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Islam between Culture and Politics

Bassam Tibi

Islam between Culture and Politics

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Islam between Culture and Politics

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The Weatherhead Center for
International Affairs, Harvard University



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Preface

Islam is both a religious faith and a cultural system, but not a political ideology. The politicisation of Islam in the last decades of the past century has created an increasing interest in contributions capable of drawing a clear distinction between Islam as a religion, thus as a cultural system, and the political use of Islamic cultural symbols resulting in the rise of the new political ideology of Islamism. At issue is the distinction between Islam and political Islam, the latter being an Islamic variety of religious fundamentalism. The need to be informed about this highly significant distinction created a demand for my earlier book *Islam and the Cultural Accommodation of Social Change* published subsequently in 1990 and 1991, but out of print since 1994. In that book I analyse Islam as a cultural system and enquire into the constraints of its politicisation. In fact, political Islam is emerging out of a crisis situation; it is both a crisis of meaning and equally a political and socio-economic, that is, a structural crisis. This twofold crisis requires new approaches for explaining this phenomenon to create a better understanding of it.

During my Bosch Fellowship at Harvard in the years 1998–2000 I envisaged a radically revised edition of my book *Islam and the Cultural Accommodation of Social Change*, but soon realised that it would be better to write a completely new book. I acknowledge the use of the materials of that earlier book for writing the new one. In doing so I selected a few of the chapters of that book and engaged myself in a radical rewriting to fit them into the structure of this new book. Most of the chapters of *Islam between Culture and Politics* are, however, new ones. They focus on the oscillation in Islam between culture and politics.

The intention of this book is to provide conceptually based reflections on *Islam between Culture and Politics* that account for the most recent debate on the issues in question. Among other things, I take a closer look at the structures of our present world, in which Islam is embedded. At issue is a global system of Western design. In this system the structural networks cover the levels of socio-economics, transport, and communication, but not that of culture. In the main, I contend that there is a simultaneity of globalised political and socio-economic structures and of cultural fragmentation. I maintain that this simultaneity is the background for the politicisation of Islam. In

developing this argument, I raise the question of the patterns of interaction that dominate current intercultural structures of communication. I also enquire into the direction in which these structures could develop in the foreseeable future, in the pursuit of peace.

My earlier book *Islam and the Cultural Accommodation of Social Change* was described by a reviewer as a 'post-orientalist' contribution (*The American Anthropologist*, June 1992). My entire enquiry is pursued in the light of the drive of non-Western peoples to culturally dissociate themselves from most of the Western patterns prevailing in the present global system. I interpret this drive as an effort at a *de-Westernisation* of the world. To be sure, being 'post-orientalist' does not necessarily mean having to be anti-Western. I do not share the self-hating attitudes of some Westerners and thus clearly do not subscribe to any demonisation of the West by the champions of de-Westernisation, although I am a Muslim and a non-Westerner myself. A critique of Western hegemony need not amount to a wholesale rejection of the West and of its values. Moreover, my critique is not one-sided, for I am also highly critical of the Islamist attitude towards approving the adoption of modern instruments (for example, science and technology) while they contest any accommodation of cultural modernity, above all of its worldview and its values. It is this attitude for which I have coined the formula: the Islamic dream of semi-modernity. I myself approve of cultural modernity as described by my German academic teacher Jürgen Habermas and see no inconsistency in combining this commitment with a critique of Western hegemony. In my earlier German work *Der wahre Imam* (1996) on the history of ideas in Islam I revive medieval Islamic rationalism and show how consonant it is with modern rationalism.

Despite my acknowledgement of the seniority of Samuel Huntington and his laudable accomplishment in bringing cultural issues to the fore in our discipline of International Relations, I forward my own very different views and reject his bias regarding Islam. In my view, there exists an alternative to the 'Clash of Civilizations'. In focusing on Islam as a civilisation I underline the need for intercivilisational dialogue. In my understanding, dialogue is a variety of conflict resolution in the pursuit of world peace. Dialogue is not simply an unbinding exchange of views. Cross-cultural bridging and establishment of a consensus over international morality are essential in my understanding of dialogue. In my view, intercivilisational dialogue could serve in our time as an instrument of crisis management in that it may provide a means for interactive conflict resolution.

The structure of this new book pays increased attention to considering the context of our global age based on world time. I view Islam as a cultural system which, however, historically and traditionally has served as a political legitimisation. Based on my enquiry, I suggest that Islam is pending between adjustment to the ongoing change and resistance to the needed accommodation. The politicisation of this resistance leads to an oscillation in Islam between a culture of meaning on the one hand and a politics of revolt against the new global conditions, as well as against the related hegemonic structures designed by the West, on the other. These themes determine the focal point of my enquiry into the interplay between culture and politics in contemporary Islam.

Despite my professional identity as a scholar of International Relations, the basic framework of this enquiry into Islam is cultural analysis. In the present case, the anthropological concept of religion as a cultural system for the production of meaning understood in the Geertzian sense is at issue. From this perspective I grasp religion in most non-Western civilisations as the major source of cultural symbols. Under the present conditions in Islamic civilisation these symbols are used and abused for giving legitimisation to the pursuit of political ends. After doing this groundwork, I then enhance the horizon of my enquiry by conceptualising this subject-matter with the tools of the discipline of International Relations, that is, the community to which I belong. In short, I argue against established traditional wisdoms and present reasonable arguments for the inclusion of religion and culture into the study of International Relations.

The cultural patterns related to religion, as Clifford Geertz puts it in his *The Interpretation of Cultures*, give a kind of 'meaning, that is, objective conceptual form, to social and psychological reality both by shaping themselves to it and by shaping it to themselves'. In my enquiry into the interplay between social and cultural change I follow this Geertzian understanding, but develop it further in an effort to go beyond it. Thus, in the introduction to this book I clearly outline the limits of my adherence to Geertz and to the recourse to cultural anthropology. In short, I establish clarity about the limits of the anthropological study of Islam. The horizon of the anthropological approach needs to be broadened through consideration of the international dimension; in our global age cultural anthropology will remain wanting without these needed new outlooks. In other words, I draw on cultural analysis, but give it an injection of International Relations. This is a challenge, equally to anthropologists and scholars of

International Relations. The latter need to learn how to study culture, and anthropologists are to be introduced to international perspectives in our global age.

There is a further requirement for the analysis of this subject-matter. The interplay between culture and politics cannot be grasped adequately if one pattern of change, be it the political, the social or the cultural, is reduced to the other. This would be a reductionist trap. A deeper insight into the complexity of this interplay calls for wariness of all kinds of reductionism. Hence, aside from going beyond the confines of the cultural-anthropological study of Islam, this book represents an effort toward overcoming the old wisdoms of reductionist approaches. Both my Islamic background and my close exposure to Geertz – in the course of an earlier research fellowship at Princeton University back in the academic year 1986/87 – helped me to develop a better understanding of the locality of culture. In particular I learned from Geertz how to grasp the production of meaning within a local set-up. Later on, I shall nevertheless explain why I fail to follow Clifford Geertz in two major issue-areas. First, I do not share the overlooking of the global environment of culture inherent in the Geertzian analysis. Second, and importantly, I am against his cultural relativism. In fact, I vigorously oppose all schools of cultural relativism as my readers will clearly notice. Furthermore: Geertz has no grasp of ‘civilisation’. In contrast, the distinction between culture and civilisation is essential in the present analysis. Related local cultures, like the Islamic ones, group to form a civilisation. I am in favour of bridging between local cultures and respectively the regional civilisations to which they belong. This pursuit creates a need for cross-cultural outlooks to establish, for instance, a cultural underpinning for the universality of individual human rights and other values such as secular democracy. This is a prerequisite of democratic peace.

The enquiry pursued in this book is set up by asking the following two questions: How do Muslims perceive the ongoing rapid and often disruptive social change taking place in their societies termed as part of the ‘abode of Islam?’ Do they culturally accommodate this change? My ensuing reasoning takes into consideration the present structural conditions of Muslim societies unwillingly integrated into the prevailing global system. The politicisation of the cultural system of Islam under the conditions of world time is thus an expression of a revolt against the West, that is, against the imposed global-structural constraints and, of course, also against the value system related to them. In going beyond the specific dealing with Islam I refer to the social theory-

oriented debate on the interplay between social and cultural change to facilitate a thorough conceptualisation of the presented analysis.

The present book took shape and was completed at Harvard in the years 1998–2000. As acknowledged, it also reflects a further elaboration and expansion of my earlier work also completed at Harvard a decade ago, back in 1988–90. As earlier mentioned I have been reluctant to consider a reprint, or even a revised second edition of my ‘Cultural Accommodation’ study. I felt that further research was needed and therefore decided to write the present book. The window for this opportunity has been my most recent affiliation with Harvard’s Weatherhead Center for International Affairs/WCFIA as Robert Bosch Foundation Fellow (1998–2000). Despite my teaching at a German university, since 1982 Harvard has been the most valued scholarly retreat for me and my work and this book therefore, is in many ways a Harvard product. The research has also been sponsored, as documented in its publication in association with the WCFIA.

This book reflects an integral part of the two to three decades I have spent thinking and writing about a variety of cultures belonging to the Islamic civilisation. I am not among those scholars who make use of quantitative methods. I follow Hedley Bull, who has rightly argued that thinking is research. My book on *The Crisis of Modern Islam*, first published in German in 1981, was the start of this process. The background lies, of course, even further in the past. It goes back to the Islamic environment of my upbringing in Damascus. In that historical city in which the records of my family Banu al-Tibi date back to the thirteenth century I received my primary education which strongly affected and continues to affect my identity and my views. Thanks to my Western academic education, and in particular to the philosophical reasoning studied in the Frankfurt School of Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, I have acquired the detachment needed for pursuing a scholarly non-apologetic approach, as well as for related unbiased thoughts. Islamic orthodoxy and Islamists, who refuse to distinguish between rational knowledge and belief, despise this reasoning and reject it as heretical. Islamic *fiqh*-orthodoxy has a long-standing record of oppressing Islamic rationalism in the past as well as in the present. There are equally Muslims and Westerners who view intellectual detachment and the willingness to subject Islam to scrutiny as cultural treason. I professedly stand in the tradition of Enlightenment, and thus I am neither an absolutist nor a postmodernist. Thanks to a personal exposure to the great philosopher Ernst Bloch in 1965 (*Avicenna and the Aristotelian Left*, 1963) and then to the Harvard scholar Muhsin

Mahdi, who became a friend, I discovered the traditionally dismissed Islamic rationalism in medieval Islam and learned not only to value it, but also to revive its meaning and topicality for the present time. I believe a revival of Islamic Averroist rationalism is more promising to Muslims than the politicisation of Islam. These remarks are pertinent to the topic of this book.

The present book is my sixth monograph published in English. For many reasons I consider myself fortunate to be in this domain of publishing culture in the Anglo-Saxon world. The publication of the first US (St. Martin's Press) and British (Macmillan) edition of my successful book *Arab Nationalism* (three editions: 1980, 1990, 1997) was followed by *The Crisis of Modern Islam* (Utah University Press, 1988), as well as my Harvard book *Conflict and War in the Middle East: from Interstate War to New Security* (two editions, 1993, 1998, again with Macmillan and St. Martin's Press). My very first monograph directly written in English was: *The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder* (University of California Press, 1998). Since the publication of these books – in addition to numerous co-authored American books – I have been able to join a global academic community much different from the parochial German one. To be sure, I am not biased and appreciate the German *Buchkultur* (i.e. reading culture), which ranks higher in continental Europe than it does in the US. However, none of the German universities could compete in the publication of academic books with the leading American universities, simply because none of the German universities has a university press.

In the past two decades I have found a retreat at Harvard and elsewhere outside Germany while maintaining my basis on a nice small island, that is, my centre, within German academe. In saying this I do not mean to engage in transgressions. I am addressing a very important issue which strongly pertains to the topic of the present book when referring to my personal case as an example. In Chapter 9 I deal with Islamic migration to Europe and argue that the interplay of culture and politics is no longer an issue-area restricted to the Islamic civilisation itself. In my Global Village Lecture in Stockholm in April 1997 my topic was 'Islam and Europe, Islam in Europe'. The implication is that Islam with a growing community of more than 15 million Muslim migrants has increasingly become part of Europe. The *othering* of this Muslim segment of Europe's population would only contribute to the politicisation of Islam and to the rise of fundamentalism among the migrants in the European diaspora of Islam. I argue for integration as opposed to the building up of communitarian ghettos.

At the present time, and unlike earlier historical periods, Islam has not come to Europe through *jihad*-conquests (for example, the Arabs from the south-west in the eighth century and the Turks from the south-east in the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries), but rather through *hijra* (migration). I, myself, am one of these Muslim migrants. An integration of Muslim migrants would help us to become European citizens and to make a separation between Islam as part of one's cultural identity and Islamism as a claim for bringing about a divine political order. Eurocentric attitudes of exclusion paralleling related policies towards Muslims living in Europe like myself inadvertently contribute to 'othering' the migrants. As argued, the result would be to unwillingly support Islamic fundamentalists in their effort at forming ghettos and building up their logistics in European exile. In alienating the Muslim migrants in Europe, Europeans are increasing the appeal of Islamism and thus doing harm to Europe and to its civilisational identity itself. In stating this, I reach the conclusion that under the conditions of a global age and Islamic migration to Europe the pendulum in Islam between culture and politics becomes a matter of concern within European societies themselves. It is definitely an issue that also highly affects European security!

Acknowledgements

I would like to move to acknowledge the institutions that supported this project and made the writing of this book feasible. The project and its intellectual environment comprise three culturally different worlds. The scope of the project extends from Europe, in particular Germany, across the Middle East, the cultural hub of the so-called world of Islam, and finally to the United States, where I have been fortunate enough to establish most beneficial scholarly networks. Since the early 1980s I have been a commuting scholar whose life has embraced all of these three worlds. Harvard in particular has been my scholarly home since my first affiliation in 1982. For this reason I need at the very outset to acknowledge how grateful I am to Harvard's Weatherhead Center for International Affairs for providing me with the proper setup needed for the completion of the present work. The same sentiment of gratitude goes to The Bosch Foundation which established a research Fellowship at Harvard for me in the years 1998–2000. In the earlier years I received funding from other institutions, among which were the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Volkswagen and Rockefeller.

Many of my earlier research trips to the Middle East and the Maghreb, sub-Saharan Africa, as well as South and Southeast Asia were supported within the framework of joint public lectures organised by the Goethe Institute (known in almost all parts of the world as the German Cultural Institute). Although this institute is not involved in research, it is engaged in a most important but widely neglected field within the discipline of International Relations – that is, intercultural dialogue.

On a scholarly level I am grateful to the late Reinhard Bendix – both mentor and friend – for the constant inspiration I received from him in Berkeley. With Clifford Geertz I shared the enriching communication we had in Princeton in the course of my tenure there in 1986/87. I hope for Geertz's tolerance in that I sided with the late Ernest Gellner against his cultural relativism. The three of us were guests of the Erasmus Foundation in Amsterdam in May 1994, when the controversy between these two great scholars flared up. Two other scholars of Islam, who became my friends, had an impact on my understanding of Islam: Muhsin Mahdi of Harvard and Bernard Lewis of Princeton. It may come as a surprise to some that I express my gratitude to Samuel

Huntington who first in 1982 invited me to join Harvard. By then he was the director of Harvard's CFIA. Huntington's *Political Order in Changing Societies* made a deep impression on me. International Relations' scholars owe to him the introduction of culture into the study of international affairs. I agree with his placing of civilisations into world politics and also with parts of his analysis, but not his conclusions. I am grateful to Samuel Huntington for the debates that we had on these issues at Harvard's Academy of Area and International Studies in the project 'Conflict and Convergence' (1997). I had the honour to join this project -- as well as the Harvard seminar on 'Culture and Globalization' (1998/2000) -- on Huntington's invitation; he was running both.

At the German university of Göttingen, my research assistant Jost Esser has been a source of inspiration and invaluable assistance. I am particularly grateful to him, but also to Silke Fauzi for her great support. In the final stages of research and editing as well as proof-reading Torsten Michel, Vera Weidemann and Anja Zückmantel joined our team and were extremely helpful. Indeed, Jost Esser provided the major assistance and thus made a particular contribution. Being myself computer-illiterate my staff assistant Elisabeth Luft was my indispensable partner in writing this book. As a traditional scholar I write and think with my hands. Elisabeth Luft thankfully word-processed all of my writing.

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Introduction: Islam between Culture and Politics – the Scope and Implications

Islam is a world religion, and it also forms the basis of a world civilisation which was once very powerful. Due to its spread across the world Islamic civilisation is composed of a great variety of diverse local cultures. The combination of civilisational unity and cultural diversity is thus a hallmark of Islam. It is unfortunate that in our age Islam is mostly addressed in political terms. The risk involved is to confuse Islam with political Islam. In the name of religious tolerance some scholars, like Voll and Esposito, justify Islamism, while others perceive Islam as a ‘threat’. In this book, I argue that Islam is a cultural system, however it is prone to politicisation. This is happening at the present time and the result of this process is the ideology of Islamism. In my view the politicisation of Islam takes place to the detriment of this religion and of its people. It is not Islam, but its politicisation that results in creating ‘faultlines’ between the people of Islam and those of other civilisations.

The issues: what is political Islam?

The term political Islam is a language variant preferred by some for depicting Islamic fundamentalism.¹ Islam and Islamism, however, are two different issues, as this book suggests. Historically, it is true, Islam as a religion has also addressed political issues since the years of its foundation. The creation of the ‘Islamicate’ as *pax islamica*² in Arabia and far beyond paralleled the creation of the Islamic *umma* being at first the association of Arab tribes. There also existed the caliphate³ being the political order of the Islamicate after the death of The Prophet Muhammed. Nevertheless, this historical background is in many ways different from the modern claim for an ‘Islamic state’ and a

corresponding *shari'a* (Islamic legal system) -bound Islamic government.

The notion of *dawla Islamiyya* (Islamic state), as presented by contemporary fundamentalists, is based on the belief that the *nizam Islami* (Islamic system) lies at the heart of Islam. In fact, this is the substance of political Islam, not the religion of Islam itself. The reader of the Koran will fail to find these neo-Arabic terms in the text of Islamic revelation or in any classical Islamic source. Nor will the reader find the traditional system of the caliphate in the Koran or the *hadith* (collection of the tradition of The Prophet Muhammed). The notion of an Islamic system is an 'invention of tradition' pursued by the adherents of Islamism in contemporary Islam as much as the caliphate was an arbitrary addition to Islam⁴ in its classical period.

Basically, political Islam⁵ is an ideology, but it stands in the context of the oscillation in Islam between culture and politics, and it is related to the politicisation of Islamic cultural concepts and symbols. The addressed oscillation or the pendulum in Islam between culture and politics is the subject-matter of this book. The use of cultural discourse for political ends is among the salient features of Islamism. It draws on defensive-cultural attitudes in pursuit of self-assertion. It follows that the politicisation of Islam is not merely an expression of a political phenomenon. It is also an expression of a *defensive culture*. By this notion I mean, as developed in my book *The Crisis of Modern Islam*, a cultural self-assertion *vis-à-vis* the intrusion of the West into the abode of Islam.⁶

In short, this book departs from looking at Islam as a cultural system to move then to dealing with the politicisation of religion in a situation of crisis resulting in the design of political Islam. Being a Muslim myself, my belief in Islam is spiritually based on the oneness (*tawhid*) of God and on a commitment to the ethics of *al-amr bi al-maruf wa al-nahi an al-munkar* (enjoining the good and prohibiting the evil), but not on an adherence to some political ideology or personal rule. The pendulum in Islam between culture and politics is a worldly, not a religious issue. On the one hand, the contemporary politicisation of Islam is a response to the ongoing crisis of the modern secular nation-state⁷ in the world of Islam, and on the other it is an expression of a defensive culture.

In modern times, Arab and Turkish nationalists were the Muslim precursors for the separation between religious authority and state power in adopting the European institution of the secular nation-state and in applying it to the *dar al-Islam* (house of Islam). In the second half of

the twentieth century, the nation-state failed to handle the pending tasks of development and also to deliver the goods it had promised upon its formation. The result has been the rise of political Islam which promises an alternative to the secular institution of the nation-state.

As much as some people confuse the religion of Islam and the ideology of Islamism, others confuse terrorism and Islamism. The decline of Islamic terrorism leads then to the wrong conclusion of diminishing Islamism. In contrast, the call for an 'Islamic state' lies at the heart of political Islam. This alternative order is the *hall Islami* (Islamic solution)⁸ for the ongoing crisis; it continues to be the substance of Islamism. Nevertheless, political Islam does not cease to be an expression of an equally cultural phenomenon in that it is a response to a twofold challenge coming from the West. Political Islam is a response to cultural modernity⁹ as much as it is a response to the realities of Western hegemony. Political Islam is a multifaceted 'Revolt against the West'.¹⁰ Islamists reverse the challenge in rhetorically claiming Islamic superiority. The challenge to Islam switches into a challenge to modernity and to the West.¹¹

In fact, the exponents of political Islam are religious fundamentalists because they define their counter-challenge and the alternatives they present in terms of a religiously articulated claim for political power. This claim is underpinned by alleged religious legitimacy. Islamists argue that current Muslim societies have reverted to *jahiliyya*. In the language of Islam this term *jahiliyya* refers to the pre-Islamic age of unbelief and ignorance. Thus the invective of *jahiliyya* implies an imputed setback in falling behind the Islamic accomplishments of the revelation. In order to steer Muslims back onto the right path (*al-sirat al-mustaqim*), it deems the exponents of political Islam imperative to legitimatise the use of force for establishing their envisaged political system. Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, completed his treatise on *jihad* in this manner to legitimise the resort to violence.¹²

A closer look at the phenomenon at issue reveals that the prototype of an Islamic fundamentalist is rather a political man, a *homo politicus*, than a *homo religiosus* (a man of religion). In thus arguing, I do not overlook the dual character of Islamic fundamentalism – it is both religious and political. In the rhetorics of political Islam we come across pronouncements revealing significant cultural implications to which I have already referred as *defensive culture*. This concept helps us to understand that political Islam is the result of a

crisis which has emerged from Islam's predicament with modernity (see note 6). In view of the fact that political Islam is the Islamic response to cultural modernity and that it is, as well, a revolt against the West, there is a need to shed light on this mix of cultural and historical background.

Islam and cultural modernity

For a better understanding of the historical constraints of the oscillation in contemporary Islam between culture and politics, it is important to outline what is meant by cultural modernity as the pertinent issue. The cultural project of modernity revolves around the concept of knowledge as related to a specific worldview based on the belief that man can shape his own destiny and also determine his own social and natural environment. The basic concept that underlies these views is the modern concept of secular knowledge as based on modern science and technology. Ever since their encounter with the modern West in the course of the nineteenth century most Muslims have consistently been ill at ease with the cultural project of modernity, to which they were and still are exposed. The learned among them have realised – on the one hand – that they cannot thrive without adjusting themselves to modern techno-scientific standards. On the other hand, however, a willingness to alter the orthodox Islamic belief in the supremacy of the sacred Islamic revelation has been lacking. Islamic reformists like Rifa'a Tahtawi and Muhammed Abduh¹³ were at pains to come to grips with the predicament to which they were exposed. Nevertheless, the Islamic orthodoxy of the *ulema* (Islamic scribes) has strongly rebuffed all efforts to subject any aspect of Islamic revelation to human reasoning. In this regard, we should recall that the separation between religious and philosophical knowledge was a major, albeit despised achievement of the Islamic rationalists in medieval Islam.¹⁴ They were defeated by the sacral *fiqh*-jurists.

From the tension between the sacred and the political grows the major predicament of Islam with modernity. Islamic modernism and the tradition of Islamic reform, going back to the late nineteenth century, failed to cope with this ever-growing tension. Secular ideologies and movements superseded the legitimacy function of Islam and based political authority on secular legitimacy. After half a century of secularism (for example, secular pan-Arabism¹⁵) we are now facing the emergence of political Islam, being the major source of legitimacy for political opposition. Even though Islamism is a political ideology, the

cultural debate on knowledge is pivotal to Islamists. In my article 'Culture and Knowledge',¹⁶ I have shown that the claim for an 'Islamisation of knowledge'¹⁷ lies at the centre of the ideology of political Islam. It follows that Islamists base their political claims on divine epistemological foundations and this constitutes the cultural underpinning of their politicisation of Islam.

It is equally intriguing and amusing to see the claim for a culturally specific Islamic knowledge concurring with a fashionable debate among some Western anthropologists ironically labelled as 'belly-button' anthropologists. These contemporary anthropologists, such as the German Wolf Lepenies, suggest the 'anthropologisation of knowledge' along the lines of the classical sociology of knowledge once established by Karl Mannheim. For a better understanding a note for non-experts is needed. Karl Mannheim established the approach that knowledge is neither abstract nor detached from social conditions for it evolves out of a *Seinslage* (condition of being). Along these lines the anthropology of knowledge reduces all knowledge to cultural set-ups. The outcome is a cultural relativism that denies the objectivity as well as the universality of knowledge.

To be sure, Islamic fundamentalists are against knowledge originated in the West, but they are not supporters of any cultural relativism whatsoever. In fact, they are neo-absolutists.¹⁸ It is intriguing to see these fundamentalists drawing on Western fashions to combat the West. Western cultural relativists, for their part, focus their efforts not against fundamentalism, but rather against modernity. Their major concern does not seem to consist in finding a way out of the impasse of the crisis of modernity, but to dismiss the latter. In other words, cultural relativism is only directed against Western claims, not against any neo-absolutist claims raised by ideologies pretending to represent non-Western civilisations. The basic question related to the proposed 'anthropologisation' is whether knowledge could be universal or just part and parcel of a specific culture or civilisation. Viewed from the first angle, Muslims might well acknowledge that cultural modernity originates from a Western-European concept of knowledge, however without concluding the need for particular reservations about the related concept of knowledge. Their ancestors, like Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd, had no problems with embracing the Greek legacy and incorporating its rationalism into Islam.¹⁹ The crucial question to be asked is: Is the validity of secular, that is, reason-based knowledge confined to Western civilisation? Is this an exclusively European cultural pattern or can it be shared by other, non-Western civilisations?

If we accept the notion that the local cultures and civilisations to which they belong are exclusive particularities, then we may view the Muslim belief in the absolute and the complete character of Islamic revelation as simply a cultural variety. Along these lines each culture would only be properly grasped in its own terms and thus would not be accessible to outsiders. This effort at an 'anthropologisation of knowledge' does not, however, solve the pending problem: Islam's predicament with modernity. Clearly, political Islam is related to this predicament. To be sure, Islamists do not contest European modernity in rendering it culturally relative. In contrast, they are not by any means hostile to the concept of universalism insofar as they themselves claim universal validity for their own beliefs. Moreover, they do not contest Western modernity as a holistic entity. They rather limit their rejection to the modern man-centred Cartesian worldview, as well as to the belief in the capabilities of human reason at the expense of sacral revelation. In narrowing the scope of this enquiry to looking at Islamic attitudes toward modern science and technology we find that contemporary Islamists do not contest the instrumental achievements of modernity. On the contrary, they want to adopt the related European accomplishments, however on Islamic grounds. In this sense Islamists talk about the 'Islamisation of science and technology'.²⁰ What does this claim mean? Is this an attempt to indigenise a cultural borrowing as was the case with the Islamic rationalists and Greek knowledge?

Is semi-modernity manageable?

The world time context pertinent to Islamism is the one determined by modernity. Political Islam has grown from this context. In a nutshell, political Islam is not traditionalism, but rather a fundamentalist dream of semi-modernity (*halbe Moderne*) with a political outlook. The contemporary Islamic mixed bag which has originated from the predicament with modernity includes an adoption of techno-scientific items along with a radical rejection of the cultural project of modernity itself, in particular, of its reason-based worldview. Islamists are reluctant to expose themselves to the question pertaining to the cultural consequences of modernity.²¹ They do not question the feasibility of their vision that combines a selective choice of orthodox Islam and an instrumental semi-modernity. For the sake of clarity I repeat that semi-modernity refers to the concept of the Islamisation of modernity by

means of the adoption of its material achievements while furiously rejecting its cultural underpinning. As an enlightened Muslim I fail to see how this option could ever work.

In most of the contemporary writings by Islamic revivalists one finds an instrumental view regarding knowledge as being decoupled from its sources and from its constructed meaning as well. For Islamists, modern science is in particular value-free. Thus scientific accomplishments can be employed in the pursuit of different ends. The fundamentalist formula is thus aimed at decoupling modern knowledge from its links to cultural modernity, that is, from its links to the primacy of human reason, and of course to secularity. There is nothing wrong in putting modern science and technology at the service of Islam. However, if this is understood as an act of Islamisation in the pursuit of establishing an Islamic political order, then the endeavour clearly becomes questionable. The issue is this: the Islamist approach divorces the adopted items of modernity from the rational worldview they depend on, because Islamists contest the civilisation from which they originated.

Islamic fundamentalists fail to notice the fact that modern knowledge involves a certain way of looking at the world, that is, a rational worldview. In my view, the current Islamic debate on technological and scientific knowledge reflects an Islamic response to cultural modernity in an effort to adapt modernity instrumentally, however without embracing its rational outlooks. It is important to acknowledge the centrality of this intricate issue. For this reason there is an urgent need to place this enquiry into the broader context of historical and philosophical trends in the Muslim world. To do so, we are advised to embed the expertise contained in the current Islamic debate concerning knowledge, as earlier referred to (note 16). Political Islam cannot be understood properly if the cultural underpinning and its broader contexts are not considered accordingly. From this argument, it follows that the pendulum in Islam between culture and politics is a key issue for understanding contemporary Islam and therefore lies at the centre of this book. It is sad to see the Western media confining themselves to sensational events, thus contributing to the spread of the cliché that political Islam is nothing other than a variety of terrorism. The result is misleading because a myth and an imaginary of confrontation cannot be illuminating.²² From this misconception follows the relating of subsiding terrorism to the downing of political Islam.

An important distinction: globalisation and universalisation

Among the basic arguments in this introduction to my study of the links between culture and politics in contemporary Islam is the idea that the modern world is shaped by European expansion. From this mapping of the world the processes of globalisation are growing and as a result shaping the world along European and Western lines determined by modernity.²³ In this context there exists an often overlooked difference between globalisation and universalisation; both distinct processes are often confused.

What has been globalised throughout the world, also in mapping the world of Islam, are the effects of modernisation, not modernity itself. Muslims conceive, on the one hand, of Western-style cultural modernity as either a cultural threat (*taghrib*/Westernisation)²⁴ of which to be wary, or, on the other, as a political challenge to cope with while adopting instruments of modernity on a selective basis. The adherents of the current Islamic revivalist trend unwittingly get involved in the ongoing debate on modernity. The values of modernity (for example, democracy, secularity and human rights) can be universalised, but so far they have not been. When it comes to globalisation, structures and institutions are at issue, but not values. Therefore, it becomes clear how important the distinction between globalisation and universalisation is. The first refers to the structural mapping of the world whereas the latter is restricted to norms and values.

The claim of a de-Westernisation of knowledge in the world of Islam (for example, by the fundamentalist Alatas) and also of freeing Muslims from the 'epistemological imperialism of the West' (the fundamentalist Sardar) indicates a fundamentalist project articulated in Islamic terms.²⁵ The claim is an expression of a non-Western revolt against Western universalism. It is reasonable and prudent to argue for an alternative to the current world order dominated by the West. But what Islamists and fundamentalists of other religions claim as a 'remaking of the world'²⁶ is not the desired alternative in that their pursuit is one for a divine order. They do not want to undo globalisation, but reject the coupling of Western universalism to the design of our global age. They want their own design of universalism.

In enquiring into Western universalism and in asking whether the consequences of modernity include the universalisation of Western values in consonance with the globalising structures, it strikes me as imperative to draw again on the meaning of cultural modernity. In so

doing we would be in a position to understand the kind of challenge involved and then to take issue with the Islamic responses to it. As my readers already know, I distinguish between the instruments of modernity (science and technology) and its value-based cultural worldview (cultural modernity). The rationalisation of worldviews is conceived of as a project of Enlightenment. In his *Philosophical Discourse of Modernity* Jürgen Habermas refers to the key events which contributed to establishing the European project of modernity. These are the *Renaissance*, the *Reformation* of Christianity, the *Enlightenment* and the *French Revolution*. According to Habermas the core idea of cultural modernity is the *principle of subjectivity*. On the one hand, this principle highlights the capabilities of man, as based on human reason, to shape and master one's own destiny. On the other hand, this principle makes religious faith reflective. As Habermas points out: 'The world of the divine was changed in the solitude of subjectivity into something posited by ourselves.'²⁷

In Habermas's interpretation the term subjectivity carries four connotations: a) individualism, b) the right to criticism, c) autonomy of action, d) idealistic philosophy itself as a self-conscious idea. As Habermas argues, this subjectivity is the outcome of modern times. All four of those connotations, as well as Kant's idea that human reason is the only judge to refer to, can collectively be considered as being in conflict with the theocentric view of the world of Islamic orthodoxy. In this regard, contemporary Islam's predicament with modernity has historical roots. In its heyday, Islamic civilisation was able to adopt the Greek legacy.²⁸ Islamic rationalism was built up on this process of Hellenisation of Islam. The Islamic *fiqh*-orthodoxy of medieval Islam, as is the case for the fundamentalists of the present period, never approved this Hellenisation. The core question asked then was: reason or revelation? *Bi al-aql aw bi al-wahi*? This very question once asked in medieval Islam²⁹ is being posed again and more firmly at the beginning of the new millennium. Medieval religious outlooks and modern politics intermingle with one another.³⁰ This gives ground to the questions: Is the validity of the primacy of reason not universal? Is it culturally relative? Could globalisation promote universalisation?

In looking back at the Islamic heritage³¹ we not only find medieval *fiqh*-orthodoxy, but also the tradition of a rational view of the world based on human reason. We may remind ourselves of the Greek impact on Islamic thought as can be found in the work of Farabi, Ibn Rushd and Ibn Sina. It is this Islamic heritage which in its turn had an impact on Europe.³² Thus, the notion of a de-Westernisation of knowl-

edge in reviving an Islamic worldview for divorcing Islam from the earlier cited epistemological implications of cultural modernity occurs to me to be based on a one-sided understanding of the intellectual tradition of classical Islam. The revolt against Western hegemony is confused with the rejection of universal values. Contemporary Islamic fundamentalists grasp Islam in political terms and dislike the reason-based Islamic philosophy and its traditions in Islamic history. They claim to revive Islam, but the Islamic heritage (*see* note 14) is not their concern!

In my view, the tensions between contemporary Islam and modernity as highlighted in my previous remarks are best interpreted as tensions between fundamentalist Islam and the rational modern view of the world. Thus the predicament of contemporary Islam in dealing with cultural modernity is a predicament of Islamic fundamentalism. Islamists along with orthodox Muslims are resilient towards the accommodation of Islamic cultural concepts to modernity. In short, they rebuff any impact of the cultural project of modernity as *taghrib*, that is, as a Westernisation. In other words, it is wrong to relate the prevailing *global* structures to a *universal* acceptance of the worldview of cultural modernity. I contend a *simultaneity of structural globalisation and cultural fragmentation*.³³ Thus I infer that globalisation does not necessarily lead to universalisation.

It is true, modern science and technology are Western achievements. Not even fierce militants among Islamic fundamentalists dispute this bold fact. The intellectual precursor of the Islamic revolt against the West, Jemaladdin Afghani (1839–97), acknowledged frankly that Europeans were able to conquer the world of Islam due to their possession of modern science and technology.³⁴ He also acknowledged that Muslims lack these instruments. There is a consensus among modern Muslims that they can thrive only by adopting modern science and technology. They want to fight the West instrumentally with its own weapons and beat it, while they continue to contest the universality of its rational worldview. This statement is based on my research conducted at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and published under the title ‘The Worldview of Sunni Arab Fundamentalists: Attitudes toward Modern Science and Technology’ (note 20). In that research I found that Islamic fundamentalists view modern technology as neutral. They adopt industrial items and dissociate them from the social system, that is, the modern industrial society, in which they have evolved. Generally speaking, leading fundamentalists are academically trained people. Why do they lack knowledge about the context addressed? Why do they reject rational knowledge?

Ignorance and confusion

To be well-informed, enlightened and reasonable are not virtues to which fundamentalists generally subscribe. The view of most of them that modern knowledge ought to be Islamised is based on their preoccupation that science and technology are neutral instruments. When it comes to modern science, the discourse of contemporary fundamentalists as the representatives of political Islam is clearly characterised by two levels of confusion.

- On the one hand they overlook the clear line drawn by early Islamic orthodoxy between revelation and human knowledge. They stress that Islam is the pivotal source of all sciences. But the Islamic tradition of Koranic exegesis and the Koran itself are often referred to interchangeably. As a result, they fail to distinguish between the religious sciences in Islam (*ulum al-din*) and the Islamic heritage of philosophy and rational sciences (*falsafa*) as did the scribes in medieval Islam. Both traditions (that is, *fiqh* and *falsafa*) were never on good terms as I have shown in my intellectual history of Islam (see note 14). As indicated in Chapter 8, the reason-based sciences, in contrast to 'Islamic sciences', were viewed in medieval Islam as 'foreign sciences', Medieval *fiqh*-scholars dismissed them as heretical. Therefore they were kept out of the Islamic educational curriculum.³⁵ Along with the failure to distinguish between *ulum al-din*, as divinities, and natural sciences and philosophy (*ulum al-qudama'*, the sciences of the ancients, that is, the Greeks), we encounter another confusion, namely:
- the allegation that modern sciences in Europe are based on adoptions from the religion of Islam. For this reason, Islamic fundamentalists believe that their adoption of modern sciences is nothing other than an act of retrieval, or repossession. It is true that the Greek legacy, as further developed by medieval Muslim rationalists, was handed over to Europe via Arab-Muslim Spain (see note 32). It is however not clear to Muslim fundamentalists that the Europeans of the Renaissance adopted Islamic rational philosophy and natural sciences from the Islamic civilisation, but not the *fiqh* or any of the religious knowledge from Islamic orthodoxy. Needless to say, Islamic Hellenised philosophy does not enjoy the respect of the Islamists, as I have already underlined.

It is unfortunate to notice how ignorant exponents of political Islam are about the history of their own civilisation, thus combining

ignorance with confusion. Moreover, they are also not knowledgeable about the global context in which their thoughts are embedded. The link between science, technology and the developmental needs raised by social change is essential in the modern global context. This is not just unique to Islam. Like other non-Western parts of the world the abode of Islam has been structurally integrated into the present global order. Different standards of development in diverse regions of this structurally unified world underlie what has been addressed in terms of underdevelopment. Due to the fact that in our present global age there are globally unifying political and socio-economic structures (the international system of nation-states and the world economy), but at the same time disuniting elements of cultural self-assertion (*see* note 33), there exists no universal 'world culture'. 'McWorld' is not a culture, but rather a mode of consumption.³⁶ The structurally unifying trends are coupled with tendencies toward cultural fragmentation. With regard to modern science and technology, Muslims, like other non-Western people, acknowledge the pivotal need for science and technology for their own development. But the Islamists among them fail to grasp that science and technology are socially constructed. In their ignorance and confusion they instead declaim Islamic values as roots of true science and they inveigh against the West in general. Modern science is based on rationality and is not simply a source for instrumental tools. Scientific tools are not value-free, they are affected by the design of culture. I conclude, the dream of a 'semi-modernity' is a great illusion.

From Islamic modernism to fundamentalism

Islamic reform in the late nineteenth century was a significant effort in the pursuit of the cultural reconciliation of Islam with modernity. Muslim reformers were at pains to smooth the way for embracing modern science. They failed, however, to address basic issues related to 'knowledge', 'culture' and 'reason' and thus missed an important historical opportunity for a breakthrough. Like early Islamic modernists, current fundamentalists cite *ilm* (knowledge)-related verses in the Koran to display the conviction that this Holy Book is the foremost source of all knowledge including modern science. They fail to understand that religious ethics can be considered in science, but only rationality determines the substance of scientific research. In addition, scientific knowledge is socially constructed and is never divine. In a lengthy interview (September 1989) the late Sheykh al-Azhar Jadul-Haq

responded to my questions in criticising the attitude of the Islamists in stating that the Koran is a revelation from God and not an encyclopedia of sciences!

Early Islamic modernists, like Tahtawi, Afghani and Abduh, different as they were from one another, stressed unanimously the need in Islamic civilisation to adopt modern science. It is most unfortunate that they, despite their reformist spirit, also viewed this need as an '*act of repossession*', exactly as contemporary Islamic fundamentalists do. In a positive manner, Islamic modernists were opposed to the traditionalism of the Islamic *ulema*, whom they blamed as the cause of stagnation in the world of Islam. In this vein, they drew a clear distinction between the 'fundamentals' (*usul*) of Islam and the sad situation of Muslims in modern times. The reformist argument was that the Islamic fundamentals (*usul*) can be interpreted in a flexible manner and therefore are truly compatible with science while the current Muslims are 'lazy' and 'underdeveloped' because they do not understand their Islam properly. This argument was spelled out by Shakib Arslan in 1930 in his call to arouse Muslims and to mobilise them against the West.³⁷

Despite the great differences between the open-minded modernists and the doctrinal, narrow-minded Islamists, both continue to be caught up in an impasse. The exposure of the pre-modern cultures of contemporary Islam to the predominantly techno-scientific civilisation of the West has been the historical context of the Islamic predicament with modernity since the nineteenth century. In the present period, the inner-Islamic pendulum between culture and politics is contributing to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. To be sure we are dealing with a recent phenomenon that started in the 1970s. This does not mean that the early roots of the phenomenon should be overlooked, for instance the fact that the Muslim brotherhood was established in 1928 (*see* note 12). The ramifications between Islamic reform and fundamentalism should be taken into consideration, however without confusing both.

From the caliphate to the secular nation-state – and back to an Islamic order?

The abolition of the caliphate in 1924 following the centuries-long disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of national movements against colonial rule in the former Ottoman provinces paved the way for new developments. In the Mashrek, the Arab East, secular pan-Arabism was on the rise, whereas a combination of Islam and national-

ism, albeit in the pursuit of secular ends, was the case in the Maghreb. The ensuing process of de-colonisation and the formation of the still existing nominally secular nation-states in most Islamic countries strengthened these secular trends. Clearly, secularity in the new states has been lacking the needed structural roots since secularisation in the sense of a structural process of functional differentiation of society had not yet taken place.³⁸ Thus, secularism was more or less simply an ideology based on normative claims set by Westernised intellectuals. Secular Turkey is an extreme case in point. In Turkey, secularisation was nothing more than a *Revolution from Above*.³⁹ Thus, in *dar al-Islam* secularism did not grow from a social process of secularisation. Secular orientation has been a product of Western education and the emergence of the related elites (for example, Kemalists in Turkey) does not reflect existing social realities; Islamists despise secularity as an 'imported solution'.

Currently, new counter-elites (for example, the Islamists) are on the rise.⁴⁰ Muslim fundamentalists view secularism as a Western means for the intellectual invasion of the Muslim world. We should keep in mind that the nation-state in the Arab-Muslim East has been secular only in a nominal way. For the 'warriors of Allah' as representatives of political Islam the battle against secularism is a *jihad* (for them a 'holy war') against the West.⁴¹ Islamist counter-elites challenge the nominally secular nation-state and its legitimacy and envisage toppling it.

In the West, people believe that the turning point for the rise of Islamic fundamentalism aimed at restoring Islamic order was the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979. This is wrong. In fact, the crushing Arab defeat in the Six-Day-War in 1967 was that turning point. The call for the *hall al-Islami* (Islamic solution) pre-dates Khomeini in that it goes back to the early 1970s. It served to underpin the presentation of an alternative to the existing order. This vision has been broadly accepted. The current wave of Islamic fundamentalism, that is, of political Islam, is an indication of this process. The effects of this tide have been disseminating far beyond the boundaries of the Middle East as the core of the abode of Islam, to reach Asia and Africa. It is not my inclination to belittle the impact of the Islamic revolution in Iran. My statement is restricted to the failure of Iran to export its revolution⁴² and to the non-Iranian origins of the idea of an Islamic state. Clearly, this is not an Arabocentric statement.

In the first place, Islamic fundamentalists have been denouncing Westernisation (*taghrib*; see note 24), insofar as they view it as an instrument for weakening the Islamic *umma* (community). Khomeini

stepped into this line of argument and cursed the impact of the West as a disease, as '*gharbzadegi*' (Westtoxication).⁴³ Against the dismissed *taghrib*, Islamists invoke their selectively chosen 'fundamentals' (*usul*) of Islam and they present them in a distorted manner as the basics and essence of political-cultural authenticity. The far-reaching implication is a call for the return to an Islamic order. We may ask: what order? Is a return to the caliphate at issue?

To view these anti-Western attitudes as being anti-modern would be a grave mistake and would lead to overlooking the Islamic fundamentalist predicament concerning modernity. As one of the leading fundamentalists, whom I interviewed in Cairo, clearly put it, it is not modernisation that he is rebutting. The subject of his rebuttal is rather the inability of the secular intellectuals and of their secular state to incorporate the 'comprehensive worldview of Islam' into their socio-political strategies. To him, the harmony between revelation and human reason is the salient feature of this Islamic worldview. In contrast to the European Enlightenment and also to classical Islamic rationalism, Muslim fundamentalists do not see any distinction between God's revelation (*wahi*) and the findings of human reason. In putting forward this view, current Islamic fundamentalists are fully in line with the early Islamic modernist Muhammed Abduh. In their rebuttals against secularism⁴⁴ they concede that religion could be an obstacle to techno-scientific progress and, as an example, refer to Christianity. The reformist Abduh himself pursued this reasoning in his book *Islam and Christianity between Science and Civilisation* (note 13). Both Islamic reformists and Islamists, however, exclude Islam. To them, Islam, of all religions, is exceptional. With regard to the religious attitudes toward science and technology, it is true that Islam – as the leading French scholar Maxime Rodinson concedes – is more favourable to rationality than other religions. However, to believe that the religion of Islam is the very source of all sciences is certainly among the peculiarities of Islamism, and even of reformism. Despite all similarities in this respect, it is most important to draw a clear distinction between Islamic reform and contemporary Islamism. They are of a crucially different spirit.

In short, Islamism is a product of Islam's predicament with cultural modernity.⁴⁵ It also results from the crisis of the secular nation-state. I have already argued, Islamic fundamentalists are not traditionalists. They do not reject modernity as a whole. They aim to employ the achievements of modernity in the pursuit of an Islamic world order. To be sure, the concept of such an order does not exist in the authoritative Islamic sources, neither in the Koran nor in the legacy of The

Prophet (*hadith*). It is an outcome of the pendulum in contemporary Islam between culture and politics which is the subject of the present book. Islamists oppose the secular nation-state; their call for a return to an Islamic order cannot however be equated with an authentic call for the restoration of the caliphate. The order they call *nizam Islami*⁴⁶ is something different.

In the remainder of this introduction I want to place this book into my overall work. The illumination of the interplay of political, cultural and social change in Islamic civilisation has been the major concern in my earlier work and books. The present book continues these efforts.

The place of this book in my study of Islam: the formative years

In this book I adopt Geertz's interpretation of religion as a cultural system, but without being a Geertzian myself. In this understanding, religions as cultural systems are both influenced by processes of social change and are themselves able to affect them. I will proceed from this frame of reference to examine the concept of the cultural system in terms of its usefulness for understanding Islam. However, I place 'culture' in an overall context and focus on its relationship to social change. This effort is pivotal in my long involvement of almost three decades in the study of Islam. The development of this work is documented in my publications on the Middle East and on Islam, both from the perspective of International Relations and the history of ideas, being my intellectual background as a student of philosophy educated in the Frankfurt School.

In the Frankfurt School of Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer I was introduced to Western philosophy. The approach of critical theory, focusing on the study of ideology, determined the perspective in my early works. The study of Islam was therefore solely that of a critique of ideology (*Ideologiekritik*) applied to a critical study of religious ideologies. Thus in my very first work, *Die arabische Linke* (The Arab Left),⁴⁷ published in 1969, I restricted myself to tracing historically the resistance of socio-critical, or more precisely rebellious thinking in Islam. Of course there have been social movements in Islam (for example, the Karmathians, who were active from the ninth century until 1030), as in Christianity, and they were vigorously opposed by orthodox Islam. When I – at that time a 25-year-old PhD student – published that first work in 1969, there still existed no major Islamist movements comparable to those of the present day. Given the rise of

these new Islamist movements there is a need to state that they are not the kind of social movements that promise a better future, for they are clearly totalitarian in their orientation. Despite having suffered a serious loss in legitimacy after the Six-Day-War in 1967, secular ideologies, like pan-Arab nationalism or socialism, continued to prevail as represented by incumbents of power, however much political Islam has been on the rise.

In my second – more scholarly – book based on the revised version of my PhD dissertation, *Nationalismus in der Dritten Welt am arabischen Beispiel* (Nationalism in the Third World – the Arab case),⁴⁸ the focus has been on the links between Islam and nationalism. I was fortunate that my study on pan-Arab nationalism was discovered by the Anglo-Saxon academic world and has been published in an English translation.⁴⁹ That has been my window to new opportunities, that is, my access to a much broader international community of readers freeing me from the confines of parochialism within the German academe as mentioned in the preface. In that book I examine the tension between Islamic universalism and modern nationalism, the latter having originated in Europe and then been taken up in the Islamic world, where it has become a political force to be reckoned with. The central classical Islamic notion of the *umma*, which – in a dichotomic manner – divides the world into the house of Islam (*dar al-Islam*) and the house of war (*dar al-harb*) has thus been partly abandoned in terms of being silent about it. The modern nation seemingly replaced the universal concept of the *umma*. But to date, the classical Islamic dichotomy, which has no grounds in reality, has not been openly questioned or revised.⁵⁰ I attempt this task in what is new in the third edition of *Arab Nationalism*, published with the new subtitle: *Between Islam and the Nation-State*.

Taking up the cause of nationalism, the Young Turks began the process of implicitly de-politicising Islam by providing Turanism with alleged antecedents in the spirit of the new ideology; they were followed by the Arabs, with the concept of *uruba* (Arabism). The application of the Western concept of the nation led to the creation of the *umma Arabiyya* (the Arab nation) and the abandonment of the *umma Islamiyya* (the community of Islam and its universal claims). Contemporary Islamists want to reverse this development by returning to the universal Islamic *umma*. These trends are covered in my book on Islam and nationalism, which continues to be topical as supported through the publication of three editions. It is nonetheless clear that my earlier approach was incomplete, being focused solely on the concept of the critique of ideology.⁵¹ I have realised the need to go

beyond the political level. Islamism is not only a political ideology that politicises a cultural system. These insights are incorporated into this book.

A similar focus on a single dimension of Islam, still valid, is apparent in my habilitation thesis (a German super PhD), *Militär und Sozialismus in der Dritten Welt* (The Military and Socialism in the Third World).⁵² The empirical part of this thesis consists of case studies on the intervention of Arab military elites in politics. This work was not primarily concerned with examining Islam; nevertheless there was a need to deal with the use of Islam to provide legitimacy. Most Arab military regimes (in the first instance, that established by Gamal Abdel Nasser⁵³ himself) invoked Islam in a modernist, clearly secular interpretation, in order to legitimise their policies. This ideological use of Islam forced me to undertake an analysis of it as an instrument for the legitimation of power. In going beyond this political study of Islam I moved to cultural analysis, however, without overlooking the socio-political and economic context in which culture is embedded.

The cultural study of Islam

A significant turning point both in the development of my thinking as well as in my own identity is documented in my book *The Crisis of Modern Islam*.⁵⁴ My reading of Norbert Elias's magnificent work *The Civilising Process*⁵⁵ during the second half of the 1970s helped bring about the change. Elias enthrallingly reconstructs the European civilising process, showing the unique character that *may* lie behind Europe's ability to conquer the whole world, and thereby to establish a claim to universality for its own civilisation. The European expansion mapped the entire world and prepared the grounds for the ensuing process of globalisation. To be sure, Elias's approach has nothing to do with the Eurocentric history being rightly criticised as *The Coloniser's Model of the World*.⁵⁶

Long before the European expansion, the Muslims tried through conquests, known as *futuh* wars, to establish their model for the world.⁵⁷ After the foundation of the Islamicate in Arabia as based on a new world religion, a specifically Islamic civilising process was initiated. Islamic expansion pre-dates European expansion. Islamic *jihad* conquests (*futuh*) started as early as the seventh century. They have left their traces in Asia, Africa and in parts of Europe (Spain and the Balkans) to this day. The European civilising process, however, has reached an unprecedented degree of universalisation and globalisation.

No other civilisation – not even Islam itself – has ever been able to create an international standard based on its worldview. It is no longer possible to study Islam, or any other non-Western culture or civilisation, without taking into account the global system that has emerged out of the European civilising process. This phenomenon can be addressed as a world-wide expansion of *The Civilising Process*. Elias's works, which I have studied in order to better grasp some of these connections, were and continue to be fundamental to the development of my cultural study of Islam. It is important to call to mind the difference between globalisation and universalisation outlined earlier. We should be wary of confusion.

In my book *The Crisis of Modern Islam*, I have added to the reconstruction of the European civilising process a comparative review of the Islamic civilising process – which Elias had unfortunately not undertaken. I was prompted to discussion by Elias's hypothesis that the standardisation of civilisation in the upper social strata of Europe had had its parallel today throughout the whole world. Elias argues that Europeans now constitute an 'upper stratum' in relation to the non-Western peoples, in spite of the latter's own internal strata structure. In fact, the difference between Westernised native elites and those parts of the native population still tied to their local native culture in Islamic societies corresponds to the standardised civilisation as described by Elias. The parallel drawn by him is both interesting and at the same time problematical, although partly accurate. In Asia and Africa, for example, eating with a knife and fork and even dressing in a suit and tie at temperatures of 40°C or more are no longer considered European, but simply civilised! The fact that this formal standard of civilisation is even accepted by those who maintain anti-Western political views and attitudes may lead to wrong conclusions.

In *The Crisis of Modern Islam*, I established the existence of a global scientific and technological age, which has been imbued by Europeans with its own specific character. This global structure is known in my discipline of International Relations as the *international system*. I was unable, however, to establish the existence of a corresponding global culture.⁵⁸ In other words, the progress in globalisation is not matched by a simultaneous universalisation. Earlier I made the distinction clear: the realm of globalisation lies in the structures, whereas the standardisation of value systems, outlooks and worldviews is a matter of a successful universalisation. In fact, there is indeed a dominant, Western, technological- and scientific-oriented civilisation on which the globalisation of the European civilising process is based, but there are also

many non-Western and at the same time non-industrial local cultures that are coming together to rival civilisations gathering force against the West and aiming to reverse the Westernisation⁵⁹ of the world in de-Westernising it.

A recurring argument throughout this book is the idea that there is a simultaneity of structural globalisation and cultural fragmentation. I avoid here the earlier employed term 'preindustrial' which is correct in terms of content. However, I need to shield my line of argument from the accusation of evolutionism to which I do not subscribe. In *The Crisis of Modern Islam*, I attempted to introduce the concept of culture into International Relations, but – admittedly – was not successful. It has been the accomplishment of Samuel Huntington to successfully introduce the concept of civilisation to the study of International Relations. To be sure, my understanding of civilisation differs from that of my Harvard colleague Huntington.

The next step in the development of my cultural analysis of Islam was my book *Islam and the Cultural Accommodation of Social Change* in which I present my understanding of Islam as a cultural system in its own right. By then, I was not able to keep other factors related to the international environment entirely out of my analysis. In the present book I am even more aware of the fact that no one can escape the realities of globalisation not even Islamic orthodoxy, not to mention the fundamentalists. I have nevertheless attempted, both on the basis of my familiarity with the cultural system of Islam from inside and with the aid of more recent social scientific theories and methods, to understand Islam as a system of cultural symbols with which Muslims perceive reality and on which they base their worldview. My acknowledgement of the impact of Clifford Geertz's anthropology of religion on the development of my thinking falls within this context. Although my concern with the elements of the Islamic cultural system considerably precedes this acknowledgement, Geertz's interpretation of religion as a cultural system has enabled me to develop an interpretative framework into which I could integrate the individual components of my work in a manner appropriate to the subject. As I have stated in the Preface, I, nevertheless, go beyond Geertz in two issue-areas. First, I strongly disagree with his cultural relativism. Second, I cross the line of determining culture exclusively in terms of locality. I go beyond Geertz in my own way, while maintaining my high esteem for this great Princeton scholar. In short, I combine admiration with 'going beyond'.⁶⁰

My efforts to overcome 'Orientalism' are continued in this book on two grounds: First, by dismantling its inferiorising thoughts. My suffer-

ing in German academia from the racism of German Orientalism underlies my scholarly drive to de-Orientalise the study of Islam.⁶¹ Second, my inclination to overcome the confines of philology in introducing the social-scientific study of Islam is the substance of my anti-Orientalism. In other words, in writing this book I am a social scientist of an Islamic background and not a Western Orientalist nor a narrow-minded philologist. Orientalism has two meanings which I strongly oppose. First, Oriental studies are traditional philology run by the exotic 'hothouse disciplines'. The second meaning of Orientalism is ideological.

In contrast to Orientalists I do not essentialise 'culture'. Instead I view it as an ever-changing set-up. The sociological discussion of 'culture' in this book is taken up in order to ascertain whether culture is a phenomenon that shapes a society, as is argued in cultural analysis. I also dissociate myself from cultural relativism as much as I dissociate myself from some Marxists who view culture merely as a superstructure reducible to a particular basis. At both the conceptual and empirical levels, it becomes apparent – with reference to Islam – that cultural systems are created in conjunction with a process of social production of meaning. However, cultural systems themselves can exert a decisive influence on the reality out of which they emerge. It is therefore preferable for research on cultural systems to dispense with any reductionist methodology.⁶² This awareness is central to the subsequent analysis, taken up in this book.

The puzzle of this book is that it views Islam as a cultural system in a Geertzian manner, while it simultaneously claims to place Islam in its global social environment. I acknowledge that this study will not remain within the framework of Geertz's anthropology of religion, in that it attempts to go beyond it.⁶³ The reader will see that this applies throughout the whole book. I argue that Western models find access to non-European societies in the context of globalised intercultural communication. This is the actual context in which processes of rapid social change, triggered externally and consequently disruptive, take place in non-Western countries. The Arab Islamic concept of *mihna* has various meanings in the sense of test, crisis, or period of suffering and it is the best expression for the situation that the Islamic cultural system has to cope with at present. The questions that come to mind are: Is Islam enabling its faithful to accommodate culturally a *mihna* on a scale that it has so far never known in its history? What are the prospects for the future, and are they promising for Muslims? Do they understand being ranked among the underprivileged and deprived

peoples of the world while claiming superiority for their religion? It is unfortunate that apologetic political Islam and not a variety of an enlightened Islam of reform is becoming the source for providing answers to these pending questions.

Thus the Islamic exposure to cultural modernity leads to the rise of neo-absolutism. In this book, my mind is equally directed against this Islamic neo-absolutism and against Western Orientalism. I am consciously developing my position as a scholar living between two rival civilisations: Islam and the West. I feel honoured both by the former German President Roman Herzog,⁶⁴ who in 1995 awarded me the German Medal of the State/First Class, and by Muslim reviewer Akhbar Ahmed⁶⁵ for being acknowledged as a mediator.

In my capacity as a mediator I fail to see the 'Islamic threat' to the West. I do not close my eyes and see a civilisational conflict. In this regard I find myself in between Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations* and the former German President Roman Herzog's *Preventing the Clash of Civilizations* (see note 64). This is the position of a mediator living in a conflict situation. Before I move to the unfolding of my analysis in the ensuing ten chapters, I would again ask my readers most vehemently to learn to honour the distinction between Islam and Islamism, that is, fundamentalism in Islam as already addressed in the Preface. As I emphatically indicated, despite the historical burden of Islamic *jihad* against Europe and the Christian crusades against Islam (see note 32), Islamic civilisation does not constitute a 'threat' to the West. In contrast, I believe that Islamic fundamentalists are a serious security problem, both for Islamic countries and for the Western states to which they migrate.

Part I

Religion, Culture and Development – Islam between Past and Present

Introductory remarks

Among the hallmarks of our new century is the renewed importance of religion. The distinguished British Journal for International Affairs *Millennium*, published by the London School of Economics (LSE), devoted its year 2000 special issue to the topic of religion and international relations. It was an honour for me to be among the contributors. The background to the surge of religion as an issue in world politics is the fact that the demise of the Cold War did not bring about the hoped-for peace. Instead domestic and regional conflicts imbued with religious and ethnic implications (for instance, in Bosnia, Kosovo, Kashmir and Chechnia) have been flaring up ever since. The diversity of these regional conflicts has replaced the hitherto dominant global bipolarity that divided the world into two spheres. To be sure, at issue in this context is not religion as such, but rather religion in its role as a political ideology. In this capacity it is becoming part of international studies and is increasingly moving to centre-stage. There are only a few scholars and journalists who – owing to the need for interdisciplinary training – are in a position to develop a proper grasp of these issues. It is obvious that familiarity with the phenomenon in the diverse geopolitical regions themselves, in addition to professional knowledge in international and religious studies, are therefore required. Armchair knowledge of scholars and editorialists is not enough.

Certainly, religion is in substance a spiritual belief and an ethics; in this understanding religion can be studied from two vantage-points: divinity studies and cultural analysis. In their respective spheres, these approaches enable us to grasp the intrinsic meaning of religion. The issues dealt with in this book are different because the concern here is rather with the politicisation of religious symbols and their function in society; it is only this politicisation that facilitates making use of religion as an ideological tool embedded in domestic, regional and international conflict. At issue is a global phenomenon that can be observed in all world religions. This is the subject-matter of the present book on the case of Islam. Being an International Relations scholar, I am at pains to make full use of the findings of Islamic studies as they relate to international affairs.

In the following three chapters of Part I I shall establish my understanding of religion as a cultural system. The basic argument is that it is quite wrong to play down the role of religion in political conflicts in contending that it is merely instrumental. I contest the popular view that in religious fundamentalism religion serves as a cover for

providing political legitimisation, thus being simply abused for non-religious ends. The implication of this untenable view is that a religious fundamentalist is a cynical person. In contrast, Islamists throughout the world act as the 'true' believers. I have encountered them as such believers. Nonetheless, I have also seen them as 'political' rather than ethical men of religion. This is the dual nature of politicised religion.

For a proper understanding of these complexities, we need first to understand religion as a cultural system in order to grasp its politicisation in an appropriate manner. Islamists are definitely not cynical people who simply use religion consciously as a cover for their political actions. Only some of them may do. In stating this, I am not overlooking the fact that political Islam is an ideology, and not the intrinsic religion of Islam in which most Muslims believe. The exploration of the political determination of religion will be the next step in the ensuing parts. In acknowledging that the Islamists equate their ideology wholeheartedly, not cynically, with Islamic religious belief, it follows that we need to understand religion, in this case Islam, in an adequate manner. The focus is on the interplay between religion, as a cultural system, and politics in the process of development in a crisis-ridden situation.

With reference to my understanding of political Islam reflecting both a religious belief and a religio-political commitment I am bearing in mind that religion as such is an intrinsic belief and an ethics. This book provides, however, a social-scientific, not a religious study of the oscillation in Islam between culture and politics. My understanding of religion in society is affected by the views of Emile Durkheim and by his definition of religion as a '*fait social*' (social fact). Nevertheless, I am wary of reducing religion to a social context.

Part I introduces the three central themes of the present analysis: culture, the worldview (*Weltanschauung*) of Islam and social change. I develop the understanding of culture employed in this study, of course consistently with reference to Islam. It follows that I am conceptualising Islam as a cultural system in addition to looking at it in the Durkheimian way as a social fact. The reader will clearly find out how much I lean on Clifford Geertz's cultural anthropology, but consistently with an attempt to go beyond his approach. For me, as a student of International Relations, local cultures are parts of regional civilisations. The latter are increasingly becoming pivotal in post-bipolar world politics. Clearly, the study of culture as a set-up isolated from its regional and international environment remains wanting. My

analysis is at pains to be free from this shortcoming and in this sense I go radically beyond Clifford Geertz and his narrow confines.

For a general analysis of Islam there is a risk which includes a harmful flaw, that is, to view Islam as a monolithic entity. It is true that Islam constitutes one civilisation as represented by the West, but it is equally characterised by tremendous cultural diversity. For this reason, I have coined the formula of *cultural diversity within civilisational unity in Islam*. Thus, we are dealing with two levels of the oscillation in Islam between culture and politics. On the domestic-cultural level, political Islam is imbued with ethnicity and sectarianism. On the civilisational level, world politics is at issue and political Islam is the foremost indication of the ongoing 'Revolt against the West' (H. Bull). At this level political Islam provides an alternative civilisational worldview and it presents its own equally universalist concepts of political order.

In the present period of the politicisation of Islam it is amazing to see how Islamic fundamentalists view Islam in a way similar to the presentation pursued by Orientalism. Both Islamists and Orientalists, even though completely at odds with one another, employ unwittingly essentialist formulae, such as the German concept of *Kulturganzheit* (cultural entirety) to depict Islam in a monolithic manner. Not only Islamic fundamentalists, but also orthodox Muslims believe that Islam is immutable; they view it as the all-embracing essential culture, valid without further accommodation for all times, places and peoples. I recall with dismay a public debate in March 2000 with a professor of al-Azhar in Cairo. In responding to my argument that only a reform Islam would allow the integration of Muslim migrants into Europe, he stated: 'No, there is only one Islam, take it or leave it, Islam is not a buffet from which you select what you want!' With these harsh words he dismissed my concept of Euro-Islam, that is, of a European understanding of Islam, which I have analogously developed in relation to Afro- and Indo-Islam.

In short, these people essentialise Islam in putting it above history, social and cultural change. On these grounds, the Islamist notion of 'true Muslim' resembles in a bizarre way that of the *homo islamicus* as presented by biased Western Orientalists. Even an uninformed traveller touring through the world of Islam will have no difficulty in observing how diverse is the great number of local cultures of the Islamic civilisation. On these grounds, I keep asking how to honour the existing diversity of Islam while talking about it, in a Geertzian way, as a single cultural system of religious symbols which determine the worldview of

its believers. We need to face this tough question again and again in this book but at different levels of the analysis.

The next step is to ask questions about the ways in which Muslims view the world. This is a cultural issue which compels me to anticipate the criticism that I essentialise culture. My response is that culture is not an essential entity, in as much as it stands under the impact of development in its local, regional and international environment. The difficulties involved in conveying a general definition of culture in cultural analysis are related to the incorporation of cultural patterns in social realities.

The approach employed in the present analysis is opposed to two dominant schools of thought. It is equally directed against economist views, whether Marxist or conservative, and modernisation theory. These theories alike are rejected because they are reductionist; they reduce one constraint of change to another without being able to view the interplay between the elements involved. The economist approach reduces culture to economic constraints, playing down every cultural impact. In contrast, modernisation theory shifts the focus from economy to norms and values; it considers change as a value-change. In arguing against these schools of thought I present the hypothesis that social and cultural change are incorporated in one process of interplay affecting and determining one another. In the present analysis, social change covers transitions in politics and economy and is also intertwined with cultural change affecting values and beliefs.

1

Religion, Culture and Social Reality: Islam as a Cultural System, and its Diversity

The understanding of religion in the present study is based on a combination of two ways of looking at religion: religion as a source of meaning and as incorporated into reality. I view religion as belief but it also has a function in society.¹ The central hypothesis underlying this study is that religion consists of socio-cultural symbols that convey a conception of reality and construe a plan for it. These symbols are related to reality but they are not a reflection of it. In this sense religion is understood here as a 'cultural system'² along the lines of the cultural anthropology of Clifford Geertz. In this book I shall, however, go beyond the confines of the Geertzian approach.

The tension between belief and reality

There is of course an important distinction to be made between '*models of reality*' and '*models for reality*'.³ The former relate to the representation of objects. They are concrete, in displaying structural congruence with the depicted object. In contrast, models for reality are abstract, that is, they are views, religious dogmas or doctrines for a reality with which they are not in congruence. On the contrary, models for reality relate, either metaphysically or rationally, to human perceptions of how reality ought to be designed. Therefore, they are normative and for this reason cannot be penetrated experimentally, only interpretatively. This is similarly the starting point of Geertz's interpretive anthropology. Religions are cultural, and therefore also symbolic, systems.

In religion, human conceptions of reality are not based on knowledge but on belief in a divine authority, which varies from one religion to another. In the monotheistic religions this authority is God/Allah

and every revelation that proceeds from Him. In the 'primitive' religions⁴ this authority is represented by spirits and magic. Yet a process of becoming underlies every form of reality. The concepts for reality, then, undergo a parallel change. The adaptation of religio-cultural concepts to changing reality thus forms a central component of the cultural assimilation of change, and of the way in which change is directed, inasmuch as people do not simply react to this process of change but also themselves direct it by means of cultural innovation. According to the orthodox Islamic conception, the revelation of the Koran to The Prophet Muhammed – as based on a verbal inspiration – is the ultimate truth, immutable, universally valid for the whole of humanity regardless of time and space.⁵ Within this interpretation, Islam is unalterable and cannot be adapted to any reality, for it is itself the ultimate religion, revealed by God to Muhammed as the Seal of all of the Prophets (Koran: *Khatam al-nabiyin*, sura 33, verse 40). In this essential understanding of Islam as the final revelation there exists only *one* Islamic religion. It is here that the question arises of how Muslims react to change, how they understand development and progress. Did such concepts of change exist before Islam's encounter with the West?

In Islam, Muslims believe that there is only one absolute truth, valid for all times and not at all conditioned by history. The tendency of every religion toward the Absolute is of course a universally observable phenomenon, but in Islamic doctrine it is manifested more intensely than in any other religion. The reason for this is twofold: first, the belief in the direct verbal inspiration and thus of the immutability of Koranic truth, and second the belief that Islamic revelation is final and closes the door to any further religious development. Thus, in the study of religion, Islam is 'the special case',⁶ as W.C. Smith notes.

I refer in this analysis to the study of culture⁷ and employ its concepts for understanding Islam. In this context I shall go beyond religious doctrines and propose to view religions as cultural systems, which are in fact symbolic systems offering a way to perceive reality. If these conceptions are unalterable *per se*, as in the case of Islam, even though reality is changing continually, then we are bound to ask whether Islam represents an obstacle to change, as it would seem, in light of the above interpretation, to obstruct rather than facilitate the cultural reception of change. We cannot answer this question yet; some informative exploration will first be necessary. Only on the basis of a more solid foundation is it possible to venture an answer.⁸ I may point out here, however, on the basis of comparative religious research,

that the Reformation in Christianity was a process that at once both assimilated and made possible the rise of modern society and thus became a segment of cultural modernity. A similar substantively renewed understanding of Islam has so far not been forthcoming. From this arises Islam's predicament with modernity which, in turn, gives rise to political Islam.

Some sociologists of religion tend toward a reductionism that denies the partial autonomy of religions by unhesitatingly placing them as cultural systems in a virtually causal relationship with the level of development of the respective society. Religious content, always equated with cultural patterns, has, according to Geertz, a dual aspect: it conveys for its adherents meaning to current social and psychological realities, thereby acquiring 'an objective conceptual form'.⁹ According to this understanding, the meaning of religion is both shaped by reality and at the same time shapes reality itself. Within this preliminary interpretation, religio-cultural symbols form part of reality but are not mere reflections of it, as they also affect it. It follows from this that the reduction of the position of a religion to the stage of development of a society is inadequate. Geertz calls attention to societies with comparable levels of development in which the 'degree of religious articulateness'¹⁰ is nonetheless very different. This is of course not intended to refute the notion that religious ideas can be correlated with social evolution; it is simply their reduction to a social structure that is contested here. Theodor W. Adorno makes it clear that every idea both 'belongs to the continuity of a society and is at the same time autonomous'.¹¹ This is particularly true of religious ideas, which correlate with reality but at the same time are able to make themselves independent of it.¹² The history of Islam and Islamic ideologies offers ample material to support this view. Some social scientists exaggerate to absurdity the conventional superstructure-basis mode of thought¹³ in which ideas are persistently reduced to a material structure and denied an existence of their own.

After these general remarks and my definition of religion as a 'cultural system', the notions of 'culture' and 'religion', which are central to this study, should now be more precisely delineated. In the field of cultural analysis, as well as in cultural sociology and anthropology and also in the study of literature, the reader is faced with a veritable plethora of studies in these categories. An evaluation of this literature has become virtually a task in itself.¹⁴ After a preliminary look through most of the available works on this subject, however, I have no difficulty stating along with Geertz that there are ways of avoiding the

difficulty of defining culture in 'turning culture into folklore and collecting it, turning it into traits and counting it, turning it into structures and toying with it. But they are escapes.' The only protection against this kind of unpromising cultural analysis, Geertz continues, is 'to train such analysis on such realities and such necessities in the first place . . . to place these things in some sort of comprehensive meaningful framework'.¹⁵ By this, Geertz means the symbolic dimensions of social behaviour.

In those countries where there is not yet an existing socio-structural equivalent of secularisation, the symbolic dimensions of social behaviour are articulated in a religio-cultural manner. In Muslim societies, in particular, the 'production of meaning'¹⁶ out of which these religio-cultural symbols spring is still to a large degree based on an Islamic worldview. Even the worldview of the secular and Western-educated social strata of these 55 countries, distributed between Asia and Africa and having a population of roughly 1.3 billion, still has its roots in the Islamic *Weltanschauung*.¹⁷ Existing Western approaches to the sociology of religion contribute little to an understanding of this mixture of secular outlooks and a religious worldview in societies of the Islamic civilisation. Apart from a few exceptions (for example Niklas Luhmann, *see* note 1), the study of religion consists of a repertoire of already somewhat hackneyed conceptual forms, borrowed from Max Weber and Emile Durkheim among others, which are of only limited value in trying to penetrate the subject at hand.

Geertz's attempt, in the context of his interpretative anthropology, to conceive of religion as a system consisting of symbols which convey meaning, would seem to be of use here. According to Geertz, a religion is '[1] a system of symbols which acts to [2] establish powerful, pervasive and long-lasting moods and motivations in men [3] by formulating concepts of a general order of being and [4] clothing these concepts with such an aura of factuality that [5] the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic'.¹⁸ Let us now unravel this comprehensive definition into its individual components and attempt in the process to ascertain the validity of the statements made for our analysis of Islam as a cultural system, being subjected to a politicisation in most of the crisis-ridden contemporary Islamic societies.

First, religion is described as a system of symbols, the prevailing symbols interfusing to form cultural patterns, which in turn constitute models. It is important here to call to mind the difference which has already been presented between 'models of reality' and 'models for reality'. The former relate to objects they depict, making it important

to distinguish between symbols and objects. 'Models of reality' thus consist of symbols that correspond to real objects, whereas 'models for reality' convey concepts and doctrines for reality. In this sense, a religion is a model *for* reality and not a model *of* it. Nevertheless religion has a dual character.

If I take the interpretative method for the study of religion as my starting point, I should point out, with regard to German Islamic studies in particular, that by 'interpretative method' I mean one representing the social facts of reality – the *fait social* in the Durkheimian sense – and not the scripture. German Islamic studies, in contrast to anthropological studies of Islam in the United States, as represented by Geertz¹⁹ and Dale Eickelman,²⁰ consist mainly of researching sources, that is, the quotation and interpretation of texts as a means of comprehending reality. Reality as such does not form the focus of interest. 'Critical text analysis' thus does not differ in method from the scripturalism of orthodox Muslims, as well as Islamic fundamentalists, differing for the most part only in its intention to comprehend reality in a scholarly way. Reality is measured by the model *for* it that is documented in the scripture. Religious symbols thus, for example, shape the conception of the unified Islamic community (*umma*), which has never had an objective equivalent, with the objective reality always having been the cultural diversity within Islam. Even the open-minded scholar of Islam Gerhard Endress (University of Bochum) falls prey to this error, stating that this albeit symbolically characterised but non-existent entity, the *umma*, was not destroyed until the impact of Western influences was felt, the manifold changes brought about by 'industrialization, the division of labour and mobility' *no longer permitting an all-embracing definition of 'Muslim society'*.²¹

In contrast, another more prominent Orientalist, Josef van Ess, tells us that a unified Islamic *umma* never existed in reality.²² However, Endress insists on retaining the method of 'textual deduction and source criticism' as an instrument for the study of Islam, responding to the call for more attention to social science methods with the polemic, '[a]nd anyone who cannot read the sources will often have to make do with half-measures and half-truths'.²³ Of course it is important to read religious scripture – not in order to stop at source criticism, however, but rather to observe how people perceive these texts and how they create their religio-cultural symbols in this context, so as to better understand the Islam of today as a social reality and a cultural system. As is widely known, the majority of Muslims are illiterate, which means that they are acquainted with the content of these texts (in the

first instance the Koran and *hadith*, the sayings of The Prophet) only in the form of oral tradition – which changes with history and cultural location.

According to Geertz, the symbols for reality that are offered by a religion as a cultural system produce pervasive and long-lasting motivations that cause people to act. But these actions are not necessarily in harmony with religious scripture. With regard to Islam, I can cite here the example of the strict proscription on interest charges (*riba*) which Muslims accepted subjectively in the Middle Ages, although their actions objectively contravened this religious prescript. At that time, what were known as *hiyal* (legal devices/evasions) were developed to enable people to circumvent the proscription on interest and at the same time to spare the consciences of the pious Muslims.²⁴ Geertz's interpretation of the motivations and moods evoked by a particular symbolic system is able to explain this circumstance fully: 'To be pious is not to be performing something we would call an act of piety, but to be liable to perform such acts.'²⁵ It thus becomes clear that interpretative anthropologists will not be able to find piety in the form of motivation and mood by looking for their literary sources in religious texts, although they must be acquainted with these; their task consists rather in understanding the perception and practice of religious scripture – which are considered Islamic by those concerned, although they vary to a great extent in practice – in the prevailing historically and culturally diverse situations. The exclusive focus of an Orientalist philologist on the text while ignoring the context of history does not contribute to illuminating these situations. Orientalism is not only a belief in superiority *vis-à-vis* others, but also a philology that replaces reality and becomes an instrument for essentialising Islam under the mask of value-free philological science. The othering of 'the Muslim' as *homo islamicus* replaces rational thought. The German variety of Orientalism is the most arduous in this regard.

The third part of Geertz's interpretation rests on the assumption that religion as a cultural system contains concepts of a general order of existence that are essential to the believers of a particular religious community. Geertz regards the existence of concepts of order in religious symbols as their life force. In this respect, 'man depends upon symbols and symbol systems with a dependence so great as to be decisive for his creatural viability'.²⁶ This 'disquieting sense that one's moral insight is unequal to one's moral experience'²⁷ is present in religions and can bring about a crisis. The cross-regional revival of orthodox Islam and the surge of religious fundamentalism is very closely

linked to a growing consciousness of the discrepancy between moral insight (internalised symbol) and moral experience.²⁸ The politicisation of Islam results from this discrepancy.

Taking Egypt as an example, we find that militant Islamists in Cairo are mostly of rural origin and have been living in urban centres only for a short time. Unable to reconcile their symbols with experienced reality,²⁹ they rebel, in the belief that they can reshape that disturbing reality through the medium of their political militancy, so as to make it compatible with their religious symbols. Like all developing countries, Egypt is one in which indigenous structures are disintegrating as a result of externally induced influences, for example, integration into the international system and its global structures. The rapid urbanisation process and its disruptive effects are only one example of this. Only in this sense – that is, not in the sense of the evolutionist argumentation of modernisation theory (that is, from tradition to modernity) – can these societies be defined as transitional. This is however a contested approach! The meaning and role of religious symbols foster change in social conditions. In this case, change does not need to be transitional, it could be disruptive, for it may not be a stage of transition, but an indication of disorder. Luhmann has provided an approach that helps understand such conditions. According to his interpretation, those involved are unable to determine a ‘transitional situation’. The recourse to religious symbols, which in this case are also politicised, is intended to assist in this process: ‘That which is to form the transition is “both and” or “either or” – moreover both at the same time! Its identity becomes unclear and indeterminable. This situation renders the problem of determining the indeterminable one of some urgency.’³⁰ To use Geertz’s terms, it is a question of understanding the conditions of change in which the need arises for bridging the gap between moral insight (symbol) and moral experience. This leads us to the fourth and most important part of Geertz’s line of argument.

The symbolic clothing of reality

According to Geertz’s thesis, religious symbolic systems are aimed at clothing reality with ‘an aura of factuality’. A religious person who senses a gulf between reality and concept experiences this as a chaos. There is an internal struggle to restore the order of being inherent in the religious symbolic system, now felt to be under threat. The person in question does not attempt to understand the causes of this ‘chaos’. In other words, he or she is not able to accommodate culturally the

change that has taken place in society. Geertz emphasises here 'that religious belief involves not a Baconian induction from everyday experience – for then we should all be agnostics – but rather a prior acceptance of authority which transforms that experience'.³¹ For the religious person the catchword is 'commitment, rather than analysis'.³² This attitude as generally conceptualised by Geertz can be observed on a concrete subject: orthodox Muslims and contemporary Islamists. The religious perspective in the perception of reality thus differs both from common sense and from the scientific perspective. It differs from the former in that it 'moves beyond the realities of everyday life to wider ones which correct and complete them', and it differs from the latter in that 'it moves beyond the realities of everyday life . . . not out of an institutionalized scepticism . . . , but in terms of what it takes to be wider, non-hypothetical truths'.³³ Persons with a worldview based on religion have difficulties in developing reason-based thoughts.

This part of Geertz's line of argument, more than virtually any other approach, has the capacity of explaining the contemporary situation in Islam. It is written in the Koran that Muslims are the best *umma* (community) ever created by God on earth. The discrepancy between the religio-cultural symbol of the *umma* and reality creates unease; the social environment is therefore perceived as a chaos and disorder. The symbol is clothed in an aura of factuality, which is at the same time perceived by those involved as a call to political militancy.

In the final link in his chain of definition, however, Geertz recognises that the feeling of 'chaos' is not the general rule. The moods and motivations produced by symbols appear to correspond to existing reality by being adapted to it. These symbols are not only of a general nature in the sense of ideals (for example, the ideal of the Islamic *umma*), but are also specific. It is precisely here that the significance of religion lies – 'in its capacity to serve, for an individual or for a group, as a source of general, yet distinctive, conceptions of the world, the self, and the relations between them . . . Religious concepts spread beyond their specifically metaphysical contexts to provide a framework of general ideas in terms of which a wide range of experience – intellectual, emotional, moral – can be given meaningful form.'³⁴

The metaphysical doctrines of Islam do not form the focus of attention in this analysis. At this point, I diverge from divinity scholars. Derivation from sources in the sphere of religious scripture is not the aim of this study either; I am familiar with these scriptures but am more interested in the perception of reality than in exegesis. This explains the point of divergence with the traditional students of Islam

and the Orientalists. Similarly, it is not the aim of the present analysis to provide an ethnographic survey of contemporary Muslim societies. This is the point of divergence with cultural anthropologists. The focus of attention in this study is rather what Geertz calls 'system of meaning' and the way in which this is socially produced. My interest therefore centres on the social contingency of the production of meaning in Muslim societies. The conflict between believed symbols and experienced reality in the present is the major concern of this study. I want to enquire into ways of Muslim understanding of change. In this regard I ask how Muslims seek to come to terms with changed realities in general, and how they cope with these realities in specific cases. The addressed conflict between religious conviction and experienced realities is the underlying element for the pendulum between culture and politics in contemporary Islam.

A recurring question throughout the study will be the one raised in the Introduction, namely: Will Islam as a cultural system continue to demand absoluteness and non-temporality, and therefore to be hostile to the historicisation of its religious doctrines, or will Muslims be able to develop their own ways of dealing with this absoluteness? There are two radically different options: to instrumentally adapt the doctrine to reality or to rethink it. We have learned from Geertz that the moods and motivations produced by the religious symbolic system 'appear to correspond fully with reality'. I open-mindedly agree with the thesis developed so far by critics of Orientalism, such as Maxime Rodinson³⁵ and Edward Said,³⁶ who rightly denounce the cliché of *homo islamicus* as the alleged cause of the backwardness of the contemporary world of Islam. I share their views but believe that it is important, though not sufficient, to look not only at socio-historical and socio-economic factors, but also at Islam itself for enquiring into the impediments of radical change. This view is, however, very unspecific and needs further illumination. In the present book I attempt to achieve this by operating on the assumption that religious symbols are themselves able, by means of appropriate human actions, to shape reality. The assertion that Islam reflects realities and is merely a form of articulation, was once important at the outset of the debate on Orientalism,³⁷ but is now no longer satisfactory from the point of view of the current state of social scientific research into the role of religion in the process of social change. For this reason, an ethically committed scholar in pursuit of truth cannot evade the question of the part played by Islam – as a cultural system – in existing realities. The repeated reference to the anthropology of Geertz in this chapter will be complemented

through the findings presented in this book. The reader will see how far I really go beyond the confines of Geertz's anthropology and also beyond the Saidian critique of Orientalism.

This introductory chapter also attempts in the ensuing sections to explain the core ideas of Islam without losing sight of its cultural diversity. On the one hand there are in reality religious, political, cultural and other patterns of diversity in this religion. Journalists who lack the necessary specialist knowledge refer to the 'Muslim world', as a coherent entity and a world of its own. On the other, there are also repeated ideological attempts on the part of contemporary exponents of militant Islam to lay claim to the *Kulturganzheit* of Islam, that is, the cultural entirety of this religion, and to take action to achieve this against the perceived enemies. This creates confusion and brings about a need to specify what, in fact, Islam is. Before I turn to introducing Islam equally in its unity and diversity it is important to underline the fact that the increasing significance of religion in our age is not restricted to Islam. Religion³⁸ in general and politicised religion, that is, religious fundamentalism,³⁹ in particular, are moving to centre-stage globally and this can be observed in all civilisations.

What is Islam? Unity and diversity in historical perspective: religion between doctrine and reality

My first and equally decisive encounter as an Arab Muslim born and brought up in Damascus with a non-Arab variety of Islam was in West Africa during my work in Senegal⁴⁰ in the summer of 1982. Subsequent work in many and diverse African and Asian Muslim societies reinforced my attitudes. During a discussion with Senegalese writers and Arab diplomats in Dakar, a heated argument arose as to whether drumming could be recognised as an Islamic ritual and whether belief in magic was at all admissible in Islam. For the Senegalese neither of these questions is controversial because drumming and magic both form part of their everyday culture; Arab participants, however, rejected both these phenomena on the grounds that they were 'un-Islamic'.⁴¹ On another occasion, at an international philosophy conference in November 1979, an Indonesian scholar of religion, Mukti Ali, lectured on the Indonesian conception of Islam; his remarks provoked discord among professors of al-Azhar University (the oldest Islamic university) because for them there is only one monolithic Islam, based on their own Arabocentric preconception.⁴² In the spring of 2000, in an open discussion in Cairo I was victim of the very same al-Azhar doctrine

concerning the monolithic unity of Islam. In a time span of more than two decades Cairo has changed, but the mind of the al-Azhar scholars has not! They continue to reject the diversity of Islam.

A pious Muslim would answer the question of what Islam is by saying simply that Islam consists of the commandments set forth in the Koran and the *hadith* (traditions of The Prophet Muhammed), as well as of the five pillars: the *shahada* (acknowledgment of the oneness of God and the prophecy of Muhammed), prayer/*salat* (five times a day), fasting or *siyam* (in the month of Ramadan), the payment of *zakat* (alms or gifts to the poor), and finally the *hajj* (the pilgrimage to Mecca). Clearly, this simple interpretation of Islam is shared by all Muslims and forms the Islamic consensus. But when it comes to culture, Muslims differ greatly despite the belief of belonging to one *umma*.

Religion is not only a doctrine, but is also incorporated into a social reality, consisting of a symbolic system that is culturally variable and which changes historically. The Koran does in fact recognise the existence of different peoples, as indicated in sura 49, verse 13: 'And we have created you in peoples and tribes, so that you may come to know one another.'⁴³ In other verses of the Koran, however, a special position, arising out of the revelation of the Koran in Arabic, may be derived for the Arabs,⁴⁴ which explains the dominant Arabocentric notion of Islam. Even a non-Arabic-speaking Turk, Indonesian, or other Muslim may practise religious rituals only in Arabic, for according to the Koran, *Arabiyya* is the language of Islamic revelation.⁴⁵ Similarly, non-Arabs must Arabise their names when they convert to Islam, as only Arab names are recognised as Islamic.

There are two important questions. What is Islam? How can the affirmation that there is only *one* Islam be understood in view of the diversity that exists in reality? The assertion of a monolithic Islam appears to be contradicted not only by cultural diversity, but also by the variety of political structures. In the world of Islam we encounter, for example, a monarchy in Saudi Arabia and Morocco, a republic in Algeria, autocracy in Libya, the populist 'divine' government in Iran, and even a political rule based on ethnic ideology such as the case of Muslim Malaysians ruling over Hindus and Chinese in Malaysia, among others.

Like Christianity, Islam is universalist in its outlook. In the course of its dissemination it has been professed by many non-Arab and non-Arabised peoples of Africa and Asia. The study of Islamic religious history shows, however, that Islam has developed out of a historical

imperative according to an Arab worldview, and that it has fulfilled that imperative historically.⁴⁶ In its Sunni form, Islam retains its Arab character up to this day. The Iranian variant of this religion, Shi'a Islam, deviates substantially from the original forms. Shi'a Islam, in the Persian form which it has acquired in the course of history, has its own characteristics and is no longer equivalent to orthodox, Sunni Arab Islam. Of course, there are significant Arab varieties of Shi'a Islam as in Iraq and in Lebanon,⁴⁷ nevertheless Arab Islam is predominantly Sunni Islam.

For the sake of clarity there is a need to refer to the historical roots. During the historical epoch in which Islam came into existence, the civilised world consisted of two empires: that of the Persian Sassanids and the other of the Roman Byzantines. The Arabs of the sixth century were not ranked among the civilised peoples; they were Bedouin and camel herdsmen who made a living by raiding merchant caravans and, to some extent, by trade. The Bedouin would have been unable to produce a materially developed culture. The Quraish tribe was involved in trade and dominated the merchant city of Mecca where Muhammed also began his activities and from where Islam was first proclaimed. In this tradition, which was mercantile and urban, the foundation of the Islamic religion took place. At that time, however, the dominant Arab cultural patterns were mostly Bedouin. Islam transformed a hitherto predominantly Bedouin Arab culture into an urban phenomenon. The pre-Islamic Arabs were likewise neither familiar with a state tradition nor, therefore, with central power structures of their own. Wherever they created states these were vassals of greater powers. Byzantium had its vassaldom of the Ghassanids, and the Persian Sassanids had in the Lachmid dynasty their own Arab satellite state. The Byzantines and Sassanids fought each other using Ghassanid and Lachmid Arab soldiers in proxy wars. The pre-Islamic Arabs were polytheists. They could observe that Jewish and Christian monotheists had their own omnipotent deity. Jews and Christians, moreover, despised the Arabs and regarded them as heathens, an attitude that was to persist into the period after the founding of the Islamic religion and which was to play a special role in the Christian anti-Islam polemics of the Middle Ages.

This then was the historical context in which a small religious group emerged, founded by Muhammed, and soon developed into a world-wide movement. Muhammed's small religious group was to be the core of an empire and of a major world civilisation.⁴⁸ It follows from this that the formation of a central power structure in Arabia is to be interpreted in the context of the foundation of Islam as a religion, and

within the conceptual framework used by Elias as the Islamic variant in the *civilising process*⁴⁹ in the course of which pre-Islamic Arabs became civilised.

Muhammed,⁵⁰ who is, according to the Islamic revelation, The Prophet of Allah, thus addressed in the Koran as God's messenger, was an Arab of the Quraish tribe. In 610 he started to receive the Islamic revelation in Mecca, founding a small group of followers with whom he migrated to Medina in 622 (the *hijra*, or migration, which marks the beginning of the Muslim calendar). In Medina he founded the first Islamic city-state, out of which an empire developed in the same century. In 630 he conquered Mecca, and in 632 he died. The period from 610 to 632 marks the foundation of Islam as a religion. After Muhammed's death, his successors (the caliphs) ruled; they were also Quraishi, of the ethnic tribe of The Prophet. After the murder of Uthman the Quraishi, the third successor of Muhammed, opponents of the Quraish tribe disputed the tenets that the caliph had to be of that tribe and that blood relationship with The Prophet, whose many wives had not all been Quraishi, should be the criterion for the succession. The murderers of the third caliph proclaimed The Prophet's son-in-law Ali as successor. Ali, who in fact was of the Quraish, was himself later murdered by a member of the Kharijite (seceders) sect for having entered into a compromise with the Quraishis. The latter were victorious in this conflict, their leaders founding the Umayyad dynasty (661–750), of which Damascus became the capital of *dar al-Islam*. The ensuing political history has been characterised as a search in Islam for the 'true imam/*imam salih*' being the authentic successor of The Prophet and thus combining religious with political authority.⁵¹ Unlike the early non-dynastic four Rashidun caliphs, all successive Islamic rulers, from 661 on, were parts of a dynasty. To be sure, this classical combination of religion and politics in early Islam is much different from the contemporary thoughts of political Islam we shall encounter later on. In other words: the caliphate is not the *nizam Islami* propagated by contemporary Islamists.

The establishment of the dynastic principle had the effect of anchoring orthodox Islam in the form of Sunni legitimacy and the religion of the urban Quraishi Arabs. Any opposition to this rule of the caliphate had to be based on religious principles. Thus, the supporters of Ali adopted the imam principle in opposition to the caliphate. Shi'a Islam emerged out of this conflict.⁵² Understandably, Shi'a Islam was to find its greatest response among non-Arabs in the later course of the religion's development: Iran is the home of the sectarian, Shi'a Islam,

which is implicitly in traditional conflict with Arab Sunni Islam, however much rhetoric there may be about the indivisible unity of the Islamic *umma*. The murdered caliph Ali, who was the fourth and last non-dynastic caliph, is regarded in Shi'a Islam as the first of the imams; his two sons, Hassan and Hussain, were the two ensuing main imams in the Shi'i tradition. Hassan died young and Hussain was killed by the Umayyads during an armed uprising against them. Shi'ites have mourned the death of the martyr Hussain, killed by the Arab-Sunni Umayyads, since that year. Annually, at the festival of Ashura, the classical Islamic festival of the dead, Hussain is commemorated.

It is interesting to point out here the topicality of this popular emotion. In December 1978 the then Persian military government wanted to ban these religious mourning ceremonies, fearing that they could develop into protest demonstrations against the Shah. But these processions had been taking place for centuries, and public pressure forced the military government to lift its ban. This marked the beginning of the collapse of the Shah's regime and the unfolding of the Iranian Islamic Revolution.⁵³

Shi'ite is an Arabic word which means partisan; Shi'ites are partisans of the party/Shi'a of Ali, in revolt against the Sunni, the orthodox Islam of Quraish (even though Ali himself was a Quraishi). In the course of Islamic history, Shi'a Islam became predominantly Persian Islam despite the existence of Arab Shi'ites, among other places, in Lebanon and Iraq (*see* note 47). The annual processions to commemorate the death of Imam Hussain perpetuate the tradition of pre-Islamic Persian theatre. It is important to note that the ethnic conflict between the Arabs and the *mawalis* (non-Arab Muslims) was not itself the origin of the Islamic schism between Sunna and Shi'a. Rather, this ethnic conflict deepened the schism in the course of history.

In the middle of the eighth century, the Umayyad dynasty came to a bloody end with the founding in 750 of the second Arab dynasty, the capital of which was this time not Damascus but Baghdad. The Abbasid empire marked the zenith of the development of the Islamic civilisation.⁵⁴ Due to ethnic particularism and other factors the Abbasid polity finally disintegrated, coming to an end in 1258. The particularism persisted until the fourteenth century, when the Ottoman Turks began their military conquests, at first restricted to Asia Minor, but by the sixteenth century covering the entire Arab-speaking world (excluding Morocco) in the Ottoman Empire they founded. The Ottoman Empire was Islamic, but no longer Arab. The Arab Middle East stagnated under Ottoman rule, relegated to the status of an Ottoman province.⁵⁵

Iran was Islamised after the Arab conquests, but in the Turkish period it did not belong to the Ottoman Empire. The Iranians established their own two empires – the Safavid (1501–1722) and the Qajar (1796–1925). The Sunni Ottoman Empire was constantly at war with Shi'i Iran, but failed to subdue it. Without a proper grasp of this historical background our present cannot be adequately understood. The pendulum in Shi'a Islam between culture and politics, in Iran between the Shah and the Ayatollahs,⁵⁶ and also the failure to export the Shi'i revolution into the neighbouring Sunni world are issues that need to be seen in the light of historical perspective.

In the past centuries, and until the surge of Khomeini's rule in Iran, Shi'a was at the fringe of world history in general and Islamic history in particular. In contrast, the Turks were at the centre. During its Ottoman phase, Islamic history in Europe became identified with the Turks, as Maxime Rodinson documents in his periodic division of this history of the East–West encounter.⁵⁷ This encounter is a very old and lasting one.

For understanding 'the geopolitics of Islam and the West' we need to go back to history and grasp the centuries-long rivalry temporarily expressed in the wars of Islamic *jihad* and Christian crusades.⁵⁸ The latest form of this 'encounter' is the European colonial conquest of the Muslim world. Since this time Islam can no longer be adequately understood without reference to the existential challenge posed by Europe. This challenge is the common denominator of all modern tendencies in Islam, but it does not change the historically evolved cultural and political diversity. This historical development was initiated by Napoleon's Egyptian campaign in 1798.

Even before Napoleon's Egyptian campaign and the ensuing monumental reforms of Muhammed Ali producing an Arab, European-educated generation of intellectuals, there had already been systematic tendencies toward a revival of the primordial Arab form of Islam. These potentially nativist aspirations were directed against Ottoman foreign rule, and found politico-religious expression in the Wahhabi movement, which dates back to the orthodox-educated Muslim Muhammed Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–91). On his travels in the Ottoman-ruled regions of Asia, he believed that he had observed a deviation from the original Islam, and he regarded it as his mission to lead Muslims back to genuine, orthodox Islam. Ever since, Islam has been at the crossroads facing the choice of Wahhabism or reform Islam.⁵⁹ Contemporary political Islam, even though not a traditionalism, draws on Hanbali/Wahhabi Islam.

Ibn Abd al-Wahhab did not question the autocratic, despotic style of Ottoman rule; he criticised only their debauched governance. According to him, the puritanical 'original' Islam could only be revitalised by the Arabs, and he took it upon himself to mobilise Muslims for this backward-looking utopia. For him, true Islam was the original Islam of The Prophet Muhammed's generation; he thereby designated the Arabs as the legitimate guardians of Islam, disputing the lawfulness of Ottoman rule. The Orientalist R. Hartmann emphasises that the:

Wahhabi movement as a religious movement is nothing more than a natural reaction to the adaption of Islam to complex cultural circumstances, which had clearly also led to a weakening of the core of ideas of the religion's founder and which denoted a process of Westernisation – a reaction, based on the most conservative of the four Sunni rites, that of Ahmad bin Hanbal, that is to be understood in terms of the social conditions prevailing in Arabia, which had hardly altered in any substantial way since the time of the Prophet.⁶⁰

Islamic modernism was a revitalising movement of a different tendency from that of Wahhabism. Although both movements aimed at a revival of Islam, their concepts of the form this revival should take were radically different. Islamic modernism, in its initial stages, was a primarily intellectual movement, for which modern civilisation was not so much a target for attack as an element of the postulated renaissance. Islamic modernists, therefore, did not try to turn Islam toward an archaic doctrine; they tried instead to adapt it to the modern age by enriching it with those findings of the rational European sciences that did not open its substance to question.

The contemporary variety of Islamic revivalism can be traced back to the nineteenth century. Jemaladdin Afghani (1839–97) together with his pupil and friend Muhammed Abduh (1849–1905) were confronted with Europe as a colonial power; they adopted a tough position toward it. In their writings, Islam acquires the character of an anti-colonial ideology calling for political action against Europe.⁶¹ This dimension of their thought is frequently, and with justification, referred to in the literature, although with very crude emphasis. In fact, neither Afghani nor Abduh had closed minds as far as Europe was concerned; they were nevertheless only prepared to engage in restricted cultural borrowings related to instrumental adoptions from modernity (for example,

science and technology) insofar as these would contribute to strengthening Islam against Europe.

Roughly expressed, contemporary tendencies in Islam can still be traced back to these two components: First, the archaic, static and equally purist interpretation of Islam that sees every innovation as a threat to its own existential frame of reference; and second, the modern-tinged concept of Islam, which interprets innovations, not always intentionally adopted from industrial societies, as authentically Islamic – adoption being understood as an act of retrieval. At a seminar on 'Islam and Modern Management' which I led in Cairo back in 1984, Islamic modernists argued in all seriousness that the first concept of management was to be found in the Koran, and that the United States had adopted it from there.⁶² The variety of contemporary Islamic fundamentalism differs from the Islamic modernism of the nineteenth century not only in its anti-Western militancy, but chiefly in that Islamists no longer seek to achieve a conscious synthesis of Islam and modernity. Unlike Muhammed Abduh,⁶³ contemporary Islamic fundamentalists pursue a dream of 'semi-modernity' that envisages the decoupling of the adopted instrumental accomplishments in divorcing them from their cultural context.⁶⁴

Over and above the archaic and modernist concepts of Islam, since the turn of the last century there have also been movements toward a secularisation of Islam. These are currently taboo, however; it arouses great agitation if a Muslim mentions secularisation in public.⁶⁵

Nevertheless, taken as a whole, all these religio-intellectual tendencies in modern Islam – archaic traditionalism (Wahhabism), modernism (Afghani and Abduh), contemporary Islamism and equally secularism – are largely the preoccupation of the educated classes, who form only a tiny minority of the Muslims living today, albeit representing 'the leaders of opinion'. If we depart from the level of analysis concerned with religio-intellectual concepts and turn instead to the question of how the majority of Muslims perceive the world around them, that is, phrasing the question of the Islamic worldview in this way, it then becomes necessary to proceed to the matter of popular Islam. We shall be seeing in this part of the study how the daily language of Muslims is pervaded by popular religious concepts to the extent of determining the related worldview. On these grounds it is now possible to explain the concept of cultural diversity in Islam, after having acquainted ourselves with an outline of the historical development of Islamic civilisation in the past fourteen centuries.

Using the example of the Sunni–Shi'i schism in Islam, which was at first of a religio-political although not yet of an ethnic or cultural nature, we have seen how out of this schism in the course of Islamic history two culturally distinct interpretations of Islam, an Arab and a Persian one, took shape. Although there are sizable segments of Arab Shi'ites, Shi'a Islam is regarded by Arabs as a Persian religion.⁶⁶ This division of Islam along Arab and Persian lines was not the last of its kind, however, as Islam was also adopted by many other peoples in Asia and Africa. We can thus observe, among others, the many variants of Indo-Islam, as well as the equally numerous variants of African Islam, of which the Senegalese variety has already been offered above as an example. Islam as a cultural system has been adopted by non-Arabs and integrated into non-Islamic, indigenous, previously existing symbolic systems. It goes without saying that the resulting religio-cultural synthesis is different in each case, which totally contradicts the fundamentalist as well as orthodox concept of the timeless cultural entirety of one Islam. This tension between the sacred concept of reality and reality itself is reflected in the tension between legal, that is, *shari'a*, and popular Islam. The former is the source of the legal provisions, of the model for reality; the latter is Islam in practice. In the mind of the average Muslim, however, this tension does not exist, and most Muslims believe that they live in accordance with Islamic law. The well-known John Waterbury, who conducted in his early years fieldwork in Morocco, learned in the course of living among Moroccan Muslims to focus his observations on what these people really did, and not what they thought or said they were doing.⁶⁷ This observation, which I have also made repeatedly in my own research in various regions, moves us toward the hypothesis that Muslims do not consciously face the question of coping with social change, and indeed that they do not ask the question at all, although it directly affects their everyday lives. The question is considered to be heretical, for change is viewed as a deviation from the true path of the immutable system of belief.

Islam between divine law, everyday spirituality and a rational view of the world

The tension between model and reality in Islam is made substantially clearer with the example of the relationship between the Islamic *shari'a* (divine law) and Islamic mysticism (Sufi Islam). In Islamic history, Islamic mysticism represents a not always conscious attempt to under-

mine the dogmatic edifice of legal Islam (*Shari'a* Islam). It achieves this on the one hand by seeking to expand the room for manoeuvre in the relationship between God and man, and on the other, by incorporating spiritualising elements into Islam. In studying the tensions between Sufi Islam and *shari'a* we may refer to Nicholson's work even though a comprehensive understanding of Sufi Islam as a historical religious phenomenon requires a historical not a philosophical method. Because we are concerned here with the contribution of Sufi Islam toward a redefinition of Islam, I shall only cite a few results of Nicholson's research, from which it is possible to derive some general observations. First of all, the distinction between *shari'a* and *tariqa* (literally, the way, the method) is a substantial one. Nicholson translates *tariqa* as 'the path of Sufism',⁶⁸ thereby expressing the basic theological position of the Muslim mystics, according to which there are many different ways (hence the word *tariqa*) to God. The Islam of the *shari'a*, on the other hand, recognises only the scriptural way. Against this, the Muslim mystic Abu Sa'd, whose life and work are the focal point of Nicholson's research, argues, 'innumerable are the ways of God'.⁶⁹ Abu Sa'd furthermore teaches, in contrast to the Islamic jurists, that God cannot be experienced intellectually but only spiritually. God is everywhere, says another mystic, Jili, and can therefore be experienced everywhere by the believer. This doctrine drifted, as Nicholson shows,

far away from Koranic monotheism into pantheistic and monistic philosophies. The Sufi reciting the Koran in ecstatic prayer and seeming to hear, in the words which he intoned, not his own voice but the voice of God speaking through him, could no longer acquiesce in the orthodox conception of Allah as a Being utterly different from all other beings.⁷⁰

Not only does this position lead to pantheism, it also increases the human room for manoeuvre in the relationship between God and man, since man can take the initiative in the relationship to God. In the view of Muslim orthodoxy, this is *kuf'r*, heresy. The most important Muslim mystic, Hallaj, who declared consistently: 'I saw my Lord with my heart's eye and said: "Who art Thou?"' He said Thou',⁷¹ and met his end at the gallows.

We know from scholarly research into Sufi Islam as a mystical tradition that Sufism represents the religious philosophy of popular religion in Islam.⁷² At present, this Islamic tradition is invoked by Islamic authors who are strictly rational and anything but mystics, on the one

hand, to point out ways toward establishing pluralism in Islam itself (*tariqa*), and on the other, to call to mind the Sufi concept of *batiniyya* (inwardness) in pursuit of a secularisation of Islam.⁷³ Within this rethinking of Islam a new tradition of spiritualising religiosity and a related ethic can be established; Islam would no longer be abused as the ideology of a theocratic order.

In its popular form, Islam is a modified version of Tariqa Islam, and was initially disseminated in this form outside the Arab region. There are numerous variants (African, Persian, Malaysian, and so on), each of which documents a fusion between Islam and a non-Islamic, indigenous culture. Shari'a Islam calls for the unified validity of its construed norms, whereas Tariqa Islam permits numerous different ways to God, in other words, diversity, and thus presumably religious pluralism. This distinction explains the adoption of Tariqa Islam by non-Arab cultures. This does not mean, of course, that the *shari'a* is rejected; it is also adopted, but remains on the surface as a formal, although not formalised sacral law, whereas Tariqa Islam, based on the Sufi tradition, is fully integrated. Since the surge of 'petro-dollar-Islam' in the 1970s, Saudi Arabia has been promoting its Wahhabi Arabocentric version of Shari'a Islam against religious pluralism.

The Islamisation of Africa is one of the best examples for illustrating the internal cultural differentiation of Islam. A central question here is whether Islam only found access to Africa as a popular religious form of worship. Islamic civilisation remained outside the boundaries of sub-Saharan Africa; Africa did not adopt Islamic culture *in toto*. Islamic culture was based on an urban civilisation; at that time, however, there were few urban centres in Africa. There are seven Islamic cultural zones in Africa, of which two are Arab or Arabised (Egypt and the Maghreb) – the remainder comprise West, Central, and East Africa, as well as Nilotic Sudan and northeast Ethiopia.⁷⁴ The cradle of the popular religious forms of Islam in Africa was the Maghreb, where the Islamisation and even more extensive Arabisation of the Berbers took place (Egypt already had an urban culture by the time of the Arab conquest). Islam 'came to be seen as a cultural element which could be assumed as additional to Berber custom, without displacing it'.⁷⁵ It was in the Maghreb that religious brotherhoods⁷⁶ flourished, either arising out of the Arab East (the Qadiriyya) or founded in North Africa itself (the Tijaniyya). Of the four Islamic legal schools, originating from the legal-religious internal differentiation of Sunni Islam, the Maliki school was adopted in the Maghreb, from where it spread throughout Africa. It was Sufi Islam as a popular religion, however, that 'introduced into the rigid

formalism of Maliki Islam aspirations towards personal spiritual growth and union with God through mystical ecstasy⁷⁷ and that enabled Islam to become rooted there. As regards sub-Saharan Africa, this meant the emergence of an Afro-Islamic version of Islam. The spread of Islam in Africa was based primarily on 'a fusion in life but not a true synthesis, the unyielding nature of the Islamic institutions precluding this . . . There is, therefore, an ultimate dualism in life, since this rests upon a double foundation.'⁷⁸ The separation of the sexes during rituals may be cited as an example. Because women are not permitted to pray beside men, African women remain bound up in animism, their Muslim menfolk carrying out the collective Friday prayer at the mosque. This explains why the cultivation and retention of non- or pre-Islamic cultural forms is predominantly the preserve of women, even in the most profoundly Muslim societies, and therefore not only in sub-Saharan Africa (for example, the pilgrimages to the 'saints' in Morocco). African Islam simultaneously embraces *different spheres of belief* like Islam in the strict sense, or the *shari'a*, and animism. The African *marabouts*, who in the absence of a priesthood in Islamic doctrine represent a functional equivalent to clergy in African Islam, are not only religious leaders, but also magicians and soothsayers, thereby retaining numerous magical forms of pre-Islamic African cultures. According to Maghreb tradition, the Muslim chief has the authority to bestow divine blessing (*baraka*). In addition to the *marabout* order, in African Islam there is also the position of the *wali* (saint), who is said to have worked miracles at one time and whose grave pilgrims visit to ask for his blessing. Shari'a Islam rejects this as superstition, recognising only the pilgrimage to Mecca. In North Africa there is an abundance of such graves, to which women predominantly make pilgrimages.⁷⁹

In practice, Shari'a Islam in Africa⁸⁰ can only be observed in the urban centres of Islamic regions, although formally it applies everywhere. In practical terms, the *shari'a* in Africa has permitted the indigenous culture to persist, so long as it does not threaten conflict. The dominant form of law is consequently what Africanists call the Islamic variant of customary law, in which elements of Islamic law, though not taken literally, are fused with pre-Islamic, animist habits and customs. The oil-producing Arab countries, above all Saudi Arabia, are trying today, through their development aid to Africa, to strengthen the position of Shari'a Islam; even the awarding of student grants to Africans (at Medina University, for example) serves to suppress Tariqa Islam, in its specifically African form, through the medium of ortho-

dox, primarily Wahhabi Islam. Petro-Islam has done great disservice to Islam, in many ways and on all counts.

In the debate on African Islam, the thesis had admittedly been put forward that Shari'a Islam takes a primarily Arab form, whereas popular Islam (Tariqa Islam) has adopted non-Arab forms. This view cannot be held as absolute, however, for even in the Arab cultural sphere there is an incalculable number of variants of popular Islam. The Islam of everyday life differs in many ways from that of the *ulema* (scribes), who see themselves as the guardians of the *shari'a*.

Everyday language constitutes the medium of popular Islam. We know, not only from the philological research of Moshe Piamenta on the forms which Islam takes in daily life, that the most common and central expressions in Arab everyday life are 'largely inspired by religion, and in most instances include the name of Allah either explicitly or implicitly. They are habits established and performed as a result of learning and training in socio-emotional situations.'⁸¹ The fear of God is manifest in all these expressions; the dread of His punishment of deviant behaviour governs their actions. The terms 'socio-emotional content' and 'socio-emotional situation' are key categories here, since emotions articulated in an Islamic, religious way cannot be understood as individual attitudes but as the patterns of a religiously dominated culture.

Of course, Arabic as is true of any language is subject to change. During the epoch of High Islam (750–1258), in the context of the reception of the Ancient Greek heritage, a substantial Hellenisation of the Islamic civilisation was initiated, an important product of which was Islamic rationalism and science.⁸² I could mention in this context the theory of the dual nature of truth of the Arab philosopher Averroës (Ibn Rushd), which distinguishes between religious and philosophical truth. As a result of this Hellenisation and the emergence of an Arab Islamic rationalism, Arabic also became a language of science. Conflict with the sacral language, characterised by Koranic expressions, was bound to occur. The accusation of heresy was of course likewise inevitable. To this day, Muslim fundamentalists refer to the great Islamic philosophers, Averroës and Avicenna among them as 'heretics'. In contrast, contemporary Arab rationalists, like al-Jabri, contend that a promising future for Islam could only be 'Averroëist'.⁸³

Whence does this rigidity in the Muslim worldview derive, and what are the underlying factors? According to the orthodox Muslim teaching, the world is governed theocentrically in a non-finite way. In a world of this kind, in which every human being is merely a receiver of

commands and an obedient servant in relation to God, the room for human action is necessarily very small. To this may be added that in Islamic history Islam was perceived primarily as *fiqh* (jurisprudence) and only secondarily as *kalam* (theology). In other words, the relationship between God and man in Islam is defined more in legal terms, with the aid of the Islamic *shari'a*, than in terms of theology or spirituality.

According to Islamic doctrine, the Koran is based on verbal inspiration which means that it constitutes both in form and in content the final, definitive word of God. The well-known scholar of religion and Islam Johan Bouman attempts in an interesting examination of the text of the Koran to deduce the structural form of Islamic anthropology, in order to discern what room for manoeuvre remains for the individual in the theocentric Islamic interpretation of the world. Bouman correctly discerns that the 'unique and incomparable nature of God' may be regarded as the fundamental principle of Islam, which comprehends itself as 'uncompromising monotheism'. In this respect, Islam is 'above all the successor to the heritage of Judaism. . . . Acknowledgment of the absolute uniqueness of God [is] the fundamental principle of faith.'⁸⁴ At the time of the foundation of the Islamic religion, there were of course two other monotheisms, Judaism and Christianity. Islam recognises both, interpreting the history of humanity as a history of the prophets, in which Islamic religious revelation is made by the final, definitive Prophet, the Messenger of God (*rasul Allah*), Muhammed, the 'Seal of the Prophets' who will reunite humanity. Seen from the viewpoint of the doctrine of divine unity (*tawhid*), the monotheistic faiths constitute a single community that can only be divided by a lapse in monotheistic faith. It follows from this that according to Islamic doctrine 'Muhammed assumes both a corrective and an authoritative position in this history of the prophets',⁸⁵ which designates him as 'the final seal' and defines him as the mediator of the final, ultimate word of God: Muhammed and the revealed scripture thus have the same corrective and culminative task with regard to the history of divine communication and teaching as Muhammed has in relation to the history of the prophets. This fundamental position of classical Islamic doctrine forms the religious core underpinning the Islamic claim to dominance:

On the one hand the Koran appeared as a corrective and culminative manifestation, and everything good contained in the earlier scriptures conforms with the content of the Koran; on the other

hand the homogeneous character of monotheistic revelation prohibited the existence of differences over major issues.⁸⁶

The Islamic community (*umma*) thus denies all forms of plurality and comprehends itself as the core of that proportion of mankind united by monotheistic faith. This Islamic claim to dominance and to universality is based on the assertion that Muhammed appeared as the 'Seal of the Prophets' and that the Koran brought the 'definitive, final, essential truth'.⁸⁷ The *pax islamica* which Muhammed set up within the city-state of Medina after 622 is regarded as the nucleus of the Islamic *umma* which recognises no boundaries; Muhammed appeared 'as the final arbitrator for all the cases in which disputes arise'.⁸⁸ The tradition of The Prophet, the Sunna, is therefore regarded as a source second to the Koran and is legitimised by it.

Bouman's discussion of the text of the Koran, of which he has full command, emphasises that the relationship between God and man is defined, in view of strict monotheism, by a distance between man and God so unbridgeable 'that the very nature of man makes it impossible for him to establish a relationship with God on his own initiative'.⁸⁹ God acts in a sovereign manner with regard to man, on his own initiative; the world is formed and defined according to His will, for which reason Islam is based on a strictly theocentric interpretation of the world. It is here, according to Bouman, that both the potential and the limitations of Islamic anthropology lie;

it stands in constant danger of being suffocated by the numinous omnipotence of God, although this omnipotence still leaves sufficient room for human decisionmaking . . . a possibility opens up for mutual relationship, in which Allah, however, remains the one who commands and decides, the human being, the believer, remaining the obedient servant. Within this structural form, the human being is perpetually subordinate.⁹⁰

This explanation may serve to elucidate why the real tension which exists between legal and popular Islam is not manifest at the cultural level. The human being has to live according to Koranic commandments, but must at the same time adapt in his practical life to his ever-changing environment. Popular Islam facilitates such an adaptation; the discrepancy that has emerged between religious dogma and practical ritual is not permitted to exist, since all actions must be in accordance with the commandments (*ta'alim*).

This complex relationship requires further exploration; I therefore turn in the next chapter to dealing with the basic patterns existing in Islam for the perception of change and development. Based on this closer look at the sources of the Islamic worldview I shall then engage in a social-scientific debate on the interplay between cultural and social change.

2

Cultural Patterns and the Perception of Change in Islam. A Religious Model for Reality: the Islamic Worldview

Cultural diversity in Islam contradicts the political notion of Islam as a monolithic unity and of Muslims as one *umma*. This notion can be found equally – albeit for different motives and with varying degrees of emphasis – in both Islamophobic writings and in the fundamentalist apologia of the Islamists. In contrast, I maintain: Islamic symbols are contingent upon both time and place, and the form they take varies accordingly. Social behaviour also changes, both directed by these symbols and at the same time affecting them. Nevertheless, we can also speak of an Islamic scriptural canon binding for all Muslims but slightly modified through this real and manifest diversity. In this sense, the diversity is connected to varying perceptions of the canon contingent upon time and place. While acknowledging the cultural diversity in Islam I maintain that there is a specific Islamic view of the world shared by all Muslims.

Consistent with my line of argument in Chapter 1, I construe an Islamic canon as a pure system of symbols offering a model for reality. Actual existing symbols were derived from this pure symbolic system, becoming suffused with prevailing reality. It is thus entirely within the scope of question as formulated in this study to outline the ideal model for reality, that is, the pure symbolic system of Islam. The related Islamic worldview¹ is abstracted from Islamic religious diversity (for example, the formation of sects and religious schools) and ignores consideration of the cultural differentiation,² that is, the adaptation of Arab Islam to non-Arab cultures, or inter-Arab cultural variations. This is due to the fact, that I, at this level of analysis am more concerned with the model for reality of the religious commandments (*ta'alim*) as

it forms the focal point. At various other levels of our analysis we shall become acquainted with the tensions arising from the incongruity of this model and the reality that deviates from it.³ For contemporary Muslims schooled in the rational discourse of reasoning it is hardly possible to overlook this tension between model and reality, provided their thinking is not hampered by scriptural dogmatism and religious fanaticism to the extent of dismissing reality as a 'deviation from true Islam'. It is hard to reconcile, for example, the religious proclamation 'You are the best community (*umma*) created by God on earth' with the reality in which members of this very *umma* rank among the underdogs in the present global system dominated by the West.⁴ Many contemporary Muslim thinkers are similarly concerned with the vexing questions of history and revelation in Islamic teaching.⁵

To begin with, I shall proceed from the hypothesis that particular issues in contemporary Islam – in this case the relationship between scriptural Islam and socio-political realities – needs to consider the following and be dealt with accordingly:

- First, the fundamental issues of modern Islam can hardly be discussed without reference to the early patterns of this religious system.
- Second, contemporary Islam cannot be adequately interpreted without taking into account its exposure to Europe, which by virtue of industrialisation is superordinate to it and hence in a hegemonial⁶ position *vis-à-vis* the Islamic civilisation.

Both constraints affect the Islamic worldview in all of its variations.

The reference to the first fact implies by no means a historical review of early Islam, desirable though this may be. Throughout Islamic history, the first Islamic polity of Medina, founded by The Prophet Muhammed, has been deemed the original Islamic community and is therefore regarded by Muslims to date as the authoritative model for every future solution. In the literature of Islamic revival that has been appearing on a massive scale in most Muslim countries during the last decades we repeatedly find the reference to the Islamic solution (*al-hall al-Islami*),⁷ being consistently a return to the model of Medina. It is not, then, for reasons of theology and the academic study of religious history, but because of the temporal retrospective orientation of Islam itself that attention to the formative years of Islam in the early seventh century is central to the discussion of Islam, development and the related worldview.

The second sphere of issues, that of Islam and Europe – and later, the West – arises out of the classical Islamic dichotomy according to which the world is divided into Muslim and non-Muslim territoriality, that is, in *dar al-Islam* and *dar al-harb* (the house of Islam and the house of war). The relations between both are thus characterised by peace and war respectively.⁸ In other words, Islam declares itself to be the ultimate and absolute monotheism, thereby claiming an absolute character correlating to the doctrine of Islamic dominance. This worldview runs counter to religious pluralism. In pursuit of democratic peace there is a need for a reconciliation of Islam and democracy, which requires the abandoning of this claim to absolutism. The Muslim legal scholar Najib al-Armanazi has shown that the cited Islamic dichotomy has never been revised for the favour of religious and cultural pluralism.⁹ Thus, the dichotomic Islamic view of the world persists.

Along the lines of the Islamic worldview non-Muslim territory is historically and perceptually identified with *dar al-harb*, the house of war. The changed realities in our present world, which has grown from the European expansion reaching out globally, are compelling. The contemporary world of Islam is now subdivided into 55 nation-states. From these changes it follows that the classical Islamic dichotomic scheme of war and peace is inapt for describing Islamic–European relations. The cultural superiority of the Islamic civilisation *vis-à-vis* Europe during the epochs of the Arab Islamic empire, and the military and political threat to Europe posed by the *jihad* invasions first by the Arabs and later by the Ottoman Turks, have been supplanted by European dominance on a global scale in cultural, political, and military terms.¹⁰ Under these new conditions, underpinning a new relationship between Islam and Europe, the Islamic concepts of development and the related worldview have been persistently under pressure to adopt.

The complexity of the posed questions indicates thus far the difficulty in answering all of them properly. The attempt to determine what the model of Islam and the related worldview is in light of the existing religious and cultural diversity leads us to concern ourselves first with the basic religious views shared by all Muslims, and then expose them to realities. Due to the fact that the issues addressed are imbued with religious content with roots going back to the original Muslim community of Medina and its legitimation through the Koran and the Sunna (the tradition of The Prophet), it becomes clear that a consideration of early Islam and its concepts of political and social development is indispensable. I shall then proceed to examine the problems of development in the altered historical situation, which

now favours Europe and to which modern Islam has tried to find an answer since the nineteenth century.¹¹

The historical background: the Islamic religious view of the world, its sources and its goal

The historical situation in which Islam came into existence was marked by rivalry among competing Arab tribes resulting in an absence of unity. At the world political level, the then two great empires of the Byzantines and of the Sassanids in Persia, were in a state of war. At the religious level, Christianity and Judaism were mutual rivals, whereas the Arabs, at that time polytheists, had no state structure of their own aside from being vassal states (the Lachmids and the Ghassanids) of the world powers. They were organised on the Arabian peninsula – as indicated – in uncivilised, fiercely competing nomadic tribes.¹² Seen in this light the propensity in Islam for unification and for universal standardisation becomes understandable. The Islamic doctrine of unity (*tawhid*) embodies this religious message against the tribal fragmentation in pre-Islamic Arabia.

After Muhammed's migration (*hijra*) from Mecca as a result of political persecution in 622, he founded in Medina the first Islamic polity, the basic principles of which were laid down in the 'municipal code of Medina'. The leading international historian of early Islam, W. Montgomery Watt, states that this new code

essentially represents a treaty of alliance in accordance with traditional Arab principles . . . In addition to this, entry into the alliance became a strict prerequisite for the adoption of Islam. Non-Arab Muslims had to become clients of Arab tribes, non-Muslim groups becoming 'protected minorities' . . . It is stated in two Articles that in the event of disputes which could split the community, the people should turn to 'God and Muhammed'.¹³

It has already been suggested that the Islamic doctrine of unity (*tawhid*) was the linchpin of this political order. Islam interprets itself as a strict, uncompromising (*la ilaha illa Allah*/There is no God but Allah) and ultimate monotheism, recognising no authority other than Allah, either in heaven or on earth. Allah is not an Arab, Muslim God, as may be read in medieval polemics against Islam, as this word has no other meaning than 'God'. On this point Watt states:

When speaking of Islam, the Arab word Allah is commonly translated as 'God'. This implies that the God whom Muslims serve is the very same God worshipped by Jews and Christians. There are several million Arab-speaking Christians who have no other word for God than Allah.¹⁴

On the basis of the Islamic doctrine of unity, contemporary Islamic fundamentalists construct a concept of an Islamic world order¹⁵ and they refer in this context to the city-state of Medina as the foundation stone of a universal political order to be ruled by Islam. To be sure, this is a modern construction, not an Islamic teaching. Still, Islam does not start from an assumption of diversity, but solely on the basis of a single unified order. After a thorough textual analysis of the Koran, the German divinity scholar Bouman came to the conclusion that 'the concept of uniformity dominates the message of the Koran like a constant factor'.¹⁶ The historical situation prevailing at the time of the foundation of Islam, in which the then perceived humanity was divided into a number of both monotheistic (Jewish and Christian) and polytheistic (Arab pagan) confessional communities, led The Prophet Muhammed to claim that he was bringing definitive unity with the message revealed to him. The goal of the development of humanity for Islam thus consists in guiding it to the point where it becomes a unified monotheistic community. It is in this sense that Islamic teaching as based on the Koran and revealed through the last of all the prophets of God, Muhammed, is 'the final essential truth'¹⁷ for mankind. This is clearly a universalist worldview and yet it is still something different from the view of an Islamic world order as propagated by contemporary Islamists. Clearly, this modern concept is an 'invention of tradition' – it has no roots in Islamic heritage.

Acceptance of Islam during the foundation of the city-state of Medina entailed both submission to God and unconditional recognition of his messenger (*rasul*) Muhammed as arbitrator. Since that time it has also entailed acknowledgement of the Koran as the ultimate, definitive word of God, and the Sunna (tradition) of The Prophet and Messenger of God. This is the core of Islamic belief. The terms for the relationship of Muslims to others has been defined by the doctrine of Islamic dominance over others. Apart from Muslims, Islam classifies people of other faiths within its territory either as unbelievers (*mushrikun* or *kuffar*) or as 'people of the book' (*ahl al-kitab*). In contrast to the 'unbelievers', who are not to be tolerated, Jews and Christians are accepted as monotheists. In this capacity, they are recognised as

tribute-paying 'protected minorities' under the banner of Islam. In referring to the dichotomic Islamic worldview, non-Muslim territory is perpetually *dar al-harb*, the sphere of war, with which it is permitted to conclude temporary peace treaties (*hudna*) only in times of Muslim weakness.¹⁸ Proselytisation defined as Islamic *da'wa* is an obligation for Muslims with the implication of enhancing *dar al-Islam* to map the entire world. This unifying of humanity is in the Islamic worldview the ultimate goal of history. To be sure again, this is something different from the contemporary Islamist notion of an Islamic world order.

In the view of scriptural Islam, within the Muslim community there can be only one concept of Islam. The Koran calls those Muslims of Medina who did not fully submit themselves to The Prophet 'the hypocrites' (*munaḥiqun*). Turning away from Islam or conversion from Islam to another religion is not permitted and punishable according to Islamic penal law – but not in the Koran – under the charge of apostasy (*ridḍa*); apostates (*murtaddun*) may be executed. The accusation of apostasy against the Egyptian Professor Nasr H. Abu-Zaid, his indictment by an Egyptian court and sentence are signs of the revival of the medieval intolerance of *takfir* (accusation of unbelief) in contemporary Islam. Abu-Zaid had to leave the country in order to save his life. He moved to Europe and is currently teaching at Leiden in the Netherlands. It is bizarre to see how the Islamic diaspora changed his attitudes – the same Abu-Zaid who in Cairo was a victim of Islamist intolerance dismisses the criticism of Islamism as 'igniting fears against Islam',¹⁹ after he moved to the West. In Dutch Leiden he shifted the focus now moving against the alleged 'enemies of Islam'.

It is clear from the discussion so far that, on the one hand, the Islamic view of the world is bound to the belief that humanity will become a united monotheistic community under the banner of Islam. It is incumbent on Muslims to move in this direction. That the original Muslim community of Medina remains an enduring model in perpetuity makes it obvious, on the other hand, that future development is oriented according to an ideal of the past, the municipal code of Medina (*pax islamica*). It follows that orthodox Islam is not familiar with utopian thoughts. Although there have been political movements in Islamic history that have proclaimed utopian notions of salvation – for example, the Karmathians (*Qarmata*) – Muslim orthodoxy has always rigorously opposed them as heresy and persecuted and executed their supporters. At present we may, however, consider the Islamist vision of an Islamic world order, as articulated by contemporary Islamic fundamentalists, to be the Islamic utopia for the new millennium.

In conclusion, it can be stated that Islamic doctrine has two different understandings of history: a forward-looking option for the future and humanity, which envisages humanity becoming united under the banner of Islam; and a backward-oriented utopia, bound up with the aspiration of restoring the original Islamic community of The Prophet at Medina. Both concepts determine the Islamic worldview, which is based on dichotomising the globe in an Islamic and a non-Islamic territoriality.

The Islamic sources of the prevailing cultural patterns

The delineated major aspects of the Islamic worldview are documented in the Islamic doctrine, being its major source. It is not only experts who are aware that the Koran is recognised by all Muslims as the sole primary source of Islam, Sunnis and Shi'ites alike. Inasmuch as The Prophet Muhammed was a messenger from God, he is acknowledged as arbitrator. The handed-down traditions of his verbal utterances and deeds are described as the practice of The Prophet (Sunna), having evolved after his death into a complementary source of Islam, second to the Koran. Resting on the Koran and the Sunna, Islam interprets itself not only as a monotheistic religion, but also as a legislative code perceived within a theocentric context. Nevertheless, the *shari'a* as the divine law of Islam is a post-Koranic construction.

According to Islamic doctrine, all past, present and future development derives from these religious sources. It follows, therefore, that no interpretation of the Islamic views on change can be accomplished without dealing with the historical importance of the Koran and Sunna as the sources of the Islamic doctrine, despite varying interpretations. Within the Islamic perception, the Koran is, in its present form, an unaltered version since the revelation received by Muhammed. Watt and other Western students of the Koran, however, working with the methods of historical and critical text analysis, have arrived at the hypothesis that some revisions after the revelation must have taken place. As evidence for this, Watt points out places in the text of the Koran where, for example, it is possible to discern 'rhyming phrases that do not fit into the passage . . . abrupt changes of rhyme . . . , the juxtaposition of apparently contradictory assertions'.²⁰ Initially, Muhammed's followers learned the revealed Koranic verses by heart. In the time of Muhammed, the text of the Koran was recorded on stones, on palm leaves, and above all with the aid of the 'heart of man', meaning human memory. After Muhammed's death there was a group

of *qurra'*, that is, those Muslims who had learned the entire Koran by heart. But as important *qurra'* members met their deaths in military *jihad* campaigns, The Prophet's successors, the caliphs, recorded the text of the Koran permanently on parchment. According to Watt, the edition of Zayd Ibn- Thabit, created between 650 and 656, is the only existing edited version of the Koran that has been handed down to this day and that is regarded as authoritative by all Muslims with the exception of the Shi'ites. Shi'ites see in it evidence of *tahrif*, falsification, alleged to have come about when Sunnis removed those parts of the text in which the first Shi'ite imam, Ali, was designated successor to The Prophet.²¹ In other respects, however, Shi'ites also accept the Arabic text of the Koran.

Both, those in political authority and ordinary individuals are obliged to express their Islamic faith by constantly striving to bring their actions into harmony with the Koran. For this reason alone, it was necessary to interpret the messages of the Koran, so as to be able to legitimise adjustment to change. After the expansion of Islam and its worldwide dissemination during the era of the Umayyad caliphate (661–750) and above all during the period of High Islam (750–1258), when Islam evolved into a world civilisation, there arose the urgent necessity to understand and cope with the complex political, economic, and social structures that had emerged. All the great Koranic commentaries stem from this epoch. After the collapse of the Arab Islamic empire in the thirteenth century, no significant Koranic commentaries were forthcoming until the nineteenth century.

The importance of the Koran for Muslims as the source of their perception of past, present and future development can only be understood, and its true position realised, by taking into account Islamic teaching, according to which the Koran is based on a verbal inspiration by God to The Prophet. If we call to mind the previous remark that Islam is a strict, uncompromising monotheism, we can properly understand the nature of the Islamic doctrine of theocentrism: God rules the world and directs it according to His will, that is, according to His revelation, contained in the Koran. Koranic exegesis is thus a means for coping with political, social, and economic change. This observation can also help explain attempts on the part of contemporary Muslims to comprehend problems of the modern age with which they have to cope through this medium of Koranic exegesis.²² The strict monotheism reflects a cultural view of the world and need not be political. At the present time, Islamic fundamentalists ignore the scholarly tradition of the diversity of Koranic interpretations in arbitrarily politicising the

related cultural concept. The result is a totalitarian political system they call *hakimiyyat Allah*/God's rule. Neither this term nor the related concept can be found in the Koran, nor in Islamic heritage. The concept is clearly a product of the politicisation of religion in Islam.

Like other monotheisms, Islam also recognises an afterlife as a prospective future in heaven for the whole of humanity (heaven and hell, with appropriate punishment or reward for life in this world). For this world, however, Muslims recognise solely the primordial community of The Prophet as a guideline for development. To be sure, this essential belief is merely a historical product. The basis for this belief is to be found in the Koran and the Sunna. As already stated, the Islamic concept of the future is retrospective, with the seventh century as the yardstick for all political, social and economic development. The Koran also constitutes the central source for orthodox Muslims for the purposes of coping with contemporary issues. 'From the doctrine that the Koran is the word of God, the ordinary Muslim draws the conclusion that it is infallible in every respect, even on scientific and historical issues.'²³

On the path of Koranic exegesis, all human actions are defined and all changes in society are determined. Islamic theology (*kalam*) and jurisprudence (*fiqh*) are thus based primarily on Koranic exegesis. In contrast, rational philosophy in Islam established reason as a basis of knowledge, but failed to institutionalise this progress. The decline of Islamic rationalism in medieval Islam resulted in the stagnation of the Islamic civilisation. In modern times, innovative Islamic thinkers have attempted to reopen creative Koranic exegesis; they have been at pains to reconcile the Koran with technological and scientific borrowings from the West.²⁴ This endeavour formed the core of the Islamic modernism of the nineteenth century.²⁵

Following Watt's research into the Koran, it is possible to discern 'that the message of the earliest parts of the Koran relates mainly to the conditions prevailing in Mecca at that time',²⁶ and that in general many verses of the Koran can only be correctly understood 'if one is familiar with the particular characteristics of Arab life, especially with life in the desert and with the Arab way of thinking'.²⁷ Here again we are confronted with the problem of coping with change using a retrospective, that is backward-oriented utopia. During the zenith of Islamic civilisation, which received substantial impulses from the process of Hellenisation,²⁸ Islamic philosophers (chiefly Averroës) endeavoured to resolve this problem by evolving a theory of the dual nature of truth. This tradition of Islamic rationalism²⁹ was rigorously opposed by Muslim orthodoxy.

Islamic rationalism acknowledges the Islamic revelation, but it distinguishes between religious and philosophical truth, each of which has its own proper sphere.³⁰ The acknowledgement of the primacy of reason in Islamic medieval philosophy smooths the way for the rational determination, that is, secularisation of knowledge. Today, Muslim secularists (and I include myself³¹ among them) are at pains to historicise Koranic knowledge and also to interpret the Koran and the Sunna as the source of a divine ethic which belongs to the realm of inwardness (*batiniyya*), thereby derigidifying the scholastic understanding of the Koran. The dominant approach, however, continues to subscribe to scripturalism of the *ulema* (scribes). Watt addresses this complex phenomenon, showing that:

many parts of the Muslim world still operate very conservatively. A person who pushes forward too quickly will perhaps encounter difficulties in one way or another. Although a reconciliation with modern thinking has been set in motion, much still remains to be done. Some paths that have been taken have proved to be dead ends. Others look promising, but so far no-one has gone very far along them.³²

The persecution of intellectuals throughout the world of Islam is a case in point. It was considered a 'sin' by Abu-Zaid to argue that a reason-based knowledge can also be applied to the study of Islamic religious sources. This case is a clear indication of the dominance of orthodoxy as well as of fundamentalism in determining what interpretation of Islam is to be allowed.

With regard to Islamic concepts of the future, the position of fundamentalism, integrism or Islamism, call it what you prefer, may be outlined as follows: Only the primordial community of The Prophet is to be accepted as the point of orientation. Clearly, this primordialism is constructed and then projected into modern Islam, which is often confused with *salafiyya*. These people view the *salaf* (the 'good old' original community of The Prophet) as the sole source for determining the development of all Muslim communities even in the new millennium. We must note, however, that in contemporary Islam, *salafiyya* is a traditionalism. In contrast, political Islam³³ being a variety of fundamentalism differs greatly from traditionalism; the basic formulas of Islamic fundamentalists are imbued with modern concerns. I have coined the term semi-modernity for describing such views. The major difference between Islamism and *salafiyya* relates to the interpretation of the pri-

mordial model of Medina as a community in Islamic traditionalism, on the one hand, and as a political state order by fundamentalists, on the other. This is a substantial difference when it comes to debating Islam between culture and politics.

Islamic law (Shari'a): a social regulative or a stumbling block?

In anticipating the chapter on *shari'a* in this book it seems imperative to address here some basic issues. My point of departure is the tradition of Max Weber, according to which law is defined as the regulative element in social development; it both governs the forms of social interaction and renders them accountable, so that processes of development may also be directed with the aid of law. No complex social system can dispense with legal norms, and even simple social systems have some legal basis. Such systems (for example, the pre-colonial, non-literate cultures of sub-Saharan Africa) may not be familiar with written law, yet they do have customary legal traditions. *Shari'a* has written records, but it is, unlike Western law, an interpretative and not a codified law. Nevertheless, traditional *shari'a* is not a law for the state, because it is virtually a civil law that focuses on human relations such as marriage, divorce, inheritance and the like. It is only after the politicisation of this cultural pattern by Islamic fundamentalists that *shari'a* becomes a law for creating the political order of an Islamic state.³⁴

Although the pre-Islamic Arabs had a written language, they had no written law; their life was designed by customary law. The most important pre-Islamic customary legal norm was the vendetta. In view of the absence of a central state power structure with legal norms at its disposal, the fear of blood revenge served as an equivalent for the directive function of law. Muhammed, Prophet of God and political leader of the polity of Medina,³⁵ initially assumed the function of an arbitrator among disputing Arab Bedouins; the *pax islamica* of Muhammed may be defined as a 'federation of Arab tribes', established on the basis of the legal norms contained in the Koran. It was a polity not a state structure.

Islamic law is post-Koranic and constructed, but it was and still is to this day perceived as a *lex divina*. In early Islam it had the character of a *lex talionis*, taking the place primarily of the ancient Arab, pre-Islamic customary legal norm of repaying an offence with a like punishment. What was new was that the Muslim community, the *umma*, now

carried out the act of punishment – no longer did the injured party take justice into its own hands.

After the Muslim *jihad* conquests, called *futuhāt* (opening), and the unfolding of a process of civilisation within the *pax islamica*, a *lex talionis* was no longer sufficient for the regulation of social interaction; the increasingly complex *pax islamica* necessitated a legal system to match. The unfolding of the Islamic legal system, which has been reconstructed by the Scottish legal historian Noel Coulson and the German-British scholar of Islam Joseph Schacht,³⁶ nonetheless evolved within the confines of Islamic doctrine, based on the Koran and the Sunna. Islamic sacral jurisprudence (*fiqh*) has similarly rested on Koranic exegesis and the reconstruction of the Sunna of The Prophet through the medium of oral and written tradition.

In contrast to Christianity, in Islam jurisprudence not theology takes primacy; not the *kalam* but the *fiqh* (literally, 'knowledge') was regarded as the core of 'Islamic knowledge' *par excellence*. Schacht rightly states: 'It is impossible to understand Islam without understanding Islamic law.'³⁷ The Muslim scribes, the *ulema*, who have come to represent a kind of Muslim clergy – even though Islamic doctrine does not recognise a clerical class – do not see themselves as theologians but as legal scholars. *Alim*, the singular form of *ulema*, means 'scholar' in Arabic. In Islamic history, the *ulema* were thus the embodiment of Islamic *fiqh* in its capacity as Muslim knowledge *par excellence*. Islamic philosophers, being the rationalists of Islam, failed to reach such a high social ranking.³⁸

Unlike Christianity, Islam is not an ecclesiastical, but an organic religious system; it has no church institutions, but it offers regulations for all spheres of life as an organic whole. *Shari'a*³⁹ as the Islamic understanding of law corresponds to this, embracing both the sphere of public worship, *ibadat*, and of business dealings, *mu'amalat*. Its essence is the regulation of what is permitted, *halal*, and what is illicit, *haram*. External control over the observance of *haram* and *halal* takes the form of Islamic legislation (*tashri'*), whereas internal control takes the form of guidance during the course of the Muslim upbringing (*taujih*). We shall find out more about this in the chapter on *shari'a*.

The Islamic post-Koranic legal system is clearly a constructed one; it evolved between the late seventh and the ninth centuries. In addition to the Koran and the Sunna as primary sources, the legal techniques of *qiyas* (analogy deduction) and *ijma'* (*consensus doctorum*) also evolved as secondary possibilities for defining laws. If neither the Koran and

Sunna nor these methods provided legal answers to problems of development, the methods of *ijtihad* (independent legal reasoning, or stretching of a point in individual cases) was permitted. However, by the beginning of only the tenth century, the developmental process of the Islamic legal system was considered by Muslim legal experts (the *faqih*s) to be complete and already to have reached a state of perfection. From that time until the nineteenth century, no further development was permitted in Islamic law. Only with the onset of a confrontation with the developed, industrialised West – the technological-scientific superiority facilitated its intrusion into the abode of Islam – were the gates of *ijtihad* opened once again by some of the more enthusiastic innovators among Muslim scholars. They provided no solution, however. The result of this historical situation was the emergence of compound legal systems, such as Anglo-Muhammedan Law in the anglophone Muslim colonial region and the *Droit Musulman* in the francophone Muslim colonial region.⁴⁰

During the epoch of High Islam, when economic prosperity engendered a social structure with which a sacral legal system could hardly be expected to cope, various methods were evolved for legally circumventing the rules of the *shari'a*.⁴¹ In the sphere of state politics, another escape from the *shari'a* was also developed in medieval Islam. The caliphate⁴² was considered to be governed by the *shari'a*. However, the distinction between *siyasa*,⁴³ as a domain of the caliph, and *shari'a*, as a domain of the *ulema*, amounted to a separation between religion and politics. Literally, *siyasa* means 'politics', but in fact it refers to administration, as it concerns the administrative measures of the Muslim ruler and in practical terms removes it from the sphere of *shari'a* legal control. *Shari'a* was restricted to civil law.

The link between cultural change and *shari'a* touches on a crucial problem in Islamic history that persists to our present: How does law cope with the problems of development? The Islamic legal experts verbally attached the law to the revealed word of God, the Koran, and removed it from the possibility of adapting to changed conditions. *Shari'a* is thus conceived as being immutable, not subject to historical change;⁴⁴ even though varying interpretations are allowed, social change is ignored, however. Under these conditions, the only remaining possibility is to acknowledge existing law verbally and then circumvent it legally in social practice through the use of *hila* (trick). A cultural innovation in Islam as a cultural system, however, would open up other possibilities. This issue will be discussed in the chapter on Islamic law.

The exposure to the industrial West in the modern age

The major challenge to the traditionally transmitted Islamic view of the world has been the exposure of Islam to modernity. The *ulema* (scribes) were supposed to deal with this challenge. In fact, Islam does not recognise a clergy, although in the course of its historical development a Muslim clerical class, the *rijal al-din* (men of religion) who as a rule belong to the *ulema* (scribes), has arisen. A clerical class came into being in institutions which had likewise not been foreseen by doctrine and which evolved largely within the fold of Arab-Islamic law (as well as during Ottoman Turkish rule); these institutions still definitely exist today in a modified form, depending on the country. In historical Islam the core-issue is law/*shari'a*, despite the fact that this term occurs only once in the Koran. The Islamic religious institution embraces the external law and education. Therefore, this book includes in Part III chapters devoted to illuminating both.

Islam in social realities is 'in the first instance a juristic and a pedagogical institution. During the course of time, men with such an education were appointed to positions which in other religions would be occupied by priests, especially after property had been transferred to them in the form of pious institutions (*awqaf*).'⁴⁵ In the nineteenth century, these scholars of religion found themselves overwhelmed by the problems of the technological-scientific age and have ever since been incapable of giving appropriate answers to the outstanding questions and burning issues of the Islamic world. Their response to the challenge of modernity ranges from apologia in the past to political Islam/Islamism in the present.

On the surface, the exposure to the West was a military one, but in essence it was a confrontation between civilisations with different standards of development and different worldviews. The gateways of this exposure were south-eastern Europe, where the Ottoman Empire had been pushed back into its Turkish heartlands by the now superior European armies, and Egypt, where Napoleon Bonaparte had attempted to block his English adversaries' route to India.⁴⁶ The military weakness of the Muslims in this encounter led them to adopt first the European institution of the modern army,⁴⁷ but cultural borrowings inevitably followed. The question is: in what spirit were these alien elements adopted, and how was the change instigated by this situation perceived? The corresponding attitudes underlie the oscillation between culture and politics in Islam.

At the beginning of the process cultural open-mindedness characterised the exposure to the West. An indication of this was provided by Rifa'a Tahtawi, the first Muslim Imam to go to Paris, who accompanied a group of Egyptian students in 1826. He was so impressed by French culture that he himself wanted, and indeed obtained permission, to study there. In his Paris diary, he writes of his astonishment that French teachers did not adhere to texts in order to find the truth, whereas Islamic scholars wrote merely 'commentaries and supercommentaries' on traditional texts. With regard to the relationship between religion and development, Tahtawi's following observation should be mentioned:

When it is said of someone in France that he is a scholar, this does not mean that he is versed in religion but that he is familiar with other sciences. It is not difficult to see the superiority of these Christians over others in the sciences, and consequently also that in our countries many of these sciences do not exist at all.⁴⁸

Tahtawi was the first Islamic scholar in the nineteenth century to recognise the conflict at issue. The premodern Islamic cultural patterns were in crisis in the technological-scientific age.⁴⁹ al-Tahtawi writes in his diary: 'Naturally I approve only of that which does not contradict the tenor of our Islamic law.'⁵⁰ This phrase demonstrates the concern of a Muslim from a traditional family and educational background who was aware that the Islamic civilisation had to learn and adopt elements from industrial Europe in order to overcome its backwardness, without, in the process, relinquishing its own identity. In the ensuing decades this remains the central problem of Islam's predicament with modernity. Are Muslims able to cope with social change and to accommodate it culturally without undertaking appropriate concomitant changes within their cultural system, that is, within Islam itself? Could Muslims adopt modern science and technology while retaining the metaphysical and theocentric worldview described above? Could Muslims appropriate modernity while rejecting the reason-based worldview related to it?

The modern history of Islam includes many cases that serve to illustrate the problems inherent in the relationship between Islam and development. On the one hand, an evaluation of attempts at modernisation support the view that in the Islamic civilisation it is not possible to cope successfully with the challenge of modernity in

instrumentally adopting items without including Islam and culturally innovating it in the process. On the other hand, the experiences of the self-styled 'Islamic Republic' in Iran have shown that establishing an Islamic state is not the solution to the conflict between Islam and modernity. This perennial conflict has affected Islamic civilisation in modern times since its exposure to the West and continues to do so in the new millennium. The Islamic revolution in Iran has failed to deliver what it promised, that is, to provide a way out of this impasse. It has been viewed not only as an alternative model to the West, but also as a revolution for export. With hindsight, Khomeinism has failed to present itself as a model for the world of Islam and also in its bid to export itself.⁵¹ The politicisation of Islamic cultural patterns in order to elevate them to a political model for reality has proven a risky way of dealing with the exposure of Islamic civilisation to the West. Despite the failure, the issue continues to prevail: the use of Islamic cultural symbols for political ends. This issue is to be placed into the global phenomenon of the crisis of post-bipolar order and politicised religion.⁵² Islam is only a case in point.

3

Culture and Social Change: Tradition and Innovation in Cultural Analysis

Religion is a cultural system and culture is increasingly becoming a pertinent issue in world politics, but the debate on these issues is quite hazy. We need to ask: What is culture? At the outset we may observe that by the end of the Cold War the political focus on bipolarity was being phased out, and this coincided with the flaring up of religious and ethnic conflicts. A greater interest in the study of culture is developing. However, a clear concept of the issue itself is not available. At least there is a need for an understanding of culture that goes beyond the existing anthropological account and also relates culture to civilisation beyond traditional wisdoms on these issues.¹ Cultural analysis has its classical roots in pre-war German sociology and I suggest looking at this to begin with. In the now classic article 'Cultural Sociology', originally published by Vierkandt in the *Handwörterbuch der Soziologie* (Handbook of Sociology), Alfred Weber defines culture as a 'spiritual and intellectual expressional form within the substance of life, or a spiritual and intellectual attitude toward it'.² In that article Weber continues: 'The social structure has hence been the most essential object of spiritual and intellectual formation throughout all ages' (p. 243). He concludes by stating:

Coming to terms with traditions and the *ideal* or *religious* incrustations of existence is in every *new* constellation – as we would describe the new historical situation in a sociological, technical way – mostly at least *as important* as the endeavour to capture and form, or come to terms with, the new naturalistic, practical, and intellectual stuff of life (p. 244).

Does this understanding of culture contribute to a better grasp of the oscillation of religion between culture and politics as addressed in the case of Islam?

The study of culture at the crossroads

Prior to the contemporary revival of cultural studies after the end of the Cold War the place of culture in social theory has been a controversial issue. Along the lines of dividing social science into 'left' and 'right',³ social-scientific thought has persistently been of a one-sided and indeed one-dimensional orientation. Marxist structural analysis was opposed to the behavioural approach. The need in cultural analysis⁴ for a combination of these two approaches, that is, the analysis of social structure *and* the theory of social action, on the grounds that both are equally essential for the development of theories orientated towards society as a whole, has not progressed beyond the level of appeal. Although it is not my purpose to take up these theoretical and methodological questions here, they do nevertheless need to be addressed. There are still social scientists who suggest that socio-cultural norms and the attitudes associated with them are the direct reflections of an existing socio-economic structure and of the level of its development. As a rule, such concepts turn out to be *a priori* constructions and armchair theorising without any empirical basis, since such theoreticians are unable to explain how it is possible for cultural norms to persist for centuries in certain cultures quite independently of the prevailing level of socio-economic development. Cultural studies are confronted with the reproach of 'essentialism' which serves as a tool for playing down the observation of cultural persistence to socio-economic change. Any proper dealing with the pivotal role of cultural values needs to be based on a reference to facts and be free of essentialist bias. To point out, for instance, that in many Muslim cultures, virginity is regarded as a substantial mark of honour (*sharaf*) and to add that this cultural value has persisted throughout the centuries is simply a statement of fact. This socio-cultural value and the often dramatic attitudes associated with it are as widespread today as they were during the Middle Ages, as much part of a highly modern urban environment as of an archaic rural one.⁵ Further examples could be added; only lack of space and the need not to lose sight of the focal issue prevent me from citing them here. Of course, cultural values change, but cultural change is not a reflection of social change, there is an interplay between both.⁶

Just as prevalent as the Marxist reductionists criticised above, certain social scientists argue that changes in the dominant procedure of socialisation – that is, embracing modern values and norms in place of the old ones – are sufficient in themselves to bring about a dynamic change in a society. The idea that the surmounting of underdevelopment signifies *The Passing of Traditional Society*, in the sense of a departure from handed-down norms and values, is not only to be found in the outdated work of Daniel Lerner,⁷ we come across it also in contemporary thinking.

Until quite recently, social science has been a 'dividing discipline', in that its schools of thought were divided along the lines of the study of social structure and the subjective-normative approach. According to these preconceived notions, a 'leftist' social scientist working on the 'Third World' has to concern himself in the first instance with political economy and with the 'structural dependence' arising out of it as the cause of underdevelopment. In contrast, there are scholars who focus their attention on the internal factors conditioning underdevelopment including cultural analysis. I have already referred to Giddens's call to go 'beyond left and right' (see note 3). Clearly, the Cold War and bipolarity, being the historical situation conditioning that debate, are now over. Instead, globalisation is coming to the fore, while it is becoming clear that no distinct part of the world exists that we may call the 'Third World'. Currently, scholars see that civilisations⁸ and local cultures do matter. Yet, there is little knowledge about this issue, even in the work of those scholars involved in cultural analysis. Due to the lack of professionalism and of specialisation in area studies, the subject matter is hopelessly weighed down with normative preoccupations and frequently dispenses with empirical substantiation altogether. It is not uncommon for the internal political debates to be projected on the 'remote' non-Western world with which scholars are frequently unfamiliar. As an extreme example of this attitude, I could mention the position that sees in Khomeini's Islamic revolution evidence supporting the call for Third World politics pursuing dissociation from the world market. It is not possible, however, to work seriously on non-European cultures and civilisations without knowing them from the inside. Without some familiarity with their background conditions, as well as with their languages, we cannot hope to understand what is known in the West as the 'Third World' – even if we know the structure of the world market and can deal with political economy. The analysis of structures of underdevelopment needs to include research into the cultural systems of the relevant region. Clifford Geertz pre-

sents himself as a proponent of this approach and endeavours to explain why a scholar is unable to comprehend the conceptual structures of an alien world: 'What in a place like Morocco prevents us from grasping what people are up to is not ignorance as to how cognition works . . . as a lack of familiarity with the imaginative universe within which their acts are signs.'⁹ After continued fieldwork in Morocco, Geertz began to understand the people and their social setting: 'The more I manage to follow what the Moroccans are up to, the more logical, and the more singular they seem.'¹⁰ It is difficult to comprehend how a scholar can be an expert on developing countries without the benefit of this first essential, and yet there is an abundance of such 'experts' in the West. My earlier books¹¹ on this domain published in English have targeted this state of affairs. Scholars of Islamic studies are not interested in conceptual reasoning, and social scientists of the general approach view the study of culture in fieldwork as a domain of specialised anthropologists or of the study of religion. Even those who write about culture (for example, Wuthnow, Inglehart) ignore books about Islam, but nevertheless make sweeping generalisations about this subject. The combination of cultural analysis, the study of International Relations and the history of globalisation leads to historical sociology to which this book is committed. Historical sociology requires empirical knowledge and an advance beyond empty generalisations.

Evolution and modernisation

Still at a general level, at this juncture we ought to go beyond a critique of the normative-subjective or socio-economic structural one-dimensionality of social scientific theory and take issue with the assumption of the evolutionary unilinearity of development. We need to clarify whether rigid, non-dynamic patterns of culture in fact represent a specific level of development or persistent forms. Both the theoretical traditions under criticism, despite their points of dissent, share an insistence on the notion of unilinear development, that is, evolutionism,¹² albeit described in different ways. For Marxist authors, the development of the means of production is an unstoppable process; it signifies the 'collapse of the Old World', as Marx described it, for which at that time England, 'whatever crimes it may have committed, was nevertheless the unwitting tool of history',¹³ by dissolving, as a colonial power, the precapitalist structures in its colonies. Modernisation theorists have similarly described the colonial system in this process,

but used different terms; for them, this system represented a modernising force, since it undermined traditional societies.

Following a spate of exertion within the materialist approach in the social sciences during the 1960s and 1970s, a certain weariness seems to have set in. It is noticeable that modernisation theories are currently enjoying renewed recognition. Previously, they were subjected in the scholarly debate to sometimes cliché-ridden, but nonetheless in some cases pertinent, harsh criticism. Some efforts have been directed by the intention of formulating a 'critical theory of modernization'.¹⁴ Even today, however, both conventional modernisation theories and Marxist analyses still leave many questions of social change unanswered. I venture to speak here of a paradigm crisis (in the Kuhnian sense) in both of these explanatory models, insofar as it is obvious that neither is able to resolve these unanswered questions (or anomalies).

In this chapter it is not my purpose to take issue with diverse anomalies of the criticised approaches. Given that this book is theory-oriented and at pains to provide a conceptual exploration of the oscillation in Islamic civilisation between culture and politics, it is worth referring to a significant contribution to this problem area. I mean the work of the *revisionist* modernisation theorist S.N. Eisenstadt¹⁵ and the cultural analysis he employed for the study of the evolution from tradition to modernity.

Although American in terms of academic training, Eisenstadt is a sociologist educated in the European tradition and familiar with the philosophical sources of modern sociology. In these he sees among other things the origin of a doctrine asserting the existence in history of a universal tendency toward development (evolutionism), which finds its fullest manifestation in modern sociology. Concepts considered to be central to macrosociological analysis in classical sociology were at first, above all in the United States, driven back in favour of microsociological research. From the 1950s and 1960s onwards there was a noticeable and sudden increase of interest in formulating questions in macrosociological terms, a change that undoubtedly coincided with the increasing importance of non-Western civilisations, hitherto addressed as the Third World. Even today, holistic social analyses find more scope within the sociology of development than within analyses of industrial societies, which tend to be predominantly microsociological. In the United States, research in development is closely linked with the sociological investigation of social change. The paradigm of the modernisation theory, is thus at the same time, in a broader sense, a theory of development. It follows that revisions in modernisation

theory have led to a rethinking about modernisation by a rethinking of development itself.¹⁶

Eisenstadt's critique of modernisation theory can be summarised in three points: the validity of the tradition–modernity dichotomy, ahistorical mind, and Euro-Americo-centrism. By modifying his own approach he assumes that he has achieved a differentiation, and has thereby overcome the tradition–modernity dichotomy. But Eisenstadt also criticises the ahistoricity of the traditional modernisation approach; he understands 'historical' to mean 'different' and concludes that a reference to the diversity of developmental paths amounts to a historical line of argument. If one conceives of history as historical social science, however, then the connection between history and sociology for the study of evolution and modernisation lies in being able to demonstrate the historical genesis of a structure. But the depiction of underdevelopment in terms of cultural tradition and the 'diverse' and 'multifarious' dissolution and continued development of that traditionality to modernity is far from constituting a holistic, combined historical and sociological analysis. Nonetheless, one element of this 'diversity' is historically determined, namely, that which affects the varying historical context of change, which now has the character of an international society or – as Eisenstadt writes – constitutes an international environment. The latter not only 'impinges in an undifferentiated way on a "closed" social system' but moreover develops relations 'among a series of international networks – cultural, economic, and political – that impinge on different aspects of these societies and evoke different responses within them'.¹⁷

This particular problem is central to any theory of social change under the prevailing conditions of an international society, as change is externally induced; its driving force is, if only partly, external and hence perceived by the people concerned as an alien influence. It is from this that hostility to change arises. According to Eisenstadt, the crucial problem of non-Western societies lies not in the 'relatively small extent of modernisation, but rather in the lack of development of new institutional settings, the lack of regulative mechanisms and normative injunctions'.¹⁸ The clear conclusion is that social change leading to transition in society requires cultural innovation. Unfortunately, this insight is not developed further and consequently does not form part of Eisenstadt's frame of reference. Although the theoretical approach referred to here fails to deal satisfactorily either with the international or with the internal overall social structural factors of

change, it is important in view of our own concern here to pursue it further, since the discussion of tradition as a cultural manifestation is a central issue for the present analysis.

Religious reformation and cultural innovation

Of particular interest is the question of the extent to which a culture can either promote or impede social change in this process of evolution and modernisation. In a comparative way the reference to the role of Protestant ethic to promote social change is most interesting. After an extensive discussion on Max Weber, Eisenstadt arrives at the conclusion that the Protestant ethic coincided with other social factors and for this reason was able to exert such a transforming influence. He thus emphatically refutes the thesis that the Protestant ethic alone could have induced change as a movement for modernisation. This consideration is of special concern to the cultural sphere in Islam. The question why this old debate is being taken up once again can be answered in terms of a reconsideration of the importance of Weber for the sociology of social change:

With the upsurge of great interest in development and modernisation beyond Europe, interest in this thesis has arisen once more. Many seek in the existence or non-existence of some equivalent to the Protestant ethic the key to understanding of the successful or unsuccessful modernisation of non-European countries.¹⁹

Western readers may be surprised to learn that a leading Muslim thinker, Afghani, explains the backwardness of the Islamic Middle East in terms of the absence of such an ethic. He envisaged a new religious movement, such as that of the Reformation, and a reformer such as Martin Luther, who would establish a new Islamic ethic, as the only escape route out of backwardness into modernity.

It is curious to see Afghani²⁰ (1839–97) being referred to among the spiritual leaders of recent Islamic awakening. He was active in the second half of the nineteenth century. In one of his writings he states:

If we pause to consider the causes of the revolutionary transition of Europe from barbarity to civilisation, we discern that this change only became possible through the religious movement initiated and carried out by Martin Luther. . . . He succeeded in propelling Europeans towards a reformed re-orientation.²¹

As a corrective to this assertion by Afghani, who hoped to overcome the spirit of traditionality in Islamic civilisation in the modern age by means of a revitalising religious movement²² in the style of the Lutheran Reformation, a fairly long passage from Eisenstadt is worth quoting:

It is of course true that originally the Reformation was not a 'modernising' movement. It did not have very strong modernising impulses; it did indeed aim at the establishment of a new, purer 'medieval' socio-political religious order. Originally Protestantism was indeed a religious movement aiming at the religious restructuring of the world. It was just because of these strong 'this-worldly' religious impulses that from the very beginning they were caught up with, and in, the major socio-political, economic, and cultural trends of change that European (and especially Western and Central European) society was undergoing from the end of the seventeenth century on: the development of capitalism, the development of Renaissance states, absolutism, and the consequent 'general' crisis of the seventeenth century, the crisis between 'state' and 'society,' the development of a secular outlook and science.²³

This explanation clearly shows that a religious ethic can only exert a decisive influence on social change if it coincides with other socio-political and socio-economic factors. Neither the definition of the development of the means of production among Marxists, nor the 'subjective-normative preconceived notion' can be an alternative for the sociologist interested in social change. The interplay between cultural attitudes and socio-economic development (*see* note 6) needs to be at the centre of the analysis. One example of a successful attempt of this kind was the analysis of the founding of the Islamic religion by the French scholar Maxime Rodinson.²⁴ Eisenstadt gives some indication of how an economic ethic can operate in social terms but allows his cultural value orientation to dominate the presented arguments.

At this socio-cultural level of analysis, we may observe that religion is one of the central elements within tradition. As the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann has shown in his seminal study of the function of religion,²⁵ in modern secular societies there are functional equivalents for religion, in contrast to traditional societies, in which religion represents the 'symbolic orientation' of an indispensable 'collective identity'. In such societies, religion has not yet become secularised, forming part of the socio-cultural and political order. Religious leaders see their task in the 'formulation and formalisation of their creeds and tradi-

tions so as to make them fully articulated and organised at a relatively differentiated cultural level'.²⁶ Part of the process of formalising religious principles and anchoring them at the organisational level includes both a forestalling of all forms of intellectualisation of religion and the suffusion of religion and state as a legitimate ruling authority. In the modern Middle East, Morocco and Saudi Arabia are states run by religious leaders in monarchies legitimised by the religion of Islam.²⁷ Other states like Iran and Sudan are based on a fundamentalist order. Though traditional monarchies and fundamentalist states are different, in both religious leaders make use of cultural and religious symbols for political ends.

The instrumental use of religion in politics and society makes clear that the socio-political role of religion is not only a concern of divinity schools, but also of the sociology of development and International Relations.²⁸ On the grounds of the discussion so far, we can conclude that the analysis of religion as a cultural system and its place in state and society should receive more consideration. The connections between existing norms and value systems and prevailing social structures or forms of rule in societies of non-Western civilisations including the Islamic one need to be enquired into and explained properly. There exists a clear and most important difference between so-called traditional and modern societies in respect of the religio-cultural tradition. Understanding culture facilitates the insight that socio-economic transition alone does not lead to the needed cultural change. Innovations are needed.

The relation between religion, being a cultural system, and socio-economic underdevelopment in Islamic societies is affected by the exposure to the West and to the structure of the global system and its 'anarchical society'.²⁹ Islam's predicament with modernity is to be placed in this context. It is true that cultural modernity grew from an indigenous development in Western Europe;³⁰ later it was not successfully 'foisted' on the whole world.³¹ But I cannot go along with the view that this modernity did not take a foothold in the non-Western world in merely cultural-normative terms. Holistic social analysis, must have at its disposal both structural analysis and a theory of behaviour.

In conclusion we need to refer to the opening remarks to this chapter and state that culture forms an integral part of social structure, but is not a direct reflection of it. Cultural innovation can on the one hand further, or even accelerate, social change, but it cannot in itself bring change about. Cultural 'encrustations', on the other hand, can inhibit social change. It is in this sense that I argue here that the fur-

thering of change calls for cultural innovations, the absence of which can give rise to stumbling blocks that prevent the pervasive social change needed.

Who are the instigators of cultural innovations?

Among its major traits at the start of the new millennium Islamic civilisation is at the crossroads oscillating in determining its identity between cultural and political Islam. What are the issues? According to a notion still prevalent in scholarly writing on modernisation theory,³² in spite of its obsolescence, innovation consists solely in adapting to Western industrial cultural patterns, which supersede indigenous ones. As a counter-view to this not only Eurocentric, but also quite simply wanting concept, innovation will here be taken to mean the unfolding of a new dynamic understanding of Islamic cultural patterns, as well as the latter's enrichment through cultural borrowings. In Islamic heritage³³ cultural borrowing from others was a source of enriching the Islamic civilisation. The question is, who will instigate this change, which I have described earlier as a cultural accommodation of social change?³⁴ Are Islamic elites in a position to carry out such called-for cultural innovations; they need to be radical and not merely peripheral. In this connection I have once again had recourse to the work of Eisenstadt, who shows, with reference to research into elites, 'that such transformative capacities are to be found primarily among elites who are relatively cohesive and have a strong sense of self-identity'.³⁵

Elites in traditional societies may be divided into those with traditional and those with Westernised education. In traditional Islam the elites are the *ulema* (scribes). Secular elites consist almost exclusively of Westernised Islamic intellectuals. The fostering of cultural reforms is one of the main activities of modern non-Western elites. This does not always result in cultural innovation. The rise of political Islam implies significant changes. Currently, we find next to the established Westernised elites the counter-elites which are the exponents of religious fundamentalism.³⁶ Self-assertive rejection of the alien is a basic attitude of counter-elites. At this point I may bring in the concept of defensive culture as an adequate explanation for such activities. Defensive culture³⁷ is a counter-movement that pertains to a counter-acculturative tendency hostile to the prevailing processes of acculturation – without, however, being able to overcome them, as it consists only of a self-assertive protest against a situation for which there is no clear alternative. The German sociologist König explains:

What is described as anti- or counter-acculturation is frequently one of the most significant consequences of *cultural defence mechanisms*, *in fact a defensive culture*, in which the indigenous and the exogenous are virtually indissolubly suffused. This defensive culture seems always to be set in motion when a hopeless situation arises in which the only two alternatives are redemption or destruction.³⁸

The concept of defensive culture is supported by an examination of the literary products of non-Western elites. It shows that the *fostering of culture* is not only of interest to this elite but in fact forms the prime content of its dealings. But what culture? And is the defensive culture prone to militant politicisation? The weak or even absent inner cohesion of these elites explains their defensive-cultural attitudes. In fact, cohesion forms one of the prerequisites for creativity and innovative ability. However, defensive culture is not only an attitude; it is conditioned both by an objective situation, that is, the existential and structural tension between two parallel cultural entities in close proximity, and by the subjective inability of modern non-Western elites and also counter-elites to assimilate change at the cultural level.

In the present context, Durkheim's concept of anomie³⁹ helps us to interpret the absence of inner cohesion among these elites, who as a result of their Westernisation have internalised cultural norms for which there are no corresponding social structures in their own societies. The result is cultural anomie. The discovery of the local culture versus globalisation assists in the self-assertion against the invading culture. Preoccupation with culture thus takes the form of a defensive culture, a defence mechanism. Modern elites are acquainted with modernity⁴⁰ but are unable to assimilate it culturally. Parallel to them we encounter the traditional elites, whose prospects are far gloomier, as they are quite unable to exert an innovative effect, hampered as they are by rigid tradition. The responses of these traditional elites to the pending challenges may be interpreted as 'resistance to change', which is synonymous to the common inability to redefine problems or permit new solutions and outlooks. Where individual new solutions are permitted, they are mostly subsumed within one of the old schemes. This can lead to new problems. But it is precisely this 'resistance to change' that, because it is culturally articulated, constitutes the content of a defensive culture. This general definition for conditions in a traditional set-up is fully valid for Muslim societies. These reflections on the concept that cultural innovations instigated by elites are necessary for overcoming underdevelopment cannot be brought to an interim con-

clusion without calling to mind once again the determining of culture as a system of the symbolic dimensions of social behaviour. Such symbols are valid for all members of a cultural sphere and are by no means peculiar to elites. Specifically with regard to Islam, we should also remember that religio-cultural symbols form an integral part of reality, so that any understanding of culture that is innovative merely at the literary level alone is futile if it is not also socially pervasive in the Geertzian sense at the same time.

Provided we are not advocates of either leftist class orientation or rightist populism, we can concede on the basis of a mere glance at the course of history that historical processes have always been directed by elites. It is precisely for this reason that I subscribe to the idea that elites are able to produce the required cultural innovations that bring about the needed sort of social change. We must always bear in mind, however, that the works of scholars of religion do not form the focal point of this study. My central interest is rather the everyday religious awareness. If elites themselves change, bring about innovations, and are the mediators of a dynamic cultural direction, this still does not signify that a process of cultural change has been set in motion. Only when everyday religious awareness has changed, that is, when the 'symbolic dimensions of social behaviour' (Geertz) have been altered, can we meaningfully speak of cultural innovation. By the same token, the innovative or dynamic behaviour of elites can only become manifest as an enduring element when a parallel socio-structural equivalent has been brought about in the context of transformation processes. We know from the Kemalist experiment in Turkey that the secularisation in Islam failed to transform Turkish society through revolution from above. This attempt foundered through lack of a socio-structural underpinning for the political measures of secularisation. Thus the needed indigenisation of cultural innovations failed.⁴¹ Socio-structural transformation, as a prerequisite for the development of socio-structural equivalents for cultural innovations, does not simply happen of its own accord or fall like manna from the skies. We find ourselves, then, confronted once again with the question of what particular elites will instigate the needed change. Only where these are enthusiastic about innovation, characterised by inner cohesion, and equipped with the necessary degree of consistency for effective action, may they successfully act as instigators of social change.

To be sure, the *ulema* can never be the instigators of change. The Islamic *shari'a* tradition positioned in the predominantly urban culture of the scribes has been in contrast to the parallel popular Islamic tradi-

tion of Tariqa Islam. The scriptural definition of Islam is very hostile to change, whereas the popular Islamic tradition was and is a source of symbolic dimensions of social change that have quite often contradicted legal Islam. This *de facto* tension, however, is not apparent in everyday religious awareness. This tension contributes to rejecting innovations in Islam. The Islamic term for innovation is *bid'a*, which is tantamount to heresy. The traditional Islamic wisdom pertaining to this cultural attitude says unequivocally *al-bid'a min al-dalal*, or: Innovation is misleading. How could such an attitude be consonant with an innovative spirit?

If we now ask where Muslim elites stand, we can meet two extremes, only one of which exists today. One of these is the extreme of the over-Westernised elite, which recognises Europe as its sole model and equates the word 'Orient' with 'backwardness'. Exponents of Egyptian liberalism and early Arab-Fabian socialism at the beginning of the last-century⁴² represent one example of this tendency, which is hardly encountered today. The other extreme, which still predominates and may be observed in all countries inhabited by Muslims, is that of politicised Islamic revivalism, correctly characterised by the Egyptian sociologist Fuad Kandil as a variety of 'nativism'.⁴³ To be sure, this qualification is not meant as a libel nor does it intend to suggest that Islamic revivalists are not affected by modernity. The question here is whether an effort toward cultural innovation can only be based on a retrieval of the traditional culture. Is re-traditionalisation an alternative and can it serve as a prospect for the future? Kandil argues that the aspect of the self-glorification and idealisation of the past as nostalgia seems to be an integral part of revivalist political Islam. The Islamists seek to master the present by resorting to 'tried and tested' solutions and watchwords, for all problems are seen as arising out of a considerable deviation from the norms of the traditional culture. This is hardly the right way to meet the urgent need to cope with change in local Islamic cultures. At the beginning of the new century we encounter a competition over power between the ruling Islamic elites and the opposing fundamentalists as the counter-elites. The latter represent a major political challenge.⁴⁴ In the age of conflict among civilisations and the related drive of de-Westernisation, the balance is shifting from pro-Western to anti-Western attitudes. The fundamentalists present themselves as the leading force of de-Westernisation. To understand this defensive-cultural attitude we need to understand the nature of political Islam which is the next step in the present book.

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Part II

The Context: the Politicisation of Islam in the Global Age

Introductory remarks

Among the findings of the chapters in Part I is the insight that culture is not an essential entity in that it is subject to change itself; it can be affected by developments in its local, regional and international environment. The difficulties involved in conveying a general definition of culture are related to the incorporation of cultural patterns in social realities. I have highlighted the 'symbolic dimensions of social conduct' as the focus of my theme and I am operating on the assumption that religion creates a 'cultural system' consisting of corresponding symbols that converge to form a model for reality. This is the background for an understanding of what Islam is. Yet, the politicisation of Islam is underpinned both by social realities and by the use of religio-cultural symbols for political ends.

The next step of my analysis is the enquiry into the cultural accommodation of change as pursued in the Islamic civilisation. By now, it must have become clear that Islam constitutes the model for reality provided for Muslim adherents, from whom 'submission' to its religious content is demanded. The very word *Islam* is derived from the verb 'to submit oneself'. To be converted to Islam is expressed in Arabic as *aslama*, literally 'he has surrendered'. The politically active Muslim switches this 'submission' into a selfless political commitment.

The first question to ask is: What are the constraints and what are the ingredients of the politicisation of Islam? This is a very complex question which equally touches on local, regional and global realities none of which could alone provide a proper and satisfactory answer. We need to see these realities in their mix with the culture of Islam and its religious symbols, in pursuit of the search for a convincing answer!

Islamic cultural symbols are twisted between religious beliefs, the revolt against the West and globalisation which is believed to be launched against the world of Islam. For understanding these complex issues we need to explore the process by which contemporary Islam as a cultural system is being politicised. It would seem appropriate to address the politicisation of religio-cultural symbols and then to place this process into the international environment of Islamic civilisation.

The outstanding feature of the 55 states with an Islamic majority population in the modern international system of states is that their societies are in most cases subject to extremely rapid and uneven social change. Unfortunately, the current politicisation of Islam is not a promising prospect for developing an innovative and path-finding

vision for the future of the Islamic civilisation. The existing cultural system has not yet adapted to changed conditions, nor have new elements been created to smooth the way for new perspectives. Instead, there has been a political call for the suppression of all development that is considered to be a deviation from Islam, that is, that does not conform to the ideal cultural system. Underlying contemporary political Islam, therefore, is the fundamentalist demand for a return to 'true' Islamic symbols which are to be kept immutable against external, that is, Western and global impact. The perceptive reader will recall the concept of religion as a model for reality, developed in Chapter 1. The political programmes derived from this cultural system are motivated accordingly. Again, political Islam provides no innovative prospects for the future but solely an understanding of the future as a restoration of the past, obtained from the 'good old ways' (*salaf*), although to be distinguished from *salafiyya*. This worldview is at odds with the fact that Islamic fundamentalism is absolutely not a traditionalism, it is rather an Islamic dream of (semi-)modernity!

Despite its modern implications, political Islam may – with some restrictions – be interpreted as a backward-oriented utopia. This demand and reality nevertheless continue to clash. The Islamic past is perceived as the primeval source of political rule, that is, a government regarded as a divine order. This is clearly not a traditionalist view of politics. Modern concepts (for example *nizam*, or system) are projected back into Islamic history and culturally understood or perceived as authentically Islamic.

In Islamic studies, the question is often asked whether a political form of government was developed in parallel with the foundation of the Islamic religion. In fact, the claim to authenticity of contemporary political Islamic integrists is also related to this question in that Islamists believe they are restoring the primordial Islamic order. In exploring this question, the available works by Orientalists of the old school have unfortunately also proved of little help, as they seldom go beyond the confines of textual philology. The study of reality cannot be pursued with the aid of exegesis of classical sources. The study of the political structures of the time are beyond philological concerns. Historical reality is not a text, however, and cannot be adequately grasped simply through research into sources. In contrast to this approach, the social historian Reinhard Bendix has been able to produce profound insights into this question in his magnificent work *Kings or People*. In his view, the classical Islamic order was based on 'royal authority', and yet this is not the religion of Islam as reform-Muslims like Said Ashmawi argue.

In my earlier work *The Crisis of Modern Islam*, I have shown that the founding of the Islamic religion was accompanied by an Islamic civilising process in the sense meant by Norbert Elias, during the course of which a central authority was established out of the 'regulated' anarchy of the pre-Islamic Arab tribes. Thus, the work of Norbert Elias is another source of inspiration in my study of Islam. His theory of civilisation is among my sources for interpreting the foundation of Islamic civilisation.

When it comes to political rule it was from the 'conjunction of pre-Islamic tribal traditions' with the religious message, according to Bendix, that the Islamic interpretation of royal authority, that is, the caliphate, emerged. Within Islam we have different Sunni and Shi'ite traditional interpretations of the charismatic prophecy of The Prophet Muhammed. In Sunni Islam the 'caliphate of the patriarchs' is the legitimate form, the caliph being a 'king', a successor to The Prophet. The prophecy is unique and cannot be either passed on or repeated. The Shi'ites, on the other hand, with their notion of the imamate (the succession of the imams), insist on the passing on of charisma. Until the time of the Safavids (1501–1722) and Khomeini's Iran in modern times, Shi'ite Islam remained primarily underground, whereas the royal tradition in Islam was of a Sunni character being the established political rule in Islamic history.

In his masterpiece *Kings or People* Bendix argues that the conflicts in Islam pertained to the 'legitimation of royal rule' derived from historical events. The caliph was an absolute ruler, whose duty was to be the guardian of the people, and if necessary to force them to obey the law. Muslim jurists imposed on men the duty of complete obedience to the ruler. The Muslim sacral jurist (the *faqih*) possessed no autonomy *vis-à-vis* the ruler, as a result of which law was generally interpreted in conformity with the existing form of government. Sunni-Islamic rule was characterised as a sultanic form (*al-hukm al-sultani*) of government. The prescribed dogmatic combination of religiously legitimised rule and law thus remained ineffective in Islamic history. Islamic fundamentalists today, aided by the politicisation of cultural symbols, contest absolute rule in the context of the existing crisis of meaning arising out of a situation of rapid change by means of the projection of modern concepts into the past.

In this, the politicisation of Islam – as a religion and culture, that is, system of meaning – is dealt with in three steps and on three levels: first, globalisation, second, a defensive-cultural response to an external exposure, and third, fundamentalism as a response to cultural and secular modernity.

4

The Dichotomy of Structural Globalisation and Fragmenting Cultural Self-Assertion: the Case of Islamic Civilisation

The present analysis of the oscillation in Islam between culture and politics is not a narrative of topical events, but is rather ambitious in that it attempts to identify the issues and find ways to gain a better conceptual grasp of their substance. With this understanding, I shall then pursue the cultural analysis of Islam in a more concrete manner. The puzzle of the locality of culture and the global framework of structural change lie at the centre of my thoughts. Our world is characterised by the most intriguing aspect of becoming equally and simultaneously more globalised and localised, that is, culturally fragmented, than ever before.¹ In short, my basic contention pertains to the simultaneity of structural globalisation and cultural fragmentation. I believe that this is the hallmark of the present world. This simultaneity also affects the pendulum between culture and politics in the contemporary Islamic civilisation.

Culture, economy and politics in the global age

The reference to *The Global Age*² in the pursuit of presenting evidence supporting the contention of culturally unifying structures on a global scale is basically flawed. In fact, there exists no such thing that underpins the view of a homogeneous and standardised international society. No doubt, globalisation is a real process, but it never works in such a way as to promote the standardisation of the world. Globalisation does not do away with cultural diversity. This is, in particular, true for the patterns of interaction among cultures and also for the related worldviews.

Despite the generally valid assertion of a growing network of interaction on global grounds there are still widely differing patterns of interaction directed by divergent sets of values. My commitment to historical sociology determines the way in which I approach the subject-matter under scrutiny. Instead of viewing it through the lenses of constructed and abstract theories, I focus on the issue itself. However, I continue to employ a conceptual frame of reference as a handle to order the available materials. Theory is here no more than a tool for conceptualising the interplay between cultural and social change as well as the politics arising from the tensions in this set-up. Conceptually and empirically, we need to look at Islam within the broader context of the cultural accommodation of social change under the conditions of globalisation. The tensions between the local and the global can be related to the following three openings for a possible development:

1. In view of the changes taking place under global conditions we may ask whether contemporary Islamic civilisation, being determined by pre-industrial standards and yet unreformed, would be able to come to terms with cultural modernity and the predicament related to these constraints. My assumption is that if the peoples of Islam were to be engaged in a kind of cross-cultural consensus over major issues within the framework of an international morality,³ Islamic civilisation would endorse inter-civilisational pluralism. This means that under such conditions Islam could become a significant part of an avowedly plural world in moving away from the neo-absolutism⁴ of Islamic fundamentalists and orthodoxy as well. Muslims need to free themselves from the ill-fated vision of an Islamisation of the entire world. A Tunisian Islamist discarded political pluralism as displayed in the former name of the party *Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique* (MTI) in arguing that viewing Islam as one among other 'tendencies' is nothing more than a 'de-classification'.
2. A differing scenario would result from a re-politicisation of religious beliefs and the related cultural symbols. This would definitely lead to a new variety of absolutism. This scenario gives rise to the following questions: Is the current cross-regional re-politicisation of the sacred an indication of a justified unfolding of an assertive identity being the expression of a revolt against Western hegemony? Or is it an effort at de-secularisation aimed at reversing the existing conditions? Manuel Castells coins the term

‘resistance identity’ for depicting the response of people ‘stigmatised by the logic of domination’.⁵ But one may also ask whether this revolt is purely and simply a romantic as well as regressive resistance to the ongoing rapid global changes.

3. In a commitment to the first scenario I assume that the revived Kantian vision of a democratic peace⁶ is most promising in our search for a solution. From the historical record of the Peace of Westphalia we learn that this kind of peace coincides with a process of secularisation. For this reason, an in-depth study of the assumed links between modernisation and secularisation is needed. The enquiry into the relationship between religion and social change is an essential part of this analysis and is therefore among the basic issues to be tackled within this chapter.

Based on the data collected in 43 societies, Roland Inglehart pursued an enquiry focused on ‘how people’s worldviews influence the world’.⁷ To answer this question properly there is a need to determine whether cultural change goes along with social and economic change – conversely we may ask whether societal change presupposes an alternation of the existing worldviews. Inglehart rightly argues that: ‘The relationships between values, economics and politics are reciprocal’ (ibid., p. 4). This argument suggests that economic development, cultural and political change affect one another and cannot be viewed in a reductionist manner. Despite the rich database it seems, however, that Inglehart, like most Western scholars, is having great difficulty in adequately understanding the problems arising from the tensions and discrepancies between social and cultural change. Without obtaining the needed insights into non-Western local cultures and subsequently the cross-regional civilisation around which they revolve, every general analysis remains wanting. The politicisation of religion and ethnicity which results in religious or ethno-fundamentalism is related to these processes. To Inglehart, modernisation and – what he calls postmodernisation – lead straight to secularisation.

Inglehart plays down the fact that our present processes of *de*-secularisation are arising from the current processes of modernisation by suggesting that it is viewed simply as an ‘impression’ that the ‘mass media tend to convey’. This is a very poor conclusion which affects his entire analysis. De-secularisation and the revival of religions in world affairs are phenomena that need to be taken most seriously.⁸

Based on allegations, not on knowledge of the addressed phenomenon, Inglehart rejects the fact that we are witnessing a global trend

toward fundamentalism.⁹ He simply assumes that this phenomenon is represented by 'a dwindling segment of the population'.¹⁰ The fundamentalist challenge remains unexplained. In contrast to the poor statements cited, the available data (*see* note 9) provide evidence for identifying fundamentalism as being a major issue in contemporary Islamic civilisation.

The consent to the hypothesis of a reciprocal relationship between socio-economic and cultural change raises the expectation that a further analysis of the assumed reciprocity will be presented, but it remains missing. Instead, 'culture' is virtually reduced to 'economy' and, most disturbingly, Islamic revival is attributed to 'oil-wealth' – this is even worse than the criticised image of Islam in the media. As Inglehart most questionably puts it:

Islamic fundamentalism remains an alternative model insofar as oil revenues make it possible to obtain many of the advantages of modernization without industrializing; but we would not expect this model's credibility and mass appeal to outlast oil reserves.¹¹

My comment as a social-scientific expert on Islam and fundamentalism is that it is utterly wrong and misleading to interpret Islamic revivalism as an outcome of oil-wealth. For this reason, the following conceptual effort is undertaken beyond the imaginary of 'oil-wealth' in the pursuit of a proper understanding of the reciprocal links between Islam as a cultural system and the politics of globalisation as well as of modernisation. No doubt, it is advisable to be at pains to free the subject-matter from the 'impression' that the Western media have spread. Such an effort involves looking at Islam as a culture and trying to understand it, thus freeing oneself from the preoccupation of identifying Islamic revival with oil and the impact of petro-dollars. Above all, we need to go beyond the reductionism of modernisation and postmodernisation theory. Among the conclusions of Part I is the insight that cultural change is affected, but definitely not fully determined, by economic developments. If we talk about reciprocity, then we need to work along those lines and not only to pay lip service to it as a requirement.

Islam at the crossroads: competing civilisational models for the future

Worldviews do not change automatically and mechanically when economic structures in societies change. The simple way suggested by

Inglehart indicates a lack of proper knowledge. It is definitely not an act of essentialism to argue that the Islamic worldview is based on principles (for example, divine revelation) believed to be immutable, even when the surrounding set-ups are undergoing change. Underlying these 'essential' beliefs (*al-usul*) is the claim to universality raised by Islam as the ultimate divine revelation, valid for all people regardless of time and space. It is not this author, but orthodox Muslims and Islamists themselves who essentialise Islam in referring to this doctrine as *usul* (essentials) which are believed to be immutable!

To begin with the 'essential' of the *umma*-concept in Islamic doctrine, we need to acknowledge that the *umma* (community) is based on an – by the time of its foundation – open-minded view in that it recognises neither limitations nor exclusivity. Any person who converts to Islam becomes a member of this *umma*, while Christians and Jews can live as *dhimmi* (protected minorities) under Islamic tutelage. Nevertheless, we come across tensions between the religious precepts of equality and the very realities standing in contrast to it.¹² Economic change triggers modernisation and thus functional differentiation. However, it could not halt the revival of holistic and parochial worldviews (for example, the splitting of the world in *dar al-Islam* and *dar al-harb*) related to the addressed *usul* (essentials). It used to be thought that they were phased out in the aftermath of the dissolution of the last Islamic order of the Ottoman empire in 1924, but this was not the case.

The Islamic model of the *umma*-based *dar al-Islam* vs the rest of the world is no longer of any significance for existing realities in our contemporary world. Nevertheless, this doctrine – as Najib Armanazi¹³ informs us – has not so far been revised. The worldview related to this dichotomy remains binding for more than 1.3 billion Muslims living as the majority in 55 states. The Islamic *Weltanschauung* represents the cultural commitment of many religio-political groups in this period of re-politicisation of Islam. In the ideology of political Islam, the worldwide North–South gap is referred to in religio-political terms that call for the awaited *sahwa Islamiyya*,¹⁴ that is, the awakening of Muslims as the 'underdogs' of the world order being dominated by the West.

Western hegemony is viewed by orthodox Muslims as well as by fundamentalists as a situation that came about at the expense of Islam. They use the term *inqilab al-mawazin* to describe it. The term may be freely translated as reversal of circumstances, or balance. The historical facts underpinning this view refer to the failed global project of the Islamic *futuh*-expansion being superseded by the modern project of

European expansion.¹⁵ Even for the greatest Muslim revivalist of the nineteenth century, Afghani, the primary characteristic of Islam consisted of its 'dominance and superiority'.¹⁶ The leaders of Islamic movements criticise Western dominance from a civilisational rather than a political viewpoint. Their contention is not based on an assumption of egalitarian and pluralist definitions of cultures and civilisations. Islamists want, rather, to reverse the hegemonic power situation in favour of Islam. They envisage a reversal leading to the emergence of structures that shift the centre of power in decentring the West to pave the way for a global dominance of Islam. My unbreakable commitment to religious and cultural pluralism leads to an unequivocal rejection of the Islamists' claim to dominance. This claim is both anachronistic and lacks intercultural open-mindedness. To be sure, cultural pluralism is not relativism. I do share the criticism on Western hegemony, but reject the drive to substitute one hegemonic structure with another, albeit an Islamic one.

It is certainly not biased to emphasise, while glancing back over history, that Islamic dominance over other civilisations in High Islam did not include the kind of disruptive effects on, or deformation of other cultures that have so often marked the European conquest of the world. Moreover, it is fair and safe to state that Islamic conquests did not imply any kind of racism or related views comparable to those of Europe.¹⁷ To be sure, it is not my inclination to 'praise' Islamic conquests while demonising Western expansion. In my major work on *jiḥād* and crusades I argue that both parties did wrong to one another, albeit to varying degrees.¹⁸

There is a need to deal with these issues in a rational manner, that is, without moralising. It is sad to see how this needed rationality is lacking in some Western writings; in particular, I find the moralising German tone, that in Weberian terms can be described as *Gesinnungsethik*, most disturbing.¹⁹ It often stands in extreme contrast to the xenophobic deeds which contradict this rhetoric of egalitarian moralisation! In general, it is wrong to equate Western values with Western hegemony, and then to demonise everything that is Western. It is intriguing to observe this demonisation of self among European intellectuals as a kind of self-defeating thinking resulting in cultural relativism. Moreover, it only applies to Western values, because it overlooks the rise of neo-absolutisms in other civilisations (see note 4) and fails to subject their claims to the same 'critique'. The French philosopher Alain Finkielkraut describes this attitude as *La défaite de la pensée* (the defeat of thinking).

Political Islam is a variety of the neo-absolutisms addressed. Thus, to criticise political Islam is not to stereotype Islam as a religion. Relativism is not the proper answer to any absolutism and it is inapt to counter such claims. Clearly, there is a need to reduce disparities among nations in order to establish an underpinning for cultural plurality. However, pluralism not only refers to an interaction between many different cultures on equal grounds, but also establishes commonalities based on a consensus on the rules of the game, that is, on interculturally valid norms and values. As argued at the outset, in our post-bipolar age peace needs to be a democratic peace among cultures. Democracy in the liberal Western sense means *droit à la différence*, the right to be different from others. There are however limits to pluralism, that is, to accepting the 'difference'. For instance, I am not willing to discuss rejections of any individual human rights (for example, gender equality) or secularity, let alone the claims to absolutism in terms of acknowledging the 'difference' in the name of tolerance. The proposed international, that is, cross-cultural morality (see note 3) is required to underpin democratic peace.

In applying the idea of pluralism to a global intercultural set-up, an inseparable combination of equality and democratisation – both within the discrete societies themselves and in global terms – is imperative. I concede that international morality is not enough for the democratic peace proposed to underpin the needed new international order. Democratic peace also requires the development of worldwide egalitarian structures. From this insight there follows the need to deal with the global structural North–South gap both as a reality and as an imaginary. Egalitarianism can never be based on cultural uniformity, be it a kind of US-style McWorld²⁰ or – in reverse – an envisaged Islamic universalism. Both prescribe a missionary universalist vision to others, which they do not need.

The late Reinhard Bendix, a friend and an intellectual mentor helped to sharpen and to specify my understanding of egalitarianism on global grounds. In the following section I shall draw on our debates and on the related process of learning which led to revisions in my earlier more radical views on global egalitarianism as a basis of cultural pluralism.

An interplay is not a mechanism: modernisation, culture and development

Some moralising scholars, myself included earlier on, view underdevelopment as an outcome of inequality and believe in an overall interna-

tional justice to be the key solution for all the problems of our world. According to Reinhard Bendix, the call for global egalitarianism, however, overlooks the historical process and later the impact of modernisation that came about in England and France in the eighteenth century.²¹ In his view it is only since then, comparatively speaking, that this model of development has put all other societies into a position of 'backwardness'. Although African and Asian societies have made 'ad hoc adoptions of items of modernity' (Bendix), this does not amount to an overall modernisation. In the course of our personal communication, both in Berkeley and Göttingen, the late Reinhard Bendix challenged my earlier thoughts on this issue, which were more focused on the external causes of underdevelopment. This is the background for the discussion of Bendix's modernisation concept, which will follow later on in more detail.

In addressing the source of inequality, Marxists and Islamists, despite being rivals by definition, believe that they see in the European capitalist expansion the explanation of *al-takhalluf* (backwardness) of the Muslim World. Although I disagree, I continue to criticise the realities of the present asymmetrical and inegalitarian international society. However, I have moved to sharing Bendix's view that a general conception of an egalitarian international society would bring about the misunderstanding of world order as based on 'cargo concepts'. These concepts subscribe to an understanding of equality which means the equal distribution of existing wealth with no consideration for the historical processes in which it came into being. Bendix's justified criticism of my earlier views compels me to revise my ideas on global equality to the extent of a plea that access to the conditions which render modernisation possible should be democratised. Without reducing the process of modernisation to the development and simply instrumental handling of modern science and technology,²² it is important to assess the contribution of both to the modernisation process.

In Western civilisation, specifically in its heartland Europe, the industrial revolution took place within a cultural and structural context in which modern science and technology have determined a radical change in the worldview of the European people.²³ The mastery over nature, which is no longer explained in religious terms, is one of the essential features of the industrial societies. This is the process which Max Weber described as 'the disenchantment of the world' (*Entzauberung der Welt*) which resulted in a pervasive rationalisation of all spheres of society. A consequence of this process has been the shift

in the European worldview from the medieval to a modern rational and secular one, as analysed by Franz Borkenau (*see note 23*). In contrast to this secular Western worldview, the Islamic *Weltanschauung* is still defined in pre-industrial, religious and theocentric (*tawhid*)-terms.²⁴ This feature both of Islamic and other non-Western civilisations affects the intercultural communication and other interactions that take place in our globalised world. The international system is truly global, but it is not as homogenous as a national social system is. Nevertheless, its components are bound together structurally despite cultural fragmentation. The global system embraces segmentary structures and cultures of various levels of development and, of course, it brings people of different norms, values and worldviews to interact with one another more closely. By the formula of *cultural fragmentation* I mean the clashing norms, values and worldviews brought together into one global set-up. People of radically divergent worldviews are forced into one structure, which they share but culturally reject.

Following the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann, I distinguish here between simple and complex, that is, segmentary, stratified, and functionally differentiated social systems.²⁵ Unlike Luhmann, however, I see a close connection between the functional differentiation of a social system and the degree of industrialisation of a society on the one hand and the related change in norms and values on the other. At this point I follow the emphasis Ronald Inglehart (*see note 7*) puts on industrialisation as a requirement of cultural change, however without assuming any necessary mechanisms between industrial development and secularisation. In this understanding I have defined the cultural system of contemporary Islam – in an earlier book – as a pre-industrial culture²⁶ and argued that it is prone to mechanisms of a defensive-culture, that is, self-assertive.

If we interpret the global system using a centre-periphery model, then we may define all central cultures as technological-scientific and those of the periphery as non-industrial. Again, without assuming any mechanism between industrial-economic development and cultural change, I agree at this point with Inglehart when he divides our global world into two different entities with different standards of development and worldviews:

We find a trend toward secularization in advanced industrial societies . . . In these societies, fundamentalism does not represent the predominant trend . . . In much of the developing world, on the other hand, insecurity is pervasive . . . In such settings we would

expect to see a heightened need for religious certainty . . . So which do we find? . . . Two contrasting trends, with affluent and secure societies moving away from religion, but societies characterized by mass insecurity turning back to fundamentalist values.²⁷

I may add – to distinguish my position from Inglehart – that not only economic insecurity, but also a crisis in meaning underpins the turning to religious fundamentalism. Moreover, I challenge the identification of religion and fundamentalist values.

There is a worldwide North–South gap between the affluence of the North and the insecurity of the South. As stated earlier this gap exists in two ways: as a real structure and as an imaginary. Both involve a socio-cultural conflict between modern and pre-modern cultures. Technological-scientific advances in one civilisation and a lack of them in others deepen the gap. In our case the ‘Revolt against the West’²⁸ is expressed in the guise of a re-politicisation of the sacred in Muslim societies. The political revolt against disparities equally brings into expression a socio-cultural protest and the drive towards a counter-acculturation.²⁹ This process results in a trend towards de-secularisation. In recalling this context, it becomes clear that Reinhard Bendix is right in contesting ideological egalitarianism that fails to consider the respective social history underlying poverty and affluence. Before further addressing this pending issue, we need to take a closer look at culture both on domestic grounds and in a global context and to place it in the social history involved. I also ask my readers to recall the findings in Chapter 1 of this book.

Bringing culture into international studies: what is development in a global context?

In relating the politicisation of religion – here interpreted as a cultural system – to the existing gaps of development we are in a position to properly understand the constraints of secularisation and de-secularisation. In this context it becomes clear that the study of international conflicts needs to be supplemented by a new approach. We need to link the study of development to the study of civilisation and the local cultures it assembles. In short, the intermingling of religious culture and of politics on global grounds requires an integration of the study of culture and intercultural conflict into international studies. Clearly, this new approach needs to be pursued without Eurocentric bias. In the Western hemisphere, Eurocentrists conceive of development as a transfer of their

societal systems to the non-Western world. In response to this attitude that implies an alleged superiority, non-Westerners move to the opposite extreme in viewing development in the context of their particular ethno-cultural authenticity threatened from the outside. In this regard African ethno-nationalists, for example, redefine development as a restoration of the pre-colonial past. For their part, Muslim fundamentalists envisage development as a means of restoring the dissolved divine Muslim order of Medina. These ideas involve romanticising development ideologies. Many of these ideologies may best be described as a cultural perception or an imaginary that prevails in anti-Western ideologies of *tiers-mondisme* (third-worldism). The opposed, but equally extreme views of Eurocentrism and *tiers-mondisme* are in fact obstacles to establishing the necessary rational knowledge on the subject-matter. They are not illuminating for questions of development.

In acknowledging the need to abandon the normative fillings in the development concept, established wisdoms and the prevailing social scientific definition are put into question. Scholarly enquiry into the issue of development goes back to the nineteenth century. At that time, the social philosophical concept of evolution, as borrowed from biology, was beginning to take shape and to be crystallised into a tradition of evolutionism. In the colonial age, it was adopted chiefly by cultural anthropology and ethnology.³⁰

Since the 1960s, the process of decolonisation has had a decisive impact on changing the study of non-Western regions. One of the effects caused by this impact has been the establishment of a new focus of research in social science that led to the birth of development studies. These studies cover also the analysis of social, political and cultural change. In the United States this approach flourished and then found its way into European universities. In US research, the nineteenth-century concept of evolution as an explanation of change was revived and adopted. The approach of evolutionism³¹ was applied to the developing countries for the study of change. The title of the well-known study by Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society*,³² illustrates this approach, in which development is considered to be an evolution from tradition to modernity. In this line, underdevelopment represents merely a passing stage in the processes of social and cultural change. In this branch of study, underdevelopment in the world of Islam and elsewhere is interpreted as the continuance of cultural traditionality. These cultural biases in development studies have led to dismissing cultural analysis in favour of the flourishing political economy.

At this juncture, I want to refer to my critical evaluation of that debate only to avoid two possible misunderstandings:

1. My interpretation of inter-civilisational conflicts within the global set-up as those between industrial, that is, modern, and non-industrial, that is, pre-modern cultures, is free from the implications of evolutionist and 'culturalist' outlooks. Muslim pre-modern societies could, of course, always retain this status, since there exists no evolutionist determination and modernity can be rejected. But this would also mean a retention of the structural gap and the related Islamic-Western tensions. It follows that industrialisation and rationalisation are related to historical choices and not to any determined development.
2. The second possible misunderstanding concerns my focus on the socio-cultural dimension of underdevelopment. This could raise the criticism that in this study the socio-economic monocausality of some Marxist and other authors obsessed with political economy is simply being replaced by another monocausality, that is, the study of culture. To be sure, I do not subscribe to any 'culturalist' approach. My argument is, that any attempt to interpret reality needs to be multidimensional covering all spheres in society. This includes dealing with economics and politics as much as with culture and social structures. In this understanding, the structure of underdevelopment has political, socio-cultural and economic dimensions that cannot be reduced to one another; none of these levels alone can help us toward a comprehensive interpretation of the phenomenon. In other words: I am not pursuing cultural analysis on its own terms, but am instead at pains to integrate it into a more general analysis. The focus on culture is simply a focus on one level of the analysis, and an effort to bring this domain back, however in a new form, into international studies. In this study the analysis of cultures underpins the examination of the politicisation of religion.

Despite narrowing the scope of my analysis to focus on cultural issues, I am still keeping the overall context in mind. In this regard, the European expansion has been a conquest of the world restructuring it into an entity dominated by the European centre. It follows that Eurocentrism is a combination of an imaginary and of the realities of domination. Development in Europe, for which England and France provided the model, thus became a yardstick for global development in

the non-European regions as well. Moreover, it underlies Western hegemony. In this context, inequality has been the outcome of the European expansion.

At present, the politicisation of Islam is not only a value-related phenomenon, but also an outcome of the existing global disparities that give rise to Muslim resentments. The pursued reasoning on development as a vehicle of change supports the earlier questioning of the suggested implications of a globalised world leading to standardisation of the McWorld type. It is possible to see developmental disparities mixed with civilisational tensions imbued with the outlooks of different worldviews. From this observation emerges an insight into the increasing significance of culture. As readers will recall, culture is always local. I hasten to add, cultures that resemble one another group together to form a civilisation. Thus, there exists only one Islamic and respectively one Western civilisation, but at the same time a great number of local cultures within both.

Civilisations do matter!

The next step in the pursued line of reasoning and the unfolding of my thoughts is to relate development studies to the study of international conflict and combine them with the theory of civilisation. In this regard, it would be equally challenging and inspiring to consider the foremost formulation of this theory in the work of Norbert Elias. The civilising process as described and analysed by Norbert Elias³³ has become globalised in the context of the European conquest of the world. To be sure, there are here two different understandings of civilisation that I combine: civilisation as a process and civilisation as a grouping of local cultures. In addressing civilisation as a process, I ask, how did it come about that Europe was in a position to undertake such a global conquest? In the previous history of mankind other civilising processes – above all the Islamic one – also pursued global conquests (*see* note 15), but they nevertheless failed to globalise their patterns. Why so?

The universalism of Islamic civilisation and the related *futuh* (expansion) were bound to a vision of Islamising the world. The expansion was successful, but stopped short of achieving such a goal on a global scale. Elias gives the following explanation as to why Europe was more successful in this endeavour:

What lends the civilizing process in the West its special and unique character is the fact that here the division of functions has attained

a level, the monopolies of force and taxation a solidity, and interdependence and competition an extent, both in terms of physical space and of numbers of people involved, unequalled in world history.³⁴

In the context of the European colonial expansion, these processes were 'exported' from Europe to the rest of the world to become global. The spread of this pattern of socio-economic complexity and competition throughout the world represents in Elias's view 'the last wave of the continuing civilizing movement that we are able to observe',³⁵ and he adds: '[T]he contrasts in conduct . . . are reduced with the spread of civilization; the varieties of nuances of civilized conduct are increased'.³⁶ For this phenomenon I have developed in articles published in Germany during the early 1980s the term globalisation of the civilising process, arguing that differing variants of cultural patterns can emerge out of this process, yet remain integral to it. In this context, I persistently warn of confusing globalisation and universalisation. At this point of discussing Elias, I must confess that both are at work.

In the wake of mapping the world a great deal of disruption resulted from the Eurocentric civilising process and crimes against other cultures were committed. Still, it is wrong to demonise Europe and I therefore share the view of my German-Jewish academic teacher Horkheimer that the 'Europe of freedom and Enlightenment' – in contrast to the 'Europe of crimes' – is worth defending.³⁷ In addition, the wheel of history cannot be turned back, and the universalising and globalising effects of the European expansion and its civilising process are now features of our present realities, like it or not. The conclusion is that the study of civilisation matters to our enquiry!

Realistically speaking, the demand for cultural pluralism can only mean striving to increase the scope for more diversity and tolerance within the socio-cultural sphere. At the same time there is a need to dismantle contrasts, above all in structural differences, in particular between industrial and pre-industrial societies. If we fail to achieve this end, the result would be – and already is – the emergence of religious fundamentalisms and the ensuing 'Clash of Civilizations'. To understand this issue, an assessment of the re-politicisation of the sacred and of its pursuit of socio-cultural disconnection from the global structure is required. Despite my conceptually oriented analysis, the case in point continues to be: Islam between culture and politics. Again, I am looking at Islam as the source of a 'cultural system'. In interpreting it also as a civilisation I do not confuse culture with civili-

sation nor do I use both terms interchangeably; I have already referred to the difference between both terms.

Civilisation-awareness, politicisation of religion and its impact

Globalisation does not only refer to the process linking the diverse parts of the world to one another, but also to the mapping of the world into one globalised system. The 'Revolt against the West' (see note 28) is distinctly a revolt against this very system designed along Western lines. The emergence of political Islam is based on a re-politicisation of religion and on the instrumental use of its cultural symbols in pursuit of political ends. This is the Islamic expression and variety of the 'Revolt against the West'. Political Islam³⁸ is in the global context an articulation of this revolt. An interpretation of political religion in the societies involved, shows it as a result of rapid social change. From this point of view political Islam is also the result of the missing cultural accommodation of change in terms of the effort needed to 'Rethink Islam',³⁹ as well as the articulation of a civilisation-awareness against the West.

The politicisation of Islam could lead and already has led to a religious legitimisation of social and political upheaval. The Iranian revolution of 1979 is a case in point. Since that event, scholarly and journalistic literature on political Islam has proliferated. The phenomenon has been perceived in the English-speaking world as 'Islamic resurgence'. In the United States, especially, the literature in question has reached such an extent that some leading observers comment ironically that the number of publications by US-Middle East experts in both academia and journalism exceeds the number of fundamentalists pamphleteering in the world of Islam itself. In many of these instant publications – luckily not in all of them – the reader will sooner find new versions of the centuries-old stereotyping of Islam than any hope-for illumination on the subject under issue.

There are only a few serious Western scholars who address Islamic fundamentalism as being the appearance of 'political Islam'.⁴⁰ A careful analysis of events demonstrates the need to place political Islam in a broader historical context. In his book *The Muslim Discovery of Europe*,⁴¹ Bernard Lewis provides a historical survey that helps to relate the contemporary phenomenon to the Muslim-European encounters of modern times. This is a more promising approach for a proper understanding of the re-politicisation of Islam than the sensational coverage of Islamists' actions by the media.

In contrast to the few illuminating works on the subject under issue, there exists a great mass of Western authors who see in Islam a grave threat to the West or even to NATO. Others view political Islam as a great liberation from Western imperialism. Both are misleading interpretations. In contrast, my point of departure is that in Islamism religion serves as a vehicle for the pursuit of non-religious ends. But Islam is a relatively autonomous value system that cannot be reduced to the mere articulation of economic demands, despite all interplay with socio-economic factors. For those social-scientists who are preoccupied with political economy – but who are mostly not professional economists – nothing remains of Islam as a cultural system of meaning that shapes the worldview of most Muslims. This flaw is also a big problem in those Western writings on the subject whose authors miss a major point: the meaning of religion.

Reaching beyond the Eurocentric mentality of some Orientalists or the dilettantist homage paid to wishful thinking of third-worldist authors and ‘belly-button anthropologists’, we need to investigate the politicisation of Islam in the process of cultural and social change without reducing the system of meaning to social realities. The interrelationship between the cultural system and the particular societal structure – not only structurally and in terms of a critique of ideology, but also in the context of cultural analysis – needs to be subjected to a careful scrutiny so as to be able to arrive at viable statements on the subject.

Among the valuable contributions worth dealing with is Martin Kramer’s interpretation provided in his book *Arab Awakening and Islamic Revival*.⁴² Kramer refers to a discernible and pending issue. The question that comes to my mind is whether the politicisation of Islam can be seen as a revival. At issue is whether it contributes to helping Muslims to develop an awareness of their civilisation for a better future! This question remains unanswered. I stick to my view that an awakening requires changed worldviews that grow from cultural and religious reforms. Defensive-cultural self-assertion need not be an awakening. Religious reforms include secularisation and this is not a unique European phenomenon that does not matter to Islam as Islamic fundamentalists aggressively maintain.

Modernisation and secularisation: religion, culture, social change and politics

Not only for students of development, but for scholars in general, the concept of ‘change’ is pivotal for dealing with social structures or with

belief systems. In contrast, for people of religion, in particular in Islam, all talk about change raises the suspicion of an involvement in heresy. In his empirical, comparative study on Islam as reality in Morocco and Indonesia, Clifford Geertz experienced this for himself and has been inclined to state in a general manner that change is problematic for every religion. Underlying this attitude is the idea that religion – being the incorporation of the absolute – should not be subjected to change because the result would be in itself a heresy.⁴³ Nevertheless, the fact that religion is embedded into social reality is at present a well-acknowledged insight. For the study of societies exposed to externally induced rapid social change, there is a need to share this insight. This is because for any analysis of the 'relationships between religion and society in the countries of the Third World . . . social change becomes both the central theoretical and empirical problem . . .'.⁴⁴ Again, we – while acknowledging this insight – need to be wary of a reductionist approach that reduces religion to realities. Religious symbols expose meaning and are not simply reflections of realities. These symbols are to be found in the scriptures of the particular religion. What is their relevance?

Aside from reductionism, there is the trap of essentialism. The essentialist view of Orientalists refers to Islam within the framework of textual, philology-oriented examination of sources, thereby overlooking that 'the content and significance of religious symbols can only be derived from the context of their specific application'.⁴⁵ Religion is not merely an ideological form of articulation, interchangeable with and secondary to the understanding of real processes, and yet it only becomes adequately comprehensible in the context of change. The role of religion in socio-cultural change needs to move to centre-stage in every analysis on the addressed topic. At issue are the links between change, modernisation and the potential for secularisation that may grow from these processes if underpinned by religious reforms.

At the present time, the politicisation of religion, that is, religious fundamentalism, is being directed firstly against secularisation. Prior to the crisis situation, that is to say, historically, there must have been a 'moral order'⁴⁶ that could be resorted to as an ideal. In addition there is an acculturative contact with a supraordinate structure at work. The expanding industrial West, which in turn causes social tensions, is the underpinning of this structure. The disruption caused by the externally induced rapid social change corresponds with the disintegration of existing structures which arouses discontent, social turmoil and the perception of an external threat. Resort to the system of beliefs provid-

ing a moral order promising salvation seems to be the needed remedy for the crisis situation.

Westernised intellectual elites were particularly affected by the acculturative contact. In the context of the dissatisfaction arising out of existing social tensions, some sections of these elites tend to de-Westernise their views and to ideologise religion by resorting to the imputed 'moral order' which is believed to have existed prior to this situation of Westernisation. Underground religio-political secret societies throughout the contemporary Islamic Middle East refer to their action as salvation movements. In fact, the major fundamentalist movement in Algeria has named itself the Islamic Salvation Front/*Front Islamique du Salut* (FIS).⁴⁷

Any perceptive reader will immediately, and rightly, ask whether it is not Eurocentric to characterise protest movements in non-Western civilisations in social-scientific Western terms. If real Eurocentrism is targeted, then there is some justification to this criticism. If, however, the claim for objective knowledge is questioned in a postmodern manner, then I reject it. In an earlier article, I have challenged the notion of 'Islamisation of knowledge' and argued for a universal human knowledge.⁴⁸ Any response to the effects of rapid change can be unique in having recourse to a particular old 'moral order' as is the case in Islamic fundamentalism. I maintain, however, that non-Muslims could understand Islam and the moral crisis involved without being caught in any Eurocentric Orientalism. The source of spiritual orientation for Islamists is the 'moral order' of the ideal city state of The Prophet Muhammed in Medina. However, the real model they inherently emulate is the West, not Medina, but they refuse to make this clear to themselves. Nevertheless, in the course of the cultural reception of change other future-oriented perspectives, in other words, perspectives not aiming for a romantic restoration of the past, can also be developed. This seems, however, not to be the approach of Islamism. Are Islamic societies unique to the extent to which they modernise without becoming secular? Is secularisation a Western imposition on Islamic civilisation? For proper answers we need to enquire into the conditions of the social and cultural change taking place.

Starting from the present state of scholarly findings and research, I will spare myself the necessity of taking up outdated modernisation theories. In his comparative social historical studies, Reinhard Bendix has gone beyond the old, almost scholasticised debate on the dichotomy of traditionality and modernity. He impressively demon-

strates that the concept of 'modernisation' is vague, but at the same time insists on its usefulness. This usefulness is retained only if we know how to avoid 'confusion between scientific constructions and actual development'.⁴⁹ If we abandon any preconstructed observations of reality, then we are able to discern:

that modernization does not necessarily lead to modernity. Moreover the modernization process itself is neither uniform nor universal, for the economic and political breakthrough made at the end of the eighteenth century in England and France has put every other country in the world in a situation of relative backwardness.⁵⁰

The processes of social change in contemporary Muslim societies therefore cannot be understood in evolutionist terms nor, indeed, in ways of reducing cultural or social and economic change with regard to one another. We are not dealing with processes of transition, nor can change be defined as catching up with a process that has already taken place in Europe. As in other non-Western societies, rapid social change in Muslim societies is externally induced through European expansion and the Western mapping of the world. A solution to the problems thus brought about cannot be that of resort to ghettoisation as the overall context of change is irrevocably of a global social nature. Not to take account of this is to succumb to a tendency to confuse reality with scholarly constructs manufactured at the desks of academia.

The ongoing processes of rapid social change currently taking place in Muslim societies confronts these same societies on the one hand with the task of modernising their structures, and on the other with the many political and cultural conflicts created by that change. Each one of these societies is faced with:

the problem of fusing its historically handed-down structure and typical tensions . . . with the effects of ideas and techniques coming from outside . . . Each one must bring the gravitational pull of the developed societies into harmony with the values contained in its own traditions.⁵¹

Bendix made this statement in a paper presented more than three decades ago at the World Congress of Sociology in 1966. At that time, it was still believed that evolutionary modernisation consists of the wholesale adoption of basically Western structures. The collapse of the Iranian modernisation experiment under the Shah and also the failure

of Westernisation elsewhere seemed to contribute to freeing the social sciences from many misleading assumptions and related constructions of all kinds. That was a misconception. The learning processes were very limited.

At the beginning of the new millennium scholars seem to have substituted evolutionism with globalism – one general concept has been replaced by another. As earlier evolutionists believed that change leads to modernity, globalists believe that the effects of globalisation are irresistible. They rightly argue that globalisation ultimately leads to spreading global structures everywhere, but they fail to understand that this is not a transmission of Western modernity. My authority is Reinhard Bendix's comparative social historical study from which we continue to learn how misleading premature predictions were in the past and continue to be in the present.

Bendix addressed in his work a crucial feature of contemporary Muslim societies in seeing social change there as characterised by 'continuously repeated conflicts between non-industrial and industrial ways of life'.⁵² Entanglement in tradition and the structural gravitational pull of the new explains why Arab Muslim elites are torn

between appeals to the great Islamic tradition they know to be popular and efforts to bring about economic change that, along with secular political institutions, tend to undermine that tradition.⁵³

The choice between the two has to be made 'in a world of alien super-powers and a modern technical civilization'.⁵⁴

In his lifetime Bendix assessed the situation correctly in seeing that it was incumbent on the elites to overcome the existing dilemma by being able 'to blend restored traditions with the demands of modern development under the conditions of the twentieth century'.⁵⁵ At the beginning of the twenty-first century we see how the secular elites have failed to cope with pending challenges. The Islamists are arising as the contemporary counter-elite⁵⁶ creating the challenge of desecularisation.⁵⁷ They, too, are unable to meet the requirement mentioned by Bendix and thus cannot bring about a breakthrough.

Is the politics of Islamic revival a spiritual mobilisation?

The underlying basic assumption throughout this book is that social change needs to be backed by cultural innovations. The question asked

in this section relates to the new cultural formula of Islamism and whether it would serve as a facilitator of spiritual mobilisation. At this juncture, I want to continue my reference to Bendix and attempt further to historically grasp the concept of 'spiritual mobilisation'. Bendix discusses this concept in the context of social change in non-Western societies. On the basis of 'demonstration effects' triggered by modern communication processes people are structurally exposed to standards related to patterns of European development which have become global. What is viewed as commendable from the perspective of 'progress' is often seen from the angle of indigenous tradition as a threat to cultural identity. For a better grasp of this attitude we need to understand the 'peculiarities' of these societies so as to be able to assess 'how they will come to terms with the ideas and institutions of the industrially and politically influential countries, or, conversely, how they could fail to do so'.⁵⁸ It depends on the capability of the elites and counter-elites of these societies to generate spiritual mobilisation. A precondition is to be able to cope culturally with the historically impending challenges. The level at which Bendix addresses this problem is that of historical reality. I am aware of the risk: the criticism of social-scientific Eurocentrism may be levelled against Bendix and me. Nevertheless, I accept the challenge as a liberal Muslim who is committed to reason as grounds for universal, not universalist outlooks. In classical Islam, Muslim philosophers like Avicenna and Averroës had no problems with cultural borrowings from Greek legacy. Universality of knowledge is desirable, in contrast to universalism which is an ideology that I dismiss, as much as I dismiss postmodern fashions and globalism.

The argument that non-Western cultures and civilisations, including Islam, can only be understood in their own terms is a wrong conclusion drawn from a debate on Eurocentric Orientalism. This wrong conclusion is based on serious misunderstandings, as well as on essentialising of European values. Edward Said told me in Chicago in December 1998 that he feels strongly misunderstood when postmodernists refer to his authority to advance cultural-relativist views. I maintain that science is related to human reason and is the common property of all mankind. Human reason has no particular cultural identity. Scholarly knowledge is universal and human; it can therefore serve for the analysis of non-Western cultures.

In short, there is a need to restrict the rampant use of the label of Eurocentrism and to limit it to identifying what is really Eurocentric. I propose identifying the following as Eurocentric: the old and new

beliefs in progress arising out of European development and the conviction of modernisation theory and of globalists that all cultures are on the road to development in the very same direction as the European and, in general, the Western model. This is the most modest version of Eurocentrism. There are tougher ones amounting to racism, with which I am familiar from my experience with German Orientalism. In focusing on the development-related Eurocentrism, I assert that there are various paths of development and that Western-style industrialisation represents only one of the prospects for overcoming underdevelopment. Despite my clear preference for industrialisation, I am aware that this by no means has to be carried out. The respective path of development depends on the given structural circumstances and above all on the ability of the elites – or counter-elites – in question to cope culturally with the changes that have taken place in non-Western societies or to become spiritually mobilised. Models of development can be recommended for improving life conditions, but none of them can be programmed to happen. Arguing otherwise would indicate a belief in evolutionism. I do not share it!

In summing up, cultural change is essential for social and economic change. 'Spiritual mobilisation' is part and parcel of it. This raises the question, how is this issue being approached by the Muslim elites themselves. A dialogue on this theme has been in progress for years between European and Arab social scientists within the scholarly forum of the Euro-Arab Social Research Group, of which I was a member. The issues discussed here were taken up in a series of regional conferences. In Marrakech we had a discussion carried out with the late Ernest Gellner. The question raised was how the products of a technological-scientific culture can be successfully adopted without at the same time changing the existing socio-political institutions and the dominant socio-cultural attitudes of a pre-modern culture and its related worldview. Unfortunately, the problem of 'cultural identity' was dealt with only in terms of cultural theory, that is, in a quasi-literary manner that neglected the social constraints. I mention this to state my observation that among non-Western intellectuals there is often an articulated fear of losing their authentic cultural heritage in the process of social change; this forms the background to debates that hardly ever depart from a vicious circle of modernity and authenticity (*asalah*). It serves, of course, as an expression for an attitude of victimisation. There is a trend to see an 'essence' in cultural identity and to overlook the fact that identity-building, as a production of meaning, is an ever-changing pattern.⁵⁹ It

follows that there is no such thing as an immutable identity, be it Arab or Islamic, Western or whatever!

In contrast, during another discussion in Cairo the Egyptian philosopher Mourad Wahba challenged all kinds of essentialism in insisting that there are no 'cultural constants', as culture is always closely connected to 'time'. With this understanding, Islamic cultural identity, if de-essentialised, is not in conflict with modernity. Aside from these debates we can state that elites under given specific conditions can be capable of the cultural accommodation of modernity. This is not the case when they adopt ready-made products from industrial societies. On the contrary, the tensions could be severe. Japan is a successful case for innovative elites. Obversely, the Islamist defensive culture is an indication of failure! It is neither imitative nor creative. It is simply rejectionist and no more than self-assertive!

In the search for a way out of the modernity/authenticity impasse, there is a need to find a middle way between universalism and the emphasis on particularities. To be concrete, cultural systems – such as Islam – require, in order to be adequately understood, a reference to their own terms. This requirement does not mean, however, that anything else is simply 'Orientalism'. I reiterate my firm position in stating that knowledge is human. To make judgements about Islam requires knowing Islam which can also be achieved by a non-Muslim. Such an assessment would similarly apply to all sociology of Islam⁶⁰ and to all social historical investigations of it. Moreover, the 'rationalisation' (M. Weber) processes in modern times permit even the scientific probing of religion as a cultural system. Muslims may like it or not, but religion is not off-limits to scholarly enquiry. The inherent danger is, however, succumbing to blind faith in science and progress. Islamists do the opposite: they subordinate scientific knowledge to religion. This is exactly what Islamic fundamentalists do when they talk about Islamisation of science (*see* note 48). I do acknowledge the confines of scientific knowledge, however with awareness of the risk of anti-science⁶¹ being the wrong conclusion. The abuse of the Koran by Islamic fundamentalists as a source of science is an indication of anti-science.

Following this reasoning I have always sided with the late anthropologist Ernest Gellner⁶² against Geertz in his criticism on cultural relativism and in his commitment to the universality of reason. Overstretching the argument of 'Orientalism' serves the views of post-modernism, as Gellner once rightly argued. Taking Gellner's side does not mean that I agree with all the views he has presented in his own

studies. However, his commitment to reason against the cultural relativism of postmodernists and against the confusion of religion, politics and knowledge by fundamentalists continues to be in the forefront of maintaining rationalism in the social-scientific study of Islam.⁶³ Accepting the primacy of reason and acknowledging the possibility of rational knowledge is the road to disenchantment with the world (Max Weber: *Entzauberung der Welt*), that is, to secularisation. Is it possible in Islam? There is no escape from this perennial question!

Islam between secularisation and de-secularisation

The links between modernisation and secularisation have already been discussed. In the modern history of Islam the abolition of the Islamic order of the caliphate in 1924 gave rise to a new secular state: Turkey.⁶⁴ It claimed to be the ground-breaking republic for introducing secularism and modernity to the world of Islam.⁶⁵ What does this historical reference mean in the light of the foregoing analysis? Why is the reverse – that is, the de-secularisation – and not the spread of Kemalist secularism beyond Turkey taking place at the beginning of the new millennium? To answer these questions properly we need to go far back into Islamic history to enquire into the compatibility of the Weberian rationalisation of culture and politics with the heritage of Islam. Is a synthesis possible, as it once was feasible for Islamic medieval philosophers to combine Islam with Aristotle and Plato? In medieval times Hellenised Islam and Islamic rationalism were promising signs in Islamic history, but they were not lasting ones.⁶⁶ This reference runs counter to overstressing the notion of Islamic peculiarities.

Although change is continually taking place and although it could result in further rationalisation, Muslim *ulema* have always been reluctant to admit the notion of change into Islamic doctrine. Muslims are therefore obliged to react to changed conditions within the adherence to a cultural system that in their own eyes is definitive and unchangeable. Unreformed Islam, however, does not enable Muslims educated in this system to understand the globalising processes of civilisation affecting our time. This process clearly has considerable and substantial effects on the process of social change worldwide. The countries in the world of Islam are no exception and therefore no longer a separate unit known in its own terms as *dar al-Islam*. This new historical situation calls for urgently needed changes in the Islamic cultural system to equip Muslims with the tools for bringing their cultural beliefs and their related worldview into line with the rapid changes taking place in

their societies. Would the Islamic cultural system promote or hinder these needed changes? Would this mean a secularisation of Islam? And why was the Turkish Kemalist secular model unsuccessful in striking roots in Turkish society as well as spreading beyond Turkey?

In maintaining the earlier expressed rejection of evolutionism, I reiterate my scepticism about interpreting secularity as a stage of evolution. This reservation applies also to the Weberian idea that religious reformation in Christianity represents a stage within the evolution of any religion.⁶⁷ Islam need not necessarily undergo this evolution in order to catch up with the contemporary situation. This reservation does not dispense us from asking about the changes needed to be carried out in Islam so as to render its adherents capable of understanding the dissociation of culture and politics. The predicament is: reality is in flux but the religion claims to be immutable! How can this be combined and comprehended? What would be the result? And how do Muslims perceive this predicament?

These are existential questions, but the best I can do is to refer to the earlier discussion of the linkage between secularisation, modernity and industrialisation and then to ask whether by embracing modernity a process of secularisation would be triggered in Islam. Another question would be whether this process could result from demonstration effects and above all whether such a process is thinkable and feasible in Islamic civilisation. Many influential Muslim authors, for example Muhammed Imara,⁶⁸ argue in this respect that the modernisation of Muslim societies would by no means lead to their secularisation. Others argue that *ilmaniyya* (secularism) is a Western fallacy.⁶⁹ These Muslim thinkers do not distinguish between secularism being an ideology (for example, Kemalism), and secularisation being a social process that could take place in any society. At an important Islamic congress in Cairo in 1979, I proposed to honour this distinction.⁷⁰ In societal terms there were significant efforts at secularisation in the Muslim world. Along with the revival of political Islam we, however, witness de-secularisation,⁷¹ that is, an effort at reversing social and cultural change. In 1979 it was possible to talk in public about *almanah* (secularisation) in Cairo. At present this would be suicidal!

In the course of the global phenomenon of the politicisation of religion and the rise of de-secularisation, it is intriguing to see even Western authors such as T.G. Carroll,⁷² distancing themselves from 'the secularisation' that has so far been regarded as universal. Carroll has his doubts whether orthodox Islam, with its organic notion of society, will be capable of keeping harmonious pace with the structures

of modernity. I disagree with Carroll, but concede the need to pay attention to contemporary critiques of civilisation and science. The outcome need not be a denial of the existence of what is being criticised, but simply point out its limitations. In this light we are obliged, despite the reservations stated here, to assess the secularisation thesis more sceptically than hitherto. In my earlier book, *The Crisis of Modern Islam* (see note 26), I interpret secularisation as a by-product of a process of functional differentiation of society affecting the religious system. This process contributes to reducing religion to a part-system within a given society as a whole. In spite of all the reservations conceded here, I continue to hold firm to this interpretation. In the course of my continued research, I have been able to further differentiate this concept (see note 71) and add nuances to it.

Two thematic spheres need to be emphasised here:

- Firstly, the alleged correspondence between the sacred and the political in Islam. It follows the necessity for de-sacralising politics in an effort at rationalisation in a broad sense.
- Secondly, we need to address the possibility of developing an Islamic accommodation of technological-scientific accomplishments in a way that goes beyond adopting items of modernity, that is, instruments decoupled from their context. The term 'Islamic' would then be reduced to the ethical and cultural sphere, and hence a process of de-sacralisation would be triggered off that enables Muslims to relate the worldview underlying these accomplishments to their own one.

In complementing the emphasis, I may also add, a doctrinal revision of the classical Islamic claim to superiority would appear inevitable from the perspective of cultural pluralism. This is in any case a doctrine that today has no material underpinning. As a source of ideological intolerance it stands in the way of establishing true cultural pluralism. These needed changes may or may not take place! Again, there exists no evolutionary determination. It is up to Muslim elites what outcome will materialise! This will affect and shape their relations to others, not only to the West.

It is recommended that Muslims learn from the history of others, and also from their ancestors in medieval Islam, who set great records in this regard. With reference to modern European social history, it is possible to point out that the secularisation of Christianity⁷³ resulting from the development of cultural modernity did not contribute to the abolition

of religion which most Islamist thinkers suspect is inherent in any secularisation. It is sad to see these authors being anxious for their religion and identifying secularisation with atheism with some even viewing it as a result of a 'Jewish conspiracy'.⁷⁴ The Islamists' awareness of secularisation is overly polemical and basically based on a misconception of the issue. Islamists do not honour the fact that this process is a by-product of change and related to differentiation within society itself.

Most Muslim societies are, to varying degrees, underdeveloped. Within this context, the correspondence between the sacred and the political seems to be resilient. Adopting modern science and technology from the developed West and developing a secular Islamic variant of technological-scientific culture should not mean simply aping the West. In other words, secularisation is not 'Westernisation!'⁷⁵ By the same token, a backward-looking cultural revival as promoted by orthodox Muslims and Islamic fundamentalists does not only appear to be unpromising, but is also incapable of offering real solutions to pending issues. This critique is in no way an argument against religious culture *per se*, it is rather a plea for a de-sacralisation of politics in Islamic civilisation. With this question in mind I shall conclude this chapter by drawing a line between the secular and the profane.

From secularisation to profanation?

In one of his interesting essays, the Harvard sociologist Daniel Bell proposes a restriction of the term secularisation to that of a return to its original content. At one time, secularisation meant simply a separation of religion from political life. In the course of the last two centuries, however, the concept has acquired a further dimension in Western societies – that of profanation. In Bell's view, underlying this idea is the belief that man can penetrate and master everything with the aid of science and his own instrumental reason. For Bell, total modernism thus implies nihilism.⁷⁶ This view is questionable since cultural modernity is related to norms and values. Not modernity, but rather post-modernity is a nihilism. Aside from this debate, it is important to note that Bell does not seek to restrict the concept of culture to its anthropological implications, that is, to how people live and cope with their lives. For him, culture means the 'modalities of response by sentient men to the core questions that confront all human groups in the consciousness of existence' (ibid. p. 333).

Although science is capable, as Bell goes on to argue, of contributing to the mastery of nature, it is by no means a substitute for the imbuing

of culture with meaning through religion in terms of religious ethics. It is important to add that Bell has no specific religion, and definitely no exclusive religion in mind here, as this would in his eyes be a political religion. Political Islam is a variety of exactly this kind of politicised religion. When Islamists talk about religion, they mean Islam, specifically their understanding of it. Such understanding would therefore neither correspond to Bell's notion nor fulfil the function of providing answers to the fundamental questions of human, that is, universal human, existence. To concede the limitations of science should not mean succumbing to some kind of anti-science of which the worldview of Islamic fundamentalists is a prominent example. It should not mean to promote one single religion in neo-absolutist terms.

To sum up, the secularisation of religion will not do away with it, but profanation could do. In contributing to de-sacralising politics, that is, decoupling religious symbols from political legitimisation, a secularisation that is not a profanation will protect religion from exploitation for political purposes. To be sure, I do not equate disenchantment with the world with a profanation of religion. Religion can be preserved as an ethical answer to the questions of human existence. In a free, democratised world, however, there cannot be cultural uniformity, as freedom is unthinkable without diversity and pluralism. Cultural diversity also applies to religious pluralism. The appeal for cultural and civilisational pluralism on a global-democratic basis does not absolve the discrete cultures from their outstanding internal social tasks. These include embracing reforms which lead to a better cultural accommodation of change and to decoupling religion, as a belief and a cultural system, from politics. In Islam, the oscillation between culture and politics needs a cutting edge! Secularity, democracy and civil society have become a standard of civilisation.⁷⁷ Will this standard be shared by the diverse civilisations, or will these clash with one another in the new millennium? Can Islamic civilisation accommodate this standard? Only the future can give an answer to this question!

In conclusion, the analysis provided in this chapter reveals that the dichotomy of structural globalisation and cultural self-assertion corresponds with a simultaneity of secularisation and de-secularisation (see note 71) in our global age. In contrast to Inglehart, I maintain that the lack of real modernisation, based on industrialisation, is neither the only explanation nor the most convincing one for the lack of secularisation in non-Western civilisations. Inglehart announces an analysis of cultural change which he fails to deliver!

There are two other issue-areas of development to be dealt with. One of them is political development and the other is cultural analysis. There are significant links between cultural change and the resilience of tradition. In short, no mechanism exists between modernisation and secularisation. The interplay between social, political and cultural change is certainly reciprocal. It is not enough to pay lip service to this reciprocity while pursuing mechanical reductionism. We need to have a proper understanding of the cultural systems at work in this interplay. In a post-bipolar world, efforts at *Preventing the Clash of Civilizations* (see note 3) are needed for the new millennium. This strategy requires serious efforts to illuminate the links between culture and politics in world religions of which Islam is a major one. We cannot prevent the 'Clash of Civilisations' if we are not in a position to ask about the constraints underlying the clash. I believe, inasmuch as democracies do not wage war with each other, reason-based civilisations do not clash. Muslims and Christians fought crusades and *jihad*-wars against each other when they resorted to politicised religion.⁷⁸ At times when the primacy of reason was accepted – for example, in Hellenised Islam and during the Islamic impact on the Renaissance in Europe – both civilisations had their best record of mutual respect and fascination.⁷⁹ Rationality and secular tolerance are the foremost bridges between civilisations – in contrast, politicised religions create frontiers!

5

The Politicisation of Religion: Political Islam as a Defensive- Cultural Response to Global Challenges. A Social-Scientific Interpretation

Political religion as it occurs at times imbued with ethnicity, and in some cases (for example, Islam) mixed with universalist claims is the hallmark of our age. However, this phenomenon has precedents. The historical context at issue is related to two attempts that have been made by two civilisations to expand by spreading far beyond the boundaries of their area of origin. First, the Islamic expansion was able to transform the Mediterranean from a Roman into an Islamic sea and even to encroach into Europe itself.¹ Then followed the European expansion which succeeded in becoming global, mapping the world of Islam into its orbit. The Islamic civilisation failed to transform its *futuhat*-conquests into a global Islamisation. Contemporary master-minds of Islamic awakening (*sahwa Islamiyya*) are probably right in arguing that European – later on becoming Western – expansion has been taking place at the expense of Islamic civilisation. To understand this, the reader needs to know that Islam views itself as the proper frame for realising world peace. In other words, Islam also has its own globalisation project. It is envisaged that this goal will be accomplished by expanding the house of Islam/*dar al-Islam* into a global *dar al-salam* (house of peace). In my view, this is the ultimate point of departure for a proper understanding of the universalist nature of contemporary political Islam and of the worldview presented by its exponents. It is intriguing, however, to see these aggressive universalist claims being at present virtually an expression of a defensive culture.

Some basic questions on the pending issues will follow while some thought will be given as to how to enquire properly into them. It is

self-evident to the sociologist of religion that a scholarly study of Islam, or indeed any other religion, cannot be merely achieved through a simple examination of the scriptures. Although familiarity with these sources is an acknowledged prerequisite, it cannot be seen as an end in itself and therefore the dominance of philology in Islamic studies needs to be challenged. According to this understanding, I follow Maxime Rodinson who argues that '*la fin de l'Orientalisme*' requires the 'end of the hegemony of philology'.² The study of Islam within the framework of a sociology of religion is based on investigating it as a system of meaning. In addition, religion will be studied in terms of a *fait social* in the Durkheimian sense. To subscribe to such a methodological position compels the social scientist to get into a conflict with two other approaches, which, though long-standing enemies, nonetheless share very similar views on the imputed existence of an 'essence of Islam'. Representatives of these approaches are the traditional Orientalists and Islamic fundamentalists. In contrast to both, the special interest of the sociologist of religion does not revolve around the text, but rather focuses on the social realities in the Durkheimian understanding of *fait social* related to any religion.

For the Islamic fundamentalist, any *fait social*, that is, any social fact inconsistent with the imputed 'essence of Islam' as derived from the Holy Text, ranks among the endless list of deviations from true Islam.³ Although the category of deviation is not part of the vocabulary of the traditional Orientalist, such a scholar nevertheless will not dispute that only research into sources can provide an adequate understanding of Islam.⁴ In contrast, the sociologist of religion is interested in how religious commandments become embedded in social relations, that is, how people perceive a religion and in what way they comply with it in their life, that is, how it affects their actions. Seen in this light, Islam in Indonesia would be a different subject-matter from Islam in Morocco, even though both invoke the same doctrinal sources.⁵ A competent sociologist of religion must of course also be familiar with the sources; criticism of the Orientalists' approach is not to be understood as a denial of the necessity for studying Islamic sources.⁶ The understanding of Islam by a sociologist who only knows the social facts is as much wanting as the understanding of the subject by a traditional Orientalist, who is only familiar with the scripture. The scholar needs to be familiar with both the texts and the socio-structural reality that corresponds to them in order to achieve an adequate understanding of how that socio-cultural system functions. These preliminary methodological comments help us to accurately place the interpretation of the

re-politicisation of the sacred in countries of the Islamic civilisation offered here. They also help to define the theme at issue; in other words, I am not concerned here with a 're-Islamisation' of the Muslim countries, but rather with the interplay between the cultural, that is, religious and social, constraints of change.

The politicisation of Islam has been addressed in the Anglo-Saxon scholarly world as the 'return of Islam'. In the German-speaking world the notion of 're-Islamisation' has been a formula for describing what is happening in Islamic countries. It is wrong and definitely not an adequate formula for depicting political Islam.⁷ The term 're-Islamisation' presupposes – from the semantic viewpoint – that Islam was once suppressed and that a return to it is now taking place. Those familiar with the Islamic civilisation will know that Islam as a system of belief has never lost significance for its adherents. However, a process of political supersession of Islam did take place following the decline of Islamic modernism. This change affected the sphere of political ideologies in the Arab East (*mashrek*). In the course of this process, Islam, as a political legitimacy of political rule, has had to quit the field in favour of secular ideologies, such as nationalism and socialism.⁸ But Islam has nevertheless forfeited none of its influence as a cultural-normative orientation determining the worldview of its believers and affecting the related meaning for their life, as well as their actions in everyday life. The notion of the current re-emergence of Islam is confined to the field of political ideology and therefore cannot be properly referred to as a re-Islamisation. It is rather a process of political revitalisation, or a *re-politicisation of the sacred*.

Ultimately, in the majority of Muslim countries this new tide is carried out mostly by militant political groups. Numerous political writers and pamphleteers raise the claim that Islam is not only a religion but also a *din wa dawla* (a religion fused with a state order). This is the expression of a correspondence between the sacred and the political. From this comes the assertion of a *nizam Islami* (Islamic system), which is defined as the content of a political ideology and a political oppositional programme.⁹

In order to address the subject-matter at issue in this chapter, I shall proceed as follows: firstly, I shall outline the socio-political factors determining the re-politicisation of Islam in advancing to the status of political ideology. Secondly, the question will be asked whether Islam as a religio-cultural system provides a foundation for a political system or whether fundamentalists are simply projecting this expectation onto Islam.¹⁰

The socio-political constraints. The political revitalisation of Islam

The re-politicisation of Islam is a process embedded in a broader context which needs to be defined historically. It will be useful first to recall what 'modern Islam' is and what in fact comprises its central problems and issues. Among my intellectual sources for a better understanding of this is the work of Maxime Rodinson. His insistent efforts at historically interpreting the unfolding of Islamic civilisation are most inspiring.¹¹ Equally, we need to grasp the religious worldview corresponding to Islam which is viewed as the ultimate divine revelation and therefore superior to all previous ones. The Koran identifies the Muslim Prophet Muhammed as *rasul Allah wa khatem al-nabiyyin* (Messenger of God and Seal of the Prophets).¹² In Arabic, the word *khatem* means 'seal' and implies that the Messenger of God is the 'final seal' in the history of the Prophets.¹³ Earlier in this book, I have referred to the research of Johan Bouman, who undertook a textual analysis of the Koran. It will therefore suffice here to remind ourselves that in Islam the belief in the superiority of Muslims over other religious communities derives from this Koranic definition of The Prophet as the Seal in the history of the prophets,¹⁴ according to which Muslims have at their command the ultimate and eternal divine revelation in the history of mankind. After its foundation in the seventh century, Islam rapidly – with the help of *jihad*-conquests – gained a superior position in the world of that time, which lasted for many centuries – albeit under various conditions and in various forms.¹⁵ This self-perception of Muslims being superior to others thus appears to be corroborated by realities of early and medieval history.

Since the eighteenth century, the crisis of meaning in Islam as a cultural system has developed out of its exposure to the new expanding civilisation of the West, both alien and – in terms of power – superior to Islamic civilisation. The West was and still is more advanced in science and technology. Modern Europe engaged Islam in an asymmetrical encounter, in which Muslims have been the underdogs not only in terms of civilisation but also politically and militarily. The self-perception of Muslims as described above thus entered a state of crisis, which is also the crisis of modern Islam.¹⁶ In 1930, a leading Islamic modernist, Shakib Arslan, posed the question, 'Why are Muslims backward, while others have developed?' and made this the title of his major treatise. His answer was straightforward: Muslims were backward because they had deviated from true Islam.¹⁷

In my earlier monograph on this crisis, I developed the following scheme¹⁸ for a periodisation of the asymmetrical encounter between the now industrial West and the pre-modern and therefore backward Islamic civilisation:

1. The first phase was based on a cultural revitalisation of Islam, so that it could assert itself against the expanding new power, Europe, which was making an incursion into the world of Islam. Anti-colonialism took the shape of *jihad* (here: holy war)¹⁹ against European hegemony. This revitalisation had both *modernist* components, that is, Islamic reform (the borrowing of modern science and technology for enriching Islam), as well as *millenarian-nativist* components. The latter was first promoted by Wahhabi Islam – a return to primeval Islam as a defensive culture against the alien – in Arabia.²⁰ It is important to know that Wahhabi Islam is a revival of Arab Islam, as directed at the outset against Turkish-Ottoman dominance.
2. In the course of this ongoing cultural incursion into the Muslim countries, new Western-educated elites evolved who were better able to lead the anti-colonial struggle. The ideologies of secular nationalism and socialism were more promising and therefore were able to replace the revitalisation movements. If by secularisation we understand both a transformation of the social structure in the sense of *functional differentiation of the social system*, as well as a *redefinition of the sacred* to suit the altered situation, then it will be necessary to supplement the thesis of the dominance of secular ideologies with further qualifying and modifying statements. The adoption of secular ideologies from Europe did not go beyond the normative level and thus did not result in a process of institutional secularisation, nor was it embedded in an effort toward theological reformation.²¹
3. The third phase, which forms the subject of this analysis, may be characterised as the suppression of secular ideologies in favour of a resurgence of Islam as a political ideology. The reformist view that Islam is a religion and not a political legitimacy, propounded earlier even by al-Azhar scholars such as Ali Abdelrazik²² during the liberal age and at present by less influential Muslims like Said Ashmawi, is now strongly rejected. The new call for *al-nizam al-Islami*, for the political order of Islam²³ is the hallmark of the present time, as being this third phase.

Inasmuch as countries inhabited predominantly by Muslims (55 states) are integral parts of the international system which is partly also an international society and are interlinked on the basis of 'worldwide interaction' by networks of transport and communication,²⁴ the student of religion working on Islam needs to take a look at the global system. For a better understanding of the political revitalisation of Islam the subject-matter at issue, that is, Islam, needs to be placed into the global context.²⁵ The recourse to an indigenous system of coordinates for the articulation of political content is directed against the impact of globalisation and can therefore be interpreted as anti-globalism.

Since the 1970s the Islamic civilisation has been undergoing a crisis brought about by both internal and external factors. In this situation Islam is in a position to provide the best symbols that can be offered in this crisis situation, inasmuch as these symbols fulfil a dual function. On the one hand, Islamic cultural symbols offer an authentic form for the articulation of political content in a situation in which the outside, or non-Muslim, world is perceived as a threat to Muslims' own identity. On the other hand, the political content being articulated Islamically has a chance that secular ideologies, Western-style, do not have, that is, to reach and mobilise broad sections of the population, in acting as a mobilisatory ideology. Political Islam has more appeal than any of the secular ideologies, which are in any case propounded only by Westernised elites and perceived by the illiterate majority of the population as an imported product. In contemporary political Islam the notion of *hulul mustawradah* (imported solutions) has been the most derogatory formula for looking down on Western intellectual impact. Some spread of secular ideologies among the Western-educated social strata has taken place in the Islamic civilisation on the normative level, but there has been no structural institutional secularisation, as I have pointed out. In light of this observation, it is then not difficult to explain how secular ideologies have so easily ended up in a legitimacy crisis²⁶ smoothing the way to de-secularisation at the normative level.

The crisis began immediately after the sweeping Arab defeat in the Six-Day-War. Both Arab nationalism and Arab socialism of the Ba'athist and Nasserist type lost their glamour with the defeat of the political regime that had exploited these ideologies for legitimisation purposes and now fell into a legitimacy crisis.²⁷ From the Middle East being the core area of Islamic civilisation this crisis spread throughout the Islamic civilisation fostering the politicisation of Islam.

Of course this development is not only a question of ideology; the Muslim Arab countries are structurally involved in the worldwide North–South conflict between industrial and non-industrialised societies. One of the academic debates on the possibilities of resolving the problems of underdevelopment was conducted under the slogan of regional integration.²⁸

It was assumed that regional integration is an important road to improving the position of the South in the North–South conflict. Readers familiar with the Middle East will agree with John Waterbury in his assertion that the practical policies of the Arab political regimes are all in too stark a contrast with daily pan-Arab rhetoric.²⁹ The ideology of Arab unity on the basis of a secular Arab nation that would include both Arab Christians and Muslims is now perceived as an ideology imported from the West for legitimating the political regimes of defeat; it is set against the concept of an Islamic *umma* (the community of all Muslims). Militant groups point to the great victories and successes of Islam in the days when the Islamic *umma* was united, comparing these achievements in rousing fashion to those of the secular regime that collapsed after the defeat in the Six-Day-War of 1967. This military defeat is also considered to be a constraint in the decay of secularism in the Arab-Muslim world.³⁰

The re-politicisation of the sacred is not only connected with Islam as a religion, but also with social and political realities. This insight leads us to discern the following realities conditioning the phenomenon of the rise of political Islam:

1. The global deterioration in the position of the Muslim countries *vis-à-vis* the West.
2. The rapid social change taking place in Muslim societies and its disruptive effects.
3. The legitimacy crisis within secular-oriented political systems, and the lack of any participation by the populace in the decision-making process, which means that the so-called third wave of worldwide democratisation did not reach the Muslim world.

Before addressing the effects of the worldwide North–South conflict on societies with a predominantly Muslim population, there is a need to refer to the dependency theory, according to which underdevelopment and social deformation in the ‘Third World’ are the outcome of external factors alone – that is, they are related to the European incursion. Empirically this is an untenable view. Although the greatest

achievement of the dependence theory lies in having drawn attention to the external factors underlying underdevelopment, it implies a monocausal interpretation, thereby reducing the otherwise promising approach to absurdity. The ultimate expression of this absurdity is the statement that only the neutralisation of these external influences by means of 'dissociation from the world market' would resolve all the problems of development in the 'Third World', including its Islamic part. To maintain that the industrial nations are solely responsible for the poverty in the Islamic countries would be to drop the level of discussion closer to that of the ideological accusations put forward by Islamic fundamentalists.

At the descriptive level, the integration of predominantly Muslim countries into the international social structure can only be presented as a feature of their underdevelopment. This is not the place to take up the debate whether the countries of the Islamic civilisation are underdeveloped in comparison with Europe. In my view, underdevelopment is also an endogenous phenomenon, but it must nevertheless be placed in a global framework. It is this very asymmetry, which existed before, that made the incursion of industrialised Europe into the non-Western world possible in the first place. It is only later that it became a structural feature of the new international social fabric.

The worldwide North-South gap became increasingly wider in the 1960s and 1970s and continues to widen. To be sure, criticism of the monocausality of the dependency theory does not at all deny that dependence structures are one of the most important factors in the impoverishment of the Muslim peoples. I am merely pointing out the fact that internal factors are also major structural elements in this process. But how do the people concerned themselves perceive this *fait social*? The privileged and politically dominant strata of Muslim societies, of course with some exceptions like Saudi Arabia, Iran and Afghanistan, consist mostly of Westernised or Western-educated, -socialised and -acculturated elites. The impoverished majority of the population feel that these elites are imposed on them and do not belong to the indigenous structure. They perceive the industrial West as the cause of their impoverishment and judge indigenous privileged elites in the same way. Secular ideologies propounded by Westernised elites are viewed as an import from the West and are accordingly rejected. The more blatant the consequences of the widening North-South gap become and the more Muslims, as a result of the communication network arising out of the global system, become aware of the contrast between European and US lifestyles and their

own poverty, the greater their hatred of the alien will become and the greater their need to have an indigenous medium of articulation to express these intensifying anti-Western attitudes. Islam is the best form of articulation for this purpose. In this situation, political Islam is useful as a 'most convenient, readily available ideological instrument',³¹ as Philip Khoury rightly puts it.

In considering these developments, the reference to Islam as a form of articulation is at issue. It helps the Muslim peoples in the North-South conflict, both to express dissatisfaction and to compensate for the suffering of poverty. Islam also fulfils another function, that of a political ideology of opposition to existing political regimes. At this point the analysis by Michael Hudson³² is useful, that Islam can be mobilised *both as an ideology of opposition and equally for the legitimisation of political power*. In Morocco, for example, where the king is legitimated through Islam as the *amir al-mu'minin* (the commander of the faithful) and is thus sanctioned by the *ulema* (the Muslim scribes), it would be difficult for an opposition to invoke Islam,³³ whereas it would be possible in Tunisia, where the deposed former head of state, Bourguiba, had the secular legitimisation of 'combatant supreme'.³⁴ Despite this pointing out of the limitations of Islam as an oppositional ideology, it should nonetheless be remembered that even a religiously sanctioned social order can be open to questioning by religious revivalist salvation movements. This was indeed the case in the Islam-legitimised monarchy of Saudi Arabia, when in November 1979 the mosque in Mecca was occupied by Islamic revivalists.³⁵

We know from Norbert Elias's grand design of the civilising process³⁶ that in Europe social change was triggered by social forces within society itself. One of the significant features of such a process of social change is that attitudes as well as norm and value systems (psychogenesis) change concomitantly and parallel to changing social structures (sociogenesis). Undoubtedly, in this process too there have been situations in which the dominant worldview had entered a state of deep crisis before it radically changed. We may recall in this connection Franz Borkenau's classic of the Frankfurt School on the 'transition from a feudal to a bourgeois view of the world'.³⁷

In contrast to Europe, the type of social change that has been taking place in non-Western societies can be qualified as one primarily induced by external factors. Crucial as it is to point out external factors, we must guard against deducing everything monocausally from dependence structures. One of the hallmarks of such primarily exogenously induced change is that it is perceived by those affected as a

threat from outside. Norms and values are autonomous and at the same time constrained by social structures. These structures change in that they are substantially altered. Nevertheless, values do not change along with structures. I have coined the term of the simultaneity of the unsimultaneous for depicting the parallel existence in the same society of norms and values of a historical formation which no longer exists along with newly evolved social structures.³⁸ Norms and values do not change as fast as structures do.

In a changing world, people feel the need to maintain their identity. Their environment no longer seems *determinable*; they need to define it if they are to safeguard their identity. In such a context, religion acquires a crucial function. This social process, which is empirically observable in many non-Western societies, is manifested with particular intensity in societies with a local culture determined by Islam. *The more rapid the social change, the more indeterminable the environment becomes for individuals as personal systems living in a state of transition, and the more marked the need for religion to maintain identity in the process of change.* Change is perceived as an out-and-out threat, and a longing for the past is cultivated as a result. A restoration of what has been repressed by the alien and a yearning for a return of overlaid indigenous elements, underlie a parallel reorientation of thought aimed at political action. This background may help to explain the appeal of militant Islamic groups specifically for those superficially modern strata which are most affected by change and its effects. It is no coincidence that Islamists are predominantly urban university students suffering urban anomie, and are not impoverished peasants. They side with the Koran on behalf of the *mustad'afun* (the oppressed). This Koranic expression is translated by Islamists in Tunisia, for example, with the word 'proletariat'. Even Marxism is dispensable for such non-Western movements that purport to be revolutionary; after all, it comes from the West, which is hated and therefore anything that comes from it is rejected and militantly opposed.

The late German sociologist Niklas Luhmann investigated such a phenomenon at the conceptual level, highlighting the importance of religion for the social system, religion having the function of 'transforming the indeterminable . . . world into a determinable one'.³⁹ He sees the individual as disoriented in an apparently indefinable environment: 'The person in transition is "both-and" or "neither-nor", and indeed simultaneously. His identity becomes blurred and indeterminable. This situation renders some urgency to the problem of determining the indeterminable.' Religion is able to solve this problem:

Islam has an optimal capacity both for 'determining the undetermined' and for absorbing disappointments – both of these being component functions of the religious system in a transitional situation, as defined by Luhmann. All ideologies of a Western stamp, from nationalism to Fabian socialism or even Marxism, pale into insignificance compared to an alternative capable of such component functions. In short, without investigating the disruptive, rapid processes of social change and its consequences (dislocations, and so on) taking place in Islamic civilisation, no social scientist will be able to reach an adequate understanding of the political revitalisation of Islam.

This specific appeal of Islam as an indigenous cultural asset and as a system of coordinates explains the intensity of the legitimacy crisis in secular-oriented political regimes in the Islamic civilisation. In the pursuit of political mobilisation to accomplish their political goals, Islamic fundamentalists ideologically contrast the achievements of the existing political regimes in their countries to those of the city-state of Medina founded by the Muslim Prophet Muhammed. In terms of an invention of tradition, they revive this city-state and attribute to it a meaning which no longer exists. The Muslim polity managed within half a century to extend 'from the banks of the Loire to the Indus, from Poitiers to Samarkand'.⁴⁰ Set against such an idealised and overly promising historical construction, based on an extremely selective view of the past, these secular-legitimated political systems, which in any case lack the support of an appropriate socio-structural underpinning, are bound to appear as corrupt political orders, blocking all forms of participation and propped up both socio-economically and socio-politically by the rule of minority parasitic social strata, while political Islam presents itself as a tried-and-true ideological weapon to combat them, promoting the current alternative *al-nizam al-Islami* (the Islamic system).

al-nizam al-Islami as a backward-looking political utopia of political Islam

The Islamist concept of *nizam al-Islami*⁴¹ (Islamic system) cannot be found in the sources of Islam like the Koran, the legacy of The Prophet (*hadith*) or the authoritative scriptures of the *ulema*. Nevertheless, it forms the major concept in the ideology of political Islam. With regard to the term of *nizam*, the great scholar of religion Wilfred C. Smith, who taught at Harvard until his retirement, stresses:

This term . . . does not occur in the Qur'an, nor indeed does any word from this root; and there is some reason for wondering

whether any Muslim ever used this concept religiously before modern times. The explicit notion that life should be or can be ordered according to a system, even an ideal one, and that it is the business of Islam to provide such a system, seems to be a modern ideal.⁴²

I could now raise the objection that the concept of *nizam*, or its synonyms, may have developed on a Koranic basis only later in the course of Islamic history. This leads us to review political thought in classical Islam. We know that in Sunni Islam there is the discussion of the political heritage of the caliphate⁴³ and in Shi'a Islam the counter-tradition of the imamate.⁴⁴ In Shi'a Islam every ruler is illegitimate in the absence of the imam. In Sunni Islam political rule is purely a matter of determining how the ruler is to be legitimated and how his rule is to be brought into line with the norms of the Islamic *shari'a*.

With few exceptions (for example, al-Farabi), there is no tradition of political theory apart from the *shari'a* to be found in classical Islam. In the work *al-Ahkam al-sultaniyya* by Abu al-Hassan al-Mawardi, we find a systematic definition of the caliphate as an indication of Islamic rule. This is in fact a variety of royal authority in the sense defined by Bendix. This effort by al-Mawardi is one of the few exceptions for theorising Islamic rule. Hamid Enayat, the late Persian Oxford scholar, refers to the

absence of independent political thought in Islamic history. It was only under the trauma of European military, political, economic and cultural encroachments since the end of the eighteenth century that Muslim elites started to write separate works on specifically political topics.⁴⁵

It is most surprising not to find any claim about restoring the traditional Islamic caliphate⁴⁶ in the writings of Islamic fundamentalists. Instead they coin the new formula of *nizam Islami* and project it back into Islamic history. In this context the classical author Mawardi is currently enjoying a kind of renaissance.⁴⁷ A *Fan al-hukm fi al-Islam*⁴⁸ (Islamic art of government) is being developed as a foil to *Asalib al-ghazu al-fikri li al-alam al-Islami* (the methods of intellectual invasion), against which *al-nizam al-iqtisadi wa al-siyasi al-Islami* (the Islamic political and economical system) is regarded as offering the best protection.⁴⁹ *al-Islam wa al-siyasa* (Islam and politics) continue to be seen as an inseparable unity. The struggle between 'left' and 'right' which is nowhere mentioned in Islamic sources, as classical Islam is not familiar with these

European concepts, is also projected onto Islamic history: *al-Yamin wa al-yasar fi al-Islam*⁵⁰ is now one of the important political writings of Islamic political revivalism. These modern projections into an extremely selective use of the past indicate a crisis situation in which a search for meaning takes place to maintain identity and to unite a group (community). The framework for this search is an 'Invention of Tradition'.⁵¹

We may now proceed to the safe conclusion that there is no specifically Islamic political system and that the latter is thus a new ideological construction based on a projection into the past – a product of the politicisation of Islam. Even the prominent al-Azhar scholar Ali Abdelraziq indicated in his classic book *al-Islam wa usul al-hukm*⁵² that the caliphate state was an Arab system of government for the ideological legitimisation of which Islam was invoked. In his view Islam knows no system of government, as it is a religion. The contemporary reform-Muslim M. Said al-Ashmawi revives this criticism of the caliphate⁵³ within the new context of unfolding a liberal Islam.

Abdelraziq published his work in Cairo in 1925 after the last Islamic caliphate had been dissolved in 1924 and the Republic of Turkey emerged as a nation-state. In fact the nation-state is by its origin a European institution, but it has been globalised to map the entire world. Islamic civilisation has been no exception in this regard. The political implementation of theocratic universalism is now, in Islam⁵⁴ as in Christendom, a thing of the past, a worldview without a corresponding structural underpinning in the contemporary world. The order of the nation-state presupposes the existence of a nation. The order of political Islam is based on the belief that all Muslims – 1.3 billion living in 55 states – constitute one *umma*. What is the difference between a nation and the community of all Muslims?

First, it will be necessary to clarify my terms. The translation of the Arab Islamic term *umma* as 'community' (prior to the foundation of the Islamic religion the Arabs were ethno-tribally organised in *qaums*) fully corresponds to the content of the term. If we recall the definition of community, in the German sense of *Gemeinschaft* as distinct from society, as may be found in Ferdinand Tönnies, we can say conversely that the idea of *umma* as a community repudiates both plurality and diversity. Only righteous believers (*al-mu'minun*), among whom there may be no dispute as to what Islam is, belong to the *umma*. This is no more than an ideal, however. Such a community has never existed in real terms since the very beginnings of Islam under The Prophet in the city-state of Medina. Islam is only monolithic if one understands by

Islam the sources and the perception of these sources held by European Orientalists and Muslim fundamentalists alike. As a *fait social*, Islam has always been characterised by complexity and diversity, not by the alleged unity of a coherent Islamic *umma*. The pre-eminent German student of Islam, Josef van Ess, concludes in his multi-volume study of early Islam:

In early Islam people acted as members of collectivity and thought along these lines. This collectivity was the framework of belonging to a social group. In fact, the notion of the *umma* which in modern times enjoys great references barely played a role in early Islam . . . The tribes had each their own mosques . . . People dismissed the idea to pray behind an Imam who does not belong to one's own tribe.⁵⁵

In considering the historical background in which the superimposed idea of *umma* failed to supersede tribal identities one may question the meaning of this concept of Muslim society. In fact, the term 'Muslim society' is mostly used in plural and sometimes as a synonym for 'societies with a Muslim population or culture'. This term, however, has no distinct content in that there are neither specifically Muslim nor specifically Christian societies. The term basically applies only to those societies whose members profess Islam. Once we become aware of the cultural diversity in Islam, as has been emphasised by Geertz, it is easy to see that the attribute 'Islamic' cannot at all be applied to any existing cohesive entity.

The universal *umma* concept is currently revived by contemporary Islamic fundamentalists and combined with the notion of *jihad*.⁵⁶ How can this invention of tradition create a Muslim solidarity covering the entirety of the world's 1.3 billion Muslims? The US political scientist Leonard Binder posed a similar question more than two decades ago and came up with an adequate answer that has since lost none of its validity. He begins by stating – thereby confirming the research results of Montgomery Watt and Louis Gardet – that Muslims feel a very deep psychosocial bond with Islam and to its adherents as fellows in faith. He then adds:

this attachment had little political efficacy, that is, it did not determine the limits of the political community. To put their views in our own terms, the concept of the *umma* served as a referent for the identity resolutions of individual Muslims throughout Islamic

history. But, as we have pointed out, identity was a religious and not a political category of concern until recent times. It is with the politicisation of identity and the posing of the problem of the individual and the political community that Islam and politics have had to be reconciled within a new framework.⁵⁷

Everywhere in those parts of the contemporary international society inhabited by Muslims we can hear the call for a *nizam Islami*, that is, for an Islamic system, and even calls for a unified Islamic *umma* – not only in the heartlands of Islam, in the Arab Islamic Middle East, but also in sub-Saharan Africa (for example, in Senegal) and even in countries where Muslims do not form an absolute majority of the population. It is indisputable that during the last decade Saudi Arabia and Libya have been undertaking activities to this effect, which continue to be furthered by an influx of petrodollars. It would be an oversimplification, however, to attribute the political revitalisation of Islam to ‘petrodollar activities’ alone, as much as the researcher may overlook them.

The analysis so far has shown that the political revitalisation of Islam has been directed to a large degree by both internal and international social determinants. Needless to say, political Islam, as Islamic civilisation itself, is both characterised by unity and diversity. Similarly, Islamist movements voice in their rhetoric the same major ideology, but in reality they are different from one another. At the general level, however, they will confirm the validity of our analysis of the socio-political factors behind this phenomenon, as presented in this chapter. Of course, area studies may serve to modify these general findings and specify them in regional terms.⁵⁸

6

From Religious Belief to Political Commitment: the Fundamentalist Revolt against the Secular Order. Between Cultural Modernity and Neo-Absolutism

The reader is already familiar with my criticism on considering the study of culture as well as its application to Islam to be a kind of monopoly for cultural anthropologists.¹ Hitherto, the exception of a small community of sociologists involved in cultural analysis² has been admitted. It was not until the end of the Cold War that the dimension of culture and civilisation factually pertinent to international studies had caught the interest of scholars of this discipline. In the course of the justified rejection of Western universalism, however, a questionable fashion of relativism has evolved in cultural studies, becoming widely disseminated in the contemporary West. The pivotal argument has been that every culture is relative with regard to its own value system. It follows that no culture is in a position to provide objective criteria for critical judgement or a value orientation valid for other cultures. This self-defeating contemporary Western intellectual fashion of cultural relativism amounts to a popular school of thought that at times can be equated with a religious conviction among those who present themselves as postmodernists.

Seen from a different angle, our age can be viewed as characterised by a *Clash of Civilizations*.³ Clearly, the conflict involved pertains to values and worldviews, not to military issues. This conflict implies an almost global trend towards de-Westernisation in which peoples of non-Western civilisations are developing a very distinctive civilisational consciousness. Globalists overlook the fact that the drive toward globalisation cannot undo this trend. In an earlier stage, Hedley Bull

addressed this new pattern of conflict in terms of a 'Revolt against the West'.⁴ The revolt is not only directed against Western values and norms. In its resort to the politicisation of religion for making use of it as a means of articulation, this revolt moves into a new direction that could be identified as a neo-absolutism. In my view, Islamic fundamentalism is a major case in point for a very prolific variety of the addressed neo-absolutism. In juxtaposing the Western fashion of cultural relativism to this neo-absolutism it becomes clear that both are in a win-lose situation. They can hardly come to terms with one another. The implication of cultural relativism facing neo-absolutism is that it does not smooth the way for cultural pluralism, but rather indicates cultural and civilisational self-denial. In their encounter with neo-absolutists, cultural relativists are the losers in a win-lose situation!

A clear distinction: Islam is not Islamism. Cultural relativist confusions

The study of the oscillation in Islam between culture and politics gives rise to a host of questions that pertain to whether cultural relativism is the appropriate frame of reference for dealing with the pending issues. Is relativism, as currently displayed by Western intellectuals, an attitude of tolerance? Or is it not rather related to moral indifference and thus virtually a setback to ways behind the rationalism of the Enlightenment and behind objective knowledge?

To be sure, there is no Western monopoly of rationality. In medieval Islam, as I have argued in an earlier book, a tradition of rationalism evolved in Hellenised Islamic philosophy. The Islamic Enlightenment was, however, suppressed by the *fiqh* orthodoxy and subsequently went into decline.⁵

It is worth mentioning that the neo-absolutists themselves view Western cultural relativism as a sign of Western decadence and consider it as an expression of the imputed civilisational decay of the West. The new Western fashion of political correctness, that introduces new taboos and new patterns of censorship, virtually prohibits a critique on non-Western cultures. It inclines one to quote Habermas's view that postmodernism might well be presented as a falling back into conditions of pre-modernity and into related intellectual thoughts.⁶ Being myself a non-European as well as a Muslim, I feel free to criticise the politicisation of religion and also to depict political Islam as a cultural variety of neo-absolutism. Following this line of reasoning, I view

Islamism as the Islamic variety of religious fundamentalism. In contrast to this political ideology, Islam is a religion and cultural system, not a neo-absolutism. In my own case, it is the reference of my identity. I pursue this enquiry with the intellectual tools of cultural modernity to which I am committed while rejecting postmodernism. The commitment to cultural modernity by a Muslim is not cultural treason, as viewed by some – rather it stands in the tradition of Islamic rationalism just referred to.

Among the new fashions in the West is the well-known monotonous reproach that the subjection of non-Western cultures to critical scrutiny leads to 'demonising the others'. I have repeatedly encountered this attitude, including in Amsterdam. During the Ascension Symposium in Amsterdam in May 1994 a controversy flared up between Geertz and Gellner which after the death of the latter has become a famous heritage.⁷ Despite harsh attacks I did not let myself be discouraged from pursuing my reasoning as a reform Muslim on the Islamists' neo-absolutism. To be sure, rational critique of neo-absolutism is not a demonisation. Rationalism is a cross-culturally valid approach which, as I have already mentioned, also has its roots in Islamic civilisation. My peer Islamic reformer Mohammed Said al-Ashmawi shared with me his story about young Dutch students. It was amazing and equally strange that those Dutch Europeans visiting Cairo as aliens accused Ashmawi in his home city of demonising Islam because of his critical view on Islamism. This is not cultural relativism, but rather European cultural imperialism, now coming from a so-called 'left'.

The age of migration and multiculturalism coincides with a time of civilisational encounters on a domestic level in Western societies with the related value conflicts. Despite all odds, it is intriguing to see exponents of political Islam making instrumental use of the cultural relativism of multicultural 'tolerance' to establish legitimacy for themselves. Their contempt for Western cultural relativists does not stand in the way of the instrumental use of their views for political convenience. As Gellner suggests:

Three principal options are available in our intellectual climate: religious fundamentalism, relativism, and Enlightenment rationalism . . . Logically, the religious fundamentalists are of course also in conflict with the relativists . . . In practice, this confrontation is not very much in evidence.⁸

In view of the stereotyping of Islam prevailing in the West as an effect of the distorted media coverage, it is at the very outset most important to clearly draw the line between Islam and Islamism. The term political Islam is a linguistic variant for depicting Islamic fundamentalism. Islamic thinkers like Mohammed Said al-Ashmawi prefer to speak of political Islam. In honouring this view, we may ask whether it is necessary to differentiate between political Islam and fundamentalism? Ashmawi believes so, but I don't. Some people argue that Islam has specifically been a political religion since its formative years. This is true, but the foundation of the 'Islamicate' (Hodgson) as *pax islamica* in early and medieval Islam⁹ is dissimilar to the modern concept of an Islamic state as envisaged by contemporary fundamentalists. At issue is an 'invention of tradition', not tradition itself. The call for a *nizam Islami* (Islamic system) is the hallmark of this invention by political Islam.¹⁰ The reader of the Koran will fail to find this neo-Arabic term in the text of Islamic revelation, nor can it be found in the *hadith* or in any of the other authoritative classical Islamic sources. The notion of 'Islamic system' is clearly a politico-cultural invention by the neo-absolutist adherents of political Islam.

In my earlier book *Islam and the Cultural Accommodation of Social Change*, I have distinguished between the vision of an Islamic state pursued by political Islam and the order of traditional Islam as it exists at the present time in Morocco and Saudi Arabia. Islamism's main feature lies in its defensive-cultural and assertive character. The implication is the dual character of the current phenomenon, that is, it is not merely political. At issue is the Islamic oscillation between culture and politics. Islamism is both a response to the ongoing political crisis of the modern secular nation-state¹¹ in the world of Islam and an indication of a defensive culture. In the liberal age, early Arab and Turkish nationalists felt most comfortable with the separation of religious authority from secular state power. In adopting the European idea and institution of the nation-state and in applying it to *dar al-Islam* (abode of Islam), liberal and secular nationalists¹² complied with the consequences of modernity and its globalisation. They had no need therefore, of defensive-cultural attitudes.

The European institution of the nation-state,¹³ being a transplant introduced to the world of Islam from the West, failed in dealing with the tasks of development and also in delivering the goods it had once promised.¹⁴ The rise of political Islam is a response to that failure and the related legitimacy crisis; it marks an effort to provide an alternative to the secular institution of the nation-state. The alternative is the

order of the Islamic state believed to be divine and therefore opposed to the secular nation-state. This political concern should not distract from the cultural phenomenon of self-assertion. At issue is a response to the pending challenges of cultural modernity. The call for de-Westernisation of the world voiced by Islamic neo-absolutists is their response to the global claim of Westernisation presently labelled as globalisation.¹⁵ This is an illustration of the defensive-cultural attitude outlined in my earlier books.¹⁶ I am adding that here a clash between two universalisms is at work: Western universalism is penetrative while the Islamic one is defensive-cultural. To be sure, at issue are politicised universalisms. The Islamic one, in this case, assumes the shape of Islamism.

Islamists define their alternative not only in terms of culture, but also in a claim to political power. They argue that current Islamic societies have fallen back to the *jahiliyya*. For them this means a regression to the age before the Islamic revelation and the light it brought to the world. The term *jahiliyya* refers in the classical language of Islam to the pre-Islamic age of unbelief and darkness. In contrast, Islam is an indication of light. To steer Muslims back onto the right path (*al-sirat al-mustaqim*) the exponents of political Islam not only subscribe to bringing light into the world of Islam, but also to the use of political power. A closer look at the phenomenon at issue reveals that the prototype of an Islamic fundamentalist is sooner a political man of action, a *homo politicus*, than a *homo religiosus*, that is, a man of religion. Nevertheless, we are again confronted here with a mixture of religion, as a cultural system, and politics. This makes up the dual character of Islamic fundamentalism.

In going beyond the rhetorics of fundamentalist pronouncements we can clearly observe that the origins of political Islam lie in the set-up of Islamic civilisation in modern times. The related attitudes can be addressed in terms of a defensive culture. At issue is a crisis which has emerged from Islam's predicament with modernity. My deliberations in this chapter are, therefore, focused on this very predicament and the crisis that is emerging from it. I maintain that political Islam is the contemporary neo-absolutist Islamic response to cultural modernity. At this point, it is important to call to mind the distinction to be made between cultural modernity and the instrumental items of modernity. Islamists are opposed to cultural modernity, but do not reject far-reaching adoptions of techno-scientific instruments of modernity. The crisis of contemporary Islam is also politico-historical and it emerges from the developmental gap addressed. In a recent work I referred to

the value-related attitudinal conflicts in terms of a *Krieg der Zivilisationen* (war of civilisations, see note 3) in the understanding of a war of *Weltanschauungen* (worldviews). Involved are value conflicts on a global scale.

A moral philosophy of convergence compels us to develop alternative strategies and requires new modes of reasoning on tolerance. At the Spinoza Institute in Jerusalem in August 1999, Muslim and Jewish scholars were engaged in a project on this link between moral philosophy and tolerance under contemporary conditions of religious-civilisational tensions. In Jerusalem we had great debates and agreed on the idea that tolerance is needed, but acknowledged that this does not mean that 'anything goes' as cultural relativism implies.

The background: the predicament with modernity

Secular tolerance in the meaning of the comprehensive mutual respect of people differing in views and beliefs is an achievement of cultural modernity. The pertinent issue linked to the cultural project of modernity revolves around the concept of knowledge as related to a specific worldview based on the belief that man can shape his/her own destiny and also determine his/her own social and natural environment. As already argued in the introduction to this book, the basic concept that underlies these views is the modern concept of secular knowledge. Modern science and technology grew from this very secular knowledge. To be sure, human knowledge is universal and may not be restricted to a specific local culture or regional civilisation. The accomplishments of Islamic rationalism in medieval Islam are a case in point¹⁷ and support the notion of universality of reason-based knowledge. At that time, the legacy of Greece and Islam became blended, in the same way as Islam and the West have done in our age, however, with the significant difference that there was no Greek supremacy over Islam.

Since the European expansion and its incursions into the world of Islam the issue addressed has become entangled in the encounter of Muslims with the modern West. In the course of the nineteenth century Muslims were consistently exposed to the knowledge emerging from the cultural project of modernity. On the one hand, they have since realised that they cannot thrive without adapting to modern techno-scientific standards¹⁸ as modern knowledge underpins political power. On the other hand, however, orthodox Muslims and reformers alike have not been willing to alter their belief in the supremacy of the

sacred Islamic revelation and the knowledge emerging from it. Unlike medieval Islamic rationalists (for example, Ibn Rushd), contemporary Muslims are unwilling to separate worldly knowledge from revelation. Thus, orthodox and even reformist Muslims stand strongly against the subjection of any aspect of Islamic revelation to human reasoning. In this regard, Muhammed Abduh restricted his reform in an effort to reconcile revelation and reason.¹⁹ The result is a continuance of the existing great tensions. This is the background to the major predicament of contemporary Islam with modernity. Islamic modernism and Islamic reform of the late nineteenth century failed to go beyond the described duality and thus were unable to cope with the ensuing ever-growing tension. The Islamist resolution of this perennial conflict is the deadlock of the proposed 'Islamisation of knowledge'.²⁰ This 'resolution' leads to nothing more than a new, but even greater impasse.

In general, there are many other predicaments of pre-modern cultures arising from reason-based knowledge as this emerges from cultural modernity. It is intriguing to encounter the proposition that the claim of modernity to universality, which is believed to be a resolution of the conflict at issue, be overcome. The underlying cultural relativist argument is that knowledge cannot be universal for it is simply part and parcel of a specific, mostly local culture. Viewed from this cultural relativist angle, cultural modernity may be interpreted as a specifically Western-European concept of knowledge without particular concern for Muslims. The result is then a downgrading of all secular patterns of knowledge by confining them to the European civilisation, of validity only for the West. It is amazing to see how the neo-absolutists make full use of these fashions in welcoming relativist arguments despite their absolutism combined with contempt for the West. The outcome of such questionable considerations is twofold: Cultural relativists unwillingly grant legitimacy to ideological concepts such as 'Islamisation of knowledge', and, moreover, strikingly continue to be caught in Western universalism.

A bright theorist on the West, David Gress, addresses the link between universalism and cultural relativism as exemplified by multiculturalism and reasons thus:

Although multiculturalism might seem to contradict universalism, the two were compatible; indeed, multiculturalism was simply universalism applied to cultural politics . . . Universalism . . . never solved its fundamental dilemma of being both a Western idea . . . and an anti-Western idea.²¹

Islamists politicise the belief of orthodox Muslims in the absolute and complete character of the Islamic revelation and present it as a basis for the envisaged de-Westernisation of the world. For cultural relativism this is just another cultural variety that can only be properly grasped in its own terms. The inconsistency is that cultural relativists claim universality, even absoluteness for their views! This insight shows how much sense the earlier quoted contribution by Gellner makes. In practice the 'confrontation (between fundamentalists and relativists) is not very much in evidence' (*see* note 8).

Within the confines of cultural relativism no proper grasp of Islam's predicament with modernity can emerge. Cultural relativists fail to understand political Islam and the set-up in which it is embedded. The issue is that Islamic fundamentalists do not contest European modernity in rendering it culturally relative. They also do not contest the concept of universalism. In fact, they themselves claim universality for their own views. Islamists limit their rejection of modernity to its cultural views pertaining to the capability of human reason while they pursue their favourable attitudes toward the adoption of the instrumental achievements of modernity.²²

The conclusion of the preceding analysis is that political Islam is no cultural traditionalism, but rather a mixed bag that grows from the Islamic predicament with modernity and results in an invented tradition and the politicisation of it. Political Islam accommodates techno-scientific adoptions, in terms of selective items of modernity, parallel however to a radical rejection of the cultural project of modernity itself. Earlier I have suggested viewing this as an 'Islamic dream of semi-modernity'.

Culture and knowledge

The oscillation in the determination of contemporary Islam either as a culture (cultural system) or as a framework for politics (political order) is related to the overall pendulum between the secular and the divine. The ambiguous attitudes toward modernity make Islamic fundamentalists overlook the fact that modern knowledge involves a certain, that is, reason-based, way of looking at the world. This determines a rational worldview.²³ There is no doubt that technological and scientific knowledge is inconceivable without this specific view of the world. Given this background, the question emerges how modernity could be accommodated without embracing its rational outlooks.²⁴ I believe that the Islamic way of dealing with this intricate issue lacks the inclination to place the issue in the broader context of historical and philo-

sophical developments.²⁵ The Islamic debate continues to be doctrinal and it rarely goes beyond the scriptural confines, in addition to defensive-cultural self-assertions!

In other words, Islam's predicament with modernity is not a textual issue, it is related to the historical realities of the modern world as shaped by globalisation processes and generated both by the European expansion and also by the challenges of modernity. The Islamic dilemma is to find a way of coming to terms with cultural modernity and simultaneously maintaining authenticity. It is a precarious dilemma. The world of Islam has been affected by developments that took place outside its boundaries, but mapped the entire world into one structural, however culturally fragmented entity. In this context, Muslims conceive of modernity either as a cultural threat of which to be wary or as a political challenge to cope with while accommodating its fruits to their own cultural legacy. This is the continued Islamic debate²⁶ on *turath* (legacy) and *asalah* (authenticity) versus *taghrib* (Westernisation) with no light at the end of the tunnel.

The current Islamic revivalist debate on these issues is determined by the dichotomy of modernity and defensive-culture. The claim to a 'de-Westernisation of knowledge'²⁷ and also to freeing Muslims from the 'epistemological imperialism of the West'²⁸ indicates a fundamentalist project articulated in Islamic terms. Culturally, this project is regarded as an alternative to cultural modernity. Politically, it is taken as an alternative to the current world order dominated by the West. In contemporary Islam, culture is imbued with politics and politics is imbued with religio-cultural symbols.

It is intriguing to see how both Western cultural relativists and non-Western neo-absolutists come close to one another in equally challenging the concept of universal knowledge and objectivity. In recalling the acknowledgement of the primacy of human reason by medieval Islamic rationalists we may argue that rationalism is neither a monopoly nor a peculiarity of Western civilisation. Moreover, civilisations affect one another as the early tradition of Islamic rationalism reveals the Greek impact on Islamic thought.²⁹ Cultural borrowing among the civilisations is one of the great sources for enriching humanity.³⁰ This is also true for Islam and it can be found in the work of Farabi, Ibn Rushd and Ibn Sina. Thoughts on the impact of this Islamic rationalism on the West are also shared by eminent scholars like Leslie Lipson who reminds us:

Aristotle crept back into Europe by the side door. His return was due to the Arabs, who had become acquainted with Greek thinkers . . .

Both Avicenna and Averroës were influenced by him . . . Aristotle was introduced from Cordoba.³¹

In the light of these historical facts, the claim to a de-Westernisation of knowledge by contemporary Islamists is comparable to the claim of Islamic orthodoxy to de-Hellenise Islam, that is, to deprive Islamic civilisation of one of its most significant sources. Contemporary political Islam contributes on the one hand to divorcing the contemporary Islamic civilisation from its own positive traditions, and on the other to disentangling Muslims from the present world of modernity. Even Afghani (1839–97), who called for *jihad* as an Islamic revolt against the West, acknowledged frankly that Europeans would not have been able to conquer the world of Islam if they had not been in possession of science and technology. In reviving this insight regarding science and technology, Islamists want to fight the West with its own weapons and beat it, however without embracing any related rational worldview. The Islamist al-Sharqawi blatantly states:

When Kemal Atatürk called [on Muslims] to emulate the West he had nothing [more] in his mind than to be in line with the West . . . This is not our intention. Our goal is to learn how to use modern arms and, more than this, how to produce them and further develop them in order to defeat our enemies.³²

Islamists are favourable to the knowledge of modernity but on the grounds of Islamising it. In other words, the terms of adoption are Islamisation.³³ This commandment runs counter to the assessment of science and technology as being neutral instruments as they are presented by the fundamentalists themselves. In addition to this amazing inconsistency, the ignorance of Islamic fundamentalists about the heritage of Islam³⁴ is hair-raising. They argue that the West owed its breakthrough to Islam and therefore they view their adoptions from Europe as a retrieval or an act of repossession. But at the very same time, lacking knowledge about the Islamic tradition of sciences, they dismiss Islamic rationalists to whom the West owes cultural borrowings. In other words, they fail to distinguish between the religious sciences in Islam (for example, the *fiqh*-sciences) and the Islamic tradition of philosophy and rational sciences.³⁵ These two traditions in Islam have never been on good terms.

The orthodox view is based on the understanding that rational sciences were – in medieval Islam – considered to be ‘foreign sciences’ and

at times heretical. At present, Islamic fundamentalists do not seem to know that rational sciences in Islam were based on what was termed *ulum al-qudama* (the sciences of the Ancients), that is, the Greeks. The Greek legacy was further developed by medieval Muslim rationalists and handed over to Europe on the eve of the Renaissance via Arab-Muslim Spain. It follows that Europeans adopted Islamic rational philosophy and natural sciences, but definitely not the *fiqh*, that is, the legal knowledge on the divine law, from Islamic civilisation. I have to reiterate: Islamic Hellenised philosophy does not enjoy the respect of political Islam, nor of orthodox Islam. It is amazing to see the Islamists remind Europeans of their borrowings from Islam while at the same time they outlaw those Islamic philosophers, to whom the West owes inspiration, as heretics.

Islam and the West: a cultural revolt?

After the height reached by Islam in medieval history, Islamic civilisation decayed due to many internal and external constraints. In parallel, a new predominantly techno-scientific civilisation developed in the West. Since the nineteenth century Islam's predicament with modernity is related to an exposure to this Western civilisation.³⁶ Islamic fundamentalism is the most recent indication of this predicament. The link between science, technology and the developmental needs raised by social change in the modern global context is not just unique to Islam. Like other non-Western parts of the world the abode of Islam has been structurally embedded into the modern globalisation processes. Different standards of development in the culturally diverse regions of this globalised world underlie existing structural gaps. This state of affairs has ever since been addressed as underdevelopment, given the fact that underdeveloped countries are viewed as such in comparison with the developed ones.

The qualification of 'backwardness' can only be applied in comparing the standard of development in non-Western societies with European standards. Due to the fact that in the present global system there are unifying political and socio-economic structures (the international system of nation-states and world economy), but at the same time cultural fragmentation expressed in a variety of self-assertions, there exists no universal civilisation. On the contrary, the structurally unifying trends are coupled with increasing tendencies toward cultural dissent and loss of consensus over values, norms and rules needed as commonalities.³⁷ Science and technology are a means and do not create a civilisation in themselves.

With regard to modern science and technology, Muslims, like other non-Western peoples, acknowledge, on the one hand, their centrality as instruments for their own development. On the other hand, however, they fail to grasp that science and technology are socially constructed in the modern Western civilisation.³⁸ Contemporary Muslims refer instead to the past and declaim Islamic values as roots of true science while they inveigh against the West in general.

It is embarrassing, but factually correct, to point to a commonality between early Islamic modernists and current fundamentalists: both cite the Koranic notion of *ilm* (knowledge) to articulate the conviction that the Koran is the foremost source of all knowledge including modern science. The early Islamic modernists, Tahtawi, Afghani and Abduh, different as they were from one another, stressed unanimously the Islamic need to adopt modern science from Western civilisation. In their view this is to be justified as an act of repossession. In their drive Islamic modernists were opposed to the traditionalism of Islamic *ulema*, whom they blamed as the cause of the stagnation of the Islamic world.

Early Islamic modernists drew a clear distinction between the 'fundamentals' (*usul*) of Islam and the deplorable situation of Muslims in modern times. We also find this reference to the 'true and dynamic fundamentals' in contemporary fundamentalist thought. The view is shared that contemporary Muslims are 'lazy and backward' because they do not understand their Islam properly. This was the substance of a book by Shakib Arslan, published in 1930. It was meant to be a call to mobilise Muslims against the West.³⁹ In short, the argument is that knowledge is to be acquired in going back to the source, that is, to the Koran via borrowing from the West as an act of repossession. This, however, has consistently been an extremely selective reference to the source, be it the Koran or the West. At the end of the day we are dealing with a politicisation of religion.

At issue, with regard to the revolt against the West, is not only knowledge and secularity in general, but also specifically the secular institution of the nation-state. We need to remind ourselves of the rise of nominally secular nation-states in most Islamic countries in the twentieth century which institutionally underlies these secular outlooks. Those nation-states, however, continue to be nominal in that they lack the needed structural roots. It follows that a substantial secularisation in the sense of a structural process of functional differentiation of society had not yet taken place. Thus, secularism in *dar al-Islam* was more or less simply an ideology based on normative claims set by

Westernised intellectuals. It was not related to social processes of secularisation. Secular orientation has been a product of Western education and does not reflect existing realities.

The tensions 'Between Islam and the Nation-State'⁴⁰ continued to prevail even in the age of secular nationalism. At present, Muslim fundamentalists view secularism as a Western means for the intellectual invasion of the Muslim world. For the 'warriors of Allah' as representatives of political Islam the battle against secularism is a *jihad* against the West. For them, secularisation is a de-politicisation of Islam reducing this religion to a culture. They oppose this option vehemently and envisage a de-secularisation and the coupling of Islam with politics as the future perspective for the world of Islam.

Conclusion

Politicised religion as an indication of a neo-absolutism is at pains to become the mainstream in contemporary Islam. The turning point in Islamic civilisation for the rise of this anti-Western neo-absolutism in the guise of religious fundamentalism was the crushing Arab defeat in the June War of 1967. The call for the '*hall al-Islami*' (Islamic solution)⁴¹ has served ever since as an alternative to the existing secular order and it was accepted as a preferred public choice. The current wave of fundamentalism as an expression of political Islam and its dissemination beyond the boundaries of the core of the abode of Islam is an outcome of this process following the 1967 defeat.⁴² The Arab world, and not Iran, has been the birthplace of political Islam.

In the first place, Islamic fundamentalists have been denouncing Westernisation (*al-taghrib*), insofar as they view it as an instrument for weakening the Islamic *umma* (community). Against '*taghrib*'⁴³ they invoke the 'true fundamentals' of Islam and they essentialise Islam to present a neo-absolutist alternative. To view these anti-Western attitudes as being anti-modern would be a grave mistake as much flawed as the view that Islamic fundamentalism is a passing phenomenon.

In concluding this chapter, I want to reiterate that Islam's predicament with cultural modernity is the foremost issue. In this sense the pending phenomenon is basically an indication of the oscillation in contemporary Islam between culture and politics. Islamic fundamentalists as 'Allah's warriors'⁴⁴ are not traditionalists. They do not reject modernity as a whole. They aim to employ the achievements of modernity in the pursuit of their neo-absolutism. A literal take of the term 'warrior' compels us to refer to the concept of war while consider-

ing a revival of the *jihad* in the meaning of war. In fact, this is one dimension of political Islam that relates this ideology to the military action of terrorism as the new kind of irregular in contrast to inter-state war.⁴⁵

A view of political Islam in terms of cultural relativism and so-called postmodernism would amount to distorting the issue or simply closing one's eyes to reality. In this case, the needed comprehension of our radically changing world in the new twenty-first century remains elusive.

Part III

The Framework: the Means of Politicisation. The Revival of the Shari'a and the Islamisation of Education

Introductory remarks

In continuing the reasoning on the interplay between social and cultural change, I contend that cultural patterns are not simply reflections of social realities. The dominating worldview and the cultural attitudes related to it are able to shape social realities, although at the same time they are affected by it. Thinking this idea through to its logical conclusion ultimately amounts to requiring cultural changes in those structurally underdeveloped regions of the world to which countries of the Islamic civilisation belong. Instead of cultural innovation we encounter a politicisation of culture. My hypothesis is that the cultural worldview can, but does not have to, change side by side with changing social structures. In other words, socio-cultural systems in their own terms can prove resistant to change. This can even be exacerbated in a situation in which a defensive-culture grows from a politicisation of religion. The role of law in Islam is a prime example that supports this hypothesis; one of the fundamental principles of the Islamic religious system is that it is not subject to change. Following this line of thought, change and adaptation are equated with heresy. Despite the claim of immutability attributed to the *shari'a*, it has not always been the very same legal system, for it is susceptible to change! And there are many *shari'as*, not just one set of laws.

As an organic religious system, Islam embraces all spheres of life and has strict commandments for conduct within them. Islamic law, the *shari'a*, is viewed as the expression of these sacral instructions; it claims to define and structure all aspects of human behaviour. Only few scholars acknowledge the fact that the *shari'a* is a post-Koranic construction. The term occurs only once in the Koran. At an international Christian–Islamic dialogue in 1980, the then Islamic supreme court judge in Pakistan Allah-Buksh K. Brohi, who was both a legal adviser to the late dictator Zia ul-Haq and also an Islamic professor of law, insisted on the belief that the *shari'a* is immutable. In contrast to this orthodox view secular Kemalists in Turkey abolished the *shari'a*. One of the most important lessons that we recognise so far from studying the models of 'revolution from above', like the Turkish one, is that social change can be forced, but cultural change cannot. If we concede the defensive-cultural resistance of cultural systems to instigate change, the question arises whether externally induced change could have an impact to the extent of putting down roots. In considering the conditions of globalisation in which Islamic law is embedded, the presented hypothesis will be examined in Chapter 7. There I shall discuss the

possibilities of an Islamic learning from the approach of topical thinking in modern legal theory in the West.

As far as the pendulum in Islam between culture and politics is concerned, the Islamic *shari'a* is a most pertinent issue. The reason for this pertinence is the high esteem in which the *shari'a* is held by Islamists. They basically call for *tatbiq al-shari'a* (implementation of the *shari'a*). As already stated, the notion of the *shari'a* occurs only once in the Koran: 'And we have shown a path/*shari'a* to you, so follow it' (*al-Jathia* 45/18). This reference does not indicate a legal system. In this capacity *shari'a* is a post-Koranic construction, not to be found in the Koran itself. Moreover, the *shari'a* legal system has been – with some exceptions, for example, the writings of Ibn Taimiyya – a kind of civil law, definitely not a state law. The concept of implementing the *shari'a/tatbiq al-shari'a* for running an Islamic state/*dawla Islamiyya* according to its rules is a product of the mind of the exponents of contemporary political Islam. This concept does not emerge from traditional *shari'a*; it is definitely a product of the more recent oscillation in Islam between culture and politics. In short, it serves as a means of politicisation.

In arguing that the law/*shari'a* is the religious regulation of worldly matters in Islam the next step is clear. Throughout the history of Islam it is through the system of education that the Islamic legacy (*turath*) has been transmitted. The *madrasa*, with which we shall be dealing in Chapter 8, is the highest educational institution in Islam. This institution is subject to change, and clashes occur between the Islamic model for reality mediated within it and reality itself. The intrusion into the Islamic civilisation by technological scientific modernity has magnified the crisis in Muslim education, but the crisis itself dates from an earlier time and can in fact be traced back to the conflict between Hellenised philosophy (*falsafa*) on the one hand and scholastic theology (*kalam*) and sacral law (*fiqh*) in Islam on the other. In medieval Islam this system of education was a domain of Islamic orthodoxy off-limits for Islamic rationalism.

In contemporary history, the rise of political Islam is to be placed in this historical context. Islamism can be viewed as an effort at de-secularisation of Islam: from reason back to scriptural revelation, this time however in a politicised manner. The political battle of Islamists takes place in the educational system. It follows that education is more promising than the use of force to push the claim of Islamisation of life and thus the pursuit of de-secularisation and de-Westernisation.

7

Social Change and the Potential for Flexibility in Islamic Law: the Shari'a between Ethics and Politicisation

In most religions, religious scholars are basically theologians. In contrast, learned men of religion in Islam are sacral jurists/*faqih*s (in Arabic: *fuqaha*), not theologians (*mutakallimun*). In medieval Islam a religious tradition of *kalam* (theology) was unfolded, but it never succeeded in becoming mainstream. The *fiqh* (Islamic sacral jurisprudence) possessed and continues to possess a monopoly over the interpretation of religious affairs in Islam. Despite the central place of law in Islam, I refer to the text of the Koran in which the term *shari'a* occurs only once (sura 45, verse 18) with an ethical, not a juridical meaning. Historically, I maintain that the *shari'a*, as a legal system, is a post-Koranic construction. In the course of Islamic history, the *shari'a* became an integral part of the everyday culture of Muslims, but not yet politicised. Of course, there are some exceptional cases. It is, therefore, basic to refer to the *shari'a* to understand why most Muslims perceive their religious beliefs in terms of legal instructions. A pious Muslim is thus a lawful person.

Legal differences and cultural diversity

One of the major arguments of the present book is that there exists no world culture, but a variety of civilisations that are composed of a great number of local cultures (see Part IV). Given that law is a cultural component, then it follows that any claim of one legal tradition to universality must be resisted by others who do not belong to the respective culture and thus reject imposing on them 'alien instructions'. In this regard, there exists a similarity between Islamic civilisation and the

West: Muslims regard their *shari'a* as universal as much as Westerners regard their law as universal, while both reject the claim to universality of the other. Western legal scholars also attribute a universal character to law, without acknowledging that they take the term *law* to mean a tradition that has evolved within Europe and which predominates in that hemisphere only. Although we do have both a global system and its inherent international structures, there are no grounds for assuming the existence of a universally valid notion of law, although Article One of the UN Charter does provide for the settlement of international disputes by peaceful, that is, legal means supposedly valid for all people and states. The UN is an international organisation of all peoples, but international law is basically European law. Therefore, this law does not correspond with a universal legal awareness. Although there is only one international law, a diversity of legal systems exist parallel to the diversity of cultures and civilisations.

The Oxford jurist H.L.A. Hart shows clearly how European-structured law becomes international law, binding for new states.

It has never been doubted that when a new, independent state emerges into existence . . . it is bound by the general obligations of international law . . . Here the attempt to rest the new state's international obligations on a 'tacit' or 'inferred' consent seems wholly threadbare.¹

This established assumption ignores cultural facts and the diversity of law. In terms of ideal type in legal dogma with regard to the procedure of lawmaking, a substantial distinction has to be made between modern European positive law and the traditional concept of sacred law prevalent in many non-European cultures. Secularisation in the West contributed to making European law predominantly positive law, that is devised and codified by the people. In contrast, sacred law is taken as God-given and derived interpretatively from holy scripture. In modern democracies the lawmakers are the legislative institutions, whereas in Islam the *ulema*, in their capacity as interpreters of the scripture, are the legal scholars. Thus, we may contrast two traditions: legislative vs interpretative law. When it comes to Islam, it is important to draw a clear boundary between legal philosophy and legal practice. At the level of legal practice there are similarities between the sacral *shari'a* law and some traditions of Western secular law. In German legalism, for instance, law is handled in a manner similar to the way in which the text of the Koran is dealt with in terms of legal

dogma, despite the difference that the *shari'a* is neither codified nor endowed with any legal institution independent of the ruler.

If, however, we follow the eminent German legal scholar Ralf Dreier and his method of treating legal theory as a discipline whose subject is law in general, we can then add further important differences between positive and sacred law to the substantial difference already mentioned. According to Dreier, the three-dimensionality of legal theory consists of a logical and linguistic (or analytical) dimension, a sociological and a psychological (or empirical) dimension, and finally an ethical or political (or normative) dimension.² The question now arises whether such a concept of law, derived from modern European law, may be applied to non-European, sacred law. In other words, can the Islamic notion of law be reformed by means of a concept of law enriched by contemporised and intercultural perspectives, or must the *shari'a* be evaluated as a parochial residue of pre-modern times?

Enlightened Muslim jurists, like Abdullah An-Na'im³ strive for an 'Islamic Reformation', but realities in the world of Islam show how the *shari'a* in the course of the call for Islamisation of the law is currently enjoying a certain revival. In most of the Islamic countries positive law is being roundly rejected by Islamists in favour of a call for *tatbiq al-shari'a* (implementation of *shari'a*).

An aspiration toward innovating the *shari'a* and a parallel and equally desirable flexibilisation of the Islamic notion of law aims not only at the adaptation of dominant cultural patterns to the modern, but are also of interest to world peace, inasmuch as intercultural bridging is of importance to world peace. I have already emphasised repeatedly that our world since the European expansion has become a global system.⁴ Along these lines there is a need for a consensus on a universally accepted legal system. The Islamic *shari'a* is not in consonance with international standards of morality, for instance it is in conflict with basic human rights. Critically minded Islamic legal scholars like An-Na'im have pinpointed this area of conflict.⁵ However, such sound Islamic voices come from exile in the West. In Islamic civilisation itself we hear the call for a politicised *shari'a* that is far from understanding *shari'a* as an ethic consonant with international morality. Can *shari'a* be reformed? Or, would globalisation contribute to one law being accepted by all civilisations?

To answer such questions, we need first to draw a distinction between non-Western cultures themselves and between their legal traditions. In non-literate cultures, law was superimposed upon them *in toto*.⁶ In many cases, this imposition came earlier through Islam,⁷ later

through the West. In societies of advanced civilisations with elaborate legal systems, these civilisations have been able to establish a legal notion of their own against the intruding European one. In Islamic civilisation, for example, this has given rise to an internal conflict within the Islamic legal sphere, polarised into religious fundamentalists and secular modernists, that persists to this day. Against this polarisation we need to revive the traditions of international ethics.

Along with existing cultural diversity, the legal notion within the Islamic intellectual tradition differs considerably from the European one. One aspect of this difference in discourse may be illustrated using the example of legal terminology. I shall begin this with a reference to Theodor Viehweg, who characterises the tradition of European legal terminology with the formulation:

Legal terminology specifically shows that, for easily discernible reasons, it prefers the assertive to the instructive form of expression, being able in this way to construct a legal reality of its own.⁸

Islamic legal terminology may be characterised as the exact opposite of this, as its lines of argument make constant use of the instructive form of legal terminology. The distinction between *halal* and *haram*, between what is permitted and what is forbidden, is indeed central to the content of Islamic law, aimed at providing instructions.⁹ Islamic law is also interpretative and has never known a tradition of codification. The interpretations of the Koran, the substantial source of Islamic law, expressly set forth what is *halal* and *haram* in an instructive style; this cultural product of legal terminology has been handed down from the seventh century and continues to pervade contemporary Islamic legal thought. Despite the difference in the structure of legal terminology in these two traditions, however, similarities are also to be found in the history of European law.

The idea of an international society rests on the assumption of a substantive cultural consensus on international law, which is in fact missing. Instead, we encounter along the diversity of cultures great legal differences in the existing traditions. Currently, the revival of these traditions which are at odds with established standards has been intensifying. The existent international consensus on legal norms, and hence international law itself, has entered a state of crisis. The claim to de-Westernisation of law is an indication of this crisis in the global system.¹⁰ An international society without a legal basis, however, would not only be a social entity without peace, it would be charac-

terised as an 'anarchical society' (H. Bull). This realisation motivates the search for common platforms for culturally differentiated notions of law in the sense of establishing an international, legally anchored consensus. Such platforms would constitute material substantiation for the principles contained in the UN Charter, which are in a certain regard postulative. Yet, such a consensus would be free from the premature integration of new states into an international legal order in the formation of which they had no part and which therefore, came into existence without them. In his work alluded to, Hart addresses these issues. For my part, I elaborate on the concept of intercultural international morality (*see* note 38) no longer based on an assumption of a Westernisation process. Universal values should not be imposed on non-Western cultures, but instead be accepted on the grounds of the wealth of cultural diversity.

The normative orientation is related to a plurality amid a consensus of mutually communicating cultures which affects my reasoning on Islamic law. I find myself in conflict with fundamentalist-oriented Islamic jurists who react to European dominance with an appeal to the old Islamic doctrine of the *pax islamica*, according to which the world consists of only two regions, the *dar al-Islam*, the house of Islam (literally, of peace), and the *dar al-harb*, the house of war, which is identical to non-Muslim territory. It is very sad to see this doctrine of Islamic dominance, which contradicts world peace in cultural pluralism, still dominant and not even revised.¹¹

World peace on the basis of intercultural plurality is of course just as impossible under the dominance of such an Islamic notion of law as it is under the conditions of a world dominated by the West. A more flexible, modern notion of Islamic law, however, would open the way for a different interpretation, reconcilable with both world peace and cultural pluralism. Nevertheless, in the interest of the societies of the Islamic civilisation, efforts at a renewal of Islamic law would be bound to be helpful, inasmuch as all these societies suffer under their structures of underdevelopment and cultural alienation. Social change needs to espouse cultural change in the domain of law in order to affect the attitudinal change which would be open to an interculturally shared universality of international law.¹²

In this chapter on Islamic law (*shari'a*) as an element of the Islamic cultural system, prone to politicisation, I argue that the notion of law could be more flexible to the extent of contributing to the cultural accommodation of social change. Although in what follows I shall have recourse to the impressive interpretation of law as an 'open

texture' by H.L.A. Hart, as well as to juristic hermeneutics, I should perhaps justify my somewhat selective concentration on the work of the German legal theorist Viehweg, with regard to his concept of topical discourse in legal thought, especially as the topics discussion among German jurists now seems to be closed. Ralf Dreier quotes the assessment of G. Otte, 'Zwanzig Jahre Topik-Diskussion', and points out:

This topics thesis . . . implies . . . that juristic thinking, even where it purports to be deductive, is in reality an inductive process of convincing decisionmaking, arising out of problematic circumstances and based on argumentations that are open to consensus.¹³

Dreier regrets the absence of a theory of argumentation in Viehweg's work, commenting in the same passage: 'The initial euphoria has now given way to a certain sobriety.'

If, despite current theory, I refer to Viehweg's concept of topical discourse, this is only insofar as it relates to my theme – that is, reform of law versus its politicisation. In my view, Viehweg's approach of topical discourse in legal reasoning would nonetheless seem to be of use in indicating the potential for reform within Islamic law. Before I engage in this legal-philosophical debate I will first attempt to reconstruct the *shari'a*. Then, in the subsequent section I will consider possible ways of making the Islamic notion of law more flexible.

The roots and patterns. Islamic law as shari'a

Islam changed Arabia radically. In pre-Islamic Arabia (the Arabian peninsula), Arab nomadic tribes were organised in a segmentary fashion and they lived by means of the 'camel economy', as well as by making raids on merchant caravans (*ghazu* actions). There existed no materially developed culture, and consequently no formal legal system was able to develop within this bedouin milieu. The bedouin is unfamiliar with abstract thinking: 'He is a realist, and the tough life in the desert has not prepared him particularly well for reflection on the infinite',¹⁴ writes the French scholar of Islam Maxime Rodinson in his portrayal of pre-Islamic Arab culture. In addition to the nomadic social organisation of these ethnic groups, however, pre-Islamic society was also familiar with two relatively developed urban centres of trade, Mecca and Medina. Islam emerged precisely from this urban background and it contributed to the spread of an urban culture.¹⁵ I should

nonetheless note here that in neither the nomadic nor in the urban component of pre-Islamic Arab culture was there a tradition of written law; the prevailing law was the primitive customary law – which included the vendetta – among the acephalous tribes; in the two urban centres of Mecca and Medina social life was regulated by more developed forms of customary law. Islam is not only a religion, it also introduced a new tradition of law. This statement does not contradict my earlier assertion that *shari'a* is a post-Koranic construction.

The birth of the new legal tradition, known as *shari'a* is the work of religious *fiqh*-scholars in Islam, it is not God's revelation. Nevertheless, it is viewed as a divine law revealed by God, even though it is purely a human interpretation. Consistently, we find a confusion of *fiqh* (sacred jurisprudence) being pursued by human beings, and God's commandment.¹⁶ The *faqih*s who have managed to establish themselves as the guardians of the *shari'a* were closer to political power than to God and thus they reached high standing as legitimators of the rulers throughout Islamic history. The eminent *shari'a* historian Joseph Schacht correctly states that it is impossible to understand Islam without understanding Islamic law.¹⁷ Schacht also points out, equally correctly, that *kalam* (Islamic theology) scholars have never been able to achieve the same status as *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence) scholars in Islamic history. Semantically *fiqh* means science, but juristic science is science *par excellence* in Islam. The term *alim* (plural *ulema*) means scholar in Arabic. In Islamic history, the *ulema* have always been the guardians of legal Islam, which has been in a state of permanent antagonism with the very spiritually oriented Sufi Tariqa Islam (Islamic mysticism) but has nevertheless always managed to keep the upper hand.¹⁸

Although pre-Islamic Arab culture was a literate one, the Koran in cultural terms was the first great written document, on the basis of which an advanced Arab culture was able to unfold in due course and then to become the core of Islamic civilisation. The Koran,¹⁹ revealed between AD 610 and 632 (the death of Muhammed),²⁰ is the focal point here, for it constitutes the first primary source of Islamic law. The second primary source is the Sunna, based on the *hadith* tradition, which consists of the lawmaking proclamations handed down by The Prophet. Two further components of Islamic law are acknowledged as complementary secondary sources: *ijma'* (*consensus doctorum*) and *qiyas* (conclusion by analogy).

In Islamic law legal concepts are fused with religious meaning. Revealed Koranic truth is the standard; it is regarded in Islam as eternal and immutable; its jurisdiction is unlimited. The Islamic law derived

from this truth claims to embrace all spheres of life and is therefore organic in character. It is also theocentric in the sense that in its capacity as revelation it merely serves as an instrument whereby God governs the world and not as a means for people to regulate their social interaction. The history of the unfolding of Islamic law so far may be divided according to Coulson's research²¹ into three phases: the *first* phase, comprising the post-Koranic development up to the ninth century, may be described as the formation phase, during which an Islamic legal system was developed; the *second* phase, from the tenth to the twentieth centuries, documents the rigidity of this law, inasmuch as reality was seen as being determined by law, which claimed to be valid as divine truth for all times and was in no respect to be modified by history. Only in the twentieth century, after the introduction of the European institution of the secular nation-state into the world of Islam, has a *third* phase been entered in the historical development of Islamic law. This phase has come about because modern states have been unable to run their regimes and the related environment with the aid of classical Islamic law. Islamic legal doctrine was related to historical conditions that no longer pertain in modern times and is, therefore, obviously not appropriate to new legal requirements. In our contemporary time, the crisis of the nation-state and the rise of anti-Western fundamentalism compel me to update Coulson's three phases scheme in adding a new *fourth* one. For identifying it I have coined the term: the de-Westernisation of law.²²

The decision to go for Islam as a political formula to the detriment of Islam as a culture assumes the shape of a contemporary call for *tatbiq* (implementation) of the *shari'a* – it blatantly overlooks the history of the *shari'a* and the related predicament. Already in the golden age of Islamic civilisation, particularly in the period between the ninth and eleventh centuries, before the collapse of the Arab Islamic empire in 1258, new and complex social and economic structures came into being. The *shari'a* was incapable of dealing with them. This difficulty was resolved by using a method characteristic of Arab Islamic history: through the legal circumvention of a legal dogma that was unlimited in its validity, namely, by means of a new type of law known as the *hiyal* literature. *Hila* (plural *hiyal*) means legal dodge in Arabic, in other words, a way of circumventing a legal norm by legal means. The Islamic *shari'a*, for example, prohibits the charging of interest; the *hiyal* literature led to showing legal ways of circumventing this prohibition. Rodinson, who took this phenomenon under scrutiny, describes 'medieval Muhammedan society . . . [as] an ideological society'.²³ This

feature is not only evident within the sphere of law, however. Clearly, the behaviour of people who believe in an immutable dogma must in the course of the centuries deviate from that dogma, if it is not newly formulated and adapted to suit new conditions. But because that dogma claims not to be historically conditioned, and because it conceives of itself as eternally valid, a rethinking of it would contradict its essence and runs the risk of being involved in a heresy. This is the substance of the great centuries-old gulf between legal philosophy and practice in the history of Islam.

In the research of the former Princeton social scientist Waterbury, who is currently the President of the American University of Beirut, we encounter the concept of 'behavioural lag'. It helps to explain the gulf between thought and behaviour that Waterbury experienced in the course of his fieldwork in Morocco. That gulf arises out of the impossible adaptation of religious dogma to new conditions: 'In this sense it is more important to understand what Moroccans really do and why they do it than to understand what they think they are doing.'²⁴ I share this assessment because it is of much importance to the analysis of Islamic law. In the following section of this chapter, I shall argue that the application of juristic hermeneutics can help us to understand this circular relationship between the imperative (although unconscious) non-historic preconception of Islamic legal sources and the belief in its immutability. Although Islamic *fiqh*-scholars impute the existence of one cohesive *shari'a*, in reality there are nevertheless varying historical and geographical notions of Islamic law.

The language of Islam is Arabic because the Koran is revealed in it. Arabic is also the language of Islamic law. Numerous verses of the Koran emphasise its Arabic character. Non-Arab Muslims must say their prayers and similarly recite the Koran in Arabic, for which reason the language used in non-Arab Koranic schools is also Arabic. All Islamic jurists are educated in Arabic. Pious Muslims also have Arabic names, even if they are not Arabs. This is an indication of a mostly accepted Arabocentrism.

In the same way that the language of the Koran is sacred and makes use both of the forms of commandment and prohibition, the language of Islamic law, as I have emphasised, is one of *instructive* rather than *expressive* form. This characteristic distinguishes Islamic from European law. Sacred law is brought to expression by means of the sacred language of the Koran,²⁵ so that one Islamic jurist feels justified in stating that '*Arabiyya* (Arabic) is the symbol of Islam.'²⁶

Islamic jurisprudence, *fiqh*, equally embraces both the sphere of worship (*ibadat*) and that of profane business (*mu'amalat*), the *shari'a* is thus to the same degree representing both a form of worship and a legal system, albeit a sacred one. Here we encounter the unity of religion and law.²⁷ Islam differs from Christianity chiefly in that it is an organic rather than an ecclesiastical religious system,²⁸ and in its pronounced worldliness. This explains why *fiqh* is central to Islam. The divine law, however, is not only concerned with the external aspects of life; Islamic *fiqh* thus distinguishes between the facts of the *tashri'* (interpreting the divine law) and *taujih* (guidance), both forms relating to the ascertainment of what *halal* (permitted) and what *haram* (forbidden) is. Whereas *tashri'*, as it is irrevocably laid down in the tradition of the four sources of the Islamic notion of law, is concerned with external control for the purpose of the observance of commandments and prohibitions, *taujih* relates to the internalisation of these norms, that is, to the hearts of Muslims, which are not externally controllable by means of law. The Lebanese *fiqh* scholar Subhi Salih (killed by Shi'ite gunmen in Beirut in 1988) regarded *tashri'* and *taujih* as a single entity, asserting:

When the outer form becomes united and harmonised with the inner depths, then this unity forms a part of *the divine beauty*, which is not to be misinterpreted as pantheism, as it is by some who have deviated from Islam, but is to be seen as the divine beauty of which The Prophet of Allah was speaking when he said that God loves beauty.²⁹

The content of *halal* and *haram* is related to making provisions in the *shari'a* concerning human conduct, lawful and unlawful. The Tunisian *fiqh* scholar Muhammed Ben Ashur, who has examined the goals (*maqasid*) of the *shari'a*, alludes to the twin concepts of *al-salah* and *al-fasad*, that is, good and evil. From these two definitions the terms *al-maslaha* and *al-mafsada*, literally, the proper course and villainy, are linguistically derived. On the basis of this conceptual definition, Ben Ashur elucidates: 'The highest goal of the *shari'a* is the realisation of *good* and aversion to *evil*.'³⁰ The former is identical to the interest of the Islamic *umma*, the Islamic community, while the latter is damaging to it. All is well with the *umma* provided Islam dominates in the spheres of *ibadat* and *mu'amalat*, that is, as long as the spheres of worship and business transaction are controlled by the principles of the *shari'a*.

The unfolding of the *shari'a*³¹ between the seventh and ninth centuries occurred simultaneously with the Muslim conquests, during which the *pax islamica* expanded from the city-state of Medina to the Islamic empire. Muhammed founded the city-state of Medina³² in 622, after leaving Mecca with his followers (the year of the *hijra*, which marks the beginning of the Muslim calendar). Even in Muhammed's lifetime the *pax islamica* grew to comprise the whole of the Arabian peninsula, becoming an empire as early as the eighth century through Islamisation by conquest.³³ The *shari'a*, as has been explained, is a post-Koranic law. Yet, Muslim scribes do not acknowledge this fact. Therefore, they systematically confuse *God's commandments* and *fiqh* as lawmaking by human beings, that is, by the *faqihs*, definitely not revealed by God. The *shari'a* is the product of an exposure to realities. The *shari'a* was thus confronted not only with the problems of regulating the internal affairs of a political order but also with those of war and peace between states. Contemporary Islamic *fiqh* scholars such as Sabir Tu'aima propound the thesis that the *shari'a* offers no less than the fundamental as well as universal formulation of international law. Tu'aima writes:

What is fundamental about Islam, is that it is a religion for the whole of humanity. Muslims hence have an obligation to proclaim Islam in order to bring all those whose hearts are open to Islam into its fold. As long as Muslims proclaim their religion in order to disseminate it, Islam is in a state of either peace or war (*dar salam* or *dar harb*). Circumstances falling between these two are regulated by means of international treaties.³⁴

Tu'aima is referring to the ninth sura of the Koran, 'Repentance'³⁵ in which, on the one hand, there is a call for the military dissemination of Islam and, on the other, for the honouring of agreements already made (for example, a truce).

By way of transition to my attempt to integrate into Islam the resumed tradition of the topical discourse of Viehweg, I would like to appeal for a reform of Islamic law. Such reform will not be promising if it is limited to a renewed exegesis of handed-down law. This much will also be conceded by culturally innovative Muslims. The Islamic definition of an international law lays claim to an imposition of Islam on the entire world and is therefore in blatant contradiction to the ideal of worldwide cultural pluralism. This reference highlights the necessity for reforming Islamic law. These remarks give rise to the ques-

tions of law and international morality³⁶ and touch as well on the universality of rights, such as on religious and human rights.³⁷

Perhaps a rapprochement between culturally divergent legal traditions, using the medium of symmetrical global intercultural communication, would do more to achieve world peace than the concepts propounded so far of a universal claim to validity on the part of a *single* legal tradition. Such proposed global communication³⁸ would of course have to embrace the legal sphere as well. For scholars such as myself, living and working as Muslims in a state of tension between Western and Islamic civilisation and their divergent lifestyles, the question arises whether Islamic legal discourse, with the great steps forward made by Western Europe in its own legal sphere, can be fertilised without at the same time sacrificing Islamic authenticity. A social transformation of the Islamic part of the world would today call for a modern notion of law, appropriate to social conditions, since any modernisation of the social structures of the present Islamic countries is condemned to failure unless it also aims for a parallel attempt to accommodate Islam through religious reforms to the changes taking place. Only reform from the inside, therefore, can bring any promise of success; it would also have to be incorporated into similarly structured Islamic institutions. In short, the accommodation of Islam to cultural modernity must take place from the inside and be carried out by Muslims themselves. The reasoning in the ensuing section is determined by this insight that efforts at *Rethinking Islam*³⁹ are needed.

The reform of Islamic law and the potential for flexibility in the Islamic notion of law

Medieval Islam marks the golden age of the, by then, most advanced Islamic civilisation. In that historical period, an Islamic philosophy was flourishing in which the central themes of ancient Greek philosophy were being assimilated. These influences are described in terms of a 'Hellenisation of Islam'.⁴⁰ A conflict flared up within Islam between philosophy and sacred law (*fiqh*) after Islamic philosophers began, in the context of their 'rationalisation of the cosmos', to introduce their Hellenised reason-based view of the world.⁴¹ The charge of heresy (*takfir*) was not long in coming, and the persecution of philosophers brought this process of rationalisation and de-sacralisation within the Islamic civilisation to an end. 'No wonder in this case either that Muslim orthodoxy cursed both Avicenna and Averroës, burning both of them in effigy, that is via their works, as the Christian Inquisition

was later to burn Giordano Bruno in body',⁴² writes Ernst Bloch, recalling and extolling Islamic philosophy. The Egyptian philosopher Mourad Wahba, of the Ain-Shams University in Cairo, has described how Averroës is honoured in Europe, whereas he is condemned by Muslim orthodoxy even today; he addresses this issue as 'the Averroës paradox'.⁴³ At the same First Islamic Conference on Islam and Civilization (Cairo, November 1979) at which Wahba spoke, the focus of my presentation was secularisation in Islam.⁴⁴ The sociology of religion developed by Niklas Luhmann was the frame of reference.⁴⁵ I emphasised that development leads to a functional differentiation in society, in the course of which a religious system is being reduced to a partial system, resulting in secularisation. In a secular society, law is a matter of legislation, not of divine provisions. Currently, we witness the call for a politicised *shari'a*, that is, de-secularisation,⁴⁶ not a secularisation in the world of Islam.

Islamic law, though post-Koranic, is believed to be a divine law revealed by God and not to be conceived of in historical terms. According to the Islamic cognisance of values it is immutable and eternally valid. In terms of the Islamic notion of law, the *shari'a* expects believers to shape their social life according to the law which has been designed to keep human behaviour in line with divine provisions. The purpose of the Islamic *fiqh* scholar consists exclusively in interpreting God's will. We have already seen, however, that in the Islamic Middle Ages the *hiyal* literature related to legal devices and evasions was required to adapt Islamic law to the life of society. This occurred because alterations to the norm were not permitted. Legal practice was thus adjusted to the changed reality, but not the legal form itself.

From the formal point of view, the deviation from the norm in practice is the starting point of every process of jurisdiction undertaken by a modern European jurist. Here, too, the principle applies: 'The legal norm has an existence independent of social reality within its fundamental sphere of validity',⁴⁷ even though it is conceived of as applied by people and is not a divine revelation like the *shari'a*. The Islamic jurist could learn a great deal in this respect from the European jurist and from his way of dealing with legal norms. Both the theory of topical discourse and juristic hermeneutics could be integrated into a reformed Islamic legal system.

At this juncture, I am not concerned with theological argumentations, but rather with the process of independent legal reasoning as a cultural discourse. Therefore, I exclude the question of the origin of

law (whether legislation or divine revelation) from the present consideration, in interpreting law instead along the thinking of H.L.A. Hart, as an 'open texture', a fixed written structure of norms, open to interpretation. Hart points out that all legal systems, whether traditionally handed down or legislative in character, represent a compromise between two legal requirements, 'the need for certain rules' and 'the need to leave open', adding: 'In every legal system a large and important field is left open for the exercise of discretion by courts.'⁴⁸ Hart reminds us that recourse to the same handed-down law can have a different content in different times and different systems. Islamic legal history offers a classic example in support of this assertion.

The present deliberations pertaining to substantive legal reform in Islam compel us to proceed on the basis of the current situation in the Muslim countries – which, at least in ideological terms, is characterised by a rejection of the Western model in general, and its legal model in particular – and by recourse to their own model, the *shari'a*. We must take this into consideration but at the same time vigorously oppose the classical Islamic legal means of the *hiyal* (legal dodges) as well as the literal understanding of Islamic law (for example, amputation of the hand as a punitive measure). Thus the question arises to what extent the potential for 'flexibilisation' of the Islamic notion of law exists. To be sure, 'flexibilisation' is a technical term employed in the German juridical debate. It refers to the non-rigid handling of legal norms. This is not tantamount to a bending of the law at the interpreter's discretion; rather, flexibilisation conveys the notion of a certain pliancy in the process of lawmaking and jurisdiction. At this juncture I view flexibilisation of Islamic law as an alternative to the politicisation of the *shari'a*.

Change – even in legal reasoning – has always taken place in Islamic history, although the Islamic cultural system does not admit a category of 'change'. Yet, change is related to legal practice and not to legal philosophy, as noted earlier. In this sense, the Islamic notion of law has always changed in opposition to its own sense of values. The flexibilisation aimed for here would, unlike the former Islamic *hiyal* legal tradition, have to incorporate a consciousness of social and cultural change. The theory of law as an 'open texture' in Hart's sense, the topics theory of Viehweg (still to be explained), and juristic hermeneutics could all be of great assistance in efforts to modernise Islamic law. The target is to establish an Islamic discourse of legal reasoning that runs – in the norm and in legal practice alike – from actual social givens to textual understanding.

In Islamic legal philosophy, the text is the point of departure. The result is scripturalism. I have already made my theme-related reference to Viehweg, even though I share Ralf Dreier's critical evaluation. I am concerned here, like Josef Esser, with 'disclosing topical forms of thinking as an indispensable element in the channelling of metadogmatic assessment criteria and in ensuring accuracy'.⁴⁹ It is only in this sense that I have recourse to Viehweg's theory of topical discourse, because it does not address the dogmatic system as such, but is rather designed against the preconceived idea that a system can be perfect and definitive. Advocating the adoption of topical thinking in the Islamic notion of law therefore amounts to advocating openness in the legal system. To be sure, this is midway between secularisation and religious scripturalism.

In real historical terms there has been no lack of openness in Islam. Viewed from historical periods in which the Muslim *ulema* enjoyed ideological supremacy, it is possible to find intellectual plurality in Islamic history. Both the tradition of Hellenised Muslim philosophers, as well as the early debates from which the legal internal differentiation of Islam arose (the emergence of the four legal schools, the *mad-hahib*) may be mentioned in this context.⁵⁰ Another important factor is the distinction in Islamic law between *taqlid*, submission to the authority of predecessors as *fiqh* scholars, and *ijtihad* creative lawmaking through individual, independent legal reasoning (although of course also on the basis of the *shari'a*). Islamic modernism, which came into existence during the second half of the nineteenth century in Egypt,⁵¹ and the efforts to reform Islamic law in the twentieth century⁵² represent a revival of this *ijtihad* tradition in Islam.

One of the central ideas of Islamic legal reformers pursues the line that God as Creator would not bring His will to expression in the form of rigid laws and that it is a gross misreading of Koranic teaching to interpret it as a rigid legal doctrine. The Koran contains general principles that are intended to be understood as an Islamic ethic and that also allow for varying interpretations within the *ijtihad* tradition. This notion of the Koran as the source of Islamic legal ethics opens the way for the introduction of topical thinking into Islam. 'Topics' here refers to 'that technique of thought which focuses on problems',⁵³ writes Viehweg, adding that it is 'thus the technique of thinking in terms of problems'.⁵⁴ Islamic ethics are of a thoroughly systematic character, so that separate problem orientations could arise and, on the one hand, take account of the needs of Muslim societies in the developmental process and, on the other, also lend themselves to integration within

the Islamic ethical system without, however, having to lapse into the ossified tracks of scholastic *fiqh* doctrine. Viehweg advocates bearing in mind a dovetailing between system and problem,⁵⁵ emphasizing that 'topics' cannot be understood without subsuming the integrity of the problem within some kind of order.

According to Viehweg, thinking in terms of problems should embrace the system as a whole, its components, and also the concepts and statutes of jurisprudence. For Islamic law, the adoption of this method would entail a notion of law deriving from the real social problems of Islamic societies and not primarily from texts. An introduction of topical discourse into Islam means grasping the idea that the function of topical themes lies in 'serving the discussion of problems . . . The topical themes, which intervene in an assisting capacity, derive their respective meanings from the problem itself.'⁵⁶

I have just cited Viehweg's central notion that problems must be integrated into an order. A highly comprehensive body of handed-down, established Islamic law is already in existence; this is not to be laid aside, but rather reconsidered in light of an awareness of problems. The introduction of topical thinking into Islamic law cannot entail starting from scratch and disavowing the traditions that have been upheld so far. Interpretation is itself an art that has always been predominantly the domain of Islamic *fiqh* scholars. Today it is a matter of cultivating this art in the wider context of the development of Muslim societies and with a problem orientation. Viehweg highlights interpretation as an element of 'topics', arguing that this involves forging new possibilities for deriving meanings without damaging the old ones. This occurs by adhering to fixed designations that have already been made but shifting them into new angles that have often arisen in quite different connections and now offer an opportunity to give new applications to old precepts.⁵⁷ These aspects of topical thinking presumably render Viehweg's theoretical framework more acceptable to Muslim jurists, who fear for their heritage, especially because exegesis (*tafsir*) forms part of Islamic law. Exegesis does provide interpretation, but it is important to point out that, according to Viehweg, not every interpretation fulfils the requirements of topical thinking. To return to the definition cited above, Viehweg stresses: 'Not every interpretation (explanation, exegesis, hermeneutics) does this, but every one is capable of doing it. It is part of topics.'⁵⁸

The writings of Islamic modernists since Afghani are characterised by the fact that they do not depart from the basis of religious dogma.⁵⁹ In other words, they lack what Viehweg indicates as a requirement. One

very important piece of Islamic writing, dating from 1925, the author of which was a *fiqh* scholar at the Muslim al-Azhar University and also a supreme court judge, is an exception. It contains an interpretation of Islam that may be construed as topical in the sense defined by Viehweg. This work is Ali Abdelraziq's Cairo publication *al-Islam wa usul al-hukm* (Islam and Patterns of Government),⁶⁰ in which the author reaches the conclusion that Islam is only a religion for the spiritual sphere, and not a system of government. In the Islamic civilisation this view counts as a revolutionary interpretation, which cost the author his material existence at the time. Abdelraziq nevertheless laid a most important foundation stone.

The introduction of topical discourse into Islamic law is of course unthinkable without corresponding religious reforms. Orthodox Muslim *fiqh* scholars respond in an intolerant manner against all reformers, not hesitating to invoke the weapons of *takfir* (pronouncement that the offender is a misbeliever) against culturally innovative Muslims. The use of *takfir* against bright Muslims is shared by the religious orthodoxy and radical Islamist groups.⁶¹ The adoption of topical thinking in Islamic law runs counter to this intolerance. A sample critique of an opponent of all forms of Islamic legal reform would illustrate what I mean. This opponent is the Pakistani fundamentalist Muhammad Muslehuddin, who in fact has a Western education and is a graduate of London University. In the context of his, in some respects justified, criticism of Western Orientalism he takes issue with Malcolm Kerr,⁶² the political scientist from California who was researching into efforts toward reform in modern Islam and who was murdered by Muslim fanatics in Beirut in January 1984. Muslehuddin discredits all reform attempts with the apodictic statement: 'Those who think of reforming or modernising Islam are misguided, and their efforts are bound to fail . . . Why should it be modernised, when it is already perfect and pure, universal, and for all time?'⁶³ In his view, therefore, the task of jurists is solely that of interpreting the *shari'a* in order 'to comprehend and discover the law and not to establish or create it'.⁶⁴ Such a rigid definition of the work of jurists, who in this case cannot be scholars in the Weberian sense, clearly leaves no room either for topical thinking or for topically oriented interpretations along the lines of Viehweg.

The jurist interprets at a purely philological level, and, if this proves insufficient, the only other recourse then is deduction by analogy. Remote from all belief in modernisation, we may discern here parallels between legal dogmatists who work with positive law but who do not

proceed on a topical basis, and the Muslim *shari'a* jurists. In this connection, Viehweg alerts us that 'frequent occurrence of deduction by analogy generally points to the absence of a perfect logical system'.⁶⁵

In contrast, Muslehuiddin's critique of Kerr lacks any logic. He focuses on the latter's rational, scientific working style, which attempts to comprehend Islamic law in rational terms, making him bound to fail, as this law is instead a divine law:

Divine law is to be preserved in its ideal form as commanded by God, or else it will be devoid of its capability to control society which is its chief purpose. The mistaken view of the Orientalists is due mainly to the fact that the real good may be rationally known and that the law should be determined by social needs, while all such needs are provided for in divine law and God alone knows what is really good for mankind.⁶⁶

With the application of juristic hermeneutics, this statement collapses as an ideology-laden assertion. Arguing in terms of *shari'a* law, the text of the Koran is abused as a directive for a God-given order. In contrast, the process of jurisdiction comprises the formulation of a question, and its answer calls for an evaluation in accordance with norms. This evaluation needs to be derived from the appropriate legal text in which those norms are laid down – in this case the Koran. Esser distinguishes between the historical and the problem-oriented preconceptions of a text, thus resorting to juristic hermeneutics as a way of representing the elements of understanding in the process of lawmaking. Esser develops the thesis of 'carrying over' a problem into the text, 'in that a specific current issue is carried over into the text . . . and a preconception of the problem is brought out of the text that does not coincide with the historical preconception'.⁶⁷ Such a cognitive procedure, that is, one of deriving a non-historical preconception from a text that is to be interpreted, such as the Koran, is inevitable according to Hans Georg Gadamer's hermeneutics. The adoption of this hermeneutic cognitive method would be an enormous enrichment of Islamic law and signify an opening to innovation.

The appeal for an integration of topical discourse into Islamic legal philosophy does not overlook the fact that orthodoxy and political Islam are more representative of Islamic standing in the legal sphere than the position being propounded here. The juridical debate in Islam is not aimed – as is the European debate – at determining the substance of law but, rather, exclusively at interpreting the imputed will of God

on the basis of *fiqh* sources, in order to transform it into a system of legally enforceable 'rights and duties', as Coulson⁶⁸ puts it. As long, however, as the fundamentalist belief prevails that Islamic society ought to be 'the product of sacred law and to be seen in an ideal way in harmony with its ordinances', resulting in the perception that Islamic law is immutable, it is difficult to imagine how Islam could evolve into a dynamic element of the currently rapid social change in crisis-ridden Islamic societies.

The adoption of topical discourse would increase the capacity of Islam to become a socio-cultural factor in the process of overcoming underdevelopment. In contrast, the generally accepted application of Islamic law as an instrument of legitimation, as is the case in many Islamic countries, leaves Islam in its archaic state, indeed making it resistant to change in societies where social change is taking place with such enormous speed and where the adaptation of socio-cultural systems to altered conditions has become a matter of urgent necessity. The call for the Islamisation of law and the policies related to this call reflect a defensive cultural response to change and ultimately lack the needed willingness to cope with structural change. The so-called Islamisation of law does not show any sign of cultural accommodation of change. To be sure, the currently prevailing concept of *tatbiq al-shari'a* (the implementation of Islamic law) is an 'invention of tradition' in that it refers to traditional law, but it is in fact a new political ideology of an unprecedented 'Islamic state'. Traditional *shari'a* law is a kind of divine civil law, not a political law as the one presented by the Islamists.⁶⁹ Currently, *shari'a* has become an ideological weapon of political Islam directed against all open-minded Muslims, who wish to see Islamic civilisation in a proper place in this ever-changing modern world.

8

Institutions of Learning and Education in Islam: between the Cultural Accommodation of Change, Religious Orthodoxy and the Politics of Cultural Islamisation

Throughout Islamic history the conflict between the Enlightenment, that is, recognition of the primacy of reason *vis-à-vis* the sacred, and religious orthodoxy has revolved around a fight over the control of the institutions of learning. In medieval Islam the cultural borrowing from the Greek legacy contributed to the rise of Islamic rationalism. The Islamic *fiqh*-orthodoxy, though, succeeded in undermining the spread of this innovation in Islam. The great achievements of Islamic rational philosophers such as al-Kindi, Avicenna or Averroës, were thus being prevented from inclusion into the teaching of the *madrasa*, that is, the Islamic institution of learning. In cultural sociology, scholars are aware of the fact that new ideas and worldviews need to be institutionalised by establishing the related new knowledge in the system of education. Otherwise the new thinking will fail to have a social impact.¹ This is exactly what happened in medieval Islam: Islamic rationalism was denied this needed institutionalisation and hence the lack of its impact on society becomes clear.

In line with the described historical legacy, the Islamists of our time put the goal of taking over the institutions of education at the top of their agenda. In Algeria, for instance, the educational politics of cultural Islamisation in the guise of 'Arabisation' preceded the rise of political Islam. In similar vein, the Turkish fundamentalists pursue the politics of cultural Islamisation as their priority. In considering these political facts I shall in this chapter not only deal with education in

Islam as a part of the Islamic cultural system, but also allude to the social and political conflicts related to the ways of determining the substance of Islamic learning.

To begin with, I acknowledge that culture as defined in Part I is mostly transmitted by various agents of socialisation ranging from the family to the social institutions of training and education, that is, institutions of learning. These agents compete with one another in the socialisation process. School and university are institutions concerned not only with cultivating and passing on tradition, but also with evolving new cultural patterns to help accommodate change that is taking place. In Islamic civilisation, patterns of training and education have evolved and have been able to maintain themselves for many centuries. Since the nineteenth century, however, these institutions have been in a deep state of crisis, and their outward form has altered radically in the course of their exposure to the West. One of the classic examples of this process are the changes at the Muslim al-Azhar University in Cairo. Since the substantial reform of 1961 it has been adapted to many standards of European or US universities. Apart from its *shari'a* legal disciplines it has introduced several scientific disciplines. It nonetheless still retains its essential, decisive characteristic: only Muslims may study there.

For a proper grasp of the Muslim institutions of training and education, and also for a better understanding of their present state of crisis, I shall deal in the first section with the historical development of these institutions. In the subsequent section the consequences of introducing the university to Islamic civilisation will be dealt with. Clearly, this institution is a modern one originating from Europe, for the higher institution of learning in Islam, that is, the *madrassa*, is not a university in the modern sense. The 'crisis in Muslim education' is related to these modern introductions. The crisis is also related to the oscillation in Islam between culture and politics.

Learning in Islam and Islamic institutions of education

In the foregoing chapter we saw how Islamic sacral law (*shari'a*) determines the content of the Islamic socio-cultural system. This tradition is transmitted through the institutions of learning, foremost the *madrassa*. This is – next to law – the most important institution in Islam due to its task in preserving Islamic precepts and related symbols. The language of this educational system is Arabic. Even in non-Arab Iran or Turkey Islamic education is transmitted in Arabic.²

Notwithstanding their developed written language, pre-Islamic Arabs had no formal system of education. This was not developed until the foundation of the Islamic religion. The central institution of learning in Islam was a by-product of this development. The place where Islamic ritual was fostered, the mosque, also became a classical seat of Islamic learning. Classical Islam still distinguished between two categories of mosque: the *masjid*, the mosque in which Muslims could recite the prescribed five prayers daily, and the *jami'*, the mosque in which Muslims performed collective prayer after the ritual sermon on Friday, the Muslim day of rest. In other words, *jami'* mosques were only used on Fridays in classical Islam and could therefore be set up as educational premises, or *madrasa*, for the other days of the week. In mosques such as these, learning was pursued in the form of a *halaqa* (learning circle), with the students sitting on a carpet in a circle around the teacher. In classical Islam, these learning circles evolved in Damascus, Cairo, Baghdad and elsewhere. In addition to the *zawiya* (Sufi order), the predominant organisational form for learning, these circles are to be distinguished from the *maktab* or *kuttab*, which are freely translatable as Koranic school.

Unlike the *maktab*, the *madrasa* was a seat of higher learning. In contrast, the Koranic school, in practical terms a primary school, was attended only by children for the purpose of learning to read and write using the text of the Koran. Some Islamic historians wrongly translate the term *madrasa* as university. This is plainly incorrect: If we understand a university as *universitas litterarum*, or consider, without the bias of Eurocentrism, the cast of the *universitas magistrorum* of the thirteenth century in Paris, we are bound to recognise that the university as a seat for free and unrestrained enquiry based on reason, is a European innovation in the history of mankind. In Islamic history a philosophical tradition of rationalism and science evolved, but it failed to establish a corresponding educational system³ and thus could not be institutionalised.

In short, the Islamic *madrasa* was not concerned with a process of reason-based investigation or unrestrained enquiry but with a learning process in the sacral sense. A *madrasa* was therefore not a university. What was considered to be Islamic science was the Koran and the *hadith* (the tradition of The Prophet), exegesis, and related disciplines (language teaching, grammar and so on). In contrast, rational science was considered to be 'foreign', that is, non-Islamic (meaning Greek or Hellenised). In the peripheral *dar al-ulum* (academy of sciences) these branches of learning were taught and studied. We shall see that this

institution was unable to flourish within Islam and that the *madrassa* became the pivotal Islamic educational institution. This educational system lasted until the onset of the modern period when the world of Islam was exposed to Europe.

Speaking of Islamic 'institutions of learning', with reference to the research of Makdisi,⁴ I must also mention those branches of knowledge not without prestige in their day. For classical Islam, I cite the classification of the sciences used by Ibn Bultan in the eleventh century, which distinguished three branches: the Islamic sciences, philosophy and natural science, and the intellectual or literary sciences.

Open-minded authors, with the best of intentions but nevertheless incorrectly, confuse 'Islamic sciences' (*al-ulum al-Islamiyya*) with the philosophical and natural science tradition in Islam, based on the Greek heritage and its reception. Of course, there were also scientific traditions outside Europe, but Islamic science means solely exegesis of the Koran and *hadith* and those branches of knowledge stemming from it. In classical Islam, reason-based philosophy and natural science were designated as 'foreign science' or as the 'science of the ancients', that is, the Greeks (*ulum al-qudama'*). As already stated, they were unable to gain a foothold in Islamic educational institutions.⁵ In the Abbasid period, philosophy and natural science were being encouraged by the caliphs. The institution of *dar al-ulum* (or: *dar al-ilm*) was the place where both were cultivated. In addition to the philosophers, Hellenised Muslim theologians, the Mu'tazilites, introduced philosophical discourse into theology.⁶ They were protected against Muslim orthodoxy above all by the Caliph al-Ma'mun in Baghdad as *Defenders of Reason*.⁷ Parallel to reason-based philosophers, the Mu'tazilites instigated a tradition of Islamic rationalism. However, it was unfortunately rigid and dogmatic and could not establish itself on a permanent basis. In contrast, Islamic philosophers were even more thoroughgoing in their introduction of reason-based thoughts into Islamic civilisation.⁸

Within Islamic education the impediments to establishing branches devoted to the free acquisition of rational knowledge and unrestrained reasoning were precipitated on the one hand because the system was financed by religious endowment (*waqf*), and on the other, because of the encroachment by the institutions of the *kadi* and later of the *mufti* during an advanced stage of state development. In both cases, the access of rational science (natural science and philosophy) to Muslim institutions of learning was obstructed. A fairly lengthy passage from

Makdisi, in which he summarises his original research, based on primary sources, is worth quoting here, as it is instructive on many outstanding issues:

The Islamic sciences had total control over the institutions of learning, their ascendancy beginning to take place definitively after the failure of the rationalist-led inquisition of al-Ma'mun, and reaching its height by the time the fifth/eleventh century had moved to its mid-point. In this division, Islamic law was crowned queen of the sciences . . . The sciences of the Ancients, that is of the Greeks . . . were studied in private, and were excluded from the regular courses of Muslim institutions of learning. *The religious sciences were at the forefront of education.*⁹

In order to understand how the Hellenisation of Islam¹⁰ was possible between the ninth and twelfth centuries despite the continued domination of the Islamic education system by Islamic scripturalist learning, it is important to refer to the non-institutional learning in Islam. It is equally important to realise that rationalism in Islam represents a historical phase in which the unimpinged reception of the Greek heritage was possible. The conflict between the two branches of learning – Islamic science and philosophy/natural science – was resolved in favour of the former.¹¹ The great German-Jewish philosopher Ernst Bloch makes an impressive comparison between the burning of the works of Avicenna and Averroës by Muslim orthodoxy and the bodily burning of Giordano Bruno by the Christian Inquisition.¹² The tradition of rationalism, established by Avicenna and Averroës as well as by the Mu'tazilite school, found no access to the formal institutions of learning, thus remaining exiled from the institutional sphere of education even in its heyday. At that time, though, there were chairs for Koranic exegesis (*mashyakh al-Koran*), *hadith* exegesis (*mashyakh al-hadith*), and for grammar (*mashyakh al-nahu*). The relevance of Arabic grammar is to be understood here in the context of exegesis.

Muslim philosophers, natural scientists, and Hellenised theologians (*kalam* theologians) lacked a comparable institutional structure beyond that of the brief flowering of the *dar al-ulum*. Their groups were thus informally organised intellectual ones: the *suhba* relationship,¹³ or informal groups of teachers and students, constituted their structure. It was in this non-institutional way that what Bloch has called the 'Aristotelian left' was able to blossom. Within the institutional learning

sector, by contrast, only sacral content dominated, with sacral law, the Islamic *shari'a*, as the focal point, for

Islam is a religion based on a system of law. God is the sole legislator. There is no clerical hierarchy. Only the jurists count as interpreters (of the will of God as documented in the law). In this sense the crucial goal of Islamic learning consists of educating within the context of divine law, which [is organic and thus (B.T.)] embraces all spheres of life.¹⁴

In its early stages, the Islamic educational system was, as has been mentioned, financed by private endowment (*waqf*). Sponsors considered the 'foreign sciences', philosophy and natural science, as heretical. Therefore they excluded them from the institutional educational sphere.¹⁵ Despite all odds, Islamic education was nonetheless highly pluralistic, as it was a source of many initiatives and allowed differing opinions on religious doctrine to be represented. Until the early tenth century, the Islamic principle of *ijtihad*, that is, the free interpretation of law – beyond exegesis – in order to interpret the imputed will of God, permitted the development of controversies and a flowering of Islamic theology, in spite of the rigid boundaries of the institutional educational sphere. The privately-through the disposition of *waqf* – financed *madrasa* came to an end in the thirteenth century, however, with the introduction of the state – paid office of *mufti*, an official who had the right to pronounce generally valid and binding *fetwas* (legal opinions). This marked the end of the room for manoeuvre¹⁶ previously enjoyed by the Islamic *madrasas* as the centres of socialisation within the Islamic legal system – and indeed as a way of life.

There is a close link between learning and the *shari'a*. Islamic law, which is interpretative rather than legislative in character (God counting as the sole legislator), provides detailed codes of behaviour for every sphere of life, even sexuality. The days of the privately financed *madrasas* permitted limited diversity, and every interpretation of a legal provision was potentially open to dispute. The appearance of an institutional establishment in Islamic law – brought about by the introduction of the office of *mufti* – and hence also of the Islamic educational sphere eliminated this diversity, as state provisions then counted as the provisions of God. The same thirteenth century saw the fall of Baghdad and the disintegration of the entire Islamic empire. A period of decay was to last for centuries. The later rise of the military feudal empire of

the Ottoman Turks was not an alleviation. During this decline of Islamic civilisation, European civilisation¹⁷ was on the rise as a Western set-up to replace the existent leadership of Islamic civilisation. Within the sphere of education, the new Western civilisation smoothed the way for a new institution of learning, the *universitas litterarum*, which was in its early stages of development. The West made its incursion into the by then stagnating Muslim world. The European conquests had their cultural by-products to which Muslims were exposed.¹⁸

This account of Islamic educational institutions should not be concluded without posing a question, on the basis of the historical material I have presented and interpreted, about the extent to which Islamic education enables the individuals who have been socialised within it to accommodate change culturally. If we look at the curriculum of educational institutions in classical Islam,¹⁹ it is clear that the room for creativity was very limited. There were always set texts that were to be transmitted, but could not be questioned or inquired into; reasoning was purely a matter of interpreting them. God was seen as the Creator (*khaliq*), and man the creature (*makhluk*), who was not permitted to create and thus not to be creative. Man's task was to accept what God had created; humans could only attempt, by means of interpreting the word of God (*kalamu'l Allah*), to better understand creation. Islamic learning methods were fixed on the holy scripture and thus structured accordingly:²⁰ rote learning, a 'constant feature of education in medieval Islam', repetition; text comprehension; the testing of memory by being checked by another or by reciting a text in front of someone else (*mudhakara*); and writing down the words of the teacher.

To sum up, traditional Islamic learning consists of both a written record and the learning of sources by heart.²¹ Using these methods, however, one cannot learn either how to think in terms of problems or how to enquire into them. This was traditionally the dominant learning method in the Islamic educational institution. Only in the non-institutional branch affected by Hellenisation, was there a way for a rationalisation of the cosmos and for reasoning on the subject of man and his environment. It is sad that this tradition was unable to be institutionalised in Islamic civilisation. In contrast, the tradition of Muslim orthodoxy, which prevailed over the ruins of Islamic rationalism and beat the 'defenders of reason', could transmit no educational content that would facilitate the cultural accommodation of social change by Muslims.

The Universitas Litterarum as a European educational institution: its universalisation and incursion into the Islamic civilisation

Neither the institutional form of the Hellenised *dar al-ulum* (academy of sciences) nor the non-institutional *suhba* group of Hellenic-influenced Muslim scholars, but the institution of the *madrassa* historically shaped higher education. After the demise of the Muslim caliphate of Baghdad and the accompanying decay of Islamic civilisation, Ibn Bultun's eleventh-century triclassification of science was narrowed to a purely Islamic definition of science, to Koran and *hadith* exegesis. All other branches of knowledge were then derived from these 'Islamic sciences'.

When Europeans started to launch their conquest of the world, Europe was already a highly developed continent. These conquests were global and also mapped the world of Islam which was comparatively much less developed. At that time, the Muslim education system was characterised exclusively by the *maktab/kuttab* at school level and the *madrassa* at the level of higher education. The exposure to Europe was centred in two areas of Islamic civilisation, the coreland of the Ottoman Empire and Ottoman Egypt. In the aftermath of Napoleon's Egyptian expedition, Muhammed Ali came to power in 1805. He began to build a modern state, soon realising, however, that he would not be able to achieve his goal on the basis of the existing structure of the traditional Muslim educational system. In the 1820s, therefore, he sent students to Europe. The following passage, quoted from the Paris diary of the leader of the first Egyptian student group to travel to France, is a striking illustration of the notion of science still predominant in those days. The author of the diary, Tahtawi, noted in Paris:

When it is said of someone in France that he is a scholar, this does not mean that he is versed in religion, but that he is familiar with other sciences. It is not difficult to see the superiority of these Christians over others in the sciences, and also consequently that in our countries many of these sciences do not exist at all.²²

In Arabic, scholars are called *ulema*, in the singular *alim*, or scientist. This refers to scribes whose knowledge is limited to Koranic science. Because the Koran is regarded by orthodox Muslims as the absolute source of knowledge, its exegesis is the object of knowledge in general. When Muslims speak of 'Islamic science' they mean the

content outlined here and not what Europeans understand by the term 'science'.²³ The *ulema*, or scribes, and especially the *faqih*s, or jurists, among them are hence the true scholars in this understanding of the term.²⁴

Science in Arabic is *ilm*, from which the term *ulema* is derived, but *fiqh*, Islamic jurisprudence, is science *par excellence*. The higher *madrasas* of Islam, especially the oldest and today the most highly esteemed, such as al-Azhar in Cairo, Zeituna in Tunis, and Qarrawiyin in Fez, were seats for the training and instruction of scholars of religion. If we take a look from the perspective of culture-specific diversification with regard to concepts of higher institutions of learning beyond the Islamic civilisation, we are bound to make a distinction between cultures with a particular notion of such institutions, analogous to the Islamic example, and cultures unfamiliar with such higher institutions of learning before contact with Europe. Illustrations of the first category of cultures may be found in many Asian countries. The non-literate cultures of Africa may be cited as an example of those with no higher institutions of learning prior to the process of exposure to Europe or to Islamic civilisation during their expansion. Cultural anthropologists are familiar with magicians, who fulfilled the function of guardians of knowledge in such cultures. In those parts of Africa where Islam has succeeded in gaining a foothold, a combined magical and clerical function came about. The *marabout*, the African Muslim scribe, embodied both Islamic Koranic science and the required skill of controlling nature by magical means.²⁵

In terms of the history of civilisations, the *universitas litterarum*, as a seat for the preservation and cultivation of human knowledge that is not limited to the religious sphere, constitutes a European innovation – although this remark should not be taken to mean that no non-European culture was previously acquainted with science in the modern sense. Islamic civilisation, for example, was familiar both with the natural sciences and reason-based philosophy. The contributions by Islamic scholars grew from a scientific tradition, even though they were not institutionalised within the education system and thus failed to give new directions to the Islamic notion of the institution of learning itself. In the traditional Islamic institutions of learning, equally in the past and the present, the *sheikh* or *ustadh* (professor) transmits to his students traditional sacred science, neither searching for truth through research nor passing on practical knowledge for the cultural reception of changes in the natural and social environment. The relationship between the *marabout* and his *talibés*, that is between teacher

and pupil, represents the equivalent of this in the parts of Africa belonging to Islamic civilisation.

A glance at universities outside Europe today, however, is sufficient to show clearly that the European notion of a university has been spreading worldwide. This is also true for universities in the world of Islam. Traditional seats of learning are even establishing departments that recognise the content of the positive sciences. In regard to this observation, we might ask ourselves why world development has taken on such a pattern and why the European notions of science and the university have come to dominate on global grounds. The question assumes some urgency when we consider the problem of the role of the university in the development process. I shall not go into this question in any depth here, however, but will limit myself to a quotation from Helmuth Plessner, who speaks of how 'Europeanism conquers the world,' arguing:

Under its banner the non-European peoples are rising up out of their medieval, archaic view of life. The massive differences in level between Europe, the Orient and the Tropics are disappearing . . . This expansion is only made possible and practically unlimited by the fact that scientific findings are becoming merged with their potential applications, and the use of apparatus and machinery is bound up with the notion of theory, but not with the notion of the humanistic ethos of theory . . . Only at the price of its mechanisation and instrumentalisation is Europeanism conquering the world. This capacity for transferral to non-European cultures is becoming its destiny.²⁶

The outcome of these historical efforts at a Europeanisation of the world is at all events the current structure in which we live, which may be called an international system with standards globally valid also for university education.²⁷

The global system is a structurally fixed reality, and any idea of escaping it can only be described as wishful thinking in the comfort of an armchair. What is the nature of this reality in relation to university structures in the Muslim and other developing countries, and what role may be expected from the university as an instrument for self-help in the development process? We may proceed first from the empirical observation that virtually all universities in the developing countries display traces of the process described by Plessner as 'the conquest of the world by Europeanism'. New cultural material is being adopted

and, in the absence of an appropriate infrastructure, is coexistent with the pre-existing parochial patterns. The result is the inconsistent set-up for which I have coined the formula 'the simultaneity of structural globalisation and cultural fragmentation'.²⁸

In Muslim societies, where higher institutions of learning have a deeply rooted procedure of rote-learning, the content of positive sciences adopted from Europe is treated in a similar fashion. Verses of the Koran are learned by heart because they are infallible and not to be enquired into. Immanuel Kant's *Critiques* or David Hume's *Enquiry*, now available in Arabic translation, are learned by heart in a similar manner and not conceived of in terms of their nature as problem-oriented enquiries. It is not just contemporary universities in the Muslim world which are characterised by this feature, however: many universities in developing countries are rote-learning institutions. They are also institutions for equipping students with academic, although not very valuable, degrees. This gloomy reality goes hand in hand with a third- and fourth-class ranking of their own making in the international university scale. In many non-Western countries a degree from a Western university is estimated far more highly, even by indigenous authorities, than a formally higher academic grade from a home university. This practice which has led to an upgrading of study abroad and a concomitant downgrading of study at home – despite all rhetoric to the contrary – is far from conducive to the developmental process.

All Arab Islamic and sub-Saharan African universities I know of and have worked at have courses of study based solely on the capacity for rote-learning in order to pass successfully. In view of climatic conditions and the extreme shortage of accommodation (a room of one's own is a dream) in most of those countries, rote-learning takes place in public and can be observed by anyone on the street or on the edge of town. Those acquainted with developing countries will be familiar with the sight of students at exam time, walking up and down certain streets, learning by heart the books in their hands, or of African pupils studying under streetlights. After study of this kind, a student is equipped with a certificate but not with any substantial qualification that can be usefully applied to the developmental needs of their respective societies. Studying is regarded by most people as a breadwinning ticket or admission to the circles of the better-off. In conversation even with academic authorities in Muslim and other non-Western countries, scholars are not generally asked first about their fields but about which academic degrees they have achieved and, most impor-

tant, at which universities these were obtained. Only then is an academic ranked accordingly.

It is striking that in many Muslim countries, especially in those with a French colonial heritage, the arts and law faculties are the most important, the *faculté des lettres* and the *faculté des droits* making up virtually the entire campus. Graduates from these courses have a command of general knowledge, one too general to be of any practical use and one that was learned by rote, without focusing on problem-solving. The Malayan sociologist Syed Alatas, who teaches in Singapore, has bitterly condemned the lack of a 'spirit of enquiry' among intellectuals of the developing countries.²⁹ As a scholar educated in Europe, I feel far more affinity with the European interpretation of the university as a place for general study (*Bildung*) than with the US notion of the university for vocational training (*Ausbildung*). The idea of general study can, however, be carried too far, even to the point of dysfunction, in that an academic who can claim to be able to speak about everything is no longer master of anything specific. This is unfortunately, for instance, the case today in Germany in many of the arts disciplines that dispense with all functional differentiation and with professionalism. US training is, on the other hand, very specialised. In contrast to the European and the US-model, students educated in a traditional Islamic institution of learning neither have a *Bildung* (general education) nor an *Ausbildung* (training). Basically, what they have learned is the firm belief that they are superior to others while, in reality, they are among the 'underdogs' of the global system.

Graduates of a training system are, on the other hand, generally experts who are fit for employment and who have mastered their subject. At many universities in Muslim and other developing countries, courses only resemble training on the surface insofar as the curriculum is laid down; and the assessment of performance is as strict as at US universities. What is to be learned, however, is often the mimeographed commonsensical lectures of the mostly underqualified teachers and professors. The great bulk of unskilled university graduates end up in unemployment and in similar frustrating situations and are thus susceptible to recruitment by groups of radical political Islam. Algeria and Egypt are prominent cases in point.

University education in most Islamic countries does not amount to a professional qualification. This type of education, moreover, does not contribute to the acquiring of skills for a change since it is based on how to learn by rote. Again, to put it crudely, a student educated at

one of the universities of today's Muslim countries has command neither of the expert knowledge of the US graduate, nor of the rigorous, problem-oriented thinking of the European liberal arts scholar. This is the fertile soil on which Islamists invade the institutions of learning and use them as their instruments.

In Europe the development of science and technology has enabled people to build new social structures within which they have been able to meet their own needs. Science is as utilisable as it is instructive; neither of these definitions can be separated from the other. Most Muslim and other developing countries import science in ready-made form. Learning processes in agrarian societies still take the form of learning by rote; the acquisition of education is generally pursued with the aim of obtaining a certificate with which to seek a privileged job. The only reason students learn their mimeographed texts by heart is to obtain good exam results. But only a few weeks later they forget what they have learned, as knowledge learned by rote, but not assimilated, cannot be retained. What remains is mostly a valueless sheet of paper obtained by graduating, and ensuing unemployment. This explains why it is easy for fundamentalists to recruit among these frustrated people.

The crisis of Muslim education and the related cultural perceptions

The preceding analysis clearly shows that religious education, next to the institution of law, forms the second mainstay of the Islamic religious system and its transmission. The *shari'a*, the Islamic *lex divina*, determines the core of Islam; the *maktab* at the elementary level and the *madrasa* at the higher level are the Muslim educational institutions that guarantee the handing-down of the legal provisions of the *shari'a*. As already argued, the *madrasa* cannot yet be understood as a university, inasmuch as the latter serves the unrestrained free pursuit of truth and enquiry into the nature of the world by means of human reason, but not solely the handing down of already existing, sacrally determined scriptural knowledge. As the modern notion of learning and the educational institutions associated with it have become universal in the wake of the European expansion, the Muslim educational system has been in a state of crisis. The tension between holding firm to the traditional and adopting new knowledge or adapting to changed circumstances characterises the gruelling test that this system has faced since its exposure to the globalising Western civilisation. Before

passing on to a closer examination of the Islamic perception of this crisis, I should first clarify my understanding of education and the institutions that correlate to it.

Education may be defined as a social system or as an institution, this system in fact forming a subsystem within the total social system. Interaction takes place between this subsystem and other institutions of the respective social system. Within an educational system, people are socialised according to a culturally determined orientation. Such a system is nevertheless also influenced externally, specifically in the context of interaction with the regional and global environment. The German educational sociologist Theodor Hanf has developed the following interesting definition:

On the one hand a process of socialisation can be given an orientation at the international level . . . On the other hand such a process also includes unintended content and effects as well as intended ones . . . In addition to national political systems, the international system ultimately also stands both in direct and indirect relationship to the educational system . . . The term political socialisation is understood to mean that process whereby an individual acquires fundamental orientations toward the political system . . . The cognitive aspect pertains to the transmission of perceptions of the political system, the affective aspect to the transmission of value orientations and the behavioural aspect to the shaping of political attitudes.³⁰

Hanf is an expert on the Middle East, who is familiar with the process of socialisation in Muslim learning institutions. The cited definition helps to make it clear that Islamic education transmits a specific *orientation*, which does not prepare for *change* but for *stabilisation*. The values internalised in a Muslim education system are defined as those eternally valid for all places and all times and not subject to change, inasmuch as their substance is divine revelation. This statement is pertinent insofar as the intentional determination of the Islamic orientation is concerned. At the unintentional level, however, Islamic values are nonetheless redefined by change that has occurred: the education system is not free of changes that take place in the social environment. In Islam, however, these changes are received and integrated into the system at the unintentional level. The history of Islam offers ample material to support this assertion. The Muslim educational system is characterised by a lack of conscious cultural reception of change, for in

Islam man, as a *makhluq* (creature of God), is supposed to live solely according to the unalterable divine commandments proclaimed in the Islamic revelation. This '*Menschenbild*' is part and parcel of the Islamic '*Weltanschauung*'.

Applying, within Hanf's cited general definition, the additional dimension of the international system as a determinant of change in the educational system provides us with even deeper insight into the problems to be overcome by the contemporary Muslim education system. The Islamic system today has to face not only the demands of change in the systemic environment but also, and above all, those proceeding from the environment of the global system.

On an empirical basis we can first observe a duality, with former patterns of socialisation existing side by side with those that have penetrated from the international environment and have been adopted. As we have already seen, a student thus learns natural science or technology exactly as if it were sacral knowledge from the Koran and the *hadith*. As a functional equivalent for the fear of God in learning the latter, the colonial inferiority complex operates during the study of positive science from Europe.

The question becomes whether this simultaneity of the unsimultaneous, the existence at the same time in the educational systems of Muslim societies of two patterns stemming from two historically different formations, is perceived and culturally coped with as such. A look at some of the most important Islamic publications may help us to answer this question.

The well-known Egyptian professor of education at Ain-Shams University in Cairo, Sa'id Isma'il Ali, constantly stresses in his publications the apologetic assertion: 'The Koran is the constitution for life in Muslim society.'³¹ For this very reason, he argues elsewhere, 'we are only acting consistently with the truth (*haqiqa*) in according first place to the Koran, and it is from this very primary source that we have to derive the definition of our Muslim education'.³² How this definition is to be derived is left open. In a later publication, Isma'il Ali speaks of the crisis in modern Muslim education, a crisis that has arisen out of the 'unrest' (*qalaq*) that accompanies the difficulty in finding a solution to the '*mushkilat al-yaum*', the problems of the present day. Isma'il Ali then asks courageously: 'Can today's Muslim educator find help in this situation in the traditions of his fathers and forefathers? Scholarly integrity compels us to answer no to this question.'³³ Isma'il Ali then amplifies upon the prospect of developing a Muslim culture in tune with the times which would be capable of going beyond the alternatives that

have prevailed so far. Muslim partisans (*al-fariq al-Islami*) have indeed held firm to Islam, he continues, but have failed to keep up with the challenges of the age. Those, however, whose thinking has kept up with the times, are no longer Muslims. Isma'il Ali offers a solution:

We must work very hard and invest energy in finding a way to harmonise these two positions, by developing a culture that not only retains the central values of the Islamic heritage . . . but that at the same time renders possible an opening to Western culture, so as to be able to embrace everything that will give us strength and propel us forward.³⁴

Although this quotation comes from an Arab publication of 1982, it is necessary to add that such an open-minded notion of primary sources, that is, the Koran and the *hadith*, no longer prevails at the beginning of the new millennium. One of the many negative secondary effects of oil wealth has been that the Saudis, who are traditionalists, but for political convenience support Islamic fundamentalists, have their own notion of the crisis in Muslim education, which they are also in a position to propagate with appropriate means. The first World Congress on Muslim Education was thus held at the Saudi university of Abdulaziz in Mecca. The subsequently published proceedings in English, *Crisis in Muslim Education*,³⁵ and the resulting volume from the same university, *Education and Society in the Muslim World*,³⁶ distributed widely by the British publishing industry, contained quite a different concept, both of the crisis itself and of the ways to combat it culturally, than that of Isma'il Ali just quoted above.

The secularisation and division of knowledge into the subdivisions of humanities, natural and social sciences, as contained in the well-known declaration which US university presidents made at Harvard after the Second World War, was criticised at the conference in Mecca. In the absence of a more profound acquaintance with their own much-lauded heritage, that is, with the classification of science put forward by Ibn Bultan in the eleventh century (*see* the first section in this chapter), the congress foresaw in such a division the seed of a rift between faith and enquiry. The congress also asserted that the Muslim world would be harmed by this seed:

The Muslim World too has been invaded by this Western form of civilisation. This feeling of rootlessness has already entered Muslim

society because our intellectuals are now being educated in the West, being brainwashed and returned to their own countries after reading text-books which are all filled with ideas in conflict with their traditional assumptions. Even in Muslim countries the traditional Islamic education system has been superseded by a modern one which has been borrowed from the West.³⁷

This, then, is the Saudi diagnosis of the crisis in Muslim education, the surmounting of which can only imply a rejection of this Western influence:

Muslim intellectuals are expected now to justify their methods and at the same time restate their traditional ideas in the context of the new, and formulate new concepts for recent branches of knowledge by reasserting the spiritual realisation of Truth as enshrined in revelations from God.³⁸

On the surface there would seem to be no difference between these two quoted positions. Both call for a renewed adoption of Islamic sources in tune with the times. On closer examination, however, we can see that in the first position, although the Koran is insisted upon as the primary source, the reply to the question of whether answers to contemporary problems are to be found in the sacred sources is no. Here, therefore, recourse to the Koran is to be interpreted in the sense of finding purpose and developing ethical principles. The fundamentalist position is not satisfied with stopping there. The demand that text-books be written 'on the basis of Islamic concepts'³⁹ clearly ranks among the postulates of the World Congress on Muslim Education – in other words, physics, chemistry, and modern technology, as well as the social scientific methods of all branches of knowledge, must rest on the basis of revealed Koranic truth. This position is writ typically large in the case of the Egyptian pedagogue Mahmud Sayyid Sultan, who insists that the Koran does not contain solely a set of ethical principles or a religious view of the world

because the Koran is a method for living and a constitution for the whole of humanity, without temporal or spatial limitations of any kind. The Koran is furthermore also evidence of creation by miracle (*i'jaz*) and is an all-embracing encyclopedia of science, and a compilation of the history of the whole of humanity.⁴⁰

In Sultan's view, the essential task of the educational system consists of accommodating 'every teaching method, every curriculum, and every scientific truth' to the 'Islamic definition of the cosmos' imparted in the Koran.⁴¹ In fact, this is nothing less than an indication of anti-science.⁴²

A critique of the fundamentalist interpretation of religious learning runs the risk of being declared a heresy. Also an attempt to disavow the Koran as an inexhaustible encyclopedia of science involves the danger of being accused of unbelief. The consequences for the offenders in either case are not to be overlooked. It would be wishful thinking not to admit that either the traditionalist orthodox or the semi-modern fundamentalist position, and not the secular modernist version, dominates the debate on the crisis in Muslim education. Although there are many modern educational institutions in the Muslim world imparting apparently secular knowledge, the overall fabric of the educational sector is strained by the awkward heritage of Islamic institutions of learning, with the result that 'science' is only to be found there in the form of a ready-made, imported product.

There is still no discernible, deeply rooted scientific tradition that could modify the substance of the educational sector in most countries of the Islamic civilisation. The duality between knowledge that is handed down unquestioned and knowledge that has been adopted in a cumulative fashion does not permit the practical application of education to the cultural accommodation of change.

In a summary fashion the following two points can be highlighted: (1) The view held by many Muslims that they can adopt modern technology and science, but not the wider framework that goes with them; (2) the Muslim theological doctrine that the Islamic *umma* (community) is the best ever created by God leads us to assume that there is 'a psychological barrier' among Muslims to learning from other cultures, to which they feel superior. Islamic rationalists in medieval Islam were in a position to overcome this barrier, but contemporary Islamists are not! Above all, the latter fail to understand that modern technology does not consist of technological goods severed from their social context, that it also embraces a specific social organisation in life and corresponds to specific attitudes that arise in that context.⁴³ Applying this to the educational sector, I can state that in Muslim educational institutions neither the social organisation referred to above nor, concomitant with adopted ready-made technological-scientific knowledge, the prerequisite psycho-social attitudes are conveyed.

Scholars involved in comparative studies are familiar with the problems discussed in this chapter and that in other, non-Islamic, but pre-modern cultures today there is also a tendency toward synthesising pre-industrial socio-cultural systems with the ready-made products of technological-scientific civilisation. The possibility of calling such a synthesis into question, does not, however, amount to the assumption of a global culture. I continue to argue in favour of a cultural pluralism. A prerequisite for such a state would be that all cultures acquire the capacity to handle modernity creatively, and to produce for themselves technology and science. The mere adoption and cumulative handling of these phenomena would rather tend toward a deepening of the existing gulf.⁴⁴

There is a further consideration connected to this particular postulate – namely, that criticism of Eurocentrism should develop into general criticism of all ethnocentrism. The Islamic teaching that Muslims are the best and hence the superior community (*umma*) on earth represents not only a ‘psychological barrier’ with regard to education; it also represents an obstacle preventing Muslims from seeing the other and the different as equal in value. This misconception of Muslim superiority blatantly contradicts the call for equality and for cultural pluralism within the international society.

The Muslim education system, which imbues its offspring with a feeling of superiority, moreover prevents them from properly perceiving realities that do not correspond to this self-image, and therefore also deprives them of the ability to cope with those changed realities. The most recent Islamist effort to deal with the flawed system of education exacerbates and does not alleviate the crisis-ridden situation. The Islamisation of knowledge⁴⁵ is a political and a fundamentalist project related to a civilisational worldview. It separates Muslims from humanity and smooths the way for the Islamists to make instrumental use of Islamic cultural symbols for their purely political, not religious ends.

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Part IV

The Topicality: Islam and the West between Inter-Civilisational Dialogue and Political Antagonisation

Introductory remarks

For a host of reasons there is an increasing awareness in the West of the fact that Islam is becoming more meaningful for the people of Western civilisation. In contrast to this novelty, for Muslims the West has always been a centre of gravity, be it for good or bad. In the new millennium the oscillation in Islam between culture and politics is no longer an inner-Islamic concern. In the age of migration Islam geographically is no longer only located beyond the borders of Europe in that it already exists in the West. As a religion and as a culture Islam can – if reformed – without any doubt be incorporated into a religious and cultural pluralism in Western societies. This potential does not apply to the claims of political Islam as related to a neo-absolutism. In this sense Islamism is a threat, both to the West and to the Muslims living in its societies. It makes no sense to abide by the rules of political correctness and to refrain from this frankness. The enquiry pursued in the preceding chapters sheds light on the predicament at issue and it makes the available options clear. My analysis took as its starting point the definition of religion as a cultural system. Culture is local, but my scope is global. What is the issue?

The present book combines the cultural-anthropological study of religion with international studies. The impact of Geertzian cultural anthropology on my thoughts is clear. I have already set the record straight in the introduction. I have borrowed from Geertz the cultural understanding of religion, but have limited his impact on my thoughts to this determination of religion as a cultural system which provides meaning. I share the determining of culture in terms of a locally constrained social production of meaning, but attempt to go beyond the confines of this Geertzian approach in considering our world time and thus the international environment pertinent to all local cultures in our age of globalisation. Geertz is not only a cultural relativist, but also – along with his school – regrettably overlooks the important global context pertinent to cultural analysis. Under present conditions, it is indispensable for any cultural analysis to address these issues. Being a student of International Relations, inclined to cross the boundaries of our discipline, I continue to learn from anthropology how to look at Islam as one of the major sources for the production of meaning in the respective local cultures. I nevertheless do not fail to consider the embedding of these local cultures into a global set-up. In other words, I am inclined to relate the local to the global.

In studying the contemporary world as an emerging international society under the conditions of globalising socio-economic and politi-

cal structures, I come across conflicting worldviews, norms and values and fail to see the assumed homogenising impact of globalisation. I maintain that the globalisation of structures is not matched by a universalisation of values, norms and worldviews. Thus, I believe that the alleged impact of what is termed *McCulture* is not leading to a presumed standardisation. This insight leads to reviewing my thoughts on the simultaneity of structural globalisation and cultural fragmentation as addressed in Chapter 4 of this book, and further developed in this concluding part.

The underlying argument is based on the dual character of the process of globalisation. The latter takes place in the world economy and the international state system and covers modern transport and communication networks. Globalisation contributes to the embedding of all local cultures in a given structural framework of interaction. Nevertheless, the related processes fail to mitigate the tensions between the local and the global. On the contrary, globalisation intensifies the gap between both by simultaneously producing more cultural fragmentation. Here lies the assumed duality of globalisation, which I address in terms of a simultaneity of two processes developing in adverse directions – globalisation and fragmentation go hand in hand.

In addition to questioning established ‘wisdoms’ about global impact we need to distinguish between globalisation and universalisation. At issue are two distinctly different phenomena with equally different meanings. Structures could become global, but in contrast, norms and values pertain to local cultures and they, therefore, could hardly become universal. Only the insight that the globalisation of structures is not matched by a parallel universalisation of values can help to understand the gap. It follows that we need to be wary of confusing both terms because it is utterly wrong and misleading to equate globalisation with universalisation. Certainly, this judgement sounds too general and might thus be open to severe misunderstanding. Therefore, it needs to be specified. This task is painstakingly pursued in different steps and on various levels in the following chapters. It is true, I doubt that universalisation could be wholesale, but nevertheless believe in an inter-civilisational morality covering human rights and democracy. I present my case on the example of Islam and its place in the interplay between cultural and socio-economic as well as political changes on global grounds. I shall carry out my enquiry while asking related questions. The search for proper answers is my goal.

Based on my analysis of the simultaneity of structural globalisation and cultural fragmentation, I develop the hypothesis that Islamism (that is, political Islam) is a defensive-cultural phenomenon directed

against the West in that it envisages a de-Westernisation. In our age of migration, the revolt against the West and the religio-political challenge to secularity are exported to Western societies themselves. Therefore, developments in the world of Islam do matter to the West. As a mediator between Islam and the West, I am attempting to place my thoughts into the disputed debate on what has been termed the 'Clash of Civilizations'. I wish to join the former President of Germany, Roman Herzog, in committing myself to *Preventing the Clash of Civilizations*. This formula is the title of Herzog's book to which I have contributed.

While I concede a need for commonalities and simultaneously see value-related conflicts, I take a stand against Huntington by arguing as follows: in order to prevent something, we first need to understand the constraint underlying the phenomenon at issue. Huntington fails to understand the difference between Islam as a cultural system and its politicisation and in addition looks at Islam in a monolithic manner. Despite this differentiation, we need to look at cultural and civilisational differences, however, without essentialising them as Huntington seemingly does. In short, *Preventing the Clash of Civilizations* requires an analysis of the value-based conflict among civilisations. I venture into this endeavour in my final Chapter 10 with a full awareness of the risks. I see no contradiction between dissociating myself from Huntington and simultaneously giving him credit. He brought the study of civilisation into international affairs, but his approach is wanting. This kind of study runs against the rules of political correctness, but after all, we need to acknowledge that without freedom of thought no reasoning could flourish! I refuse to demonise Huntington's 'Clash of Civilizations', even though I have my own approach and do not share his.

9

Islam Matters to the West! Islam and Europe, Islam in Europe: Islamic Migration between Cultural Assimilation, Political Integration and Communitarian Ghettoisation

When at the present time it comes to addressing Islam, we often encounter references to the notions of modernity, as well as to post-modernity.¹ In this context the perennial question was asked in the headline of an issue of the *Times Literary Supplement*: 'Can Islam cope with modernity?' (*TLS*, 23 April 1999). It is one that matters in many ways to the West in the age of migration. To be specific: in acknowledging the secular character of cultural modernity² we need to ask whether Islamic migrants accept a decoupling of Islam from politics. Is it possible to reduce their demand for religious tolerance in respect of their cultural identity within a pluralism that puts all religions on an equal footing? Or will they insist on a political determination of the religion of Islam as the only true one and thus insist on its absolutism? What are the implications? And last, but not least: is secular modernity, which is intrinsically secular, at peril if an increasing Islamic part of the population does not submit to it?

At the outset I, as a liberal Muslim and migrant, acknowledge the primacy of European identity in Europe and view it as normal that Muslims who migrate to Europe need to come to terms with this identity. I have publicly rejected the claim of one of the Muslim religious leaders that Europe for Muslim migrants is *dar al-Islam* (abode of Islam). Clearly, modernity is not Christianity as Islamists propagate. I distinguish between cultural modernity being normative and institutional modernity. Both segments underpin human rights as an essential part

of European identity. Freedom of belief is a major component of these rights and they apply to Muslim migrants. In this sense there is a place for Islam in Europe as a religious belief, however with a pluralist set-up and not by making out of Europe *dar al-Islam*. The tensions arising from the pendulum of Muslims and their civilisation in determining their religion in terms of culture or politics render European-Islamic relations in the age of migration more complex. Given the existence of a sizable Islamic minority in secular Western societies, a cultural legitimacy for living peacefully with one another is required from both sides. The political order of the democratic state in Europe is secular and religions have their place only within a pluralism. This has great implications for Islam which claims superiority to other religions. To be sure, the politicisation of Islam by which this claim is reinforced creates a great obstacle toward accepting both requirements: secularity and pluralism. The reference to human rights is burdened with the duplicity that the religious leaders of Muslim migrants rightly claim these rights for their community, but some of them deny fellow Muslims the very same, for instance, the freedom of belief. The behaviour of the Muslim community in the United Kingdom during the Rushdie affair has been scandalous and is simply unacceptable, not only for Europeans but also for liberal Muslims.³ I have been suffering from these double standards all my life in Europe.

Islam in Europe: the Euro-Mediterranean dimension

In substance, the present analysis applies to the entire West, but empirically I am focusing on Western Europe and excluding the United States.⁴ In our current age at the beginning of the new century Western-Islamic relations are embedded in the overall context of world time. Our present has been described along these lines as a time in the course of which our world has been shrinking through networking to the extent of becoming a global village. The development of structural and institutional networking in economy, politics, transportation and communication has led to a hitherto unprecedented degree of interaction among all parts of humanity, regardless of religion, culture and ethnicity. In particular, migration has contributed to exposing people of diverse cultures to one another in the very same neighbourhood. Islam does not only have borders with Europe, through migration Muslims in our time form a significant part of the European population itself. What is, in this context, a global village? Do people in this village simply live next to one another, or do they

share the same political culture of secular democracy, human rights and civil society?

In the American understanding of globalisation, the emerging 'global village' has been equated with what is being called McWorld. It is a world of American popular culture emerging from consumption. In this flawed reasoning, a basic fact has been overlooked, namely that culture basically refers to a social production of meaning rather than one of eating hamburgers, watching videos, handling computers, wearing fashionable clothes and the like. The rampant and unspecific use of the global village notion in the contested meaning of McWorld has led to the equally wrong and misleading assumption of an existing global culture and outlooks shared by the whole of humanity. American popular culture has been perceived as the source of these processes while the tensions between the global and the local have been ignored. The outcome of the new wave of migration to Europe and North America has belied this wrong assumption. A distinguished liberal US scholar, Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., speaks of *The Disuniting of America*.⁵ The assumed automatic integration of migrants is seemingly not taking place. In particular, Islamic migrants make clear that McCulture cannot undo radically different norms, values and related worldviews. Nevertheless, North America is a continent with an identity, Europe in its present shape is not, and this is the issue I am focusing on. I believe, therefore, that the issue in Europe is much tougher to deal with.

Historically and also in our present, the microcosmos of the global village with regard to Western-Islamic relations has been that of the Mediterranean. Unlike the clear borders of traditional European-Mediterranean relations – from the Islamic conquests of the seventh and eighth centuries through to European colonisation⁶ – in the new set-up of migration the existing frontiers are tenuous.⁷ There are very few scholars who have advanced the insight that the shrinking of the globe 'does not in itself create a unity of outlook and has not in fact done so'. This phrase stems from the eminent Hedley Bull, who borrows the following sentence from Brzezinski: 'Humanity is becoming simultaneously more unified and more fragmented.'⁸ The microcosmos of this humanity is reflected by the realities of European multicultural societies that receive migrants. The Northern Mediterranean, that is, Europe is therefore a case in point.

In my long-standing research on this subject, as well as in my own life as a Middle Eastern Muslim living in the West, I have been experiencing the realities of the addressed cultural fragmentation. I have to

contend equally on cross-regional and cross-cultural grounds with a simultaneity of structural globalisation and of cultural self-assertion with the latter's fragmenting impact. In my writing I have coined the term 'the simultaneity of structural globalisation and cultural fragmentation'⁹ as already introduced in Chapter 4. At this point, I do not intend to pursue further the addressed theoretical debate concerning modernity, migration and the consequences. I am more inclined to relate my reasoning to a concrete topic, namely, Islam *and* the West/Islam *in* the West. I shall present the related findings on this subject matter in the light of the major theme of this book being the inner Islamic oscillation between culture and politics. In my view, the pending issue touches on Muslim migrants in Europe and on their place in society and the state. The predicament of Muslims as far as modernity is concerned has inevitably become a source for troubles touching on Europe, and by and large the West.

Again, as a mediator I am inclined to bridge the two civilisations of Islam and the West. In this pursuit, I am basically concerned with the encounters of the people of these entities within the global village as the set-up for the interaction at the present time. Hereby, I shall draw a clear distinction between economic interaction, which I shall call bargaining, political interaction among states which I shall call negotiation, and cultural interaction on the civilisational level, which I shall call cultural dialogue. There is always a conflict looming and there are divergent ways of setting about interactive conflict resolution. My philosophy is that there can be no conflict resolution without addressing these issues. Therefore, I strongly reject the censorship of political correctness.

Among the concerns of this chapter is the dialogic inter-civilisational level of interaction. As a student of International Relations I place the enquiry at issue in the study of my discipline, but believe that in our global age, the science of International Relations is no longer an exclusive domain for the concerned academic community. International studies do touch on our life and on the fate of all humanity. My arguments and my findings are thus designed to address a broader community of women and men who are concerned about the peace of humanity in our crisis-ridden time at the beginning of the new millennium.

The focus of my deliberations is on the Euro-Mediterranean region as the inter-civilisational basin linking the core of the West and the core of the Islamic world to one another. The relatively recent phenomenon of migration from the Islamic countries situated to the east and south

of the Mediterranean to the European north adds a new dimension to Euro-Mediterranean relations that needs to be illuminated. In the course of history, Muslims came twice as conquerors to Europe: in the eighth century they came from the south-west to Spain and between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries from the south-east to the Balkans (*see* note 6). Now they are coming peacefully as migrants. The issue-area is therefore Islam and the West in the age of migration. I am placing this issue into the sphere of international studies and applying an approach of cultural analysis to enquire into its scope and meaning.

Is the global village an international system or an international society?

Being among a minority of scholars of International Relations who address culture as an issue-area of our discipline, I wish to challenge the monopoly of anthropologists over this domain. In focusing on 'culture' in my study of Islam, I have been displaced by my scholarly community of International Relations for decades. I have been crossing borderlines between disciplines and in so doing have been denied a professional home. In the present book on Islam I make it clear from the very outset that my outlooks are derived from the study of international politics. In the past few years, of course, there have been significant and promising changes.

Scholars of International Relations refer to the global village in their professional understanding of the world as simply consisting of a host of sovereign nation-states mutually acknowledging each other's sovereignty and thus creating systemic interaction and networking among one another on global grounds. Professionally speaking, we label this set-up as the modern international system. The study of this system of states deals with conflict and conflict resolution on political and economic grounds. Until recently, the international realities of interaction among cultures were seldom acknowledged in this confined perception. The reason for this flaw is a systemic one; it is due to the belief of Westerners in the universality of their views. Hitherto, it was taken for granted that other people think as Westerners do. Therefore, there existed no need to acknowledge cultural diversity and its consequences for international politics. Western norms, values and rules were believed to set the standards. After all, the Westerners are first and foremost those who run the discipline of International Relations. Clearly, the acknowledging of the interrelationship between culture and knowledge is a recent one in Western scholarship.

For addressing the focal issues to be dealt with within the framework of Euro-Mediterranean peace the described, hitherto dominant, equally universalistic and state-centred Western perspective is no longer a promising approach; it can barely provide help for a proper understanding of the pending questions. In the age of mass migration and increasing networking it seems that global interaction is no longer restricted to the state level. I have already hinted at the fact that state borders are becoming blurred. Migration affects the national interest of states, but they seem to have little leverage for keeping the flow of migrants in check, not to mention solving the problems arising from it.

The traditional wisdoms of International Relations as designed by realism and neo-realism are preoccupied with power both on the level of economy and of political structures. But due to the problems that come to the fore with ongoing migration and cultural self-assertion a shift in focus towards dealing with culture becomes imperative, but is still missing. To be sure, I repeat my assertion that this is not a call for what some name a 'culturalist' approach. Culture is only a component of a whole which includes political and economic structures. Political ideologies with a religio-cultural underpinning, like Islamism, cannot be understood and explained properly without dealing with the related cultures and their production of meaning. In order not to fall into the trap of culturalism we need to place this new analysis in the proper set-up at all levels.

In again referring to the late prominent Oxford scholar of International Relations, Hedley Bull, I want to draw on his acknowledgement that the study of culture in international politics is of significance, and underline this insight. Hedley Bull felt it important to distinguish between the professional notions of international society and international system. Basically, the existing international society is composed of the family of European states that is, of states that subscribe to the same norms and values of Western civilisation whose identity they share. The overall international system is the result of the expansion of this European international society¹⁰ through processes of globalisation to complete the mapping of the globe into the European system of states. From this distinction between international society and international system it follows that the global village is an interactive international system rather than an international society sharing the same values and outlooks. This distinction is blurred by the fact that the international system is constructed along Western norms and values. This is exactly the reason why some non-Westerners in our

age of de-Westernisation are contesting the present world order. At the beginning of this third millennium, a non-Western revolt against these structures and their cultural underpinning can be identified and is intensifying.

The revolt against the West is perilous to the hoped-for democratic peace in the global village. The reason for this is that the revolt is not merely anti-hegemonic, it is also a cultural-normative move. In the case of Islamism it envisages introducing its own hegemony in neo-absolutist terms. The loss of intercultural consensus leads to fragmentation and the latter is the seed of disorder. Multi-ethnic societies are a case in point. Migration creates these. Without shared values of a common political culture, inner peace is at peril.

Islam and the West in the Euro-Mediterranean region. Inherited burdens and new patterns

Historically, until the seventh century, the Mediterranean was the political sphere of the Roman Empire being *mare nostrum* of the Romans. The rise of Islam and its early conquests changed this power zone in creating Islamic hegemony over the Mediterranean that lasted until the rise of the West.¹¹ The age of empires is over and we in modern times live in the globally institutionalised international system of nation-states. It would be dishonest to evade at the outset the pivotal question: Are Europe and the southern and eastern Mediterranean being composed of states belonging to this very system of one international society? For the sake of truth, the answer needs to be: No, they are not, neither historically nor civilisationally. For in the understanding of Bull, an international society only exists when states composing it share, as he argues,

common values . . . [and] conceive of themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another . . . An international society in this sense presupposes an international system, but an international system may exist that is not an international society.¹²

In looking at the present, as well as at the past of the Mediterranean we clearly realise that we are dealing with rival and competing civilisations.¹³ In International Relations we professionally may argue that our world at present is a combination of system and society. North of the Mediterranean, the European Union forms a society of states interacting

with one another. Of course, the Islamic community of states covering the south and east of the Mediterranean and other parts of the world of Islam is not only less powerful, but also at a much lower level of integration. We can hardly compare the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) with the European Union. Nevertheless, both communities interact with one another on the grounds of the existing international system of which both state groupings constitute a subsystemic part, but together they do not constitute an international society. Commonalities between the civilisations may reduce the described gap between a system of interaction and a society of shared values.

A moralising European attitude tends to represent the Mediterranean as being the basin of one single civilisation combining a northern European and a southern Islamic component. This is not the proper place to teach history and to correct this misconception. The concern with cultural dialogue between Islam and the West requires us to be honest. If this premise is accepted, then we would need to dissociate ourselves from such misleading moralistic views. We would then need to acknowledge the records of dissent to allow ourselves to deal with 'the challenge of human difference'. It is true that both state groups share – at a merely formal level – the internationally established 'morality of the relations of states',¹⁴ but they simultaneously clearly belong to different civilisations having their own values and worldviews. It goes without saying that civilisations have different outlooks and worldviews. What are the implications of this observation for further interaction in the age of mass migration to Europe? Does the politicisation of culture and religion in Islam matter for Europe? What are the issues and what are the obstacles to resolution?

In the search for honest answers to such questions we need to acknowledge that the burdens are historically transmitted. The contemporary issues need to be seen in their historical context. In a debate at the World Economic Forum in Davos 2000, I challenged Shimon Peres who proposed that history be cancelled because it only contains hatred. I asked: how can we overcome hatred without learning how to do so through the study of history? Peres insisted on his view, but my challenge was supported by Francis Fukuyama and Paul Kennedy, who were also present at the Forum.

In positively viewing the Mediterranean as a bridge, and not as a boundary, let alone a belligerent frontier, the need arises to determine common and shared values. I have started my reasoning in criticising the state-centred view of International Relations' scholars while pointing at the changed situation resulting from the increased migration

across state borders. A prominent American student of Islam, John Kelsay, emphasises the fact that:

the rapidity of Muslim immigration, . . . suggests that we may soon be forced to speak not simply of Islam and, but of Islam in the West. What difference will this make?¹⁵

The addressed difference is related to the way in which Muslims and Europeans deal with their cultural divergences in an age of migration in which these issues concern everyday life!

In speeches by politicians playing to the gallery the existence of different worldviews is both obscured and denied. This is a very poor way of handling the issue. We need to go beyond the censorship of dictatorial political correctness and address the real issues. Only in this manner can we begin to realise how foolish it is to deny the existing cultural differences. It is unfortunate to see this debate being focused almost exclusively on contesting Samuel Huntington's contribution to this discussion. The result has been overly polemical amounting to a demonisation of both the person and work of Huntington, mostly in a regrettably inappropriate manner supposedly not worthy of academic behaviour. The outcome of such debates has not been an illumination, but a discarding of the issue itself. In this context, some experts have suggested that the West is only looking for a substitute for the lost communist foes. In an imputed arduous search, the West was viewed to have found the needed enemy in Islam. It is most disturbing to find myself being among the victims of these and similar polemics. I am dismayed to see my addressing of differences being placed in these constructed cleavages. European atheists teach a liberal Muslim how to be politically correct, that is, to be silent about political Islam. This is insanity!

In contrast to the questionable 'postmodern' debates alluded to, prudent Muslims and Westerners in an important Islamic-Western dialogue undertaken in Karachi ventured to address the existing differences as a prerequisite for dealing with them. By this, they succeeded in going beyond diplomatic fallacies. In assigning to themselves the task of searching for new modes of peaceful coexistence they were willing to expose themselves to the challenge of 'how to deal with differences'.¹⁶ I was interviewed at this event by the prominent Karachi journal *Newsline* in which I argued that 'the clash of civilisations was not invented, but it was used, abused for other reasons'.¹⁷ We may keep this in mind and then go back to the earlier quoted question as

raised by John Kelsay. He refers to the difference related to the shift in Islam's importance for the West – that is, from state neighbourhood to neighbourhood within one's own Western society now becoming multi-ethnic through migration. In my phrasing, this is a shift from the topic of *Islam and the West* to that of *Islam in the West*, a phrasing which draws on Kelsay. In this new situation there is a need to deal with persistent commonalities between both civilisations in a new manner. As John Kelsay puts it:

Perhaps such commonalities serve, in the main, to indicate the nature of disagreement between the West and Islam . . . But there should be no doubt that in certain contexts, the common discourse about ethics . . . has the potential for creative and cooperative endeavour. Given the increased presence of Muslims in Europe and North America – a presence that makes for a more than intense interaction between the two traditions than ever before – it is important to see this.¹⁸

We need to determine the existing differences to accomplish a real search for commonalities, that is, shared values. Moreover, without addressing the perils related to the politicisation of religio-cultural concepts, no strategy for peace can be developed. To thwart the consequences of politicised religion we need to deal with them, both within Europe and also with regard to what is called the Euro-Mediterranean. Thus, the pseudo-ethical suppression of the study of Islamic fundamentalism is counterproductive.

Islam in the West: culture and politics

Repeatedly, we hear talk about the identity of migrants and also about the related need to maintain that identity as an essential human right. We need to courageously ask: Could Muslim migrants to Europe combine the requirements of their religion with the political identity related to European citizenship? If odds cannot be overcome, would they then rather create a separate diaspora identity? In this case, clearly a political entity would emerge being a kind of Islamic enclave within Europe. Is that an extension of *dar al-Islam* to the West? These are very tough questions and they, for the sake of inner peace in Europe, should not be evaded.

My way of answering the pending questions, being a Muslim living in the West who has chosen to become a European citizen, is to pro-

nounce a clear commitment to the French notion of *citoyen*. Therefore, I neither accept the ethnic German concept of *Staatsbürgerschaft*,¹⁹ nor the politicised Muslim concept of the *umma*. Nevertheless, I claim to maintain my reform-Islamic, individual cultural identity while combining it with the political identity of *citoyenneté*. In so doing, I find myself in conflict both with inherent European racism and with the opposed trend of multicultural communitarianism. The latter fashionable formula has been used to foster the claims to an Islamic entity within the West as put forward by some Islamist leaders in Europe. Migrants who really want to become citizens are caught between rejection and the pressure to join a cultural *umma*-ghetto. In short, the obstacles come from both sides – the Europeans and the migrants!

The German philosopher Helmuth Plessner, who during the Nazi period in Germany found refuge in the Netherlands, criticises the ever-persistent propensity of the Germans to shift from one extreme to another, with no middle way in between.²⁰ In applying this proper assessment to the current state of affairs in Europe, we see, on the one hand, those who demonise Islam as an alleged threat while glorifying themselves. This is explained most properly by Fred Halliday in his *Islam and the Myth of Confrontation*.²¹ But on the other, there are those Europeans who are currently moving from European universalism to cultural relativism. In my work I have shown that both attitudes do not necessarily contradict one another, since they indicate a move from the extreme of Euro-arrogance to self-denial by the very same people.

Of course, there exists a third group of Europeans who combine cultural open-mindedness with a commitment to the enlightened values of their European civilisation. It is, however, unfortunate to see that attitudes of self-denial presented as an opening up to other cultures are spreading and gradually overtaking the scene. Again, Germany – as it always has been – is an extreme case in point. Nevertheless, this attitude can already be observed throughout Europe at the present time. Intellectual Muslims, like myself, who subscribe to acknowledging the Ibn Khaldunian notion of *asabiyya* – a kind of *esprit de corps*, or civilisation-awareness – believe that they see in the phenomenon of self-denial the civilisational decline of the West and the fading of its cultural values. It is a misperception of Europeans to believe that they can earn respect through such a display of self-denial. The truth is that it is the reverse.²² It is very important that Europeans grasp this issue properly with no moralisations and demonisations. Self-denial is not the proper way to deal with the existing historical burdens for it does

not advance the development of much-needed new patterns for the present. Dialogue requires that both parties are respectful of each other! Muslims do not respect people displaying this self-denial!

The choice of what variety of 'Islam in the West' will affect the Islamic segment in future Europe and its outcome will determine the kind of cooperation that might emerge between the parties involved. To be sure, there is no such thing as an essentialist or monolithic Islam. It follows that there exists no such thing as an immutable Islamic identity, as Islamists contend. Islam will always be an ever-changing cultural system adjusted to varying conditions and designed by Muslims themselves. Therefore, Muslims living in Europe could shape an Euro-Islam in line with European identity. When it comes to the future of Islam in Europe itself, Europeans are also eligible to participate in that they are challenged to get involved in the process of shaping a European variety of this cultural system. Definitely, Europeans need to have a say in this domain inasmuch as their societies are deeply affected by the introduction of Islam to their polity. The challenge is twofold: to overcome old hardships related to the European-Islamic legacy and to develop new patterns for the present to facilitate the integration of Muslims and develop a Western-Muslim understanding for living together.

To make my point unambiguously clear: I am neither in favour of a cultural relativist multiculturalism nor of the related cultural communitarianism. In contrast, I go for an honest intercultural dialogue in which both sides need to have their own stand, but are willing to find positive commonalities among themselves. And the bottom line is that living in the West cannot go along with anti-Western attitudes. My objection to multiculturalism is related to its inherent support for separate cultural entities that end up in an endorsement of ghettos in which civic personal identity has no space and secularity is objected to. In opposition to multiculturalism, I go for cultural pluralism in full knowledge of the thorny path to it. As a liberal Muslim I believe that European multiculturalists neither understand the combination of culture and politics in Islam nor do they ever grasp the implications involved.

Part of the needed honesty in a cultural-pluralist discourse is not to overlook the issue-areas of disagreement, but, on the contrary, to address them consciously while developing an ability to deal with them properly. The goal of this combination of realism and humanism is a commitment to live together in Europe, in the West, and elsewhere, in peace, mutual respect and with self-respect, without cultivat-

ing attitudes of superiority related to religious or missionary aspects. The Islamic *da'wa* missionaryism is no less evil than the Eurocentric one. For us Muslims it is, for the sake of honesty, imperative that we, while rejecting all kinds of Western, mostly Eurocentric, missionaryism, ought not to reverse this missionaryism. By this statement I address the need that we as Muslims be committed to the reason-based dialogue (*dialogische Vernunft/Diskurs-Ethik*), thus not confusing dialogue with the missionary *da'wa* (call to Islam), as some Islamists in the Muslim diaspora do. Muslims should renounce the doctrine that migration is an instrument for the Islamisation of the world.²³

The Koran clearly states '*Lakum dinakum wa liya din*' (You have your religion, I have mine). I take this as a plea for religious pluralism. One cannot turn down Western Eurocentric missionaryism in favour of one's own Islamocentric missionaryism and at the same time be honest and committed to a true dialogue, mutual tolerance and religious pluralism. At the Spinoza Institute in Jerusalem (August 1999) I was dismayed to listen to a Palestinian Muslim presenting to non-Arabic-speaking listeners *da'wa* as a means of interreligious dialogue. This is cheating and an indication of dishonesty. Put plainly, Muslims in Europe and elsewhere need to decouple themselves from the Islamic tradition of associating migration (*hijra*) with the spread of Islam. Migration today is not a *hijra* in its religious meaning.²⁴ In Islamic history, the expansion of Islam was associated with *jihad*, *hijra* and *da'wa*. The new patterns needed should be free from the hardships of this historical legacy of *jihad* to which the crusades were seemingly the response. I propose to dismiss both!

Dialogue needs to be reason-based. The politicisation of cultural-religious beliefs leads to confrontation

Earlier, I made a clear distinction between political negotiations and cultural dialogue. Negotiations among states are formal and mostly bound to political constraints and political convenience. They take place in the shadow of mostly dishonest political pronouncements, often made to the gallery. Such pronouncements do not reveal the contrast between rhetoric and actions, words and deeds. Instead, the intercivilisational dialogue needs to be upright and straightforward. In accordance with this, the needed dialogue would be in continuity with the encounters of medieval Islamic rationalism²⁵ and the European Renaissance²⁶ as well as with the tradition of the Enlightenment and the current political culture of democracy and human rights.

I believe that this tradition continues to be both topical and relevant for the needed Euro-Mediterranean dialogue. As Muslims and Europeans in the past positively encountered one another on the grounds of this spirit based on *aql* (reason), it must be equally possible to revive this tradition and its spirit as a framework for the needed dialogue in our age. Muslims living in the West are exposed to the choice of creating a ghetto or being an inter-civilisational bridge between Islam and the West.

At this juncture, I want to refer to the Harvard scholar of Iraqi Muslim origin, the philosopher Muhsin Mahdi, who believes that al-Farabi was the greatest thinker in Islamic political philosophy. In fact, al-Farabi was by origin a Turk, but his cultural language was Arabic and his commitment was to Islamic civilisation, not to his ethnicity. The Farabian *aql*-based Islamic philosophy is a lasting indication of a Western-Islamic encounter in its best terms. I continue to argue that this encounter is still topical. In reverse, I contend that current Islamism, as based on the politicisation of religio-cultural beliefs, leads to an impasse resulting in a civilisational confrontation. In the previously mentioned UNESCO dialogue on tolerance run at the Spinoza Institute in Jerusalem in August 1999, Jews, Christians and Muslims were in good agreement on these assumptions, despite the disturbance by an individual who confused dialogue with *da'wa* as quoted above.

An urgent distinction: cultural pluralism is not communitarian multiculturalism

The acceptance of Islam in Europe would be an element of cultural pluralism. To reiterate: Islam is not new to Europe as it had a great impact on the making of Europe itself in the Carolingian age. In going for pluralism we, however, need to be wary of a confusion with multiculturalism. Some European multiculturalists look with a sense of mystic romanticism to the culture of medieval Cordoba as an example of multiculturalism, while they are – in fact – lacking profound knowledge about it. I refer to this mystification to develop the extremely urgent and important distinction between cultural pluralism and multiculturalism.

Before moving to address this issue I want to voice an unpleasant political reality in Europe. Most of the leading Islamists – some having criminal records at home – reside in Europe abusing there the right to political asylum. There is no single significant fundamentalist organisation in the Mediterranean that is not represented through an office or

a leading person in London or in another European, for example, Scandinavian capital. We have to be frank about the fact that Islamist groups instrumentally abuse the Muslim diaspora in Europe for establishing their logistics so that they can act like fish in water. They thus create obstacles in the way of integrating Muslim migrants. Some Islamic diaspora fundamentalists are extremists clearly inclined to abuse Islamic migrants as an instrument for their political activities in the world of Islam itself. At issue is, therefore, a determining of the institutional status of Muslims in Europe while making clear that respect for the culture and religion of Islam does not force tolerance *vis-à-vis* political Islam. It is one of the major contentions of this book that these are different issues. The implication of this differentiation touches on the question of whether Muslim migrants would become European citizens and – in my phrasing – Euro-Muslims or whether they would prefer to live in a communitarian ghetto? These options make a great difference, also to Europe itself.

Liberal Muslims living in Europe – like myself – do not want to belong to a peripheral minority, but rather want to be members of the European polity itself with its respective rights and duties. Therefore, I subscribe to the French concept of *citoyenneté*. I see no contradiction between being at the same time a European and a Muslim. In contrast, the Islamist groups under issue are not interested in the role of Muslim migrants as a bridge between the society they are living in and the civilisation they are coming from. They are sooner interested in using them as tools for confrontation. At this point, I can refer to the authority of Prince Hassan of Jordan in arguing from the point of view of an open-minded Islam:

Muslims respect the rule of their host states and the applicable laws. For the principles of Islam require a Muslim minority to obey a state in which it is resident, just as a Muslim state expects non-Muslims to respect and to abide by its laws. The Muslims of Europe are therefore not asking for special privileges, and do not demand what is denied to others. They are merely asking for their religion to be recognised within the European context (manuscript).

To be sure, this is a normative statement and does not reflect any of the existing realities. Muslims who are committed to this understanding of their position in European societies ‘rather view themselves as both Muslims and Europeans, seeing no essential contradiction between those identities’, as Prince Hassan continues. I believe it is up

to the Europeans whether or not this enlightened determination of Euro-Islam will help to make migrants potential Europeans.

By the notion Euro-Islam²⁷ I denote a cultural pattern of Islam adjusted to the political culture of civil society and to the separation between culture and politics. This liberal design of Islam could result from a process of indigenisation of Islam in which Islam could become European as much as Afro-Islam in Africa is African. An Islamic enclave in Europe is detrimental both to Muslims and European citizens.

It must be clear by now that the cited enlightened Muslim position is not in favour of multicultural communitarianism which promotes different laws and different treatment for people from different cultural communities.²⁸ It should be noted that the issue is intercultural as opposed to multicultural discourse and interaction. The difference between both is determined by accepting or rejecting a shared civic culture.

What Islam in Europe? Conclusions

Islam exists elsewhere in the West, for example, in North America, but my focus is Europe. As Islamic civilisation claims its right to its own identity, Europe as a part of Western civilisation is equally entitled to maintain its different set-up of identity. It makes no sense to pretend in the fashion of political correctness that there are only commonalities, and no differences. In the Islamic–Western dialogue encounter in Karachi referred to earlier, there was an overwhelming agreement that the best way to avert the ‘clash’ between Islam and the West is to develop an ability to cope with differences. In this regard the required policy recommendations are different from earlier approaches but pertinent to the addressed issues on the following two levels of interaction:

At the level of International Relations, Europeans need to develop an awareness of the increasing resistance to Western hegemony over the rest of the world. In my work, I address this issue as a process of de-Westernisation of the world. A value-based consensus needs to be found with a cross-cultural underpinning for establishing world peace among civilisations on new grounds. Straight dialogue is here the best instrument for conflict resolution and establishing peace.

While at the global level de-Westernisation is a process of back to normality, *at the societal level of Europe itself* de-Westernisation, that is, making it a part of *dar al-Islam* through migration is detrimental. We need to judge this issue differently at the domestic level of European societies themselves. The question is whether the Europeans were

willing to give up on the Western cultural identity of their continent and to lose their *asabiyya*. In fact, multiculturalism and communitarianism do not refer to a pluralist set-up, but rather to a state of multi-ethnicity; they imply the creation of cultural ghettos in which Muslims and other non-Western migrants would forever remain aliens in their diaspora, and moreover, opposed to Europe and to its norms and values. It is an illusion, but some Islamists envisage becoming the demographic majority in Europe in the new millennium. In thus saying, they are helping to promote European right-wing radicalism.

The process of decision-making on the pending policy-related issues cannot be a harmonious one, because a conflict of norms, values and the related worldviews is persistently involved. The conflict revolves around the issue of whether or not Muslim migrants will and can become European citizens. To be sure, citizenship is not simply a 'passport' as is the case, for instance, in Germany; it rather implies belonging to a citizenry. At this juncture, I follow Prince Hassan and subscribe to the view that enlightened Muslims in Europe want to be treated as citizens, not as an alien minority. The clear implication is 'one law for all', not *shari'a* for the Islamic minorities, not even in the area of family law. In other words, the issue is not the providing of minority privileges, but rather individual integration. The pendulum between culture and politics in the world of Islam needs to be kept out of Europe if troubles are to be averted. To hold out for this is not a contradiction of tolerance. Civil society cannot and should not be indifferent to those who oppose it!

We must be in a position to learn from the experience of others. In this regard, India with its considerable Islamic minority is a pertinent case in point. In a study completed for a project of the University of Leiden on the Islamic presence in Western Europe, I have dealt with the status of Muslims in India in the pursuit of comparative learning.²⁹ In fact, the Constitution of India prescribes one secular personal law to be valid for all religious communities. Nevertheless, the early Congress government, simply for the political expedience of luring Muslim votes, allowed legislation that permits the practice of a 'Muslim Personal Law'. A strong response to this has been the rise of Hindu fundamentalism, for which the elections of 1996 and again of 1998 were a continuing alarm signal. This rise is related to the resentment of the privileges given to minorities. While pointing at these privileges, Hindu fundamentalists call for the de-secularisation of India and infringe even on the physical existence of Indian Muslims. My conclusions for Europe as part of the global village are the following:

Being a Muslim and a migrant living in Europe, thus fully aware of the growing hatred of foreigners and dreadful right-wing radicalism,³⁰ I have the misgiving that any granting of minority privileges and rights to cultural and religious groups would be counterproductive. It would lead to responses similar to those shown in the case of India. Communitarian minority rights would not only contribute to impeding the political integration of these groups, but also to enticing the growth of right-wing radicalism on both sides.

As much as I have been at pains to distinguish between multiculturalism and cultural pluralism I draw a distinction between political integration and assimilation. I recommend the political integration of Muslim migrants in the sense of granting them citizenship rights and duties as well as demanding from them loyalty to the existing polities in accepting all European laws and above all the secular constitutions separating religion from politics. This loyalty requires a reform of the Islamic concept of the legitimacy of the imam (leader): cultural reforms promoting the development of Euro-Islam would enable a Muslim migrant to live under the governance of a non-Muslim ruler. Even in the world of Islam an imam should not be more than a religious authority.

Unlike political integration, assimilation implies a denial of the cultural identity of the migrants. It is possible to combine difference and pluralism.³¹ In Germany, I continue to argue in contributions to newspapers and in interviews on the media, using my own case as an example, that an Arab Muslim migrant can have multiple sources of identity. My own identity is made up of diverse cultural sources. Religio-culturally I am a Euro-Muslim, ethnically I am a Damascene Arab, and politically I am a German citizen. I believe that the combination of these components can grow together to form a complex identity. This is feasible within the framework of cultural pluralism and political integration. This is not merely a personal case, but a sample that fits for the purposes of generalisation. In contrast, political Islam could never provide the ground for Muslim migrants to truly become European citizens, as it maintains a separatist diaspora mentality. In short, the pendulum between culture and politics in Islam should be resolved in Europe through a de-politicisation of this religion.

In fact, cultural pluralism runs counter to multicultural communitarianism as pursued equally by Muslim fundamentalists and European cultural relativists. In my own research I came to the conclusion that exclusive ethnic identities cultivated in the diaspora lead to a kind of neo-absolutism and the related social conflicts.³² As one of the experts of the Fundamentalism Project of the American Academy of Arts and

Sciences, I interpret fundamentalism as a modern variety of neo-absolutism. Among the limits of pluralism is its incompatibility with neo-absolutism.

In fact, pluralism³³ refers to the concept of people representing different views while at the same time strongly committed to common rules and, above all, to mutual tolerance and mutual respect as the binding value-based consensus. Tolerance can never mean that only one party has the right to maintain its views at the expense of the other. For this reason I consider the exclusivist bias of multicultural communitarianism in the age of massive migration³⁴ as dangerous and also as standing in contrast to cultural pluralism. One-way tolerance is the 'anything goes' tolerance of the loser.

In a global village, tolerance in general, and cultural tolerance in particular, is imperative. However, tolerance can only function as a segment of a civic culture in which diverse components acknowledge and accept mutuality and reciprocity. One-way tolerance does not only indicate self-denial but also promotes intolerance. Tolerance is not an issue for 'political convenience' that can be abused expediently by the Islamic fundamentalists in exile. Democracy is the essential part of the civic culture needed for a global village; it should be open-minded, but not directed against itself. A democracy that does not defend its values is a 'democracy against itself'³⁵ and thus self-defeating. It would not contribute to a peaceful global village.

In short, in the age of migration³⁶ the bottom line for a pluricultural, that is, not a multicultural platform is the unequivocal acceptance of secular democracy, individual human rights of men and women, secular tolerance and pluralism. It has been argued in favour of establishing a harmony between *Religious Commitment and Secular Reason*.³⁷ In my understanding, Euro-Islam, not ghetto-Islam or fundamentalist Islam is the facilitation. The latter may thrive in an Islamic enclave in the West and cause trouble in the future. It remains to be seen what options will be taken and what outcome will determine Islam in Europe. Will the game in Islam between culture and politics become a European game and determine the future of Europe in the third millennium of conflicting civilisations? It is sad to see most European governments and societies unable to integrate Muslim migrants. I believe integration and a rational politics of immigration would be the alternative to 'fortress Europe'.³⁸

10

Islam and the West in the Age of Conflict among Civilisations: the Alternative of Intercultural Dialogue as a Means of Conflict Resolution

At certain stages in history Islam and Europe had positive records of mutual impact. But they have also been at odds to the extent of waging war against one another, be it *jihad* or crusades.¹ Despite the existing positive records the image of Islam in the West has been subject to continued stereotyping.² Similarly, in the world of Islam the West does not enjoy a friendly image. These inter-civilisational issues touch on world politics and they became pertinent when Muslims after the end of the Cold War started to raise claims related to the question of 'order'³ in the course of the crisis of the international system in its shaken post-bipolar shape. Some observers suspect that the debate on civilisation and world politics was launched by the West itself in a desperate search for a world political enemy supposedly to replace communism. It was suggested that Islam is the 'candidate'. Of course this is wrong.⁴ Already in 1962 Raymond Aron spoke of 'the heterogeneity of civilisations'⁵ as a source of conflict in world politics veiled by bipolarity. The end of the Cold War brought about the unveiling of this heterogeneity.

Historically speaking, along with enmity there was also affection. For instance, admiration for Islam was expressed by Goethe in his West-East Divan, or by Lessing⁶ and also by other bright Europeans of the Enlightenment. Great interest in and respect for Islam occurred even earlier during the Renaissance. However, the Islamic civilisation was generally perceived to be both remote and alien. It has often been difficult for Europeans to understand Islam. At any rate, in the addressed periods of modern European history – unlike the earlier

periods of *jihad* – Islam did not really impinge on European life. At the present time, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, Islam has in many regards become more pivotal for Europe and the West in general. In the preceding chapter I alluded to Islamic migration in terms of ‘Islam in Europe’. This is a new pattern.

The increasing interest in Islam is not merely the outcome of the general effects of globalisation, or simply associated with the perception of the world as a global village. As already argued, the greater interest in Islam also results from the migration of Muslims to Europe and North America. By the end of the twentieth century, Europe has become home to more than 15 million Muslim immigrants coming from all parts of the Islamic world. In the United States there are a further six million Muslim migrants. Our age is not only a global age, but also an age of value-related conflict among civilisations. This conflict is also carried out within Western societies. In this context Islam is no longer just a subject matter for education about other cultures, but also part and parcel of our quest for peace. My focus is peace with Islam within European societies and, at the same time, peace in the Mediterranean as the basin of the geopolitical European–Islamic border. Moreover, as a Muslim living in Europe, I am aware of a severe European crisis of meaning. In my book on the crisis-ridden identity of Europe I argue that the encounter with Islam could serve as a positive element in coping with this crisis, while honouring the historical records most pivotal for the creation of Europe under the impact of its encounter with Islam.⁷ To be sure, for a host of reasons, Islam in Europe is an issue different from that of Islam in America. I argue that a shared consensus over values between Europeans and Muslim migrants is essential for the inner peace of Europe. I have coined the term *europäische Leitkultur* (literally: European guiding culture) to depict this consensus. There was a hot debate on this issue in German politics when some conservative German politicians made an effort to abuse this concept in switching it into a *German Leitkultur* with fully different implications. The focal point of this chapter is the inter-civilisational dimension of world politics insofar as it pertains to Islam. I nevertheless refer again to Islamic migration in considering the fact that this is also a world political issue.

Why do Europeans know so little about Islam?

Images and cultural perceptions are most important in inter-civilisational relations. With regard to our issue, it is regrettable to see how

all-pervasive ignorance about Islam in the general Western public is. The simplistic talk about Islam as if it were a monolithic, holistic entity indicates this ignorance. Of course, there are Islamic studies in the West. But the European scholars of Islam are usually trained as philologists concerned with classical languages and are mostly not able to explain social and historical phenomena. It is not only that most of these philologists among the Orientalists do not understand the modern languages of the Islamic world, they are also neither informed about nor interested in the social and political developments in that part of the globe. To be frank, European philologist Orientalists are not interested in gaining extensive knowledge about the modern Islamic societies.

In addition, most Western journalists – there are a few exceptions of course – lack professional training on the subject at issue and therefore know very little about the cultures and languages of Islam; in their coverage they often automatically associate Islam with fundamentalism, which is utterly wrong. Moreover, they mostly confuse fundamentalism with terrorism. As most Western media suggest, terrorism is the expression of Islamic fundamentalism *per se*. This is again a wrong view. It is sad to see international studies of Islam being reduced to an enquiry into what is suggested by ‘Islamic terrorism’.

In an effort to change this situation, I draw in this book on social sciences to present Islam as a cultural system. I then move in my social-scientific approach to interpreting Islamic fundamentalism as an outcome of the politicisation of the cultural system in a crisis-ridden context. This crisis is twofold: a crisis of the nation-state and of the post-bipolar world order. Fundamentalism is above all a concept of divine order based on what is perceived as ‘Islamic knowledge’, terrorism is no more than a side aspect of this political phenomenon. In short, there is a great need for a better understanding of Islam and to distinguish it from Islamism in honouring the pendulum between culture and politics in this world religion. If this differentiation is missing, one ends up talking about an overall clash between Islam and the West. I clearly dissociate myself from this approach.

In addressing the issues to be dealt with in this chapter, it is important to remember that the founding of the religion of Islam was connected with the birth of a new civilisation which in the ensuing centuries moved to centre-stage as a world civilisation.⁸ The rise of the West⁹ as a rival civilisation has been associated with the decline of the world of Islam in that it had contributed to halting the Islamic conquests in order to promote its own expansion. In other words, at issue

were two competing projects of expansion, one of which succeeded at the expense of the other. From this there resulted a historical situation that lasted until the second half of the twentieth century. Islam was merely a part of the subdued political and civilisational neighbourhood of Europe, particularly in the southern and eastern Mediterranean. But ever since, conditions have been changing. With regard to the Muslim presence in Europe, by 1945 there were less than one million Muslim migrants living on this continent. This figure has risen – as I mentioned at the outset – to more than 15 million by the end of the twentieth century. By the year 2040 analysts expect 40 million Muslims to be living in Western Europe. Muslims in Europe are basically immigrants. European converts to Islam represent only quite a small minority; converting to the Islamic faith is mostly the outcome of intermarriage with a Muslim woman.

With regard to the oscillation in Islam between culture and politics, it is important to know that we are not just dealing with a religion restricted to a faith and to the related religious practices. As shown in earlier chapters, Islam has its own religious rules and ethics that become the source of conflict if they are politicised. Belonging to the Islamic *umma* (community) is not just a religious issue. It may come into conflict with citizenship inasmuch as Islam is also the basis of a civilisational identity. Like Christianity, as a religion, and the West, as a civilisation, the Islamic civilisation possesses its own worldview based on and associated with the claim to universalism. The politicisation of this universalism has tremendous effects. It is also for this reason that Islam matters to world politics. There is little knowledge about this issue in the West. Therefore, the polemics concerning reference to the claims of Islamic universalism and to their clash with those of Western universalism suggest on the basis of ignorance that this is an invention or simply an allegation advanced by Huntington. The Islamic and Western worldviews are not only different, but also raise the very same claims. A politicisation of these worldviews and of the related claims leads to a conflict that could result in a 'Clash of Civilizations'.

Unlike Huntington, I view the 'clash' as an outcome of politicised civilisational worldviews. Moreover, I believe that it can be averted. It follows that my understanding of the conflict under issue is much different from that of Samuel Huntington.¹⁰ I nevertheless refuse to join in with the demonisation of Huntington, as made clear earlier. Despite all the flaws in his approach, Huntington brought a pivotal issue to the fore and deserves credit for the accomplishment of bringing culture into the social-scientific debate, in particular into International

Relations. Having acknowledged this, it is not a contradiction to add that I dissociate myself from Huntington's understanding of a 'Clash of Civilizations'. Unlike political positions, scholarly knowledge is more nuanced and is not designed to be dealt with on the grounds of 'take it or leave it'.

At the outset there is a need to answer the question: why is the focus on Islam in this debate, if not for the search for a substitute for communism? The answer is: Other major civilisations, like Hinduism, Buddhism or Confucianism,¹¹ do not lay claim to being universal. In contrast, Islam – as much as Western Christianity claims to be – is a world religion which represents a universal orientation with political connotations. This explains the centuries-old rivalry between the two civilisations. Islamic civilisation continues to be based on religion, but Europe has changed. In the course of the Renaissance and Enlightenment, Christianity underwent a secularisation, but nonetheless as a Western civilisation kept its universal outlooks. Christian Europe has become the secular West. The history of Islam and Christian or Western civilisation is not only marked by the Islamic *jihad* and the Christian crusades in the past, and by colonialism and anti-colonial *jihad* in modern history, but also by positive encounters.¹²

Religion and politics in Europe and Islam

The transformation of 'Western Christendom'¹³ into the Western civilisation was preceded by basic reforms. Underlying the secularisation of Christianity in Europe are the Renaissance, the Reformation and the Enlightenment. Religious reforms accompanied the transition to modern society and the development of cultural modernity. Since the age of the Enlightenment and of the French Revolution we may no longer speak of a Christian religion-based Western civilisation, but simply of a Western predominantly secular civilisation. In comparison to the developments in Western Europe, the Islamic civilisation continues to be generally determined and characterised by the religion of Islam and by its specific *Weltanschauung*. The rise of Islamic rationalism in medieval Islam was suppressed.¹⁴ If this had not been the case, a development could have taken place that might have contributed to an Islamic model of secularisation. I maintain that the coupling of Islam and politics is an orthodox and a fundamentalist view, not embedded in Islam itself. Nevertheless, it is most important to distin-

guish Islamic orthodoxy and fundamentalism. While the first has a long tradition, the latter is a contemporary phenomenon.

The pendulum between culture and politics is not only related to contemporary Islam, it can be traced back into medieval Islamic history. The relevance and topicality of this pendulum in our times lies in the flaring up of a civilisation-based conflict with others who also have universal claims. And, most importantly, the politicisation takes place under the exposure to modernity. Religion-based political universalism leads us to ask whether the Islamic migrants in the West are committed to this link between culture and politics. Will politicised religion be introduced to Europe in the name of multiculturalism? Given that the addressed link triggers a conflict between Islam and the West, the search for a resolution to the conflict is at issue.

In dealing with conflict and in looking for solutions we also need to recall that the positive Western-Islamic encounters took place on the basis of reason and rationality, not on that of religion linked with politics. In Islamic history we have the models of the Islamic *jihad* conquests and – in contrast – the Hellenisation of Islam in the period between the ninth and twelfth centuries as well as the Islamic influences on Europe on the eve of the Renaissance.¹⁵ These historic events concern the past, but are nevertheless topical, the reason being that with increasing migration Islam is acquiring a new significance for Europe. This means that a new approach to these issues is needed. Consequently, European-Islamic relations will raise questions that also concern the future of Europe with regard to the placing of religion and politics in society. The ground for this reasoning needs to be secular, for otherwise conflict will erupt.

The main question at the outset of the twenty-first century is whether Islam and the West will find a way to peaceful coexistence, that is, peace between civilisations, or whether a new worldview- or value-related 'war of civilisations' (see note 10) will take place. I need to repeat here that I am talking about a clash in terms of worldviews, norms and values – and clearly not in military terms. In the age of migration conflicts are not only social and economic, but also civilisational and have no boundaries as do states.¹⁶ Related conflicts are sprawling across the borders.

In order to illuminate the questions raised above we need to get more in-depth knowledge about the place of Islam as a civilisation in the debate on inter-civilisational conflict in the post-bipolar age at the beginning of the new millennium.

Between polemics and analysis: understanding world politics and the heterogeneity of civilisations

Bipolarity meant in the time of the East–West conflict that the world was divided along the lines of two rival power blocs – that is, ‘Communism’ and the ‘Free World’. Hence all conflicts were placed within this bipolar dichotomy or derived from it. The end of the East–West conflict has contributed to the rise of the debate on inter-civilisational conflicts (*see* note 10). The fact that the flaring up of this debate coincided with the end of the Cold War gave grounds for the suspicion that NATO strategists were at work seeking a substitute for the enemy they had lost after the end of the East–West conflict. At the beginning of this chapter I addressed these suspicions and disregarded the imputation that a scapegoat was needed. The belief that the Western alliance cannot restore its shaken political unity under conditions of post-bipolarity lacks firm foundations.

Aside from the polemics referred to, it is purely factual to state that each civilisation has its own worldview and upholds different understandings of state order, law, society, religion and knowledge as well as ethics of war and peace.¹⁷ I address these differences in civilisational terms and argue that they are not new. Differences between civilisations have existed throughout the history of humanity.¹⁸ In the course of civilisational interaction people develop their civilisational self-awareness *vis-à-vis* others. The Mediterranean has always been a basin for the processes of interaction between the Islamic and Western civilisation.⁸ As the historian Henri Pirenne has shown, the birth of Europe resulted from the Islamic challenge in the Mediterranean.¹⁹ Under conditions of globalisation and modernity the conflict assumes a new shape. But globalisation fails to undo the heterogeneity of civilisations.

In contrast to these historical records I often hear pronouncements by European Union politicians referring to the Mediterranean as a basin of harmony throughout history, never of discord. The rivalry between Christian Europe and Islamic civilisation is, as I have already stated, due to the fact that both civilisations advance universal claims. The clash of two universalisms hampers peaceful coexistence. As already mentioned the West is no longer defined in Christian terms, but continues its universalist tradition. There is a need, therefore, for both sides to stop insisting on their respective claims to universal validity. Instead, they need to establish a new tradition of mutual respect.

Unlike Islamic expansion, the European expansion succeeded in becoming global in mapping the entire world. In the course of the military revolution and the ensuing rise of the West in the years 1500–1800 the process of European expansion was launched.²⁰ Some Western scholars believing their civilisation to be capable of reshaping the entire world on all grounds, thus confused globalisation and universalisation. At the height of de-colonisation American sociologists considered modernisation to mean Westernisation of the non-European world,²¹ being a further step toward mapping the globe. Rethinking development has led to a revision of this view.²²

The old communists of the Cold War were no better than Western universalists. They were also at pains to export their system into other regions of the world, but they lacked the needed capabilities. In other words, the East–West conflict was also a conflict between two exporters of world political systems, both overlooking civilisation and history. The West ‘won’, but its triumphalism has been premature. It is true that the collapse of the communist empire and the ensuing end of bipolarity terminated the artificial cloak of the East–West conflict and contributed to our present, radically changed world. The fallacy has been, however, the belief that the post-bipolar world is designed harmoniously along Western lines. In fact, the post-bipolar age has smoothed the way for the real conflicts earlier veiled and suppressed by bipolarity to emerge. The conflicts among civilisations have re-emerged in a new shape to affect the future of world politics. They take the shape of local and regional, not of global conflicts. I have already referred to Raymond Aron who long before Huntington coined the formula of a ‘Clash of Civilizations’ addressed these issues. In his *Paix et guerre entre les nations* (see note 5), he brought to the fore that the heterogeneity between civilisations, as hitherto veiled by bipolarity, was the real issue. Aron predicted that this source of conflict would re-emerge once the East–West conflict disintegrated. Aron did not live to see his prediction come true. We are now witnessing the process which Aron foresaw. A proper understanding of the heterogeneity of civilisations smooths the way for a better assessment of world politics in an age of politicisation of religion under conditions of post-bipolarity.

The civilisational approach to the study of world politics is now disputed. Some critics of this approach refer to globalisation in terms of standardisation and argue in favour of an emerging world civilisation. A reference to the flaws of the ideology of globalism brings to light the underlying fundamental errors. Globalists base their sweeping general-

isations on wrong assumptions. Their claim that globalisation eliminates all differences between cultures and civilisations through the effects of standardisation is most questionable, for a McWorld is nothing else than an fallacy on all counts. The spread of American popular culture is mistaken as a wholesale standardisation on global grounds. For instance, Asian Muslims, and others, may fully enjoy McDonald's hamburgers, however without sharing any set of American values held to be an indication of McCulture!

Another line of argument refers to the parabolic satellite dish claiming its unbeatable standardising effects. In fact, this contention is meaningless. Our world is becoming a McWorld, however with no cultural standardisation as some envisage. Well, colonialism, too, wanted to Westernise the world, but it failed to do so.²³ In a joint project, my Indian colleague T.K. Oommen subtitled the book on identity that emerged from it in this manner: *From Colonialism to Globalism*.²⁴

To be sure, *globalisation* is a real process, whereas, in contrast *globalism* is an ideology. The advocates of globalism are ideologues who fail to conceive that culture cannot be equated with the consumption of McDonald's fast food and Coca Cola. Culture is based on *meaning* as socially produced in our daily life. Again, non-Westerners living in this McWorld do maintain their worldviews, norms and values and do not alter their attitudes automatically by indulging themselves in the habits of Western consumerism. In short, the assumed McWorld²⁵ of globalism is the ground for cultivating great illusions. The conclusion is that the diversity within humanity consisting of civilisations continues to persist. This diversity is also true for the global village. Western scholars who address the role of civilisations in world politics, like Huntington, tend to view them, as in the case of Islam, as monolithic entities. In contrast, I maintain and have explained throughout this book that the idea of world politics as an inter-civilisational set-up does not, and should not, overlook the diversity *within* civilisations.

Islam: civilisational unity in cultural diversity

Local cultures herald the diversity within a given civilisation. Culture and civilisation are not the same, but nevertheless are often confused and also used interchangeably in the vernacular as well as in the debate about the importance of civilisations for the study of conflict in international politics and multicultural societies. This remark also applies to the work of Huntington. We need to understand that culture

and civilisation are terms that have different meanings and are therefore not identical. In the preceding parts of this book I have focused on culture as a local system underpinned by a social production of meaning. Seen from this angle, cultures are related in each case to a socially relevant set of values pertinent within a local framework. In my enquiry into civilisations pursued in this concluding Part IV, I am looking at cultures that have a family resemblance. These cultures tend to group together to form one civilisation defined in terms of a shared view of the world. In short, cultures are local and civilisations are regional groupings of cultures which share a common worldview. For instance, Islam in India is a different culture from the West African Islam of Senegal. Nevertheless, both belong to the very same Islamic civilisation. By this meaning there exists one Islamic civilisation, which consists of a great variety of local cultures.

There are of course, conflicts within the very same civilisation. Ethnic conflicts within the Islamic civilisation bring to expression the politicisation of differences among these local cultures. Even though these conflicts make world political headlines, in the media they are barely understood. Above all, it is generally not understood that ethnic conflicts are indications of developments *within* the Islamic civilisation. In this sense, it is not correct to talk about an 'International Conflict of Cultures' or a 'Battle of Cultures' if this is meant to describe the inter-civilisational dimension of conflict in world politics. Ethno-cultural and civilisational conflicts are different issues and ought not to be confused. The first are local and domestic, the latter refer to regional and international issues.

Evidently, since the publication of S.P. Huntington's 'Clash of Civilizations?', the topical issue on the agenda has become the West and Islam, however, and unfortunately with negative connotations. Therefore we need to ask the question: Why is it in this context and in that manner that the spotlight is on Islam and the West? Underlying this question is the fact that there are many other major world civilisations. In answering this question I have to repeat that it is only in Christianity and Islam that we encounter the claims for universal and missionary worldviews. This answer sounds innocent in that it fails to respond to the concern regarding the negative connotations. The reference to the survival of the negative legacies gives us the clue. In addition, I need to say that the West in its US component is no less missionary than pre-modern Christianity or Islam. The rhetoric of the universalism of free markets and human rights replaces that of religion in US foreign policy. Aside from these claims to a world mission, the

Islamic and the Western European civilisation have always been neighbours on the shores of the Mediterranean, the hub of world history. It is not a geocentric bias to state that other civilisations outside the Mediterranean were restricted to a regional status. Confucianism, for instance, lays no claims to universality. It is necessary to mention both aspects, the positive and the negative, but for the sake of peace and a better future we need to focus on the positive heritage and learn how to overcome the negative legacies.

Underlying the dissent are value-related and normative differences between Islam and the West. Both have for instance their own, and therefore in each case, different understandings of peace. For Muslims, world peace can only be based on the expansion of the abode of Islam to map the entire world.²⁶ According to the Muslims' worldview, the world is divided into *dar al-Islam* (abode of Islam) and *dar al-harb* (house of war). In the pursuit of peace – as I understand it – this dichotomy needs to be overcome. This work to be done by Muslims themselves is still missing. This classical dichotomy has never been revised, even though it has no underlying reality.²⁷ I found it appalling that a representative of the Muslim community in Great Britain defined the areas of Muslim migration into Europe as a part of *dar al-Islam*.

In the past, Western politicians and scholars have seen the allegedly Westernised world with a similar dichotomy which was secular, but nevertheless self-centred. One American scholar has defined the clash between the two civilisations as *Jihad vs McWorld* (see note 25). In fact, we are dealing with a clash related to the politicisation of two universal outlooks. On the surface one may think a *New Cold War*²⁸ between the secular and the divine is on the rise. It is obvious that McDonaldising the world could never contribute to abolishing the differences between Islam and the West, nor will it lay grounds for world peace. Peace is possible, but the grounds on which it should be based need to be different. Cultural and religious pluralism is a requirement for sustainable peace between the civilisations.

As shown earlier, the study of the civilisational dimension of conflict in world politics found its way into academe thanks to Samuel Huntington; he has contributed to a flourishing of this debate, but equally and regrettably to its flaws. It was attributed to Huntington's reference to 'faultlines of conflict' that he is searching for new security patterns based on antagonisms among civilisations. In response to this accusation, he made an effort to modify his article of 1993 by adding to his book of 1996 a concluding chapter on the search for communal-

ities. In my work, I also see in this search a possibility of bridging and mediation between the civilisations. We are talking about being good neighbours in a world of globalised economics and politics so that we can reap mutual cultural benefits. The dialogue between the cultures and civilisations that I am proposing should become the focus of efforts for establishing a cross-cultural morality able to contribute to international peace.²⁹ However, this dialogue can only flourish if based on secular grounds and aimed at conflict resolution in addressing hot-button issues. Otherwise, one absolutism would be facing the other; universal religious missions would be challenging one another.

Dealing with belonging to a local culture requires a different level of analysis from that related to belonging to a civilisation, although both are interrelated. To illustrate these thoughts I shall refer to Afghanistan as a case in point and show how Pashtuns, Tajiks and Uzbeks, as people of different local cultures, or ethnic groups, are most violently at loggerheads, despite the fact that they are all Muslims. Because of the Soviet invasion, they were all united after December 1979 within the framework of an overall Islamic resistance force but then fragmented again after the Soviet withdrawal.³⁰ The war against the invading Soviet Union was in this case a *jihad* against an external civilisation. With this meaning in mind, we may talk about people's awareness of belonging to a local culture and civilisation as a breeding ground for potential conflict on inter- and intra-civilisational grounds. The Islamic resistance to the Soviet Union was a war motivated on civilisational grounds. The ensuing war was an inter-ethnic one between local cultures belonging to the very same civilisation. In both cases an armed struggle by irregulars had been at issue. To be sure, my notion of 'War of Civilisations', coined as the title of my 1995 book (see note 10) focuses on values and worldviews, not on armies.

By and large, civilisation awareness is growing worldwide. Despite the existing networking, this awareness contributes to a divide in that it makes people separate themselves from others in asserting their belonging to a certain civilisation. As a Muslim scholar living between rival civilisations, I am deeply convinced that it is an illusion to believe that McWorld will eliminate this phenomenon. In my book *The Challenge of Fundamentalism*, I further developed the earlier coined formula 'simultaneity of globalisation (in the field of politics, economics, communication and transport) and cultural fragmentation'.³¹ This is supposed to depict the simultaneous existence of what are called global structures and a divisive civilisation awareness. This conceptualisation is an effort to explain that in spite of the fact that people have

been brought into closer proximity than at any other time before in human history, they are still naturally divided into many discrete civilisations and cultural groups.

The politicisation of existing differences in worldview between civilisations contributes to the rise of religious fundamentalism, thus creating faultlines. It follows that the faultlines are constructed. These faultlines make people aggressively feel that they belong to different entities. It is for this reason that I talk of a perceptual worldview-related *Krieg der Zivilisationen* (war of civilisations) in the context of religious fundamentalism. The oscillation between culture and politics is the related domain. Culturally different people may indulge in exchange and borrowing, but people belonging to politicised religions are mostly at perceptual war related to a politicised divide of values. Based on this argument I interpret the 'faultlines' differently from the way Huntington does.

Islam and the claim for a de-Westernisation of the world

The process of globalisation fails to undermine the simultaneous emergence of civilisational claims with an anti-globalist bias. Along these lines we witness the flourishing of politicised cultural concepts underpinning the process of regionalisation in world politics that is taking place. It follows that regional conflicts are becoming the major ones in world politics. Alongside these developments we see a challenge to the universal validity of Western values in the context of a revolt against the hegemony of the West. Anti-Westernism and the ensuing demand for a de-Westernisation of the world are the outcome. This is the contemporary historical background for the emerging regional conflicts at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

In interpreting anti-Westernism and the efforts at de-Westernisation as signs of a new pattern of conflict in terms of a war of world-view (see note 10), I simultaneously underline the fact that civilisations cannot wage war against each other militarily. Earlier, in the medieval age, Islamic *jihad* expansion against Europe and against Asian civilisations was militarily waged civilisational war as were the crusades. In contrast, there can be no such wars at the present time, nor in the foreseeable future. Armed conflicts in our post-bipolar age are mostly regional and waged by irregulars (for example, in Chechnia, Kashmir, Kosovo before NATO intervened, Algeria and so on) rather than by state armies. Globally, competing worldviews and the related normative claims are at issue and lead to perceptual wars. In my view, such

'wars' can be averted by promoting inter-civilisational dialogue in the pursuit of peace. This task requires that we come to grips with a new type of conflict that cannot simply be denied existence through polemics and moralisation. Military action, such as the NATO war in Kosovo,³² is not an appropriate way to deal with this kind of conflict. In fact Western intervention has even aggravated the situation. The rift between Christian Serbs and Muslim Kosovo-Albanians has become even deeper than before.

Despite all odds, there is some justification for the claim of de-Westernisation. As it is a resistance against cultural standardisation, it may in principle serve the cause of plurality. However, the demand for de-Westernisation as raised by Islamists is perilous in practical terms. Vicariously, they are offering their values in an absolutist manner as an alternative to secular Western values. In fact, there is nothing wrong in reviving one's own values. But Islamic fundamentalists are articulating de-Westernisation against secular democracy and individual human rights. Western values are fading and are becoming radically questioned in an age of cultural relativism. At the same time, Islamic values and norms are being promoted with fresh missionary zeal, even within the West itself. Their adherents are mounting a self-assertive, mostly aggressive and neo-absolutist offensive. Those Europeans who subscribe to cultural relativism fail to understand that by relativising their values they are, in fact, undermining them. However, such undermining of one's values and standards is not only self-defeating in such a situation but is also a great obstacle to a cultural dialogue aimed at promoting peace. The culture of blame by the Islamists and the self-accusations of Westerners are inappropriate for dialogue.

Initially, the end of the Cold War promised to defuse the many conflicts of our world and was believed to create grounds for the universalisation of human rights. But after the end of bipolarity, the number of conflicts has not decreased, but rather the reverse. Moreover, there are more violations of human rights than ever before. Politicised religions, that is, varieties of fundamentalism, often imbued with ethnicity, now offer religious legitimacy to the new, mostly regional and domestic conflicts. Since the dissolution of the political power blocs, regional conflicts have increasingly flared up, becoming ever more brutal and less controllable. The character of these new conflicts in our time, as exemplified in contemporary wars in the Balkans, the Caucasus and numerous ones in Africa, is both ethnic and religious. These conflicts also have complementary political, economic and cultural aspects. In previous times, the importance of culture had

either been overlooked or underestimated – but times have changed. Cultural issues have moved to centre-stage in domestic, regional and international conflict. This book modestly attempts to shed light on this new set-up.

The options: head-on collision or bridge-building between the civilisations

Again, a basic requirement for this analysis in attempting to find a peaceful solution is a diagnosis of the civilisational conflict which has flared up. Given the different options and scenarios, the preference for bridging through mediation and dialogue as an alternative to the clash scenario makes it imperative to reach an inter-civilisational consensus over commonalities. In my view, secular democracy and individual human rights are to be ranked as top priorities in this consensus. In my earlier work I have termed this consensus ‘cross-cultural international morality’ (*see note 10*).

Prior to the resurgence of political Islam, Western observers were of the view that democratisation in the world of Islam would take place along the lines of a global/universal Westernisation. In the last decade of the twentieth century there has been talk about worldwide democratisation to be brought about by the end of bipolarity. Adverse changes and developments, however, have forced a rethinking of the issue as the end of the East–West conflict did not in itself create global democratic structures. Among the requirements for democratic transformation is a reconciliation of Islam with democracy.³³ By an authentic cultural underpinning of democratisation in the Islamic world I mean cultural and religious reforms. I am aware of the fact that the ever-intensifying Islamic fundamentalism is working against this process. Again, fundamentalism is a worldview and a concept of order, not sensational violence labelled as terrorism. The waning of terrorism is not an indication of the ‘end’ of Islamism, as Gilles Kepel in his recent work wrongly suggests.

Despite my criticism of Eurocentrism, I concede that secular democracy and individual human rights, though originating in Western philosophy, have disseminated across the world and have become concerns for all of humanity. However, Westerners need to learn that it works counterproductively when they try to teach non-Westerners about democracy and human rights. The response would be mostly defensive-cultural and self-assertive leading to other mostly undesirable ends. There is a need for cultural indigenisation of human rights in

non-Western societies, in promoting the cultural underpinning of these rights parallel to their introduction to non-Westerners.³⁴

The cultural effort at reconciling democracy and human rights with at times adversely oriented local cultures is a task for the concerned peoples themselves. Eurocentric teaching is certainly detrimental because it works like missionary action. Euro-arrogance is as damaging as the ignorance of Westerners about non-Western cultures; they are both great obstacles to progress. If we are to understand the conflict between civilisations, we need in the first place to acquire the necessary knowledge about the other civilisation(s). This is a basic precondition for a peaceful neighbourhood and also for the needed dialogue, based on mutual respect. Getting to know other civilisations means becoming acquainted with their ways of looking at the world in order to be in a position to coexist with them. The approach of understanding and tolerance does not preclude the possibility of saying: 'No, thank you!' This 'no' applies in the first place to Islamist efforts at hijacking democracy and human rights so as to grant themselves legitimacy despite their contempt for these secular concepts. One-way tolerance is a promotion of intolerance.

In the age of migration from the world of Islam into Europe the issues are no longer merely related to the necessity of running an appropriate foreign policy toward Islamic states. Dealing with them is also indispensable to the interests of inner peace, that is within the West itself. Here, a combination of tolerance and democracy-oriented rejection is needed. In this context, Islam is assuming a key position when it comes to anticipating Europe's future, because new migrants are increasingly arriving from the Islamic world bringing with them great challenges that cannot be ignored given that Muslims are becoming a sizable part of the populace. This is the reality I point at when I speak of Islam *and* Europe, Islam *in* Europe. In my view, Westerners should be tolerant of Islam but not of Islamism, and least of all of the requested *shari'a*-based communitarian enclaves directed against secularity for determining the status of Muslims living in Europe.

In contrast to Huntington I argue that it is not civilisations themselves, but Islamic fundamentalists who construct the 'faultlines' along the borders of Islam and within the societies in which Muslims are living. Again, Huntington fails to distinguish between Islam and Islamism. I go for mediation as an instrument to avert a clash. However, I, in no way, ignore the traditional value-related tensions between the West and Islam as two historically rival civilisations; a proper understanding of the incompatibilities in worldview of the two

civilisations is imperative for a successful pursuit of mediation. Reform is needed. The mediator is a political actor and ought not to moralise and confuse mediation with preaching while overlooking the limits. We have to operate in the knowledge that 15 million Muslims are living in Western Europe. As a Muslim scholar, I cannot deny that a Muslim will not become a European without abandoning, or at least revising inherited orthodox Islamic worldviews (for example, the *umma* and not civil society as identity referent). Hence the question is, how Muslims as migrants can live in peace with Europeans. Europeans need to give up on their exclusiveness and on their Eurocentrism and Muslims need to reform their religion. Muslims cannot ask Westerners to stop preaching while they confuse dialogue with *da'wa* (call to Islam), that is, preach themselves as this is currently often the case. I can hardly see orthodox Islam becoming a part of Europe. For this reason I have developed my understanding of Euro-Islam providing new options.

An alternative to fundamentalism in Europe: Euro-Islam as an opening for migrants

In proposing a way for the peaceful co-existence of Europe with Islam, I earlier made a clear distinction between two different levels. Accordingly, Europe needs to cope with Islam in two different ways: outside Europe and within its borders, that is, with the civilisation of Islam on global grounds and in Europe itself at the domestic level of the Islamic migrants. The concept of 'Euro-Islam'³⁵ is recommended as a framework for Muslims living in Europe, not for the world of Islam itself. For inter-civilisational relations on international grounds I recommend international morality.

To reiterate: by Euro-Islam I unequivocally mean an open-minded cultural and political adjustment of Islam to European standards to facilitate the embracing of European identity by Muslim migrants. Study of the early Islamic Enlightenment and Islamic rationalism would open the way for such an endeavour. Euro-Islam is an interpretation of Islam that makes it compatible with four European constitutional standards: laicism (that is, the separation of religion and politics), secular tolerance based on individual human rights (this includes the freedom of dissent and belief), democratic pluralism and last but not least, civil society. Muslim migrants need to adopt religious pluralism to enable themselves to learn that their belief is only one of many others and does not have the monopoly over truth, in addition to a comprehension of civil society as open society. This requires

coming to terms with Islamic absolutism as well as overcoming a belief in their superiority to others in revising or simply abolishing these beliefs. Otherwise pluralism cannot be established and Islam will continue to be alien as an enclave within Europe. The implication is that conflicts will erupt, even within the Muslim diaspora when some Muslims persecute those fellow Muslims who refuse to share their absolutism. As a liberal Muslim I am abundantly familiar with this implication from my own life experience.

Tolerance for Muslims must coincide with the binding expectation of Islamic tolerance for others, including openness and plurality within Islam itself. It is most disturbing when Islamists claim tolerance for themselves, but deny it to others, even to co-religionists in the diaspora like myself. In addition, in the interests of peace in Europe, Muslim migrants must refrain from linking the concept of migration (*hijra*) to the religious mission of *da'wa*, that is, proselytising for the spread of Islam.³⁶ The alternative to this proposed Euro-Islam is the fundamentalism of Islamic ghettos as enclaves within European societies. Euro-Islam ought to be the contribution of Muslims for dealing with the pending issues. The contribution of Europeans must be the unfolding of an integration policy which allows Muslim migrants to identify themselves with Europe as a polity becoming a referent for their own identity. The 'othering' of Muslims pushes them into the hands of fundamentalist zealots! European societies, above all that of Germany, need to overcome their ethnic exclusiveness for the sake of inner peace. The rhetoric of acknowledging cultural differences is of little help if inherited attitudes continue to prevail.

If both sides fail in this bid, then mutual rejection of the exponents of the different civilisations will be the result, of course, with consequent related conflicts. It is wrong to simply classify these rejectionist attitudes on both sides as 'racism'. The reason for stating this is my conviction that the potential for mutual rejection is based on the incompatibility of the worldviews, norms, rules and values of the two civilisations. The tensions between secular and religious values has nothing to do with different 'races'. In fact, 'race' is a construction that cannot be applied to categorising people belonging to different ethnic groups. Racism is a European invention.³⁷ In stating this and in referring to the work of Hannaford I am not arguing that racism is an exclusively European phenomenon. It also existed in Islamic history although to a much lesser extent.

In our case, we are dealing with fundamentalism on the part of the Muslims and Euro-arrogance and xenophobia on the part of the

Europeans. When working against these 'faultlines of conflict' we have to recall the positive encounters and interaction between Islam and the West and emphasise a possible way out.

Is an Islamic–Western peace of civilisations possible? Cultural dialogue without self-denial

There exist two levels for dealing with the oscillation in Islam between culture and politics. Recalling the distinction between the external relations level between Europe and the Islamic countries and the domestic Islamic diaspora level within European societies, it becomes possible to distinguish between business bargaining, political negotiations among governments and intercultural dialogue on the societal level. At issue in all cases is inter-civilisational peace between Islam and the West. Contrary to the practice of mutual hostility, a cultural dialogue as peace dialogue can help in finding a new way of overcoming conflicts. I have already emphasised that we should not forget that we can only talk to those who are capable of dialogue, that is, honestly ready to talk. Islamic fundamentalists either refuse any dialogue with the 'crusading West', or engage in it for tactical reasons, that is, for political expedience. To deceive (*ihām*) in the pursuit of religio-political ends is not a form of dialogue! In criticising the Islamic side, I need to add that unfortunately not all Europeans are capable of dialogue, either. Some Europeans lack honesty as well! The promotion of foreign trade – as is the case in Germany – is not a concern for inter-civilisational dialogue.

Repeatedly, I underline the need to form a bridge between the civilisations of Islam and the West by means of cultural dialogue. The references to the incompatibility of Islamic and Western worldviews are only meant to be the grounds for finding commonalities between the two civilisations, certainly not for drawing faultlines. Despite all odds, it is possible to find and work with people who prefer to walk on both sides of the borderlines between the civilisations. At the same time I need to point out the instrumental exploitation of European tolerance – or rather, perhaps, indifference – by Islamic fundamentalists. Those who abuse the freedoms of political asylum in Europe must be unmasked. If we are to succeed, Europeans must offer young Muslims born in Europe alternatives to ethnic 'othering'. If they fail to do so, they should not be surprised about young Muslims being attracted to fundamentalism. The German sociologist W. Heitmeyer came to that conclusion after extensive fieldwork.³⁸ It is dismaying that the publica-

tion of his shocking findings did not lead to the expected public debate in Germany. Dishonest moralising continues to dominate the debate in many European countries!

Throughout Europe, and in particular in Germany, the topic of this concluding chapter is a hot-button issue – why? On the one hand, there are those Europeans who deny the existence of conflict potential between civilisations and assume that these conflicts are constructed to disturb the ideal world of harmonious mankind. On the other, we encounter hopelessly xenophobic Europeans. The stance against both parties is part of my engagement with civil rights for Muslims in Europe while simultaneously acknowledging the identity of Europe. The argument that the clash between the politicised worldviews of these two civilisations is a reality which has only been concealed underpins the need to deal with this conflict. It should not be defamed as an effort to find a substitute for the previous East–West conflict. It is rather a rational analysis of world politics and also a means by which contemporary societies may be obliged to deal with people from different cultures and different civilisations.

I do not want to conclude without emphasising that the dialogue between the civilisations is not an aesthetic discourse pursued by intellectuals in ivory towers nor an undetached intellectual exchange. In my understanding, dialogue is sooner a means for conflict resolution. At issue is how to deal with differences over values in search of a shared, cross-cultural morality as a kind of compromise in the search for peaceful co-existence. In this dialogue each party tries to contribute or impose its own philosophy of life. As a result, conflict is inevitable. In this context cultural relativism, which in the West denies the universality of standards and values (for example, those of human rights), is self-destructive. It ignores the fact that a form of neo-absolutism is developing in other civilisations, for example in political Islam, which I view as religious fundamentalism. In this case there are limits for cultural pluralism. The morality of pluralism is neither in line with fundamentalism nor relativism.

Neo-absolutists view cultural relativism as an expression of civilisational weakness and despise those who subscribe to it. In my understanding, cultural dialogue not only requires respect for the other party, for example, the dismantling of Eurocentrism, but also respect for oneself. If Europeans do not respect themselves, they cannot expect others to have respect for them. This means that Western values, such as democracy and individual human rights, need to be defended in the dialogue against any form of neo-absolutism. Chipping away at one's

own values and standards through cultural relativism is a recipe for disaster, leading to self-surrender in the civilisational conflict.

From a European point of view, democratic peace³⁹ between civilisations is unfeasible without safeguarding the identity of Europe, however in a reformed way, that is, freed from Eurocentrism. For Muslims living in Europe, Euro-Islam is an interpretation which makes this cultural system compatible with the positive elements of European identity, that is, primacy of reason, secular democracy, human rights and civil society. Euro-Islam⁴⁰ offers a platform for a lasting democratic peace between the civilisations at the level of European societies. It is opposed to fundamentalism which offers grounds for the clash of ideologies. In accommodating the *laïcité*, that is, the separation of religion and politics, Euro-Islam frees Islamic migrants in Europe from the pendulum between culture and politics, as has been analysed in the preceding chapters of this book. For external Euro-Islamic relations another frame of reference is needed, for Euro-Islam pertains only to Muslim migrants in Europe. For coming to terms with the ongoing oscillation between culture and politics within the 55 different states of a Muslim majority population, another tack is needed, a much more intrinsic and complicated one. To deal with it is part and parcel of the burdensome Islamic predicament with modernity. I hope that I have been successful in demonstrating how difficult this job is. The formula Islam *and* Europe refers to the external set-up, while Islam *in* Europe covers the issue of Islamic migration in our post-bipolar age as an age of conflict among civilisations. There are ways to avert a 'clash' at both levels. Inter-civilisational dialogue is not only an avenue for *Preventing the Clash of Civilizations* (see note 10), but also among the instruments of conflict resolution in the post-bipolar world. This book about the oscillation in Islam between culture and politics is aimed at laying the foundation for this significant task in our contemporary history.

Notes

Introduction

- 1 The left-wing Islamist Hassan Hanafi employs the term fundamentalism in his book *al-Usuliyya al-Islamiyya* (Islamic Fundamentalism), Cairo, 1989, as the title suggests. In contrast, the reformist Mohammed S. al-Ashmawi, *al-Islam al-siyasi* (Political Islam), 2nd edition, Cairo, 1989, prefers to talk about political Islam. He challenges the claim to authenticity by the Islamic fundamentalists and contests their reference to the Islamic 'fundamentals' (*usul*). The Islamists themselves prefer to speak of 'Islamic awakening'. See note 11 below.
- 2 These are the terms used by Marshall G.S. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization*, 3 vols, Chicago, 1974.
- 3 Sir Thomas Arnold, *The Caliphate*, 2nd edition, London, 1965 (originally published in 1924); the Muslim reformer M.S. al-Ashmawi, *al-Khilafa al-Islamiyya* (Islamic Caliphate), Cairo, 1990, argues that 'the caliphate' does not belong to the tenets of Islam.
- 4 This is the argument presented by Ali Abdelraziz, *al-Islam wa usul al-hukm* (Islam and Patterns of Government), new printing, Beirut, 1966 (first published in Cairo, 1925). This position has been revived at the present time by al-Ashmawi (see note 3).
- 5 On political Islam, see Gilles Kepel, *La revanche de Dieu: Chrétiens, Juifs et Musulmans à la reconquête du monde*, Paris, 1991; Nazih Ayubi, *Political Islam*, London, 1991; and B. Tibi, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder*, Berkeley, 1998. See also al-Ashmawi, referenced in note 1 above.
- 6 B. Tibi, *The Crisis of Modern Islam: a Preindustrial Culture in the Scientific-Technological Age*, trans. Judith von Sivers, with a foreword by Peter von Sivers, Salt Lake City, 1988. Reviewed by Fred Halliday in *The Times Literary Supplement*, no. 489, 14–20 April 1989, pp. 387–8. The original German publication of *The Crisis of Modern Islam* was reviewed by Barbara Stowasser in *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 37, 2 (1983), pp. 284–5. A substantially revised and much enhanced new German edition was published subsequently twice during the Gulf War in 1991.
- 7 B. Tibi, 'The Simultaneity of the Unsimultaneous: Old Tribes and Imposed Nation-States in the Modern Middle East', in Philip Khoury/Joseph Kostiner (eds), *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East*, Berkeley, 1990, pp. 127–52; partly reprinted in Anthony D. Smith (ed.), *Ethnicity*, Cambridge, 1996, pp. 174–9.
- 8 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *Hatmiyat al-hall al-Islami* (The Islamic Solution is Determined), 3 vols. The volumes are: vol. 1: *al-Hulul al-mustawrada wa kaif janat ala ummatina* (The Imported Solutions: How They Are Entrenched in Our Community), Beirut, 1970, reprinted 1980; vol. 2: *al-Hall al-Islami farida wa darura* (The Islamic Solution is an Obligation and a Necessity),

- Beirut, 1974; vol. 3: *Bayinat al-hall al-Islami wa shabahat al-ilmaniyyin wa al-mutagharibin* (The Characteristics of the Islamic Solution and the Suspicions of the Secularists and the Westernised), Cairo, 1988.
- 9 I use the term 'cultural modernity' in line with Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, Cambridge, MA, 1987.
 - 10 Hedley Bull, 'The Revolt against the West', in Hedley Bull/Adam Watson (eds), *The Expansion of International Society*, Oxford, 1984, pp. 217–28.
 - 11 Muhammed Imara, *al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya wa al-tahaddi al-hadari* (The Islamic Awakening and the Civilisational Challenge), Cairo, 1991.
 - 12 Hassan al-Banna's 'Risalat al-jihad' is included in his *Majmu'at rasa'il al-imam al-shahid Hassan al-Banna* (Collected Essays of the Martyr Imam Hassan al-Banna), Cairo, 1990, pp. 271–91. On this movement see also Richard Mitchell, *The Society of Muslim Brothers*, London, 1969.
 - 13 Muhammed Abduh, *al-Islam wa al-nasraniyya bain al-ilm wa al-madaniyya* (Islam and Christianity between Science and Civilisation), new printing, Beirut, 1983.
 - 14 More on this in B. Tibi, *Der wahre Imam. Der Islam von Mohammed bis zur Gegenwart*, Munich, 1996, 2nd edition, Munich, 1997, Part 2. On science and Islamic rationalism, see Franz Rosenthal, *The Classical Heritage in Islam*, London, 1975 (reprinted 1994).
 - 15 B. Tibi, *Arab Nationalism: between Islam and the Nation-State*, 3rd enlarged edition, London and New York, 1997.
 - 16 B. Tibi, 'Culture and Knowledge: the Islamisation of Knowledge as a Postmodern Project?', in *Theory, Culture & Society* vol. 12, 1 (1995), pp. 1–24. On this debate, see also Roxanne L. Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Rationalism*, Princeton, NJ, 1999, pp. 163–7.
 - 17 See The International Institute of Islamic Thought (ed.), *Toward Islamization of Disciplines*, Herndon, VA, 1989. In fact this is an expression of anti-science. See Gerald Holton, *Science and Anti-Science*, Cambridge, MA, 1993. I view de-secularisation of knowledge as an 'anti-science!' See B. Tibi, 'Secularization and De-Secularization in Modern Islam', in *Religion, Staat, Gesellschaft*, vol. 1, 1 (Spring 2000), pp. 95–117.
 - 18 Erasmus Foundation (ed.), *The Limits of Pluralism: Neo-Absolutisms and Relativism*, Amsterdam, 1994 (with contributions by E. Gellner, C. Geertz and B. Tibi).
 - 19 Herbert Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna, Averroës on Intellect*, New York, 1992 (see also note 14 above).
 - 20 More references in B. Tibi, 'The Worldview of Sunni Arab Fundamentalists: Attitudes toward Modern Science and Technology', in Martin Marty/Scott Appleby (eds), *Fundamentalisms and Society*, Chicago, 1993, pp. 73–102.
 - 21 Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, Stanford, CA, 1990.
 - 22 See with great caution John Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?*, New York, 1992; more insightful Fred Halliday, *Islam and the Myth of Confrontation*, London, 1996.
 - 23 Martin Albrow, *The Global Age*, Stanford, CA, 1997; also Barrie Axford, *The Global System: Economics, Politics and Culture*, New York, 1995.
 - 24 Anwar al-Jundi, *Ahdaf al-taghib fi al-alam al-Islami* (The Targets of Westernisation of the Islamic World), Cairo, 1987.

- 25 Full references in my article referenced in note 16 above.
- 26 See the contributions in Martin Marty and Scott Appleby (eds), *Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Politics, Economy and Militance*, Chicago, 1993.
- 27 See Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse* (referenced in note 9), p. 17.
- 28 William M. Watt, *Islamic Philosophy and Theology*, Edinburgh, 1962.
- 29 More on this issue with detailed references in Tibi, *Der wahre Imam* (see note 14 above), Part 2, in particular chapter 5 on Mawardi and Ibn Taimiyya.
- 30 Emmanuel Sivan, *Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics*, New Haven, 1985.
- 31 Rosenthal, *The Classical Heritage in Islam* (see note 14 above).
- 32 See chapter 5 on the Renaissance in B. Tibi, *Kreuzzug und Dihad. Der Islam und die christliche Welt*, Munich, 1999; see also notes 14, 19 and 28 above; and Toby Huff, *The Rise of Early Modern Science – Islam, China and the West*, Cambridge, 1995.
- 33 This is the topic of chapters 4 and 5 in Tibi, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism* (referenced in note 5).
- 34 Jemaladdin Afghani, *al-A'mal al-kamila* (Collected Writings), Muhammed Imara (ed.), Cairo, 1968.
- 35 See also George Makdisi, *The Rise of Colleges: Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West*, Edinburgh, 1981.
- 36 I believe that Benjamin Barber, *Jihad vs McWorld*, New York, 1996, is utterly wrong. See my views on globalisation expressed in my book on fundamentalism (referenced in note 5 above).
- 37 Shakib Arslan, *Limadha ta'akhara al-Muslimun wa taqaddama ghairuhum* (Why Are Muslims Backward While Others Have Developed?), new printing, Beirut, 1965.
- 38 B. Tibi, 'Islam and Secularization', in Mourad Wahba (ed.), *Islam and Civilization Proceedings of the First International Islamic Philosophy Conference (November 19–22, 1979)*, Cairo, 1982, pp. 65–79. See also note 17 above.
- 39 Ellen K. Trimberger, *Revolution from Above in Japan, Turkey, Egypt and Peru*, New Brunswick, NJ, 1978; see also Andrew Davidson, *Secularism and Revivalism in Turkey*, New Haven, 1998.
- 40 B. Tibi, 'The Attitudes of Middle Eastern Elites and Counter-Elites towards Political Order: the Islamic-Fundamentalist Challenge to the Secular Domestic and International Order', in Samuel Huntington (ed.), *Conflict or Convergence: Global Perspectives on War, Peace and International Order*, mimeographed (research project of the Harvard Academy for Area and International Studies), Cambridge, MA, 1997. Published version: B. Tibi, 'The Fundamentalist Challenge to the Secular Order in the Middle East', in *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, vol. 23, 1 (Winter/Spring 1999), pp. 191–210.
- 41 See chapter 8 in Tibi, *Kreuzzug und Dihad* (referenced in note 32 above), for further references.
- 42 B. Tibi, 'The Failed Export of the "Islamic Revolution" into the Arab World', in Frédéric Grare (ed.), *Islamism and Security: Political Islam and the Western World*, published by Programme for Strategic and International Security Studies of the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, 1999, pp. 63–102.

- 43 See Mehrzad Baroujerdi, *Iranian Intellectuals and the West*, Syracuse, 1996.
- 44 Yahya H.H. Farghal, *Haqiqat al-ilmaniyya* (The Truth about Secularism), Cairo, 1989.
- 45 W.M. Watt, *Islamic Fundamentalism and Modernity*, London, 1988; see also Fazlur Rahman, *Islam and Modernity*, Chicago, 1982, chapter 4; and my book referenced in note 5.
- 46 See the major books by Muhammed Salim al-Awwa, *Fi al-nizam al-siyasi li al-dawla al-Islamiyya* (On the Political System of the Islamic State), 6th edition, Cairo, 1983; Mustafa Abu-Zaid-Fahmi, *Fan al-hukm fi al-Islam* (The Art of Governing in Islam), Cairo, 1981.
- 47 See note 51 below and B. Tibi, *Die arabische Linke*, Frankfurt/M., 1969. Favourably reviewed by Hisham Sharabi in the *Middle East Journal*, vol. 24, 3 (1970), pp. 391–2.
- 48 B. Tibi, *Nationalismus in der Dritten Welt am arabischen Beispiel*, Frankfurt/M., 1971.
- 49 B. Tibi, *Arab Nationalism: a Critical Enquiry*, trans. Marion and Peter Sluglett, New York, 1981. Reviewed by Michael Hudson in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 17, 3 (1985), pp. 292–4; and by George Atiyeh in *American Political Science Review*, vol. 76 (1982), pp. 183–4. A 2nd edition followed in 1990. The 3rd substantially enlarged and revised edition with the new subtitle *Between Islam and the Nation-State* was published in 1997 (referenced in note 15).
- 50 Najib Armanazi, *al-Schar' al-duwali fi al-Islam* (International Law in Islam), new printing, London, 1990 (first published in Damascus, 1930).
- 51 See the more elaborated outline in B. Tibi, 'Islam and Modern European Ideologies', in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 18, 1 (1986), pp. 15–29.
- 52 B. Tibi, *Militär und Sozialismus in der Dritten Welt*, Frankfurt/M., 1973. Reviewed by Peter von Sivers in *Muslim World*, vol. 67, 3 (1977), pp. 236–7.
- 53 For more details, see Morroe Berger, *Islam in Egypt Today*, Cambridge, 1970.
- 54 B. Tibi, *Die Krise des modernen Islams*, Munich, 1981 (new enlarged German edition 1991). US edition *The Crisis of Modern Islam* (referenced in note 6).
- 55 Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process*, trans. Edmund Jephcott, 2 vols: vol. 1, *The History of Manners*, New York, 1978; vol. 2, *Power and Civility*, New York, 1982. On the meaning of Elias's work for the study of Islam, see Tibi, *The Crisis of Modern Islam* (referenced in note 6), pp. 22–31.
- 56 J.M. Blaut, *The Colonizer's Model of the World: Geographical Diffusionism and Eurocentric History*, New York, 1993.
- 57 Tibi, *Kreuzzug und Dihad* (referenced in note 32 above), chapter 1 on Islamic expansion.
- 58 Hedley Bull draws a clear distinction between the international system of states (structure) and international society (a normative consensus about rules). See Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: a Study of Order in World Politics*, New York, 1977, chapter 1.
- 59 See Theodore von Laue, *The World Revolution of Westernization*, New York, 1987.
- 60 Sherry B. Ortner (ed.), *The Fate of Culture: Geertz and Beyond*, Berkeley, 1999.
- 61 See the extensive chapter on German Orientalism in B. Tibi, *Einladung in die islamische Geschichte*, Darmstadt, 2001.

- 62 For a further discussion of this thesis see B. Tibi, 'The Interplay between Social and Cultural Change: the Case of Germany and the Middle East', in G. Atiyeh and I. Oweiss (eds), *Arab Civilization: Challenge and Responses*, Albany, 1988, pp. 166–82.
- 63 My framework goes beyond Geertz, insofar as I do not confine my analysis to 'culture', but rather attempt to place 'culture' first in cross-cultural civilisations (e.g. cultural diversity in Islam existing within the very same Islamic civilisation) and second in the structures of the global system. Geertz noted ironically in one of our enlightening communications at my home during my tenure at Princeton in 1986/87 that 'anthropologists view cultures as if they were islands', thus failing to discern the surrounding international society. I have been authorised to quote this! Geertz does not draw methodological consequences from this insight (see note 60 above).
- 64 Former President Roman Herzog wanted to avert the clash of civilisations and to choose a Jew, a Christian and a Muslim commentator of his views. See B. Tibi, 'International Morality and Cross-Cultural Bridging', in Roman Herzog, *Preventing the Clash of Civilizations: a Peace Strategy for the Twenty-First Century*, New York, 1999, pp. 107–26.
- 65 See the review of my book on fundamentalism (reference 5 above) by the Muslim Cambridge scholar Akbar S. Ahmed, in *International Affairs*, vol. 75, 3 (1999), p. 694. In 1995 Ahmed became Pakistan Ambassador to the United Kingdom.

Part I: Religion, Culture and Development – Islam between Past and Present

Chapter 1: Religion, Culture and Social Reality: Islam as a Cultural System, and its Diversity

- 1 Niklas Luhmann, *Funktion der Religion*, Frankfurt/M., 1977.
- 2 Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, New York, 1973, pp. 87ff. On the debate over the evolution of the Geertzian approach, see the contributions in Sherry B. Ortner (ed.), *The Fate of Culture: Geertz and Beyond*, Berkeley, 1999.
- 3 Geertz, *The Interpretation* (referenced in note 2), pp. 93f.
- 4 E.E. Evans-Pritchard, *Theories of Primitive Religion*, Oxford, 1965.
- 5 See Johan Bouman, *Gott und Mensch im Koran. Eine Strukturform religiöser Anthropologie anhand des Beispiels Allah und Muhammad*, Darmstadt, 1977.
- 6 Wilfred C. Smith, *The Meaning and End of Religion*, New York, 1978, pp. 80ff.
- 7 See Adam Kuper, *Culture: the Anthropologist's Account*, Cambridge, MA, 1999 in particular the chapter on Geertz, pp. 75ff.
- 8 Our question thus goes beyond that of Rodinson's formulation in his early but important essay (1961) 'L'Islam, doctrine de progrès ou de réaction', in Rodinson's collection of essays, *Marxisme et Monde Musulman*, Paris, 1972, pp. 95ff.
- 9 Geertz, *The Interpretation* (referenced in note 2), p. 93.

- 10 Ibid., p. 125.
- 11 T.W. Adorno, *Stichworte. Kritische Modelle 2*, 3rd printing, Frankfurt/M., 1970, p. 189.
- 12 This line of thought also concerns Ernst Bloch in his book *Thomas Münzer als Theologe der Revolution*, Frankfurt/M., 1972, pp. 51ff., in which he uses it strictly to repudiate the equally reductionist and 'economistic' view, and specifically the inference of 'convictional complexes . . . of a religious nature' (p. 55).
- 13 For a critique see B. Tibi, *The Crisis of Modern Islam: a Preindustrial Culture in the Scientific-Technological Age*, trans. Judith von Sivers, with a foreword by Peter von Sivers, Salt Lake City, 1988, pp. 11–31.
- 14 For an earlier but not phased-out effort see the published habilitation thesis of Franz Steinbacher, *Kultur. Begriff, Theorie, Funktion*, Stuttgart, 1976. See also note 7 above.
- 15 Geertz, *The Interpretation* (referenced in note 2), pp. 29–30.
- 16 See chapter 8 in Dale F. Eickelman, *The Middle East: an Anthropological Approach*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1981, pp. 175ff., in which this concept is elaborated.
- 17 The great extent to which the political thinking of modern Muslims is pervaded by religio-cultural symbols is documented in anthologies by John J. Donohue and John L. Esposito (eds), *Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives*, Oxford, 1982 (see also my review in *The Middle East Journal*, 4 [1982], pp. 614–16); and by Kemal Karpat (ed.), *The Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East*, 2nd substantially revised and expanded edition, New York, 1982. For a more recent account of contemporary Muslim thought, see Joyce M. Davis, *Between Jihad and Salam: Profiles in Islam*, New York, 1997.
- 18 Geertz, *The Interpretation* (referenced in note 2), p. 90.
- 19 Clifford Geertz, *Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia*, 2nd printing, Chicago, 1971.
- 20 Dale F. Eickelman, *Moroccan Islam: Tradition and Society in a Pilgrimage Center*, Austin and London, 1976. This formidable anthropological survey is not matched by the later work of Eickelman in which he quite obviously fails to grasp the culture–politics links. As an example, see Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori, *Muslim Politics*, Princeton, NJ, 1996.
- 21 Gerhard Endress, *Einführung in die islamische Geschichte*, Munich, 1982, p. 106. See also Ernest Gellner, *Muslim Society*, Cambridge, 1981.
- 22 Josef van Ess, *Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra. Eine Geschichte des religiösen Denkens im frühen Islam*, vol. 1, Berlin, 1991.
- 23 Endress, *Einführung* (referenced in note 21), p. 31.
- 24 See N.J. Coulson, *A History of Islamic Law*, 3rd printing, Edinburgh, 1978, pp. 139ff.
- 25 Geertz, *The Interpretation* (referenced in note 2), p. 95.
- 26 Ibid., p. 99.
- 27 Ibid., p. 106.
- 28 Islam was earlier among the empirical subjects of Geertz's research (see note 19 above); his work dates, however, from 1966, so that at that time he could not yet have been familiar with the phenomenon of political Islam, which is dealt with in the present book.

- 29 See Barry Rubin, *Islamic Fundamentalism in Egyptian Politics*, New York, 1990; and on rationality, see Roxanne L. Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalists and the Limits of Modern Rationalism*, Princeton, NJ, 1999.
- 30 Luhmann, *Funktion der Religion* (referenced in note 1 above), p. 115.
- 31 Geertz, *The Interpretation* (referenced in note 2), p. 109.
- 32 Ibid., p. 112.
- 33 Ibid.
- 34 Ibid., p. 123.
- 35 See Maxime Rodinson, *Islam et capitalisme*, Paris, 1966 (see my lengthy introduction to the German edition *Islam und Kapitalismus*, Frankfurt/M., 1986). See also Maxime Rodinson, *La fascination de l'Islam*, Paris, 1980; and on the Orientalism debate, B. Tibi, *Einladung in die islamische Geschichte*, Darmstadt, 2001, chapter 4.
- 36 Edward Said, *Orientalism*, Cambridge, 1978; and E. Said, *Covering Islam*, New York, 1981. See also Valerie Kennedy, *Edward Said: a Critical Introduction*, Cambridge, 2000, chapter 1.
- 37 On the Orientalism debate, its major themes and exponents, see B. Tibi, 'Orient und Okzident, Feindschaft oder interkulturelle Kommunikation? Anmerkungen zur Orientalismus-Debatte', in *Neue Politische Literatur*, vol. 29, 3 (1984), pp. 267–86. As much as there is a need to go beyond Geertz, there is also a need to go far beyond Edward Said, and I do this in my most recent book on Islamic history referenced in note 35 above.
- 38 Arvind Sharma (ed.), *Our Religions*, San Francisco, 1993. On Islam chapter 7.
- 39 Martin Marty and Scott Appleby (eds), *Fundamentalisms Observed*, Chicago, 1991.
- 40 See chapter 5 on 'The Case of the Non-Arab Peoples of West Africa', in Tibi, *The Crisis* (referenced in note 13), pp. 67–80.
- 41 See my detailed report in *Orient*, vol. 23 (1982), pp. 370–7 (on this point, pp. 375ff.). See also the coverage on this in the most important Dakar daily newspaper, 'Islam et Cultures Africaines', in *Le Soleil* of 30 June 1982.
- 42 Mukti Ali, 'Islam and Indonesian Culture', in Mourad Wahba (ed.), *Proceedings of the First Islamic Philosophy Conference (Nov. 19–22, 1979)*, Cairo, 1982, pp. 15–34; and also my report, 'Islamische Weltkonferenz über islamische Philosophie', in *Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit*, vol. 21, 2 (1980), pp. 11–f.
- 43 The Koran is quoted here in comparison to the Arabic original and with appropriate modification of the translation by N.J. Dawood, 4th revised edition, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1974.
- 44 In the Koran (sura 12, verse 2) it is written, for example, that God revealed the Koran 'in the Arabic tongue'. See also verse 16/103 and 26/195; for more on this, see Tibi, *The Crisis* (referenced in note 13 above), chapter 4.
- 45 See the chapter on Arabiyya in B. Tibi, *Islam and the Cultural Accommodation of Social Change*, Boulder, CO, 1990, pp. 76–101.
- 46 Maxime Rodinson develops this theme systematically with extensive use of historical material in his work *Mohammed*, Lucerne and Frankfurt, 1975 (originally in French, Paris, 1961).
- 47 See Yitzhak Nakash, *The Shi'is of Iraq*, Princeton, NJ, 1994; and Fouad Ajami, *The Vanished Imam: Musa al-Sadr and the Shi'a of Lebanon*, Ithaca, 1986. In

- Lebanon the Hezbollah is the political party of the Shi'a. See Hala Jaber, *Hezbollah: Born with Vengeance*, New York, 1997.
- 48 The most comprehensive, reliable, and brilliant cultural history of Islam so far is contained in the lifework of Marshall G.S. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam*, 3 vols, Chicago, 1974.
 - 49 The attempt to employ Elias for conceptualising Islamic history is contained in Tibi, *The Crisis* (referenced in note 13), pp. 22ff., 57ff., 67ff.
 - 50 The life and work of Muhammed are examined in the two seminal works by W.M. Watt, *Muhammad at Mekka*, Oxford, 1953; and *Muhammad at Medina*, 6th printing, Oxford, 1977. See also W.M. Watt, *Muhammad – Prophet and Statesman*, 4th printing, Oxford, 1978. See also the biography by Rodinson referenced in note 46.
 - 51 See B. Tibi, *Der wahre Imam. Der Islam von Mohammed bis zur Gegenwart*, Munich, 1996 (new edition, 1998).
 - 52 See on this S.H.M. Jafri, *The Origins and Early Development of Shi'a Islam*, London and Beirut, 1979. See also Moojan Momen, *An Introduction to Shi'i Islam*, New Haven, 1985, pp. 11ff. and 23ff.
 - 53 See M. Fischer, *Iran: from Religious Dispute to Revolution*, Cambridge, MA, 1980; and Said A. Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown: the Islamic Revolution in Iran*, New York, 1988.
 - 54 On the Abbasid history, see J.J. Saunders, *A History of Medieval Islam*, 2nd printing, London, 1978, pp. 95ff. Also worth reading R. Stephen Humphreys, *Islamic History*, Princeton, NJ, 1991, pp. 104ff.
 - 55 On the Ottoman period of Islamic history, see B. Tibi, *Kreuzzug und Djihad. Der Islam und die christliche Welt*, Munich, 1999, chapter 4.
 - 56 See Sandra Mackey, *The Iranians: Persia, Islam and the Soul of a Nation*, New York, 1996, Parts 3 and 4. On contemporary history see also Nikki Keddie, *Roots of Revolution: an Interpretive History of Modern Islam*, New Haven, 1981.
 - 57 Rodinson, *La fascination de l'Islam* (referenced in note 35), p. 58.
 - 58 Tibi, *Kreuzzug und Djihad* (see note 55 above).
 - 59 On this and the following, see B. Tibi, *Arab Nationalism: between Islam and the Nation-State*, 3rd edition, London and New York, 1997, pp. 88 ff.
 - 60 R. Hartmann, 'Die Wahhabiten', in *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, vol. 78 (1924), part 2, pp. 176–213, here p. 177. For a recent view, see Aziz al-Azmeh, *Islams and Modernities*, London, 1993, chapter: Wahhabite Polity, pp. 104–21.
 - 61 The American Afghani editor Nikki Keddie thus adequately calls her collected texts, *An Islamic Response to Imperialism*, 2nd printing, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1983.
 - 62 On this, see B. Tibi, 'Management und Kultur im Entwicklungsprozeß. Bericht über eine entwicklungspolitische Konferenz in Kairo', in *Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit*, vol. 25, 3 (1984), pp. 29–30.
 - 63 On Abduh, see Othman Amin, *Ra'id al-fikr al-misri: Muhammed Abduh (A Pioneer of Egyptian Thought: Muhammed Abduh)*, Cairo, 1955, pp. 141ff.; and also Charles C. Adams, *Islam and Modernism in Egypt*, 2nd printing, New York, 1968 (first published in 1933).
 - 64 On the Islamic fundamentalist dream of semi-modernity, see B. Tibi, 'The Worldview of Sunni Arab Fundamentalists: Attitudes toward Modern

- Science and Technology', in Martin Marty and Scott Appleby (eds), *Fundamentalisms and Society*, Chicago, 1993, pp. 73–102; and also B. Tibi, 'Islamic Dream of Semi-Modernity', in *India International Centre Quarterly*, vol. 22 (Spring 1995), pp. 79–87.
- 65 This happened to me in Cairo when I expounded views along these lines in a paper on 'Islam and Secularisation' presented at the First Islamic Conference on Philosophy. After heavy debate and corresponding delay, this lecture – see Wahba, *Proceedings* (as in note 42 above), pp. 65–80 – was published in Cairo. An Arabic version was published in Beirut in *Oadaya Arabiyya*, vol. 7, 2 (1980), pp. 12–23. For a more recent piece, see B. Tibi, 'Secularization and De-Secularization in Islam', in *Religion, Staat, Gesellschaft*, vol. 1, 1 (2000), pp. 95–117.
- 66 An example of this is Ali al-Shabi, *al-Shi'a fi Iran* (The Shi'a in Iran), Tunis, 1980, p. 5 and (in more detail) pp. 169ff.
- 67 John Waterbury, *The Commander of the Faithful: the Moroccan Political Elite*, New York, 1970, p. 5.
- 68 R.A. Nicholson, *Islamic Mysticism*, 4th printing, Cambridge, 1980, p. 3.
- 69 Ibid., p. 50.
- 70 Ibid., p. 79. See also James Fadiman and Robert Frager (eds), *Essential Sufism*, San Francisco, 1997.
- 71 Husain Ibn Mansur al-Hallaj, *Märtyrer der Gottesliebe*, Annemarie Schimmel (ed.), Cologne, 1968, p. 37.
- 72 Nicholson, *Islamic Mysticism* (see note 68).
- 73 See B. Tibi, 'Islam and Secularization, Religion and the Functional Differentiation of the Social System', in *Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie*, vol. 66 (1980), pp. 207–22; see also note 65 above.
- 74 J. Spencer Trimmingham, *The Influence of Islam upon Africa*, London and Beirut, 1980, p. 5. See also the reference in note 40 above.
- 75 Ibid., p. 8.
- 76 See J. Spencer Trimmingham, *The Sufi Orders in Islam*, Oxford, 1971.
- 77 Trimmingham, *The Influence* (see note 74), p. 9.
- 78 Ibid., p. 46.
- 79 More on this in Eickelman, *Moroccan Islam* (see note 20 above), pp. 65ff.
- 80 J.N.D. Anderson, *Islamic Law in Africa*, 2nd printing, London, 1978.
- 81 M. Pimenta, *Islam in Everyday Arabic Speech*, Leiden, 1979, p. 1; see also note 45 above.
- 82 See Howard R. Turner, *Science in Medieval Islam*, Austin, TX, 1995. On its impact, see Toby E. Huff, *The Rise of Early Modern Science: Islam, China and the West*, Cambridge, 1995.
- 83 See Mohammed Abed al-Jabri, *Arab-Islamic Philosophy: a Contemporary Critique*, Austin, TX, 1999, pp. 120ff.
- 84 Bouman, *Gott und Mensch im Koran* (referenced in note 5), p. 19.
- 85 Ibid., p. 30.
- 86 Ibid., p. 73.
- 87 Ibid., p. 229.
- 88 Ibid., p. 208.
- 89 Ibid., p. 101.
- 90 Ibid., p. 180.

Chapter 2: Cultural Patterns and the Perception of Change in Islam. A Religious Model for Reality: the Islamic Worldview

- 1 On this Islamic worldview and on its politicisation, see B. Tibi, 'The Worldview of Sunni Arab Fundamentalists', in M. Marty/S. Appleby (eds), *Fundamentalisms and Society*, Chicago, 1993, pp. 73–102.
- 2 These processes of internal differentiation within the Islamic religious system form the subject of Part II, pp. 74ff., in B. Tibi, *The Crisis of Modern Islam: a Preindustrial Culture in the Scientific-Technological Age*, trans. Judith von Sivers, Salt Lake City, 1988, pp. 55ff.
- 3 For more on this subject, see Charles Lindholm, *The Islamic Middle East: an Historical Anthropology*, Oxford, 1996, pp. 259ff.
- 4 Barrie Axford, *The Global System: Economics, Politics and Culture*, New York, 1995.
- 5 The perception of these vexed questions in the works of six modern Islamic thinkers is analyzed by Rotraud Wielandt, *Offenbarung und Geschichte im Denken moderner Muslime*, Wiesbaden, 1971; on this book, see my review article in the collection of articles B. Tibi, *Internationale Politik und Entwicklungsländer-Forschung. Materialien zu einer ideologiekritischen Entwicklungssoziologie*, Frankfurt/M., 1979, pp. 136–40.
- 6 On this central theme in modern Muslim thought, see the works by Hichem Djait, *Urubba wa al-Islam* (Europe and Islam), Beirut, 1980 (US edition, Hichem Djait, *Europe and Islam: Cultures and Modernity*, Berkeley, 1985); and Abdallah Laroui, *Azmat al-muthaqqafin al-Arab* (The Crisis of Arab Intellectuals), Beirut, 1978 (French edition, *La crise des intellectuels arabes*, Paris).
- 7 See the widely disseminated book by Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *al-Hall al-Islami farida wa darura* (The Islamic Solution is a Duty and a Necessity), Beirut, 1974. This highly influential book by al-Qaradawi is vol. 2 out of a 3-volume work. The third volume of this trilogy has the title: *Bayanat al-hall al-Islami wa shabahat al-ilmaniyyin wa al-mutagharibin* (The Characteristics of the Islamic Solution and the Suspicions of the Secularists and the Westernised), Cairo, 1988.
- 8 See B. Tibi, 'War and Peace in Islam', in Terry Nardin (ed.), *The Ethics of War and Peace: Religious and Secular Perspectives*, Princeton, NJ, 1996, pp. 128–45. See also H.A.R. Gibb and H. Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West: a Study of the Impact of Western Civilisation on Moslem Culture in the Near East*, 2 vols., London, 1950 and 1957.
- 9 Najib Armanazi, *Al shar' al-duwali fi al-Islam* (International Law in Islam), new printing, London, 1990 (Original Damascus, 1930). On democratic peace, see Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, Princeton, NJ, 1993. See also B. Tibi, 'Democracy and Democratization in Islam: a Quest of Islamic Enlightenment', in Michèle Schmiegelow (ed.), *Democracy in Asia*, New York, 1997, pp. 127–46.
- 10 On the European expansion, see chapter 6, on Arab jihad chapter 1, on Ottoman jihad chapter 4, in B. Tibi, *Kreuzzug und Dihad. Der Islam und die christliche Welt*, Munich, 1999; and also Marshall G.S. Hodgson, *The Venture*

- of Islam, 3 vols, Chicago, 1974, here vol. 3; see also Bernard Lewis, *The Middle East and the West*, 2nd printing, New York, 1966.
- 11 An example of such an Islamic answer is the major work originally published in 1930 and still influential today, available in reprint, by Shakib Arslan, *Limatha ta'akhara al-Muslimun wa limatha taqaddama ghairuhum?* (English translation, *Our Decline and Its Causes*, 2nd printing, London, 1952).
 - 12 An exhaustive account of this situation is given by Maxime Rodinson, *Muhammed*, Lucerne and Frankfurt/M., 1975, chapters 1 and 2 (originally in French, Paris, 1961).
 - 13 W. Montgomery Watt in conjunction with A.T. Welch, *Der Islam I*, Stuttgart, 1980, in the chapter entitled 'Ursprung und Werden des Islams', pp. 39–161, see p. 97.
 - 14 Ibid., p. 46.
 - 15 On this debate, see B. Tibi, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1998.
 - 16 Johan Bouman, *Gott und Mensch im Koran. Eine Strukturform religiöser Anthropologie anhand des Beispiels Allah und Muhammad*, Darmstadt, 1977, p. 226.
 - 17 Ibid., p. 229.
 - 18 This shari'a legal position was representatively propounded by Sabir Tu'aima, *al-Shari'a al-Islamiyya fi asr al-ilm* (Islamic Law in the Age of Science), Beirut, 1979, pp. 208ff. A reconstruction of Islamic international law is provided in the classical work by Najib Armanazi, *al-Shar' al-duwali fi al-Islam* (referenced in note 9).
 - 19 See Nasr H. Abu-Zaid, *al-Tafkir fi al-zaman al-takfir* (Thinking in the Age of Accusation of Unbelief), Cairo, 1995. On the Abu-Zaid affair and on its broader context, see B. Tibi, *Fundamentalismus im Islam*, Darmstadt, 2000, chapter 7. On the dismissal of critique of Islamic fundamentalism in the diaspora, see Abu-Zaid, *Leben mit dem Islam*, Freiburg, 1999, P. 197. In fact this is an indication of hypocrisy.
 - 20 Watt, *Islam I* (referenced in note 13), p. 170; see also R. Bell and W.M. Watt, *Introduction to the Qur'an*, 2nd printing, Edinburgh, 1977.
 - 21 On the early epoch of the Islamic schism between Sunna and Shi'a, see S.H.M. Jafri, *The Origins and Early Development of Shi'a Islam*, London, 1979. See also Moojan Momen, *An Introduction to Shi'i Islam*, New Haven, 1985.
 - 22 On modern Koranic exegesis, see J.M.S. Baljon, *Modern Muslim Koran Interpretation (1880–1960)*, Leiden, 1968; and J.J.G. Jansen, *The Interpretation of the Koran in Modern Egypt*, Leiden, 1974.
 - 23 Watt, *Islam I* (referenced in note 13), p. 17.
 - 24 Bernard Lewis, *The Muslim Discovery of Europe*, New York, 1982, chapter IX.
 - 25 See Charles C. Adams, *Islam and Modernism in Egypt: a study of the Early Modern Reform Movement*, 2nd printing, New York, 1968 (originally published in 1933).
 - 26 Watt, *Islam I* (referenced in note 13), p. 17.
 - 27 Ibid., p. 75.

- 28 See W.M. Watt, *Islamic Philosophy and Theology*, 5th printing, Edinburgh, 1979, pp. 37ff.
- 29 Herbert A. Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna, Averroës on Intellect*, New York, 1992. See also the essays in honour of Muhsin Mahdi, ed. by Charles Butterworth, *The Political Aspects of Islamic Philosophy*, Cambridge, MA, 1992.
- 30 Details may be found in T.J. de Boer, *Geschichte der Philosophie im Islam*, Stuttgart, 1901. The Arabic translation of this work, *Tarikh al-falsafa fi al-Islam*, Cairo, 1957, by the Egyptian professor of philosophy Muhammed Abdulhadi Abu-Zaida (University of Cairo).
- 31 See B. Tibi, 'Islam and Secularization, Religion and the Functional Differentiation of the Social System', in *Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie*, vol. 66 (1980), pp. 207–22. See also B. Tibi, 'Culture and Knowledge', in *Theory, Culture & Society*, vol. 12, 1 (1995), pp. 1–24; and most recently B. Tibi, 'Secularization and De-Secularization in Modern Islam', in *Religion, Staat und Gesellschaft*, vol. 1, 1 (2000), pp. 95–117.
- 32 Watt, *Islam I* (referenced in note 13), p. 232.
- 33 On right-wing radical militant Islam see G.H. Jansen, *Militant Islam*, New York, 1979; and my book on political Islam referenced above in note 15, as well as Emmanuel Sivan, *Radical Islam*, New Haven, 1985.
- 34 See Tibi, *Challenge* (referenced in note 15), chapters 7 and 8.
- 35 See W.M. Watt, *Muhammad. Prophet and Statesman*, 4th printing, Oxford, 1978.
- 36 See Joseph Schacht, *An Introduction to Islamic Law*, 5th printing, Oxford, 1979; and N.J. Coulson, *A History of Islamic Law*, 3rd printing, Edinburgh, 1978; as well as chapter 7 of this book.
- 37 Schacht, *An Introduction* (referenced in note 36), p. 1.
- 38 On the tensions between scriptural fiqh and rational philosophy in Islam see B. Tibi, *Der wahre Imam. Der Islam von Mohammed bis zur Gegenwart*, Munich, 1996, Part 2.
- 39 See Subhi al-Salih, *Ma'alim al-shari'a al-Islamiyya* (Basic Features of Islamic Law), Beirut, 1975, p. 116.
- 40 Schacht, *An Introduction* (referenced in note 36), pp. 94ff.
- 41 On this, see Maxime Rodinson, *Islam et capitalisme*, Paris, 1966, new German edition with a lengthy introduction by B. Tibi, Frankfurt/Main, 1986.
- 42 For a reform-Islamic critical view of the caliphate, see M. S. al-Ashmawi, *al-Khilafa al-Islamiyya* (Islamic caliphate), Cairo, 1990. The standard work on this subject remains Thomas W. Arnold, *The Caliphate*, 2nd printing, London, 1965 (originally published in 1924).
- 43 Schacht, *An Introduction* (referenced in note 36), pp. 54ff.
- 44 See the critical views by M.S. al-Ashmawi, *Usul al-shari'a* (The Origins of the Shari'a), Cairo and Beirut, 1983. See also chapter 8 in my book *Challenge* (referenced in note 15 above).
- 45 Watt, *Islam I* (referenced in note 13), p. 24.
- 46 On both of these aspects of the encounter between the Middle East and the West under new global conditions, see B. Tibi, *Arab Nationalism: between Islam and the Nation-State*, 3rd edition, London, 1997, pp. 53ff. and 70ff.
- 47 See David B. Ralston, *Importing the European Army: the Introduction of European Military Techniques and Institutions into the Extra-European World*,

Chicago, 1990, chapters 3 and 4. Also Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 2nd edition, Oxford, 1979, chapter 3, 'The Impact of the West', pp. 40–73; and Tibi, *Arab Nationalism* (referenced in note 46), Part II.

- 48 Rifa'a R. al-Tahtawi, *Takhlis al-ibriz ila talkhis Baris* (The Refinement of Gold: toward the Summarising Description of Paris), (originally published in 1834), German trans. Karl Stowasser, *Ein Muslim entdeckt Europa. Die Reise eines Ägypters im 19. Jahrhundert nach Paris*, Munich, 1989, p. 150.
- 49 See Tibi, *The Crisis* (referenced in note 2) and Tibi, *Arab Nationalism* (referenced in note 46).
- 50 Tahtawi, *Ein Muslim* (referenced in note 48), p. 9.
- 51 See B. Tibi, 'The Failed Export of the Islamic Revolution into the Arab World', in Frédéric Grare (ed.), *Islamism and Security: Political Islam and the Western World*, Geneva, 1999, pp. 63–101.
- 52 See B. Tibi, 'Post-Bipolar Order in Crisis: the Challenge of Politicised Islam', in *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* (ed. LSE), vol. 29, 3 (2000), pp. 843–59.

Chapter 3: Culture and Social Change: Tradition and Innovation in Cultural Analysis

- 1 See Adam Kuper, *Culture: the Anthropologists' Account*, Cambridge, MA, 1999, and also the reader edited by John Rundell and Stephen Mennell, *Classical Readings in Culture and Civilization*, London, 1998.
- 2 The essay of Alfred Weber is reprinted in Hans Peter Dreitzel (ed.), *Sozialer Wandel*, Neuwied, 1967, pp. 239ff., particularly p. 242. Anglo-Saxon readers are requested not to confuse Max with Alfred Weber.
- 3 Anthony Giddens, *Beyond Left and Right*, Cambridge, 1997.
- 4 The seminal work is Robert Wuthnow, *Meaning and Moral Order: Explorations in Cultural Analysis*, Berkeley, 1987. See also R. Wuthnow, J. Habermas et al., *Cultural Analysis*, London, 1984.
- 5 On the virginity issue and sexuality as a cultural dimension in Islam, see Dale F. Eickelman, *The Middle East: an Anthropological Approach*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1981, pp. 127ff. and 141ff.
- 6 B. Tibi, 'The Interplay between Social and Economic Change', in George Atiyeh/Ibrahim Oweiss (eds), *Arab Civilization: Challenges and Responses*, Albany, NY, 1988, pp. 166–82.
- 7 Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society*, Glencoe, IL, 1958. See also the new thinking by David E. Apter, *Rethinking Development*, London, 1987.
- 8 See Fernand Braudel, *A History of Civilizations*, New York, 1994; and B. Tibi, *Krieg der Zivilisationen*, Hamburg, 1995 (new revised edition, Munich, 1998).
- 9 Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, New York, 1973, p. 13.
- 10 Ibid., p. 14.
- 11 B. Tibi, *The Crisis of Modern Islam: a Preindustrial Culture in the Scientific-Technological Age*, Salt Lake City, 1988; and B. Tibi, *Islam and the Cultural Accommodation of Social Change*, Boulder, CO, 1990, reprinted 1991.
- 12 See Stephen K. Sandersson, *Social Evolutionism: a Critical History*, Cambridge, 1990.

- 13 Karl Marx, 'Die britische Kolonialherrschaft in Indien', in Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels, *Werke*, vol. 9, East Berlin, 1960, pp. 127ff., particularly p. 133.
- 14 Hugo C.F. Mansilla, *Entwicklung als Nachahmung. Zu einer kritischen Theorie der Modernisierung*, Meisenheim/Glan, 1978; and the same Latin-American author, *Die Trugbilder der Entwicklung in der Dritten Welt*, Munich and Vienna, 1986.
- 15 S.N. Eisenstadt, *Tradition, Change and Modernity*, London, 1973. Simply for technical reasons I am using here the German translation *Tradition, Wandel und Modernität*, Frankfurt/M., 1979.
- 16 David Apter, *The Politics of Modernization*, Chicago, 1965, followed two decades later by Apter's book, *Rethinking Development* (referenced in note 7).
- 17 Eisenstadt, *Tradition* (referenced in note 15), p. 373.
- 18 Ibid., pp. 92f.
- 19 Ibid., pp. 237ff. A relevant monograph on this is Bryan S. Turner, *Weber and Islam*, London, 1974; and, more recently, the proceedings of an international conference on *Max Webers Sicht des Islams. Interpretation und Kritik*, ed. Wolfgang Schluchter, Frankfurt/M., 1987.
- 20 On Afghani, see the biography by Nikki Keddie, *Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1972; as well as the selected texts of Afghani edited by Keddie and published under the title *An Islamic Response to Imperialism*, 2nd printing, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1983.
- 21 Jemaladdin Afghani, *al-A'mal al-kamila* (Collected Works), Muhammed Imara (ed.), Cairo, 1968, p. 328.
- 22 See B. Tibi, *Arab Nationalism: between Islam and the Nation-State*, 3rd enlarged edition, London and New York, 1997, pp. 88ff.
- 23 Eisenstadt, *Tradition* (referenced in note 15), pp. 242f.
- 24 Maxime Rodinson, *Mohammed*, Frankfurt/M. and Lucerne, 1975.
- 25 Niklas Luhmann, *Funktion der Religion*, Frankfurt/M., 1977.
- 26 Eisenstadt, *Tradition* (referenced in note 15), p. 206.
- 27 See the chapter on monarchies legitimised by Islam in Tibi, *Islam and the Cultural Accommodation* (referenced in note 11), pp. 160–77.
- 28 See the chapter on religion in J.E. Goldthorpe, *The Sociology of the Third World: Disparity and Development*, Cambridge, 1984, pp. 207–27; and the special issue of the journal *Millennium*, December 2000 on Religion and International Relations.
- 29 See the pathfinding work of Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: a Study of Order in World Politics*, New York, 1977; and *The Expansion of International Society*, ed. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, 3rd printing, Oxford, 1988.
- 30 Jürgen Habermas, *Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne*, Frankfurt, 1985 (for the English version see note 40).
- 31 See also John Hall et al. (eds), *Europe and the Rise of Capitalism*, Oxford, 1989.
- 32 See David Harrison, *The Sociology of Modernization and Development*, London, 1988, chapter 2 and pp. 149ff.
- 33 See Franz Rosenthal, *The Classical Heritage in Islam*, London, 1994.
- 34 Tibi, *Islam and the Cultural Accommodation* (see note 11).
- 35 Eisenstadt, *Tradition* (referenced in note 15), p. 359.
- 36 See B. Tibi, 'The Fundamentalist Challenge to Secular Order in the Middle East', in *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, vol. 23, I (Winter/Spring 1999), pp. 191–210.

- 37 On this concept see Tibi, *The Crisis of Modern Islam* (see note 11), Introduction.
- 38 René König (ed.), *Aspekte der Entwicklungssoziologie*, Cologne and Opladen, 1969, p. 30 (italics in the original).
- 39 See the monograph on this issue by Marco Orru, *Anomie: History and Meaning*, London, 1987.
- 40 See Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, Cambridge, MA, 1987 (for the German original see note 30 above).
- 41 See Binaz Toprak, *Islam and Political Development in Turkey*, Leiden, 1981; and more recently B. Tibi, *Aufbruch am Bosphorus. Die Türkei zwischen Europa und dem Islamismus*, Munich, 1998; the Turkish edition was published in Istanbul 2000.
- 42 On the Egyptian variant of Fabian socialism see the remarkable monograph by Vernon Egger, *A Fabian in Egypt: Salamah Musa and the Rise of the Professional Classes in Egypt, 1909–1939*, Lanham and New York, 1986.
- 43 Fuad Kandil, *Nativismus in der Dritten Welt. Wiederentdeckung der Tradition für die Gegenwart*, St. Michael (Austria), 1983. The empirical part of Kandil's study is concerned with Egyptian Islam.
- 44 For more on this see B. Tibi, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder*, Berkeley, 1998.

Part II: The Context: the Politicisation of Islam in the Global Age

Chapter 4: The Dichotomy of Structural Globalisation and Fragmenting Cultural Self-Assertion: the Case of Islamic Civilisation

- 1 On this dichotomy with case studies on Asia-Pacific, see: *Global-Local – Cultural Production and the Transnational Imaginary*, ed. Rob Wilson and Wimal Dissanayake, Durham, 1996, in particular Part 1: Globalisations.
- 2 See Martin Albrow, *The Global Age*, Stanford, 1997; and also Barrie Axford, *The Global System: Economics, Politics, Culture*, New York, 1995; from a conceptual perspective Roland Robertson, *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture*, London, 1992 (reprinted 1998).
- 3 On this concept see B. Tibi, 'International Morality and Cross-Cultural Bridging', in Roman Herzog (President of Germany 1995–99), *Preventing the Clash of Civilizations: a Peace Strategy for the Twenty-First Century*, New York, 1999, pp. 107–26.
- 4 See the debate conducted in Amsterdam at The Erasmus Foundation (ed.), *The Limits of Pluralism: Neo-Absolutisms and Relativism*, Amsterdam, 1994 (for my contribution on Islamic Neo-Absolutism, see pp. 29–35). See also John Kekes, *The Morality of Pluralism*, Princeton, NJ, 1993, for new major theses on pluralism, see pp. 17–37.
- 5 Manuel Castells, *The Power of Identity*, Oxford, 1997, p. 8.
- 6 See Immanuel Kant, 'Entwurf zum ewigen Frieden', in Richard Saage (ed.), *Friedensutopien. Kant, Fichte, Schlegel, Görres*, Frankfurt/M., 1979, pp. 37–82;

- and Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, Princeton, NJ, 1993. See also the contributions in Michael Brown *et al.* (eds), *Debating the Democratic Peace*, Cambridge, MA, 1996.
- 7 Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies*, Princeton, NJ, 1997.
 - 8 For a close examination of these processes, see B. Tibi, 'Secularization and De-Secularization in Modern Islam', in *Religion, Staat, Gesellschaft*, vol. 1, 1 (2000), pp. 95–117; and by the same, 'Post-Bipolar Order in Crisis: the Challenge of Politicised Islam', in *Millennium*, vol. 29, 3 (2000), pp. 843–59.
 - 9 The flaws in Inglehart's analysis are related to his ignorance about the research on this topic pursued by the American Academy of Arts and Science (The Fundamentalism Project). See the five volumes edited by Martin Marty and Scott Appleby, *Fundamentalisms Observed*, Chicago, 1991; *Fundamentalisms and Society*, Chicago, 1993; *Fundamentalisms and the State*, Chicago, 1993; *Accounting for Fundamentalisms*, Chicago, 1994; *Fundamentalisms: Comprehended*, Chicago, 1995. I have co-authored vol. 2. See also my book that grew from this project *The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1998.
 - 10 Inglehart, *Modernization* (see note 7), p. 72.
 - 11 *Ibid.*, p. 106. For an alternative view see Tibi, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism* (note 9 above).
 - 12 On this see Charles Lindholm, *The Islamic Middle East: a Historical Anthropology*, Oxford, 1996, pp. 17ff. and 219ff.
 - 13 Najib al-Armanazi, *al-Shar' al-duwali fi al-Islam* (International Law in Islam), new reprint, London, 1990 (first published in Damascus, 1930).
 - 14 Muhammed Imara, *al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya wa al-tahaddi al-hadari* (The Islamic Awakening and the Civilisational Challenge), Cairo, 1991.
 - 15 For more on this with extensive references, see B. Tibi, *Kreuzzug und Jihad. Der Islam und die christliche Welt*, Munich, 1999. Chapters 1 and 4 deal with Islamic expansion. Chapter 6 is on European expansion. Sources are referenced there.
 - 16 Jemaladdin Afghani, *al-A'mal al-kamila* (Collected Works), ed. M. Imara, Cairo, 1968, p. 328. See his biography completed by Nikki Keddie, *Sayyid Jamal ad-Din 'al-Afghani'*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1972.
 - 17 See Ivan Hannaford, *Race: the History of an Idea in the West*, Baltimore, 1996.
 - 18 See Tibi, *Kreuzzug und Jihad* (referenced in note 15 above).
 - 19 See, for example, Rudolf Wendorff, *Dritte Welt und westliche Zivilisation*, Opladen, 1984, p. 65. On the German cultural roots of the moralising worldview see the masterpiece by Helmuth Plessner, *Die verspätete Nation*, reprint, Frankfurt/M., 1974. See also B. Tibi, *Europa ohne Identität? Die Krise der multikulturellen Gesellschaft*, Munich, 1998 (new edition 2000), Part 1, pp. 59–133.
 - 20 See, for example, Benjamin R. Barber, *Jihad vs McWorld*, New York, 1995.
 - 21 See Reinhard Bendix, *Kings or People*, Berkeley, 1978; and also his essay 'Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered', published in his collection of articles, *Nation-Building and Citizenship: Studies of Our Changing Social Order*, new and substantially revised edition, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1977, pp. 361–434, especially pp. 411ff. Of particular significance is Bendix's

thesis that the modernisation of some spheres of life in non-European societies does not necessarily contribute to bringing about modernity.

- 22 On this debate, see B. Tibi, *Islamischer Fundamentalismus, moderne Wissenschaft und Technologie*, Frankfurt/M., 1992. See also my chapter, 'The Worldview of Sunni Arab Fundamentalists: Attitudes toward Modern Science and Technology', in *Fundamentalisms and Society* (full reference in note 9 above), pp. 128–45.
- 23 See the standard work of the Frankfurt School on this subject by Franz Borkenau, *Der Übergang vom feudalen zum bürgerlichen Weltbild*, reprint, Darmstadt, 1980, new edition, Frankfurt, 1988 (it was first published in 1934 while in exile in Paris but in German).
- 24 On the Islamic Weltanschauung and its historical development, see B. Tibi, *Der wahre Imam. Der Islam von Mohammed bis zur Gegenwart*, Munich, 1996, 2nd edition, 1997, paperback 1998, Part 1.
- 25 Niklas Luhmann, 'Die Weltgesellschaft', in Luhmann, *Soziologische Aufklärung*, vol. 2, Opladen, 1975, pp. 51–61.
- 26 See B. Tibi, *The Crisis of Modern Islam: a Preindustrial Culture in the Scientific-Technological Age*, Salt Lake City, 1988.
- 27 Inglehart, *Modernization* (referenced in note 7) p. 281.
- 28 Hedley Bull, 'The Revolt against the West', in Hedley Bull/Adam Watson (eds), *The Expansion of International Society*, Oxford, 1984, pp. 217–28.
- 29 Tibi, *The Crisis* (see note 26), chapter 3.
- 30 See Gérard Leclerc, *Anthropologie et Colonialisme*, Paris, 1972.
- 31 For the history of ideas of this approach see Stephan K. Sanderson, *Social Evolutionism*, Cambridge, MA, 1990.
- 32 Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society*, Glencoe, IL, 1958. Thinking on development has since then gone far beyond Lerner's most influential work. See David E. Apter, *Rethinking Development*, Newbury Park, CA, 1987; and David Harrison, *Sociology of Modernization and Development*, London, 1988.
- 33 Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process*, 2 vols, vol. 1: *The History of Manners*, New York, 1978, vol. 2: *Power and Civility*, New York, 1982.
- 34 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 247.
- 35 Ibid., p. 256.
- 36 Ibid., p. 255. On the groundbreaking work of Norbert Elias, see Stephen Mennell, *Norbert Elias: Civilization and the Human Self-Image*, Oxford, 1989.
- 37 Max Horkheimer cited in the dedication by Tibi, *Europa ohne Identität?* (referenced in note 19 above). I owe Horkheimer, the founder of the Frankfurt School of Social Theory who was my academic teacher in my Frankfurt years of learning a great deal in my transition from an Arab nationalist to an enlightened Muslim.
- 38 See also Tibi, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism* (referenced in note 9). For earlier works on this subject in Western languages see Nazih Ayubi, *Political Islam*, London, 1991, and Gilles Kepel, *La Revanche de Dieu*, Paris, 1991. The foremost critical work in Arabic is by Mohammed Said al-Ashmawi, *al-Islam al-siyasi* (Political Islam), 2nd edition, Cairo, 1989.
- 39 Mohammed Arkoun, *Rethinking Islam*, Boulder, CO, 1994; and B. Tibi, *Islam and the Cultural Accommodation of Social Change*, Boulder, CO, 1990.

- 40 See Ayubi, *Political Islam*, (referenced in note 38). See also Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, Cambridge, MA, 1996, and the other works referenced in note 38 above.
- 41 Bernard Lewis, *The Muslim Discovery of Europe*, New York, 1982.
- 42 Martin Kramer, *Arab Awakening and Islamic Revival: the Politics of Ideas in the Middle East*, New Brunswick, NJ, 1996.
- 43 Clifford Geertz, *Islam Observed*, 2nd printing, Chicago, 1971, p. 56.
- 44 I. Mörth and F. Fürstenberg, 'Religionssoziologie', in R. König (ed.), *Handbuch der empirischen Sozialforschung*, vol. 14, 2nd printing, Stuttgart, 1979, pp. 1–84, particularly p. 46.
- 45 Ibid., p. 35.
- 46 Robert Wuthnow, *Meaning and Moral Order: Explorations in Cultural Analysis*, Berkeley, 1987.
- 47 See Michael Willis, *The Islamist Challenge in Algeria*, New York, 1996, pp. 241–3.
- 48 B. Tibi, 'Culture and Knowledge: the Islamization of Knowledge as a Postmodern Project?', in *Theory, Culture & Society*, vol. 12, 1 (1995), pp. 1–24.
- 49 R. Bendix, 'Modernisierung in internationaler Perspektive', in W. Zapf (ed.), *Theorien des sozialen Wandels*, 2nd printing, Cologne and Berlin, 1970, pp. 505ff., particularly p. 506.
- 50 Ibid., p. 507.
- 51 Ibid., p. 511.
- 52 Bendix, *Kings or People* (see note 21 above), p. 582.
- 53 Ibid., p. 594.
- 54 Ibid.
- 55 Ibid., p. 603.
- 56 See my Harvard Academy paper on 'The Attitudes of Middle Eastern Elites and Counter-Elites towards Political Order', published under the title, 'The Fundamental Challenge to the Secular Order in the Middle East', in *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, vol. 23, 1 (1999), pp. 191–210. On elites see also chapter 3 in this book.
- 57 See the references in note 8 above.
- 58 R. Bendix, *Freiheit und historisches Schicksal. Heidelberger Max-Weber-Vorlesungen*, Frankfurt/M., 1982, p. 132.
- 59 See Castells, *The Power of Identity* (referenced in note 5 above), pp. 8ff.
- 60 Jean-Paul Charnay, *Sociologie religieuse de L'Islam*, Paris, 1978. For a combination of the approaches of Islamic studies and social history see Maxime Rodinson, *Islam et capitalisme*, Paris, 1966.
- 61 See Gerald Holton, *Science and Anti-Science*, Cambridge, MA, 1993, in particular pp. 145–89.
- 62 See, in particular, Ernest Gellner, *Muslim Society*, Cambridge and London, 1981 (collection of essays).
- 63 Ernest Gellner, *Postmodernism, Reason and Religion*, London, 1992, in particular pp. 40ff., 80ff. See also my article referenced in note 48 above.
- 64 See the classical work by Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, new printing, Oxford, 1979, here, in particular, pp. 239ff.
- 65 See the new print of the classical Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, New York, 1998, chapter 17. For the ensuing develop-

- ments and the surge of political Islam, see B. Tibi, *Aufbruch am Bosphorus. Die Türkei zwischen Europa und dem Islamismus*, Munich, 1998.
- 66 On the conflict between fiqh and rational philosophy, see Tibi, *Der wahre Imam* (referenced in note 24 above), Part 2.
- 67 On this debate, see C. Seyfarth and W. Sprondel (eds), *Seminar: Religion und gesellschaftliche Entwicklung. Studien zur Protestantismus-Kapitalismus-These Max Webers*, Frankfurt/M., 1973, p. 9. See also Wolfgang Schluchter (ed.), *Max Webers Sicht des Islam*, Frankfurt/M., 1987.
- 68 See Muhammed Imara, *al-Islam wa al-uruba wa al-ilmaniyya* (Islam, Arabism, and Secularism), Beirut, 1981, particularly pp. 57ff.
- 69 Yahya H.H. Farqhal, *Haqiqat al-ilmaniyya* (The Truth about Secularism), published by al-Azhar, Cairo, 1989.
- 70 B. Tibi, 'Islam and Secularization', in *Islam and Civilization: Proceedings of the First International Islamic Philosophy Conference* (19–22 November 1979). The papers were published by Mourad Wahba, Cairo, 1982, my paper pp. 65–79. (Arabic version in: *Qadaya Arabiyya*, Beirut, vol. 7, 3 [1980], pp. 12–23). See also the concluding chapter in my book *The Crisis* (referenced in note 26), on the 'Secularization of Islam', pp. 127–48.
- 71 Tibi, 'Secularization and De-Secularization in Islam', paper presented to the international conference 'Science and Secularization', The Van Leer Institute, Jerusalem (31 May–3 June 1999). Published in 2000 (see note 8 above).
- 72 T.G. Carroll, 'Secularization and States of Modernity', in *World Politics*, vol. 36, 3 (1984), pp. 362–82, particularly pp. 375 and 380.
- 73 This debate is well documented in the reader edited by Heinz Horst Schrey, *Säkularisierung*, Darmstadt, 1981.
- 74 See Ali M. Jarisha and Muhammed Sh. Zaibaq, *Asalib al-ghazu al-fikri li al-alam al-Islami* (Methods of Intellectual Invasion of the Islamic World), Cairo, 1987, pp. 37ff., 92ff.
- 75 See also Theodore H. von Laue, *World Revolution of Westernization: the Twentieth Century in Global Perspective*, New York, 1987.
- 76 Daniel Bell, 'The Return of the Sacred? The Argument on the Future of Religion', in Daniel Bell, *The Winding Passage: Essays and Sociological Journeys 1960–1980*, New York, 1980, pp. 324ff., particularly p. 332.
- 77 See Gerrit W. Gong, *The Standard of 'Civilization' in International Society*, Oxford, 1984, chapters 1 and 2.
- 78 Tibi, *Kreuzzug und Dihad* (referenced in note 15), chapters 1 and 3.
- 79 Ibid., chapter 5.

Chapter 5: The Politicisation of Religion: Political Islam as a Defensive-Cultural Response to Global Challenges. A Social-Scientific Interpretation

- 1 On the two waves of Islamic expansion, see B. Tibi, *Kreuzzug und Dihad. Der Islam und die christliche Welt*, Munich, 1999, chapter 1 on Arab futuhat (conquests), chapter 4 on Ottoman conquests. Chapter 6 deals with the European expansion.
- 2 Maxime Rodinson, *La Fascination de l'Islam*, Paris, 1980, pp. 63ff., 95ff. In contrast, the German Orientalist Tilman Nagel argued in his lecture on the

- occasion of the 250th Anniversary of Islamic Studies in Göttingen that Orientalist philology needs to halt the social-scientific intrusion into its domain. In my view Nagel stands in the tradition of German parochial Orientalism. On Nagel and on his community, see the respective subchapter in B. Tibi, *Europa ohne Identität? Die Krise der multikulturellen Gesellschaft*, Munich, 1998, pp. 344–52.
- 3 A classic example of this view can be found in M. Muslehuddin, *Philosophy of Islamic Law and the Orientalists: a Comparative Study of the Islamic Legal System*, Lahore (Pakistan), no date.
 - 4 Critically Bernard Lewis, 'The State of Middle Eastern Studies', in *The American Scholar*, vol. 48 (1979), pp. 365–81.
 - 5 See the classic work by Clifford Geertz, *Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia*, 2nd printing, Chicago, 1971. German translation edited and with commentary by B. Tibi, Frankfurt/M., 1988 and 1991.
 - 6 A combination of the study of realities with a knowledge of the scripture is my approach to studying Islam. I call it *social-scientific historical Islamology*. I believe my two books on Islam, *Der wahre Imam. Der Islam von Mohammed bis zur Gegenwart*, 2nd edition, Munich, 1997 (Paperback-Edition, 1998); and *Kreuzzug und Djiha*d. (referenced in note 1), are cornerstones for this approach.
 - 7 For an alternative interpretation, see B. Tibi, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1998.
 - 8 For more details, see B. Tibi, *Arab Nationalism: between Islam and the Nation-State*, 3rd enlarged edition, London and New York, 1997. In contrast to the Arab East, the nationalist movement in the Maghreb was always markedly Islamic in character, as there is no Christian elite there. With the exception of Tunisia, salafīyya Islam was a part of nationalism. Taking Algeria as an example, this is illustrated by Ali Merad, *Le réformisme Musulman en Algérie*, Paris, 1967; see also the article by Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, 'Retreat from the Secular Path? Islamic Dilemmas of Arab Politics', in *Review of Politics*, vol. 28 (1966), pp. 447–76; it continues to be topical.
 - 9 One of the seminal works presenting this programme is Salim al-Awwa, *Fi al-nizam al-siyasi li al-dawla al-Islamiyya* (The Political System of the Islamic State), 6th edition, Cairo, 1983.
 - 10 A misleading interpretation that confuses the religion of Islam with political Islam, hence confusing religion and ideology, is John Voll and John Esposito, *Islam and Democracy*, New York, 1996. See my critical review in: *The Journal of Religion*, vol. 78, 4 (1998), pp. 667–9.
 - 11 See Maxime Rodinson, *Islam et Capitalisme*, Paris, 1966; see also the German edition with a lengthy introduction by B. Tibi (ed.), *Islam und Kapitalismus*, Frankfurt/M., 1986, pp. ix–li, on Rodinson and his work.
 - 12 *The Koran*, trans. N.J. Dawood, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1974, here sura 33, verse 40.
 - 13 Bouman states: 'The important thing here is the new idea "Seal-Khatam," a word that appears only in this verse. The Arabic word originates from Aramaic and means ensealment (*obsignatio*), and definitive conclusion (*conclusio*).' Johan Bouman, *Gott und Mensch im Koran. Eine Strukturform*

religiöser Anthropologie anhand des Beispiels Allah und Muhammad, Darmstadt, 1977, p. 31.

- 14 Ibid., p. 69.
- 15 See the comprehensive work by Marshall G.S. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam*, 3 vols, Chicago, 1974.
- 16 B. Tibi, *The Crisis of Modern Islam: a Preindustrial Culture in the Scientific-Technological Age*, Salt Lake City, 1988.
- 17 Shakib Arslan, *Limadha ta'khara al-muslimun wa limadha taqaddama ghairahum* (Why Are Muslims Backward While Others Have Developed?) new edition, Beirut, 1965 (first published in Cairo, 1930). English trans.: *Our Decline and Its Causes*, 2nd printing, London, 1952.
- 18 Tibi, *The Crisis* (referenced in note 16), Part 3.
- 19 R. Peters, *Islam and Colonialism: the Doctrine of Jihad in Modern History*, The Hague and Paris, 1979, especially pp. 105–21.
- 20 On both variants, see the appropriate section in Tibi, *Arab Nationalism* (see note 8 above).
- 21 See the case study by Daniel Crecelius, 'The Course of Secularization in Modern Egypt', in John L. Esposito (ed.), *Islam and Development: Religion and Sociopolitical Change*, Syracuse, 1980, pp. 49ff.; and B. Tibi, 'Islam and Secularization, Religion and Functional Differentiation of the Social System', in *Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie*, vol. 66 (1980), pp. 207–22.
- 22 Ali Abdelraziq, *al-Islam wa usul al-hukm* (Islam and Patterns of Government), new printing, Beirut, 1966 (first published in Cairo 1925). French trans. in *Revue des Etudes Islamiques* vols 7 and 8 (1933–34).
- 23 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *Hatmiyyat al-hall al-Islami* (The Determination of the Islamic Solution), 3 vols, vol. 1: *al-Hulul al-mustawrada wa kaif janat ala ummatina* (The Imported Solutions: How They Became Entrenched in Our Community), Beirut, 1974, especially pp. 88ff.; vol. 3: *Bayinat al-hall al-Islami wa shabahat al-ilmaniyyin wa al-mutagharibin* (The Salient Features of the Islamic Solution and the Suspicions of the Secularists and the Westernised), Cairo, 1988.
- 24 Unlike Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, New York, 1977, pp. 13ff., the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann, 'Die Weltgesellschaft', in Luhmann, *Soziologische Aufklärung*, vol. 2, Opladen, 1975, pp. 51–61, equates international system and international society.
- 25 See Barrie Axford, *The Global System: Economics, Politics and Culture*, New York, 1995. We need however to be wary of the misleading injection of postmodern questionable fashions into serious issues, see Bryan Turner, *Orientalism, Postmodernism and Globalism*, London, 1994 and the Contributions in *Islam, Globalization and Postmodernity*, eds, A.S. Ahmed and H. Donnan, London, 1994.
- 26 See an analysis of Arabic literature on this subject, 'Fi al-fikr al-Arabi al-mu'asir, al-kitaba al-wasfiyyat wa al-kitaba al-thawriyya' (On Contemporary Arabic Thought: the Revolutionary and the Descriptive Writings), in Adonis (ed.), *Mawaqif* (Beirut), 3 (March/April, 1969), pp. 93–117. Fouad Ajami refers to this article in his *Arab Predicament*, Cambridge, 1981, pp. 28f.
- 27 See Michael C. Hudson, *Arab Politics: the Search for Legitimacy*, New Haven, 1977, in particular pp. 1–30. See also B. Tibi, 'Structural and Ideological

- Change in the Arab Subsystem since the Six-Day-War', in Y. Lukacs/A. Battah (eds), *The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Two Decades of Change*, Boulder, CO, 1988, pp. 147–63.
- 28 See 'Arab Integration' revisited in the contributions edited by Michael Hudson, *Middle East Dilemma: the Politics and Economics of Arab Integration*, New York, 1999, with my contribution on pp. 92–106.
 - 29 See John Waterbury and R. El-Mallakh, *The Middle East in the Coming Decade*, New York, 1980, particularly pp. 21ff. and 41ff.
 - 30 For more details see chapters 5, 6 and 7 in: B. Tibi, *Conflict and War in the Middle East. From Interstate War to New Security*, 3rd revised and enlarged edition, London and New York, 1998.
 - 31 Philip Khoury, 'Islamic Revivalism and the Crisis of the Secular State in the Arab World: a Historical Appraisal', in Ibrahim Ibrahim (ed.), *Arab Resources: the Transformation of a Society*, London, 1983, pp. 213ff., particularly p. 215.
 - 32 Michael C. Hudson, 'Islam and Political Development', in Esposito, *Islam and Development* (referenced in note 21), pp. 1–24.
 - 33 See chapter 11 on Morocco and Saudi-Arabia in B. Tibi, *Islam and the Cultural Accommodation of Social Change*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1990.
 - 34 C.H. Moore, *Tunisia since Independence*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1965; and the chapter on Tunisia in G. Grohs and B. Tibi, *Zur Soziologie der Dekolonisation in Afrika*, Frankfurt/M., 1973, pp. 80–121.
 - 35 See Rifaat S. Ahmed, *Rasa'l Juheyman al-Utaibi qaid al-muqtahimin lil masjid al-haram bi Mecca* (Treatises of Juheyman al-Utaibi, the leader of the Invaders of the Holy Mosque in Mecca), Cairo, 1988.
 - 36 Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process*, 2 vols, New York, 1978 and 1982. On the relevance of Elias's concept for understanding modern Islam and its position in this global context, see Tibi, *The Crisis of Modern Islam* (referenced in note 16), pp. 21–31.
 - 37 Franz Borkenau, *Der Übergang vom feudalen zum bürgerlichen Weltbild*, new edition, Darmstadt, 1980. Also relevant in this regard is the study by Ernst Topitsch, *Erkenntnis und Illusion, Grundstrukturen unserer Weltauffassung*, Hamburg, 1979, especially pp. 50ff.
 - 38 See B. Tibi, 'The Simultaneity of the Unsimultaneous', in Philip Khoury/Joeeph Kostiner, *Tribes and States Formation in the Middle East*, Berkeley, 1990.
 - 39 Niklas Luhmann, *Funktion der Religion*, Frankfurt/M., 1977, pp. 115ff. and pp. 121ff., for the following quotations.
 - 40 Maxime Rodinson, *Mohammed*, Lucerne and Frankfurt/M., 1975, p. 281.
 - 41 See the seminal work by al-Awwa, *Fi al-nizam al-siyasi* (referenced in note 9) and chapters 7 and 8 in my book *The Challenge of Fundamentalism* (referenced in note 7) with further references.
 - 42 Wilfred C. Smith, *The Meaning and End of Religion*, paperback edition, New York, 1978, p. 117.
 - 43 Thomas W. Arnold, *The Caliphate*, 2nd printing, London, 1965.
 - 44 S.H.M. Jafri, *The Origins and Early Development of Shi'a Islam*, London and Beirut, 1979, especially pp. 289ff. See also Moojan Momen, *An Introduction to Shi'i Islam*, New Haven, 1985.
 - 45 Hamid Enayat, *Modern Islamic Political Thought*, Austin, TX, 1982, p. 3; see also my review in *MESA Bulletin*, vol. 17, 2 (1983), pp. 210–11.

- 46 Ali H. al-Khartabuli, *al-Islam wa al-khilafa* (Islam and the Caliphate), Beirut, 1969.
- 47 See the new interpretation of Mawardi by Said Bensaid, *Dawlat al-khilafa, dirasa fi al-tafkir al-siyasi ind al-Mawardi* (The State of the Caliphate: a Study of the Political Thought of Mawardi), Rabat no date. See also the chapter on Mawardi in Tibi, *Der wahre Imam* (referenced in note 6), pp. 151–77.
- 48 Mustafa Abu-Zaid Fahmi, *Fan al-hukm fi al-Islam* (The Art of Government in Islam), Cairo, 1977.
- 49 Most representative for a great number of writings is Ali M. Jarisha and Mohammad S. Zaibaq, *Asalib al-ghazu al-fikri li al-alam al-Islami* (Methods of the Intellectual Invasion of the Muslim World), 2nd printing, Medina, 1978.
- 50 Ahmad Abbas Salih, *al-Yamin wa al-yasar fi al-Islam* (The Right and the Left in Islam), Beirut, 1973.
- 51 Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge, reprint 1996.
- 52 Abdelraziq, *al-Islam wa usual al-hukm* (referenced in note 22).
- 53 Mohammed Said al-Ashmawi, *al-Khilafah al-Islamiyya* (The Islamic Caliphate), Cairo, 1990. In the source book *Liberal Islam*, ed. by Charles Kurzman, New York, 1998 we rightly find translations from the work of al-Ashmawi, but most disturbingly also some misleading texts by leading and active Islamists like Y. al-Qaradawi and Rachid Ghannouchi. One is inclined to ask: are there no differences between liberal Islam and political Islam?
- 54 See also Tibi, *Arab Nationalism* (referenced in note 8).
- 55 Josef van Ess, *Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra. Eine Geschichte des religiösen Denkens im frühen Islam*, vol. 1, Berlin, 1991, p. 17.
- 56 Jihad does not mean ‘holy war’ but rather ‘effort’, endeavour’, or ‘hard work’. See B. Tibi, ‘War and Peace in Islam’, in Terry Nardin (ed.), *The Ethics of War and Peace: Religious and Secular Perspectives*, Princeton, NJ, 1996 (paperback 1998), pp. 128–45.
- 57 Leonard Binder, *The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East*, New York, 1964, p. 131.
- 58 For additional case studies on political Islam, see my earlier book *Islam and the Cultural Accommodation of Social Change*, Part IV; see also the following readers by Shireen T. Hunter (ed.), *The Politics of Islamic Revivalism: Diversity and Unity*, Bloomington, IN, 1988; A.S. Sidahmed and A. Ehteshami, eds, *Islamic Fundamentalism*, Boulder, CO, 1996; and R. Scott-Appleby (ed.), *Spokesmen for the Despised: Fundamentalist Leaders of the Middle East*, Chicago, 1997.

Chapter 6: From Religious Belief to Political Commitment: the Fundamentalist Revolt against the Secular Order. Between Cultural Modernity and Neo-Absolutism

- 1 Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, New York, 1973; and Dale Eickelman, *The Middle East: an Anthropological Approach*, Englewood Cliffs,

- NJ, 1981. See the survey by Adam Kuper, *Culture: the Anthropologists' Account*, Cambridge, MA, 1999.
- 2 Robert Wuthnow, *Meaning and Moral Order: Explorations in Cultural Analysis*, Berkeley, 1987. See also Peter Berger et al., *Cultural Analysis*, New York, 1986.
- 3 It is important to ascertain that my views are different from those of Huntington, even though I acknowledge his primacy in the debate. See B. Tibi, *Krieg der Zivilisationen*, revised and expanded new edition, Munich, 1998 (first 1995), in particular chapter 7 of the new edition on Huntington; and Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, New York, 1996.
- 4 Hedley Bull, 'The Revolt against the West', in Hedley Bull/Adam Watson (eds), *The Expansion of International Society*, Oxford, 1984, pp. 217–28.
- 5 For this idea and the supporting sources, see B. Tibi, *Der wahre Imam. Der Islam von Mohammed bis zur Gegenwart*, Munich, 1996 (3rd edition, 1998), in particular chapter 3.
- 6 Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, Cambridge, MA, 1986.
- 7 The Erasmus Foundation (ed.), *The Limits of Pluralism: Neo-Absolutisms and Relativism*, Amsterdam, 1994 (Gellner, pp. 163–6, Geertz pp. 167–72). See herein my contribution on Islamic neo-absolutism, pp. 29–35. I do side with Gellner (see note 8).
- 8 Ernest Gellner, *Postmodernism, Reason and Religion*, London, 1992, p. 84.
- 9 Marshall G.S. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam*, 3 vols, Chicago, 1977, in particular, vol. 2: The Expansion of Islam.
- 10 M.S. al-Awwa, *Fi al-nizam al-siyasi li al-dawla al-Islamiyya* (On the Political System of the Islamic State), 6th edition, Cairo, 1983.
- 11 See chapter 6 on the nation-state in B. Tibi, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1998.
- 12 Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798–1939*, Oxford, 1962.
- 13 Anthony Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence*, Berkeley, 1987 (see also note 40 below).
- 14 B. Tibi, 'The Simultaneity of the Unsimultaneous: Old Tribes and Imposed Nation-States in the Modern Middle East', in Philip Khoury/Joseph Kostiner (eds), *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East*, Berkeley, 1990, pp. 127–52; see also note 11.
- 15 Theodore von Laue, *The World Revolution of Westernization*, New York, 1987.
- 16 B. Tibi, *The Crisis of Modern Islam*, Salt Lake City, 1988 and also by the author, *Islam and the Cultural Accommodation of Social Change*, Boulder, CO, 1990.
- 17 Herbert A. Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna, Averroës on Intellect*, New York, 1992.
- 18 Bernard Lewis, *The Muslim Discovery of Europe*, New York, 1982, chapter: 'Science and Technology', pp. 221–38; and for a historical comparison Howard R. Turner, *Science in Medieval Islam*, Austin, TX, 1995.
- 19 Muhammed Abduh, *al-Islam wa al-nasraniyya bain al-ilm wa al-madaniyya* (Islam and Christianity between Science and Civilisation), new printing, Beirut, 1983.
- 20 For references on this debate, see B. Tibi, 'Culture and Knowledge: the Islamization of Knowledge as a Postmodern Project?' in *Theory, Culture & Society*, vol. 12, 1 (1995), pp. 1–24.

- 21 David Gress, *From Plato to NATO: The Idea of the West and its Opponents*, New York, 1998, pp. 503f.
- 22 B. Tibi, 'The Worldview of Sunni Arab Fundamentalists: Attitudes toward Modern Science and Technology', in Martin Marty/Scott Appleby (eds), *Fundamentalisms and Society*, Chicago, 1993, pp. 73–102.
- 23 On this issue see the classic works by Franz Borkenau, *Der Übergang vom feudalen zum bürgerlichen Weltbild*, new printing, Darmstadt, 1980; and Edgar Zilsel, *Die sozialen Ursprünge der neuzeitlichen Wissenschaft*, Frankfurt/M., 1976.
- 24 B. Tibi, *Islamischer Fundamentalismus, moderne Wissenschaft und Technologie*, Frankfurt/M., 1992 (new printing 1993).
- 25 Even the most respected reform-Muslim Fazlur Rahman, *Islam and Modernity*, Chicago, 1982, fails to meet this challenge.
- 26 On the debate among intellectuals on *asalah* and *turath*, see Centre for Arab Unity Studies/Beirut (ed.), *al-Turath wa tahadiyyat al-asr fi al-watan al-Arabi* (On Cultural Heritage and the Contemporary Challenges in the Arab World), Beirut, 1985.
- 27 See Syed Alatas, *Islam, Secularism and the Philosophy of the Future*, London, 1985.
- 28 Z. Sardar, *Exploration in Islamic Science*, London, 1989.
- 29 See Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna, Averroës on Intellect* (referenced in note 17); and Tibi, *Der wahre Imam* (referenced in note 5); and on the Hellenisation of Islam W.M. Watt, *Islamic Philosophy and Theology*, Edinburgh, 1962, parts 2 and 3.
- 30 Leslie Lipson, *The Ethical Crises of Civilization*, London, 1993.
- 31 *Ibid*, p. 62.
- 32 Hassan al-Sharqawi, *al-Muslimun hukama wa ulama* (The Muslims as Scientists and as Wise Men), Cairo, 1987, p. 12.
- 33 See Institute of Islamic Thought (ed.), *Toward Islamization of Disciplines*, Herndon, VA, 1989. For a critique see also my article referenced in note 20 above.
- 34 Franz Rosenthal, *The Classical Heritage in Islam*, London, 1992.
- 35 On this distinction, see George Makdisi, *The Rise of Colleges: Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West*, Edinburgh, 1981. See also Tibi, *Kreuzzug und Dihad. Der Islam und die christliche Welt*, Munich, 1999, chapter 3.
- 36 See William McNeill, *The Rise of the West*, Chicago, 1963; and more recently Gress, *From Plato to NATO* (referenced in note 21).
- 37 See chapter 6 in Tibi, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism* (referenced in note 11).
- 38 Everett Mendelsohn, 'The Social Construction of Scientific Knowledge', in Mendelsohn (ed.), *The Social Production of Scientific Knowledge*, London, 1977, pp. 3–26.
- 39 Shakib Arslan, *Limatha ta'akhara al-Muslimun wa limatha taqadama ghairuhum* (Why Are Muslims Backward While Others Have Developed?), new printing, Beirut, 1965.
- 40 B. Tibi, *Arab Nationalism: between Islam and the Nation-State*, 3rd edition, London and New York, 1997.
- 41 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *Hatmiyat al-hall al-Islami* (The Islamic Solution is Determined), 3 vols, Beirut and Cairo, 1970–88.

- 42 For more details, see B. Tibi, *Conflict and War in the Middle East: from Interstate War to New Security*, London and New York, 1998, chapters 3 and 4.
- 43 Anwar al-Jundi, *Ahdaf al-taghib fi al-alam al-Islami* (The Targets of Westernisation of the Islamic World), Cairo, 1987.
- 44 On this subject, see John Kelsay, *Islam and War*, Louisville, KY, 1993, in particular chapter 5. Kelsay calls these 'warriors of Allah' (it is their own understanding: Junud Allah) 'irregular soldiers'. Mark Huband, *Warriors of the Prophet: the Struggle for Islam*, Boulder, CO, 1999 prefers a different label in the title.
- 45 See Kalevi Holsti, *The State, War, and the State of War*, Cambridge, 1996; and chapter 11 in Tibi, *Conflict and War in the Middle East* (referenced in note 42).

Part III: The Framework: the Means of Politicisation. The Revival of the Shari'a and the Islamisation of Education

Chapter 7: Social Change and the Potential for Flexibility in Islamic Law: the Shari'a between Ethics and Politicisation

- 1 H.L.A. Hart, *The Concept of Law*, 2nd printing, Oxford, 1970, p. 221. See also on international law H.L.A. Hart and Michael Akehurst, *A Modern Introduction to International Law*, 6th edition, London, 1987, pp. 21f. See also the classic, fortunately reprinted, work by F.S.C. Northrop, *The Taming of the Nations: a Study of the Cultural Basis of International Policy*, 2nd edition, Woodbridge, CT, 1987. The basic issues of international law are discussed by Terry Nardin, *Law, Morality and the Relations of States*, Princeton, NJ, 1983.
- 2 Ralf Dreier, *Recht – Moral – Ideologie. Studien zur Rechtstheorie*, Frankfurt/M., 1981, p. 24.
- 3 Abdullah An-Na'im, *Toward an Islamic Reformation*, Syracuse, NY, 1990. See also Tore Lindholm and Kari Vogt (eds), *Islamic Law Reform and Human Rights*, Copenhagen and Oslo, 1993.
- 4 On the European expansion, see B. Tibi, *Kreuzzug und D jihad. Der Islam und die christliche Welt*, Munich, 1999, chapter 6; see also Barrie Axford, *The Global System: Economics, Politics and Culture*, New York, 1995.
- 5 An-Na'im, *Toward an Islamic Reformation* (referenced in note 3), chapters 6 and 7; see also B. Tibi, 'Islamic Law/Shari'a, Human Rights, Universal Morality and International Relations', in *Human Rights Quarterly*, vol. 16, 2 (1994), pp. 277–99.
- 6 See Brun-Otto Bryde, *The Politics and Sociology of African Legal Development*, Frankfurt/M., 1976; as well as my review in *Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie*, vol. 65 (1979), pp. 433f. Bryde was promoted in 2000 to judge at the German Federal Supreme Court.
- 7 See also J.N.D. Anderson, *Islamic Law in Africa*, 3rd printing, London, 1978.
- 8 Theodor Viehweg, *Topik und Jurisprudenz. Ein Beitrag zur rechtswissenschaftlichen Grundlagenforschung*, 5th printing, Munich, 1974, p. 118.

- 9 For an authentic account, see Subhi Salih, *Ma'alim al-shari'a al-Islamiyya* (Essential Characteristics of Islamic Law), Beirut, 1975, pp. 122ff. See also Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *al-Halal wa al-haram fi al-Islam* (The Permitted and the Forbidden in Islam), 20th printing, Cairo, 1991.
- 10 On the de-Westernisation of law on the example of the *shari'a*, see B. Tibi, 'Die Entwestlichung des Rechts. Das Hudud-Strafrecht der islamischen Shari'a', in Klaus Lüderssen (ed.), *Aufgeklärte Kriminalpolitik oder Kampf gegen das Böse*, 5 vols, here vol. 5, Baden-Baden, 1998, pp. 21–30.
- 11 See Najib Armanazi, *al-Shar' al-duwali fi al-Islam* (International Law in Islam), new printing, London, 1990 (first published, Damascus, 1930). See also W.M. Watt, *Islamic Political Thought: the Basic Concepts*, Edinburgh, 1969, p. 91. See also B. Tibi, 'War and Peace in Islam', in Terry Nardin (ed.), *The Ethics of War and Peace: Religious and Secular Perspectives*, Princeton, NJ, 1996, pp. 128–45.
- 12 See the textbook by Werner Levi, *Contemporary International Law*, 2nd edition, Boulder, CO, 1991.
- 13 Dreier, *Recht* (referenced in note 2), pp. 116–17.
- 14 Maxime Rodinson, *Mohammed*, Lucerne and Frankfurt, 1975, p. 27.
- 15 See B. Tibi, *The Crisis of Modern Islam: a Preindustrial Culture in the Scientific-Technological Age*, Salt Lake City, 1988, pp. 57–66.
- 16 This is also the view of the legal Muslim reformer Mohammed Said al-Ashmawi, *Usul al-shari'a* (The Origins of the Shari'a), Cairo, 1983.
- 17 Joseph Schacht, *An Introduction to Islamic Law*, 5th printing, Oxford, 1979, p. 1.
- 18 For a detailed account, see the contributions in Nikki Keddie (ed.), *Scholars, Saints and Sufis: Muslim Religious Institutions in the Middle East since 1500*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1972; see in particular the editor's introduction.
- 19 On the Koran, see Rudi Paret, *Mohammed und der Koran*, 4th printing, Stuttgart, 1976; as well as the internationally leading monograph by R. Bell and W.M. Watt, *Introduction to the Qur'an*, 2nd printing, Edinburgh, 1977. Interesting interpretations of the Koran are given by Johan Bouman, *Gott und Mensch im Koran. Eine Strukturform religiöser Anthropologie anhand des Beispiels Allah und Muhammad*, Darmstadt, 1977.
- 20 On the interpretation of revelation in Islam, see W.M. Watt, *Islamic Revelation in the Modern World*, Edinburgh, 1969.
- 21 See the introduction to N.J. Coulson, *A History of Islamic Law*, 3rd printing, Edinburgh, 1978.
- 22 On the notion of de-Westernisation, see note 10 above, on the crisis of the secular nation-state, see B. Tibi, 'The Simultaneity of the Unsimultaneous: Old Tribes and Imposed Nation-States in the Modern Middle East', in Philip Khoury/Joseph Kostiner (eds), *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East*, Berkeley, 1990, pp. 127–52.
- 23 Maxime Rodinson, *Islam und Kapitalismus*, Frankfurt/M., 1971, p. 77. See also my introduction ('Maxime Rodinson, der Islam und die westlichen Islam-Studien') to the 2nd edition of this book (1986), on the work of Rodinson, pp. ix–li.
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Part IV: The Topicality: Islam and the West between Inter-Civilisational Dialogue and Political Antagonisation

Chapter 9: Islam Matters to the West! Islam and Europe, Islam in Europe: Islamic Migration between Cultural Assimilation, Political Integration and Communitarian Ghettoisation

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- 7 Malcolm Anderson, *Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World*, Cambridge, 1996.
- 8 Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: a Study of Order in World Politics*, New York, 1977, p. 273.
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- 21 Fred Halliday, *Islam and the Myth of Confrontation*, London, 1995.
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- 23 M.K. Masud, 'The Obligation to Migrate: the Doctrine of Hijra in Islamic Law', in Dale Eickelman/James Piscatori (eds), *Muslim Travellers. Pilgrimage, Migration and the Religious Imagination*, Berkeley, 1990. See H. Djaït, *Europe and Islam: Cultures and Modernity*, Berkeley, 1985.
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Chapter 10: Islam and the West in the Age of Conflict among Civilisations: the Alternative of Intercultural Dialogue as a Means of Conflict Resolution

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- 5 Raymond Aron, *Paix et guerre entre les nations*, Paris, 1962.
- 6 See Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *West-östlicher Divan*, new edition by Henrik Birus, 2 vols, Frankfurt/M., 1994; and on Lessing Karl-Josef Kuschel,

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- 7 B. Tibi, *Europa ohne Identität? Die Krise der multikulturellen Gesellschaft*, Munich, 1998, Part 3 on 'Islam in Europa' and the concluding chapter; for the historical records see chapters 2 and 5 in Tibi, *Kreuzzug und Djiha*d (referenced in note 1 above).
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 - 9 See William McNeill, *The Rise of the West: a History of Human Community*, Chicago, 1963.
 - 10 Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, New York, 1996; for a different perspective, see B. Tibi, *Krieg der Zivilisationen*, new expanded edition, Munich, 1998 (first published 1995). See also Roman Herzog, *Preventing the Clash of Civilizations: a Peace Strategy for the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Henrik Schmiegelow, New York, 1999, which includes B. Tibi, 'International Morality and Cross-Cultural Bridging', pp. 107–26.
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 - 14 On Islamic rationalism see B. Tibi, *Der wahre Imam. Der Islam von Mohammed bis zur Gegenwart*, 2nd edition, Munich, 1997, also available in the Serie Piper-edition, 1998.
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 - 16 Malcolm Anderson, *Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World*, Oxford, 1996, chapter 5.
 - 17 On these five issue-areas, see chapters 1 to 5 in Tibi, *Krieg der Zivilisationen* (referenced in note 10). The volume includes in its new 1998 edition chapter 7 with a survey of the Huntington debate in which I develop my own position.
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- 36 See the chapter 'Muhadjirun oder Citoyens' in Tibi, *Europa ohne Identität?* (referenced in note 7 above).
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- 38 Wilhelm Heitmeyer et al., *Verlockender Fundamentalismus*, Frankfurt/M., 1997.
- 39 On 'democratic peace', see Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for the Post-Cold War World*, Princeton, 1993.
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