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
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SOUTH SUDAN

FROM REVOLUTION TO INDEPENDENCE

Matthew Arnold | Matthew LeRiche

SOUTH SUDAN

MATTHEW LeRICHE
MATTHEW ARNOLD

South Sudan

From Revolution to Independence

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Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi
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Published by Oxford University Press, Inc
198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016

Published in the United Kingdom in 2012 by C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd.

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

LeRiche, Matthew.

South Sudan : from revolution to independence / Matthew LeRiche, Matthew Arnold.
p. cm.

"First Edition published in 2012."

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-0-19-933340-0 (alk. paper)

1. South Sudan—History—Autonomy and independence movements.
2. Sudan—History—Civil War, 1983–2005.
3. South Sudan—Politics and government—2005–2011.
4. Sudan—Politics and government—1985–
5. Sudan People's Liberation Army. I. Arnold, Matthew, (Political scientist) II. Title.

DT159.929.L47 2013

962.9043—dc23

2013017011

1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2

Printed in India
on Acid-Free Paper

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, we are grateful to the South Sudanese who have patiently shared their stories and insights with us. We have both spent a decade focused on the country and have been extremely fortunate to have had the opportunity to talk to South Sudanese of all walks. The advent of South Sudan has been an exceptionally dynamic and complex evolution. Faced with Africa's longest civil war, the South Sudanese have endured the epic challenges of near-perpetual violence, mass displacement, and famine. Recounting this story fittingly, by capturing both the broader historical themes but also the very real struggles of its ordinary people, was a daunting task. This book is our humble attempt to tell the saga of South Sudan's independence, the remarkable culmination of decades of fortitude and survival by its people.

Matthew LeRiche would like to thank those South Sudanese who have not only helped his various research endeavors but also been good friends along the way, in particular Malual Ayom Dor, Africano Mande, Majak Agoot and Atem Yaac Atem. I also want to express gratitude to the men and women of the Sudan People's Liberation Army, who have been consistently welcoming, for which I am deeply indebted to them. Early on in my research a senior SPLA officer told me to 'ask as many questions as you like but please approach the subject of our history and struggle with humility and respect.' I hope I have lived up to this request. I will forever appreciate the warmth, respect, hospitality and support afforded me by the people of South Sudan who have manifested an openness and appreciation of critical inquiry to which we all should aspire. Others have also offered critical, personal and other support in my

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

research endeavours: Dan Eiffe, Ken Miller, Erica Marsh, Mervyn Frost, Mats Berdal, Richard Rands, John Young, Ali Ngethi, Alex Dowling, Dan Morrison, Alexandre Godard, Richard Taylor, Kellee Jacobs, Oystein Rolandsen and so many others. I would also like to thank the Department of International Development at the London School of Economics, particularly Professor Tim Allen, for affording me a Post-Doctoral Fellowship that allowed me to complete this manuscript and other writing projects. Last but not least I would like to thank my family and friends, who tolerated my frequent complaints, and occasional irritability, as well as my co-author, Matthew Arnold, without whose help and understanding this book would never have been written.

Matthew Arnold would specifically wish to express his gratitude to the South Sudanese who graciously shared their life stories with him in the refugee camps of Gambella, Ethiopia from 2002 to 2004. As a young and rather naïve aid worker, these personal narratives first exposed him to the sweeping story of South Sudan, but also the very tangible hopes and fears of individual South Sudanese. Matthew would also like to thank Sheila Grudem and Aytenu Birhanu of the UN World Food Programme, who encouraged and enabled his early years working in the Sudanese refugee camps. Last but not least, Matthew would like to express his fond appreciation to the Institute of Security and International Studies at Chulalongkorn University, and particularly to Thitinan Pongsudhirak, for hosting him while he was working on the book, what was of critical importance to the effort.

We would both like to thank many people who shared their time and insights towards improving the book. These include, but are not limited to, Dan Eiffe, Malual Ayom Dor, Africano Mande, Atem Yaac Atem, Dan Morrison, and Phillip Winter. Of course, the responsibility for any mistakes lay fully with the authors.

We are grateful to our publisher, Michael Dwyer, for shepherding the book to its conclusion. Also, we very much appreciate the support of Mats Berdal for putting us in touch with Michael. We would also like to thank the anonymous reviewer for his or her enthusiasm for the text. The assistance of Marnie Parsons for her thorough and diligent editing of the manuscript was of great value.

And of course, we would like to express our affectionate thanks to our families and friends who have encouraged and supported us along the way.


ABSTRACT

On 9 July 2011 the Republic of South Sudan achieved independence, concluding what had, arguably, been Africa's longest running civil war. Chronicling a story of transformation, this book reviews South Sudan's modern history as a contested region and then details the political, security and social dynamics that will define its immediate future as an independent state. The process leading to independence was driven by the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M), an insurgency force and political movement begun in Southern Sudan but intent on bringing about the reformed unity of the whole of Sudan through revolution. After the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005, a six-year peace process unfolded in the form of an Interim Period premised upon 'making unity attractive' for the Sudan. This failed in its purpose and culminated in an almost unanimous vote for independence by Southerners in a referendum held in January 2011. Violence has escalated since, and a daunting possibility for South Sudan has arisen—to have won independence only to return to war with its new neighbour or dissolve into internal conflict, possibly civil war. Achieving internal peace will be a major challenge, and resolving the issues that so inflamed Southerners historically—oppressive governance, exploitation, and marginalisation—will be critical to South Sudan's success or failure at statehood.

South Sudan



Historic Sudan



Mahdiyya 1885 - 1898



1898 - 1912



1912 - 1919






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
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







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
C Abyei area



D Government of South Sudan border claim, May 2012



A Kafia Kingi enclave




I Ilemi triangle

Disputed border regions

Ethnic groups & flashpoints



Armed Groups - South Sudan



Oil in Sudan



INTRODUCTION

FROM SOUTHERN SUDAN TO SOUTH SUDAN

The night may be too long, but the day will surely come.

President Salva Kiir on South Sudan's
independence after decades of war.¹

On 9 July 2011 South Sudan became the world's newest country through its secession from the Sudan. Achieved fifty-five years after Sudan's own independence on 1 January 1956, South Sudan's establishment as a nation ended a painful transformation: from being a contested region within the country ('Southern Sudan') to being an independent state (the Republic of 'South Sudan'). Southerners contested the unity of the Sudan in two civil wars that extended through much of the latter half of the twentieth century. The First Civil War, stretching from the eve of independence to 1972, was largely confined to the South; this fighting and its related disease and famine resulted in an estimated 500,000 casualties, 180,000 refugees and up to one million internally displaced civilians.² The people of Equatoria are thought to have provided most of the Southern forces that fought the first war, which had the goal of independence, ending in quasi-autonomy for Southern Sudan. Although the Nuer and Dinka of South Sudan provided the bulk of the forces fighting the Second Civil War,³ from 1983 to 2005, the Movement gradually drew in

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more and more groups, eventually spreading into Sudan's northern half, leaving at least two million dead, over four million internally displaced (IDPs) and 800,000 or more displaced as refugees. This was framed as a war of revolution rather than one for regional independence. It was concluded on 9 January 2005 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, commonly referred to as the CPA.

Considering the significance of the moment—the creation of a new state does not happen often—this book undertakes to tell the story of the transformation of Southern Sudan as a region into South Sudan the state. At heart, the book is about a people and nation being born into statehood through extended processes of war and peace that were both exceedingly tortured and persistently complex. Moreover, the dynamics driving South Sudan's advent have often been contradictory and perplexing in nature, raising the three profound questions around which this book revolves. Why did a First Civil War aimed at secession result in a form of semi-autonomy, while a Second Civil War fought in the name of national revolution ended in secession? Why did an entrenched dictatorship in Khartoum, which had shown itself to be so ruthless in opposition to rebellion for so long, finally take the drastic step of allowing a peaceful referendum on secession? And a last question, more urgent, though perhaps less paradoxical in nature: how is a poverty-stricken, landlocked state with strong internal tensions and a heavy reliance on diminishing oil revenue going to survive its own independence?

This book is not meant as an exhaustive accounting of the civil wars that have shaken the Sudan since 1956. Historical works on them have already been written, most convincingly by Douglas H. Johnson, Martin Daly and Robert O. Collins. Moreover, this book is not intended as a full detailing of the new state; the reality is that, in its beginnings, South Sudan is still reconciling itself. Consequently, and with the intellectual opportunity now afforded by the finality of South Sudan's independence, the book will provide those interested in the new republic with a sweeping analysis of both its long evolution towards statehood and its general status and prospects at independence.

Conventional historical interpretation often depicts a Southern region deliberately isolated by the British and translating more naturally into two entities, but forced into a single state in 1956 by its departing colonisers. However, this is not a story of the imposition of inappropriate colonial definitions of states taking years of war to be reconciled. This is

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rather a story of a wonderfully diverse collection of peoples and identities that have long been locally defined. These peoples are from a region that was a hinterland, an area so remote that they remained outside the control of any metropol or centre for centuries and have defied assimilation. The one real similarity that is shared amongst the people of what is now South Sudan is a history of neglect and exploitative incursions associated with the slave trade and imperial economic exploitation, including Khartoum's similarly exploitative attempted rule after Sudan gained independence. These peripheral peoples have thus been engaged in a process of trying to reconcile some kind of common identity and agency within the Sudan, and having failed at this, have finally parted ways.

South Sudan, previously referred to as Southern Sudan, is less the result of a deliberate process of asserting the differences between Northern and Southern peoples, and more the result of a twentieth-century struggle over power, framed by the various geopolitical forces that have defined the time. Under British rule, the multitude of tribes and groups in the Southern geographical area did not coalesce as Southerners in some 'natural' way. It was, in the end, the opposition and struggle against the '*jallaba*' in Khartoum that fuelled some kind of common purpose and corresponding identity between the myriad different peoples in what is now the Republic of South Sudan. Theirs is an identity born of the process of war and resistance to being rolled into a narrowly defined Sudanese unitary state defined as 'Arab', with a dominant Muslim character.

The story of the creation of the Republic of South Sudan and the explanation of the situation it finds itself in at independence is not a straightforward one. It is also not the story that was depicted by the international press in the run up to 9 July, South Sudan's Independence Day. It is a story about a series of key contradictions, and about how the intent of certain leaders curiously resulted in outcomes more reflective of the goals of other leaders. It is also the story of people that have, by virtue of sharing a perceived common enemy, begun to carve out their own identity, which despite the fanfare and rhetoric of July 2011 is far from resolved and continues to be at the root of much conflict and anxiety.

Contested identities and near perpetual war

At approximately 619,000 square kilometres, a size similar to that of France or Texas, independent South Sudan sprawls across the vast flood-

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plains of the White Nile as it descends from the highlands of central Africa, resulting in one of the world's largest wetlands. Almost a fortress, it is cut off from the rest of the world by the Nuba Mountains to the north, arid desert to the northwest, the foothills of Abyssinia to the east, and the vast forests of central Africa to the west and southwest. South Sudan is more than a simple landlocked state; owing to its geographic features and lack of major infrastructure development, it is as remote an environment as can be found. The population has been estimated everywhere from approximately six million to as high as ten million: as might be expected, determining exact numbers for anything in South Sudan is close to impossible, everything is a fleeting approximation. According to the 2008 South Sudan Population and Housing Census, it is approximately 8.3 million people (8,260,490); according to the World Food Programme, it is approximately 9.6 million, with an estimated 50 per cent of the population less than twenty years old and close to 70 per cent under 35 years of age.⁴ This population is composed of groups of African peoples, primarily Christian. Historically juxtaposed against this population was that of the northern two-thirds of the Sudan, which spreads across the arid and semi-arid savanna and is predominantly Muslim and a mix of groups that identify as Arab and African.⁵

As it was initially determined, the Sudan was exceptionally large and exceptionally diverse; it measured 2.5 million square kilometres and hosted a multitude of languages and ethnic groups. There is much disagreement over the exact number of tribes and languages, but the important point is the immense diversity. Some suggest that the numerous tribes speak more than 400 languages and dialects, covering Hamitic, Semitic, Nilotic, Bantu and other ethno-linguistic groupings, with the Nilotics being the most populous and dominant in the Republic of South Sudan.⁶ The UN noted that more than 100 languages and dialects are present in Sudan (both Sudan and South Sudan) with as many as fifty ethnic groups, which themselves can be broken down into as many as 600 tribes, clans and sub clans.⁷ The Gurtong Project, which was initiated to connect the South Sudanese diaspora to South Sudan and has considerable involvement from international anthropologists, counts some 597 ethnic groups speaking nearly 400 languages in the whole of Sudan.⁸ Others classify groups differently; one, the Joshua Project, suggests 163 distinct 'people groups' or peoples in South Sudan.⁹ Suffice it to say there is almost unparalleled diversity in Sudan—a multitude of different groups

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and languages. Dinka and Arabic are recognised as the two most widely spoken languages in both Sudans, with Dinka and Nuer the most widely spoken in the South. English has become a common second language, especially in South Sudan, and is one of the official languages of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan.¹⁰

Significant demographic changes have occurred in South Sudan between the signing of the CPA and independence. Several waves of refugees have returned, as have many from Northern areas, along with many young 'Southerners' setting foot on their home soil for the first time. Numbers and estimates from the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) suggest hundreds of thousands of returnees in the months before and just after independence, with many more wishing to return but facing problems of documentation, subsistence and transport. Returnees are coming primarily from East Africa and areas around Khartoum, with some migration from the Western countries where refugees had sought sanctuary during the war. In addition there has been a significant number of economic migrants arriving in South Sudan from East Africa, particularly Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia. The following table gives an idea of the post-independence demography of South Sudan as portrayed by the Government of South Sudan.

Selected demographic indicators by place of residence.¹¹

	<i>South Sudan</i>	<i>Urban</i>	<i>Rural</i>
Total Population	8,260,490	1,405,186	6,855,304
Male	4,287,300	754,086	3,533,214
Female	3,973,190	651,100	3,322,090
Average household size	7	9	7

Source: 5th Sudan Population and Housing Census (2008).

The civil wars in the Sudan have most often been presented as growing out of crude binary tensions: Arabs versus Blacks, Muslims versus Christians, democracy versus dictatorship, secularism versus theocracy and, finally, North versus South. While the history and socio-political dynamics of the Sudan have indeed lent themselves to over-simplification, as Douglas Johnson has argued, the 'root causes' of Sudan's successive civil wars were both diverse and complex. The Sudan's wars have been

SOUTH SUDAN

defined by combustive tensions between a dominant core centred in the capital of Khartoum and the extensive periphery of the massive state.¹² In the North many saw the 'Southern Problem' as a function of 'sinister international interference', while for most Southerners the conflict has been understood 'primarily in racial and religious terms'.¹³ At their crux, these wars were the consequence of successive Sudanese states 'producing regional underdevelopment and racial and cultural antagonism'.¹⁴ Whether manifest as economic underdevelopment, ethnic and religious cleavages, or the repression of and resistance to authoritarian rule, this stark core/periphery divide marked enduring decades of violence.

Moreover, given the duration of the Sudan's wars and its deep socio-political fractures, the civil wars were a self-compounding phenomenon, what Francis Deng¹⁵ called a 'theatre of proliferating conflicts' based upon contested racial, ethnic, cultural and religious identities.¹⁶ The wars' complexities intensified as local grievances exponentially expanded motives, and more actors became involved in spurring on the violence, thus producing a 'pattern of interlocking civil wars'.¹⁷ This expansion occurred on multiple levels, most significantly between the Southern rebel movements and successive central governments in Khartoum. By the final years and months of the Second Civil War, both the western and eastern provinces of the Sudan had also arisen in revolt against the same Khartoum regime. Augmented by the entrenched anarchy of successive civil wars and the tensions already inherent in a highly fractured socio-political space, localised violence within and between communities often appeared manic.

The scale of the suffering due to the inter-factional fighting was devastating. The anthropologist Sharon Hutchinson describes the violence after 1991:

Having lost much of their homeland populations to the ravages of war, famine, disease and displacement since the SPLM/A the main opposition guerrilla movement—exploded into two warring factions in 1991, contemporary Nuer and Dinka men and women alike complain of being 'exhausted by death'. Civilians on both sides of this ethnic divide desire nothing more than an end to the military stalemate between the SPLA and leader Dr. John Garang, and his arch rival, Dr. Riek Machar, so as to protect 'the few [people] who are still alive'.¹⁸

Alongside this core/periphery dynamic, the challenges of forming a national identity and building a Sudanese state proved debilitating. As

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Robert Collins has argued, the 'central issue' for the Sudanese was their 'quest for identity whereby African indigenous cultures [could] peacefully co-exist with an imported Arab culture in a Sudan dominated by neither'.¹⁹ The state/society relations demanded by the attempts to impose an Arab-Islamic identity through autocratic rule based in Khartoum were the catalyst of the civil wars. It is crucial to understand that this trend did not begin with independence; rather, it was the continuation of nearly two centuries of contentious relations between the 'Southerner' and 'Northerner' peoples of what would eventually become the Sudan. As Amir Idriss contends, 'the kind of state that has emerged in the Sudan since the sixteenth century has created groups of people with inferior status in relation to the state'.²⁰

The origins of 'Southern Sudan'

[Contact between Northerners and Southerners] was, from the outset, a bloody contact. It was a contact not between brothers of different viewpoints, but between forces of domination on the one hand and those struggling against their subjugation on the other.

Southern Front Executive Memorandum to the OAU, Accra, 1965.

In addition to outlining the basic causality for Sudan's civil wars, it is first necessary to introduce how Southern Sudan, an area home to dozens and dozens of ethno-linguistic groups, even came to be delimited as a region. Spread across this vast territory is an amazing diversity of humanity: a plethora of Equatorians including Bari speaking groups and the Azande for example, the larger pastoralist groupings of Dinka and Nuer, and the Murle, Anuak, and Shilluk peoples, along with numerous other smaller groups.²¹ Though they are often over-simplified as insular tribal groupings, the diversity even within the larger groupings is exceptional, such as the Jikany, Lou, and Nyuong clans of the Nuer, and, among them the Agar, Malual, Bor, and Ngok of the Dinka. The inherent challenges precluding broader national identity consolidation and political cohesion amongst such a range of peoples are obvious, leaving a situation in which an Acholi man could only reasonably question his relationship to a Maban, Bari, or Mundari, let alone an Arab far to the north. The prospect of uniting such diversity has always been daunting, and helps explain the reactionary nature of both Southerners and their politics.

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The social and political nature of the Republic of South Sudan draws heavily upon the pre-modern experience. Southern Sudanese were left very isolated, until incursions increased from areas settled by Arab peoples because of the impetus of Mohammed Ali's interest in expanding commercial opportunities in the late 1830s. As Richard Gray, a prominent scholar of Southern Sudan, notes, 'by 1883 it was estimated that about ten to twelve thousand slaves were annually imported into Egypt; a Frenchman was reported to be shipping whole boatloads down the Nile'.²² European powers first opened up the route and then sent traders into Africa, with South Sudan the hinterland of a province of the Ottoman Empire—Egypt. It had no connections of major significance with modern Ethiopia or Kenya before the twentieth century. One of the most indicative manifestations of British intent was the adoption in 1922 of the Closed District Ordinance to limit northern influences by curtailing traders and settlers from spreading Islam and Arabic cultural influences, as well as encouraging the use of English in, and allowing Christian missionaries wide access to, the South.²³

Some have argued that the British effectively governed the Sudan as two separate pieces; their rule deepening a nascent regional identity.²⁴ Thus a shallow, but still burgeoning, conceptualisation of Southern Sudan as a specific region, and the concomitant construction of a nascent 'Southern' identity complex, allowed for early forms of association as 'Southerners' within wider imperial structures. The emerging nationalism with the sentiment of also being 'Southern Sudanese' was a new identity situated between Sudanese nationalism growing out of decolonisation, localised communal identities, and fragmented larger tribal identities. Essentially, it has been argued that British policies provided a catalysing discourse for the South's distinctiveness from the North, a key feature of the South's politics ever since.²⁵ Indeed, if this interpretation is correct, considering the later definition of Sudan as a unitary state with a strong centralised government, British policies retrospectively appear counter-intuitive and counterproductive. As Ann Mosely Leach notes: 'British policy would have made sense if it had led to the separation of the South from the North, then either turning it into an independent state or attaching it to a neighbouring African country.'²⁶ It has further been argued that British policies left an increasingly self-aware Southern Sudan within an independent Sudan ruled by a narrow political elite based in distant Khartoum, the ramifications of which were dire.

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However, it is much more likely that the significance of the British role is too often overstated. Neither the Closed District Ordinance nor the later 'Southern Policy' was ever fully applied, and thus the imposition of the concept of a separateness in the 'South' was more a function of general disregard and the longstanding history of the peoples of what is now South Sudan living largely outside any state governance up until the early 1900s. If the British had not been forced to abandon Empire hurriedly after the World Wars, the story might have been different.

Due consideration must also be given to the earlier indigenous factors shaping Southern Sudan's origins. Prior to British governance, the fundamentalist Mahdist governments, ruling from 1885 to 1898, also similarly failed to control the southern reaches of the White Nile effectively, just as the previous period of Turco-Egyptian rule imposed little presence from 1821 to 1885 and had little discernable administration in the South.²⁷ Thus, rather than being its origin, the British era continued the trend of little effective governance in the South, essentially manifesting itself as a 'north-south dualism'.²⁸ Significant north-south relations did already exist, and were manifestations of northern imperial control centred on resource extraction, the most profound of which was the endemic slave trade.²⁹ Even the abolitionist language of General Gordon's mission to Sudan on behalf of the British Crown was largely exaggerated for domestic consumption, and its hypocrisy was made clear by Gordon's appointment of the largest slave trader in the region as Governor of Bahr el-Ghazal. The alienation of many Southerners due to their increasingly harsh treatment by Northerners, notably through the slave trade, would prove central to a future bifurcation of Sudanese national identity; structural racism would become engrained in the Sudanese state. Otherwise, the structures of identity singularly dominant within the South were black African and localised tribal ones.

The language used by the early political movements of Southerners at the time of Sudanese independence presents a picture of people's perception of the period of Egyptian, Mahdist and British rule:

'There was not only ineffective government of Egypt in the South, there was no government at all. The only interest of Egypt in the South consisted of ivory and slaves. ... As successor to conquered Egypt the Mahdi therefore succeeded to nothing in the South... Many leaders in the South found the Mahdi's activities unbearable in their brutality.'³⁰

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In this way, and most unfortunately for Sudan's peaceful development, the historic character of the Sudanese state as northern-dominated, and with an Islamic and Arabic identity, was substantively established by the late 19th century, building upon decades of limited but extremely coercive North-South interactions. As Douglas Johnson has argued, the civil wars of the latter half of the 20th century were not merely an unfortunate byproduct of British imperialism or the confused process of decolonisation. Rather, multiple causes were themselves entrenched in the nature of the Sudanese state over the 18th and 19th centuries: the 'exploitative nature of the central state towards its rich but uncontrolled periphery', the coercive involvement of the army in politics and economics, the ambiguity of individuals who did not conform to state dictates of Sudanese identity, and the autocratic prerogatives of rulers to withhold resources from the periphery.³¹

By the mid-1940s it was becoming apparent that Sudan would be granted independence even while Southern Sudan's position in the new nation remained vague. At a conference in June 1947 in Juba, the British intentions for an independent, single, united Sudan were evident in the Civil Secretary's introductory remarks: 'It has begun to be clear, I think, that the Southern Sudan, by its history and by the accidents of geography, river transport, and so on, must turn more to the North rather than to Uganda and Congo.'³²

While Southern Sudan was clearly identified as a specific region at the advent of Sudanese independence, it was one that needed inclusion in a unified Sudan rather than reorientation towards East Africa. The 1946 'Memorandum on Southern Policy' stipulated that 'the Sudan, as at present constituted... will remain one'. This meant British policy was to

act upon the facts that the peoples of Southern Sudan are distinctly African and Negroid, but that geography and economics combine... to render them inextricably bound for future development to the middle-eastern and arabicized Northern Sudan: and therefore [our policy is] to ensure that they shall, by educational and economic development, be equipped to stand up for themselves in the future as socially and economically the equals of their partners of the Northern Sudan in the Sudan of the future.³³

The Juba Conference was crucial because the Southern participants did not object to the British government's broader purpose for the event: the raising of a Southern delegation to be included in a national legisla-

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tive assembly that would prepare for an independent and united Sudan. For some, the Juba Conference was seen as a final attempt by British officials to allow involvement by their Southern subjects in the independence process. This was achieved superficially as it became apparent that the new state was to be handed almost wholesale to a small elite in Khartoum and Omdurman. The members of this elite were already unanimous on the issue of 'Southern Sudan': it did not actually exist, and the area was to be an indistinct part of a unitary state dominated by the urban centre in Khartoum and universally defined with an Arabic and Islamic character. But the alternative view, clear from the above-noted British assertions, was that there was some distinct character and that some kind of semi-autonomy or federation was likely to be the way forward.

In the end, Sudanese nationalists in Khartoum were successful in compelling the British to curtail policies that had effectively distinguished between the Sudan's northern and southern halves. As part of the broader wave of nationalism sweeping a weakened British Empire, the political strength of the nationalists in Khartoum was significant and their interests provoked the imagination of British strategists more deeply than did the identities and seemingly parochial interests of the African tribes in the southern part of the country.³⁴

In 1946 the British 'Southern Policy' was removed in preparation for granting Sudan independence, and was replaced with a process and policy known as 'Sudanisation'.³⁵ As British officials retreated from the South, they were replaced overwhelmingly by Northern Arab Sudanese; only a few Southerners were included in the administration since most educated and capable civil servants had come from the dominant areas of the centre of the country.³⁶ Accounts vary, but the disproportion was exceptional—only eight of 900 posts went to Southerners.³⁷

The British attempt to devise 'safeguards' for the Southerners failed in the face of Egyptian condemnation of what it claimed were British efforts to prolong imperial rule in the South. Whilst decolonisation was everywhere inevitable, it clearly came in many places before a competent alternative ruling class had evolved. This was the case in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan, but not, for example, in Botswana. The process was largely driven by Sudanese nationalists in the North determined to both define their own 'Sudanese' identity in contrast to some form of Sudanese-Egyptian unity, as well as to catalyse the departure of the British.

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Following the July 1952 revolution in Egypt, much haggling ensued between the British, Sudanese and Egyptians; it focused on the 'fundamental issue that had dominated the history of the Condominium since its inception: the ultimate sovereignty of the Sudan'.³⁸ Specifically, this meant deciding what Sudan's relationship with Egypt should involve rather than what form the South's inclusion within it should take. The British were satisfied to be manipulated by both Khartoum and Cairo, and vice versa; the net result was a process unambiguously in preparation for independence, but distinctly lacking in Southern Sudanese representation. Moreover there was a process of mutual manipulation with various actors engaging in the negotiations, which included some of the earlier UN and US interventions.

Khartoum's response to the obvious social and political duality of the country was to adopt aggressive assimilation programmes of 'Arabisation' and 'Islamisation' in the South; these only became apparent under the Abboud regime, which took power in 1958. For many, this was the real starting point of the First Civil War. Before then, insurrection focused on avoiding being placed under Northern command in the army or other issues compelling mutiny of garrisons or riots, typically stemming from some practical or localised political grievance. It was clear that, within a unified Sudan, Southerners were to be marginalised—a perception that would strongly influence fomenting of armed resistance by Southerners in the decades to follow. In 1955, the initial mutiny in Torit among the Southerners in the Sudan Defence Force was telling. It was reported that the Southerners deserting did not fire on the British officers; they targeted the officers sent from Khartoum with orders to disperse many of the Southerners from their home areas.³⁹ Thus the mutinies were violent resistance to attempts to prevent Southerners being moved, or further integrated into the military, in an effort to build a national institution. This is a key theme, and an explanation for the spark of violence and war in South Sudan throughout its history of war.

The situation in Southern Sudan remained relatively peaceful for nearly a decade after the Juba Conference, until August 1955 when the Equatorial Corps of the Sudan Defence Force mutinied in Torit over the imposition of Northern officers and orders to move outside the South. After significant violence and the departure of most of the corps and arms, the remnants of the corps scattered into the bush, forming the beginnings of the future rebellion. As an editorial in the South Sudan publication

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Gurtong noted, 'It was the first time that Southerners openly displayed, in bullet and blood, their pent-up anger and political frustration with their colonizers: the British, the British-favoured northern Sudanese Arabs and their Egyptian surrogates'.⁴⁰ Considering that a recognised military asserting a monopoly on violence is a core expression of any state, the mutiny was important because the Equatorial Corps was one of the earliest institutions exhibiting a strong 'Southern' identity: it was viewed by many Southerners, especially those in Equatoria, as the legitimate security force in the South.

As Sudanese independence neared, Southern leaders were unable to assert a strong role in the discussions defining it. In April 1952 the British entered into an agreement on self-determination with several prominent Northern Sudanese political factions, which later became the two major political parties, Umma and the National Unionist Party (still later renamed Democratic Unionist Party, DUP).⁴¹ In January 1953 the Egyptians agreed that the Sudanese would be allowed to determine their own future. Only Northern Sudanese political representation was involved in the meetings, undoubtedly indicating that the Egyptians saw Northern Sudanese, especially those from the northern riverine areas and in particular from the Khartoum and Omdurman area, as the rightful leaders of the Sudan. The frustration at being excluded from such definitive events provoked Southerners to begin to form political parties in earnest.

One of the first parties to be formed in the run up to the 1953 elections, the Southern Liberal Party,⁴² was drawn from an original amorphous entity, the Southern Sudanese Political Movement; its stated purpose was to represent Southerners' interests within a unified Sudan. Stanilaus Paysama, Abdel Rahman Sule and Buth Diu, key leaders of the party, proposed a federation structure for South Sudan in Sudan at the time. Other similar parties were formed to compete in the 1953 national parliamentary elections. Afterwards the Southern Liberal Party, alongside other smaller Southern parties, formed a weak coalition known as the 'Southern Bloc', representing the further development of a Southern identity within the Sudanese political space. The Southern members of parliament opposed independence without further refinement of the status of the South at the time of, and within, any new independent state.

They pushed for a federal option to be considered after independence. Rivalries based on personal ambitions, often manifested with ethnic tensions, precluded a strong Southern Sudanese position or political move-

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ment from emerging.⁴³ In the run up to the elections, the Northern parties persuaded these Southerners to go along with independence—on which the assembly was voting—in return for promises that a federal system would be considered when independence was gained. These promises were never kept. Despite winning a significant number of seats in the 1953 elections, the Southern Bloc quickly collapsed owing to competition among and division between the various representatives. And, upon the granting of independence on 1 January 1956, consideration of Southern demands did not materialise. The new state was unitary in form rather than federal, and unabashedly Arab and Islamic in identity, leaving a bitter sense in the South over the sincerity of Northern politics. This dissatisfaction was worsened by the existence of profound divides between North and South in terms of economic and social development.⁴⁴

Even within this context of marginalisation before and after independence, there was still no ubiquitous Southern demand for independence; instead there continued to be many calls for some form of federalism with religious and cultural protections for the South. The Reverend Saturnino Lohure, a prominent Southern politician, highlighted this interest to parliament in 1958: 'The South has no intention of separating from the North, for had that been the case nothing on earth would have prevented the demand for separation'.⁴⁵ After Sudan's first independent elections in 1958, Northern politicians were consistently able to manipulate their Southern counterparts, undermining by division their weak demands for recognising Southern Sudan as a unique entity in a unified Sudan. The leader of the Southern Party, Stanislaus Paysama, described in his memoirs a deep frustration with the inability of Southern leaders to unify around Southern needs for better representation in those crucial early years. He identified the ability of Northern parties to use money and connivance to destroy Southern coherence, commenting that 'every time elections came, they [Southerners] are destroyed like this'.⁴⁶

As a result of the collapse of the Southern Bloc after the election, Southerners had very little impact on the transition from British rule to an independent Sudan, although they initially had some appreciable impact through early negotiations aiming to secure federation. After the acquiescence of the Juba Conference in 1947 and the elections essentially assuring Southern Sudan's uncontested inclusion in a unified Sudan, there never emerged an effective Southern role in defining what form independence should take. Mollified by promises of 'due consideration'

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for their proposals, the majority of Southerners in the National Assembly voted in December 1955 with the dominant Northern political parties for the independence of a unified Sudan.⁴⁷ Whereas, in the context of decolonisation, many British possessions were engaged in some kind of violent effort to secure sovereignty, in Sudan there was little violence at the time.

Overall, the era preceding independence was important because it fomented an emerging Southern Sudanese identity complex based upon conceptualisation of the region as a specific social and political entity, notably in juxtaposition to the broader Sudanese state-building that had unfolded. While Khartoum sought to replace the British 'dualistic administration' of the Sudan with a unitary one, nevertheless a nascent Southern identity formed around several touchstones, including a legacy of slavery; resistance to Arabisation and Islamisation; colonial policies defining the South as a region; and the influence of Christianity and elements of Western culture introduced during the colonial era.⁴⁸ Whatever 'regional nationalism' existed in the South at independence was limited by two factors: it was the outgrowth of contact and relations with the outside world, and it was limited to a small elite.⁴⁹

Given South Sudanese nationalism's shallow formation, there surfaced neither strong support for unity nor blanket demands for Southern independence. Indeed, much of the initial Southern discomfort over inclusion in a united Sudan was due to the broad exclusion of the region's individuals from administrative posts and the security sector; foreshadowing issues faced during the Addis Ababa peace period, during the CPA period and since independence. The perception existed that exclusion from government posts was driven along tribal lines, thereby undermining the definition of a holistic Southern identity in opposition to exclusion by Khartoum.⁵⁰

Participation in governance and perceptions of its fairness were vitally important; 'jobs' or 'positions' were largely seen as a cardinal expression of enfranchisement and inclusion in the political system, arguably even more important than having representatives in an elected assembly. Hence, the earliest frustration with Sudanese unity was not based on a particularly coherent conceptualisation of 'Southern-ness' and certainly not on a strong, consistently articulated desire for a separate state, or even autonomy. Rather, it was the general feeling of marginalisation from, and exclusion by, government—festering sentiments that would define the

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subsequent decades of resistance to rule by Khartoum. Overall, the weakness of Southern political leaders, the exceedingly shallow identity of the region and its extreme underdevelopment merged so that the South exhibited only a meagre acquiescence to inclusion within a united Sudan.

The same can be said of Darfur, which only became part of Sudan in 1916, and had Native Administration, a Closed Districts Ordinance and little economic development. The British had largely left Sudan in the course of 1954. Had they left in 1964, or even 1974—dates not impossible to imagine when the decolonisation discussion started in 1946—then Sudan would have likely looked very different. The haste of the departure of the British has long been a part of the Southern mythology of why the groups in Khartoum and the North were able to so effectively assert dominance over the various peripheral peoples.

Transforming Southern Sudan into South Sudan

By the time of Sudan's independence, Southern Sudan existed in nascent form as a regional identity and political construct, even if it was not recognised as such by Khartoum. With independence, the developmental energies of the state focused upon the 'Arab triangle' around Khartoum, where the political, business and military elite of the new state were overwhelmingly concentrated.⁵¹ Provoked by the coercive nature of the Sudanese state, the socio-political identity of the region and its accordant political aspirations would steadily deepen as Southern dissatisfaction with such union grew.

The first five or so years of independence were relatively peaceful, but by the early 1960s the South was embroiled in increasingly widespread revolt against Khartoum's rule. The Southern insurgency was driven by a loose grouping of rebels who became known as the Anya-Nya, a term in the Madi language meaning 'snake venom'. Apparently echoing prevailing public opinion, the Anya-Nya demanded Southern independence as the only remedy to Khartoum's historic proclivity towards marginalisation and exploitation of the South. The war concluded in 1972 with the Addis Ababa Agreement, which granted Southern Sudan semi-autonomy through a regional government with a representative assembly, and created constitutional provisions for religious and cultural protection. Through this Agreement, Sudan enjoyed over a decade of peace. The Agreement eventually collapsed as a result of both the inability of Southerners to unite politically in its defence and the steady undermining, and

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ultimately total abrogation, of its key provisions by the regime of Jafaar Mohammed Nimairi.

Consequently, Southern Sudan again erupted into war in 1983; this time, the rebellion was led by the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) with Dr John Garang de Mabior at its helm.⁵² A foreigner engaging with Garang, a complex and worldly man, might wonder if he or she were talking to a university professor rather than a rebel leader.⁵³ Rather than secession, the SPLA's stated goal was revolution. Citing the need to end, finally, the perpetuation of a 'monolithic Arab-Islamic state', Garang argued that a 'New Sudan of inclusivity' was needed, one capable of resolving the historic core/periphery and identity divides of the Sudan by accommodating the diversity of its peripheries and thus shaking off the yoke of the 'Old Sudan'.⁵⁴ In the context of Southern resentment against historic marginalisation compounded by a coerced national identity, Garang's demands for a transformed Sudan through national revolution rather than secession were controversial among many Southern Sudanese. They did have resonance more broadly, however, and as a result the Second Civil War extended into the North, notably into the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile areas of central Sudan, but also into eastern Sudan and Darfur.

The Second Civil War ended on 9 January 2005 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Khartoum-based regime of Omar Hassan al-Bashir and his National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M). Negotiated over two and a half years as a series of protocols, in its final form the CPA tellingly listed a correction that all previous references to 'South Sudan' be changed to 'Southern Sudan'.⁵⁵ This made clear that the CPA did not recognise a new and independent South Sudan. The fact that years later, at independence, the Republic of South Sudan was so named points to the political and social-identity processes taking place.⁵⁶ At its heart, the CPA was a compromise that allowed Southern Sudan a referendum on full independence, but only after a mandatory six-year interim period during which the signatories were committed to 'making unity attractive'.⁵⁷ In other words, while an independent South Sudan might be a possibility, Southern Sudan's perpetuation was to be attempted.

Within that overarching purpose, the CPA allowed Southern Sudan an autonomous regional government, the maintenance of the SPLA as a separate official and guaranteeing defensive armed force, and a reformed

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Interim National Constitution for all of Sudan that provided for democratic processes and religious and cultural protections for Southerners and all non-Muslims, while keeping Islamic *sharia* law as the official basis for governance in the North only. Proclamations for the CPA were grand. While cautioning that it was 'a rare and perhaps the last opportunity' for peaceful reform, Garang still predicted that it would 'usher in a complete metamorphosis of the old Sudan to a New Sudan' of devolved governance, democracy, secularism and political pluralism.⁵⁸ For his part, Bashir exuberantly declared at its signing that the CPA represented 'the birth of Sudan's second independence!' Though echoing one another's enthusiasm, Garang and Bashir each possessed a very different vision of such a new republic.

As a binary agreement between two parties with no democratic legitimacy, and an agreement neglecting the escalating crisis in Darfur, the CPA was derided by critics within Sudan and abroad as exclusionary and hence 'incomprehensive'. The CPA entrenched the NCP and SPLM in power, assuring their control of the national government and the Southern regional government respectively.⁵⁹ The SPLM had extensive participation in the national government, forming the minority partner in a broader Government of National Unity (GONU). The fact that the CPA included provisions for interim national elections at all levels of government in the Sudan is crucial. With those included, an implicit goal of the Interim Period was 'to achieve the dual democratization of both ruling parties and state institutions', a lofty objective indeed.⁶⁰

Instituting the CPA's provisions during the Interim Period of July 2005 to July 2011 proved to be a convoluted and frequently contentious process. Activities undertaken during this period utterly failed to make unity attractive for Southern voters, who accordingly voted almost unanimously for separation in the self-determination referendum, held over six days in mid-January 2011. Indeed, the Interim Period saw widespread shortcomings in implementation of the CPA's key provisions: the sharing of oil revenue was ambiguous; the withdrawal of combatants across borders delayed; security sector reform superficial and ineffective; national legal reforms stymied; and contested borders left unresolved. The CPA's protocol governing the disputed sub-region of Abyei was violently abrogated. Additionally, the gaping failure of the period was the deeply flawed interim elections that were delayed repeatedly and only eventually held in April 2010. The elections were boycotted by the opposition parties in the North

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in protest against the NCP's intransigence over reform pledges, and in the South were marred by accusations of intimidation by the dominant SPLM government.

The awkward partnership between the NCP and SPLM necessitated by the CPA proved debilitating throughout the period. The SPLM even left the GONU temporarily in 2007, arguing that the NCP's actions demonstrated 'their lack of political will to implement [the] CPA', which they instead dishonour[ed] 'like other peace agreements'.⁶¹ Garang had been the most forceful advocate for an interim period demonstrating the attractiveness of continued unity, but he was killed in a helicopter crash at the end of July 2005, three weeks after being sworn in as the GONU's First Vice-President. With Garang's untimely death the political dynamics underpinning the CPA changed, and both the NCP and the SPLM retreated to their long-held interests. The CPA no longer possessed the transformational and revolutionary potential it had with Garang leading the process.

The authoritarian NCP regime had signed the CPA not in an uncharacteristic expression of hope for secular democracy, but rather out of expediency and a need to ensure its own survival in Khartoum.⁶² Accordingly it increasingly worked to stymie the overall process, encouraging the SPLM to become fractious Southern introverts and obstructing the CPA-dictated judicial and governance reforms necessary to broaden the Northern political space. For its part, with Southern public opinion firmly secessionist, the SPLM increasingly detached itself from a prominent national role in pushing structural reform, instead making a priority the securing of the referendum. As the International Crisis Group had already concluded by 2007, 'National unity is unattractive to Southerners because the two parties... have failed to advance it'.⁶³

The CPA's Interim Period was not democratically transformational in the manner many had hoped it would be. Indeed, as one pundit remarked, the chief accomplishment of the CPA was the creation of not just one but two one-party states.⁶⁴ Through the CPA process, both parties received what they were looking for. The NCP proved itself the ultimate survivalist, reforming neither itself nor the Sudanese state and thereby defying all predictions that it would need to change or perish. As such, it was successfully ensconced in authoritarian dominance over the Sudan, leaving it 'to the charm of Old Sudan', as the SPLM's leader, Salva Kiir Mayardit, quipped it would.⁶⁵ The SPLM, for its part, was firmly embed-

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ded as the South's exceptionally dominant political party, fully in control of governance and thus able to direct the very definition of the new state.

Despite its failings, the CPA process did provide the relatively peaceful medium for transforming Southern Sudan into South Sudan. That separation was peacefully chosen through an internationally recognised referendum, and that the wider process never resulted in the return to overt war by the two major combatants was, in fact, a major achievement. Moreover, the Interim Period was essential to addressing the humanitarian situation, allowing millions of Southerners to return home and improving the health and educational standards of the South. During the process, the Government of Southern Sudan allowed the groundwork for the future Republic of South Sudan to be greatly advanced through the basic formation of a bureaucracy, judicial structures and an army.

And yet, the CPA process also highlighted the profound challenges that will define South Sudan's struggles to transform further from a region into a state. Its lack of infrastructure and its endemic extreme poverty are staggering; basic quality of life standards are amongst the lowest in the world, and there exists a debilitating proclivity for South-South violence by a plethora of armed groups, as well as an uncompromising political culture premised on militarism. Following the referendum's success, there was a disturbing upsurge in South-South violence as anti-SPLA/M armed groups re-emerged to challenge the SPLA/M's dominance. Additionally, the CPA was inconclusive, and serious issues still need resolution with Khartoum. The most acute issues include the future of the contested sub-region of Abyei and the other disputed border locations, oil management, citizenship issues and allegations of proxy force manipulation. Overall, the tasks confronting the new state are profound: rationalising the institutions of governance, forming agreements regarding state-society relationships in the fractious aftermath of decades of war, and designing plans to resolve historic underdevelopment and layers upon layers of grievance.

The purposes of the book

Within these introductory parameters, this book will proceed to describe the transformation of Southern Sudan into South Sudan by reviewing its modern history and its basic structures of state, as well as social and political dynamics at independence. The first half of the book will pro-

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vide an overview of the region, emphasising the Second Civil War and the CPA peace process. Specifically, [Chapter 1](#) provides a basis for the book by discussing the contentious evolution of the ‘unity versus separation’ discourse that defined Southern Sudan’s rebellions. [Chapters 2 and 3](#) review the history of the Second Civil War, describing the establishment of the SPLA as the prime Southern resistance force and aspiring national revolutionary movement, the subsequent divides within it, and the gradual path to the CPA. [Chapter 4](#) describes the CPA’s Interim Period, what was ultimately a failed exercise in ‘making unity attractive’; perhaps it could be more accurately described as a successful exercise in making unity very unattractive.

The second half of the book then describes and analyses the founding of the new state, outlining its structures of governance and the political, security and social dynamics defining its immediate future. [Chapter 5](#) considers the rationalisation of the new state, examining the basic structures of governance, the security situation, and economic development imperatives. [Chapter 6](#) reviews the foreign relations of the new state, identifying its imperatives for stabilising relations with its neighbour the Republic of Sudan, securing the resources necessary for meeting staggering development needs, and demonstrating the basic competences of governance necessary for international legitimacy and, ultimately, national survival and prosperity.

In the final chapter we delve into South Sudan’s future prospects while reflecting on the ideas of liberation and the meaning of independence. The reality is that South Sudan faces the possibility of winning independence only to slip back into war, or to lumber and stagnate in desperate poverty and various dependencies. A most tragic prospect would be that the new state devolves into its own civil war. The biggest threat it faces is from within; simply maintaining coherence will be a massive challenge given the depth of its socio-political fractiousness. However, a more optimistic view points out that the referendum was a joyous expression of a people for a new beginning. With that in mind, it is important to question consistently: by rejecting unity in the referendum, what do the South Sudanese actually want to forge for themselves in their newly won independence? Through the tortuous process of decades of war and the hopeful but difficult years of peace processes, their aspirations for a particular type of future were slowly being articulated. These are the themes that this book explores.

THE SOUTHERN SUDAN QUESTION

UNITY OR SEPARATION?

We fought and died for the sake of unity.

Salva Kiir, September 2009¹

In January 2011 millions of Southern Sudanese exercised their hard-won right to self-determination by voting for ‘unity’ or ‘separation’ in a historic referendum. The result was resounding and indisputable: 98.83 per cent chose separation.² In many locations voter turnout was close to 100 per cent.³ But while the simplicity of the referendum ballot neatly reduced decades of violent conflict to a binary choice, the path to independence had been complicated by evolving, often divergent, Southern goals. The political discourse had revolved around passionate debates over remaining part of a reformed Sudan or seeking a new state, through either revolution or secession.

Unlike similar referenda on independence, such as those in Eritrea or Timor-Leste, the January 2011 referendum in Southern Sudan was the culmination of an interim period, as outlined in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The peace period was intended to convince South-

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ern voters that they had more to gain from being an autonomous region in a united Sudan than from forming an independent country.⁴ While the referendum may have been the long-sought realisation of self-determination—that is, with an inherent bias towards secession—it was achieved by an insurgent movement that had officially fought for a ‘New Sudan’: unified but secular, democratic and with devolved governance. The SPLA/M’s efforts for a reformed Sudan, led by the late Dr John Garang de Mabior, clashed sharply with the much broader dynamics of Southern history and mass public opinion pushing for independence that so clearly manifested themselves in the referendum’s outcome.

To understand South Sudan as a new state, it is first necessary to consider the conflicted hopes of Southerners, especially given that the referendum’s near unanimous result masks a long history of contentious Southern discourse. So this chapter will explore the evolving, often discordant rationales for Southern resistance to rule by Khartoum, and define how those rationales have laid an historical consciousness for the new state. It will also review the ‘Southern Problem’, as the escalating violence in Southern Sudan came to be known.⁵ How to resolve the problem was definitive to war and peace in Sudan and centred upon Southerners’ responses to a basic question: what do you *actually* want—unity or separation?⁶

Section 1: The First Civil War: Anya-Nya secessionism ends in unity

The Sudan is an integral part of the Arab world and as such must accept the leadership of the two Islamic religious leaders of the Sudan; anybody dissenting from this view must quit the country.

Ali Abdel Rahman, Sudanese Minister of Interior, 1958⁷

It is better to die than to be a slave of the greedy Arabs.

The Anya-Nya: ‘What we fight for!’⁸

The period immediately following Sudan’s 1956 independence was relatively calm, aside from cattle raids, limited political agitation by Southern politicians and correspondingly intermittent ambushes of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) by small groups of rebels. Nevertheless, Southern grievances quickly accumulated, including the exclusion of Southerners from the bureaucracy and the security sector; increased racial and religious persecution by state institutions; and gross disparities in

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economic development.⁹ By the early 1960s, widespread armed rebellion had broken out across the South in what Professor Tim Allen has termed the 'Southern Sudanese war of secession'.¹⁰ As would be true during the Second Civil War, although the SPLA/M's goal was revolution, public opinion in the South was decidedly for secession. How a mass of people can fight, suffer and die for a cause not apparently in line with wider popular opinion has long confused many observers. However, this ability to reconcile two seemingly contradictory goals is typical of the South Sudanese, who possess an impressive capacity for survival and pragmatism.

The Southern insurgent force that drove the First Civil War was known as the Anya-Nya.¹¹ While there had been ongoing, albeit limited, open rebellion since 1955, it was not until 19 August 1963 that a group of exiled Southern political activists and military leaders in Kampala, including Aggrey Jaden Lado, Joseph Oduho, Saturnino Lohure and William Deng Nhial, along with a group of more military-oriented leaders, created the Anya-Nya. Joseph Lagu, a junior officer who defected from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), emerged dominant among them by bringing the group's military elements together.

Beginning in Equatoria, Lagu consolidated the disparate Southern armed groups that had increasingly attacked government forces. With greater cohesion, the strength of the insurgency increased. Since Lagu had spent significant time living with Nilotic groups, such as the Dinka Agar, he was well positioned to unite the Southern groups in their opposition to Khartoum but was from a minor tribe, leaving him inhibited in a deeply tribal political environment of the time. However, divisions remained; the Anya-Nya failed to bring the Dinka, Nuer and Shilluk into its ranks in the same numbers as Equatorians.

While rebellion placed increasing pressure on the government, Southern politicians demonstrated a consistent proclivity towards fratricidal divisiveness, and were unable to agree on goals and leadership. As Southern grievances against Khartoum aggregated, new Southern political movements formed to challenge the government. In March 1965, a peace conference known as the Round Table Conference was convened in Khartoum. The Southern Front, a collection of politicians and intellectuals, and the Sudanese African National Union (SANU) attended, as did such Northern parties as the Umma Party, the National Unionist Party, the Sudan Communist Party, and Hassan al-Turabi's Islamic Charter Front, which played a major role. The two Southern groups demanded self-deter-

mination, or at least a federal constitution; the Northerners conceded only a nebulous 'regional government'.¹² The inconclusive talks were marked by significant bickering and infighting among the Southern delegation.¹³ The official recommendations of the so-called Twelve Man Committee foreshadowed the language and principles later included in the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, which ended the Anya-Nya rebellion.¹⁴

Within this context of political factionalism, Southern rationales for challenging Khartoum varied widely. Some argued for full independence; others, for autonomy in a reformed state. A federalism capable of protecting cultural and religious diversity had been demanded from the Sudan's earliest days.¹⁵ Whatever their formal declarations, many Southerners would likely have settled for the existing unity if they had been included in positions of governance. Despite an almost universal leaning towards secessionism amongst the public, the constant divisions among politicians prevented a unified Southern position from being asserted.¹⁶ Throughout the 1960s, Southern political factionalism proliferated as several 'provisional governments' formed: the Southern Sudan Provisional Government, the Nile Provisional Government and the Anyidi Provisional Government. None was able to mobilise large numbers of Southerners politically, and all lacked overt relevance. Compounding this were the groups' frequent difficulties in dealing with their own internal coherence.

In contrast to these political fractures, the insurgency's cohesion was increasingly solidified by battlefield successes and significant military aid provided by Israel, via Uganda, starting in 1969.¹⁷ In addition, Lagu worked to assert a stronger, more exclusive leadership role over the insurgency and to detach it from dysfunctional provisional governments and their civilian leaders, particularly after 1965. Unlike the bickering politicians, Anya-Nya insurgents were nearly unanimous in their desire for separation. In January 1971, the insurgency chose to name itself the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) and officially demanded a fully independent state. As Lagu articulated in 'The Anya-Nya: What we Fight for', the insurgency's agenda emphasised the grievances of religious and racial persecution and demands for Southern self-determination:

That our specifically African—as distinct from Arab—identity and the common aspirations which unite all our tribes in a common struggle fully qualify us for nationhood and the right to self-determination. That by rejecting the attempted

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Arabization of South Sudan and by adhering to our African identity and heritage we exercise a basic human right which is bound to be recognized by everybody sooner or later.¹⁸

Combined with the major shift in Nimaïri's feeling about Southerners after the Communist Party's 1971 coup attempt, and his associated political/ideological 'U-turn', the insurgency had achieved enough military success by the early-1970s to pressure Khartoum into peace negotiations.¹⁹

For both sides the military stalemate was apparent; clearly only a negotiated settlement would break the impasse.²⁰ Through the mediation of the Ethiopian monarch, Emperor Haile Selassie, negotiations to end the war began in Addis Ababa in February 1972. Given Haile Selassie's stewardship and the Pan-African sentiments against secessionism, it was clear that Southern separation was not an option;²¹ instead, a form of regional autonomy was. Lagu determined to focus on the 'powers' that the South would have within a 'one Sudan context'.²² Despite strong feelings within the SSLM in favour of secession, the pragmatic Lagu stacked his negotiating party with individuals sympathetic to the possibility of Southern regional autonomy and/or secession.²³ When challenged, after the Addis Ababa Agreement, on his apparent shift in position regarding secession, Lagu was reported to have said, 'I never was a secessionist. Never did I believe in the secession of the South from the North. I still hold that belief.'²⁴

The key stipulations of the Addis Ababa Agreement, signed on 27 February 1972 after only 12 days of deliberations, were: Southern Sudan would be represented as a single, distinct entity through an autonomous Southern Regional Government (SRG); the 'Southern' areas outside the formally defined South (notably Abyei) would have referenda regarding inclusion in the South; and Anya-Nya insurgents would be integrated into the national army and compose half of a 'Southern Command' that would be subordinated to command in Khartoum. There was to be an elected Regional Assembly based in Juba, with a High Executive Council (HEC) comprised of ministers and led by a regional president, both appointed by the national president and elected by the Regional Assembly. The SRG could raise local taxes, but could not engage in economic planning; the President of the Republic retained final authority over it. In May 1973, the Agreement was enshrined in a new national constitution, the Southern Sudan Self-Government Act, which stipulated that

it could only be changed by a three-quarters vote in the national assembly and upon approval by a Southern referendum. Of key importance to many Southerners, the new constitution also included provisions to guarantee freedom of religion.

The Addis Ababa Agreement met some core Southern interests, while failing to meet others. The SSLM negotiators conceded full independence as a precondition for negotiations, but they achieved recognition of Southern Sudan as a distinct, autonomous entity within the Sudan.²⁵ For the first time, their own regional government now directly represented Southerners. Additionally, the Agreement resulted in a new constitution that recognised the 'African' identity inherent to Sudan's national character, and included provisions ensuring a secular state. However, the SRG had limited and ambiguous powers, and its autonomy was within the context of a Sudanese state that had an exceptionally strong presidency and no Southern representation. Despite the SSLM's demands, the Agreement did not allow for a separate Southern security force to help guarantee its implementation. It did, however, stipulate that some police and other security units were to be recruited locally.²⁶ Lagu's assured appointment as head of the military in the South inclined him towards a quick acceptance of an agreement rife with ambiguities and lacking comprehensive resolutions to some lingering issues. He was confident that as the Division One Commanding Officer he would be able to resolve any issues that arose, and that securing the deal in short order was essential.²⁷

In the years immediately following the Agreement, there was widespread peace and relative prosperity in the Sudan. As Robert O. Collins has argued, contrary to expectations, at the conclusion of the first SRG term in December 1977, its members 'could take pride that they had indeed been able to govern'.²⁸ The SRG had created the basic bureaucratic and judicial structures of governance, assisted a million Southern returnees, and undertaken a successful election for the Regional Assembly in October 1973. However, by the latter half of the 1970s the Southern political space became increasingly fractious as leading politicians manoeuvred against one another. Most notably, contests tinged with ethnic tensions escalated between factions supporting Abel Alier and Joseph Lagu, for control over the High Executive Council.

Such political incoherence in the South, in the context of the weak autonomy defined by the Addis Ababa Agreement, left the SRG open to Northern manipulation. President Nimaïri proved a master at this,

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especially through his role in constituting the HEC. As Douglas Johnson has argued, despite widespread Southern perceptions that the Addis Ababa Agreement had disadvantaged the South institutionally, Khartoum's interference was undertaken largely 'with the acquiescence or active participation of Southern leaders'.²⁹ Southern politicians could not work together effectively to counter Northern influence and manipulation, as major political factions and dominant individuals engaged in debilitating competition and confrontation.³⁰ Southern solidarity was complicated further by rising sectarian divisions, notably between Equatorians and Dinka (as well as other Nilotic, cattle-raising tribes such as the Nuer). Because of these failings within the wider Southern political space, the SRG was incapable of challenging Khartoum to share resources fairly, boost economic development, moderate educational policy or determine contested borders—including internal, inter-regional and international boundaries.³¹

The Agreement's stipulation that Anya-Nya insurgents must be absorbed into the national army proved highly problematic, and became a key factor in its collapse.³² During the negotiations, the question of the Southern security sector had been especially contentious. Despite initial demands for a separate army, the SSLM eventually accepted Emperor Haile Selassie's arguments for compromise in the form of protocols for integrating the Anya-Nya into the national army, but maintaining a Southern Command, half of which would be former insurgents. Lagu and a few top officers were guaranteed high-level posts in the SAF, police or government. The stipulations, however, were difficult for the Anya-Nya's rank and file to accept; Abel Alier, first president of the HEC, commented on their resentment: '[The Anya-Nya] were fighting for political independence against the "Arabs" until the Agreement came and took them by surprise. It was not the type of arrangement the ordinary Anya-Nya had expected ... to be in one army with their long-standing enemy.'³³

Although Anya-Nya veterans initially posed no direct challenge to the peace, as the process of integrating the ex-Anya-Nya units unfolded, tensions compounded. Khartoum was keen to see them gradually dispersed throughout the SAF, including northwards, while Anya-Nya veterans believed they would stay based in their home areas.³⁴ Another problem arose early on: while some Southerners were included in the SAF's senior command, notably Lagu, Northern officers gradually increased control over the Southern troops. More provocative still were

the orders for redeployment of Southern units to the North, which increased significantly in the early-1980s.³⁵ These orders, the living conditions of most former rebel fighters, and broader dissatisfaction with the general state of the peace agreement's implementation began provoking mutinies in the Southern Command, culminating in the May 1983 mutiny by Battalion 105 in Bor, widely identified as the beginning of the Second Civil War.

Aggravating these tensions, Nimaïri used his presidential powers during the late 1970s and early 1980s to undermine the core tenets of the Agreement. He effectively abrogated it in June 1983 through 'redivision'—breaking Southern Sudan into three smaller regions, each having its own capital, thereby undermining a distinct Southern entity.³⁶ However, many Southerners, particularly in the Equatorial areas, supported redivision policies as a means to greater control in the face of growing dominance by Dinka moving into Juba and other Equatorial areas.

The passing of the September Laws of 1983, which introduced Islamic *sharia* law as the basis for all Sudanese governance, was the final blow to official peace. But although many mark the imposition of *sharia* and the redivision of the South as the effective abrogation of the Addis Ababa Agreement, only when Khartoum attempted to move the so-called Absorbed Forces northwards were enough Anya-Nya veterans and other Southerners willing to reignite violent rebellion.³⁷

The demise of the Addis Ababa Agreement was an embittering affair with serious ramifications. Although initially it had been widely supported in the South, the Agreement did not significantly improve Southerners' quality of life, which deepened resentments over security and political struggles. The result was public dissatisfaction, suspicion and a gradual rejection of the political situation the Agreement created; Southerners were left with a deep disdain for 'false unity'.³⁸ Most would later doubt that continued unity, however reformed, could be more acceptable than full independence, given Khartoum's tendency to 'dishonour' peace processes.³⁹

Especially embittering was the realisation that the 1972 Agreement had been understood as the beginning of an extended evolution for the state, not as an end in itself. Southerners had hoped that the Agreement would provide a dynamic framework for reform; Khartoum saw it instead as something that could be renegotiated, reinterpreted, and/or permanently dismantled. Lagu emphasised that his positions evolved sharply as he recognised that understandings between himself and the Nimaïri

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government, especially regarding Southern involvement in the security sector, were not being upheld.⁴⁰ Many Southerners view the relatively quick acceptance of the Agreement, without explicit guarantees of a Southern army and strong international monitoring, as a grave mistake.

As the Southern public's outrage built, resentment was especially pronounced amongst the Anya-Nya veterans, who started returning to their bush war in the late 1970s, hoping to secure Southern Sudan's outright separation.⁴¹ An armed group known as Anya-Nya II formed over the mid-1970s, aiming to resurrect the Southern struggle on the basis of the broad dissatisfaction with the Agreement's version of unity. Anya-Nya II drew heavily upon armed men who claimed not to have accepted the peace, choosing to remain in the bush in order to continue the fight against the central authorities. Leaders of Anya-Nya II often date its beginning to a mutiny at Akobo Garrison in March 1975 which coincided with National Unity Day, the celebration honouring the peace deal.⁴²

Much of the blame for the return to war could be placed on Nimairi's shallow opportunism.⁴³ Initially, he saw a peace agreement with Southerners as a means to reinforce his tenuous control over the national power that he had secured in the years leading up to the deal. As Northern politics evolved over the 1970s, Nimairi's approach to rule and to the Agreement changed. Without the emergence of strong political leadership in the South, he was able to undermine steadily the Agreement's key provisions. Meanwhile, he continued to use the Southerners in the army and the absence of open war in the South to redouble efforts against opponents in the centre and north, particularly the Islamists and Communists. Seen in this light, the return to war arose also from a failure of Southern political groups to reconcile and unite. Echoing Paysama, the head of the Southern Liberal Party many years before, Lagu later argued that the prospect of a single Southern Sudanese identity and political entity existing comfortably within a united but reformed Sudan was compromised by the inability of Southern political elites to act as a 'Southern' bloc and defend 'Southern' interests.

Section 2: The Second Civil War: The SPLA's revolution ends in secession

Although the Movement has started by necessity in the South ... [t]he SPLA is fighting to establish a United Socialist Sudan, not a separate Southern Sudan.

The SPLA/M in its July 1983 Manifesto⁴⁴

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The First Civil War was driven by an increasingly self-aware Southern body politic that started to coalesce around demands for improved status within the state and separation from north Sudan. However, it concluded with a weak peace agreement and unclear terms regarding the absorption of the rebels into the Sudanese army. Khartoum-based governments, unwilling to alter the state's provocative nature, easily manipulated this shallow Southern autonomy.

The Second Civil War began in May 1983 with the collapse of the Addis Ababa Agreement. Driven by a new Southern insurgent group, the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M), this war was much more radical in nature. The SPLA/M sought to be a focused, singular national front for change, making it substantively different from previous rebel armies. From its inception in 1983 with the Bor Mutiny, through to the end of the war and the CPA, it went through three major phases.

1983 to 1991 saw a period of success on the battlefield, achieved in part with the aid of a militarism informed by Marxist language and authoritarian-like practices; military expediency dominated, owing largely to John Garang's rejection of failures he had identified in Lagu's Anya-Nya. Although successes mounted on the battlefield, many Southerners were alienated by the very harsh treatment of civilians; many communities were reluctant to join the revolution. The atrocities committed during this period continue to haunt the newly independent Republic of South Sudan, and add to security and political challenges that will remain well into the future.

1991 to 1996 was a period of review, especially of the SPLA/M's strategy, sparked by the near-collapse of the rebellion due to internal conflict and fractionalisation during the early post-Cold War months. Then, 1997 to 2005 was a period of renaissance; the leadership began to adopt changes essential for making the movement progressive and better able to re-engage those who had lost faith in the struggle. The developments of the latter two periods will be discussed in greater detail in [Chapters 2](#) and [3](#); this section will describe the SPLA/M's revolutionary argument for seeking continued unity in the Sudan.

The resumption of war fed off historic Southern resentments over the underdevelopment, political marginalisation and cultural/religious discrimination that drove the First Civil War, but the SPLA/M's goals broadened. The burgeoning secessionist sentiments that had fomented

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the Anya-Nya insurgency remained dominant among the Southern public, but the SPLA/M developed an ideological doctrine premised on national reform rather than secessionism. As a result, whereas the first war was limited to the South, the second would, by design, spread northwards. Rallying troops in 1985, Garang declared that the SPLA/M's rebellion sought 'to realize the noble ideals and objectives of genuine Sudanese unity, peace, democracy, equality, economic and social justice for all'.⁴⁵

This 'genuine unity', as opposed to the false unity created at Sudanese independence in 1956, required widening the rebellion by defining it as a revolution for a unified 'New Sudan'. Rather than speak of a 'Southern problem', Garang argued that Sudan itself had a 'fundamental problem', effectively the 'problem of Sudan', one not confined to the South or due to Southerners: 'the attempt by various Khartoum-based regimes to build a monolithic Arab-Islamic state to the exclusion of other parameters of the Sudanese diversity constitutes the Fundamental Problem of the Sudan and defines the Sudanese conflict'.⁴⁶

Just as Southerners were part of a periphery exploited by a repressive core in Khartoum, so too were the Fur and Zaghawa in Darfur, the Beja in the east, people of Kordofan in the centre, and even the Baraabra tribes of the northern Nile. Many of these groups identified as 'African' rather than 'Arab', despite being reluctant to do so in face of pressure from the centre. These groups were united in their subjugation by a small ruling clique comprising people from two tribes based in and around Khartoum; the Ja'aliyyin (President Omar al-Bashir's tribe) have traditionally dominated trade and business, and the Shaiqiyya have historically controlled the armed forces.⁴⁷ These elites come from a small region where people almost exclusively claim Arab descent, speak Arabic and practise Islam. In their position of power, they assumed an Islamic and Arab identity for all Sudanese, expressed as Sudanese nationalism: 'These children of the river, *awlad al-bahr*, have dominated the post-independence state'.⁴⁸ In opposing this structure of power, Garang argued the need for an 'all-inclusive Sudanese state', based on a 'new Sudanese political dispensation' and allowing broad participation in governance regardless of religion or race. In sum, the SPLA/M's New Sudan was to be a secular democracy with devolved governance, capable of creating a peaceful, progressive and inclusive political plurality in Sudan.

Garang was adamant that whatever the outcomes sought, displacing the state's entrenched exploitative nature was a prerequisite: 'We can only

achieve our aim, whether this is the New Sudan, self-determination, or separation, only and only if we destroy the system of the Old Sudan. For it is unthinkable that the regime will voluntarily relinquish power or be forced by international pressures to grant separation.⁴⁹

While Bashir's National Congress Party (NCP) regime⁵⁰ has been characterised as the worst of Sudan's governments (Garang may have originated the term 'Islamofascist' in describing it),⁵¹ it was not fundamentally unique, but merely a continuation of successive regimes since independence. Given that Sudan has experienced three coups d'état since 1956, Garang concluded that a national resistance front, instigated by a Southern armed group but supporting an increasingly diversified political movement, was required.⁵² This front would need to evolve a national character, as it spread into northern areas, including Darfur and the east. This strategy led to the creation, in the early 1990s, of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), a collection of primarily political opposition groups intending to overthrow Bashir and end war in the South. The SPLA and a group of Northern armed factions, known as the Sudan Alliance Forces,⁵³ made up the NDA's armed wing. The Northern groups' contribution was relatively small militarily, leaving the SPLA/M to drive the combat effort. However, Garang and the SPLA/M leadership felt that including various Northern opposition groups was essential to building an effective political front against Bashir. These efforts benefited greatly from the political force of the remaining Northern groups that came together under the NDA banner.

Although Garang used the New Sudan vision primarily as a critique of Khartoum, he also intended it as a rebuff to Southern secessionists. He argued that pure secessionism was demeaning to Southerners: 'Since when did we not belong to the Sudan... Is the case not rather that there are people in the Sudan who want to dispossess us of our land, of our Sudan?'⁵⁴ For Garang, seeking a transformed but united Sudan was fundamentally about gaining dignity for Southerners; secession was a form of degradation.⁵⁵ This sentiment would long guide the New Sudan vision; in 2008 the movement's then leader Salva Kiir argued that it must maintain its national focus: '[it would be] humiliating for Southern Sudanese ... to reduce themselves, in their own country, to [the] sub-national level instead of shaping and directing the national strategic direction of the Sudan'.⁵⁶ Garang often claimed that '63 per cent of Sudanese are Africans'.⁵⁷ Where he derived this statistic is unclear, but it frequently under-

lined his assertion that Sudan was an African rather than an Arab state. He argued that Southerners should be included in the government, not resign themselves to occupying a smaller piece of the African country to which they, as Africans, belonged.⁵⁹

The SPLA/M's historic emphasis on unity was also pragmatic: for Garang, despite the strong public support for it, secessionism was constricting; he commented in 1994, 'By pronouncing separation, there is nothing that the SPLM can do more than what it has been doing since 1983'.⁵⁹ In other words, including the goal of separation in the SPLA/M's mandate would be redundant—no greater struggle would be waged with the aim of secession rather than national revolution.⁶⁰ In contrast, the rigid secessionism of the 1960s had never achieved conclusive results; it was an absolutist goal that ultimately cost Southerners the political leverage needed to help them through internationally brokered peace negotiations.

Garang presented the clearest articulation of the SPLA/M's strategy at its first National Convention in 1994, defining a series of five 'models' for possible outcomes to the war:⁶¹


- 1) a secular, democratic New Sudan
- 2) a transitory confederation leading to a New Sudan (Model 5)
- 3) the 'Old Sudan' dominated by Khartoum's authoritarian regimes
- 4) a 'united black African Sudan'
- 5) Southern independence via referendum

The war's objective was to secure Model 2 through a peace agreement; that is, to end the war and arrange a South Sudanese referendum on reformed unity or sovereignty. What the SPLA/M called 'a Minimum New Sudan' occurred via the confederal arrangement of the CPA (akin to Model 2), which provided the opportunity to move to a democratic New Sudan (Model 1). Should this transformation fail, the deal allowed reversion to separation of both Sudans (Model 5).⁶² Figure 1.1 shows a direct excerpt from Garang's document outlining these models. It was a part of his opening address to the 1994 SPLM National Convention.

Definitive to Garang's strategy was leaving possibilities for national reform without abandoning the concept of the right to Southern self-determination, and thus the option for separation. This flexibility was founded on working through an extended process built upon, and secured through, the guarantee of a culminating referendum. As Garang pre-

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Figure 1.1



Source: 'This Convention is Sovereign: Opening and Closing Speeches by Dr. John Garang DeMabior' 1994 National Convention. Available on the Sudan Open Archive, <http://sudanarchive.net>.

scientifically argued in 1994: 'The SPLM objective and struggle for Model 2, that is, for a Sudanese confederation, leads either to the New Sudan (Model 1), or to separation (Model 5), and hence by adopting this strategy, the SPLM/A keeps all its options open without losing anything.'⁶³

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The SPLA/M long sought a process that would endeavour to create a reformed and united Sudan, but still allow for Southern independence should Khartoum fail to make continued unity attractive. Of course, attractive unity would demand truly consensual and inclusive governance. Garang frequently joked that, since 'nobody marries an ugly woman', and since it was obvious Southerners would ultimately have a choice on unity or secession, and would only choose something that suited their interests, the Sudanese state as it existed was so oppressive and ugly that no one would choose it.⁶⁴ In the end, the right to choose became the key victory for Garang, and he remained certain that people would choose unity with him at the helm. Nevertheless, Garang argued that unity could only happen if ruling elites in Khartoum sincerely accepted deep reform. Otherwise, 'the country will break up and none of us in the SPLM/A would shed any tears'.⁶⁵

Buttressing this argument was Southerners' hesitancy to accept the possibility that continued unity, however hypothetically reformed, could be part of the road to independence. Garang argued that the lack of broad Southern support for pursuing unity, even temporarily, did not diminish the necessity to conclude a peace deal. Any viable peace process had to be flexible enough to end the war with Khartoum in the first place, and then to push for acceptance of the referendum's results. Accordingly, an Interim Period of confederation was a compromise for both sides. On the one hand, this period would serve as a placating 'model' for a unity that was sustainable and voluntary, and as such peaceful for the whole country. On the other hand, it would conclude with the Southern populace freely making a choice.

Thus, the SPLA/M acquired the political leeway to secure external support by proclaiming unity, while accommodating the inherent secessionist sympathies of much of its rank and file. The emphasis on unity also allowed the war to broaden to include Northern opposition groups. This was profound: Khartoum's nightmare scenario was opposition coalescing throughout the country, something the NDA was partially able to achieve, though armed revolt never occurred in the core 'Arab triangle' around Khartoum. Before taking the country by coup, the NCP's forerunners never mustered more than 15 per cent electoral support, and they were not much more popular once in power. Their power was based on fear and division politics. As would become apparent in the latter years of the war, alliance amongst the national opposition, however superficial, was

an important factor in the NCP conceding the terms for the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005. The SPLA commanders Abdel Aziz and Malik Agar, both Northerners, were key in driving the SPLA's military campaign northward. By 2000, the SPLA/M had taken Kassala and controlled the outskirts of Damazin, threatening the major hydro-electric dam that provided Khartoum's main electricity supply.⁶⁶

The one absolute in the SPLA/M's New Sudan vision was the right of Southern self-determination; this right was expressed as central to its aspirations for the first time in 1994, and was meant to placate the obvious preference for secessionism held by its rank and file and the Southern public; in many respects it was also a rebuff to the leaders of the 1991 split for attempting to supplant Garang. The CPA's culminating referendum clearly defined self-determination as a vote on unity or separation, not federation or autonomy.

Many have been sceptical about the intellectual depth, political sincerity and strategic viability of this vision. Garang did tend to be grandiose at times, but much of his rhetoric was initiated by the demands of Cold War-era geopolitics. The SPLA/M's advent as the dominant Southern fighting force in the early 1980s depended largely on support from the communist Derg in Ethiopia, which would never have supported pure secessionists.⁶⁷ Such sentiments were also the norm for the international community, especially for Africans. Expressing these fears not long before the referendum, the head of the African Union Commission commented: 'Such a decision [for secession] could lead us again to a number of major difficulties, including war... Will the independence of Southern Sudan not lead other players in Darfur and in other places, which are currently not asking for independence, to seek independence as Southern Sudan will have done?'⁶⁸ The following day, the Secretary General of the UN, Ban Ki Moon aroused the ire of many Southern Sudanese when he said, 'The UN has a big responsibility with the AU to maintain peace in Sudan and make unity attractive... We'll work hard to avoid a possible secession.'⁶⁹

The South Sudanese wrongly took these expressions of the imperative to avoid the disintegration of states as support for Khartoum. However, strict adherence to the CPA's language of balance between South and North resulted in most of the international community following a policy of rhetorical dualism. This balance actively interfered with effective donor support to capacity-building programmes throughout the South,

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and was particularly confusing with respect to security sector assistance, since many countries ran programmes in both the North and the South. It led, too, to the irony of the international community assisting the North's security apparatus when the government's president and several of its bureaucrats had been indicted by the ICC. For example, the UK government maintained assistance to the security sector in North and South Sudan throughout the interim period. Many other governments offered non-lethal assistance to the police in Northern Sudan in parallel to programmes in the South.⁷⁰ While in diplomatic terms a language of balanced treatment and policy made sense, with the decision of the ICC to issue warrants for myriad crimes, and given the continuing recalcitrance of leaders in Khartoum, international assistance to build the capacity of the very security apparatus that oppressed the population and conducted war in the South and in Darfur verges on the scandalous.

While the rhetoric of the upper echelons of the SPLA/M may have eased nerves in the international community, it did not reflect the hopes of its rank and file or those of the broader Southern public: Garang was a revolutionary, but the vast majority of his guerrillas were reactionary secessionists. Many Southerners may have accepted some aspects of the New Sudan vision, notably its emphasis on overcoming historical injustices and the language of rights, but relatively few would accept fighting for a unified Sudan. For most of the SPLA's members, the goal worth dying for was Southern secessionism and freedom from the 'Arabs who had long dominated the country'.⁷¹

Arguably more telling, this vision of a 'New Sudan' was premised on Garang's centrality to it. Garang believed he would become the leader of a unified New Sudan, and any peace process or any fighting was, in part, expected to be a means to achieve that goal.⁷² With his revolutionary message, Garang believed he could win free and fair national elections to become president. Though hypothetical, such scenarios did not seem outlandish at the time of the 2010 National Elections. Had there been a national political figure to challenge the NCP incumbent Bashir, the scale of support for all of the opposition groups at the time suggested that such a figure could have, at the very least, seriously challenged the NCP.

Garang felt that, despite their overwhelming support for secession, Southerners could accept unity in the referendum if there were a Southerner as premier of Sudan. Undoubtedly, he would have challenged Bashir and others in Khartoum as First Vice-President. With support from Dar-

fur, South Kordofan and the east, along with that of youths, unions and intellectuals throughout the country, and the many young, highly educated leaders he took to Khartoum, he would have been a force to contend with on the national stage: his potential to compel major transformation was immense.

Ultimately, Garang's vision was realised. His flexible sequencing of options, with an emphasis on unity, proved prescient; the birth of South Sudan unfolded through the CPA. There was a period of transitory confederation, where the tangible option of a New Sudan was presented to the Southern public in the form of the CPA-stipulated structures of governance: a semi-autonomous Southern government secured by its own army, provisions for religious and cultural freedoms, and stipulations for democratic elections and reforms for the entire country. The actual implementation of the CPA—that is, its demonstration of what a New Sudan could look like—was found to be lacking,⁷³ and Southerners accordingly chose separation.

Section 3: Domineering personalities and conflicted collaboration

He [Garang] was the glue that held everything together ...

Dan Eiffe, Relief Worker and supporter of SPLA/M.⁷⁴

The NIF [National Islamic Front] is seeking the South's secession... didn't they ally themselves with Dr. Riek Machar who founded the Southern Sudan Independence Front, then tried to persuade him to turn his guns on us?

Garang, on the confused nature of Sudanese collaboration.⁷⁵

The previous sections have described the evolution of Southern Sudan's conundrum over unity or separation, particularly within its political elites and insurgent movements. This section will qualify these binary options by reviewing two dynamics important to that contentious Southern discourse: the dominance of Southern Sudan's modern political space by John Garang and a small number of other notable personalities, and the apparently manic shifting of loose tactical alliances, both militarily and politically. These dynamics have played off the grand rhetoric of unity or separation, and have been manipulated to meet the exigencies of war within the Southern Sudan's fractured socio-political space.

John Garang's importance to the advent of South Sudan is indisputable; even his biggest critics have acknowledged his exceptional influ-

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ence over events⁷⁶—an importance starkly highlighted by how greatly his untimely death in July 2005 altered the strategic rationales of the parties to the CPA, as will be discussed in [Chapter 4](#). Garang was one of very few Sudanese politicians ever to garner significant national support for a unified country. Conversely, despite his rhetoric of democracy, equality and pluralism, Garang was apparently inclined towards autocratic control, dominating the SPLA/M with his often-messianic character. He was frequently accused of using violence and intimidation to remove competitors.⁷⁷ Anecdotal evidence suggests that in many of the cases where violence was used to silence, intimidate or remove potential threats, it was carried out unilaterally by subordinates and endorsed by Garang after the fact, rather than directly ordered.

The command of the SPLA/M was more nuanced than it might have appeared from the outside. It had a decidedly contradictory structure, blending allegedly autocratic control with an anarchic reactionary system premised on continual negotiation between Garang and the movement's upper echelons. The response to most major issues was forming a committee. Overly conscious of the tribal politics underlying most events in Sudan, Garang would include on such committees representatives from many of the tribal groups and geographic areas. For example, if punishment had to be meted out for a major offence against the Code of Conduct, a committee would be formed and minutes kept. However, he remained a strong leader who could and typically did assert the final word on issues, while on other occasions signing off on subordinates' decisions post-hoc. This allowed him, for the most part, to maintain sole control of the movement and army, and to focus, as was his preference, on larger issues of politics.

Although Garang was in control strategically, at other levels his dominance was muted. Local leaders, both tribal/community and military, engaged in full tactical decision-making. Garang would set out a broad goal and leave the lower level leaders to achieve it. This style, what military professionals might call 'mission command'—whereby goals are dictated but the path and manner of achieving them are not—remains characteristic of the SPLA.

The core of Garang's control was rooted in his understanding of the region's political economy, and of warfare more broadly. He set out a strategy that manipulated the political economy of the region, thus creating an operational environment in which the SPLA/M controlled

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resource flows along South Sudan's borders (with Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, the DRC), besieged government garrison towns, hampered the SAF's mobility with ambushes, and influenced basic resource scarcity among major swathes of the population. In such an environment, he held control of the only significant flow of consistent and reliable external resources into the region: initially from the Derg (the revolutionary military regime) in Ethiopia, and after its collapse from a combination of international humanitarian assistance and Ugandan military resources. He was thus rendered the strongest patron, and established a dominant client-patron relationship with his armed forces, most Southern leaders (ideological allies and opponents alike) and wider society. Those who moved to oppose him, despite principles or goals, were forced to turn to the only source of material support available—Khartoum—or starve. Anyone choosing support from '*the jellaba*' could then be discredited: the propaganda power was significant. The approach reflected Garang's intimate understanding of the local situation, and an attempt to balance local realities and his often more abstract designs.

Garang's success as a leader was based on his ability to control and balance various powerful personalities within the movement. Internal animosities between other figures were often the cause of his allegedly dictatorial leadership, rather than a consequence of his playing these often volatile personalities off against each other. When the balance was struck, the SPLA/M functioned well; when the balance was off, divisions and disputes could quickly erupt into factional confrontation and violence. Reconciling these frequent outbursts and internal imbalances of power was another often-overlooked element of Garang's leadership style. Rather than dictate, Garang took the role of arbiter or conciliator after conflict. Instead of avoiding confrontation, he was often inclined to resolve it *ex post*.

The consequences of Garang's leadership style were seen in the wake of his death: the movement faced the 'existential crisis' of maintaining coherence. Several groups asserted claims for power in the South or in more localised contexts. Rebecca Garang's move to support Salva Kiir, the heir apparent, in the face of losing her husband, and her active attempts, along with those of others, to keep key leaders focused on moving the SPLM's agenda forward, overcame one of the most significant blows to the group's coherence and prospects for either New Sudan or sovereign South Sudan.

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Garang's vision was of a strong Southern military force, freed from divisive civilian politicians, that would instigate revolutionary change for the whole of Sudan; failing that, it would at least ensure Southern independence. The background to this was the fractious Southern politics of the 1960s and 70s that culminated in what Garang and others often referred to as the 'false unity' of the Addis Ababa Agreement. Garang claimed that 'a bad peace is worse than war' and blamed elder political elites for being incapable of creating the Southern solidarity necessary to counter Khartoum effectively; such solidarity would have to be brought about either consensually or through force.⁷⁸ The historian Robert Collins has highlighted that such elites were 'men of limited abilities, conceited personalities, and narrow vision unable to define, let alone articulate, a future that would unify the South against the North'.⁷⁹ In response, Garang entrenched his control and vision over the SPLA/M, never allowing it a strong civilian representation, a dominant political wing or a plurality in decision-making.⁸⁰

Relying on the argument that the struggle required virtually total military control of the SPLA/M and the Liberated Areas until victory was achieved, Garang's domineering leadership deeply alienated key individuals and significant sections of the Southern public who felt he had overstepped his seniority in the collection of Southern leaders by starting the SPLA in 1983. At the same time, many appreciated him because, forceful or otherwise, he was the first Southern Sudanese leader to move the 'cause' of Southerners forward to the degree that he did, and the first Southerner to properly contend with the elites in Khartoum. Southerners had continually been disappointed by leaders who either made poor deals with Khartoum or lacked forcefulness.

After Garang's death, the SPLA/M had to rediscover itself. With most of its leaders learning on-the-job, the task of becoming an effective government and bureaucratic entity while also resolving the movement's core ideas was daunting. For example, having always been a military man, Salva Kiir was thrust into the role of guiding an ideological movement, being the head of a government and father to a nation; no small task. With Garang's death the New Sudan Vision died, at least as originally espoused. Rightly or wrongly, the liberation movement had been too centred on Garang. The fact that the SPLM survived largely intact—albeit with an adapted ethos more in tune with the wider South Sudanese populace—is a significant achievement.

Despite the apparent total militarisation of the movement, the SPLA/M was a politicised armed group rather than a militarised political movement. Consequently, at the time of independence, it remained an army with an officer corps widely composed of politicians (or politicians in waiting) and essentially a political space. This is key in considering the future of the state. Many analysts and activists claim the country's key problem is that the government and politics are over-militarised. Rather, considering the nature of Garang's leadership, we see an intricate fusion of military and politics: the leaders of the army are political, rather than political leaders who have been militarised, and the institutions themselves are all political spaces rather than all politics being militarised.

Garang's uncompromising style, particularly with respect to Khartoum, was uncommon; previous Southern leaders had often proved willing to compromise on Southerners' future for practical and personal expediency. For his part, Garang appealed to widespread resentment of the Addis Ababa Agreement's failed unity, which had delegitimised the older Southern leadership that had agreed to it. Garang's personality helped Southerners transcend the often pervasive, though unwarranted, sense of humiliation that long oppression and suffering caused. But his critics, perceiving him as authoritarian, contended that his manner of leadership was an impractical way to bring about change in a society that customarily valued extended debate and consensus. While Garang's dominance of the SPLA/M catalysed significant armed revolt against Khartoum, the war was still defined by perpetual confrontation between Southern factions. The sad truth is that a significant number of Southern Sudanese have died fighting one another rather than resisting Northerners.⁸¹

Aside from the displacement of pluralistic discussion and decision-making, Garang used the message of New Sudan to counter his major Southern opponents. In August 1991, the SPLA experienced major defections from its forces by the commanders Lam Akol and Riek Machar. Often referred to as the 'split', their coup attempt was an historic milestone in the Second Civil War, and was said to have arisen from disagreement over Garang's New Sudan vision, along with more personal designs on power. Akol and Machar initially declared their coup as necessary for resisting Garang's authoritarianism: 'In order to save the Movement from imminent collapse, it has been decided to relieve John Garang from the leadership of the SPLM/A'.⁸² However, they also emphasised independence for the South, arguing that Garang was selling out the cardinal

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aspiration of most Southerners.⁸³ The veil of principle was quickly removed when they initiated fratricidal warfare; Garang and his faction, which became known as SPLA/M Mainstream (sometimes referred to as SPLA/M-Torit), reacted with further violence, escalating the situation. The nature of this violence brought many conspirators and Machar supporters back to the fold of the SPLA/M Mainstream. Peter Adwok Nyaba discusses this at length in his memoir of his role in the 1991 split: 'In retrospect, what Riek Machar and Lam Akol caused by their actions in the most irresponsible manner in Nasir was a split within the ranks of the SPLA/M at a time when it urgently needed unity and solidarity...what unfolded in Nasir did not reflect in any sense the slogans which were used to rationalize the coup.' Nyaba further asserts that, 'The Nasir leaders embarked on the most vicious crimes ever committed in the SPLM/A'.⁸⁴

In defending their 1991 coup attempt, Machar and Akol would cite the 'logic' underpinning collaboration between Southerners and Khartoum: 'Southern Sudanese received the [SPLA/M's] call for a United Sudan with great scepticism and finally total rejection. In fact, many Southerners chose to fight on the side of the Khartoum government because they saw the SPLA's war for one transformed Sudan as unrepresentative of their political aspirations.'⁸⁵ Akol would later highlight the uniqueness of the CPA as a peace treaty between two warring parties who actually sought the same basic outcome, a united Sudan.⁸⁶ In response, Garang was derisory, arguing 'our self-professed separatists' were actually fighting for the unity of a Sudan through their battlefield collaboration with the SAF, thereby supporting the NCP's dictatorial rule.⁸⁷ There was no shortage of hypocrisy amidst this infighting, making the environment ripe for divide and rule tactics applied by Khartoum's security and intelligence services.

The Second Civil War and the subsequent peace process were dominated by several profoundly influential individuals, making Sudanese politics 'an intensely personal matter'.⁸⁸ This was the case for the entire Sudan, not just its southern third, as Mansour Khalid describes in *The Country They Deserve*. Garang enjoyed referring to Akol and Machar as 'our ambitious PhD holders' and 'the gang of two Drs',⁸⁹ highlighting how a generation of Southern Sudanese who accessed education during the tenuous peace of the 1970s came to dominate the war.⁹⁰ Of course, Garang also held a PhD, from Iowa State University.⁹¹ These PhD-holders were complemented by Southern leaders who would remain prominent through-

out the decades of war and the subsequent peace process, effectively an emergent intelligentsia: Oyay Deng Ajak, Kuol Manyang, Deng Alor, Gier Chuang, Malik Agar, Nhial Deng Nhial, Pagan Amum, to name but a few. The SPLA/M possessed a mixture of warriors and intellectuals, and everything in between. Garang's and other leaders' support of higher education for a select few has culminated in a government and political party with some very capable and highly educated elites, often at odds with their much less educated and worldly colleagues; this division has become stark since South Sudan's independence.

The leaders of the SPLA/M were of many professions and backgrounds: from lawyers to agriculturalists to medical doctors, and from holders of doctorates to illiterates whose education was time with elders in the bush. While intellectuals with academic achievements dominated, the leadership included many military men inclined more to practical experience than academics. These practical military commanders, such as Kerubino Bol, William Nyuon Bany, and Salva Kiir, were essential to the organisation's success.

Kiir's importance cannot be understated. Although he was Garang's long-term deputy,⁹² Kiir at times grated against Garang's leadership style. Kiir's ability to challenge Garang originated in his role in securing Garang's place as the primary leader of Southern rebels during the early days of the rebellion: Kiir reportedly cast the deciding vote among the leaders who had arrived in Ethiopia regarding which would receive the Derg's support. From his management of the army to his role as internal security head, Kiir was critical in securing Garang's leadership over his rivals. Tensions climaxed in November 2004 with a standoff between groups within the SPLA/M forces, reported to have been provoked by Garang's presumed attempt to replace Kiir within the SPLA/M hierarchy with one of the more highly educated leaders he had been grooming over the years. Other factors said to be at the heart of the confrontation included Garang's perceived control over the CPA negotiations, and his unilateral control over distribution of government appointments once the CPA was concluded. Issues of funding and appointments for various projects and programmes linked to the government about to be formed were likely also factors.⁹³ An emergency meeting of the SPLA/M hierarchy in Rumbek resolved the tensions, but also represented the climax of internal resentment over Garang's leadership style. Kiir's declaration that 'The Chairman seems to have taken the movement as his own property'⁹⁴ rep-

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resented a common opinion within a leadership perturbed by Garang's monopolistic design of the peace.

While reflecting the tensions present amongst the SPLA/M's leadership, this incident also shows that Garang, often accused of being dictatorial, had less control than many believed. He was forced to allow others to be involved in decisions; while in the end his was the ultimate decision, the process was more complicated inside the leadership than either the rank and file or outsiders realised.

When, after Garang's death, Kiir assumed control with the unanimous support of the SPLM leadership, a major shift in political direction was expected. Many observers and those close to the movement's leadership have commented that 'the New Sudan went into the grave with John Garang'.⁹⁵ Despite expectations that he would immediately emphasise Southern separation, Kiir publicly espoused a united Sudan for most of the CPA Interim Period; it rapidly became clear, however, that his heart was set on independence.⁹⁶ Tensions persisted within the SPLA/M, and in 2008 Kiir somewhat self-consciously commented regarding secession-minded elements: '[they] have persuaded themselves that the passing of the mantle from power from our late Chairman to my humble person was a signal of change in our course'.⁹⁷ As will be discussed in [Chapter 4](#), he did shift the SPLA/M's focus southwards during the Interim Period, and that shift proved contentious.

Considering the lack of broad support for unity amongst Southerners, many commentators have argued that Garang's New Sudan vision was divisive within Southern politics, and actually helped prolong the war because it was so easily manipulated by Khartoum. For example, Douglas Johnson has contended that the SPLA/M's 'lack of direction' was a significant factor in extending the war.⁹⁸ Garang's passion for national revolution contributed to the extended fighting with the Anya-Nya II from 1983 to 1988 and Machar and Akol's attempted overthrow of Garang in 1991. Such tensions perpetuated themselves between the SPLA and the ostensibly secessionist South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF), Khartoum's umbrella grouping of Southern militias.⁹⁹

Moreover, contrasting the official rhetoric of unity with the secessionist sentiments of the SPLA/M's rank and file led such highly regarded analysts as Christopher Clapham to deem the SPLA/M a 'separatist' rather than 'liberation' insurgency.¹⁰⁰ From the inception of its unity agenda, the SPLA/M was defensive: nearly all the fighting in the revo-

lution's early years to bring about New Sudan had been in the South and led by a Southerner.¹⁰¹ The potential for wider support, along with the essential backing of Ethiopia, would be compromised if SPLA/M leaders expressed anything other than the mantra of national revolution rather than Southern independence or autonomy. Garang dismissed suggestions that such ideological confusion existed in the SPLA/M: 'I reject the view that there are some of us who are unionists and others separatists within the SPLA/M. There are no such differences among our people'.¹⁰² Nonetheless, Garang's so-called Model 2, an interim period of confederation prior to a self-determining referendum, was clearly an attempt to moderate the inherent disjuncture between his unitary vision and a Southern public with opinions tending otherwise. As Collins argued, the whole notion of interim confederation was a 'convoluted proposal' meant to placate the mass of separatists that made up much of the SPLA/M, while maintaining a 'veneer of unity'.¹⁰³

Such glaring contradictions between official purpose and real intent were to prove debilitating to Southern unity of action. Notably, Garang's emphasis on self-determination only came to consistent prominence from 1994,¹⁰⁴ representing his attempt to placate Southern opposition following the 1991 split and the SPLA's subsequent weakness on the battlefield. Garang responded to the 1991 action of the Nasir coup with effective political propaganda internally and internationally, though it was slow in coming. After 1994 he maintained his demand for a united New Sudan, but consistently qualified it as coming through the right of Southern self-determination—that is, through unity being demonstrably consensual. Hence, Garang's ideological fervour for unity was compromised by the need to accommodate the possibility of Southern independence, culminating in his insistence that the CPA stipulate a referendum on Southern separation. Additionally, the global political environment and the end of dependence on Ethiopia's material resources in a Cold War proxy conflict meant that the idea of Southern independence was much less daunting for other governments in the region. Opinions about secession in Africa changed throughout the 1990s as Western powers embraced a rash of struggles for self-determination in the aftermath of the Soviet Union's collapse.

It is impossible to know how different the course of South Sudan's history might have been had Garang not died in July 2005. Weeks earlier, huge crowds gathered on his arrival in Khartoum to be sworn in—

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shaking the confidence of the leadership in Khartoum, as many Southern reports suggest. Similar popularity was evident in many other major centres and communities throughout the North, as well as in the South where such celebration was expected; upon his death, riots and major demonstrations rippled throughout Khartoum and most major northern cities. Certainly he maintained a consistent emphasis on revolutionising Sudan; although most within his own movement never shared that passion, its force had an immense impact on the civil war and the subsequent peace process.

Loose alliances of collaboration across the North-South divide were also critical to the unfolding of the war. This collaboration was defined by tensions among the participants over one another's intents. Thus the two most significant partnerships—those between the SPLA/M and Northern opposition parties, and between Khartoum and anti-SPLA/M Southern armed groups—suffered as a result of profound disagreements over their shared goals, none more profound than disagreement over the alternative aims: unity or separation.

Alliance with Northern political parties was central to the SPLA/M's struggle against Khartoum. Garang's revolutionary vision resonated markedly with some Northern opposition parties, especially those in the NDA, because of its emphasis on democratisation and the SPLA/M's ability to pose a credible threat; the non-SPLA Northern groups were lacking in capacity for armed force, relying instead on organised political action. While Northern parties resented their blanket exclusion from the CPA's negotiations, the Agreement's provisions for interim national elections, which Garang argued would lead to a 'democratic and fundamental transformation' of all of Sudan, were widely encouraged.¹⁰⁵

Underpinning all this was a long-shared goal of overcoming the Sudanese state's historic political exclusion and racial and religious discrimination. Peace negotiations early in the war made headway in developing a consensus on the issue through the Koka Dam Declaration of March 1986 between the SPLA/M and the National Alliance for National Salvation, a grouping of Northern trade unions and political parties involved in the overthrow of Nimeiri in April 1985. Emphasising a need to resolve the 'basic problems of Sudan', rather than the 'so-called problem of Southern Sudan', the Declaration stated a consensus for a 'New Sudan that would be free from racism, tribalism, sectarianism, and all causes of discrimination and disparity', and called for a new constitutional convention

to proceed on that basis.¹⁰⁶ However, the DUP, a leading partner in the coalition that won the elections held immediately after the Declaration was announced, refused to participate, effectively rendering it void.¹⁰⁷ Such apparently unreliable collaboration with most Northern political actors only reinforced the arguments made for Southern secession: there was no reason why Southerners should bleed and bear the burdens of revolution only to see fickle Northern political groups benefit later on. In the end, however, despite seeing the NDA as free riders whose actions were often counter-productive or contributed very little, many in the SPLA/M resolved that political collaboration with the NDA was useful overall.¹⁰⁸

The National Islamic Front of Hassan al-Turabi also refused to participate in Koka Dam. Unlike many Northern leaders and political parties, which often moved their positions relative to negotiations with the SPLA/M, al-Turabi and his NIF consistently resisted any talks or deals with Southerners. Although al-Turabi did express support for the CPA at the time of its conclusion, this was almost certainly meant as part of a process of reconciliation with Bashir and Khartoum's political circles, and was important in securing his release from detention at the time.

Aside from the amiable hopes for democratic transformation and overcoming basic discrimination, significant ideological disputes existed between the SPLA/M and its Northern partners. Important in this regard was agreeing what the actual role of Islam should be in the Sudanese state. Many Northern parties, such as the Umma, had long supported a *sharia*-based constitution and were hesitant to back secular governance. These tensions were especially strong within the NDA, which played an increasingly important role as the 1990s progressed. Southerners questioned the sincerity of the NDA's Northern parties about pursuing the secular reform advocated by the SPLM as key to a New Sudan. Garang noted in the mid-1990s that his Northern partners' 'commitment on secularism ... remains vague'.¹⁰⁹

Even more divisive were tensions over who should lead the country. For many Northern partners in the NDA, interest in collaborating with the SPLA/M was premised more on over-throwing Bashir than on allowing strong Southern involvement in Khartoum over the long term. As Mansour Khalid, one of Sudan's elder statesmen and a Northerner long supportive of the SPLA/M, concluded, from the beginning of the Second Civil War there were strong tensions between the SPLA/M and its Northern collaborators over roles and responsibilities. While there was common

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support for national reform and democratisation, '[t]hose goals transcended the South; but once Bashir was deposed and the aspirations of the North satisfied ... the SPLM were expected to put arms aside and bless whatever was decided for the Sudan by those who considered themselves the arbiters of the nation's destiny'.¹¹⁰ The SPLA/M was often viewed more as a means to an end than as a full partner in a national project.

While the generic term 'self-determination' was broadly accepted as a requirement for peace in the Sudan, Northern parties generally understood it as the possibility for Southern regional autonomy or federalisation. Support for a Southern option of outright secession was tepid at best. After years of obfuscation, in 1995 the NDA issued a declaration in Asmara, supported by most major Northern parties and the SPLA/M, which clearly stated that Southern Sudan was entitled to a referendum on independence. Yet Northern parties still equivocated. In 1999, through negotiations supported by Libya and Egypt, the Northern elements of the NDA supported the Tripoli Declaration that allowed only for unity without any referendum on independence. The SPLA/M never accepted this declaration, a stance that undermined the NDA's anti-NCP alliance and clearly highlighted the contradictions inherent in its collaboration.

Furthermore, there existed deep conceptual divisions within the SPLA/M itself. The critically important SPLA formations in the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile State in Northern Sudan had, by and large, fought for a reformed Sudan rather than for Southern independence. Most supported independence for the South if it occurred; despite not being included in it, their consolation would be an international border with the Republic of South Sudan and their former comrades, who the Nuba believed would be unlikely to abandon them in times of conflict. There had been no such resistance to Khartoum in these locales during the First Civil War, given its orientation to Southern secessionism. In fact, many of the fighters from these areas were useful in opposing the Anya-Nya, a fact that Garang subsequently took advantage of when opposing the Anya-Nya II's espousal of full Southern secession. In contrast, the SPLA/M's New Sudan rhetoric had motivated Northern-based groups along the border area, in part, to take up arms with the movement. Historically, within that grand rhetoric, self-determination was not really meant as Southern-specific, but rather as a basic right for all marginalised peoples in the Sudan, appealing greatly to other groups, such as those in the Nuba Mountains or Darfur, similarly oppressed by Bashir's regime.

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Yet, through the CPA, people in these Northern areas were essentially jettisoned by the SPLA/M leadership in its desire not to undermine Khartoum's acquiescence to a referendum for Southern Sudan, which meant the opportunity of gaining sovereignty over most of the territory it conceived of as 'South Sudan' and most of those it considered 'Southerners'. Rather than referenda, the CPA provided the people in the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile with a watered-down form of self-determination in the form of 'Popular Consultations' (limited exercises musing on their position within the Sudan) that had no binding force. These peoples' disappointment and later bitterness over the CPA period, which effectively left them deeply embedded in an unreformed 'Old Sudan' despite the decades of painful resistance, was profound.

Khartoum governments also had their own conflicted collaboration with Southerners throughout the war. Using Southern militias/armed groups was central to Khartoum's counter-insurgency campaign against the SPLA/M,¹¹¹ furthering a strategy that had been developed since the First Civil War.¹¹² The SPLA/M's splintering in August 1991 allowed for even more extensive opportunities to use Southern proxies: Khartoum supported the forces of Akol and Machar, known as the SPLA/M-Nasir, and later SPLA/M-United. SPLA/M-United initially achieved some significant gains, but it was itself to splinter in 1993 because of confrontation between the various leaders. Throughout the mid-1990s a plethora of disparate anti-SPLA/M armed groups spread across the South. Often fighting one another and perpetually evolving in form and leadership, they shared little in common other than a deep antipathy for the SPLA/M's dominance of Southern rebellion and its message of Sudanese unity, and often a visceral loathing of Garang harkening back to events during the rebellion's early days in the 1980s and a sense of betrayal and injustice at the defeat of the Anya-Nya II forces.

Among such fluid and unreliable possibilities, Khartoum sought to consolidate the armed Southern opposition to the SPLA/M, with what it called the 'Peace From Within' strategy. In 1997 it succeeded in creating an umbrella organisation, the South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF), which was formalised through the Peace Charter of 1996 and the Khartoum Agreement of 1997 with Machar, and shortly thereafter the Fashoda Agreement of 1998 with Akol. Led by Machar, the SSDF officially stated that it was fighting for a fully independent South Sudan. Machar's own armed contribution to the SSDF was tellingly named the Southern Sudan

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Independence Movement/Army (SSIM/A). The 1997 Khartoum Agreement ostensibly allowed for Southern independence via a referendum, but did not fix a time frame or provide guarantees. It also allowed for a Southern regional government, known as the Southern Sudan Coordinating Council, which had neither resources nor sufficient support among the Southern public. However superficial its political and governance achievements were, the SSDF was a major fighting force, consisting of up to 40,000 soldiers and holding key terrain in the oil fields of Unity and Upper Nile states.

That many in the anti-SPLA/M opposition were collaborating with Khartoum while claiming to be secessionists has long provoked doubt regarding its moral and ideological sincerity. The SPLA/M, for example, widely used the epithets 'Arab collaborators', 'militia' and 'mercenaries' to discredit opponents whose extended collaboration with Khartoum undermined their legitimacy in the 'liberated' South. Yet there was some consistency to this opposition's stated purpose. Two of their goals were for long imperatives: first, to secure Southern independence, and second, to resist Garang's leadership.

To many SSDF fighters, the war was less about fighting for Khartoum than about fighting against what they had come to see as Garang's occupying SPLA/M. The SSDF defended its partnership with Khartoum as an unfortunate necessity, a tactical exigency in the midst of a protracted civil war. The greater enemy, Khartoum, was but a tool against the nearer one, the SPLA/M. For many, once the nearer enemy was defeated, the intention was to turn to the next one, Khartoum or some newly emergent foe. Tellingly, Anya-Nya II veterans formed the core leadership of the SSDF; many had resumed their bush war against Khartoum on the pretext of seeking separation after the failed unity of the 1970s, before the SPLA/M was formed or Garang had defected from the SAF. Recognising their continued resistance to Khartoum was crucial to them, for they believed the SPLA/M had unfairly deprived them of their rightful place in the South's political space.¹¹³ Such arguments remain confusing: similar ones were made while the main SSDF leader at the time, Riek Machar, was in Khartoum effectively serving as Vice-President and most of its commanders were being given senior positions in the SAF. The idea that one would in the same breath accept a high post in government and oppose that government has long befuddled outside observers; but there is a logic behind this—however confusing—that still plays a part in the thinking of leaders in both the Sudans.

This tension surrounding 'rightful ownership' over Southern liberation was aggravated by the Southern politics of tribal identities; many anti-SPLA/M militias were composed primarily of Nuer and Equatorians who resented the SPLA/M's strong Dinka presence. Overall, the SSDF's professions of separatism, in contrast to the SPLA/M's explicit goal of unity, would still win it support with large sections of the Southern public, especially in areas where the SPLA/M's support among local populations was never consistently strong, such as what was known then as Greater Upper Nile (today's Unity, Jonglei, and Upper Nile states) and the Equatorias (today Central, Western and Eastern Equatoria states).

The ramifications of these older debates over awkward partnerships and confused rationales are profound for the current Southern political discourse about rationalising the new state of South Sudan. One of the biggest fears of the CPA period was that the SSDF would be used as a proxy by Khartoum to undermine the peace process. Through the 2006 Juba Declaration, the bulk of the SSDF agreed to be incorporated into the SPLA, an outcome greatly facilitated by Garang's death. The Agreement was founded on these promises: SSDF veterans would be treated equally within the SPLA; the SPLA would become a non-partisan 'South Sudan Army' upon South Sudan's independence (it changed names initially to the South Sudan Armed Forces in early drafts of the Transitional Constitution, but quickly reverted to the SPLA); and the all-important referendum would not be obstructed, especially not by Southerners.

There were SSDF elements that held out against the Juba Declaration, but despite refusing integration, they were for the most part willing to desist from violence against the SPLA and the GoSS so that the referendum could proceed unhindered.¹¹⁴ Some significant incidents of violence by SSDF militias did occur, as in Malakal and Fangak (also known as Pangak) in 2006 and 2008, but the CPA's Interim Period was remarkably peaceful, given the not unreasonable fears that it might be otherwise. Of course, with the referendum's clear result, the first goal of the historic opposition to the SPLA/M was secured, and the second—resisting the SPLA/M's dominance over the South—could be brought forward. Predictably, there was a notable upsurge in violence by anti-SPLA/M groups after the referendum, as the movement's continued dominance was deemed unacceptable by its re-emergent Southern opposition. This opposition was different to much of the political opposition, mostly from within the SPLM itself, raised during and after the national election in 2010.

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In sum, the contradictions of shallow collaborative alliances and the manipulation of unity and separation rhetoric proved a constant theme of the Second Civil War. The result was an ever more complicated Southern political discourse, and tensions within the socio-political space of the South; this legacy will be one of South Sudan's biggest obstacles to overcome in its nascent statehood.


Conclusion: New Sudan dies; South Sudan is born

When you reach your ballot boxes the choice is yours: [if] you want to vote for unity so that you become a second class citizen in your own country, that is your choice.

Salva Kiir, 2009¹¹⁵

South Sudan's painful path to statehood revolved around contested hopes for unity or separation. During the final years of the CPA peace process, it was evident even to the SPLM's Secretary General Pagan Amum (a man with a strong revolutionary pedigree and many links along the border areas and into North Sudan) that its revolutionary struggle for a united New Sudan was no longer viable. By the January 2011 referendum, unity was a spurious concept in Southern Sudan that signalled

Figure 1.2



capitulation, marginalisation and exploitation, whereas separation resounded as empowerment and emancipation. As the SPLM's referendum advocacy material extolled: 'Vote for separation; vote for freedom!'

Although the SPLA/M may have shifted its goals over time, Garang's sequencing of 'models' emphasising unity deeply influenced the CPA peace process through the Interim Period. That period would prove an agonising and convoluted experience for Southerners, but it culminated the debate that had unfolded over the decades of war since Sudan's independence. The SPLA/M's 'conditional commitment to the unity of the Sudan' underpinned its participation in the CPA's implementation; during that period it never wavered about the Southern right to self-determination.¹¹⁶

Despite Garang's hopes for a CPA-instigated New Sudan, few were surprised that Southerners almost unanimously chose separation, in a poll the Carter Center declared as indicating 'overwhelming popular support for the secession of Southern Sudan'.¹¹⁷ Most Southerners would surely argue that they did not need a six-year interim period to make their decision; they had long perceived that unity with the North could never be attractive because Khartoum would never make it so.¹¹⁸

With these core themes in mind, the subsequent chapters will explore in greater detail the history of the Second Civil War and the CPA process, before analysing the basic structures and dynamics of the new country of South Sudan.

THE GOLDEN YEARS OF REVOLUTION

1983–1991

From 1955 to 1972 we were in war ... some of us were born in war, grew up in war, went to school in war, and grew grey hair in war. In the year 1983 we changed gears ... we changed our direction in terms of the answer we give to the problem of Sudan.

John Garang¹

The new direction for addressing the ‘problem of Sudan’ of which Garang spoke was revolution, a violent rejection of the possibility of simply renewing the Anya-Nya’s secessionism. From 1983 to 1991, the SPLA achieved widespread success on the battlefield, what Garang called the ‘golden years’ of revolution.² However, while the SPLA/M advanced militarily, the socio-political fractures of the South festered, so that the Second Civil War was defined by South-South violence from its very start.

In a tactic classic to Sudanese warfare and still used today,³ Khartoum applied a counter-insurgency strategy intent on dividing communities and collapsing the SPLA/M upon itself, in part through the use of Southern proxy forces. Escalating tensions within the movement led to groups breaking away from Garang’s SPLA/M; this climaxed in the movement’s

major internal conflict in August 1991 (often referred to as ‘the split’). Combined with the loss of Ethiopian support following the overthrow of the Derg regime, the SPLA/M faced its darkest days, even potential defeat, from 1992 to 1994.

This chapter reviews the first half of Sudan’s Second Civil War. Rather than giving a chronological and historical account, the chapter presents a discussion of the key moments and dynamics that characterised the war and are essential for understanding the new state at independence. Accordingly, it focuses on how the SPLA emerged as the dominant Southern rebel group, the intra-Southern warfare that defined the era—particularly the internal splits and personal defections—and the historic importance of 1991 to South Sudan’s present politics. Betrayal, and the sense of betrayal associated with this period, are key points of contention that have driven both war and politics in South Sudan, and will likely continue to do so well into its life as a sovereign state.

Section 1: The SPLA emerges as the dominant Southern force

Give me something to drink and let’s celebrate the start of the Revolution.

Kerubino Kuanyin Bol, 13 May 1983, as the revolution began.⁴

We did not start as a Movement in the classical way of Latin American liberation movements with a small group of men. We started as a mob. We have been in a series of reforms, reforming a mob.

John Garang⁵

The Southerners’ frustrations with the ‘false unity’ of the Addis Ababa peace escalated over the early 1980s, manifesting themselves most sharply in May 1983 as ex-Any-Nya forces mutinied in Bor. Two major dynamics culminated in the collapse of the peace: Khartoum’s undermining of several of its core aspects, and Southern political infighting.

As discussed in [Chapter 1](#), three parallel actions by Khartoum signalled the end of the Addis Ababa peace by abrogating the Agreement’s autonomy, security and secular provisions: Nimairi’s ‘redivision’ of the South into three smaller states; the imposition of *sharia* law throughout the country, under the so-called September Laws; and, particularly provocative to those Southerners who would drive the Second Civil War, Khartoum’s marginalisation of Southerners in the SAF and efforts to redeploy Southern soldiers northwards.⁶ Compounding these actions by

Khartoum was chronic political infighting in the South, which assumed tribal connotations and was driven by individual ambitions and paranoia. Most insidious was an emerging narrative of competition for 'ownership' of the struggle against Khartoum's objectification of the periphery; many Equatorians perceived the Dinka, and to a lesser extent other groups, as taking advantage of the fact that Equatorians had borne the burden of the First Civil War.

Over the early 1980s, Southern political discourse focused on proposals from Nimairi for the redivision of the Southern Autonomous Region into three states, and more generally, on whether power within the South should be devolved from Juba. These proposals were linked to his efforts to redraw boundaries throughout Sudan in a bid to reorganise political power to solidify his control. Tensions escalated after the 1980 election to the High Executive Council presidency, when Abel Alier defeated Joseph Lagu. Tensions between Lagu and Alier were particularly bitter as they were the two negotiators of the Addis Ababa Agreement; Lagu long argued it was unfortunate that Alier, a Southerner, had represented Khartoum.⁷ The ensuing debate over the issue of 'redivision', Nimairi's scheme to dilute the South's desire for autonomy by cutting it into three separate states, became deeply divisive and can be linked directly to the Agreement's collapse. Alier is a Bor Dinka; despite initially being Nimairi's key Southern political ally in the South, he opposed any redivision. Lagu, an Equatorian and formerly the main adversary of Khartoum, was generally supportive.⁸ Politics between Southern groups prevailed, allowing Nimairi to begin a process that would lead to the collapse of his reign over the state apparatus and send the country back to civil war.

The Southern Regional Assembly effectively divided along communal and tribal lines: a largely Dinka bloc opposed redivision, and an Equatorian one, led by the Azande with various kinds of support from smaller groups including some Dinka, supported redivision.⁹ Citing such fractiousness, Nimairi disbanded the entire Southern government in October 1981 and replaced it with an interim military one, led by Major-General Gasmallah Abdalla Rassas, to oversee a referendum on redivision and subsequent elections to the HEC. Southern politicians began to turn on each other. But Nimairi came under intense pressure internally, and the referendum did not happen. In the following elections Joseph Tembura,¹⁰ an Azande and a protégé of Lagu, assumed the presidency of the HEC in July 1982, an event seen by many as the moment when politics

descended past any functionality into parochial, communal and personal competition.¹¹

In line with popular Equatorian opinion, Tembura advocated the redistribution of power towards more localised structures, namely some kind of redivision. The interest stemmed from frustration over the arrival of Dinka cattlemen in overwhelming numbers in Equatoria over the 1970s, as well as perceptions that Dinka unfairly dominated the Southern government, despite the perception that Equatoria had borne the brunt of the burden in the war.¹² This frustration led many Equatorians to support redivision, believing it would facilitate the removal of Dinka from Equatoria, or at least mitigate their presence. The desire to regain Equatorian control and generally resist 'Dinka domination' was known as *Kokora* (a term variously defined, but vernacularly meaning 'expulsion'). Two inflammatory incidents that capitalised upon these sentiments were the bulldozing of Dinka squatter camps in Juba and the removal of Dinka control over Juba's meat market.¹³ Tembura's election and his provocative viewpoints inspired a further descent in the politics of the Southern Assembly, effectively incapacitating it.

The ongoing fractiousness in Juba precluded the Southern political coherence necessary to contend on the national stage against re-division, marginalisation in the security sector and the undermining of secularism. Accordingly, Nimairi moved during mid-1983 to re-impose *sharia* law, redeploy Southern-composed SAF units northwards, and divide the autonomous South into three new states. In sum, the inability to demonstrate an effective Southern political and administrative identity allowed Nimairi to undermine the regional autonomy that Southern Sudan possessed under the terms of the Addis Ababa Agreement. Furthermore, within the South, political infighting was debilitating. The effective collapse of the Assembly provided the pretext for many Dinka, as well as Nuer, to support a return to war. Even more damaging, it resulted in the Equatorians being widely perceived as having undermined Southern unity. Such unity would have been essential for defending the terms of the Addis Ababa peace by countering Khartoum's behaviour; the inter-tribal politics, spurred on by a small political class in Juba, precluded any such unity, rather compelling the disintegration of the common purpose that had come from the peace deal and was experienced in the early years of the peace period.

Amidst the political turmoil of the early 1980s, concerns were growing in Khartoum over the increasing numbers of deserters forming what

would come to be known as the Anya-Nya II insurgency (largely made up of Nuer military leaders). In 1974 a small rebellion launched at Akobo began calling itself Anya-Nya II.¹⁴ Anya-Nya veterans, defecting from posts in the civil service or military, had begun trickling into the bush, dissatisfied with marginalisation and embittered by the perception that the peace would not be worthwhile. These defections often had as much to do with disenchantment over Southern politicians bickering in Juba as with Nimairi's scheming in Khartoum. By early 1983 Khartoum concentrated special attention on the Bor garrison, for it was composed entirely of former Anya-Nya fighters. In March 1983, payroll problems, aggravated by fears that some units would be redeployed northwards, had escalated into rioting by the garrison's soldiers. In response, the SAF's General Headquarters directed the bulk of the force to relinquish their weapons and await redeployment.

Those fears were not unfounded; many former Anya-Nya had been engaged in preparation for a renewed Southern rebellion for some time before the Bor uprising. A key figure amongst the former Anya-Nya officers plotting was the then Colonel John Garang, recently returned from postgraduate studies in the US, along with William Nyuon Bany and Kerubino Kuanyin Bol. Together with Major Arok Thon, Garang began organising in Khartoum and Juba; he did this in cooperation with commanders of Southern garrisons that would be involved in the uprising, Southerners in the police and civil services, and Anya-Nya veterans who had refused to integrate after the Addis Ababa Agreement.¹⁵

To the conspirators, the events at the Bor garrison in March 1983 were particularly provocative, since it was the only remaining garrison in the South composed almost entirely of Anya-Nya veterans. This meant that the orders were interpreted as part of a more concerted effort to undermine the ability of Southerners to act against any move by Nimairi to implement redivision or impose *sharia* law, which indeed would happen later in 1983. The main cadres of conspirators were Dinkas, Nuers and Shilluks who opposed redivision and considered the redeployment orders a cue to return to war.¹⁶ This dynamic is an essential reason why, initially, the Second Civil War was fought largely by Dinka, Nuer and Shilluks, and many Equatorians remained uncommitted or aligned with government forces.¹⁷

In April 1983 Nimairi was reconfirmed as President; he ran unopposed in the election, and was able to solidify his support with Islamists.¹⁸ Con-

fidant that he was more securely in power in Khartoum, and viewing the remaining pockets of Southern soldiers as a lingering threat to the changes he was planning for the South, Nimairi ordered the army to move forces from Juba to Bor, and to begin 'integrating' all remaining Anya-Nya veterans from the Bor garrison, which meant moving them northward and/or placing them under the command of Northern officers. When the SAF began moving towards Bor, Kerubino Kuanyin Bol took command of Bor garrison and combined it with his original command in Pochalla; fighting ensued between the mutinous forces and nearby units of Northern soldiers on 16 May.¹⁹ In response, the SAF began to reoccupy Bor with the aim of arresting Kerubino, while Southern political figures tried to negotiate a deal. Such had been the response to several previous incidents of insurrection in the South during the peace period. This occasion proved very different; the result was a month-long standoff.

Garang and his supporters had devised two plans. The first and preferred option was to take Juba in a mass uprising combined with a mutiny in the SAF garrison. The second, if circumstances precluded the first, was to retreat into Ethiopia and wage a protracted guerrilla campaign.²⁰ The SAF move to put down the low-level riots in Bor, and Kerubino's corresponding decision to confront the Northern forces stationed near Bor compelled Garang and his co-conspirators to launch their revolt earlier than anticipated.²¹ Garang, then visiting the region, secured a place on the negotiating team attempting to deal with the unrest in Bor in mid-May. Upon arriving in the area, he took command of the uprising and began implementing the second option.²²

Events moved quickly: Khartoum sent reinforcements to the South with orders to launch a full attack on Bor at dawn on 16 May. After fighting off the attack, Garang and his mutineers left for western Ethiopia, regrouping along the way with mutinous forces from other garrisons—including, most notably, the former Anya-Nya battalion at Ayod under the command of William Nyuon Bany and forces from other similar mutinies occurring at Waat, Rumbek and Nzara.²³ Salva Kiir had by that time also defected from his military intelligence post in Malakal with a small number of supporters. In moves similar to those of Kiir, other key SPLA leaders followed as part of widespread defections occurring throughout SAF positions in the South.²⁴

These critical events over mid-May were definitive in the formation of the SPLA/M and the subsequent unfolding of the Second Civil War.

It should be noted that prior to the Bor mutiny, Garang was just one of the conspirators. Through the events of the mutiny itself, he asserted his leadership over the broader conspiracy that had been developing amongst the Anya-Nya veterans, and ultimately gave it the dominant bearing of revolution. Once safely inside Ethiopia, Garang and his cadre prepared to launch the SPLA/M.

As an intellectual with an avid interest in history,²⁵ Garang identified the key failing of Southern insurgents during the First Civil War as their lack of unity, exacerbated both by resources procured from competing sources and by the infighting of Southern politicians. Lagu's competence at securing foreign resources and increasing cohesion among the Anya-Nya insurgents was what eventually created the solidarity necessary to pressure Khartoum to negotiate. In 1983, the divisions amongst the Southern Sudanese were stark, especially ideological divisions. The SPLA/M's manifesto, issued in July 1983, made clear that the group identified itself as 'revolutionaries ... dedicated to the socialist transformation of the whole country' as opposed to a 'reactionary movement ... concerned only with the South, jobs and self-interest'. Lamenting the 'separatist attitude' of fellow Southerners that threatened 'the total disintegration of Sudan', it declared that the driving focus of the movement was to resist such an outcome, that is, Southern separation.²⁶

Given the initial vitriol against reactionary secessionists, the dominant tension amongst the gathering Southern groups competing to be the vanguard of a renewed struggle against Khartoum was between the SPLA/M and the Anya-Nya II; the latter group defined its goal as a simple return to the original Anya-Nya vision of Southern independence, the 'unfulfilled aspirations of the old Anya-Nya'.²⁷ The Anya-Nya II was led by an 'old guard' of Samuel Gai Tut, Akwot Atem and William Abdallah Cuol. These veteran insurgents from the First Civil War were perceived by many as not having been complicit in the failed peace of Addis Ababa and the associated political wrangling that had undermined the reputation of other veteran leaders such as Lagu.²⁸ In addition to disparaging Garang's emphasis on Sudanese unity, the Anya-Nya II leaders viewed themselves as the rightful leadership of the burgeoning revolt because they were senior to Garang during the first war.²⁹ In return, Garang considered many of the Anya-Nya veterans parochial reactionaries who highlighted the need for his broader vision of reformed unity. Madut Arop, a South Sudanese journalist and eventually a member of

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the South Sudan Assembly at the time of independence, recounted Garang's comments on this matter in an interview he conducted:

'Our objective was to convince the Anya Nya Two to join us. The Anya Nya Two also attempted to convince us to join them. The failure of the two groups to join together as one organisation, unfortunately led to the start of the war as two movements that brought untold sufferings and setbacks to the people of Southern Sudan they had wanted to liberate.'³⁰

Recalling the importance of controlling resources to Joseph Lagu's brief consolidation of Southern resistance in the latter years of the first war, Garang moved to secure the exclusive support of Mengistu Haile Mariam, the Ethiopian dictator who had been supporting various Southern armed groups on a limited scale.³¹ The competition for leadership over the emerging Southern insurgency was heated and intense. During mid-1983, the various budding guerrilla forces put forward to Mengistu and one another several proposals for command and mandates, with a particular focus on the leadership positions. Each presented proposals including one another in either side's senior hierarchy, hoping for consolidation into one group; the two most viable groups were that of Garang and the Anya-Nya II group of Tut, Cuol and Atem.³² However, the strong personal and ideological divides were finally cemented by Garang's ability to persuade the Ethiopians to back him solely.

The youthful Garang's appeal to the Ethiopians was compelling: he sought to transform what had historically been a Southern insurgency into a Sudanese socialist revolution. The early SPLA/M was a mixture of Maoist and Marxist militarism, drawn largely from the Ethiopian derivative. The SPLA/M found great success early on against the SAF and the government, which was hunkered down in garrisons, often with inferior numbers: it combined mass conscription of the peasantry with basic training to amass a large force; it fused a pragmatic patronage system with a political economy focused on sealing borders and being the sole director of resources, which facilitated control of the wider population.³³ Garang proved much more willing to adopt Ethiopian 'advice' than his competitors from the Anya-Nya II.

Although they had been supporting various other South Sudanese rebels, the Ethiopians were not satisfied with the rebels' ability to build a coherent political agenda or a sufficiently organised and commanded military force; Garang and the nascent SPLA/M appeared to the Ethi-

opians a much more viable force and political concept. On a personal level, Garang was a strong candidate for insurgent leadership, having been trained by various nations' militaries and having a level of education eclipsing that of most Southern Sudanese at the time. Although never a favourite of the Soviets,³⁴ Garang formed a strong relationship with Mengistu's regime premised upon a simple bargain: with Garang under its patronage, the Derg could offset Khartoum's meddling support for Ethiopian insurgencies, while the Sudanese insurgent leader received the *quid pro quo* of exclusive control over Ethiopian resources going into Southern Sudan, and effectively total control over the refugee camps and training camps that were the SPLA/M's rear base in Gambella; these camps were the embryonic New Sudan in gestation.

Over the next several years, the SPLA/M and Anya-Nya II had exceptionally violent altercations along the border areas with Ethiopia, as the Anya-Nya II retreated into Sudan and started to receive support from Khartoum. Gradually the members of the Anya-Nya II's key leadership were killed, during internal squabbles or through the SPLA/M's concerted attacks; the last to die was Tut, who was killed in 1988. The veteran group was left without the leadership necessary to oppose Garang, whose position was secured further through the SPLA/M's monopoly over Ethiopian resources. Ever more fractured, some Anya-Nya II remnants would be absorbed into the SPLA/M itself, while others would remain in opposition to the SPLA/M, evolving from small, localised groups in the mid-1980s to the large 'third force' of the SSDF over 1996–97.

As John Young has argued, a primary challenge for the SPLA/M in creating a united front was that Southern Sudan's 'politics [were] shaped by tribe and the movement [had] to operate within those confines'.³⁵ It is a very localised, complex and fluid political environment, and has never had a single sovereign force exerting power over the area. Thus individuals and small groups, whether stemming from tribal history or from other socio-economic realities, are intensely active politically. Within this context, three kinds of interlinked divides have been prominent, and hence definitive to Southern politics: pure tribal divisions, the SPLA/M and opposed groupings, and internal SPLA/M factionalism.

Particularly important to these early events were Nuer leaders, who had been dominant in the Anya-Nya II and heavily involved in the early fighting in Nuer areas along the Sudan-Ethiopia border. It is a rarely

cited fact that the first waves of fighters to arrive in Ethiopia to fight in a Southern Sudanese rebellion were Nuer from greater Upper Nile. The tribal tensions in these early events were pronounced, dividing tribes, clans and even families; many Nuer resented the imposition of control by Garang, a Dinka from the Bor area whose people competed with the Nuer in the region. Moreover, tensions regarding ethnic imbalances were aggravated: after the initial influx of Nuer as a backbone of the SPLA/M, early SPLA/M recruiting and mobilisation were strong in the Dinka areas of Bahr al-Ghazal. In their attempts to reach SPLA/M training camps in Ethiopia, many young Dinka men were caught up in the fighting, and this facilitated a 'Dinka versus Nuer' undertone. This unfortunate outcome has shaded Southern politics ever since.

These Nuer-Dinka tensions were compounded by Equatorian resentment, mentioned earlier, at Dinka encroachment upon their historic areas. At its inception, there were critiques common to Equatorian communities that the 'Dinka SPLA' launched its rebellion after redivision so as to prevent the devolution of power to Equatoria.³⁶ The result was that many Equatorians remained detached from the SPLA/M in its beginnings, and in turn were blamed for playing into the hands of Khartoum's divide-and-rule tactics to meet their parochial interests.

Aside from these ethnic tensions surrounding the SPLA/M's formation, its official purpose was also controversial throughout much of the South. Ideologically, Garang's victory over the Anya-Nya II was significant: it represented the complete rejection of a simple return to the secessionism that defined the First Civil War. For the Anya-Nya II veterans and their successor groups, throughout the war and the CPA period, the seemingly forgotten violent and traumatic events of the early days were definitive in their resistance against the SPLA/M. Hence these ideological tensions, and the emotions of South-South violence exhibited so sharply early on, were critically important to founding a dynamic in the civil war that manifested more South-South than North-South violence. Probably they will also underpin the greatest challenges to the stability of a newly independent South Sudan.³⁷

With his gradual consolidation of control over the rebelling groups, Garang implemented a long-term strategy to assert control over Southern Sudan. Based on his readings of economics, military strategy and history, Garang chose to close access to outside resources for all other Southern political or armed groups. With exclusive support from the

major power in the region willing to aid an insurgency in Sudan, Garang would then be the only option for people if they were to fight against Khartoum. To further this tactic, the early strategy of the SPLA/M was to manipulate the South's economy by rendering everything deeply local and thus to strangle an alternative economy: this involved fostering battles in key border areas to cut trade, precluding agricultural production and controlling the cattle market. This strategy would be at the root of both the SPLA/M's military success and its social and political failures, because it alienated Southern groups. By focusing on such an approach, rather than convincing people of the wider 'cause' of revolution, Garang set in motion a competition that resulted in deep personal animosities, which were later framed along tribal and communal lines or exacerbated already existing issues.

Section 2: The SPLA advances, Khartoum turns to Southern proxies

The behaviour of the SPLA drove many people to the government.

Dan Eiffe, relief worker for Norwegian People's Aid.

Having secured the support of the Ethiopian regime in 1983, the SPLA/M began to launch guerrilla attacks against SAF units and take control of areas immediately inside Sudan, along the border with Ethiopia. According to Alex DeWaal and Rakiya Omaar, 'For the first six years after its inception in 1983, the SPLA was an unusual guerrilla army in that it could readily outnumber its opponents in the field'.³⁸

By the end of 1985, with more than 10,000 men under arms, the SPLA/M expanded rapidly, capturing territory around the Boma plateau in Eastern Equatoria, and making the strategic locale its headquarters, thus threatening the road to Kenya.³⁹ By 1989 the SPLA/M had numbers reported at over 70,000 and was more a conventional force than a guerrilla force. The SAF only claimed forces of 65,000 by 1989, and the Southern Sudanese proxy forces they relied on to fight the SPLA, such as the Mundari or Murle tribal militias, were at that time much more poorly equipped and trained than the SPLA.⁴⁰ Struggling to build support among the public in other areas of Equatoria, the SPLA/M instead entrenched itself over much of rural Upper Nile and Bahr al-Ghazal, even making some gains in Western Equatoria around Maridi.⁴¹ With such gains between 1984 and 1986, the SPLA began to besiege major SAF

garrisons, including Juba, Wau and Malakal. Further north, SPLA forces pushed towards Kurmuk in Blue Nile State, as well as Kadugli in Southern Kordofan. Under such pressure, Khartoum's Defence Minister conceded that the SPLA sometimes had 'the upper hand in the battlefield' and feared that it 'could develop into conventional' forces as it acquired more sophisticated weapons, such as heavy mortars.⁴²

Alongside its major efforts to expand control over rural areas and mobilise new recruits, the SPLA targeted key government infrastructure. The initial targets were at the heart of the grievances underlying the return to war and of personal importance to Garang. SPLA forces attacked the Jonglei Canal construction sites and detained several French engineers and other international workers. The canal had been devised primarily to drain water from the massive *Sudd* marshes, allowing for increased water flow for areas downstream, notably Northern Sudan and Egypt. The project, which had begun construction in 1979, was highly controversial in the South: it would potentially change the ecology of many of South Sudan's tribal groups' homelands. Garang, whose home was along the Nile, had written his doctoral dissertation on the project's potentially negative impact for Southern Sudanese.⁴³ The SPLA attacks forced the canal's total cancellation in November 1983.⁴⁴

The second major infrastructure target for the SPLA was the Chevron oil drilling facilities north of Bentiu. SPLA attacks near the exploration sites in February 1984 brought oil development to a halt.⁴⁵ Chevron had first started exploring in 1974 and made major discoveries in the areas around Muglad in Southern Kordofan and Bentiu in Upper Nile in 1979. One issue that particularly aggravated Southerners was Nimairi's attempted movement of Sudan's internal North-South boundary southward. In November 1980 Nimairi called for the redrawing of the boundary so that the oil areas, all the way to the south of Bentiu, would be included in the North. Alier's government was able to stop this, but as a *quid pro quo* Alier was forced to accept that an oil refinery originally planned for the South would be constructed in the North.⁴⁶

These moves were intended to assert control over the newly discovered oil resources, which would afford any government significant wealth. The Anya-Nya II had been the first to oppose oil developments vehemently; many of their attempted disruptions were focused on Nuer areas in Unity and Upper Nile states. As early as 1980, Anya-Nya II militias, as well as other smaller groups such as the Abyei Liberation

Front, were harrying the exploration efforts and ambushing the SAF forces protecting them. For its part, the SPLA chose to target the Chevron sites because Garang feared that potential oil revenue might 'rescue the tottering Nimairi dictatorship'.⁴⁷ In February 1984 Chevron abandoned its efforts.

By the early 1980s Nimairi's rule in Khartoum had extended for nearly two decades, but it was steadily weakening. As the war escalated over 1984 and 1985, Nimairi was in desperate need of increased revenue; he had plunged Sudan into deep economic crisis, rapidly accumulating a debt of USD 24 billion, which regardless of the oil discovery continued to spiral out of control.⁴⁸ By the time of South Sudan's independence, the World Bank put Khartoum's external debt at approximately USD 37 billion and increasing daily.⁴⁹ As Mansour Khalid summed up the situation, this unruly borrowing compounded by manic corruption had rendered Sudan 'a nation of beggars'.⁵⁰ Inhibited by financial ruin, Nimairi was also challenged by an army command disinclined to wage conventional war in the South's marshy mass, instead preferring to concede rural areas and focus its conventional forces on key garrison towns. With the SPLA/M threatening government control across the South, Nimairi's response was increasingly to employ local tribal militias, beginning Khartoum's long-held preference for using Southern proxies to drive the war; this was a major departure from his focus on an Egyptian-styled, revolutionary armed force.⁵¹ The strategy was also useful propaganda, allowing Nimairi to discuss the violence in the South as being archaically 'tribal' rather than that of a contemporary civil war, something that continued into the early months of South Sudan's independence as various tribal groups raided and retaliated over cattle, and perceived security dilemmas were defined in ethnic and 'tribal' terms.

With a pressing interest in potential revenue from oil, Nimairi initially focused efforts on securing the oilfields near Bentiu, which the army had been unable to achieve.⁵² The Bentiu/Rub-Kona oilfields are in Western Nuerland, the home of Nuer groups such as the Bul, Western Jikany and Dok Nuer. Leaders from these groups were prominent in the Anya-Nya II, which was then violently confronting the SPLA/M. Seizing the opportunity, Nimairi engaged these militias. These early partnerships between Khartoum and localised, ethnically based militias fed off the bitter resentment towards Garang and the SPLA/M, crystallised by the violence further east along the Ethiopian border.

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While on a visit to the United States, Nimaïri was overthrown on 6 April 1985. The *Intifada* that brought down the regime was spurred by the Sudanese offspring of the Muslim Brotherhood, under the direction of Hassan al-Turabi, who encouraged mass street protests and union strikes, and was facilitated by a dire economic situation. The army intervened and took control of the country under the leadership of the then Minister of Defence, General Abd al-Rahman Suwar al-Dahab. Al-Dahab set up a Transitional Military Council (TMC) and appointed an interim government committed to holding elections in the near future. 'Nimaïrism'—as it had often been called—was dead.⁵³

Despite the fact that most Sudanese opposition parties were willing to take part in them, the SPLA/M boycotted the elections. It remained unconvinced that the removal of Nimaïri represented an opportunity for it, and Southerners generally, to engage fully in the national politics, and so its members remained in the bush and chose to wait and see how the new regime would respond. Although he offered to reinstate the Addis Ababa Agreement, Suwar al-Dahab made no commitment to repeal the imposition of *sharia*. In response, Garang declared that the SPLA/M would not take part in the post-Nimaïri transition, because any government produced would be unwilling to make fundamental changes to the coercive nature of the Sudanese state: 'certainly the SPLA cannot be expected to enter a national dialogue to negotiate the best possible outcome of second class citizenship', he argued.⁵⁴

Although they did not take place in the South, elections were held in the North in April 1986. Sadiq al-Mahdi, grandson of the famous Mahdi, assumed power. While he had been the first major politician to declare opposition to Nimaïri's 1983 September Laws, upon gaining power he hesitated to reverse the imposition of *sharia*. Even worse from the SPLA/M's viewpoint, al-Mahdi was actually pushing a harder line towards resolving the Southern Problem; he preferred to escalate the military effort rather than negotiate, justifying Garang's position that there was little political will in Khartoum to negotiate in good faith. Al-Mahdi's inclination for a military solution was linked to his political reliance on the Islamists and the army, both of whom wanted a harder line taken towards the recalcitrant Garang.

Al-Mahdi's approach was largely to increase the use of Southern proxy forces against the SPLA and to create other paramilitary forces, particularly the Popular Defence Forces (PDF). The PDF were paramilitaries

composed mainly of militiamen from nomadic and pastoral groups in the areas bordering the South, particularly the Misseriya and Rizaikat.⁵⁵ In the South, there were considerable options for creating proxy forces as the SPLA waged an increasingly successful onslaught against the Anya-Nya II. The SPLA's monopolisation of Ethiopian support was also critically important; there were very few options for acquiring armaments other than looking to Khartoum. For many individuals and groups throughout Southern Sudan, the immediate need to respond tactically to a surging SPLA/M overcame any distaste for partnering with the SAF.

The SPLA/M's initial proclivity for poor civic engagement contributed to this dynamic and often resulted in violence towards, and predatory looting of, local communities. For example, the SPLA/M's advances into Eastern Equatoria in the early years of the war contributed to great suffering for many communities, providing a visceral animosity ripe for co-optation and manipulation by Khartoum's intelligence and security services.⁵⁶ More generally, decades of war and limited or predatory governance contributed to a broad degree of anarchy in the South. The Azande, for instance, though willing to accept support from the government, tended to avoid engagement with the SPLA/M and used that support more in terms of defending against armed groups existing along the border with Zaire (now the DRC).

Al-Mahdi's decisions were encouraged by the obvious divisions among the Southerners—ideological divides and the increasing resistance to the SPLA/M by smaller Southern armed groups, often inflamed by a tribal dislike of the supposed 'Dinka domination'. During the mid-1980s, the strongest manifestation of these divisions was in the fighting between the SPLA/M and such militias as the Fartit in Western Bahr al-Ghazal; the Toposa, Lotuko, and Mundari in Equatoria; the Murle in Jonglei; and the Anya-Nya II in Upper Nile. In its own counter-militia strategy, the SPLA often retaliated brutally against communities believed to be supporting the militias,⁵⁷ which encouraged deep animosity towards the SPLA/M.

In developing Southern proxies and PDF militias, al-Mahdi sought to placate the SAF leadership, which was frustrated by the army's lack of resources and perturbed about fighting a guerrilla war in the vast expanses of the *Sudd* without being properly equipped. Despite its focus on mitigating frustration and opposition in the army, al-Mahdi's militia strategy was still controversial among some of the SAF leadership; they

argued that the army should be better equipped and not circumvented by non-state armed groups. Others in the army were supportive. One of the most enthusiastic was Umar Bashir, a young brigadier posted to Bentiu; he was instrumental in the strategy's application in Unity State, and its clear aim of controlling the oil areas.⁵⁸

The SPLA/M's conduct was often unrestrained and brutal, thus providing the opportunity to turn Southerners against each other. It did, however, enjoy the support of local communities as the rebels offered some of the only defence against raiding SAF proxy forces. Both supporting and opposing tribal groups were treated very harshly; the rebel forces tended to live off of the communities, and considered much of their violence essential to survival rather than purely opposition to Northern aggression. In some areas of Bahr al-Ghazal, the SPLA/M contingents 'acted like local warlords raiding cattle'.⁵⁹ There was no special love for Garang in this area, so Salva Kiir's role as leader from Greater Bahr al-Ghazal was critical. An aid worker present at the time noted that, as the war progressed the main body of the force came largely from this area: 'It was Kiir that kept BEG components under wraps... 14 years after the war began Garang only went to Greater BEG later in the war after the SPLA captured Tonj and Gogrial. It has been said that he worried that because the civilians were so brutalized Garang did not travel to the area fearing he might be targeted.'⁶⁰

Food was often acquired only by participating in battles and raids; while usually a mark of genuine desperation, such behaviour preyed upon civilian communities. The multitude of examples of such SPLA/M violence during this period is a key factor in the government forces' ability to divide the South and pit various tribal groups against each other.

Using militias as a tool of authoritarian control has long been common to Sudan.⁶¹ However, the militias unleashed by al-Mahdi over 1987–88 exhibited a new level of ferocity and orchestration, particularly the Murahalin militia along the North-South border areas.⁶² The government-supported militias in the areas of Southern Kordofan and Northern Bahr al-Ghazal were largely responsible for the acute suffering associated with the 1988 famine,⁶³ widely considered the most severe in recent African history—its death rates were reportedly higher than in Biafra or contemporary Ethiopian catastrophes popularised in the Western press.⁶⁴ The international engagement responding to suffering during the late 1980s in South Sudan led to the launch of Operation Lifeline

Sudan (OLS) and the associated tripartite agreements between all parties to the war affording humanitarians access to affected populations.

Despite the deep internal divisions and conflicts with many communities throughout the South, the SPLA/M was still popular among most of the Southern population—especially in areas along the border between greater Bahr al-Ghazal and South Darfur/South Kordofan, where it provided defence against raiding by Khartoum-sponsored militias.⁶⁵ Throughout the years of war, greater Bahr al-Ghazal was a major bastion of support for the SPLA/M. One of the single biggest sources of the SPLA/M's popularity was the fact it was consistently viewed as fighting 'the enemy'—that is, Khartoum—unlike some of its main Southern competitors who had collaborated. Indeed, a major concern of Akol and Machar's SPLA-Nasir was that the Southern public, especially in Bahr al-Ghazal, perceive it as struggling for Southern liberation despite its tentative alliance with Khartoum and its negative preoccupation with Garang.

Furthermore, although the Dinka eventually formed a majority within the SPLA/M, it remained a diverse organisation. Initially the majority of the SPLA/M had been Nuer arriving in Ethiopia from greater Upper Nile. Many of its top commanders came from other tribes, as well as from Dinka sub-groups other than Garang's Bor.⁶⁶ Although the SPLA/M's primary support came first from Nuer and Dinka areas in greater Upper Nile and Bahr al-Ghazal, it still garnered support elsewhere in the South. It was largely popular among Southerners, even if often viewed as the lesser of two evils or a tolerable imposition in the cause of defeating forces from the North.

Despite the challenges of Khartoum's broad usage of militias, the SPLA/M was still making major battlefield gains over the mid-1980s. Forces led by Yousif Kuwa Mekki and his deputy Abdel Aziz made fresh inroads into Northern Sudan via their positions in the Nuba Mountains.⁶⁷ In July 1988, the SPLA/M launched its first major campaign that included more conventional style warfare rather than purely guerilla tactics. Known as Bright Star, the campaign aimed at securing the major garrison towns in the far South and laying siege to Juba.⁶⁸ Over subsequent months, the SPLA/M proceeded to assert control along the Nile's banks while Juba was assaulted. Unable to secure it, the SPLA laid siege. Meanwhile, forces directly under Garang succeeded in capturing Torit and Kapoeta, and secured the road to the Kenyan border. SPLA/M headquarters were re-established in Torit, while further north, SPLA/M

forces captured the SAF garrison in Bor, though they would lose it not long afterwards.⁶⁹

With the capture of garrisons at Torit, Kapoeta and Bor, and the intense siege of Juba, the SPLA/M issued a unilateral ceasefire and proposed negotiations with al-Mahdi. The SPLA/M believed that the pressure of Bright Star, a worsening economy and unfavourable political trends in Khartoum would force al-Mahdi to a peace on terms in its favour. By the late 1980s Sudan's economic situation was dire; there was decreasing productivity, rising debt, and war costs estimated at up to USD 1 million per day.⁷⁰ Within Khartoum, the political repercussions of Bright Star were significant. The SAF senior leadership, which had increasingly doubted al-Mahdi's leadership, issued a letter signed by more than 300 senior officers giving an ultimatum: the government must either equip them properly to contend with the SPLA/M or negotiate a peace with the Southern insurgents. The Minister of Defence at the time, General Abdel Majid Ahmed Khalil, resigned, purportedly in frustration, demoralised by trying to engage a government unresponsive to the fact it was losing a war, in large part, because of its militia strategy.⁷¹

When combined with economic problems and the political issues swirling among the elites in Khartoum, the results of the SPLA/M's Bright Star successes were profound. By mid-1989, the al-Mahdi regime was as weak as the one it had replaced. The militia-driven strategy in the South was as dangerous to the SAF and the government as it was useful for opposing the SPLA/M; it had undermined Khartoum's sovereignty and fractured the armed groups of the South.⁷² Amidst rumours of brewing coups, al-Mahdi accepted the SPLA/M's offer to negotiate, hoping to secure his rule until the next election. As the talks seemed to be moving toward initial agreement a group of army officers, under the leadership of Omar Bashir, took power in a bloodless coup on 30 June 1989. In partnership with Bashir and his officers was al-Turabi's National Islamic Front (NIF), which had won only 6 per cent of the vote in the 1986 elections.⁷³

Embodying the rhetoric of political Islam, a fifteen-member Revolutionary Command Council was set up, with Bashir serving as Commander-in-Chief, Minister of Defence and Prime Minister. The new government's first major action was to close media outlets, outlaw political parties, ban trade unions, and, most significantly, abrogate the constitution and dissolve Parliament. After defiantly declaring that 'Khartoum

will never go back to being a secular capital', peace negotiations with the SPLA/M promptly ended.⁷⁴ Bashir's coup definitively ended efforts at reconciliation then germinating between the SPLA/M and various Northern opposition parties loosely favourable to a secular and democratic Sudan, or at least to allowing Southerners to secede. As Collins concluded, the coup 'swept away like a gigantic *habub* all hope of a secular, democratic, and united Sudan'.⁷⁵ Bashir's government would be the last government of a united Sudan.

The government dominated by the NIF, later the National Congress Party (NCP),⁷⁶ vigorously relaunched the war through an army leadership repopulated by NIF officers. The strategy combined the application of proxy forces to intensify the inter-Southern fighting with an escalation of aerial bombardment and a refreshed campaign by conventional SAF forces. In addition, the NIF strategy was to turn the war into a religious struggle: definitively ruling out secularism, espousing a strong *sharia* law position and applying stronger religious overtones by branding it a *jihad*. Originally conceived by al-Mahdi as paramilitaries drawn from tribal groups along the border, the Popular Defence Forces were reformulated by Bashir under a fanatical Islamist doctrine. What had been a group of localised tribal militiamen was turned into a *Mujahdeen* force, with its core now drawn from urban youth led by NIF military and intelligence officers.⁷⁷

For Bashir and the army, an immediate imperative after taking power was rebuffing the substantial SPLA/M gains achieved through the Bright Star campaign. Bashir then went about organising a February 1990 dry-season offensive meant to retake the initiative on the battlefield, restore the morale and vigour of the SAF, and cement the NIF's and his own claim to power. Named *Jundi al-Wattan al-Wahed* (The Soldier of One Nation), the offensive consisted of extensive conventional forces, including tanks, and the substantial reinforcement of SAF manpower in the Southern garrisons. SPLA/M forces that initially tried to counter the offensive were defeated south of Malakal; ultimately the SAF succeeded in retaking some areas around Juba and the roads into Equatoria. In these areas, the assistance of the Mundari militia proved critical, allowing the SAF to ambush the SPLA/M and to operate more freely in the Mundari home area. As with such partnerships elsewhere, the SAF successfully played off Mundari resentment of their neighbours, the Bor Dinka, from whom many SPLA/M leaders hailed, including Garang. The renewed

involvement of SAF conventional forces, bolstered by strong support from Southern militias, brought an end to SPLA gains from Bright Star; while problematical for al-Mahdi, the use of Southern proxy forces under Bashir and the NCP seemed initially very effective.

Concomitant to the SAF offensive, Bashir endeavoured to undermine the SPLA/M from within, in order to sabotage its leadership and military coherence. While the 'peace from within' process drew in Riek Machar and other groups opposing Garang and the SPLA/M-Torit, Bashir's rhetoric in describing his campaign to purchase and manipulate Southern proxies to fight and divide the Southern Sudanese population was largely cynical. The possibilities for fostering competition and communal tensions within the SPLA/M had been made apparent by similar efforts on al-Mahdi's part. With his suspicions growing in regard to several of his top commanders, some unfounded and others well founded, Garang arrested his second in command, Kerubino Bol, in September 1987, and accused him of attempting to usurp power. In March 1988, after pushing to be promoted to replace Kerubino, Arok Thon was arrested on similar conspiracy charges. A prominent Southern political leader and ideologue for the SPLA/M, Joseph Oduho, was arrested the following month. These rifts in the highest echelons of the SPLA were becoming widely known, and Bashir was intent on deepening them with offers of money and various other interventions. He went so far as to offer, publicly, Southern autonomy through a confederation and even outright Southern independence, in the hope of igniting the ideological divides exhibited in the war's early years.⁷⁸

The SPLA/M had not capitalised fully upon its Bright Star campaign victories, neither securing the western bank of the Nile from Bor nor pushing into Rumbek.⁷⁹ With resources stretched, rather than engage Bashir's offensive moving southwards from Malakal, it pushed into Western Equatoria. During 1990, despite stiff resistance, the SPLA/M was able to capture many key SAF positions in Western Equatoria and redouble the siege of Juba.⁸⁰ This success was muted by that of Bashir's campaign and the fact that politics in the region and the world were shifting drastically. With the collapse of the Mengitsu regime clearly impending in Ethiopia, the need for a change in the SPLA/M's strategy was becoming apparent; the wider geopolitical shifts connected with the end of the Cold War likewise impinged upon the strategic rationales of the NIF regime in Khartoum.

Section 3: The 1991 watershed

We seize this opportunity to appeal to all SPLA officers NCOs and men all over the South to join us at this critical moment in the history of our struggle against dictatorship and oppression. We either hang together or hang singly.

Nasir faction press release

Any appreciation of the new state of South Sudan in 2011 and its future prospects must include an understanding of the formative events in the previous twenty years: 1991 was a grand pivot for the country's modern history. While the Bright Star campaigns had given the SPLA/M effective control over roughly two-thirds of the South by late 1990, the SAF remained in control over key garrison towns such as Yei, Yirol, Rumbek, and most significantly Juba; the civil war was effectively at a stalemate.⁸¹ Critical to breaking this stalemate was the end of the Cold War, which removed the dynamic of superpower proxy wars. Most important to Sudan's war was Mengistu's loss of Soviet aid, which allowed insurgents in Ethiopia and Eritrea to take power in May 1991.⁸² After it had lost the Ethiopian rear base, Nimule along the Ugandan border, and the towns along that frontier, became more important than ever for the SPLA/M.

The SPLA/M's success during the 'golden years' had been devised under a Cold War reality: it was heavily dependent on Garang's ability to monopolise Ethiopian patronage and render the majority of Southern people and regions dependent on the resources he controlled, outside the garrisons and some border areas. The Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF), which assumed power in Addis Ababa, was hostile to the SPLA/M as it had assisted Mengistu in his counter-insurgency campaigns. In late May 1991, TPLF forces expelled both the SPLA/M and masses of Southern Sudanese refugees from western Ethiopia.⁸³ The refugees congregated in horrible conditions nearby in Nasir in Upper Nile, while the SPLA/M retreated fully, particularly to what is now Western and Eastern Equatoria and Jonglei. Overall, the loss of Ethiopian support, both military aid and the safe havens of Gambella, was disastrous for the SPLA/M. Of course the history of this deeply important moment is simplified here, and the situation had a great deal of nuance; however this description highlights the key dynamic to influence the trajectory of the war inside Sudan.

This expulsion from Ethiopia was related to a second event of major significance for the insurgency: the SPLA/M's historic split of 1991. On

28 August three SPLA/M commanders—Riek Machar, Lam Akol and Gordon Kong—launched a coup against Garang's leadership. While other top leaders had defected from the movement before these three, the action in conjunction with the loss of Ethiopian support had greater strategic significance in terms of force alignments and positions, and instigated fratricidal violence across the Southern revolt. Releasing a communiqué known as the 'Nasir Declaration', they argued the need to reform the SPLA/M and criticised Garang's control as being both dictatorial and counter-productive. Akol produced a document entitled 'Why Garang Must Go Now'; it concluded: 'There can be no way for fundamental changes and democratization of the movement as long as Garang retains the leadership... Garang has reached the terminal stage of his megalomania and has been tolerated too much and for too long...'⁸⁴

The fall of the Derg had been widely anticipated and by late August SPLA/M forces were scattered in retreat. The Nasir plot was an opportunistic move, carefully calculated to secure the leadership from Garang at the weakest moment in the SPLA/M's recent history.⁸⁵

The international presence in Southern Sudan, primarily humanitarian organisations, played into the politics of the 1991 split. Present in Nasir when the coup attempt was announced were senior UN and NGO staff.⁸⁶ The 'internationals', as they were known to many Southern Sudanese, were perceived by Garang as supportive of the coup attempt, an idea furthered by perceptions that the aid resources being injected into Nasir to support the refugees fleeing Ethiopia were critical in sustaining Akol and Machar's effort.⁸⁷ Machar and Akol had been courting the humanitarian agencies, expressing a willingness to improve humanitarian access in the South. Moreover, the two believed that if some sort of international recognition could be achieved, thereby securing a degree of legitimacy, the effort to topple Garang would be greatly furthered.

The international presence, in the form of Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), did in fact work with the Relief and Rehabilitation Association of South Sudan (RASS), the relief organisation Machar and Akol established shortly after the coup was announced. This recognition by the UN and other aid organisations resulted in perceptions that aid organisations were collaborating against Garang. Attributing special responsibility for the events of 1991 to internationals close to Machar—particularly his second wife Emma McCune, a British relief worker—Garang declared that 'Relief planes, relief radios and foreign relief personnel were the main

agents used in the abortive coup'.⁸⁸ Whatever the reality, tensions would linger for many years between the SPLA/M and the humanitarian presence. As a senior UN official commented in 1994, when deliberating whether to recognise the relief arm of Lam Akol's group which broke with Machar only three years after the two launched the coup against Garang: 'We need to bear in mind that we are still blamed by the SPLM/A (Garang) for our position on the [1991] split in which, they argue our actions—i.e. recognizing the new faction without conditions—helped the formation of SPLM/A-United and thereby the splintering of the rebel movement.'⁸⁹

Amidst these tensions between insurgents and aid workers, the role of humanitarian aid in the war's unfolding should not be underestimated. After the fall of the Mengistu regime, the only consistent supply of resources coming into Southern Sudan was humanitarian relief, making humanitarian agencies significant as they had never been before. Militia groups manipulated their presence in order to meet battlefield needs: supporting host communities, denying support to opponents, and siphoning off aid to support combatants directly.⁹⁰ Furthermore, splinter groups sought recognition from the aid community to bolster their stature and legitimacy.⁹¹ The manipulation of aid provision, especially the destructive targeting of it, was prominent throughout the 1990s.⁹²

Much of the vitriol of the coup leaders was aimed at Garang on a personal level, specifically at his admittedly domineering leadership style. Bashir had launched a propaganda campaign to cement resentment of Garang, framing the SPLA/M as '*Harakat Garang*' (Garang's Movement).⁹³ Khartoum's targeting of Garang was premised on the view of him as a greater threat to Khartoum than the reactionary Southern nationalists, who were interested only in secession and hence had no national appeal. However, the personal animosities between other SPLA/M leaders and Garang had been acute for some time. Based on the deeply held belief that a singular revolutionary force built upon a consolidated military leadership was required to avoid previous Southern failures, Garang entrenched his control over the SPLA/M's insurgency. He exerted often ruthless domination over his subordinates, on occasion having top commanders arrested or even killed if they challenged him or if he suspected them of doing so. For Garang the movement was about a larger agenda, while some of his more effective battlefield leaders were focused on personal wealth and more localised issues. As

the SPLA/M moved further northward and made efforts to widen the campaign to coordinate a move on the regime, many commanders, more parochial in their interests, saw it as practical to defect, either to escape continued fighting or to enlarge their personal wealth by exploiting the war situation and accepting direct inducements from Khartoum.

This competition and confrontation between Garang and other commanders was seized upon, and often exaggerated to great effect, by the leaders of the Nasir coup and later by SPLA/M-Nasir. After the SPLA/M under Garang moved against William Nyuon Bany, this issue was used to justify the SPLA/M-Nasir's split with Garang and their struggle against the SPLA/M-Mainstream:

We cannot and will not stand idly by and watch the bloodthirsty Garang go on eliminating Southern leaders one by one. Yesterday, it was Kerubino Kuanyin Bol, Arok Thon Arok. The day before it was Joseph Oduho and Martin Majier Gai. Today, it is the turn of William Nyuon Bany and the valiant officers now with him. We shall lend all necessary support to CDR William Nyuon Bany so that the aggression of John Garang is crushed once and for all. This is vital to create the necessary conditions for the unity of the SPLA...⁹⁴

Although it was effective in the short term, the tensions caused by Garang's forceful leadership style accumulated, creating a debilitating cycle of dissension and suspicion. Particularly provocative was Garang's exclusion of others from the decision-making process; Garang was also highly defensive about his revolutionary course of action. Garang's original top commanders—Nyuon, Kerubino, Thon and Kiir—were realists, commanders generally content to leave the ideological dogma to him. However, there were still conspiratorial tensions among them; of Garang's initial top four commanders, three either defected or attempted to usurp him as leader.⁹⁵ Aside from the 1991 split, deep disaffection between Garang and his leadership cadre was at the heart of many of the political trajectories of Southern Sudan.

A qualification to this characterisation of Garang as authoritarian is important here. While often dominating, Garang's leadership style also employed a great deal of permissiveness with respect to commanders in the field. He controlled the economics and certain aspects of the movement, but he also allowed leaders to express discontent; often decisions took on a bottom-up direction, rather than moving top-downward. He recognised that he had to allow certain leaders to act in the localities

remote from his control, as they were effectively clients of the SPLA, which was based in Eastern Equatoria after 1991. Maintaining as many deals as possible with leaders in the various ‘zones’, Garang was able to project much more control than might appear from direct orders and directions given. Using a mission-command style, he would express general goals and typically leave it to his field commanders to conduct operations as they saw fit. In the 1990s this approach caused major problems as the SPLA/M worked to claim international recognition and legitimacy. Therefore, some of Garang’s harsher responses to the more independent and often more brutal field commanders, such as Kerubino Kuanyin Bol or William Nyuon, were connected to his attempts to mould the SPLA/M into a political entity more polished and presentable to the international community.

This turmoil among the most senior commanders of the SPLA/M was not the only influence on the politics of the day, however. Akol and Machar’s actions in 1991, for instance, were in part the result of their ability to take advantage of both changing geopolitical circumstances and Sudanese political narratives. In response to earlier plots, Garang had infused the senior officer corps with young intellectuals, including highly valued PhD holders such as Akol and Machar, who he felt could play a technocratic role in a future New Sudan.⁹⁶ Although seeming to groom them as future stars, Garang generally excluded Akol and Machar from decision-making, as he was balancing the authority of older military commanders and the younger, more educated up-and-coming protégés being groomed to take over the SPLA/M; this exclusion created deep tensions—members of the intelligentsia became impatient with their lack of substantive inclusion and influence.⁹⁷

Many members also feared Garang’s ruthless nature: the coup’s timing was apparently influenced by suspicion that Garang had invited Akol and Machar to the first meeting of the Political-Military High Command so that he could arrest them.⁹⁸ Some have suggested the opposite—indicating that they, or at least Machar, were set to be promoted since Garang had on many occasions defended Machar when William Nyuon challenged the rapid promotion of a rival Nuer commander who not only possessed academic prowess but had also, with Garang’s support, proved quite effective as a field commander. Either way, it is a grand irony that the most notable challenge to Garang’s command would come from those he had at some point favoured so highly.⁹⁹ Indeed, much of

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the earlier discord between Garang and Kerubino, and later Nyuon, occurred because Garang was privileging young ‘intellectuals’ over veteran field commanders and the men who were ‘suffering for the victories of the PhDs’.¹⁰⁰ This comment from an elderly SPLA officer echoes the phrase, quoted by Douglas Johnson, ‘the war of the Doctors’—it was widely used when people reflected on who was driving the war between Southern factions and in Khartoum as well. As one former soldier recounted:

Since the inception of the SPLM/A in 1983 until 1991, if you asked any SPLA officer what he was fighting for, he would not provide a clear answer simply because he did not know what he was fighting for—or simply say he was not enlightened on the cause of war. I remember when I was in Itang in 1986 and asked a friend of mine who was also an SPLA officer what he was fighting for, he just replied ‘I don’t know but John Garang knows.’ And he continued to say ‘to me I think we are fighting to liberate South Sudan territory from the Arabs who dominate us.’ Even those who thought to be SPLM politicians were not sure about the objective for which the war was launched. And to inquire that from Garang himself for possible correction was deadly. Tens of thousands of SPLA soldiers lost their lives in battles while not clear about the cause they died for and the destiny they wanted to reach and achieve.¹⁰¹

As highlighted in [Chapter 1](#), a key aspect of disgruntlement between the coup leaders and Garang was disagreement over the purpose of Southern revolt: were they seeking revolution or separation? Only the leadership seems to have been seriously concerned by this debate; the rank and file of the forces had simpler motives—personal and community survival.

Initially the coup attempt was conspicuously limited to trying to overthrow Garang, in response to his dictatorial style. Machar and Akol made no mention of the strategy they wanted to impose on the SPLA/M.¹⁰² However, as it gradually became apparent that Garang’s control would persist, declarations were made that one of the main reasons for opposing Garang personally was the need to secure Southern independence. The *Proposed Framework and Principles for the Resolution of the Current Civil War in the Sudan*, a manifesto issued on 12 December 1991, argued:

... the old policy objective of fighting for the whole Sudan has been discarded as no longer representative of the true national wishes and aspirations of the people of Southern Sudan. The new basic policy objective of the SPLM/SPLA is to fight for the political independence of the Southern Sudan. This objective can be achieved, we believe, either through negotiations or by War.¹⁰³

With Garang remaining firmly in control of the SPLA/M, the Nasir plotters launched themselves as a breakaway faction, initially called SPLA/M-Nasir. Disagreements between the two leaders later developed: Machar believed Akol was manipulating the situation to assert himself above Machar, though it was he, Machar, who had brought the majority of the armed manpower to the effort. Additionally, their strategic aims gradually diverged. Akol wanted to focus on usurping Garang's leadership within the SPLA/M, and was willing to ally himself with the government to do so.¹⁰⁴ Machar saw this willingness as indicative of Akol's singular ambition to take over leadership; he himself, along with Kong, was more interested in creating a separate secessionist movement that would operate parallel to Garang's SPLA/M in opposing Khartoum. Regardless of these peculiarities, Garang saw both Machar and Akol as treasonous. His belief that their actions divided the SPLA/M when many believed it was on the verge of conquering Juba, and potentially ending the war, was particularly embittering.

Shaping these strategic and ideological disputes among the Southern elite were the realities on the ground in Southern Sudan. By 1990 the SPLA/M was in control of much of the South, besieging its major towns, including Juba, and poised to move deeper into Northern areas. The possibility of controlling much of the South stoked many Southerners' deeper hopes for independence, leading them to question the need for a national revolution. Moreover, if 'victory' was arguably within reach in the South itself, many Southerners questioned Garang's steadfast engagement with Northern groups. For instance, his overtures to Darfuris were especially controversial since they were common in the SAF's rank and file fighting in the South. Garang's involvement of peoples from the Nuba Mountains was similarly of concern, given these people's abstention from the First Civil War. Thus, the value of involving groups not identified as 'Southerners', even if they were stalwarts in the SPLA/M, was a matter for disagreement. So, in an interesting way, the SPLA/M's success brought support to people's ideas regarding South Sudanese independence even though the SPLA/M claimed to be fighting a revolutionary struggle against Khartoum, and intended to revolutionise the entire state. By taking control of areas in the South, holding them, calling them 'Liberated Areas' and then evolving to provide some kind of governance, the SPLA/M was helping the development of the idea of South Sudanese nationalism and independence, despite its New Sudan revolutionary agenda.

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Tension over Garang's direction of the SPLA/M was also catalysed by the lack of basic governance in the areas it controlled in the South. Although it claimed that 'liberated areas' inherently required some rudimentary governance, the SPLA/M had never put sufficient effort into civil administration; this failure on its part was a cause for disillusion in much of the Southern population. Indeed, there was broad resentment among civilian communities about the manner in which the SPLA/M interacted with them. The perceptions common in Eastern Equatoria were illustrative of those of many Southerners: Eastern Equatorians often saw the SPLA as an occupying force, though not as gruesome as the SAF and other Northern armed actors—it was the lesser of two evils.¹⁰⁵ A Panos Institute publication, *War Wounds*, described how the South Sudanese often saw the SPLA as an enemy along with the SAF, famine and even international assistance. A relief field coordinator noted, 'The civilian population in south Sudan see four enemies, all of them deadly: government troops, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), the tribal militias, and famine. And they are defenseless against any of these [*sic*].'¹⁰⁶

In the absence of immediately beneficial governance by the SPLA/M, communities tended to emphasise default parochialisms. Competition also existed between the SPLA/M and church organisations, the UN and humanitarian NGOs, which in many cases offered more elements of service provision and governance than the SPLA/M did. From the perspective of the average civilian in South Sudan, all of these groups, including the international humanitarians, could be perceived as competing to govern and control the people.¹⁰⁷ The large camps of displaced civilians were essential not only for the material resources they attracted from international assistance, but also for motivating and justifying the SPLA/M's prolonged struggle. The camps of displaced people became a central feature of the war, particularly in the areas of fighting between the breakaway SPLA/M-Nasir and in the areas near the border with Kenya and Uganda, with what were called 'Triple-A' IDP camps. Control over these camps was a key factor in sustaining the war effort; the government was bent on dispersing the camps, forcing people into the towns they controlled, or simply denying the basics of existence.¹⁰⁸

Within this context, the 1991 split was defended, and to some extent rightfully so, as an attempt to reorient the SPLA/M from being an armed group attacking 'Sudan' to one administering wide expanses of Southern Sudan. Such a shift was clearly essential, since without Ethiopian back-

ers and with no new patron apparent, Southern insurgent groups had little option but to begin relying on communities inside the South for support. This change in direction was driven by the longstanding ideological debate over what the Southern public actually wanted, and what the purpose of insurgency should be. The very successes of the SPLA in the late 1980s, combined with the dramatic events in the summer of 1991, meant that the stage was set for a deeper Southern confrontation over that core issue of seeking unity or secession.

Following the Nasir Declaration, fighting between SPLA factions quickly commenced. Hoping to establish early momentum, Machar's SPLA/M-Nasir forces engaged in extensive fighting with the SPLA in the Bor and Kongor areas of Jonglei State during late 1991. Machar's force, consisting of many Anya-Nya II remnants from Doleib Hill south of Malakal as well as localised village militias from Nuer communities, committed extensive atrocities against the local Dinka population, members of Garang's own community. In the midst of this fighting, Garang retaliated by sending forces to Machar's home area, Leer, in southern Unity State. The violence in the Bor and Kongor areas was particularly brutal, involving widespread civilian deaths, the abduction of children, raping and pillaging; it came to be known as the Bor Massacre. The event was particularly important as it quickly raised doubts about the purported motives of SPLA/M-Nasir.¹⁰⁹ For all its rhetoric of democratically reforming the SPLA/M towards becoming a more conscientious movement and armed group, focusing on human rights and humanitarian law, the brutality of SPLA/M-Nasir's actions suggested otherwise. Machar and Akol, both outspoken intellectuals and politicians, had been able to cultivate initial interest abroad for their new group, notably because of their emphasis on human rights and democracy, and their willingness to allow humanitarian organisations access to suffering populations. With the massacre, such initial consideration and opinions were quickly dampened.¹¹⁰

It also became increasingly apparent that, despite its secessionist rhetoric, the Nasir faction was getting support from Khartoum. Prior to launching their coup, Akol and Machar secured agreements with Khartoum, via the NIF governor of Upper Nile in Malakal. These agreements included a ceasefire with the SAF that would allow the latter transit through Upper Nile State unhindered. During the dry season of 1991–92, the SAF launched its largest offensive yet.¹¹¹ Named 'Hemlat Seif al-Obuur' and with a force of thousands, mostly new recruits and *Mujahedeen*

volunteers,¹¹² over the next several months the operation succeeded in dislodging the SPLA/M from strategically important towns, including Pochalla, Pibor, Bor and finally Kapoeta and Torit, and made advances into Bahr al-Ghazal. These successes were greatly facilitated by Southern militias, notably Anya-Nya II remnants in Upper Nile and Toposa militiamen, who recaptured Kapoeta.¹¹³

In response to SAF successes and bolstered by their own militia allies, the SPLA/M launched a major assault known as 'Operation Jungle Storm' on Juba in 1992.¹¹⁴ Hoping to distract the SAF's offensive in Eastern Equatoria, which was then threatening to finish off the core group of SPLA/M leaders, the assault succeeded to some extent in curbing the SAF's momentum, but failed to capture the city.¹¹⁵ Despite this SPLA/M response, the Hemlat Seif al-Obuur campaign allowed the SAF to regain the upper hand in the war.¹¹⁶ By the end of the 1992 dry season, the SAF had inflicted major setbacks upon the SPLA/M, leaving the bulk of the SPLA/M's forces pinned in positions south of Juba and Torit towards the Ugandan border. The SPLA/M, then known as 'SPLA/M-Mainstream' or 'SPLA/M-Torit', re-established its base of operations in the deep cover of the Imatong Mountains, near the camps holding the hundreds of thousands of refugees who had been relocated from Ethiopia, as well as those fleeing the intensified fighting within Southern Sudan.

Conclusion: When golden is relative

The golden years of the SPLA/M's revolution allowed the movement to consolidate itself as the South's prime insurgent force. Thus, the resumption of rebellion against Khartoum was undertaken in a substantively new form, that is, as revolution rather than to seek secession as the Anya-Nya had done; interestingly, the First Civil War, which was fought for Southern independence, ended in a form of semi-autonomy and the second war, fought for a national Sudanese revolution, ended in South Sudan's independence. However, what were golden years for the dominant armed group were less so for others, and the first half of the civil war saw South-South violence pronounced from its very beginning. The events of 1991—the SPLA/M's expulsion from Ethiopia and its subsequent split—were of profound importance to the Second Civil War; indeed, they nearly led to the SPLA/M's outright defeat in the spring of 1992. Though catalysed by the international dynamics of a concluding

THE GOLDEN YEARS OF REVOLUTION: 1983–1991

Cold War, the events of that year were proof of a Southern Sudan increasingly divided, both socially and politically, and have continued to shape the war and the politics of the South ever since.

YEARS OF DARKNESS, SERIOUS STRUGGLE, NEGOTIATIONS

1991–2005

Right in this moment, which is a critical moment in the 9 years of war, any political support to the SPLA/M may be decisive!

Helge Rohn, Head of Norwegian People's Aid, 10 June 1991.¹

The years immediately after the watershed of 1991 were bleak for the SPLA/M because its main forces and key leadership groups were pressed against the Ugandan border. Having lost its backer in Ethiopia and suffering internal fractionalisation, the SPLA/M was faced with carving out a new direction, and critically, finding new outside backers. In 1994, after a period of desperation, the SPLA/M gradually began to rebound, and by the late 1990s it had regained control over most of the rural South and once again held a strong presence in the North. A stalemate developed, paving the way for the negotiations resulting in 2005's Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).

This chapter describes the latter half of the Second Civil War, what Garang deemed the 'years of darkness, serious struggle, negotiations'.²

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Like the previous chapter this one, rather than giving a detailed historical account, presents a consideration of historic events and major processes necessary for understanding the new state of South Sudan at independence. Accordingly, it details how the SPLA/M rebounded after 1994, the evolution of anti-SPLA/M armed groups in the South over the mid-1990s, and the dynamics leading to the CPA.

Section 1: The dark years of revolution

... through the barrel of a gun ... [and] to bring peace from within the country without the SPLA.

Bashir's reflection on his strategy at the time.³

The situation for the SPLA/M from 1991 to 1994 was desperate. The SAF's dry-season offensives of 1991–92 and 1993–94 were particularly effective. Over both seasons the SAF, supported by paramilitary forces and Southern militias (sometimes referred to as Other Armed Groups or 'OAGs'), pushed the SPLA/M to the brink of collapse throughout the South. Along the frontier between Northern Bahr al-Ghazal and Southern Kordofan/South Darfur, Misseriya and Rizaiqat militias made significant advances,⁴ while in the Nuba Mountains the SPLA/M lost much of its ground, except for the most remote hilltops. In Upper Nile and Jonglei, an emboldened SPLA-Nasir fought extensively with communities supporting the SPLA/M; it also allowed the SAF freedom to move into Jonglei and Eastern Equatoria, where it repulsed the SPLA/M and recaptured key garrison towns and roads, as outlined in the previous chapter.

The result of these setbacks was that, by the end of 1992, the remaining core forces of the SPLA were operating in a shrinking area of Equatoria—most critically, in the form of a defensive line along the Aswa River, where the SAF's offensive was finally halted. On the very edge of the border with Uganda near Nimule, the SPLA's positions on the Aswa River's southern bank have been described as, potentially, its 'last stand'.⁵ A SAF victory there would have either conclusively defeated the SPLA/M or forced it to retreat into Uganda, and the SPLA/M would have spent years recovering from such a setback.⁶ After the significant splintering of previous years, the SPLA/M's remaining group of senior commanders—Salva Kiir, Kuol Manyang and Oyay Deng amongst others—

remained at the Aswa River.⁷ If this core group of Garang's supporters, upon whom he relied to bolster his wider political vision of New Sudan, had been lost in the fighting in Eastern Equatoria, it is hard to imagine the SPLA/M surviving to resemble in any way what it later became, the entity capable of concluding the CPA, and, after 9 July 2011, the governing party of the Republic of South Sudan.

Over the dry season of 1993–94, the SAF paid special attention to the Aswa River region. The SAF's goal was to take Nimule, just southwest of the Aswa. The aim was to secure the border with Uganda, as well as to bring under government control those populations in Eastern Equatoria that supported the SPLA/M or force them to take refuge in Kenya or Uganda. To add to this, the SAF were trying to deny the SPLA/M access to medical attention, such as access to the hospital in Nimule, then run by Norwegian People's Aid. This hospital was a critical source of medical care for battlefield wounded and was key in saving a significant number of top SPLA/M officers; as such, it was bombarded from the air by the SAF on numerous occasions. Of particular importance were the large IDP camps in Ame, Atepi and Aswa, known as the 'Triple-A camps'; these housed many Southerners who had fled from refugee camps in Ethiopia (the rear bases of the SPLA/M from 1983 to 1990), as well as many who had escaped the escalating fighting within Southern Sudan following the 1991 split. The camps were of critical importance to the SPLA/M, and hence a favoured target for the SAF, as many members of the SPLA/M had their families there and the insurgency depended on them for supply, recruiting, sanctuary and morale. As Richard Dowden reported at the time for *The Independent*, 'The men of these families in Ame form the backbone of the SPLA still loyal to John Garang'.⁸

Over the middle months of 1994, an exceptional level of fighting raged between the SPLA/M and the SAF, which was supported by local militias from the Lotuko, Mundari and Toposa. The Lord's Resistance Army, a cultish and infamously brutal armed group operating in northern Uganda, was also employed in support of SAF operations. It was important to the SAF because it harried the SPLA/M, impeding the group's ability to access aid from Uganda, and scattered civilians towards the southern border to escape fighting. Reinforcing and fostering ethnically defined animosities, much of the SAF's military effort by allied militias focused on the Triple-A camps themselves, in attempts either to disperse or encircle them.⁹ In addition to the fighting along the river itself, the

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SAF launched attacks on the SPLA/M from their western flank, sending forces from Juba and Yei, and carrying out significant aerial bombardment, including bombing of Nimule itself, where the local hospital suffered direct hits on several occasions.¹⁰ The fighting was intense and the losses significant on both sides. However, by August 1994 the SPLA/M was able to rebut the primary SAF assault along the Aswa River, although skirmishes continued for the next several months. Through the battle, the SPLA/M was able to prevent its total collapse while keeping its redoubt secured along the Ugandan border. Not long after this defensive action John Garang also began a series of talks with the Ugandan President, Yoweri Museveni to secure direct military and other aid.

Despite the victory in the defence of Aswa, the SPLA/M still felt the impetus to reinvigorate its movement because of its overall weakness. The events of 1991 and the great weakening of the SPLA/M in their aftermath had created a broad sense within the movement that reform was required on multiple levels. In response Garang convened the first meeting of the Political-Military High Command (PMHC) in Torit and Chukudum in Eastern Equatoria on 12 September 1991. The meeting confirmed Garang's continued leadership of the SPLA/M but launched a process of institutional change by mandating that the movement should hold a national convention.¹¹ This was also a key propaganda move to signal both the SPLA/M's survival and its renewal. Although few were aware of it at that point, Garang's confidence during the later years of the fighting at Aswa was derived from agreement by Uganda's President Museveni and Isayas Afewerki, the leader in Eritrea, to supply greater support to the SPLA/M, in part compensating for the loss of Ethiopian backers.¹² In the face of what seemed to many a desperate military situation, Garang is reported to have commented frequently, 'We are stronger than ever before',¹³ alluding to the support he had discreetly secured from the Ugandans and Eritreans. The Ugandans would back the fronts along their border and the Eritreans would support the various elements of the SPLA/M and associated NDA forces that had pressed northward along their frontier.

With a deteriorating military situation, the convention to be held at the end of the 1991 Torit meeting was delayed until April 1994, whereupon it was held in Chukudum over two weeks. Along with the successful defence of the Aswa River, the effective thwarting of internal rebellion, and the securing of new backers, the convention laid a basis for renew-

ing the SPLA/M. Several dynamics had been building over the previous years that were critical to provoking changes within the organisation. The first was in terms of basic management. Even among those who had stayed, there was brooding frustration with Garang's leadership style, especially the lack of inclusiveness in the decision-making process. Garang's reaction to such discontent was viewed as harsh, a perception catalysed by his arrest of Kerubino and Arok Thon. To many, it seemed that Garang was becoming jealous of his power and dominance over the SPLA/M.

A second issue of concern was the SPLA's relationship with the Southern population. With the loss of Ethiopian patronage, Garang and the SPLA/M were forced to become more like a classic revolutionary movement—that is, one relying on the public for support. A problem was that the relationship fostered during the 1980s with many communities throughout the South was often not good. A major critique of the SPLA/M was that it was detached from normal concerns; as Collins argued, the SPLA was 'basically a peasant army with little political consciousness ... divorced from the concerns of ordinary southerners, concentrating solely on military force to achieve success without any popular participation'.¹⁴ Garang's often over-confident reliance upon Ethiopian support and his correspondingly harsh treatment of civilians throughout the South meant that, with the loss of Ethiopia's aid, the SPLA/M faced the need to humbly seek reconciliation.

A third issue of exceptional importance was questioning of the ideological resonance of the SPLA/M's message in a post-Cold War era, especially in view of the strengthened competition provided through the 1991 split. In contrast to the Cold War dogma of Garang, Machar and Akol were expressing an agenda of democratic ideals focused on self-determination, in line with the dominating political discourse of the immediate post-Cold War world and in a language clearly appealing to the mass of Southerners who desired independence. In response, Garang's frequent musing 'Am I to go North alone?' was evidence of an emerging pragmatism within the leadership of the SPLA/M. Garang was providing for future flexibility should the movement fail to achieve its broader goals of transforming the entire state. In tandem with this pragmatic reaction to internal strife, and in recognition that a singular military victory was unlikely, he was also cunningly devising an approach to negotiations with Khartoum that would allow him to use this situation and

peace negotiations, along with elections and referenda, to further his target of national transformation, thus achieving his revolutionary goals. As will be discussed in [Chapter 4](#), this is exactly what the CPA was designed to facilitate.

In May 1992 peace talks were held in Abuja, Nigeria, under the auspices of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Both SPLM/A factions, the SPLA-Nasir (which at that point was calling itself SPLM-United)¹⁵ as well as the SPLA/M, attended. Although fighting each other at the time, they formed a joint delegation for Southern Sudan, agreeing to a ceasefire for the purposes of the talks. Each side still presented its own demands, however, and represented widely divergent interpretations of Southern aspirations. The SPLA/M reiterated its emphasis on securing a reformed Sudan while SPLA-United called for outright secession.¹⁶ Although the Abuja talks did not result in Khartoum or the SPLA/M coming any closer to a peace deal, they did elevate to prominence—and, to a large extent, forced compromise regarding—the realisation that amongst Southerners there was a widely held preference for the South to be allowed self-determination. This conceptual unity among Southerners for self-determination would provide the crux of the politics of South Sudan in the remaining years of the war, culminating in the CPA.

Given these contextual factors, the 1994 National Convention was hugely important for the SPLA/M and was, as Salva Kiir later remarked, ‘the climax of its most difficult period’.¹⁷ Composed of 183 delegates, primarily from the South but with some from the North as well (from Darfur, the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile and even Khartoum), the National Convention was a mechanism to bring a more participatory and inclusive tone and appearance to the SPLA/M. In opening the convention, Garang described the event’s purpose as an effort to refocus the group’s political ideology and military effort: ‘We must review the last eleven years of our existence as a Movement and army to discover our mistakes and correct them, and to assess and consolidate our victories so that the SPLM/SPLA forges ahead to achieve peace with justice, liberation, democracy and human dignity’.¹⁸

Garang’s rhetorical gestures towards democracy, human dignity and the correcting of mistakes were an attempt to frame the SPLA/M in a manner appealing to the Southern public, directed notably against Machar’s and Akol’s democratic arguments. Moreover, his language

demonstrated a concerted effort to rid himself and the SPLA/M of archaic Marxist dogma, thereby appealing to the West and particularly the USA, who were beginning to move support from Khartoum towards Uganda to support the SPLA/M.¹⁹ Hopes for a 'United Socialist Sudan' were never to be uttered again. The decline of socialist rhetoric was of little consequence within the movement, however, as it never had much resonance with a rank and file that was always more concerned with Southern rights, communal entitlements and individual survival than with ideology.²⁰

In order to refute the claims that Garang was but a petty authoritarian, the first task of the Convention was to elect the leaders of a new National Liberation Council and National Executive Council. Representing 'tentative steps toward institutionalization', the move was an attempt to accrue more grassroots appeal based on greater inclusivity and a rhetorical emphasis on equality and justice.²¹ Not surprisingly, Garang duly won the Convention's elections, with Salva Kiir chosen as his deputy. Moreover, after days of presentations, workshops and deliberations, a series of resolutions were voted upon, all being accepted nearly unanimously. These included key decisions about the SPLA/M's basic functioning, such as the need to separate the political and military components further, establish civil administrations in 'liberated areas', and refine the structure and mandate of the movement's humanitarian wing, the South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA). Initial moves were also undertaken to restructure the army itself, with a new Code of Conduct tabled and a more conventional command structure proposed. With these decisions, the SPLA/M started a slow, grudging evolution from a purely military organisation into a wider political and social one.²²

As briefly described in [Chapter 1](#), another significant outcome of the Convention was a relatively subtle, but still critical, change in the SPLA/M's stated purpose for waging an insurgency war. In the aftermath of Abuja and through his 'Models' (scenarios for the future), Garang clearly articulated the importance of 'self-determination' via a referendum on independence, thereby fusing the wider interest in an independent South Sudan with the 'New Sudan' rhetoric of revolution. Using the opportunity to vent feelings against his opponents, Garang highlighted the collusion between Machar, Akol and Khartoum, and argued that 'without the Nasir debacle, the SPLM/SPLA would have surely captured Juba in 1991 and the war would be long over'.²³

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More important, Garang still challenged the narrow emphasis on separation proposed by Machar and Akol, and pushed the idea of a progressive revolution instead: 'the correctness of our globalist vision of New Sudan as opposed to a myopic and narrow misperception of our reality....'²⁴ Tellingly, despite his still strong antipathy for Southern parochialism and reactionaries, he nonetheless conceded the critical qualification that would ultimately lead to the CPA's Interim Period and South Sudan's independence: he said separation was justifiable 'if the concept of a transformed New Sudan fails to materialize' and would come via a referendum after attempting reformed unity.²⁵

Overall, the 1994 Convention gave the SPLA/M an opportunity to rebound institutionally from the turmoil of the preceding years and was a major propaganda success. As Garang noted, 'By this Convention we have cleansed ourselves... We shall proceed now with a rejuvenated SPLM/SPLA....'²⁶ It successfully presented the organisation with a veneer of greater inclusivity and plurality, and notably improved the morale of its members. Unfortunately many of the apparently good intentions expressed during the Convention did not come to fruition for some time. It is rather telling that the SPLA/M would not hold its next national convention until 2008; this highlighted the consistent lack of inclusivity and consensual policy-making within the organisation. In contrast, it did demonstrate more concerted and consistent efforts in terms of civil administration and improved humanitarian efforts, such as its treatment of PoWs.

Most critically, what the First National Convention did was set the narrative for the political evolution of the SPLA/M, and thus the wider Southern discourse, thereby directly setting the stage for the independence of South Sudan. For Garang himself, the event was a key moment: it allowed him to solidify his legitimacy and control over the SPLA/M by clearly articulating a political vision based on, or requiring, a minimal degree of consensus—that is, the consensus achieved by the Convention's resolutions. Further, the Convention, through its roughly democratic-looking processes, was generally successful in regaining the support of the SPLA/M's growing number of internal sceptics and starting a process of winning back some of its defectors by offering a general amnesty and a purpose more palatable to many.

*Section 2: The SPLA/M's serious struggle to regain the initiative**One cannot lead a revolution if one is not a revolutionary.*John Garang²⁷

Despite the political successes of its First National Convention, the SPLA/M was still in a weakened military position at the end of 1994. It had successfully defended itself from being fully expunged from the Sudan through its defensive action along the Aswa River, but lacked the material resources and safe havens previously provided by Ethiopia. More problematically, Khartoum was able to use a plethora of militia groups successfully to directly counter the SPLA/M. The SAF's presence in the South was predominantly in the form of a 'garrison army', that is, a force confined to major towns.²⁸ While it successfully held many of the major towns throughout the war—most notably Juba, Wau and Malakal—it never maintained a consistent presence outside the towns where the SPLA/M as an insurgent force was widely in control; the major exception, of course, being those areas where local armed groups precluded the SPLA/M from asserting a presence.

Following the 1991 split, Khartoum's intelligence agency,²⁹ along with the SAF, engaged in increased efforts to foment factional fighting within the South, using propaganda, relief assistance and direct military supplies. The efforts came under what the Bashir regime deemed its 'Peace From Within' strategy. This strategy was a combination of efforts to destabilise the SPLA/M internally, with the intention of consolidating its ongoing collaboration with a diversity of Southern armed groups into a single Southern force opposed to the SPLA/M. The strategy was bolstered by Khartoum's military successes over the early 1990s, raising hopes of forcing a defeat of the insurgency in the South, an eventuality that seemed possible for the first time since 1983.

If a single oppositional front to the SPLA/M could be created, Khartoum felt it could effectively argue that the war in the Sudan was simply a chaotic mixture of tribal groups fighting among themselves, which the government was trying to overcome by solidifying a single, peaceful country—essentially presenting a narrative of the war as state-building, at least domestically and to Arab allies. A critical event for implementing this strategy was the contact between Khartoum and Riek Machar in the immediate aftermath of the 1991 coup attempt. A Khartoum official, Abu Gasseissa (director of the Peace and Development Foundation),

undertook 'peace talks' with Machar in Malakal, beginning in 1991.³⁰ These discussions resulted in the ceasefire between the government and the SPLA/M-Nasir that allowed the SAF to launch its *Jundi al-Wattan al-Wahed* campaign successfully against the SPLA/M in Jonglei and Eastern Equatoria in early 1992.

In pursuit of 'peace from within', Khartoum's propaganda machine—including radio, television and print media—worked to divide the SPLA/M further. High-ranking positions in the SAF were offered to many Southern militia leaders, creating a large number of Southern colonels and generals who were never to be directly involved with the army other than as irregular militia officers. Other personal inducements included ample amounts of money, houses in Khartoum, cattle and, most important, arms and ammunition. Moreover, political concessions were ostensibly offered to the Southern leaders, who widely claimed to be fighting for Southern independence. The SPLA-Nasir had itself splintered shortly after its founding. Among a plethora of smaller groups, Machar formed the South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM), while Akol stayed with the remnants of the SPLA/M-United.³¹

Machar reached an agreement known as the Peace Charter with Khartoum on 10 April 1996. It outlined a united Sudan under a federal system, with *sharia* law as a basis for governance throughout the country. The Charter arranged for Machar to become the government's primary partner in the South, and thus the official leader of Southern Sudan in the eyes of Khartoum. The 1996 Peace Charter was significant for a number of reasons. It cost Machar much of his credibility in the South. While officially demanding secession, he was flagrantly working with/for Khartoum. Arguably even more problematic was his acceptance of *sharia* law as a basis for the state. Southerners may have disagreed about the structure of Sudan, but there was near universal consensus against *sharia*. Machar defended himself by highlighting the fact that the Agreement included a provision that Khartoum would accept Southern self-determination. It did, but there was no stipulation of what such acceptance meant, nor a time frame for it, nor any guarantees. Nevertheless, this was one of the first public acceptances by authorities in Khartoum of the idea of a referendum on self-determination for Southern Sudan. Garang countered this argument, continuously stating, 'No one will give it to you, you have to fight for it'.³²

The following year, these agreements led to a more significant accord between Southerners opposed to the SPLA/M and Khartoum, known

as the 'Khartoum Agreement'. Accepted on 21 April 1997, it covered both governance and security issues, and was signed by Riek Machar, Kerubino Bol and Arok Thon Arok, among others. A Southern Sudan Coordinating Council was created and headed by Machar, the supposed purpose being to administer government-controlled areas of the South.³³ More significantly, the Agreement created the South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF), an umbrella organisation for the plethora of militias then fighting against the SPLA/M and also led by Machar.³⁴ The SSDF's component militias included, among others, those forces loyal to Paulino Matip and Peter Gadet in Unity State, those of Sultan Abdel Baggi Ayii and Tom al-Nur in Bahr al-Ghazal, Gabriel Tang Ginya and Gordon Kong in Upper Nile, and various Equatorian groups, such as those of Clement Wani and Martin Kenyi.³⁵ Lam Akol accepted the Khartoum Agreement's provisions through his own agreement with Khartoum on 20 September 1997. Known as the Fashoda Agreement, it brought his SPLA-United into concord with the Bashir regime; he subsequently became the Minister of Transport in Khartoum.

Like Machar's previous agreements, the Khartoum Agreement ostensibly offered provisions for Southern 'self-determination', effectively manipulating a term that had become increasingly central to the Southern political discourse. It did, however, go further than the 1996 Peace Charter, stating that the South could have a referendum on independence, to be held by the end of a four-year interim period, but without providing any significant guarantees for it: 'The people of South Sudan shall exercise the right of self-determination through a referendum'.³⁶ The two options were to be unity or secession. Not surprisingly, the Southern Sudan Coordinating Council proved ineffective at any governance, lacking resources as well as control over decision-making. More damningly, its collaboration with Khartoum widely undermined the somewhat shameless declarations about pursuing secession amongst the Southern public.

The SSDF, meant as the *de facto* Southern security force, was fractured and unable to function as a whole. The linkages between the component SSDF militias had been tenuous at best, their only substantial commonalities being a dislike of the SPLA/M and the opportunistic desire to acquire supplies, money and arms from Khartoum. More important, their SAF handlers supplied the SSDF's militias separately, limiting their ability to aggregate into a more coherent force. Despite these lim-

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itations, the SSDF militias exerted a critically important strategic presence in the South, and achieved notable gains on the battlefield against the SPLA/M. Most important were the actions of militias under Paulino Matip and Peter Gadet in Unity State, which controlled many of the oil areas around Bentiu.³⁷

The general dysfunctioning of the SSDF and the Southern Sudan Coordinating Council nonetheless served the counter-insurgency purposes of Khartoum, which was certainly not interested in seeing them develop a coherent agenda or a solidified military presence. For Khartoum, two outcomes were achieved without requiring any loss of control: 1) the key oil-producing areas in Unity and Upper Nile states were secured while key SPLA positions, such as in Eastern Equatoria and Jonglei states, were destabilised; 2) the propaganda assertion that there was an alternative Southern movement willing to work with Khartoum was bolstered. In sum, the Khartoum Agreement was a great achievement for the 'peace from within' strategy of Bashir, ensuring that the SPLA/M could be harassed throughout the South while the key oilfields were left increasingly secured and open for exploitation.

While the various SSDF groups fought extensively against the SPLA, particularly the large forces of Paulino Matip in the oil production areas, there were also significant levels of conflict between them as well. The SSDF militias were largely composed of Nuer; during the mid- and late 1990s there was significant fighting within and between various Nuer communities in Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile states that involved SSDF components supporting their respective communities. Some analysts, including the well-known scholar Douglas Johnson, have described this debilitating fighting as 'Nuer civil wars'.³⁸ This inter-Nuer fighting was often as intense as any ostensibly 'Dinka versus Nuer' fighting unfolding between SSDF militias and the SPLA, thus providing an important qualification for the binary characterisation of the war as a simple Dinka-Nuer tribal conflict based on the SPLA/M and SSDF.

Key to the ongoing competition between these large, formalised armed groups was widespread violence within and between communities, manipulated by these groups and their leaders, and by extension functioning as part of their military campaigns against one another. Over the mid-1990s the occurrence of 'fratricidal conflicts' escalated greatly, as commanders encouraged communal violence to weaken one another.³⁹ A cycle of visceral retaliation developed in which key leaders began rav-

aging one another's home areas. Among much of the Southern population, the perception grew that the violence unfolding within and between civilian communities after the 1991 split was driven by the respective commanders who were highly educated, many with doctorates. As such, it became a 'war of the educated', often called the 'war of the doctors', and was contrasted with the recent past when South-South violence was not as intense, since the purposeful targeting of communities, while it did occur, was not a norm.⁴⁰

Garang and Machar were the most prominent commanders involved, starting with the Bor Massacre and Garang's retribution in southern Unity in late-1991. Further examples of this violence include the brutal assaults on civilian populations in Upper Nile and Bahr al-Ghazal over 1994 and 1995 by Machar's SSIM militia, and the related violence by the SPLA against Nuer communities in Western Upper Nile, Machar's home area. Aside from the conflicts involving the SPLA, there was also significant violence unfolding in the inter-Nuer conflicts. Most notable was that between Machar and Paulino Matip in Unity State, who undertook wide-scale attacks against each other's home areas as they competed for control of the SSDF in the late-1990s. This inter-Nuer violence between Matip and Machar became so extreme that Matip's top commander, Peter Gadet, was said to have defected to the SPLA/M in disgust.

This violence was deeply destructive to communities, and had perverse ramifications. One was the wide proliferation of localised, ethnic-based militia groups prone to raiding neighbouring civilian communities. Inclined to 'ethnic pride' rather than 'national interest',⁴¹ these militias and their leaders typically had little interest in compromising or moderating their actions given their localised presence and narrow goals, and showed no wider political agenda, only tactical hopes for control and minimal spoils. A good example of this was the creation of localised civilian militias by the SPLA/M among Dinka communities in Bahr al-Ghazal. Known as *Titweng*, 'cattle-guard' militias, they were similar to the *Dec in boor*, or 'White Army', militias of armed youth found in Nuer areas in Upper Nile and Jonglei. Both were ostensibly meant to protect cattle herds and civilian communities from raiding by neighbours, but they more often devolved into predatory armed groups that escalated the overall level of violence.⁴²

Aside from the proliferation of localised militias, a further ramification of this trend was the widespread hunger and displacement caused

by the escalation in community violence. Particularly brutalised was what became known as the 'Hunger Triangle' of central Jonglei, specifically the area north of Bor through Waat, Panyagor and Kongor. In this area, in a pattern similar to events occurring throughout the South, large armed groups manipulated the humanitarian relief efforts of the UN and NGOs, creating a depraved cycle where aid, relief and violence intermingled, feeding off one another. Targeted violence was often inflicted, and aid provision facilitated or denied, in order to meet a given armed group's tactical needs.⁴³

After the dark years of 1991–94, as the anti-SPLA/M opposition in the South ebbed and flowed, the movement itself began a steady resurgence. In early 1995, the SPLA/M launched a dry-season offensive aimed at reclaiming control over Eastern Equatoria. After capturing the government positions southeast of Juba, the SPLA fought a major battle with the SAF in the area around the Triple-A camps, winning a victory that allowed it full control over the core area where a vast number of its supporters and families were living. While the fighting unfolded in Eastern Equatoria, the SPLA/M launched the second prong of its 1995 offensive along the Equatoria roads from Maridi towards Yei and in the westerly direction of Yambio and Tembura. They succeeded in gaining widespread control of this area along the borders of Uganda and Zaire (DRC) by 1997. This campaign was concluded with a successful assault on Yei in late 1995 by the SPLA/M.⁴⁴ SPLA/M successes on either side of the Nile River had left Juba effectively isolated, apart from its air links and river transport. Accordingly, the SPLA once again besieged the city in a sustained campaign, maintaining a tight cordon around it until the conclusion of the CPA in 2004/05.⁴⁵

Amidst this escalation of violence within the South, the SPLA/M was nonetheless able to expand its military successes. Important to this expansion were the SPLA's relations with neighbouring states, especially with Uganda. In the mid-1990s the United States began implementing a new policy to strengthen the military capacity of Uganda and Ethiopia. For its part, Uganda began to coordinate with the SPLA/M in resisting the LRA and other insurgent forces in Northern Uganda, providing a pretext upon which, and an environment in which, the Ugandans could give the SPLA/M more serious support, including military aid.⁴⁶ Help from Uganda allowed the SPLA/M once again to begin effective and sustained operations. Under its new regime, Ethiopia was not able to support the SPLA/M in any significant way until late in the 1990s.

While it was increasingly asserting itself across the South, the SPLA/M worked to strengthen its own collaboration with Northern opposition groups through the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). Based in Asmara, the NDA was established in 1989 by various opposition groups including the major political parties, notably the DUP and the Umma party, and key groups in the east, such as the Beja Congress.⁴⁷ While their involvement wavered, the most active and strongest participation came from the Beja, various Darfuri groups and many other smaller opposition groups from peripheral areas with long histories of exploitation by Khartoum.

Strengthening the NDA was an important element in the SPLA/M's strategy for expanding the war deeper into Northern Sudan. While fighting never occurred in the core 'Arab Triangle' around Khartoum, the SPLA/M's contribution to the NDA centred upon joint operations undertaken first in Blue Nile State and later, further north, along the border with Eritrea. Malik Agar, an SPLA commander from Blue Nile, led the SPLA/M forces that constituted the major contingent of an NDA force known first as the 'New Sudan Brigade' and later as the 'Joint Armed Forces'. Between March and April of 1996, NDA forces achieved near complete control of Blue Nile, including over the critically important cities of Kurmuk and Geissan.

Following these successes, SPLA forces united with Beja Congress insurgents to open an eastern front along the border with Eritrea in 2000, from Kassala to Gedaref and all the way to the Red Sea.⁴⁸ This deep penetration northwards understandably worried Bashir, representing the first major military threat inside Northern Sudan to his NCP government since it had taken power in 1989. Most pressing, the offensive raised the possibility that the Roseires hydroelectric dam near Damazin, which supplied the majority of Khartoum's electricity, could fall to the NDA. Therefore, over 1999 and 2000, Bashir moved a large number of his forces northwards to defend Damazin and try to recapture Blue Nile.

Starting in 1997, SPLA/M forces were successful in retaking most of Western Equatoria and Bahr al-Ghazal, including key border towns lost after the 1991 split. Important to these victories was the involvement of key commanders from various areas: Oyay Deng, a Shilluk who had married a relative of Garang, and James Hoth Mai, a Nuer from Ulang on the Sobat River.⁴⁹ Deng and Hoth would later be the SPLA's senior commanders during the CPA period, both serving as Chief of Staff (the lat-

ter at the time of South Sudanese independence). Further south, in March 1997, the SPLA/M launched a major dry-season offensive on the western bank of the Nile in Equatoria, through Lakes State and into War-rap, named 'Operation Thunderbolt'. Under the command of Salva Kiir, SPLA forces assaulted government positions, succeeding in recapturing Yei. The offensive solidified the SPLA/M's dominant position in Western Equatoria, after which attacks were launched further northwards, taking Rumbek, Thiet, Warrap, and lastly Tonj.

After these victories in Upper Nile and Equatoria, momentum swung to the SPLA/M and over 1996 and 1997 it successfully moved to retake control of most of Bahr al-Ghazal, with the exception of Wau. A governor, Nhial Deng Nhial, was appointed, reflecting the changes dictated at the 1994 National Convention for improved civil administration. While still subordinate to Garang, the SPLA/M was making initial steps to reform its administration of captured territory. As in other areas, one crucial element in Bahr al-Ghazal was the need to relieve the area from the control of what were effectively localised warlords. Wavering in affiliation between the SPLA/M and Khartoum, these warlords caused much suffering for civilian communities. One of particular importance was Kerubino Kunayini Bol, formerly a top SPLA/M commander and an instigator of the 1983 Bor Mutiny. His raiding and pillaging greatly exacerbated the disastrous famine that struck the region in 1998.⁵⁰

In addition to military campaigns, the SPLA/M also sought to confront and undermine Khartoum's 'peace from within' strategy through reconciliation with opposition militia leaders, or more concerted efforts to eliminate them. The theme remained prominent amongst SPLA/M strategists, most notably Salva Kiir, who refined a mixture of conciliatory and co-optive efforts to deal with various dissidents and groups since the CPA. While the SSDF's militias would continue as major fighting forces, there was a steady depleting of its core leadership, as the SPLA/M had major successes in encouraging SSDF commanders to defect. With the Khartoum Agreement leading to little tangible effect other than the defence of Khartoum's interests, Machar left the SSDF in 2002; the group then came under the leadership of Paulino Matip. Rejecting further alliances with the government, he formed a newly armed group called the Sudan People's Defence Forces (SPDF). Lacking significant forces and with depleted support among the public, by January 2002 Machar reached an agreement to return to the SPLA/M, allowing him the third most

senior position in the organisation. From this position, he played an ongoing role in securing rapprochement with other SSDF leaders.⁵¹ By 2004, the SPLA/M reached a similar agreement with Lam Akol.

As the 1990s concluded and the 2000s began, the SPLA/M had regained control over major areas of Southern Sudan and critical border entry points, effectively re-establishing the position it had held ten years previously, before the turbulence of 1991. However, with the government still in control of the garrisoned cities—Wau, Malakal and Juba—as well as the ongoing strength of the remaining SSDF militias, the overarching strategic situation was roughly one of stalemate, a situation that would not change significantly before the signing of the CPA. Notably, Khartoum was bolstered by the significant generation of oil revenue made possible by its control of the oil areas in the north of Unity State and in Southern Kordofan. In September 1999, the pipeline from these locales was opened, allowing for the commercial export of oil via Port Sudan on the Red Sea. This wealth would never be enough to defeat the SPLA/M, but it was sufficient for allowing modern weapons to be bought in larger numbers, such as Hind attack helicopters, numerous Antonov bombers, and even MiG jet fighters that proved highly problematic to the insurgents. Additionally, oil wealth was a boon to the Bashir regime, as it greatly facilitated the stabilisation of the economy and Bashir's ability to maintain support of elites in Khartoum.⁵²

Section 3: Negotiating the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)

*Garang may well not enjoy the support he would need to defeat Sudan's central government forces and seat himself in Khartoum, but if history is any guide, neither will the impoverished Sudanese government defeat a guerrilla army which already seems better organized and better manned than anything the Sudan has yet seen.*⁵³

The veteran Southern journalist and politician Bona Malwal made this observation in 1985. What had been evident to some as the Second Civil War was starting would eventually become the crux for a negotiated conclusion: neither Khartoum nor the SPLA/M was able to win militarily. A weak central government was never able to crush the insurgency in the South, which for its part, despite pushing into areas of the North, was never able to instigate armed revolt within the core 'Arab triangle' around Khartoum. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, possibilities

for a negotiated settlement to conclude the Second Civil War were greatly improved. Several dynamics were critical to this.

While the complexities of Khartoum's nebulous politics are beyond the scope of this book, suffice it to say that throughout the late 1990s Bashir's grip on power had come under increasing pressure within Khartoum. This was most notably after Bashir's fallout with his one-time benefactor and chief ideologue, Hassan al-Turabi, in 2004.⁵⁴ Al-Turabi subsequently became Bashir's biggest opponent in Northern politics, while Bashir reshaped his control of the National Congress Party (NCP). Khartoum had also become increasingly isolated internationally as a result of the regime's overt support for Islamist terrorists in the early and mid-1990s, along with sanctuary it had given to the high profile left-wing terrorist Carlos the Jackal.⁵⁵ These international concerns combined with a simple fact for the military dictatorship: it was not winning on the battlefield, as evinced by the rough stalemate with the SPLA/M after its gradual resurgence, and the best chance for the regime's survival lay in negotiating a settlement.⁵⁶ Lastly, oil was a factor since both sides saw that with war continuing the wealth could not be fully exploited.⁵⁷ The NCP regime could access some wealth by 1999, but the war was still hindering production and diverting investment while the SPLA/M had no access to any of it. A peace agreement would allow for such wealth to be accrued, even if it would have to be shared.

Peace negotiations had been ongoing throughout the war, often parallel to or in outright competition with one another.⁵⁸ The one ultimately reaching a successful conclusion would itself extend over a decade. Starting in 1993, a relatively obscure regional inter-governmental organisation, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD),⁵⁹ began mediating between the warring parties.⁶⁰ The first significant milestone of IGAD's effort was a Declaration of Principles (DoP) achieved in September 1994, postulating the right of Southern self-determination through a referendum and secular democracy within a unified Sudan. Meant as basic tenets that could lead to substantive and conclusive negotiations, the principles were supported by the SPLA/M and the IGAD host governments. However, while it was used in the talks, the DoP was initially rejected by Khartoum because 'self-determination' had been proffered without clearly being limited to federalism or autonomy, and because of an unwillingness to dilute the role of Islam in the Sudanese state. In contrast, and despite their own hesitance about the overarching

ramifications of Southern self-determination, the SPLA's partners in the NDA, notably the DUP and Umma parties, later accepted these principles as a basis for concluding the war through an agreement known as the Asmara Declaration of 1995. Interestingly, Khartoum would accept this language in the Peace Charter of 1996 and the 1997 Khartoum Agreement with Machar and other Southern forces.

Encouraged by President Moi of Kenya and a worsening situation on the battlefield, the Bashir government reluctantly acquiesced to the DoP serving as a non-binding basis for conclusive negotiations at an IGAD summit in July 1997.⁶¹ This was a profound step for Khartoum to take because, although the DoP emphasised that 'maintaining [the] unity of the Sudan must be given priority', it specifically left Southern independence through a referendum as an option should consensual unity be ultimately impossible: 'the respective people will have the option to determine their future including independence through a referendum'.⁶² Moreover, the Principles also declared that 'a secular and democratic state must be established in the Sudan' without explicitly dictating any constitutional forms.

From this success, several more years of disagreement followed as the NCP continually tried to renegotiate and often re-renegotiate the terms of the DoP, even refusing to agree on daily agendas to stymie meetings, and then following up its refusal with seemingly conciliatory and cooperative pronouncements. This pattern prevented a clear breakthrough towards making the DoP a binding foundation for comprehensive peace talks. Fundamental differences in interpretation lingered: 'The positions of the parties continued to diverge on several major points: areas where the referendum should take place, the interim period (two years for the SPLA/M, four for the government), interim arrangements (confederal for the SPLA/M, federal for the government) and on religion and the state.'⁶³

Everything was open for negotiation, even the most elementary questions concerning what Sudanese areas actually constituted 'Southern Sudan' and where the line was between Northern and Southern areas. This issue above all else dominated the local discourse. By August 1998, the SPLA/M had agreed in principle that Southern Sudan was constituted by the greater Upper Nile, Equatoria and Bahr al-Ghazal regions. This was a provocative matter within the SPLA/M, since it meant that Blue Nile State and the Nuba Mountains and Abyei regions were not

unequivocally part of Southern Sudan, and would require separate accommodation in any concluding peace agreement.

With neither warring side showing any definitive success in its military campaigns, there was a resurgence of international interest in resolving the war. Of most significance were US efforts following the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Bin Laden had been a guest of Turabi and the National Islamic Front (NIF), and for some time had been sheltered in Khartoum. Now, under the leadership of John Danforth, the Bush Administration's Special Envoy, US efforts first focused on securing a ceasefire in the Nuba Mountains to act as a litmus test for the warring parties' sincerity with regard to more comprehensive peace efforts.⁶⁴ Begun in January 2002, the ceasefire proved generally successful, catalysing the IGAD process to achieve a wider agreement. Accordingly, the IGAD process gained momentum in mid-2002 after nearly a decade of intermittent efforts.⁶⁵ Encouraged by President Moi of Kenya and under the direct guidance of a Kenyan general, Lazarus Sumbeiywo, on 20 July 2002 the years of IGAD-led discussions were finally formalised in the Machakos Protocol.⁶⁶ Meant as a binding foundation for comprehensive and conclusive negotiations between the NCP and the SPLA/M, the themes that were now sanctioned were those that emerged through the protracted DoP discussions of the mid-1990s, namely a 'Right to Self-Determination for the people of South Sudan' and a 'State and Religion' understanding that removed *sharia* as the basis for governance in Southern Sudan.

The Machakos Protocol succeeded in getting the primary warring parties to agree finally to a 'grand compromise' that founded the subsequent CPA peace process.⁶⁷ Specifically, the SPLA/M received Khartoum's *binding* commitment to Southern self-determination with the distinct possibility of independence. The protocol stipulated a six-year interim process leading to a Southern referendum on unity or independence, with Southern voters understanding that 'unity' meant that presented and applied during the Interim Period, that is, a confederal system. In exchange, the NCP received the SPLA/M's acceptance that Islamic *sharia* law would still be the basis for governance in the North and the national constitution, except as applied within the South. Furthermore, it was emphasised within the protocol that 'the unity of the Sudan ... is and shall be the priority' and that 'making the unity of Sudan attractive to the people of South Sudan' would be legally imperative to both the SPLM and the NCP, thus qualifying the possibilities of Southern self-determination.

YEARS OF DARKNESS, SERIOUS STRUGGLE, NEGOTIATIONS

With a ceasefire declared, and using the Machakos Protocol as a foundation, the negotiations continued under the auspices of IGAD, but were now supported by a 'troika' of influential states: the US, the UK and Norway. Over 2003 and 2004, six thematic protocols were negotiated in Naivasha, Kenya. The Agreement on Security Arrangements was signed on 25 September 2003. In contrast to the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972, the South was allowed to maintain an independent armed force, which was the SPLA, to act as a guarantee during the Interim Period. Additionally, there were to be 'joint integrated units' composed of both the SAF and the SPLA/M and deployed in the North and South. Should unity be ultimately chosen, these units were to form the basis of a new national army. Lastly, the SAF and SPLA units were to redeploy respectively to the North and South within two and a half years from the start of the Interim Period.

On 7 January 2004 the Agreement on Wealth Sharing was finalised, relatively easily, by dividing the significant oil revenue originating in the South evenly between Khartoum and the Government of Southern Sudan, after 2 per cent had been given to the respective region from which it was derived. The Protocol on Power Sharing was signed next, on 26 May 2004, and was particularly important as its stipulations would form the basis for the long-term structure of the Sudanese state, should unity be chosen through the Southern referendum. Southern Sudan would have its own regional government, while the North would have no similar structure. Accordingly, during the Interim Period, Southern Sudan would have an autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), with a president and parliament responsible for the basic governance of the South. At the national level, an interim Government of National Unity (GoNU) would rule through a president supported by two vice-presidents and a parliament. While the protocol dictated that there must be elections at all levels of governance within four years of the Interim Period's beginning, prior to that the SPLM and NCP would form the governing parties in the GoSS and GoNU respectively, with the SPLM assured of the first vice-presidency.⁶⁸

Alongside the power-sharing agreement, the Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Abyei and the Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States were also signed. These agreements assured Abyei of special administrative status under the national Sudanese presidency during the Interim Period, and con-

firmed that a referendum would be undertaken simultaneously with the Southern referendum, allowing it to choose either to join an independent Southern Sudan or to remain with the North. The 'Transitional Areas' of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States were provided with nebulous 'popular consultations' to determine whether the peace process had 'met public aspirations'. Controversially, the SPLA/M acquiesced to NCP demands that the states of Western Kordofan and Nuba Mountains should be merged to form a new state, Southern Kordofan. This was a major concession, since it meant the dilution of the SPLA/M presence in the Nuba Mountains within the new, larger state.

Alongside implementation matrices, which were expansive and exceptionally detailed,⁶⁹ these protocols together formed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The Agreement was signed on 9 January 2005 in Naivasha by John Garang on behalf of the SPLA/M and Vice-President Ali Osman Mohammed Taha for the NCP. The CPA was a notable achievement and met many core Southern aspirations.

Although the CPA was a major achievement, the future was largely predicated on US support. Most simply understood as a 'one Sudan, two systems framework', it allowed for a strong degree of Southern autonomy and the right to self-determination through the concluding referendum. Indeed, for many Sudan observers, it was remarkable that Khartoum, particularly in the extreme form of the NCP, would concede so much: most significantly the referendum itself and a new constitution allowing secularism in the South. Equally amazing was Khartoum's agreement to 50/50 sharing of oil wealth, the creation of a national unity government with SPLM participation in the presidency and future power sharing, redeployment of SAF forces from the South and the maintenance of the SPLA, and a UN peacekeeping force with a Chapter VI mandate. The war may not have been concluded by the complete overthrow of the Bashir regime as many had hoped, but the CPA was still potentially transformational, if not revolutionary, because it required interim elections and democratic reforms which presented the possibility that the NCP could be peacefully removed from power.

Critiques of the CPA were quick to form, and focused on two major themes. First, and perhaps most inflammatory to Sudanese domestic politics, was that the CPA was not inclusive, being merely an agreement between two parties, the SPLM and the NCP. Critics wryly argued that decades of war driven by political marginalisation could not be solved by

a peace process that was itself exclusive. As one commentator summarised, given its creation through an 'exclusivist narrow approach', the CPA would merely 'concentrate power in the hands of the two belligerents'.⁷⁰ This was assumed because the Power Sharing Protocol guaranteed the SPLM and NCP control of governance at all levels, at least prior to the interim national elections.⁷¹

To the CPA's critics, this was felt to be patently unfair as it left other political parties and the Sudanese people to accept lamely a process and outcomes from which they were fundamentally excluded. As a former prime minister and stalwart member of the opposition commented, political opposition in Sudan during the CPA's Interim Period would have to accept 'the political hegemony of the NCP-SPLM diarchy or be disenfranchised'.⁷² Indeed, the negotiations did not allow for parties that had played key roles in the decades of violence even to participate. The SSDF was particularly resentful at being prevented from participation, and despite its centrality to the war, did not even receive a mention in the CPA's text; it was left as an anonymous 'other armed group'.⁷³ The NDA was also notably missing, leaving Northern opposition parties bitter at their reduced prospects for challenging the NCP.⁷⁴

Secondly, many critics complained that the CPA was hardly 'comprehensive', citing the fact that even while the negotiations were ongoing over 2003–04, Darfur exploded into violence and the unrest in the East expanded.⁷⁵ Given this, critics argued that the CPA was in substance incapable of resolving the underlying core/periphery dynamics of the entire Sudan, and was most likely to conclude with Southern independence while doing nothing to resolve the issues of marginalisation and inequality in the North. Among Northerners, many felt the CPA was a misguided 'North-South' agreement that inherently favoured separation by stipulating very clear processes for it and creating institutional structures built upon a North-South divide, while only superficially emphasising unity.⁷⁶ This left many questioning the SPLA/M's sincerity about creating a unified New Sudan. As one of Garang's long-term critics contended, 'In Machakos the SPLM sacrificed the New Sudan and chose self-determination'.⁷⁷

In response, the CPA's defenders argued that the Agreement was a pragmatic response to an entrenched problem, the problem of Africa's longest civil war, requiring the expedient solution of a narrowly negotiated deal between the primary belligerents: what Garang defended as 'a

matter of necessity and practicality to end the war in the first place'.⁷⁸ Moreover, many analysts have highlighted that as the years of violence accumulated, the issues contested and actors involved expanded exponentially, creating 'civil wars within civil wars'.⁷⁹ Moreover, with the inability of either side to win militarily, the war displayed a self-sustaining dynamic allowing for near perpetual civil war, what one commentator termed a 'perfect war'.⁸⁰ Thus there existed a simple but unfortunate necessity: the civil war in the South was by far the most devastating one and hence required prioritisation if the country were ever to experience sustainable peace. Consequently, peace in Darfur was only possible if peace in Southern Sudan was first achieved and maintained. Indeed, there is strong logic supporting the idea that all grievances cannot be resolved in a single instance of political agreement.

A second major counter-argument was that the CPA represented a 'transformational' project, able to resolve peripheral marginalisation and exploitative underdevelopment throughout the Sudan because it stipulated national elections, including the North, at all levels of governance. The monopolisation of, and collusion over, power by the NCP and SPLM was only temporary; both parties would have to compete in free and fair elections.⁸¹ Whatever the failings of the negotiating process and the initial dominance of limited stakeholders, what the CPA proffered to Sudan, as was argued in its introduction, was 'not only hope but also a concrete model for solving problems and other conflicts in the country', as well as 'a model for good governance in the Sudan that will help create a solid basis to preserve peace and make unity attractive'.⁸²

Within the South, Garang defended the CPA's emphasis on unity by noting the strong autonomy granted to the GoSS during the Interim Period, describing its guarantees for secularism in the South as 'one country, two systems'; however, institutionally he argued that the 'connection between Khartoum and Juba shall only be nominal at the top most macro levels', notably through the presidency, and the basic governance of the South would be left to Southerners alone.⁸³ More important, Garang argued that while he still sought reformed unity, such unity had to be achieved through the consensual agreement of the South in the referendum, through self-determination. Long a quiet supporter of confederal political constructions, Garang saw the CPA as the mechanism to allow the revolutionary movement to achieve its goals through national elections; if not, each subpart of Sudan could then revert to its own hopes for sovereignty with the option of future reunification in a confederation.

YEARS OF DARKNESS, SERIOUS STRUGGLE, NEGOTIATIONS

In signing the CPA, the SPLA/M had come closer to achieving the goals of self-determination, Southern autonomy, independence or radical national transformation than any other Southern group. Despite the secessionist goals of the Anya-Nya, the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 had failed to offer Southern Sudan any possibilities for independence and only shallow guarantees of autonomy. For its part, the SSDF's Khartoum Agreement of 1997 had seen its Southern signatories (willingly) duped into believing Khartoum would allow a referendum without ever declaring when it would happen or what it would entail. For Garang, whatever the final outcome, the CPA offered guarantees to secure the process: the maintenance of a Southern army, strong constitutional provisions for Southern autonomy, a specific time frame for a referendum with pre-defined options, and an international peacekeeping presence in the meantime.

Conclusion: And now the hard part

The biggest challenge will be implementation of the peace agreement.

John Garang⁸⁴

In the aftermath of 1991, the golden years of revolution quickly darkened. Pressured by a hardened new regime in Khartoum, divided internally, and deprived of external patronage, the SPLA/M struggled to avoid defeat as it was pinned against the Ugandan border and scattered elsewhere. As the 1990s unfolded, violence within the South escalated; a diversity of Southern armed groups combated the SPLA and one another, encouraged along by Khartoum. The violence between competing Southern armed groups swelled to cause mass civilian suffering, often intentionally. The legacies of this violence are profound: they have shaped the current relationships between national leaders and the various communities of the South.

Gradually the SPLA/M was able to reassert itself on the battlefield. However, pressing into the North and reconciling with some of its Southern opponents, the SPLA/M found its strategic balance was reduced to a stalemate by the beginning of the 2000s. The CPA, which was negotiated over nearly a decade, ushered in the prospects for peace in Sudan, and ended Africa's longest-running civil war in January 2005. Nevertheless, it was criticised for being uncomprehensive and exclusionary; many

SOUTH SUDAN

were frustrated by beliefs that the SPLA/M had sacrificed the revolutionary cause of a New Sudan for the sake of Southern self-determination. It did, indeed, represent an awkward combination of Southern interests. Though giving the South the right to self-determination, it still required that unity, albeit a reformed unity, should be given a chance over a six-year interim period. While Garang's revolution was not over, it was certainly qualified by the broader hopes in the South for secession.

In the bitter shadow of the failed Addis Ababa Agreement, the CPA allowed Southerners significant guarantees for implementation: a strong autonomous government, access to oil wealth, the maintenance of a separate army and an international peacekeeping presence. On the other hand, it left major, potentially explosive, issues unresolved or ambiguous, notably border demarcation and the accommodation required for 'other armed groups' such as the SSDF. More significantly, many people suspicious over the Bashir regime's surprisingly generous concessions doubted how sincere it would be in actually implementing the Agreement—particularly a referendum allowing the peaceful separation of the South to proceed, which was almost universally expected should a free and fair vote be held. It is to the implementation challenges, which would unfold over the CPA's six-year Interim Period, that the next chapter will now turn.

GIVING UNITY A CHANCE

THE CPA'S INTERIM PERIOD, 2005–2011

The unity of the Sudan is based on the free will of its people, supremacy of the rule of law, decentralized democratic governance, accountability, equality, respect and justice.

Interim National Constitution¹

With much fanfare, the CPA's Interim Period began on 9 July 2005. Having arrived in Khartoum to the jubilation of massive crowds, John Garang was sworn in as First Vice-President, and declared that the Interim Period represented the 'Second Republic of New Sudan' as it would lead to peaceful, democratic unity for Africa's biggest state.² This initial euphoria was dramatically punctured when Garang was killed in a helicopter crash on 30 July. He was replaced by Salva Kiir Mayardit and, although delayed, the Government of National Unity (GoNU) was established on 20 September; the autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) came into existence on 22 October.

What followed was six years of relative calm, marked by festering discontent and moments of near collapse. As enshrined in a new constitution, the defining rationale of the Interim Period was to encourage

Southern voters to opt for the continued unity of the Sudan in the culminating referendum. Ultimately, this effort would fail to persuade Southerners of its imperative for giving unity a chance, since reform, notably in terms of democratisation, was widely lacking. The Interim Period still led to a major accomplishment, however: the Republic of South Sudan was peacefully born and the major civil war of the Sudan was decisively concluded.

Accordingly, this chapter will detail how and why the CPA's six-year process of implementation culminated with South Sudan's independence on 9 July 2011. The key contradiction of the history of the war is that a national revolution resulted in secession. A partial but crucial explanation of this is that with the death of John Garang in 2005, the revolutionary character of the SPLM changed overnight and a new understanding and approach to the CPA was applied. Rather than working towards the revolutionary transformation of the Sudanese state as the CPA provided, the focus overwhelmingly turned inward to South Sudan and the goal of independence. Instead of presenting a chronology of events, the chapter will focus on the overarching themes and dynamics that defined the CPA's troubled implementation. Considering that the Interim Period laid a basis for Southern governance through the GoSS and provided the guiding trajectory for independence, many of these challenges are also the major issues confronting a nascent South Sudan.

Section 1: The implications of Garang's death for the CPA process

*Dr. Garang was undoubtedly the only person who could articulate and reconcile the overwhelming desire for the South to peacefully secede with his vision of giving unity a chance during the six-year Interim Period.*³

This comment in 2005 by a prominent SPLM intellectual and politician, Luka Biong Deng, reflects the movement's profound reliance upon Garang to interpret the CPA and hence guide its participation in the Agreement's implementation. With Garang's untimely death, the SPLA/M's strategic understanding of the peace process changed almost overnight; consequently, there were major ramifications for the six years of the Interim Period, and ultimately for the future of South Sudan.

The CPA was an awkward, forced partnership between the NCP and the SPLM, and the challenge of implementing it grew exponentially following the death of one its principal authors and enforcers. The CPA was

built upon Garang's revolutionary programme, but without a strong SPLM leader able to challenge the NCP monolith nationally, the CPA on its own was incapable of transforming the political space in Sudan. In the personalised environment of Sudanese politics, Kiir was a comparatively quiet man focused on balancing interests and co-opting people privately, rather than leading, or coercing, them towards a public vision they doubted.⁴ Without Garang's presence, the other key personality Osman Taha also had to change tack and work towards cementing his future attached to Bashir, rather than working with Garang or any other viable alternative. Barring a resurrected John Garang, there was little energy in the South for pursuing unity.

Garang's death greatly weakened the rationales the SPLM had for its partnership with the NCP. The CPA's conceptually definitive 'making unity attractive' clause, around which its relationship was supposed to revolve, became ever more dubious as a commonly shared goal. Meant as a conciliatory opportunity, the clause was widely disregarded as both parties focused on securing their own deeper primary interests: ensuring Southern self-determination for the SPLM and regime survival for the NCP. As the International Crisis Group concluded, Garang's death was soon followed by that of the NCP-SPLM 'political partnership'; instead the parties engaged in tactical collaboration to secure their own interests.⁵

Within the SPLM, Garang's death briefly reignited the movement's old existential debate: prioritising secession versus working to reform but maintain the unity of Sudan. On one side was a cadre of senior SPLM leaders led by the party's Secretary General, Pagan Amum, who shared Garang's revolutionary vision for a united Sudan.⁶ They continued to argue for 'making unity attractive', which would have required the SPLM to confront the NCP about opening the North's political space and allowing for substantial national reform.⁷ In contrast, and echoing the broader Southern aspirations, other senior SPLM leaders sought to prioritise the referendum and the goal of independence—even if that meant placating the NCP in the meantime by not pushing too strongly for legal or judicial reforms or not contesting the political space of the North, and thus meant effectively abandoning the SPLM's own Northern Section and most of its allies in the NDA.

The NCP's approach to the peace process was also thrown into disarray by Garang's death. The organisation's strategies for the CPA's longer-

term implementation were nebulous.⁸ However, its underpinning logic during the CPA negotiations was that long-term survival was, perhaps counter-intuitively, only achievable through a political alliance with the SPLM.⁹ This strategy was premised on an electoral partnership with the SPLM during the CPA-dictated national elections. The NCP would survive through the other party's popularity and the peace process itself, while at the same time endeavouring to make the SPLM the junior partner within this alliance and a party narrowly defined as a 'Southern' one. The death of Garang, widely regarded as the Sudan's only nationally popular politician, changed all that, because it removed Bashir's strongest electoral competition for national leadership as well as Osman Taha's potential ally in a reordering of political forces in Khartoum.¹⁰

The result of these strategic recalculations in the SPLM-NCP relationship was profound. While the SPLM pressured the NCP to some extent at the national level—for example through quiet support for assorted Darfur groups and the SPLM-North sector in South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Khartoum—there was nonetheless a gradual but very clear shift away from Garang's national vision to one focused on strengthening the GoSS, and securing the referendum and thus independence. The SPLM's participation in the GoNU became a secondary concern.¹¹

Kiir consistently focused on Southern issues such as border demarcation, oil revenue, 'South-South' reconciliation and SPLA reform, leaving the national presidency and National Unity Government to be dominated by the NCP. The same was true for other ministries with the NCP largely sidelining the SPLM and the SPLM willing to accept it as they focused on Southern independence. Other key actors in the party, such as Riek Machar, focused on the formation of the South's new regional government while competent figures originally appointed by Garang to build a Southern presence in Khartoum through the GoNU were largely left adrift.¹² Gradually, even the most ardent supporters of Garang's revolutionary nationalism would reorient themselves around a 'South First' mentality. Recalling Garang's assertion that he could and would not go North alone, in the months after his death it became clear that few were willing to 'go North' without him. The few that have held on to the vision of national revolution or transformation supported independence of the South but continue to refer to South Sudan's secession as 'temporary divorce' and hold out hope for the day when the NCP is deposed and the various regions of the Old Sudan agree on a consensus based consti-

tution to form a democratic, secular confederation, whereby each region asserts itself in deciding to join together. Such a scenario has become less and less probable as the days and weeks pass, but it does remain a possibility. With the increasing trends towards international war between Sudan and South Sudan, and internal war within the Republic of Sudan (North Sudan), those who hold out the potential for a Sudanese transformed federation along the lines of Garang's vision continue to hope.

Two related and overarching trends emerged from these reformulated rationales. First, throughout the Interim Period, neither side sought to implement fully the detailed terms of the Agreement.¹³ Contentious issues that could not be easily decided were most often ignored or deferred. The CPA process became one of continual renegotiation rather than a finite end in itself. As Alex DeWaal highlighted, Sudanese politics has historically been defined by 'a routine of endless negotiation over the smallest details'. Seeking delays to the resolution of difficult topics has long been the norm, to the point where the art of *tajility* (strategic delay) often determines who ultimately wins.¹⁴

While there were acute moments of discord between Juba and Khar-toum—over force redeployment, border demarcation, oil wealth redistribution and security incidents—the NCP and SPLM partners were able to find shallow accommodation by obfuscating and pushing aside thorny questions for future deliberation. This fluid understanding of the politics of peacemaking allowed many contentious issues to be either ignored or placed on hold, thus avoiding the potential collapse of talks and the entire process; many within the SPLM, believing Juba could fare better in inter-state negotiations rather than as a junior member in a national unity government, did not mind that critical issues remained unresolved at South Sudan's independence.

A second trend was that, within the South, a largely unpredicted level of political stability developed, directed towards a very different goal than Garang's New Sudan. Garang, though singularly important to the SPLA/M historically, had pushed an agenda that did not resonate strongly with the Southern public and much of his own movement; certainly not without his personal leadership present. The relatively peaceful coherence of the post-Garang political space in Southern Sudan was largely due to the fact that the very idea of separation provided a unifying goal to replace Garang's personality-driven leadership, and without him as an antagonist to the few that opposed the SPLM a consensus of sorts existed—at least until after the referendum and independence.

Thus, the entire CPA period became focused on reaching the moment of the referendum and its defining expression of Southern self-determination. In the post-Garang political space, no Southern political leader was able to assert himself as similarly embodying the future of Southern Sudan. Rather, there returned a broad and reactionary resistance to Khartoum, reflected in the obsession with separation via the referendum. The overriding Southern political discourse of the CPA period was one focused on 'ridding the South of the North' rather than on any clear expression of a uniquely 'Southern' nationalist identity; 'bye bye Jellaba' and 'bye bye Bashir' were common chants at Southern political rallies and national events.

*Section 2: Relative accommodation and perseverance
for the referendum*

We have to give [the] unity of our country a chance and then to see how attractive it will be to Southerners so that they join into it. I am also committed to that unity until the other side proves otherwise.¹⁵

Salva Kiir

This cautionary endorsement of Sudanese unity that Salva Kiir proffered upon assuming control of the SPLM in late July 2005 was to be the official refrain of the party throughout the CPA's Interim Period. The actual NCP-SPLM partnership that unfolded was marked by consistently acrimonious public relations towards 'the other side', but also by an underlying tendency toward relative accommodation. This latter was demonstrated in the parties' proclivity for tactical decision-making, deferring contentious issues in order to prevent the outright implosion of the peace process, thereby allowing the two ruling parties to defend their narrowed core interests: Southern independence and Northern regime survival.

The generally loose approach to the CPA's strict stipulations reflected a shared understanding of the Agreement as the broad terms for an extended process of negotiation, rather than as a document exhaustively listing decisions already accepted and requiring only technical implementation.¹⁶ Hence it is important to understand the different concepts of implementation among political actors in Sudan and international actors. Within the context of only superficial commitment to explore

unity, there were some successes in implementing the less contentious aspects of the CPA. Most significantly, while the SPLM gradually detached itself from a strong role in the GoNU, the Power Sharing protocol was widely implemented and, in contrast to the failures of the Addis Ababa Agreement, the autonomy of Southern Sudan ensured by the CPA was never substantively degraded by Khartoum.¹⁷

However, nearly every CPA stipulation was delayed, often repeatedly, and then most were only partially implemented if judged in terms of benchmarks and literal assessments: the interim elections; a national census; implementation commissions covering everything from oil management and financial and land reform to human rights and the referendum; border demarcation; force redeployment; JIU formation and deployment; currency; and legal and electoral reforms. The one event, albeit of singular significance, not delayed was the referendum, which occurred as stipulated six months before the end of the Interim Period.¹⁸ With notable exceptions, most of these delays were in themselves seemingly benign, but their cumulative ramifications were nonetheless important. For example, a census was to have been undertaken by July 2007 but funding was consistently delayed by the NCP; it did not take place until April 2008.¹⁹ The census was critical to preparing for the interim elections, which were in turn stymied by delays in border demarcation. Each delay afforded excuses for further delays in implementing other provisions of the CPA.

As typified by its response to the CPA's census requirement, throughout the Interim Period the NCP established a routine of stalling the full implementation of the Agreement, while the SPLM generally accommodated these actions for the sake of the stability required to further the process. The NCP never pushed events so far as to provoke a return to open war, as many commentators had predicted it would. Rather, it was content to leave the process weakened. As Andrew Natsios, a key US government figure involved in Sudan for many years, summarised, 'They react and temporize, they divide and rule', but the NCP lacked a long-term strategy.²⁰ Driven by short-term expediency, the party focused on obstructing rivals and accessing oil wealth in order to finance that obstruction. Arguably, in many respects its actions were welcomed by the SPLM led by Kiir, as they facilitated Southern public perceptions of Khartoum conspiring against the South; an 'enemy' in the North encouraged Southern coherence essential for Kiir's strategy, which focused on South Sudanese sovereignty and internal reconciliation.

Publicly, much blame was traded between the parties over who bore responsibility for making unity attractive, particularly through the economic development of the South.²¹ The NCP had long feared that giving too much preference to Southern development would just encourage secessionism. It consistently blamed Southern incompetence in governance and 'tribal politics' for whatever challenges to the CPA arose, content to see the SPLM prioritise being a Southern party, finding little resonance with a widely popular SPLM bolstered by the martyrdom of Garang. The SPLM countered that, without an explicit effort at resolving historical disparities by Khartoum, Southern voters would never countenance Sudan remaining united.²² Highlighting the lack of economic development as Khartoum's failure, the SPLM was keen to relieve itself of a burden nearly impossible to bear considering the South's staggering under-development. In this context, a consistent trend was established from the very beginning of the Interim Period whereby Khartoum accused Juba of incompetence at governance and Juba accused Khartoum of deliberately undermining its authority.²³

Even with a general willingness to renegotiate or defer contentious issues, the SPLM approach was still defensive over particular actions by Khartoum that could negatively affect the eventual separation of Southern Sudan. The most contested issues of the CPA's Interim Period centred upon border demarcation, security incidents involving proxies (mostly the SSDF), and oil wealth sharing. Tellingly, the CPA's power-sharing protocols for the GoNU were never particularly contentious because the SPLM turned inwards and never demanded a strong role in shaping (and reforming) the national political space. For the SPLM, the single issue that could not be further negotiated was the referendum itself. If nothing else, Kiir was determined to deliver the referendum on time, and hence it was for many the only indicator of CPA implementation that truly mattered. Conversely, Khartoum was most defensive over undertaking political reforms; Kiir noted that these were 'met with silent, sometimes open, resistance, especially in so far as democratic transformation is concerned'.²⁴

Incomplete border demarcation

The deliberations over the border were the most fiercely debated because they engaged other issues, such as determining power-sharing quotas,

sharing oil wealth, undertaking force redeployment and preparing for the election and referendum. The CPA did not demarcate the border, merely stating that it was the one at the time of independence and with several disputed points, which would be resolved through arbitration. However, such a line—one delineated on a map in January 1956—never existed. There were several maps produced just before and after independence in 1956, along with descriptions of the border, leaving the exact line unclear. The British authorities had never bothered to define internal boundaries within a new state that was to be granted independence as single unit. The CPA thus passed off resolving the contestable details of the boundary to an internationally monitored process of demarcation, which became yet another example of negotiation and strategic delay.

The most contentious problem was that of the Abyei sub-region, home to Ngok Dinka and Misseriya peoples. Given the area's political and economic significance,²⁵ the CPA's negotiators created a provision for an Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC)—composed of local leaders, international experts and government officials—that would conduct research to determine the boundary of Abyei on 1 January 1956 so the Abyei people could subsequently choose being inside South Kordofan state or Northern Bahr el-Ghazal state. The SPLM, claimed the nine Ngok Dinka chieftancies, were unfairly moved by the British northward.²⁶ The ABC produced its findings in July 2005 and they were promptly rejected by the NCP. Despite the fact that in the CPA Bashir and the NCP had agreed to accept the outcome of the commission, the NCP argued that the ABC had overstepped its mandate and was defining more of the North-South border than allowed. Further negotiations ensued, resulting in an agreement to resort to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague. That court's final decision on 22 July 2009 was apparently more favourable to the position of the NCP since all of the oil-producing area of Panthou/Heglig, long known to be a Dinka area, was placed outside Abyei. Even so the SPLM immediately accepted the position. While not officially rejecting the PCA decision the NCP delayed any demarcation and occupied the entire area with armed forces. A referendum of any kind was precluded. The SPLM thus continued to contest their original claim much further north. Moreover, they also reserved further deliberation on the actual North-South border. The ABC and PCA were just about defining Abyei's border. The Abyei people would then choose in a referendum their political future. The vote never happened and thus Abyei

remained a conundrum at South Sudan's independence; an issue destined to spark future conflict.

Aside from oil wealth within the immediate region,²⁷ what was at stake was the delimiting necessary for the special referendum Abyei was mandated to have alongside the larger Southern Sudan vote. The successive decisions reflected concerns felt by both parties over whether their respective electorates would be disadvantaged. The July 2009 decision by the Permanent Court of Arbitration placed much of the areas claimed by Misseriya and other groups who historically identified themselves as Northerners outside of Abyei, but at no point did any of the decisions reconcile the prospective international border, until of course the referendum could be held, meaning the boundary of Abyei would be integrated into either North or South Sudan. Hence, the Misseriya were largely denied recognition as residents of Abyei and were, conceivably, prevented from participating in the Abyei referendum.²⁸ However, Panthou/Heglig remained an area the SPLM claimed to be inside Southern Sudan and thus at independence a part of the Republic of South Sudan, not the Republic of Sudan (North Sudan). For the SPLM this was the real victory as Abyei, roughly defined, would be included in South Sudan. In this sense, the significance of the sons of Abyei amongst the political elite of South Sudan cannot be overstated. Inside the SPLM and the army, the relatively small area and population of Abyei were disproportionately represented.

Despite the court's decision, Abyei's demarcation remained an issue. The physical demarcation of the agreed border was stymied by security problems and apathetic support from both parties and the UN. More significantly, as the referendum date approached, the contentious discourse evolved into an unresolved, and somewhat tendentious, debate over whether one had to be a permanent resident in order to vote in the referendum. Ultimately, because of such tensions, the Abyei Protocol suffered from the weakest implementation, and the required referendum on Abyei, which was to parallel the Southern Sudan vote in January 2011, never occurred. South Sudan's independence was still yet to be secured.

At the time of South Sudan's independence significant areas remained in contention and still have the potential to be as destabilising an issue as Abyei. These include Kafia Kingi; the entire border along the Bahr al-Arab River (also known as the Kiir River); the border between Northern Bahr al-Ghazal, South Darfur and South Kordofan; the border

between Upper Nile and White Nile; and the top of the Upper Nile pan-handle and its border with Blue Nile State. The Abyei issue was threatening most of all with a build-up of SAF forces in the area, and the important oil area of Panthou/Heglig being claimed by Khartoum and occupied by the SAF despite the government in Juba claiming it to be a part of South Sudan.

Some simple realities made border demarcation particularly difficult. Most basic was the economic significance, and hence the military value, of the areas. The border area was where the majority of the oil resources under current production were located, and the wealth-sharing provisions of the CPA were dependent on geographic ownership. Southerners considered gaining a fair share of Sudan's oil wealth to be a linchpin of the GoSS's legitimacy; on this subject, the leadership in Juba had limited room to manoeuvre. Hence the SPLM came to view its primary roles as defending the boundaries of Southern Sudan, of which the North-South border—particularly Abyei—was the most critical.²⁹ Early on, 'defending the borders' was stipulated as the SPLA's primary role.³⁰

Compromise over Abyei was difficult for the NCP as well; it faced Northern critics who felt the party had paved the way for the division of Sudan and ultimately represented weakness and failure to achieve the defence of the Sudanese nation, harkening back to the nationalists of the early Sudanese anti-colonial moment in 1956. In this sense, the border became a crux of state-building, or 'state-defending', for both Juba and Khartoum. Each became ever more uncompromising as the referendum date approached and expectations of Southern independence strengthened.³¹

Security challenges

The security situation during the CPA's Interim Period was consistently fraught, but arguably more stable than originally expected. Most significantly, there was never a return to outright war between the SPLA and the SAF, and the potential instigation of war by the 'third force' of the SSDF was largely negated early on through the Juba Declaration of 8 January 2006, which subsumed the bulk of the SSDF into the SPLA. However, inter-related security issues continued to drive the CPA peace process, notably the ineffectiveness of the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs), persistent tensions over Abyei and other border areas, and proxy force

manipulation by Khartoum. These challenges created a persistent mindset within the SPLM that Khartoum was undertaking a campaign to undermine the GoSS's legitimacy by spurring Southern mayhem.

The JIUs were intended as a compromise. The SPLA was left intact as a Southern, guaranteeing force while both the SAF and SPLA had to withdraw to either side of the North-South border. Filling the void in the absence of a truly national army, approximately 39,000 men from the SAF and SPLA were together meant to form the JIUs, located mostly in the South. Initially the JIUs were to be jointly composed. Over time, they would become fully integrated and form the nucleus of a reformed and integrated national army, should Southerners choose unity. The reality, as the Interim Period unfolded, was that neither side took the JIUs particularly seriously; both viewed them as a conceptual bargaining tool during the negotiations rather than an actual asset. They became a security threat in most of the areas where they were deployed, rather than a provider of security.

From the beginning, the SPLA argued that SAF participation in the JIUs was dubious. Key to this were well-founded allegations that 'SAF' members were actually remnant SSDF militias that had never been integrated into the SAF as per the CPA's provisions dealing with 'Other Armed Groups'.³² This became evident after independence, with most SAF JIU components looking to remain in the South and be integrated into the SPLA. The contentiousness of JIU composition was compounded by delays in unifying their command and even their physical location, and hence their competence was widely lacking; the JIUs were 'neither joint nor integrated'.³³

The fractiousness and institutional weakness of the JIUs were exhibited on several occasions when SPLA and SAF components of JIU forces actually fought one another. For example, in Malakal in November 2006, over a hundred people were killed during fighting between SPLA and SAF JIU components, the latter belonging to the SSDF dissident militia commander Gabriel Tang. Not long after the referendum, similar fighting occurred in the JIU based in Abyei, again involving remnant SSDF components. In Abyei, the JIU was largely ineffective an area where an impartial, pacifying presence was essential.³⁴

Broader security tensions between Juba and Khartoum were often concentrated in and around Abyei. An issue of particular concern early on was the delayed redeployment of the SPLA and SAF to either side of

the North-South border, which was supposed to have concluded by 9 July 2007 with the deployment of the JIUs to fill the void; conveniently for those resisting movement of forces, the actual border remained unclear, which led to acceptance of many forces not being redeployed according to the terms of the CPA.³⁵ The wholly ineffective UN mission was not an issue, since its ability to monitor the situation was minimal at best and it typically deferred to Khartoum and Juba. Tensions escalated dramatically in mid and late 2007; of particular concern were SAF forces heavily concentrated just north of Abyei, and SPLA forces lingering inside South Kordofan State. Other SPLA forces remaining in Blue Nile State³⁶ were also late to redeploy, as were SAF units in the key oil-producing areas of Unity and Upper Nile states.

As tensions rose within the formal security sector, the NCP's historic allies in the Misseriya community were encouraged to agitate against nearby SPLA forces. Exceptional fighting occurred in Abyei throughout late 2007 when extended clashes between Misseriya and Ngok Dinka communities escalated, and Bashir remobilised his favourite tool, the PDF militias. Brief confrontations even occurred between SAF and SPLA units.

In addition to worsening violence in Abyei, Khartoum's obfuscation and delay in sharing oil revenue was a source of major frustration to the SPLM. Tiring of Khartoum's undermining of its core interests the SPLM, in what was the most significant crisis the CPA faced, walked out of the GoNU on 11 October 2007. The SPLM argued that such drastic action, which had the potential to collapse the entire peace process, was required to 're-invigorate' its implementation. It timed its action to raise pressure on the NCP, which was then preparing for tense negotiations over the Darfur crisis.³⁷ This provocation was also a function of increasing international focus on Darfur. With Kiir's political strategy largely focused on US and wider Western backing, such reminders were critical to keep the press and pundits focused on the South.

Following international pressure and extended high-level meetings, the SPLM agreed to rejoin the GNU on 27 December 2007. Throughout the standoff, the SPLA served its intended purpose as a guarantor of the peace process; as Kiir said at the time, 'Let us be reminded that nobody in this country has the monopoly of war'.³⁸ To end the stalemate, the NCP made concessions on key points: to improve the transparency of, and allow greater GoSS participation in, the oil sector; to redeploy all SAF units

north by early January 2008; and to release funds for border demarcation. However, no concessions were made to implement the Abyei Protocol fully, and so that region was left as the major point of contention.

In addition to the problems of the JIUs and Abyei, the manipulation of Southern proxy forces by Khartoum, long feared as likely by Southerners, proved chronic throughout the Interim Period. Garang, rather longingly, had argued at the beginning of the Interim Period that as part of a national unity government, the NCP 'cannot sponsor counter-insurgency against itself'.³⁹ While the Juba Declaration was indeed a major coup for the SPLA/M, there were SSDF militias who refused to participate. Khartoum supported these groups in resisting disarmament and political reconciliation with the SPLA/M, notably in Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei states.⁴⁰

There was also extensive violence within civilian communities, often catalysed and sustained by SSDF remnants. For example, extended violence occurred in Jonglei State in early and mid-2006 when the SPLA attempted to disarm concentrations of village militias known as the White Army; these militias were supported by SSDF militias and SAF military intelligence to cause general insecurity.⁴¹ The instigation of violence by Misseriya militias was also common throughout the Interim Period, particularly in Abyei and northern Unity State.

Violence in Southern Sudan quickly re-emerged once the referendum, regarded universally as sacrosanct, had been held. Predictably, much of this violence was concentrated in and around Abyei. In March 2011 the UN reported that both parties had 'militarized Abyei', through both formal and irregular forces, even though the resident JIU was supposed to be the only armed group.⁴² The SPLM even temporarily suspended talks on CPA implementation, accusing Khartoum of supporting Southern militias and working to install a 'puppet government' in Abyei.⁴³

Wealth-sharing challenges

The third core challenge focused on the CPA's wealth-sharing protocol, which required oil revenue derived from reserves located in Southern Sudan to be shared evenly between Khartoum and Juba, minus the 2 per cent given to the particular state in which it originated. The ambiguous management of oil revenue by the NCP proved problematical throughout the Interim Period. The CPA provided for a supervisory board, the

National Petroleum Commission, to oversee the sector, but its functioning was limited and rancorous. The SPLM from the beginning was denied free and ready access to the contracting, production and accounting processes, so that it was prevented even from ascertaining its fair share of revenue.⁴⁴ The ambiguity was further compounded by the delays in border demarcation.

As described previously, such ambiguities in oil management were a major cause of the SPLM's decision to walk out of the GoNU in October 2007. According to the agreement that brought the SPLM back, GoSS officials were supposed to receive greater access to production and sales information, but this access only partially materialised. The end result was persistent accusations from the SPLM that the GoSS was being deprived of its rightful share of oil moneys, and hence lacked the financial wherewithal for its reconstruction and development efforts. Lamely, in early 2011, the NCP offered to have all the oil accounts audited to prove that it had been an honest broker for the Sudan's oil wealth. This echoed other shallow jockeying around oil wealth by Khartoum, such as Bashir's offer in December 2010 to give the South all of the oil revenue in the future if it would only choose unity.⁴⁵

Delays and ambiguities in oil-wealth sharing caused significant difficulties for the nascent GoSS. Oil revenue accounted for over 90 per cent of GoSS income, of which 40 per cent was spent on the SPLA.⁴⁶ A major budgetary challenge for the GoSS was funding an SPLA swollen by SSDF militias after the Juba Declaration. With so much wealth going to the security sector, other pressing needs were given less than desired levels of attention.

The actual amount of oil coming out of the ground and being exported was consistently unclear for the duration of the CPA period, not to mention the amount of revenue owed to Juba after a 50–50 calculation. The NCP's complete control of monetary and financial affairs rendered Juba blind in this debate.

Not so transformational elections

Committed to establish a decentralised multi-party democratic system of governance...

Preamble of Interim National Constitution.

In addition to these core challenges centred on territory, security and wealth—to wit, all the basics of statehood—the primary failing of the

CPA's Interim Period was the flawed interim national election. The elections to be held across the country were meant to be the Sudan's 'transformational' event, leading to a reformed, secular democracy and, ultimately, continued unity.

At the All Sudan Political Parties Conference in September 2009,⁴⁷ attended by most of the Northern opposition parties, Kiir countered criticisms that the SPLM was abdicating its national role. Arguing that the SPLM had 'never relented in using all the mechanisms available' to it, Kiir somewhat dubiously claimed that its withdrawal from the GoNU in 2007 was primarily over national, not Southern, issues.⁴⁸ Kiir subsequently, and tellingly, decided not to stand for the national presidency, only for the GoSS presidency. It was a decision that culminated in the SPLM's drift from the New Sudan vision. As a result, the 2010 elections never saw NCP's worst fear—the coalescence of national opposition around an SPLM or NDA challenging it in free and fair national elections. For the SPLM, the elections were less about overthrowing an autocracy and more about consolidating the political space in the South in preparation for the referendum and secession.

Compounding the electoral challenges caused by the delayed border demarcation and dubious census results was the NCP's intransigence over reform of Sudan's authoritarian election laws, as required by the CPA. Even if Garang had not died and/or all opposition groups coalesced without changes to electoral laws there was little chance of the CPA-mandated national elections being the transformational moment many had hoped for. Sudan was left facing an election with a national legal framework that constricted the basic rights necessary for a minimally acceptable electoral process. A key example of this was the arrest in Khartoum, during the campaign, of the SPLM's Secretary General, Pagan Amum (consistently a controversial figure even within the SPLM), and its presidential candidate, Yasir Arman. A dubious registration process and a national Electoral Commission stuffed with NCP diehards compounded these legal constraints. The bulk of Northern opposition parties, as well as the SPLM, boycotted the April elections in the North, citing the NCP's electoral obstructionism, ongoing unrest in Darfur and delays to the vote in South Kordofan.⁴⁹

Mandated to occur by 9 July 2009, the elections were first delayed until February 2010 and then finally held in mid-April 2010. In a poll that the Carter Center declared would 'fall short of meeting international

standards and Sudan's obligations for genuine elections', Bashir retained power with 69 per cent of the vote, while the SPLM's presidential candidate Yasir Arman, despite the boycott, received 22 per cent.⁵⁰ In the South, Kiir won 97 per cent of the GoSS presidential vote. Outside the presidential contest, the NCP dominated the Northern state legislatures, governorships and parliamentary seats with 90 per cent of the vote. In the South, the SPLM was nearly as dominant, with 80 per cent of the vote for state assemblies, governorships and parliamentary seats.⁵¹

To critics of the CPA, the un-revolutionary 2010 elections confirmed their biggest fears. The NCP was entrenched in power in the North, spuriously claiming an increased legitimacy.⁵² In the South, the SPLM similarly dominated the political space, thanks in part to 'a high incidence of intimidation and the threat or use of force', especially by the SPLA and assorted GoSS institutions, and with special attention given to independent candidates.⁵³

The SPLM's own nomination process was at times coercive and exclusionary. This was critically important because the internal SPLM process of candidate selection was in actual fact the real vote in the South. The events leading up to the elections revealed that prospects for democracy and democratic transition would rest on the development of internal SPLM democratic procedures. As it was the only relevant political party in the South, future democratic development would thus rest with the SPLM until other relevant political parties evolved, most likely out of a bifurcation of the SPLM itself. In certain states—Unity, Northern Bahr al-Ghazal, Central Equatoria and Jonglei—the SPLM reinforced incumbent governors over challengers to maintain control.⁵⁴ More generally, the election process suffered from a lack of preparation and dubious procedures. Particularly prone to abuse was the registration process: potential opposition voters were discouraged from registering. Widespread confusion over the process made it possible for voter rolls to be fudged and for local election results to be determined centrally, often at the state level. The questionable elections in the South would have profound ramifications for subsequent cohesion in an independent South Sudan.

Flawed as they were, the 2010 elections were never as important to Southerners as the referendum itself. Despite all the challenges to the CPA's implementation, from 9 January to 16 January 2011 over four million Southerners voted in a free and fair referendum that was remarkably peaceful. The results were almost unanimous: 98.8 per cent voted

for separation. To the public, what mattered most had happened, despite all the challenges and intrigues.

Section 3: What happened to the Second Republic of New Sudan?

*If the country fails to rise to the challenge ... then the union shall be dissolved amicably.*⁵⁵

Garang, upon signing the CPA.

Considering the limited enthusiasm and tactically driven implementation that defined its Interim Period, should the CPA peace process be considered a success? It was premised on the fundamental hope of maintaining Sudan's unity through reform, which Kiir called the 'slimmest opportunity ... for democratic transformation and national reconciliation'.⁵⁶ Garang, more exuberantly, had predicted that it would 'completely change the Sudan beyond recognition!'⁵⁷ The reality of the CPA process was that it was only a 'partial success'.⁵⁸ The major civil war of the Sudan was concluded, but the broader transformational goals were not realised. The possibility suggested by Garang in 2005 proved true: Sudan simply was not up to the challenge of achieving consensual unity in the shape of a reformed democratic state.

Many would argue that the 'making unity attractive' intent of the CPA was never a serious proposition, but rather a face-saving effort by a weakened NCP in 2002, a quixotic vanity project for John Garang, or the lamentable residue of Cold War politicking. Regardless, making unity attractive was still the pivot around which the CPA peace process revolved, born of the tortured relationship between the SPLM and NCP and a fleeting interpretation by the international community focused on its 'balanced approach' in its role as guarantor of the CPA. More particularly, the lack of broad support for unity within the South never diminished the CPA's importance for furthering peace, as Garang had long argued. What was critical was the process, one flexible enough first to end the war and then to push Khartoum to decide what it really wanted—and thus to be willing to accept the results: a truncated Sudanese state defined by an Arab and Muslim identity or a unitary one based on citizenship, pluralism and equal rights.

As Douglas Johnson has argued, even between those Southerners seeking a New Sudan and those wanting to prioritise Southern self-deter-

mination, there was common acceptance of the imperative to force Khartoum finally to decide: 'They agreed that only when independence for the South is a real choice will the North be forced to choose what it really wants.'⁵⁹ The only way to get Khartoum to experience that existential clarity was by giving it the opportunity to change and then deal with the consequences of its actions. At this, the CPA proved successful. Tellingly, Bashir quickly accepted the referendum results on 7 February 2011 and the NCP declared the Sudan would be based solely on an Arab identity and *sharia*.⁶⁰ Even the diehards of the NCP came to a grudging acceptance that Southern independence was a painful outcome, but one necessary to achieving important socio-cultural imperatives in the North.

The CPA process was a long, difficult one and its critics rightly highlighted its inability to resolve Sudan's deeper problems. A particularly bitter outcome was that the NCP dictatorship survived without widening the political space of the North. For the multitudes of Northerners who had fought for unity under the vision of a New Sudan, the CPA failed to end the decades of war and dictatorship, and left them facing an old enemy on their own. Many, especially in the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile State, would bitterly conclude that the price of Southern independence was their own continued subjugation, collateral damage for the SPLM's secessionism, the great tragedy of this peace first born in the Nuba Mountains, the very same place Bashir would attack just after Southern independence. At the CPA's conclusion, 'Old Sudan' persisted in the North. In the South, it remained unclear if the new state would embody the democratic principles articulated in the New Sudan vision. Continued repression in Blue Nile and the Nuba Mountains is the surest path back to war for both Sudan and South Sudan.

Moreover, the defer-and-obfuscate manner of implementation merely postponed some of the biggest challenges, leaving open the possibilities for war between South Sudan and the Sudan, as well as that of civil conflict within the new state itself. Many of the CPA's most basic provisions were left wholly unmet or half-fulfilled at best. The weakness of the security sector in the South is emerging as the biggest threat to the new state with international war looming. The Juba Declaration may have brought over most of the SSDF to the SPLA, but it was a superficial achievement; the period immediately following the referendum saw a predictable upsurge in violence by anti-SPLM Southerners who questioned the SPLM's continued dominance once separation had been secured, none more so than grizzled old SSDF veterans.

More generally, the successful implementation of the CPA was understood as full implementation based on 'national compliance and international commitment' to the process.⁶¹ Ultimately both proved lacking. Peace in Southern Sudan was obscured amid the violence in Darfur and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, while the domestic dynamics underpinning compliance were always shallow and received a mortal blow after Garang's death. It is, however, important to question whether the full implementation of the CPA was ever possible or even desirable.

Despite some profound critiques, the SPLA/M could ultimately argue that it achieved the one goal held almost universally by Southerners: the right to self-determination was indeed realised, and largely in peaceful fashion. For many in the SPLM, that the referendum's outcome was secession was arguably unfortunate, but it was not the fault of Southerners. Rather the fault lay primarily in the unwillingness of Khartoum to deal sincerely with a fundamental problem, the marginalisation and inequality that defined the Sudanese state. In 2009 as tensions with Khartoum escalated, Kiir concluded, 'To us in the SPLM, unity is a noble cause, but not any unity'.⁶² In the context of the NCP's rule, it is hard to argue with that.

Moreover, viewing the CPA's Interim Period as a fluid process of political consolidation and delineation allows for an emphasis on its outcome being refreshingly pragmatic within a history of chronic war and failed peace efforts. The SPLM's ability to win some arguments with the NCP, defer other contentious ones, and generally manipulate its opponents' tendency to short-term opportunism was a significant achievement. The lack of full implementation can then, arguably, be seen as a necessary evil. By exhibiting deference and a willingness to renegotiate subjects that outsiders might have deemed 'lines in the sand', the SPLM achieved partial success rather than total failure. An insistence on following the terms of the CPA 'to the letter' probably would have scuttled the whole peace process on several occasions, notably over the Abyei deadlock and related tensions concerning the redeployment of forces right at its outset in 2005/06.

The consistent failings of implementation were, accordingly, the peace process's greatest strength; these allowed the fluid pragmatism necessary for achieving partial success. The best example of this can be seen in the narrowing perspective of the United States following Garang's death. Though often confused and contradictory in its stance towards Sudan,

under the Bush government US policy towards Sudan had independence for the South as its primary goal. To that end Washington consistently offered Khartoum rewards to allow the peace process to reach the all-important referendum. This included limiting criticism of Khartoum's human rights record and making promises to remove the country from its list of states sponsoring terrorism, while simultaneously building up the competence of the GoSS and SPLA in anticipation of independence. Compared with a largely confused policy under President Clinton, Bush's government provided the clarity of a policy based on religious solidarity with Christian Southern Sudanese. This relationship has been symbolised poignantly by Salva Kiir's consistent donning of a Stetson hat given to him as a gift by George Bush. Overall, the US pursued what could be termed an 'aggressive policy of engagement', leveraging the NCP to allow the referendum to proceed; in turn, the SPLM banked many of its hopes on American political, military and economic support.⁶³

Perhaps the biggest argument for the CPA's partial success was that, within a historical context, there is today a significant degree of peace in the Sudan. This is profoundly important for a country that suffered more than two million dead during decades of war. Moreover, without taking continued (relative) peace for granted, Northern Sudan and the NCP government accepted the final outcome despite intense scepticism about whether either would ever do so. In the early 2000s, many commentators predicted the CPA would fail on the grounds that the NCP would prefer war to losing oil resources to an independent South.⁶⁴ Despite the peaceful referendum, it is plausible that the peace process could well have fallen apart through NCP malevolence and an SPLM declaration of unilateral independence.

Oscillating international support and monitoring

Before concluding the chapter, it is important to review the role international actors played in the Interim Period. Just as the international role in initially securing the CPA should not be overstated, it is important not to over-emphasise the international involvement in the Interim Period either. From start to finish, the CPA process was in theory and practice driven by the narrow, awkward relationship between the NCP and the SPLM. Nevertheless, international involvement around that definitive, if tortured, partnership has been significant and played an important role in shaping its unfolding. In contrast to the 1972 Addis

Ababa Agreement, primarily pushed by Emperor Haile Selassie, the CPA allowed broad international involvement, notably through UN peacekeepers, as one of the major guarantees for the process.

Under a Chapter VII mandate (Resolution 1590), the UN Security Council deployed 9,000 peacekeepers as well as 700 police officers during late 2005. Spread across the South, but with significant numbers in critical areas of the North as well, they included military observers to monitor compliance with the CPA's security protocols. This UN military presence was complemented by an extended civilian one focused on humanitarian and other issues, such as disarmament, reintegration, governance and infrastructure development. Alongside this UN contingent, a diverse mixture of NGOs strengthened what had already been an extensive humanitarian presence. It is also worth noting the anomaly of two separate UN missions operating inside a single state: UNMIS addressing the CPA and the UN mission operating in Darfur. Amazingly, to most uninitiated observers—less so to those accustomed to the creature that is UN engagement—the two missions operated for the most part independently of one another.

Aside from the routine activities of post-conflict reconstruction, the international involvement in the Interim Period focused on monitoring the Agreement's basic implementation. This primarily meant UNMIS supported by key actors, the most significant being the so-called 'troika' of Norway, the US and the UK. Internationally, the attention paid to the CPA process was often overshadowed by global outrage over Darfur or other international crises, such as the Iraq War and the focus on the US-defined Global War on Terror (GWOT). The CPA's implementation was behind schedule from the very beginning; the detailed implementation matrix was widely disregarded as it became clear that trying to cajole both parties over specific dates and activities was futile. Overall, as the International Crisis Group concluded, the international community was lacking in its role as guarantor of the CPA, and its diplomats unwilling to 'seriously engage with the parties on their numerous unmet commitments'.⁶⁵

The international parties were widely unsuccessful in having any consistent influence on the process's implementation. The CPA-dictated Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC) met too infrequently and had little effect on the pace or nature of implementation.⁶⁶ By early 2007 most observers viewed it as essentially ineffective. Grounds for crit-

icism included NCP members using it to delay the mechanism and to obscure its ability to investigate and research progress in fulfilling the agreements, particularly the security protocols.⁶⁷ Furthermore it had little—if any—enforcement capacity; it was, as one GoSS representative noted to international researchers, a ‘toothless bulldog’.⁶⁸

The UN was unable, in any of its guises, to have major influence beyond reporting that benchmarks were not being met, and facilitating further conversation—at times no small achievement, as when UNMIS helped resolve the dispute over the delayed redeployment of forces.⁶⁹ This influence was seen largely through the UN-led Ceasefire Joint Military Committee (CJMC), arguably the most effective of the CPA-stipulated monitoring organs because it met regularly and typically had respect from both parties.⁷⁰

The international community’s overarching sentiment towards implementing of the CPA was a decidedly fatalistic acceptance of the Sudanese parties’ fluid interpretation of CPA stipulations. This was driven by international distraction and growing impatience to proceed through the process peacefully, which often appeared to be a ‘box-ticking’ exercise and a matter of course rather than something requiring close attention and commitment. It was most strikingly demonstrated by the unwillingness to contest strongly the questionable results of the April 2010 elections, despite their importance to transformation. Rather, there was a broad acceptance of that failure as a cost necessary for seeing the process move further towards the all-important referendum. As the Carter Center noted of the 2010 elections, despite irregularities, their occurrence ‘allows the remaining provisions of the agreement to be implemented’.⁷¹ Similarly, the US State Department concluded it was ‘not a free and fair election’, but that the US still intended to work with Khartoum and Juba ‘as we move forward with ... the vitally important referenda that’ll happen in January of next year’.⁷² Despite the language of a balanced approach from the world’s capitals, Kiir in Juba had successfully secured overwhelming support for independence through a referendum.

While the CPA’s signatories both probably appreciated the generally detached international involvement, there were times when frustration with it arose sharply, notably for the SPLM. Perhaps the best example of this was the international preoccupation with Darfur to the detriment of the CPA process. The US was obsessed with Darfur, spending a ‘disproportionate amount’ of effort on resolving that crisis.⁷³ Similarly, a

Western preoccupation (particularly in the USA) with countering the already largely spent Lord's Resistance Army arguably diverted necessary attention from more pressing needs.⁷⁴ Within that context, the October 2007 SPLM pullout from the GoNU became a call for renewed international involvement.⁷⁵

Aside from simply being present and maintaining a calming influence, a very justifiable exercise in itself, the most important role played by the international presence was that of guarantor of the referendum. With its own institutional weaknesses risking delay for the referendum, the GoSS eventually turned to the UN to help ensure it happened on time. With Herculean logistical and legal support from the UN and a few key states, it did in fact occur as scheduled.⁷⁶ Southern independence had never been popular internationally, even among states that would later be South Sudan's biggest supporters, its regional neighbours and the US, the UK and Norway. Ensuring that the referendum happened on time was a way of finally being done with a conflict that had consumed so much diplomatic time and energy.

Conclusion: persistence pays off

Our people never asked their leaders for unrealistic demands; all that they wanted was to reap the fruits of peace after the end of a war to which they have selflessly contributed. Have we managed to live up to their expectations? The answer is Yes and No.

Salva Kiir⁷⁷

Ultimately, 99 per cent of Southerners will probably deem the CPA process a failure if the new state cannot deliver on ubiquitous hopes for peace, economic development, education and political inclusivity. With the South's long-sought separation secured, the same destabilising politics that have bedevilled Southerners for decades are likely to continue with socio-political fractiousness and personalised agendas propagating insidious violence. The waning of solidarity was apparent when South-South bloodshed predictably escalated after the historic referendum, as anti-SPLM actors arose, anew and again, to challenge the movement's political dominance, encouraged by the failings of the 2010 elections.

Ironically, most of the arguments over making unity attractive in the Sudan are equally relevant to South Sudan's future as a sovereign state. Resolving issues that so inflamed Southerners historically—one-party

rule, overly centralised governance, dominance by the military, and broad feelings of exploitation and marginalisation in the peripheries—will define South Sudan's own success or failure. Unless the Southern leadership can instigate dynamic social and political energies, the new state will be but a newly sovereign shell, holding all the same suffering and underdevelopment that existed under Khartoum's miserable rule. Garang long held this as both a reservation and a fear during the war; it contributed to his prescription of national revolution rather than local particularisms and Southern nationalism.

And yet, the Southern Sudanese now have more opportunity to direct their future than at any other time in their history. In that sense, the CPA and the referendum have been transformational in a profound social and political sense. Southern Sudan received what it wanted, the peaceful right to undertake the self-determination process; the onus for what happened after that is borne largely by the Southern Sudanese choosing to become the Republic of South Sudan. While the Interim Period was about giving Sudanese unity a chance, the next challenge is to rationalise the social and political unity of South Sudan. With that in mind, the remainder of the book will turn to analysing the dynamics and structures of the new state and its future prospects within the context of such a turbulent modern history.

DEFINING THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN

By 2040, we aspire to build an exemplary nation: a nation that is educated and informed; prosperous, productive and innovative; compassionate and tolerant; free and peaceful; democratic and accountable; safe, secure and healthy; and united and proud.

Government of the Republic of South Sudan¹

The Republic of South Sudan faces daunting challenges upon independence. Marked by the lingering acrimony over the April 2010 national elections, the Interim Period ended with a controversial transitional constitution, which stipulated a four-year transition period, beginning 9 July 2011. During this period, a permanent constitution will be drafted. Yet, constitutional wrangling continued; various localised, armed actors continued to challenge the government; internal political discord within the SPLM persists; and human capacity within government and the wider economy remained weak. Along with the omnipresent threat from old foes in Khartoum and the often confusing and disorganised attempts by internationals to help, such challenges slowed the cultivation of the institutions and character of the new state; even more dangerous was that these confusions were institutionalised in the new state's character.

Moreover, the humanitarian situation remains dire—nearly half of the population required food aid at independence, and the country's econ-

omy is among the world's poorest, despite the often-stated fact that in some calculations South Sudan is a middle-income country; the latter distortion is due to per capita calculations of oil revenue. With trade effectively slowed to a snail's pace by border closures and transit impediments, many Northern traders disappearing from the South, and inflation rising rapidly in the rest of East Africa, prices of basic commodities have soared, further deepening suffering and placing increasing pressure upon Kiir's government.

The CPA's Interim Period allowed Southern Sudan an opportunity to prepare for independence by establishing a regional government, maintaining its army, and implementing an initial economic development strategy. Unfortunately, owing to the way the CPA was itself interpreted, largely by donor governments, although some important foundational developments were initiated, the CPA period was not considered by enough people as a time for building the structures of an independent state. The 2011 referendum, rather than the CPA, was seen as the beginning of the state-building process; the CPA was viewed, essentially, as a ceasefire, not a peace agreement—an important explanation for this apparent slow start.

Structurally, the new state has been confounded by its over-reliance on a small elite of individuals to define its institutions and policy. In addition, lack of human capacity at the middle and lower levels of the civil service, and overbearing intervention on the part of government ministers and leaders (and/or dependence of entire ministries or offices on them), have undercut the implementation of policy and structural decisions. Administratively, decision-making rests with the upper limits of government; just after independence the President was making near unilateral decisions on an increasingly wide range of issues and ministries functioned little, without the physical presence of key ministers, under-secretaries or directors in the offices. Along with this focusing of decision making at the very upper echelons is a lack of clear and definitive strategic communications. Some individuals have engaged in more public communication than others, but a clear and focused communication of the agenda of the new state has been lacking. Whatever the reason for this situation, there are few things more dangerous than silence and lack of express direction from leadership at definitive times such as that facing the emerging Republic of South Sudan. The significance of the moment requires definitive expressions of priorities.

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To this end, the government of South Sudan has focused on four major state-building processes: a political reconciliation process to build a national identity; a security effort to assert the monopoly of force; the resolution of a transitional constitution; and the production of a major development plan. The latter, the South Sudan Development Plan, is a collaborative effort between primary ministries under the leadership of the Ministry of Finance. The plan is the new state's most comprehensive expression of structure and direction, and attempts to plot a course for South Sudan over the coming years. Unfortunately, like most institutional planning in the country, this one has been largely driven by international advisers, which brings its genuine importance as a strategic vision into question; as with much of the international 'help' of this kind, it remains unclear if it is worth the paper the planning documents are written on—so to speak. The development plan and constitutional documents will be discussed in the context of the time leading up to, and immediately following, independence. Accordingly, we will consider the politics of the transition period with a special emphasis on the deliberations and details of these planning documents, and the overarching trends prominent at independence and definitive to both this period and the country's future. In doing this we will draw heavily from the preceding chapter's discussion of the CPA and the structures of the interim Government of Southern Sudan, from which the foundations of the new state are largely drawn.

Section 1: From region to state—laying the foundations of sovereign governance

As a movement that has been fighting against the marginalization of others, we shall not tolerate the exclusion of anybody from the process.

Garang, on SPLM inclusion during the CPA process.²

Despite Garang's rhetoric above, the initial decisions regarding the details of the CPA, and thus the constitution of Southern Sudan, were neither inclusionary nor pluralistic. Nevertheless, many elements of the new state's long and arduous gestation date back to the early days of the SPLA/M. This bears some consideration.

The SPLA's 1984 Code of Conduct was a key foundation of the formal legal institution being developed for South Sudan. Various other

major antecedents to the terms of the CPA and Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan lay in the history of the war as the SPLA's control waned after the loss of the support of the Derg in Ethiopia. Events at this time forced it to engage more significantly in civil administration in the areas it controlled. Before progressing in this discussion, the importance of these antecedents to the legal, constitutional and administrative machinery present at the birth of the Republic needs to be acknowledged as we can situate many of the problems and successes in the earlier processes of institutional and legal development, even though it was amidst war.

Similarly important, the development of the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (later renamed Commission, SRRC) was critical for both civil administration and international relations. The SRRC managed international assistance, as well as a lot of the internal resource movements, to areas that required food and other forms of aid. Through relations with humanitarian agencies and the UN, many SPLA/M leaders initially engaged the wider international community. Although linked to attempts to enhance the SPLA/M's ability to operate more effectively and to access scarce resources for fighting the war, these relations were crucial for the development of a notion of Southern sovereignty and the wider international recognition of South Sudan as a legitimate entity whose people deserved self-determination.

With its later victories in the 1980s and the development of widespread 'liberated areas' in the South, the SPLA/M maintained dominance over vast swathes of Southern Sudan. While the larger organisation devised civil administrations and developed various codes of conduct, the military commander of any given area retained primary authority. At its first National Convention in 1994, ideas and structures of sovereign governance were further refined. Various administrative commissions were established: Military Affairs, Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, and Civil Affairs and Interior/Law Enforcement. The convention's final report—'SPLM Vision: this Convention is Sovereign'—sets out these structures in language that proves ideas of sovereignty had surfaced well before the CPA or referendum.

Drawing on the previous efforts of the SPLA/M leadership to conduct itself as a sovereign government, the CPA set the stage for the Southern Sudan Constitution. The CPA process, however, was far from widely inclusive; much of it was resolved between small negotiating groups, appointed by John Garang and made up of his preferred intellectuals. In

many cases, deliberations were conducted privately between Garang and Vice-President Osman Taha. Since such a comprehensive document resulted, this exclusive process was not a major affront to anyone; most important, the document was understood to be temporary. The referendum and what would follow were of much greater importance.

Acrimony over SPLA/M's dominance; Kiir's 'large tent' strategy

The Interim Period's relative political stability was achieved through what the International Crisis Group has termed Kiir's 'large tent' strategy—typified by the inclusion of staunch opponents, such as Paulino Matip, in the SPLA/M.³ At the time of independence, the SPLM was composed of many divergent actors representing many divergent interests: Garang's faithful; members of various tribes or patronage groups; long-time SPLA/M members; and members who had defected only to return. Salva Kiir was the only remaining original leader; many others had defected and rejoined, like Machar and Akol, some even making these moves repeatedly.

The creation of the Transitional Constitution was as much a part of the politics of balancing such competing groups and individuals as it was the technical act of composing a constitution. In the run up to independence and the discussions over the constitution, Kiir announced his intention to conduct an inclusive process of deliberation, consistent with his earlier efforts to reconcile with many of the armed groups and political factions throughout South Sudan. While willing to bring most opponents into the SPLA/M's fold, Kiir seemed much less concerned about co-opting the few opposing political parties that existed outside the SPLM than about integrating the various armed groups, and thus raised some political ire. Most vocal was Lam Akol's SPLM-Democratic Change (SPLM-DC) which, while very small, had been growing. Resentment among the SPLM's Southern political opposition over this CPA process was compounded greatly by the dubious April 2010 elections, during which the SPLM propped up unpopular governors in several states, secured the Southern presidency effectively unopposed, and dominated regional and state legislatures.

After Garang's death in 2005, the job of shepherding the SPLM and the South throughout the CPA period fell to Salva Kiir. His background in military intelligence in the SAF during the 1970s and his consolida-

tion of the SPLA in the months after his arrival in Ethiopia led to an alternative approach to dealing with external and internal opposition and any dissension or acrimony. He first engaged with Southern groups vocally opposed to the CPA because of personal animosity towards Garang. Holding Garang up as a martyr in death, Kiir also dealt with several Other Armed Groups (OAGs). This effort culminated in the Juba Declaration of 2006 that brought most of these groups into the GoSS and integrated their forces into the SPLA. As a part of a South-South dialogue facilitated by churches, NGOs and the GoSS, various reconciliation events were conducted.

Late 2005 was too early to decentralise totally, but nevertheless a moderate form of decentralisation was an important element in Kiir's strategy, and has been confusing for many. Kiir and the leadership of the GoSS were attempting to maintain stability in an already decentralised South, at least in terms of power structures, but were in most respects conducting affairs with a centralised conception of power and authority, as Garang had done, with some expression of decentralisation as a goal, accepting in particular that substantial authority should rest with governors of the ten states. Kiir's gesture towards decentralisation was linked not only to managing local actors, but also to responding to international advice to push for more 'grassroots' efforts; he had to keep the US and other internationals placated to secure their strategic backing for South Sudanese independence. Thus Kiir and the GoSS were engaging in an often contradictory process of openly advocating local governance with a federalist bent while conducting affairs as an ultimately centralised authority.

Kiir also tried to overcome some of the internal dissent within the SPLM and to mitigate the personal competition that had risen to the fore as individuals and groups jockeyed for power in the wake of Garang's passing. Using the SPLM's political bureau as a site for leaders to air grievances, Kiir essentially let individuals 'have at each other' vocally, only to intervene and reconcile the situation. Another key element of the strategy was the use of the administrative elements of the GoSS, the police and other security services, and the army in particular, as the loci for political wrangling, not for building either effective bureaucracy or technical efficiency but to offer posts and salaries to bring as many people and groups in support of the SPLM government as possible. This process served an important role in managing political instability, but undermined, or at least has delayed, the creation of effective institutions

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necessary for managing a sustainable state. In working to reconcile major Southern political players, Kiir was leaving an important element of building a national identity and agenda unaddressed: the use of the government to improve key national infrastructure and economy. The public finance situation tells this story most clearly, with the overwhelming bulk of the budget going to salaries rather than capital institutional costs or national infrastructure. The most acute expression of this among all government spending concerned the army, with a three-to-one salary to capital expenditure ratio; it is usually near the reverse. On the eve of independence, there was growing frustration at seeing little benefit from the CPA period, outside the relative peace and stability of government—itsself no small feat.

To a large extent, the CPA period was intended to further basic governance beyond the limited apparatus that operated during the war. Perhaps the biggest challenge was the sheer lack of necessary fundamentals. In 2005, Southern Sudan was estimated to have 86 medical doctors, 600 nurses, 23 judges and fewer than 100 trained lawyers.⁴ To add to the situation few of these professionals would be considered as meeting a higher standard of qualification as would be expected in the West. Thus, it was exceedingly difficult to staff a nascent civil service and fill quotas in GoNU ministries, especially with the NCP eager to highlight the weakness of Southern governance to obfuscate its own nefarious behaviour. In this sense, the SPLM and GoSS deserve recognition for establishing a basic structure of governance in one of the most miserably poor and underdeveloped spots on the planet.

Kiir argued that reforming the existing bureaucracy was a major challenge: 'We inherited a corrupt system of civil service that was used as part of counter-insurgency warfare to bribe and soothe Southerners not to join the SPLM but to mobilize them against the SPLM.'⁵ He noted that a large part of the GoSS's budget—40 per cent in 2008—went towards state salaries, especially to the pay of the SPLA; this expense was compounded by the requirement to absorb large numbers of other members into the army. Reconciling competing claims to peace dividends and co-opting political or military groups to build coherence before the elections in 2010 and the referendum in 2011 took priority over development initiatives.⁶ Thus, assessing the CPA period's governance developments using economic development or basic service provision as a measure, as is the international community's tendency, ignores the fact

that the more immediate challenge was reconciling the often violent political space, and that most of the elements of government were focused on internal SPLM politics.

Under Kiir there has been a monumental shift in the politics of the SPLM: from Garang's national Sudanese politics and New Sudan vision to Southern nation-building. Although the SPLM was given some key positions in Khartoum after the CPA, it was clear from the outset that Kiir's primary focus was to be in Juba.

This process encountered a major setback, however: the CPA-mandated national elections. Although slated to be held by July 2009, the elections did not take place until July 2010 because of logistical issues and obstructionist politics from Khartoum. The associated tensions reached an apex when, in October 2007, the SPLM walked out of the Government of National Unity in Khartoum over such unfulfilled benchmarks as border demarcation, the disputed census, and concerns about Abyei. This confrontation allowed a refocusing of the agenda in a way that helped coalesce the SPLM and Southerners in opposition to Khartoum.

Such a focus on the enemy in Khartoum was essential because in the South, the SPLM's coherence was shaken by the confusion over its selection criteria for nominating candidates. There was no major opposition party at the time, so one could almost argue that the elections in the South were conducted within the SPLM. At the SPLM's Second National Convention, it had become clear that, under a truly inclusive selection process, many local political figures would be chosen over the major GoSS players. This was not surprising: many SPLM/A leaders had spent much of the previous 30 years away from their home localities, visiting infrequently at best. When it appeared that several sitting ministers would not be selected to represent their home areas, Kiir and the political bureau abandoned the system initially intended for delegate selection. Instead, they chose representatives for the Convention and then used the same method to select candidates for election. Their process was not totally arbitrary; they applied a nomination formula based in part on seniority in the SPLM. Yet, to many this shift was an affront to the democratic principles presented as central to the movement, and to the efforts toward a sovereign democratic South Sudan or a New Sudan.

In response, many SPLM leaders ran as independent candidates against the chosen SPLM members, believing that, under a more democratic

selection process, they might have been chosen to run by the membership from their home areas. Some individual candidates were able to win as independents, with some even winning despite questionable efforts to affect the outcome of the vote. In the end, however, even those who won as independents subsequently returned to the SPLM fold. However, in more volatile political locations, Kiir and the political bureau made largely unilateral decisions regarding who would hold political office.

Despite its effort to resolve the political space in the run-up to the elections, the SPLM leadership fuelled a degree of opposition grievance. As the election results emerged, it was clear that the GoSS and SPLM authorities had engaged in questionable conduct and manipulation. The international community, despite significant reservations, did recognise the elections' outcome; however, many SPLM members, particularly those who ran as independents, were very angry.

Several of the former SSDF militia leaders who had been integrated into the SPLA and GoSS as part of the Juba Declaration of 2006, such as Gabriel Tang, again took up their guns. More important, however, was the defection of key SPLM/A leaders, such as George Athor who raised a force and destabilised his home area. Unlike the former SSDF leaders who defected, Athor was an SPLM stalwart from the early days of the war and a Deputy Chief of Staff in the SPLA when he officially retired from the army to run for Governor of Jonglei; a vote he had little chance of winning against the largely popular and powerful incumbent Kuol Manyang, a senior former SPLA commander. While Athor's was the most extreme response of those aggrieved by the election, numerous SPLM leaders and members of government rebelled, including Gatluak Gai in Unity State, David Yau Yau in Jonglei, and Deng Dau in Northern Bahr al-Ghazal. Most returned to the fold of the SPLM shortly after their moment of frustrated dissidence; however, in the run up to the referendum Gai, Yau Yau, and Athor remained in arms against the government, despite repeated efforts at reconciliation, including offers of amnesty and concessions for the individual defectors and their forces.

In the aftermath of the election fracas, the GoSS returned to its efforts to consolidate the political space. Although contentious, the elections were not viewed as the critical event of the CPA period. Instead, the GoSS's focus was on the referendum scheduled for 9 January 2011. Looking to secure consensus between the SPLM and opposition parties in advance of the referendum, Kiir and the SPLM leadership convened the

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All Southern Sudan Political Parties' Conference in October 2010. This is significant since it would not have been strange for Kiir and the SPLM to simply ignore the small number of small and largely irrelevant formal opposition political parties.

Anticipating a Southern vote to secede, the conference concluded a charter to see the South through to the point when a permanent national constitution could be established. Of particular importance were the resolutions to:

- 1) carry out a constitutional review on the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan from 2005
- 2) draft a permanent constitution for the new independent and sovereign state of South Sudan
- 3) discuss and agree on an interim broad-based national government, under the current President of the Government of Southern Sudan, H.E. Salva Kiir Mayardit, to assume office as of 10 July 2011
- 4) decide on the length of the Interim Period, necessary to carry out the general elections for the Constituent Assembly

The declaration was rather ambiguous, and proved contentious. For instance, did broad participation refer to the designing of the permanent or the transitional constitution? Did it imply, as well, power sharing and cabinet appointments during the transitional period for representatives of the various parties?

The Conference also resulted in an agreement to create a 'South Sudan Political Parties Leaders Forum' (SSPPLF) to ensure the implementation of its resolutions. Opposition parties were ultimately included in the technical drafting committee for the transitional constitution, but they had little role or consequence. After the referendum, when the committee began its work, this agreement on cooperation quickly disintegrated. Led by Lam Akol, who was angling for a position in the transitional government, most of the opposition parties refused to be involved because they felt they had been rendered irrelevant.

The GoSS executive and the leadership of the army and police determined, for the most part, not to engage the various dissidents too heavily in the lead up to independence, for fear of provoking retaliation; they simply moved to contain those dissidents. The risks to civilian communities were too high. In Southern Sudan, most military forces lived near a headquarters, connected to a village where many of the soldiers' extended

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families also reside. Incidents between such militias nearly always resulted in violence committed against civilians; this fact limited the options available to Southern Sudanese security services and army when confronting dissident armed groups.

Often the only apparent peaceful option was some kind of deal to reintegrate the dissidents and their forces, typically buying them off with positions and cash. This led to a cycle of integration, disintegration, resolution, cooption and integration: the same individuals, and a growing number of leaders, defected only to return, collect pay-offs and defect again. Without strong control by the central government, there was little to stop this kind of behaviour; incentives remained high, and sanctions almost non-existent.

After the referendum and the political deliberations that followed, the GoSS did use limited force in an effort to contain dissidents who continued to cause instability, eventually tracking down and killing George Athor just as he reentered South Sudan territory after peace talks failed in Nairobi.⁷ While the SPLA was accused of human rights violations for the harshness of one such attack, it was becoming increasingly clear that such action might be the only way to deal with these dissident groups. Many in the international community abhorred this forceful approach, but asserting a monopoly of force was critical for the GoSS to become an effective government.

Despite the consistent suggestion by various analysts that there was little chance of the referendum being held on time and without major problems, the vote occurred on time and with few issues. Unlike the national elections, the referendum was largely in the GoSS's hands and was unencumbered by requirements to collaborate with Khartoum. With key assistance from the UN, various donor governments and international organisations, Kiir delivered the vote with a resounding 97.83 per cent in favour of secession—such an overwhelming majority was the only outcome that he would have viewed as a success. While not without questionable conduct, the referendum and the momentum it created precluded any deep critique by outside observers; although some, like the Carter Center, did flag issues, the referendum was recognised as a definitive moment of self-determination by Southern Sudanese people to embark upon the creation of a sovereign state with the SPLM and Salva Kiir at the helm.

In the immediate aftermath of the referendum, the rapidly escalating security situation in Abyei became of central concern. Work on the tran-

sitional constitution, in which Abyei was initially declared to be within the new state, was conducted with the threat of a return to open war. The Misseriya's anger at Abyei's inclusion in South Sudan was eventually followed by action; the SAF moved into Abyei town and took control of the area by force, thus scattering the SPLA and driving nearly the entire population of the region southward towards Warrap and Northern Bahr al-Ghazal States.

More than any other territory, however, the Nuba Mountains are likely to draw South Sudan into continued conflict with Sudan. This contentious area has further polarised the political space inside the SPLM and the South. Various key groups inside the SPLM have been aligning in preparation for continued conflict along the border and for proxy war between the NCP and SPLM: the NCP supports former proxy militias in the South; the SPLM, groups in Nuba Mountains, Darfur and Blue Nile. Since the few opposition parties have connections to proxy forces used against the SPLA during the war, the SPLM has little interest in engaging with them. As is often the case in South Sudan, the climate of suspicion and paranoia is not without justification.

This political environment has exacerbated the deep divisions that have always been the SPLM's major vulnerability. In the run up to independence this trend created further factionalism: leaders defensive about being labelled seditious and associated with Khartoum began to stake out their political support bases. Rumours of political conspiracy abounded in the weeks leading to independence, several relating to the constitutional drafting process. The most dangerous rumour implicated Vice-President Riek Machar in an effort to align his Nuer followers with Equatorians in opposition to Kiir and his Bahr al-Ghazal Dinka supporters, and to take control of the government. Such rumours have further reduced the degree of inclusiveness in the constitutional drafting process.

The spirit of cooperation and consensus that pervaded the October 2010 conference receded rapidly following the referendum. On 21 January 2011 Kiir established the Technical Committee to Review the Interim Constitution, mandated to transform the interim constitution into one suited for a sovereign state, and to guide the emergence of the new state. Initially, the committee had 24 members, all but one of whom were SPLM members; not surprisingly, the committee's composition was controversial and drew criticism for not being sufficiently inclusive and

for sidelining the Bor Dinka and intelligentsia that Garang had been grooming for power. In response, Kiir expanded the committee to include 11 more members from other political parties, and 17 more SPLM members. Operating on a simple majority procedure, the committee remained dominated by a small group from within the SPLM. Frustrated opposition party representatives walked out and refused to participate in the discussions. Kiir's expansion was little more than a gesture; but it is difficult to see how Kiir might have seen the value in greater influence for a small number of largely insignificant political parties.

Civil society groups also criticised the constitutional process, citing lack of public comment and the initial appointment of only one civil society member on the technical committee.⁸ However, outside the churches, a few small organisations, and a handful of associations in the major towns, at independence there was little formalised civil society to speak of. Thus these critiques about the absence of civil society groups were largely lacking in foundation: whom would the government draw in?

Some questioned why a transitional constitution was even needed.⁹ As a result of the CPA, South Sudan already had an interim constitution, governance structure, army and nascent civil service. The transitional constitution would address only small alterations and additions, such as security agencies and services; the key underlying structure and principles of governance remained similar. Others speculated that major changes were actually being made; Lam Akol (a long-time political agitator and key leader of the 1991 split) consistently asserted that, 'They were supposed to making only minor changes to the Interim Constitution but they have written a new constitution ... that was meant to be decided (later) in the constitutional conference'.¹⁰

Actually, the committee interpreted its mandate quite narrowly, regarding it as a technical review of the ICSS in order to make the constitution document suitable for independence. Hence it deemed wide consultation or a publicised process unnecessary. It delivered the amended draft to the President on 20 April. The document was presented to the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly on 5 May.

In real terms, little of great substance changed during the drafting of the transitional constitution. Concern was raised over the length of the presidential term, and whether that term could be considered to have begun in April 2010, after the elections, or in July 2011, after independence. The SPLM, not surprisingly, argued for the latter as the most prac-


tical and stable approach. More controversial were the president's powers to remove elected state governors or dissolve legislative assemblies in the event of threats to national security and territorial integrity—powers deemed by many as undermining the democratic principles of elected office, as well as the system of federalism.

Indeed a powerful presidency appeared to be a key characteristic of the constitution, with the president retaining the power to appoint the chairpersons of independent commissions and to remove ministers without the assembly's consent. The president was also given power to appoint new members to the National Legislative Assembly and the Council of States, and to convene a National Constitutional Review Commission, appointing its members in consultation with political parties and civil society organisations. The commission would conduct a review of the transitional constitution; this suggests the transitional constitution might form the basis for the permanent one, undermining claims that these new presidential powers would only be temporary.

The draft constitution's terms were justified on the basis that the nascent state required robust central authority to overcome insecurity and dysfunctional local governance, and that the measures were temporary and subject to review in the drafting of the permanent constitution. However, the draft contained no guarantees regarding the limited application of presidential powers or the inclusive development of the permanent constitution. For many, credible arguments favouring the government's position were undermined by its track record.

As independence drew nearer, significant dissent regarding the constitutional process developed within the SPLM itself. The most volatile and dangerous incident involved Vice-President Riek Machar seemingly working to have presidential powers reduced and the succession for the transitional period changed. Machar suggested numerous amendments, including one to provide that, in the event the president's seat should fall vacant, the vice-president should see out the remainder of the president's term. This proposed amendment prompted questions over Machar's intentions post-independence, and was perceived as a loosely veiled threat to Kiir's power.¹¹

During the months of constitutional deliberations, old fault lines have re-emerged in the Greater Upper Nile region—home of the South's oil fields—as military commanders, previously loyal to Machar's old faction and led by Major-General Gadet, have again taken up arms against



Sudan ceremonially hauled down the British and Egyptian flags from the palace at Khartoum and all other flagstaffs in the country and hoisted the Sudanese flag on January 1, 1956. (AP Photo)



A raid on a village in Southern Sudan, 1967. (AP Photo)



John Garang with his then Chief of Staff, Lt. Col. William Nyoun Bany, in 1986. Nyoun Bany later defected and fought against SPLA forces that remained loyal to John Garang. (AP Photo/Jerry Gray)




John Garang near the town of Kapoeta on September 11, 1986. (AP Photo)



James Grant, chief coordinator of the massive U.N. effort (Operation Lifeline Sudan) to stave off starvation in war-torn Southern Sudan. He is seeing off a 22 truck convoy from Kenya's capital in January 1989. (AP Photo/Asim)



Sudanese boys in a displaced persons camp with about 10,000 other children on September 20, 1991, after fleeing refugee camps in Ethiopia that May. (AP Photo)



Sudanese President Omar Bashir addressed a pro-government rally in Khartoum on January 14, 1997. During his address Bashir ruled out any compromise with the SPLA/M, which had just seized the towns of Kurmuk and Qasan near the Ethiopian border. (AP Photo/Raouf Moh)



Kerbino Kuanyin Bol, former commander with the SPLA and later leader of a break-away armed group that fought against the SPLA, signed a peace treaty on April 21, 1997 in Khartoum agreeing to fight on behalf of the government. He later returned to the SPLA fold before being killed. (AP Photo/Raouf Moh)



Sudan's Islamic government and four Southern rebel groups signed a peace treaty on April 21, 1997 in Khartoum. Front row from the left: Kerbino Kuniyin Bol, of the SPLA of Bahr-Ghazal; the first vice-president of Sudan, General Zubair Mohamed Saleh; Dr. Riek Machar of the SSIM. Behind from the left: Chadian President Idris Deby; Sudanese President Omar Bashir; Central African President Felix Patasse; and Dr. Hassan Turabi. (AP Photo/Raouf Moh)



Ghazi Salah al-Din Attabani, Sudanese President Omar Bashir's peace adviser left, shakes hands with Salva Kiir Mayardit, leader of Sudan People's Liberation Army delegation, right, as Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi looks on at the Nairobi State House on July 20, 2002. (AP Photo/Sayyid Azim)



Sudanese President Omar Bashir holds hands with leader of the Sudan People's Liberation Army Dr. John Garang de Mabior at the NCP's headquarters in Khartoum, Sudan on July 8, 2005. It was the first time Garang had set foot in the capital in 22 years, ahead of his swearing in as First Vice President. The crowds that welcomed him were immense. (AP Photo/Abd Raouf)



Sudanese army soldiers salute as the coffin of John Garang, First Vice President of Sudan, sits on the tarmac at Juba airport on August 6, 2005 following his death in a helicopter crash in Southern Sudan. (AP Photo/Sayyid Azim)



The leader of the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF), General Paulino Matip, right, greets First Vice President and Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) leader, Salva Kiir Mayardit at the Republican Palace in Khartoum on August 13, 2005. (AP Photo/Abd Raouf)



SPLA soldier at the General Headquarters in Juba looking for registration details on where to vote in the January 2011 referendum. (Viktor Pesenti)



Major General Malual Ayom Dor casting his vote in the January 2011 referendum. (Viktor Pesenti)



SPLA soldiers waiting to vote in the January 2011 referendum. (Viktor Pesenti)



Salva Kiir Mayardit, President of the Government of Southern Sudan, addressed large crowds following the announcement of preliminary referendum results in Juba, Southern Sudan on January 30, 2011. (AP Photo/Pete Muller)



People gather around a statue of former Southern Sudanese leader John Garang, draped in the national flag of South Sudan, during independence celebrations in Juba, South Sudan on July 9, 2011. (AP Photo/David Azia)

the government. Machar has not been directly implicated, but the relationship between the political and military opposition to the government is complex.

Rumours were rampant at the time that Kiir intended to use his new powers immediately after independence to replace state governors and the majority of the Council of Ministers. He did not make anything near such sweeping changes, most governors remaining in place. Even though there has been less volatility than some characterise, such widespread insecurity within the political elite has provoked counter-rumours of plans to remove Kiir. As with the elections, the SPLM's internal deliberations and controversies were the most significant difficulties during the drafting of the Transitional Constitution; this will likely be the case again as the Republic of South Sudan Government moves to deliberate a fixed Constitution.

The role of parliament

Many perceived the presentation of the Draft Transitional Constitution to the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly (SSLA) on 5 May as a final opportunity to inject broader public opinion and aspirations into the constitutional review process. Various groups made up of the key parliamentary committees were formed to review and report on all articles of the draft. Under the terms of the Interim Constitution, Parliament had two months to consider the draft before commencing formal debate on 5 July, just four days before independence.

The majority of members of the SSLA expressed an interest in conducting a thorough and inclusive review of the draft document, and correspondingly articulated various concerns over its content. The SSLA's capacity to conduct such a review was certainly limited; however, there was a body of competence among many of the older members to contribute substantively to a review process. The real problem was apparent lethargy and disinterest on the part of the high level SPLM leadership regarding deliberations, whether stemming from a desire to move the process forward or to exclude the views of those who were not stalwart SPLM supporters or who, not having been involved in the fighting, were less respected.

Open hearings were held to invite public comment; debate flourished in the embryonic local media and between the educated elite: all to the

frustration of the government, which was intent to focus on preparing for independence celebrations, uninterested in critical debate with a view to amending the document, and angered by resistance to various provisions that empowered the president. The government moved to contain the debate and limit the circulation of the draft document. Kiir, it seems, simply assumed that his party would pass the document with little contestation.

As contention grew, Kiir addressed the SPLM Caucus—representing more than 90 per cent of parliamentarians—and warned them that far-reaching debate was not appropriate. His warning was not heeded. In response, on 8 June, in an address to the Speakers' Forum, he delivered an uncharacteristically outspoken address, warning the SSLA to 'concentrate on the document passed by the GoSS Council of Ministers'. He further accused individuals of trying to promote disunity by challenging the draft in advance of 9 July, singling out a number of guilty parties, most notably Vice-President Riek Machar.

After all the contestation and deliberation, the Transitional Constitution was passed just three days before independence. Few changes were included. The only major concession to the critics was a provision requiring that development of a permanent constitution should begin within six months of independence.

The extraordinary tone of Salva Kiir's 8 June speech confirmed the political significance of the constitutional drafting process. His rare show of emotion brought to the surface old tensions with Vice-President Riek Machar, whose history, along with other political and personal tensions, has continued to influence politics. Drafting a permanent constitution may well create a situation where more significant and risky confrontations could occur.

However, the greatest political danger arising from the constitutional process may be the response of the Equatorian tribes inhabiting the southern belt of South Sudan. Historically less prone to militarism than the Dinka and Nuer tribes, this population is generally speaking more educated and wealthier than other groups owing to the strong connection with neighbouring Uganda and Kenya. This means that many of the Equatorian elite strongly favour federalism for South Sudan, recalling the politics of re-division, whereby Equatorians supported delineation of South Sudan into three regions, which fuelled the return to war in the early 1980s.

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From 2005, Kiir navigated the South through turbulent times by demonstrating an instinct for political accommodation. This instinct appears to have reached its zenith in the October 2010 All Political Parties' Conference. Since that time he has reversed course, threatening opponents and repressing dissent. His actions have fed existing tribal and political tensions, and encouraged alternative means of resistance. He has neither articulated legitimate reasons why greater presidential powers may be needed nor reassured opponents with concessions, such as a detailed roadmap for an inclusive drafting process for a permanent constitution or a shorter transitional period before elections.

In the end, the essential feature of the constitutional deliberations, as with much of the political manoeuvring during the Interim Period, was that politicians were looking to secure positions for themselves and their allies in government. Whether arguing under the pretext of the language of 'inclusive cabinet', or competing over the terms of security service provisions, the focus has been on posts, and their perceived authority, that might translate into local influence or access to government resources. As during the Addis Ababa period, many politicians focused on individual and parochial interests, rather than building institutions based on a vision of a suitable democracy and governance for the new republic.

Section 2: Keeping it together; confronting the revival of Other Armed Groups

Unless the enemy causes us to split, the war is over.

Riek Machar, November 2004¹²

The obvious hope of the CPA process and the subsequent independence of South Sudan was that peace would finally be secured. However, independence in itself is not synonymous with peace. Francis Deng argued in 1994 that partition 'could well aggravate them [various southern groups] in the short run'.¹³ At independence, the international press described the volatile situation in Southern Sudan: 'This year [2011] has been South Sudan's most violent since civil war ended in 2005, with 2,368 civilians dying in rebel attacks and ethnic violence, including cattle raids, compared with 940 last year, according to the UN. As many as nine militia groups operate mainly along the border with the north, close to oil fields.'¹⁴

It seems, as Deng suggested, official peace and independence in the South do not equal a peaceful state of affairs. Non-state armed groups and cattle raiding are not surprising; much of the violence in South Sudan is cyclical or follows a rough pattern. Cattle raiding coincides with the dry season (a specific 'raiding season' is even apparent in some areas)¹⁵ and proxy/armed-groups aggravation is linked to manipulations of the cattle markets; other apparently localised systems of violence are connected to higher level political machinations in Juba and the state capitals, and are by no means discrete. Yet often, external observers miss a great deal of this political wrangling or, worse, discount it.

Because South Sudanese politics are interwoven with low intensity warfare, inter-communal violence (and even localised criminality and inter-personal violence) and the ability to threaten violence, this section will discuss how reforming the security sector and addressing security threats are as much an element of politics as are the deliberations over the transitional constitution. Successive regimes in Khartoum have divided and ruled Sudan using a variety of means to pit various groups on the periphery against each other. Thus we will begin with a detailed discussion of the process of reconciling outstanding armed groups, often called the 'South-South process', and the development of the security sector, before finally considering the international role in the SSR with a particular focus on the DDR process.

The status of CPA issues still remaining at independence

The CPA's Interim Period was relatively peaceful, considering the historical context. While there was serious intertribal violence, often revolving around cattle raiding and other localised issues, mass violence between the SAF and the SPLA did not occur. There was, however, serious violence along the border with the North, particularly in the transitional areas (Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile and Abyei): what that violence tells us about the fledgling republic is important. The use of violence by various groups, and the government security services' response to that violence, will be a formative dynamic in the emergence of the new state. Moreover violence in the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile areas, which are deeply linked to South Sudan and the SPLM, contributes to this dynamic.

'South-South' violence persisted throughout the Interim Period, and notably escalated in association with the elections and after the referen-

dum. The new state faces other major security challenges as well, particularly the direct threat from Sudan's military and security forces along the border. The SPLA identified and prioritised various major problems during its restructuring efforts, including border defence; international terrorism (with special concern over the LRA and Al-Shabab); and internal destabilisation caused by Khartoum.¹⁶ While still construing these significant threats as driven by external actors, the SPLA and most of the government acknowledge that many threats are internal challenges to the SPLM's near-monopoly over government. Those looking to challenge the government or SPLM dominance must act in the space where no actor has yet asserted a monopoly: the security sector. At independence the government had yet to secure a monopoly over violence; many individuals and groups thus continued to use violence to further their political or personal agendas.

Security issues are not simply about the proliferation of small arms or the size of the military; they are more about reconciling the underlying structure of power. To further democratic governance, the government must maintain a monopoly over violence and force rather than politics. The UN's quasi-religious focus on DDR and small arms control, along with nebulous concepts such as Community Security, is founded on assumptions relevant to often entirely different political models. Such a policy reflects the thought that rhetoric and an understanding of related processes solve security problems; they do not. Moreover, with the new government following such a logic, as laid out in the South Sudan Development Plan, rather than substantive design based on local knowledge and informed by international best-practice or technical support, an ill-suited rhetoric of conflict resolution and state-building risks being dominant.

OAG issues linger

While it is an admirable goal to decouple politics and the use of armed violence, violence is currently a prominent element of South Sudanese politics. A gradual process of change that appreciates the importance of the army and the police being a space for politics is needed. Kiir and his government face a strikingly difficult balance between reforming the security sector in line with best practice and dealing with a political environment that remains deeply construed in terms of potential for armed

force and threat of destabilisation, linked to a longstanding practice of raiding and communal violence that has been exacerbated by war. The simple imposition of Western-style conventional force structures and modes of conduct would be extremely dangerous.

Salva Kiir's 'large tent'/'big tent' strategy extended his attempt to fold in the many forces that remained outside the SPLA/M in the wake of the CPA. On several occasions Kiir has offered a blanket amnesty to those individuals and groups that continued to oppose the SPLM government—at the time of the Juba Declaration, during negotiations with dissidents after the 2010 national elections, and again in his speech at Independence Day celebrations. Unfortunately, this strategy has been manipulated by those accustomed to using violence to gain concessions. In effect, it has created incentives for destabilising the country rather than for constructive contributions to nation-building.

Kiir's early successes with this strategy resulted to a significant degree from Garang's death. Many of the forces that had aligned with the SAF and Khartoum in various guises throughout the war had been coaxed back into the SPLA/M in the years preceding the CPA; Garang's reconciliations with Machar's South Sudan Independence Movement and the Equatorian Defence Forces (EDF) were major achievements. But individuals and forces that harboured animosity towards Garang held out on integrating until Kiir became head of the SPLM.

Kiir argued that, with independence looming, dissidents should agree to join with the government to achieve the goals they had long expressed as their own, even when fighting against the SPLA/M. He also engaged groups not historically connected to the SPLA/M, or even the South, to move into its camp: for instance, major political work was undertaken to bring the Debab forces on side with Juba when they inhabited the border area. Combined with work by Abdel Aziz, Malik Agar, Yasir Arman and the SPLM-North, Kiir's efforts began to build momentum.

Major success came in 2006 with the Juba Declaration, which brought the largest outstanding group of SSDF forces, those led by Paulino Matip, into the SPLA/M. Matip was made the Deputy Commander and Chief of the SPLA, and many of his officers and men were officially integrated into the SPLA. This deal initially appeared promising, but Matip and his officers were for the most part sidelined, and many became disgruntled.

Matip's post was an invention, and apparently without any real authority. Whether denied the opportunity to participate or unwilling to engage,

Matip has had next to no involvement in the details of government since he took the post, at least apart from the need to continue to placate him as he was perceived to pose a potential threat should he cease to support the government. In this sense, the post can be perceived as a formalised pay-off, indicative of the nature of the integration that occurred across much of the army. At independence, although some disgruntled SSDF leaders rejected the Juba Declaration and returned to open rebellion, most of the men and officers remained in the SPLA. The risk that more might defect and spark further aggravations remains one of the greatest threats to security and stability in South Sudan post-independence.

While Matip seems content with his new position, many of his former subordinates have been involved in active insurgency. Matip's role in this insurgency is unclear; however, he remains a key figure in securing the republic's political stability. Deals to maintain his allegiance are critical for Kiir to bring his incorporative strategy to success while navigating contentious issues of 'state-building'. The SPLA clearly knows this, yet continues to treat the integrated forces with a level of disregard that could result in disaster if someone like Peter Gadet, Matip's former deputy in the SSDF, is able to stir up wider opposition to Kiir and the SPLM.

Gadet defected not long after he had been moved from one army position to another—a change he considered a demotion. With support in his home area and the loyalty of his former soldiers, many of whom left their deployments in Upper Nile, and with the help of Bol Gatkouth, a former SSDF spokesperson and former SPLM member of the SSLA, Gadet launched an open insurrection based at Maniken, in Mayom County of Unity State. His Mayom Declaration expressed the group's reasons for action, criticising among other things the SPLM and the process of developing the Transitional Constitution. The group also challenged the SPLM's competence at governance, questioned its use of oil revenue, and accused it of growing corruption.¹⁷

Not long after launching this insurrection, Gadet and Gatkouth accepted the amnesty Kiir offered at the independence celebrations. Gadet's loyalty has been purchased for a combination of substantial financial incentives, an amnesty, and a return to high rank in the army. Many of his men have remained in open rebellion; they were not offered as lucrative deals.¹⁸

Combined with growing political divisions between Juba and the states, and the obvious benefits of defection, there remain significant risks of

further conflict from militias integrated into the SPLA and the new army. That many of the SSDF leaders who had integrated as part of the Juba Declaration stated that they would not cause problems until after the referendum is cause for particular concern.

Defence transformation—SPLA to South Sudan Armed Forces and back to the SPLA

The 2008 SPLA White Paper on Defence is often considered the first in a series of documents aimed at guiding the SPLA's transformation and development—some suggest this perception is because the paper was driven by British and American support.¹⁹ To see the White Paper, though it is an important development, outside a much longer history of change ignores the significant planning efforts developed by the SPLA itself, particularly after the 1994 National Convention and in the months leading to the CPA. The SPLA made many significant decisions about its structure as it evolved from the small-armed group in camps in Ethiopia to the force that compelled the NCP government to accept the terms of the CPA in 2004/05. Also, this ignores the great importance of the core structural and conceptual foundations of the army in the Ethiopian mass mobilisation force model, adopted because of the close relationship with and dependence on the Derg for much of the first half of the war.

The doctrine and structure of the SPLA were probably transformed more in the years preceding the CPA, from the late 1990s to 2004, than in those after it. During the earlier period central issues arose, such as adopting of the norms of warfare embodied by international humanitarian law, as well as more conventional structures and methods of communicating commands and orders. Most important was the SPLA's move to impose more stringent internal discipline and control over its forces. However, as many in the army itself admit, it continues to operate much as it always has, drawing heavily on the doctrinal basis in the influence of the Ethiopian force concept of Mengistu and the Derg.

Although these agreements were often not written as law or military code in terms immediately recognisable by Western observers, much of the acceptance of a conventional structure occurred before international assistance arrived. It was John Garang who had stipulated the move away from a guerrilla approach, adopting the trappings of an army structured around divisions. This process was accepted and the forces had been in

the process of change, albeit slowly in Western terms. For example, the SPLA Jobs Description handbook, produced from 'Mobile Headquarters' in Yei in 1997, detailed the jobs and responsibilities of most officers and positions. Despite this, assigning job descriptions has been a particular preoccupation of many international advisers.

Few recognised to what extent the army's top leadership was connected to middle- and lower-level officers. Although hierarchical, the leadership was still deeply communal: anyone connected to top officers through family or region had ready access. Many Westerners might interpret the SPLA's culture of allowing middle- and lower-ranking men and NCOs to engage with leaders this way as dysfunctional.

Owing to an overwhelming reliance on American support as the core and strategic survival strategy of the GoSS, the government's leadership had a strong inclination to placate internationals. Since there was actually little interest in major institutional transformation of the army during the Interim Period, this approach by the Southern Sudanese leaders made perfect sense. However, international assistance in defence transformation has floundered, because of its deeply different understanding of the CPA and the Interim Period. With a limited understanding of the SPLA and how it interpreted the CPA, most international efforts at security sector reform or defence transformation were doomed to have marginal impact, as with the reorganisation of the General Headquarters, or to failure, as with DDR.²⁰

In the end, the most significant problem in defence transformation up to independence was linking it to the wider security sector reform and the design of the new state. Since there has been no strategic defence or security review, there has been little to guide the process; international supporters and South Sudanese defence and security leaders have not had the opportunity to exchange understandings, or design appropriate assistance in keeping with the interests of the SPLA, donor governments, and most important, the people of South Sudan and the new state itself.

Politics in the dominant discourse of security sector reform plays a large part in assistance to the SPLA transformation process. While this is outside the scope of the present work, it is important to recognise that donor governments were bound by issues that they perceived as much more significant, whether the War on Terror or the need to frame any security work as politically palatable to domestic publics. Neither these publics nor their political actors have any appreciable understanding of

the particularities of South Sudan. For the political elites and their constituencies, South Sudan was no different from Sierra Leone or Bosnia. The goal is a safer and more secure environment for individuals and communities, as the rhetoric of human security, human rights and humanitarianism indicates, but political expediency inclines to getting a programme accepted and implemented so that it can be said something—anything—is being done, regardless of the potential for success.

The Joint Integrated Units and DDR

The future of the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) after independence remained unresolved at the time of celebrations in Juba on 9 July. The terms of the CPA were clear: should unity be chosen, the JIU was to be the core of the new Sudanese Armed Forces; should independence be chosen, they would dissolve back into their respective forces—SPLA components returning to the SPLA, and the SAF component returning north. However, most of the SAF components were Southerners, from various militias that had been used by Khartoum as proxies. Although previously aligned with the North, these forces clearly identified themselves as Southerners, and had no interest in going northward. They would have to be accommodated into the new state's security apparatus, or they would pose the same kind of threat as other remnant groups of the SSDF.

Accommodating these troops would increase the size of the SPLA, which most internationals already claimed was bloated in size and pay. More critical was the conundrum of how to accommodate these individuals while others, long-time SPLA members, were being demobilised. The political costs of not integrating them immediately would be high, but the SPLA is already suffering internal fractures associated with large integrations.

The financial burden will be significant. Although few details have been resolved, it will likely cost the equivalent of 200 million South Sudanese pounds annually to integrate the 15,000 SAF component of the JIU directly into the SPLA.²¹ The JIU also had more regular pay than those in the SPLA, and typically better provisioning. These facts add further fuel to already provocative scenarios.²²

Any attempt to demobilise them immediately is likely to meet resistance and provide justification for defections that attempt to carve out economic and political power. The Disarmament, Demobilisation, and

Reintegration (DDR) package on offer in the South is not appealing to the JIU, although some individuals may chose to accept a DDR option for personal reasons.²³ Applying the DDR as a panacea to the case of SAF JIUs in the post-independence South indicates a failure to appreciate the organisation's more fundamental political purposes, and the security challenges to the government in Juba.

Social programmes to assist widows and the wounded, pension schemes, and mechanisms such as reserve forces and development programmes linked to the army might have been established at the time of the CPA, but that opportunity was missed. In the early days after independence, if introduced as part of a full national defence and security review, such schemes could have been implemented, allowing the government options for dealing with groups like the former JIU and for re-sizing the army in ways that do not create unnecessary friction and frustration. But the international community needs to better understand how its role has undermined the development of the mechanisms necessary to deal with these problems, and to shift away from its focus for rhetorical solutions that have little value in attaining the goal of a safer, more secure environment in the new Republic of South Sudan.

Section 3: The economic situation at independence and development

Upon gaining independence, South Sudan was one of the poorest, most underdeveloped countries on the planet.²⁴ Roughly the size of France, it has only 60 kilometres of paved roads, most of those in Juba. 90 per cent of Southern Sudanese were dependent on small-scale agriculture²⁵ and nine out of ten lived on less than 1 dollar a day.²⁶ With so much of the population dependent on agrarian livelihoods, achieving basic food security has proved problematical; at the time of independence, the UN estimated that half the population was in need of food aid.²⁷ This dire situation was aggravated by the multitude of returnees coming home; estimates ranged from 850,000 to 1.5 million people.²⁸

Landlocked and with exceptionally limited infrastructure, no educated masses, and a non-existent manufacturing base, South Sudan faces extremely narrow parameters for future economic development. Its basic wealth comes from oil, various minerals, timber, the Nile River's water, and vast amounts of fertile land. Accordingly, if South Sudan is to become economically viable in the near future, that viability will have to be based

upon the development of agriculture and oil production. These prospects are bolstered further by apparent reserves of gold, silver, and copper, along with potential for other natural resources.

The South Sudan Development Plan 2011–2013, developed by the Ministry of Finance with the involvement of other key ministries and under the guidance of various international advisers, purportedly drew on material set out in previous strategic planning documents.²⁹ The development plan was presented to the Council of Ministers for approval on 5 July 2011. Although not an official draft, it was comprehensive, with a core focus on linking together governance, economic growth, social development, and security considerations. At independence the plan had not yet been released officially, although it had been essentially finalised.³⁰

In terms of economic development, the challenges highlighted are: government dependence on oil revenue (especially problematical given the volatility of global markets); the country's limited 'absorptive capacity' (capacity to manage large inflows of aid and private investment effectively); under-development of the financial sector and weak or non-existent monetary policies; and limited domestic production, leading to dependency on imports.³¹ Government efforts during the transition period are to focus on making government expenditure consistent and predictable; facilitating oil revenue stabilisation; and building non-oil revenue sources.³²

An early draft of the plan gives a succinct characterisation of the country's economic situation at independence:³³

The legacy of decades of conflict has, unsurprisingly, left South Sudan's institutions, physical infrastructure and human capital seriously depleted. Today, the economy is characterized by high oil dependence, limited domestic production and a high reliance on imports for consumption. The non-oil economy is based predominantly on subsistence farming and livestock rearing. Despite a considerable number of South Sudan's families owning livestock, cultural norms among pastoral communities often limit the ability of the people to use these assets productively.³⁴

Although clearly informed by and/or written with international assistance—it is unlikely that a Southern Sudanese would characterise the customs of cattle use as limiting productivity—this assessment sets out the socio-economic development situation well; even the somehow uncomfortable indictment of the market's inefficient use of livestock is an important point.

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In other sections, the development plan lays out the key socio-economic challenges the new state faces:

South Sudan is a poor region, despite its abundant natural resources, largely due to protracted conflict. 51 per cent of South Sudanese are poor (55 per cent in rural areas and 24 per cent in urban areas). 80 per cent of poor households depend on [subsistence] agriculture for their livelihoods. Education and health indicators are among the lowest in the world reflecting the impact of protracted conflict and limited provision of social services. Only 27 per cent of the adult population is literate compared to 87 per cent in Kenya, and less than half of all primary school age children are in school (51 per cent of boys and 37 per cent of girls). The infant mortality rate in South Sudan in 2006 was 102 per 1000 live births, while the maternal mortality rate was 2054 per 100,000 live births, the highest in the world.³⁵

Conversations with organisations such as the UNDP, Oxfam and MSF, and Southern Sudanese economists monitoring the situation, suggest that this assessment is rather optimistic; several organisations put the infant mortality rate higher and the literacy rate lower.


Macroeconomic overview at independence

It was always assumed that the deep poverty in the South was masked by the North and the oil economy when calculating indicators, such as GNI or GDP. A clear picture of the South Sudanese economy and social development is distorted by oil revenue. Even though crushing poverty and underdevelopment exist, macroeconomic indicators suggest that the new state is much better-off. Owing to the overdependence on oil, South Sudan is calculated to be a low-income country with an approximate GNI of US\$800 per person. The Ministry of Finance calculated its GDP per capita at independence as \$1,200 per person. Yet, according to the World Bank's indicators for assessing poverty and development efforts, South Sudan is one of the most underdeveloped countries in the world.

The South Sudanese government considers 50.6 per cent of the population to be below the locally construed poverty line of 2 USD per day.³⁶ The picture of poverty in South Sudan may be surprising: the oil-producing areas are the most poor; the fertile areas along the borders in Central and Western Equatoria, the least. [Figure 5.1](#) is the government's depiction of the situation.

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Figure 5.1: Poverty Incidence by State.



Source: SSCSCSE (2010), *Poverty in Southern Sudan: Estimates from NBHS 2009*.

Oil revenue is expected to drop off drastically from 2020, as the wells currently producing have passed their half-life. Unless areas not yet developed and explored prove to hold major reserves, new technology applied to the old wells will only extend their lives for several years. A steep reduction in oil revenue would place extreme pressure upon the government; even with oil revenue, its budget is overburdened. The security services and army absorb over 50 per cent of the budget, most of which goes to salaries.³⁷

Inflation has become a serious problem and is placing major pressure upon people throughout the country, particularly in the major centres. Many economists believe that inflation rates are 'threatening macroeconomic stability'.³⁸

The combination of macroeconomic instability, over-reliance on a single export commodity, and an unmanageable and shortsighted budget poses a major challenge to South Sudan's ability to maintain security and improve standards of living. The Joint Donor Team (representatives from

several major donors to the World Bank Multi Donor Trust Fund, based in Juba) raised alarm about the GoSS budget early in the CPA period, and little has changed in its assessment. The South Sudan Development Plan is the only expression of intent to change the serious economic situation in which the government finds itself. With such serious issues to be faced, the choice of leaders for key ministries, such as Finance, Investment and other development-related ministries, is critical. Curiously, despite having many leaders with impressive educational backgrounds and experience, for example in finance and economics, the ministers, undersecretaries and directors in government are rarely posted in areas of their expertise. It is incumbent upon the government to seek out and better utilise Southern Sudanese who can do the best jobs in managing the economy.

Opportunity: development, investment, growth?

The control of the economy of Southern Sudan, and eventually all Sudan, was a central element of Garang's revolution. He understood that military and political effort would be concentrated on how resources could be acquired and divided. Early Marxist rhetoric aside, Garang's view of Sudan's political economy would probably have found approval in the currently accepted discourses of development economics and the World Bank Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).³⁹

South Sudan's development situation at independence, if considered in terms of the MDGs and other development indicators, is stark. According to many indicators, underdevelopment is so extreme that it is off the UN's charts. The child mortality rate is extreme; the infant mortality rate is extreme; the level of poverty is extreme; the maternal mortality ratio is extreme; access to sanitation is extremely low; access to education (though markedly improved in the past five years) remains extremely low; and the overall indicator of general poverty places most of the population below the locally determined poverty line—47 per cent of the population lives below the generally accepted minimum dietary consumption level. The government is acutely aware of the situation, reporting that 'South Sudan is in the bottom five countries for 11 of the 22 MDG indicators for which there are data'.⁴⁰

As an economist,⁴¹ Garang would have realised that South Sudan is faced with most, if not all, of the 'traps' preventing development. Garang's

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planning, reported to have a focus on roads and agriculture, directly addressed several of the key traps outlined by Paul Collier, the well known Oxford and World Bank economist: being plagued by conflict, being landlocked, having weak governance, and being resource rich.⁴² South Sudan also suffers from many other development traps such as endemic malaria and HIV/AIDS,⁴³ or—probably more debilitating to South Sudan—epidemic parasitic diseases and the group of infections now referred to as neglected tropical diseases (NTDs).

Table 5.1: Brief Overview of South Sudan MDG Progress.

<i>MDG</i>	<i>Indicator</i>	<i>Status at South Sudan's Independence</i>
Eradicating extreme poverty and hunger.	% population living below poverty line; % population below minimum level of dietary consumption.	50.6% and 47% respectively.
Achieving universal primary education	Enrolment rate for primary education.	48%
Reduce child mortality rates.	Infant mortality rate; child mortality rate.	131 and 385 per 1000 respectively.
Improve maternal Mortality rates.	Maternal mortality rate.	1,989 per 100, 000 live births. Highest in the world at the time.

Source: Based on interviews with Joint Donor Team Juba, South Sudan.

The long history of war has resulted in little transport or market infrastructure. There is little investment; investment, public or private, makes no sense in a climate of omnipresent risk—everything could be lost or taken in the mire of war and displacement. By virtue of being landlocked and its history of exploitation, South Sudan has the second highest transport costs in the world.⁴⁴ In addition its governance is not just weak, as in one of Collier's traps, but historically has been overwhelmingly exploitative. Combined with untold suffering during war, this exploitation has created unfortunate incentives for corruption in the post-CPA governance of South Sudan. Corruption has been a growing problem, despite

the creation of the Anti-Corruption Commission and Salva Kiir's pronouncements to shame those involved.⁴⁵ As long as there is little certainty about the future, there will be a strong incentive to secure one's person, family and extended community through state resources.

The SPLA/M's ability to implement the proposals contained in the development plan, security strategy and the Transitional Constitution will depend largely on its ability to find a way to pay for the myriad essential projects: the cost of security is increasing; the cost of infrastructure is huge; and the significant oil revenue available at independence is sustainable only for a few years. More immediately, the developing hostilities between Sudan and South Sudan may see oil revenue cut sooner rather than later, since South Sudan's oil has to move through Sudanese infrastructure to refineries and be exported from Port Sudan.

That South Sudan's dependence upon oil is alarming cannot be overstated: the economy is 98 per cent oil dependent. This is the single major threat in the short term to the new state. The only apparent alternative is demonstrable dependence on foreign aid, largely American or Chinese—the cost of which is unclear, though it will certainly present deep dependency and development challenges if accessed once oil revenues dissipate. As if foreshadowing this, during the Interim Period Juba developed an overwhelming dependency on oil revenue to pay government salaries, particularly in the SPLA, and for security and conflict mitigation projects.⁴⁶ At that same time, bilateral foreign aid and assistance from NGOs and UN agencies accounted for roughly 80 per cent of social services, such as health care, education and sanitation.⁴⁷

A person entering Juba at the start of the CPA's interim period saw a regional capital with dirt roads, decrepit colonial buildings, and a few architectural oddities from the 1970s. Outside the 'big cities' of Juba, Wau, and Malakal, Southern Sudan was a land of rural villages, dirt tracks, and vast expanses of empty space. Much of the infrastructure that has been regenerated since the CPA—the legislature, ministry buildings, ministers' homes, some of the hotels and larger buildings, and all of the paved roads—has its origins in the Addis Ababa Peace period.

While the development status of South Sudan was dire at independence, the CPA's Interim Period did achieve some major advances, which should not be understated. For those who have been working in the South for a long time, such as Dan Eiffe, the changes have seemed 'truly revolutionary'. There are new roads in the capitals and a city electric grid in

Juba. Outside Juba and the state capitals, the changes are less dramatic; however, substantial improvements have been made.

Perhaps the most significant development is the establishment of rudimentary governance where before there had been little other than government repression in the urban settings or rebel movement disarray in the hinterland. As Salva Kiir has remarked, 'the SPLM in 2005 inherited no viable state structures, no physical infrastructure, and hardly any dependable social services'.⁴⁸ Six years later, the basic structures of governance—legislative and executive branches, security services, and a judiciary—have been created. While undoubtedly limited, the creation of such institutions gave a significant head start to South Sudan's state-building process upon independence.

Major progress has been achieved in resolving the core structures of key institutions of governance, especially major ministries such as the Armed Forces or Internal Affairs (police, prisons, fire service, etc.). Although often perceived as highly tainted, the communications situation has developed to a remarkable degree. Linked to fostering an open media, effective communications are essential for the government to engage with the public for its day-to-day functionality. Unfortunately, the deals initially struck by mobile phone and satellite communications providers are tainted by corruption; in addition, the government has yet to tax these businesses effectively, although they are among the very few making the kinds of income that could yield substantial tax revenue. Nevertheless, whereas five years ago making a phone call was an exceptional process requiring a satellite phone or long-range radio, today most areas of South Sudan are covered by a mobile phone carrier. In Juba and some other towns, 3G data service functions relatively well. An amazing development, and one that has been critical for the progress of government, politics and business, and the maintenance of security and stability.

Advances towards improving the humanitarian situation have also been made. In the areas of education, health and other social service areas, minor, yet relatively speaking considerable, advances can be seen. However, given the amounts spent, there have been fewer improvements in these areas than might have been expected.

Other physical infrastructure improvements have been made: gravel roads link some major towns and cities. A core feature of Garang's development and security strategies was a wide network of roads connecting communities; these roads have reduced divisions between communities

and provide access to markets and trade, as well as allowing the government access to even the most remote communities to provide such services as education and policing. By November 2008 it was finally possible to drive from Juba to Bentiu, via Wau, and from there to Khartoum. However, infrastructure is still widely lacking; for instance, Upper Nile State is still inaccessible by road from Juba. Most of the northern area of South Sudan is only accessible from Juba by small aircraft. A major infrastructure challenge will be to connect the northern areas of South Sudan with those along the Kenya and Uganda borders.

A colonial and autocratic legacy of extraction by leaders in Khartoum means that all roads have led northwards to the core. For instance, the first railway from North to South was built in 1962 and went as far as Wau. This is still the only railway in South Sudan, and is most bitterly remembered as a tool for Khartoum waging war in the South. Indeed, a pressing concern resulting from these infrastructure limitations is that the new state will be deeply dependent on trade coming from the northern parts of South Sudan lacking ready access to Juba. This was painfully highlighted by Khartoum's unofficial blockade amidst escalating tensions over Abyei in the final months before independence. With prices of petrol and basic foodstuffs rising, Khartoum increased the political tensions for Juba. Northern trade routes account for 70 per cent of cereal supply to South Sudan; the shortfall had to be garnered from East Africa, where inflation rates were on the rise owing to drought and increased shipping costs. Compounded with a late harvest throughout the region, this threatened much of the South's food security.⁴⁹ Inflation in Juba skyrocketed to 39.4 per cent in May 2011, and in Wau and Malakal to almost 45 per cent, owing largely to increased fuel prices.⁵⁰ Such inflation and vulnerability to external pressures could create major risks of destabilisation for the young state.

Despite these challenges, at independence there has been a growing interest in investing in South Sudan. Through the work of Vice-President Riek Machar and the Minister of Information Benjamin Marial, a push is being made to attract new foreign direct investment. Machar has made several major tours of the United States and Europe in an attempt to attract investors, particularly in the oil sector. For his part, Marial has been engaged in various ministerial posts over the CPA period to develop an effective outreach for investors. However, the major hurdle of uncertain regulation and laws regarding property and taxation continues to

make attracting investment difficult. It is likely that the norm will continue to be smaller investors taking short-term approaches. In the months following independence it was essential that the government resolve the mechanisms and rules required for businesses to operate smoothly, resolve disputes, move financial resources without major hurdles, and embark on a strategy to court the right kind of investors.

The business community has a limited capacity to engage with foreign investors, because in many cases it lacks appreciation of how wider financial systems and markets function. This is compounded by ignorance concerning existent best practices in the large-scale and high-end investment and business world. More problematical is the government's unwillingness to compromise in terms that fit within the rubric of international business and capital markets. This unwillingness is rooted in a suspicion that is understandable, given the damage done in the last decades. During the war and early into the CPA period, major deals went sour or faltered because of exploitation of the Southerners' difficult situation. For instance, substantial amounts of cash were handed over to international firms, often construction companies, and their performance was substandard, or worse—the money was taken and the contractors simply deserted the project and left Sudan. Major infrastructure projects, including the building of the international airport in Juba and the government purchase of food and fuel, have been rife with such dealings. Consequently it has been difficult to get the government to engage in ways that would give foreign investors confidence, essentially limiting risks by sharing some of the investors' cash burden in projects. Sharing in these projects would be seen as taking a stake in the development effort, thus making the government appear more likely to collaborate effectively with international investors and business owners.

It will remain difficult to attract major institutional investors: the commercial and investment environment will likely continue to consist primarily of donor governments, international development agencies, and the smaller risk-averse investors in areas focused on commodities, short-term cash crops, and services to government and the international community. An important element in attracting the kind of investment required to help the economy grow in a way that benefits communities and individuals will be a strategy linking government reforms, efforts to court investors and major support to education at all levels in order to provide the essential human capital expected by any major businesses entering South Sudan.

Money and banking

During the Interim Period, the principle of 'making unity attractive' was interpreted as requiring that central authorities must be responsible for the key economic institutions. The NCP retained effective control over monetary policy and most banking, including the Central Bank, foreign exchange, most taxation, currency, revenue from oil, and disbursement of state revenue to the GoSS and state governments—the bulk of the revenue for all Sudan. The Bank of Southern Sudan (BoSS) remained under the control of the Bank of Sudan; it engaged very little with the government, while working to build its supervisory capacity and quietly prepare for relaunching itself as the central bank of South Sudan.

The GoSS was not included in the day-to-day or strategic management of these institutions in any substantive manner, and consequently has no experience in such dealings. While it has requested substantial technical and educational support from donors and other supporters, the government is faced with little extant capacity or preparation to deal with the major monetary and financial issues facing the new state.

The sector's development has been extremely limited by Khartoum's reluctance to allow the entry of banks and entities it did not directly control during the CPA period. While some banks, such as the Kenya Commercial Bank which has been supporting the development of a payroll system for the SPLA, did enter Southern Sudan before independence, the process has been very slow. There have been some attempts at setting up locally owned banks, for instance the Nile Commercial Bank and the Buffalo Bank. All the locally established banks have depended significantly on support from the BoSS and the government in Juba. Almost all of the Khartoum-based and Islamic banks pulled out of South Sudan before independence, further limiting the competitive banking environment. While growth in the industry has, for the most part, been positive, at independence the financial sector slowed owing to the delay in resolving the laws required to govern the economy and the financial services industry.

For some time before independence, plans were for the republic to launch a new currency, the South Sudan Pound. Even after independence, there remained uncertainty about how the currency system would be implemented; details of the plan were not clear until just before its launch. Many economists had advocated a fully controlled currency with a direct peg either to the US dollar or to some other stable currency, or even to a

commodity such as gold, for short-term stability. This stability would be crucial while the new government in Juba resolved many of the institutional and legal issues that could affect the wider economy. However, the government decided to issue a currency based on a managed float with a short-term one-to-one peg to the Sudanese pound, to make it easier for people changing out the old currency, which remains the currency in the Republic of Sudan.⁵¹ Market forces would be left to determine the exchange rate, with occasional interventions from the Central Bank.

This decision makes sense, given the significant dollarisation that occurred in South Sudan's economy during the CPA period. In addition, the managed float seems reasonable; a fixed or fully pegged regime would require major currency reserves, an implausible idea since the government runs a budget based simply on spending its revenue, and had very small US dollar reserves at independence.

After independence, relations with the NCP government in Khartoum became increasingly strained, especially with respect to monetary issues. As a result of conflicts with Khartoum over financial matters in the weeks leading up to the independence celebrations, and to stem fears of cash shortages in the economy, Juba launched its currency sooner than planned: on 18 July 2011, rather than some time in August.⁵² The response was lukewarm at best—people felt insufficient attention had been paid to details with regard to the money; they complained that the early release indicated the government's inability to manage the economy effectively.⁵³ Two issues dominated the major economic disagreements between capitals: the lack of agreed terms on the disbursement of cash to the South in the months leading to independence, and Khartoum's reported refusal to accept outstanding old currency back northward after independence. Khartoum was refusing to accept an estimated three billion Sudanese pounds in circulation immediately after independence.⁵⁴

Further problems arose with the effective closure of the border to the majority of trade between North and South, which combined with high inflation in East Africa in general resulted in extreme inflation throughout South Sudan; this was felt most acutely in Wau, Malakal, and Bentiu, areas difficult to access from East Africa by road.⁵⁵ As inflation hit South Sudan, the price per head of cattle used for bride price also jumped significantly; this price increase in cattle, coinciding with a particularly dry rainy season, resulted in an increased number of cattle raiding incidents.⁵⁶ Such violent conflict along the still-disputed border only adds

to the strained relations between South Sudan and Sudan already created by these monetary and economic issues.

Commodities, the initial opportunity for development: Oil, minerals, timber and agriculture

The legacy of historic extraction and underdevelopment meant that South Sudan at independence had almost no history of manufacturing and almost no significant companies, apart from the tobacco, cotton, gum arabic and other smaller production businesses owned by a few well-known business families.⁵⁷

The importance of agriculture and oil had long been obvious to the SPLA/M: the initial SPLA infrastructure targets were the oilfields and the major agricultural schemes; the Jonglei Canal was an essential part of the latter. Perhaps because of Garang's background as an agricultural economist, the movement's future development hopes focused on dispersed rural agriculture as the basis of a Southern economy. With oil becoming a tangible asset by the end of the 1990s, Garang argued the need to 'use the oil revenues to fuel agriculture'.⁵⁸ These twinned theme of oil revenue and agriculture production underpinned the SPLM's mantra for development: 'taking towns to rural areas'. This approach has been expressed in the South Sudan Development Plan, though not in as expansive a manner as it might have been. The plan sets out an oil revenue management policy, but indicates only that a detailed taxation policy is needed. It does however insist that 'oil-rent belongs to the people of South Sudan and not to private interests'.⁵⁹

Oil is of great importance to South Sudan's future development prospects. Indeed, many fear that it is too important; because of the limited nature of the resource, there is potential that it might spur both government corruption and increased tensions between Juba and Khartoum. For instance, the majority of South Sudan's northern oil reserves are in Southern Kordofan near the Nuba Mountains and adjacent to the disputed area of Abyei. Since independence there has been regular fighting in the Nuba Mountains between the government and the SPLA-North. More significantly, at independence, no agreement on oil management issues with Khartoum had been finalised; however, South Sudan hopes that if there is no return to war, Juba will receive larger amounts of revenue. Since 70 to 80 per cent of the oil in the country rests squarely in

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South Sudanese territory, it has decided that it does not want to split oil revenue 50/50 with Khartoum as initially proposed in the CPA.⁶⁰

Tensions about unresolved details of post-independence economic relations have been compounded by Khartoum's interference with South Sudan's exporting of oil through Port Sudan.⁶¹ When, in July 2011, a tanker was to depart with South Sudanese oil, Khartoum prevented the tanker from sailing, claiming unpaid transit fees of \$22.8 per barrel on oil that South Sudan sends through its pipelines. The global standard for such fees is between \$1.5 and \$2. The government in Juba claimed that Khartoum unilaterally and unexpectedly announced these fees, despite ongoing negotiations between the two states to resolve terms on oil revenue. With the competition escalating after independence, any agreements over oil remain uncertain, and regardless of government pronouncements will continue to be so for months, even years, to come. Competition over oil is likely to be the main issue that sparks major conflagration, even armed violence, between Khartoum and Juba.

An important qualification to the discussion of Juba's reliance upon oil revenue to maintain state coherence and stability is that Khartoum depends on it to an even greater extent, and in such a balance of power calculus, cutting off oil revenue threatens the NCP regime and Bashir more than it does the SPLM government under Kiir in South Sudan. Oil has long been an essential component of the Sudanese economy and critical for Bashir's NCP government to increase defence spending and engage in the arms-for-oil swaps that allowed him to maintain his campaigns in the South of the country and keep other restive populations in check. While it depends even more upon oil revenue for its budget, South Sudan's government does not depend on that revenue to maintain political control as much as the NCP does. Having managed to secure control over the South during the war, the SPLA/M would not likely confront as stringent internal opposition as Bashir and the NCP would, should the oil taps be turned off.

Also, as long as the government does not act in an extreme manner, the South has the support of much of the international community, and so its aid budgets are only likely to grow. Having cradled the new state to sovereignty, the United States is likely to continue its support—apparently not for oil, but for political influence and presence within the region. Should conflict re-ignite, the Southern forces could return to fighting as they did during the war, with few financial resources. In this sense, oil revenue is more important to the stability of Bashir's regime in Khartoum.

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As oil production increased in the CPA period, so did the budgets for the Sudanese Armed Forces and other security services; the security and defence budgets expanded nearly tenfold during the CPA peace period, primarily on the back of expanding oil production.⁶² During the Interim Period, production was gradually expanded, although reports of actual production figures vary. Al Jazeera noted that, 'Production grew sharply for several years—output has more than doubled since 2003, when Sudan produced roughly 210,000 barrels per day—but now seems to have hit a plateau'.⁶³ The main players were the China National Petroleum Corporation, Malaysia's Petroleum National Bhd, and India's Oil and Natural Gas Corp., foreign companies that had long relationships with the Bashir government. Juba declared that it would continue to honour these contracts after independence⁶⁴—a crucial commitment since so much of the oil comes from the South's reserves.

The questions of how much oil remains and how much can be exploited have been central to strategic calculations for both the NCP and SPLM. However, very few reliable data are available, and what there are date back to when Chevron, Talisman, Arkasis, Lundin and several other large Western oil companies initially conducted exploration in the 1970s and 1980s. The Chinese and Malaysians have taken over pre-established wells, and have been using older extraction technology and methods; more current methods would extract more of the oil contained in the wells. There is hope, then, that significant amounts of recoverable oil will remain in the currently producing wells when their estimated production lives end later this decade.

New exploration commenced in March 2011 in blocs that are not in the historic oil producing areas near the North-South border. Great hope has been placed in the development of Bloc B by Total of France and Bloc E by Star Petroleum from Spain.⁶⁵ Studies suggest that substantial oil reserves are likely to exist underground, but the full nature and quality of the reserves are unclear. Capital investment in a pipeline or some other transport method will be required: either northward linking in with current infrastructure or southeast to international markets via Kenya, possibly connected to new oil infrastructure being built in Uganda.⁶⁶ Such a pipeline would lessen South Sudan's dependence on Sudan for exporting its oil resources. However, building a new pipeline would not be feasible without major new discoveries.

Although the numbers are often wildly contested, according to the *Oil and Gas Journal* one mid-range estimate indicates that at independence

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South Sudan had 5 billion barrels of proven oil reserves able to be exploited with today's technological developments, perhaps more if drilling methods become more efficient. While most industry estimates of the South's oil potential tend to be conservative, as long ago as 2002 it was suggested that, 'It is reasonable to expect that as much as 2.9 billion barrels could be found by the end of the decade from the entire area of southern Sudan and possibly quite a bit more if the field size distribution pattern changes through additional exploration'.⁶⁷

Oil wealth could play an immediate role in catalysing the development of the economy and helping to further the institutionalisation of the government, assuming the wealth is used wisely. Two issues yet to be decided at independence were how to share the revenue within the country and the frameworks for monitoring production, both of which were major challenges during the CPA's Interim Period,⁶⁸ when corruption and cronyism were increasing.⁶⁹


Regardless of how much oil it turns out to have, oil is not a long-term prospect for South Sudan or a long-term foundation for the country's economy. Production from current wells will begin to decline after 2013, if there are no significant new discoveries.⁷⁰ The most optimistic projections put potential oil in the South at 4.9 billion barrels, with production dropping off at the latest around 2020.⁷¹ Most projections put the major drop in oil revenue closer to 2015.

Most observers and those inside Juba's new government recognise that a major budgetary crisis is looming unless alternative revenue sources can be found. With such a drastic drop in resources, it is reasonable to conclude that economic and development issues could easily escalate into security issues, since much of the stability of the security services and army is based on a degree of co-option based on some kind of rent or patronage.

Some believe that minerals, gold in particular, present the best chance to shore up short-term revenue issues for the government. 'The South holds 80% of Sudan's oil resources but it is gold, in areas south of Juba, that is the true commodity-prize that is carefully kept out of the media spotlight'.⁷² While copper, diamonds and uranium are all likely present in South Sudan, none of these sectors is anywhere near developing past even the stage of most rudimentary, low-scale mining. Gold is well known to exist in various areas, particularly near Kapoeta, Morobo and Wandaruba (all in the hilly equatorial regions with ample rocky outcrops, and

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Figure 5.2: Forecast Government Revenue.



Source: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development.

Note: Projections based on oil revenue sharing arrangement upon a principle of 50/50 between Khartoum and Juba continuing.

many streams and rivers), and in some areas of Western Bahr al-Ghazal.⁷³ The interest of the South African mining company Billiton, which had undertaken preliminary exploration in Southern Sudan before the company's restructuring in the 1990s resulted in a move away from smaller exploration projects, is highly revealing.

The opportunity to build gold reserves presents a great potential; countries able to direct significant amounts of their own gold resources into national reserves have been able to stabilise their economic situation during the major financial crises that have been endemic since the mid-2000s. While there is likely to be significant opportunity in gold, there has not yet been the appropriate regime to govern extraction and sale of minerals. The government will have to clarify regulation, and support investors and major mining companies willing to come in, otherwise the industry will not benefit South Sudan and its people. Without clear reg-

ulation, mining will continue to develop slowly and will be likely to attract only exploitative firms and individuals looking for high margins by sourcing raw material from more and more obscure locations.

Copper may also hold an important place in the mantle of South Sudan's natural resource economy. In the past, copper was extracted from the area known as Hofrat al-Nahas, near the disputed border area of Kafia Kingi, between Southern Darfur and Western Bahr al-Ghazal. Kafia Kingi has long been known as a site for copper; along with Abyei, it is also one of the key points of border dispute between Juba and Khartoum. Expectations of mineral resources have made this situation much more volatile.

Although deposits do remain, there has been no commercial effort at extraction in recent times.⁷⁴ Exploration by an international junior mining company in 1999 seems to have revealed little of commercial value, and the project was abandoned. However, often in mineral exploration information about deposits is kept quiet; the abandoned exploration project could indicate a discovery for which the company or geologist could not initiate extraction; in such cases discoveries tend to be downplayed until the business environment is better to launch a project. Considering the history of artisanal copper production in the area, there is a strong possibility that viable copper deposits remain.⁷⁵

There is also mineral potential, including gold and diamonds, along the Southern borders with the DRC, Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia.⁷⁶ These deposits have not been fully explored because of prolonged warfare, as well as the difficulty in accessing them: South Sudan's interior is covered by the world's largest swamplands.

South Sudan's longest-term economic foundation is likely to be agriculture. Farm Africa, an African-based NGO, has reported on the potential South Sudan offers: more than 90 per cent of the land is suitable for farming, and at independence had not yet been properly cultivated.⁷⁷ Culturally this makes sense: the state's population consists almost universally of rural subsistence farmers and herders, and there is limited orientation towards, even interest in, urbanisation and industry. The possibilities for agricultural development are manifold, but are most likely to emphasise cattle herding and utilising other animal resources as these activities hold the greatest prestige for South Sudanese.

During the CPA's Interim Period, such groups as CHF, Oxfam, and Vétérinaires Sans Frontières initiated projects to help agricultural devel-

opment. Other groups involved in microfinance have also begun arriving in South Sudan. As yet, however, there is no coordinated approach to this kind of development work, and the government continues to grapple with how to legislate and govern these efforts by humanitarian organisations.

A major challenge for development at independence is the lack of market institutions within the South, which only allow for minimal commercialisation and very limited ability for growers to bring goods to market. Additionally, chronic insecurity in rural areas, especially in the form of cattle rustling and extraction of payments for transit through informal local check-points, remains a major challenge; infrastructure continues to be put forward as a key to extending the authority of the state and law in order to curtail the violence that is common in many areas of South Sudan at certain times of the year.

With independence, agricultural development will be given greater priority. Key to this will be the formation of an agricultural bank linked to assistance provided by the Ministry of Agriculture; this bank will provide loans, seeds and other technical services with an emphasis on improving productivity through increased mechanisation, better farming methods and access to better seeds. Major donors, notably the United States and the Netherlands, alongside the Alliance for Green Revolution in Africa, launched a major programme in May 2011 to boost agriculture production.⁷⁸ Reports at independence by FAO and WFP of dropping agriculture production despite increased investment raise major concerns regarding the assumption of South Sudan's great potential for agriculture. Their February 2012 report notes, 'National cereal production in 2011, estimated at 562,600 tonnes, is about 19 and 25 per cent below the previous year's output and the average of the last five years respectively'.⁷⁹

The government has pushed to restart major farming schemes in Western Equatoria focused on cotton, fruit, and timber. Moreover, encouraged by Egypt, there was also discussion of reviving construction of the Jonglei Canal, with the aim of drawing the Geziera cotton schemes further south into the panhandle of Upper Nile State. Cotton was a key focus of British interest in Sudan, and thus it became one of the main development projects in the newly independent state after 1956; even though the British had stepped aside, the Sudanese were keen to continue to profit from this business relationship.

The UAE and various private investors have also been making agreements in principle, and purchasing of wide swathes of apparently arable land. The purchase of land by some Middle-Eastern companies and individuals, particularly in the prospective and existent national parks, has raised some alarm.

The questionable conduct of a few international businessmen and the role of oil in the emerging agriculture business have, however, not deterred donor governments from focusing on agricultural development as the centrepiece of a development strategy for South Sudan. A sign of this is the support by donors for the army's own plans to develop agricultural projects that could make the army self-sustaining with regard to food and use some of the restive labour within its rank and file.

Wildlife tourism is one further possibility for development. Despite decades of war, large swathes of the South maintain surprising levels of wildlife. Apart from Tanzania and Kenya, South Sudan boasts the largest wildlife migrations on the planet. During the interim period, the GoSS undertook to create several national parks, the largest being Boma National Park in Jonglei State—22,800 square kilometres. There is rich potential for a burgeoning industry here, but to realise this potential both land and animals must be protected—something often accomplished alongside a more advanced mining and oil industry.

Conclusion

The CPA period was remarkably stable: Kiir, the SPLA, and the GoSS had major successes in co-opting destabilising forces into the system, but at a great cost. The SPLA/M bought tentative stability by incorporating armed and political opposition into itself. While effective in the short term, this strategy has the potential to encourage a dynamic of escalating, or revolving, belligerence. Had John Garang not died, the SPLA/M would likely have been less focused on negotiating with potentially destabilising forces, such as the former SSDF, and the result could have been more violence. Realistically, any new South Sudan government would have been forced to concede much in order to incorporate outlying forces, thereby providing security and an environment that facilitated the rationalisation and construction of the state. Many of those outlying forces can be seen as holding the new South Sudan government hostage, threatening a return to violence and proxy war.

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With independence's glow receding from the public's consciousness, Kiir's government must show major progress in its early years. While benefits have accrued to some during the Interim Period, the majority of the population continues to face deep poverty, economic uncertainty, and local insecurity. With continued confrontation over the border between the two Sudans, the great hope that independence could produce a solution to most of South Sudan's woes might well fall short of the public's expectations.

The repercussions of slow progress are unclear, however; with the economic forces and time working against it, the government will likely face growing opposition, both internally and externally. How it responds to such criticism will, as much as the language of the Transitional Constitution, define the foundation of the new state. A great opportunity exists to move away from corrupt and parochial politics; how this will be accomplished remains to be seen.

During and after the election in 2010, there was significant violence, particularly in Jonglei, as major destabilising issues re-emerged, only to be calmed at great financial cost. These ignited again more ferociously after the referendum in the run up to, and just after, independence; many of those officially integrated began inflaming the political situation because they were dissatisfied with their level of political influence, position, or financial gain since integration. Moreover, many of these dissident figures, such as Peter Gadet, were frustrated with being part of a peacetime bureaucracy, and desired a return to the action.

The now-established tradition of co-opting opponents, with promises of financial gain and high office, and reconciling with them even if they consistently accept and subsequently renege on deals has created incentives to provoke the new government in anticipation of impending political dispensation. The result is depressingly cynical behaviour on the part of those who purport to be leaders of the new state. However, such extortion is bound up in a system of violence linked to years of war and manipulation by external actors; it will take some time to exorcise it from the nature of governance throughout South Sudan. Combating this system will remain one of the embryonic state's most difficult challenges.

Fundamentally, there have consistently been processes of incorporation with little or no effective integration, whether in the civil service, the army or the SPLM; those integrated have not been included in decision-making or the conduct of daily affairs. While affording shorter-term

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stability, this conduct has created a situation ripe for manipulation. Many are asking, and more are likely to ask, what is the point of reconciliation without real inclusion or integration.

THE PARAMETERS OF SOUTH SUDAN'S FOREIGN POLICY

South Sudan has no [formal] foreign policy beyond surviving the coming year.

South Sudanese diplomat on Independence Day.

Having provided an overview of the key dynamics within South Sudan, it is possible to turn to the new state's foreign policy. Examining the reactions to two historical legacies will provide the underlying rationales for that policy. The first legacy is the fact that most of the international community was never actually enthusiastic about Southern independence and widely preferred reformed unity.¹ This preference was due to general apprehensions about secessionism inherent in the international system, and was compounded by a more particular, underlying fear that, being ethnically fractured and utterly lacking in the institutions and competencies of rudimentary governance, South Sudan simply did not constitute a viable political construct.² Many international development experts matured professionally with Operation Lifeline Sudan or wider humanitarian responses to the war in South Sudan, so that experience of the SPLM's style of governance was still fresh in the minds of most Western capitals.

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Second, there is the mixed legacy of the CPA process itself. While the process allowed for South Sudan's independence, and accommodated it relatively peacefully, there lingers a dangerous build-up of tensions between Juba and Khartoum. Moreover, a tremendous fatigue exists amongst other states pressed to respond to perpetual crises in Sudan. Compounding this is the fact that it has not been the only major crisis in the region: drought is plaguing East Africa, politics are simmering in most places, and the problems of war and poor governance persist. The great hope that the CPA would provide respite is not likely to be realised.

With these contextual themes established, this chapter will outline the basic parameters defining South Sudan's foreign policy: relations with Sudan must be definitive and will focus on resolving significant issues deferred or aggravated during the CPA's implementation, but essential to consolidating the new state—particularly Abyei, border demarcation, oil management and shared concerns over proxy forces; there will also be a profound need to assure supportive powers and regional neighbours that South Sudan is a competently governed and viable state, and hence worthy of the foreign investment necessary to begin rationalising it as an independent one; and relations with the West and Asia will have to be balanced in the context of the fourth major foreign policy issue: the looming prospect of inter-state war with the Republic of Sudan.

Section 1: The Two Sudans—South Sudan's relationship with Sudan

We told our brothers in the South, do you want peace? Everything we've done is for peace. But if you want war, you can see what's going on in Abyei and in Southern Kordofan, and these are all lessons.

President Bashir, June 2011³

The Republic of South Sudan has six neighbours, but the vast majority of Juba's foreign policy effort will be focused on just one—Sudan. Perhaps buoyed by its assured dominance in Khartoum after the April 2010 elections, the NCP regime was surprisingly supportive of the referendum and officially accepted its outcome; Khartoum was the first to recognise the new state officially as the Republic of South Sudan, only to assert control over Abyei just at South Sudan's independence, signalling the start of what to many looked like a border war. The SPLA, South Sudan's army, has called the situation a 'war situation'. By late 2011 it was

clear that a *de facto* war was already underway between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan via each other's proxies, with small incursions and propaganda employing major economic attacks, particularly against oil exports.⁴ However, despite what seems to be the Republic of Sudan engaging in the crime of 'aggression' or aggressive war (potentially another crime that the ICC could add to President Bashir's dossier),⁵ the outstanding question for Sudan-South Sudan relations is whether Juba's larger neighbour to the north will choose to play a positive role in its rationalisation, as Indonesia did with Timor-Leste, or instead adopt a confrontational approach that encourages internal instability, as can be seen in the devolving Ethiopia-Eritrea relationship.

At independence the relationship between South Sudan and Sudan was heavily burdened by the violent dispute over Abyei, which had greatly worsened in May 2011 when the SAF invaded and occupied the disputed area, as well as by the SAF's offensive against the SPLA-North in Southern Kordofan starting in May 2011. By belligerently occupying Abyei and launching a military campaign in Southern Kordofan, the Bashir government made clear it was not going to allow South Sudan a smooth independence transition. These tensions over Abyei and Southern Kordofan have compounded the significant gaps already present in the CPA's implementation. Resolving outstanding issues will be essential to consolidating the new state: oil management, border demarcation, and proxy force manipulation will of necessity define Juba-Khartoum relations.

A critically important aspect of those relations will be oil management. Sudan had 5 billion barrels of proven reserves at the beginning of 2010.⁶ In 2011, the guaranteed Sudanese production stood at 500,000 bpd; roughly 70 to 75 per cent of that was being derived in the South.⁷ The CPA had guaranteed equal sharing of the oil wealth derived in the South, but at independence no agreement had been reached on how cooperation regarding oil would, or could, be furthered. Such ambiguity has long defined the oil sector; this, compounded with the general consensus that a fair referendum would result in Southern secession, led Khartoum's long-term partners in oil development—Malaysia, China and India—to hedge their bets and build relations with the SPLM. For example, Malaysia's Petronas signed a memorandum of understanding with Juba in March 2011 to boost cooperation, having in 2008 secured Juba's permission to participate in the exploitation of Bloc 5B in Jonglei State. Juba stated that it would review all contracts after independence,

and has since focused particular attention on France's Total, which has been slow to develop its large concession in Jonglei.⁸

As a result of Khartoum's obfuscation of production figures and blockage of full information between the CPA's partners, Southerners have always been rather bitter about oil management. Kiir even went so far as to argue in 2008 that he suspected Southern Sudan was only receiving revenue from 10 per cent of Sudan's total production.⁹ Khartoum's disclosure remained murky; Bashir, in response to ongoing critiques, even promised to allow a foreign firm to audit the oil accounts prior to independence, but not surprisingly, this never happened.¹⁰ Given such lingering suspicions of unfairness, Juba is not likely to be open to much compromise regarding oil revenue. Nevertheless, the reality of oil in the two Sudans is one of mutual dependency. At independence, South Sudan is entirely dependent on Sudan to process its oil—the pipelines, the only export terminal at Port Sudan, and the major refineries are all in the North. During the increasingly frantic negotiations prior to independence, the SPLM was resistant to any notion of 'wealth-sharing', preferring instead that a straight commercial contract should be upon in the form of 'transit/processing fees'. The negotiations were tense and at one time or another Juba threatened to sue Khartoum should it sell any oil post-independence without an agreement, while Khartoum threatened to turn off the pipelines should an agreement on their usage not be reached. Interestingly, as the war reignited in the Nuba Mountains, the SPLM-North under the leadership of Abdel Aziz even threatened Khartoum with attack on the pipeline heading north should it dishonour oil deals with Juba.

Khartoum's negotiating position remains fairly strong, however: it controls key infrastructure and possibilities for a new pipeline from South Sudan through Kenya are limited—the endeavour would be very costly, would take years to complete, and would only be viable if major new discoveries were proven in Jonglei State. The other issue shaping bargaining positions is that oil production in South Sudan is expected to start declining after 2013, barring discovery of new reserves. As long as there is not a full return to war, the most plausible scenario with regard to an oil production agreement is that a basic 'fee-for-service' model implemented by default at independence will continue—that is, one without complicated revenue-sharing percentages. Considering the importance of oil revenue to both Khartoum and Juba, these negotiations are criti-

cally important and will continue to be a major source of contention until the matter is resolved.

Even more significant, however, will be the matter of the roughly 2,000-kilometre border between Sudan and South Sudan. Along the border's vast stretch there were many border areas disputed by Khartoum and Juba at independence, in addition to the larger claims over Abyei. Resolving border issues, particularly the contested region of Abyei, will be the most important feature of Juba and Khartoum's relationship. The most serious areas of dispute were as follows:¹¹

- Abyei
- South Darfur and Northern Bahr al-Ghazal/Rizaigat and Malwal Dinka home areas respectively
- Kafia Kingi, extreme western border of Western Bahr al-Ghazal and South Darfur
- oil producing areas along the Unity and South Kordofan borders
- major mechanised farming areas of the Upper Nile panhandle and borders with the North, as well as potential oil producing areas
- northern boundary of Upper Nile
- Chali al-Fil area of Blue Nile State and Upper Nile State to the South

The First-World-War-style violence of the 1998–2000 border war between Eritrea and Ethiopia still haunts the Horn of Africa region, particularly since a major cause of that violence was the lack of full border demarcation following Eritrea's independence in 1993. Contesting ownership over Abyei has been central to the political discourse of Sudan throughout its modern history; arguably reaching back as far as 1905 and the controversial agreement signed by Deng Majok, then Ngok Dinka paramount chief, that the area would be included in Southern Kordofan.¹² Through the 1972 Addis Ababa Peace Agreement, the area—considered 'culturally and geographically a part of the Southern Complex'—was supposed to have a referendum on whether to be part of the autonomous Southern region or remain within Southern Kordofan. That referendum was never held, just as the referendum stipulated in the CPA to be conducted in Abyei in January 2011 did not occur.

The CPA's Interim Period was marred by repeated violence in Abyei, which culminated in its occupation by the SAF in late-May 2011. This sharp escalation of violence in Abyei immediately prior to independence largely defined the tenor of relations between Khartoum and Juba at

independence. Even with a last-minute agreement to deploy Ethiopian peacekeepers, the unresolved standoff over ownership of Abyei was the most acute security and political interface between the two states at independence. If there is a war between Sudan and South Sudan, a major frontline will most likely be in the vicinity of Abyei.

At independence, the situation essentially remained a standoff requiring political negotiations to be started afresh. The 20 June 2011 Agreement signed in Addis Ababa between Juba and Khartoum provided a temporary solution to de-escalate tensions and prevent further mass violence such as that seen in late May. The Agreement required the withdrawal of the SAF, the recomposition of the Abyei administration, and the deployment of up to 4,200 Ethiopian peacekeepers under a UN mandate, to be known as the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA). At the time of writing, the peacekeepers had yet to be fully deployed.

That the issue of Abyei was left unresolved was a significant success for the Bashir regime; it was forced to accept the loss of the South but satisfied itself that at least Abyei was still in contention. In occupying the area at the end of May 2011, Bashir effectively reset the negotiations on Abyei and the border more generally, as he had done previously with the rejection of the ABC decision in July 2005 and the lack of demarcation following the International Court of Arbitration's June 2009 decision. As was apparent to many, while claiming self-defence and citing the attacks on two SAF convoys, Khartoum had been planning the occupation of Abyei.¹³ Susan Rice, the American Ambassador to the UN, argued that the 22 May 2011 invasion by the SAF appeared premeditated and that the attack on the convoy was but a 'pretext'.¹⁴ Even the actor George Clooney seemed to identify the impending attack with his newly launched satellite sentinel project. The fact that a celebrity is required to engage in effective monitoring challenges the fundamentals of the UN and questions the intent and action of all major donor governments.

Overall, at the time of South Sudan's secession Khartoum had effectively secured its interests: Abyei was occupied by its forces, conclusive negotiations would be required to start anew, and to some extent at least, domestic constituencies were placated after being forced to accept the South's independence. More ominously, however, because of the mass violence of late May, almost the entire Ngok Dinka population of Abyei

had fled southward, while reports persisted that tens of thousands of Misseriya were being relocated into the area; this constitutes a type of ethnic cleansing. By resolving on its own terms a festering border issue that could, in the future, form the core of a highly destabilising conflict, Khartoum unquestionably created post-independence bargaining chips for itself. For their parts, Kiir, the SPLA and the GoSS were compelled to restraint, to avoid looking like the belligerent party.

The costs to Khartoum were relatively low as well; the process was never acute enough to stop the flow of oil or spark a full-scale, conventional war with the SPLA. The SAF never crossed the River Kiir, a threshold along the North-South border that would have constituted an invasion of the South itself. For its part, Juba was limited in its possible responses as independence was imminent and the all-important goal could not be threatened by an outright border war. The leadership in the South had but one goal: get to 9 July, declare independence and be recognised by the world. In regard to this, Kiir declared amidst the SAF invasion and widespread Southern demands for a strong response, 'We will not go back to war'.¹⁵

After independence, Abyei remains an exceptionally challenging issue to resolve for a number of reasons.¹⁶ The area holds tremendous significance to the domestic politics of both Sudan and South Sudan. As previously noted, the Ngok Dinka have strong representation in both the SPLM's and the SPLA's leadership. The Misseriya are an important constituency for the NCP along the border regions; historically they have been renowned fighters, were formerly allied to the Ansar sect that fought with the Mahdi, and were long used as paramilitaries by Khartoum in its war against the SPLA/M. Aside from these constituencies, Abyei has strong ideological resonance for both states, with Sudan not wishing to see itself further dismembered and South Sudan seeing the area as fundamentally 'Southern', culturally and ethnically.

Holding a referendum has been highlighted as a natural solution to the dispute, as was indicated in both the Addis Ababa Agreement and the CPA. However, the likelihood of actually holding one is difficult, as evidenced by repeated failures. There is a basic dilemma in Abyei that affects such a vote. As one foreign observer summarised: 'There can't be a referendum because ... if the Misseriya aren't allowed to vote, they will fight. If they are, the [Ngok] Dinka will fight'.¹⁷ While it accepted the June 2009 decision by the International Court of Arbitration, the NCP

subsequently undermined any further implementation of the Abyei Protocol by demanding that Misseriya pastoralists be allowed to participate in the referendum. Likewise, considering the masses of Ngok Dinka who were forced out of Abyei in May 2011, it is doubtful that the SPLM will be open to compromise about who gets to vote. This uncertainty has raised many conspiratorial scenarios that had SPLA/M allies provoking the SAF to escalate violence in order to preclude the vote and thus appear the aggrieved party.

If there is any positive indication for future resolution, it is the fact that both Juba and Khartoum officially accepted the 2009 decision by the International Court of Arbitration for border demarcation. Such a basis could be used for demarcating the area's territory. Furthermore, oil is not the most important consideration in the negotiations. In 2004 Abyei accounted for 25 per cent of Sudan's production; however, by 2009 that figure had fallen to 9 per cent as the International Court of Arbitration ruled that the Heglig and Bamboo fields were not part of Abyei. In addition, the remaining reserves in Abyei, including those the Court placed outside Abyei's boundaries, have been severely depleted.¹⁸

Alongside Abyei, a particularly combustible issue framing the Sudan-South Sudan relationship is the return to armed insurrection by SPLA remnant units within the North. As Southern independence approached, a perception grew among Khartoum's security apparatus that coordinated armed insurrection in the North posed a major threat, and that it would be actively backed and facilitated by Juba via the SPLM-North in Blue Nile and the Nuba Mountains. Even before violence broke out in Southern Kordofan in June 2011, the SPLM-North was steadily reminding the Bashir regime that it remained in control of significant military forces. For example, the SPLM/A-North's Secretary-General, Yasir Arman, warned Bashir in March 2011 that the SPLM/A-North had a 'military strength of 40,000 soldiers in north Sudan'.¹⁹

Following the disputed Southern Kordofan election of April 2011, political tensions between the SPLM-North and NCP escalated, as the former refused to accept the results even though international monitors described the election as relatively free and fair.²⁰ The vote was won by the NCP incumbent, Ahmed Haroun, who was wanted by the International Criminal Court for war crimes in Darfur. Moreover, when violence surged in Abyei in late May and the SAF subsequently occupied the area, Khartoum gave the ultimatum that any SPLA units that had

remained in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states after the Second Civil War must move southwards or they would be targeted.²¹ This was unlikely to happen, and indeed did not. As Malik Agar explained: 'But they are not southerners; they are from Blue Nile and they don't have anywhere else to go.'²²

The dynamics for a return to conflict were especially pronounced in the Nuba Mountains, whose peoples suffered major abuses and were targeted during the war, particularly during the mid- and late 1990s.²³ Abdel Aziz, the top-ranking SPLM leader in Southern Kordofan and former deputy governor who had lost the disputed April election for the governorship, was a senior SPLA commander in eastern Sudan during the Second Civil War.²⁴ The Nuba Mountain SPLA units were some of the more highly regarded insurgent fighters in the movement, and commanders from the area were widely recognised as among the most competent.

In the weeks before and just after South Sudan's independence, Blue Nile State was exceptional in that it remained stable while Southern Kordofan returned to war. Malik Agar, the SPLM-North's leader and governor of Blue Nile, was a highly regarded SPLA commander during the Second Civil War; within the state there remained a sizeable SPLA force, even more than in the Nuba Mountains. While SAF forces targeted the Nuba Mountains, those remnant SPLA forces in Blue Nile were left alone, perhaps because Agar was squarely in control of the state and the SPLA forces there were more significant.²⁵ However, once forces in the Nuba Mountains were contained and a tentative ceasefire with a different Darfuri group (the LJN) had been resolved, several brigades of SAF forces, including armour and air support, were moved to target SPLA-North in Blue Nile. After he announced his intention, Bashir's forces moved directly from Ad-Damazin along the main road towards SPLA-North and Malik Agar's seat of power in Kurmuk. After weeks of fighting, the SAF took control of Kurmuk with a final push.²⁶

Northern SPLA commanders, such as Aziz and Agar, had been central to the SPLA's campaign in the North during the Second Civil War, in conjunction with the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). Aziz is especially significant for his combination of competence on the battlefield, skills as an administrator and political organiser, and mixed Nubian, Masalit and Darfuri parentage.²⁷ Further threats loomed amidst the return to war in Southern Kordofan: the ongoing insurgency in Darfur and possibilities for its renewal in the East. The prospects of armed opposition

forces linking across the North—from assorted Darfuri rebels and the SPLA-North in the Nuba Mountains to the Beja Congress in the East—present enormous concerns for Khartoum's security services. It is in this context—the numerous insurgencies across the periphery and widespread political opposition to the Bashir regime—that many commentators feel the North will experience instability at least as significant as that in South Sudan, if not more so, and thus the NCP regime is at risk of collapse. Some feel that, in conjunction with the momentum of the Arab Spring revolts, the Republic of Sudan faces a greater threat to its stability than South Sudan does.²⁸ But despite the frequent ability to coordinate tactically on the battlefield when high-level political issues are raised, the various groups that make up the Kauda Alliance have been unable to coalesce around a single leader or even a unified political strategy, despite their common desire to remove Bashir and the NCP.

The economic prospects for Sudan are also cloudy and the country will be under great pressure economically. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicted that, by losing the South, Sudan would see its non-oil GDP shrink by up to 10 per cent.²⁹ Without a 50/50 wealth-sharing agreement, as per the CPA, the country stood to lose up to 75 per cent of its pre-separation oil revenues; such a loss would create a great shock for the country's economy given that oil has constituted half of government revenue and 90 per cent of national exports.³⁰ Considering the major political upheavals of East Africa and the Middle East, Khartoum's political situation is ever more tenuous. At the time of South Sudan's independence, the NCP and Bashir find themselves in a new and uncertain landscape in which they are confronted by the growing capacity of popular opposition to challenge existing regimes in both the Arab and African spheres.

Despite these ominous security and economic challenges, the wider mood in Sudan remained somewhat mixed. With 'people power' rebellions sweeping other parts of the Arab world over early and mid-2011, Khartoum addressed its distinct concern over the events of the Arab Spring by using the moment of South Sudan's independence to deflect attention from its decidedly oppressive response to its own civil unrest. For his part, Bashir tried to counter the loss of the South, arguing, 'South Sudan separation will not be the end of history, but rather a new stage for building Sudan'.³¹

South Sudan's potential involvement in the politics of the Republic of Sudan will be an important dynamic because of the historical and per-

sonal connections between the SPLA and SPLM and their old comrades-in-arms. The national SPLM announced that it would split into northern and southern halves after the Southern referendum secured independence, and officially did so on 8 July 2011. The split was a pragmatic decision, given the new reality of two states, but also mirrored tensions that had been building within the national party since Garang's death: the tensions were between Garang's 'New Sudan' programme of reformed unity and the reorientation of the party in the South and its growing bias towards Southern secession; many of the more stalwart unity-focused revolutionaries had connection to northern areas, such as the Nuba Mountains or Blue Nile. For the SPLM-North, a sense of abandonment was festering: the terms and outcomes of the CPA had effectively set it adrift in an unreformed Sudan. Nonetheless, the sister parties remain close and are likely to stay so, as a result of decades of united effort against dictatorial rule by Khartoum. More important is the strong sentiment of solidarity and comradeship felt by many in the SPLA towards those 'left' in the North.³²

Even before the SAF's offensive of early June 2011 against the SPLM/A-North in Southern Kordofan, the escalation of tensions between Khartoum and the SPLM/A-North clearly involved the South. Hardliners in the NCP had threatened to ban the party until, in the midst of negotiations between the NCP and the SPLM-North over the ongoing violence in Southern Kordofan, Bashir was forced to recognise it as a 'legal political party in Sudan'.³³ Among the staunchest supporters of Garang's 'New Sudan' vision had been SPLA/M members in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States, where support for Southern secession was decidedly muted compared with the greater hopes for fundamental change in Khartoum. Tellingly, after the referendum, the SPLM-North called for the continuation of the 'New Sudan project' with a goal of eventually reunifying the countries as a secular democracy.³⁴ The NCP rather bizarrely dismissed such references to the insurgencies' historic emphasis on Sudanese unity as being but a 'racist and separatist' ideology.³⁵

The NCP's abrogation of the CPA's religious and cultural protections, as enshrined in the Interim National Constitution, in favour of a draconian return to Islamist interpretations of *sharia* and a dogmatic emphasis on an Arabic cultural identity has been particularly upsetting to the SPLM-North.³⁶ Bashir's announcement that the CPA-dictated Sudanese constitution would be stripped of references to Sudan being 'multi-

cultural' was especially aggravating; in response the SPLM has insisted, 'No one can cancel diversity in Sudan'.³⁷

In March 2011, the SPLM-North in turn provoked the ire of the NCP by calling for the continuation of American sanctions against Khartoum because of the latter's failure to initiate political reform. The NCP had been hoping it would be rewarded for accepting the referendum's results; the SPLM-North demanded that the Bashir regime should be rewarded for bringing 'freedom and democracy to the Sudanese people' rather than merely accepting the South's independence.³⁸ Encouraged by the United States' tacit suggestions that it would help facilitate debt relief for the \$36.8 billion Khartoum owed should it peacefully accept Southern separation, Khartoum had expressed a willingness to absorb all of Sudan's debt, that is, without pressing Juba to share the responsibility, if it were granted participation in the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) programme.³⁹ For its part, and in line with the United States' request, the SPLM had stated it would consider helping Khartoum enter the HIPC programme in return for concessions regarding Abyei and other issues, such as the redemption of old Sudanese pounds.⁴⁰ The convoluted politics of debt relief were subsequently dampened by the SAF's occupation of Abyei and the return to war in Southern Kordofan.

Related to the turmoil in Abyei and Southern Kordofan, a core dynamic of Juba and Khartoum's relationship will be the manipulation of remnant structures of proxy war lingering from the Second Civil War. The proclivity to support one another's armed insurrections has been common to the international relations of the Horn of Africa. It is unlikely that the relationship between Sudan and South Sudan will be devoid of such meddling: the region has been the epicentre of the art and it is hard to conceptualise how those in South Sudan could fully abandon their former comrades. It is also not probable that Khartoum's security apparatus will end its manipulation of politics and security affairs in South Sudan, both for strategic considerations of power and gamesmanship and from force of habit. If Khartoum wishes to keep its southern neighbour weak, it has a tried and tested approach for doing so—using proxy forces to leverage tribal and political discontent with the SPLM. While Khartoum publicly supported a stable South, it nonetheless continued a policy of destabilisation by using proxy militias during the CPA's Interim Period, especially as it drew to a close and primarily through its old SSDF collaborators.

One of the most pressing questions at the time of South Sudan's independence is whether Khartoum has retained the numbers and depth of support amongst its old allies, or whether the SPLA/M has been able to co-opt enough of those allies—via the Juba Declaration and subsequent reconciliation agreements—to keep them a minor and relatively manageable threat. Defections from the SPLA, particularly by forces loyal to Peter Gadet and Sultan Abdel Baggi, dramatically increased insecurity in Unity and Northern Bahr al-Ghazal States south of the Nuba Mountains and Abyei. Gadet's defection was particularly problematical since he had led one of the most formidable SSDF militias during the war; when he left the SPLA in March 2011, it is estimated that up to 3,000 soldiers deserted with him. In actual fact the number was probably closer to several hundred defectors rather than thousands. The ranks swelled because Gadet recruited other fighters from among youth in his areas of operation. Perhaps more problematic for the government in Juba was the perception of growing links between Gadet and the militia forces of David Yau Yau, George Athor, Gatluak Gai and others after the contentious April 2010 elections.⁴¹ The presence of Gadet and his main spokesperson Bol Gatkouth in Khartoum and the tracing of equipment recently supplied by Republic of Sudan security services have made the connection between these groups and Khartoum clear.

Juba has long been sensitive to proxy manipulation being used to destabilise the South and discredit its government internationally. A common refrain among SPLM politicians during the Interim Period was that such manipulation was 'meant to show the world that South Sudanese are not capable of managing their own affairs through disgruntled individuals in the South'.⁴² During the CPA's Interim Period, Khartoum was willing to push destabilisation using Southern proxies at opportune moments—for instance, during negotiations over Abyei and wealth sharing—and to highlight its continuing ability to shape future events, for example in the immediate aftermath of the referendum. Historically, the response by the SPLA and SPLM was to reconcile and include opponents within the party and army, a method colloquially referred to as Kiir's 'big tent' strategy. However, in a post-independence era, the ability to do so may be challenged by the simple fact that the solidarity possible before independence no longer exists.

However, while Khartoum has long excelled at using proxies, the possibilities for encouraging instability in the North are plentiful for Juba.

The NCP frequently accused the SPLA/M of supporting Darfuri rebels and hosting leaders, such as Minni Minawi and top officers of JEM, in Juba during the Interim Period. Tensions over proxy manipulation were important to the November 2010 bombing of an SPLA position along the Kiir River on the border between Northern Bahr al-Ghazal and South Darfur. The incident was significant: it was the first direct attack on the SPLA by the SAF since the signing of the CPA.⁴³ Khartoum defended the bombing by arguing it was attacking JEM rebels. The SAF claimed the attack was hot pursuit of Darfuri insurgents and that it was justified in pursuing them into South Sudan. That SPLA soldiers were killed was cited as proof of Southern support to Darfuri rebels. As tensions escalated in the final months of the Interim Period, Khartoum often said in response to Juba's accusations that it would consider invading the South should it be unable to control its proxies in the North. Sudan's then Defence Minister, Abdel Rahim Mohamed Hussein, declared that it was a 'secondary option' to intervene in the South if the SPLA/M continued to support Darfur's rebels, exclaiming, 'Take your hands off Darfur and expel the rebels'.⁴⁴ Tensions were set to escalate and retaliation seemed imminent, which undoubtedly was exactly what Khartoum intended. Only the specific intervention of both militaries' upper leaderships precluded escalation in that instance, but the same tensions persist.

Should Juba really want to escalate the unrest in the North, the medium for it would be its former SPLA compatriots in the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile State. If Sudan returned to civil war on a nationwide scale, which would certainly not be surprising,⁴⁵ there is a strong likelihood that the SPLM-North would be involved, and would continue its historic attempts to instigate a New Sudan through revolution. The role Juba's support for SPLA-North units might play in this is unknown. Rumours of SPLA support to the forces of Aziz in the Nuba Mountains grew in the run up to 9 July. Word of any assistance provided was kept extremely quiet; Aziz refused to make press comments or public demands for support, apparently to avoid causing embarrassment to Juba at its moment of independence. However, acquiring such support from the independent South Sudan would be easy enough given the historic linkages and the geographic proximity of SPLA-North units to major SPLA garrisons along the border, notably in northern Unity and Upper Nile States, since the SPLA's primary focus is defence of the border with the Republic of Sudan.

What control Juba will have over any Northern proxies with which it wishes to engage is debatable. Juba long defended its relations with Darfuri rebels as an effort to consolidate them into a single group, so as to catalyse peace talks. Yet it was never successful in this—the rebels fractured ever more over the years. While it still carries Garang's 'New Sudan' vision, albeit an adapted version, it is doubtful that the SPLA-North will ever allow itself to be too subservient to Juba. Regarding Juba's difficulty in intervening in response to Khartoum's May 2011 demands that SPLA-North units withdraw to the South, Riek Machar explained: 'Even if we tell them to withdraw, to go south, they are not from the south; they are revolutionaries from the north'.⁴⁶ Regardless, these revolutionaries are still likely to accept and seek material support as they carry on their fight. Many in the South will find it difficult to say no.

It is in this context of tit-for-tat pressure that a low-intensity proxy conflict, using embedded grievances and divisions, is likely to characterise and define relations between the two states in the coming years. Although Salva Kiir and the government in Juba have made a concerted effort to avoid appearing to be supporting armed insurrection in Sudan in any way, considering the history and connections with those in the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile and even Darfur, it is unlikely that in the post-independence period Kiir and the Southern leadership will be able to escape being drawn into a proxy war. With the SAF and the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) already backing various proxy forces throughout the South, the situation is likely to escalate.

Aside from Sudan manipulating proxy forces and inflaming border disputes, a key challenge for South Sudan is the ease with which Khartoum could make life economically difficult for Juba. This fact was made abundantly clear in the run-up to independence when Khartoum imposed an unofficial blockade on Southern Sudan in May and June 2011. By harassing trucking companies and closing key North-South border posts, Khartoum made evident its ability to prevent basic goods—petrol and food—from entering the South. These shortages were particularly problematical for areas along the North-South border, such as Unity and Upper Nile States, that had limited transport linkages to Juba and from there to Kenya and Uganda.

The importance of the two Sudans to one another is profound, for better or worse. Considering a history of war by proxy, contested boundaries and general acrimony, the possibilities for inflicting mayhem north-

wards and southwards are considerable. As an astute Northern politician observed of the two countries' prospective relationship: 'North Sudan has the power to resolve or complicate the problems of South Sudan and both of them have the ability to turn themselves into failed states'.⁴⁷ In view of the dire poverty plaguing both, their 2,000-kilometre border and the mutual dependence required for economic development, they could conversely play exceptional roles in each other's future prosperity. As Bashir simply stated, 'We need them and they need us'.⁴⁸ One might doubt his sincerity in saying it, but the truth of the matter is obvious enough.

Section 2: South Sudan's relations with regional neighbours

South Sudan is Africa's fifty-fourth state. The regional neighbourhood has historically been decidedly harsh; nearly all the states have been intricately involved in one another's wars, playing the role of 'either arsonist or peacemaker', sometimes simultaneously.⁴⁹ For example, over the decades of the Second Civil War, Muammar Qaddafi's Libya participated in assorted peace dialogues and, in the mid-1980s, was one of the SPLA/M's biggest backers, but was also the first foreign country to become militarily involved against the SPLA.⁵⁰ Not long before Western intervention to remove him in mid-2011, Qaddafi had promised substantial assistance to Juba. Further complicating Libya's role, as relations with Bashir improved, Qaddafi had held the JEM leader Ibrahim Khalil under house arrest.

With independence, South Sudan's Arab neighbours to the north have not shown any particular disdain for the new country, rather blaming the Bashir regime for the referendum's outcome in favour of secession. Both Egypt and Libya, for instance, publicly derided Khartoum, even before the vote, for not rendering unity attractive during the CPA's Interim Period.⁵¹ Always fearful of further complications to the Nile River's management, Egypt was particularly embittered; Hosni Mubarak's ruling party labelled Bashir's government the 'worst in [the] country's history'.⁵²

Even with Sudan's Arab neighbours placing the onus for separation on Khartoum, South Sudan's nascent foreign policy will emphasise a shift in alignment away from the Arab Middle East towards East Africa. Considering the inherent social, linguistic and cultural linkages, such an orientation had seemed possible in the context of Britain's 'Southern Policy' before the rush for independence overwhelmed what most would argue

is the natural orientation for the South. Connections with China via Kenya will also prove particularly important economically.

Highlighting this intention for realignment, Juba made clear that upon independence it would join the East African Community, an inter-governmental organisation composed of Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Burundi, and Rwanda.⁵³ South Sudan's relations with its East African neighbours will be of critical importance, and are likely to be positive as several regional states—notably Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda—played constructive roles in the CPA peace process.

While in the end it was Uganda's military support that helped the SPLA to recover and drive home a stalemate with the SAF, Kenya played the predominant role in securing the peace process by hosting the talks and providing senior mediators for finalising the deal. The country was able to play the role of mediator and facilitator because it had long been perceived by both Juba and Khartoum as the most objective and neutral-minded neighbour. Kenya's role during Sudan's civil wars, particularly the second, was as a logistics hub for humanitarian aid flowing into the South. Lokichogio, in Turkana District along the Sudanese border, hosted countless NGOs and the UN humanitarian mission coordinating Operation Lifeline Sudan. Loki, as it was known, had the busiest airport in Africa owing to the number of humanitarian and other charter flights related to operations in southern Sudan. During the CPA's Interim Period, Kenya emerged as a major economic actor in the South; Kenyan businesses flooded in to meet demands for accommodation, construction, and basic goods and services. By 2010 Kenya was its second biggest economic partner, supplying South Sudan with exports worth USD 184 million in 2010.⁵⁴ In the future, Kenya's business interest and logistics role will remain essential. As a landlocked country, South Sudan will need Kenya's 'land bridge' to its port in Mombasa. Conceivably, the country could also play into South Sudan's future oil development. Given the turmoil with Khartoum, it had been suggested quite some time ago that a new pipeline could be built to link South Sudan's oil fields with an offshore export platform in Lamu. If the deposits believed to exist throughout Jonglei State are proven, there is a strong possibility that the pipeline will be built.

In contrast to Kenya, Uganda has been a much more partisan actor in Sudan's two civil wars. During the first war, Uganda's participation was primarily to facilitate Israeli aid to the Anya-Nya insurgency. Uganda also became home to many South Sudanese refugees, just as South Sudan

hosted many Ugandan refugees in the years leading up to the return to war in 1983. During the Second Civil War, after the SPLA/M's expulsion from western Ethiopia in 1991, Uganda gradually began to play a more overt role in providing aid and safe haven to the SPLA/M. This relationship was encouraged because, in the late 1960s, John Garang and Yoweri Museveni had spent time together as students at the University of Dar es-Salaam. In retaliation for Kampala's assistance to the SPLA, Khartoum was supportive of Ugandan insurrectionist forces, specifically the Ugandan West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) and the notorious Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which was engaged in actively destabilising the SPLA/M by preventing its resupply from Uganda or regrouping in Ugandan refugee camps. For much of the war, the LRA was supported and run by the NISS out of Juba.

During the first years of the CPA's Interim Period, Uganda was allowed to use its army, the UPDF, inside Southern Sudan to conduct counter-insurgency operations against the LRA. Additionally, SPLA/M leaders, notably Salva Kiir and Riek Machar, were deeply involved in attempts to mediate with the LRA; at other times they unleashed the SPLA against the cultish militia as it ravaged Southern communities in Western Equatoria and Bahr al-Ghazal. Beside security matters, the development of economic linkages was imperative during the Interim Period. Uganda emerged as the South's largest trading partner: its exports to South Sudan were worth USD 187 million in 2010⁵⁵ and it had the largest number of foreigners resident in South Sudan—approximately 12,000 officially registered.⁵⁶ As is the case with Kenya, Uganda will be a critically important logistics outlet for South Sudan, since the road linking Juba to northern Uganda via Nimule is the country's key transport route. And, what may prove an interesting development for regional relationships, in 2006 Uganda discovered up to 2.5 billion barrels of oil under Lake Albert.⁵⁷ Being landlocked and without major refineries, Uganda faces challenges similar to those experienced by South Sudan; consequently, there may be room for regional cooperation on energy schemes, including infrastructure development such as pipelines.

Among South Sudan's regional neighbours, Ethiopia has played perhaps the most definitive role. The military aid and safe havens provided by the Derg regime of Haile Mariam Mengistu were instrumental to the advent of the SPLA/M in mid-1983. The later collapse of the communist regime, in May 1991, was a watershed moment for the SPLA/M,

and almost resulted in its outright defeat over the subsequent three years. The successor regime of Meles Zenawi, an insurgent leader of the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) who had battled the SPLA because it fought alongside Mengistu in the 1980s and early 1990s, was initially hostile to the SPLA/M, and expelled the Sudanese insurgents and the mass of refugees from Gambella.⁵⁸ After Mengistu's overthrow and the establishment of a new government (primarily drawn from the TPLF), it did not take long for the leaders in Addis Ababa to soften their relationship with Garang and the SPLA/M. Even though they were former adversaries inside Ethiopia when the SPLA/M was a beneficiary of Mengistu, Garang and the SPLA/M seemed less threatening when juxtaposed with the increasingly extreme Islamist adventurism of the NCP regime. Nevertheless it is important to recognise that Khartoum had supported the Ethiopian and Eritrean rebels throughout the 1980s as they struggled against Mengistu and the Derg. While never providing further military aid to the SPLA/M, Ethiopia has continued to play a strong role in the Republic of South Sudan's advent.⁵⁹

During the CPA's Interim Period, Ethiopia played an increasingly political and security-oriented role. In cooperation with the African Union, Addis Ababa consistently facilitated negotiations between Juba and Khartoum over such issues as Abyei and border demarcation. Thus, the Ethiopian peacekeepers deployed to the Abyei area under UN/AU auspices, as well as Ethiopian advisers and instructors supporting the SPLA and the development of the Gambella to Malakal road, will all play important roles in South Sudan's security and economic prospects.

A major foreign policy issue for South Sudanese diplomats to contend with regionally will be the Nile River. Flowing as it does through the middle of the country, the river with its central position is literally and figuratively its heart; it creates the special geography that is the Sudd/Toich, itself deeply fundamental to the livelihoods, identities and culture of South Sudanese peoples. As independence was drawing near, there were even some calls for the new state to be named 'The Nile Republic'. As a country straddling the Nile River, South Sudan will find itself immersed in the regional politics of water rights and water management. These will centre on regional efforts to reshape the archaic colonial treaty agreements governing usage. Under agreements dating from 1929 and 1959, the bulk of water rights were afforded to Egypt and, to a lesser extent, to Sudan; Egypt's approval was also required for upstream devel-

opments, such as irrigation schemes and dams. For South Sudan, as an independent state looking to develop agriculture as its core economic activity, harnessing the potential of the Nile is critical, and thus potentially threatening to Egypt and Khartoum's historic control.

However, in May 2010, six upstream states (Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania) signed a 'Co-operative Framework Agreement' intended to replace the colonial ones. Heavily criticised by both the Republic of Sudan and Egypt, the Agreement did not designate water usage quotas and stripped Egypt of veto rights over upstream development projects. Moreover, the group indicated that the Republic of South Sudan would be welcomed into the deliberations and future agreements, once it was independent, to the concern of Khartoum and Cairo. Tensions were aggravated further by Ethiopia's announcement of plans to build a USD 4.78 billion dam on the Blue Nile near the Sudanese border. While not ratified by the signatory states at the time of South Sudan's independence, the Co-operative Framework Agreement is likely to be a major foreign policy issue for Juba as regional countries jockey for its favour, none more so than Egypt. Cairo's interest in Sudan's civil wars long centred on fears that an independent South Sudan would complicate the management of the Nile's water, being yet another state straddling the river. As a sign of its keen interests in South Sudan, following the vote for the state's independence in January 2011, Egypt called for the construction of the Jonglei Canal to recommence.⁶⁰ Abandoned after attacks by the SPLA in 1984, the canal would add four billion cubic metres of water to the Nile's flow by preventing evaporation in the *Sudd*.⁶¹

Section 3: South Sudan's relations with the major powers

Apart from relations with its immediate neighbours, Juba's relations with the major powers—the United States, the European Union and China—will be of most importance; these relationships will be marked by the political, economic and humanitarian roles taken on by those powers.

Juba will, no doubt, give primacy to its relationship with Washington, as it has done in the lead-up to, and since the signing of, the CPA. The United States has a long history of strategic and economic partnership with Sudan, both in opposition to the SPLA/M and later in support of the South in opposition to the Islamist NIF/NCP in Khartoum. Through-

out the 1970s and 80s, against a backdrop of American tensions with Libya and fears of communist entrenchment in Ethiopia, Sudan was the largest recipient of American foreign aid in Africa, aid directed towards both military and development projects.⁶² Robert McNamara, formerly Secretary of Defence and then head of the World Bank, along with the US government saw supporting Sudan as a way to contain communist influence. The actions in Sudan by the World Bank during that period were a part of the wider security and development agenda, which by 2010 had become a dominant international discourse.

During the 1980s the United States was decidedly anti-SPLA/M, given the backing the latter received from the Derg regime and its overt socialist rhetoric. However, with the Cold War's conclusion, and as the NCP pushed Islamist extremism over the early and mid-1990s, American support for Khartoum quickly slackened. The NCP's support of such extremism was exemplified through its hosting of Osama bin Laden. The US military retaliated, following the Al-Qaeda bombings of American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es-Salaam, by attacking a factory in Khartoum in 1998 with cruise missiles; it turned out to be a pharmaceutical plant. Bin Laden was eventually expelled under American pressure in 1996.

Focused through much of the 1990s on disruptions in the Balkans and the Middle East, America increased its interest in Sudan after the embassy bombings, and even more intensely following the 9/11 attacks in 2001. The American Special Envoy to Sudan, John Danforth, argued in October 2002 that the United States should have a 'catalytic approach' to the Sudanese peace process by encouraging the NCP to negotiate in the nascent CPA process hosted by IGAD.⁶³ This catalytic involvement included sanctions as well as inducements, such as promises to consider removing Khartoum from its list of states sponsoring terrorism. The best example of Washington's approach was the 2002 Sudan Peace Act, which authorised USD 100 million per year for the years 2003–05 for humanitarian relief in areas not controlled by Khartoum, and threatened economic pressure if the NCP did not show itself as sincerely negotiating.

Ever masterful at subterfuge and co-option, the NCP government was widely successful at leveraging Washington's 'overweening focus on stemming terrorism' to reduce pressure on the regime.⁶⁴ For example, when the violence in Darfur was at its worst over 2003–04, Khartoum used its supply of intelligence on terrorism to dilute Washington's critiques of

the regime, as part of the Bush Administration's 'Global War on Terrorism'. While Washington was public in admonishing the regime, and the then Secretary of State famously declared that 'genocide' was unfolding in Darfur (or 'genocidal acts'), the Administration remained slow to impose tangible punishment on the regime. The first American sanctions against Khartoum came in 1997 over human rights and terrorism charges, but were only tightened in 2007 as a result of the situation in Darfur.

During the CPA's Interim Period, Washington continued its attempt to balance pressuring Khartoum to implement the Agreement and respond to the ongoing violence in Darfur against maintaining its counter-terrorism collaboration. Sudan remained the largest recipient of US foreign aid in Africa, with much of it focused on the massive humanitarian disaster provoked in Darfur. Within the South, much US aid was focused on improving the humanitarian situation but also on improving the capacity of the GoSS for basic governance. The SPLA was given special attention as Washington sought to transform a guerrilla force into a more professional, modern army capable of acting as a security guarantor of the CPA process; the impact of this remains highly questionable. Given the scale of violence in Darfur, critics of US Sudan policy diverged, viewing Washington as either failing to respond appropriately to the mass civilian suffering there or not dedicating enough effort towards ensuring the CPA's implementation, challenged as it was by Khartoum's intransigence over issues such as Abyei.

Despite the challenges of balancing its assorted interests, and given its long-held fears that Khartoum would never implement the deal and that Juba lacked the competence at governance necessary to secure it, the primary role played by the US during the CPA process was pressuring Khartoum and bolstering Juba. Following South Sudan's independence, this attempt to coerce and strengthen the respective capitals will likely continue, countering Khartoum's proxy force manipulation and Juba's governance gap. The US declared that its primary role with two Sudans would be to facilitate negotiations between Juba and Khartoum, as well as to work towards development and stability in the new country.⁶⁵

A particular demand by Khartoum was that the US remove Sudan from the State Department's list of terrorist sponsors and help facilitate debt relief, both of which had been tangentially promised by Washington in return for allowing the South's referendum to proceed and recognising the new state. The US Special Envoy had said in 2009 that Sudan

no longer sponsored terrorism and its inclusion on the list was a 'political decision'.⁶⁶ Sudan's inclusion on the terrorism sponsor list was the bargaining chip of US diplomats, and had been particularly prominent in the latter years of the CPA's Interim Period. Accordingly, the NCP for long charged that it was used to favour the SPLM and pressurise Khartoum over Abyei. Though Sudan was still on the terrorism list, following the referendum the Obama administration moved to review and eventually remove the sanctions on Sudan. This act was complicated by Khartoum's occupation of Abyei in May 2011, as well as congressional critiques of alleged support from Khartoum for the LRA. The Obama administration has said that, while it has no evidence that Khartoum supports the LRA any more, fully removing US sanctions will be difficult because most relate to the Darfur crisis rather than to terrorism.⁶⁷ Not long after independence, the Obama administration expanded sanctions on Khartoum and increased its criticisms of SAF attacks on the SPLM-North and the targeting of civilians in the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile and Darfur.

The European Union and its member states will also be of importance to South Sudan's foreign policy. Two European states, Norway (not in the EU) and the UK, played key roles in the CPA's negotiation and implementation as part of the 'troika' alongside the US, pushing the warring partners to negotiate particularly contentious issues. The UK's historic legacy still lingers. With independence, the role of the Europeans will largely focus on humanitarian efforts. The EU has offered substantial levels of aid. For example, its members pledged 85 million euros in direct development assistance to South Sudan in July 2010 and an additional 200 million euros in support of the 2011–13 South Sudan Development Plan, resolved in November 2010.⁶⁸

China's involvement with South Sudan will also be a priority. Chinese foreign policy towards Sudan is highly contentious and centred on oil. It has been argued that oil was a catalyst for peace, notably by underpinned wealth-sharing possibilities, and also contributed the near entirety of Juba's budget during the Interim Period. Conversely, China's oil investments are also resented because they bolstered the Bashir regime during the latter years of the Second Civil War. Lingering resentment exists in the South over the violence that unfolded in the late 1990s around the oilfields; many communities were driven brutally away in order to allow Chinese corporations to begin pumping. With oil revenue accruing, the

NCP effectively shifted from its Islamist origins towards a more utilitarian focus on regime survival. Moreover, although the resources from oil never allowed the NCP to crush the SPLA/M as it had hoped, they did allow Khartoum to escalate the war after pumping starting at the end of 1999, and concomitantly allowed Bashir to consolidate his power after the ruptures caused by the rifts with Turabi and the Islamists.

Another major relationship for South Sudan will be that with the UN, and particularly the UN peacekeeping mission. Khartoum was adamant that UNMIS's mandate would expire on 9 July 2011 and not be extended, at least not in the Republic of Sudan.

Khartoum has long suspected the UN of bias towards the SPLM, particularly in supporting electoral campaigns, transporting party members, and providing satellite images of SAF movements.⁶⁹

However, the relationship between the UN and the SPLA/M has never been as amicable as Khartoum has asserted. Throughout the life of Operation Lifeline Sudan and the CPA period, UN activities in much of South Sudan were accepted with frequent suspicion, frustration and confrontation. More recently frustrations with UNMIS, such as the lack of response to Khartoum's invasion of Abyei in May 2011, resulted in serious confrontation between the Government of South Sudan and the UN. The SPLA spokesman went so far as to question the purpose of the UN mission, rhetorically asking 'What is the point of "monitoring" peace when you are "monitoring" people being killed?' With the support of the US President, Kiir asked for a UN 'mission that can impose peace'.⁷⁰

Regardless of such dissatisfaction, the SPLM still agreed that UN troops should remain in the South after independence and has continually requested more effective operations rather than an end to the UNMIS mission. For the SPLM and the government of South Sudan, the UN is critical for maintaining their wider political strategy of Western support and recognition. Thus they are willing to accept a UN that may not live up to their hopes and expectations.

Ban Ki-Moon had proposed a new mission of 7,000 troops to protect civilians and help build the capacity of new government.⁷¹ At independence the numbers deployed were not as high as promised, and the majority of the UN forces were based in Juba and the few major centres rather than patrolling the new international border and monitoring internal conflict, as the government had proposed should be the UN's contribution to managing Juba-Khartoum relations.

THE PARAMETERS OF SOUTH SUDAN'S FOREIGN POLICY

The GoSS and Kiir, in particular, requested that the UN send peacekeepers to the border region during the referendum and over the period leading to independence to monitor and act as a buffer in case of aggression or the outbreak of violence. This request reflects the thinking of those in the SPLA, and other Southern leaders, that confrontation surrounding the border, even a border war, is likely to be the defining feature of the Republic of South Sudan's foreign policy. Owing to the belief that a border war was imminent and should be prevented, many were disappointed to see the UN not engage more actively to shore up and demarcate the border between the two new states.

At independence, the Republic of South Sudan was poised to join most international organisations. Juba was quick to apply for membership to the International Monetary Fund and the African Development Bank among other institutions. Membership in the African Union and UN was quickly secured and applications were made to smaller international organisations thereafter. More broadly, the SPLM has said it will accede to the Rome Statue, thereby participating in the International Criminal Court in The Hague.⁷² At the time of independence the SPLM expressed its interest in adopting most major international conventions.

Conclusion

South Sudan's foreign policy prospects at independence are mixed, but clearly focused on US political backing, East African economic integration, and defence of the Northern border. On the one hand, the new state enjoys significant international support: large amounts of donor aid money and a refreshed UN mission. On the other hand, it is one of the most impoverished and violence-wracked countries in the world. South Sudan's biggest challenges to rationalising itself will be internal; with much less self-definition based on anti-Arab, anti-Khartoum rhetoric, South Sudan will have to find and cement an idea of itself as South Sudan. How Khartoum responds to that weakness—either by encouraging it or by assisting in overcoming it, perhaps through recalcitrance and belligerence—will, in turn, be definitive.

Accordingly, Juba's foreign policy is most likely to resolve itself around building and managing external relationships to help manage internal difficulties. This will focus on managing what will likely be a turbulent relationship with Khartoum, and garnering the support necessary to

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improve governance, ameliorate a still dire humanitarian situation, and spur economic development in one of the poorest parts of the planet. South Sudan received what it asked for in securing its independence, with significant international support over the duration of the CPA peace process. Juba must now convince the world that such support was worthwhile and that further investing in the country will not be a wasted effort.

THE MEANING OF LIBERATION IN SOUTH SUDAN

Mr. Chairman, you have talked about people eating the boat while we are in the middle of the river. Let me add this; the issue is not eating the boat in the middle of the river. The issue is that there are a few who have already crossed to the other side of the river and when the remaining ones asked them to bring the boat, they refused to return the boat. This is the problem.

Salva Kiir to John Garang, November 2004.¹

As has been the case with other states emerging from protracted independence struggles, for the foreseeable future the Republic of South Sudan's political space will be defined by highly emotive and contested interpretations of 'liberation'. Central to this discourse will be the SPLM's claims of ownership in achieving liberation (its source of legitimacy and hence control), versus calls for greater participation in liberation now that it has been achieved. John Garang long argued for the expediency of consolidated decision-making rather than the pluralism needed for a broad sense of inclusivity—at least while the armed struggle was ongoing. Many questioned this, even within the SPLA/M, and demanded greater participation in decision-making, fearing they were being left

behind. This historic tension between the benefits of consolidated power and calls for wider political inclusivity continues and is of profound importance to an understanding of the society and politics of South Sudan at independence.

As the governing party, the SPLM can argue strongly that other political forces in the country should not 'eat the boat' as the nascent state attempts to solidify itself in the midst of massive challenges. The SPLM's domineering leadership can, arguably, play a stabilising role, though patience and accommodation will be required by all. Conversely, unless the SPLM can engender a greater sense of participation within more useful political forms, such as the assembly, masses of South Sudanese will feel that they are stranded 'on the other side of the river'; this sense of distance from the political process will impede the country's prospects. As long as enfranchisement in the political system in South Sudan is largely understood as linked to having a patron with a 'good' post in the government (bureaucracy, army, etc.), the nature of the nascent democracy will be unable to offer wider political participation whilst being able to manage the tasks of a bureaucracy essential for the functioning of the state. Once the voice for those left behind, at independence Salva Kiir is pressed to reconcile the SPLM's dominance, secured by its role as the party of liberation, with the need to broaden the participation in that liberation and spread its benefits widely through a combination of political inclusion and technical services; at the time of independence these two features of the state were functionally conflated.

Considering the profound importance of the idea of liberation to South Sudan, this chapter will examine three inter-related discussions crucial to the Transition Period's unfolding and hence to the country's future: first is the cardinal debate over the SPLM's claims of ownership of liberation and the possibilities for broadening the political space to bring about more inclusiveness and pluralism; second, the definition of what Southern Sudanese nationalism actually means in the wake of liberation, when a crude juxtaposition against the 'other' in the North no longer provides meaning (or at least has less potency); and third, with independence secured but amidst an escalation in Southern violence, the need for 'South-South' reconciliation. With an escalation in Southern violence despite independence having been secured, this last matter is pressing, and very much complicated by contested interpretations of liberation and the unresolved traumas of decades of war.

Section 1: Who owns South Sudan's liberation?

The flag used historically by the SPLA/M was three stripes of colour divided by thin white lines; on the left side was a blue triangle with a gold star. The colours, of course, had symbolic meanings for the South Sudanese people: black for the people, white for peace, red for the blood lost for freedom, green the land, and blue the Nile; the gold star represented the 'guiding star' of Bethlehem. This flag was chosen to be the new state's official flag in 2011, as it had been for the autonomous region of Southern Sudan during the CPA's Interim Period. While unremarkable to many Southern Sudanese, particularly those in the party and the Southern army, for others it raised questions about the fairness of so directly correlating the dominant insurgent and political force with the nascent state, regardless of the empirical reality that at independence the SPLM was the single and most dominant actor and could make strong claim to have delivered South Sudanese to the 'other side of the river'—liberation.

Within the context of a new state attempting to assert some form of political normalcy after decades of visceral warfare and convoluted peace processes, a key pillar of politics will be debates over legitimacy, however often obscured by other rhetoric and a tendency to approach management by responding to apparently urgent and immediate issues. The nature of the Second Civil War was never straightforward, as is highlighted by the fact that it was driven as a revolutionary insurgency but ended in secession. While that war was defined by confrontations over seeking unity or separation, and by the evolving alliances with and against Khartoum, for most Southern Sudanese legitimacy was clearly understood in terms of achieving an independent state.² This means that what will be fiercely contested is who deserves credit for that outcome.

At independence the SPLM is the dominant political force in the country, and its strongest claim to power stems from its role as a liberator, shepherding the country to independence after decades of brutal war. As signatory of the CPA and governing party during the process that concluded in independence, the SPLM can obviously make the strongest argument that it deserves the credit, and hence the legitimacy provided, for securing it. However, the history of the revolutionary movement creates some dissonance: there is a normative leap between the group's long-stated intentions and the actual outcome, that is, unity and separa-

tion. This discord over intentions and outcomes may have been dampened somewhat by Garang's death, but is still strong nonetheless.

The bitterness over the SPLM's styling itself as 'liberator' will be pronounced among the political opposition in Juba, but even more so among the plethora of emerging armed groups opposing it within the South. Internally there will also be major arguments over who deserves more or less credit for perceived victory and therefore, at least in the short term, power. Many of its opponents consider the SPLM's insistence on credit for separation both pretentious and disingenuous. After having for so long dismissed the 'separatist attitude', which Garang criticised as parochial, and brutally crushed secessionists opposed to its revolutionary message, for the SPLM now to claim rights over achieving separation strikes some Southerners as an absurd contradiction, although they embrace and laud the achievement of that sovereignty. The memories of the SPLA/M's assertion of control at its gestation and over the mid-1980s are still very strong.

Moreover, for many critical of the SPLM, even more definitive is the fact that the South's independence resulted from a struggle that long predated the existence of the SPLA/M. Thus final victory was achieved through the efforts of many more forces than just those of the SPLA/M. The 1991 split is important to the contemporary discussion as it created different concepts of 'Southern nationalism',³ many of which still reverberate. Representing the broader context, those willing to ally with Khartoum argued that doing so was a pragmatic decision, an unfortunate necessity on the road to achieving Southern independence. The apparent hypocrisy of these SPLM leaders was galling for many; most notable was the about-face made by Garang and Kiir, who had themselves been incorporated into the SAF through the Addis Ababa Agreement, while many Anya-Nya veterans, including some who later joined Anya-Nya II, had refused to be co-opted and remained fighting.

More significantly, for many SSDF veterans, the CPA was hardly a remarkable achievement. Rather, they viewed it as a shameless replication of their 1997 Khartoum Agreement, which provided for an interim period concluded by a referendum on independence. At the time, of course, SPLA/M partisans argued that signatories to the 1997 pact were either extremely naïve or—more likely, they said—grossly insincere, as they also argued with regard to the 1998 Fashoda Agreement. The only way to achieve 'victory', the SPLA/M maintained, was to overthrow the

Khartoum regime, not to partner with it. After the CPA, when the SPLM itself agreed to partner with the NCP regime in Khartoum to form the Government of National Unity, many felt the party had acted hypocritically. Garang and the SPLM responded that the revolution's victory was, in fact, contained in the CPA, since the democratic features that would form the Sudanese constitution of the Interim Period would be transformational. The national election was intended to provide an opportunity to unseat the regime in Khartoum, which had been consistently dominated by the centre since Sudanese independence in 1956.

Even within the SPLM, debates over ownership are intense. The inherent tensions between 'old' members (those who were always in the movement) and 'new' members (those who defected and returned, or joined later, as well as those who were incorporated as part of the evolution of reconciliation) will be provocative. This debate centres on who, as Garang used to argue, was a 'so-called secessionist' or a 'so-called Southerner' as opposed to a dedicated rebel—that is, one who never allied with Khartoum. The best example of this is Riek Machar, historically the greatest Southern agitator against the SPLA/M, but at independence the Vice-President of South Sudan and the SPLM's deputy leader. Other notable examples include Clement Wani, Paulino Matip, John Luk Jok, and Taban Deng, all now senior members of the government. This tension became particularly apparent in the factional bickering over candidate lists within the SPLM during the April 2010 elections. Controversially, the party dictated that time spent in the movement was the key criterion for selection as an SPLM nominee. This policy significantly disadvantaged those, such as SSDF veterans, mostly Nuer, who had only recently been reconciled.⁴

Within the SPLA, there also exist stark tensions, especially in the aftermath of the 2006 Juba Declaration when many ex-SSDF commanders felt they were marginalised and deprived of opportunities for promotion or assignment to relevant or adequately prestigious jobs. The SPLA's November 2010 round of promotions was a clear precursor of the defections and violence of 2011. Having integrated a large number of officers from the SSDF, the SPLA was left with an inflated senior officer corps. Among the existing SPLA officers, this created a perception that their roles had been diluted in relevance. For those SSDF veterans brought in, tensions resulted from perceptions that they had been denied access to key positions. For example, Peter Gadet was initially given the rank of

Major General and assigned the post of Director of Air Defence at SPLA General Headquarters, but then moved to Deputy Commander of 3rd Division based in Warrap State—what could be perceived as a demotion from a central command post. Such perceived slights, as well as attempts to move ex-SSDF commanders away from their old units and home areas, were contentious and cited as provocation for escalating violence after the referendum.⁵ Gadet's rebellion after independence is no anomaly or coincidence; these perceptions and dynamics exist and are significant. They will persist for some time to come in South Sudan, and can either be harnessed as energy to develop peaceful opposition and political discourse or prepare the ground for future internal violence and resistance to the extension of the state.

Debates over who deserves credit for liberation are further qualified by what will be an even more pressing discourse in the newly sovereign South Sudanese politics: what does liberation even mean? Historically 'liberation' was understood as rightful control over a sovereign state framed against colonialism and foreign imperialism. More contemporarily the notion of 'liberation' is about freedom from oppression by the state and economic development, for example through the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals or the African Union's Economic Rights.⁶ This raises the question of how easily an overwhelming vote for separation in January 2011 will translate into broad public belief that 'liberation' has actually been achieved amid the South's still-chronic insecurity, political and ethnic divides, and overwhelming underdevelopment.

The SPLM is the predominant—if not the only significant—political institution of South Sudan. Many, within the South but internationally as well, fear that the party is perhaps too dominant for the country's good. When it was an insurgency, the expediency required for success was understandably claimed, but it came at a cost—the exclusion of many from the very process of liberation and state formation. Within the SPLA/M these tensions challenged its own coherence at times, as in November 2004 when Salva Kiir questioned John Garang to explain his depth of control against the need for allowing greater participation, provoking a moment of internal tension not felt since the fighting that ensued after the 1991 split. Although internal tensions were largely a result of various personal competitions, and although most were in the process of resolution at the time of independence, the SPLM as a political movement has actually presented few opportunities for the development of

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alternative political groupings within it. Nevertheless, there are long existing cleavages within the SPLM, so much so that the extent to which coherence has been maintained over the years of struggle, particularly since the CPA, is impressive. More broadly for South Sudan, the contemporary politics of liberation could potentially stratify Southern society, with SPLA/M 'liberators' monopolising the benefits of power, thus marginalising much of the public in a manner that justified Southern rebellion in the first place.

Such apprehension over the SPLM's dominance was common within the South during the CPA's Interim Period, culminating in the debates over the Transitional Constitution. The primary fear among the party's political opponents was that the SPLM would unfairly entrench its control over the South's politics and governance, using the primacy ratified by the CPA and the arms of the SPLA to dominate the new state. Arguably, much of this paranoia was based on petty posturing by opposition parties, and often amounted to very little in terms of votes or substantial support from the public.

More significantly, this apprehension was unavoidable since the SPLA/M was never particularly democratic or pluralistic. Despite its revolutionary zeal and ostensibly progressive form, the SPLA/M had never emphasised civil administration or even basic development, preferring to view itself as a national movement for reform rather than a nascent Southern government. While this changed somewhat after its 1994 National Convention, when the movement initiated a slow shift towards emphasising democratic processes and economic development, the SPLA/M's legacy of autocratic rule over 'liberated areas' still looms large in the South's collective political psyche. Problematically for contemporary Southern social harmony, this tension was compounded by the exceptional inter-communal violence that escalated after the 1991 split.

The critiques of the SPLA/M, from its violent origins crushing Southern opposition to its near monopoly control over the South's political and economic space after independence, are often justified. However, it is important to qualify and contextualise them. The sum reality is that the SPLA/M is the Southern organisation that secured the CPA peace process, allowing for independence, and the SPLM was the governing party that saw that outcome secured at the end of the Interim Period. Indeed, it is somewhat ironic that the greatest champion of the New Sudan vision and critic of Southern sovereigntists as parochial, John

Garang de Mabior, will be regarded as the father of an independent Republic of South Sudan.

Historically, the SPLM's rhetoric was for unity, but it was also qualified, most often by Garang himself. Garang presciently predicted in 1994 that Bashir's would be 'the last government of the Old Sudan'; it would have to allow reform, otherwise 'the Sudan will break up into several states'.⁷ Moreover, that the SPLA/M's insurgency was revolutionary rather than secessionist never negated its ability to pressure Khartoum more than any other Southern group had; as Garang rhetorically asked of his critics, 'What more can I do now than what I am already doing?'⁸

True, South Sudan's secession was part of a longer history, and many actors besides the members of the SPLA/M, such as the Anya-Nya insurgents of the 1960s, paid dearly in contributing towards that outcome; none more so than the general public, however. For liberation to be broadly embraced it must be recognised by all the remnants of the SPLA/M (whether political or military) as having been a victory for the whole Southern population. However, some criticisms should be dismissed. Amidst the escalation of post-referendum violence, notably by ex-SSDF commanders such as Peter Gadet, arguments glorifying their own 'secessionist' histories and roles, and justifying renewed violence in terms of grievances, are suspect. Shadowing the efforts of the Anya-Nya II, claims by SSDF veterans of having similarly pushed Khartoum towards Southern independence are considered by many as dubious. While many cite the 1997 Khartoum Agreement as a righteous predecessor to the CPA, the claim is somewhat disingenuous. As Francis Deng has argued, considering that it was between parties already in alliance against the SPLA/M, it was 'more of a war pact than a peace agreement'.⁹

Aside from disputed claims of ownership, due credit should be given to the SPLA/M regarding the basic foundation of governance provided for at independence, namely the formation of a Government of Southern Sudan started in July 2005. There are massive challenges ahead and there is ample and appropriate cynicism regarding prospects and performance to date, but South Sudan's political trajectory at independence at least allows for the possibility of a democratic future. Whatever the SPLM's faults, it has long espoused liberal intentions in the face of formidable challenges, or, as one long-term commentator noted, 'The SPLA was the poorest rebel group in Africa with the strongest cause'.¹⁰ Even when the SPLA/M was trying to look and sound Marxist, the clear devel-

opment-oriented and democratically oriented liberalism underlying the hope of Garang and average soldiers—though they diverged in other ways—were squarely about democratic change and a future built on economic development, though with various iterations as the wider context of the struggle changed.

Despite the democratic challenges of the Interim Period and the contradictions of ideological hopes and actual outcome, the SPLA/M's historic intentions should not be disregarded. South Sudan's independence occurred at the same time as the so-called Arab Spring revolts of 2011, and there have been similar recent moments of democratic expression throughout Africa. While there is room for cynicism, it should be hoped that dictatorial rule could in fact be overcome by the will of the people. Until it is proved otherwise, the democratic ideals the SPLA/M has long espoused as its core ideology still have potential for fruition in South Sudan. Despite parochial tendencies, nepotism and corruption (admittedly the corruption so far pales in comparison with some of South Sudan's neighbours), the SPLM and Garang's heir Salva Kiir have already delivered more than most. Moreover, the SPLM and SPLA's successes at achieving relative peace and political stability, particularly during the Interim Period, came primarily from reconciliation and co-option rather than suppression. There were no pogroms, no mass exodus of refugees fleeing political violence. Whatever its mistakes, the SPLM is still by far the most popular party in the country with a base of support much greater than that of any other political party.

Furthermore, actions undertaken by the SPLA/M and its leadership, which draw the ire of contemporary critics, must be placed in context. There is hardly any leader in South Sudan who has a personal history untainted by some form of excess amidst decades of war. The SPLA/M, and particularly John Garang, must be judged within the fractured socio-political space of the South, one that was chronically manipulated by Khartoum as it sought to divide and rule. Garang felt the need to overcome the Southern political fractiousness that had been so debilitating to previous efforts at emancipation. And he was successful; South Sudan's liberation was achieved by an insurgency surmounting the divisions that had previously stymied Southern solidarity and hence independence, though at an often bloody price. Within this context, it is worth highlighting that while Garang had many critics and many that loathed him personally, he was also a vastly popular man. A compelling example can

be found in the massive crowds that greeted him both in Khartoum during his triumphant arrival on 8 July 2005, and, following his death, across the South as his body travelled through the country in an extended funeral three weeks later.

Despite hopes for a democratic future grounded in political stability and improved security, there are still major challenges ahead. Unfortunately, the precedents for authoritarianism by liberation movements in Africa are many, represented most starkly by Robert Mugabe's ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe. Within the Horn of Africa, the early hopes of an independent Eritrea representing a 'new Africa' of progressive democracy were punctured by the decidedly dictatorial control of Isaias Afewerki and his EPLF.

In any case, a good deal of fractiousness is to be expected and welcomed as the general nature of a new democracy. However, it is also potentially dangerous; democracy is a double-edged sword. Over the 1970s and early 1980s, during the implementation of the Addis Ababa Agreement, much tension, skilfully manipulated by Khartoum, existed between factions of the Southern political class. The *modus operandi* of the SPLM, and the SPLA, has been to subsume opponents into itself rather than see them left as agitators adrift and threatening. While this made sense, particularly for the SPLA, it is not practical for a democracy that seeks to stand on its own. Thus the SPLM's greatest challenge, similar to that of the ANC in South Africa, is how to allow for a reformulation away from a single dominant party into a multi-party system. Perhaps the best outcome would be the gradual dissolution of the party, allowing the internal cleavages to manifest themselves in a peaceful, even collegial manner. In the short term at least, the most viable potential rests with the development of internal democratic practices and constructions; democracy within the SPLM can be the precursor to gradual transition to multi-party democracy. Like that of the army, the party's name is highly emotive and much coveted. The army, officially at least, found a way to accept being renamed the South Sudan Armed Forces in the Transitional Constitution. But it was not after, however, that resistance to this idea was expressed strongly enough for the President to accept the decision of the army to continue using the name SPLA. To encourage the transition to a functioning democracy, the political wing of the movement must also go through this identity reckoning.

Political opposition at independence was exceedingly weak, consisting for the most part of so-called 'briefcase parties' composed of loud

individuals lacking support among the public.¹¹ Often they were tainted by past collaboration with the Bashir regime or previous regimes in Khartoum, or near total absence from Sudan—even from the region—during the war; one of these parties was Lam Akol's SPLM-DC, which until independence was still headquartered in Khartoum. While the SPLM often had its democratic sincerity questioned, it countered that the opposition was itself lacking in democratic legitimacy. It argued that the CPA had afforded the other parties more formal places in government and the legislature than they deserved if there were an election. The opposition parties had actually lost seats in the Southern legislature in the April 2010 elections. However, the SPLM was itself criticised by international observers for its management of the elections. Further criticism was levelled at the governing party over a mixed system of voting based on the GoSS's interpretation of the CPA's democratic provisions, which saw the SPLM collect 94 per cent of seats in the Southern legislature despite only winning 75 per cent of the vote.¹² Compounding tensions between the governing party and its opposition have been suspicions that Khartoum has used Southern political parties as fronts for assistance to armed groups, as when the SPLM accused Lam Akol's SPLM-DC party of unleashing militias in the Shilluk areas of Fashoda, on the western banks of the Nile north of Malakal in Upper Nile, in March 2010.

An effective opposition to the SPLM's political dominance is needed, but despite a strong culture of oppositional politics among the wider population, such an opposition is challenged by the movement's history of barely tolerating, much less encouraging, opposition. The Southern Sudanese are very locally empowered, but the SPLA and SPLM worked hard to subvert that tendency so as to bring coherence and unity to their war effort. However, during the war, the SPLA had to accept that meetings needed to be held frequently to allow lower ranking soldiers opportunity to air grievances in front of officers. The SPLM's origins as the political wing of a military organisation, and the domineering legacy of leadership style, have left the party with a deeply ingrained habit of militarism; although individual leaders often maintained political ambitions, few kept the connection to local communities in a way naturally conducive to rapid transition to elected representation—a key reason why the SPLM was happy to have appointed assemblies and government for the Interim Period, and did not insist on elections immediately.

While arguably defensible in the context of waging a long insurgency campaign, this absolutism clashes with the needs of a nascent democ-

racism. The top leaders of the insurgency have consequently had a difficult time transitioning to electoral politics, some even losing elections in their home areas—most notably, the former head of the army Oyay Deng Ajak and the senior SPLM minister John Luk Jok. Admittedly neither was particularly surprised at these losses, considering how little time they had spent in their home areas. That there are other similar cases suggests a slow process of transition is reasonable, so as not to undermine and distress those who directed the armed forces for the duration of the war. Accordingly, the SPLM will have to adapt its institutional mindset further—from insurgency to political party; to partner in the new Government of the Republic of South Sudan; finally, to governing party willing to accept the plurality of democracy. Perhaps the best hope for such change is that, with independence, the SPLM has progressed further, and is on the way to becoming a group of ‘stationary bandits’, dependent on the population for affirmation and support.¹³

Many international analysts, activists, commentators, and the few opposition politicians tend to espouse some version of the argument expressed by the International Crisis Group, ‘The line between the military and the party is extraordinarily thin’.¹⁴ This analysis tends, however, to be an unfortunately shallow appreciation of the situation. It is also a replication of typical and accepted rhetoric associated with post-conflict societies and security sector reform. The simple application of this analysis to South Sudan ignores the fact that during the CPA period the SPLA has actually been largely separated from the political party. While undoubtedly there are many army leaders with political aspirations and most of the top politicians have some form of military/guerrilla background, the fact that the SPLA has not been used as a direct tool of the political party is significant. The evidence put forward for this purported ‘thin line’ is intimidation during the elections in 2010 and other political situations. Although intimidation occurred, it was not institutional; the SPLA was not being used or directed as a militia or gang of the SPLM. Rather, there were individuals and small groups still involved in the army, the police and other security services, involved in acts of intimidation during political events.

The transformation of the SPLA, however problematic, has succeeded in separating the army and the political party. The historical connections and linkages between the SPLM and the SPLA remain apparent, so such separation may not continue for ever; still, it is one of the major demo-

cratic achievements of the CPA period. Many other nascent states and post-war, post-revolution states have not been able to make this break between the military and the political system. It remains to be seen whether the SPLA develops like the army in Turkey, where military leaders intervene when the core principles of the state—in this case those bestowed by Garang and the SPLM in the CPA—are threatened by a particular political party. Also, one cannot predict whether a coup or some other political takeover, launched from within the army or security services, may occur. However, at independence, the SPLA has been separated from the SPLM—no small achievement for the future of democracy in South Sudan. If anything the army has been used as a space for managing certain contentious politics, not the other way around.

Given the political dominance of the SPLM, the most important politics for the new state exist within it, rather than between it and the opposition. The biggest need for reform is within the SPLM itself;¹⁵ the military's very hierarchical structure still lingers from its origins. A major cause of the tensions during the April 2010 elections was the lack of internal primary elections or sufficiently inclusive selection methods, prior to the general election. Particularly inflammatory was the selection of candidates by the SPLM Political Bureau, in effect the SPLM's executive committee. Many individuals felt they were unfairly overlooked, particularly for governorships, which led to acrimony within the party. Consequently, reforming the laws and regulations has been difficult; it requires a degree of consensus within the party so that the legislation can be moved forward. This problem was particularly acute during the CPA period. Although some very important legislation was concluded, much of it came about with a great deal of international advisory assistance—even the drafting of legislation has been overseen by international advisers, and the resulting laws often lack local relevance or buy-in.

The SPLM was keen during the CPA's Interim Period to equate itself with the GoSS. Historically, the institutional culture of Sudanese governance has been overtly politicised by the party in power, something facilitated by the SPLM's formation of the GoSS in 2005 and its dominant control at independence. Moreover, critics have contended that the international community, often accused of over-emphasising Khartoum's nefarious actions during the CPA peace process while acting simply as 'cheerleaders' for the SPLM, has encouraged such politicisation. Many consider this a lost opportunity to inject a small dose of pluralism into

the South's body politic. Alternatively, had the SPLM not focused on Khartoum as a force, there was the possibility that its own internal factions might have deepened, resulting in major splits likely to pose a greater danger to the stability of South Sudan during the CPA period than the risk of an overly narrow political space.

While strong leadership based on a rigid hierarchy helped the SPLA/M secure independence, the movement's challenge now is to morph away from such control, even as its removal threatens the status of its primary beneficiary—the party itself. At independence many question the benefit of consolidating power under the SPLM. The tensions between the SPLM's dominance over the state and its claims of ownership over South Sudan's liberation—what could conceivably catalyse its development and stability—will constantly clash with the reasonable and necessary counter-claims for greater inclusion and participation. Creating Garang's often hoped-for 'new political dispensation', a functioning democracy built on pluralism and inclusivity will hence be imperative.

If South Sudan devolves into a highly centralised, authoritarian state built upon one-party rule exerting control through the military, it will be nothing but an 'Old Sudan' itself. Appreciation of this is common among leaders in the political and military hierarchy, and they want to avoid this trap. While all the good intentions in the world may do little to confront the myriad challenges and some of the depressingly negative traits apparent in the emergent state, there is ample intention to avoid a future Republic of South Sudan conducting itself in a manner reminiscent of the successive and oppressive Khartoum-based regimes.

Section 2: What is South Sudanese nationalism?

As it is a new state, born through decades of resistance to Khartoum's rule but hosting exceptional social and ethnic diversity, it is important to ask what shared sense of identity will exist in the Republic of South Sudan. Simply put, is there an 'imagined community' of South Sudan? Sudan's civil wars were, at heart, conflicts over defining a national identity, the imposition of an Arab and Islamic one being simply unacceptable among Southerners. Amid such historical tensions over identity creation, weak states such as South Sudan—and Sudan before it—are 'challenged to explore a national common ground and to develop an inclusive sense of belonging, with the rights and obligations of full citizenship'.¹⁶

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South Sudanese nationalism was premised upon the narrative of resistance against marginalisation and exploitation by the North. This was a form of 'regional nationalism': 'Southerners' identified themselves by their very inclusion within Sudan. Tellingly, prior to independence in July 2011, the Southern government declared that South Sudan's official rebellion stretched from 1820 to 2011.¹⁷ These 191 years of resistance to 'outside' domination were underpinned by little intrinsic identity creation. What existed, according to Francis Deng, was limited: 'In reaction to the threat from the North, the South forged a new identity, welding together notions of African-ism and received Western and Christian values. The SPLA/M in the south is the culmination of this process.'¹⁸ This was primarily in the form of a rebellion seeking democracy, devolved power and secularism.

While the CPA's Interim Period saw a good deal of Southern solidarity, especially compared with the latter years of the failed Addis Ababa peace, much of this solidarity was superficial and driven more by an opportunistic nationalism focused on ridding the South of the North, rather upon a South Sudan in itself. The January 2011 referendum was perhaps the clearest articulation of Southern nationalism, and represented a maturing identity. However, as the International Crisis Group lamented, even a near-unanimous vote for independence was based on 'collective opposition' rather than any 'inherent harmony'.¹⁹ Lacking opposition in the North, the solidarity of being 'Southern' and 'African' will likely dissolve.

In the wake of the referendum, the rivalries between various Southern factions escalated into widespread violence. Considering the militia groups involved, this was somewhat predictable; it had been made clear by the SPLA/M's armed opponents that whatever detente existed in the South was meant to allow a peaceful referendum to occur, rather than represent acquiescence to the SPLM's dominant, governing role.²⁰ Among those SSDF factions that had agreed to incorporate with the SPLA through the 2006 Juba Declaration, but even more strongly among those that had not, the determination was clear that any peaceful coexistence during the CPA's Interim Period was meant to allow Southern separation to be secured.²¹ Once this was achieved, there was little to deter expression of their renewed grievances against the SPLA/M.

Aside from the political challenges of national identity creation, there are some profound physical and geographic ones as well. In such a mas-

sive and underdeveloped state, there is likely to be a lack of governance in the new state's extended periphery. Even with a six-year headstart allowed for by the CPA's Interim Period, 'the gap between "established" and "functioning" institutions was unmistakable' throughout the South.²² Most problematic for rural communities desperate for a 'peace dividend' have been chronically poor security and negligible development benefits. Improving basic social services may be the best way for the government to foster a new national identity. 'Progress' in terms of basic development, especially that provided by their government rather than foreign aid workers and in the periphery rather than Juba, would be something Southerners could rally around as a national project. Conversely, the lack of such progress could also be hugely divisive.

The new state lacks the technical means to overcome its sheer geographic mass, a fact that will inherently reinforce an already strong core-periphery divide between the booming capital and the undeveloped periphery. The dearth of roads is pressing, and for much of northern South Sudan nearly all roads still lead to Khartoum rather than Juba. Likewise, the only railway goes from Wau to the North. For residents in the border-states, Khartoum can be reached usually in a long day or two; reaching Juba is nearly impossible by land, and requires a weeks-long journey via the Nile River. Such limitations to movement and economic development within the South hinder social interaction, and encourage cultural tendencies toward localised introversion.

There are sources of hope, however. As fractious as South Sudanese politics is, the national legislature was able to function throughout the CPA's Interim Period, promulgating the Interim Constitution and most of the major laws required for governing the state. Furthermore, the period saw burgeoning media, including a national television channel. The Southern universities long housed in Khartoum began the slow movement to the South, and a national police academy was opened outside Juba. Perhaps even more important has been the development of the SPLA as a national institution. Considering its central role in independence, the SPLA provides perhaps the clearest institution capable of furthering a shared identity for the South.

Despite such hopes, the ability of the new Government of South Sudan to organise a coherent system of governance widely inclusive of its citizens' diversity remains to be tested. The shallow 'Southern Sudanese' identity of the CPA's Interim Period could easily make way for the more

particular identities—localised and reactionary—that have long defined most of life in the South. Amid the escalating violence in early 2011, *The Economist* lamented that '[t]he South Sudanese are perhaps their own worst enemies'.²³ It is not an uncommon sentiment given the history and depth of South–South violence, but it is one that should be contextualised by the reality that the South has always been heavily manipulated by outside actors, by none more so than Khartoum's evolving autocrats. Nonetheless, the biggest challenge to the new state's social and political viability is indeed internal: it suffers manipulation because it is so easy to manipulate.

While it would be a mistake to identify the 'tribal' dynamics of South Sudan as the only feature driving its nascent socio-political dynamics, it would equally be a mistake to pretend they do not exist. Tensions between the new state's component groups are of profound importance, especially within the context of claiming 'liberation' and rationalising the country's political space and national identity. This is most striking in terms of perceptions over who suffered most to resist Northern oppression—that is, those claiming ownership for liberation and seen as therefore most deserving of its fruits. While many Equatorians argued that their communities suffered disproportionately during the First Civil War, many Dinka felt the same was true for them during the Second.

From the very beginning of the Second Civil War in 1983, it was obvious that the South did not speak with one voice, the SPLA/M's. Different communities were willing to liaise with Khartoum to meet their own interests: take, for instance, those groups more willing to accept Nimairi's plans for 'redivision' as well as collaboration between localised, ethnic-based militias and SAF. Hoping to play a greater governing role by diluting what was perceived as an overbearing Dinka presence in Juba, many Equatorians pushed for some form of re-division. The Addis Ababa peace was premised upon Southern autonomy; Garang described Nimairi's redivision of the South in June 1983 as being 'his policy of divide and rule'.²⁴

Hence a counter-perception developed that Equatorian politicians had facilitated Nimairi's attempts to undermine the Addis Ababa peace through their own calls for power to be devolved, even if that meant re-division of the Southern autonomous region. Conversely, there were perceptions by many Equatorians that the SPLA/M was merely an offshoot of the growing Dinka dominance that had controlled much of the South-

ern Sudan regional government during the latter years of the Addis Ababa peace. The SPLA/M quickly proved unpopular in parts of the South; an unpopularity best highlighted by the violent hostility shown by many Equatorian groups towards the SPLA over 1984–85 as it expanded its presence across the South.

Similar fears of 'Dinka domination' played out as a major theme among the anti-SPLA/M opposition within Nuer communities during the Second Civil War. These were most concentrated in the origins and evolution of the SSDF, particularly among Nuer armed groups long disparaging of the SPLA as a 'Dinka militia'. Such tensions thrived among communities which had earlier supported the Anya-Nya II rebels. The result was that, in the mid-1980s, Nuer were targeting Dinka recruits from Bahr al-Ghazal passing through Upper Nile en route to training camps in Ethiopia.

The South-South violence that escalated during the 1990s as the SPLA battled its Southern opponents by targeting civilian communities, and vice versa, produced absolutist perceptions still viscerally present. During that time, the SPLA perceived its militia opponents and the subsequent retribution raids against their home communities as a 'national security issue' that must be brutally dealt with to protect the revolution, whereas the anti-SPLA opposition saw its own violence against Southern communities as 'countering Dinka domination'.²⁵ More embittering for many SPLA opponents, particularly Nuer militiamen forming the bulk of the SSDF, was to be dismissed by the SPLA as 'Arabs' and not really 'Southerners' because of their collaboration with Khartoum.²⁶

The result has been lingering mistrust and suspicion between South Sudan's largest ethnic groups, notably aggravated between Nuer and Equatorian communities by their perception of Dinka dominance in governance and the SPLA. The reality, however, has always been rather different from partisan perceptions. During the contentious period of redivision, the creation of three smaller states was supported by several groups—including Equatorians, Fartit in Bahr al-Ghazal and Nuer in Upper Nile, as well as many Dinkas—some of whom accepted government posts in reconstituted provincial governments.²⁷ Moreover, the SPLA/M always had significant membership throughout the South; Equatorians, for instance, were in the movement from its very inception. More recently, at independence, Nuers were in positions of leadership in seven ministries and held the vice-presidency as well as the SPLA's Chief of Staff post.

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Nonetheless, such tensions are still very strong and potentially explosive. In early 2011 Salva Kiir stirred controversy when 15 of the 24 members he named to the committee formulating the Transitional Constitution were Dinka. Still, John Luk Jok, the minister in charge of leading the effort, himself a Nuer, argued to his fellow Nuers that they should not claim they were being marginalised from the process. With the escalation of post-referendum violence by dissident Southern armed groups, there were further overtones of these ethnic tensions. While the rebeling groups included among their leadership members of the Murle and Shilluk tribes, aggravation amongst the Nuer was arguably the strongest.²⁸ Ex-SSDF commanders, such as Peter Gadet, defected from the SPLA and launched major attacks in Unity State. Riek Machar, playing his favourite role of reconciler, cautioned that dialogue was required to deal with the post-referendum militias: 'Today you may think it is the SPLA fighting George Athor's forces, but tomorrow it can turn into a tribal war which can spread and become difficult to contain'.²⁹ Athor, a Dinka, had long been in the SPLA, but such was the sensitivity of the overarching situation that calm, deliberative negotiation was deemed most appropriate. Negotiation worked in some cases; brute force was applied in others, such as the SPLA's assault on Peter Gadet's forces in Unity State in July 2011.

Related to these tensions, manifest in debates over the Transitional Constitution and in the re-emergence of anti-SPLA militias were broader arguments over federalism in the South post-independence. Included in the Transitional Constitution was its predecessor's provision for strong state governments, in the form of directly elected state assemblies and governors. The SPLM has supported federalism, espousing a 'unity through diversity' mantra, but the CPA's Interim Period saw little actual devolution of power to the states, and less still to the even lower levels of county and *payam* (village). Rather, power has continuously been concentrated at the central government level in Juba. Much of this has to do with the reality of having to create governance from almost nothing and the ease with which foreign aid can flow in to the capital, but it is still a controversial topic.

With power concentrated in Juba, the older discussions over power and inclusion have remained strong. The opposing dynamics of wanting more localised control to secure against abuse by a biased national government versus the need to avoid the fractiousness and division so eas-

ily manipulated by Khartoum remain. *Kokora* is still used in the Southern political discourse as a synonym for 'regionalism', 'decentralisation', or more derisively, 'division', and more extremely, 'expulsion'. The term is associated primarily with Equatorian hopes for devolution to ensure that the Dinka do not overly dominate the South and that local communities have some degree of control over local events. For instance, on 27 April 2011 a 'greater Equatoria' conference was held in Juba, which, while endorsing Kiir's continued leadership, called for a federal system of governance. This was hardly a revolutionary outcome, but the conference still provoked much acrimonious debate, with many criticising it as unnecessarily provocative and representative of a brooding Equatorian resentment similar to that of the early 1980s.

Another issue that will continue to prove contentious is the building of a national civil service. Within the South, enfranchisement has often been viewed through the lens of group representation in government institutions rather than the ballot box. Most strikingly, this first became clear in Southern resentment against the 'Sudanisation' process as Northerners/Arabs replaced British administrators in the 1950s. It was likewise present in Equatorian fears that the Regional Government of the 1970s and 80s had become overly dominated by Dinka. Comparable is the ongoing and highly emotional debate over building a new capital. The Bari community resident in Juba has long advocated that a new capital should be built elsewhere to alleviate pressure from large numbers of other Southerners flooding into their home areas.

With these tensions in mind, the overarching need is to ascertain how feasible it will be for a South Sudanese nationalism to develop on its own, lacking the bond provided by resistance to a common enemy. Resistance by the various Southern tribes to European, Egyptian, Turkish, and Northern Sudanese rule relied upon customary approaches to warfare based on a conservative desire to preclude change. Most leaders have historically been concerned primarily with maintaining their own localised authority and protecting their communities from attack, which at times encouraged them to ally with outsiders to overcome nearer enemies. This approach to resisting invaders was common to most Southern Sudanese groups, with local rivalries figuring as significantly in the strategic calculus as the appearance of outsiders. Writing about the launch of the SPLA/M, Robert O. Collins identified the difficulty of uniting the South into a single revolutionary effort:

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Indeed, the principle characteristic of Nilotic [Shilluk, Nuer, Dinka], if not Azande, society during the past hundred years has been its hostility to change, and this same, intensely conservative nature of Southern Sudanese societies has greatly hindered today's revolutionaries who are seeking a wider political allegiance than any of their predecessors.³⁰

Garang and the SPLA/M found this conservatism difficult to counter; it was perhaps the single biggest reason Garang could never overcome the popular preference within the South for secession over his New Sudan vision. Translating the 99 per cent vote for separation in January 2011 into a new identity based on an independent South Sudan will be remarkably difficult. The introverted and reactionary tendencies that so often manifest themselves in debilitating South-South violence and collaboration with an almost universally hated regime in Khartoum will remain prominent after independence. The process of consolidating a new identity will be encumbered by the identities of the various Southern tribes, many of whose members will continue to see their Southern Sudanese identities as of secondary or tertiary importance. Nowhere will this be more clearly manifested than in the political space of governance, where the historical precedents of Southern fractiousness loom large.

Section 3: The need for South-South reconciliation

Our civilians have suffered a great deal. We have now put the citizen at centre stage. He is the one that liberation should serve, not the one that should suffer from liberation.

John Garang³¹

That the civilian should be put centre stage was the great hope of the SPLA/M's National Convention of 1994, intended to reform the movement into one more caring about the South's population than it had been previously. Arguably the violence against civilian communities only got worse in the years after the 1994 convention. Lacking binary simplicity, the war was never a South-North conflict; rather its 'root causes' were exponentially expanding grievances driven by ever widening numbers of actors. After decades, indeed generations, of such convoluted violence, the layers of tension are deep, particularly within the South. The sad truth for Southerners was that they 'invested more time and energy fighting each other than in combating the [NCP] government'.³² The challenges for South Sudan will be how to start 'delaying' such legacies, thereby resolving the traumas of their war.

With statehood achieved, there will be increased calls for a reckoning of the war's brutal excesses. Given the duration of the Second Civil War, the violence was exceedingly diverse in form. There are many such exceptional cases,³³ but more generally the need is for recognition and action on the deep divides within and between communities caused by the years of targeted violence. The 1991 split remains highly controversial in the South. Some have argued it was a perverse 'blessing in disguise', as it provoked the SPLA/M to re-emphasise Southern self-determination. Others have bitterly concluded that the extensive violence that unfolded afterwards negated any possible benefit.

Starting with the Bor Massacre, the violence between Dinka and Nuer communities, as well as the Nuer civil wars of the mid and late 1990s, reached a scale that was exceptional. The violence was also profound within greater Equatoria, where the SPLA waged numerous campaigns against SAF forces as well as their Southern proxies militias and other groups allied to Khartoum such as the LRA; many communities were involved as proxy militias. Still other prominent violence included the SPLA's early crushing of the Anya-Nya II, as well as the fighting that contributed to the 1988 and 1998 Bahr al-Ghazal famines. The sum result is a society still haunted by the trauma.

Considering the scale and depth of violence, during the CPA's negotiations there had been hopes in some quarters, including within the SPLA/M, that something akin to South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation process would be included. Rejected by the NCP, the CPA's actual provision was a decidedly ambiguous compromise calling for the Government of National Unity to 'initiate a comprehensive process of national reconciliation and healing throughout the country'.³⁴ Premised on the overarching imperative of 'making unity attractive', the treaty's emphasis was implicitly along a North-South bearing. International human rights activists were troubled by the Agreement's lack of emphasis on securing 'justice' for the victims of mass wartime violence. The CPA did not stipulate specific mechanisms for reconciliation, much less for the future prosecution of war crimes. Regardless of the debate, no actions resembling a 'comprehensive process' of reconciliation and national healing were implemented during the Interim Period.

Within the South there are enduring norms of reconciliation. For political actors and armed groups this has been manifested, as described extensively in previous chapters, as the routine agreements bringing oppo-

sition actors within the SPLA or SPLM. The best example is Riek Machar, perhaps the movement's biggest agitator over the 1990s, holding the vice-presidency. Moreover, Paulino Matip, the Anya-Nya II veteran who fought bitterly against the SPLA from the earliest days of the Second Civil War and was perhaps its single most formidable opponent on the battlefield, was made the SPLA's Deputy Commander-in-Chief through the 2006 Juba Declaration.

Within the context of routine manipulation by Khartoum and debilitating Southern fractiousness, reconciliation by the SPLA/M was long considered more of a strategic need than an emotive undertaking. In the aftermath of the 1991 split, Garang declared the need for South-South dialogue 'to heal wounds and restore fraternity and mutual respect so as to create a healthy political environment that is accommodative of all Southern Sudanese political forces'.³⁵ Ever blunter, in the midst of troubles during the Interim Period, Kiir argued for Southern reconciliation so that 'agitators [are] denied the opportunity to fish in troubled waters'.³⁶ Creating a 'healthy political environment' within the South was also clearly Kiir's concern when, in October 2010, he convened the All Parties Conference in the aftermath of the contentious April elections, so as to stabilise the South's political situation prior to the referendum.

These efforts at reconciliation, pushed so strongly by Salva Kiir, were critically important to providing the relative political stability and calmer security situation experienced during the CPA's Interim Period. Garang himself was notoriously dismissive of reconciliation efforts. He refused to refer to the SSDF, instead disparaging it as 'GoS-sponsored tribal militias'. The Juba Declaration was largely a result of Garang's untimely death and the willingness of SSDF commanders, notably Matip, to engage with Kiir, whom they had always regarded as more conciliatory than Garang.³⁷ This conciliatory approach was epitomised by the blanket amnesty offered on Independence Day to various individuals who had defected or raised armed opposition to the Government of South Sudan; it was the expression of the opportunity for the beginning of the new state and was meant to manifest the hope for liberation, however defined and acted upon, that had sustained the multitude of Southern Sudanese in the face of oppression and war since before 1956.

However, a challenge, identified in [Chapter 5](#), has been the degree of inclusion actually exhibited in such gestures of reconciliation and, more technically, how these reconciliations have been carried out, with ample

levels of integration of armed groups into the army. Doubt over the sincerity of these initiatives has in turn provoked further social and political tensions. Many of these became apparent through the contentious April 2010 elections and in the escalation of violence following the 2011 referendum. More broadly, such 'reconciliation' over the years has encouraged a tendency to manipulative militarism, with agitators routinely escalating violence in order to be offered reconciliation agreements. Considering both the demand for expediency belligerence seems to evoke and the entrenched dominance in South Sudanese politics of limited numbers of individuals, the result is a political environment defined by tactical decision-making and manically shifting alliances.

The near-perpetual cycles of escalating, or revolving, belligerence have produced much cynicism. Sometimes referred to as 'big man power', a tendency was encouraged whereby militia commanders stayed armed and dangerous in order to be worthy of negotiation.³⁸ The best way for a militia commander to be promoted into government office was to hold out for whatever round of 'South-South' dialogue might provide suitable opportunities. Agitation thereby provided for reconciliation, leading in turn to promotion and government posts. Among the SSDF holdouts from the 2006 Juba Declaration, some defended their boycott on the grounds that 'there weren't enough posts to go around'.³⁹

As in other countries attempting to recover from extended civil wars, and perhaps more likely to stymie broader social reconciliation than anything else, fears have been expressed about the creation of a 'warlord class' of politicians, businessmen, and senior civil servants. The seeding of the Southern government with officially retired warlords has raised doubts about maintaining peace. The appointment of former warlords to important positions, ostensibly as a means of reconciliation, has been a particular cause for concern. For instance, Sultan Abdel Baggi Ayiei, a former SSDF commander from Bahr al-Ghazal, was appointed Salva Kiir's presidential adviser on 'border and tribal conflict resolution', while the Murle commander Ismail Konye, a former SSDF commander from Jonglei, was appointed adviser for 'peace and reconciliation'.⁴⁰ Unsurprisingly, Baggi was among those returning to the bush. His rationale undoubtedly paralleled a 2004 explanation for resisting reconciliation with the SPLA: 'It's only a person who holds arms that gets his or her rights... the successive governments of Sudan listen to rebels or those who have guns'.⁴¹

Local communities' efforts to achieve greater peace and stability via reconciliation have been framed by the evolving reconciliation between

the SPLA/M and its armed opponents in the South. By the late 1990s, in civilian communities, there was a great fatigue after years of violence perpetrated by the SPLA/M and SSDF, and a renewed desire for grassroots efforts to resolve conflicts.⁴² This was particularly pronounced in Nuer and Dinka communities in Unity and Bahr al-Ghazal States. During February and March 1999 a 'Dinka and Nuer Peace Conference', known as the Wunlit Conference, was held. Its purpose was to allow the gathered Dinka and Nuer leaders to achieve grassroots reconciliation between and among their communities. It greatly lowered the amount of violence.⁴³

The Wunlit Conference was notable for its size and success, but such grassroots level dialogues had been ongoing since the early 1990s. For example, successive rounds of reconciliation talks had been unfolding between the Mundari and Dinka communities.⁴⁴ Critical to all of these efforts was the involvement of the New Sudan Council of Churches and NGOs such as Pact. These localised 'South-South dialogues', as they were often called, focused on resolving grievances harboured by various groups against Garang and the SPLA/M, particularly by communities but also by some armed groups as well. In facilitating Southern dialogue and reconciliation, space was created for the SPLA/M to better focus on its insurgency against Khartoum. A more coalesced political voice emerging from the South also increased pressure on the central government to negotiate with the SPLA/M.

During the CPA's Interim Period, the importance of South-South dialogues, especially between local communities, grew even more prominent. With chronic insecurity still rampant in many rural areas after the CPA, a Peace Commission and later a Ministry of Peace were established, with the intention of furthering 'peace and reconciliation between conflicting communities'.⁴⁵

With this history in mind, the Transitional Constitution of South Sudan dictated that all levels of government would 'initiate a comprehensive process of national reconciliation and healing that shall promote national harmony, unity and peaceful co-existence among the people of South Sudan'.⁴⁶ In the absence of specific mechanisms, it remains to be seen how far a formal reconciliation process focused on the past excesses of war will be pushed.

What is perhaps more likely is that twin tracks will be pursued in the absence of any official 'truth and reconciliation' process. Grassroots-driven

reconciliation between communities will likely be furthered, having already been successfully entrenched as a norm in the South. But there has been little sense of urgency that 'justice' must be sought, other than in terms of rectified political relationships; for the CPA, this meant within Sudan through Southern self-determination. Furthermore, defenders of the CPA have instead emphasised its provisions for protecting basic human rights in the future. Post-independence, such a framing of the issue is likely to be prominent within the South as well.

Conclusion: the long walk to freedom

Let's take care not to do the same things Northerners did; give every citizen the sense of his/her belonging.

Joseph Lagu⁴⁷

In July 2011 the Southern Sudanese received what they had fought so long and hard for: separation from Sudan. The onus is now on them to prove that South Sudan was a more worthwhile outcome than Southern Sudan. There are many challenges ahead, but the world owes South Sudan the benefit of the doubt. Its founding was through an internationally sponsored peace process ending decades of brutal war against a dictatorial regime, and affirmed in the democratic moment of the January 2011 referendum. With a 99 per cent vote for separation, there is undoubtedly a lot of solidarity for independence, however it might be challenged.

The SPLA/M, and particularly John Garang and Salva Kiir, deserve credit for the liberation of South Sudan. However, as the wizened elder statesman Joseph Lagu suggested when asked to comment on the referendum vote's meaning, the most pressing need post-independence will be to create the sense of inclusion and participation among Southerners necessary to feel that the new South Sudan is substantively different from the 'Old Sudan' of marginalisation and exploitation. This will require the SPLM, as the governing party, to balance the needs of consolidating the political space necessary for stability with the openness and engagement required for Southerners to believe they have not, proverbially, been left on the other side of the river once liberation has finally been achieved.

If there is one thing pushing Southerners to succeed in this, it is surely the bitter memories of their long struggle for liberation. The South Sudan National Anthem, written as a prayer, expresses what South Sudan's peoples hope liberation will bring:

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*Oh God,
We praise and glorify you
For your grace on South Sudan
Land of great abundance
Upholds us united in peace and harmony
Oh motherland
We arise raising flag with the guiding star
And sing songs of freedom with joy
For justice, liberty and prosperity
Shall forevermore reign
Oh great patriots
Let us stand up in silence and respect
Saluting our martyrs whose blood
Cemented our national foundation
We vow to protect our nation
Oh God bless South Sudan*

NOTES

INTRODUCTION: FROM SOUTHERN SUDAN TO SOUTH SUDAN

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2. Paul Ladouceur, 'The Southern Sudan: A Forgotten War and a Forgotten Peace,' *International Journal*, Vol. 30: 3 (Summer 1975), pp. 406–427 (p. 409).
3. Susan Hutchinson, 'Spiritual Fragments of an Unfinished War' in Niels Kastfelt (ed.), *Religion and African Civil Wars*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 28.
4. According to the Government of South Sudan the population is 8,260,490, a figure based on the 2008 census; initially the Southern government disputed these numbers, but it did eventually accept and cite them. Source: Southern Sudan Centre for Census Statistics and Evaluation, *South Sudan Statistical Yearbook, 2009*, Juba: Government of South Sudan, 10 December 2009. Other estimates range more widely, with the various UN organs' and agencies' estimates putting the population between 7.5 and 9.7 million people in 2006. The most recent statistics from the UN are from the UN World Food Programme and UN Food and Agriculture Organisation, *Special Report: WFP/FAO Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to South Sudan*, Rome, 8 February 2012, p. 7, putting the number at 9.6 million. The population of South Sudan has almost certainly grown since the reports in 2006 and in 2008. Source: 'South Sudan Profile,' *BBC News*, 5 July 2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14019208>
5. That the North is uniquely 'Arab' is highly contested, even in the North. For example, in the 1955–56 census, 46 per cent of 7 million inhabitants in the six northern provinces did not claim 'Arab' origins. David Roden, 'Regional Inequality and Rebellion in the Sudan,' *Geographical Review*, Vol. 64:4 (October 1974), pp. 498–516 (p. 502).
6. Peter K. Bechtold, 'More Turbulence in Sudan: A New Politics This Time,' *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 44:4 (Autumn 1990), p. 579.

7. United Nations Information Centre, 'Sudanese Tribes', on <http://unic.un.org/imucms/khartoum/36/499/sudanese-tribes.aspx>
8. Gurtong, 'Peoples Profiles,' <http://www.gurtong.net/Peoples/PeoplesProfiles/tabid/71/Default.aspx>
9. The Joshua Project, <http://www.joshuaproject.net/countries.php?rog3=SU>
10. Douglas H. Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*, Oxford: James Currey, 2002, pp. 1, 2.
11. Ministry of Finance, Government of South Sudan, *South Sudan Development Plan: 2011–2013, Council of Ministers Draft*, 5 July 2011.
12. *CIA Factbook*, 'Sudan' <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/su.html>
13. Abdul Rahman and Abu Zayd Ahmed, 'Why the Violence?' in The Panos Institute (ed.), *War Wounds*, London, Paris, Washington: The Panos Institute, 1988, p. 5.
14. Johnson, *Root Causes*, p. 2.
15. Francis Deng is a key Southern historical figure involved in the politics of South Sudan and Sudan, both as a member of government and in a private capacity as an academic. He has represented Southern Sudanese in the government in Khartoum, formerly as Sudanese Foreign Minister, and as a dedicated member of the civilian political and intellectual community in Sudan and while in the Diaspora. He is the UN Secretary General's Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide (appointed in 2007) and was Sudanese Ambassador to Canada, the Nordic States, and the USA. He is from the Ngok Dinka community in the still-disputed area of Abyei.
16. Francis M. Deng, 'A Nation in Turbulent Search of Itself,' *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 603 (January 2006), pp. 155–62 (p. 157).
17. Johnson, *Root Causes*, p. 127. The full quotation reads: 'The current civil war has intensified in complexity the longer it has been fought. Multiple local grievances have created numerous motives for armed confrontation, and shifting alliances within the wider conflict have produced a pattern of interlocking civil wars, now being fought on different levels.'
18. Hutchinson, 'Spiritual Fragments of an Unfinished War,' p. 28.
19. Robert O. Collins, *A History of Modern Sudan*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 137–8.
20. Amir Idriss, 'Beyond "African" and "Arab" in Sudan,' in Francis M. Deng (ed.), *New Sudan in the Making*, Asmara, Eritrea/Trenton, NJ: Read Sea Press, 2010, pp. 197, 198.
21. A note regarding the use of the term 'pastoralists': all the groups in South Sudan discussed in this book are not solely pastoral; they have livelihoods better described as transhumance. However, to simplify language, and given that the pastoral element of their way of living is so definitive—particularly so when discussing war and politics—we have chosen to refer to the major groups as

- 'pastoral'. This is, again, different from 'nomadic', another term by which some of these groups are also often characterised.
22. Richard Gray, *A History of the Southern Sudan 1839–1889*, London: Oxford University Press, 1961, p. 6.
 23. *Ibid.*, p. 407.
 24. For its part, the Government of South Sudan noted at independence that 'British policy can be said to have played a positive role in protecting and promoting the indigenous African identity of southerners (a 1930 directive stating that Africans in the southern provinces be considered a people distinct from northern Muslims)...': Government of the Republic of South Sudan, Ministry of Finance, *South Sudan Development Plan 2011–2013*, p. 4.
 25. Robert O. Collins has argued that rather than a deliberate attempt to promote separate halves of the Sudan, Britain's policies, and more precisely the 'Southern Policy', were actually more of a 'muddled' attempt by the British colonial government to deal with a region that they simply did not know what to do with, being unwilling to invest significant economic, military or bureaucratic resources into it. See *History of Modern Sudan*, p. 36.
 26. Ann Mosely Lesch, *The Sudan—Contested National Identities*, Oxford: James Currey, 1998, p. 33.
 27. A loose exception would have been the province of Equatoria, governed for Egypt from 1869 by Samuel Baker, then Charles George Gordon, and lastly by Emin Pasha until the Mahdists assumed power.
 28. Francis M. Deng, 'The Sudan: Stop the Carnage,' *The Brookings Review*, Vol. 12:1 (Winter 1994, pp. 6–11), p. 8.
 29. By 1839–41, the penetration of the South had deepened as expeditions were undertaken by the regime of Muhammad Ali, which discovered a navigable route along Nile as far south as Juba, exposing the vast interior to exploitation. See Gray, *A History*, p. 109.
 30. The Executive Committee of the Southern Front, 'Afro—Arab Conflict in the Sudan: Memorandum on the Southern Problem,' Part I: The Mahdia Period, Khartoum, October 1965, np.
 31. Johnson, *Root Causes*, p. 7.
 32. Quoted in Oliver Albino, *The Sudan: A Southern Viewpoint*, London: The Institute of Race Relations and Oxford University Press, 1970, p. 25.
 33. See 'Appendix II' in Wai (ed.), *The Southern Sudan: the Problem of National Integration*, London: Routledge, 1973.
 34. Mohammed Omer Bashir, *Revolution and Nationalism in the Sudan*, London: Rex Collings, 1977.
 35. According to the newly independent government in South Sudan, 'In 1946, it was determined that Sudan should be administered as one country, even though this did not reflect the wishes of the majority of southerners at the time, as clearly expressed at the 1947 Juba Conference. The Khartoum administration nullified prohibition against Islam being spread in the South, replaced several hundred

- colonial officials with Sudanese, only four of whom were southerners, and introduced Arabic as the official administration language of the South.' In Government of the Republic of South Sudan, *South Sudan Development Plan 2011–2013*, p. 4.
36. In 1954, six of 800 posts were given to Southerners, the rest going to Northerners. The same was true for the military, and the Equatorial Corps responded to the imposition of Northern officers violently. Edgar O' Balance, *The Secret War in the Sudan: 1955–1972*, London: Faber and Faber, 1977, p. 37.
 37. Ibid., p. 5. The same was true for the military and the Equatorial Corps, which responded to the imposition of Northern Officers violently. Ibid., p. 37.
 38. P.M. Holt and M.W. Daly, *The History of the Sudan: From the Coming of Islam to the Present Day*, London: Pearson Longman, 2000, p. 136.
 39. Account of the last British Commanding Officer of the Equatorial Battalion of the Sudan Defence Forces, Colonel Walter Brown. Interviews, 20 February 2012, by phone from Juba, with Philip Winter, who had interviewed Brown on this matter not long before Brown's death.
 40. Paul Luel Wel, 'Torit August 18 1955 revisited,' *Gurtong*, 21 August 2011. On <http://www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ctl/ArticleView/mid51>, accessed 13 May 2010.
 41. In 1968 there was a merger between the NUP and the Peoples Democratic Party, forming the Democratic Unionist Party or DUP.
 42. Originally named the Southern Party, it was renamed in 1955 ahead of its first major conference in Juba.
 43. Bechtold, 'More Turbulence,' p. 585.
 44. Ibid., and Lam Akol, 'South Sudan Referendum: First things first,' 4 September 2010, SPLM-DC blog <http://sudaneseonline.org/cs/blogs/articles/archive/2010/09/07/south-sudan-referendum-first-things-first.aspx>.
 45. 'The Memoirs of Stanislaus Paysama' cited by Raphael K. Badal, 'Political Cleavages within the Southern Sudan' in Sharif Harir and Terje Tvedt (eds), *Short Cut to Decay: The Case of the Sudan*, Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1994, p. 105.
 46. Ibid. and Deng, 'A Nation in Turbulent Search of Itself,' p. 156.
 47. 'Due consideration' would become a dirty term in the lexicon of Southern politics, meaning the duplicity of Northern politicians failing to fairly consider Southern demands. For a most comprehensive review, see Roden, 'Regional Inequality,' pp. 498–516.
 48. Deng, 'A Nation in Turbulent Search of Itself,' p. 156.
 49. Gray, *A History*, p. 108.
 50. This was notably the broad perception that Equatorians had been favoured historically by the British and had been able to use that earlier access to boost themselves into government posts upon independence.
 51. Little investment was made outside the core—the Gezira agricultural area between White and Blue Niles south of capital, the capital itself, and the riverine district immediately north of it; in these areas could be found the concentra-

- tion of agriculture, the commercial hub, the focus for what manufacturing existed, the educational facilities, and the government and military complexes. Culturally most integrated into the concept of new state and centre of Sudanese nationalism, its people dominated the government bureaucracy, military and executive. In 1956, by example, the average per capita income was SD£71 in the Gezira area, compared with less than SD£25 nationally. In 1956, 88 per cent of secondary students were Arab and Nubian Northerners, even though they were less than 46 per cent of the national population. See Roden, 'Regional Inequality,' p. 508.
52. Garang graduated from secondary school in Rumbek and did a BA at Grinnell College in Iowa, USA. He was then in the Anya-Nya insurgency from 1970 until the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement, when he became part of the SAF and attended training in Fort Benning, Georgia. He went on to complete a PhD in Agricultural Economics at Iowa State University before returning to Sudan to become head of research at the SAF research centre and a part-time lecturer at the University of Khartoum. For further biographical details see the entry by Matthew LeRiche, 'John Garang DeMabior' in Henry Louis Gates, Jr., and Emmanuel Akyeampong (eds), *Dictionary of African Biography*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.
 53. Francis Deng described Garang as 'a right proper Renaissance man: a soldier, a scholar, a politician and a statesman.' See Deng, 'Tributes to Dr. John Garang de Mabior,' in *New Sudan in the Making*, p. 475.
 54. John Garang speech at the CPA signing, Naivasha, Kenya, 9 January 2005.
 55. See CPA, 'List of Corrections 1.1,' p. 233.
 56. Interestingly, Riek Machar and his South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM) were among the first to use prominently and formally the terminology 'South Sudan' as distinct from some version of 'Southern Sudan'.
 57. The CPA peace process, defined and implemented during the Interim Period, was meant as a 'cornerstone of attractive unity'.
 58. Garang speech, CPA signing, Naivasha, January 2005.
 59. One critic summed it up this way: 'The Naivasha partners tightened their grip on power by increasing their mechanical majorities significantly.' See John A. Akec, 'Sudan election: pointing towards de facto two-party state,' *Sudan Tribune*, 5 May 2010, on <http://www.sudantribune.com/Sudan-Election-Pointing-towards-de,34979>
 60. Emeric Rogier, 'Designing and Integrated Strategy for Peace, Security and Development,' Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael Institute, Conflict Research Unit, The Hague, April 2005, p. 64. Available on www.clingendael.nl/.../2005/20050400_cru_paper_rogier.pdf
 61. President Salva Kiir speech at Juba Airport upon returning from foreign visit, Juba, 19 November 2007.
 62. The NCP's character became focused on short-term expediency and survival, rather than on Islamist ideology, as Rogier indicates in 'Designing an Integrated

- Strategy for Peace, Security and Development' (p. 6): 'the key objective of the NCP core is no longer the pursuit of political Islam, but simply to survive.'
63. International Crisis Group, *Sudan: Preventing Implosion*, Africa Briefing N°68, Nairobi/Brussels, 17 December 2009, p. 1.
 64. Akec, 'Sudan Election.'
 65. President Salva Kiir, Opening Statement, SPLM 2nd National Convention, 15–20 May 2008, Juba.

1. SOUTHERN SUDAN QUESTION: UNITY OR SEPARATION?

1. President Salva Kiir speech to All Sudan Political Parties Conference, Juba, 26–29 September 2009.
2. South Sudan Referendum Commission (SSRC) 'official statement on referendum results'. Cited in Carter Center Statement, <http://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/sudan-021411.html>, accessed on 9 December 2011.
3. Carter Center, 'Preliminary Statement, Sudan Referendum,' <http://www.carter-center.org/resources/pdfs/peace/democracy/preliminary-statement-sudan-011711-final.pdf>, accessed 9 December 2011.
4. In an effort to convince each Southern voter in the referendum, Kiir argued 'that he or she stands to enjoy more benefits in a united Sudan rather than in an independent Southern Sudan'; 14 January 2008, CPA 3rd Anniversary speech in Wau, Western Bahr el Ghazal, South Sudan.
5. Collins, *History of Modern Sudan*, p. 77. Interestingly, the full name of the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement was the 'Addis Ababa Agreement on the Problem of South Sudan.' Also, 'the problem of the South' was how Salva Kiir described the historical conundrum of responses to Southern unrest, such as autonomy, confederation, right to self-determination, Southern participation in the national governance or guarantees of religious and cultural protection. Kiir argued that the 'problem of the South is a subset of the problem of Sudan'—a position long held by the SPLA/M, hence the emphasis on New Sudan.
6. Note that 'The Southern Question' was a chapter title by Abel Alier in Wai (ed.), *The Southern Sudan*.
7. Gray, *A History*, p. 116.
8. Southern Sudanese Liberation Movement Leadership (1963), 'Any-Nya: What We Fight For!,' quoted in Severino Fuli Boki Tombe Ga'le, *Shaping a Free Southern Sudan: Memoirs of Our Struggle 1934–1985*, Limuru, Kenya: Loa Catholic Mission Council and Paulines Publications Africa, 2002, p. 391.
9. In the first ten years of independence, forty-five secondary schools were added across the North but only three in the South; at the same time 483 Northerners received officer commissions but only thirteen Southerners, and 153 Northerners entered police training but only seven Southerners. See Gray, *A History*, p. 117. The only major investment after independence outside the core area was the construction of the railway to Nyala and Wau. By the late 1950s, the Gezira

- district accounted for 77 per cent of government spending; see Roden, 'Regional Inequality,' p. 511.
10. Tim Allen, 'Full Circle: An Overview of Sudan's 'Southern Problem' since Independence,' *Northeast African Studies*, 1989. [First written in 1986, published in 1989.]
 11. For a comprehensive analysis of the First Civil War and the Anya-Nya, see Scopas S. Poggo, *The First Sudanese Civil War: Africans, Arabs and Israelis in the Southern Sudan, 1955–1972*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
 12. Ladouceur, 'The Southern Sudan,' p. 409.
 13. The conference's proceedings avoided profound discussions of the nature of the state and national identity, and instead made overtures to improving the 'Southernisation' of Sudanese institutions by including Southerners in the civil service and security sector and by improving educational opportunities. See 'Appendix IV: Resolutions of the Round Table Conference on the South, Khartoum, 16–25 March 1965,' in Wai (ed.), *The Southern Sudan: The Problem of National Integration*.
 14. Atem Yaac Atem, Interview, Juba, South Sudan, May 2011.
 15. Elias Nyamlell Wakoson, 'The Dilemmas of South-North Conflict' in Francis M. Deng and Prosser Gifford (eds), *The Search for Peace and Unity in the Sudan*, Washington: The Wilson Center Press, 1987, p. 93.
 16. Two commentators remarked upon the popular sentiment in the 1960s that if 'feeling and emotional identification were the criterion,' then public support for secessionism would 'probably run over 99%.' This was also true in January 2011. See Peter Russell and Storrs McCall, 'Can Secession be Justified? The Case of Southern Sudan,' in Wai (ed.), *The Southern Sudan: The Problem of National Integration*.
 17. Lagu received fourteen days of training in Israel, as did other Anya-Nya officers, while the Israelis began extended efforts to supply the Anya-Nya with training and weaponry, including assigning small numbers of officers to Lagu's headquarters at Owiny-ki-Bul. Uganda's President Idi Amin cut aid to the Anya-Nya in early 1972 because of the relationship with the Israelis, forcing Lagu to refuse much of the Israeli support. See Poggo, *The First Sudanese Civil War*, pp. 158–9.
 18. Joseph Lagu, *Sudan: Odyssey through a State, from Ruin to Hope*, Khartoum: MOB Center for Sudanese Studies, Omdurman Ahlia University, 2006, p. 505.
 19. Interview, Atem Yaac Atem, Juba, South Sudan. May 2011.
 20. Additional factors included Nimairi's willingness to negotiate because he had consolidated power after a July 1971 coup attempt, and realised the need to solve the 'Southern Problem' to secure the regime over the long term. For the Anya-Nya, the challenge was that Amin was being increasingly questioned about his continued support for the Southern insurgents; he was influenced by Libya's Colonel Gaddafi to challenge Israeli support and closed the Israeli mission at the end of March 1972, and threatened to close Anya-Nya camps in northern Uganda. See Ladouceur, 'The Southern Sudan,' pp. 412–13.

21. Pan-Africanism at the time was guided by a couple basic tenets, one being that strengthening Africa required accepting the borders defined through colonisation.
22. Lagu, *Sudan: Odyssey*, p. 252.
23. Collins, *History of Modern Sudan*, pp. 109–110.
24. Ga'le, Severino Fuli Boki Tombe, *Shaping a Free Southern Sudan: Memoires of Our Struggle 1934–1985*, Limury, Kenya: Loa Catholic Mission Council and Paulines Publications Africa, 2002, p. 391.
25. The Addis Ababa Agreement superficially presented Southern Sudan with significant autonomy, in the form of a regional executive (the HEC) and legislature (the People's Regional Assembly for the South) which could ratify 'preservation of public order, internal security, efficient administration, and the development of the Southern Region in cultural, economic and social fields.' The Southern government could also request that the President and the National Legislature postpone laws deemed questionable to the South so that issues could be debated. These powers were balanced by the reality that it had little ability to manage finances; in theory, it could raise local taxes but such powers were meaningless in the poorest region, and hence it was dependent on Khartoum for money. Also, the President could veto Southern legislation, and had the ultimate authority to appoint the president of the HEC (on the recommendation of regional assembly). See Ladouceur, 'The Southern Sudan,' p. 414.
26. Lagu, *Sudan: Odyssey*, p. 254.
27. Joseph Lagu, interview with the author, May 2010, London.
28. Collins, *Modern History*, p. 115.
29. Johnson, *Root Causes*, p. 42.
30. Interview, Joseph Lagu.
31. Johnson, *Root Causes*, pp. 42–50.
32. Matthew LeRiche, 'South Sudan: The Integration of the Anyanya after the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement and the return to War' in Roy Linkletter (ed.), *Integrating Armed Forces After Peace Agreements* (forthcoming). Also in a paper presented at the International Studies Association (ISA) Conference of the same title by the author, San Diego, April 2012.
33. Abel Alier, *Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured*, Reading: Ithaca Press, 1990, p. 162.
34. Numbers were a basic challenge. The Anya-Nya veterans were supposed to form half of a new Southern Command of 12,000 men. After the agreement, the number of Anya-Nya insurgents ballooned to over 25,000 who wanted incorporation into the regular army. Overall, 10,000 Anya-Nya went into normal army, police and prison service, with another 14,000 going to regional ministries, departments and corporations. See Ladouceur, p. 414.
35. The transfer of Southern units northwards was viewed by Lagu as an action to 'erode the most important and sensitive part' of the Addis Ababa Agreement, i.e. the security protocols. See Lagu, *Sudan: Odyssey*, p. 415.

36. As Abel Alier argued, these three regions were left 'to masquerade as new institutions of regional self-government.' Abel Alier, *Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured*.
37. Arop Madut. Arop, *Sudan's Painful Road to Peace*, Charleston, SC: BookSurge, 2006, p. 27. Matthew LeRiche, 'South Sudan: The Integration of the Anyanya after the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement and the return to War'.
38. The term 'false unity' was a favourite of John Garang's when defending his own vision for a New Sudan in the aftermath of the failed attempt to do so through the Addis Ababa Agreement.
39. 'Dishonouring' peace agreements developed as a common refrain for Southerners describing Khartoum's tendencies. For the best review of how Khartoum governments have dishonoured peace agreements, see Alier, *Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured*.
40. Interesting in this regard was Lagu's observation that Nimairi's response to the SPLA/M was not to support the proponents of decentralisation; rather, he said, the President 'behaved as if waging anti secessionist war against [the whole] south.' See *Sudan: Odyssey through a State*, p. 418.
41. Gabriel Tang, Interview with the author, 2007, in Khartoum.
42. Alier, *Southern Sudan*, pp. 154, 155.
43. He first needed the Southerners as he asserted his position relative to the other military leaders who had taken power, particularly those linked to the emergent Muslim Brotherhood. He subsequently deserted them when he thought he had won the favour of the Islamists, who, he felt, offered him longer-term potential for staying in power. This chain of events was linked to regional dynamics, particularly those with Nasser in Egypt and the associated revolutionary zeal that spread at the time in connection with the Arabism driven by Islamist nationalism.
44. SPLA/M *Manifesto*, 31 July 1983.
45. John Garang, *The Call for Democracy in Sudan*, London: Kegan Paul, 1992, p. 59.
46. John Garang, Opening Speech to the 1994 SPLA/M National Convention. This was a theme Garang had long pushed. For example, five years earlier, in 1989, he had argued that 'The problem is not a Southern Problem but the problem of Khartoum, or rather, the problem of power in Khartoum.' John Garang, Speech to SPLA/M Officer training Graduates, 14 August 1989, broadcast on Radio SPLA 15 August 1989.
47. Some also include a third group in this ruling tribal complex: the Danagala. In March 2000 the scale of these three groups was the focus of an anonymous publication, 'The Black Book: Imbalance of Power and Wealth in the Sudan.' This was a controversial publication indeed, going as far as listing the ethnic affiliation of many key government business and social leaders in Sudan. A copy of this document at the University of Durham Middle East Documentation Unit, 17/3/GEN/67.
48. John Ryle, 'People and Cultures of Sudan' in John Ryle *et al.* (eds), *The Sudan Handbook*, London: James Currey, 2011, pp. 34–5.

49. John Garang, Opening Speech to the 1994 SPLA/M National Convention.
50. The NCP was previously constituted as the National Islamic Front (NIF), which shared its origins and ideology with Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood. Following the internal ideological and leadership contests between Bashir and Hassan al-Turabi, which climaxed during the late 1990s, the party was reformed around Bashir; al-Turabi was placed under house arrest in 1999.
51. Garang used the term in his introductory speech at the 1994 SPLM National Convention. Interestingly, many others would complain about the bizarre nature of the Bashir regime. Even Osama bin Laden bitterly complained, following his expulsion from Sudan by Bashir, that the NCP was but a bizarre mixture of religion and organised crime. See Collins, *Modern History*, p. 221.
52. As stated in the SPLA/M Manifesto, a key goal of the movement was 'to wage a protracted armed struggle in order to establish a Socialist system in the whole Sudan, beginning in the South and extending northwards to end up in the capture of Khartoum.' SPLA/M *Manifesto*, 31 July 1983, p. 74. Quote from interviews conducted at the time of the launch of the SPLA, cited in Philippa Scott, 'The Sudan People's Liberation Movement and Army, Briefing,' *Review of African Political Economy* 12:33 (Summer 1985), p. 71.
53. Not to be confused with the Sudan Armed Forces, also abbreviated SAF; for clarity, this book only refers to the national army as SAF.
54. John Garang, Opening Speech to the 1994 SPLA/M National Convention.
55. This was true even in terms of language selection. As Garang wrote, 'Arabic... must be the national language in a new Sudan and therefore we must learn it. We are as frank and as sharp as everything. Arabic cannot be said to be the language of the Arabs. No, it is the language of the Sudan. English is the language of Americans, but that country is America, not England.' See John Garang, *The Call for Democracy in Sudan*, p. 133.
56. Salva Kiir opening statement speech, Opening Statement, SPLM 2nd National Convention, 15–20 May 2008, Juba.
57. Although several accounts by close friends of Garang suggest that 63 per cent was a common proportion stated, it is unclear where he derived this number from, except for raw population statistics of various groups, which were/are little more accurate than some statistics of identification as Arab or African. He was however, probably close, with most of the opposition groups exhibiting African identity or a mixed/fused sense of identity, both African and Arab, though tribe is the paramount identity; Dan Eiffe, interview with the author, Juba, South Sudan, May 2011.
58. Dan Eiffe, interview with author, Juba, January 2011.
59. John Garang, Speech to the 1994 SPLA/M National Convention.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
62. Joseph O. Abulemoi, *The Fragility of Sudan: A Study of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement*, London: Janus Publishing Company, 2011, p. 77. This is a self-pub-

- lication of the Doctoral Dissertation by the author for London Metropolitan University awarded in 2008.
63. John Garang, Speech to the 1994 SPLA/M National Convention.
 64. Interview, Dan Eiffe, Juba, January 2011.
 65. John Garang, Speech to the 1994 SPLA/M National Convention.
 66. Eiffe, interview, January 2011.
 67. Johnson, *Root Causes*, p. 65.
 68. 'AU top diplomat warns against Southern Sudan secession,' *New Sudan Vision*, 25 May 2010, http://www.newsudanvision.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2144:aus-top-diplomat-warns-against-southern-sudan-secession-&catid=3:international&Itemid=10, accessed 20 August 2011.
 69. Philip Thon Aleu, 'UN Chief's Anti-Secession Remark Triggers South Sudan Protest,' *Sudan Tribune*, 1 February 2010, <http://www.sudantribune.com/UN-chief-s-anti-secession-remark,33985>, accessed 20 August 2011.
 70. The term 'non-lethal' is the line in the sand for security sector assistance for most governments. This boundary is important to challenge, however; for example, assisting in resolving any aspect of the efficiency and capacity of a security institution or entity may contribute to the 'lethal' potential of the organisation and individuals within it. Hence, either it is valid to support the development and training of an entire security institution or it is not. The ability many governments have in compartmentalising programmes for various political aims is often frustratingly contradictory to espoused principles and rhetoric. For example, in the aim of 'balance' and preserving the CPA, various governments continued to work in support of Northern Sudanese security services even after the indictment of President Bashir and other members of his security apparatus by the ICC for war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. In the security sector reform and development world, especially in Sudan and South Sudan, contradictions and even absurdities abound. Since Southern independence, the UK government has continued its programmes in the North, with senior SAF officers even attending the Royal College of Defence Studies (RCDS), an official UK armed services training institution, and without controversy: strange, considering the fact the superior officer of any SAF officer Omar Bashir has had a warrant issued for arrest on war crimes.
 71. Perhaps a little crude, but decidedly common, was the sentiment of a young Southerner, 'The northerners hate us, we hate them, so we demand our own country'. See 'Cries for Unity Resound as Sudan buries Garang,' *Sudan Tribune* 6 August 2005 (AFP), <http://www.sudantribune.com/Cries-for-unity-resound-as-Sudan,11029>
 72. These observations are based on conversations and interviews with individuals close to Garang before he died, particularly, interviews with Dan Eiffe.
 73. The Government of South Sudan did little to engage with Khartoum in respect of 'making unity attractive', choosing to place the burden of such a proposition upon the NCP government of Bashir in Khartoum. For their part, the NCP

government did little if anything to make unity attractive, apart from a couple of last-minute infrastructure development proposals. Worse, frequent provocation with respect to the debate over border demarcation, oil sharing and talks on post-referendum issues meant that the NCP government appeared decidedly belligerent in the eyes of most South Sudanese, supporting the initial inclinations toward secession.

74. Eiffe, interview, May 2011.
75. 'Sudan: Bashir to meet Mirghani as Garang urges Arabs to lend him an ear,' *Mideast Mirror*, 25 September 2000.
76. The ideological instigator of the NCP's Islamist doctrine, Hassan al-Turabi, commented on Garang's death in July 2005: 'the man around whom all the political forces and the Sudanese have built consensus for the first time in Sudan's history... his departure will greatly affect the issues he has raised and on which the Sudanese have agreed with him.' See Johan Brosche, 'CPA—New Sudan, Old Sudan or Two Sudans?: A Review of the Implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement,' forthcoming: Uppsala University, p. 235.
77. In a November 2004 meeting meant to resolve a rift between Kiir and Garang, there was common regret among senior commanders that Garang monopolised decision-making to the detriment of official party structures, as well as promoting only his narrow group of loyalists. See 'Text: minutes of historical SPLM meeting in Rumbek 2004,' *Sudan Tribune*, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?page=imprimable&id_article=26320, accessed 10 March 2008.
78. John Garang, 1994 National Convention Speech official SPLA/M transcript 'A Watershed Moment', p. 36.
79. Collins, *Root Causes*, p. 87.
80. Sudan has tended to produce leadership of two kinds. The first is the Machiavellian politician interested in personal advancement (Bashir, and Nimairi) and that of his immediate patronage group. The second category—the archetype being the Mahdi—consists of messianic figures who lead by virtue of their larger-than-life, almost demagogic personalities. It was to the second that Garang always likened himself. See Mansour Khalid, *The Government they Deserve*, London: Routledge, 1990.
81. There is no way to quantify the numbers dead in fighting and in what specific situations, or from associated or direct causes, without a massive undertaking. However, anecdotal accounts frequently suggest that the death in fighting between various tribal groupings and/or between various SPLA/M factions accounted for a major proportion of those killed during the war. Understanding that much of the war was fought in a way whereby proxies were used by Khartoum, and internal security services frequently fostered and catalysed inter-factional fighting as a core element of their counter-insurgency strategy, means that even those killed in fighting between Southern groups could be considered part of the confrontation with Khartoum. However, the racism and inter-personal, inter-communal grievances manipulated by Khartoum featured as a significant

- element in the war and many South Sudanese died as a result of fighting with their fellow South Sudanese.
82. In his book *SPLM/SPLA: The Nasir Declaration*, New York: iUniverse, Inc. Publishers, 2003, Lam Akol includes Nasir's announcement of the coup, known in the SPLA as message No. 299/8/99: 'In order to save the Movement from imminent collapse, it has been decided to relieve John Garang from the leadership of the SPLM/A. He is no longer the leader of the Movement. An interim leadership composed of the high command members listed in this message will as of today 28/8/91 take charge of the Movement's affairs. The struggle will henceforth be waged with a clear sense of purpose to achieve equality, justice and freedom under the democratic set-up' (p. 13).
 83. Secessionism quickly became a rallying call when trying to assemble other Southern leaders to their cause. Initially the announcements were clearly designed for the international audience, and were focused on the dictatorial/authoritarian/undemocratic nature of Garang and the SPLA/M. Only through asserting this did the Nasir conspirators begin to resent that Garang's political project was not about the self-determination of Southerners, and then later secession and independence entered into the rhetoric.
 84. P.A. Nyaba, *The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan: An Insider's View*, Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1997, p. 117.
 85. Akol, *SPLM/SPLA: The Nasir Declaration*, p. 16, 76.
 86. Lam Akol blog, <http://www.splm-dc.org/south-sudan-referendum-first-things-first>. For example, Nimairi argued in June 1969 that his government 'recognizes the historical and cultural differences between the North and South and firmly believes that the unity of our country must be built upon these objective realities. The Southern people have the right to develop their respective culture and traditions within a United Socialist Sudan.' Garang could have said as much, i.e. wanting a 'United Socialist Sudan'. See Ladouceur, 'The Southern Sudan,' p. 411.
 87. John Garang, 1994 National Convention Speech, official SPLM/A transcript 'A Watershed Moment,' p. 22.
 88. Collins, *Root Causes*, p. 301.
 89. Lam Akol, *SPLM/SPLA: The Nasir Declaration*, p. 16.
 90. Machar has a PhD from Bradford University, while Akol has one from Imperial College, London.
 91. John Garang de Mabior, 'Identifying, Selecting and Implementing Rural Development Strategies for Socio-Economic Development in the Jonglei Projects Area, Southern Region, Sudan,' PhD Dissertation, Iowa State University, 1981, p. 288.
 92. Kerubino Kuanyin Bol was Deputy from 1983 to 1987; William Nyuon Bany was Deputy from 1987 to 1992; and Salva Kiir was Deputy from 1992 to 2005. Both Kerubino and Nyuon rebelled against Garang, for various reasons. Kiir was a stalwart for the entire war.
 93. This was also to do with Garang's plans to move in many of the young leaders that he was grooming to be the future leaders of the Movement (often referred

to as the ‘Garang Boys’ by people looking to demean the groups—the term has thus become pejorative) as soon as he could after the CPA, and at the time of the election to position as many as possible for the election. Kiir’s resistance was supported by many of those who were well aware of this plan and did not agree, particularly those who were not in the Garang inner circle, those without education, and people from different tribes who feared Garang would use this and the idea of competence to supplant them, leaving the CPA period as a ‘Dinka take-over’. Such plans to groom and insert young educated loyalists into the Southern leadership was for long key to Garang’s revolutionary strategy, as is shown by his willingness to send people abroad to study, train etc. The strategy was also his succession planning—a vision not common to authoritarian types and which shows some difference in Garang’s approach.

94. ‘Text: Minutes of Historical SPLM Meeting in Rumbek 2004.’
95. Dan Eiffe, interview, May 2011.
96. In terms of interesting personal relationships, Kiir was himself connected to Bashir. Kiir had been a SAF captain in Unity State when Bashir was a Brigadier and Commanding Officer of SAF forces there before the NIF coup. Some suggest that Kiir actually got along better with Bashir on a personal level than did Garang.
97. President Salva Kiir, Opening Statement, SPLM 2nd National Convention, 2008, Juba.
98. Johnson, *Root Causes*, p. 76.
99. On the issue of the SSDF, see the work of John Young, especially *The South Sudan Defence Forces in the Wake of the Juba Declaration*, Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2006. Available on <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/pdfs/HSBA-SWP-1-SSDF.pdf>
100. See Christopher Clapham, *African Guerrillas*, London: James Currey, 1998.
101. SPLM External Relations Committee, London, *Sudan Today: A Collection of Talks Given at the Africa Centre*, London: Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement, March 1985, pp. 43–4.
102. SPLM, ‘Text: minutes of historical SPLM meeting in Rumbek 2004.’ *Sudan Tribune*, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?page=imprimable&id_article=26320
103. Collins, *Modern Sudan*, p. 267.
104. Tellingly, the SPLA/M’s 1983 Manifesto made provisions for ‘autonomy’ but left the nature of that autonomy to be clarified and defined as the struggle progressed. A defining goal was ‘to provide a consistent social democratic solution to the nationality question in the Sudan by establishing Socialism in the whole country and according autonomous status to various regions within the context of a United Socialist Sudan, not a United Arab Sudan.’ *SPLA/M Manifesto*, 31 July 1983, p. 74. Quote from interviews conducted at the time of the launch of the SPLA, cited in Scott, p. 71.
105. John Garang, speech at inauguration as First Vice-President, 9 July 2005, Khartoum.

106. Among other things, the Declaration also called for an end to the state of emergency, the repeal of the 'September Laws' imposing *sharia* law, and a cease-fire. Available on, <http://www.fou.uib.no/fd/1996/f/712001/annex1.htm>
107. Johnson, *Root Causes*, pp. 71–2.
108. Various SPLM-North leaders, interviewed by the author regarding the role of northern parties in the civil war, Juba, December 2011.
109. John Garang, 1994 National Convention Speech, official SPLM/A transcript 'A Watershed Moment,' p. 31.
110. Khalid, 'Introduction,' *The Call for Democracy in Sudan*, by John Garang, p. 5.
111. The use of the term militia became quite contentious during the later stages of the CPA when Garang and the SPLM/A leadership began discussing with the various other armed groups that had been used by Khartoum as proxies or had simply not joined with the SPLM/A. Thus the term 'Other Armed Groups' or OAGs became the more politically correct term. It was the term used in the sections of the CPA that attempted to set out a plan for dealing with these groups so that they would not become spoilers of the peace agreement. For his part Garang typically refused to change his language and often referred to these groups as militias, which angered many, reinforcing the unwillingness most leaders of these groups had to negotiate with Garang as their issues were often directly to do with opposition and anger against Garang himself, rather than wider disagreement with the movement or its goals.
112. Douglas H. Johnson and Gerard Prunier, 'The Foundation and Expansion of the Sudan People's Liberation Army,' in M.W. Daly and Ahmad Alawad Sikainga (eds), *Civil War in the Sudan*, London and New York: British Academic Press, 1993, p. 119.
113. See Matthew Arnold, 'The South Sudan Defence Force: Patriots, Collaborators or Spoilers?' *Journal of Modern African Studies* 45:4 (December 2007), pp. 489–516.
114. Ibid.
115. ICG, *Sudan: Preventing Implosion*, p. 7.
116. Salva Kiir, 14 January 2008, CPA 3rd Anniversary speech in Wau.
117. Carter Center press release, 14 February 2011. <http://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/sudan-021411.html>
118. National Democratic Institute (NDI) focus group and polling research done during the CPA supports this. See their collection of focus groups studies from South Sudan meant to inform peace work and humanitarian engagements in the Sudan: <http://www.ndi.org/>

2. THE GOLDEN YEARS OF REVOLUTION: 1983–1991

1. Garang speech on CPA to South Sudanese Diaspora in Washington, June 2005, video available on <http://www.sudandecides.com/2011/08/01/john-garang-speak-ing-in-washington-dc-shortly-before-his-death/>, accessed 01. 02. 2012.
2. John Garang speech, 'Chairman's 22nd anniversary address at a mass rally in Rum-

- bek 16th 2005,' video available on <http://www.vigilsd.org/adoc.htm>, accessed 10 December 2011.
3. The manner in which the various Darfuri groups have been dealt with, the continued targeting of the Beja groups in the East, and also, at the time of South Sudan's independence, the targeting of the SPLM-North all used the same counter-insurgency/counter-revolutionary tactics employed by Bashir's security services and Sadiq Al-Mahdi's before him.
 4. Arop Madut-Arop, 'The founding of the SPLA,' *New Sudan Vision*, 15 May 2009, available on http://www.newsudanvision.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1694:the-founding-of-the-peoples-revolution-splm-spla-1983-2005&catid=1:sudan-news-stories&Itemid=6, accessed 1 February 2012.
 5. John Garang, Opening address to SPLM Conference on Civil Society and the Organization of Civil Authority of the New Sudan, New Kush, 30 April 1996.
 6. LeRiche, 'Sudan' in *Military Integration After Peace Agreements*. This presents at length the argument that the perceived nature of events of the peace period is set out in the SPLA/M Manifesto. Here we can see the focus on lack of positions and rank given and also the near complete failure of the process of integrating the Anya-Nya. According to the Manifesto a key part of the abrogation of the Addis Ababa Agreement was the absorption of '6,000 Anya-nya guerrillas in 1972 into the Sudanese armed forces leaving about 32,000 to be absorbed in unproductive civil jobs, and paid under a special fund. When the fund was exhausted two years later these 32,000 Ex-Anya-Nya guerrillas were summarily dismissed and left in limbo.' See the *SPLA/M Manifesto* 1983, available on <http://www.docstoc.com/docs/27902480/MANIFESTO>, accessed 9 January 2012. Also available on the Rift Valley Institutes, Sudan Open Archive, at www.sudanarchive.net
 7. Lagu, *Sudan: Odyssey*, p. 252.
 8. Both authored booklets making cases for and against redivision: Abel Alier's *The Solidarity Book* contrasted with Joseph Lagu's *Decentralization: A Necessity for the Southern Provinces of Sudan*. While never formally published, these booklets were circulated widely in the major towns in the South and in Khartoum.
 9. For a review of this dynamic, see Andrew Mawson's 'South Sudan: A Growing Conflict,' *The World Today*, 40:1 (December 1984), pp. 522–4. Overall, it is important to note that the debate was both dynamic and complex. For instance, there was some interest in devolution within the autonomous regional structure, i.e. under Juba, rather than federalism under Khartoum. On the other hand, some Southerners were supportive of redivision into separate Southern states under a national system, believing that in this context there would be no 'North' by which to be oppressed, as the whole country would be federalised.
 10. According to Prunier and Johnson, in 'Civil War in the Sudan' (p. 127), Tambura was also the first governor of the new Equatoria State after redivision, and was a driving force behind *Kokora*. They also make an interesting argument that it

was the anti-Dinka action and *Kokora* that helped the SPLA/M to grow quickly in Jonglei and Upper Nile, suggesting that had they not, Anya-Nya II might have been more universally appealing since it espoused the idea of secession. However, the anti-Dinka sentiment and action connected with *Kokora* sent them and many Nuer straight to Garang. Also, in the areas where politicians were pro-divisionist because they opposed former Southern front politicians like Bona Malwal, the SPLA did not grow quickly. So it is very interesting that the pro-divisionists become ardent separatists, and those determined to support the single Southern autonomous region are the revolutionaries. Johnson focuses on how the issue is not so much tribal but local politics; however, it is clear how the operative tribal identity is what was (and is today) defining much of local politics and was able to inflict major confusion on the larger ideas of secession, independence and revolution.

11. Tembura would be the last President of the High Executive Committee of Southern Sudan, as Nimiri abrogated the Addis Ababa Agreement by issuing Republican Decree 1 on 5 June 1983, dividing Southern Sudan into three states all with constituent assemblies, at the same time restructuring the states in Northern Sudan as well.
12. Allen, 'Full Circle...', p. 16.
13. Johnson, *Root Causes*, p. 197. For example, upon election Tembura appointed a Mundari Commissioner of Eastern Equatoria, who promptly began efforts to oust any Dinka from Juba and surrounding areas, including levelling the camps of Dinka migrants and displaced persons around the city. This replacement of the Dinka dominance of the Juba meat market with those from the Mundari, direct competitors with the Bor Dinka in matters of cattle and trade, emboldened those Equatorians looking to expel the Dinka from the region. Clearly, dominance in the cattle markets was hugely important considering the deep reverence for cattle and their centrality to many peoples of South Sudan. The process of expulsion, known as *Kokora*, had begun further inflaming the conflicts between Southern leaders.
14. The group that eventually became known as the Anya-Nya II was composed of Anya-Nya veterans who had never participated in the formal peace mechanisms and had remained in the bush throughout the peace period, as well ex-Anya-Nya soldiers who had defected from the SAF. In the early 1980s, they began to congregate in larger numbers and to use safe havens in western Ethiopia, where they received some minimal support from the Mengistu regime.
15. This included Battalions 116 in Juba, 117 in Torit/Kapoeta, 110 in Aweil, 111 in Rumbek, 105 in Bor/Pibor/Pochalla, and 104 in Ayod/Waat/Akobo.
16. Many of those returning to the bush and those inside the SAF involved in conspiring were connected to the group that resisted redivision and supported a coherent autonomous South. Their connections were both political and ethnic, with most being Dinka, Nuer or Shilluk. Many of those individuals would go

on to form the Anya-Nya II; ultimately these individuals and Anya-Nya II were secessionists, but amidst the politics of the Addis Ababa period some saw coherent Southern autonomy as an acceptable second choice. See Matthew LeRiche, 'Integrating the Anyanya: Military Integration in the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement in Roy Linkletter (ed.), *Military Integrations after Peace Agreements*, forthcoming, 2012.

17. Additionally, it helps explain the brutality meted out to Equatorians when the SPLA first arrived in Eastern Equatoria and other areas.
18. In 1972 after Addis Ababa, Nimairi included in the constitution that Sudan was a one-party Socialist State: the Sudan Socialist Union was the only party and he was its leader. Ironically the Islamists were to initiate the uprising that unseated Nimairi in 1985.
19. Kerubino was the Pochalla garrison commander but had been in Bor on a temporary duty assignment as the commander of its garrison was sick in Juba. The few Northern forces attached to the Bor garrison were defending the Bor airstrip, the Dutch DeGroot road project and Jonglei Canal contractors outside Bor town.
20. This conspiracy was revealed and outlined in the *SPLA/M Manifesto*: 'attempts by the repressive minority clique regime in Khartoum to dismantle the Addis Ababa Agreement on the military side were used by prominent absorbed Anya-Nya 1 officers as a basis to organize two contingency plans within the Sudanese Army.' The two contingency plans were as follows: 'A) The first plan was to attack and capture Juba, Capital of the Southern Region. This plan was to be executed by Battalion 105 with reinforcement from Torit and Kapoeta, and from Anya-Nya 2 who were to assemble near Ayod and Pachalla. A socialist government was to be established in Juba and measures taken to assist in transforming the situation in Khartoum. B) The second plan, in the event that Khartoum attacked first displacing and dislodging Battalions 105 and 104 from their bases, was to regroup and reorganize to wage a protracted armed struggle for the total liberation of the Sudan' (p. 9). In the Manifesto, it is claimed that Garang and the conspirators were forced to adopt the second of these plans. 'It is the second plan that has become necessary. Khartoum attacked Bor and Pibor Garrisons on 16/5/1983, and later Ayod Garrison attacked Khartoum forces that were sent to arrest the Commander.' It has been suggested, however, that Garang and his supporters, particularly Kerubino Bol and William Nyuon, attempted to pre-empt the first plan. In interviews, many of the Anya-Nya II who later resisted the SPLA (for instance Kong, Tang and Bol) have indicated that this was the moment when Garang usurped the seniority and leadership of others to grab control of the rebel effort, which led to the imposition of his preferred focus—revolution in the entirety of Sudan, rather than first regaining control of the South, asserting autonomy and then, only then, considering working to support others in the North. It has also been suggested that the option of protracted war was added simply to placate Garang and a minority of the conspirators involved in the discussions, as the Addis Ababa Agreement was apparently collapsing because

of the pressures of those Southerners in the army. It is interesting how adding the protracted war/national revolution option to placate those supporting the Unity/Revolutionary approach occurred early in the conspiracy; later, Garang was compelled to augment the SPLA/M Southern self-determination programme by supporting a referendum on independence in order to placate the large number of SPLA members and Southerners who desired secession. Despite having taken advantage of the situation in Bor in the summer of 1983, Garang and supporters of his vision of revolution had to concede to supporters of this first plan conceived by the conspiracy within the SAF that developed during the later years of the Addis Ababa Peace period.

21. Douglas Johnson says the SAF attacked first, but others say Kerubino moved on the government forces stationed to protect the construction team. What exactly happened is unclear: combining the various accounts, it seems obvious that Kerubino and his forces thought they were being attacked, but the Northern forces of the SAF also believed that Kerubino moved first to intercept the reinforcements being deployed to bolster the Bor garrison in anticipation of any insurrection; delineating who provoked who is difficult as rumours abounded as to what was 'actually' occurring. While the logic of his move is not clear, probably Kerubino saw SAF forces as an advance guard to an anticipated larger force and considered his act a way of compelling those who had conspired for some time to launch the second of their contingency plans, retreat to Ethiopia and prepare for a protracted revolutionary guerrilla war. Interviews indicate that Garang, knowing the intentions and movements of SAF forces out of Juba because his fellow conspirator Major Arok Thon Arok was there in Military Intelligence, advised Kerubino to delay the mutiny. Moreover, the decision to make the move at that time was likely linked not just to calculations of success for the fledgling rebellion but also to personal ambitions and designs to secure his place as one of the top leaders of the SPLA/M, or whatever force emerged from the collapse of the Addis Ababa Agreement.
22. John Garang arrived in Juba supposedly on his way to spend his annual leave at his agricultural project just outside Bor, his home area. He convinced General al-Banna, the commander in Juba, that he had to go on to Bor as his family were already there and he needed to bring them out to safety in Khartoum or Juba if the situation was as al-Banna had described it. Of course, Garang was well aware of the situation as reported to him through his network. He had been meeting with many in Juba and Bor who were involved in the underground movement. Al-Banna subsequently authorised Garang to go and get his family from Bor, and on 13 May he left with Arok Thon Arok and Elija Malok.
23. Nyuon, whose actions would become significant during the fighting of the war, was Garang's second in command but later defected to oppose Garang. His actions engaging advancing forces in mid-1983 foreshadowed his cunning and brutality later in the war. It is rumoured that when a convoy of Northern soldiers stopped off at his command post on their way to support counter-revolt forces

converging on Bor, Nyuon invited the officers to stay for the night and they accepted. While they slept he had the officers killed. Early in the morning, he brought the troops into the barracks, under the pretext of resupply and breakfast, and had the Northern and Southern soldiers separated. All the Northerners were killed and dumped in a mass grave with their dead officers. The Southerners were given an offer to join the revolt or join their officers; the story recounted by Southern SPLA officers is that they all accepted. Nyuon then emptied the garrison of all supplies and weaponry, and headed to join Garang and others who were already en route to Ethiopia.

24. Salva Kiir was a Captain in Military Intelligence stationed in Malakal when the Bor mutiny broke out. When some of the SAF forces were sent to move on the 104 battalion in Ayod under the command of William Nyuon, Kiir secretly alerted Nyuon and then made his move, in the process killing several SAF soldiers to ensure his own and others' escape.
25. Garang had a very rapid rise from the late 1960s to 1983. His ideas, particularly his active agitation during the Addis Ababa period, were developed in part by giving Political Economy lectures that discussed socialism and related subjects, and through a Marxist critique of the political and economic structure of Sudan. He headed the Research Section at the Sudan Military College, was involved in a cooperative agriculture scheme in Bor, and opposed the Jonglei Canal.
26. SPLA/M *Manifesto*, 31 July 1983.
27. Prunier and Johnson, in Daly and Sikainga (eds), *Civil War in the Sudan*, p. 126.
28. One of the early Anya-Nya II leaders was Gordon Kong Chuol; he joined Garang's mutinous forces early on, but later, largely out of personal frustrations and a sense that he and his supporters were marginalised within the emergent structures of the SPLA/M, defected back to his own force in opposition to Garang. An attack on Kong's camp early on, allegedly by William Nyuon's forces aligned to Garang, did not help matters; it further drove Kong to resist Garang and the SPLM/A as it was initially constituted in the weeks after the Bor Mutiny.
29. Garang was only actively involved in the Anya-Nya for six months; he then joined the SAF, where he spent much of the peace period studying abroad and lecturing at the military college in Omdurman, a part of Khartoum University.
30. Arop-Madut, 'The Founding of the People's Revolution'.
31. Garang had already arranged connections with the Derg forces, and quickly met Mengistu. Arok Thon, one of the few Anya-Nya combatants to become an intelligence officer in the SAF, had made the arrangements with the Ethiopian leadership.
32. The initial proposal was made in Itang in 1983: Atem Akuot at the head of the rebel movement's political wing, Gai Tut as the head of its military wing and Garang its Chief of Staff. Moreover, Garang had collected some military commanders in Kerubino Bol, William Nyuon and Salva Kiir, who he felt could propel his faction to greater success. He thus offered Tut and Atem roles subordinate to him in the SPLA/M. They predictably refused to serve under the man they saw as their junior and engaged in trying to build their own 'Movement'.

33. Africa Watch, *Evil Days: Thirty Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia*, London: African Rights, 1991, Chapter 17.
34. The Soviets never saw Garang and the SPLA/M as Marxist enough for them, and were not convinced of the centrality of this war to their wider strategic aims; it seems that they rightly assessed Garang early on as more of a social democrat looking for equitable development, rather than a communist revolutionary. Perhaps this was because of Garang's pedigree as holder of a higher degree in agricultural economics from an American University. Nonetheless, Garang was left with what the Ethiopians could spare; the Soviets indicated to the Ethiopians that should the Derg believe it necessary to support the SPLA, they were free to do so, but that the Soviets were not interested in engaging with Garang and the SPLA as a direct patron. Garang was thus left with support from the Ethiopians and later the Cubans, Christian organisations in various Western countries, and other allies such as Zimbabwe. The Soviet Union was also reluctant to support the SPLA/M because it did not advocate Communism, and seemed too Western in its philosophy and doctrine of development through socialist democracy. Unlike the Soviets, Mengistu in Ethiopia did not demand a fully Communist SPLA/M as long as the organisation posed a strong threat to Khartoum and could be of use in securing Ethiopia against its own insurrection.
35. John Young, 'Sudan: Liberation Movements, Regional Armies, Ethnic Militias and Peace,' *Review of African Political Economy* No. 97 (2003), pp. 423–34 (p. 425).
36. Akol, *SPLM/SPLA: Inside an African Revolution*, Khartoum University Press, 2001, p. 22.
37. Salva Kiir, the first President of independent South Sudan, was instrumental in mobilising and equipping a core group that supported Garang against Anya-Nya II in an area called Pinyido just inside Ethiopia on the border with Greater Upper Nile State of Sudan. This core group helped Garang cement his position as the key Southern revolutionary leader and sole recipient of Ethiopian backing.
38. Alex DeWaal and Rakiya Omaar, *Food and Power in Sudan*, London: African Rights, 1997, p. 64.
39. Confidential interview, SPLA Officer involved in early action in Boma, Juba, May 2011. Close to the borders of Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia, the expanse of the Boma National Park provided the hills and swamps essential for the concealment of guerrilla forces, as well as ample food and water to sustain the SPLA forces. Their control of the Boma area caused great hardship for many of the local population. Those that initially agreed to accept the SPLA were accommodated and given privileged access to the SPLA, and some of their young men were made officers. Those that opposed the SPLA were treated harshly, and their communities were violently captured and pillaged. The SPLA officers that orchestrated the takeover of Boma were successful at using the divide-and-rule approach with the Didinga and Topossa tribes, traditional rivals in the area. Moreover they were eventually able to pit some sections of the Topossa against other sections of the Topossa.

40. DeWaal and Omaar, *Food & Power in Sudan* p. 65.
41. Douglas Johnson, *Root Causes*, p. 70.
42. Ann Mosely Lesch, 'Confrontation in the Southern Sudan', *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 40:3, Summer 1986, pp. 410–28 (p. 425).
43. Garang's PhD thesis was titled 'Identifying, Selecting and Implementing Rural Development Strategies for Socio-economic Development in the Jonglei Projects Area, Southern Region, Sudan'. In it, he argued the need for development projects to go beyond 'misery management' and made recommendations of agriculture such as '1) development of modern drainage and irrigation works, 2) introduction of specific mechanical power technology, 3) introduction of new forms of land tenure and firm organization, and 4) spatial reorganization of the countryside into compact villages'. His thesis was not on the canal itself, but rather on the broader development possibilities for the areas the canal went through. He wanted more extensive planning and support for local communities, i.e. a 'transformation approach' for agriculture in the area.
44. Zygmunt L. Ostrowski, *Le Soudan à l'aube de la paix ... combat de John Garang*, Paris: L'Harmattan, 2001, p. 21. Tim Niblock in *Class and Power in Sudan*, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1987, claims that SPLA attacks on the French Company CCI working on the Jonglei Canal took place in December 1983. Owing to Ostrowski's presence in the area at the time, and his role in the resolution of the incident involving the few expatriate workers the SPLA held in custody, his date and description of the event are considered authoritative.
45. Niblock, *Class and Power*, p. 288.
46. Allen, 'Full Circle...', p. 22.
47. Bechtold, 'More Turbulence' p. 588.
48. According to the African Development Bank, 'In nominal terms, the total external debt amounts to USD 35.7 billion as at end-2009. The share for official bilateral creditors accounts for 68.8%, of which 31.4% to the Paris Club. The debt of multilateral institutions represents 14.8%, with the rest owed to commercial banks and suppliers (16.5%). The country's debt ratios are unsustainably high, with the net present value (NPV) of debt-to-exports of over 200% in 2009, well over the Heavily Indebted Countries (HIPC) debt sustainability analysis (DSA) threshold of 150%. Contracting or guaranteeing of new non-concessional debt will weaken further the country's debt sustainability outlook and delay creditors' participation in a potential debt-relief operation. African Development Bank, *Sudan—Country Brief 2010–2011*.
49. World Bank, 'Sudan Facts', on www.worldbank.org at <http://data.worldbank.org/country/sudan>, accessed 30 January 2012.
50. Mansour Khalid, *The Government they Deserve*, p. 303.
51. The use of groups of tribally defined armed men as formal and semi-formal militias or paramilitaries in support of government aims did not exist in the time of the Mahdist state of the late 1800s. Starting with the colonial influence, and more formally under Nimairi, militia structures were formalised. See M. A. Mohammed Salih, 'Tribal Militias, SPLA/SPLM and the Sudanese State: New

- Wine Old Bottles,' (publisher unknown), 23 February 1989. On Sudanarchive.net, accessed 1 February 2012.
52. Ibid.
 53. Khalid, p. 405.
 54. Lesch, 'Confrontation in the Southern Sudan,' p. 421.
 55. Jago Salmon, 'A Paramilitary Revolution: The Popular Defence Forces,' *Small Arms Survey* Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2007, p. 12.
 56. Cole P. Dodge and Siddiq Abdel Rahman Ibrahim, 'Civilians Suffer Most' in Twose and Pogrud (eds), *War Wounds: Sudanese People Report on their War*, London: The Panos Institute, 1988, pp. 45–52.
 57. Although we do use the term to refer to militias, there is a politics behind using the word in South Sudan. While it is technically correct in referring to the various other armed groups there is a strong negative connotation associated with the term. It is thus not often used in South Sudanese discourse.
 58. Johnson, *Root Causes*, p. 81.
 59. Dan Eiffe, interview, Juba, 17 June 2011.
 60. Ibid.
 61. According to Martin Meredith, 'an age-old custom used by the north, the government readily exploited divisions and rivalries among southern groups, arming tribal militias to attack rebel factions. *Aktul al-abid bil abid*, was the saying—kill the slave through the slave. See Martin Meredith, *The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence*, London: The Free Press/Public Affairs Books, 2006, p. 360.
 62. The Misseriya were the main component of the Murahalin, which is the term used to refer to nomadic raiders from the Northern border areas, who also included, to a much lesser degree, the Rezigat groups. Misseriya and Rezigat are tribal and local ethnic groups that live along the border.
 63. This has been noted by Roger Winter, a well-known American activist and relief worker, in various testimonies to the US Congress. Also see Ushari Ahmed Mahmoud and Suleyman Ali Baldo, *The Dhein Massacre: Slavery in the Sudan*, London: Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association, 1987. Available on the Sudan Open Archive www.sudanarchive.net.
 64. Death rates were far higher than in the major famines in Ethiopia or Biafra according to Douglas Johnson, *Root Causes*, p. 83.
 65. An exception is the role played by Kerubino Bol in the late 1990s. Acting more as a warlord, he caused much havoc and exacerbated the 1998 famine; some even referred to the famine as the 'Kerubino famine'. See Luka Biong Deng, 'Famine in the Sudan: Causes, Preparedness and Response,' Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, Discussion paper 369, November 1999, pp. 22–4. This rampaging by one of its original leaders was undoubtedly a failure of the SPLA/M, but the organisation's status as a defender and liberator remained strong. In the end, however, it was the SPLA/M that ended the problems associated with Kerubino, initially trying to coax him back into the SPLA fold, and when that failed, confronting him militarily.

66. Of the initial top command Wiliam Nyuon was a Nuer, Kerubino was a Dinka from Twich East, Salva Kiir a Dinka from Gogrial in Greater Bahr al-Ghazal, and Arok Thon Arok was a Dinka from Twich East.
67. The SPLA officer Yusef Kuwo and his deputy Abdel Aziz led forces taking control of many of the hilltops of South Kordofan, providing an important counter to the growing strength of the various paramilitary and proxy forces al-Madhi was relying on to fight the SPLA.
68. It would first take Kapoeta and Torit, and secure southwesterly approaches to Juba, and then, upon success, redouble the siege of Juba before moving to take it. Having new sources of weapons and other equipment, from Namibia and unknown clandestine sources (many of these negotiated by the infamous Tiny Rowland), was an important reason why, during the Bright Star campaign, the military initiative was halted and the army was fully placed on the defensive. Commander William Nyuon Bany was given the task of taking control of the Nile banks; the remainder of Bright Star was under the command of John Garang with Salva Kiir, Kuol Manyang, Oyaii Deng, James Hoth Mai, Gier Chuang Aluong, and Obuto Mamur Mete in support. See Madut-Arop, *Sudan's Painful Road to Peace*, p. 213.
69. Once the town had been captured, Manyang and his forces imposed harsh punishment upon the government defenders of Bor, largely in retaliation for the treatment of many of the families of the SPLA leadership. According to Madut-Arop, only 13 soldiers managed to escape across the Nile to the safety of territory the army held with the assistance of the local Mundari militia, long-time rivals of the Bor Dinka. While the figure of thirteen could not be corroborated by interviews, interviewees who were involved in Bright Star and the assault on Bor report that few government troops survived, and that many who were captured were summarily executed. The 'liberation' of Bor became an important morale boost and rallying cry for the SPLA in Bahr al-Ghazal and Western Equatoria. The zeal and momentum that followed the capture of Bor were significant. Kuol Manyang, the CPA-period governor of Jonglei State, has been notorious for this victory ever since and retained much admiration for his role in the war. Moreover, his tactics, beginning at the capture of Bor, engendered fear of Manyang among Northern Sudanese and, more widely, within the army.
70. Bechtold, 'More Turbulence', p. 583.
71. Madut-Arop, *Sudan's Painful Road*, p. 214.
72. As Holt and Daly note, 'By the middle of 1989 the regime of Sadiq al-Mahdi had ironically come to resemble Nimairi's in important ways. Although his authority was formally based in an elected parliament, the series of deals he had made with the DUP NIF and army to stay in power discredited the parliamentary process. In economic affairs the regime appeared simply to have given up. By prosecuting the war through tribal militias Sadiq had abrogated a principal attribute of sovereignty. By vacillating between calls for abolishing the 'September Laws' [the Islamic laws brought in by Nimairi] and support for penal codes

based on the Shari'a, he had exasperated secularists and confirmed the suspicions of southerners. Thus when negotiations with the SPLM appeared in June 1989 suddenly to be bearing fruit, these appeared just another manoeuvre to retain the trappings of power in Khartoum.' P.M. Holt and M.W. Daly, *The History of the Sudan: Fifth Edition*, London: Longman, 2000, p. 185.

73. Randolph Martin, 'Sudan's Perfect War,' *Foreign Affairs* 81:2 (March–April 2002), p. 113.
74. Bashir is quoted in Martin Meredith, *The State of Africa*, p. 361.
75. Collins, *A History of Modern Sudan*, p. 170.
76. The National Islamic Front (NIF) was later restructured and called the National Congress Party, as Bashir tried to dilute the power and influence of Turabi and his Islamist faithful, just as Nimairi had tried to do after he relied on Islamist support in the latter years of his regime—ultimately a major cause of his downfall.
77. These purported 'volunteers' who turned the PDF from an Arab/Islamic inclined tribal militia into a *Mujahedeen* force were largely recruited using various methods, including strong indoctrination at young ages, false propaganda about the 'enemy' in the South, and extortion from students based on the threat of denying credentials or completion unless armed service in the *Jihad* was preformed. See Madut-Arop, *Sudan's Painful Road*, p. 237. The wider goal of the NIF with respect to the PDF was to form an Islamist armed force, like the Revolutionary Guard in Iran. Any effort by al-Mahdi to have the PDF be anything more than a tribal-based paramilitary group was opposed by the old-guard leadership of the Army, which was largely replaced after Bashir's coup. At the time, Turabi is reported to have claimed that by 2003 the PDF would have replaced the SAF as the primary armed force in Sudan, with PDF centres throughout the country.
78. The NIF government proclaimed its openness to peace, holding a 'National Dialogue' conference in October 1989 where it was agreed to seek a confederated Sudan, an idea it presented to the SPLA/M. See Bechtold, 'More Turbulence', p. 594. As for the offers of separation, see Madut-Arop, *Sudan's Painful Road*, pp. 239–41.
79. It appeared the SPLM had misread the political situation in Khartoum by prematurely believing it could reach a deal with Northern parties in opposition to al-Mahdi. Although they expected a coup from a faction in the army rather than Bashir and the Islamists, it seems Garang and the SPLA/M were taken by surprise to some degree; however, some have since indicated they anticipated this move and pleaded with Garang to press home the Bright Star campaign.
80. Madut-Arop, *Sudan's Painful Road*, p. 220.
81. *Ibid.*, pp. 188–90 and Johnson, *Root Causes*, p. 85.
82. This did not result in the new leaders in Ethiopia backing their former supporters in Khartoum against the SPLA. Interestingly, with the end of US support to Khartoum in March 1990, the new Ethiopian regime showed little interest in supporting the campaign by Bashir, which had taken on a strong Islamist bent.

The groups that took over control of Ethiopia, particularly the Tigray forces, were wary of Bashir and the NIF's Islamic nature; they were deeply worried about Islamist groups inside Ethiopia, particularly those based in the Oromo areas and along the Somalia border. For more on this see John Young, *Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia: The Tigray People's Liberation Front, 1975–1991*, London: Cambridge University Press, 1997, and his *Brothers at war: Making Sense of the Eritrean–Ethiopian War*, New York: Ohio University Press, 2001.

83. Notably the large camps at Itang, Fungyido and Dimma; estimates vary from 250,000 to 400,000 refugees having lived in them.
84. Lam Akol, *SPLA/M, The Nasir Declaration*, p. 3.
85. The logic was that if Garang's power came from his control over resources acquired from Mengistu, without Mengistu a new power source would be required. Akol and Machar seem to have believed that, if they could gain control of international assistance, they would be able to wrest control of the SPLA/M from Garang. Besides just denying Garang international support, they also planned to use international humanitarian connections to help convince Western countries to support them. The US was particularly important in this calculation; the conspirators believed that, through an effective use of the appropriate language of democratisation and human rights, they could appeal to the US, especially since the US had always been wary of Garang's socialist rhetoric. See Matthew LeRiche, 'How Humanitarianism Affected the Conduct and Outcome of the War in South Sudan' (PhD, War Studies, Kings College London, 2009).
86. Among them, Vincent O'Reilly, a director of OLS; Alistair Scott Villiers, also of OLS; Detlef Palm and other WFP representatives; and even a group from the US Congress that was in Nasir just before the launch of the Split. See Lam Akol, *Nasir Declaration*, p. 12. Moreover, in 1992 the SPLM/A had grown so suspicious of international humanitarian and UN workers that they declared then OLS head Thomas Ekvall *persona non grata* in all areas under the control of the SPLM/A, in a letter from Elijah Malok then Executive Director of the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association to the various international agencies on 18 August 1992.
87. LeRiche, 'How Humanitarianism Affected...' p. 146. Also Nyaba, *The Politics of Liberation*, p. 95.
88. SPLA/M, 'Torit Resolutions' of 12 September 1991, quoted in African Rights, *Food and Power*, p. 273.
89. This was asserted in internal OLS correspondence when considering Lam Akol's request for OLS recognition and inclusion of his faction's humanitarian wing, the Fashoda Relief and Rehabilitation Association (FRRA).
90. Matthew LeRiche, 'Unintended Alliance: The Co-option of Humanitarian Aid in Conflict,' *Parameters*, Spring 2004, pp. 104–20.
91. The extreme politicisation of relief and internationals' presence played into further splits and defections, first from the SPLA-Mainstream and then from the

- SPLA-Nasir and SPLA-United thereafter, evidenced by the attempt by William Nyuon to engage OLS and international relief agencies in 1992 after he defected from the SPLA. Interview, Dan Eiffe.
92. Though OLS did not recognise these new factions, these commanders took the approach of targeting the relief system. Kerubino proved particularly brutal in his targeting of relief centres and drop sites for food aid, so much so that his military planning can be directly linked to the approaches used to deliver relief in the Northern Bahr al-Ghazal. See Luka Biong, 'Famine in the Sudan...' pp. 22–32.
 93. SAF strategists argued at the time that 'in order to defeat an army, the best and effective strategy is to hit the commander, either by physical elimination or by discrediting him.' Madut-Arop *Sudan's Painful Road*, p. 242.
 94. SPLM/A (Nasir Faction) Department of Information and Culture 'Press statement: Garang attacks his deputy killing many soldiers and a United Nations relief worker,' 29 September 1992. The statement was issued by Commander William Nyuon Bany.
 95. Worse still, just after the end of Operation Jungle Storm, William Nyuon, one of Garang's top field generals, defected from the SPLA in September 1992. Officially part of the Nasir faction, Nyuon began carving a personal fiefdom northeast of Juba which he used to accumulate large herds of cattle. From it his men conducted extensive cattle raiding into what is now Jonglei and were particularly brutal towards Garang's home area around Bor. Other targets were the alluvial gold mines in Eastern Equatoria. Nyuon and others were able to benefit from the gold mining in the Tapossa areas. This was a substantial loss as the SPLA/M had relied on this as a part of funding its operations; these resources had become particularly important with the loss of Mengistu's support.
 96. Both Machar and Akol had been included on the 'Alternate Commanders' list of the Permanent Military High Command in the late 1980s, placing them both within the top fifteen or so leaders of the SPLA/M.
 97. Lam Akol later described Garang's *modus operandi*: 'In the SPLA, the Chairman did not see it necessary to share with his colleagues in the High Command the task of formulating the military strategy for prosecuting the war. He took it upon himself to do the work alone.' Lam Akol, *SPLM/SPLA: Inside an African Revolution*, p. 214.
 98. One provocation towards this was that Kerubino had been arrested after arriving at what he thought was to be the first ever Political Military High Command.
 99. Garang's knowledge of the purported plot was uncovered some months before, likely by Salva Kiir, who was taking care of such internal security matters; Garang apparently refused to believe it and did not move to have them arrested.
 100. Interview, former Anya-Nya fighter and former senior SPLA officer, Malakal, May 2009.
 101. Gatkuoth Lam, 'What good will Machar's apology produce?' *Sudan Tribune*, 13 August 2011, <http://www.sudantribune.com/What-good-will-Machar-s-apology>, 39819, accessed 12 December 2011.

102. It is important to indicate that there was much to doubt about the individual coup leaders' sincerity; in fact, one of the main conspirators later declared the coup itself was 'nothing but naivety and parochialism...': see Nyaba, *The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan*, p. 789.
103. Akol, *SPLM/SPLA: The Nasir Declaration*, p. 75.
104. Nyaba, *The Politics of Liberation*, p. 137.
105. Mareike Schomerus, Tim Allen et al., 'Southern Sudan At Odds with Itself: Dynamics of Conflict and Predicaments of Peace', London School of Economics Development Studies Institute.
106. N. Pogrud and B. Twose, *War Wounds: Development Costs of Conflict in Southern Sudan*, London: The Panos Institute, Panos Publishers, 1988.
107. Volker Riehl, 'Who is Ruling in South Sudan?: The Role of NGOs in Rebuilding Socio-political Order,' *Studies on Emergencies and Disaster Relief, Report No. 9*, Stockholm: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2001.
108. LeRiche, 'How Humanitarianism Affected...'
109. The violence of the Bor Massacre was shown to the world by a small number of journalists, facilitated by the then Norwegian People's Aid coordinator Dan Eiffe.
110. The role of various international humanitarian workers, NGOs and UN employees present in Nasir at the time lingers as a questionable factor in how and why Machar believed they could and/or should overthrow Garang and upon their failure embark on a process of internal confrontation between largely tribally defined elements of the SPLA/M.
111. Agence France Presse reported in 1994 that 'the army is closing in on Torit after recapturing a string of southern towns from the Garang faction since the government launched its biggest offensive in the nine-year war two months ago.'
112. Madut-Arop, *Sudan's Painful Road*, confirmed in interviews by Matthew LeRiche with SAF Military Spokesmen, Khartoum 2007.
113. Moreover, the defeats it was incurring provoked further defections from within the SPLA. For example, Galerio Modi Horinyang defected with many Lotuko soldiers, which then helped the SAF harass the SPLA in their home areas between Juba and Uganda. Though many of the Taposa supported the SPLA/M there remained many who did not. The Taposa who supported the SPLA/M were better armed and could be distinguished by the newer version AK-47s they carried. The Taposa militia who were loyal to the Taposa tribal chiefs had more rudimentary arms until they decided to support the GoS Seif Obuur offensive.
114. Jim Hooper, 'Africa, Khartoum, Suffering, Discouragement and Defeat,' *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vol. 009/006, 1 June 1997, p. 274; Mawut Achicque Mach Guarak, *Integration and Fragmentation of the Sudan: an African Renaissance*, Bloomington: Author House, 2011, p. 379; Scott Peterson, *Me Against My Brother: At War in Somalia, Sudan and Rwanda*, New York: Routledge, 2002, p. 193; LeRiche, 'How Humanitarianism Affected...', p. 85.

115. As described earlier in the book, the SPLA/M was not as singularly coherent as the way they are typically written about could suggest. There were various parts of the SPLM/A operating throughout the South at different times and under differing levels of control from Garang and the core leadership. As has been described, much of the fighting in Bahr al-Ghazal during the war was done by groups loosely led by the top command of the SPLA/M. John Garang and the core of the SPLA/M's leadership during the early 1990s were based in Eastern Equatoria. This included Salva Kiir, Kuol Manyang and Oyay Deng Ajak, amongst others. This group was the one under dire threat during the battle of Aswa described above; in Bahr al-Ghazal, for example, the SPLA/M forces at this time were more like client local forces. Garang himself did not visit the fronts in the Bahr al-Ghazal region until well into the war.
116. The ease with which the Seif Obuur forces moved into position to advance in the South, was not only aided by the ceasefire with Machar's Nasir forces; it also appears that significant intelligence regarding SPLA/M plans and movements and other essential information were gained by the Army from the Nasir commanders.

3. YEARS OF DARKNESS, SERIOUS STRUGGLE, NEGOTIATIONS: 1991–2005

1. From Situation report from Nairobi NPA office to Oslo office, from Helge Rohn, 10 June, 1991. Accessed at NPA archives, Oslo.
2. Interview, Dan Eiffe, relief worker and close supporter and friend of John Garang and various SPLA/M leaders, Juba, May 2011.
3. 'Achieving peace in the Sudan after the collapse of the IGAD talks in Nairobi 1994': quoted in Ruth Iyob and Gilbert Khadiagala, *Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, International Peace Academy Occasional Papers Series, 2006, p. 107.
4. Jago Salmon, 'A Paramilitary Revolution: The Popular Defence Forces,' *Small Arms Survey*, Working Paper, 10 December 2007. Available on http://www.smallarms-survey.org/files/portal/spotlight/sudan/Sudan_pdf/SWP%2010%20PDF.pdf, accessed 22 October 2008.
5. The SPLA's defence at the Aswa River has been described by the soldiers and officers involved as a 'last stand'.
6. First, without the area of sanctuary behind the Aswa River up to the Ugandan border, resupply of the SPLA/M units in the region would have been complicated; it is hard to see how the spectacular 'break out' campaign launched by the SPLA/M from 1995/96 would have been possible if the units of the Eastern Equatoria fronts had been forced to fall back into Uganda or scatter into the bush. Also, the SPLA/M's ability to continue its siege of Juba would have been seriously limited. Conventional fighting could not have been launched in the region for some time if, for example, the SAF soldiers had been able to rout the SPLA/M at the Aswa

River and force many of the civilian supporters of the SPLA living in the area into Uganda or into Juba under government control; the result would have been a major strategic setback for the SPLA/M. Secondly, the political fallout from failure to defend the Aswa River line is linked to the potential repercussions of the loss of individual leaders, as well as large IDP and refugee populations and the loss of prestige. When one considers the importance of the military plans of the 1994/95 dry season for the leadership of the SPLA/M, which led to Operation Thunderbolt and Operation Jungle Storm from 1996 to 1999/2000, failure in 1993/94 might have resulted in further factionalisation of the SPLA/M.

7. Such key leaders as Kuol Manyang, Pieng Deng, Oyai Deng, Majak d'Agoot, James Hoth Mai, David Deng, Sampson Kwaja, and many others—who have all held important positions in government since the CPA process—were all involved in this series of battles. Corroborated in interviews, Dan Eiffe.
8. Richard Dowden, 'Attack forces Sudan refugees to flee camp,' *The Independent* (London), 10 February 1994, p. 17.
9. As far as the government was concerned, because humanitarians supported people outside the garrison towns, these camps provided key strategic support, both moral and material, to the SPLA/M. Owing to the presence of international personnel, the camps were a major aggravation for the GoS, as they were witnesses to the counterinsurgency strategy that consisted significantly of directly targeting civilians. This approach was designed to move populations from areas of support to the rebels to areas under the direct control (and benefit) of the GoS, or out of the country. As a former Northern officer who fought in Eastern Equatoria explained, 'the camps were the centres for the rebels so it was important for the army to disrupt them.' He continued, 'many of the aid agency people were telling stories and writing reports of the evil army, I don't understand ... it was war, the rebels do the same'. Hassan Suliman (former SAF soldier), interview with the author, Khartoum, November 2007.
10. Interview with Dan Eiffe and his personal Documents, as it was an NPA-run hospital; at that time they had taken it over from the ICRC.
11. Rolandsen, *Guerrilla Govt.* p. 54.
12. 'Sudan's rebels change their spots,' *The Economist*, 28 March 1998, p. 43.
13. Dan Eiffe, interview, May 2011.
14. Collins, *Modern Sudan*, p. 203
15. SPLA-United was an attempt to redesign and name the breakaway SPLA-Nasir in order to bring in other disaffected leaders, including Kerubino Nuyon, Joseph Oduho, etc. The meeting was held in Panyagor in March 1993. Joseph Oduho was killed in a fight with some of Garang's forces sent to disrupt the meeting. The name 'SPLA-United' was chosen in the hope of rebranding the organisation to attract all the other anti-Garang groups. This renaming appears to have been less about any ideological position on independence of unity for South Sudan and more about internal 'Unity'. Machar would return to the idea of secession when he launched the SPLA-Unity in 1994.

16. Previously Machar and Akol had focused on criticising Garang's leadership, trying to win over the whole of the SPLA/M Movement, but at Abuja it was clear they were making the claim for Southern independence. Machar and Akol, having failed to wrest control of the SPLA/M as a whole from Garang, had decided to try and win over the many Southerners who preferred the option of independence.
17. Kiir, Opening Statement, SPLM 2nd National Convention.
18. SPLM/SPLA, 'First National Convention: Transcript of Opening Speech by John Garang,' 2 April 1994, p. 28.
19. Interestingly, as a means of appealing to wider progressive political discourse, there was a special attempt to include women and to promote a series of resolutions related to women and their equal rights as well as expressing their critical role in the Movement.
20. Writing in 1984, Andrew Mawson indicated it was apparent that despite its rhetoric, the SPLA/M was not particularly devout: 'for most rebels the issue at stake concern southern rights, not ideologies,' p. 526.
21. Clair Metelits, 'Reformed Rebels? Democratization, Global Norms, and the Sudan People's Liberation Army,' *Africa Today* 51:1 (Autumn 2004), p. 73.
22. Mark Bradbury, Nicholas Leader and Kate Mackintosh, 'The Agreement on Ground Rules in South Sudan,' Overseas Development Institute, HPG Report 4, 2000. The National Convention was followed by a series of implementation meetings structured around committees established at the Convention. Though slow, these meetings were significant; for example, the meeting held regarding civil administration and humanitarianism resulted in a clarification of roles of administrators and agreement and implementation of new procedures for the SRRA to engage with international humanitarian actors—no small feat considering the difficult relationship between humanitarians and the SPLA/M during the 1980s. This then played an important role in the process of negotiation with the UN that resolved and agreed upon the OLS-SPLA/M 'Ground Rules' meant to regulate and facilitate humanitarian involvement. This agreement was a landmark event in the history of humanitarianism and a major breakthrough for the SPLA/M in terms of international recognition of empirical sovereignty and perceived legitimacy.
23. John Garang, Opening Speech, 2 April 1994.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
25. *Ibid.*
26. SPLM/SPLA, 'First National Convention: Transcript of Garang's Concluding Remarks,' 2 April 1994.
27. SPLM/SPLA, 'Minutes of 1991 Torit meeting of the Politico-Military High Command,' p. 14.
28. Collins, *History of Modern Sudan*, p. 253.
29. General Security Organ (typically referred to as 'National Security' or just 'Security' and later restructured as the National Intelligence and Security Service, NISS).

30. A humanitarian relief operation was launched by groups in Khartoum, with funding largely from other Arab governments, that was said to be in response to the reported suffering of civilians due to what the Sudanese official news service described as tribal violence. Abu Gasseissa—the person overseeing the plan Khartoum had devised to work with Southern militias to divide and rule the South—was on board a barge hired by the NIF heading for Malakal, where he would become the NIF political supervisor, supposedly to work on the relief efforts for Upper Nile in conjunction with Islamic Relief and other Arab and Islamic ‘humanitarian’ agencies. Gasseissa was to play a critical role in working with the NISS, the various tribal militia and SPLA, breakaway factions that would further press home Bashir’s effort to defeat Garang and the New Sudan revolution.
31. Many of those who have rebelled against the SPLM understand this rebellion and their periodic collaboration with Khartoum as a part of the wider southern Sudanese liberation struggle, however contradictory this may appear.
32. Garang noted versions of this comment through his introductory and concluding speeches at the First National Convention in 1994.
33. This led many to perceive that the government was recognising Machar as the leader of a future Southern government to be instituted under a federal structure at a juncture in the future.
34. Under these agreements, the SSDF also created its political wing, the United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF). It was not long, however, before various new political wings and splinter groups formed, including groups proclaimed from the Diaspora with little local connection or presence, such as the South Sudan Democratic Front initiated by David De Chand, then living in the USA.
35. For a full list see John Young, *The South Sudan Defence Forces*.
36. See Chapter 2 on General Principles and Chapter 7 for the specifics of the referendum. *The 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement*, http://www.sudanoslo.no/PDFs/search_for_peace.pdf
37. John Young, *The South Sudan Defence Forces*.
38. Johnson, *Root Causes*, pp. 116, 117.
39. Jok Madut Jok and Sharon Elaine Hutchinson, ‘Sudan’s Prolonged Second Civil War and the Militarization of Nuer and Dinka Ethnic Identities,’ *African Studies Review* 42:2 (September 1999), p. 129.
40. *Ibid.*, pp. 131–2.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 136.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 134.
43. LeRiche, ‘How Humanitarianism Affected...,’ pp. 136–50.
44. A particularly brutal battle, it left the SPLA with 1,500 prisoners of war, who were accorded much better treatment than had previous been the practice of the SPLA/M; this appears to have contributed to a greater willingness to surrender to the SPLA/M than in the past, facilitating their resurgence.
45. Madut-Arop, *Sudan’s Painful Road*, p. 317.

46. The Ugandan army began leaving truckloads of equipment that were collected by SPLA drivers inside Uganda and driven into Southern Sudan, mostly to Yei and New Site via Kenya. Interviews, Dan Eiffe.
47. The NDA provided an important opportunity for gaining support from the Eritrean and Ethiopian governments. Both had benefited from support by Khartoum in their insurrections against the Derg, which in turn had allied with the SPLA/M. Despite this, Addis Ababa and Asmara had low views of the Islamist leadership in Khartoum, which continued to support insurgencies in both countries. The Eritreans were particularly supportive of the NDA, providing it with a headquarters in Asmara (the former Sudan Embassy), safe passage, and material support.
48. The SPLA only took control of Kassala for one day and the territory it controlled in the region amounted only to a small strip of land along the Eritrean border and the Red Sea Hills.
49. At the same time as the rise of the Shilluk leader Oyay Deng to prominence for his leadership of major victories in the preceding years, the Reth (the Shilluk King) decided to support the SPLM.
50. Luka Biong Deng, 'Famine in the Sudan,' p. 22.
51. Once back in the SPLA/M, Machar began playing an important technical and negotiating role, particularly in the IGAD talks. He also worked to reconcile the various SSDF, particularly Equatorian and Nuer, groups. With his assistance, the Equatorian Defence Forces (EDF) under Martin Kenyi (later made General in the SPLA) left the SSDF and joined the SPLA/M in 2004. Since then, Machar has been a central figure in the process of consolidating support for the SPLM and the Government of South Sudan. He became number three in the line of succession when James Wani Igga agreed to step aside with the aim of winning over the Nuer population, thereby putting Machar in the position to become the Vice-President of South Sudan when Kiir assumed the presidency; Wani Igga thus became the Speaker of the Southern Assembly.
52. Jeffrey Gettleman, 'War in Sudan? Not where the oil wealth flows,' *New York Times*, 24 October, <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/24/world/africa/24sudan.html>
53. Bona Malwal, *The Sudan: A Second Challenge to Nationhood*, New York: Thornton Books, 1985, p. 40.
54. Early in 1999 President Bashir dissolved the National Assembly and the Southern state assemblies. In Khartoum he had come under increasing internal challenge from his Islamist allies loyal to Hassan Turabi. Much of this pressure was in reaction to Bashir's agreement with the DOP the previous year, which many in the Islamist camp perceived as conceding to the SPLA/M, the West and secularism. Bashir was portrayed as abandoning both *sharia* and the maintenance of Sudan as an Islamic state. It looked as though there would be little room to engage in a peace process as Southern self-determination was strongly resisted by the hard-line factions in the NCP that were pressing Bashir to renege on the

DOP and continue the military campaign. Bashir, ever the pragmatist, was balancing much more than the interests of the Islamists and hard-line elements in his own party. Growing international isolation, pressure from the army and security services to resolve a deal, and concern about the growing support for the various opposition groups led him to continue with the talks. Bashir was, after all, the militarist in the fusion of militarism and Islamism upon which the NCP was based. In this instance, his concern about the military situation proved more pressing and he saw the IGAD process as a component of a way to manage the various interests. When Turabi worked to foment discontent in Western and Eastern Sudan, Bashir responded with greater peace overtures to the Southerners and moved his counterinsurgency to focus more internal matters and those relating to Darfur.

55. This was most conspicuously highlighted by allegations of involvement in the assassination attempt on Hosni Mubarak and the hosting of Osama bin Laden.
56. Analysts and Western countries have long over-emphasised their role in bringing the CPA about and compelling the NCP to negotiate. The reality was that the SPLA was by the early 2000s a major military power and the NCP believed it could not win. The NCP calculated that signing the CPA, despite the cost of sharing oil with an SPLM government, would cost less than maintaining the war. By signing the CPA, the NCP thought it 'would increase the chances of its own survival'. See Andrew Natsios, 'Beyond Darfur,' *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2008, p. 84.
57. Peter Woodward, 'From CPA to DPA: 'Ripe for Resolution', or 'Ripe for Dis-solution', in Elke Grawert (ed.), *After the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan*, Woodbridge: James Currey, 2010, pp. 233–4.
58. The International Crisis Group had termed the plethora of efforts a 'traffic jam' by the early 2000s.
59. 'The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Eastern Africa was created in 1996 to supersede the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) which was founded in 1986. In 1983 and 1984, six countries in the Horn of Africa—Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda—took action through the United Nations to establish an intergovernmental body for development and drought control in their region.' From 'History of IGAD,' <http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/recs/igad.htm>.
60. Several dynamics were important to the IGAD process. One was that it enjoyed the consistent financial and political support of the US and other Western governments, something the other major peace initiative, the OAU's Nigerian-led talks in Abuja, did not have. Additionally, as a general rule, the IGAD process premised itself on negotiations between Garang's SPLA/M and the very top level of power in Khartoum. Starting in 1993, Bashir attempted to get involved with IGAD, to avoid Western involvement and to highlight how Africans could solve their problems. He particularly wanted to avoid humanitarian interventionism ('without loopholes through which colonialism could penetrate on the pre-

text of humanitarianism'.) See Ruth Iyob and Gilbert M. Khadiagala, *Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace*, p. 103.

61. Ibid., p. 109.
62. Note that the possibility of independence was premised on a consensus for unity not being achievable owing to disagreements over wealth sharing, religious freedom, human rights protections, judicial impartiality, and the actual provision of the basic right of self-determination. See <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sudan/key-texts-igad-dop.php>
63. Abdelwahab el-Affendi, 'The Impasse in the IGAD Peace Process for Sudan: The Limits of Regional Peacemaking?' *African Affairs*, 100 (2001): pp. 581–99.
64. In his 'Report to the President of the United States on the Outlook for Peace in Sudan,' dated 26 April 2002, Special Envoy for Peace John C. Danforth argued that the history of Sudanese peace agreements showed that all have one thing in common: 'none was implemented, and none brought Sudan closer to peace'. Accordingly, the need was to see, first, if the warring parties, i.e. those who would actually implement anything, agreed by asking them to demonstrate their sincerity.
65. US interests in Sudan originated with the realisation of Sudanese involvement in the bombing of the World Trade Centre in June 1993; the result was a focus on Sudan as a terrorist threat and on the Second Civil War as a potential source of regional instability. By the mid-1990s, Khartoum was recognised as a centre for Islamist terrorist groups as well as other militant groups: the Islamists attracted and were given sanctuary by the NIF leader Hassan al-Turabi, one of the early ideologues of Political Islam, connected with the Muslim Brotherhood and various Islamic political movements. Not long before this period, Khartoum harboured Carlos the Jackal, an infamous terrorist, and served as the base for Osama bin Laden and the establishment of the Al-Qaeda terrorist organisation. American conviction and support, primarily channelled through the East African states it supported, allowed IGAD to become a sustained process, able to withstand major periods of recalcitrance by the belligerents, a feature that the other peace initiatives lacked.
66. The leadership of the former Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi, and later in the process the retired Kenyan Army General Lazarus Sumbeiywo, also contributed greatly to the success of the peace process. Moi was able to connect with Garang and had strong links with most Southern opposition groups, as well as the humanitarian and UN agencies working in Sudan. His ability to use this network to influence the Southern groups and particularly his ability to temper Garang were essential in the functioning of the IGAD forum. For his part, Sumbeiywo was the element that helped resolve the very contentious security issues and provisions for the ceasefire. His military background and the respect with which he was regarded by the Sudanese and international actors allowed him to engage with both parties in a constructive manner, cutting to the heart of the security dilemmas that were all too often stumbling blocks at the later stages of the negotiations in Naivasha.

67. Collins, *History of Modern Sudan*, p. 263.
68. The SPLM was guaranteed 70 per cent, and hence control, of the GoSS, while John Garang was declared the President of the GoSS. At the national level, notably the ministries and parliament, 52 per cent of the seats in institutions were accorded to the NCP, 28 per cent to the SPLM, and the balance to both Southern and Northern opposition parties. The presidency was assigned to Bashir, with Garang serving as his first Vice-President. Within the Northern states, the NCP was assigned 70 per cent of representation, and hence guaranteed control prior to the elections. In Abyei, Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile State, the divide was 70 to 30 per cent, respectively, for the NCP and SPLM.
69. 'The Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities' and the 'Implementations Modalities' were signed on 30 October and 31 December 2004. Importantly, these outlined the timeframes for withdrawing or garrisoning troops, accommodating 'other armed groups' in either the SAF or SPLA, and detailing the roles and responsibilities of the signing parties during the six-year Interim Period.
70. John Young, 'Sudan: A Flawed Peace Process Leading to a Flawed Peace,' p. 100.
71. Some prominent international observers have concurred, and the International Crisis Group wryly noted that through the CPA the NCP and SPLM became 'strange bedfellows' working to guarantee their primacy within the Sudanese political space and the institutions of governance, notably at the expense of their former allies the SSDF and NDA. ICG, 'The Khartoum-SPLM Agreement', p. 2.
72. Sadiq al-Mahdi, 'The Limitations of Bilateral Governance,' 2006, <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sudan/bilateral-governance.php>
73. The NCP argued in negotiations for other Southern-armed groups, notably the SSDF umbrella of militias, to be understood as a sanctioned third force through the CPA for an interim of 2.5 years. The SPLM countered that all non-SAF, non-SPLA forces needed to immediately pick sides or be disarmed. The NCP also argued strongly against the national treasury being used to fund the SPLA, even while conceding that it was to be half of the national armed forces.
74. Garang was well aware of critiques of exclusion and marginalisation of allies: 'the partnership does not mean abandonment of political allies by any of the two parties. Such partnership, while safeguarding the new political dispensation, shall in effect nurture the democratic transformation and political multiplicity, which by their very nature may lead to diverse alliances.' Garang speech at CPA signing, 9 January 2005, Naivasha, Kenya.
75. Garang himself argued that the CPA 'will not be completed and comprehensive' if there remained war in western and eastern Sudan: Garang speech at inauguration as First Vice President, 9 July 2005.
76. Indeed, there were very few 'national' organisations and assets—the GoNU, JIUs, the currency, etc.—and many 'North-South' divides were institutionalised: electoral and DDR commissions, etc.

77. Matthew LeRiche interview with Lam Akol, also see SPLM-DC website, <http://www.splm-dc.org>, accessed 5 September 2010.
78. Garang speech at CPA signing, 9 January 2005, Naivasha, Kenya.
79. Douglas Johnson provides the clearest expansion of this common theme.
80. Khartoum's masterful ability to use Southern proxies, its newfound access to oil wealth, and its skilful aptitude at defying international pressure meant that by the late 1990s and early 2000s the Second Civil War, from Khartoum's perspective, had in effect become self-sustaining politically and economically, 'a perfect war': Randolph Martin, 'Sudan's Perfect War', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81:2, March–April 2002, pp. 111–27 (p. 112).
81. Proponents of the CPA, such as the SPLM's Luka Biong Deng, argued that its 'parity nature' would actually encourage its full implementation. The two 'partners' would be mutually dependent on one another and hence need to work together. Luke Biong Deng, 'The Comprehensive Peace Agreement: Will it also be Dishonoured?' *Forced Migration Review*, Oxford, No. 24, 1 November 2005.
82. See CPA, p. xii.
83. Garang declared, 'When you combine (a) real power in the GoSS, (b) an independent SPLA, (c) organic sources of revenue for the GoSS and (d) a separate banking system, then one can say that we truly have an autonomous Southern Sudan.' Chairman's 22nd anniversary address at a mass rally in Rumbek 16 May 2005, <http://www.vigilsd.org/adoc.htm>
84. Garang speech at CPA signing, 9 January 2005, Naivasha.

4. GIVING UNITY A CHANCE: THE CPA'S INTERIM PERIOD, 2005–2011

1. Government of Sudan, The Interim National Constitution, 2005. Section 4 (a), page. 3.
2. Garang Speech, July 2005, Khartoum.
3. Luka Biong Deng, 'The Comprehensive Peace Agreement: Will it also be dishonoured?' in *Forced Migration Review*, Volume 24, November 2005, pp. 15–16, p. 16. Available at <http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR24/FMR24full.pdf>
4. Notably, Kiir remarked at the time of his swearing-in that, 'From its inception the SPLM leaders, of which I remain the only survivor, have fought for unity. The comprehensive peace agreement... provides the last chance for Sudan's unity.' Quoted in Ophera McDoom, 'Salva Kiir Sworn in as new Sudanese vice president,' *The Journal of the Turkish Weekly*, 12 August 2005, <http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/17665/salva-kiir-sworn-in-as-new-sudanese-vice-president.html>.
5. SPLM-North and NDA leaders were meant to be central in the SPLM's Interim Period strategy had Garang not been killed.
6. The group often referred to as 'Garang Boys' consisted of those few leaders that Garang was grooming for top leadership in the post-war system and those to whom, for one reason or another, he was close and afforded advantage and privilege. The term has become a pejorative one used by those opposing the SPLM. It

was perceived by those in the SPLM as reflecting the attempt to remove agency from the multitude of leaders and make the SPLM out to be Garang's revolution rather than a movement of the people. That is, to call a group 'Garang's Boys' was to mean this group were little more than puppets of Garang. Garang had a predisposition towards those with high formal education and academic achievement. Having himself achieved a doctorate, he often brought those with similar credentials close and gave them special recognition and consideration. Doing so was often risky; for example, in promoting Riek Machar and Lam Akol quickly through the ranks, Garang gave positions of power to ambitious people who did not necessarily share his political and military vision, and then conflicted with them. For someone like Salva Kiir, a stalwart military leader in the field and an unwavering protector of Garang from internal and external conspiracy and intrigue, the advantages and consideration given such 'PhDs' and intellectuals must often have been frustrating; such advancement had no apparent correlation with proven loyalty or time-served in the cause. The 'Garang Boys' rose to the top ranks of the army and were given many initial government positions. Garang was even reported to be planning to replace Salva Kiir with one of those he was grooming for top leadership in post-war Sudan. As discussed above, Kiir resisted this and asserted his position as number two.

7. This is where the role of figures from Northern areas became critically important, such as Abdel Aziz, Yasir Arman and Malik Agar, now SPLM-North, and NDA leaders. These leaders were rumoured to have been meant to play a much more central role in the SPLM's Interim Period strategy had Garang not been killed.
8. Much conspiratorial musing has been devoted to the fact that the CPA was crafted largely by the two men who would dominate its implementation through the powerful Sudanese presidency, namely its two vice-presidents-to-be, Garang and Taha. Speculation was often that these two intended to use the CPA as a medium for national change. Following Garang's death, Taha was conspicuously marginalised within the NCP. The internal push and pull that developed between the 'hard-liners', the moderates, and the third group, the secession supporting Islamists (i.e. the group that wanted the South gone so they could focus on building an Islamist state governed by *sharia* law in the North) became the key determining factor that drove much of the politics of the Interim Period. Bashir's rejection of the hard liners who wanted to see all effort made to keep the South from separating, and his pressure upon them to allow the referendum to happen on time and without significant hindrance from Khartoum—though some occurred—is very interesting and revealing about his survival strategy. It has been suggested that he made a strong assertion in face of pressure that he should more actively resist the South from leaving. It seems Mohammed Atta (Director of the NISS) was interested in being more provocative and has since South Sudan's independence been at the centre of the provocative military activities along the border with South Sudan.
9. SPLM intentions concerning partnership with the NCP, as noted by the ICG,

were about ‘maintaining a working partnership... based on joint implementation of the CPA’ at least until the interim elections. For a more detailed explanation of the thesis see International Crisis Group, *Khartoum-SPLM Agreement: Sudan’s Uncertain Peace*, Africa Report No. 96, 25 July 2005, p. 13.

10. Simon Tisdall, ‘Omar al-Bashir: conflict in Darfur is my responsibility,’ *The Guardian*, 20 April 2011. Available on <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/20/omar-al-bashir-darfur-responsibility>, accessed 20 January 2011. In this interview with *The Guardian* Bashir describes his vision of Sudanese democracy and his role in the previous years, setting out his role as a state builder. The information about Bashir’s role in holding off those hard-liners in the NCP who wanted to preclude the South from separation and his commitment to the process of the CPA in broad terms—at least the referendum—is interesting and now matches up to information that many of us did not believe. Even Salva Kiir has commented to key personalities on several occasions that Bashir was pragmatic and was supporting the referendum and had reconsidered his strategy in power, apparently considering not standing for the presidency again after the Interim Period election long before he announced this a few months ago. It is interesting to consider history here and the way Nimairi flirted with the Islamists, then used the Southerners to solidify a tenuous position, then went back to the Islamists. The Islamists in the NCP were divided between those who wanted the South held on to by any means required and those who wanted to be done with the battle over identity and have the opportunity to remove the ‘fly in the ointment’, so to speak, and form their Islamic state in the North. It seems Bashir was stuck in the middle and playing them off against each other, and the result was a willingness to play either the commitment to referendum card or the classic nationalist card. As in Naivasha the thing that kept the leader in power has been a part of his undoing, so the CPA process kept Bashir in power but was the mechanism that will inevitably see him off—if he follows through with the promise not to run for re-election, or enough opposition to him mounts and he is deposed by opposition forces after South Sudan’s independence.
11. John Prendergast and Colin Thomas-Jensen, ‘Blowing the Horn,’ *Foreign Affairs*, March/April, 2007, p. 61.
12. The New Sudan ideological intentions were steadily sidelined although individuals, such as Amum, maintained senior leadership roles. Once in charge, Kiir moved to install a leadership group which was not as close to Garang. A whole series of top SPLA commanders, including some from the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile, and the Bor area were either jettisoned from the immediate circle of influence at the top or told to wait for an appointment. Only after some years and apparent ‘rehabilitation’ did many of these leaders re-enter the fold.
13. Apparently internationals were deeply confused by this change, as their interpretations of the CPA and the process were often literal ones focused on the document itself rather than the understandings of the key stakeholders. The EU, the UK, Norway and the US all differed in how they understood this, some tak-

ing a more literal approach than others. The US was the quickest to respond to Garang's death, backing the Southerners in the manner it seemed the Southerners wanted (i.e. secession), all the while still maintaining the line of unity. Other states, like Canada, were even more confused as they tried to reconcile their internal distaste for secession in principle and the clear expression of Southerners' desire for independence in the face of the CPA's defined process. Most countries faced with the difficult choices of the period chose the safe diplomatic position of sticking to the letter of the CPA, the CPA's process, and humanitarian/development concerns, rather than the outcome for people or the government/politics, as the most important factors. This progress could be mapped and described, and, it was supposed, measured and monitored. Those that took this line never allowed a frank and effective engagement with the GoSS and were thus unable to affect the underlying political, security or social conditions in the country; neither made it more or less likely that there would be a return to war. Effectively, these governments were copping out of real engagement in Sudan, in lieu of being able to state they were involved to domestic audiences and not risk any major scandal or decisions on where to fall politically. Only Norway came out more openly in support of the GoSS and the government of Garang, and then of Kiir, publically lamenting Garang's death and the loss of their hope for a Unified Sudan with him, before moving clearly back to support Southern secession.

14. Alex DeWaal, 'The Politics of Exhaustion,' *African Arguments*, Royal African Society and the SSRC, blog. Available on <http://africanarguments.org/2009/05/25/the-politics-of-exhaustion/>, accessed 2 January 2011. Here DeWaal sets out both the idea of strategic delay and the argument that the talks in Sudan end up becoming about 'a routine of endless negotiation over the smallest details'.
15. Salva Kiir interview on BBC Radio, 2 August 2005. Interview commented on by ICG, 'Garang's Death: Implications for Peace in Sudan,' Africa Briefing No. 30, 9 August 2005, p. 5.
16. Garang called the CPA a 'Mini-New Sudan' because it was a step in the longer-term process of transforming Sudan; it was Model 2 leading to other models, that is, a framework for change but not the final product. Kiir long qualified the CPA as a part of a larger process: 'the CPA is not an end in itself nor will it replace the New Sudan vision.' See: Kiir, 'Opening Statement,' SPLM 2nd National Convention.
17. Grawert (ed.), *After the Comprehensive Peace Agreement*, p. 2.
18. It is important to point out that many wanted and advocated a delay—some for political reasons, and others, like the UN and various international governments, for purported 'technical reasons'. Kiir was, however, very determined to hold the referendum and insistent that it be held on time, as he felt, probably rightly, that delay would begin to undermine his support within the SPLM and might give those who would supplant him an opportunity to build support. It was feared that those who had called for independence for many years, including Riek Machar, would use any delay to argue that the SPLM was clinging to power and

not allowing the development of pluralism and democracy. He might have even opened himself to a coup attempt. Coups are common after the launch of new states and the kind of dynamics that could build towards one exists in Southern Sudan, although there is not a sufficiently dominant alternative.

19. Additionally, the SPLM complained that the 5th Population and Household Census was illegitimate, as it made no determination of ethnicity or religion and had dubious implementation in contested areas.
20. Andrew Natsios, 'Beyond Darfur,' p. 82.
21. CPA Article 1.5: '[the South] shall be brought up to the same average level of socio-economic and public standards as the Northern states'.
22. In his speech at the All Sudan Political Parties Conference (26–29 September 2009), Kiir argued that the onus lay on the NCP as the majority party of GoNU: 'The government, more than the SPLM and GoSS, is endowed with the wherewithal to make unity attractive.'
23. As Jan Pronk, then a senior official at the UN, once explained, 'Khartoum accuses Juba of not being able to run a government and Juba accuses Khartoum deliberately undermining the authority of the new state'. See: Weblog no. 14, Jan Pronk, 24 February 2006, <http://www.janpronk.nl/index156.html>
24. Kiir, Speech to All Sudan Political Parties Conference, 26–29 September 2009.
25. Abyei was heavily represented in the upper echelons of the SPLM, making it an imperative within the GoSS that the area should eventually be recognised as part of the South. Abyei is apparently more disproportionately represented in the top levels of the GoSS and SPLM than any other area in South Sudan, with the possible exception of Bor.
26. See Douglas Johnson, *When Boundaries Become Borders: The Impact of Boundary Making in Southern Sudan's Frontier Zones*, Nairobi: The Rift Valley Institute, 2010. This is a detailed discussion of the intrigues of the Abyei Boundary Commission activities recounted by Douglas Johnson, the key academic expert on the Commission.
27. Interestingly, Abyei itself contains little oil relatively, estimated at 0.6 per cent of Sudanese oil revenue. International Crisis Group, *Negotiating Sudan's North-South Future*, 23 November 2010.
28. Interviews with NCP/Government of Sudan sources involved in the Abyei negotiations, London, February 2011.
29. And thus the military planning that has occurred has focused on the potential for a post-independence border war, as was the case between Eritrea and Ethiopia after their split. Reflecting this, the SPLA/M turned to Addis Ababa for advice.
30. Government of Southern Sudan, Ministry of SPLA Affairs, *SPLA White Paper on Defence*, The Committee of the SPLA White Paper on Defence, June 2008.
31. Interestingly, in contrast to the *Realpolitik* of defending and claiming territory, boundaries in Sudan have historically been a fairly fluid idea, particularly amongst its migratory agro-pastoralists. Accordingly, many have argued that struggling to

demarcate the North–South border was more of a threat than simply accepting a fluid boundary area. This would allow the various communities to perpetually re-negotiate the terms of land usage directly, as the Ngok Dinka and the Misseriya had historically done to mitigate conflict. Regardless, the CPA stipulated that the border be specified and defined; its economic and military significance negated possibilities for such fluidity. However, such considerations were one reason why the issue of partial residency was discussed for the referendum.

32. The CPA—Chapter 5—and thus the corresponding Interim Constitution of Sudan, along with the Transitional Constitution since South Sudan's independence, made any armed forces or groups in existence after 9 January 2005 other than the SAF, the police (North and South), the National Security and Intelligence Service and the SPLA illegal. Thus the SPLM argued that including former militia proxies as the SAF component in the JIU was a breach of the terms of the CPA, since it was a ploy to maintain the existence of illegal forces.
33. Neither 'Joint' nor 'Integrated': The Joint Integrated Units and the Future of the CPA, *Small Arms Survey*, Human Security Baseline Assessment, Geneva.
34. This fighting was also notable as SSDF militias refused to redeploy northwards.
35. These JIUs were supposed to be in place before the SPLA was to redeploy southwards: Ceasefire Joint Monitoring Commission (JMC), 'Press Release of the CJMC on the Redeployment of Forces North and South of the 1–1–56 on the 9th of July'.
36. The SPLA forces that had remained in the north were in the areas just inside Blue Nile State; the remnants of the mechanised NDA force were under the command of Malik Agar, the SPLA Commander who eventually became in the 2010 national elections the governor of Blue Nile State, an area remaining a part of Sudan after Southern secession. Agar served as the SPLM/A secretary in southern Blue Nile and was a key negotiator at peace talks in Naivasha. He joined the SPLM/A with the rank of lieutenant in 1986, and was subsequently promoted to commander, leading many military operations in eastern Sudan until 1997. He became involved in senior command and in 2000 returned to command some of the NDA forces pushing towards Damizen, and worked closely with the Beja Congress.
37. Kiir argued that the boycott was necessary given the NCP's 'deliberate intention to kill' the peace process, and that it intended 'to speed up and reinvigorate the implementation of [the] CPA': Kiir speech, Ministry of Information and Communications, Transcript of 'Gen. Salva Kiir Mayardit message on the occasion of his arrival from his foreign visit,' Juba, 19 November 2007.
38. Ibid.
39. John Garang, speech at his inauguration as First Vice-President, Khartoum, 9 July 2005.
40. These were under the command of Gordon Kong, Gabriel Tang and Ismail Konyi David Yauyau in Jonglei; Gatluak Gai in Unity State; and Peter Gadet in Unity and Upper Nile, among others.

41. See Matthew Arnold and Chris Alden, 'This Gun is our Food': Disarming the White Army Militias of South Sudan', *Conflict Security and Development*, Volume 7, Number 3, October 2007, pp. 361–85.
42. *Reuters*, 'Sudan's north, south militarise disputed Abyei: UN,' 31 March 2011. Available on, <http://www.sudan.net/completenews.php?nsid=865&cid=1>, accessed 2 January 2012.
43. Simon Boboya and Matthew Stein, 'South Sudan: Rebellion on all fronts', *The Independent Newspaper*, 26 March 2011. Available on, <http://independent.co.uk/News/regional-news/4029-attacked-on-all-fronts>, accessed 10 February 2012.
44. See International Crisis Group, *Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead*, 31 March 2006, pp. 7–10.
45. 'Sudanese president makes an 'Oil for Unity' offer,' *Sudan Tribune*, 17 December 2010, <http://www.sudantribune.com/Sudanese-president-makes-an-Oil>, 37323, accessed 10 January 2012.
46. By comparison, 70 per cent of GoS oil income was spent on defence. John Brosche, 'CPA—New Sudan, Old Sudan or Two Sudans?', p. 239.
47. This was a conference held in the run up to elections with the purpose of negotiating a common position among political parties opposed to the NCP; this included the SPLM.
48. Salva Kiir, Speech to All Sudan Political Parties Conference, 26–29 September 2009.
49. Along with South Kordofan, Darfur did not have elections for security reasons; without leadership from the SPLM, the various other opposition parties all eventually folded to NCP pressure, many figures accepting deals.
50. Although he withdrew from the race shortly before the vote his name remained on the ballot as he pulled out after the deadline to officially withdraw; but he publicly announced his withdrawal. See The Carter Center Election Observation Mission in Sudan Presidential, Gubernatorial, and Legislative Elections, 'Preliminary Statement', 17 April 2010, on <http://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/sudan-041710.html>, accessed 12 January 2012.
51. Through the 2010 elections, SPLM holds the GoSS' presidency and vice-presidency, 88 per cent of ministerial posts, and 94 per cent of the legislature. International Crisis Group, *Politics and Transition in the New South Sudan*, Nairobi/Brussels, 4 April 2011. p. 7
52. The boycott did deprive the NCP of a chance to improve both its international reputation, tarnished by Bashir's indictment for war crimes in Darfur, as well as the political consensus of Northern parties, although it stopped short of the kind of united action that may have been possible. How the Islamists were playing things was important in this calculation. Under Turabi, they were moving to be in the king-making position which they held in the past when they contributed to Nimairi's collapse, to the entry of Sadiq al-Mahdi, and to bringing Bashir to power in a coup against al-Mahdi's elected government. Many in the NCP close to Bashir were concerned about how the Islamists of Turabi might sway and

shape the various opposition political groups in the North and the various other armed groups in Darfur and other areas. So they reinforced the decision by Kiir and the SPLM to engage in moves during the election that would solidify the NCP and Bashir, believing he was more likely to allow the referendum to go ahead and to recognise the separation of the South. It was common to hear from top SPLM officials that Bashir had gone further to deal with them and had not backed out of a deal the way al-Mahdi and the leaders of the other parties had done with the SPLM in the past, so there was more of a basis for them to trust Bashir than their potential partners in political opposition in the North. As a result, Kiir backed away from the SPLM-North and Yasir Arman, Abdel Aziz and Malik Agar, and essentially reinforced the NCP and Bashir.

53. See The Carter Centre 'Preliminary Statement', 17 April 2010.
54. Perhaps they believed this, but the SPLM would have won almost all the seats anyway, and those that could win as independents were, for the most part, all SPLM members that did not get nominated owing to internal seniority considerations and most likely would have just returned to the SPLM fold. So the real election was the nomination process inside the SPLM. The SPLM had little to worry about in the election, so it was odd that the party would manipulate anything; clearly, it was concerned about opposition and the potential for the SPLM to disintegrate around tribal or other political lines.
55. John Garang, speech at signing of CPA, Naivasha.
56. This specifically meant interim elections, but was also true more broadly: Salva Kiir, CPA 3rd Anniversary speech in Wau, 14 January 2008.
57. John Garang 'memo to all SPLA units explaining CPA,' 1 January 2005.
58. Andrew Natsios, 'Beyond Darfur,' p. 80.
59. Douglas H. Johnson, *Root Causes*, p. 179.
60. Bashir officially endorsed the referendum results on 7 February 2011, stating: 'We declare our acceptance of the southern Sudan people's choice and we pledge to work for resolving the outstanding issues and build constructive relations between north and south Sudan.' See 'President Bashir officially endorses South Sudan independence,' *Sudan Tribune*, 7 February 2011, <http://www.sudantribune.com/South-Sudan-officially-voted,37905>, accessed 11 January 2012.
61. Emeric Rogier, 'Designing and Integrated Strategy for Peace, Security and Development,' p. 62.
62. 'Sudan faces "historic crossroads",' *BBC News*, 28 September 2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8278130.stm>, accessed 11 January 2012.
63. Natsios advocated this policy in 2008, and its general application has arguably been the defining theme of US policy since then. For an account of this see Natsios, 'Beyond Darfur'.
64. John Predergast and Thomas-Jensen, p. 72, 'Khartoum will probably return to war rather than allow the referendum to occur and risk losing access to 80 per cent of its oil resources.' Jan Pronk, the UNRSG commented in February 2006, 'I am convinced that separation would lead to war.' Weblog no. 12, Jan Pronk,

- 12 February 2006, <http://www.janpronk.nl/weblog/english/february-2006.html#b158>, accessed 8 January 2011.
65. International Crisis Group, *Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement*, p. 2.
 66. Confidential Iquote Alex DeWaal on this—also interviews with former AES staff, December 2011, Juba.
 67. Timothy Carney, 'Some Assembly Required: Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement,' US Institute of Peace: Special Report 194, November 2007, p. 9.
 68. Anita Haslie and Axel Borchgrevink, 'International Engagement in Sudan after the CPA: Report on the piloting of OECD/DAC's "Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States" for the Case of Sudan,' Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Occasional Paper 714, January 2007, p. 32.
 69. See UNMIS, 'CPA Monitor' series of documents covering the progress on the implementation of the protocols of the CPA. <http://unmis.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=2213>, accessed 2 January 2012.
 70. International Crisis Group, *Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement*, p. 9.
 71. See The Carter Center, 'Preliminary Statement', 17 April 2010.
 72. 'US says Sudan elections "not fair and free", shifts focus to 2011 referendum,' *Sudan Tribune*, 19 April 2010, on <http://www.sudantribune.com/US-says-Sudan-elections-not-fair,34817>, accessed 6 January 2012.
 73. Andrew Natsios, 'Beyond Darfur,' p. 78.
 74. The LRA has long been a focus of US and regional concern. Many forget how central it was to the war effort against the SPLM/A as it was for a long time based in Juba and managed and supported by the security services and army from Khartoum. The LRA has also greatly affected politics in Uganda, a major US ally and has been a key pretext for US military and other aid to Uganda. Thus it is not surprising that there would be a particular focus on the issue of the LRA and violence in Northern Uganda. However, it was the agenda driven by new campaigners in the US, particularly groups such as Invisible Children and the less radical Resolve, that drove the campaign that resulted in the historic actions by the Obama government and the US Congress to put into law a package to assist victims of the LRA and, more provocatively, reinforce in law the military assistance already underway to the UPDF against the LRA, which was by that time operating in the DRC, the CAR and South Sudan. Dyncorp has been contracted by the US government to provide logistics support and the US military and intelligence services are supporting with technical and informational advisers. (This is based on research conducted assessing the counter LRA operation by the author during 2008–10.)
 75. Accordingly, Kiir defended the SPLM action as required 'to draw attention to serious aspects of implementation of the CPA that could not afford to be ignored any further.' Salva Kiir, Speech at the CPA 3rd Anniversary celebrations in Wau, January 2008.
 76. Essential to this was the UN agency UNIRED. Moreover, donor countries contributed significant amounts; for instance, the US provided over USD 60

million for the referendum. See: Alan Boswell, 'How Southern Sudan's 'ticking time bomb' was defused,' *Miami Herald*, 27 February 2011.

77. Kiir, Opening Statement speech, SPLM 2nd National Convention.

5. DEFINING THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN

1. GoSS, 'South Sudan Vision 2040: Towards Freedom, Equality, Justice, Peace and Prosperity for all,' Introduction, 15 January 2010. Unpublished official document.
2. John Garang, Speech at CPA signing, 9 January 2005, Naivasha.
3. International Crisis Group, *Politics and Transition*, p. 13.
4. Emeric Rogier, 'Designing and Integrated Strategy,' p. 8.
5. Kiir, 14 January 2008, CPA 3rd Anniversary speech in Wau.
6. Ibid.
7. Confidential interview, SPLA officer, Juba, March 2011.
8. Julius N. Uma, 'Constitutional Review: S. Sudan civil society activists decry lack of participation,' *Sudan Times*, 26 April 2011, <http://www.sudantribune.com/Constitutional-review-S-Sudan>, 38688
9. Based on interviews with various government figures and the general conversations in the press and public in Juba at the time.
10. Jeremy Clarke, 'South Sudan to adopt new constitution, claims Abyei,' Reuters, 27 April 2011.
11. In 1991 before the Nasir coup, Kiir was taking care of internal security issues for Garang among other military command duties. It is rumoured that he alerted Garang to the threat and the growing conspiracy lead by Machar, Lam Akol and Gordon Kong. Garang refused to act and as described in earlier chapters, communal violence due to the various SPLA factions fighting each other ensued. It is no surprise, then, that Kiir responded with frustration and anger to Machar proposed amendments to the structure of the presidency.
12. SPLM, 'Minutes of Historical SPLM Meeting in Rumbek 2004,' *Sudan Tribune*, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?page=imprimable&id_article=26320,
13. Deng, 'The Sudan: Stop the Carnage,' p. 11.
14. 'Japan Tobacco Agrees to pay 450 Million for Sudan's Hagar, shares climb,' *Bloomberg*, on <http://gmsudan.com/20110802/japan-tobacco-agrees-to-pay-450-million-for-sudan's-hagar-shares-climb>, accessed 8, July 2011.
15. Matthew LeRiche, 'Raiding Season: the Evolution of Cattle Raiding and Politics in South Sudan,' forthcoming, June 2012.
16. Confidential interviews, SPLA senior officers, Juba, June 2011.
17. 'New rebel group calls to overthrow South Sudan Government,' *Sudan Tribune*, 14 April 2011 <http://www.sudantribune.com/New-rebel-group-calls-to-overthr>'ow, 38566
18. Interviews with Bol Gatkouth, former SSLA MP from Nasir and spokesman for the breakaway Nuer faction the South Sudan Liberation Movement, Khar-toum, November 2011. This was later reported widely in the press.

19. Richard Rands, 'In Need of Transformation: The SPLA' *Small Arms Survey*, Human Security Baseline Assessment, Geneva Institute of International Affairs, October, 2011.
20. Public critiques of DDR have been strong but private critiques are much stronger. The tame criticisms presented in the more widely read *Small Arms Survey* papers on DDR reflect the fact that the failure of the DDR programme to date has been recognised by many and a new way forward was being devised at the time of South Sudan's independence. See *Small Arms Survey*, 'Failures and Opportunities: Rethinkign DDR in South Sudan,' *Small Arms Survey*, Issue Brief 17, Human Security and Baseline Assessment, Geneva Institute of International Affairs, May 2011. Also see Ryan Nichols, 'DDR in Sudan: Too Little, Too Late?' *Small Arms Survey*, Sudan Working Paper 24, Geneva Institute of International Affairs, February 2011.
21. The SPLA budget request for 2011 is approximately 2.3bn SDP. Source, Interview Ministry of Finance International Adviser, March 2011, Juba.
22. Neither 'Joint' nor 'Integrated': The Joint Integrated Units and the Future of the CPA,' *Small Arms Survey*, Human Security Baseline Assessment, Geneva.
23. SPLA JIU personnel, discussions with author, Nasir, South Sudan, 7 August 2010.
24. Basic economic and social development details are available at http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_report_124.pdf.
25. Julius N. Uma, 'South Sudan plans to form own agricultural bank,' *Sudan Tribune*, 10 March 2011 <http://www.sudantribune.com/South-Sudan-plans-to-form-own>, 38247, accessed 20 January 2012.
26. See UNDP, 'Achieving the MDGs and Reducing Human Poverty,' available on http://www.sd.undp.org/focus_poverty_reduction.htm, accessed 10 February 2012.
27. 'South Sudan formally applies for IMF membership,' *Sudan Tribune*, 21 April 2011 <http://www.sudantribune.com/South-Sudan-formally-applies-for>, 38647
28. Evans Wafula, 'S. Sudan: 2.7m people on brink of starvation,' *Africa News*, 26 April 2011, http://www.africanews.com/site/S_SUDAN_27m_people_on_the_brink_of_starvation/list_messages/38293, accessed 10 January 2012.
29. Particularly the GoSS Vision 2040, the Budget Sector Plans, the GoSS Budget, the Southern Sudan Growth Strategy and the Southern Sudan Security Strategy. The latter was never circulated as a public document and was accessible only to a closed number of upper level leaders.
30. Confidential interview, Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) Ministry of Investment official, Juba, July 2011.
31. South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP), section on 'Macroeconomic Management Challenges'.
32. SSDP, Section 5 of Chapter 2.
33. Some of the advisers came from the UNDP, others from the Overseas Development Institute, others from the US Department of State/USAID, some

- from private firms such as Deloitte and Touche, and all were paid for by donor governments.
34. Ministry of Finance, Government of Southern Sudan, 'Working Draft of SSDP for Discussion with Other Ministries and International Partners,' 28 February 2011.
 35. Ibid., p. 12.
 36. Government of Southern Sudan, Statistics Bureau, *2008 Household Survey*, p. 3.
 37. 'Macroeconomic and Public Finance Brief 2011,' Joint Donor Team, Juba.
 38. Interview with African Development Bank Economist John Okello, confirmed and supported with interviews with economist from Joint Donor Team Juba, a World Bank economist researching South Sudan, and international advisers to the Ministry of Finance. The Joint Donor Team based in Juba presented alarm about the GoSS budget early on during the CPA period and little has changed in their assessment since, and only with the South Sudan Development Plan is any expression of intent and strategy to change the seriously risky economic and budgetary situation in which the government of South Sudan finds itself.
 39. The Millennium Development Goals are eight key indicators or socio-economic goals determined by the World Bank, the UN as a whole and the wider international community, as benchmarks to strive for to bring the underdeveloped world towards a better, essentially minimum acceptable standard of living. They are: 1) Ending Poverty and Hunger; 2) Universal Education; 3) Gender Equality; 4) Child Health; 5) Maternal Health; 6) Combating HIV/AIDS; 7) Environmental Sustainability; 8) Global Partnership. Though some of these goals are vague there are quite narrow targets and definitions provided for by the UN, accessible at <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mdg/Default.aspx>
 40. Ministry of Finance, Government of Southern Sudan, *Working Draft of SSDP for Discussion with Other Ministries and International Partners*, 28 February 2011, section 2.3.2, p. 36. The assessment represented in the Government of South Sudan documentation was determined by the Ministry of Finance with the assistance of the UNDP. For the list of indicators see: <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mdg/Host.aspx?Content=Indicators/OfficialList.htm>
 41. Recalling that Garang's doctoral dissertation focused on agricultural development in Jonglei and taking into consideration the development of the Jonglei Canal project.
 42. Paul Collier, *The Bottom Billion*, Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 17–75. Here Collier sets out the various 'traps' to development and poverty reduction all of which seem to fit an independent South Sudan.
 43. Jeffery Sachs, *The End of Poverty*, New York: Penguin, 2006. There is a vast literature on Poverty and Development 'traps'; these are just the two more popular authors.
 44. Interview with economists at the Joint Donor Team office, Juba, March 2011.
 45. Kiir challenged those with substantial personal holdings to return this wealth to South Sudan publicly. Rather than directly shaming or targeting he gave certain

people, corrupt or otherwise, the chance to save face and return wealth to South Sudan from their foreign held accounts.

46. See 'Context' section of introduction of, Ministry of Finance, Government of Southern Sudan, 'Working Draft of SSDP for discussion with other Ministries and international partners,' 28 February 2011, p. 2.
47. 'South Sudan formally applies for IMF membership,' *Sudan Tribune*, 20 April 2011.
48. Kiir, speech to All Sudan Political Parties Conference, 26–29 September 2009.
49. Government of South Sudan, Food Security Technical Secretariat, 'South Sudan Food Security Update, May–June 2011,' 26 July 2011, p. 1.
50. Although inflation data outside Juba are not available a rough estimate indicates the percentage difference described in the text, based on comparing various key goods such as fuel, potatoes, sorghum, sugar, bottled water and beans/lentils. This was considered during the month of July 2011, based on research conducted by engaging those operating similar small hotels in each of the towns of Juba, Malakal and Wau: specifically, in Wau River Lodge and Acacia Village in Juba, both owned and run by the same company and staff, and in Malakal the residential compound run by the WFP and the South Sudan Hotel. Source of inflation data for Juba was the UNDP in Juba, and interviews with economists at the Joint Donor Office in June 2010. Confirmed by interviews with the Ministry of Finance, June 2011.
51. Jacob Goldstein, 'The world's newest currency,' NPR, 13 July 2011, on <http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2011/07/13/137815430/the-worlds-newest-currency>, accessed 10 January 2012.
52. 'Sudan New 2-pound Note Reported,' Banknote News, <http://www.banknote-news.com/files/tag-sudan.php>, accessed 2 January 2012.
53. Ibid.; 'South Sudan's New Currency Launched Amidst Concerns over Omission of Date,' *Sudan Tribune*, 19 July 2011, <http://www.sudantribune.com/South-Sudan-s-new-currency,39565>
54. 'South Sudan accuses Khartoum of 'economic war,' Voice of America, 25 July 2011, <http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/South-Sudan-Accuses-Khartoum-of-Economic-War-126119029.html>, accessed 20 January 2012.
55. 'Upper Nile: soaring prices scare locals in Malakal,' *Sudan Tribune*, 27 July 2011, <http://www.sudantribune.com/Upper-Nile-Soaring-prices-scare,39646>, accessed 10 January 2012.
56. The severe drought in the region beginning the end of 2010 has resulted in increased cattle raiding opportunities as well as impacting prices throughout East Africa. Political unrest in North Africa has also contributed to increased prices, and rising oil prices elsewhere have further reinforced inflation issues in both Sudans.
57. Ivory extracted from Southern areas and shipped north along with slavery was core to the Sudanese economy for many years. This kind of deeply exploitative trading has been the essence of the Sudanese economy and the core of much of

- the civil conflict since independence. Sudan.Net, 'Japan Tobacco Agrees to Pay \$450 Million for Sudan's Hagar, Shares Climb,' Bloomberg and GMS Sudan. Net, 1 August 2011. Accessed on <http://gmsudan.com/20110802/japan-tobacco-agrees-to-pay-450-million-for-sudan's-hagar-shares-climb/>
58. Garang speech at CPA signing, 9 January 2005, Naivasha.
 59. SSDP, section 2.4.5.2.
 60. 'South Sudan Independence—Background: Sudan's Oil Industry,' Al Jazeera, 2 July 2011, <http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/spotlight/southsudanindependence/2011/07/20117216441419555.html>, accessed 15 July 2011.
 61. 'Sudan confirms holding oil shipment over unpaid fees,' *Sudan Tribune*, 6 August 2011, <http://www.sudantribune.com/Sudan-confirms-holding-oil,39758>; 'Sudan reportedly blocks South's oil shipment,' *Sudan Tribune*, 5 August 2011, <http://www.sudantribune.com/Sudan-reportedly-blocks-South-s,39747>, accessed 20 January 2012.
 62. Mike Lewis, 'Skirting the Law: Sudan's Post-CPA Arms Flows,' *Small Arms Survey*, Working Paper, 18 September 2009.
 63. 'South Sudan expects new oil finds to boost its economy,' *Sudan Tribune*, 14 January 2011, <http://www.sudantribune.com/South-Sudan-expects-new-oil-finds,37613>, accessed 13 January 2012.
 64. 'North and South Sudan seek accord on oil pipelines and Abyei,' *Sudan Tribune*, 11 February 2011, <http://www.sudantribune.com/North-and-South-Sudan-seek-accord,37957>, accessed 12 January 2012.
 65. 'South Sudan expects new oil finds to boost its economy,' *Sudan Tribune*, 13 January 2011, <http://www.sudantribune.com/South-Sudan-expects-new-oil-finds,37613>, accessed 20 January 2012.
 66. Tullow Oil, 'Letter: Tullow Oil, we are working well with the Ugandan Government,' *The East African*, 20 August 2011, on <http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/OpEd/letters/Tullow+Oil++We+are+working+well+with+the+Uganda+govt/-/434756/1222386/-/6sehxe/-/>, accessed 30 August 2011.
 67. Michael Rodgers, 'Sudan: Projected Oil Production and Revenues, August 2002' PFC Strategic Studies, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/0208_SudanPFC-Sum.pdf, accessed 20 August 2011.
 68. ICG, *Politics and Transition*, p. 21.
 69. There are high levels of corruption; one coalition of NGOs estimated that the Greater Nile Petroleum Corporation, a Southern Sudanese company with strong connections to the regional government, lost \$250,000 per week to corruption. See Julius N. Uma, 'Oil negotiations should tackle environmental concerns—group,' *Sudan Tribune*, 1 March 2011, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201103010987.html>, accessed 12 January 2012.
 70. ICG, *Politics and Transition*, p. 20.
 71. Michael Rodgers, 'Sudan: Projected Oil Production and Revenues, August 2002'.
 72. <http://www.theleader.co.za/wp/index.php/2011/07/republic-of-southern-sudan/>

73. SPLA, Directorate of Military Production. 'Report on gold mining potential', Juba, Southern Sudan, 2008.
74. John Ryle (ed.), *The Sudan Handbook*, London: James Currey, 2011.
75. Ibid., p. 21.
76. Ibid.
77. 'Where We Work: South Sudan,' FarmAfrica, <http://www.farmafrica.org.uk/where-we-work/southern-sudan>, accessed 15 November 2011.
78. Julius N. Uma, 'USAID and Netherlands boost S. Sudan's private sector,' *Sudan Tribune*, 7 May 2011, <http://www.sudantribune.com/USAID-and-Netherlands-boost-S,38802m>, accessed 20 January 2012.
79. FAO/WFP, 'Special Report: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to South Sudan,' 8 February 2012.

6. THE PARAMETERS OF SOUTH SUDAN'S FOREIGN POLICY

1. The recent war (1998–2000) between Eritrea and Ethiopia echoed historic fears across Africa, even as it shaded the scepticism within the Horn of Africa. The violence had been devastating despite the fact their 1993 split had been sanctioned through an Eritrean referendum and was internationally legitimised. The US, for example, long pushed for Southern autonomy or a federalised system with religious and cultural protections. John Danforth, its Special Envoy during the Machakos period and later, when mechanisms were set up that led to the CPA, at the time argued that the US sought Southern autonomy with religious and cultural protections but not outright independence.
2. Khartoum historically encouraged these fears, describing the war in the South as 'tribal' rather civil, and later arguing that the CPA's flawed implementation resulted from Juba's immaturity and general dysfunction. More controversially, within the South itself, there was a hesitant voice within the political discourse concluding that South Sudan simply was not up to independence. Egyptian leaders were often the strongest proponents of this argument. In a 2003 article, Mubarak is quoted saying, 'The South is only a strong entity when joined to the north as one state.' See: 'Southern Sudan would collapse if granted independence from North: Mubarak,' *Sudan Tribune*, 26 July 2003, <http://www.sudantribune.com/Southern-Sudan-would-collapse-if,055>, accessed 12 January 2011.
3. Dan Morrison 'The Twilight of the Nuba,' *Foreign Policy Online*, 23 June 2010, at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/23/twilight_of_the_nuba?hidecomments=yes, accessed 12 January 2012.
4. A consideration of the major press stories at the time indicates this *de facto* state of war despite the fact that all parties, including the UN and Western capitals, are avoiding calling it a war; it thus remains a 'conflict'. See AFP, 'Sudan Border conflict a 'war situation': SPLA,' 9 December 2011. Simon Martelli, 'Sudan lodges Juba 'border war' protest at UN', AFP, 5 November 2011, available on <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5j3f9XU-ifWV13fLL1AZnu4vzf->

- tdQ, accessed 12 February 2012. Also, BBC News Africa, 'US Envoy Princeton Lyman warns of Sudan Border Conflict', 7 September 2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14830218>, accessed 12 February 2012.
5. Only in 2011 has the crime of 'aggression' been defined after the Review Conference of the Rome Statute in Kampala. Aggression is the crime the UN and much of the post-World War Two international legal regime was meant to prevent. It is a major, if not the primary crime in international law according to the UN. While the situation along the border between the two Sudans develops it looks more and more like a case of aggressive war.
 6. Maram Mazen, 'Sudan to Recognize Independent South After Talks Suspension,' Bloomberg, 14 March 2011, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-13/sudan-to-recognize-independent-south-after-talks-suspension-1-.html>, accessed 10 January 2012.
 7. 'North Sudan Offers to Bear the Country's External Debt in Return of Joining Relief Initiative,' *Sudan Tribune*, 18 April 2011, <http://www.sudantribune.com/North-Sudan-offers-to-bear-the-38610>, accessed 12 January 2012.
 8. Nima Elbagir, 'Southern Sudan to review oil contracts, minister says,' CNN, 3 July 2011, <http://edition.cnn.com/2011/BUSINESS/07/03/south.sudan.oil/>, accessed 12 January 2012.
 9. Kiir, CPA 3rd Anniversary speech in Wau, 14 January 2008.
 10. Reuters, 'Sudan plans oil audit to refute transparency fears,' Reuters online, 14 March 2011, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/14/sudan-oil-idUSHEA43784320110314>, accessed 05 February 2012.
 11. This list is according to Douglas Johnson, 'When Boundaries Become Borders: The Impact of boundary-making in Southern Sudan's frontier zones' The Rift Valley Institute, London, 2010, p. 28.
 12. Francis Deng, *A Man Called Deng Majok: a biography of power, polygyny, and change*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986).
 13. Satellite Sentinel Project in an initiative of several celebrities supported by a small number of technical experts. There is some controversy regarding the project as it is led by celebrities and has in some cases been accused of diverting technical resources from the UN as the celebrity directors of the project were able to afford and to leverage influence to gain satellite imagery in lieu of UNOSAT, which is meant to provide satellite imagery to UNMIS. See <http://www.satsentinel.org/>
 14. Edith M. Leaderer, 'US says Sudan move into Abyei was premeditated,' The Associated Press, 26 May 2011.
 15. 'South Sudan: Salva Kiir Says No to War with North,' *BBC World News*, 26 May 2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-13560829>, accessed on 12 January 2012.
 16. For a comprehensive review of the issue, see: Joshua Craze, 'Creating Facts on the Ground: Conflict dynamics in Abyei,' Working Paper 26, *Small Arms Survey*, Geneva, June 2011.
 17. Nicky Woolf and Joshua Craze, 'Sudan's Proxy War May Escalate,' *The Guardian*,

- 8 April 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/apr/08/sudan-proxy-war-escalate>
18. 'Sudan's Peace Negotiator Calls for Creation of Independent State in Abyei,' *Sudan Tribune*, 26 May 2011, <http://www.sudantribune.com/Sudan-s-peace-negotiator-calls-for,39015>
 19. SPLM's northern sector calls for continuation of economic sanctions on Khartoum, 26 March 2011, *Sudan Tribune*, <http://www.sudantribune.com/SPLM-s-northern-sector-calls-for,38404>
 20. Eric Reeves, 'Carter Centre Fails to Consider Key Issues in South Kordofan Gubernatorial Election' on <http://www.southsudannewsagency.com/opinion/analyses/carter-center-fails-to-consider-key-issues-in-the-south-kordofan-gubernatorial-election>, accessed 13 January 2012.
 21. The situation was complex. Some had been included in the JIUs while others had cantoned along the North-South border as part of the CPA's provisions for SAF and SPLA forces to redeploy to their respective sides of the border. Many had dispersed within their home areas and kept their weaponry.
 22. Jeffrey Gettleman and Josh Kron, 'Sudan Threatens to Occupy 2 More Disputed Regions' *New York Times*, 29 May 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/30/world/africa/30sudan.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all
 23. Alex DeWaal, 'Averting Genocide in the Nuba Mountains, Sudan,' published 22 December 2006, available on SSRIC web site 'How Genocides End', on http://howgenocidesend.ssrc.org/de_Waal2/, accessed 12 January 2012. Also see, African Rights, 'Facing Genocide: The Nuba Mountains' African Rights, London, July 1995. Also see, 'Millard Bur, Quantifying Genocide in Southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains 1983–1998', U.S. Committee for Refugees, http://www.occasionalwitness.com/content/documents/Working_DocumentII.htm, accessed 13 January 2012.
 24. Yusef Kuwo was the senior commander for the SPLA in the Nuba Mountains area during the war and Abdel Aziz was for a period of that his deputy.
 25. Controversially, as the fighting was entrenching itself across Southern Kordofan, SPLM-North was negotiating with the NCP in Addis Ababa in mid-June 2011 to de-escalate the violence. However, at the time of independence SPLM-North leader Malik Agar had just signed the deal regarding the situation in Nuba Mountains, to the dismay of Aziz and the SPLM-North from that region. At the time Agar, unlike Aziz, was in a position to continue talking, if for nothing more than a strategy of delay, since he was not being surrounded by SAF as was the case with Aziz in Nuba Mountains; though SAF turned their attention to Blue Nile and Agar's forces shortly thereafter. The terms of the deal signed by Agar (under the auspices of his position as head of SPLM-North) and the NCP government in Addis in July 2011 covering the situation in Nuba Mountains stipulated the disarmament and integration of any armed fighters in the Nuba Mountains into SAF. Strikingly similar to the terms of the failed Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972, the requirement of integration, with no detail on terms,

- renders the agreement of little weight for the fighters in the Nuba Mountains, not to mention the fact that Aziz and other top Nuba leaders were not involved in the negotiation or drafting process in a serious way. At independence Aziz and the Nuba fighters were continuing their campaign and were not willing to adhere to the terms of the agreement signed by SPLM-North.
26. Magdi El-Gizouli, 'Kurmuk: The Limits of Liberation' *Sudan Tribune*, 13 November 2011. On <http://www.sudantribune.com/Kurmuk-the-limits-of-liberation,40719> accessed 12 January 2012. There are also many news stories which track the announcement of Bashir that the army would take Kurmuk from Agar and his SPLM/A-North forces: Sudan Vision, 'SAF Vows to Free Kurmuk, Expel Rebels', 2 November 2011, available on, <http://www.sudan.net/complete-news.php?nsid=2038&cid=1>, accessed 10 February 2012. Also see video produced by the government in Khartoum of the capture of Kurmuk, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DA4n4iNXU28o>, accessed 10 February 2012.
 27. Confidential Interview with senior SPLA Officer, Juba, South Sudan, July 2011.
 28. For example see, Richard Downie and Brian Kennedy, 'Sudan: Assessing Risks to Stability,' CSIS Africa Program, June 2011.
 29. 'IMF says North Sudan must undertake measures to avoid post-secession "shock"', *Sudan Tribune*, 19 April 2011, on <http://www.sudantribune.com/IMF-says-North-Sudan-must,38625>, accessed 12 January 2012.
 30. Ibid.
 31. 'Machar: building good relations with the North is South Sudan', *Sudan Tribune*, 27 January 2011, <http://www.sudantribune.com/Machar-building-good-relations,37784>, accessed 12 January 2012.
 32. Interviews with SPLM-North officers in Juba, South Sudan, December 2011 and January 2012. Also, interviews with senior SPLA officers, Juba South Sudan, December 2011.
 33. 'Sudan's Bashir affirms reservations on S. Kordofan accord' *Sudan Tribune*, 4 July 2011, <http://www.sudantribune.com/Sudan-s-Bashir-affirms,39428>, accessed 14 January 2012.
 34. 'SPLM's northern sector calls for continuation of economic sanctions on Khartoum,' *Sudan Tribune*, 26 March 2011, <http://www.sudantribune.com/SPLM-s-northern-sector-calls-for,38404>, accessed 13 January 2012.
 35. 'SPLM's northern sector accused of inciting U.S. to wage war on Sudan,' *Sudan Tribune*, 24 April 2011, <http://www.sudantribune.com/SPLM-s-northern-sector-accused-of,38684>, accessed 12 January 2012.
 36. 'Ninety-eight per cent of the people in North Sudan are Muslims... Islam is the official religion of the state, and the state will govern by sharia and this is the basis on which we are going to build a new state.' Source: 'Sudanese president asserts North Sudan's Arabic, Islamic identity,' *Sudan Tribune*, 5 February 2011, <http://www.sudantribune.com/Sudanese-president-asserts-North,37889>, accessed 14 January 2012. The World Christian Database in 2011 indicated in a study that 90.7 per cent of those in Northern Sudan were Muslims.
 37. 'SPLM-North warns against attempting to omit diversity from Sudan constitu-

- tion,' *Sudan Tribune*, 22 December 2010, <http://www.sudantribune.com/SPLM-North-warns-against,37378>, accessed 14 January 2012.
38. 'SPLM's northern sector calls for continuation of economic sanctions on Khartoum,' *Sudan Tribune*, 26 March 2011, <http://www.sudantribune.com/SPLM-s-northern-sector-calls-for,38404>, accessed 13 January 2012.
 39. Sudanese debt stood at between 35.7 and 36.8 billion USD at end of 2010, much of which came from old loans taken by the Nimairi regime over the 1960s and '70s, mostly from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. 'IMF says North Sudan must undertake measures to avoid post-secession "shock"', *Sudan Tribune*, 19 April 2011, <http://www.sudantribune.com/IMF-says-North-Sudan-must,38625>, accessed 10 February 2012.
 40. 'North Sudan offers to bear the country's external debt in return of joining relief initiative,' *Sudan Tribune*, 17 April 2011, <http://www.sudantribune.com/North-Sudan-offers-to-bear-the,38610>, accessed 12 January 2012.
 41. See the *Small Arms Survey* 'Facts and Figures, Southern Dissident Militias' on <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/facts-figures-armed-groups-southern-sudan-emerging.php>, accessed 12 January 2012.
 42. Ngor Arol Garang, 'Defection of General Peter Gadet is a "rumour"—South Sudan army,' *Sudan Tribune*, 27 March 2011, on, <http://www.sudantribune.com/Defection-of-General-Peter-Gadet,38409>, Accessed 12 January 2012.
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- to bombarding one of the key areas of SPLA/M support around Rumbek, and later other SPLA/M controlled areas; 'this was the first time a foreign country became actively engaged in the war in the South.' Mansour Khalid, *The Government They Deserve*, p. 352.
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7. THE MEANING OF LIBERATION IN SOUTH SUDAN

1. SPLM, 'Minutes of Historical SPLM Meeting in Rumbek 2004', 29 November 2004, Rumbek, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?page=imprimable&id_article=26320, accessed 15 January 2012.
2. Claire Metelits, 'Reformed Rebels? Democratization, Global Norms, and the Sudan People's Liberation Army,' *Africa Today*, Vol. 51:1, Autumn 2004, pp. 65–82, p. 79.
3. Jok Madut Jok and Sharon Elaine Hutchinson, 'Sudan's Prolonged Second Civil War and the Militarization of Nuer and Dinka Ethnic Identities,' *African Studies Review*, Vol. 42:2, September 1999, pp. 125–145, p. 137.
4. Most provocatively, seniority was determined to mean time accrued since returning for those that had defected at one time or another. Since most had only rejoined the SPLM in the run up to the CPA their seniority was thus much lower than they felt was appropriate. Due to the fact that most perceived even their time in league with Khartoum and fighting against the SPLA of Garang was still more broadly a part of the liberation struggle, many felt they should be accorded much more seniority in SPLM decisions on nominations for the election. This was further exacerbated since some individuals actually increased their seniority in the

deals they struck on returning, such as Riek Machar, while others failed to cut more advantageous deals. This sense of being slighted compelled many to defect once again or to back away for involvement in the politics and government of the new state.

5. Gadet was kept away from his supporters in his home area in Maniken/Mayom County as well as severed from his old SSDF forces that had been integrated and redeployed almost wholesale to the Shilluk areas on the west bank of the Nile in Upper Nile, where they made up the majority of the SPLA's 7th Division contingent there. Gadet would rebel later in 2011 after the referendum out of frustration directly related to these perceived affronts to status. Bringing many of his men back to his home areas compelled them to desert the 7th Division. Bringing their weapons and collecting recruits along the way they moved northward (with substantial SAF and NISS acquiescence and support), through northern areas and then down into the areas controlled by Gadet.
6. Claire Metelits, 'Reformed Rebels? ...' p. 77.
7. Garang, 1994 National Convention Opening Speech, p. 26.
8. Ibid.
9. Francis M. Deng, 'Africa's Dilemmas in the Sudan,' *The World Today*, March 1998, pp. 72–74, p. 74.
10. Dan Eiffe, 'Mr. Dan Eiffe Prepared Testimony' Hearings on Religious Persecution in Sudan, The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, 15 February 2000, <http://www.uscifr.gov/component/content/article/43-hearings-2000/912-hearings-on-religious-persecution-in-sudan-mr-dan-eiffe-prepared-testimony.html>, accessed 10 January 2012. In 1998 Dan Eiffe also gave testimony to several committees of the US Congress about the situation in Sudan. At the time he was running Norwegian People's Aid's programs in the region and was actively supporting the SPLM/A.
11. See International Crisis Group report, *Politics and Transition in the New South Sudan*, Nairobi/Brussels, 4 April 2011.
12. Ibid, p. 27. Though this disparity seems significant, compared to many Western democracies the disparity between aggregate vote percentage and assembly seats is actually quite narrow. Such disparity is a common feature of first-past-the-post Westminster style electoral systems. Furthermore there were an exceptionally high number of 'special lists' meant to bring some proportionality and force representation to typically underrepresented groups, such as women. What were essentially proportional seats thus afforded women and other groups representation, though they all tended to be SPLM.
13. Claire Metelits, 'Reformed Rebels...', p. 80.
14. Zach Vertin, quoted in Maggi Fick, 'Birth of a Nation: Can South Sudan limit internal strife?' *Christian Science Monitor*, 6 July 2011. Vertin was noted as commenting that as the Republic of South Sudan prepares to declare independence, internal ethnic and political divisions threaten the nation's long-term viability.
15. This was a major theme of the influential International Crisis Group as independence neared. ICG Report, 'Politics and Transition in the New South Sudan'.

16. Francis Deng, *A Nation in Turbulent Search of Itself*, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 603, January 2006, pp. 155–162, p. 161.
17. 'South Sudan officially recognises 191 years of struggle for freedom,' *Sudan Tribune*, 30 April 2011, <http://www.sudantribune.com/South-Sudan-officially-recognises>, 38743, accessed 10 January 2012.
18. Francis M. Deng, 'The Sudan: Stop the Carnage,' *The Brookings Review*, Vol. 12:1, Winter 1994, pp. 6–11, p. 8.
19. ICG Report, 'Politics and Transition in the New South Sudan', p. 4.
20. SSDF militias not wishing to participate in the 2006 Juba Declaration clearly stated that while they wouldn't join the SPLA, they would generally refrain from violence to allow the referendum to occur unhindered.
21. Matthew Arnold, 'The South Sudan Defence Force: patriots, collaborators or spoilers?' *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 45:4 (2007), pp. 489–516.
22. ICG Report, 'Politics and Transition in the New South Sudan', p. 1.
23. 'Their own worst enemies,' *The Economist*, 16 February 2011, http://www.economist.com/blogs/baobab/2011/02/violence_south_sudan, accessed 10 January 2011.
24. Lesch, 'Confrontation in the Southern Sudan,' p. 414.
25. Jok Madut Jok and Sharon Elaine Hutchinson, 'Sudan's Prolonged Second Civil War and the Militarization of Nuer and Dinka Ethnic Identities,' *African Studies Review*, Vol. 42:2, September 1999, pp. 125–145, p. 133.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 138.
27. Lesch, 'Confrontation in the Southern Sudan,' p. 416.
28. One of the SSDF commanders to defect was Abdel Bagi Ayiei Akol who had been made President Salva Kiir's advisor on 'border and tribal conflict resolution' not long after he was integrated in as part of the Juba Declaration deal in 2006.
29. 'Machar opposed to an all-out war against forces of George Athor,' *Sudan Tribune*, 6 March 2011, <http://www.sudantribune.com/Machar-opposes-to-all-out-war>, 38202, accessed 10 January 2011. Machar was not alone early on in resisting all out SPLA attack on Athor. Many in the SPLA hierarchy itself were willing to spend significant time negotiating and accommodating Athor as he was a close colleague and compatriot, not to mention the fact that he was largely viewed as a stalwart of the SPLM/A up to that point.
30. O' Collins, *The Southern Sudan in Historical Perspective*, p. 40
31. Garang, *The Call For Democracy in Sudan*, p. 52
32. Emeric Rogier, 'Designing and Integrated Strategy for Peace, Security and Development,' Clingendael, April 2005, p. 20.
33. A notable early example was when, on 16 August 1986, the SPLA shot down a civilian airliner taking off from Malakal with a SAM-7 missile, killing all 57 passengers on-board. The SPLA defended its action, noting that it had warned Khartoum it would shoot down all aircraft in the South, regardless of the presence of civilian passengers, on the ground that these flights were most likely to

- be also carrying weaponry for the government. See Peter K. Bechtold, 'More Turbulence in Sudan: A new Politics this Time?' *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 44, No. 4, Autumn, 1990. Also noted in, Africa Watch Committee, *Denying the honor of living: Sudan a human rights disaster*, New York: Human Rights Watch, 9 June 1997, p. 116.
34. CPA, Article 1.7, p. 17.
 35. John Garang, Speech at CPA signing, 9 January 2005, Naivasha.
 36. Salva Kiir, Opening Statement Speech, SPLM 2nd National Convention, 15–20 May, 2008, Juba, Southern Sudan.
 37. This was not just between Garang and the larger SSDF militias but also within and between communities. By example, the Wunlit Conference was encouraged by Salva Kiir whereas Garang did not support it, as he was consistently suspicious of decentralized action. See, Jok Madut Jok and Sharon Elaine Hutchinson 'Sudan's Prolonged Second Civil War and the Militarization of Nuer and Dinka Ethnic Identities,' *African Studies Review*, Vol. 42:2, September 1999, pp. 125–145, p. 142.
 38. Matthew Arnold, interviews with SSDF and SPLA commanders in Upper Nile and Jongle states in July and August 2006.
 39. Ibid.
 40. UNMIS, CPA Monitor Number 20, 'Annex: 13, The Government of South Sudan (GoSS)'. On <http://unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIS/CPA%20Monitor/Annexes/Annex%2013%20-%20Government%20of%20Southern%20Sudan.pdf>, accessed 12 January 2012.
 41. Gabriel Hillary, 'Interview with Major General Ayei Akol for SSDF,' *Sudan Vision Daily*, 3–5 October 2004, <http://www.gurtong.net/Forum/tabid/81/forum-mid/94/threadid/37572/scope/posts/Default.aspx>, accessed 20 January 2012.
 42. Jok Madut Jok and Sharon Elaine Hutchinson 'Sudan's Prolonged Second Civil War and the Militarization of Nuer and Dinka Ethnic Identities', *African Studies Review*, Vol. 42:2, September 1999, pp. 125–145, p. 140.
 43. Ruth Iyob and Gilbert M. Khadiagala, *Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace*, London: Lynne Rienner, 2006, p. 183.
 44. Mundari Consultative Council, 'Mundari Position Paper on the Conflict between the Mundari and Dinka Bor and Dinka Aliab', unpublished, January 2005.
 45. See the Government of Southern Sudan website, <http://www.goss-online.org/magnoliaPublic/en/Independant-Commissions-and-Chambers/Peace-Commission.html>, accessed 14 January 2012.
 46. The Republic of South Sudan, Transitional Constitution, Part 3, Chapter 1 sub-sec 35—'Political Objectives', p. 10.
 47. Mary Ajith, 'Lagu: North-South Reunion Possible,' *The Citizen*, Vol. 6:17, 19 January 2011, p. 3.

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