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OTTOMAN IMPERIAL DIPLOMACY

A POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL HISTORY

DOGAN
GURPINAR

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INTRODUCTION

This study is a humble attempt to examine the mental structures of the late Ottoman bureaucracy. It probes the intellectual/cultural/ideological formations of the Hamidian diplomatic service. The diplomatic service is selected as representative of the late Ottoman bureaucracy since it reflected the distinctive habitus and culture of the late Ottoman bureaucracy at its best with its elitist and exclusive character. Although one of the motivations of the study is to show the significance and extent of the ideological and cultural formations of the diplomatic service (and the entire Ottoman political establishment beginning with Abdülhamid II himself) in the formulation of foreign policy orientations, the primary aim of this study is to investigate the emergence of a bureaucratic nationalism wielded throughout the Empire and to expose the imperial origins of Turkish Republican nationalism. Arguing that the Hamidian (as well as the Tanzimat) bureaucratic establishment (the Turkish/Ottoman *ancien régime*) was constitutive of Turkish nationalism, I attempt to demonstrate that the Turkish nation was imagined and formulated by a certain state elite which defined the Turkish nation in its relation to the state and which claimed to represent the nation itself. This Turkish nation was defined in a subservient relationship to the eternal and transcendental state and the idea of the Empire. However, the same state was simultaneously perceived as intimate by the state elite, given that the state was imagined and constructed with reference to a certain habitus, identity, and culture espoused by this elite. The study especially emphasizes that the state was not perceived as transcendent but, on the contrary, as familiarized by the Turkish state elite. The particular concerns of

this state elite were projected to the imagined Turkish nation. I also elaborate on the continuities of the perceptions of the institutional culture of the Ottoman Foreign Office and its legacy in the Republican Foreign Office. Evidently, most of its peculiarities and its distinct social culturalization were retained and reproduced in the transition to the Republic and persisted throughout the Republic. Therefore, a cultural and ideological continuity may be observed from the late Ottoman bureaucratic establishment to the Republican bureaucracy.

This study will not depend on a discursive analysis. It will be an inquiry into a certain mindset which was constitutive of Turkish modernity, the modern and secular Turkish state, and the Turkish national imagination. This study will not discuss the intellectual formations of the late Ottoman elite in a vacuum, but will contextualize and situate its mental structure within a particular milieu in which the Empire was in retreat and where the challenges of modernity, of the imperialist powers, and of non-Muslim groups could not be met. In a sense, this study will attempt to trace the progress of some of the prominent unit ideas and unit concepts as applied by historians of *Begriffsgeschichte* to the fundamental concepts of European modernity.¹ Although this study lacks the meticulousness and depth of *Begriffsgeschichte*, it aims to be a modest preliminary to a full study of the development of concepts constitutive of the modern Turkish political and national discourse. It attempts to show the intertwined character of the notions of the nation, modernity, and the state, especially in the imagination of the Ottoman/Turkish elite. Furthermore, it will point out how the concept of the Turkish nation was constructed in the imagination of a particular elite and derived from an imperial vantage point. It tries to demonstrate that the particular concerns of the political (and therefore national) elite stimulated the creation of a national imagination, so that the particular self-attributes (or cultural intimacy to use the term of Michael Herzfeld²) of this elite were “nationalized” and consecrated as “national characteristics”. In this study, it will be further argued that many of the Turkish *lieux de mémoire* were already formulated and espoused by the imperial *ancien régime* before their consummation in the early Republic.³ It will also emphasize the institutional and cultural continuities of the bureaucratic and political elites

without underestimating the breaks, modifications, and adaptations. This continuity from the pre-Tanzimat elite to the Republican elite can be observed both in terms of perceptions and genealogy. In short, this study attempts to expose some facets of an intellectual collective biography of the late Ottoman diplomatic service with a particular emphasis on the Hamidian diplomatic service embedded in a distinctive culture and *habitus*.

In many aspects, this study relies on the revisionist historiography of the late Ottoman Empire that has challenged conventional assumptions and modernist paradigms. A long summary of the revisionist historiography of the late Ottoman Empire, however, will not be presented. The modernist paradigm that reigned in late Ottoman scholarship was challenged and discredited by a new generation of Ottomanists who were inspired by the paradigms and methodologies of the European historiography of the 1980s and who approached the late Ottoman Empire in a comparative perspective. The new generation of historians who challenged the paradigms and visions of the pioneers of the late Ottoman scholarship were imbued with a different intellectual formation. They learned to be more critical of the alleged achievements of modernity and were skeptical of the extent of the transformative impact of nineteenth-century modernity. Following the European historians who demonstrated the impact of the early modern age on the nineteenth-century transformation and exposed the “early modern origins of modernity”, scholars of the Ottoman Empire demonstrated the pre-Tanzimat origins of the Tanzimat. One of the latest interests in Ottoman historiography is the “roads to modernity” of the post-classical Ottoman Empire. This period is no longer regarded as one of decline and degeneration.⁴ Instead, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are studied as the foundational periods of the modern bureaucratized Ottoman/Turkish state.⁵ The new paradigm perceives modernity not as a rupture exported from abroad, but as a continuous process fuelled by indigenous dynamics and further questions the agency of the state (and especially the Tanzimat state) in the reception and production of modernity. Beginning with the avant garde study by Rifa’at Abou-El-Haj, Ottomanists such as Linda Darling, Ariel Salzmann, Butrus Abu-Manneh, and Beshara Doumani have demonstrated the

long history and multiple sources of an indigenous modernity in the Ottoman lands and the Middle East. These historians also denounced grand theories and Gordian-knot concepts and exposed the complexities of the Ottoman transformation.

The new generation of scholars was also skeptical of the self-righteousness of modernity and the modern state. Influenced by the post-World War II critical scholarship on modernity, they did not champion the emergence of modernity in the Middle East. On the contrary, since they were influenced by the Foucauldian turn and post-structuralism, they were prone to expose the mechanisms of violence and surveillance that new modern states imposed under the guise of progress and development.

Other historians rejected dualities, such as secularism versus Islam, Republic versus Empire, and reaction versus progress, and portrayed the late Ottoman Empire in its complexity and multidimensionality. Studies such as Selim Deringil's *The Well-Protected Domains* and Ussama Makdisi's works on Ottoman Orientalism exposed the rich mental worlds of the late Ottoman identity, representations, and possibilities.⁶ Şükrü Hanioglu's evaluation of the Young Turks in exile exposed the syncretic nature of their mental formations and portrayed them in their complexity and in their self-contradictions.⁷ Many other works scrutinized the ideological and intellectual formations of men of prominence in the late Ottoman period. Dispositions such as Turkism, Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism, modernism, and traditionalism were no longer taken as mutually exclusive categories and diametrical opposites. The new generation of late Ottoman scholarship demonstrated how different dispositions coexisted, complemented each other, and overlapped. In that regard, they also established the institutional, structural, ideological, and cultural continuities from the Empire to the Republic, partially influenced by the genre of "persistence of the old regime" in the scholarship of modern European history. It was also established that Turkish nationalism did not emerge after the 1908 Revolution as a break from the *ancien régime*, but that its seeds, variously manifested in various disguises, were already observable much earlier. Apparently, these new approaches were inspired and even exported from the changing paradigms of Western historiography and

the social sciences. New intellectual history, the cultural turn, and neo-statist theory were all sources of inspiration.

This study sees the thrust of the nineteenth-century transformation in the shifting structures of mentalities of the Ottoman *ancien régime* elite with regard to state, society, and the self. Arguably, nationalism and modernism were to a large extent derived from the concerns, perceptions, and politics of the elite in Turkey. This does not mean that these concerns and perceptions were merely fantasies belonging to the realm of ideas. On the contrary, these concerns and dispositions were embedded within a certain material conjuncture and were products of a certain social and political context as Quentin Skinner, J.G.A. Pocock, Reinhart Koselleck, and others have demonstrated concerning the transformations of European mental structures and perceptions.

The elite as a concept has not been examined as a specific and prominent formative component of Turkish modernity beyond the pioneering studies of Frey⁸ and the works of scholars such as Roderick Davison, Şerif Mardin, and Metin Heper. The concept of the elite and its structural qualities were not analyzed within a structural framework. The reductionist paradigm of the duality of center and periphery was preserved. This paradigm treats this duality as specific to the Ottoman/Turkish pattern and sees it as an aberration. This duality fails to answer several questions regarding the emergence and development of Turkish modernity. For example, why did the Kemalist republican secular elite assume the national leadership position and how did they retain this position long after the transition to multi-party democracy? From where did it derive its legitimacy? What were the structural reasons that enabled an allegedly “super-Westernized” elite to assume the position of “national leadership” in most of the late modernizing, “non-Western” nations in formation and allowed it to speak “in the name of the nation”? Kemalists in Turkey, the Congress Party in India, the Muslim League in emerging Pakistan, and Ba’athists in the Arab world are manifestations of the same recurring structural pattern.⁹ Why is it that the national leadership was always taken over by a modernizing/Westernized and supersecular elite? What are the structural bases of this recurring pattern? These questions need answers that go beyond the paradigm of the dichotomy

of center–periphery, which treats this dichotomy as a “mistake”/flaw rather than as a sociological and political pattern. It is argued here that we have to take the elite as a prominent determinant in the making of nations and modernities.

The question of why the nineteenth-century non-Western elites replicated the Western model seems to be very obvious and straightforward at first glance, but in fact it is a very complex question. If we acknowledge that “Westernization” and “modernization” are the *sine qua non* of the non-Western nineteenth-century elites, it means that Westernization is not an autonomous process but a dependent variable of the politics and economies of elites and states. Thus, Westernization/modernization does not constitute a historical/social category by itself. We have to assume that Westernization is not a cultural category but a social/political one. Westernization and modernization are functions of the relationships of class and social structures. They are explicable within a socio-economic structure.

The nuances and modifications of the manifestations of Westernization are varied in different geographies, but not Westernization itself. Westernization emerges and develops as an imperative rather than as a choice or an option. It is important to emphasize this dimension because Turkish sociology and political science take it for granted that there lies a dichotomy between the Westernized elite and the traditional folk, whether it be characterized as center and periphery or otherwise¹⁰ and treats it as an idiosyncratic phenomenon. We may even speak of the “Westernization of the West” with reference to the path-breaking works of Norbert Elias, Eugen Weber, and Marc Raeff¹¹ where it has been demonstrated that the traditional folkways classified as barbaric and uncivilized were effectively obliterated or transformed beginning in early modern Europe. This discourse is endorsed with equal vigor by both the Kemalist left and the right in Turkey as the alleged dichotomy serves to enhance the self-images and righteousness of both parties, the former representing the courageous enlightened few against the ignorant masses, the latter representing the *vox populi* against the illegitimate usurpers. If we assume Westernization as a non-category, then we have to redefine the course of late Ottoman/Turkish history within a social/economic

framework after redefining the cultural dynamics as historical and structural categories embedded within their social context.¹²

States are not only class-based entities, but also inventors of values, as well as bearers of values. The modern state, by its modern nature, is a generator and promoter of certain values compatible with its vision of governance.¹³ For example, one of the most indispensable and prominent values the modern state generates is its secularity. A modern state should be secular not only for reasons of state, but also to fulfill its professed obligations towards its subjects. Therefore, the state renounces any alternative source of power that may hinder its ability to espouse its legitimacy over its subjects. In that regard, secularism derives from such a structural concern and is an imperative of the modern state-formation. It is less a cultural category than a structural prerequisite. Secularism is not an option but a consequence of the modern state and nation state. The legal understanding of religion and modern nation-states is quite distant. Whereas religion prioritized the regulation of relations between the community as a whole and the individuals within this community, modern nation states acknowledge only relations established between the state and the individual and deny the legitimacy of any intermediaries. Only individuals exist, not communities. We may argue that modernity is the renunciation of communalism in favor of a nation-state universalism in which the state is able to monopolize the regulation of relations between individual citizens and the relations between individual citizens and itself. Apparently, modern states generated and disseminated values *ex nihilo*, and these values were not derived from social sources and do not need to be. Hence, what is called Westernization is, in fact, arguably the practice of emerging modern/rational states. The supposedly Westernized elites became the executors of this practice not only in the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire, but also in other states, including Eastern European ones. This elite's foremost quality is to be endowed with the necessary skills to undertake and lead this process thanks to a process which is rightfully dubbed as Westernization (and modernization).

This interpretation makes the paradox of nationalism more explicable. After all, a nation is created in the image of the state elites (and the rising new intellectuals). By nation, a nationalist does not understand

“the ethnic community to which he feels attached” but something more profound and subtle. The nation is an idol which he adores and adheres to. It is not a coincidence that many of the nationalist intelligentsias bolstered anti-populist discourses, especially in the Third World, and despised the commoners. They were unlike nationalist intelligentsias such as the Russian Pan-Slavists, who were “going to the people” in late nineteenth-century czarist Russia, glorifying the people as opposed to those who lived a corrupt urban life.¹⁴ Indeed, it is the sacred mission of the nationalist intelligentsia to educate, civilize, and rear the people so that the “nation” will be saved from obscurantism, ignorance, and the threat of extinction. Thus, a self-designated *mission civilisatrice* and the scorning of the people is an indispensable trait of the nationalist intelligentsia. It is an intrinsic attribute of its missionary zeal. This attitude is visible throughout the history of Turkish nationalism from the first generation of nationalists (and most explicitly in Ömer Seyfeddin) to the early twenty-first-century neo-nationalists. It may be argued that this is because in the minds of the nationalist intelligentsia the nation they sympathize with is not the present-day nation but the future nation designed and appropriated by the modernist visions of the intelligentsia. It is the prospective “ideal nation” that will be created after the overcoming of backwardness they feel attached to. Because an ideal “really existing nation” does not exist, it is only the image (or mirage) of the nation they adore and praise. In fact, in the image of the nation, the nationalist intelligentsia sees its own values and reference system. The fiction of the nation is thus appropriated from the prism of the self-attributes of the elite and serves to disseminate the traits of the culture and habitus of a certain cultural community in the disguise of “national traits”.

The nation is an idea before it turns into a reality. Even when it becomes a reality thanks to improved means of communication, education, and the practices of everyday life, it still remains a powerful idea, shaping and reshaping the material world. Moreover, the emergence and development of a “national idea” cannot be dissociated from the encroachment of modernity. Nation-making and modernism go hand in hand. Furthermore, they are not only complementary processes, but also consequences/manifestations of the same

phenomenon, just like different sides of the same coin. One obliges the other.

Here, the question of which of these manifestations precedes the other may be raised. I would argue for the precedence of modernism over nationalism. According to this proposition, nationalism is a corollary of modernism. This does not mean that, à la Marx, nationalism should be regarded as an epiphenomenon and a consequence of modernity. On the contrary, the establishment of nations and their espousal is an indispensable and preeminent element of the formation of modern states and modernity. Following the transformation of the state and subsequently the populace from which the state derives its legitimacy, a certain imagination is to be generated compatible with the transforming perceptions of the world, society, and the self. Subsequently, this new imagination acquires its own reality. Disentangling the concept of nationalism from a label referring to ethnicity, and reconceptualizing it as an expression of a collective self-identity constituted within a process of social and economic transformation and as a response to the challenges posed by these developments, will let us frame it within the process of the formation of modernity (and early modernity).¹⁵

The new intellectual historians criticized conventional intellectual history for being interested only in what the authors wrote and not paying attention to the social/political milieus in which ideas developed and concepts emerged, matured, and died out.¹⁶ Moreover, they questioned the reliability of taking only some eminent authors (of whom some became famous only after their deaths) to demarcate the structure of the mentalities of the time. Likewise, the new cultural historians rejected the conventional understanding of culture. They arrived at a thick description of culture in which culture was perceived as being constituted within a particular social, economic, and political background and milieu, and was also considered a reflection of the social, material, and political background in which they flourish.

This study was inspired by the impressive studies of new intellectual historians, new cultural historians,¹⁷ and historical anthropologists who probed into early modern and modern European history, as well as political anthropologists such as Michael Herzfeld.¹⁸ It attempts to emphasize the prominence of ideas and concepts which acquire an

objective existence once they are constructed in the mind. Rejecting a duality of “objective existence” and “subjective existence”, this study treats the intellectual/cultural/ideological formations as embedded in the social and political background they inherited and the social, economic, and political structures in which they were born. It also argues that structures of mentalities have the power and capacity to shape supposedly objective political, social, and economic dynamics. This relation is double-sided. They complement and mutually constitute each other simultaneously. Thus, the emergence of “nationhood” and a secularized outlook were at the center of the making of the “Turkish modern” and were consequences of reactions arising in the context of a retreating and threatened empire by the imperial Ottoman elite, who were overtaken by the rising new elite of Young Turks (and subsequently the Kemalists). In short, this study probes the development of a structure of mentality born by the Ottoman *ancien régime* elite that was constitutive in the establishment of “Turkish nationhood” and the “Turkish modern”.

CHAPTER 1

NATIONALISM AND THE *ANCIEN RÉGIME*: POLITICS OF THE TANZIMAT

Nationalisms

This chapter aims to situate elusive concepts such as modernity, elites, nationalism, and proto-nationalism before delving into the ideological/intellectual/cultural formations of the late Ottoman bureaucracy and diplomatic establishment, and the making of modern Turkey.

The early theories of nationalism perceived nationalism as an “idea”. After all, this was the time when social sciences were conceived as an outer reach of *humanitas*, an activity related to the reflection on the world and the self. One of the foremost classical studies of nationalism within this paradigm was penned by Elie Kedourie, who commenced his book by blatantly arguing that, “nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century”¹ by the German romantics. Given that Kedourie reflected the attitude of pre-World War English conservatism, he was troubled by the endorsement, popularization, and spread of this continental fiction, which he considered an avoidable misfortune:

The attempt to refashion so much of the world on national lines has not led to greater peace and stability. On the contrary,

it has created new conflicts, exacerbated tensions, and brought catastrophe to numberless people innocent of all politics. The history of Europe since 1919, in particular, has shown the disastrous possibilities inherent in nationalism. In the mixed area of Central and Eastern Europe, and the Balkans, empires disappeared, their ruling groups were humbled and made to pay, for a time, the penalty of previous arrogance...What can be said with certainty is that the nation-states who inherited the position of the empires were not an improvement. They did not minister to political freedom, they did not increase prosperity, and their existence was not conducive to peace.²

However, Kedourie's particularistic explanation remained a minority view. "The twin founding fathers" of the academic study of nationalism, Carleton B. Hayes and Hans Kohn,³ who began to write after World War I and in the age of the emergence of numerous new nation states in Central and Eastern Europe,⁴ argued that nationalism was by its very definition a modern concept and located it within a historicity. "Nationalism, as we know it, is a modern development. It has had its origins and rise in Europe, and through European influence and example it has been implanted in America and all other areas of Western civilization. But it is no longer peculiar to the Christian West."⁵ Within the modernist paradigm of the time, they tacitly assumed that the diffusion of nationalism (like any development in history) was inevitable. For them, nationalism was inherent in the making of the modern world and the modern imagination. This is not because they upheld nationalism. On the contrary, Hayes saw nationalism as a pathology inexplicable within a rational view. For him, nationalism was an irrational outburst and an enigma/deviation of modernity. Although he was one of the first scholars to attest to the bleak nature of the nineteenth century underneath the disguise of the glamour of progress,⁶ he viewed this undercurrent as a deviation from the main track and triumphal march of modernity. In other words, his critical/relatively pessimistic approach to modernity did not lead him to question the triumphalism or the myth of modernity, but he judged nationalism a digression.

Later scholars of nationalism distanced themselves from Kedourie, denied any room for contingency in history, and pursued the path of

Hayes and Kohn. The modernization school, which was an offshoot of structural functionalism, treated the course of modern history and the emergence of the modern society/social organization as an institutionalization of a mechanistic body, which allowed no room for agency and meaning. Talcott Parsons, the founder of structural functionalism, perceived the idea of nation and nationalism as an instrument of social needs: "At one extreme, the principal content of the normative order may be considered more or less universal to all men...At the other extreme, both government and the normative order may apply only to a particular small community. Within the broad range of variation between these extremes, modern societal communities have generally taken a form based upon nationalism. The development of this form has involved both a process of differentiation between societal community and government and a reform in the nature of societal community, especially with respect to membership."⁷ Thus, he and the adherents of his paradigm dismissed anything fuzzy and uncanny in nationalism. For them, nationalism was an inevitable and indispensable outcome of modernity. It was viewed as intrinsic to modernity and an indispensable element of modern social organization, functional in the establishment of the capitalistic modern society. In his *The Social System*, Parsons related nationalism with industrialism: "The connection between the development of industrialism and of nationalism is well attested. Soviet Russia, in this as in so many respects, seems to be no exception, in spite of its 'internationalist' ideology."⁸ The construct of nation was an indispensable aspect of modern society. In the words of Benedict Anderson: "(within) the formal universality of nationality as a socio-cultural concept – in the modern world everyone can, should, will 'have' a nationality, as he or she 'has' a gender – versus the irremediable particularity of its concrete manifestations"⁹ in the modern age. However, historians of nationalism disagreed as to why nationalism emerged as unavoidable, inevitable, and indispensable.

A classical explanation was proposed by Ernest Gellner. For Gellner, "nationalism is not the awakening of an old, latent, dormant force, though that is how it does indeed present itself. It is in reality the consequence of a new form of social organization, based on deeply internalized, education-dependent high cultures, generally transforming them

in the process, but it cannot possibly use them all.”¹⁰ Gellner explains nationalism as a necessary instrument in the transition of humanity from *agraria* to *industria* within his periodization of human history.¹¹ Gellner’s impressive interpretation of nationalism renders nationalism not an independent ideology *per se* but a mechanism to create a nation and society. For him, national formation is a requisite process for the emergence and consolidation of modern industry-based states and social organizations of *industria*. In short, for Gellner, nationalism is the *sine qua non* of capitalism, modernity, and industrialization. Thus, it is not an irrational outburst, but a masterfully planned plot to serve goals totally irrelevant to its declared and “official” goals.

Gellner’s modeling of nationalism is highly imposing and instructive. However, what is unpersuasive in Gellner’s account is its all-encompassing explanatory nature. The model is so perfect, so convincing, and so comprehensive that it does not leave much room for contingency and variation. Although Gellner’s general modeling is impressive, his presentation of nationalism as a rational and coldly calculated ideology that was hijacked for ends other than its declared aims remains deterministic, dismissing nuances in its different manifestations.¹² Others also interpret nationalism as a strategy of interest-seeking and interest-maximization, supplying legitimacy for propagandizing for other means, generally particular interests of a class, a status group, or a generation.¹³

A new generation of historians in particular and social scientists in general, however, contemplated the meaning of believing in belonging to a nation and the experience of discovering a nation. With the “cultural turn”, a new generation of scholars of nationalism and comparative nationalism rehabilitated the basic premises of Kedourie and refashioned them within the perspectives of “new intellectual history” and “new cultural history”. Since Gadamer’s *Truth and Method*,¹⁴ meaning gained prominence as the ultimate explanatory concept in comprehending the complexity of modern society and the making of modernity. In a sense, this shift can be seen as a return to Kedourie. However, the recent anthropological approach, rejecting the conventional history-of-ideas perspective situating “nationalism” as belonging to the realm of ideas, focuses more on the context in which people

are forced and constrained to contemplate their identity, their selves, and their relation to the outer world. In recent studies, the principal subject of inquiry has focused on individuals and their appropriation of the outer world rather than on anonymous masses and ideologies.¹⁵ As historical anthropology burgeoned (supplanting the historical sociology of the 1970s and 1980s), the mental cosmologies of individuals (such as the miller Menocchio) became objects of inquiry and interest, and not the abstract ideas that supposedly influenced the masses.

Recently, social scientists and historians sought to answer how a socio-political vision (dubbed as nationalism) may be engendered as an end to this existential quest. Accordingly, the idea of nation may be viewed as inseparable from individuals' and groups' encounter with modernity. The birth and development of nationalism cannot be dissociated from the unprecedented transformations individuals (and societies) encountered. It may be argued that nationalism was received by these individuals and groups as a revelation to explain the perplexing and frightening developments which individuals and groups failed to comprehend. Thus, we can further argue that in an age of uncertainty nationalism provided shelter, relief, certitude, and confidence. It provided a comprehensive answer to all unknowns and thus resolved ambiguities and obscurities, a feat comparable to the cutting of the Gordian knot by Alexander the Great.

Recent studies approached nationalism as a constitutive element of modernity rather than a passive outcome of modernity.¹⁶ They did not view it as collateral damage, a side effect, or a bastard of modernity. By modernity, a mechanistic transformation is not implied. Rather, I understand a redefinition of the perception of the relation of man to nature, the relation of man to other men, and of man to society. Modernity is the emergence of a new meaning of personal and social existence. The anthropologists of modernity demonstrated that it is an anthropological encounter as much as a social and political development. The ideas of nation and of belonging to a nation are also corollaries of the drastic alteration of social meaning and existence. This is not to claim that nationalism is a natural and automatic process that comes with the new configuration of the meaning of man. On the contrary, the new structures of meaning were created and maintained,

or at least buttressed, by the emerging modern states that successfully filter and shape these structures of meaning. A new interpretation of nationalism is necessary without reducing nationalism to a dependent function of the modern nation state, industrial capitalism, or mass education. The simple question we have to answer is why people tend to feel that they belong to a nation or why they tend to accept/affirm the ideological infiltration of the state-sponsored or intelligentsia-sponsored idea of nationhood and nationalism. For our purposes, we also have to ask the question of why nineteenth-century European intellectuals were disposed to imagine and discover a nation for themselves. After questioning the reality of nationhood, we have to address the question of why the construct of nationhood was so fundamental in the development of nineteenth-century social, cultural, and political developments.

Simply put, we may speak of two different types of nations in nineteenth-century Europe: those nations with existing states and those nations without states.¹⁷ With regard to the first type, a scholar may study how the idea of nationhood was forged around an already existing state. Many studies investigated the emergence of a national idea in countries such as England and France, where preexisting states became associated with a national essence and identity.¹⁸ In other countries, national ideas and a sense of nationhood developed before the structuring and consolidation of modern nation states. A sense of nation was pursued and developed in countries such as Greece and Russia relatively late and in tandem with the structuring and consolidation of a modern state where states consciously enforced ideological enterprises.¹⁹

A study investigating the emergence of nationalism in countries such as England and France would involve a survey of the state and the bureaucracy, because in these examples the fiction of nationhood was forged with the active involvement and vanguard role of the state while the background of this endeavor was already prepared within an ideological setting. With regard to the second category, where the emergence of a "sense of nation" preceded the emergence of a state, nationalism was more or less an intellectual activity and a "curiosity" turned into the "political". It was a fantasy that subsequently came

into political being. The Bulgarian, Romanian, and Czech discourses on nationhood are examples of this category. In the first category, states forged an idea, whereas in the second, ideas appear to have forged states. For example, it was the successful cultivation of a sense of being a Czech (and Slovak) that to an important extent enabled the foundation of Czechoslovakia.

In comparison to the aforementioned models, the Turkish/Ottoman trajectory follows rather an idiosyncratic path. In the Ottoman case, an idea took over an already existing state. Defying the bureaucracy/intelligentsia dichotomy in the vanguard of nationalism, the conspicuous situation in the Ottoman Empire is that the bureaucracy and the intellectual elite were indistinguishable. Therefore, in the Ottoman/Turkish case, the "nation" may be both an intellectual fantasy and a political imposition at the same time.

Why does "an intellectual" need to belong to a nation and furthermore dedicate his life to a fictitious nation? Certainly, nation is an idea which has emerged within a certain social context, and since ideas can be meaningful only within the framework of social contexts, intellectual quests may be contextualized in their social/historical settings.

Here, primordialist theories of nationalism provide some assistance to us. John Armstrong, in his survey book discussing nations and ethnicities throughout centuries and even millennia, claimed that nations existed before nationalism.²⁰ Likewise, Anthony Smith and subscribers to the Ethno-symbolism School argued that nations existed prior to the modern age, although not as the entities that nationalists of the nineteenth century envisioned them to be. Anthony Smith wrote:

...nations are not fixed and immutable entities "out there" (not even the nationalist thought so); but nor are they completely malleable and fluid processes and attitudes, at the mercy of every outside force. To interpret them as masks and channels of "real" social forces or the cultural surface of anatomical structures beneath, is to miss the independent role and originating power of ethnic identities and ethnic cleavages... (h)ence the need to take the ethnic roots of modern nationalism seriously, and give due weight to those myths, memories and symbols that

can ignite populations and mobilize them for assault on the precarious balance of forces that hold the regional systems of state together.²¹

In other words, for Smith, the ethnic symbols, myths, and the very ethnicities themselves constituted a reservoir of material to be utilized for other goals. However, this does not mean that ethnicity is a blank sheet to be filled in freely. Ethnic groups enjoy historical and cultural particularities. Criticizing the “modernists” who are “wont to describe...[a] one-way relationship between past and present,”²² Anthony Smith argues that the symbolic reservoir such as the “myths, memories, traditions, and symbols of ethnic heritages”²³ which the nationalists utilized also had an impact on the modalities of the configuration of nations. Hence, “historical backgrounds” enjoy contingent power to shape “today” not via path dependencies but via their contributions to the molding of historical and national imaginations which limit the extent of manipulation in the hands of abusers. Nations are not simply the words of Humpty-Dumpty, meaning whatever the nationalist chooses.

In the light of the Smithian perspective, what did “nationhood” mean for the ruling (and intellectual) elite in the context of the Ottoman Empire? The Ottoman case exemplifies neither the first (nations with states) nor the later version (nations without states) of the two “types of emerging nationhoods”. The Ottoman ruling elite owned its state, but this state was to be reclaimed and rejuvenated (and “owned”). It had to be charged with new attributes and meanings. As Smith points out, there is no single definite and objective notion of ethnicity and nation. It may signify different meanings in each historical context, continuously shaped and reshaped in interaction with various dynamics that are also in constant change. The dynamics that shape the making of nations are not necessarily domestic. International factors may be as influential as domestic factors, as is apparent in the development of Turkish nationalism. In the end, some of the competing meanings of nations arise due to apposite intellectual and *Realpolitik* conditions. Here, it will be argued that many of the premises and contours of Turkish nationalism were developed out of

the already existing Ottoman and Islamic visions of social and political order, and mental structures by the imperial elite in a century of radical transformation and imperial retreat. This development was a response to political, intellectual, and cultural shocks and challenges, and it was superseded by the coming generations who advanced on the basis of the values and mental sets they inherited.

Imperial Nationalism versus Ethnic Nationalism

Recent literature on nationalism has established the early modern origins of nationalism²⁴ as well as the existence of proto-nationalisms which preceded full-fledged nationalisms and which molded the main tenets of nationalisms. Nationalism was no more seen as exclusively modern, but as a disposition that may be seen already in the early modern world, albeit in various nebulous forms. It is not observable as strictly an ideology of nineteenth-century intellectuals and the age of the bourgeoisie, but as a concept already forming in pre-French Republic political cultures.

Abigail Green begins her book *Fatherlands* with a quote from Heinrich von Kleist's *German Catechism* (1809). In his "German Catechism," Kleist envisages a confrontation between a Saxon father and his German son. "I am a German," the son declares. "A German," his father cries. "You must be joking. You were born in Meissen, and Meissen is in Saxony!" "I was born in Meissen," the son replies "and Meissen is indeed in Saxony; but my fatherland, the country to which Saxony belongs, is Germany—and your son, my father, is a German." But the father remains unconvinced. "Where is this Germany?" he asks; he cannot find it on the map.²⁵ This anecdote is probably one of the earliest examples of the clash of generations – the radical son revolting against his conservative father; a popular theme of nineteenth-century European literature and imagination. The anecdote also resembles the late Ottoman overlapping of identities. One can easily replace the "Saxon" with the "Ottoman" and the "German" with the "Turk" to adapt it to the Ottoman context (later to meet the Teuton and Turanian dyad as well). However, Green criticizes the conventional historiography of nineteenth-century Germany and those who assume the anecdote of

Kleist as reality. She asserts that German nationalism displays continuity rather than a break. "The book attempts to establish how national Germany was before unification and how federal it remained thereafter."²⁶

The same criticism may be leveled against the conventional historiography of the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire and Turkish nationalism. The conventional historiography dates the emergence of Turkish nationalism to the era of the Young Turks.²⁷ According to this narrative, the idea of Turkishness emerged in the minds of Young Turks in the first decade of the twentieth century during their opposition to the Hamidian regime. This "idea" came to power with the 1908 Revolution. One dissenting interpretation, however, was proposed as early as 1977 by David Kushner. In his book, he demonstrated the prevalence of Turkism as early as the era of Abdülhamid II.²⁸ Remarkably, the Turkists of Kushner were not revolutionaries or upstarts like the Turkist Young Turks. On the contrary, Kushner's Turkists were established figures writing in the harmless dailies of Istanbul and publishing articles approved by Abdülhamid II's censor. In short, in their intellectual predispositions and class backgrounds, they were men of different stock from that of the Young Turks. Although Kushner's study did not draw attention in his day, later studies of Turkish nationalism did begin to date the emergence of Turkish nationalism to an earlier time.²⁹ This observation also requires questioning the alleged sharp dichotomy between the Hamidian generation/establishment and the Young Turk generation in their intellectual orientations. Dating the emergence of a "certain idea of Turkishness" to an earlier date is not only a matter of chronological precision. It also requires us to question the main premises and features of Turkish nationalism. The redefinition of Turkish nationalism would force us to acknowledge the intertwining of various coexisting and sometimes contradictory dispositions, ideologies, and leanings in its very emergence rather than treating it as a strictly modern construct.

The presumed characteristics of the two variants of nationalism/national awareness (Hamidian versus Young Turk) differ in many ways. The Young Turks were preoccupied with inventing a nation *ex nihilo* in their image. Conversely, the earlier imperial generation was

merging the society (Muslim society with a Turkish “natural” center in the process of being imagined as a nation) into the already existing imperial identity and into an idea of social order. The nation was to serve a certain purpose. That is to say, the nationalism of the earlier generation was a “matter of state”. In the perception of the Hamidian dignitaries, the nation is a submissive, hierarchically organized community. Nevertheless, within this framework, “The Ottoman Empire hedged towards a ‘nationally imagined community’ as Ottoman identity assumed an increasingly Turkish character, even if this identity was packaged in universalist Islamic terms.”³⁰

However, whatever the differences between the two strands of nationalism may have been, there was no smooth supplanting of one with the other. On the contrary, the social imagination and premises of the Hamidian generation were prominent in the formation of the nationalism of the Young Turks. In this study, it is argued that the Young Turks took over many propositions of the earlier generation as indispensable tenets of their image of the Turkish nation and Turkish nationalism, which they were claiming to invent. Turkish nationalism was constituted as a state project although not necessarily planned intentionally and top-to-bottom. It is also remarkable that dating the emergence of a full-fledged nationalist discourse to the Young Turks was first construed by the Young Turks themselves (presenting themselves as the generators of national awareness in contrast to the feeble and nationally insensitive Hamidian *ancien régime*), and the historiography bolstered this ideological maneuver (which was further consolidated by the Kemalist/republican historiography) by turning this assertion into actuality.

The very early historiography on the emergence of Turkish nationalism, which developed after World War II within the modernization paradigm, established a dichotomy between Turkish ethnic nationalism and imperial Ottomanism.³¹ In fact, these accounts were heavily influenced by the Young Turks’ (and subsequently Kemalists’) discrediting of Ottomanism and presenting it as a naive and almost effeminate paradigm given that Kemalist paradigms were prominent in the development of the Anglo-Saxon historiography on the late Ottoman period. Here, “imperial Ottomanism” is taken as the official

Ottomanism propagating the equality of subjects of the Empire regardless of religion. The practice of Ottomanism, however, was not perfectly compatible with this encyclopedic definition of Ottomanism. Apparently, the Ottoman center was not a neutral site but biased disproportionately towards an Islamic and Turkish identity.³² By imperial Ottomanism, I refer to the ideological/political predisposition prioritizing the imperial interests and bearing imperial reflexes in contrast to the Turkist reflexes of the later generation which would prioritize the interests of the imagined Turkish nation. This dichotomy (between Ottomanism and Turkism/Turkish nationalism) assumes that imperial Ottomanism became defunct and succumbed without leaving any trace. This simplification derives from the very categorization that the Young Turks themselves formulated. The caricature of Ottomanism by the Young Turks (and the non-Muslim and non-Turkish intellectuals) obliterated the significance and possibilities of Ottomanism. The gradual secularization, radicalization, and ethnicization of Turkish nationalism between the early 1900s and the early 1910s obscured the transitions, linkages, and intertwining between imperial nationalism and ethnic Turkish nationalism.³³ In a sense, Yusuf Akçura's breakthrough article "Three Modes of Politics" (*Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset*), published in the Young Turk journal *Türk* in Egypt in 1904, determined the course of Ottoman studies by persuading practitioners to assume that (secular and radical) Turkism was the only feasible ideology, the only one capable of adapting to modern times by using a somewhat Darwinian logic.

Interestingly, Akçura does not speak of three mutually exclusive "modes" of politics (i.e., ideologies) in his "Three Modes of Politics" but seems to blend them. Furthermore, the pragmatic Akçura concludes his treatise by noting that he cannot decide if Turkism or Islamism is more feasible for the Ottoman polity and remained undecided between the two.³⁴ He was a pragmatic Turkish patriot urging strategies to save the Empire rather than yearning for ideological purity. Apparently, ideologies were a secondary concern for Akçura.³⁵ For Akçura, Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkism were all ideal types rather than exclusive ideologies. Akçura wrote this piece relatively early when Turkism was not yet seen as a predatory ideology

destined to monopolize the ideological scene by eliminating its rivals, as obliged by the iron law of history. It was too early in 1904 to realize that ethnic nationalism would turn into the inevitable ideology of the future while the others were doomed to collapse. Turkish nationalism (in its particular form) succeeded in presenting itself as the only viable and popular ideology. In this study, the extent of this success and the contradictions between Turkish nationalism's self-portrayal and its actuality will be investigated. Following several other studies of the past two decades, this study asserts that Turkish nationalism derives its peculiarities and distinctiveness from its Ottoman/imperial heritage. Turkish nationalism neither resembles state-centered Western nationalisms nor idea-centered Eastern nationalisms.³⁶ Rather, Turkish nationalism is an imperial nationalism with its distinct features and background.

Definitely, such "peculiarities" are not unique to Turkish nationalism. The riddle of nationalism is that nationalism is a sweeping label/code word used to define various distinct evolutions of certain imaginations that do not necessarily resemble each other. As Anne McClintock aptly states, "nationalisms are invented, performed and consumed in ways that do not follow a blueprint."³⁷ Likewise, as articulated by Partha Chatterjee, they do not "follow 'script already written' but they are projects of individual national imaginations."³⁸ Therefore, with regard to Turkish nationalism, our work is to expose what social/cultural/class-related attributes Turkish nationalism evokes under the rubric of nationalism and the national imagination.

Development of an "Official Nationalism" at the Ottoman Center

Nationalism was an import into Ottoman lands. Although the use of the word "import" may sound rather odd, as if it were describing a commodity, nationalism was an "import" in the sense that the arrival of the word "nationalism" as a textbook concept preceded the arrival of nationalism as a social-political reality. The concept of "nationalism" was learned as a textbook concept before it was encountered in its mature form resembling its European manifestations (while

disregarding the proto-nationalist popular movements within the Ottoman realm) beginning from the early nineteenth century.

Southeastern European intellectuals marveled and toyed with the ideas and worlds of the Enlightenment, which had fostered their discovery of their “dormant” national identities and transformed Balkan peasant rebellions into national revolts and awakenings.³⁹ The Ottoman ruling elite perceived these new Balkan nationalities’ phenomena as “technical” textbook issue. Ahmed Cevdet Pasha (1823–95), the conservative reformist statesman and one of the emblematic figures of the culture of the nineteenth-century Ottoman imperial elite, stipulated that these Balkan nationalities had taken the idea of nationhood from the West as if it were an imported commodity. He also remarked that “nationalism is an outcome of the French Revolution” as he reiterated the French historians’ accounts of the French Revolution without contemplating the dynamics and origins of this novel phenomenon. Ahmed Cevdet Pasha held a rather low opinion of nationalism. He wrote that there exists no equivalent of the word “nation” in the Ottoman vocabulary. According to him *vatan* (*patrie*) implies just the village square and has no capacity to motivate soldiers, whereas “Islam” provides a far better motivation for waging war.⁴⁰ However, Ahmed Cevdet Pasha’s employment of Islam was also “national”. For him, Islam was a political cause to be pursued, not limited to the “other world” but also germane to this world. Islam epitomized what was just and good, and it was the backbone of the ideal political order. This mental background led to his scorning of Balkan nationalisms. For Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, the Balkan insurgencies were no more than brutal and barbaric banditry, failing to submit to the seamless and just political order of the abode of Islam as practiced by the Ottoman polity.⁴¹

In the Ottoman elite’s perception, Bulgarians, Greeks, or Serbians were not equal to the imperial Ottomans. The emerging nationalisms of these Balkan nations were regarded only as expressions of rapaciousness, and the arrogant and uncivilized sentiments of these lowly nations. Contrary to the obnoxious nature of the Balkan nations, the Ottoman Empire epitomized ultimate goodness and righteousness. Thus, its use of force was legitimate as long as it served a higher ideal.

These constituted the premises of the imperial discourse attacking the unruly Balkan nationalisms. To a certain degree, these nationalisms emanated from rural banditry and were the reactions of Christian villagers to their subordinate status vis-à-vis their Muslim landlords. These feelings existed long before they were given nationalist twists in Bulgaria, Serbia, and Bosnia. Hence, the perceptions of the imperial discourse were not entirely erroneous.

The Ottoman imperial vision took it for granted that the Ottoman polity was inherently superior to the unhistorical nations of the Balkans. The Ottoman imperial vision did not concede any agency to the Balkan nations.⁴² As Ebru Boyar rightfully pointed out in her book, the perception of the Ottomans “represented the Balkans very much within the centre–periphery paradigm, assigning no concept of ‘sentient being’ to the areas of the periphery whose very existence depended not on their own aspirations and actions but on a centre, be it Istanbul or elsewhere...although nationalism came to be used more and more in the interpretations of the later Ottoman historians and, especially, of those of the early Republic, essentially the late nineteenth-century understanding...of the uprisings remained framed within the centre–periphery paradigm.”⁴³ The traditional Turkish/Kemalist historiography attributed this perception to the mental backwardness of the nineteenth-century Ottomans and their inability to comprehend contemporary ideological developments. However, more recent studies have revealed other motivations for the Ottomans’ denouncement of Balkan nationalisms. This attitude did not stem from being not in touch with the latest developments but from their imperial discourse and worldview.

In fact, a remarkable discursive continuity exists from the narrative of Ahmed Cevdet Pasha regarding the depiction of the Balkan nationalist uprisings in the official Kemalist discourse in terms of denying them any agency in their exploits.⁴⁴ The Kemalist historiography reiterates the imperial assumptions and assumes that these Balkan rebels might have been manipulated by the Russians (or other foreign powers).⁴⁵ The Ottoman ruling elite did not grant any legitimacy to the claims of the bandits in the Balkans for political authority for themselves.⁴⁶ This perception is in contradistinction to the self-victimizing

perception of the Unionist and Kemalist nationalisms, which portrayed Turks as oppressed and in retreat and Balkan nationalists as arrogant and aggressive. However, the Republican perception may be interpreted as a consequence of the change of the conjunctures and not as a modification in ideological outlook. Yet, if we agree to establish a link from Ahmed Cevdet Pasha to the Turkish nationalism of the following decades, we also need to acknowledge continuity from the post-classical Ottoman historians to Ahmed Cevdet Pasha. In *Tarih, Tezâkir* and in his other works, Ahmed Cevdet Pasha reiterates the premises and contours of the age-old Ottoman discourse, which relies on Islamic law and the Islamic notion of politics,⁴⁷ claiming absolute legitimacy to rule over the territories already seized and ruling its subjects without paying attention to their considerations. The ruthlessness of the discourse of pre-modernity and the naturalization of violence (as long as it is just) is also prevalent in Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, and is reminiscent of his predecessors. Once the subject races revolted, the Islamic *âmân* ("mercy") was to be abandoned and, given the "situation of war," the life of any rebellious subject was no more to be maintained.⁴⁸ Therefore, a dehumanizing discourse was maintained based on classical Islamic and pre-modern premises which prevailed in the modernizing nineteenth century.

The transformation of the Ottoman perception with regard to its taking care of its subjects and the endorsement of the discourse of the modern benevolent state were visible as early as the reign of Mahmud II.⁴⁹ Although the obligation to serve one's subjects and maintain their prosperity and security existed in pre-modern political rhetoric and was a pivotal part of the Islamic (and therefore Ottoman) conception of law and governance,⁵⁰ the modern understanding acknowledging subjects as individual citizens and perceiving the duties of the state as not rooted in graceful benevolence but in social responsibility was novel. Moreover, the enhancement of state capacities ensured the effective interference of the state in the daily lives of individuals, both directly and indirectly. The changing perception of the Ottoman polity was manifested on various occasions, such as the tour of the Grand Vizier Kırıbrıslı Mehmet Emin Pasha to Bulgaria in 1861 to listen to the complaints of Christian subjects.⁵¹ Although visits to areas as distant

as Varna had begun with Mahmud II, Mehmet Emin Pasha's visit was the most comprehensive and most publicized one.⁵² Nevertheless, this new sensibility and "rhetoric of inclusion" neither eradicated nor supplanted the prevailing "rhetoric of exclusion". Instead, we observe the coexistence of these two seemingly contradictory discourses. The Islamic dehumanization of non-Muslims did not die out. Rather, it adapted itself and went along with an inclusive rhetoric encompassing non-Muslims as long as they remained loyal. This conditional "rhetoric of inclusion" would be pursued as long as the aspirations of non-Muslims did not challenge the essential premises of Islamic hierarchy, morality, justice, and order.

Ahmed Cevdet Pasha's perception of the French Revolution may be read from the perspective of the same imperial rhetoric. His negative attitude towards the French Revolution⁵³ did not arise from the fact that he was, as an "old Turk", immune from the latest European currents and developments but due to his class/status origins.⁵⁴ Apparently, he was perturbed by the revolution, not only out of fear for the Ottoman polity, but also for the European order in general. He was an aristocrat in the sense that he was a member of the semi-closed and privileged community of the Muslim state elite. He happened also to be an ethnic Turk. These two identities of his were intertwined: being an ethnic Turk was associated with membership in the state nobility.⁵⁵ Many ethnic Turks might be denied this privilege and be despised as part of the vulgar masses, but being an ethnic Turk (and being a Muslim from different origins to a lesser extent) was relatively advantageous for incorporation into the state elite, thus providing ethnic Turks with a "comparative advantage". Arguably, a peculiar Turkish national identity was born from these overlapping identities. This identity implied a certain notion of superiority (*millet-i bakime*), not only vis-à-vis the non-Turks, but also vis-à-vis the ethnic Turkish riffraff as well.⁵⁶ A separation was established between those who were almost divinely ordained to rule and those who were supposed to be submissive (the Muslim masses and non-Muslims) to those who were morally superior (the Muslim/Turkified imperial elite). The imperial identity was not based on ethnic lines but with implications for its prospective ethnicization. Similarly, imperial identity was not strictly exclusive but

was open to those comfortable with the imperial premises, including non-Muslims.

The concept of *millet-i hakime* appeared in the first half of the nineteenth century as a reaction to the rise of non-Muslim nationalities, probably inspired by the Habsburg *Herrenvolk*⁵⁷ idea and the Germans' self-perception in the Habsburg Empire. This concept denotes the development of what Krishan Kumar dubs *Staatsvölker*, or state-bearing people,⁵⁸ or what Hugh Seton-Watson and later Benedict Anderson call "official nationalism"⁵⁹ imbued with a nationalized imperial identity. It has been suggested that the future racist nationalism of Germany emanated from the prevalent European colonial thought which divided society into two, i.e., those destined to be subjugated and those destined to rule. It has been argued by scholars such as Deringil and Makdisi that European colonialist discourse influenced the nineteenth-century Ottoman political governance and ideology.⁶⁰ The racist doctrines of late nineteenth-century Europe were far from the mindset of the Ottoman imperial elite, although such a linkage might be tangential to Young Turk thought. Whereas the racist doctrine was egalitarian insofar as it regarded all members of the racial community/ethnicity as equal, the Ottoman imperial nationalism was flamboyantly elitist and lacking in equality. We observe, however, several manifestations of the impact of European political visions and terminology on Ottoman political culture, such as in the notion of *millet-i hakime*. (This term was recast with a new content by the Young Turks as boldly articulated by Hüseyin Cahid in his notorious article "Millet-i Hakime" in *Tanin* in 1908, which transmitted it to the Young Turk generation along with a secular and ethnicized Turkish nationalism as manifested in the practices and premises of the Republic vis-à-vis the non-Muslim minorities.⁶¹)

Given that the new generation of historians has established that the early modern European state formations were pivotal in the making of the modern state and paradigms of governance,⁶² the reception of these structures of governance and the ideological settings by the Ottoman Empire had to be relocated to an earlier date. The impact of the early modern European political culture in the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire also needs to be assessed. Thus, we can argue that the Turkish nationalist discourse was simultaneously molded within

the hierarchical premises of both modern and pre-modern images and visions of political order. On the one hand, the nineteenth-century colonialist visions that presupposed the superiority of the “enlightened ones” influenced nascent Turkish nationalism. On the other hand, hierarchy and order were already two of the principal ethical premises of the classical Ottoman polity inherited and appropriated by later generations. Hence, the ideological formations of Turkish nationalism derived from different and sometimes contradictory origins.

Discovery of a Nation for a State and for an *Intelligentsia*

Within this hierarchical paradigm, it can be argued that the Ottoman ruling elite “discovered” Turks and Muslims as a community with which it can identify itself in response to two different challenges. The first was the challenge of a series of non-Muslim upheavals severely shattering Ottoman imperial authority. The second was the encroachment of the European powers and the unchallengeable military and diplomatic supremacy of Europe. It may be argued that a self-identity developed in response to these emerging threats. These perceived threats forced the imperial center not only to devise new mechanisms of legitimacy, but also to engender new self-identities. The discovery of a religio-ethnic community on its journey to the discovery of Turkishness can be located within the historical context of these grim realities and pressures. In the beginning, the idea of a certain proto-nationhood was apparently an imperial project discovered by the ruling elite, not necessarily overlapping with an ethnic understanding of nationhood. This argument is not surprising given that the process was more or less similar in some other cases, especially in the Eastern European examples (in the hands of “intellectuals”, in the lack of a “ruling class”).⁶³ It seems that the Empire and the imperial elite retained a religious/imperial identity while buttressing a certain proto-nationhood with ethnic implications (to be sanctioned by the Empire).

Before the 1860s, there is no possibility of speaking about an intellectual elite independent of the state. The Turkish/Muslim *intelligentsia* was hardly distinguishable from the state elite. No

Habermasian intellectual “public sphere” independent of the political realm and political authority emerged in the Ottoman/Turkish center (especially before 1908).⁶⁴ Furthermore, the emergence of a public sphere outside the state did not bring an “emancipation” of the intellectual elite from the political authority, as occurred in Russia with the emergence of a totally new class known as *raznochintsy*. This class distinguished itself and its interests from the state and from the classes whose interests were strictly dependent on the state. The *raznochintsy*, a class composed of college graduates who were denied the prospect of quick advancement in the civil service and were, therefore, alienated from the state-centered prospects of life and worldview, developed its own knowledge, its own values and value system independent of the state, stately culture, and habitus. Therefore, the *raznochintsy* nurtured its own public sphere and spaces of free public discussion, such as literary journals and publishing networks.⁶⁵ Contrary to the process of the emergence and development of the intelligentsia in Russia, the Ottoman intelligentsia did not break away from imperial paternalism. On the contrary, it associated its interests and prospects with the interests and prospects of the state. The Ottoman intelligentsia, in terms of its members’ occupations, wealth, and lineages (bloodlines as well as genealogies not based on bloodlines) continued to be wedded to the state. The question of the destiny of the Ottoman state continued to be the chief preoccupation of the elite as their assets relied on the well-being of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, it was their concern for the fate of the political authority in which they had faith that motivated them to work for a community/nation.⁶⁶ Thus, the Ottoman/Turkish intellectual sphere was more or less a function of the state and the knowledge they produced could not be disassociated from the state, including their epistemology with regard to nation and ethnicity. Therefore, although the impact of Balkan nationalism was considerable, especially on the prospective Young Turks’ appropriation of Turkish nationalism, the Turkish intellectuals’ discovery of proto-nationhood and ethnicity enhanced its particularities and distinguished it from that of their East European counterparts. Their discovery was molded to a major extent within an imperial discourse.

It would be a mistake to argue for a “Young Turk invention” of Turkishness. Following Anthony Smith, we can discern the historicity of a “Turkish nation”. By Turkish nation, I mean those Sunni Muslim populations who either spoke Turkish or who identified Sunni Islam with Turkishness. Furthermore, it could be claimed that there existed an implicit self-consciousness (based on linguistic and cultural distinctions) among the Turkish-speaking population, who felt to a degree that they belonged to a certain community which distinguished them from the Albanians in Macedonia and from the Kurds, Arabs, and others in Eastern Anatolia and in the Levant. It could be anticipated that with improvements in communications and transportation, and with an enhanced awareness of the existence of a world beyond their localities, a feeling of belonging that surpassed people’s localities would emerge. However, this was not a natural and an inevitable process but rather a constructed one which was at its base political (rather than social or cultural).

Furthermore, it is more accurate to speak of various Turkish nations (or proto-nations) that shared a language and accumulated a shared memory transmitted over generations throughout the centuries. The existence of common traits, however, does not rule out the potentiality of separate nations-in-the-making. It was the marginalization and trivialization of differences and nuances together with the exposure and emphasizing of commonalities and resemblances that engendered the imagination of a single Turkish nation. Among these potential Turkish nations-in-the-making, the Roumelian individual/communal experiences, myths, and memories of the Young Turks,⁶⁷ in which Roumelia was a constant (ethnic) war zone in which Turks/Muslims were on the defensive and in retreat, may be regarded as one of the constitutive moments of the Turkish nation as we know it today.

Therefore, it may be argued that a significant factor in the forging of the imagery of a “certain” Turkish nationhood was the Roumelian origin of the Young Turk generation. These prospective Young Turks grew up benefiting from the opportunities provided by a good education and were able to subsequently join the Ottoman bureaucracy based on their superior merits (along with their cohort coming from all

parts of the Ottoman Empire benefiting the educational opportunities provided by the imperial schooling system).

This is not to say that they invented the Turkish nation in their image. On the contrary, the origins of Turkish nationalism went further back before Roumelian and Anatolian recruits modified it. Here, the employment of the word nationalism rather than specifically Turkish nationalism may be more accurate given that the sentiment of nationalism is not simply a matter of distinguishing and privileging ethnicities. Beyond referring to ethnicity, nationalism is fundamentally the feeling of belonging articulated within the discourse of ethnicities, establishing inner and outer groups using ethnic differences. Hence, nationalism cannot be reduced simply to a matter of ethnicity. Indeed, nationalisms address and seek loyalties beyond ethnicity. It is not easy to distinguish between coexisting loyalties by isolating one of them. The very fundamental and appealing reference in nationalism is the concept of “we”.⁶⁸ In this framework, the foe emerges as “they”.

In the Ottoman/Turkish context, it may be appropriate to use the word “they” rather than “other”. Before the nineteenth century, “Turks” (and “Muslims”) did know the “others” without necessarily “otherizing” them as “they”. This was because they did not previously perceive a “threat” from “them”. “Other” was safely distant and non-threatening to “us” because the other never posed the danger of mingling with “us”. In the old order, all Muslims knew their place, as did non-Muslims. The passing of the old order severely disturbed the non-Muslim communities as well. Once the old hierarchical order was shattered, the non-Muslim entities became legitimate rivals with equal or even greater chances of outdoing Muslims in a free (and Darwinian) competition.⁶⁹ The process of realizing the competitive advantages of the outsiders of yesterday became the cement of the emergence of an awareness of belonging to a community for Muslims (of Turkish and non-Turkish origin). It may be argued that, as the Muslim populace lost its natural/naturalized and inherited superiority, the angst of entrenchment sowed the seeds of a sense of nationalism in search of an identity.

This development was visible in the localities. However, such conceptualizations/categorizations were to remain local phenomena unless an external force were to be exerted. It was a central project to “politicize”

these local sentiments and quests for belonging, to merge unrelated developments, and to incorporate them into one single grand narrative.⁷⁰ Apparently, “nation” is a political concept by definition. However, it is built on non-political themes and agendas. It may be “artificial” in its political construction, though this political construction builds on genuine non-political concerns and socio-economic realities. If we define modernity as the politicization of what had been non-political and the publicization of what had been private, then nationalism was arguably the main protagonist in this transformation.

The existence of local rivalries does not necessarily result in the politicization of the concepts of nation and belonging⁷¹ nor the form of its politicization,⁷² although it is a fact that with the advent of the modern age, “knowledge of human behaviour...became nationalized and universalized. Events that occur in isolated villages and hamlets or on the city streets have become subject to placement in categories and contexts previously unknown to or incidental to the lives of those who experience them.”⁷³ We may observe that the ethnic tensions and atrocities in the Balkans, which reached their climax during the Balkan Wars, immortalized the sufferings and the subsequent exiling of the Turkish/Muslim civilians and established the vivid, founding memories of Turkish nationalism.⁷⁴

Nevertheless, it was not easy to establish the imagery of a certain, singular Turkishness within the vast Ottoman geography. “A certain idea of Turkishness” can be constructed along with a certain conception of spatiality and the existence of an undisputable center epitomizing the unity of the imagined nation. The well-known response of Fuad Pasha to the British ambassador to Constantinople, Stratford Canning, as quoted in Cevdet Pasha’s *Tezâkir*, illustrates this perception: “The integrity of the Ottoman Empire is founded on four premises. As long as these four premises are retained, it progresses. In the absence of any of these premises, it cannot be maintained. These premises are as follows: the nation of Islam, the Turkish state, the dynasty of the Ottomans and Istanbul as its capital.”⁷⁵

To be able to incorporate the rivers Vardar and Arax within the same imagination, a *deus ex machina* was necessary. It may be argued that it was the “myth of Istanbul” around which the idea of

Ottoman/Turkish imagery/ideal was constructed. It was a pivotal element that engendered the flourishing and consolidation of an encompassing Turkishness within a wide geographical setting. Apparently, Istanbul epitomized the grandeur of the Ottoman *imperium*. Here, the symbolism of Istanbul can be taken as the “primacy of politics” (i.e., external interference of the center) which facilitated the unification of the various strands and embodiments of Turkishness. This was yet another instance of the constitutive role of the imagery of imperium in the making of political Turkish ethnicity.

Thus, the making of the Turkish nation and a single Turkish ethnicity eliminating local differences was an amalgamation of different processes in progress. It is impossible to dissociate any of these constitutive elements of Turkish nation and nationalism. The center needed the peripheral forces. The peripheral forces were to remain politically negligible unless stimulated and manipulated by the center. Regarding the making and development of Turkish national awareness and Turkish nationalism, there was no one single storyline in progress but different plots streaming independently within the storyline to intersect at a later point in time. The imperial center was the reference point both for the peripheral developers of Turkish nationalism and the intellectuals in Istanbul, and it served as the unifier of these different plots.

The Ruling Elite of the Tanzimat

At this point, it is necessary to undertake an analysis of the Tanzimat ruling elite. In order to make such an analysis, meticulous and extensive research must be undertaken; two different clusters referring to two different generations, divergent socialization, and upbringing, will be proposed. The two clusters proposed are that of the Tanzimat generation and the Young Turk generation.⁷⁶ These clusters will constitute models similar to the Weberian ideal types. In reality, they resemble and overlap as much as they diverge. The transformation of the former to the latter and transitional figures defying such reductionism and duality are also observable, especially in the outlook of the bureaucrats of the late Hamidian era.⁷⁷ The complete

detachment of these two clusters (generations) would only conceal the Tanzimat origins of the Young Turk era. Furthermore, this study aims to emphasize the evolution of a structure of mind rather than to assess the generational change in terms of “the revolt of sons against their fathers”. This study focuses on what we will call the Tanzimat generation and discusses the Young Turk generation when necessary. The next chapters will demonstrate that the diplomats of the Hamidian Foreign Ministry were very much representative of their Tanzimat generation in their upbringing, socialization, and mental structures.

We may also divide the Tanzimat generation into two distinctive sub-groups. In my scheme, “the early Tanzimat elite” was comprised of the higher echelons of the imperium from the 1840s onwards. They received a limited and informal education reflecting the mores of the pre-modern cultural and institutional structures rather than the professionalized and standardized modern codes of civil service amalgamated with the attributes of the creeping modernization of the political and bureaucratic structures. After the transitional phase, the Hamidian generation (the other sub-group of the Tanzimat generation) reflected the gradual maturation of the Tanzimat elite comprised of bureaucrats with more or less formalized educational backgrounds. They benefited from the educational opportunities provided by the late Tanzimat reforms and held clearly defined public offices during their smooth careers. In the Hamidian era, the reforms of the Tanzimat had broadened to encompass the entirety of the state structure. Therefore, a modern bureaucracy, structured to a certain degree in terms of merit and formal education, gradually became visible (albeit with limitations) thanks to the maturation of Tanzimat reformism. However, the nature of the Hamidian bureaucracy has to be qualified. The nineteenth-century bureaucratic culture hardly resembled the formal and impersonal bureaucratic culture of the twentieth century. Instead, it relied predominantly on personal connections and skills acquired less from formal education than from cultural socializations. It may be observed in many ways the preexisting agrarian-coercive ruling elite that reinvented itself as the bureaucratic elite and assumed bureaucratic offices.⁷⁸

The term "ruling elite" is rather ambiguous and must be precisely defined. By ruling elite, I mean a group of people who reached the higher echelons of the Ottoman polity by merit, blood, or mere chance and who felt secure enough to transfer their wealth and prestige to their descendants. In his classic book, Şerif Mardin convincingly argued that by the time of the Tanzimat, or by the late years of the reign of Mahmud II, there had emerged a self-consciousness and *esprit de corps* among the ruling elite. This caused them to perceive themselves to be a closed community dedicated to upholding the Ottoman polity and to seize responsibility for the destiny of the Ottoman polity from the sultan.⁷⁹

This elite was not a hermetically closed community. It allowed and even encouraged new recruits. However, that does not mean that it was a completely open system welcoming any new member. Endorsing the appropriate mores, code of conduct, values, and motivations of the governing elite and the state was a *sine qua non* for admission into the ruling elite. A new recruit had to attain the imperial ethos. However, this requirement was not an impossible obstacle because the requisite education and training did infuse mores, and the new graduates did not pose serious challenges to the ideological pillars of the imperium. The recruits, to a large extent willingly and enthusiastically, assimilated, and the state was capable of absorbing them.

Many subjects of the sultan were unsuitable candidates for incorporation into the state elite due to their inappropriate ethnic, confessional, or social backgrounds. Although many from the disfavored ethnic and communal groups were incorporated into the ruling elite, the extent of incorporation among these groups remained limited. It is possible to imagine that this discrimination tacitly and implicitly contributed to the emergence of an awareness of belonging to a certain (national) identity which generated a sympathy with the population with whom they supposedly shared the same ethos and same (notorious) fate in the context of the collapse of the Empire which, incidentally, also threatened their material and non-material interests and dignity. Arguably, an imagination of a cross-class community sharing commonalities was forged in this process.

The new recruits faced few practical problems in their conversion and assimilation into the state and the state elite. Of course, they encountered severe grievances and injustices as they were the new recruits to

be marginalized and abused by the more privileged in the highly corrupt environment of the late Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman establishment was a conservative/patriarchal polity to which newcomers were not enthusiastically welcomed. This meant that they were admitted to the governing elite but not acknowledged as equals. However, such mistreatment and discrimination derived partially from personal rivalries as a consequence of the gerontocratic and patriarchal understanding of statecraft, which prized age and seniority. Better treatment came with gradual promotion within the state bureaucracy.

On the other hand, the governing elite in the late Ottoman Empire was always “in the making” and continued to be “in the making” throughout the early Republic as the number of bureaucrats and students studying in the imperial colleges of the Empire continued to rise exponentially in every generation. Every new generation of officials redefined and recast the nature and strengthening of the Ottoman bureaucracy and polity while never radically altering its fundamental characteristics. Thus, continuity within change is visible. Nevertheless, in the late Hamidian era, the assimilative education began to fail to indoctrinate the new recruits with this ethos and did not provide them with an appropriate orientation. The new generation became disenchanted with the acclaimed ethos of the Empire. This generation demanded the modification of Ottoman ideology and renounced the ethos introduced to them in their training. However, the main premises of the new generation were not destructive to the thrust of the imperial discourse.

The Elite-Formation and Identity-Formation Processes of the Tanzimat

The new interest in the early modern Ottoman Empire (inspired by Western interest in early modern Europe) which perceived it as dynamic, thriving, and constitutive of its posterity, revolutionized Ottoman scholarship in the 1990s. Ariel Salzmann's research on the tax-farmers of the eighteenth century showed how the Istanbul “aristocracy of service” took advantage of a distinctly old-regime type of insider trading, or what the economist Joseph Stiglitz calls in a

modern context, asymmetric information.⁸⁰ Rifa'at Abou-El-Haj demonstrated how a bureaucratic and military aristocracy, without bearing hereditary titles and designations, reproduced itself in the late seventeenth century.⁸¹ Norman Itzkowitz pointed out that sons maintained the career patterns of their fathers.⁸² Dina Rizk Khoury demonstrated that the emergence of a provincial elite was not necessarily adverse to the interests of the centralized Ottoman polity within an Ottoman framework. While Salzmann and Abou-El-Haj established that the emerging self-interested households of the center did not pose a threat to the effectiveness and authoritativeness of the polity either. The aforementioned Ottomanists reveal that these household maneuvers and politics, on the contrary, contributed to the development of an effective and imposing state power.⁸³ As demonstrated by these and other scholars of early modern Ottoman Empire, such as Virginia Aksan, Jane Hathaway, and Shirine Hamadeh,⁸⁴ the post-classical centuries witnessed the emergence of a recognizable Ottoman elite which merged provincial elites and the Istanbul elite as the Ottoman polity replicated early modern European patterns in its path to a modern state. By the eve of the Tanzimat, it is possible to speak of a self-conscious state elite which had emerged gradually over two centuries and which could enforce the proclamation of the Rescript of Tanzimat, the beginning of the modern Ottoman Empire.

The Rescript of Tanzimat in 1839 assured officials and dignitaries that they would not be arbitrarily beheaded and that their wealth and property would not be confiscated as a consequence of their dismissal from office.⁸⁵ The recognition of the maintenance of personal wealth after dismissal from office with the Rescript of Tanzimat also brought a new self-understanding to this elite. Previously, wealth, property, and honor had been seen as an imperial grant and therefore dependent upon the imperial grace. The state made the man, and thus the beneficence granted by the state may be revoked once the grace is withdrawn. With the termination of confiscations, the grantees' wealth began to belong solely to the individuals themselves. Such an assurance and the acknowledgment of the right to retain their property and wealth turned this "grouping" for the first time into a class-for-itself (in a non-Marxian sense). This does not mean that with the state's

(or sultan's) recognition of the irrevocability of the wealth, this elite became detached from the state. On the contrary, we may argue that, with the assurance of their possessions, they became associated/identified with the state even more closely since the legal recognition of their possessions meant that their wealth, prestige, and reputation (and their class interest and identity) became strictly bound to the survival and well-being of the Ottoman state. Thus, they had a major stake in the future of the Ottoman state for the first time.⁸⁶

The bloody end of the Pertev Pasha-Akif Pasha conflict which took place just before the Rescript of Tanzimat terminated the use of violence and the physical elimination of political rivals as an effective method of advancement in the hierarchy.⁸⁷ The Tanzimat brought out the mutual recognition of the inviolability of the basic rights of life and property of the members of the governing elite as well as the recognition by the sultan of these essential rights of the individuals belonging to the governing elite. Hence, the Tanzimat paved the way for the emergence of a solid governing elite with a number of families whose members occupied various chief posts of the state.

Apparently, there is a genealogical continuity of the Tanzimat elite with that of the pre-Tanzimat elite as attested to by Itzkowitz: "(i)t is significant that the bureaucrats were in the forefront of those who supported the reforms of Selim III and Sultan Mahmud II in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The wearers of the fez and the long, black frock coat, the uniform of the bureaucracy under Mahmud II, were the sons of the scribes of the eighteenth century, many of them in turn, descendants of the scribes of the seventeenth century."⁸⁸

The dignitaries of the early decades of the Tanzimat formed the first generation of these families who were overwhelmingly scions and descendants of minor (or prominent) clerks and military officers of the preceding generation. Others were scions of the provincial/peripheral elites moving to Istanbul. In the next decades, we can observe the second and third generation of these governing elite families retaining the preeminence of their families. A genealogical revolution would only take place with the coming of the graduates of the imperial schools in the late nineteenth century although even after the "democratization" of education, a remarkable continuity is visible.

A prosopographic study would show us the genealogies, lineages, and connections of the late Ottoman elite.⁸⁹ In the forthcoming chapters, this pattern will be illustrated in the case of the Ottoman diplomats. A genealogical continuity from the first generation of Tanzimat to the early Republic will also be established. What is arguably more remarkable than the genealogies extending from the early Tanzimat (and pre-Tanzimat period) to the Republic are the marriage connections. Marriage ties functioned as the glue for a somewhat closed community, delineated its borders, and enhanced its cohesiveness. The prominent role of marriages is again revealed in the case of the diplomats, which will be covered in the next chapters. The lineages and connections observable among the Ottoman diplomats will also expose how this closed elite was integrated and how well the closed elite perceived itself as a community with neatly drawn borders and habits. Furthermore, marriages ensured this community's perpetuation and adjustment in terms of welcoming newcomers from the newly ascending segments of the society and unifying different elites (commercial, agrarian, bureaucratic) as capitalism and agrarian capitalism burgeoned simultaneously with the expansion of the Ottoman administrative and bureaucratic machine.

The emergence of a relatively cohesive bureaucratic aristocracy and a state elite fostered a certain sense of belonging. For the first time, the governing elite constituted a certain community (imagined or real).⁹⁰ The development of the notion of belonging to a certain community was the first step for the creation of the idea of a national identity.⁹¹ Perhaps nations are the images of families writ large. If this allegory is tenable, nations then symbolize what a family (or a small community consisting of people who know each other well, like a neighborhood) symbolizes: intimacy, feelings of security, and affection. In the case of the Ottoman governing elite, the image of Turkishness (which is itself to a certain extent a derivation of Muslimness) may be interpreted as a projection of its own sense of belonging and identity in the face of a variety of threats, both close and distant.

The Tanzimat and post-Tanzimat generations of bureaucrats attained different political outlooks due to their experiences of different social environments in their formative periods. The Young Turk generation, experiencing daily ethnic discrimination and cleavages,

was more prone to conceptualize social and economic matters in ethnic terms given that they felt themselves threatened and regarded themselves as inferior to the non-Muslims in terms of economic and local political dynamics. For the Tanzimat generation, it was the opposite. Not only were they more self-confident vis-à-vis the non-Muslims, but they also perceived themselves as metaphysically superior to those whom they regarded as their unruly subjects or their *ra'yah*.⁹² This perception, as pointed out above, originated from an actuality but persisted while the reality changed dramatically throughout the nineteenth century when Muslims could not compete with the advancement of the non-Muslims. The idea that non-Muslims had to be submissive as Islamic law and divine grace required endured even in the republican perception of the non-Muslims as a remnant of the imperial consciousness. In short, these two outlooks, sometimes contrasting and sometimes coinciding self-perceptions, were transplanted onto the modern self-image of Turkishness. Simplistic categorizations do not confirm the interrelatedness of these perceptions. On the contrary, these continuities within breaks demonstrate the complex nature of Turkish nationalism.

This observation is congruent with the argument made above. Since we regard nationalism not as a phenomenon “out there” to be grasped with the onset of modernity, but instead as something contingently crafted in minds over time, positing similar trajectories as nationalism (as if all these unique trajectories are equivalent) is misleading.⁹³ If we do not regard nationalism as a constitutive and indispensable outcome of modernity but instead as a style or a rhetorical style, and if we contextualize nationalism in relation to the socio-economic and political context in which it flourished, we can conceptualize it as emerging as an answer to larger, vexing existential questions.

Signs of these continuities could be traced at a symbolic level. The language and vocabulary of the classical Ottoman polity were a reservoir from which the basic tenets of Turkish nationalism were reproduced. Alleged symbols of the grandeur of the classical Ottoman imperium such as *Mebter Marşı* and the myth of the Golden Apple (*Kızıl elma*) were invented by the Young Turks as “tradition”, as were the various “inventions” of Abdülhamid II regarding the origins of the Ottoman

Empire and the Ottoman Empire in its classical age as shown by Selim Deringil.⁹⁴ After 1908, the anniversary of the birth of the Empire began to be celebrated as a national holiday.⁹⁵ These practices amounted to what Anthony Smith calls the utilization of myths and symbols. Smith argues that ethno-symbolism was prevalent for centuries and that nationalists built on these ethno-symbols and myths.⁹⁶ Here, further developing Smith's argument, we may attest to how constitutive the Ottoman symbols and myths were in the making of Turkish nationalism. Furthermore, these continuities involve not only myths and symbols, but also the discourses and perceptions. This does not mean that Turkish nationalism was a continuation, revival, or modification of Ottoman imperialism (as the Balkan nationalist historiographies were prone to claim). It only reveals how certain perceptions and modes of conduct were predetermined by an inheritance which was voluntarily or involuntarily, consciously or unconsciously, adopted. In short, although Turkish nationalism may be a novelty and a recent/modern phenomenon, it arose from a legacy that it had inherited and appropriated. First and foremost, it inherited a particular perception which had been born within a certain socio-politico-economic context and background, but, once constructed, created its own reality and autonomy.

Regarding the emergence of a Turkish national identity, it has been pointed out that two alternative suggestions (as ideal types) may be stipulated. The first idea is that national identity was brought forth by the group of people whom this study calls the Young Turk generation, originating mostly from Roumelia and coming from the provincial lower middle classes⁹⁷ (and certainly some from Anatolia and Istanbul as well). The second alternative interpretation is to argue that a certain national identity has already been conceptualized in the center (in the abode of imperium). Maintaining that these were autonomous and interactive plots in the storyline, this study argues that the emergence of Turkish nationhood was not a smooth and straightforward process. On the contrary, it was the outcome of an interactive and complex process that was made, remade, and negotiated every day.

To summarize, Turkish nationalism's perceptions, premises, and assumptions cannot be disassociated from the Ottoman elite's perceptions, premises, concerns, reflexes, and responses to changing

circumstances. The perceptions of “retreat” and “advances of the others” were all retained, maintained, and reinvented. Although many novel concerns peculiar to the ramifications of modernity and the encounter with modernity appeared, such as the proposed strategies for “regeneration”, a step function trajectory from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to the discourse and nature of Ottoman/Turkish modernity can be traced.

The *Ancien Régime* Problem in Europe

One of the flaws in studying nineteenth-century Ottoman intellectual history as well as studying the ideological make-up of the nineteenth-century Ottoman state elite has been to perceive it as a passing or transitory phenomenon. It is as if the Kemalist mind and the Republican reformers ran over the intellectual legacy of the Tanzimat, resulting in its death by this merciless stroke. For example, in 1962, Richard Chambers divided Turkey’s evolution “into a modern nation state in two stages, the first of which may be said to begin in 1789, and the second in 1919.” For Chambers, “the early phases of change were in a manner of speaking defensive since they were effected to preserve the authority of the traditional ruling elite; the changes after 1919 were effected in a genuinely progressive spirit.”⁹⁸ The Tanzimat “brought bureaucrats to the fore as leaders of further defensive reforms”.⁹⁹ Chambers perceived the Tanzimat as the “age of bureaucrats” before they “lost the position of leadership they had intermittently held for some half a century, first to Abdülhamid II and his conservative allies, then to the Young Turk army officers and intellectuals, and finally to Atatürk and the politicians.”¹⁰⁰ These lines illustrate the emblematic approach of the modernization school and the reigning paradigms of the time. Chambers himself was a scholar of the Tanzimat bureaucracy and the author of a dissertation on Ahmed Cevdet Pasha.¹⁰¹ Moreover, his quoted article was probing not the Republican bureaucracy but the Tanzimat bureaucracy. Nevertheless, he regarded the Tanzimat as a bygone age that failed to respond to the assaults leveled first by the patrimonialism of Abdülhamid II and later by military officers. In short, the Tanzimat was eradicated without a trace. While Kemalist

ideology was delighted with this alleged eradication, many others resented the collapse of the Tanzimat (and its alleged “liberal spirit”). However, we should probe the Tanzimat intellectual environment not as an archaeologist excavating relics of the past but as a contemporary historian, if not a political scientist, to reconstruct a formative moment in Turkish modernity. In short, here the mindset of the Ottoman bureaucracy will not be investigated as a *passé* phenomenon, a Turkish *ancien régime*, but as the foundation of Turkish modernity and the origins of the Republican discourses.

“[The concept] *ancien régime* was created by the French revolution. It was what the revolutionaries thought they were destroying in and after 1789.”¹⁰² Thus, the concept of *ancien régime* emerged at its onset as an ideological artifact for the purpose of discrediting and denigrating an invented diametrically opposite adversary by the revolutionaries. Thus, the *ancien régime* was denied any agency and any constitutive role for its posterity. Later scholarly works, however, acknowledged the existence of a certain form of politics, society, and culture, which may be justly named as *ancien régime*, not definable in relation with what it preceded (the new regime) but as an encompassing vision of a political and social order with its distinctive attributes.¹⁰³

The culture of the aristocracy was at the very center of the *ancien régime*. Nobility and aristocracy are concepts which may acquire different meanings in different contexts and times. Marc Raeff, a historian of Russian aristocracy, remarked that, “we must turn to the always tricky problem of terminology, for Russian reality and concepts have no obvious equivalents in the West. Our study concerns the *dворянство* of eighteenth century.” He defines *dворянство* as “all titled persons, serf owners, officers, officials, professional people, whether they owned land or not,”¹⁰⁴ and technically “the service nobles of the Grand Duke and Tsar.”¹⁰⁵ The aristocracy of Russia was from the beginning constituted in relation to the state and shaped by the initiatives of the state beginning with Ivan the Terrible’s suppression of the *boyars*.¹⁰⁶ Every polity improvised different notions of privilege, distinction, and political ordering. An aristocracy does not necessarily fit into the Western European classical model in which nobility preceded the formation

and expansion of the states. The making of nobilities and state nobilities involved different modalities in different national contexts.¹⁰⁷

Moreover, no aristocratic cluster remains the same over the course of time. The characteristics and social roles of aristocracies change, transform, and evolve. One remarkable case is the trajectory of the Prussian aristocracy throughout Prussia's evolution from a lesser princely feudal polity to an authoritarian monarchy with an industrialized economy monitored by an interventionist state dubbed as the alliance of iron and rye. The Prussian aristocracy sustained its power vis-à-vis the non-aristocratic interests in a world in which land and landed interests were no more the predominant means of production or of power. The state and the aristocracy established a partnership in which the aristocracy redefined its relation to the state.¹⁰⁸

Arno Mayer's *The Persistence of the Old Regime* is the classic account of the new reassessment of nineteenth-century Europe.¹⁰⁹ Arno Mayer demonstrated that, contrary to received opinion, it was the nobility of a different sort that had enjoyed political power in the nineteenth century.¹¹⁰ For Mayer, the Marxian assumption that economic power and political power are indistinguishable and that who controls the economy controls the political power is erroneous. For him, throughout the nineteenth century, political power continued to be exerted by traditional elites, which did not necessarily overlap or intersect with the economic elites and centers of economic production.¹¹¹

One of the major debates among English historians involved the problem of the break/continuity of the *ancien régime* in Britain. The question is whether the political establishment of nineteenth-century Britain can be seen as the continuation of the eighteenth-century political establishment or not. The (old) Whig families constituted the political elite of eighteenth-century Britain. It was a century of oligarchy and a period of consensus within the commanding heights of the British ruling class. With the extension of political rights in 1832, a reshuffling took place, terminating the Whig ascendancy. Whigs had to share political power with the Tories as the commonality of interest among the ruling elite had ebbed. Furthermore, the Tories reigned for most of the nineteenth century, and new alignments within the ruling elite and outside the ruling elite took place. Thus, liberals and radicals

made their way into parliament within the Whig establishment, and the old Whigs lost their predominance within the Liberal Party.

The traditional Whig historiography associated the ascendancy of Britain with the rise of a new entrepreneurial class capitalizing on the benefits of the Industrial Revolution. However, the revisionist historians of the 1980s claimed that "the strength of Britain...lay less in its novel entrepreneurial activities than in the elements of stability and continuity, which derived from its status as a rural *ancien régime* society, the monarchy, the church and the aristocracy."¹¹² Eighteenth-century Britain (not unlike the new interest in the eighteenth-century Ottoman Empire) was rehabilitated from a neglected field of study to a field enjoying increasing attention. John Brewer, Paul Langford, Linda Colley,¹¹³ and others produced remarkable studies that investigated and reassessed eighteenth-century Britain and its aristocracy not as a world doomed to collapse and vanish but as the harbinger of the dynamic Britain of the nineteenth century. The revisionist historians asserted that the aristocracy played a constitutive role in the making of the British nineteenth century.

David Cannadine showed that the collapse of the British aristocracy can be dated as late as the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.¹¹⁴ In another book, he also reinterpreted English imperialism, in a polemic with Edward Said, as a venture animated mainly by aristocratic aspirations,¹¹⁵ which also challenged the chief assumptions of Marxist and non-Marxist imperial historians. The new imperial historians also shed light on the salient contributions of the British aristocracy to the development of British imperialism. For Hopkins and Cain, two prolific historians of British colonization and imperialism, British imperialism was advanced by the southern English aristocracy who failed to compete against the northern industrialists and northern capitalism.¹¹⁶ In an influential book, Martin Wiener claimed that the disappointing economic performance of twentieth-century Britain was a result of the dominance of the southern land-based aristocrats in the political and cultural spheres, which impeded the rising northern industrialists and their bourgeois ethos. For Wiener, land-based aristocrats disdained the culture of the innovative and industrious business elite and promoted

an anti-industrialist ethos. The industrialists, who were mocked in Charles Dickens' *Hard Times*, never seized the political and ideological power,¹¹⁷ and the "old regime" with its value system prevailed.

French historians also rehabilitated the neglected role of the aristocracy in the making of nineteenth-century France. Coming from an aristocratic family victimized in the terror of the French Revolution, Alexis De Tocqueville claimed in the mid-nineteenth century that the French Revolution did in fact pursue the legacy of the *ancien régime* but he did not suggest that the old powerhouses of the *ancien régime* had survived and retained their power after the French Revolution. Nevertheless, Tocqueville's view remained a minority one until he was rehabilitated by the revisionist historians of the French Revolution. The "arch-revisionist" Alfred Cobban refuted the Marxist interpretation of French Revolution in 1964 and argued that it was essentially a bourgeois revolution.¹¹⁸ Influenced by him, in the late 1960s and the 1970s a new generation of historians of the French Revolution further demolished "the myth of bourgeois revolution."¹¹⁹ Revisionist historians of the French Revolution differed in their views and in their interpretation of the revolution. Nevertheless, the collapse of the argument that 1789 was a bourgeois revolution brought the aristocracy back to the stage. The aristocracy was no longer seen as a class that had ceased to exist after 1789. Revisionist historians documented how the *ancien régime* aristocratic families managed to adapt themselves to the new circumstances of the nineteenth century and reproduced their wealth.¹²⁰ The French case was different from the British one in the sense that the French aristocrats as a class lost their political power. Nevertheless, in economics, politics, and the bureaucracy, the aristocracy retained its strong presence throughout the nineteenth century.¹²¹ The aristocratic families found ways to retain and reproduce their wealth and prestige before they began to vanish at the end of the nineteenth century.

Furthermore, it was also revealed that there was no independent and arrogant bourgeoisie committed to eradicating the aristocracy and the *passé* aristocratic values, as Marx had postulated with enthusiasm in the nineteenth century. Sarah Maza showed that the "myth of bourgeoisie" was invented to refer to a fictive enemy rather than to represent social

reality.¹²² Contrary to the vision of Marx, the bourgeoisie of nineteenth-century France was timid and did not intend to challenge or oppose the aristocracy. On the contrary, the bourgeoisie emulated the aristocracy as found in the impressive literary account of Marcel Proust. We may speak of the final triumph of the bourgeoisie, if there ever was a bourgeoisie and if it was ever victorious, only in the 1890s with the consolidation of the institutions established by the Third Republic.¹²³ However, the bourgeoisie of the 1890s was not the bourgeoisie of the previous decades. It was the bourgeoisie that made its peace with the existing order and abandoned its progressive and oppositional rhetoric especially after witnessing the horrors of the Paris Commune. In other words, the triumph of the bourgeoisie and the Third Republic may be regarded in many ways as more the victory of the *ancien régime*.

The czarist Russian historiography also reassessed the Russian *ancien régime*. The conventional historiography of czarist Russia has been revised by revisionist historians beginning in the 1970s. The revisionist historiography propounded a comparably favorable view of czardom by refusing to associate czardom with ruthless and arbitrary despotism.¹²⁴

In recent years, Nicholas' bureaucracy has been the subject of considerable study in the West. For H. J. Torke the major characteristics of the Russian civil service were its lack of professional autonomy, expertise or ethos. Unlike its Prussian counterpart it had neither the corporate rights guaranteed by the *Allgemeine Landrecht*, nor yet a clear sense of service to the communal welfare enshrined in an abstract ideal of the state. Without challenging Torke's view that the Russian civil service as a whole was corrupt, inefficient, arbitrary and concerned with its own welfare rather than the communal interest, some American scholars recently casted a somewhat redeeming light on certain aspects of Nicholas' bureaucracy. What emerges clearly from the work of these scholars is that by the 1850s Russia possessed an elite officialdom fully committed to the service of a state whose only legitimate function in their eyes was the welfare of the community. These men were expert career officials, firmly rooted in the

ministerial apparatus, and possessed an ethos distinct in most cases from that of the landed aristocracy and the gentry. They expected the state to play the leading role in bringing reform and modernization to Russian society and, if permitted by the monarch and his entourage, were willing and able to take the burden of leadership on their own shoulders.¹²⁵

The Great Reform era initiated after the catastrophic Crimean War, which was perceived as a dismal failure, was reexamined and rehabilitated: "More recently, Western scholars have looked much more in depth at the question of how the Great Reforms were implemented, tested and developed and considered their broader social, political, and cultural implications in an impressive series of studies."¹²⁶ Apparently, recent studies do not celebrate the autocratic reforms of Alexander II but present a balanced evaluation of the Great Reform era.¹²⁷ Hence, the myth of monarchic absolutism for Russian czardom has been demolished. In short, for revisionist historians, czarist Russia was not a medieval obscurantism but a dynamic polity that would have had viability in the world of the twentieth century if the revolution had not taken place as an unforeseen consequence of World War I.

The *Sonderweg* (special path) debates constitute the very crux of German historiography.¹²⁸ The post-World War II historiographical assumption that Germany followed a distinct trajectory in contrast to the British and French trajectories has also been criticized severely by recent historians. "The peculiarity of Germany" argument was problematic first and foremost because it implied that France and Britain followed a normal/straight path. Furthermore, the revisionist historians have questioned the validity of the conventional narrative portraying Britain and France as destined to evolve into liberal democracies and leaving Germany doomed to its path to the Nazi totalitarian state. They dismissed it as a presentist reading of history.¹²⁹

Different explanations and variants of the *Sonderweg* paradigm offer various reasons, such as late modernization, the failure of the 1848 Revolution,¹³⁰ or the authoritarian Prussian tradition for the German *Sonderweg*.¹³¹ The late modernization thesis states that the urge to catch up to the early modernizers compelled the state to engineer the growth

of the economy.¹³² The state assumed an immense power in the economy and did not allow the emergence of a self-regulating market. On the contrary, the state promoted certain industries and entrepreneurs to enable them to expand to gigantic proportions. The lack of a competitive market meant that the capitalist entrepreneurs were rendered dependent on the state and therefore subordinate to the *ancien régime* elite. In short, according to the *Sonderweg* approach, "Germany industrialized without destroying the social and political hegemony of aristocracy, of modernizing economically while remaining entrapped in a pre-industrial nexus of authoritarian social structures, values and political attitudes."¹³³

This study is not the place to enter into the rich historiography of the *Sonderweg*. The word was originally coined in the imperial era by conservative German historians and publicists to eulogize Germany for escaping both from the corrupt autocracy of Russia and the decadent democracies of Britain and England.¹³⁴ Later, especially after the impact of World War II, the word was employed by English observers and historians, such as Sir Robert Vansittart and Lewis Namier, the French historian Poliakov, and most popularly by the American journalist William Shirer to establish that Hitler was an inevitable outcome of the course of German history. This assumption was taken and transformed into an academic postulate by postwar German historians, such as Fritz Fischer and Hans-Ulrich Wehler, who were critical of the nationalist historiography prevalent in Germany before the 1960s. Hans-Ulrich Wehler and his Bielefeld School associates depicted imperial Germany as a paternalistic and hierarchical society assiduously engineered by the *ancien régime* aristocrats.¹³⁵

Criticizing an older German historiography which denied the long-term roots of Nazism in German history... (Wehler) insisted... (that) in 1848... the German bourgeoisie failed in its attempt to wrest power from aristocracy in the way its counterparts in other countries had done, in England in 1640 for example, or France in 1789. As a result, the Prussian aristocracy was able to preserve its sociopolitical hegemony. It cemented it through the conservative "revolution from above" which united Germany under Prussian domination from 1866–71. Continuing industrialization and

social change increasingly threatened its position, but it was the army, the civil service and the Reich leadership. To bolster this, it engaged in a successful “feudalization of the bourgeoisie” into aristocratic modes of behavior and value-orientations (such as dueling, deference to inherited status, the hunt for decorations and titles, the scramble for the position of reserve officer, the adoption of an authoritarian and paternalistic attitude towards employees in industry, and, crucially, the rejection of democracy and parliamentarism), a process made easier...as a result of the “great depression” of 1873–96, which left the big industrialists heavily dependent on the interventionism of the undemocratic state.¹³⁶

Wehler’s imperial Germany was static and closed to any change unless destroyed by external shocks and interventions, as happened in 1918.¹³⁷

The nature of the German bourgeoisie was at the center of the debate of the German *Sonderweg*. The German bourgeoisie was accused of being accommodationist and submissive. It has been suggested since the time of Friedrich Engels’ pamphlet that because the German bourgeoisie did not dare to openly challenge the established order, especially in the critical year of 1848, it was forced to accept a marginal and subordinate role within the power elite. However, this assumption tacitly assumes that the bourgeoisie fought aggressively elsewhere and, furthermore, that the bourgeoisie as a class had an intrinsic motivation to confront (and destroy) conservative establishments.

Two leading historians of Germany, David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, analyzed the problem of the German bourgeoisie in their path-breaking book, *The Peculiarities of German History*. They questioned the relevancy of the historiography of German history and concluded that it is misleading to assume that German history is particularly “peculiar”. They criticized the tendency to compare the German model/trajectory to a supposedly normal model/trajectory. For Blackbourn and Eley, the course of German history might display certain peculiarities, but “all national histories are peculiar.”¹³⁸

Blackbourn and Eley opposed the bourgeoisie-centered historiography. The conventional historiography assumed that it was the dynamic bourgeoisie that had shaped and transformed the modern world.

According to this approach, the problem with Germany (and Russia and many others) was that the state played the constitutive role in the “making of modern Germany”. Recent historians of imperial Germany demonstrated the rich and multifaceted aspects of the Wilhelmine era. With the hindsight of many historical case studies and theoretical works, we now know that the state played an enormous role in the making of the modern world in general.¹³⁹ First of all, capitalism was generated, fostered, and maintained thanks to the institutionalization of the states, as the new institutionalists and others have demonstrated. It was the states that were the gears of capitalism, not the markets.¹⁴⁰

Tanzimat/Hamidian Regime in Comparative Perspective

The enormous and decisive role that the state played in the emergence and development of modernity was not peculiar to the Ottoman/Turkish case. States defined the mode of modernity in their respective nations. Moreover, it was the states that formulated the parameters of Turkishness, as well as Englishness, Germanness, Frenchness, even Britishness and Ottomanness. However, unlike in eighteenth-century Britain, where John Bull was drawn, defined, and redefined in journals,¹⁴¹ the role the state played in the Ottoman/Turkish case was incomparably immense because of the absence of a large public sphere, the limited market for books, journals and pamphlets, and the paucity of opportunities for free expression.

In many ways, Hans-Ulrich Wehler’s representation of Wilhelmine Germany resembled the Hamidian Ottoman Empire although some seminal aspects which Wehler attributed to Wilhelmine Germany are lacking in the Hamidian Empire, such as the “manipulation of political anti-Semitism”¹⁴² and “industrial capitalism”. Definitely, the “industrialists” are missing in the power configuration in the Hamidian context. Nevertheless, the Hamidian Empire may easily be interpreted as an authoritarian polity with the “superimposition of class differences on those between the traditional late-feudal estates” and the “myth of the bureaucracy” as Wehler defined Wilhelmine Germany. Interestingly, such an interpretation of the Wilhelmine Empire would overlap with the traditional perceptions of the Hamidian polity, which portrayed the

regime as closed to any modernization and as a bastion of obscurantism in reaction to the reformism of the Tanzimat. Recent studies, however, acknowledged the enormous contributions of the Hamidian era to the establishment and development of modern institutions and reforms in Turkey. Therefore, while the frameworks of historians such as Wehler and Mommsen were criticized by the new generation of historians, such as Blackbourn, Eley, Evans, and Berghahn, for taking the Wilhelmine era as static and “reactionary” within a structural Marxian paradigm, historians such as Deringil and Akarlı criticized the earlier generation of scholars’ depiction of the Hamidian regime as a monolithic power structure with reactionary ideological foundations. Apparently, the Wilhelmine Empire and the Hamidian Empire were not monolithic power blocs, and a new generation of late Ottomanists and scholars of Wilhelmine Germany have exposed the more complicated nature and subtleties of these two polities.

The Hamidian elite was not the intimidating and monstrous Wilhelmine elite of Wehler and Mommsen. It was much more modest in terms of its organization and structure. No Hegel had attributed a historical mission to it. No Fichte had consecrated it. However, a national mission was assumed by the late Ottoman bureaucracy. It was the state elite that had to counter the assault of the Western powers and, more importantly, the seditious and separatist non-Turkish and non-Muslim communities. It was the bureaucracy which had to import the necessary knowledge and skills and apply them for the good of the nation. It became the teacher/instructor and role model of the nation. It was the importer, producer, and reproducer of modern and national knowledge. This was not yet the divine task the Unionists assumed when they attempted to reestablish the state as a tool in their radical and uncompromising policies. However, the Tanzimat bureaucracy perceived itself as the only source for the revival of the Ottoman state and the idea it represented. In this regard, the Tanzimat bureaucracy played a much more effective role than its Prussian counterpart. It was more “Hegelian” than the Prussian bureaucracy, at least as far as “national cause” was concerned. Therefore, the particular structures of mentalities of the Ottoman bureaucracy were decisive in the formation of the Turkish nation and modernity.

It was no coincidence that the foundation and the consolidation of the Hamidian autocracy coincided with the consolidation of the fellow authoritarianisms of Wilhelm II in Germany, Alexander III (who inverted the policies of the assassinated liberal czar Alexander II) in Russia, and the Meiji in Japan. In this regard, the Hamidian autocracy, like the Tanzimat preceding it, can be seen as influenced and shaped by the political/social/economic developments and trends of the late nineteenth century.¹⁴³ It was a manifestation of the European turn to conservative and authoritarian modernization. In Europe, the late nineteenth century was an age of restoration of political stability and restoration of *ancien régimes* within the structures of modern states. This process was a reaction to the surge of republicanism, liberalism, and other destabilizing forces and political movements throughout the nineteenth century. Political stability was maintained with the iron fists of the states in the age of dreadnoughts and machine guns.¹⁴⁴ Certainly, the Ottoman Empire also achieved a temporary stability in the Hamidian era. The principal motivations for the emergence of the Hamidian autocracy were dissatisfaction with Tanzimat reformism and liberalism, and the surge of insurmountable ethnic politics and separatism. Apparently, in the Hamidian context, the forces of instability were created by ethnic unrest rather than the social and political upheavals in Europe.

Wehler and his contemporary associates assumed that because Germany had not eliminated the aristocratic/imperial elite as the French had, imperial Germany was doomed to be reactionary. Although it is a truism that the German aristocratic ruling elite did construct a different political system from that of France or Britain, this political system was equally “modern”. Indeed, in many ways, it was arguably “more modern” than its French or British counterparts in terms of its economic dynamism and its seamless military organization, technology, and mobilization.

Wilhelmine Germany cast its own national cult, a state-nationalism unique to itself like any other manifestation of nationalism. Contrary to the pre-1848 anarchic/Republican nationalisms,¹⁴⁵ the Wilhelmine national cult presupposed a staunch loyalty to the monarchy and the emperor. It was the emperor and his aura that represented the nation in

his persona. In the figure of the emperor, the nation found its embodiment. The German nation was embedded within the emperor and the state. This national cult was to be challenged not only by socialists, but also by race-centered nationalists from the 1890s onwards,¹⁴⁶ not unlike the Young Turk challenge to the Hamidian official proto-national imperial representations and the official cult. Apparently, the structures of the German/Prussian construction of the official national cult were not unique to Germany. Russian autocracy established its own cult along the same lines around an imperial idea wedded to the persona of the czar. In the genesis and development of Russian official nationalism and in the Russian perception of the nation, the nation was not defined strictly in terms of ethnicity but in terms of obedience to the imperium and identification with the imperium.¹⁴⁷ In the words of Richard Wortman, "after 1825, nationality was identified with absolutism, 'autocracy' in the official lexicon. Russian nationality was presented as a nationality of consensual subordination, in contrast to egalitarian Western concepts. The monarchical narrative of the nation described the Russian people as voluntarily surrendering power to their Westernized rulers."¹⁴⁸

In post-1870 Europe, nation states had consolidated themselves and repressed liberal and republican oppositions. The liberal and republican facets of nationalism were dismissed and subjugated. Nations were redefined by their attachments to the states. States were to embody nations and replaced ethnic fantasies to constitute the core of the national imaginations. The Hamidian structures of loyalty to the Empire and the sultan himself can be interpreted in line with these developments. The Hamidian Turkish national cult defined nationhood not in terms of Turkish ethnicity but Turkishness embodied within the imperium, an Islamic identity, and the sultan himself. This construction of nationhood around the imperial center was arguably salient in the forging of Turkish nationalism.

To sum up the remarks on the problem of *ancien régime*, this study views *ancien régime* not as a concept to be thrown into the dustbin of history, but as entities that rejuvenated/reinvented themselves, not static and doomed to collapse sooner or later, but vivid and innovative in their own ways. In other words, this was an *ancien régime* constitutive

of the modern world as much as the modern nation state. Establishing the preeminent roles of the *ancien régimes*, we may argue that the Ottoman *ancien régime* was constitutive of the Turkish modern nation state, Turkish nationalism, and Turkish modernity in general. It reinvented and adapted itself not as a relic of the past but as an entirely novel phenomenon.

The Turkish *ancien régime* was pivotal in the constitution of Turkish modernity, not only due to its legacy but also due to its crafting of the principal contours and axioms of Turkish modern experience and discourse. The Turkish *ancien régime* should be understood fundamentally as a state-elite institution. Economic and social forces played a minor role in this process. The principal stimulator was the state and the state-elite. Just as 1789 and the Industrial Revolution were not “year zeros” for France and Britain, respectively, and just as the elites of these *ancien régimes* persisted in new clothes, the Tanzimat and Hamidian elites derived from earlier generations of elites. In this genealogical continuum, an ideological continuum may also be observable connecting the traditional Ottoman imperial discourse to Turkish nationalism via the stops of the Tanzimat and Hamidian eras. Clinging to the banner of the Ottoman imperial identity, the agents and actors of the *ancien régime* designed a modern Turkish national identity defined in its subordinate relation to the political authority before these premises were reproduced by later generations. This study will focus on the Ottoman diplomatic service because it is assumed that the Ottoman Foreign Ministry, one of the showcases of the Turkish *ancien régime*, is a good place to examine the worlds and times of the *that régime*.

CHAPTER 2

PRIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: DIPLOMACY AND APPROPRIATION OF THE “NEW KNOWLEDGE”

This chapter aims to show how diplomacy emerged as a primary concern of Ottoman statecraft and how this development triggered the appropriation of “new knowledge”, which consequently entailed a new organizational and ideological restructuring of the Ottoman polity. In other words, the chapter suggests the “primacy of foreign affairs” in certain historical conjectures.

Discovery of Diplomacy and the Rise of “New Knowledge”

Since the formation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1836 as a modern bureaucratic structure replacing the previous scribal service attached to the Office of the Grand Vizierate, the Ministry became a preeminent part of Ottoman statecraft. Although conducting foreign relations had never been an insignificant business, the increasing sophistication and impact of international developments on the Empire and its growing vulnerability vis-à-vis neighboring powers

such as Russia and Austria, as well as the requisites of the rise of the modern state, made the conduct of foreign relations a prominent preoccupation of statecraft. Therefore, the Ministry gained an importance of unprecedented levels within the Ottoman establishment. It rose from a secondary position (especially vis-à-vis the military and the *ilmiye* – religious establishment) to the forefront of Ottoman statecraft. The Ottomans had to play according to the rules of the international game to respond to the immediacy of the international pressure on the Empire.

It may be argued that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the bureaucratic institution that played the foremost role in the Ottoman transformation, a role more profound than that of the military, especially after it became evident in the eyes of the state elite that something more fundamental than military prowess was necessary to survive the looming international challenges. This became apparent after the acknowledgment of the enormity of Russian military might, which was evident from the disastrous Ottoman-Russian wars in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.¹ The Russian army had the capacity to mobilize millions of peasants, as observed by the Ottomans, and therefore it was literally unbeatable given Ottoman military capabilities.² The Ottomans suffered severe defeats by intimidating Russian armies in 1774, 1812, and 1829, when Ottoman defenses in Bulgaria collapsed, enabling the Russian army to cross the Balkans and reach as far as Burgas, Aydos, Varna, even threatening Edirne.³

Under such dire circumstances, no domestic policy could be developed and implemented unfettered from its international consequences and imperatives. The Ottomans were well aware that they were dependent on and subject to international developments. This was also an opportunity for the Ottomans, since exploiting diplomacy and the dynamics of the international balance of power provided them room to maneuver against the otherwise militarily invincible Russians. Especially from 1774 onwards, the Ottomans were cognizant of their retreat and reluctance to act in such an environment. They were obsessed with efforts to reverse their seemingly inevitable collapse. From 1774 onwards, the prospect of an eventual collapse of the

Empire guided a substantial portion of diplomatic, as well as domestic, policies. The Ottomans knew that they were no longer an independent actor in the international arena. The international alignments, rivalries, and aggressions were of primary importance for the prospects of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman establishment acknowledged that its well-being was dependent on a number of overlapping factors. Therefore, they had to accommodate the world around them.

To accommodate the new circumstances, importing and appropriating the “new knowledge” was necessary and inevitable. The knowledge needed to govern, maintain, and defend the state was no longer held by the *ilmiye* class, the prestigious class that held a monopoly and the halo of respectability for possessing privileged knowledge throughout the classical age. Although the *kalemiye* (scribal class) rose to prominence within the Ottoman state as early as the eighteenth century (if not earlier), the *ilmiye* class constituted the thrust of the ideological make-up of the state. Certainly, the very critical moment that brought the sudden decline and marginalization of the *ilmiye* was the abolition of the janissaries given that the janissary-*ilmiye* alliance was the fulcrum of the institutional power of the *ilmiye*. With the organization of the new army, the *ilmiye* retreated from its prominence within the power bloc.⁴ Nevertheless, we cannot explain this retreat merely as a consequence of changing alliance structures. If that were the case, it would be even harder to explain the paradoxical involvement and support of the *ulema* in the destruction of the janissaries. It is possible to conjecture that the *ilmiye*'s prestige collapsed abruptly and drastically with the realization that they no longer possessed superior and relevant knowledge. Islamic knowledge and science were increasingly discredited in the process of the Ottoman encounter with the modern and “Western” sciences (in the process of military revolution) as their “knowledge” remained irrelevant and impractical.⁵ They were sidelined and marginalized by new circumstances, and the social-cultural environment in which their knowledge remained important was restricted to the private and non-political spheres.⁶

The bearers of technical knowledge, who had been recruited to conduct daily affairs, were elevated from secondary class auxiliaries to captains of statecraft. Those with the skills to lead the ship of state were

new officials from the *kalemiye* (scribal class) equipped with positive and pragmatic knowledge distinct from the philosophical knowledge that the *ilmiye* maintained (and the military knowledge possessed by the military). The *ilmiye* class gave way to a new class which was more compatible and in touch with new developments (after a period in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries when the prominence of the *ulema* was at its zenith).⁷

The eighteenth-century rise of the *kalemiye* class, as shown by Aksan, reached its apex in the early nineteenth century. Although the rise of the *kalemiye* can be witnessed as early as the seventeenth century, it was only in the early nineteenth century that the *kalemiye* became a self-conscious group assuming immense political prominence and power. The new knowledge was now the monopoly of this new class, who had acquired the necessary skills to thrive in the new circumstances that were pushing the Empire into a corner. It was this group that assumed power with the Edict of Reform in 1839. Paradoxically, the authoritarian policies of Mahmud II that eradicated the opponents of the reform enabled the newly rising class, who benefited from the elimination of their rivals from offices of prominence, to grab power from the palace and the sultan with the accession to the throne of the young and inexperienced Abdülmecid in 1839.⁸

The analysis of Christoph Neumann on the foreign policy decisions of the Ottoman Empire in the reign of Selim III, in his aptly named article *Decision Making without Decision Makers*, demonstrates that policy making was highly fragmented and that there was no authorized corporate structure to decide foreign policy. Neumann also underlines the prominent role of the *ilmiye* class in the making of foreign policy. In addition, Neumann demonstrates that foreign policy decisions were highly dependent on personal relations and household rivalries. Before its institutionalization, foreign policy was hostage to rivalries of "political factions aimed at achieving personal career enhancement, not political programs."⁹ Many independent actors were extensively involved in this process, such as the Admiral Gazi Hasan Pasha, who had veto power over matters relevant to the North African Barbary Coast. From such a chaotic, uninstitutionalized configuration in which personal and interpersonal relations shaped foreign policy, the creation

of an institutionalized and impersonal organization isolated from daily and personalized petty politics was no less than a revolution.

This institutional revolution brought about the victory of modern knowledge over traditional knowledge.¹⁰ This epistemological revolution compelled an institutional reorganization. Hence, the institutional reorganization was a corollary of the epistemological revolution. The reorganization of the state was a consequence of the reorganization of knowledge. Apparently, modern knowledge necessitated the emergence of an autonomous bureaucracy to reproduce itself. Furthermore, it generated the development of notions of expertise and specialization. Modern epistemology maintains that what is valuable is not "knowledge as a whole and in a totality" but knowledge as specified and particularized. Modern officialdom, bureaucracy, and bureaucratic professionalism were to an important extent founded on these premises.¹¹

In fact, modern epistemology forced a radical reorganization in the military.¹² The Ottoman transformation began with the military.¹³ The reasons were obvious. The very visible symptoms of the Ottoman failure were observed most ostensibly in devastating military defeats. Throughout the eighteenth century, the Ottomans imported the knowledge of European military science and undertook the Ottoman Military Revolution, introducing drills and orderly regiments which were clear manifestations of the abstract and modern "new knowledge". Although the immediate aim of all these efforts was to reorganize and strengthen the military, in the "new world", military prowess and military victories were less decisive than before. After long efforts to overcome military deficiencies, it was recognized that changes had to be made elsewhere. A new kind of knowledge other than military prowess had to be acquired. These motivations prepared the ground for the emergence and rise of the future-diplomats as a group.¹⁴ In this environment, the discovery of diplomacy was the new great white hope for the Ottomans.

To establish a chronological order, we may contextualize the rising prominence of foreign affairs beginning from the late eighteenth century. The continuous Russian wars, especially from the disastrous 1774 war onwards, exposed the reluctance to know and exploit

international political dynamics.¹⁵ The helplessness of the Empire against the Russian menace compelled the Ottomans to seek long-lasting and comprehensive alliances rather than temporary alliances. The Western European states were now potential new comrades for the Ottomans against the Russians. These future comrades shared a common fear, the rise of the Russian bear.¹⁶

The second crucial phase in the emergence of modern Ottoman diplomacy was the Napoleonic Wars. The term Napoleonic Wars encompasses a more than 20-year period not of continuous warfare, but a period in which coalitions and alliances were formed, dissolved, and reestablished. It was a period in which diplomacy reached unprecedented levels of sophistication and modern diplomacy was established and institutionalized. The Congress of Vienna of 1815, convened to design post-Napoleonic European political (and social) order, can be regarded as the founding moment of modern (aristocratic) diplomacy with its established codes of conduct, later.¹⁷ It marked the rise of the role and prominence of foreign affairs in government policies, which was particularly true for the Ottomans. The world of the Napoleonic Wars was unprecedented in the sense that war and peace were indistinguishable from each other and no power in Europe had the luxury of isolating itself diplomatically. The Ottomans were entangled in this complex web of relations, oscillating within the complex web of alliances. With the aim of preventing a possible European-wide deal at the expense of the Empire, the Sublime Porte attempted to make the best of it within the European-wide politics of alignment, and thus the Ottomans were incorporated into the European order, albeit passively.

The European-wide Napoleonic Cold War was also an opportunity for the Ottoman Empire. Russia and Austria had to abandon their campaigns against the Ottomans by 1792 as a response to the French Revolution.¹⁸ After the break of the French Revolution, and once the European powers including Russia and Austria were forced to track post-revolutionary developments instead of fighting, the Ottomans not only found breathing space but a chance to forge previously unthinkable alliances with the Russians and others. Playing a diplomatic game between Napoleonic France on one side and Britain on the other, the Ottomans endeavored to maximize their interests.¹⁹

Recent studies have revised the Orientalist/reductionist image that the Ottomans were completely ignorant of their time, demonstrating that, on the contrary, the Ottomans were perfectly aware of the conditions they were in and cognizant of the transforming world.²⁰ However, such awareness could not automatically break the impasse. Diplomacy requires the acquisition of massive technical knowledge, as shown by early modern Venetian diplomacy.²¹ Diplomacy also needs accumulated experience and practical skills attained over a long time span. Diplomacy as a craft and an art developed in Europe in the early modern period, first becoming visible in the Italian city states in the fifteenth century and gradually becoming established throughout Western Europe in the sixteenth century.²² The Ottomans were not complete foreigners to the world of diplomacy. They pursued a rather sophisticated diplomacy in the post-classical centuries.²³ However, Ottoman diplomacy failed to adopt many of the specifics of the intra-Christian codes and cultures of diplomacy. Moreover, they failed to modernize the craft and techniques of diplomacy, such as information gathering and utilization of gathered information. The Ottomans had to acquaint themselves with the new language, new skills, and new code of conduct. They lacked the accumulation of knowledge and experience which Europeans amassed in the few centuries of early modernity.²⁴

In short, the Ottomans were not as unaware of the world around them as they have been portrayed by the earlier Eurocentric historiography. Nevertheless, although they had a clear vision in this new jungle, they lacked the necessary equipment to implement sophisticated policy making. The lack of background knowledge and background training rendered them slow to respond effectively.²⁵

After the defeat of Napoleonic France and the conclusion of the Congress of Vienna, the new European concert and the diplomatic world became even tougher for the Ottomans. Ahmed Cevdet Pasha in his *Tarih-i Cevdet* was highly critical of the non-participation of the Ottomans in the Congress of Vienna, which in his opinion cost the Ottomans severely in the diplomatic arena.²⁶ He went further in exposing the diplomatic blunders of the Ottomans, which were for him to a large extent responsible for Greek independence, which was

unthinkable and undesirable in the eyes of the Western powers at the beginning of the rebellion.²⁷ For him, the blunders of the Ottomans assured the changing attitude of the European powers towards the Greek rebels. This fiasco was the last warning for the Ottomans that full participation and involvement within the Concert of Europe was exigent to evade further setbacks. Ottoman reformism was born in such an imposing environment.

The so-called Ottoman Westernization was not only motivated, but also led, by anxiety about surviving in such a predatory environment. Ottoman reformism cannot be dissociated from these diplomatic entanglements.²⁸ It was arguably a function of international developments and alignments. The so-called Ottoman Westernization was not a process that started at a certain time in history with a clear sight, intention, and direction. It arguably consisted of only a set of responses to Western (mainly Russian) aggression. There existed no conscious break/rupture from the “old”. The project was limited to the acquisition of new knowledge, first in military matters, *Nizam-ı Cedid* (soldiers onwards) and then in diplomacy. In this historical conjecture, rather than being a dependent variable of socio-economic and political developments, diplomacy became a transformative force itself, and it shaped and influenced socio-economic and political developments.

The new knowledge was to be rational, measurable, and free of any metaphysical assumptions, hence “modern”. Therefore, “modern” was first and foremost a methodology and organization designed by people attentive to the aforementioned principles. The implementation of this methodology was dubbed Westernism or reformism retrospectively, with the hindsight of the drastic transformation it triggered. In fact, in the beginning, the reception of modern technical knowledge and methodology began with the Ottoman Military Revolution during the reign of Selim III and continued with the establishment of a modern army after the brutal suppression of the janissaries in 1826.²⁹ Given that military prowess was insufficient to respond to the challenge, a similar Diplomatic Revolution along the same premises was undertaken. In short, although the initiation of this process prompted an inevitable massive-scale transformation, it was not an intentional project with an end goal. As argued above, diplomacy and diplomatic

considerations were major dynamics in this process (along with military concerns and necessities).

Origins of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry

The Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Umur-u Hariciye Nezareti*) was established in 1836 by an edict of Mahmud II.³⁰ Akif Efendi, the incumbent Chief Secretary of the Sublime Porte (*Reis-ül-Küttab*) since 1832, was named as the first Foreign Minister.³¹ Hulusi Pasha replaced Akif Efendi after the latter was dismissed in four months' time. However, it was with the appointment of Mustafa Reşid Pasha in 1837 that the new ministry was organized as a modern office. Before the establishment of the Foreign Ministry, the institution of *Reis-ül-Küttablık* was a department within *sa'drazamlık*. The official titles of the *reis-ül-küttabs* were lower in comparison to the other holders of prominent offices. Whereas the Chief Financial Official (*defterdars*) and the Drawer of the Sultanic Seal (*nişancı*) were among the top functionaries of the Sublime Porte (*erkan-ı Babıali*), the *reis-ül-küttabs* belonged to the rank of "higher officials" (*ricai-i babıali*). Recognizing the rising importance and increasing role of foreign relations, Mahmud II allowed the upgrading of the title of the *Reis-ül-Küttablık*. Mahmud II in the very beginning of his edict established that the title of the Foreign Ministry had to be upgraded because they represented the Ottoman Empire vis-à-vis the European powers and they were in a position to serve the Empire on very important issues. ("*çünkü rütbe-i evveliyede bulunanlar Devlet-i Aliyye'mizin en büyük hizmet ve maslahatlarına me'mur olduklarından ve zat-ı me'muriyetleri i'tibarıyla lazım gelen nüfuz ve haysiyetleriğin fi ma ba'd müşirlik ve vezaret rütbe-i celileleri sıralarında add ve i'tibar olunmaları hususu geçende tıbb-ı irade-i şahanem üzre icra olunmuş idi.*")³²

By 1836, the new Foreign Ministry had become an independent body with the ministers enjoying the title of *vezir*.³³ A regulation for the new organization had already been prepared by 1835. The regulation, in line with Mahmud's centralizing policies institutionalizing and restructuring the state bureaucracy, bestowed upon the Ministry sole authority to conduct foreign relations in contradistinction to the

fragmented and collective nature of the policy making organization of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

However, the Ministry did not become a modern/Weberian institution overnight. On the contrary, it took a few decades for the institution to professionalize and create its own *esprit de corps*. Before its professionalization and specification of knowledge in the Hamidian era, it was one of the major offices of the Sublime Porte, where there was a flow of recruits in and out. In the absence of trained bureaucrats, many preeminent statesmen served in diplomatic posts for short stints. The Foreign Ministry became an office where bureaucrats and men of future political prominence were trained and acquired experience.

The Tanzimat Foreign Ministry had a very minor influence in the making of foreign policy as an institution.³⁴ Foreign policy had been determined in the upper echelons at the political level. In this regard, it would be misleading to speak of a self-serving and autonomous bureaucratic caste reminiscent of the astute Prussian state bureaucracy.³⁵ It seems that the nineteenth-century Ottoman pattern resembled the Russian bureaucratic culture more than the Prussian one.³⁶ The Foreign Ministry's mission was confined to carrying out the tasks it was given. The post of Foreign Minister was a political post (filled by the sultan in line with political exigencies) and not a bureaucratic post, functioning as the supreme functionary of the Ministry, above the undersecretary. Nevertheless, given the small size and intertwined nature of the political-bureaucratic elite, it was not a place of minor significance. The Foreign Ministry was important because the institutional culture attained in this office was decisive for advancement in the bureaucracy (in its Golden Age before the 1870s) and was exemplary in the eyes of the emerging Tanzimat state elite.

A review of the literature on nineteenth-century Ottoman foreign affairs reveals that although Ottoman foreign policy has been extensively covered, we do not know much of the details of the actual daily conduct of foreign affairs even though the files of the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs have recently been declassified. We know a considerable amount about Ottoman foreign policy, yet almost nothing about the subtleties, technicalities, and procedures in the making of foreign policy. Furthermore, although the implementation of policies

has been examined, we do not know the details of the preparations of policy papers nor about the gathering of information and reports that shaped the contours of policy making. This observation contradicts the superficial impression that diplomatic history is one of the most developed areas of nineteenth-century Ottoman historiography. In other words, diplomacy has been interpreted and analyzed as a constituent of international relations rather than as a profession in its own right. Moreover, we lack the insights of the new critical diplomatic history that contextualizes diplomatic relations within larger political, social, and even cultural frameworks.

The attention of those studying modern history and international relations in the past has focused largely upon three areas: the political substance of major foreign policies, the personalities of leading decision makers, and the events of dramatic crisis situations. As a result, our knowledge of diplomacy frequently has been confined to “high policy” regarding such issues as war or peace, to a restricted number of leaders whose names and actions made headlines, or sporadic episodes of tension and conflict. Obviously the problems and intricacies of international politics are infinitely more complex than indicated by these few highlights. Integral – but largely neglected – features of diplomacy, particularly in the twentieth century, must include the management of those policies encompassing more subtle commercial or ‘cultural’ questions, the responsibilities of lesser bureaucratic officials in periods of both turmoil and stability, and the actual administrative machinery or organized context of policy formulation and execution.³⁷

The Foreign Ministry emerged as a key source of the knowledge required for the political exigencies of the age. Carter Findley speaks of the renunciation of “military politics” in favor of diplomatic politics.³⁸ A competent Foreign Ministry became more crucial than a strong army for the survival of the state. Civilians (efendi-turned-pashas in Itzkowitz’s formulation) began to rise in the state administration as early as the eighteenth century.³⁹ However, it was the Tanzimat in which the civilian supremacy was institutionalized and consolidated after the reorganization of the military as subordinate to the political authority, following the violent purging of the janissaries and the destruction of the pre-modern military organization.

Mustafa Reşid Pasha (1800–58) was arguably the person who most embodied this institutional and cultural transformation. He was born to a family of state servants in Istanbul. Although he studied in a religious college (*medrese*) and worked in the *ilmiye* for a while, he moved to the civil bureaucracy. Following the trajectory of a traditional clerk in a pre-modern polity, he worked in different capacities in various governmental offices within *Reis-ül Küttablık*. He participated in the negotiations with the Russians in Edirne to settle the terms of the 1829 treaty and in the negotiations with Mohammed Ali in Kütahya in 1833. He joined the retinue of the illustrious Pertev Pasha. Thanks to patronage relations (and his erudition), he was appointed as ambassador to Paris in 1834. He rose to prominence at a surprisingly young age with his appointment as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1837. During his ambassadorship in London, he was active in establishing a rapprochement with Britain and obtained British support. After defeating Hüseyin Pasha, who was unsympathetic to the reform policies advocated by Mustafa Reşid Pasha, he proclaimed the Edict of Tanzimat in 1839 as the Minister of Foreign Affairs.⁴⁰ He was associated with the policies and ideals of the Tanzimat. He was hailed as the “prophet of civilization” by Şinasi, an enlightened Ottoman intellectual, and in him the Tanzimat was personalized. He was praised unanimously by the rising Tanzimat elite, who associated him with progressivism, enlightened thought, patriotism, and incorruptibility. The Tanzimat was celebrated as the rebirth and regeneration of the Ottoman Empire thanks to Mustafa Reşid Pasha.⁴¹

One of the most explicit examples of the optimism of the Tanzimat was arguably the diplomat Mustafa Sami Efendi's *Avrupa Risalesi* (Pamphlet on Europe), first published in 1840. Mustafa Sami's travelogue elucidates the utmost confidence in the achievements of Europe. At the end of his book, Mustafa Sami concludes that the advanced state of Europe was neither due to the climate of Europe nor to the fertility of its soil. For Sami, the reason for the advanced state of Europe was due to science and to science only. Mustafa Sami suggested that once Ottomans emulated this model, the abode of Islam would be even more advanced than Europe given that its land is fertile, its climate

is fine, and its people are intelligent by birth.⁴² It is remarkable to observe the same developmentalist, optimistic interpretation articulated in the Rescript of Tanzimat, which announced that due to the fertility of the soil and intelligence of its people, the Ottoman Empire would be an advanced nation “in five to ten years” once the necessary measures were taken.⁴³ In fact, what Mustafa Sami did was to reiterate and propagate the ideas of the Rescript of Tanzimat. Given that Mustafa Sami was appointed as a secretary in the Ottoman embassy to Paris (after serving in the Ottoman embassy to Vienna) and that this travelogue was written based on his observations while on his way to Paris to begin to serve in his new post, and furthermore, given that he was a confidant of Mustafa Reşid Pasha, the political agenda of this text is evident.

After the demise of Mustafa Reşid Pasha, his disciples, who also came from diplomatic careers, became the most prominent statesmen of the Empire. The reign of Abdülaziz was the high point of the Foreign Ministry with many recruits of the Ministry occupying the highest posts. “(I)t became common for the foreign minister to go on to serve as grand vizier. Dominating this combination of posts, Mustafa Reşid (1800–58), Keçecizade Fuad (1815–69) and Mehmed Emin Âli Pasha (1815–71) shaped the period.”⁴⁴

Arguably, the death of the pro-French Âli Pasha in 1871 (one year after the defeat of the French at Sedan) was a landmark. With his death, the “liberal” phase of the Tanzimat waned. Abdülaziz, freed from the sway of the imposing Âli Pasha, aspired to impose his personal rule and appointed to the grand vizierate Mahmud Nedim Pasha (1818–84), who was known for his distaste for Tanzimat reformism and his lack of sympathy for Britain and France. Butrus Abu-Manneh argued that Mahmud Nedim’s takeover was tantamount to a coup d’état against the Tanzimat cabal and its ethos.⁴⁵ Mahmud Nedim aimed to destroy the incumbent bureaucracy and pack the bureaucracy with an alternative group of officials.⁴⁶ Mahmud Nedim Pasha, however, was astutely and successfully resisted by the Tanzimat bureaucracy as a whole, and his enterprise collapsed. However, the international and domestic dynamics also rendered the Tanzimat unsustainable. The Tanzimat bureaucracy lost its faith in

nineteenth-century liberal optimism. The mutual trust between the Ottoman elite and the Anglo-French alliance eroded. The failure of the Ottoman treasury to pay its debts to its English and French creditors in 1875⁴⁷ was another significant factor in the emerging anti-Turkish mood supplanting philo-Turkism in Britain. Hamidian politics and dispositions reflected the change in the Ottoman mood in these unpromising circumstances.

In the Hamidian era, the prominence of the Foreign Ministry also eroded. One reason for this relative decline in prominence within the state may lie in the fact that the Foreign Ministry cadres lost their monopoly in speaking fluent French and in being acquainted with European realities. In the early Tanzimat period, the lack of sufficient education and necessary knowledge enabled the diplomatic service to assume a privileged position by holding a monopoly on “Western knowledge”. By the Hamidian era, the development of better communications facilities and access to Western printed materials rendered the privileged knowledge of the earlier decades more accessible. Diplomats’ technical information and relatively superior level of knowledge regarding European realities might have provided them with prestige and esteem, but they no longer bestowed them with political prominence. By then, Ottoman statecraft was much more sophisticated than it had been half a century earlier. Nevertheless, the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued to be one of the most prestigious offices.

Ottoman Foreign Ministry as Precursor of “Westernism” and Nationalism: Making of the Ottoman Modern Transformation

As has been suggested several times above, the Ottoman Foreign Ministry was a preeminent institution in the process of the Ottoman transformation in the nineteenth century. This was because after the final collapse of the conventional prescription advocating stronger military stockpiling for the healing of all ills, it was the Ministry that represented the novel and ambitious promise of salvation through other means. It was the Foreign Ministry that held the means to deal

with and weather the dire situation. In the early Tanzimat period, the Ministry was the institution which had the foremost and most effective contact with the West. The ministerial cadres were in everyday touch with the Christian powers, and therefore they had the advantage of following the latest developments more closely than other governmental offices. Hence, they were the ones who felt the urgency, acuteness, and graveness of the situation not only regarding diplomatic realities, but also regarding the technical retardation of the Ottomans. Furthermore, they “possessed” the best available prescription for the healing of the “Sick Man”. Only they had the skills to apply the proposed remedy. They were the ones who were perfectly aware that a new and complete reorganization of the state and state affairs was not a matter of intellectual debate and preference, but an imperative. For these reasons, the Ottoman Foreign Ministry not only recruited and trained the bulk of the Tanzimat leadership (Mustafa Reşid Pasha, Âli Pasha, Fuad Pasha), but also represented a role model for the desired new Ottoman civility. It assumed the role of the bearer of the Ottoman transformation decades before this mission was endorsed by broad sections of the bureaucracy. It is not a coincidence that Western observers of the Ottoman Empire found Ottoman diplomats to be those with whom they most sympathized while considering them to be the most “Westernized and civilized.”⁴⁸

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was perceived as the transmitter of the Western way of conduct and Western knowledge. It is no coincidence that institutions such as the Council of Agriculture and Manufacture and the “Council of Quarantine” were established in 1838 under the aegis of Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Council of Agriculture and Manufacture was transferred to the Ministry of Trade in 1839.⁴⁹ Apparently, these bodies were established under the aegis of the Ministry due to its proximity and access to the “centers of modern/Western knowledge”. The Foreign Minister also served as the head of the Board of Health (*Meclis-i Umur-ı Sıhhiye*), and therefore functioned as the *de facto* Minister of Health.⁵⁰ Thus, the offices to monitor and improve public health were listed in the Hamidian Foreign Ministry yearbooks. The Board of Public Education, founded in 1846, was also to be monitored and led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁵¹

The diplomats functioned as intermediaries for the “import of Western and technical knowledge” into the Ottoman Empire in addition to their diplomatic responsibilities. For example, it was the embassy to Paris that found, negotiated, and contracted two French forest engineers to come to Istanbul to supervise the forests, and establish a modern forestry office.⁵² Upon the request of Abdülhamid II, “(Ottoman ambassador to Paris) Salih Münir...was involved in the selection process [for the employment of an urban planner and finally]...sought out Bouvard and asked him to develop a master plan for Istanbul.”⁵³ The embassies coordinated and were actively involved in the recruitment of experts in all kinds of engineering, mining, and medicine for the introduction of industrial production and the establishment of modern public institutions in the Ottoman Empire.

The first president of the board established to modernize Istanbul and create a modern municipal organization (*İntizam-ı Şehir Komisyonu*) was Emin Muhlis Efendi, a diplomat and a chief official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁵⁴ Apparently, the experience and knowledge he acquired in his years in Europe were the reason for his appointment to this post. Likewise, “Kamil Bey, the chief of protocol in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was the first director of the Sixth [municipal] District” consisting of Pera, the European part of Istanbul. The board of the Sixth District was created and was composed of Europeans, non-Muslims, and a few Muslims resident in the Sixth District to administer and develop Pera following the West European urban planning models and urban developments.⁵⁵

Apparently, the pioneering role of the Foreign Ministry was not unique to the Ottoman Empire. On the contrary, the same pattern is discernible in all the other non-Western modernizing states. Like the Ottoman case, the first generation of the Iranian modernization movement was comprised of Foreign Ministry officials who had previously been assigned to posts in Persian embassies in Europe. The Persian diplomats, who came from the culture and habitus of the traditional bureaucracy, not unlike the first Ottoman generation of reformers, were frustrated by their homeland’s inability to adapt to the modern world.⁵⁶ Saul Bakhshash writes “Persia’s diplomats also assigned to the ministry of foreign affairs and themselves as members of it a pivotal

role in bringing the new civilization to Persia. Malkam believed that the foreign ministry had the duty of acting as a channel through which the achievements and knowledge of Europe could be directed towards Persia. Others, as we have noted, believed that Persia's ambassadors abroad had a special mission to enlighten their government and people and lead both along the right path to progress."⁵⁷ He continues:

Those who were advocating reform in the 1860's were never a large group, and they were not a tightly knit one. But their contacts with one another and the fact that they shared many attitudes in common seems to have given them a certain group feeling...The diplomats urging reform in the 1860's also believed that their foreign experience and training better qualified and equipped them to guide the country than those who had not been abroad. In vaunting the superiority of the new arts and sciences of Europe, they were also suggesting that as Persians with a knowledge of these sciences, they had a special claim to higher offices of the state...This elitist attitude, which owed something both to the Persian bureaucracy and to Islamic traditions, was closely bound up with the attitude to government that they looked on as the central guiding force in determining and directing the affairs of the people. They favored schools and newspapers because these offered a means for creating a better informed and better educated public. But this was at the same time a desire for newspapers, for instance, that would educate the public in ideas they believed suitable for Persia rather than as a means for permitting many schools of thought to compete for the people's allegiance.⁵⁸

In Persia, the role and active involvement of diplomats was significantly stronger than in the Ottoman Empire due to the less institutionalized nature of the early modern Persian state. In China, the transformative, modernizing, and civilizationist functions of the Foreign Ministry far exceeded the missions of its Ottoman and Persian counterparts:

The activities of the Tsungli Yamen [the de facto Chinese Foreign Ministry] involved not only foreign affairs but also the

promotion of modernization and defense projects. The office was concerned with the introduction of Western science and industry, modern schools, customs and the purchase of ships and guns⁶⁰...Functionally, the Yamen handled many duties far beyond the normal limits of a foreign office. In addition to diplomatic affairs, it coordinated almost the entire range of "Western affairs" (*yang-wu*) such as foreign trade, customs, education, overseas affairs, postal service, national defense, and cultural affairs. It oversaw the work of the Trade Inspectorate General of customs and indirectly supervised the port commissioners in consultation with the two trade superintendants. It was involved in mining, machine factories, telegraph construction, Chinese laborers abroad, missionary incidents, and the manufacture and purchase of guns and ships. Further, the Yamen supervised the two T'ung Wen Kuan for the training of language students and future diplomatic and consular personnel. After 1867, when astronomy, chemistry, mathematics, and physics were added to the curriculum of the school, the Yamen defended this development against conservative opposition. All in all, the Yamen's activities were too diverse to be functionally efficient.⁶⁰

The same was true for the Japanese Foreign Ministry: "In this quarter-century (the end of the late nineteenth century), the Foreign Ministers enjoyed high status since they had generally played some role in the civil war or the imperial restoration that followed it. In a way, many of them were statesmen and enjoyed a prestige second only to the Prime Ministers of today. In some cases, they possessed an exceptional knowledge of foreign countries by virtue of having travelled abroad. Of the early Foreign Ministers the following had visited overseas before taking up office: Inoue Kaoru, Saionji Kimmochi, Mutsu Munemitsu, Enomoto Takeaki, and Aoki Shuzo."⁶¹ For the same reason, many Japanese foreign ministers subsequently became prime ministers, a pattern reminiscent of the Ottoman pattern in the Tanzimat era.⁶² In all of these four countries, bureaucratic modernizers were to introduce "modern knowledge" to their people, as well as to minor officials. In all four countries, these bureaucrats were members of a small elite

originating from the traditional elites of the preceding decades and centuries.⁶³

In fact, the Ottoman statesmen and diplomats-to-be were exporters of their mission. The Persian modernization project was influenced by and modeled on Ottoman modernization. Malkam Khan, the Persian ambassador to London and other capitals and a pioneer and leading figure of the Persian modernization, was heavily influenced by Ottoman reformers during his stint in the Persian embassy to Istanbul.⁶⁴ While he was a low-ranking official in the Persian embassy in Istanbul, he cultivated friendships with prominent figures of the Tanzimat elite, such as Âli Pasha, Fuad Pasha, Ahmed Vefik Pasha, and Münif Pasha.⁶⁵ His closeness to these names benefited him financially as well. When the Persian government ceased paying his salary (for reasons which remain obscure), he was granted a salary by the Ottoman Empire.⁶⁶

The transformation was not limited to the reorganization of the state. The officials' own conduct of affairs and their self-image transformed as well. As pioneers and promoters of the modernization/Westernization process, nineteenth-century bureaucrats endorsed and replicated a new way of officialdom and refinement. The servant of the state turned into a civil servant. However, that does not necessarily imply the transformation of the pre-modern servant of the state into a rational, modern bureaucrat. The adaptations are not necessarily "transformations". This "process of adaptation" may be divided into several stages. The shifting of the structures of mentalities throughout the decades of the Tanzimat was examined in the previous chapter. Such a periodization, however, does not imply a linear evolution from one world to another. Continuities as well as disruptions can also be observed. It may be more insightful to perceive the transformation not simply as the renunciation of the "old" and adoption of the "new", but instead as a complex historical process in which a new reference and value system was created, coexisting with the previous reference and value system. Following this perspective, the Ottoman Foreign Ministry exemplifies a distinct internalization of modernity in a certain social-political milieu and *Weltanschauung*. This selective reception of modernity by the Ottomans was not a phenomenon peculiar to the

Ottomans. Rather, it was a pattern observable in other non-Western modernization enterprises.

The Foreign Ministry in the Hamidian Era

Abdülhamid II preferred to appoint men coming from other civilian organizations to prominent posts in the Sublime Porte. Of the 16 grand viziers of Abdülhamid II, only one of them (Arifi Pasha) was a diplomat. Two others (Ibrahim Edhem Pasha and Safvet Pasha) served as ambassadors, but it would not be appropriate to regard them as diplomats. Of the ten foreign ministers of Abdülhamid, only three (Turhan Hüsnü Pasha, Arifi Pasha, Ahmed Tevfik Pasha) had extensive diplomatic backgrounds. Possibly this was due to Abdülhamid II's personalization and monopolization of the conduct of foreign policy. He was suspicious of the power of the Ministry and feared that he might be forced to share power with the Ministry in foreign policy decisions once he allowed others some power in the decision-making process.⁶⁷ The memory of the dictatorial Âli Pasha and his close associate Fuad Pasha, who were known for being sympathetic to Britain and France and who had marginalized Abdülaziz, should have been a warning for Abdülhamid II not to favor diplomats in statesmanship. He might also have thought that appointing ex-ambassadors as foreign ministers or prime ministers might enable the countries in which these ex-ambassadors had served to interfere and gain influence over the policy making of the Ottoman Empire. The suspicion of Abdülhamid II was equally true for any bureaucrat who might rise to challenge the supreme authority of the sultan, as Said Pasha had. Instead, he preferred the palace to be the sole authority in making foreign policy. He corresponded with the ambassadors and consulates personally from the palace and bypassed the Ministry and Grand Vizierate as he did with governors and local officials.

Abdülhamid II established an alternative bureaucracy in the Yıldız Palace coexisting with the Porte and rivaling and interfering with the Porte, to the abhorrence of many well-trained clerks.⁶⁸ It was not, however, a personalized and patrimonial office but an efficient, professional, and well-structured modern bureaucracy, as demonstrated by

its immense and orderly correspondence, which was efficiently registered and archived. However, it was patrimonial in other aspects and in its culture of deference.

On the other hand, it was the Hamidian period in which the Ministry was professionalized and bureaucratized like other bureaucratic offices. It was in this period that the modern Turkish Foreign Ministry emerged as a professional Weberian bureaucracy. Mahmud Esad Bey (later Pasha) was the first career diplomat to be appointed as ambassador in 1877 after passing through the necessary steps and promotions. He was recruited following his graduation and was promoted consistently, beginning with his first appointment as the third secretary in the embassy to St. Petersburg, and then serving as the second secretary and the first secretary in the embassy to Paris. This was in addition to his services in the Ministry in Istanbul (a total of 20 years before reaching the rank of ambassador).⁶⁹ Mahmud Esad was first appointed as ambassador to Vienna in 1877 and then subsequently as ambassador to Paris in 1880. He also served as the ministerial undersecretary for one year in 1879. By the 1880s, the Ottoman ambassadors were predominantly career diplomats who had begun their service as third secretaries in the 1850s. Furthermore, it was the Hamidian era in which appointments and promotions (and therefore career paths) were regularized and standardized. New recruits were to be appointed as third secretaries and promoted in time. After they were promoted to the rank of first secretary, many served in the embassies to Balkan capitals as ambassadors or undersecretaries before they were appointed as ambassadors to the prominent capitals of Western Europe. In short, in the Hamidian era, Ottoman representatives of the higher and lower echelons were predominantly professional diplomats who had risen within the Ministry over years (with the exception of some military appointments to various ambassadorial posts).

In contrast to their insignificance in the posts of the Prime Ministry and the Foreign Ministry during the Hamidian era, the presence/representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was remarkably high in the Senates of both the first and the second constitutional periods, demonstrating the prestige and distinguished place of the Ministry. With regard to the Senate of 1877, it is not possible to make a table

and a comparative analysis of the senators due to the fact that at the time, stable bureaucratic and diplomatic career patterns were not yet fully institutionalized. The senators who rose up from the ranks of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to be appointed to the Senate in 1877 were Musurus Pasha, Ahmed Arifi Pasha, Ahmed Vefik Pasha, Ali Rıza Bey, Kostaki Antopoulos Pasha, and Server Pasha, not counting a few others who served in diplomatic posts briefly. A typical career pattern for a member of the Senate of 1877 involved an earlier appointment in the *Şuray-ı Devlet* (Council of State). For their lack of domestic experience, the diplomats were rarely appointed to the *Şuray-ı Devlet* and were therefore deprived of a crucial stepping stone for promotion to either a seat in the Senate or a position in the cabinet. In that regard, a diplomatic career was not a rewarding channel for political prominence nor as promising as a career in the military or in the civil administration although the prestige of the diplomatic establishment helped them to be appointed as senators.

The Senate which convened in 1908 displayed the increasing prominence of the diplomatic service. The career diplomats who began their civil service careers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, served only in the Ministry, and attained distinct professional socializations and intellectual formations as a group by the second half of the reign of Abdülhamid II. They constituted a sizeable number in the senate of 1908, which was in fact a council of the dignitaries of the Empire. The Senators of 1908 with Foreign Ministry backgrounds included Gabriel Noradonkian, Yusuf Ziya Pasha, Keçeçizade İzzet Fuad, Yusuf Azaryan Efendi, Abdülhak Hamid, Ali Galip Bey, and Damad Ferit Pasha, in addition to those who served briefly in diplomatic posts. Several others began their careers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but then moved to other administrative offices at various points, such as Dimitri Mavrokordato Bey, Ibrahim Faik Bey, Bohor Efendi, and Nail Bey.⁷⁰ All these figures were elected not only due to their impressive diplomatic careers but possibly also for their aristocratic genealogies. Almost all of the non-Muslim senators were from aristocratic and reputable (and therefore reliable) families. This was especially true with regard to the Greek senators. Thus, we can argue that the diplomats were regarded as constituting one of the most prestigious segments of

the state elite (although lacking the political prowess and prominence normally accompanying this social prestige).

Changing International Environment and Changing, Transforming Identities

The Foreign Ministry tried its best to enable the Ottoman state to survive against all odds through its involvement in European diplomacy and its tackling of the delicate and difficult matters the Empire had to face. We may observe from correspondence that, bearing the anxiety regarding the (non)future of the Empire in mind, the Ministry contributed to the crafting of its imperial nationalism not necessarily by referring to a certain ethnicity (Turkishness), but by allegiance to a certain imperial center. In other words, their preoccupation and responsibilities led them to develop an identity formation. This identity formation was not an ideological preference, but the superimposition of a *raison d'état*. Their structures of loyalty were also formed by their appreciation of the imminent and long-term threats to the Empire, and therefore to themselves, as an examination of ambassadorial dispatches will reveal in the coming chapters.

A new Ottoman identity was forged in the nineteenth century, influenced by modern and medieval European traditions. The Ottoman imperial ideology inherited from the classical ages of the Empire had been redefined and refashioned in interaction with the modern European imperial pageantry. The synthesis and integration of different traditions bolstered an entirely new Ottoman imagination.⁷¹ Evidently, the nineteenth-century Ottoman imagination did not evolve directly from the earlier Ottoman imperial tradition. Yet it is also important to recognize the critical role of the former Ottoman representations in the forging of the novel nineteenth-century Ottoman imperial symbolism. However, again we need to emphasize that it is the brand new modern framework that utilized the traditional Ottoman representations and symbolisms to propagate and familiarize the new modern Ottoman imperium.

The content and essence of the new imperial ideology (officialization of Ottomanism by the 1860s) is another subject for debate revolving

around the questions of whether there was room for Ottoman universalism; whether the imperial ideology was merely window-dressing for the control of the “sovereign nation”; and whether this “sovereign nation” was comprised of Turks or inclusive of all Muslims. These questions do not have clear-cut and self-evident answers. However, it is certain that an Ottoman imperial nationalism referring to various and not necessarily contradicting identities developed in defense against European aggression.

The structures of loyalty of the diplomatic service will be investigated in the coming chapters. Some questions that may be posed are as follows: what were the motivations of the Ministry personnel in fulfilling their duties? Did their supreme loyalty towards the idea of the supra-national Ottoman Empire derive from being believers in a *Kaisernationalismus* or did they nurture a superior loyalty to the Ottoman dynasty without a certain political agenda? What did the imperial family and the sultan mean to the ranks of the Ministry? Was the dynasty a central figure in their conception of the political body they were serving? How did they relate the survival of the Empire with Islam? For them, did the Ottoman Empire represent the realm of Islam and did serving the Ottoman Empire also imply serving religion and God? How secular were their political commitments? Were they “political” in any sense beyond dealing with technicalities and bureaucratic niceties? Did they have a perception of representing Turks, “the sovereign nation” among other Muslim “nations”, the “Muslim nation” being the nation more sovereign than others? Although no conclusive or even satisfactory answers will be given to these questions in the coming chapters, some preliminary observations will be made based on the evidence available.

The interrelations of Muslim identity (as a political modern construct rather than a personal faith) and imperial-dynastic discourse (based on various legitimizations) will be explored. Identity construction is a modern phenomenon and a consequence of modernity, which emerged as a response to the ambivalence and discontent of modernity.⁷² In the Ottoman context, identity-formation was also directly related to the perceived threat from European aggression and encroachment upon the Empire. Modes of identity-formations were strategies

to react to the complexities of international, social, and political developments.

The Foreign Ministry's view was directed towards incorporating the Ottoman Empire into Europe proper. This was presumably a primary motive in the construction of loyalties and ideological commitments in the diplomatic service. After avoiding relegation to the ranks of dissolved nations/states, the Ottoman Empire aspired to be promoted to the league of European powers. The international situation and the imperialist international order were such that no room for a third option was acceptable.⁷³ In this perception, it was a zero sum game in which the Ottomans will lose everything or will be victorious in the end, victorious in the sense that the Empire will be stabilized and saved from collapse.

The founding diplomatic strategy of the Tanzimat was to seek an alignment with the "West" (England and France against Russia) and a strict adherence to the "order party". This "French-British" connection constituted the thrust of Ottoman "reformism". Being in alliance with the French and the British against Russia, the Ottomans were culturally influenced, especially by the French: "To gain internal strength and external legitimacy (in the eyes of France, the symbol of progress), the Empire must modernize itself."⁷⁴ The Edict of Tanzimat in 1839 was the major document of the forging of this alliance, and the Edict of Reform (*Islahat Fermanı*) in 1856 denoted the apex of this alliance before the alliance (and the "Crimean system") began to erode gradually through the 1860s since this alliance could not overcome the ethnic upheavals in the Ottoman Empire. Also, international dynamics were drastically transformed with the emergence of a unified Germany, which defeated the French at Sedan.

The Tanzimat leadership knew that these alignments were not between two equal parties but between states at two different levels. It was not up to the Ottomans, but up to the British, to decide the future of the alliance. The British decided to loosen the ties between the two states after observing the devastation of the Ottomans by the Russian army in 1877-78. By then, the British realized that it seemed unwise to bet on the protection of the Ottoman Empire against the Russians. Britain gravitated to new alternative diplomatic policies

and acquired Egypt as its new defensive border in the south against Russian aggression. Britain assumed the control of Cyprus (and Egypt) to sustain its new policy.⁷⁵ By the 1880s, Abdülhamid II was obliged to turn to Germany for a new partnership, a new move in his game of survival. The new partnership was not between two equal parties, either. Abdülhamid II was placing yet another bet on survival. These diplomatic and strategic shifts were salient in the recalibration of ideological fronts as well. The three modes of international alignments of the Ottomans (in the Tanzimat, in the Hamidian era, in the Unionist rule) were accompanied by three modes of modernizations and ideological dispositions.

In such an environment, the self-representation of the Empire was self-contradictory and convoluted. After the breach with Britain, the Ottoman Empire was left alone in its struggle to survive. These circumstances forced Abdülhamid II to fabricate an imperial grandeur. Although, on the one hand, the very fear of being annihilated was pervasive, on the other hand, a self-esteem bolstered by the pomposity of the Ottoman imperium was used to counter and evade the fear. These two motivations were not necessarily contradictory but, on the contrary, complemented each other. The fiction of grandeur magnified the obsession with annihilation, and the fear of collapse and annihilation motivated the construction of a fictitious grandeur in response.⁷⁶

Abdülhamid II sought to create an aura around himself to nurture confidence in the imperium. He personalized the Empire in himself. The modes of traditional Ottoman self-representation and display were amalgamated with nineteenth-century modes of European self-representations and public display, and this blend reached its zenith in the Hamidian era. The Ottoman Empire could portray and display itself as yet another prestigious and esteemed Empire, though limits of its persuasiveness is another matter.⁷⁷ Hence, the Hamidian Empire was in a sense the era of the “invention of Empire”.⁷⁸

“Empire” is one of the latest “fads” of historiography and the social sciences. While Empire used to be a specialty of a small circle of historians not highly regarded by others, the retreat of nation states in the 1990s has made Empire an attractive theme to study. Yet, Bernard Porter, one of the earliest scholars of Empire⁷⁹ and one of

the foremost “imperial historians” of the British Empire, criticizes the new, booming interest in and fascination with “studying Empire” by arguing that the “imperial rhetoric” was confined to the ruling aristocratic class and that it would therefore be inappropriate to discover the “imperial” elsewhere.⁸⁰ Porter is particularly critical of the studies advanced by the British imperial historian John Mackenzie,⁸¹ which purported to establish that Empire was at the center of nineteenth-century British society, politics, and culture. For Porter, Empire was a class-related phenomenon and ideology. Nevertheless, the discovery of the Empire opened new horizons and challenged the conventions of “modern historical scholarship”, tainted by its internalization of the premises of modern nation states and its tacitly taking them for granted.

Excited by these new horizons, Takashi Fujitani, an eminent historian of nineteenth-century Japan, stated:

In this respect, I consider myself to be among a number of scholars of the so-called emperor system who have begun in various ways to critique the view long espoused by Japanese Marxists of the *koza* school, as well as modernists such as Maruyama Masao, that treated the prominence of the monarchy in modern history as a reflection of and reason for the incompleteness of Japan’s modernity. By resituating the emperor at the center of a modern panoptic regime, as I propose, we see not only that the cults of nation and emperor were created in relatively modern times, but also that what has been called the emperor system, far from being characterized by its “feudal” characteristics, was central to the production of Japan’s modernity.⁸²

Apparently, what Fujitani did with respect to Meiji Japan (and Richard Wortman to imperial Russia⁸³) was done by Deringil to the Hamidian Ottoman Empire.⁸⁴ The pre-modern political structures all exhausted mechanisms of legitimization, but traditional strategies of legitimization came after the construction and consolidation of political powers rather than vice-versa. However, modern political structures should be charged with “mission” and “meaning” from their very beginning.

The merciless political power struggles for domination should be justified with the claim to bear superior and loftier ideals. Self-identities (and national identities) were also forged for this goal. This was the case for Great Britain, France, Russia, and also the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire.

What did the Ottoman Empire mean in the eyes of its reorganizers? Or, to formulate the question better, what did the reorganizers want the Ottoman Empire to mean? Furthermore, how much of this pursued ideal had been instilled? Apparently, instead of speaking of an abstraction, we need to historicize and contextualize the Empire. The Tanzimat engendered the introduction of a totally new and unfamiliar language. With the Tanzimat, the self-imagination and self-representation of the Ottoman Empire were recast from the medieval to the modern. Whereas the Rescript of Tanzimat in 1839 may be seen within the traditional Ottoman political visions and vocabulary,⁸⁵ the Rescript of Reform in 1856 marked a drastic shift in taking and endorsing the “modern” and “universalist” (with regard to its subjects) discourse. The makeshift and transient alignment of the Ottoman Empire with the European “party of order” was intensified and institutionalized with the Crimean War.⁸⁶ The vocabulary and language employed in the Edict of Reform demonstrated the transformative role of the diplomatic alignment of the Ottoman Empire in the previous two decades with regard to political discourse and visions. The Rescript of Reform also epitomized the entrance of the Ottomans to the European family, following the wartime alliances with France and Britain and the signing of the Paris Treaty, which admitted the Ottomans into the Concert of Europe.⁸⁷

The reign of Abdülhamid II can be interpreted as the maturation and sophistication of the Tanzimat discourse after its infancy in the 1840s and its adolescence in the 1860s, dressed in authoritarian garb (not unlike the authoritarian self-images of Russian czardom, Prussia, and the European-wide conservative-reactionary monarchism in reaction to the “democratic” currents of the time). It was the legal and institutional undertakings in the late 1860s, such as the new codes of Public Education (1869), Provincial Administration (1867), and Citizenship (1869), that set the ground for the Hamidian autocratic

institutionalization. At the same time, the Hamidian regime was constitutive in the emergence of the Republic, not only in the microcosm of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but in the entirety of Ottoman statecraft. This was not only true in an institutional context. The men who had been educated and recruited to the state service in Abdülhamid II's reign would establish the Republic and constitute its bureaucratic and political elites.

International developments were at the center of changing and transforming Ottoman identities, cultural and intellectual formations, and the structures of mentality of the Ottoman bureaucratic establishment. Therefore, the Ottoman diplomatic service was at the hub of these shifts, formations, and transformations. In this foundational stage, the identity formation of diplomats was constituted by three complementary dynamics, one primarily "political", the second "structural", and the last primarily "socio-cultural". The first one involved the encounter with external actors ranging from *Düvel-i Muazzama* (Great Powers) to Armenian, Albanian, Arab dissidents, and from the social and cultural habituses of Europe to various political networks of Turcophobe and Turcophile tendencies. The second dynamic encompassed international politics, entanglements, and rivalries. The last was their social culturalization and social backgrounds, which influenced and determined their reactions and perceptions in encountering political developments. In fact, it was the amalgamation of these three dynamics that led to the formation of a certain identity and cultural/ideological/mental formation.⁸⁸ Moreover, the Hamidian regime's official discourses and stances (with the legacy of the Tanzimat in the background) certainly had an impact on their political, social, and cultural dispositions. Therefore, the international entanglements and encounters were constitutive in the intellectual formation of the Ottoman state elite in general and Ottoman diplomats in particular.

CHAPTER 3

A SOCIAL PORTRAIT OF THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

The Service Aristocracy: Who Were The Diplomats?

The nineteenth-century Ottoman bureaucracy was a *habitus* with regard to its mores, internal codes of conduct, socialization, and attitudes devoid of a Weberian structure. When the two sons of Hayrullah Efendi, Abdülhak Hamid and Nasuhi, arrived in Paris in their teens to study at the Ottoman School and Saint-Cyr respectively, they immediately visited the embassy. The ambassador, Cernil Pasha (the son of Mustafa Reşid Pasha), welcomed them at the embassy. Abdülhak Hamid, who claimed to be the first Ottoman child ever in Paris,¹ visited the embassy daily throughout his stay in Paris and was entertained by the ambassador. The child Abdülhak Hamid also became friends with the scribes Artin, who was to become Artin Dadyan Pasha, and Esad, who later became Esad Pasha, the first career diplomat to be appointed as ambassador (first in Vienna, then in Paris). He also met Edhempaşazade Hamdi, the future Osman Hamdi Bey, who also happened to regularly visit the embassy while studying law in Paris.² When their father, Hayrullah Efendi, arrived in Paris, he also immediately visited the embassy.³ During his stay in Paris, he frequented the embassy regularly.⁴ We may observe that the ambassadorial staff performed their daily routines in line with

the habitus in which they operated and from which they had been recruited in the first instance.⁵ Apparently, Ottoman embassies, besides attending to their professional obligations and preoccupations, served as the hub of an Ottoman network and an "Ottoman club" where Ottomans belonging to the same social class met, socialized, and asked for help when necessary.⁶ When the Young Turk Şerafettin Mağmumi visited Rome, he "could not make it without visiting [the Ottoman ambassador] Mustafa Reşid Bey" whom he regarded as "an extremely polite and elegant gentleman."⁷ Ahmet İhsan, in his travels to Europe, visited the Ottoman embassy as soon as he arrived at a capital city. In his travel account, which was one of the earliest of the genre of Ottoman/Turkish touristic guides, he described the physical aspects and features of the Ottoman embassies in each city he visited as one of the most important sources of information regarding the cities. His socialization and the intimate relations he nurtured with the staff in the embassies are illustrative. For example, desperate to check if the new issue of his journal *Servet-i Fünun* was printed and in circulation, he obtained a copy of the latest issue of his journal from Rifat Bey, the military attaché in the Berlin embassy.⁸ In Rome, the ambassador Mahmut Nedim Bey awakened from his sleep to welcome Ahmet İhsan and hired the carriage of the embassy for Ahmet İhsan to wander in the city.⁹ Ahmet İhsan found and befriended Katibyan Efendi in London, a new graduate of the school of engineering and a secretary in the embassy, who was a nephew of Hayik, a friend of Ahmet İhsan's from high school, and they wandered around in the city together.¹⁰ Ahmet İhsan met and befriended many Ottoman university students working as secretaries in the Ottoman embassies.¹¹ Reading *Servet-i Fünun* and other journals, and socializing within the same milieu inhabited by the privileged few, we may observe that Ahmet İhsan and the staff in the embassies shared the same closed world.

One rejected applicant to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the future Mehmed Tefvik Bey, later governor, Minister of Finance, and President of *Şuray-ı Devlet* (Council of State). He applied for a position in the Foreign Correspondence Office in the Ministry after his graduation from *Mülkiye* in 1885. Yusuf Ziya Bey (the future Yusuf Ziya Pasha, the ambassador to Paris and Vienna) was a close friend

of young Mehmed Tevfik's family. Therefore, young Mehmed Tevfik requested the acquaintances of his family to arrange a post for him in the Ministry. According to Mehmed Tevfik's account, Ziya Bey had shown interest in the request of the young Mehmed Tevfik. He asked his brother, Mustafa Reşid Bey (the aforementioned ambassador to Rome and the future Minister of Foreign Affairs), to arrange Mehmed Tevfik's employment through Naum Efendi (the future undersecretary of the Ministry), then an official in the Foreign Correspondences Office. To his regret, no suitable post could be arranged for the young Mehmed Tevfik. Instead, he was assigned to a less prestigious position in the Translation Office. Mehmed Tevfik resigned after three months to move to the *Mabeyn* (the Chancellery of the Ottoman Palace).¹² Mehmed Tevfik Bey's application for employment and his short tenure is yet another demonstration of the intra-elite character of the Ottoman bureaucracy. He was admitted to the Ministry not due to his merit but because he was the son of Şirvanlı Ahmed Hamdi Efendi, an educator and a high-ranking bureaucrat who served in various posts related to education (though Mehmed Tevfik was a graduate of *Mülkiye* and his credentials were superior to any ordinary son of a bureaucrat).

Young Mehmed Tevfik was not the only recruit appointed due to family connections. Galip Kemali's (Söylemezoğlu) employment in the Foreign Ministry was thanks to his father's post. At the start of Galip Kemali's bureaucratic career, his father was no less than the Head of the Committee of Recruitment (of Civil Servants) who arranged his son's appointment thanks to his friendship with Said Pasha, the foreign minister of the time. The appointment document of his son was passed to Abdülhamid II for his signature personally by Süreyya Pasha,¹³ the Chamberlain of the Palace to Abdülhamid II. Furthermore, after securing the appointment of his son to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the office of *Tabirât-ı Hariciye*,¹⁴ he introduced his son to Artin Dadyan Efendi, the undersecretary of the Ministry.¹⁵ Given that both of the families lived close by in Beşiktaş, young Galip Kemali began to regularly eat his dinners at Dadyan's *konak* with the family of Artin Dadyan. Abdülhak Hamid's appointment as a scribe to the embassy in Paris was arranged by Ibrahim Bey, who was a relative of Abdülhak Hamid and son-in-law of Raşid Pasha, the foreign minister at

the time.¹⁶ Given that Abdülhak Hamid came from a prominent family and had many family connections, all his appointments were made due to personal requests and some of the less desirable appointments were annulled thanks to his connections.¹⁷ When Abdülhak Hamid was appointed to a post in the embassy to Belgrade, he was infuriated and, using his connections, he had this appointment abrogated because he “did not want to live in a barn after Paris”.¹⁸ Young Mehmet Murad (yet to be Mizancı Murad) was appointed to an office (*kalem*) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs thanks to the patronage of Midhat Pasha.¹⁹ After arranging the appointment of his younger brother Receb as an official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ahmed Tevfik Bey (Pasha) thanked the sultan in a rather submissive tone, rearticulating his obedience and allegiance to his Excellency.²⁰

In the pre-modern perception, this was the most usual and practical recruitment pattern. It was yet to be dubbed as nepotism in a culture in which oral communication was as reliable as, if not more so than, the written word. This was far from a bureaucratic culture of individualism and meritocracy. It was seen as the most reliable method for recruitment in a culture of oral communication before the culture of the text. It was the usual mode of conduct in a cultural system in which genealogies and family reputations were taken as more substantial credentials and references than personal achievements and competences. This was viable not only because there was no regularized official procedure of recruitment, but also because the recruitment pool was small and those who were within the circle knew each other, if not personally, at least by name. The recruitment pool would expand after the number of graduates of imperial colleges increased exponentially and the class/social origins of the officials changed and became diversified. Recruitment patterns would become considerably regularized and formalized after the 1908 Revolution and after the purge (*tensikat*) of officials on a grand scale. In fact, the “myth of the bureaucracy” in its rigid Weberian definition was hardly applicable to nineteenth-century European bureaucracies where patronage also reigned supreme. In Britain, France, and the United States, a dispassionate Weberian bureaucracy began to loom only in the second half of the nineteenth century, partially and slowly.

It was only in the twentieth century that a modern bureaucracy based on strict procedures and formality, and on merit instead of recommendations, was institutionalized.²¹

Nevertheless, efforts to transform the bureaucracy were attempted in the Western European polities at an earlier stage. The Northcote-Trevelyan Report of 1853's Ottoman counterpart²² was to be undertaken in the Ottoman Empire only after the 1908 Revolution. The reaction to the bureaucratic machine of the Hamidian era and concerns with reform and modernization of the bureaucracy became one of the most pressing issues of the early Second Constitution Era.²³ Hüseyin Cahid Bey was an outspoken critic of the Hamidian bureaucracy.²⁴ For him, the inefficient bureaucracy was a product of the degenerate *ancien régime* (*devr-i sabık*) and was completely corrupt and self-interested. What he (and all the other reformers) proposed was recruitment based only on merit measured by objective and standardized examinations, and promotions again based on merit measured by strict criteria. Examination became a magical word/concept in the writings of Hüseyin Cahid Bey and other opinion leaders, as well as in the eyes of the parliamentarians.

The Hamidian bureaucracy can be characterized as a closed world in which personal relations were of primary importance. This was more evident in the highest echelons of the bureaucracy, where social exclusion and elitism survived after its dissolution in the lower echelons of the bureaucracy. This culture was most manifest in the diplomatic service since it was one of the most elite governmental offices. The end of the Hamidian regime widened the pool of recruitment and weakened the intimate nature of the bureaucracy. However, it was not the case that the dispassionate Weberian bureaucracy replaced the Hamidian bureaucracy. No such duality existed. This culture of bureaucracy was considerably modified but continued to reproduce itself.

Michael Herzfeld argues in his study on bureaucracy that, "the family provides an easily understood model for the loyalty and collective responsibility that citizens must feel towards the state."²⁵ He also argues that: "There is no such thing as an autonomous state except in the hands of those who create and execute its ostensibly self-supporting

teleology...To recover accountability, we should not simply revert to the Weberian ideal type of the legal-rational bureaucratic state. We should instead ask who makes each decision on the basis of 'the law.' Restoring time and individuality to our analyses – the recognition of human agency – is the only viable defense against the reification of bureaucratic authority."²⁶ For the late Ottoman bureaucracy, and especially for the diplomatic service, where the staff was recruited from a small and intimate social milieu, Herzfeld's suggestions are particularly pertinent. The self-perception of the bureaucrats and their perception of the state could be understood within the metaphor of the "family". This perception maintained a loyalty to the intimate state and constructed a group identity imagined and forged around the familiarized state. Thus, the state was not an entity above the clouds to be subordinated. It was the perceptions and self-perceptions of the members of this group that constituted and reinforced the idea of the state, which was transcendentalized only to serve more personal goals and aspirations. The rhetoric of submissiveness and rhetorical obedience to the sultan, which was one of the hallmarks of this imperial culture, was also a manifestation of this familiarization process. For example, the "thank you" letters of Yusuf Ziya Bey and Mahmud Nedim Pasha for their appointments as ambassadors to Vienna and Rome respectively display the extent of level of submissiveness to the sultan.²⁷ However, this allegiance and obedience was less about submissiveness to authority than a reiteration of adherence to a certain community (family) which was legitimized and upheld by a culture of deference and hierarchy. The sultan was perceived as the pivot that secured and perpetuated the maintenance of this habitus. The relationship established with the sultan and the symbolism employed in the tenor of the addresses to the sultan were reminiscent of intra-family relations. According to Engin Deniz Akarlı, Abdülhamid II served as "the royal fountain of favor" that produced "the best harvest on the field of sovereignty" and functioned as the supreme arbiter between the intriguing pashas.²⁸

The Hamidian regime may be defined as an amalgamation of the institutionalization of a modern bureaucratic state under the aegis of a semi-aristocratic and patriarchal polity. The enhanced professionalization and meritocracy at the lower echelons of the bureaucracy coexisted

with the traditional and personalized structures at the higher levels of the bureaucracy and politics. The Hamidian bureaucracy was a loyalist bureaucracy, not necessarily loyal to the persona of the sultan, but loyal to the Ottoman polity, its image, its representations, and its ideal. Loyalty to the sultan was one of the indispensable and fundamental constituents of the Ottoman polity, as the sultan's personality embodied and symbolized the integrity and immortality of the Empire. In such a complex organization, the role of the sultan was pivotal. The office of the sultan was indispensable not because there was consensus over the legitimacy and efficiency of the system, but because there was no viable and promising alternative to it, not unlike the Habsburg monarchy in the perception of the German-speaking bureaucracy or the Russian czardom in the perception of the Russian bureaucracy. The presence of sultanic authority also excluded politics from the legitimate sphere of governance. Moreover, there would be no transcendentalization of the governing elite and the social internalization of the inherent superiority of the governing elite in the absence of the sultan and his metaphysical aura. Allegiance to the sultan meant allegiance to the class itself. Of course, the Turkish and Muslim (and caliphal) identity of the sultan established and secured the ethnic and confessional nature of the imperium as well. Therefore, this was a class identity embedded in confessional and (to a certain extent) ethnic identities. In Marxian terms, this was class consciousness rather than a false consciousness.

We may define the Hamidian status quo as a "transition to a controlled and restrained modernization in reaction to the advancing threats supported and administered by the newly – established Muslim elites aiming to avoid the rise of rival elites, be they Muslim or non-Muslim." This endeavor necessitates the establishment of a values system organized hierarchically and symbolized in the persona of Abdülhamid II. Elites are not ideologically motivated. They seek to maximize their interests. The claim here is not that this elite created Abdülhamid II. What may be modestly suggested is that the consolidation of an established state elite after the precarious decades of the early Tanzimat provided the appropriate conditions for an autocracy to rise which nurtured and monitored an established

status quo representing and upholding the values and priorities of this elite in the persona of the sultan and in the symbolism of the imperium. The state was reified for these self-interested reasons: "Officials both contribute to the creation of standardized views of the state and experience the constraints on action that result from this constant process of reification."²⁹ Engin Akarlı also maintained that, "this new elaboration of bureaucratic structure penetrated deep into society and enhanced the visibility, control, and to a certain extent also the respectability of the government. Equally important, it served as a mechanism to create a growing cadre of officials committed to the Ottoman cause."³⁰ As it happens, self-interest and social/political visions are often negotiated and intertwined.

Despite the somehow aristocratic character of late Ottoman diplomatic service, the Hamidian diplomats were not financially secure. On the contrary, in their missions abroad, many suffered from financial problems arising from the financial difficulties the Empire was facing. Complaints to the sultan for the non-payment of the salaries of the ambassadorial staff abounded.³¹ The embassies were not financially supported adequately enough to be able to afford their routine daily and professional expenditures.³² The second military attaché of the embassy to St. Petersburg complained that he had been paid one month's salary for the preceding seven and a half months.³³ It was not only the minor officials who complained about unpaid salaries. Şerif Pasha, the ambassador to Stockholm and son of Kürd Said Pasha, requested his unpaid salary.³⁴ Tevfik Pasha, while he was ambassador to Berlin in 1899, asked for his back salary from previous years to be paid.³⁵ After eight years (in 1907), he reiterated his request, asking the palace either to pay his unpaid salary or to remove him from his post.³⁶ İzzet Pasha, the ambassador to Madrid and son of Fuad Pasha requested a loan from the treasury to be repaid by cuts in his future salary.³⁷ Mustafa Reşid Pasha, while serving as ambassador to Rome, complained of the financial burden caused by his unpaid salary and allowances.³⁸ Apparently, only those who were able to bear such financial burdens could be diplomats, not unlike the European diplomatic services. Although many diplomats suffered financial burdens abroad, they enjoyed a privileged life in Istanbul and, more

importantly, shared an exclusive culture of their own. More importantly, the social capital and prestige they entertained were more valuable and preferable than material wealth in a world where many benefits were enjoyed not based on cash but based on reputation and social respectability.

The annal of the Foreign Ministry published in 1889 (1306) provides us with an opportunity to scrutinize the social portrait of the Ministry (as of 1889). A list of the officials of the Ministry is presented with information on the occupation of their fathers, their birthplaces, and the offices they held. Although three other annals of the Ministry were published during the Hamidian era, the best and most comprehensive information on the diplomatic service is provided in this annal. Only the data in this annal are appropriate for use in preparing a statistical observation, but the rich data on the social background of the officials in the other three annals are also employed throughout this chapter.³⁹ This survey of the higher, middle, and lower cadres of the Ministry illustrates clearly that Hamidian diplomats were predominantly scions of state officials and members of this semi-closed world. The ranks of the fathers of the diplomats vary significantly. The sons of grand viziers, governors, and ministers worked together with the sons of minor officials. These minor officials whose sons became diplomats worked predominantly in offices in the capital rather than in the provinces. For example, of the 35 Muslims who were employed in the Ministry working in Istanbul as of 1889 and who are listed in the annals of the Ministry, only eight were not born in Istanbul. Of these eight, only three of them were sons of provincial officials. That is, of the 27 officials who were sons of officials, only three of them were born outside Istanbul. The others not from Istanbul were fathered by *ulema* (2), local notables (2), and merchants (1). In short, a typical official in the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs was raised in Istanbul in the family of a state official. Some also had grandfathers who were state officials who had been recruited in the very early phase of the Tanzimat. Of all the officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs counted (a total of 152) and listed in the annals of the Ministry for the year 1889,⁴⁰ including the consulates, only 28 were born outside Istanbul. However, some were born outside Istanbul while their fathers were

serving in the provinces – for example, the magisterial Sadullah Pasha, who was born in Erzurum while his father was serving as the governor of Kurdistan. Therefore, not all of those born outside Istanbul can be regarded as recruits from the provinces. Of these 28, some others were sons of minor provincial officials, and three were sons of provincial *ulema*. Two of the Muslim officials were born out of the domains of the Ottoman Empire: one in Anapa in Crimea, the other in Circassia. The map of the births of the Muslim and non-Muslim officials does not display any meaningful variation. The Arab lands, Macedonia, and Anatolia seem to be equally represented. The only meaningful variation observed in the geographical distribution of their births is the prevalence of Istanbul as a birthplace.

In the yearbook of the Ministry printed in 1889, brief personal information for the 152 officials was provided.⁴¹ Of these, 98 were Muslims. Of the remaining 54 non-Muslim officials, 25 were Armenians, 15 were Greek, and the remaining 14 non-Muslims were Catholic/Orthodox Arabs, Jews, Bulgarians, or Europeans.⁴² Of the Muslims, 73 were scions of state officials of varying ranks. Of the non-Muslims, 29 were scions of non-state official fathers. Only 14 of the non-Muslims were the children of state officials. The remaining six had fathers with a nationality other than Ottoman.

We observe an upward mobility within the generations. For example, Irfan, the senior secretary of the London embassy, was the son of an official in the Directorate of Forestry in the province of Selanik.⁴³ Although the prestigious posts of full ambassadorships [ambassadors to Berlin, London, St. Petersburg, Paris, Rome, Vienna, and Teheran were full ambassadors (*büyük elçi*) whereas ambassadors to capitals such as Athens, Belgrade, Washington, and Den Haag were *orta elçis* (middle ambassadors)] were predominantly restricted to the scions of dignitaries and families of high-ranking bureaucrats, there were exceptions. For example, Mahmud Esad Pasha, the ambassador to Paris, was the son of a minor *alim* in Izmir. Mahmud Esad Pasha owed his impressive rise in the civil service to his enrollment in the Ottoman School in Paris. He joined the *Bab-ı Ali* Translation Office upon his graduation from the Ottoman School. He was posted to the embassy in St. Petersburg after his years in the Translation

Office and from there he was promoted regularly every five years before he was appointed as ambassador in 1877.⁴⁴

Others did not enjoy such upward mobility. Several scions of *sadr-ı azams*, ministers, and generals were assigned modest positions and most held on to mediocre offices before their retirements. Even though they lived prosperous lives thanks to their backgrounds, they could not transfer their financial assets and social prestige into rank and office. In that sense, Ottoman statecraft differed from nineteenth-century British statecraft, the aristocratic nation *par excellence*, or Prussian statecraft, where the integration of the aristocracy and the bureaucratic estate (*Beamtenstand*) privileged the aristocrats. It has to be noted that the scions of Ottoman dignitaries comprised a considerable portion of the diplomatic corps. This was most visible in the posts of full ambassadorships. Full ambassadors of the Hamidian era, such as Sadullah Pasha, Ahmed Tevfik Pasha, Yanko Fotiyadi Pasha, Yusuf Ziya Pasha, Salih Münir Pasha, Ahmed Arifi Pasha, and Musurus Pasha, were all men of aristocratic and illustrious backgrounds.⁴⁵ Apparently, the Ministry was a prestigious office where the sons of Ottoman dignitaries hastened to draft their sons.

Abdülhamit Kırmızı's survey of the social origins of the governors in the Hamidian era is to some extent compatible with the findings presented above on the social origins of the officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs based on the ministry's four annals.⁴⁶ Kırmızı also finds that the sons of officials made up a high percentage of governors. Sons of local notables and dynasties, *ulema*, and merchants comprised the remaining office-holders. However, it is remarkable that the percentage of governors descended from state officials is significantly smaller in comparison to diplomats. The most likely reason for this difference might be attributed to the necessity of having sufficient fluency in French to serve in the Ministry, which consequently privileged the sons of state officials who had easier access to French learning. The officials' sons were more likely to be enrolled in the prestigious schools where they could master the French language. Furthermore, they grew up socialized in environments more conducive to learning French. Moreover, their being raised in an environment where one could attain a more cosmopolitan cultural formation and be more prone

to acquire knowledge relevant to the diplomatic service should have favored the sons of higher-ranking officials. However, as suggested above, Kırmızı's survey and the findings provided here indicate the predominance of the sons of officials in the state bureaucracy, which engendered a distinct cultural intimacy closed to outsiders. The outsiders had to endorse the specific codes of conduct to be fully admitted and assimilated into this cultural and social world.

Some recruits might have served to prove the loyalty of the *âyân* dynasties to the state. It can be observed that numerous scions of local dynasties were recruited to the Ottoman diplomatic service. This pattern probably indicates a strategy of the local elites to incorporate their descendants and family into the state. The early Tanzimat era witnessed the destruction of the power bases of many local dynasties in the course of the Tanzimat's policy of centralization. The devastation of the local dynasties was followed by their displacement and resettlement in Istanbul, or exile to distant localities. This process was to some extent semi-voluntary in the sense that the local dynasties, once they accepted their new status, were granted attractive opportunities in the capital and welcomed. Given the pros and cons, many members of these dynasties "collaborated". The Bedirxans, Karaosmanoğlu,⁴⁷ Menemencioglu,⁴⁸ and Çapanzades⁴⁹ raised the new generations of their families in the modern schools of Istanbul and Europe, and gave their best sons to the service of the state.

The transition and interconnectedness between local notables and the state was a phenomenon that existed before the advent of the Tanzimat, especially in the post-classical centuries as the provincial elites consolidated their power in their localities. The delicate balance and mutual recognition between Istanbul and local power-holders was the backbone of the Ottoman control of Anatolian and Roumelian lands in the post-classical Ottoman Empire. The center and the provincial elites were in a relationship consisting of bargains and compromises rather than zero-sum clashes.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, in the eighteenth century the *âyân* did not bother to have their sons recruited into the central administration, but rather trained them to rule over their own land and possessions. The center was not yet attractive enough. The pull and push factors were not sufficiently strong. As the center

enhanced its relative (as well as absolute) power vis-à-vis the provincial elites, this relationship evolved into one of submission and obedience. This did not, however, mean that this obedience was necessarily disadvantageous to the submissive provincial elites as long as they benefited from the new opportunities offered to them. As Nagata noted, the *âyân* were not annihilated in the reign of Mahmud II. On the contrary, they survived, rehabilitated themselves, and assumed power within the local administrations and councils of the Tanzimat.⁵¹ Those whose local powerhouses were uprooted sought other lucrative and desirable options. They found ways to adapt to the changing circumstances, albeit not under favorable conditions: "By 1820, the center had asserted its control over all of Anatolia and Eastern Roumelia although occasional clashes with lesser notables persisted for a time. Those notables who adjusted to the new reality of a strong and assertive center continued to wield economic power well into the twentieth century."⁵²

Assimilating and Integrating the Local Aristocracies: Periphery Marries the Center

In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we encounter several descendants of Babans and other Kurdish tribal leaders, Turcoman chieftains, local Albanian dynasties, and Crimean aristocrats from the family of the Crimean khans. Apart from the reputable Ahmed Tevfik Paşa, the prime minister, the foreign minister, and the ambassador to Berlin and London, Hüseyin Saadet, an official in the Ministry of Foreign Ministry who died at a young age in 1901, and Ali Seyyid Bey were also members of the family of the Crimean khanate (Girays).⁵³ Ahmed Tevfik Paşa was described by Esat Cemal in his memoirs as "*Türk oğlu Türk*" (a Turk son of a Turk) probably due to his impeccable (ethnic) credentials as a member of the Crimean khanate (who, in fact, claimed to descend from Genghis Khan).⁵⁴ The recruitment of the Circassian tribal chiefs should be regarded as a distinct sub-category. Although many descendants of the Circassian tribal leaders (for obvious reasons) were recruited into the Ottoman military after fine educations, we encounter only one descendant of a Circassian tribal leader, Mehmed Şemseddin Bey,⁵⁵ within the higher ranks of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁵⁶

One of the most established figures in the ranks of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a local dynastic background was Numan Menemencioğlu. His father, Rifat, was a high-ranking bureaucrat who served as the governor of Baghdad, Minister of Finance, and President of the Senate, and he married the daughter of Namık Kemal, thus integrating himself into the culturally exclusive world of the Istanbul bureaucracy. His son, Numan, entered the Ottoman diplomatic service in 1914 as the third secretary at the embassy in Vienna. He graduated from Saint-Joseph Lycée before studying law at the University of Lausanne.⁵⁷ In other words, he followed the well-worn path of a son from a well-to-do family and enjoyed the comfortable life of an aristocrat. Looking at him more closely, Numan Menemencioğlu defies categorizations. From a family of local Turcoman notables in Cilicia by birth, his kin were well assimilated into the Ottoman aristocracy. He, himself, served as a loyal servant of the Republic in Ankara. His father's marriage to the daughter of Namık Kemal, who belonged to a family of the state aristocracy and thereby acquiring from these family backgrounds different social and political values, further complicates the social background of Numan Menemencioğlu. Beginning his career in the Empire and serving as the General Secretary of the Republican Foreign Ministry between 1933 and 1942 (and Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1942–44) and controlling the Ministry, he embodied the multifacetedness of the late Ottoman bureaucracy.⁵⁸ Numan's brother, Edhem Menemencioğlu, born in 1878, pursued a career in the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1906 to 1927 and briefly served as ministerial under-secretary in 1916. Edhem Menemencioğlu, who taught courses on international law, private international law, and diplomacy at the School for Civil Service (*Mülkiye*) after his departure from the Ministry, also had an impressive career.⁵⁹ Turgut Menemencioğlu, the nephew of Numan, was also a high-ranking bureaucrat of the Republic and held the posts of ambassador to the United Nations and to Washington. In short, the Menemencioğlu family illustrates the path of a nineteenth-century provincial family joining the imperial bureaucracy from the periphery and surviving in the twentieth-century Republican bureaucracy.

Another provincial dynasty, the Baban family, was also represented in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Kürd Said Pasha served as the ambassador to Berlin between 1883 and 1885 in addition to his 11-year tenure as the Minister of Foreign Affairs. His son, the famous Şerif Pasha, who claimed to represent the Kurds after the Armistice of Mondros in 1918, entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after serving as a military officer. Another member of the family who advanced in his career in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was Halil Halid Bey, who also served as the ambassador to Belgrade and Teheran.⁶⁰

The Babans were a good illustration of the refashioning of an aristocratic family uprooted from its own soil but having accommodated to the new opportunities and benefits of the centralized Empire. Many members of the Babanzades became prominent Ottoman bureaucrats, and with the emergence of an autonomous public space, leading Ottoman/Turkish intellectuals, ideologues, etc. They were also leading early Kurdish nationalists.⁶¹ The father and son Babanzades (and Halil Halid) demonstrate the assimilation of the periphery into the center. The father, Kürd Said Pasha, was born in his hometown of Suleymaniye (in present day Iraqi Kurdistan) in 1849. His birth was just two years after the destruction of the semi-independence/autonomy of the Baban emirate.⁶² He was raised in Istanbul, where his family had to resettle. After graduating from *Mekteb-i Sultani*, he entered state service in the Translation Office. He was employed in a variety of posts in different governmental offices before he got his appointment as the Minister of Foreign Affairs (and subsequently as the ambassador to Berlin). His son received a better education. Following his graduation from the *Mekteb-i Sultani*, he enrolled in the prestigious Saint-Cyr Military Academy in Paris. He was appointed as the military attaché in Brussels and subsequently in Paris. He was appointed as the second secretary in the embassy to Paris before his appointment as the ambassador to Stockholm. He was married to Emine Hanım, the granddaughter of Mohammed Ali Pasha of Egypt. His association with the Unionists just prior to the Revolution of 1908, his liberal opposition to the Unionists in exile, his subsequent conversion to Kurdish nationalism, and his pretensions for the leadership of the Kurdish independence movement during the Allied occupation of

Turkey after his decades-long aristocratic/imperial leanings, however, reflect the permeable nature of identities and dispositions.

The process by which Şerif Pasha, the loyal Ottoman diplomat, became a Kurdish nationalist seeking an independent Kurdistan is emblematic of the complexities and permeability of the ideologies of the time. The simultaneous contributions of the Babans both to the emergence of a Kurdish nationalism and to the Ottoman imperial grandeur were not a contradiction and exception. These were strategies of the members of the grand families of yesterday, who were trying to determine the best way to survive and to preserve and foster their power in transforming circumstances.⁶³ The varieties of strategies employed by different individuals and even the strategies employed by these certain individuals in the different phases of their lives may differ, but the concerns behind these strategies are the same. One wise and safe strategy was to be incorporated into the imperium and be a part of the imperium, if not a major stakeholder in it. Moreover, such a course was welcomed and even encouraged by the state. Thus, we observe the emergence of a new state elite with aristocratic backgrounds assimilated into the service of the state.⁶⁴ This process was not unlike the stick-and-carrot tactics of the French absolutist monarchs in gathering the French aristocrats at Versailles.⁶⁵

The maneuvers of Şerif Pasha, the recruitment of the members of notable Kurdish families into the Ottoman state, and the generation of Kurdish nationalism by other family members posed no contradiction. At a time when stubborn identities were not forged and fixed, oscillations and shifting loyalties were to be expected. In the absence of identity politics, the primary concerns of these actors were adaptation to the new circumstances at an optimum level. They may have preferred "exit", "loyalty", or "voice" at any given time and then switched to another option at a later time when their interests were best served by that option.⁶⁶

In fact, there was no strict separation between local dynasties and the Istanbul aristocracy. In a way, the Tanzimat may be interpreted as the gradual move of local notables to Istanbul. The greater families' accession to the center was more spectacular and came about later. Nevertheless, most of the first-generation Tanzimat statesmen were

scions of local notable families who had previously opted to move to the center. Aristocratic Istanbul families, such as the Samipaşazades, were all recent newcomers to Istanbul who had left their Roumelian homelands not long before. As pointed out earlier in the study, such grand names of the Tanzimat as Fuad Pasha, Münif Pasha, Midhat Pasha, and Ahmed Cevdet Pasha can be seen in this light. They were predominantly descendants of small notables and *ulema* in the provinces. One difference between them was the voluntary accession of the early recruits who had a smaller stake, less glory, and less prestige to lose by leaving their homelands; therefore, opportunities and posts in Istanbul were more attractive and adventurous for them. This contrasted with those who were forced to accommodate the new realities as their last chance.

The background of Mustafa Reşid Pasha (not to be confused with the Great (*Koca*) Mustafa Reşid Pasha for whom he was named), the last of the Ottoman foreign ministers and ambassador to Bucharest, Rome, and Vienna, nicely reflects the movement, adaptation, and promotion of a local notable family. The Müftüzades were an *Evlad-ı Fatihan* (Descendants of the Conquerors) family and the holders of the office of the mufti of Ioannina (present-day northwestern Greece). The office belonged to the family, sons replacing fathers. The family's respectability did not originate from the ownership of land, but, not unsurprisingly, the family owned vast lands that enabled them to live prosperously not unlike many other local judges who thrived and enriched themselves thanks to their alliances with the local landowners and tax-farmers⁶⁷ when they moved to Istanbul. Due to the family's religious titles and indirect affiliation with the state, the adaptation to the changing circumstances was not easy. After the end of the practice of hereditary succession to Roumelian mufti offices, the family moved to Istanbul to seek more attractive prospects.⁶⁸ Şakir Mehmed Bey became a protégé of Mustafa Reşid Pasha (hence the name given to his son) and advanced in his career, serving as the head of the State Financial Council (*Meclis-i Maliye*).⁶⁹ Both of his sons graduated from the *Mekteb-i Sultani*. Being thus eligible for admission to the ministry, they began their careers in diplomacy, and both subsequently became ambassadors. Thus, the Müftüzades constitute an example of

the identified pattern in three generations. Like the Müftüzades, many sons of other families with notable backgrounds that had settled in Istanbul entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Some other diplomats displaying this pattern are Mahmud Hamdi Bey, the head of the personnel registers (*Sicil-i Ahval*) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whose origins went back to a dynasty in Nevrekob (present-day Goce Delcev, in southwestern Bulgaria) and Mehmed Nuri Bey, who was an official in the same department in the Ministry and whose origins went back to a local dynasty in Serres (present-day northeastern Greece). The other sons of these dynasties were apparently distributed to the other governmental offices (*kalems*) and constituted a significant portion of the late Ottoman bureaucracy.⁷⁰ The old house of the Köprülü was also represented in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Ahmed Ziya Bey, who was the grandfather of the historian Mehmed Fuad Köprülü and who served as the ambassador to Bucharest between 1885 and 1888.⁷¹ The Keçecizades, after Keçecizade İzzet Molla and his son Fuad Pasha, secured posts for many of their sons in various governmental offices, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as in the case of Reşad Fuad Bey, the grandson of Fuad Pasha, during the late Tanzimat period. The Samipaşazades, a family of religious scholars from the Peloponnese, emerged as another distinguished family after Abdurrahman Sami Pasha had to settle in Istanbul after Greek independence and a sojourn in Egypt in the service of Mehmed Ali.⁷² The mansion of Abdülatif Subhi Pasha, the son of Abdurrahman Sami Pasha's son, became a meeting place of the secluded Tanzimat elite where intellectual, literary, and cultural exchanges took place and networks of patronage developed.⁷³ Two of his sons, Sezai and Necib (and one of his grandsons, Resmi⁷⁴), became diplomats. One of the prominent families of the Tanzimat elite, its members displayed the unity and divergence of the ideological orientations of the sons of the Tanzimat. The family had one prominent Young Ottoman (Ayetullah Bey), one early novelist (Sezai), and one prominent Turkist, first as a Unionist and then as a Kemalist (Hamdullah Suphi). Abdurrahman Sami Pasha was the Minister of Public Education of Mustafa Reşid Pasha in the years between 1857 and 1861. His son Abdülatif Subhi Pasha served as the Minister of Public Education for Abdülhamid

(1876–78). Abdülatif Subhi Pasha's son, Abdurrahman Sami Pasha's grandson, Hamdullah Suphi (Tanrıöver) was the Minister of National Education for Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) (1920–1, 1925).⁷⁵ He was later appointed as ambassador to Bucharest as a *de facto* exile after the abolition of Turkish Hearths and its incorporation into the Republican People's Party (RPP) as People's Houses, over which he presided.⁷⁶ The Söylemezoğlus were another local family of notables from Kiğı (present-day eastern Turkey) that obtained positions for many of its members in governmental offices. These included İbrahim Edhem Pertev and Galip Kemali, who were appointed to posts in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁷⁷

Another example of the shifting and changing loyalties and identities reminiscent of the political trajectory of Şerif Pasha was the flight of Abdürrezzak Bedirxan from the diplomatic service. Beginning his career in the diplomatic service, he served as the third secretary in St. Petersburg. While he was serving in Russia, he became acquainted with many Russians and developed connections. He then abruptly left the diplomatic service and took refuge in Russia in 1891 to pursue pro-Kurdish activities and subsequently moved to London to get in touch with the Armenian dissidents. Later, he was pardoned by the Ottoman state, and after his return to Istanbul (persuaded by his father) he was again appointed to a prestigious post in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1895.⁷⁸ He was again exiled and subsequently executed during World War I due to his involvement in pro-Kurdish activities. Loyalties were not mutually exclusive. Abidin Pasha, one of the foreign ministers of Abdülhamid II, was at the same time a sympathizer of the Albanian League. Moreover, according to a European observer, his Albanian background and instincts caused him to be alarmed by the territorial demands of Greeks during his tenure.⁷⁹ Turhan Pasha, the Ottoman ambassador to St. Petersburg (and ex-ambassador to Rome and Madrid) left the diplomatic service to be the prime minister of the newly founded independent Albania.⁸⁰ In fact, in an investigation in 1890, one Ali Nevzad Bey, a *kaymakam* and an Albanian notable from Ergiri, revealed that Turhan, while serving as the ambassador to Madrid, “worked to achieve the eventual ‘independence’ of Albania” among other Albanian notables although apparently nothing came from this

investigation.⁸¹ Mehmed Konitza, another Ottoman diplomat, came from a prominent provincial Albanian family, and his brother, Faik Konitza, who “was the most influential of all Albanian writers and publishers of the turn of the century”⁸² emigrated to the United States and worked for the nationalist cause. Mehmed Konitza was involved in the Albanian delegation at the Conference of Ambassadors in London in 1913 and served twice as the Albanian foreign minister.⁸³ During the Albanian rebellion, “Corfu became a natural staging ground for [Albanian] guerrilla bands, being Greek territory, near the Albanian border, with a Turkish consul, Mehmet Konitza, of Albanian origin, and sympathetic to the cause.”⁸⁴ Another Albanian diplomat who not only served as ambassador to Sofia and Bucharest but also as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1920 and 1921, Abdüllatif Safa Bey, was a member of the local Albanian dynasty of the Frasheri family and was the nephew of Şemseddin Sami and Naim Frasheri, one of the pioneers of Albanian nationalism.⁸⁵ Albanian identities and Ottoman/imperial identities and loyalties did not necessarily contradict each other.⁸⁶ They may have complemented one another in specific cases, given that the Albanian League was originally founded in 1878 by Albanians who wanted to defend their Albanian lands from Christian ambitions⁸⁷ in reaction to the activities and agitations of the Christian Slavs and Greeks. Notable Druze families contributed to the Ottoman diplomatic establishment, too. Muhammad Arslan, a distant cousin of Shakib Arslan, served in the Hamidian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁸⁸ Osman Adil Bey, the son of Hamdi Bey, the Dönme (Jewish converts of the seventeenth century following Sabbatai Sevi) mayor of Salonika and a member of one of the leading and influential Yakubi Dönme families, served in the legal department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at a time when Dönmes increasingly began to join the imperial governmental offices.⁸⁹ In short, many non-Turkish Muslim recruits of the ministry demonstrated overlapping loyalties and identities. In that regard, the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs was more inclusive than the German Foreign Office, where Catholics were significantly underrepresented and the very few Jews were discriminated against,⁹⁰ and more inclusive than even the British Foreign Office, where non-conformists, Jews, and Scotsmen were “conspicuously absent.”⁹¹

Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that notables from various ethnicities were united in one aspect. The fact that non-Turkish Muslims (not unlike their ethnic Turkish colleagues) came predominantly from high-class origins also arguably demonstrates the limits of inclusion, not only with regard to non-Turks but also with regard to Turks. Their social prominence, aristocratic backgrounds, and respectability (and education in the same imperial colleges for succeeding generations) were the common denominators. Thus, these newcomers to the state machine were welcomed with due respect for their lineages and social respectabilities. Ethnicity may have divided them, but their social backgrounds united them as long as this commonality remained compelling and rewarding.

The assimilation and integration of the peripheral elites is analogous to a marriage, where the center was the groom and the peripheral elites were the bride. Apparently, this was a strategy of the center, partially derived from customary Ottoman practices and partially from the practicalities of the nascent modern state. Nevertheless, Abdülhamid II developed a special ability to contact, co-opt, and incorporate the peripheral elites, a practice that would deteriorate after the end of the Hamidian regime.⁹²

Non-Muslims

Different from the Muslim officials, non-Muslims working in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs tended to be the scions of merchants and financiers, as well as officials. The considerable number of Armenians whose fathers were *sarrafs* is also illustrative. Of the 25 Armenians employed in the ministry as of 1889, six of them were the children of *sarrafs*. Their efforts to get their sons recruited into the civil service reflect the interrelation between the state and its financiers and the efforts of those financiers to integrate their families into the state. In this closed world, the state was the main benefactor, and the clients wanted to get close to it. The high level of recruitment highlights the possible connections and networks between the state and the *sarrafs*. The tendency for the *sarrafs* to have their sons and descendants

recruited into positions within the state makes one think that this intimate connection between the *sarrafs* and the state is one that cannot simply be reduced to material interests.

Two prominent (almost legendary) Armenians of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were both descendants of subcontractors to the palace and indirectly servants of the palace. Gabriel Noradonkyan, the long-time legal counselor of the Ministry, was the son of Krikor Noradonkyan, the chief supplier of bread to the military. Artin Dadyan came from a family of *barutçubaşı* (fireworks supplier to the palace) and his grandfather, Arakel Dadyan, was the last appointed *barutçubaşı* in the reign of Mahmud II. The Manas family, many of whose sons were recruited into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, served as the palace painters from the seventeenth century to the early nineteenth century.⁹³ The traditional Ottoman governmental subcontracting practices favoring Armenian artisan families as hereditary family businesses encouraged their descendants living in the age of the market to reestablish their affiliation with the Ottoman state. This occurred in a changing environment at a time when personalized subcontracting practices were no longer tenable, and when the Ottoman state was undergoing reorganization and eliminating its personalized attributes in favor of a depersonalized modern state. In such circumstances, the new form of incorporation into the state consisted of the recruitment of its members as (prominent) state officials. Ironically, family businesses and special relations between the Armenian *amira* class and the state continued in a modified form. The pre-modern mode of relations was adapted into the modern practices of a bureaucratic state. The mode of relation had changed, but the beneficiaries of the old practices survived. Whereas previously the privileged non-Muslim families were incorporated into the state through indirect and semi-official mechanisms, with the Tanzimat they formally became part of the state. The continuity within change is striking in the case of the adaptation of the relation between "state Armenians" and the state.⁹⁴ The relations between the Greek Phanariot families and the Sublime Porte also became more formalized several decades after the Greek rebellion. Although socio-economic dynamics and conditions formed the backbone of the special relationship between the Sublime

Porte and the *amira* class and Phanariot families, it was formed at a very personal level. One example of the integration and persistence of personal ties with the state and its transformation into adherence to the state was the recruitment of the two sons of Mavroyeni Bey, the personal doctor of Abdülhamid II, into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁹⁵ Although Yanko pursued a humble career, Aleksander's impressive career included the post of ambassador to Vienna.⁹⁶ In short, the world and fortunes of the privileged non-Muslim dignitaries continued to be constructed around the state.

A few non-Muslim dignitaries of the Foreign Ministry were appointed to the Senate in 1908. Excluding Bohor Efendi and Dimitri Mavro Kordota, who had left their diplomatic careers at some point, Manuk Azaryan and Gabriel Noradonkyan were two prominent figures of the Ministry. Manuk Azaryan was an erstwhile undersecretary in 1909,⁹⁷ and Gabriel Noradonkyan was the long-time legal counselor of the Ministry. In the Senate sessions, they emerged as among the most active members of the Senate. It has to be pointed out that Senate discussions were conducted very differently from parliamentary debates. Whereas there were heated debates in parliament, the Senate was a milieu for the dispassionate and calm exchange of views. Although several different opinions were held and expressed by the senators, all these differences of opinion were discussed calmly, as if they were merely technical matters that were bound to be resolved. In other words, all the members appeared to disregard "politics" and acted as (patriotic) bureaucrats rather than politicians, hence continuing the code of conduct of the *Şuray-ı Devlet*. All the members spoke as responsible non-partisan servants of the imperium whose only concern was its advancement.

Whenever non-Muslim senators discussed matters pertaining to religion, they would routinely point to the tolerance shown by the imperium to Christianity and to Christian religious sermons, reiterating their loyalty and reverence.⁹⁸ Azaryan presented the Christian faith as "pertaining to the individual" and as something "which is protected and secured by the Ottoman Empire". He reiterated that Christianity was one of the three legitimate faiths of the populace of the Empire. For him, the Christian faith's political significance

was limited to the conduct of Christian *millets'* communal affairs, and Christians were part of the Ottoman political nation.⁹⁹ Gabriel Noradonkyan also emerged as a dispassionate technical expert providing expertise in legal and administrative issues and instructing the senators. His speeches were always technical and informative. Azaryan also assessed the issues discussed from the point of view of the imperial interests in a calm and dispassionate tone. Apparently, both of these senators came from the Armenian *amira*, born in Istanbul to wealthy and respectable families. Therefore, they were natural candidates for appointment as senators. Nevertheless, it has to be mentioned that they were prominent figures in Armenian communal affairs and, therefore, had representative status. Azaryan assumed the post of secular head of the Armenians and was the head of the general assembly of the Armenian community.¹⁰⁰ He was prominent in the Armenian communal affairs run by the Armenian elites of Istanbul and was an opponent of the rural and East Anatolian Armenian revolutionaries and militants.¹⁰¹

Salih Münir Pasha, after reminding his Western readers that, "par contre, á coté deces passionnés du panhellénisme, de nombreux ministres et hauts fonctionnaires et de notables grecs ottomans surent garder á la Turquie un loyalisme incontestable et hautement dévoué,"¹⁰² enumerated the members of prominent Phanariot families who, as hard-working and loyalist Ottomans, served in the Ottoman bureaucracy. There is a striking contrast between the Greeks and the Armenians serving in the Ministry in terms of their fathers' occupations. Of the 25 Armenians counted in the 1889 annal of the Ministry, only 4 had a father serving in the Ottoman state. In contrast, of the 15 Greeks counted, 6 had a father employed in the civil service. Minor officials in the diplomatic service had Greek fathers who were merchants. These included, for example, Istavriki Kiryagidi, a certain Konstantin, and Azgoridi Nikolaki, whose fathers were Kiryako, Anesti, and Istavriki Ezgoridi from Erdek (on the southern shores of the Marmara Sea), respectively. Although two Greek officials of the Ministry, Mihalaki Akselos and Aristidi Akyadis, had fathers who were officials of relatively more humble origins, in general the Greeks who joined the Ministry had fathers who were officials of prominence

and not minor officials. They belonged to the old Phanariot families¹⁰³ or the protégés of the established old Phanariot families (such as Musurus) who were incorporated into the Ottoman state machine via established Phanariot families. This observation is equally valid for the social origins of prominent Greek bureaucrats and senators as a whole. Logofets, Mavrokordatos, Mususruses, Aristarchis, and Karacas (of originally Romanian origin) filled Ottoman posts, especially diplomatic posts where they could serve the Ottoman state and their family prospects and reputations simultaneously. Whereas the Greeks of more humble origins were minor officials, the scions of Phanariot families were ambassadors, ambassadorial counselors, or holders of other high-ranking offices. As of 1889, from the Phanariot families, two Mavroyani brothers (Aleksandr and Dimitri), two Karateodori brothers (Etienne and Aleksandr) and the father and son Fotiyadis were in the diplomatic service. One Karaca was the Ottoman ambassador to Stockholm and Den Haag. His father was the ex-ambassador to Den Haag, and the son assumed the office as if it were a right of patrimony after 21 years. In that regard, these Phanariot families resembled the local dynasties of Turkish, Kurdish, or Albanian origin incorporated into the centralizing state. The role of marriage in this incorporation was as important among the Phanariot families as it was with the local notable Muslim families. The Phanariot families also intermarried and maintained themselves as a closed community, thus retaining their privileged status.¹⁰⁴

While the Ottoman state gave its due to its loyalist Greek families of repute and dignity, it opened the way for aspiring young Armenians to be promoted in the Ottoman diplomatic service. Apart from the reputable families, the Greeks seemed distant to the Ottoman state. The Greek communities of Anatolia and Macedonia were almost invisible in the Porte. The background of the Armenian officials examined in the annals discloses a different picture. Armenians from different social and economic backgrounds, with or without any connections to the state, were recruited. The mixed and diverse backgrounds of the Armenian officials show that Armenians were comparably more “integrationist” whereas Greeks remained outside of the Ottoman political and administrative edifice. Of the 15 Greeks serving in the ministry,

only one of the officials was born outside Istanbul (Meleka Yanapoulo, the consulate general to Trieste, born in Lesbos) disregarding Phanariot Ianko Karaca, who was born in Berlin. In contrast, Armenian officials serving in the Ministry were born in various peripheral cities such as Aleppo, Edirne, and Izmir. The Armenian modernizing educational infrastructure also spurred an upward mobility for many provincial Armenians to prosper and establish an Armenian intelligentsia residing in Istanbul who could join the Ottoman bureaucracy.¹⁰⁵ Nevertheless, certain Armenian families who were prominent within the Armenian community and had acquired their wealth and prominence due to their connections with the palace and the state, known as the *amira*, supplied a considerable portion of the officials of the ministry, such as Dadyans and Manas, as indicated above.¹⁰⁶ Service to the state was also a hereditary family business. Many Armenian diplomats and officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were the sons of diplomats and Ministry officials. Ohannes Kuyumcuyan, an under-secretary of the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was the son of Bedros Kuyumcuyan, a member of the *Şuray-ı Devlet* and a protégé of Âli Pasha.¹⁰⁷

Differentiating between the lower, middle, and higher echelons of the Ministry provides further insight into the ethnic make-up of officials. As of 1889, of the 71 officials of the middle and lower ranks serving in Istanbul (those who were paid 5,000 gurus or less a year), 54 were Muslims and 17 were non-Muslims. Of the 54 Muslims, 44 were the sons of state officials of different ranks and positions. Of the 17 non-Muslims, 5 were the sons of state officials, whereas 12 were sons of merchants or financiers. They were born predominantly in Istanbul.

An examination of the highest-ranking officials in the Ministry in 1889 as listed in the annal of the Ministry provides similar findings. Of the seven Muslims in posts of major significance, six were sons of state officials. Of the four non-Muslims of equal rank, none were scions of state officials. According to these figures, there is no significant differentiation based on the rank of the posts. The primary distinction was apparently based on the religion of the officials. The social and economic backgrounds of minor and prominent officials

are similar. This statistic is yet another demonstration of the different modes of social production of social (and economic) capital for Muslims and non-Muslims. Whereas the recruited Muslims came from a considerably small, closed group welded around the state, the non-Muslims came from different backgrounds. This demonstrates the diversification of the development of the non-Muslims' social (and economic) capital, which was more productive than that of the Muslims.

One striking finding in the annal of 1889¹⁰⁸ is that the non-Muslim officials were much more likely to be born in Istanbul than non-Muslim officials. Whereas 25 percent of the Muslim officials were born outside Istanbul, this was the case for only 12 percent of non-Muslim officials (excluding non-Muslim officials of foreign origin). The higher percentage of non-Muslims born in Istanbul is yet further evidence of the relationship of the non-Muslims with the state. Although the non-Muslims of the capital tended to join the ranks of Ottomanism, there were fewer propensities for non-Muslims from the provinces to join the Ottoman ranks and be integrated into the system. It may be argued that the politics of Ottomanism was not free from class relations. Here, we observe the development of a class formation based not only on economic opportunities and economic relations, but also on state and geographical affiliations. "The new-fangled official ideology [Ottomanism] fared well in social strata already benefiting from the Pax Ottomana. Greek Phanariots, members of the Armenian *amira* class, and Bulgarian merchants who imported garments from Manchester and sold them in Aleppo were the typical enthusiasts of an ideology that promised to remove the social disabilities afflicting non-Muslims. Wider swaths of the Ottoman population, such as Bulgarian peasants who continued to chafe under their *Gospodars*, or Christian Bosnian and Herzegovinian peasants serving Muslim landowners, derived little benefit from the new ideology."¹⁰⁹ Although recent studies¹¹⁰ have established that Ottomanism was not marginal within the non-Muslim communities of the Ottoman Empire, as assumed by the Turkish and Balkan nationalist historiography, it found support predominantly among the elites of these communities and those who had expectations based on

the well-being of the Ottoman polity. The politics of Ottomanism also enabled these communal elites to dominate their coreligionists. Although these communities had had patriarchal and hierarchical social organizations previously, the new social structures of the nineteenth century enhanced the power of the communal elites thanks to the politics of Ottomanism and new ways of communicating with the Ottoman state. The Ottoman state subcontracted the allegiance of its non-Muslim communities to the communal elites. Thus, we observe an overlapping of interests between the Ottoman state and the communal elites. These imperial non-Muslim Ottomanists were also the leaders and prominent figures of their respective communities. For example, as indicated above, Azaryan, the undersecretary of the Foreign Ministry and senator, assumed the position of chairman of the Armenian *cismani meclis* (Secular Assembly) in 1909 and became the chairman of the Armenian patriarchy's "secular assembly". Apparently, "democratization", enhanced educational opportunities, and vertical mobilization for a larger segment of the communities would not only destroy this patriarchal structure, but also the promises of Ottomanism, which seemed to have a bright future before 1908.¹¹¹

The Greek Revolution of the 1820s was one of the major causes of the reorganization of the Translation Office. Once the Greeks were considered suspect and viewed as untrustworthy, new cadres of Muslim origin had to be trained and recruited.¹¹²

"Greeks" former preponderance as non-Muslims in official and semi-official positions had declined drastically following the Greek Revolution of the 1820s...Greeks had gone into eclipse as officials, so opening the way for the Armenians to become the chief beneficiaries of Tanzimat egalitarianism. Referred to then as the *millet-i sadıka* (faithful people or nation), the Armenians retained this prominence until the last quarter of the century, when nationalist conflict disrupted the Ottoman-Armenian relationship...Had the Empire lasted longer, it is interesting to speculate whether Ottoman Jews could have succeeded Armenians as the leading non-Muslim minority in official service, as the Armenians had supplanted the Greeks...It is interesting that

the last Translator of the Imperial Divan (*Divan-ı Hümayun Tercümanı*), a position that Greeks monopolized for over a century until 1821, was a Jew, Davud Efendi.¹¹³

The fact that in Findley's survey Jews constitute the youngest ethnic group in the Ministry of Ottoman Affairs¹¹⁴ seems to be evidence supportive of this speculation. In his memoirs, Abdülhak Hamid also pointed out the contrast between the prevalence of Armenians, especially in the highest echelons of the Foreign Ministry, with the almost total lack of Greeks in the diplomatic service and tacitly questioned the loyalty of the Greeks: "For example, Midhat Pasha had one Odyan Efendi, Mahmud Nedim Pasha had one Artin Dadyan Efendi, Safvet Pasha had one Serkis Hamamcıyan and Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha had one Noradonkyan Efendi. Why were all the undersecretaries of the prime ministers [foreign ministers] Armenians with the exception of Davut Efendi? Why was there only one Greek beside them? Said Pasha's undersecretary was Sultan Hamid. That was a different case."¹¹⁵

A cursory look at employment within the Ministry would reveal that Armenians constituted its intellectual backbone. The legal and technical offices were filled by them: "The special association of the Armenians with the Foreign Correspondences Office went back to its earlier years, when, at the end of the Crimean War, Sahak Abro, an able Armenian official well regarded by the Tanzimat leadership, became head of the Office and – a familiar motif – made of it something like a preserve for people he found congenial, namely, his coreligionists."¹¹⁶ The stuffing of the Ministry by the Armenians was resented by Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, who put the blame on Âli Pasha. In the beginning of his *Ma'ruzat* he wrote, "Reşid Pasha retained the procedures and traditions of Mahmud II. After he was replaced by Âli Pasha, Armenians were promoted and the Foreign Ministry became filled with Armenians. These Armenians gradually eliminated not only the Muslim clerks, but also those Armenians who were loyal to the state, and replaced them with Armenians sharing their views. Thus, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was swayed by Armenians."¹¹⁷ Those who shared the worries of Ahmed Cevdet Pasha were later relieved, however, because "by the end of the Hamidian period...the Office was losing its predominantly Armenian character."¹¹⁸

A comparison of the officials working in the Ministry as listed in the annals of 1889 and 1902 shows a slight but steady decrease in the employment of Armenians.¹¹⁹ Muslim youngsters who in the 1890s were learning the skills of writing erudite memoranda in French and developing their capabilities had risen to the high-ranking professional positions of the Ministry. Among them, for example, was the undersecretary of the Ministry during the time of the Unionists, Reşad Hikmet Bey.¹²⁰ Another legendary name in the Ministry was İbrahim Hakkı Bey (later pasha and prime minister 1910–11), who was appointed as one of the legal counselors of the Ministry: “The appointment of one so young as the government’s counselor on international law aroused surprise. But the appointment had a larger significance, too. For the Empire had until then employed foreign experts in these positions. The simultaneous appointments of İbrahim Hakkı and Gabriel Noradounghian presented Ottomans with exciting proof that the Empire could produce its own experts for this function.”¹²¹ After İbrahim Hakkı’s long tenure, no Muslim as eminent as İbrahim Hakkı appeared within the ranks of the Ministry. The Armenians continued to hold on to the key positions like the legal counselorship, undersecretariat, and assistantships to these two positions even after the Revolution of 1908 when Turkification manifested itself. Of the 286 officials of the expanded Ministry listed in the yearbook of the Ottoman Empire for 1906, only 40 were non-Muslim, which indicates a dramatic decline over the years.¹²² Ohannes Kuyumcuyan retained his position as the undersecretary until he was replaced by Said Bey in 1912, and Hrand Abro, the son of Sahak Abro, continued to serve as the legal counselor. One British report noted that the replacement of the undersecretariat by a Muslim may enhance the prominence and influence of the undersecretariat. The report assessed Ohannes Kuyumcuyan as “possessed of a good knowledge and some knowledge of affairs” but “as under-secretary...timorous and unenterprising.” As for Said Bey, “as a Moslem he may, perhaps, have a greater share in the counsels of the ministry.”¹²³ Reşad Hikmet, the next “Moslem” undersecretary, will be a man of respect and a person whose opinions and suggestions are considered by the prime minister and foreign minister. Although the new and younger recruits were largely Muslim (with some Jewish), the higher offices continued to be held by non-Muslims (and predominantly

by Armenians). According to the *salname* (annual) in 1910 (1326), of the 46 officials holding the highest posts, 35 were Muslims and 11 were non-Muslims.¹²⁴ This represents a sharp decrease in comparison to 20 years earlier. Two years later, the ratio remained more or less the same. Of the 46 high-ranking officials, 34 were Muslim and 12 were non-Muslim. A sharper decline in the representation of non-Muslims was observed with the advent of World War I. The war was used by the Unionist leadership as an opportunity to Turkify capital, employment, and many other areas.¹²⁵ The Turkification in the Ottoman diplomatic service was also achieved to a considerable degree. According to the 1918 (1334) annals, of the 52 officials in Turkey, only 7 were non-Muslim.¹²⁶ These seven non-Muslims were old-timers such as Aleko Kasap, Hasun Efendi, and Hrand Abro Bey. No non-Muslim was promoted to a prominent position. Only a few professionals were kept in their positions to practice their expertise. The degree of Turkification in the embassies was much more visible. Whereas in 1912 a significant portion of the staff was non-Muslim, in 1918 the staff in all the embassies, with very few exceptions, was Muslim. Not surprisingly, by 1926, no single non-Muslim remained within the Ministry, which was moved to Ankara.¹²⁷

Apprenticeship for the Modern

The Ottoman Foreign Ministry also served as a school for men of various interests. It was a prestigious office, attractive to many caring fathers with good connections who directed their sons to the craft of diplomacy. With the profession of diplomacy, these sons attained satisfactory incomes, not to mention relatively light workloads, which enabled them to pursue their personal interests. Perhaps the most famous diplomat of the Ministry within this category was Abdülhak Hamid, who served in several consulates and embassies, including Paris, Den Haag, and London, and who wrote literary pieces while serving in the embassies (and enjoying London and Paris). Although he was known to succeeding generations as a poet, a gentleman, and a man of letters, he was a full-time diplomat by occupation. Although he was known for his disregard for his professional obligations and duties, he

depicted himself as a diligent and committed diplomat in his memoirs. Another literary figure also worth mentioning, although he only served the Republican Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was Abdülhak Şinasi Hisar. Today he is remembered as a man of letters detached from his surroundings and committed to a desperate nostalgic search for the Ottoman lost time. After long tenures in European firms active in Istanbul, and a stint as a civil servant after 1924 when Regié was taken over by the state, he left his beloved Istanbul and moved to Ankara to serve in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was appointed as a legal adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1931 and as secretary of the Balkan League. He worked on the preparation of the Montreux Protocol and served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs until 1945.¹²⁸ While working in the Foreign Ministry, he published well-known novels and books, such as *Fahim Bey ve Biz* (1941), *Boğaziçi Mehtapları* (1942), and *Çamlıca'daki Eniştemiz* (1944). *Fahim Bey ve Biz* is the story of a young recruit to the Ottoman Foreign Ministry that the story Parodies.

Others began their careers in the Foreign Ministry but left after briefly serving in the diplomatic service. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was seen as a prestigious office in which many sons of high-ranking public servants who turned out to be men of high significance served for a short time (one to three years on average). Predominantly, they served in the Office of Translation to master their French (or in the Office of Correspondences). Short-time officials of the Ministry included Recaizade Mahmut Ekrem, Mizancı Murad, İsmail Kemal, Hüseyin Nazım Pasha, Ferit Kam, Babanzade Ahmed Naim, and Avlonyalı Ferit. Mizancı Murad was recruited to the Translation Office at a time when state officials with proficiency in diplomatic French were few. Thus, the French fluency he had acquired in the Russian gymnasium was incomparably exceptional.¹²⁹ Others were recruited into the Ministry at the beginning of their careers. Avlonyalı Ekrem worked in the Legal Department of the Ministry while studying in the Law Faculty. His was a *de facto* part-time job thanks to the fact that he was the nephew of Avlonyalı Ferid Pasha.¹³⁰

Another short-term official in the Ministry was Halid Ziya (Uşakizade/Uşaklıgil), though he failed to be recruited. This very

much disappointed his father, who was highly desirous of such a career path for his son. Halid Ziya's father had asked two acquaintances, Agop Pasha, the overseer of the Imperial Treasury, and Mustafa Mansurzade, the Minister of Education, to arrange the recruitment of his son into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Young Halid Ziya went to Istanbul from Izmir with the dream of being appointed to the embassy in Paris, the city with which he was fascinated. To his misfortune, just after he visited Mustafa Mansurzade, Mansurzade was deposed. Agop Pasha, the other acquaintance of Halid Ziya's father, advised the young man not to enter the civil service but instead to join his family's business, as entering into trade was more beneficial to the interests of the state than serving it as an official. Agop Pasha acknowledged that the state needed competent officials, but he believed that these officials should be recruited not from the families of prominent tradesmen, but from more humble sections of the society. It was more important for the state to have well-trained people in commerce and industry.¹³¹ The Uşakizades were one of the few prominent Muslim merchant families in Izmir among the many Greek, Jewish, and Levantine merchant families. Needless to say, their position was rather precarious, and they experienced daily conflict in the economic, social, and political spheres. Halid Ziya's short stint in the Directorate of Foreign Affairs at a later time combined his concerns as a member of an Izmir merchant family of Turkish origin and a state official. He and his colleagues in the Directorate displayed the skepticism of state officials towards the non-Muslims of the Ottoman Empire, as well as towards the Europeans. Knowing that the local non-Muslim merchants who held the nationality of a foreign country (especially Greece) were privileged before the law, the officials felt as though they were vanguards in the fight to defend Turkishdom (in the economic war) against the bloodsucking non-Muslims. As a member of an Izmir merchant family, Halid Ziya must have held such concerns much more fervently, as is openly indicated in his memoirs.¹³²

Remembering his failure to be recruited into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Halid Ziya acknowledged that after more than 40 years, he was still thrilled to imagine a career path in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs serving in the embassy in Paris. Nevertheless, he served for a

while in Izmir as the assistant to the foreign affairs director.¹³³ Halid Ziya, the failed diplomat, contrary to the mercantilist advice of Agop Pasha, did not enter the family business but opted to settle in Istanbul as a man of letters (and serving in various governmental offices to make his living). However, Edhem, the elder brother of Halid Ziya, “although graduated from law school in Istanbul,” engaged in the family business in Izmir, disavowing bureaucratic prestige.¹³⁴

The failed diplomat Halid Ziya brought up his two sons, Bülend and Vedad as diplomats. Vedat committed suicide at an early age despite being seen as a promising grand diplomat of the future. Halid’s other son, Bülend Uşaklıgil, served as the ambassador to Paris.¹³⁵ Apparently, diplomatic service continued to be an occupation desired by well-off families, especially due to the prestige it provided.

Halid Ziya’s circle included many young men serving in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The deposition of Mustafa Mansurazade and the illness of his mother may have hindered his prospective career in the diplomatic service, but other youngsters with literary interests were admitted to the Ministry and were known for their literary works rather than their desk work. Besides the “greatest poet”, some personalities who are known to posterity for activities they pursued out of their office were Samipaşazade Sezai, Saffeti Ziya, Reşit Saffet (Atabinen), and Ahmet Hikmet (Müftüoğlu). Serving at the embassy in Paris, the literary capital of the world, was an aspiration most of them shared with young Halid Ziya.¹³⁶ A small circle of friends from similar backgrounds made up a significant portion of the staff of the Ministry, as we can see from the literary recollections of the time. In fact, it was the same pool from which the early men of letters and diplomats were drawn, as established earlier in this study.

These were personalities whose principal lifetime contributions, concerns, and preoccupations were irrelevant to their professional work. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs trained the new early twentieth-century generation, a function it had had during the early Tanzimat period. This is not because the Ministry taught and motivated its staff to be pioneers in various fields. Rather, it had to do with the fact that it was the imperial recruits who had the social and intellectual capital to be entrepreneurs and pioneers in introducing aspects of the modern

West. They opted for a career in diplomacy principally because it provided them with free time, comfortable lives, income, prestige, and connections. Furthermore, brought up in a particular habitus, they knew no alternatives. Their positions and connections also facilitated the pursuit of alternative careers. It is unsurprising to observe that the diplomatic service contributed to pioneering more than other governmental offices did, thanks to its close contacts with the West in general and its cosmopolitan nature. The opportunity they had to be in proximity to the means of communication and exchange of ideas with the West enabled them to import many previously unknown ideas and insights.

The diplomatic service also assisted the emergence and development of Ottoman/Muslim satire. Cemil Cem, the founder of the satirical journal *Cem*, served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was the son of Cemal Pasha, a military doctor, and graduated from law school. After his graduation, he joined the diplomatic service and served in the consulates of Nice and Toulouse before being appointed to more prestigious posts in the embassies to Rome and Paris. He regularly contributed to the satirical journal *Kalem* while serving in posts in Paris and Vienna between 1908 and 1909. He resigned from the Ministry to publish his own satirical journal. He founded *Cem* in 1910. After his resignation from the government, he never assumed any bureaucratic post except for serving briefly as the Director of the School of Fine Arts. Throughout his life, after his resignation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he made his living drawing cartoons and painting, which was unthinkable before 1908.¹³⁷

Tobias Heinzelmann wrote that the first Muslim cartoonists (who emerged only in 1908 after the near monopoly of Armenian cartoonists in the Tanzimat and Hamidian eras) were predominantly ex-officials, civil or military.¹³⁸ Most of them resigned from their posts just after 1908, believing that it was an opportune time for free expression of their opinions.¹³⁹ The Young Turk Revolution in 1908 may be characterized as a milestone that marked the development of a non-official sphere, since officials began working in non-state (private) positions or were self-employed. Ironically, this was a break with the state only in terms of leaving the civil service. On the other hand, it was tantamount

to the extension of the official sphere with regard to the emergence of new classes of free professionals maintaining the views and habitus they had acquired and internalized throughout their education in state service. Thus, they reproduced and extended a particular state-centric worldview, political cosmology, and cultural/intellectual formation. Therefore, we may suggest that the Turkish middle class and free professions emerged and developed in the image (and custodianship) of the state.

Although Armenian and other non-Muslim printing activity and newspapers were commercially profitable by addressing a sizable market, the Turkish language printing, publishing, and newspapers continued to be predominantly non-commercial or promised only modest profits and commercial value. This rendered the Turkish press a part-time voluntary pursuit of civil servants motivated by political concerns and goals, and not a strictly professional occupation. Thus, Turkish printing and publication retained its character as an extension of the official mind. Nevertheless, with slow but gradual commercialization and capitalization, Turkish printing and publishing became more commercial and more emancipated. It was the civil servants who moved from governmental offices to private bureaus, beginning with Agah Efendi, Şinasi, and Namık Kemal in the 1860s, and this trend continued with larger numbers during the Second Constitutional period, in which popular journalism flourished.¹⁴⁰ Hence, it was the original state-funded capital accumulation that financed the emergence and development of the printing and publishing businesses.

Another transfer to the arts from diplomacy was Burhanettin Tepsi, a pioneer of Turkish theater. Coming from a family of diplomats, he was recruited into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after his graduation from the *Mekteb-i Sultani*. In his daily routine at the Ministry, he spent most of his time reading and studying the latest plays of Paris. Thanks to the intervention of the *sadr-ı azam* Avlonyalı Ferit Pasha, he was sent as envoy to Paris, where he had the opportunity to follow theater and buy the scripts of the latest theatrical oeuvres. After a few years in the Ministry, he resigned to pursue an artistic career abroad.¹⁴¹

Sports also benefited from the contributions of the diplomats. The first Turkish soccer team, the Black Stockings, was founded in 1901 by Mehmed Raşid Bey, a career diplomat, along with Fuad Hüsnü Bey, the son of Admiral Hüseyin Hüsnü Pasha. He was elected as the president of the club and assigned as the coach of the first Turkish soccer club in its only match against the local Greek soccer club before the Black Stockings was closed down by the public authorities and Mehmed Raşid was *de facto* exiled to Iran to serve in the embassy to Teheran.¹⁴² Another Ottoman diplomat, Reşid Safvet Atabinen, served as the head of the Turkish Olympic Committee between 1933 and 1936.¹⁴³

The civil service's fostering of the arts and humanities was not limited to its recruitment. Most of the first generation of artists, scientists, journalists, and pioneers in the free professions were scions of bureaucrats. The relatively comfortable material opportunities of these families facilitated the emergence of the first generation of the practitioners of the modern professions.¹⁴⁴ The comparably high incomes of their fathers provided the capital needed for the development of non-productive, or at least non-profit, endeavors. Simply put, for a non-productive sphere which does not produce any surplus to flourish, an already accumulated capital had to be amassed and transferred. For the non-Muslims, this original accumulation of capital was provided by finance, commerce, and industry given that most of the pioneers in the arts were the scions of merchants and financiers (resembling the West European pattern).¹⁴⁵ The remuneration provided by the state in the form of salaries and other pecuniary rewards served the same function for Muslims.

The networks and patronage were important mechanisms for political, literary, and intellectual advancement. Apparently, blood relations and relations based on marriages were also very significant factors in the Tanzimat. A map that demonstrates these relations would be illuminating. Such a map would also display the intertwined character of the families. The Tanzimat elite was not only small and secluded, but also interwoven and integrated. Moreover, the political, intellectual, and literary realms were not distinguishable from each other. They were all intertwined. Thus, it would be interesting to look at

the genealogies of the late Ottoman (and early Republican) men of letters. Being men of letters required free time, a good education, and financial support. Therefore, a typical man of letters in the late Ottoman Empire was (and had to be) a scion of a two-generation family of bureaucrats, whether descended from a high-ranking bureaucrat or a low-ranking civil servant.¹⁴⁶

More interestingly, an analysis of the late Ottoman literature will show that late-Ottoman literature was a closed milieu. It was written by the members of a certain (imagined) community, read by the members of the same (imagined) community, and conveyed the worlds and lives of the members of that community. The characters, the plots, and the themes of these literary works strictly addressed the world of the governing elite. Thus, this literature was unintelligible and incommunicable to the non-members of the governing elite. Given that the readers' market was predominantly restricted to the members of this habitus and to the aspiring youth emulating this habitus, the wider populace was neglected. The themes and inspirations of the literary works reflected the intellectual upbringing and social milieu of the authors.¹⁴⁷

Needless to say, the decisions of young men to seek artistic careers were not well received by their disappointed parents, who had anticipated seeing their sons as high-ranking imperial bureaucrats or officers, and not despicable artists, as we can observe in the memoirs.¹⁴⁸ In contrast to Europeans (and the non-Muslims of the Ottoman Empire and Istanbul), where capital was amassed from commerce and industry, in the Ottoman Empire the state became the main supplier of capital for the emergence of an autonomous sphere for the fine arts and the humanities. This support was not limited to financial resources. The state also provided intellectual capital through the training it provided in the imperial high schools and colleges. These scions of the civil service who opted for the fine arts and literature also received their training in schools established to train civil servants. It is no coincidence that the Military Academy produced pioneers in the fine arts. Technical skills taught as a part of the military and engineering curriculum enabled many youth to encounter the fine arts for the first time. Şeker Ahmed Pasha, Halil Pasha, Hüseyin Zekai Pasha, Hoca

Ali Rıza, and Celal Esad (Arseven) are some examples (as pioneers of Turkish painting) of individuals who had been recruited into the fine arts while in the Military Academy.¹⁴⁹ Şeker Ahmed, who may be regarded as the first Ottoman painter in the Western sense, made his way to study art in Paris thanks to his education in the Military Academy, where he learned painting. He made his career in the military for more than 30 years and was paid as a civil servant, in contrast to the freelance artists who depended on the sales of their work for an income.

In the fine arts, the first generation of artists almost without exception, was composed of the scions of civil servants, and particularly high-ranking ones. Due to the necessity of being trained technically and the necessity of being able to study and observe contemporary works to develop aesthetic tastes, the pioneers of Turkish painting predominantly came from exclusively aristocratic backgrounds, most clearly in the example of Abidin Dino.¹⁵⁰ One exception was the theater, where the bulk of the early performers were recruited from traditional street theater; in other words, it was performed by self-made people of lower class origins.¹⁵¹ A few of the early men of letters came from mediocre origins, in contrast to the pioneers in the fine arts who came predominantly from families with civil service backgrounds. This was because writing did not require expensive and time-consuming training, unlike the costly and extensive training required for the fine arts.

To a noteworthy extent, the late Ottoman pattern resembles that of pre-revolutionary Russia. Dominic Liever writes:

[T]he Russian imperial bureaucratic elite was very much a part of the highly cultured world of pre-revolutionary-educated society. In no field was that more true than in that of music. A.S. Taneev was the first cousin of Serge Taneev and a close friend of P.I. Tchaikovsky. The latter was educated alongside future members of the State Council, at the School of Law, just as N.V. Rimsky-Korsakov and Mussorgsky, along with Serge Rachmaninov, himself a good friend of Nicholas II's brother Mikhail, all came from families of the Russian landowning gentry.¹⁵²

Lieven remarks that the Russian traditional upper class's "contribution in the fields of literature and music was far more impressive than those of any of their European peers."¹⁵³ This is hardly unexpected given the social, economic, and political organization of Russian society and the state. The same observation is equally true for the Ottoman social, political, and economic organization. The early prominent composers and pioneers of modern Turkish music were predominantly scions of families of state officials, such as Cemal Reşit Rey, who was the son of Ahmed Reşid, a governor and minister in the late Ottoman Empire, and Sadeddin Arel, who was the scion of a family of high-ranking ulema including his grandfather, Mehmed Emin Efendi, who served as the *kazasker*. His father was a religious scholar and a member of the committee that prepared the 1876 Constitution.¹⁵⁴ Ulvi Cemal Erkin was the son of Mehmed Cemil, a high-ranking bureaucrat.¹⁵⁵ Adnan Saygun came from a notable provincial family from Nevşehir known as Fişekçizadeler for their family business of producing fireworks. His father was incorporated into the state and modern professionalism by becoming a mathematics teacher and settling in İzmir.¹⁵⁶ The aforementioned Samipaşazade family contributed to the emergence of contemporary music in Turkey. Erdem Buri, a pioneering jazz musician, was a member of the Samipaşazade family.¹⁵⁷

In contrast, we do not observe a similar pattern in countries such as Britain, Germany, and France, where the burgeoning middle classes were the driving force of "modernity" and served as the promoters of newly developing modern arts and literature. It was predominantly the sons of the middle classes who were the pioneers in the arts and sciences. In these countries, the aristocratic elites were pushed into the bureaucratic world and left the artistic and intellectual worlds to the middle classes, who were more dynamic, intellectually vibrant, and adept at the culture of modernity. Therefore, the roles of the elites in these countries were to uphold their symbolic power in non-modernist art and academia, the bastion of conservative elites.¹⁵⁸ The emergence of the free professions in a vibrant public sphere independent of any state authority is in contrast to the Russian and Ottoman/Turkish cases, where the state was the chief initiator, and the harbinger of modernity and the modern professions. Whereas the aristocracy

lived “in the past” in Western Europe, in the Ottoman Empire (and Russia), they contributed to their posterity, especially thanks to their prodigy sons.

With regard to the contribution of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the fine arts, the example of Muhsin Ertuğrul, the pioneer of Turkish cinema, who was the son of Hüseyin Hüsnü Bey, a cashier of the Ministry can be given.¹⁵⁹ Definitely, Nazım Hikmet, whose father, Hikmet Bey, worked in the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs and served as the Ottoman consul in Hamburg, can be regarded as the most famous scion of an Ottoman diplomat.¹⁶⁰ Sedad Hakkı Eldem, one of the foremost twentieth-century Turkish architects, was the grandson of Grand Vizier Edhem İbrahim Paşa, a descendant of a late Ottoman aristocratic family, and the son of İsmail Hakkı Alişan, an official who served in the Ottoman Foreign Ministry from 1891 until his retirement in 1925.¹⁶¹ The Erteğün brothers, the Turkish-American music executives, were the sons of Münir Erteğün, the ambassador of Turkey to the United States between 1934 and 1944, who began his career in the Ottoman diplomatic service just before the Revolution of 1908 and advanced in his career thanks to his erudition and expertise in law.¹⁶² “Thanks to his sons, the Turkish Embassy [in Washington] took the lead in desegregating the capital, hosting black musicians at a time when Marian Anderson was unable to perform at Constitution Hall in Washington because she was black.”¹⁶³

Gendering the theme, the same pattern, not unsurprisingly, is much more evident in the case of the recruitment of females into the modern professions. If providing a good education for sons requires a certain level of prosperity, it is much more the case for the education of daughters. It was almost impossible for a woman of modest upbringing to enter the arts and the modern professions. Thus, early feminists and pioneering women in different fields were all the daughters of civil servants. Moreover, they were predominantly the daughters of high-ranking bureaucrats and men of prominence. A glance at the contributors to the *Hanımlara Mahsus Gazete* (Daily for Women) reveals this. The contributors included the daughters (Fatma Aliye and Emine Semiye) and granddaughter (Zeyneb) of Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, Abdülhak Hamid’s daughter (Hamide), the

granddaughter of Ahmed Vefik Pasha (Fatma Fahrünnisa), and the daughter of Osman Pasha, the head of the Military School (Şair Nigar bint-i Osman).¹⁶⁴

It is also very significant to note that, for a long time, Ottoman Muslim medical doctors were civil (or predominantly military) servants rather than free professionals. Although medical doctors of non-Muslim origins had been practicing their professions independently, in the case of medical doctors of Muslim origins, it was in official positions that the first medical doctors proved and improved themselves. A similar observation is valid for the law and lawyers. Muslims learned the intricacies of modern law in governmental offices. The many legal offices of the state established in the Hamidian era to apply modern Western laws and to regulate the commercial laws prepared Muslim graduates of law faculties to train themselves to be lawyers after gaining experience in these offices. The professors of the first universities (and teachers of the prestigious high schools) of the Ottoman Empire were also predominantly ex-officials and scions of officials. Academic studies and the natural and social sciences were also initiated and advanced by this caste, arguably in line with the epistemological premises held by them. Thus, the free professions of law and medicine and academia developed as apprenticeships with the state.¹⁶⁵

Thus, we can argue that the state became the bedrock for free professionals such as medical doctors,¹⁶⁶ lawyers, engineers, pharmacists, and academicians.¹⁶⁷ It provided not only the primitive accumulation of capital for the development of the free professions among Muslims but also, due to the origins of the pioneers of these professions, it expanded/transmitted the particular cultural, intellectual, and ideological formations welded around it.¹⁶⁸

Merry Marriages

Marriages serve a purpose in the establishment and consolidation of elites and elite cohesion. Before the advent of the love marriage, marriage was an institution of social exchange. Daughters and prospective wives were assets to be employed efficiently.¹⁶⁹ Marriages were to provide financial means, connections, and entitlement for the father

of the bride (the owner of the asset) and the groom (purchaser of the asset), and both parties would try to maximize their profit by making optimal choices.¹⁷⁰ One of the functions of marriage was the integration of the holders of the financial means into the holders of titles of social prestige and political power. This was due to the contradictory political/economic environment of early modern Europe, an age of capitalist accumulation when the economically powerful lacked the means to transfer their financial power into political power while the economically vulnerable held the political means. Marriages also provided the means by which those who wanted to be incorporated into a certain caste could circumvent their lack of a blue-blood lineage. "Marriage was a means of rapid social ascent. Modest gentry or lesser nobles who gained money or power through commerce or office could swing instantaneously to high places through one spectacular marriage or a series of well-plotted ones. Nothing allowed for more rapid blending into the established elite. Old families were consistently ready to marry beneath them for financial advantage."¹⁷¹ Nevertheless, different patterns were observable in different geographies. Whereas in Prussia and England endogamy within the aristocracy was prevalent, "old families in Russia were happy to marry commercial heiresses. In the eighteenth century French dukes and peers seem to have been more likely than lesser nobles to marry the daughters of great financiers."¹⁷²

A prevalent pattern of marriage (especially observable in early modern Europe), in which both parties were satisfied with the conclusion of the marriage, consisted of an arrangement between a son of a socially aspiring and ascending family and a daughter of a socially deteriorating family that was superior in social prestige, but inferior in actual terms. This pattern of marriage was exercised extensively in *ancien régime* France, where the aristocracy tried to slow its decline and the bourgeoisie desired to be ennobled.¹⁷³ Nevertheless, in stable economic, social, and political environments, the routine practice of aristocratic marriage was endogamy, sons of nobles marrying daughters of nobles.

Ottoman upper-class marriage patterns changed from a certain mode of marriage in which the marriage was perceived as simply a

man's taking a woman to maintain his lineage to a mode of marriage in which the bride was an asset providing benefits both for her father and for the groom. In the Classical Ottoman era, a man of prominence was to marry a modest bride or a freed concubine. This pattern avoided the development of aristocratic lineages. This mode of marriage was also compatible with the structuring of the Ottoman polity as a household written large in which the patriarch of the household was the sole authority and the households remained intact as long as allegiance was owed to a single uncontested authority. Not unexpectedly, intimate life was the sphere where the influence of Westernization and modernization had a very slow and gradual impact and faced a resilient opposition.¹⁷⁴ Old marriage patterns, which persisted for a generation after the Tanzimat, were gradually replaced by a new marriage pattern with ebbs and flows in which marriages were arranged between the scions of two equal or compatible families.¹⁷⁵ The marriage connections of Abdülhak Molla's family and Ahmed Tevfik's daughters' marriages,¹⁷⁶ which will be discussed below, are just two prominent examples of this trend. Curiously, although Abdülhak Molla married a woman of respectable descent, his son, Hayrullah Efendi, married a concubine. Likewise, Abdülatif Subhi Pasha was married to women of slave origins besides his numerous concubines.¹⁷⁷ The liberal and constitutionalist Midhat Pasha's purchasing of a concubine (with whom he had three children) while serving in Baghdad was an embarrassment for him, which he tried to conceal from his wife in Istanbul, who was the daughter of a judge.¹⁷⁸ Evidently, this was a remnant of the old cultural norms and a display of the different levels of "Westernization" in the public and private domains for the Ottoman reformist elite. Nevertheless, these were the last (and partially exceptional) examples in the new era of the Tanzimat. Tanzimat grandees such as Ahmed Midhat Efendi, Abdülhak Hamid, and İbrahim Hakkı were among the last sons born to Circassian concubines. By this time, concubinage was seen by the new generation as a barbaric anachronism to be eliminated and replaced by affectionate marriage.¹⁷⁹ Already by the beginning of the Tanzimat era, it was rumored that Mustafa Reşid Pasha dubbed polygamy and concubinage as a "cancer", a practice particularly embarrassing when socializing with the Western diplomats in Pera.¹⁸⁰

As the structures of political legitimacy and the organization of the political order were transformed, marriage patterns changed¹⁸¹ along the same lines, and a new domestic ideal developed.¹⁸² The new mode of marriage was a derivation of the (European) aristocratic endogamous marriage practice in which marriages were arranged between two equal parties, or at least between two parties of same origin.¹⁸³ The nineteenth-century European bourgeoisification of marriage partially influenced the transformation of nineteenth-century Ottoman marriage patterns as well.¹⁸⁴ Third-generation Tanzimat members were influenced by the idea of bourgeois affectionate marriage (albeit limited to the sons of the bureaucratic elite) via French novels (and very early twentieth-century Ottoman novels such as *Aşk-ı Memnu* and *Eylül*) and acculturation. In practice, however, marriage patterns continued to replicate those of the earlier generation in a social milieu in which no affectionate marriage could take place. At the same time, the anachronistic imperial institution of the harem was an embarrassment to the Ottoman aristocratic elite,¹⁸⁵ which in time led to the dissolution of the Hamidian harem by the Young Turks.¹⁸⁶

During the Tanzimat, we observe two general trends of marriage: intermarriages within the same social stratum and marriages between the scions of two different, but converging social strata, e.g., provincial merchants and dynasties with aristocrats in Istanbul. In the marriages of the scions of the prominent families of Istanbul, an example of the prevalence of this inter-marriage comes from the Abdülhak Molla family. Abdülhak Molla, the chief doctor of the palace, was married to the daughter of Naci Efendi, the head of the Translation Office, and, hence, the aunt of Ahmed Vefik Pasha. Nasuhi Bey, the grandson of Abdülhak Molla, the son of Hayrullah Efendi, and the brother of Abdülhak Hamid, was married to the daughter of Rıza Pasha, the chief of staff. Mührünnisa Hanım, the sister of Nasuhi, was married to the son of Fuad Pasha. Therefore, Abdülhak Hamid, a descendant of the family, had the chance to work with many of his relatives in the diplomatic service. While he was the ambassador to Den Haag, his second secretary was one of his relatives by marriage, Mehmed Ali Bey.¹⁸⁷ Salih Münir Pasha's son Celil married Samiye, the daughter of Abdülatif Suphi Pasha. Salih Münir Pasha was also related by marriage to grand families, such as the

family of Ibrahim Edhem Pasha and the Menemencioğlus. These marriages reestablished and reproduced the coherence and convergence of the closed circle of the Tanzimat elite. In short, and with slight nuances, Tanzimat marriages were exclusively inter-elite marriages.

Some diplomats, such as Ahmed Tevfik Pasha¹⁸⁸ and Mustafa Reşid Pasha,¹⁸⁹ arranged royal marriages for their sons. Necib Bey, while he was a scribe in the embassy in Paris, was married to Mediha Sultan, the daughter of Abdülmecid. Necib Bey became Necib Pasha through this marriage. This marriage was probably arranged due to the prestige of Abdurrahman Sami Pasha, the father of Necib (and Sezai), a highly respectable and imposing personality during the Tanzimat period, who developed an extensive patronage network.¹⁹⁰ After the sudden and unexpected death of Necib at an early age, Mediha Sultan married a colleague of Necip's, Ferid, then a scribe in the embassy in London.¹⁹¹ Apparently, this marriage enabled young Ferid to be appointed to the Senate after 1908 (and to be appointed as prime minister during the British occupation in Istanbul, which gained him notoriety) and facilitated his career. Some diplomats married women from non-Ottoman royal families such as Şerif Pasha, who married a member of the Egyptian dynasty.¹⁹² Houlusi Foad became part of the Egyptian dynasty by marrying the granddaughter of Ismail Pasha.¹⁹³ Intra-marriages between members of the diplomatic service were also prevalent. Mustafa Reşid Pasha arranged the marriage of his son Celal to the daughter of Sadık Rifat Pasha, the ambassador to Vienna and shortly the Minister of Foreign Affairs. A marriage was arranged between Sadullah Pasha's granddaughter (Asaf Sadullah's daughter) and Ahmed Tevfik Pasha's son.¹⁹⁴ Abdülhak Hamid arranged the marriage of his daughter to Emin Bey, who served in the Ministry as ambassador to Teheran (a post once filled by Hayrullah Efendi) and Director of Political Affairs.¹⁹⁵ Naum Paşa, the Ottoman ambassador to Paris, was married to the daughter of Franko Paşa, an undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs whose sons were also serving in the Ottoman diplomatic service.¹⁹⁶ Esat Cemal (Paker), whose memoir is extensively utilized in this study, was married to Osman Hamdi Bey's daughter and thus entered a family of diplomats.¹⁹⁷

This pattern enabled the unification of a single state aristocratic grouping that dominated the high-ranking bureaucratic positions and had the financial means to maintain a relatively prosperous lifestyle.

Another area in which the diplomatic service pioneered was marriage to European women. By the early twentieth century, it became so common that in 1914, after his tour of Europe where he met with many Ottoman diplomats, Kazım Karabekir criticized this habit harshly. In his opinion, it not only posed security threats for the Ottoman Empire but was also tantamount to “unjustly and to the detriment of the nation, declaring to the world that there are no Turkish girls who can accompany our foreign ministers and ambassadors.”¹⁹⁸ The first ambassador to marry a European was İbrahim Haydar Bey, the ambassador to Vienna. In 1867, he married a Hungarian woman.¹⁹⁹ Nevertheless, Ottoman ambassadors and diplomats could not arrange marriages to the daughters of European aristocrats. Ahmed Tefvik Pasha, a member of the Crimean khanate family, married the daughter of a Swiss policeman,²⁰⁰ whom he had met in Athens while she was working as a governess. She was looked down upon within diplomatic circles because of her lower class origins. Likewise, Mustafa Reşid Pasha married an Italian woman of low origins, which cost him the ambassadorship to London because the British government did not want to include a European woman of low origins in the royal protocol. Mustafa Asım Bey, ambassador to Sofia and Teheran and foreign minister for a short time, was married to a Viennese woman.²⁰¹ Asaf Sadullah, son of Sadullah Pasha and himself also a diplomat, was married to a German woman. Ahmed Şakir Pasha’s second wife was Russian. Ottoman diplomats also followed the European aristocratic fad of taking American brides, popular also among European diplomats.²⁰² Celal Münif’s first wife was American.²⁰³ The wife of Yusuf Ziya Pasha was “born in New Orleans and bred in New York.”²⁰⁴ Marrying European women was not limited to the higher echelons of the diplomatic service. İbrahim Edhem, who remained a low-ranking official in the headquarters of the ministry in Istanbul and in the foreign legations of the Ottoman Empire, married a Frenchwoman.²⁰⁵ Other diplomats married women of better origins. For example, Mehmed Rifat Pasha married the daughter of a Russian general who converted to Islam after the marriage.²⁰⁶

In contrast to his Muslim colleagues, Musurus Pasha was successful in marrying off his daughter to the general secretary of the Italian embassy in London. The son-in-law of Musurus Pasha would later be appointed to Istanbul.²⁰⁷ Malkom Khan, one-time Persian ambassador to Istanbul and London, an Armenian convert to Islam, and the pioneer of Persian reforms, married a woman from the illustrious Dadyan family while he was serving in Istanbul.²⁰⁸

Marriage was a pivotal institution for nineteenth-century European aristocratic culture, as well as for diplomatic establishments: "In the opinion of the (German) Foreign Office... (T)he women, like the men, were to have grace, tact and polish; they should be German-born and propertied. Aristocratic lineage was desirable but not essential provided...[the] wife had a 'patrician or cosmopolitan background and natural good manners, in addition to a lot of money.' "²⁰⁹ The Ottoman Foreign Ministry resembled the house of Habsburg in that it enjoyed the fruits of favorable marriages. Although it is beyond the capabilities of the author to list comprehensively the marriage patterns of the diplomats, the anecdotal evidence presented above suggests three conclusions. Firstly, the diplomats entered into auspicious marriages and, thus, secured good connections. Secondly, intra-marriage within the group (in-marriage) was prevalent. Thirdly, diplomacy turned into a family profession in which succeeding generations were recruited into the diplomatic service. Thus, marriages reproduced the ethos and culture of the exclusive world of the state elite. The genealogical continuity of the cadres of the ministry was partially thanks to the marriage patterns.

Fortunate Sons

Osman Hamdi's father, Ibrahim Edhem, served as ambassador to Berlin in 1879 and ambassador to Vienna between 1879 and 1882. Originally a Greek from Chios, he was captured, enslaved, and sold to Hüsrev Pasha, who sent him to Paris to study mining engineering. His skills led him to appointments to various posts from the military to diplomacy, in addition to his later political appointments as Grand Vizier, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Minister of the Interior. He

raised sons who rose to prominence. Osman Hamdi's "brothers served the state in various capacities...While his brother Mustafa became a customs agent and his brother Galip Ibrahim became the first Ottoman numismatist, his youngest brother, Halil (Edhem), followed in Osman Hamdi's footsteps as assistant director of the museum after the latter's death in 1910. He later played a significant role in the transition of Ottoman cultural institutions in the Turkish Republic and served as a member of parliament from 1923 until his death in 1935."²¹⁰ Osman Hamdi, who probably spoke French at home in his childhood, developed his interest in the arts thanks to the high-level administrative posts of his father. Cosmopolitanism, fluency in French, encounters with "Western culture", and more importantly, connections and financial means were bestowed by the mechanisms of officialdom. Osman Hamdi's refinement and elegance is a perfect example of the creation of a self-made and self-styled aristocracy in two generations.

Osman Hamdi's entry into the world of the arts was possible within this environment and set of circumstances. He could renounce the fine career the bureaucracy offered him. He was sent to Paris to study law: "However, he soon decided to pursue his interest in painting instead, left the law program, and trained under the French Orientalist painters Jean-Léon Gérôme and Gustave Boulenger." He was called back to Istanbul by his father, who was concerned by his son's turning into a vagabond in Paris.²¹¹ When Osman Hamdi returned to Istanbul from Paris, where he had a fanciful and uncommon life, he was posted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he was appointed to several positions. He also served for one year in Baghdad in the retinue of Governor Midhad Pasha. It seems it was not yet acceptable for a scion of a high-ranking Ottoman bureaucrat to live completely out of the world and shelter of the government. Furthermore, there was as yet no social sphere in which a Muslim could make such a living. Thus, Osman Hamdi pursued the career of a typical official. In 1881, he was appointed as the director of the Imperial Museum. He became the director of the Academy of Fine Arts and thus combined his interests and his responsibilities to the public and to the reputation of the family.²¹² Arguably, the first artists perceived their art and profession as being in line with their

political loyalty to the state (and the nation embodied within the state). The process whereby artists began questioning their innate loyalty to the state and became (at least moderate and loyalist) dissenters began only after the 1908 Revolution. Even after that, the artists and men of letters never achieved the level of radicalism and dissent of their European and Russian colleagues, and the Kemalist ideology in the Republic constituted the thrust of the culture and ethos of the Turkish artistic community.

This attitude was retained due to the fact that serving in state service was inherited from the family. It was not perceived as a career or a profession. It was rather the *habitus* in which fortunate sons felt comfortable and which they did not easily or voluntarily leave. Many sons followed in their fathers' footsteps. Mehmed Cemil, the son of Mustafa Reşid Pasha, served as the ambassador to Paris three different times over a three-year period and was appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1872. Two sons of Mustafa Reşid, Mehmed Cemil and Ali Galip, served as Minister of Foreign Affairs for very brief periods. Mustafa Reşid Pasha's two grandsons, Mehmed Tevfik and Mustafa Reşid "Beyefendi", also served in the Hamidian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Istanbul. Fuad Pasha's son, İzzet Fuad Pasha, was the ambassador to Madrid between 1900 and 1908. Celal Münif, son of Münif Pasha, one of the most prominent intellectuals and statesmen of the Tanzimat period, served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin and in Teheran, and in the Office of Translation in his youth,²¹³ and became a career diplomat serving in various posts in Ottoman embassies abroad before being appointed as the Director of Protocol of the Republican Foreign Ministry in 1924.²¹⁴ Ambassador Arifi Pasha's son, Mustafa Şekip Bey, was the ambassador to Stockholm. Given that Arifi Pasha's father, Şekip Pasha, was also an ambassador and later Minister of Foreign Affairs, three generations of the family worked in the Ministry. Individuals in two different generations held the position of Foreign Minister. Four Franko brothers, Yusuf, Nasri, Fethi, and Feyzi, were sons of the former governor of Lebanon, Franko Pasha, and served in the Ministry simultaneously. Mustafa Reşid and Yusuf Ziya, Agah Efendi and Şakir Pasha, and Ahmed Cevad and Şakir were sets of brothers who both served as ambassadors.²¹⁵

As pointed out previously, genealogical continuity was particularly prevalent among non-Muslim officials. Kostaki and Stefanaki were father and son ambassadors to London. The embassy to London operated practically as the private property of the Musurus family until 1874, when all the officials in the embassy were relatives of Kostaki Musurus Pasha. The staff included the ambassador Kostaki Musurus Pasha, his brother, his two sons, and his son-in-law.²¹⁶ The military attaché appointed in 1874 was the first non-Musurus recruitment in the embassy. The state of affairs at the London embassy, the privileges held by Musurus Pasha, and the appointment of his son, Stefanaki, can be seen as artifacts of the pre-modern practice of giving posts as family possessions. Artin Dadyan, the long-time secretary-general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, recruited his son, Diran, into the Ministry. Diran worked as an administrative official in the Ministry in Istanbul.²¹⁷ Artin Dadyan's brother, Arakil, also briefly served as translator in the embassy in Paris.²¹⁸ Hrant Noradonkian, whose brother Gabriel Noradonkian was the gray eminence of the Ministry, also served in the Ministry as assistant counselor in the Legal Council.²¹⁹ Hirant, the son of Sahak Abro, who was also the long-time Head of the Office of Foreign Correspondence, became a preeminent legal expert in the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs.²²⁰ One of Naum Pasha's sons also entered the Ottoman diplomatic service.²²¹ Naum Pasha's two cousins were also Ottoman diplomats.²²² Said Bey, the son of Jewish Davud Efendi, assumed the post of chief translator of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and served in that capacity for a long time.²²³ Ahmet Rüstem, the Ottoman ambassador to Washington, was the son of the Polish aristocrat, émigré, and convert, (Nihad) Bilinski, who also served in the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs.²²⁴

Asaf Sadullah, Sadullah Pasha's son, worked as the secretary in the Berlin embassy while his father was the ambassador to Berlin. Nusret Sadullah, another son of Sadullah Pasha, who became the ambassador to Brussels and Den Haag, appears to be an exception to the absence of European-style "monarchism" within the Ottoman imperial elite. He resigned from the diplomatic service after the abolition of the sultanate due to his loyalty to the Ottoman dynasty and went into self-exile in Nice, where the members of the Ottoman dynasty settled.²²⁵

Nevertheless, his monarchism was short-lived as he returned to the diplomatic service and even became an RPP deputy in 1927.²²⁶ Abdülhak Hüseyin, the son of Abdülhak Hamid, began his diplomatic career in Den Haag and London, working with his father. He died while he was the charge d'affaires in Washington during World War I, replacing Ambassador Ahmed Rüstem. Mehmed Su'ad, who served in the offices of the Legal Councilor and the Translation Office, was the son of Asım Pasha, a Minister of Foreign Affairs for Abdülhamid II, although Asım Pasha was not a career diplomat.²²⁷

This pattern was not unique to the Ottoman case. On the contrary, the Ottomans reproduced the European pattern. Sons working with their fathers (or nephews working with their uncles) was not unique to the Ottoman diplomatic service. In Germany, "(t)wo ambassadors to France, Prince Chlodwig zu Hohenloe-Schillingfürst and Baron Willhelm von Schoen, were joined in Paris by their sons. In Madrid, Radowitz sent for his son, while young Count Hatzfeldt-Wildenburg served under his father at the Court of St. James...When Count Karl von Pückler, a junior army officer, desired to become a diplomat, he asked his uncle, Prince Heinrich VII Reuss, the ambassador to Austria-Hungary, to request that he be assigned to the embassy."²²⁸ In France, "(t)he profession could at one time have been considered a kind of caste...an aristocracy that was permitted to elect its own members...There have been in France, both before and since the Revolution, dynasties of diplomats...There have also been instances of brothers following parallel diplomatic careers."²²⁹ In Austria-Hungary, "employment in the foreign service was almost a family affair. Indeed, once a new family had gained a foothold in the Foreign Ministry it was almost a rule that the sons, even the grandsons, remained in this profession."²³⁰ In the Netherlands, offices were "handed down from father to son, uncle to nephew."²³¹ In Russia, "(p)laces in the diplomatic corps were generally reserved for men born into the gentry. In fact, a diplomatic career was often passed down through the family."²³² In short, genealogical continuity was a European-wide phenomenon in the nineteenth century: "These [Foreign Office] staffs were small and their members personally known to their chiefs. Gradually, positions came to be handed down from generation to generation. The

same family names appeared – fathers and sons, brothers, uncles and nephews. There were many ‘closed shops.’ Successive generations of civil servants were often related to one another through descent or marriage.”²³³ The genealogical continuity was a corollary of the aristocratic quality of the diplomatic services. Though many “diplomatic dynasties” lacked impressive aristocratic credentials, they became *de facto* magnate families or nobles of the robe in the nineteenth-century style by associating themselves with the most prestigious offices of the state and became families of prominence. This was especially the case in France, where some dynastic families of the foreign office were of middle-class origin. State service was an elite-processing mechanism converting aristocracies of lineage to state aristocracies and creating new aristocratic lineages.

The Legacy of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry

Needless to say, genealogical continuity survived the Empire. Salih Münir Pasha’s nephew, Melih Esenbel, served as Turkey’s long-time ambassador to Washington, ambassador to Tokyo, the general secretary of the Ministry, and briefly Minister of Foreign Affairs. Diplomacy was a family business on Melih Esenbel’s father’s side, as well. His maternal grandfather, Şemseddin Ziya, a descendant of the Ramazanoğulları, was another Hamidian diplomat. Melih Esenbel was the product of an intra-marriage within the diplomatic service given that there were diplomats on both sides of the family.

Selim Sarper, Turkey’s ambassador to Rome and Moscow, secretary-general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Foreign Minister between 1960 and 1962, was the nephew of Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu. Yüksel Söylemez, the son of a nephew of Galip Kemali was another diplomat raised in the family. Hüsrev Gerede, military officer-turned-diplomat during the Republic, who served in the key post of ambassador to Berlin during World War II, was the son-in-law of Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu. However, the diplomatic genealogy of the family goes back to Kabuli Pasha, the father of Galip Kemali, who served as ambassador to Vienna. Seyfullah Esin, a descendant of both Sadullah Pasha and Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu, served as the Turkish

ambassador to Bonn, Cairo, and the United States. Seyfullah Esin was married to Emel Esin, who was the daughter of Ahmed Ferit Tek, a Young Turk who became a career diplomat in the Republic, serving as ambassador to London, Warsaw, and Tokyo.

We meet the Uşaklıgil family again in the marriage of Cevat Açıkalın, the influential secretary-general of the Minister of Foreign Affairs²³⁴ and son of Ali Cevad, the imperial secretary to Abdülhamid II, to Mevhibe Uşaklıgil, the sister of Latife, the niece of Halid Ziya, and the aunt of Bülend Uşaklıgil. Cevad Ezine, the late Ottoman and early Republican ambassador and a descendant of a prominent family from Ezine (a town in the Çanakkale province of modern Turkey) married the daughter of the illustrious Halil Edhem Bey and became the son-in-law of an aristocratic Istanbul Ottoman family. These two marriages were examples of the incorporation of two diverse elites. Hulusi Fuad Tugay, the son of Deli Fuad Pasha who himself served as an ambassador of Turkey, married the granddaughter of Khedive Ismail Pasha and daughter of Mahmud Muhtar Pasha, the Ottoman military commander and the ambassador to Berlin between 1913 and 1915.²³⁵ This marriage was yet another one which connected diverse elites. The Republican cadres of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued to be the scions of late Ottoman civil servants. Prominent figures of the Republican diplomatic service such as Fatin Rüşdü Zorlu, his brother Rıfki Rüşdü Zorlu, Muharrem Nuri Birgi, and many other prominent ambassadors, such as Nureddin Vergin, İsmail Erez, Pertev Subaşı, and Nüzhet Kandemir were descendants of Ottoman pashas.²³⁶ Hasan Esat Işık, the ambassador to Paris and Moscow, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of Defense, was the son of Mehmed Esat (Işık), one of the pioneering medical (military) doctors and medical bureaucrats of the Ottoman Empire. Necdet Kent was the nephew of Ahmet Muhtar (Mollaoglu).²³⁷ Among others, Süreyya Anderiman, the Republican ambassador to Tokyo, was the son of Mehmed Süreyya Bey,²³⁸ who began his diplomatic career in 1892 and served as Ottoman consul and ambassadorial secretary in various posts throughout the Hamidian era before becoming the Director of Protocol in the Republican Ministry in 1931. Mustafa Reşid Paşa's son, Basri Reşid Danişment, was also a Republican ambassador.

Sons of Ottoman figures as diverse as Tunalı Hilmi (İnsan Tunalı), Ebubekir Hazım (Tepeyran) (Celal Hazım Tepeyran), Ali Kemal (Zeki Kuneralp), Bursalı Mehmed Tahir Bey (Bedri Tahir Şaman), Ali Fuat (Türkgeldi) (Âli Türkgeldi) and the grandsons of Kamil Pasha (Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, Hilmi Kamil Bayur), Said Pasha (Hasan İstinyeli), Midhat Pasha (Şefik Fenmen), Tunuslu Hayreddin Paşa, Fuad Paşa (Şevket Fuad Keçeci being the grandson of both Fuad Paşa and Tunuslu Hayreddin Paşa), Halil Rıfat Pasha (Fuad Simavi²³⁹), İbrahim Edhem Pasha (Sadi Eldem),²⁴⁰ and Ali Kemal (Selim Kuneralp, son of Zeki Kuneralp) served as Republican diplomats and ambassadors.²⁴¹ Hence, at least seven Ottoman grand viziers had grandsons who served in the Republican Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In short, the degree of continuity of the cadres of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in terms of blood lineages from the Empire to the Republic is enormous. It has been argued previously that the critical threshold of the founding of Turkish modernity and the modern state was passed by the Tanzimat and Hamidian elite, and hence it is natural to observe continuity from the Hamidian aristocratic culture to the Republican culture with certain breaks and alterations. This continuity can be established not only in ideological terms, but also in a genealogical sense.

The imagined state elite persisted in holding the major positions within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The idea of the state for the members of this elite was not an external reality that belonged to the political realm. On the contrary, the state was part of their daily life. The state was a concrete and intimate reality. It was not sacred and transcendental,²⁴² it was very real and familiar. It was their own. The state was internalized, familiarized, and personalized. The state was not something to which they should be servile, but the pivotal symbol of their sense of belonging and the safe harbor in which they felt secure. It was the polar star in their mental cosmology which made them confident in the eternity of the universe and which provided ontological security.²⁴³ From this cultural intimacy, they also invented a national imagination which linked the state, the nation, and themselves and attributed to the nation certain imagined “national characteristics” they themselves displayed

in their habitus. In this perception, the nation was defined in reference to the state, which was perceived within a cultural prism. The “nation” was imagined in line with the habitus, cultural formations, and premises of this state elite. Within this conjecture, the Turkish nation was imagined as “secular” and “modern” as opposed to “backward” and “pious”.

The state became more “sacred” and “transcendental” in the twentieth century as the bureaucracy became more formalized, depersonalized, and lacking in familiarity. Thus, the state lost its humane touch and its immediate proximity. The state also lost its embedded nature within the culture of a certain class formation. It lost its very personalized aspects and its emotional contact with its constituency. It ceased to be flesh and blood, although the very nineteenth-century perception of the state persisted in the minds of the state elite who exported this perception of the state to the masses.²⁴⁴ Thus, a certain imagery was disseminated. It was no coincidence that the Republican Ministry of Foreign Affairs was one of the institutions that was able to partially evade formalization and anonymity. It could keep its *corps d'esprit*, retain the “closed shop” nature of the nineteenth-century (Ottoman) bureaucratic habitus, and be a harbinger of a (state-centric) distinct nationalism and national imagination embedded within a certain culturalization.

CHAPTER 4

THE ROUTINE OF THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE AND ITS ENCOUNTERS ABROAD

Defending the Hamidian Autocracy Abroad

A habitual assumption regarding the cadres of the Foreign Ministry is that they are primarily interested in “international” affairs, unlike the other bureaucratic offices. However, only a small percentage of the office work of the Foreign Ministry relates to the conduct of foreign relations. This is true for all foreign ministries, but it was much more so regarding the Ottoman Foreign Ministry. The chief tasks of the Ottoman Ministry were the supervision of the activities of Ottoman nationals and especially the activities of the dissidents and non-Muslims abroad, and the tracking of the local press’s commentaries regarding the Ottoman Empire and the sultan. These activities were in addition to many technical matters, such as the pursuit of the commercial and legal rights of Ottoman subjects abroad. In short, in an age of internationalization, or in Hobsbawm’s “Age of Empire”, foreign policy was not a matter of technicality in isolation from domestic politics and political struggles. The Ottoman representatives were not mere technicians, but civil servants, whose duties and policies were shaped by the domestic concerns of the Hamidian regime. A separation of foreign

policy and internal policy was untenable. However, the diplomatic service was not a garrison of the Hamidian regime, either. In some ways, the Ottoman diplomats were at the very center of the Hamidian political structures, given their representation of the Hamidian establishment abroad. Yet, given their closeness to the international world, they constituted a small, privileged group relatively freed from the restraints of the Hamidian establishment. This situation also rendered them distant from the networks and powerhouses in Istanbul. The themes and content of ambassadorial correspondences attest to the changing mood in the Hamidian era after the disillusionment with the failure of Tanzimat reformism.

Different embassies specialized in the pursuit of different national dissident groups. For example, the correspondence of the embassy to Washington abounds with documentation of the activities of the Armenians, whether dissidents or not. Not only did the bulk of the diplomatic relations between the Ottoman Empire and United States consist of the status of missionary schools and the problems deriving from the legal problems faced by Armenians in obtaining American citizenship, but the Ottoman embassy to Washington's specific task was the monitoring of Armenian activities (rallies, demonstrations, publications, organizational works) in the United States. Although the tracking of Armenians residing in the United States had been a regular activity of the embassy in Washington prior to 1890, with the outbreak of the Armenian insurgencies, it became the principal preoccupation of the embassy. Prior to 1890, dispatches written by the embassy remained infrequent. These dispatches were written down not for urgent matters, but as regular dispatches sent every two weeks or so. With the explosion of the Armenian insurgency, however, the Washington embassy's workload increased drastically.

These dispatches included the regular supervision of the Armenian press in the United States¹ with a specific focus on the New York-based *Haik*,² a close surveillance of the American press and their commentaries on Armenian events, the writing of disclaimers to the relevant newspapers, and the lobbying of congressmen with pamphlets, etc. In 1896, the *tekzipler* (disclaimers) were gathered and published as a separate pamphlet to be distributed to congressmen.³ In 1890,

the embassy submitted a comprehensive report, an overview of the Armenian press in the United States.⁴ It was recommended in 1896 that some American newspapers, such as the *New York Herald*⁵ and the *Washington Post*,⁶ be denied entry to the Ottoman Empire due to insulting photographs they published regarding the Armenian events. The embassy also regretted that the unfounded reports relayed by the Armenian press had been publicized by American newspapers.⁷ As counter-propaganda, texts written by the *Matbuat-ı Ecnebiye Kalemi* (Office of Foreign Press) were published in the American media.⁸

Ahmed (Alfred) Rüstem Bey, the son of a Polish aristocrat who immigrated to the Ottoman Empire, was appointed as the ambassador in Washington in 1914. He had been working in the Washington embassy in various posts previously and was the Turkish diplomat who did the most to combat the negative propaganda. He actively pursued a counter-propaganda policy by publishing articles in prominent American newspapers and making statements to the American newspapers. His Polish origins and European erudition should have facilitated his communication with Westerners and allowed his skills to impress and convince them.⁹ Reports also summarized articles printed in prominent newspapers. For example, the embassy noted in 1895 that the newspaper *Sun* had argued that the Armenians were victorious vis-à-vis the Ottoman state with regard to their improved relations with the European powers.¹⁰ The embassy also dispatched the publications of Armenian newspapers to Istanbul. As an example of the dangerous deeds of the Armenian press based in New York and in other cities, the embassy noted that the Armenian press in the United States had requested that Britain be involved in Armenian affairs in order to protect the rights and interests of the Armenian people.¹¹

The principal concern of the Ottoman Empire in its diplomatic relations with the United States of America was Armenian affairs; the predominant preoccupation in the diplomatic correspondence of the USA with the Ottoman Empire was the same, as can be gathered from the yearbooks *Foreign Relations of the United States*. It had been estimated that "officers in the Constantinople legation spent nine-tenth of their time toiling over missionary issues."¹² The number of documents regarding diplomatic relations with "Turkey" included in the

yearbooks is very small vis-à-vis the excessive amount of documents on other European and Latin American countries. Furthermore, no political report of Turkey was deemed necessary for inclusion in the yearbooks. The selected dispatches written from Washington to the embassy in Istanbul and from the embassy in Istanbul to Washington covered the problems that the missionaries and their schools (especially the Euphrates College in Harpoot) were facing. The selected documents were on the "maltreatment" and "murderous attacks" on the Armenians. Also, a lot of paperwork was devoted to the naturalization of Armenian residents of Ottoman nationality and to the problems that naturalized Armenians residing in America were facing regarding inheritances and legal rights.¹³ In short, the diplomatic relations with America meant predominantly Armenian dissidence for the Ottoman diplomatic service.¹⁴ It was no coincidence that Ahmed Rüstem Bey, after long service in the embassy to Washington, wrote a book in Switzerland justifying Ottoman policies regarding the massacres of 1915.

Although dominated by Armenian-related activities, the occupation of the embassy was not only policing. The embassy regularly reported the latest developments in continental American politics. A regular report in 1898 informed Istanbul about the aggression between Nicaragua and Costa Rica, which could have triggered a war between the two countries.¹⁵ The embassy also closely followed the crisis over the Panama Canal in 1903 and the involvement of the United States in these affairs, which resulted in the independence of Panama from Colombia.¹⁶ The embassy also relayed information about South American politics since this is what constituted the main interest of the United States government in international politics. Several reports informed Istanbul on the international and domestic politics of countries such as Chile, Paraguay, Bolivia, and Mexico.

As the embassy in Washington specialized in the pursuit of Armenian activities, the embassy in Rome specialized in monitoring Albanian dissidents or "potential" dissidents. There was no timeframe in which the preoccupation of the pursuit of dissidents increased significantly. On the contrary, this was a constant concern. From the 1870s onward, there was a continuous concern about Albanian activities in

Italy (as well as in Austria, Greece, and to a lesser extent Romania). The level of vigilance remained constant before the Albanian rebellion of 1911 when the Albanian problem turned into a primary and immediate concern for Istanbul.

In contrast to Armenian activities in the United States, Albanian dissidence in Italy was disorganized and personal. However, that does not mean that the embassy in Rome was less concerned, as the routine dispatches reporting the latest Albanian activities demonstrate. It nevertheless was one of the main tasks of the embassy. In contrast to the embassy in Washington, reporting Albanian dissidence comprised a relatively insignificant portion of the immense load of paperwork.

A report in 1886 relayed that the Albanian émigré community in Bari was trying to finance a newspaper and an institute in the Albanian language.¹⁷ The embassy was particularly alarmed when two Albanian dissidents, Ali Hilmi and Süleyman Sami, moved from Athens to Rome in 1880. The embassies in both capitals sent dispatches relaying their information on these dissidents. The dissidents were chased in Rome.¹⁸ Suspicions were raised that they would move to Vienna. However, in the end the dissidents asked for permission to return to the Ottoman Empire after failing to advance their activities.

The task of the embassy was much simpler because the Albanians in Italy lived on their own and were not in regular contact with the indigenous people and the leaders of public opinion. In short, although the occupation of the embassy in Washington was a sophisticated and multifaceted job, the job of the embassy in Rome remained focused on policing. As pointed out above, the embassy had more political obligations and important duties, such as following Italian intentions with regard to the Ottoman Empire and with regard to the other European powers. The other embassies which were occupied with Albanian dissidence were Athens, Bucharest, and Vienna.

One of the main preoccupations of the embassies was the issue of the negative portrayal of the Ottoman Empire in the press. All the embassies were equally concerned with the improvement of the image of the Ottoman Empire. The overall perception and portrayal of the Ottoman Empire was negative, and this was perceived as a principal threat to

the interests of the Empire. Of course, embassies were not only relaying information on the mood of the local press. They were also active in changing and transforming the negative depiction and image of the Ottoman Empire. For example, a dispatch from the embassy informed Istanbul that a newly founded Vienna-based newspaper was planning to employ a correspondent in Istanbul, and the embassy requested/suggested that the Ministry be involved in the process so that the prospective correspondent would be sympathetic to the Ottoman Empire.¹⁹ Every embassy was paranoid about the negative coverage of the Ottoman Empire in their local press, so much so that a dispatch from Vienna portrayed the press of Vienna as “the center of the anti-Ottoman coverage in Europe.”²⁰

It has to be noted that it was Abdülhamid II who zealously endeavored to influence, lead, and manipulate the Western press after the relatively passive stance of his predecessors. His personal policy of developing contacts with Western correspondents brought up a general concern for struggling with and manipulating the Western media. This interest in the foreign press was a top-to-bottom affair. Abdülhamid’s first act in this regard was an attempt to influence English public opinion by publishing the letters of Admiral Hobart in the prestigious newspaper, *The Times*, in 1877.²¹ Abdülhamid II developed close relations with correspondents in Istanbul. In 1878, he awarded Ottoman insignia to three of the seven French correspondents resident in Istanbul.²² After that, he continued to track the Western press coverage personally.²³ Although Abdülhamid II had established a bureau in the Yıldız Palace to follow foreign press coverage, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was also active in tracking the foreign coverage and taking action when necessary.

The issue of public opinion became an obsession throughout the reign of Abdülhamid II. Public opinion became a novel factor to be considered and, if possible, controlled as early as the reign of Mahmud II.²⁴ Throughout the Tanzimat, with the emergence of newspapers, it became apparent that public opinion had become a significant factor that had to be dealt with accordingly. For the first time, the minds of the general public were a matter of concern. The idiom “*efkar-ı umumiye*” (public opinion) emerged and assumed a great importance in the 1860s with the emergence and success of a highly influential

Turkish-language Ottoman press.²⁵ The state was obliged to measure, respond to, and lead public opinion. This concern became almost an obsession for Abdülhamid II.

Newspapers were treated as acid tests of public opinion. In fact, excerpts from newspapers were not only sent to Istanbul as annexes to dispatches, but also comprised the bulk of the dispatches themselves. Sometimes, insignificant and minor press coverage caused scandals and uproars and required a heavy load of dispatches to be sent from both Istanbul and the embassy in question in order to resolve these "blows". Nevertheless, in the diplomatic dispatches, it was elections which were seen as the primary (and direct) manifestations of public opinion.²⁶ The diplomatic service focused on the role of public opinion expressed via political parties and via other means of expression. The anti-Ottoman mood of the public in Britain during the Russo-Turkish War had a devastating impact on the Ottoman diplomatic service. For this reason, party politics in Britain was carefully scrutinized. Reports on party lines and positions were diligently dispatched to Istanbul from Britain. A comparable concern regarding partisan divisions and disputes was also displayed in France, Italy, and other parliamentary regimes. Unsurprisingly, the correspondence from the embassies in Germany and Russia lacked the tracking of a public opinion since public opinion was not regarded as important there.

Ironically, Britain was the country where artificial manipulation of public opinion was least possible due to its developed civil society and free, public political debates. It was also the country where public opinion exerted the most pressure on the foreign policy of the British cabinet. Knowing this, the Ottoman diplomatic corps showed a special concern for public opinion in Britain, as became clear from the long reports assigned to this matter.²⁷ Paradoxically, although it was least likely to influence public opinion in Britain via authorized publications, it was in Britain where the most effort was exerted and the incomparably highest expenditures were made, paying affiliated journalists, and other "artificial" means.

With the emergence of the Armenian events in the 1890s, this issue began to haunt all the embassies.²⁸ Although the massacres instigated diplomatic tensions, the most disturbing repercussion of the events

was the uproar of public opinion and the press in Europe rather than the relatively mild reactions of the European governments. All the embassies struggled with the growing bad reputation of the Empire. The most severe pressure was on the shoulders of the embassy in London, as the British had the most organized and most outspoken civil society with Protestant/humanitarian and evangelical attitudes.²⁹ Moreover, the Bulgarian atrocities further displayed the enormous role of public opinion and public agitation in the making of foreign policy in Britain.³⁰ Halil Halid, who was employed in the consular service in London and was also a Turkish instructor at Cambridge University, addressed the British audience and pointed out that the reality of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire was different from what the public assumed due to the success of Armenian propaganda in Britain. He also published articles in the British press challenging anti-Ottoman propaganda.³¹ The embassies felt a strong urge to defend the Empire's honor and their own, although this experience also instigated an escalating reaction to the (red) sultan's notorious reputation in the eyes of the diplomatic service. The Young Turks in exile also cultivated contradictory sentiments regarding the Armenian events. They oscillated between cooperating with the Armenian organizations in Europe and defending the actions of the Ottoman government as legitimate self-defense against a violent and bloody insurrection.³²

From 1890 onwards, the embassies dispatched an abundant number of reports related to the Armenian problem. Four embassies were sending by far the highest number of reports on the issue: the embassies to St. Petersburg, Washington, London, and Paris. As mentioned above, these reports constituted the main paperwork of the embassy to Washington whereas the "Armenian work" was one of the main activities in the other three embassies. The importation of any publication into the Ottoman Empire reporting on the Armenian issue was to be prevented. Therefore, the embassies reported on the harmful contents of publications and proposed the prohibition of publications or certain issues of publications in the Ottoman Empire.³³ It is not surprising to observe that the embassies in Vienna and Berlin did not find much to report to Istanbul. In the Hamidian era, Berlin and Vienna emerged as two reliable and unwavering allies of the Ottoman Empire in which any kind of unruly or

sedition activity of dissent was not permitted. On the contrary, the German diplomatic service even requested friendly countries, such as Switzerland, to disallow any activity of the Ottoman dissidents within their territories.³⁴ Although the number of dispatches on the Armenian issue erupted in 1890, after the quieting of the Armenian events in the late 1890s, dispatches of the same ilk continued to be sent until 1908. Only a slight decrease is observable after the pacification of the Armenian problem in the late 1890s. In the eyes of the diplomats and the center, the affair calmed down only temporarily, and therefore vigilance and readiness for a prospective eruption of the affair had to be maintained. This shows the extent of the impact that the Armenian phenomenon had on the psyche of the Ottoman center. It may also be argued that the constant Armenian threat and subversiveness nurtured the development of a sense of “we” against “them” (Armenians), and subsequently this sense of “we” was transferred into an awareness of Turkishness, the only loyal element within the Ottoman Empire.

Ottoman officialdom remained vigilant and alarmed regarding the Armenian problem. Armenians abroad continued to be monitored and their activities reported. All the Armenians, whether they were students, peasants, people seeking their fortune, or political activists, were individually identified by files containing short biographies and information about their physical appearances. The movements of Armenians (especially when in groups) were followed and reported. In that regard, the Ottoman representatives abroad displayed the quick consolidation of a modern state seeking to know its own subjects in detail, given that in the Ottoman Empire citizenship had only been established in 1869. Nevertheless, the dimensions and effort of documenting and identifying by the embassies were on a very modest scale in comparison to the Ottoman provincial administrative offices, from which detailed reports and dispatches identifying and documenting were flowing abundantly.

Opposing Young Turks

Apparently, the activities of the Young Turks were another major issue to be addressed by the Ottoman foreign representatives. Regular

reports on the activities of the Young Turks and informative memoranda were continuously sent from the embassies to Istanbul.³⁵ The rich reports on the activities of the Young Turks and analyses of their personalities took a considerable amount of ambassadorial and consular work. When Ali Haydar Midhat, the son of Midhat Pasha, left İzmir for Paris for subversive activity, he was contacted by the relevant Ottoman representatives personally both in Athens and Marseilles so as to be persuaded to return.³⁶ One report just after the move of Kemal Bey, the grandson of Midhat Pasha, to France, suggested that Kemal Bey's participation in the Young Turks should be avoided, by employment abroad if necessary.³⁷ Ahmed Rıza Bey, İsmail Kemal, Ali Nuri (Gustaf Noring), and Edhem Nuri were the dissidents whose activities were most frequently reported.³⁸ However, Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha, who joined the Young Turks in Paris, was the dissident who was most assiduously and exhaustively followed and tracked at every opportunity. Numerous reports were amassed and dispatched to Istanbul.³⁹ His desertion to the Young Turks shocked and panicked Abdülhamid II and his establishment. The scare caused by Mahmud Celaleddin's desertion reverberated in the continent-wide communications about him. All the Ottoman diplomatic legations were on the alert for his possible moves. His short stay in Greece to make contact with the Albanian revolutionary committees organized by İsmail Kemal, who voyaged to Corfu from southern Albania, instigated an immense uproar. His activities in Greece created a continent-wide alert in the Ottoman legations; his journey was reported day-by-day by the relevant representatives. The Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs tried every means to persuade the Greek government to expel him. The rebuff of the Greek government was regretted by Rifat Bey, the ambassador to Athens, who admitted that Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha was a figure of sympathy for journalists, parliamentarians, and even ministers. He also related the negative response of the Greek authorities, who asserted that such an expulsion would be contrary to the spirit of their constitution. Thus, concluded Rifat Bey, who was desperate to accomplish the tasks given to him, Greece provides "liberty of action to the anarchists". Nevertheless, in the end, Mahmud Celaleddin was forced to leave Greece, not for his "anarchist

activities" but "out of his own will" as enforced by the Greek government. His departure from Greece via Corfu was instantly communicated to Istanbul with relief by Rifat Bey, who received definite information from the consul general of the Ottoman Empire in Corfu. He landed in Brindisi, and this was reported by the Ottoman embassy in Rome. Simultaneously, Salih Münir Bey, the ambassador to France, was informed that Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha might be on his way to France. The exchange of dispatches included brainstorming on how to react to Mahmud Celaleddin's prospective arrival in France. The embassy in Rome kept Istanbul informed continuously until Mahmud Celaleddin left Italy for Switzerland. His activities in Switzerland, where he tried to organize the Young Turks in Geneva under his leadership, were followed very closely by the Ottoman consul general in Geneva, Baron Richthofen, who was in reality "a shadowy associate of Baron Oppenheim...[and] certainly for German intelligence."⁴⁰ Baron Richthofen sent regular and bulky reports to Istanbul on the moves of Mahmud Celaleddin.

The principal reason for the ensuing panic after the desertion of Mahmud Celaleddin was the sympathy expressed by European public opinion towards him. The European press portrayed him as a liberal and an able opponent of Abdülhamid II who might challenge and seize Abdulhamid II's authority as he was acknowledged to be capable of such a takeover due to his impressive political background, intellectual credentials, and his royal marriage.

Since his pro-British sympathies were well known, Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha contacted Britain for support. These maneuvers alarmed Abdülhamid II, who feared Mahmud Celaleddin would "translat(e) it into a movement of the pro-British wing of the Ottoman bureaucracy and instructed Ottoman diplomats to scrutinize the affairs of his brother-in-law. Later, the palace tempted Damad Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha to return with an offer of £50,000 and shares in the concession that he had been trying to acquire for a British company. Later in England, Anthopoulos Pasha made him a new offer, and finally Turhan Pasha added some inducement in order to persuade him to return."⁴¹ Although Abdülhamid II failed to convince his brother-in-law to return, his diplomatic efforts resulted in the British giving a cold

shoulder to Mahud Celaledin's request for support. His efforts to seek assistance from Germany and France also failed. Mahmud Celaledin's desertion resulted in one of the most coordinated and extensive flurries of Ottoman diplomatic activity involving various diplomatic posts in Europe.

Although regular reporting of the subversive activities of the Young Turks was a permanent task of the diplomatic representatives, the number of reports on subversive activities exploded in 1898 and declined by 1905. The years 1900, 1901, and 1902 were years of heightened panic and tension, as we can observe from the unprecedented amount of work devoted to the subversive activities in these three years. These years were also the years of Abdülhamid's aggressive purge of the Young Turks. After Abdülhamid II successfully countered the Young Turks, things calmed down from 1902 onwards. Nevertheless, the tracking of Ottoman citizens within the area of responsibility of any diplomatic post continued to be a primary concern regardless of the potential threat that the individual in question posed. Students, merchants, and others were to be tracked with equal diligence.

Salih Münir Pasha (1859–1939) in Paris was the chief antagonist in the eyes of the Young Turks. He was the willing master spy of the sultan and pleased Abdülhamid II with his impressive service.⁴² Salih Münir Pasha played the role of the intermediary between Abdülhamid II and European diplomatic representatives by using his personal diplomacy, and he became a confidant of the sultan.⁴³ Being the son of Mahmud Celaledin Pasha, who was a high-ranking bureaucrat and Minister of Public Works in the Hamidian age, probably helped in gaining the trust of the sultan. He was rewarded for his loyalty with his long tenure as the Ottoman ambassador in Paris from 1895 until the fall of Abdülhamid II. He chased the Young Turks vigilantly on every occasion and reported all their malice to his master. He was responsible also for Switzerland and Belgium. He also tracked down the Young Turk committees in Geneva with equal determination.⁴⁴ However, Salih Münir Pasha was no subservient loyalist. He was also a master of double-dealing. He asked to be paid for informing the sultan of the subversive activities of the Young Turks. Unless he was pleased financially, he preferred to keep the information to himself. Moreover,

he also invented conspiracies to squeeze money out of the sultan. The privileged ambassador visited Istanbul several times a year, as he managed to keep his halo of immunity. His capacity for intrigue rendered the Yıldız Palace incapable of subordinating him. He succeeded in keeping the trust of the sultan.

Not surprisingly, he was dismissed immediately after the takeover of the Young Turks. He was degraded, and his title of “pasha” was revoked. He was prosecuted for his dealings, and his wealth was confiscated. He was forced to leave the Ottoman Empire. He was denied a pension until 1913.⁴⁵ Only in 1925 could he return to Turkey.⁴⁶ Salih Münir Pasha was one of the victims of the Young Turks as, in their eyes, he was one of the prominent symbols and arch-villains of the corrupt regime of Abdülhamid II. He was also the only major dignitary within the diplomatic service who was demonized. Apparently, he was purged and eliminated not for ideological reasons, but for his exploits and maneuverings. The diplomatic service in general was relatively free of the disgrace of cronyism within the corrupt regime. The governors and military officers had much more chance to promote their own interests and benefit from the regime, and thus more of them suffered after the Young Turk Revolution in 1908. In comparison, the Ottoman diplomatic service never enjoyed the prestige and privileges of the German diplomatic service that would have enabled them to be one of the pillars of the autocracy.⁴⁷

Although the toughest and most extensive work was performed by the Paris embassy, all the other embassies were meticulously tracking any Young Turk activity and their contacts within their areas of responsibility. Necib Melhame, the brother of the ill-reputed Selim Melhame, was appointed as the undersecretary to the embassy to Paris with the specific mission of “buying” Young Turks. However, his corruption obliged the French government to declare him *persona non grata*, and he was deported. Although Abdülhamid II appointed his favorite as the commissioner to Bulgaria, his corruption ended with the Bulgarian government’s deportation of Necib Melhame, declaring him again *persona non grata*.⁴⁸ Gadban Efendi and Necib Melhame, both Christian Arabs, were Abdülhamid’s special appointments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the specific purpose of tracking

down Young Turks, and they acted as Abdülhamid's personal informants and intelligence officers. Nevertheless, except for these figures who were assigned for specific purposes, and a few others assigned for other particular reasons as political appointments, Abdülhamid II did not interfere with the running of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the promotions and appointments of diplomats and officials.

An important point we have to address is the personal convictions and views of the members of the diplomatic service. The considerable number of diplomats who joined the Young Turks makes us think that, apart from their obligation to perform their office work and their concern for future promotions, diplomats did not have much enthusiasm and conviction in tracking down the Young Turks. Beginning from Kanipaşazade Rifat Bey, a scribe in the Paris embassy who joined Namık Kemal and his entourage when they left the Ottoman Empire for Paris, many others opted to join the Young Turks.⁴⁹ Samipaşazade Sezai, while working in the *İstişare Odası* (Counseling Office) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, decided to join the Young Turks and moved to Paris in 1901.⁵⁰ Reşid Sadi Bey, the chief secretary of the London embassy, participated in the conspiratorial meeting organized by Prince Sabahaddin and İsmail Kemal in London in 1903.⁵¹ Although it is hard to make a sweeping generalization, the observation that these officials seemed indifferent and lacking in any conviction while performing their professional duties seems true for the entire Hamidian bureaucracy, as can be deduced from the memoirs of the officials. Many other officials, who were more likely to be older and scions of the first Tanzimat generation, were loyal, not necessarily to the person of the sultan, but to the idea of the Ottoman polity. Lastly, careerism also had to be a decisive motivation in generating loyalty and conformism. It would be more accurate to reconstruct the conflict between the Young Turks and the palace not as an exclusively ideological clash, but as a function of the unfulfilled expectancies of the newly rising, educated generation, who felt that their merits and their superior Western-style education were not rewarded adequately, vis-à-vis those who owed their social status and offices to traditional and patrimonial loyalties, connections, and old-style education. Once the members of the new generation were satisfied, they were prone to

abandon their opposition and keep their personal opinions to themselves, unlike the Russian opposition, where the opponents of the regime were forced to abandon their loyalties to the regime outright.

After a compromise was reached between Abdülhamid II and the Young Turks, “İshak Sukuti and Abdullah Cevdet became medical doctors at the Ottoman embassies in Rome and Vienna; soon after, Tunalı Hilmi was appointed scribe to the Ottoman embassy in Madrid.”⁵² The age-old, pre-modern Ottoman practice of appointing dissidents to state offices illustrates the complicated nature of politics. Abdülhamid II could be confident that these Young Turks would not confuse the minds of the staff in the embassies. His confidence derived not from his trust in the ideological and personal resistance of the staff in the embassies but from his recognition that the Young Turks would immediately cease to propagate their subversive ideas once they were subordinated to the palace. For example, one report suggested that if Kadri Bey, who had previously been a contributor to the subversive *Saday-ı Millet* (Voice of the People) published in Bucharest and who was subsequently appointed as consul to Kragujevac, was not paid his salary, he would go back to Bucharest and continue his subversive activities.⁵³

Abdülhamid II followed the same policy with regard to Halil Halid, who departed the Ottoman Empire for Britain to pursue his oppositional politics and worked for the opposition newspaper of Selim Faris printed in London. He was persuaded by Abdülhamid II in 1897 to quit the newspaper and accept employment as the second secretary in the Ottoman embassy to London.⁵⁴

In the previous chapter, I pointed out that by sharing the same social milieu, experiencing similar processes of socialization, and being part of the same state elite, Young Turks could be recruited in the embassies upon deference to the sultan. The world of Ahmet İhsan (as depicted in the previous chapter), the Young Turks, and the embassies was a familiar/habitual one in which conflicts and compromises were more personal than we may appreciate from outside and thus could be reconciled at a personal level.⁵⁵ The tone and discourses employed in the “submission letters” of the Young Turks can be analyzed in this regard. In them, they were forced to depict themselves

as erroneously and irresponsibly rebellious against the order in which they were taken care of. Thus, they breached the code of conduct of this culturally intimate world.⁵⁶ Although this discourse was apparently imposed on them, given that the Young Turks overwhelmingly came from the same social milieu (or at least trained in schools where they experienced a similar socialization process and were assimilated to this culture), reconciliation with them and the recruitment of apologetic Young Turks into embassies was possible. Thus, the Hamidian regime could develop its mechanisms of repression without ever using physical violence. The executions that the Young Turks undertook after the suppression of the Incident of 31 March heralded the end of this intimate world and the beginning of a new era in which political disagreements were no longer seen as an intra-family problems, but as genuine, irreconcilable political enmities. Therefore, in this new world, there was no room for compromise; the legitimacy of politics was acknowledged, and the “age of politics” emerged.

Connecting Two Separate Worlds

The position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was unique in that it functioned as the intermediary institution between foreigners and Ottomans, between Muslims and non-Muslims, and between provincial Ottoman officials and high-ranking bureaucrats in Istanbul as it coordinated the implementation of Ottoman “reform” (i.e., reform of the situation of the Christians in the Ottoman Empire) in an interactive bargaining between the parties.⁵⁷ Local officials reported their implementation of the “reform”, as well as the general situation regarding relations between Muslims, Christians, and the state. Not surprisingly, most reports were optimistic regarding the implementation and the results of the “reforms”. On the other hand, many complaints were voiced by missionaries, the representatives of the local churches, and the consuls of the European powers, and these complaints were communicated to the offices in charge or were reviewed by the Ministry itself.⁵⁸

Of course, the Ministry also collected reports from local governmental offices (governorships, district administrations, military garrisons,

police) reporting the subversive military, political, and non-political activities of Armenians, the communications and relations between the foreign consuls and the Armenians, etc. These reports were transmitted to the Prime Ministry. The Ministry was at the center of a web of communications connecting distant parties. At the same time, it conveyed communications to alleviate the situation and to execute the coordination of the progress of the counterinsurgency by managing its international dimensions. For example, Roumelia became an important concern of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the 1900s. The Ministry was involved in the international dimensions of the Roumelian problem and coordinated the pursuit of the Bulgarian, Greek, and Serbian brigands moving back and forth between the Ottoman Empire and their “homelands abroad.”⁵⁹ The Roumelian problem was a multilayered and multifaceted one in which diplomatic, political, legal, and ideological dimensions were intertwined. Therefore, it needed instant follow-up of various dynamics simultaneously.

This task of the Ministry regarding non-Muslims partly derived from the fact that the supervision and administration of the Ottoman non-Muslim *millet*s was managed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs until 1876. *Mezabip Odası* (Office of Religious Confessions) – later called *Deva-i Hariciye Kitabeti* – was established to administer the records of the non-Muslim *millet*s and monitor their relations with the state. *Mezabip Odası* was also charged with handling any legal disputes between non-Muslims and Muslims.⁶⁰ The office was transferred to the Ministry of Justice in 1877 with all the tasks of the office maintained due to the recognition that non-Muslims were subjects of the Ottoman Empire like the Muslims.⁶¹ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs partially acted as the overseer of the “reforms” due to its intermediary role between the clashing parties.

Given the interconnectedness of the external and internal politics of the Ottoman Empire, it is hard to perceive the Ottoman Foreign Ministry as merely coordinating the running of foreign relations. For example, the concerns of the Inspectorship of the Province of Roumelia were a major preoccupation of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry. The Ministry corresponded with the relevant embassies to

track necessary information to inform and assist the inspectorship.⁶² Apparently, the Inspectorship of the Province of Roumelia is a good example of the interconnectedness of domestic and international politics. Nevertheless, the Inspectorship of the Province of Roumelia was not the only Ottoman governmental office assisted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Any governmental office in need of information was provided with that information and logistics by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Indeed, this was one of the crucial responsibilities of the Ministry. Security concerns of the *Dahiliye* (Ministry of Interior) were an important task of the Prime Ministry. The *şekavet* (brigandage) activities of Balkan nationalists were tracked by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in coordination with the *Dahiliye*.⁶³

The Foreign Ministry conveyed the dispatches of the embassies to the relevant ministries (predominantly *Dahiliye* and *Zabtiye*) through the Prime Ministry.⁶⁴ The ministries and the Prime Ministry were also in touch with the Foreign Ministry in order to obtain the necessary information and for consultation. These included the reliability of individual foreign nationals (as well as Christians of Ottoman nationality) regarding their possible activities and connections abroad, possible foreign contact with local activists, etc.

It is important to bear in mind that the Ottoman Empire had a very centralized state organization in which every communication passed through the Prime Ministry. The Prime Ministry was informed of any communication between any two governmental agencies.⁶⁵ The Prime Ministry was acting in the name of the sultan, and this status endowed the Prime Ministry with immense power. The organizational structure of the Sublime Porte was instituted taking the Prime Ministry as the center and the ministries as conductors of daily business rather than independent bodies. Thus, it was no coincidence that the Ministries of Internal and Foreign Affairs were both working in the building complex of the Prime Ministry. Thus, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its routine cannot be dissociated from the other governmental offices. This is true also with regard to its ideological build-up as reflected in the official documents and correspondence.

From Sedition to Anarchism: Enemies of the State

The Hamidian official language used when referring to Armenian affairs was strikingly archaic. As Grigor Suny has observed, we cannot assess the Turkish–Armenian conflicts as the outcome of “two competing nationalisms” but rather as a conflict between the rising Armenian nationalism and “state imperialists”, who were ambivalent and vexed facing a threat they could not comprehend in an age of nationalism.⁶⁶ The official language is not only dehumanizing, but also self-confidently and arrogantly state-centric. First of all, in the eye of the Ottoman bureaucrat, Armenian disorders were “*Ermeni fesadı denilen asar-ı şekavet*” (signs of brigandage known as the Armenian conspiracy). Armenian activity was imagined and regarded as merely brigandage with pre-modern and pre-political implications (à la Hobsbawm). The official language condemned these activities as a kind of chaos and disorder. The word used was *ibtilal*, which at the time did not refer to a revolution but meant rebellion, disorder, and unrest. The nineteenth-century Balkan uprisings were referred to as *ibtilal*, similar to the French Revolution, not because they were perceived as revolutionary but because they were rebellions threatening the political and social order and transgressing public morality. In this pre-political perception, the Balkan rebels were revolting against the legitimate and just order of the Ottomans. Mahmud Celaleddin Paşa’s (1839–99) *Mirat-ı Hakikat* on the Turkish–Russian war was illustrative in this regard. In his book on the Balkan rebellions and the Turco-Russian War, he spoke of rebellions (*ibtilal*) in Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Crete. According to Mahmud Celaleddin, the rebels were “firing the cellar of revolution/rebellion (*mabzen-i ibtilal*).”⁶⁷ The revolutionary ideas were corrupting “those Bulgarians who were inclined to radical ideas (*efkar-ı müfrite*) and support seditious activities.”⁶⁸ In fact, the phrase *ibtilal* was used in tandem with phrases such as *fitne* and *fesad* (sedition) implying a transgression of the just and legitimate order. The ideas of revolution were considered so seditious in that they may lead the Balkan people to seek for independence (*emel-i istiklal*).

Thus, the response to Armenian militancy was police action. The Ottoman embassies and consulates were to undertake police actions,

such as informing Istanbul regarding the moves of the Armenians and demanding the persecution of the Armenians by their host countries. Thus, no agency was dedicated to dealing with Armenians' activism and their political commitments and aspirations. As indicated previously, this perception was equally applicable to any of the rebellious ethnic groups, such as Serbians, Greeks, and Bulgarians, and derived from the state-centric vision of the Ottoman bureaucratic world. "*Yüz bulmak*" (heartened by) was a label exhaustively used in official documents depicting the attitude of the non-Muslim communities as stimulated and manipulated by external forces denying them agency.⁶⁹ This discourse also condemned their aspirations for independence as being utopian and illegitimate fantasies.

The gullible Armenian folk, who were yet to be "encouraged" by external forces, were carefully dissociated from the Armenian *tertibat-ı fesadiyye* (conspiratorial organization) in imperial benevolence.⁷⁰ This was because, as the developing official discourse argued, the Armenian community lived peacefully and faced no discrimination in their daily lives and in practicing their religion. Therefore, Armenian brigandage was illegitimate, baseless, and unrepresentative of the Armenian community. Nevertheless, probably partially for reasons of practicality, Armenian militants in official correspondence were described simply as "Armenians", which ethnicizes political activity, perceives all the members of the ethnic group as parts of the indivisible whole, and subsumes them within a homogenous politicized community. Thus, although the official discourse uses an archaic state-centric language that curses those who were not grateful for the benevolence of Ottoman rule, through repetition it is transformed into an ethnically sensitive state-nationalist, if not nationalist, language.

It is insightful to compare and contrast the language used between the Ottoman governmental offices and between Ottoman officialdom and their foreign counterparts. The Armenian bands were termed as *erbab-ı fesad*, *eşkiya*, *Ermeni fesadesi*, *erbab-ı iğtişas*, *Ermeni müfşedatı*, *fesad komiteleri* (intriguers, brigands, Armenian conspiracy/sedition, conspiratorial committees) in the interdepartmental correspondence of the Ottoman state.⁷¹ The label of *erbab-ı fesad* and others were dropped in the dispatches of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs conveyed to its

foreign counterparts. However, it appears that *erbab-ı fesad*, a specific concept meaningful only in its Ottoman/Islamic background was also excluded in the (French language) intra-ministerial correspondence of the Foreign Ministry and not translated into French. The same was true with regard to the language employed in reporting on the Young Turks. For example, a dispatch sent to Abdülhamid II in Turkish from the Ottoman consul general in Geneva defines Geneva as *her kısım erbab-ı müfşedat ve melanetin ilticagahı* (the haven of all kinds of seditionists).⁷² Apparently, these terms were very emotionally loaded and bound to lose their specific references when translated into French and even more so when translated into diplomatic French. The same dispatch defined the journal *Osmanlı* as *Osmanlı nam melanetkarane*.⁷³ We observe that the use of French as the language of communication tempered the tone of the discourse, as any language was another medium in which the discourses were reconstructed according to the references of the language. The French language with its “civilizationist” and “objective/rational” tenor remained aloof from the discourse and vocabulary of the Ottomans in the eyes of the Ottoman bureaucracy. The fact that it was accessible to any foreigner also forced the drafters of the texts to accommodate a new mental milieu and develop strategies specific to the language of conduct. In the French-language reports, the *erbab-ı fesad* turned into Armenian anarchists, revolutionary committees, or committees, transforming the age-old seditionist and unruly subjects of the Muslim polity into modern revolutionaries and conspirators aiming to destroy the social order.

The 1890s were also the peak of anarchist activism and assassinations throughout Europe (and the United States). It was a preeminent concern of the European governments. Several heads of state were assassinated, following the killing of Alexander II in 1881 by *Narodnaya Volya*, Sadi Carnot (France 1894), Umberto I (Italy 1900), and William McKinley (USA 1901) were murdered by anarchist assassins.⁷⁴ The activities of the anarchists, as well as the persecution of the anarchists, were seen as important news to be dispatched to Istanbul. Anarchism was a common threat to, the established order and the ruling elites of Europe. This aspect was underlined by the Ottoman diplomats as they were aware that all the ruling elites and establishments

were floating on the same ship. Such an understanding was reached as early as the Congress of Vienna (1814–15), at which the representatives of the European powers agreed to intervene in cases of popular unrest or rebellion. This policy was implemented several times between 1815 and 1830 before such interventionism became unproductive and even counterproductive.⁷⁵ Given that Armenian Dashnaks, Hncaks, and the Bulgarian IMRO were all influenced by the socialist and anarchist currents and militancy, the Ottoman state aimed to cajole European governments by referring to the subversive agendas of these movements. The Ottoman state also tried to learn to combat anarchism from the methods and strategies of the European governments.⁷⁶ Regular information was conveyed by the embassies, such as the passing of new bills to combat anarchism⁷⁷ and the pursuit of anarchists of various countries.⁷⁸ The Russian revolutionaries were also followed and reported on.⁷⁹ Anarchism among Italian workers in Istanbul was monitored as well.⁸⁰

The Foreign Ministry was startled by the “anarchist international”. It pursued not only those who posed a threat to the Empire, but also those who might present a danger to other empires and states. This was the undertaking of a responsible state showing solidarity with its fellow states. A certain Alexandre Mikolovich (French spelling), a Serb by nationality, left Istanbul for Copenhagen with two bombs, for a task he undertook for the Polish revolutionary committee. Due to a request made by the Danish Foreign Ministry to the Ottoman consul general in Copenhagen in early May 1885, the Ottoman Foreign Ministry investigated the activities and connections of this revolutionary in Istanbul for two weeks. The investigation concluded that Mikolovich resided in Istanbul at the Hotel Britannia. The Ministry deepened the investigation by requesting the Ottoman legations in Vienna and Budapest to investigate and report on the activities of Mikolovich while he stayed in Vienna.⁸¹ This case was just one of the examples of the investigation of dubious anarchists and revolutionaries by the Ottoman Empire, not for its immediate interest and police activities, but for its imperial reflexes and in the name of imperial solidarity. Therefore, the Ottoman Empire rightfully expected the other European states to inform Istanbul regarding Ottoman dissidents and revolutionaries and

to take action when necessary. The Foreign Ministry investigated various suspicious individuals who were assumed to pose a threat to the public and political order of the Empire. Many Greek nationals and other individuals holding Balkan nationality fell into this category.

The Ottoman establishment was cognizant of the anarchist dispositions of the Armenian revolutionary committees and their links to the anarchist currents in Europe. This dimension facilitated Ottoman demands to the European powers regarding the surveillance of Armenian revolutionaries. Legations abroad were in pursuit of informants to access intelligence. Although there were several extraneous intelligence reports provided by informants not in the interest of the Empire, many other informants apprised Ottoman representatives of the activities of Armenian revolutionaries abroad.⁸² For example, the Ottoman embassy to Washington conveyed that a certain Vartan Bulguryan, aged 35, departed New York for Moersina with dynamite, arms, and money.⁸³ Another report on a move by Armenian revolutionaries was dispatched from Tblisi. According to the consul in Tblisi, Essad Bey, four Armenian exiled revolutionaries arrived in Tblisi.⁸⁴ Every minor move of the Armenians was assiduously tracked.⁸⁵

Activating its channels of international communication, the Ministry was involved extensively in the investigation of the abortive assassination attempt on Abdülhamid II by a Belgian anarchist in the pay of Armenian revolutionary committees. The investigation was conducted by requesting the Ottoman legations in various countries, as well as the European embassies in Istanbul, to provide extensive information on the persons involved in or related to the failed assassination. The final report was prepared in light of these communications and information-gathering by a commission and later published as a separate book in 1905.⁸⁶

With the reign of Mahmud II and the Tanzimat, we encounter the emergence of the "rhetoric of tolerance". In a report to Abdülhamid II on the Armenian militancy, Hüseyin Nazım Pasha began by writing: "as is well-known, the Armenians, as subjects of the sultan, have long lived peacefully and safely and completely free to conduct their religious rituals and services by the grace of the justice and compassion of

the Ottoman government.”⁸⁷ Namık Kemal wrote that the Ottoman Empire: “emerged at a time when the fire of bigotry (*taassub*) was burning like a volcano...We protected the Greeks and their ethnicities, confessions, beliefs, interests and rights. We saved the Armenians in Iran and the Jews in Spain from the paws of oppression...In the lands of the Ottoman Empire, there were Christian princes and non-Muslim clerks in state service three–four centuries ago.”⁸⁸ The Ottoman imperial system of managing religious and confessional groups began to be consecrated as “tolerance”, and the Tanzimat ideology of Ottomanism was eternalized and adapted to the classical age of the Ottoman Empire (as “tolerance”). The radical move that admitted non-Muslims into the political nation in 1856 was reproduced in the classical age of the Empire.⁸⁹ Needless to say, the “rhetoric of tolerance” was an imperial discourse. It also implies that the maintenance of tolerance is conditioned on the Armenian community’s tacit consent to the hierarchy between the *millets*. “Tolerance” is a contract not signed by two equal and legitimate parties but imposed on one of the parties. The Armenian revolutionary organizations had challenged this tacit consent. The conceptualization of the Armenian militarized organizations is also remarkable. Rather than being nationalists, they were perceived and indicted for being anarchists, socialists, and corrupters. This was the continuation of the rhetoric that viewed Balkan nationalist movements not as free agents but as pawns of foreign powers (especially Russia), and not as serving the aspirations of nationhood, but as instigating anarchy and chaos.⁹⁰

Ottoman officialdom denied that nationalism was the chief motivation of the Armenian organizations. This discourse was careful to differentiate between the corrupting minority of Armenians and the majority of Armenians, who were gullible, loyal subjects of the sultan but who could potentially be misled by the corrupting minority due to their naivety (and ignorance). Any violence inflicted on the Armenian militant organizations which had rebelled against the legitimate order and, therefore, against peace, was perceived as legitimate and even necessary, reproducing Islamic legal notions of order, peace, and war. Within this perception, the Ottoman administrators did not feel that they transgressed the boundaries of legitimacy when they employed

undue violence not only on the militants, but also on those who were influenced by them.⁹¹

The Ministry obtained notifications of the latest activities of the Armenian nationalist organizations from the local governmental offices, written with this language and vocabulary. The Ministry was supposed to use this information to respond to international pressure regarding the "oppression of the Armenians". As expressed above, the reports and dispatches of the Ministry were self-assured of their righteousness and regarded the problems as a matter of discipline and order within a very Islamic and imperial conceptualization. For Abdülhak Hamid, all the articles published under titles such as "massacres in Anatolia and Roumelia" (perpetrated by Turks) were outrageous libels and only the writers of these articles believed in these lies.⁹² What the Ministry tried to do in its efforts to whitewash the Ottoman policies was merge the very traditional discourse imposed by the Islamic legacy and the modern (and European) discourse of rights and liberties. In this regard, the Ministry polished and reinvigorated the very Ottoman discourse and rendered it politically correct and compatible with the modern political discourses of legitimacy. Nevertheless, this was not a distortion, but a rearticulating of the concerns of Ottoman officialdom in a language more communicable to the European discourses of legitimacy. The Ministry seemed to agree with the premises of these reports from the provinces, given the fervor expressed in the intra-ministry dispatches against European interference in the Ottoman Empire and their abuse of the conditions of non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire. In fact, the disconnect between the Ottoman officials' statements and the Westerners' indictments derived from different perceptions of state, violence, and legitimacy structures. Furthermore, such an encounter is a site where the rhetoric of confrontation with the imperialist West was produced and reproduced.⁹³

In short, the international dimensions of the Armenian issue display the centrality of the Armenian factor in the constitution of Turkish nationalism. It should also be said that excessive vigilance cannot be regarded as a symptom of paranoia, given what had already happened (the loss of Bulgaria, another traumatic episode constitutive of Turkish nationalism) and what would happen (in the Balkan Wars,

the loss of Crete, etc.). Another impact the Armenian events generated was the frustration Ottoman officials experienced. Ottoman officialdom resented that the Westerners only listened to the "other side" and had to surrender to the tenor of anti-Ottoman agitation because of public opinion and popular sympathy towards the Armenians. This sentiment of frustration resulted in a gradual rise in anti-Westernism and anti-imperialism throughout the Hamidian era before it became ubiquitous in the Young Turk regime.⁹⁴ The Armenian problem was arguably formative in the constitution of Turkish nationalism, not only stemming from sedition and attacks by Armenian militants and nationalists against the Ottoman center, but also stemming from international dimensions and international moral isolation.

During the Tanzimat, the enemy was Russia, as it had been for the previous century and a half.⁹⁵ This enduring enmity has a long history. The Tanzimat maintained the traditional concerns, fears, and anxieties of the Ottomans, which were primarily based on the possibility of an imminent attack from its neighbor to the north. What we observe with the Hamidian era is the alteration of the modes of enmities and the emergence of a novel mode of enmity. This novel mode of enmity was abstract, deracinated, diffused, and unspecified. It did not have a particular, attainable, and identifiable focus. It was rather a perpetuated perception of immediate threat from anywhere and everywhere. Perpetual vigilance had to be maintained to encounter this new mode of enmity. The principal source of this enmity was the emerging and rising threat and perceived threat from the non-Muslims and their economic advancement. The hostilities perpetrated by the non-Muslim brigands and the unruliness of the non-Muslim populace were not new. The methods to subdue these disturbances were not new, either. However, the intensification, politicization, and internationalization of these upheavals created a completely novel situation, which instigated intense fear and terror on the side of the Ottoman state. Friendly Britain, a country adored during the Tanzimat, revoked its support of the Ottoman polity and its reform program. This development encouraged non-Muslim militants and activists. It also engendered an intense disappointment and frustration for the Ottomans. The strain between the Ottoman Empire and Britain was not akin to the hostility

between the Ottomans and Russia. This hostility was not confined to military affairs. The traditional modes of enmity that existed between the Ottomans and the Russians were no longer applicable in this new world. Domestic policy and foreign policy were no longer separate. Foreign policy could no longer be isolated. In these circumstances, a deep mistrust developed towards the outer world as the only genuine concern of the Ottoman center was to hold on to what it already had, and the outer world seemed not to sympathize with the defensive concerns of the Ottoman Empire. Nobody was a "friend" of the Ottomans, and no one was to be trusted. On the domestic scene, no Christian (and in the later stages, no non-Turk) was to be trusted or relied upon for cooperation. Therefore, the Hamidian era gave birth to an obstinate fear, the perception of an imminent threat, and the demonization of the outer world. Apparently, it was the diplomats who experienced this frustration personally.

The Dusty Desk of the Weberian Bureaucrat?

Not surprisingly, the most detailed, meticulous and informative political reports were dispatched from the London embassy. This was due to the fact that Britain was the most important country regarding European affairs in general and Ottoman interests in particular. These regular dispatches were also superior in their content and in their level of analysis. They were longer as well. They were also prepared not to simply report recent developments or incidents, but to pen regular basis summaries of all the latest developments and debates worth mentioning.⁹⁶ In that regard, they were much more professional, routine, informative, and organized. Other evidence indicating the level of professionalism was the absence of any press sources. Summarizing and quoting journal articles, which was an important preoccupation of the Ottoman diplomatic service, was a sign of a lack of substantive sources and the capacity to develop an independent analysis. This was not the case in the reports dispatched from London. These reports surveyed British politics, regularly reporting the latest political developments. It is also noteworthy that the British reports concentrated much more on parliamentary politics rather than cabinet policies.⁹⁷

The alignments in the parliament made up a significant portion of the political reports. The two political parties and their policies were carefully examined as the Ottoman diplomatic corps were attentive to the shift in British policy towards the Ottoman Empire. The different predispositions of the two parties were observed with maximum attention. Of course, Gladstone, whose name was associated with the anti-Turkish campaign he launched during the Russo-Turkish War in 1876–7, thereby gaining notoriety in the eyes of the Ottoman state elite, devised policies with enduring ramifications for the Ottomans. His stance became a principle reference for liberal politics with very negative connotations. The efforts of Armenian committees based in London to contact him and their attempts to engage him in their campaign against the Ottoman state were followed with disquiet.⁹⁸ In the 1880s, the Irish problem propelled a division within the liberal ranks as the liberals who were against “Home Rule” left the party to form a liberal unionist group. This group was more sympathetic to the Ottoman cause. This arduous conflict was carefully noted by the London embassy.⁹⁹ The dispatches display an overt sympathy towards the Conservative Party as opposed to the Liberal Party, and the electoral and parliamentary successes of the Liberals were relayed with unease.

Apparently, the delicacies of British politics had a robust impact on British foreign policy. The intricate and multidimensional issues were well scrutinized and analyzed in the embassy reports, which were masterfully prepared in a manner far superior to the reporting of any other embassy. In these reports, domestic political developments and foreign policy orientations were analyzed in tandem. It is a question to what extent the diplomats and administrators of the Ottoman Empire could analyze the impact of domestic politics and party politics in the making of foreign policy. Given that, Abdülhamid II was nominating prime ministers considering the attitudes and dispositions of the foreign powers in mind; this dimension should have been appreciated to a certain extent although the dynamics of party politics and authoritarian politics are apparently very different.

Strictly technical analyses were employed by the embassies. An exception to the generally cold-blooded reports was a report dispatched

after the passing of the Home Rule Bill by the House of Commons in 1893. The dispatch regarded this new bill as, "a formidable and dangerous innovation leveled against the English 'ancient constitution.'" The dispatch suggested that this bill would probably be vetoed by the House of Lords. The dispatch also noted the hostile attitude of the "Gladstonians" during the parliamentary sessions against the opponents of the bill.¹⁰⁰ After summarizing the content of the bill, the dispatch ended with the analysis that Gladstone and the radicals leaned on the newly emerging and developing class of laborers and the lower orders. It was noted that the role of this class was so significant that it had the power to shape the composition of the House of Commons. Apparently developing a class perspective, the embassy observed the transformation of British politics due to its democratization, which had alarming consequences for the Ottoman Empire. In the dispatch, the fervent anti-Gladstonianism, which will be a recurring theme for the Ottoman establishment, was very strong. It saw Gladstone as the man who was responsible for the collapse of the traditional British–Ottoman common understanding.¹⁰¹ Furthermore, the new radicals (many of them from the free professions and not from the "landed interests"), who were transforming the traditional Whig character of the Liberal Party, were followed with unease. The Ottoman diplomatic service knew well that they could speak and compromise with people who came from a similar social and cultural background but were perturbed by the rising new social/cultural classes as British liberals reflected different cultural formations with another ethos and vision.

Another point to be underlined in the ambassadorial reports is the depiction of political matters at a technical level. The reports did not display the subjectivity, complexity, and intricacy of political matters. They were penned as if there was no room imagined for the "political". This may be seen as unsurprising for an Ottoman official given there was no political space envisaged within the worlds of the Ottoman political imagination. However, the lack of political space in the Ottoman Empire did not prevent officials from making political assessments. As has been suggested previously, this is not simply because no democratic space was allowed by the state. The opponents of the regime did not themselves foster a sense of politics

for reasons previously elaborated. The opponents of the regime had a non-political political vision in which the deficiency of the Ottoman state stemmed from Hamidian corruption and despotism, and it was believed that the situation would be ameliorated once an appropriate and effective policy program was implemented. Such a background (dismissive of politics) rendered politically charged notions such as public opinion, democratic legitimacy, and pressure groups merely as abstractions, instead of vivid realities. As a conclusion, we may suggest that this deficit caused the Ottoman Empire to fail to grasp political subtleties and therefore impeded the development of a realistic and plausible policy in response to the maneuvers of these powers. Parliamentary debates made up an important portion of the reports. Although the ferocious debates in the Ottoman parliament in 1876–7 were not to be forgotten,¹⁰² the documentation of the parliamentary debates seemed like technicalities (maybe analogous to the meetings of *Şuray-ı Devlet* and other administrative and legal commissions of the Ottoman Empire), rather than political debates with flesh and bone and passion.

Thus, a “mechanistic” attitude in the political reports of the embassies is discernible. “Mechanistic” denotes the dull and technical accounting of highly politically sensitive and even precarious matters. The routine follow-up of the St. Petersburg embassy on Pan-Slavism or the routine follow-up on the Dreyfus Affair by the Paris embassy display such a remarkable “dullness”. Reading the political reports, it is as if the Pan-Slavs were not agitated Russian expansionist warmongers yearning for Russian domination over the Ottomans, and as if the Dreyfus affair had not divided France into two over a very hard-edged and strained dispute. Loads of dispatches reporting on Pan-Slavist meetings, organizations, and articles published in the prominent newspapers and journals of Russia (with copies of the articles included in the files as an appendix) were blithely penned as mere informative accounts.¹⁰³ Likewise, issues such as the Irish problem in Britain were recounted constantly as if they had no Ottoman repercussions, as if the Irish problem were only a matter of technical dispute between the conservatives and liberals, and, within the liberal party, among the radical and liberal unionist factions. These observations would lead us

to assume that the Ottoman diplomats were cold-blooded technical experts, not moved by national interests of any sort. These dispassionate and boring reports that contained only factual information without any passionate comments exemplify the desk work of a Weberian bureaucrat. The reports were predominantly fact-based. That is to say, the reports were composed to convey the latest developments without making ostentatious judgments. This is a distinction between a bureaucrat and a politician. The bureaucrat leaves the assessment to the reader of the report, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The same observation can be made for the reporting of the provincial administrators who developed a new language towards their "subjects". The nineteenth-century Ottoman bureaucratic establishment endorsed the dispassionate language of its European counterparts, which indicates a radical break from the culture of pre-Tanzimat bureaucracy, although in light of the extra-documentary information we may tend to assume otherwise.¹⁰⁴

At a time when a written text was perceived as semi-sacred and seen as having the power to reveal the truth and only the truth, writing was a serious and intense activity, very different from the experience of writing one century later.¹⁰⁵ "Writing" had an authoritative quality. Likewise, "writing" as a formal activity was a "serious" task to be undertaken accordingly. Its significance diminished drastically in an age of informality and relative truths. A text had an unprecedented authoritative power in the nineteenth century, before its diminution in the twentieth.

The aesthetics of handwriting was also a very important concern for the quality of the document. Elegance and mastery in handwriting were not seen as technicalities of secondary importance, but were perceived as skills of primary importance, worthy of being acquired. The aesthetic quality of their handwriting was an important asset for young diplomats seeking promotion. The young diplomats were assisted by their mentors in developing their handwriting skills and the language used in their dispatches.¹⁰⁶ Bismarck's imposition on the German diplomatic service of stringent standards for meticulous handwriting is well known: "A diplomat who wanted to make an impression on the chancellor would also do well to have a scribe whose

handwriting pleased him. Even the color of ink and the quality of letterheads fell under the chancellor's scrutiny."¹⁰⁷ Of course, it was not only handwriting that mattered to Bismarck. He was very concerned about the straightforwardness, literary quality, and elegance of communiqués. Formalism, independent of content, was an important concern of the nineteenth-century bureaucrat. Form was considered as important as content. A fine document had to be perfectly written and correctly constructed in its form, and great care needed to be exercised to perfect its formalism. The mastery of formalism was important for the future careers and promotions of the officials. The painful process of drafting and then revising the text to perfection through several additional drafts was one of the most tiring and important preoccupations of Ottoman officials in all the governmental offices, including the Foreign Ministry.¹⁰⁸

In short, passion and professionalism were not mutually exclusive. A passionate clerk might pen a dispassionate and formal text. This was how he was trained. The Weberian bureaucrat is not necessarily the soulless desk worker who detaches himself from his passions and identities, but the man who endeavors to imitate the fictive soulless bureaucrat, the imaginary role model of the nineteenth-century bureaucratic culture. The reason why the Weberian ideal-type was taken for granted (recently being questioned) is that the written evidence and archival documents at our disposal lead us to assume bureaucratic pretensions as reality. Likewise, the alleged contrast between the deeds and desk work of the nineteenth-century Ottoman bureaucrat was not a contradiction, but a matter of different modes of expression.

The Ottoman diplomats, who were only a few generations removed from the scribes, were naturally skilled and learned in the aesthetics of handwriting. The Tanzimat was not a sharp break in which the old ways of conducting statecraft gave way to a new and modern way of conducting statecraft. On the contrary, it took several decades and a few generations for a transition from the traditional scribe to the modern official.¹⁰⁹ The traditional Ottoman *a'dab* (refinement) with the genteel culture of the Tanzimat was integrated into the making of the Ottoman diplomats' culture of conduct in their work. The Tanzimat was not a renunciation of the *ancien régime*, but a refashioning of it even

in its maturity, not only in an ideological sense but also in the bureaucrats' work and in the culture of bureaucracy.

The World of the *Ancien Régime* Aristocracy: A Shared World

Another issue which is overlooked in these reports is economics. Nevertheless, this does not show any deficiency of the Ottoman diplomatic establishment vis-à-vis the European diplomatic services. Indifference to and disregard of economics was a common attitude of the pre-World War I diplomatic establishments, contrary to the Marxian argument that diplomacy was an instrument of the economic interests.¹¹⁰ Diplomats had no real knowledge of economic matters. However, more importantly, they had no comprehension of the role of economics in international politics. The aristocratic upbringing of the diplomats infused them with disdain towards "moneyed interests". For them, it was not respectable to consider pecuniary matters. This attitude grew with the rise of the middle classes to prominence in the political scene in the nineteenth century. In the culture of diplomats, high politics was only a matter of state politics, and economics had no place in it. Therefore, they had no interest in commercial matters.¹¹¹ The interrelation between politics and economics had yet to be recognized. State affairs and economic affairs were (and should be) two different and unrelated realms; the former was deemed respectable whereas the latter was regarded as despicable and embarrassing: "Curiously enough, this anti-commercial bias was possibly strongest in Britain."¹¹² Even the British consuls, who were to protect the British communities overseas and safeguard/promote British commerce, were appointed not based on their merits and skills regarding commerce, but on patronage and connections. Therefore, they failed to provide efficient services to the "moneyed interests". For the consuls and their superiors in London, the chief tasks were administrative and judicial matters.¹¹³ "British businessmen saw, or thought they saw, a more wholehearted promotion of trading interests by the consuls of their foreign rivals, especially the Germans and Americans, and they demanded the same treatment from their own. For many years British

Government resisted any suggestion that its officers should become actively engaged in the promotion of British trade."¹¹⁴ The consular service, in the eyes of a contemporary critic in 1903, was a "harbour of refuge for retired army officers and for failures whose only recommendation is aristocratic, official or personal influences, or an easy source of reward for persons to whom the Government of the day is in some way indebted."¹¹⁵ One exception to the contempt of diplomatic establishments towards "moneyed interests" was the Netherlands: "the pressure was so strong that between 1825 and 1850 the diplomatic missions were downgraded, the consular service augmented and the Ministry staff increased to handle commercial rather than political affairs." However, the Dutch exception had its reasons, and it was the exception that proves the rule: "The reduction of the Netherlands after 1830 to a third-class power meant a diminished interest in power politics and favored a sustained shift of attention to economic and colonial affairs."¹¹⁶ In other words, the marginalization and exclusion of the Netherlands from the diplomatic scene and European politics allowed its diplomatic establishment to prioritize economic interests.

This state-centric vision of international politics only slightly began to erode in the decade preceding World War I with the reformation and partial democratization of the foreign offices.¹¹⁷ The financialization of international economics and extra-Europeanization of international affairs and state interests in the late nineteenth century was another factor that deemed economics a matter of concern in the eyes of policy makers although staunch resistance to this process never ceased in the foreign offices.¹¹⁸ Until the "opening of the state" with democratization, the state was claimed only by those who perceived themselves as part of it and perceived the state as theirs: namely by the aristocracy which historically and originally comprised the entourage of the kings and emperors. Industrialists, merchants, and professionals were seen as outside the realm of the state and within the realm of markets which were juxtaposed against the interests of the state.

One scholar of Austro-Hungarian diplomacy observed that: "What reports often lacked, however, was detailed analyses of economic issues. Aside from tariff problems, these questions simply did not get much scrutiny. This weakness reflected the general failure within the

Habsburg leadership to recognize until too late the potential of economic tools for political purposes.”¹¹⁹ The Habsburg Empire lacked the economic means to obtain political gains except through some modest economic initiatives in the Balkans.¹²⁰ Economic tools were at the disposal of the British, French, and German foreign offices, and they employed them to force countries into certain decisions, but the foreign offices were aloof to economics and economic diplomacy. As late as the interwar period, these deficiencies regarding the ambassadorial reporting of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian diplomatic services endured. In this period, this deficiency was observable in all the diplomatic services. In the United States, “political reporting, so far as it was influenced by old school diplomats, tended to deal with leading figures of government rather than deep social and economic forces.”¹²¹ Thus, the dismissal of economics by the Ottoman diplomatic service as an indispensable component of international politics should not be perceived as a sign of its backwardness in statecraft. On the contrary, the Ottoman diplomatic service pursued the nineteenth-century European pattern in its ideological and cultural make-up.

Naturally, international relations made up an important portion of the Ottoman reports. In these reports, the foreign policies of the governments were taken as cabinet policies. This contrasts with the approach of assuming foreign policy orientations to be state policies rather than deliberations by the cabinets. The reports were very much cabinet-centered. Parliamentary debates also amounted to a significant portion of the reports. The permanent governmental institutions did not find much place in the reports. The Ottoman embassy reports did not assume the existence of permanent state interests to take precedence over the subjectivity and temporariness of the cabinets and the intentions of the prime ministers and foreign ministers.¹²² The reports did not reflect the state-centric assumption that politics was a sham when it comes to the making of foreign policy.¹²³ On the contrary, the cabinets were perceived as having a free hand in the making of foreign policy. Thus, the establishment of cabinets comprised of politicians from parties more sympathetic to the Ottoman Empire was desired, and cabinets which were perceived as antagonistic to the interests of the Ottoman Empire were loathed.

We may argue that this perception vanished with the coming to power of the Young Turks.¹²⁴ The ultimate Western-skeptic and anti-imperialist Young Turks (very much like the distrustful sultan Abdülhamid II) denied any significant role to politics as they were sure that the Western powers were inherently Turcophobic and imperialist.¹²⁵ For them, political discourses were mere facades to deceive the naive old-school diplomats. The magical word “imperialism” rendered diplomatic and political maneuvers, dexterity, and compromises meaningless as the ultimate end of diplomacy was merely the implementation of the predetermined agenda of imperialism. Moreover, politics was also unnecessary as imperialism was (à la Lenin) one single program to be activated, and no small adjustment, alteration, or variation of it was possible. Diplomacy was a zero sum game. In the world of imperialism, it meant zero for the underdog, and one for the imperialist. It is true that as World War I approached, the contraction of international politics and tightening of alliances left no free space for political and diplomatic flexibility and maneuver. The complexities of the age of imperialism also made the makers of foreign policy incapable of deciding the track of foreign policy independently.¹²⁶ Moreover, the “political” lost its centrality in a time when economic and financial interests began to play a significant role in interstate relations. By then, the splendid days of the masters of diplomacy, such as Canning and Castlereagh, were long gone, especially after Wilhelm II deposed Bismarck for seeking *Weltpolitik*. Arguably, the Hamidian Ottoman diplomatic service was cognizant of this transformation of the style and conduct of foreign policy albeit with some delay and ambivalence.

Writing in 1910, Hayreddin Nedim’s acclaim of the art of diplomacy reflects the education of a diplomat having a nineteenth-century upbringing as observable in his recounting of the genius of Bismarck, one of the favorite and inspirational themes of the nineteenth-century diplomatic training.¹²⁷ Writing in a new age in which the delicacies of diplomacy were abandoned, Hayreddin Nedim praised Âli Pasha and Fuad Pasha, but above all the legendary Mustafa Reşid Pasha for their genius in diplomacy.¹²⁸ He epitomized the aristocratic culture of the nineteenth century with his reference system and his mental

framework, all imported from the nineteenth-century diplomatic/aristocratic culturalization, intellectual formation, and the arsenal of knowledge it nurtured.

To conclude, the ambassadorial reports which reflected less the personal opinions of the ambassadors and the ambassadorial scribes than the reiteration (and reproduction) of the official discourse, present us with some vistas of a particular political culture, socialization, and cultural formation. The dispassionate reports were produced not in Weberian bureaucratic offices, but in a highly personalized habitus. The content and priorities of the reports also manifested a worldview subsuming and amalgamating political and personal concerns. This cultural formation was constituted within an intimate relation established with a state that was in retreat and that had to be saved in order to maintain the moral universe that the authors of the reports subscribed to. This world was a bygone age by 1908 in some regards but was also constitutive of its afterlife in other aspects.

CHAPTER 5

THE MENTALITIES AND DISPOSITIONS OF THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE: THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION

An appraisal of the nineteenth-century Ottoman “bureaucratic mind” was presented in the previous chapters. The mind of the nineteenth-century diplomatic service was the epitome of the Ottoman bureaucratic mind. Moreover, it constituted one of the pillars of the Ottoman bureaucratic establishment and therefore bears the constitutive characteristics of the nineteenth-century Ottoman bureaucratic mind at its best. The Ottoman bureaucratic mind of the nineteenth century may be divided into four variants developed and based on the preoccupations and tasks assigned. The military, the civil administration, the diplomatic service, and the technical offices, such as the agricultural, forestry, and public construction offices, reflect varieties of the nineteenth-century Ottoman bureaucratic mind. Modernization, security, and incorporation into the “civilized world” were its coexisting preoccupations and concerns. All these bureaucratic offices prioritized some of these coexisting preoccupations and concerns due to their areas of responsibility and their daily encounters. Nonetheless, disregarding their immediate tasks, in their intellectual formations and

socialization, they shared the same ethos and the same worldview with nuances and variations developed due to their professional encounters and obligations. As a whole, these variations of the nineteenth-century Ottoman bureaucratic mind complement each other and constitute a meaningful overarching structure of mentality. Thus we have to perceive the ideological/intellectual/cultural formations of the Ottoman diplomatic establishment as a particular manifestation of the ideological/intellectual/cultural formation of the nineteenth-century Ottoman bureaucratic establishment.

Structures of such mentalities do not come out of a vacuum but are nurtured within a certain international political context. As has been stated, the zenith of the power and influence of the Ottoman diplomatic service was the early Tanzimat era until the 1870s. In these decades, an optimism regarding the future of the Ottoman realm led the Ottoman state to prioritize diplomacy as the crucial and main pursuit of the state. The Ottoman reforms were undertaken with the support and assurance of Britain, although British interference hindered it as much as encouraged it.¹ International diplomacy, reform, reorganization of the administration, and the suppression of local militarized powerhouses were four complementary undertakings which cannot be separated from each other. The Tanzimat reforms were derived and encouraged by prospects envisaged by the Ottoman leadership in the international scene.² Thus, the alliance during the Crimean War generated further optimism. However, after the disastrous 1877–8 Russian War, it became clear to Abdülhamid II and many Ottoman statesmen that it was seemingly impossible to keep the Empire intact by the use of only peaceful means and reform. Though Abdülhamid II was mastering the complex webs of diplomacy, a fatal threat loomed, and diplomacy was no more regarded as an effective mechanism and a guarantee for the survival and integrity of the Empire. Moreover, the early optimism regarding the administrative reforms conducted by the local and province-level offices waned. On the contrary, these efforts produced unforeseen and detrimental consequences. The Ottoman state could not accommodate the rising non-Muslim unrest and nationalism that were prompted by the Tanzimat reforms.³ The limits of the Tanzimat reforms convinced non-Muslims to rebuff the

Ottoman carrot and seek the advancement of their national/communal interests. In the eyes of the larger segments of non-Muslim communities, the Ottoman Empire promised no future (if it ever did in the eyes of these communities).

Due to the changing realities within the Ottoman territories and the international scene, new reflexes developed to encounter the changing (gloomy) conditions. Although diplomacy was at the very center of the Hamidian polity, diplomacy was relegated to a technical business. It ceased to be perceived as redemptive. In the reign of Abdülhamid II, diplomatic service was no more at the forefront of Ottoman statecraft. Abdülhamid II personally took over the "diplomatic front" and, during his reign, the sultan did not elevate men of diplomatic origins to loftier political posts. The statesmen he supported and preferred in his appointments were predominantly from non-diplomatic offices such as governors, officers, and fiscal administrators. He needed expertise and skills that were not possessed by diplomats but possessed by military officers, financial officials, and especially by governors, who gained an immense experience in silencing dissent in their provinces. Men from his personal retinue, such as Said Pasha and Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha, also rose to prominence in the Hamidian era.

Abdülhamid's neglect of the diplomatic service was so enormous that he appointed military men to most of the ambassadorial posts in the 1890s. His long-time ambassadors in Berlin (Tevfik Pasha), in St. Petersburg (Hüseyin Hüsnü Pasha), in Stockholm (Şerif Pasha), in Belgrade (İbrahim Fethi Pasha), in Cetinje (Ahmed Fevzi Pasha), and in Madrid (İzzet Pasha) were of military origin.⁴ Although the appointment of military officers to posts at Cetinje, Belgrade, and St. Petersburg are partially understandable, appointments of officers to posts in Stockholm and Madrid are hardly understandable. Appointment of an officer to Berlin leads us to assume that Abdülhamid's assessment of his cooperation with Germany was predominantly a military one. Furthermore, appointing people with a profound knowledge of military matters, rather than of diplomacy, reveals what kind of skills and expertise Abdülhamid II expected from the men whom he selected as his main sources of information and intelligence. In short, Abdülhamid's preference for military

officers displayed his prioritization of military over diplomatic affairs and the creeping militarization of diplomacy. Although classic diplomacy was meticulously pursued, Abdülhamid was aware that diplomacy not supported by a substantial military power with assets to be employed and manipulated in diplomatic bargaining was ineffective and futile.⁵ Thus, Abdülhamid switched to *Realpolitik* diplomacy from a post-Metternich–Castlereagh diplomacy in the age of Bismarck. More evidence that Abdülhamid II did not hold the professional diplomatic service in high regard can be derived from the fact that from the 1890s until his overthrow in 1908 he retained ambassadors for terms of 15 years due to their loyalty to the sultan. Most of the ambassadors he appointed in the 1890s kept their posts until the Revolution of 1908. Mehmed Rifat Bey in Athens served from 1897 to 1908. Ibrahim Fethi Pasha served as ambassador to Belgrade from 1897 to 1908. The list of the other long-serving Hamidian ambassadors with their years of service is as follows: Ahmed Tevik Pasha in Berlin, from 1897 to 1908; Hüseyin Kazım Bey in Bucharest from 1896 to 1908, Ahmed Fevzi Pasha in Cetinje from 1891 to 1908, Salih Münir Pasha in Paris from 1896 to 1908; Mustafa Reşid Pasha in Rome from 1896 to 1908, Şerif Pasha in Stockholm from 1898 to 1908; Mahmud Nedim Pasha in Vienna from 1896 to 1908.⁶ It is highly unreasonable to assume that Abdülhamid's confidence in them was based on merit. Seemingly, he appointed them because of their loyalty to him, and he did not risk appointing new representatives who might have been less loyal or less diligent. He personalized his relations with the ambassadors and conducted regular correspondence with them from the palace. Long tenures might also have helped the development of a mutual confidence and understanding between himself and the appointees. At least, this was what Abdülhamid II might have calculated. In short, we may argue that he sacrificed competent and dynamic diplomacy in favor of stability and confidence in his bureaucrats. In his personalized diplomacy, ambassadors began to write directly to the palace instead of addressing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The sultan gathered all the necessary information both from the embassies abroad and from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and then he formulated and implemented his complex foreign policies and maneuvers. From the flow of

information coming from embassies and ministry, as observed previously, it seems that domestic concerns were very prominent in the making of foreign policy.⁷ The threat of domestic instability and separatist agitation was a matter of primary concern. However, it has to be noted that Abdülhamid's militarized and security-centered diplomacy was less his personal preference than his reluctance to adapt to changing circumstances and respond to them.

The diplomatic service was no longer at the forefront of Ottoman reform and modernization, either. By the Hamidian era, early efforts to establish the modern governmental infrastructure had developed significantly. Modern forms of administration to regulate forests, agriculture, and metallurgy were all in the process of reaching maturity.⁸ All the relevant offices were institutionalized comprehensively and were able to improve in communication with the West without any external assistance. It was military ventures and military efforts to modernize the army that engendered, forced, and prompted Ottoman modernity, technology transfer, and importation of modern knowledge.⁹ The spectacular advancement of military technology and the new horizons in military organization in Europe after the 1870s were to be imported by the Ottoman Empire.¹⁰ It was no coincidence that the Young Turks, who made progress in the Hamidian era, captured the *mission civilisatrice* of the Ottoman Empire after 1908. The "military modern" of the late nineteenth century was to supplant the "nineteenth-century modern".

However, this does not mean that the military had grabbed the role of pioneers of modernization and transformed the mode of modernization. On the contrary, it was the changing and evolving perception of modernity that engaged the military. It was not the takeover of the Ottoman military that modified the track of Ottoman modernization, but it was the modification of the Ottoman modernizing mind that put the military in the driver's seat as far as statecraft was concerned. Partially, it was a response to international alignments and the rise of military superpowers, such as Germany and Russia (and Japan in the East). It was Abdülhamid II who spent an enormous amount of time strengthening the Ottoman military, and, ironically, as a reward for his efforts he was toppled by the military

he built. Arguably, it is not that the military seized power but that it was *bestowed* upon the military. It was the change of the times that had forced a transformation in the “modernizing ideal”, which was not merely an Ottoman phenomenon, but a continent-wide phenomenon.¹¹ Thus, a shift in the minds of the diplomats was also to be discerned. As we will observe below, the Ottoman diplomatic service also lost its confidence in the nineteenth-century concert of Europe of Metternich, Castlereagh, and “reform”.

Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu: A Liminal Diplomat

Galip Kemali was a complex figure embodying all the ambivalence and contradictions (from our point of view with a century of hindsight) of his time and the transformations his generation experienced. He was a liminal character reflecting the intertwinedness of nationalism, modernism, elitism, and Ottoman imperialism. In his mental framework, all these dispositions overlapped and coexisted. His memoirs are arguably one of the most insightful primary sources exposing the complexities and multidimensional structures of the mentalities of his time. This is seen not only in terms of the memoirs’ massiveness, but also in terms of its profound and multilayered nature.

Galip Kemali came from a local notable family in Kiğı in Eastern Anatolia: his forefathers had moved to Istanbul after serving in the provincial administration in Trabzon as the protégés of Halil Rifat Pasha when he was the governor of Trabzon. Galip Kemali was born in 1873 and joined the diplomatic service in 1892 upon his graduation from the *Mekteb-i Sultani*. His father, Ali Kemali Pasha, had served as the governor of Konya. Although he may be regarded as a high-ranking Tanzimat bureaucrat, Ali Kemali Pasha’s career path resembled the pre-Tanzimat pattern of career advancement before the formalization and regularization of the bureaucracy, which ceased to exist with the generation of Galip Kemali after the development and consolidation of training and merit-based recruitment and promotion. His uncle, İbrahim Edhem Pertev Pasha, served in various high positions, including Assistant Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs. His career in various postings in different governmental offices also resembled the pre-modern and pre-Tanzimat career pattern.¹² Thus, his father and uncle were among the last examples of pre-Tanzimat bureaucrats who rose not due to their formal education and slow advancement in the governmental offices, but due to connections and experience gained in office.

Having grown up in an atmosphere of parvenu aristocracy (local notables in the process of integrating into the imperial Tanzimat aristocracy), Galip Kemali emphatically endorsed the aristocratic culture he encountered in Istanbul. Although he belonged to the first generation of the family in terms of having a sound formal education unlike his autodidact father and uncle, he was a staunch defender of aristocratic exclusivity throughout his career and was uncompromising in his criticism of the failure to follow the aristocratic code of conduct in diplomacy. In his memoirs, Galip Kemali continually reminds his readers that diplomacy was not simply a matter of settling disputes and implementing policies, but also an art. Therefore, only those who possessed special qualities could be genuine diplomats. He was also a rigorous upholder of the standards of professionalism. He was disturbed by the dilettantism, impatience, and crude patriotism of the Unionists. While conceding that they were sincere patriots, Galip Kemali argued that they destroyed the Empire with their empty rhetoric.¹³ While he was ambassador to Athens, he was particularly disappointed with the obstruction of the Turco-Greek alliance he attempted to launch in order to counter the Slavic threat from the north. He was annoyed with the Unionists because of their obsession over Crete and their empty nationalist fervor that thwarted the forging of the Turco-Greek alliance in which Galip Kemali had full confidence. After the negotiations between Greece and the Ottomans collapsed, Greece aligned with the Balkan states, and this alliance cost the Ottomans severely in the Balkan Wars. For Galip Kemali, the Young Turks and their lack of insight into diplomacy were the chief culprits in this fiasco. Very critical of the nationalist arrogance of the Unionists and their obstruction of diplomatic pragmatism, he himself was no less nationalist or Turkist than the Unionists, as will be shown in the coming few pages.

He was also no less critical of the Republican establishment. For Söylemezoğlu, the diplomatic service's quality deteriorated drastically after World War I (meaning after the proclamation of the Republic) because of the employment of youths lacking respectable origins, manners, and sophistication.¹⁴ Writing his memoirs in the late 1940s during the liberalization of the public sphere, he criticized the abandonment of official uniforms by the Republic. Pointing out that even Bolshevik Russia reestablished official uniforms, particularly for the diplomatic service, he felt that it was not only helpful but imperative for Turkey to reestablish official uniforms for the diplomatic service.¹⁵ He suggested that "even the most democratic" countries were following the rituals of official garb and of bestowing and accepting badges. Apparently, what democratic meant for Galip Kemali was Republicanism and the culture of egalitarianism over aristocratic exclusivity. For Galip Kemali, aristocratic formalities and codes of conduct were the very thrust of diplomacy, and it was untenable to conduct diplomacy in their absence.¹⁶

Though he was a staunch advocate of the nineteenth-century European code of conduct, his Islamic upbringing and socialization also showed itself at times. One remarkable episode is the transformation of Galip Kemali's approach to the *fez* and hat as depicted in his memoirs. Before his first appointment abroad as secretary in the embassy to Bucharest, he was perturbed. "Until that time, I was instinctually disgusted with the hat. Like any other Turkish and Muslim child, my ears were ringing with the rhymes of 'whoever dons a hat, God forbid, becomes an infidel.' " Fortunately, before his departure to Bucharest, his pious father advised him that: "if you don a hat out of necessity, it is permissible. It is impermissible only if you don a hat as an imitation of the Westerners." Although convinced by the argument of his father, on the first day that he donned a hat while presenting himself to the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Romanian diplomatic establishment, he was very much embarrassed and distressed.¹⁷ But over time, he began to feel more comfortable without a *fez* on his head. He notes that before 1908, the *fez* was regarded as an indispensable part of the Ottoman official uniforms, but after 1908, he preferred not to don a *fez* and leave his head uncovered while he was in official garb.

Moreover, while ambassador to Athens, he encouraged and convinced a colleague of his to remove his fez in favor of a hat while socializing in Athens, assuring him that it was no sin to don a hat. Söylemezoğlu advised him that, "one has to follow the culture of foreigners when he is in their environment."¹⁸ We observe the transformation of Galip Kemali into a proud defender of the hat during his tenure in the diplomatic service; he came to see the hat as a sign of refinement and civilization. He began to attribute to the hat a symbolic (and positive) meaning in reaction to the resilient antagonism towards the hat, which Galip Kemali perceived as superstition.¹⁹

Apparently, the fez was a sensitive issue. It symbolized the very mark of Muslim identity while wearing a Western suit. It was regarded as the threshold of Muslimness. The astute resilience in defense of the fez and animus towards the hat display the contradictions and ambiguities which are consistent and totally explicable for their protagonists. The fez and hat duality conveys the liminality of the group we are investigating. The fez emerged as a sign of authenticity within full-fledged Westernization. It is also associated with notions such as honor and decency. The fez acquired an intense and resolute meaning independent of its own reality, and in donning it, a value system which was felt to be lost, was regained.

According to Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, a staunch defender of the hat, public consciousness, assured that no one could dare to don a hat in public.²⁰ İbrahim Hakkı Pasha was another outspoken and staunch defender of the hat from the diplomatic service and proudly defended his wearing of a hat during his Berlin tenure when he was grand vizier.²¹ Living in European countries, diplomats faced the challenge of the hat, and they ended up wearing hats and normalizing what had previously appeared to be taboo. They subsequently turned into open defenders of the hat by again imputing a profound symbolism to donning hats, that of being liberated from bigotry and obscurantism.²²

Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu's proposals to reform and restructure the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and diplomacy are also worth mentioning. Galip Kemali proposed recruiting diplomats from privileged families, as was the habitual practice in Europe. In his memorandum on the *Reform of Diplomatic Service* in 1909, he remarked that "like the other countries, the diplomats who will be appointed to the embassies

have to be from prosperous families.” He recommended that graduates of *Mülkiye* who wanted to serve in the Ministry should be employed as Ottoman representatives abroad without being paid any salary or allowance for one year. After completing one year in the embassies without any salary, they should be entitled to be third secretaries in the embassies. However, for one year they were to be paid only salary, not an allowance.²³ Apparently, this policy prevalent in European diplomatic services was a mechanism to eliminate those who could not support themselves and privilege those with financial means.

For Galip Kemali, diplomats have to be familiar with the European social codes (*adab-ı muşaret*) and with the codes of conduct of the European higher classes with whom they would be in contact throughout their diplomatic careers. For Galip Kemali, this was another reason why the diplomats had to come from respectable families. Only people from reputable families could easily socialize with the refined European classes. Abdülhak Hamid agreed heartily with Galip Kemali on this point. He wrote: “an ambassador has to be from the high classes of the society which he is supposed to represent and has to be a career diplomat. If an ambassador lacks these qualities, there would be a loss of prestige... There had been several cases in which ambassadors of secondary ranks were more esteemed and taken into consideration by the aristocracies, rulers, and governments to which they were appointed.”²⁴ For Abdülhak Hamid: “those ambassadors who lack social prestige are doomed to be failures. An ambassador has to be respected not only by the governments, but also by the social circles in which he is socializing. Otherwise, he will be unsuccessful (as a diplomat).”²⁵ Thus, “an official in an embassy either should come from an aristocratic background or should maintain an aristocratic outlook and attitudes.”²⁶

For Galip Kemali (and Abdülhak Hamid), the training of diplomats was also a major consideration. He resented the unsatisfactory level of the training of diplomats. After noting that the principal source of recruits for the diplomatic service was *Mekteb-i Sultani*, Galip Kemali argued that a higher college for further study was necessary for the graduates of *Mekteb-i Sultani* to be eligible for recruitment into the diplomatic service. He had in mind a part-time college of political science (*ulum-ı siyasi*). In the scheme proposed by Galip Kemali, youths

were to begin to work in the Ministry while attending the college until noon. They also had to be taught English or German as their second foreign language after French. Galip Kemali did not ignore the practicalities either. These youths also had to be introduced to the European diplomats in Istanbul, so that they would not feel ignorant of the European code of conduct.

In short, Galip Kemali emphasized “refinement” and “civility”. However, he was also very strict regarding the necessity of fostering the erudition of the Ottoman diplomatic service. He was disappointed with the miserable level of erudition therein. Nevertheless, in concluding his memorandum, Galip Kemali was optimistic. He believed that by training prospective diplomats in a distinguished college with an intense curriculum, teaching them the basics of politics, and integrating them into the European world of culture and mores, their skills and erudition would be enhanced. This would upgrade the sophistication of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Galip Kemali’s memorandum was consistent with the self-portrait he drew in his memoirs. He depicted himself throughout as a professional aristocrat. That is to say, in his self-representation, he was simultaneously very fastidious in maintaining the refined and socially exclusive nature of the craft of diplomacy and in the professionalization of this intellectually demanding occupation. He was a professional in the sense that for him one needed to be hard-working, if necessary working both day and night.

Interestingly, his memorandum resembles the reforms of the British and French Foreign Offices undertaken in the first decade of the twentieth century,²⁷ which all yearned for maximizing bureaucratic rationality and efficiency. Nevertheless, Galip Kemali also suggested retaining a culture of elitism and social exclusion, which the European reformist programs sought to diminish or even dared to eliminate. Galip Kemali, on the contrary, sought to formalize what was the *de facto* practice and maintained and evaded “democratic currents” which he found dangerous. Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu portrays himself as an aristocratic diplomat endowed with codes of courtliness. Yet, he was also a staunch Turkish nationalist on the fringes of xenophobia.

Galip Kemali's propaganda publication in French, *L'Assassinat d'un Peuple*,²⁸ written for the purpose of defending the rights of Turkey under occupation (in 1920), displays an amalgamation of different discourses: anti-imperialism, civilizationism, and Turkism. The pamphlet addresses Westerners and was written to unmask the hypocrisy of the West. He criticized the West for glorifying civilization and styling itself as the very embodiment of civilization, but ignoring the requisites of civilization when it comes to actual policy decisions. He criticizes the Western perception of Turks as barbarians and argues that the reality is just the opposite. He reminds the Western reader of the murdered, mutilated, and expelled Muslim civilian populace of Thrace and the atrocities perpetrated by Greeks, Serbs, and Bulgarians. For Galip Kemali, the European powers entertained an irrational historical animosity to Turks. The Europeans' unjustified actions and attitudes towards Turkey were inexplicable within the imperatives of *Realpolitik* alone. He tacitly associated the contemporary Western aggression with the Crusades (although not openly, given that he addresses a Western audience). He appealed to the conscience of the European audience and invoked the notion of Western civilization to convince them.

He clearly endorsed the Young Turk perception that the European aggression towards the Ottoman Empire was tantamount to a "modern crusade". In this view, imperialism, Europe, and Christianity became indistinguishable. He also equated Turks and Islam, and championed the innate anti-imperialism of this cultural/political entity as the eternal foe and diametrical opposite of the "toothless" Western civilization. For Şükrü Hanioglu, "besides its alleged immoral character... [Young Turks] maintained [that] European imperialism had a hidden Christian agenda."²⁹ The enmity between modern Western imperialism and Islam (led by the Turks) was rendered eternal (and thus rendered absolute and irreconcilable) by the metaphor of the Crusades.³⁰ The Turks emerged as the standard bearers and vanguard of Muslims in their (eternal) struggle against the West. The enmity of the Europeans did not originate from *Realpolitik*. It derived from historical animosities and was therefore a timeless and eternal antagonism that cannot be resolved by practical ceasefires and agreements.

Galip Kemali was more explicit in his memoirs in which he addressed a Turkish audience rather than the conscience of Westerners. In the memoirs and correspondence published after his propaganda pamphlet, he revealed that his disgust and abhorrence of the Western powers was immense. He was very much influenced by Unionist jargon.³¹ In these texts, Galip Kemali, the elegant aristocrat and imperial patriot, surrendered to vulgar nationalist rhetoric (with sycophantic praise of Mustafa Kemal): "After the Mondros Treaty, our most sacred rights were violated by the victorious states who claimed to draw their swords for rights and liberties...not only the independence but also the very existence of the seven-century old state and the illustrious Turkish nation which lived independently since the beginning of history and challenged the whole world was put into question."³² Luckily, "with an outrage, the great Turk showed the national faith in his heart and the immortal fervor in his soul and under the leadership of a genius, the Turkish nation fought back and survived."

Yet, the transformation of Galip Kemali into a crude nationalist was neither exceptional nor idiosyncratic. The recurring military and political defeats and the encroachment of the West and the non-Muslims instigated a fear that fomented a blatant and unapologetic nationalism. The change in the political elite with the Unionists replacing the Hamidian old guard also forced the old-timers to accommodate themselves. For example, Sami Paşazade Sezai, who had served in the ministry since 1885, had been a staunch defender and promoter of the "West" and "Western values", and had supported the incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the Concert of Europe (which he called a "Peaceful Conquest" *feth-i sulhperveri*),³³ also lost his enthusiasm for "Western civilization" during his ambassadorship in Madrid between 1914 and 1921 and after witnessing the occupation of Turkey in 1918.³⁴ After observing the policies of Britain in World War I, he began to associate the "West" with hypocrisy, and arch-imperialist Britain came to embody the essence of the hypocritical West.³⁵ Although he was previously critical of Christian prejudice and the double standards of the West, for him these were side issues not belying the superiority of Western values and political culture.

Abdülhak Hamid, the elegant aristocrat of the nineteenth-century Ottoman world, wrote with an anti-imperialist and anti-Christian fervor in 1924: "The ones who share most responsibility (for the decline of humanity and civility) are those who captured the most territories in the Great War. Yes, those plunderers and pirates... This cannibal wants to swim in the blood of Muslims. He enjoys eating Muslim flesh and even Muslim carcasses. In his eyes, no nation can have its own state and patrie except himself. Whenever he sees independence, freedom, and survival, he thinks of annihilating it and plundering it, destroying whatever the nation has."³⁶ In the anti-Western and anti-Christian tirade quoted above, he went as far as to dub European imperialism as "*dünyadaki vatanların en kabbe baini*" (the most whorish traitor of the fatherlands of the world). The Christian West as the eternal foe of the Muslim Turk emerged as an invented image rampant not only among the Young Turk generation, but also among the elder generation. Nevertheless, this imagery was much more profound in the new generation of the diplomatic service. The next generation of the Ottoman diplomatic service introduced young nationalist poets and men of letters. Müftüoğlu Ahmet Hikmet and Enis Behiç (Koryürek) were two gifts of the diplomatic service to nationalist literature.

The New Generation and Cumulative Radicalization

Ahmet Hikmet was born in 1870 with the background typical of the bulk of the diplomat service (a middle-level bureaucrat father serving in the provincial administration, a respectable genealogy going back to the Peloponnese, and himself born in Istanbul) and was a graduate of *Mekteb-i Sultani*, like most of his colleagues. He obtained his first appointments to Marseilles, Piraeus, and Poti in the Hamidian era. Later in his career, he was appointed ambassador to Budapest in 1916, apparently to fulfill his Turkist and Turanist ambitions. He was active in Turkist activities during his tenure in Budapest, enthusiastically participating in Hungarian Turanian circles and academic clubs. He died while serving as the ministerial undersecretary in 1926. Like

Abdülhak Hamid, today he is not known and remembered for his remarkable diplomatic career but for his literary output and his contribution to (nationalist) literature.³⁷

Enis Behiç belonged to a later generation.³⁸ Born in 1892, like Ahmet Hikmet he possessed the three indispensable attributes of the social and cultural background of a "typical" diplomat: he was fathered by a military doctor (a civil servant), was born in Istanbul, and was a graduate of *Mülkiye*. He entered the diplomatic service in 1913. Serving in mediocre posts abroad and in Istanbul, he is remembered mostly for his extremely nationalist poems. His poem *Kırmızı Şezlong* (Red Chair) was an outrageous anti-Semitic poem recounting the lives of a greedy Jewish speculator, Mişon, and his lustful wife, Rebeka, who deceived her husband. It portrays the Jewish characters as nasty, corrupt, and disgusting rascals. The motives for writing such a poem remain unclear given that no full-fledged anti-Semitism developed in the Ottoman Empire and that the chauvinistic animus of Turkish nationalism was then reserved for Christian ethnics. One explanation is that the anti-Semitism in this poem is a perfect illustration of the anti-Semitic themes then prevalent in *fin de siècle* France. It seems that Enis Behiç was influenced by European/French anti-Semite depictions of the time (rather than indigenous sources). Enis Behiç's oeuvre were sharply divided into two: highly individualistic poems reflecting the loneliness, failed aspirations, and the melancholy of the modern individual, and nationalist poems depicting war scenes in which victorious Turkish soldiers are seeking Turan or are about to reconquer lost Roumelia up to Budapest. Enis Behiç was definitely a "salon Turanist". By this time, the third generation of the Tanzimat, we meet a modern individual in the personality of Enis Behiç, with whom we share some of the same sensibilities and for whom we feel empathy. He was, at the same time, a Turkish nationalist as a product of his own times.³⁹ His nationalism is explicitly and blatantly secular. There is no sign of religion in his poems, whether they are nationalist or personal. His poems display how, in three generations, religion had gradually retreated and then vanished from the mental cosmology of the Ottoman bureaucrats.

Apparently as a general observation, Islam gradually turned to be a private matter in the minds and perceptions of the diplomats and the Ottoman bureaucrats. İbrahim Hakkı Pasha, the long-time legal counselor of the Foreign Ministry, perfectly epitomized this privatized and individualized understanding of Islam and faith. İbrahim Hakkı suggested that: "I don't pray five times [per day]...I do not infringe anybody's right. God forgives those acts committed against himself but does not forgive infringements of the rights of his subjects. Faith is in the heart. Islam is a matter of believing in the Almighty. This is its essence; rituals and obedience [to God] are means to that." (*Beş vakt de namaz kılamıyorum...Kimsenin hakkını gasb etmiyorum.Üstümde kul hakkı yoktur. Allah, kendi hakkını afv buyurur emma kulun hakkını afv etmez...İman kalbededir. Müslümanlık kelime-i şehadetten ibarettir...Esas budur, ibadat ve taat bunun fîru'udur*).⁴⁰ The members of the Hamidian diplomatic service were the first generation who retained and upheld their Islamic heritage but individualized, adjusted, and rationalized it.⁴¹ Arguably, with Enis Behiç's generation, indifference and disregard (if not hostility) to religion developed, and Islam was no more taken as a reference system.

As suggested previously, secularization as relativization and a decline in individual faith did not soften or prevent anti-Western animus. On the contrary, as observed in the many prominent modernist nationalists of the time, such as Ömer Seyfeddin and Galip Kemali, anti-Western sentiment and xenophobia were rampant. In fact, in Galip Kemali's case (as with any other member of his generation), xenophobia was enhanced by secularization. As monotheist universalism and morality vanished or were relegated to the private realm, the nation and national ethics/morality emerged as alternative and all-encompassing reference points. The extreme nationalism of the two close friends of Halid Ziya's,⁴² Reşid Safvet and Safveti Ziya, exemplify the third generation of the Tanzimat and the third generation of Tanzimat diplomats.

Reşid Safvet (Atabinen) did not get promising promotions. The highest posts he held were the first secretariat in the embassies to Bucharest, Washington, Madrid, and Teheran. He participated in the Lausanne Conference as the general secretary of the Turkish delegation.

He became a member of parliament in 1927, serving two terms. However, his major achievement was his foundation of TURING (Touring Club Turc) in 1923. Reşid Safvet was an impressive personality with various interests and talents. Halid Ziya remembers him as a young man, a minor official in the Regie, who was about to join the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and whose sole interest was reading books. Halid Ziya tells us that Reşid Safvet lived in an apartment in Akaretler, a quarter in the Westernized part of Istanbul, which was so full of books and dozens of notebooks that there was only enough empty space for his writing desk. According to Halid Ziya, he read whatever he found on history, sociology, philosophy, politics, and religion (but never literature). He never went out to socialize, slept little, and showed up in the office exhausted, but before his colleagues.⁴³ In short, Reşid Safvet was a man of his times, driven to learn and discover the whole new world in front of him. He exemplifies the new intellectual of the third generation of the Tanzimat who established for himself a completely new world and explicitly severed himself from the past, a move that is striking in this generation. He was a third generation Tanzimat figure like many others, fascinated with the enormity of Western knowledge and science. The encyclopedic curiosity of this new generation is embodied in his person.

Later in his life, Reşid Safvet produced numerous books in French, defending Turkey and Turks before the international public in such works as *Turcs et Arméniens Devant l'histoire: Nouveaux Témoignages Russes et Turcs sur les Atrocités*.⁴⁴ These publications demonstrated the outstanding contributions of Turks to world civilization⁴⁵ and adamantly defended the Turkish Historical Thesis in the heyday of the Kemalist regime. Reşid Safvet displays the contrast between the conspicuous Westernism in his lifestyle and his hatred towards the West. He adopted a fervent nationalist outlook, not unlike that of his colleagues Ahmet Hikmet and Enis Behiç. Yet, Reşid Safvet was also a *bon vivant* and loved the good life. The son of Saffet Bey, a prominent musician in the Imperial Orchestra and the first Muslim to conduct the Imperial Orchestra, he came from a prosperous family (including his uncle, Hüseyin Hasib Efendi, Ottoman diplomat and ambassador to Teheran between 1909 and 1912⁴⁶) and married the granddaughter of Rıza Pasha, Abdülhamid's chief of staff.

He provided the demimonde in the marginalized and déclassé Istanbul of the Republic with various entertainments mimicking the grandeur of the imperial Istanbul of yesteryear.⁴⁷ Yet, his hedonism did not impede or temper his rhetoric of extreme and obsessive Turkism. He also volunteered to be an apparatchik of the Republican regime in Ankara. Nevertheless, the idiosyncratic playboy of the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs seemed to have his counterparts in other European diplomatic services. For Vladimir Lambsdorff, a diplomat serving the Russian Foreign Ministry, “the court had ‘the character of a café’, the Yacht Club was a ‘temple of idleness’ and much of the aristocracy was ‘...a clique of which the court and the circle of profligates and idlers called ‘society’...the Foreign Ministry was indeed not only the focus of Lambsdorff’s professional skills and energies but also his home and his ‘fatherland’, whence he drew most of his personal friendships...”⁴⁸

Safveti Ziya was one of the major figures of the *Edebiyat-ı Cedide* (New Literature) influenced by French poetry and literature of the late nineteenth century. A man of exquisite manners and elegance, Halid Ziya described his artistic and bohemian worlds and circles. Coming from a respectable Istanbul family which sent many of his members to the privileged offices in the government, for Safveti Ziya life meant good food, good clothing, spending money, and all kinds of luxury. In the account of Halid Ziya, he was well-known for frequenting the trendiest venues in Pera in order to be close to beautiful women. In the extravagant lines of Halid Ziya, he danced the best, spoke the most fluent French and English, and was the most handsome. In short, Safveti Ziya was a prototypical dandy. Nevertheless, his eccentric lifestyle did not obstruct his successful career. At the time of his sudden death (aged 54 in 1929), he had just been appointed as ambassador to Czechoslovakia after serving as the director of protocol of the Ministry. He died during a party at the Yacht Club in Principio. Safveti Ziya lived well, dined well, and died well. Apparently, he belonged not to the Tanzimat generation, but to a new generation with different socialization and mores.

He was, like his other colleagues, a passionate Turkist and Westernist. His novel, *Salon Köşelerinde*, was originally “published in ... Servet-i Fünun, told the story of a ‘Europeanized’ Ottoman man who socialized

in the foreign quarters of Istanbul and tried to prove by waltzing like a European that he was 'civilized' to an English girl with whom he had fallen in love. The protagonist of the novel writes that, '... I changed my plan of action, thinking that it would be necessary to prove to an English girl and an English family that Turkishness within a society is not an example of barbarity, but an adornment, and that the Turks too are a civilized nation.' Even in this non-political, romantic novel, the Europeanized character, who was ready to accommodate to European culture, exhibited a reactionary attitude to the European perception of the Turk and fought against this 'misperception' by dancing."⁴⁹ At the beginning of the novel, the author voices his regrets at Turks' failure to dance elegantly and hopes that one day Turks will excel in European dances.⁵⁰ Safveti Ziya was encouraged to write this book by Ahmet Hikmet, who opined, "how great it would be if you account for your experiences in the salons and high society with regard to our nation. No such work has been yet written."⁵¹ Apparently, both Safveti Ziya and Ahmet Hikmet perceived personal encounters with Westerners within a political prism. The politicization of every sphere of private life was an aspect of the third generation of the Tanzimat.⁵² Whereas Westernization and expressions of Westernization had been confined to politics, intellectual activity, and professionalism, there existed in the first and second generations of the Tanzimat a demarcation between Westernization for public display and a well-preserved traditionalism in intimate culture and in the private sphere.⁵³ With the third generation of the Tanzimat, we observe the Westernization of every sphere of life, and every sphere became a contested zone of nationalism in which national displays and national enmities became ubiquitous.⁵⁴

Safveti Ziya, like many of his generation, defined Turkishness with reference to individual attributes and developed a Turkish nationalism to challenge and outdo the Europeans. Safveti Ziya's book, *Adab-ı Muâşeret Hasbihalleri* (Conversations on Good Manners), published in 1927, was another exposure of the prioritization of the national identity within daily social interactions. Safveti Ziya encouraged Turkish youth to participate in the rebirth of the Turkish nation by adopting the code of conduct of civilized societies and nations.⁵⁵ In his "guide book", Safveti Ziya gave particular importance to the role of women

within polite society. For him, respect towards women was an important sign of the degree of the civilized nature of a nation. For him, the code of good conduct and politeness was first and foremost a matter of national dignity. The subsuming of the personal manners and codes of conduct of individuals was an extreme example of the politicization and nationalization of individual lives.

Definitely, these men had different mores and a different reference system from their predecessors. We observe the emergence and development of a new intellectual/cultural formation subsuming a particular national imaginary, a secularized worldview, and a militarized political imagination, not unlike the new generations in conflict with their “fathers” observed in late czarist Russia and Europe in general.⁵⁶

Accommodating the New Times

Galip Kemali's aforementioned pamphlet in defense of the nation under attack was not unique. Two years earlier, Alfred Rüstem Bey, another senior Ottoman diplomat, published a tract in Bern in French to counter Armenian allegations and to address Western public opinion regarding the Armenian massacres.⁵⁷ The text was conspicuous in the sense that its author was an Ottoman diplomat born in Turkey of Polish origins, whose father was also a diplomat, who converted to Islam after immigrating to the Ottoman Empire from Russian-occupied Poland. Ahmed (Alfred) Rüstem Bey was acquainted with Western knowledge and Western intellectual erudition thanks to his Polish origins. In his tract, after denying the accusations regarding the Armenians, Ahmed Rüstem pointed to the hypocrisy of the West.⁵⁸ He recounted the atrocities Britain perpetrated in its colonies. Not restricting himself to conventional anti-imperialist rhetoric, he also exposed British brutality in Ireland and condemned British policies there.⁵⁹ Not unexpectedly, he did not fail to mention the brutality of imperial Russia in Poland both during its occupation throughout the nineteenth century and during World War I. Questioning the credibility of those who themselves were the perpetrators of unspeakable crimes, he related the charges of the Allies to their perpetual hatred

of the Turks.⁶⁰ Regarding the Armenian events, Ahmed Rüstem acknowledged the tragedy Armenians had suffered during World War I, but he subsequently pleaded with the Europeans to acknowledge the great suffering Turks also experienced during World War I.⁶¹ Moreover, for Ahmed Rüstem, the responsibility for this tragedy lay with the Armenian revolutionary committees, who attempted to mobilize the gullible Armenian masses against Turkish rule.

Ahmed Rüstem represents a complex but characteristic post-Unionist Turkish nationalism. The text was in some ways emblematic of the Turkish nationalism of his time. On the other hand, some of its idiosyncratic aspects reflect his European origins and the formation of nineteenth-century Polish liberal nationalism. It is striking to observe how his Polish Russophobia easily rendered him a sincere Turkish nationalist resenting the hypocrisy of Europeans and European liberalism. He arrived at an anti-imperialist stance with different motivations and from different origins than the Unionist anti-imperialism. His anti-imperialism was compatible with the European political language and vocabulary. Unlike many Unionist or quasi-Unionist texts and pamphlets, Ahmed Rüstem did not abandon the rhetoric of rights and liberties. On the contrary, he repeatedly reiterated his allegiance to humanitarian values and argued that his criticism was directed at those who were hypocritical and insincere in defending rights and liberties. Thus, he did not renounce the premises and ideals of nineteenth-century liberalism. Nevertheless, one can easily observe that his disillusionment with the West engendered a transformation in his belief in rights and liberties as well. The surge of his anti-imperialistic views was prompted by Russian expansionism towards Poland, the support the British gave to the Russians in the war, and the atrocities Russians committed against Polish civilians during World War I. This background led him to endorse and internalize the Turkist and Islamic anti-imperialism of the Unionists. The Polish aristocrat was forced to speak the language of a Roumelian upstart merging his nineteenth-century liberal language with the Unionist anti-Western ethos.

As suggested above, the years in which Galip Kemali and Ahmed Rüstem composed their French propaganda texts were traumatic.

It was the time when the last bastion of Turkishness was occupied and humiliated. Another propaganda text with the same overtones was composed by Ahmed Rıza, a figure who distanced himself from the Unionists after 1908. Ahmed Rıza, the arch-secularist, depicted the current situation as a crusade and an episode in the eternal struggle between Islam (and Turks as the banner of Islam) and the treacherous, barbaric West.⁶²

The deterioration of the once-gentlemanly Ottoman civil officialdom, which was a product and unique composite of Westernization and the classical Ottoman *efendi* tradition, was dramatic. Nevertheless, officials who became prominent political figures after 1908 but before the Young Turks assumed direct control of cabinets, such as Ahmed Tevfik Pasha, and İbrahim Hakkı Pasha, kept their distance from the new radicals of the time. They were the last ones to defend and uphold the *Bab-ı Ali* tradition.

Voices From the Tomb?

Hayreddin Nedim Bey's 1910 book on diplomacy consummately reflected nineteenth-century diplomatic socialization and its intellectual/mental build-up as it coalesced with Tanzimat's official discourse. Hayreddin Nedim's account of nineteenth-century Tanzimat diplomacy was laudatory. His praise of the Tanzimat was not limited to its achievements in diplomacy. For Hayreddin Nedim, Mustafa Reşid Pasha was a man of extraordinary gifts, and every Ottoman should be grateful to him.⁶³ This was especially so because he achieved the introduction of Ottomans into the concert of Europe as a reputable member of the club.⁶⁴ Reviewing the close relations Tanzimat statesmen developed with France and Britain as a safeguard against the Russian danger, he noted that diplomacy and the diplomatic skills of statesmen were crucial in the making of international politics and that the Tanzimat statesmen did an excellent job in upholding the Ottoman Empire via diplomacy. He emphasized that the conduct of diplomacy predominantly rested upon personal skills and qualities.⁶⁵ Thus, Hayreddin Nedim regretted that Ottoman diplomats and statesmen did not write their memoirs as their European colleagues did. Impressed with the

careers and accomplishments of prominent European diplomats who mastered their craft and inspired diplomats such as himself, he studied them by reading their memoirs or those written by their colleagues. Thus, he wrote his book to display the laudable deeds of Tanzimat diplomats and statesmen. Apparently, Hayreddin Nedim saw himself and his fellow Ottoman diplomats and statesmen as part of the post-Vienna Congress European diplomatic family. In short, the intellectual cosmos of Hayreddin Nedim illustrates the emblematic Tanzimat diplomat loyal to the premises and principles of the Tanzimat and determined to invigorate the Ottoman Empire within the concert of nineteenth-century Europe. That is, in Hayreddin Nedim, the Congress of Vienna went hand in hand with the Tanzimat as if they complemented each other. He was a believer in the ideal of a peaceful Europe in which an enlightened Ottoman Empire participated as an equal member. His ideal coincided with the ideals of the British, French, and Austrian diplomatic establishments. In fact, his ideals (and Tanzimat ideals in general) were partially derived from the ideals and premises of the nineteenth-century European *ancien régime*.

In another book of his on the Crimean War, which he published in the same year, he regretted the collapse of the British/French alliance with the Ottomans, which was forged during the Crimean War and sealed by the Paris Treaty. Surprisingly, Hayreddin Nedim put the blame on both sides instead of indicting Britain unilaterally, as his Ottoman contemporaries had. He criticized the Ottoman party for not fulfilling the commitments and reforms it had promised and criticized the British/French for their indifference to and neglect of the injustices that Turks and the Muslim population had suffered. Another astonishing commentary developed by Hayreddin Nedim was with regard to Ottoman–Russian relations. Observing the Russian aggression towards the Ottomans, he claimed that the best interests of these two “great nations” were to be in an alliance and peace.⁶⁶

Salih Münir Pasha, one of the most reputable (or notorious in the eyes of the Young Turks) diplomats of the Hamidian *ancien régime*, in his book on Russian foreign policy published in Lausanne in 1918 while he was in exile, reconstructs the course of the history of the Tanzimat as the lethal struggle between hostile and expansionist Russia and the

defensive Ottomans. He perceived the Russian drive to the south as an expansion (rather than imperialism) and saw the Eastern Question primarily as a diplomatic entanglement. According to his account, whereas all the internal disorders of the Ottoman Empire perpetrated by Christian groups were either instigated or manipulated by the Russians, all the Tanzimat policies whether concerning international diplomacy, administrative reform, or military action were undertaken to encounter this many-headed threat. In Salih Münir Pasha's account, Britain and France appear as bystanders during Russian aggression. Although they also advanced their interests in the Ottoman Empire and espoused the causes of the "oppressed Christians"⁶⁷ (mainly stemming from the pressure of public opinion and Christian prejudice) to the detriment of the Ottomans, their role remained secondary in contrast to the Russian menace. Defining diplomacy as "distinguishing between friendly and hostile states...to maintain the well-being of the people and foster the advancement (*terakki*) of the state,"⁶⁸ Salih Münir's approach to international relations is arguably within the world of the post-Bismarckian European order and epitomizes a transitional perspective.

Lütfi Simavi, a diplomat who served in various posts as Ottoman consul, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Istanbul, and as the undersecretary of the embassy to St. Petersburg before his appointment as the Lord High Chamberlain⁶⁹ of Mehmed Reşad, was another voice from the tomb. Appointed to the palace chamberlainship, he was perturbed at the prospect of having to move from Europe to an archaic court and palace.⁷⁰ In fact, what was expected from him was to modernize the imperial rituals and adapt them to European court ceremonial.⁷¹ What Lütüf Simavi did, according to his memoirs and his account, was to blend traditional Ottoman rituals and the modern European court ceremonial and invent an Ottoman imperial pageantry and imperial public display.⁷² He administered Mehmed Reşad's public and ceremonial appearances. For this task, he benefited from his immense knowledge of European imperial and official ceremonies and the code of conduct, knowledge of which he was extremely proud. Using Mehmed Reşad, Lütüf Simavi attempted to invent an Ottoman imperial pomp and pageantry in line with and in competition with

European imperial pomp and rituals. The low profile character and humility of Mehmed Reşad (in contrast to the pomposity of his predecessor, Abdülhamid II) was suitable for this newly defined and appropriated role.

Although for Lütfi Simavi, Ottomanism encompassed the non-Muslim,⁷³ the Muslim and Turkish character of Ottoman imperialism was not to be marginalized or obscured. On the contrary, its Muslim/Turkish character was outspokenly expressed within the refashioned imperial ritualism. The new manifestation of the Ottoman imperium was to include non-Muslims, but it would not renounce its Islamic heritage completely. The Muslim/Turkish character of the imperium was deemed not disquieting and threatening in the eyes of non-Muslim Ottoman co-citizens. For Lütfi Simavi, the new imperial display should proudly reflect the heritage and splendor of the classical age of the Ottoman Empire.⁷⁴ In short, Lütfi Simavi tried to invent the Ottoman imperium as the very symbol and embodiment of an Ottoman patriotism, to be endorsed enthusiastically by non-Muslims and to be glorified by the Muslims/Turks.⁷⁵

Lütfi Simavi was critical to the developments that commenced with 1908. He was not only removed from the vigilance and nationalism of the Unionists (although he was appointed by them for his modernist credentials), but their socialization and acculturation were alien to him. He had legal reservations about post-1908 politics as well. He was critical of the appointment of members of parliament to ministries.⁷⁶ He pointed to the technical problems it may cause. He argued that the Ottoman Empire moved from absolute monarchy to absolute parliamentarianism, which rendered parliament omnipotent. For him, this aberration stemmed from the habit of imitating the French, and he reminded his readers that absolute parliamentarianism was a French practice. He argued that the French model was one of various alternatives and certainly not a suitable one in the Ottoman context. In this system, the ministers and prime ministers were to be elected from the parliament. The principal problem with the appointment of members of parliament to ministries and the Prime Ministry was that most members of parliament did not possess any prominent official titles. However, in the Ottoman tradition and political culture, Ottoman

ministers and prime ministers had to possess titles and had to come from a socially privileged background. They were to be addressed with deference and held in high esteem. If they were to be given titles because of the importance of the Prime Ministry, then still it would not be appropriate because the titles would have to be revoked after the officials no longer held office. It would be inappropriate for an ex-prime minister not to carry a lofty title, and, moreover, it would be embarrassing for an ex-prime minister to have to work to make a living, e.g., to work as a lawyer and live as a humble man. He wrote that in France neither the presidents of the state nor the prime ministers were given any titles. Presidents of the state were not even officially entitled *Excellency*. If prime ministers were to be elected from among members of parliament, this would create a problem of authority and respect. In short, for Lütfi Simavi the republicanism of the French political system was not to be replicated in a political structure and culture completely alien to it. Apparently, the concerns and priorities of Lütfi Simavi were alien to the Young Turks, who had different concerns and priorities. Lütfi Simavi cultivated a contemptuous attitude towards the Young Turks.⁷⁷ Thus, Lütfi Simavi, who came from a reputable family,⁷⁸ is an example of a loyalist and liberal/conservative imperial aristocrat whose loyalty was not to the monarchy *per se*, but to the idea that the monarchy represented or should have represented in a constitutional monarchy. He also entertained an avowed civilizationist commitment to the values of the nineteenth-century European order.⁷⁹

Nevertheless, the traditional nature and characteristics of the diplomatic service as a “voice from the tomb” and the survival of the nineteenth-century European gentlemanly statesman ideal lived on in the names of Ahmet Tevfik Pasha and Mehmet Rifat Pasha, the ambassadors to London and Paris in the Unionist government. The appointment of Mehmed Rifat Pasha as the Minister of Foreign Affairs after serving one year as the ambassador to London was welcomed by the British as “the only safeguard for the dubious British orientation of the new Cabinet.” But it was noted by the British ambassador, Lowther, that: “His capacity to cope with the CUP was also in doubt.” In his reply, the permanent undersecretary Hardinge concurred. The new regime was “gradually tending to a military despotism of a nationalist

and chauvinistic character.”⁸⁰ Mehmed Rifat served for two years as the Minister of Foreign Affairs without much say in foreign policy decisions. After his appointment as ambassador to Paris in 1911, he continued to be neglected by the Unionist leadership like Ahmed Tevfik Pasha, the ambassador to London. Mallett, the British ambassador just after the beginning of World War I, related that: “If Tewfik had had control of Turkish policy, there would be no war with Turkey now.” But Tewfik was poorly regarded by the Young Turks, as was Rifat in Paris, and during most of October he obtained no replies to the numerous letters in which he had urged the Porte to abandon its policy, which as he had told Nicolson “must inevitably end in disaster for the country.”⁸¹

Ahmed Reşid (Rey) also agreed with the observation made by the British embassy. In the homage he wrote after the death of Rifat Pasha in *Servet-i Fînnun* in 1925, he pointed out the resentment that Rifat Pasha harbored towards Enver and his cronies.⁸² Apparently, it was not a coincidence that the Unionists preferred to appoint aged, pro-Entente (Anglophile and Francophile), and experienced diplomats to these capitals. While the Young Turk leadership pursued its own agenda in sympathy with revisionist and adventurist Germany, these ambassadors tried to co-opt and assuage the traditional powerhouses of Europe.⁸³ However, by 1914 their efforts proved to be futile as the pro-German orientation of the Young Turks progressed and negotiations with Britain and France collapsed.

The Unionist Generation

It is legitimate to question whether these idiosyncratic personalities were representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a whole. Some anecdotal evidence may also be gathered from otherwise unknown officials of the lower ranks, such as the comments of Mehmed Ali Bey, the secretary of the Bern embassy in 1917, who made a racist remark regarding the Armenians to his German counterpart.⁸⁴ A cumulative radicalization was not limited to the diplomatic service, but was observable in other Ottoman government offices as well.⁸⁵ In short, we may observe that there was an apparent radicalization of diplomats

with the coming of the third generation of the Tanzimat in line with the pattern observable for the Ottoman political, intellectual, and bureaucratic elite in general. These third generation diplomats did not share much with their elder colleagues. The radicalization had three manifestations: nationalism, secularism, and modernism. These three traits of radicalization complemented and consolidated each other. Nevertheless, a resistance to the radicalization within the ministry was observable. The ministry, like its counterparts in Europe, was one of the most conservative, exclusive, and elitist offices within the Ottoman bureaucracy. Of course, the diplomats were not in a position to influence the decision-making process except by providing the flow of information from European capitals and providing legal and technical support. The old-guard diplomats were contemptuous of the amateurishness and coarseness of the Young Turks.⁸⁶ Moreover, the Ministry had to be cautious and evade tensions. However, it must be said that resistance was limited to the shifting mentalities and orientation of foreign policy. Disillusionment with long-trusted Britain was a significant factor in this process.⁸⁷ This radicalization was not simply intrinsic to, but derived from, the transformation of the Ottoman Muslim elite and a distinctive Ottoman mental evolution, as well as being a part of the radicalization of the European mind and ideologies in general in the age of Nietzsche.⁸⁸ This transformation was a generational phenomenon. The younger diplomats socialized in a milieu which forced them to maintain radical political stances. Thus, instead of speaking of a Unionist political leadership or ideological disposition, we may speak of a quasi-Unionist generation capturing the minds and souls of a particular generation.⁸⁹

Recently, conventional assumptions of the discipline of international relations have been criticized.⁹⁰ International relations' isolation from the other disciplines of social science came to an end, and it was integrated into the larger framework of the social sciences. Critical of the conventional paradigms of international relations and rejecting approaching states as "black boxes", constructivists in international relations argued: "(1) that the structures of human association are determined by shared ideas rather than material forces, and (2) that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by

these shared ideas rather than given by nature.”⁹¹ Therefore, within the constructivist paradigm, foreign policy orientations and international alignment preferences are determined not merely by *Realpolitik* and the “supreme interests of the nation” but by ideologies and perceptions determined by the social and cultural backgrounds of the foreign policy elites.⁹² Foreign policy considerations are (to a certain extent) reflections of struggles between elites and between different social amalgamations.

In the case of pre-World War I Ottoman priorities, we can clearly observe that the difference regarding foreign policy orientations stemmed from diverging class origins and mentality structures. The upstart and radical revolutionary Young Turks, who detested the status quo, perceived an alignment with revisionist Germany and Germany’s drive to demolish the European conservative status quo designed by Britain and France as germane to their endeavor to undermine the Ottoman establishment and its political culture. Needless to say, Young Turk ideological dispositions (and those of the Young Turk generation as a whole) were compatible with the German radical/militarized modernist vision (especially rampant among the German general chiefs of staff) which on the eve of World War I was in the process of escalation.⁹³ In contrast, the old guard, having faith in the nineteenth-century conservative, optimistic belief in order and progress, remained aloof from Germany’s revisionism and felt close to the conservative international order orchestrated by Britain. They also kept faith in resolving matters by diplomacy, a view not shared but detested by the Young Turks (in the age of imperialism). The Hamidian establishment was defensive within these changing circumstances, resisting the rising new generation with its different agenda and social background. It was in their interest to cling to an order in which they could safeguard themselves. The old world was a world they knew and a world in which they felt secure and content.

Apparently, in terms of domestic politics, Germany embodied the arch-conservative order as portrayed by Wehler, Mommsen, and others. However, with regard to international politics, German militarism was the revolutionary/revisionist force threatening the European conservative order and the status quo. It was Great Britain that was desperate

to defend the international order and resist any change. That is to say, the political regime of Germany was contradicted by its international aspirations. Nevertheless, this does not mean that political stances and international visions necessarily contradict each other ideologically. On the contrary, they manifest an affinity. The expansionism of conservative Germany led the political regime to develop a vision of total war during World War I by organizing society as a military asset in the service of the military,⁹⁴ and it transformed itself into a radical and revolutionary state in two decades. This is not to say that this transformation was inherent in the Prussian order, but it is an example of how interactions between the level of international politics and domestic politics influence and shape each other. The revisionist zeal in terms of international politics restructured Germany as a militarized autocracy in which the military and the newly rising classes were in the ascendancy by 1914.⁹⁵

It was equally true for the Ottomans. The revisionism of the Young Turks on the international level led them to endorse a radical and modernist agenda and policy program. Such a comprehensive vision was quite different from the dispositions of those who were not pursuing territorial revisionism and who were eager to accommodate the international order as long as the much-feared collapse of the Empire was avoided. Therefore, whereas the Young Turks allied with Germany (although this was not their original intention), others aspired to side with Britain and France even after the outbreak of World War I. Apparently, the Young Turks' association with Germany was not limited to a political alliance. It was the German vision with which they were fascinated.⁹⁶ The same was true for the pro-English and pro-French old guard and the opponents of the Unionists (as well as pro-British and pro-French Unionists, such as the liberal Minister of Finance, Cavid Bey), who were pursuing a moderate political stance (arguably both for their class interests and due to their political socialization).

Although such orientations may derive from formations that developed based on class backgrounds, aspirations, and identities, once they are developed, they surpass social differences and socialization. The sons of old Istanbuliots and diplomats of the new generation who came from socially exclusive backgrounds were also heavily influenced and

molded by the new radicalism. As argued in the previous chapters and in this chapter, this was a generational phenomenon determined by interacting complex dynamics (surpassing class interests). As the new intellectual historians and new cultural historians have shown, patterns and structures of mentalities were formed, constructed, and developed within certain milieus, and subsequently these structures of mentalities also stimulate and transform their surroundings.

The Problem of Generations: A Key to the History of the Late Ottoman Empire?

Arguably, the world of the Tanzimat can also be understood by taking ideal-type generations into consideration. Generation is a concept that seemingly refers to our individual daily lives, unlike lofty social concepts such as class, bureaucracy, status, and stratification. However, early experiences and particular modes of socialization in particular periods are crucial for the formation and development of individuals and constitutive of pervasive and shared mindsets. It is possible that a person who is a member of a certain generation has more affinity with his coevals than his parents regardless of differences of class, status, etc. However, it is also important to point out that a generation does not automatically include any person who is born within a certain time range. Generations are also class-bound. Generation is an idea and a cultural concept. Therefore, generations are exclusive rather than inclusive. For example, Robert Wohl defines the generation of 1914 as follows:

In early twentieth century Europe generationists [generation of 1914] were almost always literary intellectuals living in large cities. They were members of a small elite who were keenly aware of their uniqueness and proud of their intellectual superiority. What concerned these writers or would-be-writers was their declining culture and the waning of vital energies; what drove them together was the desire to create new values and to replace those that were fading; what incited them to action was the conviction that they represented the future in the present.⁹⁷

Paradoxically, the generation of 1914 simultaneously subsumed all Europe by surpassing national borders and excluding many of the layers and cultural formations of Europe. Likewise, the Tanzimat generations were also simultaneously exclusive and inclusive. In short, generations do matter.⁹⁸ Generation is a historical category constructed within social and political circumstances rather than a cultural conceptualization. In this regard, some generations are “more generations” than others in the sense that they reveal particular characteristics differentiating them from others. This is particularly so when history accelerates. Certain time periods witness drastic changes and transformations brought forth by certain generations. It is important to point out that generation is a modern concept, meaningful only in the context of the modern age in which time accelerates and the sharp discrepancies between fathers and sons become insurmountable. The first Tanzimat generation was arguably the first generation *per se* in Turkish/Ottoman history that envisioned an intentional and dramatic break from their fathers’ practices and mental cosmologies. As Wohl points out, “Historical generations are not born; they are made.”⁹⁹ The second Tanzimat generation and Hamidian generations were more “humble generations” in terms of their self-consciousness of their own generation and of their displaying the characteristics of a generation. The Young Turk generation (subsuming the young officials of the late Hamidian era) exemplifies a conscious and tremendous rejection of the values, codes, and mentalities of their fathers.

As pointed out above, generational politics cannot be isolated from social changes and transformations. The reshaping of class structures and the export of new thoughts gave rise to the emergence of a new politics and new social, political, and philosophical cosmologies. For example, Peter Wien illustrates a similar contrast in Iraq in the interwar period. Wien demarcates between the old-school “Sherifian generation” of officers in conflict with the coming radical nationalist “Young Efendiyyah” generation sympathetic to Germany and inclined to fascism. As Wien defines them, the members of the Sherifian generation/class: “regard themselves as an elite of Arab nationalism. Many of them had received an elevated military education at the Ottoman Staff College in Istanbul and had learned Western languages...The Sherifian officers

had managed to enter the old urban landholding elite through shady moves in legislation, and thus the old and new urban landlords had the upper hand.”¹⁰⁰ For Wien, the Sherifian officers who constituted the ruling conservative elite compromised with the landholding Sunni elite. In contrast, the Young Efendiyya were: “educated in the newly established nationalist schooling system...they challenged the ruling elite of the 1920s. They were disappointed by the collaboration of the Sherifians with the Mandate Power and by their abuse of power...Instead of the conciliatory and pro-British inclination of the Sherifian elite, the Young Efendiyya absorbed ‘Western Ideas’ and ideologies as they were transported as translations in the press and on the book market.”¹⁰¹ In short, generations are sets where class, status, social backgrounds, and age-groups intersect, and are therefore salient social formations themselves.¹⁰² As argued above, the Hamidian generation represented the apex of the imperial elite at a time when the limits of conservative liberal politics became apparent and the Empire was failing to respond to the demands of its constituents. It is no coincidence that in these conditions, the last imperial generation was aggressively brought down by the first generation of the nation.

To conclude this chapter, because generations are not solely determined by time, but also by class and socialization, it has to be noted that these clusters of generations were actually restricted to small elites. In fact, the Tanzimat era constitutes a process of elite-formation and elite-expansion. The Tanzimat (and Hamidian) generation paved the way for the emergence of a new generation that I call the Unionist generation. Nevertheless, the Tanzimat generation did not die leaving no trace. On the contrary, its worldviews, premises, and cultural and intellectual formations made a decisive impact upon subsequent generations.

CHAPTER 6

THE EUROPEAN PATTERNS AND THE OTTOMAN FOREIGN OFFICE

The End of the Old Order and the Old Diplomacy

Resenting the decline of the influence of the Foreign Office over policy making and criticizing the ignorance of the political elite of Britain regarding international affairs, Permanent Undersecretary Hardinge wrote to Buchanan, the British ambassador to St. Petersburg, in 1917: “We have two diplomacies – one the Foreign Office and the other ‘amateur,’ running side by side.”¹ Harold Nicolson, one of the foremost historians and scholars of diplomacy and himself an eminent diplomat in the service of the Foreign Office, narrates several witty anecdotes to demonstrate the amateurishness of the leaders participating in the Paris Peace Conference: “Addressing the House of Commons on April 16, 1919, he [Lloyd George] made the following frank, modest, and eminently reasonable statement: ‘How many members have ever heard of Teschen? I do not mind saying I had never heard of it.’ Obviously, no more than seven members of the House of Commons could ever have heard of that remote and miserable duchy, yet Mr. Lloyd George’s admission of that fact struck horror into the heart of those specialists, such as Mr. Wickham Steed, who had been familiar with

the Teschen problem for many years." Nicolson was evidently underlining the ignorance of Lloyd George but nevertheless shared the apprehensions of Wickham Steed, who reacted to the self-exposure of Lloyd George's ignorance: "The cry was raised at once. 'Lloyd George knows nothing of the problems which he is attempting to solve. From his own lips, we learn it. The whole British Delegation in Paris, the whole Conference in fact, are ignorant and unprepared. Disaster is upon us.'"² Ironically, the Cassandra prophecy of Wickham Steed³ turned out to be correct. The Paris Peace Conference failed to maintain a peaceful Europe. Instead, it sowed the seeds of future conflicts.⁴ The snobbish amateurishness of Lloyd George became even more marked in the mismanagement of Turkish affairs leading to opposition and resentment in the British Foreign Office, and the Turkish–Greek war ended up as a disaster for Britain.⁵

Nicolson, in his book on the Paris Peace Conference, from which the above excerpts are taken, makes his points clear. He did not see the political leaders as personally responsible for this failure.

Given the atmosphere of the time, given the passions aroused in all democracies by four years of war, it would have been impossible even for supermen to devise a peace consisting of moderation and righteousness. The task of the Paris negotiators was, however, complicated by special circumstances of confusion. The ideals to which they had been pledged by President Wilson were not only impracticable in and of themselves but necessitated for their execution the intimate and unceasing collaboration of the United States...It was thus the endeavor of men like Clemenceau and Lloyd George to find a middle way between the desires of their democracies and the more moderate dictates of their own experience, as well as a middle way between the theology of President Wilson and the practical needs of a distracted Europe.⁶

Nicolson situates the shortcomings of the Peace Conference within a wider framework: "I have tried to deal with the transitional phase between pre-war and post-war diplomacy and give some picture of the Paris Peace Conference."⁷ For him, the diplomacy of the Peace

Conference epitomized the changing times and milieu. For him, in the new postwar world, no effective and constructive diplomacy could be pursued. He sympathized with the “old diplomacy”, the world he had known from his childhood, from his career in the Foreign Office, and from his father, who was also a prominent diplomat in the Foreign Office and served as the undersecretary of the Foreign Office between 1910 and 1916. Nicolson wrote, “Diplomacy essentially is the organized system of negotiation between sovereign states. The most important factor in such organization is the element of representation – the essential necessity in any negotiator that he should be fully representative of his own sovereign at home...in other words, it is the incidence of sovereignty which has gradually shifted and not the essential principles by which efficient diplomacy should be conducted.”⁸ For him, postwar diplomacy represented interests and “sovereigns” other than those of the nineteenth-century diplomatic services.

Arno Mayer contrasts the participants of the Paris Peace Conference with the participants of the Congress of Vienna a century earlier:⁹

In 1814–15, the peace was negotiated “in elegant and ceremonious privacy...[by] a group of Aristocrats life-trained as statesmen or diplomats” who considered themselves responsible to crowned sovereigns and barely worried about partisan pressures. The situation was not so serene a century later when seasoned party politicians of *petit-bourgeois* background – two professors, a journalist, a solicitor – gathered around the conference table. The Big Four were responsible to parliaments, and they never seriously considered insulating themselves from the political parties, pressure groups, mass media, and mass electorates, which were highly agitated over the peace question. To be sure, compared to Metternich, Castlereagh, and Talleyrand, the Big Four were “amateur” diplomats.¹⁰

Arno Mayer propounded a lucid interpretation of the logic of the Paris Peace Conference. For Mayer, it was the last stand of the party of order to reestablish and impose the status quo, which had been severely crushed. Mayer notes that, in 1917–18, during the heat of war, the

“parties of movement” were in a strong position. With the end of the war and the treaties concluding war, the party of order reclaimed its supremacy.¹¹ However, this victory remained only on paper. The good old days of the party of order were already gone.¹²

The Italian Prime Minister Francesco Nitto lamented in his memoirs, “Europe was happy and prosperous, while now, after the terrible World War, she is threatened with a decline and a reversion to brutality, which suggests the fall of the Roman Empire.”¹³ World War I was certainly a watershed for the “old regime” and “ruling elites”. There were few republics in Europe in 1914. The end of the war brought the collapse of four monarchies and a mushrooming of numerous republics, large and small and continent-wide. At the end of the war, the first socialist state of the world was calling for a world revolution. Democratic and revolutionary currents were on the rise. The world of nineteenth-century Victorian conservative values was gone forever. The red scare of the postwar era was to be accompanied by the fascist scare at its zenith in the 1930s. Socialism, fascism, and liberalism were all challenging the status quo in their own unique ways. Although they diverged in their political visions, with regard to the threat they exerted on the conservative orders and the milieu in which they were fostered, they were different manifestations of the same phenomenon. They were all the products of the post-1918 milieu and the consequences of the collapse of the old order.

In that sense, 1918 was a landmark year. It sealed the end of the continental Old Regime. Many members of the old guard like Harold Nicolson lamented the passing of the good old times in which diplomacy was not a quarrel (and not philanthropy in the Wilsonian sense) but a discussion among gentlemen. The vision of diplomacy and statecraft imagined and presented in the earliest scholarly studies on diplomacy perceived the “art of diplomacy” likewise. Diplomacy in the nineteenth century cannot be reduced to the staunch defense of state interests. It was also never a matter of principles, beliefs, and commitments. It was not *Realpolitik* either. *Realpolitik* was yet to be invented in its Morgenthau definition. These premises of the “old diplomacy” began to change gradually in the last three decades of the nineteenth century as the alliances system replaced the conventional concert of

Europe. The rise of Germany triggered the conclusion of bilateral agreements and alliances between the Great Powers. When a young British diplomat resigned from the diplomatic service in September 1914 arguing that “diplomacy is dead”, he was not mistaken.¹⁴ The old diplomacy which was born with the Congress of Vienna in 1815 as a bulwark against revolutionary threats collapsed in its centennial.¹⁵

However, others were not enthusiasts of the old diplomacy. For them, the old diplomacy was the epitome of the decayed and corrupted aristocratic order: “In the immediate aftermath of the Great War, impelled by revulsion at the carnage of that conflict, generations of historians identified ‘old’ or ‘secret diplomacy’ as a major factor leading to war. The pre-1914 Foreign Office, in particular, appeared to be the quintessence of ‘old diplomacy’.”¹⁶ Mistrust of the Foreign Office and its dealings were already suspect in the eyes of the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Group of the Liberal Party, which consisted of radicals who were heavily critical of the mandarin-like organization of the Foreign Office.¹⁷ Another issue the parliamentary group had brought forth was the Foreign Office’s defiance in giving information to the parliament on its conduct of foreign affairs.¹⁸ In their eyes, the old diplomacy was another name for political conspiring and corruption. Thus, in the age of democracy, such an attitude and the old diplomacy were relics of the old bigotry and had to be eliminated.¹⁹

The old diplomacy ended with World War I, at a time when it had been completely discredited. However, it has recently been acknowledged that the transformation from the old diplomacy to the “new diplomacy” was a myth exaggerated by the champions of the new diplomacy, who were trying to legitimize their exercise of diplomacy by discrediting the old corrupt style.²⁰ The Bolsheviks’ revelation of the secret treaties was the final blow to the defenders and makers of the old diplomacy. These revelations exposed its level of corruption and insincerity. The idealists, journalists, and radicals were advocating the “new diplomacy”, which was supposed to be open rather than secret and corrupt, internationalist rather than national, and “democratic” rather than “aristocratic”. The League of Nations was to be the embodiment of this new ideal. In fact,

the rhetoric of the new diplomacy was a sign of the changing class character of the makers of foreign policies. Middle-class radicals were now replacing aristocrats, both as makers of foreign policy and as opinion leaders with regard to foreign policy. The 1920s epitomized the development of a new style of diplomacy in Versailles, in Genoa,²¹ and in the routine conduct of diplomacy. However, the new style of diplomacy collapsed in the hollow decade of the 1930s, when democracies were uncertain as to how to respond to the rise of fascist and authoritarian regimes.²² Vansittart, the last "old diplomat,"²³ failed in the face of the opposition of the political elites to pursue the "aesthetics" of the old diplomacy.²⁴ Arguably, one of the reasons why Vansittart was alarmed by the ascent of fascism and was concerned with opposing Hitler was his "old diplomat" background. Nevertheless, the democratic world of politics and the active involvement of party politicians did not allow him to pursue a nineteenth-century diplomatic game, which had been more efficient and had had a more problem-solving orientation in its understanding of conflict resolution. The diplomacy of the post-World War II era, dominated by the ruthless realities of the Cold War and the rise of *Realpolitik*, was a world apart from pre-1914 diplomacy. In short, the nineteenth-century diplomatic world, with its class character and social culture, was gone and had turned into a curiosity for historians to study.

We have to situate the Ottoman Foreign Ministry within this framework. The Ottoman Foreign Ministry is a world lost to us as well. A similar and simultaneous transformation was observable with the coming of the Republic. The Ankara government, with the habit (out of necessity and concern for the urgency of international bargaining and compromises that are not possible within the practice of routine diplomacy) it gained during the War of Independence, appointed several non-career diplomats (such as army generals) to important positions. They were trustees and *de facto* personal representatives of Mustafa Kemal. They functioned as persons in the service of Mustafa Kemal and the political authority in Ankara rather than as functionaries performing regular and professional diplomatic craft. Several of them retained their diplomatic careers after the end of the War of Independence thanks to the prominence they acquired through the

partial shift of the political and bureaucratic elite. Nevertheless, the displacement in the diplomatic establishment was modest and limited to some ambassadorial posts.²⁵ The rank and file of the Ministry retained their posts. What changed was the style and aesthetics of diplomacy. The diplomacy of a nation state was different from the diplomacy of a retreating empire. The diplomacy of the latter was the old diplomacy, which had its own code of conduct, whereas the diplomacy of the former entailed an interest-maximizing strategy of the nation state.

The Aristocratic Worlds of the Hamidian Foreign Ministry

One of the significant signs of the transformation of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century was its changing perception of the European powers. The European powers came to be seen as equals and counterparts rather than as eternal foes of the Empire. This was more a discursive transformation than a real one given that it was a *de facto* acknowledgment on the part of the Ottoman Empire. The European powers were also considered to have legitimate claims to power and authority. Moreover, as fellow monarchies (or fellow republics, as republics also had their legal personalities), they were regarded as "venerable."²⁶ The principle of reciprocity was also established. The representatives of the foreign states (ambassadors, consuls, etc.) were welcomed with due respect.

In the ambassadorial reports, esteem and reverence for royalty were articulated very delicately. Esteem and respect were observed for non-royal offices as well. The prime ministers, presidents of states, and military generals were addressed with due respect as the Ottoman Empire and its ruling elite were integrated into the European established order and the noble families of Europe. This was not only limited to the honoring of the persons in question with proper forms of address. While reporting on political developments, an important part of the dispatches was devoted to ceremonies. The acceptance speeches of the new prime ministers,²⁷ the speeches of the prime minister in the parliament to honor visiting royal figures, and the inauguration speeches read at the beginning of the parliamentary year by the kings

were all meticulously reported in detail.²⁸ These concerns and perceptions are a further indication of the transformation of Ottoman political culture (to be destroyed and reversed by the end of the Empire and replaced by the Republic's own political culture) and its integration into the "European royal family."²⁹

A significant portion of the activity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was dedicated to ceremonies. The Ministry was responsible for celebrating and marking the "days" of the monarchs, which included birthdays, anniversaries of their accessions to the throne, and weddings. Of course, national holidays were also commemorated. The greetings of fellow monarchs on the anniversaries of the enthronement of Abdülhamid II and the religious holidays were received and dispatched to the palace.³⁰ The follow-up and conduct of this procedure was one of the tasks of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The annals of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also reflect this mood. In the first annal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs published in 1885, the chapter *Diüvel-i Ecnebiye* (Foreign States) introduced the emperors, kings, and sultans with biographies of the reigning monarchs and the names and titles of their honorable wives, sons, and brothers. The only other detail provided with regard to these monarchies was the official religion of each monarchy.³¹ Thus, we are provided with ample information on the monarchs of Hawaii, Ethiopia, and Württemberg. The following chapter was entitled *Cumhuriyyetle İdare Olunan Memalik-i Ecnebiye* (States Governed as Republics).³² It is interesting to observe that, at least theoretically, according to this categorization, the republics were not recognized as states proper given that monarchies were introduced in the chapter *Diüvel-i Ecnebiye*, while the republics were introduced in a separate chapter titled "states governed by Republics" as if they are states needing an extra adjective (*Cumhuriyyetle İdare Olunan*). At the very least, they were not seen as equal to those states which were monarchies. In this chapter, only the name of the presidents and the year of their election were listed. For example, what we learn about the Republic of Argentina is that its president was General Julio Roca and that he was elected on 12 October 1880. The same scant information was provided for republics such as France, the United States, Peru, and Haiti. Although considerable space was allocated to monarchies, the

information provided for republics is conspicuously small. The next chapter listed the prime ministers and certain ministers of the states regardless of whether they were monarchies or republics.³³ Here at least, an equality of republics and monarchies was acknowledged. Thus, although republics and monarchies were deemed as equal in introducing their administrative organization, in terms of their legal personality they were not. Nevertheless, in the Ottoman diplomatic jargon, while the emperors and kings were majestically addressed as *Son Altesse Impériale* and *Son Altesse Royale*, the presidents of the republics were merely addressed as *Notre très cher ami et allié*. The French presidents of the republic were specifically addressed as *Notre Grand et Bon Ami*.³⁴

The next chapter listed the former representatives of the states in the Ottoman Empire as well as the incumbent staff of the legations from ambassadors to minor scribes.³⁵ In short, the annals of the Foreign Ministry were formalistic texts and clear manifestations of the Ottoman claim to be a part of the concert of Europe. More significantly, the annals were meticulous in their observations of ranks and formalities of aristocracy – so much so that a page was allocated for the definitions and explanations of the European aristocratic titles (*Avrupa'da asilzadegana mahsus unvanlar*) such as baron, cardinal, and marquis.³⁶ The decorations of European orders, insignia, and merits were also seen as very prestigious and, thus, worth mentioning. The biographies of the high-ranking members of the Ottoman diplomatic service listed the merits and orders granted by the European states. The listing of the decorations of European titles was also mentioned in the biographies of prominent Ottoman diplomats and statesmen in the Foreign Ministry annals. It was also one of the five questions asked in the questionnaire the Ministry kept in the personal files in *Sicil-i Ahval*. In fact, the awarding of decorations was a mechanism employed exhaustively by Abdülhamid II to maintain the loyalty of his civil servants and to monitor them. This strategy, as well as “inventing a loyalist Hamidian state aristocracy” was one of the pillars of the Hamidian regime.³⁷ While Esat Cemal Paker mocked the absurdity and ridiculousness of the exhaustive decorations in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,³⁸ for Galip Kemali (Söylemezoğlu)³⁹ and Hayreddin Nedim,⁴⁰

decorations were a primary institution of diplomacy and governance. In his memoirs, Galip Kemali seriously and meticulously enumerated the decorations he was awarded, as well as those given to others. We may conclude by arguing that while the Hamidian regime sanctioned and endorsed contemporary European formalities, codes of conduct, and procedures, the sultan made use of them to maintain and reestablish a traditional loyalty alongside a new mode of loyalty established based on these new codes of conduct. In this regard, the Hamidian imperium was an idiosyncratic blend of these two diverse political traditions. This was not different from the other nineteenth-century Ottoman institutions that integrated traditions imported from Europe and those derived from the pre-modern Ottoman past, appropriating them for nineteenth-century consumption.

The annals of the Foreign Ministry allocated numerous pages to the glamour of the Ottoman Empire at its zenith and during its post-classical age. The annals began with a long tribute to the sultans. The sultans were listed with their illustrious titles in due respect, reverence, and exaltation. Obviously, what was implied in these pages was that the splendor of the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire of Tanzimat owed its magnificence to the exploits and the splendor of the Ottoman Empire of the previous centuries.⁴¹ The next entry in the annals provided brief information regarding the full names and the definitions of the prominent Ottoman titles beginning from the highest ranks (*rütbe-i vezaret ve müşiriyet*) to the lowest titles (*bacegan rütbesi-yüzbaşılık rütbesi*).⁴² The entry *Rütbe-i Resmîyye-i Saltanat-ı Seniyye'nin Suret ve Keyfiyyet Te'ssine Da'ir İzabat-ı Mahsusa* informs us that the "modern" system of titles and its regulation was introduced in 1836.⁴³ The annals also listed how the bearers of certain ranks and titles were formally addressed. Addressing individuals in a culture of hierarchy and ranks was not a simple procedure and was not a matter of formality. First and foremost, everybody was to be addressed differently according to their own ranks and titles. Forms of address revealed the relationship between the parties. Therefore, the forms of address also changed according to the position of the person doing the addressing. Moreover, when a bearer of a certain title was cited, out of respect, his title had to be used alongside appropriate phrases.

For example, the *ulema* had to address a former prime minister as *ma'lum-ı da'ileridir ki* whereas members of the civil service had to address a former prime minister as *ma'ruz-ı çakerleridir ki*. When the name of a former prime minister was cited in a speech, he had to be addressed *übbebetlî devletlî...Paşa hazretleri*.⁴⁴ The use of forms of address in a culture of aristocracy and hierarchy was not a technicality. On the contrary, it was one of the founding pillars of the polity and a mechanism for reproduction of the hierarchical order. The superiority of superiors was reproduced and reinforced every time they were addressed with the respect they were to be afforded. It was one of the constitutive parts of the hierarchical political order. In that regard, cultures of aristocracies including the Ottomans were no different from the Malaysian cockfights depicted by Geertz⁴⁵ and the theater state of Negara.⁴⁶

The next entry in the annals describes the regulations governing the priority of the title-bearers. Here, we learn who precedes whom in a ceremony. The entry continued with the listing of names and descriptions of the four decorations of the Ottoman imperium: *Nişan-ı imtiyaz*, *osmani*, *mecidi*, and *şefkat*. All these decorations have several degrees from first degree to fourth or fifth degree.⁴⁷ In short, the annals of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were books of protocol observing the codes of respect between fellow monarchies and states and recorded the “official discourse” of the Empire at its best.

The appropriate and formal address for foreign emperors, presidents of the states, and other holders of various prestigious titles was crucial. Hüseyin Agah's pamphlet was written to instruct young diplomats in European protocol and the formality of diplomacy. The author was an official employed in the Translation Office of the Foreign Ministry. In his tables, he provided the Turkish and French versions of the principal forms of address. For example, he noted that the French “*Son Excellence*” was the translation of the Ottoman title *devletlu*, *atufetlu*, *saadetlu*, *asaletlu efendim hazretleri*. The French *Impériale Votre Majesté* was the Ottoman *zat-ı hazreti müliikhaneleri*.⁴⁸ It is interesting to observe the assimilation of the classical Ottoman titles and addresses into the European titles and addresses. In this adaptation process, the long Ottoman titles and addresses were shortened and specified.⁴⁹

Room for authenticity was also maintained. The adjective of imperial was Ottomanized and absorbed into the Ottoman political culture and parlance. While *zat-ı Şahane* was employed for the emperor sultan, the term *şahane* was also employed to establish the exaltedness of the imperial institutions such as *Mülkiye-i Şahane* and *Tıbbiye-i Şahane*. The Empire began to be called *Memalik-i Mabruse-i Şahane* as an alternative to the conventional *Devlet-i Aliyye*. The adjective *seniyye* was also employed as the Ottoman counterpart of imperial as in *saltanat-ı seniyye*. The Ottoman embassies abroad were known as *sefaret-i seniyyes*, translated into French in official documents as *Ambassade Imperiale Ottomane*. The more traditional imperial titles were also retained and used for various and ancient institutions as in *Hassa-i Hümayun* and *Mabeyn-i Hümayun-u Hazret-i Mülükane*. With indigenization of the European terminology, the Empire invented an authenticity for itself while accommodating European (imperial) universalism. In this way, the original conventional Ottoman contents and their idiosyncratic senses of grandeur remained unchanged. The standardization and concretization of the traditional titles and addresses were also part of the process of the adaptation of the Ottoman statecraft to modernity and modern governance.⁵⁰ However, the Ottoman forms of addresses continued to be longer (and loftier) than their European counterparts, and Ottoman distinctiveness was articulated in these formulations. Yet, it is clear that the Ottoman political culture was accommodating European political culture.

In short, the contents of these annals demonstrate an aspiration on the part of the Ottoman polity to be recognized as a part of the Concert of Europe. The Hamidian and Tanzimat Ottoman Empire was the continuation of the splendid empire of Suleiman I and Mehmed II. This emphasis continued to serve as the principal legitimacy for the maintenance and advancement of the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire. Although, the Tanzimat was perceived as the birth of a new political entity supplanting an obsolete structure (an *ancien régime*) in terms of administration, the magnificence of the previous Ottoman centuries was still to be hailed. The regression and degeneration of the Empire two centuries before the Tanzimat separated the Tanzimat state from the glorious era of the Empire. However, the imperium was

recast not as a military superpower with militarist zeal but an empire of cultivation and civility as a part of the empires international (as opposed to the republics and republican international).

The *de facto* aristocratic nature of the Ottoman Empire was not new, but its formalization and its open recognition, affirmation, and articulation were novel. It is also significant that although republics and presidents of republics were included in the first annals published in 1885, in the second annals, published in 1889, there was no mention of them. Instead, the table included the Pope, the King of Saxony, the Prince of Monaco, and the Grand Duke of Hesse with an entry in the table showing the dynasties to which these monarchs and princes belonged.

The second annals published in 1889 allocated a chapter to the decorations granted after the publication of the first annals. In other words, the list was revised. It included the names of the diplomats who were decorated and the insignias that had been granted. Another list showed the members of the diplomatic service who had been granted insignias by other states. For example, we learn that the former Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs was granted the insignia of the "Red Eagle" by the state of Germany.⁵¹ As expected, the list begins with the highest-ranking officials who had been honored with decorations. They were also given to low-ranking officials such as Galib Beyefendi, an assistant in the Office of Ceremonies in the Foreign Ministry, who was decorated with a second-level Vasa insignia from the state of Sweden.⁵² States ranging from Montenegro to Italy had decorated several Ottoman officials, although the two countries which decorated the Ottoman officials the most were Iran and Romania.

The symbolism and meaning of the institutionalization of *nişans* has been analyzed extensively by Edhem Eldem. He demonstrated the gradual transformation of the aesthetics and the style of the *nişans* from the first insignia in 1831 (or 1832) to the end of the Empire. Although Mustafa Reşid Bey (the future Mustafa Reşid Pasha) suggested that the institutionalization of an insignia system would increase the prestige of the Empire, it did not happen that way because Westerners did not feel honored by the decoration of the insignia by the Ottoman Empire. On the contrary, they felt that it was a degradation to be

granted an insignia by a state of such low prestige.⁵³ Nevertheless, it seems that in two decades the assiduous efforts of the Ottoman elite bore fruit. In the following decades, Europeans began to be honored by being awarded an Ottoman insignia. For Eldem, the crucial decade for the institutionalization of the system was the 1850s. This was due especially to the endorsement of a cosmopolitan discourse created by the implications of the Crimean War and the coalition with Great Britain and France. Nevertheless, the Crimean War only reinforced an ongoing process. The modernization of insignias began as early as 1852 with the appearance of the *Mecidiye* insignia in 1852 prior to the Crimean coalition. By the 1850s, the more traditional designs and scripts of the insignia alluding to the classical age of Ottomans were replaced by more “modern” designs and scripts in terms of the messages conveyed.⁵⁴ While the insignia of the early Tanzimat reflected a blend of the traditional discourses of the pre-modern Ottoman Empire and the modern self-image of the nineteenth century, in time this transitional phase was superseded by the complete endorsement and replication of nineteenth-century European Augustan imperial display. By the 1850s, the Ottoman Empire had succeeded in entering the family of fellow European monarchies in the symbolic realm.

In short, Ottoman officialdom endeavored to be incorporated into the European family. This was not a matter of symbolism. On the contrary, the Empire’s primary concern in its pursuit of admission into the European family was to secure its territorial integrity. Ottoman officialdom believed that the perpetual threat of partition and annihilation would be avoided by inclusion in the European family. Tanzimat statesmen thought that they had achieved this in 1856: “Finally, the Ottomans had succeeded in gaining admission, however qualified, to the European club of powers. The Paris Treaty of 1856, which provided an unprecedented guarantee of the territorial integrity of the Ottoman state, made the Empire, in effect, a member of the European concert. From the Ottoman perspective, this was a more important result than the Russian surrender of southern Bessarabia or even the neutralization of the Black Sea.”⁵⁵ Nevertheless, the hopes and expectations of the Ottoman statesmen were not to be realized. Equal terms between the Ottomans and the European powers could

not be established for obvious reasons. *Realpolitik* and *Machtpolitik* were a better means to secure territorial integrity (as Abdülhamid II and his diplomatic service fully understood), and Ottoman attempts at Europeanization and synchronization of its self-image and self-portrayal remained futile.

Transitions to the Cultures of Bureaucracy

Refinement and sociability were the unwritten requirements of diplomacy. The otherwise disappointing and unimpressive memoirs of the Ottoman diplomat Esad Cemal Paker seem to be written for the purpose of convincing the reader that he lived the life of a *bon vivant* and that he drank the best wines. Apparently, the diplomatic establishment was associated with a “Westernized” lifestyle. This established prejudice had both positive and negative connotations. The diplomats were particularly targeted by the Islamists. Derviş Vahdeti in his journal *Volkan* assailed diplomats exemplifying the prevalent perceptions within the Islamic and Islamist milieus regarding the diplomats. For him: “Ambassadors had taken Christians wives, had let their children [be] educated in their mothers’ European mores. These children learn European languages and [are] educated in Islamic faith and morals only by governesses and teachers belonging to other religions.”⁵⁶ They were prey for populist discourses, as well. Fazıl Arif Bey, a parliamentarian representing Amasya in the parliament of 1908, was outraged with the diplomats whom he regarded as those “who are bringing governesses and courtesans from Europe” and living in luxury while the Ottoman populace was suffering in poverty.⁵⁷ Kazım Karabekir was also highly critical of the Ottoman diplomatic establishment. For him, Ottoman diplomats and ambassadors “were certainly respectable people whose merits I would never question, however...it is my duty to remind the sufferings of my nation and the country. In the Ottoman era, our diplomatic establishment was blind and deaf although its mouth was open. That means, [the diplomats] could not monitor themselves while speaking and had not the capacity to hear, to see and to comprehend the manœuvres of our enemies. This was enough to lead a nation to a catastrophe.”⁵⁸ While this imagery was to be abused

at the hands of populists, it made diplomats the object of emulation for others. The recollections of Feridun Cemal Erkin, one of the doyens of the Republican diplomatic service, are illustrative. His childhood memories vividly display the image of the “super-Westernized” Ottoman diplomat. In his memoirs, Erkin writes that when he was a child, his father, who was a civil servant of prominence, was visited by two men. One of them was sporting a goatee and a white mustache, the other wearing a glass monocle. Impressed by their elegance and courtliness, small Feridun asked who these visitors were. When his father responded that they were *sefir-i kebirs* (full ambassadors), young Feridun was impressed, and he recalled after more than half a century that he then decided to be a *sefir-i kebir* like them.⁵⁹ At least this is how Feridun Cemal Erkin explained why he wanted to be a diplomat. Abdülhak Hamid argued that ambassadorial officials and military attachés not only have to be presentable, but should also be “good-looking”. “Even a rich diplomat should not be poor in his physical appearance.”⁶⁰ He recalled, “that once an Ottoman foreign minister refrained from sending a son of a Pasha as an ambassador because of the son’s poor physical appearance.”⁶¹ For Abdülhak Hamid, “especially the members of the demi-monde are superficial (so that they pay attention to physical appearance very much),”⁶² and they had to be cajoled accordingly. In short, these accounts should be a disclaimer to Marcel Proust, who in his *In Search of Lost Time* portrayed the Turkish ambassador and his wife as superfluous Orientals alien to the refinement and elegance of the aristocratic European culture and the diplomatic establishment.

A glance at the salaries of the members of the diplomatic service also gives some inkling as to the aristocratic and patriarchal nature of the Ottoman culture of officialdom.⁶³ The disparity between the highest-paid officials and the lower echelons of the bureaucracy is arresting. From the annals, we learn that the Foreign Minister was (supposedly) paid 360,000 guruşes per year according to the 1889 year-book. The undersecretary, the highest-paid employee of the Ministry, was paid 288,000 guruşes. The second highest-paid employees were the ambassadors to London, Berlin, Paris, St. Petersburg, and Vienna, who enjoyed an annual income of 246,000 guruşes. They were also

entitled to stipends of 186,000 guruşes each. Although the Ottoman representatives in Rome and Teheran also held the title of *büyükelçis*, they were entitled a more modest salary of 120,000 guruşes per year (with a stipend of another 120,000 guruşes), which was considerably lower than the salaries paid to the holders of other more prestigious ambassadorships. Regarding the staff in the embassies, we observe a dramatic decrease for the lower posts, including the salaries of the undersecretaries of the embassies. The undersecretary in London was granted only 48,000 guruşes a year. The secretaries of the first rank, the second rank, and the third rank were entitled to an average of 20,000 to 35,000 guruşes a year. The translator of the embassy in Teheran, who was not part of the regular staff of the diplomatic corps in the embassy, was paid 18,000 guruşes.⁶⁴ When it came to the porters, the salaries were even lower. The porters serving in Istanbul were paid a maximum of 350 and a minimum of 150 guruşes a year.⁶⁵ That meant that the ministerial undersecretary was paid almost two hundred times more than the lowest paid worker, which was a conspicuous and manifest demonstration of the aristocratic/patriarchal nature of the Ottoman polity.⁶⁶ The salary scheme of the Ministry (with regard to diplomats) was like a steep pyramid in which the few highest-ranking diplomats were paid enormously in comparison to the modest income levels of the low-ranking diplomats and officials.

On the one hand, the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire resembled a bureaucratic state in which the level of incomes was determined by state fiat. On the other hand, it retained vestiges of the pre-modern mode of wealth distribution in which there was no concern for egalitarianism, and scales of wealth accumulation were determined by personalized, decentralized, arbitrary, and irregular dynamics.⁶⁷ Moreover, the lack of finances of the state meant that modestly paid officials were more likely to have their salaries curbed, something that is reminiscent of an unequal mode of wealth distribution based on prestige and power. Furthermore, they were financially more vulnerable in case of non-payment of salaries.

The aristocratic and patriarchal nature of Ottoman officialdom can also be deduced from the table of salaries in Findley's work on the social history of Ottoman officialdom.⁶⁸ In Findley's scheme, the employees

of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were divided into three: non-Muslims, "modernist Muslims", and "traditional Muslims". In his table, the "modernist Muslims" were paid the best whereas the non-Muslims came second. The "traditional Muslims" were paid very modestly and were predominantly employed in low-ranking posts. Considering that in Findley's categorization, "modernist Muslims" were those who were educated in Westernized (and therefore the best) schools, they occupied the highest and most prestigious positions, which non-Muslims had difficulty securing unless their competence was indispensable, like the non-Muslim officials in the Office of Legal Counselorship. This table clearly demonstrates that a good education translated to considerably higher income. It also reflects the discriminatory nature of the Ministry in favor of Muslims. Although non-Muslims on average had better education and skills, they were denied equal opportunity of advancement in ranks and income.

One of the radical moves of the Tanzimat was the inauguration in 1838 of a salary system that replaced the old structure in which no distinction between public and private was made.⁶⁹ Obviously, the pre-Tanzimat rewarding of public officials privileged the high-ranking officials who had better connections and occupied better positions. However, it was ironic that the "salary system" of the Tanzimat "while [it] intended to do the opposite, [it]...heightened officials' economic worries."⁷⁰ This was due to its elimination of arbitrary and irregular sources of extra income. Although the new Weberian/rational system of payment seemed to serve as a relative equalizer between officials in public officialdom, "a vast gap between highest and lowest salaries remained a hallmark of the Ottoman official salary system, even if the gap narrowed with time."⁷¹ In this regard, the Ottoman understanding of merit was a typical corollary of the aristocratic culture, albeit an aristocratic culture in which the state was at the center and determined aristocratic credentials. The emerging bureaucratic state of the Tanzimat retained several features of the pre-modern state, especially in its structures of redistribution of wealth. Throughout the Tanzimat, the state continued (for Muslims) to be the foremost provider of wealth, which reproduced the principal attributes of a pre-modern polity. Although the Tanzimat acquired many features

of the modern bureaucratic state, and the Hamidian era witnessed the enormous growth of a bureaucracy with the number of civil servants employed in state service reaching 100,000 by 1900,⁷² the facets of modern and pre-modern structures coexisted before most of the pre-modern remnants were gradually abandoned (culminating in the Hamidian era and progressing thereafter). Substantial steps to standardize and formalize salaries and their regular distribution were taken in the early reign of Abdülhamid II. One significant development was the 1881 Decree on the Promotion and Retirement of Civil Officials (*Memurin-i Mülkiye Terakki ve Tekaiid Kararnamesi*), which was superseded by another decree in 1884.⁷³ The decree of 1881 “was divided into two sections, of which the first dealt summarily with conditions of appointment and promotion, while the second dealt with the creation of a modern kind of Retirement Fund (*Tekaiid Sandığı*), to be financed by the deductions from the salaries.”⁷⁴ The foundation of *Mülkiye* was another major step in the recruitment of officials endowed with sufficient skills and knowledge regarding administration and (modern European) law. The new recruits were provided with much better opportunities, rewards, and assurances compared to their elder colleagues. The conditions of employment were also standardized and regularized. “To govern the workings of the personnel records system, there were two sets of instructions, the first being issued in 1879, the second in 1887.”⁷⁵

It was the porters and the lower-ranking officials, not members of the highest-ranking officialdom of the state, who benefited from the newly emerging Weberian regulation of public officials, in which the disparity between the salaries of the higher and lower echelons of the bureaucracy gradually narrowed. Although the Hamidian bureaucratic reforms established a predominantly bureaucratic state, the higher echelons remained privileged and intact, insulated from bureaucratic modernization and development of a culture of (Weberian) bureaucracy.⁷⁶ This duality lessened with the 1908 and subsequent purges (*tensikat*). The *tensikat* of 1909 severely reduced the salaries and benefits of high-ranking bureaucrats. Against the motions of the parliament, the ministers had to defend the reasonableness of the salaries of high-ranking bureaucrats, including those in the diplomatic service.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs suggested that with the salaries proposed by the parliament, no one would want to work in the Foreign Ministry.⁷⁷ The motion prepared by the committee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was rejected by the parliament, so the committee had to prepare a second motion regarding the salaries and reorganization of the Ministry to satisfy the concerns of the critical parliamentarians.⁷⁸ The scale of disparities of incomes and the gradual narrowing of these discrepancies in the Ottoman Foreign Ministry was an indication of the development and evolution of the modern bureaucracy and state. As observed, this was not a linear and smooth process in which the former was repudiated and the new was endorsed, but rather an evolution in which distinctions were retained and reproduced.

The rationalization and professionalization of the diplomatic service, as well as other governmental offices, progressed without a definite deadline. Nevertheless, 1908, and to a lesser extent 1923, were two key turning points in this process. The move of the capital from Istanbul to Ankara protected Mustafa Kemal from the predatory elite of the *ancien régime*. Therefore, instead of surrendering to them, (learning from the experiences and mistakes of the Unionists) he could demolish all the established strongholds of the aristocratic and imperial order. What the relatively rationalized and depersonalized bureaucracy replaced was not a pre-modern and unprofessional bureaucracy, but an institutional culture of its own which had retained its own intimate and personalized socialization. One institutional culture replaced another although the culture of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry was retained to a considerable extent in the Republican Foreign Office in Sıhhiye in Ankara.

There were apparent continuities in the transition from the Empire to the Republic. Nonetheless, the foundation of a republic also meant dramatic changes in various areas. The relations established between the state and its privileged servants were one of the distinctions between a republic and an empire. Klinghardt, writing in 1924, just one year after the proclamation of the Republic, puts the main difference between the old times and new times as the austerity and plainness of the style and aesthetics of the new regime compared to the ostentation of the old regime. He contrasts these two "spirits" not with regard to architecture

and ideology but predominantly with regard to the aesthetics of governmental offices and office habits.⁷⁹ For Klinghardt, the new state in Ankara managed to halt the flamboyance and impudence of the imperial civil servants and imposed the authority of a modern and effective state. Klinghardt contrasts the toughness of the “new men” with the elegance and effeminate-like courtliness and empty pageantry of the imperial establishment. Klinghardt was mesmerized with the demise of the cosmopolitan world in Istanbul, smashed by a Prussian-like egalitarian Ankara which represented genuine Anatolian Turkishness. For him, Ankara symbolized a new style of aesthetics and not a world apart from the communist aesthetics of the Bolsheviks and the prospective European fascist aesthetics. Although this excessive contrast drawn by Klinghardt was more of a public relations success and the self-representation (and mechanisms of demonization) of the Kemalist elite rather than the sheer reality, one thing was true: the Ottoman pageantry, its distinct culture, and the ethos imbued in the imperium had vanished for good, or bad.

The Aristocratic Worlds of European Diplomatic Services

The pre-1914 diplomatic service was the most aristocratic of all the civil services throughout Europe: “The atmosphere within the Habsburg foreign service was distinctly international and aristocratic. Only 3 percent of the seventy-two senior diplomats posted outside Austria-Hungary had no noble title. At the Balhausplatz, a prince, ten counts, twenty-four barons, and thirty-two with simple noble predicates controlled the bulk of the senior positions. Aristocrats, whether Austrian or Hungarian, held the top diplomatic posts abroad and usually represented decades of familial service to the Habsburg dynasty.”⁸⁰ Russian diplomats, “in line with general European practice, were from much grander social backgrounds than any of the domestic civil servants.”⁸¹ “Members of the Swedish foreign service were consequently recruited almost exclusively from the high nobility of the country.”⁸² In Belgium: “Of the 169 diplomats that can be accounted for in the period between 1830 and 1850, 120 were noblemen.”⁸³ The dominance of aristocracy in the diplomatic service prevailed throughout Europe until 1914 with

the relative exception of France, where the diplomatic service was composed more of those of bourgeois origins to a certain extent throughout the Third Republic, thanks to the conscious policies of Third Republican politicians.⁸⁴ The pre-World War I years were the years of talk of reform to reorganize and “modernize” the foreign offices and end the aristocratic institutional culture, since aristocratic cultures of diplomatic services were not suitable for the complexities of the international politics of the age. Although talk of reform was in the air, implementation of reforms remained fairly limited,⁸⁵ and the foreign offices successfully resisted the efforts of the political elites to reform them.⁸⁶ After Foreign Minister Gyula Andrassy’s (1871–79) efforts to introduce reform and end favouritism in the Habsburg diplomatic service were thwarted, the unprofessional and aristocratic culture of the diplomatic service prevailed until World War I and the diplomatic service remained an archaic office.⁸⁷ Nevertheless, after World War I, diplomacy lost its blatantly aristocratic character in all Europe, much to the lament of aristocrat diplomats, including a saddened Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu writing in the 1940s.⁸⁸

The typical nineteenth-century diplomat did not perceive his occupation as a profession but rather as an aristocratic pastime. The workload was far from being heavy and “there was time for friends and visitors.”⁸⁹ Their working hours were scant between long lunch breaks.⁹⁰ In other words, diplomacy was a part of the aristocratic way of life. It was not seen as a profession practiced for income and material reward but as an activity performed for prestige, glamor, and family reputation. Naturally, given that such an understanding of diplomacy prevailed in the foreign ministries, the organization of foreign ministries remained backward in the nineteenth century in terms of their professionalism, organizational structures, and bureaucratic efficiencies in comparison to the other “reforming” governmental offices. In the heyday of the Concert of Europe, diplomacy was seen as a culture of aristocratic socialization.⁹¹ As the Concert of Europe unraveled and the complexities of international affairs became more sophisticated, an attempt at professionalization and “disciplining” of the foreign offices was undertaken.⁹² However, by the outbreak of World War I, as suggested above, the reforms were only partially successful.

In the British Foreign Office, diplomats and Foreign Office officials were strictly separated. "Diplomacy was recognized as elitist service... By 1914, career diplomatists numbered 150, forming a closed, gilded circle, staffed in the main by the sons of peers, landowners, and aspiring gentry, and drawn primarily from the prestige public schools and Oxbridge colleges."⁹³ In contrast, Foreign Office officials were less aristocratic than diplomats. The reasons were obvious. The expenses abroad were difficult to afford, especially bearing in mind that their salaries were comparably modest and that they were paid no salary in the first two years of their service.⁹⁴ Apparently, such a material difficulty for the recruits was established to discourage those who lacked means of self-financing and favored those who were financially privileged. There was a sharp criticism leveled against this discriminatory practice. Both services cultivated prejudices against each other. "The Foreign Office...tended to regard diplomatists as dilettantes and social butterflies. Quite naturally, a degree of competition, if not latent hostility, developed between the two services...continued until 1919 when formal amalgamation took place."⁹⁵ Transition between these two services was an exception, and such a move was not seen as laudable nor was it encouraged. For a Foreign Office official, a transfer to a diplomatic post meant downgrading. For a diplomat, a post in the Foreign Office meant deterioration in social standing and prestige.

The idea that diplomacy was not a source of income was well established in the French and German Foreign Offices as well. "No requirement was so carefully observed, as the rule formally in effect until 1908, that candidates had to have independent incomes... The Wilhelmstrasse had first insisted in the 1880s that candidates give evidence of private wealth, with the annual figure set at 6,000 marks."⁹⁶ In Austria, "admission to the foreign office was not in the first place decided by the obligatory diplomatic examination but by social status; for a leading position in the Foreign Service, proof of a fixed income, which made it possible to fulfill the duties of representation, was also required."⁹⁷ "This was a common practice, enforced also in...Russia and Italy as well."⁹⁸ In Italy, "the candidate had to be 'possessed of sufficient financial means to maintain the volunteer in the Italian consulates abroad and, for a diplomatic

career, a compulsory income of 6,000 lire'; this last figure was fairly high so as to ensure that the number of candidates was limited."⁹⁹ In the Quai d'Orsay, "(u)ntil 1894 candidates [applying for the Foreign Office] had to have a private income of 6,000 francs."¹⁰⁰ The French Foreign Office was an island of aristocracy in the sea of republicanism: "French governments (of the Third Republic) were prone to send aristocrats of great standing to important posts. Moreover, even if a Republican represented the French government, he usually made a clear distinction between internal and international politics... Republicanism was simply not an export commodity. Like his aristocratic counterpart, the new Republican diplomat also found parliamentary politics thoroughly repugnant."¹⁰¹ In an effort to make the *Quai d'Orsay* more bourgeois, "the Republic had attempted to upgrade salaries in the hope of attracting permanent officials of bourgeois Republican persuasion."¹⁰² This policy was unsuccessful primarily because the social costs of the diplomatic corps were not affordable for a state official dependent on a salary. Although in the Ottoman Empire there was no strict separation of diplomatic posts, and Foreign Office posts and diplomats were assigned to both tracks, these two tracks were fairly autonomous. The diplomatic posts were filled by men of comparably higher social origins and respectability.¹⁰³

In reaction to the rising popularity of social and economic history and the *Der Primat der Innenpolitik* paradigm, Zara Steiner argued that the making of the British foreign policy and the road to World War I was decided primarily by the independent exploits of the Foreign Ministry. For Steiner, although several concerns might play a role in the making and implementation of foreign policy, the determining force was the closed world of diplomacy.¹⁰⁴ "They operated in a closed circuit and tended mainly to hear each other's voices."¹⁰⁵ Denying a prominent role to social and economic forces in determining foreign policy orientations, Steiner maintains that states and "official minds" had immense power in shaping foreign policy orientations. Moreover, the world of diplomacy was a socially exclusive world closed to the worlds and minds of the non-official elites (such as industrialists)¹⁰⁶ and, therefore, the secluded "diplomatic mind"

strictly hindered other alternative visions and perspectives from contributing to the molding of foreign policy, avoiding any external influence of any sort.

Diplomats shared a common educational background besides a common social background. A comparison between education systems and universities of various countries is illuminating.¹⁰⁷ Britain was the country where institutions of education were most strictly exclusive of the non-aristocratic. In fact, Oxbridge functioned to sustain the social, political, and cultural superiority of the aristocracy. Oxbridge and public schools were strictly non-egalitarian, class-conscious, and class-based.¹⁰⁸ The Prussian gymnasiums were state institutions launched to recruit and educate future knowledgeable bureaucrats trained in a Humboldtian neo-humanist culture and imbue them with *Bildung*.¹⁰⁹ In gymnasiums, nobles and non-nobles were trained together without discrimination, especially in the late nineteenth century. In Russia, in contrast, education was overtly non-aristocratic. It was the sons of the poor, the lower-middle classes, and the non-privileged who crowded the best universities in St. Petersburg and Moscow and cultivated contempt and hatred against the philistine, indolent, and unproductive aristocracy during their education. Lieven remarks that in the Russian universities (and in Moscow University in particular), it was the scions of aristocracy who were discriminated against.¹¹⁰ In contrast to the Prussian case, the Russian state failed to absorb and assimilate the university students to its habitus and culture. As a result, a grave and insurmountable social contradiction emerged between the aristocracy and the new class of *razbnochintsy*.¹¹¹ The Hamidian graduates of the Ottoman Empire demonstrated a similar pattern in which the state's establishment of a modern and fine education system created an undesired outcome. As the education system paved the way to a Communist takeover in Russia with the alienation of the university graduate intellectuals, the egalitarian and relatively non-class-conscious Ottoman education system facilitated a Young Turk takeover against which the Hamidian establishment and aristocracy remained helpless. The construction of the education system was a significant factor in determining the evolution of national paths. In the Ottoman

and Russian cases, they became dysfunctional and worked against the establishment.¹¹² The Hamidian graduates of imperial colleges became adversaries of the system (although unlike their Russian peers, they were employed within the state administration and thus perceived their prospects in the state and reproduced the culture of the state in modified form). Most of the upstarts cultivated resentment towards the beneficiaries of the “unproductive” establishment and were in favor of a more efficient, productive, and meritocratic one.

Evidently, the diplomats in all the Great Powers of Europe graduated from privileged and secluded schools of aristocracy and officialdom. The typical educational background of a British diplomat was schooling at Eton and university training at Oxford. A few graduates of Cambridge University and graduates of prestigious aristocratic public schools besides Eton such as Harrow, Rugby, and Wellington (at the high-school level) can be seen. A career in diplomacy was certainly closed to any outsider.¹¹³ In France, recruitment favored elite schools.¹¹⁴ Austro-Hungarian diplomats were predominantly graduates of Theresianum, the school founded by Maria Theresa as a center of patriotic imperial officialdom.¹¹⁵ In Russia, many of the graduates were from the exclusive and prestigious Imperial Lycee Alexander.¹¹⁶ In a republic with strong anti-aristocratic prejudices, over 60 percent of the diplomats of the United States in the late nineteenth century were graduates of Harvard, Yale, or Princeton and overwhelmingly from East Coast patrician families.¹¹⁷

In the Ottoman Empire, given that there were only a few university-level institutions, the diplomats came overwhelmingly from the two imperial colleges, *Mülkiye* and *Mekteb-i Sultani*. We observe that the graduates of *Mülkiye* and *Mekteb-i Sultani* who opted for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs came from relatively conformist backgrounds in comparison with those graduates who opted for other governmental offices. According to the list prepared by Ali Çankaya, 8 percent (124 men) of the graduates of the *Mülkiye* joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.¹¹⁸ This minority was comprised predominantly of the privileged graduates of *Mülkiye*. As pointed out previously, this was due to the costliness of the life of a diplomat and the prestige the diplomatic

service provided to the scions of dignitaries, a luxury which the sons of lower-middle-class clerks could not enjoy.¹¹⁹

The End of the World of Aristocracy and Gentlemanly Diplomacy

The aristocratic culture of public administration enabled the nineteenth-century configuration of the foreign offices to prevail, creating very limited friction until World War I. In France, prior to World War I, new recruits who were dubbed “Young Turks” reacted to the conservative style of the conduct of diplomacy. The French Young Turks were nationalists and Germanophobes.¹²⁰ Whereas the ambassadorial elite, comprised of men of aristocratic background, held on to the alliances system to maintain peace, the Young Turks advocated an aggressive policy and alliance with Germany and were willing to risk a war if necessary. The disagreements took place between the ambassadorial elite, consisting of the ambassadors appointed to St. Petersburg, London, Berlin, and other members of the old guard who advocated pursuing delicate diplomatic negotiations, and Young Turks in the *Centrale*, who advocated a tougher and uncompromising stance and created mischief in the Moroccan Crisis in 1909. The crisis was finally resolved with a Franco-German agreement thanks to the workings of the old guard.¹²¹ The Austrian historian Fritz Fellner argued that “the unleashing of the war [World War I] could be attributed in no small part to the activities of younger diplomats in the Viennese foreign office.”¹²² The old diplomacy, which not only referred to the method and conduct of the craft of diplomacy, but also to the aristocratic culture, paved the way for a new culture of diplomacy determined by competing nationalisms and unilateralist postures in contrast to the premises of the old diplomacy. The old diplomacy was based on a mutual understanding of the shared interests of the aristocratic ruling classes.¹²³

However self-enclosed or socially exclusive, this was a professional elite whose interests went beyond national borders. With few exceptions, the same kind of men staffed the departments of all the states; they understood each other, they spoke the same language, and they

read the same books. Members of the diplomatic establishment were the multinationals of their time. William Tyrell, Sir Edward Grey's pre-war private secretary, spent his vacations from 1900 to 1910 at the home of Prince Hugo von Radolin, the German ambassador in Paris, whose mother-in-law was in turn a Talleyrand. Members of the profession, despite the occasional chauvinist, thought of themselves as members of a cosmopolitan, culturally homogenous, European family...They were the defenders of the same institutions, national and international. They were conscious of the common lines that kept the peace between them and had a vested interest in their preservation. There were unspoken assumptions about the way diplomacy should be conducted that influenced behavior at home and abroad.¹²⁴

In the old diplomacy, diplomats met not to maximize their own party's interest to the disfavor of the other party, but to reach a compromise on common ground to protect and advance their shared class-based interests. "Europe's elite was more closely tied by culture and concrete interests to an international class than to the classes below them."¹²⁵ It was so much so that the Danish foreign minister Christian Bernstorff, who was an ethnic German like most of the Danish diplomats¹²⁶ and whose father was a Danish foreign minister as well, was transferred to Prussia as the new Prussian foreign minister to serve from 1818 to 1832.¹²⁷ This class-bound multilateralism under the tutorship of Great Britain became unfeasible after the rise of Germany and emergence of rival alliances and camps in the last decades of the nineteenth century.

The responsibility for World War I is a matter of controversy, both as a political issue and as an academic debate. Fischer, in the 1960s, argued that Germany bore the sole responsibility for World War I.¹²⁸ Moreover, for Fischer it was not the German Foreign Office but the Chiefs of Staff that intentionally opted for war. According to Fischer, it was the deliberate calculation of the militarist elite that had instigated the Armageddon.¹²⁹ However, others questioned the argument for the sole responsibility of Germany and suggested that the escalation of tensions, the irreconcilable nature of Great Power aggressions, and many other structural factors rendered a great war possible if not inevitable. Examining the change of attitudes,

perceptions, and ideologies within the foreign offices of Britain and France as well as Germany supports such a claim.¹³⁰ The new cadres of diplomats were more nationalistic (even chauvinistic), and they were eager to demolish gentlemanly international diplomacy.¹³¹ *Realpolitik* and national interest became the catchwords of the new generation of the diplomatic service. These catchwords replaced the hegemonic discourses of balance of power and reciprocity.¹³² Furthermore, every single incident and clash of interests began to be taken as ends in themselves instead of being seen as parts of a whole. Therefore, trying to maximize national interest on every occasion naturally triggered the escalation of tensions and the irreconcilability of interests.

It was also the beginning of the twentieth century when ideology and politics made their way into the foreign offices. Ideological and political preferences and inclinations began to influence and shape the advising and implementation of foreign policy. At this particular time, national and ideological orientations became decisive in the making of foreign policy as the old cosmopolitan and aristocratic cultures of the foreign offices were collapsing. The rising aversion towards Germany in the British Foreign Office, which was a manifestation of these nationalistic and conservative inclinations, was a significant factor in the making of the anti-German alliances with France and Russia, which prepared the ground for World War I. Bernhard von Bülow noted that Sir Robert Morier, the British ambassador to St. Petersburg from 1884 to 1893 was "one of the first of the serious and dangerous upholders of that English attitude which saw in neither Russia nor France but in Germany – ever stronger economically and politically – the rival, therefore enemy, of the British Empire,"¹³³ to be followed by a new generation of Germanphobe British diplomats. Karl Max Lichnowski, the German ambassador to London between 1912 and 1914, also remarked in his memoirs that there not only existed "a formidable anti-German phalanx" of Sir Eyre Crowe, Sir Francis Bertie, Sir Edward Goschen, and Sir Arthur Nicolson, but also "anti-German policy...was then in fashion among the younger British diplomats."¹³⁴

The issue of responsibility for the outbreak of the war has been a controversy since 1914, and the culpability of Germany has been

maintained by many scholars. This group of scholars includes not only Fritz Fischer and his followers (Immanuel Geiss, Volker Berghahn), but also other reputable scholars, such as Albertini in the 1940s, and Taylor, Steiner, and Lieven since then. However, it seems more accurate to argue for common guilt with different levels of culpability. In an era of ideological escalation, the outbreak of World War I cannot be regarded as an accident or a consequence of the overreaching of one of the parties.

Institutionalization, Modernization and Bureaucratization of Foreign Offices

The British Foreign Office gradually evolved from being a small bureau predominantly occupied with the desk work of diplomacy to a sophisticated office responsible not only for the coordination and conduct, but also for the making of foreign policy throughout the second half of the nineteenth century. It was only on the eve of World War I that the Foreign Office was acknowledged as the primary office responsible for foreign policy. In the nineteenth century, foreign policy was mainly the domain of the foreign minister: "Castlereagh completely ignored his staff, Canning did all his own drafting...Palmerston wrote all important dispatches himself and left only minor administrative details to his clerks. He wanted abstracts made, dispatches copied, queries answered and papers properly circulated, but he did not wish for or seek advice."¹³⁵ The Foreign Office grew in size and in its tasks throughout the second half of the nineteenth century. The number of dispatches handled by the Foreign Office increased steadily (6,000 in 1829, 30,000 in 1849, 111,000 in 1905), but on the eve of World War I, the staff of the Foreign Office numbered only 176, including doorkeepers and cleaners.¹³⁶

In this era, a crucial development was the rise of the permanent undersecretary. The traditional duties and responsibilities of the permanent undersecretary (writing first drafts, preparing abstracts of incoming dispatches, and even copying and ciphering) were replaced by his duties as the chief advisor to the foreign minister and active coordination of the implementation and conduct of foreign policy.¹³⁷

By the turn of the twentieth century, the permanent undersecretary was perceived and regarded as the primary expert regarding international politics and the most prominent counselor in the conduct of foreign policy. Nevertheless, this transformation was not a smooth and linear process. On the contrary, many Foreign Office staff, including permanent undersecretaries, resisted the imperatives of the modernization of the Foreign Office. The conventional perception of the task of the Foreign Office was sustained in the minds of the officials. Many permanent undersecretaries avoided assuming political powers.¹³⁸ In short, the Foreign Office lagged behind the other governmental offices in assuming the responsibilities of a modern bureaucratic state, predominantly due to its aristocratic character.

The reforms of 1905 determined the character of the modern Foreign Office and signaled the end of the old order.¹³⁹ While many continued to question, as late as the Cold War, if the British Foreign Office had ever been reformed to adapt to the needs of the twentieth century, it became a nostalgic icon for those who remembered it at a later time within a much more professionalized era of diplomacy.¹⁴⁰ The 1907 reforms in *Quai d'Orsay* were less drastic and radical given that its aristocratic character had already been largely effaced.¹⁴¹ However, the most radical reform, which was in fact no less than a revolution, was undertaken by Schüler just after World War I in Weimar Germany. The German Foreign Office was also Weimarized/republicanized by the eradication of its aristocratic heritage and its commercialization and bourgeoisification under the supervision of Schüler.¹⁴² These reforms, which were undertaken in all major European countries, significantly curtailed the cultural characteristics and distinctions of foreign offices. Although all the foreign offices continued to retain their own cultures and characteristics,¹⁴³ they began to look alike more than ever and transformed (at least) into semi-Weberian bureaucracies. It was the strange death of the old order.

It is also striking to observe that such a small number of people played such a fundamental and determinative role in the making of world politics, especially regarding the advent of World War I: "Ministries remained tight organizations right until the First World War. Russia was the outstanding exception. Elsewhere, few foreign

offices, even among the great powers, employed more than 50 officials at mid-century, or between 100 and 150 men on the eve of the Great War. The French, for instance, increased the number of their officials from 80 in 1870 to 170 (excluding doorkeepers, typists, etc.) in 1914. The Danish Foreign Ministry increased from nine officials in 1848 to 21 in 1914, the Dutch from 23 in 1849 to 45 in 1914."¹⁴⁴ It is also striking to observe how limited the level of professionalism was in offices which had enormously influenced, shaped, and designed the modern world. The secluded worlds of Foreign Offices shaped the course of history. Given the smallness of these offices, the role these individuals and small groups of men played in the shaping of the modern world order is striking.

The Bismarckian and Wilhelmine German Foreign Office

Among the foreign offices throughout Europe, the German Foreign Office was arguably the one that resembled the Hamidian Foreign Office most in terms of its incorporation of loyalty, subservience to the throne, and high level of professionalism. Compared to its British and French counterparts, the German Foreign Office had the least institutional autonomy vis-à-vis its political superiors. During the chancellorship of Bismarck, the Foreign Office was completely subservient to him. Bismarck controlled the Ministry via his son, whom he appointed as the foreign minister. The subservience of the Foreign Office continued after the downfall of Bismarck. In spite of his disregard of the diplomatic service, Bismarck was held in esteem by the diplomatic service, whose exceptional level of knowledge of international affairs, skill in conducting foreign relations, and political genius were both acknowledged and revered: "Under Bismarck, if diplomats were allowed only a limited initiative, they could at last be confident that they were serving Europe's preeminent statesman and the policies they would be expected to implement would be reasoned and coherent."¹⁴⁵ In contrast, Wilhelm II was seen as a reckless and unreliable amateur, if not a charlatan. Although the destructive intrusions of the kaiser were resented by the diplomats and his damage to the professionalism of the diplomatic service exasperated them, there was not a

single resignation from the service between 1890 and 1914 in reaction to these arbitrary and coarse intrusions.¹⁴⁶ Apparently, in the clash between professionalism and aristocratic loyalties, the aristocratic loyalties determined the deeds of the officials. In fact, these two attributes do not necessarily contradict. They may coexist. Nonetheless, what we observe is that aristocratic ethics came first, since professionalism was an aptitude to be acquired and practiced whereas the culture of aristocracy was a *habitus*, a code of conduct, and a merit.

The only exception to the total subservience of the Foreign Office was the immense control Holstein exerted over the Ministry during his tenure as the senior counselor of the Political Division.¹⁴⁷ Holstein was a figure that Bismarck had to take into consideration during his chancellorship; but Holstein's power reached its zenith during the Ministry of Caprivi, who was inexperienced in foreign affairs and, therefore, in this period, Holstein reigned over the Ministry. With the exception of Holstein, the highest-ranking positions lacked prominence and never played major roles in policy making: "The under-secretary was completely subservient to the state secretary, and it was, therefore, a post to be avoided"¹⁴⁸ for the German diplomats.

The German diplomatic service was one of the clearest examples of the European-wide practice of diplomacy as a game involving gentlemen. It was strictly elitist. The German diplomatic service was predominantly Protestant. Only a few Jews ever served in the office.¹⁴⁹ Sixty-nine percent of the Foreign Ministry officers bore titles of nobility.¹⁵⁰ Moreover, most of these officials came from certain families which were closely related and affiliated with others operating within a closed circle.¹⁵¹ It is not surprising that, for Bismarck, what a diplomat should know and do best was socialize in aristocratic salons and display the best manners (and no more).¹⁵²

Nevertheless, the aristocratic nature of German diplomacy went hand-in-hand with an aggressive and fervent foreign policy conducted both by Bismarck and Wilhelm II. German diplomatic aristocratic culture did not hinder the uncompromising tenor of German foreign policy which, in the end, destroyed Old Europe and its political order. On the contrary, it perceived aggression as a manifestation of the ethos of the aristocratic culture and upbringing of its members. Apparently,

aristocratic distinctions in the original medieval era were distinguished by military vigilance and maintained with military honor. What the Wilhelmine German aristocratic culture did was uphold this militarized ethos and exercise it within modern militarist politics and culture.¹⁵³ Together with the fact that Germany was seeking a place under the sun, German aristocratic culture did not become a bastion of order and status quo in the international arena but an anti-status quo force that was forced in the end to bow to non-aristocratic radicals. This is not surprising given the fact that the old German regime developed its own “peculiarities” and did not follow the path of the liberal/conservative credo of the old British regime. No two older regimes resemble each other. In that regard, the Ottoman Hamidian Foreign Ministry oscillated between subterranean radicalism and anti-status quo intentions, and pro-status quo conservatism. In time, it gravitated from the latter to the former as the *ancien régime* generation passed away and international developments increasingly obliged it to change.

The Hamidian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Comparative Perspective

The political division of the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs was formed after the Revolution of 1908. The institution of the political division was a sign of the relative “autonomization” and institutionalization of the Ministry after the Hamidian yoke had been lifted and was a further step toward professionalization, distancing itself from its reigning aristocratic culture. Nevertheless, the workings of the “political divisions” in Britain and Germany show that the political divisions work not within a Weberian bureaucratic ethos but within the aristocratic ethos and worldview. The “myth of professionalism” does not apply to these bureaus. The bureaus based on geographical specialization were formed only after the proclamation of the Republic. This was one more step towards compartmentalization of knowledge, expertise professionalization, and bureaucratization in the Weberian sense. Interestingly, geographical bureaus based on geographical specialization were formed in the Western foreign offices after World War I simultaneously with their Turkish counterpart as one of the reforms undertaken to professionalize these offices.¹⁵⁴

To recap, as a continent-wide trend, foreign offices reached the zenith of their institutional power on the eve of World War I. This period was characterized by the meteoric expansion of bureaucracy and the development of bureaucratic professionalism. It was followed by the advent of the democratization of politics and governments following the devastating world war. The democratization and the middle-class takeover of the governments and administrations brought about the imposition of political infringement on the bureaucracy.¹⁵⁵ The bureaucracy and the political elites no longer came from the same cultural and social class. The change of the class character of the political elites destroyed the concord of the bureaucracy and political decision makers in favor of the new political elites. The aversion and distrust of Lloyd George towards the diplomatic service is well known. The liberal Lloyd George, who liked to expose his lower-class origins on various occasions, disdained the snobbery of the diplomatic service and made foreign policy decisions in minimal coordination with the Foreign Office.¹⁵⁶ While he ignored the Foreign Office, he made his decisions in consultation with his informal "garden cabinet". From the prime ministry of Lloyd George onwards, the British Foreign Office was sidelined and lost its prominence in the decision-making process.¹⁵⁷ Its monopoly in shaping foreign policy was taken away, and some of the components of the foreign policy-making process were distributed to various governmental offices. This process destroyed the self-image of exceptionalism that the privileged foreign policy establishment had enjoyed and the idea that foreign policy was to be conducted and implemented behind closed doors by knowledgeable experts, thus rendering the political elites' position stronger vis-à-vis the bureaucratic establishment.

The reign of Vansittart in the British Foreign Office (and his failure to lead foreign policy due to the opposition of the political elite) was the last stand of the *éminence grises* and a swan song, thus bringing to a close the generation of the great diplomats that had emerged in the early twentieth century. The "golden age of the diplomats" included impressive names such as Holstein and Schüler in Germany, and Hardinge, Eyre, and Crowe in Britain. These "grey eminences", who exerted immense power and oversaw the implementation and making of foreign policy owing to their professionalism, erudition, and

respectability, were the product of a particular and idiosyncratic era. With the end of the old order in diplomacy, enigmatic and thundering grey eminences disappeared and gave the floor to the dreary Weberian desk-worker bureaucrats. The old diplomacy in which personal skills and interpersonal relations were a decisive part of the conduct of business gave way to a depersonalized diplomacy in which personalities mattered less. The new mode of diplomacy hindered and limited the role of individuals in favor of the preponderance of the structural and political dynamics.

Regarding the Ottoman/Turkish case, a similar pattern is observable with one difference. The zenith of the institutional power of the Ministry, not in terms of exerting influence on the making of foreign policy but in terms of developing an institutionalized role in the conduct of coordination of foreign policy and establishing its institutional autonomy, occurred (after the collapse of the "old diplomacy" and in the age of Weberian bureaucratization) in the 1950s just after the end of single-party rule. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs became much more influential in the making of foreign policy during the rule of the Democrat Party (1950–60) than during the Kemalist single-party period in which the presidents (Atatürk and then İnönü) were decisive in the making of foreign policy. During the rule of the Democrat Party, the inexperienced Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fuad Köprülü, ensured that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was at the forefront in making foreign policy.¹⁵⁸

However, this institutional power was a legacy of a process of decades. One figure that may be seen as the master architect of the institutional power of the Ministry during the single-party regime was Numan Menemencioğlu, the general secretary of the Ministry between 1933 and 1942 and the Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1942 and 1944, a figure who is comparable to the grey eminences of the pre-World War I era of European diplomacy. He embodied the institutional power of the Ministry and was one of the last representatives of the ethos and culture of the Ottoman diplomatic service who rose in the ranks of this office. This process was related to the development of the institutionalization of bureaucracy in general. In Turkey, the democratization of the political scene, not only in terms of the

emergence of an electoral democracy but also in terms of the background of the politicians, was observed in the 1950s which brought an end to the parliaments and cabinets composed of ex-bureaucrats and weakened the institutional powers of the bureaucratic offices.¹⁵⁹ This political vacuum should have temporarily enhanced the importance of the diplomatic service before it again retreated before the democratically elected political elites. Although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs retained its institutional culture, privilege, and relative autonomy due to the peculiarities of Turkey, the post-1950 period was a new era for the Turkish diplomatic service as well.¹⁶⁰

There is no evidence that the structuring of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was consciously modeled on any European example: "There is no documentary evidence that the officials of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry made any close study of the organization of the corresponding agencies of European governments before 1908."¹⁶¹ Yet, we observe a similar/parallel pattern and trajectory regarding the evolutions and transformations of the Ottoman/Turkish Foreign Office and its Western counterparts. This is not due to imitation but due to the fact that Ottoman nineteenth-century bureaucratic culture demonstrated a comparable path of evolution and transformation sharing the same premises and externalities. One major difference is the time lag of the Turkish Foreign Office. The institutional zenith of bureaucracy in Turkey was reached with the Kemalist regime, building upon the institutional reforms already undertaken during the Hamidian and post-Hamidian eras and the premises taken from the Hamidian establishment.

CHAPTER 7

PASSAGES OF THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE FROM THE EMPIRE TO THE REPUBLIC

From 1908 onwards, the pace of change accelerated in the Ottoman Empire. “New men” came to power with an entirely new political agenda and vision of politics and social order. This transformation was not unique to the Ottoman framework. A similar transition and transformation was visible in the European scene as Europe approached World War I. European mental structures were evolving in a direction in which ideologies such as fascism, communism, and republicanism would later be able to flourish. Liberal optimism was supplanted by a “cultural pessimism”. This was not the world of Metternich, Castlereagh, or Bismarck anymore. This was not the world of Âli Pasha, Fuad Pasha, or Abdülhamid II, either. The Ottoman Foreign Ministry which mastered the “balance of power politics” was out of fashion in the new world of *Machtpolitik*. The Ministry was less at home and, therefore, less influential in the coordination of policy making in the post-1908 world of *Machtpolitik*. Aging diplomats belonging to the age of Metternich–Castlereagh in Europe, who had faith in the traditional European order and were inclined towards France and Britain (i.e., Europe), were alienated and marginalized although they

were also partially capable of adapting to the new cultural and intellectual milieu and radicalizing in pursuit of the "spirit of the times."¹

Given that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was part of the Tanzimat/Hamidian bureaucracy and its informal culture, it cannot be separated and isolated from the attitudes and culture of the Tanzimat bureaucracy in general. This elite encountered an unprecedented crisis with the 1908 Revolution. The Kamil Pasha government, which assumed office after the Revolution due to the lack of experience of the Young Turks, may be regarded as the "last stand of the old/established Tanzimat bureaucracy". The Kamil Pasha cabinet was ousted from office by the Unionist parliament after a strained period during which parliament, seeing itself as the representative of new forces against the *ancien régime* (*devr-i sabık*), clashed on various occasions severely with the Kamil Pasha cabinet. The vote of no confidence for the Kamil Pasha cabinet² was the first vote of no confidence in the Ottoman constitutional period.

The expectation of the Tanzimat bureaucracy in the first years of the Second Constitutional Period was that it would regain the position it had largely lost during the Hamidian era. This did not materialize. On the contrary, with 1908 it lost its power and influence forever. This was true for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well. The ministerial staff was scrutinized harshly by a skeptical parliament. The salaries of its personnel were curtailed.³ Many were dismissed from office in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the conclusion of *tensikat* (purge). Many parliamentarians expressed their dissatisfaction with the diplomats and questioned their skills. The parliament was apparently distrustful of the Ministry, seeing it as a hub of *ancien régime* corruption and decadence.⁴

The post-1908 era was the transitional period from an imperial language to a national one although this transition did not follow a linear and inevitable path as the discourse of the nation supplanted that of the Empire. It may be formulated that in many aspects "the Empire was already national and the Nation still imperial."⁵ The Young Turks, although they were ardent Turkish nationalists, did not denounce the Empire and the imperial idea. On the contrary, they aspired to build their nationalist project on the top of the imperial

structure and grandeur. Rather than abandoning Ottomanism, they Turkified Ottomanism. They tried to retain and even strengthen the imperial idea while trying to enact their national(ist) project. They had to reconstitute the Empire along with their worldview and render the imperial and national discourses compatible.

However, it has to be said that there was no one identifiable and concrete Young Turk worldview.⁶ It is even hard to argue that any individual “Young Turk” had a consciously developed, proper, consistent, and comprehensive worldview. The era can be characterized as one of ambivalence. The acts and moves of the Young Turks developed spontaneously. It is clear that the Young Turk era and its disruption set the ground for the Kemalists to take over. The Kemalists managed to assume control of the state, thanks to the Young Turks’ purge of the Tanzimat bureaucracy (*rical-i Tanzimat*). The continuity was an ideological one as well. We can establish a link from the Young Turks to the Kemalists, especially in terms of constructing nationhood. But there were also major ruptures and discontinuities between the two. In a sense, Kemalism was closer to the Hamidian paradigm in its glorification and sacralization of the state than the Young Turks’ attempt to mobilize the state for an ideology. Arguably, Kemalism reestablished the primacy of the state which had been destroyed by the Young Turk zealots.

As the Ottoman government in Istanbul was abolished by the Ankara leadership on 1 November 1922, the Ottoman Foreign Ministry was also abolished. With that decision, hundreds of officials serving in the Ministry became technically unemployed. In two weeks’ time, all the foreign representations of the Ottoman Empire were assigned to Ahmed Ferid (Tek), the Paris representative of the Ankara government. Ahmed Ferid sent circulars to the undersecretaries or other assigned officials to take over the administration of the relevant embassies and representations. For example, the person in charge in the London embassy was no longer the illustrious Mustafa Reşid Paşa, but Şefik Bey. In Stockholm, the head of the delegation became Esad Bey, replacing the ambassador Galip Kemali (Söylemezoğlu). However, decisions with regard to other heads of delegation were not conclusive. Although Ahmed Ferid assigned the second secretary, Numan Rifat Bey (Menemencioğlu), in place of the head official, Reşat Nuri Bey, he

informed Reşat Nuri Bey that this decision was temporary and that he should stay in Berne and take a rest while waiting for the final decision. In this purge, prominent diplomats with connections and affiliations with the *ancien régime* were eliminated, and others who were not associated with the *ancien régime* were retained.⁷

Before the proclamation of the Republic in 1923, like all other Ministries, the Foreign Ministry in Ankara took over the responsibilities of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry although the office in Istanbul continued to function until 1927. The transfer of the Ministry to Ankara was completed by 1928 with the opening of the new building of the Foreign Ministry at Sıhhiye.⁸ There was not a Republican policy of purging the cadres. The ones who were eager to move to Ankara from their comfortable houses and mansions in Istanbul were welcome to continue their careers with the exception of those who were thought to have been disloyal to the National Struggle during the War of Independence. Fahreddin Reşad, who served in diplomatic posts such as charge d'affaires in St. Petersburg, ambassador to Cetinje, undersecretary of the embassy to Berlin, and who participated in the *Şura-yı Saltanat* ratifying the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920 representing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was listed among the "hundred and fiftiers" and exiled in 1923.⁹ Others, such as Mehmed Şefik and Mehmed Kadri, were temporarily discharged and examined before their transfer from İstanbul to the new administration in Ankara.¹⁰ Their investigations concluded that they did not participate in any anti-national activity, and they continued their diplomatic careers in the Republican Foreign Ministry.¹¹ This was not an ideological purge, but a retribution for misdeeds. Investigations conducted after the abolition of the government in Istanbul enabled the members of the Istanbul bureaucracy to continue their careers in Ankara.

It is true that the Republic recruited many of its ambassadors from among Kemalist loyalists who had committed themselves to the Kemalist cause during the War of Independence. Many military officers turned into career diplomats. Although some of the military officers terminated their diplomatic careers after one posting, others became professional diplomats serving the Republic for decades like Ahmed Ferid (Tek), Kemalettin Sami Pasha, and Hüsrev Gerede (who was ironically the son-in-law of Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu, whose career was terminated

by the Republic due to his service to the Istanbul government during the War of Independence). However, the transplantation of the loyalists into the diplomatic service occurred only at the ambassadorial level. The cadres below the ambassadorial posts continued to serve as Republican loyalists and were promoted to more prominent posts in time. However, in the first ten years of the Republic, the Republican Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reluctant to fill the diplomatic posts with sympathizers of Britain, France, and imperial loyalists, found difficulty in recruiting qualified younger people due to the unattractiveness of Ankara and the limited prospects such a career promised. A popular joke in the 1920s proposed that anyone found in the Ankara railway station speaking fluent French would be immediately recruited. Nevertheless, however, the Foreign Ministry reacquired its previous prestige and became a niche of prestige and high esteem, attracting the descendants of the aristocratic/imperial families of Istanbul and the sons of high-ranking bureaucrats and the new political elite in Ankara.¹² With the appointment of Numan Menemencioglu as the general secretary of the Ministry, the Ministry was professionalized and "admission to the Ministry was now conditional on the candidate passing an entrance examination."¹³ Menemencioglu was also personally actively involved in persuading and recruiting the sons of the Istanbul elite after the Ankara regime deliberately shifted its recruitment policy regarding the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The internationalization of politics, the escalation of tensions in Europe, and enhancement of the role of diplomacy from the early 1930s onwards should have played a role in the professionalization of the Ministry. In short, the Republic took over the imperial cadres, making the Ministry exceptional within the Republican bureaucracy in its class background and the Ministry became one of the most prestigious offices of the Republic after ten years of neglect.

This, however, does not mean that the Republic continued with conventional policies. On the contrary, the Republican leadership was at a distance from the traditional Ottoman diplomacy. The Republic had a clear change of policy in foreign relations. It renounced the old style of balance of power¹⁴ politics and turned to isolationism.¹⁵ The Republic and the Republican historiography demonized the Tanzimat era by associating it with the sellout of the Empire. It was also highly

critical of the Tanzimat diplomacy. The Tanzimat was associated with capitulation and submission to the Western powers. It was perceived as effeminate and naive in contrast to the vigilance and Spartan nature of the Republic.¹⁶ The Republic took Turkey away from the predatory webs of European diplomacy. It consciously disowned Tanzimat diplomacy. The resistance and delay by foreign diplomatic legations in Istanbul in moving to Ankara, a city regarded by Lord Curzon as a place of "almost savage barbarity,"¹⁷ was symbolic in the sense that they symbolically resisted the change of the Turkish government's new diplomatic course and abandonment of the Ottoman old diplomacy. The Republican Foreign Ministry declined any request by an ambassador to meet with the foreign minister because such moves were regarded as reminiscent of the Tanzimat diplomacy in which the ambassadors were acting like semi-colonial governors.¹⁸

The good news was that the Republic did not have a heavy workload (before the mid-1930s). The European powers were not interested in Turkey and the Eastern Question anymore. The Eastern Question expired with the post-1918 settlement in the Middle East and Anatolia, in which every party was forced to accept its share. Each country had its own problems at home to which they all had to turn. After 1923, Turkey deteriorated from being the hub of international diplomacy, military intelligence, and espionage for battles for world domination before World War I to becoming a remote land on the margins of world diplomacy (to the delight of the Republican elite). The British representatives' spare dispatches (predominantly limited to technical and commercial matters rather than political issues) sent from Turkey in the second half of the 1920s and the early 1930s in contrast to the heavy files containing extensive correspondence and reports before 1914 betrays a drastic contraction in diplomatic involvement and a lack of interest.¹⁹ The number of Turkish representatives abroad and foreign representation in Turkey shrank drastically not counting the new representation required by the post-1918 new independent states.²⁰ This was the end of the age of diplomacy (and age of imperialism) in which the Ottoman Empire was a grand chessboard for diplomats and on which the Ottoman Empire was on the defensive. Instead of being entangled and trapped in the niceties of international diplomacy and

forced to make new “concessions” each time, the Republic could break with the past and Europe in the aftermath of the collapse of the old European order. Temperley, one of the doyens of the history of diplomacy, commented just one year after the Treaty of Lausanne that this treaty “seemed destined, in all human probability, to inaugurate a more lasting settlement, not only than the Treaty of Sévres, but than the Treaties of Versailles, St. Germain, Trianon and Neuilly.” Temperley’s prediction turned out to be impressively accurate.²¹ Hence, the Treaty of Lausanne was rendered mythical, the very symbol of being freed from former bonds and the founding moment of the revival/resurgence emerging from a disgraceful legacy.

In fact, in spite of the Republican claim to disowning the diplomacy of the *ancien régime*, continuity was also visible with regard to the conduct of foreign policy. The Republican stubbornness of the Republican/Kemalist foreign policy establishment, observable during the negotiations in Lausanne, in the conduct of foreign policy throughout the 1920s and 1930s, and in the resilient neutrality of Turkey in World War II,²² was inherited from the Tanzimat and Hamidian mode of conducting foreign policy. The Republican foreign policy’s pragmatism, conservatism vis-à-vis the maintaining of the status quo, and low-profile diplomacy were also retained from the Tanzimat and Hamidian conduct of foreign policy.²³

The Republic willingly renounced any claim to grandeur. Instead, the Republic happily espoused the role of being a small nation state, not interested in what was happening beyond its borders.²⁴ Lost territories were gone. It was not the time to weep for what had been lost. Macedonian melodies and the memories of lost Macedonia saddened Republican cadres,²⁵ but they never dreamed of regaining what had been lost even though it had been the homeland of many. They educated themselves to come to terms with this loss forever. They endorsed non-revisionism in international politics. Anatolia was the new Macedonia, the new El Dorado. It was the site where the Republic aimed to build its utopia. “Peace at home, peace in the world” was the motto of the new understanding of international politics. Turkey did not interfere with developments abroad and expected the same attitude from the other countries regarding its “resolution” of domestic

problems. Suppressing the Kurdish insurgency from the 1920s to 1938 was a relatively easy job because, especially after the settlement of the Mosul problem, no one in Europe was interested in these policing maneuvers, unlike the "Armenian problem" of the 1890s, which transformed into an international crisis, and the notorious "Bulgarian atrocities", which infuriated Gladstone and the British liberals.

The Republic consciously disclaimed imperialism whether in the Islamist or Turkist form. Many of the formal symbols of legitimacy of the Empire were abandoned.²⁶ The new discourse of legitimacy was constructed through very different language. Turkishness became the only source of legitimacy.²⁷ This perception was in many ways a complete reversal of the Ottoman self-representation. However, these represented just one side of the coin. The Republic retained and reformulated many practices and mental structures of the Empire. Arguably, the new Empire was in Ankara, and Turkishness was the new source of legitimacy functioning to establish the imperial tradition in Republican/national garb. Many features and peculiarities of the Empire were retained in the Republic. Republican political cosmology and its vision of social order were taken over from the imperial legacy and reproduced. Its imagination of the "people" was arguably more imperial than nationalist in many aspects. The relation it established with its citizens also retained the Ottoman pattern. The state retained its mythical and supra-social attributes. It continued to be elitist. Its assimilative nationalism was also partially inherited from the Empire and Ottomanism. As demonstrated by recent studies, it was assimilationist and inclusive as long as its premises were endorsed and internalized.²⁸ It was exclusive otherwise.

A valid question to be posed concerns the level of the endorsement of the new Republican line by the imperial diplomats. In the absence of archival sources, we cannot make conclusive observations. However, it is safe to observe that many Ottoman intellectuals and diplomats became sycophants of the Kemalist regime throughout the 1920s in the absence of any alternative political center. We do not observe any significant ideological opposition or criticism leveled against the regime by the imperial and bureaucratic elites. On the contrary, many turned into Kemalist Republicans overnight. Some preferred to stay

silent in their later lives in Istanbul, but almost none of them leveled any ideological assault on the Republic even after 1950. Their criticisms remained mild, and they were respectful of the “achievements” of the Republic.

Remarkably enough, the Republic developed its isolationist new course with the old cadres. The experiences, frustrations, and disillusion of the imperial diplomats may have reoriented their political and ideological outlooks. The pupils of the Republic, who studied in the Republican *Mülkiye* (in İstanbul and after 1936 in Ankara) instead of the imperial *Mülkiye* in İstanbul,²⁹ began to take office in the Foreign Ministry by the 1930s. Interestingly, the generation trained by the Republic began to take high office by the late 1940s as the Republican isolationist policy gave way to a new internationalism within the alignments of the Cold War. Ironically, the first generation of Republican-trained cadres had, from the late 1940s onwards, established and directed the pro-Western policy, a departure from the isolationist Republican foreign policy.

Taking over the imperial legacy, the Republic tried to establish its distinct and not-so-distinct ideology. It adopted various tenets of the imperial ideology and modified some others. In many ways, the Empire had already established a nation-state ideology through a process that began in the early nineteenth century and escalated in the Unionist imperialism. As argued above, Ottomanism in its various practices and manifestations resembled the prospective Kemalist nationalism of the Republic. In that regard, staying away from romanticizing empires (as opposed to the cruelties of the twentieth-century nation states), we may argue that the Ottoman Empire may not be regarded as an empire in the universal sense, if any of the other empires (British, Habsburg, Russian) are to be regarded as such,³⁰ although it also has to be noted that the Ottoman Empire took its Ottomanism and its claim to universalism seriously. The course of the late Ottoman Empire can be seen as the process of a gradual transformation into a nation state in the form of an Empire.³¹ On the other hand, the Republic took over and retained many facets of the imperial ideology.³² The Republic tried to establish the primacy of the state and *raison d'état* against the primacy of “politics” and “ideology”, which brought

about the destruction of the Empire at the hands of the Unionists. In this regard, Kemalist nationalism differed from Unionist nationalism. Kemalism was tantamount to the reimposition of *raison d'état* and suppression of the "political" in the aftermath of 1908 and its costly consequences. The Republic attempted to create loyalty to the state by consecrating the state as the embodiment of the nation and rendering the nation subservient to the state. It repressed the non-official alternative interpretations of the nation. It rendered the nation subordinate to the state and defined it only in its submissive relation to the state. This perception was also arguably a derivative of the imperial ideology.³³

Kemalism can be interpreted as statism (or nation-statism) rather than "nationalism proper". This derived from the heritage it attained from the culture of the Empire. In other words, there was a visible continuity from the Empire to the Republic. The transition was really a step function. The generally smooth adaptation and transition of political, intellectual, cultural, and bureaucratic elites to the new environment, and their noteworthy capacity and eagerness to adapt to the new ideological formations and the new ideological milieu is illustrative. The Republican bureaucracy which was crucial in the establishment, institutionalization, and consolidation of the Republic was taken over from the Empire. Even prominent men of the late Ottoman Empire who were sidelined and lost their positions in the Republic did not level ideological criticisms at the Republic. They acquiesced in their retirement in their mansions in Istanbul. This was partially due to the surveillance of the Republican authorities. However, it was also facilitated by the culture of loyalty and the (emotional) bond they had established with the state which they perceived as intimate to them. Therefore, it was easier for the old cadres to switch their loyalties without contradicting themselves. It was the state upon which they bestowed their allegiance, regardless of the specific ideological dispositions of the state to which they adhered. Thus, the Republican transition may be dubbed as a quiet revolution in which the old culture and habitus was retained and rehabilitated.

The Turkish Foreign Ministry with its radical Westernism and nationalism was an ideal site where we can observe this cooptation. The Turkish Foreign Ministry was not only the quintessential prototype

of institutionalized Kemalism reflecting the Kemalist ethos at its best, but also the site where the two allegedly contradictory cultures meet and reconcile. Kemalism was not nationalism in its conventional sense (nationalism with a reference to ethnicity) but a discourse of elitism that utilized nationalist rhetoric to serve other ends. The nation was defined in the image of the habitus and culture of the elite. The national attributes and qualities were imagined and defined in line with the culture and socialization of this class. The nation was supposed to be secular, modern, and pure as a replica and dissemination of the cultural intimacy of the late Ottoman and Republican bureaucratic elite, which was constituted based on the absorption of a shared ethos and cultural intimacy.

A fundamental assumption prevalent among the Turkish diplomatic establishment is that foreign policy is a supra-political issue not to be interfered with by amateurish and irresponsible politicians.³⁴ This was also a dictum arguably retained from the Ottoman pre-political world in which the state was the chief object of allegiance and politics was not seen as legitimate, but viewed as corrupting (*fitna*). Thus, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs' elitism and its culture of detachment from the outside world were also arguably derivations/remnants of the imperial heritage it retained.

The social portrait and characteristics of the Republican diplomatic service are also worth an assessment. With its elitist background, it continued to constitute a Bourdieuan state nobility.³⁵ We may argue that it retained the old Ottoman premise of the complete separation of the masses from the ruling class (*askeri* versus *reaya*) and nurtured its own *askeri* class (based on assimilation into its value system as well as genealogical continuity) ethos. The erudition and skills necessary for admission into the Tanzimat's new bureaucratic class rendered this separation even more plausible. Coming from distinctive and privileged backgrounds (education in *Mekteb-i Sultani* and the imperial high schools), experiencing their political and cultural socializations in their habitus, and cultivated as *a la franga*, they developed an exclusionary perception of the masses. This elite also reserved the state as their privilege and continued to regard it as intimate to them. In other words, they owned it rather than vice versa.

The persistence of the diplomatic establishment and its elitist characteristics can also be observed in examining the biographical data of the diplomatic service as of 1967. By 1967, Istanbul continued to be the main source for recruiting diplomats. Of the 474 career diplomats serving as of 1967,³⁶ 191 were born in Istanbul, 52 diplomats were born in Ankara, 19 were born in Izmir, and 24 were born in foreign countries, including the lost territories of the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, 265 of the 474 career diplomats graduated from high schools in Istanbul. Given that 47 of the career diplomats graduated from high schools abroad and 94 of the career diplomats graduated from high schools in Ankara (84) or Izmir (10), only 56 of the career diplomats graduated from provincial high schools.³⁷ Not surprisingly, 40 percent of the diplomats graduated from French-language schools, such as *Galatasaray* (the Ottoman *Mekteb-i Sultani*), Saint-Benoit, and Saint Joseph. Around 15 percent of the diplomats were graduates of both *Galatasaray* and *Mülkiye*. These statistics display the portrait of a “typical” Turkish diplomat. According to Mahmut Dikerdem, the idiosyncratic socialist diplomat, until the end of World War II, only “sons of Istanbuliot families, especially those who were graduates of Galatasaray and the American College, could dare to take the entrance examination of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.”³⁸ Ergun Sav, who joined the diplomatic service in 1962, finds it necessary to emphasize that he was born and grew up in Ankara (as opposed to being born and growing up in Istanbul): “Don’t think when I joined the diplomatic service, I was imprisoned in the circle of diplomats. I am a native of the capital, Ankara. I had social contacts in Ankara. I was not from the Galatasaray–Mülkiye line.”³⁹

It also has to be remembered that *Mülkiye* only moved to Ankara in 1937 and that before the Republican purge of the faculty of the University of Istanbul in 1933, the Ottoman *Mülkiye* continued to deliver diplomats to the Republic. Many of the prominent Turkish diplomats continued to be scions of the late Ottoman elite. The new political elite in Ankara also recruited its sons to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Indeed, these elites gradually merged. Five general secretaries (or undersecretaries after 1980) of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs were sons of military generals (Muharrem Nuri Birgi,

Haluk Bayülken, İlder Türkmen, Kamuran Gürün, and Ercüment Yavuzalp). Sons of military officers were rampant in the Republican diplomatic service. Diplomats such as Celal Çalışlar, Orhan Eralp, Osman Conker, Taha Carım, and Hüveyda Mayapetek were the sons of the (predominantly military officer) members of the early Republican political elite.

In this study, the Foreign Ministry was not only taken as a governmental office, but also as a manifestation of the making of the modern Turkish state elite. Given that the Ministry assumed an unprecedented and prominent role in the turbulent (and long) Ottoman nineteenth century, it is hoped that this study of the Ministry reveals that in the development of the discourse of modern Turkishness, modernity and nationalism were intertwined and indistinguishable from each other. The case of the Ottoman/Turkish Foreign Ministry provides us with some vistas concerning how Turkish Euroskeptical nationalism was an inherent part of the Turkish modernization project itself and how Turkish modernization, contrary to the established Kemalist and pseudo-Kemalist discourse, was not an attempt to renounce the “old”, but instead was an endeavor to revive and restore it in a brave new world. The study attempts to trace the discursive continuity from Mahmud II onwards and its lasting impact.

Kemalist foreign policy should not be understood as primarily an effort at pro-Westernism nor as a function of the self-ascribed identity and identity politics of the Kemalist elite. On the contrary, this study argues that Kemalism was a much more complex amalgam, which included Westernism as an indispensable and pivotal component. Kemalism's principal premise was a nation-statism characterized by isolationism, hostility towards any Western (international) intervention, and a profound distrust of the “West”. Kemalism's Westernist foreign policy orientation emerged after it was reformulated, tempered, and rendered compatible with democracy in the Cold War environment (and therefore reinvented) after the collapse of the single-party regime.⁴⁰ In fact, Kemalism was reinvented with the collapse of the single-party regime trivializing Kemalism's anti-Westernism before its comeback after the end of the Cold War. Taking Kemalism as an evolution of the late Ottoman *souverainisme*, this study has attempted

to establish that Kemalism fits into the mindset of the late Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs (and the Ottoman bureaucracy as a whole). This also partially explains the conservatism of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the post-Cold War world and its becoming trapped in the arguably insoluble issues of Cyprus⁴¹ and coming to terms with the Armenian massacres in 1915.

Observing the continuity of a certain discourse espoused by the Ministry not only from the Empire to the Republic, but also from the early nineteenth to the twenty-first century, may open vistas in reinterpreting the ideological and mental structures of contemporary Turkey and in understanding the crises faced by Turkey as manifested in its perceptions of the EU, Cyprus, the United States, and globalization. It is crucial to observe how this perpetual discourse of *souverainisme* was created at a time of imperial retreat and dissolution and was perpetuated and transmitted to the Turkish nation state, which continued to live with Sèvresphobia as if time was frozen at a particular moment in the course of history.

We also should bear in mind that Sèvresphobia does not simply refer to the Treaty of Sèvres signed in 1920, which rendered Turkey a small state confined to the interior of Anatolia and which delivered vast territories with Turkish populations to Armenians and Greeks. Sèvresphobia goes back in time before the Republic and before the Sèvres Treaty. It is as much about St. Stephanos, the Balkan War treaties, and other humiliating treaties that the Ottomans were forced to sign as it is about Sèvres. Nevertheless, it may be argued that Sèvresphobia, or the Sèvres syndrome, a concept introduced by liberal political scientists⁴² to define a certain attitude, perception, and reflex, is an apt label given that the Republic also strove to obliterate the pre-Republican traumas, subsumed the previous disillusionment under the bogeyman of Sèvres (republicanization of the traumas), and established a sharp dichotomy between Lausanne and Sèvres. Nevertheless, it is important to reiterate that the trauma of Sèvres was not generated by Sèvres. On the contrary, the traumatic perception towards Sèvres was constructed upon previous memories and experiences such as the loss of Crete, the unkept promises of the Western powers after the Balkan Wars, etc. What Sèvres did was to make eternal and transcendental the

mundane and *Realpolitik*, transmitting them to the realm of universals, and amalgamating several traumatic experiences into one single overarching and encompassing traumatic experience which subsumed and reinforced all the others. With such disillusionment, it was the transcendental imagery of the state which the elite always turned to and espoused.⁴³ The transcendental state was not only a haven against external attacks, but also a shelter from the ignorant masses that had to be reeducated, civilized, and incorporated into the habitus and cultural intimacy of the state elite.

CONCLUSION

This study investigated the cultural, intellectual, and ideological formations of the Ottoman diplomatic service in the late Ottoman Empire with an emphasis on the Hamidian era. The study attempted to describe the basic contours and premises of the culture of the late Ottoman bureaucracy (in its thick description) as well as the social origins of the late Ottoman state elite by examining the diplomatic service as a microcosm of the late Ottoman bureaucratic elite. The study also aimed to highlight the prominent role that the late Ottoman bureaucratic establishment played in the development of the modern Turkish national identity and Turkish nationalism, as well as the ideological premises of the Republic.

The Ottoman diplomatic service was the most elitist governmental office of the late Ottoman Empire. This elitism becomes even more apparent in the social backgrounds of the ambassadors. The elitist nature of the diplomatic service was not peculiar to the Ottoman Empire. On the contrary, this was a European continent-wide pattern. It has been argued that the Tanzimat was an era of the consolidation of a state elite or nobility. In contrast to European nobility, the late Ottoman nobility was constructed on its relation to the state and was based on serving in the state bureaucracy (which had some resemblance to the Russian nobility, based on both bloodlines and service to the state). The Ottoman state elite was wedded to the state and displayed loyalty to the state, which also served the self-interests of this class cluster. The Tanzimat elite was an amalgamation of different elites. It was consolidated by the marriage of the aristocracies of the peripheries and the elite resident in Istanbul. The late Ottoman

diplomatic service is illustrative for observing the recruitment patterns, structures of loyalty, and other prominent characteristics and peculiarities of the *ancien régime* of the late Ottoman Empire because it was where we can observe the sons of grand viziers, *ulema*, and lower-ranking officials working alongside the sons of Kurdish emirs, Turcoman tribal chieftains, and Turkish, Caucasian, Albanian, and Arab provincial dignitaries, as well as the sons of the elites of the non-Muslim communities. The Ottoman diplomatic service was an amalgamation of modern, meritocratic professionalism with the ethos of the traditional aristocratic service. This world of the Ottoman *ancien régime* came to an end with the Revolution of 1908. As education became a salient factor for advancement and the accumulation of material and social capital, a new political and bureaucratic elite emerged. The new Unionist generation, predominantly coming from lower middle-class backgrounds and from the families of lower-ranking civil servants, curtailed the privileged world of the Ottoman *ancien régime*. The mental and ideological structures of the *ancien régime* were abandoned in favor of a new radical stance. This was not only the end of the Ottoman *ancien régime* and the emergence of the Turkish *nouvelle régime*, but also the end of the Metternichean–Castlereaghian Concert of Europe and Bismarckian diplomacy, and, therefore, the end of the late Ottoman diplomats and their diplomatic culture. Nevertheless, the Ottoman *ancien régime*, its culture, and its ideological underpinnings were constitutive in the Young Turk and Republican *nouvelle régimes* in terms of their cultural and ideological structures, as well as their elite recruitment.

The continuities (as well as modifications and changes) from the Empire to the Republic are also emphasized. The notion of the “nation” in the Republic was very much influenced by the image created and bolstered by the Ottoman imperial centre, which imagined the “nation” as subservient to itself. Studying the dispatches sent from the Ottoman embassies and legations to European and Balkan capitals suggests that the self-identity of the Ottoman imperial elite was constituted in the process of encountering (and opposing) perceived threats. These threats, unlike the perceived threats of previous centuries, were diffuse and abstract, which rendered them not only

less predictable, but also more disquieting and threatening. They were not clearly identifiable; thus, they were not only more dangerous, but also regarded as more treacherous. These enemies, as observed in the correspondence from European and Balkan capitals, included seditious non-Muslims; the expansionist and imperial aims of the Great Powers; small, ambitious Balkan powers; and other destabilizing elements and ideas. Furthermore, these threats were envisaged as conspiring and coordinating in concert. These perceived threats and dangers ensured the emergence of a defensive and reactive statism. Within this environment, an intimate relation with the state was forged. It was the state and the imagery of the state that was aggressively protected, and simultaneously it was within this state where these people could take refuge in the midst of permanent danger.

It has been proposed that over time non-Muslim communities and eventually even Muslim ethnic groups (such as Albanians, Arabs) would come to be seen as unreliable and disloyal to the imagery of the imperial center, leaving only those of Turkish ethnicity as a reliable force. Thus, although an interest in Turkish ethnicity emerged, this derived less from ethnic awareness and more from the concerns of the state and the imperial center. As pointed out in this study, this nation was defined with regard to the (subservient) relation it established with the state. Nevertheless, what was radical and novel in the *nouvelle regime* was the renunciation of the multiple objects of loyalty in the Empire and the monopolization of one single object of loyalty, the Nation.

NOTES

Introduction

1. For the literature available in English for conceptual history, see Koselleck, Reinhart, *The Practice of Conceptual History*, (Stanford, 2002); idem, *Critique and Crisis: Pathogenesis of Modern Society*, (Cambridge, 1988); Richter, Melvin, *The History of Political and Social Concepts*, (Oxford, 1995); Tribe, Keith, "The GG Project: From History of Ideas to Conceptual History", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 31, January 1989, pp. 180–184; Richter, Melvin, "Begriffsgeschichte and the History of Ideas", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 48, No. 2, April 1987, pp. 247–263.
2. "Cultural intimacy" is defined by Michael Herzfeld as "the recognition of those aspects of a cultural identity that are considered a source of external embarrassment but that nevertheless provide insiders with their assurance of common sociality, the familiarity with the bases of power that may at one moment assure the disenfranchised a degree of creative irreverence and at the next moment reinforce the effectiveness of intimidation." Herzfeld, Michael, *Cultural Intimacy: Social Poetics in the Nation-State*, (London; New York, 1997), p. 3.
3. For the concept of *lieux de mémoire*, see Nora, Pierre (ed.), *Rethinking France: Lieux de Mémoire*, (Chicago, 2001).
4. Kafadar, Cemal, "The Question of Ottoman Decline", *Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic Review*, No. 4 (1997–8), pp. 30–76; Grant, Jonathan, "Rethinking the Ottoman "Decline": Military Technology Diffusion in the Ottoman Empire, Fifteenth to Eighteenth Centuries", *Journal of World History*, Vol. 10, No. 1, Spring, 1999, pp. 179–201.

5. For the earliest effort to interpret these two centuries as the emergence of the modern state, see Abou-El-Haj, Rifa'at, *Formation of the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire Sixteenth to Eighteenth Century*, (New York, 1991). Also see Salzmänn, Ariel, *Tocqueville in the Ottoman Empire: Rival Paths to the Modern State*, (Leiden, 2004).
6. Deringil, Selim, *The Well-Protected Domains*, (London, 1998); Makdisi, Ussama, *The Culture of Sectarianism*, (Berkeley, 2000); Makdisi, Ussama, "Ottoman Orientalism", *The American Historical Review*, June 2002, Vol. 107, No. 3, pp. 768–796.
7. Hanioglu, Şükrü, *The Young Turks in Opposition*, (Oxford, 1995); idem, *Preparing for a Revolution*, (Oxford, 2001); idem, *Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Abdullah Cevdet*, (İstanbul, 1981).
8. Frey, Frederick, *The Turkish Political Elite*, (Cambridge, 1965).
9. For the emergence of the modernist/nationalist elite in India, see Seal, Anil, *The Emergence of Indian Nationalism: Competition and Collaboration in the Later Nineteenth Century*, (Cambridge, 1968).
10. Mardin, Şerif, "Center–Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?", *Daedalus*, Vol. 102, No. 1, 1973, pp. 169–190. İdris Küçükömer's classic book, which preceded Mardin's article by two years, should also be considered as a supplement to this article with its sweeping impact on the Turkish left, Turkish intellectual thought and academia although it also established a reductionist revisionist reinterpretation of the course of Turkish history. Küçükömer, İdris, *Düzenin Yabancılaşması*, (İstanbul, 1969). Whereas Küçükömer's periphery was the populace untouched by the reformism of the center, Mardin's center was the state, and therefore the center–periphery clash did not occur between two compatible foes. The inherent tension in Mardin's work was constructed between the state and its unruly subjects, and therefore it is erroneous to explain this scheme as a cultural rift. Also see, Heper, Metin, *The State Tradition in Turkey*, (Beverly, 1985).
11. Elias, Norbert, *The Civilizing Process*, (Cambridge, 1984); Weber, Eugen, *Peasants into Frenchmen*, (Stanford, 1976); Raeff, Marc, *The Well-Ordered Police State*, (New Haven, 1982).
12. For the outlines and premises of the new cultural history, see Geertz, Clifford, *The Interpretations of Culture*, (New York, 1973).
13. The classical work that underlines the value-generating nature of the early modern state is Raeff, Marc, *The Well-Ordered Police State*. For the nineteenth-century modern state, see also Weber, Eugen, *Peasants into Frenchmen*.
14. See Kohn, Hans, *Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology*, (New York, 1960).

15. For a discussion of nationalism as an expression of a collective identity, see Eisenstadt, Shmuel N. & Schluchter, Wolfgang, "Introduction: Paths to Early Modernities – A Comparative View", in Eisenstadt, Shmuel N., Schluchter, Wolfgang & Wittrock, Björn (eds.), *Public Spheres & Collective Identities*, (New Brunswick, 2001), pp. 13–14. For a discussion of nationalism and early modernity, see Wittrock, Björn, "Early Modernities: Varieties and Transitions", *Ibid.*, 19–40.
16. Among many others, especially see Pocock, J.G.A., *The Machiavellian Moment*, (Princeton, 1975); idem, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law*, (Cambridge, 1957); idem, *Barbarism and Religion*, (Cambridge, 1999); Viroli, Maurizio, *From Politics to Reason of State*, (Cambridge, 1992); Baron, Hans, *The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance*, (Princeton, 1966).
17. For some prominent studies of new intellectual history and new cultural history, see Darnton, Robert, *The Literary Underground of the Old Regime*, (Cambridge, 1982); idem, *The Forbidden Best-Sellers of the Pre-Revolutionary France*, (New York, 1995); Hunt, Lynn Avery, *Family Romance of the French Revolution*, (Berkeley, 1993); Furet, Francois, *Rethinking the French Revolution*, (Chicago, 1982); Ginzburg, Carlo, *The Cheese and the Worms*, (Baltimore, 1992); Grafton, Anthony, *Defenders of the Text*, (Cambridge, 1991); Keith Michael Baker, *Inventing the French Revolution*, (Cambridge, 1990); Pocock, J.G.A., *The Machiavellian Moment*, (Princeton, 1975); Skinner, Quentin, *Visions of Politics*, (Cambridge, 2002); Chartier, Roger, *The Cultural Origins of the French Revolution*, (Durham, 1991).
18. Herzfeld, Michael, *Cultural Intimacy*; idem, *A Place in History: Social and Monumental Time in a Cretan Town*, (Princeton, 1991); idem, *The Social Production of Indifference: Exploring the Symbolic Origins of Western Bureaucracy*, (Chicago, 1993); idem, *Ours Once More: Folklore, Ideology and the Making of Modern Greece*, (New York, 1986); idem, *Portrait of a Greek Imagination: An Ethnographic Biography of Andreas Nenedakis*, (Chicago, 1997).

Chapter 1 Nationalism and *ancien régime*: Politics of the Tanzimat

1. Kedourie, Elie, *Nationalism*, (London, 1966), 9.
2. Kedourie, *Ibid.*, pp. 138–39.
3. See Hayes, Carlton, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism*, (New York, 1931); Kohn, Hans, *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in its Origins and Background*, (New York, 1944).

4. Hobsbawm, Eric, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, (Cambridge, 1992), p. 3. Also from the excerpt quoted above we can observe how much Kedourie was also appalled by post-1918 Central and Eastern European developments. Mark Mazower propounds a hollow portrayal of the post-WWI developments in Central and Eastern Europe and sees them as the precursor of the darkest years of the continent. See Mazower, Mark, *Dark Continent*, (London, 1999). It has to be noted that Anglo-Saxon academics of post-WWI ranging from conservatives to left-liberals were all longing for the peaceful *ante bellum* liberal/conservative Europe of empires which had been shattered and demolished by the arrogant nationalisms of small nations. It was "the world they have lost."
5. Hayes, Carlton, *Nationalism: A Religion*, (New York, 1960), p. 1.
6. See Hayes, Carlton, *A Generation of Materialism 1871–1900*, (New York, 1941).
7. Parsons, Talcott, *Politics and Social Structure*, (New York, 1969), pp. 49–50.
8. Parsons, Talcott, *The Social System*, (Glencoe, 1951), pp. 187–88.
9. Anderson, Benedict, *Imagined Communities*, (London; New York, 2003), p. 5
10. Gellner, Ernest, *Nations and Nationalism*, (Ithaca, 1983), p. 48.
11. For Gellner's suggested modeling of human history, see Gellner, Ernest, *Plough, Sword and Book: The Structure of Human History*, (Chicago, 1990).
12. Gregory Jusdanis rejects the Gellnerian market-state-centered logic explanation of the emergence of nationalism in favor of a "culturalist" alternative explanation: "I argue that nationalism developed in the latter eighteenth century for two reasons. First, the far reaching transformations accompanying modernity brought about a profound interaction among populations. Although cultural and economic exchanges had always been part of human history, in the modern age this intercourse began to threaten the ethnic identities of regional groups more than had been the case with the multi-ethnic empires of the Antiquity and the Middle Ages. Capitalism, colonialism, and new means of communication and transportation pulled distant places closer together and mixed their populations, endangering thereby their cultural existence. The intensity and scope of contact among the world's peoples engendered a deep interest in the collective self and the separation of this self from others. The more people confronted groups beyond their frontiers and borrowed from them, the more the differences between those inside and outside were emphasized." Jusdanis, Gregory, *The Necessary Nation*, (Princeton, 2001), pp. 5–6. For the birth of Turkish nationalism, a reconciliation of these two approaches may be established. The urge to rescue the Empire, which epitomized the dignity, self-esteem and stature of the imperial elite and lay at the pivot of imperial elite's spiritual cosmology, was also prompted by the prospect of material rewards; the continuation of the Empire secured the well-being of the elite. This

- urge arose both from “culturalistic” impulses (self-respect, pride, identity-formation, expression of the “self” – à la Charles Taylor) and “materialistic” impulses (employing it as a strategy to maintain and uphold the group’s privileged status). The emergence of Turkish nationalism is problematic for a Gellnerian approach because the Ottoman context lacked a market-based economy. In the Ottoman/Turkish case, a, state-centered approach would be more plausible and convincing.
13. Brass, Paul R, *Ethnicity and Nationalism*, (New Delhi; Newbury Park, 1991); Breuilly, John, *Nationalism and the State*, (Manchester, 1993).
 14. Gadamer, Hans Georg, *Truth and Method*, (London, 1979).
 15. For example see Kidd, Colin, *British Identities Before Nationalism*, (Cambridge, 1999); idem, *The Forging of Races*, (Cambridge, 2006).
 16. Herzfeld, Michael, *Cultural Intimacy*; Cheah, Pheng, *Spectral Nationality*, (New York, 2003); Mann, Michael, *Sources of Social Power*, Vol. II, (Cambridge, 1986) James, Paul, *Nation Formation*, (Newbury Park, 1996).
 17. Tilly, Charles, *Coercion, Capital and European States AD 990–1992*, (Cambridge, 1990), p. 116.
 18. Bell, David A, *The Cult of the Nation in France*, (Cambridge, 2001); Hastings, Adrian, *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nation*, (Cambridge, 1997); Romani, Roberto, *National Character and Public Spirit in Britain and France 1750–1914*, (Cambridge, 2002); Pincus, Steven, *Patriotism and Protestantism*, (Cambridge, 1996); Colley, Linda. *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707–1837*, (New Haven, 1992); Wahrman, Dror, *The Making of the Modern Self: Identity and Culture in the Eighteenth-Century England*, (New Haven, 2004); Wilson, Kathleen, *The Sense of People: Politics, Culture and Imperialism in England 1715–1785*, (Cambridge, 1998); Sayer, Derek & Corrigan, Philip, *The Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural Revolution*, (Oxford; New York, 1985).
 19. Hoskings, Geoffrey, *Russia and Russians*, (Cambridge, 2001); Weeks, Theodore R, *Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia*, (De Kalb, III, 1996); Jurdanis, Gregory, *Belated Modernity and Aesthetic Culture*, (Minneapolis, 1991); Tatsios, Theodore George, *The Megali Idea and the Greek-Turkish War of 1897*, (Boulder, 1984); Clogg, Richard, *A Concise History of Greece*, (Cambridge, 1992); Kitromilides, Paschalis, “‘Imagined Communities’ and the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans”, *European History Quarterly*, No. 2, pp. 149–192.
 20. Armstrong, John, *Nations Before Nationalism*, (Chapel Hill, 1982).
 21. Smith, Anthony D., *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, (Oxford, 1988), p. 211.
 22. Smith, Anthony D., *Ethno-Symbolism and Nationalism*, (London; New York, 2009), p. 37.

23. Smith, Anthony D., *Myths and Memories of the Nation*, (New York, 1999), p. 9.
24. Greenfeld, Liah, *Five Roads to Modernity*, (Cambridge, 1992); Bell, David A., *The Cult of the Nation in France*, (Cambridge, 2001); Hastings, Adrian, *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nation*; Colley, Linda, *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707–1837*.
25. Green, Abigail, *Fatherlands: State-Building and Nationhood in Nineteenth-Century Germany*, (Cambridge, 2001), p. 1.
26. Green, Abigail, *Ibid.*, p. 7. For the persistence of local political identities disguised within the discourse of the centralizing and imposing German identity, see Confino, Alon, *The Nation as a Local Metaphor: Württemberg, Imperial Germany and National Memory 1871–1918*, (Chapel Hill, 1997).
27. Ramsaur, Ernest, *The Young Turks*, (Princeton, 1957), p. 147; Berkes, Niyazi, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, (London, 1964), p. 313; Lewis, Bernard, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, (Oxford, 1961), pp. 228–29; Shaw, Stanford, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, (Cambridge, 1976), Vol. II, p. 289.
28. Kushner, David, *The Rise of Turkism 1876–1908*, (Portland, 1977). Also see Albayrak, Hasan, *Milletin Taribinden Ulusun Taribine*, (İstanbul, 2009), p. 42. I thank Hakan Erdem for making this observation.
29. Especially see Karpas, Kemal, *The Politicization of Islam*, (Oxford, 2001); Hanioglu, Şükrü, *Young Turks in Opposition*.
30. Deringil, Selim, *The Well-Protected Domains*, p. 11.
31. Lewis, Bernard, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*; Berkes, Niyazi, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*; Shaw, Stanford, *History of the Ottoman Empire and the Modern Turkey*.
32. For some works rehabilitating Ottomanism and investigating the discourse of Ottomanism within such a framework, see Deringil, Selim, *The Well-Protected Domains*, Somel, Selçuk Akşin, “Osmanlı Reform Çağında Osmanlıcılık Düşüncesi (1839–1913), in *Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet’in Birikimi*, Mehmet Ö. Alkan (ed.), (İstanbul, 2001), pp. 88–116; Cleveland, William, *The Making of an Arab Nationalist: Ottomanism and Arabism in the Life and Thought of Sati’ al-Hus*, (Princeton, 1971); Prator, Sabine, *Der Arabische Faktor in der Jungtürkischen Politik*, (Stuttgart, 1993).
33. See Hanioglu, Şükrü, *Preparing for a Revolution*, pp. 64–73.
34. Yusuf Akçura, *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset*, (Ankara, 1976), p. 36.
35. Yusuf Akçura was not unique in his pragmatism. In a response to the article of Yusuf Akçura, Ahmet Ferit, one of the future public leaders of Turkists, pointed to the deficiencies and impracticalities of all three suggested “modes of politics” and asked, “is there a more rewarding political program than opportunism?” Excerpted in Yusuf Akçura, *Ibid.*, p. 55.

36. For "Western" and "Eastern" nationalisms, see Plamenatz, John, "Two Types of Nationalism", in *Nationalism: The Nature and Evolution of an Idea*, Kamenka, Eugene (ed.), (London, 1976), pp. 23–36.
37. McClintock, Anne, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Context*, (London; New York, 1995), 360.
38. Chatterjee, Partha, *The Nation and its Fragments*, (Princeton, 1993), p. 5.
39. Kitromilides, Paschalis M., "The Enlightenment East and West: A Comparative Perspective on the Ideological Origins of the Balkan Political Traditions", in *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1983, p. 64.
40. For the convoluted connotations of the concept "*vatan*" in Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, see Heinzelmann, Tobias, "Die Konstruktion eines Osmanischen Patriotismus" in *Aspects of the Political Language in Turkey*, Hans-Kieser, Lukas (ed.), (Istanbul, 2002), pp. 41–51.
41. Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, *Tezâkir*, (Ankara, 1963), Vol. II, pp. 266–275, Vol. III, pp. 3–107. Also see Mahmud Celaleddin Paşa, *Mirat-i Hakikat*, (Dersaadet, 1326).
42. Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, (Dersaadet, 1309), Vol. XII, pp. 204–219; Şani-zade Mehmed Ata'ullah Efendi, *Şani-zade Tarihi*, (İstanbul, 2008), Vol. II, p. 1187.
43. Boyar, Ebru, *Ottomans, Turks and the Balkans*, (London; New York, 2007), p. 70–71.
44. For the persistence of the Ottoman/imperial discourse in the Kemalist era, see Boyar, Ebru, *Ibid.*, pp. 59, 79
45. For example, see *Tarih III (Yeni ve Yakın Zamanlar)*, (Ankara, 1933), pp. 257–58.
46. After the publication of Edward Said's *Orientalism* and his exposure of the "invention of the East", this theme was "applied" to many other non-Western regions. For the Balkans, see Wolff, Larry, *Inventing Eastern Europe*, (Stanford, 1996); Todorova, Maria, *Imagining the Balkans*, (Oxford, 1997). For images of the Balkans in Ottoman caricatures strikingly resembling Western images depicting the Balkan nations as bandits wearing traditional clothes (in contrast to civilized-looking and appropriately dressed Turks), see Heinzelmann, Tobias, *Osmanlı Karikatüründe Balkan Sorunu*. This book shows that the imagery of Ahmed Cevdet Pasha and his contemporaries persisted in the heyday of Unionist Turkish nationalism within a more ethnically charged parlance. The Balkans continued to be represented as the culturally and socially underdeveloped periphery of the Ottoman Empire during the Balkan Wars, as Heinzelmann's study demonstrates. For another Ottoman author who depicted Bulgarians as vagabonds "killing their prime ministers in the streets" and Montenegrins as "lacking any sign of civilization and progress"

- in 1905, see Samipaşazade Sezai, "Balkanlar'da İttifak-ı Müselles", *Şura-yı Ümmet*, 4 June 1905, excerpted in Kerman, Zeynep (ed.), *Sami Paşazade Sezai: Bütün Eserleri*, (Ankara, 2001), Vol. III, p. 200.
47. For the Islamic perception of state and order with special reference to the Ottomans, see Lewis, Bernard, *The Political Language of Islam*, (Chicago, 1991). Also see Lambton, Ann K.S., *State and Government in Medieval Islam*, (London; New York, 1991), pp. 15–16. "Belief in the divine origin of community and the lack of any separation between 'church' and the state had important consequences so far as civil war and internal disturbances were concerned. These were called *fitna* (pl. *fitan*) and were considered to be, fundamentally, rebellion against the divine law." (p. 15) I do not argue that there prevails a monolithic Islamic law and legal perception concerning the state, community and order unchanging throughout centuries. However, certain premises derived from Islamic legal perceptions have the power to partially shape and influence the subsequent perceptions including the founding axioms, reference system, and mental cosmology of Turkish nationalism and Ottoman imperial official nationalism. Turkish nationalism bears Islamic origins in many regards as is visible in its various attributes and manifestations.
48. For such a language of dehumanization, see Mehmed Es'ad Efendi, *Vak'a-Nüvis Esad Efendi Tarihi*, (İstanbul, 2000); Erdem, Hakan Y, "'Do not Think of Them as Agricultural Labourers': Ottoman Responses to the Greek War of Independence" in Dragonas, Thalia & Birtek, Faruk (ed.), *Citizenship and the Nation-State in Greece and Turkey*, (London; New York, 2005), pp. 67–85. For pre-modern dehumanizing perceptions, see Kiernan, Ben, *Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur*, (New Haven, 2007). In the Ottoman perspective as derived from Islamic law and Islamic political culture, non-Muslim subjects were not regarded as individuals deserving dignity but as captives whose right to life was assured conditionally. In many ways, this language may be seen as dehumanizing non-Muslims. However, such a judgment (as was asserted by many ideologically charged critics of the Ottoman Empire) would be mistaken because dehumanization presupposes a normality in which humans are acknowledged as enjoying full command over their bodies. Apparently in pre-modernity, no such ontology existed. Thus, the reproduction of this dehumanizing discourse in Tanzimat cannot be regarded as the "persistence of the old regime" but should be perceived as an integral part of the Ottoman modernization experience. Also, see Reid, James, *Crisis of the Ottoman Empire: Prelude to Collapse 1839–1878*, (Stuttgart, 2000). For a dehumanizing discourse regarding the Balkan rebellions of 1875 and the Turkish-Russian War, also see Mustafa Celaledin Pasha, *Mirat-ı Hakikat*, (İstanbul, 1983).

49. Somel, Selçuk Akşin, "Osmanlı Reform Çağında Osmanlıcılık Düşüncesi (1839–1913)", in *Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet'in Birikimi*, (İstanbul, 2001), p. 93; Kırılı, Cengiz, *Sultan ve Kamuoyu*, (İstanbul, 2008).
50. İnalcık, Halil, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300–1600*, (New York, 1973), pp. 65–68.
51. For an evaluation of the tour of Kıbrıslı Mehmet Emin Pasha, see Köksal, Yonca & Erkan, Davut, *Sadrızam Kıbrıslı Mehmet Emin Pasha'nın Rumeli Teftişi*, (İstanbul, 2007).
52. Kırılı, Cengiz, *Ibid.*, p. 28; Özcan, Abdülkadir, "II. Mahmud'un Memleket Gezileri", in *Prof. Bekir Kütükoğlu'na Armağan*, (İstanbul, 1991), pp. 361–80.
53. For his attitude towards the French Revolution and his interpretation of the revolution, see Neumann, Christoph, *Araç Tarih, Amaç Tanzimat*, (İstanbul, 2000), pp. 138–140. For Ahmed Cevdet, revolutionaries were immoral and barbaric, threatening justice and order.
54. It would be enlightening to assess Ahmed Cevdet Pasha's attitudes in comparison with the attitudes developed by the European nineteenth-century aristocracy with regard to the French Revolution and imperialism. John MacKenize, one of the severest and most prominent critics of Edward Said writes: "they (orientalists) were culturally conservative and technically innovative. Far from offering an artistic programme for imperialism, they were finding in the East ancient verities lost in their own civilization." MacKenzie, John, *Orientalism*, (Manchester, 1995), p. 67. For MacKenzie, orientalism was not the fifth column of imperialism but a conservative enterprise in the aftermath of the French Revolution. MacKenzie's criticism of Said is rather instructive for us to locate the ideologies and mental sets within a social framework. Along the same lines, David Cannadine also portrayed the British Empire – pace Said – as an aristocratic venture and extension/replication of the British aristocracy's perceptions of society, order, nature, hierarchy, and privilege. See Cannadine, David, *Ornamentalism*, (Oxford, 2001). Both authors are "socializing" imperialism in contrast to the essentialization of the empire by Edward Said. MacKenzie's and Cannadine's hints may be useful for us to understand some tenets of the making of the worldview of Turkish nationalism as well.
55. For the prominent role of Ahmed Cevdet Pasha's high-class background on his writings and analyses, see Neumann, Christoph, "Bad Times and Better Self: Definitions of Identity and Strategies for Development in Late Ottoman Historiography 1850–1900", in *Ottomans and Balkans: A Discussion of Historiography*, Farouqi, Suraiya & Adanır, Fikret (eds), (Leiden; Boston; Köln, 2002), p. 64.
56. Many ethnicities were established and forged within social and class contexts. For example, although there were variations, as a general observation,

in the Central and Eastern European lands, it was the German-speakers who were nobles and made up a significant portion of the urban populace whereas the folk and peasantry spoke various accents of Slavic languages. This was not because classes and social formations were constituted along ethnic lines but because certain languages were associated with respectability. Ethnic differences were aggravated within this social texture as the dissemination of modernity began to cause discrepancies among social classes. Similarly, social upheavals and riots turned into national rebellions as happened in the Balkans against the Turks who constituted the “dominating class” vis-à-vis the Christian peasantry. Likewise, whereas Belorussian had been a provincial identity defined by the tongue of the peasantry in contrast to the urban population speaking Polish and Ukrainian, with the invention of a Belorussian nationality, the peasant tongue established its own nation and Belorussian identity joined the superleague of nations. For the emergence and consolidation of the Belorussian national culture and identity, see Snyder, Timothy, *The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999*, (New Haven, 2004), p. 41. Also see Martin, Terry, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Empire, 1923–1939*, (Ithaca, 2001).

57. I thank Hakan Erdem for drawing my attention to the novelty of *millet-i hakime* and its probable transplantation from Habsburgian political language. Ahmed Cevdet Pasha in his *Tezâkir* writes: “Ehl-i İslâmdan bir çoğu; ‘Aba ve ecdadımızın kanıyla kazanılmış olan bukuk-u mukaddese-i milliyemizi bugün gaib ettik. Millet-i İslâmiye millet-i hakime iken böyle bir mukaddes haktan mahrum kaldı. Ehl-i İslâm’a bu bir ağlayacak ve matem edecek gündür deyu söylenmeye başladılar. Teb’a-i gayri müslime ise ol gün raiyyet silkinden çıkıp millet-i hakime ile tesavi kazanmış olduklarından anlarca bir yevm-i meserret idi.” Cevdet Paşa, *Tezâkir*, (Ankara, 1986), Vol. I, p. 68. Although the quote gives the impression that there existed an established self-perception as *millet-i hakime* from time immemorial, in fact this perception was attained as a reaction to the perceived threat from the advancement of non-Muslims. Yetim, Fahri, “II. Meşrutiyet Döneminde Türkçülüğe Geçişte Kapsayıcı Formül: ‘Millet-i Hakime’ Düşüncesi ve Etkileri”, *SDÜ Fen Edebiyat Fakültesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, No. 18, December 2008, pp. 66–68.
58. Kumar, Krishan, “Nation and Empire: English and British National Identity in Comparative Perspective”, *Theory and Society*, Vol. 29, No. 5, 2000, p. 579.
59. Anderson, Benedict, *Imagined Communities*, pp. 83–111.
60. Deringil, Selim, “They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery”, *Comparative Studies in Society and History* Vol. 2, 2003, pp. 311–343; Makdisi, Ussama, *The Culture of Sectarianism*, (Berkeley, 2000).

61. Kerimoğlu, Hasan Taner, *İttihat-Terakki ve Rumlar 1908–1914*, (İstanbul, 2009), pp. 69–70; Peçe, Uğur, *Greek Ottomans in the 1908 Parliament*, unpublished MA Thesis, Sabancı University, 2007, pp. 16–18.
62. Raeff, Marc, *The Well-Ordered Police State*, (New Haven, 1983); Bernard, Paul, *Jesuits and Jacobins: Enlightenment and Enlightened Despotism in Austria*, (Urbana, 1971); Bernard, Paul, *From the Enlightenment to the Police State*, (Urbana, 1991); Ingrao, Charles, “The Problem of ‘Enlightened Despotism’ and the German States”, *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 58, Supplement: Politics and Society in the Holy Roman Empire, 1500–1806 Dec., 1986, pp. 161–180; Ertman, Thomas, *The Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, (Cambridge, 1997).
63. Hroch, Miroslav, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe*, (Cambridge, 1985); idem, “From National Movement into the Fully-Formed Nation: The Nation-Building Process in Europe”, in *Mapping the Nation*, Balakrishnan, Gopal & Anderson, Benedict (eds), (London; New York, 1996), pp. 80–81. For the emergence and discovery of southeastern European nationalisms by intellectual elites, see Kitromilides, Paschalis M, “The Enlightenment East and West: A Comparative Perspective on the Ideological Origins of the Balkan Political Traditions”, *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* Vol. 10, No. 1, 1983, pp. 58–60.
64. For the emergence of a bourgeois public sphere and its aspects, see Habermas, Jürgen, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, (Cambridge, 1991).
65. For the emergence and development of the *raznochintsy* in the 1860s, see Kimerling Wirtschafter, Elise, “The Groups Between: *Raznochintsy*, Intelligentsia, Professionals”, in Lieven, Dominic (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Russia*, (Cambridge, 2006), Vol. II, pp. 245–263; Confino, Michael, “On Intellectuals and Intellectual Tradition in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Russia”, *Daedalus*, 101–3 (1972) pp. 107–149. Also see Becker, Christopher, “Raznochintsy: The Development of the Word and of the Concept”, *American Slavic and East European Review*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Feb., 1959), pp. 63–74; Pipes, Richard, *Russia under the Old Regime*, (London, 1977), pp. 249–80. For the background of the “parting of ways” which did never happen in the Ottoman/Turkish context, see Riasanovsky, Nicholas, *A Parting of Ways: Government and Educated Public in Russia 1801–1855*, (Oxford, 1976).
66. For a discussion of nationalism as elite politics and elite strategies, see Brass, Paul R., *Ethnicity and Nationalism*. Brass perceives nationalism as an invention of the elites, especially in the case of Indian Muslims. Also for an assessment which traces the origins of nationalism into the early modern centuries and denotes the nobility as the founders and developers of nationalism, see Greenfield, Liah, *Five*

- Roads to Modernity*. Greenfeld maintains that the intellectuals and professionals of the nineteenth century were the promulgators and disseminators of nationalism rather than inventors of nationalism (p. 22). Such an analysis of the roles of the social clusters in the making of Turkish nationalism may render the birth and development of Turkish nationalism more explicable.
67. Zürcher, Erik Jan, "The Young Turks-Children of the Borderlands?", *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, Vol. 9, 2003, pp. 275–286.
 68. For a discussion of "we" in Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, see Neumann, Christoph K., "Whom Did Ahmed Cevdet Represent?", in *The Late Ottoman Society*, Elizabeth Özdalga (ed.), (London; New York, 2005).
 69. For a critique of the Balkan historiography regarding the Ottoman Empire, see Adanır, Fikret & Faroqhi, Suraiya, "Introduction", in Adanır, Fikret & Faroqhi, Suraiya, *The Ottomans and the Balkans: A Discussion of Historiography*, pp. 40–44. Also see Daskalov, Rumen, *The Making of a Nation in the Balkans: Historiography of the Bulgarian Revival*, (Budapest; New York, 2004).
 70. For a discussion of how diverse Greek regional communities with different languages, cultures, and memories, such as Pontus Greeks, Capadocian Greeks, and Cypriot Greeks, were assembled together and incorporated into a single Greekness by the policies of the nineteenth-century Greek government and intellectuals and how they were then managed by Greek schooling and other mechanisms, see Kitromilides, Paschalis, "Greek Irredentism in Asia Minor and Cyprus", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 1, 1990, pp. 3–17.
 71. For the evolution of local rivalries and hostilities into ethnic hatreds during and after the Balkan Wars, see the Carnegie Report: *The Other Balkan Wars: A 1913 Carnegie Endowment Inquiry in Retrospect*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1993. For the violent crashes and feuds between Bulgarians and Greeks within villages and communities before the outbreak of the Balkan Wars and throughout the Hamidian era, see Dakin, Douglas, *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia, 1897–1913*, (Thessaloniki, 1966), p. 45.
 72. For example, left-wing political identities derived in many cases from local enmities as happened in post-WWII Greece, Italy, and France. Accordingly, the endorsement of right and left political stances was derivative of non-political and pre-political cleavages. See Kalyvas, Stathis, "Red Terror: Leftist Violence during the Occupation", in Mazower, Mark (ed.), *After the War was Over*, (Princeton, 2000), p. 176.
 73. Brass, Paul, *Theft of an Idol*, (Princeton, 1997), p. 4.
 74. For the impact of the Balkan Wars on the production of Turkish memory, see the short stories of Ömer Seyfeddin such as *Beyaz Lale*, *Primo Türk Çocuğu*, and *Bomba*.

75. Cevdet Paşa, *Tezâkir*, Vol I, p. 85. “Devlet-i Aliyye dört esas üzere müesses olup bunlar ile her nasıl istenilir ise idaresi ve ilerlemesi kabil olur ve bunlardan kangısı nakıs olur ise idare kabil olmaz. Dört esas budur. Millet-i islamiyye devlet-i türkîyye salatin-i osmaniyye payitaht-ı İstanbul.”
76. By the Young Turk generation, I do not refer strictly to the Young Turks and Unionists but to the generation that grew up in the late nineteenth century, was educated in the Hamidian imperial schools, was socialized in a particular cultural and intellectual milieu, and became much better equipped with Western and modern knowledge and vision. Thus, this category subsumes the bulk of the young bureaucrats of the Hamidian era.
77. For example, see Çetinsaya, Gökhan, *Ottoman Administration in Iraq, 1890–1908*, (London; New York: 2006), p. 71.
78. See Akarlı, Engin Deniz, “The Tangled Ends of an Empire: Ottoman Encounters with the West and Problems of Westernization—an Overview”, *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, Vol. 26, No. 3, 2006, pp. 353–366.
79. Mardin, Şerif, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, (Syracuse, 2000), pp. 110–112.
80. Salzmann, Ariel, *Tocqueville in Ottoman Empire: Rival Paths to the Modern State*, p. 19.
81. Abou-El-Haj, Rifa’at, “The Ottoman Vezir and Pasha Households, 1683–1703: A Preliminary Report”, *JAOS* 94 (1972), pp. 438–47. Also see Itzkowitz, Norman, *Mehmed Raghib Pasha: The Making of an Ottoman Grand Vizier*, unpublished dissertation, Princeton University, 1959, pp. 15–21. Itzkowitz takes a snapshot of the eighteenth-century Ottoman civil bureaucracy which according to Itzkowitz was closed, self-perpetuating and “became more and more self-conscious and jealous of its privileges.” (p. 16)
82. Itzkowitz, Norman, “Eighteenth Century Realities”, *Studia Islamica*, No. 16, 1962, p. 91.
83. For the rise of households in the eighteenth century in provinces, also see Hathaway, Jane, *The Politics of Households in Ottoman Egypt*, (Cambridge, 1997).
84. Hamadeh, Shirine, *The City’s Pleasures: Istanbul in the Eighteenth Century*, (Seattle; London, 2008); Aksan, Virginia, *An Ottoman Statesman in War and Peace: Ahmed Resmi Efendi, 1700–1783*, (Leiden; Boston; Köln, 1995); Hathaway, Jane, *The Politics of Households in Ottoman Egypt*.
85. For a conscious advocacy of the importance of the assurance of civil officialdom, see Sadık Rifat Pasha’s *Müntehabat-ı Asar*, quoted extensively in Mardin, Şerif, *Ibid.*, pp. 179–90.
86. For a parallel and comparative “emergence of an aristocratic caste” in the absence of an official recognition of an aristocracy, the Turkish aristocracy

- in Egypt is very instructive. The Turkish caste, which derived its power not from holding land and property but from bearing technical and bureaucratic knowledge and its domination of military and civil bureaucracy, established itself during the reign of Mohammed Ali and consolidated its power throughout the nineteenth century. Its dominance was based on its claims to cultural superiority and expertise. For a discussion of this peculiar aristocratic caste, see Grant, Samuel Becker, *Modern Egypt and the Turco-Egyptian Elite*, unpublished dissertation, University of Michigan, 1968, pp. 47–8, 88–90.
87. For the bloody struggle between Akif Pasha and Pertev Pasha and its drastic repercussions, see Findley, Carter, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom*, (Princeton, 1989), pp. 70–80. This case epitomizes the Foucauldian argument regarding the replacement of bodily violence with non-physical mechanisms of violence at its best.
 88. Itzkowitz, Norman, *Mehmed Raghib Pasha: The Making of an Ottoman Grand Vizier*, unpublished dissertation, Princeton University, 1959, p. 21. Itzkowitz also notes that Roderick Davison failed to recognize this continuity of the nineteenth-century Ottoman bureaucracy, implying that Davison treats the Tanzimat bureaucracy as if it had come from outer space. Also, see Itzkowitz's remarks in Itzkowitz, Norman & Shinder, Joel, "The Office of Şeyh-ül Islam and the Tanzimat-A Prosopographic Enquiry", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 1, Jan., 1972, p. 100. "There is evidence to indicate that bureaucrats who progressed rapidly after 1839 to attain high, but not the highest, offices were the sons of Ottomans of low bureaucratic rank. In other words, *Tanzimat* did not open up Ottoman status in any wholesale way to those who had not been Ottomans prior to 1839." Avigdor Levy also underlines the persistence of the old elite: "From a social point of view, the new military leadership was fully integrated with the older ruling class. It was this integration that had assured the acceptance of Mahmud's reforms in the first place, for they had not been accompanied by any social upheavals. This was an achievement of mixed significance. The absorption of the old ruling elite into the new system was a source of weakness in Mahmud's own time, for the transformation of a traditional leadership into a modern one is a slower process than the creation of a new elite. In the long run, however, the preservation of the old elite became a source of strength." Levy, Avigdor, "The Officer Corps in Sultan Mahmud II's New Ottoman Army, 1826–39", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 1 Jan., 1971, p. 39.
 89. Apart from various names mentioned throughout this study, some examples coming from local dynasties and notables include Yusuf Kamil Pasha (İbnülemin Mahmut Kemal İnan, *Son Sadrazamlar*, (İstanbul, 1982), p. 196);

- Hüseyin Avni Pasha (İbnülemin, *Ibid.*, p. 483); Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha (Rifat Uçarol, *Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Paşa*, (İstanbul, 1989), p. 7). (Istanbul or local) *Ulema* was another source for the recruitment of Tanzimat statesmen. Some figures were fathered by an *alim*, such as Münif Pasha (Budak, Ali, *Münif Paşa*, (İstanbul, 2004), p. 4), and others came from prominent local *ulema* families such as Fuad Pasha (İbnülemin, *Ibid.*, p. 149) and Ahmed Cevdet Pasha (Fatma Aliye Hanım, *Ahmed Cevdet Paşa ve Zamanı*, (İstanbul, 1332), p. 7; Chambers, Richard, "The Education of a Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Alim, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 4, Oct., 1973, p. 440). Apparently, a significant portion of the Tanzimat elite were fathered by prominent servants of state like Mustafa Reşid Pasha (*Sicill-i Osmani*, p. 1384), Mehmed Emin Pasha (İbnülemin, *Ibid.*, p. 83), Mahmud Nedim Pasha (Pakalın, Mehmet Zeki, *Mahmud Nedim Paşa*, (İstanbul, 1940), p. 1).
90. The old paradigm associated and even equated the advent of modern age with the decline of aristocracy. According to this paradigm, in the new modern world, aristocracy had no chance to survive. Its age-old privileges were abolished, and therefore it was forced from the political scene. The monetarization and capitalization of the economy destroyed the economic base of the aristocracy. However, this paradigm has been questioned as the mechanisms the aristocracy developed to adapt itself to the modern economy have been studied. The new studies acknowledge a significant role to the aristocracy in the nineteenth century not only in Britain, but also in France (and apparently Germany). See Higgs, David, *Nobles in Nineteenth Century France*, (Baltimore, 1987). Hence, although in the Ottoman Empire we cannot speak of an entitled aristocracy in the European sense based on bloodlines, we may speak of an aristocracy based on belonging to a respectable lineage with venerable service to the state. In this regard, we may reanalyze the origins of modern Turkey along the same lines.
 91. For an assessment of nationalism as a collective identity, see Eisenstadt, Shmuel N., Schluchter, Wolfgang & Wittrock, Björn (eds), *Public Spheres & Collective Identities*, (New Brunswick, 2001).
 92. This perception is prevalent in various nineteenth-century accounts of Ottoman statesmen. For example, see Mahmud Celaledin Paşa, *Mira'at-ı Hakikat*; Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa, *Sergüzeşt-i Hayatım*, Vol. I, (İstanbul, 1996).
 93. Lila Abu-Lughod goes one step further and maintains that nations are reconstituted in every instance, and therefore representations of the nations differ drastically in every subsequent decade partially thanks to changing media of communications. See Abu-Lughod, Lila, *Dramas of Nationhood: The Politics of Television in Egypt*, (Chicago, 2005), p. 14.

94. Deringil, Selim, *Ibid.*
95. For the development of Ottoman historiography of the Ottoman Empire for the purpose of its glorification and infusing the masses with national sentiments, see Akbayrak, Hakan, *Milletin Tarihinden Ulusun Tarihine*. For the celebrations of the anniversaries of the birth of the Ottoman Empire, see Efdaleddin, "İstiklal-i Osmani Tarih ve Günü Hakkında Tedkikat", *Tarih-i Osmani Encümeni Mecmuası*, Vol. V, No. 25, 1 April 1330, pp. 36–48; Polat, Nazım, *Müdafaa-ı Milliye Cemiyeti*, (Ankara, 1991). Also see Lütü Simavi, *Sultan Mehmed Reşad Hanın ve Halifenin Sarayında Gördüklerim*, (İstanbul, 1340).
96. Smith, Anthony, *Myths and Memories of the Nation*, pp. 8–19.
97. For the Roumelian origin of the Young Turks, see Erik J. Zürcher's statistics; Zürcher, Erik J, "The Young Turks – Children of the Borderlands?", *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 1–2, 2003, pp. 275–286.
98. Chambers, Richard, "The Civil Bureaucracy: Turkey", in Robert E. Ward & Dankwart A. Rustow (eds), *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, (Princeton, 1962), pp. 301–2.
99. *Ibid.*, p. 302.
100. *Ibid.*, p. 325.
101. Chambers, Richard, *Abmed Cevdet Paşa: The Formative Years of an Ottoman Transitional*, unpublished dissertation, Princeton University, 1968.
102. Doyle, William, *The Ancien Régime*, (New York, 2001), p. 1.
103. For example, see Baker, Keith Michael (ed.), *The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture: The Political Culture of the Old Regime*, (Oxford, 1987); Doyle, William, *The Old European Order*, (Oxford, 1992).
104. Raeff, Marc, *Origins of the Russian Intelligentsia: The Eighteenth-Century Nobility*, (San Diego, 1966), p. 8.
105. Raeff, Marc, *Ibid.*, p. 15. Also see Lieven, Dominic, *Russia's Rulers Under the Old Regime*, (New Haven, 1989), pp. 21–2.
106. For the development of nobilities and orders in post-Petrine Russia, see Becker, Seymour, *Nobility and Privilege in Late Imperial Russia*, (De Kalb, III, 1985).
107. For comparative nobilities, see Dewald, Jonathan, *The European Nobility 1400–1800*, (Cambridge, 1996); Bush, Michael, *Noble Privilege*, (Manchester, 1983); Bush, Michael, *Rich Noble, Poor Noble*, (Manchester, 1988).
108. For the evolution of the Prussian aristocracy, see Rosenberg, Hans, *Bureaucracy, Aristocracy and Autocracy: The Prussian Experience 1660–1815*, (Cambridge, 1958).
109. Mayer, Arno J, *The Persistence of the Old Regime*, (New York, 1982).

110. The “persistence” of traditional landed, bureaucratic, and military elites was not discerned for the first time by Arno Mayer: “Vilfredo Pareto, Herbert Spencer and Max Weber wrote with dismay about the ‘persistence’ of traditional elites at the second half of the nineteenth century as after the 1870s, as new authoritarianism is rising European wide.” See Halperin, Susan, *War and Social Change in Modern Europe*, (Cambridge, 2004), p. 11. Also see, Wasson, Ellis, *Aristocracy and the Modern World*, (Basingstoke, 2006).
111. For an interpretation of nineteenth-century European political power structures, see Susan Halperin, *Ibid.*
112. O’Gorman, Frank, *The Long Eighteenth Century*, (New York, 1997), p. xi.
113. Brewer, John, *Pleasures of Imagination*, (Chicago, 2000); Langford, Paul, *Public Life and the Propertied Englishman 1689–1798*, (Oxford, 1991); Colley, Linda, *In Defiance of Oligarchy: The Tory Party 1714–1760*, (Cambridge, 1985).
114. Cannadine, David, *The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy*, (London, 1992).
115. Cannadine, David, *Ornamentalism*.
116. Cain, P.J. & Hopkins A.G., *British Imperialism: 1688–2000*, (New York, 2002).
117. Wiener, Martin, *The Decline and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit 1850–1980*, (Cambridge, 1981).
118. Cobban, Alfred, *The Social Interpretation of the French Revolution*, (Cambridge, 1964). For an overview of the revisionist historiography of the French Revolution, see Maza, Sarah, “Politics, Culture and the Origins of the French Revolution”, *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 61, No. 4, Dec., 1989, pp. 704–723.
119. Lucas Colin, “Nobles, Bourgeois, and the Origins of the French Revolution”, *Past and Present* No. 60, August 1973, pp. 84–126; Taylor, George V, “Noncapitalist Wealth and the Origins of the French Revolution,” *American Historical Review*, Vol. 72, January 1967, pp. 469–496.
120. See Higgs, David, *Nobles in Nineteenth Century France*; Forster, Robert, “The Survival of the Nobility during the French Revolution”, *Past and Present*, No. 37, July, 1967, pp. 71–86; Gibson, Ralph, “The French Nobility in the Nineteenth Century – Particularly in the Dordogne”, in Jolyon Howorth, Philip G. Cerny (ed.), *Elites in France*, (London, 1981), pp. 5–45; Kale, Steven D. *Legitimism and the Reconstruction of French Society, 1852–1883*, (Baton Rouge, 1992); Tudesq, André-Jean, *Les Grands Notables en France, 1840–1849*, (Paris, 1964). Also see Chaussinand-Nogaret, Guy, *The French Nobility in the Eighteenth Century: From Feudalism to Enlightenment*, (Cambridge, 1985).

121. Mayer, Arno, *The Persistence of the Old Regime*.
122. Maza, Sarah, *The Myth of the French Bourgeoisie*, (Cambridge, 2003).
123. For the struggle of the Republicans to establish a "bourgeois Republic" during the Second Empire, see Nord, Philip, *The Republican Moment*, (Cambridge, 1995). For the intense struggle in the first decade of the Third Republic between the Republicans and the monarchists and the dynamics of the consolidation of the Third Republic as a "bourgeois Republican" regime, see Agulhon, Maurice, *The French Republic 1879–1992*, (Oxford, 1995), pp. 11–45.
124. Also for Lieven's reassessment of the autocracy of Nicholas II and his criticism of the historiography on Nicholas II, see Lieven, Dominic, *Nicholas II: Emperor of all the Russians*, (London, 1994).
125. Lieven, Dominic, *Russia's Rulers Under the Old Regime*, pp. 23–24. For an exhaustive survey of the literature on the czarist bureaucracy, also see Orlovsky, Daniel T, "Recent Studies on the Russian Bureaucracy", *Russian Review*, Vol. 35, No. 4, October 1976, pp. 448–467. Also see Raeff, Marc, "The Bureaucratic Phenomena of Imperial Russia 1700–1905", *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 84, No. 2, Apr. 1979, pp. 399–411.
126. Lincoln, W. Bruce, *The Great Reforms: Autocracy, Bureaucracy and the Politics of Change in Imperial Russia*, (De Kalb, III, 1990), p. x.
127. See Orlovsky, Daniel, *Limits of Reform*; Lincoln, W. Bruce, *In the Vanguard of Reform: Russia's Enlightened Bureaucrats 1825–1861*, (De Kalb, III, 1986); Wortman, Richard, *The Development of Russian Legal Consciousness*, (Chicago, 1976).
128. For a survey of the *Sonderweg* debates, see Kocka, Jurgen, "German History Before Hitler: The Debate About the German Sonderweg", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 23, No. 1, January 1988, pp. 3–16; Berger, Stefan, *The Search for Normality*, (Providence, 1997).
129. For a criticism of this presentist reading of German history, see Nipperday, Thomas, *Thinking About Germany*, (Oxford, 1994).
130. The failed 1848 Revolution was hailed as Germany's missed opportunity. Although it is evidently true that the failure of the liberal parliament in Frankfurt paved the way for the consolidation of power by the authoritarian and illiberal Prussian monarchy, the significance of 1848 has been exaggerated. For a brief historiography of the 1848 Revolution, see Han, Hans Joachim, *The 1848 Revolutions in German-Speaking Europe*, (New York, 2001).
131. Engels was a contemporary observer of the failure of the 1848 Revolution. For his pessimism as to the advancement of liberalism in Germany as well as his severe critique of the bourgeoisie for their failure to challenge the authoritarian regime, see Engels, Friedrich, *Germany: Revolution and Counter-Revolution*, (New York, 1969).

132. See Moore, Barrington, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, (London, 1967). For the coining of the term of *Verspatete Nation* (belated nation), see Plessner, Helmuth, *Die Verspatete Nation*, 1959.
133. Blackburn, David & Evans, Richard J, "Preface" to *The German Bourgeoisie*, David Blackburn &, Richard J. Evans (eds), (London; New York, 1991), p. xv.
134. Kocha, Jurgen, "Asymmetrical Historical Comparison: The Case of German Sonderweg", *History and Theory*, Vol. 38, No. 1, February 1999, p. 41.
135. Wehler, Hans-Ulrich, *The German Empire, 1871–1918*, (Leamington Spa; Dover, 1985); Mommsen, Wolfgang J, *Imperial Germany, 1867–1918*, (London; New York, 1995); Hamerow, Theodor S, *Restoration, Revolution, Reaction: Economics and Politics in Germany 1815–1871*, (Princeton, 1966); Hamerow, Theodore S., *The Social Foundations of German Unification, 1858–1871*, (Princeton, 1969). Also see, Willis, John, *The Prussian Bureaucracy in Crisis 1840–1866*, (Stanford, 1971); Craig, Gordon A., *Germany 1866–1945*, (Oxford, 1988).
136. Evans, Richard J, *Rereading German History*, (London; New York, 1997), pp. 12–13.
137. For a recent reinterpretation of imperial Germany, see Berghahn, V.R., *Imperial Germany 1871–1918*, (Berghahn Books, 1994). For the historiography of the imperial Germany, see Lorenz, Chris, "Beyond Good and Evil? The German Empire of 1871 and Modern German Historiography", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 30, No. 4 Oct., 1995, pp. 729–765.
138. Blackbourn, David & Eley, Geoff, *The Peculiarities of German History*, (Oxford, 1984), p. 286.
139. Among many others, see Brewer, John, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State 1688–1783*, (Cambridge, 1990); Bonney, Richard (ed.), *The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe c. 1200–1815*, (Oxford, 1999); Mann, Michael, *The Sources of Social Power*; Tilly, Charles, *Coercion, Capital and European States*, (Cambridge, 1990).
140. The unnatural nature of nineteenth-century markets was the main theme of Karl Polanyi's *The Great Transformation*. (Boston, 1957). Also for a critical approach to the market-centered explanations of modern capitalism, see Grassby, Richard, *Kinship and Capitalism*, (Cambridge, 2001). Also see North, Douglass C, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economical Performance*, (Cambridge; New York, 1990).
141. For the development of the character of John Bull in eighteenth century English print press, see Langford, Paul, *Englishness Identified: Manners and Character, 1650–1850*, (Oxford, 2000).

142. Wehler, Hans-Ulrich, *Ibid.*, p. 246.
143. For a survey of the historiography of the Hamidian era, see, Özbek, Nadir, "Modernite, Tarih ve İdeoloji: İkinci Abdülhamid Dönemi Tarihçiliği Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme" *Literatür*, No. 3, 2004, pp. 71–90.
144. Eric Hobsbawm aptly names this period as the "Age of Empire" following his "Age of Revolution" and "Age of Capital". Hobsbawm, Eric, *The Age of Empire 1875–1914*, (New York, 1989).
145. For the anarchist, liberal, and libertarian nature of early nineteenth-century nationalisms, see Thom, Martin, *Republics, Nations and Tribes*, (London; New York, 1995).
146. Eley, Geoffrey, *Reshaping the German Right*, (Ann Arbor, 1991), p. 9; Frankel, Richard, *Bismarck's Shadow*, (Oxford; New York, 2005), p. 55.
147. See, Wortman, Richard, *Scenarios of Power*, (Princeton, 1995) (2 volumes). Also see, Weeks, Theodore R, *Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia*, (De Kalb III, 1996); Hoskings, Geoffrey, *Russia and Russians*, (Cambridge, 2001).
148. Wortman, Richard, *Scenarios of Power*, Vol. II, p. 12

Chapter 2 Primacy of international politics: diplomacy, and appropriation of the "new knowledge"

1. For the Russian-Ottoman wars and their impact on the Ottoman establishment, see Aksan, Virginia, *Ottoman Wars*, (New York, 2007). For a risaleh of primary importance originally named *Hülasat ü'l Kelam fi Redd-il Avam*, see Uçman, Abdullah (ed.), *Koca Sekbanbaşı Risalesi*, (İstanbul, 1974). Also see Aksan, Virginia, "Ottoman Political Writing, 1768–1808", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 1 February 1993, pp. 61–62.
2. For the czarist Russian army, see Keep, John, *Soldiers of the Czar*, (Oxford, 1985); Duffy, Christopher, *Russia's Military Way to the West*, (London; New York, 1994).
3. Aksan, Virginia, *Ottoman Wars*, pp. 349–56.
4. Levy, Avigdor, "The Ottoman *Ulema* and the Military Reforms of Sultan Mahmud II", *Asian and African Studies*, Vol. 7, 1971, pp. 13–39.
5. Timothy Mitchell explored the meaning of modernity and the employment of modernity in the non-Western world. In his landmark study, *Colonising Egypt*, Mitchell argued that the inevitable entrance of the "new knowledge" and "modern mind" brought the collapse of the "old ways of making things" and forced Egypt to submit to modern discourse. It was therefore open to the penetration of Western imperialism,

which holds the monopoly on modern knowledge. Local “experts” also established their dictatorship based on their monopoly of the “new knowledge”. They were the only ones who were familiar with “making things rationally”. In *Rule of Experts*, Mitchell shows how the modern Egyptian bureaucracy developed a novel mentality which re-creates Egypt in their image and entails the eradication of the old knowledge. Thus, according to Mitchell, the local elite of “experts” and the Western imperialists collaborated, and the local experts functioned as the “compradors of western knowledge” adapting the Marxist notion of “compradorial bourgeoisie”. Mitchell, Timothy, *Colonising Egypt*, (Berkeley, 1991); idem, *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-politics, Modernity*, (Berkeley, 2002). Also for the eradication of the effective “local knowledge” by the states and the detrimental effects of states’ intrusion into the traditional society, see Scott, James, *Seeing Like a State*, (New Haven, 1999). For another inspiring essay on the meaning of modern/Western bureaucracy, see Herzfeld, Michael, *The Social Production of Indifference: Exploring the Symbolic Roots of Western Bureaucracy*.

6. For the nineteenth-century Ottoman ulema, see Kara, İsmail, “Turban and Fez: Ulema as Opposition”, in *Late Ottoman Society: The Intellectual Legacy*, 162–200; Kushner, David, “The Place of the Ulema in the Ottoman Empire During the Age of Reform (1839–1876)”, *Turcica*, No. XIX, pp. 51–74; Itzkowitz, Norman & Shinder, Joel, “The Office of Şeyh ül-Islâm and the Tanzimat: A Prosopographic Enquiry”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 1, January 1972, pp. 93–101; Bein, Amit, *The Ulema, Their Institutions and Politics in the Late Ottoman Empire (1876–1924)*, unpublished dissertation, Princeton University, 2006. For a case study demonstrating the decline of the ulema in terms of prominence in the provinces, Yazbak, Mahmoud, “Nabulsi Ulama in the Late Ottoman Period, 1864–1914”, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 29, 1997, pp. 71–91. Also see, Yazbak, Mahmoud, *Haifa in the Late Ottoman Period, 1864–1914*, (Leiden; Köln; Boston, 1998), p. 158.
7. The whole *Tarih-i Cevdet* can be read as a polemic against the crumbling *ilmiye* class. Coming himself from the ranks of the *ilmiye*, Cevdet in his *Tarih* is a staunch modernist propagating the new way of conducting the state. He does not spare his words when it comes to scorning the *ilmiye* and making fun of their lack of understanding of the new world. For Cevdet, the alternative to accepting the new modes of statecraft is the death of the Ottoman polity. See a broad analysis of the discourse of *Tarih-i Cevdet*, Neumann, Christoph K, *Araç Tarih Amaç Tanzimat: Tarih-i Cevdet’in Siyasi Anlamı*.

8. For the power struggles after the death of Mahmud II and the subsequent victory of the reform party and Mustafa Reşid Pasha, see Ahmed Lûtfi Efendi, *Vak'aniyyât Ahmed Lûtfi Efendi Taribi*, (İstanbul, 1999), 1006–25.
9. Neumann, Christoph K, “Decision Making Without Decision Makers: Ottoman Foreign Policy circa 1780”, in *Decision Making and Change in the Ottoman Empire*, Caesar E. Farah (ed.), (Kirksville, 1993), p. 34.
10. In Iran, the reformist Malkom Khan makes a differentiation between “natural intellect” and “acquired education”. He criticizes Iranians for preferring to see the former as more valuable and important, whereas for Malkom, this is not tenable in the modern world. Menashri, David, *Education and the Making of Modern Iran*, (Ithaca; London, 1992), p. 33.
11. For the rising prominence of the *ilmiye* in conducting foreign affairs in the last quarter of the eighteenth century and the subsequent, drastic dwindling of their role in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, and a detailed survey of the *ilmiye* members in the conduct of foreign affairs, see Cihan, Ahmet, *Reform Çağında Osmanlı İlmiye Sınıfı*, (İstanbul, 2004), pp. 91–101.
12. For an application of the rationalized military reorganization, see Mahmud Raif's *Tableau des Nouveaux Reglemens de L'Empire Ottoman* printed in 1798 to advertise the recent Ottoman military reforms which made the Ottoman military a fully fledged modern military. For the text, see Terzioğlu, Arslan & Hatemi, Hüsrev (eds), *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Yeni Nizamların Cedveli*, (İstanbul, 1988).
13. See Levy, Avigdor, *The Military Policy of Sultan Mahmud II, 1808–1839*, unpublished dissertation, Harvard University, 1968.
14. The same can also be said for the rise of modern bureaucracy. The bureaucratic model copied from the West was first introduced by Mahmud II, but it took the bureaucracy several decades to mature and exemplify a modern Western-type bureaucracy.
15. The “Russian dimension” has been neglected in the Ottoman historiography. The permanent Russian wars and menace had been treated as a side issue rather than a pivotal issue of the Ottomans throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The “Russian dimension” is significant not only in terms of military defeats, but also because the Russian army as a modernized army with Western skills and training since Peter the Great was the first Western model the Ottomans encountered and emulated. The Russian army that overwhelmed the Ottoman army was the modern army Selim III, and subsequently Mahmud II, desired to establish. Virginia Aksan writes: “Napoleon's bold thrust into the Eastern Mediterranean in 1798, prelude to his imperial reign is very often held to be the beginning of the ‘modern’ age in the Middle

- East. My sense is rather that the modern age for the Ottoman Empire began on the fields of Kartal [referring to the Russian victory at the Battle of Kartal in 1770] and at the walls of Ochako." Aksan, Virginia, *Ottoman Wars*, 170.
16. Blanning, T.C.W., *The Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars*, (New York, 1986), pp. 55–60.
 17. For an appraisal of the congress, see Schroeder, Paul W., *The Transformation of European Politics 1763–1848*, (Oxford, 1994), pp. 575–582.
 18. Blanning, T.C.W., *The Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars*, 83.
 19. For a diplomatic history of Ottoman during the Napoleonic Wars, see Shaw, Stanford, *Between Old and New: Ottoman Empire Under Sultan Selim III*, (Cambridge, 1971); Yıldız, Aysel Danacı, *Vaka-yı Selimiyye or The Selimiyye Incident: A Study of May 1807 Rebellion*, unpublished dissertation, Sabancı University, 2008; Aksan, Virginia, *Ottoman Wars*; Gosu, Armand, "The Third Anti-Napoleonic Coalition and the Sublime Porte", *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, Vol. 9, 2003, pp. 199–237.
 20. See Aksan, Virginia, *An Ottoman Statesman in War and Peace: Ahmed Resmi Efendi, 1700–1783*; Goffman, Daniel, *The Ottoman Empire and the Early Modern Europe*, (Cambridge, 2002); Goffman, Daniel & Aksan, Virginia (eds), *The Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire*, (Cambridge, 2007); Agoston, Gabor, *Guns for the Sultan*, (Cambridge, 2005).
 21. For a reassessment of early Venetian diplomacy, see Valensi, Lucette, *The Birth of the Despot: Venice and the Sublime Porte*, (Ithaca, 1993), pp. 14–20.
 22. For the classical study on how diplomacy had risen to become professionalized and institutionalized beginning from the early modern era, see Anderson, M. S., *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 1450–1919*, (New York, 1993). Also see idem, *The Origins of the Modern European State System 1494–1618*, (New York, 1998).
 23. For example, see Kolodziejczyk, Dariusz, *Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations (15th–18th Centuries)*, (Leiden; Boston; Köln, 2000).
 24. In 1838, while he was the foreign minister, Mustafa Reşid Efendi was appointed as the ambassador to France, retaining his ministerial post. This was "to examine the European codes of conducts and the developments in Europe in situ." Akyıldız, Ali, *Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı Merkez Teşkilatında Reform*, (İstanbul, 1993), p. 79.
 25. For eighteenth century Ottoman diplomats, see Aksan, Virginia, *An Ottoman Statesman in War and Peace: Ahmed Resmi Efendi, 1700–1783*.
 26. Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, Vol. XII, pp. 194–96.
 27. Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, *Ibid.*, Vol. XII, pp. 215–19.
 28. For the emergence and development of the concept of "Westernization" in Turkish historiography, see Murphey, Rhoads, "Westernization in the

- Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Empire: How Far, How Fast?", *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* vol. 23, 1999, pp. 116–139.
29. For the Ottoman Military Revolution, see Agoston, Gabor, *Guns for the Sultan*; Grant, Jonathan, "Rethinking the Ottoman 'Decline': Military Technology Diffusion in the Ottoman Empire, Fifteenth to Eighteenth Centuries", *Journal of World History*, vol. 10, No. 1, Spring 1999, pp. 179–201; Yıldız, Gültekin, *Neferin Adı Yok: Zorunlu Askerliğe Geçiş Sürecinde Osmanlı Devleti'nde Siyaset, Ordu ve Toplum (1826–1839)*, (İstanbul, 2009).
 30. See *Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciyye*, (1301/1885), pp. 162–163.
 31. For the foundation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see Akyıldız, Ali, *Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı Merkez Teşkilatında Reform*, pp. 70–91.
 32. For the text, see Akyıldız, Ali, *Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı Merkez Teşkilatında Reform*, p. 152.
 33. Akyıldız, Ali, *Ibid.*, p. 78.
 34. Akyıldız, Ali, *Ibid.*, p. 90.
 35. The myth of Prussianism has been questioned by John Röhl. See his *The Kaiser and His Court*, (Cambridge, 1996). Röhl shows the role of the Kaiser and his personal circle in the making of foreign policy. In Röhl's assessment, German foreign policies did not develop from professional analysis and work, but from personal and irrelevant motivations.
 36. For a sharp contrast between the Prussian and Russian bureaucratic structures in the nineteenth century, see the articles in Heper, Metin (ed.), *The State and Public Bureaucracies: A Comparative Perspective*, (New York, 1987). However, such a dichotomy has been discredited by the latest studies on Russian bureaucracy.
 37. Lauren, Paul Gordon, *Diplomats and Bureaucrats*, (Stanford, 1976), p. xvii.
 38. Findley, Carter, "The Tanzimat", in *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, vol. IV, Reşat Kasaba (ed.), (Cambridge, 2008), p. 13.
 39. Itzkowitz, Norman, "Eighteenth Century Ottoman Realities", *Studia Islamica*, No. 16, 1962, p. 86.
 40. For a biography of Mustafa Reşid Pasha, see Kaynar, Reşat, *Mustafa Reşit Paşa ve Tanzimat*, (Ankara, 1954). Also see "Reşid Mustafa Paşa", *Sicill-i Osmani*, (İstanbul, 1996), pp. 1384–85.
 41. For the history textbooks of the Hamidian regime, see Demiryürek, Mehmet, *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Bir Osmanlı Aydını: Abdurrahman Şeref Efendi*, (İstanbul, 2003), pp. 153–73.
 42. Mustafa Sami Efendi, *Avrupa Risalesi*, (İstanbul, 12569, pp. 37–8.
 43. See the text of the rescript in Mehmet Ö Alkan (ed.), *Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet'in Birikimi Vol. I*, pp. 449–51.
 44. Findley, Carter, "The Tanzimat", in *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, Vol. IV, Reşat Kasaba (ed.), p. 13.

45. See Abu-Manneh, Butrus, "The Sultan and the Bureaucracy: The Anti-Tanzimat Concepts of Grand Vizier Mahmud Nedim Pasha, in *Studies on Islam and the Ottoman Empire in the Nineteenth Century*, (Istanbul, 2001), 160–80. Davison speaks of the setback of "gradual secularization, of the pursuit of Osmanlılık, of general modernization" and the coming of "nascent Islamic sentiment and a rising anti-Europeanism" with the death of Âli Pasha and the appointment of Mahmud Nedim as his successor. Davison, Roderick, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856–1876*, (Princeton, 1963), p. 269.
46. For a short discussion of the "cabal" of Mahmud Nedim Pasha, see Butrus Abu-Manneh, *Ibid.*, pp. 171–76. For the exile policy of Mahmud Nedim Pasha, see Davison, Roderick, *Ibid.*, p. 281.
47. Clay, Christopher, *Gold for the Sultan*, (London, 2000), pp. 314–31, 544, 550–51.
48. For example, see Mordtmann, Andreas David, *İstanbul ve Yeni Osmanlılar*, (İstanbul, 1999), pp. 279–304.
49. Mundy, Martha & Saumarez Smith, Richard, *Governing Property, Making the Modern State*, (London, 2007), p. 42. Also see "Hariciye Nezareti", DİA.
50. Findley, Carter, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, p. 261.
51. Akyıldız, Ali, *Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı Merkez Teşkilatında Reform*, p. 81, 231.
52. Keskin, Özkan. *Orman Ma'adin Nezareti'nin Kuruluşu ve Faaliyetleri*, unpublished dissertation, Istanbul University, 2005, p. 18.
53. Çelik, Zeynep, *The Remaking of Istanbul*, (Seattle; London, 1986), pp. 110–11.
54. Ergin, Osman Nuri, *Mecelle-i Umur-ı Belediyeye*, (İstanbul, 1995), Vol. III, p. 1275, quoted in Gül, Murat, *The Emergence of Modern Istanbul*, (London; New York, 2009), p. 44.
55. Gül, Murat, *Ibid.*, p. 45.
56. See Bakhash, Saul, *Iran: Monarchy, Bureaucracy and Reform under the Qajars: 1858–1896*, (London, 1978), p. 28.
57. Bakhash, Saul, *Ibid.*, p. 52.
58. Bakhash, Saul, *Ibid.*, pp. 51–53.
59. Immanuel C.Y. Hsü, "The Development of the Chinese Foreign Office in the Ch'ing Period", "The Foreign Ministry: Japan", in *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, Zara Steiner (ed.), (Westport, 1982), p. 126.
60. Immanuel C.Y. Hsü, *Ibid.*, p. 128.
61. Nish, Ian, "The Foreign Ministry: Japan", in *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, p. 328.
62. Nish, Ian, *Ibid.*, p. 328.
63. For the social origins of Persian diplomats, see Bakhash, Saul, *Ibid.*, p. 28.

64. Algar, Hamid, *Mirza Malkum Khan*, (Berkeley, 1973), pp. 66–67.
65. Algar, Hamid, *Ibid.*, pp. 65–74. Also for Abdülhak Hamid's meeting with Malkom Khan several times in the residence of Ahmed Vefik Pasha (and also in London), see Abdülhak Hamid, *Ibid.*, p. 178.
66. Bakhash, Saul, *Ibid.*, p. 27.
67. For how Abdülhamid II established direct contacts with officials bypassing the Grand Vizierate and the Sublime Porte in general, see Akarlı, Engin Deniz, *The Problems of External Pressures, Power Struggles, and Budgetary Deficits in Ottoman Politics under Abdülhamid II (1876–1909)*, unpublished dissertation, Princeton University, 1976.
68. For a vivid depiction of the Yıldız bureaucracy, see Mayakon, İsmail Müştak, *Yıldızda Neler Gördüm?* (İstanbul, 1940); Tahsin Paşa, *Abdülhamid Yıldız Hatıraları*, (İstanbul, 1931). Also Georgeon, Francois, *Sultan Abdülhamid*, (İstanbul, 2006), pp. 170–74.
69. For a biography of Mahmud Esad Pasha, see *Salname-i Hariciyye Nezaret-i Celilesi*, (1306/1889), 537–38; Kunalalp, Sinan. “Tanzimat Sonrası Osmanlı Sefirleri”, in Soysal, İsmail (ed.), *Çağdaş Türk Diplomasisi: 200 Yıllık Süreç*, (Ankara, 1997), 113–14.
70. For the list and biographies of the senators, see Demirci, Aliyar, *İkinci Meşrutiyet'te Ayan Meclisi 1908–1912*, (İstanbul, 2006), 453–508; *Türk Parlamento Tarihi- I. ve II. Meşrutiyet*, (Ankara, 1997), Vol. II.
71. For some examples of this multilayered and eclectic imperial identity and discourse reflected in the accounts of the Ottoman officialdom, see Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa, *Serzüğest-i Hayatım*, (2 vols); Mehmed Memduh Pasha, *Mi'rat-i Şumut*, (İstanbul, 1990); Mahmud Celaledin Paşa, *Mira'at-ı Hakikat*. For the Ottoman discourses regarding Yemen, blending the civilizationist, imperialist, and nationalist (in terms of development of a discourse of Arabness perceived as inferior to the Turks who are civilized and “own” the empire) predispositions in the accounts of Ottoman military and civil bureaucrats is particularly illustrative. See, Mahmud Nedim Bey, *Arabistan'da Bir Ömür*, (İstanbul, 2001); Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa, *Serzüğest-i Hayatım*, Vol. I, 40–97; Biren, Mehmet Tevfik, *II. Abdülhamid, Meşrutiyet ve Mütareke Devri Hatıraları*, (İstanbul, 1993), Vol. I, 265–370; Ahmet İzzet Paşa, *Feryadım*, (İstanbul, 1992), Vol. I, 87–107; Doktor İbrahim Abdüsselam Paşa, *Yemen Seyahatnamesi ve Bitkisel Coğrafyası*, (İstanbul, 2009); Süleyman Şefik Paşa, *Hatıratım*, (İstanbul, 2004), pp. 7–43. Also see Namık Kemal, “Yemen'e Dair Mütalaa”, in *Namık Kemal: Osmanlı Modernleşmesinin Meseleleri*, Aydoğdu, Nergiz Yılmaz & Kara, İsmail (ed.), (İstanbul, 2005), pp. 56–57.
72. “In fact, identity and self-perception crises are merely an effect of modernization, all the sharper as the latter quickens its pace. As a consequence,

- there is no escape from an inter-conditioning between critical reflection on modernity and an identity-centered problematic, as a fundamental and inextricable datum of one's existence. Modernity, as mental space and general human condition, shelters the seed of a somewhat paradoxical attitude: the post-modern tendency to deny and ceaselessly reformulate not only tradition and the 'oldness' against which it defines itself, but also its own bases and motivations-reasons, individualism and 'progress', individual and collective identity, which is a tendency that runs the risk of being (completely erroneously) taken for traditionalism and anti-modernity." Mitu, Sorin, *National Identity of Romanians in Transylvania*, (Budapest, 2001), p. 97. For the development of identity politics in Poland throughout the nineteenth century encounter with the "West" and the quest for authenticity and inclusion, see Jedlicki, Jerzy, *A Suburb of Europe*, (Budapest, 1988). Also see, Taylor, Charles, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity*, (Cambridge, 1992).
73. Deringil, Selim, "They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery", p. 313.
 74. Hanioglu, Şükrü, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, (Princeton, 2008), p. 77.
 75. Millman, Richard, *Britain and the Eastern Question*, (Oxford, 1979), p. 459.
 76. For some prominent and impressive works on Ottoman imperialism and colonialism, see Makdisi, Ussama, *The Culture of Sectarianism*; idem, "Ottoman Orientalism", *American Historical Review*, Vol. 107, No. 3, June 2002, pp. 768–796; Ersoy, Ahmet, "A Sartorial Tribute to Late Tanzimat Ottomanism: The Elbise-i Osmaniyye Album", *Muqarnas*, Vol. 20, 2003, pp. 187–207; Deringil, Selim, "They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery", pp. 311–343.
 77. For a study on the self-image and self-display of the Ottoman Empire in its ambivalence, complexity, and contradictory manifestations, see Çelik, Zeynep, *Displaying the Orient: Architecture of Islam at Nineteenth Century World's Fairs*, (Berkeley, 1992).
 78. Deringil, Selim, *The Well-Protected Domains*; Karateke, Hakan, *Padişahım Çok Yaş*, (İstanbul, 2004). For the "invention of emperor" in Japan in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see Fujitani, T. *Splendid Monarchy*, (Berkeley, 1998), 233.
 79. For an impressive introduction to the concept of "Empire", see Howe, Stephen, *Empire: A Very Short Introduction*, (Oxford, 2002). For a few other impressive studies, see Pagden, Anthony, *Lords of the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France 1500–1800*, (New Haven, 1995); Armitage, David, *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire*, (Cambridge, 2000); Porter, Bernard, *The Lion's Share: A Short History of British Imperialism 1850–2004*, (New York, 2004).

80. Porter, Bernard, *The Absent-Minded Imperialists*, (Oxford, 2005), pp. viii-x.
81. MacKenzie, John, *Propaganda and Empire: Manipulation of British Public Opinion 1880–1960*, (Basingstoke; New York, 1984); idem, *The Empire of Nature*, (Manchester, 1997); idem, *Orientalism: History, Theory and the Arts*, (Manchester, 1985); idem (ed.), *Imperialism and Popular Culture*, (Manchester, 1989). MacKenzie also edited the Manchester University Press series of “Studies in Imperialism” which published books examining the impact of imperialism in the nineteenth (and twentieth) century on politics, society, and culture.
82. Fujitani, Takashi, *Splendid Monarchy*, p. 26.
83. Wortman, Richard, *Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy*.
84. Deringil does not develop his arguments from Fujitani’s book which appeared just two years prior to the publication of Deringil’s book. Deringil depends on Carol Gluck for his comparison with Japan and was inspired by her analysis of the representation of the Japanese monarchy. See Gluck, Carol, *Japan’s Modern Myths*, (Princeton, 1985).
85. Abu Mannah, Butrus, “The Islamic Roots of the Gülhane Rescript”, in his *Studies on Islam and the Ottoman Empire in the Nineteenth-Century 1826–1876*, (Istanbul, 2001), pp. 73–97.
86. Saab, Ann Pottinger, *The Origins of the Crimean Alliance*, (Charlottesville, 1977); Badem, Candan, *The Ottoman Crimean War (1853–1856)*, (Leiden, 2010); Baumgart, Winfried, *The Peace of Paris 1856*, (Santa Barbara, 1981); Mosse, W.E., *The Rise and Fall of the Crimean System, 1855–1871*, (London, 1963).
87. For an impressive study on how the Ottomans used symbolism to deepen the temporary military alliance with the countries of Order in the Crimean War, Eldem, Edhem, *İftihar ve İmtiyaz: Osmanlı Nişan ve Madalyaları Tarihi*, (İstanbul, 2004). The book demonstrates the urge of the Ottomans to present the Empire as an esteemed European Empire equal to the others. For the earliest observation of such symbolism back in the reign of Selim III, see Berktaş, Halil & Artan, Tülay, “Selimian Times: A Reforming Grand Admiral, Anxieties of Re-possession, Changing Rites of Power”, in Zachariadou, Elizabeth (ed.), *The Kapudan Pasha, His Office and His Domain*, (Rethymnon, 2002), pp. 7–45.
88. For a recent collection of articles in tribute to Norman Itzkowitz with a particular emphasis on “identity formation” in the Ottoman Empire, see Barbir, Karl & Tezcan, Baki (eds), *Identity and Identity Formation in the Ottoman World*, (Madison, 2007).

Chapter 3 A social portrait of the diplomatic service

1. Abdülhak Hamid, *Abdülhak Hamid'in Hatıraları*, (İstanbul, 1994), p. 32.
2. Abdülhak Hamid, *Ibid.*, pp. 33–34.
3. Hayrullah Efendi, *Avrupa Seyahatnamesi*, (Ankara, 2002), p. 89.
4. Abdülhak Hamid, *Ibid.*, pp. 44–45.
5. The term “habitus,” as first used by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, is defined as, “...the durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisations, produces practices which tend to reproduce the regularities immanent in the objective conditions of the production of their generative principle, while adjusting to the demands inscribed as objective potentialities in the situation, as defined by the cognitive and motivating structures making up the habitus.” Bourdieu, Pierre, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, (Cambridge, 2004), p. 78.
6. For example, see Abdülhak Hamid, *Ibid.*, pp. 356–57; Ahmet İhsan, *Ibid.*, pp. 432–33.
7. Şerafettin Mağmumi, *Avrupa Seyahat Hatıraları*, (İstanbul, 2008), p. 319.
8. Ahmet İhsan, *Avrupa'da Ne Gördüm ?* (İstanbul, 2007), p. 315.
9. Ahmet İhsan, *Ibid.*, pp. 432–33.
10. Ahmet İhsan, *Ibid.*, p. 161.
11. Alain Servantie, Preface to *Avrupa'da Ne Gördüm*, p. xlviii.
12. Mehmet Tevfik Biren, *II. Abdülhamid, Meşrutiyet ve Mütareke Devri Hatıraları*, (İstanbul, 1998), Vol. I, pp. 13–14. Also see Naciye Neyyal, *Mutlakîyet, Meşrutiyet ve Cumhuriyet Hatıraları*, (İstanbul, 2004), p. 40.
13. Söylemezoğlu, Galip Kemali, *Hariciye Hizmetinde Otuz Sene*, (İstanbul, 1949), p. 53
14. Söylemezoğlu, *Ibid.*, p. 53.
15. Söylemezoğlu, *Ibid.*, p. 54.
16. Abdülhak Hamid, *Ibid.*, pp. 99–101.
17. Abdülhak Hamid, *Ibid.*, pp. 213–14, p. 321.
18. Abdülhak Hamid, *Ibid.*, p. 127.
19. Emil, Birol, *Mizancı Murad Bey*, (İstanbul, 1979), p. 57.
20. BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA, 19/6, 1311 C 19.
21. For example, for the patronage in the British navy in its transition to a bureaucratic institution, see Dandeker, Christopher, “Patronage and Bureaucratic Control – The Case of the Naval Officer in English Society 1780–1850”, *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 29, No. 3, September 1978, pp. 300–320. Also see Vincent, David, *The Culture of Secrecy in Britain, 1832–1898*, (Oxford; New York, 1998); Parris, Henry, *Constitutional Bureaucracy*, (London, 1969).

22. For the Northcote-Trevelyan Report and reforms based on this report in Britain, see Dreyfus, Françoise, *L'invention de la Bureaucratie*, (Paris, 2000).
23. For the political debates and reforms, see Tural, Erkan, *Son Dönem Osmanlı Bürokrasisi: II Meşrutiyet Dönemi'nde Bürokratlar, İttihatçılar ve Parlamenterler*, (Ankara, 2009).
24. Tural, Erkan, *Ibid.*, pp. 76–78, 96.
25. Herzfeld, Michael, *The Social Production of Indifference*, p. 12.
26. Herzfeld, Michael, *Ibid.*, pp. 156–57.
27. Mahmud Nedim Pasha writes to the sultan: “*velinimet-i bi- minnetimiz padişahımız şevketmeab efendimiz hazretlerinin sadık bir abd-ı memluk ve abkârları olmaktan başka asla bir değer ve liyakatim olmadığı halde bu kere dahi nail ve mazhar olduğun lütf ve inayet-i mahsusa-yı cenab-ı tacdarinin binde birinin ifası faraza-yı şükran ve ubudiyetten vücut ile acizim bulunduğum dua-yı bil-bayr-ı şebriyarilerini bu vesile ile dahi yüziümü yerlere sürerek...*” BOA, Y.PRK. EŞA, 13/29, 1308 Ş. 13; For the thank-you letters of the ambassadors to Vienna (Yusuf Ziya Bey) and to Madrid (İzzet Pasha) with the same submissive and obedient language, see BOA, Y. PRK.EŞA, 13/30, 1308 Ş.13; BOA, Y.PRK. EŞA, 42/21, 1320 Z. 4.
28. Akarlı, Engin Deniz, “The Tangled Ends of an Empire: Ottoman Encounters with the West and Problems of Westernization—an Overview”, *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, Vol. 26, No. 3, 2006, p. 363.
29. Herzfeld, Michael, *Cultural Intimacy*, p. 10.
30. Akarlı, Engin Deniz, “The Tangled Ends of an Empire: Ottoman Encounters with the West and Problems of Westernization—an Overview”, p. 362.
31. BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA 41/15, 1320 C. 29; 40/67, 1320, Ra. 27; 40/45, 1320 S. 27; 40/26, 1320, M. 27;38/52, 1319 Ra. 14.
32. BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA, 40/83, 1320 Ra. 30; 44/31, 1321 Ş. 2.
33. BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA, 35/101, 1318 Ra. 15.
34. BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA, 42/63, 1321 M. 8.
35. BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA, 28/46, 1315 C. 29.
36. BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA, 47/75, 1323 Ra. 26.
37. BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA, 48/42, 1323 L. 15.
38. BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA, 28/23, 1315 C. 1.
39. Carter Findley develops a much more sophisticated social portrait of the Ministry from the early Tanzimat to the demise of the Empire based on the *Sicil-i Ahval* (Personal Registers). With regard to the social origins of the Muslims and non-Muslims, many of the conclusions suggested below had been already made by Carter Findley based on his findings and counts. Findley, Carter, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History*.
40. *Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye* (1306 /1889), pp. 485–630.

41. *Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye* (1306/1889), 485–630.
42. Although no Jew served as an Ottoman ambassador, the son of a Jewish convert to Islam became an Ottoman ambassador. Several Europeans and Arab Christians also served as Ottoman ambassadors. However, predominantly, it was Armenians and Greeks that rose to prominent posts in the diplomatic service. See Kunalalp, Sinan, “Tanzimat Sonrası Osmanlı Sefirleri,” in Soysal, İsmail (ed.), *Çağdaş Türk Diplomasisi: 200 Yıllık Süreç*, pp. 115, 126.
43. *Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye* (1306/1889), p. 603.
44. *Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye* (1306/1889), pp. 537–538.
45. For the biographies and social origins of the Hamidian ambassadors as of 1889, see *Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye* (1306/1889), pp. 530–60.
46. Kırmızı, Abdülhamit, *Abdülhamid’in Valileri*, (İstanbul, 2007), pp. 69–70.
47. Yuzo Nagata remarks that “after the negative impact of the centralization policies of Mahmud II, the Karaosmanoğlu family...tried to retain its influence over the region by taking offices in the government.” Nagata, Yuzo, *Taribte Ayanlık: Karaosmanoğulları Üzerinde Bir İnceleme*, (Ankara, 1997), p. 191. One cannot neglect to recall that one descendant of the Karaosmanoğlu family was a “reluctant diplomat”. After the failure to retain their influence over their homelands and after moving to Izmir and Istanbul, the descendants of the Karaosmanoğlu family had made impressive governmental careers.
48. For the destruction of the Menemencioğlu family’s powerhouse, narrated by a contemporary member of the family, see Menemencioğlu Ahmed Bey, *Menemencioğlu Taribi*, (Ankara, 1997).
49. Ahmed Şakir Pasha, the ambassador to St. Petersburg between 1878 and 1889, was a descendant of the Çapanzade family. *Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye* (1306/1889), p. 533.
50. See Barkey, Karen, *Bandits and Bureaucrats*, (Ithaca, 1994); Khoury, Dina Rizk, *State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire: Mosul 1540–1834*, (Cambridge, 1997). For the dynamics of center–periphery relations in the Classical Age and its origins, see Kunt, Metin, *The Sultan’s Servants*, (New York, 1983).
51. Nagata, Yuzo, *Muhsin-zade Mehmed Pasha ve Ayanlık Müessesesi*, (Tokyo, 1982), p. 11.
52. Hanioglu, Şükrü, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, p. 61.
53. Çankaya, Ali, *Yeni Mülkiye Taribi ve Mülkiyeliler*, (Ankara, 1969), Vol. III, p. 305.
54. Parker, Esat Cemal, *Siyasi Taribimizde Kırk Yıllık Hariciye Hatıraları*, (İstanbul, 1952), p. 47.
55. *Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye* (1306/1889), pp. 512–13.

56. For a biography of Mehmed Şemseddin, Çankaya, Ali, *Yeni Mülkiye Tarihi ve Mülkiyeliler*, Vol. III, pp. 83–85. For the prominence of Circassians of aristocratic descent in the Hamidian era in various distinguished posts and Abdülhamid's pro-Circassian policies, see Avagyan, Arsen, *Çerkesler*, (Istanbul, 2004), pp. 95–104.
57. For a biography of Numan Menemencioğlu, see Güçlü, Yücel, *Eminence Gris of the Turkish Foreign Service: Numan Menemencioğlu*, (Ankara, 2002). For an analysis of the diplomatic perspectives and views of Numan Menemencioğlu, see Dikerdem, Mahmut, *Hariciye Çarkı*, (Istanbul, 1989), pp. 23–26; Deringil, Selim, *Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War: An "Active" Neutrality*, (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 51–57; Weisband, Edward, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1943–1945: Small State Diplomacy and Great Power Politics*, (Princeton, 1973), pp. 46–54.
58. Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu, who worked with Edhem, the brother of Numan, for one year in the embassy in Bucharest, sees these brothers as some of the last representatives of the old-style diplomat – aristocratic, cultivated, exceptionally well-educated, and well-mannered before the eventual deterioration of the quality of the diplomatic service. See Söylemezoğlu, Galip Kemali, *Hariciye Hizmetinde Kırk Sene*, pp. 285–86.
59. For a biography of Edhem Menemencioğlu, see Çankaya, Ali, *Yeni Mülkiye Tarihi ve Mülkiyeliler*, Vol. II, pp. 1124–25.
60. *Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye (1306/1889)*, p. 544.
61. For a list and general view of the members of the Babanzade family in the late Ottoman and Turkish world, see Alakom, Ruhat, *Şerif Paşa: Bir Kürt Diplomatının Fırtınalı Yılları*, (İstanbul, 1998), pp. 16–20.
62. For the Tanzimat's destruction of the Kurdish emirates, see Özoğlu, Hakan, *Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State*, (New York, 2004), pp. 59–68.
63. For the Kurdish elite, see Özoğlu, Hakan, *Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State*; Strohmeier, Martin, *Crucial Images in the Presentation of a Kurdish National Identity*, (Leiden; Boston; Köln, 2003).
64. Abdülhamid Kırımı's list of governors displays the presence of the descendants of the local dynasties of Kurdish, Turcoman, Albanian and Anatolian/Roumelian Turkish origin as well as the scions of Daghestani aristocrats. Kırımı, Abdülhamid, *Ibid.*, p. 69.
65. Major, Russell J, *From Renaissance Monarchy to Absolute Monarchy: French Kings, Nobles & Estates*, (Baltimore, 1997), p. 375.
66. For the double movement of the Kurdish notables, see Özoğlu, Hakan, *Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State*; Strohmeier, Martin, *Crucial Images in the Presentation of a Kurdish National Identity*.
67. See Tezcan, Baki, *The Second Ottoman Empire*, (New York, 2010), p. 39.

68. Muftıy-Zade K. Zia Bey, *Speaking of the Turks*, (New York, 1922), pp. 8–9.
69. *Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye* (1306/1889), p. 550.
70. Enis Bey (Akaygen), who had a similar socio-economic background, began his career in the Hamidian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1901, served as the undersecretary of the Republican Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 1927 and 1929, and retired in 1945, see Tulça, Enis, *Atatürk, Venizelos ve Bir Diplomat: Enis Bey*, (İstanbul, 2003). He belonged to a reputable family in Plovdiv that owned sizable lands and possessions before the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78. After the war, the family's fortunes waned and lost its possessions. A number of its members died, and the rest had to move to Istanbul, where they joined the ranks of the Ottoman central bureaucracy.
71. *Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye* (1306 /1889), p. 549; "Mehmed Fuad Köprülü," *DİA*, V ol. 28, p. 471.
72. For the origins of the Samipaşazade family, see the account of a descendant of the family, Kocamemi, Fazıl Bülent, *Bir Türk Ailesinin 450 Yıllık Öyküsü*, (İstanbul, 2005). Also see İbnül Emin Mahmud Kemal, *Son Asır Türk Şairleri*, (İstanbul, 1969), pp. 1649–50.
73. Kerman, Zeynep, *Sami Paşazade Sezai*, (Ankara, 1986), pp. 11–12; Kocamemi, Fazıl Bülent, *Bir Türk Ailesinin 450 Yıllık Öyküsü*, (İstanbul, 2005), pp. 74–76; Mardin, Şerif, *Yeni Osmanlı Düşüncesinin Doğuşu*, (İstanbul, 1996), p. 20; Şehsuvaroğlu, Haluk, "Sami Paşa Konağı," *Cumhuriyet*, 24 August 1951.
74. Abdülhak Hamid, *Ibid.*, p. 277.
75. Üstel, Füsun, *Türk Ocakları*, (İstanbul, 1997), pp. 60–61.
76. Üstel, Füsun, *Ibid.*, p. 61.
77. Söylemezoğlu, Galip Kemali, *Ibid.*, p. 7.
78. BOA, Y.PRK.UM, 30/97, 27 R 1312; BOA, HR.SYS 32/26, 7 July 1895; Celile Celil, *Kürt Aydınlanması*, (İstanbul, 2001), p. 102; Ahmet Kardam, *Cizre-Bohtan Beyi Bedirhan*, (Ankara, 2011), pp. 35–36 45–48.
79. Watson, Charles (ed.), *The Life of Major General Sir Charles William Wilson*, (London, 1909), pp. 179–80.
80. Avlonyalı Süreyya Bey, *Osmanlı Sonrası Arnavutluk* (1912–1920), (İstanbul, 2009), p. 195; Kunalp, Sinan, "Tanzimat Sonrası Osmanlı Sefirleri," in Soysal, İsmail (ed.), *Çağdaş Türk Diplomasisi: 200 Yıllık Süreç*, p. 115. For Turhan Pasha's diplomatic and administrative activities during his prime ministry in Albania, see Avlonyalı Süreyya Bey, *Osmanlı Sonrası Arnavutluk* (1912–1920).
81. Gawrych, George, *The Crescent and the Eagle: Ottoman Rule, Islam and the Albanians, 1874–1913*, (London; New York, 2006), p. 101.
82. "Konitza, Faik Bey," Robert Elsie, *Historical Dictionary of Albania*, (Lanham; Oxford, 2004), pp. 231–33.

83. Also for Mehmed Bey Konitza's visions of Albanian nationhood, see "The Albanian Question", *International Conciliation*, No. 138, May 1919, pp. 29–64.
84. Edwin Jacques, *The Albanians*, (Jefferson, 1995), p. 267.
85. Levent, Agah Sırrı, *Şemsettin Sami*, (Ankara, 1969), p. 49.
86. For the multiple identities of Şemseddin Sami Frasheri, the influential Albanian/Ottoman intellectual, see Bilmez, Bülent Can, "Şemsettin Sami mi Yazdı Bu 'Sakıncalı' Kitabı?," *Tarih ve Toplum Yeni Yaklaşımlar*, No. 1, Spring 2005, p. 141. As Bilmez demonstrates, Şemsettin Sami Frasheri wrote and acted as an Albanian and Turkish nationalist simultaneously, and this multiplicity did not pose any contradiction. For the complexities of the transition from Ottomanism to Arabism of Satı al-Husri, see Cleveland, William L, *The Making of an Arab Nationalist: Ottomanism and Arabism in the Life and Thought of Satı-al Husri*. For the Albanian students studying in the imperial *Mülkiye* and their later careers, also see Clayer, Nathalie, "Albanian Students of the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*: Social Networks and Trends of Thought," in *Late Ottoman Society: The Intellectual Legacy*, Özdalga, Elizabeth (ed.), pp. 289–309. Also for a historiographical analysis of the complex dynamics and origins of Albanianism in the late nineteenth century, see Gawrych, George, *The Crescent and the Eagle: Ottoman Rule, Islam and the Albanians, 1874–1913*, pp. 1–3.
87. Skendi, Stavro, *The Albanian National Awakening 1878–1912*, (Princeton, 1967), pp. 36–38.
88. Akarlı, Engin Deniz, "Daughters and Fathers: A Young Druze Woman's Experience (1894–1897), in *Identity and Identity Formation in the Ottoman World*, Tezcan, Baki & Barbir, Karl (eds), p. 181; *Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye (1320 /1902)*, p. 73.
89. Baer, Marc David, *The Dönme: Jewish Converts, Muslim Revolutionaries, and Secular Turks*, (Stanford, 2010), p. 90; DH.SAID 81/227, 29 Z. 1284.
90. Cecil, Lamar, *Ibid.*, p. 96.
91. Steiner, Zara, *Ibid.*, p. 19.
92. See also Akpınar, Alişan & Rogan, Eugene, *Aşiret, Mektep, Devlet*, (İstanbul, 2001).
93. Çark, Y, *Türk Devleti Hizmetinde Ermeniler*, (İstanbul, 1953), p. 135.
94. For the *amira* class, see Barsoumian, Hagop, "The Dual Role of the Armenian Amira Class within the Ottoman Government and the Armenian Millet (1750–1850)", in B. Braude & B. Lewis (eds), *Christians and the Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, (New York; London, 1982), Vol. I, pp. 171–84. For the presence of Armenians in the provincial bureaucracy, see Krikorian, Mesrob, *Armenians in the Service of the Ottoman Empire 1860–1908*, (London; New York, 1977).

95. Andrianopoulou, Konstantina, *Alexander Mavroyeni Bey: From the Nineteenth-Century Reform Era to the Young Turk Revolution Through the Life and Ideology of a Neophanariot Ottoman Bureaucrat*, unpublished MA thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2004, pp. 43–44.
96. For the Mavroyeni family, see Andrianopoulou, Konstantina, *Alexander Mavroyeni Bey*; Kırmızı, Abdülhamid, *Osmanlı Bürokrasisinde Gayrimüslimler*, unpublished MA thesis, Hacettepe University, 1998, pp. 16–18.
97. Demirci, Aliyar, *İkinci Meşrutiyet'te Ayan Meclisi 1908–1912*, p. 471.
98. For the speech of Beserya Efendi, see *Meclisi Ayan Zabıt Ceridesi* Vol. I, pp. 669–71. The chairman of the session, Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha, reiterated the “extensive level of tolerance” Muslims showed to the non-Muslims (p. 671).
99. *Meclisi Ayan Zabıt Ceridesi*, Vol. 1, p. 669.
100. Pamukçıyan, Kevork, *Biyografileriyle Ermeniler*, (İstanbul, 2000), p. 65.
101. For the tension between the conservative amira class, the newly developing “enlightened” middle classes, and the rural radicals, see Panossian, Razmik, *The Armenians*, (London, 2006), pp. 148–153.
102. Salih Münir Pasha, *La Politique Orientale de la Russie*, (Lausanne, 1918), pp. 76–77.
103. For Phanariot families, see Philliou, Christine, “Communities on the Verge: Unraveling the Phanariot Ascendancy in Ottoman Governance”, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 51, No.1, pp. 151–181; Janos, Damien, “Panaïotis Nicousios and Alexander Mavrocordatos: The Rise of the Phanariots and the Office of Grand Dragoman in the Ottoman Administration in the Second Half of the Seventeenth Century”, *Archivum Ottomanicum* No.23, 2005, pp. 177–196; Runciman, Steven. *The Great Church in Captivity*, (Cambridge, 1968), pp. 360–384; Andrianopoulou, Konstantina, *Alexander Mavroyeni Bey*, pp. 8–22.
104. Andrianopoulou, Konstantina, *Ibid.*, p. 53.
105. Beşiryan, Aylin, *Hopes of Secularization in the Ottoman Empire: The Armenian National Constitution and the Armenian Newspaper Masis, 1856–1863*, unpublished MA thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2007.
106. For Dadyans, see Pamukçıyan, Kevork, *Biyografileriyle Ermeniler*; Pamukçıyan, Kevork, *Zamanlar, Mekanlar, İnsanlar*, (İstanbul, 2003); Ter Minassian, Anahid, *Ermeni Kültürü ve Modernleşme*, (İstanbul, 2006), pp. 95–117. For the English of this text, see “A Family of Armenian Amiras: The Dadians”, *Armenian Review* 45 (3/179), Fall 1992, pp. 1–16.
107. Akarlı, Engin Deniz, *The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861–1920*, (Berkeley, 1993), p. 199.

108. *Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye* (1306 /1889), pp. 485–630.
109. Hanioglu, Şükrü. *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, p. 107.
110. Kayalı, Hasan, *Arabs and Young Turks*, (Berkeley, 1997); Kechriotis, Vangelis, *The Greek Community in Izmir, 1897–1914*, unpublished dissertation, University of Leiden, 2005; Campos, Michelle U, “Between ‘Beloved Ottomania’ and ‘The Land of Israel’: The Struggle over Ottomanism and Zionism among Palestine’s Sephardi Jews, 1908–13”, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 4, November 2005, 461–483; Andrianopoulou, Konstantina, *Alexander Mavroyeni Bey*; Vezenkov, Alexander, “Reconciliation of the Spirits and Fusion of the Interests: ‘Ottomanism’ as an Identity Politics”, in Mishkova, Diana (ed.), *We, the People: Politics of National Peculiarity in Southeastern Europe*, (Budapest, 2009), pp. 47–77.
111. See Avagyan, Arsen. “İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti ile Ermeni Siyasi Partileri Arasındaki İlişkiler”, in idem *Ermeniler ve İttihat ve Terakki*, (İstanbul, 2005), pp. 11–141.
112. Erdem, Y. Hakan, “Do not Think of the Greeks as Agricultural Labourers: Ottoman Responses to the Greek War of Independence”, in Dragonas, Thalia & Birtek, Faruk (eds), *Citizenship and the Nation-State in Greece and Turkey*, pp. 73–74.
113. Findley, Carter, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom*, pp. 95–97.
114. Findley, Carter, *Ibid.*, p. 97.
115. Abdülhak Hamid, *Ibid.*, p. 357.
116. Findley, Carter, *Ibid.*, p. 264.
117. Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, *Ma’ruzat*, (İstanbul, 1980), p. 1.
118. Findley, Carter, *Ibid.*, p. 264.
119. For example, compare the staff of the embassy as listed in the yearbook of the ministry in 1320 (1902), where the Armenian presence had considerably deteriorated (pp. 70–100).
120. See the account of Esat Cemal (Paker), who joined the Foreign Correspondence Office in 1896 after his graduation from *Mekteb-i Sultani*, Paker, Esat Cemal, *Kırk Yıllık Hariciye Hatıraları*, pp. 8–9. For valuable information, observations, and insights on the Hamidian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see Söylemezoğlu, Galip Kemali, *Hariciye Hizmetinde Otuz Sene*, pp. 53–62.
121. Findley, Carter, *Ibid.*, pp. 196–197.
122. See *Salname-i Devlet-i Aliyye-i Osmaniye* (1324) (excerpted in *Salname-i Nezaret-i Umur-ı Hariciyye* (1320/1902), (İstanbul, 2003), pp. 356–383). In this count, the consulates and consulate officials were not counted.
123. PRO FO, 371/1812, p. 348.
124. *Salneme-i Devlet-i Aliyye-i Osmaniyye* (1326), pp. 196–213.

125. Toprak, Zafer, *Türkiye'de "Milli İktisat" 1908–1918*, (İstanbul, 1982).
126. *Salname-i Devlet-i Aliyye-i Osmaniye* (1334), pp. 185–190.
127. *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devlet Salnamesi* (1926–1927), pp. 281–300.
128. Karaca Tağızade, Nesrin, *Abdülbak Şinasi Hisar'ın Eserlerinde Geçmiş Zaman ve İstanbul*, (Ankara, 1998).
129. Emil, Birol, *Ibid.*, pp. 37–41, 57.
130. For the account of Avlonyalı Ekrem Bey on his service in the ministry, see Avlonyalı Ekrem Bey, *Osmanlı Arnavutluk'undan Anılar (1885–1912)*, (İstanbul, 2006), p. 99.
131. Uşaklıgil, Halid Ziya, *Kırk Yıl*, (İstanbul, 1936), Vol. II, pp. 43–48.
132. Uşaklıgil, Halid Ziya, *Ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 84–88.
133. Uşaklıgil, Halid Ziya, *Ibid.*, Vol. III, pp. 84–88.
134. Uşaklıgil, Halid Ziya, *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 147.
135. For Vedat Uşaklıgil, see Emine Uşaklıgil, *Benim Cumhuriyet'im*, (İstanbul, 2010), pp. 90–93. For Bülent Uşaklıgil, see *Ibid.*
136. Uşaklıgil, Halid Ziya, *Ibid.* p. 45. For the account of Samipaşazade Sezai's first visit to Paris while going to London to serve as an ambassadorial secretary, his enchantment with Paris, and his acknowledgement of the privilege of enjoying Paris, see "1901'den İtibaren Paris'te Geçen Seneler", *Servet-i Fünun*, 5 February 1340, excerpted in Kerman, Zeynep (ed.), *Sami Paşazade Sezai: Bütün Eserleri*, Vol. II, pp. 124–25.
137. For a short biography of Cemil Cem, see Heinzelmann, Tobias, *Osmanlı Karikatüründe Balkan Sorunu 1908–1914*, p. 70.
138. For the the development of satire and cartoons in the late nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire, overwhelmingly practiced by Armenians and other non-Muslims with some Muslims before the entry of Turkish/Muslim cartoonist in large numbers and the launching of popular cartoon journals owned by Turks/Muslims after 1908, see Çeviker, Turgut, *Gelişim Sürecinde Türk Karikatürü*, (İstanbul, 1986); idem (ed.), *Terakki Edelim Beyler: Nişan G. Berberyan*, (İstanbul, 1986); idem (ed.), *Osmanlı Tokadı: Ali Fuat Bey*, (İstanbul, 1986); idem, *Meşrutiyet İmzasız Karikatür Antolojisi*, (İstanbul, 1989).
139. Heinzelmann, Tobias, *Ibid.*, p. 72. Many resigned from their governmental posts to pursue careers in non-governmental occupations in which they felt they could seek fulfillment. For example, see Arseven, Celal Esad, *Sanat ve Siyaset Hatıralarım*, (İstanbul, 1993), p. 52.
140. For the boom of the Turkish language and Ottoman press following the 1908 Revolution, see Koloğlu, Orhan, *1908 Basın Patlaması*, (İstanbul, 2005); Zarcone, Thierry & Clayer, Nathalie & Popovic, Alexandre, *Presse Turque et Presse de Turquie*, (İstanbul; Paris, 1992).

141. See his autobiographical article published in 1941 as quoted in Ertuğrul, Muhsin, *Benden Sonra Tufan Olmasın!* (İstanbul, 1998), pp. 86–91.
142. Gökaçtı, Mehmet Ali, “Bizim İçin Oyna”: *Türkiye’de Futbol ve Siyaset*, (İstanbul, 2008), pp. 26–28. This book (and any other book on the beginnings of Turkish soccer and sports) demonstrates the immense role the sons of high-ranking bureaucrats played in the founding of sports organizations and the promotion of sports.
143. Çelik Gülersoy, “Ölümünün 29. Yılında Reşid Safvet Atabinen,” *Tarih ve Toplum*, February 1994, No. 122, p. 71.
144. Young Celal Esad, resisting the pressure exerted on him by his family to seek a military/governmental career, notes that he wanted to live freely, and he knew well that his fortune provided him with the freedom to enjoy such a luxury. Arseven, Celal Esad, *Ibid.*, p. 44. Later in his memoirs, Arseven remarks that his friend and fellow artist, Nazmi Ziya, also had to face intransigent opposition from his family. See, *Ibid.*, p. 73.
145. For the social origins of Armenian painters, see Kürkman, Garo, *Armenian Painters in the Ottoman Empire*, (İstanbul, 2004) (2 volumes). Also see the observations made by Celal Esad Arseven regarding non-Muslim artists studying in the Academy of Fine Arts, see Arseven, *Ibid.*, p. 50.
146. This is not the place to present a detailed documentation of the men of letters of the Tanzimat, but to corroborate the argument made above, a few examples can be given. The Recaizade family was originally from Kepsut in Balıkesir. Selim Ağa, Mahmud Ekrem’s grandfather from the fifth generation, had moved to İstanbul and joined the janissaries. Selim Ağa’s son served as a judge. Mehmet Şakir Recai Efendi, Mahmud Ekrem’s father, continued the family’s gradual upward mobility by serving as Takvimhane Nazırı. Mahmud Ekrem was born in 1847 in Recai Efendi Yalısı in Vaniköy as a scion of an established family. As a further note, Mahmud Ekrem began his civil service career in 1862 in the *Hariciye Mektubi Kalemî*, where he met Namık Kemal and Ayetullah Bey. He continued his civil service career in various posts in the Ministry of Finance and then in the Council of State. For Recaizade Mahmud Ekrem’s social origins, see Parlatır, İsmail, *Recai-zade Mahmud Ekrem*, (Ankara, 2004), pp. 13–14. A very similar pattern is seen for Abdülhak Şinasi Hisar. His family’s origins went back to Ali Pasha of Tepelen. His great grandfather, Selim Sırrı Pasha, a grandson of Ali Pasha of Tepelen, was the last guardian of Belgrade before Belgrade was evacuated. After the evacuation, he moved to İstanbul, where he rose in the central bureaucracy to the position of vizier. His son served as an official in *Topbane-i Amire*. Abdülhak Şinasi was born in his grandfather’s *yalı* (seaside mansion on the Bosphorus) in Rumelihisarı as a

- descendant of an established Istanbul family. See Tağızade Karaca, Nesrin, *Abdülhak Şinasi Hisar'ın Eserlerinde Geçmiş Zaman ve İstanbul*.
147. This observation is applicable to all the first generations of Ottoman novelists. When Nabizade Nazım wrote a novel (or a novella) in which the setting was a remote village of Antalya, he did an extraordinary job of describing an environment in which his readers were uninterested and with which they were unfamiliar. Reşat Nuri Güntekin, who with his novels illustrates the unbroken continuity from the Empire to the Republic, recounts the life of clerks in their offices and in their daily lives. Güntekin depicts the habitus of the officialdom brilliantly as an insider. What is also so striking in Güntekin's novels is the lack of almost any difference from the Empire to the Republic as his clerks continued their routines. Their habitus remains uninterrupted.
 148. See Arseven, Celal Esad, *Ibid.*, p. 43.
 149. Tansuğ, Sezer, *Halil Paşa*, (İstanbul, 1994), p. 13.
 150. For the aristocratic origins of Abidin Dino, see *Abidin Dino: Bir Dünya*, (İstanbul, 2007).
 151. For the emergence of modern Ottoman theater, its Armenian pioneers, and Muslim latecomers, see And, Metin, *Osmanlı Tiyatrosu*, (Ankara, 1999).
 152. Lieven, Dominic, *Russia's Rulers under the Old Regime*, p. 204.
 153. Lieven, Dominic, *Ibid.*, p. 206.
 154. Öztuna, Yılmaz, *Türk Musikisi Ansiklopedisi*, (Ankara, 1970), pp. 45–46.
 155. Say, Ahmet, *Türkiye'nin Müzik Atlası*, (İstanbul, 1998), p. 61.
 156. Arabacı, Emre, *Ahmed Adnan Saygun*, (İstanbul, 2007), p. 37.
 157. Kocamemi, Fazıl Bülent, *Ibid.*, pp. 172–74.
 158. For the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century British aristocracy, see Cannadine, David, *The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy*; idem, *Aspects of Aristocracy*, (New Haven, 1994). For the surviving French aristocracy in nineteenth-century France, see Higgs, Daniel, *Nobles in Nineteenth Century France*.
 159. Ertuğrul, Muhsin, *Benden Sonra Tufan Olmasın!*, p. 48.
 160. Timms, Edward & Göksu, Saime, *Romantic Communist: The Life and Work of Nazım Hikmet*, (London, 1999), pp. 3–4.
 161. Çankaya, Ali, *Ibid.*, p. 410. Sedat Hakkı Eldem's brother, Sadi Eldem, also became a Republican ambassador and retired from his ambassadorial post in Teheran in 1975.
 162. For Münir Ertegün, see Harris, George S, "Cementing Turkish-American Relations: The Ambassadorship of (Mehmet) Münir Ertegün (1934–1944)", in Harris, George S. & Criss, Nur Bilge, *Studies in Atatürk's Turkey: The American Dimension*, (Leiden; Boston, 2009), pp. 177–96.

163. Harris, George S, *Ibid.*, p. 195.
164. Çakır, Serpil, *Osmanlı Kadın Hareketi*, (İstanbul, 1994), p. 32.
165. For the emergence of the legal profession in relation to the preponderant role of the state, see Demirel, Fatmagül, *Adliye Nezaretinin Kuruluşu ve Faaliyetleri (1876–1914)*, unpublished dissertation, Istanbul University, 2003, pp. 225–231.
166. Şehsuvaroğlu, Bedi & Erdemir Demirhan, Ayşegül & Cantay Güreşsever, Gönül, *Türk Tıp Tarihi*, (Bursa, 1984); Terzioğlu, Arslan & Erwin, Lucius (ed.), *Mekteb-i Tıbbiye-i Adliye-i Şabane ve Bizde Modern Tıp Eğitiminin Gelişmesine Katkıları*, (İstanbul, 1989); Ataç, Adnan, *Güllhane Askeri Tıp Akademisinin Kuruluşu*, (Ankara, 1996).
167. For the foundation and development of *Darülfünun* (later University of Istanbul) as the first university of the Ottoman Empire, see Dölen, Emre, *Türkiye Üniversite Tarihi 1: Osmanlı Döneminde Darülfünun*, (İstanbul, 2010); Bilsel, Cemil, *İstanbul Üniversitesi Tarihi*, (İstanbul, 1943); Ergin, Osman, *Türk Maarif Tarihi*, (İstanbul, 1977); Çankaya, Ali, *Yeni Mülkiye Tarihi ve Mülkiyeliler*, (Ankara, 1968), Vol. I; Irmak, Sadi & Saatçioğlu, Fikret & Oğuzman, Kemal & Pekiner, Kamuran, *Cumhuriyetin 50. Yılında İstanbul Üniversitesi*, (İstanbul, 1973); İshakoğlu-Kadioğlu, Sevtap, *İstanbul Üniversitesi Fen Fakültesi Tarihçesi (1900–1946)*, (İstanbul, 1998).
168. For some studies on the development of the free professions critical of the axiom that the free professions are harbingers of liberalism, see Jarausch, Konrad, *The Unfree Professions*, (Oxford, 1990); McClelland, Charles E, *The German Experience of Professionalization*, (Cambridge, 2002); Jarausch, Konrad & Cocks, Geoffrey (ed.), *German Professions, 1800–1950*, (Oxford, 1990); Balzer, Harley D, *Russia's Missing Middle Class*, (Armonk, 1996); Kovacs, Maria, *Liberal Professions and Illiberal Politics: Hungary from the Habsburgs to the Holocaust*, (Oxford, 1993).
169. Before modernity, as the Lasletts argue, the household was the basic and principal economic unit. Thus, marriage regulated the economies of households. See Laslett, Barbara, *Household and Family in Past Time*, (Cambridge, 1972); Laslett, Peter, *The World We Have Lost*, (London, 1965).
170. For some classical studies on pre-modern marriages and family, see Stone, Lawrence, *The Family, Sex and Marriage in England 1500–1800*, (London, 1977); Duby, Georges, *Love and Marriage in the Middle Ages*, (Chicago, 1994); Duby, Georges, *The Knight, The Lady and the Priest: The Making of Modern Marriage in Medieval France*, (Chicago, 1993).
171. Wasson, Ellis, *Aristocracy and the Modern World*, (Basingstoke; New York, 2006), p. 59.
172. Wasson, Ellis, *Ibid.*, p. 60

173. Doyle, William, *Aristocracy and its Enemies in the Age of Revolution*, (Oxford, 2008), pp. 12, 156.
174. For the classic study investigating the family lives and perceptions of the modernizing Ottoman urban middle-class sons of the Tanzimat, see Parla, Jale, *Babalar ve Oğullar*, (İstanbul, 1993). For a depiction of the family life of Kıbrıslı Mehmed Pasha, see Melek Hanım, *Haremden Mabrem Hatıralar*, (İstanbul, 2003).
175. For the transformation of marriage patterns and the persistence of the practice of holding concubines in the Ottoman reformist statesmen, see Madeline Zilfi, *Women and Slavery in the Ottoman Empire*, (Cambridge; New York, 2010), pp. 229–35.
176. Of his three children, the first married a sultan from the palace, the second, a daughter of a diplomat colleague (and granddaughter of Sadullah Pasha), and the third, the son of Memduh Pasha, himself the son of Abdülhamid's long-time Minister of the Interior. See Okday, Şefik, *Ibid.*
177. Baydar, Mustafa, *Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver ve Anıları*, (İstanbul, 1968), p. 37.
178. Davis, Fanny, *The Ottoman Lady: A Social History from 1718–1918*, (Westport, 1986), pp. 89–90.
179. One of the most reputable criticisms of the institution of slavery and concubinage was leveled by Samipaşazade Sezai in his novel *Sergüzeşt* published in 1888 while he was serving in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Kerman, Zeynep (ed.), *Sami Paşazade Sezai: Bütün Eserleri*, Vol. I, pp. 1–78.
180. Davis, Fanny, *Ibid.*, p. 93.
181. For the end of the medieval marriage pattern and the rise of the new monogamous marriages in Egypt, see Cuno, Kenneth, "Ambiguous Modernization: The Transition to Monogamy in the Khedival House of Egypt", in *Family History in the Middle East*, Beshara Doumani (ed.), (New York, 2003), pp. 247–270.
182. Diane Robinson-Dunn argues for the supplanting of the ideal of patriarchal households "by a new ideal, that of the middle-class home, which contemporary Egyptians believed would provide a new foundation for the new nation" on the eve of the twentieth century with the elimination of slavery in Egypt. Robinson-Dunn, Diane, *The Harem, Slavery and British Imperial Culture*, (Manchester, 2006), p. 57.
183. For the patterns and strategies of marriages in the Pomeranian Junker nobility from the eighteenth century to the twentieth century, see Baranowski, Shelley, *The Sanctity of Rural Life*, (Oxford, 1995), pp. 32–34.
184. For some prominent theories on the making of the modern affectionate bourgeois family, see Shorter, E., *The Making of the Modern Family*, (New

- York, 1975); Stone, Lawrence, *The Family, Sex and Marriage in England 1500–1800*; Gay, Peter, *The Tender Passion: The Bourgeois Experience, from Victoria to Freud*, (New York, 1999); Willis, John, *A World of Their Own Making: Myth, Ritual and the Quest for Family Values*, (Cambridge, 1997).
185. Erdem, Hakan, *Slavery in the Ottoman Empire and its Demise*, (Basinstoke, 1996), pp. 149–50.
 186. Erdem, Hakan, *Ibid.*, pp. 147–49.
 187. Abdülhak Hamid, *Ibid.*, p. 286.
 188. Okday, Şefik, *Büyükbabam Son Sadrazam Ahmet Tevfik Paşa*, p. 13.
 189. Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tezâkir*, Vol. II, p. 70.
 190. Erdem, Can, *Sadrazam Damat Ferit Paşa*, unpublished dissertation, Marmara University, 2002, p. 2.
 191. Erdem, Can, *Ibid.*, p. 2.
 192. Alakom, Rohat, *Şerif Paşa: Bir Kürt Diplomatının Fırtınalı Hayatı*, (İstanbul, 1998), p. 15.
 193. Tugay, Emine Foat, *Three Centuries*, (Oxford, 1963), table I on the back flap.
 194. Okday, Şefik, *Ibid.*, p. 20.
 195. Abdülhak Hamid, *Ibid.*, p. 340.
 196. Akarlı, Engin Deniz, *The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861–1920*, (Berkeley, 1993), p. 195; Duhani, Said N., p. 116.
 197. E-mail from Edhem Eldem (18 February 2010). I owe this information to Gül İnanç.
 198. Karabekir, Kazım, *Birinci Cihan Harbine Neden Girdik?*, (İstanbul, 1994), p. 31.
 199. Kunalalp, Sinan, “Tanzimat Sonrası Osmanlı Sefirleri”, in Soysal, İsmail (ed.), *Çağdaş Türk Diplomasisi: 200 Yıllık Süreç*, p. 117.
 200. Okday, Şefik, *Ibid.*, p. 13.
 201. Lütfi Simavi, *Sultan Mehmed Reşad Hanın ve Halifenin Sarayında Gördüklerim*, (Dersaadet, 1340), p. 96.
 202. See Montgomery, Maureen E., *Gilded Prostitution: Status, Money and Transatlantic Marriages, 1870–1914*, (New York; London, 1989). For the “American brides” in the Habsburg diplomatic service, see Godsey, William D, *Aristocratic Redoubt: The Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office on the Eve of the First World War*, (West Lafayette, 1999), p. 96; For the “American brides” in the British Foreign office, see Montgomery, Maureen E., *Ibid.*, p. 148.
 203. BOA, HR.İM 227/68, 18 July 1928.
 204. Mufty-Zade K. Zia Bey, *Ibid.*, p. 12.
 205. Çankaya, Ali, *Ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 194.

206. Çankaya, Ali, *Ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 92; Kunalalp, Sinan, *Ibid.*, p. 117.
207. Abdülhak Hamid, *Ibid.*, p. 177.
208. Algar, Hamid, *Mirza Malkum Khan*, p. 10; Abdülhak Hamid *Ibid.* p. 178.
209. Cecil, Lamar, *The German Diplomatic Service 1871–1914*, p. 87. For the “stupefyingly complex” web of marriages within the Habsburg diplomatic service, see Godsey, William D, *Aristocratic Redoubt: The Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office on the Eve of the First World War*, p. 35. For the marriage connections within the Dutch diplomatic service, see Wels, C.B., “The Foreign Policy Institutions in the Dutch Republic and the Netherlands 1579 to 1980”, in *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, Zara Steiner (ed.), p. 372.
210. Shaw, Wendy, *Possessors and Possessed: Museums, Archaeology and the Visualization of History in the Late Ottoman Empire*, (Berkeley, 2003), p. 98.
211. Artun, Deniz, *Paris'ten Modernlik Tercümelere*, (İstanbul, 2007), p. 59.
212. Shaw, Wendy, *Ibid.*, p. 99.
213. Budak, Ali, *Münif Paşa*, pp. 21–35.
214. Budak, Ali, *Ibid.*, 86; Abdülhak Hamid, *Ibid.*, p. 357.
215. For family ties of the ambassadors, see Kunalalp, Sinan, “Tanzimat Sonrası Osmanlı Sefirleri,” in Soysal, İsmail (ed.), *Çağdaş Türk Diplomasisi: 200 Yıllık Süreç*, pp. 113–18.
216. Kırmızı, Abdülhamid, *Osmanlı Bürokrasisinde Gayrimüslimler*, p. 36.
217. BOA,, DH.SAİD 10/207, 1270 Z. p. 29.
218. Kırmızı, Abdülhamid, *Ibid.*, p. 34.
219. BOA, DH.SAİD 88/143, 1293, Z. 29; Kırmızı, Abdülhamid, *Ibid.*, p. 32.
220. BOA, DH.SAİD 71/117, 1278 Z. p. 29.
221. Akarlı, Engin Deniz, *The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861–1920*, p. 197.
222. Duhani, Said N., *Beyoğlu'nun Adı Pera İken*, (İstanbul, 1990), p. 117.
223. Özdemir, Bülent (ed.), *İngiliz İstibbarat Raporlarında Fişlenen Türkiye*, (İstanbul: 2008), p. 80.
224. BOA, DH.SAİD 1/664, 1236 Z. p. 29.
225. BOA, HR.İM 99/14, 2 March 1924.
226. BOA, HR.İM 150/72, 12 July 1925.
227. BOA, DH.SAİD 22/197, 1278 Z. p. 29.
228. Lamar, Cecil, *Ibid.*, pp. 21–22.
229. Dethan, Georges, “France: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs since the Nineteenth Century”, in *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, Zara Steiner (ed.), p. 218. For the French state elite, see also Bourdieu, Pierre, *The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power*, (Cambridge, 1998); Charle, C., “The Present State of Research on the Social History of Elites and Bourgeoisie: A Critical Assessment”, *Contemporary European History*, No. 1, 1992, pp. 99–112.

230. Rumpler, Helmut, "The Foreign Ministry of Austria and Austria-Hungary 1848 to 1918", in *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, Zara Steiner (ed.), p. 51. Also see Godsey, William D, *Aristocratic Redoubt: The Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office on the Eve of the First World War*, p. 36.
231. Wels, D.C., "The Foreign Policy Institutions in the Dutch Republic and the Kingdom of the Netherlands 1579 to 1980", *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, Zara Steiner (ed.), p. 372.
232. Uldricks, Teddy J., "The Tsarist and Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs," in *Ibid.*, p. 518.
233. Steiner, Zara, "Introduction", in *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, Zara Steiner (ed.), p. 13.
234. For a biography of Cevat Açıkalın, see Güçlü, Yücel, *The Life and Career of a Turkish Diplomat: Cevat Açıkalın*, (Ankara, 2002).
235. Tugay, Emine Foat, *Three Centuries*.
236. Günver, Semih, *Fatin Rüştü Zorlu'nun Öyküsü*, (Ankara, 1985), pp. 7, 17. This book is a valuable resource providing the documentation of numerous genealogical and marriage connections, ranging from late Ottoman officialdom to the second generation of the Republican bureaucratic elite via the founding generation of the Republic.
237. Ahmed Muhtar Mollaoğlu was the son of Cemaleddin Efendi, the 18-year şeyhülislam of Abdülhamid II and a scion of a family of religious scholars. See Ahmet Muhtar, *İntak-ı Hak*, (İstanbul, 1930).
238. Derin, Haldun, *Çankaya Özel Kalemimi Hatırlarken*, (İstanbul, 1995), p. 81.
239. Fuad Simavi was also the nephew of Lütü Simavi, an Ottoman diplomat and Lord High Chamberlain of Mehmed Reşad and Vahdeddin. Lütü Simavi, *Sultan Mehmed Reşad Hanın ve Halifenin Sarayında Gördüklerim*, p. 10; Birol, Nurettin, Halil Rıfat Paşa, *C.Ü. Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, Vol. 27, December 2003, p. 278. Fuad Simavi is also a cousin of the future press tycoon Sedat Simavi.
240. These data were gathered by examining the obituaries retrieved from the database of the daily *Milliyet*'s on-line archive and the yearbook of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared in 1964–5. Aral, Hamid (ed.), *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Yıllığı (1964–1965)*, (Ankara, 1967).
241. All the above-mentioned Republican diplomats were titled ambassadors with the exceptions of the son of Tunalı Hilmi (İnsan Tunalı), who resigned from the diplomatic service after serving as secretary in the embassies to Jerusalem and Tokyo and as consul, and the grandson of Halil Rıfat Pasha (Fuad Simavi), who was removed from the diplomatic service. Ateş, Sabri, *Tunalı Hilmi*, (İstanbul, 2009), p. 108; Dikerdem, Mahmut, *Hariciye Çarkı*, (İstanbul, 1989), p. 24.

242. For a classical interpretation of the Ottoman/Turkish modern state along these lines, see Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey*, p. 66.
243. For Giddens' notion of "ontological security", see Giddens, Anthony, *The Consequences of Modernity*, (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 94–99. For a discussion of "ontological security" with regard to the perception of the people of the Republican state, see Alexander, Catherine, *Personal States*, (Oxford, 2002), p. 19. Also see Reinkowski, Maurus, "The State's Security and the Subjects' Prosperity: Notions of Order in Ottoman Bureaucratic Correspondence (Nineteenth Century)", in *Legitimizing the Order*, Hakan Karatepe & Maurus Reinkowski (eds), (Leiden; Boston; Köln, 2005), p. 199.
244. See Alexander, Catherine, *Ibid.*

Chapter 4 The routine of the diplomatic service and its encounters abroad

1. BOA, HR. SYS 64/13, BOA, 26 June 1895; HR.SYS 60/40, 16 March 1891.
2. For a close scrutiny of the newspaper *Haik*, see BOA, HR.SYS 63–22, 4 August 1894; 60–46, 9 February 1895. The embassy repeatedly disclaimed the "unfounded allegations" in the Armenian journals. For the monitoring of the New Jersey-based Armenian newspaper *Arekag*, BOA, HR.SYS 59/37, 18 May 1888.
3. BOA, HR.SYS 65/52, 2 June 1896.
4. BOA, HR. SYS 59/37, 18 May 1888.
5. BOA, HR.SYS 65/58, 20 July 1896.
6. BOA, HR.SYS 65/58, 20 July 1896.
7. BOA, HR.SYS 64/13, 26 June 1895.
8. BOA, HR.SYS 64/12, 25 June 1895.
9. See Erol, Mine, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Amerika Büyük Elçisi A. Rüstem Bey*, (no publishing house, 1972).
10. BOA, HR.SYS 64/13, 26 June 1895.
11. BOA, HR.SYS 61/6, 10 August 1891.
12. Robert L. Beisner, *From the Old Diplomacy to the New, 1865–1900*, (Arlington Heights, 1986), p. 60.
13. See *Foreign Relations of the United States*, years 1885, 1886, 1890, 1891, 1892.
14. Also see Erol, Mine, *Birinci Dünya Savaşı Arifesinde Amerika'nın Türkiye'ye Karşı Tutumu*, (Ankara, 1976); Moore, John Hammond, *America Looks at Turkey 1876–1909*, unpublished dissertation, University of Virginia, 1961.

- Fendoğlu, Hasan Tahsin, *Modernleşme Bağlamında Osmanlı-Amerika İlişkileri*, (İstanbul, 2002); Şafak, Nurdan, *Osmanlı-Amerikan İlişkileri*, (İstanbul, 2003).
15. BOA, HR.SYS, 77/15, 30 April 1888.
 16. BOA, HR.SYS, 77/16, 17,18,19,20,21,22,23. (5 May 1886, 2 February 1893, 11 November 1903, 30 November 1903, 14 December 1903, 2 January 1904, 18 April 1904).
 17. BOA, HR. SYS 125/22, 18 March 1886; 127/25, 17 March 1886.
 18. BOA, HR.SYS 126/2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15 (dated from 10 June 1878 to 14 August 1878).
 19. BOA, HR.SYS 184/46, 25 January 1887.
 20. BOA. HR.SYS, 198/9, 8 April 1903.
 21. Koloğlu, Orhan, *Avrupa'nın Kışkacında Abdülhamid*, p. 65.
 22. Koloğlu, Orhan, *Ibid.*, p. 67.
 23. Needless to say, although this endeavor was a personal venture of the sultan, it was the hard-working diplomats, whether they were Ottoman representatives abroad or the diplomats working in Istanbul who informed Abdülhamid and did the job in the name of the sultan. However, Abdülhamid was not satisfied with the regular work of the bureaucracy. Abdülhamid recruited Louis Sabuncu, who was in charge of following the newspapers published in English, French, Italian, and Arabic and translating the articles on the Ottoman Empire. See the memoirs of Sabuncuzade Louis Alberi, *Yıldız Sarayı'nda Bir Papaz*, (İstanbul, 2007).
 24. Kırılı, Cengiz, "Coffeehouses: Public Opinion in the Nineteenth Century Ottoman Empire", in Salvatore, Armando & Eickelman, Dale F. (eds), *Public Islam and the Common Good*, (Leiden; Boston; Köln, 2004), pp. 75–97.
 25. For example, Ebüzziya Tevfik in his memoirs clearly indicates that he and his colleagues (the first generation of Turkish journalists) succeeded in developing and promoting a public opinion (*efkar-ı umumiye*) that had to be respected and heeded, which was beneficial for the well-being of the Turkish nation. Ebüzziya Mehmed Tevfik, *Genç Osmanlılar Tarihi*, (İstanbul, 1973).
 26. For a political report commenting on the British elections as the manifestation of British public opinion, BOA, HR.SYS 582/20, 28 January 1892.
 27. For the permanent pressure on the Ottoman diplomatic corps in London, see the memoirs of Abdülhak Hamid and Esat Cemal (Paker). Abdülhak Hamid, *Abdülhak Hamid'in Hatıraları*; Paker, Esat Cemal, *Kırk Yıllık Hariciye Hatıraları*.
 28. For the tension the Ottoman representations abroad experienced due to the Armenian events and their international repercussions, see Abdülhak Hamid, *Ibid.*, pp. 217, 280. Abdülhak Hamid's negative views on the

- Armenian activities displays the immense effect of these events on the Ottoman diplomatic service. He endorsed a very defensive position on behalf of the Hamidian regime against the Armenian threat.
29. For an Ottoman tract accentuating the significance of public opinion in Britain and criticizing how humanitarianism had been hijacked by the biased propaganda of Turcophobe opinion leaders, see Halil Halid, *A Study in English Turcophobia*, (London, 1904).
 30. Halil Hamid, *The Diary of a Turk*, (London, 1903).
 31. Wasti, Tanvir. "Halil Hamid: An Anti-Imperialist Muslim Intellectual", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 29, No.3, 1993, pp. 559–579.
 32. For some puzzling repercussions of the attempted assassination of Abdülhamid organized by the Armenian committees on the Young Turk opponents of the regime, see Hanioglu, Şükrü. *Preparation for a Revolution*, p. 59. Also, for the ambivalent attitude of Young Turks towards Armenian revolutionaries, see Hanioglu, Şükrü. *Young Turks in Opposition*.
 33. For example, see the request of Salih Münir Pasha, the ambassador in Paris, regarding the prohibition of the entry of the newspapers *Echo de Paris* and *Aurore* into the Ottoman Empire, BOA, HR.SYS 2750–24, 4 April 1902.
 34. Hanioglu, Şükrü. *Young Turks in Opposition*, p. 126.
 35. See the folders BOA, HR.SYS 1788/1814.
 36. Ali Haydar Midhat, *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Hatıralarım*, (İstanbul, 2008), pp. 149–155.
 37. BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA 41/55, 1320 N. 21.
 38. See folders BOA, HR.SYS 1788 to 1797.
 39. For the reports on Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha, see the folder BOA, HR.SYS 1791, 1792 (correspondence between 14 December 1899 to 3 February 1902, with half of it dated from the year 1902).
 40. McMeekin, Sean, *The Berlin-Baghdad Express*, (Cambridge, 2010), p. 59.
 41. Hanioglu, Şükrü, *Ibid.*, p. 143.
 42. For a bleak portrait of Salih Münir Pasha, see Fesch, Paul, *Abdülhamid'in Son Günlerinde İstanbul*, (İstanbul, 1999), pp. 81–89.
 43. İsmail Kemal Bey, *The Memoirs of İsmail Kemal Bey*, (London, 1920), p. 150.
 44. Hanioglu, Şükrü. *The Young Turks in Opposition*, pp. 161–62.
 45. BOA, MV 174/62, 1331 Ra. 11. Also see Salih Munir, *Meclis-i Mebusan-ı Osmani Heyet-i Celilesine*, (İstanbul, 1908).
 46. Birinci, Ali, *Tarihin Gülgesinde: Meşahir-i Meçhuleden Birkaç Zat*, (İstanbul, 2001), p. 91.
 47. For a comparison, see the immense influence of Prince Eulenburg, "the best friend of the kaiser", on the kaiser, in Röhl, John C.G. "Philipp Eulenburg, the Kaiser's Best Friend", in idem, *The Kaiser and his Court*, (Cambridge,

- 1996), pp. 28–69. Apparently, there was no equivalent of Prince Eulenburg in the Ottoman diplomacy. Furthermore, such an influence and affinity is unimaginable given the different social status and social prestige of the ministries of foreign affairs in these two countries.
48. For Necib Melhame's short diplomatic career, see Kırmızı, Abdülhamid, "*Osmanlı Bürokrasisinde Gayrimüslimler*", p. 48.
 49. Davison, Roderick, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 212–13.
 50. "Sezai (Samipaşazade)", *Tanzimat'tan Bugüne Edebiyatçılar Ansiklopedisi*, (İstanbul, 2001), Vol. II, p. 735.
 51. Ali Haydar Midhat, *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Hatıralarım*, p. 176.
 52. Hanioglu, Şükrü, *Young Turks in Opposition*, p. 134.; Ateş, Sabri, *Tunalı Hilmi Bey*, p. 67.
 53. BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA, 30/62, 1316 Ş. 25.
 54. Şirin, İbrahim & Kılıç, Musa, "Halil Halid Efendi ve Londra Sefaretine Dair bir Layiha", *Ankara Üniversitesi Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi*, No. 18, 2005, p. 396. For more information on Halil Halid, see Öztürk, Kurtuluş. *Cambridge'de Bir Türk Eğitimci*, unpublished MA thesis, Marmara University, 2005.
 55. One striking illustration of the primacy of personal and kinship over ideology is the closeness of Mehmed Bey and his uncle, Mahmud Nedim Pasha, who was portrayed by the Young Ottomans as the arch-reactionary enemy of the Young Turks and of any progress whatsoever. Mehmed Bey, the most radical and an anarchist member of the Young Ottomans, developed good relations with his uncle after he became grand vizier. He supported his uncle and became his bridge to the Young Ottomans, who were frustrated by his appointment to the post of grand vizier. (See Mardin, Şerif, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, Princeton, 1962, pp. 62–63.)
 56. For example, for the "submission letter" of Mizancı Murad in 1897, see Emil, Birol, *Mizancı Murad Bey*, pp. 149–150.
 57. For the genesis and development of the Armenian imbroglio in the Ottoman diplomacy throughout the Hamidian era, see Küçük, Cevdet, *Osmanlı Diplomasisinde Ermeni Meselesinin Ortaya Çıkışı 1878–1897*, (İstanbul, 1994). Also see Şaşmaz, Musa, *British Policy and the Application of Reforms for Armenians in Eastern Anatolia 1877–1897*, (Ankara, 2000).
 58. For the follow-up on the problems Christians (and predominantly Armenians) faced as reported by British military consuls throughout Anatolia, see DeVore, Ronald Marvin, *British Military Consuls in Asia Minor 1878–1882*, unpublished dissertation, Indiana University, 1973. Also see Kieser, Hans-Lukas, *Der Verpasste Friede*, (Zürich, 2000).
 59. See BOA, HR.SYS 1132/1, 19 February 1903.
 60. "Hariciye Nezareti", *DİA*.

61. Demirel, Fatmagül, *Adliye Nezaretinin Kuruluşu ve Faaliyetleri (1876–1914)*, p. 54.
62. For example, see folders BOA, HR.SYS 1622 to 1636.
63. For example see BOA, DH.MKT, 474/60 (1319 Z. 29) for the communiqué of the *Dabiliye Nezareti* requesting the governorships to dispatch the *şekavet* incidents to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on a daily basis.
64. For example, the dispatch from the Athens embassy submitted to the Prime Ministry by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports the plans of the Armenian revolutionaries in Athens to instigate a rebellion in Istanbul. BOA, A.MKT. MHM 630/20, 1314 Ca 2.
65. See BOA, A.MKT.MHM 617/41, 1324 C 13. Terşabuk, who lived in Paris for several years and had just returned to Mersin where his relatives resided, was arrested with his relatives. An interrogation was conducted simultaneously by *Zabtiye*, *Dabiliye* (Governorship of Adana), and *Hariciye*, which requested an investigation of Terşabuk's possible political activities in France. All the correspondence was coordinated by the Prime Ministry. Also see Akyıldız, Ali, *Osmanlı Bürokrasisi ve Modernleşme*, p. 47.
66. Suny, Ronald Grigor, "Religion, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Armenians, Turks and the End of the Ottoman Empire", in *In God's Name: Genocide and Religion in the Twentieth Century*, Bartov, Omer & Mack, Phyllis (eds), (New York, 2001), pp. 24–5.
67. Mahmud Celaleddin Paşa, *Mirat-i Hakikat*, p. 80.
68. Mahmud Celaleddin, *Ibid.*, p. 80.
69. For Armenians, see BOA, Y.EE 167/7; for Serbians, see BOA, İ.HUS 54/1320.
70. BOA, HR.SYS, 2829/47, 15 February 1894.
71. For the report of ministerial undersecretary Artin Dadyan, see BOA, Y.PRK. EŞA 19/16, 1311 L. 4. Also see, BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA 9/69, 1306 N. 19.
72. Quoted in Ateş, Sabri, *Tunalı Hilmi Bey*, p. 59.
73. Quoted in Ateş, Sabri, *Ibid.*, p. 59.
74. For the dispatches reporting the murder of Sadi Carnot by an anarchist in June 1894, see BOA, HR.SYS 419/27, 4 July 1894. For the relay of measures taken against the anarchists in the United States by the Ottoman legation in Washington, see BOA, HR.SYS 419/26, 1 July 1894.
75. Schenk, H.G. *The Aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars*, (New York, 1967), pp. 214–21.
76. For the report dispatched from the embassy to London on cooperation between the Armenians and the Russian nihilists based in London, see BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA, 19/13, 1311 B. 5.
77. For the dispatch informing the amendment made to the Italian penal code to combat anarchism, see BOA, HR.SYS 1760/6, 7 July 1894.

78. For the Russian policing of the activities of the nihilists in the United States, see BOA, HR.SYS 1760/2, 21 October 1883.
79. BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA, 24/30, 1313 Za. 6.
80. BOA, HR.SYS 1759/3 (correspondences from 22 June 1898 to 18 April 1899).
81. BOA, HR.SYS 1822/8, 22 May 1885.
82. For a depiction of an Armenian informant visiting the Ottoman embassy to London, see Paker, Esat Cemal, *Kırk Yıllık Hariciye Hatıraları*, pp. 21–22.
83. BOA, HR-SYS 1760/18, 20 July 1898.
84. BOA, HR-SYS 1760/19, 21 July 1898.
85. Also see the documents collected in the aforementioned three-volume *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeni-Rus İlişkileri*.
86. The final report is to be found in the Prime Ministry archives at BOA, HR SYS. 1823/1, 30 September 1905.
87. “Cümlemin ma’lumu olduğu vechile tebe’a-i şabaneden bulunan Ermeniler mine’l kadim Hükümet-i Seniyyenin saye-i adl ü re’fetinde asude-nişin (ve) emn ü eman olarak her hususda dare-i emniyyetde ve mezheb ve ayin bahsinde de serbesti-i kamil içinde yaşamış.” Hüseyin Nazım Paşa, *Ermeni Olayları Tarihi*, (Ankara, 1998), Vol. I, p. 2.
88. Namık Kemal, “Vefa-yı Ahd”, *İbret*, 10 June 1288; excerpted in Aydoğdu, Nergiz Yılmaz & Kara, İsmail (ed.), *Namık Kemal, Bütün Makaleleri 1*, p. 60.
89. The rhetoric of tolerance was also buttressed and popularized by European Turcophiles with the onset of the Tanzimat as well. For early praise of “Turkish tolerance”, see M. A. Ubicini, *Letters on Turkey*, (London, 1856), Vol. II, pp. 28–34.
90. For similar language being used for the Balkan nationalists, see Mahmud Cemaleddin Pasha, *Mir’at-ı Hakikat*.
91. For the “annihilationist mentality” of the Tanzimat, see Reid, James, *Crisis of the Ottoman Empire: Prelude to Collapse 1839–1878*.
92. Abdülhak Hamid, *Ibid.*, pp. 245–46.
93. For a more open account of the distrust of an Ottoman diplomat towards Britain, France, and Russia in their double-dealing and their support and encouragement of militant Armenian nationalism, see the report on the Armenian problem prepared by Münir Süreyya Bey, *Ermeni Meselesinin Siyasi Tarihi*, (Ankara, 2001). Also see Salih Münir Pasha, *La Politique Orientale de la Russie*, (Lausanne, 1918).
94. For a strong dose of anti-imperialism already apparent in the Hamidian era in two diplomats serving in the London embassy, see Halil Halid, *The Crescent Versus the Cross*, (London, 1907). For the anti-imperialism of Abdülhak Hamid, see his play *Finten*, and particularly the introduction he wrote for it, published in *Servet-i Fünûn* for the first time in 1898. For the introduction to his play, see Abdülhak Hamid Tarhan, *Tiyatroları 3*, (İstanbul, 1998), pp. 156–59.

95. For a study written by an eminent diplomat that reconstructs the course of the history of Tanzimat diplomacy as the Ottoman efforts to resist Russian maneuvers by means of diplomacy, reform, and military force, see Salih Münir Pasha, *La Politique Orientale De La Russie*. In line with his contemporaries, Salih Münir Pasha does not develop a particular distaste towards Britain and France. For him, Russia was the principal enemy of the Ottomans and was behind the social and ethnic unrest within the Empire.
96. For a study of the official mind of the British Foreign Office based on the dispatches of the diplomats sent from St. Petersburg and Moscow to London, see Michael Hughes, *Inside the Enigma: British Officials in Russia, 1900–1939*, (London; Rio Grande, 1997).
97. Nevertheless, the quality of political reports of the Ottoman embassy is disappointing vis-à-vis the European political reports dispatched to their capitals. See the description of the Austro-Hungarian embassy in London in Bridge, F.R., *Great Britain and Austria-Hungary 1906–1914: A Diplomatic History*, (London, 1972), p. 22.
98. BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA 12/70, 1308 C. 1; 12/73, 1308 C. 6.
99. See the political report; BOA, HR.SYS 582/19, 1 December 1891.
100. BOA, HR.SYS 582/40, 22 April 1893.
101. Also see the views and remarks of Abdülhak Hamid, a diplomat with a very long tenure in the Ottoman embassy to London. Abdülhak Hamid, *Ibid.*, p. 250.
102. For the first Ottoman parliament convened in 1876, see Devereux, Robert, *The First Ottoman Constitutional Period*, (Baltimore, 1963).
103. See political reports dispatched from the St. Petersburg embassy, BOA, HR.SYS 1184/1 to 63; BOA, HR.SYS 1185/1 to 72.
104. For example, the regular articles Samipaşazade Sezai wrote in the Paris-based Young Turk journal *Şuray-ı Ümmet* after he joined Young Turks in Paris in 1901 are clearly in contrast to the dispassionate ambassadorial reports he sent from Madrid after 1908. His *Şuray-ı Ümmet* articles were heavily loaded with Turkish nationalism and abhorrence towards the “hypocrisy” of the “West”.
105. The very relation between writing, modernity, and bureaucracy is viewed by Herzfeld as follows: “Writing occupies a pivotal position in this symbolic constellation. The symbol, as well as the instrument of all bureaucratic power, it is, above all, the key to the reification of personal identity. Rather than being asked for a personal name as such, one is just as likely to be asked – especially in formal contexts – *pos gbrafese* (“how are you written”). Writing, too, is the instrument of fate’s irrevocable decrees.” Herzfeld,

- Michael, *The Social Production of Indifference*, p. 139. Apparently, writing no longer possesses the power it used to enjoy in the nineteenth century.
106. Urbach, Karina, *Bismarck's Favourite Englishman: Lord Odo Russell's Mission to Berlin*, (London, 1999), p. 25. The young diplomat Odo Russell was grateful to his mentors, Layard and Hammond, for their assistance and suggestions in developing his writing style.
 107. Cecil, Lamar, *The German Diplomatic Service 1871–1914*, p. 242. For the “especially good” handwriting of the British Foreign Office, see Drummond Wolf, Henry, *Rambling Recollections*, (London, 1908), Vol. I, p. 47.
 108. See Veled Çelebi, *Hatıralar: Tekke'den Meclis'e*, (İstanbul, 2009), p. 28.
 109. The examination made by the state to recruit the graduates of the *riiştîyes* of Süleymaniye and Sultan Ahmed to various *kalems*, as accounted by Aşçı İbrahim Dede, was to measure the level of knowledge of the students and to observe the elegance of their handwriting. For Aşçı İbrahim Dede, the students of Süleymaniye were better in terms of knowledge but the students of Sultan Ahmed were better in terms of their elegant handwriting. One exception among the students of Süleymaniye was Ziya (the future Ziya Pasha), who had an elegant handwriting. Aşçı İbrahim Dede, *Aşçı Dede'nin Hatıraları*, (İstanbul, 2008), Vol. I, p. 183. Aşçı İbrahim Dede was recruited to the military as a civil official after this examination.
 110. The quasi-Marxian analysis of imperialism, which was derived from Hobson's critique of imperialism, takes it for granted that the international prerogatives of the European powers were economically motivated and determined. However, there is no empirical data that verifies this Marxian assumption. Many studies conclude that it was not economic motivations but politico-military motivations that triggered high imperialism and the economic benefits of imperialism. For some classic studies on high imperialism, see Fieldhouse, D.K., *Economics and Empire, 1830–1914*, (Ithaca, 1973); Hopkins A.G. & Cain P.J. *British Imperialism 1688–2000*; Gallagher J., Robinson R., Deny, A., *Africa and the Victorians*, (London, 1981); Cain, P.J., & Harrison, Mark, “Introduction”, *Imperialism*, (London; New York, 2001), Vol. I, pp. 1–31. For the emergence of the theory that associates imperialism with economic interests, see Koebner, Richard & Schmidt, H.D., *Imperialism: The Story and Significance of a Word 1840–1960*, (Cambridge, 1964).
 111. Steiner, Zara, *The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy 1898–1914*, (Cambridge, 1969), p. 184.
 112. Steiner, Zara, “Introduction”, in *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, Zara Steiner (ed.), p. 18.

113. Platt, D.C.M., *The Cinderella Service: British Consuls Since 1825*, (New York, 1971), p. 104.
114. Platt, D.C.M. *Ibid.*, p. 107.
115. Quoted in Platt, D.C.M. *Ibid.*, p. 22.
116. Steiner, Zara, "Introduction", in *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, Zara Steiner (ed.), p. 15. Also see Wels, C.B., "The Foreign Policy Institutions in the Dutch Republic and the Kingdom of the Netherlands 1579 to 1980", in *Ibid.*, p. 370.
117. Hayne, M.B., *The French Foreign Office and the Origins of the First World War 1898–1914*, (Oxford, 1993), p. 150; Steiner, Zara, *The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy 1898–1914*, p. 185.
118. The consulates operating principally to assist and protect merchants abroad were not only secondary-level posts, but also the European diplomatic service was established on the complete separation of these two services. The separation between the two services ended only with reforms initiated on the eve of World War I but were not completed until World War II. See Cecil, Lamar, *The German Diplomatic Service 1871–1914*, p. 18; Maisel, Ephraim, *The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy 1919–1926*, (Brighton, 1994), p. 24. For the British consulates abroad and their inferior positions, see Platt, D.C.M., *The Cinderella Service: British Consuls Since 1825*.
119. Williamson Jr., Samuel R., *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War*, (Basingstoke; New York, 1991), p. 41.
120. For the economic interests of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire, see Bridge, F.R., "The Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire", in *Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire*, Marian Kent (ed.), (London; Portland, 1996), pp. 31–51.
121. DeSantis, Hugh & Heinrichs, Waldo, "The Department of State and American Foreign Policy", in *The Times Survey of the Foreign Ministries of the World*, Zara Steiner (ed.), p. 582. The nineteenth-century State Department of the United States was a refuge of European aristocratic manners. It remained ineffective and amateurish throughout the nineteenth century. It was only (partially) professionalized and modernized in the first half of the twentieth century. With its aristocratic and dandy characters, the State Department was ignored and overlooked. Also see Heinrichs, Waldo, *American Ambassador: Joseph C. Grew and the Development of the United States Diplomatic Tradition*, (Oxford, 1986); De Santis, Hugh, *The Diplomacy of Silence*, (Chicago, 1981); Schulzinger, Robert D., *The Making of the Diplomatic Mind: The Training, Outlook and Style of American United States Foreign Service Officers, 1908–1931*, (Middleton, 1975); Ilchman, Warren Frederick, *Professional Diplomacy in the United States 1779–1939*, (Chicago, 1961).

122. We can only say this based on embassy reports. Abdülhak Hamid (although in 1923) writes as follows: "(In London) there exists one certain Foreign Office. The ruler changes, the cabinets change, parties change and evolve but Foreign Office is always what it was and what it will be. The essence of politics is pursuit of interests. Foreign Office rules over the palace, the House of Lords, the House of Commons, trade and even navy and the dominions. It rules England." Abdülhak Hamid, *Ibid.*, p. 184. It has to be noted that from ambassadorial dispatches, no such view can be inferred. The same is true for Sami Paşazade Sezai whose articles in *Şuray-ı Ümmet* reflect views poles apart from his ambassadorial dispatches.
123. The genre of diplomatic history is very much a product of the nineteenth century unlike other genres of history (social history, history of mentalities, economic history, etc.). The standard diplomatic history narrative also lacks the assumption of the "permanence of state interests" which are superior to the orientation of cabinets. The analysis of the "permanence of state interests" will appear with the domination of a full-blown materialistic and deterministic perspective over the social sciences in the twentieth century. Likewise, the classical diplomatic history does not recognize any domestic or extra-political sources in the making of foreign policy. *Primat der Aussenpolitik* was the essential assumption of the conventional diplomatic history in its classic age. It is interesting to observe that this perspective was congruent with the paradigms of the makers of foreign policy in the nineteenth century. For the first classics of diplomatic history at its best, see Temperley, Harold, *England and the Near East: The Crimea*, (London, 1936); Temperley, Harold, *The Foreign Policy of Canning 1822–1827*, (London, 1925); Gooch, G.P., *Before the War: Studies in Diplomacy*, (London, 1938), Gooch G.P, *Studies in Diplomacy and Statecraft*, (London, 1942); Webster, Charles, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh 1815–1822*, (London, 1925); Webster, Charles, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston 1830–1841*, (London, 1951); Mowat, R.B., *A History of European Diplomacy 1815–1914*, (London, 1927); Crawley, C.W., *The Question of Greek Independence: A Study of British Policy in the Near East, 1821–1833*, (Cambridge, 1930).
124. For the escalation of the rhetoric of anti-imperialism of the Young Turks in their last years of opposition, see Hanioglu, Şükrü, *Preparation for a Revolution*, pp. 302–305.
125. For the anti-imperialist discourse of the Young Turks, see Brummett, Palmira, *Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press 1908–1911*, (New York, 2000); Aydın, Cemil, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia*, (New York, 2007). For a Young Turk anti-imperialistic tract, see Ahmed Rıza, *La Faillite Morale de la Politique Occidentale en Orient*, (Paris, 1922).

126. For some prominent studies on the approach of World War I, see Fischer, Fritz, *Germany's Aims in the First World War*, (New York, 1967); Stevenson, David, *Armaments and the Coming of War*, (Oxford; New York, 1996); Joll, James, *The Origins of the First World War*, (London; New York, 1992).
127. Hayreddin Nedim, *Vesaik-i Taribhiye ve Siyasiyye Tettebbuatı*, (Dersaadet, 1326), Vol. II, p. 76.
128. Hayreddin Nedim, *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 90.

Chapter 5 The mentalities and dispositions of the diplomatic service: the great transformation

1. Davison, Roderick, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856–1876*, p. 9.
2. Ahmed Lûtfi Efendi, *Vak'anüvîs Ahmed Lûtfî Efendi Tarihi*, p. 1026.
3. Artinian, Vartan, *The Armenian Constitutional System in the Ottoman Empire 1839–1863*, (İstanbul, 1969), p. 106; Davison, Roderick, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856–1876*, pp. 125–26; Davison, Roderick, “Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian–Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century”, *American Historical Review*, 59:4 (July 1954), pp. 844–864. Davison, Roderick, “The Millets as Agents of Change in the Nineteenth Century Ottoman Empire”, in Braude, Benjamin & Lewis, Bernard (eds), *Christians and the Jews in the Ottoman Empire Vol. I*, pp. 319–337.
4. For the ambassadors assigned to various post in the late Ottoman Empire, see Kuneralp, Sinan, *Son Dönem Osmanlı Erkan ve Ricali (1839–1922): Proposografik Rehber*, (İstanbul, 1999).
5. For Abdülhamid’s foreign policy, see Yasamee, F.A.K., *Ottoman Diplomacy: Abdülhamid II and the Great Powers 1878–1888*, (İstanbul, 1996); Deringil, Selim, *The Ottomans, The Turks and World Power Politics*, (İstanbul, 2000); Özcan, Azmi, *Pan-Islamism: Indian Muslims, Ottomans and Britain 1877–1924*, (Leiden; Boston; Köln, 1997); Engin, Vahdettin, *II. Abdülhamid ve Dış Politika*, (İstanbul, 2005); Eraslan, Cezmi, *II Abdülhamid ve İslam Birliği*, (İstanbul, 1992); Kuneralp, Sinan, *Studies on Ottoman Diplomatic History*, (İstanbul, 1987) (5 volumes); Georgeon, François, *Sultan Abdülhamid*, pp. 116–147, 249–277.
6. Kuneralp, Sinan, *Son Dönem Osmanlı Erkan ve Ricali (1839–1922): Proposografik Rehber*.
7. For the information provided to the sultan from the embassies and the ministry, see BOA, Y.PRK.HR, BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA.
8. See Qutaert, Donald, *Ottoman Reform and Agriculture in Anatolia 1876–1908*, unpublished dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles 1973; Keskin, Özkan, *Orman Ma'adin Nezareti'nin Kuruluşu ve Faaliyetleri*,

- unpublished dissertation, Istanbul University, 2005; Dursun, Selçuk, *Forest and the State*, unpublished dissertation, Sabancı University, 2007.
9. See Griffiths, Merwin Albert, *The Reorganization of the Ottoman Army Under Abdülhamid (1880–1897)*, unpublished dissertation, University of California, 1968.
 10. Bond, Brian, *War and Society in Europe 1870–1970*, (Stroud, 1998), pp. 42–44.
 11. For the emerging “spirit” of the fin de siècle, see Hughes, H. Stuart, *Consciousness and Society*, (New Brunswick, 2002). For the military build-up in Europe and its repercussions, see Stevenson, David, *Armaments and the Coming of War: Europe 1904–1914*, (Oxford, 1996); Herrmann, David G, *The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War*, (Princeton, 1997).
 12. For a biography of İbrahim Edhem, Galip Kemali’s uncle, see Gürel, Naz Rana, *İbrahim Edbem Pertev Paşa*, (İstanbul, 2004). İbrahim Edhem also briefly served as a secretary in the embassy to Berlin.
 13. Söylemezoğlu, Kemali, *Atina Sefareti (1913–1916)*, (İstanbul, 1946), p. 83.
 14. Söylemezoğlu, Galip Kemali, *Hariciye Hizmetinde Kırk Sene*, pp. 285–86.
 15. Söylemezoğlu, Galip Kemali, *Ibid.*, pp. 126–28.
 16. Interestingly, the annal of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 1964–5 provides detailed information on the Ottoman insignia, medallions, and forms of address which contradicts the official line of the culture of the Republican bureaucracy. See Aral, Hamid (ed.), *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Yıllığı (1964–1965)*, (Ankara, 1967).
 17. Söylemezoğlu, Galip Kemali, *Hariciye Hizmetinde.*, pp. 78–79.
 18. Söylemezoğlu, Galip Kemali, *Atina Sefareti (1913–1916)*, p. 40.
 19. Wearing a hat was regarded as tantamount to apostasy among Muslims in the nineteenth century. When Muhmmah Abduh, in response to petitioners from the Muslim community of Transvaal, issued a fatwa known as the Transvaal fatwa permitting the wearing of a hat as long as it was a necessity he caused considerable stir and controversy although he only legitimized it on the grounds of necessity. Kerr, Malcolm, *Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal Theories of Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rasbid Rida*, (Berkeley; Los Angeles, 1966), pp. 145–46.
 20. Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, *Siyasi Anılar*, (Ankara, 1976), p. 237.
 21. İbnülemin Mahmut Kemal İnal, *Son Sadrazamlar*, Vol. IV, p. 1798. For the depiction of the unusually Westernized habits and lifestyle of İbrahim Hakkı Paşa, see Findley, Carter, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom*, pp. 195–200.
 22. The abhorrence for the hat can only be compared with the uneasiness shown towards pigs. For the symbolism of dirtiness (*murdar*) and the anthropology of the aversion to pigs and hats, see Douglas, Mary, *Purity and Danger*, (London; New York, 1965).
 23. Söylemezoğlu, Galip Kemali. *Hariciye Hizmetinde*, pp. 202–204.

24. Abdülhak Hamid, *Abdülhak Hamid'in Hatıraları*, p. 64.
25. Abdülhak Hamid, *Ibid.*, p. 64.
26. Abdülhak Hamid, *Ibid.*, p. 387.
27. For the 1906 reform in the British Foreign Office, see Steiner, Zara, *The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy 1898–1914*, (Cambridge, 1969), pp. 76–78. For the 1907 reforms in the French Foreign Office, see Hayne, M.B., *The French Foreign Office and the Origins of the First World War 1898–1914*, (Oxford, 1993), pp. 144–70.
28. Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu, *L'Assassinat d'un Peuple*, (Roma, 1920). For its Turkish translation, idem, *Yok Edilmek İstenen Millet*, (İstanbul, 1957).
29. Şükrü Hanioglu, *Preparing for a Revolution, Young Turks, 1902–1908*, p. 303. Also see, Emil, Birol, *Mizancı Murad Bey*, pp. 137–38.
30. Ahmed Rıza, *La Faillite Morale de la Politique Occidentale en Orient*; Halil Halid, *A Study in English Turcophobia*; Halil Hamid, *The Diary of a Turk*, 1903.
31. See Söylemezoğlu, Galip Kemali, *Hariciye Hizmetinde Otuz Sene*, Vol. IV, (İstanbul, 1955). For the level of degradation of the once courtly high-ranking diplomatic corps by 1921, see a “poem” written by the ex-Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, Asım, as quoted by Söylemezoğlu. “*Dünya değişirde Türk değişmez/Bak vakti hazerde bir kebuter !...Yareb bu necibi Aliosman.../Olsun mu yarın esiri Yunan ?/Sönsün mü ocağı şanlı Türkün/Olsun mu o nam karini nışyan*” Söylemezoğlu, Galip Kemali, *Ibid.*, pp. 7–8.
32. Söylemezoğlu, Galip Kemali, *Başımıza Gelenler: Yakın Bir Mazinin Hatıraları*, (İstanbul, 1939), p. 6.
33. Samipaşazade Sezai, “Riya”, Tanin, 4 October 1333/1917, in *Samipaşazade Sezai Bütün Eserleri*, Vol III, pp. 313–16.
34. “Sezai (Samipaşazade)”, *Tanzimat'tan Bugüne Edebiyatçılar Ansiklopedisi*, Vol. II, p. 735. For some of his anti-Western articles published in Tanin, see Kerman, Zeynep (ed.), *Sami Paşazade Sezai*, p. 14.
35. Samipaşazade Sezai, “Riya”, Tanin, 4 October 1333/1917, in *Samipaşazade Sezai Bütün Eserleri*, Vol III, pp. 516–520.
36. Abdülhak Hamid, *Abdülhak Hamid'in Hatıraları*, p. 60.
37. For a biography of Ahmet Hikmet Müftüoğlu, see Tevetöğlu, Fethi, *Büyük Türkçü Müftüoğlu Ahmed Hikmet*, (Ankara, 1951).
38. For a biography of Enis Behiç Koryürek written by Fethi Tevetöğlu, see Koryürek, Enis Behiç, *Miras ve Güneşin Ölümü*, (İstanbul, 1951).
39. The same observation is equally valid for Ahmet Hikmet. While half of his literary works are imbued with Turkist themes and crude nationalism, such as *Gönül Hanım* and *Çağlayanlar*, the other half of his works elaborate themes of very personal angst and quests reflecting the sensitivities of the modern urban individual, such as his short stories collected in *Haristan*.

- Nevertheless, some of his stories collected in *Haristan* and published after 1908 also involve themes such as the mutual exclusiveness of West and East and the equating (and charging) of Westernized cosmopolitanism with decadence and corruption.
40. Quoted in İbnülemin Mahmud Kemal İnal, *Osmanlı Devrinde Son Sadrazamlar*, (İstanbul, 1945), pp. 1796–99.
 41. Also for the “liberal” interpretation of Mehmet Rifat Pasha with regard to veiling and education of women, see Muhammed Ferid, *Mısır Mısırlılarıdır*, (İstanbul, 2007), p. 90.
 42. The cosmopolitan Halid Ziya is hardly free of nationalist instincts. His memoirs reveal how the strain between Turks and non-Muslims was pivotal in the formation of his political opinions. Experiencing the social worlds of İzmir and the intellectual milieu of Istanbul, he assumes a nationalist outlook. See Uşaklıgil, Halid Ziya, *Kırk Yıl*, pp. 114–19.
 43. Uşaklıgil, Halid Ziya, *Ibid.*, Vol.V, pp. 177–84.
 44. Kara Schemsi, *Turcs et Arméniens Devant l'histoire: Nouveaux Témoignages Russes et Turcs sur les Atrocités*, (Genève, 1919).
 45. Atabinen, Rechid Saffet, *Contributions Turques a la Sécurité et a la Civilization Méditerranéennes*, (İstanbul, 1950); Atabinen, Rechit Saffet, *Les Apports Turcs dans le Peuplement et la Civilization de l'Europe Orientale*, (n.p., 1952).
 46. BOA, HR.SAID, 24/3, 3 M. 1331.
 47. For a biography (without any references) of Reşid Safvet, see Çelik Gülersoy, “Ölümünün 29. Yılında Reşid Safvet Atabinen”, *Tarih ve Toplum*, February 1994, No. 122, pp. 68–73.
 48. Lieven, Dominic, *Russia's Rulers Under the Old Regime*, p. 167.
 49. Boyar, Ebru, *Ottomans, Turks and the Balkans*, pp. 87–88.
 50. Safveti Ziya, *Salon Küşelerinde*, p. 14.
 51. Safveti Ziya, *Salon Küşelerinde*, p. 11. (in his preface to the novel).
 52. Ömer Seyfeddin's short stories were also a good demonstration of “the politicization of the personal” and “the politicization of every sphere of life”. For example, see his Fon Sadrişayn'ın Karısı, (*Bütün Eserler*, İstanbul, 1999, Vol. II, pp. 191–202), Nakarat (Vol. III, pp. 17–34), Bir Çocuk Aleko (Vol. IV, pp. 310–327).
 53. The outward Westernization was not accompanied by the Westernization of the private lives of the Ottoman upper classes. For a vivid portrayal of the intimate lives and family relations of Ottoman dignitaries, see Melek Hanım, *Haremden Mabrem Anılar*.
 54. For the politicization and nationalization of consumer culture and personal realms in the late Hamidian era, see Frierson, Elizabeth, “Cheap and Easy: The Creation of Consumer Culture in the Later Ottoman Empire”, in *Consumption Studies and the History of the Ottoman Empire, 1550–1922*, in Donald Qutaert (ed.), (New York, 2000), pp. 201–43.

55. Safveti Ziya, *Adab-ı Muâzeret Hasbihalleri*, (Ankara, 1927), p. 3.
56. Also see Aydın, Cemil, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia*; Doğan, Atila, *Osmanlı Aydınları ve Sosyal Darwinizm*, (İstanbul, 2006).
57. Ahmed Rüstem Bey, *La Guerre Mondiale et La Question Turco-Arménienne*, (Bern, 1918).
58. During his service in Washington, he continuously urged Westerners to contextualize the Ottoman military measures. Publishing an opinion piece in *Washington Evening Star*, he bluntly and quite undiplomatically asked how the American government would react to “American Negroes if they conspired with the Japanese to invade the United States”. He further asked, “how many of them would be left alive to tell the tale?” *Papers Relating to Foreign Relations of the United States, the Lansing Papers, 1914–1920*, Washington, 1939–1940, Vol. I, pp. 70–71. Quoted in Roger R. Trask, *The United States Response to Turkish Nationalism and Reform, 1914–1939*, (Minneapolis, 1971), pp. 18–19.
59. Ahmed Rüstem Bey, *Ibid.*, pp. 72–75.
60. Ahmed Rüstem Bey, *Ibid.*, pp. 70–72.
61. Ahmed Rüstem Bey, *Ibid.*, p. 69.
62. Ahmed Rıza, *La Faillite Morale de la Politique Occidentale en Orient*.
63. Hayreddin Bey, *Vesaik-i Tarihiyye ve Siyasiyye*, (İstanbul, 1326), Vol. I, p. 94.
64. Hayreddin Bey, *Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 11–12.
65. Hayreddin Bey, *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 6.
66. Hayreddin Bey, *1270 Kırım Muharebesinin Tarih-i Siyasîsi*, (Dersaadet, 1326).
For similar remarks regarding Ottoman–Russian relations, see Lütfi Simavi, *Ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 44–47.
67. Salih Münir Paşa, *La Politique Orientale de la Russie*, p. 80; Salih Münir Paşa, *Diplomasi: Malumat-ı Esasiye*, (İstanbul, 1328), p. 14.
68. Salih Münir Paşa, *Diplomasi: Malumat-ı Esasiye*, p. 9.
69. Lütfi Simavi, *Sultan Mehmed Reşad Hanın ve Halifenin Sarayında Gördüklerim*, Vol. I, p. 10.
70. Lütfi Simavi, *Ibid.*, Vol II, pp. 11, 72, 83.
71. Lütfi Simavi, *Ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 6, 68, 83.
72. For the monarchial and imperial ritualism, see the landmark book, Cannadine, David, & Price, Simon, (eds), *Rituals of Royalty: Power and Ceremonial in Traditional Society*, (Cambridge, 1992). Also see Fujitani, T., *Splendid Monarchy*, (Berkeley, 1998); Burke, Peter, *The Fabrication of Louis XIV*, (New Haven, 1992).
73. For example, see Lütfi Simavi, *Ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 10, 11–12, 50, 64.
74. Lütfi Simavi, *Ibid.*, pp. 123–24.
75. Fujitani interprets the transformation of Japanese imperial ritualism along the same lines. For Fujitani, the Japanese monarchy turned into a symbol of the nation and the Japanese political community in the making. In the

- image of the emperor “the leaders of the Meiji regime (aimed to channel) the longings of the people for a better world and the inchoate and scattered sense of identity as a people in the direction of modern nationalism.” Fujitani, T., *Ibid.*, p. 9. For Carol Gluck’s analysis of the image of the emperor, see Gluck, Carol, *Japan’s Modern Myths*, pp. 73–101.
76. Lütfi Simavi, *Ibid.*, pp. 81–84.
 77. Lütfi Simavi, *Ibid.*, p. 159.
 78. For Lütfi Simavi’s pedigree, see Gökman, Muzaffer, *Sedat Simavi: Hayatı ve Eserleri*, (İstanbul, 1970), p. 1.
 79. Lütfi Simavi, *Ibid.*, pp. 26–27, 37–38.
 80. Heller, Joseph, *British Policy Towards the Ottoman Empire 1908–1914*, (London; Portland, 1983), p. 26.
 81. Heller, Joseph, *Ibid.*, pp. 153–54.
 82. Çankaya, Ali, *Ibid.*, vol. III, pp. 93–96.
 83. For Mehmet Rifat’s pro-Entente credentials, also see the remarks of Mahmud Şevket Pasha in his memoirs *Sadrızam ve Harbiye Nazırı Mahmud Şevket Pasha’nın Günlüğü*, (İstanbul, 1988), p. 48.
 84. Quoted in Kieser, Hans-Lukas, *Türklüğe İbtida*, (İstanbul, 2008), p. 78.
 85. For the cumulative radicalization of military officers throughout the Hamidian era, see Akmeşe, Handan Nezir, *The Birth of Modern Turkey: The Ottoman Military and the March to World War I*, (London, 2005). For the intellectual trajectory and evolution of Ebubekir Hazım, see Tepeyran, Ebubekir Hazım, *Zalimane Bir İdam Hükmi*, (İstanbul, 1997). Compare and contrast this account with the account conveying his experiences in the Hamidian era. Tepeyran, Ebubekir Hazım, *Hatıralar*, (İstanbul, 1998). A similar observation can be made with regard to Ahmed İhsan, the owner and publisher of *Servet-i Fünun*. His memoirs display an ideological and intellectual evolution before events crystallized in 1908. For his avid nationalist rhetoric, see Tokgöz, Ahmed İhsan, *Matbuat Hatıralarım*, (İstanbul, 1993), p. 205.
 86. Söylemezoğlu, Galip Kemali, *Atina Sefareti*, pp. 82–83; Lütfi Simavi, *Sultan Mehmed Reşad*, p. 159; Abdülhak Hamid, *Abdülhak Hamid’in*, p. 352.
 87. Ahmad, Feroz, “Great Britain’s Relations with the Young Turks 1908–1914”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 4, July 1966, pp. 302–329; Berridge, G.R., *Gerald Fitzmaurice (1865–1939), Chief Dragoman of the British Embassy in Turkey*, (Leiden; Boston, 2007), pp. 133–144.
 88. For the national radicalization of the German intellectual elite, see Verhey, Jeffrey, *The Spirit of 1914*, (Cambridge, 2000), p. 231. For the national radicalization of the French intellectual elite, see Hanna, Martha, *The Mobilization of Intellect*, (Cambridge, 1996). For “radicalization” as a reaction

- to conventionalism and order, see George Mosse, *The Image of Man*, (Oxford, 1998); Eksteins, Modris, *Rites of Spring*, (New York, 1990); Gentile, Emilio, "The Struggle for Modernity: Echoes of the Dreyfus Affair in Italian Political Culture, 1898–1912", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 33, No. 4, October 1998, pp. 497–511; Gentile, Emilio, "Fascism as Political Religion", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 25, No. 2/3, May–June 1990, pp. 229–251; Berghaus, Günter, *Futurism and Politics*, (Providence; Oxford, 1996). For a book overviewing the radicalization as a generational attribute, Wohl, Robert, *The Generation of 1914*, (Cambridge, 1979).
89. For the aggressive nationalist literature prevalent after the Balkan Wars, some written by authors with clear Unionist sympathies but others written by authors aloof from the Unionist intellectual environment, see Aksakal, Mustafa, *The Ottoman Road to 1914*, (Cambridge, 2008), pp. 19–41.
 90. Among many others, see Hobden, Stephen & Hobson, John, M. (eds), *Historical Sociology of International Relations*, (Cambridge, 2002); Wyn Jones, Richard (ed.), *Critical Theory & World Politics*, (Boulder, 2001); Wendt, Alexander, *Social Theory of International Relations*, (Cambridge, 1999); Smith, Steve & Booth, Ken & Zalewski, Marysa (eds), *International Theory: Positivism & Beyond*, (Cambridge, 1996); Onuf, Nicholas, *World of Our Making*, (Columbia, 1989); Katzenstein, Peter (ed.), *The Culture of National Security*, (New York, 1996).
 91. Wendt, Alexander, *Social Theory of International Relations*, (Cambridge, 1999), p. 1.
 92. For the role of the perception of threat determined by the ideological backgrounds and dispositions of the foreign policy decision-making elite, see Haas, Mark L, *The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics 1789–1989*, (Ithaca, 2005).
 93. For example, for an interesting text exalting the German social and political order of Germany during World War I written by the General Director of Secondary Schools after visiting Germany as quoted in Gencer, Mustafa, *Jöntürk Modernizmi ve "Alman Rubu"*, (İstanbul, 2003), pp. 114–15, see (Taylan) Muslihiddin Adil, *Alman Hayat-ı İrfanı*, (İstanbul, 1333). For other pamphlets exalting the achievements of Prussianism and Germany's military preparedness just before World War I, see Aksakal, Mustafa, *The Ottoman Road to War in 1914*, pp. 31, 33. For Enver's admiration of Germany see Trumpener, Ulrich, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire 1914–1918*, (Princeton, 1968), p. 18.
 94. For the invention of "total war" in World War I in Germany, see Chickering, Roger & Förster, Sig (eds), *Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914–1918*, (Cambridge, 2000).

95. This is not the place to discuss the multifaceted and controversial historiography of late imperial Germany. Nevertheless, the approaches of Wehler and Mommsen were previously criticized. Some studies enumerated above are valuable readings that attest to the transformation of the German political regime within. Eley, Geoff, *Reshaping the German Right*, (Ann Arbor, 1990); Chichering, Roger, *We Who Feel Most German*, (London; Boston, 1984); Fritzsche, Peter, *A Nation of Fliers: German Aviation and the Popular Imagination*, (Cambridge, 1992); Repp, Kevin, *Reformers, Critics and the Paths of German Modernity*, (Cambridge, 2000).
96. For the impact of German militarism and effective governance, see Gencer, Mustafa, *Jöntürk Modernizmi ve "Alman Rubu"*.
97. Wohl, Robert, *The Generation of 1914*, p. 5
98. Studies of generations are numerous although these studies of generations did not enable the conceptualization of generation as a historical and sociological category. For locating generations within a social framework, see Mannheim, Karl, "The Problem of Generations", in *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge*, (London, 1952); Eisenstadt, Shmuel, *From Generation to Generation: Age Groups and Social Structure*, (London, 1956). For a review of studies taking generation as a proper sociological category, see Kertzer, David, "Generation as a Sociological Problem", *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 9, 1983, pp. 125–149. For some remarkable studies on certain "generations" see Spitzer, Alan, *The French Generation of 1820*, (Princeton, 1987); Wohl, Robert, *The Generation of 1914*; Ekstins, Modris, *Rites of Spring*; Owsam, Doug, *Born at the Right Time*, (Toronto; Buffalo, 1997). Both Spitzer and Wohl emphasized the extraordinary and exceptional nature of the generations they studied. Both the French generation of 1820 and the European generation of 1914 were revolutionary and displayed very distinctive features that easily distinguished them from their preceding and succeeding generations.
99. Wohl, Robert, *Ibid.*, p. 5.
100. Wien, Peter, *Iraqi Arab Nationalism: Authoritarian, Totalitarian and Pro-Fascist Inclinations 1932–1941*, (London; New York, 2006), p. 16.
101. Wien, Peter, *Ibid.*, p. 16. The case was no different in the Japanese modernization. "This generation was 'new' relative to the 'old men of Meiji' who had engineered the revolutionary reforms of the Restoration; specifically, they were 'the first generation of Japanese to attend the new Western-oriented schools of higher learning.' Reaching maturity in the decade before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95, this generation struggled with the fundamental problem of national identity and of the proper use to be made of the Japanese heritage in the process of modernization." Smith II, Henry Dewitt, *Japan's First Student Radicals*,

(Cambridge, 1972), p. ix. Also see Pyle, Kenneth B, *The New Generation in Meiji Japan: Problems of Cultural Identity, 1885–1995*, (Stanford, 1969).

102. For the forging and dissolution of class/status groups in the course of time, see Batatu, Hanna, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq*, (Princeton, 1978).

Chapter 6 The European patterns and the Ottoman foreign office

1. Neilson, Keith, *Strategy and Supply: The Anglo-Russian Alliance 1914–1917*, (London; Boston, 1984), p. 18.
2. Nicolson, Harold, *Peacemaking 1919*, (London, 1933), pp. 24–25
3. For Wickham Steed, see Macmillan, Margaret, *Peacemakers*, (London, 2003), pp. 123–125. Wickham Steed was not a member of the “old school” like Harold Nicolson. Originally a journalist, in the course of World War I, he subscribed to the cause of the Slavs. A Germanophobe, he advocated the collapse of the Habsburg Empire and supported the dissidents of the Habsburg Empire from various non-German nationalities. His views became very influential in the higher echelons of Foreign Office at the end of the war.
4. The settlement of the Paris Peace Conference was long taken as the cause of the miseries of the 1930s. See Fromkin, David, *A Peace to End All Peace*, (New York, 1989). Recently, Margaret Macmillan attempted to exonerate the Paris Peace Conference from disparagement and rehabilitated it. She criticized the view that sees the conference as the main culprit in the developments that took place in no less than ten to fifteen years. Macmillan, Margaret, *Peacemakers*. For Lloyd George’s own views on the conference, see Lloyd George, David, *The Truth About Peace Treaties*, (London, 1938).
5. Maisel, Ephraim, *The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy 1919–1926*, pp. 64–66.
6. Nicolson, Harold, *Peacemaking 1919*, (London, 1933), p. 7.
7. Nicolson, Harold, *Ibid.*, p. 5.
8. Nicolson, Harold, *Ibid.*, p. 4.
9. Almost all the diplomatic participants of the Paris Peace Conference had the image of the Congress of Vienna in their minds. For example, Sir James Headlam-Morley, who initially worked in the Propaganda Department during World War I and joined the British Delegation at the Conference, noted in his diaries, “It is very interesting and amusing here. On the whole, I am coming to have much higher respect for the Congress of Vienna than I used to have.” Sir James Headlam-Morley, *A Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference*,

- (London, 1972), p. 17. Also see the introduction of Harold Nicolson to his book *The Congress of Vienna*, (London, 1946). Evidently, the Congress of Vienna, the triumph of the "party of order" against the revolutionary tide symbolized an impressive illustration of the old school gentlemanly diplomacy which established the peace and order for the upcoming half a century before the rise of Prussia in the 1860s. The experience of the Paris Peace Conference hardly accomplished such enduring peaceful results.
10. Mayer, Arno, *Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking*, (New York, 1967), p. 12. Zara Steiner, one of the foremost diplomatic historians, also contrasts Vienna of 1815 and Paris of 1919. Steiner, Zara, *The Lights that Failed*, (Oxford, 2005), pp. 16–17.
 11. Also see Mayer, Arno, *Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917–18*, (New York, 1973).
 12. For the transformation of the diplomatic corps after World War I, also see Steiner, Zara, "The Foreign Office Reforms 1919–1921", *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Mar. 1974), pp. 131–156.
 13. Nitti, Francesco S., *Peaceless Europe*, (London, 1922), p. 3.
 14. Hamilton, Keith & Langhorne, Richard, *The Practice of Diplomacy*, (London; New York, 1995), p. 135.
 15. Hamilton, Keith & Langhorne, Richard, *Ibid.*, pp. 79, 82, 84.
 16. Otte, T.G., "Old Diplomacy: Reflections on the Foreign Office before 1914", *Contemporary British History*, Vol. 18, No. 3, Autumn 2004, p. 31. For a "defense" of the "old diplomacy" against the claim that secret diplomacy was a major component of it, see Temperley, Harold, "Secret Diplomacy from Canning to Grey", *Cambridge Historical Journal*, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1938, pp. 1–32. Also, for a contemporary critical account and assessment of the "old diplomacy" and the "new diplomacy", see Mowat R.B., *Diplomacy and Peace*, (London, 1935). Especially see pp. 7–9, 13–17, 46–63.
 17. For an insider's account, see Ponsonby, Arthur, *Democracy and Diplomacy*, (London, 1915). The book is a severe criticism of what will be known as the "old diplomacy". Ponsonby, who is best known for his frequently quoted phrase "when war is declared, truth is the first casualty" and a sincere believer in this phrase, opposed World War I from the beginning and blamed the diplomacy of a minority for sealing the fate of millions in the war. Also see, Ponsonby, Arthur, *Falsehood in War-Time*, (London, 1928).
 18. Steiner, Zara, *The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898–1914*, pp. 67–68.
 19. For the parliamentary and intellectual opposition to "secrecy in the making of foreign policy" in World War I, see Swartz, Marvin, *The Union of Democratic Control in British Politics during the First World War*, (Oxford, 1972).
 20. Henig, Ruth, "New Diplomacy and the Old: A Reassessment of British Conceptions of a League of Nations, 1918–1920", in *The Paris Peace Conference*,

- 1919: *Peace without Victory?*, Dockrill, M. L. & Fisher John (eds), (Palgrave, 2001), pp. 157–74; Steiner, Zara & Dockrill, M.L., “The Foreign Office Reforms, 1919–1922”, *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Mar. 1974), p. 151. For a critique of the “myth of the new diplomacy”, also see Gilbert, Felix, “The ‘New Diplomacy’ of the Eighteenth Century”, *World Politics*, Vol. 4, No. 1, October 1951, pp. 1–38.
21. For the failed Genoa Conference, see Fink, Carol, *The Genoa Conference: European Diplomacy 1921–1922*, (Chapel Hill, 1984). For some portrayals of the “old diplomats” in the interwar era longing for the pre-1914 diplomatic practice, see Liebmman, George, *Diplomacy Between the Wars*, (London; New York, 2008).
 22. For the diplomacy of the 1930s, see Steiner, Zara, *The Lights That Failed*.
 23. McKercher, B.J.C., “The Last Old Diplomat: Sir Robert Vansittart and the Verities of British Foreign Policy, 1903–1930”, *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1995, pp. 1–38.
 24. McKercher, B.C.J., “The Foreign Office, 1930–39: Strategy, Permanent Interests and National Security”, *Contemporary British History*, Vol. 18, No. 3, Autumn 2004, pp. 87–109.
 25. The best source on the Kemalist diplomatic service and the making of diplomats by decree is Şimşir, Bilal, *Bizim Diplomatlar*, (Ankara, 1996).
 26. Hurewitz, J.C., “The Europeanization of Ottoman Diplomacy: The Conversion from Unilateralism to Reciprocity in the Nineteenth Century”, *Belleten*, Vol. 25, July 1961, pp. 455–466.
 27. For example see BOA, HR.SYS 778/6, 14 February 1891.
 28. See the account of the inauguration speech of Queen Victoria addressing the parliament, BOA, HR.SYS 582/3, 15 September 1890. A copy of the brochure of the inauguration speech is enclosed in the dispatch.
 29. For a study on the role and impact of the kings/emperors and royal family members on diplomacy (predominantly as appeasers, ice-breakers and problem resolvers) at certain junctures, see Roderick R. McLean, *Royalty and Diplomacy in Europe 1890–1914*, (Cambridge, U.K., 2007).
 30. For congratulations on the birthdays of the monarchs, see BOA, HR.SYS 222–101, for the anniversaries of their weddings, see BOA, HR.SYS 212/98. For the congratulations of the monarchs on the anniversary of the accession to the throne of Abdülhamid and the religious holidays, BOA, HR.SYS 211/91.
 31. *Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye (1301/1885)*, pp. 342–396.
 32. *Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye (1301/1885)*, pp. 397–404.
 33. *Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye (1301/1885)*, pp. 405–428.
 34. Hüseyin Agah Bey, *Diplomasi Usul-i Kitabeti*, (Konstantiniyye, 1308), pp. 15–16.

35. *Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye* (1301/1885), pp. 429–490.
36. *Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye* (1301/1885), p. 547.
37. Georgeon, Francois, *Sultan Abdülhamid*, p. 178; Paker, Esat Cemal. *Kırk Yıllık Hariciye Hatıralarım*, (İstanbul, 2000), p. 17; Mayakon, İsmail Müştak, *Yıldız'da Neler Gördüm?*, pp. 34–35.
38. Paker, Esat Cemal, *Kırk Yıllık*, p. 17.
39. Söylemezoğlu, Galip Kemali, *Hariciye Hizmetinde Otuz Sene*, pp. 127–128.
40. Hayreddin Nedim, *Vesâik-i Tarîhiyye ve Siyâsiyye Tettebbuatı*, Vol. I, pp. 61–69.
41. For the periodization of Ottoman history by nineteenth-century Ottoman historians, see Demiryürek, Mehmet, *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyete Bir Osmanlı Aydını: Abdurrahman Şeref Efendi*.
42. *Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye* (1306/1889), p. 30.
43. *Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye* (1306/1889), p. 26.
44. For the list of the formal addresses, see *Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye* (1306/1889), pp. 31–33.
45. Geertz, Clifford, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, (New York, 1973), pp. 412–453.
46. Geertz, Clifford, *Negara: The Theater State in Nineteenth-Century Bali*, (Princeton, 1980).
47. Geertz, Clifford, *Ibid.*, pp. 31–32.
48. Hüseyin Agah Bey, *Diplomasi Usul-i Kitabeti*, p. 15.
49. See Akyıldız, Ali, *Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı Merkez Teşkilatında Reform*, pp. 59–61.
50. For the changes in the texts and discourses of the official documents of the Ottoman Empire with Tanzimat, see Akyıldız, Ali, *Osmanlı Bürokrasisi ve Modernleşme*, pp. 103–116.
51. *Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye* (1306/1889), p. 190.
52. *Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye* (1306/1889), p. 195.
53. Eldem, Edhem, *İftihar ve İmtiyaz*, pp. 117–121.
54. Eldem, Edhem, *Ibid.*, p. 169.
55. Hanioglu, Şükrü, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, p. 82.
56. Kıbrıslı Derviş Vahdeti, “Dindarlık-Dinsizlik ve Tarikatlar”, *Volkan*, No. 36, 5 February 1909, quoted in Baer, Marc David, *The Dönme: Jewish Converts, Muslim Revolutionaries and Secular Turks*, p. 104.
57. MMZC, 1909, V. III, p. 50.
58. Kazım Karabekir, *Birinci Cihan Harbine Neden Girdik?* p. 32.
59. Erkin, Feridun Cemal, *Dışişlerinde 34 Yıl*, (Ankara, 1987), Vol. I, pp. 6–7.
60. Abdülhak Hamid, *Abdülhak Hamid'in Hatıraları*, p. 246.
61. Abdülhak Hamid, *Ibid.*, p. 246.

62. Abdülhak Hamid, *Ibid.*, p. 246.
63. See *Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye (1306/1889)*, pp. 632–642. Discrepancy in the salaries of the pashas and the officials was a prominent feature of the Hamidian regime. See Georgeon, François, *Sultan Abdülhamid*, p. 177.
64. Of course, these were the salaries as indicated in the yearbooks. That does not mean that these salaries were paid on time or in full. As is well known, the state frequently failed to pay salaries on time and in full. As mentioned previously, many ambassadors complained that their salaries were not paid for months and even for years.
65. *Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye (1306/1889)*, p. 670.
66. The hierarchy between the workers was also apparent. The “head of the *bademes*” (chief porter) was paid 1,000 guruşes whereas the assistant to the head of the *bademes* was paid 500 guruşes. That is, in the Ottoman arrangement of payments, access to reasonably high income was given to the “heads”. The “head”, the paternal position, was prestigious and privileged. This posture reflects the prevalence of paternalistic and hierarchical thought. For a classic study on the pre-modern hierarchical and paternalist mind, see Laslett, Peter, *The World We Have Lost*.
67. For a case study examining the sources of revenues and commercial activities of a high-ranking seventeenth-century bureaucrats, see Kunt, Metin, “Derviş Mehmed Pasha, Vezir and Entrepreneur: A Study in Ottoman Political-Economic Theory and Practice”, *Turcica*, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1977, pp. 197–214.
68. Findley, Carter Vaughn, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History*, pp. 358–359.
69. See Kırılı, Cengiz, “Yolsuzluğun İcadı: 1840 Ceza Kanunu, İktidar ve Bürokrasi”, *Tarih ve Toplum Yeni Yaklaşımlar*, No. 4, Fall 2006, p. 49.
70. Findley, Carter Vaughn, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History*, p. 296.
71. Findley, Carter Vaughn, *Ibid.*, p. 296.
72. Georgeon, François, *Sultan Abdülhamid*, p. 177. During the Hamidian era, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also expanded enormously. The number of the officials employed in the departments of the Ministry in Istanbul more than doubled in 15 years. Compare the lists in the annals of 1902 and 1889. *Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye (1320 /1902)*, pp. 70–100; *Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye (1306 /1889)*, pp. 485–630.
73. Findley, Carter Vaughn, *Ibid.*, p. 273.
74. Findley, Carter Vaughn, *Ibid.*, p. 273.
75. Findley, *Ibid.*, p. 271. Transition to a fully standardized and salary-based system in Europe occurred in the early nineteenth century. In the consular system of Britain, consuls earned their income through the fees they charged for their services, their personal talents, connections, and commercial activities. There

- was an attempt to supplant this highly corrupt, inefficient system, (incompatible as it was with the premises of an imperial modern-state early modern system) with a rational and standardized system in the early nineteenth century. The reforms of Canning in 1825 were intended to transform consuls into "salaried, full-time state servants drawing a fixed income by the Parliament." Nevertheless, it took half a century to implement the goals of the reform. Platt, D.C.M., *The Cinderella Service: British Consuls since 1825*, p. 68.
76. Akarlı, Engin Deniz, "The Tangled Ends of an Empire: Ottoman Encounters with the West and Problems of Westernization—an Overview", *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, Vol. 26, No. 3, 2006, p. 363. It also has to be said that such a duality developed with the reign of Kaiser Wilhelm II. The highly developed bureaucracy and the Kaiser's entourage coexisted and exasperated the civil bureaucracy and middle classes. Therefore the Hamidian duality cannot be viewed as a remnant of the past to be inevitably crushed, but a variation of the nineteenth-century constructions of bureaucratic states. See "Introduction", in Mombauer, Annika & Deist, Wilhelm (eds), *The Kaiser*, (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 2–3. Also see Lerman A., Katharine, "The Kaiser's Elite? Wilhelm II and the Berlin Administration, 1890–1914", in Mombauer, Annika & Deist, Wilhelm, *Ibid*.
 77. MMZC, 1909, Vol. I, pp. 3–16, MMZC, 1909, Vol. III, p. 49.
 78. Tural, Erkan, *Son Dönem Osmanlı Bürokrasisi: II Meşrutiyet Dönemi'nde Bürokratlar, İttihatçılar ve Parlamenterler*, p. 58.
 79. Klinghardt, Karl, *Angora-Konstantinopel: Ringende Gewalten*, (Frankfurt, 1924), pp. 83–87. For the plain modernism of the Republic in architecture, see Bozdoğan, Sibel, *Modernism and Nation Building: Turkish Architectural Culture in the Early Republic*, (Seattle, 2001).
 80. Williamson Jr., Samuel R., *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War*, p. 39. Also see Bridge, F.R., *From Sadowa to Sarajevo: The Foreign Policy of Austria-Hungary 1866–1914*, (London; Boston, 1972), p. 21; William D. Godsey, *Aristocratic Redoubt: The Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office on the Eve of the First World War*, p. 17; Wank, Solomon, *In the Twilight of Empire: Count Alois Lexa von Aehrenthal (1854–1912): Imperial Habsburg Patriot and Statesman*, (Wien, 2009).
 81. Lieven, Dominic, *Russia's Rulers under the Old Regime*, p. 80.
 82. Calrlgren, Wilhelm, "Sweden: The Ministry for Foreign Affairs", in *The Times Survey of the Foreign Ministries of the World*, Zara Steiner (ed.), p. 459.
 83. Willequet, Jacques. "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Belgium", in *The Times Survey of the Foreign Ministries of the World*, Zara Steiner (ed.), p. 78.
 84. Hayne, M.B., *The French Foreign Office*, pp. 9–10.
 85. On the reform of the British Foreign Office, see Zara Steiner, "The Last Years of the Old Foreign Office 1898–1905", *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 6, No. 1,

- 1963, pp. 59–90; idem, “Grey, Hardinge and the Foreign Office 1906–1910”, *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 10, No. 3 1967, pp. 415–439.
86. For David Vincent, because the Foreign Office was the most elitist office comprised of the members of the traditional ruling class, it was the one that most resisted professionalization and the Act of Northcote-Trevelyan. Vincent, David, *The Culture of Secrecy in Britain, 1832–1898*, (Oxford; New York, 1998), p. 79.
87. Godsey, William D, Aristocratic Redoubt p. 58.
88. Söylemezoğlu, Galip Kemali. *Hariciye Hizmetinde*, pp. 285–86.
89. Steiner, Zara, *The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy 1898–1914*, p. 16.
90. American legations overseas “were open from 10 A.M. until noon, and then, following a two-hour lunch break, from two until four in the afternoon.” Schulzinger, Robert D, *The Making of the Diplomatic Mind: The Training, Outlook and Style of American United States Foreign Service Officers, 1908–1931*, p. 3. The normal time schedule was not different in the Ottoman embassies. See Abdülhak Hamid, *Ibid.*, p. 351.
91. For the intimate world of the British Foreign Office, see Henry Drummond Wolf’s introduction of his colleagues in the Foreign Office. He introduced most of his colleagues with reference to their fathers, mothers, and uncles whom he personally knew and expected the reader to know due to their public prominence. Drummond Wolf, Henry, *Rambling Recollections*, pp. 61–65. For the family connections in the German Foreign Office and its intimate worlds, see Von Bülow, Bernhard, *Memoirs of Prince Von Bülow*, (Boston, 1932), Vol. IV.
92. The Concert of Europe was perceived as the classical age of diplomacy. The earliest academic studies focused on the Concert of Europe and its management by skillful prime ministers and foreign ministers. In these earliest accounts of diplomatic history, diplomacy is an art mastered by knowledgeable men of aristocratic descent. See Temperley, Harold, *England and the East: Crimea*, (London, 1936); Temperley, Harold, *The Foreign Policy of Canning 1822–1827*, (London, 1925); Webster, Charles, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815–1822: Britain and the European Alliance*, (London, 1925); Webster, Charles, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston 1830–1841*, (London, 1951).
93. Rose, Norman, *Harold Nicolson*, (London, 2005), p. 29, also see Otte, T.G., “Almost a Law of Nature? Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Office and the Balance of Power in Europe 1905–1912”, *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (2003), p. 79.
94. Moreover, for a candidate to be admitted as a diplomat, he had to have a yearly income of €400. See Steiner, Zara, “The Foreign Office Reforms 1919–1921”, *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 17, No. 1 March 1974, p. 137.

- The conditions were not different in czarist Russia: "It was not easy to meet the expenses of diplomatic life in a major European capital without some addition to one's official salary." Lieven, Dominic, *Ibid.*, p. 196.
95. *Ibid.*, p. 30
 96. Cecil, Lamar, *Ibid.*, p. 39.
 97. Rumpler, Helmut, "The Foreign Ministry of Austria and Austria-Hungary 1848 to 1918", in *The Times Survey of the Foreign Ministries of the World*, p. 54.
 98. *Ibid.*, p. 39.
 99. Serra, Enrico, "Italy: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs", in *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, p. 298.
 100. Hayne, M.B., *The French Foreign Office*, p. 8.
 101. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
 102. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
 103. For the necessity of appointing diplomats from prosperous and respectable families to the post of ambassador in the Ottoman Empire, see Söylemezoğlu, Galip Kemali, *Ibid.*, p. 286.
 104. Steiner, Zara & Neilson, Keith, *Britain and the Origins of the First World War*, (Basingstoke; New York, 2003) (original publication in 1977 authored by Steiner alone). Other studies also developed balanced conclusions as to whether social forces or the imperatives of the states had been decisive in the making of World War I. For some accounts, see Bosworth, Richard, *Italy and the Approach of the First World War*, (London, 1983); Keiger, John, *France and the Origins of the First World War*, (London, 1983); Wilson, Keith, *The Policy of the Entente*, (Cambridge, 1985).
 105. Steiner, Zara, *The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy 1898–1914*, p. 210.
 106. For a criticism of interpretations of international relations and the history of diplomacy based on economics and commercial interests, and for a study of the extent of the abhorrence of aristocratic diplomats at the commercial world, see Steiner, Zara, "The Foreign Office Reforms 1919–1921", *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Mar., 1974), p. 138. For a general assessment of the closed world and mentality of the Foreign Office, see Steiner, Zara, *The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898–1914*. Also see the classic work of Robinson and Gallagher in which they argued that imperialism erupted from the "official mind" of the British state denying that imperialism was an outcome of the amalgamation of the complex dynamics of economics and militarism. Gallagher J. & Robinson, R. & Deny, A., *Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism*. Erik Goldstein, one of the leading scholars of British diplomacy, employs the idiom of "official mind" to define a particular tendency and culture to investigate British diplomacy. Among his articles, see Goldstein, Erik, "The British Official

- Mind and the Lausanne Conference, 1922–23”, *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2003, pp. 185–206; idem. “Neville Chamberlain, the British Official Mind and the Munich Crisis”, *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, Volume 10, No. 2, 1999, pp. 276–292; idem. “The British Official Mind and Europe”, *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, Vol. 8, No. 3, 1997, pp. 265–278. Also see idem, *Winning the Peace*, (Oxford, 1991).
107. For a general survey of the nineteenth-century European universities and national traits of the university systems, see Rüegg, Walter (ed.), *Universities in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century (1800–1950)*, (Cambridge, 2004); Jarausch, Konrad, *The Transformation of Higher Learning 1860–1930*, (Chicago, 1983).
 108. Anderson, R.D., *European Universities from the Enlightenment to 1914*, (Oxford, 2004), p. 191. Also see Soffer, Erba, *Discipline and Power: The University, History and the Making of an English Elite, 1870–1930*, (Stanford, 1994); Deslandes, Paul, *Oxbridge Men*, (Bloomington, 2005).
 109. For the nineteenth-century German universities, see Anderson, R.D., *Ibid.*, pp. 51–65; Ringer, Fritz, *Education and Society in Modern Europe*, (Bloomington, 1979).
 110. See Lieven, Dominic, *The Aristocracy in Europe, 1815–1914*, (New York, 1993), pp. 161–180.
 111. Alston, Patrick L., *Education and the State in Tsarist Russia*, (Stanford, 1969).
 112. The two major studies on Ottoman education are Somel, Akşin, *The Modernization of Public Education in the Ottoman Empire 1839–1908: Islamization, Autocracy and Discipline*, (Leiden; Boston; Köln, 2001); Fortna, Benjamin, *Imperial Classroom*, (Oxford, 2002).
 113. For the lists and tables, see Steiner, Zara, *Ibid.*, pp. 217–21.
 114. Hayne, M.B, *Ibid.*, p. 22. For the elite schools in France, training middle-class youth (as well as the promising youth of lower classes) and preparing them for state service, see Bourdieu, Pierre, *The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power*.
 115. Williamson Jr., Samuel R., *Ibid.*, p. 39.
 116. Otte, T.G., “European Nobility and Diplomacy”, in Markus Mösslang, Torsten Rietze (ed.), *The Diplomats’ World: A Cultural History of Diplomacy, 1815–1914*, (Oxford; New York, 2008), p. 45.
 117. Ilchman, Warren Frederick, *Professional Diplomacy in the United States 1779–1939*, (Chicago, 1961), p. 78. This educational elitism was retained after the early twentieth century reform. See p. 95.
 118. Çankaya, Ali, *Yeni Mülkiye Tarihi ve Mülkiyeliler*, 1968–1971, Vol. 8, page opposing 164. For a discussion, see Findley, Carter, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom*, pp. 157–58.

119. For a comparative survey of the graduates of *Mülkiye*, see the impressive documentation of Ali Çankaya *Yeni Mülkiye Taribi ve Mülkiyeliler*.
120. Hayne, *Ibid.*, p. 199. For the rise of anti-German sentiment in the British Foreign Office, see Corp, Edward T., "Sir Charles Hardinge and the Question of Intervention in the Boer War: An Episode in the Rise of Anti-German Feeling in the British Foreign Office", *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 51, No. 2, On Demand Supplement June 1979, p. D1071-D1084.
121. Hayne, M.B., *Ibid.*, p. 143.
122. Fellner, Fritz, "Die 'Mission Hoyos'" in *Deutschlands Sonderung von Europa 1862–1945*, Wilhelm Alf (ed.), pp. 283–316, quoted in Mombauer, Annika. *The Origins of the First World War: Controversies and Consensus*, (New York, 2002), p. 188.
123. For some "masters" of old diplomacy, see Busch, Briton Cooper, *Hardinge of Penhurst: A Study in the Old Diplomacy*, (Hamden, 1980); Nicolson, Harold, *Portrait of a Diplomatist: Being the Life of Sir Arthur Nicolson, First Lord Carnock*, (London, 1930).
124. Steiner, Zara, "Introduction", in *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, pp. 16–17.
125. Halperin, Sandra, *War and Social Change in Modern Europe*, pp. 30–31.
126. Kjolsen, Klaus, "The Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs", in *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, p. 166.
127. Baack, Lawrence J., *Christian Bernstorff and Prussia*, (New Brunswick, 1980), p. 21.
128. Fischer, Fritz, *Germany's Aims in the First World War*, (New York, 1967).
129. For such an interpretation, also see Geiss, Imanuel, *German Foreign Policy 1871–1914*, (London; Boston, 1976); Berghahn, Volker, *Germany and the Approach of War in 1914*, (London, 1973). For a recent critique of the Fischer thesis, see Mombauer, Annika, *The Origins of the First World War: Controversies and Consensus*, (New York, 2002), 127–64; Mombauer, Annika, *Helmuth Von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War*, (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 1–6.
130. With regard to Italy, C.J. Lowe and F. Marzari note that the right was able to determine the course of foreign policy thanks to the right-wing nature of the diplomatic corps. See Lowe, C.J. & Marzari, F, *Italian Foreign Policy 1870–1940*, (London; New York, 2002), p. 8. They also note that the lack of any substantial ideas on the part of the Italian left with regard to foreign policy (with the exception of Crispi) facilitated the control of foreign policy by the right-wing diplomatic establishment.
131. For a parallel observation regarding the shift of the making of the Russian foreign policy, Lieven D.C.B., *Russia and the Origins of the First World War*, (London, 1984), p. 64. For the depiction of the Russian diplomatic service,

- see Lieven, *Ibid.*, pp. 84–102. Also for the pro-German dispositions of the makers of Russian foreign policy originating from an ideological position defending authoritarianism as an ideology, see Lieven, D.C.B., “Pro-Germans and Russian Foreign Policy 1890–1914”, *International History Review*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1980, pp. 34–54. Also see the memoirs of the Russian anti-German diplomat and later Russian Foreign Minister (1906–1910) Alexander Iswolsky, *Recollections of a Foreign Minister* (Garden City, 1921).
132. For a literature of “war aims” developed by the political elites, the military and the diplomatic establishments in the years before World War I and revision of the “war aims” in the heat of the war, see Gooch, John, *Plans of War*, (London; New York, 1974); Stone, Norman, *The Eastern Front: 1914–1917*, (London, 1998); Kennedy, Paul (ed.), *The War Plans of the Great Powers 1880–1914*, (Boston, 1979); French, David, *British Economic and Strategic Planning 1905–1915*, (London; Boston, 1982); idem, *British Strategy and War Aims 1914–1916*, (London; Boston, 1986). All these works attest to the changing military, political, and strategic planning and maneuvers of the European powers in a transforming political world that prepared the ground for the upcoming war.
 133. Von Bülow, Bernhard, *Memoirs of Prince Von Bülow*, Vol. IV, p. 599
 134. Harry F. Young, *Prince Lichnowsky and the Great War*, (Athens, 1977), pp. 37–38.
 135. Steiner, Zara, *The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898–1914*, p. 3. Also see, Otte, T.G. & Neilson, Keith, *The Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 1854–1946*, (New York, 2009).
 136. Steiner, Zara, *Ibid.*, p. 4.
 137. Steiner, Zara, *Ibid.*, p. 7.
 138. Steiner, Zara, *Ibid.*, pp. 4–10.
 139. Steiner, Zara, *Ibid.*, p. 210.
 140. See reminiscences of the pre-reform Foreign Office by Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, *Diplomat in Peace and War*, (London, 1949), p. 11.
 141. Hayne, M.B., *Ibid.*, p. 170.
 142. Doss, Kurt, “The History of the German Foreign Office”, in *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, pp. 235–40.
 143. For example, the American State Department resisted all efforts at reform and retained its own informal culture. See Scott, Andrew M., “Environmental Change and Organizational Adaptation: The Problem of the State Department”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No. 1, March 1970, pp. 85–94; Scott, Andrew M., “The Department of State: Formal Organization and Informal Culture”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 13, No. 1 March 1969, pp. 1–18. For the partial success of the reform in the State Department in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, see

- Werking, Richard Hume, *The Master Architects: Building the United States Foreign Service 1890–1913*, (Lexington, 1977).
144. Steiner, Zara, "Introduction", in *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, p. 13.
 145. Cecil, Lamar, *Ibid.*, p. 256
 146. Cecil, Lamar, *Ibid.*, p. 256.
 147. For Holstein, the *éminence gris* of German diplomatic service, see Rich, Norman, *Friedrich von Holstein: Politics and Diplomacy in the Era of Bismarck and Wilhelm II*, (Cambridge, 1965) (2 vols); Rich, Norman & Fisher, M. H. (eds), *The Holstein Papers*, (Cambridge, 1955) (4 vols).
 148. Cecil, Lamar, *Ibid.*, p. 158.
 149. Röhl, John, "The Splendour and Impotence of the German Diplomatic Service", in idem, *The Kaiser and His Court*, p. 154.
 150. Cecil, Lamar, *Ibid.*, p. 66.
 151. For the prominent families who recruited their scions into diplomacy and their political and social connections, see Cecil, Lamar, *Ibid.*, p. 67.
 152. Cecil, Lamar, *Ibid.*, pp. 238–39.
 153. Vagsts, Alfred, *A History of Militarism*, (New York, 1967), pp. 62–64, 65–74, 175–79. For the pivotal role of military honor and spirit in the German aristocratic tradition, see also Craig, Gordon, *The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640–1945*, (Oxford, 1964); Brose, Eric Dorn, *The Kaiser's Army*, (Oxford, 2001). For this ethos in Austria, see Barker, Thomas, *Army, Aristocracy, Monarchy; Essays on War, Society and Government in Austria, 1618–1780*, (Boulder, 1982).
 154. For the postbellum introduction of the regional bureaus in the French and German foreign offices, see Lauren, Paul Gordon, *Diplomats and Bureaucrats*, (Stanford, 1976), pp. 93, 128.
 155. For Britain, among many other valuable studies, see Cannadine, David, *The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy*; idem, *Aspects of Aristocracy*, (New Haven, 1994). Also see the classic work, Dangerfield, George, *The Strange Death of Liberal England*, (Stanford, 1998) (originally published in 1935). The destruction of the old regime in Germany was incomparably ruthless. Germany had transformed and became the "first truly modern experiment" from being the bastion of conservatism and hierarchical political society. See Peukert, Detlev, *The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical Modernity*, (London, 1993).
 156. Maisel, Ephraim, *The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy 1919–1926*, p. 68.
 157. For the efforts of the Foreign Office to adapt to the new circumstances, see Sharp, Alan, "Adapting to a New World? British Foreign Policy in the 1920s," *Contemporary British History*, Vol. 18, No. 3, Autumn 2004, pp.

- 74–86. Also see Sharp, Alan, “The Foreign Office in Eclipse, 1919–1922”, *History*, Vol. 61, 1976, pp. 198–218; Warman, Roberta M, “The Erosion of Foreign Office Influence in the Making of Foreign Policy, 1916–1918”, *Historical Journal*, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1972, pp. 133–159.
158. Uzgel, İlhan, “TDP’nin Oluşturulması”, in Oran, Baskın (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası*, (İstanbul, 2001), Vol. I, pp. 74, 76–77.
159. For the social portrait of the Kemalist single-party period political elite, see Frey, Frederick W., *The Turkish Political Elite*.
160. The democratically elected governments continued to acknowledge a considerable autonomy for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, seeing the international affairs as supra-political and conducted by the imperatives of state interests. However, the transformation of the social character of the political elites had an impact on the relations between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the political authorities.
161. Findley, Carter, *Ibid.*, p. 262

Chapter 7 Passages of the diplomatic service from the Empire to the Republic

1. For an insight and comparison, see the observation of Lieven on the gradual alteration of the premises of the foreign policy from the pragmatic style of the conservative/reactionary imperial elite to the ideologically committed (nationalist, Pan-Slav, rightist) new generation. Apparently, this was not a linear shift from one predisposition to another but a constant struggle between different predispositions. Lieven, D.C.B., *Russia and the Origins of the First World War*, p. 64. Apparently, a similar vista is observable for the Ottoman context.
2. Tural, Erkan, *Son Dönem Osmanlı Bürokrasisi: II Meşrutiyet Dönemi’nde Bürokratlar, İttihatçılar ve Parlamenterler*, pp. 34, 130–147.
3. Tural, Erkan, *Ibid.*, pp. 58, 68.
4. MMZC, 1909, Vol. III, pp. 47–50.
5. For a book demonstrating the imperial characteristics of Republican Turkey and Turkish nationalism, see Meeker, Michael, *A Nation of Empire*, (Berkeley, 2002).
6. Kayalı, Hasan, *Young Turks and Arabs*, p. 3.
7. For this process, see Şimşir, Bilal, *Ibid.*, pp. 166–170. I thank Gül İnanc for reminding me of this process.
8. Girgin, Kemal, *Osmanlı ve Cumhuriyet Dönemleri Hariciye Taribimiz*, (Ankara, 1992), p. 130.
9. Çankaya, Ali, *Ibid.*, p. 276
10. Çankaya, Ali, *Ibid.*, pp. 448, 780.

11. For the purge of those who opposed the National Struggle, see Koçak, Cemil, *Heyet-i Mahsusalar*, (İstanbul, 2005). The purge was not an ideological cleansing, but a retribution against those who did not act “appropriately” during the War of Independence. The purges punished individual misbehaviour. It may be useful to compare/contrast the Republican handling of the incumbent bureaucracy with the actions spurred by French nineteenth-century regime changes.
12. Dikerdem, Mahmut, *Hariciye Çarkı*, pp. 22–24.
13. Kuneralp, Sinan, “Turkey: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Under the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic”, in *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, p. 506.
14. It has to be said that balance of power politics was discredited continent-wide. The old-fashioned “balance of power” paradigm was heavily criticized, and the alleged new diplomacy was introduced. Although, the “New Europe” group in Britain had aspired for open diplomacy and Wilsonism, the Republic opted for isolationism, which was seen as a viable alternative after observing the successful Soviet example. It was such an environment that made the Kemalist reformulation of foreign policy orientation possible. It is meaningless to assess the Kemalist foreign policy within a noncomparative historiography.
15. For the changing parameters of the early Republic’s diplomacy and its new orientation, see Koçak, Cemil, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri (1923–1939)*, (Ankara, 1991). Also see Oran, Baskın (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası*, Vol. I; Krüger, Karl, *Kemalist Turkey and the Middle East*, (London, 1932).
16. For some interpretations and representations of Tanzimat by the Republican discourse, see Bayur, Yusuf Hikmet, *Yeni Türkiye Devletinin Harici Siyaseti*, (İstanbul, 1934), pp. 1–3; *Türk Taribinin Ana Hatları*, (İstanbul, 1999), pp. 460, 465–66; T.T.T. Cemiyeti, *Tarih III (Yeni ve Yakın Zamanlar)*, (Ankara, 1933), pp. 188–310; Bayur, Yusuf Hikmet, *Türk İnkılabı Taribi*, (Ankara, 1991), Vol. I, p. 149.
17. Berridge, G.R., *British Diplomacy in Turkey, 1583 to Present*, (Leiden: Boston, 2009), p. 143.
18. Derin, Haldun, *Çankaya Özel Kalemmini Anımsarken 1933–1951*, (İstanbul, 1995), pp. 48–49.
19. The correspondence from the embassy to Ankara (and earlier to Istanbul from 1906) are kept in the British archives under the catalogue PRO, FO 371.
20. See Girgin, Kemal, *Ibid.*, pp. 123–27.
21. Quoted in Anderson, M.S., *The Eastern Question*, (London; Basingstoke, 1972), p. 376.

22. For the “active neutrality” of Turkey in World War II, see Deringil, Selim, *Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War: An “Active” Neutrality*.
23. Oran, Baskın, “Türk Dış Politikasının (TDP) Teori ve Pratiği”, in idem (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası*, Vol. I, p. 23.
24. For the outline and vision of foreign policy of the Republic, see Bayur, Yusuf Hikmet, *Yeni Türkiye Devletinin Harici Siyaseti*, (İstanbul, 1934).
25. Atay, Falih Rıfkı, *Batış Yılları*, (İstanbul, 1963), p. 59.
26. For example (with the exception of İstiklal Madalyası), as a reaction to the imperial flamboyance of the Ottoman imperial culture, the Republic did not designate any insignia or medallions. The introduction of insignia and medallions came only after the military coup of 1980, and they were predominantly given only to foreigners and in a very limited fashion. Eldem, Edhem, *İftihar ve İmtiyaz: Osmanlı Nişan ve Madalyaları Tarihi*, p. 491.
27. Çagaptay, Soner, *Islam, Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who is a Turk ?* (London; New York, 2006).
28. For the assimilationist nationalism of the Kemalist Republic, see Yeğen, Mesut, *Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu*, (İstanbul, 2006); idem, *Müstakbel Vatandaş’tan Sözde Vatandaşa: Cumburiyet ve Kürtler*, (İstanbul, 2006); Yıldız, Ahmet, *Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene*, (İstanbul, 2004); Bali, Rıfat, *Cumburiyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri: Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni (1923–1945)*, (İstanbul, 1999); Aktar, Ayhan, *Varlık Vergisi ve “Türkleştirme” Politikaları*, (İstanbul, 2000).
29. It should be borne in mind that the Republic could intervene and reshape higher education much later than 1923. The critical moment for this move was the “University Reform” of 1933, which purged many undesired professors of *Darülfünun*.
30. For “Empire” and “imperial ideology”, see Howe, Stephen, *Empire*; Pagden, Anthony, *Peoples and Empires*, (New York, 2003); Armitage, David, *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire*, (Cambridge, 2000).
31. The continuity of the ideological discourse has been studied both in a theoretical framework and within a local setting and has been discussed and shown by Michael Meeker in *A Nation of Empire*.
32. Of course, it is a debate as to what we should understand from an Empire. It is certainly not possible to dissociate nationhood from Empire. Every Empire has its core constituency and “original nation”. The new turn in the study of nationalism emphasizes the early modern origins of nationalism especially in the English case. The very first nationalism of Europe had derived from the British imperium and Protestantism. See Colley, Linda, *Britons: Forging the Nation*; Greenfeld, Liah, *Nationalism: Five Paths to Modernity*; Pincus, Steven, *Protestantism and Patriotism*; Newman,

- Gerald, *The Rise of English Nationalism*, (New York, 1997). As this book has shown, nationalism is not simply a modernist construct forged in the nineteenth century but an amalgam of different dynamics developing from early modernity onwards.
33. Russian czardom's blend of monarchism and national principle, which gave birth to the "official nationality", resembles both the Ottoman official nationality and the Republican idea of nationhood and thus arguably betrays the linkage between the Ottoman background and the Republican notion of Nation in a comparative perspective. Richard Wortman, one of the foremost authorities on nineteenth-century czarist Russia, writes: "After 1825, nationality was identified with absolutism, 'autocracy' in the official lexicon. Russian nationality was presented as a nationality of consensual subordination, in contrast to egalitarian Western concepts. The monarchical narrative of the nation described the Russian people as voluntarily surrendering power to their Westernized rulers." Wortman, Richard, *Scenarios of Power*, Vol. II, p. 12.
 34. This perception is not peculiar to Turkey. David Vincent writes that, in nineteenth-century Britain, because the diplomatic service was the most elitist and had the greatest access to state secrets, it was perceived as the most privileged (and most associated with the supreme interests of the state) office and thus, it was the office most resistant to reform and democratization of the civil service. It was the service which was most disturbed by interference from outside. Vincent, David, *The Culture of Secrecy in Britain, 1832–1898*, p. 79.
 35. See Bourdieu, Pierre, *State Nobility*, (Cambridge, 1998). Also see Suleiman, Ezra, *Politics, Power and Bureaucracy in France: The Administrative Elite*, (Princeton, 1974); idem, *Elites in French Society: The Politics of Survival*, (Princeton, 1998). Also see a more sophisticated discourse on the emergence of the Egyptian modern bureaucracy and the modern bureaucratic mind in, Mitchell, Timothy, *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-politics, Modernity*.
 36. See Tamkoç, Metin, *The Warrior Diplomats*, (Salt Lake City, 1976), pp. 256–8.
 37. Data on 12 career diplomats are unavailable.
 38. Dikerdem, Mahmut, *Hariciye Çarkı*, p. 74.
 39. Sav, Ergun, *Cumhuriyet Bebeleri*, (Ankara, 1998), pp. 9–10.
 40. Koçak, Cemil, *Belgelerle İktidar ve Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası*, (İstanbul, 2006), pp. 633–92.
 41. For the discourses, views, and approaches of Turkish diplomats regarding the Cyprus dispute, see İnaç, Gül, *Türk Diplomasisinde Kıbrıs, 1970–1991: Büyükelçiler Anlatıyor*, (İstanbul, 2007); İnaç, Gül, "Narratives of Diplomats:

- Representations of Nationalism and Turkish Foreign Policy”, in Niyazi Kızılyürek, Ayhan Aktar & Umut Özkırımlı (eds), *Nationalism in the Troubled Triangle*, (London, 2010), pp. 112–29. Also see Yavuzalp, Ercüment, *Kıbrıs Yangınında Büyükelçilik*, (Ankara, 1993).
42. Piccoli, Wolfango & Jung, Dietrich, *Turkey at the Crossroads: Ottoman Legacies and a Greater Middle East*, (London; 2001), pp. 115–18; Kirişçi, Kemal & Winrow, Gareth, *The Kurdish Question and Turkey*, (London; Portland, 1997), pp. 184, 193; Robins, Philip, *Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War*, (London, 2003), pp. 102–104; Yılmaz Hakan, “Two Pillars of Nationalist Euroskepticism in Turkey: The Tanzimat and Sèvres Syndromes”, in Karlsson, Ingmar & Strom Melin, Annika (eds), *Turkey, Sweden and the European Union: Experiences and Expectations*, (Stockholm, 2006), pp. 29–40.
43. For some memoirs written by eminent Turkish diplomats exposing this bond established with the state, see Gürün, Kamuran, *Fırtınalı Yıllar: Dışişleri Müsteşarlığı Hatıralarım*, (İstanbul, 1995); Yavuzalp, Ercüment, *Liderlerimiz ve Dış Politika*, (Ankara, 1996); İnan, Kamran, *Cenevre Yılları*, (İstanbul, 2002).

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