at certain characteristics of the provincial administration in the region of Amasya in terms of the transition from the Seljukids to the Ottomans through an analysis of changing administrative divisions as well as the terminology employed.

The transition: from Seljukids to Ottomans

As already mentioned above, only one detailed register for Amasya has survived, dated 1576, and the earliest extant *defter* is a summary one, from around the year 1480 (*TT15*).² From the evidence in this *defter*, and others belonging to neighbouring regions, it is clear that the region had previously been surveyed at least twice, the first survey belonging to the early years of the fifteenth century. However, no register has survived from these surveys. Between the two mentioned above, we also have two summary registers from around 1520 (*TT387* and *TT95*). The following remarks therefore are based on those registers that have survived.

We must first note that *TT15* is an *icmâl* of the area of Rûm (*mahmiyye-i bâ'zı memleketü'r Rûm*), prepared on the basis of the types of revenue, i.e. *hashâ*, *ze'âmethâ*, *timarhâ*, *mâlikâne*, *mevkûfât*, *emlâk*. This means that, unlike the detailed or *mufassal* register, its primary purpose was to map revenue distribution according to revenue holders, rather than identifying taxable resources on the basis of geographical-administrative divisions. However, since the recording of revenue distribution was done according to settlement name, rural or urban, the *defter* also reflects the situation of provincial administration. Another significant feature of this

¹ For the Amasya region, see Hüseyin Hüsameddin, *Amasya Tarihi*, vol. 3, 3-140 (*dokuzuncu fasıl*).

² *TT15* is housed in the Ottoman Archive (BOA) in İstanbul.

register is that it was compiled on the basis of a survey that was directly related to Mehmed II's attempt at radical fiscal reform in the last years of his reign.¹ The register therefore has a particular value for the analysis of this attempt at large scale reform; it can thus be seen as a crucial step towards the definitive establishment of the Ottoman administration in the provinces, as directly related to the very process of the transition under examination.

It appears that, in this *defter*, the whole area is referred to as the *vilâyet-i Rûm*, although it does not cover the whole province.² It is understood that the term *vilâyet* in this sense corresponds to a *beylerbeyi* area, in other words the sixteenth-century *eyâlets*. We know that the third Ottoman province (*Rûm Beylerbeyliği* or *Vilâyet-i Rûmiye-i Suğra*),³ the largest military administrative division governed by a *beylerbeyi* or governor-general, was formed in this region in 1413, following the *vilâyets* of *Rumeli* in the Balkans and *Anadolu* in the western parts of Anatolia.⁴ The *defter* does not give any name of a *beylerbeyi* (or *mîr-i mîrân*) as a governor general of the *vilâyet-i Rûm*, although names of some previous post-holders are known.⁵ Instead, we see various revenues deriving from the Amasya, Tokat and Osmancık regions, which were assigned to Prince Bâyezid, son of

¹ For the late 1470s' reform attempt of Mehmed II, see Bistra Cvetkova, "Sur certaines reformes du régime foncier au temps de Mehmed II", *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, VI (1963), 104-120; N. Beldiceanu, "Recherches sur la reforme"; Mithat Sertoğlu, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda XV. XVI. Asırlarda Girişilen Toprak Reformları", *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi*, 35 (1970), 68-71; İnalçık, "Mehmed II", *IA*, 7 (1957), 533. Compare my "Limits of Almighty".

² It is difficult to give the full composition of the province of Rûm in the fifteenth century because there is no complete *icmâl* showing whole components of the province, as *TT387* of c.1530, nor do we have a full series of separate *mufassal* registers for all parts of the province. See Gökbilgin, "15. ve 16. Asırlarda Eyâlet-i Rûm"; Şimşirgil, "Osmanlı Taşra Teşkilatında Rûm Beylerbeyliği".

³ For the name "Vilâyet-i Rûmiye-i Suğra", see Gökbilgin, "15. ve 16. Asırlarda Eyâlet-i Rûm", 51.

⁴ See Şimşirgil, "Osmanlı Taşra Teşkilatında Rûm Beylerbeyliği", 290; Gökbilgin, "15. ve 16. Asırlarda Eyâlet-i Rûm", 51-52; İnalçık, *The Ottoman Empire*, 106; Kunt, *The Sultan's Servants*, 5.

⁵ Among them were Biçeroğlu Hamza Bey (during the time of Mehmed I), Hızır Ağa, Yörgiç Paşa, Balaban Paşa (during the time of Murad II), Yahya Bey and Şarabdâr Hamza Bey (during the time of Mehmed II). See Şimşirgil, "Osmanlı Taşra Teşkilatında Rûm Beylerbeyliği", 290-91; İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol. I (Ankara, 1961), 396. Most of these names are also mentioned in the sources as "lalâ" of the princes appointed to Amasya as "sancakbeyi", and it can be thought that they usually held the post of the *beylerbeyilik* of the province of Rûm as well, at least in this early period. However, Hüseyin Hüsameddin notes that when Çelebi Mehmed was appointed to Amasya as governor (*emîr*) in 805/1402, shortly before the battle of Ankara, his *lalâ* was Gümlüoğlu Ali Paşa, and Yakût Paşa was appointed as "beylerbeyi" (Hüsameddin, *Amasya Tarihi*, vol. 3, 172-73). On the other hand, Halil İnalçık thinks that Çelebi Mehmed himself was appointed to "the governorship of the province of Rûm" (Halil İnalçık, "Mehmed I", *EI*², 973-74). Since we know that the first *beylerbeyilik* was created in this region in 1413, the statements of both Hüsameddin and İnalçık leave doubts on what they mean by "beylerbeyi" and "governorship of the province of Rûm" prior to 1402. It should be noted here that, Hüseyin Hüsameddin's account in his work and the terminology he used are not always consistent in this respect. This still remains a problem and needs further research beyond the scope of this study.

Mehmed II, and to his tutor (*lalâ*).¹ This confirms our knowledge that, in the last years of the reign of Mehmed II, Amasya was under the governorship of Prince Bâyezid. We already know that, since the early years of the fifteenth century, Amasya was one of the prince-sanjaks (*şehzâde sancağı*), to which princes were appointed as governors to have their first experience of government.² Among them was Prince Bâyezid, the son of Mehmed II, who was the prince governor of Amasya since 1454.³

TT15 refers, on the other hand, to Sivas and Çorumlu as separate *livâs* with their respective governors (*mîr-i livâs*), while Amasya was designated as a *vilâyet* along with many others (Sivas, Tokat, Amasya, Zile, Osmancık, Çorumlu, İskilib, Karahisar).⁴ Most of them were further divided into a number of *nâhiyes*. Although the term *vilâyet* was sometimes used to refer to the combined areas of Amasya and Geldigelen,⁵ this area consisted of six *nâhiyes* (Geldigelen, Yavaş-ili ve Bergoma, Akdağ, Ladik, Simre, and Argoma).⁶ It is clear that the term *vilâyet* here corresponds to the sixteenth-century division of *kazâ*, a term not used in *TT15*.⁷ As will be seen below, this area was to constitute the "kazâ of Amasya" in the c. 1520 register.⁸ This picture also reveals that the Ottomans did not use the term *kazâ* as an

¹ The *defter*, *TT15*, starts with "hashâ-yi Şehzâde" without giving the name of the prince, and gives all the revenues which were to constitute the *has* of the *mîr-i livâs* of the region in the absence of a prince-governor during most of the sixteenth century (pp. 3-21). However, from the record "hashâ-yi Lalâ-i Sultan Bayezid tâle bekâhü", we learn that the prince-governor was Bayezid, son of Mehmed II (p. 22).

² For the first prince, Murad, son of Mehmed I, appointed to Amasya as governor in 1416, see Doukas, *Decline and Fall of Byzantium to the Ottoman Turks*, trans. Harry J. Magoulias (Detroit, 1975), 121-22. See also Karaçelebizâde, 1248, 364. Compare Hüseyin Hüsameddin, *Amasya Tarihi*, vol. 3 (İstanbul, 1927), 193. For a discussion of the date of Murad's appointment see İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, "Sancağa Çıkarılan Osmanlı Şehzadeleri", *Belleten*, XXXIX/156 (1961), 350, 358. However, we know that Mehmed I himself, as prince, had also stayed in Amasya for a very short period of time just before the battle of Ankara, 1402 (see Gökbilgin, "15. ve 16. Asırlarda Eyâlet-i Rûm", 51). So, his stay in the region can also be taken as the beginning of the "prince sanjak" status of Amasya. For the princes who resided in Amasya during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, see Uzunçarşılı, "Sancağa Çıkarılan Osmanlı Şehzadeleri." For the detailed account of the period between 1454 and 1559, see Petra Kappert, *Die Osmanischen Prinzen und ihre Residenz in Amasya in 15. und 16. Jahrhundert* (Leiden, 1976).

³ See Kappert, *Die Osmanischen*, 19-67.

⁴ *TT15*: 221-246.

⁵ "Vilâyet-i Amasya ve Geldigelen", see *TT15*: 236.

⁶ *Nâhiye* of Argoma was once mentioned as "vilâyet", as an alias for Merzifon ("hashâ-yi vilâyet-i Argoma ki Merzifon dimekle ma'rûfdu"). See *TT15*: 14.

⁷ Other studies of neighbouring regions also show that, the terms *nâhiye* and *vilâyet* were sometimes used interchangeably in the *defters* of both 1455 and 1485, most turning into *kazâs* in the sixteenth century. For example, in the region of Canik and Ordu, the 1455 and 1485 registers were compiled on a *nâhiye/bölük* basis, instead of a *vilâyet/nâhiye* basis (although the term *vilâyet* was rarely used), and later, most of the *nâhiyes* became *kazâs*, whereas the *bölüks* turned into *nâhiyes*, at the latest, by the mid-sixteenth century. See Öz, *Canik Sancağı*, 28, 31-34, 38-39; Bahaeddin Yediyıldız, *Ordu Kazâsı Sosyal Tarihi (1455-1613)* (Ankara, 1985), 38-50.

⁸ Similarly, in 1455 and 1485, the Ordu region was recorded as "vilâyet" and then, from 1520 on, designated as "kazâ". See Yediyıldız, *Ordu Kazâsı Sosyal Tarihi*, 41, 49.

administrative unit, either in Amasya, or in the province of Rûm in the fifteenth-century registers, although we sometimes see the existence of *kadis* in the *defter*.¹ There is an interesting resemblance to the situation under Seljukid rule referred to above. In short, the absence of *kazâ* as a judicial administrative unit in the early Ottoman registers may well be seen as a significant aspect of the continuity of Seljukid practice under the early Ottomans in the region.

As Gökbilgin and Öz have pointed out, in the early years of the Ottoman domination in the region, other units, such as *ze'âmet* and *seraskerî*, might have had greater practicality for the Ottomans.² In fact, apart from the *vilâyets* mentioned above, we find these units in the *defter*. After the records of *hashâ* revenues, for instance, comes the heading "*ze'âmethâ-yi vilâyet-i Rûm*", which were recorded on the basis of the locality rather than the names of the *zâ'ims*, although their names were also given.³ More interestingly, when it comes to the enumeration of the *timar*-holders, with their revenue-source villages, the areas recorded as *vilâyet* were also qualified in *TT15* as *seraskerî*. The recording of these military divisions of regional cavalry starts with the *seraskers*, the commanders of these cavalry divisions, who appear to have been placed under the command of the *mîr-i livâ* or *sancakbeyi*.⁴ As Venzke points out, this makes one suspect that the terms *serasker*, *çeribaşı*, *miralem*, and even *subaşı* found in early Ottoman registers for different parts of Anatolia and Syria at the sub-*sancak* level were used interchangeably. All of these had pre-Ottoman origins and only some of them were to become standard use under the Ottomans, albeit with slightly modified names and/or functions.⁵

¹ For example (*kadi* of Sivas), see *TT15*: 136. Cf. Öz, *Canik Sancağı*, 31.

² Gökbilgin, "15. ve 16. Asırlarda Eyâlet-i Rûm", 54; Öz, *Canik Sancağı*, 31. However, it seems that the terms *ze'âmet* and *seraskerî/serleşkerî* were synonymous with the term *subaşı[lık]* and referred to the same or similar institution in both Seljukids and Ottomans times.

³ For example, "*ze'âmet-i Hakala, be nâm-ı İbrâhim Beğ*" (*TT15*: 32), then comes the list of the villages or towns whose revenues were assigned to a *ze'âmet*-holder.

⁴ For example, under the heading of "*Seraskerî-i Amasya*", a number of *timar*-holders were recorded with the villages whose revenues were assigned to them; the list starts with the record of the "*timar of 'Ali Beğ, serasker*", followed by the "*timar of Balaban Bey, subaşı*" (see *TT15*: 37). Similarly, for Tokat, see p. 93; for Sivas, see p. 129; for Gavurni, see p. 157; for Osmançık, see p. 167; for İskilib, see p. 201. Compare Gökbilgin, "15. ve 16. Asırlarda Eyâlet-i Rûm", 54-55. In the case of Sivas, in the first page of the *defter*, the contents recorded as "*livâ-i Sivas ve seraskerî*" (p.1); where actual records were given, "*hashâ-yi mîr-i livâ-i Sivas*" was recorded first (pp. 125-27), and later followed by the record of "*seraskerî-i Sivas*" with the *serasker* and other *timar*-holders (pp. 129-52). Such commanders were sometimes mentioned as "*serasker-i vilâyet-i x*" (p. 157).

⁵ Venzke, in her detailed analysis of Dulkadir region in the early years of the Ottoman rule, c. 1519-20, makes references to the terms *serasker*, *çeribaşı*, *miralem*, and *subaşı* while discussing another found in the Aleppo register, *binbaşılık*, meaning the "command of the thousand", the term not seen in the Ottoman military administration (Venzke, "The Case of Dulgadir-Mamluk İqta", 406-07). She concludes that all of these military ranks "represented the commands at the *nâhiye* level", although their military functions were not clear, apart from *subaşı*, who exercised police functions under Ottoman rule (p. 407).

It seems that these pre-Ottoman divisions as well as the terminology were taken as the basis for the survey from which the *defter* was compiled around 1480. Regarding pre-Ottoman practices that continued under Ottoman rule, it is interesting to note that the term *vilâyet* which denoted smaller areas in the Seljukid period¹ would later become an Ottoman *kazâ* and/or *nâhiye* in the terminology of the classical Ottoman provincial administration, that only fully took a uniform character towards the mid-sixteenth century. Similarly, the Seljukid terms *ze'âmet* and *serleşkerî*, which referred to areas that constituted separate military (administrative?) units, were also used by the Ottomans: "serleşkerî" becoming *seraskerî*, referring to the same kind of provincial cavalry units as used during the fifteenth century. The usage of the term *serasker* as the commander of a military force, on the other hand, corresponds to the military position of the *alaybeyi* or *miralay*, the sixteenth century-commander of cavalry units under the *sancak beyis* in Ottoman provinces. What is more, the term *seraskerî* in the case of Amasya around 1480 denotes simultaneously also an administrative unit corresponding to a *vilâyet* or *nâhiye*, some of which were to turn into *kazâs* later in the sixteenth century.²

It can therefore be concluded from this analysis that the Seljukid terms *serleşker/serleşkerî*, sometimes used interchangeably with *subaşı*,³ vaguely refer to highest military commanders in the absence of proper administrative units in late Seljukid north-central Anatolia. The same term was also utilised by the Ottomans, though referring to lower ranks both in military and administrative contexts, in the fifteenth century when they were still in the process of establishing a coherent set of administrative divisions. The same applies, of course, to the terminology that would go with it. The situation seen in the province of Rûm around 1480, therefore, manifests exactly such a transition process, which had its own peculiarities in a region where a strong Seljukid legacy still existed.

It appears that a significant dimension of this legacy was the local aristocracy. As mentioned above in the context of the present study, the province of Rûm in general and Amasya in particular had a strong nobility

¹ Tuncer Baykara, *Türkiye'nin Sosyal ve İktisadi Tarihi* (XI – XIV. Yüzyıllar) (Ankara: TDV Yay., 2000), 178-180.

² In this *defter*, Gavurmi was also referred to as a *nâhiye* belonging to the *vilâyet* of Sivas (TT15: 225). Tayyib Gökbilgin notes that, in the time of Selim I (*Yavuz*), there were many *seraskers* in the *kazâ* of Trabzon, almost one for each *nâhiye*. See Gökbilgin, "15. ve 16. Asırlarda Eyâlet-i Rûm", 55.

³ T. Baykara suggests that the term *subaşılık* was the larger [military] administrative unit under the Seljukids and was composed of *vilâyet*s with central towns/cities (*mahrusa*) (see Baykara, *Türkiye'nin Sosyal ve İktisadi Tarihi*, 178-180). If this was so, *subaşı*, the highest military commander and, perhaps, the district administrator of the Seljukids in provinces, would be reduced under the Ottomans to a lower rank (in the early registers), to become eventually the head of the police force, thus changing function as well (in the sixteenth century).

who held rights over certain tax revenue shares deriving from agricultural produce, a right referred to in the *defter*s as *mâlikâne*. We have already noted by reference to Turan that a great portion of these revenues had become private property by the end of the thirteenth century. By the time the *emirs* of Amasya peacefully accepted Ottoman protection and suzerainty in the late fourteenth century, the local nobility had already established itself firmly in the region. Additionally, the unstable conditions of the post-Seljukid period of local principalities or emirates in Anatolia provided a suitable ground for the further consolidation of their power. It appears that a great portion of revenues once held as military fief (*ikta*) had become private property and changed hands through selling and donation as waqf or pious foundation during the century prior to the Ottoman takeover of the region.

When considering the nature of early Ottoman rule, the changing status of revenue-holdings has a particular significance: the apparent continuity of pre-Ottoman administrative practices and terminology under Ottoman rule can thus be partly accounted for by the very existence of a strong nobility in the province of Rûm. In other words, Ottoman rule in the region did not enforce a sudden rupture in administrative practices. On the contrary, what is seen here is yet another example of a policy of reconciliation. One such illustration in the region under examination is that the Ottoman central administration recognized and respected the already established rights of local nobility over certain revenues as private property, as also sanctioned by Islamic Law. Another component of the same policy appears to have been the Ottoman pragmatism in provincial administration. While the first gave way to the development of a peculiar taxation system known as *mâlikâne-divânî*,¹ the second manifests itself clearly in the survival of pre-Ottoman administrative practices and terminology under Ottoman rule up to the early sixteenth century. The partial inclusion or incorporation of the local aristocracy (in particular those with "military" status and members of ruling families of the region) into the ranks of the Ottoman administrative system as *timar*-holder, higher ranking officials or holders of positions in the military and civilian bureaucracy, completed the general picture, conveying concrete evidence of such a process of transition with a high degree of continuity. I have already given elsewhere a good example of such continuity in the case of the members of the Şadgeldi family who, under Ottoman rule, maintained their pre-Ottoman rights, namely their *mâlikâne* shares, while also holding military-

¹ For a detailed examination of this form of revenue-holding system, see particularly Ö. L. Barkan, "Türk-İslâm Toprak Hukuku Tatbikatının Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Aldığı Şekiller: Malikâne-Divânî Sistemi", in his *Toprak Meselesi*, 151-208; Venzke, "Aleppo's *Mâlikâne-Divânî* System"; Mehmet Öz, "Tahrir Defterlerine Göre Vezirköprü Yöresinde *Mâlikâne-Divânî* Sistemi", *Vakıflar Dergisi*, XVIII, idem, "XVI. Yüzyılda Ladik Kazâsında *Mâlikâne-Divânî* Sistemi", *Vakıflar Dergisi*, XXVI (1997), 65-73.

administrative posts both in local and central administration through successive generations up to the late sixteenth century.¹

Returning to Ottoman provincial administration in the region, the changes continued up to the early sixteenth century, with a focus on uniformity. In the second register, *TT387* of c. 1520,² the province of Rûm was again recorded as a *vilâyet* (*vilâyet-i Rûm*) and divided into two parts: the ancient (*kadîm*) and newly-created (*hâdis*).³ Each part consisted of *livâs* made up of a number of *kazâs*, which appeared in place of the *vilâyets* of the register of c. 1480, *TT15*. These *kazâs* were further divided into *nâhiyes*, some of which consisted of two or more *divân*s, which appear for the first time in the registers for Amasya.

This overall picture points to a significant systematisation of provincial administrative units, with standardisation in the terminology as reflected in the *defter*. In this register of c. 1520, Amasya, as a sub-province, was qualified as *livâ* and governed by an unnamed *mîr-i livâ*. We do however know that, following his accession to the throne, Selim I (1512-1520) eliminated his brothers, among whom was Ahmed, prince-governor of Amasya from 1481 until his death. Between 1513 and 1541, no prince was appointed as governor of Amasya. At the time this register was compiled, the revenues, which had previously been held by prince-governors, were largely transferred to the sultanic estates (*hassâ-i pâdişâh*) but partly accrued to the *mîr-i livâ* of the time. This time (c. 1520) the *livâ* consisted of four *kazâs* (Amasya, Gümüş, Ladik, and Merzifon), some of which were made up of a number of *nâhiyes*. The largest was the *kazâ* of Amasya, composed of five *nâhiyes* (Akdağ, Argoma, Geldigelen, Bergoma and Yavaş, and Aştagul).

Compared to the situation in c. 1480, we see certain changes in the composition of the *kazâ* of Amasya. Firstly, the *nâhiye* of Ladik had become a *kazâ* in its own right, and Simre was recorded as a *nâhiye* belonging to

¹ See Özel, "Limits of the Almighty", 239-41.

² For a discussion of the possible date of this register, see Mehmet Öz, *Canik Sancağı*, 12-14. Detailed examination of the register reveals that this register, dated 1530, was in fact the outcome of a general survey of Rûm carried out around 1519-20, in the last years of the reign of Selim I, as was the case of the Aleppo registers mentioned above. Therefore, the date 1530 in the publication of the register by the Prime-ministerial Archive of Turkey indicates only the date of its compilation. See 387 *Numaralı Muhâsebe-i Vilâyet-i Karaman ve Rûm Defteri* (937/1530), 2 vols (Ankara, 1996 and 1997).

³ This appears to have been because of the new territories in the neighbourhood of the original lands of the province of Rûm, acquired by the Ottomans during the time of Selim I (1512-1520); some of these newly conquered lands were included in the existing *vilâyet* of Rûm. However this did not last long, and most of these *livâs* were transferred to other newly created provinces from the mid-sixteenth century on. For the new composition of the province of Rûm in this *defter* and the subsequent changes, see Gökbiçgin, "15. ve 16. Asırlarda Eyâlet-i Rûm"; Şimşirgil, "Osmanlı Taşra Teşkilatında Rûm Beylerbeyliği".

Ladik.¹ Secondly, the *nâhiye* of Aştagul, which in the 1480s belonged to the *vilâyet* of Zile,² was included in the *kazâ* of Amasya in the 1520s. Thirdly, and more importantly, two *dîvâns* appears in this *defter*, as parts of the *nâhiye* of Argoma: Tûrnûk and Semâyîl.³ The striking point is that there was no mention at all of these *dîvâns* and their dependent villages in the previous register of c. 1480, while the same register recorded a number of *dîvâns* in other parts of the province.⁴ This is difficult to explain. However, their inclusion in TT387, the register of c. 1520, as separate units may be accounted for by the fact that the entire revenues of the villages in these two *dîvâns*, both *mâlikâne* and *dîvânî* (*iki başdan*), were allocated to the *vakîf* of the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina. It may be suggested that the Ottoman fisc found it administratively most convenient for practical reasons to record these villages as separate units with their actual names instead of creating a *nâhiye* with a different name (as will be seen below, this was to happen later anyway), and, more importantly, using again a pre-Ottoman term for an administrative unit: *divân*.

One might see in this further reshuffling both in the status and borders of provincial administrative units according to financial concerns a picture of change towards uniformity in the terminology applied. Leaving behind the confusing usage of certain old pre-Ottoman terms, the Ottoman central administration was gradually putting things in order, shaping a clearer basis for its decisive infiltration into its provinces. This direction is also seen elsewhere under the reign of Sultan Selim I, who expanded the Ottoman domination over the central lands of the Islamic world, thus turning the Ottoman Empire into a significant power in the whole Middle East. Administering a vast empire obviously necessitated such a final touch in establishing law and order that would function effectively without any serious obstacles stemming from the institutional practices of the pre-Ottoman past.

¹ This is another example of *nâhiyes* later turned into *kazâs* in the sixteenth century, hence, the interchangeable usage of the terms *nâhiye* and *vilâyet* in the fifteenth century.

² TT15: 233.

³ The term *divân* is often seen in the early registers of the regions, comprising the province of Rûm, and referred to a small, and mostly geographically-defined, administrative unit consisting of a number of villages. In some regions inhabited and turkified by nomadic Turkish tribes, such as Canik and Ordu, *dîvâns* and *bölüks* usually meant the same thing, and were administered by *dîvânbaşı*, which literally means "head of *dîvâns*" (we find a *dîvânbaşı* in TT15 holding a *timar* in Ladik, see TT15: 74). Bahaeddin Yediyıldız, in his work on the region of Ordu, points out the possible pre-Ottoman character of the *dîvâns* as an administrative unit (See Yediyıldız, *Ordu Kazâsı Sosyal Tarihi*, 46), while Mehmet Öz, in his work on the Canik region, emphasises the tribal/nomadic connection of these two units (Öz, *Canik*, 28-31). Another feature of the *dîvâns*, again in these regions, is that, a number of *dîvâns* usually form a larger unit, *nâhiye*, although sometimes *nâhiye* and *divân* seem to mean the same thing, namely a small, geographically-defined administrative unit. See Yediyıldız, *Ordu Kazâsı Sosyal Tarihi*, 44. In our case, the name of one of the *dîvâns*, Semâyîl, might suggest that this was a region inhabited by a Türkmen tribe connected to a certain Semâyîl (or İsmail) Bey.

⁴ TT15: 14.

It must also be remembered that centralising policies had already been on the agenda from the time of Mehmed II, whose attempt at an all-out fiscal reform in his last years was the first serious sign of such a trend in the development of the Ottoman imperial polity.¹ Neither is it an accident that the comprehensive efforts of legal codification, producing the first corpus of provincial law codes, which regulated and defined in a most detailed way the fiscal structure of the empire more than anything else, were made also during the same period, the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. The political dimension of Mehmed II's reform attempt as well as the emergence of a serious threat to the Ottomans in the East, the Safavids, and their stirring up of the ethno-religious composition of eastern and central Anatolian provinces further complicated the situation, contributing greatly to the Ottoman policies of assimilation and integration, if not total elimination, of all kinds of centrifugal forces along with their local traditions and practices. The apparent uniformity and increasing order in provincial administration in the Amasya region during the early sixteenth century can thus be seen as only one aspect of an ongoing process of transition towards an empire.

In the Amasya region we indeed observe parallel changes from the late fifteenth to the late sixteenth century that demonstrate other aspects of such a transition. I will just point out in passing that most of the local *mâlikâne*-holders of the region, descendents of the pre-Ottoman Turkish aristocracy, were hit hard by Mehmed II's reform attempt, but managed to survive, regaining only a few years later their revenue holdings under Bayezid II. However, their increasing military responsibilities of serving either as *eşkünci*, mounted soldier, or ordinary *timar*-holder in the Ottoman army furthered their integration into the Ottoman imperial system during the sixteenth century. This was also accompanied by a change in the composition of the *timar*-holding military class in the region: the members of local origin were gradually replaced by those of *kul* origin. While the number of the latter increased significantly, the average size of the holdings in the region (*dirliks* or the fiefs) got smaller.² In the context of our discussion, this meant that the Ottoman central administration succeeded during the sixteenth century in producing quite a significant degree of homogenisation in terms of its administrative agents in the north central Anatolian provinces, both military and civilian. What our registers present us with, both in terms of changing administrative divisions and terminology, is thus the end result of a successful process, with the achievement of tangible change: an empire eventually creating its own image in institutions.

¹ For an analysis of this reform attempt in the region, see Özel "Limits of the Almighty."

² Özel, *Changes in Settlement Patterns*, Chapter II/d.

As we have already seen at the beginning of my analysis in the above pages, the region of Amasya in 1576 was indeed an Ottoman classic in provincial administration, manifesting the same imperial image. It retained the *livâ* status in 1576. In the period between 1520 and 1576, two princes were appointed to Amasya as governor, Mustafa and Bâyezid, sons of Süleyman the Lawgiver. However, their governorship of Amasya did not last long (Mustafa, 1541-1553; Bâyezid, 1558-59), both losing their lives in the struggle for the Ottoman throne.¹ At the time of compilation of the last register in 1576, the *mîr-i livâ* of Amasya was a certain Mustafa Bey, whose *livâ* consisted of seven *kazâs* or districts, including that of Amasya.² As already mentioned, the *kazâ* of Amasya was still made up of the same *nâhiyes* or sub-districts as in c. 1520, with a slight difference in composition. The two *divâns*, parts of the *nâhiye* of Argoma in c. 1520, now formed a separate *nâhiye* in their own right, the *nâhiye* of Gelikiras. The interesting point however is that the names of the *divâns* still survived in the *defter* – with their dependent villages recorded as "*Karye-i Boğacık, tâbî-i dîvân-ı Semâyil. Vakf-ı Medine-i Münevere, iki başdan.*"³

A postclassical transformation: Amasya in 1642

This final composition of the *livâ* of Amasya in the Ottoman provincial administration at its zenith in the 1570s in terms of regularity and clarity in divisions as well as in the terminology employed seems to have undergone further changes during the period that followed; this time, towards smaller and manageable-size taxation units. According to the detailed *avârız* register,⁴ TT776 dated 1642, the *livâ* was divided into ten *kazâs*. While the territorial integrity of the *livâ* had remained unchanged, the number of *kazâs* within this territory increased considerably. As can be seen clearly from Table I, this was done by changing some of the previous *nâhiyes* to *kazâs*, with either an individual *nâhiye* forming a *kazâ* (like Gelikiras) or with a *nâhiye* being subdivided into two or three parts, some of which constituted separate *kazâs* (like Geldigelenâbâd and Argoma). Thus, the number of *nâhiyes* in the

¹ See Kappert, *Die Osmanischen Prinzen*, 95-155; Şerafettin Turan, *Kanuni'nin Oğlu Şehzade Bâyezid Vak'ası* (Ankara, 1961).

² The other *kazâs* comprising the *livâ* of Amasya were Merzifon, Gümüş, Gedegra, Zeytun, Ladik, and Simre-i Ladik. See TT34.

³ TT26: 96b

⁴ For these sources, see Oktay Özel, "17. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Demografi ve İskan Tarihi İçin Önemli Bir Kaynak: 'Mufassal' Avârız Defterleri", in *XII. Türk Tarih Kongresi, Kongreye Sunulan Bildiriler*, III. Cilt (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 2000), 736-743; idem "Cizye ve Avarız Defterleri", in Halil İnalcık & Şevket Pamuk (eds.), *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Bilgi ve İstatistik* (Ankara: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Yayınları, 2000), 35-50.

kazâ of Amasya was reduced to four (Akdağ, Hakala, Ezinepazarı, and Nefs-i Geldigelen), only two of which retained their names. The former Argoma was divided into two parts, one of which became a *kazâ* (Merzifonâbâd) while the other remained as a *nâhiye* belonging to the *kazâ* of Amasya, but changed its name to Hakala,¹ one of the major villages which had previously belonged to Akdağ. Similarly, the former *nâhiye* of Geldigelenâbâd was divided into three parts, two of which formed separate *kazâs* whereas the core area (*nefs-i Geldigelen*) remained as a *nâhiye* in the *kazâ* of Amasya. The former *nâhiye* of Aştagul disappeared, its villages now recorded in one of the newly created *kazâs* from the former Geldigelenâbâd. Contrary to the case of Argoma and Geldigelenâbâd, the former *nâhiyes* of Bergoma and Yavaş, which had only been recorded separately in 1576,² were combined into one, and called by the name of the chief village (*nefs*) of the *nâhiye*, Ezinepazarı.

These changes in the composition of the *livâ* of Amasya, in the form of a series of re-arrangements of the borders, as well as the legal-administrative status of the sub-divisions (*kazâs* and *nâhiyes*), appear to have been closely related to the overall change in the fiscal administration of the Ottoman Empire. The main characteristics of the fiscal transformation that the Empire underwent from the late sixteenth century onwards are on the whole well known. What is important to note here is that at the centre of this transformation lay a serious financial crisis that was an enormous strain on the imperial treasury, forcing the central government to take action to generate new sources of income. Two significant consequences of the government's efforts to this end are of particular importance in our context. First, the central government at the beginning of the seventeenth century turned the extraordinary levies, collectively known as *avârız* and *tekâlif*, into regular annual payments on the part of the peasantry, and began to carry out provincial surveys to keep records of the individual taxpayers liable for *avârız* as well as *cizye*, the traditional head tax paid by non-Muslim subjects. As a matter of fact, the *avârız* register referred to above was compiled as a result of such a survey undertaken in the first years of the 1640s.

It appears that the major change and further reshuffling in the provincial administrative divisions as reflected in the 1642 register was directly related to the very process of this transformation in the financial administration of the Empire. It seems that by changing the borders the government aimed to create smaller administrative units, facilitating the

¹ Present day village of Yolpınar.

² Although these two *nâhiyes* were recorded separately in 1576, a record in the register, related to the village of Kayı ("karye-i Kayı, tâbi-i Bergoma, Yavaş dirler...", TT26, p. 176a), clearly shows that there was no clear-cut difference between the names of these two geographically-indivisible *nâhiyes*.

collection of *avârız* taxes, certain portions of which were still paid in kind or fulfilled by service.¹ The *kadı*'s involvement in the assessment and the collection of these taxes as well as in the application of the expanding *mukataa/iltizam* system was crucial.² Therefore, one may assume that one way to reduce the burden of such a difficult task on each *kadı* under the unstable conditions of the period would thus be to reduce the area they were responsible for to a manageable size. In so doing, the central government demonstrated that it no longer considered the *kazâ* as a solely legal-administrative unit; thus it was the need for effective revenue assessment within the *avârız* and *iltizam* systems and collection of taxes that eventually turned the *kazâs* into fiscal administrative units as well, more than ever before. If so, this would largely explain the general picture of the *livâ* of Amasya as portrayed in the 1642 register: the creation of as many *kazâs* as possible in order to facilitate tax assessment and collection.

The second significant consequence of the financial crisis of the turn of the seventeenth century was that revenue sources previously allocated to state functionaries (mainly the military) under the *timar* system began to be increasingly farmed out to well-off individuals, eventually resulting in the widespread application of *iltizam* to the detriment of the *timar* system as the main institutional mechanism of taxation in the Ottoman Empire.³ Since the *timar* also functioned as a system producing a powerful provincial cavalry army, this very same process seriously undermined the institutional basis of the military dimension of Ottoman provincial administration, though the organizational structure and military positions remained generally unchanged. The overall role and place of the provincial cavalry army in Ottoman military and fiscal-provincial administration diminished significantly during the seventeenth century, to be largely replaced in the eighteenth by governors' personal retainers (*kapı halkı*).⁴

¹ See Linda Darling, *Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy. Tax Collection and Finance Administration in the Ottoman Empire, 1560-1660* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996).

² For the *kadı*'s role as supervisor of the *iltizams*, see Darling, *Revenue-Raising*, 131, 141, 154, 159. On the *kadı*'s duties in the process of *avarız* assessment and collection, see, for example, Darling's emphasis: "The *avarız* documents from around the turn of the century [17th century] show the *avarız* being collected by the *kadis* and therefore organized and divided by *kazâ*" (...) "collection of the *avarız* by the *kadis* themselves was still practiced, even in the mid-century" (Linda T. Darling, "Avarız Tahriri: Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century Ottoman Survey Registers", *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin*, 10 (1990), 252, 256, and the following pages).

³ For the application of *iltizam* system in the Ottoman Empire with the relevant literature, see Darling, *Revenue-Raising*, 119 ff..

⁴ For a general evaluation of these changes as "decentralization" of Ottoman administration, see Halil İnalcık, "Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700", *Archivum Ottomanicum*, VI (1980), 283-337; idem, "Centralization and Decentralization in Ottoman Administration", in T. Naff and R. Owen (eds.), *Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History* (London: 1977), 27-52.

It is also well known that the financial crisis was accompanied by great Celâli rebellions and widespread terror caused by the activities of hundreds of brigand bands, which continued during the rest of the century leaving particularly the central and eastern Anatolian countryside in ruins. The primary actors of the Celâli activities in Anatolia were the discontented members of the provincial cavalry, whose economic conditions had seriously deteriorated during the second half of the sixteenth century. Furthermore, the gradual dissolution of the *timar* system and the Celâli rebellions in Anatolia during the first half of the seventeenth century also caused a large-scale abandonment of villages and displacement of rural population.¹ This meant that while the increasing number of *timar*-holdings became vacant (their revenues were to be farmed out later), large tracts of arable lands once tilled by the peasants were left uncultivated (to be occupied largely by members of the military class).²

These are the very conditions that gradually paved the ground for the emergence in Anatolia of a new kind of local nobility, who were to become the *ayâns* of the following decades of the seventeenth and throughout the eighteenth centuries. Such conditions gave rise to two main consequences. Firstly, as seen in Amasya, the existing administrative system once more underwent certain changes in accordance with the changing priorities of the Ottoman fiscal administration. Secondly, the dissolution of the rural order not only contributed greatly to the rise of local nobility as an economic and socio-political power, but also created suitable ground for *de facto* changes both in property relations and the organization of agricultural economy and production,³ a phenomenon that still remains largely unstudied.

I will conclude by emphasizing that the seventeenth-century legacy in Anatolia was a set of extremely fluid and dynamic socio-economic conditions comparable in certain ways to those of the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, conditions that the early Ottoman administration inherited and attempted to manipulate according to its own priorities. It may even be suggested that the seventeenth century transformation had similar characteristics to the previous one. Although the difficulties that the Ottoman Empire faced during the early seventeenth century were of different kind and

¹ See Mustafa Akdağ, *Celâli İsyanları. Türk Halkının Dirlik Düzenlik Kavgası* (İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınları, 1975); Özel, *Changes in Settlement Patterns*, esp. Chapter IV.

² Preliminary findings of the examination of seventeenth-century detailed *avârız* registers of both Anatolia and the Balkans attest such a process. For the literature on the subject, see my "Avarız ve Cizye Defterleri".

³ See Bruce McGowan, *Economic Life in Ottoman Europe. Taxation, Trade and the Struggle for Land, 1600-1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). Also see idem, "The Age of Ayans, 1699-1812", in Halil İnalcık with Donald Quataert (eds.), *A Social and Economic History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), esp. 646-694. It would be interesting to study, for example, the changes that occurred in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to the Ottoman form of small peasant family labour farm, referred to as *çift-hane* system by İnalcık (İnalcık and Quataert, *ibid.*, 143 ff).

largely a product of its own regime, the central administration tried to cope with them by resorting to similar pragmatic policies as those observed in fifteenth century-Anatolian provinces. Moreover, the destruction of the existing rural order with its institutional structures, political instability, social depredation and insecurity, constant terror by the Celali bands and armies, changing taxation and revenue-holding systems, etc., are only a few of the resemblances that can be observed between the two periods, features that eventually produced similar results, briefly referred to above. It is also important to note that the Ottoman reaction to such conditions, it seems, was based on and largely shaped by financial concerns.¹ Despite the seemingly conservative nature of the central bureaucracy both in attitude and organisation, the Ottomans' constant endeavour to adopt varying sets of coherent and relevant administrative systems in accordance with changing conditions had such a pragmatic dimension. If the general transformation portrayed in the present study including the seventeenth century picture derived from the *tahrir* registers of different kinds is not highly biased towards the changing needs of the Ottoman fisc, it reveals once more how fiscal the very nature of Ottoman provincial administration was from the very beginning.

¹ For an in-depth analysis and interpretation of the experiments of Ottoman fiscal administration during this period, see Linda T. Darling, "Ottoman Fiscal Administration: Decline or Adaptation", *The Journal of European Economic History*, 26/1 (1997), 157-179.

ON THE SOURCES OF TURSDUN BEY'S *TÂRİH-İ EBÜ'L-FETH*

Kenan İnan

Introduction

The *Târîh-i Ebü'l-Feth*¹ of Tursun Bey² is not a systematic chronicle of events but essentially a panegyric on the reigns of Mehmed II³ and of its dedicatee Bâyezid II.⁴ It belongs to a genre of history writing with a literary pedigree that goes back to Cüveynî's History of the World Conqueror (*Târîh-i Cihângüştâ*) and is the first example of this type in Turkish. The Introduction can be placed in the tradition of 'Mirrors for Princes' literature, in which an imperial servant, in this case Tursun Bey, offers advice on ruler ship to the reigning Sultan. The main section of the History conforms with Persian

¹ There are six manuscripts of Tursun Bey's *Târîh-i Ebu'l-Feth*. These are Vienna manuscript no. 984, Topkapı Palace Revan Library nos. 1097 and 1098, Hazine Library no. 1470, İstanbul University Library no. 4369, and Ayasofya Library no. 3032, the last that bears Bâyezid II's stamp and is therefore almost certainly a 'presentation copy' made for Bâyezid II. For detailed descriptions of the above manuscripts see A. Sırrı Levend, *Gazavât-nâmeler ve Mihaloğlu Ali Bey'in Gazavât-nâmesi*, Ankara, 1956, 16; H. İnalçık & R. Murphey, *The History of Mehmed the Conqueror by Tursun Bey* (Chicago, 1977)8. The *Târîh-i Ebü'l-Feth* was most probably written after 895/1490. Tulum states that Tursun gives information on Mamluk affairs up until 895/1490, but not after this date. He therefore suggests that Tursun may have composed his work between the years 1490 and 1495. Tursun Bey, *Tarih-i Ebü'l-Feth*, Haz. M. Tulum (İstanbul, 1977), XXIV.

² For information on Tursun Bey's life see H. İnalçık, "Tursun Beg, Historian of Mehmed the Conqueror's Time", *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, LXIX (1977), 55-71. The historian gives his name as Tûr-ı Sînâ, adding that he was known as Tursun Beg, a nickname that had been given to him. *Tarih-i Ebü'l-Feth*, 5. In his *Tezkire*, Sehi Bey also mentions in connection with Tursun Bey's name that the poet Hayatî was killed because of a couplet, which he wrote for Tursun Bey. *Tezkire-i Sehi*, ed. M. Şükrü (İstanbul, 1325), 69.

³ For detailed information on Mehmed II's reign and his life see, H. İnalçık, "Mehmed the Conqueror (1432-1481) and his Time", *Speculum*, XXXV (1960), 408-427; H. İnalçık, "The Policy of Mehmed II toward the Greek Population of İstanbul and the Byzantine Buildings of the City", in *The Ottoman Empire, Conquest, Organization, and Economy Collected Studies* (London: Variorum Reprints, 1978), 231-249; H. İnalçık, "The Re-building of İstanbul by Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror", *Cultura Turcica*, IV/1-2 (1967), 5-15; H. İnalçık & R. Anhegger, *Kanunnâme-i Sultânî Ber Müceb-i Örf-i Osmânî II. Mehmed ve II. Bâyezid Devirlerine ait Yasakname ve Kanunnâmeler* (Ankara, 1956); H. İnalçık, *Fatih Devri Üzerinde Tetkikler ve Vesikalar I*, 3. Baskı (Ankara, 1995); H. İnalçık, "Osmanlı Hukukuna Giriş: Örfi-Sultani Hukuk Ve Fatih'in Kanunları", *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*, XIII (1958), 102-126; H. İnalçık, *Essays in Ottoman History* (İstanbul 1998); S. Tansel, *Osmanlı Kaynaklarına Göre Fatih Sultan Mehmed'in Siyasi ve Askeri Faaliyeti*, 3. Baskı (Ankara, 1999).

⁴ For detailed information on Bâyezid II's life see S. Tansel, *Sultan II. Bâyezid'in Siyasi Hayatı* (İstanbul, 1966).

models in that for Tursun the events he describes are usually exemplary, or occasions for eulogising the Sultan, hence his tendency to omit or gloss over events which, to the modern mind, may seem important, and to emphasise incidents which might appear trivial. For example, the most prominent incident in his account of the first Karaman Campaign is Mehmed's refusal to accede to the demands of the Janissaries. He evidently selected this incident because it was exemplary: an instance of the Sultanic *siyaset*¹ necessary for the preservation of order. In other places, he highlights events, notably the defeat of the Moldavians in the Campaign of 1462² because they are exemplary illustrations of divine interventions in human affairs.

The most prominent element is panegyric. The specific models, which Tursun seems to have had in mind, were the panegyric histories of Timur.³ This emerges not simply from the literary style, which emulates Nizamüddin Şami and Şerafüddin Yazdi, but also Tursun's direct reference to Şerafüddin Yazdi,⁴ and from his comment in the section on the Bosnian Campaign of 1463, that Mehmed had waged more Holy Wars than Timur.⁵ This favourable comparison with Timur is above all a panegyric device, but Tursun perhaps also intended to hint that the Ottomans had thrown off the ignominy of the defeat of 1402.⁶ The panegyric mode frequently determines the way in which Tursun presents events. Most obviously perhaps, when the failed siege of Belgrade in 1456⁷ is presented as a victory. In this case, Tursun entirely

¹ For the term "siyaset" and its meaning in the Ottoman Empire, see, M. Zeki Pakalın, *Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlüğü*, Vol. III (İstanbul, 1993), 240-241; Ahmet Mumcu, *Osmanlı Devletinde Siyaseten Katl* (Ankara, 1985). A. Yaşar Ocak, *Osmanlı Toplumunda Zındıklar Ve Mülhidler (15.-17.Yüzyıllar)* (İstanbul, 1998), 71-103.

² *Tarih-i Ebü'l-Feth*, 170-173.

³ For detailed information on Timurid historiography, see J.E. Woods, "The Rise of Timurid Historiography", *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*, XLVI, (1987), 81-108; C. Rieu, *Catalogue of the Persian Manuscripts in the British Museum*, Vol. I (London, 1879); Edward G. Browne, *A History of Persian Literature Under Tartar Dominion (A.D. 1265-1502)*, (Cambridge, 1920).

⁴ In mentioning the Medh-i Timur (The Praise of Timur) of Şerafüddin Yazdi, Tursun leaves no doubt that he had actually read or at least seen the work. *Tarih-i Ebü'l-Feth*, 125

⁵ For detailed information on Timur's reign and His life, see Nizamüddin Şami, *Zafernâme*, çev. Necati Lugal, Ankara 1987; Sharaf al-din Ali Yazdi, *Zafernâme: the History of Timur Bec*, tr. J. Darby (London, 1723); İsmail Aka, *Timur ve Devleti* (Ankara, 1991); Beatrice F. Manz, *The Rise and Rule of Tamerlane* (Cambridge 1991); David Morgan, *Medieval Persia 1040-1797* (London, 1990).

⁶ Timur had dismembered the first short-lived Ottoman Empire when he defeated Yıldırım Bâyezid at the battle of Ankara in 1402. For this reason he was usually dealt with very harshly by Ottoman historians. For early Ottoman Chroniclers approach to Timur, see F. Emecen, "İlk Osmanlı Kroniklerinde Timur İmajı", *İlk Osmanlılar ve Batı Anadolu Beylikler Dünyası* (İstanbul, 2001), 161-173. One of the Ottoman Historians Gelibolulu Mustafa Ali has different approach Timur's activities and claims that Bâyezid should have submitted to Timur as a vassal. For detailed information on Ali's approach to Ottoman-Timurid relations, see C. H. Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in The Ottoman Empire The Historian Mustafa Ali (1541-1600)*, (New Jersey, 1986), 273-292.

⁷ *Tarih-i Ebü'l-Feth*, 78-84.

glosses over the scale of the Ottoman defeat and, he is able to use the death of Yanko (Janos Hunyadi) as evidence that the Sultan had achieved his end.¹

Tursun Bey makes it clear that he used a variety of sources for his introduction although he does not, for the most part, specify what these were. He seems to have interwoven material from both oral and written sources, with material drawn from his own experiences. A source which he identifies by name and parts of which can be collated with passages in his introduction is the *Ahlâq-ı Nasiri* of Nasiruddin Tusi.² In other cases, however, he does not identify his sources specifically, but simply names them as "*kütüb-i hikemiyye*" (Philosophical books), or uses the phrases: "*kütüb-i mu'teberede gördüğümüz üzere*" (as we saw in the respected books), "*hükema'dan menkuldur ki*" (it is narrated from the philosophers that), and "*hikayet-i takrir buyurdu*" (he also said that),³ "*hikayet ederler ki*" (it is narrated that), and "*hikayet-i takrir buyurdu*" (he told the story). Most of these phrases indicate a plurality of sources, for instance 'philosophical books', but it is not clear whether these are to be taken literally or are simply a device used to add weight to Tursun Bey's own statements. A second identifiable source which Tursun Bey seems to have used but does not mention by name is the *Chahar Maqala* (Four Discourses) of Nizami-i Arudi⁴ of Samarqand, probably composed in the year 551/1156.

Of the oral sources for Tursun Bey's introduction, the most important was Mahmud Pasha,⁵ the Grand Vizier of Mehmed II, whom he mentions by

¹ "Çün matlûb-ı pâdişâh kat-i rakib idi ve bi-hamdi'llah müyesser oldu, pes vasl-ı habib-ki nevarûs-ı pür-nâz-ı memleket-i Lâz'dur--tahsilünün esbâbı ve tarîkı mübâseretü için...." *Ibid.*, 83. For detailed information on Janos Hunyadi's life see J.Held, *Hunyadi: Legend and Reality* (Boulder, 1985).

² The famous philosopher and astronomer was born in Tus in A.H 507 and died in Baghdad in A.H 692. Tusi mentioned in his introduction to his book that he wrote it at the wish of the ruler of Khorasan, Nasiruddin Abdurrahim b. Ebu Mansur. He entitled it after the name of his sponsor. See C. Rieu, *Catalogue of the Persian Manuscripts in the British Museum*, Vol. II, 441. For detailed information about Tusi's life and writings, see *EI* (first edition), VIII, 980-2; Nasir al-Din Tusi, *The Nasirean Ethics*, tr. G.M. Wickens (London, 1964).

³ *Tarih-i Ebü'l-Feth*, 10-29.

⁴ Ahmad b. Umar b. 'Ali of Samarqand, poetically named Nizâmi and entitled 'Arudi ('the prodig') flourished in the sixth/twelfth century and appears to have spent most of his life in Khorasan and Transoxiana. He was a poet and courtier, but when occasion arose, he also performed astrology and medicine. His poetry is far inferior to his prose. It is by virtue of the *Chahar Maqalah* that Nizami-i Arudi of Samarqand deserves to be thought amongst the famous names of Persian writing. This work also includes the only contemporary information about 'Umar Hayyam' and the earliest known account of Firdausi, and many of the anecdotes in his book are derived from his personal involvement in the events recorded. Therefore, the book is one of the most valuable sources for the period of two or three centuries proceeding its compilation, which might be placed between the years 547/1152 and 552/1157, and most probably in the year 551/1156. See Browne, *Revised Translation of the Chahar Maqala* ("Four Discourses") of Nizami-i Arudi of Samarqand (London, 1921), X-XII.

⁵ For a detailed account of Mahmud Pasha's life, see M. ... Tekindağ, "Mahmud Paşa", *İ.A.*, 7 (İstanbul, 1957), 183-8; C.H. Imber, "Mahmud Pasha", *EI*, 2nd edition, VI, 69-72; T. Stavrides, *The Sultan of Vezirs. The Life and Times of the Ottoman Grand Vezir Mahmud Pasha Angelović (1453-1474)*, (Leiden, 2001).

name and to whom he devoted almost half of his foreword. Apart from Mahmud Pasha, Tursun Bey sometimes implies that he quotes from other people¹ whom he does not identify, but whose possible identities will be discussed below. Although Tursun Bey himself does not acknowledge it, the study also demonstrates that he used further written sources in addition to those, he used in composing his introduction. As the comparisons in the text show, he used Neşri as a written source, although this is sometimes hard to detect, since he displayed great skill in modifying his sources. The clearest and best example of his use of Neşri is perhaps in his account of the battle of Otlukbeli in 1473. This finding disproves the commonly held idea that Tursun did not use written sources in the composition of his History.²

The *Ahlaq-ı Nasırî* of Nasiruddin Tusi

Tursun Bey used this source extensively for his preface. Sometimes he quotes verbatim, sometimes he modifies it, and sometimes he collects the points, which are useful to his argument. Some quotations from Tursun Bey and Tusi are given below. In both writers' accounts the underlined sentences are shared and show Tursun Bey's use of Tusi.

Tusi reads.

"In enumeration of the classes of virtues to which the excellences of disposition refer

In Psychology it has been established that the human soul has three divergent faculties. with respect to which faculties it becomes the source of different actions and operations. in association with the will; and when one of these faculties prevails over the others. the latter are overcome or lost. First is the Rational Faculty. also called the Angelic Soul. which is the principle of reflection and distinction. and of the yearning to see into the realities of things. Second is the Irascible Faculty. also called the Savage Soul. which is the principle of irascibility and courage. of advancing to meet perils. and of yearning to rule. to rise. and to gain increased status. Third comes the Appetitive Faculty. also styled the Bestial Soul. which is the principle of the appetites. of the search for nourishment. and of yearning for pleasure by way of foods and drinks and women. A reference to this classification has already been made in the First Division."

Now the number of the souls's virtues will tend to be in accordance with the numbers of these faculties. Thus. whenever the motion of the Rational Soul is in equilibrium in itself. and its yearning is for the acquisition of certain knowledges (not that which is thought to be certain. while being in reality pure ignorance). from that motion the virtue of knowledge comes into being. the virtue of wisdom being a necessary

¹ *Tarih-i Ebü'l-Feth*, 12

² *Tarih-i Ebü'l-Feth*., XXVII.

consequence. Again, whenever the motion of the Savage Soul is in equilibrium (it being submissive to the Intelligent Soul, content with what the latter apportions to it, with no untimely excitation or infringement of limits in its states) then from that motion the virtue of mildness comes into being for this soul, with the virtue of courage as a necessary consequence. Yet again, whenever the motion of the Bestial Soul is in equilibrium (so that it is obedient to the Intelligent Soul, limiting itself to what the latter assigns to it, and offering it no opposition in the pursuit of its own passion) from that motion the virtue of continence comes into being, with the virtue of liberality as a necessary consequence.

When these three classes of virtue accrue, all three being blended harmoniously, there comes into being from their compounding a homogeneous state, which represents the perfection and completion of those virtues; and that is called the virtue of justice. Hence the consensus and agreement of all philosophers, both modern and ancient, on the fact that the classes of virtues are four: Wisdom, Courage, Continence and Justice; and no person is deserving of praise or apt to glory or take pride, save in respect of one of these four, or in all four together. Those who boast of nobility of lineage or family, greatness, moreover, are ultimately referring to the fact that some of their forefathers and ancestors were noted for these virtues; and if a man glory in superiority and mastery, or in great wealth, men of intelligence show disapproval of him.”¹

Tursun reads,

“In enumeration of the classes of virtues to which the excellences of disposition refer and they were written in the books of the philosophers. As the chief of Islamic philosophers Hoca Nasiruddin Tusi has written in his book Ahlak-ı Nasiri the human soul has three divergent faculties, with respect to which faculties it becomes the source of different actions and operations, in association with the will. First is the Rational Faculty, also called the Angelic Soul, which is the principle of reflection and distinction, and of yearning to see into the realities of things. Second is the Irascible Faculty, also called the Savage Soul, which is the principle of irascibility and courage, of advancing to meet perils, and of yearning to rule, to rise, and to gain increased status. Third comes the Appetitive Faculty, also styled the Bestial Soul, which is the principle of appetites, of the search for nourishment, and of yearning for pleasure by way of foods and drinks and women. Now, the number of the soul's virtues that, whenever that the motion of the rational souls is in the equilibrium in itself and its yearning for the acquisition of certain knowledge from that motion the virtue of knowledge comes into being, the virtue of wisdom being a necessary consequence. And again, whenever the motion of the savage soul is in equilibrium, it being submissive to the intelligent soul, content with what the latter apportions to it, with no untimely excitation or infringement of limit in its states, then from that motion the virtue of mildness comes into being for this soul, with the virtue of courage as a necessary consequence.

¹ *The Nasirean Ethics*, 80-81.

Yet again, whenever the motion of the bestial soul is in equilibrium, so that it is obedient to the intelligent soul, limiting itself to what the latter assigns to it, and offering it no opposition in the pursuit of its own passion, from that motion the virtue of continence comes into being with the virtue of liberality as a necessary consequence. Every one of the three strengths has three states, which are: excess, deficiency, and moderateness. To guard oneself from excess and deficiency, and to obey only the moderateness is also a quality. And that is called the virtue of justice, that those previous virtues can be completed with this one. Hence the consensus and agreement of all philosophers on the fact that the classes of virtues are four: wisdom, courage, continence, and justice. And no person is deserving of praise or apt to glory or take pride save in respect of one of these four, or in all four together. And those who boast of nobility of lineage or family greatness, moreover, are ultimately referring to the fact that some of their forefathers and ancestors were noted for these virtues.”¹

Tursun Bey's other quotation from Tusi is a story of Alexander the Great, illustrating the virtues of mildness and forgiveness. The equivalent passage in Tusi comprises two anecdotes, the first of which Tursun Bey omits. This is a story of how Alexander forgave a miscreant who had committed a crime against him. The second story, this one quoted by Tursun, also shows Alexander pardoning a criminal against the advice of his courtiers.² Here Tursun Bey uses the second anecdote in connection with Bayezid II's virtues. Tursun adds that Bayezid II also had the virtue of mildness. It is also important to note that this example takes place before the section, devoted to Mahmud Pasha by Tursun Bey in which Mehmed II was said to have anger superior to his mildness.

Tursun and Tusi's accounts are given below, showing Tursun's additions and modifications to Tusi's text.

Tusi reads,

They relate of Alexander that a saucy fellow proceeded to injure his honour by recounting his faults and deficiencies. One of the nobles said: "If the king will give the command for him to be punished, he will desist from this behaviour, thus becoming an example to others." Alexander replied: "Such an idea is remote from (sound) opinion; for if, as a consequence of the punishment, he grows even more insolent, busying himself with criticizing and publishing my faults, then I shall have given him material for chatter and have led others to find some excuse for him." Again, one day, they captured and brought before him a domineering person, who had rebelled against Alexander and stirred up much sedition and mischief. Alexander signed for him to be pardoned. One of his boon companions, in an excess of rage, remarked: "If I were you, I would kill him," to which Alexander replied: "Then I, since I am not you, will not kill him!"³

¹ *Tarih-i Ebü'l-Feth*, 16-17.

² *Tarih-i Ebü'l-Feth*, 20.

³ *The Nasirean Ethics*, 135.

Tursun reads,

A Story

They brought a sinful person to the world conqueror Alexander's presence, who had lost all hope of saving his life with perpetration of crimes and confession of misdemeanours. His Excellency Alexander sought an omen from the book of happiness. On the mirror of his heart the interpretation, "Let them forgive and overlook. Do you wish that God should forgive you?" was ornamented and he pardoned that guilty person. One of the courtiers of Alexander's household who was present referred to the omission of *siyaset* punishment and said reproachfully, "If I were you, I would kill him" that is to say, If I were you, I would have deprived this useless ne'er-do-well of the blessing of life". Alexander with the aim of belittling [him] answered him and told these words "Then I, since I am not you, I will not kill him!" in other words, he said, "Of course, I am not at the lowest depths of deficiency like you, and that is why I did not want to kill him." May God give him his just deserts.¹

The *Chahar Maqala* of Nizami-i Arûdî

As mentioned above, Tursun Bey's use of the terms *ehl-i hikmet* (the philosophers), *hukama* (philosophers), *kütüb-i hikemiyye* (the philosophical books), and the other similar terms suggests that he used more than one source for his introduction. Apart from Tusi, the second or, if we include Davani, the third source might be the *Chahar Maqala* (Four Discourses) of Nizami-i Arûdî of Samarqand, a poet and a courtier of tenth century Iran. There are only three copies of the book in existence, and the one, written in Herat in 1431, is in Istanbul.² This makes it possible for Tursun Bey to have seen the book and to have had it in his mind when he was writing his own. A point, which the two writers share, is that both of them were the employees of a ruler and both were poets and men of letters.

Below, examples are given from Tursun Bey's *Tarih-i Ebü'l-Feth* and from Arûdî's *Chahar Maqala*. There seems to be a similarity between the two writers' accounts. It is worth remembering that Tursun Bey is sometimes very successful in modifying his sources or in recasting them in other styles. Below, the accounts from both writers are given.

¹ *Tarih-i Ebü'l-Feth*, 20.

² Nizami-i Arûdî, *Chahar Maqalâ*, Aşir Efendi Library Ms. no 285 (currently in the Ayasofya Library, İstanbul).

Arûdî reads,

(Beginning of the book:

This loyal servant and favoured retainer Ahmad ibn Umar ibn Ali an Nizami Arudi Semerkandi, who for forty-five years had been devoted to the service of this house and inscribed in the register of service of this Dynasty, desired to dedicate to the Supreme Imperial Court (may God exalt it!) some work equipped according to the canons of philosophy with decisive proofs and trenchant arguments, to set forth therein what kingship truly is, who is truly king, whence is derived this honourable office, to whom rightly appertained this favour, and in what manner such a one should show his gratitude for, and after what fashion accept, this privilege, so that he may become second to the lord of the sons of men and third to the Creator of the Universe. For even so had God, in His Incontrovertible Scripture and Eternal Word, co-ordinated on the thread and shown forth on one string the pearls represented by these three exalted titles. "Obey God," said He, "and obey the Apostle, and such as possess authority amongst yourselves." For in the grades of existences and the ranks of intelligible, after the Prophetic Function, which is the supreme limit of man's attainment, there is no rank higher than kingship, which is not else than Divine gift. God, glorious and exalted is He, had accorded this position to the King of this age, and bestowed on him this degree, so that he may walk after the way of former kings and maintain the people after the manner of bygone ages.).¹

It appears that in two places in his introduction Tursun Bey may have used this quotation from Chahar Maqala. In Tursun's introduction Arûdî's material seems to have been divided and used in two places. At the beginning of Tursun Bey's second chapter, after the heading and the *nazm*, we read:

(Prose- Now, first of all, according to the books of philosophy, let us say how high the rank of *padişah* is, and how praiseworthy the existence of the Sultan is, and why there is a necessity for him among the people and among all creatures and he who is distinguished and honoured with sovereignty-with what kind of peculiarities he deserves to be adorned.)²

In the first quotation given above, Arûdî explains how he wants to dedicate to the Supreme Imperial Court a work equipped according to the canons of philosophy. By doing so he wants to argue who is truly king, who deserves to be given the kingship, and what kingship truly is. Tursun Bey uses similar ideas to Arûdî in explaining the necessity for the existence of a Sultan. He gives his source as *kütüb-i hikemiyye*, while Arûdî gives his as *kanun-ı hikmet*.

Tursun shares these ideas with Arûdî. As pointed out above, he seems to have used the rest of Arûdî's material given in the above quotation, in

¹ *Chahar Maqala*, tr. E.G. Browne, 3.

² *Tarih-i Ebü'l-Feth*, 10.

another part of his introduction. Tursun says that without existence of a Sultan, there cannot be order in society. Thus, he argues that thanks are due to the Sultan. To support this idea, he uses one *Ayet* and one *Hadis*. Arûdî gives the *Ayet* in Arabic and the *Hadis* in Persian, followed by his own comment on it. Tursun Bey gives both in Arabic, adding that the *Ayet* is the witness to his argument and the *Hadis* is the interpretation of the *Ayet*. Here Tursun Bey seems to have abridged and modified Arudi. He gives the *Hadis* in its original Arabic form and, in place of Arudi's more-lengthy explication, says simply that the *Hadis* is its (the *Ayet*'s) interpretation. That Tursun Bey did modify his sources in this manner is evident from his re-casting of Tusi's story of Alexander the Great. Tursun Bey reads:

(Especially since the words of God "Obey God and obey the Apostle and such as possess authority amongst yourselves" are also a witness and the saying of the Prophet, "Apart from a prophet and a close angel, there is no higher rank above that a sultan" is the interpretation of the *Ayet* as well.)¹

In another part of his introduction, Tursun Bey seems to have used similar ideas to those of Arûdî, suggesting that here too he may have used Arûdî as a source. The second discourse of Arûdî's book is about the poetic art and in it he argues the essence of the poetic art and the aptitude of the poet. The passage in Arûdî reads:

(On the essence of the Poetic Art and the Aptitude of the Poet:

Poetry is that art whereby the poet arranges imaginary propositions and blends fruitful analogies, in such a wise that he can make a little thing appear great and a great thing small, or cause good to appear in the garb of evil and evil in the form of good. By acting on the imagination, he excites the faculties of anger and concupiscence in such a way that by his suggestion men's temperaments become affected with depression or exaltation; whereby he conduces to the accomplishment of great things in the order of the world.)²

In Tursun Bey we read:

(Prose- And because this robe of munificence has met with his well-proportioned form, sometimes, with the tips of skilful writers, he makes the despicable great, and sometimes the great despicable, and sometimes with the tongue of sharp sword and executioner's dagger, he displays world-conquering command.)³

¹ *Tarih-i Ebü'l-Feth*, 13.

² *Chahar Maqala*, 27.

³ *Tarih-i Ebü'l-Feth*, 15.

Arûdî also explains that "no burden, after the Prophetic office is weightier than sovereignty, nor any function more laborious than that of governing." He continues,

(Hence a king needs round about him, as men on whose counsel, judgement and deliberations depend on the loosing and binding of the world, and the well-being and ill-being of the servants of God Almighty, such as are in every respect the most excellent and most perfect of their time.

Now the servants essential to kings are the Secretary, the Poet, the Astrologer and the Physician, with whom he can in no wise dispense.)¹

The quotations above demonstrate a similarity between Tursun Bey and Arûdî, suggesting that the former was borrowing from the latter. Furthermore, Tursun's emphasis, derived from Arûdî, on the importance of the "pen of the skilful writer", suggests that he is referring to his own portion as a *münşi* in the Ottoman Palace. He perhaps intended his accounts of his own role in the conquest of Sinop (1461)² and in Mahmud Pasha's Serbian campaign (1458)³ to illustrate this part.

Mahmud Pasha

Tursun Bey also used oral sources for his introduction and text. One of the oral sources which was extensively used for the construction of his introduction was Mahmud Pasha the Grand Vizier of Mehmed II. In his preface, Tursun Bey states that he was in the service of Mahmud Pasha for twelve years and compares him with Sultan Melikşah's Vizier Nizamü'l-mülk, adding that even Nizamü'l-mülk did not possess the abilities of Mahmud Pasha. Tursun Bey says that he had spent the best years of his life with Mahmud Pasha's conversations and teachings, and adds that he wants to recall Mahmud Pasha's words which he remembers at the time of writing his

¹ *Chahar Maqala*, 11.

² *Tarih-i Ebü'l-Feth*, 106-8.

³ *Tarih-i Ebü'l-Feth*, 99.

book and to use them as an appetizer to the remaining section of his introduction.¹

There after he gives some personal information about Mahmud Pasha. It is clear from this how important Mahmud Pasha had been to Tursun, and in fact he devotes almost half of his introduction to Mahmud Pasha's sayings. A single example of these is:

(Nesr- Bir gün, sohbet-i hâsında, münâsebetle Sultân Mehmed-i gâzî'nün azamet-i kibriyâsı söylendi. Ehl-i sohbetten biri, küstâhâne, "Bu ulu ni'metin mukâbelesinde şükr imkânı var mı?" dedi. Çün bu su'âl kendüye de vârid göründi; fi'l-hâl, lafz-ı dürer pâşından bu rübâi revân oldu:

Rübâ 'i
Ez-tahayyür ki kâsirem der-şükr
Pîş-i çevgân-ı fikr çün gûyem
Hôd giriftem ki şükr-i Hak güftem
Şükr-i tevîk-i şükr çün gûyem.)²

(Prose- One day, during his special conversation, in connection with a subject, the greatness of Sultan Mehmed's pride was told. One of the followers of the meeting insolently said, "Is there any possibility of thanksgiving in return for this great benefaction?" Because this question seemed admissible for himself, at once he told this quatrain (rübâi):

Quatrain
I am completely amazed that I cannot entirely express my gratitude to him [God].
How can I talk before this idea?

¹ *Tarih-i Ebü'l-Feth*, 24. It is clear that, at least, Tursun Bey's introduction belongs to the genre of literature usually referred to as 'Mirrors for Princes'. So far as their influence on Ottoman writers is concerned, the most important 'mirrors for princes' are perhaps the three composed during the Seljuk period: The *Kabusname* written in 375/1082 by Keykavus ibni İskender; the *Siyasetname* of Nizâmü'l-Mülk (408-485/1018-1092); and the *Kitab-ı Nasihatü'l-Mülük* of Ebu Hamid Muhammed el-Gazali (450-505/1058-9-1111). There are some more materials, which were commonly used by most of the 'mirror'-writers. Some of these have Sasanian roots and the others come from Muslim history. One of them is Alexander the Great whom Tursun used as an example of the virtue of forgiveness. The above three famous 'mirrors' also used him. He normally appears as a God-fearing and heroic Persian king who was travelling the world for knowledge with his tutor Aristotle. In the 'mirrors' he was attributed with many wise sayings. Another common character whose sayings were also commonly used was Buzurghmihr who, according to *Kalilah va Dimnah*, was Anusirvan's wise counsellor and, since Anusirvan was the champion of justice, the Muslim writers also gave his vizier great rank. From Muslim history, the most commonly used characters by the 'mirror'-writers were Caliph Omar (famous for his justice), Caliph Ali (famous for his bravery), and the Gaznavid Sultan Mahmud (who was famous for his closeness to the ulema and educated people. In addition, 'mirror' writers frequently quote *ayet* and *hadis*. Tursun Bey's employment in the Palace and access to its library must have drawn his attention to traditional 'mirror'-literature, and his employment in the service of a ruler must have stimulated his ambition to emulate it. It is not surprising therefore to find some of the themes of the 'Mirrors for Princes' in the Introduction to his History. See: Ghazali's Book of Counsels for Kings (*Nasihat al-Muluk*), ed. H.D. Isaacs (London, 1964), IX-XXIII.

² *Tarih-i Ebü'l-Feth*, 25.

Imagine that I have expressed my gratitude to God; however,
How am I going to express my thanks for the help, which was given to
me to express my gratitude to him [God]?)

In another part of the introduction Tursun Bey again used Mahmud Pasha as an oral source. Here Mahmud Pasha offers advice to the Sultan. The first of these commences with the word '*Nesr*' and continues with Tursun's words '*Ve eyitti ki*' (and he said that); clearly indicating that the material quoted is Mahmud Pasha's. Mahmud says, 'In fact our Sultan is careful about what I said above, but the mystery of sovereignty could defeat human intelligence.' In the second paragraph, Mahmud Pasha is asked a question during a conversation. Tursun Bey does not make the questioner's identity clear, but he gives the question the person asked as, 'What are the best virtues of a sovereign?' He answers, 'The best virtues of a sovereign, which require the happiness of things relating to the present and the future world, are said to be the welcoming and bringing near of '*ulema and şuyuh* in order to draw the ruler to God.'¹ After this advice, Tursun Bey inserts a sentence of his own, saying that in this context Mahmud Pasha told the following story. Tursun Bey gives the story under the heading '*Hikayet*' (Story):

(Sultân Mahmûd-ı Gaznevî dâym bu üç işkâli pâ-yi semend-i aklında ikâl gösterürdi. Biri bu ki, kendü tahkîk-i sulb-i selîl-i Sebük Tegin midür? Biri bu ki, âhirette nasîbe-i rahmetten behremend ola mı? Üçüncü bu ki, isnâd-ı hadîs-i "*el-ulemâ'ü veresetü'l-enbiyâ*" sahîh mi? Bir zamân bu hayret meydânında cevelân iderdi, ve fikri gavvâsına bu ummân-ı tereddüdde gûta virürdi; tâ bir gün ulemâdan bir âlim-i Rabbânî bârgâhına hâzır oldu. Akîde-i sâfî ile hadd-i müntazırdan ziyâde terhîb ü te'hîl ve ta'zîm ü tebcîl buyurdi. Ol gice rû'yâsında sadr-nişîn-i suffa-i safâ, Hazret-i Muhammed Mustafâ "*aleyhi's-selâm*"ı gördi. Lafz-ı dürer-nisârî ile ile Sultân Mahmâd'a hitâb itti ki: "*Yâ ibne Sebük Tegin! Ekremeka'l-lâhü ke-mâ ekremte vârisi*"; ya'nî Ey Halîfe-i sıdk, ciger-kûşe-i Sebük Tegin! Hak Ta'âlâ sana ikrâm itti, yâ itsün; nitekim sen vârisüme ikrâm ittün." Bir kerre sâfî kalb ile âlime ikrâm imekten bu kadar yıllık müşkili hall oldu.)²

(Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna always used to see these three difficulties as a hobble on the foot of the steed of his intelligence. One of them was whether he was the real son of Sebük Tegin. The other was whether he would share God's mercy on the day of judgement. The third was whether the attribution of the hadith "learned men are the inheritors of prophets" is true. At one time he was wandering up and down in the field of astonishment and he was dipping the diver of his thought into ocean of hesitation, until one day a learned holy man presented himself in his court. In his [Mahmud

¹ *Ibid.*, 28.

² *Ibid.*, 29.

Ghaznavi's] pure religious faith, he welcomed him, deemed him worthy, honoured him, and treated him with greater respect than was expected. That night, he had a dream of the Purest of the Pure, who sits in the highest place of honour, the Prophet Muhammed Mustafa (peace be upon him). He [the Prophet] addressed him [Mahmud] with pearl scattering words: "o son of Sebük Tegin! As you showed honour to my inheritor, God also showed honour to you," that is to say, "O caliph of sincerity, beloved child of Sebük Tegin! God Almighty showed honour to you or may he show it, just as you showed honour to my heir." This time, because, with a pure heart, he showed kindness to a learned man, the problems of many years were solved.)

Tursun Bey's Other Sources

Apart from the sources, which Tursun Bey used in constructing his introduction, it seems that he also used other written sources in composing his text. Now we will demonstrate Tursun Bey's use of oral and written sources through his text. The use of oral and written sources becomes clear in some narratives. Therefore these stories will be taken into account. If Tursun Bey's text is followed chronologically, the use of oral and written sources as follows:

While Tursun Bey explains the details of Murad II's abdication and re-accession, it seems possible that he used an oral source and this source was Çandarlı İbrahim. The line supports this possibility.

(‘Ve eğer şimdi sen ol azîzin rûh-ı latîfin musavver görmek ister isen sulb-ı selîl-i vezîr-i sâhib-tedbîr İbrâhim Pâşâ “yesserehu’llâhü mâ yeşâ” hazretinün mübârek yüzine nazar kıl’)¹

(‘And now, if you would wish to see Halil Pasha's soul figured, his offspring, look at the face of His Excellency the wise Vizier İbrahim Pasha’)

Tursun Bey also narrates Sultan Mehmed's answer, probably to Halil Pasha, when he suggests to him that the enemy [crusaders] strong and only his father, Murad II, could defeat them.

(‘Bu ihtimâlât cün var imiş, “evvelü'l-fıkr âhiru'l-amel irşâdı ile amel itmek hoş değül midî? Bu, sehâfet-i re'y ve kusûr-ı tedbîrden gayrı değüldür”)²

(‘When there was this probability, you should first of all have thought and acted according to the situation. This is nothing other than weakness of mind and defective planning’).

¹ *Tarih-i Ebü'l-Feth*, 34.

² *Tarih-i Ebü'l-Feth*, 36.

Mehmed II's answer would seem to indicate somebody (most probably Halil Pasha) was in the presence of Mehmed II during the conversation and Tursun Bey seems to be using Halil Pasha's information via İbrahim Pasha.

The narrative of the conquest of Istanbul indicates that Tursun Bey used oral sources to compose the story. Tursun Bey mentions the arrival of two huge ships from 'Firengistan', but he does not specify that they were Genoese. There ensued a battle between the Ottoman fleet and these two ships, in which the Ottoman fleet was unable to prevent the two ships from reaching the city. Although this was a defeat for the Sultan's fleet, Tursun interprets the event as a precursor of the ensuing victory. In order to support this idea, he describes the argument between the Genoese ships' crews and the Byzantine people about the defence of part of the devastated wall.¹ This information probably came from an oral source such as a Byzantine soldier or a high-ranking officer of the Emperor's army captured during the war or after the conquest of the city (It is also possible to assume that the Sultan knew what was going on in the city through his spies'. Thus Tursun Bey might have heard of the event from them, since he was very close to the Sultan.)

After the account, Tursun Bey seems to have used an oral source, this time mentioning the battle between the Ottoman soldiers and the Genoese commander of the ships. It is possible that he is using an Ottoman soldier's story or the account of an Ottoman high-ranking official who had witnessed the event, but he does not cite his source. Following this, he mentions the Sultan's kapı kulu guards' battle in the city and for this information he may well again have used an oral source, most probably a soldier who was present at the event. Then he uses the phrase '*kıssa böyledür ki*' (it is narrated that) to introduce his story of the death of the Emperor. He mentions that a group of azabs, dressed as janissaries, entered the city, but lost their way. In the city they encountered the Emperor and a group of armed courtiers. The Emperor lost his life in the ensuing battle. Tursun Bey used this story as an *ibret* (exemplary tale): the Emperor, all-powerful on the day before, was killed by 'a half-dead 'azab'. The moral is that nobody can be certain about the future.

Tursun Bey follows this with an account of the Sultan's entering the city, his visiting Hagia Sophia Church, and a description of the church. Tursun Bey himself escorted the Sultan in his ascent to the dome of Hagia Sophia. The Sultan next assembled the Council of State, where the prisoners of war were brought to him and divided up. The Sultan also appointed a

¹ For a similar account, which supports Tursun Bey's information see Nicolo Barbaro, *Diary of the Siege of Constantinople 1453*, Translated by J. R. Jones (New York, 1969), 23, 65.

governor and ordered him to make the city prosperous again.¹ For this information, Tursun might have used Neşri's account or some written source. The possible connection between Neşri and Tursun is discussed below.

Following the story of the conquest of Istanbul, Tursun Bey narrates the Sultan's work to make Istanbul prosperous. This section seems to have a special character in terms of its sources. It seems that Tursun Bey wrote from his own knowledge but added material from Neşri, which in turn, was mainly taken from Aşıkpaşazade. Aşıkpaşazade deals with the same subject under the heading "*Bab anı beyan eder kim bu İstanbul kim alındı, şehir harab oldu, gerü ne suret ilen mamur olındı anı bildirür*"² (The section states that Istanbul was conquered and then fell into ruins, and relates how it was later made prosperous.) Neşri uses Aşıkpaşazade's materials but divides it into two sections to which he attaches separate headings. Neşri's first section is entitled "*Hikayet-i İbtida-i İmaret-i Kostantiniyye*"³ (The Story of the Beginning of the Rebuilding of Constantinople). His second section is entitled "*Asar-ı Sultan Mehmed fi İstanbul*"⁴ (The Buildings of Sultan Mehmed in Istanbul). In Tursun Bey we have a section entitled "*Âsâr-ı Sultân Ebü'l-Feth Der İsti'mâr-ı Kostantiniyye*"⁵ (The Buildings of the Sultan, the Father of Conquest, to make Constantinople Prosperous). This title seems to be a conflation of Neşri's two titles. Tursun Bey may have used Neşri's account as his basis, spreading Neşri's material thinly throughout the section and elaborating it with his own information.

Tursun Bey's use of Neşri continues in this section and it is possible to see the similarities between the two historians' accounts. For example, where Neşri reads, '*ganisinden ve fakirinden*' Tursun unusually substitutes for these two words their Turkish equivalents: '*bay u yohsultan*' ('from the rich and the poor'). Although Tursun Bey clearly used Neşri's account, he omits some of Neşri's facts. For instance, dealing with the imposition of the *mukata* rent, he mentions that the Sultan was criticized, but he does not specify who that person was. Neşri names him as 'Kula Şahin Paşa'. Neşri, via Aşıkpaşazade, accuses Rum Mehmed Pasha of encouraging the Sultan to implement the tax, but Tursun Bey does not mention his name at all, saying simply that it was the Sultan who imposed the tax and later abolished it. Tursun Bey no doubt deliberately omitted this fact as he was directly involved

¹ *Tarih-i Ebü'l-Feth*, 62-65.

² Âşıkpaşaoğlu Ahmet Âşıkî, *Tevârih-i Âl-i Osman*, in Ç. Nihal Atsız (ed.), *Osmanlı Tarihleri* (İstanbul, 1949), 193 (hereafter Aşıkpaşazade).

³ Neşri, *Kitâb-ı Cihânnüma*, ed. F. R. Unat & M. A. Köymen, 2 vols. (Ankara, 1995), 709 (hereafter Neşri).

⁴ *Kitâb-ı Cihânnüma*, 711.

⁵ *Tarih-i Ebü'l-Feth*, 65.

in the tax and clearly did not wish to record the tax's negative effects on the people. Instead, he tries to represent the whole business of the tax as an example of the wise actions of the Sultan.¹

In the account of the capture of the castles of Eynoz and Taşoz, Tursun Bey probably used a written source, most likely Neşri. It is also possible that he himself was with the Ottoman army during part of its march towards Enez, since his description of the winter is very vivid and the report of the soldiers' death is conceivably his eyewitness report. After this special information, Tursun Bey's account shows similarity with some parts of Neşri's account. However, Tursun Bey also omitted many details, which occur in Neşri's account and decided to précis the information. So, for instance, he omitted the Sultan's sending of Admiral Yunus to Enez, mentioning simply that the fleet came from Gallipoli. After the conquest according to Neşri, the ruler came to the Sultan and received some land from him. The Christians also remained in the city it, but again Tursun does not explain this but simply notes that the ruler came to the Sultan. In addition to this, Tursun seems to have copied from Neşri the date of the conquest, 858 (1454).²

The Story of the siege of Belgrade and the subsequent battle seems to be recounted from Tursun Bey's own observations. He appears to have been present in the Ottoman camp throughout the expedition and it is also possible to conclude that he was close to the events, which occurred during the campaign. In the story the use of the phrase '*kıssa böyle oldu ki*'³ (it is narrated that') to introduce the Ottoman army's attack on the fortress and subsequent defeat, suggests an oral source. Tursun Bey does not however mention the source. He was however informed that when the Ottoman soldiers entered Belgrade the Hungarian King's troops were already waiting for them. The King had placed his troops in the devastated parts of the city walls. With this information, we may quite justifiably imagine that the oral source was either a soldier or an Ottoman commander who faced the situation in the castle. At the end of his description of the event, Tursun Bey mentions that the Sultan achieved one of his aims by killing his rival (Janos Hunyadi), who was injured by an arrow fired by an Ottoman soldier and later died from the injury received. For this information, Tursun Bey might have used an oral source, but presumably knowledge of the event was widespread.⁴

Sultan Mehmed's Wallachian (Eflak) expedition seems to be recounted from Tursun Bey's own observations, perhaps combined with an oral source.

¹ *Kitâb-ı Cihânnüma*, 68-69.

² *Kitâb-ı Cihânnüma*, 76-78.

³ *Kitâb-ı Cihânnüma*, 81.

⁴ *Kitâb-ı Cihânnüma*, 78-84.

It is quite possible that Tursun Bey was with Mahmud Pasha during the battle, which occurred in the expedition since he gives a very detailed account of the army's organization. Following this episode, Tursun Bey describes Evrenos Beg's offensive against an enemy troop which Evrenos defeats, taking many prisoners. It seems probable that the source for Tursun Bey's account was Evrenosoğlu Ali himself or, less likely, one of his followers.¹

The Sultan's first Bosnian expedition is most likely recounted from Tursun Bey's own experiences, supplemented perhaps by one or two oral sources. It would appear that Tursun was with Mahmud Pasha during his pursuit of the Bosnian King. He is careful to mention Mahmud Pasha's words countering those of his commanders who did not want to pursue the King, portraying Mahmud as a man of courage and mature understanding, as well as a pious man who prayed to God and sought His favour. Tursun Bey may have used an oral source for details of the battle before the castle of Kılıç, since he was probably with Mahmud Pasha during the event. There is, however, no clue as to who this oral source might have been. Possibly it was Turahan Beyoğlu Ömer Bey, the commander of the battle forces or perhaps one of the Ottoman soldiers who participated in the battle. There was conceivably another oral source as well, since Tursun Bey relates what the King did in the castle before the battle. This could have been a prisoner of war taken in the battle, but the stereotyped nature of the passage presenting the confident infidels drinking wine, as opposed to Mahmud Pasha praying to God, suggests that Tursun Bey probably created it himself.²

The story of the arrival of the news of the death of Karamanoğlu İbrahim Bey does not seem to be based on Tursun Bey's own observations. He evidently used a written source, probably Neşri. It seems that Tursun simply summarized Neşri's account without adding anything of his own or giving the background to the events, and omitting some of Neşri's information. For example, according to Neşri, the Sultan sent Pir Ahmed, the governor of the province of Karahisar 'with many soldiers' and the governor of the Sancak of Antalya, Köse Hamza. Tursun Bey gives the name of the governor of Antalya, but does not mention any other person, merely stating that the Sultan gave Hamza some of his soldiers. Similarly Neşri specifies that Pir Ahmed gives the castles of Sıklan and Kayseri to the Sultan, while in Tursun Bey's account Pir Ahmed merely gives 'some of his lands' to the Sultan to thank him for his help. Tursun Bey's main purpose in this passage seems to have been

¹ *Kitâb-ı Cihânnüma*, 110-118.

² *Kitâb-ı Cihânnüma*, 121-128.

present the death of İbrahim as an example of divine providence acting in Mehmed's favour, and to present Mehmed as the helper of the oppressed.¹

Tursun Bey's account of the Venetians' attack on the Morea seems to be Tursun Bey's own information, with the possible supplementation from an oral source. According to Tursun Bey the Christian countries, particularly Hungary, had organized an alliance including Fireng (Venice), and Albania against the Ottoman Empire. The Hungarians and Venetians attacked the Sultan's lands while the Albanians revolted. Tursun Bey presents the Sultan as deciding to save the Morea and the people who were besieged in its castles, on the grounds that the land had become an Islamic country and could not be left to the infidels again. As an immediate precaution, the Sultan sent Mahmud Pasha to the help of the Morea and it is almost certain that Tursun Bey was in Mahmud Pasha's camp during this expedition. Tursun Bey describes the siege of Korisos castle by the Venetians and the defenders' victory. The very detailed account, suggests, that he made use of an oral source as he himself was most probably with Mahmud Pasha at the time of the siege. This source might have been Elvan Beyoğlu Sinan Bey, or possibly it was one of the sixty soldiers who made the surprise attack.²

The Sultan's second expedition to Bosnia seems to have been recounted from Tursun Bey's own experience, with the possible addition of an oral source. According to Tursun Bey there were two reasons for the expedition: the Hungarian King's attack on Bosnia, and secondly, the surrender of Jajçe by its voyvoda and warden. In this section Tursun Bey also mentions the Venetian attack on the island of Lesbos (Midilli). The siege of Mtylene almost succeeded, forcing the Sultan to postpone the Bosnian expedition and to send Mahmud Pasha to the assistance of the islands. However, Mahmud did not encounter the enemy, his commanders rejected the idea of pursuit and reminding him that there was an urgent command from the Sultan to return as soon as possible. After describing this expedition Tursun turns to Bosnia. After an unsuccessful siege of Jajçe castle the Sultan went to Sofia to overwinter. He sent Mahmud Pasha to the assistance of Izvornik, which was being besieged by the King of Hungary. Tursun Bey accompanied Mahmud Pasha on his expedition and, as with the earlier Serbian campaign, provides detailed information. Mahmud Pasha came close to the castle but found that the strategic pass was in the hands of the Vlacs, and the approach to the castle blocked. Mahmud Pasha used the stratagem of instructing his men to cut their way through the forest above the castle and to hoot to the garrison that the Sultan was approaching. The ploy worked and the King's soldiers did not want

¹ *Kitâb-ı Cihânnüma*, 129.

² *Kitâb-ı Cihânnüma*, 129-132.

to continue the siege having heard that the Sultan was coming. Here Tursun Bey mentions the situation in the King's camp. He relates the reaction of the King's lords and their suggestion, as well as the King's decision, to make a final assault on the castle. For this information Tursun might have used an oral source, perhaps a prisoner of war who spoke of what had happened in the King's camp before the final attack. Tursun Bey also explains that after the defeat of the King, he was sent to the castle with the task of registering the provisions, which had been sent there but had not reached it at the right time. Tursun Bey completes the registration and returns with Mahmud Pasha and the castle's commander Mihaloğlu İskender Bey.¹

Tursun Bey's story of the conquest of Alaiye by Gedik Ahmed Pasha suggests that he did not have direct experience of this event. Firstly, the commander was Gedik Ahmed, and not his own patron Mahmud. Secondly, and more importantly, he seems to have summarized Neşri, his own additions to Neşri amounting only to a few words. The account is in rather plain Turkish, which might also be proof of his use of Neşri. He also cuts the information very short and does not incorporate his usual couplets, lines of poetry, and other conventions of the ornamented prose style. He seems to have wished to cut the story short, possibly not wishing to say too much about an expedition which was not conducted by his master, Mahmud Pasha. In order to demonstrate the similarities between Neşri and Tursun Bey, their accounts are given below. In the quotations from both historians the sentences underlined convey similar information and the sentences underlined in Tursun's account also show Tursun Bey's way of summarizing Neşri. The sentences, which are not underlined, represent material, which is not shared. To show the extent to which Tursun summarized Neşri each account has been cut into sections, divided by brackets. So, for instance, in Tursun Bey's text the information in bracket number two corresponds with the information in bracket number two in Neşri's account.

Neşri reads:

(Hikayet-i Feth-i Alaiye)² fi yedi Gedik Ahmed

...Andan Gedik Ahmed yer öpüb, dua kılıp eyitti: Sultanım devletinde Allahü Teala verirse varayım, Sultanımın hizmeti benim canıma minettir deyip, hemen kalktı. (Andan kapıdan nice kullar ana yoldaş koşup, Anadolu leşkerinin dahi yararlarını koştular.)³ (Elhasıl Gedik Ahmed Alaiye'ye vardı. O vakit Alaiye'nin Beyi Lütü Beyoğlu Kılıç Arslan Bey idi. Gedik Ahmed gelip, toplarını kurucak, evvel bir top atıp, kalenin heri yanından öte yanına geçirdi. Alaiye kavmi eyitti: 'Bu Karamanoğlu gibi değildir. Bununla cengin faydası yoktur'. Kılıç Arslan eyitti: 'Siz dahi nice etmek

¹ *Kitâb-ı Cihânnüma*, 133-139.

² *Kitâb-ı Cihânnüma*, 133-139.

³ Neşri, 793-795.

gerek, fikr edin, görelim' dedi. Andan şehrin ayanı Ahmed Paşa'ya işaret edip eyittiler: 'Berî burc kenarına gel, seninle sözümüz var dediler. Ahmed Paşa burc kenarına gelip, eyittiler.'¹ (El hasıl Ahmed Paşa bunları bir vechile teselli etti ki, eğer kalayı lutf ile verirlerse beylerine ve kendilerine naif dokuna; hergiz ziyarı dokunmaya. Andan Kılıç Arslan bey dahi bu söze razı olup, hisardan çıkıp, Ahmed Paşa'ya gelip, hisarı teslim etti. Ahmed Paşa dahi hisarı berkidip, halkını teselli edip, kanun-ı Osmanî icra kıldı.)⁴ (876 senesinde vaki oldu.)⁵

Hikayet. (Çünkü Ahmed Paşa amanla Alaiye'yi feth etti. Beyini cemi taallukatıyla ve hazinesiyle Padişaha getirdi. Kılıç Arslan Bey, Sultan Mehmed'i göricek, ayağına düştü. Padişah eyitti: 'Korkma benim sana ziyarım dokunmaz. Vilayetinden ziyade tımar vereyim' deyip Gümülcine'yi nevahisiyle tımar verip.)⁶ eyi hilatler giyirüp, hatununa ve oğlanına çok nesne ata etti...²

(The Conquest of Alaiye at the Hand of Gedik Ahmed)

After that Gedik Ahmed kissed the ground, offered a prayer and said, 'O my lord, during your sultanate, if God wills, I will go [to Alaiye]. To be in your service makes my soul give thanks.' Then he stood up. He was given many household guards from the Sultan's service. He was also given many brave Anatolian soldiers. In short, Gedik Ahmed came to Alaiye. At that time Kılıç Arslan, the son of Lütfi Bey, was the lord of Alaiye. Gedik Ahmed came and ranged his artillery. First of all, one cannon was fired and its shell passed over the castle and fell on the other side of the fortress. The people of Alaiye said 'This does not look like the Karamanoğlu' There is no point in going battle against them'. Kılıç Arslan said [to them] 'Think about what we should do.' Then the notables of the fortress called Ahmed Pasha and said, 'Come close to the tower; we want to talk to you.' Ahmed Pasha came and they said... In short, Ahmed Pasha convinced them that if they surrendered the castle willingly, it would benefit their lord and themselves, and there would be no harm done to anyone. Kılıç Arslan accepted the offer. He came out of the castle, went to Ahmed Pasha, and surrendered the castle. Ahmed Pasha strengthened the fortress and consoled its people. The Ottoman kanun was implemented. This happened in the year of the hijra 876 [1471-72].

Story- When Ahmed Pasha conquered Alaiye by *aman*, he took the lord of Alaiye, his dependants, and his treasures to the Sultan. Kılıç Arslan cast himself at the feet of the Sultan. The Sultan said to him, 'Do not be afraid; no harm will be done to you by me. I will give you a timar which is greater than your country.' Then he gave Gümülcine and its surrounding regions to Kılıç Arslan as a *timar*, and he was also given robes of honour. His wife and his son were also granted many favours by the Sultan.

¹Tarih-i Ebü'l-Feth, 149.

² Neşri, 793-795.

Tursun reads:(Zikr-i Feth-i Alâiyye)

(Sene sittin ve seb'îne ve semâni mi'e târîhinde)⁵ (Gedük Ahmed Pâşâ'ya asker koşup ve gemi tonanmasın idüp, bahrden ve berden Alâiyye üzerine gönderdi.) (Varup beğini muhâsara ittiler. Nökerleri ve şehri halkı mehâbet-i asker-i gerdûn-me'âsirden hevlnâk düşüp kar'-ı halka-i bâb-i istûmân ittiler). Alâiyye beği çıkup, Ahmed Pâşâ ile mülâkat oldu. Kal'a ve memleketi zabt olunup bir sancak kılındı.)⁴ (Ahmed Pâşâ mürâfakatı ile südde-i gerdûn-udde türâbına gelüp yüz urdı. Avâtuf-ı pâdişâhânedan Gümülcine ze'âmetini levâhıkı ile mansıb virüp,) ⁶ sâye-i devleti altında âsûdelerden oldu.¹

(In the year of the hijra 876 [1471], the Sultan] gave soldiers Gedük Ahmed Pasha and a fleet was also prepared. The forces were sent to the castle overland and by the sea. They went and besieged the castle's lord. His retainers and the people of the city were frightened at the strength of the army and asked for quarter. The lord of Alaiye came out of the castle and met Ahmed Pasha. His castle and the region were captured and made into a sancak. The lord of Alaiyye came before the Sultan with Ahmed Pasha. Through the favour of the Sultan he was granted the zeamet of Gümülcine and he lived in peace beneath the shadow of the Sultan.)

Tursun Bey includes the additional information that the Ottoman fleet was also used in this expedition. He does not explain Kılıç Arslan's fate and merely says that he was happy in the Sultan's service. Tursun Bey also used different terms when he modified Neşri's account. So, for example, instead of Neşri's *Kanun-ı Osmani icra kıldı*, he writes, *kal'a ve memleketi zabt olunup bir sancak kılındı*. Tursun Bey also alters Neşri's *timar* to *zeamat*, presumably because he felt that this term –which implies a fief of greater value than a *timar*– would more accurately reflect the value of the fief, which Kılıç Arslan received. Tursun Bey seems also to have used Neşri's heading for his account with some modifications, Neşri gives the heading as *Hikayet-i Feth-i Alaiye fi yed-i Gedik Ahmed*, while Tursun modifies it to read, *Zikr-i Feth-i Alaiye* thus omitting the name of Gedik Ahmed.

Tursun Bey's narrative of Mehmed II's campaign against Uzun Hasan is especially important in terms of the use of written sources.

Tursun Bey seems to have had three sources for his account of 1473.

1. Aşıkpaşazade, for background to the campaign, presumably through Neşri as an intermediary.
2. His own observations.
3. Mahmud Pasha, whom he seems to have used, presumably as an oral source, for his account of the Has Murad affair.

¹ *Tarih-i Ebü'l-Feth*, 149.

Following an introductory passage in the story, Tursun Bey gives a summary account of events in Karaman. This derives from Aşıkpaşazade probably through Neşri, but he makes some modifications and additions, as the following quotation shows.

Aşıkpaşazade's History reads,

("...Karamanoğlu İshak Beğ kim Uzun Hasan'a kaçmış idi. Karamanoğlu karındaşı Pir Ahmed Mukun kalasını almış idi. Ve ishak Beg, oğlum Silifke kalasına komış idi kendü Uzun Hasana gitdüğinde. İshak Begün oğlu, Sultan Mehmede habar göndürdi kim: "Silifkeyi Sultanuma vereyin" dedi. 'Adam göndür' dedi. Sultan Mehmed Han Gazi dahı anun sözüne itimad edüp Gedük Ahmedî yarar yoldaşlar ile göndürdi. Gedük Ahmed dahı bundan yürüdü. Karaman'a vardı. İç Ele girdi. Silifkenün üzerine vardı. İshak Begün oğlu hisardan çıkub hisarı teslim eyledi. Ol hinde Karamanoğlu Kasım Beg, Uzun Hasana varmış idi. Uzun Hasan ana leşker koşup göndürdi. Bu tarafda Gedük Ahmed kim Silifke'yi aldı, Mukun hisarına yürüdü. Pir Ahmed, avratım ve oğlamnı Mukun hisarında komış idi. Ve İshak Begün bir küçücük oğlu dahi bileyidi. Ve hem Karamanoğlu Mehmed Beg var idi, anunda bir mahbube kızı ol hisarda bileyidi. Gedük Ahmed ol hisarın üzerine düşdi. Anı dahi darb-ı dest ilen aldı. Ve geldi, Keveleye düşdi. Anı dahi darb ilen aldı. Halkını kırdı. Ve hisarı zabt eyledi.)¹

Tursun Bey did not acknowledge the passage's source but rewrote it as follows.

("...Kıssaya gelem: Ol vakt ki Karamanoğulları Pir Ahmed ve Kasım kaçup Uzun Hasana gitmişler idi [to Apz. Tursun like Neşri, adds 'Pir Ahmed']. Karamanoğlu İbrahim Begün ulu oğlu İshak Beg'ün oğlu kal'a-i Silifke'de kalup, kal'a ile İç-ile ve Karataş'a hükm ider idi. Padişah işigine ilçi gönderdi. Kal'ayı vermeğe iltizam gösterdi. Padişah-ı muzaffer dahi Gedük Ahmed Paşa'ya biraz asker nam-zed idüp mefatih-i kal'ayı teslim etti. [to Apz. Tursun adds 'Fi'l-hal Ahmed Paşa kal'a gedüklerin berkidüp vasair kaydı gördü'] Ahmed'ün cemaati ve oğlu Menyan kal'asında olduğın işidüp üzerine göç itti. Kal'a-i Menyan'ı muhasara idüp, darb-ı dest ile feth itti, ve Pir Ahmed'ün ehl ü ıyalın çıkarup padişah işigine gönderdi. Kendü Lülve kal'ası üzerine düşüp muhasara itti.)²

Tursun Bey continues with his own material as follows. The passage begins with the phrase *ol taraftan*, denoting a change in source from Aşıkpaşazade. The passage immediately following *ol taraftan*, tendentiously presenting Uzun Hasan as receiving the Karamanoğulları at a wine party (*sohbet-i müskirat*) and praising Mehmed's valour (*yaman garimdür, yahşi padişaktur*), is evidently Tursun Bey's own invention. The *sohbet-i müskirat*

¹ Aşıkpaşazade, 220.

² *Tarih-i Ebü'l-Feth*, 153.

is given to show Uzun Hasan as a bad Muslim while Uzun Hasan is made to say complimentary things about Sultan Mehmed. After this passage, Tursun Bey again continues with material from Aşıkpaşazade. However, he makes some modifications and additions of his own as follows. The section begins with '*Dahi beğlerbeğisi...*

(Dahi beğlerbeğisi Emir Beğ'e bazı asker nam-zed idüp, Mirza Yusuf'ı ve Karamanoğulları Pir Ahmed ve Kasım'ı ve İsfendiyaroğlu Kızıl Ahmed'i bile koştı. [To Apz. And Neşri Tursun adds 'İsfendiyaroğlu Kızıl Ahmed'] Vilayet-i Karaman'dan yana azm ittiler. [Tursun adds his own comment that their intention was to eject Ahmed Pasha from Karaman and to restore Pir Ahmed to his old realm. Tursun continues with information from Apz.] Bu kasda ki, Ahmed Paşa'yı Karaman ilinden çıkarup kal'aları berkideler ve Pir Ahmed'i bekleyeler; dahi me'arib-i uhrâ ne ise, kayurular. Vakta ki Erzincan'dan göçtiler. Sultan Bayezid –ki ekber-i ebna-yı Sultan Mehmeddür ve eyelet-i Rum anun taht-ı hükümetinde idi- anun işiğine ilçi gönderdiler ki: "Biz konşılaruz, padişah memleketine ayak basmağa me'mur değülüz. Kılıç Arslan oğlum atası yirine nasb itmeğe Dulkadır iline giderüz" diyü, geçmeğe destur suretin ve öwr-hahlık merasimin gösterdiler. Meğer Şarabdar Hamza Beğ [to Apz. Tursun, like Neşri, adds the name Şarabdar] Rum Beğlerbeğisi idi, Tokat şehrinde oturur idi. Türkman'un ilçisi ana yitişti; Sultan Bayezid [To Apz. Tursun like Neşri, adds Sultan Bayezid's name] işiğine arz itmedin, ilçinün öwr-i gadr-encamına inanup, -arada il illiği sureti [Tursun adds the phrase il illiği to Apz. and Neşri] dahi var idi- bu iki mağlatadan galat-ı fahiş idüp, dostane cevab ve icazet virüp kendü gafil oturdu.)¹

Tursun Bey also adds, obviously in order to exonerate Bayezid from any blame, that Bayezid was absent, having left the Beğlerbeği in Tokat and instructed the lords to be wary of any enemy. After this passage Tursun Bey continues, apparently drawing on his own knowledge and giving an account of Gedük Ahmed Pasha's actions in İçil.

Tursun Bey's account of the plundering of Tokat requires some comment. In Tursun Bey, Uzun Hasan sends an ambassador to Sultan Bayezid. Here, via Neşri, Tursun Bey corrects Aşıkpaşazade who makes Uzun Hasan send the messenger to Mehmed.

Aşıkpaşazade: ('Padişaha habar göndürdüler kim...')²

Tursun Bey: ('Sultan Bayezid –ki ekber-i ebna-yı Sultan Mehmeddür ve eyalet-i Rum anun taht-ı hükümetinde idi- anun işiğine ilçi gönderdiler.')

¹ *Tarih-i Ebü'l-Feth*, 153.

² Aşıkpaşazade, 221.

³ *Tarih-i Ebü'l-Feth*, 153.

It seems that Tursun Bey, like Neğri, adds Bayezid's name because Sultan Bayezid was Sultan at the time both of them wrote their histories. Tursun Bey must also have added the phrase '*Sultan Bayezid işiğine arz itmedin*' because he could not make Sultan Bayezid, the reigning monarch, responsible for the attack on Tokat. He, in fact, completely exonerates Bayezid from responsibility by adding that during the event Sultan Bayezid was not in Tokat but that he had given the necessary orders to his lords, while he himself was elsewhere 'doing good for his people'. By these means Tursun shifts the blame onto Şarabdar Hamza Bey.

Tursun Bey continues his account with his own material in which he uses the sack of Tokat as the justification for war against Uzun Hasan. Thereafter, he narrates Mirza Yusuf's action in Karaman and Sultan Mustafa's battle against him and Mirza Yusuf's defeat. After that the narrative of the campaign of 1473 begins. The first passage actually adds nothing to the accounts of earlier historians, except for the statement at the beginning where Mehmed left his youngest son Cem in Edirne, a fact, which Tursun Bey knew from personal observation. Then Tursun Bey explains that the army marched by stages to Sivas and pursued Uzun Hasan. Following this passage, Tursun Bey gives an account of Has Murad's action and death on the Euphrates. It seems likely that he received the information directly from Mahmud Pasha. The phrase '*Kıssa böyle oldu ki...* (It is narrated that...) marks a change in Tursun Bey's source and, here the information is presented as if narrated by someone. This person must be Mahmud Pasha because of his close relations with Tursun Bey.¹

Tursun Bey continues the narrative with a digression under the heading *Hikayet* (story since it is given in Tursun's account, its purpose must be to demonstrate Mahmud Pasha's wisdom. Further, in describing Mahmud as 'one who attracts divine victory' (*müsteclib-i fevz-i mübin*), Tursun seems to hint that Mahmud possesses the qualities of a 'saint' (*veli*). The narrative then returns to the battle, recounting how Murad lost both his life and the battle. When his horse stumbled Fenarioğlu Ahmed Pasha fell and he was taken prisoner. Turahan Beyoğlu Ömer Bey and Aydın Beyoğlu Hacı Bey were captured. Here Tursun Bey is the only source to mention Hacı Bey's full name (Aydın Beyoğlu), an indication that he is here relying on his own knowledge and not on an earlier chronicle.²

Tursun Bey continues his account by describing the battle of Otlukbeli. In his account Davud Pasha, the Beylerbeyi of Anatolia, is not given a prominent place in the battle and is always shown in company with Mahmud

¹ *Tarih-i Ebü'l-Feth*, 160..

² *Tarih-i Ebü'l-Feth*, 162..

Pasha. This contrasts with Neşri's account, which Tursun Bey seems to have used and which gives greater prominence to Davud Pasha. Tursun Bey appears to be highlighting Mahmud Pasha's role in order to glorify him, as follows:

("...Çün iki kol basıldı ve sadr-ı leşkerine -ki kendü alaydır- Mahmud Paşa ve Anadolu Beği Davud Paşa tayife-i azeb ile hamle ittiler, kendü kalbine dahı tefrika düştü... Mücerred Mahmud Paşa ve Davud Paşa çarhacısından ruy-ı tavakkuf görmeyüp kafayı hezimet gösterdi.")¹

Here Tursun Bey uses the word *çarhacı*, which was also used by Neşri. It would therefore appear likely that Tursun took it from Neşri. Thereafter Tursun Bey describes the fate of Uzun Hasan and his army, as a very heavy defeat in which one of Uzun Hasan's sons lost his life, and which most of his troops were killed or taken prisoner. Tursun concludes his history of the battle with a quotation attributed to Uzun Hasan as he deserted his fleeing troops and took flight. The paragraph opens with the words, '*Hikayet ederler ki...*'² suggesting an oral source. Neşri and Aşıkpaşazade also end their stories with a quotation, different from Tursun's, attributed to Uzun Hasan. This suggests that there were different versions of Uzun Hasan's words in circulation, and that each chronicler recorded the version, which he had heard.

The Moldavian and Smederovan expedition of 1476 are most likely recounted from Tursun Bey's own experience, possibly supplemented by oral sources in both accounts. After his heading, Tursun Bey has an introductory passage containing a quotation introduced by the phrase *buyurdu ki* while Tursun does not specify the source, it could have been Mahmud Pasha, since although he was not alive at the time of the expedition, it was Tursun Bey's custom to use his words suggestively to the present ruler as he had done previously, for example in his introduction. It must be added, however, that the contents of the quotation are stereotypical.

Here the source (possibly Mahmud Pasha) argues that victory or defeat depend on God's approval or otherwise and suggests that whoever helps the religion of Islam will obtain victory, while whoever does not will be debased and disgraced. Thus, the ruler's duty is to conduct holy wars. With these introductory words, Tursun Bey clearly wished to represent the Sultan as one who fought religious battles and sought God's approval for his deeds. The passage also reflects the tone and content of the traditional Islamic literary genre of 'Mirrors for Princes' in which rulers are systematically advised to follow the rules of Islam. However, the main motive for including this

¹ *Tarih-i Ebü'l-Feth*, 165..

² *Tarih-i Ebü'l-Feth*, 166.

passage must be to introduce a major theme in the account of the campaign, which follows. This is the theme of divine intervention on behalf of the Sultan's army, bringing them unknowingly to the *voyvoda*'s hiding place and allowing his defeat; and the freezing the moats of the Hungarian castles, allowing their capture.¹

Tursun Bey probably used Neşri as written source for his accounts of the expedition of Gedük Ahmed Pasha against the island of Pulya and Mesih Pasha's expedition against the island of Rhodes. There are, however, major differences between the two historians. Tursun Bey's account is less detailed and, most importantly, unlike Neşri, he does not admit that both of these campaigns failed. As can be seen, Tursun Bey either omits or glosses over the defeats, which the Sultan or his commanders suffered, for example, as at Belgrade in 1456. Tursun seems to have 'rewritten' by selectively combining some details from Neşri while omitting others. Below is Neşri's and then Tursun Bey's account, with similar passages in both accounts underlined to show the degree of Tursun's modifications to Neşri's account.

Neşri reads:

(Hikâyet-i İrsâl-i Gedik Ahmed İlâ Polya ve İrsâl-i Mesih Paşa İlâ Rodos Rivayettir ki, Hünkâr bundan sonra gaza etmeyip, hemen İstanbul'da oturdu. Amma Gedik Ahmed'i Polya'ya gönderdi. Ve Gedik Ahmed, Polya vilayetine ehl-i İslam'dan mübalağa adam geçirip, bir kaç para kale fethetti. Ta Hünkâr ahirete nakl edince (ye kadar) Polya'da kalıp, hayli fütuhlar ede başladı. Andan Sultan Mehmed vefatından sonra, Gedik Ahmed, Sultan Bayezid'e istikbale gelicek ol müslümanlara kafir anda çok iş etti. El-hasıl Polya'yı yine kafir alıp, anda olan Müslümanların kimi öldü, kimi bin türlü belayile halas oldu. Ve dahi Sultan Mehmed İstanbul'da otururken Mesih Paşa'yı Rodos'a gönderip, ol-dahi leşker-i azim ile varıp, zahmet çekip, nice cengler edip, bunca müslümanlar hasaret edip, iş kolayını bilmediği sebepten feth edemeyip, yine geldi. Mesih Paşa sındığı yıl, hicretin sekiz yüz seksen beşiydi.)²

Tursun reads:

(Makâle Der İrsâl Kerden-i Gedük Ahmed-râ be-Gazâ-yı Cezire-i Pulya ve Mesih Pâşâ-râ be-Gazâ-yı Cezîre-i Rodos)

After this heading, which Tursun Bey appears to have adopted from Neşri, he composed a rhetorical passage in which the Sultan achieves his aims with the help of God. Then he continues as follows:

¹ *Tarih-i Ebü'l-Feth*, 170-176.

² Neşri, 889.

(...Pes bu devâ'i-i kibriyâ muktazî oldu ki, kendü sa'adet ile sükûn ihtiyâr idüp etrâfa çeriler hareket ittüre. Binâberîn ma'nâ Gedük Ahmed Pâşâ'yı sene erbâ'in ve semânîne ve semâni mi'e târîhinde, azîm tonanma ile Pulya cezîresine saldı. Varup bi-inâyeti'llâh ve bi-himmeti Sultân-ı zıllu'llâh, nefsi kal'a-i Pulya'yı -ki mânend-i kal'a-i Kostantiniyedür-kahr ile feth itti ve çok memleketini zabt itti. Ma'abid-i asnâm mesâcid-i İslâm olup penç nevbet-i Muhammedi "*aleyhi efdalü's-selam*" çalındı. Ve sene hamsin ve semânîne ve semâni mi'e tarihinde fahrü'l-vüzerâ Mesîh Pâşâ'yı ulu yarak ve tonanma ile Rodos cezîresine saldı. Ol dahı varup, nefsi kal'a-i Rodos'u muhâsara idüp yöriyüş itti. Muhkem dâr-ü-gîr olup cezîresin urdı, yaktı ve yıktı. Toyumluğ ile gelüp atebe-bûsa mülhak oldu ve memâlik-i a'dâya akınlar eştürdi. Envâ'ı ganâyim ü fütühât husûle mevsûl oldu.)¹

As has been shown, Tursun Bey follows Neşri in combining the two events in a single section, and using a modified version of Neşri's heading. Tursun Bey's main addition to the heading is his insertion of the term *gaza* (Holy War). After the heading, Tursun Bey inserts an introductory paragraph stating that the Sultan's victories were divinely inspired and the result of divine guidance. Tursun links this introduction to the material taken from Neşri with the phrase, "The motives of divine greatness made necessary that..." ("*Devâ'i-i kibriyâ muktazî oldu ki...*"), implying that the Sultan remained in Istanbul because of divine inspiration. After this phrase, Tursun Bey seems to have taken information from Neşri. However, Tursun Bey's use of Neşri is very limited, the main reason evidently being the fact that Neşri's account represents the two events as failures, whereas Tursun Bey wanted to record them as successes. Thus, like Neşri, Tursun Bey recorded that the Sultan stayed behind (in Istanbul) and, again like Neşri, recorded that the Sultan sent Gedik Ahmed (Tursun adds Paşa) to Apulia. Tursun Bey added to Neşri that Gedik Ahmed Pasha was sent with a great fleet. Neşri mentions that Gedik Ahmed captured a few castles in the region of Apulia and ends by stating that after the Sultan's death, Gedik Ahmed returned and the infidels captured Apulia, with the Muslims suffering a great deal. Tursun Bey does not mention the fate of the expedition after the Sultan's death, ending instead with the conquest of the "fortress of Pulya" (=Otranto). In short, he followed Neşri's account but omitted its crucial concluding section describing the expedition's defeat. Thus Neşri gives a 'historical' account. Tursun Bey, although using Neşri's material does not. Tursun Bey's aim in altering Neşri's material is obviously that he wished to show Gedik Ahmed's success as a divine gift from God and, more importantly, from 'the divine influence of the Sultan, the Shadow of God.' This aim is made even more clear when he describes Otranto as being 'like the fortress of 'Kostantiniyye.' The Sultan had

¹ *Tarih-i Ebü'l-Feth*, 180.

conquered Kostantiniyye; with the himmet of the Sultan, Gedik Ahmed had conquered a fortress as great as Kostantiniyye. Tursun Bey seems also to have used Neşri in his account of Mesih Pasha's Rhodes expedition. Here, like Neşri, Tursun Bey records that the expedition was made in A.H. 885, merely adding the epithet 'the glory of the viziers' ('*fahrü'l-vüzerâ*') to the name of Mesih Pasha. Then Tursun Bey's use of Neşri becomes patent as he adds that Mesih Pasha went to Rhodes with a fleet and, instead of Neşri's great army ('*leşker-i 'azîm*'), he refers to the 'great provision and fleet' ('*ulu yarak ve tonanma*'). While Neşri wrote of 'many battles' ('*nice cengler*'), Tursun Bey speaks of 'great battles' ('*muhkem dar ü gir*'). After this, Neşri records that Mesih Pasha returned defeated, but Tursun Bey again omits this, to relate, misleadingly, that Mesih Pasha returned successful and laden with much booty. It should be noted that, in reality, Mesih Pasha was dismissed from office as a result of the failed campaign.¹

Two sections, concerning respectively the Sultan's expedition and death, seem to depend on Tursun Bey's own experience, but there is also strong possibility that in the account of the Sultan's death he could have used an oral source.

Tursun Bey begins the first section with a passage of poetry, acting as an overture to the story, which he goes on to tell. In it he states that Sultans may not be able to achieve all their ends since God exists and they can only achieve those that find acceptance with God. After this verse introduction, Tursun Bey continues by stating that the Sultan was preparing for a major expedition towards the east, stating, however, that he knew of nobody who knew its goal. As he had said previously, it was characteristic of the Sultan not to make public the destination of his campaigns. The Sultan passed over to the Anatolian side of the Bosphorus and pitched his camp. After giving the date and a rhetorical description of the customary rejoicing at the start of a campaign, Tursun Bey inserts a passage under the heading '*Hikâyet*' (the story) and begins with the phrase '*Rivayet ederler ki...*' ('It is narrated that') which suggests that he is using an oral source for the information that follows. He states that the Sultan was already ill when he set out on the expedition and that the sea crossing and the march worsened the illness to the point that the Sultan realized that the expedition would be the last one he made. Then Tursun Bey cites a couplet in which the Sultan foresees his imminent death, adding that the vizier (*Karamanlı*) Mehmed Pasha heard and understood from the couplet that the Sultan was ill. This strongly suggests

¹ Tansel, *Fatih Sultan Mehmed'in Siyasi ve Askeri Faaliyeti*, 244-247; For more information on the subject, see Kemalpaşazade, *Tevarih-i Al-i Osman VII. Defter* (Ankara, 1991), LXXXIV-LXXXVI.

that the source of the story was Mehmed Pasha himself who must have related it to Tursun Bey immediately afterwards. Mehmed Pasha's words to the Sultan also suggest that he alone, and through him, Tursun Bey knew for certain that the expedition would be against Egypt. Tursun Bey's tale reveals that he himself was not too close to the Sultan at the time, but suggests that he was a confidant of Mehmed Pasha and to have held him in respect. It is quite possible that these events were related to Tursun by the vizier.¹

Concerning Karagöz Pasha's Arabian expedition and Ali Pasha's Moldavian expedition, Tursun Bey seems to have used a written source. However, the account of Ali Pasha's Arabian expedition seems to be told from Tursun Bey's own experiences. The written source might have been Neşri, but Tursun Bey appears to have made some modifications to Neşri's account and to have supplemented it with further information. In order to demonstrate the degree of modifications, which Tursun seems to have made, the corresponding accounts of each historian's narrative of Karagöz Pasha's Arabian expedition are given below, then Neşri's account of is presented in English.

Tursun's account reads,

(Güftar Der Havale Kerden-i Karagöz Beğ-ra Be-Mülk-i Arab ve Fırstaden-i Fahrî'l Vüzera Ali Paşa Be-Kara-Boğdan

Ve çün bu ma'nî mûcib-i izdiyâd-ı mevâdd-ı mehâbet oldı; himmet-i kader-miknet-i pâdişâh-ı mansûr buna maksûr oldı ki, re'îs-i çerâkise, ya'nî Mısır sultânından yukarı zikr ittigümüz gibi sâdır olan isâ'etine mukâbil "*ve cezâ'ü seyyi'etün seyyi'etin mislühâ*" hükmi ile âmil ola. Pes mukaddemâtına şürû' gösterdi. "*li-küllü dûrin bâbün fe'tü'l-büyûte min ebvâbiha*" rây-ı memâlik-ârây irşâdı ile, şol dem ki i'tidâl-i havâ-yı rebî'îye nesîm-i sabâ-yı bahâr-ı sene tis'ine ve semâni mi'e teshîr-i mülk-i sermâ için imdad ü is'ad itmeğe başladı. Sultân-ı muzaffer memleket-i Karaman iyâletinde olan kurra-ı aynı, şehzadesi Sultan-ı Şehenşah hazretinin lalası Karagöz Beğ'e bazı asker nâm-zed idüp diyâr-ı Arab üzerine gönderdi. Varup Adana ve Tarsus ve Gülek ve Annakşan ve nice kal'aların feth idüp memleketlerinün hâsılını kabza-i zabtına düşürdi, ve Kuş-timürlü ve Kosunlu ve Kara-İsalu kabîlelerinün tâvîfesini tedmîr ü teshîr itti.)²

Neşri reads,

(...Bu vilayet zalimler elinde kalmışdı. Anda olan zalimler Rum'dan varan huccace hayli iş ederlerdi. Sultan Bayezid karaman vilayetini feth idecek ol iklimün zayıflarının feryadı padişahın sem'ine irişdi ve hem

¹ Later events clarify the relationship between Vizier Karamani Mehmed Pasha and Tursun Bey. Mehmed Pasha was supporting Cem Sultan and for that reason he was killed in İstanbul by the Janissaries after Sultan Mehmed's death. Tursun Bey was also supporting Cem Sultan against his brother Bayezid II although he never mentioned that. However we know that Bayezid's army captured Tursun Bey during the war between Cem Sultan and Bayezid II in Yenışehir plain in 1481. See İbn Kemal, *Tevarih-i Al-i Osman VIII. Defter* (Transkripsiyon), ed. A. Uğur (Ankara, 1997), 10-40.

² *Tarih-i Ebü'l-Feth*, 207.

huccace itdükleri işe tamam vakıf oldu. Diledikim zunufaya merhamet ide ol vilayete aman-ı besatın döşeye. Pes kulı Karagöz Paşa'ya emr itdü kim varup ol mazlumlari zalim elinden kurtara. Karagöz Paşa emr-i padişaha imtisal idüp Adana üstüne indi. Ol zalimler cümlesi kaçtılar. Ol vilayetin halkı gelüb padişahın kuluna istikbal idüp itaat itüler. Andan Gülek kalasına gelünce gerü kalan kalaların taifi ve Tarsusun ayanları ve Kuş temürlü ve Kusunlu ve Kara İsalu cümle gelüb istikbal ve itaat ittiler. Bu fethün tarihi hicretün sekizyüz doksanında Cemaziyelulanın başında vaki oldu. Karagöz Paşa elinden...¹

(That region had stayed in the hands of the oppressors and the region's oppressors were committing many enormities against pilgrims coming from Anatolia [to Mecca]. When Sultan Bayezid captured the land of Karaman, the cries of the helpless people of that clime reached his ears and he completely understood the enormities committed against pilgrims. He wished to show mercy to the weak and to spread out the carpet of security, and so he ordered his slave Karagöz Pasha to go and save the oppressed from the oppressors. Karagöz Pasha received the Sultan's order and went to Adana. All the oppressors fled. The people of the region came out and meet the Sultan's slave and declared their obedience. After that, when he came to the castle of Gülek, the garrison for the rest of the castles, the high-ranking citizens of Tarsus, and [the tribesmen] of Kuş Temürlü, Kusunlu, and Kara-İsalu met him and submitted themselves to him. This conquest took place in the year of the hijra 890 [1485] and Karagöz Pasha made the expedition.)

In the passages above from the two historians, the sections underlined are similar. It is probable that the sections in Neşri's account were taken and used by Tursun Bey in his own account. Tursun Bey seems, however, to have made modifications and additions to Neşri's work. For example, each historian presents different reasons for the expedition; Tursun Bey refers to the confiscation of the Indian ruler's gift by the Egyptian ruler, while Neşri refers to attacks on pilgrims coming from the Egyptian Sultan's territory. Like Neşri, Tursun Bey names Karagöz Pasha as the expedition's commander, but adds that he was the tutor to the Sultan's son Şehinşah who was in Karaman. Like Neşri, Tursun goes on to say that Karagöz went first to Adana and then he captured Tarsus and Gülek. However, to Neşri's list of conquests, Tursun Bey adds the castle of Annakşan. According to Neşri, the garrison came voluntarily to do obeisance to the Pasha, while Tursun Bey strongly implies the use of force. Tursun Bey gives the names of the tribes in exactly the same order as Neşri, but claims that the tribes were 'devastated and destroyed' by Karagöz Pasha, while Neşri again implies that they submitted voluntarily. Thus, the substance of the two accounts is almost identical. What differences there are seem largely to reflect the different purposes of the authors. Neşri wished to present Bayezid as the 'just Sultan' who removes oppression from

¹ *Gihannüma: die altosmanische Chronik des Mevlana Mehmed Neschri*, ed. T. Menzel & F. Taeschner, II, Leipzig, 1955, 272 ff. (hereafter *Gihannüma II*).

the Muslims; while Tursun wished to present him as the Sultan who utterly destroys his enemies. These are both standard themes in the panegyric.

Below are passages from Neşri and Tursun Bey describing Ali Pasha's Moldavian expedition the underlining indicates the similarities between the two accounts.

Tursun reads,

("...İttifâk bu sâl-i mübârek içinde menba'-ı ısyân Kara-Boğdan dahi mekr ü hud'a ile kal'a-i Kili'ye kasd idüp, asker-i müteferriku'l-bâl cem' idüp, üzerine varup, ol ki hîle vü mekrdür, gösterdi. Ammâ "ve lâ yahîku'l-mekru's-seyyi'ü illâ bi-ehlih" fehvâsınca, ehl-i kal'a haber-dâr olup şerrini def' ittiler...)"¹

Neşri reads,

(...Şöyle rivayet olunur kim, ol vakit ki Bayezid Han Kili ve Ak-Kirmanı feth eyledi ekser kafirleri münafık idi. Kılıç korkusundan mebhut olmuşlardı. Kara-Boğdan oğluna haber gönderdi. Eydürki elbette gelesin hisarı yine sana uğrılayı virelüm dirler. Kara-Boğdan oğlu dahi merduban ihzar edip leşkerün cem' idüp geceleyin gemilere adam doldurup su tarafından Ak-Kirman hisarının dibine geldiler. İçinde olan münafık kafirler yol gözleyüp müntazır idi. Kal'a bekliyenleri ol hayin kafirler şehid ettiler. Gice ile Ak-Kirman hisarına merduban urdular kim yukarı çıkalar. Allah rast getirüb gazilerin bir nicesi kafirlerin bu fiilinden habir olup sakit olup ta kim kafirlerin bazıı merdubandan çıktılar. Gaziler dahi tekbir getirüb Allah deyüb dahi kılıc vurub ta sabaha degün kırdılar. Kara-Boğdan oğlu başını güçlülkle kurtardı. Ve hem bile kalan kafirlerin nicelerün tutub esir ettiler. Hunkara gönderdiler. Padişah dahi saltanatına layık ne ise etti...).

(It is narrated that, when Bayezid Khan conquered Kilia and Ak-Kerman, most of the infidels of those places were double-dealers. They had professed obedience to the Sultan on account of his sword. Those people sent word to Kara-Boğdan, declaring that if he were to come, they would raid into the castle and give it back to him. Kara-Boğdan prepared many ladders, organized an army, put his soldiers aboard the ships at night, and he came beneath the castle of Ak-Kerman from the water. The double-dealing infidels killed the castle's garrison. On that night Kara-Boğdan's soldiers rested their ladders against the castle's walls [ready] to climb up. With the help of God, many of the Ottoman soldiers in the castle heard the happenings, but they waited in silence for some of the infidels to climb the ladders. The gazis called out, 'God is great!' and, crying 'Allah!' drew their swords and slaughtered them until morning. Kara-Boğdan saved his life with enormous difficulty. Many of the remaining infidel soldiers were caught and taken prisoner. Then they were sent to the Sultan, who dealt with them in whatever manner was worthy of his sultanate.)

¹ Târih-i Ebü'l-Feth, 208.

² Gihannüma, II, 272 ff.

Tursun Bey seems to have used Neşri's detailed account, incorporating some modifications and additions, the most important of which is the change of the name of the castle. At the beginning of his account Neşri refers to the castles of Kilia and Ak-Kerman, but makes it clear that the Moldavian attack was on Ak-Kerman. Tursun Bey, however, names the castle as Kilia. At first sight, this difference in names seems to suggest that Tursun Bey was not actually using Neşri as a written source, but the closeness of the two passages does in fact suggest that Tursun Bey used Neşri, but changed the name of the castle. His use of a Quranic Ayet seems to support this claim since the Ayet in question; "*ve lâ yahîku'l-mekru's-seyyi'ü illâ bi-ehlih*" ('bad intentions can only harm those who entertain them') seems to allude to Neşri's story of the treachery of the infidels in the castle, which was duly punished.

It seems that Neşri's account of Ali Pasha's Moldavian expedition underwent a process of modification and abbreviation at the hands of Tursun Bey. As the following passages from both historians show, there are similarities between them. Tursun Bey seems to have used Neşri's account, but also incorporating details from his own observations and literary devices such as couplets, lines of verse, and Quranic Ayets.

Tursun reads,

("...Çün bu kazıyye atebe-i gerdûn-sâyeye arz olundu, ol vakt Hazret-i Emîrû'l-ümerâ Âlî Pâşâ "yesserehu'llâhü mâ yesürruhû" Rûm-ili beği idi; Pâdişâh-ı muzaffer ana himmet ham-râh idüp, bir iki koşun dahı kapu halkından koşup Kara-Boğdan üzerine gönderdi ki, varup hem kal'anun eksüğün itmâm idüp berkide; ve hem ol bed-baht-ı la'in bulunur ise kam' u kahr itmeğe mübaşiret ide, bulunmaz ise memleketin yakup, yıkup harâb ide. Ber-muktezâ-yı emr-i âlî, Âlî Pâşâ dahı Rûm-il askerine -ki her biri miğfer-i târafun askeri müretteb ü müheyya, râkib ü merkûb, ez pây tâ-be-fark gark-ı âhen olup geldiler. Âlî Pâşâ dahı

Mısrâ'

Bir mübârek sa'at ü kutlu gün içre bir sabâh

Pâdişâh-ı âlî-himmet, Mirrih-savlet hazretinün dest-i deryâ-feyezânın öpüp himmet ü icâzet aldı. "*Ve men yetevekkel ala'llâhi fehüve hasbüh*" fehvâsı a'lâm-ı zafer-i'lâmı hareketine mutâbık olduğı hâlde göçüp sahrâda ordu bapladı, ve bi-tavakkuf düşmen-i dîn ü devlet üzerine azm-i cezm itti. Her tarafun askeri gelüp, ırmaklar deryâya kavışur gibi ordu-yı zafer-rehbere karşıdılar. Çün Tuna suyına yitiştiler; bi-had gemiler ihzâr olunup, asker-i mansûr Tuna'dan ubûr idüp, kal'a üzerine varup, al ki gereklidür, ke-mâ yaktazı 'l-akl ve'l-hâl kayurdu, kal'yı berkitti. Andan sonra memleket-i Boğdan içine yörیدی. Çün ser-halyl-i kefer-e-i fecere kendüde bu asker-i kattâle tâkat-ı mukâvemet görmedi, kaçup görünmemegi esah tedbîr bilüp Ken'an-ı müşrik mezhebince. "*seâvi ilâ cebelin*" didi, başını alup sarplara düştü. Çün memleket hâlî kaldı, asker-i zafer-ıyân mutlaku'l-inân olup çesm-i Türkân-ı yağmâcı yağmâ-yı cân-ı uşşâk ider gibi târâc ü yağmâya boşandılar. Ve mehâbîb-i Keşmîrî-i Kara-Boğdan, kız ve oğlan, bî-hadd ü

pâyân kayd-ı esre düştüler; ve ağnâm-ı ganâyim ve sayir mevâşi şol kadar sürüldi ki, hisâba sığmaz. Ve ol bed-bahtun tahtını ve sârayını oda urup, yakup yıktılar. Bu hediye-i feth ü zafer ile Hazret-i Alî Pâşâ mansûren ve muzafferden gelüp Pâdişâh-ı felek-bârgâh işiğine yüz sürdi, ve mesâ'î-i meşkûresine mukâbil envâ-'ı avâtuf-ı avârif-i pâdişâhi birle behremend oldı. Ve teza'üf-i mertebesine sebep oldı ki, mesned-i vezâret vücûd-ı pür-cüdi ile tâze şeref buldı.)¹

Neşri reads,

(...Andan Hüncar Rum-ili Beyler-beyisi Ali Bey'e emr etti kim vara ol kafire buluşub hakkından gelmeğe sai-balığ ide. Eğer buluşamazsa vilâyetini talan ide yakıp yıkub bir vech ile harab ide kim şenlik eseri kalmasın. Ali Bey niyyet-i gaza idüp Tuna kenarına varub bi-tekellüf suyu öte geçüb Eflâk vilâyetine giricek, Eflak'un beyleri ve sipahileri cem'i olup itaate gelüb Ali Bey'le buluşub bile yürüdüler. Şaban ayının yigirmi beşinde Boğdan vilâyetine girdiler. Boğdan'un nice beyleri karşı gelüb itaat ettiler. Amma kara-Boğdan oğlu belürsüz oldu. Boğdan vilâyetünün kuh u sahrasını cest u cu idüb bulmadılar. Ahir bir kafir tuttular. Ol eyitti Boğdan oğlu varub Leh vilâyetine gitdi dedi. Andan Beylerbeyi gazilere hükm itdi. Etrafa segirdüm idüb her taraftan doyumluklar oldu. Kumaş cinsinden gayrı mubalağa altun, gümüş avadanlığı getürdüler. Hayvan sürmeğe üşendiler zira zahmeti çok bahası azdur. Beylerbeyi dahi varub Boğdan'ın tahtını yıkub yakdı. Köşkerin ve sarayların harab itdi. Andan mansur ve muzaffer salim ve ganim Allah inayeti ile ve yüz aklığı ile asitane-i devlete müteveccih oldı. Bu Kara-Boğdan oğlu didüğümüz ol kafirdir kim Sultan Muhammed'le uğraşub baş kurtarmışdır ve dahi bu nice asker dağdup Eflak oğlını zebun itmışdi ve dahi Engürüs kiralım dahi basmışdı. Ve Süleyman Begi sımışdı. Bunun şerrinin nihayeti yokdur. Gayet mütekebbir ve su-i tebdir ve hurıad kafirdi. Amma Beglerbegi Ali Beg himmet idüb ol şir ü delün mehabetine durmayub firarı ihtiyar itdi. Bu gazanın tarihi hicretün sekizyüz doksanda vaki oldı. Beglerbegi Ali Beg elinden...).²

(Then the Sultan ordered Ali Beg, the Beylerbeyi of Rumelia, to go, find, and to strive to punish the infidel. If he did not manage to do so, he was to plunder, destroy, and burn the enemy's country in such a manner that nothing should be left standing. With the intention of gaza, Ali Bey reached the banks of the river Danube and, without losing time; he crossed to the other side of the river. When he entered Wallachian territory, the lords and the sipahis of the country came altogether and did obeisance to Ali Beg, after which they marched together. On the 25th of the month of Shaban [28th August 1485], they entered the land of Moldavia. Many of the chiefs of Moldavia came out to meet Ali Pasha and submitted to him. There was no sign of Kara-Boğdan. They searched the mountains and the plains of the country, but he could not be found. In the end they caught an infidel. He said that Boğdan had fled from the country and had gone to Poland. Thereupon, the Beylerbeyi gave the command to the gazis, they made raids and plunder in all directions, bringing in not only clothes, but gold, silver, and jewellery. The Beylerbeyi went, destroyed and burned the capital city of Boğdan. He destroyed his pavilions and palaces. Then, in triumph and

¹ *Tarih-i Ebü'l-Feth*, 208-9.

² *Gihannüma*, II, 273 ff.

victorious, secure and laden with booty, he came to the Sultan crowned with honour by the help of God. This infidel whom we have called Kara-Boğdan fought against Sultan Mehmed, but had escaped and, sending out soldiers, had routed the Wallachian prince and attacked the Hungarian king. He had, in addition, defeated Süleyman Bey. There was no end to his wickedness. He was an extremely haughty and rough infidel. However, he could not resist Ali Bey and chose to flee. The Beylerbeyi Ali Bey made this expedition in the year of the hijrah 890 [1485].)

Conclusion

Tursun Bey, like many other Ottoman historians such as İdris-i Bitlisi, Celalzade Mustafa, Selaniki and Ali, was a historian belonging to the government secretarial (*küttab*) class. Most of these historians also belonged to that category of bureaucrats known as the *kâtib-i tebdir* who, as members of the highest rank in the secretarial profession, had a close relationship with all the statesmen responsible for policy making. They considered it part of their duty as historians to record their experiences as an aid to others in the good management of government affairs. Tursun Bey believed that his work would be a guide and aid to administrators and statesmen and thus follows the general line of the "Mirror for Princes" literary genre and proscribes that approach to political theory.¹

Although Tursun Bey himself does not acknowledge it, the study demonstrates that he used further written sources in addition to those used in composing his Introduction. As the comparisons show, he used Neşri as a written source, although this is sometimes difficult to detect, since he displayed great skill in modifying his sources. The clearest and best example of his use of Neşri is in his account of the battle of Otlukbeli in 1473. This finding disproves the commonly held idea that Tursun Bey did not use written sources in the composition of his History.

The inconsistencies and weakness in Tursun Bey's panegyric, together with the frequent clumsiness of style, makes it difficult to judge Tursun Bey's *Târih-i Ebü'l-Feth* as an unqualified literary success, and this may account for the later neglect of the work. Only Kemalpaşazâde seems to have made use of it before the 21th century. However, since it was the first work of its kind in Turkish, some deficiencies in style are inevitable, and it is when Tursun Bey lapses from the standard of his literary models that he allows the reader to glimpse the realities of his age. The passages where Tursun Bey shows the greatest mastery of *inşa* prose and panegyric conventions are, for the modern reader, the least interesting.

¹ İnalcık and Murphey, *The History of Mehmed the Conqueror by Tursun Bey*, 17.

Tursun Bey's History finishes abruptly with a *mesnevi* in which he prays for the ruling Sultan and for the Ottoman dynasty, an expression of thanks to God for granting him the facility to expound on the Sultan's holy wars, and finally a statement of intent to continue his History if his health and life allowed him. This suggests that Tursun unwillingly abandoned his history's composition. Perhaps he was too unwell to continue writing the History or perhaps some unknown event forced him to abandon his work. If we compare Tursun Bey's introduction with his last words, we see that he anticipated writing a rather long and ornamented conclusion to his work. Thus, it seems reasonable to deduce that something went awry for Tursun Bey during Ali Pasha's Arabian expedition in which Tursun was most probably present.¹

¹ On the reasons for Tursun Bey's sudden breaking off from his work, see V. L. Ménage, review of "H. İnalcık & R. Murphey, *The History of Mehmed the Conqueror by Tursun Bey* (Minneapolis and Chicago, 1978)", in *BSOAS*, XLIII (1980), 144 ff.

THE FIRST OTTOMAN CONQUEST OF BUDA IN 1526 AND THE HISTORY OF A JEWISH FAMILY

Evgeni Radushev

Events, facts and the relationships in the lives of individuals rarely become an object of historical study. There are relatively few individuals in the boundless stream of human existence whose personal attitudes and acts are assessed as worthy of being studied by historical science. This is so because the researchers of human history in the sphere of individual contacts or of individual-society relations frequently come across numerous examples of generally known experience and the very thought of describing it seems absurd.

Before presenting to the inquisitive reader's attention several documents from the history of one Jewish family in the Ottoman state it is necessary to specify that the events chronicled deserve the researcher's attention and are far from a trivial story of ordinary life. In addition, the special position of this family as regards the institutions of Ottoman power makes it possible to draw some general conclusions about the situation of the Jewish population in the Ottoman Empire.

As can be seen from the title of the paper the event around which this story will develop is the first conquest of the town of Buda¹ by the army of the Ottoman Sultan Süleyman I during the early autumn of 1526. That event followed the battle near the town of Mohach where the army of the Hungarian king Layosh II and that of Süleyman I engaged with each other in battle.

The Ottoman expansion from the Balkans to Central Europe directly and greatly threatened the Hungarian kingdom. The fall of Belgrade and the neighboring fortresses in August 1521 opened the way for the Muslim offensive to new Christian lands. The borders of the Ottomans moved from the Lower Danube in a north-western direction against the course of the river and from these new positions the Ottoman advanced military detachments,

¹ The town of Budapest. The town is mentioned as Budun or Buda in the Ottoman documents.

under the leadership of Gazi Hüsrev bey¹, Sinan bey² and Bali bey³, in the course of several years gave no respite to the population of neighboring Croatia, South Hungary, Dalmatia and Transylvania. At the beginning of 1526 Sultan Süleyman I declared a military campaign against the Hungarian kingdom. The decisive battle took place near the south Hungarian town of Mohach. In the battle lasting several hours the forces of the young king Layosh were completely defeated and the ruler himself was killed.

The victors spent the night on the battlefield. In the morning when they saw the surrounding area covered with dead bodies they decided to make their camp at a distance of 1-2 horse marches from the scene of battle. At the new site the Sultan rewarded the commanders who had distinguished themselves in the battle and then the captives were brought before him. The Ottoman chronicler İbrahim Peçevi claims that "their number was more than 4000 and there were only four survivors who were left as guides and tongues". The remainder were executed - an activity that took the Ottomans a whole day. Towards nightfall, the surrounding area was again full of the bodies of the executed and the camp had to be moved to another place.⁴

After they settled down at a new place for a second time the Sultan allowed his army to rest for several days. The Ottoman advanced guard detachments, however, took no rest: they lost no time in plundering and destroying the surrounding area. The chronicler Peçevi describes these events with enthusiasm: "This same day the advance-guard detachments [*akıncı*] and some other military units got permission to attack [...]. There was no unplundered town, village or farm in the surrounding area. The Islamic soldiers for the faith obtained numerable spoils of beautiful women and fair-haired young beauties, pleasing to the eye and the soul, boys and young men. And what was the number of the silver vessels, candlesticks, baking-dishes and jugs - heaven only knows."⁵

On 4th September 1526 Süleyman I, at the head of his army, started for the Hungarian capital. The news of the Ottoman victory at Mohach had already spread and the local population had already met with the advanced detachments of the victors. On their way the Ottomans did not encounter

¹ The grandchild of Sultan Bayezid II, *sancak bey* of Semendere (today the town of Smederevo, Serbia) and *vali* of Bosnia during the rule of Sultan Süleyman I.

² *Sancak bey* of Semendere during the rule of sultan Selim I, one of the commanders of the Ottoman frontier military detachments (*akıncı*) on the territory of the present-day Serbia.

³ The Commander of the Ottoman front fighting line in present-day Serbia, the first Ottoman governor of the occupied by the Ottomans Belgrade. He participated in the battle near Mohach and was appointed governor (*beylerbey*) of Bosnia and later of the newly formed *eyalet* of Budin during the rule of Sultan Süleyman I.

⁴ Peçevi İbrahim Efendi, *Peçevi Tarihi* (Ankara, 1992), 73.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

resistance but found deserted towns and villages everywhere. The local aristocracy and population hurried to leave the regions of the Ottoman offensive and withdrew to a safe distance. Half-way to Buda, the Sultan's forces bivouacked near the town of Fodvar.¹ Here it became clear that the population of the capital had already fled the town. Only the Jewish community remained, appointing a delegation led by Solomon, son of Yasef, who had the task of handing over the keys of the town and begging for mercy from the victors.²

So we have already before us the character of our story - Solomon, son of Yasef, and his family. But before giving more details about these people, let us see what happened in Buda with the coming of the Ottomans, because in this way it can be understood how that Jewish family came within the Ottoman state. The Ottoman chronicler describes the events as follows: "Here [the town of Fodvar] came several notables of the infidels, gave the keys of Budin and begged for mercy. The *padishah* condescendingly granted them their life and sent them back to the capital with one detachment. On 26th September 1526 the Islamic army stood in front of Budin [...]. Men and women came out of the fortress to beg for mercy by rubbing their faces on the ground. At that time it was vital to have discipline in the army and encroachments upon the properties and the families of the infidels were not allowed. On the next day the *padishah* went to inspect the fortress and lay hands on the [Hungarian] king's treasury and wealth [...]. The *padishah* stayed in the town with his army for exactly for ten days. During that time there were splendid feasts, games and entertainment with many dancers, musicians and poets who were lavishly fed and presented with different presents. After that [the Sultan] went to the hunting fields of the infidel king and he enjoyed himself to his heart's content by shooting a great number of animals [...]. Thousands of families of the infidel *reaya* and Jews to whom the sultan had granted life wished to immigrate to the Islamic country and were loaded on ships with their families. Many of them were settled in the region of Yedi kule.³ Some of the Jews were sent to Selanik⁴ or other places [...]. A bridge was thrown across the river [the Danube River] on the tenth day and the army crossed to the other bank near Pest. Here everything was trodden down under the hooves of the victorious cavalry. Except for the king's palace in Budin all

¹ Today the town of Dunafoldvar, Hungary.

² İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, II. Cilt, 2. Baskı (Ankara, 1964), 326; M. Cavit Baysun, "Budin", *İslam Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul, 1961), 749; Peçevi, 76.

³ The residential area of İstanbul.

⁴ Present-day town of Thessalonika, Greece.

other buildings were set on fire. The whole town was burnt down from end to end to a big heap of ashes."¹

The Ottoman chronicler does not mention anything about a Jewish notable Solomon, son of Yasef. For İbrahim Peçevi the delegation who gave the keys of the fortress to Süleyman I included in fact "several infidel notables" who came to ask for mercy from the Sultan. Here the first question arises: why did not those notables leave the town as did the representatives of the local aristocracy and a large part of the Christian population?

The researchers studying these events also do not mention anything more concrete. Professor Avram Galanti relying on Ottoman documents claims that a person called Solomon, son of Yasef, participated in the events described² but Turkish historians doubted the authenticity of the Galanti's sources.³ Recently, however, several documents which confirm the identity of Solomon were discovered in the Ottoman archives at the Oriental Department of the "St. Cyril and St. Methodius" National Library in Sofia.⁴ Furthermore the documents reveal the fate of this man's family. In order to better present the archival materials, it is necessary to discuss the background circumstances.

To start with the fact that was not so peculiar - the Jews from Buda did not leave the town under the threat of the Ottoman offensive, as did the greater part of the population. It is beyond doubt that they relied on the already proven tolerant attitude of the Ottomans towards them.⁵ The actions of the Ottomans, however, from the battle near Mohach to the first conquest of Buda draw attention towards considering the victors' attitude to the population of the newly conquered territories and the attitude to the Jews as a part of an overall political line.

Even the small extracts from Peçevi's chronicle given above, reveal clearly the typical behavior of every conqueror during a campaign of conquest. The battles were not yet forgotten when the Ottomans started to carry out an undertaking which was not easy for that epoch - the deportation of a large number of the local population to the interior of the Ottoman state. The Ottomans, however, had gained experience in such an activity, since the first larger conquests in the Balkans when they had to act in an ethnic and religious environment that was completely alien to them. At that time claiming new

¹ Peçevi, 76-77.

² Avram Galanti, *Türkler ve Yahudiler* (İstanbul, 1947), 36.

³ Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, II. Cilt, 326.

⁴ The documents were found by Dr. Sv. Ivanova in connection with the research work of Dr. Zvi Keren from Tel Aviv University and they have been translated by the author of the present paper.

⁵ The Ottoman policy towards the Jews in the 15th -16th centuries is explained well in many papers and there is no need to discuss it here.

land inevitably required the settling of population of their own ethnic group or at least of one and the same religion at places of strategic importance. For that reason Turkish researchers are tempted to state that the early Ottoman reclamation of the conquered Balkans passed exclusively under the sign of the deportation and colonization of Turkish Muslims from Anatolia.¹ However, it should not be forgotten that this process developed in the political and social environment which was found in the Balkans and itself imposed the absorption of local experience and traditions which in turn was achieved mainly by involving and using the local population in their own structures of state government.²

As early as the beginning of the organization of the Ottoman state the first rulers accepted representatives of the Byzantine-Balkan feudal aristocracy within their close circle and appointed them to high state posts. At that time there was a constant presence of local (Balkan) detachments in the Ottoman army. These detachments joined the army either voluntarily or by virtue of vassal dependence.³ In fact this was a practice used by the Seljuk conquerors of Asia Minor who did not even require from the Christian collaborationists in their Court that they convert to Islam.⁴ It can be said with certainty that this approach also worked well in the reclamation of the newly conquered Balkan lands. Furthermore, it gave positive results in terms of the intentions of the Ottomans to compensate for one of their weakest aspects - the lack of sufficient "qualified specialists" for the needs of the state government. The building of the social and economic structure of the new Empire posed one more question with a full force: the provision of a large enough productive population for the development of the Ottoman economy. This was a rather complicated problem in the Ottoman economic reality and it will not be elaborated here. Suffice to mention that in the 15th-16th centuries, one of the most widespread ways for providing the big estates (*mülk, vakf*) with labor was to bring and settle prisoners of war and civilians from the battle-field regions.⁵ It seems that at first it was the Balkan town under Ottoman domination that had a greater need of economically active population than the village. The best example of this was Constantinople which when conquered

¹ Ömer Lütfi Barkan, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Bir İskan ve Kolonizasyon Metodu Olarak Sürgünler", *İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, XI, XIII, XV (1949-1955); M. Tayyip Gökbilgin, *Rumeli'de Yürükler, Tatarlar ve Evlad-ı Fatihan* (İstanbul, 1957).

² Halil İnalcık, "Ottoman Methods of Conquest", *Studia Islamica*, II (Paris, 1954), 112-122.

³ Halil İnalcık, "Stefan Dušan'dan Osmanlı İmparatorluğuna", *Fatih Devri Üzerinde Tetkikler ve Vesikalar* (Ankara, 1954).

⁴ Paul Wittek, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Doğuşu* (İstanbul, 1985), 39-40.

⁵ See Halil İnalcık, "Servile Labor in the Ottoman Empire", *Studies in Ottoman Social and Economic History. Variorum Reprints* (London, 1985).

in 1453¹ became a busy town and became the economic and political center of the Ottoman state and required the immigration of large groups of people from the already conquered Balkan lands and also the settling of immigrants who were mainly Jews and Armenians.² In that way, "the sucking" of population from the enemy lands where the Ottomans had military operations (*dârü'l-harb* = countries where the Muslims waged a struggle for the faith) and resettlement within the Ottoman state (*dârü'l-İslâm* = the abode of Islam) was established as one of the methods of changing the ethnic and demographic situation in the Balkans under Ottoman domination.

Now let us go back to the town of Buda, conquered by the army of Süleyman I. According to the chronicler Peçevi during the Sultan's ten-day stay in the Hungarian capital "thousand of families of the infidel *reaya* and Jews wished to move to the Islam state". Therefore it was not the entire Christian population that left the town before the Ottoman advance as some researchers claim.³ The appearance of a delegation led by Jews in the Ottoman camp in order to hand over the key of the fortress and ask for mercy possibly leads to the following scenario: the Christians who remained in the town put trust in their Jewish fellow-townsmen to negotiate with the conquerors by relying on the tolerant attitude of the Ottomans towards the Jewish ethnic group. In connection with this Peçevi states that the life and the property of the infidels were out of danger; the Chronicler boasts of the good discipline in the Ottoman army, which did not allow attempts upon the lives of the local people. The Ottomans, however, knew that they would not be able to keep Buda and the occupied Hungarian lands as a result of only that campaign. A part of the Hungarian aristocracy that had survived had not yet laid down their arms and depended on the fact that with the help of the Austrian Emperor Ferdinand it could continue the struggle against the conquerors. The magnate Yanos Zapolya who had been elected king by the anti-Habsburg aristocracy was given control of the occupied territories.⁴

During their withdrawal the Ottomans did not consider the security of the town. In Buda and Pest, along the two banks of the Danube River, fire broke out and Peçevi writes that the victors rode everything down under the hooves of their horses and finally the town was burnt to a big heap of ashes

¹ See Halil İnalcık, "Jews in Ottoman economy and finances", in *The Islamic world*, eds. C. E. Bosworth and C. Issawi (Princeton, 1988).

² The Jews and the Armenians in Istanbul lived in residential areas of the town that were included in Istanbul *vakıf* of sultan Mehmed II the Conqueror. See Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, TD 240.

³ Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, II. Cilt, 326-327.

⁴ Dimitrov, Str. "Introduction", in Velkov, A., E. Radushev, *Ottoman Garrisons on the Middle Danube*, Akademiai Kiado (Budapest, 1996), 9-10.

by the conquerors.¹ Only the king's palace was left standing -in Buda Süleyman I was leaving behind a man he trusted- the proclaimed king Zapolya to whom the sultan had also given a certain number of janissaries. Bearing in mind, however, the circumstance that in the meantime the Ottomans realized their decision to relocate a part of the local population then "the scorched earth" tactics applied to the town can find its logical explanation: the destroyed homes would not tempt the future sultan's subjects to turn back to their birthplaces.

Coming back to the story, fifteen years later, in the spring of 1541, Süleyman I declared the next campaign against the existing traditional enemy - the Hapsburgs. Zapolya had died the previous year and Ferdinand's army immediately besieged Buda. The Sultan judged that during this campaign it was appropriate to conquer a part of the Hungarian lands by making use of the lack of agreement between the Hungarian groupings who therefore were not in a position to appoint a strong replacement for Zapolya. Süleyman had the intention of driving the Hapsburgs away from the approaches to Buda with a single blow and also of occupying a large amount of territory. In this way he wanted to prevent any further consolidation of the local aristocracy either within itself or with the Hapsburg neighbors. On 28th August, 1541 the Ottoman army cunningly conquered the town and Süleyman declared that the Hungarian capital and the lands between the Danube and the Tissa River were under direct Ottoman rule.

There was an immediate listing of lands, people and incomes in the newly conquered territories. In the register, made in 1546, the Ottoman clerks described 98 Jews - as paying the *cizye*² tax in one of the areas of Buda. Most of these people were registered according to the standard order in the document - by their given and father's names. Some of them, however, were registered by their given name and then the place where they had first been registered in the Ottoman tax lists, for example: Ishak Selyanik, Jacob Belgrade, Pinkas Filibe,³ Mousa Istanbul, etc. There were 19 people altogether who had come to Buda from the Balkan towns of Istanbul, Thessalonica, Plovdiv, Belgrade, Vidin, Kavala, Smederevo, Sofia and Edirne.⁴

Here it is possible to suppose that the 19 Jews in question and their families were from those inhabitants of Buda who were taken by the Ottomans

¹ Baysun, "Budın", *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, 749; Peçevi, 77.

² A tax in cash collected for the state from the male non-Muslim population in the Ottoman Empire.

³ Present day town of Plovdiv, Bulgaria.

⁴ Gyula Kaldy-Nagy. *Kanuni Devri Budin Tahrir Defteri 1546 -1562* (Ankara, 1971), 10-11.

to the Balkans when they withdrew after the first conquest of the town in 1526. Later, after the permanent settlement of the Ottomans on a part of the Hungarian lands and the turning of Buda into an Ottoman town, some of the banished Jews would have obtained permission to return to their former homes. Another possibility is that besides the 19 families many more people of the Jewish community listed in this way were people who had moved to the Ottoman Balkans sometime before. Their names bore the imprint of their stay in the Turkish-Muslim environment and for some of the Jews of Buda the traveling to and from the Ottoman state ended with the adoption of the Islamic religion.¹ Finally, it seems that not the whole Jewish population of Buda was moved to the Ottoman state after the first conquest of the town. The register of 1546 suggests the possibility that a part of this community did not leave the Hungarian capital despite the destructive actions of the Ottoman army. In the end these people were again within the Islamic Empire though after a delay of fifteen years.

Returning to one of the main characters in the events of 1526, Solomon, Yasef's son, the head of the Jewish community in Buda, who went to the Ottoman camp in deference to the conqueror and to obtain compassion towards his fellow-townspersons. As already mentioned the historical authenticity of Solomon has been proved by several documents found in the Ottoman Archives in Sofia. Solomon, Yasef's son is also cited by Galanti² although there is some confusion in the Ottoman sources. In one of the documents, giving the earliest information about this family, the person in question is given the name Yasef, Solomon's son. Immediately after that in the same document we come across the name of Solomon's brother- Israil, Yasef's son. There is no doubt that there was a mistake made by the Ottoman clerk who had changed the order in writing the first name. In the course of time this initial mistake was repeatedly reproduced in the confirmation of privileges conferred by the Sultan.³

There is a need to give a further explanation about the names. The later generations of Solomon's family are named in the documents but it is not possible to specify from the context with absolute exactness the period when the given person lived. Thus the name Sabitai, Yasef's son appears. He had perhaps been doyen of the family somewhere at the end of the 16th century and the beginning of the 17th century when privileges granted to his grandfather Solomon by Sultan Süleyman I (see Document No 2, p. 1-3

¹ Ibidem.

² Galanti, *Türkler ve Yahudiler*, 36.

³ According to the practice of the Offices the confirmation of privileges was conferred by inquiry made in the previous documents on that question and it was from there that the necessary information was taken. Compare below, documents No 1 and No 2, fol. 2 and 3.

below) had been devolved upon him and his generation. All later official confirmations of those privileges had been made by virtue of the document issued in the name of Sabitai but with the explicit explanation that the original holder of the Sultan's good graces had been Solomon, Yasef's son.

The documents which will be referred to in this paper are of different official types. They were drawn up in 1859-1860 and refer to confirmation of fiscal and other privileges. What is noteworthy here is that for three centuries both the Ottoman administration and Solomon's family, saw to and observed the main conditions connected with the granted privileges. The first document offered is Sultan Abdülmecid's order¹ of 1860 referring to the next in turn confirmation of these privileges and the granting of new privileges in conformity with the current changes in the fiscal system of the Ottoman state. A thorough analysis of this document will not explain the social position of a group of people under the auspices of the central power (a question interesting in itself for researchers) but it will reveal the taxes the ordinary Jewish-taxpayer had to pay. The fact that his compatriots had privileges that exempted them from concrete taxes and services shows that the ordinary Jewish person completely fulfilled these fiscal obligations. From this document the regions where the emigrants from Hungarian lands first settled and also the directions of their later movement to other parts of the country will be established. Solomon's family settled in south-east Thrace, the regions near Constantinople and in the Turkish capital. Later some of those people moved through the Balkan Mountains and settled in the town of Rousse (Rusçuk). The documents presented here settled the formalities connected with the privileges of that branch of a large Jewish family.

The main part of the privileges consists of a full exemption from fiscal obligations towards the state - a great social privilege which placed these people outside the category known as ordinary *reaya*.² This special social position becomes much clearer bearing in mind the following privileges: to buy and possess up to ten slave women and up to ten non-Muslim slaves; to apply directly to the highest legal institutions regarding legal problems and the legal processes initiated to be decided according to Muslim religious law (*şer'iyyat*)³; to be exempt from death-duty the state fiscal institutions having no right to collect these duties from their heirs. All this ensured immense economic and social privileges for a Jewish family, a situation rarely observed

¹ Sultan (1839 - 1861), son of Sultan Mahmud II.

² Translated literally, it means a herd. The taxpayers were called in this way in the Ottoman administrative practice.

³ That privilege meant that the members of this Jewish family were equal in right in the Court with the Muslims.

in a state which divided its citizens into true believers-Muslims and infidels, Christians and Israelites.

The first document shows a rather interesting situation: adhering to the traditions in the Ottoman offices and strictly complying with the previous sultans lead to the constant confirmation and reconfirmation of the privileges which were connected with realities of previous rather than current fiscal and administrative practices. Thus, for example, the fleet of the middle of the 19th century no longer used oarsmen but it was still stated that this Jewish family would not be required to give money for the remuneration of the fleet oarsmen. A second example is that although the Janissary army was once and for all disbanded in 1826, thirty-four years later this privileged Jewish family continued to receive confirmation of its right not to give shelter in their homes to people of the Janissary corps.

This conservatism of the Ottoman offices in fact proved to be useful for researchers who in this way obtain information about the fiscal duties of the Jewish taxpayer in the Ottoman state in the 17th-18th centuries. There were even tax collections and military-administrative practices borrowed from the Seljuks of Asia Minor and applied by the Ottomans in the early period of their state. In the 14th century to the second half of the 16th century non-Muslim warriors - the so-called *cerahor* - were involved and actively used in the Islamic Ottoman army and taxes were collected from the civilian population for their maintenance (see Document No 1 below). This is, in fact, a rather interesting period in the development of the Ottoman state organization when the ruling pragmatism of the conquerors outweighed religious dogmatism and the potential of the conquered lands and their population was successfully involved in building the Muslim Empire.

The remaining documents originate from the local administration of the town of Rusçuk and from the administration of Silistre *vilayet*. They refer to the settling of formalities connected with the privileges of that part of Solomon's generation which had settled in the town near the Danube River. Here of particular interest for the researchers of family relations is a description of the Jewish community in Rusçuk and the family tree of the local family branch is given.

By these documents which are presented to researchers and to all those who are interested in Jewish history in the Balkan lands, I have tried to make their future work easier by accompanying my translation with detailed explanatory notes of the lesser known Ottoman administrative and financial terms.

Document No 1¹

The order of the holy imperial sultan's sign, of the splendid and world-conquering monogram is as follows:

During the time when the majestic and happy Sultan Süleyman Han,² may he rest in peace, was conquering the fortress of Budun,³ the person Yasef, Solomon's son,⁴ came and gave the keys of the fortress in question in the happy sultan's chamber, his brother Israil, Yasef's son, also did not stay outside this act and that is why my great-grandfather of blessed memory Sultan Mehmed Han⁵ granted him and the following generations both male and female, from son to son and from daughter to daughter, to be exempt from taxes. The glorious Sultan Ibrahim Han⁶ confirmed this privilege which exempts the family in question stock after stock from letting envoys, ambassadors and *acemi oğlans* and other of the same kind⁷ stay in their homes and properties, from the tax for supplying sheep, from *harac*,⁸ from *salgun*,⁹ from the tax for oarsmen,¹⁰ from guarding the seraglio and the court,¹¹ from [collecting] *cerahor* and from *cerahor akçesi*,¹² from collecting money for the army, from fortress building, from serving *naibs*¹³ and *subaşı*s,¹⁴ from

¹ "St. St. Cyril and Mehtodius" National Library - Sofia, Oriental Department, R. 27, fol. 92 b.

² Sultan Süleyman I Kanuni (1520-1566), son of sultan Selim I.

³ See Note 1.

⁴ A mistake of the Ottoman clerk. The name should be read Solomon, Yasef's son.

⁵ Sultan Mehmed III (1595-1603), son of sultan Murad III.

⁶ Sultan Ibrahim (1640-1648), son of sultan Ahmed I.

⁷ There was a practice in the Ottoman state according to which the clerks traveling on business to the province, foreign envoys and diplomats stayed free of charge in the homes of the local people. With the so-called *acemi oğlans* the situation was as follows: young men were collected regularly from the non-Muslim population in order to man the Janissary corps. Young men gathered from different Balkan regions as *acemi oğlans* = novices, were taken in groups to the capital. On their way they stopped to rest and the local population give them shelter and food.

⁸ The other name of the cizye tax. See Note 23.

⁹ Foodstuffs and fodder supplied by the population for the needs of military men and state administrators during their business trips outside the capital.

¹⁰ Money collected from the taxpayers for maintenance of the oarsmen in the Ottoman galleys.

¹¹ Probably the local population had to provide people for guards in the palace (*saray*) of the local administrative governor and the Sharia court.

¹² The name for the warriors non-Muslims used for active military service in the army during the early Ottoman period (XIV - XV centuries) Sometimes *cerahor* refers to the non-Muslim young men who were collected to man the Janissary corps (see Note 40 - *acemi oğlans*). And finally *cerahor* is also used for those collected from the local non-Muslim population in case of war to carry out semi-military and auxiliary activities. In this case it seems that the Jewish family was exempt from auxiliary military service in the Ottoman army and from paying ransom in money for such service (*cerahor akçesi*).

¹³ Deputy-kadi.

¹⁴ A title designating the representatives of a given military-administrative functionary or to entitle persons performing police and supervisory functions in the towns.

the tax for cattle slaughtering, from *yamak* tax,¹ from meadow mowing and from forced labor. Nobody should prevent them from buying up to ten slave women and up to five slaves of the oarsmen-captives on the galleys who have not adopted the Islam religion. If they initiate proceedings against a person on a given occasion that should be done in conformity with the requirements of the Sharia, and the *şeyh ül-İslam*² should listen to them and should become familiar with their case. When members of the family die, the clerk in charge of the inheritance should not require death-duty from the heirs. If whoever of the officials violates these orders or wishes to violate them he should be considered a criminal and his acts should be damned!

This holy order was issued in the month of *cemazielahir* 1024³ and it follows the former sultans' resolutions [on the same question]. It was renewed for the last time on the occasion of my enthronement in 1255⁴ when an imperial order was issued for exemption [of taxes]. That order was handed to people from Sabitai and his brother Israil's generation. The group of people in question consists of 65 families. Six live in nahiye of Hasköy⁵ falling under the *kaza* of Çekmece-i Sagir.⁶ The rest live in Galata, Üsküdar⁷ and İstanbul and up to the present time not a single *akçe* for tax paying has been required from them. It has been required, however, from these six families to pay taxes to the amount of 150-200 *guruş* under the circumstances that in principle they are exempted from fiscal duties. That contradicts the ordinances for exemption from taxes given in the holy order. I was informed of these violations in the form of a petition handed on behalf of the claimants in which they asked for the settling of their situation. On 12 *safer* 1262⁸ the order for exemption from *cizye*⁹ and other taxes for 45 people of the above-mentioned family living in Edirne¹⁰ was renewed. On 23 *rebiyülahir* of the same year¹¹ the holy order for exemption from taxes of the people of this family, living in Rusçuk was renewed.

¹ *Yamak* was the name given to members of different formations of the population with special duties to the state who at a given moment were not in the service but took care of the farms and the families of their friends who were in service at that time. Probably the Ottoman clerk had in mind that the privileged people were exempt from *yamak* duties.

² The head of the Muslim scholars-theologians, head of the judicial machine in the state (consisting of *kadis* and *müftüs*) and at the same time head of the Muslim education.

³ 28th June – 26th July, 1615.

⁴ 17th March, 1839 – 4th March, 1840.

⁵ Probably the administrative unit of that time, *Hasha-i İstanbul*, including the close environs of the Ottoman capital.

⁶ Küçük Çekmece, today a residential area of İstanbul.

⁷ Residential areas of İstanbul.

⁸ 9th February, 1846.

⁹ See Note 25.

¹⁰ A town in Turkey.

¹¹ 20th March, 1846.

The Jews, David and Nessim, living in Rusçuk, have a sultan's order for tax exemption and their plea is for the latter to be renewed. The answer given to the inquiry made by the state offices was that these two men are the deceased Ilia's sons. The latter lived in Edirne sometime ago and as a man of the said Sabitai's offspring he had been exempt from taxation. The aforesaid Ilia and his people moved to live in Rusçuk 40-50 years ago. By virtue of the old imperial order for tax exemption in which not a single *akçe* of taxes had been required from them when they lived in Edirne 40-50 years before that. The situation of that family remained the same after they moved to Rusçuk where for the time being live 24 offspring and no money is required from them in the form of state taxes. Since it was necessary to renew the holy order for tax exemption possessed by them the question arose whether they had to be exempt or not from paying the tax *iane-i askeriyye*¹ which was introduced in the intervening time. After the elucidations and the explanations given by my Minister of Finance - the happy and of high renown Mehmed Hasib Paşa having privileges and sultan's symbols delegated by me - and after making inquiries and extracts from the main registers a sultan's order was issued confirming the exemption of this family from paying *iane-i askeriyye*. In connection with this the Revenue Accountant's Office should be informed about the tax exemption determined and from now on it should be known that the said people are not subject to taxation and they have the necessary document for that. On that occasion I issue my Sultans' order and I give instructions that nobody should harm these people's interests with his acts from now on. That you should know and believe in my holy sign! Written on the 20th day of the happy month of *ramazan* of 1276².

Document No2³:

(fol.1)

The persons named below belong to the Jewish community in the town of Rusçuk. In our capacity as leaders of this community we testify to the following: Ilia, son of Juda, son of Sabitai, son of Yasef and his elder brother Moussa - persons from the Jewish nation and inhabitants of the town of Edirne [...] ⁴ - by virtue of a Sultan's order for tax exemption the state did not collect taxes from them for a period of 40 to 50 years. The offspring of

¹ A tax introduced to replace *cizye* during the time of the reforms in the state-administrative system of the Ottoman Empire during the *Tanzimat* period.

² 10th March, 1860.

³ "St. St. Cyril and Methodius" National Library - Sofia, Oriental Department, F. 112, a.e. 1653.

⁴ Damaged text.

the said Ilia [...] ¹ consists of 24 adult people altogether. Nothing has ever been collected from them in favor of the state and [...] ² and some time ago when it was required they pay the tax *iane-i askeriyye* ³, they showed the Sultan's deed [for tax exemption] to the *Vilayet* administration and they were told that the deed had to be renewed. At that time the above-mentioned [...] ⁴ had collected money and the said David, a man from the family, went to the capital where by lawful means [...] ⁵ for what we report to the authorities. [Written on]: 9th rebiyülevvel 1276. ⁶ [Signed by]: *Haham başı* ⁷ Bentsion Ponto; the servant ⁸ Beniamin Kapoune; the servant Avram Eshkenazi; the servant Haim Avram Levi; the servant Samuel David Levi; the servant David Haim Shuui; the servant Moussa.

In order to prove that the Jews, David, Nessim and the deceased Juda, living in Rusçuk belong to the offspring of Sabitai, Yasef's son, mentioned in the Sultan's *ferman* [for privilege granting] the following diagram was made:

¹ Damaged text.

² Damaged text.

³ See note No 59.


⁴ Damaged text.

⁵ Damaged text.

⁶ 6th October, 1859.

⁷ The leader of the Jewish religious community was called in this way in the Ottoman state.

⁸ The sense is that every subject of the Sultan was considered a slave.



the deceased Juda

the deceased Ilia

Nessim

the deceased Juda

David

Samuil
Ilia
Solomon
Yasef

the woman Gracia
the woman Sara
the woman Mazal
the woman Rahil

Juda
Mussa
Ilia

David

Juda
Samuil

Solomon
Mussa
Avram

Behor
Juda

Solomon - the person in question
saw the light of day two months ago

According to this genealogy the generation of the deceased Sabitai, Yasef's son, included 24 men and women.

(fol.2)

The persons David and Nessim of the Jewish community in Rusçuk together with some more people whose names are known have a sultan's order according to which since the old times, for centuries and generation after generation these people are exempt from paying *cizye* and other taxes collected in favor of the state. The Jews in question come from Sabitai's generation, the latter being Yasef's son and a petition was handed on their behalf to renew the Sultan's order because they were required to pay taxes. We discussed the question as we were instructed by Sultan's order of the month of *safer* 1276¹ addressed to the *Vilayet* administration of Silistre.² We examined the available documents obeying the Sultan's order and the case was forwarded to the *Vilayet* Accountants Office with record of 2nd *cemaziyelahir* 1276.³ As it became clear the Jews bearing the name [...] ⁴Nessim are Ilia's offspring and they are in the same way as Ilia himself long ago exempt from state taxation and gatherings by the Sultan's order. That became a fact by virtue of a former Sultan's act of grace shown to Sabitai, Yasef's son and his offspring when they were still living in Edirne. Later they moved to live in [...] ⁵and by virtue of the Sultan's order, which they have, the state has not collected a single *akçe* tax from them for the last 40 to 50 years. According to the inquiry made there are 24 offspring of this family in Rusçuk and we report that nothing has been collected from them in the form of taxes. [The members of this family] who are in Hasköy, Edirne and other places have a confirmation of the old privilege and on different dates they obtained two Sultan's orders not to be bothered and forced to pay taxes because they are exempt from fiscal obligations to the state. Some time ago complaints were handed in on the occasion that it was required from them to pay taxes; attempts were made to collect *cizye* from them which contradict the decrees involved in the Sultan's order which they possess. According to these decrees the privileges [of this family] should not be compared to other similar cases because the case in point here is a full exemption from all taxes. The reason for that is as follows: when the deceased sultan Süleyman Han, let him rest in peace, was besieging the fortress of Budun with the aim at conquering it, one of the forefathers of the said family gave to His Majesty the keys of the fortress in question. This same person also did some other favors and as a reward for that it was vouchsafed he and his family to be exempt from collection of *cizye* and all other taxes generation after generation, century after

¹ 30th August – 27th September, 1859.

² Silistra, a town, Bulgaria.

³ 27th December, 1859.

⁴ Damaged text.

⁵ Damaged text.

century. It is instructed in the Sultan's order not to act against the imperial will and in connection with that some warnings are given.

Since the issue of the imperial order for exemption from taxation, to date all Sultans consecutively ascending the throne have confirmed [their predecessors'] will and have issued a holy order for maintaining the grantee privileges. According to the administrative systems in the Sultan's orders it is only noted that [the people] are exempt from paying *cizye*. Since it is not mentioned definitely [in the document] the exemption from the other taxes [...] ¹ nothing should be required from them in the form of *cizye* or some other taxes. It is quite a long time since the Jewish people have no cases of arrears no matter how they divide among themselves the taxes due to be paid. Continuing paying taxes in this way [...] ² was erased and in the past in 1262³ a new sultan's order was issued according to which in conformity with the imperial will tax collection prevailing hitherto should be cancelled as soon as possible in order to neutralize the possibility for the *haham-başı* and the leaders of [the Jewish] community to exert pressure on and act in arbitrary manner regarding the people [...] ⁴ with reference to the complaint the *Vilayet* Administration took a decision based on the Sultan's order to put an end to the violations of the law. In connection with this an instruction has been sent also [...] to collect the tax *iane-i askeriyye* from the non-Muslim population. According to the general system for military service granted by His Majesty to all his subjects the collection of this tax will not be reported in the "*Cizye*" Department but in the Revenue Accounting Department. According to the inquiries made in these departments the above-mentioned Jews, David and Nessim, are sons of the said Ilia. Ali of them, being offspring of Sabitai, Yasef's son, have been exempt from paying state taxes by an imperial order. They used to live in Edirne sometime ago but then moved to Rusçuk. They have an order for exemption from taxation and in the course of 40 to 50 years not a single *akçe* in the form of state taxes has been collected from them and their offspring which currently number 24 people. In accordance with the order which they possess the offspring of this family are exempt not only from paying *cizye* but also other state taxes. If these people are also to be exempt from the *iane-i askeriyye* tax ensuing from the new system for military service then this should be noted and marked in the related documents and for that order belongs to our almighty master. Written on 15 *cemaziyelevvel* 1276.⁵

¹ Damaged text.

² Damaged text.

³ 30th December, 1845 – 19th December, 1846.

⁴ Damaged text.

⁵ 10th December, 1859.

(fol.3)

The persons of Jewish origin, David, Nessim and some others, living in Rusçuk, whose names are known, have been exempt from paying *cizye* and the other state taxes as a result of constantly renewed orders of the Sultans since the time of Sultan Selim Han up to now. They have been exempt from paying taxes generation after generation for centuries because they are of the family of Sabitai, Yasef's son. The Sultan's order which they possessed was confirmed and renewed when the respective happy master came to the throne or during his rule. Lately, however, it happened that they did not receive a renewal order and for that reason they addressed [the *Vilayet* Administration] in the established way with a record and a Court Order. According to the transcripts of the imperial orders issued by the Sultan's council the grandfather of the said Sabitai - Yasef, Solomon's son, and his brother did a favor to the power during the rule of Sultan Süleyman Han,¹ let him rest in peace and as a reward it was vouchsafed that they and their offspring of both male and female sex be exempt from *cizye* and all other kinds of taxes. The offspring of the above-mentioned Yasef and his brother now numbers 65 *hane*² people and of them 6 *hane* live today in the *nahiye* of Hasköy included in the *kaza* of Çekmece kebir³ and 45 live in Edirne. Contrary to the Sultan's order for exemption from taxation, taxes started to be required from the six *hane* living in the said *nahiye*. It was understood that two Sultan's orders were issued on 12 *safer* 1262⁴ and on 22 *rebiyülahır* 126[...] ⁵ in order to confirm their privileges and not to bother them any more. Under these circumstances the above-mentioned Nessim and David had to find whether the names mentioned in the order belong to people from their community and for that reason they went there. The situation was clarified from the towns and villages mentioned in the documents. The only point that has yet to be clarified is how an order meant for the local Jews⁶ has fallen in other hands. The *Vilayet* Administration made an official inquiry about this with a view to starting an inquiry to find the truth. [Not dated]

¹ Sultan Süleyman I Kanuni (1520-1566), son of sultan Selim I.

² *Hane* literally means a home, a house or a household. In Ottoman taxation system, it is the basic tax unit.

³ Büyük Çekmece, today a residential area in İstanbul. It is stated, however that the *kaza* was Çekmece-i Sagir, the old name of the present-day Küçük Çekmece and that coincidence is due probably to a mistake made by the Ottoman clerk.

⁴ 9th February, 1846.

⁵ The date was not completely written.

⁶ Having in mind the Jewish community in the town of Rusçuk.

IN SEARCH OF THE HAREM

SEXUAL CRIME AND SOCIAL SPACE IN OTTOMAN ROYAL LAW OF THE 15TH AND 16TH CENTURIES¹

Leslie Peirce

When the Moroccan world traveler Ibn Battuta toured the Turkish principalities of western Anatolia in the 1330s, he was surprised to see so many women in public. And when he visited the newly emerging Ottoman principality, the traveler was received by the wife of Orhan (second in the line of Ottoman rulers), who, he noted, “treated me honorably [and] gave me hospitality.”² But by the 16th century, when Hans Dernschwam visited Istanbul, he remarked how few women there were out and about on the streets.³ Around the time of Dernschwam’s visit, the chief mufti of the Ottoman empire, Ebu’s Su’ud Efendi, was busy issuing fetvas clarifying which women might be honored with the epithet *muhaddere*—a term perhaps best translated as “respectable” that in 16th-century thinking connoted a reputation for chaste behavior and its corollary, observation of the protocols of veiling and seclusion. A *muhaddere* woman was not confined to the house, declared the mufti, but were she to go out—for example to the baths or a wedding or for a visit in another neighborhood—she should be accompanied “by servants and attendants”.⁴

A common explanation for the spread of what we might call the social culture of the harem as Ebu’s Su’ud defined it in his fetvas is the increasing influence of Islamic norms in the Ottoman polity. But while Ebu’s Su’ud gave an Islamic *imprimatura* to his characterization of the *muhaddere* woman by virtue of his role as chief interpreter of Islamic law, it is clear that he did not regard this social practice as intrinsically Islamic: “it is not conformity to

¹ Colin Imber’s article “*Zinâ* in Ottoman Law” (1983) inspired my original interest in this legal problem.

² Ibn Battuta, *The Travels of Ibn Battuta*, ed. & trans. H.A.R. Gibb (Cambridge, 1962), 2, 454.

³ On Dernschwam’s observations, see Yvonne Seng, “Standing at the Gates of Justice: Women in the Law Courts of Early-Sixteenth-Century Üsküdar, Istanbul”, in M. Lazarus-Black & S.F.Hirsch, eds., *Contested States: Law, Hegemony, and Resistance* (New York & London, 1994), 187-9.

⁴ M. E. Düzdağ, *Şeyhülislam Ebussuûd Efendi Fetvaları Işığında 16. Asır Türk Hayatı* (Istanbul, 1983), 56

the prescriptions of the noble Shari'a that is the essential element in being *muhaddere*," he wrote, "that is why non-Muslim women can also be *muhaddere*. A woman is *muhaddere* if she does not let herself be seen by persons other than members of her household and does not set about taking care of her affairs in person."¹ The *muhaddere* woman was following a social, not a religious, injunction, the mufti seemed to be saying.

This essay explores the issue of social change as reflected in legal culture by examining the *Kanunname-i Osmanî*, the Book of Ottoman Laws, a formal compilation of edicts issued by Ottoman sultans for application throughout the empire. It asks when and how the social culture of the harem became normative in imperial law and thus an intrinsic element of Ottoman legal culture. Two principal themes structure the essay. The first explores the world of domestic space, sex, and gender as it was imagined from the Ottoman imperial center by tracing the evolution of harem culture in successive redactions of the *Kanunname*. Here it is critical to discard the venerable western stereotype of the harem, whose creatures are assumed to be female and hardly noteworthy for their chaste demeanor. As Ebu's Su'ud's *fetvas* reveal, the secluded woman might be a woman of affairs. Moreover, while the relations between females and males were its principal concern, the *Kanunname* gradually advanced a notion of the protected domicile that encompassed sons and slaves as well as wives and daughters. The second theme considers what the *Kanunname* was meant to accomplish, both practically and ideologically. It also considers the extent to which the sultans were legislating *islamically* when they made laws regulating conduct in public and private space.

It is the legislative activity of the four sultans who gave basic shape to the Ottoman Empire with which we are concerned. The reigns of Mehmed II, Beyazid II, Selim I, and Süleyman I spanned the long century of imperial consolidation from 1451 to 1566. Following upon Mehmed's conquest of Constantinople in 1453, which ended the empire of the Byzantines, one of the acts that signaled the new imperial status of the Ottoman sultanate was the issuing of a *Kanunname-i Osmanî*, a formal comprehensive document for application throughout the empire that regulated criminal justice, taxation, and agricultural and urban enterprise. The *Kanunname* was in effect a royal blueprint for managing what was becoming an increasingly diverse and complex population. Through the on-going process of amendment by successive sultans, it was a blueprint that adapted to the shifting circumstances of the empire and its subjects. As such, the *Kanunname* permits a reading of domestic life from the ground up as viewed from the top

¹ Düzdağ, 56

down. It is in sections of the *Kanunname* devoted to the definition of criminal acts and their punishments that the sexual world of Ottoman subjects as visualized by their sovereigns comes into view. The statutes on sexual crime constituted a relatively small part of the *Kanunname* but the section containing them always came first.

Islamic *kanun* (Arabic *qânûn*, pl. *qawânîn*—"regulations", from the Greek *κανών*) originated as royal edicts regulating taxation.¹ This emphasis persisted, and it is not surprising that the bulk of the Ottoman *Kanunname* was devoted to legislating relations between taxing authorities and taxpayers. But fairly early in Islamic administration (roughly the eleventh century CE), royal *kanun* came to encompass public law more broadly, as a supplement to Islamic law (*Shari'a*), which was notoriously weak in the domain of criminal prosecution and in legal implementation in general. It came to be accepted, at least in the lands that were to comprise the Ottoman empire, that it was the sovereign's duty and prerogative to prosecute "crimes against God", that is, criminal acts disruptive of public order whose penalties were initially laid out in the Qur'an. These crimes were illicit sex, sexual slander, theft, consumption of intoxicants, and highway robbery (the latter category would be broken down in the Ottoman *Kanunname* into the separate crimes of physical assault, robbery, and murder). By opening with criminal statutes that dealt largely with these crimes and variations on them, the *Kanunname* asserted that the empire was based on the rule of law and that the sovereign was the architect of Ottoman justice.²

The very first section (*fasıl*) in all versions of the *Kanunname* dealt with sexual crime under the general rubric of *zina*, illicit sexual acts. Consistent with Islamic law, *zina* in the *Kanunname* is defined primarily as adultery and fornication, that is, consensual heterosexual sex outside the permitted relationships of husband and wife or master and female slave. Statutes dealing with the separate crime of sexual slander (*kazf*) are usually included in the *zina* section as well. It is primarily, although not exclusively, the *zina* section of the *Kanunname* that portrays the evolution of what we might call "the legal harem". Over time, successive iterations of the *Kanunname* incorporated other forms of sexual congress, including sex between males and non-consensual sex, as well as "related matters" such as abduction, physical harassment and assault in public spaces, and even sex within the family household. While Mehmed's *Kanunname* contained twelve

¹ For a concise treatment of *kanun*, see Y. Linant de Bellefonds, "Qânûn, i. -Law", *Encyclopedia of Islam*, 2nd edition.

² This essay is indebted to the scholarly work on *kanun* by Ömer Lütfi Barkan, Halil İnalcık, Uriel Heyd, Ahmet Akgündüz, and of course Colin Imber (*Ebu's-Su'ud: The Islamic Legal Tradition*), and to that of Ronald Jennings on *kanun* in the context of the Ottoman courts.

statutes in its *zina* section, the longest versions of Süleyman's *Kanunname* contained some three- dozen. In its sexualizing, criminalizing, and policing of space and speech, the *Kanunname* increasingly evoked the ideal of the harem (although never using the term)—a domestic regime that forbade visual and verbal, as well as physical, contact between strangers and dependents of the male head of household and that put responsibility for the collective honor of the family in his hands.

Was the *Kanunname* a mirror of social practice?

The *Kanunname* was not a fixed collation of statutes, hence I have hesitated to use the term “codification of imperial law” to describe Mehmed II's action in formulating and promulgating the initial redaction of the *Kanunname*. Rather, it was a living, evolving, document, and one could easily speak of multiple “imperial *kanunnames*”. Each of Mehmed's three successors elaborated upon the work of the previous sultan (his father) by periodically issuing amended versions of the *Kanunname*, dropping or revising some statutes and adding new ones. Even within a single sultan's reign, several versions of different length might be circulating simultaneously.¹

It is worth reflecting on why these multiple versions did not create legal chaos. One reason would seem to be the widely acknowledged point that Ottoman statecraft was designed to accommodate local cultural and administrative traditions. Indeed, other sorts of *kanunnames* were issued for the administration of individual provinces (a standard practice) as well as for the regulation of government departments, e.g. the Mint, and individual groups, e.g. nomads, Christian military recruits. Because *kanunname* is thus a generic term for a collection of administrative statutes, this essay distinguishes the comprehensive imperial law book from other *kanunname* documents by capitalizing the term. The cultivation of flexibility in the practice of *kanun* meant that the Ottoman regime could react to cultural and political change on the ground when and where necessary. To be sure, such flexibility was not limited to *kanun* but rather reflected a broader attitude toward legal practice. With somewhat the same rationale, Islamic legal-administrative tradition gave discretionary leeway to the judge (*kadi*) as he

¹ Compare Uriel Heyd's longer version of Süleyman's *kanunname* (*Studies in Old Ottoman Criminal Law* {Oxford, 1973}) to the two shorter versions published by Ahmet Akgündüz (*Osmanlı Kanunnâmeleri ve Hukukî Tahlilleri* {Istanbul, 1990+}, Vol. 4). Heyd (30-1, 36-7) groups 38 manuscripts of Süleyman's *kanunname* into four families—ample, shorter, shorter with additional sections, and incomplete; the manuscripts published by Akgündüz both fall in the “shorter” family.

sentenced the guilty. It makes sense, then, to think of the *Kanunname* as a generic blueprint that set the limits of the tolerable rather than as a fixed code intended for universal literal application.

The Ottoman *Kanunname* is not the only source that can be interrogated on the subject of harem practices. As a kind of legal constitution for the whole empire, the *Kanunname* was presumably widely distributed to governors, judges, tax officials, and the like, but it is hard to know how precisely it was followed in the many provinces of the empire. Other sources that help to round out the picture of grass-roots legal life are the abundant registers of local court records (*sicillât*) and contemporary works of Islamic jurisprudence in the form of *fetvas* and legal treatises. Rather than effects of the *Kanunname* on the ground, however, this essay is interested in influences that affected the evolution of *kanun* at the center. The *Kanunname* is an important source because it does more than reveal an *imperial* vision of a properly ordered domestic universe. *Kanun* as a legal genre and a legal practice included a heavy dose of customary law, that is, local normative practices that carried the historical weight of custom. These norms, some of ancient provenance in the legally minded Near East, might be in conflict with the dictates of *Shari'a*. Indeed, *kanun* was, and had traditionally been, a bridge of compromise between Islamic *Shari'a* and customary practices. *Kanun* was the art of the possible. Let us consider as an example the problem of adultery: prosecution under strict Islamic law was virtually impossible because conviction required four witnesses of the act of penetration; customary law, on the other hand, could be brutal in its sanctioning of honor killing, that is, the right of a husband to kill his wife (and sometimes a brother his sister) together with her lover. We will see that the *Kanunname* attempted to mediate between the inadequacy of *Shari'a* and the vigilante excesses of customary practice in the matter of prosecuting illicit sex.

The penetration of customary practice, which accounts in large part for the *Kanunname*'s lengthening over time, introduced social values as well as the vagaries of human behavior into the regulation of sexual conduct. For example, the question of honor becomes central to our exploration of the harem—namely, is honor protected (that is, defined) by imperial legislation and whose honor is at stake? There are several other themes that emerge in successive versions of the *Kanunname*, but it is worth highlighting two more, both related to the question of honor, before we proceed to examine the *Kanunname* as evolved by each of the four sultans. One of these themes is the mapping of sexually charged space and the shifting configuration of male and female roles around sexuality and space. The second is the question of gender

and criminal accountability, that is who pays the penalty for criminal sexual acts. The equality of women and men as partners in crime in Mehmed's *Kanunname* gives way, as we will see, to a dissymmetry that charges the male head of household with enormous responsibility for the conduct of his dependents.

The act of balancing Islamic and customary law was fraught with tension. One of the underlying themes of this essay is the shifting stance of the sultans toward the sources of their legitimacy and power. Selim's *Kanunname*, for example, justified imperial legal policy as *raison d'état*—*siyaset* in Ottoman parlance, the absolute legislative authority of the sultan that included the power to inflict punishment without trial by a judge—and made few explicit concessions to the Islamic bases of sovereign authority. Selim's toughness was not without its context. It is important to bear in mind that the century during which the *Kanunname* was evolved was one of continued territorial expansion and the resultant challenge of pacifying and integrating new peoples into an Ottoman civil subjecthood. This task also required that the Ottoman regime subordinate local power brokers as well as its own agents to sultanic authority. Literary and documentary sources abound in stories of abuse by local lords and the Ottoman military.¹ Over and over, in virtually every *kanunname*, the rhetoric of Ottoman justice celebrated the sultan's protection of the little person, in particular the peasant taxpayer, from exploitation by tax collectors. Moreover, because ordinary criminal penalties under the Ottomans were largely monetary fines that made up part of the stipends of local officials, an imperial legal blueprint that specified exactly what acts were punishable and exactly what sums might be exacted from wrong-doers was a critical administrative tool.

The *Kanunname* of Mehmed II

In comparison with later *kanunnames*, the *Kanunname* of Mehmed II displays little vision of a domestic harem. Its section "on *zina* and intentions [to commit *zina*]"² is spare, containing only twelve statutes. The statutes are confined to heterosexual adult acts that assume consent, with one or possibly two exceptions. Nearly half the *zina* section is taken up by the prescription of fines for adultery and fornication, a feature that is standard in all subsequent versions. The fine structure comprises several statutes because it calculates

¹ On this question, see Leslie Peirce, *Morality Tales: Law and Gender in the Ottoman Court of Aintab* (California, 2003), Chapter 8.

² (*fî'l-zina ve devâ'ihî*) For Mehmed II's *kanunname*, see Akgündüz, *Osmanlı Kanunnâmeleri*, Vol. 1.

penalties by two factors: civil status—married free persons, single free persons, and married and single slaves, all presumed to be Muslim; and degree of wealth—well-off, middling, poor, and destitute individuals. For example, well-off married Muslim men and women pay the highest fine—300 *akçes* (the standard Ottoman silver coin), while their slave counterparts pay half that amount; a destitute Muslim male or female is fined 40 *akçes* if married, 30 if single, and the slave half that amount. Note that slaves, like free persons, and women, like men, were penalized with reference to the scale of personal wealth.

In Mehmed's *Kanunname*, the spatial dynamics of potential sexual disorder are rudimentary. In the geography of sexual crime, domestic space is summoned in a single statute: breaking into a dwelling by a person intent on *zina* merits the *zina* penalties, whether or not the perpetrator realizes his intent. As for public space, grabbing a woman (*avret*), kissing her, or otherwise embracing her is punished by a beating (the *bastinado*) as well as a fine. The number of *bastinado* strokes (*ağaç*) is determined at the judge's discretion (*ta'zir*); the fine is one *akçe* for every two strokes. Nor is there much of a conceptual harem in this early law book, that is, a hierarchy of control whereby the male head of household is responsible for the conduct of dependent family members. Married and unmarried women mirror their male counterparts in punishment: they pay the same fines for *zina*. They also enjoy the same rule for impunity from sexually slanderous accusations ("If a man says to a woman, 'I had sex with you', and the woman denies this, the woman shall take an oath [of innocence], and the judge shall punish the man"; likewise, "If a woman or a girl says to a man, 'You had sex with me', and the man denies this..."). As they enjoy equal impunity, so are women and men subject to the same punishment for unsubstantiated slanderous accusations (beating plus fine).

Women are indeed sexual actors in the public sphere, intentionally committing crimes and being punished for doing so. Female pimps (*pezevenk*) receive the *ta'zir* punishment of a beating whose severity is, as usual, decided by the judge and a fine of one *akçe* per stroke (male pimps are not mentioned). In only one statute is the male head of household singled out, and this statute is also the only one that inscribes a customary practice in the *Kanunname*: a man who fails to divorce an adulterous wife must pay a fine (100 *akçes*) for cuckoldry (*köftehorluk*). Here, finally, is a hint of the stereotypical harem dynamic: a man is dishonored, indeed guilty, if he fails to control his wife and is moreover willing to live with the dishonor she brings upon him. There is, however, a condition to this "cuckold tax": the husband pays it only if his wife is a woman of independent means (*avret'in malı olsa*),

the rationale presumably to avoid casting out a woman unable to support herself lest she resort to further *zina* in the form of prostitution.¹

In sum, Mehmed's *zina* edicts are skeletal in comparison with what was to come. What they are is a minimal statement of the sovereign's responsibility to enforce Qur'anic penalties for illicit sex and sexual slander. The absence of non-Muslims in the criminal social body is noteworthy, for they will appear in every subsequent version of the *Kanunname*, where they incur half the fines of their Muslim counterparts. The majority of the subject population in Mehmed's time was Christian and surely harbored its own adulterers; hence this absence confirms the conclusion that the sultan's purpose was less the actual regulation of society than a proclamation that the Ottoman sovereign had now attained the stature to formulate an imperial law and to assert his authority to prescribe exact penalties for the violation of God's law.

As a statement of the ruler's duty to implement Islamic law, the *zina* section of Mehmed's *Kanunname* reflects what we might call the *Shari'a* principle of gender equality in *zina*: men and women are partners in crime, equal sufferers in punishment. This would soon change. Beyond adultery and fornication, however, Mehmed's *Kanunname* is comparatively *laissez-faire* with regard to the monitoring of morals. While it punishes intention as well as the illicit sexual act itself, criminalized acts of intention that may be a prelude to actual sex are only three: prostitution (at least at the hands of female pimps), breaking into dwellings with sex on the mind, and embrace of mature women in public. Mehmed's edicts are aimed overwhelmingly at heterosexual perpetrators; the only collateral victims are women harassed on the street. Finally, customary law plays little role in this comparatively bare bones treatment of sexual crime. Mehmed's *Kanunname* is not much of a window onto actual social practices and abuses.

The *Kanunname* of Bayezid II

Every sultan put his own, -and his legal advisers'- imprint on the amended version(s) of the *Kanunname* issued during his reign. Each updating also responded to the effects of a still-expanding empire—to ideological shifts and to the repercussions of war and internal consolidation. Moreover, each incarnation of the *Kanunname* bore a generational stamp, as sultans reacted to

¹ I hypothesize this explanation from a comment on a similar situation by the 12th-century Hanafi jurist Al-Marghinani, who cautions against imposing the punishment of ostracism on a harlot for more than a few days lest she be forced to support herself through prostitution (*The Hedaya, or Guide*, trans. C. Hamilton [London, 1791], 2: 17). Al-Marghinani's work was widely used in the Ottoman Empire during the period treated here.

the events and character of their fathers' reigns. Bayezid II (r. 1481-1512), known as "the saint" (*veli*), was more religious than his father Mehmed, known as "the conqueror" (*fatih*), and although he built up an Ottoman navy, this sultan spent considerably less time in the saddle (in part because European monarchs threatened a new anti-Ottoman crusade with the sultan's renegade brother Cem at its head). Rather, Bayezid spent much of his long reign advancing the administrative consolidation of his ancestors' conquests, albeit with less innovative flair than his father had wielded. His administrative work is immediately evident in his *Kanunname*, now considerably longer—some 250 statutes, three times as long as Mehmed's.¹ It is structured in a more elaborate manner, with three chapters (*bâb*), each containing between four and seven sections (*fasıl*). Chapter One, comprising four sections dealing with crime, opens with the *zina* section, and continues with section two on physical injury and murder and section three on consumption of intoxicants, theft, and slander, and closes with a section on *siyaset*. The first three sections, but not the fourth, were present in Mehmed's *Kanunname*, albeit in lesser volume.

Among the conceptual advances made by Bayezid's *Kanunname* is the enlargement of what we might call the "legal nation", that is, the complex population subject to imperial legislation. The inclusion of non-Muslims as criminal perpetrators signaled that kanun was now viewed by its promulgators as the "law of the land"² rather than a law to be applied only to Muslims; in other words, the crimes of all subjects, regardless of religion, could be disruptive of social order, hence subject to imperial oversight. Furthermore, the incorporation of more customary-law statutes signaled that "society" in all its unruly cultural variety was coming under the scrutiny of imperial authorities, who were no longer willing to leave the definition of crime in the hands of local lords. The large number of provincial *kanunnames* issued by Bayezid confirms this point about the spreading grass-roots legal control exerted by the Ottoman regime.

The *zina* section of Bayezid's *Kanunname* is largely identical to that of Mehmed, even in the wording of its statutes. Its major innovation is the statute applying *zina* penalties to non-Muslims, who are fined at half the rate of their rich and poor, married and single, Muslim counterparts. Otherwise, Bayezid's *Kanunname* differs only in adding widows to the line-up of the guilty (they pay the fine assigned to single persons) but omitting young

¹ Mehmed Arif, "Kanunname-i Al-i Osman", *Tarih-i Osmanî Encümeni Mecmuası* 1329/1911-12, Supplement; note that this kanunname was ascribed by Arif to Süleyman; Akgündüz, *Osmanlı Kanunnâmeleri*, Vol. 2.

² On this point, see Najwa Al-Qattan, "Dhimmis in the Muslim Court: Legal Autonomy and Religious Discrimination", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 31 (1990), 433.

unmarried females (*kız*, presumably virgins). It is in the new fourth section of Chapter One ("Which exclusively declares *siyaset*") that we find "harem" legislation expanded, that is, the addition of statutes concerning illegal association between the sexes. These new statutes are fierce.¹ The first prescribes the punishment of castration for persons (assumed to be male) who abduct a girl or boy, or who enter a dwelling with "subversive intent" (*hiyanet*), or who "come" [on a raid?] to abduct a woman or girl. The second statute, dealing with the aftermath of abduction, forces the person who marries an abducted female to her abductor to dissolve the marriage; it also punishes the marriage-maker by cutting off his beard (a lesser form of emasculation). The final statute prescribes execution for a man caught in the sexual act with a married woman. This elliptically brief but important rule appears to remove the threat of "honor killing"—at least of the male lover—from the hands of a woman's husband into those of state officials.

These new items amplify the *zina*-section statute on entering dwellings with sexual intent by grappling with the actual performance of that intent, left untreated in Mehmed's *Kanunname*. The statute on abduction addresses an intractable practice common in tribal societies, one that has persisted into modern times. Abduction as a social practice might take place with the female's complicity, since it could be a route around obstacles to marriage, for example, parental resistance or the presence of elder siblings whose marriages needed to come first.² It is noteworthy that neither Mehmed's nor Bayezid's *Kanunnames* acknowledged the possibility of female compliance in abduction. This silence stands in contrast to the criminal agency and liability assumed by women in the *zina* section. This conundrum—that the socially aseptic treatment of sexual crime in the *zina* sections, but not the socially animated treatment in the *siyaset* section, includes women in the criminal social body—is a question to which we will return.

Lastly, let us comment briefly on what Bayezid's *Kanunname* suggests about the evolution of imperial legal ideology. That Bayezid isolated these harsh new statutes in a section devoted to *siyaset*—here meaning the ruler's power to define and punish crime—suggests that he was making an explicit distinction between the religious and political sources of legislative authority. It would be a mistake to think that this religiously minded sultan was squeamish about castration and other harsh customary-law practices and so isolated them from "pure" *Derived-derived zina* legislation. Rather, Bayezid

¹ Akgündüz, *Osmanlı Kanunnâmeleri*, 2: 42-43.

² See Daniel Bates, *Nomads and Farmers: A Study of the Yörük of Southeastern Turkey* (Ann Arbor, 1973), 72-79.

was reiterating the role of imperial authority in prosecution of justice. His delineation of *siyaset* in some twenty statutes confirms the point about Mehmed's criminal edicts -that they announced the legal maturity of the Ottoman sultan, who now embraced the duty of enforcing God's law. Bayezid's contribution was to acknowledge in explicit detail that the latter alone was not sufficient to ensuring socio-sexual order in the polity.

To clarify distinctions, as well as the ambiguity, in the sources of legal authority, we can turn to the types of penalty prescribed in the *Kanunname*.¹ *Ta'zir*, the judge's discretionary imposition of beatings and occasionally imprisonment, is a common *Shari'a* punishment. Monetary fines (*cürm*), on the other hand, are not a *Shari'a* penalty, but rather a practice of ancient provenance in the region. As we have seen, these two types of penalty—*ta'zir* and *cürm*, beating and fine—are routine and often combined in the *Kanunname*, as if to symbolize the intertwining of religious and political authority in the prosecution of everyday crime. *Siyaset* penalties, on the other hand, are harsher and connote the full and deliberate weight of the political regime's punitive justice. They tend to be spectacular in the Foucaultian sense of a physical display intended for public consumption: penalties in Bayezid's *siyaset* section include hanging arsonists, castrating sexual offenders, branding the forehead of [male] pimps, cutting off the limbs of a highway robber, and cutting off the hand of the habitual cutpurse or parading him around with a knife stuck in his arm if he is a one-time offender. Another way that these categories of punishment can be informative is to alert us to the hierarchy of criminal acts from the perspective of the Ottoman regime. The worst crimes are those that are punished solely with state-imposed fines or *siyaset* prescriptions. Thus in the *zina* sections of Mehmed's and Bayezid's *Kanunname*, adultery and fornication are the worst offenses since they are penalized solely by fine, but harassment on the street and pimping are lesser crimes, even though they carry the double penalty of a beating plus a fine. The very worst crimes, it would seem, were those whose punishment was deemed *siyaset*.

¹ On the subject of penalties, Islamic law, and the Ottomans, see Joseph Schacht, *An Introduction to Islamic Law* (Oxford, 1954), 89-92, 175ff. Schacht's work is particularly useful because much of it is based on a mid-16th-century Hanafi legal work by Ibrahim al-Halabi, which was commissioned by Selim I.

The *Kanunname* of Selim I¹

In the *Kanunname* versions attributed to Bayezid's energetic and militant son Selim (r. 1512-1520), the world of sexual crime is both more threatening and more rigorously prosecuted. It is a tougher world for the sexually undisciplined. The fines for adultery have gone up, at least for the rich Muslim male, who is now fined 400 rather than 300 *akçes*. Moreover, the harem has acquired a variegated demography. Men have more to protect—not only wives, but also sons, daughters, and slaves. Victims of street harassment are no longer merely “someone's wife” but also “someone's daughter”, “someone's son”, or “someone's female slave”.

Women—at least married women—have receded from the public sphere, that is, they do not appear as unfettered or autonomous sexual actors. While obviously partners in some crimes, they are more salient as victims. In the lineup of the sexually criminal, Selim's law book envisions neither widow and nor female pimp. Moreover, married women's responsibility for their misdeeds has passed to their husbands: when a wife commits adultery, it is the husband who is culpable—it is he who now pays the fine for *zina*. Since he is also charged with the cuckold fine if he keeps his wife (that is, does not divorce her), it seems that he is liable to being fined twice. To sum up, the husband has been put in charge of his wife.

This same man is also charged with keeping his minor sons from sexual liaisons wherein they “play the role of the slave girl” (*keñizlik*—here, the non-dominant role in a homoerotic encounter). It is the father who takes the beating (but pays no fine) if such a liaison occurs because “the father must guard his son”. Note, however that the male child who has reached legal majority incurs his own punishment in this matter (a severe *ta'zir* beating and a fine of one *akçe* per stroke). He is publicly responsible for his conduct, while his errant mother is not. Moreover, unmarried daughters, absent in Bayezid's *Kanunname*, reappear as potential fornicators accountable for their transgression. However, they are still not regarded as possible accomplices in their abduction.

¹ Different manuscripts of Selim's *kanunname*, mostly undated, have been published. I have consulted the two versions published by Selami Pulaha and Yaşar Yücel in *1. Selim Kânunnâmeleri (1512-1520)* (Ankara, 1995), the first of which is a composite of two manuscripts located in Tirana, Albania, and the second a version dated 1520 whose provenance the author (Yücel) does not reveal; the version published by Akgündüz (*Osmanlı Kanunnâmeleri*, Vol. 3.); and the “Leningrad” manuscript published by Anna S. Tveritinova (*Sultan I. Selim'in Kanun-namesi* {Moscow, 1969}) a facsimile of which appears in her own (Russian) book and in Pulaha and Yücel's as well. On the basis of internal consistencies (e.g. the higher *zina* fines), it would seem that Akgündüz may be wrong in alleging that the first version in Pulaha and Yücel's work should be attributed to Süleyman; however, the 1520 version published by Yücel resembles Süleyman's *kanunname* more than it does the early Selim, and so I do not comment on it separately.

Some versions of Selim's *Kanunname* even penetrate the domain of the household in order to monitor sexual activity within it. A man is penalized for having sex with his wife's or his mother's female slave or with his former wife from whom he is definitively divorced. On the other hand, he is not to be penalized for the same infraction with his son's slave or with his own female slave to whom he has granted a contract of future freedom (*mukatebe*).

In some areas of sexual crime, Selim's amendments are of a more minor nature. The point about abduction having already been made strongly by his father, Selim merely adds a heavy beating to the beard-cutting penalty inflicted on the person who marries an abducted female to her abductor. (This beating *-muhkem let*) -appears to be a *siyaset* punishment, not the judge's discretionary beating). With regard to physical and verbal harassment on the street, Selim's major innovation is the additional classes of victims noted above, but his *Kanunname* also permits the judge to imprison the harasser in a location he believes in the best interest of the community. Ambiguous wording suggests that imprisonment may be an option only in the case of abduction of a boy; this would be in keeping with the consistently more severe punishment for street harassment of a boy -one *akçe* for every stroke, rather than for every other stroke typical of the punishment of molesters of females. Finally, Selim's *Kanunname* criminalizes bestiality with an animal owned by another, the penalty being a beating prescribed by the judge and a fine of one *akçe* per stroke.

Let us summarize the major changes evident in Selim's *Kanunname*. It extends the regime's prosecutorial reach by concentrating almost as much on victims as on perpetrators, detailing larger numbers and introducing new classes (slaves, children) of the casualties of crime. A major innovation of this *Kanunname* is the definition and regulation of the household. The male head of household is now empowered over his dependents. On the other hand, as corollary of his patriarchal authority, he is subject to more punitive actions: he pays fines for his wife's and his prepubescent son's indiscretions, and he also carries an enlarged burden of honor to defend. Moreover, his own sexual misconduct is more carefully scrutinized: he pays a higher fine for his own adultery, and his sexual relations with household members have come under the legal gaze of the regime. In sum, the success of Selim's design for social order in the empire appears to depend on the male householder's ability to maintain domestic order, including the management of his own libido. Finally, the *Kanunname* introduces homoerotic sex as a criminal act. This is the one major innovation of Selim's *Kanunname* that is not foreshadowed in his father or grandfather's *Kanunname*. However, homoerotic sex enters

indirectly, as one variation in the repertoire of acts and preferences of sexual predators. In other words, it is not yet confronted in the *Kanunname* as a crime in and of itself, as it will be in Süleyman's *Kanunname*. It is documented but not named.

A critical question that comes into sharper outline under Selim is that of female guilt and responsibility in illicit sexual acts. The sexual world of Selim's law book is a man's world. Men have sex with both sexes and men band together in gang abduction. All others -women, girls, boys, slaves- comprise the society governed by the male householder. The sexual autonomy of married women is erased, at least discursively (they seem to be committing sexual crime in the shadows). These emphases, particularly the rise of the legally accountable male householder, suggest a legal harem shaped by two linked pressures, one explicit and one implicit, that disrupt the *Shari'a* view of gender symmetry in sexual guilt. The first is the pressure on the male householder that combines honor (remember the cuckold penalty already present in Mehmed's *Kanunname*) with legal accountability, and the second a seeming reluctance to subject women, especially married women, to punishment, as if their physical and moral exposure might degrade the integrity of the household.

A note on the contents of the various *Kanunname* versions attributed by scholars to Selim: there is considerable variation among them. This is probably a measure of increasing legal activity at the center of government, as the production of, and demand for, *kanun* regulations multiplied and perhaps opened the door to unauthorized copies. Yet at the same time there is a cluster of persistent features -Selim's "signature statutes"- that help to identify the *Kanunname* manuscripts that belong to this sultan: the 400-*akçe* adultery fine, the statute requiring a husband to pay the fine of his adulteress wife, the inclusion of all household dependents in the street-harassment statute, and the statute criminalizing a boy or youth's homoerotic acts. From this perspective, Selim emerges even more sharply as the architect of the patriarchal household.

The terminology and the format employed in Selim's *Kanunname* render political legal authority -*siyaset*- a stronger force than religious legal authority, at least discursively. This is consistent with several anecdotes about Selim's severity in imposing summary punishment, even on members of the governing class, for example, his order to execute 150 treasury officials, from which he was dissuaded with difficulty.¹ In several statutes, the *Kanunname* calls for "severe *ta'zir*", seemingly instructing judges to impose the maximum level of beating. Selim also moves the abduction statutes in with

¹ The story is recounted in Richard Repp, *The Müfti of Istanbul: A study in the development of the Ottoman Learned Hierarchy* (London, 1986), 211.

all other *zina* statutes, thus collapsing the distinction made by Bayezid between the political and religious bases of imperial legal authority. It is as if Selim were impatient with the attention paid by his ancestors to the delicate balance between sources of a ruler's authority.

Selim I is well known to posterity as *Yavuz*, "stern", even "ferocious". On the other hand, a lesser-known epithet accorded to this sultan was *Adil*, "the just".¹ And his son Süleyman was *Kanunî*— "the *kanunifier*", the Law Giver—an epithet intended as a tribute. The development of imperial *kanun*, then, is not a simple story of an authoritarian regime imposing more and more laws on the subject population for the purposes of social engineering and political control. Indeed, some of Selim's new statutes have the feel of a clarification issued to answer inquiries from the field about the fine points of a legal principle, just as Ebu's Su'ud's several *fetvas* on the *muhaddere* woman responded to popular confusion about the practice of female seclusion. We can easily imagine a scenario in which judges were faced with silences or ambiguities in the *Kanunname*, and appealed from their metropolitan or provincial posts to imperial legal offices for answers. In fact, Selim almost seems to be conversing with the empire's judges in the *Kanunname*, albeit as their employer (judges, like soldiers, were on the imperial payroll). Examples in the *Kanunname* are the statutes clarify the degrees of guilt in a man's sexual relationships with household slaves and divorced wives, as well as a statute clarifying whether the penalty for sexual slander applied to a man who wrongly accused another of *zina* with his wife, daughter, or female slave (the accuser was somewhat guilty, incurring a beating but no fine). It is important to remember that the legal infrastructure of the empire had evolved considerably between Mehmed's and Selim's reigns: new cadres of judges, jurists, and legal scholars had been shaped in the imperial *medreses* founded by Mehmed, Bayezid, and their leading statesmen, and newly conquered cities and towns required new courts and judges. Still, it was one thing for Ebu's Su'ud to issue a *fetva*, a non-binding legal opinion, and another thing for a sultan to inscribe a judgment of guilt in imperial law.²

New territories, new legal regimes

Mehmed's *Kanunname* contains almost no customary-law penalties; it is basic and "clean", so to speak, routinely applying *ta'zir* and fines,

¹ Akgündüz, *Osmanlı Kanunnâmeleri*, 2: 85.

² At least in the two matters just cited, the sultan was making legal policy on questions that were typically decided by religious authorities. In this he prefigures the more explicit role of Süleyman as the legislating "imam", a role articulated by the chief mufti Ebus Suud.

envisioning a legal world regulated by judge and sultan. Bayezid's *Kanunname*, with its *siyaset* section, at first seems less "modern", populated as it was by the cutpurse bearing a knife in his arm, the pimp with branded forehead, the castrated sexual predator. But it was not an antiquarian bent that impelled Bayezid to add such statutes, it was a politician's respect for the varied social and legal customs alive in his empire.¹ His *Kanunname*, in other words, gave executive force to a legal program many of whose particulars would have been familiar to the empire's subjects.

Accounting for this increasing responsiveness to social practice -for example, Bayezid's to the problem of abduction and Selim's to the socio-sexual politics of the household- may seem a straightforward task. By the end of Selim's reign, the empire encompassed a more complex subject population, particularly after this sultan's momentous conquests of eastern Anatolia in 1514 and in 1516-1517 of the Mamluk sultanate's domain in greater Syria, Egypt, and the Hijaz, home to the Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Customary-law influences and pressures proliferated as a result of these new conquests, as many new societies and cultures underwent the process of integration into imperial systems of administration.

The incorporation of the old Islamic lands, with their longer life under *Shari'a*, is sometimes assumed to have introduced a socio-religious conservatism into Ottoman society. Certainly as "servant of the two noble sanctuaries" of Mecca and Medina, the Ottoman sultan was now the most powerful Sunni sovereign in the world. But there are other factors that can account for social change in the world of domestic space, sex, and gender, and the growing influence of harem culture. For one thing, the Ottoman regime had, by Selim's reign, grown its own formidable body of religious scholars and administrators who were ready to fill the legal vacuum created by the decline of Mamluk administrative control in its later decades. For another, the influence of urban culture generally weighed increasingly heavily in the evolving ottoman polity. When Ibn Battuta visited Anatolia in the 14th century, the Turkish people he encountered were new to the old civilizations that had shaped the region -Byzantine Christian and Persianate Muslim societies, with their own class structures that valorized the seclusion of upper-class women. And it is not at all clear that the social habits of the Arab lands

¹ Note the overall title of his *Kanunname*, *Kitab-ı Kavanin-i Örfiyye-i Osmanî*, which emphasizes plural regulations. Because of the multiple if interrelated connotations of 'örf—customary practice, but also a synonym of *kanun* in its meaning of the extra-*Sharia* legislative authority of the ruler, the title is difficult to render in English; "The Ottoman Book of Customary/Imperial Regulations" is an approximation. Likewise, the overall title of Chapter One, "Which itemizes and clarifies (*zikreder ve beyan kılır*) the fines and *siyaset* penalties corresponding to crimes".

were any more conservative than those of Anatolia or the Balkans.¹ The impact of Selim's conquest of the old Islamic lands on the social outlook of Ottoman law is thus a matter for further debate.

Rather, I would like to explore a different influence that was arguably of critical importance to Bayezid's and especially Selim's *Kanunnames*—the socio-legal world of the 15th-century Turkmen states of Anatolia. I want to suggest that rural, especially tribal, customs put a good deal of pressure on Ottoman administration—pressure that at least partially accounts for the expanding legal architecture of the harem evident in Bayezid's and especially Selim's *Kanunnames*. Ömer Lûtfi Barkan, scholar of Ottoman kanun, has drawn repeated attention to the influence on the Ottomans of the legal legacy of the two principal Turkmen states—the Akkoyunlu sultanate, which was based in western Iran but controlled eastern Anatolia, and the Dulkadir principality, whose large territory stretched from central through southeastern Anatolia into northern Syria.² These two states challenged the reigns of Mehmed and Bayezid, and it was not until Selim's reign that their domains in greater Anatolia were finally conquered. Established in the 14th century, both regimes had a substantial impact on Anatolian life.

Turkmen rulers were legally observant Muslims, although their respect for God's law and its historical administration was circumscribed by a strong sense of tribal custom and the rights of chieftains. The several local *kanunnames* issued by Uzun Hasan, renowned Akkoyunlu sultan from 1453 to 1478, dealt mainly with agricultural taxation; they were retained under Ottoman administration until around 1540, when new Ottoman provincial *kanunnames* were introduced to the region.³ It is the Dulkadir legal regime that is of particular interest to us because of the criminal sections present in the Dulkadir *Kanunname*. This *kanunname*, which like its Ottoman counterpart existed in different redactions, remained in force under the Ottomans until as late as 1560 or so, when it was finally superseded by Ottoman provincial *kanunnames*.⁴ Whether in its definition and regulation of crime it competed for grass-roots authority with the *Kanunname-i Osmanî* is an unstudied question—and perhaps 'unstudiable', given the lack of court records or other local sources that might cast light on local legal life.

¹ On the habits of Cairene women, see Huda Lutfi, "Manners and Customs of Fourteenth-Century Cairene Women: Female Anarchy versus Male Shar'i Order in Muslim Prescriptive Texts", in N. Keddie & B. Baron, eds., *Women in Middle Eastern History: Shifting Boundaries in Sex and Gender* (New Haven, 1991).

² See Barkan's "Osmanlı Devrinde Akkoyunlu Hükümdarı Uzun Hasan Beye Ait Kanunlar", *Tarih Vesikaları* 1/2 & 3 (1941), and his *XV ve XVIinci Asırlarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Ziraî Ekonominin Hukukî ve Malî Esaslar: Kanunlar* (İstanbul, 1943), 119-20, 130.

³ It appears that the Akkoyunlu *kanuns* entered the official records of the Ottoman regime in 1518 (Barkan, *Kanunlar*, 145).

⁴ Barkan, *Kanunlar*, 128, note 1; Peirce, *Morality Tales*, 321.

However, that the Ottomans took so long to displace the Dulkadir *Kanunname* in the more tenaciously tribal areas of the former Dulkadir domain is surely some measure of its tenacity on the ground.

The Anatolian domains of the Akkoyunlu and Dulkadir were difficult areas for the Ottomans to control, both politically and socially, especially the predominantly tribal Dulkadir region. Selim was famously watchful over these territories and fierce in his policies toward the empire's eastern frontier and the intractable populations that might threaten it. In general, the challenge of controlling tribal groups -Bedouin Arab, Turkmen, and Kurd- was one that the empire never fully met. During the reigns of Bayezid, Selim, and Süleyman, the unruly and anti-Ottoman Turkmen tribes of Anatolia, northern Syria, and northern Iraq presented a serious political crisis to the Ottoman regime because of their support of the increasingly militant and expansionist Safavid spiritual order, which in the early years of the 16th century created a new empire in Iran. In fact, it was these Turkmen, nominal subjects of the Ottoman sultan, who provided most of the military power for the extraordinarily successful new state. Selim allegedly deposed his father in 1512 because of his failure to address the looming Safavid threat, and his defeat of the new shah of Iran in 1514 brought Turkmen territory, if not Turkmen hearts, back into the Ottoman Empire. Let us turn now to the Dulkadir *Kanunname* to explore its character and possible relation to that of the Ottoman *Kanunname*.

The Dulkadir *Kanunname*

Bertrandon de la Broquière, a late 15th-century traveler to the east, told in his memoir of the female soldiers of Dulkadir.¹ Even Hans Dernschwam, who held the women of Istanbul to be of little account, noted that Dulkadir women handled horses well, riding full saddle like men. It may seem surprising, then, that the Dulkadir *Kanunname* was militant about gender relations. Like Selim's *Kanunname*, it depicts a starkly masculine world, where men are the instigators of sexual crime and women's sexual misconduct is portrayed as a product of men's assault. The Dulkadir *Kanunname* adamantly guards the domicile. It shares with the Ottoman *Kanunname* rulings on breaking into dwellings with sexual intent, physical harassment (embracing, kissing) of women, abduction, and prevention of the marriage of an abducted female to her abductor. Like Selim's *Kanunname*, the Dulkadir *Kanunname* puts particular emphasis on the problem of boys as sexual

¹ Bertrandon de la Broquière, *Le Voyage d'Outremer*, ed. Ch Schefer (Paris, 1892).

objects. It is particularly fierce in the face of the abduction of a boy, which carries the penalty of castration or a fine of 24 gold pieces, the highest of *zina*-related fines.¹

Before looking at its statutes in detail, we should note that, like the Ottoman *Kanunname*, the Dulkadir *Kanunname* existed in variants. Or rather, two main variants have survived through their incorporation into Ottoman survey registers beginning in the 1520s.² One is the *Kanunname* of Bozok, a largely tribal central-Anatolian region that was part of the Dulkadir domain (and that would be notoriously resistant to Ottoman political control), and the other the *Kanunname* of Alaüddevle ruler of the Dulkadir principality from 1481 to 1515. The latter has somewhat more Arabic, i.e. Islamic, terminology than the former, perhaps a reflection of the urban residence of Dulkadir princes and their patronage of Islamic institutions. It makes sense to assume that both variants reflected Dulkadir *kanun* of the early 16th century. While the differences between them are minor, their variations cast light on some of the main themes of this essay.

An outstanding feature of the Dulkadir *Kanunname* is that men are held responsible for the crimes committed by women. In the *Kanunname*'s *zina* section ("the regulations (*ahkam*) on *zina* and related matters"), only men are punished. The married adulterer is fined 15 gold pieces, the single man guilty of fornication 12 or 13. These fines were considerably higher than Ottoman fines for the same crimes. A man who has sex with his fiancée suffers the *zina* penalty; however, if their amorous encounter stops short of sex, his fine is 5 gold pieces. No mention is made of the fiancée. In the case of abduction, while females (assumed to be unmarried) are recognized as potentially complicit, only the responsible males are punished: if the female is abducted willingly, her father or brother is fined 12 gold pieces; if unwillingly, her abductor pays the *zina* fine twice (whether sexual intercourse has actually taken place would appear to be irrelevant). But where is the married adulteress? There is no mention of her in the *zina* section of the Dulkadir *Kanunname*. However, toward the end of the Bozok (but not the Alaüddevle) *Kanunname*, there is a statute declaring that, "if any offence is committed by a woman [*avret*, a married or once married female], half the fine

¹ For the Dulkadir *Kanunname*, see Barkan, *Kanunlar*, 119-129, which gives both the Bozok and the Alaüddevle variants; and Heyd, *Old Ottoman Criminal Law*, 132-147, which relies primarily on the Bozok *Kanunname* but includes variations between it and the Alaüddevle *Kanunname*.

² Both variants can be found in the massive survey of southeastern Anatolia, northern Iraq, and greater Syria that is dated 1526 (the survey register, *Tapu Tahrir Defteri* 998, is part of the cadastral survey collection housed in the Ottoman Prime Ministry Archives in Istanbul).

imposed on a man shall be collected".¹ Sandwiched between statutes penalizing the destruction of a dwelling and the sale of a stray animal, this rule may or may not apply to the mature female's sexual misconduct

If Dulkadir females themselves suffered reduced fines or none at all, they were actively present in the *Kanunname*, which elaborated in detail the possibility of their complicity in illicit sexual unions—a matter on which the Ottoman *Kanunname* was silent. Factored into a number of statutes with which we are by now familiar, the “did she or didn’t she” question determined the severity of the male’s punishment. For example, if the female is complicit, a man guilty of breaking into a dwelling with intent to commit *zina* or kissing or embracing a female pays only 5 gold pieces instead of the usual *zina* fine; moreover, in the Alaüddevle (but not the Bozok) *Kanunname*, her father or brother must pay the *zina* fine for her transgression. Both variants are adamant that male relatives must compensate for female complicity in the case of abduction.

Abduction looms more threatening and more complex in the Dulkadir than in the Ottoman *Kanunname*, perhaps not surprisingly in this largely tribal polity where inter-tribal raids were a common feature of life. Indeed, abduction by raiding parties is addressed in a statute that fines each member of the party 8 gold pieces (Bozok) or 15 gold pieces (Alaüddevle, whose scenario includes breaking into a dwelling). Moreover, if someone should be injured (fighting off the raiders is implied), the abductors are liable for compensation (*diyet*).

On the problem of abduction as a subterfuge toward marriage, the Dulkadir *Kanunname* is more detailed and thus less arbitrary than the Ottoman *Kanunname*. It acknowledges the possibility that the female’s guardian (father or brother is implied) may consent to the *fait accompli* created by the couple’s elopement. On the other hand, the guardian may insist on annulment by appealing to the Islamic legal principle of *küfv*, i.e. by claiming that his female relative is socially superior to her captor. These details suggest a *longue durée* persistence of strategies, explored in their modern manifestations in the work of anthropologist Daniel Bates with nomads in the former Dulkadir domain, whereby young lovers use abduction to subvert barriers to marriage. The Dulkadir *Kanunname* suggests a particular urgency to elopement when the girl’s family disapproves of her choice of partner. Perhaps the possibility of conspiratorial planning lay behind the *Kanunname* statute that penalized mere conversation between an engaged couple.

¹ Barkan, *Kanunlar*, 127; Heyd, *Old Ottoman Criminal Law*, 142.

Dulkadir girls were not sexually reticent, it seems. Perhaps the horsemanship lauded by European travelers figured in their patent ability to escape from their family. But woe to the married woman who was caught with a male stranger, for the *Kanunname* is adamant that her husband has the right to kill both her and her lover if he catches them in an amorous encounter. "Under *Shari'a*, he is guilty of homicide, but by customary law ('*örfen*') he is not guilty," asserted the Bozok *Kanunname*. Alaüddeve's *Kanunname* is more careful, assuming, it would seem, that "honor killing" (as we have come to label this act) was regarded by some as forbidden by customary law as well: "...he is not guilty of homicide, nothing may be taken from him [as fine or compensation] on the pretext that he is guilty under customary law." A husband may not, however, legitimately kill the lovers on the basis of hearsay, unless there is a witness who can provide valid *Shari'a* evidence. In the light of this Dulkadir defense of honor killing, we must recall Bayezid II's ruling that made the killing of a married woman's lover the prerogative of state authorities ("a man who is caught with a [married] woman is punished by *siyaset*", i.e. executed by official decree). While it invalidated honor killing, the Ottoman statute skipped over the issue of the wife's betrayal of her husband, perhaps hoping a cuckolded male would be satisfied with recouping his honor through divorcing his wife (recall the fine exacted from a man who failed to divorce an adulterous wife, a rule absent in the Dulkadir *Kanunname*). Under Süleyman, however, the Ottoman *Kanunname* would sanction honor killing—perhaps yielding to popular pressure—albeit with restrictive caveats.

Apart from honor killing, the most severely punished *zina*-related crime in the Dulkadir *Kanunname* was the abduction of boys (*oğlan*). The penalty, which appears to apply to all members of an abducting party, is castration or a fine of 24 gold pieces. However, the scenario changes if the abducted is a catamite, presumably complicit in his capture: in this case both parties are punished, either by the *Shari'a* penalty of a beating or by payment of the fine imposed on unmarried male fornicators (12 gold pieces). Fathers are not expected to pay this fine incurred by their minor sons. What is the sub-text here? Unmarried females are the usual (and expected) victims of abduction, and fathers are responsible for guarding their daughters from this threat. The abduction of a boy, on the other hand, is a capital crime, with which fathers have nothing to do. Or *must not* have anything to do—in this regard, the Dulkadir *Kanunname* was perhaps attempting to head off the same social catastrophe of vigilante vengeance that Bayezid attempted to by depriving a husband of the right to kill an adulterous wife caught *in flagrante delicto*.

The social world of the Dulkadir *Kanunname* is not an urban world. No judges, no slaves, and no non-Muslims are present in its statutes. Consistent with an essentially tribal ambience in which raiding was a way of life, the first crimes it details are highway robbery and theft. The world of the *Kanunname* is not, however, a purely nomadic or anti-urban world, as it contains statutes regulating agricultural and commercial crimes. Nor does it lack recognition of the expectations of *Shari'a* with regard to the ruler's cognizance of God's law. "God's crimes" are all present in the *Kanunname*, and in its treatment of sexual slander (*kazf*) it is closer to the spirit of *Shari'a* than parallel Ottoman statutes.¹ Indeed, the Dulkadir *Kanunname* pays attention -or lip service at least- to the canonical *Shari'a* penalties of stoning to death (for adulterers) and cutting off hands (for thieves), even though these penalties were for all practical purposes eschewed in favor of fines, in both the Ottoman and Dulkadir domains. For example, the statute on adultery states, "Whoever commits *zina* and it is proved in accordance with *Shari'a* [or] customary law, if he is not married and the canonical punishment [*hadd*, typically a beating of 100 strokes] does not take place, he is fined 12 gold pieces; if he is married and stoning to death (*recm*) does not take place, he is fined 15 gold pieces." Thus, on paper at least, the Dulkadir lords paid honor to the higher law of Islam. Not until Süleyman's reign does the Ottoman *Kanunname* contain such ritual nods to the authority of *Shari'a*. Where the Ottomans outperformed the Dulkadir islamically was in the development of a legal infrastructure such that we can be confident that judges played a significant role in the translation of the *Kanunname* to actual practice.

Let us now consider the relationship between the Dulkadir *Kanunname* and the evolution of the Ottoman *Kanunname*. We cannot settle for the simple premise that Ottoman rulers -who only gradually incorporated customary legislation present in the Dulkadir *Kanunname* into their own *Kanunname*, starting with Bayezid's statutes on abduction- were directly influenced by Dulkadir *kanun*. For one thing, the Dulkadir *Kanunname* may have well been influenced by developments in Ottoman *kanun*, given that the Dulkadir rulers were at first neighbors, friendly for the most part, of the Ottoman sultans, then their vassals, and only finally their subjects. Since we cannot be sure how representative the surviving texts of the Dulkadir *Kanunname* are of the legal regime of an independent Dulkadir principality, it is difficult to say when, how, and under what (mutual) influences various statutes in either *Kanunname* were shaped. For another thing, it may very well be that the practices criminalized and penalized by the Dulkadir rulers

¹ The *Kanunname*'s treatment of slander (*buhtan*) distinguishes between the accused of good and of bad moral reputations, and thus incorporates the legal concept of *muhsan/muhsana*.

were widespread and likewise prosecuted in Ottoman lands before they were canonized in official *kanunnames*. After all, the origins of the Ottoman dynastic house itself and its original followers were Turkmen. And some legal sanctions incorporated in both *Kanunnames* -for example, honor killing, and the predominance of fines as criminal penalties- were ancient to the region, present in the legal codes of Anatolian Hittite rulers of the second millennium BCE, and might thus be said to be embedded in the land itself.¹ But the emphases shared by Selim's and the Dulkadir *Kanunnames* -the harsher fines for *zina*, the responsibility of male relatives for the crimes of their women, the abhorrence of sons taken as sexual objects of men- suggest that this sultan was particularly attentive to Dulkadir law, not the least because it was he who brought the principality into the empire. In the end, however, whatever the vectors of influence, the affinities and undeniable influences generated by the evolution of *kanun* in the two polities had the outcome of expanding the role of the state in the regulation of sexual relations and the legal architecture of the harem.

The *Kanunname* of Süleyman I

Süleyman's *Kanunname* is a *summa*, a comprehensive treatment of imperial *kanun* that incorporates the work of his ancestors and also adds new provisions as well as clarifying details. It recuperates statutes in Bayezid's *Kanunname* that were ignored or superseded in Selim's *Kanunname*, and it continues the practice observable in the latter of elaborating the fine points of existing statutes. Like his grandfather's, Süleyman's *Kanunname* treats sexual crime in both the *zina* section and a *siyaset* section. The number of statutes in its many variants differs considerably, the largest totaling forty-some statutes.² Sometimes there are multiple and contradictory rulings on a specific crime -for example, three rules on pimping, one under the rubric of *zina* (Mehmed's rule on the female pimp) and two under *siyaset* (*ta'zir*, a

¹ Harry A. Hoffner, Jr., "Legal and Social Institutions of Hittite Anatolia", in J. Sasson, ed., *Civilizations of the Ancient Near East* (New York, 1995), 1: 555-569; Hoffner notes commonalities among Hittite, Babylonian, and Israelite law.

² See Heyd, *Old Ottoman Criminal Law*, 29-30, on the different "families" of the *Kanunname* of Süleyman; the version published by Heyd is comprehensive, while the version published by Ahmet Akgündüz (*Osmanlı Kanunnameleri*, Vol. 4) is one of the shorter variants. There are clear affinities between Süleyman's *Kanunname* and what is claimed to be a late version of Selim's *Kanunname* (1520) by Yaşar Yücel, who has published it (without citing its provenance or archival location) in *1. Selim Kanûnnâmeleri (1512-1520)* (Ankara, 1995). It is therefore possible that some of the changes introduced by Süleyman, were in fact introduced by his father; on the other hand, this "late Selim" variant lacks some of Selim's "signature statutes" and so its attribution to Selim rather than Süleyman seems questionable.

fine, plus public shaming; branding the pimp's face and in some versions the face of the prostitute). Indeed, Süleyman's *Kanunname* is considerably more unabashed than its predecessors about the inclusion of clashing rules, reminding us forcefully that the Ottoman *Kanunname* is not a fixed code but rather a collection of statutes that permits some latitude in application.

Some major innovations appear in Süleyman's *Kanunname*. One of these is the acknowledgement of women's potential complicity in abduction, as well as the direct punishment of the complicit female -her genitals are branded, a seeming parallel to the castration of her abductor. The *Kanunname* now penalizes accomplices to an act of abduction: two punitive "options" are, first, a *ta'zir* beating and a fine no greater than 100 *akçes*, the other castration. Honor killing is now deemed permissible, provided that the husband immediately summons "the community" (*cemaat*) to witness the slaying; if he does so, the heirs of the murdered individuals cannot claim compensation (e.g. it is not homicide). As a kind of corollary, a man who wounds a stranger he catches in his home is not to be prosecuted, as long as he immediately summons witnesses. Perhaps this statute was intended as a less violent sanction than honor killing (go after him, but do not kill him).

Parallels with the Dulkadir *Kanunname* have clearly multiplied. Süleyman's *Kanunname* also pays lip service to the canonical punishments for adultery and fornication in the manner of the Dulkadir *Kanunname*. With this sultan's reign, we can hazard a more direct linkage between the two *kanun* traditions: the office of the chancellery (*nişancı*), which was responsible for issuing updated versions of the Ottoman *Kanunname*, presumably had a direct hand in the re-inscription of the Bozok and Alaüddevle *Kanunnames* in the cadastral survey registers disseminated during Süleyman's reign. In other words, imperial legal specialists were actively working with both *kanunname* corpuses.

A final innovation of Süleyman's *Kanunname* is its criminalization of sodomy as an act in and of itself, not as a variation on abduction. Sodomy is framed in the Arabic language of jurisprudence, as *livata*. Indeed, the *zina* section of some versions of Süleyman's *Kanunname* is entitled "on *zina* and *livata*."¹ Selim had already written the sodomized into the *Kanunname* in inflicting punishment on a son who had reached majority (*balıg*) for "playing the role of the slave girl", and on the father if the boy were still immature. Now the sodomizer himself -assuming he has reached majority and is not feeble-minded- is punished with the *zina* fines (300 *akçes* for a rich married man, 100 for a rich single man, and so on). Thus the assimilation of homoerotic sex to the crime of *zina* has been completed. Homoerotic sex is

¹ E.g. the version published by Akgündüz cited above.

still penalized by castration in the context of abduction, but there the criminal emphasis is on abduction for sexual exploitation, not on sodomy, since the abductor of a girl is similarly incapacitated. In a logical extension of the premise that it is the sodomizer who is guilty, some versions of Süleyman's *Kanunname* punish a man who has anal intercourse with his wife with a heavy *ta'zir* beating and a fine of one *akçe* per stroke. What the *Kanunname* is silent on is the adult male of sound mind (no longer someone's son) who chooses the passive role.

Süleyman's *Kanunname* also reconciles some divergent tendencies in his ancestors' work. It reduces the *zina* fines stipulated by Selim, returning them to the levels set by Bayezid and Mehmed. Süleyman also reinstates women's accountability for their criminal acts: married and widowed women are fine-paying adulterers, fornicators, and pimps. The provision insisted on by Selim -that a husband pay his adulterous wife's fine- is absent from a majority of manuscripts attributed to Süleyman.¹ Since the latter's *Kanunname* also introduces a rider to the standard cuckold penalty of 100 *akçes* for a rich man -"but it has become the practice to take 300 *akçes*"- it would seem that a husband's divorce of his adulterous wife took the place of paying her fine. This is underlined by a statute that forbids the marriage of a woman divorced by her husband because of gossip about her relations with another man to that man. What we might call "cuckold divorce" was, it seems, common practice.²

In contrast to the man's world of Selim's (and the Dulkadir) *Kanunname*, Süleyman's gives the impression of women constantly engaging in sexual dalliance. This is in part because of the number of new statutes, including new restrictions on women's public appearance. Not only is a woman to be divorced if her name is bandied about as a loose woman, but now she cannot even be seen in a secluded place (*halvet*) with a man; should she so err, both are punished with *ta'zir* or the *zina* fines. Women now also populate the legions of individuals who brawl in public: women who fight are punished with severe *ta'zir* and a fine of one *akçe* per stroke, unless they are "honorable" women (*muhaddere*), in which case their husband is upbraided and fined 20 *akçe* -the humiliation of the honorable man presumably worth many blows and *akçes*.

¹ Heyd, *Old Ottoman Criminal Law*, 96, note 6. It is worth noting that the Leningrad manuscript of Selim's *Kanunname* (see n. 17) contains both the "Mehmed/Bayezid rule" that an adulteress pay her own *zina* fine and the "Selim rule" that her husband pay the fine (apparently as well as the cuckold penalty). This ambivalence on who pays the adulteress's fine may be a tacit acknowledgement of unmediated cultural variation concerning the punishment of adulteresses and therefore an authorization of two options for local interpretation.

² This is confirmed in my own work on mid-16th-century Aintab, where in the space of thirteen months there were five "cuckold" divorces registered at the Aintab court, four by Muslim men and one by an Armenian Christian man (*Morality Tales*, *passim*).

What has become of the harem in this last of the imperial law books from this long legal century? The starkness of harem culture in the Dulkadir *Kanunname* is diluted by the sheer number of statutes, their details and variations. But the dynamics of the harem are just as present, and they have been reinforced by new restrictions on the public association of males and females. The street has become virtually off-limits as a zone where women can retain personal dignity and honor. The burden of defending household honor still falls to the male, whose own sexual options have been further reduced through the criminalization of sodomy. Women have been restored as criminal agents, but this has less to do, I think, with a recuperation of their honor than with alignment of the *Kanunname* with the *Shari'a* principle of equal punishment of males and females in the general arena of *zina*. This is most drastically signaled in the parallel punishments inflicted on abducting lovers.

In sum, by Süleyman's reign, the sexual legislation of the Ottoman *Kanunname* has realized in full detail the definition of *zina* as any sexual contact outside of marriage or the relationship of master and female slave. In the process it has curtailed, normatively if not actually, a range of sexual expression that appear to have been earlier either tacitly tolerated or endured for lack of legal protection.

SCRIBAL CHAOS? OBSERVATION ON THE POST OF *RE'İSÜLKÜTTAB* IN THE LATE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

Christine Woodhead

Between 1574 and 1603 the personnel of the Ottoman central chancery service increased significantly in number and its practices began to attract more attention from contemporaries. Selaniki's history shows that there were at least 28 appointments to the post of *re'isülküttab* in these 29 years, and several controversial cases of dismissal and imprisonment of senior chancery officials. He also records a major forgery scandal perpetrated by a group of lesser scribes, which came to light in 1590, and the fate of two minor treasury clerks punished for theft by being hung on a chestnut tree in front of the treasury building in Topkapı Sarayı in May 1596, an awful warning to the *ehl-i divan* on the eve of Mehmed III's Hungarian campaign.¹ Such evidence accords well with the growing perception by Ottoman observers of increasing corruption and declining standards in various branches of Ottoman administration from the reign of Murad III onwards.

However, such details cannot automatically be taken as evidence of major difficulty within the chancery service without examining more closely how the system worked in this era. The dubious standards of a few lesser *küttab* were to some degree inevitable in view of the rapid expansion of the entire scribal service in response to the demands of almost continuous warfare after 1578. At the lower levels, more men of various origins and training were able to enter the corps of *divan katipleri* and their apprentices through recommendation by a vezir, *paşa* or in some cases the Han of the Crimea, often as a reward for campaign service. Not all of these necessarily proved incompetent. At the top end of the scale, vezirial patronage also had an increasingly decisive influence on appointments and dismissals as *re'isülküttab* – a factor, which, again, had less to do with general competence than it did with politics. A significant case in point is the resignation of the grand vezir Mesih Paşa in 1586 because the sultan would not accept as

¹ Selaniki Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Selaniki*, ed. Mehmet İpşirli (İstanbul, 1989), I, 227; II, 603-4. See also Pal Fodor, 'How to forge documents? A case of corruption within the Ottoman bureaucracy around 1590', *Acta orientalia academica scientiarum Hungaricae*, XLVIII/3 (1995), 383-89.

re'isülküttab his nominee Küçük Hasan Bey.¹ The 28 appointments during the reigns of Murad III and Mehmed III involve sixteen men, several of whom served two or more turns as *re'is*, depending to a large extent upon the favour of the incoming grand vezir. In the main, dates of appointment of grand vezir and *re'is* correlate very closely. The more frequent changes of grand vezir after the stability of the Sokollu era therefore appear to be the prime determinant in the increasing frequency of *re'isülküttab* appointments.² The open hostility between Koca Sinan Paşa and his rivals for the grand vezirate sharpened the factional divisions and made short tenure a fact of life. In addition, natural death and meritorious promotion to higher posts outside the chancery service helped to further accelerate the turnover of postholders. Paradoxically, as the importance of the office of *re'is* increased, stability of tenure decreased. Generally speaking, however, those appointed *re'isülküttab* were either men of long experience in the chancery service, or talented younger men such as Okçuzade Mehmed Şah Efendi and İlyas Medhi Bey, virtually all of whom were highly regarded by their peers. The one possible exception – Yahya Çelebi – appears to prove the rule.

As the career of the *re'isülküttab* became more closely influenced by his political superior, the grand vezir, the relationship with his professional superior, the *nişancı*, also changed. Before c.1580, no *re'isülküttab* who had once been promoted to *nişancı* appears to have reverted to *re'is* thereafter. Elevation to *nişancı* was a prestigious route out of the scribal service, not to be reversed.³ However, by the early seventeenth century the relationship between the two posts had clearly altered. The greater practical importance of the *re'is* over the *nişancı* within the central administration led to some *nişancı*s being re-appointed *re'is*; the *nişancılık* ceased to be an obvious or permanent promotion. Biographical data on the sixteen *re'isülküttab* given below illustrate the beginning of this transition towards the end of the sixteenth century. Hamza Çelebi/Paşa was the first *nişancı* to be 'demoted' to *re'is*, in 1581. In the reign of Ahmed I, *katib* Hasan Hükmi appears to have been appointed *re'is* and *nişancı* in quick succession in 1606, then *re'is* (1614), *nişancı* again (1618), and (finally?) *re'is* (1621). After 1623 there are

¹ See 'Küçük Hasan Bey' below.

² See Cornell H Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: the Historian Mustafa Ali (1541-1600)* (Princeton, 1986), 97-9, who also makes a case for significant military-economic reasons for the increasingly short tenure of many administrative offices in this period. The *re'isülküttab* list given in Josef Matuz, *Das Kanzleiwesen Sultan Süleymans des Prachtigen* (Wiesbaden, 1974), 41-5, shows no regular correlation between *re'is* and grand vezir appointments during Süleyman's reign, and generally longer terms of office.

³ See the biographical lists in Matuz, *Das Kanzleiwesen*, 29-33, 41-45, which also highlights the generally more educated backgrounds of the *re'is/nişancı*s of Süleyman's reign, in contrast to the more professional training of later *re'isülküttabs*.

very few cases where a *re'isülküttab* subsequently become *nişancı*; for most the post of *re'is* became an end in itself.¹

Tenure of the office of *re'isülküttab* appears chaotic, with many appointments of only a few months' or weeks' duration. However, this does not necessarily imply that the chancery service as a whole was in chaos or would inevitably become so. As Linda Darling has pointed out in relation to the financial section of the scribal service, the 'pragmatic adaptation' required to cope with the force of changing political, military and economic circumstances in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries evolved within the financial service itself. Far from becoming disorderly and corrupt, the service responded successfully to new situations.² A comparable evolution must have taken place within the chancery section, with changes in the role of the *re'isülküttab* a significant element. If we assume that the *re'isülküttab*, appointed originally as the *nişancı*'s deputy and *de facto* head of the chancery, had a practical role in chancery organisation and daily routine, in overseeing the training of new recruits, and of generally supervising scribal operations in the *divan*, then we would also assume that continued rapid turnover of postholders in this position of chief executive would necessarily have an adverse effect upon procedures and morale in the chancery service as a whole. This would be particularly problematic when considerable numbers of new scribal staff were being recruited, and order needed to be imposed. Undoubtedly, discontinuity was harmful to a degree and contemporary criticisms had some substance. However, did the *re'is* actually remain so closely concerned with chancery routine, or was he becoming more an hierarchical figurehead? If in the 1580s and 1590s it was the grand vezir who determined most *re'isülküttab* appointments, this was largely because he was the person with whom the *re'isülküttab* worked most closely and with whom the *re'is*'s patronage loyalties and his political and professional fortunes lay. Unless or until he obtained a posting outside the chancery system, the *re'is*'s interests and work would therefore tend more towards the grand vezir's concerns than the requirements of the *nişancı* or the chancery. Greater continuity and responsibility within the chancery was probably provided by senior scribes just below the level of *re'isülküttab*, i.e. the *tezkirecis* of the *divan* and other experienced *küttab* of twenty or more years' *divan* experience, the pool of potential *re'isülküttabs* perfectly capable of running the chancery

¹ Cf. Feridun M. Emecen, 'Ali'nin 'Ayn'ı: XVII. yüzyıl başında Osmanlı bürokrasisinde katib rumuzları', *Tarih Dergisi*, 35 (1984-94), 140, fn. 23 for Hasan Hükmi; Ahmed Resmi Efendi, *Halifetü'r-Rü'esa* [*Sefinetü'r-Rü'esa*] (compiled c. 1750, publ. İstanbul, 1269/1853) for later *re'is* careers.

² Linda T. Darling, 'The Finance Scribes and Ottoman Politics' in Caesar E. Farah (ed.), *Decision-making and Change in the Ottoman Empire* (Kirksville, Missouri 1993), 89-100, esp. 94.

service on a routine basis. In this argument, the rapid turnover of *re'isülküttab* personnel, though destabilising for the individuals concerned, probably had a much less significant impact than expected on the chancery as a whole. Although it is not easy to identify separate scribal groups for specific chancery functions in the late sixteenth century, it is likely that subordinate chains of responsibility and authority were developing to cope with the increase in workload and personnel, and that these would to some degree compensate for the relative detachment and short tenure of the *re'isülküttab*.

The principal sources used for the present study are appointment records from the *rü'us* registers, and the diary history of Selaniki, himself a financial/secretarial official with a close interest in chancery appointments.¹ Such records are inevitably incomplete and sometimes confusing, particularly during the Iranian campaigns of the 1580s. A major problem of usage is the difficulty of distinguishing between a *re'isülküttab* and his *ka'immakam* (sometimes termed *na'ib*) when one is serving in Istanbul and the other on campaign with the grand vezir. The division of secretarial forces for campaign duty was generally solved by the *re'isülküttab* accompanying the grand vezir whenever the latter was appointed *serdar*, i.e. the senior position was held to be with the grand vezir wherever he was. Another problem of tracing *re'is* personnel is that, unlike the *nişancı* who retained a ceremonial status throughout, the *re'isülküttab* was not sufficiently important in hierarchical terms to be always noted by name in imperial accession ceremonies or on other major occasions. Although Selaniki prominently notes as *nişancı* Feridun Bey at the accession of Murad III in 1574, and Hamza Bey at the accession of Mehmed III in 1595, on neither occasion does he mention the *re'isülküttab* by name.

The object of the following biographies is therefore not to attempt a definitive listing of late sixteenth-century *re'isülküttabs*, though a slightly clearer picture may emerge. Rather, it presents biographical information on a significant professional group from two contrasting sources showing how senior chancery careers were linked with and influenced by certain other parts of the central administration. While a change of grand vezir is clearly the main

¹ Ahmed Resmi Efendi's *Halifetü'r-Rü'esa* also draws largely on Selaniki, though reference here will be made primarily to İpsirli's modern edition of the 16th-century source. Additional details are culled from *Sicill-i Osmani*, although the list of *Re'isülküttabs* in v. IV, 794-5, is unreliable and should be treated with care. Similarly, the list given in J Reyhman and A Zajackowski, *Handbook of Ottoman-Turkish Diplomats* (The Hague-Paris, 1968), 160-1, though an improvement on that in *SO*, does not include all the appointments given in the appendix below. Danişmend's *re'isülküttab* listing begins only in 1648: *İzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi* (Istanbul, 1971), V, 332 ff.; some of his *nişancı* listings are contradicted by evidence presented here. Occasional *re'isülküttab* references are also found in the major Ottoman chronicles of the period.

reason for the appointment of a new *re'isülküttab*, other factors include the obvious ones such as illness, death or promotion of a predecessor or higher official, especially one which led to a chain reaction of appointments as on the death of the *nişancı* Abdülmuhiyî in 1592; major positive events such as military victory (principally the capture of Eger in 1596) and perhaps the accession of a new sultan, and negative events such as military revolt, scandal, or the disgrace of a leading vezir. The least likely cause of change was voluntary resignation. Selaniki is not usually critical of dismissals *per se*, unless he considered there to have been a clear injustice. This suggests that short tenure was becoming accepted, with the expectation that officials would be re-appointed in due course, either after a period of retirement or of service in a scribal office of comparable status such as *defter emini* or as a *defterdar*.¹ All senior *küttab* of the late sixteenth century had established income as *timar* holders and thus were not financially destitute when dismissed from office.

It is not intended to consider here how far critics of the 1590s such as Mustafa Ali, elderly, disappointed and cantankerous, or Selaniki, elderly, hardworking and conscientious, were correct in their denunciations of falling standards and corruption.² All Ottoman government servants were involved to some extent in patronage networks, the more so as the administration expanded in size. Bribery and corruption were easy charges to level against successful members of another group, particularly those seen as outsiders, Mustafa Ali's *ecnebis*. Contemporary parallels exist in developing bureaucracies in Western Europe, study of which has led to an extensive literature on patron-client relationships as a central feature of dynamic political and social change in the pre-modern period.³ A corresponding depth of analysis has yet to be applied to the Ottoman system, and the claims of corruption and disorder re-assessed in the context of necessary administrative developments.

¹ C. V. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: the Sublime Porte 1789-1922* (Princeton, 1980), *passim*, underlines the fact that tenure of bureaucratic office remained short throughout the later Ottoman period, generally counted in months rather than years.

² Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual*, esp. 201-31, raises many interesting questions through analysis of Mustafa Ali's concern with scribal career paths and his constant search for a sufficiently powerful and generous patron.

³ E.g. Sharon Kettering, 'Patronage in early modern France', *French Historical Studies*, 17/4 (1992), 839-62, which provides a short introduction to terminology and a survey of research, and Linda Levy Peck, *Court Patronage and Corruption in Early Stuart England* (Boston, 1990).

Re'isülküttab biographies, 1574-1603¹(*?) Muhyiddin Mu'ini Çelebi (d. mid 1580s?)²

The *Sicill-i Osmani* list of *re'isülkütablar* (IV, 793-4) suggests that the incumbent in 1574 was Muhyiddin Mu'ini Çelebi, formerly *tezkireci* to Sokollu Mehmed Paşa and subsequently appointed *re'isülkütab* by him, possibly in 981/1573 in succession to Sokollu's other protégé Feridun Ahmed Bey (*re'isülkütab* 1570-73) on the latter's promotion to *nişancı*. Kınalızade records that Muhyiddin had had a *medrese* training before becoming a *katib*, and that he subsequently served as *nişancı*, but gives no dates of appointment. He was a recognised poet and *münşi*.

Okçuzade Mehmed Çelebi/Paşa (d. 1587)³

A man of military background, with long scribal experience and a reputation for learning, Okçuzade Mehmed Çelebi was promoted from the position of *tezkireci* (noted in 983/February 1576) to that of *re'isülkütab* for the first time in 984/August 1576. Appointed *Anadolu defterdarı* in 986/1578,⁴ he was again in this post when his son Şah Mehmed Çelebi was appointed *katib* in 988/October 1580.⁵ According to Selaniki, Okçuzade also succeeded Abdülmuhyi as *re'isülkütab* in RI 988/March 1580, which would have been in between his postings as *Anadolu defterdarı*.⁶ A further appointment as *re'is* in 989/1581 was soon followed by promotion to *baş defterdar*, but by equally rapid dismissal and brief imprisonment in 990/late 1582 due to his involvement (with other financial officials) in a bribery scandal concerning Cüce Nasuh Ağa, a former favourite of Murad III.⁷ Once pardoned, Okçuzade

¹ Given in chronological order of first appointment as *re'isülkütab*. An asterisk denotes men who were also appointed *nişancı* at some point in their career. Information not otherwise footnoted will be found in the relevant *SO* entry. Other sources frequently correct *SO*. The titles *çelebi*, *efendi*, *bey* and *paşa* are used as found in the sources and vary as a career proceeds. Contrary to Fleischer's assumption that 'professional bureaucrats' were generally known as *efendi* (*Bureaucrat and Intellectual*, 204), it appears here that they were initially known as *çelebi*, might become *efendi* as they became more senior, and became known as *bey* probably when they received a certain level of *dirlik* income. Those given the honorific rank of *beylerbeyi* were known as *paşa*.

² *SO* IV, 346; Kınalızade Hasan Çelebi, *Tezkiretü's-Şu'ara*, ed. İbrahim Kutluk (Ankara, 1981), II, 918-9, 'Mu'ini'.

³ *SO* IV 125-6; Selaniki, 128.

⁴ *SO* IV, 125. Cf. Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual*, 219 ff. on the appointment of chancery officials to financial posts (but rarely the other way around).

⁵ Başbakanlık Arşivi, Kamil Kepeci tasnifi [hereafter KK] 238/125. For Okçuzade Şah Mehmed Çelebi, see biography below.

⁶ Selaniki, 128. This may have been as appointment as *re'is ka'immakamı* during a campaign; see appendix below.

⁷ Selaniki, 136. The notion that imprisonment (for whatever reason) meant permanent disgrace does not apply to several of the individuals in this *re'is* list, who went on to resume successful careers.

Mehmed was appointed *beylerbeyi* of Cyprus and, in 993/1585, of Aleppo.¹ Okçuzade's slightly unusual career path thus passed through chancery service to the posts of *re'is*, *baş defterdar* and *beylerbeyi*, by-passing that of *nişancı* to succeed in the military-administrative sphere. He died in Rebi'ülevvel 985/March 1587, shortly after dismissal from his post in Aleppo.

***Abdülmuhyi Çelebi/Paşa (d.1592)²**

A *katib* of the divan since at least 976/1568-9,³ Abdülmuhyi Çelebi was by 1574 already a senior *katib* and *zeamet* holder. He served at least twice as *re'is*, first from late 1579 to dismissal in March 1580,⁴ possibly again after the early dismissal of Derviş Çelebi in August September 1580, and definitely from October 1581⁵ to his appointment as *Anadolu defterdarı* during the circumcision festival for Şehzade Mehmed in May 1582.⁶ Although promoted to *nişancı* on the death of Feridun Bey in March 1583,⁷ he was dismissed very shortly afterwards,⁸ since in August 1585, as a former *nişancı*, he successfully petitioned the *divan* for the grant of a *müteferrikalık*, citing the precedent of Celalzade Mustafa (*nişancı* 1534-57 and 1566-67), arguing that he had been out of office for nearly three years and had insufficient means for his upkeep. In a register entry of July 1587 he is still described simply as 'the former *nişancı*'.⁹ However, as a result of large-scale changes of office following the Janissary revolt early in 1589, Abdülmuhyi Paşa¹⁰ was re-appointed *nişancı* and remained so until his death in post in July 1592.¹¹

Apparently a native of Akhisar, near Geyve in northwest Anatolia, Abdülmuhyi had at least two sons and a cousin who sought to follow him in a scribal career. The first son, Mehmed, died in 1579 whilst a *şagird*

¹ *Selaniki*, 153-4.

² *SO* III, 401 and IV, 794.

³ KK 6593/268a; from a composite register entitled *defter-i 'adet-i giyah-i huşk*, listing members of various central administrative groups entitled to fodder rations between the years 962/1554-5 and 977/1569-70.

⁴ Entry dated 8 Zilh 987/26 Jan 1580 (KK 236/225) in Abdülmuhyi's hand as *re'is*, but KK 236/40 dated CII/August 1579 refers to him still as *divan-i hümayun katibi*. Hasan Beyzade, *Tarih* (ms. Nurosmaniye 3134), 49b implies he was a protégé of Nişancı/Boyalı Mehmed Paşa.

⁵ *Selaniki*, 130.

⁶ KK 239, 362: 28 RI 990/22 May 1582

⁷ *Selaniki*, 139. He does not appear in the *SO nişancı* list (IV, 792).

⁸ Hasan Beyzade, *Tarih*, 54b, gives 'forty days'.

⁹ KK 246/10 and 249/80. This data conflicts with Danişmend's statement (V, 325) that Abdülmuhyi served as *nişancı* for a continuous period of almost five years from 1583 to 1588.

¹⁰ *Selaniki*, 212 notes that he had been in retirement with the rank of *Anadolu beylerbeyi*.

¹¹ *Selaniki*, 278. *Selaniki* also notes (p.238) that Abdülmuhyi was retained as *nişancı* during 1591 despite being chronically ill. The former *nişancı*, currently a *vezir*, Nişancı Mehmed Paşa had stood in for him.

(apprentice *katib*); the second son was promoted from *şagird* to *katib* in 1587, and a cousin, a *timar*-holder called Abbas, was appointed to this vacant *şagirdlik*.¹

***Hamza Çelebi/Bey/Paşa (d.c.1606)²**

In a fifty-year chancery career beginning c.1562,³ Hamza Çelebi held the posts of *re'is* and *nişancı* at least four times each and was the most highly respected chancery official during the reign of Mehmed III. By 1574 he was a senior *zeamet*-holding *divan katibi*, in 1578 was charged with compiling a new *tahrir* of *yaya* and *müsellem* troops, and in February 1580 secured a *şagirdlik* in the chancery for his son Ahmed.⁴ Promotion to *re'is* (first tenure) must have followed shortly thereafter, since in 988/August 1580 he was promoted further, to *nişancı*, and succeeded as *re'is* by Derviş Çelebi.⁵

Hamza Bey was dismissed from the *nişancılık* in February 1581 in favour of Feridun Bey, whose *sancak* of Köstendil he was offered in return. He refused this, on the grounds that he would rather attend on campaign with the rank of *müteferrika*.⁶ Hamza Bey's first term of office as *nişancı* may have been a stop-gap measure until Feridun Bey could be recalled from his *sancak* to take up the post. Selaniki reports a crisis at the top of the central administration in late 1580/early 1581 when due to the recent deaths of two vezirs there was in effect only one, the *kaimmakam* Siyavuş Paşa, remaining in Istanbul to conduct normal business. The *nişancı* Mehmed Paşa was hurriedly promoted to vezir, leaving his own post vacant,⁷ to be filled temporarily by Hamza Bey.

Hamza Bey's next appointment was as *nazır* (superintendent) of the circumcision festival, a task which according to Selaniki involved six months preparation before the event itself in May 1582.⁸ His reward was a second term as *re'isülküttab*, probably from late 1582 to his appointment as *sancak beyi* of Kastamonu in December 1585.⁹ At least the final year of this

¹ KK 236/40 (for 1579), 249/80 (for 1587).

² SO II, 252-3.

³ KK 6593/248d, appearing simply as 'Hamza', towards the end of a list of divan scribes for 970/1562-3.

⁴ KK 236/30 (CI 981/Sept. 1573); Başbakanlık Arşivi, Mühimme Defterleri 35, no.6 (RI 986/May 1578); KK 236/243 (Muh. 988/Feb. 1580).

⁵ KK 238/37, entry written by Hamza Çelebi, noting Derviş Çelebi's appointment. See Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual*, 91-2, for Ali's hopeless plea to the grand vezir to have himself appointed *nişancı* in place of the 'ignorant' Hamza Çelebi; and p.117 for a continuation of this vendetta.

⁶ KK 238/276; KK 238/291 Safer 989/March 1581. The petition was not allowed.

⁷ Selaniki, 129-30.

⁸ Selaniki, 133.

⁹ Noted as *re'is* in KK 241/332, RI 991/March 1583; cf. reference in Douglas Howard, 'The Historical Development of the Ottoman Imperial Registry (*defter-i hakani*): mid-Fifteenth to mid-Seventeenth Centuries', *Archivum Ottomanicum*, XI, 1986 (1988), 225-6. Hasan Beyzade, *Tarih*, 58a, records Hamza's posting as *bey* of Kastamonu.

unusually long three-year term of office was spent on campaign as *re'is* in the service of the grand vezir Özdemiroğlu Osman Paşa in the Caucasus.¹

Hamza Bey's postings for the next few years are unclear, with records available of dismissal but not of appointment. Selaniki records his dismissal as *re'isülküttab* in January 1587, which suggests that he must have been re-appointed some time in 1586 (third tenure). A register entry from November 1589 referring to '*re'is-i küttab* Hamza Efendi' then implies a final tenure of the post, ultimately terminated in September 1590 by dismissal as a result of disagreements with the grand vezir Koca Sinan Paşa.² Selaniki comments specifically that this was Hamza Bey's fourth dismissal from the *riyaset*, and is critical of the grand vezir for engineering the removal of such an experienced and valued official.

Thereafter Hamza Bey's appointments were to the *nişancılık*, a post he dominated for the rest of his life. A chain of senior chancery promotions triggered by the death of the *nişancı* Abdülmuhyi Paşa in July 1592 brought Hamza a stable four-year appointment until October 1596, when many administrative posts changed hands as rewards after the successful siege of Eger.³ Hamza served as *nişancı* for a third time from mid-1598 to his dismissal in May 1599 in favour of Okçuzade Şah Mehmed Efendi, a protégé of the current grand vezir İbrahim Paşa. A debate ensued as to whether either the previous or present *nişancı* was to accompany İbrahim Paşa on campaign in Hungary, Hamza Paşa having already spent considerable sums of his own money in preparation. Both were subsequently excused this duty.⁴ Hamza Paşa's fourth and final term as *nişancı* lasted from August 1601, when he succeeded Okçuzade,⁵ to his resignation some time in 1013/1604-5, due probably to old age. This final period of office was interrupted 'unjustly' (*bila sebeb*) in 1011/early 1603 for a three-month period by the appointment of the elderly Lam Ali Efendi.⁶

Various comments by Selaniki suggest an increasing lack of respect for the post of *nişancı* during the 1590s, despite the calibre of some of its incumbents. Hamza Paşa - 'truly a man with ready knowledge and experience in the affairs of state, respectful of *kanun*, with no equal in the sultan's

¹ Selaniki, 151 for Hamza Bey's departure in November 1584, and p. 163 for comment on his activities.

² KK 251/170; Selaniki, 226-7. Selaniki's next entry, dated two or three weeks later, records the document forgery scandal (see fn.1 above).

³ Selaniki, 278 (for 1592), and p.636 reporting the 1596 campaign appointments as received in İstanbul.

⁴ Selaniki, 749, 808, 811.

⁵ KK 145 (divan kalemi), 6b.

⁶ See Cengiz Orhonlu, *Osmanlı Tarihine Aid Belgeler: Telhisler (1597-1607)*, (İstanbul, 1970), 37, for the grand vezir Yemişçi Hasan Paşa's request on behalf of Hamza Paşa, citing his almost fifty years' service in the *divan*.

service' - was raised to the rank of *Anadolu beylerbeyi* in May 1595, and to that of *Rumeli beylerbeyi* in 1599, and his opinion was sought on campaign arrangements specifically because he was one of the few who could recall procedures in Süleyman's reign.¹ He was also accepted in *ulema* circles, marrying his son to the daughter of the sultan's *şeyh* and presiding over Ramazan celebrations for the *şeyhülislam* and leading *ulema*.² On the other hand, Hamza Paşa found himself in two disputes over the *nişancı*'s precedence on formal occasions. In April 1596 he clearly had a shouting match at the door of the *divan* chamber with the newly appointed *baş defterdar* Hacı İbrahim Paşa over who should enter first, lost the argument, and failed to appear for the next two days. In October 1598, at a feast given by the vezir Mehmed Paşa, Hamza Paşa found his place usurped by the Janissary *ağa*, and retired 'broken hearted' to eat in another room with the *müderrisler*.³

Derviş Çelebi/Efendi (d.c.1580)⁴

Little is known of [Pristineli] Derviş Çelebi apart from the fact that he was promoted from the post of *tezkireci* to succeed Hamza Çelebi as *re'is* in 988/August 1580 and was given a substantial increase in *zeamet* income on appointment.⁵ According to the *Sicill-i Osmani*, Derviş Efendi was soon dismissed as ineffective and died shortly thereafter.

***Lam Ali Çelebi/Efendi (d.c.1603)⁶**

Although Lam Ali Çelebi worked his way up through the chancery system and ultimately attained the post of *nişancı*, his career progression was not smooth. Closely associated initially with the vezir Koca Sinan Paşa, whom he served as *divan katibi* and *tezkireci*, Lam Ali Çelebi's first appointment as *re'isülküttab* was in 989/1581 during the grand vezirate of Sinan Paşa, then *serdar* on the Iranian campaign. Dismissed at the same time as Sinan Paşa in 990/December 1582 and briefly imprisoned in Yedi Kule with several of the former grand vezir's other 'tevabi' *u mensubat*', he subsequently served as *re'is* in the field chancery of the fourth vezir Ferhad Paşa during the Revan

¹ *Selaniki*, 476, 808, 790. See also Orhonlu, *Telhisler*, 37.

² *Selaniki*, 525-6, 741.

³ *Selaniki*, 587, 778.

⁴ *SO* II, 328. *SO* gives Pristineli Derviş Çelebi as *re'isülküttab* on two different dates, 985/1577 (V, 794 list) and in 987/1579 (II, 328), but he is not mentioned as *re'is* in the *rüus* registers for these dates, nor by *Selaniki*. KK 6593 lists a Derviş Çelebi (senior in the list) and a Derviş Mehmed (relatively junior) for the 1560s; the latter may be the one in question here.

⁵ KK 238/37.

⁶ *SO* III, 505. On the chancery use of *rumuz* signatures which then became scribal nicknames, such as 'Lam', and 'Dal' below, see Emecen, 'Ali'nin 'Ayn'ı', 131-49.

campaign of 1583-4,¹ and probably remained with him in the eastern campaigns of the later 1580s. This new association severed Lam Ali Çelebi's early links with Sinan Paşa. His next major appointment, as *re'isülküttab* for the second time, occurred some years later in 999/August 1591, when Ferhad Paşa succeeded his arch-rival as grand vezir and the sultan ordered that all postholders associated with Sinan Paşa be immediately removed from office.² He now held a series of Istanbul-based posts, including *defter emini* (mid-1592-March 1593) and as deputy *re'is* in the capital on the appointment there in July 1593 of Ferhad Paşa as *ka'immakam* for the 1593-4 Hungarian campaign.³ In 1002/July 1594 he was promoted from deputy *re'is* to *Anadolu defterdarı* and in March 1595, after a month out of office, was appointed as *re'isülküttab* again under Ferhad Paşa, recently re-appointed grand vezir and *serdar* for the campaign in Wallachia.⁴ Given the close correspondence of Lam Ali's appointments with those of Ferhad Paşa, it is safe to assume that when the latter was dismissed in July 1595 so too was his *re'isülküttab*, and that when Sinan Paşa persuaded the sultan to order Ferhad Paşa's execution in October 1595 Lam Ali was in need of a new patron. Participating in the 1596 Hungarian campaign in his capacity as a *zeamet* holder without office, Lam Ali Efendi was on hand to benefit from the celebratory appointments made immediately after the siege of Eger and was appointed to succeed Hamza Bey as *nişancı*. In this role he was responsible for the *fethname* announcing the victory at Haçova, composed virtually on the field of battle and in the knowledge that credit for the victory had been given largely to the new grand vezir Cığalazade Sinan Paşa. When Cığalazade was dismissed after only six weeks in office, accused of exaggerating his role in the battle, the unfortunate Lam Ali was also removed from office in December 1596, for having praised the grand vezir too highly in his *fethname*.⁵ His appointments thereafter appear spasmodic. Selaniki notes that in late 1007/June 1599 he was appointed deputy to the *baş defterdar* when the latter was ordered on campaign.⁶ He then served briefly as *nişancı* again in

¹ *Selaniki*, 137; Hasan Beyzade, 53a. The difficulty of translating terms such as *tabi'* (pl. *tevabi'*) and *mensub(at)* emphasises how little is understood of Ottoman political patronage. Cf. İ. Metin Kunt, *The Sultan's Servants: the Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government, 1550-1650* (New York, 1983), 41-2 on similar uncertainty in interpreting the term *kul*.

² *Selaniki*, 249-50, quoting some complimentary lines of verse implying that Lam Ali's appointment was long overdue and widely approved. He probably continued as *re'is* until Ferhad Paşa's dismissal from the grand vezirate in April 1592.

³ KK 253/60 (CII 1001/March 1593); *Selaniki*, 327.

⁴ *Selaniki*, 380, 442, 456.

⁵ *Selaniki*, 655.

⁶ *Selaniki*, 811.

1011/early 1603 but was dismissed after three months when a prolonged attack of gout prevented him carrying out his duties in the *divan*.¹ He appears to have been the first *nişancı* not to achieve the rank of *paşa*. At least one son, Sa'di Çelebi, was also a *katib* of the *divan*.²

Küçük Hasan Bey (d.1586)³

It is unclear whether Küçük Hasan Bey actually became *re'isülküttab*. According to his son, the historian Hasan Beyzade, Küçük Hasan was appointed deputy *re'is* (*na'ib*) to the *ka'immakam* Mesih Paşa in October 1584, when Hamza Çelebi was designated as *re'isülküttab* for Özdemiroğlu Osman Paşa's Tabriz campaign.⁴ When promoted to grand vezir in December 1585, Mesih Paşa nominated Küçük Hasan Bey as his *re'isülküttab*. According to Hasan Beyzade, this appointment was achieved, albeit briefly. However, according to Peçevi, it was disallowed by the sultan who wished to impose his own (unnamed) candidate. Mesih Paşa resigned over the incident, arguing 'I cannot work with someone who will not support me in maintaining the integrity [of my post]. I do not want to be a vezir whose word carries no weight'.⁵ This statement, if true for the period and not reflecting Peçevi's later understanding, underlines the close ties between vezir and *re'is*. Mesih Paşa clearly expected the *re'is* to be 'his man' and to have the appointment in his gift; he considered his authority to be compromised when this was refused.

***Taczade Mehmed Çelebi/Efendi (d.1588)⁶**

Recorded as a *divan katibi* in 970/1562-3,⁷ Taczade Mehmed Çelebi served as *tezkireci* to Lala Mustafa Paşa on the 1579-80 Iranian campaign until being imprisoned briefly on his patron's replacement by Sinan Paşa in March 1580, and later as *tezkireci* to the grand vezir and *serdar* Özdemiroğlu Osman Paşa in his Iranian campaign chancery headed by the *re'isülküttab* Hamza Efendi in 1584-5.⁸ According to Selaniki, Taczade Mehmed was appointed *re'is* to succeed Hamza Bey in Safer 995/January 1587, although the *Sicill-i Osmani*

¹ See Orhonlu, *Telhisler*, 37.

² KK 3398/18, listed in a daily salary register dated 1013/1604.

³ SO II, 123, describing him as one of the *haddam* ('servants') of Mesih Paşa, gives the clearly erroneous dates 989-96/1581-8 for Küçük Hasan Bey's tenure as *re'isülküttab*. KK 6593/248d lists a Hasan Beg in 970/1562-3, who may be the same person.

⁴ Hasan Beyzade, *Tarih*, 56a. On this controversial appointment, see also M. Cavid Baysun, "Reis'ül-küttab Küçük Hasan Bey", *Tarih Dergisi*, II/3-4 (1952), 97-102.

⁵ Hasan Beyzade, *Tarih*, 58a-b; İbrahim Peçevi, *Tarih* (İstanbul, 1866), II, 18-19.

⁶ SO IV, 127.

⁷ KK 6593/248d, as Mehmed b. Taci.

⁸ KK 225/110; *Selaniki*, 127, 151.

has him appointed both *re'is* and then *nişancı* in 996/1588. He died in Zilka'de 996/October 1588.¹

Taczade Mehmed may have been a member of the highly respected family of Ottoman administrators and poets, descended either from Tacizade Ca'fer Çelebi (d. 1515), *nişancı* to Bayezid II and Selim I and one of the chief exemplars of the Ottoman chancery tradition, or from his brother the *müderriş* and *münşi* Sa'di Çelebi (d.1516). He had at least one son, İbrahim, who also followed a scribal career, being appointed *şagird* in 993/May 1585.²

Dal Mehmed Çelebi/Efendi (d.c.1598)³

Probably the *katib* indicated by the *rumuz* (scribal signature) Dal in a divan rota of 1586-7,⁴ Dal Mehmed Çelebi was promoted by Koca Sinan Paşa from the post of *baş tezkireci* to that of *re'isülkütab* in 998/September 1590 to succeed Hamza Bey on the latter's fourth dismissal. After a full year in office, in the removal of Sinan Paşa's adherents in August 1591, he was succeeded by Lam Ali Çelebi. After an interim period as *baş tezkireci* from February 1593, he was appointed *re'isülkütab* a second time the following April on the sudden death of Hüseyin Çelebi, but dismissed in July to be replaced by Yahya Çelebi.⁵

Molla Ferruh Bey/Efendi (d. c.1597)⁶

Ferruh Bey's title Molla suggests a *medrese* education and perhaps a teaching post before entering the chancery service. His career appears relatively uneventful. In 988/October 1580 he was appointed *tezkireci* in succession to [Küçük?] Hasan Bey and is still noted as such in 995/August 1587 when a second son Pir Mehmed Çelebi was appointed to a chancery *şagirdlik* vacant after the death of another son also apparently named Mehmed.⁷ Ferruh Bey was appointed *baş tezkireci* in 1000/1591-2 and promoted to *re'isülkütab* in July 1592.⁸ After eight months in post he was appointed *defter emini*, in 1001/March 1593, to succeed the historian Mustafa Ali, and was again in that

¹ *Selaniki*, 179. Danişmend, *Kronoloji* V, 325, gives his period as *nişancı* from January to October 1588. See also Emecen, 'Ali'nin Ayn'ı', 136.

² KK 244/187. Neither *Selaniki* nor Ahmed Resmi state that Taczade was a descendant of Ca'fer or Sa'di Çelebi, though Danişmend, *Kronoloji* V, 325, assumes that he was a member of this family.

³ SO IV, 133.

⁴ Emecen, 'Ali'nin Ayn'ı', esp. 134-6. This Dal Mehmed is clearly not to be confused with Dal Mehmed Çelebi who was a scribal contemporary of Mustafa Ali on the 1578 Şirvan campaign, wrote an account of Özdemiroğlu Osman Paşa's campaigns under the penname Asafi, and by 1588 was himself *beylerbeyi* of Şirvan: cf. Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and intellectual*, 81-2.

⁵ *Selaniki*, 307, 311, 324. KK 253/206 (July 1593).

⁶ SO IV, 13.

⁷ KK 238/125 (988/1580); KK 249/150 (1587).

⁸ *Selaniki*, 278.

post when finally dismissed from office in October 1596 after the siege of Eger.¹

Hüseyin Çelebi/Efendi (d.1593)²

A long-serving *divan katibi*, listed in 974/1566, and probably the Hüseyin Çelebi noted by Selaniki as *tezkireci* to Koca Sinan Paşa in 999/June 1591, at the time of the completion of the *kasr* (pavilion) built by the grand vezir for Murad III. He was promoted from *baş tezkireci* to *re'isülküttab* by Sinan Paşa on the latter's next appointment as grand vezir in February 1593. Hüseyin Çelebi died in July 1593 after only three months in office.³

*Yahya Çelebi/Efendi/Bey/Paşa⁴

Yahya Efendi appears the most controversial *re'is/ nişancı* of this period, due initially to his status as son-in-law of Murad III's 'spiritual guide', the much-disliked Şeyh Şuca (d. 998/1590),⁵ to his being subsequently a protégé of Koca Sinan Paşa, and to his own apparent proclivity towards giving and receiving bribes.

The first definite mention of Yahya Çelebi by Selaniki is his promotion to *baş tezkireci* in 1000/July 1592 as one of the series of appointments following the death of the *nişancı* Abdülmuhiyî Paşa.⁶ He may also be the same Yahya Çelebi who, as a former *defter emini*, was appointed *Sivas defterdarı* in 1001/April 1593,⁷ though he is not identified as such by Selaniki when noting his 'irregular' appointment from *tezkire-i evvel* to *re'isülküttab* in 1001/July 1593.⁸ As *re'isülküttab*, he accompanied Sinan Paşa on the 1593-4 Hungarian campaign, was dismissed with him in February 1595, and reinstated by him in July. He was dismissed again in December 1595 after complaints that he was not paying sufficient attention to *divan* business.⁹ In October 1596, in the immediate aftermath of Eger, Yahya Efendi

¹ KK 253/60 and *Selaniki*, 307 (1000); *Selaniki*, 636 (1596). Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and intellectual*, 144-6, on Mustafa Ali's tenure of this post and the enmity of Koca Sinan Paşa which was partly responsible for his dismissal.

² SO II, 185.

³ KK 6593/259 for 974/1566-7; *Selaniki*, 245, 307, 311.

⁴ SO IV, 635. *Selaniki*, 324.

⁵ Cf. Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and intellectual*, 72, 74-5.

⁶ *Selaniki*, 278. This appointment probably lasted only a few months, given that Hüseyin Çelebi is given as *baş tezkireci* by Selaniki in February 1593 (p.307).

⁷ *Selaniki*, 312 (for 1593) and 268 for the appointment of a Yahya Çelebi as *defter emini* in April 1592.

⁸ *Selaniki*, 324, using as a chronogram the single word *şaz*, 'contrary to the general rule', and commenting that more deserving men were being ignored. Cf. KK 253/206, where the entry for Yahya's appointment is annotated *ba hatt-i hümayun*, and a note added in another hand specifying that when dismissed from the *riyaset*, Yahya Çelebi would be able to resume his position as *divan katibi*.

⁹ *Selaniki*, 466, 489, 552.

was appointed *defter emini*, and was raised again to *re'isülküttab* in September 1597, although his appointment was resisted by the grand vezir İbrahim Paşa who preferred to keep his own protégé Okçuzade in the post. According to Selaniki, Yahya Efendi was widely thought to have gained the post by bribery, though he does not say of whom.¹

Some time after his dismissal from this tenure of the *riyaset* (late 1598?), Yahya Bey was appointed *beylerbeyi* of Gence, a promotion which probably again cast doubt on his integrity. From there, in 1008/February 1600, he was appointed *nişancı*, to the general dismay of the *ulema* and the *ehl-i divan*. Two months later, in April 1600, he was dismissed during the *sipahi* revolt against the *valide sultan's* Jewish *kira* (agent), accused of having taken bribes from the latter.²

Yahya Paşa is not known to have held any further office. He had two sons who both entered the chancery service and appear with him in a 1598 list of forty *divan katibs* given special exemption from campaign duty.³ The first of these sons, Mehmed Abdülbaki died shortly after the list was drawn up; the second, Abdülkerim Hasan failed to renew his exemption registration on the accession of Ahmed I and may have abandoned the scribal profession. This is particularly likely if he had owed his position in it to his father's influence and this had been removed by dismissal and/or death.

*Musa Çelebi (d. 1599)⁴

Probably the most senior of those appointed *re'isülküttab* for the first time in the 1590s, Molla Musa's chancery service dated back to at least 969/1561-2.⁵ According to *Sicill-i Osmani*, his first appointment as *re'is* occurred in 1000/1591-2; Selaniki refers as 'the former *re'isülküttab*' when noting his appointment as deputy *re'is* in March 1595 when Lam Ali Çelebi was appointed *re'isülküttab* on campaign with Ferhad Paşa.⁶ He served a second appointment as *re'isülküttab* from late December 1595 to October 1596, and briefly a third time from November to late December 1596 before he was promoted to *nişancı* in place of Lam Ali Efendi. Dismissed as *nişancı* in June 1598, he was again appointed *re'is* in 1599 in order to head İbrahim Paşa's campaign chancery but died of dysentery en route.⁷

¹ Selaniki, 636, 705-6.

² Selaniki, 848, 856. On the revolt of 1600, see Leslie P. Peirce, *The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire* (Oxford, 1993), 242-3.

³ KK 7530, a register dating from 1597/8 granting exemption from campaign service to forty scribes; an incomplete copy of this register is published in Emecen, 'Ali'nin Ayn'ı'.

⁴ SO IV, 521.

⁵ KK 6593/243.

⁶ Selaniki, 456.

⁷ Selaniki, 552, 636; 650, 655; 821.

*Okçuzade Şah Mehmed Çelebi (1562/3-1630)¹

Much younger than most of the other *re'is/nişancı* appointees of this period, Okçuzade Şah Mehmed had the advantages of a father who had also been *re'isülküttab*, of a *medrese* education and an early reputation for literary merit, but the disadvantage of trying to make a career as *nişancı* when the post was coming to be held in less regard and appointments to it too were influenced increasingly by factional politics. Okçuzade's high-flying early career as a protégé of İbrahim Paşa brought him appointment as *tezkireci* to the grand vezir in 1004/April 1596, *re'isülküttab* for a few weeks in the immediate aftermath of Eger and again from December 1596, and *defter emini* from September to December 1597. His first appointment as *nişancı*, from May 1599 to August 1601 (interrupted by the two-month tenure of Yahya Paşa in early 1600) was also due to the influence of İbrahim Paşa.² Thereafter he lacked a sufficiently influential patron and did not hold office again in the central chancery until c.1620 when he was appointed *defter emini*, a post he considered demeaning. He served briefly as *nişancı* prior to Osman II's Polish campaign in 1621, and again from May 1622 to September 1623, gained through the patronage of the *şeyhülislam* Yahya Efendi. He attributed the twenty-year gap in his chancery appointments largely to having attracted the enmity of the sons of Hoca Sadeddin Efendi who held the post of *şeyhülislam* for much of the first two decades of the seventeenth century. Okçuzade's career thus provides useful evidence for both vezirial and *ulema* patronage of administrative personnel.

Yazıcızade [Küçük] Hamza Çelebi (d.1623)³

Successor to Musa Çelebi on the latter's sudden death in August 1599, Hamza Çelebi served a first tenure as *re'isülküttab* until (probably) mid-1600, was appointed a second time in 1603 but was dismissed shortly after the accession of Ahmed I. Noting his later appointments as *re'isülküttab*, Ahmed Resmi associates him each time with a particular grand vezir, i.e. in 1015/1606 with Lala Mehmed Paşa, in 1025/1616 with the *ka'imnakam* Etmekçizade Ahmed Paşa and subsequently with the grand vezir Halil Paşa (appointed November 1616). Despite his four terms as *re'is*, Yazıcızade Hamza was not appointed *nişancı*.

¹ For a detailed account of his career, see Christine Woodhead, 'Ottoman *İnsa* and the Art of Letter-writing: Influences upon the Career of the *Nişancı* and Prose Stylist Okçuzade (d.1630)', *Osmanlı araştırmaları*, VII-VII (İstanbul, 1988), 143-59.

² See also *Selaniki*, 636, 650, 655, 705, 719, 808, 848.

³ *SO* II, 253.

İlyas Medhi Bey (d. 1603)¹

Like Okçuzade Şah Mehmed, İlyas Bey was highly regarded among contemporaries as a younger man of great potential as a writer of fine prose, in his case particularly in Arabic. Originally from a *sipahi* background, he became a protégé of İbrahim Paşa, whom he served as *tezkireci* in the late 1590s and then as *re'isülkütab* on the Kanije campaign of 1600-1. According to Ata'i, İlyas Bey remained *re'isülkütab* under Yemişçi Hasan Paşa, grand vezir and *serdar* after İbrahim Paşa's death in July 1601. He himself died in Belgrade in Şaban 1011/January-February 1603.

APPENDIX**Appointments of grand vezir and *re'isülkütab***

<i>date</i>	<i>grand vezir</i>	<i>date</i>	<i>re'isülkütab</i>
in 1574	Sokollu Mehmed Paşa	in 1574	Muhyiddin Mu'ini
		1576 Aug	Okçuzade Mehmed
1579	Oct Şemsi Ahmed Paşa	1579 late	Abdülmuhyi
1580	April Lala Mustafa Paşa	1580 Apr	Okçuzade Mehmed or Hamza ²
1580	Aug Koca Sinan Paşa	1580 Aug	Priştineli Derviş Abdülmuhyi
		1581 Oct	Lam Ali [<i>re'is</i> on campaign]
		"	Abdülmuhyi [<i>na'ib</i> to May
1582?]			
1582	Dec Siyavuş Paşa	1582 Dec	Hamza
1584	July Özdemiroğlu Qsman Paşa		
1585	Dec Mesih Paşa	1585 Dec	[Küçük Hasan Bey or Taczade?]
1586	Apr Siyavuş Paşa	1586 Apr	Hamza
		1587	Jan Taczade
		[1588]	Hamza
1589	Apr Koca Sinan Paşa	?	
		1590 Sept	Dal Mehmed
1591	Aug Ferhad Paşa	1591 Aug	Lam Ali
1592	Apr Siyavuş Paşa	1592 Apr	[Musa]
		July	Molla Ferruh
1593	Jan Koca Sinan Paşa	1593 Mar	Hüseyn
		Apr	Dal Mehmed
		July	Yahya
			Lam Ali [<i>ka'immakam</i>]
1595	Feb Ferhad Paşa	1594 Feb	Lam Ali
			Musa [<i>ka'immakam</i>]
1595	July Koca Sinan Paşa	1595 July	Yahya
1595	Nov Lala Mehmed Paşa	1595 Dec	Musa

¹ See Nevizade Ata'i, *Zeyl-i Şeka'ik-i Nu'maniye* (İstanbul, 1268/1852), 461-2, 'İlyas Beg', on which all subsequent accounts depend, incl. Katib Çelebi, *Fezleke* (İstanbul, 1267/1851), I, 195; Ahmed Resmi, *Halifetü'r-Rü'esa*, 25-6; short entry in *SO* I, 397-8.

² Probably one appointment as *re'is* on campaign, the other as *naib* in İstanbul.

<i>date</i>	<i>grand vezir</i>	<i>date</i>	<i>re'isülküttab</i>
1595	Dec Koca Sinan Paşa		
1596	Apr İbrahim Paşa	1596 Oct	Okçuzade Şah Mehmed
	Oct Cıǧalazade Sinan Paşa	Nov	Musa
	Dec İbrahim Paşa	Dec	Okçuzade Şah Mehmed
1597	Oct Hadim Hasan Paşa	1597 Sept	Yahya
1598	Apr		Cerrah Mehmed Paşa
1599	Jan İbrahim Paşa	1599 summer	Musa
		Aug	Küçük Hamza Yazıcızade
		1600 ?	İlyas Medhi
1601	July Yemişçi Hasan Paşa		
		1603 Jan	Küçük Hamza Yazıcızade [?]
1603	Oct Yavuz Ali Paşa		

MEDITERRANEAN BORDERLANDS: EARLY ENGLISH MERCHANTS IN THE LEVANT

Linda Darling

Colin Imber's collected work reveals the wide range of his interests beyond the studies on the rise of the Ottomans for which he is best known, ranging from the Ottoman navy in the Mediterranean to women's issues, religious issues, and Islamic law.¹ In the context of the first and oldest of these interests, the current paper addresses the construction of Mediterranean contacts in conditions other than war. The Mediterranean is usually understood as a frontier between Christian and Muslim civilizations, a sort of early modern Iron Curtain. Those who live on either side of this frontier have branded each other as alien, separated by religion, culture, and language. Frontiers -whether real ones on the ground, such as oceans, rivers, mountains, and deserts, or imaginary ones, lines drawn on a map- are ways to separate "us" from "them." They are the boundaries of our existence, the borders of our lives, the frontiers between the known and the unknown, civilization and savagery, safety and danger. Frontiers hem us in or challenge us to go beyond them, to dwell in the wilderness or to reclaim it, to make it known, to see what lies on the other side.²

The Mediterranean, in contrast, has been throughout its history a porous boundary. Despite the polemics of hatred between the two religions and civilizations on its shores, people transgressed the boundaries between them more often than we may realize. Merchants, migrants, mercenaries, missionaries, conquerors, refugees, and slaves moved permanently or crossed repeatedly to the other side, while goods and ideas were briskly exchanged. In a frontier paradigm, these border crossings are anomalies, considered less important than warfare, propaganda, exploration, or other boundary-defining activities. As such they have a tendency to disappear from the researcher's view or even to be deliberately ignored in an attempt to strengthen the

Note: I thank Susan Karant-Nunn for comments on an earlier version of this paper.

¹ See Colin Imber, *Studies in Ottoman History and Law* (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1996).

² The idea of the frontier was popularized by Frederick Jackson Turner in his essay *The Frontier in American History* (New York, 1920). For a discussion of frontiers in Mediterranean studies see Robert I. Burns, "The Significance of the Frontier in the Middle Ages," in *Medieval Frontier Societies*, ed. Robert Bartlett and Angus MacKay (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 307-330. What I call the borderland below, Burns calls neo-Turnerism.

conceptual barrier the frontier represents. To think more clearly about these border crossings and their real significance, a more useful model than that of the frontier may be that of the borderland.

The borderland, in this sense, is the area on either side of the border where the inhabitants have as much or more to do with each other than with their own hinterlands. Unlike a frontier, the edge of society looking outward from the center, the borderland looks backward over its shoulder to the metropole -or metropolises, in the plural, because the borderland is the meeting place of two societies, not the edge of one. In the borderland two societies do not simply abut, they overlap.¹ While frontiers and boundaries divide or mark off, borderlands are areas of interaction and assimilation. According to borderlands scholar Oscar Martinez, "International boundaries have the same basic functions everywhere: to delimit one nation from another and to control the movement of people and goods from one side of the boundary to the other."² In these terms the Mediterranean Sea can be seen as a borderland that served to channel -not to prevent- the movement of people, goods, and ideas. In the sixteenth century it would have fit into the category that Martinez calls the "interdependent borderland," where both sides of the border were symbiotically linked. Christians and Muslims -or Europeans and Middle Easterners/North Africans -depended on each other for commercial and cultural exchange, perhaps as much during war as in times of peace.

Trade was the lifeblood of the Mediterranean, and until the sixteenth century it was the property of the people on its shores.³ They were linked through interdependent relationships of mutual benefit, shared practices, and a common language of commerce and navigation.⁴ The initiation of direct English-Ottoman trade relations in 1580 brought outsiders from Northern Europe into the Mediterranean region. The reactions of these traders and travelers from the hinterland to the conditions and customs they encountered

¹ Stanley R. Ross, "Foreword," in *Views Across the Border: The United States and Mexico*, ed. Stanley R. Ross (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1978), xii. Practitioners of the New Western (United States) History have changed the meaning of the term "frontier" and now use it in the same sense in which "borderland" is used in this essay. The usage here adheres more closely to the popular sense of these terms. For a recent review of the borderland model see Michiel Baud and Willem van Schendel, "Toward a Comparative History of Borderlands," *Journal of World History*, 8 (1997): 211-42; that article concerns the role of the nation-state in the borderland, but it should be noted that borderlands predate borders, dividing cultural and religious as well as national-political groups.

² Oscar J. Martinez, *Border People: Life and Society in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1994), xviii.

³ For an analysis of the role of Italian merchants in Mediterranean trade and re-export to northern Europe see Herman van der Wee, "Structural Changes in European Long-Distance Trade, and Particularly in the Re-Export Trade from South to North, 1350-1750," in *The Rise of Merchant Empires*, ed. James D. Tracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 14-33.

⁴ See Henry Kahane and Andreas Tietze, *The Lingua Franca in the Levant: Turkish Nautical Terms of Italian and Greek Origin* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1958).

there will help illuminate the borderland characteristics of the Mediterranean in the years 1580-1630. These reactions are revealed in their letters and memoirs, many of which were collected and published by the indefatigable editor Richard Hakluyt.¹ Scholarship on the records of the Levant trade generally puts relations between Europeans and Middle Easterners into one of two frameworks, in both of which the Mediterranean functions more as a frontier than a borderland. One common approach, through intellectual history, studies the manifestations of prejudice and irrational hatred in Christian-Muslim polemics and the development of orientalism. A classic work in this vein is Norman Daniel's recently reissued *Islam and the West*, which describes the medieval construction of an image of Islam as the negation of Christianity and its development into the object of crusades and eradication policies.² Studies of religious and diplomatic literature chart the continued use of this image in the writings of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.³ The other framework is the practical one of economic history, the examination of trade commodities, statistics, and commercial relations. This approach is exemplified by Alfred C. Wood's detailed study of the English Levant Company, or Susan A. Skilliter's documentary history of the foundation of British-Ottoman trade, *William Harborne and the Trade with Turkey*.⁴

These two approaches do not, however, account for all the data. An earlier attempt of mine to integrate them looked at the writings of English merchants in the first generation of England's Levant trade to see how the realism of trade tempered the prejudice of crusade.⁵ That study precipitated a residue of anomalous incidents and humorous observations that did not fit into either of the above frameworks. This residue presents a problem in the conceptualization of Mediterranean encounters. In order to deal with it, the

¹ Richard Hakluyt, ed., *The Principal Navigations Voyages Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation* (Glasgow: James MacLehose and Sons, 1904), hereafter Hakluyt.

² Norman Daniel, *Islam and the West: The Making of an Image* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1960; rev. ed. Oxford: One World Press, 1993).

³ See Franklin L. Baumer, "England, the Turk, and the Common Corps of Christendom," *American Historical Review*, 50 (1944/45): 26-48; and Norman L. Jones, "The Adaptation of Tradition: The Image of the Turk in Protestant England," *East European Quarterly*, 7 (1978): 161-75. Other examples are Nabil Matar, *Turks, Moors, and Englishmen in the Age of Discovery* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999); Brandon H. Beck, *From the Rising of the Sun: English Images of the Ottoman Empire to 1715* (New York: Peter Lang, 1987); and of course Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979).

⁴ Alfred C. Wood, *A History of the Levant Company* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1935); Susan A. Skilliter, *William Harborne and the Trade with Turkey, 1578-1582: A Documentary Study of the First Anglo-Ottoman Relations* (London: Oxford University Press, 1977); see also, for instance, Albert Lindsay Rowland, "England and Turkey: The Rise of Diplomatic and Commercial Relations," in Albert Lindsay Rowland and George Born Manhart, *Studies in English Commerce and Exploration in the Reign of Elizabeth* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1924).

⁵ "The Work of the Levant Company in the First Generation: Initial Observations from the Published Sources," unpublished paper (March 1980).

borderlands model becomes a useful tool, permitting us to recognize in this evidence a record of the struggles of merchants from the European hinterland to adjust to an environment of heterogeneity and interdependence. As Martinez states, "borderlanders live in a unique human environment shaped by physical distance from central areas and constant exposure to transnational processes."¹ Considering the Mediterranean world as a borderland enables us to account more completely for the "transnational" and transcultural experiences of sixteenth-century Englishmen, their successes and failures, their recognitions and bewilderments. Before discussing these experiences, however, it will be helpful to outline the structural conditions within which they took place.

England's Entry into the Levant Trade

The trade conditions of England in the late 1570s encouraged English merchants to seek commercial relations directly with the Ottoman Empire, where previously they had traded only through intermediaries or under the Venetian flag. England's only major industry, the production of woolen cloth, had expanded to the point where it could compete successfully with that of Italy and Spain. English merchants were well aware that their country's fortune lay in sales, and their writings repeatedly mention the desire to find "a vent for cloth" in order to increase production and "set the poor on work."² The closure of the Antwerp entrepot in the 1550s pushed the English farther overseas in order to market their woolens.³ Another important motive for trade with the Mediterranean was to fulfill the needs of the new English cloth-dyeing industry which was growing to replace that of Antwerp. Merchants' letters stressed the urgency of searching for dyestuffs to import, of bringing seeds or roots of dye plants back to England to be grown there, and of inducing foreign dyers to travel to England.⁴

¹ Martinez, xvii-xviii.

² Richard Hakluyt, "Remembrances for master S. to give him the better occasion to informe himselfe of some things in England, and after of some other things in Turkie, to the great profite of the Common weale of this Countrey . . .," Hakluyt, 5: 232. The lowness of English wages also contributed to the competitiveness of English woolens; Ralph Davis, "England and the Mediterranean, 1570-1670," in *Essays in the Economic and Social History of Tudor and Stuart England in Honour of R. H. Tawney*, ed. F. J. Fisher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961), 123. For Ottoman woolen production see Benjamin Braude, "The Rise and Fall of Salonica Woollens, 1500-1650: Technology Transfer and Western Competition," *Mediterranean Historical Review* 6 (1991): 216-36.

³ In addition to woolen cloth, the English offered steel, bronze, lead, and tin, and soon they began to sell arms; V. J. Parry, "Materials of War in the Ottoman Empire," in *Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East: From the Rise of Islam to the Present Day*, ed. M. A. Cook (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 226-27; Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, tr. Sian Reynolds, 2 vols. (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 1: 629.

⁴ Richard Hakluyt, "A briefe remembrance of things to be indeuoured at Constantinople . . .," Hakluyt 5: 229-30; Richard Hakluyt, "Certaine other most profitable and wise instructions penned by the sayd M. Richard Hakluyt, for a principall English Factor at Constantinople," Hakluyt 5: 231-43.

Political events of the mid-sixteenth century created something of a crisis for English commerce. In 1553, the very year that the English merchant Anthony Jenkinson voyaged to the Mediterranean to open up new commercial contacts in the East, the accession of Catholic Queen Mary brought England under a papal ban on commerce with the Ottomans.¹ English merchants unable to trade in the Mediterranean or through the usual routes organized projects of exploration seeking direct contact with other sources of Eastern wares where English cloth might be sold. Efforts were made to buy more sugar from Morocco and to trade for gold in Guinea, but neither of these were places where the heavy English woolen cloth had much appeal. Russia, where English woolens could be exchanged for naval stores, was a likely market, but small; former Mediterranean traders were among those who tried to develop it.² The inadequacy of the African and Russian markets was soon augmented by an interruption of England's trade through Venice. The Venetians had maintained their role as Levantine intermediaries through the mid-sixteenth century, but the Ottoman-Venetian war of 1570-1573 severely curtailed Italian trade with the Ottomans, although the Christian naval victory at Lepanto in 1571 promised a more open sea in the future.³ The obstacles to trade posed by England's war with Spain, the prospect of a Spanish takeover of Portugal, France's move into the Catholic camp after the St. Bartholomew's Day massacre of 1572, and the chronic state of unrest on the Continent contributed to England's anxiety to make direct contact with the Ottoman ports under her own flag.

Official relations between England and the Ottoman Empire were initiated by English Levant merchants in the last quarter of the sixteenth century. William Harborne, agent for a prominent wool merchant, obtained a grant of commercial privileges (capitulations) in 1580, renewed in 1583 and many times thereafter.⁴ The English capitulations, like those the French had obtained in 1569, provided for entry and exit from Ottoman territory, exemption from poll taxes, freedom from molestation, deliverance from

¹ "The Safeconduct or Privilege given by Sultan Solymán the great Turke to master Anthony Jenkinson at Aleppo in Syria, in the yeere 1553," Hakluyt 5: 109; Rowland, xvii.

² G. D. Ramsay, *English Overseas Trade during the Centuries of Emergence* (London: Macmilland & Co., Ltd., 1957), 25-30; for English trade to Morocco see Thomas S. Willan, *Studies in Elizabethan Foreign Trade* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1959), 92-312; for Russia see Sir William Foster, *England's Quest of Eastern Trade* (London: A. & C. Black, Ltd., 1933), chs. 1 and 2.

³ Frederic C. Lane, "The Mediterranean Spice Trade," *American Historical Review*, 45 (1940): 581-89; Braudel, 1, 547-49. Andrew C. Hess, "The Battle of Lepanto and Its Place in Mediterranean History," *Past and Present*, 57 (1972), 53-73; Colin Imber, "The Reconstruction of the Ottoman Fleet after the Battle of Lepanto," in idem, *Studies in Ottoman History and Law*, 85-101.

⁴ For the story of Harborne's achievement see Skilliter, *William Harborne and the Trade with Turkey*.

captivity, help in shipwreck and restoration of goods, independence from the debts or crimes of fellow countrymen, selection of consuls, use of interpreters, and the right to buy and sell, to use the Ottoman courts, to bequeath property to heirs, and to live according to English customs.¹ The guarantee of these privileges opened the door for English traders to send their ships to the Mediterranean. Long-distance commerce had been for millennia one of the main components of both Mediterranean and Middle Eastern civilizations. In Muslim society the merchants of the caravan and overseas trade formed a separate and exalted class, free from the restrictive legislation controlling the work of artisans and shopkeepers and often amassing large amounts of wealth.² Their organization and practices were based on long experience as the most important commercial class in the world; for centuries they had controlled the silk and spice trades between Europe and the Far East, the north-south slave trade, and the internal commerce of a region stretching from Spain to China. Islamic mercantile practices had strongly influenced commercial development in Venice and Genoa and through them the rest of Europe.³ The Ottomans viewed English merchants as simply one more group of participants in an established sector of society. To the English, entering the Mediterranean in larger numbers after 1580, the rules of borderland society were new and sometimes bewildering; the remarks even of those who adapted readily show what aspects they found striking and unusual.

As foreign merchants the English generally resided in the commercial districts, but their living arrangements varied from place to place. When Harborne came as ambassador to the Ottoman Empire he rented a mansion in Pera, the European quarter across the Golden Horn from Istanbul, and the English probably also had a warehouse in Galata on the waterfront.⁴ In Egypt, the English lived in the French house in Alexandria. English merchants in

¹ "The charter of priviledges granted to the English, and the league of the great Turke with the Queenes Majestie, for traffique onely, Anno 1580," Hakluyt 5: 178-91. On capitulations in general see *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., s.v. "İmtiyazat," by Halil İnalçık. The capitulations have been examined in the contexts of international diplomacy by Ralph Davis, *Aleppo and Devonshire Square: English Traders in the Levant in the Eighteenth Century* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1967); Ottoman-British relations, Mübahat Küttükoğlu, *Osmanlı-İngiliz İktisadî Münâsebetleri* (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1974); and the growth of a world capitalist economy, Reşat Kasaba, *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy: The Nineteenth Century* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988).

² Halil İnalçık, "Capital Formation in the Ottoman Empire," *Journal of Economic History*, 19 (1969): 97-140.

³ On medieval Islamic commerce, see S. D. Goitein, *A Mediterranean Society: The Jewish Communities of the Arab World as Portrayed in the Documents of the Cairo Geniza*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), Vol. I: Economic Foundations; David Abulafia, "The Role of Trade in Muslim-Christian Contact during the Middle Ages," in *The Arab Influence in Medieval Europe*, ed. Dionisius A. Agius and Richard Hitchcock (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1994), 1-24.

⁴ John Sanderson, *The Travels of John Sanderson in the Levant, 1584-1602*, ed. Sir William Foster, Ser. 2, No. 67 (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1931), 195.

Tripoli of Syria, the port of Aleppo, had a house of their own, a *khan*, to which the first consul was ordered to go.¹ A merchant who passed through in 1583 described the *khan* as follows:

In this city our English marchants have a Consull, and our nation abide together in one house with him, called Fondeggi Ingles, builded of stone, square, in maner like a Cloister, & every man hath his severall chamber, as it is the use of all other Christians of severall nations.²

English trade in Aleppo expanded rapidly; by 1638 the English colony had grown to five *khans* in Aleppo and a warehouse in Scanderoon (İskenderiye or Alexandretta?).³ The European *khans* were located in the heart of the bazaar area, surrounded by retail shops, the *bedestan* (a stone building with iron doors where valuable goods were stored), and other *khans* where long-distance merchants of all nations lived and did business.⁴

The English merchants, feeling themselves outsiders to the Mediterranean world and to Ottoman society, tended with few exceptions to huddle in their *khans*, forming a hinterland enclave within the Mediterranean borderland. Cut off from social intercourse with other inhabitants of the city, deprived of the influence of religion and the society of women of their own nationality, and coming from a country where the social customs of understatement and polite manners had not yet been adopted, the young factors led a riotous life.⁵ If we are to believe the merchant Sanderson, who had something of a reputation for rowdiness himself, life in an English *khan* was compounded of drinking, whoring, plots, fighting, and alchemy. Those who survived the attacks of antagonistic citizens in the streets outside were in danger of being knifed or poisoned within the house. The behavior of the English factors in their house, bringing in prostitutes and beating drums

¹ "A letter of directions of the English Ambassadors to M. Richard Forster, appointed the first English Consull at Tripolis in Syria," Hakluyt 5: 261-63.

² John Eldred, "The voyage of M. John Eldred to Trypolis in Syria by sea, and from thence by land and river to Babylon and Balsara. 1583," Hakluyt 6: 1. The Turks had a similar building in Venice, called Fondaco dei Turchi: Şerafettin Turan, "Venedik'te Türk Ticaret Merkezi (Fondaco dei Turchi)," *Belleten*, 32 (1968), 247-83; Cemal Kafadar, "A Death in Venice (1575): Anatolian Muslim Merchants Trading in the Serenissima," *Journal of Turkish Studies*, 10 (1986), 191-218.

³ Niels Steensgaard, "Consuls and Nations in the Levant from 1570 to 1650," *Scandinavian Economic History Review* 15 (1967), 46. On trade in Aleppo see also Bruce Masters, *The Origins of Western Economic Dominance in the Middle East: Mercantilism and the Islamic Economy in Aleppo, 1600-1750* (New York: New York University Press, 1988).

⁴ Jean Sauvaget, *Alep* (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1941), 217; Halil İnalcık, "The Hub of the City: The *Bedestan* of Istanbul," *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, 1/1 (1979-80), 1-17.

⁵ The Venetian ambassador Morosini considered that it would be harder to control 2,000 Europeans than 100,000 Turks; see James C. Davis, ed. and trans., *Pursuit of Power: Venetian Ambassadors' Reports on Spain, Turkey, and France in the Age of Philip II, 1560-1600* (New York: Harper & Row, Harper Torchbooks, 1970), 134.

during the time of prayer, so outraged their respectable Muslim neighbors that they petitioned the court and obtained a royal order for their eviction.¹ In 1599 the Levant Company began sending out chaplains to oversee the moral life of the young factors.²

In the bazaars, merchants of all nationalities visited each other's warehouses to inspect the goods and to haggle over quality and price. "A great capacity for patient sitting and devious conversation had to be acquired to fit in with local habits."³ As foreign merchants with capitulatory privileges, English factors were able to change money, hire camels and boats to transport their goods, and obtain the services necessary to the prosecution of their trade.⁴ They were expected to conform to local customs and Ottoman regulations with regard to buying and selling. Liaison with the Ottoman government was provided by the consuls, the chief merchants of each nation in every port, who were charged with organizing the other merchants and enforcing trade regulations. The Ottomans regarded these consuls as government officials and gave each one a diploma or patent of privilege from the Sultan, which made him a functionary in the Ottoman administrative system, the head of his "nation." He was responsible for maintaining the peace and friendship that were the grounds of capitulatory privileges. For all their informality of behavior, the English merchants had an official status derived from their role in bringing benefits to Ottoman society.⁵

The way in which the Mediterranean trade was organized necessitated the writing of many detailed letters and memoranda. The chartered company formed to take advantage of the capitulatory privileges, generally called the Levant Company, was not a single organization but an association of firms run by single individuals or partnerships. The firms sent apprentices or junior members called "factors" to the Mediterranean to deal on the spot, while the heads of the firms stayed in London and forwarded their cloth to the Mediterranean ports. The factors, who had already been trained in the London end of the business, sold or bartered the cloth and bought other goods, such as silks, spices, dyestuffs, and currants, for return shipment to England. They also traded on their own account and could become quite wealthy. The factors in the East communicated with their principals through letters informing them

¹ Sanderson, 9-14; Geoffrey Lewis, "Turks and Britons over Four Hundred Years," in *Four Centuries of Turco-British Relations: Studies in Diplomatic, Economic and Cultural Affairs*, ed. William Hale and Ali İhsan Bağış (Wilmington, Eng.: Eothen Press, 1984), 126.

² Sanderson, 175-76.

³ Davis, 77-78.

⁴ Eldred, 2-9; Laurence Aldersey, "The second voyage of M. Laurence Aldersey, to the Cities of Alexandria, and Cayro in Aegypt. Anno 1586," Hakluyt 6: 43.

⁵ *EI*, 2nd edition, s.v. "İmtiyazat."

of market conditions, suggesting what goods to send and how to package them, and seeking advice on what to purchase that would sell well back home. These letters, together with reports from diplomats and travelers, contain a wealth of information on the experiences and attitudes of the writers as well as the details of trade. Most studies of English merchants' experiences, however, do not dwell on the developmental period, while texts written by merchants tend to be disregarded in studies on the literature of travel and the image of the Turk. Yet these early traders were the first Englishmen to live and work in the East for extended periods and to establish direct personal contact with Muslims. Their writings provide a window on an early modern borderland society as viewed by outsiders and on their adjustment and adaptation to its conditions.

The English in Mediterranean Borderland Society

Despite official toleration, English merchants voyaging through the Mediterranean faced a gauntlet formed by guerrilla warfare at sea between Spain and North Africa, as well as occasional naval battles between the Habsburg and Ottoman forces. That the merchants could make it through in such numbers reflected the lowered state of hostilities after the first half of the century and especially after Lepanto. Irredentist warfare degenerated into piracy, which became a way of life in many Mediterranean ports, notoriously those of North Africa. More than the woolsens carried by English ships or the ransoms that merchants could command, the North African sea captains wanted the ships themselves and the technical skills of their crewmen.¹ These made ongoing warfare possible despite the low tax base of the region. Although the seamen's cooperation was often involuntary, Muslim captains must have made it as easy as possible for their captives to contribute their efforts to the Ottoman cause. Many did so, to the surprise of writers used to the uncompromising religious warfare of Europe. In addition to captives and converts, there were 2,000 English pirates operating their own ships out of the North African port of Mamora.² Members of borderland societies "take advantage of borders in ways that are not intended or anticipated by their creators," the states or cultures on either side, with "unintended and often subversive consequences."³

¹ Matar, 56-59; cf. Colin Imber, "The Costs of Naval Warfare: The Accounts of Hayreddin Barbarossa's Herceg Novi Campaign in 1539," and "The Navy of Süleyman the Magnificent," in idem, *Studies in Ottoman History and Law*, 71-84 and 1-69.

² Matar, 58.

³ Baud and van Schendel, 211-12.

The English merchants' entry into the Mediterranean borderland, "a unique human environment" where people from diverse cultures intermingled and cooperated, forced them to rethink the rigidly negative concept of Muslim-Christian relations that they brought from their island home. An example of this reassessment process appears in the story of the sailor Thomas Sanders, a crewman on an ill-fated voyage to Tripoli in 1583. His ship got into trouble when one of its merchants gave passage to a European debt hostage who was fleeing from Tripoli. Hit with cannon fire from a Spanish prisoner in Tripoli who was an expert gunner, the ship was forced back into port and the crew and merchants were made captives. The leaders were executed and the others were put to hard labor until the Ottoman sultan, through the efforts of the English ambassador, commanded their release in accordance with the capitulations. One might expect Sanders to have made this story into a narrative of struggle between virtuous Christians and perfidious Turks and "renegades", but he did not. With an engaging air of surprise, he described good and bad deeds performed by Christians and Muslims alike. He clearly thought Christianity right and Islam wrong, but he found that both religions held honest people and liars, brave and cowardly, compassionate and intemperate men.¹ What was a surprise to Sanders, coming from the hinterland, was common knowledge in the border society of the Mediterranean, where even during the crusades alliances had been made across religious boundaries. According to Martinez, "This contact fosters open-mindedness and cosmopolitanism, impelling borderlanders to understand and appreciate the perspective of their neighbors."²

In a similar vein are some comments by the early seventeenth-century English traveler Henry Blount in 1634 which were diametrically opposed to contemporary fulminations about Turkish "tyranny." To many Englishmen the Turkish empire appeared as

a cruel tyranny, bathed in the blood of their emperors upon every accession; a heap of vassals and slaves; ... a people that is without natural affection; ... a nation without morality, without letters, arts, or sciences, ... base and sluttish ... and in a word, a very reproach of human society.³

In contrast, Blount found the Turks not "absolutely barbarous, as we are given to understand" but possessing "an other kinde of civilitie, different

¹ Thomas Sanders, "The voyage Made to Tripolis in Barbarie, in the yeere 1583 . . .," Hakluyt 5: 292-311.

² Martinez, 19.

³ Sir John Digby, "An Advertisement Touching on Holy War," *Works*, 3, 477, cited by Samuel C. Chew, *The Crescent and the Rose: Islam and England during the Renaissance* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1937), 117. Popular broadsheets celebrated Turkish defeats and reinforced the negative image of the Turks (Chew, 139-40).

from ours, but no less pretending."¹ He related that the Sicilians suffering under French and Spanish rule were "not much averse" to being governed by the Turks, and described how in Egypt, where the system of justice had been completely corrupted, the appointment of Turkish judges in place of Egyptians effected a reform.² In Martinez's view, "Tolerance of ethnic and cultural differences" such as Blount's is "a major trademark of borderlands."³

By ignoring cultural and political divisions, border people "challenge the political status quo of which [borders] are the ultimate symbol."⁴ It was often the change of loyalties rather than doctrines that was at issue in religious conversions of the early modern period. In a frontier model, conversion is stepping over the line, climbing a wall. Many Europeans of the sixteenth century certainly thought of it that way; they labeled all converts "renegades," traitors to their own background. In a borderlands framework, though, conversion is an act of assimilation into the surrounding society, a very natural thing to do for someone who now lived there. Europeans taken by pirates frequently converted to Islam, though the figures reported in the sources vary widely, as do the numbers of Christians reported living in various Muslim centers. These discrepancies apparently arose because some authors counted Europeans as Christian even after they converted to Islam. According to J. B. Gramaye, for instance, in Algiers in 1619 there were 120,000 or 200,000 "Christians," only about 32,000 of whom currently professed Christianity; by "Christians" he clearly meant people of Christian origin, not believers.⁵ The anonymous merchant who gave us a detailed description of the pilgrimage to Mecca in 1580 was probably a convert, although he did not say so, possibly in expectation of an adverse reaction from his readers.⁶ Some of these conversions, however, were not so much wholehearted turns of faith as protective coloring. Gramaye listed a number of reasons why men might convert: some by force, especially in the case of children (therefore "involuntarily," but not necessarily at sword's point), others of their own accord, for reward, in pretense, or for fear of torture and despair of liberty. Probably not atypical was one convert, now a Muslim Janissary, who

¹ Quoted in Lewis, 127.

² Henry Blount, "A Voyage into the Levant (1634)," in *A General Collection of the Best and Most Interesting Voyages and Travels in All Parts of the World*, ed. John Pinkerton (London: Longman, 1811, hereafter Pinkerton), 10, 245, 243.

³ Martinez, 19.

⁴ Baud and van Schendel, 211.

⁵ J. B. Gramaye, "Relations of the Christianitie of Africa, and especially of Barbarie, and Alger," in *Hakluytus Posthumous, or, Purchas His Pilgrimes*, ed. Samuel Purchas (Glasgow: James MacLehose and Sons, 1905, hereafter Purchas), 9: 268, 278.

⁶ Anonymous, "A description of the yeerely voyage or pilgrimage of the Mahumitans, Turkes and Moores unto Mecca in Arabia," Hakluyt 5: 329-65.

stole a Bible from a shipmate of Thomas Sanders. Presumably he wanted to read it, which would suggest that his Islam was only skin-deep, but his officer would not let him keep it.¹ Blount, however, considered that most converts were "Atheists," his term for people who did not care about religion but were attracted by the success of the Turks and the opportunity for advancement in their service. He met few people who had been converted "by force" and none who had been attracted specifically by Islamic teaching or the Muslim paradise of pleasure gardens and hours.²

Converted or not, some Europeans chose to make their home in the East. These people did not fit into early modern categories and classifications, and many authors found themselves unable to deal with the anomaly they represented. Martinez maintains, "In contrast to populations in national heartlands, where cultural homogeneity is the norm, people of border regions are more likely to live in heterogeneous environments," where customs and cultures represent gradations between the polarities of the heartlands, and "borderlanders live and function in several different worlds."³ In this light, it is easy to understand someone like Jasper Campion, an Englishman who lived on the island of Chios for thirty years in the mid-sixteenth century, marrying a local woman.⁴ At that time Chios was in Genoese hands and its people were Christian, but there were also Englishmen who "turned Turk" and made lives for themselves in Muslim lands. Sanderson listed the names of several Englishmen he met who had converted and remained in the East.⁵ Two such men were employed as translators by Thomas Dallam, who came to Istanbul in 1596 escorting a fabulous mechanical organ presented to the sultan by Queen Elizabeth. One, originally from Cornwall, interpreted for him in his visits to the sultan's seraglio to install the organ, and another, named Finch, guided Dallam's party across Greece on the way home.⁶ So integral a part of Ottoman society could such men become that in the 1640s an Englishman (not a convert) could be employed as an Ottoman tax collector.⁷

In the early years of interaction, merchants and travelers in the Ottoman Empire who stayed any length of time adopted Ottoman dress and made efforts

¹ Gramaye, 268; Sanders, 298.

² Blount, 266.

³ Martinez, 16, 20.

⁴ Jasper Campion, "A discourse of the trade to Chio, in the yeere 1569 . . .," Hakluyt 5: 116.

⁵ Sanderson, 56.

⁶ James Theodore Bent, ed., *Early Voyages and Travels in the Levant*, I. The Diary of Master Thomas Dallam, 1599-1600, Hakluyt Society, ser. 1, vol. 87 (London: Hakluyt Society, 1893), 79, 84; Stanley Mayes, *An Organ for the Sultan* (London: Putnam, 1956).

⁷ Daniel Goffman, "Ottoman Millets in the Early Seventeenth Century," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 11 (1994), 135-58; see further his *Britons in the Ottoman Empire*.

to learn the local languages. John Sanderson knew enough Turkish to transcribe snatches of conversation in that language, while sixteenth-century ambassadors Edward Barton and Thomas Glover spoke and wrote Turkish fluently, and William Shales, the English agent at Tripoli in Syria, was said to know Arabic "as perfect as English."¹ The Levant Company's agents knew the value of being on good terms with those with whom they did business. In their writings, such men corrected misapprehensions and stereotypes of the East held in their distant island with newly discovered information.² They recorded, for those who would follow, the conditions and customs that they encountered, especially those that contradicted the generally negative view of the Turks. Many of these writers, for instance, made a special point of the fact that Muslims bathed frequently, washed their hair and brushed their teeth - in contrast to contemporary Europeans, perhaps.³ Blount contrasted European images of Turkish savagery with the "incredible civility" of actual Turkish sailors on his ship, who would respectfully and affectionately say, "Get out of my way, my dear" (*canum benim*) when shortening sail, or with the politeness of a group of timariot cavalymen he questioned: although they thought him a spy, they insisted that he write down the answers they gave to his questions.⁴

In the course of their work, English merchants visited places and saw sights previously considered to exist only in legend. One of the best parts of their accounts is the careful descriptions they gave of the marvels they saw in the East: pyramids, mummies, giraffes, crocodiles, vultures, big-tailed sheep, carrier pigeons, bananas, chicken hatcheries, swings, nail polish, cotton sheets, sidewalks.⁵ Note that these were all real marvels; descriptions of this

¹ John Sanderson, "Sundrie the personall Voyages performed by John Sanderson of London, Merchant," Purchas, 9: 420-21, note m; Lewis, "Turks and Britons over Four Hundred Years," 125.

² Rhoads Murphey, "Bigots or Informed Observers? A Periodization of Pre-Colonial English and European Writing on the Middle East," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 110 (1990), 291-303; Esther Kafé, "Le mythe turc et son déclin dans les relations de voyage des européens de la Renaissance," *Oriens*, 21-22 (1968-69), 175-80; Sydney H. Moore, "The Turkish Menace in the Sixteenth Century," *Modern Language Review*, 40 (1945), 30-36; Albert Hourani, "Islam in European Thought," in *Islam in European Thought and Other Essays* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 12-13.

³ Gramaye, 276; Francois Pyrard de Laval, "The Voyage of Francois Pyrard de Laval, to the East Indies," Purchas 9: 517, 534-35. Such attempts at objectivity modified but did not eliminate the antagonism between Christians and Muslims; Robert Schwoebel, *The Shadow of the Crescent: The Renaissance Image of the Turk (1453-1517)* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), 147.

⁴ Blount, 251, 248.

⁵ Fynes Moryson, *An Itinerary: Containing His Ten Yeeres Travell through the Twelve Dominions*, 4 vols. (Glasgow: James MacLehose and Sons, 1907), 2: 52; John Evesham, "The voyage passed by sea into Aegypt, by John Evesham Gentleman. Anno 1586," Hakluyt 6: 37; Henry Timberley, "A Report of the Voyage of Master Henrie Timberley from Cairo in Egypt, to Jerusalem," Purchas 9: 487; "A description of the yeerely voyage," 336; Peter Mundy, *The Travels of Peter Mundy, in Europe and Asia, 1608-1667*, ed. Sir Richard Carnac Temple, 6 vols. (Cambridge: Hakluyt Society, 1907), 1: 58; Moryson 2: 51-52, 96, 100; Mundy, 1: 58; de Laval, 531; Sanderson, 417, 421, 423.

sort introduced to northern European readers many new plants, animals, customs, and practices. These merchants also related with astonishment the variety of peoples and languages that made up the Ottoman Empire, noting that merchants "injoy freedom of their consciences, and bring thither many kinds of rich marchandise."¹ Beyond this, a few writers were perceptive enough to describe accurately the economic situation of the Ottoman Empire at that time. One of the stereotypes Western Europeans long held of the Ottomans was that the empire's low population reflected troubled conditions and the poverty of the countryside, a judgment drawn from travelers' reports embodying the early modern idea that population growth must indicate increased wealth. On the contrary, said Blount, because it was sheepherding country, although the population was low the people were well off; there was plenty of food at good prices and there were few beggars.²

Another thing many writers described in detail was the cruelty of the Turks.³ A frontier perspective would permit the assumption that this was because the Turks were more cruel than the Europeans, but a borderland outlook would suggest the possibility of other motives. Sixteenth-century writers and readers in Western Europe certainly seemed to relish descriptions of bizarre forms of execution in the Ottoman Empire. Impalement, gaunching, and flaying relieved the tedium of mere hanging, burning, and beheading (this was perhaps the sixteenth-century equivalent of the modern fascination with sex scandals). Eastern cruelty, if not greater, was clearly different, and the legal process was notoriously swift. Writers who had lived in the East had various explanations for the use of these cruel punishments. Blount thought that because the empire was made up of people different in ethnicity, language, and religion, it was much more difficult to reach a consensus on the public good, so swift and severe chastisement was used to discourage rebellion. On the other hand, William Lithgow, who had resided in the East for nineteen years, felt that the rigor of Ottoman punishment was due to the deficiency of enforcement mechanisms, so that when law finally caught up with practice, punishments had to be exemplary to keep perpetrators from thinking they could get away with further abuses and crimes.⁴

¹ John Eldred, "The voyage of M. John Eldred to Trypolis in Syria by sea, and from thence by land and river to Babylon and Balsara. 1583," Hakluyt 6: 2-3.

² Blount, 263-64.

³ Orhan Burian, "Interest of the English in Turkey, as Reflected in English Literature of the Renaissance," *Oriens* 5 (1952): 221; Sanderson, 85-90; Mundy 1: 55-57; Jean de Thévenot, *The Travels of Monsieur de Thévenot into the Levant* (London: H. Clark, 1687, rpt. Westmead, Eng.: Gregg International Publishers, 1971), 68.

⁴ Blount, 257; William Lithgow, *The Totall Discourse, of the Rare Adventures, and Painefull Peregrinations of Long Nineteene Yeares Travayles* (London: Nicholas Okes, 1632), 152.

It must not be thought that prejudice was all on the European side. Away from the borderland atmosphere of the commercial centers, the ordinary Muslim population despised Europeans quite as much as Europeans despised them. Little boys in the street taunted the Europeans for their funny clothes and beards (this was, after all, the era of the ruff and goatee, the tights, codpieces, and doublets). Adults immediately saw that they were foreigners and tried to cheat them or even beat them up. Ambassadors and consuls were permitted to hire Janissary guards for protection from the insults of the common people. One traveler particularly noted that the port of Jidda was free from this kind of prejudice and ascribed it to a greater level of experience with merchants from all over the world.¹ Blount's reasoning was that clothes make the man: "They would have no novelties ... for they desiring perpetual hostility with the Christians, must estrange the people from their customs as much as may be. Now there is no innovation draws in foreign manners faster than that of apparel." The Ottomans, he thought, discouraged assimilation in dress because it might lead to assimilation in more important ways. According to Baud and van Schendel, borderlands are pre-eminently sites of contest over rules of inclusion and exclusion.²

This battle is still being fought today over the dress of Muslim women. Enforcing clothing standards is clearly an attempt to maintain boundaries in what has become a borderland world. Presenting these barriers as "natural" and rigorously maintaining them over the centuries has successfully created a Berlin Wall in modern minds (both Eastern and Western), which we are now busily engaged in demolishing and/or reconstructing. The people of the sixteenth century Mediterranean world recognized and tried to combat the natural tendency toward assimilation by enforcing boundaries of dress and religion, precisely because it was so difficult to maintain the separation even between peoples of different languages and religions within a borderland society. The writings of early modern Englishmen, with all of their increased realism, still tended to exoticize the Muslim "other" and to reinforce boundaries that might otherwise have faded away.³ The exoticizing of the East

¹ Carsten Niebuhr, "Travels in Arabia," Pinkerton 10: 21. For prejudice against Europeans see "A description of the yeerely voyage," 332; Philip K. Hitti, *History of Syria, Including Lebanon and Palestine* (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1951), 673. "It was apparently easy to mobilise a crowd to hurl not just abuse but sticks and stones at the wine-swilling, pork-eating, uncircumcised polytheists in their midst" (Abulafia, 17). On the other hand, when one Englishman was tormented in the streets of Aleppo by a Turk, his Janissary guard found the man and administered a severe beating; E. S. Bates, *Touring in 1600* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1912), 198; see also George Sandys, *A Relation of a Journey Begun An: Dom: 1610* (London: W. Barrett, 1621), 49.

² Blount, 261; Baud and van Schendel, 214-15.

³ G. S. Rousseau and Roy Porter, "Introduction: Approaching Enlightenment Exoticism," in *Exoticism in the Enlightenment*, ed. G. S. Rousseau and Roy Porter (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), 4-5.

was part of the process of creation of a "European" identity, an identity which is in the process of being re-created in modern times, in part because of the large influx of Muslims who have crossed to the other side of the Mediterranean without giving up their traditional dress and religion.¹ Both the Muslims' resistance to assimilation and the Europeans' insistence on homogeneity may have their origin in the meeting of the two societies in the fluid conditions of the borderland, where crossing boundaries was so easy that it had to be made artificially difficult. Now that the whole world is a borderland, the experience of the Levant merchants becomes newly relevant for us. Their entry into a borderland culture transformed the ways in which they identified others and, in the process, themselves. And so will ours.

¹ On the creation of European identity see Denys Hay, *Europe: The Emergence of an Idea* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1957; rev. ed., 1968); Denis de Rougemont, *The Idea of Europe*, trans. Norbert Guterman (New York: Macmillan, 1966); and more recently Gerard Delanty, *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality* (Houndsmills, England: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1995). On the Muslim experience in Europe see Henk Dreissen, "At the Edge of Europe: Crossing and Marking the Mediterranean Divide," in *Borders, Nations and States: Frontiers of Sovereignty in the New Europe*, ed. Liam O'Dowd and Thomas M. Wilson (Aldershot: Avebury/Ashgate, 1996), 179-198; Ziauddin Sardar, "Introduction: Racism, Identity and Muslims in the West," in *Muslim Minorities in the West*, ed. Syed Z. Abedin and Ziauddin Sardar (London: Grey Seal, 1995), 1-17.

LE STATUT DE *MUSTA'MIN*, ENTRE DROIT ET POLITIQUE

Gilles Veinstein

La présence d'étrangers chrétiens sur certains points de l'Empire ottoman était une condition nécessaire au commerce entre les états du Grand Seigneur et les pays de l'Europe occidentale, du *Frengistân* - un commerce également souhaité par chacune des deux parties. Or cette présence posait un problème fondamental, au regard de la loi musulmane: ces ressortissants francs, sujets d'Etats qui n'avaient pas fait leur soumission à l'islam, ne disposaient pas des protections du statut de *zimmî*: ils demeuraient des infidèles *harbî*. Comme tels, ils étaient susceptibles, à tout instant, d'être réduits à l'esclavage par le premier musulman venu, et leurs biens d'être confisqués - une situation qui, même théorique, n'était guère compatible avec la bonne marche des affaires. Pour écarter ces menaces et donner à l'étranger infidèle les garanties indispensables dans ses déplacements, dans ses lieux de résidence et dans l'accomplissement de ses transactions, une solution était néanmoins offerte par l'arsenal juridique: il suffisait que lui-même ou, plus globalement, le prince dont il dépendait, ait reçu du sultan un sauf-conduit temporaire (*amân*).¹ Les capitulations (*'ahdnâme*) accordées par le sultan à un certain nombre de pays avec lesquels il était en bonne intelligence, se substituant aux «lettres d'*amân*» des temps plus anciens, apportaient ces garanties nécessaires aux nationaux des pays que le sultan voulait favoriser. Ces derniers cessaient d'être des *harbî*: ils devenaient des *musta'min* (*müste'men*).

Les *musta'min* étaient non seulement bénéficiaires des privilèges et exemptions inscrits dans les capitulations mais ils échappaient également aux obligations des *zimmî*, particulièrement au paiement de la capitation (*cizye*, *harâc*). Ce distinguo restait cependant fragile car il n'y avait pas de différence essentielle entre les deux catégories.² L'état de *musta'min* n'était pas un statut à proprement parler mais seulement une situation temporaire qui, en se

¹ J. Schacht, "Amân", *EI2*, I, 441-442; M. Khadurri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam* (Baltimore, 1955), 168, 225.

² Schacht souligne ainsi qu'à l'origine l'*amân* ne se distinguait pas du concept plus général de *zimma*; art. cit. Le sultan exprimait la même idée lorsque, accordant aux Vénitiens la possibilité de témoigner en justice contre ses sujets infidèles, il justifiait cette concession aux premiers en constatant que tous les mécréants formaient une seule et même communauté (*cümle kefere millet-i vâhîde olduğı ecilden...*); cf., par ex., le *'ahdnâme* de 1540 à Venise, M. T. Gökbilgin, "Venedik Devlet Arşivindeki Vesikalar Külliyyatında Kanunî Sultan Süleyman Devri Belgeleri", *Belgeler*, 1/2 (1964), 126.

prolongeant, déboucherait sur le statut de *zimmî*. La loi fixait un terme à cet état provisoire: le délai maximal de la validité de l'*amân* était d'une année lunaire (de quatre mois seulement pour les shafi'ites). Mais la documentation révèle combien ce qui aurait dû être fixé une fois pour toutes par le droit devient en réalité un enjeu diplomatique et fluctue dans la pratique au gré des vicissitudes politiques et de l'évolution des rapports de force.

Il apparaît qu'un premier succès de la diplomatie vénitienne fut d'obtenir de façon précoce, dans la définition du *musta'min*, la substitution à la notion rigide de délai d'un critère plus flou, plus malléable, correspondant mieux aux modalités pratiques du commerce occidental dans le Levant.

Le traité vénéto-ottoman de 1503 (connu sous la désignation d'*instrumentum reciprocum*) fixait à un an le délai de validité du sauf-conduit du *musta'min*, «qu'il soit marié ou célibataire». Au-delà de ce terme, la version ottomane commandait d'agir selon la *cheri'a*, ce qui, curieusement, dans la version vénitienne devenait faire «*quel che la rason vole*».¹ Cependant, dès le '*ahdnâme* de 1513 apparaît une autre formulation, plus souple, laissant place à l'interprétation et l'appréciation et, du même fait, moins contraignante pour les intéressés. Au terme, vraisemblablement, d'habiles négociations, les représentants de la Sérénissime ont obtenu qu'à la notion de délai soit substituée celle de type d'activité et de genre de vie: un Vénitien, marié ou célibataire, est exempt du *harâc*, dès lors qu'il s'adonne au commerce dans les états du Grand Seigneur, en y faisant des va et vient, sans s'y établir à demeure². Il est à noter à ce sujet que dans les capitulations franco-ottomanes de 1536 – ou plutôt, dans ce qui est tenu aujourd'hui pour le simple projet français d'un traité non ratifié, le principe d'un délai était au contraire maintenu, mais il était libéralement étendu à une période de dix ans, sans autre fondement que de permettre au représentant d'une maison de commerce d'accomplir sans encombres ce qui devait correspondre à une durée de séjour

¹ Sur ce traité, cf. M. Şakiroğlu, "1503 tarihli Türk-Venedik Andlaşması", in *Türk Tarih Kongresi. Kongreye Sunulan Bildiriler* (Ankara, 1983), III, 1559-1569; H. Theunissen, *Ottoman-Venetian Diplomats: The 'Ahdnames. The Historical Background and the Development of a Category of political-commercial Instruments together with an annotated edition of a corpus of relevant Documents*; thèse de la Faculté des Lettres de l'Université d'Utrecht (Pays-Bas, 1998), 364-379 (passage cité 378). On remarquera que l'*'ahdnâme* accordé en 1453 aux Génois de Galata, suite à la reddition de ces derniers, en faisant un distinguo entre les Génois établis dans la ville et qui seraient désormais assujettis au *harâc* et, d'autre part, 'les marchands génois[qui] peuvent aller et venir par mer et par terre', à charge pour eux de 'verser la douane selon la coutume', laissait dans l'ombre la question de la durée de séjour autorisée aux seconds; cf. le texte chez N. Beldiceanu, *Recherche sur la ville ottomane au XVe siècle. Etude et actes*, (Paris, 1973), 153-154; commentaires chez H. İnalçık, "Ottoman Galata, 1453-1553" in *Essays in Ottoman History*, (Istanbul, 1998), 283-285.

² Cf. M. T. Gökbilgin, "Venedik Devlet Arşivindeki Türkçe Belgeler Koleksyonu ve Bizimle İlgili Diğer Belgeler", *Belgeler*, V-VIII (1968-1971), n° 9-12, doc. n° 129, 380-385 (passage cité 384).

normale.¹ Les solutions vénitienne et française témoignaient, chacune à sa manière, de l'acuité du problème.

La formule vénitienne est reprise dans les versions postérieures des '*ahdnâme* accordés à la République mais, dans le même temps, les documents de la pratique nous apprennent les contestations auxquelles elle donne lieu. Particulièrement éloquentes à ce sujet sont les firmans que les bailes de Constantinople, affrontés à une question aussi délicate et grave, ont jugé nécessaire de conserver, en originaux ou en copies, dans leurs archives propres, rapatriées aujourd'hui à Venise et que j'ai pu retrouver dans ce fonds si instructif sur les réalités concrètes de l'immersion vénitienne dans le monde ottoman.²

Un épisode emblématique, connu par ailleurs,³ y est représenté: l'affaire du recensement des non-musulmans de Galata en 1617. Ce recensement avait été rendu nécessaire, expliquent les actes qui s'y rapportent, par l'afflux dans ce faubourg d'Istanbul de mécréants *harbî*, et la tâche en avait été confiée à un ancien *kâdî* d'Edirne, le *mevlanâ* 'Alî. A cette occasion, le recenseur avait inscrit comme *zimmî*, redevables de la *cizye*, non seulement les *harbî* en question (dont on constate, au passage, que la *cheri'a* ne leur est pas, en tout état de cause, appliquée dans toute sa rigueur, puisqu'il ne s'agit nullement de tuer ou capturer ces *harbî* mais de les transformer automatiquement en *zimmî*), mais les ressortissants des quatre nations ayant obtenu des capitulations à cette époque: Vénitiens, Français, Anglais et Hollandais. La protestation ne se fait pas attendre, sous la forme d'une pétition collective des quatre ambassadeurs respectifs. A la suite de quoi, le sultan, par un ordre solennel des 19-28 mars 1617,⁴ leur donne, dans un premier temps, une complète satisfaction: en vertu des '*ahdnâme* qui les protègent, les ressortissants de ces quatre nations résidant à Galata et sur les autres territoires du sultan, ne seront pas soumis à la *cizye*: ni les ambassadeurs et consuls (*elçileri ve baylosları*), ni les marchands, ni les autres sujets (*re'âyâ*). Bien plus, l'exemption est étendue aux interprètes et

¹ Sur la question de l'authenticité des capitulations françaises de 1535 (ancien style), cf. J.-P. Laurent, "Les célèbres articles franco-ottomans de février 1535: la transmission de leur texte; leur caractère" in *Ordonnances des rois de France, règne de François 1^{ER}*, t. VIII, (Paris, 1972), 503-574. Texte in G. Noradounghian, *Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'Empire ottoman*, I, 1300-1789, (Paris, 1897), 83-87: 'qu'aucun des sujets du roi qui n'aura habité dix ans entiers et continus es-pays dudit grand-seigneur, ne doive ni ne puisse être contraint à payer tribut...'

² Sur le fonds *Bailo a Costantinopoli* (cité infra *bailo*) de l'Archivio di Stato di Venezia (cité infra ASV), qui, pour ses pièces en ottoman, double parfois mais complète sans doute aussi les *Venedik ecnebi defterleri* d'Istanbul, cf. G. Migliardi O'Riordan, "Présentation des archives du baile à Constantinople", *Turcica*, 33 (2001), 339-367; et D. Desaiue, "Les documents en ottoman des fonds des archives du baile à Constantinople", *ibid.*, 369-376.

³ Cf. J. von Hammer, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, Graz, 1963 (reprint de Pest, 1927), IV, 481; Theunissen, *Ottoman-Venetian Diplomats*, 174.

⁴ ASV, *Bailo*, Busta (cité infra B.) 376, n° 25; cf. aussi Archives de la Présidence du Conseil (cité infra BBA), Istanbul, *Ecnebi defteri* 13/1, n° 710, 149.

autres personnels des ambassades.¹ Tout va donc pour le mieux pour ces résidents, avec cependant, cette notation plus inquiétante, au détour d'une ligne (l. 15), comme si on avait cherché à tempérer subrepticement, non sans dévier de la lettre des '*ahdnâme*, le libéralisme largement manifesté par ailleurs: il est précisé, en effet, que, parmi les marchands, seuls les marchands célibataires (*müccerred olan bâzârgân*) sont concernés. Poursuivant dans la même direction, dans un ordre des 27mai-5 juin 1517,² le sultan indique qu'il a ordonné au recenseur de supprimer de la liste des infidèles soumis à la *cizye* de Galata les noms des drogmans et des marchands non-mariés, relevant des quatre nations. Toutefois, quelques semaines plus tard, entre les 5 et 14 juillet 1617, sous l'influence, peut-on supposer, de services financiers, un nouvel ordre impérial est émis qui précise et étend les restrictions déjà perceptibles:³ l'exemption de la *cizye* ne s'applique qu'aux marchands célibataires venus dans l'empire pour faire du commerce et en tirer profit, mais sans jamais s'y fixer. Plus loin, le même texte revient à la charge en dénonçant explicitement ces marchands qui arrivent en étant célibataires et continuent à se présenter comme des marchands de passage, alors qu'entre temps, ils se sont mariés sur place, ont acquis des biens immobiliers, bref, ont en réalité élu domicile et résidence (*vatan ve mekân tutmuşken...*) dans l'empire.⁴ En ce qui concerne les drogmans qui sont, pour une bonne part au moins, à l'origine des *zimmi*, le sultan confirme, dans ce même ordre, son acceptation, de les assimiler à des *musta'min*, en raison de leurs fonctions auprès des ambassades, sans faire dans leur cas de différence entre mariés et célibataires (tous étant vraisemblablement destinés, tôt ou tard, à se marier) mais les bénéficiaires de cette faveur sont limités cette fois à trois drogmans par ambassade.

La question n'est pas close pour autant, et réapparaîtra au siècle suivant. Enjeu diplomatique pour les bailes, elle semble être aussi une pomme de discorde entre différents secteurs de l'administration ottomane, fiscal et

¹ Sur ce point, un précédent avait eu lieu en 1605: un percepteur avait voulu imposer les drogmans et les portiers du baile, résidant à Galata, en les distinguant, non sans raison, des Francs véritables. La Porte l'avait cependant désavoué en acceptant d'exempter les cinq drogmans en service auprès de l'ambassade de Venise, du *harâc*, des '*avâriz* et des autres taxes extraordinaires; cf. D. Goffman, "The Ottoman Role in Patterns of Commerce in Aleppo, Chios, Dubrovnik and Istanbul (1600-1650)" in *Decision Making and Change in the Ottoman Empire*, Eed., C. E. Farah (The Thomas Jefferson University Press: 1993), 140 (d'après *Ecnebi Defteri*, 13/1, p. 28, n° 6). Les Vénitiens ont dû faire état de cette jurisprudence.

² ASV, *Bailo*, B. 376, n° 24.

³ ASV, *Bailo*, B. 376, n° 27.

⁴ Un ordre définissant la procédure par laquelle un résident vénitien pouvait devenir sujet chrétien de l'Empire ottoman mentionne le fait d'épouser une chrétienne locale ou celui de faire une déclaration d'intention; cf. S. Faruqi, "The Venetian Presence in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1630" in *The Ottoman Empire and the World-Economy*, ed., H. İslamoğlu (Cambridge-Paris: 1987), 329 (analyse de BBA, *Maliyeden Müdevver Defteri* n° 6004, p. 21(1621-22)).

diplomatique, dont les objectifs prioritaires ne sont pas nécessairement convergents.

Une leçon analogue se dégage d'un second type de situation qui n'est pas moins récurrent dans la documentation. Il s'agit cette fois d'habitants d'îles de la Méditerranée orientale appartenant à Venise (et qui sont donc sujets vénitiens), émigrant, pour des raisons économiques ou autres, en territoire ottoman, notamment à Chio (annexée en 1566) et à Izmir.

Les conflits se succèdent entre les consuls locaux de Venise pour qui ces éléments sont vénitiens et relèvent de la fiscalité de la République, et, d'autre part, les représentants directs ou indirects (affermateurs) du fisc ottomans, pour qui les mêmes sont bel et bien des *zimmî* redevables de la *cizye*. A vrai dire, ces *zimmî* sont d'un genre un peu particulier puisque, contrairement à la règle, ils proviennent de territoires qui n'ont pas été subjugués par le conquérant musulman après reddition. On observe qu'est utilisé pour ces derniers le concept de *yava/yave harâcî*, une expression qu'on rencontrera par ailleurs, par exemple, dans les steppes du nord de la mer Noire, appliquée à des nomades chrétiens (des semi-nomades plus précisément) séjournant une partie de l'année sur le territoire ottoman.¹ Le fait que chaque partie s'arrange pour obtenir des firmans de la Porte arbitrant, plus ou moins clairement, en sa faveur ne simplifie évidemment pas les choses.²

A la suite d'une plainte adressée par le baile contre un *emîn* de Chio, un Juif dont le nom est laissé en blanc dans le document, qui voulait imposer le *yava harâcî* aux sujets vénitiens se trouvant à Chio, le sultan rappelle, dans un ordre du 6 juin 1624 adressé au *sancakbey* et au *kâdî* de Chio, qu'une telle

¹ Sur le terme *yava*, cf. W. Hensel, "Some Notes concerning the Apprehension of Runaway Slaves in the Ottoman Empire", *Rocznik Orientalistyczny*, XXXVIII (Varsovie, 1976), 161-168. Le terme, d'origine persane, apparaît sous les formes *yâve* et *yevâ*; il signifie 'perdu, ruiné' et s'applique également aux choses et aux hommes dont l'origine n'est pas connue; cf. F. Steingass, *A comprehensive Persian-English Dictionary*, 2^e éd., (London, 1930), 1528; passé en turc, le terme y connaît également les formes *yavu* et *yuva*; cf. *Tarama Sözlüğü*, VI, (Ankara, 1972), 4398-4399; *Türkiye'de Halk Ağzından Söz Derleme Dergisi*, III, (Istanbul, 1947), 1554. On trouve dans la terminologie fiscale en usage dans les régions ottomanes de Kili (Kilija), Bender (Tighina), Akkerman (Cetatea-Alba, Belgorod Dniestrovskij) et Cankerman (Özü, Ocakov), en rapport avec les semi-nomades chrétiens fréquentant temporairement les steppes de la zone sous domination ottomane, une série d'expressions incluant le terme *yava*: *yava harâcî*, *yava emîni*, *cizye-i gebrân-i yava*; l'*ispence* perçu sur les mêmes populations est désigné quant à lui comme *ispence-i gebrân-i haymanegân*. Des tenures occupées temporairement sont nommées *çift-i yava*; cf. M. Berindei et G. Veinstein, "Règlements fiscaux et fiscalité de la province de Bender-Aqkerman, 1570", *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique*, XXII/2-3 (1981), 274, 278 (les références sont tirées de BBA, TT 483. Dans cette publication, nous avons transcrit le terme sous la forme *yava*). La similitude de la terminologie employée à propos de ces populations nord-pontiques, et d'autre part les émigrants originaires d'îles sous domination vénitienne, est frappante; dans l'une de ses requêtes, l'affermataire des revenus de Chio en 1628, citait de même parmi les recettes fiscales de l'île entrant dans sa ferme les *cizye-i yava-i gebrân* et les *ispence-i haymanegân*; ASV, *Bailo*, B. 373-II, n° 9).

² Sur la faiblesse et la 'malléabilité' du pouvoir ottoman qu'on constate dans la première moitié du XVII^e siècle, et leurs conséquences sur le sort des étrangers dans l'empire, cf. les remarques de Goffman, "The Ottoman Role in Patterns of Commerce", *passim*.

mesure serait une exaction illégale, contraire au '*ahdnâme* et à de nombreux ordres antérieurs.¹

La Porte n'en recevra pas moins, quelque trois ans plus tard (13-22 juillet 1627), l'humble supplique ('*arz*) d'un *zimmî* du nom de Pedr (ou Peder) qui est affermateur (*mültezim*) de la *mukâta'a* de Chio.² Celui-ci avait produit un «ordre sacré», daté du 5 *ramazân* 1036 (20 mai 1627) l'autorisant à percevoir le *yave harâcî* des émigrés de l'île vénitienne de Tinos (*Istendil*) venus à Chio et y gagnant leur vie (*kâr-ü kışb üzere olanlarından*). Il s'est alors heurté, dans une audience au tribunal du *kâdî*, à l'opposition du «*zimmî* nommé Yakameto (Jacomo Coronello) qui est consul sur l'île de Chio pour le compte des Vénitiens». Ce dernier produit alors à son tour un ordre d'Istanbul, datant cette fois de la dernière décade de *ramazân* 1036 (5-14 juin 1627). De fait, on retrouve dans les archives du baile, une copie authentifiée par le *kâdî* de Chio, Mustafa bin Mehmed, de l'ordre mentionné.³ Adressé au *kâdî* de Chio, il lui commande de ne laisser aucun percepteur d'aucune sorte (*emîn, harâcî* ou autres...) percevoir, en violation du '*ahdnâme*, le *yuva harâcî* d'aucun sujet vénitien s'étant rendu en territoire ottoman pour des raisons de commerce ou d'autres affaires. Après production de cette pièce, le *mültezim* reconnaît bien devant le *kâdî* que l'ordre dont dispose son adversaire est postérieur au sien (ce qui, a priori, lui confère une autorité supérieure), mais il le disqualifie cependant en dénonçant la procédure suivie du côté vénitien: «un ordre sacré concernant ce genre d'affaire intéressant les finances, déclare-t-il, doit être émis par le département des finances; or celui-ci a été émis par le divan auguste» (*bu makûle mâla müte'allik husûsa emr-i şerîf mâliye tarafından gerekdir, dîvân-i hümayûn tarafından olmağla...*). Il rapporte enfin dans sa supplique que, face à cette situation, lui-même et son adversaire, ont estimé que l'affaire devait rester en suspend et être «soumise au pied du trône sublime avec des copies des ordres sacrés» respectifs, en attendant de nouvelles instructions. Une note de chancellerie tracée au-dessus de la supplique porte ce *buyuruldu*: «le commandement a été donné de sorte qu'il n'y ait pas d'ingérences ni d'oppression contraire à ce qui est habituellement pratiqué». Laconique, cette instruction paraît favorable à la thèse vénitienne.⁴

¹ ASV, *Bailo*, B.376, n° 23 bis. L'*emîn* juif de Chio incriminé ici est vraisemblablement Abraham Elkaz, collecteur de la douane à Chio et à Izmir, une des «bêtes noires» des résidents vénitiens, qui avait déjà obtenu en 1618 un firman l'autorisant à percevoir le *yuva harâcî* sur les sujets vénitiens de l'île, BBA, *ED*, 13/1, 178, n° 2, cité in Goffman, "The Ottoman Role in Patterns of Commerce", 142.

² ASV, *Bailo*, B. 376, n° 23.

³ ASV, *Bailo*, B. 376, n° 20.

⁴ ASV, *Bailo*, B. 376, n° 23.

L'affaire rebondit cependant peu après, comme il ressort d'un ordre au *kâdî* de Chio du 9 juin 1628.¹ Entre temps, le *kâdî* Mustafa b. Mehmed a été remplacé par un autre: Hasan b. Musa. Le consul Jacomo Coronello (désigné cette fois dans le document sous l'appellation de «Yakomi fils de Domeniko») est mort et le vide qu'il laisse n'a pu qu'enhardir son adversaire. En effet, ce dernier, le *zimmî* nommé Peder exerce, pour sa part, encore (ou de nouveau) les fonctions d'*emîn* affermateur (*ber vech-i iltizâm*) de la *mukâta'a* de l'île de Chio et de ses dépendances, et le commandement considéré fait suite à une nouvelle supplique de la part de celui-ci. Il y revient à la charge, se plaignant que, lorsqu'il réclame leurs *cizye* aux *re'âyâ* migrants (*yava re'âyanın cizyeleri*) de l'île, conformément aux conditions de son contrat d'affermage et au contenu de son brevet de nomination (*şart-i iltizâmuma ve berâtımda mestûr ve mukayyed olub...*), certains de ceux-ci se révoltent en disant qu'ils sont venus de Tinos et autres îles et d'autres lieux encore et qu'ils acquittent leurs *cizye*, (entendons par là leurs obligations fiscales en général) dans leurs lieux d'origine (*cizyelerimiz anda verürüz*). L'*emîn* développe ensuite son argumentation: «alors qu'on percevait habituellement les *yava cizyeleri* sur des gens séjournant depuis plus de six mois, certains de ceux-là résident ici depuis plusieurs années et y sont même propriétaires d'immeubles (*emlâk sahibleri iken...*)». Ils appuient leur refus sur le firman produit devant le tribunal par le défunt consul de Venise, un ordre dont l'*emîn* rappelle qu'il n'avait pu être obtenu que «par certains procédés» (*bir tarîkle*), sous-entendant par là qu'ils avaient été irréguliers (allusion probable, bien que voilée, à des pratiques de corruption). Mais il conclut que ce comportement entraîne un grave manque à gagner tant pour le fisc que pour sa ferme (*bu sebeble mâl-i mîrîye gadr ve iltizâmuma külli kesr müterettib olmuştur*). La réaction du sultan lui donne, cette fois-ci, entièrement gain de cause: il répond qu'on a consulté les registres de *mukâta'a* conservés dans le Trésor impérial et qu'on y a constaté que «la *mukâta'a* de la *cizye* des migrants infidèles, l'*ispence* des nomades, et ce qui en dépendait, faisaient effectivement partie de la ferme de l'*emîn* susdit» (*cizye-i yave-i gebrân ve ispence-i haymanegân ve tevâbi'i mukâta'atı emîn-i mezburun iltizâmına dâhil idügi mestûr ve mukayyed bulunma İn...*). Il réfute l'argument des migrants pour se soustraire à leurs obligations, selon lequel ils seraient arrivés de Tinos et d'autres lieux. A l'appui de sa décision, le sultan invoque toutes les références juridiques possibles (*şer'at, kânûn, defter, şart-i iltizâm ve berât, emr-i hümayûn*), mais il en excepte cependant de l'*ahdnâme* dont il n'est même pas fait mention dans ce cas.

¹ ASV, *Bailo*, B. 376-II, n° 9.

Nous pouvons faire encore un petit pas de plus sur ce chemin sans fin, grâce à la copie, authentifiée par 'Osmân, le *nâ'ib* de Chio, d'un ordre de la Porte du 25 juin 1628, émis par conséquent deux semaines après le précédent et, de nouveau, adressé au *kâdî* de Chio¹. Référence y est faite, de la même façon, à la plainte adressée à la Porte par le *zimmi* Peder, présenté cette fois comme *emîn* de la *mukâta'a* des ports de Chio et de la région d'Izmir. Dans sa requête, il évoque l'obstruction du consul de Venise (curieusement désigné sous l'appellation de Vedikoglu; sic). Dans sa réponse, la Porte rappelle de nouveau qu'on a vérifié que la collecte des taxes en question était bien stipulée par son contrat d'affermage et les clauses de son *berât*. Toutefois, elle conclut de façon moins catégorique que dans l'ordre précédent: le *kâdî* doit préalablement mener une enquête pour établir si l'*emîn* a dit la vérité en prétendant que les mécréants concernés s'étaient définitivement établis en territoire ottoman et c'est seulement, une fois ce point acquis, qu'il devrait prêter la main à la perception par Pedr des taxes qui lui sont dues.

La question ne manque pas de resurgir au lendemain de la guerre vénéto-ottomane de Crète (1645-1669). Précisément, la présence ou non d'un individu pendant cette longue période de guerre- et par conséquent de rupture de l'*amân* - entre les deux pays, durant laquelle il n'était pas possible, en principe du moins, à des sujets vénitiens de continuer à résider en territoire ottoman (les diplomates étant quant à eux emprisonnés à Yedikule ou maintenus en résidence forcée), devient un élément nouveau (à côté de la simple durée de séjour ou, par exemple, de la propriété de biens immeubles) pour départager *musta'min* et *zimmi*.

Dans un ordre du 3 juin 1673, adressé au *kâdî* de Chio (dont nous possédons une copie authentifiée par le *nâ'ib* de Chio, 'Osmân),² il apparaît que c'est, cette fois, l'*emîn* de la douane d'Istanbul qui a informé la Porte du refus des mécréants venus, depuis très longtemps déjà, s'établir à Chio en provenance de Tinos et d'autres villes vénitiennes, d'acquitter la capitation. Après contrôle des registres, la Porte ordonne au *kâdî* de contraindre ces mécréants à payer la capitation et l'*ispence* prévus par «la loi et le registre».

Mais c'est à propos d'Izmir, alors en pleine ascension et exerçant un fort pouvoir d'attraction sur les populations en quête de moyens de subsistance,³ que la Porte tente une mise au point plus explicite sur cet objet

¹ ASV, *Bailo*, B. 376, n° 21. Un autre ordre, cité infra, bien postérieur puisqu'il est daté de 1673 (B. 376, n° 26) est également une copie authentifiée par 'Osmân, *nâ'ib* de Chio. Si, comme il est vraisemblable, il s'agit bien du même, on peut en conclure qu'à un moment donné (au plus tôt en 1673), le besoin est apparu de constituer un dossier rassemblant des copies d'ordres de différentes dates.

² ASV, *Bailo*, B. 376, n° 26.

³ Sur l'ascension d'Izmir, cf. D. Goffman, *Izmir and the Levantine World, 1550-1650* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1990).

récurrent de litige. Le sultan qui réside alors à Edirne a été saisi cette fois de la plainte d'un certain Mehmed, chargé de percevoir la *cizye* des mécréants migrants se trouvant à Izmir pour l'année 1082 (1671-1672).¹ Le collecteur y reprend les termes de la déposition qu'il avait été amené à faire au tribunal devant l'obstruction de ses contribuables: «des mécréants chargés de famille (*ehl-i 'ayâl sâhibi olan kefere*), avait-t-il déclaré, qui résident dans la ville en question et y exercent les métiers d'épicier, jardinier, portefaix, fabriquant de babouches, boulangers, meuniers et autres métiers, avaient acquitté jusqu'ici leur *harâc*, les uns depuis dix ou quinze ans, d'autres depuis trente ou quarante ans. Or voici qu'à présent le baile (entendons le consul) de Venise dans la ville en question fait valoir que les mécréants en question sont originaires des îles de Tinos et de Céphalonie, que ces îles dépendent de Venise et que ces gens bénéficient donc d'une exemption [de la capitation], en vertu de l'*'ahdnâme* auguste». Pour finir, Mehmed avait demandé au juge de constater l'obstruction exercée par le consul de Venise à Izmir et le préjudice qui en résultait pour le fisc.

Suite à la plainte du percepteur, l'administration centrale se montre plus soucieuse que dans d'autres occasions de traiter la question à fond, à en juger par la description détaillée de ses raisonnements et de ses démarches: elle reconnaît que les populations en question sont bien originaires d'îles dépendant de Venise, mais elle observe qu'elles sont établies à Izmir depuis une très longue période, laquelle n'est pas seulement mesurée en termes absolus mais est, en outre, rapportée à ce repère chronologique significatif qu'est la guerre de Candie: les émigrés en question sont là, les uns depuis quinze ou vingt ans, les autres depuis trente ou quarante ans *depuis l'époque de la conquête*» (*lâkin hîn-i fetihden kimi on beş yirmi sene, kimi ve kırk sene mukaddem...*). Ils se sont fixés dans le port ottoman «pour gagner leur vie et y faire du profit (*kâr-ü kisb ve menfa'at ile temkin olub...*)». Ils ont acquitté régulièrement leur *harâc* pendant tout ce temps, jusqu'à ce qu'un consul de Venise les dissuade de continuer en arguant de leurs origines et des clauses relatives de l'*'ahdnâme*. Or, contrairement aux cas précédents, l'administration centrale ne mène pas son enquête dans ses archives internes. Elle se place sur le terrain qui est celui de Venise, en s'en tenant à la seule lettre du *'ahdnâme*. Etant retournée à ce texte, elle en extrait les deux *capitula* relatifs aux étrangers vénitiens de passage dans les états du sultan. La citation du premier a ceci de déconcertant qu' il est sans rapport avec le problème précis à traiter (la mention qui en est faite résulte-t-elle d'une maladresse ou du souci de montrer qu'on a méthodiquement procédé à un tour complet de la question du sort des étrangers dans l'empire?): «on a constaté, écrit le sultan, qu'il était inscrit et

¹ ASV, Bailo, B. 376, n° 19.

consigné dans le '*ahdnâme* de Venise que [les hommes] des bateaux en provenance de Venise ne devaient pas être retenus pour le service dans mes pays-bien-gardés et qu'autant il en était arrivé, autant il en devait repartir.¹ On en vient ensuite au second article qui est cette fois le bon: «que le hommes originaires de Venise, mariés ou célibataires, qui font un séjour ici, dans la mesure où ils vont et viennent, s'adonnent au commerce et ne s'établissent pas à demeure dans mes pays-bien-gardés (*Venedik'den gelüb mütemekkin[?] üzere evlû olsun ve ergen olsun mâdemki gelüb gidüb rencberlik edüb memâlik-i mahrûsemde yerleşmeye...*) ne soient pas soumis à la capitation des migrants (*yava cizyesi*), puisqu'elles repartent après être venues (*varub ve yine gerü gidenlerden...*). En revanche, sur les mécréants qui se sont établis et installés, vivent à demeure et y gagnent leur vie (*memâlik-i mahrûsemde mütevattın ve mütemekkin olan ve yerleşüb kâr-ü kışb üzere olan keferelerden...*), tu feras réclamer et percevoir les *yuva cizyeleri* au bénéfice du fisc, conformément à l' '*ahdnâme* auguste...». Ce qui est «conforme à l' '*ahdnâme* auguste», c'est la définition de ceux qui sont soumis à la *cizye*. En revanche, la tentative de définition de ces sujets d'origine vénitienne devenant passibles, en raison de l' évolution de leur situation, du paiement de la *yava cizyesi*, est absente des '*ahdnâme* et relève de cet ordre particulier, adressé au *kâdî* d'Izmir. Encore n'y retrouve-t-on pas une définition aussi complète des raisons faisant passer de l'état de *musta'min* à celui de *zimmî* que celle figurant dans le document de 1617, émis à propos du recensement des mécréants de Galata:² «Ceux qui se sont mariés sur place, y ont acquis des biens immobiliers, y ont élu domicile et résidence» (*bunda evlenüb emlâk ve akar edinüb vatan ü mekân tutmuşken...*).

Ne nous faisons pourtant pas d'illusions sur les effets de cette mise au point relativement ferme et nette, et sur sa capacité à décourager les efforts du consul de Venise: quelques années plus tard, le 22 avril 1677, il est de nouveau nécessaire d'adresser un firman au *kâdî* d'Izmir alors en fonction (nous connaissons cet ordre par une copie authentifiée par le *kâdî* d'Izmir Mehmed) pour lui redonner des instructions à peu près similaires:³ les personnes originaires des îles vénitiennes (sont citées Tinos, mais aussi Corfou, Céphalonie et Zante/Zaklise), qui sont arrivées avant la conquête de la

¹ Cf. le passage concerné qui réapparaît à l'identique dans les capitulations vénitiennes de 1523, 1540 et 1641, in Theunissen, *Ottoman-Venetian Diplomats*, 415, par. 49; 428, par. 43-44 et 606, par. 40-41. Le scribe a cependant omis dans sa copie le terme *nefti*, pourtant repris dans les différentes versions citées: peut-être a-t-il été déconcerté par cette manière, empruntée au grec, de désigner les hommes d'équipage; cf. H. et R. Kahane et A. Tietze, *The Lingua franca in the Levant. Turkish Nautical Terms of Italian and Greek Origin*, (Urbana, 1958), 546-547 (Mes remerciements à Edhem Eldem qui m'a indiqué cette référence).

² Doc. Cit. supra, B. 376, n° 27.

³ ASV, *Bailo*, B. 376, n° 22 bis.

Crète (*Girid cezîresi fethinden mukaddem*), qui exercent à Izmir les fonctions d'épicier, jardinier et boulanger, qui ont accepté de devenir des *zimmî* (*zîmmet kabûl edüb*) et qui, depuis lors, ont acquitté leurs *yuva cizyeleri*, devront continuer, comme par le passé, à les acquitter au *cizyedâr* 'Osmân. Il ne faudra pas laisser le consul de Venise interférer et s'y opposer.

On décèle à travers les différents documents qui viennent d'être analysés la tendance précoce et constante des Vénitiens à élargir le plus possible la notion de *musta'min*. Il n'est pas nécessaire d'insister sur les avantages que les contribuables avaient à le faire puisque c'était un moyen pour eux d'échapper à la *cizye* et à d'autres redevances. Quant aux représentants de la République, ils préservaient ainsi non seulement le principe de la souveraineté vénitienne sur ces populations, mais, par la même occasion, les capacités contributives de celles-ci. Il n'est pas douteux en effet qu'un consul vénitien ne mettait ses administrés à l'abri du fisc ottoman que pour mieux les soumettre au fisc vénitien. Or il est tout aussi probable que les mêmes cherchaient à résister dans le second cas aussi bien que dans le premier: dans ces conditions, il faudrait, pour avoir une vue complète de la question, rechercher dans la documentation vénitienne l'écho des procédés et des arguments qu'ils opposaient à leurs autorités d'origine.

Face à l'attitude habile et pugnace des Vénitiens, les agents du fisc ottoman ne manquent pas de se défendre, mais leurs plaintes ne sont pas fermement relayées par le pouvoir central, que les flottements dans l'attitude de celui-ci aient pu tenir à sa difficulté à saisir des situations fuyantes, à formuler des critères de distinction clairs et constants, ou qu'ils résultent de décisions ambiguës ou carrément contradictoires — dysfonctionnements dans lesquels la prudence diplomatique mais aussi la corruption avaient vraisemblablement leur part.

Si dans les différents cas ce sont les Vénitiens qui profitent ou tentent de profiter de la situation en imposant une conception élastique de la notion de *musta'min*, il n'est pas douteux par ailleurs que des abus existent également de l'autre côté et que les autorités ottomanes — les petits agents locaux et les émissaires de la capitale, plus précisément — aient tendance à ignorer les droits des *musta'min* pour ne voir chez les infidèles que des *zimmî*.

C'est ce qui ressort, par exemple, d'un ordre au *kâdî* de Degirmenlik (Milot) du 3 décembre 1625.¹ Ce commandement a été motivé par une plainte de l'évêque (*piskopos*) des *Efrenç* (entendons des catholiques d'origine

¹ ASV, *Bailo*, B. 372, n° 1. Autre exemple d'abus des percepteurs ottomans: dans une requête adressée à la Porte par le *kâdî* de Filibe (Plovdiv), le 27 mars 1725, il rappelle les exactions d'un *cizyedâr* de Filibe qui avait exigé la *cizye* de deux courriers (*portaliç*) vénitiens et les avait fait emprisonner. Conformément à l'ordre qu'il avait reçu précédemment, le *kâdî* a fait libérer les deux prisonniers et les a remis à Hüseyin Beşe, *yasakçı* de l'ambassadeur de Venise; ASV, *Bailo*, B. 375-II, n° 27.

étrangère) présents à Milot, Fra Kaçino (?), qui faisait état de nombreuses exactions et vexations infligées à ses ouailles, par les diverses autorités locales (*kapu kulları, mîrlivâ' ve sâ'ir ehl-i örf tâ'îfesi*): elles l'empêchent de prélever les taxes et redevances auxquelles il a droit; elles s'en prennent aux armes qu'il a apportées pour s'opposer à tout préjudice (sic: *def'-i mazarrat için getürdüğü yat ve yaraga dahl ederler*); elles interviennent dans les mariages, de même que dans les nominations et les destitutions de prêtres et de moines, tandis que les métropolitains et évêques grecs (*medrepolidi ve piskoposları*), de leur côté, se mêlent de ses églises et de ses autres affaires; en outre les *kapu kulları* et les courriers (*ulak*) confisquent ses chevaux et ses mules. A cette liste déjà longue de griefs s'en ajoute encore un qui vient illustrer notre propos: les percepteurs réclament la *cizye* et d'autre taxes à des gens qui ne sont pas dans l'île depuis six mois (une référence qui réintroduit la notion de durée dans la définition du *zimmî*). Le *kâdî* de Milot doit vérifier si toutes ces plaintes sont fondées. Dans l'affirmative, il mettra un terme à toutes les injustices.

Quelques autres documents plus tardifs apportent des éclairages sur l'évolution de la situation au cours du XVIII^e siècle, en un temps où le rapport de forces est devenu nettement favorable aux Occidentaux qui poussent encore plus loin leur avantage.

Nous avons vu plus haut qu'en 1617, lors de l'affaire du recensement des mécréants de Galata, la Porte avait admis le principe de faire bénéficier les drogmans et autres personnels des ambassades et consulats, des franchises des *musta'min* quitte, comme nous l'avons vu, à limiter dans un ordre émis à cette occasion, le nombre des bénéficiaires à trois par ambassade. Il faut cependant attendre le dernier quart du XVII^e s. pour que ce principe soit inséré, sans limitation du nombre des bénéficiaires, dans les différentes capitulations: capitulations françaises de 1673 et 1740, anglaises de 1675, hollandaises de 1680.¹ On sait que l'attribution en nombre croissant aux ambassades et consulats de ces privilèges, destinés théoriquement à des drogmans, est à l'origine de cette catégorie grandissante des marchands à *berât* ou à patente (*patanta*), qui plaçaient des sujets du sultan, des *re'âyâ*, sous la protection de nations étrangères.²

La plainte anonyme d'un haut responsable du Trésor (document non daté mais qu'on peut placer dans les années 1783-1785, en fonction de la

¹ Cf. Noradounghian, *Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'Empire ottoman*, I, 139, 165, 177, 282.

² Sur cette évolution, cf. F. Rey, *La protection diplomatique et consulaire dans les échelles du Levant et de Barbarie*, (Paris, 1899), not., 252-254; B. Lewis, «Beratlı», EI2, I; A. I. Bağış, *Osmanlı Ticaretinde Gayri Müslimler. Kapitülasyonlar. Beratlı tüccarlar, Avrupa ve Hayriye Tüccarları (1750-1839)*, (Ankara, 1983).

terminologie, ainsi que des pièces classées avec lui) apporte quelques précisions éloquentes sur le processus:¹ «Dans les années précédentes, explique l'auteur de ce rapport, on a remis à l'ambassadeur de Venise (*Venedik elçisi*) cinquante quittances de *cizye* (*cizye tezkeresi*) cachetées, destinées à ses employés et son entourage (*ittibâ' ve etrafi için*). En outre, conformément aux clauses de l'*'ahdnâme* auguste, il est de coutume de cacheter un certain nombre de patentes (*patanta*; texte: *batante*), destinées à être remises à des sujets vénitiens faisant des allées et venues depuis Venise; mais alors qu'elles n'étaient remises qu'à l'intention de gens faisant des allées et venues (*ancak gelür giderlere verülür iken...*), voici que, depuis plusieurs années, on donne des patentes à des ressortissants des communautés grecque et juive d'Istanbul; à des gens qui, tout en étant des résidents autochtones au Seuil de la Félicité et qui y possèdent des boutiques, déclarent: 'nous autres, nous sommes vénitiens' (*Istanbul re'âyâsından Rûm ve Yahûdî tâ'ifeleri 'bizler venedikliüyüz' deyü âsitâne-i saâdetde yerlü ve sâkin ve ehl-i dükkân olanlara...*)».

Le rapporteur dénonce ensuite les effets funestes de ces agissements et les abus croissants de l'ambassadeur de Venise: «Il résulte de cette situation un important manque à gagner sur la *cizye* d'Istanbul, une perte sèche et un préjudice pour les recettes publiques. Cette année, on a cacheté 212 patentes à l'intention de l'ambassadeur de Venise et il en réclame 200 de plus qu'il destine uniquement à des *re'âyâ* d'Istanbul et du Monténégro».

En conséquence de ce rapport, l'auteur sollicite «un sublime *irâde* pour que l'ordre soit rétabli par la suppression des patentes accordées à des gens qui sont établis à Istanbul depuis trois ou cinq ans et y gagnent leur vie et surtout à des *re'âyâ* de la ville même ou du Monténégro...».

Le mécanisme des patentes évoqué ici bouclait en quelque la boucle que le '*ahdnâme* de 1513 avait commencé à tracer: au début du XVI^e siècle, la diplomatie vénitienne était parvenue à éviter à ses ressortissants de tomber trop facilement de la condition de *musta'min* à celle de *zimmî*. A la fin du XVIII^e, elle en était, à l'instar des autres diplomaties occidentales, à transformer, par la grâce de cette nouvelle concession ottomane, des *zimmî* en *musta'min*.

¹ ASV, *Bailo*, B. 341, n° 34.

ON ZIMMIS AND CHURCH BUILDINGS: FOUR CASES FROM RUMELI

Rossitsa Gradeva

The status of the non-Muslim subjects of a Muslim state is usually discussed within the framework of the so-called pact *zimma*. In most general terms the latter implies that they have been granted some degree of self-rule and the right to profess their religion in exchange for political loyalty, payment of a range of taxes and certain restrictions in the personal standing. The regulation of the relations between the Islamic polity and its non-Muslim subjects dates back to the time of Muhammad who seems to have laid its foundations in the course of the expansion of his state when a variety of non-Muslim communities were incorporated within it. The stipulations of these earlier 'treaties' evolved in line with the development of the Islamic legal doctrine and the state itself.¹ Most of the contemporary sources and later historiography refer to this set of conditions as a 'pact' in which the two parties –the ruler of the Islamic state or his representative and a concrete non-Muslim community/settlement, seem to have entered contractual relations. However, where the Ottoman Empire is concerned, such an approach can be regarded as anachronistic at best. Indeed, there is little evidence about the conclusion of such pacts, mainly for monasteries, probably also for some fortified places which voluntarily submitted to the Ottomans but for most of them the sources are, to say the least, controversial.² The regime to which the non-Muslims were subjected in the Islamic state varied in time and space. As a result of the growing number of Muslims and the development of their governmental skills, the evolution of the Islamic polity led to the

¹ A. Fattal, *Le statut légal des non-Musulmans en pays d'Islam* (Beyrouth, 1958), 18-69; C. Cahen, "Dhimma", *EI2*, v. 2, 227-31; A. Tritton, *The Caliphs and Their Non-Muslim Subjects* (London, 1970); Bat Ye'or, *The Dhimmi. Jews and Christians under Islam* (Rutherford and others, 1985).

² See a survey of the evolution of the *millet* system and its roots in the *zimma* pact in Sv. Ivanova, "Predi da se rodi bălgarskiyat millet" [Before the birth of the Bulgarian millet] (forthcoming). More specifically, she raises the issue of the validity of the latter term for the Empire and for the Bulgarian lands in particular. I wish to thank the author for allowing me to read the text before its publication. See also S. Anagnostopoulou "The terms millet, genos, ethnos, oikoumenikotita, alytrotismos in Greek historiography", in Eadem, *The Passage from the Ottoman Empire to the Nation-states* (Istanbul, 2004), 37-56; P. Konortas, "From taife to millet: Ottoman Terms for the Ottoman Greek Orthodox Community", in D. Gondicas and Ch. Issawi (eds), *Ottoman Greeks in the Age of Nationalism: Politics, Economy, and Society in the 19th century* (Princeton, 1999), 169-79.

amplification of the restrictive conditions but it was not necessarily a uniformly accelerated evolution "from bad to worse."

On the basis of the works of several classical authors M. Khadduri has summarized *zimmis*' duties and disabilities reducing them to the following twelve: every male, adult, free and sane *zimmi* is under obligation to pay the *cizye*; the *zimmis* should not attack the religion of Islam nor show any disrespect to Muslim practices; they should not revile or show any disrespect to the Prophet Muhammad or the Koran; they should not injure the life or property of a Muslim, nor should they abjure his belief or induce him to apostatize; *zimmis* are not permitted to marry Muslim women; they are not permitted to assist the enemy nor give refuge to a foreigner nor harbor a spy; while they are permitted to enter into business transactions with Muslims, they are not allowed to sell wine or practice usury; they are required to wear distinctive clothing; they are not permitted to ride on horseback or carry weapons; their houses should not be higher than Muslim houses; they should not ring their church bells loudly nor should they raise their voices loudly in prayer; their dead should not be wept over loudly, they must be buried in places away from Muslim quarters.¹

Some of these limitations sound rather specific but in many ways they refer to the more general conditions of non-Muslims' status in the Islamic polity. Many factors influenced its concrete parameters in a given place and at a given time. Some of them had a lasting effect, others were valid only for a short span and/or in a specific territory. The legal school to which the state officially adhered or which prevailed in the region was no doubt among the former. It should be pointed out, however, that even scholars belonging to one school displayed differences of opinion on important issues, which left space for the *muftis* to choose from a range of views in each disputable case and for the *kadis* to decide which authority's opinion to adopt. Very important, especially at the time of the conquests and the expansion of the Muslim states, was also the way in which a fortified place was taken. Voluntary submission could entail some advantages to the conquered followers of a monotheist religion. They would be left in their old residences, even in the citadel, exempted from some taxes or levies, such as the notorious *devşirme* in the Ottoman Empire, could keep their cult buildings.

These conditions were not settled once and for all and were not necessarily and coherently strictly applied. They simply provided the legal framework but the realities were liable to a number of variables. The concrete dimensions of the restrictions and the privileges were subject to modification in the case of changes in the relations between subjects and rulers, especially

¹ See M. Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam* (Baltimore, 1955), 196-98.

if the former rebelled or sided with enemies of the latter, but also when Christians or Jews supported the Ottoman rule against enemies. Sometimes political circumstances in distant areas influenced the situation in another place. The persecutions of Moriscos in the Iberian Peninsula triggered the seizure of churches across the whole Ottoman Empire in which all Christians, Catholics and Orthodox, seem to have been treated as one community and those living in the Ottoman Empire were being punished for the wrongdoings of their 'brethren' at the westernmost extreme of Europe. A military loss in Caucasus could lead to the confiscation of Christian churches in the Balkans. Several khalifs and sultans contributed personally to the deterioration and respectively to the improvement of the religious climate in their domains.¹ For various reasons a sultan would launch campaigns to restore 'the old order' forcing the non-Muslims to stick to clothes and colors assigned to them as a way of distinguishing them and of humiliation, to destroy illegally built, renovated or expanded churches. Coffeehouses and tobacco were also subject to persecution by particularly conservative rulers.² The cultural traditions of the peoples involved, Turks, Arabs, Persians or other, as well as the numerical correlation between the two communities in one or another region could also be a significant factor for the emergence of one or another pattern of relations between Muslims and their non-Muslim subjects. The higher numbers of the non-Muslims, the insecure dominance in a border area could bring about a milder and more flexible regime than the theory prescribed, at least for a certain period until the solidification of the new rulers or a more restrictive policy at a time of military/ political retreat.

The status of the cult buildings is one of the issues of particular interest in this context since they are a prerequisite for the profession of each of the 'allowed' monotheist religions. Some of its major aspects that engaged the Muslim legal authorities are: in what cases the non-Muslim communities were allowed to keep and under what circumstances they were to lose the ones

¹ Some of these issues are discussed in R. Gradeva, "Ottoman Policy towards Christian Church Buildings", *Etudes balkaniques* (Sofia, 1994, No 4), 14-36; M. Kiel, *Art and Society of Bulgaria in the Turkish Period* (Assen/ Maastricht, 1985), 143 - 205.

² More generally on the triumph of fanaticism in the late 16th and 17th century see H. Inalcik, *The Ottoman Empire. The Classical Age 1330-1600*, transl. by N. Itzkowitz and C. Imber (London, 1975), 179-85. See also: an order for the destruction of all churches built without special permission in Ohrid *sancak*, in: D. Shopova, *Makedonija vo XVI i XVII vek. Dokumenti of Tsarigradskite arhivi (1557-1645)* [Macedonia in the 16th and 17th century. Documents from the Archives in Tsarigrad (1557-1645)] (Skopje, 1955), doc. 66, 89; a *ferman* of 1622 to the *kadis* of the middle and left branch of Rumeli prohibiting the use of green and red clothes (listed in detail), weapons, the purchase and sale of Muslim slaves -to Jews and *zimmis*, that is Christians, in: M. Sokoloski et al (eds), *Turski dokumenti za istorijata na makedonskiot narod* [Turkish Documents for the History of the Macedonian People, hereafter *TDIMN*], Serija prva: 1607-1699, v. 1 (Skopje, 1963), doc. 129, 97-98; a decree of 1633 to the *kadis* of the *sancaks* of Paša, Küstendil, Ohrid, Yanina and Elbasan ordering the destruction of taverns, in: V. Boshkov (ed.), *TDIMN*, v. 2 (Skopje, 1966), doc. 51, 28; a decree of 1634 prohibiting the use and growing of tobacco, in *ibid.*, doc. 183, 96-97.,

they had from before the conquest; the conditions under which they might maintain the already existing structures and would be allowed to build new ones.¹ The underlying rule defining the attitude to the holy places was the way in which a given settlement had been incorporated into the Islamic state –after a military assault and resistance to the end, after an attack and voluntary submission, or as the result of straightforward collaboration.² In theory, the first implied the loss of the holy places for the local people, while the third, their right to keep them. Also important was whether at some later instance the local people allied with enemies of the Muslims since this would entail punitive measures. Reality provides us with a wide range of approaches adopted by the conquerors. Whatever the case was, however, it seems that political considerations were often a stronger argument than the legal framework. Islamic legal schools varied in their opinion about the right of *zimmi* groups to renovate or repair their cult buildings. Differences exist even within one school. Thus Abu Hanifa allowed the restoration of demolished churches under certain conditions that can be reduced to the prerequisite that no improvement or enlargement of the building was permissible. According to him the construction of new churches (and synagogues) was not allowed in cities and other big settlements as well as in their vicinities at a distance of less than a mile. Abu Yusuf, one of the authorities in the Hanafite School, also confirmed the protected status of churches but allowed the construction of new ones under no condition. The other three schools also guaranteed the security of already existing cult buildings but did not permit the construction of new ones at all.³ The living life in the Ottoman Empire, however, confronts us with a very different reality in which churches were converted into mosques because of sins of Christians outside the Ottoman realm but also in which the non-Muslims succeeded in constructing new buildings in places where there had been none in the pre-Ottoman period.

In this essay I do not intend to discuss all aspects of, variables and factors for the status of the non-Muslims in the Ottoman state throughout the time of its existence and in all of its provinces. This is a subject that, despite all done so far, in my opinion still awaits its thorough examination and analysis taking into account both the legal theory as it appears in *fatva* collections, legal treatises and handbooks of provincial judges and the practice as revealed by sultanic orders, *kadi* records, local historical notes and evidence

¹ Specifically on the churches in Ottoman legal theory and practice in general see Gradeva, "Ottoman policy," *passim*.

² See for example the discussion on the fate of the churches in Constantinople which triggered the issuance of the famous *fatva* of M. E. Düzdağ, *Şeyhülislâm Ebussuud Efendi Fetvaları Işığında 16. Asır Türk Hayatı* (İstanbul, 1972), doc. 456, 104.

³ Fattal, *Le statut légal*, 18-69.

provided by foreign travelers. Elsewhere I have dealt with several aspects of the general status of churches in the Ottoman Balkans throughout the pre-Tanzimat period and the instruments used by the non-Muslims to circumvent the restrictions imposed by theory, probably very often in collaboration with representatives of the authority *in situ*. My aim here is more modest - to examine the situation in four settlements, two towns and two villages in Rumeli during the first Ottoman centuries with special regard to the emergence of new churches in mixed settlements and their renovation as an important aspect of the real policy to *zimmis* in the Ottoman Empire.¹ The analysis of the concrete situation in my case studies –the towns of Rusçuk (mod. Ruse) and Tatar Pazarcik (mod. Pazardzhik), and the villages of Çer(ve)ne voda (mod. Chervena voda, *kaza* Rusçuk), and Çalık kavak (mod. Rish, *kaza* Şumnu), on the territory of contemporary Bulgaria, allows me to draw conclusions concerning the application of the legal theory of *zimmi* status in concrete spatial and temporal circumstances. The period of the war with the Holy League and shortly afterwards provides a good opportunity to test my supposition that the Ottoman policy to the non-Muslim cult buildings, was a complex resultant from the legal theory, most generally in its Hanafite version, but also of political and probably economic expediency which sometimes ran contrary even to the most permissive views on the position of the non-Muslims.

For all four of these settlements I have been able to retrieve information from a variety of sources. In the first place, I have found several documents concerning restoration of churches included in the *mühimme defters* dating from the time of the war with the Holy League (1683-1699) and shortly after the ratification of the Karlowitz peace treaty.² Apart from them I rely also on relevant information from the *kadi sicills* (for Ruse and Chervena voda), from *tapu tahrir* and *cizye* registers, as well as on domestic sources and travellers' accounts. The combination allows an examination of the issue from different angles and, hopefully, a more balanced evaluation of the possibilities for the non-Muslims to secure the essential material basis for the profession of the cult in a restrictive, sometimes even hostile environment.

¹ It is a continuation of a long-standing interest. On the attitude of the Ottoman authority to the Christian churches, the construction of new ones and their repair see in more detail Gradeva, "Ottoman Policy". I am currently processing a massive collection of documents related to non-Muslim cult buildings' renovation and construction for all parts of the empire. I am grateful to the Andrew Mellon Fund whose grant allowed me to start it in 2001, and to Sabanci University for providing me with the opportunity to continue my work on the subject, in 2003-2004.

² These documents are an invaluable source also for the study of the procedures followed when non-Muslim communities applied for permissions to restore/ renovate their cult buildings. I am preparing a study on this topic based on similar documents for all parts of the Ottoman Empire.

Rusçuk (mod. Ruse, Bulgaria)¹

The emergence of the settlement is shrouded in mystery. It is clear that there had been a pre-historical settlement and later a Roman fortress and port on the Danube but it is still unknown when exactly the medieval fort had come into being. Certainly one, with an adjacent civil settlement, existed during the Second Bulgarian Kingdom. During the early Ottoman period Rusi/Rusçuk (from the 16th century onwards) was a doublet name of the place, equally popular being Yergöği, rather “Yergöği on this side of the river”² suggesting that the forts on the two river banks, modern Ruse and Giurgiu (Romania) were probably part of a single defensive line. Though separate settlements they were somehow connected as were also other pairs along the Danube such as Vidin and Kalafat for example.

During the 15th century the settlement had a predominantly Christian population. The fortress and the settlement were burnt down and destroyed in 1445 by the crusaders’ fleet led by Waleran de Wavrin. It was at this place that according to Wavrin 12,000 Bulgarians crossed the river in an attempt to escape repressions from the Ottomans. In 1462, Vlad the Impaler proudly reported to Matthias Corvinus that 6,414 people were killed in Yergöği on both sides of the river and its hinterland. Despite the disasters that came upon Ruse and its population by the 1470s it had already come back to life as a center of a *zeamet* and one of the most significant settlements in the region, more populous than the administrative center of the district Çernovi [mod. Cherven] which the Ottomans had inherited from the Bulgarian Kingdom.³ During the 16th century the correlation changes, with the Muslim element growing much faster, and towards its end the two religious groups were close

¹ The exposé on the history of the town is based mainly on A. Kuzev and V. Gyuzelev, *Bălgarski srednovekovni gradove i kreposti*, v. 1, *Gradove i kreposti po Dunav i Chernomore* [Bulgarian Medieval Towns and Fortresses/ Towns and Fortresses on the Danube and the Black Sea] (Varna, 1981), 157-70; T. Bakardzhieva and St. Yordanov, *Ruse. Prostranstvo i istoriya (kraya na XIV v. – 70te godini na XIX vek): gradoustroystvo, infrastruktura, obekti* [Ruse. Space and History, end of 14th century-1870s: urban structure, infrastructure, sites] (Ruse, 2001), 12-34; M. Kiel, “Urban Development in Bulgaria in the Turkish Period: the Place of Turkish Architecture in the Process,” in K. Karpat (ed.), *The Turks of Bulgaria. The History, Culture and political Fate of a Minority* (Istanbul, 1990), 102-05; T. Bakardjieva, “Ruse and the Ruse Region in the Context of Demographic Process in the Lower Danube Region,” in *Uluslararası Osmanlı ve Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türk-Bulgar İlişkileri Sempozyumu, 11-13 Mayıs, Bildiriler Kitabı* (Eskişehir, 2005), 39-48. See all of them for references to the relevant sources and bibliography. Where I have used new sources or have been able to consult the original documents I have indicated it at the relevant place.

² N. Todorov and B. Nedkov (eds), *Izvori za bălgarskata istoriya* [Sources for Bulgarian History, hereafter *IBI*], v. 13 (Sofia, 1966), 192-93.

³ The number of the military, administrative and religious functionaries remains unknown but in the late 1470s the *reaya* were: four Muslim and 240 Christian households, incl. one of a widow (*ibid.*); and in the mid-1480s: three Muslim households, 205 Christian, four widows and 39 bachelors, R. Kovachev, *Opis na Nikopolskiya sandzhak ot 80te godini na XV vek* [Inventory of the Nikopol Sancak of the 1480s] (Sofia, 1997), 149.

to equal in number. The town had attracted also Ragusan merchants and a Gypsy community.¹ The steady rise of Ruse was brought to an abrupt halt in January 1595 when it was attacked by the troops of Michael the Brave. The town was destroyed and all its inhabitants – Muslims and Christians alike, were annihilated or abandoned it for more secure places.

Seventeenth century came with a new start for the port on the Danube. Clearly it quickly restored its citizenry. All travelers are unanimous that this was an important trading center and crossroads of trade arteries connecting the Ottoman Empire and Central European lands. During the 17th century it became the seat of the Ottoman *kapudan paşa* on the Danube and the winter port for the fleet.² These were important factors for the quick recovery of the town after the severe blow at the end of the 16th century. In 1640, Petăr Bogdan estimates its population at roughly 3,400 houses. At around the same time Hacı Khalifa reported 6,000 houses, while Evliya Çelebi calculated 2,200 houses, the latter probably being the closest to reality. Unfortunately I have been unable to find any Ottoman survey of all components of the town's population but only for its Christian segment, the *cizye* taxpayers for the late 17th century. According to a *mufasssal cizye defter*, the Christian taxpayers (*nefer*), Orthodox and Armenian, who lived in four *mahalles* of the Rusçuk *varoş*³ numbered 384, a significant drop from the 16th century. Apart from them quite a few Christians resided in six local *hans* (153 men), and even more (1,196 men from a number of places) were registered simply as *perakende*, men from all parts of the empire, attracted by the trade or just job opportunities a port, trade hub and administrative center on the rise offered. Many Christians were also living in the *çiftlik*s on the territory of the *kaza*, some of which were located around the town.⁴ Part of a *zeamet* in the 15th

¹ In 1530 there were 350 Christian and 50 Muslim households; in 1541/45: 556 Christian and 324 Muslim; in 1550/52: 628 Christian and 467 Muslim; in 1580: 532 Christian and 525 Muslim households. As the patronyms of Muslims show much of the expansion of the Muslim community was at the expense of converts. Bakardjieva, "Ruse and the Ruse Region", 46. One would expect that the number of the *askeri* citizens must have grown at an even higher pace.

² See R. Gradeva, "Shipping along the Lower Course of the Danube (end of the 17th century)," in E. Zachariadou (ed.), *The Kapudan Pasha. His Office and His Domain* (Rethymnon, 2002), 301-23, *passim*.

³ On the *varoş* as an institution see Sv. Ivanova, "Varoş: the Elites of the Reaya in the Towns of Rumeli, Seventeenth-Eighteenth Centuries," in A. Anastasopoulos (ed.), *Provincial Elites in the Ottoman Empire* (Rethymno, 2006), 201-46. Interestingly, under the rubric of *nefs-i Rusçuk varoşu* in this case were included the permanently resident Orthodox Christians and the Armenians.

⁴ BOA, D.CMH 26678, 6-8, 27-32, of 1106 AH/1694-5. I wish to thank Dr Stefka Parveva for sharing her copies and notes of this register with me. See also Sv. Ivanova, "Hristiýanska i myusyulmanska blagotvoritelnost po b_lgarskite zemi, XVI-XVIII v. (dokumenti, uchastnitsi, institutsii)" [Christian and Muslim Charity in Bulgarian Lands, 16th-18th centuries (documents, participants, institutions)], in Pl. Mitev (ed.), *Daritelstvo i vzaimopomosht v b_lgarskoto obshchestvo (XVI-nachaloto na XX v.)* [Donation and Mutuality in Bulgarian Society, 16th-beg. of 20th century] (Sofia, 2003), 17, who gives slightly different numbers for 1693, also on the basis of a *cizye* register: 264 inhabitants of the *mahalle* of Tuna with Orta, 914 taxpayers living in 26 *çiftlik*s, 60 men, *reaya* of the *çarşı*, 35 cauldron makers (*kazancı*), and 612 oarsmen (*kürekçi*) at the ship captains, altogether 1885 *cizye* payers. At this point I am unable to resolve the problem of such a difference in just one year.

century, at the beginning of the 18th century it figures as a *has-i hümayun*, a clear indication of Ruse's economic prosperity.

All sources point to a religiously and ethnically diverse population of Rusçuk. Apart from the constantly growing number of Muslims there were also Christians of various denominations, Orthodox, Catholics and Armenians. At the end of the 17th and beginning of 18th century the two major non-Muslim groups were the Orthodox Christians and Armenians, the latter being about one fourth of the total number of the permanent non-Muslim citizens of the town. The Orthodox Christians were not an ethnically homogeneous group, including among the largest group of Bulgarians also conspicuous groups of Greeks, Albanians, Vlachs, mainly merchants, craftsmen and people gravitating around the bishopric see. Probably all three of the latter would have comprised the *Rum taife* that on several occasions surfaces in the documents as a distinct unit within the group of the non-Muslim taxpayers in the town.¹ Local tradition attributes the settlement of Armenians to the beginning of the 16th century but this is not confirmed in documents or other material sources. It is quite probable though as Armenian presence and an Armenian church are ascertained in the nearby Cherven during the Second Bulgarian Kingdom from at least the 13th century. After the rise of Ruse -at the expense of Cherven- the former may have become more attractive to them for the trade opportunities it provided but also as an administrative center. During the 17th century their presence in the town is well attested in both Ottoman and Armenian sources. There was no established Jewish community in the town until the late 18th century. Jews started settling there permanently at the express invitation by İsmail Tirseneklioğlu, the local 'strong man', and as a result of the turmoil in other parts of the Balkans.²

The 16th-century registers provide us with the earliest information about the spatial structuring of the population of Rusçuk. In 1541 the Muslim citizens of the town lived in five *mahalles*: *Cami*, *Mahmud Voyvoda*, *Süleyman Çelebi*, *Mesih Voyvoda*, *Mescid Mehmed Çelebi*,³ while just four -*Pop Dobro*, *Pop Marko*, *Pop Dudko* and *Pop David*, housed the whole Christian population. There is no evidence about the location of the

¹ Sv. Ivanova, "Malkite etnokonfesionalni grupi v bălgarskite gradove prez XVI-XVII v.," [The Small Ethno-confessional Groups in Bulgarian Towns, 16th-17th centuries], in B. Hristova (ed.), *Bălgarskiyat Shestnadeseti Vek* [The Bulgarian Sixteenth Century] (Sofia, 1996), 70: according to 17th-century *kadi sicill* documents these were identified as *Rum kaftancıyan* ve *kürkçıyan* or simply *Rum taife*.

² See R. Gradeva, "Jews and Ottoman Authority in the Balkans: the Cases of Sofia, Vidin and Ruse, 15th-17th Centuries", in Eadem, *Rumeli under the Ottomans, 15th-18th centuries: Institutions and Communities* (Istanbul, 2004), 248.

³ In 1544/46, the Muslim *mahalles* were already six.

Christian *mahalles* and about the churches in this period. The names of the Christian *mahalles* indicate that there might have been several priests at that time in the town and an established parochial network that might have been based on as many as four churches. This cannot be claimed with certainty as the situation elsewhere shows that the number of the priests did not necessarily directly correspond to the number of the cult buildings. Even four, however, would have been too few for the over 500 Christian households in 16th-century Rusçuk. After the destruction of 1595 the town re-emerged as a predominantly Muslim one. This transformation is reflected in the first place in the names of the town *mahalles*, none of which bears a Bulgarian name: *Cami-i cedit*, *Cami-i atik*, *Hacı Musa*, *Kara Mustafa*, *Faik*, *Arik Ramazan*, *Mesih Voyvoda*, *Mahmud Voyvoda*, *Bacanak*, *Armenijan*, *Tuna with Orta*, *Kuyumcu*, *Batin*. They appear in various lists till the end of the 17th century. During the 18th century new ones emerged, some of the old ones expanded and split, with the non-Muslim population gradually growing in numbers. At that time Orthodox Christians seem to have lived mainly in the *mahalles* of *Kuyumcu* and of *Tuna with Orta*, as well as interspersed among Armenians and Muslims in the *mahalles* of *Kara Mustafa* and *Hacı Musa*.¹ At this moment I am unable to judge how Christian *Kuyumcu* and *Tuna with Orta*, and how Muslim the others had been. For the time being it is clear that some Muslims did live in *Kuyumcu*.² Conversely, despite that the rest of the *mahalles* look homogeneously Muslim, it seems that not all of them actually were.³

Here I should point out, however, that Ottoman documents from the same period indicate an entirely different regrouping of the Rusçuk Orthodox Christian citizens. A list of the town's neighborhoods of March 1709, drawn on occasion of a grievance sent to the Porte by the local *zimmis* reveals the more or less traditional names for the Muslim parts – *Mahmud Voyvoda*, *Süleyman Çelebi* with *Faik*, *Cami-i Cedit*, *Cami-i Şerif*, *Memi Şah Kethüda*, *Mehmed Çelebi el-Batin*, *Mesih Voyvoda* with *Hacı Musa*, *Kara Mustafa* and *Mescid Şahin*. Interestingly, the *Kefiren nefis-i Rusçuk* are

¹ Cf. BOA, D.CMH 26678, 6-8.

² A *hüccet* for the sale (55 *guruş*) of a house (with a roof of reed and consisting of two rooms, a garden and a courtyard) in this *mahalle* by a Christian woman to the *vladika* (bishop) Dionysios v. Papa Yani, reveals as its neighbours the church, and the properties of Ali Çelebi and Hasan Bey. NBKM, Or. Dept., R2, f. 4v, doc. II, of 2 *Muharrem* 1110 AH/ 11.07. 1698. The document has been reported first by Sv. Ivanova, "Kām predistoriyata na Rusenskata obshtina prez XVII-XVIII vek" [On the pre-history of the Ruse municipality], *Almanah za Istoriyata na Ruse*, v. 1 (Ruse, 1996), 55.

³ Two inheritances of Despo (?) bt Aleksı and of her husband Dülger Todori v. Yorgi, inhabitants of *Arik Ramazan* (adjacent to *Kara Mustafa*) from *Evail Safar* 1121 AH/ 12-21 April 1709 show that Christians were located not only in those *mahalles*. See NBKM, Or. Dept., R 5, f. 1v, doc. I and II. I am unable at this moment to judge whether this was an exception or there were similar cases in the other neighbourhoods.

divided into four *mahalles* bearing the names of four priests –*Pop Millet* (202 *nefer*), *Pop Manol* (204), *Pop Nedelko* (200) and *Pop Yovan* (297). Even more interesting the document states that they were in the place of respectively *Pop Stefan*, *Pop Novak* (?), *Pop Yani* and *Pop Koyu*. The names of the priests which also confront us with some problems I shall discuss in more detail below while here I would like only to indicate the striking resemblance between this structuring –spatial or not, but based on *mahalle*, and the four *mahalles* of 1540 also led by four priests. The number of the men belonging to these units by far exceeds those in the aforementioned *cizye* register of only ten years earlier, probably including the *perakende*.¹ At this stage I am unable to offer any definite explanation to the existing controversy concerning the spatial location of the Orthodox Christians, whether these represented parallel practices and whether for different purposes the Ottoman administration resorted to different re-groupings of the *zimmi* subjects.

Kadi sicill documents mainly related to collection of taxes from the 17th century reveal the existence of a *mahalle-i Armeniyan*.² Behind this term one should probably see –similarly to the Jews, the community of the local Armenians as an entity rather than a territorial unit.³ Indeed one rarely comes across single Armenians identified as inhabitants of the *mahalle-i Armeniyan*. In the few cases when they are, it is again related to the community rather than to business or legal problems of an individual.⁴ When they appear in the Shari'a court for personal matters they are usually identified as inhabitants of *Hacı Musa* or *Kara Mustafa*, where they lived among(?) Muslims and a few Orthodox Christians. Such an interpretation of the 'Armenian neighborhood' seems to be corroborated by the data in the aforementioned *cizye* register of 1694/95 where Armenians appear in two *mahalles* –in *Hacı Musa* and in *Kara Mustafa*. Interestingly, in the former they seem to have formed an already conspicuous group of more than 50 taxpayers registered as *mahalle-i Armeniyan bi-mahalle-i Hacı Musa* suggesting an advanced stage of evolution towards the formation of a separate unit.⁵ It should, however, be pointed out that it is probably from the other one, *Kara Mustafa*, that the actual 'Armenian' neighborhood of the town had

¹ NBKM, Or. Dept., R 5, f. 33r, doc. II and f. 33v, doc. I, *Muharrem* 1121/ March 1709. The latter document has been first reported in Ivanova, "Kām predistoriyata," 55.

² See for example NBKM, Or. Dept., R1, f. 28v, doc. I, of 1657; Istoricheski Muzey-Ruse [History Museum-Ruse, hereafter, IMR], B2919, f. 57v, doc. I of 1664, etc. See also Ivanova, "Malkite," 58, Bakardzhieva and Yordanov, *Ruse. Prostranstvo i Istoriya*, 37.

³ Sv. Ivanova, "Kām predistoriyata," 54–55; Gradeva, "Jews," 263, n. 1.

⁴ NBKM, Or. Dept. R3, 7, doc. II, dated 26 *Safer* 1097/23.01. 1686, where a group of Armenians appear to register a collective loan. The document has been used in Ivanova, "Malkite," n. 62, 79.

⁵ BOA, D.CMH 26678, 7.

evolved. Apart from the permanent residents there was also a significant group of Armenian traders resident in three of the town's *hans*.¹

Thus, with the exception of the settlement of Armenians in *Hacı Musa* in particular in the economic heart of the town and probably close to the *hans*, the 'Christian' neighborhoods were located in the peripheral parts of the 17th-century town, forming a sort of a non-Muslim belt around the nearly homogeneously Muslim central part. This seems to be a clear indication that following the 1595-destruction the living places of Christians and Muslims had probably changed radically.²

The first evidence about the existence of an Orthodox church in the post-1595 era of the town's history dates from 1638. A short marginal note in a *Gospel* kept at the local cathedral *Sv. Troitsa* (Holy Trinity) informs about the construction of a "new church" during the incumbency of Bishop Gavril. The very expression "new church" implies the existence of an earlier one probably at the same site. Unfortunately the note does not specify its name and it is not clear which of the town's churches is referring to.³ In 1640, the Catholic bishop Petăr Bogdan related that there were two wooden churches in the town but did not specify their names.⁴ It is generally assumed that these were *Sv. Troitsa* and *Sv. Georgi* [St George], the two oldest churches in Ruse located at the outskirts of the 17th-century town. The existence of at least one church is confirmed by the evidence from 1664 of Francesco Soymirovich who called Ruse a "cathedral" city with its own 'vescovo di rito Greco' at that time.⁵ Until recently scholars thought that the name of one of the Ruse churches, *Sv. Troitsa*, was first mentioned in a marginal note included in a *menaion* published in 1698 in Buzău, Wallachia.⁶ An Ottoman document from the *mühimme defters* allows to move this date a bit earlier. According to a sultanic order from 1693 the *Rum taife* of the *varoş* of Rusçuk had applied

¹ Ibid., 27-28, Armenians staying in the town for trade resided in the *Han of the Late Ahmed Efendi*, the *Han of Mehmed Ağa damadı Hacı Receb* (in both there were also Greeks and Bulgarians), and in the *Han of the Late Çelebi Efendi* (only Armenians).

² The religious communities re-settled also later, after the destruction of the town as a result of the bombardment and occupation by the Russian troops at the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th century, and especially after the war of 1806-12.

³ T. Bakardzhieva, "Novootkriti pripiski v miney ot 1698 g." [Newly discovered marginal notes in a *menaion* of 1698], *Izvestiya Istoricheski Muzei Ruse* (hereafter *Izvestiya-IMR*), v. 6 (Ruse, 2000), 189-93.

⁴ P. Bogdan, "Opisanie na Tsarstvo Bălgariya" [Description of Tsardom Bulgaria], in B. Dimitrov, *Petăr Bogdan Bakshev. Bălgarski politik i istorik ot XVII vek* (Sofia, 1985), 160.

⁵ Sv. Stanimirov (ed.), *Dokumenti za katolicheskata deynost v Bălgariya prez XVII vek* [Documents for the Catholic Activity in Bulgaria during the 17th century], (Sofia, 1993), 360.

⁶ Bakardzhieva, "Novootkriti pripiski", 190. Since the publication date of the book is 1698 we may presume that it had reached Pop Peno and his son Pop Dragne who donated the *menaion* probably several years later. This assumption is to a certain extent corroborated by the date of the death of Pop Peno, in 1734. The names of the two priests do not crop up among those we know from various Ottoman sources from the end of the 17th and beginning of 18th century.

for the restoration of their church located in the *varoş*. The name of the church reads as *Toriche*, which can easily be identified as a distorted form of *Troitsa*.¹ In 1764 the church of *Sv Troitsa* was thoroughly refurbished acquiring its view of today of a solid stone half-buried pseudo-basilica, but with a spacious and richly decorated interior. After the town's destruction by the Russian artillery and occupation in 1811 during the Russo-Ottoman war of 1806-1812, a new displacement of the urban population followed, with Muslims settling around *Sv. Troitsa*. In effect a high and solid wall had to be erected around the church concealing it from outside onlookers.

In 1698, a Christian woman sold to the bishop a property adjacent to the church in the *mahalle* of *Kuyumcu*.² The church in question was in all probability *Sv. Georgi*, located in that neighborhood and serving as the town's cathedral until the end of the 17th century. Its name, however, crops up only much later, in 1840, when the church was renovated after its destruction of 1811.³ Interestingly, in a document dating from exactly a century after its first mention as a structure and related to transactions undertaken by the *mütevelli* of its *vakıf* *Kürkçi Yovan v. Nikola* it is called *Bulgaran kilisasi* (بلغاران),⁴ probably indicating the dominant ethnicity in the parish. Whether this can be projected back to the late 17th-century realities is difficult to judge. Such an inner division within the Orthodox flock may probably explain the fact that the applicants for the restoration of *Sv. Troitsa* at the end of the 17th century were identified in the Ottoman document as the *Rum taife* of the *Ruşçuk varoş*. On the other hand, the names of the two priests who donated a book to *Sv. Troitsa* at the beginning of the 18th century belong to the Slavic tradition. Therefore such a division among the Orthodox Christians in the town was probably only beginning to emerge at the time of our concern here.⁵ In any case, this was a reality in the 19th century.

An Armenian church might have existed in Ruse from a rather early time but the first secure evidence seems to come from Archimandrit Mardiros who, on his way to Jerusalem, in 1673 visited the Armenian colonies in Ruse, Silistra and Varna and found each of them in possession of one. Since Petăr Bogdan explicitly stated in 1640 that Armenians had no cult structure T. Bakardzhieva concludes that the Armenian church in Ruse had probably emerged as a distinct building in the period between 1640 and 1673. Before

¹ BOA, MD 104, 159, doc. III, *Evasit Cemazi I* 1104 AH/ 17-26.01.1693.

² NBKM, Or. Dept., R2, f. 4v, doc. II, cf. Ivanova, "Kām predistoriyata," 55.

³ Bakardzhieva and Yordanov, *Ruse, Prostranstvo i Istoriya*, 137.

⁴ NBKM, Or. Dept., R10, 148, doc. II, of 5 *Cemazi I* 1212/ 26. 10. 1797.

⁵ See n. 34.

that local Armenians might have used as a chapel a room in a private house.¹ From the beginning of the 18th century onwards *Surp Astvadzadzin* (The Holy Mother), the Armenian church, probably a wooden construction and at the outskirts of the *mahalle* of *Kara Mustafa*, seems to be well attested, including several of its reconstructions with imperial permission.² Similarly to *Sv Troitsa*, *Surp Astvadzadzin* was half buried and wooden. Only in the 19th century was it rebuilt as a stone one but still half under the surface.

The existence of the churches of the two largest non-Muslim communities in Rusçuk during the 17th century is supported by the information about the presence of priests among the Christians. Thus, Sv. Ivanova registers a Papas Petri and one son of a *pop* in a *cizye* register of 1693.³ Two Orthodox priests and three sons of priests were registered in 1694/95 as *cizye* taxpayers in the *mahalle* of *Orta ve Tuna*: Gergi v. Pop Yovan, Yovan Pop Zhelesko(sic!), Petre v. Pop Mratin (?), Pop Dragne v. Istoyan, Pop Yovan v. Lazar; and one priest and one son of a priest in the *mahalle* of *Kuyumcu*: Manol v. Pop, Pop Peni (?) v. Dimo.⁴ In the aforementioned document of 1709 related to the complaint sent to the Porte by the non-Muslims in the town there seem to have been Pop Milet, Pop Manol, Pop Nedelko and Pop Ivan as parish/*mahalle* priests who had replaced (but we do not know when) Pop Stoyan, Pop Novak, Pop Yani and Pop Koyu.⁵ In 1709, the time of the aforementioned list of Christian neighborhoods, a Papa Hristo v. Todori appears as a guardian of the underage son of wealthy Christians.⁶ The abovementioned Pop Peno and Pop Dragne had probably been functional also in that decade. For the time being it is difficult to resolve the rigmarole with the names of the local priests. Whether some of them were part of the entourage and staff of the bishopric and were not recorded in *cizye* registers is difficult to establish. The state of the source basis does not allow me to offer a satisfactory solution to the problem of the number of the acting priests and their respective flock. It is even more difficult to explain the

¹ Bakardzhieva and Yordanov, *Ruse. Prostranstvo i istoriya*, 144, P. Bogdan, "Opisanie na Tsarstvo", 160.

² A. Giligyan, "Armenskata koloniya v gr. Ruse XVI-XIX v. do Osvobozhdenieto" [The Armenian Colony in the town of Ruse, 16th-19th centuries until the Liberation], *Almanah za Istoriyata na Ruse*, v. II (Ruse, 1997), 129-30, based on a publication of a collection of Ottoman *fermans* rendered with Armenian letters; idem, "Armenski nadgrobiya v Ruse. Nadgrobnii plochi i pametnitsi v dvora na armenskata tsarkva "Surp Astvadzadzin" ("Sveta Bogoroditsa") – XII-XIX vek" [Armenian Funerary Inscriptions in Ruse. Funerary Plates and Monuments in the courtyard of the Armenian Church of *Surp Astvadzadzin* (Virgin Mary), 12th-19th century], *Izvestiya-IMR*, v. 7 (Ruse, 2002), 68-76.

³ Ivanova, "Hristiyanska i myusyulmanska blagotvoritelnost," 17.

⁴ The Ottoman scribe has used in all these cases the word *pop*. See BOA, D.CMH 26678, 6-7.

⁵ NBKM, Or. Dept., R5, f. 33r, doc. II. Ivanova, "Kam predistoriyata," 55.

⁶ NBKM, Or. Dept., R5, f. 1v, doc. II.

frequent change of the former, if that is to be deduced from the available documents. What seems safe to state at this stage is that at the end of the 17th-beginning of 18th century a stable number of about four priests seem to have functioned in Ruse, apart from the staff of the bishopric and the clergy engaged in other structures such as monasteries or monastic dependencies (*metochion*) located in the vicinity or in the suburbs of the town.¹

In 1686, there were at least two Armenian priests, Papas Garabed (?) and Sarkis Papas, in Ruse who appeared in the Shari'a court with other representatives of the community to register a collective debt of 350 *guruş* to Merim Hatun. The *cizye* register of 1694/95 records one priest in the *mahalle* of *Hacı Musa*, Abazar (?) v. Sarkis, *papas*, and one son of a priest, Bedros v. Papas, in *Kara Mustafa*.²

Although a relatively significant community of 20 (in 1640) to 45 (in 1664) ethnically diverse households, Catholics never before the 19th century had at their disposal a church as a specialized building. However, they had a priest and held their services in private houses.³ The last to settle permanently in Ruse were Jews –towards the end of the 18th century and it took them time to officiate their cult building, too, despite the protection of İsmail Tırseniklioğlu.⁴

Although data for the early Ottoman period is sparse, it seems that after the destruction of 1595 the religious groups in Ruse had re-settled, this being particularly valid of the Orthodox Christian community which in the new plan occupied spaces on the edge of the town and beyond its 16th-century boundaries. It is within this process that we can trace back the emergence of the three of the oldest and still existing Christian cult buildings there. What is interesting and is directly related to the issue of major concern in this paper is that this single fact makes them immediately illegal from the point of view of Islamic theory of *zimmi* status.⁵ Remnants of an older building, probably from Roman times, can still be seen in the right corner of the narthex of the

¹ Sv. Ivanova has identified two monasteries which were part of the revenue sources from the town of Ruse in 1572 *Prechista* and *Sv. Petka*, raising also the question of whether these were actual monasteries, *metochions* or simply churches, "Hristiyanska i myusyulmanska blagotvoritelnost," 17.

² NBKM, Or Dept, R3, 7, doc. II, of 26 *Safer* 1097/23.01.1686; BOA, D.CMH 26678, 8. See also Giligyan, "Armenskata koloniya," 128, who mentions the fact that in 1634 a copier from Istanbul had prepared a copy of a prayer-book while staying in the *mahalle* of Kara Mustafa.

³ P. Bogdan, "Opisanie na Tsarstvo," 160, Stanimirov (ed.), *Dokumenti za katolicheskata*, 371 (Fr. Soyimirovich).

⁴ Gradeva, "Jews," 247-9; Z. Keren, "Sāzdvane i razvitie na Evreyskata obshtina v Ruschuk" [Emergence and Development of the Jewish Municipality in Rusçuk], in *Almanah za istoriyata na Ruse*, v. 3 (Ruse, 2002), 124-46.

⁵ See for example an undated *fetva* included in one of the *sicills* in Ruse of 1657, NBKM, Or. Dept., R 1, f. 25r, doc. III, which stipulates the illegality of restoration of a church on a different site.

church and may well have served as an argument to apply for a permission to build a church on the site, but unfortunately for the time being I have been unable to trace back its actual beginning.¹ The very fact that the churches were wooden and half-buried, both characteristics not being a legal requirement,² is probably an indication of their problematic status from the point of view of Islamic law. On the other hand, at the time most of the houses in this town and elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire were also wooden, and thus the material should not probably be regarded as a specifically discriminatory measure imposed on the Christians. It is only much later, towards the end of the 18th and in the first half of the 19th century, that the churches in Ruse were rebuilt with more solid materials, marking a further step in their legalization in line with the growing importance of the *zimmi* community in the town's life and with the changing outlook of the buildings there.

Tatar Pazarcik (mod. Pazardzhik)³

The beginning of this town situated at the confluence of two rivers, Maritsa and Topolnitsa, and two routes, where Via Militaris/Orta Kol forks into the traditional road from Adrianople/Edirne to Belgrade, and the less popular today road to Macedonia and Albania via Samokov, is also obscure. What seems to be certain is that there had been no medieval settlement, Byzantine or Bulgarian, on the site. The geographically central location was appreciated shortly after the Ottoman conquest. It is not quite clear when exactly the settlement was founded and who exactly did it but as its name suggests this must have been related to the settlement of some Tatar group. Until recently scholars had been unanimous that the town was established in 1485 by Akkerman Tatars who appeared in the area shortly after the conquest

¹ Bakardzhieva and Yordanov, *Ruse. Prostranstvo i istoriya*, 136.

² D. Vasileva, "Po vāprosa za tsārkovnoto stroitelstvo po vreme na osmanskata vlast" [On Church Building during the Ottoman Rule], *Vekove* (Sofia, 1979, No. 3), 36-41.

³ The historical background survey below is based mainly on St. Zahariev, *Geografiko-istoriko-statisticheskoto opisanie na Tatar Pazardzhishkata kaaza* [Geographic, Historical and Statistic Description of the Tatar Pazarcik Kaza] (Sofia, 1973); I. Batakliiev, *Grad Tatar-Pazardzhik. Istoriko-geograficheski pregled* [The Town of Tatar Pazarcik. Historio-Geographic Survey] (Sofia, 1923); idem, *Istoriya na tsārkvata Usenie Presveta Bogoroditsa v gr. T.-Pazardzhik* [History of the Church of the Assumption of the Holy Mother of God in the Town of Tatar-Pazarcik] (Sofia, 1932); M. Kiel, "Tatar Pazarcik. The Development of an Ottoman Town in Central-Bulgaria or the Story of How the Bulgarians Conquered Upper Thrace without Firing a Shot, 1485-1874," in K. Kreiser and C. Neumann, *Das osmanische Reich in seinen Archivalien und Chroniken Nejat Göyünç zu Ehren* (Istanbul, 1997), 31-68; D. Zhlegov, *Prosvetnoto delo v Pazardzhishkiya kray prez Vāzrazhdaneto* [Education in the Pazardzhik region during the Revival], (s.l.), 1996; Gr. Boykov, "Who Established the Town of Tatar Pazarcik in the Middle Upper Thrace," in: *Osmanlı ve Cumhuriyeti Dönemi*, 253-59.

of the Danube delta (1484) by Sultan Bayezid II (1481–1512).¹ In the last few years there have been attempts to move the date of the emergence of Pazarcik to an earlier time, to the end of the 1420s² or 'before mid-1440s'.³ The arguments of the latter scholars do indeed allow considering an earlier foundation date although questions remain and the exact time is still uncertain. With a view to our theme it is important to accentuate the fact that the settlement is clearly a post-conquest one, founded probably shortly after the conclusive appropriation of the region and its pacification. By the 1470s it had been promoted to the rank of *kasaba* and several decades later, by the 1530s had become the seat of a *kadi*. Indeed the first *defters* of Pazarcik of 1472 and 1516 reveal it as a small town with a Friday mosque.⁴ It quickly expanded as a trade center specializing in iron and iron products from Samokov and in coarse textile products.⁵

All authors are unanimous about the ethnic and religious characteristics of its original population as Muslims, probably Tatars. Ottoman registers corroborate this view. Originally a purely Muslim settlement it soon started attracting Orthodox Christians, probably from nearby villages. After an initially short-lived attempt to settle there in the period 1516–26, from 1570 onward the number of the Christians had been constantly on the rise.⁶

¹ This view is based almost entirely on St. Zahariev, as well as on more vague evidence about the re-settlement of Tatars in mod. South Bulgaria. It was adopted by the local historian Batakliiev and less conclusively by Kiel who attributes the settlement of Muslims in the Upper Thrace both to the state policy and to migratory movements of various groups and individuals, "Tatar Pazarcik," 38–39.

² Zhlegov, *Prosvetnoto delo*, 12.

³ Boykov, "Who Established," 253–56.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 256.

⁵ Constantin Ikonon, "Nar_chnik za Plovdivskata eparhiya ili neynoto opisanie" [Handbook of the Plovdiv parish, i.e. its description], *Izvestiya na B_lgarskoto geografsko druzhestvo*, v III (Sofia, 1935), 200; Zahariev, *Geografiko-istoriko-statistichesko*, 20–21; Batakliiev, *Grad Tatar-Pazardzhik*, 89–90, 141–73; Kiel, "Tatar Pazarcik," 50–51.

⁶ Kiel, "Tatar Pazarcik," 40–42, and Boykov, "Who Established," 257, vary in some of the numbers they give but generally reveal a similar trend. According to Kiel, Christians (42 households compared to 288 Muslim) appeared for the first time in a register of 1568/9. In 1604 their number had risen to 100 (and 434 Muslim households). The Christians' number continued to grow in the 17th century – 108 men were liable to pay the *cizye* in 1625, 133 in 1633/34 (but 121 in the appended Table 1), 146 in 1652, 977 men in 1698, gradually the Christians outnumbering the Muslims (1874). Boykov's table is concentrated on the first century and a half of Pazarcik's history: 1472 – 105 Muslim households; 1516 – 197 Muslim households, 36 bachelor Muslims and just one Christian household; 1525 – 195 Muslim households and 18 bachelors, 13 Christian households and two bachelors; 1530 – 178 Muslim households and 16 unmarried, no Christians; 1570 – 231 Muslim households and one bachelor; 28 Christian households; one Gypsy household; 1595 – 287 Muslim households and five bachelors; 44 Christian households; 1614 – 414 Muslim, 100 Christian and, seven Gypsy households. I am unable to resolve the contradiction between the two authors where differences of dating of the *defters* and figures are concerned. The evidence from the *defters* is in striking unison with the notes of St. Gerlach who in 1578 reported the presence of 30 Christian families in the town. Stefan Gerlach, *Dnevnik na edno putuvane do Osmanskata Porta v Tsarigrad* [Diary of a journey to the Ottoman Porte in Tsarigrad], transl. by M. Kisselincheva (Sofia, 1976), 260.

Interestingly Zahariev, and following him, Batakliiev, attribute the settlement of Bulgarians in the town to the construction of the enormous *Kurşum Han* in 1574, which is indeed very close to what the registers show as the beginning of the real settlement of Bulgarians in the town.¹ Jews appeared in the town sometime at the very beginning of the 17th century.² Towards the end of that century yet another religious (and ethnic) group also started settling in Pazarcik, the so-called "Merchants from Iran" or "Group of Armenians from Iran."³

The traditional view holds that the religious communities lived separately from the outset,⁴ Christians having settled first in the so-called *Varoş*, the only neighborhood where Christians seem to have lived during the 17th century. During the 18th and 19th century the Bulgarian community expanded, founded new *mahalles* and started moving into the 'Turkish' ones. According to this view Bulgarians lived in peripheral *mahalles* while 'Turks' occupied the central zone of the town around the major economic and administrative buildings. More recent research allows us to qualify this view. Indeed, in the register of 1625 the Christians were concentrated only in the *Varoş*, and this probably was indeed the first 'Christian' *mahalle*. However, the next registration of 1633/34 shows a more variegated picture. In it, Christians lived in the *Varoş* (50 households, and 16 new ones), but also in the *mahalles* of *Ibrahim Paşa* (nine), *Divane Sefer* (six), *Tabanich* (probably *Debbaghane*, that is *the Tanners'*, six), the *Cami-i Kebir* (11), *Tiksala* (10), *Hacı Kılıç* (10) in all of which there were none in the earlier registers of the 16th century, and finally 13 lived in the new (*haric ez-defter*)⁵ *New (Yeni) Mahalle* with another name *Dink Kara Divan*.⁶ Around twenty years later (1651) in another *cizye* register, the Christians are entered as an entity – *nefs-i Varoş*, 140 *hanes* and the community of the *bostancis*, six *hanes*,⁷ but it is difficult to judge whether this reflected a spatial regrouping of the Orthodox

¹ Zahariev, *Geografiko-istoriko-statistichesko*, 42-43; Batakliiev, *Grad Tatar-Pazardzhik*, 4.

² According to Kiel ("Tatar Pazarcik," 44, 46, 49, see also the table in p. 62) there were seven households of Jews in 1604 (according to Boykov, "Who Established," 257, in 1614), in 1625 – six, in 1633/34 – ten. After that date they were not included in the *cizye defters* with the rest of the non-Muslims, 1698 – 40 *cizye* payers, that is around 28 to 30 households.

³ Kiel, "Tatar Pazarcik," 49-50. Their presence in the town is noticed as early as 1680 by Count Luiggi Marsigli, in M. Yonov (ed.), *Nemski i avstriyski pātepisi za Balkanite, XVII-XVIII v.* [German and Austrian Travel Accounts of the Balkans, 17th – 18th centuries] (Sofia, 1986), 169.

⁴ Batakliiev, *Grad Tatar-Pazardzhik*, 91-93.

⁵ That is, not included in the (previous) register.

⁶ St. Andreev and S. Dimitrov (eds), *Turski izvori za bălgarskata istoriya* (hereafter *TIBI*) [Turkish Sources for Bulgarian History], *Arhivite govoryat*, v. 13 (Sofia, 2001), 22; see also Kiel, "Tatar Pazarcik," 46.

⁷ Andreev and Dimitrov (eds), *TIBI*, 218.

Christians or, which I regard as the more likely explanation, this registration marks the emergence of the local *varoş* as an institution. All these *mahalles* with the exception of the New and the Tanners' (?) are actually centrally located.¹ The ethnic and religious grouping and separation of the 19th century might probably be attributed to the time of the great turmoil of the end of 18th-beginning of 19th century and to the natural leaning towards occupying a space where the profession of the cult would be less disturbing for the Muslims, and hence, less disturbed. The *Varoş* as a neighborhood, however, remained the center for all Orthodox Christians throughout the pre-Tanzimat period. On its territory, as we shall see below, were located their main cult and educational institutions. Jews and Armenians started settling among the Muslims. Even in the first half of the 19th century, Armenians were using the great *Kurşum Hanas* as their basis.² Gradually both communities established their own small *mahalles* in the very centre of the town.³

Similarly to Ruse, the beginning of the cult buildings of the non-Muslim groups in Pazarcik is rather obscure. The authors who touch upon the subject refer to the Church of *Uspenie Bogorodichno* (the Assumption of the Holy Mother of God) as the earliest Orthodox cult building in the town, connecting its emergence to the growth of the Bulgarian community in the *mahalle* of *Varoş*, sometime at the end of the 17th or beginning of the 18th century.⁴ Local historians have registered four restorations and reconstructions of the church before it had acquired its present shape in the 19th century. These were probably related to the following events: after it was founded at the end of the 17th century when the Christian community emerged as a noticeable group within the town citizenry; in 1712 a house was built in the courtyard for the local bishop; in 1790 it was destroyed during the *kircali* turmoil and restored only in 1801 at the initiative of the local bishop and with the permission of the local strong man Kavanozoğlu Hasan Bey; in 1829 the governor of Leskovac burnt down the house of the bishop; and in 1834 the church itself was damaged during a massive town conflagration to be rebuilt of

¹ Interestingly, Evliya Çelebi who visited the town in 1653 did not notice any non-Muslim presence in the town, which he usually did for other places providing relatively accurate information about their *mahalles*. See D. Gadzhanov, "Pätuvane na Evliya Çelebi iz b_lgarskite zemi prez sredata na XVII vek" [A Journey of Evliya Çelebi across Bulgarian Lands during the mid-17th century], *Periodichesko Spisanie na BKD*, v. LXX (Plovdiv, 1909), 691-93.

² See a detailed description of the *kervansaray* in *ibid.*, 691-92; Zahariev, *Geografiko-istoriko-statistichesko*, 42; Batakliiev, *Grad Tatar-Pazardzhik*, 83-86.

³ Batakliiev, *Grad Tatar-Pazardzhik*, 86, 93.

⁴ Zahariev, *Geografiko-istoriko-statistichesko*, 43; Batakliiev, *Grad Tatar Pazardzhik*, 98, *idem*, *Istoriya na tsärkvata*, 4-6, P. Berbenliev, "Tsärkvata "Sveta Bogoroditsa" v grad Pazardzhik" [The Church of the Holy Mother of God in the Town of Tatar Pazardzhik], *Izvestiya na Instituta po gradoustroystvo i arhitektura*, v. 16 (Sofia, 1962), 164.

stone in 1837.¹ Until that date sources speak of a wooden church, which was an easy prey to fire or other disasters. M. Kiel is very cautious in establishing the date of the local church admitting only that the monumental basilica of the 1830s was constructed on the site of a much older church and that the growing number of Christians in the 17th century called for the emergence of one but that, regrettably, there was no positive data about the local churches in the pre-Tanzimat period.²

Two dates set the chronological framework in which we should locate the emergence of the first Orthodox Church in the town. What has been so far known with certainty is that in 1578 when Gerlach crossed the town he found there 30 Christian families who had no church and who for all services had to go to Plovdiv or elsewhere.³ About a hundred years later, in 1680, Luigi Marsigli referred to the church dedicated to 'St Maria' in Pazarcik.⁴ A sultanlic order in the *mühimme defters* supports Marsigli's evidence.⁵ Though of some 18 years later it corroborates the fact of the church's existence and the fact that by that time it already needed restoration, that is, it was not a new building, but we cannot tell how old. In the Ottoman document its name reads (with some imagination) as *Panaya*, most probably a distorted and bulgarized version of *Panagia*, that is *Holy Mother*. The church is explicitly located in the *Varoş mahalle* of the town.

According to local tradition Armenians also were in possession of a church from an early but difficult to define time. In 1820, at the initiative of the Armenian metropolitan in Edirne the wooden half-buried church was replaced by the contemporary *St Stephen*. The same must have been the case also with the synagogue attributed to the 1620s⁶ or –according to local tradition, to the beginning of the 18th century. It burnt down in the middle of the 19th century and was rebuilt in 1872 in its modern view.⁷

This brief survey of the history of the settlement of the non-Muslim communities in this newly founded Muslim town reveals that the emergence of their specialized cult buildings seems to have followed invariably shortly. We may only guess exactly how long it took each of the communities to get an official permission for its construction or just a sanction of a *fait accompli*, on what grounds and through what mechanisms, whether this was

¹ Zahariev, *Geografiko-istoriko-statistichsko*, 43 and Batakliiev, *Grad Tatar Pazardzhik*, 97, quote a stone inscription commemorating the construction of the bishop's house in Greek.

² Kiel, "Tatar Pazarcik", 48.

³ Gerlach, *Dnevnik na edno pätuvane*, 260.

⁴ Yonov (ed.), *Nemski i avstriyski pätepsi*, 169.

⁵ BOA, MD 110, p. 344, doc. 1524, *Evahir Şaban* 1109 AH/ 3-12.03. 1698.

⁶ Oral communication by Vl. Paunovski, based on his research on the history of the local Jewish community. I wish to thank him for sharing his findings with me.

⁷ Batakliiev, *Grad Tatar-Pazardzhik*, 99-100.

achieved through several steps in the course of a long period or through an official permission. What is important in view to the theme of this paper is that –again, this is a clear case of breach of Islamic legal theory where *zimmi* cult buildings are concerned, which explicitly banned the building of new ones in towns and in settlements where Muslims lived.¹ I wonder whether the Ottoman authorities kept exact record of how each of the towns had been incorporated into their domain, whether it was a new or an old settlement, whether it had been conquered or had voluntarily accepted their rule. It should be pointed out, however, that Evliya Çelebi who usually includes more or less fabulous stories about the conquest of the places in Rumeli he visited, about Sofia, Plovdiv and Ihtiman for example, has none for Tatar Pazarcik. He is actually rather vague saying only that its name comes from a Tatar tribe settled there by Gazi Hüdavendigâr Murad. This probably should be taken as an indication of the local awareness of the beginning of the town.

Çer(ve)na Voda (Chervena voda, Ruse district)²

The first written sources about this village located near Ruse date from 1479 and 1485 when it was registered as an uninhabited *mezra* included in a *timar*. In 1530, the earliest time when it is recorded as a populated settlement, we actually find two villages with identical names –Çervene voda, in the *kaza* of Çernovi both part of *timars*. Prior to 1555/56 one of the two villages had become part of the *vakf* of Mihrimah Sultan, the daughter of the reigning Sultan Süleyman I (1520-1566) and wife of the Grand Vezir Rüstem Paşa, dedicated to her mosque in Üsküdar (Istanbul).³ The *defter* of 1555/56 reveals

¹ Ebu's Su'ud Efendi prohibited the construction of new churches in mixed villages where there was a *mesjid*, and in small towns where the Friday prayer was read, and there was a *mekteb* (primary school) and education in Koranic studies, meaning that this was a mixed settlement, Düzdağ, *Şeyhülislâm Ebussuud Efendi Fetvaları*, Nos. 460 and 461, 105; H. Krüger, *Fetwa und Siyar, zur internationalrechtlichen Gutachtenpraxis der osmanischen Şeyh ül-Islâm von 17. bis 19. Jahrhundert unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des "Behçet ul-Fetava"* (Wiesbaden, 1978), 95-96. See also Ali Efendi's *fetva* which allowed the destruction of a church built in a town where lived Muslims, published in S. Dimitrov (ed.), *Osmanski izvori za islyamizatsionnite protsesi na Balkanite XVI-XIX v.* [Ottoman Sources for the Islamisation Processes in the Balkans, 16th-19th centuries] (Sofia, 1990), 296, 300. I have discussed this problem in Gradeva, "Ottoman Policy," 354-58.

² The names under which this village appears in the Ottoman and Western sources vary considerably, and often tend to be assimilated into Çemova (but also Çernovada, etc.) which is very close to the name of a former administrative centre, Çernovi/ Cherven. Sometimes this makes the identification as the one or the other mere guesswork and rather shaky. It is further complicated by the existence of the two Çer(ve)no vodas. See more on the name, the general history and other details about the settlement in the first Ottoman centuries as well as references to publications and sources related to the size and ethnicity of the population and to their status in R. Gradeva, "Villagers in International Trade: the Case of Chervena Voda, Seventeenth to Beginning of Eighteenth Century," *Oriente Moderno* (in press). The general background is based on this text but at times due to newly found documents I shall qualify some of the theses proposed there.

³ BOA, TD 382, 813.

also that the inhabitants of the *vakf* village had been charged with the guard of a *derbend* (a dangerous and fearful place, as a note in the register explains), with all ensuing obligations, but also advantages. In return they were exempted from the extraordinary taxes and dues (*avarız-i divaniye ve tekâlif-i örfiye*), and hence –are missing from the *avarız* registers.¹ In a document of 1714 Chervena voda is indicated as a *celepkeşan* village which supplied the capital with animal products.²

It should be pointed out that throughout the 16th and 17th centuries the ‘twin’ villages crop up in the available documents and I am not always able to identify which is which as this is rarely explicitly indicated. This certainly makes the use of some the available data questionable. Elsewhere I have suggested that one of the villages, the Muslim (Çervena voda-i Müslim)³ or Small (Çervena voda-i küçük)⁴ Chervena voda must have emerged sometime in the mid- or second half of the 17th century.⁵ It seems that here I should qualify this view as the two villages crop up in Ottoman sources from 1530⁶ till the end of the 17th century.

Both villages started as purely Muslim⁷ but by the end of the 17th century had acquired Orthodox Christian communities. I cannot tell when exactly but before 1555/6 the one that had become part of the *vakf* of Mihrimah Sultan had also undergone a dramatic increase and change of the population, already including a large group of Christians by far outnumbering the original Muslim community.⁸ In 1595, Chervena voda, similarly to Ruse and the rest of the settlements in the region, must have suffered a serious demographic blow from the raid of the Wallachian *voyvoda* across the Danube

¹ BOA, TD 382, 817. See R. Kovachev, “Novi svedeniya za Ruse i selishta v Rusensko ot Istanbulskiya osmanski arhiv (XVI-XVII v)” [New data on Ruse and settlements in the district of Ruse from the Ottoman Archives in Istanbul, 16th-17th centuries], in E. Radushev, Sv. Kostova and V. Stoyanov (eds.), *Studia in Honorem Professoris Verae Mutaŭieva* (Sofia, 2001), 235.

² BOA, MD 122, 79, doc. II. Cf. A. Refik, *Türk İdaresinde Bulgaristan* (973-1255), Istanbul, 1933, doc. 76, 52.

³ BOA, TD 771, 159; Andreev and Dimitrov (eds), *TIBI*, 257 (1657), 310 (1663); the ‘Muslim Çervena voda’ is recorded also in a *celepkeşan* register of 1663/4, IMR, B 2919, f. 35r, doc. I, according to which its inhabitants were to submit 40 sheep.

⁴ Two Muslims, inhabitants of Çervena voda-i küçük, are included in a register of falcon- and hawk-breeders, B. Tsvetkova, “Novi dokumenti za bălgarskata istoriya ot chuzhdi arhivi” [New Documents on Bulgarian History from Foreign Archives], *Izvestiya na NBKM*, v. XVI/XXII (Sofia, 1981), 728.

⁵ Gradeva, “Villagers in International trade.”

⁶ 370 *Numaralı Muhasebe-i Vilayet-i Rum-ili Defteri* (937/1530), v. II (Ankara, 2002), 559-560

⁷ 370 *Numaralı*, 559-560: the two recorded villages of the same name had respectively – 18 *hanes* and 13 bachelors, and nine *hanes*, three bachelors and one Yürük, all Muslims; BOA, TD 439, 75-76 – in 1540/41 one of the Chervena vodas was inhabited by 24 Muslim households and bachelors only.

⁸ BOA, TD 382, 820, including 12 Muslim *hanes*, ten bachelor Muslims, 15 Muslim *hanes reaya* of Mecca and Medina, one retired *sipahi*, as well as 168 Christian *hanes* and 69 bachelor Christians.

during the war with the Ottoman Empire.¹ Due to the above-mentioned specifics of the status of the village the data about the 17th century are rather scanty. For the 17th century there is evidence mainly about the Çervena voda-i Müslim.² In fact, Chervena voda is absent from any of the accessible to me registers of the population. Its Christian population appears only in the aforementioned detailed register of the *cizye* payers of 1694/95. As is usually the case the taxpayers (*nefer*) are divided according to their property status –127 of the high, 302 of the middle, and 182 of the low category, ranking among the largest in the region.³

Travelers give rather diverse evidence about the ethnicity of the village population.⁴ What they seem to be unanimous about is that the Muslims, if mentioned at all, were few.⁵ According to Jochann Kindsperg (1672-4) it was mainly Albanian merchants who resided in Chervena voda.⁶ Twenty-five years later, Janos Komaromi, the secretary of Imre Tököly, called it a "Greek" village,⁷ which can be as much an ethnic as a religious indicator for Orthodox Christians. Simpert Nigel, who crossed it in 1700 with the embassy of Count Oettingen, pointed out that it was inhabited mainly by Greeks, but also, that the Orthodox Greek inhabitants of the village were subjects of the Wallachian prince.⁸ Kelemen Mikes (1738-1739), the secretary of the Hungarian prince Joseph Rakoczy, who spent a relatively long period in Chervena voda, gave the most detailed data about the ethnic composition of the population –that these were Wallachs (half of the population), Bulgarians (the other half), and a few Turks.⁹

¹ In 1595, during the war, a considerable number of the population of the village moved to Wallachian territory. See a charter of 1602 of the Wallachian *voyvoda* Simeon Movila, which arranged the special status of the villagers in their new residence in the village of Kalineşt, the district of Prahova. *Poporul Român şi lupta de eliberare a popoarelor din Balcani* [The Romanian People and the Liberation Struggle of the Balkan Peoples] (Bucharest, 1986), doc. 25, 159-60; doc. 39, 180-1.

² Andreev and Dimitrov (eds.), *TIBI*, 257, 310. According to *cizye* registers of 1657 and 1663 only nine *hanes* paid the per capita tax on non-Muslims in the Muslim Chervena voda. The detailed *avarız defters* of the same century which replaced the *timar defters* during the 17th century, also contain information about Çervena voda-i müslim only. In 1642/43 this village had 33 inhabitants paying extraordinary taxes of whom only one was Christian, BOA, TD 771, 159.

³ BOA, D.CMH 26678, 8-10, 36-37. This village as well as Kadı köy, another one belonging to the *vakf* of Mihrimah Sultan are recorded in two places due, as the second entry explains, to the unfinished work of the *kadı*.

⁴ None of them mentions the existence of the two villages.

⁵ See Kelemen Mikes, secretary of J. Rakoczy, 1738-1739, in P. Miyatev (ed.), *Madzharski pātepsi za Balkanite XVI-XIX vek* [Hungarian Travel Accounts about the Balkans, 16th-19th centuries] (Sofia, 1976), 56.

⁶ Yonov (ed.), *Nemski i avstriyski*, 143.

⁷ P. Miyatev (ed.), *Madzharski pātepsi*, 40.

⁸ Yonov (ed.), *Nemski i avstriyski*, 199.

⁹ P. Miyatev (ed.), *Madzharski pātepsi*, 56.

The documents corroborate to a great extent the information provided by travelers. Thus, the charter granted in 1602 to the settlers in Wallachia from Chervena voda explicitly defines them as Albanians: "I, Simeon Movila, by Divine will *voyvoda* and master of Wallachia, issue this order to these Arbanasses¹ from Chervena voda (arbănași din Țervena Voda) who moved to the land of My Grace from the land of the Turks ...".² The Ottoman documents help to nuance the data in the travel accounts even further. As mentioned above, in 1540/41 the village was populated entirely by Muslims some of whom might have been converts (two or three of them bear Abdullah as paternal name, but the rest are at least second generation Muslims).³ Of particular interest is the register of 1555/56, which records a considerable increase of the population of the village at the expense of Christians -168 *hanes* and 69 bachelors, according to the scribe.⁴ Even more interestingly, there is a *mahalle-i Arnavudlar* belonging to the village where 147 men are recorded of whom 41 bachelors, that is, more than half of the Christian population of the village.⁵ The given names recorded in later Ottoman documents largely confirm the "Albanian connection," probably of Epirote origin (Andon, Leka, Gön, Kondoş, Dimo, Kondo, Deda, Andri), but also all other details provided by the travelers that speak of Greek (Yorgo), Wallachian (Gika, Lupul), and certainly Slavic (Nedelko, Stoyan, Rad, Slav) presence, as well as of Muslim population.⁶ All this is probably sufficient to conclude that during the 16th through the 18th centuries, despite migrations to Wallachia and wars, the Greco-Albanian settlers as well as some Wallachians along with the Bulgarians constituted an important part of the Christian population of Chervena voda. This should probably explain the fact that the initiators for the reconstruction of one of the churches, unfortunately unnamed, are identified as *Çerne voda nam kariye'de sakın Rum taifesi*, as opposed to those for the other three, *Çernova nam kariye zimmileri* or *Çernova nam kariye'nin ehl-i zimmet reayası*. As with Ruse, for the time being this is only a working hypothesis that seems to be corroborated by data for other parts of the empire but still needs more investigation into.

It seems that Chervena voda was indeed in many ways "special". Ottoman documents reveal that it consisted of several *mahalles* with

¹ That is, Albanians.

² *Poporul Român*, doc. 39, 180.

³ BOA, TD 439, 75-76.

⁴ Strict counting shows 181 *hanes* and 68 bachelors.

⁵ BOA, TD 382, 818-820, names as Gön and Leka confirm the Albanian background of some. There are also names typical of the Orthodox Christian name system in general, or of the Greek name system in particular.

⁶ See in detail Gradeva, "Villagers in International Trade," as well as BOA, D.CMH 26678, 8-10, 36-37.

kethüdas.¹ The peasants in Chervena voda obviously could afford a higher standard of life than most of their co-religionists of the time. Their houses pleasantly surprised travelers who compared them favorably to those in the whole region. This is also confirmed by the transactions of real estate property in the village, which reveal most of the houses in the second half of the 17th century as having at least one storey of stone and roof tiles. Elsewhere I have discussed the involvement of villagers from Chervena voda in international and regional trade, and various aspects of their material affluence and lifestyle.²

One of the village's most striking features was its rich cultural and religious life, and the existence of seven churches, information that we owe to Simpert Nigel who crossed the village in 1700.³ However questionable this evidence may appear at a first glance, it seems to be corroborated by the more reliable Ottoman sources. Four sultanic orders were issued related to permissions for the reconstruction of churches in the village of the end of the 17th and beginning of the 18th century -one whose name is not indicated (1693), *Sv. Atanas* (St Athanasius) (1698), *Sv. Iliya* (St Elijah) (1699), *Sv. Ivan* (St John) (1708).⁴ It should be pointed out that the first three of them deal with the start while the fourth belongs to the final stage of the procedure for securing a permission for the restoration of a church and thus the order about the unnamed cult building may well have been about *Sv. Ivan*.⁵ Unfortunately the visitors of the village have not left any descriptions of the churches but the permission for the restoration of *Sv. Ivan* reveals a monumental building probably brick-laid (only the columns are explicitly

¹ For example *Pop Yorgi mahalle*, IMR, B 2919, f. 3r, doc. II, 1664; *Küçük mahalle*, NBKM, Or. Dept., R4, f. 26r, doc. I, 1695; *Pop Andriko mahallesı*, BOA, MD 115, p. 663, doc. III, 1708; *Pop Yanaki mahalle*, B. Tsvetkova (ed.), *Turski izvori za istoriyata na pravoto po bălgarskite zemi* (hereafter *TIIPBZ*) [Turkish Sources for the History of Law in Bulgarian Lands], v. 2 (Sofia, 1971), 172, 1738. Two *kethüdas* (Christians) are recorded among the witnesses to a lawsuit and a judicial record of a transaction of a property in the village between inhabitants of Chervena voda. IMR, B 2919, f. 79r, doc. IV, 1663; another *kethüda* from this village appears as a guardian of an orphan, IMR, B 2919, f. 76v, doc. III, f. 77r, doc. II, 1663. It is within this context that we should mention also another striking detail – in the register of 1694/95 one is confronted with a record of three men identified as sons of *onbaşı*, but for the time being I am unable to explain what their occupation or obligations could have been, BOA, D.CMH 26678, 9, 36.

² Gradeva, "Villagers in the International Trade." Cf. also the considerable number of payers of the *cizye* belonging to the high category, BOA, D.CMH 26678, 8-10, 36-37.

³ Yonov (ed.), *Nemski i avstriyski*, 199.

⁴ BOA, MD 104, p. 159, doc. IV; MD 110, p. 386, doc. 1686; MD 111, p. 53, doc. 178; MD 115, p. 663, doc. III. The fourth document is published by Refik, *Türk İdaresinde Bulgaristan*, doc. 73, 49-50.

⁵ In the first three the *kadi* of Rusçuk is ordered to examine the application of the local non-Muslims and find out whether the building in question did indeed need restoration. The fourth had been issued after the investigation in situ and reflects the findings of the judicial authorities about the current situation of the church in question, permitting its renovation provided the conditions prohibiting its enlargement or improvement were observed.

described as built of bricks) and with roof tiles.¹ Though sketchy the dimensions recorded in the document allow a comparison with the largest new churches built during the pre-Tanzimat period.²

Ottoman documents reveal also the presence of several priests in the village in one year. For 1662-1664 documents relating to Chervena voda mention at least three –Pop Andriko, Pop Koncho, Pop Kondo;³ in 1694/95, they are seven –Pop Nikola, Pop Milyo, Pop Gyoko Yano, Pop Zhivko v. Niko, Pop (no name) v. Istani, Pop (no name) v. Pancho, Pop Stoyko v. Veliko, as well as eight sons of priests, an indication that the village could indeed have had several churches. I cannot tell how many priests served in one church at any moment and there can easily have been more than one in each but still their number in 1694/95 nicely corroborates the number of the churches mentioned by Simpert Nigel. Archaeologists report that the foundations of a church as well as of other buildings are still visible on the village square. The place is referred to as the *Tsärkvishteto*, that is the *Church-site*. Another site of a church of about 40 sq m is located on the territory of the village cemetery. Unfortunately the finds do not allow the dating of the ruins, but it is quite possible that they are from the time in question, especially since local tradition also holds it that the village had once had seven churches.⁴

The large number of the churches and the priests in the village as well as the considerable economic possibilities of its inhabitants are probably both a factor and a result of the fact that for a certain part of the 18th century it had been the seat of the bishop of Cherven.⁵ Inhabitants of the village maintained

¹ BOA, MD 115, p. 663, doc. III/ Refik, *Türk İdaresinde Bulgaristan*, doc. 73, 49-50. The church's circumference was around 80 m (105.5 *zira*), 4.64 m (6.25 *zira*) high, with 11 windows, three big domes and one half-dome on the eastern wall, with an open shed (*sundurma*) in front, 11 m long, 2.27 m wide, with columns in front 2.60 m high. Along its left wall there was a hall, more than 19 m long and 1.7 m wide, 11 columns with vaults 2.65 m high, and eaves of 1.14 m. My calculations are based on one *zira* = 0.758 m. See *Système des mesures, poids et monnaies de l'Empire ottoman et des principaux états* (Constantinople, 1910), 3.

² See data about these churches in D. Dimitrov et al. (eds), *Kratkaya istoriya bolgarskoy arhitekturiy* [Short History of Bulgarian Architecture] (Sofia, 1969), 168-202.

³ IMR, _ 2919, f. 77r, doc. II.

⁴ Tsv. Dremsizova-Nelchinova and D. Ivanov, *Arheologicheski pametnitsi v Rusenski okrăg* [Archaeological Monuments in the Ruse district] (Sofia, 1983), 77.

⁵ His presence is mentioned by Simpert Nigel, Yonov (ed.), *Nemski i avstriyski*, 199. See the information quoted by K. Jireček for 1725 (K. Irechek, *Pătuvaniya po Bălgariya* [Travels around Bulgaria] (Sofia, 1974), 324, n. 16) and the *berat* of Pop Milich of 1738 (*TIIPBZ*, 175). This is discussed extensively in T. Bakardzhieva and St. Yordanov, "Kăm rannata istoriya na Chervenska eparhiya" [On the Early History of the Cherven Parish], *Duhovna kultura*, v. LXIV/12, (1994), 16-26; I. Tyutyundzhiev, *Tărnovskata mitropoliya prez 17 - părvata polovina na 18 vek. Po dokumenti ot arhiva na metoha "Bozhi grob" na Yerusolimskata patriarshiya v Tsarigrad* [The Tărnovo Metropolitanate during the Seventeenth and the first half of the 18th century. Based on Documents Kept in the Holy Sepulchre Convent at the Jerusalem Patriarchate in Constantinople] (Veliko Tărnovo, 1996), doc. 12, 29; Gradeva, "Villagers in International Trade."

direct connection with the patriarchs of Jerusalem who visited them on their tours in the Balkans when collecting alms and received letters from them.¹ The data about journeys of inhabitants of Chervena voda to the Holy Places during that period is rather scanty. It comes from the aforementioned *cizye defter* of 1694/95 where one *aci* and two sons of *aci*, as were usually indicated Christian pilgrims to Jerusalem in Ottoman sources, are registered. Villagers from Chervena voda are frequently mentioned in codices and beadrolls of Hilandar and Zographou of the monasteries on Mount Athos.²

In 1773, during the Russo-Turkish war, the inhabitants of the village led by the bishop of Cherven Neophite moved to Wallachia.³ It seems that soon after this cataclysm the "Greco-Albanian" past of the village had gone into oblivion. Chervena voda became a predominantly Bulgarian village as far as its Christian population is concerned. While its inhabitants were still among the most active economically, politically and culturally villagers in the region, the glamour of the 16th-18th centuries seems to have passed away. Even more interesting, while some vague memories remain, even the sites of the old churches have been forgotten.

The fact that Chervena voda was recorded in the first Ottoman *defters* as a *mezra* and then a village with only Muslim population but with a Slavic name leads me to believe that there might have been a settlement in the pre-Ottoman period which disappeared during the conquest or the Ottoman-Wallachian military conflicts of the end of the 14th and the 15th centuries.⁴ Unfortunately written sources and material finds do not allow reconstructing its medieval history, which could provide the clue in the discussion of how the village churches had received their legal status. Whatever the situation, however, it is clear that there are quite a few questionable details about them. As with Ruse, ancient remnants could well have served as a point of reference for the Christian new settlers in the first half of the 16th century. While I have not come across any document explicitly permitting the construction of a new church orders for the destruction of illegally built new ones⁵ are an indication that such a legal possibility was probably not just a fiction. Thus a speedy permission, especially given its *vakf* status and belonging to the

¹ Gradeva, "Villagers in International Trade."

² B. Raykov (ed.), *Hilendarska kondika ot XVIII vek* [A Hilandar Codex of the Eighteenth Century] (Sofia, 1998), f. 211.; M. Kovachev, *Zograf. Izsledvaniya i dokumenti* [Zograf. Studies and Documents], Pt. 1. Sofia, 1942, 35-37, 89-95, 96; in 1803 some ten persons from Chervena voda were recorded, 108, 109-112.

³ Bakardzhieva and Yordanov, "Kăm rannata istoriya," 21.

⁴ Archaeological excavations on the territory of the village, however, reveal only a Thracian necropolis and a settlement from Roman times. Dremsizova-Nelchinova and Ivanov, *Arheologicheski pametnitsi*, 77.

⁵ Shopova, *Makedonija*, doc. 66, 89.

endowment of the powerful princess, cannot be dismissed either. It sounds probable also because –unlike the churches with equally problematic legal status in Rusçuk and Pazarcik, here it/they were built of solid material.

Çalı(k) kavak (mod. Rish, Shumen district)

This is a village in the northern recesses of the East Balkan range. Located at an important mountain pass on the road from Edirne via Karnobat to Şumnu (Shumen) and then to Isakçea, Silistra or Ruse,¹ its importance for the security of travelers and the region, and for trade was appreciated by the Ottomans and by 1485 it had already been registered as a *derbend* with its population fully involved in guarding the pass across the Balkan.² In the 15th and the beginning of the 16th century it was a *timar*, later it appears as part of the *hasses* of Abu'l-Fadl Efendi, *defterdar*, in the 1540s, and of Lütü Paşa, in the 1550s. In the 17th century it appears as part of the *vakf* of (probably) Sultan Selim I (1512-1520).³ Its significance grew especially from the second half of the 18th century onwards when the territory of modern North Eastern Bulgaria became the theatre of war in several Russo-Ottoman conflicts and

¹ Edirne'den Silistre'ye ve Niğbolu'ya giden yolda Balkan içinde *derbend beklerler* as has put it the Ottoman scribe in 1530, 370 *Numaralı*, 551, see also Kovachev, *Opis na Nikopolskiya*, 163 for 1485.

² In return they were exempt from the *avarız* and *tekâlif* extraordinary taxes, Kovachev, *Opis na Nikopolskiya*, 163, of 1485; 370 *Numaralı*, 551: *Avarızdan mu'aflardır ber müceb-i emr-i şerif*. Interestingly, in the later registers of the 16th century the village is still described as a *derbend* from olden times, but only 90 of the *hanes* of its inhabitants performed the service guarding at three places, the rest paid normal taxes. See BOA, TD 439, 174, dated from 947-51/1541-45 in E. Radushev and R. Kovachev, *Opis na registri ot Istanbulskiya osmanski arhiv kam Generalnata direktsiya na darzhavnite arhivi na Republika Turtsiya* [Inventory of Registers from the Ottoman Archive in Istanbul at the General Directorate of State Archives in the Republic of Turkey] (Sofia, 1996), 16-17, and TD 382, 410, dated 963/1555-56, *ibid.*, 19-20. I wish to thank Mr Nikolay Antov for kindly providing me with copies of the relevant pages from these registers.

³ This information is drawn from a *cizye* register of 1687/88 where Çalık Kavak is registered along with many villages on the southern slope of the Balkan range as a *vakf* of Sultan Selim, without specifying which one, Andreev and Dimitrov (eds), *TIBI*, 420. For the identification of the sultan as Sultan Selim I see St. Parveva, "Vakâfite v Severoiztochna Trakiya prez p_rvata polovina na XVIII v." [The Vakıfs in North-Eastern Thrace During the First Half of the 18th Century] *Istoricheski Pregled* (Sofia, 1992, No 5), 44-55. Interestingly among them is also the village of Dobral, the 'twin' village of Çalık Kavak on the southern entrance of the mountain pass. Dobral is recorded as part of Sultan Selim I's *vakf* also in 1634/5, S. Dimitrov, E. Grozdanova and St. Andreev (eds), *IBI*, v. 26 (Sofia, 1986), 379. Around 1652/3, between the two registrations Evliya Çelebi explicitly identifies the latter as a *serbest zeamet* and *derbend* (Gadžanov, "Pätuvane na Evliya Chelebi," 681). I am unable to explain this controversy but it should probably be attributed to a mistake of the traveller. While usually reliable in providing such details I have come across other similar inaccuracies in his travelogue. See for example his evidence about the village of Kadı köy, near Ruse, as a *vakf* of a Civan kapucıbaşı, *vezir* of Sultan Ibrahim, while it belonged to the pious endowment of Mihrimah Sultan. Gadžanov, "Pätuvane na Evliya Chelebi," 653.

during the so-called *kırcalı* time¹ at the end of the 18th and the beginning of 19th century.²

It is not clear whether the village had suffered much during the conquest of the region in the late 1380s, but it must have been affected by the turmoil of 1402-13 and during the rising of Şeyh Bedreddin. This, however, is only a hypothetical proposition. The earliest register in which I found the village, from 1485, presents it as a developed settlement most probably inherited from the pre-Ottoman period, and interestingly, in contrast to Chervena voda, with only Christian population but with a Turkish name.³ Whether it was the translation of a local toponym or new is difficult to judge. All sources from the first three Ottoman centuries – documents and narratives, reveal it as a significant Orthodox Christian and Bulgarian settlement.⁴

Its location made it also visible to those travellers who chose the Danube to reach the Ottoman capital from Central Europe or from the North-East. The inhabitants of the village were explicitly identified as Bulgarians and their language as Bulgarian by Evliya Çelebi who tells of a funny experience of his there in 1652/3 to which I shall refer below.⁵ The Bulgarian-ness of the local people was noticed by Edmund Chishull, chaplain at the Levantine Company in Smyrna, who passed by the village on his way back home in 1702⁶ and by Captain Schad, member of the imperial embassy to the Porte in 1740.⁷ Twenty years later, in 1762, the Ragusan Jesuit scholar Yoseph Boscowich, also crossed the village on his way from the Ottoman

¹ See on the phenomenon V. Mutafchieva, *Kärdzhaliysko vreme* [Kırcalı Time] (Sofia, 1977).

² See for example S. Dimitrov, *Osmanski izvori za istoriyata na Dobrudzha i Severoiztochna B. Igariya* [Ottoman Sources for the History of Dobrudzha and North-eastern Bulgaria] (Sofia, 1981), doc. 347, 176-77 (1786), doc. 431, 223-224 (1787), doc. 534, 280.

³ In the Ottoman sources the village appears as Çalı Kavak, that is, pollarded poplar, but also as Çalık kavak, that is, crooked/awry poplar.

⁴ Kovachev, *Opis na Nikopolskiya*, 163: in 1485 it had 140 households and 63 bachelors, all Christians; 370 *Numaralı*, 551: in 1530 it had 128 *hanes* and 47 bachelors, all non-Muslims; BOA, TD 439, 174-77: in the 1540s it had 90 *hanes* of *derbendcis*, 57 non-*derbendcis*, and 73 bachelors, all Christians; TD 382, 410-13: in the 1550s it had 90 *hanes* of *derbendcis*, 130 non-*derbendcis*, 151 bachelors and three widows, all Christians. Andreev and Dimitrov (eds), *TIBI*, 420: in 1687/88 there were 161 *cizye* tax-paying *hanes*.

⁵ Quoted from R. Dankoff, *An Ottoman Mentality. The World of Evliya Çelebi*. With an afterword by G. Hagen, Leiden-Boston, 2004, 202-3; in a slightly different translation, rather an annotation, sparing the more piquant details, Gadzhanov, "Pätuvane na Evliya Çelebi," 681.

⁶ *Travels in Turkey and back to England by the Late Reverend and Learned Edmund Chishull, B.D., Chaplain to the Factory of the Worshipful Turkey Company at Smyrna* (London, 1747), 74: "... we arrive at length at an open plain on the top of the hill, and therein at a true country paradise of Bulgar Christians called Challikcavak."

⁷ Immediately after his description of the big village of Chalik Kavak Captain Schad explains that "From Rusçuk to Adrianopolis the Bulgarian Christians speak also Illyrian [that is, Slavic] language which is even more distorted and diverged from our Czech than the Russian. Apart from their native language all men in general and most of the women speak also an excellent Turkish," Yonov (ed.), *Nemski i avstriyski*, 369.

capital to Wallachia. He described it as a large one, with around 200 Bulgarian and 50 Turkish houses, the earliest evidence of Muslim presence there.¹

Evliya Çelebi is chronologically the earliest of the accessible sources to mention the existence of a church in the village. He referred to it in the context of a rather strange tale about a local witch. To cut it short, at the end of the story a Bulgarian man, having undone the magic took 'the old hag' to 'a house, which turned out to be their church. He gave the woman over to a priest, and the priest anathematized her.'² Unfortunately, the text, which was probably intended as entertainment for the reader, while based on some positive data, is rather vague in itself and it is not clear whether this house was a church or the house of the local priest which might have also served as a gathering place for religious services (the whole event was taking place during the night). What one can deduce from the narrative is that at least from the outside it was not clear that this was a cult building. On the other hand, the existing prohibition to display crosses and other Christian symbols publicly may have made it look as an ordinary house.

Next come two documents from the *mühimme defters* related to the permission for the renovation of the church in the village, unfortunately without mentioning its patron saint.³ Finally, we come across a real curiosity in the travel account of Edmund Chishull. Himself a pastor, he specifically dwells upon the church issue for various parts of the Ottoman realm.⁴ Chishull was well acquainted with the restrictions on church building in the Ottoman Empire and on occasion of an exceptional case of permission for the construction of a new church granted to an Armenian community he noted that 'this was an instance, which seemed to us observable; for the Christianity is tolerated in Turkey, yet they hold it inconsistent with their law to permit the erection of any new churches and allow only the liberty of repairing old ones.'⁵ On another occasion, already in Wallachia he remarks that in that country the churches were 'for the most part furnished with bells; though in some places I have observed the wooden plank, which is common to the

¹ The former informed him that they lived in peace with the Turks and even inter-married. R. Boshkovich, *Dnevnik na edno pátuvane* [Diary of a journey], transl. by M. Todorova (Sofia, 1975), 44-45. See also the above referred to registers.

² Dankoff, *An Ottoman Mentality*, 203.

³ BOA, MD 104, 264, doc. 1212, *Evasit Şevval* 1104 AH/ 14-23.06. 1693; MD 110, 570, doc. 2629, of *Evahir Receb* 1110/ 22-31.01. 1699.

⁴ See for example *Travels in Turkey*, 3 (the description of a church in the village of St George near Ephesus), 75 (the description of the church in Eski Stambul [Preslav]), 77 (about the spread of 'wooden crosses erected in many places to excite the devotion of Christian travellers).

⁵ *Ibid.*, 13, where he says that in April 1699 in a 'discourse with an Armenian priest we were informed of a church, which by a peculiar grant of the Grand Signor that nation had newly founded in Durguthli [near Smyrna].

Greeks in Turkey where bells are not permitted.’¹ This careful observer has provided us with an interesting detail about the village of Çalık kavak, which he crossed on his way back from the Ottoman capital with the embassy of Lord Paget in 1702. According to him ‘a new church has been lately obtained for the inhabitants, by the interest of Count Oetingen, ambassador extraordinary from his Imperial Majesty,’ but Chishull was not so impressed by the fact as he was with the aforementioned new Armenian church.² Interestingly, this intervention is mentioned by neither Simpert Nigel, the personal priest of the count, who otherwise informs extensively on the charity acts of the ambassador, especially about freeing war captives,³ nor have I yet found a relevant Ottoman document.⁴ It is also unclear how we should interpret the evidence of Chishull –whether he spoke of a brand new church or of a significant restored one making it look as new.⁵ Actually the sultanīc order describes a church in a very miserable state whose thorough repair seems to have been badly in need.⁶ Of course, it is also unknown whether, given the size of the settlement this was the only church there.

In short, Çalık kavak appears to be the only ‘legal’ case of restoration of churches that I have examined in this small selection. The village did in all probability exist during the conquest. Documents and travelers depict it as a religiously, probably also ethnically, homogeneous settlement at the time the permissions were issued, –a requirement that, judging from *fetvas* and applications for restoration alike, seems to have been of vital importance. Although villagers did occasionally refer to the argument of a ‘*zimmi* village’ to apply for such a permission, in this case the inhabitants of Çalık kavak chose to point out the traditional justification, that presumably the village had it from the time of the conquest.

¹ Ibid., 86.

² Ibid., 74. See also E. Grozdanova, “Mnogolikite pātishta na mira i voynata” [The Diverse Roads of Peace and War], in Eadem (ed.), *Kontrasti i konflikti “zad kadār”* [Contrasts and Conflicts “behind the screen”] (Sofia, 2003), 52.

³ Yonov (ed.), *Nemski i avstriyski*, 200. For the village of ‘Cholakova’ he says only that it was a ‘poor’ village inhabited ‘predominantly’ by Orthodox Christians but nothing about their request. Unfortunately he does not specify whether Muslims lived there on a permanent basis and what ‘poor’ meant in its case.

⁴ In some cases the Ottoman documents explicitly note the intervention of a foreign ambassador in favour of a permission for a restoration of a church. This is more often the case about the Holy Places in Jerusalem and for cult buildings in Istanbul, but in a couple of cases I have also come across the explicit reference to the role of the Polish ambassador for a permission for the restoration of the churches in another village in North-eastern Bulgaria, again shortly after the Karlowitz peace treaty.

⁵ This is also a problem that emerges from the wording of some marginal inscriptions in books and epigraphic monuments commemorating the restoration/construction of a church. See Gradeva, “Ottoman Policy.”

⁶ BOA, MD 104, 264, doc. 1212, which specifies in particular that apart from ‘some places,’ the roof had been completely destroyed and that in winter water dripped in; MD 110, 570, doc. 2629, speaks of the roof, the wall and ‘some places’ that needed repair.

By way of conclusion

In this essay I have tried to explore the realities of church construction and restoration in the Ottoman Balkans against the backdrop of the political situation in the region, migrations and emigrations, economic prosperity and destruction during the first centuries of the Ottoman rule. The settlements I have chosen to examine may probably be classified as 'successful' ones starting from scratch and growing into populous places, centers of trade and crafts. Situated at important crossroads they were inhabited and visited by foreigners and attracted local people with the opportunities they provided. This may have been the reason for the wide range of approaches adopted by the Ottoman authorities to the cult buildings of their non-Muslim subjects.

At the one extreme stands Çalık kavak, a village, which despite its Turkish name was most probably inherited from the pre-Ottoman period. A century after the conquest, -after the turmoil of the first half of the 15th century caused by military campaigns rebellion and internecine war- it appears in the Ottoman registers with a stable number of inhabitants which puts it among the 'very big' villages in the region.¹ Thus it may be safe to conclude that it probably had a church from before the conquest. At the time of the villagers' application for permission to renovate their church the settlement was probably homogeneously Christian and Bulgarian as the travelers and the Ottoman documents describe it. Thus in theory all conditions for it were available, especially also bearing in mind the miserable state of the church. Çalık kavak should not have met any legal impediments for its initiative. However, if we are to trust the evidence of E. Chishull, it was the intervention of the Habsburg ambassador who crossed the village in 1700 that secured the permission, or more likely, speeded up the procedures starting in mid-1693 and resulting in 1702 in the 'new' or rather, renovated church.

At the other extreme is the case of Tatar Pazarcık where the emergence of a church is against all conditions of *zimmi* status. The town had come into being only after the conquest and remained homogeneously Muslim throughout its first century. The permanent settlement of Orthodox Christians in the second half of the 16th century as well as of Armenians and Jews during the 17th century attracted by the trade and consumption center and the economic opportunities in it led within a relatively short period to the emergence of a specialized cult building for each of the three groups. Unfortunately, for the time being I have been unable to find out how exactly

¹ See Tsv. Georgieva, *Prostranstvo i prostranstva na bălgarite, XV-XVII vek* [Space and Spaces of Bulgarians in the 15th-17th centuries] (Sofia, 1999), 69-84, who classifies in this group villages with over 80 *hanes* on the basis of data for the Niğbolu *sancak* where Çalık kavak belonged. According to her these were the most stable settlements in the region that survived all vicissitudes of the time until present days.

this had happened; whether through an intermediate stage when rooms in private houses would be used for the holy services; or a permission for their construction was officially obtained, directly through negotiations with the central authority, securing the support of its local representatives; or probably both. Eight years after the first record of a sizable Orthodox community in the town its members had to go to Plovdiv or nearby villages for any of the holy sacraments as it obviously still had neither a church nor even a priest. A century later the building was already there and at the end of the 17th century the Christians applied for permission to start the procedure for the restoration of their cult center on the grounds that it was an old one and they possessed it since the time of the conquest. I have not found documents concerning the later saga of the church but it seems that in 1712 the complex expanded with the construction of a house for the newly established bishop in the town, a clear sign of the strengthening of the position of the local Christian community. It is not clear whether the church was actually renovated only then. Its ambiguous legal status, however, seems to have mattered as it emerged, and remained till the Tanzimat, wooden and half-buried.

Between the two extremes of the legal and illegal stands the legal twilight where, for different reasons, qualify Ruse and Chervena voda. Ruse was not a new settlement. It was predominantly Christian till the end of the 15th century and -despite the changing balance between Christians and Muslims- still more Christian than Muslim till the destruction of the town in 1595. In the 17th century it rose from the ashes as a Muslim city but only if we do not take into account its temporary inhabitants. During the first two Ottoman centuries the town was several times completely destroyed losing all its citizens this causing certain spatial re-arrangement of the major religious groups among which moved also the Armenians. There is all ground to expect that the settlement had at least one church at the time of the conquest. The complete destruction certainly caused displacements and changes of the locations of both neighborhoods and cult buildings, especially those of the non-Muslims. Their number and location in the pre-17th century time is not clear. Probably they were two and served by more than two priests. After the disaster of 1595 the Orthodox churches that appeared were two, both wooden and half-buried. It is clear that the Orthodox Christian cult buildings could not have been entirely illegal. The problem about them derived from their new location where they could not have existed at the time of the conquest, on the edge of the far larger town of the 17th century. This or other cases in the *kaza* may have given rise to debate in the local Muslim community. Probably one of its echoes is the record of a *fetva* in the *kadi sicill* of 1656/7 prohibiting

the renovation of a village church at a new site.¹ The Armenian church seems to have been a newcomer and hence illegal from the Shari'a point of view. It, too, remained wooden and half-buried until the 19th century. The number of the churches in the town and that of the priests who served in them remained constant through the centuries till the Tanzimat despite the changes in the citizenry. At least one of the buildings, however, was rebuilt of stone in the second half of the 18th century.

No less striking is the case of Chervena voda. Probably an old village it must have disappeared during the conquest or as a result of the warfare of the 15th century. Whatever the historical background when it re-emerged prior to 1530 it was a purely Muslim village, and this changed only with its inclusion in the *vakıf* of Mihrimah Sultan. From the middle of the 16th century it becomes a predominantly Christian but never a purely Christian settlement. Be it for its status, because of the affluence of its population or on the grounds of some ancient ruins, or for all these reasons, towards the end of the 17th century despite its 'Muslim past' Chervena voda had seven churches, at least one of which being monumental and of solid material.

The recapitulation of the situation in the four settlements allows me to conclude that the Ottomans were indeed rather flexible in applying the theory of the *zimmi* status to each concrete case that would emerge in their domains. Unfortunately at this stage of my research I cannot tell who exactly initiated the 'foundation' and how exactly the respective permission was secured, had this been part of the advantages offered sometimes by *vakıfs* or a conscious policy pursued by the rulers with a view of reviving the economy of their towns and providing the necessary minimum of facilities for their non-Muslim subjects.² Whether this had been negotiated in loco or with the central authorities what the case study clearly proves is that the construction of churches was allowed even in absolutely illegal situations as Tatar Pazarcık shows. However the Ottoman permissiveness was not unlimited and especially in the case of the two towns the ambiguous legal status of the churches must have been among the major reasons for their being wooden and half-buried, the latter allowing the acquisition of a larger space without making it too disturbing for the Muslims.

The restrictive policy can be traced also in the correlation between the number of the Orthodox Christians and the available churches. In Ruse, for example, the two churches were to serve nearly 400 men who were permanent citizens and more than 1200 single men who resided there in search of job

¹ NBKM, Or. Dept., R1, f. 25r, doc. II.

² See for example H. İnalcık, "The Policy of Mehmed II Toward the Greek Population of Istanbul and the Byzantine Buildings of the City," in idem, *The Ottoman Empire: Conquest, Organization and Economy* (London, 1978), 248-9.

opportunities, for trade or as craftsmen. Although the number of the priests is not that low it still reveals a very weak parish network. The situation is similar in Pazarcik. The first evidence about the existence of a church shows around 150 Christian families as its flock, but at the end of the 17th century the Ottoman sources show nearly a thousand local men and visitors just for one church. Probably in both cases we may expect that part of the needs of the Christians were met by churches in nearby or more distant villages and monasteries. The situation in the two villages looks by far better. The peasants in Çalık kavak, around 200 men at the end of the 17th century, had at least one church, while those in Chervena voda, with their seven churches, had one for less than a hundred *cizye* taxpayers.

Difficulties existing for the non-Muslims surface also when we examine the lengthy and complicated procedure followed in order to obtain the desired permission to renovate an existing church. The information we have with respect to the period the applicants needed to acquire the permission is rather random, sketchy and contingent. Yet some details allow me to consider it as usually a very long one. If we are to trust the evidence of Chishull about Çalık kavak, for example, it took the villagers more than seven to eight years. It was initiated before 1693 (the date of the sultanic decree ordering the *kadı* of Shumen to investigate the situation on the spot); a second sultanic order was issued in 1699 to assist the villagers to overcome the obstacles created by unnamed *ehl-i örf*; it ended in the late 1700, after the embassy of Count Oetingen had crossed it, and before 1702 when Chishull visited it and saw the 'new' church, a result of the intervention of the Habsburg ambassador. If my guess that the earliest document about the unnamed church in Chervena voda and the fourth, about Sv. *Ivan*, are related to a single building then we are confronted with an even longer period, of roughly 15 years, between 1693 and 1708, and this is a village which obviously enjoyed a 'special' treatment and whose inhabitants could afford spending money.

Thus, it seems safe to conclude that the Ottoman authorities obviously did not raise serious impediments to the construction of new cult buildings in an effort to provide their non-Muslim subjects with needed basic infrastructure. The examined cases as well as others that I have encountered reveal, however, that they rarely went beyond the absolutely minimum number for the cult to be maintained. The buildings, especially the new ones in the towns were wooden and often half-buried, the latter probably more a device used by the Christians themselves to compensate for the limitations on the height they would have faced. It seems that even obtaining permission for a fully legitimate renovation could take something like ten years, a sufficient period for repairs to be in need. Finally, sometimes what was allowed by the

central and provincial authorities was opposed by the Muslim communities who closely monitored any liberties legally or illegally attained by non-Muslims. Again, as with so many aspects of the status of the non-Muslims in the Islamic states, the concrete reality was a complex function of a variety of factors ranging from legal theory to political and economic expediency. None of them, however, envisaged more than the status of 'protected' but second-rate subjects.

COMMENT ON GARDE UN SECRET

Une note confidentielle du grand-vizir Şoğollu Mehmed Paşa en septembre 1566

Nicolas VATIN

Les archives du palais de Topkapı conservent, sous la cote E 11680/1, un document que le catalogue décrit comme «contenant les instructions de Şoğollu Mehmed Paşa sur ce qu'il convenait de faire pour le corps de Süleymân Ier décédé»¹. Travaillant avec Gilles Veinstein sur un livre consacré aux morts et successions des sultans ottomans², j'étais évidemment curieux d'en connaître le contenu. À première lecture, je fus à dire vrai assez décontenancé par cette note non datée, qui n'indiquait ni le nom du signataire ni celui du destinataire, comme c'est du reste si souvent le cas dans ce fonds. Une meilleure connaissance des événements qui se déroulèrent en septembre 1566 dans le camp ottoman de Szigetvár me permet aujourd'hui de mieux comprendre la nature de ce curieux document et d'en dégager quelques informations. C'est donc un petit exercice de critique interne que je dédie à Colin Imber.

*

Voici le contenu de la note en question.

- 1- *mevlûd-ı şerîf harcına³ sükker içün beş yüz filûrî gider
denilmiş bu makûle*
- 2- *zamânlarda her ne harc (sic) gider ise nesne lâzım gelmez
kal'ede işleyenlere*

¹ Mehmed Paşa (Sokollu)'nun ölen I. Süleyman'ın cenazesi için yapılacak şeylere ait hazırladığı talimatname. Ce document a été récemment reproduit en fac-similé par Mme Zeynep Tarım Ertuğ en annexe de son livre XVI. yüzyıl Osmanlı Devletinde cülûs ve cenaze törenleri, Ankara, T.C. Kültür Bakanlığı, 1999, p. 168. La légende placée sous le document par Mme Ertuğ est la suivante : «Kanunî Süleyman'ın ölümünün gizli tutulması gerektiğine dair».

² Nicolas Vatin et Gilles Veinstein, *Le sérail ébranlé. Essai sur les morts, dépositions et avènements des Sultans ottomans, XIVe-XIXe siècles*. Paris, Fayard, 2003.

³ Sic. Comme on le constatera dans la suite, le scribe (dont rien ne permet de supposer qu'il est le grand-vizir lui-même) omet systématiquement de porter le point diacritique des *h*.

- 3- *vérildüğine gâyetde eyü olmuş-dur ve taşrada Hünkâr (sic) Selîm Hana (sic) çavuş göndermiş-dür*
- 4- *déyü söylenürmiş denilmiş arâzil-i nâs söyledükleri mukarrer-dür ammâ anlaruñ sözlerine*
- 5- *'amel yok-dur hem-ân biz kendümüzi aldurmıyalum hekîm başıya ol aşl sözi*
- 6- *kim demiş-dür anlar dahi ne cevâb vermişlerdür harem-i hümayûn mazbût olmaduğuna¹*
- 7- *ağların Allâh te'âlâ şabırlar vére âyuñ on beşine dek gayret etmek*
- 8- *gerek-dür bir nesne hatıruma (sic) gelmiş-dür Hünkâr (sic) içün kışa muta'allık bir kaç libâs*
- 9- *kesdürseñüz ve yol cizme ve kalçınlar ve minder-i keler gibi buña dahi bir kaç gün*
- 10- *mukayyed oluñ ve kapu oğlanına mukayyed olmañ yine mirâren desün ki ol makûle*
- 11- *sözi bir dahi dile getürmesün şimdi kapu oğlanına el uzadılursa*
- 12- *şâyed ki dübelik² duyula yine ıgmâz evlâ gibi bu sırra mu'ta'allık şimdi kelimât édenler*
- 13- *ağvâli sa'âdet ile geldüklerinde anlara denilüb geregi gibi hakklarından gelinür ve mevlûd-ı*
- 14- *şerîf tedârükin muhtaşarca (sic) dutasın şimdi sükker bulunmaz bi-l-farz altun olmuş-dur*

En marge et de biais :

- 15- *mevlûda gelmek özengi*
- 16- *ağaları-dur katî çok âdem*
- 17- *gelmek lâzım-dur 'âdet olınageldi-ise*
- 18- *be-her-ğâl 'âdeti icrâ etmek gerek*
- 19- *niğâyet sö[z]i³ dutilsun*
- 20- *muhtaşarca (sic) dutılacak*
- 21- *halk (sic) dahi üşmez*
- 22- *ve tezkereden gayrî*

¹ Cette lecture me semble probable, malgré une haste (dont je ne m'explique pas la présence) qui recouvre en partie la boucle du *ğayn*.

² Sic pour *dübelek* ?

³ Lecture hypothétique. *Seferi* se lirait sans doute mieux, mais semble mal convenir au contexte. Il ne paraît pas absolument impossible de voir un *zel* trop court et en partie recouvert par le *vav*...

- 23- *sizüñ¹ kağıduñuzu*
- 24- *tezkerenüñ içine şarasız*
- 25- *ki halk (sic) arasında pâdişâh*
- 26- *mektûbı-dur dëyü açıldukda*
- 27- *evvelinde elümüze sizüñ*
- 28- *tezkerenüz girmeye*

Traduction :

«On a dit qu'il se dépensait cinq cents pièces d'or de sucreries pour les frais du *Mevlûd*. Dans les moments que nous vivons, de quelque dépense qu'il s'agisse il n'est besoin de rien. Pour ce qui a été donné aux hommes qui travaillent au fort, on a très bien fait.

D'autre part on a dit qu'il se disait : "Il [le grand-vizir] a envoyé un *çavuş* auprès du souverain Selîm Han, en province"². Il est sûr que ce sont là propos tenus par les éléments les plus vils de la population [du camp]. Mais il n'y a rien à faire contre leurs propos. N'y prêtons aucune attention. Qui a tenu ce genre de propos au *hekîm başı* ? Et lui, qu'a-t-il répondu ? Je déplore que le harem auguste ne soit pas protégé. Dieu (qu'Il soit exalté !) nous donne de la patience ! Il faut maintenir l'effort jusqu'au 15 de ce mois.

Une chose m'est venue à l'esprit : si vous faisiez couper des habits d'hiver pour le souverain ? Consacrez quelques jours à des choses de ce genre : bottes de voyage, chausses de feutre³, coussin en lézard⁴...

Quant au *kapu oğlanı*, ne t'en occupe pas. Qu'on lui répète⁵ encore qu'il ne doit plus tenir pareil propos. Si l'on met maintenant la main sur le

¹ Le point du *zel* manque. On pourrait donc lire *sırruñ*, néanmoins le suffixe de la seconde personne de *kağıduñuz* donne à penser que la lecture *sizüñ* s'impose.

² Mme Desaiwe me fait remarquer qu'on comprend plus spontanément : «qu'il se disait en dehors [des appartements privés] : "le souverain [autrement dit Soliman] a envoyé un *çavuş* auprès de Selîm Han». La traduction qu'elle me propose peut paraître d'autant plus vraisemblable que l'emploi adjectif de *hünkâr* est curieux. Du reste le mot est employé de façon plus normale un peu plus bas pour désigner «le souverain», en l'occurrence Soliman. Dans le contexte, cette interprétation laisse cependant un peu perplexe, dans la mesure où, comme on le verra, un *çavuş* fut en effet envoyé officiellement par Soliman. On ne voit donc pas en quoi il y aurait eu lieu de se préoccuper d'un tel ragot. En outre *şağrada* serait également une curieuse façon de désigner le camp par opposition à l'*enderûn* : il paraît plus vraisemblable que la formule désigne la province où se trouve Selîm.

³ *falçın* : «Longs bas de feutre qu'on porte sous les bottes» (Samy-Bey Frascbery, *Dictionnaire turc-français*, Constantinople, 1885, p. 801, sous l'entrée «qaltchyn»).

⁴ *Minder-i keler*. Peut-être peut-on lire plutôt *minderekler*, compris comme un diminutif de *minderler* ?

⁵ Le texte dit *desün*, littéralement «qu'il dise». Mais le sujet de ce verbe reste difficile à déterminer. Il ne s'agit pas du *kapu oğlanı* lui-même, car le verbe de la subordonnée serait alors *getürmeyim* plutôt que *getürmesin*. Peut-être est-il ici question du *Kapu oğlanı kethüdâsı* ? Peut-être aussi, comme le suggère Mme Desaiwe, faut-il restituer *diyesün* et comprendre «Répète-lui», la formule s'adressant donc au destinataire du document.

kapu oğlanı, on risque d'entendre les tambourins¹. Le mieux est encore de fermer les yeux. Quand il² sera arrivé, on lui parlera de ceux qui tiennent maintenant des propos concernant ce secret et ils seront punis.

Quant aux préparatifs du *Mevlûd* sacré, tiens t'en au minimum. Actuellement on ne trouve pas de sucreries : on dirait que c'est de l'or !

Se rendre au *Mevlûd* est réservé aux aghas de l'étrier. Cela doit faire beaucoup de monde. Si telle était la coutume, en tout cas il faut appliquer la coutume. Bref qu'on s'en tienne à ce qui a été dit³. Si on s'en tient au minimum, la foule ne se rassemblera pas.

Pour la note que vous écrirez en sus du *tezkere*, enveloppez-la dans le *tezkere* de manière à ce que, quand il sera ouvert devans la troupe comme si c'était une lettre du *pâdişâh*, votre propre note ne me tombe pas la première dans les mains».

*

La datation approximative de ce document proposée par le catalogue des archives du palais de Topkapı est exacte. Encore n'est-il pas inutile de la justifier et de la préciser.

Notre document fait référence à un Selîm *Han* qui se trouve loin de la *kapı* impériale. Il s'agit donc d'un *şehzâde* héritant du trône ottoman. Il ne peut s'agir ni de Selîm Ier, qui s'empara du trône de son père à Istanbul même en 1520, ni de Selîm III qui n'était jamais sorti du palais lorsqu'il hérita de son oncle 'Abdü-l-*hamîd* Ier en 1789⁴. Reste Selîm II, qui, en 1566, se trouvait bien dans la situation décrite. Plus précisément, notre note concerne les préparatifs du *Mevlûd*, l'anniversaire du Prophète célébré tous les ans le 12 *rebî'ü-l-evvel*, soit, en 974, le 27 septembre 1566. Elle est donc antérieure à cette date et postérieure à celle de la mort de Soliman, le 21 *şafar* / 7 septembre 1566. Ajoutons que Selîm II y est présenté comme *hünkâr*, apparemment⁵, et en tout cas comme *han*, formule qui semble impliquer qu'il est déjà sultan en titre, donc qu'il a déjà procédé à son intronisation (*cülûs*). Or nous savons que celle-ci eut lieu à Istanbul, le 8 *rebî'ü-l-evvel* / 23

¹ Le *dümbelek* est un petit instrument à percussion fait d'un récipient de cuivre ou de laiton sur lequel on tendait une peau, et dont on tirait un son sourd (Cf. N.R. Büngül, *Eski eserler ansiklopedisi*, Istanbul, s.d., I, p. 106).

² Il s'agit évidemment de Selîm *Han*.

³ La formule n'est pas claire, mais il faut sans doute comprendre qu'on doit appliquer à la lettre les rites habituels du *Mevlûd*.

⁴ Cette seconde hypothèse n'est faite que dans le souci d'être complet, la langue et la graphie de notre document étant manifestement antérieures au XVIII^e siècle.

⁵ Cf. note 2, p. 241.

septembre 1566, à une date sans doute à peu près prévisible pour ceux qui étaient au courant de la situation¹. Il me semble donc qu'on peut admettre comme probable que cette note relative à la préparation des rites du *Mevlûd* fut rédigée, assez naturellement, dans les jours qui précédèrent celui-ci, autrement dit un peu avant le 27 septembre 1566.

Cela faisait un peu plus de quinze jours que le sultan Soliman le Magnifique était décédé sous sa tente, quelques heures avant la prise de Szigetvár. Même une fois cette victoire obtenue, la situation restait dangereuse. Les armées de l'empereur Maximilien II n'étaient guère éloignées. En outre il importait de ne pas laisser les troupes ottomanes sans maître. Aussi le grand-vizir Şokollu Mehmed Paşa avait-il pris au plus vite des mesures pour maintenir le secret autour de la mort du sultan en attendant l'arrivée de son successeur². Aussitôt informé, nous raconte Ferîdûn, il avait envoyé l'ordre suivant dans l'*içerü*, en l'occurrence le campement privé du sultan et de ses pages :

«Que ce secret qu'il convient de dissimuler ne soit en aucune façon absolument révélé et annoncé à personne parmi les créatures du genre humain. Si quiconque dévoile ne fût-ce qu'un atome de ce rapport aux signes de confusion et de ce registre qui réveille la douleur, grand ou petit, quel qu'il soit, il est entendu qu'il subira un traitement dégradant et subira la punition la plus ferme et la plus grave. Que chacun montre de la prudence en conséquence. Que tous prennent garde de ne pas révéler cette nouvelle !»³.

Non content d'ordonner le silence, le grand-vizir multiplia les procédés visant à faire croire à la troupe que Soliman était toujours vivant. Les mesures qu'il prit, certaines très spectaculaires, sont pour beaucoup d'entre elles bien connues et il est inutile de revenir ici sur celles-ci⁴.

L'une d'entre elles doit cependant être rappelée, car elle nous permet de déterminer plus précisément la nature de notre document. Le principe en était de donner l'impression que le grand-vizir continuait à correspondre par échange

¹ Sur ce point et plus généralement pour une discussion de ces dates, cf. la dernière partie de cet article, *infra*.

² Sur toutes ces questions, d'ailleurs bien connues, cf. Vatin et Veinstein, *op. cit.*

³ *Aşlâ ve ka'â bu sırr-ı lâzümü-l-ihtifâ efrâd-ı âferide-i nev'-i insândan bir ferde ifşâ ve inbâ olunmıya bu ceride-i işkâl-erkâm ve defter-i imlâl-irtâmdan bir kimesne bir nokta mikdâr ifşâ-yı esrâr eyleye a'lâ ve ednâ her kim gerekse olsun hakâret olunub muhkem ve müntahâ hakkından gelinmek mu'arrar-dür aña göre her kişi başîret üzre olsun izhâr-ı ahhbâr eylemekden hâzer eylesünler* (Ferîdûn, *Nûzhetü-l-esrârî-l-ahbâr der sefer-i Sigetvâr*, Ms. H. 1339 de la bibliothèque du palais de Topkapı, 52 v° ; texte inédit dont je prépare l'édition et la traduction française).

⁴ On en trouvera le détail dans les chroniques de Ferîdûn et Selânikî (*Tarih*, M. İpşirli éd., Istanbul, 1989).

de notes avec le sultan malade retiré sous sa tente. Voici comment Ferîdûn décrit la méthode employée :

«Toutes les affaires donnaient lieu à la rédaction d'une note envoyée dans l'*içerü* et l'on agissait conformément à la réponse qui revenait. Mais de quoi qu'il s'agît, cette note était en fait envoyée au fidèle compagnon que [le grand-vizir] avait pour confident dans l'*içerü*. C'est ce dernier qui rédigeait la réponse et la renvoyait hors [de l'*içerü*] à Son Excellence le grand ministre. Et celui-ci, quelle que fût la question, répondait "Tel est l'ordre qu'a donné le *pâdişâh*" et en venait à bout avec soin»¹.

Il est clair que le *tezker*e publié ci-dessus est une de ces notes. On en trouvera un indice sûr dans sa conclusion, qui fait allusion sans ambiguïté à un *tezker*e que son destinataire devra déployer ostensiblement devant la troupe —ou tout au moins quelques officiers— comme si c'était un ordre émis par le sultan, et sans doute même, plus précisément, un *hatt-ı şerif* écrit de la main du souverain. Ainsi le destinataire de cette réponse impériale, et donc l'émetteur de notre document, n'est autre, en effet, que le grand-vizir Şokollu Mehmed Paşa.

Quant à la personne à qui écrivait le grand-vizir, et qui devait lui répondre, on peut également la nommer. Si Ferîdûn n'en dit pas plus sur ce «fidèle compagnon» qu'il avait dans l'*içerü*, en revanche Muştafa 'Âlî de Gallipoli le nomme : il s'agit du *silahdâr* Ca'fer Ağa, dont l'écriture ressemblait à celle du sultan défunt. Il devait par la suite, à sa sortie de l'*enderûn*, épouser la petite fille de Şokollu Mehmed Paşa. Il fut agha des janissaires, *beglerbeg* de Roumélie et vizir². L'information de Muştafa 'Âlî est du reste confirmée au détour d'une phrase par Selânîkî, qui était sur place et faisait partie des proches collaborateurs du grand-vizir. Signalant la venue, par la suite, de lettres en provenance d'Istanbul qui donnèrent à comprendre que le souverain avait changé, il ajoute en effet : «Les personnes intelligentes surent combien était douloureux le contenu du papier apporté par le *kapucular*

¹ *Her ne kažiyye vâkı' olsa tezkere yazulub içeriye gönderilüb ve cevâb çıkub mûcibi-ile 'amel olurdu ammâ her ne huşûş olsa tezkere içeride hem-râz olan şadık refiğe gönderilürdi ol dahî cevâb yazub yine taşraya düstûr-ı a'zam hâzretlerine işâl ederlerdi düstûr-ı a'zam dahî emr-i pâdişâhî bu vech-le olmış-dur dëyü her ne kažiyye olsa cevâb vërub itmâm ve ihtimâm buyururlardı* (Ferîdûn, 58 v°).

² Cf. Gelibolulu Muştafa 'Âlî, *Kühnü-l-a'hbâr*, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Manuscrits orientaux, Supplément turc n° 1028, 319 v° : '*âdet üzerine vezîr-i a'zamuñ 'arzlari içerü gönderilürdi tenbihi üzre silahdâr Ca'fer Ağa cevâb yazub taşra gönderürdi hattâ mezbûri serîr-i salânata emîn êdüb kaç'-ı merâtib-le re'âyetine ve âgalığ-la taşra çıkdukda dâmâd edinüb izdiyâd-ı rıfkına mukayyed eylemiş (...) mezbûr Ca'fer Ağaya yeniçeri ağalığı vezîr-i müşârün-ileyhün duhterinün duhteri tezvîc kılınmışdı mezbûruñ yazusı hatt-ı hümâyûn-ı şehriyâriye müşâyih (sic pour müşâyî ?) olmağ-la ol eyyâmda ... (?) tezkereler çeküb elbette kal'enüñ fethince bezl-i mechûd êtsünler dëyü mü'ekked tenbîhler vâkı' ve vezîr-i a'zam lisânında ol mazmûn-ı mektûb sâ'ir vüzerâya ve mîr-mîrâna şâyî' kılınmağın, etc.*

kethüdâsı Gülâbî Ağa, comme *haft-ı hümayûn*, de la part du *silahdâr-ı hâşşa* Ca'fer Ağa, au moment où le défunt avait rendu l'âme»¹.

Nous sommes donc en présence d'une note adressée par Şokollu Mehmed Paşa au *silahdâr* Ca'fer Ağa, son homme de confiance dans l'*içerü*. C'est à ma connaissance le seul exemple que nous connaissions d'un tel document. Son existence vient confirmer la qualité des informations fournies par les chroniqueurs : il me semble qu'il n'est pas inutile de le souligner².

*

La lecture détaillée des instructions du grand-vizir complète notre information sur un certain nombre de points.

On soulignera d'abord l'intérêt du conseil final, qui fait probablement allusion à un incident survenu lors d'un précédent échange de courriers : une note personnelle de Ca'fer Ağa était semble-t-il apparue à côté du faux ordre du sultan qu'il avait également rédigé, ce qui risquait d'attirer l'attention et de susciter les doutes des personnes présentes³. Ceci vient nous rappeler que le rôle de Ca'fer Ağa n'était pas seulement de rédiger au nom du sultan défunt des ordres secrètement dictés par Şokollu Mehmed Paşa : ce puissant ministre attendait également de son agent qu'il l'informât sur ce qui se passait dans l'*enderûn*, où lui-même n'avait pas accès. On a du reste quelques exemples de telles informations dans le document qui nous intéresse. En l'absence du sultan, il pouvait en outre se poser, au sein de l'espace privé, des questions pratiques que le grand-vizir était désormais seul à pouvoir résoudre : c'est le cas par exemple de l'organisation du *Mevlûd*, qui se heurte apparemment à la pénurie de sucre dans le camp. On notera que les dépenses auxquelles il est fait allusion sont au débit du Trésor privé du sultan, et que, sans ces circonstances exceptionnelles, elles n'auraient pas dû être du ressort du grand-vizir. Mais, surtout, il y a tout lieu de supposer que Ca'fer Ağa servait déjà d'informateur à Şokollu Mehmed Paşa avant la mort de Soliman : bien que moribond, celui-ci avait le pouvoir à tout moment de briser la carrière de son ministre, voire

¹ *Merhûm ve mağfûrun-leh teslim-i rûh eyledüğü hinde gece-ile kapucular kethüdâsı Gülâbî Ağa silahdâr-ı hâşşa Ca'fer Ağadan haft-ı hümayûn nâmına getürdüğü kâğıduñ mefhûmı ne mertebe cân-suz idüğü 'uçalâya ma'lûm* (Selânikî, p. 39). Sur ce message, cf. Ferîdûn, 45 v°.

² Faut-il s'étonner de la présence de cette note dans les archives du Palais ? Dans la mesure où elle avait été envoyée dans l'*Enderûn*, on peut considérer son archivage sur place comme naturel. Mais ceci implique que Ca'fer Ağa n'avait pas jugé nécessaire de détruire un document aussi confidentiel...

³ C'est du moins ainsi que je comprends le conseil donné par Şokollu Mehmed : bien plié à l'intérieur du soi-disant *haft-ı hümayûn*, la note de Ca'fer ne risquera plus d'apparaître inopinément dans ses mains. Mme Desaiwe me suggère une autre possibilité : le grand-vizir craint, si la note de Ca'fer lui vient la première entre les mains, de la prendre pour le courrier du sultan et de la lire par erreur à haute voix.

d'ordonner sa mort. On aurait tort de considérer ce risque comme théorique et improbable : quelques semaines auparavant, quand Soliman laissa éclater sa fureur contre le *beglerbeg* de Bude Arslân Paşa, coupable d'avoir levé avec précipitation le siège qu'il avait mis devant Palota sans en avoir reçu l'instruction, Şokollu Mehmed Paşa dut également se défendre devant les reproches du maître qui lui attribuait une part de responsabilité¹.

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Un deuxième point qu'on peut soulever concerne la célébration du *Mevlûd* elle-même. En effet on considère généralement, à la suite de Mouradgea d'Ohsson, que le *mevlûd âlâyî* fut institué par Murâd III en 1588², et l'on se fonde, pour rendre compte de cette cérémonie, sur des descriptions dues à des auteurs du XVIII^e et du XIX^e siècle : Mouradgea d'Ohsson lui-même, Es'ad Efendi et Tayyârzâde 'Atâ³. À cette époque, cette fête qui n'était, selon l'expression de Mouradgea d'Ohsson, «que pour la cour et non pour le peuple», était célébrée dans la mosquée de Sultanahmet par un grand nombre de dignitaires, séparés du peuple par une haie de janissaires.

Or il apparaît que le rite était, au palais, antérieur à Murâd III. Selânîkî évoque du reste la cérémonie qui eut lieu dans le camp de Szigetvár en 1566 : «Dans la nuit du 12 du mois de *rebî'ü-l-evvel*, des chantres ayant été demandés dans la chambre impériale, Hâfîz Maḥmûd Çelebi récita le *Mevlûdü-n-nebî*»⁴. Ainsi que l'écrivait Mouradgea d'Ohsson, il s'agissait donc d'une cérémonie relativement privée. Notre document nous en apprend cependant plus. Il y apparaît clairement qu'un protocole était déjà fixé à la fin du règne de Soliman : il y avait une «coutume» (*'âdet*) à laquelle il importait de se conformer. Si nous n'en connaissons pas le détail, du moins apprenons-nous qu'il était de règle de distribuer des sucreries — ce qui n'est d'ailleurs pas pour surprendre —, mais aussi que la fête, loin d'être confinée au cercle intime des pages de l'*enderûn*, était ouverte à des officiers du *bîrûn*, puisque «se rendre au *Mevlûd* était réservé aux aghas de l'étrier». Les *özengi* (ou *rikâb*) *ağaları* sont les aghas marchant devant le cheval du sultan : l'agha des janissaires, l'*emîr-i 'alem*, le *kethüdâ* des *kapucî*, les *kapucîbaşı*, le *çavuş*

¹ Cf. Selânîkî, p. 25.

² Cf. Mouradgea d'Ohsson, *Tableau général de l'Empire ottoman*, Paris, 1779-1824, II, pp. 358-368.

³ Cf. les articles «Mevlid alayı» in M.Z. Pakalın, *Osmanlı tarih deyimleri ve terimleri sözlüğü*, Istanbul, 1983, II, pp. 521-522 ; «Mevlid», in *İslâm Ansiklopedisi* VIII, Istanbul, 1979, pp. 171-176.

⁴ *Mâh-ı rebî'ü-l-evvelin on ikinci gecesî otak-ı hümâyûnda hâfîzlar istenüb ve Hâfîz Maḥmûd Çelebi mevlûdü-n-Nebî okuyub* (Selânîkî, p. 36).

başı, les *şikâr ağaları*, les aghas des *altı bölük*, le *cebeci başı*, le *topçı başı*, le *top 'arabacılar başı'*¹... Ainsi que le constatait le grand-vizir, cela faisait déjà beaucoup de monde et ne passait sans doute pas inaperçu, puisqu'il envisageait le risque d'attroupements à cette occasion. Il s'agit donc bien, dès cette date, d'une cérémonie aulique codifiée et jusqu'à un certain point publique.

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Pour en revenir aux instructions de Şokollu Mehmed Paşa, elles visent principalement, cela va de soi, à organiser et préserver le secret, qui est la grande préoccupation du moment. Les cas concrets qui nous sont relevés ici sont différents de ceux rapportés par les chroniqueurs, mais ils sont de même nature, ce qui, encore une fois, doit nous conduire à ne pas rejeter *a priori* les anecdotes à première vue romanesques que ceux-ci nous racontent.

La première règle est de tout faire comme à l'accoutumée : la fête du *Mevlûd* sera donc célébrée selon le protocole habituel, à la lettre. Néanmoins on se bornera au strict minimum, afin d'éviter d'attirer l'attention de la troupe. De même, il est inutile de punir un *kapu oğlanı* apparemment trop bavard : cela risquerait de provoquer la colère du corps, qui en manifestant son mécontentement par le sourd murmure des tambourins pourrait également susciter une dangereuse curiosité. Quant aux sommes tirées après sa mort du Trésor privé du sultan pour récompenser et encourager en son nom les soldats affectés à la restauration de la forteresse de Szigetvár, elles sont un exemple de plus des nominations et gratifications qui furent alors multipliées pour faire croire que Soliman vivait toujours, puisqu'il exerçait toujours ces prérogatives essentielles du pouvoir : nommer, payer. Enfin nous découvrons un nouveau subterfuge né de l'imagination fertile du grand-vizir, que les chroniqueurs ne rapportent pas : puisque la version officielle doit être que Soliman hivernera à Bude pour repartir contre l'ennemi au printemps suivant², ne pourrait-on pas maintenir l'illusion qu'il est encore de ce monde en commandant des vêtements et des souliers pour passer la mauvaise saison sous le climat rigoureux de la Hongrie ? La formule employée par Şokollu Mehmed Paşa («une chose m'est venue à l'esprit») nous le montre, tout comme dans le récit de ses confidents Selânîkî et Ferîdûn, dans la quête perpétuelle d'expédients nouveaux, plus surprenants les uns que les autres.

¹ Cf. İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin Saray Teşkilâtı*, Ankara, T.T.K., 1945, repr. 1984, p. 388.

² Sur ce point, cf. Ferîdûn, 62 r°-v°.

Au demeurant, rien n'est plus fragile qu'un secret. C'était sans doute un moindre mal qu'on parlât de l'envoi d'un *çavuş* auprès de Selîm : encore qu'il fût sans doute maladroit d'appeler ce dernier *han* (voire *hünkâr*), l'expédition de Hasan Çavuş, officiellement chargé d'un *fethnâme* à l'intention du prince, était un acte public qu'on n'avait pas cherché à dissimuler¹. Mieux valait ne pas relever les insinuations. L'allusion au *hekîm başı* n'est pas claire. Nous ignorons ce qui lui avait été dit et, du reste, le grand-vizir lui-même n'en savait guère plus à ce moment, à en juger par les questions qu'il pose. Le *hekîm başı* Kayşûnîzâde Maḥmûd, qui en raison de ses fonctions avait été le premier informé du décès du souverain, avait eu un rôle fondamental dans l'application de la politique du secret. Du reste c'est lui qui, plusieurs semaines après l'événement, fut chargé d'annoncer officiellement cette mort aux membres du divan². Il n'est donc pas impossible que certains lui aient posé des questions indiscretes sur la santé du sultan: on en est réduit aux hypothèses sur ce point.

En revanche, il paraît clair qu'un *kapu oğlanı* avait trop parlé. Contrairement à ce que leur titre pourrait donner à penser, les *kapu oğlanı* n'étaient pas des pages, mais des eunuques blancs chargés de garder la *bâbü-sa'âde* et de surveiller les pages de la *küçük* et de la *büyük oda*³. Il va de soi que ces personnages devaient être bien informés de ce qui était arrivé au souverain et qu'ils pouvaient révéler ce qu'il convenait de taire. Le personnage (non nommé, du reste) dont il est question ici fut-il l'unique responsable de ce qui devait bien se produire un jour ? On a de bonnes raisons en tout cas de penser qu'il y eut en effet des fuites. Le grand-vizir les avaient craintes dès le début : c'est juste après avoir cité une lettre rédigée six jours après le décès de Soliman (donc le 13 septembre) que Ferîdûn donne l'information suivante :

«Des espions sûrs et de confiance avaient été glissés parmi les communautés de piliers et les illustres notables, au sein des janissaires et sur les sites qui servaient de lieux de rassemblement dans l'armée auguste. Ils faisaient leurs enquêtes et écoutant d'une oreille attentive tout ce qui se disait sur la maladie du *pâdişâh* et la prolongation de son mal, ils allaient en faire un rapport véridique [au grand vizir]. Tout aussitôt, pour éviter les dommages de ces nouvelles dignes de faire pleurer et pour les éradiquer, on inventait une feinte qu'on annonçait et communiquait à la troupe»⁴.

¹ Cf. Selânîkî, p. 40 ; Ferîdûn, 56 r°-v°.

² Cf. Selânîkî, pp. 38-39. Sur le rôle des médecins dans ces circonstances particulières, cf. N. Vatin, «Les médecins au chevet des sultans ottomans (XVe-XIXe siècles)», in *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes* 89 (1999), pp. 225-251.

³ Cf. İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, op. cit., p. 356 ; A. Bobovius, *Topkapı. Relation du sérail du Grand Seigneur*, A. Berthier et S. Yerasimos éds, Arles, Actes Sud, 1999, p. 29-30.

⁴ *Cemâhîr-i erkân ve meşâhîr-i a'yân arasında ve yeñîçeri tâ'îfesi içinde ve ordu-yı hümayûnda maḥall-i cem'iyet olan yerlerde şîka ve mu'temed casûslar konulmuşdı cust-ü-cû éderlerdi pâdişâhuñ hastalugına ve imtidâd-ı marazına muta'allık ne maḥûle kelimât olunsa sem'-i işgâyla istimâ' édüb vukû'î üzre geliüb haber vérürlerdi def'i hem-ân ol haber-i vâcibü-l-hadruñ def'-i zararî ve nakzı içün bir şûret kurulub halk içinde inbâ ve inhâ olunurdu* (Ferîdûn, 78 r°-v°).

Selânîkî raconte de son côté l'anecdote fort intéressante d'un devin qu'il avait lui-même interrogé et qui fut poursuivi pour avoir émis des présages inquiétants¹. Si l'on songe à la place qui était la sienne auprès Şokollu Mehmed Paşa, il se pourrait bien que le chroniqueur ne nous dise pas tout et qu'il ait été un de ces espions et délateurs dont parle son ami Ferîdûn. Quoi qu'il en soit, il ne précise pas à quelle date se situe l'incident². En revanche, c'est vers le 18 septembre — donc une dizaine de jours après la mort de Soliman et un peu avant la rédaction de la note de Şokollu Mehmed Paşa — qu'arriva au camp de Maximilien II un derviche qui annonça le décès du sultan, mais que les Impériaux ne voulurent pas croire en raison de l'étrangeté de sa tenue³.

Il est donc probable que depuis un certain temps déjà, des employés de l'*enderûn* avaient dévoilé tout ou partie du secret et que des bruits coururent très tôt. Comme on le voit, le grand-vizir choisit de les ignorer plutôt que de leur donner une importance qui les aurait rendus plus nuisibles. Il est de fait que la discipline qui continua à régner dans le camp ottoman⁴ contribua grandement à faire douter l'ennemi de la véracité des informations qui lui parvenaient⁵.

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Le passage le plus intrigant de la note de Şokollu Mehmed Paşa est sans doute cette curieuse exclamation que lui arrachent les fuites sur la mort du sultan : « Dieu (qu'Il soit exalté !) nous donne de la patience ! Il faut maintenir l'effort jusqu'au 15 de ce mois ».

À quoi correspond cette date du 15 *rebî'ü-l-evvel* ? Ferîdûn nous apprend que le grand-vizir avait estimé à trente jours environ le temps nécessaire à l'arrivée de Selîm II auprès de la troupe, et qu'il considérait qu'il

¹ Cf. Selânîkî, p. 45.

² Selânîkî évoque également l'arrivée — à une date qu'il ne précise pas — de lettres en provenance d'Istanbul qui provoquèrent des ragots dans la troupe, mais ce fut apparemment après le 14 *rebî'ü-l-evvel*, donc après la rédaction de notre document. Cf. Selânîkî, p. 39.

³ L'anecdote est racontée par Nicolaus Isthvanfus (Istvánffy), *Historiarum de rebus ungaricis libri XXXIV*, nle édition, Vienne, 1622, p. 302. Il la présente comme contemporaine de la remise de la tête de Zrinyi, le commandant vaincu de la forteresse de Szigetvár. Or le représentant vénitien Albini évoque l'arrivée de cette tête dans sa dépêche du 18 septembre 1566 : cf. G. Turba, *Venetianische Depeschen von Kaiserhof*, Vienne, 1835, vol. III, p. 356.

⁴ Sur l'attitude de la troupe ottomane qui semble avoir choisi de collaborer en fait à la politique du secret élaborée par le grand-vizir, cf. Vatin et Veinstein, *op. cit.*, pp. 141-143.

⁵ C'est en tout cas ce qu'écrit P. Bizarus, *Bellum pannonicum sub Maximiliano II Romanorum et Solymano Turcorum Imperatoribus gestum, recognitum et emendatum*, in J.G. Schwandtner, *Scriptorum rerum hungaricarum*, Vienne, 1768, vol. III, p. 388.

pourrait maintenir le secret — et l'ordre — jusque là¹. Il prévoyait donc que le nouveau souverain arriverait vers le 21 *rebî'ü-l-evvel*, et non le 15.

Une autre hypothèse pourrait être qu'il attendait, pour être rassuré, que Selîm fût monté sur le trône à Istanbul. De fait, Selânîkî écrit que le prince parvint à Kadıköy, traversa le Bosphore et accomplit son *cülûs* le lundi (en fait un dimanche) 14 *rebî'ü-l-evvel*². Mais il doit s'agir d'un *lapsus calami*, dans la mesure où lui-même affirme que Hasan Çavuş avait mis douze jours pour rejoindre Selîm près de Kütahya, soit vers le 4 ou 5 *rebî'ü-l-evvel*. Il n'est pas vraisemblable que ce dernier ait mis dix jours pour gagner la capitale. On admettra donc plutôt les dates fournies par Ferîdûn et confirmées par Almosnino (qui était présent à Istanbul). Autrement dit, Selîm arriva à Istanbul et y monta sur le trône le lundi 8 *rebî'ü-l-evvel* / 23 septembre 1566 ; accomplit un pèlerinage à Eyüp le mardi 9 *rebî'ü-l-evvel* / 24 septembre ; enfin partit pour Belgrade le mercredi 10 *rebî'ü-l-evvel* / 25 septembre ou le jeudi 11 *rebî'ü-l-evvel* / 26 septembre³. Son *cülûs* n'eut donc pas lieu aux alentours du 15 *rebî'ü-l-evvel*, mais une semaine auparavant, autrement dit vers le milieu de la période d'un mois que s'était fixée le grand-vizir. En effet, puisqu'il fallait une douzaine de jours à Hasan Çavuş pour rejoindre l'héritier du trône, cette date correspondait au calendrier prévisible. Prévisible, et peut-être prévu, car on sait (par les récits indépendants et concordants de Selânîkî, Ferîdûn et Almosnino) que Şokollu Mehmed Paşa avait organisé le passage de Selîm par Istanbul sur la route de Belgrade : on peut admettre en conséquence qu'il s'attendait à ce que, vers cette date, le prince eût bel et bien accompli son *cülûs* et reçu la *bey'at* de ceux des officiels qui étaient demeurés dans la ville⁴.

¹ *Pâdişâh hazretleri sa'âdet-le Kûtâhiyyeden kalkub süir'et-le yürüdükleri takdîrce ordu-yı hümâyûna mülâkî olmaları bâbında tahmînen otuz gün kıyâs olunmuşdu ol kadar müddet içinde iş-bu ahbâr-ı mektûme ve esrâr-ı merkûme bâ-cehd hıfz olinsa kâbil-dür* (Ferîdûn, 75 v°).

² Cf. Selânîkî, p. 41.

³ Cf. Ferîdûn 70 v°, 79 r°-v° ; Almosnino écrit que Selîm fit le pèlerinage d'Eyüp le 24, au lendemain de son intronisation, et qu'il quitta Istanbul le jeudi 26. Cf. Almosnino (Rabi Moysen), *Extremos y grandezas de Constantinopla*, I. Cansino trad., Madrid, 1638, p. 47-48. Selânîkî parle également d'un départ le jeudi, mais on verra que la chronologie de cet auteur n'est pas absolument sûre. Des chroniqueurs postérieurs, comme Peçevî (*Ta'rîh*, Istanbul, 1283, I, p. 422), Hasanbegzâde (*Tevârîh-i âl-i 'Osmân*, B.N.F., Ancien Fonds Turc 124, 320 v° - 321 r°) ou Mehmed bin Mehmed (*Nuhbetü-t-tevârîh ve-l-ahbâr*, Istanbul, 1860, p. 106) datent l'intronisation de Selîm II du 9 *rebî'ü-l-evvel*, mais on notera que Hasanbegzâde dit que c'était un lundi, alors que le lundi fut le 8. Quant à Şolâkzâde (*Ta'rîh*, Istanbul, 1927, p. 577), il reproduit fidèlement Selânîkî.

⁴ Selânîkî, pp. 41-42 ; Ferîdûn, 57 v° - 58 r° ; Almosnino, p. 39. Sur ces questions et sur le fait que Şokollu Mehmed Paşa avait prévu que Selîm passerait par Istanbul et y organiserait son *cülûs* et sa *bey'at* dans la capitale, cf. Vatin et Veinstein, *op. cit.* ; Vatin, « Remarques sur l'oral et l'écrit dans l'administration ottomane au XVI^e siècle », in *Oral et écrit dans le monde turco-ottoman*, n° à thème de la *Revue du Monde Musulman et de la Méditerranée* 75/76 (1995), pp. 143-154 (voir pp. 148-149).

En revanche, même en supposant que Selîm II repartit dans la plus grande hâte et fit la route aussi vite que Hasan Çavuş, pouvait-on espérer qu'il arriverait dès le 15 *rebî'ü-l-evvel* à proximité de la troupe ? Même en partant le 9, il serait arrivé le 17. Du reste, il est vrai qu'il voyagea à une vitesse inaccoutumée, au point d'épuiser certains de ses compagnons de voyage et d'arriver à Belgrade avant sa tente¹. Néanmoins il n'était pas un courrier professionnel exercé comme Hasan Çavuş. Aussi n'était-il pas encore arrivé à Sofia quand il reçut une lettre que les vizirs avaient rédigée à son intention le 27 *rebî'ü-l-evvel* / 12 octobre².

C'est donc ailleurs qu'il faut chercher la signification de cette date du 15 *rebî'ü-l-evvel*. La solution se trouve peut-être chez Selânikî. Celui-là mentionne en effet, comme on l'a vu, la fête du *Mevlûd* sous la tente du sultan dans la nuit du 12 *rebî'ü-l-evvel*, puis de nouveaux rites chez le grand-vizir la nuit suivante, donc le 13. Il nous explique alors qu'on a proclamé que la prière du vendredi — qu'on suppose donc à venir, à ce moment — se ferait dans la place conquise de Szigetvár, mais que le sultan ne pourrait pas y participer. Ayant rapidement évoqué la cérémonie, il conclut :

«Ensuite, alors qu'on commençait à dire et répéter qu'il eût été bon que la prière se fit en présence de Son Excellence le *pâdişâh* du monde lui-même et fût suivie de l'examen des affaires et des distributions de dons, les hérauts proclamèrent : "Begg et aghas, demain est jour de *dîvân*. Soyez présents." Chacun se tut alors et se prépara activement»³.

D'après cette version, c'est donc l'impatience de la troupe qui aurait amené le grand-vizir à décider de tenir un divan fictivement suivi d'une entrevue des membres du conseil avec le sultan : nouveau mensonge destiné à calmer les hommes en maintenant le secret. Dans la nuit, Ferîdûn et Selânikî sont envoyés par leur patron Şokollu Mehmed Paşa auprès des principaux

¹ «Parmi les 4 000 rapides soldats montés qui étaient auprès de son étrier auguste, nul ne pouvait marcher un jour [à ce rythme], et ce sont ceux qui se tenaient fermement sur la place du zèle qui, tombant et se relevant, filèrent en compagnie de l'étrier bienheureux. Quant à ceux qui étaient insuffisants sur la route du dévouement, ils se montrèrent inaptes et impuissants à faire avec lui ne fût-ce qu'une demi étape et présentant des excuses boiteuses restèrent en arrière, dispersés au long des étapes et des distances» (*Rikâb-ı hümâyûnları yanınca olan dört biñ miqdârî 'askeri çabuk süvârdan bir gün bile yürimege kimesne iktidâr edemeyüb anlar ki meydân-ı himmetde gâbû-kademler-di rikâb-ı sa'âdet-mend-le üftân ver hızân bilece revân oldılar ve anlar ki tarîk-i hamîyyetde kâşırlar idi yarım menzil bile varmağa tâkat ve istiâ'at göstermeyüb 'özü-i leng-le menâzilde ve merâhilde dökilüb kaldılar* : Ferîdûn, 83 r°). Pour l'épisode de la tente, cf. Ferîdûn, 106 v°.

² Cf. Ferîdûn, 81 v°, 84 v°.

³ *Ve ba'de-s-salât münâcât ve 'arz-ı hacât olunub muşâfahadan soñra namâz hûd pâdişâh-ı âlem-penâh hazretleri-ile kılınub ve nice maşlahat görilüb bahşış vérilse gerek idi déyüb söze ve kelecîye başlıyor-ken hem-ân münâdîler nidâya başlayub begler ve ağalar yarın dîvân-dur hazır olasız déyü tenbîh olunmağ-la her kişiye sükûn gelüb tedârükine meşgûl oldu* (Selânikî, p. 36).

dignitaires afin de préparer cette séance cruciale¹. Pour la plupart, ceux-ci se montrent réticents : selon eux, c'est jouer avec le feu. Ils savent qu'il y a eu des fuites — nous avons vu que tel était en effet le cas — et craignent manifestement une révolte. Ahmed Paşa quant à lui souhaiterait que le Trésor privé fût rapatrié au plus vite. Quoiqu'il ne le dise pas clairement, on peut supposer qu'il lui semble préférable dès maintenant de dire la vérité et de ne pas refaire l'erreur qui avait été fatale à Karâmânî Mehmed Paşa en 1481². À quoi Selânikî lui oppose le précédent du secret maintenu avec succès autour de la mort de Selîm Ier en 1520. Quoi qu'il en soit, le divan a bien lieu «le lendemain»³, donc, si l'on suit la chronologie de Selânikî, le 14 *rebî'ü-l-evvel*. La séance levée, «quand vint le moment de se lever pour gagner les appartements du sultan, les vizirs de haut rang sortirent de la salle du divan par la porte de la grande tente et comme le trône du sultanat était vide, le *silahdâr* Ca'fer Ağa, le *çukadâr* Muştafâ Ağa et les *iç ağalar* vinrent et répondirent : "Le samedi 22 *şafar*, quatre heures avant l'aube, le défunt à la vie fortunée, qui a fait l'expérience de la mort, qui a fait l'objet du pardon et de la grâce de Dieu, a vu l'oiseau de son âme s'envoler de ce monde où niche la misère et s'installer à la Porte du Paradis»⁴. Puis le *hekîm başı* fait aux vizirs un rapport sur les mesures qu'il a prises jusqu'ici.

Un premier point sur lequel il faut revenir est la chronologie. Si l'on suit celle de Selânikî, on obtient la succession suivante⁵ :

- nuit du «jeudi» 12 *rebî'ü-l-evvel* : cérémonie du *Mevlûd* dans les appartements du sultan ;
- nuit du «vendredi» 13 *rebî'ü-l-evvel* : cérémonie du *Mevlûd* chez le grand-vizir ;
- matinée du «vendredi» 13 *rebî'ü-l-evvel* : prière du vendredi dans l'église de Szigetvár, en l'absence remarquée du sultan ;
- nuit du «samedi» 14 *rebî'ü-l-evvel* : Ferîdûn et Selânikî rendent visite aux vizirs pour préparer le divan ;
- matinée du «samedi» 14 *rebî'ü-l-evvel* : divan, suivi d'une visite fictive des membres du conseil auprès du sultan, dont la mort leur est alors officiellement annoncée.

¹ Sur ce qui suit, cf. Selânikî, pp. 36-39.

² Rappelons que ce grand-vizir, qui avait tenté sans succès de cacher la mort de Mehmed II à la troupe, fut assassiné par les janissaires lors des troubles qui suivirent.

³ *Ve ertesî 'âlî dîvân olub* (Selânikî, p. 38).

⁴ *Ve içerü kalķub girmek lâzım geldükde vüzerâ-ı 'izâm dîvânı âneden oba kapusından girüb serîr-i şaltanat hâlî olmağın silahdâr Ca'fer Ağa çukadâr Muştafâ Ağa ve iç ağalar gelüb cevâb vérüb şa'idü-l-hayât ve şehidü-l-memât merhûm ve mağfûrun leh şafar âyınunı yigirmi ikinci cum'a-ertesî gecesî şabâha dört sâ'at kaldukda bu miñnet-âbâd dünyâdan murğ-ı rûh-ı pür-fütûhları tayerân eyleyüb dârü-l-cinânda âşırân edindi dedî* (Selânikî, pp. 38-39).

⁵ Rappelons, pour éviter tout malentendu, que dans le calendrier islamique la journée ne commence pas à minuit, mais à la tombée de la nuit.

Tout ceci paraît cohérent, mais est certainement inexact. En effet le 12 *rebî'ü-l-evvel*, en 974, tomba un *vendredi* 27 septembre. À dire vrai, ce décalage de Selânîkî n'est pas pour surprendre¹, puisqu'on aura noté qu'il date la mort de Soliman du «samedi» 22 *şafër*. Mais le 22 *şafër*, ou 8 septembre, était un dimanche. Il paraît donc préférable de s'en tenir à la date fournie par Ferîdûn et admettre que le sultan décéda dans la 8ème heure nocturne du 21 *şafër*, autrement dit dans les premières heures du *samedi* 7 septembre 1566. Une fois ce décalage d'un jour constaté dans les datations de Selânîkî, on ne s'étonnera plus qu'il considère le 12 *rebî'ü-l-evvel* 974 comme un jeudi, alors que ce fut un vendredi. Dans ces conditions, il faut reprendre la chronologie, et admettre ce qui suit :

- nuit du 12 *rebî'ü-l-evvel* (soirée du jeudi 26 au vendredi 27 septembre) : cérémonie du *Mevlûd* dans les appartements du sultan ;
- matinée du 12 *rebî'ü-l-evvel* (matinée du vendredi 27) : prière du vendredi à Szigetvár ;
- nuit du 13 *rebî'ü-l-evvel* (soirée du vendredi 27 au samedi 28) : cérémonie du *Mevlûd* dans les appartements de Şokollu Mehmed Paşa. Ferîdûn et Selânîkî rendent discrètement visite aux vizirs, en profitant peut-être de ce que l'attention est attirée par la fête chez le grand-vizir.

Faut-il pour autant conclure que le conseil fut bien tenu le samedi 13 *rebî'ü-l-evvel* / 28 septembre, et non le 14 / 29 ? C'est évidemment possible. Néanmoins il faut rappeler que, sur les quatre jours de divan dans la semaine (samedi, dimanche, lundi et mardi), seuls le dimanche et le mardi étaient des «*arz günleri*», des «jours de rapport» au cours desquels le grand-vizir présentait un rapport au sultan à l'issue du conseil. Or, si l'on veut bien se souvenir que le principal souci de Şokollu Mehmed Paşa était que tout se passât comme de coutume, de la façon la plus banale possible, on concevra qu'il ait préféré attendre le *dimanche* 14 *rebî'ü-l-evvel* / 29 septembre pour organiser la séance décrite par Selânîkî.

Il semble donc que la chronologie de celui-ci ne soit pas seulement inexacte, mais incohérente. Aussi conservera-t-on la date du 14 *rebî'ü-l-evvel* / 29 septembre pour le divan, mais force est d'admettre que la fête du *Mevlûd* eut lieu le même jour que la prière du vendredi. Au moment où il rédigeait la

¹ Sur la question toujours difficile de la datation dans les documents ottomans, cf. N. Beldiceanu et I. Beldiceanu-Steinherr, «Considérations sur la chronologie des sources ottomanes et ses pièges», in C. Heywood et C. Imber éds, *Studies in Ottoman History in Honour of Professor V.L. Ménage*, Istanbul, Isis, 1994, pp. 15-29.

note qui sert de point de départ à cet article, Şoğollu Mehmed Paşa ne pouvait pas l'ignorer. Il se doutait bien entendu que l'absence du sultan à la grande prière, même excusée par avance, mettrait les hommes mal à l'aise. Mais bien plus grave encore serait l'absence de Soliman sous sa propre tente, quelques heures plus tôt, pour la fête du *Mevlûd* en présence de nombreux officiers du *bîrûn* qu'il était indispensable d'inviter si l'on voulait maintenir la fiction que tout se déroulait comme à l'habitude. Certes, il y avait déjà eu des fuites, mais maintenant la vérité allait éclater aux yeux d'un cercle restreint mais déjà important de hauts dignitaires extérieurs à l'*enderûn* où le secret avait été jusque là tant bien que mal maintenu. Ce vendredi 12 *rebî'ü-l-evvel* / 27 septembre était donc le jour de tous les dangers.

Il n'y aurait donc rien d'étonnant à ce que le grand-vizir n'ait pas attendu d'entendre les réactions (prévisibles) de la troupe à l'issue de la prière du vendredi 27 pour prévoir un divan suivi d'une séance d'*'arz* précisément destinée à rendre officielle la mort du sultan auprès des membres du gouvernement. Cela ne signifiait pas que le secret allait être publiquement levé en dehors de ce cercle très restreint, mais que désormais le grand-vizir ne serait plus seul à assumer la responsabilité de cette politique. Maintenant, les membres du conseil seraient dans l'obligation de le soutenir et renonceraient à la tentation — qu'on avait pu constater — de prendre des mesures ou de tenir des propos qui pourraient nuire aux dispositions prises par Şoğollu Mehmed Paşa.

Ainsi, à la date où il rédigeait cette note à l'intention de son confident Ca'fer Ağa, Şoğollu Mehmed Paşa avait toutes raisons de supposer que Selîm II, ayant accompli son *cûlûs* dans la capitale, y ayant reçu l'allégeance (*bey'at*) des autorités présentes, était maintenant le sultan en titre, même s'il importait selon lui que le souverain se présentât au plus vite devant la troupe pour recevoir son allégeance et lui faire les dons de rigueur. Il pouvait donc paraître possible, sans y renoncer entièrement, d'assouplir la politique du secret. Du reste, la conjonction des obligations du *Mevlûd* et de la prière du vendredi dans la ville conquise rendait impossible de rester beaucoup plus longtemps dans le *statu quo* qui durait depuis plus de deux semaines. Mais il fallait attendre, pour modifier en partie la situation, le prochain '*arz günü* : donc, le dimanche 14 *rebî'ü-l-evvel*.

Dès lors, à partir de ce 15 du mois qu'il attendait avec impatience, Şoğollu Mehmed Paşa serait soulagé d'un grand poids.

DE LA GUERRE DE CHYPRE A LA GUERRE DE CRETE : UN ENTRACTE EN MEDITERRANEE (1572-1645)

Daniel Panzac

La bataille de Lépante, qui s'est déroulée le 7 octobre 1571, est certainement l'une des plus importantes batailles navales de l'époque moderne tant par le nombre de navires engagés, 212 bâtiments chrétiens ont affronté 220 à 230 navires ottomans, que par le nombre de combattants, de cinquante à soixante mille hommes de part et d'autre. La victoire écrasante de la flotte chrétienne, commandée par Don Juan d'Autriche, sur celle des Ottomans d'Ali Pacha, célébrée avec éclat dans toute l'Europe, n'a pas empêché ces derniers d'achever la conquête de Chypre, possession vénitienne, alors que l'objectif de Don Juan d'Autriche était précisément de les en empêcher. Cet affrontement marque également, pour trois quarts de siècle, la fin de la grande guerre d'escadres en Méditerranée. La révolte des Pays-Bas puis l'annexion du Portugal et de ses possessions entraîne l'Espagne vers l'Atlantique et la mer du Nord cependant que l'Empire ottoman est désormais avant tout engagé dans une expansion terrestre en Europe centrale et orientale ainsi qu'au Moyen-Orient. La Méditerranée demeure certes le champ clos où s'affrontent toujours la croix et le croissant, mais si l'acharnement persiste, les moyens navals employés par les belligérants se caractérisent par le nombre limité des effectifs engagés, l'usage routinier des types de navires existants et la modestie des objectifs. C'est dire que les bâtiments à rames, avant tout la galère, constituent l'essentiel des escadres méditerranéennes alors que l'océan voit se développer, se perfectionner et se multiplier le vaisseau. A partir de 1645, la reprise de la guerre entre Venise et l'Empire ottoman, guerre qui se prolonge presque sans interruption jusqu'à la fin du XVIIe siècle, ranime la guerre d'escadres et contraint les belligérants à moderniser leurs flottes. Le vaisseau devient alors lui aussi, et non sans difficultés, le *capital ship* en Méditerranée.

Une Pratique Navale Routinière (1572-1644)

Le 7 mars 1573, la république de Venise signe avec l'Empire ottoman un traité de paix par lequel elle reconnaît la perte de l'île de Chypre. Cette paix, les deux puissances entendent bien la respecter et, en cas d'incident, elles s'efforcent de le régler rapidement afin d'éviter tout regain de tension. Venise réprime ainsi tout acte d'insubordination de la part de ses officiers. En 1583, Gabriele Emo, à la tête de trois galères, capture une galère turque, tue l'équipage et les passagers, dont la femme du pacha de Tripoli, et ramène sa prise à Corfou. L'Etat vénitien le fait exécuter et rend aux Turcs le bâtiment et ce qui reste de la cargaison. En revanche, l'Etat ottoman admet tacitement que les représailles de Venise à l'encontre des corsaires barbaresques ne portent pas atteinte à leurs accords. Par contre, Venise s'abstient soigneusement de participer aux nombreuses expéditions navales menées par les autres participants de l'ancienne Sainte Ligue contre les possessions et les navires ottomans.

Les premières années

L'effort considérable, consenti de part et d'autre, en navires et en hommes, ne se prolonge guère après Lépante. En 1572, Don Juan d'Autriche parvient péniblement à rassembler 140 galères et six galéasses à l'entrée de l'Adriatique alors qu'Uluç Ali, le nouveau kapudan pacha, aligne 225 galères et six *mavna*, version turque de la galéasse vénitienne que les Ottomans se sont empressés d'adopter. Cette spectaculaire reconstitution de la flotte ottomane en moins d'un an témoigne de la puissance et des ressources de l'Etat ottoman à cette époque. Le sultan Selim II avait fait ce commentaire après les événements de 1571: en détruisant ma flotte les Chrétiens à Lépante m'ont rasé la barbe, mais celle-ci repousse, alors que la perte de Chypre est comme l'amputation d'un membre pour Venise.

En fait, hormis différentes croisières et quelques escarmouches, il ne se passe rien d'important en 1572. L'année suivante, la flotte chrétienne forte de 152 galères, toujours aux ordres de Don Juan d'Autriche, reconquiert Tunis en octobre et y établit une garnison essentiellement espagnole. En juillet 1574, Uluç Ali, à la tête d'une immense flotte de 280 galères et de 15 galéasses, escortant une imposante flotte de transports avec l'armée commandée par Sinan Pacha, reprend sans difficulté Tunis et cette fois définitivement. Cette dernière opération amphibie fixe, pour 70 ans, la carte des possessions côtières et insulaires en Méditerranée. Les affrontements s'y poursuivent, mais sans

enjeux territoriaux. Limitées, de part et d'autre, à des razzias à terre et à des captures de navires, les opérations navales ne nécessitent plus, sauf exception, que des effectifs modestes.

Une guérilla navale récurrente¹

Parmi les différentes tâches assurées par la marine, il convient d'évoquer d'abord celle qui lui incombait à une époque où la sécurité en mer était chose plus qu'incertaine: le transport de personnalités. Dignitaires civils et militaires, tant ottomans qu'européens, utilisaient en effet la voie maritime, plus courte et plus rapide, pour gagner leurs nouvelles affectations et, selon leur rang, ils étaient escortés par un nombre variable de bâtiments de guerre. Toutefois, le nombre élevé de familles régnantes en Europe multipliait ce type de transport et les risques encourus par leurs membres.² En février 1585, 48 galères escortèrent Charles Emmanuel de Savoie, d'Albenga en Ligurie à Barcelone, pour le ramener en juin à Nice avec son épouse fille de Philippe II. A la fin de 1588, une vingtaine de galères se rendirent à Marseille pour y prendre Christine de Lorraine et la conduire à Livourne où l'attendait son futur mari, le grand duc de Toscane. Au printemps de 1599, une flotte de quarante galères amenèrent Marguerite d'Autriche, future épouse de Philippe III d'Espagne, de Gènes à Vinaroz à l'embouchure de l'Ebre, et retournèrent à Gènes durant l'été en transportant cette fois sa sœur et son mari l'archiduc Albert. Mentionnons enfin, à l'automne 1600, le voyage par mer de Livourne à Marseille, sous la protection d'une trentaine de galères, de Marie de Médicis venue en France épouser Henri IV.

Cette longue période est caractérisée par des effectifs le plu souvent limité et d'une grande diversité de pavillon, en particulier du côté chrétien. Du côté ottoman figure tout d'abord la flotte ottomane proprement dite qui effectue chaque année, avec un nombre variable de navires, une croisière en Méditerranée. A sa sortie des Dardanelles, cette flotte, armée par l'Etat ottoman à l'arsenal d'Istanbul, est rejointe par les galères des beys des îles du Dodécanèse propriétaires de leurs galères qui bénéficient d'une aide de l'Etat pour leur construction et leur armement. En 1589, le kapudan pacha venu mater la révolte de Tripoli de Barbarie est à la tête de 55 galères et trois galéasses et en 1594, Sinan Pacha dispose de 70 galères. A partir du début du

¹ R. C. Anderson, *Naval wars in the Levant 1559-1853* (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1952).

² Cela se produisait aussi, quoique plus rarement, dans l'Empire ottoman. C'est la capture, en 1644, lors de leur retour d'Egypte, d'une des épouses du sultan et de son fils, qui servit de prétexte à la conquête de la Crète par les Ottomans l'année suivante.

XVII^e siècle, le nombre de navires diminue de façon sensible mais cet affaiblissement est compensé par l'essor spectaculaire des escadres barbaresques sur lesquelles nous reviendrons plus loin.

Du côté chrétien la diversité est la règle comme le montre la campagne de 1594. Cette année, face aux 70 galères de Sinan Pacha, les escadres catholiques alignent en principe 74 galères. De part et d'autre, il s'agit d'un effort exceptionnel depuis vingt ans et qu'on ne reverra plus avant un demi-siècle. La flotte chrétienne, qui a rendez-vous comme d'habitude dans la remarquable rade de Messine, comprend douze galères appartenant en propre à Andrea Doria, sorte de condottiere naval, sept galères génoises, seize espagnoles, quatorze napolitaines, huit siciliennes, trois toscanes, deux savoyardes, sept pontificales, cinq de l'Ordre de Malte. On notera l'absence des Vénitiens en raison de leur neutralité. Il faut près de trois mois pour que la totalité des différents contingents arrivent et ce n'est que le 25 septembre que la flotte sort enfin du port à la recherche de la flotte de Sinan Pacha. Trop tard ! Celui-ci a achevé sa campagne en mer Ionienne et est reparti pour Istanbul.

Outre la lenteur à se rassembler, la flotte chrétienne souffre d'un autre mal : la désignation, à chaque campagne, du commandant en chef et de sa capacité à se faire obéir. Chaque escadre obéit à son propre amiral qui accepte généralement très mal d'être placé en sous-ordre. Cela prend toujours beaucoup de temps et aboutit parfois à une impasse. C'est ainsi qu'en 1606, alors que Djaffar Pacha et ses 55 galères menacent la Sicile, les sept chefs des différentes escadres arrivées cette année-là, 49 galères au total, ne parviennent pas à s'entendre et chacun repart comme il était venu !

Un dernier élément complique et retarde encore l'action de cette flotte combinée depuis que Venise ne participe plus à ces opérations : la domination qu'y exerce l'Espagne que masque la diversité des pavillons. En effet, le royaume de Naples comme la Sicile sont des provinces espagnoles cependant que Gènes et la Toscane sont des alliées qui lui doivent leur survie. Il en résulte que les intérêts de l'Espagne priment sur les autres et que, peu à peu, la lutte contre les Barbaresques en Méditerranée occidentale s'impose au détriment de croisières dans la lointaine Méditerranée orientale.

D'une façon générale, l'activité navale en Méditerranée connaît une inflexion importante dans la première décennie du XVII^e siècle. Le tiers de siècle qui suit Lépante est dominé par les razzias à terre aussi bien du côté chrétien que de la part des musulmans. De part et d'autre, on préfère le pillage des zones côtières ennemies et les représailles sur les rivages adverses que les véritables combats navals. Certes, on cherche à empêcher le débarquement de l'ennemi quand cela est possible et à le poursuivre lorsqu'il n'est pas encore trop loin, mais en cas de rencontre, on aboutit plutôt à des accrochages qu'à de

véritables combats, surtout si l'équilibre des forces est à peu près patent. Le scénario est toujours le même: une division navale plus ou moins importante arrive à l'improviste sur une côte ennemie, un corps de débarquement met pied à terre, s'empare de tous les habitants qui ne parviennent pas à leur échapper, pille les maisons, capture même le bétail le cas échéant, et se rembarque avec son butin. Le tout a duré quelques heures car les assaillants craignent une riposte ce qui signifie que les villes fortifiées sont rarement attaquées sauf par des effectifs considérables en état de dresser un véritable siège. Il ne saurait être question de dresser la liste complète, au demeurant impossible à établir, des innombrables "descentes" dont furent victimes les malheureuses populations côtières à cette époque. Les centaines de tours de guet édifiées à cette époque sur les rivages européens en sont un éloquent témoignage. En voici toutefois quelques exemples.

En juin 1576, les galères de Malte ravagent les îles Kerkena au large de Sfax dans le sud de la Tunisie. En juillet de la même année, une escadre ottomane vient piller les côtes de la Calabre. En 1581, six galères turques saccagent Terranova en Sicile. En 1594, la flotte ottomane ravage les environs de Syracuse et réussit à prendre Reggio de Calabre. L'année suivante, une escadre comprenant des galères de Toscane, de Sicile et de Naples parvient à s'emparer de Patras. Durant l'été 1602, les Ottomans saccagent les alentours de Messine alors qu'au même moment les chevaliers de Malte ravagent Hammamet en Tunisie. Pour d'évidentes raisons de proximité, les régions le plus souvent pillées sont toujours les mêmes: l'Albanie, le Péloponnèse et la Tunisie dans l'Empire ottoman, la Sicile, et le royaume de Naples en Europe.

Le début du XVII^e siècle en Méditerranée occidentale

Cet affrontement, ritualisé en quelque sorte depuis trois décennies, est bouleversé dans les premières années du XVII^e siècle par la combinaison de plusieurs événements majeurs qui ont leur origine en Espagne. Épuisée par plus d'un quart de siècle de guerres sans avoir pu atteindre ses objectifs, celle-ci se résigne à traiter avec ses adversaires, en particulier avec ses anciennes provinces des Pays-Bas, dont l'indépendance est reconnue de fait, et avec l'Angleterre inaccessible dans son île. Par ailleurs, le roi Philippe III voulant achever l'unité religieuse de l'Espagne commencée en 1492, expulse de force les musulmans encore nombreux dans le pays, surtout dans le royaume de Valence et en Andalousie. Plusieurs centaines de milliers de personnes quittent ainsi le pays dans les années 1604-1606 et se réfugient, pour la plupart, en Afrique du Nord. Outre des savoirs et des techniques élaborées, ils y apportent

une solide haine de l'Espagne. Ceux qui s'installent dans les ports des provinces ottomanes d'Alger et de Tunis donnent une impulsion considérable à la course en mettant à profit leurs connaissances des ports et des rivages espagnols.¹

Si la paix ainsi obtenue permet au commerce maritime anglais, et plus encore néerlandais de se développer de manière spectaculaire en Méditerranée, elle a aussi un effet pervers. En effet, la guerre navale des Néerlandais et des Anglais avait favorisé l'existence d'une course qui attaquait sans trêve les convois espagnols d'Amérique et ceux qui acheminaient des renforts vers les Pays-Bas. Ne pouvant plus s'en prendre sous leur propre pavillon aux Espagnols, une partie de ces corsaires sans emploi va se mettre au service des Barbaresques, en se convertissant ou non à l'Islam. Arrivant avec leurs navires, ils introduisent ainsi au profit de la course barbaresque, l'usage des vaisseaux, pourvu d'une importante artillerie, haut sur l'eau leur permettant de naviguer presque en toute saison. La conjonction des Ottomans en place avec les Andalous soucieux de revanche et les Nordiques avec leurs vaisseaux, rejoints dans les ports maghrébins par une masse d'aventuriers de tout poil, donne alors une extraordinaire impulsion à la course barbaresque qui connaît son apogée dans les années 1610-1660.

Les corsaires continuent certes à ravager les côtes européennes, mais leur hardiesse et leur ardeur les poussent bien au-delà, dans l'Atlantique qui est familier à beaucoup d'entre eux. Les corsaires commencent à razzier les côtes d'Espagne puis apparaissent en 1622 dans la Manche avant d'aller ravager Reykjavik en Islande en 1627 et l'Irlande en 1631. Profitant de leur supériorité en hommes et en canons, ils s'attaquent de préférence aux navires de commerce qui se multiplient en Méditerranée à cette époque. Durant la décennie 1613-1622, 963 navires, la grande majorité de tonnage limité il est vrai, sont amenés à Alger dont 447 néerlandais et 253 français. La majorité des bâtiments capturés est vendue, le plus souvent à Livourne avec d'ailleurs une bonne partie de leur cargaison, et les meilleurs viennent remplacer les pertes ou grossir des flottes corsaires dont la plus importante dans les années 1630 est celle d'Alger :

En Alger, il y en a septante tant de navires que de polacres, que grandes barques, qui vont toutes en course; dont les unes portent vingt cinq pièces de canons, et les autres trente cinq et quarante... Le septième d'Aoust, l'an mille six cents trente quatre, je vis partir d'Alger une flotte de vingt huit de ces navires, les plus beaux et les mieux armez qu'il fut possible de voir. Ils firent voile en Ponant, pour aller attendre les vaisseaux Bretons, Normands et

¹ Ce sont des "Andalous" qui fondèrent le port de Salé au Maroc, en face de Rabat qui devint rapidement une grande base corsaire.

Anglois, qui environ ce temps-là vont d'ordinaire en Espagne pour y charger des vins, des huiles et des especeries. A quelques huit jours de là il partit du port une escadre de cinq autres navires qui prirent la route du Levant. Tout le reste estoit sur mer il y avoit déjà longtemps.¹

Pour les combattre, les Européens sont contraints de s'adapter. Afin de s'opposer aux vaisseaux barbaresques, les Espagnols font passer en Méditerranée un certain nombre de leurs propres vaisseaux jusqu'alors uniquement utilisés dans l'Atlantique. Des combats incertains opposent ainsi les Espagnols et leurs alliés aux Barbaresques, mais les Chrétiens adoptent une tactique qui se révèle plus efficace : aller détruire les bâtiments barbaresques dans leurs ports. En 1601, une imposante flotte combinée de 66 galères quitte Messine, gagne Majorque et se dirige vers Alger mais les défenses de la ville les dissuadent de poursuivre. Nouvelle tentative en septembre 1602, tout aussi décevante que la précédente.

Les Chrétiens cherchent alors des ports plus faciles à atteindre. En 1609, six vaisseaux espagnols, commandés par Ribera, pénètrent pour la première fois en Méditerranée et avec l'appui d'un unique vaisseau français commandée par Beaulieu-Persac, ils forcent l'entrée du port de La Goulette le 29 juin et y brûlent 23 bâtiments dont seize navires de guerre tunisiens et une galère algérienne. Ce même port, mal protégé, est à nouveau attaqué par treize galères siciliennes et napolitaines qui, le 23 mai 1612, détruisent sept navires tunisiens. Une nouvelle incursion de six vaisseaux espagnols le 31 mars 1619 aboutit à la capture de cinq bâtiments tunisiens. Malgré ces pertes, vite comblées, la course barbaresque, en particulier celle d'Alger, demeure plus active et redoutable que jamais.

Le début du XVII^e siècle en Méditerranée orientale

En Méditerranée orientale également, la guerre navale se transforme, non pas dans les navires utilisés qui restent à peu près uniquement des galères, mais dans les objectifs des navires européens. Certes le pillage des zones côtières est toujours à l'honneur, mais les chefs des escadres chrétiennes, en particulier les chevaliers de Malte qui sont les plus actifs dans cette région, se rendent peu à peu compte que ces razzias rapportent de moins en moins. Naviguer près des côtes fait courir de grands risques aux navires alors que les populations les désertent pour s'installer à l'intérieur où il ne peut être

¹ *Histoire de Barbarie et de ses corsaires* (Paris, 1649), 315.

question de les poursuivre.¹ Or la stabilisation des frontières maritimes à partir de 1574 marque le vrai départ d'un phénomène de grande ampleur et d'importance capitale pour l'Empire ottoman. Cette immense construction politique, qui s'étend désormais de l'Atlas marocain au golfe Persique et de la Moldavie au Yémen, se constitue peu à peu en un vaste ensemble économique dans lequel les différentes provinces qui le composent se révèlent complémentaires les unes des autres et commencent à tisser entre elles des relations commerciales. Un coup d'œil sur une carte montre qu'elles sont en majeure partie disposées autour de la Méditerranée orientale qui constitue en quelque sorte le cœur de l'Empire ottoman. Ces indispensables liaisons intérieures ne peuvent qu'être maritimes car celles-ci sont plus directes, plus rapides et moins chères.

La principale de ces routes maritimes, l'axe majeur de l'empire sur lequel viennent se greffer des routes secondaires vers l'ouest et l'est, est celle qui relie Istanbul au Nord à Alexandrie au Sud. L'Egypte est en effet la plus riche et la plus importante des provinces ottomanes. Elle fournit à la capitale un important tribut en argent, le riz qui est la base de la nourriture de la cour du sultan et en particulier des janissaires, enfin les produits précieux en provenance de l'Extrême-Orient, soieries, parfums, drogues variées ainsi que le café du Yémen. C'est enfin la principale voie d'accès pour les pèlerins se rendant à La Mecque. A partir de la fin du XVI^e siècle, le système est bien établi et pratiquement chaque année, le convoi, comprenant quelques gros vaisseaux pesants et maladroits mais fortement armés, les *kalyon*, des bâtiments de transport plus légers, les *saïka*, et des galères d'escorte, quitte Alexandrie, laisse Chypre à l'Est, puis se dirige vers Rhodes et longe la côte anatolienne en faisant escale à Chio, à Samos, à Mytilène avant d'entrer dans les Dardanelles.

Ce convoi, malgré les risques qu'il y a à l'attaquer, est une proie autrement tentante que les pauvres cabanes des paysans anatoliens et les corsaires chrétiens en font leur objectif privilégié, avec des résultats inégaux. La première tentative connue a lieu en 1599 mais, faute d'informations précises, l'escadre chrétienne ne trouve pas le convoi et la crainte de voir surgir la flotte ottomane les conduit à renoncer. Nouvelle tentative en mai 1601 lorsque dix galères napolitaines, une sicilienne et cinq maltaises tentent d'intercepter la caravane d'Alexandrie entre Chypre et la côte anatolienne. Elles sont repérées par des bâtiments éclaireurs turcs, le convoi change de route et échappe à leurs agresseurs. Par contre, en 1608, une escadre toscane de huit

¹ Voir par exemple le cas de la côte de Palestine dans Amnon Cohen, "Ottoman Rule and the Re-Emergence of the Coast of Palestine", *Revue de l'Occident musulman et de la Méditerranée*, 39, 1985, 163-175.

galères et d'autant de vaisseaux, commandée par Beauregard, surprend victorieusement la caravane d'Alexandrie près du cap Khélidonia: deux des trois galions attaqués sont capturés ainsi que sept saïques. En août 1610 en revanche, Beauregard et ses Toscans subissent un échec : l'escorte, forte de 21 galères et d'une galéasse, les repousse sans peine. En 1621, la flotte chrétienne de 48 galères, en majorité espagnoles, se rend au Levant, découvre la caravane d'Alexandrie et, après avoir repoussé les 22 galères turques de l'escorte, capture ou détruit la plupart de ses navires.

Ainsi se déroule, depuis Lépante, l'activité navale en Méditerranée constituée, de part et d'autre, d'innombrables attaques, pillages et combats, le plus souvent au détriment des malheureuses populations civiles ou des paisibles navires de commerce. Depuis trois quarts de siècle, c'est une activité sans envergure et sans véritable évolution, dominée en quelque sorte par la routine. Si les objectifs n'ont guère changé, on a noté toutefois l'apparition, à côté des traditionnelles galères, du vaisseau venu de l'Atlantique avec une réserve de taille toutefois: le problème de sa maîtrise et surtout celui de sa construction. On a évoqué les corsaires anglais et néerlandais qui l'ont introduit dans les flottes barbaresques ce qui ne veut pas dire qu'ils savaient les construire. En fait, à cette époque, le vaisseau pouvait assurer successivement, voire simultanément, deux fonctions celle de guerre et celle de commerce. Quand ils avaient besoin de remplacer leurs navires, les Barbaresques gardaient pour eux les prises qui leur convenaient le mieux et revendaient les autres, quitte à les capturer à nouveau plus tard!

En fait les marins méditerranéens ne savaient ni les construire ni vraiment les utiliser comme en témoigne le cas, exemplaire, des Vénitiens, pourtant marins émérites. En 1618, la guerre éclate entre l'Espagne et Venise. Une flotte espagnole, forte de dix-huit vaisseaux de 24 à 50 canons, franchit le détroit de Gibraltar avec, pour objectif, le blocus de l'Adriatique voire l'attaque de Venise. Pour briser cette menace, celle-ci loue douze vaisseaux néerlandais et huit vaisseaux anglais ce qui suffit à dissuader les Espagnols. Les bâtiments loués, fort cher d'ailleurs, sont des vaisseaux mixtes modestes, armés de 26 à 30 canons mais montés par des équipages entraînés et redoutés. Ce système de location, incluant le bâtiment et son équipage, est appelé à un grand avenir pendant tout le XVII^e siècle car l'efficacité de ces navires se révèle rapidement. Le 14 juillet 1616, six vaisseaux espagnols, un de 52 canons, deux de 34, un de 30, un de 27 et un de 14, sont attaqués par 55 galères turques. Après deux jours de combat acharnés, les six vaisseaux ont subi des dommages dans leurs gréements et comptent plusieurs dizaines de morts et de nombreux blessés, mais ils ont résisté à un ennemi presque dix fois plus nombreux où l'on

compte une galère coulée, une réduite à l'état d'épave et 17 sérieusement endommagées.

La Reprise de la Grande Guerre: La Guerre de Crète

Le 28 septembre 1644, six galères de Malte sous le commandement de Boisbaudran attaquent, au large de Rhodes, la caravane d'Alexandrie. L'un d'eux, un très grand navire à voiles, fortement pourvu d'artillerie avec six cents personnes à bord, ne succombe qu'après plusieurs heures d'une défense acharnée. Parmi les captifs figure une des épouses du sultan et son jeune fils. Cotoner, qui a pris le commandement après la mort de Boisbaudran, retourne à Malte mais, à cause du mauvais temps, doit s'abriter pendant quelque temps dans une rade au Sud-Est de la Crète, possession vénitienne.

Estimant, sans doute à tort, que les autorités vénitiennes se sont rendues complices de l'ordre de Malte, le sultan Ibrahim choisit ce prétexte pour rompre la paix et entreprendre la conquête de la Crète, déjà envisagée depuis un certain temps. Malgré les précautions prises par Venise, les Ottomans, constamment harcelés en Méditerranée par les Espagnols et leurs alliés, Etats du pape, Toscane, Ordre de Malte, craignent que Venise ne reconstitue avec eux une Sainte Ligue afin de reconquérir Chypre. La possession de la Crète fermerait désormais la mer Egée, servirait de relais avec l'Afrique du Nord et permettrait, le cas échéant, de menacer Malte et l'Adriatique. Le moment paraît en outre bien choisi : l'Empire ottoman est en paix avec ses voisins européens, la Pologne et l'Empire des Habsbourg, et le traité de Kasr-i Sirin a mis fin, en 1639, à la guerre avec la Perse. Par contre, Venise est épuisée par la terrible peste de 1631 et les guerres menées en Italie du Nord à propos de la Valteline de 1641 à 1644. Enfin on sait à Istanbul combien la population crétoise, de confession orthodoxe, supporte mal la domination vénitienne et le comportement de l'église catholique à son égard.

L'initiative ottomane est à l'origine d'un affrontement entre l'Empire ottoman et la république de Venise qui dure près d'un siècle, ponctué par plusieurs guerres, et dont l'enjeu est la domination de la mer Egée grâce à la possession de ces contrées stratégiques que sont la Crète et la Morée. Si le but à atteindre est simple, conquérir, grâce à des forces armées terrestres, puis conserver, des territoires convoités, sa réalisation se révèle très complexe car elle nécessite, impérativement, la collaboration d'importantes forces navales.

La dernière guerre qui a opposé Venise et l'Empire ottoman a duré trois ans à peine, de 1570 à 1573, aussi, lorsqu'en 1645, éclate ce nouveau conflit, les deux adversaires n'envisagent pas que celui-ci puisse se prolonger bien

longtemps. C'est particulièrement vrai pour les Ottomans qui ont gardé le souvenir de la rapide conquête de Chypre. La résistance opiniâtre des Vénitiens et les difficultés qu'elle engendre font de la guerre de Crète une épreuve qui contraint les belligérants à des efforts considérables en hommes et en matériel. De plus, elle porte en germe les deux guerres de Morée qui ponctuent la fin du XVIIe et le début du XVIIIe siècle, provoquant ainsi un renouveau spectaculaire et durable de la guerre navale en Méditerranée orientale.

CHILDREN TREATED AS COMMODITY IN OTTOMAN CRETE*

Eugenia Kermeli

"All wickedness comes from weakness.... Make [the child] strong and he will be good".¹

Rousseau's articulation on the need to raise strong children as expressed in *Emile* could not have been more relevant to the plight of children in Ottoman Crete. In the middle of the seventeenth century children in the Ottoman courts of Rethymnon and Kandiye are sold, pledged and deposited by their own parents and relatives against the prescriptions of the *Shari'a* and despite the painstaking laws of protection elaborated by muslim jurists.

A *saghîr* is an infant, child or minor, one who has not attained to puberty. Arabic has a rich vocabulary to designate childhood and its subdivisions.² Medieval Islamic sources are abound, in accounts of tender relations between parents and children, and the Prophet Mohammed is presented as the model for treating children properly.³ According to one of the traditions, a caring father who in the middle of the night gets up to warm his children with his clothes is more virtuous than a fighter in the Holy War.⁴ Islamic Law has also provided a number of rules for the protection of their body and interests.⁵ However being subject to legal disability children do not have the capacity to contract and to dispose, and cannot be punished as sane adult Muslims. Islamic law though distinguished between different stages of

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¹ Jean Jacques Rousseau, *Emile: or, On Education*, translation by Allan Broom (Basic Books, 1979), paragraph 164.

² A. Giladi, "Saghîr", *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Second Edition, vol. VIII (Leiden, 1995), 821-27.

³ Al-Ghazzali, *Ihya' 'ulum al-din*, translated in Turkish by Ali Arslan, vol. II (İstanbul, 1978), 275-79.

⁴ *Ibid*, ii, 41.

⁵ J. Schacht, *An Introduction to Islamic law* (Oxford, 1966), passim; A. Giladi, *Children of Islam: Concepts of Childhood in Medieval Muslim Society* (London, 1992), 169-78; N. J. Coulson, *Succession in the Muslim Family* (Cambridge, 1971).

childhood allowing a minor (*saghîr*) to conclude beneficial transactions and to accept donations and charitable gifts. Moreover an intelligent minor (*mumayyiz*) can adopt Islam, and conduct a manumission contract (*mukataba*), if he is a slave.¹ The sanctity of a minor life is not though restricted to muslim children. In the *hadiths* there is a prophetic prohibition against the killing of an enemy's children and women in time of war, as they were considered innocent and not responsible.²

However idyllic this picture might be, both Islamic jurists and ottoman administrators have dealt with transgressions against the life and property of minors. Strict rules have been set up for the upbringing of children; the function of wet-nurses; the welfare of children in case of divorce; the protection of their inheritance rights and property; the right to refuse an unsuited marriage forced by their relatives or legal guardians (*walis*); the assignment of daily allowance (*nafaka*) in case they are in the employment of others.³ The jurisconsults' opinions (*fetvas*) thus shed light on problems as reflected in the questions they were asked to address.

Decrees of the Sultan and his bureaucracy and entries in the *kadı* courts further reinforce the efforts of the community to protect their minors and punish perpetrators.⁴ In the *Mühimme* records the abductors of small boys and girls that abuse and illegal detain them are severely punished⁵. Furthermore in the ottoman criminal codes included in the *kanunnames* promulgated by a number of Sultans, there are references to children both male and female as victims of abduction and sexual abuse.⁶ It is interesting to note that the legislator penalized not only the culprit but also the father of the child for

¹ Schacht, *Islamic Law*, 124-25.

² A. Tekin, *Bukhari'den seçme hadisler*, vol. 1 (İstanbul, 2000), 217.

³ C. Imber, *Ebu's-su'ud: The Islamic Legal Tradition* (California, 1997), 115-269; C. Erbay, *İslam Hukukunda Küçüklerin Himayesi* (İstanbul, 1998); Schacht, *Islamic Law*, passim; J. Tucker, *In the house of the Law: gender and Islamic law in ottoman Syria and Palestine* (Berkeley, 1998); M. Düzdağ, *Şeyhülislam Ebussuud Efendi Fetvaları Işığında 16. Asır Türk Hayatı* (İstanbul, 1972), passim; İ. Ural and M.A. Sarı, *Zembilli Ali Efendi: El-Muhtarat Minel Fetâvâ, Seçme Fetvalar* (İstanbul, 1996); Çatalcalı Ali Efendi, *Fetâvâ* (İstanbul, 1830); *Behcetü'l- fetâvâ* (İstanbul, 1852); Abdürrahim Efendi, *Fetâvâ* (İstanbul, 1776); Feyzullâh Efendi, *Feyziyye* (İstanbul, 1820); Minkârîzâde Yahya Efendi, *Fetâvâ* (İstanbul, 1800).

⁴ L. Peirce, *Morality Tales: Law and Gender in the Ottoman Court of Aintab* (California, 2003), 130-52, 180-85, 455-60; R. Jennings, *Studies on Ottoman Social History in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: Women, Zimmis and Sharia Courts in Kayseri, Cyprus and Trabzon* (İstanbul, 1999); B. Ergene, *Local Court, Provincial Society, and Justice in the Ottoman Empire: legal practice and dispute resolution in Çankırı and Kastamonu* (Leiden, 2003).

⁵ 82 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri (1026-1027/1617-1618) (Ankara, 2000), doc. 210, 140; doc. 303, 202; 7 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri (975-976/1567-1569) (Ankara, 1999), doc. 2770, 116; doc. 1386, 84; 12 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri (978-979/1570-1572) (Ankara, 1996), doc.132, 109; A. Kal'a, *İstanbul Ahkâm Defterleri: İstanbul'da Ticaret Tarihi (1742-1779)* (İstanbul, 1997), 2/216/739, 38.

⁶ U. Heyd, *Studies in Old Ottoman Criminal Law*, ed. V. L. Ménage (Oxford, 1973), 95-147; A. Akgündüz, *Osmanlı Kanunnameleri ve Hukuki Tahlilleri* (İstanbul, 1990), passim.

failing in his guardian duties.¹ The rules set up by the central administration were also endorsed in local courts. The court records of Crete and Antep for example have entries applying the rules set up in the law codes.²

There is a common factor in these measures initiated by the central administration through the *kannunames* and decrees, or executed by local judges -sometimes with the support of legal opinions of *müftis*-, this is an adherence to the spirit of Islamic/Ottoman law. This adherence to law is lacking in the cases from ottoman Crete whereupon children are treated as commodity. Despite bearing witness in our sources of numerous instances of abuse towards minors, the very existence of legal limitations -regardless of the effectiveness of application- function as a safeguard for the well being of children. Thus when minors are traded in court -against the prescriptions of law- and the transactions are registered by the same judge who was responsible for their protection, we are faced with not only another example of judicial misconduct but also with a grave moral offense against the sanctity of law.

In 1654³ a new Muslim Kara Mehmed acknowledged in court his debt of 20 *guruş* to Alaiyeli Mehmed Ağa. He also admitted that in return he gave away his underage son Mustafa to the keep of the said Ağa (*ıyâline verdüm*), on condition that when he pays back his debt he will recover his son.⁴ From 1654-659 there are at least 15 cases involving insolvent parents resorting into a number of financial transactions in court using their own offspring as security. The financial difficulties the local population faced, undoubtedly a result of the abrupt change of fortune following the ottoman advancement, is evident in the first two *defters* for Resmo. Numerous cases of loan, pledge and suretyship testify to the population's financial hardship.⁵

The majority of the parents involved are *zimmi*s. Even in the two remaining cases the parents were former *zimmi*s and new adherents to Islam.⁶ There is only one case of a woman giving away her daughter⁷ otherwise fathers are litigants. The parents' debt ranges from 3 *riyal guruş* to 35; and only in two cases wheat and olive oil comprises part or the whole of the loan.⁸ A daily allowance of 4 to 5 *akçe* was designated to children -apart from

¹ Heyd, *Studies*, paragraph 27, 102

² *Resmo Kadı Sicilleri* [*Resmo* hereafter], defter no: 56, doc. 11, 38, 122, 218, 605; C. C. Güzelbey, *Gaziantep Şer'i Mahkeme Sicilleri* (Antep, 1970), doc. 82, 6; doc. 106, 55-56.

³ The entry is undated but we assume from the previous and following ones that the year is 1654.

⁴ *Resmo*, 57/387.

⁵ *Resmo*, 57/ 17, 22, 26, 29, 61, 126, 166, 177, 229, 420, 434, 468, 536, 551, 593, 639; 56/ 510, 639, 744, 823, 866.

⁶ *Resmo*, 57/387, 56/495.

⁷ *Resmo*, 56/737.

⁸ *Resmo*, 56/549, 57/761.

the first case. The lowest *nafaka* is allocated to the child sold by his father, that is 3 *akçe*.¹ Only in two cases we find out that the children were approximately 6 years of age,² otherwise they are only mentioned as *saghîr*. Apart from only one case whereupon the father acted as a guarantor and was forced to acknowledge the debt contracted by another, in all remaining cases the parents had personally acquired the debt. In a guarantor case (*kefil*) case Kostandin gave away his approximately six year old daughter Sofia not to the original creditor, but to a third party, Veli Beşe, who as the document informs us promptly paid the debt of the father consisting of 29 *mestate* of olive oil.³ In every transaction one child was given at a time, apart from a case. The father had contracted the second largest loan and was forced in return to give away two sons.⁴ The *ikrar* of the father echoes his anxiety to recover the boys, “*inşallah* upon payment of my debt I will take them back and pay for their *nafaka* until this day”. Unfortunately this type of judicial documents does not allow us to find out anything about the children’s fate after the transaction. The operation of two racketeers though who acquired more than one child, leads us to believe that it must have been a lucrative trade. Within 15 days in December 1656 Mahmud Beşe took three boys from two insolvent parents.⁵ Moreover a Mustafa Beşe of the 38 *bölük* son of Ahmed seized almost all children traded in court in 1659. Since these cases were available to me only through the translation of Stavrinides, although I suspect that the Mustafa Beşe son of Mehmed in the remaining three cases might have been the same person to Mustafa Beşe son of Ahmed, I cannot prove it.⁶ My suspicions increase when looking at a peculiar adoption case in 1659. Manuel gave away his son Ioannis to Nalızâde Mustafa Efendi, the *kadı* of Resmo, to serve him, on the condition that the boy will be educated and raised as a Muslim. This as the *hüccet* mentions was done because the *kadı* paid all the debts of the father to a Kara Mustafa Beşe and others. It seems that for the father to have his son being raised as an educated Muslim was a better choice than handing him over to his creditor.⁷ Finally not all creditors and recipients of children were Muslim. In 1659 Kostas son of Kornelos gave away his son

¹ Resmo, 56/881.

² Resmo, 56/761 and 762.

³ Resmo, 56/761.

⁴ Resmo, 56/599.

⁵ Resmo, 56/579, 56/599.

⁶ N. Stavrinides, *Μεταθρόσεις Τουρκικών Ιστορικών Εγγράφων Αθωρώντι εις την Ιστορίαν της Κρήτης* [Translations of Turkish Historical Documents on the History of Crete] (Herakleion, 1975), vol. 1, doc. 117, 19, 120, 121, 123, 124, 127.

⁷ Stavrinides, *Translations*, vol. 1, doc. 121.

Manuel to Georgila Belitaki in return for a debt of 15 *guruş* and a designated *nafaka* of 5 *akçe* per day.¹

Apart from the social side of the affair, my focal point is to examine the legality of such transactions in an effort to determine the role played by custom in judicial procedure. Thus the first surviving court records of Resmo are rather invaluable, especially when dealing with the unusual case of treating children as commodity. The first hurdle the local *kadı* was faced with is the legality of the procedure of treating free persons as the children of new Muslims and *zimmi*s were, as *mal*. According to the stipulation of the Islamic law free persons cannot be the object of property, alongside animals not ritually slaughtered (*mayta*) and blood.² They cannot even be categorized under the term *mal-ı natik* (speaking property) as this applied to slaves and cattle.³ Any transaction and especially sale (*bey'*) is considered null and void (*batıl*). This prohibition in Islamic law must have been the reason why the *kadı* in the first case we examined only registered in the statement (*ikrar*) of the father the transaction in rather vague terms (20 *riyali guruş ala-tariki'l-karz aldum ve mukabelesinde oğlum Mustafa'yi iyâline verdüm*). The uncertainty about the procedure must also be the reason why this child was deprived of a daily allowance.

The *kadı*'s uneasiness about the procedure and perhaps awareness of the illegality is obvious in the one case of sale of an offspring. In 1657 Manuel sold his underage son Yorgi to Bağdadi Mehmed Beşe for 9 *guruş* and 15 *akçe* (*bey' itdüm*).⁴ A *nafaka* of 3 *akçe* per day was settled upon and the entry finishes with the salient statement that the document was registered with the permission of the *mahalle* in Kasteli. Whether it is an effort on behalf of the *kadı* to safeguard himself -by employing the collective responsibility of the neighborhood, or it is within the duties of the *mahalle* as upkeepers of public conduct remains a question for investigation.⁵ It is certain though that this practice was not tolerated as we will see in the imperial order of 1659 putting an end to this and similar acts, and in a *fetva* of the almost contemporary *şeyhülislam* Abdürrahim Efendi.

¹ Stavrinides, *Translations*, vol. 1, doc. 127.

² Schacht, *Introduction*, 134.

³ M. Plessner, "Māl", *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Second Edition, vol. VI (Leiden, 1991), 205.

⁴ *Resmo*, 56/881.

⁵ This case may be comparable to the duties and responsibilities of the *mahalle* in cases of prostitution or *ehl-i fesad*. See, E. Kermeli, "Sin and the Sinner: *Folles Femmes* in Ottoman Crete", *Eurasian Studies*, 1 (2002), 84-96; Ergene, *Local Court*, 160-69.

Question: If 'Amr the dependant of the *sancakbeği* Zeyd in an area, takes away Beşir the underage son of Bekr, a *re'aya* in one of the villages, with the intention to make him a slave (*kul*) and he buys him, what should happen to 'Amr?

Answer: He should be imprisoned and cannot be released until he produces Beşir or his death becomes known.¹

We have many references -apart from the Resmo case- of children sold as slaves. In 1713 a *şeyhülislam* 'Atâullah Mehmed Efendi discusses the case of an orphan sold as a slave to a Jew. He recommends that the Jew should be compelled to sell the child to a Muslim to raise him in a muslim manner.² The concern of the jurisconsult is primarily in winning over the child to Islam instead of discussing his legal status. In 1841 we have information about the selling of Muslim and Christian boys in the Mosul area by their parents on account of their extreme poverty.³ Erdem asserts that this was not an extensive phenomenon before the Circassian immigration in the second half of the nineteenth century.⁴ He argues that in the Caucasus rival tribes often kidnapped each other's people, mostly young children and girls and sold them to the Ottomans. They also kidnapped the children of non-Muslim Ottoman subjects.⁵ This is confirmed in a *Mühimme* entry in 1618 where the Sultan is giving instructions for the release of captives enslaved by the Tatars and two entries in the *Ahkâm Defterleri* in 1748 and 1762.⁶ Although it is difficult to argue with certainty as to the extent of the custom of selling children we can assume that the practice was not tolerated by the ottoman administration. In June 1747 an attempt to sell two underage *zimmi* girls in Trabzon is discovered and the *kethüda* in the port of Trabzon is ordered to send to the Porte the culprit and the unfortunate girls.⁷ There are two important details worthy of mentioning. Margarita and Kadret were handed over to the *Laz* captain by their own brother-in-law, who claimed that they were captives (*esir*). When the captain took them to Burgos in the Black Sea to sell them he was caught on

¹ Abdürrahim, *Fetâvâ*, v. ii, 171. Ebu's-su'ud has also produced a *fetva* on whether the enslavement, buying and selling of *zimmis* is allowed. The answer was affirmative only if they had revolted against the Sultan, Düzdağ, *Ebussuud*, doc. 101.

² 'Atâullah Mehmed Efendi, *Fetâvâ* (İstanbul, 1834), 128.

³ Y. H. Erdem, *Slavery in the Ottoman Empire and its Demise, 1800-1909* (London, 1996), 32. See also, N. Vatin, "Une affaire interne. Le sort et la libération des personnes de condition libre illégalement retenues en esclavage sur le territoire ottoman (XV^e siècle)", *Turcica*, 33 (2001), 149-190.

⁴ Erdem narrates the account of the British ambassador Sir H. Elliot arguing that the Circassian parents sold their children with the sincere intention of bettering their condition. Erdem, *Slavery*, 48.

⁵ Erdem, *Slavery*, 46, 48. Also E. Toledano, *The Ottoman Slave Trade and Its Suppression, 1840-1890* (Princeton, 1982), 18.

⁶ 82 Numaralı *Mühimme Defteri*, doc. 324; A. Kal'a, *İstanbul'da Ticaret Tarihi*, doc. 6/172/493, 199; 2/283/950, 213.

⁷ Kal'a, *İstanbul'da Ticaret Tarihi*, doc. 2/216/739, 38.

the warning of an anonymous informant (*ihbar*). Thus it is apparent that the girls could only be sold if they were captives. In the light of this case the illegality of the sale in court is even more apparent. The son of the Christian sold in Resmo was certainly not a slave or a captive.

Apart from sale the terms used in the *hüccets* for giving away an offspring in return for a debt are: *ala-tarik-i rehn*,¹ *terbiyesi için mezbura emanet vaz' eyledüm*² or *hakk-ı terbiyesini dahi mezbura feragat idup*.³ *Rahn* means pledge, security and is a practice confined in the Qur'an (II, 283). The contract demands offer and acceptance and it becomes binding (*lazim*) when possession of the pledge is taken.⁴ While possession is taken, the ownership is not transferred. Thus the disposal of the pledge by the debtor (pledgor) is absolutely excluded. He only retains the ownership of the pledge and any accessions occurring, i.e. fruit of fruit bearing trees etc.⁵ The jurists were mainly concerned with two questions: a/ whether the security in case of non-fulfillment passes without more ado into the ownership of the creditor or not; b/ who is entitled to use it and is bound to maintain it.⁶ As an answer to the second question the Hanafi doctrine prescribes that the debtor is bound to maintain it. Whereas the creditor has the right to sell it to satisfy his claim, if the debt becomes overdue or is not paid. All these conditions of the contract are dealt with to minute detail in the contemporary to the *sicils, fetvas* of Çatalcalı Ali Efendi, Abdürrahim Efendi and the *Behcetü'l- Fetâvâ*.⁷ However I have not yet found a *fetva* on pledging children. Even the *fetvas* on the pledge of slaves are limited and they deal with problems like the right of the creditor to take away a slave before the debtor formally conceded to the pledge;⁸ whether the condition put forward by the owner of a female slave that she should not be manumitted can be circumvented if she marries;⁹ or whether the use by the creditor of a wet nurse slave given as pledge could decrease the debt.¹⁰ Finally on the question of the maintenance costs of the slave while

¹ *Resmo*, 56/495.

² *Resmo*, 56/737.

³ *Resmo*, 56/599.

⁴ Schacht, *Introduction*, 139.

⁵ Schacht, *Introduction*, 140.

⁶ J. Schacht, "Rahn", *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Second Edition, vol. VII (Leiden, 1994), 400.

⁷ Abdürrahim, *Fetâvâ*, chapter on *rahn*, vol. II, 204-234; *Behcetü'l Fetâvâ*, chapter on *rahn*, 502-512; Çatalcalı Ali Efendi, *Fetâvâ*, chapter on *rahn*, 762-780.

⁸ Abdürrahim, *Fetâvâ*, vol. II, 204

⁹ Abdürrahim, *Fetâvâ*, vol. II, 204. The answer is negative.

¹⁰ *Behcetü'l Fetâvâ*, 203(2). See also J. Schacht and J. Burton, "Rada' or Rida", *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Second Edition, vol. VIII (Leiden 1993), 361-62. In the Byzantine and post-Byzantine law the work of a slave or the rents of properties given as pledge were taken into consideration. The pledge was even released if the earnings were more than the amount of the debt. K. Armenopoulos, *Προχειρον Νόμων ή Εξάβιβλος* [Exabiblos] (Athens, 1971), 182.

pledged the answer follows the Islamic prescriptions and designates the expenses on the debtor.¹ The *sicil* entry of 1656 is drawn according to the Islamic rules on *rehn*. After the acknowledgment of the debt the pledge is described -in this case Ali the son of a new Muslim Mehmed, and the debtor Ferruh Beşe accepts the pledge. Then a *nafaka* of 4 *akçe* for the food and clothing (*kisve*) of the child is agreed upon and the debtor resumes the responsibility of paying back the *nafaka* with the debt. All is legal apart from the nature of the pledge.²

The other category used in court was *emanet* or *wadi'a*. The deposit is the commission given by the owner to another to hold his property in safe custody and constitutes a fiduciary relationship (*amana* or *emanet*).³ One of the conditions for the contract to be valid is that the object of the contract should be legal (*mal mutakawwim*).⁴ The safe keeping must be assured by the depositary himself or by a member of his family. His refusal to return the deposit, his denial that the deposit exists and its confusion with his property, are usurpation and engender liability.⁵ Like in the case of *rehn* the contemporary *fetva* collections do not include items on deposited children.⁶ They concentrate on slaves and complications if they escape, die or get injured while in the possession of the depositary.⁷ In the Ankara court records we have two cases of children given away as *emanet*. In 1588 Ahmed Çelebi gave his daughter Esma to Hasan son of Hüseyin; and in 1589 Abdullah gave his daughter Ayşe to Mehmed. There is no connection though to an outstanding debt or any reference of a financial affair.⁸ Although the depositary contract in the records of Resmo resembles the pledge one; with the acknowledgment of debt, the delivery of the *emanet* and the designation of the *nafaka*-, the only reason Radula in 1657 opted out to ask for this type of contract and gave away her daughter Elena to Ibrahim Çeribaş, must have been the stricter rules Islamic law prescribes on the use of the *emanet* and the return of it. The concluding clause of the *hüccet* reaffirms our supposition: "This document was drawn as a precaution against the evasion of restitution in case of

¹ *Behcetü'l Fetâvâ*, 511.

² *Resmo*, 56/495.

³ Schacht, *Introduction*, 157.

⁴ Mawil Y. Izzi Dien, "Wadi'a", *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Second Edition, vol. XI (Leiden, 2000), 21-23. However *mal* is not the focus of the condition but the legality of the *mal*. Thus wine is not legally an item of property for an ordinary Muslim, but if it is owned by a newly converted Muslim it is considered as legal.

⁵ Schacht, *Introduction*, 157.

⁶ Abdürrahim, *Fetâvâ*, chapter on *wadi'a*, vol. II, 102-169; *Behcetü'l Fetâvâ*, chapter on *wadi'a*, 490-501; Çatalcalı Ali Efendi, *Fetâvâ*, chapter on *wadi'a*, 604-610

⁷ Abdürrahim, *Fetâvâ*, vol. I, 152, 156. *Behcetü'l Fetâvâ*, 501.

⁸ H. Oğan, *Ankara'nın İki Numaralı Şer'iye Sicili, 1 Muharrem 997-8 Ramazan 998* (Ankara, 1974), doc. 63, 6 and doc. 1620, 123.

payment".¹ Radula obviously anxious to recover her daughter requested the inclusion of the final clause. Although it would be very interesting to find out the network of legal advice and support a *zimmi* woman received few years after ottoman law was established in Crete, the answer to this question is not eminent for the time being.

The remaining cases are more problematic to categorize, as the entries do not use explicitly terms like *emanet* or *rehn*. The parents admit in court their debts and incapacity to raise their children (*infaka kâdir olmamağla mezbura verdüm*),² (*deynüm olup edasına kâdir olmamağın*).³ Ostensibly these *hüccets* resemble the contract on hiring (*icara*) and in particular the *besleme* ones, however as we will see the *kadı* in order to avoid using the illegal terms of *rehn* and *emanet*, employed a legal stratagem.

According to the *icara* contracts the parties are not required to have reached maturity (*bulugh*). It is sufficient that they should be free men, of sound mind and capable of discernment ('*akil and mümeyyiz*').⁴ The period of the *icara* or the work to be completed must be stated and anything, which may be valid for payment in a sale, is valid as payment for hire as well. There are many *fetvas* on underage children working as servants until they come of age. The children are either given a *nafaka* and their cloth expenses or upon maturity the fair wage (*ecr-i misl*).

Question: If the seven year-old Hind has served Zeyd until her coming of age, is it permissible to receive the minimum fair wage (*ecr-i misl*) for her service from Zeyd?

Answer: Yes.

Question: Hind gave away her underage daughter Zeynep to Hatice to raise her (*terbiye-i içün*). If Zeynep continues to serve Hadice until she becomes an adult, is it permissible to receive the minimum fair wage from Hadice?

Answer: Yes.⁵

In the first *fetva* the conditions under which the girl was given to service are not specified. Her right though to a fair wage is stressed by the jurist. The second case is more elaborate as the mother of the child hands it over to be raised by another person. Still though since service was involved the employer is still responsible for the payment of a wage.

¹ Resmo, 56/737.

² Resmo, 56/549.

³ Resmo, 56/579, 762, 759.

⁴ E. Tyan, "Idjar, Idjara", *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Second Edition, vol. III (Leiden, 1971), 1017. A. J. Wensinck, "Khadim", *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Second Edition, vol. IV (Leiden, 1978), 899.

⁵ Abdürrahim, *Fetâvâ*, vol. II, 112.

Question: Zeyd received the under aged Hind with the permission of her guardian, and agreed that the clothing and daily allowance expenses of the child are equal to the minimum fair wage. It was also agreed that the expenses were to be deducted from the property of Zeyd. If Hind continues to serve Zeyd until she becomes an adult, is it still permissible to claim from Zeyd the minimum wage?

Answer: No.

Question: Zeyd took away the orphan minor Hind (*asla velisi olmıyan*) without the judge's permission. If she serves him for a few years, can Hind upon maturity claim as the fair wage for her service, the excess amount of money after the deduction of the clothing and daily allowance expenses, Zeyd had paid?

Answer: No, she cannot.¹

According to these legal opinions, if the minors' services are worth more than their daily allowance they are entitled to claim the remaining sum from their employers however the terms of payment are to be decided by the *kadı* himself. In case the *kadı* has not been consulted and the child is an orphan she or he has still the right to claim *ecr-i misl* upon maturity. The child is not entitled to any extra payment if in the *icara* contract it is explicitly stated that the *nafaka* and *kisve* are accepted to be equal to *ecr-i misl*.

The parents or relatives who gave away minors to the service of others retained the legal representation of the children. The employers can only pursue a legal matter involving the minor with judicial permission.

Question: The seven or eight year-old Zeyd was given by his mother to the stranger 'Amr to keep and raise him (*hafz ve terbiye-i içün*). 'Amr with the permission of Hind took Zeyd to another locality. If another stranger to the boy Bekr unlawfully seize (*gasb*) and take away Zeyd, can 'Amr with judicial permission remove Zeyd from Bekr?

Answer: Yes, he can.²

In the case of *besleme* contracts the child is not expected to leave its adopted family unless he or she marries. The court records of Bursa in the nineteenth century include a number of *besleme* cases. According to Kurt in the majority of cases the child is female around eight years old. There are only few cases of minors of four years of age. The *besleme* are given under the category of *icar-i saghîr* and were expected to serve until their employers married them off.³ In the *sicils* of Resmo we have one definite case of a *besleme* contract to allow comparisons. In 1653 Ağa Osman Beşe son of

¹ Ibid.

² Abdürrahim, *Fetâvâ*, vol. II, 171.

³ A. Kurt, *Bursa Sicillerine Göre Osmanlı Ailesi (1839-1876)* (Bursa, 1998), 81. See also A. Aydın, *İslam-Osmanlı Aile Hukuku* (İstanbul, 1985).

Ömer received a three year old girl, whose name is not mentioned in the document, from her grandfather and resident of Ayoç Vasilis village Mehmed, a new Muslim and formerly known as Kostandin (*bina'en virdüm ba'de'l-yevm alakam yokdur, evladı yerine besleyüp gözetmeğe müteahhid olup*).¹ Although *nafaka* was not designated the child is according to a *fetva* of Abdürrahim entitled to one.² In the cases of insolvent parents there is only one entry that bears the finality of the *besleme* contract. Yannis admitted in court, in 1656, that he could not pay back his debt of 15 *guruş* and 2 *muzur* of wheat to Ibrahim Beşe of the 20th *bölük*. He uses exactly the same terms (*bina'en virdüm ba'de'l-yevm alakam yokdur*) and he adds that in case a claim has been raised against the agreement either personally or by proxy the *kadı* should not allow a hearing. He closes his statement by accepting that his son Mihalıs would have to serve his creditor until his is capable of it (*hizmetine kadir oluncaya dek*).³

There are three important differences between this contract and the rest: the parents have explicitly mentioned in their statements; a) that they wish to recover their children upon payment; b) that they will accept the payment of the daily allowance as part of the debt. Also there is no mention of the children's obligation to serve the creditor or an indication about the termination of the service as required in the *icara* contracts.⁴ Even if we consider that serving the creditor is presupposed, two cases of insolvent debtors offering their services and specifying both the nature of service and the time framework, convince us otherwise. In 1657 Hüseyin Beşe a new Muslim promised that himself, his wife and two sons would work for his creditor for a period of 20 years against a loan of 70 *guruş*.⁵ On the same day Mehmed another new Muslim accepted to work for his creditor for 1080 days in return for his debt of 21 *guruş*. He included in his statement the calculation that his repayment amounts to 7 *guruş* per year to conclude that if he pays earlier the remaining debt he should be freed.⁶ In both cases a specific hiring period is agreed upon and the debtors did not claim a daily allowance.

Thus the local *kadı* of Resmo has exhibited a high degree of legal ingenuity. To evade using the apparently illegal terms *rehn* and *emanet* in the contracts, he resorts to a legal trick. Although he draws them as hiring or *besleme* contracts, he cannot avoid adding the terms required in pledge

¹ *Resmo*, 56/845.

² Abdürrahim, *Fetâvâ*, vol. 1, 272. Question: Is Zeyd forced to pay the daily allowance of Zeyneb who is the servant and *besleme* of his rich wife Hind? Answer: No, he is not.

³ *Resmo*, 56/549.

⁴ *Resmo*, 56/579, 599, 759, 761, 762.

⁵ *Resmo*, 56/779.

⁶ *Resmo*, 56/781.

contracts; that the offspring is given away in return for a loan or that the parents accept to pay their children's expenses. If we rule out negligence or ignorance on the kid's behalf –and his general conduct in court induces us to believe in his abilities– the only plausible explanation for his insistence to register such type contracts would be his adherence to local custom. Looking into whether pledging children or giving them away as servants was in practice during the Venetian period remains an issue for research. In Byzantine and post-Byzantine legal jurisprudence though there are entries on handing over offspring for service to creditors and even selling them.

The Exabiblos of Armenopoulos is a 14th century guidebook for judges and students of law. His popularity in the Balkans and Europe produced many copies and translations of the text which was used by the Orthodox Patriarchate as the codex of the patriarchal courts until 1887 when it was replaced by the code of Napoleon Serouios drawing largely on the Exabiblos.¹ Nomokritirion is another legal guidebook (*nomokanon*) published from manuscript by Gkines and dated roughly around 1600-1700.² In both texts it is stressed³ that insolvent debtors should not be forced to work for their creditors. In particular according to the Exabiblos “if the creditor hires or takes as servants the children of the debtor the amount of debt is deducted and he also has to pay an equal to the debt amount to the detained children or their parents. Otherwise he is chastised”.⁴ The Nomokritirion is heavily influenced by the Exabiblos reflecting though 17th century realities. For example a number of loan words from ottoman are used and the monetary unit in the text is *akçe*. “If one lends *akçe* to a person and against the debtor's will he forces him or his children to work in return for the loan, then the creditor loses his debt. He is forced to pay as much and either himself or his child is chastised. If, however, the debtor at will offers his services to the creditor in return for the loan then the loan is deducted and the creditor should give him an amount equal to the debt”.⁵

The reference to the sale of offspring by the insolvent parents is found only in the 17th century Nomokritirion. “If a person due to extreme poverty and incapacity to raise his son or daughter sells them, the sale is valid. The buyer should not be forced to return the child unless the parents or its relatives; a) pay the proper price designated at the time they made their request

¹ Armenopoulos, *Hexabiblos*, Introduction, 109.

² D. Gkines, *Περίγραμμα Ιστορίας του Μεταβυζαντινού Δικαίου*, [Historical Framework of the Post-Byzantine Law] (Athens 1966), manuscript, n. 2764, 65-112.

³ Armenopoulos, *Hexabiblos*, 191 and Gkines, *Post-Byzantine Law* 98.

⁴ Armenopoulos, *Hexabiblos*, 191.

⁵ Gkines, *Post-Byzantine Law*, 98.

or b) they replace the child with slaves of equal value".¹ The absence of such clause in Exabiblos indicates that extreme cases like the selling of children might have been a phenomenon restricted to the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries. When we compare the reality in the ottoman court in Resmo with canon law we see that the result of the combination between local custom and canon law on the one hand and Islamic law on the other, works in favor of the creditor. Not only the creditor's right is safeguarded by acquiring -through legal tricks- a pledge illegal in Islamic jurisprudence but allowed in canon law-, but he also evades even the few rights given by canon law to the insolvent parent, i.e. to proceed in free will and demand a payment equal to his debt.

Despite the remarkable efforts of the local *kadis* the illegality of treating children as commodities was finally banned in 23 April 1659. An *imperial* order sent to the commander of Resmo Ibrahim Paşa, the *ağa* of the *yeniçeri* and the religious authorities and *ayans* of Resmo forbade the selling and pawning of children. According to Stavrínides' translation, some *re'aya* still sell their children or take away other people's children and enslave them against the Shari'a.² These practices were henceforth forbidden and if there is a recurrent culprit the authorities are ordered to question his motives (*niçün evladlarını satarsın?*).

The treatment of children of new Muslims and *zimmis* as commodity in the Resmo court points out to a social problem the full extent of which is still a subject for research. However until parallel cases are found in other parts of the empire, the legal procedure of pledging and depositing children in ottoman Crete remains unique. The sale of children though seems to be a different case. There are examples of sale of minors in Mosul, the Caucasus and Trabzon. The Caucasians were actively involved in kidnapping and selling the children of rival tribes and even of non-muslim ottoman subjects. The extent of this practice explains perhaps the reason why in Trabzon when the relative of the two minor girls sold them to a captain, he claimed that they were captives. We can thus assume that it was legally allowed to sell children only if they were slaves or captives. The case of Mosul, though, where the parents claimed poverty to sell their children needs further investigation. It would be useful to examine the legal procedure followed in the Mosul court permitting these sales, although I suspect that like in the case of Crete local custom must have been the determining factor.

It seems though that the litigants in the sale case in Resmo were either unaware of the illegality of the case or uninterested. However the *kadı* exhibits his uneasiness by subjecting the sale to the conditional approval of the local

¹ Gkines, *Post-Byzantine Law*, 81.

² Stavrínides, *Translation*, vol. 1, 147.

community. If we assume, -and it seems almost certain that the *kadı* of Resmo permitted the registration of pledge and depositing of minors on the basis of well-known custom ('*örf*')¹ confirmed by the Byzantine and post-Byzantine entries of *nomokanons*- then we could perhaps comprehend his insistence on allowing the sale, upon the approval of the more authoritative interpreters of local custom, i.e. the *mahalle*.

The legal ingenuity of the *kadı* of Resmo is not limited only in accepting local custom as the defining legitimating tool in his decision to register uncanonical acts. He also displayed an advanced level of legal creativity when he disguised these transactions as *icara* and *besleme* contracts.

Whether this incident is an example of the Weberian notion of the *kadı*'s justice or rather Rosen's opinion on the unlimited discretion of the *kadı* or not, the case of children treated as commodity in Ottoman Crete serves as a fine example of the power of custom as independent factor in Hanafi legal thought². Aspired by the example of Ebu's Su'ud the illustrious sixteenth century *şeyhülislam*, the local *kadı* accommodated pre-ottoman practice and attempted to justify it in Islamic terms without though acquiring the refinement of his predecessor's legal argumentation.

¹ G. Lisbon, "Urf", *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Second Edition, vol. X (Leiden, 2000), 887-88. Ibn Nujaim -a sixteenth century *mufti*-, on custom is revealing: "know that custom and usage are so frequently taken into consideration in law that they [the jurists] have made it a formal source."

² H. Gerber, *State, Society, and Law in Islam: Ottoman Law in Comparative Perspective* (New York, 1994), 11-23; L. Rosen, *The Anthropology of Justice* (Cambridge, 1989); M. Weber, *Economy and Society* (New York, 1968); M. Weber, *Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society*, ed. M. Rheinstein (New York, 1969).

THE SHIFTING CHRONOLOGY OF THE CHYHYRYN (ÇEHRİN) CAMPAIGN (1089/1678) ACCORDING TO THE OTTOMAN LITERARY SOURCES, AND THE PROBLEM OF THE OTTOMAN CALENDAR

Colin Heywood

Introduction¹

It has been observed that it has been largely through the activity of historians that the passage of time has come to be reckoned in dates.² Ottoman chronology, as furnished by Ottoman literary sources, has long been recognised as a subject of study which contains pitfalls for the unwary or uncritical historian. It is now almost thirty years since Professor Ménage, in his study of the so-called 'Annals' of Murâd II, pointed out some of the chronological problems embedded in the early Ottoman chronicles and *takvîm* ('royal calendar') texts.³ More recently, Colin Imber's examination of what he has aptly termed the 'black hole' which lies at the heart of our knowledge of the reign of Osmân I, has dramatically illuminated the problems inherent in any attempt to establish a secure chronology for the earliest period of Ottoman history.⁴

In both these instances, however, we are dealing essentially with the faulty transmission of chronological data by our informants. At a deeper level of investigation there lies a more fundamental problem which is inherent in the Muslim calendar itself and in Ottoman usage with regard to it. This is a problem which in principle has been known to scholarship since the earliest days of the field, but which in practice historians have only recently begun seriously to address. My own interest in it was stimulated some years ago by a typically forensic and thoroughgoing article dealing with the subject by

¹ An earlier version of this paper was read at Zvenyhorodka (Ukraine), on 29 May 1997, on the occasion of the First Ahatanhel Krymsky Readings in Oriental Studies, held in Kyiv and Zvenyhorodka, 27 - 30 May 1997. My grateful thanks are due to the Institute of Oriental Studies, Kyiv, for their invitation to participate, and to several colleagues there present, in particular to Omeljan Pritsak, Victor Ostapchuk and Oleksandr Halenko, for their constructive comments on this earlier version of the present study. For the faults which still remain I accept full responsibility.

² Diana E. Greenway, "Dates in History: Chronology and Memory", *Historical Research*, LXXII/178 (June 1999), 128-139.

³ V. L. Ménage, "The 'Annals' of Murâd II", *BSOAS*, XXXIX/3 (1976), 570-584.

⁴ Colin Imber, "The Legend of Osman Gazi", in Elizabeth Zachariadou (ed.), *The Ottoman Empire (1300-1389)*, Rethymnon, 1993, 67-75.

Mme Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr and the late Nicoara Beldiceanu.¹ Their valuable study investigates certain inconsistencies in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Ottoman chronology, with particular emphasis being placed on the problem of the one-day shift, from 15 to 16 July, 621 A.D., in the base date for the Muslim era. This shift, it appears, was rendered necessary on astronomical grounds *circa* 850/1446, and was applied fairly haphazardly during the following century down to the end of the reign of Süleymân I, the point at which the Beldiceanus' study ends. As a conclusion of their study of this and other inconsistencies in Ottoman chronological practice, the Beldiceanus have demonstrated that the mechanical conversion of *hicrî* to A.D. dates based on an uncritical use of the 16 July-base Muslim calendar, a process which has become institutionalised, as it were, through the use of, e.g., the well-known Wüstenfeld-Mahler conversion tables, can result in error.²

The Beldiceanus' study raises many interesting questions. Was this one-day shift -- which had been already noticed more than three quarters of a century ago by Joachim Mayr³ -- and its slow and intermittent application possibly indicative of a more extensive chronological problem? It was perhaps no more than coincidence that, shortly after reading the Beldiceanus' article for the first time as part of Colin Imber's and my own editorial labours on the *Ménage Festschrift*, I should have encountered a set of parallel problems of chronology in the context of Ottoman military involvement in the Ukraine in the later seventeenth century.

One of the most valuable recent contributions to this subject has been the edition by Lubomir Hajda of two hitherto little-studied Ottoman *gazânâmes* (lit. 'Book[s] of Holy War', i.e., accounts of particular campaigns), devoted to the Ottoman expedition against the Ukrainian Cossack fortress-town and administrative centre of Chyhyryn (Ott.: Çehrin) in 1089/1678.⁴ The so-called (but anonymous and untitled) *Çehrin seferi* (Paris,

¹ Nicoara Beldiceanu and Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr, "Considérations sur la chronologie des sources ottomanes et ses pièges", in Colin Heywood and Colin Imber (eds.), *Ottoman Historical Studies in Honour of Professor V. L. Ménage*, Istanbul, 1994, 15-29.

² Beldiceanu and Beldiceanu-Steinherr, "Pièges", 16.

³ Joachim Mayr, "Probleme der islamischen Zeitrechnung", *Mitteilungen des Seminars für orientalischen Sprachen* (Berlin), II (1923-6), 282; *idem*, "Osmanischen Zeitrechnungen", in F. Babinger, *Geschichtsschreiber der Osmanen und ihre Werke* (Leipzig, 1927), 417-30, where Mayr reckons (p. 417, n. 1) that the final shift occurred between the Ottoman conquest of Egypt (923/1517) and the death of Selim I (926/1520), after having been applied fairly haphazardly down to the beginning of the 16th century. As the present study hopes to demonstrate, this would appear not to have been the case.

⁴ Lubomir Andrij Hajda, "Two Ottoman *Gazânâmes* concerning the Chyhyryn Campaign of 1678", unpublished Harvard Ph.D. thesis, 1984. This edition is due to appear as vol. 4 of the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute's series, 'Studies in Ottoman Documents Pertaining to Ukraine and the Black Sea Countries'. On the Ottoman literary genre of *gazâl/gazavât-nâme* see A. S. Levend, *Gazavât-nâmeler ve Mihaloğlu Ali Bey'in Gazavât-nâmesi* (Ankara, 1956); *Ahvâl* and *Çehrin seferi* are mentioned briefly by Levend at pp. 130 and 129-30, respectively.

B.N., MS Blochet, *Suppl.*, 927, henceforth C), which has been attributed to the Bosnian mystic and sufi Şeyh, Şeyh Hasan Kâ'imî Baba (d. 1091/1680) and the equally anonymous but still not satisfactorily attributed *Ahvâl-i İcmâl-i Sefer-i Çehrin* (ibid., Blochet, *Suppl.*, 134, henceforth A), the two Ottoman works edited and translated by Hajda, provide valuable new insights into and information on the conduct of the campaign and the successful Ottoman siege of Çehrin.¹ Nonetheless, both A and Ç, when read in parallel, and even more so when read together with the official campaign diary embedded in the official history of the Ottoman court historian Mehmed Fındıklılı, known as Silahdâr Ağa, reveal chronological inconsistencies between themselves and also with Silahdâr's account, which have not been fully recognised hitherto.

I dedicate this study of chronological errors and inconsistencies to my colleague and old friend Colin Imber, whose own spirited explorations of the errors and inconsistencies of Ottoman historians both ancient and modern have done much to rescue our field from the second-hand hypotheses and factographic inadequacies which from time to time have been visited upon it by interpreters either more credulous or less scrupulous than he.

I

Chyhyryn (Russ. Chigirin, Turkish Çehrin²) is today a minor provincial town in the central Ukraine, situated approximately 250 km. south-east of Kiev in the present-day *oblast'* of Cherkasy. It lies on the Tyasmin river, a small west bank tributary of the Dnieper, opposite a point c. 500 km. from the latter's mouth. In the mid-seventeenth century, during the brief period (1648-57) of Ukrainian semi-independence under Bohdan Khmelnytsky, and the subsequent period of Cossack ascendancy, Çehrin served as Khmelnytsky's residence and the *de facto* capital of the so-called Right-Bank Hetmanate of the Ukraine.³ The uneasy balance struck by Khmelnytsky and his successors between the conflicting ambitions of Poland, the Ottomans and Russia, as the past, potential and future overlords of the Cossack hetmanate could not be maintained. Subsequently, in the period known to Ukrainian historians as 'The Ruin', Çehrin was the focus of strenuous military efforts by the competing great powers of eastern Europe and the Pontic steppe. The

¹ On the authorship of the two works, see Hajda, 180-1 and 27-9, respectively.

² Since the argument and substance of this paper is drawn almost exclusively from contemporary Ottoman literary-historical sources, I have used the Ottoman toponyms for primary reference to place names within its *Aktionsradius*.

³ Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine: a History* (Toronto, 1988), 123 ff.

Ottomans' objective, the establishment of their overlordship in the Ukraine, first accepted by Khmelnytsky at the time of the Great Revolt by the Cossacks against Poland in 1648,¹ and subsequently reasserted with decreasing success, together with their wider aims of securing, initially by warfare against Poland, an unmediated ascendancy in the lands between their newly-conquered province of Podolia (1672-3; creation of the *vilâyet* of Kamañice [Ukr. Kam''janec''; Russ. Kamenec Podolsk'']) and the lower Dnepr.² Equally, the Ukraine was the scene of Russian attempts to establish their own rule over the lands of the Hetmanate. The resulting armed conflict between the Ottomans and Russia took the form of major campaigns by both powers into the central Ukraine, targeted on Çehrin, in 1088/1677 and 1089/1678.³

The campaign launched in 1089 / 1678 by the Ottomans against Çehrin is historically significant for a number of reasons. In the first place the conduct of the campaign under the Ottoman Grand Vizir Kara Mustafa Pasha prefigures, in its combination of impetuous force and impulsive violence, and in the size of the Ottoman armament, his better-known campaign five years later against Vienna. The inconclusive outcome of the Çehrin campaign, which led to no territorial gains for the Ottomans despite the fall of the bitterly defended fortress, which was razed to the ground, also suggests what might have been one outcome had the Ottomans succeeded in taking Vienna in 1683. Secondly, the Ottoman campaign of 1678 and its less successful predecessor in 1677 mark the furthest point reached by the Ottomans in their attempt to control what may be termed their 'Northern Quadrant', a tract of eastern Europe seen from the vantage-point of Istanbul as a vast arc of territory stretching from Slovakia to Podolia and across the Pontic Steppe as far as the lower Volga.⁴ Thirdly, the Ottoman campaigns of 1677-8, inconclusive as they turned out to be, occasioned the first direct hostilities

¹ Cf. Omeljan Pritsak, "Das erste türkisch-ukrainisch Bündnis", *Oriens*, VI (1953), 266-298.

² On the Ottoman conquest of Podolia and its reorganisation into the short-lived *eyalet* of Kamañice see Zygmunt Abrahamowicz, "Die türkische Herrschaft in Podolien (1672 - 1699)", in Andreas Tietze (ed.), *Habsburgische-osmanisch Beziehungen. Wien, 26.-30. September 1983. (Colloque sous le patronage du Comité international des études pré-ottomanes et ottomanes)* (Wien, 1985; = *Beihefte zur Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, Bd. 13), 187-192; Dariusz Kolodziejczyk, "Ottoman Podillja: the Eyalet of Kamjanec" 1672-1699", *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, 1992, 87-101; idem, *Ejalet Kamieniecki* (Warsaw 1994); idem, *The Ottoman Survey Register of Podolia (ca. 1681): Dîfter-i mufasssal-i eyalet-i Kamañice*, 2 vols., [Cambridge, MA], 2004.

³ There has been little study by British scholars of Ottoman warfare in the Pontic steppe. The recent revival of interest in the history of Ottoman-Ukrainian relations in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries has been principally the work of a number of historians based in France and North America. Cf. in particular, beyond the works already cited, Victor Ostapchuk, "The Human Landscape of the Ottoman Black Sea in the Face of the Cossack Naval Raids", *Oriente Moderno*, n.s., XX (2001), 23-95.

⁴ Cf., for the Ottomans' 'Northern Policy' in this period, İ. Metin Kunt, "17. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Kuzey Politikası Üzerine Bir Yorum", *Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Dergisi, Beşeri Bilimler*, IV-V (1976-7), 111-116.

between Ottoman and Russian armies which, with hindsight, can be seen to have opened the way to two centuries of Russian advance and Ottoman withdrawal in the northern Black Sea region. Fourthly and lastly, although not least in its significance, the 1678 campaign marks a turning-point in the history of the Ukrainian hetmanate, signalling the end of several decades of marginally effective Ottoman involvement in the region during a period (1648-78) which may be seen as one of transition between the effective end of the old Polish&Lithuanian ascendancy in the Ukraine and the first stages in the violent, long drawn-out, and ultimately unsuccessful process of subjecting the Ukraine to Muscovite political control.¹

Hajda in his pioneering work in editing the two Çehrin *gazâ-nâme* texts from Paris, and supplying them with exemplary translations, has failed to solve certain basic problems of chronological discrepancy between the two texts. These problems thus remain for historians who wish to make use of them and also of the other Ottoman literary-historical sources for the Çehrin campaign of 1089/1678. Initially, on first reading Hajda's work some years ago, I was struck by certain chronological inconsistencies between the two Paris texts. These inconsistencies, when I subsequently attempted to correlate the Muslim chronology contained in these two accounts with the accepted *hicrî* (A.H.) calendar time base and with its A.D. equivalent as supplied in, e.g., the Wüstenfeld-Mahler tables, appear to provide further evidence for the existence in these Çehrin campaign accounts of significant and mutually incompatible variations from the theoretical norms of the Muslim calendar. It thus seemed worthwhile to investigate for this limited time-scale of some seven months in the later eleventh/seventeenth century, the chronological or calendar problems which had been studied by the Beldiceanus with reference to the early tenth/sixteenth century.

To give examples. A dates the opening of the siege of Çehrin by the Ottomans to 'Tuesday, the last day of Cum. I [1089]', which Hajda glosses as '20 July [1678]'², pointing out in an endnote (p. 252, n.17) that 3? [sic] Cum. I was in fact a Wednesday. The author of Ç, however, in his account of the siege (Hajda, 85), dates the opening of the trenches - which in Ottoman military practice indicated the commencement of a siege of a fortified place³ - to the 'first day of Cum. II, which was a Wednesday'. Hajda glosses this date as '21 July', adding the observation (p. 106, n.65, that '1 Cum. II was a

¹ Subtelny, *Ukraine: a History*, 139 ff. . Cf., for Ottoman involvement in the Ukraine prior to 1678, Pritsak, "Das erste türkische-ukrainische Bündnis (1648)"; Ostapchuk, "Human Landscape", *passim*.

² All dates referred to subsequently fall within A.H. 1089 and A.D. 1678, unless otherwise stated.

³ *ET*², s.v. "Hisâr" (V. J. Parry).

Thursday'. A few pages earlier, however, Ç refers (p. 79) to the preliminaries of the siege as taking place on 'Tuesday, 29 Cum. I.', a date which is glossed by Hajda as '19 July'. Hajda's glossed A.D. dates, be it noted, are in themselves consistent, but we are faced, unobserved by Hajda, with a Tuesday which falls one day earlier (29 Cum.I) in Ç than A (gâyet-i [=30] Cum.I). Hajda's critical mistake, therefore, has been to accept the month-date supplied by his texts as the given, mechanically converting it on the basis of the Wüstenfeld-Mahler tables, rather than taking the given day of the week as normative, and adjusting the month-date accordingly. I make no claim to originality for this observation. As Joachim Mayr pointed out long ago, a *hicrî* date can only be precisely converted to its A.D. equivalent if the corresponding day of the week is also supplied by the source.¹ In other words -- as the Beldiceanu have also already noted -- literary day-of-the-week data are usually (and inherently) more reliable in establishing a secure chronology in a context where the beginning of a lunar month is dependent more on the visual sighting of the new moon -- 'Neulicht, nicht Neumond', as Mayr critically observes -- than are the corresponding month-date data.²

Nor are the chronological discrepancies between A and Ç the end of the confusion. There is, as mentioned above (and as Hajda has already pointed out³) a third major Ottoman historical account of the Çehrin campaign. This third version is in the form of a detailed campaign diary for the entire campaign, embedded in the text of the Ottoman chronicle written by the court official Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa, commonly known as Silâhdar, which covers the years 1065 / beg. 1/11 Nov. 1654 to 1106 / ends 31 July / 11 Aug. 1695.⁴ This section of Silâhdar (i, 674-727 in Ahmed Refik's edition;

¹ Mayr, in Babinger, *Geschichtsschreiber*, 417.

² Beldiceanu, "Pièges", 28-9; cf. Mayr, in Babinger, *Geschichtsschreiber*, 417, for the ramifications of this fact.

³ Hajda, 257 ff.

⁴ Mehmed Fındıklılı known as Silâhdar Ağa, *Zeyl-i Fezleke* [i.e. of Hacci Halife's *Fezleke-i tevârih*], commonly known as *Târih-i Silâhdar* or *Silâhdar Târihi* (thus ed. by Ahmed Refik [Altınay], 2 vols., İstanbul, 1928), continued under the title of *Nusretnâme* (covers the years 1107/1695 to 1133/1721); inadequate simplified and romanized version by İsmet Parmaksızoglu, 2 vols. in 5 parts (İstanbul, 1962-66). The text of the 1678 Çehrin campaign diary is to be found in S, I, 674-729. On Silâhdâr (12 Rebî' I 1069 / 28 Nov./ 7 Dec. 1658 [not 11 Dec. as in Babinger, *Die Geschichtsschreiber der Osmanen und ihre Werke*, (Leipzig, 1927), 253] - 1136 / beg. 20 Sept./ 1 Oct. 1723), see Ahmed Refik, '*Âlimler ve San'atkarlar*, (İstanbul, 1924), 228 ff., and the introduction (vol. I, iii-xii) by Refik to his edition; Babinger, *Geschichtsschreiber*, 253-4 (inaccurate); [J. von] Hammer-Purgstall, "De la grande histoire de Funduklu...", *Journal Asiatique*, 3^{ème} série, I (1836), 493 ff. (notice of the acquisition of a MS of S by the Hofbibliothek in Vienna); İbrahim Artuk, "Silâhdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa", *Tarih Dergisi* (1973), 123-132.

Cf. also the important unpublished work of David Thomas, "The Ottoman Chronicle of Silâhdar", [Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute], 'Colloquium, 5-6 October 1989. Ottoman Sources on the Ukraine and Northern Black Sea Countries in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. Uncorrected Minutes' [unpublished typescript], pp. 18-21, and 'Discussion [on Silâhdar]', 'Colloquium', 22-26. I am most grateful to Professor Victor Ostapchuk (University of Toronto; formerly of the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute) for kindly furnishing me with this document, and to Professor David Thomas, of the University of Rhode Island, for permission to quote from his unpublished paper.

henceforth: S) is almost certainly an official *relazione* prepared for submission to the sultan,¹ and, like most of his lengthy and extremely valuable work, has never been subjected to published critical attention, although the importance of this part of his text has been noticed by scholars in the field.² On turning to S it is immediately evident that his account of the Çehrin campaign represents yet a third 'chronographic tradition', if one may utilise the term. According to S (i, 676), the opening of the siege of Çehrin indeed took place, as stated also in the two *gazânâme* texts, on a Tuesday, but the Muslim date given for the event by S is '1 Cum. II'.

We are thus faced with three apparently distinct 'chronographic traditions' relating to the siege of Çehrin. In Ç the Tuesday in question falls on 29 Cum. I; in A it falls on the 30th of that month; and in S it falls on 1 Cum. II.

The question of the day/date (Tuesday or Wednesday -- Ç alone notes the opening of the trenches as taking place on the following day, Wednesday, being, according to Ç, 1 Cum. II), the day on which the siege of Çehrin was commenced, is secondary to the basic chronographic incompatibility between our three texts, and can in any case be established from non-Ottoman A.D.-based sources. A full study of the 1678 Çehrin campaign lies beyond the scope of the present paper, in which I attempt only to illuminate the primary chronographic problem by a comparison of the dates recorded in A, Ç and S for the more significant campaign events, and to point up some of the implications for further research which this short study raises.³

¹ The war diary covers the period from the departure of the sultan and the army from Dâud Paşa on Saturday 8 Rebi' I 1089 (20/30 April 1678) for the '*gazwa-i Moskov*', to the return of the sultan to the palace at Dâ'üd Paşa on 19 Muharram 1090 (20 Feb./ 2 March 1679). The original manuscript of the war diary, if it survives, appears not to have been located.

² See the "Uncorrected Minutes", 18, 20, 23-4, where (p. 24) Professor İnalçık is quoted as remarking that "on the siege of Chyhyryn, every military detail is found which could only come from the commanders themselves". Is therefore the Çehrin campaign 'war diary' in S from the pen of Kara Mustafâ Paşa -- or his private secretary?

³ A full study of the Çehrin campaign and the defence and siege of Çehrin, based on the Ottoman literary and archival sources, and the detailed account of the siege from the Russian side in the original manuscript of General Patrick Gordon's diary (written, naturally, in English: presumably the original manuscript is still, as it was in the mid-nineteenth century, in the possession of the Russian Foreign Ministry) remains a desideratum (cf. *Fürst M. A. Obolenski* (vol. I only) and Dr. phil. M. C. Posselt (eds.), *Tagebuch des Generals Patrick Gordon ... 1655 bis 1661, und ... 1661 bis 1699*, 3 vols., (Moscow: Universitäts-Buchdruckerei, 1849-52). For Gordon's account of the siege of Çehrin see *Tagebuch*, I, 464-558.

II

Selected Chronographic Bases of the Çehrin Campaign 1089/1678*[1] The departure of the Ottoman army from Dâ'ûd Paha*

The base date for the chronology of the Çehrin campaign is the day of the departure of the Ottoman army from its assembly area at Dâ'ûd Paha, outside the land walls of Istanbul. This took place on Saturday 8 Rebî' I 1089.¹ All three sources, S, Ç and A, agree on the date, and on the day of the week on which it fell. In addition S provides, as he so frequently and usefully does, the Rûmî (i.e. Julian, or Old Style) equivalent, in this case 20 Nisan (= April).²

The Julian calendar, in the seventeenth century, was ten days behind the Gregorian (or 'New Style') calendar. Thus, Saturday 8 Rebî' I 1089 equals, on the basis of S, 20/30 April 1678, and is common to all three sources. It also supplies a perfect concordance as to both date and day with a computation of the A.D. date on the basis of the Wüstenfeld-Mahler tables, which take 16 July 621 as the base date for the Muslim calendar. We have therefore adopted this day/date equivalence, and the 16 July-base Muslim calendar, which had become the Ottoman standard by the later seventeenth century, as the chronographic baseline for establishing the chronology of the 1089/1678 Çehrin campaign.

[2] The arrival of army at Hâcî-oğlu Bazarı³

Hâcî-oğlu Bazarı was situated on the so-called *sağ kol*, the main 'branch of the right [hand]' of the Ottoman courier (*ulak*) and staging-post (*menzilhâne*) network in Rumeli. The army had left Istanbul on 8 Rebî' I 1089 or 20/30 April 1678. By the time it had arrived at this major staging post in the Dobrudja, three weeks later, at the very end of Rebî' I, chronological divergences between the three accounts have become already apparent. A dates the arrival of the army to Friday 28 Rebî' I; Ç, possibly following a different source, dates the event to the following day, Saturday the 29th. The day/date concordances in both Ç and A are, however,

¹ S 674; Ç 37/71; A 185/219.

² According to Mayr, 418, the common use of the Rûmî / Julian calendar in Turkey, but with the names of the months derived from the Seleucid era (commenced 1. 10. 312 B.C.) and with 1 Muharram of the *hicrî* year corresponding to 1 March of the solar year in question, dates only from 1677, as the basis of what from 1789 became the official *mâlîye* (finance year) calendar.

³ S 674; Ç 37/72; A 185/219.

chronologically sound on the 16-base line. S also places the event¹ on the Saturday, but assigns the day in question to the 'first [day]' (*gurre*) of Rebî' II. This date he equates with '11 Mayıs', i.e. Sat. 11/21 May, which in fact corresponds in theory (and in reality in Ç and by implication in A) to 29 Rebî' I. Since Rebî' I is supposed to have 30 days, S thus begins Rebî' II two days ahead of the baseline - and of Ç and A. The question therefore presents itself: is S's source here (a) reckoning only 29 days to Rebî' I, and (b) still using a 15-base line - both usages attested (admittedly for an earlier period) by the Beldiceanus?²

The one notable event to take place during the army's eight-day³ stay at Hâcı-oğlu Bazarı was the investiture by Mehemmed IV of his grand vizir Kara Mustafa Pasha as its commander-in-chief for the remainder of the campaign. A is silent regarding the date of this event. Ç, who devotes a great deal of attention to it, places it on Thursday 5 Rebî' II; S also ascribes the event to Thursday, but places this day on the 6th [of Rebî' II]. On a day basis, Ç is now one day, and S is still two days ahead of the baseline.⁴ Four days later, on the departure of the army from Hâcı-oğlu Bazarı, the same situation still obtains. Ç dates the event to Monday 9 Rebî' II; S to 'Monday the 10th': that Monday, in fact, was the 16-base 8th of Rebî' II, corresponding to 20/30 May 1678.

[3] *The march from Hâcı-oğlu Bazarı to Çehrîn*

During this section of the campaign specific day and date references for the chronology and the events while the army was on the march are only rarely supplied by all three of our Ottoman literary sources. For example, the date on which the army encamped at Isakcı is not supplied by S. A offers Sunday, 15 Rebî' II; Ç 'Monday, for 16th', which Hajda glosses in the text as 5 and 7 June respectively, while pointing out in the relevant footnotes (p. 252, n. 12 and p. 105, n. 38) that 15 Rebî' II 'was a Monday' and that '16 Rebî' II was a Tuesday'. This is indeed the case if the dates are computed on a 16 July 621 epoch base, but in fact both A and Ç turn out to be operating here on a 15 July base.

A week later the army departed from Isakcı, crossing the Danube at that point, and encamping at the first stage north of the river, at Kartal. A

¹ Ç and A refer to the arrival of the army at Hâcı-oğlu Bazarı; S to the arrival there of the sultan.

² Beldiceanu, 'Pièges', 28-9.

³ Thus Ç (H. /72).

⁴ Rebî' II 1089 began on a Tuesday (= 13/23 May 1678).

does not date this event. C, however, does: 'Monday, 23 Rebi' II' – i.e., Ç is still operating on a 15 July epoch base calendar. S also supplies a date for this event: 'Tuesday, 24 Rebi' II, which equals 4 Haziran [i.e., 4 June, O.S.]', which proves that A, Ç and S are *all* at this point operating on a 15 July epoch base (on a 16-epoch base, 24 Rebi' II 1089 would equal 5/15 June 1678). Hajda's redating of the *day* of the event to a Tuesday (cf. p. 105, n. 39) is irrelevant in this context.

The next critical event of the march, and one for which all three sources supply day-dates, is the arrival of the army at Bender, the sixteenth-century fortress which was held to mark the frontier of the empire. A dates this event to 'Thursday, 13 Cum. I', which is glossed by Hajda as 3 July. A is manifestly incorrect in his chronology at this point, or else there has been an error introduced in the transmission of the text, since on a 16-epoch base Cum. I 1089 began on Tuesday, 11/21 June 1678. We must therefore read A here as 'Thursday, 3 Cum. I', which equals 13/23 June.

Ç and S both date the arrival of the army at Bender to 5 Cum. I – according to Ç this was a Saturday (i.e., like A, Ç is now back on a 16-epoch base era); S supplies 'Friday', and is thus clearly still operating on a 15-epoch base. Ç is still on the same 16-base when he records the departure of the army from the Bender bridgehead as taking place on 'Saturday, 12 Cum. I', which equates to 22 June/2 July, as per Wüstenfeld-Mahler and Hajda.

Six days later, on Friday 18 Cum. I (28 June/8 July), the Ottoman army arrived at a halting-place known as Koyun Geçidi, where the line of march crossed the Boh / Aksu river.

A and Ç are in agreement here (Hayda's date for Ç, '18 July', needs to be corrected), and are still on a 16-base epoch, which they continue with for the next few days (transit of the Boh / Aksu completed on Monday, 21st; departure of the army from the Aksu bridgehead camp, Tuesday, 22nd; camp at Inhul on Friday, 25th; and arrival at Inhulets / Küçük Inhul on Monday, 28th of Cum. I). S, however, for his first precise date for two weeks, supplies 'Saturday, 20 Cum. I' as the date of departure from the Aksu bridgehead camp, i.e., he is still operating on a 15-base cycle, and he gives 'Saturday, 27 Cum. I equals 6 Temmuz [July]' for the army's arrival at Inhulets / Küçük Inhul, thus supplying a precise *rûmî* date with which to establish a clear 15-epoch basis.

[4] *The arrival of the Ottoman army before Çehrîn and the opening of the siege*

To recapitulate, the last event before the arrival of the Ottoman army before Çehrîn for which A, Ç and S all supply a day/date reference was the departure of the army from the Ak Su / Boh bridgehead camp. For this event S supplies Saturday (!) 20 Cum. I [= 30.6./10.7]; both Ç and A day-date the event to two days later, Tuesday 22nd [Cum. I], i.e. 2/12 July. Ç and A here are both correct on a day/date basis on the 16 July epoch base. S is correct in his day/date correlation (Sat. = 20 Cum. I) only if we calculate on a 15 July epoch base, otherwise he is one day ahead -- on the 16 July base Saturday falls on the 19th.

By the time, a week later, that the Ottoman army appeared before the walls of Çehrîn, the chronographic bases of our three texts have once more shifted. All three -- A, Ç and S -- agree that the Ottoman army appeared before the walls of Çehrîn on a Tuesday. Ç equates this with 29 Cum. I, which was indeed a Tuesday on the 16 July epoch (and Wüstenfeld-Mahler) base. A dates this event to 'Tuesday, the last day' -- scil. the 30th -- of Cum. I. S opts for Tuesday the first (*gurre*) of Cum. II. The 'Diary' of General Patrick Gordon, one of the leading generals of the Russian forces, which we can now begin to make use of as a control, appears to offer support, dating the event precisely to '9 July, towards ten o'clock [in the morning]', i.e., 9/19 July: Gordon's dates are all Old Style, as one would expect.¹ Thus, for the crucial date of the appearance of the Ottoman army before Çehrîn, on a 16 July base, Ç is correct; A is one day ahead, and S two days ahead, on a date basis. There is, however, a further problem with S. If we accept S's 'Saturday, 27 Cum. I', then 1 Cum. II should fall on Wednesday by S's reckoning (Cum. I is a 30-day month). In fact it falls, according to S, on Tuesday, thus S's Cum. I 1089 has only 29 days instead of the canonical 30.

[5] *The Fall of Çehrîn*

I pass over, for lack of space, the chronology of the siege itself. According to both A and Ç, Çehrîn fell to the Ottomans on Sunday, 3 Receb 1089. This

¹ According to Gordon's diary (*Tagebuch*, I, 482), Turkish scouts first appeared within sight of the defenders on the 8th/[18th]; he learned from deserters that the main army would appear below the walls 'on the following day' (scil. the 9/19th). Gordon then records the planting of the tents of the grand vizir and other notables beneath the walls (ib., 483). After describing some small-scale skirmishes and sallies, and the developments within the walls of the fortress, down to the evening of the 8/18th, he then describes under the date 9 July the appearance of the main Ottoman army before the fortress (ib., 485).

equates, on a 16 July base, with 11/21 August, a Sunday (W-M), and with Gordon's diary date of 11 August (Old Style).¹ Ç calls the day of the fall the 34th day of the siege, reckoning therefore Tues. 29 Cum. I as the first day. A calls it the 33rd day, reckoning from Wed. 30 Cum. I. S dates the fall to 'Saturday the third [*scil.* of Receb, which is] 11 Ağustos' -- i.e., S, or his source, is still calculating on a 15-epoch base. But two days later, when S notes the arrival of the *serdâr* for the siege of the Muscovite camp outside Çehrin, he is back on a 16-epoch base: all three Ottoman sources now agree that the arrival of the *serdâr* took place on Tuesday 5 Receb (13/23 August).

A week later, on Tuesday, 12 Receb (A: '42 days since the beginning of the siege'), the blockade of the Muscovite camp was lifted and the Muslim forces returned to Çehrin. 'Three days after this' (A, Ç), 'on the night of Friday 15th [Receb] (A)' -- i.e., the night of Thursday to Friday, 22-23 August / 1-2 September 1678 -- Çehrin was razed and its walls levelled to the ground, and the Ottoman army departed from the site of Çehrin en route for Edirne and the end of the campaign.

III

Conclusions

The warnings against a too facile 'straight' conversion from *hicrî* to A.D. dates, issued by the Beldiceanus for the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, still holds good for the later seventeenth century, on the basis of the shifting chronographic evidence for the Çehrin campaign of 1089/1678.

There is evidence, also, firm in the case of S, circumstantial with regard to A, for the use of non-standard month lengths -- in this case a 29-day Cumadâ I, instead of the standard thirty day sequence. Furthermore, an examination of the Ottoman literary sources for Kara Mustafa Pasha's Çehrin campaign demonstrate that even in the late 11th/17th century there was still no firm adherence to the 16 July base date for the Muslim era which had begun to come into use some two centuries previously. The account in S is incontrovertibly on a 15 July base for dates subsequent to the departure of the army from Istanbul, down to the fall of Çehrin on 11/21 August, which is the terminal point of the present survey. A and C occasionally shift from a 16 to a 15 July base, but mainly adhere to the reformed 16 July baseline.

¹ Gordon, *Tagebuch*, I, 530.

Thus some general precepts may be offered. Firstly, it is crucial, when computing date equivalents from A.H. to A.D., to take prime account of the *day* of the week, and not the *month date*, if the former is supplied by the Muslim source. If the *day* given there corresponds to that of the computed 16 July-base, but the date does not, the date, and not the day, must be revised -- i.e., the reverse of the procedure adopted by Hajda must be invoked. The *Rûmî* date, also, where it is supplied, must be taken into account, and due weight accorded to it. It goes without saying that if western sources are available as controls, they must (with due caution) be utilised. Only in this way can basic errors be avoided.

A COSSACK ADOPTED BY THE FORTY SAINTS: AN ORIGINAL OTTOMAN STORY IN THE LEIDEN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Edith Gülçin Ambros and Jan Schmidt

Introduction

1. The story (*hikāye*) and its reception

Hitherto, the genre of the 'story' (*hikāye*) in Ottoman Turkish has rarely been the object of scholarly editions, let alone translations or research. In contrast, the genres of the 'folk tale' and the epic written in (relatively) simple Turkish have been studied much more extensively.¹ The prestigious handbook *Philologiae Turcicae Fundamenta* (*PhTF*), published in 1964, contains two chapters on popular epics, tales and legends in Turkic languages in general,² but no exhaustive discussion of Ottoman narrative literature as a whole. The same tendency can be observed in the current Turcologist bibliography, *Turkologischer Anzeiger*, published in Vienna since 1975, which includes sections on the genres of narrative folk literature. Similarly, narrative literature as a whole has received no more than fleeting attention in general works on Ottoman literature. While Alessio Bombaci does devote paragraphs to Ottoman prose narrative in his history of Turkish literature, he restricts his attention to a few outstanding works, mostly romances and legends of the earlier period.³ A more recent and very ambitious, multi-volume handbook on Ottoman Culture, edited by Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, hardly mentions narrative prose for the period before 1603, apart from a few titles.⁴

¹ Some recent publications/editions include Yorgos Dedes (ed.), *Battalname*, 2 v. (Harvard University, 1996) (with a full English translation); Doğan Kaya & M. Sabri Koz, eds., *Halk Hikâyeleri*, I, (İstanbul, 2000).

² Pertev Naili Boratav, «L'épopée et la 'hikāye' », and « Le conte et la légende », *PhTF* II (Wiesbaden, 1964), 11-67.

³ *La letteratura turca*, 9th ed. (Milan, 1969), 305-13, 397-9.

⁴ *Osmanlı Devleti ve Medeniyeti Tarihi* II (İstanbul, 1998), 26-49. We have not been able to see a recent publication: Şerife Yağcı, "Klâsik Türk Edebiyatı Geleneğinde Hikaye", in *Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları*, 141 (2002), 147-60 – it is mentioned in Hatice Aynur, *Üniversitelerde Eski Türk Edebiyatı Çalışmaları; Tezler, Yayınlar, Haberler 2002* (İstanbul, 2003), no. 3.381.

Ottoman narrative materials of the *belles lettres* type have not been the object of the same amount of scholarly attention as that paid to, particularly, history and archival research, sometimes half-jokingly dubbed 'defterology'. This is a pity, because they are incredibly rich. Further, the story (*hikâye*, *kıssa*) is of importance to works primarily devoted to other genres like history, geography or biography, in which it often occurs as a connecting device, an informative digression or entertaining intermezzo. Moreover, in historiography and other genres, supposed to describe historical truths, it is often difficult to distinguish fact from fancy. Here we only have to mention the famous seventeenth-century travelogue of Evliyâ Çelebi, perhaps the most famous of Ottoman prose narratives, in which all kinds of anecdotal intermezzi occupy a prominent place.

Much poetry is of a clearly narrative type and commonly included in the category of 'narrative literature' as well. The great variety of possible formats further complicates the definition and delineation of genres and sub-genres. Even a cursory glance at general works like handbooks on Ottoman literature or encyclopaedia articles shows that confusion is rife. Ottoman story telling takes many forms, such as folk tales, anecdotes, legends, romances and fairy tales, and is in prose or poetry, or in both. A clear, unambiguous distinction can perhaps only be made according to the binary criterion of poetry/prose. Other criteria are more difficult to implement, though a further three seem essential for a determination of genres and sub-genres, namely: (2) subject matter; (3) language/style; and (4) audience/readership.

A tentative categorisation is found in Ağâh Sırrı Levend's introductory volume of his history of Turkish literature wherein he gives an impressive survey of the vast subject. Levend only partly distinguishes between rhymed and prose stories and divides the material into groups according to a confusing range of topical and formal criteria which inevitably overlap: religious and religious-heroic stories, stories with two heroes or one, mystical, allegorical (*temsîlî*), various (*türlü*), autobiographical and adventure stories, stories in prose, dialogues, and 'short' stories (*küçük*) in prose and in poetry. Under these categories the author does not do much more than present tantalising lists of titles of such works, many only available as manuscripts, some of which are owned by himself.¹ A similar confusion is found in encyclopaedia articles, and here too the mere listing of titles and references to manuscripts or manuscript catalogues looms large.² In most surveys, a collection of stories

¹ *Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi*, I: *Giriş* (Ankara, 1973), 122-48.

² Pertev Naili Boratav, *Hikâye* iii, and B. Flemming, "Kıssa" 3a, both in *Enclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd edition; Hasan Kavrak & İskender Pala, "Hikâye" – "Klasik hikâyeler" b, in *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi* (TDVİA).

entitled *Muḥayyelât-ı ledün-i ilâhî* of 1796 by 'Azîz Efendi¹ is considered to be the culmination of the 'classic' genre of narrative ('classic' as used by Kavruk and Pala² for stories one might associate with 'divân literature' in contradistinction to 'folk literature'). Furthermore, because of the adoption of Western sources and the partial unification in Western fashion of originally separate frame stories, it is considered a precursor of modern (post-Tanzimat) developments.³ Andreas Tietze analysed the contents of the *Muḥayyelât* in an article of 1948,⁴ and some of the characteristics he found, can be applied to the text presented here. There is a mixture of elements belonging to both the 'Arabian Nights' type of tale and to the romance, of fantasy and reality, of themes and motifs, and of style, ranging from florid 'rococo' to simple spoken language (in dialogues).⁵

As Tietze demonstrated, nearly all the stories found in 'Azîz Efendi's book were to some extent based on those of existing collections: in particular on the stories of the 'Arabian Nights' (some derive from their French versions), but also on Turkish collections like the popular and anonymous *Ferec ba'de ş-şidde*,⁶ with stories of the 'Arabian Nights' type, and Lâmi'î's *İbretnümâ* (of 938/1532-3), with stories of a mystical content.⁷ Judging by an initial examination, this is far less the case with the collection of stories under discussion that are older by about a century and gathered in the miscellany preserved in the Leiden University Library as Cod.Or. 12.423. Based on our criteria mentioned earlier these stories may be roughly characterised as (1) prose, relieved occasionally by lines of poetry; (2) multifarious content, combining, as in the *Muḥayyelât*, realistic and legendary/mystical elements; and (3) a mixture of styles, also found in 'Azîz Efendi's work, ranging from verbose passages in the high Persian style to mundane dialogues in simple Turkish (see also below).

¹ Printed four times in Istanbul between 1268/1852 and 1290/1873, see M. Seyfettin Özege, *Eski Harflerle Basılmış Türkçe Eserler Kataloğu*, 5 v. (İstanbul, 1971-9), n. 14148.

² In the article in *TDVİA*, see above, published in 1998.

³ See Walther Björkman, "Die klassisch-osmanische Literatur", in *PhTF* II, 457; Bombaci, *La letteratura turca*, 397-8.

⁴ "Aziz efendis Muhayyelât", *Oriens* I (1948), 248-329.

⁵ *Ibidem*, 250-1.

⁶ The Leiden University Library preserves two copies: Cod.Or. 12.406 (6), an incomplete late-18th century copy, and Cod.Or. 12.407, copied in 896/1491. A recent linguistic study is the unpublished Ph.D. thesis of Mustafa Koç, *El-Ferecü Ba'de's-Şidde* (İstanbul Üniversitesi, 1998).

⁷ Printed in Istanbul in 1273/1857-8 and 1327/1911-2, see Günay Kut Alpay, "Lâmi'î Chelebi and his Works", in *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 35 (1976), 73-93; two copies are preserved in the Leiden University Library: Cod.Or. 3086, a 16th or early 17th century copy, and Cod.Or. 8763, dated 965/1558.

Finally our fourth criterion is that of reception. Is it possible to generalise about the audience/readership of Ottoman narrative literature? Previously mentioned terms like 'folk' and 'classic/*dīvān*' suggest the existence of separate groups of listeners and readers, roughly the common people for the 'folk' and the court and intelligentsia for the 'classic/*dīvān*' type of narrative. If there were different classes of listeners/readers, as there probably were, for whom, apart from the owner of the manuscript, were the stories in our collection composed, elaborated upon or merely copied? Little is known about reception in general. As in other Muslim societies, public story telling was a profession in the cities of the Ottoman Empire until the early twentieth century; its performers were generally known as *meddāh* or *kıssa- h'vān*.¹ Sources on this phenomenon increase in the nineteenth century, but there are a few from earlier periods. Evliyā Çelebi, in his description of Istanbul, mentions that there were eighty professional story-tellers in the city who performed on improvised platforms, "a stick in their hands, their scrapbooks [*mecmū'alar*] [ready] at their waists, reading stories with eloquent diction..."² Especially popular were stories about the battles fought in the early days of Islam (*gāzāvāt*), in which the Prophet's uncle Hamza was the main protagonist. These were read in those days from a *Hamza-nāme* in 366 volumes.³ The French orientalist and traveller, Antoine Galland –who was also the first European translator of the Arabian Nights– noted in his diary in 1672 that he had seen books lent by libraries in the Covered Market in Istanbul ('*Bezestein*') for four or five aspers, and that Turks liked to pass their time in winter listening to stories ('*fables*').⁴ Bazaars and also coffeehouses seem to have been the preferred public forums for this activity. This seems to confirm the essential 'folkish' milieu in which 'stories' were recounted. However, it is known from various sources that at least some of the Ottoman sultans loved being entertained by professional artists, among them story-

¹ See P.N. Boratav, "Maddāh" in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed.; Özdemir Nutku, *Meddahlık ve Meddah Hikâyeleri* (Ankara, 1976), with the texts of a number of stories; see also Robert Irwin, *The Arabian Nights. A Companion* (Penguin Books, 1994), 115-6.

² Orhan Şaik Gökyay, ed., *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*, I (İstanbul, 1995), 225 – the section is headed *Evsāf-i meddāhān-i sultān u vüzerā vu a'yān*, which suggests that the performers were not strictly acting on their own but were being supported by the court (see also below) and high state officials.

³ *Ibidem*. Copies of a 24-volume work of the same title, by a certain Hamzavī (flourished around 1400), are preserved in several libraries; see Manfred Götz, *Türkische Handschriften II* (*Verzeichnis der orientalischen Handschriften in Deutschland III*, 2) (Wiesbaden, 1968), 367-7.

⁴ Quoted in A. Tietze, "Das türkische Ferec ba'd eş-şidde als Medium der Wanderung orientalischer Stoffe ins Abendland", in Zeki Velidi Togan, *Proceedings of the Twenty-Second Congress of Orientalists Held in Istanbul in September 15th to 22nd, 1951 II Communications* (Leiden, 1957), 416.

tellers, even if pretentious authors like Muṣṭafā ‘Ālī of Gallipoli very much disapproved of this. Writing in the 1590s, he berated his former patron, Sultan Murād III, who entertained several *meddāhs* at his court, for this weakness. ‘Story-teller’ occurs as a deprecating epithet in his work, and is applied to court historians not worthy of the name.¹ What he most objected to was both the imperfect style of their work and the fact that they were ‘upstarts’ (not true scholars like himself!) who had been recruited in an irregular way. Nevertheless, listening to story tellers was also a favourite pastime of Sultan Murād IV half a century later.²

Only rarely is it possible to connect a specific type of narrative written in a given literary style with a specific audience. There is such an exceptional case in the Manchester University John Rylands Library. The MS Turkish 156 contains a copy of the *Ḥikāyāt-ı Mihr-ile Vefā*, a prose version of the adventures, love and marriage of Mihr, daughter of a sultan of Oman, and Vefā, son of a king of Rām. From annotations in the manuscript it is clear that the stories were read and enjoyed in public in Istanbul during the years 1804 to 1807. Explicitly mentioned venues were a private house (of a coffee dealer, Ḥasan Ağa), the chickpea (*leblebeciler*) market, ‘Alemdār Riyāzī’s coffeehouse near the New Mosque, and the shoemaker’s shop of Sa’d Ağa in Terlikçiler sokağı. Here performers were not professional *meddāhs*, but shopkeepers and tradesmen. This confirms that reading stories was essentially a social activity that could take place both in public and in the intimate circle of friends as is confirmed by one annotation: “We read this book with some friends...”³ The style of these stories is simple, and one can imagine that they would have been easily understood by the literate men whose annotations are found in the manuscript. But what about stories, like those in Cod.Or. 12.423, which, even if their subject matter was easy to understand and the plot simple, were, at least partially, composed in complex adorned prose featuring long sentences, subdivided into series of gerundial clauses, and numerous compounds and *izāfet*-constructions with *recherché* words? Could they only be understood by an élite audience of highly literate courtiers, scholars and officials? And were they only meant for private reading by the same limited group of the very well educated? In texts meant for recitation we sometimes find sentences that directly addressed an audience,⁴ but these have not (yet)

¹ Cf. Jan Schmidt, *Pure Water for Thirsty Muslims, A Study of Muṣṭafā ‘Ālī of Gallipoli’s Kūnhü l-aḥbār* (Leiden, 1992), 154, 271; Nutku, *Meddahlık*, 26.

² Nutku, *Meddahlık*, 28-9.

³ MS Turkish 156, f. 67a.

⁴ This is for instance the case for an autobiographical account of the early 19th century in simple Turkish prose, recently translated by Jan Schmidt, see “The Adventures of an Ottoman Horseman: the Autobiography of Kabudlı Vaşfı Efendi, 1800-1825”, in: *The Joys of Philology. Studies in Ottoman Literature, History and Orientalism (1500-1923)*, I (İstanbul, 2002), 178.

been found in our stories. For the time being, at least, these questions must remain unanswered.

2. Leiden University Library Cod. Or. 12.423

The interesting thing about our stories, apart from the texts themselves, is the fact that they are found in a miscellaneous work, a *mecmū'a*, a term which we have met as a tool indispensable for the storyteller.¹ The manuscript, measuring 192 by 130 mm and comprising 161 folios, belonged to the German scholar Franz Taeschner, who died in 1967, and whose manuscripts were acquired by the Leiden library in 1970.² The miscellany had, to all appearances, originally been used as a scrapbook by an Ottoman official who lived in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century. Apart from copies of various documents and letters, a *fālnāme*, aphorisms, a list of professions with their 'patron saints', and some poetry, the largest part of the manuscript is filled with administrative notes, mostly in the form of tables, with data on local cadis and taxes, *kısmet-i 'askeriye*, due in many Ottoman districts during the years 1103 to 1110 (1691-9). This makes it likely that the owner, or at least the original owner, was a tax officer, *ķassām*, who worked in one of the *ķāzī'askers'* offices in Istanbul. As annotations on f. 161b indicate, two sons were born in, respectively, 1107/1695 and 1122/1711. Both were called Mehmed, implying the early death of the first boy. The last datable text,³ in the same handwriting as the stories, is a copy of a note by Hāccī Ahmed Paşa, *vālī* of Baghdad, to the Porte informing it of the victorious campaign of Topal 'Osmān Paşa against the Persian army (in 1146/1733).⁴ The second largest part of the manuscript is taken up by the stories, occupying 92 densely written pages, all in the same handwriting. This script is *neshī* with some *ta'liķ* tendencies, that is also recognizable in most annotations, including the aforementioned letter, although the tables were done in a much more casual and smaller, *ķikeste*, hand, and may well have been done by another person, possibly by a clerk in

¹ See also Boratav, "Meddāh", and Nutku, *Meddahlık*, 101-2, where a *mecmū'a* (Istanbul University Library MS TY 6758) is described which contains, among other annotations, brief notes, functioning as an aid to the memory of the storyteller, on the plots of 56 stories.

² See on his collection: Jan Schmidt, "Franz Taeschner's Collection of Turkish Manuscripts in the Leiden University Library", in: *The Joys of Philology*, II (İstanbul, 2002), 237-66.

³ Or. 12.423, ff. 3b-4a.

⁴ See İsmail Hāmi Danişmend, *İzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi*, IV (İstanbul, 1972), 23.

the same office. Taeschner acquired quite a number of miscellaneous manuscripts, seventeen in fact. His collection comprises 128 items, mostly bought in Istanbul in the 1920s, but he was also interested in stories, seven collections of which he bought. Among these were the aforementioned copies of *Ferec ba'de ş-şidde*, so he may have purchased the manuscript given this intersection of his interests.

The manuscript comprises seventeen stories of varying length. They are headed by a title, always comprising the word *hikāye* (*hikāyāt* in the case of the first story), in red or in black with a red line over it. They were not only composed or elaborated from a known original — the words '*naql şüde*' are added to some of the titles — or compiled and copied by one person, but also written in a consistent, rather idiosyncratic style, which, as in the *Muḥayyelāt*, combines the complex with the simple. The stories are set in various historical periods and diverse parts of the Islamic world, though nearly always within the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire, often Istanbul. They often have historical protagonists, like Sultan Selīm I and the *şeyḫülislām* Kemāl Paşazāde (ff. 107b-110a), or at least persons with clearly Ottoman names, like Tiryākī Eskici Baba (ff. 103-107a) and Yayabaşızāde Meḥmed Çelebi (ff. 110a-111a). Other protagonists include İskender 'zū l-ḳarneyn' (ff. 83b-84a), the Prophet (ff. 111b-113b) and Ja'far Barmakī (ff. 84b-85a). Reference to datable events, like in our story below, but also other circumstantial evidence, like the preparation and consumption of coffee, make it likely that at least some of the stories were not composed before the middle of the sixteenth century. In two stories the palace, or rather the summer pavilion, of Sinān Paşa built in the late sixteenth century at Saray Point is mentioned.¹ The first story, presented below, is set in the (alternately singular and plural) first person and is contemporary with the owner of the manuscript, being written in 1108/1696-7 or later. It may well have been composed by him. The same is the case with a story on friendship (ff. 100a-103b) which is set in a frame of the same period; it begins with a dialogue between the narrator, who refers to himself in the first person singular, and a certain Meḥmed Usta, nicknamed *Ḳavaḳ Ustası*, who were involved in a legal dispute, explained in full juridical detail, about the ownership of two vegetable gardens in Göksu, Istanbul. From this preliminary dialogue it appears that the father of the narrator was Hōcāzāde Seyyid 'Osmān Efendi, probably the

¹ ff. 81b:3 and 108a:18, in this latter instance, being in the aforementioned story in which Sultan Selīm I figures, anachronistically.

defterdār who died in 1112/1700,¹ but apparently still alive at the time of composition. The content of only one story, ff. 85b-92a, so far, has been identified and is not original: that of the merchant of Bursa, ‘Abdurra’ūf, also known under the title *Ana Bacı* – but the version in our manuscript is completely different from the one by Ca’fer Vecdi.²

It is not clear why these stories are collected in the scrapbook. As far as we can see, there is no common link –either in theme or subject– connecting the texts. Some stories are clearly moralistic –as with that of an extortionist governor of Egypt, who came to grief after he had been summoned to Istanbul, to which is added, over-lined in red: “May you be taught a lesson, you, office-holders!”³ –but this is not so clear in some others. Nor, unfortunately, is it clear what was done with the texts. They may have been collected, even composed by the manuscript owner for his own enjoyment, but they may also have been read aloud to his *medrese*-educated friends and colleagues, to the highly literate members of a sufi *ṭarīkat* or to littérateurs. Whoever did compose them, the somewhat idiosyncratic style of the stories seems to suggest that he spent some time in getting the wording just right, so what would be more natural than that he would not restrict the result to his own eyes? And even if we suppose that they were initially meant for an élite circle, we cannot exclude the possibility that in time they also entertained and edified a not so well educated public of a lower social rank. For apart from the flights into preciosity, these stories are in everyday Turkish. They do feature long sentences, but these are made easier to understand through their division into gerundial clauses of a ubiquitous nature. Also, various and numerous rhyming elements provide variegated rhythm, which makes it easier to follow, understand and enjoy these stories if read out loud. Closer scrutiny of all texts may give some clues to this intriguing aspect in the future.

3. *Introducing the Ottoman ‘short short story’*

According to Abrams, “the short story differs from the anecdote –the simple and unelaborated narration of a single incident– in that it organizes the action, thought, and interactions of its characters into the artful pattern of

¹ See Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmanî. Osmanlı Ünlüleri*, Nuri Akbayar & Seyit Ali Kahraman, eds., 6 v. (Istanbul, 1996), 1294-5.

² See the text in the Leiden University Library Cod.Or. 1087, dated first half of the 17th century or earlier, Jan Schmidt, *Catalogue of Turkish Manuscripts in the Library of Leiden University and Other Collections in the Netherlands*, I (Leiden, 2000), 391-3

³ f. 83b:16.

a plot.”¹ Or, alternatively and quite frequently, short stories concentrate on the creation of mood rather than plot.

The story (*hikāye*) presented here in transcription and translation (see 5 and 6 below) has hardly any plot. Nor is it a narrative of mood. So should we say that this is a short story with a ‘failing’?

Obviously this story with flat (two-dimensional) characters has an affinity with the Ottoman anecdote. It is much longer, of course, and the narrative is more elaborate than that of the anecdote. Should we then say that it is a long, elaborate anecdote?

Lastly, is there any need to call this story anything? In other words, is this a case of idiosyncratic story writing or does it exemplify a specific type (sub-genre) of Ottoman story?

We suspect that it exemplifies a type; further research will show if our supposition is correct. As to giving the type, if such it is, a name: the modern term ‘short short story’ has been coined in the West for “a slightly elaborated anecdote of perhaps five hundred words”² and seems to fit well enough.

The First Story, Or. 12.423

1. Orthography

Peculiarities in orthography are pointed out in footnotes. There are hardly any writing errors. Occasionally *h* is written as *ḥ* and vice versa. In a few cases the script is disjointed; for example, *adamlar-ıdur* (‘-d-m-l-r ‘-y-d-r; 17b:17), *kırklar-ız* (k-r-k-l-r ‘-y-z; 18a 8).

In some instances *plene* script points to the modern labial harmony, so that there is, for example, *gıdığımız* (g-t-d-y-k-m-z; 17a:2), *etdirelim* (‘-y-t-d-y-r-h-l-m; 17b:5), *atlarımızı* (ā-t-l-r-y-m-z-y; 17b:12) in contradistinction to, for example, *başduğı* (b-‘-ş-d-v-ğ-ı; 17a:3), *etdügümüzi* (‘-y-t-d-v-k-m-z-y; 17a:19), *görünür* (k-v-r-y-n-v-r; 17b:10). These instances are in bold type in the transcription.

An intriguing instance of alternation in script is *g-v-z-y-m*, 17b:10 (*gözüm*) and *g-v-z-m*, 17b:9 (*gözüm/gözüm?*). *Toğrı*, a characteristic of western local dialects (in contradistinction to *toğru*, characteristic of eastern local dialects) occurs twice (17b:16; 17b:26).

¹ See M. H. Abrams, *A Glossary of Literary Terms*, (New York, London, ⁵1988), 172.

² Abrams, 173.

2. Vocabulary

2.1 The vocabulary of this story is such as would have been easily understood by literate persons. However, persons with hardly any education would have been able to understand and enjoy the general development and outcome of the story. The key concepts are in Turkish, most of the Persian and Arabic words are of the more common type, and the Koran quotation is out of one of the best-known Suras.

The “mixed” character of the vocabulary –literary language alternating with plain Turkish– is emphasized by the presence of both *dāne* (17b:13) and its vulgar variant *tāne* (17b:5).

The use of the *izāfet* is quite frequent, but only rarely with more than two segments, such as, for example: *huzūr-ı bahr-ı nevmüñ* (17b:8); *miyân-ı şahrâ-yi dil-keş* (17b:1).

In the case of *istifrâş* (17b:7) we have a deverbative noun not documented in the dictionaries, an instance of Ottoman “composition” of Arabic *maşdars*.

There is the occasional use of derivation (*istikāk*); for example: *karīb*, *kurbında* (17a:2); *ferş*, *istifrâş* (17b:7); *miqdârı*, *qadar* (17b:4-5).

2.2 Idiomatic expressions:

The use of *gâh.....ve gâh.....ve gâh* (17a:4 and 17a:17-8) is frequent.

günlerden bir gün takes the form of *günlerde bir gün* (17a:7 and 17a:20; it also occurs in other stories in this *mecmû‘a*, cf. for example 107a:3 and 110b:3).

3. Style

3.1 The gerund –ub/-üb

3.1.1 Strings of clauses: In older times, strings of clauses ending with –ub/-üb were nothing out of the ordinary,¹ and ensured a “flowing” style, as we can see in the present story’s Turkish original. It is a fact, of course, that clauses connected to each other with a gerund have quite a different effect from sentences connected with a conjunction, but “and” had to be resorted to in the translation *faute de mieux*. That no tediousness resulted from such long passages was due, of course, to the fact that the strings of clauses ending in –ub/-üb were relieved by other connecting elements, by interpolated sentences, direct speech, etc. For example, the two longest strings in this story contain eleven clauses ending with –ub/-üb (numerous other sentences contain smaller numbers of this gerund):

¹ Deny, 882: «La langue littéraire de l’osmanli ancien avait fait de ce gérondif un usage qu’on peut qualifier d’abusif »

...*olmağla* ... *gelüb* ... *edüb* ... *olunub*...*çıķub* ... *olub* ... *sürdük ki* ... *edüb* ... *alınub* ... *başduğumuzda*...(interpolated sentence) ... *olub* ... *olmağla* ... *olub* ... *oldığı* ... *yoklanub* ... *edüb* ... (17a:20-6); ... *edüb*... *olunub* ... *edüb*...*edüb* ... *yoklayub* ... *ķakub* ... *edüb* ... *dedük ki*... *dedigümüzde*...(direct speech)... *deyüb* ... *edinüb* ... *edüb* ... *yatub* .. (17a:27-17b:7).

3.1.2 As subject of stylistic preference: In 18a:10-1 we have: ...*ol kimesneyi içimüze vaz'a me'mār* [*olduk* crossed out] *olub sizi bunda bulduk*. The fact that *olduk* has been crossed out and replaced by *olub* is a clear indication of a stylistic preference, since the writer could very well have written *ol kimesneyi içimüze vaā'a me'mār olduk* (ve or comma) *sizi bunda bulduk*.

3.2 Direct speech

3.2.1 Length: In sharp contrast to the long sentences made up of numerous clauses is the author's rendering of direct speech. Here the sentences are mostly short or very short. For example: *Nola!* (17b:5); *Bire ne var?* (17:9); *Baba ķalkuñ!* (17b:8); *Siyāmā Beg senden bir su'ālüm var.* (17a:7-8).

3.2.2 Double indication of direct speech: Direct speech passages containing many sentences are introduced with a finite verb (with or without the conjunction *ki*) and at their termination are joined to what follows with a verbal noun; for example: *dedüm ki...dedigimde*...(17a:8-12); *Eyitdiler... dedüklerinde*...(17b:18-22); *dediler ki...deyüb...dedükde*... (18a:7-11).

3.2.3 No indication of direct speech: Direct speech also occurs sometimes without a verb indicating it; for example:

... *biri gelüb "Baba Kalkuñ!"* (17b:8);

... *dedigimizde* [change of subject] *"Baķuñ!"* (17b:9);

Dediler "Ėayr." [change of subject] *"Ne bir adamlar-ıdur ve bunda niye gelmişler?"* (17b:17-8).

In translating, this lack of a verb indicating direct speech has been adhered to.

3.3 Rhyme

A striking characteristic of the text is the great number of rhyming elements. This must have added to the enjoyment of the listeners/readers, as the Ottomans were obviously fond of rhyme, seeing that they loved traditional poetry and thought highly of prose with rhyming passages.

Also, as the rhyming elements in this story are of various types, there is a variegated rhythm, an obvious story-telling asset.

3.3.1 Rhyming prose (*sec'*) with Arabic and Persian words; for example:

*aldığımız ānāyīm meh-mā emken taḥmīl ve üserā'-i mezbūreyi
kuyūd u selāsīl ile taḳlīl* (17a:26-7);

*bir bālā ḳadd u ḳāmet ḳara ṣaḳallu bir mūḥīb-~~key~~'et ile ḥoş
şoḥbet olunub*

be-her gün bir nice eyyām her nev'a muşāḥabet olunurdu (17a:4-5).

3.3.2 Turkish suffixes functioning as rhyming elements; for example:

*bizler bār bend-i der-dest hegbelerimiz bālān ve
yağmurluklarımız* (17b:6);

*geh öninde ve gāḥ ardında ve geh ceb ü rāstında şoḥbet ederek
gitdiğimiz eyyāmda* (17a:4).

3.3.3 The gerund *-ub/-üb*, which through frequent recurrence functions as a very efficient rhyming element: *Passim*.

3.3.4 Rhyme through alliteration; for example: *ḳazıklar ḳaḳub* (17b:3);
...*yarası var. Ne iṭūñüze yarar?* (18a:3).

3.3.5 "Rhyme" through repetition; for example: *Buña ḡayretü llāḥ derler
ve buña hidāyetü llāḥ derler. 'Ināyet senden, hidāyet senden. Eger
olmazsa hidāyet ü 'ināyet senden, ne umaruz benden?* (17a:6-7).

3.3.6 Rhyme through derivation (*iştikāk*); for example: *ḳarīb, ḳurbında*
(17a:2); *ferṣ, istifrāṣ* (17b:7); *mīḳdārı ḳadar* (17b:4-5).

3.4 Inversion

3.4.1 Inversion in the service of rhyme; for example: *Eger olmazsa hidāyet ü
'ināyet senden, ne umaruz benden?* (17a:6-7). If we had *Eger senden
hidāyet ü 'ināyet olmazsa* or *benden ne umaruz*, we would not have had
the rhyme *senden – benden*. Another example: *eger olmazsa senden
'ināyet müşkil olur kār>m>z ḡāyet* (17a:11). Had the author written *eger
senden 'ināyet olmazsa* or *kārımız ḡāyet müşkil olur*, we would not have
had the rhyme *'ināyet – ḡāyet*.

3.4.2 Inversion not in the service of rhyme; for example: *Baḳuñ şu ḳarşuda
olan mecma' u ḥalkaya!* (17b:9).

3.5 Interpolation

Interpolation occurs occasionally; for example: *bu ikiyüz mīḳdār>
ḡālibā var-ımuşlar* (17a:24); *ki seyr-i vasaṭ ile toḳuz menzil eder* (17a:22)

4. Form and Theme

This short story is a didactic frame story. Its theme or thesis is *Thou exaltest whom Thou willst and abasest whom Thou willst*, Koran 3:26(25).¹

The illustration of this religious tenet seems to cry for dramatization. This is, in fact, achieved through the introduction of the mystical/mythical into a purely realistic background. The advent of the supernatural is foreshadowed by a mood of suspense. The hyperbolic choice of the characters enacting the dénouement adds to the dramatic effect.

The frame story is a widespread story-telling device in the Orient. In this case it is a preliminary first-person narrative. Its setting is the entourage of Sultan Muṣṭafā II at the head of the Ottoman troops in Transylvania in the year 1108/1696-7, and its tone is realistic. The anonymous narrator tells how this company was often engaged in conversation, and how one of them, an awe-inspiring man called Şiyāmī Bey, punctuated his utterances with a formulaic statement of his utter dependence on God's grace and guidance. Such dependence wholly conforms to dogma, so there would be no cause of surprise for the narrator if such a statement were uttered at appropriate times and places. But Şiyāmī Bey's use of it is so excessive that the narrator finds it necessary to inquire if there is a meaning to this or if it is just a habit of speech he's developed. Whereupon Şiyāmī Bey bursts out crying, so deeply is he moved, and narrates a personal experience which has affected him indelibly. Thus begins the story proper.

He relates a raid into enemy (Hungarian) territory, the taking of prisoners and booty, and camping preparations in a clearing on the way home. Up to here the mood is realistic. Details of these activities are given in a matter-of-fact fashion.

The slumbering camp under moonlight sets the stage for a change in ambience. A mood of suspense and mystification builds up to the realization that the 'Forty'² –the sainted dervishes– are assembled at the edge of the clearing.

¹ Translation by Richard Bell, *The Qur'ān* I (Edinburgh, 1937), 47.

² Literature on this phenomenon is scarce: meant are probably the forty ṣ but there was disagreement among scholars about their number - *abdāl*, one of the degrees (the fifth) of the hierarchical order of sufi saints, who, unknown by the masses, participate by means of their powerful influence in the preservation of the order of the universe, I. Goldziher, 'Abdāl', in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. The *abdāl* are characterised as pure, contented persons who have risen from a life of carnal lusts (*Ḥayāt-i naṣṣānī*) to a divine life (*ḥayāt-i rabbānī*); see Richard Gramlich, *Die Schiitischen Derwischorden Persiens*, II, *Glaube und Lehre* (Wiesbaden, 1976), 162-3. When one of them dies, God makes another to his substitute (*badal*), *ibidem*. In the Ottoman Empire 'The Forty' prominently figured in Bektashi doctrine, as is clear from the text of a discharge paper for a Janissary officer of 1822, quoted in Jon Kingsley Birge, *The Bektashi Order of Dervishes* (London, 1937), 75.

They have come, they say, to replace a deceased comrade of theirs with, of all people, one of the prisoners, a Cossack.¹ Şiyāmī Bey pleads that they take him instead, as he is a devout Muslim of pious deeds, a fighter for the faith. They refuse, saying that they have come to get the Cossack on God's behest. And so, because God so wishes, the infidel Cossack is elevated into their ranks in preference to the devout and meritorious Şiyāmī Bey. There the story, the dramatic illustration of the Koran verse² ends, with Şiyāmī Bey coming to the painful realization that if God does not wish it, no deeds of his will make a iota of difference in his fate. And from then on Şiyāmī Bey never lets himself forget what he has learned, repeating the tenet ceaselessly.

The introduction of the Forty Saints as emissaries of God is dramatic and makes sense from a mystical-religious point of view. The choice of an infidel Cossack prisoner –instead of a person more moderately “unsuitable” for the honour– emphasizes the point through exaggeration.

The tale evokes the daily life of *ghāzīs*, with details of their conversation, raiding customs, their horses, baggage, bedding and habit of drinking coffee in the war zone on the border of the Ottoman and the Habsburg Empires during the last decade of the seventeenth century. In fact, the remarks the warriors make among themselves are arguably the most charming aspect of the story. These details suggest that the author knew what he was writing about. Possibly, such a raid followed by an intercession for the release of a prisoner was the nucleus of the story of the Forty Saints coming to adopt a Cossack.

The introduction to the theme occurs in the preliminary narrative, with Şiyāmī Bey repeating a Turkish paraphrase as a constant incantation. It recurs as a paraphrase when Şiyāmī Bey is asked why he keeps repeating it. Lastly it occurs at the end of the story, when the reason for the choice is given, first in Turkish as before, then as a quotation from the Koran. This building up to the original Koranic words is doubtless effective story telling, and the repetition drives the point home with greater force.

¹ Although the presence of a Cossack on the Habsburg side of the border may seem unexpected to us, it is less so if one realises that Poland had been an ally of the Habsburgs since 1683, and that many Cossacks served in the Polish army, see Philip Longworth, *The Cossacks* (London, 1969), 35.

² The verse, cf. text and translation below, is quoted in at least one other story of our collection (f. 109a:3), where it refers to God's abasement of the last Mamlūk Sultan, Tuman Bay, and His exaltation of Selim I in Cairo in 1517.

5 *Transcription* (in an arrangement showing the use of rhyme)[17a:1] *Hikāyāt-ı ğaribedür, naql şüde*

Bu hâkîrûn eyyâm-ı siyâhatı,
 merhûm cennet-mekân
 firdevs-âşiyân
 Sulţân Muştafâ Hân / ibn Mehemmed Hân
 ile gitdigimiz¹
 senelerden sene-i semâniyemüz,
 Şakşâ-nâm / Nemce çasârı ser-‘askeri
 Temeşvâr’a qarib Yeñi-nehr-nâm / nehr kırbında
 ‘alâ l-ğafle vaqt-i ‘aşrda
 her-kes firâş-ı rāhatda / müsterih iken
 ordu-yı hümayûn/ı başduğı senede
 küll-i yevm münāsib yārân ile her gün pâdişahuñ
 geh öninde ve gâh ardında
 ve geh ceb² ü rāstında
 şöhet ederek gitdigimiz³ eyyāmda
 bir bālâ kıadd u kıamet
 kıara şakallu bir mühib-hey’et
 ile hoş şöhet / olunub
 be-her gün bir nice eyyām her nev’a müşāhabet / olunurdu.

Ammā bu fakıre inbāt gibi üç dört sözde bir bi-l-münāsebe

“Buña ğayretü llāh derler

ve buña hidāyetü llāh derler.

‘İnāyet senden, hidāyet senden.

Eger olmazsa hidāyet ü ‘ināyet senden,

ne umaruz benden⁴” / kelāmı

belki günde bir on kerre lisānından cereyān eder.

Yine günlerde [*sic*] bir gün “Şiyāmî Beg senden bir su’ālüm var, Allāhı seversen [*sic*] baña bir şāfı cevāb ver” dedigimde⁵ “Buyruñ sulţānum” dedi.

¹ MS: *g-t-d-y-k-m-z*.

² For çep.

³ MS: *g-t-d-y-k-m-z*.

⁴ Alternatively: *bendden*.

⁵ MS: *d-y-d-y-k-m-d-h*.

Ben daḥı dedüm ki "Şiyāmī Beg bir nice gündür senüñle

mürāfaḳat / üzere

müvāfaḳat / etdük.

Ma'lümumuz oldu ki

mücerreb-rüzgār/, ümür-dide

vü kār/-azmüde,

şoḫbetüñ leziz

ve vaktüñ 'aziz,

enfāsından bü-yı haḳıḳat istiṣmām olunur.

Ammā ekser bir ḫikāye baştuñda kelimāt-ı sābıḳa

'Buña 'ināyetü llāh,

buña hidāyetü llāh / derler.

'Ināyet senden,

hidāyet senden.

Eger olmazsa senden 'ināyet,

müşkil olur kārımız¹ ḡāyet.'

sözini āḫir maḫlaṣuma dek ondan ziyāde zıkr edersin². Bunuñ bir ḫikmeti var mı-dur yohsa lisāna Kolay-mı gelüb mu'tād mı olduñız?³ dediğimde⁴ bir āh-ı ciger-süz ile duḫānı āsımān-peyvest olub ağlamağa başladı.

Dönüb dedi ki

"Emr-i ḡarib

ü sırr-ı 'acib/den su'al buyurıñız.⁵

Muḳtażā-yi şoḫbet birbirimize⁶

nice esrār/-ı ḫafiyeyi

izhār/dur.

Bunuñ aslı budur-ki biz ser-ḫadd-livāyuz ya'nī Egri ve Üstürgön ser-ḫaddlerinde sākin oluruz.

Ol ser-ḫaddlerüñ ḳā'idesi senede iki def'a,

bir bahārda

ve bir güzde

sinni yigirmiyi mütecāviz civān dil-āverler,

yigitler/e

¹ MS: *k-'-r-y-m-z*.

² MS: *s-n* of this word is added between the lines in a possibly different hand; see footnote 11, p. 312.

³ MS: *'-v-l-d-y-k-z*.

⁴ MS: *d-y-d-y-k-m-d-h*.

⁵ MS: *b-y-v-r-y-k-z*.

⁶ MS: *b-r-b-r-y-m-z-h*.

bir yigit beg-zâde emîr olub
 vâkı ü zamânında ol beğe buluşub
 çeteye giderler,
 ya'ni kefere tarafından dağı böyle mu'tâddur.
 Kemâl-mertebe sebük-bâr yaranmış atla süvâr olunub
 gâh yüz ve gâh yüz yigirmi ve gâh yüz elli yigit çete ta'bir olunur
 üslûb-ı gâzâ vü cihâda çıkub
 ölenümüz, şehîd kalanumuz.
 Gâzî her def'ada kâfir-i bed-fi'âlden / gâh on ve gâh onbeş ve gâh
 yigirmi esîr alub
 ve içümüzden / ba'zı şehîd olub
 ve gâh bir kaçumuz kâfire esîr olur.
 Beynümüzde menn ü fidâ kâ'idesi cârî olmağla bizüm esîrimiz¹ alub anlardan
 esîr etdüğümüzü² verür-iz.³ Cümle ser-hâdd-i memâlik-i ma'mûrede bu üslûb
 câridür.
 Yine günlerde [*sic*] bir gün çete tedârîki vâkı ü zamâm olmağla
 tedârîkine şürûc gönlinde olanlar gelüb
 begümüz ve aḥbâbumuz
 ve ihtiyârumuz
 ḥuzûrlarında 'arz-ı hûner u kâlâ edüb
 yüz otuz miḳdârı mücâhid defter olunub
 bir gece bi-izni llâh şehrimüzden çıkub
 müşâvere ile
 ber-cânib-i dârü l-ḥarbe / müteveccih olub
 üç gün üç gece sürdük ki
 seyr-i vasaṭ ile toḳuz menzil eder / bir ḥarbî çetesine müşâdefe edüb
 ḳanḳı semtten oldukları ḥaber / alınub
 dördünci gece nıṣfu l-leylde üzerlerine mânend-i hezz bir şeb-ḥûn⁴ ile nağme-yi
 'Allâhu ekber' ile başduğumuzda ḡaflet üzre bu iki-yüz miḳdârı ḡalibâ var-
 ımışlar⁵
 yüzi firâr
 ve kırkı düzaḥ⁶-ḳarâr
 ve otuzı zaḥm⁷-dâr

¹ MS: '-s-y-r-y-m-z.

² MS: '-y-t-d-v-k-m-z-y.

³ MS: v-y-r-r '-y-z.

⁴ MS: with ḥ.

⁵ MS: v-'-r '-y-m-t-l-r.

⁶ MS: with ḥ.

⁷ MS: with ḥ.

ve otuzı naşib-i gūzāt-ı şimsîr-pây-dâr / olub

şüret-i istîşāl nihân olmağla

üç refikümüz cām-ı şehâdet-nâş ve dört refikümüz¹ şimsîr-i küffâr/
dūzah² kaddârasıla zahm-dâr³ / olub

bir yarar karındaşumuz kayd-ı esârete mübtelâ olduğı⁴ maḥall-i
muḥârebede yoklanub

aldığımız⁵ ḡanâyimi meh-mâ emken tahmîl

ve üserâ'-i mezbûreyi kıyûd u selâsil

ile taklîl / edüb

bir haftadur dâr-ı diyâr/umuzdan çıkalı

bî-tâblığımız⁶ kılan tarîk-i pür-każâ-yi cāna=[17b]vârdur⁷.

Ol cānibe 'aṭf-ı 'inân / edüb

eṭrâfı eşcâr-ı âsımân/-ser-keş⁸

miyân/[ı] şahrâ-yi dil-keş / bir yere

meks-i ahırde nüzûl olunub

taylılarımız⁹ / bend edüb

ve mâ-ḡazarımız¹⁰ ekl edüb

ve üserâmuñ elinde

ve belinde

şaḡîr ü kebîr âlet-i ḡarb var mı-dur yoklayub

ve ṭavla-mişâl ḡazıklar ḡakub

üserânuñ dest ü pâların muḡkem bend edüb

berâ-yi âsâyîş civân ḡâzile[re] dedük ki¹¹ 'Aşlanlarum bizler babalarıñız¹² bir
mıḡdâr istirâḡat eylesünler. Sizler nevbet bekleñ. Bizler üç sâ'at mıḡdârı evc-i
nevmümüz aldūkdan soñra sizleri istirâḡat etdirelim¹³, dedigimizde¹⁴ on
ḡadar tâne yigitlerimiz¹⁵

¹ MS: *refikümüzüñ*.

² MS: with ḡ.

³ MS: with ḡ.

⁴ MS: '-v-l-d-y-ḡ-y.

⁵ MS: '-l-d-y-ḡ-m-z.

⁶ MS: t-'-b-l-y-ḡ-m-z.

⁷ MS: *vā* repeated by mistake.

⁸ MS: *ser-kes*.

⁹ MS: t-'-y-h-l-y-l-r-y-m-z; emended as a word t-'-y-h could not be traced.

¹⁰ MS: m-'-ḡ-ż-r-y-m-z.

¹¹ *ki* seems to have been added later (in the same hand as *s-n* above; see footnote 2, p. 313).

¹² MS: b-'-b-'-l-r-y-k-z.

¹³ MS: '-y-t-d-y-r-h-l-m.

¹⁴ MS: d-y-d-y-k-m-z-d-h.

¹⁵ MS: y-k-t-l-r-y-m-z.

‘Nola! Şafāda,

pister-i rāhatda / oluñ!

‘Avn-i Hakk ile bizler nevbet bekleyüb

muḥāfaẓa ederüz’ deyüb

bizler bār bend-i der-dest hegbelerimiz¹/ bālin

ve yağmurlıklarıımız² / kalın edinüb

tāz[e] çemen ferşi istifraş [sic] edüb

yatub

uykuya varduk.

Bilmezüz az mı çok-mı zamān mürür etdi, nevbet-zen nigeḥ-bān olanlardan biri gelüb: ‘Baba kalkuñ!’

Biz-de beynü n-nevm ve l-yaḳaẓa

‘Ne iktizā / eyledi?

Bizler ḥuzūr-i baḥr-i nevmün kenārın görmedük’ dedigimizde³ dahı pekce

‘Tiz kalkuñ!’

‘Bire ne-var?’ dedigimizde⁴ ‘Baḳuñ /

şu qarşuda olan mecma’ u ḥalkaya!⁵

Meh-tābda gözüm erimi şahrā dükenüb eşcār tolunduğı⁶ yerde bir ‘aẓım ḥalka⁷ olmuş, gece içre sāyeleri gāyet ‘aẓım ve meḥābet üzre görinür⁸.

Gözüm⁹ görüb

cümlemüz birbirimiz¹⁰ iḳāz u bīdār edüb

ol ḥalka-i mūḥibe erbābın gösterdük ammā cümlemüz ḥayret ü dehşetde.

Bunlar kimlerdür ‘aqlumuz ihāta etmedükden hemān ayağa kalkub

ḳolanlarımızı¹¹ / çeküb

atlarımızı¹² / gemleyüb

‘alā l-‘umūm dedük ki ‘İçüñüzden kimdür ki bu cem‘e şem‘ olub bize bir ḥaber getirür?’

¹ MS: h-k-b-h-l-r-y-m-z.

² MS: y-ğ-m-v-r-l-ğ-l-r-y-m-z.

³ MS: d-y-d-y-k-m-z-d-h.

⁴ MS: d-y-d-y-k-m-z-d-h.

⁵ MS: written with ḥ.

⁶ MS: t-v-l-n-d-v-ğ-y.

⁷ MS: written with ḥ.

⁸ MS: k-v-r-y-n-v-r.

⁹ MS: k-v-z-y-m.

¹⁰ MS: b-r-b-r-y-m-z-y.

¹¹ MS: ḳ-v-l-’-n-l-r-y-m-z-y.

¹² MS: ā-t-l-r-y-m-z-y.

Hemân-dem üç dâne civân/-i sa‘âdet-‘unvân / ilerü gelüb

‘İşte biz giderüz¹’ deyüb

taraf-ı mezbûra müteveccihen gitdiler.

Ammâ bizler hayâl üzre gidenleri ve ol yerde tûranları fark ederüz. Vara vara halkaya² vardılar. Ammâ kimesne bunlara karşı ne istikbâl ve ne kıyâm / etdiler. Bizler bu hâli görüb makâm/-ı hayretde kalduk.

Gidenler bir mîkdâr hâric-i halkada³ tûrub

yine dönüb

bizlere toğrı ‘avdet üslûbın gösterüb

anlardan bir kimesne bunlar ile tarafumuza teveccüh etmedi.

Gele-geldiler ammâ yürüyüşleri âheste âheste. Biz anların yürü[y]üşlerinden fâ l-cümle ra‘b u hirâsdan halâş bulduk, su‘âl etdük: ‘Hayr ola?’

Dediler: ‘Hayr.’

‘Ne bir adamlar-ıdur⁴ ve bunda niye gelmişler?’

Eyitdiler: ‘Bilmezüz kimlerdür, ne yerden gelmişler ve ne yere gider. ‘Adedi erba‘ânî mütecâviz gâlibâ.

Bir Kac def‘a şayduk,

gece olmağ-la hisâbumuz şaşırduk.

Kimi şâbb ve kimi şeyh. Kaı‘â tarafumuza teveccüh etmediler ve keyfiyetümüzden şormadılar. Cümlesinün teveccühi dergâh-ı Hakkâ, serîr-i envere. Te‘abbüd-i tevhid-i şerife müdâvemetden gayrı ne harf var ve ne şavt. Etrâfların vâfir tolaşduk,

iltifâta / sezâ

ve kelimâta / ruhşat etmediler,

ammâ bir mertebe mehâbet var ki nûr-i beşerlerine bakmağa iktidâr olmaz.

Zileri zî-yi İslâm

ve mürekkepleri mürekkeb-i İslâm

ve enfâslarından bû-yi misk ü ‘anber istişmâm / olunur.

Ammâ ne hâlet idügin fehm edemedük’ dedüklerinde ‘Hoş imdi hayr ola.

Bize lâzım olan başiretdür.

Şûret-i döstide çok düşmen görilmişdür,

hile vü hud‘a ile nice cân u başlar telef olmuşdur.

Çahve ibriklerin ocaga koñ!’ deyüb mütecellidâne mucâmeleye şürû’ etdük.

¹ MS: *k-y-d-h-r-z*.

² MS: written with *h*.

³ MS: written with *h*.

⁴ MS: ‘*-d-m-l-r*’ ‘*-y-d-r*’.

Vākı‘ā ƙahveler pişüb
içilüb

taḥşil-i dimāğ etdük.

Bunlaruñ cāniblerine nāzır oturunken gördük

halkadan¹ üç şaḥş ayrılub / ʔarafumuza ʔoğrı teveccüh etdi,
gelerek² cem‘ümümüze gelüb /selām verdi.

Bizler daḥı redd-i ziyāde ile selāmın redd etdük.

Nefsü l-emr bir mertebe mehābet üzre ki baƙanuñ³ çihresi çāk olur. Ḥattā cümlemüz bir su‘āle ƙādir olamaduk.

Üserā bend olan ƙazuƙlara ʔoğrı gidüb

üserāyı ferdā-ferden görüb

yine bizüm cem‘ümüze teveccüh etdiler

ve yine selām verdiler.

“‘Aleyk!”, alub tevƙir etdük.

İçlerinden üçüñ biri bir ihtiyār baḥtiyār [18a] eydi ki ‘Ġāziler!

Üserā içinde ortada ƙolı zaḥmetlü bir tüvānā / esiriñiz⁴ vardır.

Anı bize fedā / edüñ.’

Biz-de dedük ‘Ne ƙazā/-yile de eyderseñüz rızāmuzdur.’

Biz daḥı ma‘an varduk, ol esire naƣar etdük. Bir terāş ƙırcıl tüvānā, otuza ƣarib bir ƙazakdur.

Biz-de dedük: ‘Bu bir güçlü ƣuvvetlü, hıyāneti ġālib, hattā ƣolında yarası var. Ne işüñüze yarar?

Sizler bunlara,

civānlara,

anlara / baƣuñ!’

Anlar-da dediler: ‘Ol bize lāzımdur. Mecmū’ın verseñüz maƣbūlümüz’ degüldür. Bu sözlerinden bizler daḥı şüret-i işrārda sābit olub ‘Güzel. Biz-de size bu ƣırcıl[ı] ferāğ⁵ edelüm, ammā siz daḥı bunu ne hizmetde istihdām ederseñüz bize beyān edüñ’ deyü ʔarafeynden söz çoğaldı. Ḥaşıl[ı] cümlemüz hizmeti beyāndan muƣaddem vermemeƣ üzre ƣarār verdük. Aña ḥaml etdük bizüm ‘ilmümüz muḥit olmadı⁶

bunda bir ma‘rifete bir töhmet ola,

anlaruñ ma‘lümü ola,

¹ MS: written with ḡ.

² MS: k-l-h-r-k.

³ MS: b-ƣ-h-n-k.

⁴ MS: ‘-s-y-r-y-n-k-z.

⁵ MS: ferāğı.

⁶ MS: ‘-v-l-m-d-y-ğ-y.

zîrâ ‘Cümlesin verürseñüz maqbûlümüz degüldür’ demişler idi.

Bunlar dediler ki ‘Biz bunı sizden tav‘an olmazsa kerhen almak emr-i sehldür, ammâ muқтаzâ-yi tarîkümüz mütäva‘atdur.

Bârî hikmeti size beyân edelüm

ve sırrın size ‘iyân edelüm’

deyüb ‘Bizler ‘âlemi ser-tâ-ser devr ü tavâf eden cünüd-ı kırklar-ız¹.

Yolunca bir karındaşumuzuñ va‘desi tamâm olub

dünyâsın tebdil edüb

‘adedimiz² noqsân terettüb etmekle

emr-i Hakk’a gitmekle / tamâmı müyesserdür.

Kocamızda sizler yedinde olan üserâdan işbu civân hakkında

‘inâyet-i Bârî

ve hidâyet-i şamedânî / müyesser olmağla

ol kimesneyi içimüze vaz‘a me‘mür olub³ sizi bunda bulduk. İşte keyfiyet-i ahvâlümüz budur’ dedükde

hemân kalkub

bunlaruñ dâmenine rüy-mâl edüb

‘Sulţânım bu fakîr altmış ğazâ ve on yedi hacc

ve bu kadar hayrât

u meberrâtım / vardır.

Beni ol maķâma dergâh-ı ‘izzete teveccüh buyruñ’ dedigimde⁴

‘Cânum buña ‘inâyetü llâh / derler

ve buña hidâyetü llâh / derler

– *tu‘izzu man taşâ’u*

*wa-tuzillu man taşâ’u*⁵ ş

bi-llâhi l-ğayr ezel-i âzâlde /

buña bu rütbede / buyurulmuş,

bizler bende-i fermânuz’ deyüb

güyâ tağyir-i şüret mu‘âmelesin etdüklerinde varub

hakkında ‘inâyet-i erzânî olan esiri kayddan halâş edüb

ellerine teslim edüb

cümlemüz baķa-ķalduk.

¹ MS: *ķ-r-ķ-l-r* ‘-y-z.

² MS: ‘-d-d-y-m-z.

³ Preceded by the crossed out word *olduk*.

⁴ MS: *d-y-d-y-k-m-d-h*.

⁵ Koran 3:26(25).

Hālā ol günden beri¹ bu benüm gūyā tesbiḥüm ve vird-i zebānumdur” deyüb göz yaşı ırmaqların ceryān etdi.

6 Translation

[17a:1-18a:15] Strange stories that were told [to me]

In my days of travel, in the year [110]8² of the years we accompanied the late Sultan Muṣṭafā Khan, son of Meḥemmed Khan³, residing [now] in heaven, dwelling in paradise, – the [very] year when, on a mid-afternoon while everyone was heedlessly resting on his bed of ease, the commander-in-chief of the German Emperor called Saksa⁴ attacked the Imperial Army near the river Yeninehir⁵ close to Timișoara. In those days when we were travelling, chatting all day long with congenial friends, sometimes ahead of the sultan, sometimes behind him, sometimes at his left and sometimes at his right side, pleasant conversations were had with an awe-inspiring figure, tall of stature and with a black beard. Every day for quite some time we kept each other company in every way. But perhaps ten times a day, like the [almost constantly blowing] Egesian wind⁶, [and] on the pretext of every three or four sentences [addressed] to me, the words “This is called God’s zeal, and this is called God’s guidance. Grace is from You, guidance is from You. If there is no grace and guidance from You, what can we expect from me⁷?” flowed from his tongue.

When, one day, I said, “Siyāmī Bey, I have a question to ask you. For the love of God, give me a clear answer,” he said, “Please do, my sultan.”

And I said, “Siyāmī Bey, for many days we have been companions by mutual consent. We have come to know that you are experienced in life’s trials, have had practice and experience in affairs, that your conversation is delightful and your time precious, and that your breath smells of the perfume of truth. But usually when you spin a yarn you recite the words⁸ ‘This is

¹ MS: *b-r-y*.

² Meant is clearly the year 1108 (1696-7).

³ Sultan Muṣṭafā II, ruled 1106/1695-1115/1703.

⁴ Probably Friedrich August von Sachsen (1670-1733), Austrian military commander in Hungary, and later king of Poland.

⁵ Lit. ‘New River’, probably the Bega canal; the Austrian army was defeated there on 27 August 1697, see Danişmend, *Kronoloji* III, 480.

⁶ This wind blows almost constantly during summer in the Levant

⁷ The meaning “from the servant [of God]” (*bendeden*) might seem to be more relevant. The reasons it was not preferred to “from me” are the script (*b-n-d-n*) for one, and the fact that *senden* and *benden* rhyme whereas *senden* and *bendeden* do not.

⁸ MS: the preceding words.

called God's grace, this is called God's guidance. Grace is from You, guidance is from You. If there is no grace from You, our task is extremely difficult' more than ten times, [as if you would go on reciting them] till doomsday.¹ Is there some wisdom in this? Or did you find it easy to say and so became accustomed to [saying] it?" Upon which, a heart-searing sigh reached the heavens with its smoke and he burst into tears.

He turned [to me] and said, "Ask me about strange events and amazing secrets. Conversation requires us to disclose many hidden secrets to each other.

The truth here is that we are a frontier brigade, that is, we live at the Eger and Esztergom borders. The rule at those frontiers is that twice a year, once in spring and once in autumn, a young nobleman becomes commander of courageous youths, of heroes of over twenty years of age, and at the right time they meet this commander and go on a raid. (That is to say, this is also the accustomed practice of the unbelievers.) Perfectly well-seasoned and light horses are mounted, and sometimes a hundred, sometimes a hundred-and-twenty, and sometimes [even] a hundred-and-fifty heroes go off on what is called a raid in the manner of holy war, of war for the faith (*çete*)², [and] our dead are our martyrs. The warriors for the faith take prisoners every time—sometimes ten, sometimes fifteen, and sometimes [even] twenty of the wicked unbelievers. And some of us become martyrs, and sometimes a few of us become prisoners of the unbelievers. As ransom and gift-bestowal is the customary rule among us, we take back those of us who have become prisoners and return the prisoners we have made from among them. This is the principle in force on all the frontiers of the inhabited lands.

One day, as it was the time to prepare a raid, those who were in the spirit to get on with it came and showed their skills and trappings before our commander, our friends and our elders, and one-hundred-and-thirty fighters for the faith were enrolled. One night, with God's permission, we left our town and, deliberating all the while, headed towards enemy country. We had ridden for three days and nights, which at an average pace makes nine stages, when we chanced upon a marauding expedition of the enemy. We had received news about where they came from, and in the middle of the fourth night we swooped down on them in a staggering nocturnal attack, shouting 'God is greatest!', while they were [still] half-asleep. They were probably about two hundred; a hundred of them fled, forty of them became denizens of hell, thirty were wounded, and thirty fell to the lot of the warriors of the faith with the

¹ Literally: up to my last refuge.

² See Mehmet Zeki Pakalın, *Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlüğü*, I (İstanbul, 1983), s.v. "çete" on the fact that this was the name given to raids undertaken by forces of less than one-hundred fighters, raids with a greater number being called *harâmlık*.

firm swords. As the scope of the carnage was [as yet] unknown, we inspected the battlefield and saw that three of our comrades had drunk the cup of martyrdom, four of our comrades had been injured by the two-edged swords of the unbelievers from hell, and one of our brave brothers had been stricken by the fetters of imprisonment. We loaded up as much as possible of the booty we had taken and subdued the aforementioned prisoners with fetters and chains.

The dangerous path [of war] against the brutal wretches had exhausted us since we had left our country a week ago, [so] we turned [our] reins in that direction. We alighted at our last halt, in a place surrounded by trees reaching to the sky, with a lovely glade in the middle. We tied up our loaded horses,¹ ate what we had ready at hand, checked whether there were any small or large fighting implements in the hands or waistbands of our prisoners, drove stakes into the ground as when picketing horses, and tightly bound the hands and feet of the prisoners [to them].

To set our minds at ease we said to the young fighters for the faith, 'My lions! Let us, your elders, rest for a while. You keep watch. After we have taken the edge off our [need for] sleep with three hours of slumber, we will see to your rest.' Then about ten of our heroes said, 'Why not! Do be at peace and on the bedding of ease. With the help of God we will keep watch and stand guard.' [So] out of our handy pack-bundles we made pillows of our saddle-bags and a thick layer of our rain-cloaks, spread a mat of fresh grass, lay down, and fell asleep.

We do not know whether little or much time had passed when one of the sentinels on watch came up. 'Master, get up!'

And when we, between sleeping and waking, said, 'What do you want? We haven't [yet] reached the sea-shore of sleep's peace': 'Get up quickly!'

[And] when we said, 'Now then! What is it?'

'Look at that gathering and circle of people opposite you!'

Within reach of my eyesight in the moonlight was a great circle of people where the plain ended and the trees were thickest. In the night their shadows looked huge and frightening. I saw [this] and we roused and awakened each other and pointed to the people of that frightening circle. All of us were amazed and in fear.

Because we did not grasp who these people were, we immediately rose to our feet, tightened up our girths, bitted our horses, and said to everyone in general, 'Which of you will throw some light on this gathering and bring us some news?'

Immediately three glorious youths came forward and said, 'Look, we are going!' And off they went in the aforementioned direction.

¹ See footnote 63.

We could [barely] distinguish as ghostly apparitions those who went and those who were on that spot. They went on until they reached the circle. But no one stood up or went to meet them. We saw this and were dumbfounded. Those who had gone stood for a while outside the circle of people, then turned around in order to head back towards us, but none of those [gathered] came in our direction with them. The youths¹ came on, but at a slow pace. In short, the way they walked freed us from fear and terror, and we asked, 'Good news, we hope?'

They said, 'Good.'

'What sort of people are they and why have they come here?'

They said, 'We do not know who they are, from where they have come and where they will go. Their number seems to exceed forty. We counted a number of times, [but] it being night, we got our calculations mixed up. Some of them are boys, others elderly men. They did not turn towards us at all and did not inquire about our circumstances. All were turned towards the Court of God, towards the most luminous Throne. There was no word or sound other than [those uttered in] assiduously worshipping the noble Unique One. We circled them many times but they did not see fit to take notice [of us], nor did they permit [us] a word [with them]. There was such a degree of awe that one was unable to glance at their radiance as mortals. They are endowed with the endowment of Islam, they are composed of the compound of Islam, and one breathes the perfume of musk and ambergris in their breaths. But we were not able to understand what the situation is.'

When they had said this [we said], 'Fine, let's hope this is to our good. What we [now] need is circumspection. One has seen many enemies figuring as friends, many heads and lives have been lost through tricks and deceit. Put the coffee-pot on the fire!' And we pluckily started to deal with the matter.

In fact, the coffee was brewed and drunk, and we were [still] racking our brains. While we were sitting, looking in their direction, we saw that three persons left the gathering and came towards us. They came up to our group and greeted [us]. We returned their greetings profusely. [But] in truth, there was such a degree of dread that an onlooker's face would have crumpled up [in fear]. None of us even dared to ask a question!

They went towards the stakes to which the prisoners were tied, looked at the prisoners one by one, and [then] again came towards our group and greeted [us] anew. We accepted and returned the greeting and showed [our] respect.

One of the three of them, a fortunate old man said, 'Oh warriors for the faith!

¹ MS: they.

Among the captives, in their [very] midst, you have a strong prisoner whose arm is injured. Cede him to us.'

And we said, 'We consent if you tell us upon what judgment.'

We all went together and looked at that prisoner. He was a shaved Cossack with grizzled hair, strong and approaching thirty.

And we said, 'This is a powerful, strong one, overpoweringly treacherous. He even has a wound on his arm. Of what use could he be to you? [Better] look at these, at the youths, look at them!'

But¹ they said, 'This is the one we need. Were you to give [us] all [the others instead], we would refuse.'

Because of these words of theirs, we continued to insist. 'Fine, we will cede this grizzled one to you. But [first] explain to us how you will employ him.' Thus more words from both sides.

In short, we all decided not to be of service without [having heard their] explanation. We supposed that information, which lay outside our scope of knowledge but was known to them, was to be suspected, for they had said 'Were you to give [us] all [the others instead], we would refuse.'

They said, 'If not [given] willingly, it will be easy for us to take him from you against [your] will. But the requirement of our way of life is compliance. Let us explain, in short, the wisdom [in this] and let us reveal its secret. We are the troop of the Forty who travel around the world from end to end. As the term [of life] of one of our Brothers ended in its proper way and he exchanged this² world [for the other], our number has become deficient. Completing it is made easy by acting on the order of God. As the grace of God and divine guidance regarding this young man, who is one of the prisoners in your hands, took effect with our elder, we were appointed to make him one of us and have found you [and him] here. See, this is the state of our affairs.'

When they had said this, I immediately got up and rubbed my face on their hems and said, 'My sultan, I have [to my account] sixty battles for the faith and seventeen pilgrimages and these many pious deeds and good works. Please favour me with that station, that court of glory.'

But they said, 'My dear soul, this is called the grace of God, and this is called the guidance of God. *Thou exaltest whom Thou wilt and abasest whom Thou wilt*.³ Favour comes through God[']s decree; in the eternity of past eternities it was decreed to this one in this degree. We are [only] servants of the decree.' When they had spoken thus—and it seemed as if they were

¹ MS: And.

² MS: his.

³ Koran 3: 26 (25), translation by Richard Bell, *The Qur'an* I (Edinburgh, 1937), 47.

changing in appearance—, we went,¹ freed the prisoner, who had become blessed with grace, from his shackles, and gave him into their hands. And we all remained staring.

Ever since that day it is as if this were my rosary and the constantly repeated prayer on my tongue.” And saying this, he let flow rivers of tears.

¹ MS: came.

OTTOMAN CARTOON MAPS: IMAGINING SPACE, IDENTITY, AND NATION IN THE ISTANBUL POPULAR PRESS, 1908-1913*

Palmira Brummett

In 1908, the second Ottoman constitutional revolution resulted in the temporary suspension of censorship and a great outpouring of Ottoman literature.¹ Over 200 new gazettes were published in Istanbul alone in the first year after the revolution. Cartoon satire, in these gazettes, was used, in particular, to express the anxieties of a state and society in rapid transition.² Part of that anxiety centered on notions of Ottoman sovereign space and the imminent threats to Ottoman territorial integrity. To express those threats, cartoons embodied the empire, and those states construed as aggressors, in human, allegorical, or iconic forms. In some cases that embodiment was accomplished through the use of emblematic characters: the sultan, John Bull, Marianne, the Russian peasant, the shah, Egyptian nationalists, or figures from the Ottoman shadow puppet theatre. In other cases, an animal, a building, a piece of clothing, a monument, or the outlines of a territory might be used to represent sovereign space. This essay examines the rhetorical construction of maps in the Ottoman cartoon space in the period after the revolution and before World War I (1908-1913).³ Maps were employed in satiric frames to suggest states, sovereignty, identity, borders, and possession:

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This paper was originally presented at the 20th International Conference on the History of Cartography, June 15-20, 2003, in a session entitled "Reading Ottoman Maps: Text, Context, and Cultural Understanding." I offer it to Colin Imber with admiration and best regards and with the caveat that the modern period is not so divorced from the early modern as some of our historiography would seem to suggest.

¹ On the period of the second Ottoman constitutional revolution, its contexts, and its politics, see Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, (London: Routledge, 1993); Erik Zürcher, *Turkey, A Modern History*, (London: I. B. Tauris, 1998); M. Şükrü Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Hanioglu, *Preparation for a Revolution 1902-1908*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Selim Deringil, *The Well Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909*, (London: I. B. Tauris, 1998); and Hasan Kayali, *Ottomans and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire 1908-1918*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).

² On the cartoons of the second constitutional era, and their cultural and political contexts, see Palmira Brummett, *Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908-1911*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000). For a reference work on Ottoman cartoons of this era, see Turgut Çeviker, *Gelişim Sürecinde Türk Karikatürü*, (İstanbul: Adam Yayınları, 1986-1991).

³ I use the term 'cartoon space' to suggest not just the cartoon itself, but the text, and the technical, social, political, and cultural contexts in which the cartoon was embedded.

past, present, and future. Territorial visions were also used to suggest affinities (between the empire and Egypt or Morocco, for example); threats (territory annexed, "eaten," or "raped" by Ottoman foes); and aspirations (territory claimed but not physically possessed). These maps provide an interesting, though abbreviated, set of texts for assessing the construction of late imperial identity.

Presented here are a few examples of maps from the illustrated gazettes *Kalem* (Pen) 1908-1911, and *Karagöz* (Black Eye) 1908-1928, employed to suggest a typology of cartoon maps in Ottoman gazettes.¹ Both periodicals were published in Istanbul. Through these images, I propose to address, in a preliminary way, the kinds of maps found in Ottoman cartoons; their situation within the cartoon frame and surrounding texts; their rhetorical use; their cultural context (e.g. urban, cosmopolitan, multi-ethnic and multi-linguistic); and their connections to Ottoman traditions of mapping. We are still in the early stages of an assessment of Ottoman publishing and reading habits in the early 20th century. But this limited selection of cartoons can also provide insights into Ottoman audiences and the ways in which cartoon maps were "read."

Maps, as J. B. Harley (and others) have so eloquently demonstrated, are rhetorical constructions that function within both their textual and societal frames.² Maps in the Ottoman cartoon press of 1908-1913 certainly fit that designation. The short period after the second Ottoman constitutional, or Young Turk, revolution and before World War I was a time of tremendous stress for the empire. A new form of government (constitutional monarchy) was put in place; the sultanate was dramatically weakened; Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina outright; a series of draining and unsuccessful wars engaged the empire in the Balkans and in North Africa; and Britain and Russia conspired to divide the neighboring Qajar territory in Iran into spheres of influence. Given the situation, the Istanbul press was, not surprisingly, preoccupied with the issues of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and war. Whether or not the new regime could preserve and protect the empire was an open question. In this context of political paranoia, maps, embedded in cartoons, were employed to suggest the empire's struggle for self-determination and self-preservation.

Maps, in general, are not routinely found in the texts of Ottoman gazettes. When they were employed, they could be used to illustrate specific areas of the empire, highlight news stories, or test geographic knowledge.

¹ *Kalem* was published 21 Ağustos 1324/3 September 1908 to 16 Haziran 1327/29 June 1911; and *Karagöz* was published 10 Ağustos 1324/23 August 1908 to 28 Kasım (November) 1928.

² See J. B. Harley, *The New Nature of Maps: Essays in the History of Cartography*, ed. Paul Laxton (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001).

Cartoon maps are an even more limited, and rather different, genre: they presume a higher level of “playing” with reality; their designations are understood to be impressionistic; and they make use of the ambiguities of the Ottoman situation by emphasizing the often ephemeral nature of borders and states. That direct approach to the tenuous nature of sovereignty often stood in stark contrast to “serious” press coverage, which often portrayed the empire in more optimistic terms (especially right after the revolution) as solid and enduring.

Cartoon maps are embedded in texts, which may or may not have anything to do with the cartoons’ content. Sometimes cartoons highlight the topic of a gazette’s editorial or main news item; more often satiric images are not directly related to the surrounding text. The cartoon is thus expected to stand alone, a visual that presumes a certain recognition by the reader of the issues, conflicts, or places depicted. It may be intended to express editorial opinion, provide entertainment, or simply to deliver a brief but telling visual message. Within the cartoon frame, the message may be conveyed primarily through visual symbols (which are presumed to be familiar) and verbal cues,¹ or it may require multiple labels and extended captions to be comprehensible. The image itself may be complex or simple, dramatically evocative or nondescript and mundane.

Rhetorically, maps in the Ottoman cartoon space were used primarily to suggest the distinctions and divisions between an assumed “us” (the “cherished community” treated by Charles Press in his work on American political cartoons) and a threatening “them.”² They act to certify who is sovereign over what space; to build notions of “national” identity; and to classify foreign states as allies or enemies whose actions either support or threaten the integrity of the Ottoman state. In 1908, the empire’s enemies far outnumbered its allies. Secondly, cartoon maps might act as commentary on specific territorial claims, divisions, or treaties. They depict and satirize the use and abuse of borders, as lines across which goods might be smuggled, armies marched, or disreputable Ottoman administrators flee, for example. And they suggest the arbitrary nature of Great Power boundary drawing.

¹ For an interesting examination of the relation between word and image in political satire, which focuses on eighteenth century broadsheets but is certainly relevant for later cartoon images as well, see Eirwen Nicholson, “Soggy prose and verbiage: English graphic political satire as a visual/verbal construct,” *Word and Image* 20, no 1, (January – March 2004): 28-40.

² Charles Press, *The Political Cartoon* (New Brunswick: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1981), 58, 62-64. Press argues that the cartoonist presumes a ‘cherished community’ of fellow spirits with shared values and targets his images to touch on those things, which the community fears or holds dear.

Culture and Audience

The culture out of which these cartoons emerge is the cosmopolitan culture of Istanbul with its highly mixed, and cross-cultural traditions of literary production, art, satire, and mapping. Istanbul was a multi-lingual and multi-ethnic city, accustomed to the mingling of languages and artistic traditions. Its presses produced books, gazettes, and ephemeral literature in Turkish, Greek, Armenian, Hebrew, Persian, French, and Italian, among other languages. Ottoman satire evolved out of that polyglot milieu and out of Ottoman theatrical traditions, particularly that of the shadow puppet theatre, with Karagöz (the ne'er-do-well) and his side-kick Hacivat as its main characters. There were at least two cartoon ateliers in Istanbul and another in Izmir; and cartoons were copied and reprinted from gazette to gazette. Just as Constantinople had participated in a culture of artistic production and consumption, which mingled the materials, and techniques of the Graeco-Roman world, so Istanbul stood as a center of artistic and literary production, which synthesized the aesthetic forms of the Afro-Eurasian world.

Map drawing in Istanbul also emerged out of a highly cosmopolitan cartographic tradition. Matrakçı Nasuh, a sixteenth century pasha and chronicler, produced maps in the mid-sixteenth century which are distinctively Ottoman in their artistic design; but he also produced illustrated accounts of Sultan Süleiman's western campaigns which employ maps modeled on European city-views.¹ Evliya Çelebi (1611-1684) notes that there were eight workshops of mapmakers in Istanbul in the seventeenth century, but that allusion, to date, has not been fleshed-out with further documentation on the nature and production of Early Modern Ottoman maps.² From the later seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, Ottoman maps were increasingly modeled on the dominant mapping traditions of Europe: Italian, Dutch, French, and English. And in the modern era, with which this essay is concerned, mapping in the empire reflected Ottoman economic and political subordination to the European Great Powers. Some maps were produced

¹ On Matrakçı Nasuh, see Halil Sahillioğlu, "Dördüncü Muradın Bağdat Seferi Menzilnamesi," *Belgeler*, 2/ 3-4 (1965), 1-36; Nasūhū's-Silāhi (Matrakçı), *Beyân-ı Menâzil-i Sefer-i 'Irâkeyn*, ed. H. G. Yurdaydın (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1976); and J. M. Rogers, "Itineraries and Town Views in Ottoman Histories," in J. B. Harley and David Woodward, eds., *The History of Cartography*, vol. 2, book 1, *Cartography in the Traditional Islamic and South Asian Societies* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 234-245. See also Ahmet T. Karamustafa, "Introduction to Ottoman Cartography," in Harley and Woodward, eds., *History of Cartography*, vol. 2, book 1, 218, 228-229. There is not agreement on whether Matrakçı actually executed the beautiful map images in his chronicles or simply directed and patronized the artists who did. Yurdaydın argues that he is the artist.

² Svat Soucek, "Islamic Charting in the Mediterranean," 265-279, in *History of Cartography*, 284. The groups are called, *esnaf-ı haritacıyanı*.

abroad and others were bilingual or copies labeled in Ottoman Turkish.¹ Thus, the cartoon maps presented here do not represent particularistic Ottoman cartographic traditions. Historically, cartographic nuances and innovations were pirated and copied very swiftly in the Afro-Eurasian world; mapmaking was, by its very nature, a shared and cross-cultural endeavor. I have not found any hajj maps or “Oriental” styles of mapping regions, cities, or routes in Ottoman cartoons. In any case, it would be difficult to characterize Istanbul as an “Oriental” city any more than as a “European” city; either designation obscures more than it reveals. In 1908, there was no real distinction between maps found in Ottoman cartoons and maps found in the cartoons of European gazettes.² Cartoon maps in both cases were meant to be simple and evocative, not clear visions of “reality,” guides to travel, or masterpieces of the cartographic arts.

The two gazettes employed as examples in this essay differ to some extent in their use of cartoon maps. Cartoons in *Karagöz* often require a sophisticated command of language, geography, and foreign affairs to appreciate the import of the cartoons. The dialog, as in the shadow puppet theatre from which these caricatures emerge, is often crucial. In *Kalem*, the picture of reality may also be complex but, in other cases, simple iconography (of good guys and bad guys, their turf, and their symbols) is employed to get the message across with a minimum of words. The visual then takes precedence over the caption. In both cases the immediate audience is the elite, literate readership of the Istanbul educated classes. *Kalem*, was a bilingual gazette, publishing in both Ottoman Turkish and French, an influential literary language of the time.³ But there is a broader audience for these cartoons and their maps; gazettes were posted to the provinces, passed from person to person, and read aloud in coffee houses; cartoons were cut out and posted. Some cartoons conveyed their basic messages through image

¹ A good example of some of the types of Ottoman and European maps found in Istanbul from the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries can be found in the catalog of the Turkish Naval Museum's map collection, *Türk Deniz Müzesi Harita Kataloğu*, Kültür Yayınları Tarih Dizisi, 33 (Ankara: T. C. Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Deniz Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı, 2001).

² One exception is that there are several cartoon images of the city of Istanbul, which call up classical poetic imagery (e.g., letters in the form of a crying eye, or the city represented as a fairy).

³ *Kalem* employed both languages in its articles and its cartoons often had bi-lingual captions. *Kalem* tended to favor the new parliamentary regime and the Committee for Union and Progress, which ultimately dominated the parliament after the 1908 elections; but it was also quite critical of the new regime's actions and programs. *Karagöz*, like *Kalem*, was critical of the new regime, and often targeted social aspects of Ottoman society. However, *Karagöz* did not employ French. On the intellectual climate of the day and the education of the military-administrative and bureaucratic classes, see Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 1968; and Carter Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). On questions of circulation, audience, and publishing logistics, see Brummett, *Image and Imperialism*, 25-50.

alone; the caption was extra. Thus cartoons could appeal to an illiterate audience, either through simple visuals or through the intermediary of a literate reader.

School children were exposed to maps of the empire and foreign lands in the classrooms (particularly in the secondary schools) of late Ottoman Istanbul.¹ One can thus begin to argue that the educated citizen of the empire had at least some geographic sense of the shape of Anatolia or Iran, and some political sense of the contests for territorial control in which the empire was enmeshed.² If nothing else, the Istanbul populace was aware of the threats to Ottoman survival (and territory) posed by such powers as Russia and Austria. The city's inhabitants had witnessed a series of waves of in-migration from territories already lost to those powers. They had also participated in the boycott of Austrian goods provoked by that country's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in fall 1908.³

In general, however, I would argue that the cartoon maps presented here presumed more than just a vague sense of the Austrian empire and its location. They assumed a literate and at least somewhat politically astute audience. That is, they appealed only to a segment of the literate target audience. Cartoon maps could be read at three levels. One was an emotional level, which responded to recognizable symbols. For example, the depiction of one-time Ottoman territories like Bosnia and Herzegovina as female figures threatened by foreign males was calculated to invoke an automatic response of injured honor and protectiveness from a predominantly male readership. That response required no necessary knowledge of the actual shape or location of these territories. What was required was the knowledge (often invoked through clothing style) that the females were "ours" and the aggressors "outsiders." On a second level, the regular labeling of territory, as in the cartoon (included below) in which Russia and Britain are preparing to eat Persia, suggests that the average reader might need a verbal cue in order to identify territorial outlines. At the very least, labels served to reinforce what might be a fairly limited knowledge of geography. On a third level, maps used in cartoons with

¹ Benjamin Fortna, *Imperial Classroom: Islam, The State, and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 165-201, discusses the images of the empire found in late Ottoman school texts and hanging maps, and the ways in which the Ottoman regime and its bureaucrats used maps to shape an image of the empire in the classroom. Some of these maps were produced in Europe; others were modeled on European maps.

² For an interesting discussion of the ways in which people in a multi-lingual setting imagine their land, their nation, its borders, occupants, and neighboring (outsider) people, see Thongchakul Winichakul, *Siam Mapped: A History of the GeoBody of a Nation* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1997).

³ Kemal Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 97-98, 184-188, 343-345. Austria already controlled and occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina, but in the aftermath of the constitutional revolution, it felt free to annex the territories outright.

rather sophisticated political messages suggest the assumption by editors that a significant element of their readers were well versed in the political events of the day and in the territorial machinations of states outside the empire. They knew what the outline of Albania looked like, who ruled it, and who aspired to rule it.

As Ben Fortna has pointed out, Ottoman school texts were designed to develop loyalty to the empire at the precise moment when its territories were shrinking. Ottoman gazettes, and the cartoons in them, were also designed to promote a sense of shared "national" or imperial identity.¹ At the same time, along with targeting European aggressors, they satirized the empire's inability to maintain its territorial integrity. They urged the government to act in order to preserve the empire and its peoples. Cartoon maps might bemoan territory lost; but they also depicted, as Ottoman, territories like Crete or Egypt, which the empire had not actually possessed for some time. That drawing of lines of possession within the cartoon space does not mean that the editors and cartoonists were blind to the losses of Ottoman territory. Rather, these cartoons were meant to reinforce and to echo sentiments of solidarity, protectiveness, and national honor presumed already to exist in the target audience. Although Bosnia and Herzegovina were physically lost, they retained their identity as pieces of the traditional imperial lands (the well-protected domains, or *memâlik-i mahrûse*) and their place in the imagination and historic memory of the Ottoman reader. Even if the reader had no concrete knowledge of or abiding sentiment attached to these territories, equating them with the body of the Ottoman female might suffice to create sentiments of possession and loss.²

Typology of Maps in Cartoons

The territorial mapping found in Ottoman cartoons may be roughly divided into the following categories: 1) globe images; 2) regional or local

¹ There is a great overlap in these terms in this period. I am persuaded that the Ottoman language gazettes of the period in question reflected a commitment to the preservation of the empire and its territories, hence 'imperial' identity. At the same time, the idea of a 'national' (though multi-ethnic) identity was being laid down over the imperial identity, manifesting itself in notions of new and transformed political systems, gender roles, and technology, among other focuses.

² On the invocation of a feminized homeland to cement group loyalty and provoke protective sentiments in Iran at roughly the same time, see Afsaneh Najmabadi, "The Erotic Vatan [Homeland] as Beloved and Mother: To Love, to Possess, and to Protect," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 39/3 (July 1997), 442-467. On alternatives for the cartoon construction of women, see Palmira Brummett, "Dressing for Revolution: Mother, Nation, Citizen and Subversive in the Ottoman Satirical Press," in Zehra Arat, ed., *Turkish Woman: Deconstructing Images and Ideologies* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998).

maps with recognizable outlines; 3) topographic markers, often situated in otherwise unidentified space; 4) territory embodied as “food” being eaten by “imperialists;” 5) territory embodied as human, using a representative figure (real or allegorical) such as a king or “the army;” frequently such imagery juxtaposed a threatened female and an aggressive or protective male; 6) territory embodied as some type of object or animal (a club, a spike, a bear, a wolf, etc.) employed symbolically in a (peopled) cartoon frame; 7) frontiers (indicated by a line, a river, a signpost, etc.) used to suggest territories which often are not, themselves, depicted in any concrete fashion.¹ Not all of these categories are represented in the cartoons presented below; but the selections will, hopefully, provide some sense of the range of possibilities.

A common image in cartoon maps is the vision of large human characters standing on or striding across expanses of territory: straddling the Bosphorus, pacing out the Balkans, or even poised on the globe. These figures might be cartoon mascots (such as those of the shadow puppet theatre, often employed as spokesmen (or women) for gazettes); they might be kings, diplomats, or other representatives of specific places. The territorial spaces themselves (Anatolia, the Balkans, Crete) are shrunk to make them fit a cartoon frame in which human figures dominate. In other cases, a label appears in the cartoon to suggest a specific territory. That territory may be unbounded, stretching beyond the confines of the cartoon frame. No real attempt is made to give it concrete form. Elsewhere, the label is applied to the outline of a territory presumed to be recognizable, at least to some readers. In other examples the territorial label is applied to an object (a cake, a throne, a spike), which maps that territory into the cartoon frame by juxtaposing it to other symbolic objects or human figures.

The Map as Symbol

Cartoons addressed the question of what the empire looked like. Did it have a recognizable shape or costume? Did its provinces stretch on forever or did they run up against the lands of hostile neighbors. What peoples lived in the empire as part of the “cherished community?” What properties, ethnicities, or groups required the empire’s protection? What pressing events were taking place within the empire that affected the identity, security, or well being of the reader? Was the empire simply a comfortable and familiar “here” as opposed to a distant and foreign “there?” In the cartoon space, an empire-wide affinity (if not unity) was a premise. But the empire was not depicted as a whole. Rather, the empire was invoked, to be lauded or denigrated, by drawing its parts.

¹ For an illustration of a state depicted as an inanimate object, see *Kalem* 118: 10, 10 Mart 1327 / 23 March 1911, which shows Japan as a peg stuck in Russia’s boot, impeding it in its confrontation with China.




Figure 1) Anatolia transformed into a lion.

Kalem, 15:10, 28 Teşrin-i sani 1324 / 10 December 1908.

One cartoon, which combines the techniques of outline map and allegorical figure, focuses on a very critical part of the empire, Anatolia. It is labeled, in Turkish, “*Arslan Anadolu*,” Anatolia the Lion. The French caption reads, simply “Asia Minor.” This image uses the readily identifiable figure of an Ottoman soldier (unlabelled) to divide two maps of the same segment of the empire (western Anatolia, and the southern Balkan peninsula, labeled “*Rumili*”). The map to the soldier’s right is labeled “Anatolia as it was,” the map to his left is labeled “Anatolia as it will be.” In the latter frame, the landmass of Anatolia has become a roaring lion. The general caption beneath the frame is a single word, “Metamorphosis.”¹ This cartoon suggests the anticipation and hope surrounding the crafting of a new regime. In December of 1908, when the cartoon appeared, the selection of parliamentary deputies was taking place. There was great enthusiasm in the press for the possibilities this transformation represented, including a reassertion of Ottoman military power. Hence the lion and the soldier embody the expectation for a newly assertive empire. There are no outside aggressors in this image, but the metamorphosis from a passive to a snarling Anatolia alludes to them. This

¹ *Kalem*, 15: 10, 28 Teşrin-i sani 1324 / 10 December 1908. The Ottoman reads ‘*istihale*’, which can mean watching for a change as well as the change itself. That meaning conveys the mood of anticipation that this cartoon suggests. The French captions in *Kalem* matched the Ottoman ones to a greater or lesser degree, varying from frame to frame.

cartoon aims at building national identity. It also suggests Anatolia as a defensible core of the empire. As is often the case in cartoons of this time, the army is depicted as the defender and preserver of the nation, or what was left of it. The soldier, as pivotal figure in the nation's transformation, is upright, dignified, and ready for action.

The Empire Consumed

In other cartoons, the mood of hopeful expectation disappears, and the foreign aggressors take concrete shape. Maps, in such cartoons, provided the dramatic image of the empire consumed by its enemies. The vision of the empire's annihilation might take the forms of foreign powers playing with, abducting, seducing, or conquering Ottoman lands. But in the cartoon space, the empire could also, quite literally, be eaten. Austria, Britain, and Russia thus became not only imperialist aggressors but also cannibal nations, calmly preparing to digest a helpless and inert Ottoman empire that was both European and Asian.¹

One such cartoon, of imperial European powers feasting on Asian lands, is taken from the gazette *Kalem*. Figures representing England and Russia, identified by their clothing, hats, and hairstyles, sit down to a tray of "Persia."² The outlines of that country are clear, and the map shows "*Arabie*" and "*Turkestan Russe*" to the southwest and northeast. All are labeled. The men have their hands in their laps and no utensils are visible, but the caption makes plain the act in which they are about to engage. The Ottoman caption at the top says simply "to Iran," while the French caption reads "two insatiable eaters." The captions beneath the frame elaborate. "England" (in the Turkish caption) asks, "Well, are we ready to divide up this lamb's fatty tail?" "Russia" responds, "Certainly!" In the French caption, the delicate repast in which the two well-contented powers are about to engage is labeled a

¹ For another consideration of images of eating and of symbolic 'cannibalism' in cartoon satire, see Mark Jenner, "The Roasting of the Rump: Scatology and the Body Politic in Restoration England," *Past and Present*, 177 (November 2002), 84-120. Jenner speaks of 'political cannibalism' in 1660 England, in satire, which 'feasted upon the image of the previous political regime' (p. 111). He notes that cannibalism was used in cartoons and broadsheets to represent the antithesis of civility, to characterize the 'Other,' and to animalize the opposition. 'The Parliamentarians were said to have consumed the body politic, gorging themselves on the spoils of sequestration and regicide (p. 112).'

² *Kalem*, 99: 14, Teşrin-i evvel 14, 1326 / 27 October 1910.

"gateau."¹ But lamb's tail or cake, this is a typical depiction of Russia and Britain as imperialist aggressors, gendered male.²



Figure 2) England and Russia preparing to eat Persia.
Kalem, 99:14, Teşrin-i evvel 14, 1326 / 27 October 1910

It is not the empire itself that is directly threatened in this cartoon, but a neighbor, Iran, for whom the Ottoman gazettes often expressed great affinity. Iran was seen as a fellow regional and Muslim nation, similarly struggling to emerge from an era of despotism but stymied, in part, by the intrusions of Russia and Britain, both greedy to annex Iranian lands. Iran's constitutional revolution began in 1905-1906 shortly before that of the Ottomans. But unlike the relatively bloodless Ottoman installation of a constitutional regime, the Iranian revolution precipitated a civil war in which

¹ England: *Acaba şu yağlı-kuyruğu paylaşabilir miyiz?* Russia: *Hay, hay!* Some cartoons are signed and others remain anonymous. Some readers have been tempted to suggest that cartoons in Ottoman gazettes were simply penned by European cartoonists, or copied from European publications. This is clearly not the case. Turnover time was ordinarily too swift to import foreign cartoons, although Ottoman gazettes did reprint (usually with provenance provided) cartoons from European gazettes. Rather, the multi-ethnic list of names of cartoonists employed by Ottoman editors simply reflects the multi-ethnic nature of the Ottoman Empire and of the artistic production in Istanbul. For a list (although not complete) and brief biographies of cartoonists operating in Istanbul at this time, see Çeviker, *Gelişim Sürecinde Türk Karikatürü*.

² In Ottoman cartoons, the czar is often depicted as a bloody slaughter of Russians, Iranians, and Turks. John Bull is also depicted as a military aggressor, but more often as a greedy economic aggressor.

the newly appointed shah, Muhammad Ali, used Russian assistance in an attempt to squash the constitutionalists.¹ Ottoman gazettes often depicted the Iranians as still struggling beneath the weight of despotic monarchy, which the Ottomans themselves had thrown off. Both, in the cartoon space, were shown struggling against the militaristic designs of the European Powers.

That shared predicament is indicated in another cartoon in which the Ottoman sultan becomes a waiter, serving up his own territories to the Austrian emperor. In this frame, the entrée is called "*gateau*" in the French caption and "*pasta*" in the Turkish. The message, however, is unambiguous. Abdülhamid, the sultan who ruled from 1876 until he was deposed in spring 1909, is shown offering up a map of Rumelia (the Greco-Balkan segment of the empire) to Franz Josef, emperor of Austria. He calls him by the imperial title, *Haşmetma'ab*, which ordinarily would have been reserved for the sultan. "Your imperial majesty," he asks, "do you wish to have this lovely confection?" The emperor, however, is reticent. He still has a portion of "Herzegovina" left on his plate. "Thanks," he replies, I still haven't managed to eat and digest what I've in front of me.²

This cartoon is an image of humiliation. The Ottomans, who had ruled Rumelia for hundreds of years, would now yield that rich territory to be swallowed up by their long-term enemy. Not only must they watch the map of the empire being diminished, they must participate in their own subordination.

Identifying the figure of the waiter as Abdülhamid is problematic here.³ This issue of *Kalem* is dated 25 Nisan 1325, or 6 May 1909, just at the point when Abdülhamid was deposed, accused of having instigated a counter-revolution. Thus, the bearded figure in the fez presumably represents the sultan's inability to protect Ottoman Balkan territory or even his participation in a conspiracy. But it could also represent elements of the new regime forced to preserve the empire by sacrificing some of its parts. My own view is that this is a figure of Abdülhamid. In either case, the map of the Balkans becomes an item for consumption and a symbol of Ottoman weakness.

¹ For the vision of Iran in the Ottoman satirical press, see Brummett, *Image and Imperialism*, 73-112.

² *Kalem* 35:18, 25 Nisan 1325 / 6 May 1909. '*Haşmetma'ab, bu güzel pastayı tenavül buyururlar mı?*

Merci, daha önümdekini yiyüb hazm idemedim.'

³ Individual figures are sometimes hard to identify because of the ubiquity of the beard, fez, and frock coat. Caricatures of the vezir, Hilmi Pasha, for example, sometimes looked like those of the sultan. Abdülhamid, however, is always caricatured with a very prominent nose and often with the same juxtaposition of highly prominent nose and brooding, shadowing eyebrows found in this particular image. The main action of the abortive counter-revolution of 1909 in Istanbul was on April 13.

6 Mai 1909


Journal humoristique et satirique paraissant le Jeudi

N° 35

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CHATELAIN



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— Sire! voulez-vous manger ce gâteau ?
— Merçi, je n'ai pas encore digéré l'autre.

— مشتاق بودم که این تابه را بخورم ؟
— مرسی دها! او که کفی پیوپ همم انشالله.

Figure 3) Sultan serving up Rumelia to Austria
as he eats Herzegovina

Kalem, 35:18, 25 Nisan 1325 / 6 May 1909

Another eating cartoon also depicts the Balkans as the object of Great Power gluttony. In this case, however, there is no attempt to depict a map of Balkan territory. Rather, a label ("Balkan" in Arabic script, and "Balkans" in Latin script) is placed on a large plate of mounded food in the center of a table around which the monarchs of Europe, including Abdülhamid, sit. The French caption suggests this is a festival of politics. The Ottoman caption says, "*ma'ide-i hükümdaran*," the "groaning table," or feast of the monarchs.¹ In this frame, the sultan becomes one of many kings whose objective it is to possess the Balkans. There are guns and knives on the table or in the hands of the diners and each seems to be eying the others warily, waiting to see who will make the first move. This cartoon suggests that the Ottomans are still players in the competition for the Balkans, and indeed, the empire would soon be embroiled in a series of exhausting Balkan wars. Austria, however, had shown by its formal annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in fall of 1908 that the empire had fewer and fewer pieces of the Balkans over which to contend.



La fête des Rois selon la Sainte Politique.

مائدة حكام اوران

Figure 4) European Rulers at table, eating the "Balkans".
Kalem 30:14, 1 Kanun-ı sani 1324, 14 January 1909.

¹ *Kalem*, 30:14, 1 Kanun-ı sani 1324 / 14 January 1909. 'Soresco,' the name noted on this and the preceding cartoon seems to be one of the major cartoon production houses in Istanbul at the time. Various cartoonists drew under the Soresco rubric.

The image of territory eaten by the lords of predatory states is a powerful one, imbued with strong emotions. It invokes feelings of honor, powerlessness, and territoriality. The Ottomans, however, whose territory was being eaten, and whose revolution threatened to weaken the empire's defenses even further, were ill-equipped to fight for a share with the increasingly aggressive rivals vying to consume lands long part of the "well protected domains."

The Rape of Empire, Territory Embodied (Female)

Although territory was mapped in the Ottoman cartoon space through the mechanisms of labels and geographic outlines, it was also mapped onto images of the human form. In particular, the empire and its parts were mapped onto female forms seduced, abducted, or raped by European nations mapped onto the bodies of militaristic males. In such cartoons, the bodies in question might be labeled, or their identity might simply be suggested by their dress, visage, and physical structure. One such cartoon shows the figure of Franz Josef of Austria, a balding white haired male with medals on his chest and sword slung at his side, beckoning to two young females representing Bosnia and Herzegovina. "Please Mesdemoiselles," he says. "Come! I've been waiting for you too long."¹

L'Autriche racolle.



~ Post. Post. Mesdemoiselles devenues mes dames !! ~ ماه ما از سر و پا بدردم پیورند؟ سزی چوقدنیری بکلیوم

Figure 5) Franz Josef as Dirty Old Man with Bosnia and Herzegovina
Kalem 10:7, 23 Teşrin-i sani 1324 / 6 November 1908

¹ *Kalem*, 10:7, 23 Teşrin-i sani 1324 / 6 November 1908.

The figures are not labeled but their dress and the timing of the cartoon make them recognizable. Austria had actually controlled Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1878, but it used the opportunity of the Ottoman constitutional revolution to annex them outright on October 5, 1908. The Ottomans protested and launched a boycott of Austrian goods, but to no avail. In this cartoon of that "abduction," the females in the doorway are reluctant and indecisive, still "protected." Yet, the cartoon suggests that they will be lured away (as in fact they already have been). The exaggerated pseudo-traditional, "Oriental" costumes type these females as Ottoman property. This type of feminization and sexualization of territory tends, in the cartoon space, to be employed for threatened or seized segments of the empire, like Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Crete, but not for Albania (which is invariably depicted as male). The former lands were also depicted as harem women or juxtaposed to Alsace and Lorraine, contested territories also gendered female.¹

While the cartoon space was also inhabited by strong female figures, the gendering of threatened territory tended to equate the feminine with the weak. This picture of weakness took varying forms. Often, the simple use of a female figure conveyed frailty and the need for protection. In other frames, the empire was embodied as a sick patient in need of a cure, or one about to be "operated upon" by the imperialist male "physicians" of Europe, who were intent on detaching its various "limbs."² The sick "patients" might be gendered male or female. In either case, however, the mood invoked was either one of anger and outrage, on the one hand, or of desperation and depression, on the other. When foreign males handled the national "body," especially the female body, sexual honor became a counterpart to political or military honor.

Walking on the Map

Ottoman satire was defined by its emphasis on dialog; and as the revolutionary era brought a suspension of censorship, the satiric press found no better representative of that dialogic form than Karagöz, the main character of the shadow puppet theatre, and his various subsidiary characters. The repartee of the shadow puppet theatre was employed in editorials and satirical prose, while the puppet characters became the mascots of many satiric gazettes.³ *Karagöz*, a gazette named after the emblematic puppet hero, was a long running periodical that excelled in both political and social satire. *Karagöz* and his sidekick *Hacivat* appeared in almost every cartoon frame, expressing the fears, dissatisfaction, and skepticism of the denizens of

¹ *Kalem* 22: 4, 15 Kanun-ı sani 1324 / 28 January 1909.

² In a related and humorous instance of 'surgery' in the cartoon space, Austria and Italy are shown as surgeons operating on two 'growths' on the back of Greece while *Karagöz* looks on (all the figures are male). The growths are little maps of contested territory, Salonica and Epirus. The date is 1914, when the political situation in the region had already changed dramatically. The ever-cynical *Karagöz* tells the '*operatör efendi*' that the wound will not heal. *Karagöz* 610: 4, 2 Nisan 1330 / 15 April 1914.

³ See Brummett, *Image and Imperialism*, 51-72.

Istanbul. These “Everyman,” or “John Q. Public” figures were drawn perched on the globe, hopping from island to island in the Aegean, or skulking through the streets of Istanbul heaping scorn on the municipal authorities.¹

Although Karagöz reserved much of his harshest criticism for the internal politics and cultural issues of the empire, he routinely satirized the ambitions of European powers as well. In one particular cartoon, he acts the posturing conqueror while standing astride the islands of Midilli (Mitylene) and Sakız (Chios). These islands, which are labeled and drawn as generic islands rather than as renderings in cartographic outline, lie off the western coast of Turkey. Greece annexed Chios in 1912, and Mitylene in 1913. On

October 4, 1913, *Karagöz* employed its characteristic dialogic form to satirize the aspirations of Greece, a state that had, for so many years, itself been a territory of the Ottoman Empire:

Hacivat: Mercy, Karagöz, what are you doing, practicing gymnastics?

Karagöz: In a minute you'll find out what I'm practicing. You'll see! I'm not lifting my foot from the place I already trod; and I'm not going to lift this one over here either.²



حاجیوات — آمان قره کوزه اییورسک جیناسیق می نعلیر اییورسک ده
قره کوزه — نه نعلیر اینترکی بر مدت سوکرا آکلاجه سقسته بن باصدیق وردن آگاهی قانیریم — یوزدن ده قانیریم
کورد سیکسک ۱۹

Figure 6) Karagöz Striding Across Midilli/Mitylene and Sakız/Scio (Chios)

Karagöz, 562:1, 21 Eylül 1329 / 4 October 1913.

¹ For two images of Karagöz and Hacivat standing on the globe (lassoing the moon or signaling Mars), see *Karagöz*, 561:4, 18 Eylül 1329 / 31 July 1913 and 575: 1, 6 Teşrin-i sani 1329 / 19 November 1913.

² *Karagöz*, 562:1, 21 Eylül 1329 / 4 October 1913. This cartoon plays on the word *basmak*, which means to conquer or overwhelm as well as to step or trod on.


In this frame there are no king-figures. Rather, Karagöz, sword in hand, is mocking the Greek annexations. Chios has become a stepping-stone for the taking of Mitylene. But “the conqueror,” perched awkwardly between two islands cannot move without lifting his foot off of one or the other. He may possess a gateway to the mainland, but he may also fall in the water. In Ottoman satire, states like Greece and Bulgaria were “little” powers, or pretenders to power. There was always the suggestion that territories lost to them could be taken back. In this type of cartoon map, as is so often the case, the broad geographic context is not visible. Neither Greece nor the Ottoman mainland is shown. The viewer glimpses, between Karagöz’s legs, what looks like a steam powered warship, perhaps an allusion to British support for Greek ambitions, although the flag the steamer flies is not decipherable.

Borders and Possession

Conquest was one avenue for the transfer of territory; treaties were another. In the period from 1908 to 1913, Ottoman losses occurred through both of these modes. Although there are many images in the Ottoman cartoon space of military assaults or of sovereigns meeting to plan the division of Ottoman lands, I have found only one cartoon image of territory actually being marked off. This particular cartoon explicitly depicts the (scientific) drawing of territorial boundaries and has some pretenses of cartographic accuracy. The image targets one of the primary objects of Ottoman satirists’ scorn.

Bulgaria’s Prince Ferdinand, capitalizing on the uncertainty engendered by the Ottoman constitutional revolution, had declared Bulgaria independent in October 1908. Later, during the Balkan war lasting from July 1912 to May 30, 1913, Ferdinand was allied with Serbia and Greece against the Ottomans. But, in the later stages of the war, he became distrustful of his allies; and shortly after the war’s end he attempted to preempt their territorial ambitions by expanding his own borders. This cartoon, dated June 15, 1913, targets that expansionist ideal.¹ Here, King Ferdinand is shown as a compass-legged figure, slashing new borderlines on a map of the Balkans. Karagöz, the omniscient observer, stands off to the side warning that his bold demarcations may be as tenuous as his perch is precarious.

¹ The Powers had asked the Serbs and Montenegrins to withdraw from occupied Albanian territory. Greece supported the Serbian demand for compensation from the Montenegrin territories previously assigned to Bulgaria. Bulgaria prepared for war, prompting a Greco-Serbian alliance on June 1, 1913. Albania (*Arnavudluk*) whose fate appears undetermined in this frame was formally made independent by the Powers shortly after this cartoon appeared; and Bulgaria launched its war against its former allies on July 29, 1913. Karagöz’s prophecy was fulfilled as the Bulgarians suffered a devastating loss to Greece and Serbia.



قلم کوز سن آغاڭی اوندر آجیشک اما هرکس اندازسه کوره قنای ویرمزلر ایته درکلر نه نوبتی ایندره شک
برسی شهر نیدر . . .

Figure 7) Ferdinand of Bulgaria with Compass Legs
Karagöz, 528:1, 12 Haziran 1329 / 25 June 1913.

Like the previous cartoon, this image is about “footing,” the ability to stand firm and match territorial realities to territorial ambitions. The caption is best translated using English slang. *Karagöz*, satirizing Ferdinand’s attempt at a land-grab, suggests that he has reached too far. He remarks that Bulgaria’s king is “too big for his britches,” and that certainly someone will come along to “take him down a peg.”¹ King Peter of Serbia and King George of Greece seem poised, on either side, to take on that task or even to topple Ferdinand from his pointed compass “toes.”

In this cartoon, we have what looks like a “real” map, in the narrow sense of that term. Cities and regions are labeled, seacoasts are demarcated, and borders are marked by at least two types of lines. The frame combines the device of emblematic figures standing on the map, with an attempt to demarcate, in rough outline, part of the peninsula and its states. As in other examples shown here, the surrounding territorial context is missing; the space around the demarcated territory is blank or cut off by the edge of the cartoon frame. To the left side of the frame, in an unbounded territory, is scrawled in large letters the word “*Arnavutluk*,” Albania. Its fate, at least in this cartoon, is as yet undetermined.

¹ *Karagöz, 528: 1, 12 Haziran 1329 / 25 June 1913.* The caption reads, ‘*Sen ayağını o kadar açmışsın ama, herkesin endazesine göre kumaş vermezler. Elbette “pergel” in ucunu indirecek birisi zuhur eder.*’ Literally, “You’ve stretched your leg(s) this far but one isn’t given cloth according to his size. Certainly someone will appear who will knock down the leg of the compass.” *Pergel açmak* in colloquial Turkish means to take long steps; and *endaze* can mean ability as well as size or measure. It was customary in Ottoman chronicles to speak of the sultan as a ‘master with a long reach’ (*yed-i tûl sahibidir*). In this cartoon, that image of long reach is invoked to suggest that Ferdinand’s reach may exceed his grasp, which indeed it did.


While the previous image depicts the drawing of borderlines, the vision of borders or frontiers in Ottoman cartoons was often not so specific. In the cartoon space, a border might be suggested by a signpost, a river, a fence, a customs station, or simply by contrasting styles of dress on either side of an imagined line.¹ Usually there is little indication of the lands on either side. One such cartoon, appearing in the gazette *Kalem*, used material culture and the idea of the civilized vs. the uncivilized to depict the Austrian-Serbian frontier. This split-frame cartoon shows the frontier as a line, or more precisely as what seems to be a grassy bulwark. The first image, entitled, "The Austrian frontier, seen from the Serbian side," shows a line of bayoneted rifles with a cannon in their midst. The second image, captioned, "The Serbian frontier, seen from the Austrian side," shows a range of more primitive weapons: knives, arquebuses, a pitchfork, a crossbow, and wooden poles.²

This cartoon would be incomprehensible without its captions. Although the contrast of technology is clear, the reader needs to know that these are borderlines, and where, in order to appreciate the joke. Borders mark divisions of territory, but they also mark divisions of language, ethnicity, costume, material culture, and arms. For the Ottoman satirist, Austria was an empire, a civilized equal. Serbs, Bulgarians, and Albanians were one-time subjects, peasants or mountaineers, with antiquated guns or pitchforks. They did not possess the same status in the Ottoman civilizational hierarchy and their entitlement to rule themselves at all was questionable.³ The Ottomans, however, were not only mocking the weakness of the Serbs, they were also indirectly mocking themselves, as citizens of an empire unable to compete technologically with its northern rival. "*Sirbistan*" was part of what occupied the space between Austria and Istanbul. If its "primitive" modes of defense could not protect it from Austria then the frontiers would move, and the distance between the Ottomans and their powerful foes would grow shorter.

¹ See *Kalem* 111: 18, 20 Kanun-ı sani 1326 / 2 February 1911, for a cartoon caricaturing the capitulations by showing a smuggler at the Ottoman-Bulgarian frontier. The border is marked by a fence and two signposts, one of the '*Frontiere Turque*,' and one of the '*Frontiere Bulgare*.'


² *Kalem*, 22 Nisan 1325 / 6 May 1909. '*Avusturya hududunun Sirbistandan görünüşü*.' *Sirbistan hududunun Avusturyadan görünüşü*.' '*Hudud*,' from the Arabic, is the word for frontiers, it suggests, like the Italian '*confini*,' limits, ends, borders, or far-reaches of a territory.

³ Even though Ottomans were, in part, Serbs, Bulgarians, and Albanians (among other ethnicities), in the course of the struggle against separatist movements in the Balkans and Austrian and Russian imperial aggression, and in the cartoon space, ethno-national typing was employed to delineate those peoples who had been part of the empire but had removed themselves or were being removed from it.



La frontière d'Autriche, vue du côté de la Serbie.

آوستریا حدودیك مرستاندن كورونوشی



La frontière de Serbie, vue du côté de l'Autriche.

مرستان حدودیك آوستریا دن كورونوشی

Figure 8) Arms at the Austrian-Serbian Frontier
Kalem, 22 Nisan 1325 / 6 May 1909

Conclusion

These images do not give us any sort of comprehensive picture of the evolution of Ottoman identities in the early twentieth century. They are, after all, fragments drawn from a specialized body of literature produced by a privileged elite hardly representative of the bulk of Ottoman citizenry. Nonetheless, the satirical press was a powerful and widely disseminated form of literature and art, reflective of the humor and ideas circulating at least among the Ottoman literate classes. The cartoonists and their audience could not forget the history of empire, the notion of the “well protected lands” extending from the Adriatic to the Persian Gulf, or an era of grandeur during which the Ottomans pushed the frontiers of their empire towards Vienna. Neither, however, could they forget the military weakness of the Ottoman state, its territorial losses, and the threats posed by the new constitutional reality. Thus the satirical construction of enemies was, inevitably, also a satire of self --- one in which the possession of lands played a crucial role. The imperial body was being dismembered, and cartoon maps responded with anger, determination, frustration, resignation, and humor. The cartoon space provided a frame, suspended between ideals, ambitions, memories, and ground-level realities, in which the Ottomans could project the multiple and sometimes schizophrenic identities available to them. The cartoon map reveals how those identities were indelibly attached to visions of space, possession, borders, gender, and national honor.

OTTOMAN WAR PLANNING AND THE BALKAN CAMPAIGN OF OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1912

F. A. K. Yasamee

I

In late September 1912 the government of the Ottoman Empire received unmistakable intimations that it was about to be attacked by its four smaller Balkan neighbours: Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro and Greece. Militarily, it found itself in an exceptionally vulnerable position, with its armed forces partially dispersed, thanks to a year-long war with Italy, and revolts in Albania and the Yemen, and also well below strength, thanks to a recent decision to demobilise one whole class of serving conscripts, together with reservists who had been called up for the Italian war. Mobilisation against the Balkan states was ordered on 1 October. Montenegro declared war on 8 October, and ten days later, with its own mobilisation and deployment far from complete, the Ottoman Empire found itself at war with Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece as well. What followed was a disaster for Ottoman arms. Within little more than a month, the main Ottoman armies had been routed, and only a last-ditch defence at Çatalca had prevented the Bulgarians from entering the Ottoman capital. Elsewhere only the isolated fortresses of Adrianople, Jannina and Scutari held out, together with some forces in southern Albania, and on 3 December the Ottoman government concluded an armistice with Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro, though not Greece.¹ Five centuries of Ottoman rule in the Balkan peninsula had been brought to an abrupt end, not, as so often predicted, through inexorable processes of internal decay, or a *diktat* by the European great powers, but in a conventional military campaign. The Ottoman Empire's failure was first and foremost the failure of its army.

The rapidity and scale of the Ottoman collapse provoked surprise at home and abroad; only a handful of Ottoman generals appear to have foreseen it. The Ottoman army enjoyed an historic reputation, and the fighting qualities

¹ General surveys of the Balkan wars and their origins in Edward J. Erickson, *Defeat in Detail: The Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 1912-1913*, (Westport, Connecticut, 2003); Richard C. Hall, *The Balkan Wars 1912-1913. Prelude to the First World War* (London, 2000); Ernst Christian Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars 1912-1913* (New York, 1938); Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türk İnkılabı Tarihi II: II. Balkan Savaşları* (Ankara, 1943); Andrey Toshev, *Balkanskite Voyni*, 2 vols. (Sofia, 1929-1931); Andrew Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans: Inter-Balkan rivalries and Russian foreign policy 1908-1914* (Toronto, 1981).

of the ordinary Turkish conscript were widely esteemed. Admittedly, the army had not fought a major campaign since 1878, and over the following three decades it had suffered serious neglect, and been allowed to degenerate into an ill-trained internal security force. Since the constitutional revolution of 1908, however, strenuous efforts had been made to modernise the army, and restore its conventional fighting capacity. The officer corps had been purged and rejuvenated; conscription had been reformed, and extended to hitherto exempt groups; a new organisation had been introduced; military schools and training facilities had been expanded; German instructors had been introduced into all branches; and quantities of new munitions and equipment had been purchased, chiefly from Germany. The general impression was of solid progress. In April 1911 the German general staff assessed the Ottoman army as "already fit for its task in a defensive war, and within a foreseeable time, in an offensive war as well".¹ Indeed, fear of an unstoppable Ottoman military revival was one of the factors which impelled the Balkan states to launch their pre-emptive attack in October 1912.²

Contemporary explanations of the army's Balkan failure fell into two main groups. The defeated Ottoman generals were at one in arguing that their army had let them down: a chaotic mobilisation had left most units severely under-strength; the bulk of the reservists were untrained, and worse than useless; there was a serious shortage of supplies, and above all, of food; morale was less than zero, and the troops prone to panic.³ In contrast, more junior officers threw the blame squarely onto the army's senior commanders. They acknowledged the deficiencies of the troops and the rear organisation, but insisted that it was a series of gross strategic and tactical blunders which had turned a difficult situation into a disaster. To the portrait of the ill-trained, half-starved and demoralised conscript they opposed that of the incompetent, dilettante and panicky staff officer.⁴

¹ Kriegsarchiv-München, Generalstab 252, 'Jahresbericht 1911 über das Heerwesen der Türkei, Japans und Chinas', April 1911.

² Novica B. Rakočević, *Ratni planovi Srbije protiv Turske od Vožda Karađorđa do Kralja Petra*, (Belgrade, n. d.), 169-70.

³ For typical accounts, see Abdullah Paşa, *1328 Balkan Harbinde Şark Ordusu Kumandanı Abdullah Paşa'nın Hatıratı* (İstanbul, 1336); Mahmud Muhtar Paşa, *Üçüncü Kolordunun ve İkinci Şark Ordusunun Muharebeleri* (İstanbul, 1334); Mirliva Pertev, *Balkan Harbinde Büyük Karargah-ı Umumi* (İstanbul, 1927); Birinci Ferik Zeki, *1912 Balkan Harbine aid Hatıratım* (İstanbul, 1337); Mahmud Belig, *Balkan Harbinde Müretteb Dördüncü Kolordunun Harekatı* (İstanbul, 1928).

⁴ See in particular Bursalı Mehmed Nihad, *1328-9 Balkan Harbi. Trakya Seferi*, 3 vols. (İstanbul, 1340-1928); Müşir Fevzi Paşa, *Garbi Rumeli'nin Suret-i Ziyai ve Balkan Harbinde Garb Cebhesi* (İstanbul, n.d.); A. [Asım], *Balkan Harbinde Neden Münhezim Olduk?* (İstanbul, 1329); *Askeri Mağlubiyetlerimizin Esbabı* (İstanbul, 1329); Hafız Hakkı Paşa, *Bozgun* (İstanbul, n.d.).

II

Evidently, there can be no single explanation of the army's defeat, and the present study seeks to explore but one of a complex of relevant issues: namely, the role of pre-war strategic planning. As will be seen, many of the key problems facing Ottoman planners derived from their own army's force structure. As in other European armies, this rested on conscription, and a system of reserves which would augment the army's strength in wartime. The army comprised three separate forces: the active army (*Nizam*), which served as the peacetime standing army, and possessed its own active reserve (*İhtiyat*); the territorial reserve (*Redif*); and the home guard (*Müstahfiz*). Conscripts served in the active army full-time for three years, and were then passed in succession to the active reserve, for six years; the territorial reserve, for nine; and the home guard, for two.¹ In accordance with the new organisation introduced in 1910, the active army comprised 43 divisions, organised into 14 corps and six unattached divisions. The territorial reserve comprised 54 divisions, which might be formed into corps in wartime. The home guard was a purely local defence force, whose largest unit was the battalion. On paper, this gave a peacetime strength of 275,000, and a potential wartime strength, with all reserves mobilised, of 1.7-1.8 million.²

This structure had three main weaknesses. In the first place, the new organisation was not yet complete. There were significant shortages of officers, NCOs, technical units, field transport, artillery and machine guns. Budgetary constraints kept the active army below its envisaged peacetime strength, and in most infantry regiments the third battalion was no more than a cadre. It was also questionable whether the reserves were sufficient to bring the army up to full fighting strength, particularly if due allowance was made for 'no-shows' at mobilisation, and the modernised army's need for expanded rear services.³ A second, associated weakness was training. Since 1908 the training of conscripts in the active army had been intensified and brought up to date, but the bulk of the reservists knew only the inferior training practised under Sultan Abdülhamid. A large portion had received little or no training, thanks to a generous system of exemptions which allowed men to escape full-

¹ Conscripts from the Empire's Balkan provinces served an additional two years as home guards, between the ages of 18 and 20.

² Nihad, *Balkan Harbi*, I, 15-6; Reşat Hallı, *Balkan Harbi (1912-1913)*, I (Ankara, 1970), 92-112; Faruk Aydın, *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Tanzimat'tan sonra Askeralma Kanunları (1839-1914)* (Ankara, 1994), 28-49.

³ Nihad, *Balkan Harbi*, I, 16-20.

time service with the active army, and pass directly into the reserves.¹ On the most favourable assumptions, it would be 1917 before the army possessed a properly trained active reserve; the formation of a fully trained territorial reserve would take even longer. Until then, the army would be composed of heterogeneous elements of markedly varying quality.² War planning would have to allow for these deficiencies. It was accepted that at mobilisation active units would have to make up their numbers with trained territorials, that territorial units would take in trained home guards, and that much field transport would have to be commandeered from the civilian population. The problems were acknowledged; whether they were properly addressed is another question.

The third weakness was the geographical distribution of the reserves. In peacetime, most units of the active army were based in the Balkans, on the Russian frontier, and in the fertile crescent, these being the regions judged most vulnerable to foreign attack, or internal subversion. The bulk of the active reserve, however, and also the bulk of the territorial reserve, were drawn from western and central Anatolia, the Empire's main sources of conscriptable manpower. It followed that the army's wartime mobilisation and deployment would be slow, and certainly slower than those of most of its potential enemies. The Empire would be vulnerable to a surprise attack, or a war which began at short notice.³ In principle, the problem of slow mobilisation and deployment could be addressed through improvements in transport infrastructure, and the construction of fortified positions which would delay or divert an invader. In practice, these measures would require considerable sums of money, and could be implemented only over time. As of 1908, the Empire's transport infrastructure comprised a sparse network of railways, mostly single-track, and foreign-owned, an equally sparse network of metalled, all-weather highways, and a handful of substantial harbours. Fortifications, similarly, were largely superannuated, and in some cases in a poor state of repair. By 1912 the railway network had been partially enhanced in Thrace and western Anatolia, and plans announced for the construction of 10,000 kilometres of motor roads, but proposed harbour improvements were still

¹ The annual call-up of new recruits was a complex affair. Conscripts who could demonstrate that they had dependents were automatically exempted from service with the active army, and assigned to the territorial reserve, subject to the proviso – generally not enforced – that they undertake, over time, a specified number of days' training with their local territorial unit. All those not so exempted were divided into two portions by ballot, with only the first required to perform three years' active service. The so-called 'second portion' served for no more than six months before passing to the territorial reserve. Even then, it was possible to transfer from the first to the second portion upon payment of a fee.

² Halli, *Balkan Harbi (1912-1913)*, 122.

³ F. A. K. Yasamee, 'Some Military Problems faced by the Ottoman Empire at the Beginning of the 20th Century', *Kök Araştırmalar: Osmanlı Özel Sayısı* (Ankara, 2000).

outstanding.¹ Progress on fortifications was likewise slow. In Thrace, the fortress of Adrianople was partially modernised, but proposals for the parallel fortification of Kırkkilise were not followed up. In Macedonia, proposals for the fortification of Kumanovo, Skopje and Štip were likewise deferred, and priority given to the modernisation of the Albanian fortresses of Scutari and Jannina – a curious choice, in the view of some, for these two fortresses could serve in a war against Bulgaria or Serbia only on the pessimistic assumption that Ottoman forces would be driven back into Albania. In addition, some works were undertaken at Karaburun, covering the seaward approaches to Salonika.² Though useful, these various improvements in transport and fortifications were insufficient to transform the strategic picture: for the time being, the army's slow mobilisation and deployment remained a given, with which the general staff's planners would have to reckon.

III

It is known that in 1912 the Ottoman general staff had five current plans of operations, all drawn up in 1909-10, during Major-General Ahmed İzzet Paşa's active tenure of the post of chief of the general staff. Each plan envisaged the case of hostilities with a different enemy or combination of enemies: no.1, against Bulgaria; no.2, against an alliance of Bulgaria and Greece; no.3, against Greece; no. 4, against an alliance of Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro; and no. 5, against an alliance of Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro and Greece. Each was supported by a mobilisation project, specifying which units would be mobilised in the particular case, and where and by when they would be deployed.³ Only three of the plans appear to have survived, one in an abridged version: no.1, against Bulgaria; no.4, against an alliance of Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro; and no.5, against an alliance of Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro and Greece. The three plans shared a common approach. They identified strategic problems and choices, and made recommendations for the initial concentration of forces and the conduct of operations up to the first major battles. They showed the clear influence of German strategic thought, notably in their assumption that the primary objective of operations was the destruction of the enemy's main forces, rather than the gaining or holding of

¹ Nihad, *Balkan Harbi*, I, 72-3, 77-8, 79-80; [Asım], *Askeri Mağlubiyetlerimizin Esbabı*, 40-1.

² Ahmed İzzet Paşa, *Feryadım*, I (İstanbul: Nehir Yay., 1992), 46-7; Nihad, *Balkan Harbi*, I, 78-9; Fevzi, *Garbi Rumeli'nin Suret-i Ziyar*, 19-21; Pertev, *Balkan Harbinde Büyük Karargah-ı Umumi*, 115-8; NL Goltz 34, 'Gutachten betreffend Anlage von Grenzverstärkungen zum Schutze des Aufmarsches der Ottomanischen Streitkräfte auf der rumelischen Seite', 13 November 1910; note by Col. Posseltdt and Lt-Col. Muth, n. d.

³ Hallı, *Balkan Harbi (1912-1913)*, 185-92; Nihad, *Balkan Harbi*, I, 31-49, 104; Ahmed İzzet, *Feryadım*, I, 124-5.

territory for its own sake, and that final victory must be achieved offensively. This, however, is not to say that the Ottoman army's German advisers had any hand in the preparation of the plans, or any detailed knowledge of their contents, though they were doubtless aware of some of the planning issues. The tale that the most senior German adviser, general von der Goltz, had himself drawn up a plan for the defence of the Ottoman Balkans appears to lack any foundation.¹

The plans also shared a common approach to the problems of fighting a war in the Balkans. They acknowledged that a war against a particular Balkan state or states might draw the others in, and that in addition to those forces which would be deployed against the immediate enemy, others would have to be mobilised as a deterrent to the non-belligerents. In practice, this meant that the three plans envisaged the mobilisation of forces of similar size, including all active, territorial and home guard units in the Empire's Balkan provinces, all active and territorial units in western and central Anatolia, and three divisions in Syria. Other units in Syria, Iraq, Arabia, eastern Anatolia and Tripolitania would not be mobilised.

A second common assumption was that the Empire's principal military opponent would be Bulgaria, whose 370,000-strong army was larger than those of Serbia, Greece and Montenegro combined. Any war involving Bulgaria would have to be fought in two theatres, Thrace and Macedonia, and a great deal would depend upon how the Bulgarians chose to divide their forces between the two. The assumption was that the Bulgarians would be most likely to place their main forces in Thrace, since victory in that theatre would enable them to threaten the Ottoman capital, and dictate peace on their own terms. At the same time, however, it was acknowledged that the acquisition of Macedonia would be the Bulgarians' primary political objective, and they might be tempted to launch their main attack there, particularly if they counted upon an intervention by the European great powers to bring hostilities to a premature end, thus enabling an initially successful Bulgarian offensive to create a territorial *fait accompli*. The Bulgarians would also enjoy the advantage of interior lines, and be able to move forces between the two theatres with relative ease; the Turks would not, their sole land link between Thrace and Macedonia being a narrow strip along the Aegean littoral which might easily be severed by enemy action. The Turks would therefore have to fight two separate campaigns, in two theatres, and with two armies operating largely independently of one another: an Eastern Army in Thrace, and a Western Army in Macedonia and Albania.

¹ For the rumoured 'Goltz plan', see Bernd F. Schulte, *Vor dem Kriegsausbruch 1914. Deutschland, die Türkei und der Balkan* (Düsseldorf, 1980), 25, 125-7.

A third common assumption was that the Balkan states, with their compact territories and populations, would be capable of mobilising and deploying their armies much faster than the Ottoman Empire, which, even in a Balkan campaign, would have to rely heavily on active and territorial units transported from Asia. The Bulgarians, in particular, were expected to complete their mobilisation and deployment within 15 days at most; the other Balkan states would take longer, though certainly no longer than the Ottoman Empire itself, which, depending on the case, might take up to 45 days.¹ It followed that there was a real risk that Ottoman forces might find themselves outnumbered at the start of the campaign, and consequently be forced to assume the defensive, or even to undertake a strategic withdrawal, avoiding a decisive engagement until they had been adequately reinforced. Finally, the plans assumed that the Ottoman Empire could eventually mobilise forces greater than those of any single Balkan state, or all four of its Balkan neighbours combined: herein lay the best guarantee of ultimate victory.

The plans advocated no single strategy. Rather, they assumed a range of cases, from best to worst, depending upon the state of the Ottoman army's own mobilisation and deployment at the outbreak of hostilities. In the best case, with Ottoman forces fully deployed, the strategy would be to assume the offensive, in at least one of the two theatres. In the worst case, with Ottoman forces seriously outnumbered in one or perhaps both theatres, a three-stage strategy would be followed: an initial withdrawal to gain time for reinforcement, followed by a defensive battle or battles well to the rear, which would break the enemy's offensive, and finally a counter-offensive which would complete the destruction of the enemy's forces and lead the war to a victorious conclusion on enemy soil. The latter strategy carried acknowledged risks. The deliberate abandonment of Ottoman territories and populations could provoke demoralisation, disaffection and desertion among reservists from the regions affected, whose first concern would be the protection of their families and homes. It might also provoke mass flight by the Moslem population of those regions, creating a refugee problem which could seriously hamper military operations. Domestic opinion might react badly to the news that territory was being abandoned without a fight, thereby imperilling the stability of the government. Above all, there was a risk that the European powers might intervene to bring hostilities to an early end, depriving the Empire of the prospect of a protracted campaign, and leaving its enemies in *de facto* possession of large swathes of Ottoman territory. The precedents were not encouraging: Eastern Rumelia in 1885, and Crete in 1897, had both been cases in which the powers had endorsed *faits accomplis* at Ottoman expense.

¹ [Asım], *Askeri Mağlubiyetlerimizin Esbabı*, 38.

The planners had to face the fact that military and political logic might collide.¹

IV

Plan 1, against Bulgaria, was drawn up in 1909, and revised a year later to take account of the army's new force structure.² It assumed that the Bulgarians would probably launch their main attack in Thrace, deploying two-thirds or three-quarters of their army there; but it declined to rule out the possibility that they might do so in Macedonia, and warned that Ottoman forces in each theatre must be strong enough to deal with either eventuality. The general staff's customary method of calculating fighting strength was to count infantry battalions.³ This gave a Bulgarian total of 288, and the plan therefore proposed to assign 308 Ottoman battalions to Thrace, and 251 to Macedonia. A further 60 battalions would cover the Serbian, Montenegrin and Greek frontiers, but were not included in the calculation of fighting strength. In principle, therefore, Ottoman forces would enjoy the prospect of superiority in both theatres, but only over time, for more than half of the Ottoman forces to be deployed in Thrace would be drawn from western, central and eastern Anatolia, and roughly one third of those to be deployed in Macedonia would be drawn from western Anatolia and Syria. It was therefore likely that Ottoman forces would be initially outnumbered in the theatre selected by the Bulgarians for their main attack, and be forced to assume the defensive. Ottoman forces in the other theatre would assume the offensive.

In Thrace, the Bulgarians were likely to advance in two convergent directions: eastwards, via the Maritsa valley, and southwards, from the Tundzha basin. An advance via the Maritsa would be obstructed by the fortress at Adrianople, and, further south, by the Maritsa itself. An advance from the Tundzha would face no such obstacles, and would offer the Bulgarians opportunities to threaten the Turks' rear communications. It could therefore be presumed that the Bulgarians would launch their main offensive from the Tundzha, and a subsidiary offensive from the Maritsa. Ottoman forces would deploy accordingly. The 'Maritsa line' would be held by four divisions at Adrianople, two divisions at Dimetoka and a single division in the Rodop

¹ Ahmed İzzet, *Feryadım*, I, 126-7; Perteve, *Balkan Harbinde Büyük Karargah-ı Umumi*, 42; Nihad, *Balkan Harbi*, I, 81-2; Fevzi, *Garbi Rumeli'nin Suret-i Ziyai*, 32-3, 114.

² The text of Plan 1 is given in Nihad, *Balkan Harbi*, I, 81-93; cf., Hallı, *Balkan Harbi* (1912-1913), 192-207; Abdullah, *1328 Balkan Harbinde*, 23-31.

³ And also, sometimes, artillery batteries and cavalry squadrons. The reason for using these smaller units as the basis for comparisons of force strength was that they were of roughly equivalent size in all relevant armies. Larger units were not: a Bulgarian infantry division, for example, comprised 24 battalions, whereas a Turkish division comprised only 9-10.

mountains at Kırcaali. The main Ottoman force, comprising six corps, would deploy east of Adrianople, on the Yenice-Hasköy line, and secure its right flank by placing a strong detachment at Kırkkilise and a lesser detachment at Vize. Should the Bulgarians launch their main attack in Macedonia, and assume the defensive in Thrace, Ottoman forces in Thrace would assume the offensive, passing on both sides of Adrianople, with their main weight in the south. The aim would be to force the Bulgarians northwards, away from the railway through the Maritsa valley and any prospect of reinforcement from Macedonia. In the more likely event that the Bulgarians launched their main attack in Thrace, Ottoman forces on the Yenice-Hasköy line would seek to gain additional time for reinforcement by withdrawing, and fight a defensive battle either at the Telan valley near Alpulu, or to the rear of Lüleburgaz, "towards Karıştiran". Once suitably reinforced from Anatolia, they would launch a counter-offensive. Forces on the Maritsa line would not withdraw, but resist, and seek to draw the maximum enemy force towards themselves.

In Macedonia, the Bulgarians might invade by three routes: in the north, from Kyustendil towards Kumanovo; in the centre, via the Bregalnica valley towards @tip, and in the south, via the Struma valley towards Salonika. The central route seemed most likely: the northerly route was circuitous, and vulnerable on its Albanian flank, while the southerly route was mountainous, and unsuitable for the deployment of large forces. Nonetheless, the plan warned that if the Bulgarians chose to attack in strength, they would probably use all three routes, and in addition send a subsidiary force by a fourth route, from the Mesta Karasu valley towards Serez and the Aegean. Ottoman forces would be best deployed in the centre: a northerly deployment, around Kumanovo, would expose their rear communications to a Bulgarian attack further south, while a southerly deployment, towards the Struma valley and mount Belasica, would mean surrendering considerable territory and take place on difficult terrain which would hamper an eventual counter-attack.

Accordingly, the plan proposed that the main Ottoman force, to be formed of 22 divisions organized into six corps, should commence its assembly west of the Vardar between Köprülü and Demirkapı, with flanking detachments of one division at Kumanovo and two in the Mesta Karasu valley around Serez and Nevrekeop. Once the main force had assembled two corps, and despatched a single division to the Struma valley, it would advance across the Vardar to the line @tip-Radovi@, and continue its deployment there. Thereafter all would depend upon the scale and direction of the Bulgarian attack, and the progress of the Ottoman deployment. Should Ottoman forces have completed their deployment by the outbreak of hostilities, they would assume the offensive towards the line Kyustendil-Dupnitsa, and then on

towards Sofia. Should Ottoman forces not have completed their deployment, and should the Bulgarians direct their main attack southwards, via the Struma valley, the three Ottoman divisions in the Struma and Mesta Karasu valleys would withdraw towards Salonika, taking full advantage of the terrain to fight defensive, delaying actions, while a portion of the central Ottoman forces in the Vardar valley would move south, and fall upon the enemy's flank and rear in the neighbourhood of Dojran. Should the Bulgarians launch their main attack in the centre and north, Ottoman forces there would combine their operations, and "exploit the interior lines".

The final case to be considered was the possibility that the Bulgarians might attack in Macedonia with two-thirds or more of their army, before Ottoman forces had completed their deployment. Should there be no prospect of defeating the Bulgarians east of the Vardar, Ottoman forces would have to withdraw, avoiding any decisive encounter until they had been adequately reinforced. The choice would lie between a withdrawal southwards, towards the port of Salonika, or westwards, towards Albania. The plan favoured a withdrawal to the west, partly because communications to the south were inadequate, and partly because Albania would be a source of reinforcement. Supplies and troops arriving at Salonika from Asia could be moved west to Monastir by rail. The aim would be to fight a defensive battle in the neighbourhood of Prilep and Monastir, which, if successful, would open the way to a counter-offensive.

There is evidence that some aspects of this plan were subsequently reconsidered. In his published memoirs, Ahmed İzzet Paşa stated that after fresh examination of the terrain and timetables he concluded that a withdrawal to the Telan valley in Thrace would gain insufficient time for reinforcement, and that it would be better to fight the defensive battle behind Lüleburgaz. Even a withdrawal to the upper Ergene valley or to Çorlu was not excluded. In a further departure from the original plan, he also indicated that he would have withdrawn the detachments at Dimetoka and Kırcaali to the position selected for defence behind Lüleburgaz.¹ Neither in his memoirs nor in the original plan is the location of this position clearly defined, but it may be inferred from other sources that the general staff had two possibilities in mind: the line of the Karaağaç valley, immediately behind Lüleburgaz, and the line of the Boğazköy valley, some 30 kilometres further east.²

¹ Ahmed İzzet, *Feryadım*, I, 120-2.

² [Asım], *Askeri Mağlubiyetlerimizin Esbabı*, 41-2.

V

Plan 4, against an alliance of "the small Slav governments", Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro, had been drawn up in 1910.¹ It estimated Bulgaria's strength at 288 infantry battalions, Serbia's at 140, and Montenegro's at 60, giving a total of 488. Against this, it proposed to deploy a total of 619 Ottoman battalions, 308 of them in Thrace, and 311 in Macedonia and Albania. The units to be deployed in each theatre were more or less the same as in Plan 1; the main difference was the counting in of the 60-odd battalions which Plan 1 had held in reserve against Serbia and Montenegro. A further 30 battalions in southern Macedonia were to be held in reserve as a precaution against a hostile Greek intervention, and were not included in the calculation of fighting strength.

The plan envisaged three cases: in the first, the Bulgarians would place one third of their forces in Thrace, and two thirds in Macedonia; in the second, they would place two thirds of their forces in Thrace, and one third in Macedonia; and in the third, they would place all their forces in Thrace, and leave operations in Macedonia to their allies. The first case might hold political advantages for the Bulgarians, and the second would offer valuable reinforcement to their allies; but on a strictly military view, the third offered them the best chance of victory, and was therefore the most likely.

As far as Thrace was concerned, the first two cases were already covered by Plan 1, and Ottoman forces there would respond accordingly: if faced by no more than one third of the Bulgarian army, they would assume the offensive, but if faced by two thirds, they would fight a defensive battle behind Lüleburgaz. In the third case, however, Ottoman forces would have to withdraw much further, and offer battle "in a defensive position whose flanks are supported". No specific position was stipulated, but an accompanying footnote recommended investigation of the lines at Çorlu-İstranca, Silivri-Belgrad, and Çatalca. The first of these lines lay 120 kilometres behind the frontier, the second was 20-40 kilometres further back, while the third was some 250 kilometres behind the frontier and barely 40 from the Ottoman capital. The greater part of Thrace would therefore be evacuated: Adrianople would have to be prepared for a long siege, and the Gallipoli peninsula secured by the fortification of Bolayır.

A defensive battle at Çorlu, Silivri or Çatalca would be fought on a narrow front, which would hamper a subsequent counter-offensive. The plan therefore proposed that the harbour of Tekirdağ be fortified and prepared as a place of offensive sortie, from which attacks might be launched on the

¹ Text of Plan 4 in Nihad, *Balkan Harbi*, I, 100-4; cf., Hallı, *Balkan Harbi* (1912-1913), 209-13.

Bulgarians' flank and rear, and that consideration be given to landing forces at other points on the coasts of the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmara. The initial deployment of Ottoman forces would therefore be flexible. The plan is not explicit, but it may be inferred that those units which were normally based in Thrace would deploy forward, as in Plan 1. If it became evident that the Bulgarians were attacking in overwhelming strength, these units would be withdrawn to the position selected for defence, where they would be joined by a portion of the units assigned from Anatolia, while other portions would be deployed at Tekirdağ, or prepared for coastal landings elsewhere. The plan also alludes to the possibility of reinforcements from Syria, but does not make clear whether these would be the three divisions assigned in principle to Macedonia, or whether other Syrian units would be mobilised.

The plan's recommendations in respect of the Macedonian theatre were clearer. The main force, of 171 battalions, would be concentrated against the Bulgarian frontier, with lesser forces, of 51 battalions each, facing Serbia and Montenegro, and a general strategic reserve of 30 battalions to the rear. In the event that the Bulgarians sent no forces to Macedonia, the main force would turn against the Serbs, and assume the offensive. In the event that the Bulgarians sent a quarter, a third, or more of their total strength to Macedonia, Ottoman forces would attempt to defeat the Serbs and Bulgarians separately, or failing that, would withdraw to a defensive position, either around Prilep and Demirkapı, or around Monastir and Prilep, from where they would launch counter-attacks. In the worst case, they would withdraw to the Albanian mountains, "and prolong resistance through small-scale operations until the Ottoman army in Thrace achieves victory".

In one respect, the plan does not appear to have been the general staff's final word, for there is evidence of continuing hesitation over the position to be selected for defence in Thrace. The Çorlu, Silivri and Çatalca positions lay well to the east, but attention was also paid to a more westerly option: the upper Ergene valley, between Saray and Muradlı, some 10 kilometres in front of Çorlu. This 'Ergene line' had clear advantages, for both its flanks were naturally strong, and it could be easily reinforced and supplied, being no more than a day's march from the harbours at Tekirdağ, Ereğli and Silivri, and paralleled throughout its length by the Constantinople-Adrianople railway.¹ This was the line selected for defence in the army manoeuvres of October 1910, which simulated a surprise Bulgarian invasion of Thrace.² The German general von der Goltz, who directed the manoeuvre, noted afterwards that "the

¹ [Asım], *Askeri Mağlubiyetlerimizin Esbabı*, 41-3.

² Pertev Demirhan, *Generalfeldmarschall Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz. Das Leben eines großen Soldaten*, (Göttingen, 1960), 147-9.

practical outcome of the manoeuvre was the conviction that...the Turkish army does not need to move its assembly further back than the line İstranca-Çerkezköy-Çorlu.”¹ Goltz appears to have been left with the impression that the Ergene line had been definitely selected as the position for defence. Ahmed İzzet Paşa’s memoirs are less precise: they indicate that the defensive battle would be fought “at Çorlu”, but do not make clear whether this is a reference to the Ergene line or the Çorlu-İstranca position.²

VI

Plan 5, against an alliance of Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro and Greece, was apparently drafted in late 1910, possibly following that autumn’s manoeuvres, but survives only in the form of a resume, drawn up by the head of the general staff’s 1st operations section, Lieutenant-Colonel Cemil, at the start of the Ottoman mobilisation against the Balkan states in October 1912. The resume is odd in certain respects, and needs to be compared with the corresponding mobilisation project for 1912-13, also numbered 5, and with accounts of the original plan left by Ahmed İzzet Paşa.³ The resume estimated Bulgaria’s strength at 288 infantry battalions, Serbia’s at 140, Montenegro’s at 56 and Greece’s at 72. Against this, both the resume and the mobilisation project proposed to deploy 373 Ottoman battalions in Thrace, and 285 in Macedonia. This meant that the forces which Plan 5 proposed to deploy against four enemies in the Macedonian theatre were slightly less than those which Plan 4 proposed to deploy against three. The explanation was straightforward: it was assumed that Greece’s belligerency would close the Aegean to troop transports, and so the three Syrian divisions assigned to Macedonia by Plan 4 were reassigned to Thrace. The counting in of units which Plan 4 had held in reserve against Greece was not quite sufficient to compensate for this shortfall. This greatly increased the risk that Ottoman forces in the Macedonian theatre would find themselves definitively outnumbered. On the other hand, Ottoman forces in Thrace would outnumber the entire Bulgarian army, even if that army were joined there by a portion of the Serbian army.

Plan 4 had proposed a flexible deployment in Thrace: forward or to the rear, depending upon the strength of the enemy. The resume and mobilisation

¹ BA-MA Freiburg, NL Goltz 5, Goltz to military cabinet, 10 December 1910.

² Ahmed İzzet, *Feryadım*, I, 123-4.

³ Text of the resume in Pertev, *Balkan Harbinde Büyük Karargah-ı Umumi*, 11-4; cf., Hallı, *Balkan Harbi* (1912-1913), 215-8. Details of mobilisation project 5 in Nihad, *Balkan Harbi*, I, 38-44; Pertev, *Balkan Harbinde Büyük Karargah-ı Umumi*, 4-7; Belig, *Balkan Harbinde Müretteb*, 64-9; Hallı, *Balkan Harbi* (1912-1913), 227-30.

project 5, in contrast, followed Plan 1 in stipulating a forward deployment on the Yenice-Hasköy line, with flanking detachments at Kircaali, Dimetoka, Adrianople, Kirkkilise and Vize. This reversion to a forward deployment seems strange, for Greece's intervention in Macedonia would make it even more likely that the Bulgarians would place their entire army in Thrace, and perhaps bring a portion of the Serbian army with them. As will be seen, there are grounds for suspecting that the original plan may have been altered in this respect. On the other hand, the resume followed Plan 4 in proposing that, should the Bulgarians achieve initial numerical superiority, Ottoman forces should seek decisive battle further to the rear, in a position east of Lüleburgaz. Further, by recommending the fortification of Bolayır and Tekirdağ, and landings on the Black Sea and Marmara coasts, it too implied that this battle might take place as far east as Çatalca.

The resume's discussion of operations in Macedonia and Albania is perplexing. On the one hand, it clearly identifies Greece as a belligerent, and assigns 51 battalions to the Greek frontier. On the other, it makes no provision for operations against Greece, and appears to count the units deployed against Greece as a "general strategic reserve", which might reinforce operations against Bulgaria and Serbia. The omission defies explanation. Otherwise, the resume's proposals echo those in Plan 4: if the Bulgarians sent no forces to Macedonia, all Ottoman forces, except those assigned to Montenegro, would turn against the Serbs; if the Bulgarians sent significant forces to Macedonia, Ottoman forces would either counter-attack near the frontiers, seeking to defeat the Serbs and the Bulgarians separately, or else undertake a strategic withdrawal, to Prilep and Demirkapı, or to Monastir and Prilep, or to the Albanian mountains.

The accounts of the original plan left by Ahmed İzzet Paşa differ substantially from the resume. In the first place, they indicate that he proposed to send no Asiatic units to Macedonia, given that the Aegean would be closed by the Greek navy, and that the enemy would be free to place large forces in Thrace. In principle, this would have reduced Ottoman forces in Macedonia and Albania to 264 battalions, while raising those in Thrace to 393. Secondly, he indicated that as in Plan 4, he would have sought to gain time by deploying forces in Thrace well to the rear, between Saray and Çorlu, and offered battle there. Finally, he indicated that he had little hope of early offensive success in Macedonia and Albania: observation forces would be placed on the frontiers, with a reserve force at Monastir, but unless an opportunity arose to destroy one of the invading enemy armies in isolation, it would be necessary to withdraw to the mountains of Albania and the Pindus range, where the Ottoman army's flanks would be secured by the fortresses of Scutari and

Jannina, and seek to pin the enemy down in small-scale operations until such time as forces in Thrace had secured a decisive victory.¹

Ahmed İzzet Paşa's claims are plausible, and are partially confirmed by other testimony.² If true, they imply that the original plan was modified at some point after February 1911, when he was transferred to the Yemen. One possibility is that the general staff reduced its estimate of the time Ottoman forces would take to deploy. The key was the Bulgarians, who were expected to complete their deployment ahead of their allies, on the fifteenth day of mobilisation. Ahmed İzzet Paşa's original calculations are unknown, but he evidently anticipated that Ottoman deployment would be slower: hence his proposals to deploy well to the rear in Thrace, and to send all Asiatic units there. By October 1912, however, the current version of project 5 estimated that all Ottoman forces assigned to Macedonia and Albania, and two-thirds of those assigned to Thrace, could be deployed within fifteen days of the start of mobilisation.³ In the light of this estimate, it may have been judged safe to revert to a forward deployment in Thrace, and to allow three Asiatic divisions to be sent to Macedonia. A further possibility is that greater weight had been given to the political risks of a strategy of rearward deployment: as noted, these included military and civil disaffection, the creation of a refugee problem, and a hostile diplomatic intervention by the European great powers. This suggests a third, more troubling possibility: namely, that the deployment schedules had been revised precisely in order to rule out a strategy based upon rearward deployment and deep withdrawal. In other words, the general staff had been tempted or pressured into cooking the books. There is no evidence that any other planning assumptions had changed. According to Colonel Mahmud Belig, the chief of staff of 4th corps, war games and staff rides in the spring of 1912 had confirmed the view that the Bulgarians would deploy rapidly, and place their main forces in Thrace, with their weight concentrated in the Tundzha basin.⁴ There is, however, evidence that some within the general staff were unhappy with the trend of planning: Major Asım, the deputy head of the operations section, claimed that for months before the outbreak of the Balkan war he and others had warned against a forward deployment in Thrace, and the diversion of forces to Macedonia, and in his own case, at least, the claim is supported by a memorandum which he

¹ Ahmed İzzet, *Feryadım*, I, 124-5; Pertev, *Balkan Harbinde Büyük Karargah-ı Umumi*, 8.

² See the statement by Halil Sedes, the chief of staff of 1st army at the time the plan was drafted, in İbnülemin Mahmud Kemal İnal, *Son Sadrazamlar* (İstanbul, 1940-53), xiii, 2022-4.

³ The deployment schedules for forces in Macedonia and Albania are given in Fevzi, *Garbi Rumeli'nin Suret-i Ziyai*, table 2; those for forces in Thrace in Nihad, *Balkan Harbi*, I, 182-201.

⁴ Mahmud Belig, *Balkan Harbinde Müretteb*, 32-7.

submitted at the start of mobilisation in October 1912.¹ The available evidence goes no further; all the foregoing remains speculation.

VII

After the defeat of 1912, these plans came in for severe criticism. Four main issues were raised. In the first place, it was suggested that the plans attempted to cover too many contingencies, and consequently spread Ottoman forces too thinly. The critics argued that the Bulgarians were bound to place their main forces in Thrace, not simply because of the proximity of the Ottoman capital, but also because, on any rational calculation, the Bulgarians would assume that the Turks, too, would place their main army in this theatre. It followed that the maximum possible force should have been assigned to Thrace, including all units from Anatolia; Macedonia and Albania should have been defended by local forces only. Within each theatre, too, the critics found Ottoman forces unnecessarily dispersed. In Thrace, there seemed little point in placing forces at Dimetoka, while the strength of Adrianople lay in its fortifications, rather than the size of its garrison: more forces should have been placed east of Adrianople, covering the main invasion route towards the capital. In Macedonia, plans 4 and 5 mistakenly attempted to cover all possible invasion routes, distributing Ottoman forces along the frontiers in rough proportion to the enemy's presumed strength, and thereby exposing them to the risk of defeat in detail; better to concentrate forces centrally, and if necessary, carry out a staged withdrawal towards Monastir.²

A further focus of criticism was the plans' hesitation between initial offence, and initial defence and strategic withdrawal. This led the plans and the accompanying mobilisation projects to propose deployment in a fashion which would satisfy either eventuality. In the critics' view, it satisfied neither, and simply reinforced the tendency to disperse Ottoman forces. The critics also questioned the implied assumption that a rational choice between offence and defence could be made on the basis of information available before the first major encounters, arguing that in reality, as the campaign of 1912 would confirm, the strength and direction of the enemy's attacks would become apparent only once serious operations had begun, by which time it might be too late to extricate Ottoman forces from an initial forward deployment. At the very least, a withdrawal in these circumstances would risk the loss of munitions and supplies which would have been placed in the area of initial

¹ [Asım], *Askeri Mağlubiyetlerimizin Esbabı*, 44-7; Pertev, *Balkan Harbinde Büyük Karargah-ı Umumi.*, 23-5; cf., Asım Gündüz, *Hatıralarım* (İstanbul, 1973), 25-6.

² [Asım], *Askeri Mağlubiyetlerimizin Esbabı*, 26-50; Nihad, *Balkan Harbi*, 1, 96-100, 106-7.

deployment. The safer course would be to assume the worst, and deploy to the rear from the start: any resulting loss of time need not be decisive.¹

A third criticism was that the plans and their accompanying mobilisation projects assumed an Ottoman army both larger, and capable of more rapid deployment, than was in fact the case. The figures for fighting strength were suspect. They took insufficient account of the continuing shortage of trained men, particularly in the active reserve, which, as late as 1912, could satisfy no more than 60% of the active army's wartime requirements. The figures also took insufficient account of the numbers who might not respond to the call-up, for whatever reason, and of the modernised army's need for expanded rear services. Nor was any provision made for the replacement of losses resulting from combat or desertion – the latter a chronic feature of all Ottoman campaigns within living memory. One critic suggested that the figures should have been reduced by 40%.² In similar fashion, the planners had grossly overestimated the capacities of the Empire's railways and harbours, and the availability of shipping and field transport. The timetables for mobilisation and deployment were pure guesswork. None had been tested in practice: for example, through trial mobilisations.³ To plan on this basis was to invite chaos at mobilisation – as indeed occurred in 1912.

Beneath these three issues lurked a fourth: namely, the suggestion that inhibitions against retreat and the abandonment of territory had led the planners to shrink from a military logic which dictated a strategy based upon acceptance of initial inferiority, and the consequent need to gain time to concentrate Ottoman forces. The plans acknowledged the likely realities, but attempted to hedge their bets, in the hope that circumstances might somehow prove more favourable. Hence the dispersal of forces, the hesitation between offence and defence, and, perhaps, the optimistic assumptions of the mobilisation projects. As one critic perceptively noted, in reality it was the Balkan states whose military strategy was likely to be distorted by political imperatives: their territorial ambitions, and their mutual jealousies, would encourage them to disperse and divide their forces, as each sought to seize the maximum territory for itself. There was no reason for the Ottoman army to follow suit; rather, it should have used the opportunity to concentrate its own forces to the maximum, seek decisive victory in Thrace, and accept the inevitability of retreat in Macedonia and Albania.⁴

¹ Hafız Hakkı, *Bozgun*, 151-3; Nihad, *Balkan Harbi*, I, 106-7.

² Nihad, *Balkan Harbi*, I, 16-20; Hallı, *Balkan Harbi (1912-1913)*, 122.

³ Nihad, *Balkan Harbi*, I, 49-50.

⁴ [Asım], *Askeri Mağlubiyetlerimizin Esbabı*, 26-50.

IX

The ultimate test of any war plan is war itself. On 1 October 1912 the War Minister, Lieutenant-General Nazım Paşa, instructed the army to mobilise against the Balkan states in accordance with project 5, which envisaged the formation of a 480,000-strong Eastern Army in Thrace, and a 335,000-strong Western Army in Macedonia and Albania. For reasons which have never been fully explained, however, he decided to abandon the corresponding plan 5, and instead instructed all forces to assume the offensive at the outbreak of hostilities. The acting chief of the general staff, Major-General Hadi Paşa, and the Eastern Army's commander, Lieutenant-General Abdullah Paşa, vainly attempted to uphold the spirit of Ahmed İzzet Paşa's plans, and to argue that the safer course would be to deploy forces in Thrace well to the rear, on the upper Ergene, and fight a defensive battle there. They were ignored. Project 5 proved a disaster: there were nowhere near enough troops, their deployment was massively delayed, and the outbreak of hostilities with Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece on 18 October found the Western Army with barely half of its planned forces, and the Eastern Army with barely a quarter. On 21 October a reluctant Abdullah Paşa ordered the Eastern Army to assume the offensive. The offensive collapsed within 24 hours, and was followed by a chaotic withdrawal to the line of the Karaağaç, where fresh arguments broke out over Abdullah's preference for a further withdrawal to the Ergene. In the midst of these arguments, the Bulgarian army appeared at the Karaağaç, and in the ensuing five-day battle of Lüleburgaz (29 October – 2 November) the Eastern Army suffered a decisive defeat, and fell back to Çatalca. Meanwhile the Western Army had similarly failed in its offensive against the Serbs at Kumanovo (23-24 October), and fallen back towards southern Albania, fighting a series of delaying actions en route. By mid-November the whole of Macedonia had been lost. A successful defence of Çatalca against the Bulgarians on 17-18 November opened the way to talks, and on 3 December an armistice was concluded with Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro, though not Greece.

The planning system can be seen to have failed in three respects. In the first place, it had failed to resolve a persistent tension between military logic, which dictated a strategy of initial withdrawal and defence, and political logic, which feared the consequences of even a temporary abandonment of national territory. These political fears may have been reasonable, but the proper conclusion was not to distort military strategy, but to accept that the Ottoman Empire's Balkan possessions could not be defended by pure military force, and to seek alternative paths to security, through diplomacy and alliances. In the event, the plans hesitated between offence and defence, attempting to deploy

forces in a manner which would cover either eventuality, and postponing crucial decisions until the actual outbreak of hostilities. In the second place, and possibly as a result of this tension, mobilisation project 5 had taken a grossly unrealistic view of the possibilities of rapid mobilisation and deployment, and thereby placed the army in a false position from the start. In the third, Nazım Paşa had compounded the army's problems by abandoning the prepared plan of operations, and hazarding all on an improvised offensive. Strictly speaking, the plan was not to blame: it provided for alternative courses of action which might have produced happier results. Even so, the fact that a prepared plan could be so cavalierly discarded amounted to a further failure of the planning system.

Explaining these failures is less easy. The internal workings of the general staff, and its relations with other bodies within and outside the armed forces, remain obscure. It has been suggested that Ahmed İzzet Paşa's prolonged absence in the Yemen left the general staff rudderless, and vulnerable to pressure; not until March 1912 was Hadi Paşa appointed to act in his place. The head of the mobilisation section, Lieutenant-Colonel Halil, is said to have kept all work to himself, and refused to consult or take advice.¹ There is even a suggestion that the head of the operations section, Lieutenant-Colonel Cemil, had been converted to the cause of an early offensive by reading Schlieffen's *Cannae Studies*.² The accuracy or relevance of these claims remains unclear. Two further observations may be made. The first concerns the staff officers who occupied most senior commands and were responsible for war planning. It was a recurrent complaint of the army's German advisers that such officers, while well-versed in the theory of warfare, lacked practical experience and a practical understanding of their own army – the consequence of a system which, until very recently, had allowed graduates of the staff college to devote their entire careers to staff work, with no intervening periods of line service.³ The second observation would suggest that in contrast, the Ottoman army at large remained wedded to an inherited spirit of improvisation, and had not fully assimilated the notion of planning. Nazım's last-minute decision to discard the prepared plans of operations was one instance of this. Another was the failure to update the plans of operations in parallel with the mobilisation projects, which were revised annually; by

¹ Fahrettin Altay, *10 Yıl Savaş ve Sonrası 1912-1922* (İstanbul, 1970), 58-9.

² [Asım], *Askeri Mağlubiyetlerimizin Esbabı*, 60-1.

³ See, e.g., Freiherr von der Goltz, *Der jungen Türkei Niederlage und die Möglichkeit ihrer Wiedererhebung* (Berlin, 1913), 29-36; cf., *Kriegsarchiv Wien*, KM, 1913 Präs. 47 1/64, report by Pomiankowski, Res. Nr.128, 13 May 1913, enclosing report by Back, April 1913.

1912 there were clear discrepancies.¹ As striking is the fact that the October 1912 announcement of mobilisation was answered with a deluge of requests for clarifications and explanations of project 5, the relevant portions of which had been issued to corps and divisional commands well in advance; evidently, many had failed to study it.²

¹ By October 1912, for example, project 4 assigned only 289 battalions to Macedonia and Albania, as against plan 4's total of 311. The corresponding figure for Thrace has not been traced, but probably rose from 308 to 339. See Fevzi, *Garbi Rumeli'nin Suret-i Ziyai*, table 2.

² Nihad, *Balkan Harbi*, I, 153.

WRITING ALTERNATIVE HISTORIES: AITMATOV'S *THE DAY LASTS MORE THAN A HUNDRED YEARS*

Çiğdem Balım

'Of course some people regarded only what is written down on paper as true history. But if no books were being written at the time, then how could the truth ever be established? (The Day Lasts More than a Hundred Years, p. 49)

Literary texts, autobiographies, and memoirs are increasingly used in historical studies, political science and anthropology in order to provide a counter epistemology to a more ethnocentric interpretation, which has been the norm for a long time. Kyrgyz author Chingiz Aitmatov's semi autobiographical, historical novel *The Day Lasts More than a Hundred Years* (I dol'she veka dlitsia den') first published in 1980, is an example of a literary text, which can be used as a testimony to the history and lore of a nation.¹ The novel gives an alternate version of history, one that is remembered by the colonised. Throughout the novel there is a close relationship between memory and history, because history nourishes memory and accounts for what is remembered and forgotten by the individuals and the society. But we know that memory is an art of construction and reconstruction and it is malleable, just like language. It can reveal and conceal, and it can be the antidote as well as the poison.² In this essay I will illustrate how Aitmatov weaves memories of the past as experienced by the Kazakhs and parts of his own experiences into his work to write an alternative history different from the one constructed by the Soviet authorities.

Alternative histories

Lothman and Uspensky argue that culture is usually treated and understood as a diachronic development, as a composite of texts, beliefs, and

¹ I use in this study a later edition of the book: Chingiz Aitmatov, *The Day Lasts More Than A Hundred Years*. Translated by John French (London: Macdonald & Co., 1983). A section of the novel, which was taken out at the time and then published in 1990 under the title 'The White Cloud of Ghenghis Khan', is not included here. All references to the novel will be given as *The Day* from now on.

² Azade Seyhan, *Writing Outside the Nation*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 30-2.

products of human expression of a group of people transmitted in time, it is difficult to demarcate the line between culture and the memory of that culture.¹ Culture as a record of community memory is tied to past historical experience. As culture experiences change, the memory is contested, repressed or reconfigured. On occasion in history, during times of societal oppression, names and social myths are changed, and people may be ordered to forget aspects of certain historical events and facts. New texts of histories are imposed upon people, and they are ordered to forget anything, which does not conform to this new fiction of their collective past. In Aitmatov's *The Day*, we come across the best examples of how new histories are created, how memories are suppressed and forgotten. Aitmatov's characters are complex and confused beings. They are at home but feel homeless because everything about their home has been changed, they are aliens in the lands where they were born and bred. They have lost their memory and native language and therefore their collective past identity.

Aitmatov's novel can also be regarded as 'borderlands writing', where geographical space includes historical sites and passages, and as well as border crossings, there are cultural crossings, and borders which the characters are not allowed to cross. The reader is warned of the cultural crossings first with the name of the hamlet where the main character lives. It is 'Boranly-Burannyi'; meaning 'snow-stormy', written both in Kazakh and Russian. Aitmatov himself was born in a border village, Sheker, between today's Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, although the distinction between the Kazakh and the Kyrgyz in history is a murky one and not at all clear before the Soviet period.

Aitmatov's birthplace in northern Kyrgyzstan is at the foot of the legendary Mount Manas, bearing the same name as the hero of the Kyrgyz epic *Manas*. As a young man, Aitmatov listened to performances by Saiakbai Karalaev (1894-1971), one of the last great *manaschi*.² The role of the *manaschi* in the pre-Soviet Kyrgyz society as the story/history teller, keeper of the collective memory of the nation, is revived in the themes and characters of Aitmatov's own work. He is also very much a *manaschi* in literary style, as observed by Mozur.

'His prose possesses a distinct oral quality, with numerous refrains and subplot digressions punctuating the narration. As in the performance of a *manaschi* An air of improvisation, with abrupt shifts in styles, themes and even genres.'³

¹ Yuri Lotman and B. A. Uspensky, "On the Semiotic Mechanism of Culture", Translated by George Mihaychuk, *New Literary History* 9 (1978), 212-17.

² Cited in the report of an interview with the author, given in Joseph P. Mozur, *Parables from the Past*, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995), 12. (from now on Mozur).

³ Mozur, 13.

Aitmatov's novel covers history from the 1930s to the 1980s in the story of a burial in the Kazakh steppes. The hero of the book Yedigei Zhangeldin learns of the death of his older friend Kazangap Asanbaev. He decides to honour his friend's last wish and bury him according to Muslim traditions in the ancient burial ground of Ana-Beiit. The preparations for the funeral and the procession into the steppes to Ana-Beiit make up the novel's day. During the slow movement of the funeral procession, Yedigei remembers his past life. We learn of the repression of Yedigei's family during collectivisation; his service in World War II; the death of his infant son while he was fighting at the front; his discharge from the army because he was wounded; the difficulties he and his wife go through looking for work; how he comes across Kazangap, who persuades him to settle at the small Buranly station in the middle of the Kazakh steppe; his confrontation with the State Political Directorate (GPU) interrogators in the early 1950s following the arrest of his friend Abutalip Kuttybaev; the death of Stalin, and how life changes on the steppes slowly over the years. In the novel, Yedigei is not able to bury his friend at Ana-Beiit. The procession is not allowed to enter the burial ground, which is now in the zone of a top-secret space centre, and it will soon be liquidated to make room for a housing project.¹ Yedigei buries his friend in a ravine within the sight of the barbed-wire fence, behind which Ana-Beiit lies. This is an alternative, unofficial history of the Soviet Union. It is symbolised by the burial procession not following the railway route, the official line, but going through ancient camel routes. Then, through stories, folk legends and songs, the text of the novel becomes the lore and the history of the Kazakh people over the centuries. In the novel, there is also a science fiction plot, which parallels both the events on the ground and the folk legends.

The memories of Yedigei in the novel start from the events of the 1930s, when through death, migration, murder, starvation, imprisonment, one third of the population of the Kazakh lands disappeared (1.5 million). The number of cattle shrank from a previous 7.4 million to 1.6 million in 1933, and sheep from 21.9 to 1.7 million. In the *Harvest of Sorrow*, Robert Conquest writes of how the regime undertook to turn a nomadic culture into a settled and collectivised agricultural society in a few years, against the wishes of the population.² The nomads who were turned into farmers did not have the tools, seeds, housing or the machinery to farm even at basic level. By 1932, famine was raging over Kazakhstan and little help came from Moscow. After

¹ The setting of the novel is around the Baikonur cosmodrome in northern Kazakhstan. Apparently after writing the novel, Aitmatov learned that a local cemetery had to be destroyed while building a town to service the Baikonour complex (Mozur, 188).

² Robert Conquest, *Harvest of Sorrow*, (London: Arrow Books, 1988).

all, famine was helping to break down the resistance of the nomads to the regime.

Some of the stories in the novel are informed by Aitmatov's own family narrative, where the author tells of his own life, as an exile in his own motherland.¹

Enemy of the people

Chingiz Torekulovich Aitmatov was born in 1928 in Sheker, a village in modern day Kyrgyzstan close to the border of Kazakhstan. Both his parents were literate, and his father, Torokul Aitmatov, was one of the first communists in Kyrgyzstan. During the late thirties he was invited to Moscow to receive higher instructions in Marxism. In 1937 Torokul Aitmatov (b. 1903) was imprisoned as an 'enemy of the people', and like many intellectuals from Central Asia he was executed in 1938, by the Stalinist regime. His family was to find out about this much later. Torokul's wife Nagima (1904-1970), and her four young children, went to live in the village Sheker. Chingiz was nine years old when he saw his father for the last time. The family lived with Torokul's uncle Alymkul. But, soon he, too, was arrested and subsequently put to death for aiding the 'family of an enemy of the people'. Nagima and the children moved in with Torokul's older sister, and after her death, they lived with the younger sister. Roza Aitmatova, Chingiz Aitmatov's sister, said in an interview:

'Soon after Alymkul had been arrested, the militia came back one night and jailed my father's younger brother Ryskulbek who had been dismissed from his studies at a pedagogical institute for being the brother of "an enemy of the people". Thus, from one family three brothers had been taken away, never to return. On top of that my father's older sister, unable to carry on, soon died stricken by grief'.²

The fourth member of the family to disappear was Alymkul's younger brother, who was taken away as a relative of an 'enemy of the people'. Nagima Aitmatova was one of the best-educated women in Kyrgyzstan, but she could not find work because her husband was an 'enemy of the people'. Finally, the German director of a workplace in Kirovskoe employed her as an accountant, until in 1941, during World War II, he also disappears. After that the family moves to Jiyde, a village close to Sheker, where Nagima worked as

¹ Almost all research about Aitmatov and his works is about how and why Aitmatov managed to escape persecution by the Soviet regime.

² Roza Aitmatova, "Lecture Transcripts", (University of Washington, July 18, 1996).

an accountant on a collective farm. During the war years nobody questioned the wife of an enemy, but the war itself brings unbearable deprivation and hardships.

Aitmatov portrays the Stalinist purges of the intellectuals in the 1930s in *The Day*, through the story of the schoolteacher Abutalip Kuttybaev. Although he had been a prisoner in World War II and fought with the Yugoslav partisans against the Nazis, Abutalip is reduced to working on the railway. He starts writing his memoirs of the War for his children, but soon he is arrested by the state, and dies in prison. In *The White Cloud of Genghis Khan* (1990), the previously unpublished chapter of the novel, Abutalip commits suicide in prison. During his interrogation Abutalip is tortured, beaten and kept awake for days by a bright light in the cell. During these interrogations, Abutalip recalls the Kazakh legend, 'The Sarozek Hangings', the legend about Genghis Khan's violence and cruelty during his campaigns to occupy the West, which is a parable of Soviet totalitarianism. Echoing the memories of his own childhood, Aitmatov uses the theme of the son who loses his father at war or through political oppression in the story of Abutalip's two small sons.

Through Abutalip's story, Aitmatov writes about memory, official history and alternative histories. In the novel, Yedigei attempts to reason with the official who has arrested his friend Abutalip.

' "But that was all he wanted to do". Said Yedigei. "He wanted, no doubt, to express in his own words something from himself, some of his thoughts, so that his children, so that they could read it when they grew up." '1

However, the state cannot allow any diversions to the official history. Memory is a harmful thing and thought is dangerous especially when put into writing.

' "Some of his thoughts – is that what you mean? His own point of view? His own special opinion? That cannot be allowed. Once a thought is down on paper, it's no longer personal. That which is written down cannot be cut out with an axe." '2

History cannot be personal, there is only one narrative, and it is that of the state.

¹ *The Day*, 186.

² *The Day*, 186.

'In life, anything can be an historical event in a sense. What we are concerned with here is not what happened and how it happened. What matters is that when we describe the past, when we speak of it – and even more so when we write about it – we should do so in the way that is needed now, as is appropriate now, for us. Things are of no use to us at the present time must not be mentioned.'¹

Another story, which parallels that of Abutalip, is the ballad of the aging bard Raimaly-aga, who is infatuated with a young girl, Begimai. Although the legend is given in the romantic context of the hero Yedigeyi's love for his friend Abutalip Kuttybaev's widow Zaripa, Raimaly-aga's story is about the pressures put on free expression by the regime. In the story, Raimaly-aga finds new inspiration and a revival of his youth by his new love. Thinking this to be scandalous, the leaders of his clan pronounce him insane, smash his *dombra*, kill his horse and tie him to a birch tree (symbol of Russia) and leave him to die. This charge of insanity reminds the reader of the wide use of psychiatry by the Soviet regime in dealing with dissidents. Aitmatov unites the two stories: the authorities confiscate Kuttybaev's collection of Kazakh ballads and legends, and among them is the ballad of the Raimaly-aga. Kuttybaev's arrest happens in 1953 in the novel, and indeed during the early 1950s there was a campaign against national epics in the Central Asian Republics. The subject matter of the national epics, such as *Manas*, was declared to be spoilt by alien stratification. They were accused of being pan-Islamist and carrying military-adventurist ideas.²

Abutalib's two boys watch as Stalin's men take their father away by a train similar to that which took away Aitmatov's father and others. In the vast Kazakh steppes, the railway plays a great role in the lives of the people. In *The Day*, the railway stations and railways are in the background of the personal narratives of the people. Railways, as well as acting as borders, become symbols of the state, the regime, of history written by the rulers, and of injustices done to people.

'Trains in these parts went from East to West and from West to East.

On either side of the railway lines there lay the great wide spaces of the desert– Sary Ozeki, the Middle lands of the yellow steppes.

In these parts any distance was measured in relation to the railway, as if from the Greenwich meridian ...

And the trains went from East to West and from West to East'

¹ *The Day*, 189.

² In the 1950s the Soviet Union was forging good relationships with China, and therefore the struggle of the Kyrgyz hero against the Chinese in *Manas* was unacceptable. Members of the Kyrgyz Academy of Sciences working on *Manas* were arrested and in the subsequent editions of the epic, the Chinese were substituted for the Kalmyks. This is a good example of how national legacies were destroyed and the historical experiences of people were perverted.

Aitmatov repeats these lines in the novel every time he moves from one section to the other or introduces another narrative. The pattern reminds the reader of the bard reciting an epic where the refrain serves both as a divider between sections and as a reminder of what should not be forgotten. Railroads are the barriers, which divide the land; they are unnatural and fearful. Their unnaturalness is emphasized in the opening pages of the novel where they are described from the point of view of a fox in search of food. In fact, 'The vixen ran away in a great curve over the steppe. She would return to the line when the trains had gone.'¹

In an interview with J. P. Mozur in 1991, Aitmatov remarked that the railroad [built by Aitmatov's father and grandfather in Kyrgyzstan] did not only bring happiness, new culture, and civilization to his region but also totalitarianism and misery.

' "The railroad brought us everything, so to say. On that railroad my father left to study in Moscow. On the same line he returned in a prison wagon for his investigation. The same railroad was used to take him away to the north somewhere, perhaps to Chukotka, or maybe he disappeared somewhere else. Who knows?... It was as if Father and Grandfather built that tunnel for our fate." '²

Railways also take the people of the periphery to the metropolitan centres where they become urbanised, turn into the robots of the regime and lose their identity. These are the offspring of the nomads, who after they have been to the city despise the land and the customs of their forefathers. They lose their memories (their history) and their language, and they are no longer humans, but *mankurt*³ as in the ancient legend.

The Modern Mankurt

According to the legend, there was a tribe called the Zhuan' zhuan, who targeted the minds and the memories of the people they enslaved. They destroyed the memory of their slaves by putting *shiri* (a skull-cap made from a she-camel's udder) on their heads. The cap exerted increasing pressure, crushing the skull of the victim as it dried under the sun. If the victim

¹ *The Day*, 11.

² Mozur, 20.

³ A term coined by Aitmatov. The first syllable comes from the Kyrgyz first person pronoun 'men', meaning 'I'. The second syllable 'kurt' means 'worm'.

survived, the result was the *mankurt* slave, deprived of his memory. *Mankurt* slaves were worth ten healthy, untreated prisoners. They did not know their names, from which tribe they had come, could not remember their childhood, fathers or mothers. Stripped of their identity, they made excellent slaves. In the version of this legend given in *The Day*, the mother Naiman-Ana, whose son has become a *mankurt*, compares herself to a she-camel who has no-one to nurse and roams in agony looking to nourish her offspring (the next generation), as she looks for her son.¹ Naiman-Ana laments:

‘ “Men botasy olgen boz maya, tulybyn kelep iskegen . . .” ‘I am a she-camel who has lost her young one, come to sniff the smell of a young camel's skin stuffed with straw ...” then there burst from her soul an endless succession of heartbroken cries that echoed long and loud among the silent, endless Sarozek.’²

When she fails to make her son remember who he is, she decides to remind him who he had been.

‘Your name is Zholaman. Can you hear? You are Zholaman. And your father's name was Donenbai. ... You are from the Naiman tribe, do you understand? You are a Naiman ...’³

The legend ends with the *mankurt* killing his mother on the orders of his masters. As she falls with her son's arrow in her heart, her scarf turns into a white bird, which even today flies over the steppes and cries ‘Whose son are you? Donenbai, Doenbai ...’. Naiman-Ana is buried in ‘what came to be known as Ana-Beiit, or the Mother's Resting Place’⁴ and this is where, Aitmatov's hero Yedigei is going to bury his friend.

In *The Day*, there are several *mankurts*. Kazangap's son Sabitzhan is one. He has been educated in the city, he is urbanized and Russified. He scorns at the traditions of his forefathers. He has lost his sense of history, his memory and identity. The journey to Ana-Beiit to bury his father is an act of continuity between generations, but Sabitzhan is unwilling to go.

‘Sabitzhan began to express such thoughts: why take his father so far out into the steppe, to Ana-Beiit, with desert all around and nothing but the empty Sary-Ozeki steppe stretching as far as the eye could see? They could

¹ In *The Day*, the legend of the Camel is told within the legend of the ‘mankurt’. This legend also appears in Aitmatov's *Farewell, Gulsary* as the ‘Lament of the Mother Camel’. Loss of memory and therefore a sense of identity are especially important in the Kazakh and Kirghiz tradition, where one must know his/her personal history as far back as seven forefathers.

² *The Day*, 140.

³ *The Day*, 140.

⁴ *The Day*, 146.

dig his grave somewhere here, not far away, on a hillock close to the railway. Then he could lie there and hear the trains go by on the line where he had worked all his life.’¹

Sabitzhan is married to a city girl, who could not even bother to come to the funeral.

“She has some conference to attend, some foreigners would be present”. Nothing was said about Kazangap’s grandchildren – they had been left behind to fight for their advancement and good attendance, in order to get the best attestation for their entry to the Institute.’²

So, in one generation, the Soviet regime had succeeded in changing the people forever and claimed their young. Sabitzhan is a *mankurt* character, controlled by the regime and the Soviet culture, colonised and dehumanised. The night before the funeral procession leaves, Sabitzhan brags about progress and advancement almost as if it is he, who is achieving all this. It is a most chilling prospect, which describes extreme *mankurtisation*.

‘The time will come when it will be possible to control people directly by radio, like any other automated systems - you understand? To control *people*, all of them, from the lowest to the highest. ... I’m talking about invisible waves, so called bio-currents, which work on you, on your conscious self. ... A person will always do everything in accordance with the central programme. It’ll seem to him that he acts and lives of his own volition, but in fact he’ll be directed from above.’³

Sabitzhan blindly admires progress and accepts the Soviet version of history, which undermines his forefathers, but ironically undermines him as well.

Another example of the *mankurt* character is the commanding officer, which the procession comes across when they reach the ancient burial site, which has now become a military site. Here, the *mankurt* refuses to speak his ancestral language.

‘ “Who are you, you strangers? Who is waiting to speak to me? Is it you?” he asked, turning to Burannyi Yedigei. “It is, it is, my son. They won’t let us through to the Ana-Beiit cemetery. Please do something to help us, my son.” Yedigei spoke in Kazakh, trying to ensure that his medals caught the eye of the young officer. But this effort had not the slightest effect on Lieutenant Tansykbaev; he simply coughed, and when the old man tried to continue, stopped him coldly. “Comrade stranger, speak to me in

¹ *The Day*, 31.

² *The Day*, 33-4.

³ *The Day*, 46.

Russian. I am on duty," he snapped, his black eyebrows in a frown over his slanted eyes.¹

Both in the Czarist Russia and in the Soviet Union language was the most important determinant of ethnicity and national identity. The 'people' (*narod*), an entity defined by its language is a construct of the 19th century. Dividing up territories as well as the people into ethnicities started during the Czarist period. Later, during the Soviet regime, any group defined by a language was a nationality (*natsionalnost*), and was granted an administrative status. Peoples who were 'developed enough' were given the status of 'nation' and were made a Soviet Socialist Republic. These republics were given a head of state, a foreign minister, a flag, a national Communist Party, a national language, an Academy of Sciences, and a national anthem. Under this system, languages had three statuses: unwritten languages, written languages, and literary languages. A nationality, which did not have a written language, could not have a territory, and therefore if the Soviets wanted to give territory to the speakers of an unwritten language, then a writing system had to be invented, as in the case of the Bashkirs or the Karakalpaks.

If language is this important, then it follows that language and texts in that language, become both useful and dangerous tools because narratives, especially epics and folk tales, help to create national myths and support national consciousness. Remnants of community memory are hidden in and transmitted through rites and rituals. They are buried in songs, chants, epics, and sagas, and language becomes the unifying force of community identity as well as a marker of personal and ancestral identity. Sometimes old texts have to be rewritten and new texts need to be recreated in order to create the desired new identity, this was practiced by the Soviet regime in the purges of the 1950s.

However, changing, altering, playing with memories and identities were common practice during the whole Soviet regime. Names of the peoples were adjusted, territories were given and assigned administrative structures according to the political needs of the time, named and renamed. For example, the Kyrgyz were renamed Kazakh in 1925 and the Kara-Kyrgyz became the Kyrgyz. The Kara Kalpak, who speak a Kazakh dialect, were made into an Autonomous Republic and given their own literary language and put under Uzbekistan, in order to divide and weaken Kazakhstan. The invention of languages went hand in hand with the invention of alphabets where they did not exist.

¹ *The Day*, 328.

Alphabet changes in Central Asia ranged from changes made to the Arabic alphabet between 1923-29, to converting to the Latin alphabet (1929-40), then to the Cyrillic alphabet after 1940. With each alphabet change, differences between the dialects became fixed. Changes prevented new generations from having access to the writings of the previous generations. With every change of alphabet there were mass literacy campaigns, but relatively little was produced in the changed languages and very little was transliterated from the past because the authorities did not approve of most of the past literature. Through the Cyrillic alphabet, the languages themselves were Russified as well. New symbols for Russian sounds were added to the alphabets in order to write Russian words correctly so that the words could carry their Russian pronunciation. All intellectual work was translated from Russian or written in Russian, and the measure of intellectuality was assessed by one's knowledge of Russian.

In *The Day*, the Kazakh lieutenant cannot or will not speak in Kazakh, his native language. He also has forgotten the other important elements of his ethnicity: he does not know the importance of the ancient cemetery (which has been turned into a cosmodrome) for his people. The question Yedigei puts to him 'Listen, who is your father?'¹ without an apparent context, is the same question Naiman-Ana repeatedly asks her *mankurt* son. The young people, brainwashed by the state, destroy the continuity of the tradition and the history of their people. In the novel, the concept of continuity is important and presented in different forms. For example, Karanar, the strong, black, unruly he-camel given to Yedigei by his friend/mentor Kazangap, comes from the line of Akmaya, Naima-Ana's she-camel in the legend. Yedigei himself is a continuation of Kazangap, the carrier of folk wisdom and traditions, and a modern day *shaman*. However, there is no one to take over from Yedigei: he has no sons and Kazangap's son Sabitzhan is a *mankurt*.²

Exiles at home

Although Aitmatov became famous through his writing in Russian, he is also very competent in Kyrgyz and publishes in both languages. On a personal level, as his career shows, he crosses borders. In *The Day*, crossings happen geographically as the funeral party travels from one part of the country to the other. Cultural crossing happens when the party meets the guard at the

¹ *The Day*, 332.

² ' "You're a *mankurt*! A genuine *mankurt*!" he whispered in his heart, hating and pitying Sabitzhan.' *The Day*, 348.

burial site. Although Yedigei is mentally distant from the Soviet culture of the younger generation, the young use Russian, believe in the official history and narratives of the culture imposed on them. They have crossed borders into Russian Soviet culture. The desire and nostalgia for his own native culture increase and consume him as Yedigei confronts these cultural borders. In the novel however, there is one border, which even the young russified generation of Kazakhs cannot cross, and that is into the world of science and technology, echoing the fact that in the Soviet state Russians dominated the field of natural sciences. This fact is symbolized by the space research site in which the ancient cemetery is situated, and that the Kazakh are no longer allowed to enter the site to bury their dead.

This border, surrounded by barbed wire, also keeps them away from their Ana-Beit cemetery, which will be destroyed. Thus, the passage of the young into their forefathers' customs, traditions and memories of the past is prohibited. The young are becoming *mankurts* and are made to kill their mothers – their history.

The Kazakhs in the novel, are made to feel and act like minorities, or unwanted travelers in their own land. Their histories and cultures are decomposed and rewritten for them as they become dispossessed peoples in exile in their own homelands,¹ and like all exiled peoples, the resistance of the communal memory of the colonised to the imposed dominant state norms is low. Yedigei expects the younger generation to remember and to duplicate the old cultural norms, but how can the younger generation resist the realities of everyday life around them? As a result, official accounts of the past, and officially sanctioned nationalisms replace the wealth of communal memories reserved in legends, poetry, symbols, and rituals.² The Soviet nationalities policy was conceived exactly for this purpose, in order to break up existing nationalisms or identities and replace them with smaller nationalities and nationalisms. The peoples were to be put into clearly defined administrative structures to ease and control their fusion into one Russian speaking soviet people – homo sovieticus. After the Soviet authorities created the Soviet Republics and attributed titular peoples to them, this was followed by the appointment of archaeologists, anthropologists, linguists and historians to write histories for these virtual peoples. Each such nation had a nationalistic form (land with borders, a flag, a language, history, etc), but they had to be 'Soviet in content'. The regime then implanted the new nationalism into the younger generation. Roy argues that the local intelligentsia did not try to give content to the concept of national culture, and that 'creating nationalism does

¹ Jacques Le Goff, *History and Memory*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992).

² Geoffrey H. Hartman, "Public Memory and Its discontents." *Raritan* 13/4, 31.

not necessarily need intellectual effort.¹ The intellectuals, writers, linguists, historians, worked on a body of knowledge, the meaning of which was assigned by others, and in time the people internalised the ethnic identity given to them in line with the criteria defined by Soviet anthropology and the Soviet administrative system. It is worth observing that in Aitmatov's novel, typical of all colonised peoples, even the traditional and nationalist characters, accept the national borders drawn for them by the coloniser.

The non-*mankurt* Kazakhs of *The Day*, become increasingly alienated and feel exiled in their own homeland. In reality the Kazakhs had been a minority in their own land since the Civil War. The Kazakh steppes were swamped with outside settlers or forced immigrants from the early 19th century onwards, but the Soviet state not only exiled unwanted peoples to Kazakhstan using it as a gulag, but also compelled the Kazakhs to change their nomadic life style through forced collectivisation. Kazakh lands were also used for the most polluting lead and chemical plants. During World War II, thousands more exiles and unwanted minorities were relocated to Kazakhstan, this continued after the war. In order to boost agricultural production, the Virgin Lands Scheme was introduced in 1954. The Kazakh steppes were declared 'virgin territory', and land was allocated to 'volunteers' from Russia and Ukraine, who were ordered to farm it 'ignoring fears expressed by some experts that Kazakhstan would be turned into a dust bowl.'² The scheme was unsuccessful. In wind erosion and storms, four million hectares of farmland were ruined and twelve million hectares damaged.

The Baikonour cosmodrome, where in 1961 Yuri Gagarin was launched to become the first man in space, is in the northern steppes, on the Syrdarya River, near the Aral Sea. The nuclear testing grounds of Semipalatinsk are also in the north, where after 1949, 467 nuclear tests were conducted. In the east, the 450 kilometre long Lake Balkhash is heavily polluted after copper smelters were situated on its shores in the 1930s. Today natural life in the lake is almost extinct and drinking water in the region is polluted. In the west is the Aral Sea, one of the worst environmental disasters of the 20th century, and in fact no longer a lake. In the novel, the Aral Sea is constantly in the background. Both Yedigei and Kazangap originate from the shores of the Aral and this fact brings them close together. Not long before his death, Kazangap wants to go and visit the Aral Sea and say farewell. However,

'The sea had receded. The Aral was disappearing, drying up. They had to walk for ten kilometres over what was once seabed until they reached the water's edge. Here Kazangap had said, "How much this land cost – it was the

¹ Olivier Roy, *The New Central Asia*, (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000), xi.

² Ahmed Rashid, *The Resurgence of Central Asia*, (London: Zed Books, 1994), 115.

price of the Aral Sea. Now it is drying up; one can say much the same about a man's life.”¹

In the novel there is reference to the Kazakh lands of the past and this description is at the same level as the legends. It is worth noting that a Russian geologist tells the tale of the land. Is this to be believed? Or is it a part of the national narrative created by the Soviet regime? We do not know.

‘The geologist, Yelizarov, an old friend of Buranniy Yedigei used to tell how once upon a time there were rich grassy places here and a different climate, with three times the present rainfall. Evidently life here was quite different then. Herds of horses and flocks of sheep roamed around. This was long ago – perhaps even before those wild people, the Zhuan’zhuan, came here, as the stories relate. All trace of them had long since gone and now only the legends remained. But how else could so many people exist and be supported in the Sarozek?’²

In their ancient lands, the Kazakhs are now strangers. Their lands have been fenced off with barbed wire, and they are not allowed to move freely. In fact, the young Kazakh lieutenant reminds the burial procession that they do not belong: ‘I’m telling you once more, Comrade Stranger, no one is allowed to enter here.’³ They protest in bad Russian ‘This is our, our Sarozek country. And we are, we are the people of the Sarozek. We have a right to bury our dead here.’⁴ But their plea falls on deaf ears. Life in the Sarozek steppe has been changed forever.

¹ *The Day*, 49.

² *The Day*, 49.

³ *The Day*, 331.

⁴ *The Day*, 331.

