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LENIN

On the Question of Dialectics



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Workers of All Countries, Unite!

LENIN

On the Question of Dialectics

A Collection



Progress Publishers

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Moscow

Publishers' Note

The collection comprises a few of Lenin's works devoted to materialist dialectics. In the first two articles Lenin expounds the essence and main features of materialist dialectics as "the doctrine of development in its fullest, deepest and most comprehensive form". Some of the articles show how Lenin used the method of materialist dialectics to analyse social relations and socio-political events.

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As the most comprehensive and profound doctrine of development, and the richest in content, Hegelian dialectics was considered by Marx and Engels the greatest achievement of classical German philosophy. They thought that any other formulation of the principle of development, of evolution, was one-sided and poor in content, and could only distort and mutilate the actual course of development (which often proceeds by leaps, and via catastrophes and revolutions) in Nature and in society. "Marx and I were pretty well the only people to rescue conscious dialectics [from the destruction of idealism, including Hegelianism] and apply it in the materialist conception of Nature.... Nature is the proof of dialectics, and it must be said for modern natural science that it has furnished extremely rich [this was written before the discovery of radium, electrons, the transmutation of elements, etc.!] and daily increasing materials for this test, and has thus proved that in the last analysis Nature's process is dialectical and not metaphysical.²"

"The great basic thought," Engels writes, "that the world is not to be comprehended as a complex of ready-made things, but as a complex of processes, in which the things apparently stable no less than their mind images in our heads, the concepts, go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away ... this great fundamental thought has, especially since the time of Hegel, so thoroughly permeated ordinary consciousness that in its generality it is now scarcely ever contradicted. But to acknowledge this fundamental thought in words and to apply it in reality in detail to each domain of

investigation are two different things.... For dialectical philosophy nothing is final, absolute, sacred. It reveals the transitory character of everything and in everything; nothing can endure before it except the uninterrupted process of becoming and of passing away, of endless ascendancy from the lower to the higher. And dialectical philosophy itself is nothing more than the mere reflection of this process in the thinking brain." Thus, according to Marx, dialectics is "the science of the general laws of motion, both of the external world and of human thought"³.

This revolutionary aspect of Hegel's philosophy was adopted and developed by Marx. Dialectical materialism "does not need any philosophy standing above the other sciences". From previous philosophy there remains "the science of thought and its laws - formal logic and dialectics"⁴. Dialectics, as understood by Marx, and also in conformity with Hegel, includes what is now called the theory of knowledge, or epistemology, which, too, must regard its subject matter historically, studying and generalising the origin and development of knowledge, the transition from *non-knowledge* to knowledge.

In our times the idea of development, of evolution, has almost completely penetrated social consciousness, only in other ways, and not through Hegelian philosophy. Still this idea, as formulated by Marx and Engels on the basis of Hegel's philosophy, is far more comprehensive and far richer in content than the current idea of evolution is. A development that repeats, as it were, stages that have already been passed, but repeats them in a different way, on a higher basis ("the negation of negation"), a development, so to speak, that proceeds in spirals, not in a straight line; a development by leaps, catastrophes, and revolutions; "breaks in continuity"; the transformation of quantity into quality; inner impulses towards development, imparted by the contradiction and conflict of the various forces and tendencies acting on a given body, or within a given phenomenon, or within a given society; the interdependence and the closest and indissoluble connection between *all* aspects of any phenomenon (history constantly revealing ever new aspects), a connection that provides a uniform, and universal process of motion, one that follows definite laws - these are some

of the features of dialectics as a doctrine of development that is richer than the conventional one. (Cf. Marx's letter to Engels of January 8, 1868, in which he ridicules Stein's "wooden trichotomies", which it would be absurd to confuse with materialist dialectics.)

Written July-November 1914

V. I. Lenin,
Collected Works,
Vol. 21, pp. 53-55

The splitting of a single whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts (see the quotation from Philo on Heraclitus at the beginning of Section III, "On Cognition", in Lassalle's book on Heraclitus⁶) is the *essence* (one of the "essentials", one of the principal, if not the principal, characteristics or features) of dialectics. That is precisely how Hegel, too, puts the matter (Aristotle in his *Metaphysics* continually *grapples* with it and *combats* Heraclitus and Heraclitean ideas).

The correctness of this aspect of the content of dialectics must be tested by the history of science. This aspect of dialectics (e.g., in Plekhanov) usually receives inadequate attention: the identity of opposites is taken as the sum-total *examples* ["for example, a seed", "for example, primitive communism". The same is true of Engels. But it is "in the interests of popularisation..."] and not as a *law of cognition* (and as a law of the objective world).

In mathematics: + and -. Differential and integral.

In mechanics: action and reaction.

In physics: positive and negative electricity.

In chemistry: the combination and dissociation of atoms.

In social science: the class struggle.

The identity of opposites (it would be more correct, perhaps, to say their "unity", - although the difference between the terms identity and unity is not particularly important here. In a certain sense both are correct) is the recognition (discovery) of the contradictory, *mutually exclusive*, opposite tendencies in *all* phenomena and processes of nature (*including* mind and society). The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world

in their “*self-movement*”, in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the “struggle” of opposites. The two basic (or two possible? or two historically observable?) conceptions of development (evolution) are: development as decrease and increase, as repetition, *and* development as a unity of opposites (the division of a unity into mutually exclusive opposites and their reciprocal relation).

In the first conception of motion, *self-movement*, its *driving* force, its source, its motive, remains in the shade (or this source is made *external*—God, subject, etc.). In the second conception the chief attention is directed precisely to knowledge of the *source* of “*self*”-movement.

The first conception is lifeless, pale and dry. The second is living. The second *alone* furnishes the key to the “self-movement” of everything existing; it alone furnishes the key to the “leaps”, to the “break in continuity”, to the “transformation into the opposite”, to the destruction of the old and the emergence of the new.

The unity (coincidence, identity, equal action) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute.

NB: The distinction between subjectivism (scepticism, sophistry, etc.) and dialectics, incidentally, is that in (objective) dialectics the difference between the relative and the absolute is itself relative. For objective dialectics there *is* an absolute *within* the relative. For subjectivism and sophistry the relative is only relative and excludes the absolute.

In his *Capital*, Marx first analyses the simplest, most ordinary and fundamental, most common and everyday *relation* of bourgeois (commodity) society, a relation encountered billions of times, viz. the exchange of commodities. In this very simple phenomenon (in this “cell” of bourgeois society) analysis reveals *all* the contradictions (or the germs of *all* the contradictions) of modern society.

The subsequent exposition shows us the development (both growth and movement) of these contradictions and of this society in the Σ^* of its individual parts, from its beginning to its end.

Such must also be the method of exposition (or study) of dialectics in general (for with Marx the dialectics of bourgeois society is only a particular case of dialectics). To begin with what is the simplest, most ordinary, common, etc., with **any proposition**: the leaves of a tree are green; John is a man; Fido is a dog, etc. Here already we have *dialectics* (as Hegel's genius recognised): the **individual** is the *universal* (cf. Aristoteles, *Metaphysik*, translation by Schwegeler, Bd. II, S. 40, 3. Buch, 4. Kapitel, 8-9: "denn natürlich kann man nicht der Meinung sein, daß es ein Haus (a house in general) gebe außer den sichtbaren Häusern," "ὅν γὰρ ἄν δείημεν εἶναι ἴνα οἰκίαν παρὰ ἰὰζ ἴναζ οἰκίαζ").** Consequently, the opposites (the individual is opposed to the universal) are identical: the individual exists only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the essence of) an individual. Every universal only approximately embraces all the individual objects. Every individual enters incompletely into the universal, etc., etc. Every individual is connected by thousands of transitions with other **kinds** of individuals (things, phenomena, processes), etc. *Here already* we have the elements, the germs, the concepts of *necessity*, of objective connection in nature, etc. Here already we have the contingent and the necessary, the phenomenon and the essence; for when we say: John is a man, Fido is a dog, *this* is a leaf of a tree, etc., we *disregard* a number of attributes as *contingent*; we separate the essence from the appearance, and counterpose the one to the other.

Thus in *any proposition* we can (and must) disclose as in a "nucleus" ("cell") the germs of *all* the elements of dialectics, and thereby show that dialectics is a property

* summation. - Ed.

** "For, of course, one cannot hold the opinion that there can be a house (in general) apart from visible houses." - Ed.

of all human knowledge in general. And natural science shows us (and here again it must be demonstrated in *any* simple instance) objective nature with the same qualities, the transformation of the individual into the universal, of the contingent into the necessary, transitions, modulations, and the reciprocal connection of opposites. Dialectics *is* the theory of knowledge of (Hegel and) Marxism. This is the “aspect” of the matter (it is not “an aspect” but the *essence* of the matter) to which Plekhanov, not to speak of other Marxists, paid no attention.

* *

*

Knowledge is represented in the form of a series of circles both by Hegel (see *Logic*) and by the modern “epistemologist” of natural science, the eclectic and foe of Hegelianism (which he did not understand!), Paul Volkmann (see his *Erkenntnistheoretische Grundzüge*,* S.)

“Circles” in philosophy: [is a chronology of *persons* essential? No!]

Ancient: from Democritus to Plato and the dialectics of Heraclitus.

Renaissance: Descartes versus Gassendi (Spinoza?)

Modern: Holbach-Hegel (via Berkeley, Hume, Kant). Hegel – Feuerbach – Marx.

Dialectics as *living*, many-sided knowledge (with the number of sides eternally increasing), with an infinite number of shades of every approach and approximation to reality (with a philosophical system growing into a whole out of each shade) – here we have an immeasurably rich content as compared with “metaphysical” materialism, the fundamental *misfortune* of which is its inability to apply dialectics to the Bildertheorie,** to the process and development of knowledge.

Philosophical idealism is *only* nonsense from the stand-

* P. Volkmann, *Erkenntnistheoretische Grundzüge der Naturwissenschaften*, Leipzig-Berlin, 1910, p. 35. – Ed.

** theory of reflection. – Ed.

point of crude, simple, metaphysical materialism. From the standpoint of *dialectical* materialism, on the other hand, philosophical idealism is a *one-sided*, exaggerated, überschwengliches (Dietzgen) development (inflation, distention) of one of the features, aspects, facets of knowledge into an absolute, *divorced* from matter, from nature, apotheosised. Idealism is clerical obscurantism.

NB this aphorism || True. But philosophical idealism is ("*more correctly*" and "*in addition*") a *road* to clerical obscurantism *through* one of the shades of the infinitely complex *knowledge* (dialectical) of man.

Human knowledge is not (or does not follow) a straight line, but a curve, which endlessly approximates a series of circles, a spiral. Any fragment, segment, section of this curve can be transformed (transformed one-sidedly) into an independent, complete, straight line, which then (if one does not see the wood for the trees) leads into the quagmire, into clerical obscurantism (where it is *anchored* by the class interests of the ruling classes). Rectilinearity and one-sidedness, woodenness and petrification, subjectivism and subjective blindness – voilà the epistemological roots of idealism. And clerical obscurantism (=philosophical idealism), of course, has *epistemological* roots, it is not groundless; it is a *sterile flower* undoubtedly, but a sterile flower that grows on the living tree of living, fertile, genuine, powerful, omnipotent, objective, absolute human knowledge.

Written in 1915

V.I. Lenin,
Collected Works,
Vol. 38, pp. 359-63

THE COLLAPSE OF THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL

The collapse of the International⁷ is sometimes taken to mean simply the formal aspect of the matter, namely, the interruption in international communication between the socialist parties of the belligerent countries, the impossibility of convening either an international conference or the International Socialist Bureau,⁸ etc. This is the point of view held by certain socialists in the small neutral countries, probably even by the majority of the official parties in those countries, and also by the opportunists and their defenders. With a frankness that deserves profound gratitude, this position was defended in the Russian press by Mr. V. Kosovsky, in No. 8 of the Bund's⁹ *Information Bulletin*, whose editors said nothing to indicate that they disagreed with the author. Let us hope that Mr. Kosovsky's defence of nationalism, in which he went so far as to justify the German Social-Democrats who voted for war credits,¹⁰ will help many a worker at last to realise the bourgeois-nationalist character of the Bund.

To the class-conscious workers, socialism is a serious conviction, not a convenient screen to conceal petty-bourgeois conciliatory and nationalist-oppositional strivings. By the collapse of the International they understand the disgraceful treachery to their convictions which was displayed by most of the official Social-Democratic parties, treachery to the most solemn declarations in their speeches at the Stuttgart and Basle international congresses,¹¹ and in the resolutions of these congresses, etc. Only those can fail to see this treachery who *do not wish* to do so or do not find it to their advantage to see it. If we would formulate the question in a scientific

fashion, i. e., from the standpoint of class relations in modern society, we will have to state that most of the Social-Democratic parties, and at their head the German Party first and foremost – the biggest and most influential party in the Second International – have taken sides with their General Staffs, their governments, and their bourgeoisie, against the proletariat. This is an event of historic importance, one that calls for a most comprehensive analysis. It has long been conceded that, for all the horror and misery they entail, wars bring at least the following more or less important benefit – they ruthlessly reveal, unmask and destroy much that is corrupt, outworn and dead in human institutions. The European war of 1914-15 is doubtlessly beginning to do some good by revealing to the advanced class of the civilised countries what a foul and festering abscess has developed within its parties, and what an unbearably putrid stench comes from some source.

I

Is it a fact that the principal socialist parties of Europe have forsaken all their convictions and tasks? This, of course, is something that is readily discussed neither by the traitors nor those who are fully aware – or surmise – that they will have to be friendly and tolerant towards them. However unpleasant that may be to various “authorities” in the Second International or to their fellow-thinkers among the Russian Social-Democrats, we must face the facts and call things by their right names; we must tell the workers the truth.

Do any facts exist that show how the socialist parties regarded their tasks and their tactics before the present war and in anticipation of it? They undoubtedly do. There was the resolution adopted at the Basle International Socialist Congress of 1912, which we are reprinting together with the resolution adopted at the Chemnitz Congress of the German Social-Democratic Party held in the same year,¹² as a reminder of socialism’s forgotten ideals. This resolution, which summarises the vast anti-war propagandist and agitational literature in all countries, is a most complete and precise, a most solemn and formal exposition of socialist views on war and tactics towards

war. One cannot but qualify as treachery the fact that none of the authorities of yesterday's International and of today's social-chauvinism – neither Hyndman and Guesde, nor Kautsky and Plekhanov – dare remind their readers of that resolution. They are either silent about it, or (like Kautsky) quote excerpts of secondary importance and evade everything that is really of significance. On the one hand, the most “Left” and arch-revolutionary resolutions, and on the other, the most shameless forgetfulness or renunciation of these resolutions – this is one of the most striking manifestations of the International's collapse, and at the same time a most convincing proof that at present only those whose rare simplicity borders on a cunning desire to perpetuate the former hypocrisy can believe that socialism can be “rectified” and “its line straightened out” by means of resolutions alone.

Only yesterday, one might say, when, before the war, Hyndman turned towards a defence of imperialism, all “respectable” socialists considered him an unbalanced crank, of whom nobody spoke otherwise than in a tone of disdain. Today the most prominent Social-Democratic leaders of all countries have sunk entirely to Hyndman's position, differing from one another only in shades of opinion and in temperament. We are quite unable to find some more or less suitable parliamentary expression in appraising or characterising the civic courage of such persons as, for instance, the *Nashe Slovo*¹³ authors, who write of “Mr.” Hyndman with contempt, while speaking – or saying nothing – of “Comrade” Kautsky with deference (or obsequiousness?). Can such an attitude be reconciled with a respect for socialism, and for one's convictions in general? If you are convinced that Hyndman's chauvinism is false and destructive, does it not follow that you should direct your criticism and attacks against Kautsky, the *more influential* and more dangerous defender of such views?

In perhaps greater detail than anywhere else, Guesde's views have recently been expressed by the Guesdist Charles Dumas, in a pamphlet entitled *The Peace That We Desire*. This “Chef du Cabinet de Jules Guesde”, as he styles himself on the title-page of the pamphlet, naturally “quotes” the former patriotic declarations of the

socialists (David, the German social-chauvinist, does the same in his latest pamphlet on defence of the fatherland), but he fails to refer to the Basle Manifesto! Plekhanov, who utters chauvinist banalities with an extraordinarily smug air, is likewise silent on the Manifesto. Kautsky behaves just like Plekhanov: in quoting from the Basle Manifesto, he *omits* all the revolutionary passages (i. e., all the vital content!) probably on the pretext of the censorship regulations.... The police and the military authorities, whose censorship regulations forbid any mention of the class struggle or revolution, have rendered timely aid to the traitors to socialism!

Perhaps the Basle Manifesto is just an empty appeal, which is devoid of any definite content, either historical or tactical, with a direct bearing on the concrete war of today?

The reverse is true. The Basle resolution has less idle declamation and more definite content than other resolutions have. The Basle resolution speaks of the *very same* war that has now broken out, of the *imperialist* conflicts that have flared up in 1914-15. The conflicts between Austria and Serbia over the Balkans, between Austria and Italy over Albania, etc., between Britain and Germany over markets and colonies in general, between Russia and Turkey, etc., over Armenia and Constantinople – all this is what the Basle resolution speaks of in anticipation of the present war. It follows from that resolution that the *present* war between “the Great Powers of Europe” *“cannot be justified on the slightest pretext of being in the least in the interests of the people”*.

And if Plekhanov and Kautsky – to take two of the most typical and authoritative socialists, who are well known to us, one of whom writes in Russian while the other is translated into Russian by the liquidators – are now (with the aid of Axelrod) seeking all sorts of “popular justifications” for the war (or, rather, vulgar ones taken from the bourgeois gutter press); if, with a learned mien and with a stock of false quotations from Marx, they refer to “precedents”, to the wars of 1813 and 1870 (Plekhanov), or of 1854-71, 1876-77, 1897 (Kautsky), then, in truth, only those without a shadow of socialist conviction, without a shred of socialist conscience, can take such arguments in earnest, can *fail* to call them

otherwise than unparalleled Jesuitism, hypocrisy and the prostitution of socialism! Let the Executive (*Vorstand*) of the German Party anathematise Mehring and Rosa Luxemburg's new magazine (*Die Internationale*) for its honest criticism of Kautsky; let Vandervelde, Plekhanov, Hyndman and Co. treat their opponents in the same manner, with the aid of the police of the Allied Powers.¹⁴ We shall reply by simply reprinting the Basle Manifesto, which will show that the leaders have chosen a course that can only be called treachery.

The Basle resolution does not speak of a national or a people's war—examples of which have occurred in Europe, wars that were even typical of the period of 1789-1871—or of a revolutionary war, which Social-Democrats have never renounced, but of the *present* war, which is the outcome of “capitalist imperialism” and “dynastic interests”, the outcome of “the policy of conquest” pursued by *both* groups of belligerent powers—the Austro-German and the Anglo-Franco-Russian. Plekhanov, Kautsky and Co. are flagrantly deceiving the workers by repeating the selfish lie of the bourgeoisie of all countries, which is striving with all its might to depict this imperialist and predatory war for colonies as a people's war, a war of defence (for any side); when they seek to justify this war by citing historical examples of *non-imperialist* wars.

The question as to the imperialist, predatory and anti-proletarian character of the present war has long outgrown the purely theoretical stage. All the main features of imperialism have been theoretically assessed, as a struggle being waged by the senile and moribund bourgeoisie for the partition of the world and the enslavement of “small” nations; these conclusions have been repeated thousands of times in the vast socialist press in *all* countries; in his pamphlet *The Impending War (1911)*, for example, the Frenchman Delaisi, a representative of one of our “Allied” nations, has explained in simple terms the predatory character of the present war, with reference to the French bourgeoisie as well. But that is far from all. At Basle, representatives of the proletarian parties of all countries gave unanimous and formal expression to their unshakable conviction that a war of an imperialist character was impending, and drew *tactical* conclusions

therefrom. For this reason, among others, we must flatly reject, as sophistry, all references to an inadequate discussion on the difference between national and international tactics (see Axelrod's latest interview in *Nashe Slovo* Nos. 87 and 90), etc., etc. This is sophistry, because a comprehensive scientific analysis of imperialism is one thing – that analysis is only under way and, in essence, is as infinite as science itself. The principles of socialist tactics against capitalist imperialism, which have been set forth in millions of copies of Social-Democratic newspapers and in the decision of the International, are a quite different thing. Socialist parties are not debating clubs, but organisations of the fighting proletariat; when a number of battalions have gone over to the enemy, they must be named and branded as traitors; we must not allow ourselves to be taken in by hypocritical assertions that “not everybody understands imperialism in the same way”, or that the chauvinist Kautsky and the chauvinist Cunow can write volumes about it, or that the question has not been “adequately discussed”, etc., etc. Capitalism will *never* be completely and *exhaustively* studied in *all* the manifestations of its predatory nature, and in all the most minute ramifications of its historical development and national features. Scholars (and especially the pedants) will never stop arguing over details. It would be ridiculous to give up the socialist struggle against capitalism and to desist from opposing, on such grounds, those who have betrayed that struggle. But what else are Kautsky, Cunow, Axelrod and their like inviting us to do?

Now, when war has broken out, no one has even attempted to examine the Basle resolution and prove that it is erroneous.

II

But perhaps sincere socialists supported the Basle resolution in the anticipation that war would create a revolutionary situation, the events rebutting them, as revolution has proved impossible?

It is by means of sophistry like this that Cunow (in a pamphlet *Collapse of the Party?* and a series of articles) has tried to justify his desertion to the camp of the bourgeoisie. The writings of nearly all the other social-

chauvinists, headed by Kautsky, hint at similar "arguments". Hopes for a revolution have proved illusory, and it is not the business of a Marxist to fight for illusions, Cunow argues. This Struvist, however, does not say a word about "illusions" that were shared by all signatories to the Basle Manifesto. Like a most upright man, he would put the blame on the extreme Leftists, such as Pannekoek and Radek!

Let us consider the substance of the argument that the authors of the Basle Manifesto sincerely expected the advent of a revolution, but were rebutted by the events. The Basle Manifesto says: (1) that war will create an economic and political crisis; (2) that the workers will regard their participation in war as a crime, and as criminal any "shooting each other down for the profit of the capitalists, for the sake of dynastic honour and of diplomatic secret treaties", and that war evokes "indignation and revolt" in the workers; (3) that it is the duty of socialists to take advantage of this crisis and of the workers' temper so as to "rouse the people and hasten the downfall of capitalism"; (4) that all "governments" without exception can start a war only at "their own peril"; (5) that governments "are afraid of a proletarian revolution"; (6) that governments "should remember" the Paris Commune (i. e., civil war), the 1905 Revolution in Russia, etc. All these are perfectly clear ideas; they do not *guarantee* that revolution will take place, but lay stress on a precise characterisation of *facts* and *trends*. Whoever declares, with regard to these ideas and arguments, that the anticipated revolution has proved illusory, is displaying not a Marxist but a Struvist and police-renegade attitude towards revolution.

To the Marxist it is indisputable that a revolution is impossible without a revolutionary situation; furthermore, it is not every revolutionary situation that leads to revolution. What, generally speaking, are the symptoms of a revolutionary situation? We shall certainly not be mistaken if we indicate the following three major symptoms: (1) when it is impossible for the ruling classes to maintain their rule without any change; when there is a crisis, in one form or another, among the "upper classes", a crisis in the policy of the ruling class, leading to a fissure through which the discontent and indignation of the

oppressed classes burst forth. For a revolution to take place, it is usually insufficient for "the lower classes not to want" to live in the old way; it is also necessary that "the upper classes should be unable" to live in the old way; (2) when the suffering and want of the oppressed classes have grown more acute than usual; (3) when, as a consequence of the above causes, there is a considerable increase in the activity of the masses, who uncomplainingly allow themselves to be robbed in "peace time", but, in turbulent times, are drawn both by all the circumstances of the crisis *and by the "upper classes" themselves* into independent historical action.

Without these objective changes, which are independent of the will, not only of individual groups and parties, but even of individual classes, a revolution, as a general rule, is impossible. The totality of all these objective changes is called a revolutionary situation. Such a situation existed in 1905 in Russia, and in all revolutionary periods in the West; it also existed in Germany in the sixties of the last century, and in Russia in 1859-61 and 1879-80, although no revolution occurred in these instances. Why was that? It was because it is not every revolutionary situation that gives rise to a revolution; revolution arises only out of a situation in which the above-mentioned objective changes are accompanied by a subjective change, namely the ability of the revolutionary *class* to take revolutionary mass action *strong* enough to break (or dislocate) the old government, which never, not even in a period of crisis, "falls", if it is not toppled over.

Such are the Marxist views on revolution, views that have been developed many, many times, have been accepted as indisputable by all Marxists, and for us, Russians, were corroborated in a particularly striking fashion by the experience of 1905. What, then, did the Basle Manifesto assume in this respect in 1912, and what took place in 1914-15?

It assumed that a revolutionary situation, which it briefly described as "an economic and political crisis", would arise. Has such a situation arisen? Undoubtedly, it has. The social-chauvinist Lensch, who defends chauvinism more candidly, publicly and honestly than the hypocrites Cunow, Kautsky, Plekhanov and Co. do, has gone so far as to say: "What we are passing through is

a kind of *revolution*" (p. 6 of his pamphlet, *German Social-Democracy and the War*, Berlin, 1915). A political crisis exists; no government is sure of the morrow, not one is secure against the danger of financial collapse, loss of territory, expulsion from its country (in the way the Belgian Government was expelled). All governments are sleeping on a volcano; all are *themselves* calling for the masses to display initiative and heroism. The entire political regime of Europe has been shaken, and hardly anybody will deny that we have entered (and are entering ever deeper – I write this on the day of Italy's declaration of war) a period of immense political upheavals. When, two months after the declaration of war, Kautsky wrote (October 2, 1914, in *Die Neue Zeit*) that "never is government so strong, never are parties so weak as at the outbreak of a war", this was a sample of the falsification of historical science which Kautsky has perpetrated to please the Südekums and other opportunists. In the first place, never do governments stand in such need of agreement with all the parties of the ruling classes, or of the "peaceful" submission of the oppressed classes to that rule, as in the time of war. Secondly, even though "at the beginning of a war", and especially in a country that expects a speedy victory, the government *seems* all-powerful, nobody in the world has ever linked expectations of a revolutionary situation exclusively with the "beginning" of a war, and still less has anybody ever identified the "seeming" with the *actual*.

It was generally known, seen and admitted that a European war would be more severe than any war in the past. This is being borne out in ever greater measure by the experience of the war. The conflagration is spreading; the political foundations of Europe are being shaken more and more; the sufferings of the masses are appalling, the efforts of governments, the bourgeoisie and the opportunists to hush up these sufferings proving ever more futile. The war profits being obtained by certain groups of capitalists are monstrously high, and contradictions are growing extremely acute. The smouldering indignation of the masses, the vague yearning of society's downtrodden and ignorant strata for a kindly ("democratic") peace, the beginning of discontent among the "lower classes" – all these are facts. The longer the

war drags on and the more acute it becomes, the more the governments themselves foster – and must foster – the activity of the masses, whom they call upon to make extraordinary effort and self-sacrifice. The experience of the war, like the experience of any crisis in history, of any great calamity and any sudden turn in human life, stuns and breaks some people, *but enlightens and tempers others*. Taken by and large, and considering the history of the world as a whole, the number and strength of the second kind of people have – with the exception of individual cases of the decline and fall of one state or another – proved greater than those of the former kind.

Far from “immediately” ending all these sufferings and all this enhancement of contradictions, the conclusion of peace will, in many respects, make those sufferings more keenly and immediately felt by the most backward masses of the population.

In a word, a revolutionary situation obtains in most of the advanced countries and the Great Powers of Europe. In this respect, the prediction of the Basle Manifesto has been *fully* confirmed. To deny this truth, directly or indirectly, or to ignore it, as Cunow, Plekhanov, Kautsky and Co. have done, means telling a big lie, deceiving the working class, and serving the bourgeoisie. In *Sotsial-Demokrat* (Nos. 34, 40 and 41)¹⁵ we cited facts which prove that those who *fear* revolution – petty-bourgeois Christian parsons, the General Staffs and millionaires’ newspapers – are compelled to admit that symptoms of a revolutionary situation exist in Europe.

Will this situation last long; how much more acute will it become? Will it lead to revolution? This is something we do not know, and nobody can know. The answer can be provided only by the *experience* gained during the development of revolutionary sentiment and the transition to revolutionary action by the advanced class, the proletariat. There can be no talk in this connection about “illusions” or their repudiation, since no socialist has ever guaranteed that this war (and not the next one), that today’s revolutionary situation (and not tomorrow’s) will produce a revolution. What we are discussing is the indisputable and fundamental duty of all socialists – that of revealing to the masses the existence of a revolutionary situation, **explaining its scope and depth**, arousing the

proletariat's revolutionary consciousness and revolutionary determination, helping it to go over to revolutionary action, and forming, for that purpose, organisations suited to the revolutionary situation.

No influential or responsible socialist has ever dared to feel doubt that this is the duty of the socialist parties. Without spreading or harbouring the least "illusions", the Basle Manifesto spoke specifically of this duty of the socialists - to rouse and to stir up the people (and not to lull them with chauvinism, as Plekhanov, Axelrod and Kautsky have done), to take advantage of the crisis so as to *hasten* the downfall of capitalism, and to be guided by the *examples* of the Commune¹⁶ and of October-December 1905.¹⁷ The present parties' failure to perform that duty meant their treachery, political death, renunciation of their own role and desertion to the side of the bourgeoisie.

III

But how *could* it have happened that the most prominent representatives and leaders of the Second International have betrayed socialism? We shall deal with this question in detail later, after we have examined the attempts being made to give this treachery "theoretical" justification. We shall try to characterise the principal theories of social-chauvinism, of which Plekhanov (who in the main reiterates the arguments of the Anglo-French chauvinists, Hyndman and his new adherents) and Kautsky (who advances much more "subtle" arguments) with their semblance of far greater theoretical profundity may be regarded as representatives.

Perhaps the most primitive of these is the "who-started-it?" theory, which may be worded as follows: we have been attacked and are defending ourselves; the interests of the proletariat demand that the violators of the peace in Europe should be properly dealt with. This is merely a rehash of the declarations made by all governments and of the outcries of the bourgeois and the gutter press all over the world. Plekhanov embellishes even this threadbare piece of vulgarity with his inevitable Jesuitical reference to "dialectics": to be able to assess the concrete situation, he says, we must first of all find out who started it and

punish him; all other problems will have to wait until another situation arises. (See Plekhanov's pamphlet, *The War*, Paris, 1914, and Axelrod's repetition of its arguments, in *Golos*¹⁸ Nos. 86 and 87.) Plekhanov has set a new record in the noble sport of substituting sophistry for dialectics. The sophist grabs at one of many "arguments"; it was Hegel who long ago very properly observed that "arguments" can be found to prove anything in the world. Dialectics calls for a many-sided investigation into a given social phenomenon in its development, and for the external and the seeming to be reduced to the fundamental motive forces, to the development of the productive forces and to the class struggle. Plekhanov has plucked out a quotation from the German Social-Democratic press: the Germans themselves, before the war, admitted that Austria and Germany had "started it", he says, and there you are. He does not mention the fact that the Russian socialists repeatedly exposed the tsarist plans of conquest of Galicia, Armenia, etc. He does not make the slightest attempt to study the economic and diplomatic history of at least the past three decades, which history proves conclusively that the conquest of colonies, the looting of foreign countries, the ousting and ruining of the more successful rivals have been the backbone of the politics of *both* groups of the now belligerent powers.*

* Very instructive is *The War of Steel and Gold* (London, 1914, a book dated March 1914!), by the British pacifist Brailsford, who is not averse to posing as a socialist. The author clearly realises that national problems are now in the background, and have been solved (p. 35), that this is not the issue of the day, that "the typical question of modern diplomacy" (p. 36) is the Baghdad railway, the contracts for rails for it, the Moroccan mines, and the like. The author correctly considers as one of the "most instructive incidents in the recent history of European diplomacy" the fact that French patriots and British imperialists fought against Caillaux's attempts (in 1911 and 1913) to come to terms with Germany on the basis of an agreement on the division of spheres of colonial influence and the quotation of German securities on the Paris Bourse. The *British* and the *French* bourgeoisie *frustrated* such an agreement (pp. 38-40). The aim of imperialism is the export of capital to the weaker countries (p. 74). In Britain, the profits from such capital totalled between £90,000,000 and £100,000,000 in 1899 (Giffen), and £140,000,000 in 1909 (Paish); we would add that, in a recent speech, Lloyd George calculated it at £200,000,000, which is almost 2,000 million rubles. Unsavoury machinations and bribing of high-ranking Turks, and cushy jobs in India and Egypt for the younger sons of the British aristocracy, such

With reference to wars, the main thesis of dialectics, which has been so shamelessly distorted by Plekhanov to please the bourgeoisie, is that "*war is simply the continuation of politics by other [i. e., violent] means*". Such is the formula of Clausewitz,* one of the greatest writers on the history of war, whose thinking was stimulated by Hegel. And it was always the standpoint of Marx and Engels, who regarded *any* war as the *continuation* of the politics of the powers concerned – and the *various classes* within these countries – in a definite period.

Plekhanov's crude chauvinism is based on exactly the same theoretical stand as the more subtle and saccharo-conciliatory chauvinism of Kautsky, who uses the following arguments when he gives his blessing to the desertion of the socialists of all countries to the side of their "own" capitalists:

are the main features (pp. 85-87). An insignificant minority gains from armaments and wars, he says, but that minority is backed by "society" and the financiers, whereas behind the adherents of peace there is a disunited population (p. 93). A pacifist who today talks about peace and disarmament tomorrow proves to be a member of a party wholly dependent on the war contractors (p. 161). If the Triple Entente wins, it will grab Morocco and partition Persia; if the Triple Alliance wins, it will take over Tripoli, strengthen its hold on Bosnia and subordinate Turkey (p. 167). In March 1906, London and Paris provided Russia with thousands of millions, and helped tsarism crush the movement for freedom (pp. 225-28); today Britain is helping Russia to throttle Persia (p. 229). Russia instigated the Balkan War (p. 230).

There is nothing novel about this, is there? All this is common knowledge and has been reiterated a thousand times in Social-Democratic newspapers all over the world. On the eve of the war a British bourgeois sees all this as clearly as can be. Against the background of these simple and universally known facts, what drivelling nonsense, what smug hypocrisy, what glib lies are the theories advanced by Plekhanov and Potresov concerning Germany's guilt, or Kautsky's theory concerning the "prospects" of disarmament and a lasting peace under capitalism!

* Karl von Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege*, Werke, I. Bd., S. 28. Cf. III. Bd., S. 139-40: "All know that wars are caused only by the political relations of governments and of nations; but ordinarily one pictures the situation as if, with the beginning of the war, these relations cease and a totally new situation is created, which follows its own laws. We assert, on the contrary, that war is nothing but the continuation of political relations, with different intensity." <https://www.marxists.org/archive/Clausewitz/>

It is the right and duty of everyone to defend his fatherland; true internationalism consists in this right being recognised for the socialists of all nations, including those who are at war with my nation.... (See *Die Neue Zeit*, October 2, 1914, and other works by the same author.)

This matchless reasoning is such an unutterable travesty of socialism that the best answer to it would be to strike a medal with the portraits of Wilhelm II and Nicholas II on one side and of Plekhanov and Kautsky on the other. True internationalism, we are told, means that we must justify German workers firing at French workers, and French workers firing at German workers, in the name of "defence of the fatherland"!

However, closer examination of the theoretical premises in Kautsky's reasoning will reveal the selfsame idea that Clausewitz ridiculed about eighty years ago, viz., that when war breaks out, all historically created political relations between nations and classes cease and that a totally new situation arises! There are "simply" those that attack and those that are defending themselves, "simply" the warding off of the "enemies of the fatherland"! The oppression of a number of nations which comprise over half the population of the globe, by the dominant imperialist nations; the rivalry between the bourgeoisie of these countries for a share of the loot; the desire of the capitalists to split and suppress the working-class movement – all these have suddenly disappeared from the ken of Plekhanov and Kautsky, although they themselves were describing these very "politics" for decades before the war.

In this connection, false references to Marx and Engels are the crowning argument of these two chieftains of social-chauvinism; Plekhanov recalls Prussia's national war of 1813 and Germany's national war of 1870, while Kautsky argues, with a most learned air, that Marx examined the question of whose success (i. e., the success of which bourgeoisie) was more desirable in the wars of 1854-55, 1859 and 1870-71, and that the Marxists did likewise in the wars of 1876-77 and 1897. In all times the sophists have been in the habit of citing instances that refer to situations that are dissimilar in principle. The wars of the past, to which they make references, were a "continuation of the politics" of the bourgeoisie's national movements of many years' standing, movements

against an alien yoke and against absolutism (Turkish or Russian). At that time the only question was: the success of which bourgeoisie was to be preferred; for wars of this type, the Marxists could *rouse* the peoples in *advance*, *fostering* national hatred, as Marx did in 1848 and later, when he called for a war against Russia, and as Engels in 1859 fostered German national hatred of their oppressors - Napoleon III and Russian tsarism.*

Comparing the "continuation of the politics" of combating feudalism and absolutism - the politics of the bourgeoisie in its struggle for liberty - with the "continuation of the politics" of a decrepit, *i. e.*, imperialist, bourgeoisie, *i. e.*, of a bourgeoisie which has plundered the entire world, a reactionary bourgeoisie which, in alliance with feudal landlords, attempts to crush the proletariat, means comparing chalk and cheese. It is like comparing the "representatives of the bourgeoisie", Robespierre, Garibaldi and Zhelyabov, with such "representatives of the bourgeoisie" as Millerand, Salandra and Guchkov. One cannot be a Marxist without feeling the deepest respect for the great bourgeois revolutionaries who had an historic right to speak for their respective bourgeois "fatherlands", and, in the struggle against feudalism, led tens of millions of people in the new nations towards a civilised life. Neither can one be a Marxist without feeling contempt for the sophistry of Plekhanov and Kautsky, who speak of the "defence of the fatherland" with regard to the throttling of Belgium by the German imperialists, or with regard to the pact between the imperialists of Britain, France, Russia and Italy on the plundering of Austria and Turkey.

* Mr. Gardenin in *Zhizn* labels as "revolutionary chauvinism" - but chauvinism - Marx's stand in 1848 for revolutionary war against the European nations which in fact had shown themselves to be counter-revolutionary, viz., "the Slavs and the Russians in particular". This reproof of Marx reveals once again the opportunism (or - properly speaking and - the inconsequence) of this "Left" Socialist-Revolutionary. We Marxists have always stood, and still stand, for a *revolutionary* war against *counter-revolutionary* nations. For instance, if socialism is *victorious* in America or in Europe in 1920, and Japan and China, let us say, *then* move their Bismarcks against us - if only diplomatically at first - we certainly would be *in favour* of an offensive revolutionary war against them. It seems strange to you, Mr. Gardenin? But then you are a revolutionary of the Ropshin type!

There is another "Marxist" theory of social-chauvinism, which runs as follows: socialism is based on the rapid development of capitalism; the development of capitalism in my country, and consequently the advent of socialism there will be speeded up by her victory; my country's defeat will retard her economic development and consequently the advent of socialism. In Russia this Struvist theory¹⁹ has been developed by Plekhanov, and among the Germans by Lensch and others. Kautsky argues against this crude theory - against Lensch, who defends it overtly, and against Cunow, who defends it covertly; his sole purpose, however, is to reconcile the social-chauvinists of all countries on the basis of a more subtle and more Jesuitical chauvinist theory.

We need not dwell on this crude theory. Struve's *Critical Notes* appeared in 1894, and during the past twenty years Russian Social-Democrats have become thoroughly familiar with this habit of the enlightened Russian bourgeois of advancing their ideas and advocating their desires under the cloak of a "Marxism" *purged* of revolutionary content. Struvism is not merely a Russian, but, as recent events clearly prove, an international striving on the part of the bourgeois theoreticians to kill Marxism with "kindness", to crush it in their embraces, kill it with a feigned acceptance of "all" the "truly scientific" aspects and elements of Marxism *except* its "agitational", "demagogic", "Blanquist-utopian" aspect. In other words, they take from Marxism all that is acceptable to the liberal bourgeoisie, including the struggle for reforms, the class struggle (without the proletarian dictatorship), the "general" recognition of "socialist ideals" and the substitution of a "new order" for capitalism; they cast aside "only" the living soul of Marxism, "only" its revolutionary content.

Marxism is the theory of the proletarian movement for emancipation. It is clear, therefore, that the class-conscious workers must pay the utmost attention to any substitution of Struvism for Marxism. The motive forces in this process are varied and manifold. We shall indicate only the three main forces: (1) the development of science is providing more and more material that proves that Marx was right. This makes it necessary to fight against him hypocritically - not to oppose the principles of Marxism

openly, but to pretend to accept Marxism, while emasculating it by sophistry and turning it into a holy "icon" that is harmless to the bourgeoisie. (2) The development of opportunism among the Social-Democratic parties fosters such a re-fashioning of Marxism, and adjusts it for a justification of all kinds of concessions to opportunism. (3) The epoch of imperialism is one in which the world is divided among the "great" privileged nations that oppress all other nations. Morsels of the loot obtained as a result of these privileges and this oppression undoubtedly fall to the share of certain sections of the petty bourgeoisie and to the working-class aristocracy and bureaucracy. These strata, which form an insignificant minority of the proletariat and of the toiling masses, gravitate towards "Struvism", because it provides them with a justification of their alliance with their "own" national bourgeoisie, against the oppressed masses of *all* nations. We shall have occasion to deal with this later, in connection with the causes of the collapse of the International.

IV

The most subtle theory of social-chauvinism, one that has been most skilfully touched up to look scientific and international, is the theory of "ultra-imperialism" advanced by Kautsky. Here is the clearest, most precise and most recent exposition of this theory, in the words of the author himself:

"The subsiding of the Protectionist movement in Britain; the lowering of tariffs in America; the trend towards disarmament; the rapid decline in the export of capital from France and Germany in the years immediately preceding the war; finally, the growing international interweaving between the various cliques of finance capital - all this has caused me to consider whether the present imperialist policy cannot be supplanted by a new, ultra-imperialist policy, which will introduce the joint exploitation of the world by internationally united finance capital in place of the mutual rivalries of national finance capital. Such a new phase of capitalism is at any rate conceivable. Can it be achieved? Sufficient premises are still lacking to enable us to answer this question..." (*Die Neue Zeit*, No. 5, April 30, 1915, p. 144).

"The course and the outcome of the present war may prove decisive in this respect. It may entirely crush the weak beginnings of ultra-imperialism by fanning to the highest degree national hatred also among the finance capitalists, by intensifying the armaments race, and by making a second world war inevitable. Under such conditions, the thing I foresaw and formulated in my pamphlet, *The Road to*

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Power, would come true in horrifying dimensions; class antagonisms would become sharper and sharper and with it would come the moral decay [literally: "going out of business, *Abwirtschaftung*", bankruptcy] of capitalism.... [It must be noted that by this pretentious word Kautsky means simply the "hatred" which the "strata intermediary between the proletariat and finance capital", namely, "the intelligentsia, the petty bourgeois, even small capitalists", feel towards capitalism.] But the war may end otherwise. It may lead to the strengthening of the weak beginnings of ultra-imperialism.... Its lessons [note this!] may hasten developments for which we would have to wait a long time under peace conditions. If it does lead to this, to an agreement between nations, disarmament and a lasting peace, then the worst of the causes that led to the growing moral decay of capitalism before the war may disappear." The new phase will, of course, bring the proletariat "new misfortunes", "perhaps even worse", but "for a time", "ultra-imperialism" "could create an era of new hopes and expectations within the framework of capitalism" (p. 145).

How is a justification of social-chauvinism deduced from this "theory"?

In a way rather strange for a "theoretician", namely as follows:

The Left-wing Social-Democrats in Germany say that imperialism and the wars it engenders are not accidental, but an inevitable product of capitalism, which has brought about the domination of finance capital. It is therefore necessary to go over to the revolutionary mass struggle, as the period of comparatively peaceful development has ended. The "Right"-wing Social-Democrats brazenly declare: since imperialism is "necessary", we too must be imperialists. Kautsky, in the role of the "Centre", tries to reconcile these two views.

"The extreme Lefts," he writes in his pamphlet, *The National State, the Imperialist State and the League of States* (Nuremberg, 1915), wish to "contrapose" socialism to inevitable imperialism, i.e., "not only the propaganda for socialism that we have been carrying on for half a century in contraposition to all forms of capitalist domination, but the immediate achievement of socialism. This seems very radical, but it can only serve to *drive* into the camp of imperialism *anyone* who *does not believe* in the immediate practical achievement of socialism" (p. 17, italics ours).

When he speaks of the immediate achievement of socialism, Kautsky is resorting to a subterfuge, for he takes advantage of the fact that in Germany, especially under the military censorship, revolutionary action cannot be spoken of. Kautsky is well aware that the Left wing is demanding of the Party *immediate* propaganda in favour of ~~and preparation for~~ ^{and preparation for} revolutionary action,

not the "immediate practical achievement of socialism".

From the necessity of imperialism the Left wing deduces the necessity of revolutionary action. The "theory of ultra-imperialism", however, serves Kautsky as a means *to justify the opportunists*, to present the situation in such a light as to create the impression that they have not gone over to the bourgeoisie but simply "do not believe" that socialism can arrive immediately, and expect that a new "era" of disarmament and lasting peace "may be" ushered in. This "theory" boils down, and can *only* boil down, to the following: Kautsky is exploiting the *hope* for a *new* peaceful era of capitalism so as to justify the adhesion of the opportunists and the official Social-Democratic parties to the bourgeoisie, and their rejection of revolutionary, i.e., proletarian, tactics in the *present stormy era*, this despite the solemn declarations of the Basle resolution!

At the same time Kautsky does not say that this new phase follows, and necessarily so, from certain definite circumstances and conditions. On the contrary, he states quite outspokenly that he cannot yet even decide whether or not this new phase is "*achievable*". Indeed, consider the "trends" towards the new era, which have been indicated by Kautsky. Astonishingly enough, the author has included among the economic facts "the trend towards disarmament"! This means that, behind innocent philistine talk and pipe-dreaming, Kautsky is trying to hide from indisputable facts that do not at all fit in with the theory of the mitigation of contradictions. Kautsky's "ultra-imperialism" - this term, incidentally, does not at all express what the author wants to say - implies a tremendous *mitigation* of the contradictions of capitalism. We are told that Protectionism is subsiding in Britain and America. But where is there the least trend towards a new era? Extreme Protectionism is now subsiding in America, but Protectionism remains, just as the privileges, the preferential tariffs favouring Britain, have remained in that country's colonies. Let us recall what the passage from the previous and "peaceful" period of capitalism to the present and imperialist period has been based on: free competition has yielded to monopolist capitalist combines, and the world has been partitioned. Both these facts (and factors) are obviously of world-wide significance: Free Trade and

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peaceful competition were possible and necessary as long as capital was in a position to enlarge its colonies without hindrance, and seize unoccupied land in Africa, etc., and as long as the concentration of capital was still weak and no monopolist concerns existed, i.e., concerns of a magnitude permitting domination in an *entire* branch of industry. The appearance and growth of such monopolist concerns (has this process been stopped in Britain or America? Not even Kautsky will dare deny that the war has accelerated and intensified it) have rendered the free competition of former times *impossible*; they have cut the ground from under its feet, while the partition of the world *compels* the capitalists to go over from peaceful expansion to an armed struggle for the *repartitioning* of colonies and spheres of influence. It is ridiculous to think that the *subsiding* of Protectionism in two countries can change anything in this respect.

Let us further examine the fall in capital exports from two countries in the course of a few years. In 1912 these two countries, France and Germany, each had about 35,000 million marks (about 17,000 million rubles) of foreign investments, this according to Harms's statistics, while Britain alone had twice that sum.* The increase in exports of capital has never proceeded evenly under capitalism, nor could that have been so. Kautsky dares not even suggest that the accumulation of capital has decreased, or that the capacity of the home market has undergone any important change, say through a big improvement in the conditions of the masses. In these circumstances, the fall in capital exports from two countries over several years cannot imply the advent of a new era.

"The growing international interweaving between the cliques of finance capital" is the only really general and indubitable tendency, not during the last few years and in two countries, but throughout the whole capitalist world. But why should this trend engender a striving towards disarmament, not armaments, as hitherto? Take any one

* See Bernhard Harms, *Probleme der Weltwirtschaft*, Jena, 1912; George Paish, "Great Britain's Capital Investments in the Colonies, etc." in the *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, Vol. LXXIV, 1910/11, p. 167, Lloyd George, in a speech early in 1915, estimated British capital invested abroad at £4,000,000,000, i.e., about 80,000,000,000 marks.

of the world-famous cannon (and arms) manufacturers, Armstrong, for instance. The British *Economist* (May 1, 1915) published figures showing that this firm's *profits* rose from £606,000 (about 6,000,000 rubles) in 1905/6 to £856,000 in 1913, and to £940,000 (9,000,000 rubles) in 1914. Here, the intertwining of finance capital is most pronounced, and is on the increase; German capitalists have "holdings" in British firms; British firms build submarines for Austria, and so on. Interlinked on a world-wide scale, capital is thriving on armaments and wars. To think that the fact of capital in the individual states combining and interlinking on an international scale must of necessity produce an economic trend towards disarmament means, in effect, allowing well-meaning philistine expectations of an easing of class contradictions take the place of the actual intensification of those contradictions.

V

It is in a wholly philistine spirit that Kautsky speaks of the "lessons" of the war, presenting those lessons in the light of a moral abhorrence at the misery it causes. Here, for instance, is how he argues in the pamphlet entitled *The National State, etc.*:

"It stands beyond doubt and needs no proof that there are strata of the population that are greatly interested in universal peace and disarmament. The petty bourgeoisie and the small peasants, and even many capitalists and intellectuals, are not tied to imperialism by any interests that outweigh the damage suffered by these strata as a result of war and armaments" (p. 21).

This was written in February 1915! The facts show that all the propertied classes, down to the petty bourgeoisie and the "intelligentsia", have joined the imperialists *en masse*, and yet Kautsky, like Chekhov's man in a muffler shrugs off the facts with an air of extraordinary smugness and with the aid of saccharine phrases. He judges of the interests of the petty bourgeoisie, not by their *conduct*, but by the *words* of certain petty bourgeois, although at every step such words are refuted by the deeds. It is exactly like judging of the "interests" of the bourgeoisie in general, not by their deeds, but by the benevolent speeches made by bourgeois clergymen who avow that the present-day system is imbued with the ideals

of Christianity. Kautsky applies Marxism in a way that voids it of all content, so that what remains is the catchword of "interests", in a kind of supernatural, otherworldly meaning, for it implies, not real economics, but pious wishes for the common weal.

Marxism appraises "interests" according to the class antagonisms and the class struggle which find expression in millions of facts of daily life. The petty bourgeoisie prattle and dream of the abatement of antagonisms, whose aggravation, they "argue", leads to "harmful consequences". Imperialism means the subjugation of all strata of the propertied classes to finance capital, and the partition of the world among five or six "Great" Powers, most of which are now involved in the war. The partition of the world among the Great Powers means that all their propertied classes *are interested* in possessing colonies and spheres of influence, in oppressing other nations, and in securing the more or less lucrative posts and privileges that stem from belonging to a "Great" Power and an oppressor nation.*

Life *cannot* go on in the old way, in the comparatively tranquil, cultured and peaceful conditions of a capitalism that is smoothly developing and gradually spreading to new countries. A new epoch has arrived. Finance capital *ousts*, and will completely oust, a particular country from the ranks of Great Powers, will deprive it of its colonies and spheres of influence (as Germany, which has gone to war with Britain, threatens to do), and it will deprive the petty bourgeoisie of their dominant-nation privileges and additional incomes. This has been proved by the war.

* E. Schultze states that by 1915 the value of securities in the whole world was calculated at 732,000 million francs, including state and municipal loans, the mortgages and shares of commercial and manufacturing corporations, etc. Of this sum, Britain's share was 130,000 million francs, that of the United States 115,000 million, France 100,000 million and Germany 75,000 million, i.e., the share of all four Great Powers being 420,000 million francs, over half the total. From this one can realise the advantages and privileges accruing to the leading Great Powers, which have outstripped other nations, oppressing and plundering the latter. (Dr. Ernst Schultze, *Das französische Kapital in Russland in Finanz-Archiv*, Berlin, 1915, 32nd year of publication, p. 127.) To a Great Power "defence of the fatherland" means defence of the right to share in the plundering of foreign countries. In Russia, as is common knowledge, capitalist imperialism is weaker than military-feudal imperialism is.

It is the *outcome* of that aggravation of antagonisms which has long been admitted by all, including Kautsky, in his pamphlet *The Road to Power*.

Now that the armed conflict for Great-Power privileges has become a fact, Kautsky wants to *persuade* the capitalists and the petty bourgeoisie to believe that war is horrible, while disarmament is beneficial, in exactly the same way and with exactly the same results as the Christian churchman, speaking from the pulpit, would persuade the capitalist to believe that love of one's fellow-men is a Divine commandment, as well as the spiritual yearning and the moral law of civilisation. What Kautsky calls an economic trend towards "ultra-imperialism" is just a petty-bourgeois *exhortation* to the financiers that they should refrain from doing evil.

The export of capital? *But* more capital is exported to independent countries such as the United States of America, than to the colonies. The seizure of colonies? *But* they have all been seized, and nearly all of them are striving for liberation. "India may cease to be a British possession, but as an integral empire it will never fall under the sway of another foreign power" (p. 49 in the pamphlet quoted). "Any attempt on the part of any industrial capitalist state to acquire for itself a colonial empire sufficient to make it independent of other countries in regard to raw materials must cause all other capitalist states to unite against it and involve it in endless and exhausting wars, without bringing it nearer to its goal. Such a policy would be the surest road towards the bankruptcy of the entire economic life of that state" (pp. 72-73).

Is not this a philistine attempt to persuade financiers to renounce imperialism? Any attempt to frighten capitalists with the prospect of bankruptcy is like advising against speculating in shares on the Stock Exchange because many fortunes have been lost in this way. Capital *gains* from the bankruptcy of a rival capitalist or of a rival nation, because in this way capital becomes more concentrated. Hence the keener and "closer" economic competition becomes, i.e., the economic driving of a competitor towards bankruptcy, the more the capitalists strive to add *military* pressure in order to drive the competitor in that direction. The fewer the countries to which capital

can still be exported as advantageously as to colonies or to such dependent states as Turkey—since in *such* cases the financier reaps a triple profit as against capital exports to a free, independent and civilised country like the United States of America—the *fiercer* is the struggle for the subjugation and partition of Turkey, China, etc. That is what economic theory reveals about the period of finance capital and imperialism. That is what the facts reveal. But Kautsky turns everything into a trite petty-bourgeois “moral”: it is not worth while getting worked up and certainly not worth while going to war over the partition of Turkey, or the seizure of India, since they cannot be held for long anyway, and, moreover, it would be better to develop capitalism peacefully.... It would be better still, of course, to develop capitalism and expand the home market by increasing wages; this is quite “conceivable” and it is a very fitting topic for a churchman to preach on to the financiers.... The good Kautsky has almost succeeded in persuading the German financiers that it is not worth while waging war against Britain for the colonies, because these colonies will soon secure their liberation in any case!

Britain’s exports to and imports from Egypt between 1872 and 1912 have not kept pace with the overall growth of British exports and imports, whence the “Marxist” Kautsky draws the following moral: “We have no reason to suppose that British trade with Egypt would have been less developed as a result of the mere operation of economic factors, without military occupation” (p. 72). “Capital’s urge to expand ... can be *best* promoted, not by the violent methods of imperialism, but by *peaceful democracy*” (p. 70).

What a remarkably serious, scientific and “Marxist” analysis! Kautsky has splendidly “rectified” unreasonable history; he has “proved” that there was no need for the British to have taken Egypt from the French, that it was absolutely not worth the German financiers’ while to have started the war, organised the Turkish campaign, and taken other measures to drive the British out of Egypt! All this is merely a misunderstanding—it has not yet dawned upon the British that it would be “best” to give up forcible methods in Egypt, and adopt “peaceful democracy” (so as to increase exports of capital à la Kautsky!).

"Of course it was an illusion on the part of the bourgeois Free-Traders to think that Free Trade would entirely eliminate the economic antagonisms generated by capitalism. Neither Free Trade nor democracy can eliminate these. We, in all respects, are interested in having these antagonisms eliminated by a struggle waged in such forms as will impose the least amount of suffering and sacrifice on the masses" (p. 73).

The Lord help us, the Lord have mercy on us! "What is a philistine?" Lassalle used to ask, and answered by quoting the words of the well-known poet: "A philistine is a gut void of everything but fear and hope that God will have mercy on him."²⁰

Kautsky has degraded Marxism to unparalleled prostitution and has turned into a real churchman. The latter tries to *persuade* the capitalists to adopt peaceful democracy – and calls this dialectics: if at first, he argues, there was Free Trade, and then arrived the monopolies and imperialism, why should there not be "ultra-imperialism", and then Free Trade again? The churchman *consoles* the oppressed masses by depicting the blessings this ultra-imperialism will bring, although he has not even the courage to say whether it can be "achieved"! Feuerbach was right when, in reply to those who defended religion on the ground that it consoles the people, he indicated the reactionary significance of consolation: whoever consoles the slave instead of arousing him to rise up against slavery is aiding the slave-owner.

All oppressing classes stand in need of two social functions to safeguard their rule: the function of the hangman and the function of the priest. The hangman is required to quell the protests and the indignation of the oppressed; the priest is required to console the oppressed, to depict to them the prospects of their sufferings and sacrifices being mitigated (this is particularly easy to do without guaranteeing that these prospects will be "achieved"), while preserving class rule, and thereby to reconcile them to class rule, win them away from revolutionary action, undermine their revolutionary spirit and destroy their revolutionary determination. Kautsky has turned Marxism into a most hideous and stupid counter-revolutionary theory, into the lowest kind of clericalism.

In 1909, he acknowledged, in his *The Road to Power*, the fact of the unrefuted and irrefutable intensification of antagonisms within capitalism, the approach of a period

of wars and revolutions, of a new "revolutionary period". There can be no "premature" revolution, he said, and branded as "a direct betrayal of our cause" any refusal to count on the possibility of victory in an uprising, even though, before the fighting began, the prospect of defeat could not be denied.

With the advent of war, the antagonisms have become *still* more bitter. The sufferings of the masses have assumed tremendous proportions. The end of the war is not in sight and the hostilities are spreading more and more. Kautsky is writing pamphlet after pamphlet and, meekly submitting to the dictates of the censorship, refrains from quoting the facts on the land-grabbing, the horrors of war, the scandalous profiteering of the war contractors, the high cost of living and the actual slavery of the workers mobilised in the munitions industries; instead, he keeps on consoling the proletariat. He does so by quoting the instance of wars in which the bourgeoisie was revolutionary and progressive, in regard to which "Marx himself" desired victory for one bourgeoisie or the other; he consoles it by quoting rows and columns of figures to prove that capitalism is "possible" without colonies, without the plundering of others, without wars and armaments, and to prove that "peaceful democracy" is preferable. Not daring to deny that the sufferings of the masses are becoming more acute and that a revolutionary situation is arising before our very eyes (one must not talk about this, since it is not permitted by the censor!), Kautsky, in his servility to the bourgeoisie and the opportunists, depicts the "prospect" (he does *not guarantee* that it can be "achieved") of forms of struggle in a new phase, which will entail "less sacrifice and suffering".... Franz Mehring and Rosa Luxemburg were quite right when, for this very reason, they called Kautsky a street-walker (*Mädchen für alle*).

* * *

In August 1905 a revolutionary situation existed in Russia. The tsar had promised convocation of the Bulygin Duma²¹ in order to "console" the masses who were in a state of unrest. If the abandoning of armaments by the financiers and their agreeing to a "lasting peace" can be

called "ultra-imperialism", then the Bulygin regime of consultative parliamentary representation may be described as "ultra-autocracy". Let us assume for a moment that tomorrow a hundred of the world's biggest financiers, "interwoven" as they are in hundreds of colossal enterprises, will *promise* the peoples that they will stand for disarmament after the war (we make this assumption only for a moment in order to draw political conclusions from Kautsky's foolish little theory). Even if that happened, it would be downright treachery to the proletariat to dissuade it from taking revolutionary action, without which all promises and all fine prospects are only a mirage.

The war has not only brought the capitalist class huge profits and splendid prospects of fresh plunder (Turkey, China, etc.), new contracts worth thousands of millions and new loans at increased rates of interest; it has also brought the capitalist class still greater political advantages in that it has split and corrupted the proletariat. Kautsky is encouraging this corruption; he sanctified this international *split* among the militant proletarians *in the name of unity* with the opportunists of their "own" nations, with the Südekums! And yet there are people who fail to understand that the unity slogan of the old parties means the "unity" of the proletariat of a given nation with the bourgeoisie of that nation, and a *split* among the proletariat of the various nations.

VI

The preceding lines had already been written when *Die Neue Zeit* of May 28 (No. 9) appeared with Kautsky's concluding arguments on the "collapse of Social-Democracy" (Section 7 of his reply to Cunow). Kautsky sums up all his old sophisms, and a new one, in defence of social-chauvinism as follows:

"It is simply untrue to say that the war is a purely imperialist one, that at the outbreak of the war the alternative was either imperialism or socialism, that the socialist parties and the proletarian masses of Germany, France and, in many respects, also of Britain, unthinkingly and at the mere call of a handful of parliamentarians, threw themselves into the arms of imperialism, betrayed socialism and thus caused the collapse of Social-Democracy in history."

A new sophism and a new deception of the workers: the war, if you please, is not a “purely” imperialist one!

Kautsky vacillates amazingly on the question of the character and significance of the present war; this party leader evades the precise and formal declarations of the Basle and Chemnitz congresses, as studiously as a thief keeps away from the place where he has just committed a theft. In his pamphlet, *The National State, etc.*, written in February 1915, Kautsky asserted that “still, in the final analysis”, the war is an “imperialist one” (p. 64). Now a fresh reservation is introduced: it is not a *purely* imperialist war. What else can it be?

It appears that it is also a national war! Kautsky arrives at this monstrous conclusion by means of the following “Plekhanovist” pseudo-dialectic:

“The present war is not only the child of imperialism, but also of the Russian revolution.” As early as 1904, he, Kautsky, foresaw that the Russian revolution would revive Pan-Slavism in a new form, that “democratic Russia would, inevitably, greatly fan the desire of the Austrian and Turkish Slavs for national independence.... Then the Polish question would also become acute.... Austria would fall apart because, with the collapse of tsarism, the iron band which at present binds the centrifugal elements together would be destroyed” (Kautsky himself quotes this last phrase from his 1904 article). “The Russian revolution...gave a new and powerful impetus to the national aspirations of the East, adding Asia’s problems to those of Europe. *All these problems* are making themselves very strongly felt in the *present* war and are acquiring very decisive significance for the mood of the masses *of the people*, including the *proletarian* masses, whereas among the ruling classes imperialist tendencies are predominant” (p. 273, italics ours).

This is another sample of the prostitution of Marxism! *Inasmuch* as a “democratic Russia” would foster a striving towards freedom in the nations of Eastern Europe (this is indisputable), the present war, which will not liberate a single nation, but, whatever the outcome, will enslave many nations, is not a “purely” imperialist war. *Inasmuch* as the “collapse of tsarism” would mean the disintegration of Austria, owing to its undemocratic national structure, a temporarily strengthened, and counter-revolutionary tsarism, which is plundering Austria and is bringing *still greater* oppression to the nations inhabiting Austria, has given “the present war”, not a purely imperialist character but, to a certain degree, a national character. *Inasmuch* as “the ruling classes”

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are deluding the stupid petty bourgeois and browbeaten peasants with fables about the national aims of the imperialist war, a man of science, an authority on "Marxism", and representative of the Second International, is entitled to reconcile the masses to this deception by means of a "formula" which claims that the ruling classes reveal imperialist tendencies, while the "people" and the proletarian masses reveal "national" aspirations.

Dialectic is turned into the meanest and basest sophistry!

In the present war the national element is represented *only* by Serbia's war against Austria (which, by the way, was noted in the resolution of our Party's Berne Conference).²² It is only in Serbia and among the Serbs that we can find a national-liberation movement of long standing, embracing millions, "the masses of the people", a movement of which the present war of Serbia against Austria is a "continuation". If this war were an isolated one, i. e., if it were not connected with the general European war, with the selfish and predatory aims of Britain, Russia, etc., it would have been the *duty* of all socialists to desire the success of the Serbian *bourgeoisie* - this is the only correct and absolutely inevitable conclusion to be drawn from the national element in the present war. However, it is this conclusion that the sophist Kautsky, who is now in the service of the Austrian bourgeoisie, clericals and militarists, has failed to draw.

Further, Marxist dialectics, as the last word in the scientific-evolutionary method, excludes any isolated examination of an object, i. e., one that is one-sided and monstrously distorted. The national element in the Serbo-Austrian war is not, and cannot be, of *any* serious significance in the general European war. If Germany wins, she will throttle Belgium, one more part of Poland, perhaps part of France, etc. If Russia wins, she will throttle Galicia, one more part of Poland, Armenia, etc. If the war ends in a "draw", the old national oppression will remain. To Serbia, i. e., to perhaps one per cent or so of the participants in the present war, the war is a "continuation of the politics" of the bourgeois-liberation movement. To the other ninety-nine per cent, the war is a continuation of the politics of imperialism, i. e., of the decrepit bourgeoisie, which is capable only of

raping nations, not freeing them. The Triple Entente, which is "liberating" Serbia, is *selling* the interests of Serbian liberty to Italian imperialism in return for the latter's aid in robbing Austria.

All this, which is common knowledge, has been unblushingly distorted by Kautsky to justify the opportunists. There are *no* "pure" phenomena, nor can there be, either in Nature or in society – that is what Marxist dialectics teaches us, for dialectics shows that the very concept of purity indicates a certain narrowness, a one-sidedness of human cognition, which cannot embrace an object in all its totality and complexity. There is no "pure" capitalism in the world, nor can there be; what we always find is *admixtures* either of feudalism, philistinism, or of something else. Therefore, if anyone recalls that the war is not "purely" imperialist, when we are discussing the flagrant deception of "the masses of the people" by the imperialists, who are deliberately concealing the aims of undisguised robbery with "national" phraseology, then such a person is either an infinitely stupid pedant, or a pettifogger and deceiver. The whole point is that Kautsky is *supporting* the deception of the people by the imperialists when he asserts that to "the masses of the people, including the proletarian masses", the problems of national liberation were "of decisive significance" *whereas* to the ruling classes the decisive factors were "imperialist tendencies" (p. 273), and when he "reinforces" this with an alleged dialectical reference to the "infinite variety of reality" (p. 274). Certainly, reality is infinitely varied. That is absolutely true! But it is equally indubitable that amidst this infinite variety there are two main and fundamental strains; the objective content of the war is a "continuation of the politics" of imperialism, i.e., the plunder of other nations by the decrepit bourgeoisie of the "Great Powers" (and their governments), whereas the prevailing "subjective" ideology consists of "national" phraseology which is being spread to fool the masses.

Kautsky's old sophism, repeated time and again, claiming that "at the outbreak of war" the "Lefts" regarded the situation as presenting an alternative between imperialism or socialism, has already been analysed. This is a shameless subterfuge, for Kautsky knows very well that the Lefts advanced a *different* alternative, viz., either that

the party join in the imperialist plunder and deception, or else propagate and prepare for revolutionary actions. Kautsky knows also that it is the censorship *alone* that prevents the Lefts in Germany from exposing the stupid fable that his servility to the Südekums makes him spread.

As for the relation between the “proletarian masses” and a “handful of parliamentarians”, Kautsky advances a most threadbare objection:

“Let us disregard the Germans, so as not to plead in our own behalf; who would seriously assert that men like Vaillant, Guesde, Hyndman and Plekhanov became imperialists overnight and betrayed socialism? Let us disregard the parliamentarians and the ‘leading bodies’.... [Kautsky is obviously hinting at *Die Internationale*, the journal issued by Rosa Luxemburg and Franz Mehring, in which the policy of the leading bodies, i.e., the official bodies of the German Social-Democratic Party, its Executive, the “Vorstand”, its parliamentary group, etc., is treated with deserved contempt]... who would dare assert that an order given by a handful of parliamentarians is sufficient to make four million class-conscious German proletarians turn right-about-face within twenty-four hours, in direct opposition to their former aims? If this were true, it would, of course, be evidence of a terrible collapse, not only of our Party, but also of the *masses*. [Kautsky’s italics.] If the masses were such a spineless flock of sheep, we might just as well allow ourselves to be buried” (p. 274).

Politically and scientifically, Karl Kautsky, the great authority, gave himself a burial long ago through his conduct and his collection of pitiful evasions. Those who fail to understand or at least to feel this, are hopeless as far as socialism is concerned; it is for this very reason that the tone adopted, in *Die Internationale*, by Mehring, Rosa Luxemburg and their adherents, in treating Kautsky and Co. as most despicable creatures, was the only correct one in the circumstances.

Consider: the *only* people *in a position* to express their attitude to the war more or less freely (i.e., without being immediately seized and dragged to the barracks, or the immediate risk of being shot) were a “handful of parliamentarians” (who were free to vote, with the right to do so; they were quite able to vote in opposition. Even in Russia, no one was beaten up or even arrested for this), a handful of officials, journalists, etc. And now, Kautsky nobly places on the *masses* the blame for the treachery and the spinelessness of that social *stratum* of whose *links* with the tactics and ideology of opportunism Kautsky himself has written scores of times over a number of years! The first and most fundamental demand of

scientific research in general and of Marxist dialectic in particular is that a writer should examine the *link* between the present struggle of *trends* in the socialist movement – between the trend that is doing the talking, vociferating, and raising a hullabaloo about treachery, and the trend which sees no treachery – and the struggle that preceded it for *whole decades*. Kautsky, however, does not say a word about this; he does not even wish to raise the question of trends and *tendencies*. Till now there have been tendencies, but now there are none! Today, there are only the resonant names of “authorities”, which the servile spirits always invoke as their trump card. In this connection it is most convenient for one to refer to the other and to cover up one’s “peccadilloes” in a friendly fashion, according to the rule: you roll my log and I’ll roll yours. “How can this be called opportunism,” Martov exclaimed at a lecture in Berne (see No. 36 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*), “when Guesde, Plekhanov and Kautsky...”! “We must be more careful in accusing men like Guesde of opportunism,” Axelrod wrote (*Golos* Nos. 86 and 87). “I will not defend myself,” Kautsky echoed in Berlin, “but Vaillant, Guesde, Hyndman and Plekhanov...”! What a mutual admiration society!

In his writings, Kautsky has revealed such servile zeal as to fawn upon even Hyndman and to make it appear that it was only yesterday that the latter deserted to the side of imperialism. And yet the selfsame *Neue Zeit* and scores of Social-Democratic papers all over the world have been writing about Hyndman’s imperialism *for many years*. Had Kautsky gone to the trouble of thoroughly studying the political biographies of the *persons* he mentions, he would have recalled whether or not those biographies contained traits and events which paved the way for their desertion to imperialism, not “overnight”, but over decades; whether Vaillant had been held captive by the Jaurèsists,²³ and Plekhanov by the Mensheviks and liquidators²⁴; whether the Guesdist *trend*²⁵ had been publicly giving up the ghost in that typically lifeless and insipid Guesdist magazine, *Le Socialisme*, which was incapable of taking an independent stand on any important issue; whether Kautsky himself (we add this for the benefit of those who very properly put him alongside Hyndman and Plekhanov) had been supine in the question of Mille-

randism,²⁶ in the early stage of the struggle against Bernsteinism,²⁷ etc.

But Kautsky does not display the slightest shadow of interest in any scientific examination of these leaders' biographies. He does not even attempt to see whether these leaders are defending themselves with their *own* arguments or by repeating the arguments of the opportunists and the bourgeoisie; whether the actions of these leaders have acquired serious political significance because of their own extraordinary influence, or because they have adhered to some other really "influential" trend which is supported by a military organisation, namely, the bourgeois trend. Kautsky has not even set about examining this question; his only concern is to throw dust in the eyes of the masses, dumbfound them with the sound of authoritative names, prevent them from raising a clear issue and examining it from all sides.*

"...an order given by a handful of parliamentarians is sufficient to make four million class-conscious proletarians turn right-about-face...."

Every word uttered here is a lie. The German Party organisation had a membership of one million, not four million. As is the case with any organisation, the united will of this mass organisation was expressed *only* through its united political centre, the "handful", who betrayed socialism. It was this handful who were asked to express their opinion; it was this handful who were called upon to vote; they were in a position to vote; they were in a position to write articles, etc. The masses were not consulted. Not only were they not permitted to vote, but they were disunited and coerced "*by orders*", not from

* Kautsky's references to Vaillant and Guesde, Hyndman and Plekhanov are characteristic also in another connection. The outspoken imperialists of the Lensch and Haenisch variety (to say nothing of the opportunists) refer to Hyndman and Plekhanov so as to justify *their own* policy, and they have a *right* to do so. They are speaking the *truth* when they say it is one and the same policy. Kautsky, however, speaks with disdain of Lensch and Haenisch, radicals who have turned towards imperialism. Kautsky thanks God that he is unlike such sinners, that he disagrees with them, and has remained a revolutionary (*sic!*). As a *matter of fact*, Kautsky's stand is the same as theirs. Kautsky, the hypocritical chauvinist who employs sentimental phrases, is much more odious than the chauvinist simpletons, David and Heine, Lensch and Haenisch.

a handful of parliamentarians, but from the military authorities. A military organisation existed; there was no treachery among the leaders of *this* organisation. It called up the "masses" *one by one*, confronted the individual with the ultimatum: either join the army, as your leaders advise you to, or be shot. The masses could not act in an organised fashion because their previously created organisation, an organisation embodied in a "handful" of Legiens, Kautskys and Scheidemanns, had betrayed them. It takes time to create a *new* organisation, as well as a determination to consign the old, rotten and obsolete organisation to the scrap heap.

Kautsky tries to defeat his opponents, the Lefts, by ascribing to them the nonsensical idea that the "masses", "in retaliation" to war, should make a revolution "within twenty-four hours", and institute "socialism" as opposed to imperialism, or otherwise the "masses" would be revealing "spinelessness and treachery". But this is sheer nonsense, which the compilers of illiterate bourgeois and police booklets have hitherto used to "defeat" the revolutionaries, and Kautsky now flaunts in our faces. Kautsky's Left opponents know perfectly well that a revolution cannot be "made", that revolutions *develop* from objectively (i.e., independently of the will of parties and classes) mature crises and turns in history; that without organisation the masses lack unity of will, and that the struggle against a centralised state's powerful terrorist military organisation is a difficult and lengthy business. Owing to the treachery of their leaders, the masses *could not* do anything at the crucial moment, whereas this "handful" of leaders *were in an excellent position* and in duty bound to vote against the war credits, take a stand against a "class truce" and justification of the war, express themselves in favour of the defeat of *their own* governments, set up an international apparatus for the purpose of carrying on propaganda in favour of fraternisation in the trenches, organise the publication of illegal literature* on the necessity of starting revolutionary activities, etc.

Kautsky knows perfectly well that it is precisely such or rather *similar* actions that the German "Lefts" have

* Incidentally, it would not have been at all necessary to close all Social-Democratic papers in reply to the government's ban on writing about class struggle and class struggle. They agree not to write

in mind, and that under a military censorship they cannot talk about these things *directly*, openly. Kautsky's desire to defend the opportunists at all costs has led him into unparalleled infamy: taking cover behind the military censors, he attributes patent absurdities to the Lefts, in the confidence that the censors will protect him from exposure.

VII

The serious scientific and political question, which Kautsky has deliberately evaded by means of subterfuges of all kinds, thereby giving enormous pleasure to the opportunists, is this: how was it *possible* for the most prominent representatives of the Second International to betray socialism?

This question should not, of course, be considered from the standpoint of the biographies of the individual leaders. Their future biographers will have to analyse the problem from this angle as well, but what interests the socialist movement today is not that, but a study of the historical origins, the conditions, the significance and the strength of the social-chauvinist *trend*. (1) Where did social-chauvinism spring from? (2) What gave it strength? (3) How must it be combated? Only such an approach to the question can be regarded as serious, the "personal" approach being in practice an evasion, a piece of sophistry.

To answer the first question we must see, first, whether the ideological and political content of social-chauvinism is *connected* with some previous trend in socialism; and second, in what relation – from the standpoint of actual political divisions – the present division of socialists into opponents and defenders of social-chauvinism stands to divisions which historically preceded it.

about this, as *Vorwärts* did, was mean and cowardly. *Vorwärts* died *politically* when it did this, and Martov was right when he said so. It was, however, possible to retain the legal papers by declaring that they were non-Party and *non-Social-Democratic*, and served the technical needs of a section of the workers, i.e., that they were *non-political papers*. Underground Social-Democratic literature containing an *assessment* of the war, and legally published working-class literature *without that assessment*, a literature that does not say what is not true, but keeps silent about the truth – why should this not have been possible?

By social-chauvinism we mean acceptance of the idea of the defence of the fatherland in the present imperialist war, justification of an alliance between socialists and the bourgeoisie and the governments of their "own" countries in this war, a refusal to propagate and support proletarian-revolutionary action against one's "own" bourgeoisie, etc. It is perfectly obvious that social-chauvinism's basic ideological and political content fully coincides with the foundations of opportunism. It is *one and the same* tendency. In the conditions of the war of 1914-15, opportunism leads to social-chauvinism. The idea of class collaboration is opportunism's main feature. The war has brought this idea to its logical conclusion, and has augmented its usual factors and stimuli with a number of extraordinary ones; through the operation of special threats and coercion it has compelled the philistine and disunited masses to collaborate with the bourgeoisie. This circumstance has naturally multiplied adherents of opportunism and fully explains why many radicals of yesterday have deserted to that camp.

Opportunism means sacrificing the fundamental interests of the masses to the temporary interests of an insignificant minority of the workers or, in other words, an alliance between a section of the workers and the bourgeoisie, directed against the mass of the proletariat. The war has made such an alliance particularly conspicuous and inescapable. Opportunism was engendered in the course of decades by the special features in the period of the development of capitalism, when the comparatively peaceful and cultured life of a stratum of privileged workingmen "bourgeoisified" them, gave them crumbs from the table of their national capitalists, and isolated them from the suffering, misery and revolutionary temper of the impoverished and ruined masses. The imperialist war is the direct continuation and culmination of this state of affairs, because this is a war for the *privileges* of the Great-Power nations, for the repartition of colonies, and domination over other nations. To defend and strengthen their privileged position as a petty-bourgeois "upper stratum" or aristocracy (and bureaucracy) of the working class – such is the natural wartime continuation of petty-bourgeois opportunist hopes and the corresponding tactics, such is the economic foundation

of present-day social-imperialism.* And, of course, the force of habit, the routine of relatively "peaceful" evolution, national prejudices, a fear of sharp turns and a disbelief in them – all these were additional circumstances which enhanced both opportunism and a hypocritical and a craven reconciliation with opportunism – ostensibly only for a time and only because of extraordinary causes and motives. The war has changed this opportunism, which had been fostered for decades, raised it to a higher stage, increased the number and the variety of its shades, augmented the ranks of its adherents, enriched their arguments with a multitude of new sophisms, and has

* Here are several examples showing how highly the imperialists and the bourgeoisie value the importance of "Great-Power" and national privileges as a means of dividing the workers and diverting them from socialism. In a book entitled *Greater Rome and Greater Britain* (Oxford, 1912), the British imperialist Lucas acknowledges the legal disabilities of coloured people in the present British Empire (pp. 96-97), and remarks that "in our own Empire, where white workers and coloured workers are side by side, ... they do not work on the same level, and that the white man is rather the overseer of ... the coloured man." In a pamphlet entitled *Social-Democracy after the War* (1915), Erwin Belger, a former secretary of the Imperial Alliance against Social-Democrats, praises the conduct of the Social-Democrats and declares that they must become a "purely labour party" (p. 43), a "national", a "German labour party" (p. 45), without "internationalist, Utopian", and "revolutionary" ideas (p. 44). In a book dealing with capital investments abroad (1907), the German imperialist Sartorius von Waltershausen blames the German Social-Democrats for ignoring the "national welfare" (p. 438) – which consists in the seizure of colonies – and praises the British workers' "realism", for instance, their struggle against immigration. In a book on the principles of world politics, the German diplomat Ruedorffer stresses the generally known fact that the internationalisation of capital by no means eliminates the national capitalists' intensified struggle for power and influence, for "majority share-holding" (p. 161). The author notes that the workers become involved in this intensified struggle (p. 175). The book is dated October 1913, and the author speaks with perfect clarity of the "interests of capital" (p. 157) as the cause of modern wars. He says that the question of the "national tendency" becomes the kingpin of socialism (p. 176), and that the governments have nothing to fear from the internationalist manifestos of the Social-Democrats (p. 177), who in reality are turning more and more national (pp. 103, 110, 176). International socialism will be victorious, he says, if it extricates the workers from national influence, since nothing can be achieved through violence alone; however, it will suffer defeat if national sentiments gain the upper hand (pp. 173-74).

merged, so to say, many new streams and rivulets with the mainstream of opportunism. However, the mainstream has not disappeared. Quite the reverse.

Social-chauvinism is an opportunism which has matured to such a degree that the *continued* existence of this bourgeois abscess within the socialist parties has become impossible.

Those who refuse to see the closest and unbreakable link between social-chauvinism and opportunism clutch at individual instances – this opportunist or another, they say, has turned internationalist; this radical or another has turned chauvinist. But this kind of argument carries no weight as far as the development of *trends* is concerned. Firstly, chauvinism and opportunism in the labour movement have the same economic basis: the alliance between a numerically small upper stratum of the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie – who get but morsels of the privileges of their “own” national capital – against the masses of the proletarians, the masses of the toilers and the oppressed in general. Secondly, the two trends have the same ideological and political content. Thirdly, the old division of socialists into an opportunist trend and a revolutionary, which was characteristic of the period of the Second International (1889-1914), *corresponds*, by and large, to the new division into chauvinists and internationalists.

To realise the correctness of the latter statement, one must remember the social science (like science generally) usually deals with *mass* phenomena, not with individual cases. Let us take ten European countries: Germany, Britain, Russia, Italy, Holland, Sweden, Bulgaria, Switzerland, France and Belgium. In the first eight countries, the new division of socialists (according to internationalism) corresponds to the old division (according to opportunism); in Germany the magazine *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, which was a stronghold of opportunism, has become a stronghold of chauvinism. The ideas of internationalism have the support of the extreme Lefts. In Britain about three-sevenths of the British Socialist Party are internationalists (66 votes for an internationalist resolution and 84 against it, as shown by the latest counts), while in the opportunist *bloc* (the Labour Party plus the Fabians, plus the Independent Labour Party) *less* than

one-seventh are internationalists.* In Russia, the liquidationist *Nasha Zarya*, the mainstay of the opportunists, has become the mainstay of chauvinism. Plekhanov and Alexinsky are making more noise, but we know from five years' experience (1910-14) that they are incapable of conducting systematic propaganda among the masses in Russia. The nucleus of the internationalists in Russia is made up of "Pravdism" and the Russian Social-Democratic Labour group in the Duma as representing the advanced workers who restored the Party in January 1912.

In Italy, the party of Bissolati and Co., which was purely opportunist, has turned chauvinist. Internationalism is represented by the *workers'* party. The *masses* of the workers are for this party; the opportunists, the parliamentarians and the petty bourgeoisie are for chauvinism. In the course of several months a free choice could be made and indeed was made in Italy; not fortuitously but in conformity with the difference in the class stand of rank-and-file proletarians and the petty-bourgeois groups.

In Holland, Troelstra's opportunist party is reconciled to chauvinism in general (one must not be deceived by the fact that in Holland the petty bourgeoisie, like the big bourgeoisie, have a particular hatred of Germany, because the latter can "swallow" them up easiest of all). It is the Marxist party, led by Gorter and Pannekoek, that has produced consistent, sincere, ardent and convinced internationalists. In Sweden, Branting, the opportunist leader, is indignant at the German socialists being accused of treachery, while Höglund, leader of the Lefts, has declared that this is precisely the opinion of some of his adherents (see *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 36). In Bulgaria, the "Tesnyaki", who are opposed to opportunism, have, in their press (the paper *Novo Vreme*), accused the German Social-Democrats of having "perpetrated a foul act". In Switzerland, the adherents of the opportunist Greulich are inclined to

* The Independent Labour Party *alone* is usually compared with the British Socialist Party. That is wrong. The essentials should be considered, not the forms of organisation. Take the daily newspapers: there were *two* of them – one, the *Daily Herald*, mouthpiece of the British Socialist Party, the other, the *Daily Citizen*, mouthpiece of the opportunist bloc. The dailies do the actual work of propaganda, agitation and organisation.

justify the German Social-Democrats (see their organ, the *Zurich Volksrecht*), whereas those who support the much more radical R. Grimm have turned the Berne paper, *Berner Tagwacht*, into an organ of the German Lefts. Only two countries out of the ten – France and Belgium – are exceptions, but even here, strictly speaking, we see, not an absence of internationalists, but their excessive weakness and dejection (due in part to causes that can be readily understood); let us not forget that Vaillant himself has admitted, in *l'Humanité*, that he has received from his readers letters of an internationalist character, letters which, however, he has not published in full, *not a single one* of them.

By and large, if we take the trends and tendencies, we must admit that it was the opportunist wing of European socialism that betrayed socialism and deserted to chauvinism. What is the source of its strength and its seeming omnipotence within the official parties? Now that he himself is involved, Kautsky, who is well versed in raising questions of history, especially with reference to ancient Rome or similar matters that do not have a direct bearing on problems of our times, hypocritically pretends a lack of understanding. But the whole thing is crystal-clear. The immense strength of the opportunists and the chauvinists stems from *their alliance* with the bourgeoisie, with the governments and the General Staffs. This is often overlooked in Russia, where it is assumed the opportunists are a *section* of the socialist parties, that there always have been and will be two extreme wings within those parties, that “extremes” should be avoided, etc., etc. – and plenty of similar philistine copybook maxims.

In reality, the opportunists' formal membership in workers' parties by no means disproves their objectively being a political detachment of the bourgeoisie, conductors of its influence, and its agents in the labour movements. When the opportunist Südekum, whose claim to fame is like that of Herostratus,²⁸ convincingly demonstrated this social and class truth, many good people gasped with amazement. The French socialists and Plekhanov pointed the finger of scorn at Südekum – although had Vanderfelde, Sembat or Plekhanov looked into a mirror they would have seen *nothing but a Südekum*, with slightly different national features. The members of the German

Executive (*Vorstand*), who now praise Kautsky and are praised by Kautsky, have made haste to declare – cautiously, modestly and politely (without naming Südekum) – that they “do not agree” with Südekum’s line.

This is ridiculous, because, at the crucial moment, Südekum alone, actually proved stronger in the policies of the German Social-Democratic Party than a hundred Haases and Kautskys (just as *Nasha Zarya*²⁹ alone is stronger than all the Brussels bloc³⁰ trends, which are afraid to break away from that paper).

Why is that so? It is because behind Südekum are the bourgeoisie, the government, and the General Staff of a Great Power. These support Südekum’s policy in a thousand ways, whereas his opponents’ policy is frustrated by every means, including prison and the firing squad. Südekum’s voice reaches the public in millions of copies of bourgeois newspapers (as do the voices of Vandervelde, Sembat, and Plekhanov), whereas the voices of his opponents *cannot* be heard in the legal press because of the military censorship!

It is generally agreed that opportunism is no chance occurrence, sin, slip, or treachery on the part of individuals, but a social product of an entire period of history. The significance of this truth is not always given sufficient thought. Opportunism has been nurtured by legalism. The workers’ parties of the period between 1889 and 1914 had to take advantage of bourgeois legality. When the crisis came, they should have adopted illegal methods of work (but this could not be done otherwise than with the greatest vigour and determination, combined with a number of stratagems). A *single* Südekum was sufficient to prevent the adoption of illegal methods, because, speaking in a historico-philosophical sense, he had the whole of the “old world” behind him, and because he, Südekum, has always betrayed, and will always betray, to the bourgeoisie all the military plans of its class enemy, speaking in the sense of practical politics.

It is a fact that the entire German Social-Democratic Party (and the same holds for the French and *other* parties) does *only* that which pleases Südekum or can be tolerated by Südekum. *Nothing else* can be done legally. Anything *honest* and really socialist that takes place in the German Social-Democratic Party, is done in *opposition*

to its centres, by *circumventing* its Executive and Central Organ, by *violating*, organisational discipline, in a *factional* manner, on behalf of new and anonymous centres of a new party, as was the case, for instance, with the German Lefts' ³¹ manifesto published in *Berner Tagwacht* on May 31 of this year. As a matter of fact, a *new* party is growing up, gaining strength and being organised, a real workers' party, a genuinely revolutionary Social-Democratic Party, unlike the old and corrupt national-liberal party of Legien, Südekum, Kautsky, Haase, Scheidemann and Co.*

It was, therefore, a profound historical truth that the opportunist "Monitor" blurted out in the conservative *Preussische Jahrbücher* when he said it would be bad for the opportunists (i.e., the *bourgeoisie*) if present-day Social-Democracy were to *swing to the right*—because in that case the workers would desert it. The opportunists (and the bourgeoisie) need the party as it is today, a party *combining* the Right and the Left wings and officially represented by Kautsky, who will be able to reconcile everything in the world by means of smooth, "thoroughly Marxist" phrases. In word, socialism and the revolutionary spirit for the people, the masses, the workers; in deed, Südekumism, adhering to the bourgeoisie in any grave crisis. We say: *any* crisis, because in any serious political strike, and not only in time of war, "feudalist" Germany like "free and parliamentary" Britain or France will *immediately* introduce martial law under one name or another. No one of sound mind and judgement can have any doubt about this.

Hence logically follows the reply to the question raised above, viz., how is social-chauvinism to be combated? Social-chauvinism is an opportunism which has matured to such a degree, grown so strong and brazen during the long period of comparatively "peaceful" capitalism, so

* What happened before the historic voting of August 4 (for war credits. — *Ed.*) is extremely characteristic. The official party has cast the cloak of bureaucratic hypocrisy over this event, saying that the majority decided and that all voted unanimously *in favour*. But this hypocrisy was exposed by Ströbel who told the truth in the journal *Die Internationale*. The Social-Democratic members of the Reichstag split into *two* groups, each of whom came with an *ultimatum*, i.e., a dissentient decision, i.e., one signifying a split. One group, the opportunists, who were about thirty strong, decided to vote *in favour*.

definite in its political ideology, and so closely associated with the bourgeoisie and the governments, that the existence of *such a trend within* the Social-Democratic workers' parties *cannot* be tolerated. Flimsy, thin-soled shoes may be good enough to walk in on the well-paved streets of a small provincial town, but heavy hob-nailed boots are needed for walking in the hills. In Europe socialism has emerged from a comparatively peaceful stage that is confined within narrow and national limits. With the outbreak of the war of 1914-15, it entered the stage of revolutionary action; there can be no doubt that the time has come for a complete break with opportunism, for its expulsion from the workers' parties.

This definition of the tasks the new era of international development confronts socialism with does not, of course, immediately show how rapidly and in what definite forms the process of separation of the workers' revolutionary Social-Democratic parties from the petty-bourgeois opportunist parties will proceed in the various countries. It does, however, reveal the need clearly to realise that such a separation is inevitable, and that the entire policy of the workers' parties must be directed from this standpoint. The war of 1914-15 is such a great turn in history that the attitude towards opportunism *cannot* remain the same as it has been. What has happened cannot be erased. It is impossible to obliterate from the minds of the workers, or from the experience of the bourgeoisie, or from the political lessons of our epoch in general, the fact that, at a moment of crisis, the opportunists proved to be the nucleus of those elements within the workers' parties that deserted to the bourgeoisie. Opportunism - to speak on a European scale - was in its adolescent stage, as it were, before the war. With the outbreak of the war it grew to manhood and its "innocence" and youth cannot be restored. An entire social stratum, consisting of parliamentarians, journalists, labour officials, privileged office personnel, and certain strata of the proletariat, has sprung

under all circumstances; the other and Left group numbering about fifteen, decided - less resolutely - to vote against. When the "Centre" or the "Marsh", who never take a firm stand, voted with the opportunists, the Lefts sustained a crushing defeat and - submitted! Talk about the "unity" of the German Social-Democrats is sheer hypocrisy, which actually covers up the inevitable submission of the Lefts to ultimatums from the opportunists.

up and has become *amalgamated* with its own national bourgeoisie, which has proved fully capable of appreciating and "adapting" it. The course of history cannot be turned back or checked – we can and must go fearlessly onward, from the preparatory legal working-class organisations, which are in the grip of opportunism, to revolutionary organisations that know how *not* to confine themselves to legality and are capable of safeguarding themselves against opportunist treachery, organisations of a proletariat that is beginning a "struggle for power", a struggle for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie.

This, incidentally, proves how wrong are the views of those who befog both their own minds and those of the workers with the question as to what should be done with such outstanding authorities of the Second International as Guesde, Plekhanov, Kautsky, etc. In fact, no such question arises. If these persons fail to understand the new tasks, they will have to stand aside or remain as they are at present, in captivity to the opportunists. If these persons free themselves from "captivity" they are hardly likely to encounter *political* obstacles to their return to the camp of the revolutionaries. At all events, it is absurd to substitute the question of the role of individuals for the question of the struggle between trends and of the new period in the working-class movement.

VIII

Legal mass organisations of the working class are perhaps the most important feature of the socialist parties in the epoch of the Second International. They were the strongest in the German Party, and it was here that the war of 1914-15 created a most acute crisis and made the issue a most pressing one. The initiation of revolutionary activities would obviously have led to the dissolution of these legal organisations by the police, and the old party – from Legien to Kautsky inclusively – sacrificed the revolutionary aims of the proletariat for the sake of preserving the present legal organisations. No matter how much this may be denied, it is a fact. The proletariat's right to revolution was sold for a mess of pottage – organisations permitted by the present police law.

Take the pamphlet by Karl Legien, leader of the German Social-Democratic trade unions, entitled *Why Trade Union Officials Must Take a More Active Part in the Internal Life of the Party* (Berlin, 1915). This is a paper read by the author to a gathering of trade union officials on January 27, 1915. In the course of this lecture Legien read - and reproduced in his pamphlet - a most interesting document that would not otherwise have been passed by the military censor. This document - the so-called *Notes for Speakers in the District of Niederbarnim* (a suburb of Berlin) - is an exposition of the views of the German Left-wing Social-Democrats, of their protest against the Party. The revolutionary Social-Democrats, says the document, did not and could not foresee a certain factor, viz.:

"That the whole of the organised power of the German Social-Democratic Party and the trade unions would take the side of the war government, and that the whole of this power would be used for the purpose of suppressing the revolutionary energy of the masses" (p. 34 of Legien's pamphlet).

This is the absolute truth. Also true is the following statement contained in the same document:

"The vote of the Social-Democratic group in the Reichstag on August 4 proved that a different attitude, even had it been deeply rooted in the masses, could not have asserted itself under the leadership of a tested party. It could have asserted itself only against the will of the leading party bodies, only by overcoming the resistance of the party and the trade unions" (*ibid.*).

This is the absolute truth.

"Had the Social-Democratic group in the Reichstag done its duty on August 4, the external form of organisation would probably have been destroyed, but the spirit would have remained, the spirit that animated the Party under the Anti-Socialist Law and helped it to overcome all difficulties" (*ibid.*).

It is pointed out in Legien's pamphlet that the "leaders", brought together to listen to his lecture and styling themselves leading trade union officials, *laughed* when they heard this. The idea that it was possible and necessary to organise illegal revolutionary organisations at a moment of crisis (as was done under the Anti-Socialist Law) seemed *ridiculous* to them. Legien, that most faithful watchdog of the bourgeoisie, exclaimed, beating his breast:

"This is an obviously anarchist idea: to wreck the organisation in order to bring about a solution of the problem by the masses. There is no doubt in my mind that this is an anarchist idea!"

"Hear, hear!" came a chorus of exclamations (*ibid.*, p. 37) from the lackeys of the bourgeoisie, who style themselves leaders of the Social-Democratic organisations of the working class.

An edifying picture. People are so degraded and stultified by bourgeois legality that they cannot even *conceive* of the need for organisations of *another* kind, *illegal* organisations, for the purpose of guiding the revolutionary struggle. So low have people fallen that they imagine that legal unions existing with the permission of the police are a kind of ultima Thule—as though the *preservation* of such unions as *leading* bodies is at all conceivable at a time of crisis! Here you have the living dialectic of opportunism: the mere growth of legal unions and the mere habit that stupid but conscientious philistines have of confining themselves to bookkeeping, have created a situation in which, during a crisis, these conscientious philistines have proved to be traitors and betrayers, who would *smother* the revolutionary energy of the masses. This is no chance occurrence. The building of a revolutionary organisation must be begun—that is demanded by the new historical situation, by the epoch of proletarian revolutionary action—but it can be begun only *over the heads* of the old leaders, the stranglers of revolutionary energy, *over the heads* of the old party, through its *destruction*.

Of course, the counter-revolutionary philistines cry out "anarchism!", just as the opportunist Eduard David cried "anarchism" when he denounced Karl Liebknecht. In Germany, only those leaders seem to have remained honest socialists whom the opportunists revile as anarchists....

Take the army of today. It is a good example of organisation. This organisation is good only because it is *flexible* and is able at the same time to give millions of people a *single will*. Today these millions are living in their homes in various parts of the country; tomorrow mobilisation is ordered, and they report for duty. Today they lie in the trenches, and this may go on for months; tomorrow they are led to the attack in another order.

Today they perform miracles in sheltering from bullets and shrapnel; tomorrow they perform miracles in hand-to-hand combat. Today their advance detachments lay minefields; tomorrow they advance scores of miles guided by airmen flying overhead. When, in the pursuit of a single aim and animated by a single will, millions alter the forms of their communication and their behaviour, change the place and the mode of their activities, change their tools and weapons in accordance with the changing conditions and the requirements of the struggle—all this is genuine organisation.

The same holds true for the working-class struggle against the bourgeoisie. Today there is no revolutionary situation, the conditions that cause unrest among the masses or heighten their activities do not exist; today you are given a ballot paper—take it, learn to organise so as to use it as a weapon against your enemies, not as a means of getting cushy legislative jobs for men who cling to their parliamentary seats for fear of having to go to prison. Tomorrow your ballot paper is taken from you and you are given a rifle or a splendid and most up-to-date quick-firing gun—take this weapon of death and destruction; pay no heed to the mawkish snivellers who are afraid of war; too much still remains in the world that *must* be destroyed with fire and sword for the emancipation of the working class; if anger and desperation grow among the masses, if a revolutionary situation arises, prepare to create new organisations and *use* these useful weapons of death and destruction *against* your *own* government and your *own* bourgeoisie.

That is not easy, to be sure. It will demand arduous preparatory activities and heavy sacrifices. This is a *new* form of organisation and struggle that also *has to be learnt*, and knowledge is not acquired without errors and setbacks. This form of the class struggle stands in the same relation to participation in elections as an assault against a fortress stands in relation to manoeuvring, marches, or lying in the trenches. It *is not so often* that history places this form of struggle on the order of the day, but then its significance is felt for decades to come. *Days* on which *such* method of struggle can and must be employed are equal to *scores of years* of other historical epochs.

Compare K. Kautsky and K. Legien. Kautsky writes:

“As long as the party was small, every protest against war had propaganda value as an act of bravery... the conduct of the Russian and Serbian comrades has met with general appreciation. The stronger a party becomes, the more are the propaganda considerations, in the motives of its decisions, interwoven with the calculation of practical consequences, the more difficult does it become to give due regard equally to both motives, and yet neither of them must be neglected. Therefore, the stronger we become, the more easily differences arise between us in every new and complex situation” (*Internationalism and the War*, p. 30).

These arguments of Kautsky's differ from Legien's only in that they are hypocritical and cowardly. In substance, Kautsky supports and justifies the Legiens' despicable renunciation of revolutionary activities, but he does so stealthily, without committing himself; he makes shift with hints, and confines himself to complimenting both Legien and the revolutionary behaviour of the Russians. We Russians are used to witnessing this kind of attitude towards revolutionaries only among the liberals; the latter are always ready to acknowledge the “courage” of the revolutionaries, but at the same time they will on no account renounce their ultra-opportunist tactics. Self-respecting revolutionaries will not accept Kautsky's “expressions of appreciation” and will indignantly reject such a presentation of the question. Were there no revolutionary situation, were it not obligatory to propagate revolutionary action, the conduct of the Russians and Serbians would be *incorrect*, and their tactics would be wrong. Let such knightly persons as Legien and Kautsky at least have the courage of their convictions; let them say this openly.

If, however, the tactics of the Russian and Serbian socialists deserve “appreciation”, then it is wrong and criminal to justify the *contrary* tactics of the “strong” parties, the German, the French, etc. By means of an intentionally vague expression – “practical consequences” – Kautsky has *concealed* the plain truth that the great and strong parties were *frightened* by the prospect of their organisations being dissolved, their funds sequestered and their leaders arrested by the government. This means that Kautsky justifies betrayal of socialism by pleading the unpleasant “practical consequences” that follow from revolutionary tactics. Is this not a prostitution of Marxism?

"We would have been arrested," one of the Social-Democratic deputies who voted for the war credits on August 4 is alleged to have declared at a workers' meeting in Berlin. The workers shouted in reply: "Well, what would have been bad about that?"

If there was no other *signal* that would instil in the German *and the French* working masses revolutionary sentiments and the need to prepare for revolutionary action, the arrest of a member of parliament for a courageous speech would have been useful as a call for *unity* of the proletarians of the various countries in their revolutionary work. It is *not easy* to bring about such unity; all the more was it the duty of members of parliament, whose high office made their purview of the entire political scene so extensive, to *take the initiative*.

Not only in wartime but positively in any acute political situation, to say nothing of periods of revolutionary mass action of any kind, the governments of even the *freest* bourgeois countries will threaten to dissolve the legal organisations, seize their funds, arrest their leaders, and threaten other "practical consequences" of the same kind. What are we to do then? Justify the opportunists on these grounds, as Kautsky does? But this would mean sanctifying the transformation of the Social-Democratic parties into national liberal-labour parties.

There is only one conclusion a socialist can draw, namely, that pure legalism, the legalism-and-nothing-but-legalism of the "European" parties, is now obsolete and as a result of the development of capitalism in the pre-imperialist stage, has become the foundation for a bourgeois labour policy. It must be augmented by the creation of an illegal basis, an illegal organisation, illegal Social-Democratic work, without, however, surrendering a single legal position. Experience will show *how* this is to be done, if only the desire to take this road exists, as well as a realisation that it is necessary. In 1912-14, the revolutionary Social-Democrats of Russia proved that this problem can be solved. Muranov, the workers' deputy in the Duma, who at the trial behaved better than the rest and was exiled to Siberia, clearly demonstrated that - besides "*ministeriable*" parliamentarism (from Henderson, Sembat and Vandervelde down to Südekum and Scheidemann, the latter two are also being

completely “ministeriable”, although they are not admitted further than the anteroom!) – there can be *illegal and revolutionary* parliamentarism. Let the Kosovskys and Potresovs admire the “European” parliamentarism of the lackeys or accept it – we shall not tire of telling the workers that *such* legalism, *such* Social-Democracy of the Legien, Kautsky, Scheidemann brand, deserves nothing but contempt.

IX

To sum up.

The collapse of the Second International has been most strikingly expressed in the flagrant betrayal of their convictions and of the solemn Stuttgart and Basle resolutions by the majority of the official Social-Democratic parties of Europe. This collapse, however, which signifies the complete victory of opportunism, the transformation of the Social-Democratic parties into national liberal-labour parties, is merely the result of the entire historical epoch of the Second International – the close of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth. The objective conditions of this epoch – transitional from the consummation of West-European bourgeois and national revolutions to the beginning of socialist revolutions – engendered and fostered opportunism. During this period we see a split in the working-class and socialist movement in some European countries, which, in the main, was cleavage along the line of opportunism (Britain, Italy, Holland, Bulgaria and Russia); in other countries, we see a long and stubborn struggle of trends along the same line (Germany, France, Belgium, Sweden and Switzerland). The crisis created by the great war has torn away all coverings, swept away conventions, exposed an abscess that has long come to a head, and revealed opportunism in its true role of ally of the bourgeoisie. The complete organisational severance of this element from the workers’ parties has become imperative. The epoch of imperialism cannot permit the existence, in a single party, of the revolutionary proletariat’s vanguard and the semi-petty-bourgeois aristocracy of the working class, who enjoy morsels of the privileges of their “own” nation’s “Great-Power” status. The old theory that opportunism

is a "legitimate shade" in a single party that knows no "extremes" has now turned into a tremendous deception of the workers and a tremendous hindrance to the working-class movement. Undisguised opportunism, which immediately repels the working masses, is not so frightful and injurious as this theory of the golden mean, which uses Marxist catchwords to justify opportunist practice, and tries to prove, with a series of sophisms, that revolutionary action is premature, etc. Kautsky, the most outstanding spokesman of this theory, and also the leading authority in the Second International, has shown himself a consummate hypocrite and a past master in the art of prostituting Marxism. All members of the million-strong German party who are at all honest, class-conscious and revolutionary have turned away in indignation from an "authority" of this kind so ardently defended by the Südekums and the Scheidemanns.

The proletarian masses—probably about nine-tenths of whose former leaders have gone over to the bourgeoisie—have found themselves disunited and helpless amid a spate of chauvinism and under the pressure of martial law and the war censorship. But the objective war-created revolutionary situation, which is extending and developing, is inevitably engendering revolutionary sentiments; it is tempering and enlightening all the finest and most class-conscious proletarians. A sudden change in the mood of the masses is not only possible, but is becoming more and more probable, a change similar to that which was to be seen in Russia early in 1905 in connection with the "Gaponade",³² when, in the course of several months and sometimes of several weeks, there emerged from the backward proletarian masses an army of millions, which followed the proletariat's revolutionary vanguard. We cannot tell whether a powerful revolutionary movement will develop immediately after *this* war, or during it, etc., but at all events, it is *only* work in this direction that deserves the name of socialist work. The slogan of a civil war is the one that summarises and directs this work, and helps unite and consolidate those who wish to aid the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat against its own government and its own bourgeoisie.

In Russia, the complete severance of the revolutionary

Social-Democratic proletarian elements from the petty-bourgeois opportunist elements has been prepared by the entire history of the working-class movement. Those who disregard that history, and, by declaiming against "factionalism", make themselves incapable of understanding the real process of the formation of a proletarian party in Russia, which has developed in the course of many years of struggle against various varieties of opportunism, are rendering that movement the worst possible service. Of all the "Great" Powers engaged in the present war, Russia is the only one that recently experienced a revolution. The bourgeois content of that revolution, in which the proletariat nevertheless played a decisive part, could not but cause a split between the bourgeois and proletarian trends in the working-class movement. In the approximately twenty years (1894-1914) that Russian Social-Democracy has existed as an organisation linked with the mass working-class movement (and not only as an ideological trend, as in 1883-94), there was a struggle between the proletarian-revolutionary trends and the petty-bourgeois, opportunist trends. The Economism³³ of 1894-1902 was undoubtedly a trend of the latter kind. A number of its arguments and ideological features – the "Struvist" distortion of Marxism, references to the "masses" in order to justify opportunism, and the like – bear a striking resemblance to the present vulgarised Marxism of Kautsky, Cunow, Plekhanov, etc. It would be a very grateful task to remind the present generation of Social-Democrats of the old *Rabochaya Mysl* and *Rabocheye Dyelo*,³⁴ as a parallel to the Kautsky of today.

The "Menshevism" of the next period (1903-08) was the direct successor, both ideological and organisational, to Economism. During the Russian revolution, it pursued tactics that objectively meant the dependence of the proletariat upon the liberal bourgeoisie, and expressed petty-bourgeois, opportunist trends. When, in the ensuing period (1908-14), the mainstream of the Menshevik trend produced liquidationism, the class significance of that trend became so apparent that the best representatives of Menshevism were continually protesting against the policy of *Nasha Zarya* group. It is that very group – the only one which, during the past five or six years, has conducted systematic work among the masses in *oppo-*

sition to the revolutionary Marxist party of the working class - that has proved to be *social-chauvinist* in the war of 1914-15! And this in a country where absolutism still exists, the bourgeois revolution is far from consummated, and forty-three per cent of the population oppresses a majority consisting of non-Russian nations. The "European" type of development, in which certain strata of the petty bourgeoisie, especially the intelligentsia and an insignificant section of the labour aristocracy can share in the "Great-Power" privileges of their "own" nation, could not but have its Russian counterpart.

All their history has prepared the working class and the Workers' Social-Democratic Party of Russia for "internationalist" tactics, i. e., such that are truly revolutionary and consistently revolutionary.

P. S. This article had already been set when a manifesto appeared in the press, jointly issued by Kautsky, Haase and Bernstein, who, seeing that the masses are swinging to the left, are therefore now prepared to "make peace" with the Left wing - naturally, at the price of maintaining "peace" with the Südekums. Verily, *Mädchen für alle!*

Written in the second half of May-
first half of June 1915

V. I. Lenin,
Collected Works,
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**ONCE AGAIN
ON THE TRADE UNIONS,
THE CURRENT SITUATION
AND THE MISTAKES OF COMRADES
TROTSKY AND BUKHARIN³⁵**

The Party discussion and the factional struggle, which is of a type that occurs before a congress – before and in connection with the impending elections to the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P. – are waxing hot. The first factional pronouncement, namely, the one made by Comrade Trotsky on behalf of “a number of responsible workers” in his “platform pamphlet” (*The Role and Tasks of the Trade Unions*, with a preface dated December 25, 1920), was followed by a sharp pronouncement (the reader will see from what follows that it was deservedly sharp) by the Petrograd organisation of the R.C.P. (“Appeal to the Party”, published in *Petrogradskaya Pravda* on January 6, 1921, and in the Party’s Central Organ, the Moscow *Pravda*, on January 13, 1921). The Moscow Committee then came out against the Petrograd organisation (in the same issue of *Pravda*). Then appeared a verbatim report, published by the bureau of the R.C.P. group of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions, of the discussion that took place on December 30, 1920, at a very large and important Party meeting, namely, that of the R.C.P. group at the Eighth Congress of Soviets. It is entitled *The Role of the Trade Unions in Production* (with a preface dated January 6, 1921). This, of course, is by no means all of the discussion material. Party meetings to discuss these issues are being held almost everywhere. On December 30, 1920, I spoke at a meeting in conditions in which, as I put it then, I “departed from the rules of procedure”, i. e., in conditions in which I could not take part in the discussion or hear the preceding and subsequent speakers. I shall now try to make amends and express myself in a more “orderly” fashion.

**THE DANGER OF FACTIONAL
PRONOUNCEMENTS TO THE PARTY**

Is Comrade Trotsky’s pamphlet *The Role and Tasks of the Trade Unions* a factional pronouncement? Irrespective of its content, is there any danger to the Party in

a pronouncement of this kind? Attempts to hush up this question are a particularly favourite exercise with the members of the Moscow Committee (with the exception of Comrade Trotsky, of course), who see the factionalism of the Petrograd comrades, and with Comrade Bukharin, who, however, felt obliged, on December 30, 1920, to make the following statement on behalf of the "buffer group":

"...when a train seems to be heading for a crash, a buffer is not a bad thing at all" (report of the December 30, 1920 discussion, p. 45).

So there is some danger of a crash. Can we conceive of intelligent members of the Party being indifferent to the question of how, where and when this danger arose?

Trotsky's pamphlet opens with the statement that "it is the fruit of collective work", that "a number of responsible workers, particularly trade unionists (members of the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions, the Central Committee of the Metalworkers' Union, Tsektran and others)" took part in compiling it, and that it is a "platform pamphlet". At the end of thesis 4 we read that "the forthcoming Party Congress will have to *choose* (Trotsky's italics) between the two trends within the trade union movement".

If this is not the formation of a faction by a member of the Central Committee, if this does not mean "heading for a crash", then let Comrade Bukharin, or anyone of his fellow-thinkers, explain to the Party any other possible meaning of the words "factionalism", and the Party "seems to be heading for a crash". Who can be more purblind than men wishing to play the "buffer" and *closing their eyes to such a "danger of a crash"*?

Just imagine: after the Central Committee had spent two plenary meetings (November 9 and December 7) in an unprecedentedly long, detailed and heated discussion of Comrade Trotsky's original draft theses and of the entire trade union policy that he advocates for the Party, one member of the Central Committee, *one out of nineteen*, forms a group outside the Central Committee and presents its "collective work" as a "platform", inviting the Party Congress "to choose between *two* trends"! This, incidentally, quite apart from the fact that Comrade

Trotsky's announcement of two and only two trends on December 25, 1920, despite Bukharin's coming out as a "buffer" on November 9, is a glaring exposure of the Bukharin group's true role as abettors of the worst and most harmful sort of factionalism. But I ask any Party member: Don't you find this attack and insistence upon "choosing" between two trends in the trade union movement rather sudden? What is there for us to do but stare in astonishment at the fact that after three years of the proletarian dictatorship even one Party member can be found to "attack" the two trends issue *in this way*?

Nor is that all. Look at the factional attacks in which this pamphlet abounds. In the very first thesis we find a threatening "gesture" at "certain workers in the trade union movement" who are thrown "back to trade-unionism, pure and simple, which the Party repudiated in principle long ago" (evidently the Party is represented by only one member of the Central Committee's nineteen). Thesis 8 grandiloquently condemns "the craft conservatism prevalent among the top trade union functionaries" (note the truly bureaucratic concentration of attention on the "top"!). Thesis 11 opens with the astonishingly tactful, conclusive and business-like (what is the most polite word for it?) "hint" that the "majority of the trade unionists... give only formal, that is, *verbal*, recognition" to the resolutions of the Party's Ninth Congress.

We find that we have some very authoritative judges before us who say the *majority* (!) of the trade unionists give only *verbal* recognition to the Party's decisions.

Thesis 12 reads:

"...many trade unionists take an ever more aggressive and uncompromising stand against the prospect of 'coalescence'... Among them we find Comrades Tomsy and Lozovsky.

"What is more, many trade unionists, balking at the new tasks and methods, tend to cultivate in their midst a spirit of corporative exclusiveness and hostility for the new men who are being drawn into the given branch of the economy, thereby actually fostering the survivals of craft-unionism among the organised workers."

Let the reader go over these arguments carefully and ponder them. They simply abound in "gems". Firstly, the pronouncement must be assessed from the standpoint of factionalism! Imagine what Trotsky would have said, and how he would have said it, if Tomsy had published

a platform accusing Trotsky and "many" military workers of cultivating the spirit of bureaucracy, fostering the survivals of savagery, etc. What is the "role" of Bukharin, Preobrazhensky, Serebryakov and the others who fail to see – positively fail to note, utterly fail to note – the aggressiveness and factionalism of all *this*, and refuse to see how much more factional it is than the pronouncement of the Petrograd comrades?

Secondly, take a closer look at the approach to the subject: many trade unionists "tend to cultivate in their midst a spirit".... This is an out-and-out bureaucratic approach. The whole point, you see, is not the level of development and living conditions of the masses in their millions, but the "spirit" which Tomsky and Lozovsky tend to cultivate "in their midst".

Thirdly, Comrade Trotsky has unwittingly revealed the *essence* of the whole controversy which he and the Bukharin and Co. "buffer" have been evading and camouflaging with such care.

What is the point at issue? Is it the fact that many trade unionists are balking at the new tasks and methods and tend to cultivate in their midst a spirit of hostility for the new officials?

Or is it that the masses of organised workers are legitimately protesting and inevitably showing readiness to throw out the new officials who refuse to rectify the useless and harmful excesses of bureaucracy?

Is it that someone has refused to understand the "new tasks and methods"?

Or is it that someone is making a clumsy attempt to cover up his defence of certain useless and harmful excesses of bureaucracy with a lot of talk about new tasks and methods?

It is this *essence* of the dispute that the reader should bear in mind.

FORMAL DEMOCRACY AND THE REVOLUTIONARY INTEREST

"Workers' democracy is free from fetishes", Comrade Trotsky writes in his theses, which are the "fruit of collective work". "Its sole consideration is the revolutionary interest" (thesis 23).

Comrade Trotsky's theses have landed him in a mess. That part of them which is correct is not new and, what is more, turns *against* him. That which is new is all wrong.

I have written out Comrade Trotsky's correct propositions. They turn against him not only on the point in thesis 23 (Glavpolitput) but on the others as well.

Under the rules of formal democracy, Trotsky *had a right* to come out with a factional platform even against the whole of the Central Committee. That is indisputable. What is also indisputable is that the Central Committee had endorsed this formal right by its decision on freedom of discussion adopted on December 24, 1920. Bukharin, the buffer, recognises this formal right for Trotsky, but not for the Petrograd organisation, probably because on December 30, 1920, he talked himself into "the sacred slogan of workers' democracy" (verbatim report, p. 45)....

Well, and what about the revolutionary interest?

Will any serious-minded person who is not blinded by the factional egotism of "Tsektran" or of the "buffer" faction, will anyone in his right mind say that *such* a pronouncement on the trade union issue by *such* a prominent leader as Trotsky does promote *the revolutionary interest*?

Can it be denied that, even if Trotsky's "new tasks and methods" were as sound as they are in fact unsound (of which later), his very approach would be damaging to himself, the Party, the trade union movement, the training of millions of trade union members and the Republic?

It looks as if the kind Bukharin and his group call themselves a "buffer" because they have firmly decided *not to think* about the obligations this title imposes upon them.

THE POLITICAL DANGER OF SPLITS IN THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT

Everyone knows that big disagreements sometimes grow out of minute differences, which may at first appear to be altogether insignificant. A slight cut or scratch, of the kind everyone has had scores of in the course of his life, may become very dangerous and even fatal *if* it festers and *if* blood poisoning sets in. This may happen

in any kind of conflict, even a purely personal one. This also happens in politics.

Any difference, even an insignificant one, may become politically dangerous if it has a chance to grow into a split, and I mean the kind of split that will shake and destroy the whole political edifice, or lead, to use Comrade Bukharin's simile, to a crash.

Clearly, in a country under the dictatorship of the proletariat, a split in the ranks of the proletariat, or between the proletarian party and the mass of the proletariat, is not just dangerous; it is extremely dangerous, especially when the proletariat constitutes a small minority of the population. And splits in the trade union movement (which, as I tried hard to emphasise in my speech on December 30, 1920, is a movement of the almost completely organised proletariat) mean precisely splits in the mass of the proletariat.

That is why, when the whole thing started at the Fifth All-Russia Conference of Trade Unions on November 2-6, 1920 (and that is exactly where it did start), and when right after the Conference - no, I am mistaken, *during* that Conference - Comrade Tomsy appeared before the Political Bureau in high dudgeon and, fully supported by Comrade Rudzutak, the most even-tempered of men, began to relate that at the Conference Comrade Trotsky had talked about "shaking up" the trade unions and that he, Tomsy, had opposed this - when that happened, I decided there and then that policy (i.e., the Party's trade union policy) lay at the root of the controversy, and that Comrade Trotsky, with his "shake-up" policy against Comrade Tomsy, was entirely in the wrong. For, *even if the "shake-up" policy were partly justified* by the "new tasks and methods" (Trotsky's thesis 12), it cannot be tolerated at the present time, and in the present situation, because it threatens a split.

It now seems to Comrade Trotsky that it is "an utter travesty" to ascribe the "shake-up-from-above" policy to him (L. Trotsky, "A Reply to the Petrograd Comrades", *Pravda* No. 9, January 15, 1921). But "shake-up" is a real "catchword", not only in the sense that after being uttered by Comrade Trotsky at the Fifth All-Russia Conference of Trade Unions it has, you might say, "caught on" throughout the Party and the trade unions. Unfortunately,

it remains true even today in the much more profound sense that it alone epitomises *the whole spirit, the whole trend* of the platform pamphlet entitled *The Role and Tasks of the Trade Unions*. Comrade Trotsky's platform pamphlet is shot through with the spirit of the "shake-up-from-above" policy. Just recall the accusation made against Comrade Tomskey, or "many trade unionists", that they "tend to cultivate in their midst a spirit of hostility for the new men"!

But whereas the Fifth All-Russia Conference of Trade Unions (November 2-6, 1920) only saw the makings of the atmosphere fraught with splits, the split within Tsektran³⁶ became a fact in early December 1920.

This event is basic and essential to an understanding of the political essence of our controversies; and Comrades Trotsky and Bukharin are mistaken if they think hushing it up will help matters. A hush-up in this case does not produce a "buffer" effect but rouses passions; for the question has not only been placed on the agenda by developments, but has been emphasised by Comrade Trotsky in his platform pamphlet. It is this pamphlet that repeatedly, in the passages I have quoted, particularly in thesis 12, raises the question of whether the essence of the matter is that "many trade unionists tend to cultivate in their midst a spirit of hostility for the new men", or that the "hostility" of the *masses* is legitimate in view of certain useless and harmful excesses of bureaucracy, for example, in Tsektran.

The issue was bluntly and properly stated by Comrade Zinoviev in his very first speech on December 30, 1920, when he said that it was "Comrade Trotsky's immoderate adherents" who had brought about a split. Perhaps that is why Comrade Bukharin abusively described Comrade Zinoviev's speech as "a lot of hot air"? But every Party member who reads the verbatim report of the December 30, 1920 discussion will see that that is not true. He will find that it is Comrade Zinoviev who quotes and operates with the facts, and that it is Trotsky and Bukharin who indulge most in intellectualist verbosity minus the facts.

When Comrade Zinoviev said, "Tsektran stands on feet of clay and has already split into three parts", Comrade Sosnovsky interrupted and said:

"That is something you have encouraged" (verbatim report, p. 15).

Now this is a serious charge. If it were proved, there would, of course, be no place on the Central Committee, in the R.C.P., or in the trade unions of our Republic for those who were guilty of *encouraging a split* even in one of the trade unions. Happily, this serious charge was advanced in a thoughtless manner by a comrade who, I regret to say, has now and again been "carried away" by thoughtless polemics before this. Comrade Sosnovsky has even managed to insert "a fly in the ointment" of his otherwise excellent articles, say, on production propaganda, and this has tended to negate all its pluses. Some people (like Comrade Bukharin) are so happily constituted that they are incapable of injecting venom into their attacks even when the fight is bitterest; others, less happily constituted, are liable to do so, and do this all too often. Comrade Sosnovsky would do well to watch his step in this respect, and perhaps even ask his friends to help out.

But, some will say, the charge is there, even if it has been made in a thoughtless, unfortunate and patently "factional" form. In a serious matter, the badly worded truth is preferable to the hush-up.

That the matter is serious is beyond doubt, for, let me say this again, the *crux* of the issue lies in this area to a greater extent than is generally suspected. Fortunately, we are in possession of sufficiently objective and conclusive facts to provide an answer in *substance* to Comrade Sosnovsky's point.

First of all, there is on the same page of the verbatim report Comrade Zinoviev's statement denying Comrade Sosnovsky's allegation and making precise references to conclusive facts. Comrade Zinoviev showed that Comrade Trotsky's accusation (made obviously, let me add, in an outburst of factional zeal) was quite a different one from Comrade Sosnovsky's; Comrade Trotsky's accusation was that Comrade Zinoviev's *speech at the September All-Russia Conference of the R.C.P.* had helped to bring about or had brought about the split. (This charge, let me say in parenthesis, is quite untenable, if only because Zinoviev's September speech was approved in substance by the Central Committee and the Party, and there has been no formal protest against it since.)

Comrade Zinoviev replied that at the Central Committee meeting Comrade Rudzutak had used the minutes to prove

that "*long before* any of my (Zinoviev's) speeches and the All-Russia Conference the question (concerning certain unwarranted and harmful excesses of bureaucracy in Tsektran) had been examined in Siberia, on the Volga, in the North and in the South".

That is an absolutely precise and clear-cut statement of fact. It was made by Comrade Zinoviev in his first speech before thousands of the most responsible Party members, and his facts were *not* refuted either by Comrade Trotsky, who spoke *twice later*, or by Comrade Bukharin, who *also spoke later*.

Secondly, the December 7, 1920 *resolution of the Central Committee's Plenary Meeting concerning the dispute between the Communists working in water transport and the Communist group at the Tsektran Conference*, given in the same verbatim report, was an even more definite and official refutation of Comrade Sosnovsky's charges. The part of the resolution dealing with Tsektran says:

"In connection with the dispute between Tsektran and the water transport workers, the Central Committee resolves: 1) To set up a Water Transport Section within the amalgamated Tsektran; 2) To convene a congress of railwaymen and water transport workers in February to hold normal elections to a new Tsektran; 3) To authorise the old Tsektran to function until then; 4) To abolish Glavpolitvod and Glavpolitput immediately and to transfer all their funds and resources to the trade union on normal democratic lines."

This shows that the water transport workers, far from being censured, are deemed to be *right* in every essential. Yet *none* of the C.C. members who had signed the common platform of January 14, 1921 (except Kamenev) voted for the resolution. (The platform referred to is the *Role and Tasks of the Trade Unions. Draft Decision of the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.*, submitted to the Central Committee by a group of members of the Central Committee and the trade union commission. Among those who signed it was Lozovsky, a member of the trade union commission but not of the Central Committee. The others were Tomsy, Kalinin, Rudzutak, Zinoviev, Stalin, Lenin, Kamenev, Petrovsky and Artyom Sergeyev.)

This resolution was carried *against* the C.C. members listed above, that is, against our group, for we would have voted against allowing the old Tsektran to continue temporarily. Because we were sure to win, Trotsky was

forced to vote for Bukharin's resolution, as otherwise our resolution would have been carried. Comrade Rykov, who had been *for* Trotsky in November, took part in the trade union commission's examination of the dispute between Tsektran and the water transport workers³⁷ in December, and saw that the latter were right.

To sum up: the December 7 majority in the Central Committee consisted of Comrades Trotsky, Bukharin, Preobrazhensky, Serebryakov and other C.C. members who are above suspicion of being biased *against* Tsektran. Yet the substance of their resolution did not censure the water transport workers but Tsektran, which they just stopped short of dissolving there and then. This proves Sosnovsky's charge to be quite groundless.

There is one other point to be dealt with, if we are to leave no room for ambiguity. What were these "certain unwarranted and harmful excesses of bureaucracy" to which I have repeatedly referred? Isn't *this* last charge unsupported or exaggerated?

Once again it was Comrade Zinoviev who, in his very first speech on December 30, 1920, provided the answer which was as precise as one could wish. He quoted from Comrade Zoff's water transport circular of May 3, 1920: "Committee treadmill abolished."³⁸ Comrade Zinoviev was quite right in saying this was a fundamental error. It exemplified the unwarranted and harmful excesses of bureaucracy and the "appointments system". But he said there and then that some appointees were "not half as experienced or as tried" as Comrade Zoff. I have heard Comrade Zoff referred to in the Central Committee as a most valuable worker, and this is fully borne out by my own observations in the Council of Defence. It has not entered anyone's mind either to make scapegoats of such comrades or to undermine their authority (as Comrade Trotsky suggests, without the least justification, on page 25 of his report). Their authority is not being undermined by those who try to correct the "appointees'" mistakes, but by those who would defend them even when they are wrong.

We see, therefore, that the danger of splits within the trade union movement was not imaginary but real. And we find that the actual disagreements really boiled down to a demand that certain unwarranted and harmful

excesses of bureaucracy, and the appointments system should not be justified or defended, but corrected. That is all there is to it.

DISAGREEMENTS ON PRINCIPLE

There being deep and basic disagreements on principle – we may well be asked – do they not serve as vindication for the sharpest and most factional pronouncements? Is it possible to vindicate such a thing as a split, provided there is need to drive home some entirely new idea?

I believe it is, provided of course the disagreements are truly very deep and there is no other way to rectify a wrong trend in the policy of the Party or of the working class.

But the whole point is that there are no such disagreements. Comrade Trotsky has tried to point them out, and failed. A tentative or conciliatory approach had been possible –and necessary – *before* the publication of his pamphlet (December 25) (“such an approach is ruled out even in the case of disagreements and vague new tasks”); but *after* its publication we had to say: Comrade Trotsky is essentially wrong on all his new points.

This is most evident from a comparison of his theses with Rudzutak’s which were adopted by the Fifth All-Russia Conference of Trade Unions (November 2–6). I quoted the latter in my December 30 speech and in the January 21³⁹ issue of *Pravda*. They are fuller and more correct than Trotsky’s, and wherever the latter differs from Rudzutak, he is wrong.

Take this famous “industrial democracy”, which Comrade Bukharin hastened to insert in the Central Committee’s resolution of December 7. It would, of course, be ridiculous to quibble about this ill-conceived brainchild (“tricky flourishes”), if it merely occurred in an article or speech. But, after all, it was Trotsky and Bukharin who put themselves into the ridiculous position by *insisting in their theses* on this very term, which is the one feature that distinguishes their “platforms” from Rudzutak’s theses adopted by the trade unions.

The term is theoretically wrong. In the final analysis,

every kind of democracy, as political superstructure in general (which must exist until classes have been abolished and a classless society established), serves production and is ultimately determined by the relations of production in a given society. It is, therefore, meaningless to single out "industrial democracy", for this leads to confusion, and the result is a dummy. That is the first point.

The second is that if you look at Bukharin's own explanation given in the resolution of the C.C. Plenary Meeting on December 7, which he drafted, you will find that he says: "Accordingly, the methods of workers' democracy must be those of industrial democracy, which means...." Note the "which means"! The fact is that Bukharin opens his appeal to the masses with such an outlandish term that he must *give a gloss on* it. This, I think, is *undemocratic* from the democratic standpoint. You must write for the masses without using terms that require a glossary. This is bad from the "production" standpoint because time is wasted in explaining unnecessary terms. "Which means," he says, "that nomination and seconding of candidates, elections, etc., must proceed with an eye not only to their political staunchness, but also business efficiency, administrative experience, leadership, and proved concern for the working people's material and spiritual interests."

The reasoning there is obviously artificial and incorrect. For one thing, democracy is more than "nomination and seconding of candidates, elections, etc." Then, again, not all elections should be held with an eye to political staunchness and business efficiency. Comrade Trotsky notwithstanding, an organisation of many millions must have a certain percentage of canvassers and bureaucrats (we shall not be able to make do without good bureaucrats for many years to come). But we do not speak of "canvassing" or "bureaucratic" democracy.

The third point is that it is wrong to consider only the elected, the organisers, the administrators, etc. After all, they constitute a minority of outstanding men. It is the mass, the rank and file that we must consider. Rudzutak has it in simpler, more intelligible and theoretically more correct terms (thesis 6):

"...it must be brought home to each participant in production

that his production tasks are appropriate and important; that each must not only take a hand in fulfilling his assignments, but also play an intelligent part in correcting any technical and organisational defects in the sphere of production."

The fourth point is that "industrial democracy" is a term that lends itself to misinterpretation. It may be read as a repudiation of dictatorship and individual authority. It may be read as a suspension of ordinary democracy or a pretext for evading it. Both readings are harmful, and cannot be avoided without long special commentaries.

Rudzutak's plain statement of the same ideas is more correct and more handy. This is indirectly confirmed by Trotsky's parallel of "war democracy" which he draws with his own term in an article, "Industrial Democracy", in *Pravda* of January 11, and which fails to refute that his term is inaccurate and inconvenient (for he side-steps the whole issue and fails to compare his theses with Rudzutak's). Happily, as far as I can recall, we have never had any factional controversy over that kind of term.

Trotsky's "production atmosphere" is even wider of the mark, and Zinoviev had good reason to laugh at it. This made Trotsky very angry, and he came out with this argument: "We once had a war atmosphere.... We must now have a production atmosphere and not only on the surface but deep down in the workers' mass. This must be as intense and practical an interest in production as was earlier displayed in the fronts...." Well, there you are: the message must be carried "deep down into the workers' mass" in the language of Rudzutak's theses, because "production atmosphere" will only earn you a smile or a shrug. Comrade Trotsky's "production atmosphere" has essentially the same meaning as production propaganda, but such expressions must be avoided when production propaganda is addressed to the workers at large. The term is an example of how *not* to carry it on among the masses.

POLITICS AND ECONOMICS. DIALECTICS AND ECLECTICISM

It is strange that we should have to return to such elementary questions, but we are unfortunately forced to do so by Trotsky and Bukharin. They have both

reproached me for "switching" the issue, or for taking a "political" approach, while theirs is an "economic" one. Bukharin even put that in his theses and tried to "rise above" either side, as if to say that he was combining the two.

This is a glaring theoretical error. I said again in my speech that politics is a concentrated expression of economics, because I had earlier heard my "political" approach rebuked in a manner which is inconsistent and inadmissible for a Marxist. Politics must take precedence over economics. To argue otherwise is to forget the ABC of Marxism.

Am I wrong in my political appraisal? If you think so, say it and prove it. But you forget the ABC of Marxism when you say (or imply) that the political approach is equivalent to the "economic", and that you can take "the one and the other".

What the political approach means, in other words, is that the wrong attitude to the trade unions will ruin the Soviet power and topple the dictatorship of the proletariat. (In a peasant country like Russia, the Soviet power would surely go down in the event of a split between the trade unions and a Party in the wrong.) This proposition can (and must) be tested in substance, which means looking into the rights and wrongs of the approach and taking a decision. To say: I "appreciate" your political approach, "but" it is only a political one and we "also need an economic one", is tantamount to saying: I "appreciate" your point that in taking that particular step you are liable to break your neck, *but* you must also take into consideration that it is better to be clothed and well-fed than to go naked and hungry.

Bukharin's insistence on combining the political *and* the economic approach has landed him in theoretical *eclecticism*.

Trotsky and Bukharin make as though they are concerned for the growth of production whereas we have nothing but formal democracy in mind. This picture is wrong, because the *only* formulation of the issue (which the Marxist standpoint *allows*) is: without a correct political approach to the matter the given class will be unable to stay on top, *and, consequently*, will be incapable of solving *its production problem* either.

Let us take a concrete example. Zinoviev says: "By carrying things to a split within the trade unions, you are making a political mistake. I spoke and wrote about the growth of production back in January 1920, citing the construction of the public baths as an example." Trotsky replies: "What a thing to boast of: a pamphlet with the public baths as an example (p. 29), and 'not a single word' about the tasks of the trade unions" (p. 22).

This is wrong. The example of the public baths is worth, you will pardon the pun, a dozen "production atmospheres", with a handful of "industrial democracies" thrown in. It tells the masses, the whole bulk of them, what the trade unions are to do, and does this in plain and intelligible terms, whereas all these "production atmospheres" and "democracies" are so much murk blurring the vision of the workers' masses, and *dimming* their understanding.

Comrade Trotsky also rebuked me for not "saying a word" (p. 66) about "the role that has to be played – and is being played – by the levers known as the trade union apparatus".

I beg to differ, Comrade Trotsky. By reading out Rudzutak's theses *in toto* and endorsing them, I made a statement on the question that was *fuller, plainer, clearer and more correct* than all your theses, your report or co-report, and speech in reply to the debate. I insist that bonuses in kind and disciplinary comrades' courts mean a great deal more to economic development, industrial management, and wider trade union participation in production than the absolutely abstract (and therefore empty) talk about "industrial democracy", "coalescence", etc.

Behind the effort to present the "production" standpoint (Trotsky) or to overcome a one-sided political approach and combine it with an economic approach (Bukharin) we find:

- 1) Neglect of Marxism, as expressed in the theoretically incorrect, eclectic definition of the relation between politics and economics;

- 2) Defence or camouflage of the political mistake expressed in the shake-up policy, which runs through the *whole* of Trotsky's platform pamphlet, and which,

unless it is admitted and corrected, *leads* to the collapse of the dictatorship of the proletariat;

3) A step back in purely economic and production matters, and the question of how to increase production; it is, in fact, a step back from Rudzutak's *practical* theses, with their concrete, vital and urgent tasks (develop production propaganda; learn proper distribution of bonuses in kind and correct use of coercion through disciplinary comrades' courts), to the highbrow, abstract, "empty" and theoretically incorrect general *theses* which *ignore* all that is most practical and business-like.

That is where Zinoviev and myself, on the one hand, and Trotsky and Bukharin, on the other, actually stand on this question of politics and economics.

I could not help smiling, therefore, when I read Comrade Trotsky's objection in his speech of December 30: "In his summing-up at the Eighth Congress of Soviets of the debate on the situation, Comrade Lenin said we ought to have less politics and more economics, but when he got to the trade union question he laid emphasis on the political aspect of the matter" (p. 65). Comrade Trotsky thought these words were "very much to the point". Actually, however, they reveal a terrible confusion of ideas, a truly hopeless "ideological confusion". Of course, I have always said, and will continue to say, that we need more economics and less politics, but if we are to have this we must clearly be rid of political dangers and *political mistakes*. Comrade Trotsky's political mistakes, aggravated by Comrade Bukharin, *distract* our Party's attention from economic tasks and "production" work, and, *unfortunately, make us waste time* on correcting them and arguing it out with the syndicalist deviation (which leads to the collapse of the dictatorship of the proletariat), objecting to the incorrect approach to the trade union movement (which leads to the collapse of the Soviet power), and debating general "theses", instead of having a practical and business-like "economic" discussion as to whether it was the Saratov millers, the Donbas miners, the Petrograd metalworkers or some other group that had the best results in coalescing,⁴⁰ distributing bonuses in kind, and organising comrades' courts,⁴¹ on the basis of Rudzutak's

theses, adopted by the Fifth All-Russia Trade Union Conference on November 2-6.

Let us now consider what good there is in a "broad discussion". Once again we find political mistakes distracting attention from economic tasks. I was against this "broad" discussion, and I believed, and still do, that it was a mistake - a political mistake - on Comrade Trotsky's part to disrupt the work of the trade union commission, which ought to have held a business-like discussion. I believe Bukharin's buffer group made the political mistake of misunderstanding the tasks of the buffer (in which case they had once again substituted eclecticism for dialectics), for from the "buffer" standpoint they should have vigorously opposed any broad discussion and demanded that the matter should be taken up by the trade union commission. Here is what came of this.

On December 30, Bukharin went so far as to say that "we have proclaimed the new and sacred slogan of workers' democracy, which means that questions are no longer to be discussed in the board-room within the corporation or at small meetings but are to be placed before big meetings. I insist that by taking the trade union issue before such a large meeting as this one we are not taking a step backward but forward" (p. 45). And this man has accused Zinoviev of spouting "hot air" and overdoing the democracy! I say that he himself has given us a lot of hot air and has shown some unexampled bungling; he has completely failed to understand that formal democracy must be subordinate to the revolutionary interest.

Trotsky is in the same boat. His charge is that "Lenin wants at all costs to disrupt or shelve the discussion of the matter in essence" (p. 65). He declares: "My reasons for refusing to serve on the commission were clearly stated in the Central Committee: until such time as I am permitted, on a par with all other comrades, to air these questions fully in the Party press, I do not expect any good to come of any cloistered examination of these matters, and, consequently, of work on the commission" (p. 69).

What is the result? Less than a month has passed since Trotsky started his "broad discussion" on December 25, and you will be hard put to find one responsible Party

worker in a hundred who is not fed up with the discussion and has not realised its futility (to say no worse). For Trotsky has made the Party waste time on a discussion of words and bad theses, and has ridiculed as "cloistered" the *business-like* economic discussion in the commission, which was to have studied and verified practical experience and projected its lessons for *progress* in real "production" work, in place of the *regress* from vibrant activity to scholastic exercises in all sorts of "production atmospheres".

Take this famous "coalescence". My advice on December 30 was that we should keep mum on this point, because we had *not studied* our own practical experience, and without that any discussion was bound to degenerate into "hot air" and draw off the Party's forces *from* economic work. I said it was bureaucratic projecteering for Trotsky to propose in his theses that from one-third to one-half and from one-half to two-thirds of the economic councils should consist of trade unionists.

For this I was upbraided by Bukharin who, I see from p. 49 of the report, made a point of proving to me at length and in great detail that "when people meet to discuss something, they should not act as deaf-mutes" (*sic*). Trotsky was also angry and exclaimed:

"Will every one of you please make a note that on this particular date Comrade Lenin described this as a bureaucratic evil. I take the liberty to predict that within a few months we shall have accepted for our guidance and consideration that the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions and the Supreme Economic Council, the Central Committee of the Metalworkers' Union and the Metals Department, etc., are to have from one-third to one-half of their members in common" (p. 68).

When I read that I asked Comrade Milyutin (Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council) to let me have the available *printed* reports on coalescence. I said to myself: why not make a small start on the *study of our practical experience*; it's so dull engaging in "general Party talk" (Bukharin's expression, p. 47, which has every chance of becoming a catchword like "shake-up") to no useful purpose, without the facts, and inventing disagreements, definitions and "industrial democracies".

Comrade Milyutin sent me several books, including *The Report of the Supreme Economic Council to the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets* (Moscow, 1920; preface

dated December 19, 1920). On its p. 14 is a table showing workers' participation in administrative bodies. Here is the table (covering only part of the gubernia economic councils and factories):

Administrative body	Total members	Workers		Specialists		Office workers and others	
		Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent
Presidium of Supreme Economic Council and gubernia economic councils...	187	107	57.2	22	11.8	58	31.0
Collegiums of chief administrations, departments, central boards and head offices...	140	72	51.4	31	22.2	37	26.4
Corporate and one-man managements of factories....	1,143	726	63.5	398	34.8	19	1.7
<i>Total.....</i>	1,470	905	61.6	451	30.7	114	7.7

It will be seen that 61.6 per cent, that is, closer to two-thirds than to one-half, of the staff of administrative bodies now consists of workers. And this *already proves* that what Trotsky wrote on this matter in his theses was an exercise in bureaucratic projecteering. To talk, argue and write platforms about "one-third to one-half" and "one-half to two-thirds" is the most useless sort of "general Party talk" which diverts time, attention and resources from *production* work. It is empty politicking. All this while, a great deal of good could have been done in the commission, where men of experience would have refused to write any theses without a study of the facts, say, by polling a dozen or so "common functionaries" (out of the thousand), by comparing their impressions and conclusions with objective statistical data, and by making an attempt to obtain practical guidance for the future: that being our experience, do we go straight on, or do we make some change in our course, methods and approach, and how; or do we call a halt, for the good

of the cause, and check things over and over again, make a few changes here and there, and so on and so forth.

Comrades, a real "executive" (let me also have a go at "production propaganda") is well aware that even in the most advanced countries, the capitalists and their executives take years—sometimes ten and more—to study and test their own (and others') practical experience, making innumerable starts and corrections to tailor a system of management, select senior and junior executives, etc., fit for their particular business. That was the rule under capitalism, which throughout the civilised world based its business practices on *the experience and habits of centuries*. We who are breaking new ground must put in a long, persistent and patient effort to retrain men and change the old habits which have come down to us from capitalism, but this can only be done little by little. Trotsky's approach is quite wrong. In his December 30 speech he exclaimed: "Do or do not our workers, Party and trade union functionaries have any production training? Yes or no? I say: No" (p. 29). This is a ridiculous approach. It is like asking whether a division has enough felt boots: Yes or no?

It is safe to say that even ten years from now we shall have to admit that all our Party and trade union functionaries do not have enough production training, in much the same way as the workers of the Military Department, the trade unions and the Party will not have had enough military experience. But we have made a *start* on production training by having about a thousand workers, and trade union members and delegates take part in management and run factories, head offices and other bodies higher up the scale. The basic principle underlying "production training"—which is the training of *our own selves*, of the old underground workers and professional journalists—is that we should start a painstaking and detailed study of our own practical experience, and teach others to do so, according to the rule: Look before you leap. The fundamental and absolute rule behind "production training" is systematic, circumspect, practical and business-like verification of what this one thousand have done, and even more efficient and careful correction of their work, taking a step forward only when there is

ample proof of the usefulness of a given method, system of management, proportion, selection of men, etc. And it is this rule that Comrade Trotsky has broken by his theses and approach. All his theses, his entire platform pamphlet, are so wrong that they have diverted the Party's attention and resources from practical "production" work to a lot of empty talk.

DIALECTICS AND ECLECTICISM. "SCHOOL" AND "APPARATUS"

Among Comrade Bukharin's many excellent traits are his theoretical ability and keen interest in getting at the theoretical roots of every question. That is a very valuable trait because you cannot have a proper understanding of any mistake, let alone a political one, unless you dig down to its theoretical roots among the basic premises of the one who makes it.

Responding to this urge, Comrade Bukharin tended to shift the controversy into the theoretical sphere, beginning from December 30, if not earlier.

In his speech on that day he said: "That neither the political nor the economic factor can be ignored is, I believe, absolutely incontrovertible - and that is the theoretical essence of what is here known as the 'buffer group' or its ideology" (p. 47).

The gist of his theoretical mistake in this case is substitution of eclecticism for the dialectical interplay of politics and economics (which we find in Marxism). His theoretical attitude is: "on the one hand, and on the other", "the one and the other". That is eclecticism. Dialectics requires an all-round consideration of relationships in their concrete development but not a patchwork of bits and pieces. I have shown this to be so on the example of politics and economics.

That of the "buffer" has gone to reinforce the point. You need a buffer, and it is useful when the Party train is heading for a crash. No question about that at all. Bukharin has built up his "buffer" problem eclectically, by collecting odd pieces from Zinoviev and Trotsky. As a "buffer", Bukharin should have decided for himself just where, when and how each individual or group had made their mistake, whether it was a theoretical mistake,

one of political tact, factional pronouncement, or exaggeration, etc. He should have done that and gone *hammer and tongs at every* such mistake. But he has failed to understand his task of "buffer", and here is good proof of it.

The Communist group of Tsektran's Petrograd Bureau (the C.C. of the Railwaymen's and Water Transport Workers' Union), an organisation sympathising with Trotsky, has stated its opinion that, "on the main issue of the trade unions' role in production, Comrades Trotsky and Bukharin hold views which are variations of one and the same standpoint". It has issued Comrade Bukharin's report in Petrograd on January 3, 1921, in pamphlet form (N. Bukharin, *The Tasks of the Trade Unions*, Petrograd, 1921). It says:

"Comrade Trotsky's original formulation was that the trade union leadership should be removed and suitable comrades found to take their place, etc. He had earlier advocated a 'shake-up', but he has now abandoned the idea, and it is therefore quite absurd to use it as an argument against him" (p. 5).

I will let pass the numerous factual inaccuracies in this statement. (Trotsky used the term "shake-up" at the Fifth All-Russia Conference of Trade Unions, November 2-6. He mentions "selection of leadership" in Paragraph 5 of his theses which he submitted to the Central Committee on November 8, and which, incidentally, some of his supporters have published as a leaflet. The whole of Trotsky's pamphlet, *The Role and Tasks of the Trade Unions*, December 25, reveals the same kind of mentality, the same spirit as I have pointed out before. When and how he "abandoned" this attitude remains a mystery.) I am now dealing with a different matter. When the "buffer" is an eclectic, he passes over some mistakes and brings up others; he says nothing of them in Moscow on December 30, 1920, when addressing thousands of R.C.P. functionaries from all over Russia; but he brings them up in Petrograd on January 3, 1921. When the "buffer" is a dialectician, he directs the full brunt of his attack at every mistake he sees on either side, or on all sides. And that is something Bukharin does not do. He does not even try to examine Trotsky's pamphlet in the light of the "shake-up" policy. *He simply says*

nothing about it. No wonder his buffer performance has made everyone laugh.

To proceed. In that same Petrograd speech he says (p. 7):

“Comrade Trotsky’s mistake is insufficient support for the school-of-communism idea.”

During the December 30 discussion, Bukharin reasoned as follows:

“Comrade Zinoviev has said that the trade unions are a school of communism, and Trotsky has said that they are a technical and administrative apparatus for industrial management. I see no logical grounds for proof that either proposition is wrong; both, and a combination of both, are right” (p. 48).

Bukharin and his “group” or “faction” make the same point in their thesis 6: “On the one hand, they (the trade unions) are a school of communism ... and on the other, they are – increasingly – a component part of the economic apparatus and of state administration in general” (*Pravda*, January 16).

That is where we find Comrade Bukharin’s fundamental theoretical mistake, which is substitution of eclecticism (especially popular with the authors of diverse “fashionable” and reactionary philosophical systems) for Marxist dialectics.

When Comrade Bukharin speaks of “logical” grounds, his whole reasoning shows that he takes – unconsciously, perhaps – the standpoint of formal or scholastic logic, and not of dialectical or Marxist logic. Let me explain this by taking the simple example which Comrade Bukharin himself gives. In the December 30 discussion he said:

“Comrades, many of you may find that the current controversy suggests something like this: two men come in and invite each other to define the tumbler on the lectern. One says: ‘It is a glass cylinder, and a curse on anyone who says different.’ The other one says: ‘A tumbler is a drinking vessel, and a curse on anyone who says different.’” (p. 46).

The reader will see that Bukharin’s example was meant to give me a popular explanation of the harm of one-track thinking. I accept it with gratitude, and in the one-good-turn-deserves-another spirit offer a popular explanation of the difference between dialectics and eclecticism.

A tumbler is assuredly both a glass cylinder and a drinking vessel. But there are more than these two properties, qualities or facets to it; there are an infinite number

of them, an infinite number of "mediacies" and inter-relationships with the rest of the world. A tumbler is a heavy object which can be used as a missile; it can serve as a paper-weight, a receptacle for a captive butterfly, or a valuable object with an artistic engraving or design, and this has nothing at all to do with whether or not it can be used for drinking, is made of glass, is cylindrical or not quite, and so on and so forth.

Moreover, if I needed a tumbler just now for drinking, it would not in the least matter how cylindrical it was, and whether it was actually made of glass; what would matter though would be whether it had any holes in the bottom, or anything that would cut my lips when I drank, etc. But if I did not need a tumbler for drinking but for a purpose that could be served by any glass cylinder, a tumbler with a cracked bottom or without one at all would do just as well, etc.

Formal logic, which is as far as schools go (and should go, with suitable abridgements for lower forms), deals with formal definitions, draws on what is most common, or glaring, and stops there. When two or more different definitions are taken and combined at random (a glass cylinder and a drinking vessel), the result is an eclectic definition which is indicative of different facets of the object, and nothing more.

Dialectical logic demands that we should go further. Firstly, if we are to have a true knowledge of an object we must look at and examine all its facets, its connections and "mediacies". That is something we cannot ever hope to achieve completely, but the rule of comprehensiveness is a safeguard against mistakes and rigidity. Secondly, dialectical logic requires that an object should be taken in development, in change, in "self-movement" (as Hegel sometimes puts it). This is not immediately obvious in respect of such an object as a tumbler, but it, too, is in flux, and this holds especially true for its purpose, use and *connection* with the surrounding world. Thirdly, a full "definition" of an object must include the whole of human experience, both as a criterion of truth and a practical indicator of its connection with human wants. Fourthly, dialectical logic holds that "truth is always concrete, never abstract", as the late Plekhanov liked to say after Hegel. (Let me add in parenthesis for the benefit of young

rs that you *cannot* hope to become a *real*, communist without making a study - and of all of Plekhanov's philosophical writings, nothing better has been written on Marxism in the world.*)

of course, run through the whole notion of logic, but what I have said will do for the time being. We can return from the tumbler to the old Trotsky's platform.

On the one hand, and an apparatus on the other, Bukharin, and writes as much in his theses. There is "insufficient support for the school-of-thought"; Zinoviev errs by being lukewarm on "factor".

Bukharin's reasoning no more than inert and dogmatism? It is because he does not even try independent analysis, from his own standpoint, the whole course of the current controversy *that is*, dialectical logic, unconditionally of the whole approach to the question, presentation - the whole trend of the present - of the question at the present time and the circumstances. You do not see Bukharin!! His approach is one of pure abstraction: no attempt at concrete study, and takes bits from Zinoviev and Trotsky. That is eclecticism. Let me give an example to clarify the picture. I know nothing about the insurgents and revolutionaries in China (apart from the two or three articles in the *Pravda*, and a few books and newspaper articles a few years ago). Since there are these uprisings, Bukharin is fetched to assume a controversy going on in Chinese No. 1, who says that the insurrection is a most acute nation-wide class struggle, No. 2, who says that insurrection is an art. I need to know in order to write theses

on China, it would be a good thing, first, if the current volume of Plekhanov's works contained a special volume or volumes of philosophical articles, with detailed indexes, etc., to be used as standard textbooks on communism; secondly, the state must demand that professors of philosophy have knowledge of Plekhanov's exposition of Marxist philosophy and impart it to their students. But all that is a digression to "administration".

à la Bukharin: "On the one hand,... on the other hand". The one has failed to reckon with the art "factor", and the other, with the "acuteness factor", etc. Because no *concrete* study is made of *this particular* controversy, question, approach, etc., the result is a dead and empty eclecticism.

On the one hand, the trade unions are a school, and on the other, an apparatus; but they also happen to be an organisation of working people, an almost exclusive organisation of industrial workers, an organisation by industry, etc.* Bukharin does not make any analysis for himself, nor does he produce a shred of evidence to prove why it is that we should consider the first two "facets" of the question or object, instead of the third, the fourth, the fifth, etc. That is why his group's theses are an eclectic soap bubble. His presentation of the "school-apparatus" relationship is fundamentally eclectic and wrong.

The only way to view this question in the right light is to descend from empty abstractions to the concrete, that is, the present issue. Whether you take it in the form it assumed at the Fifth All-Russia Conference of Trade Unions, or as it was presented and *slanted* by Trotsky himself in his platform pamphlet of December 25, you will find that his *whole* approach is quite wrong and that he has gone off at a tangent. He has failed to understand that the trade unions can and must be viewed as a school both when raising the question of "Soviet trade-unionism", and when speaking of production propaganda in general, and even when considering "coalescence" and trade union participation in industrial management, *as Trotsky does*. On this last point, as it is presented in Trotsky's platform pamphlet, the mistake lies in his failure to grasp that the trade unions are a *school of technical and administrative management of production*. In the context of the controversy, you cannot say: "a school, on the one hand, and something else on the other"; given Trotsky's approach, *the trade unions, whichever way you look at them, are a school*. They are a school of

* Incidentally, here again Trotsky makes a mistake. He thinks that an industrial union is designed to control industry. That is wrong. When you say that a union is an industrial one you mean that it admits to membership workers in one industry, which is inevitable at the present level of technology and culture (in Russia and elsewhere).

unity, solidarity, management and administration, where you learn how to protect your interests. Instead of making an effort to comprehend and correct Comrade Trotsky's fundamental mistake, Comrade Bukharin has produced a funny little amendment: "On the one hand, and on the other."

Let us go deeper into the question. Let us see what the present trade unions are, as an "apparatus" of industrial management. We have seen from the incomplete returns that about 900 workers - trade union members and delegates - are engaged in industrial management. If you multiply this number by 10 or even by 100 - if it helps to clarify your fundamental mistake let us assume this incredible speed of "advance" in the immediate future - you still have an insignificant proportion of those directly engaged in *management*, as compared with the mass of six million trade union members. This makes it even clearer that it is quite wrong to look to the "leading stratum", and talk about the trade unions' role in production and industrial management, as Trotsky does, forgetting that 98.5 per cent (6 million minus 90,000 equals 5,910,000 or 98.5 per cent of the total) *are learning, and will have to continue to do so for a long time to come*. Don't say *school and management*, say *school of management*.

In his December 30 argument against Zinoviev, whom he accused, quite groundlessly and incorrectly, of denying the "appointments system", that is, the Central Committee's right and duty to make appointments, Comrade Trotsky inadvertently drew the following telltale comparison:

"Zinoviev tends to overdo the propaganda angle on every practical matter, forgetting that it is not only a source of material for agitation, but also a problem requiring an administrative solution" (p. 27).

Before I explain in detail the *potential* administrative approach to the issue, let me say that Comrade Trotsky's fundamental mistake is that he treats (rather, maltreats) *the questions* he himself had brought up in his platform pamphlet as *administrative* ones, whereas *they* could be and ought to be viewed *only from the propaganda angle*.

In effect, what are Trotsky's good points? One undoubtedly good and useful point is his *production propaganda*, but that is not in his theses, but in his *speeches*, specially

when he forgets about his unfortunate polemics with the allegedly "conservative" wing of the trade-unionists. He would undoubtedly have done (and I believe he will do) a great deal of good in the trade union commission's practical business, as speaker and writer, and as a member of the All-Russia Production Propaganda Bureau. His platform theses were a mistake, for through them, like a scarlet thread, runs the administrative approach to the "crisis" and the "two trends" within the trade unions, the interpretation of the R.C.P. Programme, "Soviet trade-unionism", "production training" and "coalescence". I have listed all the main points of Trotsky's "platform" and they all happen to be topics which, considering the material at Trotsky's disposal, can be correctly approached at the present time only from the propaganda angle.

The state is a sphere of coercion. It would be madness to renounce coercion, especially in the epoch of the dictatorship of the proletariat, so that the administrative approach and "steerage" are indispensable. The Party is the leader, the vanguard of the proletariat, which rules directly. It is not coercion but expulsion from the Party that is the specific means of influence and the means of purging and steeling the vanguard. The trade unions are a reservoir of the state power, a school of communism and a school of management. The specific and cardinal thing in this sphere is *not* administration but the "*ties*" "*between* the central state administration" (and, of course, the local as well), "the national economy and the *broad masses* of the working people" (see Party Programme, economic section, § 5, dealing with the trade unions).

The whole of Trotsky's platform pamphlet betrays an incorrect approach to the problem and a misunderstanding of this relationship.

Let us assume that Trotsky had taken a different approach to this famous question of "coalescence" in connection with the other topics of his platform, and that his pamphlet was entirely devoted to a detailed investigation of, say, 90 of the 900 cases of "coalescence" where trade union officials and members concurrently held elective trade union posts and Supreme Economic Council posts in industrial management. Let us say these 90 cases had been analysed together with the returns of a selective

statistical survey, the reports of inspectors and instructors of Rabkrin and the People's Commissariats concerned: let us say they had been analysed in the light of the data supplied by the administrative bodies, the results of the work, the headway in production, etc. That would have been a correct administrative approach, and would have fully vindicated the "shake-up" line, which implies concentrating attention on removals, transfers, appointments and the immediate demands to be made on the "leading stratum". When Bukharin said in his January 3 speech, published by the Tsektran people in Petrograd, that Trotsky had at first wanted a "shake-up" but had now abandoned the idea, he made another one of his eclectic mistakes, which is ridiculous from the practical standpoint and theoretically inadmissible for a Marxist. He takes the question in the abstract, being unable (or unwilling) to get down to brass tacks. So long as we, the Party's Central Committee and the whole Party, continue to run things, that is, govern, we shall never - we cannot - dispense with the "shake-up", that is, removals, transfers, appointments, dismissals, etc. But Trotsky's platform pamphlet deals with something else, and does not raise the "question of practical business" at all. It is not this but the "*trends* within the trade union movement" (Trotsky's thesis 4, end) that was being debated by Zinoviev and Trotsky, Bukharin and myself, and in fact the whole Party.

This is essentially a political question. Because of the substance of the case - this concrete, particular "case" - it is impossible to correct Trotsky's mistake by means of eclectic little amendments and addenda, as Bukharin has been trying to do, being moved undoubtedly by the most humane sentiments and intentions.

There is only one answer.

First, there must be a correct solution of the political question of the "trends within the trade union movement", the relationship between classes, between politics and economics, the specific role of the state, the Party, the trade unions, as "school" and apparatus, etc.

Second, once the correct political decision has been adopted, a diversified nation-wide production propaganda campaign must be carried through, or, rather, systematically carried forward with persistence and patience over

a long term, under the sponsorship and direction of a state agency. It should be conducted in such a way as to cover the same ground over and over again.

Third, the "questions of practical business" must not be confused with trend issues which properly belong to the sphere of "general Party talk" and broad discussions; they must be dealt with as practical matters in the working commissions, with a hearing of witnesses and a study of memoranda, reports and statistics. And any necessary "shake-up" must be carried out only on that basis and in those circumstances: only under a decision of the competent Soviet or Party organ, or of both.

Trotsky and Bukharin have produced a hodgepodge of political mistakes in approach, breaks in the middle of the transmission belts, and unwarranted and futile attacks on "administrative steerage". It is now clear where the "theoretical" source of the mistake lies, since Bukharin has taken up that aspect of it with his example of the tumbler. His theoretical—in this case, gnosiological—mistake lies in his substitution of eclecticism for dialectics. His eclectic approach has confused him and has landed him in syndicalism. Trotsky's mistake is one-track thinking, compulsiveness, exaggeration and obstinacy. His platform says that a tumbler is a drinking vessel, but this particular tumbler happens to have no bottom.

CONCLUSION

It remains for me to go over a few more points which must be dealt with to prevent misunderstanding.

Thesis 6 of Trotsky's platform quotes Paragraph 5 of the economic section of the R.C.P. Programme, which deals with the trade unions. Two pages later, his thesis 8 says:

"Having lost the old basis of their existence, the class economic struggle, the trade unions...." (that is wrong, and is a hasty exaggeration: the trade unions no longer have to face the *class* economic struggle but the *non-class* "economic struggle", which means combating bureaucratic distortions of the Soviet apparatus, safeguarding the working people's material and spiritual interests in ways and means inaccessible to this apparatus, etc. This is a struggle they will unfortunately have to face for many more years to come). "The trade unions," says Trotsky,

“have, for various reasons, not yet succeeded in mustering the necessary forces and working out the necessary methods enabling them to solve the new task, that of *organising production*” (Trotsky’s italics, p. 9, thesis 8), “set before them by the proletarian revolution and formulated in our Programme.”

That is yet another hasty exaggeration which is pregnant with grave error. The Programme does not contain any such formulation nor does it set the trade unions the task of “organising production”. Let us go over the propositions in the Party’s Programme as they unfold in the text:

(1) “The organisational apparatus” (but not the others) “of socialised industry should rely chiefly” (but not exclusively) “on the trade unions.” (2) “They must to an ever increasing degree divest themselves of the narrow craft-union spirit” (how? under the leadership of the Party and through the proletariat’s educational and other influence on the non-proletarian mass of working people) “and become large industrial associations, embracing the majority, and eventually all of the workers in the given industry.”

That is the first part of the section of the Party Programme dealing with the trade unions. You will have noted that it starts by laying down very “*strict* conditions” demanding a long sustained effort for what is to follow. And what follows is this:

“The trade unions being, on the strength of the laws of the Soviet Republic and established practice, participants” (note the cautious statement: participants only) “in all the local and central organs of industrial management, should eventually arrive at a *de facto* concentration in their hands of the whole administration of the whole national economy, as a single economic entity” (note this: should arrive at a *de facto* concentration of management not of branches of industry and not of industry as a whole, but of the whole national economy, and moreover, as an economic entity. In economic terms, this condition may be considered fulfilled only when the petty producers both in industry and agriculture account for less than one-half of the population and the national economy). “The trade unions ensuring in this way” (the way which helps to realise all the conditions listed earlier) “indissoluble ties between the central state administration,

the national economy and the broad masses of working people, should draw the latter" (that is, the masses, the majority of the population) "into direct economic management on the widest possible scale. At the same time, the participation of the trade unions in economic management and their activity in drawing the broad masses into this work are the principal means of combating the bureaucratisation of the economic apparatus of the Soviet power and making possible the establishment of truly popular control over the results of production."

There again, in that last sentence, we find a very cautious phrase: "participation in economic management"; and another reference to the recruitment of the broad masses as the chief (but not the only) means of combating bureaucratic practices; finally, we find a highly cautious statement: "*making possible*" the establishment of "*popular*" - that is, workers' and peasants', and not just purely proletarian - "*control*".

It is obviously wrong to boil this down to the Party Programme "formulating" the trade unions' task as "organisation of production". And if you insist on this error, and write it into your platform theses, you will get nothing but an anti-communist, syndicalist deviation.

Incidentally, Comrade Trotsky says in his theses that "over the last period we have not made any headway towards the goal set forth in the Programme but have in fact retreated from it" (p. 7, thesis 6). That statement is unsupported, and, I think, wrong. It is no proof to say, as Trotsky did in the discussions, that the trade unions "themselves" admit this. That is not the last resort, as far as the Party is concerned, and, generally speaking, the proof lies only in a serious and objective study of a great number of facts. Moreover, even if such proof were forthcoming, there would remain this question: Why have we retreated? Is it because "many trade-unionists" are "balking at the new tasks and methods", as Trotsky believes, or because "we have not yet succeeded in mustering the necessary forces and working out the necessary methods" to cut short and correct certain unwarranted and harmful excesses of bureaucracy?

Which brings me to Bukharin's rebuke of December 30 (repeated by Trotsky yesterday, January 24, during our discussion in the Communist group of the Second Miners'

Congress) that we have "dropped the line laid down by the Ninth Party Congress" (p. 46 of the report on the December 30 discussion). He alleged that at that Congress I had defended the militarisation of labour and had jeered at references to democracy, all of which I now "repudiate". In his reply to the debate on December 30, Comrade Trotsky added this barb: "Lenin takes account of the fact that ... there is a grouping of opposition-minded comrades within the trade unions" (p. 65); that I view it from the "diplomatic angle" (p. 69), and that there is "manoeuvring inside the Party groups" (p. 70), etc. Putting such a complexion on the case is, of course, highly flattering for Trotsky, and worse than unflattering for me. But let us look at the facts.

In that same discussion on December 30, Trotsky and Krestinsky established the fact that "as long ago as July (1920), Comrade Preobrazhensky had proposed to the Central Committee that we should switch to a new track in respect of the internal life of our workers' organisations" (p. 25). In August, Comrade Zinoviev drafted a letter, and the Central Committee approved a *C.C. letter* on combating red-tape and extending democracy. In September, the question was brought up at a Party conference whose decisions were endorsed by the Central Committee. In December, the question of combating red-tape was laid before Eighth Congress of Soviets. Consequently, the whole Central Committee, the whole Party and the whole workers' and peasants' Republic had recognised that the question of the bureaucracy and ways of combating its evils was high on the agenda. Does any "repudiation" of the Ninth Congress, of the R.C.P. follow from all this? Of course, not. The decisions on the militarisation of labour, etc., are incontestable, and there is no need for me at all to withdraw any of my jibes at the references to democracy by those who challenged these decisions. What does follow is that we shall be extending democracy in the workers' organisations, without turning it into a fetish; that we shall redouble our attention to the struggle against bureaucratic practices; and that we shall take special care to rectify any unwarranted and harmful excesses of bureaucracy, no matter who points them out.

One final remark on the minor question of priority and equalisation. I said during the December 30 dis-

cussion that Trotsky's formulation of thesis 41 on this point was theoretically wrong, because it implied priority in production and equalisation in consumption. I replied that priority implied preference and that that was nothing unless you also had it in consumption. Comrade Trotsky reproached me for "extraordinary forgetfulness" and "intimidation" (pp. 67 and 68), and I am surprised to find that he has not accused me also of manoeuvring, diplomatic moves, etc. He has made "concessions" to my equalitarian line, but I have attacked him.

Actually, however, anyone who takes an interest in Party affairs, can turn to indisputable Party documents: the November resolution of the C.C. Plenum, point 4, and Trotsky's platform pamphlet, thesis 41. However "forgetful" I may be, and however excellent Comrade Trotsky's memory, it is still a fact that thesis 41 contains a theoretical error, which the C.C. resolution of November 9 does not. The resolution says: "While recognising the necessity of keeping to the principle of priority in carrying out the economic plan, the Central Committee, in complete solidarity with the decisions of the last All-Russia Conference (September), deems it necessary to effect a gradual but steady transition to equality in the status of various groups of workers and their respective trade unions, all the while building up the organisation on the scale of the union as a whole." That is clearly aimed against Tsektran, and it is quite impossible to put any other construction on the exact meaning of the resolution. Priority is here to stay. Preference is still to be given to enterprises, trade unions, trusts and departments on the priority list (in regard to fulfilment of the economic plan), but at the same time, the "equalitarian line" - which was supported not by "Comrade Lenin alone", but was approved *by the Party Conference and the Central Committee, that is, the entire Party* - makes this clear-cut demand: get on with the gradual but steady *transition* to equalisation. That Tsektran failed to carry out this C.C. resolution (November) is evident from the Central Committee's December resolution (on Trotsky and Bukharin's motion), which contains another reminder of the "principles of ordinary democracy". The theoretical error in thesis 41 is that it says: equalisation in consumption, priority in production. That is an economic

absurdity because it implies a gap between production and consumption. I did not say – and could never have said – anything of the sort. If you don't need a factory, close it down. Close down all the factories that are not absolutely essential, and give preference to those that are. Give preference to, say, transport. Most certainly. But the preference must not be overdone, as it was in Tsektran's case, which was why the *Party* (and not just Lenin) issued this directive: *get on with the gradual but steady transition* to equality. And Trotsky has no one but himself to blame for having come out – after the November Plenary Meeting, which gave a clear-cut and theoretically correct solution – with a factional pamphlet on “the two trends” and proposed a formulation in his thesis 41 which is wrong in economic terms.

Today, January 25, it is exactly one month since Comrade Trotsky's factional statement. It is now patent that this pronouncement, inappropriate in form and wrong in essence, has diverted the Party from its practical economic and production effort into rectifying political and theoretical mistakes. But, it's an ill wind, as the old saying goes.

Rumour has it that some terrible things have been said about the disagreements on the Central Committee. Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries undoubtedly shelter (and have sheltered) behind the opposition, and it is they who are spreading the rumours, incredibly malicious formulations, and inventions of all sorts to malign the Party, put vile interpretations on its decisions, aggravate conflicts and ruin its work. That is a political trick used by the bourgeoisie, including the petty-bourgeois democrats, the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, who, for very obvious reasons, hate – and cannot help hating – the Bolsheviks' guts. Every intelligent member of the Party is familiar with this political trick, and knows its worth.

Because of the disagreements on the Central Committee, it had to appeal to the Party, and the discussions that followed clearly revealed the essence and scope of these disagreements. That killed the rumours and the slander. The Party learns its lessons and is tempered in the struggle against factionalism, a new malaise (it is new in

the sense that after the October Revolution we had forgotten all about it). Actually, it is an old malaise, with relapses apparently bound to occur over the next few years, but with an easier cure now well in sight.

The Party is learning not to blow up its disagreements. Let me quote at this point Comrade Trotsky's correct remark about Comrade Tomsy: "I have always said - even when the polemic against Comrade Tomsy was at its bitterest - that it is quite clear to me that only men with his experience and authority ought to be our trade union leaders. I told this to the Party group of the Fifth Conference of the Trade Unions, and repeated it at the Zimin theatre a few days ago. Ideological struggle within the Party does not mean mutual ostracism but mutual influence" (p. 34 of the report on the December 30 discussion). The Party will naturally apply this correct approach to Comrade Trotsky himself.

During the discussion it was Comrade Shlyapnikov and his group, the so-called Workers' Opposition, who showed the most pronounced syndicalist trend. This being an obvious deviation from communism and the Party, we shall have to reckon with it, talk it over, and make a special propaganda effort to explain the error of these views and the danger of making such mistakes. Comrade Bukharin, who actually coined the syndicalist phrase "mandatory nominations" (by trade unions to management bodies) tries to vindicate himself in today's issue of *Pravda*, but I'm afraid his line of defence is highly ineffective and quite wrong. He wants us to know, you see, that he deals with the role of the Party in his other points. I should think so! If it were otherwise it would have been more than just a *mistake*, requiring correction and allowing some slight rectification: it would have been withdrawal from the Party. When you say "mandatory nominations" but neglect to add, there and then, that they are *not* mandatory for the Party, you have a syndicalist deviation, and that is *incompatible* with communism and the Party Programme. If you add: "mandatory but *not* for the Party" you are giving the non-Party workers a false sense of having some increase in their rights, whereas in fact there will be no change at all. The longer Comrade Bukharin persists in his deviation from communism - a deviation that is wrong theoret-

ically and deceptive politically – the more deplorable will be the fruits of his obstinacy. You cannot maintain an untenable proposition. The Party does not object to the extension of the rights of the non-Party workers in general, but a little reflection will show what can and what cannot be done in this respect.

In the discussion by the Communist group of the Second All-Russia Miners' Congress, Shlyapnikov's platform was defeated despite the backing it got from Comrade Kiselyov, who commands special prestige in that union: our platform won 137 votes, Shlyapnikov's 62, and Trotsky's, 8. The syndicalist malaise must and will be cured.

In this one month, Petrograd, Moscow and a number of provincial towns have shown that the Party responded to the discussion and has rejected Comrade Trotsky's wrong line by an overwhelming majority. While there may have been some vacillation "at the top" and "in the provinces", in the committees and in the offices, the rank-and-file membership – the mass of Party workers – came out solidly against this wrong line.

Comrade Kamenev informed me of Comrade Trotsky's announcement, during the discussion in the Zamoskvo-rechye District of Moscow on January 23, that he was withdrawing his platform and joining up with the Bukharin group on a new platform. Unfortunately, I heard nothing of this from Comrade Trotsky either on January 23 or 24, when he spoke against me in the Communist group of the Miners' Congress. I don't know whether this is due to another change in Comrade Trotsky's platform and intentions, or to some other reason. In any case, his January 23 announcement shows that the Party, without so much as mustering all its forces, and with only Petrograd, Moscow and a minority of the provincial towns going on record, has corrected Comrade Trotsky's mistake promptly and with determination.

The Party's enemies had rejoiced too soon. They have not been able – and will never be able – to take advantage of some of the inevitable disagreements within the Party to inflict harm on it and on the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia.

V.I. Lenin,
Collected Works,
Vol. 32, pp. 70-107

January 25, 1921

OUR REVOLUTION

(APROPOS OF N. SUKHANOV'S NOTES)

I

I have lately been glancing through Sukhanov's notes on the revolution. What strikes one most is the pedantry of all our petty-bourgeois democrats and of all the heroes of the Second International. Apart from the fact that they are all extremely faint-hearted, that when it comes to the minutest deviation from the German model even the best of them fortify themselves with reservations—apart from this characteristic, which is common to all petty-bourgeois democrats and has been abundantly manifested by them throughout the revolution, what strikes one is their slavish imitation of the past.

They all call themselves Marxists, but their conception of Marxism is impossibly pedantic. They have completely failed to understand what is decisive in Marxism, namely, its revolutionary dialectics. They have even absolutely failed to understand Marx's plain statements that in times of revolution the utmost flexibility⁴² is demanded, and have even failed to notice, for instance, the statements Marx made in his letters—I think it was in 1856—expressing the hope of combining a peasant war in Germany, which might create a revolutionary situation, with the working-class movement⁴³—they avoid even this plain statement and walk round and about it like a cat around a bowl of hot porridge.

Their conduct betrays them as cowardly reformists who are afraid to deviate from the bourgeoisie, let alone break with it, and at the same time they disguise their cowardice with the wildest rhetoric and braggartry. But what strikes one in all of them even from the purely theoretical point of view is their utter inability to grasp the following Marxist considerations: up to now they have

seen capitalism and bourgeois democracy in Western Europe follow a definite path of development, and cannot conceive that this path can be taken as a model only *mutatis mutandis*, only with certain amendments (quite insignificant from the standpoint of the general development of world history).

First - the revolution connected with the first imperialist world war. Such a revolution was bound to reveal new features, or variations, resulting from the war itself, for the world has never seen such a war in such a situation. We find that since the war the bourgeoisie of the wealthiest countries have to this day been unable to restore "normal" bourgeois relations. Yet our reformists - petty bourgeois who make a show of being revolutionaries - believed, and still believe, that normal bourgeois relations are the limit (thus far shalt thou go and no farther). And even their conception of "normal" is extremely stereotyped and narrow.

Secondly, they are complete strangers to the idea that while the development of world history as a whole follows general laws it is by no means precluded, but, on the contrary, presumed, that certain periods of development may display peculiarities in either the form or the sequence of this development. For instance, it does not even occur to them that because Russia stands on the border-line between the civilised countries and the countries which this war has for the first time definitely brought into the orbit of civilisation - all the Oriental, non-European countries - she could and was, indeed, bound to reveal certain distinguishing features; although these, of course, are in keeping with the general line of world development, they distinguish her revolution from those which took place in the West-European countries and introduce certain partial innovations as the revolution moves on to the countries of the East.

Infinitely stereotyped, for instance, is the argument they learned by rote during the development of West-European Social-Democracy, namely, that we are not yet ripe for socialism, that, as certain "learned" gentlemen among them put it, the objective economic premises for socialism do not exist in our country. It does not occur to any of them to ask: but what about a people that found itself in a revolutionary situation such as that

created during the first imperialist war? Might it not, influenced by the hopelessness of its situation, fling itself into a struggle that would offer it at least some chance of securing conditions for the further development of civilisation that were somewhat unusual?

"The development of the productive forces of Russia has not attained the level that makes socialism possible". All the heroes of the Second International, including, of course, Sukhanov, beat the drums about this proposition. They keep harping on this incontrovertible proposition in a thousand different keys, and think that it is the decisive criterion of our revolution.

But what if the situation, which drew Russia into the imperialist world war that involved every more or less influential West-European country and made her a witness of the eve of the revolutions maturing or partly already begun in the East, gave rise to circumstances that put Russia and her development in a position which enabled us to achieve precisely that combination of a "peasant war" with the working-class movement suggested in 1856 by no less a Marxist than Marx himself as a possible prospect for Prussia?

What if the complete hopelessness of the situation, by stimulating the efforts of the workers and peasants tenfold, offered us the opportunity to create the fundamental requisites of civilisation in a different way from that of the West-European countries? Has that altered the general line of development of world history? Has that altered the basic relations between the basic classes of all the countries that are being, or have been, drawn into the general course of world history?

If a definite level of culture is required for the building of socialism (although nobody can say just what that definite "level of culture" is, for it differs in every West-European country), why cannot we begin by first achieving the prerequisites for that definite level of culture in a revolutionary way, and *then*, with the aid of the workers' and peasants' government and the Soviet system, proceed to overtake the other nations?

January 16, 1923

II

You say that civilisation is necessary for the building of socialism. Very good. But why could we not first create such prerequisites of civilisation in our country as the expulsion of the landowners and the Russian capitalists, and then start moving towards socialism? Where, in what books, have you read that such variations of the customary historical sequence of events are impermissible or impossible?

Napoleon, I think, wrote: "*On s'engage et puis... on voit.*" Rendered freely this means: "First engage in a serious battle and then see what happens." Well, we did first engage in a serious battle in October 1917, and then saw such details of development (from the standpoint of world history they were certainly details) as the Brest peace,⁴⁴ the New Economic Policy,⁴⁵ and so forth. And now there can be no doubt that in the main we have been victorious.

Our Sukhanovs, not to mention Social-Democrats still farther to the right, never even dream that revolutions cannot be made in any other way. Our European philistines never even dream that the subsequent revolutions in Oriental countries, which possess much vaster populations and a much vaster diversity of social conditions, will undoubtedly display even greater distinctions than the Russian revolution.

It need hardly be said that a textbook written on Kautskian lines was a very useful thing in its day. But it is time, for all that, to abandon the idea that it foresaw all the forms of development of subsequent world history. It would be timely to say that those who think so are simply fools.

January 17, 1923

Lenin,
Collected Works,
Vol. 33, pp. 476-80.

¹ This work is a chapter from the article "Karl Marx" which was written in 1914 for the *Granat Encyclopaedia*. p. 7

² See F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Progress Publishers, Moscow; 1978, pp. 15-16, 33. p. 7

³ See K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, 1976, pp. 362-63, 339-40, 362. p. 8

⁴ See F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978, p. 36. p. 8

⁵ The fragment "On the Question of Dialectics" is a kind of summing up of Lenin's work on the problems of dialectics in 1914-15. It was written in 1915. p. 10

⁶ The reference is to F. Lassalle's book *Die Philosophie Herakleitos des Dunklen von Ephesos*, Berlin, 1858 (*The Philosophy of Heraclitus the Obscure of Ephesus*, Berlin, 1858). p. 10

⁷ The *Second International* - the international association of socialist parties, founded in 1889. When the World War of 1914-18 broke out the Second International leaders betrayed the cause of socialism and sided with their imperialist governments, thus causing the split of the Second International. p. 17

⁸ The *International Socialist Bureau* - the executive and information body of the Second International. p. 17

⁹ The *Bund* - the shortened title of the General Jewish Workers' Union of Lithuania, Poland and Russia, founded in 1897. It embraced mainly the Jewish artisans in the western regions of Russia. The Bund pursued an opportunist, Menshevik policy. p. 17

¹⁰ On August 4, 1914, the German Social-Democrats voted, together with the bourgeois parties, in the Reichstag for granting the loan of 5 billion marks to the Wilhelm's government, thus giving their consent to Germany's waging the imperialist war. p. 17

¹¹ The *Stuttgart International Socialist Congress* (the Seventh Congress of the Second International) was held in 1907. The Basle

International Socialist Congress (the extraordinary congress of the Second International) was held in 1912. p. 17

¹² The mentioned resolutions have not been included in the present edition. p. 18

¹³ *Nashe Slovo* (Our Word) - a Menshevik daily newspaper published in Paris from January 1915 to September 1916. p. 19

¹⁴ The *Triple Entente* - the imperialist bloc of Britain, France and tsarist Russia, which took final shape in 1907, and was opposed to the imperialist Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy. p. 21

¹⁵ The reference is to Lenin's articles "A German Voice on the War", "The Slogan of Civil War Illustrated", and "Bourgeois Philanthropists and Revolutionary Social-Democracy". p. 26

¹⁶ Lenin is referring to the Paris Commune of 1871. p. 27

¹⁷ *October-December, 1905* - the climax of the revolution of 1905-07. The All-Russia general political strike was held in October, and in December the armed uprisings took place in Moscow, Rostov-on-the-Don, Krasnoyarsk, Sevastopol, and many other cities and industrial centres. p. 27

¹⁸ *Golos* (The Voice) - a Menshevik daily newspaper published in Paris from September 1914 to January 1915. p. 28

¹⁹ *Struvist theory, Struvism* - a theory which, while recognising Marxism in words, in deeds distorted it attempting to subordinate it to the interests of the bourgeoisie. It was so named after P. B. Struve, the chief exponent of "legal Marxism" in Russia in the 1890s. Struve accepted the Marxist theory of the necessity of the development of capitalism in Russia but he discarded the revolutionary essence of Marxism - the theory of the socialist revolution, the inevitability of the downfall of capitalism and its replacement by the communist social-economic formation. p. 32

²⁰ The quotation is from Goethe. p. 41

²¹ The *Bulygin Duma* - the consultative "representative assembly" to be convened in Russia under the tsar's manifesto of August 6 (19), 1905. It was named after A. G. Bulygin, the then Minister of the Interior, who drafted the law for its convocation. The Bulygin Duma was not convened, it was swept away by the growing revolutionary movement. p. 42

²² The reference is to the Conference of the Bolshevik Party sections abroad held in Berne from February 14 to 19 (February 27-March 4). p. 43

²³ The *Jaurèsists* - an opportunist wing of the French Socialist movement. p. 48

²⁴ The *Mensheviks* – an opportunist trend in the Russian Social-Democratic movement. After the defeat of the 1905-07 revolution the majority of the Mensheviks shifted to the positions of *liquidationism*. The liquidators demanded the dissolution of the illegal revolutionary working class party. They urged the Social-Democrats to give up all the revolutionary activity and intended to establish a “broad”, i. e. legal, party, including the petty-bourgeois parties of the S.R.s, anarchists, etc. as well as the Social-Democrats, which would engage only in the legal activity permitted by the tsarist government. The policy of the liquidators was not supported by the workers. The Prague Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (January 1912) expelled the liquidators from the Party. p. 48

²⁵ The reference is to the Left wing of the French Socialist movement, led by Jules Guesde. When the First World War broke out, Guesde openly came out in support of it and entered the French bourgeois government. p. 48

²⁶ *Millerandism* – an opportunist trend named after the French Socialist A. Millerand, who, in 1899, betrayed the socialist cause and entered the French bourgeois government. In 1900 the Paris Congress of the Second International adopted a resolution condemning the participation of socialists in bourgeois governments but admitting it in certain “exceptional” cases. p. 49

²⁷ In 1896-98 the German Social-Democrat Eduard Bernstein wrote a series of articles entitled “Problems of Socialism”, in which he set out to revise the philosophical, economic and political principles of Marx’s theory. Rejecting the Marxist revolutionary teaching, he advocated narrow social-reformism within the limits of the capitalist society.

Bernstein’s revisionism was condemned at the congresses of the German Social-Democratic Party. However, the Party leadership did not show sufficient determination in opposing Bernsteinism. p. 49

²⁸ Tradition has it that *Herostratus*, a Greek who lived in the 4th century B. C., set fire to the noted temple of Artemis in his native town of Ephesus for the sole purpose of becoming known to posterity. p. 56

²⁹ *Nasha Zarya* (Our Dawn) – a legal monthly journal of the Menshevik liquidators published in St. Petersburg from 1910 to 1914. p. 57

³⁰ The *Brussels bloc* was formed at the Brussels Conference by the liquidators, the Trotskyites, the Bund members and the representatives of other opportunist movements against the Bolsheviks in June 1914. p. 57

³¹ The *German Lefts* – the Left wing of the German Social-Democracy, led by K. Liebknecht, R. Luxemburg and F. Mehring. Following the principles of internationalism, they sharply criticised the leadership of German Social-Democracy during the First World War. p. 58

³² On January 9 (22), 1905, the priest Gapon organised a peaceful procession of workers with their wives and children to the Winter

Palace to present a petition to the tsar, describing intolerable lot and inhuman exploitation of workers. The unarmed workers were shot down by the tsarist troops. This act served to provoke mass political strikes and demonstrations all over Russia. It marked the beginning of the 1905-07 revolution. p. 67

³³ *Economism* – an opportunist trend in Russian Social-Democracy which arose at the turn of the century. The “Economists” limited the tasks of the working class to an economic struggle for higher wages and reducing of the working hours, etc., asserting that the political struggle was the business of the liberal bourgeoisie. p. 68

³⁴ *Rabochaya Mysl* (Workers’ Thought) and *Rabocheye Dyelo* (The Workers’ Cause) – the Economist newspaper and journal. p. 68

³⁵ This pamphlet was written by Lenin in January 1921, in the period of the Party discussion of the trade unions’ role and functions in socialist construction. The discussion was imposed on the Party by Trotsky. At a sitting of the R.C.P.(B.) group of the Fifth All-Russia Trade Union Conference on November 3, 1920, he came out against the Party course on broader application of democracy in the trade union’s practice, calling to “shaking up” the trade unions and immediate “governmentalisation of trade unions”. N. I. Bukharin who tried to reconcile Leninism and Trotskyism, acting as a buffer between the two platforms, actually supported Trotsky. Lenin was against the discussion in general, asserting that Trotsky’s theses distract the Party from the great practical tasks posed before the country to the empty abstract talks. But after the Trotskyists started the discussion, Lenin revealed Trotsky’s mistakes in a number of articles and speeches. The discussion lasted for over two months and ended with the complete defeat of the Trotskyists in the Party organisations and with declining of Trotsky’s programme. p. 70

³⁶ *Tsektran* – the Central Committee of the Joint Trade Union of Rail and Water Transport Workers. The red tape, administration by injunction, the appointments system, etc., were cultivated by the Trotskyists who had seized the leadership of the union. The departure from democratic methods of work arose the indignation of the union members and led to a split in their ranks. The First All-Russia Congress of Transport Workers held in March 1921 expelled the Trotskyists from Tsektran and recommended that the union should change methods of work in the direction of extending democracy within the union. p. 76

³⁷ The union of water transport workers came out with criticism of the Trotskyist methods of the Tsektran leadership. p. 79

³⁸ The circular by V. I. Zoff, a leader of Tsektran, ran as follows: “A great change is about to occur in the life of water transport: primitive methods, committee treadmill, haphazard work and anarchy are on the way out. Water transport is becoming a state enterprise, headed by political commissars with appropriate powers.

Committees, trade unions and elected delegates will no longer have the power to interfere in technical and administrative matters." The order was an example of administration by injunction and bureaucratic practices, which Tsektran's Trotskvite leadership was introducing. p. 79

³⁹ The reference is to Lenin's speech "The Trade Unions, the Present Situation and Trotsky's Mistakes". p. 80

⁴⁰ Lenin is referring to the participation of trade unions in managing the state affairs. p. 85

⁴¹ The reference is to the disciplinary courts which were to be introduced at the enterprises, according to Rudzutak's theses, in order to strengthen labour discipline. p. 85

⁴² This, evidently, is a reference to the Paris Commune as a supremely flexible political system in Marx's "The Civil War in France" and the high appraisal of the "flexibility" of the Parisians given by Marx in a letter to L. Kugelmann on April 12, 1871 (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1975, p. 247). p. 107

⁴³ In his letter to Engels of April 16, 1856 Marx wrote: "The whole thing in Germany will depend on the possibility of backing the proletarian revolution by some second edition of the Peasant War. Then the affair will be splendid." p. 107

⁴⁴ The reference is to the peace treaty between Soviet Russia and Germany and her allies signed at Brest-Litovsk in March 1918. The terms were extremely harsh for the Soviet Republic but the treaty enabled it to get out of the imperialist war and start peaceful economic development. The Treaty of Brest was annulled after the revolution in Germany in November 1918. p. 110

⁴⁵ The *New Economic Policy (NEP)* - the economic policy introduced by the Soviet Government in 1921 after the Civil War. It was called "new" in contrast to the so-called war communism policy, imposed by the war, which was characterised by the banning of the free trade and the peasants delivering all their surplus products to the state to supply provisions to starving urban population and the army. Under the New Economic Policy a food tax was introduced. This gave the peasants the possibility of freely disposing of their surplus products, selling them in the market. The NEP permitted a certain margin of capitalist enterprise and free trade. p. 110

A

Alexinsky, Grigory Alexeyevich (b. 1879) - during the 1905-07 revolution Social-Democrat, Bolshevik; during the First World War took up a social-chauvinist stand; supported an aggressive tsarist policy. - 55

Aristotle (384-322 B. C.) - Greek philosopher and scientist, whose works cover practically all aspects of knowledge of his time; in philosophy wavered between materialism and idealism. - 10, 12

Armstrong - the name of the owners of a British arms manufacturing firm. - 37

Artyom (Sergeyev, Fyodor Andreyevich) (1883-1921) - prominent figure in the Communist Party and the Soviet state; in 1921 Chairman of the CC of the All-Russia Miners' Union; member of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. - 78

Axelrod, Pavel Borisovich (1850-1928) - Russian Social-Democrat; Menshevik after the Second Party Congress (1903), subsequently a liquidator; during the First World War took up a social-chauvinist stand disguised in Centrist phraseology. - 20, 22, 27, 28, 48

B

Belger, Erwin (1875-between 1919 and 1922) - German political figure and publicist; before the First World War General Secretary of the Imperial Alliance against Social-Democrats, reactionary political organisation of representatives of the nobility and bourgeoisie monarchist bloc. - 53

Berkeley, George (1685-1753) - English philosopher, subjective idealist. - 13

Bernstein, Eduard (1850-1932) - leader of the extreme opportunist wing of the German Social-Democracy and the Second International; advocate of the revision of philosophical, economic and political fundamentals of revolutionary Marxism. During the First World War adopted a Centrist stand disguising his social-chauvinism in internationalist phraseology. - 48, 69

Bismarck, Otto Eduard Leopold (1815-1898) - statesman and diplomat of Prussia and Germany, who forcibly unified Germany under Prussia's hegemony; first Chancellor of the German Empire (1871-90); author of the Anti-Socialist Law (1878). - 32

Bissolati, Leonida (1857-1920) – a founder of the Italian Socialist Party and leader of its Right wing. In 1912 he was expelled from the ISP and founded the “social-reformist party”. During the First World War held a social-chauvinist stand. – 55

Blanqui, Louis Auguste (1805-1881) – French revolutionary, utopian communist, organiser of a number of secret societies. – 32

Brailsford, Henry Noël (b. 1873) – British publicist, pacifist. Actively participated in the British liberal and working-class press. In 1907 joined the Independent Labour Party. From the beginning of the First World War a leader of the pacifist Union of Democratic Control. – 28

Branting, Karl Hjalmar (1860-1925) – opportunist leader of the Social-Democratic Party of Sweden, one of the leaders of the Second International; social-chauvinist during the First World War. – 55

Bukharin, Nikolai Ivanovich (1888-1938) – Russian Social-Democrat, member of the Bolshevik Party from 1906. After the October Socialist Revolution held a number of responsible posts; repeatedly opposed the Party’s Leninist policy; in 1918 headed the anti-Party group of “Left Communists”; during the Party discussion on trade unions occupied a “buffer” position, supporting in actual fact the Trotsky group. In 1937 was expelled from the Party for his anti-Party activities. – 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 90, 91, 93, 94, 95, 98, 99, 101, 103, 105, 106

Bulygin, Alexander Grigoryevich (1851-1919) – statesman in tsar-

ist Russia, Minister of the Interior in 1905; on the tsar’s instructions directed the drafting of a bill to convene a consultative Duma. – 42

C

Caillaux, Joseph (1863-1944) – French statesman, one of the leaders of the Radical Party; before the First World War Minister of Finance, Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of the Interior. – 28

Chernov, Viktor Mikhailovich (Gardenin) (1876-1952) – one of the Socialist-Revolutionary leaders and theoreticians who came out with anti-Marxist articles; during the First World War he hid his social-chauvinism behind Left phrases. – 32

Clausewitz, Karl (1780-1831) – Prussian general, prominent military theoretician; author of works on the history of Napoleonic and other wars. – 29, 30

Cunow, Heinrich (1862-1936) – German Social-Democrat, historian, sociologist and ethnographer; initially adhered to Marxism, later a revisionist and falsifier of Marxism; during the First World War a theoretician of social-imperialism. – 22, 23, 24, 26, 32, 43, 68

D

David, Eduard (1869-1930) – a Right-wing leader of German Social-Democracy, revisionist; during the First World War a social-chauvinist. – 20, 49, 62

Delaisi, Francis (b. 1873) – French petty-bourgeois economist, Syndicalist, pacifist. – 21

Democritus of Abdera (c. 460-370 B. C.) – Greek materialist phi-

losopher, one of the founders of the atomistic theory. - 13

Descartes, René (Lat. *Renatus Cartesius*) (1596-1650) - French philosopher, mathematician and natural scientist. - 13

Dietzgen, Joseph (1828-1888) - German worker, Social-Democrat, philosopher, adherent of dialectical materialism. - 14

Dumas, Charles (b. 1883) - French socialist, publicist, deputy to the Parliament; during the First World War social-chauvinist. - 20

E

Engels, Frederick (1820-1895) - 7, 8, 9, 10, 29, 30, 31

F

Feuerbach, Ludwig Andreas (1804-1872) - German materialist philosopher and atheist, whose philosophy became one of the theoretical sources of Marxism. - 13, 41

G

Gapon, Georgi Apollonovich (1870-1906) - priest who on January 9, 1905, instigated the march of St. Petersburg workers to hand a petition to the tsar. - 67

Gardenin, Y. - see *Chernov, V. M.*

Garibaldi, Giuseppe (1807-1882) - national hero of Italy, leader of the Italian revolutionary democrats; in 1848-67 headed the movement for the unification of Italy against foreign enslavement, feudal absolutist system and clerical reaction. - 31

Gassendi, Pierre (1592-1655) - French materialist philosopher who developed the ideas of atomism and the Epicurus' ethics; famous for his works in astronomy, mathematics,

mechanics and the history of science. - 13

Giffen, Robert (1837-1910) - British economist, Syndicalist, pacifist. - 28

Gorter, Herman (1864-1927) - Dutch Left-wing Social-Democrat, publicist; during the First World War internationalist; supporter of the Zimmerwald Left. - 55

Greulich, Hermann (1842-1925) - a founder of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party, leader of its Right wing; during the First World War adopted a social-chauvinist stand. - 56

Grimm, Robert (1881-1958) - one of the leaders of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party; during the First World War Centrist, participant in the Zimmerwald and Kienthal conferences; Chairman of the International Socialist Commission. - 56

Guchkov, Alexander Ivanovich (1862-1936) - big capitalist, monarchist; organiser and leader of the Octobrist Party. - 31

Guesde, Jules (Basile, Mathieu) (1845-1922) - one of the founders and leaders of the French socialist movement and of the Second International.

In 1901 Guesde and his supporters founded the Socialist Party of France. After the unification of the Socialist Party of France with the reformist French Socialist Party (1905), he headed the Left wing of the united party. From the outbreak of the First World War he took up a social-chauvinist stand and entered the French bourgeois government. - 19, 47, 48, 49, 60

H

Haase, Hugo (1863-1919) - a Cen-

- trist leader of German Social-Democracy; in 1911 Chairman of the Board of the German Social-Democratic Party; from 1912 Chairman of the Social-Democratic faction in the Reichstag; Centrist during the First World War. - 57, 58, 69
- Haenisch, Konrad* (1876-1925) - German Social-Democrat and publicist; an ideologist of social-chauvinism during the First World War; from October 1915, editor of the social-chauvinist journal *Die Glocke*. - 49
- Harms, Bernhard* (1876-1939) - German economist; representative of Katheder-socialism; apologist of the German imperialism; author of works on world economics and politics. - 36
- Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich* (1770-1831) - prominent representative of classical German philosophy, objective idealist who, on an idealistic basis, deeply and thoroughly worked out the theory of dialectical development.
- K. Marx and F. Engels critically studied Hegel's idealist dialectics and created materialist dialectics which reflects the general laws of development of the objective world and human thinking. - 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 28, 29, 93
- Heine, Wolfgang* (1861-1944) - German politician, Right-wing Social-Democrat; social-chauvinist during the First World War. - 49
- Henderson, Arthur* (1863-1935) - British politician, a Right-wing leader of the Labour Party and the Council of Trade Unions; social-chauvinist; from 1915 to 1931 held several ministerial posts in the British government. - 65
- Heraclitus of Ephesus* (c. 530-470 B.C.) - Greek materialist philosopher, a founder of dialectics. - 10, 13
- Höglund, Carl Zeth Constantin* (1884-1956) - leader of the Left-wing Social-Democrats and the youth socialist movement in Sweden; during the First World War internationalist, supporter of the Zimmerwald Left. - 55
- Holbach, Paul Heinrich Dietrich* (1723-1789) - French materialist philosopher, atheist; an ideologist of the French revolutionary bourgeoisie in the eighteenth century. - 13
- Hume, David* (1711-1776) - British philosopher, subjective idealist, agnostic; historian and economist. - 13
- Hyndman, Henry Mayers* (1842-1921) - British socialist, reformist; from 1900 to 1910 member of the International Socialist Bureau; a leader of the British Socialist Party from which he withdrew in 1916 after the Salford Party conference had condemned his social-chauvinist attitude towards the imperialist war. - 19, 21, 27, 47, 48, 49

J

- Jaurès, Jean* (1859-1914) - prominent figure in the French and international socialist movement; historian; organiser of the French Socialist Party. After the amalgamation of the French Socialist Party and the Socialist Party of France (1905) he headed the Right wing of the united party; came out in defence of democracy, people's liberties and against imperialist oppression and wars of conquest. Jaurès' struggle for peace

and against the impending threat of war incurred bitter enmity among the imperialist bourgeoisie. On the eve of the First World War, Jaurès was assassinated by a hireling of the reactionaries. - 48

K

Kalinin, Mikhail Ivanovich (1875-1946) - prominent leader of the Communist Party and the Soviet state; Party member from 1898; from March 1919, Chairman of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee; from December 1922, Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Central Executive Committee; from 1938, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.; from 1919 member of the Party Central Committee, and from 1926, member of the Political Bureau of the C.P.S.U.(B.) Central Committee. - 78

Kamenev (Rosenfeld), Lev Borisovich (1883-1936) - member of the R.S.D.L.P. from 1901; joined the Bolsheviks after the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903).

After the October Socialist Revolution he held a number of responsible posts; repeatedly opposed the Party's Leninist policy; in 1927, at the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) was expelled from the Party as a leader of the anti-Party Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc; then twice restored and expelled again for his anti-Party activities. - 78, 106

Kant, Immanuel (1724-1804) - founder of German classical philosophy; Kant's theory of knowledge is characterised by inconsistent combination of idealism with certain materialist elements, which found its expression in the recognition of

the objective existence of "things-in-themselves". - 13

Kautsky, Karl (1854-1938) - one of the leaders of German Social-Democracy and the Second International; initially a Marxist, later a renegade from Marxism; ideologist of Centristism (Kautskyism), an opportunist trend in the working-class movement. - 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 56, 57, 58, 60, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 110

Kiselyov, Alexei Semyonovich (1879-1938) - Party member from 1898; after the October Socialist Revolution a Party and trade union leader, worked in the economy; in 1918 was elected the Chairman of *Tsentrotexil*, later member of the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council; in 1920, Chairman of the Miners' Union; in 1921, member of the Workers' Opposition, an anti-Party anarcho-syndicalist group; from 1924 to 1938, Secretary of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. - 106

Kosovsky, V. (1870-1941) - one of the founders and leaders of the Bund; member of its Central Committee; a social-chauvinist during the First World War. - 17, 66

Krestinsky, Nikolai Nikolayevich (1883-1938) - Soviet statesman, Bolshevik; from 1918 to 1921, People's Commissar for Finance of the R.S.F.S.R.; from December 1919 to March 1921, Secretary of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.); during the discussion on the trade unions in 1921 took, together with Trotsky and Bukharin, the anti-Leninist position; later a diplomat. - 102

L

Lassalle, Ferdinand (1825-1864) - German socialist, founder of the General Association of German Workers (1863); directed the German working-class movement along an opportunist line. - 10, 41

Legien, Karl (1861-1920) - German Right-wing Social-Democrat, a revisionist leader of the German trade union movement; from 1893 to 1920 (intermittently), deputy to the Reichstag from the German Social-Democratic Party; took up a social-chauvinist stand during the First World War. - 50, 58, 60, 61, 64, 66

Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870-1924) - 78, 85, 86, 102, 103

Lensch, Paul (1873-1926) - German Social-Democrat; from 1905 to 1913, editor of the *Leipziger Volkszeitung*, organ of the Left wing of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany; from the beginning of the First World War a social-chauvinist. - 24, 32, 49

Liebkecht, Karl (1871-1919) - prominent figure in the German and international working-class movement; actively fought opportunism and militarism. From the beginning of the First World War opposed the idea of supporting "one's own" government in the predatory war. On December 2, 1914 he was the only Reichstag deputy to vote against war credits. One of the organisers and leaders of the revolutionary Spartacus League; a founder of the Communist Party of Germany and a leader of the Berlin workers' uprising in January 1919. After the uprising had been crushed he was killed by order of the Scheidemann government. - 62

Lloyd George, David (1863-1945) - British politician, Liberal Party leader; Prime Minister of Great Britain (1916-22). - 28, 36

Lozovsky (Dridzo), Solomon Abramovich (1878-1952) - Russian Social-Democrat, Bolshevik; in 1920, Chairman of the Moscow Gubernia Trade Union Council; from 1921 to 1937, Secretary General of the Red International of Trade Unions. - 72, 73, 78

Lucas, Charles Prestwood (1853-1931) - British colonial official and historian, apologist of the British imperialism; author of the works on the history of the British colonial empire. - 53

Luxemburg, Rosa (1871-1919) - prominent figure in the German, Polish and international working-class movement; a Left-wing leader of the Second International; one of the founders and leaders of the Polish Social-Democratic Party.

On the outbreak of the First World War she took up an internationalist stand and was one of the founders and organisers of the Spartacus League and the Communist Party of Germany. In January 1919 she was killed by order of the Scheidemann government. - 21, 42, 47

M

Martov, L. (Tsederbaum, Yuli Osipovich) (1873-1923) - one of the Menshevik leaders; a Centrist during the First World War; in 1917 headed the group of Menshevik internationalists; emigrated after the October Socialist Revolution. - 48, 51

Marx, Karl (1818-1883) - 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 20, 29, 30, 31, 32, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 107, 109

Mehring, Franz (1846-1919) – outstanding figure in the working-class movement of Germany, a Left-wing leader and theoretician of German Social-Democracy; actively opposed opportunism and revisionism within the ranks of the Second International, criticised Kautskyism but shared the errors of the German Lefts who were afraid of breaking away from the opportunists organisationally; consistently defended internationalism; one of the leaders of the revolutionary Spartacus League; took part in founding the Communist Party of Germany. – 21, 42, 47

Millerand, Alexandre Etienne (1859-1943) – French politician; in the 1890s, joined the Socialists; in 1899 betrayed socialism and entered the bourgeois government of Waldeck-Rousseau and collaborated with General Galliffet, the hangman of the Paris Commune; was expelled from the Socialist Party in 1904 and, together with Briand and Viviani, established the group of “Independent Socialists”; in 1909-10, 1912-13 and 1914-15 held various portfolios; President of France (1920-24). – 31, 48

Milyutin, Vladimir Pavlovich (1884-1938) – participant in the Social-Democratic movement from 1903, initially adhered to Mensheviks, a Bolshevik from 1910; after the October Socialist Revolution, occupied responsible government and economic posts; alternate member of the Party's Central Committee and member of the Central Control Commission. – 87

Monitor – pen-name of a German Social-Democrat, opportunist, who published an article in the conservative *Preussische Jahr-*

bücherin April 1915. The author openly praised the Centrist character of Social-Democracy and proposed to support it as beneficial for both the opportunists and the bourgeoisie, as it allowed the opportunists to disguise the policy of class collaboration with the bourgeoisie in the Leftist phraseology. – 58

Muranov, Matvei Konstantinovich (1873-1959) – Russian Social-Democrat, Bolshevik; deputy to the Fourth Duma; in November 1914, together with other Bolshevik deputies, was arrested for revolutionary activity directed against the imperialist war and deported to Siberia. – 65

N

Napoleon I (Bonaparte) (1769-1821) – Emperor of France (1808-14 and 1815). – 110

Napoleon III (Louis Bonaparte) (1808-1873) – Emperor of France (1852-70). – 31

Nicholas II (Romanov) (1868-1918) – the last Russian Emperor (1894-1917). – 30

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P

Paish, George (1867-1957) – English bourgeois economist, pacifist; author of works on world economics and politics. – 28, 36

Pannekoek, Anton (1873-1960) – Dutch Social-Democrat; in 1907, one of the founders of *De Tribune*, organ of the Left wing of the Dutch Social-Democracy; during the First World War took up an internationalist stand. – 23, 55

Petrovsky, Grigory Ivanovich (1878-1958) – veteran of the revolutionary working-class move-

ment, Bolshevik, prominent Soviet state and Party figure. - 78

Philo of Alexandria (c. 25 B.C.-A.D. 50) - Alexandrian Jewish theologian and Hellenistic philosopher. - 10

Plato (c. 427-347 B.C.) - Greek philosopher, objective idealist. - 13

Plekhanov, Georgi Valentinovich (1856-1918) - outstanding leader of the Russian and international working-class movement, the first propagandist of Marxism in Russia; author of a number of books on dialectical materialism, the Marxist philosophy; after the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903), a Menshevik leader; in the period of reaction (1907-10) opposed Machist revision of Marxism; a social-chauvinist during the First World War; disapproved of the October Socialist Revolution. - 10, 13, 19, 20, 21, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 44, 47, 48, 49, 56, 57, 60, 68, 93, 94

Potresov, Alexander Nikolayevich (1869-1934) - one of the Menshevik leaders. In the period of reaction (1907-10) liquidator; took up a social-chauvinist stand during the First World War. - 29, 66

Preobrazhensky, Yevgeni Alexeyevich (1886-1937) - member of the Bolshevik Party from 1903. After the October Socialist Revolution, was at Party and military-political work. In 1918, "Left"-wing Communist. During the discussion on trade unions (1920-21), supported Trotsky's platform. From 1923, an active leader of the Trotskyist opposition, for which he was expelled from the Party. In 1929, was reinstated in the Party. In the following years, however, was again expelled from it for

his anti-Party activities. - 73, 79, 102

R

Radek, Karl Berggardovich (1885-1939) - participant in the Social-Democratic movement in Galicia, Poland and Germany; during the First World War took up an internationalist stand; occupied an erroneous position on the problem of the right of nations to self-determination; in 1917 joined the Bolshevik Party; from 1923 active member of the Trotskyist opposition; was expelled from the Party for his factional activities. - 23

Riezler, Kurt (Ruedorffer) (1882-1955) - German diplomat, philosopher and publicist; a representative of the Liberal monarchist wing of the German imperialist bourgeoisie; author of works on world politics. - 53

Robespierre, Maximilien Marie Isidore (1758-1794) - prominent figure in the French bourgeois revolution at the end of the eighteenth century, the Jacobin leader; actual head of the revolutionary government (1793-94). - 31

Ropshin - see *Savinkov, B. V.*

Rudzutak, Yan Ernestovich (1887-1938) - prominent leader of the Communist Party and the Soviet state; member of the Party from 1905; after the October Socialist Revolution a trade union leader, later member of the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council; from 1920, member of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), member of the Presidium and Secretary General of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions. - 75, 77, 78, 80, 81, 82, 84, 85

Ruedorffer - see *Riezler, Kurt*.

Rykov, Alexei Ivanovich (1881-1938) - member of the Bolshevik Party from 1899; after the October Socialist Revolution held responsible posts; repeatedly opposed the Party's Leninist policy; in 1928 one of the leaders of the Right-wing opportunist trend in the Party; in 1937 was expelled from the Party for his factional activities. - 79

S

Salandra, Antonio (1853-1931) - Italian statesman, a leader of the extreme Right wing of the "liberal bloc" of industrial monopolies and big landowners in Italy; Chairman of the Council of Ministers (1914-16); one of the initiators of Italy's joining the World War on the side of the Entente. - 31

Sartorius von Waltershausen, August (b. 1852) - German economist, apologist of the German imperialism; author of works on world economics and politics. - 53

Savinkov, Boris Viktorovich (Ropshin) (1879-1925) - prominent figure of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, one of the leaders of its "fighting organisation"; a social-chauvinist during the First World War; after the October Socialist Revolution organised a number of counter-revolutionary revolts and supported the foreign military intervention against the Soviet Republic. - 32

Scheidemann, Philipp (1865-1939) - a leader of the extreme Right opportunist wing of German Social-Democracy; from 1911, member of the Board of the Social-Democratic party of Ger-

many; during the First World War a social-chauvinist; from February to June 1919 headed the Coalition Government of the Weimar Republic; one of the organisers of the brutal suppression of the German working-class movement in 1918-21 and the assassination of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg. - 50, 58, 65, 66, 67

Schultze, Ernst (1874-1943) - German economist, apologist of the German imperialism; author of works on world economics and politics. - 38

Schwegler, Albert (1819-1857) - German theologian, philosopher, philologist and historian. - 12

Sembat, Marcel (1862-1922) - a leader of the French Socialist Party; a social-chauvinist during the First World War; Minister of Public Works (August 1914-September 1917) in the imperialist "government of national defence". - 56, 57, 65

Serebryakov, Leonid Petrovich (1888-1937) - Party member from 1905; after the October Socialist Revolution, member of the Moscow regional Party Committee, Secretary of the C.C. R.C.P.(B.) and Secretary of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee; during the discussion on trade unions (1920-21) supported the Trotsky's group; from 1923 active member of the Trotskyist opposition; in 1927 was expelled from the Party, in 1930 reinstated and in 1936 expelled again for his anti-Party activities. - 73, 79

Shlyapnikov, Alexander Gavrilovich (1885-1937) - member of the Bolshevik Party from 1901; after the October Socialist Revolution became a member of

- the Council of People's Commissars as a People's Commissar for Labour; later held trade union and executive posts; in 1920-21 organised and led the anti-Party group of Workers' Opposition; in 1933 was expelled from the Party during the Party purge. - 105, 106
- Sosnovsky, Lev Semyonovich* (1886-1937) - member of the Bolshevik Party from 1904; from 1918 to 1924 (intermittently), editor of the newspaper *Bednota* (The Poor); during the discussion on trade unions (1920-21) supported Trotsky's group; in 1927 was expelled from the Party at the Fifteenth Party Congress as an active member of the Trotskyist opposition. - 76, 77, 78, 79
- Spinoza, Baruch (Benedictus)* (1632-1677) - Dutch materialist philosopher, atheist. - 13
- Stalin (Jugashvili), Joseph Vissarionovich* (1879-1953). - 78
- Stein, Lorenz* (1815-1890) - German lawyer, expert on state law, historian; vulgar economist. - 9
- Ströbel, Heinrich* (1869-1945) - German Social-Democrat, Centrist; at the beginning of the First World War came out against social-chauvinism and the imperialist war and adhered to the Left *Internationale* group as a representative of the Kautskyite trend; in 1916 completely came over to the Kautskyite positions; in 1917 one of the initiators of founding the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany. - 58
- Struve, Pyotr Bergardovich* (1870-1944) - Russian economist and publicist, one of the leaders of the Constitutional-Democratic Party; in the 1890s, a prominent representative of "legal Marxism"; came out with "amendments" and "revision" of Marx's economic and philosophical doctrines trying to adapt Marxism and the working-class movement to the interests of the bourgeoisie. - 23, 32, 33, 68
- Südekum, Albert* (1871-1944) - an opportunist leader of German Social-Democracy, revisionist; from 1900 to 1918 deputy to the Reichstag; during the First World War social-chauvinist, held imperialist views on the colonial question; opposed the revolutionary movement of the working class. - 25, 43, 47, 56, 57, 58, 65, 67, 69
- Sukhanov, N. (Gimmer, Nikolai Nikolayevich)* (b. 1882) - economist and petty-bourgeois publicist, Menshevik; after the October Socialist Revolution worked in Soviet economic institutions. - 107, 109, 110
- Sun Yat-sen* (1866-1925) - prominent Chinese revolutionary democrat; headed the revolution of 1911-13 in China; provisional President of the Chinese Republic (1911-12). - 95

T

Tomsky, Mikhail Pavlovich (1880-1936) - member of the Bolshevik party from 1904; after the October Socialist Revolution, Chairman of the Moscow Trade Union Council; from 1919 Chairman of the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions; repeatedly opposed the Party's Leninist policy; in 1928-29 one of the leaders of the Right-wing opportunist trend in the C.P.S.U.(B.). - 72, 73, 75, 76, 78, 105

Troelstra, Pieter Jelles (1860-1930) - Right-wing socialist, leader of the Dutch working-class movement; a founder

(1894) and leader of the Dutch Social-Democratic Workers' Party, opportunist; a social-chauvinist during the First World War. - 55.

Trotsky (Bronstein), Lev Davidovich (1879-1940) - member of the R.S.D.L.P. from 1897, Menshevik; in 1912 set up the anti-Party August bloc; Centrist during the First World War. After the February 1917 bourgeois-democratic revolution he returned from emigration and joined the Bolshevik Party but did not take up a fully Bolshevik stand.

After the October Socialist Revolution he held a number of key posts; waged a vigorous struggle against the general line of the Party and Lenin's programme of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R.; in 1927 was expelled from the Party and in 1929 deported from the U.S.S.R. for his anti-Soviet activities. - 70-92, 94-106

V

Vaillant, Edouard Marie (1840-1915) - French socialist, a leader of the Second International. In 1905, after the unification of the Socialist Party of France and the reformist French Socialist Party, he took up an opportunist stand on major issues; a social-chauvinist during the First World War. - 47, 48, 49, 56

Vandervelde, Emile (1866-1938) - opportunist leader of the Belgian Workers' Party; Chairman of the International Socialist Bureau of the Second International; a social-chauvinist during the First World War; member of the bourgeois government, occupied different ministerial posts. - 21, 56, 57, 65

Volkman, Paul (1856-c. 1938) - professor of theoretical physics in Königsberg (from 1894); eclectic philosopher, waged a struggle against materialism. - 13

W

Wilhelm II (Hohenzollern) (1859-1941) - German Emperor and King of Prussia (1888-1918). - 30

Z

Zhelyabov, Andrei Ivanovich (1850-1881) - prominent Russian revolutionary, organiser and leader of the *Narodnaya Volya* (People's Will) Party; was one of the first among the Narodniks who understood the necessity of political struggle against tsarism; leader of a number of attempts on the life of Alexander II; was executed for organising the tsar's assassination (March 1, 1881). - 31

Zinoviev (Radomyslsky), Grigory Yevseyevich (1883-1936) - member of the Bolshevik Party from 1901.

After the October Socialist Revolution held a number of responsible posts; repeatedly opposed the Party's Leninist policy; an organiser of the New Opposition (1925); a leader of the anti-Party Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc (1926); expelled from the Party in 1927, twice restored and expelled again for his factional activities. - 76, 77, 78, 79, 82, 84, 85, 86, 90, 92, 94, 96, 98, 102

Zoff, Vyacheslav Ivanovich (1889-1940) - Soviet statesman and military leader, Party member from 1913; participant in the Civil War; from 1920, member of the Board, later head of the Central Political Water Transport Administration. - 79

REQUEST TO READERS

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В. И. Ленин
К ВОПРОСУ О ДИАЛЕКТИКЕ

На английском языке