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Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774–1923

The Impact of the West

Roderic H. Davison



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*To my students,
who for the past fifty years have made the teaching of
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and
to the librarians, archivists,
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Contents

Acknowledgments ix

Introduction xi

I. The Turks in History I

A capsule account of Turkish origins and of the rise, height, decline, and reform of the Ottoman Empire, to the rise of the Republic.

2. "Russian Skill and Turkish Imbecility": The Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji Reconsidered 29

The Ottoman-Russian treaty of 1774, allowing Russia great commercial and diplomatic privileges and a dubious "right" to protect Christians in Ottoman domains.

3. The "Dosografa" Church in the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca 51

On the nature of the Christian church that the 1774 treaty allowed the Russians to build in Istanbul, and to protect. And was it built?

4. The First Ottoman Experiment with Paper Money 60

Why and how the Sublime Porte, in 1840, issued treasury notes that became the first circulating paper money, and attendant problems.

5. Foreign and Environmental Contributions to the Political Modernization of Turkey 73

The influence of military defeat by outside powers, and of diplomatic pressure; the importance of foreign concepts and models; channels for new ideas.

6. The Advent of the Principle of Representation in the Government of the Ottoman Empire 96

How representation of the people in government organs began in 1840 on the provincial level and grew to affect the central government, especially with the constitution of 1876.

7. Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century 112

The advent of an official policy of egalitarian and secular Ottomanism; the views of leading statesmen on Christian equality, and popular attitudes.

8. The Advent of the Electric Telegraph in the Ottoman Empire 133

How Morse's invention was introduced at the time of the Crimean War,

how the telegraph system expanded, and the effects of the new technology on Ottoman government and society.

9. Westernized Education in Ottoman Turkey 166

An assessment of the impact of foreign mission schools, Ottoman technical schools, and the new Ottoman secular educational beginnings, and study abroad.

10. The Armenian Crisis, 1912–1914 180

Russia raises for her own interests the question of reforms in eastern Anatolia where most Armenians lived; the machinations of all six great powers of Europe; the Porte and the powers find a temporary solution.

11. Turkish Diplomacy from Mudros to Lausanne 206

How the nationalist movement led by Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) dealt with outside powers, 1919 to 1923, trying to get rid of British, French, Italian, Greek, and Armenian occupation forces; success lays a basis for the Republic.

12. Atatürk's Reforms: Back to the Roots 243

An analysis of the origins and background of many of the Turkish Republic's basic political principles and practices, tracing them back to nineteenth-century developments in the period of Ottoman reform.

Index 265

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Introduction

The Ottoman Empire at the start of the nineteenth century still covered a vast territory, including all of North Africa except Morocco, the whole Balkan peninsula, Anatolia, Syria, Iraq, and parts of the Arabian peninsula. Its hold on much of the area was, however, tenuous. Its peoples were many; Turks numbered somewhat fewer than half. In a world increasingly dominated by European power and increasingly agitated by nationalist sentiments this multi-ethnic Ottoman state struggled to survive. In its last century and a half it experienced both successes and failures in the quest for greater viability. After suffering defeat in the First World War, however, it finally disappeared. Among its successor states was the Turkish Republic, which established itself in the Anatolian core of the old empire.

All the essays in this volume excepting the first, a broad survey of Turkish history, examine events or developments in this period of Ottoman decline and reform, and of the birth of the republic. The modern history of Europe is often taken to begin with the French Revolution of 1789. The beginning of the modern history of the Ottoman Empire is sometimes linked to a dramatic event produced by that revolution, Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798. But the beginning can also conveniently be put at 1774, the year of the peace treaty sealing a major defeat of the Ottoman Empire by Russia, an event that pushed the Ottoman sultans toward more serious efforts at westernizing reforms. The essays begin with this treaty of Küçük Kaynarca. They end essentially with the treaty of Lausanne of 1923, which launched the republic on its life as an independent sovereign state. Most of them focus on political and diplomatic developments, but they also concern religious, intellectual, social, and economic aspects of the Ottoman world. Eleven of these studies, written for varying purposes, appeared originally in widely scattered publications over a span of thirty-three years, beginning in 1948. They are here collected for the first time and again made available. One new study, on the advent of the electric telegraph in the Ottoman Empire, has been included. Because each essay is designed to stand alone, there is occasional overlapping when one complements another.

Although independent, the essays are linked by a common theme. The linkage, which was not intentional when they were written, flows logically from the course that Ottoman history took in these years. Every essay deals with change, and in every case with change that came about because of the impact of the West. The essay "Foreign and Environmental Contributions to the Po-

litical Modernization of Turkey” focuses most specifically on that impact, but all reflect change that occurred directly or indirectly because of contact with the West.

For the Ottomans, the West in the modern period was essentially Europe. America was distant and uninvolved; individual Americans had some impact on Ottoman society, but it was modest. Europe meant, in general, a somewhat French-flavored western civilization shared by peoples in a number of large and small states, in many of which technology and industry were advancing rapidly. More specifically, Europe meant the great powers, the governments who dominated international affairs and referred to themselves as the Concert of Europe. From the eighteenth century until 1861 they were the Pentarchy of Europe—Britain, France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia. Then Italy was added as a sixth power when it became a unified kingdom, and in 1871 the unified imperial Germany replaced Prussia. Russia was a member of this western group, a full participant in European great power politics and also since the time of Peter the Great a country consciously westernizing first the military and then some other aspects of Russian life. Only after the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 was Russia split from her great power fellows to become “East.” In the essay “Turkish Diplomacy from Mudros to Lausanne” there appear “Easterners” among the Turks, those who in the postwar nationalist struggle looked to Russia for cooperation and aid, as opposed to the “Westerners,” who preferred ties to the western European powers.

The impact of the West was felt in the Ottoman Empire in many ways. The most direct was military defeat. Most of that came at the hands of Russia. Between 1768 and 1918 there were seven Ottoman-Russian wars, in every one of which Russian forces invaded Ottoman territory. The first of these, ending in Ottoman defeat and the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, set the precedent for Ottoman defeat in all the others except the Crimean War of 1853–1856, when Britain and France aided the Ottomans. The last was the Great War of 1914–1918, which saw Russian victory in 1915–1916 reversed by Ottoman victory in 1917–1918 when the Bolshevik revolution convulsed Russia. But the Ottoman victory proved to be ephemeral, as the same two powers who had supported the Ottomans in the Crimea were, this time, the instruments of their defeat and humiliation in 1918. Their empire was on its deathbed.

The great powers also on occasion took Ottoman territory for themselves, not only by conquest but also by occupation declared “temporary” or by diplomatic convention forced on the Istanbul government. Five of the six great powers helped themselves to Ottoman provinces between 1830 and 1912. Only Germany did not, but she coveted the great central Baghdad Railway sphere in Anatolia, as the study of “The Armenian Crisis, 1912–1914” makes clear. During the Great War the Allied powers further secretly and prospectively partitioned much of the Ottoman Empire for themselves, by the Constantinople agreement of 1915 and the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 and

others. These furnished the background, although not as it turned out the exact model, for the devastating treaty of Sèvres of 1920 that reduced Turkey to a nubbin and spurred the nationalist movement of Mustafa Kemal to new efforts. In sum, the Ottoman Empire took a severe battering at the hands of the European powers through the course of a century and a half.

Defeat and despoiling by the West were supplemented by diplomatic pressure and interference in Ottoman domestic affairs. This interference, especially by Britain and France, was at times aimed at strengthening the Ottoman state; sometimes it was not. Almost always, however, the diplomatic pressure was resented by the Sublime Porte. Often the European powers used diplomatic intervention to further the cause of one or another of the minority peoples, usually Christian, in the empire. This sort of interference was the most threatening when practiced by Russia, an immediate neighbor. Russian misuse of the articles in the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca permitting her to build and protect a church in Istanbul bothered the Ottomans on several occasions and helped to bring on the Crimean War. Russian raising of the Armenian question in 1912 for the purpose of expanding her own influence in Anatolia furnishes a prime example of diplomatic interference. It led, among other things, to a conference of all the great powers held in the Ottomans' own capital, but with no Ottoman participation.

The western impact was felt not only in war, territorial conquest, and diplomatic intervention but also in the economic dominance that Europe acquired in the Ottoman domains. European manufactures, more and more machine produced, supplanted indigenous wares in many instances. Europe's technological advantage was magnified by extraterritorial rights benefiting their merchants and goods that the powers had gained in earlier years. Among the capitulatory rights were very low Ottoman import duties. These concessions, once unilateral grants by the sultans, became enshrined in the eighteenth century in bilateral treaties between the Porte and European powers—now a matter of right rather than of gift. The low import duties were confirmed by an Ottoman-British commercial convention of 1838, along with Ottoman export duties at a higher rate, increasing thus the disadvantage under which Ottoman manufactures labored. Other western powers secured commercial conventions with the Porte on the same model. In addition, the Ottoman Empire went into debt to westerners, beginning at the time of the Crimean War. The Porte sold bonds, many of them on the European market, failed in 1876 to meet the interest payments, and thereafter came under European financial tutelage. The Council of the Public Debt, although it was an Ottoman organ, was created to represent the European creditors. From 1881 on it collected and disbursed some of the most important Ottoman revenues for the benefit of the bondholders.

Among the western influences that affected the Ottoman Empire the nationalist spirit became perhaps the most unsettling. This sentiment, burgeoning first in western Europe, spread to Ottoman minority peoples geographically,

from the western provinces to the eastern, over the period of a century. The Greeks felt it first and revolted in 1821, getting also some great power support. Other Balkan peoples followed the same course. The last revolt against the Ottoman Empire in the name of nationalism came with the Arab rising of 1916, during the Great War. Muslim peoples came generally to nationalism later than the Christian peoples, and among the later ones to feel the impact of this western force were the Turks themselves.

Military defeat, territorial loss, diplomatic interference, economic subordination, and nationalist revolt impelled the Porte to seek strengthening—through military reorganization, administrative reform, educational development, financial and economic rejuvenation, and other measures. The reform process itself naturally led to the greater impact of the West by the adaptation of western concepts, practices, and institutions, such as appear throughout these essays: new-style army drill, the equality of rights of all subjects, representative bodies of various sorts, new law codes, constitution, foreign loans, paper money, secular schools, a diplomatic corps, newspapers, and many other innovations of western origin. Mechanical objects and hardware like the printing press, the telegraph, Krupp arms, and ironclad naval vessels were even easier to import from the West and had a more immediate impact than ideas and modes of acting. But the ideas continued to flow—not only legal and political, technological and scientific, but literary and artistic also. A high point came with Ismet Paşa's insistence at the Lausanne conference on territorial and political sovereignty for Turkey, western style: secure national boundaries, no capitulations, no economic or judicial servitudes, no western interference in independent Turkey's domestic affairs. Ismet and the nationalists used the concepts of the West to combat domination by the West.

When institutions or practices adapted from the West were launched they often met with opposition from major segments of Ottoman society. The concept of an equal and secular citizenship of all Ottoman subjects did not sit well with conservative Muslims. Secular schools also could arouse protest. Not infrequently a conflict of cultures emerged, bolstered by the common Muslim bias against innovation as something inherently bad, even blasphemous. Sometimes the reform process eventuated in a dualism—two sets of institutions side by side, one derived from the example of the West, one more traditional: two sets of schools, two kinds of law. But paralleling the conflict of cultures there was also a confluence of civilizations, as some concepts and institutions borrowed from the West took root and grew over the years: the representative principle, constitution, journalism. There was, in effect, a continuity of change under the impact of the West, not always at an even pace but never arrested.

When western ideas or institutions were adapted to Ottoman use, their advocates were almost always members of the official elite. Westernization came from the top down, from individuals usually concerned with the func-

tioning of government and ultimately with the salvation of the empire. Westernizing changes did not, as might have been the case in western European countries in analagous situations of change, well up from a vigorous yeomanry or an increasingly prosperous bourgeoisie but rather trickled down from an administrative, diplomatic, and military elite. Furthermore the changes, as well as coming from the top down, frequently came from the outside in and backward. Externals sometimes preceded essentials—Mahmud II's soldiers and civil officials, for instance, were put into western-style uniforms and costumes before they were trained in new methods or had acquired a new mentality. The backward nature of some reforms is exemplified by the desire to introduce the end product before the infrastructure was complete—the establishment of a university, for example, before the nascent school system was sufficient to undergird it. But by whatever methods and in whatever order they were introduced, western concepts and western institutions, as well as western gadgets, continued to make an impact.

The study of Ottoman history has made progress since World War II, world over and especially in the United States, where before the war it was almost nonexistent. These essays reflect, in their widening of sources, an aspect of that progress. The essay that was published earliest—in 1948, although actually written in first draft in 1938—was able to draw on no materials in Turkish, although it used a few Turkish materials available in French. The later essays have used many more materials in Turkish, both published and archival, for since 1948 sources in Turkish have become much more widely available. One reason is that some libraries in the United States and in Canada have built up important collections in that language. Another is that since the war a new generation of historians has grown up in Turkey who are doing research, writing histories, and publishing documents, which then are available elsewhere. The third reason is that Turkish libraries and Ottoman archives have been made more accessible to scholars. There are of course auxiliary reasons in the postwar development of Turkish-language courses, Middle East centers, the provision of travel and research funds, and inauguration of teaching positions in Turkish history and Turkish studies more broadly.

It is interesting to recall now that half a century ago, in the summer of 1939, I started to travel to Istanbul on a fellowship to learn to read Ottoman manuscript documents and, if possible, to do research in the Başvekâlet Arşivi, as it became known, the Prime Ministry archive housing voluminous Ottoman records. At that time Turkish, whether old or new, was taught in no American university. One had to seek private instruction or be an autodidact, or combine the two. An American historian who had pursued that course most successfully, Walter L. Wright, Jr., had been on the Princeton faculty and then had moved to Istanbul to be president of Robert College. He knew the archives there, knew that a specialist from Hungary had been helping to clas-

sify materials, knew that some of the Turkish professors could do research there, and encouraged me to see if I could also. But the war that started with Hitler's invasion of Poland came while I was en route. The fellowship administrators insisted that I return to the United States. In the years that followed, the arranging of the Ottoman archives proceeded slowly. By the 1950s some western scholars were admitted to do research there. Ultimately, I was able to do so on a number of occasions.

The greater availability of Turkish sources has changed, and will continue to change, western writing on Ottoman history, including the history of the period from 1774 to 1923 in which the western impact was so marked. The Ottoman Empire of those years used commonly to be regarded as an object of the West, rather than as an actor in its own right. The "sick man of Europe" concept was often present. Further, most of what was produced was political, military, or diplomatic history in which the Ottoman viewpoint was largely forgotten. These kinds of history are immensely important and, as Ottoman records have become available, are being much more objectively pursued. They are not, however, sufficient. The western view of Ottoman history has been broadening, as it should. Institutional history of the nineteenth century has begun to come of age, and intellectual history also, including the history of literature. More recently still, Ottoman economic history of that century has found some practitioners—not just those who detail how deeply the Ottoman Empire was in debt to the West, but those who investigate crafts, industry, transportation, communication, labor, agriculture, commerce, and capital. These fields merge into social history, which in many ways is nearly unplowed, including the history of the family and of women in the last two centuries of the Ottoman Empire. Research on such topics can sometimes be assisted by viewpoints developed in the social sciences. And as archival work brings more and more data to light, statistics will play a bigger role, as they are already beginning to do. Demographic studies are among those now profiting from data collection and statistical analysis.

Two or three other approaches to later Ottoman history can prove fruitful. One is biography. A great tradition existed in the Ottoman Empire, which carried over into the Republican period, of the biographical sketch, the *hal tercümesi*. But there is hardly as yet a single major biography in the Ottoman period, in Turkish or in any language, comparable to the two-volume life and letters of a dead Englishman, or to the life and times of a French, German, or American statesman or general or poet. No first-class biography exists even of a sultan of the late Ottoman period. Several attempts to write one for Abdülhamid II have fallen short of the mark. The history of a sultan could turn into another genre, a period history, so valuable in the study of western societies. Even the history of a decade, the complete fabric of life in a short period, could be one of the most profitable ventures for a historian. Still another area worth cultivating is local history, which exists in rudimentary form

in Turkish for a good many localities in Anatolia, and in more sophisticated form for some of the non-Turkish provinces, but this still leaves room for much investigation in the last Ottoman century. In some areas local records abound. The twin pitfalls of local patriotic piety and unsynthesized chronicle need to be avoided.

Finally, at the other extreme from local history, the Ottoman Empire as a whole needs works of synthesis. It may be that only team effort can do this well. The later Ottoman Empire, as indicated in the opening paragraph, was immense, although it was shrinking. It was made up of peoples who used about a dozen written languages, and it dealt with great powers who used five other major languages. That magnificent bibliographical tool that Andreas Tietze and Georg Hazai and their collaborators in Vienna and Budapest have given us annually since 1975, the *Turkologischer Anzeiger/Turkology Annual*, searches out and classifies books and articles in all those languages and more. Ideally, those who work in Ottoman history will use materials in all these tongues. But for any one mortal historian that seems unlikely. Cooperative effort among historians of differing language backgrounds may be one trend for the future.

These observations and hopes apply to Ottoman history in general, but they apply also to those aspects of later Ottoman history that reflect the influence of western governments and armies, western statesmen and diplomats, western ideas and institutions, western techniques and inventions. The essays that follow examine some phases of Ottoman and Turkish history where these influences played a significant part. A brief note has been added after the notes for some of the essays to call attention to a few scholarly works that supplement the essay and that have appeared since it was written.

Turks since the earliest centuries of the Christian era have been moving west. The Ottoman Empire followed this course. From its inception it had close contact with the West. At first this was the Byzantine Empire, then other states and peoples. The Ottomans pushed their way deep into Europe, nearly to Vienna. The impact in those days was probably more one of the Ottomans on the West than the reverse. There is a considerable literature on this broad topic. After the Ottomans were halted for the second time at Vienna, in 1683, the West began to have a greater impact on the Ottomans, in such ways as are outlined above. The first essay will provide some background on the Ottoman rise and ensuing decline, and then on the years 1774 to 1923 in which the other essays fit.

Note

Except for corrections of some typographical and a few factual errors, the essays are republished here as they originally appeared. The spelling of Turkish names and Turkish words is not completely standardized, as some appear in modern Turkish spelling in one place and in a conventional Anglicized spelling in another. The index will show both spellings and will contain cross-references.

The modern Turkish alphabet is phonetic. Most of its consonants are pronounced as in English, and most of its vowels as in Italian. There are a few exceptions. Turkish *c* is an English *j*, as in "jam." Turkish *ç* is an English *ch*, as in "chin," and the *ş* is an English *sh*, as in "shin." Among vowels, Turkish *ö* and *ü* are like the same vowels in German, or like the French vowels in *peu* and *tu*. Turkish has both a dotted *i*, pronounced rather like the *i* in the English "fin," and an undotted *ı*, sounded like the *i* in English "fir." A Turkish *ğ*, with a soft mark over it, is practically a vowel; it can lengthen the vowel that precedes it. A circumflex also lengthens a vowel. Thus, Ali and Âli are different names. The latter is equivalent to Aali, which is how the famous Âli Paşa signed his name when writing French.

All dates in the text are in the Gregorian calendar, not in one of the calendars used in the Ottoman Empire. Some publication dates of works cited in the notes are in Hicrî years.

Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774–1923

1. The Turks in History

When first known to history, the Turks were a nomadic people living in what is now Russian Siberia. They moved west, adopted Islam as their religion, again moved west, and built one of the world's great empires. At its apogee in the sixteenth century, the Ottoman Turkish Empire stretched from the borders of Morocco to the borders of Iran, and from southern Poland to southern Yemen. It then entered two centuries of slow decline, followed by a century of efforts to reverse the decline by a process of westernization. Finally it collapsed at the close of World War I. From its ruins sprang the Turkish Republic, which soon will celebrate its sixtieth anniversary. This frame will serve for the historical sketch that follows: rise, height, decline, reform, and republic.

The Rise of Turkish Power

It is not certain when the Turks first used that name to describe themselves. The earliest known writing in a Turkish tongue dates from the eighth century A.D.; it was found in the Orhon inscriptions near Lake Baykal. Yet Byzantine records of two centuries earlier refer to Turks, and Chinese chronicles mention them in 1300 B.C. Nor is it clear whether the word Turk first designated one tribe or a group of tribes. The latter was true at least by the late seventh and early eighth centuries, when the expanding forces of Islam came into contact with tribal groups they called Turks. Presumably at about the same period Turks also began to call themselves collectively by that name.

The designation is primarily linguistic: Turks are speakers of Turkish. Turkish, the language spoken by western Turks in Turkey today, is one of a large family of closely related Turkic languages; its tens of millions of speakers also inhabit parts of Iran, areas of the Russian Caucasus, and most of Russian and Chinese Turkestan. The Turkic tongues in turn are a part of the Altaic group, whose relationships are not so clear, but which includes Mongolian and perhaps Korean. Place names in Turkish are sprinkled in a vast belt from central Mongolia and western China across inner Asia through Iran, the Caucasus and Black Sea regions, and Turkey, into the Balkans as far as

Yugoslavia. This indicates the route of migration and expansion of Turks in past centuries.

Early in the Christian era Turkish tribes living on the fringes of Mongolia seem to have been bumped westward by stronger tribal confederations. They migrated to new homes near the Syr Darya (Jaxartes) in Central Asia. Some established urban centers. For a time in the sixth century there was an organized state in the area, which sent ambassadors to Constantinople, the Byzantine capital, and received tribute and ambassadors from the Byzantines. This little kingdom controlled the silk route from China to the West—not a road, of course, but a series of merchants and caravan stops. But the kingdom soon broke into smaller tribal units or incipient city-states.

When in the seventh century the Arabs, under the banner of their new religion, burst from their peninsula to overrun Syria, Irak, and Iran, they encountered the edges of the Turkish world in Central Asia. Through military contact, trade, and the proselytism of itinerant holy men and dervishes the Turks came to know Islam and gradually to adopt it. Some had been Buddhists, some Zoroastrians, some Christians, some Manichaeans, but most had been pagans. By the tenth century most Turks who lived in the Syr Darya region had become Muslims. They were still predominantly horsemen, and the life they led is reflected in the great Turkish epic *Dede Korkut*. The tales, told by Grandfather Korkut, originated among the Oğuz confederation of Turkish tribes probably in the tenth century. They praise the traditional virtues of tribal life: horsemanship, heroism, loyalty. They show devotion to Islam (in both orthodox and heterodox forms) and also reveal a monogamous society in which women played a prominent role.

Then there began a reverse penetration. Groups of Turks began to enter the classical world of Islam. At first some were employed as slave fighters and guards for the caliphs of Baghdad or their subordinates. Then in the eleventh century other Turks struck out on their own, taking control of eastern districts in the caliphal lands. These were Seljuk Turks, so called after a warrior leader from one of the Oğuz tribes. In 1055 Tuğrul, a grandson of Seljuk, led his followers to the capture of Baghdad, the seat of the caliph himself. The caliph was neither killed nor deposed but remained as religious head of the community, while Tuğrul and his successors, also in the name of Islam, exercised political and military control with the title of sultan. For a half-century they ruled in the central lands of the Abbasid caliphate. The Seljuk Turks now appeared as strong defenders of orthodox Islam against the varied heterodoxies of the Shiites. Their intent was to continue expanding their control to the west, to rescue Syria and Egypt from the rule of the Fatimid schismatics. Unplanned but portentous events diverted them from exclusive concentration on this objective.

These events were the successful raids of Turkish bands into Byzantine Anatolia. The raiders were nomadic Turkish tribesmen from Central Asia,

usually called Türkmen (Turcomans), whom the Seljuks had earlier shunted to fighting along the borders of Christian Byzantium in order to be rid of them. The Türkmen fought both for booty and for Islam, but an Islam of a more popular and dervish-inspired sort than the variety approved in Baghdad. It happened that the Byzantine Empire was at one of its weaker stages in the later eleventh century. The Türkmen raiders infiltrated Anatolia, as the Arabs of the seventh and eighth centuries had never been able to do. They raided as far as Kayseri. When the Byzantine emperor gathered a large army for a counterblow, Tuğrul's successor, Alp Aslan, felt obliged to respond with his regular forces. The ensuing Turkish victory of Malazgirt (Manzikert) near Lake Van in eastern Anatolia in 1071 broke the Byzantine hold in the east, leaving Anatolia open to further penetration. Recently the nine-hundredth anniversary of Malazgirt was celebrated in Turkey. It symbolizes not only the military victory of the Turks but also the beginning of what would be a four-hundred-year process of Turkification of Anatolia.

It was not soldiers of the organized Seljuk state who infiltrated Anatolia but Türkmen raiders. Calling themselves gazis (warriors for the faith) they rode in from the east in increasing numbers, some even going all the way to the Aegean coast. To stabilize the situation the Seljuk rulers sent one of their family, Süleyman, as organizer and ruler of the unruly elements. He fixed his forces and his capital far to the west, at İznik (Nicaea), and for a few years in the 1080s it looked as if a new frontier of some stability had been secured in western Anatolia between Byzantines and Turks. But Süleyman's ambitions for more eastern lands led to his death in battle against other Seljuks in 1086, and for a decade thereafter Anatolia was the scene of many-sided conflicts among local Turkish leaders seeking power, and between them and Byzantine rulers in the west.

In this situation the Byzantine emperor Alexis I appealed to the Christian West for aid. The resultant First Crusade retook İznik for the Byzantines in 1097. The Christian successes pushed the Turkish frontier eastward, back to Dorylaeum near modern Eskişehir, where it remained for more than a century. Seljuk control in Anatolia was then limited to a region on the central plateau, flanked in the west by Byzantine territory and in the east by Lesser Armenia and the crusader state of Edessa.

Konya became the capital of the Anatolian Seljuk state, now quite independent of any control from Baghdad or elsewhere. Turks called their state the Sultanate of Rum, since it occupied territories that once belonged to Rome—although to the Turks “Rum” no longer meant Latin civilization but Greek, for the Eastern Roman Empire had long since lost what Latin veneer it once had possessed. So the Seljuk sultanate was a successor state ruling part of the medieval Greek empire, and within it the process of Turkification of a previously Hellenized Anatolian population continued. That population must already have been of very mixed ancestry, deriving from ancient Hittite,

Phrygian, Cappadocian, and other civilizations as well as Roman and Greek. The Turkish language, the Arabic script that Turks had adopted, and Islam became dominant along with Seljuk rule. Among the instruments of Turkification and Islamization was the Mevlevi order of dervishes, established at Konya in the early thirteenth century by the mystic poet Celaleddin Rumi. The whirling dervishes seem to have been effective missionaries. At the same time the Greek church lost many properties, and bishops were often kept from their sees by the Turks. Thus, material difficulties and self-interest as well as conviction led to conversions of Christians to Islam.

For more than a century, from about 1100 to 1240, the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum flourished. It took lands from the rival Türkmen state of the Danişmends to the east. In the early thirteenth century it gained seaports on both the northern and the southern Anatolian coasts, at Sinop and Antalya, and conducted a thriving commerce with Italian city-states. The remains of Seljuk roads, bridges, mosques, hans (khans), and other monuments in Konya and elsewhere in Anatolia bear testimony to its vigorous life. Then from the outside came an anti-Seljuk blow far more shattering than the Crusades, and from the opposite direction.

Mongol hordes, still pagan, swept out of Asia into the Near East, spreading terror as they came. Even before destroying Baghdad in 1258, they invaded eastern Anatolia and defeated the Seljuk army of Rum in 1243 at the battle of Köseadağ. Thereafter the Seljuk state was tributary to the Mongols, who, following a local rebellion, kept troops and a governor in Anatolia. The Sultanate of Rum became a dependency of the Ilkhanid dynasty of Islamicized Mongols who ruled from Iran. The weakened Seljuk state was further beset by new waves of Türkmen tribesmen, some driven from Central Asia or eastern Anatolia by the Mongols and some following in the Mongol wake. Here in Anatolia in the late 1200s Marco Polo encountered the Türkmens—"a rude people," he called them, who bred fine horses, sought good pastures, and revered the Prophet Muhammed. He remarked on the cities, with their many Greek and Armenian inhabitants, on the fine carpet and silk manufactures, and on the dependence of Konya and Kayseri on the Mongol Great Khan.

Though the Seljuk dynasty of Rum lingered until 1307, the newly arrived Türkmens provided the moving force in a rearrangement of power in Anatolia and in a renewed expansion of Turks into western Anatolia, where the Byzantines had ruled since the First Crusade. Again, as had occurred two centuries before, there was a period of Byzantine weakness that the gazi warriors exploited. Byzantine rulers had been evicted from their great city in 1204 by the Latins of the Fourth Crusade, who then set up their own Latin kingdom of Constantinople. Then in 1261 the Byzantines, from their base in western Anatolia, regained Constantinople—but at the expense of weakening their Anatolian defenses and of becoming involved with other enemies to the west, like the Bulgars and the Serbs. The Turks profited from this. Pushing on the

Byzantine frontiers, competing with each other, Turkish emirs (local princes) with their followers carved out little emirates in former Byzantine territories. They did this also in former Seljuk territories, as the Ilkhanid control faltered in the fourteenth century.

One of the emirs was Osman (1299?–1324?), whose emirate was based on Söğüt, a small town near present-day Eskişehir. His was originally one of the lesser principalities, yet it grew, surprisingly, to eclipse all its competitors. The explanation now usually accepted is this: Osman's northwestern situation, closest to the remaining Anatolian Greek territories that formed the Byzantine defense for Constantinople, not only attracted vigorous gazis to his ranks but also forced a slow, step-by-step conquest from the Christians that had to be solid and well organized. Osman became the first of a ruling dynasty that continued unbroken until 1922. From his name were derived the names both of the dynasty and of the state—"Osmanli" in Turkish, "Ottoman" in western European languages (from the Arabic form of his name, Othman or Uthman).

Ottoman expansion was slow for the first half-century. It was only Osman's son and successor Orhan (1324?–62?) who gained the first important cities: Bursa in 1326, İznik and İzmit (Nicomedia) soon thereafter. Striking his own coinage a year after taking Bursa, Orhan in effect declared by this act of sovereignty that he was free of Mongol control. Bursa became his capital, which he provided with good streets, a covered market, a hospice, a bath, and a caravansaray. Here the first Ottoman sultans—as they now began to style themselves—are buried in stately mausoleums in the city that Turks today affectionately call "green" for its verdant environs, green mosque tiling, and pious Muslim atmosphere. From his capital of Bursa, Orhan annexed the lands to the west that verged on the Dardanelles. The leap across the narrow strait to Europe was first made by his forces in 1345, when they were called in as allies by a Byzantine emperor in a conflict with a rival claimant to his throne. The Ottomans took a liking to Europe, and evidently resolved to stay.

In the next half-century Ottoman expansion went more rapidly. By 1354 the conquerors had established themselves for good in fortress towns on the Gelibolu (Gallipoli) peninsula. In 1361 they took Edirne, which shortly became the new headquarters for the conquering sultans. Now under Murad I (1362?–89) Turkish armies advanced through Thrace and Bulgaria and up the river valleys into Serb territory. Conquering towns such as Sofia and Nish, making vassals of Bulgars and Serbs, Turkish horsemen reached the Danube. Simultaneously the Ottomans pressed eastward in Anatolia, incorporating lands of other gazi leaders. Victory over a Serb-led coalition at the battle of Kosovo in 1389 consolidated the Balkan gains, though at the cost of Murad's life. His son Beyazid I (1389–1402), "Thunderbolt" to his followers, continued the expansion both east and west. He probed into Hungary and began to besiege Constantinople itself. Europe's answer was a crusade organized by the king of Hungary, the pope, and Western knights—a real threat to the

fledgling Ottoman Empire but met boldly by Beyazid. In 1396 at the crucial battle of Nicopolis (Niğbolu) on the Danube in Bulgarian territory, the Western knights were routed. It was the last real crusade.

But Beyazid's expansion to the east in Anatolia brought an even greater threat. It was always somewhat embarrassing for the Ottomans to fight other Muslims; religious law condoned warfare only against the unbeliever. But the Ottoman sultans did fight brother Muslims when they could not take over Turkish emirates by marriage or any sort of peaceful annexation. Beyazid had particular success against the rival Turkish emirs of the Karaman family. He then ran up against a greater rival—himself a Turk and a Muslim—who had also become the champion of dispossessed Anatolian emirs. This was Timur the Lame (Tamerlane), heir to a large part of the Mongol realm. From his capital in Central Asia, Timur had conquered Iran and now appeared in eastern Anatolia. Mutual insults and threats between Timur and Beyazid were followed by the inevitable clash, and in the battle of Ankara in 1402 Timur won a major victory. He captured Beyazid, who died the next year. The Ottoman state, headless, fell into chaos as Timur restored ousted emirs to their former lands, while Beyazid's sons fought among themselves for the Ottoman succession. Had a major crusade now been launched from the Balkans, there is no telling what the course of Ottoman history might have been, or whether the dynasty and state might then have come to an end, after a century of remarkable expansion that had created an empire stretching from the Danube to the Euphrates.

The first half of the fifteenth century, however, brought Ottoman recovery. For a decade the empire remained fragmented, until Beyazid's youngest son triumphed and, as Mehmed I (1413–21), began to put the pieces back together. Both he and his son Murad II (1421–51) were constantly engaged in warfare, partly against Venetians and Hungarians, but just as much against those local rulers and tribal elements who hated the curbs that a centralized state with a strong ruler would put on them. The centralizing forces won not only because of the individual ability of the two Ottoman rulers, but because the rulers enjoyed significant popular backing. Townspeople and merchants tended to favor the order and unity that a centralized state created. Peasants favored a check on the exactions of local lords. The cavalrymen, who lived on lands granted by the sultan in return for services, furnished him strength, as also did the elite infantry, the Janissaries. This corps of shock troops, the first standing army of modern Europe, had been created by Murad I from slaves who had been prisoners of war. Now numbering 6,000 or more, they had no equal in fighting. In this period of recovery the Ottomans also began to use muskets and cannon, borrowing the best they saw in use by their Western opponents. The first use of cannon by Turks was perhaps in an unsuccessful siege of Constantinople in 1422.

The Ottoman Empire at Its Height

When Mehmed II (1451–81) succeeded his father, his consuming desire was to win Constantinople, the prize that had for so long eluded his forebears. The conquest of this Christian stronghold would not only be a gazi deed, but would also knit together the Anatolian and Rumelian halves of the resurgent Ottoman Empire. In 1452 Mehmed built the great fortress of Rumeli Hisari—still standing today—to control ship traffic in the Bosphorus. Then he gathered his army, perhaps 50,000 regulars and as many irregulars, outside the land walls of the city. The siege began on April 6, 1453. The world's largest cannon, one with a barrel twenty-six feet long, hurled huge stone balls at the triple walls surrounding the city. The 7,000 defenders nightly repaired the damage. To distract defenders from the land walls, a fleet of small Turkish ships was hauled up the hill behind Galata in one night and gently dropped into the harbor of the Golden Horn, behind the chain that closed off its mouth. But it was the land assault of May 29, undertaken by Mehmed against the counsel of his grand vezir, that finally broke through the city's walls. Turkish troops poured in for a day of pillage. At its end, Mehmed the Conqueror entered Constantinople to restore order and to pray in the Church of Aya Sofya, now at his order turned into a mosque.

The Ottoman capture of Constantinople in 1453 has sometimes been shrugged off as historically unimportant—the conquest of an already surrounded and largely depopulated city. But for the Turks the capture of Constantinople has a triple significance. It gave them a splendid harbor and a leading commercial center, commanding the routes from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean and from Rumelia to Anatolia. It further gave them a new capital with an aura of imperial majesty, the second Rome, seemingly destined to be the capital of another great empire; now Mehmed added “Roman Caesar” (Rum Kayseri) to his titles. Finally the capture confirmed the Turks' position as a European power. They were no longer a frontier gazi state, no longer an Asian state with a foothold in Europe, but a state with a claim to deal equally with other great European states.

Mehmed II was a builder as well as a conqueror. He began at once to repopulate the city, bringing in craftsmen, merchants, and husbandmen of all religions from various parts of his realm. He had bazaars, hans, mosques, and other buildings constructed. Istanbul—as the Turks popularly called it, presumably from hearing Greeks say they were going *eis ten polin*, “to the city”—was again becoming *the* city. Mehmed also continued to enlarge the empire of which it was the capital. He retook Karaman lands in Anatolia, conquered Trabzon (Trebizond) from its last Greek rulers, reconquered and absorbed some Serb lands, took some Aegean islands from Venice, overran and annexed the Morea, Bosnia, and Albania, made the Crimea a vassal, and did

the same with Wallachia. Turkish power was fast extending over all the shores of the Black Sea and Aegean Sea and into the Adriatic. This Aegean and Mediterranean expansion, largely at the expense of Venice, continued under Mehmed's successor Beyazid II (1481–1512). Turkish naval units under Kemal Reis raided as far west as the Balearic Islands. One of the results of such raids was the acquisition of the most up-to-date geographical and cartographical knowledge, through capture from a Spanish seaman of a map or chart of some of Columbus's discoveries in the New World. The surviving half of the world map with many marginal notations drawn in 1513 by Kemal's nephew, the admiral Piri Reis, shows in detail sections of the Caribbean and South American coastlines.

If the impression given thus far is one of almost uninterrupted warfare by the Ottomans, this is not far from wrong. By the early sixteenth century this warfare had consolidated the Ottoman position as heirs of the Byzantine Empire in Anatolia and Rumelia and as heirs of much of the Venetian maritime empire on the coasts and islands around the Balkan peninsula. The conquests had usually been achieved in two stages: first, a conquered principality or other area would be made tributary, supplying troops and money; then, sometimes after a renewed campaign, it would be put under direct Ottoman administrative control. Some areas therefore were conquered more than once. But there was also cooperation with the Ottoman conquerors. In the early days in Anatolia, numbers of Greeks, including some leaders, had voluntarily joined the Ottomans. In the Balkans the peasantry seems often to have welcomed the Ottoman advance as a release from extortionate rule by local lords, and there too some of the leaders had joined the Ottoman cause. In some cases the Turkish sultans appointed leading Christian fighters in the Balkans to posts in local military-civil government, giving them, as cavalymen, grants of fief lands.

But, as repeated rebellion showed, there were also some who wanted no strong central government and who resented Ottoman control. Among these were many of the still-nomadic Türkmen tribesmen in Anatolia, who opposed not only central authority and its taxes but also its Orthodox Sunnite Islam. Türkmens tended to favor some form of Shiite heresy, usually mixed with pagan survivals, and they were encouraged by dervish leaders. Often called *kizilbaş* (redhead) from the red caps they wore, these heterodox Anatolians were a perpetual danger to the Ottoman state. They were a danger particularly in Beyazid II's reign, because the newly resurgent Iran under Shah Ismail was also Shiite and could rouse the Anatolian discontented as a fifth column in the never-ending struggle of Ottoman state against Persian state. The great *kizilbaş* rebellion at the end of Beyazid's reign had to be suppressed by his son Selim I (1512–20), called "the Grim" (Yavuz), who slaughtered perhaps 40,000 rebels. Selim then marched into Iran, winning a major battle at Çaldıran in 1514 and securing further territory in eastern and southeastern Anatolia as far as Diyarbakir. This success in turn brought Selim into conflict with the

northern Syrian forces of the Mamluk sultanate and opened the way for the first of seven major expansionist drives that ensued during the sixteenth century.

In 1516 Selim's forces marched south into Syria against the Mamluks. This warrior caste of Turk and Circassian slaves had ruled in Egypt since 1250, though they were unloved by the native population of Egypt as well as by the Arabs of Syria. In the early 1500s the Mamluks were threatened by the Portuguese, who, having circumnavigated Africa, preyed on Muslim commerce in the Arabian Sea and nibbled at the southern Red Sea approaches to Egypt itself. Selim may have conceived of himself as a deliverer of Arabs from both the Mamluks and the Portuguese. In any case, he was welcomed by the people of Aleppo in 1516, defeated the Mamluk sultan and his army nearby at Marj Dabik, and proceeded south to take all of Syria. Continuing the long march into Egypt, Selim routed another Mamluk army near Cairo in 1517. Firearms, which the skilled Mamluk horsemen refused to use because they disdainfully considered them unchivalrous, were the key to the Ottoman victories.

The result of the victories was to add to the Ottoman Empire a vast expanse of territory—Syria, Egypt, and also the Hijaz, which had been under Egyptian protection. More than just territory, these areas constituted a major part of the Arab heartland, including the ancient capital cities of Medina and Damascus and the modern capital of Cairo. Aleppo and Cairo were also great commercial centers, and the revenues of the Ottoman Empire now began to swell from the eastern trade that came through Egypt and Syria. Perhaps the most significant result of the conquest was that Selim and his successors became without question the world's leading Muslim rulers, guardians of the three holy cities of Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem. Sunnite orthodoxy and the *şariat* (the holy law of Islam), expounded by the ulema (learned men) of the Arab world, became even more important at the Ottoman court.

This first expansionist drive, to the south and southeast, was followed soon by a second, to the north and northwest, under Süleyman I (1520–66). He first had to take the key city of Belgrade, which for years had resisted the Turks with Hungarian aid; he then had to secure his rear in the Mediterranean by winning the island of Rhodes from the Knights of Saint John, effective harassers of Muslim shipping. Then, urged on by Francis I of France, Süleyman advanced up the Danube in two major campaigns against the forces of the Hapsburgs, whose monarch Charles V was also the Holy Roman Emperor. A great victory on the field of Mohacs in 1526 established Ottoman suzerainty over Hungary. Renewed Hapsburg opposition provoked a repeat campaign in 1529. This time the Ottoman armies went all the way to Vienna, though they lifted the siege at the onset of the autumnal equinox without taking the city. This was the high point of Turkish advance into Europe. They never were able to enter the gates of Vienna but for a century and a half kept Hungary and Transylvania under their control.

The third expansionist drive of the sixteenth century was an outgrowth of the land wars against the Hapsburgs. When Charles V's fleet threatened Turkish-held coasts in the Balkans, Süleyman's response opened a half-century of intermittent naval war in the Mediterranean. Barbaros Hayreddin Paşa, the famous Turkish corsair who already had conquered Algiers, was appointed grand admiral. He led the Turkish fleet in a series of encounters with the Christians, at the end of which Tunis and Tripoli as well as Algiers and other North African ports were firmly in Ottoman rather than Hapsburg-Spanish hands. The Ottoman military success in the Mediterranean was, however, never total. In 1565, near the end of Süleyman's reign, an attempt to take Malta ended in ignominious failure. Yet Ottoman influence extended beyond the confines of the war zone to the German and Dutch Protestants who were rallied against the Hapsburgs, to the Muslims and crypto-Muslims (Moriscos), and to the Jews and crypto-Jews (Marranos) who fled from persecution in Spain to the haven of Ottoman lands.

The fourth major expansionist drive was again to the east, in the alternating sequence characteristic of Ottoman warfare. Süleyman's armies turned against Safavid Iran in 1534–35. The campaign resulted in the conquest of Tabriz and Baghdad. Tabriz was lost in renewed warfare in the 1550s, but Irak and Baghdad remained in Süleyman's possession. Now the Ottomans were on the shores of both the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. In Basra, as they had done earlier in Suez, they built a fleet to confront the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean. But here again the Ottomans were halted. They could not compete with the Atlantic powers in the art of navigating the high seas, nor could they oust the Portuguese from Hormuz, control point for entrance to and exit from the Persian Gulf. Vienna, Malta, Hormuz—these marked the points at which the Ottomans remained forever blocked by the Christian European world.

The next two expansionist drives of the sixteenth century came during the reign of Süleyman's son, Selim II (1566–74). Boldly envisioning a scheme for opposing the growing Muscovite power in the north, Grand Vezir Sokollu Mehmed Paşa mounted an expedition with the Tatars of the Crimea to cut a canal from the Don River to the Volga, so that Ottoman ships could join land forces in attacking Russian-held Astrakhan and sail the Caspian Sea. But the expedition of 1568–69 failed. No canal was dug, and Astrakhan resisted siege. Then Ottoman attention turned to a smaller but more accessible prize, Cyprus, which was a Venetian colony. An amphibious assault in 1570–71 won the island by bloody fighting. During the war the Ottoman fleet lost to a combined Christian fleet a major engagement at Lepanto, off the coast of Greece, but Cyprus itself remained in Turkish hands.

The last great drive—against Iran in the reign of Murad III (1574–95)—gained much territory for the Ottomans. Georgia and other Iranian provinces bordering the Caspian Sea passed into Turkish control. Ottoman ships finally

were launched on the Caspian itself. Yet this victory, confirmed in 1590, was undone in the early years of the next century. Ottoman expansionism seems at last to have come to a halt. Even though additional bits of territory—Crete and southern Poland—were added to the empire in the seventeenth century, the élan by then was gone. The sixteenth century saw the apogee of Ottoman territorial conquest.

Straddling three continents, the Ottoman Empire of the sixteenth century had a population that has been estimated at anywhere from twenty to fifty million—perhaps thirty million is a realistic guess—at a time when France had about sixteen million. It was composed of an extraordinary mixture of peoples. In Europe there were Hungarians, Serbs, Croats, Romanians, Bulgarians, Albanians, Greeks, and Turks. In Asia were Turks, Greeks, Lazes, Armenians, Kurds, Circassians, and Arabs. In Africa there were Arabs and Berbers. There were also other smaller groups. The multitude of languages and dialects was almost matched by the variety of religious sects. Muslims were probably a majority if one adds together Turks, Arabs, Kurds, Berbers, and those Bosnians, Albanians, Bulgarians, and others who had converted to Islam. Of the Christians, the vast majority were Greek Orthodox; the next largest Christian church was the Armenian. The Jewish population, never as numerous as the others, was composed of important communities in Baghdad and other cities and during the sixteenth century was swelled by tens of thousands of Sephardic Jews who fled Christendom for the toleration of Muslim rule. Salonica became a major Jewish city; İstanbul had an important Sephardic community. Some of these peoples, and some of these sects, lived in fairly compact agglomerations, but others lived intermixed in cities—a Greek or Armenian quarter side by side with a Muslim quarter—or in adjacent villages, or in scattered locations.

The mixture of peoples was more confusing than might otherwise have been the case because of two processes that had accompanied Ottoman expansion. One was conversion of other peoples to Islam when the Turks took territorial control. Most of the Hellenized population of Anatolia had become Islamic during the centuries of invasion and disruption, but important pockets of Christians remained. Most of the Greek Orthodox peoples of Rumelia, more swiftly conquered by the organized Ottoman state, retained their traditional faith. Yet numbers of Greek Orthodox did apostatize in Rumelia; an outstanding example is the Serb peasantry surrounding the Islamicized towns of Bosnia, a distinct group of Muslims embedded in the generally Christian Balkans. The second process was *sürgün* (forced migration). Ottoman sultans not infrequently ordered the transplanting of groups of people for reasons of nomadic sedentarization, defense, security, or economic development, as Mehmed II had done in repopulating İstanbul. In the sixteenth century, for example, some 20,000 or more Turkish peasants of Anatolia were moved to

Cyprus as a partial remedy for overpopulation in Anatolia and to develop Cyprus. These processes made the settlement patterns in the Ottoman Empire heterogeneous in the extreme.

The governing of so heterogeneous an empire, in an age when a man's religion was his identifying mark, was made simpler by the fact that each major religious community was also a community in civil law. All Muslims, as members of the *umma* (the community of the Prophet), were subject to the religious law of Islam, and their disputes were judged in the Muslim courts. The non-Muslims were members of millets (religious communities), which had their own civil law for matters of personal status—marriage, divorce, property inheritance—and their own courts. The millets, from the time of Mehmed II on, were headed by clergymen whom the sultans confirmed as civil heads of their communities: the Greek Orthodox and Armenian millets under their respective patriarchs in İstanbul, the Jewish millet under the grand rabbi of the same city. The millet organizations were responsible not only for civil status and the judicial process but also for church property, worship, education, charity, and even for the collection of some taxes to be remitted to the central government.

At the head of the central government of this vast empire was the sultan of the Ottoman dynasty. The ten sultans in the line from Osman to Süleyman, individuals differing greatly in character, were men of considerable, and in some cases conspicuous, ability. Each sultan had been given experience in military and civil affairs during his teenage years as a prince guided by a tutor and advisers. Contests for the succession among brothers were not uncommon. Once on the throne, the victor usually had any surviving brother killed; the cruelty of this fratricide was accepted by religious leaders and the public as justifiable, since it helped to avoid anarchy arising from disputes as to who was rightful ruler. The sultan was in theory absolute, accountable to no one but God, and restricted only by God's law, the *şariat*. In fact, he was often held in check by rebellion, or the threat of it, and sometimes by the religious men who interpreted the law for him, though they were subject to his dismissal. Yet Ottoman sultans had never abandoned the *örf* (right of pre-Islamic Turkish rulers to legislate) and therefore often issued *kanuns* (regulations having the force of law).

Except when the sultan was away from the capital, most often on a campaign, he ruled from the New Palace, so called to distinguish it from the first palace built by Mehmed II on the present site of İstanbul University. Known today usually as Topkapı Sarayı, the New Palace was a series of garden-courts and buildings erected at various times—all rather modest for the ruler of so great an empire but magnificently situated on the point overlooking the confluence of the Marmara, the Golden Horn, and the Bosphorus. Topkapı Sarayı included kitchens, storerooms, ateliers, reception rooms, private quarters, and of course the harem—most of whose female inhabitants were servants of

various kinds rather than favored imperial concubines. In the palace chamber called the Kubbealtı (Under-Dome) the sultan's council, or divan, met several days a week. Its members included the top ranks of the various branches of officialdom. The chancellor and two chief treasurers were "men of the pen," from the hierarchies of bureaucrats who did the office work of government. The two chief judges, for Europe and Asia, "men of religion," represented the hierarchy of jurists who presided over *şeriat* courts in various judicial districts throughout the realm. The grand vezir, who was the sultan's alter ego and presided over the divan, was a member of the empire's most peculiar institution, the system of slave officials of the sultan.

Since the time of Mehmed II the slave administrators had become the most powerful segment of the Ottoman government. Seljuk rulers and early Ottoman sultans had had officials who were personal slaves known as *gulams* or *kuls*. They usually were young men taken as prisoners of war or bought in slave markets. Since no born Muslim should, under Islamic law, be enslaved, the slaves were of non-Muslim origin. In the time of Murad II the *devşirme*, a system of collecting Christian peasant boys from areas within the empire, became regularized. Every few years an imperial commission selected boys between eight and twenty years of age, who were sent to İstanbul for screening and training. All were obliged to become Muslims; evidently most did so willingly. Strong ones of less intelligence became Janissaries. Those of highest ability were trained in Topkapı itself, in the Palace School. After a thorough education and apprenticeship they were assigned to palace posts, provincial governorships, or military commands. By merit the slaves could advance to the highest post in the empire, that of grand vezir. For more than 200 years after Mehmed II the *devşirme* group thus controlled the pinnacle of central government. Sultans found two advantages in this system: they could counterbalance the influence of the old leading families, the natural aristocracy, through reliance on their own men, and they could demand complete personal obedience from the slaves. For though the slaves might gain power and wealth, their careers and their very lives were at the ruler's disposition. Their children, furthermore, as freeborn Muslims, could not follow in their fathers' careers.

In the sultan's divan the governor-general of Rumelia, the European half of the empire, was also privileged to take a seat. He represented "men of the sword" other than the Janissaries, since he was commander of the provincial governors and ultimately of the cavalymen who held local fiefs. Whenever conquered land had been incorporated into the empire, it had been carefully surveyed. Great *defters* (registers) recorded population and economic production—the oldest now surviving in the İstanbul archives dates from 1431. Units of villages and farmlands were assigned as *timars* (fiefs) to cavalymen according to the expected productivity and tax revenue. The local *sipahi* (horseman) then lived on the revenues of his fief, kept order, carried out the

sultan's regulations, and gave military service on campaigns. This system was particularly strong in the Balkans; later conquests in the Arab areas were put under administrators who were tax-farmers rather than cavalrymen.

All of the foregoing groups—men of the pen, men of religion, men of the sword—constituted, with their families, the upper level of Ottoman society, the so-called *askeriye* (military) class. They served faith and state, in the Ottoman formula. They paid no taxes. The bulk of the *reaya* (population) were peasants, nomadic herdsmen, artisans, merchants. They were the food growers, goods producers, and taxpayers. Transfer from one class to the other was possible, but infrequent. In Ottoman theory, each person had his designated place in society; the good order of society required that he remain there. Enforcing this was sometimes difficult. In the sixteenth century great numbers of villagers migrated to the cities, almost doubling the urban population and often causing economic and political problems. At various times then and later, the government would bar their entry or deport them back to the countryside.

Among townsmen, the craft guilds played a primary role, providing religious fellowship as well as economic status and protection. Tailors, tanners, tallow chandlers, taxidermists—each trade was organized as an *esnaf* (guild). It conferred economic status, regulated employment, purchased and apportioned raw materials, oversaw standards of production and fairness of prices. İstanbul had about 150 major guilds. Collectively they could be a powerful political as well as economic influence. There were guilds of small merchants as well. The great merchants who participated in the flourishing international trade—with the East via Egypt or Syria, with the Black Sea regions, and with the Italian city-states and western Europe—were often individually powerful and well connected with officials of high rank; such merchants were big investors, lenders, and accumulators of capital.

The empire was not only Ottoman but thoroughly Islamic, the greatest among the Islamic states of its day (which included Morocco, Safavid Iran, and Mughal India). Ottoman sultans were leaders of the Muslim community; they were defenders of the faith, of the holy cities, and of the Sunni branch of Islam in particular. This orthodox Islam was taught and interpreted by the ulema, who were teachers, preachers, judges, and jurisconsults. In the sixteenth century the most prominent scholar among the ulema was Ebussüüd, who worked out the codified accommodation of religious law and the sultan's *kanuns*. For thirty years he was the *şeyhülislam* (chief interpreter of the law). Law, theology, and other subjects were taught in the *medreses* (schools attached to major mosques); of these, the highest ranking were established in İstanbul by Mehmed II and Süleyman I adjacent to the mosques they had also built and which bear their names.

Medreses, their libraries, adjacent kitchens, their teachers and students were usually supported by funds from property established as a *vakif* (religious foundation). Such property, legally dedicated in perpetuity for chari-

table purposes, was in theory God's and no longer subject either to ordinary taxation or to sale. In the Ottoman Empire, as in all Islamic lands, the institution of *vakif* played a major role in supporting works which, in modern times, are customarily financed by the public fisc. Mosques, *medreses*, libraries, hospitals, hospices, kitchens for the needy, public water fountains, even roads and bridges were built and maintained by foundations established by sultans, high officials, and other wealthy individuals. Some of the empire's major architectural monuments owe their existence to *vakifs*. In the sixteenth century the master builder Sinan, a product of the *devşirme* who started life as a military engineer, created many of them. For thirty-five years as chief architect to Süleyman and his successor, Sinan dominated the age in his field as Ebussüüd did in his. Sinan is reported to have built 304 structures, from Hungary to the Hijaz; the Mosque of Süleyman in İstanbul and the Mosque of Selim in Edirne rank among his greatest and finest.

There was a popular Islam as well as the orthodox Islam of the law and the learned ulema. Sufism, the more personal and mystical path to the knowledge of God, had greater appeal for many. The two varieties of Islam often intermixed; even Ebussüüd harbored some Sufi tendencies. But the common popular expressions of this path to divine knowledge, the *tarikats* (dervish orders), espoused beliefs and modes of worship quite different from the austere theology and prayer ritual of strict orthodoxy. The Mevlevi (Whirling Dervishes) attracted many upper-class Ottomans to their search for direct ecstatic experience of God. Other orders, particularly the Bektāşis, attracted many ordinary Turks in addition to more cultivated individuals. Eclectic in their beliefs, incorporating elements of shamanism and Christianity, the Bektāşis tolerated wide variation in doctrines and practices. The Mevlevi and Bektāşi orders, and others, had convents called *tekkes*, which were not only the residences of full-time dervishes, but the centers to which on occasion the thousands of lay brothers came.

Just as there were two Islams, so also there were in more general terms two cultures. The true Ottoman wrote a Turkish intermixed with many words of Arabic and Persian origin, all embedded in a complex style that was incomprehensible to the ordinary Turk. Subtle elegance of expression, rather than simple clarity, was the usual objective. Poetry flourished—for the Ottomans, usually a poetry of a Persianate sort. Süleyman himself was known as an accomplished poet. Fuzuli of Baghdad was perhaps the most distinguished of the age. To an Ottoman, a "Turk" was an uneducated, rather boorish and peasantlike fellow who spoke common Turkish and was illiterate. The Turk enjoyed mystical folk poetry of the dervishes, the love poetry of wandering minstrels, the professional storyteller, the shadow play.

All classes began to enjoy coffee, which invaded the empire from the south by way of the Arab provinces in the mid-sixteenth century. At first condemned as a vice by many of the ulema (though not by Ebussüüd), it conquered all,

even the ulema. The coffeehouses of villages and town quarters became gathering places for the men, sometimes for rabble. This was sometimes the case also with the public bathhouses, which were a necessary part of life in every city and town, centers for social gathering of women (during women's hours) as well as of men. One bathhouse built by the rather Rabelaisian poet Gazali of Bursa became so notorious as a center for dissolute characters that Süleyman ordered it destroyed. Tobacco joined coffee as a companion vice, or pleasure, around 1600; in this age, it was smoked in long pipes or water pipes, the cigarette being a more recent invention. There were also the joys of nature—streams, shady groves, flowers. The tulip was much cultivated—it was from Turkey that the Dutch first imported it in 1559.

The Decline of the Ottoman State

Though the age of Süleyman was undoubtedly one of prosperity and military victory with a reasonably well-ordered society and a high level of culture, there was evidence of both social discontent and the beginning of economic and military problems. These became quite obvious in the last decade of the sixteenth century and increased during the seventeenth, so that Ottoman writers began to comment on the decline and to call for a return to the good order of the preceding golden age. Economic, military, social, administrative, and psychological problems, more clearly seen now by hindsight, interacted to produce the decline.

Economic difficulties stemmed in part from a massive inflation in the later sixteenth century caused by the influx of cheap silver from the newly discovered mines of Peru. Prices of staples rose, hurting all who lived on fixed revenues and taxes, like cavalrymen, bureaucrats, judges, and beneficiaries of pious foundations. The Ottoman government, accustomed to stable currency and prices, had no idea what to do; when some sultans debased their own coinage it only forced prices up faster. Revenues failed to meet needs, even when taxes were sharply increased. Shortly thereafter Ottoman profits from Eastern trade fell off, as the East India Company and other European merchants found it cheaper to import goods from India and the Persian Gulf by the all-sea route around Africa. Meanwhile Ottoman manufactures suffered from competition with European goods that came into the empire under low tariffs fixed by the capitulations—treaties of privilege and commerce granted by the sultans to European states—while Ottoman exports were themselves subject to tax to raise revenues.

These economic problems helped to create an almost permanent financial crisis for the government just at a time when it needed greater cash income to pay new troops. Cavalrymen from the fiefs were less effective in an age of gunpowder, so a corps of infantrymen with muskets was built up, composed

mostly of Anatolian peasants. Some fiefs were taken from cavalrymen and made into tax-farms to get cash. Other fiefs, however, were given to palace favorites or otherwise got into private hands. As the *timar* system broke down, fewer cavalrymen turned out for campaigns, partly because they could no longer afford the expense. Local order, entrusted to cavalrymen, was less well kept; this in its turn adversely affected agricultural production and revenues. Such was also the case when the new tax collectors in the former fiefs tried to squeeze too much out of their peasants.

Social discontent was exacerbated by such military-economic difficulties. The new infantry units of musketeers were often turned loose at the end of campaigns, no longer on the payroll. They then became brigand bands, principally in Anatolia. Their ranks were on occasion swelled by former *timar*-holders who had lost their fiefs. In addition, there seems to have been a marked population increase during the sixteenth century, contributing to the number of landless peasants. Migration to the cities was one result. Another result was the further swelling of brigand bands who staged, in effect, a number of revolts—the so-called *celâli* revolts of the 1590s and early 1600s—that the government suppressed only with the greatest difficulty. Curiously, at the time of rural overpopulation there seem also to have been increasing numbers of deserted villages and farms, perhaps owing to flight from plague, from extortionate taxation, and from marauding brigands.

One way of maintaining order in the provinces was to station Janissary units there. This was done, but the total result was not always beneficial. For the Janissary corps had begun to decline even as it was increased in size. First, Janissaries on active duty had been allowed to marry. Then their sons were allowed to enroll in the corps. Then other Turks, not products of the *devşirme*, became members. Having family ties, not just a simple loyalty to the sultan, Janissaries looked for more money, especially in the age of inflation. They could get pay increases by threats of revolt. Many also began to lead a double life, moonlighting at jobs in the city. When Janissary units were stationed in provincial cities to keep order, they continued in their new evil ways and often became part of an unruly local ruling clique, along with notables among the ulema and the *esnafs*.

The breakdown of discipline in the Janissary corps reflected a breakdown in the whole slave-official system. Though the *devşirme* was continued through the seventeenth century and into the eighteenth, it produced fewer recruits. More and more sons of slave officials managed to insinuate themselves into official careers. Promotion by merit became less common, replaced by favoritism and corruption. This was true among the bureaucrats as well. The corruption involved buying and selling of official posts and favors, understandable in a time when government salaries failed to keep pace with inflated living costs, but still subversive of orderly government. Judges, too, became

corrupt; one of the commonest complaints of would-be Ottoman reformers was that justice was a mockery when it was bought and sold. There were still able officials, even within a corrupted system, but they were probably fewer. The most outstanding were members of the Köprülü family who occupied the office of grand vezir many times between 1656 and 1710.

It is tempting to blame the decline of the Ottoman administrative system on the sultans themselves. "The fish begins to stink at the head," said a much-quoted Turkish proverb. It is tempting even to single out one ruler, Selim II, known to his subjects as "Selim the Sot" for his overindulgence in Cyprus wine. But Selim II was not without ability. It was after his reign that the real problems of the sultanate developed, owing more to a change in the system of succession to the throne than to anything else. It formerly had been the practice that a sultan's sons be sent out into the provinces to gain military and administrative experience. It also had formerly been the custom that a newly enthroned sultan kill his surviving brothers, thereby eliminating possible contenders and fomenters of civil anarchy. In the early seventeenth century both practices were changed. Princes were no longer exposed to firsthand experiences in the field, but were kept in special apartments in the palace known as the *kafes* (cage or lattice). Nor were brothers any longer routinely slain (though it still sometimes happened) by a newly acceded sultan, partly because Mehmed III (1595–1603) had had nineteen younger brothers killed at his accession; this wholesale slaughter turned opinion against the practice of fratricide. Ahmed I (1603–17) on his accession allowed his brother, Mustafa, to live on in the *kafes*. This became the custom. Thereafter, the oldest surviving male—uncle, brother, son—would succeed on a sultan's death. Mustafa I was twice placed on the throne (1617–18, 1622–23) and twice removed because he was mentally deficient. His retardation was originally not due to internment in the *kafes*, but the internment undoubtedly did not help him. Nor was it a help to any potential heir to the throne. The lack of practical experience, in addition to the debilitating life of confinement, produced some sultans who were incompetent, some who were simply disinterested in government, and some who were mentally unbalanced.

On the whole, the seventeenth-century sultans were not a very able lot. Ahmed I was known for his piety but also for the lack of success of his armed forces. "Mad Mustafa," as he was called, was incompetent. Ibrahim (1640–48) was also incompetent and unbalanced. Mehmed IV, whose long reign (1648–87) began at a tender age, became known as the "Huntsman Sultan" because the chase rather than administration became his principal occupation. Two sultans were exceptions, in that they exhibited energy and ability. Osman II (1618–22), who had been only a few months in the *kafes* before accession, harbored thoughts of reform but was soon assassinated by the suspicious Janissaries, whom he had wanted to replace with new levies of more

effective and more loyal forces. Murad IV (1623–40) was equally energetic and extraordinarily cruel in punishing malfeasance or disloyalty with instant execution. But these two were atypical in a period when power generally was exercised by court officials and palace cliques. Among the most influential politicians, for such in fact they were, were a number of women of the imperial harem. Kösem Mahpeyker, mother of Murad IV and of İbrahim, and Hadice Turhan, mother of Mehmed IV, were effectively the real rulers of the Ottoman Empire for considerable periods.

The weakness in the sultanate and the economic and social difficulties of the period following Süleyman might have been less injurious to the Ottoman Empire in the long run had there not been also an intellectual or psychological metamorphosis. Considerable numbers of ulema, backed by many of the uneducated and by poor *medrese* students, inveighed increasingly against innovation. A pride in Islamic achievement, combined with a strict interpretation of the Koran, worked especially against borrowing new concepts or techniques from the Christian West. There were always learned men among the Ottoman ulema, and always some who sought European knowledge in this field or that, but Ottoman Islam seems to have become generally more ingrowing and less absorptive than it had been in the early days. This prejudice—that innovation was blasphemous—spread at an unfortunate time, when western Europeans were making strides in geographic discovery, rational thought, scientific investigation, technology, and manufacture. The gap between East and West was widening; it made Ottoman decline more dangerous in the face of relative Western superiority.

It was in warfare that the gap first became excruciatingly obvious. In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, Ottoman armies were less easily and less often victorious than before. Ahmed I, for example, was faced with simultaneous wars on two fronts, something that the sultans had always sought to avoid. He fought a long intermittent war against Shah Abbas I of Iran and in some of the same years fought the Austrian Hapsburgs. His Iranian war was a losing proposition in the long run; his Austrian war more nearly a draw, at the end of which, in the Treaty of Zsitvatorok (1606), he had to acknowledge for the first time that the Hapsburg ruler was his equal—emperor, not just king. Ahmed's naval strength was in decline, while the Barbary corsairs ceased to obey him and independently operated out of Tripoli, Tunis, and Algiers. At the same time fleets of small Cossack ships came down the Russian rivers and raided in the Black Sea; in 1614 they burned Sinop, though they were later defeated at the mouth of the Don. In 1621 Osman II embarked on an ill-conceived Polish campaign partly because of Cossack raids from the Polish frontier. The war was unpopular; the unenthusiastic Ottoman forces performed indifferently at best. Wars such as these were costly to support and were not compensated by booty or new taxable territory. Even the victorious

campaigns in the seventeenth century, which gained Podolia from Poland and the island of Crete from its Venetian masters, exhibited neither the old élan of the sixteenth-century armies nor a military and naval establishment rejuvenated by new Western techniques.

In 1683 it seemed for a moment that this situation might be reversed. A vast Ottoman army marched to besiege Vienna for the second time. But the siege was broken by a Hapsburg victory, aided by Polish forces. It was not simply that the Turks voluntarily retired, as they had done in 1529; they were driven into retreat. The continuing warfare brought Venice and Russia also into the anti-Turkish coalition. When peace was finally made at Karlowitz in 1699, the Ottomans had to abandon all of Hungary and Transylvania and were back at Belgrade on the Danube. The Russians under Peter the Great had gained Azov, their first appearance on the shores of the Black Sea. Even Venice, a declining power, had been able to seize the Morea. This was the first great Ottoman retreat from Christian lands they had earlier conquered and ruled. It gave a somewhat bitter flavor to the epithet "ever victorious" that was incorporated into the *tuğra* (official signature) of each Ottoman sultan.

Though it was weakened from within and without, the Ottoman Empire still was far from total collapse. In the first half of the reign of Ahmed III (1703–30) some territories were regained. Azov was retroceded by the Russians in 1711 at the end of a short war that the Turks had entered as a result of urging by Charles XII of Sweden, who had been allowed refuge in Ottoman lands after a defeat by Peter the Great. The Morea, whose Greek Orthodox inhabitants chafed under a Roman Catholic government and sought the rule of Muslim Turks again, was reconquered from Venice. The one significant loss of these years was Belgrade, yielded up in 1718 to the Austrian Hapsburgs by the Treaty of Passarowitz and regained by the Turks only in 1739.

In the time of Ahmed III the atmosphere in the Ottoman Empire seemed to change, at least superficially. The first man of the pen to become grand vezir took office in 1703. The grand vezir's residence, the Sublime Porte (Bab-ı Âli), in the eighteenth century began to rival the palace as the center of government. The change in atmosphere was especially marked in the years of peace following 1718, when the sultan gained a reputation for avoiding war and cultivating luxurious tastes. In these pursuits he was vigorously aided by his grand vezir, Nevşehirli İbrahim Paşa, who had married a daughter of the sultan, one of Ahmed's thirty-one children. Festivities celebrating his sons' circumcisions and his daughters' marriages were frequent in his reign. Nedim, the poet laureate of his day, expressed the new tone with his familiar line, "Let us laugh, let us play, let us enjoy the world to the full." The pleasure seeking of Ahmed's court was often directed into artistic channels. Music, poetry, and literature were cultivated. Five libraries were established in İstanbul, and Nedim was put in charge of the sultan's own. Growing tulips became a

craze, which has given to the last twelve years of Ahmed's reign the name of *Lâle Devri*, the Tulip Period. Some of the new inspiration of the time came from the West, either directly or by way of the Greek community of the Fener quarter of İstanbul. The Ottoman ambassador Yirmisekiz Mehmed Çelebi was sent to Paris to investigate French institutions that might be useful for the empire. The most important innovation was the establishment of the first Turkish printing press in 1724 by İbrahim Müteferrika, originally a Hungarian; the ulema agreed to sanction it if secular works alone were printed. A fire brigade of pumpers was organized in İstanbul by a French convert to Islam. There was some interest in Western military techniques, not seriously pursued until later, although in the 1730s a French renegade, Count Bonneval, turned Ahmed Paşa, helped reorganize the bombardiers.

There was, however, no major transformation in the Tulip Period. The superficial westernisms, though they affected court tastes and some of the architecture of the period, did not penetrate deeply. In fact, popular antagonism was aroused against Frankish manners at a time when there were economic hardship and new rural migration from villages to İstanbul. When Ahmed III's military weakness was revealed in a losing campaign on the Iranian frontier in 1730, a revolt in İstanbul led by Patrona Halil, a junk dealer and Janissary associate, expressed the popular indignation. Grand Vezir İbrahim was sacrificed to the mob, and Ahmed III abdicated. So ended the Tulip Period and its somewhat liberal atmosphere.

Throughout the next half-century there were intermittent attempts to profit from Western knowledge and techniques. But the "long peace" lasting from 1739 to 1768 resulted in more complacency and in less military rebuilding and reform than was needed. Peripheral provinces continued to slip from effective central control—North African provinces were long gone into almost independent corsair hands, while Egypt, Irak, Lebanon, and many tribal areas oozed from the sultan's grasp into the control of local strongmen. In Anatolian and Rumelian provinces *ayans* (local notables), professing allegiance to the Ottoman Dynasty, were still on occasion able to defy or disregard the sultan's authority.

War with Russia from 1768 to 1774, and particularly the treaty that concluded it, ended Ottoman complacency. Though both sides fought poorly, the Russians won the final campaign. The Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774 sealed the Ottoman defeat with consequences felt ever after. The Crimea was detached from Ottoman control and made independent. Russia gained a strategic coastal strip to the north of the Black Sea, her first permanent foothold there. For the first time Russian ships were allowed to trade freely in that sea, through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, and in all Ottoman ports. A permanent Russian embassy in İstanbul and Russian consulates throughout the Ottoman Empire were permitted. In a few years Catherine II annexed the Crimea and

seized more Black Sea coast; after renewed war the Porte was also obliged to recognize this in 1792. The Russian advances served to spur Ottoman efforts at reform, first of all reform of the military establishment.

The Era of Ottoman Reform

Between the late eighteenth century and the early twentieth century, the Ottoman government initiated many changes, all in the direction of westernization. The process of changing established ways was inherently difficult. Progress was also hindered and interrupted by two parallel sets of events: a series of foreign attacks, many of which resulted in loss of Ottoman territory, and a series of risings among minority peoples of the empire who sought self-government or independence. Napoleon's invasion of the province of Egypt in 1798 made it clear that even the central parts of the Ottoman realm were not immune from foreign attack. Thereafter, the Turks fought four wars against Russia (1806–12, 1828–29, 1853–56, 1877–78), only one of which—the Crimean War of the 1850s—resulted in victory; in each of the others, Russia gained Ottoman territory. France seized Algeria in 1830 and Tunis in 1881; Britain occupied Cyprus in 1878 and Egypt in 1882; Austria took Bosnia in 1908; and Italy seized Tripoli (Libya) in 1911. Finally, in 1912–13 a coalition of Balkan states took from the empire all its remaining European territory except the region immediately surrounding İstanbul. Over the same period Greece, Serbia, Romania, Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Albania had gained independence, while among Armenians and Arabs of the empire there were also nationalist stirrings. Under such conditions reform was difficult and the progress made was fitful rather than steady. Yet war and rebellion were also added spurs to reform. By the early twentieth century the cumulative effects of the reform efforts were enormous.

Abdülhamid I (1774–89) had attempted some measures of military reorganization, but it was his successor Selim III (1789–1807) who plunged wholeheartedly into the effort. Despite fifteen years in the *kafes*, Selim had acquired some knowledge of governmental affairs and also of Europe. On ascending the throne, he asked his top advisers for memoranda on needed reforms and then began to improve Ottoman weapons, military organization, and technical military schools. In the process, the door to Western influence was opened wider than it had ever been. Several hundred Europeans were in Ottoman employ, many of them French. Some Western styles, even some secular concepts, began to penetrate the top levels of Ottoman society. The first porcelain works were established in İstanbul. The printing press, which had been closed in 1742, was again set to work producing books about military and other useful matters. Selim's major project was to recruit and train fresh troops for a modern army more efficient than the corrupt Janissaries. The new recruits were equipped with imported guns, uniformed in tight red breeches and blue

berets, and drilled by instructors with Western experience. But a combination of reactionary forces, Janissaries and ulema among them, threatened Selim. He lost his nerve and yielded, disbanding his new corps of 20,000 in 1807. The reactionaries deposed Selim anyway. Had he resisted, he might have been able to go on to further westernization. Instead, traditional prejudice and vested interest triumphed against the perceived threats of innovation and godless French influence.

Mahmud II (1808–39), a determined reformer, had to be cautious at the start because of the strength of the reactionaries. He was also plagued by Greek and Serb revolts and by the rebellion of the ambitious Muhammed Ali, governor of Egypt. Finally, in 1826 Mahmud completed plans to rid himself of the Janissary danger by retraining the old corps, unit by unit, in modern tactics. Though the Janissary command had approved the plan, the corps again revolted. Then Mahmud, unlike Selim, gathered all available loyal forces, even arming theological students in the *medreses*, and crushed the rebels. Eight executioners thereafter worked for weeks carrying out orders of courts-martial. The Janissary corps was abolished after this “auspicious event,” as Turks call it, and a new westernized army was slowly built up. The Prussian army captain Helmuth von Moltke was secured as military adviser; the Italian composer Giuseppe Donizetti was hired to train military musicians; the American master shipbuilder Henry Eckford was brought from New York to produce the world’s finest frigates in İstanbul dockyards. Western methods, Western books, sometimes Western instructors appeared in the new military academy and military medical school. The French language became the usual vehicle for transfer of new ideas and techniques, as more and more Ottoman officers, diplomats, and bureaucrats learned it. Those fluent in French began to constitute a new westernized elite in the Ottoman government.

The central government itself was reshaped by Mahmud. He abolished old sinecures and established the first Western-style ministries: war, foreign affairs, interior, treasury. He deprived the ulema of some official functions. He founded the first official gazette, the *Moniteur Ottoman*, soon followed by its Turkish counterpart, the *Takvim-i Vekayi*, which represents the start of Turkish journalism. Mahmud’s most dramatic move was to oblige his officials to give up flowing robes and turbans for black trousers, the stambouline (*istanbulin*) frock coat, and the fez. As its use spread, the conical red felt cap became the symbol first of the new bureaucracy, then of Ottoman subjects generally. What Mahmud did was often superficial. The fez did not guarantee Western thought processes in the head that wore it. Mahmud nevertheless launched his country firmly in the course of westernizing reform and re-established the power of the central administration not only as the governing but as the reforming agency.

His successor, Abdülmecid I (1839–61), pursued a similar policy under the urging of Reşid Paşa, a westernizing French speaker who was first a diplomat,

then foreign minister, then grand vezir. The imperial edict of 1839 that Reşid inspired, the Hatt-ı Şerif of Gülhane, set the tone of Ottoman affairs for the next forty years, a period known as the Tanzimat—the Ordering. It promised reforms in conscription, taxation, and justice; further, it promised that reforms would apply equally to all in the empire, regardless of religion. This was a big step toward secularism, toward thinking of each individual as an Ottoman subject rather than as a member of a millet.

From 1840 to 1871 Reşid Paşa and two of his disciples, Âli Paşa and Fuad Paşa, pushed ahead with reforms whenever circumstances allowed. A scheme of secular education, patterned on French models, was elaborated; the most famous of the schools established was the Galatasaray lycée, where instruction was in French. Commercial and penal law codes were recast, also on French models, though the reformers dared not touch the Islamic law of personal status. A revised system of provincial administration, the vilayet (province) system, copied many aspects of France's organization by *départements*. These and other secular, westernizing changes were superimposed on the traditional society; in some cases two sorts of institutions existed side by side—the old *medreses* and the new Western schools, traditional religious law and courts and modern secular law and courts. For some Ottoman subjects the changes were confusing, for others they were abhorrent, and for others they were insufficient.

Among the critics of the Tanzimat reformers were journalists writing for the newspapers that began to burgeon in the 1860s and 1870s. Some journalists, along with some government officials, were members of a group calling themselves the Yeni Osmanlılar (New Ottomans). They criticized Abdülaziz (1861–76) as irresponsible and authoritarian and demanded a parliament to curb autocracy. Discovered in conspiracy, the most prominent New Ottomans had to flee to Paris. Namık Kemal, the writer whose fiery play *Vatan* (Fatherland) still awakens patriotic sentiments a century after its first performance in 1873, is the most renowned of the group.

A Balkan crisis in 1875–76 gave reformers, including some of the New Ottomans, a chance to get their parliament. Abdülaziz was deposed, and the leaders of the coup enthroned Abdülhamid II (1876–1909) only after he promised support for a constitution. A commission headed by Midhat Paşa, one of the leaders of the coup, and including Namık Kemal, then hammered out a constitution. It was promulgated on December 23, 1876. Thereafter elections were held for the chamber of deputies, and two sessions of the new parliament took place in 1877 and early 1878. But when the deputies became too critical of Abdülhamid, he dismissed the chamber and called no new elections for thirty years.

For those thirty years Abdülhamid ruled as an autocrat. He became increasingly fearful and oppressive, censoring the press, forbidding meetings, relying on spies to ferret out opposition. Ottoman intellectuals led two lives, one

open, one secret; proscribed works and anti-Hamidian poems circulated from hand to hand. Abdülhamid was, however, not unpopular with the masses. He emphasized religiosity, called himself caliph of all Muslims, and pushed building the Hijaz railway from Damascus to the holy city of Medina. He was progressive in a technical sense, for he encouraged expansion of the telegraph and railway lines that had first come to Turkey during the Crimean War—the Baghdad Railway is the major example. He also continued to build the army with the advice of a German military mission.

But inevitably the political and intellectual repression bred opposition. This time the opposition was led by the Young Turks, as they often called themselves, who wanted the constitution restored. A secret society, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), grew up among younger officers, officials, and writers. Some were exiled and had to flee, smuggling propaganda back into the empire from Europe. Cells of opposition also sprang up among army officers, especially in the Salonica region, and they were in touch with the CUP members in Paris. In the summer of 1908 some army units began revolting, and the CUP leaders in Salonica demanded by telegraph that Abdülhamid restore the constitution. Frightened, he yielded on July 24, calling new elections.

The news that the constitution would be restored brought Ottoman citizens pouring out into the streets amid unbelievable scenes of rejoicing and fraternization. Many were not sure what “constitution” meant, but all seemed sure that a new day of liberty had arrived. In a way, it had. The press was now free; newspapers, political comment, cartoons flourished. Exiles returned from abroad. Elections were held, and the first session of parliament opened in December 1908. The new regime survived an attempted counterrevolution by disgruntled common soldiers and political reactionaries in April 1909; loyal CUP troops from Salonica suppressed the rising. Since Abdülhamid seemed to have been involved in the counterrevolution, the chamber decided that he must be deposed. For the first time in history an elected body dismissed a sultan of the line of Osman. Abdülhamid’s successor, Mehmed V (1909–18), furthermore, was permitted only to be a figurehead. The Ottoman house still reigned, but it no longer ruled.

In the next half-dozen years the political life of the Ottoman Empire was anything but smooth. The parliament was usually dominated by the CUP, which finally became an open political party. Opponents, especially the Liberals, felt that the Unionists, as CUP members were called, were in their turn becoming too authoritarian. By 1913 this certainly was true. Enver Paşa, a Unionist hero of 1908 and now minister of war, and Talat Paşa, minister of the interior, were the dominant government figures. The Unionist domination came at a time of external crisis, when Italy had made war for Tripoli and when the Balkan states also had attacked. Some 200,000 Turkish refugees from the Balkans flooded into İstanbul. Ethnically, the shrinking empire was perforce becoming less heterogeneous and more Turkish. Ideologically, this

also began to be true. The egalitarian Ottomanism of the Tanzimat period was giving way to a greater emphasis on Turkishness. The most prominent advocate of Turkishness was Ziya Gökalp, a sociologist and popular writer. For Turks, he insisted, culture must be Turkish. The traditional Persianate-Arabic-Islamic culture and the nineteenth-century Europeanized culture were artificial, "like flowers raised in hothouses." Ziya would abandon neither Islam nor the best aspects of European civilization but maintained that they would have to contribute to and merge into a basic Turkishness.

Then, largely through Enver's negotiation of a secret anti-Russian alliance with Germany, the Ottoman Empire became engulfed in the Great War of 1914. During the four-year ordeal Turkish armies fought on several fronts, usually on the defensive. On only one front were they clearly victorious. This was the defense of Gelibolu and the Dardanelles in 1915 against an Anglo-French attack trying to break through to İstanbul. In 1916 an Arab revolt, supported by the British, began in the Hijaz. By the time of the armistice on October 30, 1918, all the Syrian and Iraqi conquests of Selim I and Süleyman had been torn from Ottoman rule. The war also ended the Unionist regime, whose leaders fled abroad. British, French, Italian, and Greek occupation forces controlled strategic areas, including İstanbul and the straits. The new sultan, Mehmed VI (1918–22), was not popular and hardly of leadership caliber. There was an atmosphere of despair. Meanwhile, Allied statesmen dictated to the Ottoman government the Treaty of Sèvres, signed on August 10, 1920. It confirmed the total dismemberment of the Ottoman domain, leaving only central Anatolia under unrestricted Turkish sovereignty and imposing foreign control in various areas, including a Greek zone around İzmir.

The Founding of the Turkish Republic

Well before the treaty was signed, however, a national resistance movement had arisen. It was led by Mustafa Kemal, better known by the surname Atatürk (Father Turk), which he adopted in 1934. Mustafa Kemal was a general, the most successful Ottoman field commander, who had made his reputation at Gelibolu in 1915. Seeking to revitalize his country after its defeat, he went from İstanbul as military inspector to Anatolia, landing at Samsun on May 19, 1919. In the next four years, he created an army, a government, and a state. He also forged a greater degree of political cohesion, a most difficult task when many Turks still thought of themselves as natives of a locality, or as Muslims, or even as subjects of the sultan-caliph, but not primarily as Turks.

During the National Struggle, as Turks call it, a National Pact, setting forth nonnegotiable minimum demands for an independent Turkish territory, was worked out in two representative gatherings. Then the newly elected Ottoman parliament, meeting in İstanbul early in 1920, with many nationalist deputies as members, adopted the pact as Ottoman policy. Shortly, in the face of this

new sign of resistance, the British military forces arrested many of the deputies. Other deputies escaped from İstanbul and joined Mustafa Kemal in Ankara, where together they constituted the new government of the Grand National Assembly on April 23, 1920. From this point on the assembly, with Mustafa Kemal as its president, was the true government of Turkey. Mehmed VI with his ministers remained in occupied İstanbul, almost powerless. In 1921 the Ankara government adopted a constitution proclaiming that sovereignty resided in the nation. It also officially called the state "Turkey" for the first time. Thus, even before a republic was proclaimed, its essence existed, though no one used the term "republic." To Mustafa Kemal, that is what sovereignty of the people, who were the Turkish nation, meant.

Between 1920 and 1922 the government and army of the Grand National Assembly achieved a series of successes, both diplomatic and military, that led to liberation of most of the territory specified in the National Pact. The split between Soviet Russia and the Western powers was used to Turkish advantage, for Russia was willing to give some military aid if the purpose were anti-English or anti-French. Lack of harmony among the Western powers themselves was exploited, leading to withdrawal of Italian and French occupation forces. The Greeks, by contrast, launched a major offensive from İzmir in 1920 that was checked only in 1921 by Mustafa Kemal's colleague İsmet İnönü at the battle of İnönü and again by Mustafa Kemal himself when the Greeks were some fifty miles from Ankara. Then the tide turned, and in 1922 a Turkish offensive pushed the Greeks out of Anatolia. At that point the British remained as the sole effective opponents of the Turks, but they were now willing to negotiate. A new armistice in October 1922 led to a new peace conference, which met at Lausanne, Switzerland, the next month.

Britain invited the sultan's government also to send a representative, whereupon Mustafa Kemal persuaded the Grand National Assembly that the sultanate itself should be abolished. After stormy debate, this was done on November 1, 1922. Mehmed VI went into exile aboard a British vessel, and the Ottoman sultanate of more than 600 years was ended. The assembly did elect a member of the family as caliph, but he was to be a religious figurehead with no political power. Two years later he also was ousted and the caliphate abolished.

The Kemalist military victory of 1922 paved the way not only for the end of the sultanate but also for three events of 1923 that, taken together, symbolize the firm establishment of the new Turkey. The first was the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, by İsmet İnönü as Turkish plenipotentiary, on July 24, 1923, after seven months of hard bargaining, interruption, and near breakdown of the peace conference. By the treaty, which was freely negotiated rather than imposed as the Treaty of Sèvres had been, the new Turkey gained essentially its present-day borders and the end of foreign capitulations. The second event was the official moving of the capital, for the first time since

1453, from İstanbul to Ankara on October 13. İstanbul was the cosmopolitan center of the dead empire; Ankara, on the Anatolian plateau, was the far more Turkish center of the newborn state. Finally, on October 29, the assembly formally proclaimed Turkey to be a republic. It began its life by electing its founder, Mustafa Kemal, to be president and İsmet İnönü to be prime minister.

Modern Turkey: Change and Continuity

The Turkish Republic has now been a member of the family of nations for over a half-century since its formal establishment in 1923. During that period it has changed greatly. It has developed a completely secular government and many secular cultural institutions. It has worked out a democratic multiparty political system. It has pursued a policy of peaceful foreign relations. It has embarked on the path of industrialization. Its population has tripled since the 1920s. The literacy rate has increased five times in the same period. Women play an entirely new role in the political, economic, and cultural life of the country. The sense of Turkishness—of belonging to the Turkish nation and culture, as opposed to purely local or religious loyalties—has become much stronger and more widespread. These developing trends encounter obstacles and problems, but they continue. They mark, in many ways, radical change from the days of the Ottoman Empire.

Yet there is also continuity. Modern Turks are heirs of the pre-Islamic past of the early Turks in Central Asia. They are also heirs of the pre-Islamic past of various early Anatolian civilizations. They inherit much from both their Islamic past and their Ottoman past. They also inherit from the Western past, as well as forming a part of the Western present. All these heritages, Eastern and Western, Asian and European, are intermingled in the civilization of modern Turkey. The symbol of the union is the bridge, opened in 1973, that spans the Bosphorus, springing on one shore from beside a mosque, on the other shore from beside a French-style palace, linking two continents with many pasts and one future.

2. "Russian Skill and Turkish Imbecility": The Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji Reconsidered

Just over two centuries ago, on July 21, 1774, at the village of Kuchuk Kainardji,¹ Russia and Turkey signed a peace treaty which not only marked one of history's great shifts in power relationships, but also became a continuing source of controversy among statesmen and scholars. Most of the terms of the treaty, which ended a six-year war, are clear, easy to summarize, and obvious in their impact.² But articles 7 and 14, which dealt with the protection of Christianity in the Ottoman Empire and with an Orthodox church that Russia could build in Istanbul, have been subject to widely varying interpretations. The central question is whether Russia received, under these articles, a right to act as protector of Ottoman Christians. Many historians have contended that the treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji did confer such a guardian role on Russia, and some have adopted the opinion that the treaty, especially in this regard, was an example of "Russian skill and Turkish imbecility." Other historians have maintained that any such right, under the treaty, was vague. Still others have said it was nonexistent. A reexamination of the historical evidence is long overdue.

The obvious first task is to go back to the text of the treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji to see what articles 7 and 14 specify about protection of Christians. In this connection, determination of the exact nature of the church that Russia could build in Istanbul—whether it was to be an ordinary Greek Orthodox church or a Russian Orthodox church—seems to be important. Then, other provisions of the treaty or circumstances of that immediate era which may have furnished a basis for a Russian claim to be protector of Ottoman Christians must be considered. Finally, an attempt will be made to show how the judgment about Russian skill and Turkish imbecility originated and how it came to affect historical writing.

The treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji as a whole is not in question here, but a brief summary is useful. The treaty marked a turning point as momentous for the Near East, as the American Declaration of Independence was for the Atlantic world two years later. By its provisions Russia gained a strategic foothold on the north shore of the Black Sea. She also gained acknowledgment of the independence of the Tatars, a move preliminary to her own absorption of the Crimea. She achieved a special position in Moldavia and

Wallachia, even while these principalities remained under Ottoman suzerainty. She gained privileges for an expanded commerce that could now move freely on the Black Sea and through the Straits into the Mediterranean, as well as by land in Ottoman domains. She reaffirmed her right to permanent and prominent diplomatic representation in the Ottoman capital of Istanbul, and gained the further right to plant Russian consulates wherever she wished in the Ottoman Empire. All of this meant not only a quantum leap forward in Russia's international position but also a proportional weakening of the once formidable Turkish power. The extent of gains secured to Russia by the treaty was immensely pleasing to Catherine II, who, even after the military victory, had not dared to hope for quite that much. She exuded joyful satisfaction to her correspondents and her guests. To Count Peter Aleksandrovich Rumiantsov, her field marshal and negotiator, she dispatched a present of thirty pineapples newly ripened in her garden in gratitude for a treaty "the likes of which," she wrote to him, "Russia has never had before."³ Russia's gains and Turkey's losses were so evident in 1774 and in the course of the subsequent relations of the two empires, that there is no divergence of views among historians as to the significance of the event. The treaty as a whole requires no bicentennial reevaluation. It need simply be noted as a major step, possibly the greatest single step prior to 1955, by Russia into the Near East.

The one controversial matter that has persisted concerns Russia's relationship, under the treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji, to the Greek Orthodox peoples of the Ottoman Empire. Sometimes this controversy has taken the form of an argument between governments, particularly in 1853, when the Crimean War resulted from the Russian assertion of a right to protect their Orthodox brethren in Turkey and the Turkish denial that there was any such right.⁴ But among historians, divergent views about a Russian protectorate have existed independent of the question of the Crimean War's origins. A recapitulation of these conflicting views will serve to show why the treaty text needs to be considered again.

At one end of the spectrum are historians who flatly assert that Kuchuk Kainardji did accord Russia a right to protect the Greek religion and the Greek Orthodox churches throughout the Ottoman Empire. This position is most forthrightly stated in Paul Miliukov's history, recently published in English translation from the French original: "Finally—and this was a clause gravid with major consequences, which granted her [Russia] the right of intervention in Turkey's domestic affairs—she won acknowledgment of her duty to defend the religious freedom of the sultan's Christian subjects and to protect them against the exactions of the tax collector."⁵ Although stated in extreme terms—no other historian says that Turkey acknowledged Russia's "duty" to protect Christians—Miliukov's viewpoint has a long and respectable ancestry.

Edouard Driault says something similar: the treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji had "formulas in which the Sublime Porte had 'permitted' Russia 'constantly to protect the Christian religion' (art. VII). . . ." ⁶ This view parallels that of Sergei Zhigarev, who says that the Porte gave Russia "the right to protect the Orthodox church on all the territory of the Turkish Empire," and who cites with approval the opinions of Vladimir Ulianitskii to support the contention that Russia obtained by the treaty "a unilateral right of interfering in the internal affairs of the Turkish Empire with the objective of defending the Christian populations of the East." ⁷ Albert Sorel accepts the arguments of Russian diplomats and publicists, concluding in his classic work on the Eastern Question that "this treaty . . . made of Russia the protectress . . . of the religious independence of the Christians of Turkey." ⁸ Two of the major European historians of the Ottoman Empire espouse the same view: Nicholas Jorga says that "Russia provided for herself the right of protection over all coreligionists," while Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall as early as 1832 averred that Kuchuk Kainardji "recognized the Christian power most hostile to the Porte as . . . protector of the Christian religion and churches." ⁹

Other historians, though they may not think that Russia was entitled to an explicit right of protection, believe that the treaty gave her a right to make representations to the Ottoman government in behalf of its Christian subjects. A typical statement, in a respected textbook, this one by Sidney Harcave, asserts that under the treaty terms the Ottoman Empire "agreed that Russia might appeal to the Sultan at any time on behalf of the Turkish Christians." ¹⁰ George Vernadsky puts it only slightly differently: "Russian envoys were given power to confer with the Sultan upon affairs concerning the Orthodox church." ¹¹ Textbooks tend to reflect the generally received opinion, and on this point there is a reasonably broad consensus. ¹²

A related but less dogmatic view is taken by historians who find that Kuchuk Kainardji allowed the tsars to claim a right to protect, or to make representations about, Ottoman Christians because it contained vague or loosely worded clauses. Michael Florinsky and Hugh Seton-Watson refer to Russia's "ill-defined" right to protect Ottoman Christians under the treaty. ¹³ Charles and Barbara Jelavich see "ambiguous wording" in the treaty, Akdes Nimet Kurat sees "obscure or confused expression," in article 7 of the treaty, while M. S. Anderson points to "a vague and potentially dangerous phrase" in that same article, which allowed Russia to make representations "in behalf of a church in Constantinople 'and those who serve it.'" One could give multiple examples illustrating this charge of vagueness, which also commands fairly wide support among historians. ¹⁴

Some of the historians who see Russian acquisition of a right of interference in behalf of Ottoman Christians in the treaty—whether through precise stipulation or because of vagueness—repeat a colorful characterization of

the treaty as a product of Russian "skill" and of Turkish "imbecility." This judgment, however, did not originate with a historian but with a contemporary observer, the Austrian diplomat, Franz Thugut, who in 1774 was the inter-nuncio representing the Habsburg sovereign in Istanbul. Thugut's judgment is most recently cited by Akdes Nimet Kurat in his monumental work on Russo-Turkish relations, and by L. S. Stavrianos in his Balkan history.¹⁵ The same judgment is also quoted by Reşat Ekrem Koçu (1934), by Edouard Driault and Michel Lhéritier (1925), by J. A. R. Marriott (1917), by Driault much earlier (1898) and by Zhigarev (1896).¹⁶ Most of these historians link Thugut's judgment to the articles of the treaty that touch on Russian relations with the Greek Orthodox church of the Ottoman Empire. Since almost all of them cite Albert Sorel as their source for the quotation, and none cite any other, it is well to see exactly what Sorel, in his influential work on the Eastern Question, relays from Thugut:

"The whole accumulation [*échafaudage*] of the stipulations of the treaty of Kainardji is a model of skill on the part of the Russian diplomats and a rare example of imbecility on the part of the Turkish negotiators," wrote Thugut. "By the dexterous combination of the articles of this treaty, the Ottoman Empire becomes from today onward a sort of Russian province. Since for the future Russia is in a position to dictate laws to it, she will perhaps content herself, for some years more, with reigning in the name of the Grand Seigneur [that is, the Sultan], until she judges the moment favorable to take possession of it definitely. . . ." ¹⁷

Sorel cites Thugut's reports of August 17 and September 3, 1774, as the source, without giving any indication of where he got Thugut's reports. To this point we shall return shortly.

At the far end of the spectrum are historians who find in the treaty only very limited rights for Russia—rights on which she later tried to build vastly expanded claims. Nicholas Riasanovsky, in a recent Russian history, best represents this view: "Russia acquired a right to build an Orthodox church in Constantinople, while the Turks promised to protect Christian churches and to accept Russian representations in behalf of the new church to be built in the capital. The provisions of the treaty relating to Christians and to Christian worship became the basis of many subsequent Russian claims in regard to Turkey."¹⁸ This view is also the one espoused generally by Theodor Schiemann, Bernard Pares, and B. H. Sumner—that the treaty simply provided Russia limited rights that could be a "pretext" (Schiemann) or a "basis for claims" (Sumner) or that could later be "interpreted by some to imply a Russian protectorate" (Pares).¹⁹ A number of historians of diplomacy and of the Near East have taken a similarly cautious view.²⁰

All these views cannot be correct. Obviously the text of the treaty is the place to start a reexamination. What does it say?

Most historians, particularly those writing in the West, have relied on a translated version of the treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji, either in French or in English. But neither French nor English was an original or official language of the treaty. Three official languages were used in 1774—Russian, Turkish, and Italian. Field Marshal Rumiantsov signed in Russian and Italian, while the Ottoman grand vezir Muhsinzade Mehmed Pasha signed in Turkish and Italian, as article 28 of the treaty itself stipulates. No scholar appears to have tried to compare the three versions.²¹ In this three-language situation, should the Turkish and Russian texts disagree on any point, the Italian text would control.²² Articles 7 and 14 in particular, since they have been the basis for the judgments cited above, need scrutiny in the original languages.

Article 7, fortunately, exhibits only minor differences between the Turkish and Russian texts. The most significant difference is that in the Russian text the Sublime Porte promises "defense" or "protection" (*zashchita*) of the Christian religion, whereas in the Turkish text the word used (*siyanet*) can mean simply "preservation" as well as "protection," and is not the usual word with the stronger connotation of "defense" (*himaye*). So it is best to go to the controlling Italian text of article 7, and to put it into the clearest possible English. Article 7 says:

The Sublime Porte promises a firm protection to the Christian Religion and to its Churches; it further permits the Ministers of the Imperial Court of Russia to make in every circumstance various representations to the Porte in favor of the below-mentioned Church erected at Constantinople, cited in Art. xiv, no less than of those who serve it, and promises to receive those remonstrances with attention, as made by a respected person of a neighboring and sincerely friendly power.

The Italian confirms the Russian—it is "protection" and not merely "preservation" that the Ottoman government promises. The Russian text further says that the Porte will "take into consideration" the Russian ministers' representations; the Turkish text can be read to mean simply that the Porte will "receive" the representations. Again, the Italian text, reading "receive with attention," confirms the Russian.

But when article 7 is considered as a whole in relation to the judgments earlier set forth, the position adopted by so many scholars must be seriously questioned. Article 7 does indeed recognize a protectorate over the Ottoman Christians, but it is the protectorate of the Ottoman government itself. The article is not vague on this point, it is specific. In fact the precision of this

provision is emphasized by the juxtaposition of the broad power of protection specifically recognized as Turkey's, and the narrow power accorded Russia. This power too is precisely expressed. The ministers representing Russia in Istanbul have the right to make representations in behalf of a single church building and of those who serve it. If "those who serve it" are simply clergymen and caretakers, as indicated by the Russian and Turkish treaty texts, the number of faithful about whom Russia can make representations is small.²³ One might stretch the Italian phrase to include a whole congregation, perhaps several hundred communicants, though the phrase probably would not bear the weight of that construction. But to state that the article gives Russia a right of making representations in behalf of all Orthodox churches or of all Orthodox believers in the Ottoman Empire, or even in behalf of a large number of churches or of believers, is a flight of fancy. The provision about Russian representation is precise, its meaning clear; there is no vagueness leading to the potential danger of misinterpretation. To suggest that the Russian right of making representations encompasses the Porte's promise of protecting the Christian religion is patently misconstruing the document.

The Russian right of making representations to the Ottoman government concerned a church which was more specifically described in article 14. Again the Russian and Turkish texts of the article exhibit no differences in meaning, but, since the Turkish text is rather wordier than the Russian, here also the Italian is the best guide. It says:

The most high court of Russia shall be able, on the example of the other Powers, aside from the Residence Church, to have one built in the section of Galata in the street called Bey-Uglu, which Church shall be public, called Russo-Greek, and which shall always be maintained under the protection of the Minister of that Empire, and shall be unharmed by any molestation and outrage.²⁴

The church that the Russian minister could protect, and about which he could make representations, was, then, not to be an ordinary Greek Orthodox church, but a Russian church of the Greek rite.²⁵

This may be considered a distinction without a difference. After all, the Russian and Greek churches are fundamentally one. They come from the same tradition. Both normally use the liturgy of St. John Chrysostom in their services. But the distinction does seem to be important in the Ottoman context. Instead of being under the Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Istanbul, like the other Orthodox churches of Istanbul, the new church would be unique in being under Russian protection. It would use the Old Slavonic, which would be even more unfamiliar to the Greeks of Istanbul than to the Russians of Moscow.²⁶

The distinction between Russian and Greek churches, moreover, seems to be intentional if the wording of article 14 is a guide. A new church, "aside from the Residence Church," would likewise represent the national church, in this case the Russian church, of the envoy's country. Further, the new church was to be "on the example of the other Powers." The other powers were France and Austria (Catholic) and England and Prussia (Protestant). Although the Protestant powers did not have protected churches, France and Austria each acted as protector of a Roman Catholic church in Beyoğlu, apart from the embassy church. These churches were served by European religious orders, and the worshippers were principally foreign nationals.²⁷ Article 14 does not, to be sure, specify that the new Russian church would be principally for foreigners; this is an area of the treaty where a charge of "vagueness" might be made. However, in 1774, this may not have been vague at all. Though not conclusive, it is significant that a contemporary diplomat, long a resident of Istanbul and at home in both Turkish government and European diplomatic circles there, wrote that the treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji gave the Russian minister "the liberty to have built, in the quarter of Pera, a church for the use of his nationals."²⁸ These nationals were likely to be merchants and pilgrims, for the treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji provided broad freedoms for Russian merchants to trade by land and by sea in the Ottoman Empire, Istanbul being specifically mentioned as open to them (article 11). The treaty further granted Russians, both clergy and laymen, an uninhibited right of pilgrimage to Jerusalem and other centers (article 8). Today in Galata there still exist two or three Russian churches which earlier had the function of serving large groups of pilgrims, and undoubtedly merchants as well.²⁹

Two other pieces of evidence reinforce the conclusion that the new church was to be Russian rather than Greek. One is the nature of the original proposal for a church, made in the abortive peace negotiations at Bucharest in 1772-73 by the Russian negotiator A. M. Obreskov, who had earlier served as envoy in Istanbul. This proposal, with other documents on the negotiation, has been unearthed in the archives by a Russian scholar, E. I. Druzhinina. She shows that Obreskov, on his own initiative, proposed the building of a church in Istanbul because some of the local Greek Orthodox worshippers had been coming to the private Russian residence chapel for want of a church of their own nearby in Beyoğlu. A number of them petitioned him to use Russian influence to build a church under Russian protection, and Obreskov thought this

- a good move, as it would increase Russian influence among them. But the Greeks of Beyoğlu proposed that it be a church for Russian merchants, since without such a pretext the Ottoman government might not allow an official Russian-protected church. When Obreskov raised the point with the Turkish negotiators at Bucharest he actually represented it as a church for "clergymen confessing the Greco-Russian faith," undoubtedly meaning pilgrims traveling

to Jerusalem. The Turkish negotiators thereupon demurred, having no instructions on this new point, and Obreskov dropped the matter. But Obreskov's draft of an article on such a church was resurrected when negotiations were later resumed at Kuchuk Kainardji and was incorporated word for word into the treaty as article 14.³⁰ What article 14 meant, then, to both the Russian and the Turkish negotiators of the treaty was the establishment of a Russian church for Russian clerics and, presumably, other pilgrims and merchants.

The second bit of evidence emerges from collation of the three treaty texts. Each text specifies in article 14 a "Russo-Greek" church in Beyoğlu.³¹ Had the negotiators meant to indicate a Greek Orthodox church of the usual sort, they would have said so by calling it simply "Greek." This is made clear by their use of the adject "Greek" in article 16 to describe the Greek Orthodox religion of the Ottoman subjects. The Turkish term is the most revealing. It is "Rum."³² This was the usual Turkish word for Greek. "Grek" was an unknown term to Turks; it was something foreign, like the "Ruso-Grek" church which the Turkish text of article 14 said was to be established. If a Greek Orthodox church for the Greek Orthodox people of the Ottoman Empire was to have been established, the Turkish text would undoubtedly have used "Rum" in article 14, also.

This lengthy exposition and textual criticism may seem a work of supererogation. But, in view of the broad interpretations of the treaty that have been quoted earlier, it is useful to establish the fact that the single church about which Russian envoys could make representations to the Sublime Porte was not a Greek but a Russian church—of the Greek rite, to be sure, but a foreign import primarily for Russians. To deduce from this that Russia, under the Kuchuk Kainardji treaty, secured a right of making representation about Greek Orthodox churches or believers in the Ottoman Empire is a giant leap of faith.

If, then, neither article 7 nor article 14 affords any basis for a judgment that Russia had a general right of making representations, or of protection, or of intervention, where could such views have originated? Of the possible answers, three relate to the text of the treaty and to its interpretation in the first year following the signing at Kuchuk Kainardji.

First, three articles of the treaty other than 7 and 14 contain specific promises by the Porte in favor of Christian rights, such as freedom to construct and repair churches. Each of these articles concerns the people of a region which Russian forces had occupied in whole or in part during the war of 1768 to 1774—Moldavia and Wallachia (article 16), the islands of the Archipelago (article 17), and Georgia and Mingrelia (article 23)—and which under the peace terms were to be restored to Ottoman rule. The article on Georgia and Mingrelia further specifies that Russia shall have no right of intervening in

their affairs. The article on the islands is silent on this matter, but the article on Moldavia and Wallachia grants to Russia a specific right to make representations on behalf of these principalities, and the Porte promises to take them into consideration. This right of making representations is again precise, limited to the two principalities, but it is far more important than the right to make representations about one church. No general rights within the Ottoman Empire accrued to Russia by article 16, but blurring or deliberate misconstruing of its terms was of course possible in the future—and did happen.

Second, after the treaty was concluded, either Catherine or some close adviser saw an opportunity to give it a new twist, with added emphasis on the rights of Christians in the Ottoman Empire. Though Russia had tried, during the war, to encourage Ottoman Christians and to get support from them in the rear of the Turkish armies, the rights of Christians had played an unimportant role in the peace negotiations compared to such questions as Tatar independence, territorial gains, or navigation rights. Catherine II's original proposals for peace terms included little on Christians.³³ Obreskov added most of the proposals on this matter later. When the treaty was finally concluded, its joyful reception by Catherine was, quite naturally it would seem, because of its political, territorial, and commercial terms, and not because of articles 7 and 14.³⁴ Yet, in March 1775, shortly after ratifications were exchanged, Catherine issued a manifesto which emphasized the advantages Russia had secured for Christians in the Ottoman Empire. "Our orthodoxy," she proclaimed, "is henceforth under Our Imperial guardianship in the places of its upspringing, protected from all oppression and violence."³⁵ The manifesto may have been designed chiefly for domestic consumption, to curry favor with the devout, but the implications of this claim of guardianship were plain for future Russian policy toward Turkey. It was the first move in a long and somewhat erratic campaign by Russian officials, culminating in 1853, to misinterpret the treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji.

Third, an additional Russian maneuver, also in 1775, apparently helped to legitimize the claim to a right of protection. The government in St. Petersburg issued an official French translation of the Kuchuk Kainardji treaty.³⁶ Its version of article 14 said that Russia could build in Beyoğlu "*une église publique du rit Grec.*" This was not quite a lie, but it was not a true translation of the treaty's terms. The Russian church was at a stroke transformed into a Greek church. If the Russian minister in Istanbul was permitted to make representations about a Greek church, less stretching would be needed to contend that he could make representations about *the* Greek church in the Ottoman Empire. The hoax was successfully foisted on Europe, since the made-in-Russia French version became the working text of the treaty in the European diplomatic world of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, where French was the common language. To this day the error has persisted, not only in French but

in English as well, because the British government translated St. Petersburg's French version into English, and the Foreign Office's English translation has continued to be used by contemporary scholars.³⁷ The mistranslation may have been innocent, unlikely as that seems, but its potential consequences for misinterpreting the treaty were vast.

An additional explanation of how erroneous judgments about Russia's powers under the treaty gained acceptance goes back to Sorel's publication of *La Question d'Orient au XVIII siècle* in 1878, and through him to Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall in 1832 and, finally, to the Austrian diplomat Franz Thugut in 1774.

Sorel, as has been observed, concluded that the treaty made Russia the protector of Christians throughout the Ottoman Empire, and dramatized this by quoting Thugut's judgment of the treaty including the now-famous phrase about the skill of Russian diplomats and the imbecility of the Turkish negotiators. Sorel cited no source for the Austrian internuncio's dispatches. Much longer extracts from the same dispatches, however, drawn from the Vienna archives, were printed in 1832 as appendixes in the last text volume of Hammer's *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, and again in 1839 in its French translation (with some inaccuracies) by J.-J. Hellert.³⁸ Undoubtedly, the latter is Sorel's source.³⁹ But Sorel, writing a century after Thugut, used the diplomat's words to emphasize the Russian "right" of protecting Ottoman Christians far more than Thugut emphasized this "right" in his original dispatch. "The essential stipulations of the treaty were those which touched on religion," said Sorel.⁴⁰ Sorel could look back on the origins of the Crimean War, as Thugut could not, and knew the importance of those stipulations. Thugut did believe these provisions of the treaty to be very important, but his major concern was with the advancing Russian military threat to the Ottoman Empire and to Istanbul itself. It was Sorel who made the direct connection between the alleged Russian right of protectorate over all Ottoman Christians and the alleged skill of the Russian and imbecility of the Turkish negotiators.

But Sorel's most unforgivable error in his use of Thugut was concealing the fact that Thugut had not seen a copy of the treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji when he wrote about it. Thugut was only guessing about the contents. The Porte, Thugut complained in his dispatch of September 3, 1774, had not yet revealed the terms of the treaty. Thugut speculated on possible reasons for the delay, and then added:

However that may be, the little that is known publicly of this treaty suffices to draw from it this conclusion: namely that the whole accumulation of the stipulations is a model of skill on the part of the Russian diplomats and a rare example of imbecility on the part of the Turkish negotiators. . . .

The passage then goes on, about as Sorel quoted it, to say that now the Ottoman Empire had become a sort of Russian province.⁴¹ Why would a competent diplomat make such definite judgments on a treaty he had not read?

It is only fair to Thugut to point out that his guessing was informed. The Russo-Turkish peace negotiations had gone on sporadically since 1772. Thugut had been physically present at the first peace negotiation, at Focșani, and had been in correspondence with Obreskov during the second round of Russo-Turkish peace talks in 1772–73 at Bucharest.⁴² He knew the prevailing moods in the Ottoman capital. He knew the Russian demands and the Turkish positions on them. But he did not know the final outcome. In the matter of Russian protection of Ottoman Christians, for example, Thugut knew that Obreskov, at Bucharest, had demanded that 'moderate representations by the Russian ministers on behalf of the Christian churches be favorably received.'⁴³ The Turkish negotiators were immediately suspicious, and rightly so, given the plural of "churches." In the Turkish accounts this overture appears as a Russian demand for a right of protection over all Orthodox believers.⁴⁴ Obreskov had then retreated, saying the matter could be omitted from the treaty and only mentioned in the protocols of the negotiations; finally his demand was whittled down to a Russian right of making representations about the one Russian church in Istanbul.⁴⁵ Thugut probably knew all of this, but he was fearful, and when he could not learn the exact terms of the Kuchuk Kainardji treaty, he expected the worst. So in his September 3 dispatch he said that "on the strength of common assurance, the right of protection of the schismatic religion is accorded to Russia by a formal stipulation of the treaty."⁴⁶ He was simply wrong.

Thugut was wrong, apparently, because he was so fearful for Austria's position after the Russian defeat of Turkey. One can understand his fear, given Russia's gains, for Austria was now faced with a major competitor in the Near East. But Thugut's reaction to events, set down in this dispatch on which Hammer, Sorel, and many later historians have relied, was almost hysterical. Taking a strongly Catholic view of Russia's championing of the "schismatic" Orthodox, he foresaw "the suppression and extermination of the Catholic religion in the Levant" unless countermeasures were undertaken. He conjured up a vision of Russian might poised at the northern edge of the Black Sea, able within thirty-six to forty-eight hours to transport by sailing ship an army of 20,000 to the walls of Istanbul, and so to seize that metropolis, helped by the sympathetic Orthodox believers inside, before any European power was aware of the action. The sultan would have to flee to Asia. Then Western Anatolia, the Aegean islands, and Greece west to the Adriatic, "lands blessed by nature, with which no other region in the world can compare in productivity and wealth," would fall to Russia with schismatic help. Russia would then be a superpower surpassing any of the greatest monarchies of ancient times. And

there is more. It is a fascinating and frightening dispatch, but hardly good reporting.⁴⁷

Thugut's credentials as a prophet were cast in doubt not only by this vision but also by his prediction in the same dispatch that there would doubtless be no future Russo-Turkish wars along the Danube, since Russia could hereafter act so swiftly by sea. In actuality, five such land wars followed in a century.⁴⁸ In some ways Thugut had, by 1774, already become the prisoner of his own predictions. He and his Prussian diplomatic colleague at Istanbul had been shunted out of a mediating role in the Russo-Turk peace negotiations in 1772 by the Russians, whose demands on Turkey then increased. As the negotiations broke down in the spring of 1773, and the Turkish position did not improve, Thugut began to predict that the skill of the Russians would lead to their effective dominion over the Ottoman Empire.⁴⁹ Before he even knew that a treaty was finally being negotiated, he predicted that Russian skill would somehow get a right of protection over the Greek religion into the treaty, and that this would have melancholy consequences for Catholicism in the Near East; he bemoaned the weakness and imbecility of the Ottoman government.⁵⁰ His judgment of September 3, 1774, on the treaty, seems then to be at least in part a self-fulfilled prophecy.

If Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall had not adopted Thugut's views and reprinted parts of his dispatches in his *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, the affirmation by some historians of Russia's "right" of protecting Orthodox believers in the Ottoman Empire might have been less categorical. Hammer did not endorse all of Thugut's statements, but he did endorse those dealing specifically with the alleged Russian protectorate. One wonders why, but there is no completely satisfactory answer. Obviously, Hammer clearly saw that Kuchuk Kainardji was, in general, a disaster for the Turks. He may also have been influenced by his later knowledge that the Russian government had indeed at times advanced pretensions of being the protector of Ottoman Christians.

In addition, Hammer may have been influenced by his friendship with Thugut. These two men were both Habsburg state servants. They were among the earliest and most brilliant of Austrian orientalists trained in the new oriental academy in Vienna. Thugut, the older (1739–1818), became foreign minister and, as such, gave Hammer (1774–1856) his first appointment in 1799—as "Sprachknabe" at the Habsburg internuntiate in Istanbul, to perfect his Turkish. Between 1802 and 1816, Hammer was a frequent guest at Thugut's table in Vienna, and the two often talked at great length. Hammer eclipsed Thugut as an orientalist, but, until Thugut's death, evidently regarded him as a patron.⁵¹ For whatever reason, Hammer accepted Thugut's view on the Russian protectorate of Christians.

So the connecting links in the chain emerge: Thugut judged a treaty before he knew its exact terms, Hammer endorsed and reprinted the judgment,

Hellert translated Hammer although not quite accurately, Sorel quoted Hellert's translation although with a significant omission and with different emphasis, and a number of historians over the past century have relied on Sorel. As a final note to this chain of garbled transmission, it might be pointed out that Thugut's phrase as quoted in Hammer's original German edition was: "a rare example of Russian skill and Turkish imbecility." Russian diplomats and Turkish negotiators were not mentioned!⁵²

Perhaps the best antidote to Thugut's misinterpretation of the treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji is the judgment of his most eminent successor as Habsburg foreign minister, Prince Metternich. After the Greek revolt against Ottoman rule in 1821 had again opened up the Eastern Question, Russia advanced pretensions to a right of intervention in the Ottoman Empire's Balkan provinces. Metternich made an analysis of the Russo-Turkish treaties, Kuchuk Kainardji the most important among them, to discover what legal basis the Russian pretensions had. This meticulous recapitulation of treaty terms, still in the Vienna archives, shows that the Porte had made promises about the rights of Christians in specifically limited areas—the islands of the Archipelago and the Danubian principalities—and that Russia had a right to make representations about the latter only. In addition, the Porte had made, in article 7, one general promise: "to protect constantly the Christian religion and its Churches." Metternich's analysis dismisses the rest of that article with the curt observation that it "relates to the new church in Constantinople, construction of which is authorized in article XIV." There was nothing general about it.⁵³ Metternich's dissection of the treaty revealed that the Sublime Porte, not the Emperor of all the Russias, was the protector of Ottoman Christians.

If there is need for any further debate on Russian rights concerning Ottoman Christians in general, under the treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji, it can logically involve only the one general promise that the Turkish government made. Clearly, the Porte was the Christians' protector.⁵⁴ Russia, under this provision, received no right of making representations, no right of protection, and no right of intervention. But the promise by the Porte was made in a bilateral treaty with Russia. Was this a recognition that Russia had some sort of special interest in the situation of Ottoman Christians? In the crisis of 1853 leading to the Crimean War, the Ottoman government said the treaty conferred no such special interest.⁵⁵ Count Nesselrode, the Russian chancellor, said it did.⁵⁶ He and the tsar had been expanding on that claim during the first six months of 1853. But Nesselrode had not informed himself very well on the terms of Russo-Turkish treaties, and after the war started the tsar confessed that he also had been badly informed. "He had been misled," said Nicholas I, "as to the rights which were secured to him by the Treaty of Kainardji and . . . his conduct would have been different but for the error into which he had been led."⁵⁷

This is not the place to begin a reinvestigation of the rather involved controversy of 1853 that led to the Russo-Turkish war of that year. But the tsar's statement does serve as an additional reminder that the Russian claims of 1853 cannot quite be taken at face value. Instead, the investigation must go back to the treaty terms themselves, and especially to consideration of whether any general right of protection devolved upon Russia from the fact that the Porte promised in a bilateral treaty "a firm protection to the Christian religion and its churches."⁵⁸

Russia did receive under the treaty, as has been shown, some specific rights to act within the Ottoman Empire on behalf of Christians. The rights were three: to build one Russo-Greek church in Istanbul, to make diplomatic representations about that one church and those who served it, and to make similar representations about the Christians of Moldavia and Wallachia. These fairly narrow provisions might of course be advanced as a *pretext* for subsequent pretensions to larger rights of representation, protection, or intervention. But they obviously do not provide a sound *basis* for expanded claims. Those historians who, over the years, have repeated the old claim that the Kuchuk Kainardji treaty granted Russia broad rights of protection or representation are clearly wrong. Those who have affirmed Russian rights of a more limited character are closer to the truth.

The verdict that the treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji exhibited Russian skill and Ottoman imbecility also merits a jaundiced eye. Russian skill was exhibited, although not quite so much as has been claimed. Sorel and others have pointed to what they perceive as a skillful scattering of related articles—especially the separation of articles 7 and 14 that dealt with the church in Constantinople, as if to conceal the connection from the Turks and the world. But in the original Russian treaty proposal the two articles were juxtaposed! Druzhinina finds no proof that either party tried to hoodwink the other "by a disorderly piling up of articles" during the negotiations, and suggests that possibly the Turks separated article 7 from article 14 to weaken the public impact in Istanbul of the concessions they were forced to make.⁵⁹ There was even some stupidity on the part of the Russians, for their recognition of the Ottoman sultan as rightful caliph of the new independent Crimean Khanate caused great trouble which had to be corrected later in the convention of Aynali Kavak in 1779.⁶⁰ Ottoman imbecility was also exhibited—less, however, in the final peace negotiation at Kuchuk Kainardji than in the lack of courage to make peace earlier in the war when a better bargain could have been obtained. During the peace negotiations of 1772–73 and again in 1774, the Ottomans saw to it that no general right of representation or protection was allowed to Russia, but only the three rights specified above. The real Ottoman stupidity was to have gone to war over the Polish question and, once irrevocably at war, to have been defeated in the field.

Thugut's verdict that the treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji exhibited Russian skill

and Turkish imbecility has been a good story for two centuries. Sorel's account has enhanced the story for the past ninety-eight years. Now it is time for a change.

Notes

1. A village south of Silistria, on the right bank of the Danube, in present-day Bulgaria. The name in Turkish means "little hot spring" and is spelled "Küçük Kaynarca" in the modern Turkish alphabet.

2. Russo-Turkish disagreement over the meaning of some clauses, especially concerning the Crimean Tatars, was settled by a "Convention explicative" of Aynali Kavak, March 10, 1779; text in Gabriel Noradounghian, *Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'Empire ottoman*, 4 vols. (Paris, 1897-1903), 1:338-44. On these and other problems concerning the Crimea between 1774 and 1779 see Alan W. Fisher, *The Russian Annexation of the Crimea, 1772-1783* (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 55-111.

3. Draft of a letter to Rumiantsov, undated (ca. July 29 to August 3, 1774, O.S.) in *Sbornik imperatorskago russkago istoricheskago obshchestva* (hereafter cited as *SIRIO*), 13 (1874): 429.

4. See the Ottoman government's manifesto on its declaration of war against Russia, October 4, 1853, referring to Russia's unacceptable demand which she sought to ground on a provision of the treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji, in G. F. de Martens, ed., *Nouveau recueil général des traités* . . . , 20 vols. in 22 (Göttingen, 1843-75), 15:548.

5. Paul Miliukov, Charles Seignobos, and L. Eisenmann, *History of Russia*, trans. Charles Lam Markmann, 3 vols. (New York, 1968-69), 2:111. The same statement in French in the original, *Histoire de Russie*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1932-33), 2:580.

6. Edouard Driault and Michel Lhéritier, *Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce*, 5 vols. (Paris, 1925-26), 1:143.

7. Sergei Zhigarev, *Russkaia politika v vostochnom voprose* (Moscow, 1896), pp. 199-200.

8. Albert Sorel, *La Question d'Orient au XVIII^e siècle*, 4th ed. (Paris, 1902 [1st ed. 1878]), p. 262.

9. Nicholas Jorga, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, 5 vols. (Gotha, 1908-13), 4:511-12; Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, 10 vols. (Pest, 1827-35), 8:447. Among other historians who have expressed similar opinions with various degrees of shading are Emile Bourgeois, Sergei Goriainov, Bernard Lewis, Alfred Rambaud, L. S. Stavrianos, and Nicholas Zernov.

10. Sidney Harcave, *Russia: A History*, 6th ed. (Philadelphia, 1968 [1st ed. 1952]), p. 157.

11. George Vernadsky, *A History of Russia*, 6th ed. (New Haven, 1969 [3rd printing 1971]), p. 167. The first edition was 1929.

12. L. S. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453* (New York, 1958), p. 192, and Barbara Jelavich, *A Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 1814-1914* (Philadelphia, 1964),

pp. 20–21, make almost identical assertions about Russia's right of representation, quoting a portion of article 7. Jelavich's statement in her expanded version, *St. Petersburg and Moscow: Tsarist and Soviet Foreign Policy, 1814–1974* (Bloomington, Ind., 1974), pp. 20–21, quotes a few more words of article 7 and so narrows the claim. Sidney N. Fisher takes a broad view in *The Middle East: A History*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1968 [1st ed. 1959]), p. 251, citing articles 12 and 14 but obviously meaning 7 and 14. Among others advancing a similar opinion on Russia's right of representation are Cemal Tükin, "Küçük Kaynarca," *İslâm Ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul, 1940–), vol. 6, p. 1069; Enver Ziya Karal, *Nizam-i cedit ve Tanzimat devirleri* (Ankara, 1970 [3rd printing]; first published 1947), p. 109; Norman E. Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean, 1797–1807* (Chicago, 1970), pp. 8–9.

13. Michael T. Florinsky, *Russia: A History and an Interpretation*, 2 vols. (New York, 1953; reprinted 1960), 1:526; Hugh Seton-Watson, *The Russian Empire, 1801–1917* (Oxford, 1967), p. 46.

14. Charles and Barbara Jelavich, *The Balkans* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1970), p. 35; Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Türkiye ve Rusya, XVIII. yüzyıl sonundan Kurtuluş Savaşı'na kadar Türk-Rus ilişkileri (1798–1919)* (Ankara, 1970), pp. 28–30; M. S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question, 1774–1923* (London, 1966), p. xi. See also Yahya Armanjani, *The Middle East, Past and Present* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1970), p. 196.

15. Kurat, *Türkiye ve Rusya*, p. 31; Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 192.

16. Reşat Ekrem Koçu, *Osmanlı muahedeler ve kapitulasyonlar, 1300–1920* (Istanbul, 1934), p. 102; J. A. R. Marriott, *The Eastern Question*, 4th ed. (Oxford, 1940 [1st ed. 1917]), p. 153; Driault and Lhéritier, *Histoire diplomatique*, 1:24; Edouard Driault, *La Question d'Orient*, 8th ed. (Paris, 1921 [1st ed. 1898]), p. 55; Zhigarev, *Russkaia politika*, p. 198. Marriott on p. 152 cites articles 12 and 14 but obviously means 7 and 14. Zhigarev and Driault and Lhéritier say Thugut's view may be slightly exaggerated, but concur in his general appraisal of Kuchuk Kainardji as reflecting Russian skill and Turkish imbecility.

17. Sorel, *Question d'Orient*, pp. 263–64. Sorel gives one additional sentence from Thugut, not essential here. The above translation is a little closer to Sorel's French than that by F. C. Bramwell in Albert Sorel, *The Eastern Question in the Eighteenth Century* (New York, 1969 [1st ed. London, 1898]), p. 250. A Turkish translation by Yusuf Ziya [Özer] also appeared: *On sekizinci asırda Mesele-i Şarkıye ve Kaynarca muahedesi* (Istanbul, 1911), as well as a Polish translation by Marya Gomolinska, *Kwestya Wschodnia w w. XVIII* (Warsaw, 1905).

18. Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1969 [1st ed. 1963]), p. 294.

19. Theodor Schiemann, *Geschichte Russlands unter Kaiser Nikolaus I*, 4 vols. (Berlin, 1904–19), 1:257–58; Bernard Pares, *A History of Russia*, 4th ed. (New York, 1946 [1st ed. 1926]), p. 266; B. H. Sumner, *Survey of Russian History* (London, 1944), p. 238. Hans Uebersberger, *Russlands Orientpolitik in den letzten zwei Jahrhunderten*, 2 vols. (Stuttgart, 1913), 1:335–37, takes a similar view, as does Sergei Pushkarev, *The Emergence of Modern Russia, 1801–1917* (New York, 1963 [1st ed. in Russian, New York, 1956]), p. 344; see also Charles and Barbara Jelavich, *The Balkans*, p. 35.

20. A. J. P. Taylor, for instance, following Harold Temperley, says "there was clearly no general right of protection by Russia," in his *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918* (Oxford, 1954 [New York, 1971]), p. 52, n. 1. Temperley's judgment is in *England and the Near East: The Crimea* (London, 1936), pp. 467-69. J. C. Hurewitz speaks of Russia's "claim" to a right of protection as "based upon a liberal (and questionable) interpretation of articles 7 and 14" in *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, 2 vols. (Princeton, 1956), 1:54. For similar views, see also Alfred S. Stern, *Geschichte Europas . . . 1815 . . . 1871*, 10 vols. (Stuttgart, 1894-1924), 8:35; A. Debidour, *Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe . . . (1814-1878)*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1931 [1st ed. 1891]), 1:101 and 2:86; Stanford J. Shaw, *Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire Under Sultan Selim III, 1789-1807* (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), p. 10; Armajani, *The Middle East*, p. 196.

21. Kurat, *Türkiye ve Rusya*, p. 29, compares the Russian and Turkish texts of article 7; his transcription of the Turkish text has inconsequential errors. Alan W. Fisher, *The Russian Annexation*, p. 55, n. 2, says his comparison of Russian and Turkish texts of articles concerning the Crimea showed no discrepancies. Joseph L. Wieczynski, "The Myth of Kuchuk Kainardji in American Histories of Russia," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 4, no. 4 (July 1968): 276-79, uses only a text in English as basis for evaluating historians' statements.

22. Russian text is in *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii* (hereafter cited as *PSZ*), 134 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1830-1916), Series 1, vol. 19, no. 14164, pp. 957-67; in *Dogovory Rossii s Vostokom*, ed. T. Iuzefovich (St. Petersburg, 1869), pp. 24-41; and in *Sbornik gremot i dogovorov o prisoedinenii tsarstv i oblastei k Gosudarstvu Rossiiskomu v XVII-XIX vekakh* (Petersburg, 1922), pp. 383-406. All are the same except for minor spelling variations. The last cites a printed copy in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives under "Turkey, 1774." E. I. Druzhinina, *Kiuchuk-Kainardzhitskii mir 1774 goda (ego podgotovka i zakliuchenie)* (Moscow, 1955), prints the text as an appendix; on p. 349 she notes a few differences between the *PSZ* text and a "contemporary copy," none of which affect the treaty's wording or meaning. Even she, having used several archives, does not refer to the original manuscript copy in Russian that was signed at Kuchuk Kainardji. I do not know if this still exists. I have relied on the *PSZ* text.

In the Başbakanlık Arşivi in Istanbul I have not discovered the original either in Turkish or in Italian. But an early and presumably contemporary manuscript copy is there in a register, *Ecnebi Defterler* No. 83/1, pp. 139-49, and I have relied on this. This may be the source for the official printed text in *Muahedat mecmuasi*, 5 vols. (Istanbul, A.H. 1294-98 [A.D. 1877/8-1880/1]), 3:254-75; the two texts are almost identical. Ahmed Cevdet, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, tertib-i cedid, 12 vols. in 6 (Istanbul, A.H. 1301-9 [A.D. 1883/4-1891/2]), 1:285-95, also gives the text, with very slight variations from the two preceding ones. I have found no complete text in modern Turkish letters. Reşat Ekrem (Koçu), *Osmanli muahedeleri*, pp. 102-4, is a brief summary only, with comment.

The Italian text is in G. F. de Martens, ed., *Recueil des principaux traités . . . de l'Europe*, 7 vols. (Göttingen, 1791-1801), 4:606-38, and again in Martens, ed., *Recueil*, 2nd ed., 8 vols. (Göttingen, 1817-35), 2:286-322, in each case taken from *Storia del Anno* for 1774. I have seen no other complete Italian text. Druzhinina,

Kiuchuk-Kainardzhiiskii mir, pp. 274–75, prints a clear facsimile of the first and last pages only of the Italian manuscript original in the Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossii. There are some differences in spelling, in word forms, and occasionally even in wording between the Martens and facsimile Italian versions, although the meaning is not affected. It would be a great service if a facsimile of the complete Italian text, and also of the Russian original, if extant, were published in Moscow. Similarly, if a Turkish scholar can discover the original Italian and Turkish copies in Istanbul, their publication would be welcome.

Martens, *Recueil*, 1st ed., 1:507–22, gives a "private translation" of the treaty into French, probably from the Italian of *Storia del Anno*. Noradounghian, *Recueil*, 1:319–34, is a different translation into French, from either Italian or Turkish. George Vernadsky et al., *A Source Book for Russian History* . . . , 3 vols. (New Haven, 1972), 2:406–7, give an independent translation of extracts into English from *PSZ*. On other translations into French and English see notes 36 and 37 below.

23. The Russian term here tends to mean "employees," the Turkish to mean "officials," while the Italian seems slightly broader.

24. Galata was the part of Istanbul north of the Golden Horn in which most Europeans lived, as well as many native non-Muslims. European embassies were situated there in Beyoğlu, which is today usually the designation for a whole quarter rather than for its original and principal street. Pera, a Greek-derived name for Beyoğlu, was commonly used by Europeans.

25. The phrase "called Russo-Greek" is in the Italian "chiamata Russo-Greca." *Chiamata* does not mean simply "having the title of," but "having the essential character of," as is clear from its further use in article 11 of the treaty.

26. Isabel Florence Hapgood, *Service Book of the Holy Orthodox-Catholic Apostolic (Greco-Russian) Church, Compiled, Translated, and Arranged from the Old Church-Slavonic Service Books of the Russian Church, and Collated with the Service Books of the Greek Church* (Boston, 1906). See also John Glen King, *The Rites and Ceremonies of the Greek Church, in Russia* (London, 1772 [reprinted New York, 1970]), pp. vii, 5, 47, 133.

27. The considerable groups of native Catholics in the Ottoman Empire were mostly in Syria, Lebanon, Serbia, and Albania. In Istanbul the majority of Latin Catholics were probably foreign nationals. Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall, *Constantinopolis und der Bosporos*, 2 vols. (Osnabrück, 1967 [original ed. 1822]), 2:126–27 mentions the protected Catholic churches in Beyoğlu; Robert Mantran, *Istanbul dans la seconde moitié du XVII^e siècle* (Paris, 1962), pp. 73, 561–62, has information on French-protected churches in an earlier period. There were very few Protestants in the Ottoman Empire; almost every one was a foreigner.

28. Ignatius Mouradgea d'Ohsson, *Tableau générale de l'Empire Othoman*, 2nd ed., 7 vols. in 8 (Paris, 1788–1824), 7:463–64. A chief dragoman and then chargé d'affaires for Sweden, d'Ohsson sometimes makes errors, and has made one earlier in this passage by describing treaty rights which Russia gained in the provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia as applying to the Ottoman Empire generally. But his statement on the church is simple and probably contains the understanding of 1774. As previously noted, Europeans usually said "Pera" for "Beyoğlu." J. W. Zinkeisen,

Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches in Europa, 7 vols. (Hamburg, 1840–63), 5:3, also says that the Greek church to be built in Galata was for Russian subjects.

29. These churches also served the Russian refugee community that flooded into Istanbul after World War I. That community has now dwindled, leaving the churches to be cared for by the remaining older faithful.

30. Druzhinina, *Kiuchuk-Kainardzhiiskii mir*, pp. 220–24, 296, 348, and article draft (here article 23) on p. 346.

31. Actually, the Russian text says "Greco-Russian," while the Italian in this instance supports the Turkish "Russo-Greek." The difference appears to have no significance.

32. Article 16, paragraph 9 of the Kuchuk Kainardji treaty allows the princes of Moldavia and Wallachia to have chargés d'affaires in Istanbul, representing their masters at the Porte, who would be Christians "of the Greek religion"—"della Religione Greca" in Italian, "Grecheskago zakona" in Russian, but "Rum mezhebinden" in Turkish.

33. Druzhinina, *Kiuchuk-Kainardzhiiskii mir*, pp. 111 and 295; "Exposé confidentiel au Pr. Lobkowitz," May 16, 1771, *SIRIO*, 97 (1896): 286–302; Lord Cathcart to Earl of Halifax, February 18/March 1, 1771, *SIRIO*, 19 (1876): 190–91.

34. Sir R. Gunning to Earl of Suffolk, July 24/August 4, 1774, *SIRIO*, 19:423–24. William Tooke, *Life of Catherine II*, 5th ed., 3 vols. (Dublin, 1800), 2:116–18, evaluates the treaty similarly; see also Norman Itzkowitz and Max Mote, *Mubadele: An Ottoman-Russian Exchange of Ambassadors* (Chicago, 1970), pp. 37–39.

35. Manifesto of March 17, 1775 in *PSZ*, Series 1, vol. 20, no. 14274, pp. 80–81. Druzhinina, *Kiuchuk-Kainardzhiiskii mir*, p. 316, and Kurat, *Türkiye ve Rusya*, p. 30, give a date of March 19, apparently mistaken. The "places of upspringing" might be construed to mean Palestine, but this seems less likely than that it means Constantinople, and generally the lands of the former Byzantine Empire (with Palestine and other parts), now included in the Ottoman Empire.

36. G. F. de Martens gives the French in two editions: *Recueil*, 1st ed., 4:607–38, with notes on pp. 606 and 607 asserting that this is the authorized French version made in Russia and published in St. Petersburg in 1775; and *Recueil*, 2nd ed., 2:286–321, with similar notes.

37. The St. Petersburg French version and the English translation of it are in "Treaties (Political and Territorial) between Russia and Turkey, 1774–1849," in Great Britain, House of Commons, *Sessional Papers*, 1854, vol. 72. This English translation is reproduced in Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, 1:54–61, and also in the 2nd edition, revised and enlarged, J. C. Hurewitz, *The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record* (New Haven, Conn., 1975–), 1:92–101. M. S. Anderson, *The Great Powers and the Near East, 1774–1923* (London, 1970 [New York, 1971]), pp. 9–14, uses the same English version. There is a more recent and different translation into English in Fred L. Israel, ed., *Major Peace Treaties of Modern History, 1645–1967*, 4 vols. (New York, 1967), 1:913–29. The source from which the translation was made is not indicated, except that it was a French text (and hence not one of the official treaty languages). But it is

certain that the St. Petersburg French text is not the source, since the church in article 14 is called "Russo-Greek." Almost certainly the source is Noradounghian. There are a few errors in translation in this new English version. Curiously, Israel says (p. v) that the reason for translating from French is that no official English translation existed.

38. Hammer, *Geschichte*, 8:577-84; Hammer, *Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman*, 17 vols. (Paris, 1835-41), 16:494-503. On a significant inaccuracy, see n. 46 below.

39. Sorel listed the works he consulted on p. iv of his *Question d'Orient*. Hammer's French edition is among them. Thugut's words as quoted above, from Sorel, pp. 263-64, are nearly identical with those in Hammer, *Histoire*, vol. 16, pp. 500 and 503. But Sorel adds a few words that are not in Thugut, fails to indicate his omissions in quoting Thugut, and actually reverses the dates for the two dispatches from which he does quote. He also makes an inconsequential error in copying.

It may be noted that Sorel has been criticized before for deficiencies in research methods and precision. The most telling criticisms apply to the last four volumes of his *L'Europe et la Révolution française*, 8 vols. (Paris, 1895-1904); see especially Raymond Guyot and Pierre Muret, "Étude critique sur 'Bonaparte et le Directoire' par M. Albert Sorel," *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, 5, no. 4 (January 15, 1904): 241-64, and no. 5 (February 15, 1904): 313-39. Sorel, nevertheless, still enjoys a considerable reputation. His *Question d'Orient*, almost a century after its appearance, is called "useful" by authors of two of the most recent monographs in that area: Anderson, *Eastern Question*, p. 400, and Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, p. 231.

40. Sorel, *Question d'Orient*, p. 260.

41. Hammer, *Histoire*, 16:500.

42. Hammer, *Geschichte*, 8:401-3, 415 n.c.

43. Druzhinina, *Kiuchuk-Kainardzhiiskii mir*, p. 221.

44. Hammer, *Geschichte*, 8:412.

45. Druzhinina, *Kiuchuk-Kainardzhiiskii mir*, p. 346, giving Obreskov's draft article 24.

46. Hammer, *Geschichte*, 8:578. The French edition of Hammer, *Histoire*, 16:495, omits the vital qualifying phrase, "on the strength of common assurance." Why so sloppy a translation? According to the title page of volume 1 of *Histoire*, J.-J. Hellert made the translation under Hammer's own direction.

47. Hammer, *Geschichte*, 8:577-82.

48. There were such Russo-Turkish wars in 1787-92, 1806-12, 1828-29, 1853-54, and 1877-78. According to Philip E. Mosely, *Russian Diplomacy and the Opening of the Eastern Question in 1838 and 1839* (Cambridge, Mass., 1934), p. 7, the Russian fleet sixty years after Kuchuk Kainardji was still ninety-six hours' sail from the Straits.

49. Thugut's dispatch of May 3, 1773, partly quoted in Hammer, *Geschichte*, 8:412, n.a, and 446, n.b.

50. Thugut's dispatch of July 18, 1774, *ibid.*, pp. 582-83.

51. Joseph Freiherr von Hammer-Purgstall, "Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben, 1774–1852," in *Fontes Rerum Austriacarum*, sec. 2, vol. 70 (Vienna, 1940), pp. 35–38, 132, 174–76, 209, 233, 245. See also Constant von Würzbach, *Biographisches Lexikon des Kaiserthums Oesterreich*, 60 vols. (Vienna, 1856–91), 7:267–89, on Hammer. On Franz Maria Freiherr von Thugut, see *ibid.*, 45:1–6. Hammer was sometimes critical of Thugut, as he was of everyone, but in an appendix in his *Geschichte*, 8:577, he introduces extracts from Thugut's reports as proof of judgments in the text of the *Geschichte* on Thugut's "diplomatic skill and correct view of affairs." Hammer states that the extracts will not be unwelcome to "political readers."

52. Hammer, *Geschichte*, 8:582. Turkish accounts, curiously, speak of "idiocy" or "stupidity" of the second Turkish negotiator at Kuchuk Kainardji, but this because he was said himself to have raised the question of indemnity payments to Russia after the treaty was completed and agreed on, thus costing the Turks 15,000 purses of *akçe* (4,500,000 rubles). One account says the stupidity occurred when the delegate awoke from an "elbow nap" and introduced the indemnity subject to cover up the fact he had been dozing. I. H. Danişmend, *Izahli Osmanlı tarihi kronolojisi*, 4 vols. (Istanbul, 1947–55), 4:58.

53. Metternich to Prince Esterhazy (London), March 17, 1822, and enclosure 4, "Dispositions des Traités entre la Russie et la Porte, relativement aux Chrétiens : Grecs:/ habitants des Provinces Européennes de l'Empire Ottoman," in Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Staatskanzlei, England, Kart. 166, Korr. Weisungen. Metternich's analysis included nothing on Ottoman Asian territories but did include provisions of the Treaty of Bucharest (1812). Paul Schroeder, *Metternich's Diplomacy at its Zenith* (New York, 1969), p. 188, n. 80, refers to Metternich's analysis but gives the dispatch date erroneously as April 24, 1822.

54. Zinkeisen, *Geschichte*, 5:3, interprets this clause as promising religious freedom in the Ottoman Empire simply for Russian subjects. So narrow an interpretation cannot be sustained by the language.

55. Reshid to Musurus (London), August 25, 1853, in *Diş-İşleri Bakanlığı Hazine-i Evrak* (Foreign Ministry Archives, Istanbul), dosya 609.

56. A. M. Zaionchkovskii, *Vostochnaia voina 1853–1856 gg.* . . . , 4 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1908–13), *Prilozheniia*, 1:449–50, circular of May 30/June 11, 1853.

57. Nesselrode's circular, cited in n. 56, makes a flat misstatement about Russia's rights, particularly under the 1829 treaty of Adrianople. The tsar's admission, probably made originally to Count Orlov, is reported in Sir Hamilton Seymour (St. Petersburg) to Clarendon #176, February 21, 1854, Secret and Confidential, in Public Record Office (London), FO 65/445. G. B. Henderson, *Crimean War Diplomacy* (Glasgow, 1947), p. 10, cites this dispatch (first noted in his article in *History*, October 1933); Temperley, *England and the Near East*, p. 469, also refers to it.

58. It might be possible to argue that Russia needed no treaty basis at all to act as protector of Ottoman Christians, and that "might made right." This argument, which will not be pursued here, is suggested by some Russian statements of 1853. Baron Brunnow, the tsar's ambassador to London, wrote privately to Prince Menshikov and Count Nesselrode: "Russia is strong, Turkey is weak, that is the preamble of all our

treaties." F. F. de Martens, ed., *Recueil des traités et conventions conclus par la Russie*, 15 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1874–1909), 12:311, letter of March 21/April 2, 1853. Nesselrode himself wrote soon after: "Russia's right rests on an incontestable fact: 50 million Orthodox Russians cannot remain indifferent to the fate of 12 million Orthodox subjects of the Sultan." Nesselrode to Brunnow, April 20 (presumably O. S., hence May 2), 1853, *ibid.*, p. 318.

59. Druzhinina, *Kiuchuk-Kainardzhiiskii mir*, pp. 278 and 346.

60. Text in G. F. de Martens, *Recueil*, 2nd ed., 2:653–61; Noradounghian, *Recueil*, 1:338–44.

3. The “Dosografa” Church in the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca

By the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca of 1774, which marked a disastrous defeat of the Ottoman empire by Russia, the Russians were accorded the right to build a church in Istanbul, in the Galata quarter. The treaty further specified that the church was to be under the protection of the Russian minister, who could make representations concerning it to the Sublime Porte. This church, and the Russian right to protect it and to make representations about it, furnished much of the basis on which Russian governments, in later years, built a claim to a broader right to protect the Greek Orthodox Church, even the Greek Orthodox people, in the Sultan's domains. The claims were exaggerated, but since the church in Istanbul was to be ‘of the Greek ritual,’ as article 14 of the treaty said, the connexion seemed logical.¹ The Turkish text of the treaty, however, as Cevdet Paşa reproduces it in his history, makes no mention of a church ‘of the Greek ritual.’ Instead, his article 14 specifies that this church is to be called the *dusuğrafa* or *dosografa* church (دوسوغرافه کنیساسی).²

What is a *dosografa* church? The meaning of this label is not immediately obvious. The word seems to be neither Turkish nor Greek nor Russian, nor does there appear to be a Saint Dosografa for whom the church was named. Is this then an error? If so, it is shared by the modern Turkish historian who has delved most deeply into Russo-Turkish relations, the late Professor Akdes Nimet Kurat, who in his monumental work *Türkiye ve Rusya* quotes article 14 of the treaty as providing for a ‘Dosografa’ church.³ Furthermore, the *Mu‘āhedāt Mecmū‘ası*, the official published collection of Ottoman treaties, confirms Cevdet. Its designation of the church is exactly the same—دوسوغرافه.⁴ None of the three works offers any annotation which would explain the nature of a ‘Dosografa’ church.

The problem is partly elucidated by tracing the treaty text back a step farther, to the copy of Küçük Kaynarca in the Başbakanlık Arşivi in Istanbul. The original of the treaty has not been found there, but an early manuscript copy, which may have been the source for Cevdet and for the *Mu‘āhedāt Mecmū‘ası*, is in a register in the series of Ecnebi Defterleri which record treaties, decorations, and consular matters. Here the designation of the church to be established under article 14 is spelled differently—‘Rosograf’ or

'Rusuğraf' or 'Rusograf' (روسوغراف).⁵ The initial letter is clearly *r* and not *d* and resembles the other initial *rs* in the same paragraph and elsewhere throughout the treaty. Probably, then, the word is meant to begin with a reference to something Russian, or 'Rüs.'

A sensible explanation for the 'Dosografa' church finally becomes possible when the texts of Küçük Kaynarca in Russian and Italian are also examined. In 1774, Grand Vizier Muhsinzâde Mehmed Paşa signed Turkish and Italian texts of the treaty, while Field-Marshal P. A. Rumyantsov signed Russian and Italian texts, as provided by article 28 of the treaty itself. These three languages, then, are the only official ones, and in case of a divergence between the Turkish and Russian texts the Italian would control. Article 14 in the Russian text specifies that the church to be built in Istanbul will be of the 'Greco-Russian faith.'⁶ The church was, then, obviously to have some 'Russian' character, corresponding to the 'Rus' of the Turkish manuscript text. The Italian version of the treaty makes matters even clearer. Here article 14 stipulates that the church is to be 'called Russo-Greek.'⁷ Thus, in the Turkish text, it is most likely that the *graf* occurs mistakenly when *grek* is meant. The Porte's copying clerk evidently misread the final *k* of 'Rusogrek' and transformed it into a *f* by using one dot instead of two.

In this manner the 'Dosografa' church of Cevdet Paşa and of the official treaty collection becomes, in all probability, a 'Rusogrek' church, in exact conformity with the Italian text of Küçük Kaynarca and in conformity also with the meaning of the Russian text, although the latter reverses the order of the compound adjective to make it Greco-Russian instead of Russo-Greek. It is hard to explain why two sound historians like Cevdet and Kurat should have accepted a so-called Dosografa church without query, and why no other Turkish historian has questioned their article 14, or that in the officially published treaty collection. It is strange, further, that there is apparently no complete published text of Küçük Kaynarca in modern Turkish; at any rate, I have found none. What published texts of article 14 are available in Turkish are, therefore, the product of sequential copying errors: the first by the clerk who made 'Rusogrek' into 'Rusograf,' and the second by Cevdet or the compiler of the treaty collection or someone else who made 'Rusograf' into 'Dosografa.'

When the correction has been made, the Turkish text of article 14 may be translated as follows.

By analogy with the other powers it is permitted that the Russian government, besides the private church, may have a church built in the district of Galata on the public road in the street of the quarter called Beyoğlu. This church is to be public, is to be called by the title of the Russo-Greek church and to be forever under the protection of the minister of the

Russian government, and is to be secure and free and guarded from any sort of molestation and interference.⁸

This treaty provision was an immense success for Russia. The Empress Catherine would now be able to boast of a Greek church, in a suburb of the Ottoman capital, under Russian protection. Her empire, a recent arrival in the Near East, would be the equal of the Catholic powers, Austria and France, who traditionally had been the protectors of Latin churches in Galata and Beyoğlu.⁹ But Catherine's success was even greater. Article 14 allowed the construction of a completely new church, not just the replacement of an old one. This was a violation of Islamic law. Although the Ottoman government had permitted Greek and Latin churches built before 1453 to survive, it had permitted no new ones to be built after the conquest of Constantinople.¹⁰ The new church, furthermore, would be situated on the main street of Beyoğlu, would be open to the public generally rather than being a private embassy chapel, and would have Russia's name attached to it. Among the Greek Orthodox of Istanbul, Russia and the Tsarina Catherine would be praised to the skies. The history of the protracted negotiations for the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca shows that some of the Greeks of Istanbul were eager for just such a Russian-protected church, would contribute the land and funds for it, and had pressed A. M. Obreskov, the Russian negotiator in 1772–3, to secure the right to build it under Russia's aegis. He, of course, recognized the increased influence among Ottoman Greeks that a church under Russian protection would give to St. Petersburg.¹¹ The increase in religious influence would march parallel with the increase in territorial, commercial, and diplomatic status accorded to Russia by the treaty.

Yet the name of the church that Russia was authorized to establish has a significance that qualifies this prospective advance in Russian influence. For if the church was to be Russo-Greek, rather than simply Greek, it would furnish a much more tenuous base if Russian rulers sought to build on it a claim to protect the whole Greek Church in the Ottoman empire. The Istanbul church would not, under the treaty provision, be one of the usual Greek Orthodox churches of the Ottoman empire. That it was not intended to be one of these usual churches is a likely deduction from the terminology used in the Turkish text of the treaty, and from the clerk's mistake in copying. The term commonly used for the usual Greek church in the Ottoman empire was 'Rüm.' The treaty itself, in fact, employs that word to designate the Greek religious community in the Ottoman empire.¹² Had the Istanbul church authorized in article 14 been intended to be one of these usual Greek churches, it probably would have been called a 'Rüm' church and the clerk would have had no trouble with the term. Instead, the church was called 'Rüsogrek.' The clerk recognized 'Rūs,' which was commonly used in Turkish, but he failed to rec-

ognize 'Grek,' which was not. In contradistinction to the indigenous or 'Rûm' church, what the treaty authorized was apparently a foreign church, as the foreign term 'Rûsogrek' implied.

It may also be significant that the Russian text of the treaty did not describe the church as *pravoslavniy*. This was, after all, the usual term for Orthodox. In 1775 the Empress Catherine herself, in a proclamation praising the treaty, referred both to the faith of the Russian church and to Greek Orthodox inhabitants of Moldavia and Wallachia as *pravoslavniy*.¹³ Why was the church called 'Greco-Russian' instead? The answer can only be speculative. Possibly the Russian term was influenced by the 'Russo-Greca' of the agreed Italian text. But, although the influence of the Italian expression is possible, this may not explain the origin of the term. It was Obreskov, apparently, who first used it. In the abortive peace negotiations of 1772-3 he proposed to the Turks a Russian-protected church in Beyoğlu for clergy 'confessing the Greco-Russian faith.'¹⁴ The Russian draft treaty presented to the Turks in those same negotiations contained an article identical with article 14 of the final treaty, stipulating the right of Russia to erect in the street of Beyoğlu in Galata a public church of the 'Greco-Russian' faith.¹⁵ One can only guess that Obreskov may have had three reasons for using 'Greco-Russian' instead of 'Orthodox.' First, he may have wished to impress on the Turks the close religious relationship of Greeks and Russians, so helping to expand Russia's sphere of religious influence within Ottoman domains. Second, he knew from the Greeks of Istanbul that the Porte was unlikely to approve the construction of an ordinary Greek church; a Russian church, they thought, was possible. Third, he probably wanted the distinctive appellation 'Russian' attached to the church for the diplomatic prestige it would bring. This would demonstrate that if France and Austria could protect churches of *their* particular brand of Christianity in Beyoğlu, Russia could do the same for a church of *her* brand.¹⁶

If both the Russian and Italian texts of Küçük Kaynarca, and as we see now the Turkish text also, specified that the church to be established in Istanbul was Russo-Greek, why then does the English text of the treaty not specify this as well? Why does it say, erroneously, a church 'of the Greek ritual,' with no mention of Russo-Greek? The answer here lies in a history not of faulty copying, but of faulty translation. The English text of the treaty most widely used today is reproduced in two documentary collections edited by contemporary scholars.¹⁷ They have relied on the translation made, evidently, in the Foreign Office and published at the time of the Crimean War, when Russian pretensions to a right of protection of the Greek Orthodox in the Ottoman empire had been vigorously advanced.¹⁸ This English translation was in its turn made from a French translation of Küçük Kaynarca, which was printed for Parliament in 1854 together with the English. A note reveals that this French version had been published in St. Petersburg in 1775.¹⁹ This French version was evidently made by the government of Catherine II; for Martens, editor of the

most widely used treaty collection in Europe, prints the same French version and notes that it is the authorized translation made in Russia and published in St. Petersburg in 1775.²⁰ This Russian-authorized French version, which became standard in Europe (even though Martens had earlier published his own French translation), did not designate the church to be built in Istanbul as 'Russo-Greek'. Instead, the church was said to be simply, 'du rit Grec.'²¹ Reference to the Russian character of the church was omitted. This mistranslation, current in French and then in English, obviously was a help to Russian pretensions to a right of protection of the wider Greek church in the Ottoman empire. It conformed neither to the Russian, the Italian, nor the Turkish text of the treaty. One wonders whether the mistranslation was innocent, or not.²²

Perhaps it was, if the St. Petersburg French translation was made from the Russian and not from the Italian text. For a church 'of the Greek ritual' may seem only a little removed in essential meaning from the church 'of the Greco-Russian faith' that the Russian text of article 14 provided for. But a church 'of the Greek ritual' differs rather more from the church 'called Russo-Greek' stipulated by the controlling Italian text, and equally by the Turkish text. The St. Petersburg French translation, then, by dropping any reference to the Russian character of the church, and including only reference to the Greek, was misleading. Deliberate or not, it certainly laid an advantageous base for later Russian claims.

It is anticlimactic to discover that the Russo-Greek church, to all appearances, was never built. This must be the conclusion, at least, from the published record; and it seems unlikely that such a church, if actually constructed, would have escaped mention, particularly by Russian visitors to Istanbul. The fairly detailed accounts of two members of a Russian embassy sent to the Ottoman capital in 1793 fail to mention such a church.²³ A Russian officer who carried despatches to Istanbul in 1808 and stayed for some weeks records nothing in his journal about such a church.²⁴ Two later Russian guide-books for pilgrims and tourists mention no Russo-Greek or Russian-protected church.²⁵ I have noticed, further, no mention of such a church in Cevdet's history, nor yet in Mouradgea d'Ohsson's *Tableau général de l'empire ottoman*, which he wrote not long after the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca.²⁶ Finally, a succession of knowledgeable Western travellers to Istanbul and residents of Istanbul are equally silent about any Russo-Greek or Russian-protected church.²⁷ Had such a church been constructed, it could well have perished in the great Beyoğlu fire of 1831 that destroyed several European embassies and Catholic churches, but neither before nor after that date is it mentioned as constructed or reconstructed.

Why the church was not constructed remains a matter of guesswork, and it may be so even after Russian and Ottoman archives are further searched. Perhaps there were practical difficulties. It may be that the ideal moment for building was never found, given the recurring tensions and wars between the

governments of Sultan and Tsar. Or, possibly, the Russians were content with the Sublime Porte's affirmation of their *right* to build and protect a church in Beyoğlu, putting them on a basis of theoretical equality with the Catholic powers.

The conclusion from the evidence so far available is threefold: the 'Dosografa' church of the published Ottoman treaty text is fictitious; the church 'of the Greek ritual' in the French text of St. Petersburg is also erroneous; and the legal right obtained by Russia in the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca to build and protect a Russo-Greek church was not translated into physical fact.

Notes

1. Text of the treaty in English in J. C. Hurewitz (ed.), *The Middle East and North Africa in world politics: a documentary record*, New Haven, 1975, 92–101.

2. Ahmed Cevdet, *Tārīh-i Cevdet. Tertīb-i cedid*, Istanbul, 1301–9, I, 289.

3. Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Türkiye ve Rusya: XVIII yüzyıl sonundan kurtuluş savaşına kadar Türk-Rus ilişkileri (1798–1919)*, Ankara, 1970, 29. Kurat's text is not quite the same as Cevdet's article 14; the major variant is that Kurat converts *kenise* into *kilise* each time the word occurs, but the meaning is not affected.

4. *Mu'āhedāt Mecmū'ası*, Istanbul, 1294–8, III, 261.

5. Başbakanlık Arşivi, Ecnebi Defterleri 83/1, 144.

6. Literally, 'Grekorossiyskago ispovedaniya.' *Polnoye sobraniye zakonov rossiyskoy imperii*, St. Petersburg, 1830–1916, First Series, XIX, 962.

7. Literally, 'chiamata Russo-Greca'. G. F. de Martens (ed.), *Recueil des principaux traités . . . de l'Europe*, Göttingen, 1791–1801, IV, 620.

8. A literal rendition from the manuscript copy in the Ecnebi Defterleri 83/1 and from *Mu'āhedāt Mecmū'ası*, whose wording is identical: *Düvel-i sâ'ireye kıyâsen kilise-i mahşûseden mâ'adâ Galata tarafında Beg Oğlu nâm mahallenün yolında tarîk-i âmda Rûsya Devleti bir kenise etdirmek câ'iz ola işbu kenise kenise-i 'avâmm olub Rûsoğrek kenisesi ta 'bîriyle tesmiye ve ile'l-ebed Rûsya Devletiniñ elçisi şiyânetinde olub her dürlü ta 'arruz ve müddâheleden emîn ve berî ve hırâset olına*. Cevdet adds one word, without changing the meaning—he says *bir kenise binâ etdirmek câ'iz*. The Turkish text might allow a translation that begins: 'The Russian government, besides the private church in the manner of the other powers, is permitted to have a church built . . .'. But this phrasing, linking only the private embassy chapel to the analogy of the other powers, probably must be ruled out since it does not conform either to the Italian or to the Russian text.

The Italian article 14 reads, as Martens gives it: 'L'altissima Corte di Russia potrà a norma delle altre Potenze, a riserva della Chiesa Domestica, edificarne una nelle parte di Galata nella strada detta Bey-Uglú, la qual Chiesa sarà pubblica, chiamata Russo-Greca, e questra sempre si manterrà sotto la protezione del Ministro di questo Impero, e anderà illesa da ogni molestia, ed oltraggio.'

The Russian article 14 reads: 'Rossiyskomu Visochayshemu Dvoru, po primeru

drugikh Derzhav, pozvolyayetsya, krome domashney v dome Ministra tserkvi, vozdvignut v chasti Galata, v ulitse Bey Oglu nazyvayemoy, publichnyu Grekorossiyskago ispovedaniya tserkov, kotoraya vseгда pod protektsyeyu onoy Imperii Ministrov ostat'sya imeyet, i nikakomu pritesneniyu, ili oskorbleniyu podverzhena ne budet.'

9. Information on the Catholic churches and embassy chapels is in F. A. Belin, *Histoire de la Latinité de Constantinople*, second enlarged ed., ed. R. P. Arsène de Chatel, Paris, 1894, 178, 227, 231, 241–2, 277–80, 302–6, 312–14, 332–4, 375–7; Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall, *Constantinopolis und der Bosporus*, repr., Osnabrück, 1970 (original ed. 1822), II, 126–7. Perhaps the Russian desire for a church in Beyoğlu was sharpened by the fact that the Austrian-protected church and embassy chapel there had both just been more permanently rebuilt in stone after being burned in the great fire of 1767: Belin, *Latinité*, 277, 333. However, like other Catholic churches in Beyoğlu, they were not very prominent, because of simple exteriors or a situation somewhat off the main street: A. Brayer, *Neuf années à Constantinople*, Paris, 1836, I, 14. The Russian embassy was also destroyed by the fire of 1767.

10. Not all the old churches, of course, survived. A number of the pre-1453 churches had been converted into mosques. In the following three centuries Christians could not always secure fermans to repair burned churches, and sometimes the land on which destroyed churches had stood was expropriated by the Muslim authorities: Belin, *Latinité*, 303, 536; Robert Mantran, *Istanbul dans la seconde moitié du XVII^e siècle*, Paris, 1962, 73. To be sure, Greek Orthodox churches had been constructed in Istanbul after the conquest—Ernest Mamboury, *Istanbul touristique*, Istanbul, 1951, 348–50, lists 24 of them built after 1453—but the presumption must be that they replaced older churches, or else were built in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries when the ban on new construction was occasionally relaxed.

11. Ye. I. Druzhinina, *Kyuchuk-Kaynardzhiyskiy mir 1774 goda (yego podgotovka i zaklyucheniye)*, Moscow, 1955, 220–4, 295–6, 348. I am grateful to a reader of the original draft for several suggestions incorporated in this paragraph, as well as for some elsewhere.

12. Article 16, par. 9. Ecnebi Defterleri 83/1, 145.

13. Proclamation of 17 March 1775: *Polnoye sobraniye zakonov*, First Series, XX, 81. She did not specifically mention the Beyoğlu church, however. A later Russian guidebook, for example, uses *pravoslavniy* to refer to Greek Orthodox churches in Istanbul: Antonii (hieromonach), *Putevoditel' po Konstantinopolyu: opisaniye zamiyechatel'nykh i svyatykh miyest*, Odessa, 1884, 66. I am grateful to another reader of the draft for calling my attention to this point.

14. 'dlya dukhovnykh, grekorossiyskoy zakon ispoveduyushchikh': Druzhinina, *Kyuchuk-Kaynardzhiyskiy mir*, 221, quoting from the document in the Arkhiv Vneshney Politiki Rossii, Moscow. Did Obreskov use Italian in communicating with the Turks?

15. *ibid.*, 346, article 23: 'vozdvignut v chasti Galati, v ulitse Bey-Oglu nazyvayemoy, publichnyu grekorossiyskago ispovedaniya tserkov . . . '.

16. On the question of interpretations of the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca to allow Russian protection of Greek Orthodox generally in the Ottoman empire, see Roderic H. Davison, "'Russian skill and Turkish imbecility': the treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji reconsidered', *Slavic Review*, XXXV, 3, 1976, 463–83.

17. Hurewitz, see n. 1, above; M. S. Anderson, *The great powers and the Near East, 1774–1923*, London, 1970, 9–14.

18. 'Treaties (political and territorial) between Russia and Turkey, 1774–1849', in Great Britain. House of Commons, *Sessional Papers*, 1854, LXXII.

19. *ibid.*, 1.

20. Martens, *Recueil*, IV, pp. 606, n., 607.

21. Article 14, in this translation, reads: 'À l'exemple des autres Puissances on permet à la haute Cour de Russie, outre la Chapelle bâtie dans la maison du Ministre, de construire dans un quartier de Galata dans la rue nommée Bey Oglu, une église publique du rit Grec, laquelle sera toujours sous la protection des ministres de cet Empire & à l'abri de toute gêne & de toute avanie'.

22. Theodor Schiemann noted the discrepancy between 'Greco-Russian' in the Russian text and 'Greek' in the French text, but its significance escaped him: *Geschichte Russlands unter Kaiser Nikolaus I*, Berlin, 1904–19, I, p. 257, n. 1. Martens's earlier 'private' translation, presumably from the Italian, was in his *Recueil*, I, 507–22. Gabriel Noradounghian (ed.), *Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'empire ottoman*, Paris, 1897–1903, I, 319–34, gives a French version that is probably also translated from the Italian. For further detail on other published versions in Turkish, Russian, Italian, French, and English see Davison, *loc. cit.*, nn. 22, 36, 37.

23. Heinrich Christoph von Reimers, *Reise der Russisch-Kaiserlichen ausserordentlichen Gesandtschaft an die ottomanische Pforte im Jahr 1793*, St. Petersburg, 1803; Johann Christian von Struve, *Voyage en Krimée, suivi de la relation de l'Ambassade envoyée de Pétersbourg à Constantinople en 1793*, tr. from German by L. H. Delamarre, Paris, 1802. Struve does say that on the Tsarina's feast day, 25 November/6 December 1793, there was a great celebration in the Russian ambassador's residence in Istanbul; and 'after the celebration of divine service, which we attended with great ceremony in the Greek church, there was a very fine repast. . . .'. But he does not identify the Greek church, which might be a local church or, quite possibly, the embassy chapel, since the impression Struve gives is that church and embassy were adjacent, though he does not say so explicitly.

24. Aleksandr Grigorevich Krasnokutskiy, *Dnevnyia zapiski poyezdki v Konstantinopol v 1808 godu*, Moscow, 1815. He remarks on the grave of a Russian major in Istanbul, and presumably would have mentioned a Russian-protected church, especially as his account reveals him to be a believer.

25. Antonii, *Putevoditel' po Konstantinopolyu*, who lists present-day 'Christian' (i.e. Greek) churches pp. 99–101, including two in Galata but none in Beyoğlu (Pera); D. Korkmas and M. Skokovskaia, *Putevoditel' po Konstantinopolyu*, Constantinople, 1912, which notes in part II, p. 31, that Pera has 'monasteries and big Christian churches' without specifying whether Catholic or Orthodox, and in part IV, p. 29, lists Russian establishments in Istanbul (consulate, banks, schools, archaeological museum), but no church.

26. Second ed., Paris, 1788–1824, 7 vols. in 8. D'Ohsson, dragoman for the Swedish legation, knew Beyoğlu well. He mentions the Russian *right* under the treaty to build a church: VII, 463–4.

27. Elizabeth Craven, *A journey through the Crimea to Constantinople*, repr., New York, 1970 (first ed., Dublin, 1789); Hammer, *Constantinopolis*, who lists and describes 24 Greek churches, I, 446–66; Brayer, *Neuf années*, who mentions only Catholic churches in Pera, and Greek Catholic communicants, II, 14; Charles Perthusier, *Promenades pittoresques dans Constantinople*, 3 vols., Paris, 1815, who has much to say on Galata and Pera and on Greek church organization; John Auldjo, *Journal of a visit to Constantinople in the spring and summer of 1833*, London, 1835, who speaks often of the Russians then at Hunkâr İskelesi and about the metropolis; Friedrich von Tietz, *St. Petersburg, Constantinople, and Napoli di Romania in 1833 and 1834*, 2 vols., London, 1836, who mentions three Catholic churches in the 'long street' of Pera, II, 126–7; Charles McFarlane, *Constantinople in 1828*, second ed., 2 vols., London, 1829, who is quite favourable to the Greeks at the time of Russia's attack on Turkey; Charles White, *Three years in Constantinople*, 3 vols., London, 1845, an industrious inquirer; A. I. Davydov, *Zhivopisniye ocherki Konstantinopolya*, St. Petersburg, 1855, who writes during the Crimean (Russo-Turkish) war and makes a point of describing Hunkâr İskelesi, where the Russians had encamped in 1833.

Added Note: The Turkish text of the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca is given, entire, with the additional articles, in the new letters, in Nihat Erim, ed., *Devletlerarası Hukuku ve Siyasi Tarih Metinleri*, vol. I: *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Andlaşmaları* (Ankara, 1953), pp. 121–137. I was unable to find this volume when the two foregoing essays on the treaty were written. Erim takes his text from the text in old letters in the *Muahadat Mecmuası*, cited in note 4 above. But he corrects that source, without telling his readers, on article 14, saying not that the church is "dosografa" as his source does, but that it is "Ruso-Girek (=Russo-grecque)." Obviously he has relied on a French translation of the treaty rather than on his Ottoman source.

In 1986 I discovered in the archives of Venice an Italian text of the treaty which had been copied in 1774 from a register at the Sublime Porte. It is probably based on an authentic copy and differs in many small respects from the Italian text published by Martens, which I had assumed was the original Italian text. An explanation of the comparative texts and some extracts from the Venice copy are in Roderic H. Davison, "The Treaty of Kuchuk Kaynardja: A Note on Its Italian Text," *The International History Review* 10:4 (Nov. 1988): 611–621.

These two discoveries demonstrate two things: the historian must try to find *all* pertinent sources; the historian's work is never done.

4. The First Ottoman Experiment with Paper Money

In 1840 the Ottoman government began, in a modest way, a financial experiment—the issue of paper money. It marked the beginning of a new era in Turkish monetary history. The experiment continued, with many vicissitudes, until 1862.¹ The *kaime*, as the paper money was called, eventually came to be hated by many Ottoman subjects, and when all of it was retired from circulation in 1862 there was public rejoicing. The later years of the experiment are better known than the early ones, which still require further investigation. The first phase of the history of Ottoman paper money, from 1840 to 1852, is the subject of the following pages. They attempt to show what happened, and how, and (as much as possible) why. Even establishing the facts is often difficult.

It is clear that the *kaime* was first issued because of a treasury crisis. In earlier years, when Ottoman sultans had been faced with such crises and could not easily increase revenues, they had resorted to debasing the coinage. One result of this practice was the circulation, in the early nineteenth century, of five- and six-piaster pieces, the *beşliks* and *altılıks*, which were accepted only at a discount in terms of gold. In 1840 the Porte may have felt that it could not use the same expedient again. In earlier crisis situations, also, the Porte had sold *esham* (sing. *sehim*), short-term government obligations to be repaid by future revenues. Furthermore, government departments had been allowed to issue *sergi*, notes of indebtedness, to suppliers when their assigned funds were exhausted. Thus a considerable short-term debt, owed mostly to the *sarrafs* (bankers) of Galata, the European-Levantine commercial suburb of Istanbul, was built up. Evidently in 1840 it was not thought desirable to resort to either expedient again. But money was sorely needed by the Treasury for current expenses.

The need was partly for funds to build up the armed forces. Mehmet Ali's army had defeated the Ottoman forces in 1839. Although the great powers of Europe intervened to rescue the Ottoman Empire from the menace of its Egyptian vassal, the critical situation remained unresolved in 1840. The Porte then undertook military measures that entailed "enormous expenses."² There

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were other needs for money, too. The reform edict of 1839, the Hatt-i Şerif of Gülhane, had promised new measures in law and justice, taxation, military service, and generally in civil administration. More money would be required to carry them out. The revenues of the Sublime Porte, however, failed to increase when direct collection of taxes was substituted for the old system of tax-farming. The inexperience of the new collectors, added to the subtle opposition of all those with a vested interest in the old system, resulted in revenues which were below the norm.³ The revenues were also delayed in arriving in Istanbul, as Fuad Paşa later noted when he explained why *kaime* was first issued.⁴ At the same time, customs duties did not produce nearly as much income as they might have, since the Porte was bound by treaty—partly a consequence of the traditional system of capitulations, and partly the consequence of British pressure and of a Turkish desire to win British support—to impose only a 3 per cent ad valorem tariff on imports into the Empire. Exports also paid a 3 per cent tariff, and additionally were subject to a 9 per cent internal tariff when transported from the place of production to the port of embarkation.⁵ Adding to the crisis in 1840, the grain harvest was poor, leading the Porte to announce early in September that for a period of three months, starting in October, all export of grain from the Ottoman Empire would be forbidden.⁶ A poor harvest also meant less revenue from the tithe, the largest single source of government income. From these elements the Treasury crisis of 1840 was fashioned.

It appears, although the dates are not certain, that the Porte, before issuing the *kaime*, sounded some London bankers on the possibility of a loan to see the government through the crisis. If so, no agreement was reached on the terms of a loan as speedily as the Porte desired.⁷ Instead the Porte turned, finally, to the issue of paper money.

It is curious that no one has yet determined the exact date when this happened. Scholars, both Turkish and foreign, while they generally agree on the period of the Egyptian crisis, have seized on dates from 1839 to 1841, usually without adducing proof for their selection. Some have even put the first issue in 1830, which seems most unlikely.⁸ The year 1840 seems to be correct, because contemporary newspaper accounts and documents allow one to bracket the first issue date of *kaime* within that year.

On February 5, 1840, the correspondent of the London *Times* in Istanbul reported that local *sarrafs* had lent the government nearly a million pounds sterling for two years at 18 per cent interest, payable semiannually.⁹ This sort of short-term loan from Galata bankers was not unusual except in its interest rate, since 12 per cent seems to have been more common. More unusual was the succeeding information, dated February 18, of a rumor circulating for some days that the government “had the intention of shortly issuing a paper currency.”¹⁰ The *Times*’s correspondent thought it a false report, adding that in his opinion any issue of paper money now would be unsuccessful. He fol-

lowed this with a communication of March 6 averring that "the Armenian bankers have declared to the Porte that they would accept no bank notes for money, but that they have furnished the Divan with two other financial projects."¹¹ It is quite possible that the *sarrafs* feared that a bank with power of note issue would be an unbeatable competitor and spoil their business. If the correspondent's information was correct, perhaps one of the projects proposed by the *sarrafs* concerned the issue of government paper which occurred in the summer, possibly in late July, more probably in August. For a government memorandum of August 25, 1840, laid down rules for the use of an issue of government paper called *sehim kaimesi* (pl. *esham kavaimi*) which, said the memorandum, had the Sultan's approval. The memorandum implied that the paper either had just been issued, or was about to be issued.¹² The *sehim kaimesi* was to be introduced into circulation as half of the salary of civil servants (but not the armed forces) and as payment for supplies for the government. Probably the *sehim kaimesi* had already been issued, since newspapers of August 27 in Izmir reported that it was then in circulation.¹³

The amount issued, according to the Izmir papers, was 16,000,000 piasters. This information was accurate, for about two weeks later the *Takvim-i Vekayi* (Calendar of Events), the official gazette of the government, confirmed it. The issue, said *Takvim-i Vekayi*, had been of 32,000 purses (*kese*). A purse was a customary accounting unit equal to 500 Turkish piasters or 5 Turkish pounds. The total issue, therefore, was the equivalent of 160,000 pounds or 16,000,000 piasters.¹⁴ At that time the piaster was worth a little more than 2d. in British currency, while the pound sterling was equal to 1.07 pounds Turkish, so the total issue would be the equivalent of approximately £149,500.

Was this modest amount of government paper in fact paper money? A number of circumstances attendant on its issue lead to some doubt. First, the term *sehim kaimesi*, by which the paper was first designated, meant fundamentally "bond note" or "treasury bond document." The paper was, in effect, a variety of treasury note, seemingly related to the earlier *sehim*; the August 25 memorandum specified that the new notes should be separate from and not interfere with the old notes already issued, using the same term for both. Second, the first issue in 1840 and succeeding issues through the following decade bore interest payable semianually to bearer. Exactly what the original interest rate was poses something of a question; the basic problem here as elsewhere in this investigation of early *kaime* history is simply to establish the facts. The annual interest rate is stated by every later Turkish scholar to be 8 per cent; each writer appears to have accepted the undocumented statement of an earlier writer. *The Times* said in 1840 that the rate was 9 per cent, which seems quite unlikely.¹⁵ But the earliest official Turkish account, although it does not give percentages, describes the first issue as consisting of "four thousand purses interest and thirty-two thousand purses principal." The second issue, in September 1840, is described as bringing the total of *kaime* so far

current to ten thousand purses interest and eighty thousand purses principal.¹⁶ This peculiar formula seems to mean that interest was not 8 per cent, but one eighth of the face value of the *sehim kaimesi*, or 12½ per cent. This would bring the rate into the normal lower range for local government borrowing in Istanbul. Two accounts by foreigners in the Ottoman Empire confirm this rate.¹⁷ Third, this *kaime* had a limited life, coming to maturity in eight years.¹⁸ Finally, the only denomination of the first issue was 500 piasters, which was in those days a large sum and could not easily be used in small-scale buying and selling.¹⁹

At the same time, however, these treasury notes were also incipient paper money. Possibly this was the original intention of the Porte.²⁰ Certainly it was the intention by the time of the second issue, when 48,000 purses of *kaime* were added to the original 32,000. For the official announcement of the second issue (which referred also to the first issue) said that the *kaime* was to circulate as the equivalent of cash (*nakid hükmünde tedavül etmek*).²¹ This had not been the case with other certificates of government indebtedness that arose from bankers' loans or from purchases on credit. The *kaime*, said the announcement, was to be accepted by tax collectors in the provinces, and at the Treasury in Istanbul for payments to the government. Furthermore, because the original *kaime* were of a rather large and clumsy size, the second series was reduced in format for greater ease in safekeeping and transfer. In addition, three new denominations, all smaller than the original one, were created: 50, 100, and 250 piasters.²² The reductions in size and denomination were meant to facilitate the use of the *kaime* as money in everyday business (*muamelat-i nas*). As time went on, the character of *kaime* as circulatory medium would become even clearer. So early as October 1840 the Porte, conveniently omitting any mention of its financial crisis, was declaring that it had instituted the *kaime* "for the purpose of facilitating commerce by circulating at the same value as coin."²³ Foreign embassies and legations were asked to see that merchants of their nationality resident in the Empire accepted the new paper money. It is quite unlikely that a facilitation of commerce by increasing the money supply was a strong reason for the Porte's decision to try the *kaime* experiment. Nor does there seem to be any evidence that the Porte issued the paper money to promote economic development of any sort. The reason for the *kaime*'s existence was the Treasury crisis. But the emphasis on *kaime* as an aid to commerce developed early and was continued. Thus the treasury notes came also to be paper money.

Was the *kaime*, then, legal tender? Government pronouncements frequently emphasized the quality of *kaime* as equivalent of cash or coin. The official gazette's announcement of the second series of *kaime* said that it (and obviously the first series also) "of necessity would be valid and current in every locality in the Sultan's dominions."²⁴ The specimens of *kaime* that have survived (although none from the first issues in 1840) bear the words *evrak-i*

nakdiye (cash paper) or *evrak-i mutebere* (valid paper) or *kaime-i mutebere* (valid document) or combinations of these terms. But only government offices were obliged to accept the *kaime*. Private individuals apparently could not be forced to accept it. They could be induced to accept it—hence the appeal to foreign merchants through their embassies—if they accepted it voluntarily because of the interest, or because it was convenient, or because at times it may have been the only available circulatory medium. The *kaime*, then, cannot be considered legal tender. In later years, after 1852, the tender quality of the *kaime* seems to have changed somewhat. But I have found no statement that the *kaime* was, by government requirement, legal tender for payment of all debts, public and private.

The *kaime* was not, of course, convertible on demand into metallic currency. This would happen only at maturity, after eight years. The *kaime* had no backing in specie.²⁵ No specific government revenues were assigned to the *kaime* either as backing or for redemption, unlike the case of earlier *esham* and of later foreign loans. The *kaime* was secured only “on the general revenue of the Empire,” as an employee of the Ottoman Bank later noted.²⁶ As money, the *kaime* can perhaps be called representative money, an inconvertible fiat currency, without being legal tender.

The paper money was still, however, a domestic loan at the same time. The Porte apparently needed more funds than the 40,000,000 piasters provided by the first two series of *kaime*. A third series was issued late in October 1840, in denominations of 50, 100, 250, 500, and 1,000 piasters.²⁷ With the appearance of this series a new problem confronts the historian: how much *kaime* was in circulation? The announcement in the *Takvim-i Vekayi* provides no figures for total issue.²⁸ Furthermore, some of the new issue must have been exchanged for some of the first, large-size issue. But at the same time earlier *kaime* were still in circulation, presumably, with the exception of any which had been used to pay tax obligations. From October 1840 until the end of the experiment with paper money the public never knew how much was in circulation, and perhaps the government itself did not accurately know the total amount of *kaime* in the hands of the public. Without question, however, the total amount was still comparatively small.

It may be that the Porte actually intended to retire the *kaime* before the eight-year maturity term. Negotiations for a foreign loan apparently continued for a time in the fall of 1840.²⁹ *The Times* was informed by its Istanbul correspondent on October 10 that ‘the Porte has contracted with English bankers a loan of 4,000,000 sterling at 80 per cent., and 6 per cent. interest. . . . It is said that part of the money is to be applied to withdrawing from circulation the paper lately issued under the name of *Seims*.’³⁰ Whatever the Porte’s intentions, no foreign loan was concluded, and the *kaime* remained in circulation.

From the very beginning the circulation of *kaime* was plagued by counter-

feiting. The original notes were written by hand on large sheets of paper, like other government documents. Forgery was not difficult. For the second issue, therefore, indelible ink was used for the figures of principal and interest, and the Sultan's sign manual (*tuğra*) and the seals of the finance minister and of his ministry were affixed.³¹ The counterfeiters proved equal to the challenge, however, and more false *kaime* appeared in circulation. Therefore, in the third series, figures for principal and interest were impressed into the paper and sealed, and figures on the earlier *kaime* were similarly sealed when presented at the Treasury (presumably for the semiannual interest payment).³²

Again, however, counterfeiting occurred. This led to two important decisions by the High Council, confirmed by the Sultan's *irade*, that were announced together in January 1841 by flyers distributed to the public and then in the official gazette.³³ One decision was that the *kaime* should hereafter be printed, to thwart the skilled calligrapher-counterfeiters. The new printed notes would also have an embossed *tuğra* and other protections against forgery. The old handwritten notes, as they were presented at the Treasury, would be retired and printed ones given in exchange. Although the decision for printing was made after only five months' experience with the manuscript *kaime*, it was almost another two years before all the manuscript *kaime* were finally retired; finally it was decreed that the exchange must be completed in the three months following September 7, 1842. After December 3 of that year manuscript *kaime* ceased to circulate and became valueless.³⁴

The second decision was to terminate circulation of the *kaime* in the provinces. After the ending of a three-month period on April 22, 1841, neither manuscript nor printed *kaime* should have currency there. The reason officially given was that the provincial population found it very difficult to distinguish good *kaime* from counterfeit. This was probably true, but the basic reason may have been that people in the provinces, unsophisticated in commercial and financial matters and inveterately suspicious of currency that was not good metal, balked at accepting the *kaime*.³⁵ Restriction of the *kaime* to the capital from 1841 on furnishes additional proof that the *kaime* was not legal tender, but rather a currency of convenience in Istanbul. The printed *kaime* became standard there after December 1842.³⁶

Almost at once the printed notes were counterfeited. Counterfeiting was facilitated by the fact that the Treasury did not number its *kaimes* serially. Why this is so it is impossible to explain—perhaps this occurred through inexperience, perhaps so that *kaime* could be issued in quantities unknown by the public. The remedy for the new forgery was not to number the notes, but to undertake a new printing. It was decided early in January 1843 to call in the first printed series for exchange with a new series printed in *talik* letters (a Persian style). Holders of the first printing were slow in bringing them to the Treasury, and had to be prodded by leaflets and published reminders to do so

before April 29, 1843, when the first printing would become valueless, entitled neither to interest nor to repayment of principal.³⁷

Again, the historian is puzzled as to whether additional printed *kaime* were put into circulation by the Treasury to gain more funds, or whether the first and second printed series were used simply to replace earlier manuscript notes. Nor does he know how much *kaime*, if any, had been turned in to the Treasury for taxes. If Süleyman Sudi, a member of the Meclis-i Maliye some fifty years later, is correct, the total value of *kaime* in circulation in May 1843 was 29,862,350 piasters, less than the sum of the first two manuscript series of 1840.³⁸ Apparently to secure more funds, therefore, it was decided to lengthen the term of the *kaime* from eight to ten years. It was also decided to issue 10,000,000 piasters in new *kaime* to get capital for agriculture.³⁹ This is the first time that paper money was called upon to provide resources for economic development. It would be interesting to know what, if anything, was done. Then a third printing (or a fourth, if the agricultural *kaime* were a separate series) was undertaken, again to combat counterfeiting, and a new exchange made in January-February 1844.⁴⁰

In the years between 1840 and 1844 the Istanbul populace—or at least the merchants—seem to have become used to the *kaime* and to have accepted it. Acceptance was gradual. In December of 1840, soon after the first three manuscript series had appeared, rumors had been current that interest on the *kaime* would not be paid. The government reacted vigorously, labelling the rumors “false and lies” and promising full interest payment on time.⁴¹ Evidently the semiannual interest instalments were regularly paid when due, so that public confidence in the *kaime* increased. Each payment was entered on the reverse of the note, when presented. It does appear that the *kaime* fluctuated somewhat in value in the market, but this was probably the normal drop after interest had been paid, and the normal rise shortly before interest payment was due. Obviously some *kaime* owners simply kept their notes as an investment and collected interest twice a year. Some undoubtedly used them as money, perhaps at discount, immediately after interest payment. Some perhaps used *kaime* only as a medium of exchange in business.

The situation in the early 1840s may have been much as Charles White described it, even though he was unaware of all the denominations of paper in circulation. White, an intelligent Englishman who spent three years inquiring into all aspects of life in Istanbul, found the situation about 1843 or 1844 as follows: “The common currency of the Empire is of two kinds, paper and metallic. The former consists of bank-notes, or rather treasury bonds (*sehhim*) of 25, 50, and 100 piasters’ value, payable to bearer, and bearing interest at 12½ percent per annum. They are badly executed, on coarse paper, and are easily forged. At some periods these *sehhim* are at a discount, and pass with difficulty in the bazaars at par; at other periods, about the time when the inter-

ests are due, they are at a premium, and then, becoming much in request, form an article of traffic and speculation on 'Change. The first sehhim was issued in 1840. The number in circulation is not extensive; firstly, because all government salaries, civil and military, are paid in specie; and secondly, because the paper, although convenient for large payments, is of no value in the provinces, unless, indeed, it be at Smyrna."⁴² Assuming that White is correct on the payment of civil officials' salaries in metal, the half-salary payment in *kaime* authorized in 1840 had been abandoned, perhaps after the first or second series.

According to Süleyman Sudi, the amount of *kaime* hoarded and simply presented for interest reduced its circulation below the level needed for business in Istanbul. Therefore in July 1844 still another printing of *kaime* was decreed, with interest reduced to .5 per cent a month (6 per cent a year) according to "the method customary in Europe."⁴³ If the interest actually had been paid monthly, this might well have induced circulation rather than hoarding; in fact, interest was paid twice a year, as before. It was the halving of the interest rate that worked against hoarding. Evidently the *kaime* was still acceptable and useful to merchants, even with the lower rate. During the later 1840s new series of *kaime* were uttered at least twice, in June 1847 and December 1848. On each occasion the reason was in part, at least, to foil counterfeiters. In 1847 new denominations of 500, 1,000, 5,000 and 10,000 piasters were issued; in 1848, of 50, 100, probably 250, 500, and 1,000 piasters.⁴⁴ The large denominations indicate clearly that the *kaime* was used principally by merchants and wealthier people, and probably hardly at all by little people. Once again, there is no certainty as to how much of the new printings was exchanged for earlier ones, and how much may have been added to the total in circulation.

Toward the end of the 1840s, the value of *kaime* did suffer somewhat as the result of the chronic shortage of circulatory medium in Istanbul. This shortage arose from problems of the Empire's metallic currency—change often being in short supply, coin being shipped to the provinces (where paper was unacceptable), specie being shipped to Europe to cover import costs and bills of exchange, a lack of confidence in the *beşliks* and *altıliks* which put gold and silver at a premium, a chaotic market in old Ottoman and foreign coins to the detriment of new Ottoman coins, and in general a lack of stability in money equivalents and foreign exchange rates. The Porte in 1845 contracted with two leading local *sarrafs*, Jacques Alléon and Th. Baltazzi, to furnish bills of exchange on London and Paris and to keep the exchange rate stable at 110 piasters to the pound sterling, in return for an annual payment from the Treasury. They did so, and after two years established the Banque de Constantinople to carry out the same functions with support from the Ottoman government. This Bank, which had no capital but depended on government subvention, eventually cost the Porte a good deal of money. The Bank's checkered history

is not pertinent here, excepting for one aspect: it also dealt in *kaime*. When the Istanbul market lacked coin, the Bank would provide *kaime*. The Bank would buy the *kaime* back, however, only at considerable discount. The effect was to cause a depreciation, at least at times, in the value of paper money.⁴⁵ At the end of 1848 a group of seventy or more of the leading banking and mercantile houses of Galata agreed to help stabilize the monetary situation, provided the Porte for its part, among other things, took steps "to give the *kaimes* a stable exchange rate vis-a-vis specie."⁴⁶

A new phase in the history of *kaime* began in January 1852. Then, for the first time, paper money that bore no interest was put into circulation. The denominations issued were smaller than ever before—first 20-piaster notes, then 10s. According to the official explanation, they were issued in order to provide easier means for making change in small business transactions, and interest was not offered because it would be too little on such low amounts. This explanation may be the truth, but it is also true that the new emissions, of unknown total, gave the Treasury added funds at no cost. No one, of course, hoarded the small notes. They circulated rapidly, they wore out quickly, they invited counterfeiting, and it was hard for the Treasury to check on their genuineness. Soon there were complaints about the harm they caused, and finance ministers began to make plans to abolish paper money.⁴⁷ The Russian (Crimean) War of 1853–56, however, led to further issue of paper money to be used not only in Istanbul, but wherever army corps were located (hence called *ordu kaimesi*, army paper money). After the war new plans for retiring the *kaime* were aborted by new Treasury crises which led to further printings of *kaime*. It was only in 1862 that paper money was abolished, with the help of a foreign loan. This second, rather agitated, phase of *kaime* history, 1852–1862, deserves separate and more detailed treatment, which cannot be attempted here.

In summary, it may be said that the *kaime* had started out in 1840 as a kind of domestic loan, to get funds for an empty Treasury. Unlike other obligations of the Treasury, however, the *kaime* did circulate and did become paper money by intention and in fact, although only in Istanbul. So long as interest was paid, it remained at or near par. So long as interest was paid, however, the *kaime* retained its dual character: paper money and domestic loan. Modern economists criticize the Porte for not understanding the function of money, and for regarding the paper money as a state debt note.⁴⁸ It is true that the Porte did not understand how money could be used in a modern economy. It is also true that the Porte, like other governments, succumbed after 1852 to the temptations of financing its operations by overissue of paper, and like other governments experienced the damaging results of inflation and crises of confidence. Before 1852, however, the problems with the *kaime* seem to have been relatively minor, aside from the counterfeiting. In the years 1840 to 1852 the

kaime, in its dual role, served two real purposes: it helped the Treasury in times of need, and it provided additional circulatory medium for Istanbul. In its first phase, the *kaime* may be adjudged moderately successful.

Notes

1. A second period, this time not so experimental, when paper money was issued was 1876 to 1879; a third period began in 1915, during the Great War, and has continued under the Turkish Republic to the present.

2. *The Times* (London), 18 September 1840, p. 4.

3. Halil Inalcık, "Tanzimat'ın uygulanması ve sosyal tepkileri," *Belleten* 28: 112 (Ekim 1964), 637; Stanford J. Shaw, "The Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Tax Reforms and Revenue System," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 6:4 (October 1975), 423; Reşat Kaynar, *Mustafa Reşit Paşa ve Tanzimat* (Ankara, 1954), pp. 224–64, 283, 291–95; Mehmet Zeki Pakalın, *Tanzimat Maliye Nazırları* (Istanbul, 1939–40), I, 36–38.

4. Fuad's memorandum of 19 February 1862, in J. Lewis Farley, *Turkey and its Resources* (London, 1862), pp. 22–23.

5. Text of the Anglo-Turkish treaty of 16 August 1838, which was also a model for the Franco-Turkish treaty of the same year, in J. C. Hurewitz, ed., *The Middle East and North Africa: A Documentary Record* (New Haven, 1975), I, 265–66.

6. Ahmed Fethi, Minister of Commerce, to Reşid Paşa, Foreign Minister, 11 receb 1256/7 September 1840, in United States National Archives, Record Group 84 (hereafter USNA, RG 84), Notes From the Sublime Porte, 1839–1851, transl. Embargoes on export of grain were not infrequent, if the Porte determined that domestic consumption would suffer, but usually the embargoes applied to one or a few provinces, less often to the whole Empire.

7. Kaynar, *Reşit Paşa*, pp. 284–85, quotes documents from the Başvekkâlet Arşivi in Istanbul concerning the loan, but dates of negotiation are unclear. Kaynar's own Hicrî date of 1265 (1848/9) seems an obvious error for 1256 (1840/1).

8. For instance, these say 1830: Refii-Şükrü Suvla, "Tanzimat devrinde istikrazlar," in *Tanzimat I* (Istanbul, 1940), p. 266; Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı tarihi IV* (Ankara, 1954), p. 204; Charles Morawitz, *Les finances de la Turquie* (Paris, 1902), p. 16. These say 1839: Mehmed Nihad, *Das Papiergeld in der Finanz-und Währungs-geschichte der Türkei* (Istanbul, 1930), pp. 2, 35; A. Du Velay, *Essai sur l'histoire financière de la Turquie* (Paris, 1903), p. 123; Adrien Biliotti, *La Banque Impériale Ottomane* (Paris, 1909), p. 94. These say 1841: J. H. Abdolonyme Ubicini, *Letters on Turkey*, trans. Lady Easthope (London, 1856), I, 298; Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 2nd ed. (London, 1968), p. 111. Those who correctly say 1840: Süleyman Sudi, *Usul-u meskukat-ı osmaniye ve ecnebiye* (Istanbul, 1311), p. 105; Pakalın, *Maliye nazırları*, I, 41; Şükrü Baban, "Tanzimat ve para," in *Tanzimat I*, 246; Ekrem Kolerkılıç, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda para* (Ankara, 1958), p. 132;

Mine Erol, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda kâğıt para (kaime)* (Ankara, 1970), p. 1. Sudi and Pakalın give the month as cemazielahir (August), and some others say the issue was in Sultan Abdülmecid's second year on the throne (which began 1 July 1840).

9. *The Times*, 2 March 1840, p. 5.

10. *The Times*, 9 March 1840, p. 5. I have no confirmation from other sources that the Porte planned paper money this early.

11. *The Times*, 6 April 1840, p. 3.

12. Text of the memorandum, dated 26 cemazielahir 1256, in İnalcık, "Tanzimat'ın uygulanması," pp. 671–72.

13. *The Times*, 18 September 1840, p. 4. There were no Turkish newspapers in İzmir, but only French-language papers published by Europeans who were closely connected to the European merchant community there.

14. *Takvim-i Vekayi*, #206, 15 receb 1256 (12 September 1840), p. 5. Ubicini, *Letters*, I, 299, and Lewis, *Emergence*, p. 111, both give 60,000 piasters, which seems a mistake. Both also say the *kaime* had no term (rather than eight years).

15. *The Times*, 18 September 1840, p. 4.

16. *Takvim-i Vekayi*, # 206, p. 5. Erol, *Kâğıt para*, pp. v–vi, and Kolerkılıç, *Para*, p. 133, both say they could find no specimens of the first *kaime*; if any can be discovered, this would help to fix the interest rate. Erol on p. 39 gives a photograph of a *kaime* (printed, thus 1841 or later) which has written on its face "25 piasters interest" and "250 piasters principal." The 10 per cent interest thus indicated is a rate I have encountered nowhere else.

17. Ubicini, *Letters* I, 299, who gives 12 per cent; Charles White, *Three years in Constantinople* (London, 1845), II, 71, who gives 12½ per cent.

The 10,000 purses interest could not have been for the full eight-year term, since 1,250 purses a year would be only about 1.56 per cent interest annually on the 80,000 purses face value of the *kaime*, an impossibly low rate. Although of later date, a commercial court in Istanbul recognized 1 per cent interest *per month* as "the usual commercial rate": "Judgement or Decree, of the Tribunal of Commerce, date the 1st of Jemaadi el Akhar 1278 (December 3, 1861)", in USNA, RG 84, Notes and Translations From the Sublime Porte, 1860–1869. It must be assumed, therefore, that the 10,000 purses was interest on 80,000 purses for one year, or 12½ per cent a year. The holder of a 500-piaster *kaime*, then, would receive 62½ piasters a year interest, in two equal instalments of 31¼ piasters. In eight years, he would receive 500 piasters interest, doubling his capital.

18. Biliotti, *Banque Impériale*, p. 94, says eight months. He should have known better, since he was an Ottoman Bank employee.

19. All this information in *Takvim-i Vekayi* # 206.

20. Because the memorandum of 25 August 1840 referred to facilitating buying and selling, although it was not clear whether this meant private or public: İnalcık, "Tanzimat'ın uygulanması", p. 671.

21. *Takvim-i Vekayi*, # 206.

22. *Ibid.*

23. USNA, RG 59, Despatches From United States Ministers to Turkey, 1818–1906, M46, Roll 11, Foreign Ministry note of 18 şaban 1256/15 October 1840, transl. by J. P. Brown, encl. in David Porter to Secretary of State # 61, St. Steffano (sic), 18 October 1840. Osmanlı original in RG 84, Notes From the Sublime Porte, 1839–1851.

24. *Takvim-i Vekayi*, # 206. The phrase can also be read to mean that the *kaime* would be “required” (iktiza) to be valid and current, but this seems to fall short of a requirement that everyone must accept *kaime*.

25. Stanford J. Shaw, “Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Tax Reforms,” p. 423, says that the issue of 1840 (presumably the first issue, of 160,000 pounds or 16,000,000 piasters) was backed by 160,000 gold pieces held in the Treasury. This would be 100 per cent gold backing, assuming the gold pieces to be Turkish gold pounds. I have not found confirmation of this. In 1860 the Treasury did have 160,000 purses of metallic currency to help retire the *kaime*, but the sum was spent instead on suppressing the Syrian uprising of that year: Süleyman Sudi, *Usul-u meskukat*, p. 116.

26. J. Lewis Farley, *Turkey* (London, 1866), p. 118.

27. *Takvim-i Vekayi*, # 210, 27 şaban 1256 (24 October 1840), p. 2.

28. Nor does it have any statement about interest, probably still at 12½ per cent.

29. See the documents in Kaynar, *Reşit Paşa*, pp. 284–87, 289–91.

30. *The Times*, 9 November 1840, p. 3, correspondence from Constantinople dated October 10. Morawitz, *Les finances*, p. 17 speaks of a contract with the house of Ricardo for an advance on the *kaime*; this may refer to the same negotiation, although Morawitz is sometimes unreliable for events before 1881.

31. *Takvim-i Vekayi*, # 206.

32. *Takvim-i Vekayi*, # 210.

33. *Takvim-i Vekayi*, # 216, 4 zilhicce 1256 (27 January 1841); the same information is in a Porte memorandum to all foreign legations of 3 zilhicce 1256/26 January 1841, transl. encl. in USNA, T238, Roll 2, David Offley (Smyrna) to Secretary # 26, 21 July 1842.

34. Sudi, *Usul-u meskukat*, pp. 107–8.

35. Probably merchants in Izmir continued to accept the *kaime*, and perhaps it was allowed informally to circulate there; see the comments by White, below at n. 42.

36. It is not clear exactly when *kaime* were first printed, although this must have been some time in 1841. Sudi, *Usul-u meskukat*, p. 107 says the people called them “Saib Paşa kaimesi” because they were printed when Saib Paşa was finance minister. If this is so, the printing was before 27 February 1841, when he left that office. But Pakalın, *Maliye nazırları*, I, 43, says the manuscript *kaime* were called “Saib Paşa kaimesi.” Both may be correct.

37. Sudi, *Usul-u meskukat*, p. 108, on the decision. USNA, RG 84, Notes From the Sublime Porte, 1839–1851, contains a copy of the printed flyer dated 18 rebiülevvel 1259 (18 April 1843) warning the public that only ten days of the exchange period remained. This is evidently a sample of the leaflets (*varaka-i mahsus*) by which the Porte communicated its regulations on *kaime* to the merchants of Istanbul.

38. Sudi, *Usul-u meskukat*, p. 108. He says that a survey was made to determine the figure, since there was no good accounting of circulation. One presumes that Süleyman Sudi had access to Treasury records when he wrote.

39. *Ibid.* I have seen no other mention of this except in Nihad, *Das Papiergeld*, p. 43, and do not know whether it was in fact issued.

40. Sudi, *Usul-u meskukat*, p. 108.

41. *Takvim-i Vekayi*, # 213, 20 şevval 1256 (15 December 1840), p. 4.

42. White, *Three Years*, II, pp. 71–72. He adds on p. 76 that notes were often held as an investment. White mentions a 25-piaster note, which I have not seen in official announcements, but Erol, *Kâğıt para*, p. 1, and Morawitz, *Les finances*, p. 17 mention such a note.

43. Sudi, *Usul-u meskukat*, p. 109. He gives the interest rate as 100 paras per *kese* per month, a curious formula, never mentioning 6 per cent. This means 2½ piasters a month, or 30 piasters a year, interest on 500 piasters principal, which works out to 6 per cent.

44. *Ibid.*, pp. 109–10.

45. Du Velay, *Histoire financière*, pp. 126–29. In Turkish accounts the name Baltazzi often appears as Baltacı. Th. Baltazzi was replaced by Emmanuel Baltazzi.

46. “Engagement contracté par les Négociants de Constantinople,” 9 December 1848, in USNA, RG 84, Notes and Translations From the Porte, 1848–1849, enclosed in Foreign Ministry note no. 6, 29 rebiulâhir 1265/24 March 1849.

47. Sudi, *Usul-u meskukat*, pp. 110–11; Pakalın, *Maliye nazırları*, I, 10. Nihad, *Das Papiergeld*, pp. 49–50, gives a total of 165,000,000 piasters of this *kaime* without references to support the figure.

48. Oktay Yenal, “Türkiye’de kâğıt para,” *Belgelerle Türk Tarih Dergisi* 32 (May 1970), 28–29.

Added Note: Numismatists have recently been investigating the early issues of *ka’ime*, publishing bits of additional information about the circumstances of issue and some facsimiles and descriptions of the handwritten notes. Among the most pertinent articles are Cüneyt Ölçer, “Faizli bir Osmanlı Kaimesi,” *Türk Numismatik Derneği* (Istanbul), *Bulletin* 12 (1983), and by the same author, “1274 Tarihli Son Seri Faizli Osmanlı Evrak-ı Nakdiyesi,” in the same society’s *Bulletin* 25 (1988). Also in the same society’s *Bulletin* 21 (1987), Garo Kurkman, “The Experiments of ‘Kaimes with Interest’ during Sultan Abdülmecid’s Period,” originally in Turkish but an expanded version in typescript under the English title, using some Armenian newspaper accounts of 1840–41. Also Kenneth M. MacKenzie, “Ka’ime of Sultan Abdul Mecid: The Second Issue, 1840,” in *Materiala Turcica* 9 (1984).

5. Foreign and Environmental Contributions to the Political Modernization of Turkey

On December 2, 1922, Baron Hayashi had some advice on political modernization for İsmet Pasha. Each was representing his country at Lausanne in the peace negotiation following the Turkish victory over the Greeks. Sitting in a meeting of the Second Commission to discuss the regime of foreigners, they and other diplomats were considering the capitulations and a possible transitional regime which might replace them. Hayashi proclaimed his sympathy for the Turks, since Japan also had once had a capitulatory regime. "He would, however, like to point out for the kind consideration of İsmet Pasha that Japan had taken twenty years or more to prepare for herself a complete juridical system. It was only after hard work by Japan, lasting more than twenty years, that the Powers were able to agree to the Capitulations being brought to an end."¹ He counselled similar slow haste on the part of the Turks.

İsmet was unmoved by this appeal. Reviewing past history, he declared that the modernization of jurisprudence in his country had begun before the Crimean War, and that, since the Congress of Paris in 1856, "Turkey has worked feverishly at the perfection of her judicial system." He cited commercial, penal, and procedural law codes fashioned on the European model, and the recent "very important reform in the civil law, by which our judicial institutions have been completely secularized." Furthermore, he said, a European-model law faculty had for forty years been training judges and advocates. Turkey therefore needed no transitional regime of law. After adducing many other arguments, İsmet concluded that "the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey can in no wise agree to the reestablishment of the Capitulations."²

At a second meeting of the commission six days later its president, Marquis Garroni of Italy, reminded İsmet that there were colonies of foreigners in Turkey possessing interests and rights, that these persons needed guarantees of justice, and that this end might be achieved under Turkish law if the Ankara government would appoint to its courts some foreign judges on recommendation of the Hague International Tribunal. "I am convinced," said Garroni,

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"that Turkey will succeed within a short time in creating a system of laws and a bench of judges which will fulfill all modern requirements; but it must be recognized that even under the new regime Turkish justice has not yet been able to give proof of its worth, and also that Turkey is still subject today to laws some of which are based on religious laws." A transitional regime was thus indispensable, and Garroni referred back to Japan, "a country which is making brilliant advance on the path of progress," and to Hayashi's statement that twenty years were required to pass from capitulations to the "regime of freedom." İsmet replied that Garroni's proposals, especially as regarded foreign judges, were "clearly incompatible with the independence and sovereignty of Turkey," and that the Turkish civil code, from whatever sources it might be derived, "had no religious or theocratic character; . . . there was no appreciable difference between it and the codes of foreign countries as regards the fundamental principles and rules of law enshrined in it."³

Lord Curzon made a masterful rejoinder to İsmet. İsmet had talked again and again of sovereignty. "Cannot the Turks realize that theirs is not the only sovereignty in the world?" Curzon too found the Turkish civil code "based in the last resort on Muslim religious law." Finally, taxing İsmet with asserting that "the judicial system of Turkey is excellent and indeed almost perfect," he himself bleakly asserted, "Everybody knows that this is not the case." Nor, he added, would İsmet's repetitions make it so, even though he might have deluded himself. Turkey's dependence on foreign trade conducted by Europeans, Armenians, and Greeks made sound judicial procedures vital for the nation's own welfare.⁴

İsmet's replies at a meeting on January 6 contained no concessions. He stated once again that "the Turkish Civil Code has no religious character at all." Further, "the reason why we have frequently spoken of our sovereignty is that we have been compelled to do so owing to the proposals made to us, which were calculated to injure that sovereignty."⁵

This episode at Lausanne derives its relevance to this study of political modernization not only from the fortuitous confrontation of Japanese and Turkish experience. It also sums up many of the major foreign contributions to Turkey's political condition. Among these are some basic impulsions or stimuli to modernization which were implicit in the situation leading to the Lausanne conference. Turkey had been defeated in the Great War, had been shorn of much of her territory, and had been subjected to foreign occupation. She had then been the victor in a nationalist war against the occupation forces, particularly those of the Greeks. At the conference itself she was subjected by the European powers to heavy diplomatic pressure, of which the prodding on capitulations and judicial reform is but one instance. These incitements to political reform, moreover—military defeat, the loss of territory, the revival of national energies, and diplomatic pressure—have all been felt in Turkish political life more than once in modern times. They have repeatedly urged on the

struggle of the Ottoman Empire before 1918, and of the emerging Turkish Republic from 1919 on, for survival as a sovereign state, an equal among equals: *Cet animal est très méchant; quand on l'attaque, il se défend*. The Turks have sought to preserve themselves not only through military rejuvenation, but through political modernization.

İsmet's emphasis on undiluted sovereignty exhibited, however, not only a desire for survival, but also the adoption of a foreign political concept that had for some time been working its way into the Turkish consciousness. That is the concept of sovereignty attached to a particular territory and to the people who live in it. Such a sacrosanct territorial sovereignty, a product of recent European thought, replaced the earlier concept of a sovereign monarch who could win, lose, or trade territory without impairing his right to rule, and without thought of the people involved or of the sanctity of boundaries. Among other foreign concepts evident in İsmet's discourse was his acceptance of secularism as a test of progress. He was willing and even anxious to declare that the Turkish civil code had nothing religious about it. And he made explicit his acceptance of European models, repeatedly asserting that for decades the Turks had been patterning law codes after those in the West.

The arguments at Lausanne touched finally on some of the channels through which foreign contributions were made to the Turkish culture: the new Turkish schools with Westernized curricula, the contacts of foreign "colonies" of businessmen and diplomats, and the activity of Greeks and Armenians. x

As İsmet pointed out, Turkey had been embarked on a path of political modernization since the Crimean War. He could have gone back to the eighteenth century, when the Ottoman Turks began to suffer the recurring military defeats which persuaded them of the need for change. The pattern of Ottoman military retreat and cession of territory that began with the treaty of Karlowitz in 1699 was never permanently broken until 1922. Particular military defeats were suffered in 1718, 1774, 1792, 1799, 1812, 1829, 1878, 1912, 1913, and 1918. In virtually every case the victors were European powers. European military science hence very naturally became the example for Ottoman sultans and vezirs, and the desire for military reform opened channels of communication with Europe through which a flood of influences was eventually to pass. Beginning with the mission of Yirmisekiz Çelebi Mehmed, who, after the defeat of 1718, was sent to Paris to report on those aspects of Western knowledge from which the Ottoman Empire might profit, there was sporadic contact of individual Turks with Europe. The military, naval, and engineering schools established in the eighteenth century with the help of European instructors gave some acquaintance with the French language and with European "progress," and produced graduates who were not infrequently advocates of political change.

By the end of the eighteenth century, significant efforts toward political modernization were visible in Turkey. From the time of Selim III (1789–1807),

and more especially the time of Mahmud II (1808–1839), the foreign influences on Turkish political life became so manifold that a chronological account alone could exceed the bounds of this essay. It is possible in shorter compass to review analytically the last century and a half of Turkish political development and the influence of foreign nations upon it. The three topics already referred to—the immediate stimulus of international encounter, the concepts supplied by European political theory and practice, and the channels through which these and other influences flowed—will supply a sufficient framework. A fact which may normally be taken for granted is that, from the time of Mahmud II, political reform in Turkey was almost always modernization, and modernization was almost always Westernization.

I. Foreign Stimuli to Political Modernization

There are certain periods when political reform in Turkey took on a new *élan*, or became concentrated and comparatively rapid, and we might inquire what external stimuli were present on each occasion. These periods were the latter years of Mahmud II's reign, especially from 1833 to 1838; two periods early in the reign of Abdülmecid, from 1839 to 1841 and from 1845 to 1850; the stretch of time from the Crimean War to the death of Âli Pasha, from 1854 to 1871; the time of Midhat's constitution and the first years of Abdülhamid II's reign, from 1876 to 1882; the Young Turk and World War I era, from 1908 to 1918; the period of the establishment of the Turkish Republic, from 1919 to 1926; and the half decade in which the two-party system grew up, from 1945 to 1950.

When he first came to the throne, Sultan Mahmud II could exercise little authority outside his own capital. The governors of many provinces paid scant attention to the central administration, *derebeyis*, or lords of the valley, being established in many sections of Anatolia and Rumelia almost by hereditary right. Furthermore, there was a revolt in Serbia; the Wahhabi power was growing in Arabia; and Egypt was launched on the path toward autonomy. In addition, the Janissaries, who had deposed Selim III, were an ever-present danger. To this list of troubles must be added the Greek revolt, breaking out in 1821 and continuing for a decade, and the war launched by Muhammad Ali of Egypt in 1832. In the first twenty or so years of his reign, therefore, Mahmud undertook chiefly to quell insurrection or rival authority within the empire, so that he might become master in his own house. But this work of destruction made easier any political reform that might follow, weakening the vested interests that might oppose it and concentrating power in the hands of the sultan, who, with his group of advisers, was the necessary instrument of change.

The events of Mahmud's reign also provided some foreign stimuli to change. The military superiority of Europe was several times demonstrated. In 1812

and 1829, Mahmud's armies were defeated by the Russians, Russia winning Balkan territory from Turkey on each occasion. In the latter war the Russians came as close as ever in history to taking Istanbul. In 1830 France began the conquest of Algeria. The Serb revolt, which in 1829 issued in semi-autonomy for the Serbian principality, had foreign support. The Greek revolt was able to succeed because of European naval aid, which destroyed the Turkish fleet at Navarino, and the Russo-Turkish war of 1828-1829. The Egyptian attack of 1832-1833, which also threatened Istanbul, was met only with timely help from the Russians. The Egyptians themselves were so nearly successful because their army had been reorganized on European lines. This war resulted in the cession to them of Syria and of the administration of Cilicia.

To these negative stimuli of military defeat and territorial loss in the face of European power was added the positive prodding of Europe, especially of England, toward political reform. Mahmud II had vainly sought British help in the face of Egyptian attack. The British cabinet was much more interested in current crises over Belgium and Portugal, and realized too late the seriousness of the Near Eastern situation. Palmerston, the foreign minister, later found this inaction "a tremendous blunder,"⁶ however, and set about encouraging Mahmud in the rejuvenation of the Ottoman Empire. Ponsonby, the British ambassador, was ordered to impress upon him the need for naval, military, economic, financial, and administrative progress. In the same interest, the British pursued a policy which today would go by the name of trade and aid. The Turks were moved to accept the British offers to escape overtures from Russia. The Russian aid against Muhammad Ali in 1833 had resulted in the Russo-Turkish treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi, an eight-year defensive alliance which made Turkey a junior partner to Russia and provided for consultation on all matters concerning "their respective tranquillity and safety."⁷ The ultimate Russian aim, however, as the Turks well knew, was to keep the Ottoman Empire itself weak and Russian influence strong within it. To escape this unwanted embrace, the Turks would have to progress as fast as possible.

These were the external stimuli which prompted Mahmud II's measures of political modernization. In addition he was faced with internal revolt and needed to bolster his domestic position. He abolished a number of the traditional offices of state, and created new ones dependent on his own fiat. The new bureaucracy he began to build was relatively European and modern both in organization and in the type of personnel appointed to it. Though Mahmud himself had no experience of the West and knew no Western language, he presided over the period in which Turkish institutions were genuinely started on the path of Westernization.

The external stimulus to the next period of rapid modernization is obvious. Mahmud II died and Abdülmecid ascended the throne at a most critical period, when Turkish-Egyptian warfare again threatened the integrity of the Ot-

toman Empire. After the Egyptian victory at the battle of Nezib, and the surrender to the Egyptians of much of the Turkish fleet, the Turks sought foreign help. They succeeded in gaining, in 1839, diplomatic support from all the great powers except France, and, in 1840, military support from Britain and Austria. As a token that the Ottoman Empire was at least as progressive, and as well worth saving, as Egypt, the dramatic proclamation of the Hatt-i Şerif of Gülhane was issued on November 3, 1839. Its promises—greater security of life and property, tax reform, the reform of military conscription, and the equal treatment of all Ottoman subjects in these matters—were precisely such as would attract European approval. The author of this edict was Reşid Pasha, the energetic foreign minister, who was himself a product of embassies to London and Paris and who genuinely admired the West. “M. Thiers transformed into a pasha and with a fez on his head,” a French journalist said of him.⁸ Reşid was also interested in safeguarding the bureaucracy from the arbitrary power of the sultan which Mahmud II’s reforms had so vastly increased. The promises in the edict about security of life and property took on a special meaning for civil servants. The periods of intensive reform effort, 1839 to 1841, and 1845 to 1850, coincide roughly with Reşid’s tenure of office as foreign minister and as Grand Vezir, before his reforming *élan* seemed to wane. When Lord Palmerston had written in 1839 to his ambassador Ponsonby, “Your Hatti Sheriff was a grand stroke of policy,”⁹ he was under a misconception—the imperial rescript of reform was Reşid’s, not Ponsonby’s. But Palmerston’s very error shows that the British pushed Reşid and other Turkish ministers as hard as they could. Especially was this so after Stratford Canning in 1842 became ambassador to the Porte.

It is usual to think of the next phase of Turkish reform as opening with a new imperial rescript, the Hatt-i Hümayun of February 18, 1856. The beginnings of the later phase of the Tanzimat may as plausibly be found in 1854, the year in which the British and French became the allies of Turkey against Russia. Though most of the foreign troops went on to fronts first in Bulgaria and then in the Crimea, the Turkish capital was host to a kind of foreign occupation from 1854 to 1856, at about the same period when Commodore Perry’s ships appeared in Edo Bay. Turkish ministers could not easily avoid the diplomatic pressures exerted on them by the ambassadors of their military allies. A series of measures in 1854 and 1855 designed to promote administrative reform and to bring Christians into parity with Muslims before the law and in the army was undoubtedly the result of allied pressure. The Hatt-i Hümayun itself was the product of conferences which the British, French, and Austrian ambassadors held with Âli and Fuad Pashas, and its proclamation was hastened by the approach of the Paris Peace Conference. In order to keep in their own hands as much initiative as possible at that conference, the Turkish ministers agreed in advance to the fairly sweeping terms of the edict. At the same

time, as the chief Muslim dignitary (*şeyhülislâm*) wryly observed, English and French naval vessels, as well as land forces of both nations, were in the environs of Istanbul. Some negative reactions to their presence were soon observable.

During the succeeding years of political reform, which lasted until Âli Pasha's death in 1871, foreign influences were intermittently felt. In some cases the stimulus was conveyed by direct diplomatic representation, as in 1859 and 1867, when collective or nearly simultaneous notes by the great powers urged the Turks to faster action on the pledges of the Hatt-i Hümayun. Foreign occupation—the disembarkation of a French force in 1860 with the sanction of all the powers—helped to bring about revision of the administrative statute of the Lebanon. In 1867, pressure from the great powers to have all Turkish troops withdrawn from Belgrade, coupled with European interest in the cause of the Cretan rebels, stimulated new Turkish reform, this time by revulsion against the pressure. In this period a distaste for Western interference worked in a curious way to keep in power in the Ottoman government the two statesmen who were the most consistent Westernizers, Âli and Fuad. During most of the decade from 1861 to 1871, one or the other of these men was Grand Vezir, and his colleague foreign minister. These accomplished statesmen, with their knowledge of the French language and of Europe, were better equipped to ward off further intervention than were any of their contemporaries. Within the confines of Turkey, meanwhile, a series of uprisings in various provinces, some of them influenced by a foreign “ism”—nationalism—gave impetus to the drive for a more efficient administration. And the personal ambition of Âli and Fuad made them anxious so to organize the government as to preserve the ruling administrative bureaucracy from the sultan and his palace officials.

The next period of rapid modernization was again the product of various forces, some of which were exerted from abroad. In 1875 and 1876 domestic risings in Bosnia and Herzegovina, followed by revolts on the part of Bulgars, Serbs, and Montenegrins, took their source both from local discontent and from a nationalism tinged with Pan-Slavism. The threat of forceful Russian intervention on the side of the Balkan rebels and the prospect of a conference of the great powers on Turkish affairs triggered a major political reform, the proclamation of the constitution of December 23, 1876. European loans to the Ottoman Empire that had piled up since 1854 and the default on bond interest that ensued in 1875–1876 were an immediate source of pressure. Among the more purely indigenous forces simultaneously felt were the driving energy of Midhat Pasha, the constitution's chief advocate, and the growth of a small but influential public opinion, voiced by certain New Ottoman writers, in favor of a parliament consistent with Islamic tradition. Midhat was joined by statesmen desiring to curb the extravagance and caprice of the sultan's government

and to restore administrative and economic order after five years of chaos. The military and diplomatic crisis of the mid-1870's gave these men occasion to act.

Though the parliament was prorogued in early 1878, the period of reform to which it gave birth may logically be extended until 1882, in Sultan Abdülhamid II's reign. Some of the Tanzimat reforms, especially of the judiciary, culminated in these years. There were the further bitter incentives of defeat by Russia in the war of 1877-1878, of the loss of Serbia, Roumania, and Montenegro, and of the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary. The British forced the Turks to accept British administration of Cyprus in 1878, and occupied Egypt in 1882. The French took Tunis in 1881. In that year the powers forced the cession of additional Turkish territory to Greece. These events stimulated Abdülhamid II less to political modernization than to the reform of the army and of Turkish education. His emphasis on Islam as a means of holding the empire together was a step into the political past, and the appointment of eight British military consuls to cooperate with two commissions of the Porte to improve administration in the "Armenian" vilayets served only to make Abdülhamid more wary of the great powers. The continuing Ottoman financial crisis did, however, lead to the establishment of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration under the supervision of foreign bond holders. In effect, a separate administrative system was set up to control a large proportion of Ottoman revenues; it was efficiently run and had a beneficial effect on the Ottoman economy and on Ottoman bureaucratic practices, even while opening the door to further financial imperialism. Throughout the rest of Abdülhamid's reign there was intermittent European diplomatic pressure for administrative reform in Turkey, most notably in 1895-1896 over the Armenian question, and in 1903-1904 over the Macedonian question. In the first instance, largely because the powers failed to agree among themselves, the results were nil. In the second instance the gendarmerie and parts of the civil administration were somewhat improved. But foreign intervention generally elicited a negative response from Abdülhamid.

The threat of still further great-power pressure and the possibility of the further loss of Balkan territory explain in part the revolt of the Young Turk officers in 1908. Their basic motive, like that of earlier reformers, was to preserve the empire. Abdülhamid's autocratic and spy-ridden rule was their aversion, and his efforts to investigate military insubordination in Macedonia provided the occasion for their uprising. The Reval meeting of Edward VII and Tsar Nicholas II, renewing the threat of foreign support for separatist movements with the empire, provided another stimulus, however. And perhaps the Japanese defeat of Russia in 1905 encouraged Near Eastern officers to believe that they too could resist European power. No sooner had the Young Turks achieved, in 1908, the restoration of the Constitution of 1876 than they were confronted by the foreign danger anew: Bulgaria declared her independence,

and Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the ten years before the Turkish collapse of 1918, the Young Turk regime was constantly faced with domestic revolt or foreign war, or both together. The Italians defeated the Turks and took Tripoli from them in 1912; the Balkan League defeated them and took almost all their remaining European possessions in 1913; and in the Great War, despite their victories at Gallipoli and in the Caucasus, the Turks faced defeat by the summer of 1918. Much of the political modernization in this era undoubtedly came by way of reaction against defeat; some, especially after 1914, came because a period even of victorious war tends to speed up social change.

When the Turkish military effort collapsed in 1918 and the Allies occupied the country, there seems at first to have been a feeling of lassitude and even of relief among the population. What might have happened had the occupation been brief and benevolent, the peace treaty lenient, and the government of Sultan Mehmed VI firm in upholding the national dignity, it is impossible to say. The sultan almost eagerly collaborated with the occupation authorities. Four specific acts of the victorious Allies, from 1919 to 1922, spurred the development of a vigorous nationalist movement which was eventually to inaugurate swift and drastic political change. The first act of provocation was the landing of Greek troops in İzmir on May 15, 1919, which aroused Turkish opinion to the point where Mustafa Kemal could hope to weld the resistance into an organized movement. The second was the British occupation of Istanbul on March 16, 1920, accompanied by the arrest of prominent nationalist deputies to the parliament. This event spurred Kemal to convert the movement into the Government of the Grand National Assembly at Ankara—the one which İsmet represented at Lausanne. The third act was the imposition of the extremely harsh treaty of Sèvres, of which the terms, revealed to the Turks on May 11, were perforce signed by Mehmed VI's government on August 10, 1920. Thereafter the Kemalists felt that they had nothing to lose in all-out opposition to the powers and the Greek invaders. Two years later, after the Turks had won their war against the Greeks, the Allies perpetrated a fourth act, the invitation of both the Istanbul and the Ankara governments to attend the peace conference at Lausanne, in the face of which the Grand National Assembly declared the sultanate abolished, leaving only a member of the house of Osman as caliph. Within two years he too was gone, partly because of the interest shown in him by Muslims abroad. It was as if the European nations were deliberately driving Turkey precisely where Mustafa Kemal was seeking to head her. They were contributing unwittingly to the will and purpose personified by İsmet at Lausanne: to make Turkey a sovereign national state, equal to other sovereign states, and progressive enough to hold her own among them.

Since 1922, Turkey has known no military defeat. She has participated in no foreign war except the United Nations action in Korea. But World War II put her for a time in a very delicate position between the warring nations, and

left her at the end confronted with Russian demands for partial control of the Straits and for the cession of eastern territory. From 1945 on, Turkey found shelter in a close association with the Western powers, especially the United States. This association in turn contributed to the rapid political change occurring in the years from 1945 to 1950, which saw the establishment of an effective opposition party and its victory in a free election. How much of a stimulus to change the association with the Western democracies provided it is hard to say, for economic and political discontent within Turkey itself made at least some change inevitable. Nevertheless, the Turkish adherence to the United Nations charter in 1945, the Western and particularly American diplomatic support in 1945–1946 against Russia, the beginning of military and economic aid to Turkey under the Truman Doctrine in 1947, and American criticism of *étatisme* must have had some effect. The influence felt was not like that of 1856, when direct pressure from Turkey's allies dictated a charter of reform; it was more like that of 1839, when Reşid sought to show the Western powers that Turkey was progressive and was worth helping.

The foregoing historical review allows two generalizations. One is that throughout the last century of its existence, the Ottoman Empire was confronted constantly with the challenge of increasing power in the hands of European states, and that the efforts to meet their challenge by way of political and military modernization proved insufficient. In apparent exception to this rule, victory in the Crimean War was in fact a triumph only for Turkey's allies. Minor victories like those over Greece in 1897 and over Bulgaria in 1913 were not enough to obliterate the reality of recurring defeat. Nor was the reality of diplomatic inferiority affected by the theoretical admission of Turkey to the concert of the European powers in 1856. In sum, until 1922, when military victory gave a final *élan* to reformism, the rest of the world contributed to the development of modern institutions in Turkey very largely by convicting the Turks of past and present inadequacy.

It is evident, secondly, that there was no period of concentrated political reform which did not begin with one or more specific stimuli from without. This is true of 1833, 1839, 1854–1856, 1876, 1908, 1919–1922, and 1945. Though in no case was the external stimulus a sufficient explanation or cause for the reforms which ensued, it presented at least an opportunity which could be seized and a warning to conservatives that change was necessary. The Hatt-ı Şerif of 1839, the Constitution of 1876, and the establishment of the Ankara government and elimination of the sultanate in the years from 1920 to 1922 furnish cogent examples.

Two additional observations may be offered. The periods of reform here cited are cut from the fabric of Turkish history to serve as clinical examples. Historically, each built on its predecessors. There is a cumulative effect of reform which the successive consideration of isolated periods will not show. The process of modernization, once well started, was not easy to arrest; after a

certain point it probably became irreversible even without further external stimuli. After 1839 there was at any rate no possibility of return, as some would-be reformers still wished, to the good old days.

It should also be noted that Turkish reaction to external pressure was sometimes negative. Such, in particular, was the response to diplomatic pressure, which often amounted to intervention and was never disinterested. The Constantinople Conference of 1876, for example, the recommendations of which were rejected in toto by the Turks despite the pressure of all six powers, had a result exactly opposite to that which the powers intended: it aroused a patriotic Muslim reaction. There was considerable truth in Fuad Pasha's bitter jest to a European statesman: "Our state is the strongest state. For you are trying to cause its collapse from without, and we from within, but still it does not collapse."¹⁰ Diplomatic pressure, unless delicately used, could also render Turkish statesmen hateful in the eyes of their Muslim Turkish subjects, and lower their prestige. Âli Pasha complained of such use by Lord Stratford, the British ambassador, who had in many ways helped the Ottoman Empire greatly. Fuad complained similarly of a friendly French ambassador, M. Bourée, that "the French will never be satisfied with giving advice in an unassuming way; . . . whatever good thing was done must be advertised as a benefit conferred by France. . . ."¹¹ A similar sensitivity existed under the republic. Joseph Grew, the American ambassador, observed in one period of tension that even "friendly contact would inevitably be interpreted as intervention."¹² The natural fear was, of course, that Turkey's sovereignty would be impaired, and the effectiveness of her government weakened, if she gave in to foreign diplomatic pressures. This was the issue when İsmet Pasha at Lausanne absolutely rejected a transitional judicial regime, or anything resembling the capitulations. He preferred to declare categorically that the Turkish civil law had no religious character, and was adequate to modern life. He was willing to break up the conference on this issue. It is sufficient commentary on his remarks to note that, less than four years after he presented his brief, the Kemalist republic abandoned its existing civil code for a new one modelled on the Swiss.

II. Foreign Concepts and Models

Much of the foreign contribution to Turkish political modernization came in the form of ideas and institutions, concepts and models, which the Turks could make their own by adoption or adaptation. The first infusion of European ideas came in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, as a result of the changing position of the Ottoman Empire in a world increasingly ordered by European power. First, of course, was the series of military reforms that partly Westernized the organization, dress, drill, and specialized education of the army and navy. Then came changes in Ottoman diplomatic

procedure. When the fiction of the superiority of the Ottoman sultan to all other rulers had perforce been abandoned and he had to deal with European powers on their own terms, the sultan began to send regular diplomatic missions instead of *ad hoc* envoys to the major Western capitals. Selim III began the practice, which became fully established in the reign of Mahmud II—the Turks recapitulating at that late date the transition made by Western Europe in the Renaissance. Further, to take care of diplomatic business in his own capital, Mahmud II, after the Greek revolt, gave up his reliance on Greek interpreters and replaced them with Muslims. Soon thereafter, he established a Translation Bureau in which young Turks might master French. The exigencies of war and diplomacy had thus persuaded the Turks to create new institutions in two fields, each serving to educate an official elite that knew French and something of Western ways. The diplomatic establishment may be counted the first concrete step toward modernization in Ottoman political organization.

From this point on, foreign concepts and models adapted by the Turks became so numerous that only general categories can be treated in an essay of this scope. The categories I have chosen, corresponding approximately to those which Robert Scalapino employs in his discussion of Japanese politics, are the administrative machinery of the state, equal individual citizenship under secular law, representative government, and modern nationalism.

Mahmud II, as has been noted, abolished a good many traditional offices and created new ones more directly dependent on his will. Some of these bore European titles, and exemplified a relatively modern allocation of functions among officials. Before the end of his reign there were ministers of foreign affairs, finance, and interior; the title of grand vezir even was briefly changed to that of prime minister. Such titles often meant that the mere trappings of European government were being approximated. But in the course of time new ministries were created, genuinely reflecting the European belief that modern government should acknowledge wide public responsibilities. For example, a ministry of education was established in 1847, and under its aegis a scheme of state-supported education from the primary school to the university was drawn up in 1869. Another foreign institution adopted was the Council of State, which developed through several permutations out of a deliberative committee set up by Mahmud II. As reorganized in 1868 this Council of State had much in common with that of Napoleon III. Provincial government also was reorganized with a vilayet law of 1867, again very close to the French pattern. In this and subsequent Ottoman legislation the modern principle of the separation of administrative and judicial powers was incorporated. The corporate municipality, a concept quite foreign to Islamic law, first appeared in embryo in Turkey in 1858 as the *sixième cercle* of Istanbul—answering to the desires of Europeans and Levantines living there.

Every one of these developments in administrative machinery answered to some foreign model, whether or not the Turkish imitation was altogether faithful. One need not catalogue all the organs of Turkish government of which this may eventually be said. Under the modern republic it may be said of them all, with the solitary exception of the Directorate of Religious Affairs.

In lesser ways, too, the administrative machinery has become more European. Midhat Pasha was unable, when president of the Council of State in 1868, to carry through the reforms in filing procedures that he wanted. But gradually the traditional sack, or *torba*, was replaced by the folder, the box, and the filing cabinet. Ahmed Vefik Pasha was a radical when, as director-general of indirect taxation in 1871, he ordered all employees to be in their offices by nine a.m., on pain of dismissal; but punctuality has greatly increased. The statute of 1855—that “in the future, the *nizamat* laws or ordinances will no longer be written in obscure or ambiguous words, they shall be stated and explained in clear, easy, and concise terms”¹³—was not uniformly observed thereafter. Yet, allowing for some peculiar experimentation with official vocabulary, the clarity of ordinances has been much improved over the past century. The first “modern” census of 1831 yielded at length to the first really modern census of 1927, which availed itself of expert Belgian advice. In a multitude of such particulars Turkey owes much to European bureaucratic example.

Beyond the fairly mechanical aspect of administration, Europe supplied philosophical concepts of far-reaching significance. One of these was the concept of the secular state. The realization of this concept involved abandonment of any official state religion and a shift in the legal basis for individual rights and personal status. Traditionally such status had derived from the individual’s membership in a millet—Muslim, Christian, or Jewish. The modern European concept, which slowly worked its way into Turkish political life, was that an individual’s rights and duties were grounded rather in his political status as subject of a ruler—or, in a later period, as citizen of a state.

The first secular political ideas came to the Ottoman Empire during the French Revolution, although these were roundly condemned as godlessness in some quarters. Âtîf Efendi, the foreign minister (*reisülküttâb*), wrote that the revolution was a product of atheists like Voltaire and Rousseau, and that the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen was a means of reducing them to the level of animals.¹⁴ Nevertheless, such ideas spread among a few young Turks of the elite, providing Selim III with supporters for his attempted reforms. Although reaction wiped out a number of the reformers, Mahmud II himself began to speak of equal treatment for all his subjects. By 1839 the Hatt-i Şerif of Gülhane reflected some of the major principles of eighteenth-century liberal thought. Security of life, honor (rather than “liberty”), and property were promised in that document, together with equal justice for the

great and the small; and these promises were made to all the sultan's subjects, "of whatever religion or sect." Thus the doctrine of Ottomanism (*Osmanlılık*) was solemnly pronounced. It meant, if carried to its logical conclusion, that millet boundaries would be wiped out. Phrases promising equality without distinction as to religion recur like a *leitmotif* throughout the period from 1839 to 1876. Though in part an answer to European criticism and minority separatism, equality of all subjects before the law was sincerely espoused by a growing number of Ottoman statesmen as the way of salvation for the heterogeneous empire. In the Constitution of 1876, all subjects were considered "Osmanlı, whatever religion or creed they hold," and their legal equality was reaffirmed. It was again reaffirmed when the constitution was restored in 1908.

Never during the last century of the Ottoman Empire was full equality in fact conferred on the adherents of all religions. Even the reforming statesmen who enunciated the principle tended to retain an instinctive belief in Muslim superiority. Yet, from 1850 on, secular law patterned on European codes was increasingly accepted. The ideal of equality persisted, to be supplemented early in this century by the belief of a few Turkish *philosophes* in the ideal of a secular state. Finally, with the adoption of the Swiss-based civil code in 1926, came the official triumph of secular law guaranteeing equal rights to adherents of all religions. In 1928, the second article of the 1924 Constitution was altered to eliminate the statement "The religion of the Turkish state is Islam." In 1937, the principle of secularity, or laicism, was positively written into the constitution. This foreign contribution to Turkish polity has nevertheless failed to win complete popular acceptance. The state itself, furthermore, still maintains certain official connections with Islam and some of its institutions, despite the victory of secular law over religious.

Parliamentary and representative government, and the sovereignty of the people, represent a third complex of ideas imported into Turkey from abroad. It can be argued that the sultans were in a fashion "elected" by the military and civil elite. It can also be argued, and was in fact argued by the New Ottoman propagandists of the 1860's and 1870's, that Islam is fundamentally democratic, enjoining that the ruler heed counsels other than his own. Ottoman sultans and Grand vezirs did sometimes convene general assemblies of high officials, ex-officials, and notables to discuss important public issues. Yet there was more color than substance to the argument that representative government was indigenous to Turkey. Its adoption there came historically as the result of Western influences.

The process of its adoption was a curious inversion of Western expectations. Parliamentary procedure was first used in a deliberative assembly which was neither representative nor elected. This was the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances, a body created by Mahmud II at the end of his reign to discuss possible new regulations. As of 1839, this body was charged with writing

into Turkish law the promises of the Hatt-i Şerif. Its procedural rules included free speech for all members, acknowledged in the order of their inscription; the interpellation of ministers; the keeping of minutes; and decision by majority vote. All these practices were borrowed from the West. Next—in the 1840's—came a recognition of the principle of representation, when the newly created advisory councils attached to each provincial governor incorporated a few non-Muslim members. The same representative principle, though still without elections, was first applied to a national body in 1856, when some non-Muslims were designated to sit with the Supreme Council.

The electoral principle was first recognized—apart from its inclusion in the reformed non-Muslim millet structures of the early 1860's—in the vilayet laws of 1864 and 1867. Under these laws the administrative councils of the province (vilayet) and its subdivisions contained members elected by the local population, though by a complex and indirect process. Each vilayet also had an elected general assembly, though with powers essentially advisory. Finally the Constitution of 1876 created an elected chamber of deputies. This constitution was fashioned upon a number of foreign models. Popular sovereignty was not achieved by it, for the sultan retained great powers, and the ministers were ultimately responsible to him rather than to the chamber—as in the Prussian Constitution of 1850 or the German Constitution of 1871. Ministerial responsibility was broadened after the restoration of the Constitution in 1908, however, and in 1920 the Grand National Assembly, newly convened in Ankara, firmly proclaimed the sovereignty of the people. In somewhat later debate on the deposition of the sultan, Kemal succinctly said: "Sovereignty and Sultanate are not given to anyone by anyone because scholarship says so. . . . The Turkish nation . . . has rebelled and taken the sovereignty into its own hands."¹⁵ Though expression of popular sovereignty in a completely free multi-party election had to wait until 1950, İsmet already spoke at Lausanne in the name of an elected parliament representing the Turkish people. Nearly a century of Western-inspired change lay behind his claim; further changes were to follow.

Bound up with the concept of popular sovereignty is the peculiarly Western spirit of nationalism. This consciousness of the unity and individuality of a people possessing common cultural traits and a common homeland has spread rapidly since the days of the French Revolution. Together with modern industrialism, it is probably the major European contribution to the world at large. Certainly it is the major political contribution of Europe to Turkey's modernization.

Such a concept was foreign to the Ottoman Empire, where, as generally in the world of Islam, distinctions among peoples followed religious lines. But together with the concept of the secular state, it slowly entered the national consciousness over the course of a century. Ottoman leaders traditionally served faith and state, but had no sense of solidarity with the people they

ruled. "Turk" was a term of opprobrium, denoting an uncultivated boor. To conceive of serving fatherland and nation (*vatan ve millet*) rather than faith and state (*din ve devlet*), and of being basically a Turk rather than a Muslim or an Osmanlı, was extremely difficult for them. All who know modern Turkey realize that it is still difficult for most Turks to conceive of a non-Muslim Turk.

The idea of fatherland began to be expressed as *vatan* about the middle of the nineteenth century. The growing familiarity of Osmanlı intellectuals with the French *patrie*, in fact and in literature, called into being a companion concept in Turkey. For a long time, however, *vatan* connoted not a true and fervent nationalism but a spirit of patriotism, the older and milder European antecedent of the modern sentiment. It viewed with distress the shrinking boundaries of the Ottoman Empire, and promoted the desire to defend those boundaries; it sought also to promote Osmanlılık among the various peoples and creeds of the imperial state. The Hatt-i Hümayun of 1856 coined a word, *vatanlaş*, meaning patriotism or perhaps "compatriotism," the common bond among all Turkish subjects.¹⁶ The spirit, first of patriotism and later of nationalism, was nurtured also by revulsion against European attacks and pressures, and by reaction against the nationalism of the rebellious Balkan peoples. By 1873, when the journalist and poet Namık Kemal produced his drama entitled *Vatan*, the fatherland concept was charged with emotional content. This fatherland was not yet fully Turkish; it was still Ottoman. The emotional content was Islamic as well as patriotic. *Vatan* freed itself from such ambivalence and became clearly nationalist in the twentieth century. The term *millet* underwent a similar gradual metamorphosis from its older meaning of "religious community" to its modern meaning of "nation." The patriotic spirit, however defined, grew steadily more secular and national. In the Russo-Turkish war period of 1877–1878 it was Islamic. By 1908, when the Young Turks boycotted Austrian goods in retaliation for Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it was perhaps predominantly political rather than religious.

Meanwhile, helped along by Russian Turks and by European writers like Léon Cahun, the concept of Turkishness grew during the late nineteenth and earlier twentieth centuries to the point where it displaced Ottoman sentiment and vied only with Islam for primary allegiance. The loss of the non-Turkish territories of the empire, especially as the result of the Balkan Wars and the Great War, hastened this transfer of loyalties. The eventual acceptance of the Turkish state as a small, relatively homogeneous republic allowed Mustafa Kemal to emphasize purely national virtues and to point out the burden that imperial and Islamic responsibilities had imposed on Turks in the past. Today it is possible to speak not only of a Turkish patriotism (the successor to Ottoman patriotism), but of a Turkish nationalism, at least among the educated

and Westernized citizens of the country. The European diplomats who faced the stubborn İsmet at Lausanne felt that they were already in the presence of such a force.

III. Channels for Foreign Contributions

It remains for us to identify the channels through which foreign contributions to the modern Turkish polity chiefly flowed. There were many such channels, and they entered the Turkish national life at such a diversity of points that generalizations concerning them are difficult. But a skeletal treatment of them may be attempted.

There had always existed contacts between the Ottoman Empire and the West. Almost from its inception, that empire was physically and politically oriented toward Europe more than toward Asia. Nor was the empire ever closed to foreign visitors as was Japan. Not only the contacts provided by military campaigns, but those with Western diplomats, merchants, refugees, renegades, and travellers within the empire, and with minorities among the sultan's subjects, brought knowledge of the West to Turkey. It is true, however, that until the nineteenth century few Turks had themselves travelled in Europe beyond the Ottoman boundaries. It is also true that, though the Ottoman Empire was not a physically closed domain, the Ottoman or Islamic mind was generally closed to Western influences. This mind opened only very gradually.

The first obvious channel of communication was the European diplomat. Many able and intelligent diplomats of the great powers served in the Ottoman capital. Though they associated almost exclusively with European or Levantine circles, or with Turkish officials, they were seldom backward in giving advice on political reforms. Such advice was as often resented as not, especially when it was accompanied by pressure. Yet some changes with important consequences for political modernization were effected by it. The *lycée* of Galatasaray, for example, was established upon the advice of an expert from Napoleon III's ministry of education after the French ambassador to the Porte had urgently proposed that action. There were also foreign diplomats who gave the Turks a sympathetic ear and perhaps friendly unofficial advice in periods of crisis; among these were Sir Henry Elliott, British ambassador in 1875–1876, and Admiral Mark Bristol, American High Commissioner after the Great War. In all, however, the Turks learned less than they might have from foreign diplomats. The foreign consul, lord in a small domain, was often obnoxious to them.

The much larger group of foreigners in Turkey were private citizens—merchants, adventurers, concession-hunters, travellers, missionaries, and teachers. Individual Turks, and sometimes Turkish statesmen, gained a sym-

pathetic knowledge of European ways from them. Ahmed Vefik Pasha, for instance, used to discuss a variety of questions with Americans on the Robert College faculty. Especially after 1908, the number of Turkish graduates of foreign schools in Turkey increased rapidly. Of these graduates—the late Adnan Menderes was one—some attained high positions in government.

Before the republican period, and even to some extent during it, the foreign “colonies” usually had more associations with Greeks, Armenians, Jews, and Levantines than they did with the Turks. The merchants tended to live apart, although their desires and interests, especially after the Crimean War, helped to bring Westernized commercial law into Turkish courts. Colonies of foreign workers, like the Swiss factory hands at Amasya or the British dockyard employees at Hasköy, seem to have had little influence on their Turkish neighbors. The adventurers and concession-hunters, and the dubious or even criminal European rabble that operated under the protection of the capitulations, made anything but a good impression on Turks. The missionaries, usually exemplary in character, worked almost entirely among the Christian minorities. When their evangelical enthusiasm touched Muslim Turks, a violent reaction was likely to ensue—even, as the Bursa incident of 1928 shows, under the “secular” republic. The total impact of such groups on Turkish political modernization is hard to assess. So also is the impact of American military men in Turkey in recent years. The effect of foreign cultures on Turkish social and economic aspirations is easier to see. The Turkish reaction to the foreign “colonies” in their midst has, at best, been mixed.

Among the foreigners in Turkey have been some, however, directly employed for specific purposes, who have had an undoubted national influence. The list of foreign military instructors and advisers, from Bonneval and Tott through Moltke, Goltz, and Liman von Sanders down to the Americans of today, is long and distinguished. During the period of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic era the French influence was predominant. Mahmud II introduced a diversity of foreign technicians and advisers. Mahmud employed a Frenchman to start a medical school, a Spaniard at the head of the naval academy, a Scotsman to run his steamboat, a Cornishman to set up a tannery, an Italian to instruct army bandsmen, Americans to build ships, English officers to train the navy, and Prussian officers to improve the army. In the 1870's the empire employed De Salve to head Galatasaray, Count Szechenyi to set up a model fire brigade, and the German or Austrian renegade Emin Efendi, who had been a teacher in the Translation Bureau, to head the law school. In the Young Turk period, the state had Crawford to reorganize the customs, Baumann for the gendarmerie, Ostrorog as legal adviser. Turkish reactions to these men were normally favorable among the upper administrative echelons, otherwise mixed. To measure the impact such advisers and technicians had, individually and collectively, on political modernization, is difficult. Some such impact must perforce have existed.

Perhaps even more influential as a channel for the communication of Western concepts, at least in the mid-nineteenth century, were the Polish and Hungarian refugees who found asylum in the Ottoman Empire after the revolutions of 1830, 1848, and 1863. Some turned Turk, adopting Islam and marrying Turkish wives. Since they served no great power and were uniformly anti-Russian, they were more likely to be trusted than were Europeans generally. They served the Turks as doctors, engineers, and army officers, and helped to staff the administrations of several vilayets. They introduced ideas of nationalism, political liberty, and constitutionalism.

Another channel of communication that cannot be disregarded was provided by the non-Muslim minorities of the empire. The educated among the Greeks, Armenians, and Jews were closer to European ways and ideas than the Turks. As middlemen in business and as translators they constituted in part a buffer between Turks and European. As second-class citizens of the empire, they were not collectively influential; yet, as individuals, some undoubtedly were. Many an Ottoman statesman had as his *homme d'affaires* a Greek or Armenian banker who could play a political role behind the scenes. Odian Efendi, one of the leading Armenians, was for years a close adviser of Midhat Pasha, and influenced the latter's constitutional ideas. It is possible even that the revised constitution of the Armenian millet provided a model for some provisions in the vilayet law of 1867 and the constitution of 1876.

Those portions of the Ottoman Empire which were breaking away from the control of Istanbul also reacted upon the Turkish nation in some significant ways. Balkan nationalism served to arouse Turkish nationalism, though by revulsion rather than by contagion. The development of parliaments in Serbia and Roumania influenced Namık Kemal's thinking about parliaments. Even more influential was Egypt. Muhammad Ali's advances were a stimulus to Turkish modernization, and both his regime and that of his successors contributed political ideas to the Ottoman Empire. A number of Ottoman statesmen had their early education or professional training in the Egyptian service. The persons and influences passing between Egypt and Turkey in the nineteenth century might be the object of an independent study. For example, though European manners and Parisian modes came to Istanbul via the Levantines and during the Crimean War via an influx of Europeans, free-spending members of the Egyptian ruling family were exemplifying such fashions in Istanbul at an early date. To take a more significant example from political history: Âli Pasha evidently got some of his ideas about introducing parts of the French *code civil* into Turkey from his knowledge of an Arabic translation of that work made in Egypt. Hayreddin Pasha, who became Grand Vezir under Abdülhamid II, brought with him from Tunis ideas based on his knowledge of French civilization.

Muslims from outside the confines of the Ottoman Empire, and the later Republic, brought still further ideas to Istanbul and Ankara. Some of these

were archaic enough—like those emanating from Bokhara or Kashgar in the 1870's; or, later on, from the Senusi brotherhood of Libya; or, most recently, from the North Africa-centered Ticani order. Other Muslim visitors, like Djemaleddin el-Afghani, encouraged a defensive modernization. The most important among the progressive Muslim visitors were certain Russian Turks. Often well educated, proponents of new departures in writing, eager for a Turkish renaissance, familiar with pan-Slavism, and advocates of Turkish nationalism or of Pan-Turkism, these men—Yusuf Akçura, for example—channeled new ideas into Turkey in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Some came as immigrants or exiles to spend their lives in Turkey.

When all such visitors from abroad are considered together, however, they appear to have contributed less to political modernization than did the education variously obtained by members of the Ottoman, and later the republican, elite. This education was sometimes secured on the job—through service in the Translation Bureau, or in diplomatic posts in the West. Sometimes it was supplied by formal study abroad—in the *Mekteb-i Osmanî* maintained in Paris from about 1855 to 1874, or in one of the European universities or military academies. Sometimes it was gained in exile, as in the case of some of the New Ottomans and of the later Young Turks. Most often, especially in more recent times, it was gained in one of the higher schools established in Turkey—the military and naval schools, the military and civilian medical schools, the various schools set up to train administrative personnel, and the universities. The curricula of these schools became progressively Westernized, from the time of Selim III on. Those schools designed especially to train government clerks and administrators—the *Mekteb-i Maarif-i Adliye* (1838), the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* (1859), and others—developed a curriculum which today would be called “public and international affairs.”

The common denominator of education gained from these several sources was a knowledge of French, which opened up new vistas on the modern world, and numbers of Turks piled one educational experience upon another. Fuad Pasha studied at the military medical school, worked in the Translation Bureau, and then held major diplomatic posts. Ahmed Vefik Pasha was a product of the Lycée St. Louis, the military engineers' school, the Translation Bureau, and diplomatic service; in addition, he came from a family that had already provided two generations of dragomans. The bilingual elite began to dominate the government toward mid-century, gradually eclipsing those with the traditional Islamic education. And as army officers, after the *coups d'état* of 1876 and 1908, entered more deeply into politics, the Westernized education received in the military schools had an increasingly important effect on Turkish political life.

Westernized education, even for a comparatively large number of the elite, was no total guarantee that the Ottoman Empire would turn modern. There was always opposition from the people as a whole, who were steadfastly op-

posed to innovation. There was further opposition from vested interests. Many a modernizing statesman was called the *gâvur paşa*, the "unbeliever of a pasha." Nor was there any guarantee that a Western education would produce a Westernizer. Some products of this education became cynical, others acquired more vices than virtues. Some, like Ahmed Vefik, became modernizers but without accepting the Western political example. Namık Kemal, admitting Ahmed Vefik's great learning, said that he understood nothing of parliamentary procedure,¹⁷ and others who knew him thought Ahmed Vefik would have made a good Grand Vezir for Mahmud II or even Süleyman the Law Giver. Many bureaucrats came to possess only a superficial veneer of Western education. "The result of a half-baked Frank education is depressing," wrote Mark Sykes of a young *kaymakam* he met in 1906. "His idea of reform was the regular payment of Kaimakams, the provision of free illustrated newspapers for Kaimakams to read, the building of railways for Kaimakams to travel by, and eventually the restoration of all Kaimakams to Constantinople, where they would be given places as highly-paid deputies in a Parliament of Kaimakams, who would collect and control the expenditure."¹⁸

Yet, when all these weaknesses are taken into account, the foreign contribution to Turkish politics by way of Western education was tremendous. Most of the modernizers have come from the civilian and military bureaucracies. Most have had a Western education. Many have known French. Modern Turkey could not have come into being except through their labors. In the end, they came to serve not as the channel of transmission for foreign influences but as the self-reliant political leaders and philosophers of a changing nation-state. "Past a critical threshold," as William Schorger wrote in a paper presented in 1961, "the impetus for modernization of the society derives from modernized indigenous elements as much as, or more than, from external sources."¹⁹ The Turkish experience bears this out.

At the Lausanne conference, Signor Montagna, one of the Italian plenipotentiaries, was very dubious about Turkey's political growth. He talked about this to the American observer, Joseph Grew. "In his own mind," said Grew, "he compares Turkey to a mummy which so long as it remains sealed in its tomb retains its normal state but as soon as the tomb is opened and it comes into contact with the outside air it immediately begins to decompose and to crumble away. Turkey's contact with the outside nations would make her crumble away because she was not content to make the transition gradually as Japan had done, but must bring it about all at once."²⁰

Turkey of course did not crumble. What Montagna failed to realize was that she had for more than a century been in contact with the outside air. Foreign nations had provided the harsh stimulus of military defeat. Foreign contacts had planted in the Turkish consciousness the seeds of such vital concepts as nationalism and the sovereignty of the people. And they had made possible an

education, the principal advantage of which was usually knowledge of the French language, whereby Turkish leaders might inform themselves of the new state of the world and of expedients for adapting to it.

Notes

1. Great Britain, Turkey No. 1 (1923), *Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs, 1922-1923* (Cmd. 1814), p. 470. Cf. p. 493.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 479.

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 482-483, 489.

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 496-497.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 510, 514.

6. C. K. Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston, 1830-1841*, London, 1951, I, 283.

7. Art. I. Text in J. C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, A Documentary Record: 1535-1914*, Princeton, 1956, p. 105.

8. C. Hippolyte Castille, *Réchid-pacha*, Paris, 1857, p. 23.

9. Webster, *op. cit.*, II, 657.

10. Abdurrahman Şeref, *Tarih Musahabeleri*, Istanbul, A.H. 1339, p. 104.

11. Elliot (Constantinople), No. 68 confidential, 17 December 1867, F.O. 78/1965, Public Record Office, London.

12. Joseph C. Grew, *Turbulent Era*, New York, 1952, II, 758.

13. Quoted from the *Takvim-i vekayi*, the official gazette, in T. X. Bianchi, *Khaththy Humaïoun*, Paris, 1856, p. viii.

14. Cited by Abdülhak Adnan-Adıvar, *Osmanlı Türklerinde ilim* (Istanbul, 1943), p. 192. Cf. translation of part of the document in Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, London, 1961, pp. 65-66.

15. Quoted in G. L. Lewis, *Turkey*, New York, 1955, p. 70.

16. Bianchi, *op. cit.*, p. 4, n. I. Later the word came to mean simply "compatriot."

17. Fevziye A. Tansel, *Namuk Kemal ve Abdülhak Hâmid, hususi mektuplarına göre*, Ankara, 1949, p. 52.

18. Mark Sykes, *The Caliphs' Last Heritage*, London, 1915, p. 365.

19. "The Social Community in the Contemporary Middle East," mimeographed, 1961, p. 6.

20. Grew, *op. cit.*, I, 568.

Added Note: Three varieties of scholarly work have in recent years resulted in publications that can add a significant dimension to this sketch of political modernization. The first is concerned with administrative modernization. Two books by Carter V. Findley are important in this area: *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire:*

The Sublime Porte, 1789–1922 (Princeton, 1980) and *Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History* (Princeton, 1989). Steven T. Rosenthal, *The Politics of Dependency: Urban Reform in Istanbul* (Westport Conn., 1980), is concerned principally with the development of municipal government rather than with dependency. The second variety of scholarly work is concerned with the economic environment in which modernizing changes, including the political, took place. Charles Issawi, *The Economic History of Turkey, 1800–1914* (Chicago, 1980), is a collection of sources, with introductions. Donald Quataert, *Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance in the Ottoman Empire, 1881–1908: Reactions to European Economic Penetration* (New York, 1983), and Şevket Pamuk, *The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820–1913: Trade, Investment, and Production* (Cambridge, 1987), examine aspects of economic development in the Ottoman Empire and their relation to outside influences. The third variety is intellectual history, some of which helps to understand the growth in the Ottoman Empire of the western concept of nationalism: Davud Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism, 1876–1908* (London, 1977); Şerif Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, 1895–1908* (Ankara, 1964); M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *Doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi* (İstanbul, 1981?) and Hanioğlu's *Bir Siyasal Örgüt Olarak Osmanlı İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Jön Türklük*, vol. 1: 1889–1902 (İstanbul, 1985?).

6 The Advent of the Principle of Representation in the Government of the Ottoman Empire

Modernization is a term which has no agreed meaning. As a conceptual tool for historical analysis it may or may not be useful, depending on the content one pours into it.¹ Perhaps for the moment the ambiguities of the term can be left aside after some prefatory remarks. For what we are discussing is, obviously, some of the evidence of significant change since the late eighteenth century that affected life in Iran and the Ottoman Empire and its successor states. Much of this change was affected by contact with the European West and can properly be called Westernization.

One example of such Westernization is the advent in the governmental structure of the Ottoman Empire of the principle of representation. Ward and Rustow exclude this principle from the categories of modernization which they have tried to apply to the political development of Turkey and Japan. "Democracy and representative government," they say, "are not included in our definition of modernization."² With the question of democratic government we do not here need to be concerned, although I would be willing to argue elsewhere that one aspect of the Ottoman Empire's Westernization (and therefore, for that empire, modernization) was its progress toward democratic political forms and even toward the substance of democratic government. If democracy as a whole were my subject, it would be necessary to examine the development of concept and of practice in such areas as these: popular sovereignty, the equality of rights and duties of all subjects or citizens, the separation of legislative and judicial from executive power, electoral systems and techniques, controls placed by constitutional or other means on the executive, ministerial responsibility to a parliament, parliamentary procedure, and respect for and defense of the rights of minorities. All of these are, of course, related to one another and to the representative principle. To examine here developments in all these areas would be impossible.

I shall limit my scope, therefore, to an examination of how the representative principle came to be applied to various organs of government in the Ottoman Empire. This development was not only one aspect of Westerniza-

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tion but, I would maintain, was also related to political modernization, even as Ward and Rustow define it—for the representative principle contributed, in the terms of their check-list of the indices of political modernization, to the elaboration of a differentiated and specific system of governmental organization, to the growth of secular procedures in making political decisions, to a greater sense of popular identification with the territory of the state, to a wider popular interest in the political system, and to the allocation of political roles on the basis of achievement rather than on the basis of social status.³ Although the representative principle could not and did not by itself create such results, it was an integral part of the process both in the Ottoman Empire and in the Turkish Republic and in other successor states of the empire. The historian who is interested in determining what actually happened, and how, has to acknowledge that fact.

How, then, did the people of the empire, considered either as the mass of individual subjects or as a collection of groups, come to have representation in one or more organs of government in the nineteenth century?

It is sometimes tempting to assume that Ottoman tradition carried within it the seeds of a principle of representative government. One scholar has argued, for instance, that the Ottoman sultans up to the start of the seventeenth century were essentially elected by the people, though “electors” were in fact high officials, usually a palace clique, and Janissaries.⁴ The sultan would thus be the representative of the people, and the ceremony of *biat* would confirm this. A theory might be constructed to show that during the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries there was a kind of balance of political power within the Ottoman Empire in which *ayan*, Janissaries, and *ulema* each acted in some manner as representatives of the people, as popular voices which could operate as checks on the authority of the sultan. Some later nineteenth century Turks argued in this fashion. But such theoretical constructions seem a bit far-fetched, despite the element of truth in them.

It is true, of course, that the idea of representing the views of the people to the ruler was not a new one in Turkish history. Sultans and their ministers heard petitions and sometimes received delegations from the provinces. Inspectors were not infrequently sent out from the capital to hear complaints and check on local officials. Sultans themselves occasionally went on inspection trips and indulged in opinion-sampling. The sultan was not a complete autocrat and not only took counsel of his ministers and advisers but also sometimes called assemblies representing officials, notables, guilds, and Janissaries to discuss important matters. The most common form of a general assembly (*meclis-i umumî*), or gathering of dignitaries, was however not representative of all the people of the empire, but only of the higher civil, religious, and military officials in and out of office who might be available in the capital at a given moment. It might serve as a check on the actions of the sultan or of the new bureaucracy developed from the time of Mahmud II, but this was the

limit of its representative quality. The extraordinary assembly of *ayan* in 1808 that produced the *sened-i ittifak* can be considered to embody a representative principle only if one believes that these local magnates, who in fact often shielded the people in their districts from direct control by central authority, were interested in more than their own autonomy; but this is debatable.⁵ So, while the central government had various means at its disposal for gathering information, opinion, and counsel, none of these ways seem to have been, even in embryo, a form of the principle of representative government. They might, however, provide traditions that could be appealed to in the future as supporting, by extension, that representative principle.

In the same category of traditions that might be appealed to, although in historical fact they did not really embody representative government, were two from early Islam: the idea that the early caliphate had been elective, and the Koranic injunction to act upon consultation (Sura 3:153 and 42:36). Ottoman reformers were to make frequent reference to these traditions and texts in the 1860's and 1870's. They had early support from some turcophil Europeans. Abdolonyme Ubicini, writing about 1850, found to his satisfaction "all the essentials of modern democracy" in the Koran, and that Islamic law "formally sets forth the sovereignty of the nation, universal suffrage, the principle of election extended to all, even to the governing power. . . ."⁶ Ubicini was enthusiastically misreading Islamic history, but he and others like him may have influenced the thinking of some Turkish reformers. Possibly more important, however, to the development of the representative principle was the fact that the Ottoman rulers, while heading the greatest state ever based on Islamic law, had legislated on their own initiative beyond the provisions of the *şeriat*, occasionally even in contradiction to it, so that in the nineteenth century this Turkish (rather than Arab or Muslim) tradition could condone manmade law and imported Western principles.⁷ The principle of representative government was to be among these.

If there was in Ottoman tradition any real base for the principle of representative government, it was in the localities at the bottom of the political scale. From early Ottoman days imperial orders were communicated to the towns by convoking the local *ayan* (magnates), *eşraf* (notables, usually religious), guildmasters, and *imams* (district clerics), who were, in the words of an unnamed Ottoman chronicler, "the agents and representatives of the people."⁸ Whether truly representative or not, some of these men continued to play an important role in Ottoman political history throughout the period of nineteenth century experiments with the representative principle. Similarly, in villages and hamlets (which sometimes evidently coincided with parishes of the non-Muslim *millet* church organizations) there was a tradition of electing a council of elders (*ihtiyar meclisi*), along with a headman (*kocabaşı* or *muhtar*). The traditional forms, however, provided no organizational link between this local representative body and the central government.

One usually thinks of the Ottoman constitution of 1876, with its provision for an elected chamber of deputies, as the real birth of the principle of representative government in the empire.⁹ This is true if one will consider only a well-developed national scheme of representation. But the parliament that met under the constitution of 1876 was the culmination of nearly forty years of experiment with the representation idea in one form or another, after the centralizing reforms of Mahmud II had cleared away the rival power of the greatest *derebeys* and the Janissaries and had weakened the authority of the *ulema*.

The experimentation began with the reforming bureaucrat Reşid Paşa, who from diplomatic service in Paris and London had gained considerable knowledge of Western political institutions in the great days of liberal bourgeois government that followed the French Revolution of 1830 and the British Reform Bill of 1832. The reform edict—the *Hatt-i Hümayun* of Gülhane—which Reşid caused Sultan Abdülmecid to promulgate in 1839 had in it nothing about representative government, either in principle or in practice. Though it has sometimes been called a constitution, it was not. Reşid did not intend to introduce a parliamentary system of government into the Ottoman Empire; he said that Turkey was not ready for such methods, although he was conscious of the constitutions which involved representative assemblies in Moldavia, Wallachia, and Serbia.¹⁰ In this judgment he was quite correct, and the perennial, often effective, opposition of conservatives to his reform program proved the point. The Gülhane *hat* did, however, both indicate the rationale under which representative institutions might be tried and, through its enunciated principles, help to create an atmosphere that would be favorable. The rationale was the strengthening of the Ottoman Empire, then at a critical period in the face of Great Power pressures from without and rebellion from within. Anything that would bind the empire more closely together and win a greater loyalty of its subjects to the central government would be advantageous and welcome. The *hat*, furthermore, opened the door officially to new laws and new institutions—to experiment, in fact. It emphasized the rights of all subjects of the sultan in certain matters and the equality of all classes of subjects before the law. It promised good administration.¹¹ There was no necessity that institutions of representative government would follow from all this, but there was a logical possibility, however small, that they could. And in fact they did.

The beginning of the movement toward representative government did not occur in the central administration at the capital. Mahmud II had, it is true, established the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances, *Meclis-i vâlâ-i ahkâm-i adliye*, at the end of his reign. Under the 1839 *hat* this council was charged with preparing new laws to carry out the reform. It operated on Western-style rules of parliamentary procedure, and the sultan promised to put into effect the laws it prepared. It was, however, in no way a representative assembly, being composed of appointed high officials.¹²

The true start of representative government occurred in the provinces. In a *ferman* of January 1840 to provincial officials—a *ferman* which was in part concerned with the reform of tax collection methods by abolishing tax-farming—it was stipulated that in each of the major divisions and subdivisions of the empire there should be an administrative council.¹³ Councils in the major centers were to have thirteen members. Of these, six would be appointed government functionaries sitting *ex officio*. The others, however, would be representatives of the local population: four Muslims and, where there were non-Muslims in the district, the bishop and two headmen (*kocabasıs*). The elected members were to be nominated and chosen by an oddly complex and, from a modern viewpoint, quite unsophisticated system. Nevertheless, the principle of representation was thus established in the major provincial centers. It was established also in the smaller centers, where a council of five was to include two Muslims who were not officials and one Christian notable if the region had Christian inhabitants.¹⁴

The effectiveness of the local councils, once established, varied from place to place and year to year, and with the quality of the membership and of the local governor. A good many public works projects were initiated and supervised by the councils. But often the councils worked poorly, as many witnesses of the 1840's and 1850's testify. Members used their positions for private gain. Justice was not impartially administered. There was always a Muslim majority on the local council, given the *ex officio* membership of officials, who were Muslims. The "elected" representatives were often from the same old dominant groups of *ayan* or Christian *kocabasıs* who pursued their individual and class interests. Members of the *ulema* on the councils retained great influence. Obviously the councils were not truly representative of the common people, except in the sense that in many localities any one of the *ayan* on the council may have had a clientele among the people and may have defended their interests in return for contributions of goods and services.

Yet the councils did represent innovation in several ways. One was that the chairmanship was not given to the local *kadı*, as had earlier been the usage. This was a step toward secularization in government. Furthermore, an electoral principle had now been officially introduced; and the representative principle had also been officially sanctioned, inasmuch as non-Muslims took seats on the council with the same right, in theory, to free discussion of administrative, financial, and judicial matters as their Muslim colleagues. It should be noted, however, that representation was on what may be called a corporate basis—that is, by *millet*. Delegates were not chosen by a mixed electorate of all sects. That the *kadı* was no more chairman of the local council was a sign of secularization; but that the representation was of *millets*, rather than of individuals, tended to reaffirm the religious lines drawn between elements of the Ottoman population.

The value of this initial step toward adopting the representative principle is

not lessened by the fact that the motives behind the action were anything but theoretical convictions about popular sovereignty. The fundamental aim was to strengthen a weakened empire, at that moment under attack by Mehmed Ali of Egypt. Vigorous support from the European powers was necessary. They had to be shown that the Ottoman Empire was worth saving and that it was capable of progress. Reşid Paşa wanted to show them that the sultan's government could deal justly with, and attract the loyalty of, all its subjects. By attracting that loyalty, he hoped to combat separatism. He was also concerned to strengthen the central government by weakening the influence of local conservatives and magnates, while at the same time providing a means for a local voice. He wanted the provincial councils to act as a check on local magnates, and on the Istanbul-appointed officials as well, in carrying out the reforms now inaugurated—in particular, at the moment, in tax collection. Hence the virtues, in his eyes, of the representative principle. It is possible also that he had in mind examples of representative organs that had been inaugurated elsewhere in the empire, in regions not under the capital's direct control—the privileged Balkan provinces, for instance, or the island of Samos.¹⁵ Possibly the Egyptian example influenced Reşid, for local councils, including both Muslim and Christian representatives, had been formed in the 1830's by İbrahim Paşa in Syria and Mustafa Paşa in Crete.¹⁶

The representative principle was first employed in the capital in an extraordinary assembly convoked in 1845, although plans for such seem to have been envisioned in a *ferman* of May 1840.¹⁷ In February of 1845 Sultan Abdülmecid visited the Porte and read a *ferman* ordering each *eyalet* to send two delegates to the capital. This was to be a consultative group to express to the government the rural needs and wishes in regard to agricultural improvement, roads, taxes, and the like. It evidently also was to serve as a sounding board for the central administration, as the delegates were to carry back to their localities the news of the central government's benevolent intentions. The provincial notables, both Muslim and non-Muslim, came and did express their wishes, though apparently with some trepidation. They stayed in the capital two months or more. After their departure, so-called "commissions of improvement" were sent to the provinces to oversee reforms, but the results were unimpressive.¹⁸

The assembly was undoubtedly more than a showpiece for Europe. Whether its convocation was influenced by the experiments of Mehmed Ali in Egypt, particularly by his gathering of some 400 notables—including some village *şeyhs*—in 1829, I do not know. Apparently because of the financial burden of transporting and maintaining the delegates, the experiment was not repeated.¹⁹ It remains unique, the first assembly at all representative of the empire as a whole.

At the end of the Crimean War a new imperial edict of February 18, 1856, confirmed the promises of the 1839 *hat*, but went far beyond the earlier docu-

ment in several ways, particularly in emphasizing the equality of all the sultan's subjects of whatever sect.²⁰ The *Hatt-i Hümayun* of 1856 also introduced, where the *hat* of 1839 had not, the representative principle. The pressure of the empire's Great Power allies in the victory over Russia was without question responsible for most of this. But most of the terms were in any case in accord with the ideas of Âli Paşa and Fuad Paşa, who were members of the group that drafted the *hat*. It seems clear that neither of these statesmen believed that the Ottoman empire could support a representative parliament of any sort. Fuad possibly might have been receptive to such an institution in an undefined future; Âli certainly would not have been. But both statesmen evidently favored, like their former master Reşid Paşa, the widening of some sorts of representative institutions. Thus the *Hatt-i Hümayun* of 1856 mentioned in three separate places the application of the representative principle to various Ottoman political units: first, the existing provincial councils should be reorganized to provide for fair choice of delegates and free voting within them. Second, the non-Muslim *millet* organizations were to be revised so that laymen would have a voice in control of their temporal affairs. Third, representatives of the non-Muslim *millets* were to be added to the *Meclis-i vâlâ-i ahkâm-i adliye* whenever matters affecting the interests of all Ottoman subjects were being considered.

These promises of the *Islahat fermanı*, as Turks called the 1856 edict, were carried out within a few years. Actually within a few months some representatives of the principal non-Muslim *millets* were appointed to the *Meclis-i vâlâ*, which had now become in effect a court of higher appeal rather than a body to draft new legislation.²¹ The men appointed were, however, from the leading non-Muslim families of Istanbul, and were already closely attached by interest and employment to the Porte. One Armenian so appointed, for instance, was Fuad Paşa's personal *sarraf* and a farmer of port duties.²² He and his non-Muslim colleagues were representative only insofar as they were technically members of the chief non-Muslim *millets*. But the principle of such representation was thereafter retained for this body and its successors. It furnishes the first example of the representative principle applied to a permanent organ of the central government.

Reorganization of the non-Muslim *millet* structures was harder to effect because of the opposition by clergy and certain small groups of influential notables to any weakening of their traditionally dominant position. But for some years there had been stirrings within the Greek, Armenian, and Jewish communities as Western ideas spread among them, and as tradesmen and some middle and upper bourgeoisie struggled against the control of the entrenched elite. The Porte applied pressure to hasten the reform being prepared by commissions set up within each of the three *millets*. Between 1862 and 1865 all achieved new written constitutions—the Porte called them regulations or laws

(*nizamat*). In each case the power of the clergy in civil matters was weakened, and for each *millet* a general assembly (*meclis-i umumî*) was created which contained elected lay delegates. Although provincial delegates were included, the provinces were grossly under-represented, while the Istanbul region had a disproportionately high number of delegates. The representative principle was, however, now officially entrenched in a written constitution for each *millet*. This reform affected approximately nine million souls scattered over the empire—nearly a third of the empire's population if the self-governing territories of Moldavia, Wallachia, and Serbia are excluded.

It is quite unlikely that Ottoman statesmen intended that the Armenian reorganization be "an experiment in constitutions" and "a model for later use," as İsmail Kemal Bey later claimed.²³ But the *millet* reorganization undoubtedly helped to familiarize some Ottoman statesmen with the concept of a representative assembly embodied in a written constitution. And within a few years Namık Kemal, leading spirit of the Young Ottomans, was to refer to the assemblies of the Christians as possible models for a chamber of deputies.²⁴ There is also a possibility that the *vilayet* reform of 1864 was affected by the Armenian constitution of the previous year.²⁵

In any case, in 1864, just when the *millet* reforms were being completed, a new scheme of provincial government was worked out. This was the *vilayet* system, so-called because of the new name given to the provinces. Efforts since the *Hatt-i Hümayun* of 1856 to improve local government and the functioning of the partly representative provincial councils had been sporadic. Tours by inspectors and a Balkan inspection trip by the grand vezir, Kibrıslı Mehmed Paşa, had achieved something by way of improving the councils, but only by ad hoc methods such as dissolving corrupt ones and requiring new elections.²⁶ In 1864 a complete overhaul of regulations on the organization of provincial government was attempted, and a slight further revision was made in 1867. The new scheme obviously owed much to the French example of *département-arrondissement-canton-commune*, which emerged in the Ottoman law as *vilayet-sancak-kaza-kariye* (or *nahiye*).

The representative principle was incorporated in three separate institutions set up under this law: in the administrative council (*meclis-i idare*) in each *vilayet*, *sancak*, and *kaza*; in the local courts; and in a general assembly (*meclis-i umumî*) created for each *vilayet*. For the administrative councils and the courts the electoral system provided was immensely complex and indirect. Only the members of the *kaza* council were elected by something approaching a direct ballot. The whole law was nevertheless suffused with the idea of representation. It was still corporate representation—by *millet*—in most cases. The administrative councils of the *vilayet* and *sancak* were to have, in addition to their ex officio members, two elected Muslims and two elected non-Muslims. The courts were to have three elected Muslims and three elected

non-Muslims. The *vilayet* general assembly was to be composed of two elected Muslims and two elected non-Muslims from each *sancak*. Only in the *kaza* administrative councils was the religion of the elected members left unspecified. At the bottom of the ladder, the council of elders (*ihityar meclisi*) of each commune was presumably homogeneous in religion, whether Muslim or Christian.²⁷

The *vilayet* law, with changes and additions, had a long life. Its operation was attended with many difficulties, and complaints about it were numerous. The balance it attempted between centralization and decentralization—between Istanbul-appointed officials and local representatives—could breed friction, inefficiency, or collusion. The representative element within the system was often, depending on the locality and the appointed officials at any given moment, more shadow than substance. But there is no question that the law itself was fundamental in establishing the representative principle in Ottoman government and in linking it to an electoral process, however indirect. Some Turkish historians, notably Ahmed Rasim and Ali Fuad, have taken literally a statement in Midhat Paşa's memoirs that the new law was intended by Âli Paşa and Fuad Paşa as "a preface to a chamber of deputies."²⁸ This seems, in the case of Âli Paşa, most unlikely, and doubtful in the case of Fuad Paşa. It is possible that Midhat Paşa, who helped to prepare the law, had some such idea in mind at so early a date. The aim of the law seemed to be simply to secure better government, by a combination of some popular voice with central administrative authority in each locality. It is, however, undeniable that when the constitution of 1876 was being prepared, the electoral law that accompanied it was based squarely on the electoral provisions of the *vilayet* law.

The first connection between the provincial assemblies and an organ of the central government was soon made when the former *Meclis-i vâlâ* was replaced by the Council of State (*Şura-i devlet*) in 1868. The Council of State, now the major law-drafting body of the empire, was to meet each year with three or four delegates from the general assembly of each *vilayet* and to discuss with these delegates the desires set down in memoranda sent from the *vilayet*.²⁹ This marks the first link between elected provincial representative bodies and a permanent central body which operated on well-defined rules of parliamentary procedure and was itself partly representative of the peoples of the empire. The Council of State was itself also more truly representative of the peoples of the empire than its predecessor, the *Meclis-i vâlâ*, had been. Of the thirty-eight original members appointed in 1868, nearly one quarter were provincial notables. Nearly one-third, including some of these notables, were non-Muslims, though the proportions were all askew in relation to *millet* population totals: four were Armenian Catholics, drawn from a tiny minority group; three were Greeks; two were Jews; one was Armenian Gregorian; and one was Bulgarian. This was still, therefore, corporate representation.

Thus by 1868 there was a considerable history, stretching over nearly thirty years, of experiment with institutions of both local and central government which embodied the representative principle. All the institutions worked imperfectly, some very poorly indeed, and the representative principle was more often breached than observed. No one could maintain that the common people of the empire were genuinely represented, or that such elections as existed were not as a rule tightly controlled by officials or local notables. Yet the representative principle was, in several ways, firmly embedded in Ottoman law. Some of the institutions created might contribute to a further extension of the representative principle, even to providing a base for the creation of a parliament. Occasional Turkish commentators have seen the foundation for a parliament in the Council of State. Midhat Paşa, who was its first president, was probably developing ideas in this direction by 1868. As Fuad Paşa reportedly said of Midhat, "This man sees in the parliamentary regime a remedy for all evils, without suspecting that politics rebels against panaceas even more than medicine."³⁰ Most observers, if they saw any virtue at all in the Council of State, were more likely to agree with Ahmed Midhat that it was "a school for the training of statesmen."³¹

By the late 1860's, however, there were new influences urging the development of representative institutions, and specifically envisioning the creation of a chamber of deputies of some sort. Among these were parliamentary examples within the Ottoman Empire itself: in the United Principalities, which had now in effect become Rumania; in Egypt, where a "constitution" had been issued in 1866; in Tunis, with its constitutional experiment of 1861 to 1864. Perhaps Napoleon III's "liberal empire" of the later 1860's had influence. There were also voices of critics of the *Tanzimat* regime. Some of these critics who had held high office, like Mustafa Fazıl Paşa, Halil Şerif Paşa, and Tunuslu Hayreddin Paşa, wrote political treatises which advocated some sort of a representative chamber as a curb on autocratic government.³² The most effective of these critics were the New Ottomans, who in their newspapers and from their places of exile began similarly to advocate a representative assembly. Undoubtedly the ablest of them was Namık Kemal, who supported the doctrine of popular sovereignty and argued for a *meclis-i şura-i ümmet*—a national assembly.³³ He argued also that Islam offered the necessary basis on which to build, though he drew on French and English examples. Interesting as it is to try to follow the convolutions of thought of the individualistic New Ottomans, this is not possible here.³⁴ The point is that, in their view, the institutions already in existence that embodied the representative principle had not gone far enough, had not proved effective, or were simply a coating of whitewash for an autocratic regime.

By the 1870's a growing dissatisfaction with the spendthrift and rather capricious personal government of Sultan Abdülaziz, coupled with a concern about lack of effective resistance to European, especially Russian and pan-

Slav, pressures, gave new impetus to planning for representative government on the part of a few statesmen. One plan went off at a tangent, in an effort to hold the empire together. This was the proposal advanced by Midhat Paşa and Halil Şerif Paşa in 1872 that the Ottoman Empire should become federalized like the new German Empire, the initial objective being to stop the progress of Rumania and Serbia toward independence. Strong opposition by these vassal states and Russia ended flirtation with the plan. Had it gone far enough, it might have resulted in representation of states on a federal council, after the German model.³³

The other plan looked to the creation of some sort of chamber of deputies. When it was first discussed in secret among a few Ottoman ministers, in 1873, it did not get far. But the idea grew more attractive, particularly after the inability of the government to deal effectively with the Balkan revolts of 1875 became apparent. Amid the growing discontent with the government, more people turned to the idea of a parliament as a remedy, although frequently they did not understand what a parliament was. The most enlightened, however, did, including some genuine conservatives. A symbol of this discontent was the Manifesto of the Muslim patriots, issued anonymously in March, 1876. It argued that the cure for financial irresponsibility, for autocratic government, and for European pressure and intervention was a consultative assembly which might begin with limited powers, but which might eventually grow to be somewhat like the English parliament. The assembly should represent all races and creeds in the empire.³⁶

The culmination of the agitation came in the same year with the deposition of two sultans and the initiation of a process of working out a constitution. This process, which consumed more than half a year, with interruptions, naturally provoked much debate over the nature of representation. The basic decisions were three: that there should be a chamber of deputies; that all members of the chamber should be elected, one deputy for each 50,000 males, rather than in part appointed (though the senate members were to be appointed); and that each member of the chamber was to consider himself as representative of all Ottomans, not only of his electoral district and, by implication, not only of his own sect. In the process, the point was won that all Ottoman subjects were to be represented, not Muslims only. Argument on this became crucial on two occasions, but each time the proponents of an all-Muslim assembly were beaten down.³⁷ This was underscored by the provision decided upon and written into the constitution, that all Ottoman subjects were to be styled "Osmanlı" and were to be equal before the law and equally admissible to public office. Only once in the constitution was the *millet* distinction retained, and this was in a provision for elected councils of each religious community in the *kaza* to care for charitable funds. The constitution was promulgated on December 23, 1876. It makes a significant transition in the history of the devel-

opment of the representative principle from a corporate or *millet* to an individual base.

The transition was not, however, at once complete. In order to convene a chamber of deputies as soon as possible, and so try to ward off imminent European intervention, a provisional electoral law was drawn up by the constitution-drafting committee even before the constitution itself was complete. The provisional electoral law was based on the *vilayet* law. Members of the administrative councils in the *vilayets*, *sancaks*, and *kazas*—themselves chosen on a *millet* basis—were to serve as electors for the deputies. The Porte was to allocate a proper number of deputies to each *vilayet*, whose governor would decide how to divide the quota between Muslims and non-Muslims. So the members of both the first and second sessions of the chamber that met in Istanbul in 1877–78 were elected as corporate representatives.³⁸

Steps were taken to change this situation when the first chamber met. One of the bills it debated and passed was a new electoral law which did not take religion into consideration. Christian deputies tried to amend the bill by specifying a fixed ratio of Muslim and non-Muslim deputies, but the motion failed.³⁹ Sultan Abdülhamid did not at once promulgate this new electoral law, and in view of his suspension of the chamber for thirty years, his failure to do so turned out to be of no immediate importance. But the new law, and with it the individual base for the representative principle, triumphed in the end. The law was resurrected and used in 1908. With amendments, it was used for elections throughout the Young Turk period thereafter, and for all elections under the Turkish Republic through 1939.

The constitution of 1876 did not, of course, bring into existence representative government as that term is usually understood in the West today. Under that constitution the sultan retained such broad powers as to continue to be sovereign; the people, though they had representatives in the chamber, were not. Ministers were not responsible to the elected chamber, but to the sultan alone. These plain truths should not, however, lead one to underestimate the importance of the constitution and of the chamber that met under its terms. Constitution and chamber represented an important step in the process whereby People might ultimately constitute a balance against Palace and Porte. The chambers of 1877 and 1878 proved this. Despite the peculiarities and official pressures in the elections in many districts, the deputies who were chosen exhibited an amazing degree of independent thought and constructive criticism of government. Their debates were for the most part on a high plane. The individual deputies only occasionally spoke as Christians or Muslims; in general they spoke as representatives of Ottoman interests. The experiment in representation was, in fact, so successful that Sultan Abdülhamid, whose ideas on proper government ran in a different channel, felt obliged to close the parliament down.⁴⁰

It is possible for a cynical realist to take the viewpoint that all this experimentation with the representative principle was a sham and to maintain further that the true needs of the Ottoman Empire were justice, efficient administration, and economic prosperity. This was the view of many conservative Turks, including enlightened ones like Ahmed Vefik Paşa, in the nineteenth century. It was also a view often expressed by Westerners. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, the British ambassador in Istanbul, told a young subordinate of his in 1855: "Above all, avoid those [Turks] who praise European systems of government, European ideas, European laws or customs. No *honest* Turk will ever pretend to admire any of these. If ever Easterns get imbued with Liberal ideas of government their own doom is sealed. . . ." ⁴¹ There is enough truth in such views to make them appealing. But it is also true that representation and other forms of progress are not necessarily mutually exclusive; that imperfections in representative systems have not throughout history been characteristic of Eastern peoples alone; and that states do not develop their institutions from theoretical blueprints but by a process of growth as opportunities arise and leadership is available. Despite its many imperfections, the representative principle seems to have taken root in Turkey in the nineteenth century and to have been capable of growth thereafter. The parliament of 1877–78 was an important milestone in this process, and it had precedents to build on that extended back at least to 1840.

Notes

1. See the discussion in R. E. Ward and D. A. Rustow, *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (Princeton, 1964), especially the introduction and the conclusion.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

4. A. D. Alderson, *The Structure of the Ottoman Dynasty* (Oxford, 1956), p. 8.

5. Cf. Halil İnalçık, "Sened-i İttifak ve Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayûnü," *Belleten* 28:112 (Ekim, 1964), pp. 604–9; İnalçık, "The Nature of Traditional Society: Turkey," in Ward and Rustow, *Political Modernization*, pp. 51–54; Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal, 1964), pp. 90–91. See also Bernard Lewis' review of Berkes' book in *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, vol. 29, pt. 2 (1966), pp. 384–87, and remarks there about consultation.

6. J. H. Abdolonyme Ubicini, *Letters on Turkey*, tr. Lady Easthope (London, 1856), 1:57, 132.

7. Leon Ostrorog, *The Angora Reform* (London, 1927), pp. 37–49, emphasizes this Turkish independence of the *şariat*.

8. İnalçık, in Ward and Rustow, *Political Modernization*, p. 47.

9. Cf. Albert Hourani, "The Decline of the West in the Middle East," in Richard

Nolte, ed., *The Modern Middle East* (New York, 1963), p. 37: ". . . the constitution of 1876 brought in the idea of representative government."

10. Nicholas Milev, "Réchid pacha et la réforme ottomane," *Zeitschrift für Ost-europäische Geschichte*, 2 (1922): 389; F. E. Bailey, *British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement* (Cambridge, Mass., 1942), p. 275.

11. English translation of the text is in J. C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East* (Princeton, 1956), I: 113-16.

12. Text of the Council's procedural statute in Friedrich Wilhelm von Reden, *Die Türkei und Griechenland in ihrer Entwicklungsfähigkeiten* (Frankfurt a.M., 1856), pp. 288-90.

13. Texts in Halil İnalçık, "Tanzimat'ın uygulanması ve sosyal tepkileri," *Belleten*, 28: 112 (Ekim, 1964), pp. 660-71; Reşat Kaynar, *Mustafa Reşit Paşa ve Tanzimat* (Ankara, 1954), pp. 226-34.

14. İnalçık, "Tanzimat'ın uygulanması," pp. 625-27, 633-36, gives further description and evaluation of these councils. In actual practice the total number of council members seems to have varied widely, as well as the distribution of members among various *millets*. In Syria, Moshe Ma'oz has found that council membership sometimes reached fifteen or more, and that non-Muslim members were sometimes excluded: "Syrian Urban Politics in the Tanzimat Period Between 1840 and 1861," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, vol. 29, pt. 2 (1966), pp. 283-84, 291-92. Stanford Shaw has kindly communicated preliminary results of a study of archival documents and contemporary newspapers which show that there were often fewer than thirteen members except in provincial capitals, with varying distribution among *millets* and between officials and nonofficial Muslims; in smaller centers the membership might vary from three to six, depending on the number of *millets* in the region.

15. From 1834 on, internal authority in Samos resided in "a Council composed of members chosen, according to custom, from among the notables of the region." Grégoire Aristarchi Bey, *Législation ottomane* (Constantinople, 1873-88), 2: 145-46.

16. M. Sabry, *L'Empire égyptien sous Mohamed-Ali et la question d'Orient (1811-49)* (Paris, 1930), pp. 346, 398.

17. İnalçık, "Tanzimat'ın uygulanması," p. 627.

18. Recai G. Okandan, *Umumî âhme hukukumuzun ana hatları* (Istanbul, 1948), I: 72-73; Ubicini, *Letters*, I: 321-22.

19. Communication from professor Shaw, who states also that the reports drawn up by the assembly in Istanbul had considerable effect on regulations issued thereafter concerning agriculture and public works.

The *ferman* of Sefer 17, 1261 (February 25, 1845) which convoked this assembly is referred to by Ubicini (*Letters*, I: 321) in terms that imply that each province was to send one Muslim and one non-Muslim delegate, indicating that the corporate or *millet* principle of representation was followed. According to Professor Shaw the Balkan delegations were in fact composed in this manner, but it is not clear that other delegations were so chosen. I have not seen the text of the *ferman*.

20. Text in English in Hurewitz, *Diplomacy*, 1: 149–53.
21. The Tanzimat Council, created in 1854, had assumed the legislative function.
22. Cevdet Paşa, *Tezâkir 1–12*, ed. Cavid Baysun (Ankara, 1953), p. 177; Y. G. Çark, *Türk devleti hizmetinde Ermeniler, 1453–1953* (Istanbul, 1953), p. 69.
23. Sommerville Story, ed. *The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey* (London, 1920), p. 254.
24. Mithat Cemal Kuntay, *Namuk Kemal* (Istanbul, 1944–56), 1: 185, quoting his “Answer to the Gazette du Levant” of 1867.
25. On the whole question of *millet* reform and its effects, see R. H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856–1876* (Princeton, 1963), pp. 114–35.
26. See, for example, on the situation in Nish, Ricketts to Longworth, August 11, 1860. Great Britain, House of Commons, *Sessional Papers, Accounts and Papers* (1861), vol. 67, no. 16, encl. 2.
27. Text of the law in Aristarchi, *Législation ottomane*, 2: 273–95. It is interesting to compare this with the Lebanese statute of 1864, which of course involved greater sectarian complexity, *ibid.*, pp. 204–10. I do not know what influence, if any, the Lebanese statutes of 1861 and 1864 may have had on the Ottoman *vilayet* law, though one suspects there may have been some through Fuad Paşa, who was concerned with both.
28. Ahmed Rasim, *İstibdaddan hakimiyeti milliyeye* (Istanbul, 1342), 2: 73–74. Ali Fuad, *Rical-i mühimme-i siyasiye* (Istanbul, 1938), p. 173. The statement by Midhat is in Ali Haydar Midhat, *Tabsira-i ibret* (Istanbul, 1325), p. 23.
29. Text of the law in Aristarchi, *Législation ottomane*, 2: 38–41. I have seen no records indicating whether the *vilayet* delegates actually came or not.
30. Charles Mismar, *Souvenirs du monde musulman* (Paris, 1892), p. 20. Mismar was for a time secretary to Âli Paşa.
31. Ahmed Midhat, *Üss-i inkılâp* (Istanbul, 1294–95), 1: 107.
32. [Mustafa Fazıl], *Lettre adressée à Sa Majesté le Sultan* (Paris, 1867); Le Général Khérédine, *Réformes nécessaires aux états musulmans* (Paris, 1868). Halil Şerif’s treatise may not have been published; it is described in Edouard Engelhardt, *La Turquie et le Tanzimat* (Paris, 1882–84), 1: 231.
33. İhsan Sungu, “Tanzimat ve Yeni Osmanlılar,” *Tanzimat I* (Istanbul, 1940) p. 847.
34. On their views, see especially Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought* (Princeton, 1962).
35. On the federalization scheme, see Davison, *Reform*, pp. 290–91. The third quarter of the nineteenth century produced in Europe a good many schemes for federal organization in this area or that, and some of the sultan’s Balkan subjects, especially Bulgars, had worked out and proposed plans of this sort.
36. Published in *Stamboul*, June 2, 1876. Midhat is suspected to be the principal author.
37. On one occasion a statesman who proposed an English-type parliament of

Muslims only was accused by the grand vezir, who at that point wanted no constitution at all, of being a Red ("Rouge") like other constitutionalists (Süleyman Paşa, *Hiss-i inkılâp* [Istanbul, 1326]. p. 62).

38. Robert Devereux, *The First Ottoman Constitutional Period* (Baltimore, 1963), pp. 124–25.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 201.

40. On the debates, see the reconstructed reports by Hakkı Tarık Us, *Meclis-i meb'usan, 1293/1877 zabut ceridesi* (Istanbul, 1940–54), 2 vols. Devereux, *The First Ottoman Constitutional Period*, analyzes some of the debates.

41. Edmund Hornby, *Autobiography* (London, 1928), p. 74.

Added Note: Additional light on aspects of Ottoman governmental machinery and the principle of representation is in some of the work of Stanford J. Shaw, "The Central Legislative Councils in the Nineteenth Century Ottoman Reform Movement Before 1876," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 1 (1970): 51–84, and "The Origins of Representative Government in the Ottoman Empire: The Provincial Representative Councils, 1839–1876," pp. 53–142, in R. Bayly Winder, ed., *Near Eastern Round Table, 1967–1968* (New York, 1969). Some of the same information appears in the second volume of Stanford J. and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey* (Cambridge, 1976–1977).

7. Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century

Every modern society has been faced with problems arising from inequalities among the various groups of which it is composed, particularly since the eighteenth-century proclamation in America that "all men are created equal," and the elaboration in France of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen. The differences which produced inequality have been various—economic, social, racial, linguistic, religious, political—and variously intertwined. In the Near East until very recent times the major boundary lines between groups, and therefore the principal barriers to a homogeneous society of equals, have been religious. Although today social and economic disparities in Near Eastern society have vastly increased as modern technology and finance have provided greater opportunities for getting and spending, and although nationalist rivalries now challenge the primacy of religious rivalries, it is still often true that religion is the dividing line, and that a man's creed is his distinguishing mark.

In the Ottoman empire of the early nineteenth century his religion provided a man's label, both in his own conceptual scheme and in the eyes of his neighbors and his governors. He was a Muslim, Greek Orthodox, Gregorian Armenian, Jew, Catholic, or Protestant before he was a Turk or Arab, a Greek or Bulgar, in the national sense, and also before he felt himself an Ottoman citizen. The Ottoman government, by granting official recognition to these *millet's*, as the religious communities were called, had preserved and even emphasized the religious distinctions. The empire itself was governed by Muslims; its law was based on the religious law of Islam. But within this empire the several Christian communities and the Jewish community enjoyed a partial autonomy, whereby the ecclesiastical hierarchy which administered the *millet* supervised not only the religious, educational, and charitable affairs of its flock; it controlled also such matters of personal status as marriage, divorce, and inheritance, and it collected some taxes. This mosaic pattern, in which a Christian and a Muslim living side by side in the same state under the same sovereign were subject to different law and different officials, had served the Ottoman empire well for four centuries. In the Near East law was still, as it had formerly been in the West also, personal rather than territorial.

The semiautonomy of the Christian *millet's* did not, however, mean com-

plete equality among the subjects of the empire. The Muslim *millet* was dominant. This did not lead to any systematic persecution of Christians by Muslims, nor to any systematic oppression of Christians by the Ottoman government. Indeed, inefficient or corrupt and extortionate government in the empire often bore more heavily on Muslim Turks and Arabs than it did on Christians. Pasha and tax-farmer alike found the piastres they could squeeze from Muslims just as sound as Christian money and did not vary their harshness or their methods with the religion of the victim. Despite all this, it was still incontestable that Christians were looked down upon as second-class citizens both by the Muslim public and by the government. They suffered unequal treatment in various ways. Their dress was distinctive, and if Christian or Jew wore the fez he was required to sew on it a strip of black ribbon or cloth, not to be concealed by the tassel. Sometimes the unequal treatment was in purely ecclesiastical matters, as for example on those occasions when the Sublime Porte denied permits to one of the Christian sects for the repair of churches. One aspect of religious inequality was particularly galling, though it arose infrequently as a concrete issue—Christians could not so easily make converts from among the Muslims as could Muslims from among the Christians, since Islamic law demanded that apostasy be punished by death. In addition, the Christians suffered certain specific disabilities in public life. They were, for example, denied opportunity for appointment to the highest administrative posts; they could not serve in the armed forces but had to pay an exemption tax; Christian evidence was discounted in a Muslim court of law. Neither the concept nor the practice of citizenship, involving equal rights and duties, existed in the Ottoman Empire before the nineteenth century.¹

After 1800, the attention of the Ottoman government was forcibly directed toward the question of equality in several ways. First, as Christian groups in the empire absorbed Western ideas of liberty and nationality, and as education and literacy increased among them, they complained more frequently and loudly about the lack of equality. Second, they found ready hearers among the several great powers who traditionally acted as protectors of Christians in the Near East and who, for mixed motives of humanitarianism and power politics, magnified the volume of these complaints in the Sublime Porte's ear and pressed for changes. Third, Ottoman statesmen who were concerned to check the territorial disintegration of the empire, and its internal decline, embarked on a program of reorganization and incipient westernization which inevitably brought them up against the same problem of equality as they moved to adopt or adapt elements of the Western state's political pattern. The question of the equality of Christian, Muslim, and Jew was by no means the major question faced by these statesmen, but it ran like a thread through many phases of the larger problem of Ottoman reform and westernization. Should Christians be given equal opportunity as students in the schools to be established in a reformed educational system? Should they be allowed to serve in a rejuvenated

army? Should they be admitted to the highest administrative posts as the bureaucracy was improved? Should the contemplated revisions and codifications of law apply equally to Christian and Muslim? And, if any sort of representative government were established, whether on a provincial scale or in the form of a constitutional monarchy, should Christians be represented, and how?

It is, therefore, one of the most significant aspects of Ottoman history in the nineteenth century that the doctrine of equality did, in fact, become official policy. Sultan Mahmud II (1808–1839), who took some crucial steps toward reform in his own vigorous way, frequently made it plain that in his view all his subjects, of whatever creed, were equal.² But it was during the Tanzimat period of 1839 to 1876, a new era in Ottoman efforts at reform and westernization, that the doctrine of the equality of Christian and Muslim was proclaimed in the most solemn manner and came to play a prominent role in the central question of Ottoman revival.³

I

An imperial edict of reforms, the Hatt-i Sherif of Gülhane, opened the new era on November 3, 1839.⁴ After public proclamation before an impressive assembly of diplomats and Ottoman notables, the edict was sworn to by the young sultan Abdul Medjid [Abdülmejid] and his high officials in the room where the mantle of the prophet Muhammad was preserved. Much of the Hatt-i Sherif had a profoundly Muslim ring. It laid the decline of the empire directly to the nonobservance of "the precepts of the glorious Kuran. In the next breath it then attempted to reconcile Muslim tradition and progress, promising new institutions which should not contravene Muslim law but should conform to its demands. Security of life, honor, and property was guaranteed, along with reforms in taxing and conscription methods. But the Hatt-i Sherif was most remarkable neither for its Muslim overtones, for its promises of "life, liberty, and property," nor for its pledge to correct specific evils, though all this was important. The most novel aspect of the *hatt* arose from its official declaration of equality. "These imperial concessions," affirmed Abdul Medjid in his edict, "are extended to all our subjects, of whatever religion or sect they may be."

The new policy was confirmed in a more extensive Hatt-i Humayun of 1856, which promised equal treatment for adherents of all creeds in such specific matters as educational opportunity, appointment to government posts, and the administration of justice, as well as in taxation and military service.⁵ An interesting antidefamation clause was included also, forbidding "every distinction or designation tending to make any class whatever of the subjects of my Empire inferior to another class, on account of their religion, language, or race." Legal action would ensue against anyone, whether public official or private individual, who used "any injurious or offensive term." Even name-calling was forbidden in the name of equality.

At frequent intervals the theme was restated, with variations. The next sultan, Abdul Aziz [Abdülaziz], opened his new Council of State [Şûray-ı Devlet] in 1868 with a speech which referred to adherents of all creeds as “children of the same fatherland.”⁶ His successor, Murad V, echoed these sentiments in his first *hatt*.⁷ The trend culminated in December, 1876, with the promulgation of the first written constitution in Ottoman history, establishing a limited monarchy all of whose subjects were considered “Osmanli, whatever religion or creed they hold.” The constitution further affirmed that “all Osmanli are equal before the law . . . without distinction as to religion.”⁸

From 1839 to 1876 many efforts—some valiant, some half-hearted, some merely for the record; some spontaneous, some under diplomatic pressure—were made by the Ottoman government to translate the promises of equality into fact. The sultan in 1844 engaged not to enforce the death penalty for apostasy from Islam. Some Christians were appointed, and some later were elected, to local advisory councils [*meclisler*] established in each province, and also to the Grand Council of State [*Meclis-i Vâlâ-yı Ahkâm-ı Adliye*] in 1856. Christians and Muslims were accepted together as students in the newly established imperial *lycée* of Galata Saray in 1867. These and many other measures did something to raise the status of the non-Muslims of the empire, but the advance was slow and piecemeal. No genuine equality was ever attained.

Many European writers of the time, and many Western historians since, have dealt with the Tanzimat period, and the equality question that ran through it, in one of two ways. Some look on it from the outside as a phase of the Eastern Question, during which European diplomats in the service of their own national interests had constantly to prod the Ottoman government to live up to its professions of reform and equality, and to carry them out in a French, Russian, or English fashion. Others consider it primarily as a phase of the long-continued internal decay of the empire, when all efforts to restore the “sick man” to health were unavailing. In either case, most writers have assumed the inability or the unwillingness of the Turks to carry out any significant change. Measuring achievement against promise, they have frequently concluded that the Ottoman statesmen either publicly professed what they did not believe or publicly promised what they knew they could not effect. Such viewpoints, together with the abundant evidence of partial successes, failures, and sins of omission in the Ottoman reform efforts, have often led to the judgment that the promises, particularly the promise of equality, were largely hypocrisy—dust to throw in the eyes of the West, to ward off foreign intervention in favor of the subject peoples of the empire, and to blind observers to the continuance of an oppressive Turkish rule over downtrodden Christians.⁹

Careful reassessment of the Tanzimat period is likely to show that such views are based on an inadequate understanding of the aims of the Ottoman statesmen, of the results actually obtained, and of the formidable obstacles

to progress and equality. There is need for more penetrating investigation and analysis of the Tanzimat period than has yet been undertaken either by Turkish or Western historians.¹⁰ Among the subjects demanding attention is that of Turkish attitudes on the various phases of reform. An inquiry into the attitudes of Turkish statesmen and people on the subject of Muslim-Christian equality can help to explain what changes the then climate of opinion might or might not accept and why the official program of equality was only partly realized. A complete explanation would of course involve all aspects of the reform question. It would involve also a reconsideration of the degree and nature of Ottoman lag behind European civilization, of the impediments which great-power diplomacy offered to Ottoman reform, and of the situation of multinational empires in an age of clamoring nationalisms. But Turkish attitudes were obviously among the most important forces at work in this period. Some useful indications can be given in answer to three crucial questions: what in reality were the attitudes of leading Ottoman statesmen toward these promises of equality? what traditions and what experience shaped the basic attitudes of Turks toward Christians, a century ago? and what attitudes were then current among them on the proclamation of Christian equality with Muslims?

II

Four Ottoman statesmen initiated and carried through most of the reform measures in this period—Reshid, Ali, Fuad, and Midhat.¹¹ Each was grand vizier [*sadr-azam*] at least twice, and each occupied high public office throughout most of his adult life. As individuals they were completely different, and often rivals for power. But they were alike in their lack of bigotry and fanaticism.¹² Each had a fair acquaintance with Western political ideas and practices, and with some phases of European life and culture, though Ali was less “Europeanized” than the others in his manner of life and of speech. Each of the four, in his struggles with the administration of the unwieldy empire, came to believe that a degree of westernization was necessary to strengthen the empire. They agreed, further, that this process of reform demanded that all subjects of the empire be treated alike, regardless of creed. They differed as to how fast and by what measures the goal of equality might be reached. Often they waited to be pushed by events. Midhat, who had the greatest energy but the least finesse of the four Tanzimat statesmen, was the most inclined to brush aside legitimate doubts and the cautions born of experience, and to shoulder his way ahead against general prejudices.

It is quite true, as their Western critics charged, that the Tanzimat statesmen used some of the great declarations involving the principle of equality as weapons of diplomacy in times of international crisis, and not solely as programs for domestic reform. The Hatt-i Sherif of 1839 was proclaimed at a time when Muhammad Ali of Egypt threatened the empire’s integrity and when

the Ottoman government sorely needed the European support which such a promise of reform might help to secure. The Hatt-i Humayun of 1856 was issued under diplomatic pressure as a means of avoiding foreign supervision of Ottoman reform after the Crimean War. Again, the constitution of 1876 was announced dramatically just as a conference of European diplomats got under way in Constantinople to draw up a reform program for parts of the empire. Midhat, who was both the principal author of the constitution and grand vizier at the moment, used his constitution to thwart foreign intervention by proclaiming that the empire was already reforming itself in fundamental fashion. But specific crises alone did not dictate the content of reform promises or the views of the Ottoman statesmen, although they often dictated the time and manner of proclamation. Sometimes, as in 1876, crisis facilitated reform, since at other less turbulent periods there might be more objection from the sultan, from other ministers, or from the public, on the score that no such radical measures were warranted. Crisis, therefore, helped to crystallize and precipitate reform projects already considered by responsible viziers, and also to induce a readier reception. The impact of crises on the Tanzimat statesmen was also, naturally, a strong influence on their attitudes toward equality, but their attitudes did not then fluctuate constantly.

Ali was the most conservative Muslim of the four and cautious in moving ahead with reform measures. His views, therefore, are probably the most significant gauge of the advance of attitudes among leading statesmen on Muslim-Christian equality. Ali believed firmly that the Ottoman Turk was best fitted to govern the conglomeration of peoples in the empire.¹³ He believed further that the prestige of this government rested on the prestige of Islam, against which he would allow no propaganda, though he was quite willing that Christians should enjoy freedom of belief and worship.¹⁴ But under the pressure of events, including both the rebellions of native Christians and the interventions of the great powers, Ali's views on the status of Christians changed slowly. In 1867, when he was dealing with the rebellion in Crete, Ali wrote for the Sublime Porte a remarkable memorandum recommending a speedier application of the policy of equality. The Christians would cease to be revolutionaries, said Ali, as their hopes were fulfilled. Therefore they must be given every opportunity for education and tenure of public office, for which they were well fitted, even better prepared than Muslims generally at the moment. The Christians would then no longer regard themselves as held in subjection by a Muslim state but as subjects of a monarch who protected all equally. "In short," concluded Ali, "the fusion of all subjects . . . with the exception of purely religious affairs . . . is the only means."¹⁵ There is no reason to question Ali's sincerity here, though it is obvious that he was pushed to his conclusions by the rush of events and not by thinking in a vacuum about the virtues of equality.

The other three statesmen came more easily to such opinions. Reshid was

certainly influenced by a desire for praise for his liberal views from European courts but was apparently convinced that reforms which should guarantee equality to all peoples of the empire would ensure their devotion to the Ottoman government.¹⁶ Fuad expressed in a private memorandum his belief that the grant of liberties to the non-Muslim peoples of the empire would dull their nationalist and separatist enthusiasms.¹⁷ Midhat had as a provincial governor in Bulgaria (the Tuna or Danube *vilayet*) shown that he believed in treating Christians and Muslims on an equal basis, while at the same time he suppressed ruthlessly any separatist or revolutionary moves among the Bulgars. He continued to maintain, even after his political star sank in Abdul Hamid II's reign, that the chaotic condition of the empire could be remedied only by a rule of law under which Christians were brought to complete equality with Muslims.¹⁸

What the four Tanzimat statesmen believed boiled down to this—that to save the empire, a new egalitarian citizenship and concept of patriotism, *Osmanlilik* or “Ottomanism,” had to be created. Sometimes they expressed this as the “fusion,” sometimes as the “brotherhood” of all Ottoman subjects. Official documents began to speak more of “imperial subjects,” “subjects of the Sultanate,” and “subjects of the Exalted [Ottoman] state,” in a composite or collective sense, as if to convey a concept of Ottoman citizenship unbroken by *millet* boundaries.¹⁹ The idea of patriotism, or “compatriotism,” was also expressed in the Hatt-i Humayun of 1856.²⁰ Though the statesmen knew that the concept of *Osmanlilik* was a break with the past, it is hard to say whether they fully realized what a tremendous revolution in traditional views was involved here, and what the logical outcome would be. They were not consciously trying to undermine the dominant position of the Muslim Turk. Yet by fostering an egalitarian citizenship, and by attempting to blur the demarcation lines between *millet*'s, they were taking a significant step on the road to a purely secular concept of state and citizenship. A nationality law of 1869, intended to combat the evils of the foreign protection of native Ottoman subjects, had also the effect of putting the acquisition and retention of citizenship on a purely territorial basis, unconnected with religion.²¹ When the 1876 constitution specified that all peoples of the empire were to be called Osmanli, the unspoken corollary ran that henceforth their primary allegiance was to the state, and only secondarily were they Muslim, Jew, or Greek.

With this program of *Osmanlilik*, which would swallow up the narrower concept of Christian equality with Muslims, the Tanzimat statesmen sought to promote reform, fend off the powers, and forestall rebellion. They knew that reform measures would be hard to put across. “*L'on ne saurait improviser la réforme des mœurs*,” said Fuad in 1867, explaining to the European powers why more had not been accomplished in the way of reform since the Hatt-i Humayun of 1856.²² But in the view of the statesmen, Ottomanism was necessary for the salvation of the empire. They wanted to regain a viable and com-

petitive status in a world increasingly ordered by European power and civilization and to prevent the Balkan provinces and Egypt, in particular, from breaking away. Like Winston Churchill, none of them took office in order to preside over the liquidation of empire. Because this was a self-interested version of the doctrine of equality, it was no less honestly meant by its proponents. They are open to criticism not so much on the grounds of hypocrisy as because they failed to understand the driving force of the nationalistic spirit which at this very period was growing stronger among the Greeks, Serbs, and Rumanians of the empire and beginning also to infect Bulgars and Armenians. Because the virulent forms of modern nationalism were not fully comprehensible to them, the Tanzimat statesmen tended to regard such movements as discontent with local conditions, or the product of foreign agitators, or plain insolent rebellion.

One might proceed from this point to argue that the program of equality between Christian and Muslim in the empire remained largely unrealized not because of bad faith on the part of leading Ottoman statesmen but because many of the Christians wanted it to fail. The demand in Crete was basically for autonomy or union with Greece, not for equality. Other Greeks in the empire wanted the same thing. In 1862, for instance, five thousand of them held a banquet on the Bosphorus, agitating for the extension of Greek rule to Macedonia and Thessaly.²³ Serbs wanted not equality but union with the autonomous principality of Serbia. Serbia and Rumania, still within the empire, wanted no sort of equality but national independence. When Midhat Pasha in 1872 began work on a scheme of converting the Ottoman Empire into a federal state like Bismarck's new Germany, with Rumania and Serbia playing Bavaria and Württemberg to the Porte's Prussia, he got a blunt rebuff from them.²⁴ They were not interested even in a sort of corporate equality within the empire.

The ecclesiastical hierarchies that ruled the Christian *millet's* also opposed equality. *Osmanlılık* would both decrease their authority and lighten their purses. This was especially true of the Greek Orthodox hierarchy, which had the most extensive prerogatives and by far the largest flock. When the Hatt-i Sherif was solemnly read in 1839 and then put back into its red satin pouch it is reported that the Greek orthodox patriarch, who was present among the notables, said, "*Inşallah*—God grant that it not be taken out of this bag again."²⁵ In short, the doctrine of equality faced formidable opposition from Christians of the empire who were leaders in the churches and the nationalist movements. Ottoman brotherhood was only a remote possibility, if the Christians continued in these directions.

But equality and brotherhood had also to contend with the fundamental Turkish view of Christians. Not only the specific reactions of the Muslim Turks to the proclamations of equality but their basic attitudes toward Christians showed from the beginning that *Osmanlılık* would have hard sledding.

III

If there were a possibility that Muslim Turks could accept an Ottoman fusion in which Christians were their equals, it would be owing to two strong currents in their religious tradition and development. As Muslims, the Turks inherited an attitude of toleration for "peoples of the book" [*ehl-i kitap*]²⁵—those who, like Christians and Jews, possessed a book of divine revelation and paid tribute to the Muslim government. At various times the Ottoman government had offered sanctuary to non-Muslims, notably in the sixteenth century to the Jews driven from Spain. A Turk was likely to say to a Christian that "your faith is a faith, and my faith is a faith."

The tolerant attitude was often reinforced among the people by the remarkable degree of religious syncretism which had existed in Anatolia, and also in the Balkans, since the earliest days of Turkish penetration. The racial mixtures of the Ottoman Empire had been accompanied by religious mixtures of all sorts. Folk-Islam among the Turks was unorthodox in many ways, bearing marks not only of Shiite mysticism but of belief in various Christian miracle stories, saints, and shrines. The widespread Bektashi order, which claimed some seven million adherents, embodied in its beliefs many heterodox notions and helped to provide a climate which might be sympathetic to Christianity and Christians. During the Tanzimat period, American missionaries at work in the Ottoman empire were occasionally excited to discover what they at first thought might be a fertile field for their evangelism—groups of Muslims who read the Christian scriptures or heard Christ preached by their leaders. Some of these were Bektashi. Once such group, not specifically Bektashi, was reported to have 10,000 adherents and twice that number of sympathizers.²⁶

Despite the toleration and the syncretism, however, there remained among the Turks an intense Muslim feeling which could sometimes burst into open fanaticism. Such outbursts characteristically came at times of political crisis, particularly in the 1870's, when the internal chaos in the empire, and the external pressures on it, produced a distinct Muslim reaction, the counterpart of what later would have been a nationalist reaction. More important than the possibility of fanatic outbursts, however, was the innate attitude of superiority which the Muslim Turk possessed. Islam was for him the true religion. Christianity was only a partial revelation of the truth, which Muhammad finally revealed in full; therefore Christians were not equal to Muslims in possession of truth. Islam was not only a way of worship, it was a way of life as well. It prescribed man's relations to man, as well as to God, and was the basis for society, for law, and for government. Christians therefore were inevitably considered second-class citizens in the light of religious revelation—as well as by reason of the plain fact that they had been conquered by the Ottomans. This whole Muslim outlook was often summed up in the common term *gâvur* (or *kâfir*), which meant "unbeliever" or "infidel," with emotional and quite

uncomplimentary overtones. To associate closely or on terms of equality with the *gâvur* was dubious at best. "Familiar association with heathens and infidels is forbidden to the people of Islam," said Asim, an early nineteenth-century historian, "and friendly and intimate intercourse between two parties that are to one another as darkness and light is far from desirable."²⁷

Islam embodied also a strong prejudice against innovation [*bid'at*]. A declaration of equality might encounter this prejudice not only among Muslim theologians but among the ruling group of the empire who traditionally served faith and state, not state alone. And to the popular mind the promotion of second-class citizens to equal status would undoubtedly be innovation, even if considered only against the background of popular conservatism, rather than as the sort of innovation proscribed by Islam. The whole reform program of the Tanzimat period inevitably ran up against these two intermingled conservatisms of inertia and Islam. Not only that, but the trend of the Tanzimat toward new institutions carried a profound psychological shock in its implication that the traditional Ottoman way of life was not in all respects the best, and that in Christian Europe some things were done better. Imponderables like these confronted the doctrine of Muslim-Christian equality.

Attitudes from their Muslim and Ottoman past were strengthened by the Turks' reactions to the recent impact of Christians on Ottoman life and affairs. The impact seemed generally bad. The Christians of the empire made constant trouble with their sectarian squabbles, whether argument over privileges in the Holy Places, the question of whether Bulgars should be subject to the Greek hierarchy, or the Hassounist controversy over papal authority among the Catholic Armenians. Some Christians made trouble by shifting from one *millet* to another in search of political advantage and foreign protection. The Christian sectarian quarrels were not only unedifying to the Muslims; they were positive nuisances to the Porte and offered in addition excuses for great power intervention.

The other general experience which Muslim Turks had of native Christians was that increasingly the latter tended to become rebels against legitimate authority. It is true that many Turkish and Arab lords had defied central authority, but the matter was not quite the same in Muslim eyes. Turkish *derebey*'s, or "lords of the valley," had governed various districts without regard to the Porte's decrees, but many were benevolent despots who held the esteem of their subjects and whose downfall at the hands of Mahmud II was often regretted. Muhammad Ali of Egypt was a rebel, but he was a Muslim, and many Turks had thought of him as a possible saviour from the infidel ideas of the reform edict of 1839.²⁸ Christian rebellion, on the other hand, antagonized Muslim sentiment and eventually provoked among some Turks a reaction which was Ottoman and patriotic but would later become Turkish and nationalist. The events of 1867, for example, when Crete was in revolt and when the last Turkish garrison was forced to withdraw from Belgrade, aroused some

Turks to a pitch of frenzy.²⁹ Their anger mounted both against the rebel Christians and against the weakness of the Ottoman government in dealing with rebellion. A similar reaction was natural in the critical years 1875–76, when uprisings in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria were followed by open war against the sultan by two of his vassal states, Serbia and Montenegro.

The continuous interference of the great powers of Europe in Ottoman affairs also angered the Turks. These powers were all, of course, Christian by profession, if not in conduct. Russia, an enemy of long standing, was in a category by itself. But England and France also, despite the fact that they had assisted the empire with their armies in the Crimean War, and at other times with diplomatic pressure, were often detested because these services were overshadowed in the Turkish view by frequent and often high-handed interference. One such instance, which rankled particularly in connection with Muslim-Christian equality, was the fact that the Hatt-i Humayun of 1856 was not purely an autochthonous edict, but that large parts of it had in effect been dictated by the British, French, and Austrian ambassadors. The British ambassador, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, had in many ways done great service for the Ottoman Empire, but in this period Ali three times asked London to recall him. Stratford would not allow the sultan to reign along with him, said Ali, and demanded that his own influence should be “so paramount and notorious” that the Porte lost prestige in the eyes of its own public.³⁰ Years after Stratford had left Constantinople, Ali still spoke of him with real hatred.³¹ Fuad, who with his social graces, fluent French, and Europeanized witticisms got along well with foreign diplomats, nevertheless voiced almost the identical criticism of a sympathetic French Ambassador, M. Bourée, because “whatever good thing was done must be advertised as a benefit conferred by France. . . .”³²

Foreign interference rankled particularly when it was based on the capitulatory privileges which the great powers stretched and abused. Many ordinary Turks became aware of this when they saw the support given by Christian diplomats and consuls to thousands of protégés, largely Ottoman Christians who had never seen their protecting country but who were shielded against the taxes and courts of their own state and were often granted foreign passports. Many of the protégés were decidedly shady characters, and their number was considerably augmented in the Crimean War period by riffraff and adventurers of European origin who raised the crime rate in Constantinople.³³ At the end of the Crimean War the Austrian internuncio felt that “the only respectable people, at least so it appears, are the Turks whom we are going to civilize and initiate into the mysteries of our progress.”³⁴

The conduct of the more respectable representatives of Christendom in the empire might elicit Turkish approval but might also arouse resentment. It is not apparent that the little colonies of foreign workers, such as the English dockyard workers at Hasköy or the German Swiss at Amasya, had any no-

ticeable impact. Some of the Polish and Hungarian refugees who came after the revolutions of 1830 and 1848 fitted in well with the Ottoman scene, and some became Muslims. There were always respected individual westerners like the English merchant of Beirut, James Black. It was reported that when a Muslim of the area wanted to use an oath stronger than "by the beard of Muhammad" he swore "by the word of Black, the Englishman."³⁵ But westerners of the utmost personal respectability could often rub Turks the wrong way. Some of the British consuls in the empire were found even by their own superiors to be shallow and vain, and to supply their personal deficiencies "by borrowing largely from the national dignity," which they then dragged into every private affair.³⁶ Missionaries of impeccable character often annoyed Muslims by their evangelical persistence. An extreme example concerns two English missionaries who one day affixed a poster to the mosque of St. Sophia advertising that on the morrow from its steps they would denounce the prophet Muhammad as an imposter.³⁷

IV

Given such a background of the innate Muslim conviction of superiority, and the unfortunate experiences of Turks with Christians, a preponderance of opinion against the official doctrine of Muslim-Christian equality was natural. Turkish resistance to the doctrine varied with the individual, the locality, and the moment. Some Turks, quite a few of them in the Ottoman bureaucracy, accepted it at least superficially, but wholehearted acceptance was rare. No great uprisings against the reform edicts occurred, though in some localities there was rioting. In part, the opposition came from the mere fact of the proclamation of unpopular principles, whereas the slow introduction of specific measures, with no fanfare, might have gone unnoticed. Many Turks muttered their resentment against the authors of the doctrine of equality and other infidel concepts. Each of the four Tanzimat statesmen was called the "*gâvur paşa*," the "unbeliever of a pasha," though Ali probably less frequently than the others. The mere idea of equality, especially the antidefamation clause of 1856, offended the Turks' inherent sense of the rightness of things. "Now we can't call a *gâvur* a *gâvur*," it was said, sometimes bitterly, sometimes in matter-of-fact explanation that under the new dispensation the plain truth could no longer be spoken openly.³⁸ Could reforms be acceptable which forbade calling a spade a spade?

Events which followed the two great reform proclamations serve to illustrate the general antipathy to their promises of equality. One example is related to the touchy question of military service. Both in 1839 and 1856 the sultan proclaimed that his Christian subjects should be equally privileged to serve in the armed forces along with the Muslims, instead of paying an exemption tax as they had previously done. It soon became obvious that the Christians would rather continue to pay than serve, despite the step toward

equality which military service might mean. It also became obvious that the Turks wanted Christians to be equally liable to service so far as sharing the burdens and dangers went but balked at giving the Christians equal opportunity for promotion to the officer corps. Muslim Turks did not want to serve under native Christian officers. In theory the equal right to serve in the armed forces remained, but in fact the whole matter was quietly buried, and the old exemption tax reappeared under a different name. Both Turks and Christians were satisfied to see the inequality continue.³⁹

Another illustration of Turkish reactions is found in the experience of the considerable group of American Congregational missionaries in the empire. They reported in general a decrease in Muslim fanaticism and in interference with their work. One missionary who knew the country well observed that only the *ulema*, the Muslim theologians, kept up any semblance of old-style bigotry by the 1860's, and that merely in order to keep what influence they could among the people and "sponge" off the wealthy.⁴⁰ Another calculated that "before the Hatti-Humayoun [of 1856] there were more cases of persecution reported to us every week than there are now in a whole year."⁴¹ This situation continued until the new rise in Muslim sentiment with the recurrent crises of the 1870's.

But most of the proselytizing efforts of the Congregationalists, and most of their converts, were among the Armenians. Muslim opinion, therefore, was not directly touched. When, however, any case of apostasy from Islam was involved, public fury could easily be aroused. Governmental protection might be secured in such cases, especially in the capital, but the Turkish public was not willing to recognize equal opportunity of conversion in either direction despite the Porte's assurance that "the Musselman is now as free to become a Christian as the Christian is free to become a Musselman. The government will know no difference in the two cases."⁴² The outstanding case of a fanatical Muslim outburst over transfer of religious affiliation came in the Saloniki incident of 1876. A Bulgarian girl of dubious morals came to Saloniki from her native village to register with the authorities her conversion from Orthodoxy to Islam. When some Greeks of the city kidnapped her, apparently to prevent the transfer of allegiance, an angry Muslim mob sought her out. In the process the mob murdered the French and German consuls who had taken refuge, along with the Turkish governor, in a mosque. The incident occurred at a time when the empire was under great strain from the rebellions in Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁴³

When the question of religious equality and conversion involved only competing Christian denominations, Ottoman officials were more likely to act to preserve fair play, and undoubtedly proclaimed equality with greater conviction and delight than when Muslims were involved. A classic example occurred in a town near Ankara following a local persecution of Protestants by Armenians. The governor investigated, and then sent forth a herald to cry: "If

is commanded by the ruling authorities that all subjects cease to deride one another as Moslems and Rayahs, as Armenians and Protestants, since all are equally the dependent subjects of the royal government, and it is further commanded that mutually respecting and honoring one another, all shall dwell together in brotherly love.”⁴⁴ In its way this pithy proclamation was a masterly summary of the official policy of equality among adherents of all creeds, of the concept of Ottoman citizenship, and of the antidefamation clause, revealing that the provincial governor understood perfectly what the central government had announced. That the civil authority should also command all men to live together in brotherly love was undoubtedly commendable—and unenforceable.

Another measure of Turkish attitudes on the question of Christian equality is provided by the views of participants in the conspiracy of 1859. The plot, directed against Abdul Medjid and his ministers, was betrayed to the authorities. Some forty-odd participants, many of them army officers and Muslim theological professors and students, were arrested. Interrogation revealed that through their rather fuzzy ideas there ran a general dissatisfaction with the Ottoman government, caused more by the proclamations of Christian equality than by any other single factor. The conspiracy's leading spirit and theoretician, one Sheikh [Şeyh] Ahmet, indicated that he regarded the reform edicts of 1839 and 1856 as contraventions of Muslim law, the *Şeriat*, because they allowed Christians equal rights with Muslims. According to the deposition of another conspirator, Sheikh Ahmet had been teaching in the *medrese* that the Christians got these privileges with the help of foreign powers.⁴⁵ The Kuleli incident, as this abortive conspiracy has since been known, provides a good index to widespread Turkish attitudes. It revealed an ill-defined resentment against the mere concept of equality, a conscious support of “religious law,” and condemnation of the government both for its reform edicts and for its apparent submission to foreign influence.⁴⁶ The doctrine of equality seemed bad if for no other reason than that it proclaimed to be equal adherents of religions that were not equal. And *Osmanlılık*, as a purely political concept of the allegiance of peoples of all creeds to a ruler who treated them equally, was unreal, because the traditional concept of “Osmanlı” had always carried strong implications of Muslim orthodoxy as well as of loyalty to the Ottoman state.

Any sample of Turkish opinion in the Tanzimat period must include the one group which was forward-looking, politically conscious, constantly vocal, and therefore influential out of proportion to its small size. This was the New Ottoman Committee, composed principally of writers and would-be reformers who for a short time in the late 1860's coalesced into the nearest approximation to a political party that existed in the empire. Its members were an extraordinary collection of individualists. They quarreled among themselves but were united in their ardent desire to preserve the Ottoman Empire. This

group has often been called the "Young Turks." Its members were, in fact, the spiritual fathers of the true Young Turks of 1908, and the spiritual grandfathers of the Turks who created the nationalist republic of today. From their writings the later development of a genuinely "Turkish" consciousness derived great impetus. But by preference the leaders of this group of the 1860's called themselves the New Ottomans [*Yeni Osmanlılar*]. The name is a good indication of their outlook.

The New Ottomans represented a more deeply felt patriotism, a devotion to *Osmanlılık* as they conceived it, than such statesmen as Ali and Fuad were hoping to inculcate. New Ottoman patriotism meant an equal co-operation of peoples of all creeds in a devoted effort to preserve the empire, but opposition to any special concessions to Christians. The New Ottomans believed that the empire could be reformed and revived within the framework of Muslim tradition and religious law, which they thought was sound enough, and progressive and elastic enough, to allow also the adaptation of new institutions from Europe. Most of them seem also to have believed in Muslim Turkish superiority among the united peoples of a united empire. Sometimes, therefore, their writings seem self-contradictory. Ali Suavi, probably the most extravagant and fanatic Muslim among them, could write that "all the populations composing the Ottoman Empire today form only one nationality: the Osmanli."⁴⁷ Mustafa Fazil Pasha, an Egyptian prince of broad views who was for a time leader of the New Ottomans because his financial resources supported the group, said in a public statement for them that "it does not matter whether one is Muslim, Catholic, or Greek Orthodox to be able to place the public welfare ahead of private interests. For that it suffices to be a man of progress or a good patriot."⁴⁸ In a bold letter to Abdul Aziz, he contended that the Christian revolts in the empire were but a symptom of a malady—backwardness and bad government—that afflicted the uncomplaining Muslims even more than the Christians. The line of division ran, said Mustafa Fazil, only between oppressors and oppressed, not between Christian and Muslim.⁴⁹

The emphasis on Ottoman patriotism, on preservation of the fatherland from internal decay and external attack, led the New Ottomans to voice retroactive approval of the Hatt-i Sherif of 1839, since in their view Reshid Pasha had with the Gülhane edict started the empire on the road to progress and self-preservation. But they tended to regard the Hatt-i Humayun of 1856 and most of the subsequent acts of the Porte as harmful, seeing in them concessions to Christians in response to pressures exerted by great powers and by domestic rebellion. This, in the New Ottoman view, led to inequality, not equality. Namik Kemal, the most admirable of the group, castigated the Porte and the powers for enumerating the privileges of Christians in the edict of 1856 when, he said, there should rather have been progress toward constitutional government and the elimination of foreign intervention.⁵⁰ Namik Kemal here reflected a view common to many Turks which led them to argue against reform

programs proposed by European powers for particular peoples or provinces of the empire, such as the proposals for Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1875–76, by saying that these measures represented special privilege, injustice to Muslims, and therefore inequality.⁵¹

In 1867, the year when New Ottoman criticism of the government forced many of the group into European exile, Ali and Fuad were unmercifully excoriated for making concessions to the Cretan rebels and for agreeing, under pressure, that the last Turks would evacuate Belgrade. Again the New Ottomans raised the point that this was inequality, that Muslims in Belgrade and Crete were being unfairly treated.⁵² Obviously the weakness of the Sublime Porte in the face of European pressures only increased the exasperation of the New Ottomans over the inequities of the situation. Ziya, next to Namik Kemal the most influential of the New Ottoman writers, expressed the common complaint that equality could never be attained so long as Christians within the empire could have recourse not only to the Ottoman government, and to their *millet* representatives, but also to foreign protectors. For example, said Ziya, if a guilty Christian is jailed, he is suddenly released without cause because some one influential has intervened. But if an innocent Muslim fall into the toils of justice and be imprisoned without cause, who is there to help him? “Is this equality?” he asks bitterly.⁵³

V

In the face of such attitudes, the realization of Ottoman equality, involving the equality of Muslims and Christians, faced extraordinary difficulties.⁵⁴ Though Reshid, Ali, Fuad, and Midhat hoped to find salvation for the empire by creating among its peoples the bond of equal citizenship based on Ottoman nationality, the obstacles they faced were too great and the time too late. The Turkish mind, conditioned by centuries of Muslim and Ottoman dominance, was not yet ready to accept any absolute equality, much less to endorse the grant of particular privileges to Christians. And the Christian minorities of the empire continued to push toward separatism. Despite the various steps taken toward it, Ottoman equality was not attained in the Tanzimat period, nor yet after the Young Turk revolution of 1908 when, for a few wild and enthusiastic days, Ottoman brotherhood seemed to have arrived with the end of Abdul Hamid’s personal rule and the resurrection of Midhat’s constitution of 1876. Then, after this short emotional spree, competing nationalisms again crowded out the concept of *Osmanlılık*. This was true not only among the Christians of the empire but now among the Muslims as well. While Arab nationalism developed, like the Christian nationalisms, as a reaction to Ottoman Turkish control, the Turks themselves found the source for a nationalism of their own in the *Osmanlılık* of the Tanzimat, especially in the more patriotic version of Namik Kemal and other New Ottomans.

In the end, the sort of Ottoman equality at which the Tanzimat statesmen

aimed, though it had never been given a full and fair trial, was discredited as an idea both among Muslims and among Christians. Instead of the equality of Christian and Muslim within a heterogeneous empire, based on “fusion” and “brotherhood,” there emerged finally a different sort—the corporate equality of competing national sovereign states.

Notes

1. There is no adequate study on the status of Christians in the Ottoman Empire. Voluminous sources exist, many of them dealing only with a particular district or period, and many have a distinctive bias. Among the best accounts for the mid-nineteenth century are Abdolonyme Ubicini, *Letters on Turkey*, tr. by Lady Easthope (London, 1856), II; and *Accounts and Papers*, 1861, LXVII, “Reports . . . relating to the Condition of Christians,” a collection of statements by British consuls in different parts of the empire.

2. See the convenient collection of such statements in Harold Temperley, *England and the Near East: The Crimea* (London, 1936), pp. 40–41.

3. The doctrine of equality of course included Jews as well. But Christians were far more numerous in the empire and provided most of the problems. Among the 14,000,000 non-Muslims in an empire of some 35,000,000, Christians were an overwhelming majority. There were perhaps 150,000 Jews. All figures for the nineteenth century are inaccurate approximations. These follow Ubicini, I, 18–26. His estimates, probably low, have found the widest acceptance. For practical reasons, I shall limit the discussion to the status of Christians.

4. Western writers have ordinarily referred to the edict of 1839 as the Hatt-i Sherif [Illustrious Rescript], which was its title in the official French translation distributed by the Sublime Porte to foreign diplomats. See facsimile of French as well as Turkish texts in Yavuz Abadan, “Tanzimat Fermanın Tahlili” [Analysis of the Tanzimat Edict], *Tanzimat* (Istanbul, 1940), I, following p. 48. Turkish historians usually say *Hatt-ı Humayun* [Imperial Rescript], or else *Gülhane Fermanı* or *Tanzimat Fermanı*. A *ferman* is a decree or edict. I shall continue here to follow the customary Western terminology in order to avoid confusion and to provide a convenient distinction from the Hatt-i Humayun of 1856 (see note 5). Similarly, where Turkish names first occur, their Western forms are used, followed by the modern Turkish spelling in brackets. The official French text of the Hatt-i Sherif is available in many places, for instance in Ubicini and Pavet de Courteille, *Etat présent de l'Empire ottoman* (Paris, 1876), pp. 231–34.

5. Westerners usually call this edict the Hatt-i Humayun, but Turks call it the *Islahat Fermanı* [Reform Edict]. See explanation in note 4. The most useful text, both Turkish and French, is Thomas X. Bianchi, *Khaththı Humaïoun* . . . (Paris, 1856).

6. Text in Ignaz von Testa, *Recueil des traités de la Porte ottomane* . . . (Paris, 1864–1911), VII, 521–23.

7. Text in *Das Staatsarchiv*, XXX (1877), no. 5702.

8. Articles 8 and 17. Text in *Das Staatsarchiv*, XXXI (1877), no. 5948.
9. Many examples might be cited. Edward A. Freeman, *The Ottoman Power in Europe* (London, 1877), is a gem—three hundred pages of magnificently righteous anti-Turkish tirade. On reform promises see especially pp. 189, 197, 225.
10. There is as yet no scholarly history of the Tanzimat period. The best account of the reforms is still Edouard Engelhardt, *La Turquie et le Tanzimat* . . . (Paris, 1882–84), 2 vols. The most satisfactory general history on the first half of the period is Georg Rosen, *Geschichte der Türkei von dem Siege der Reform im Jahre 1826 bis . . . 1856* (Leipzig, 1866–67), 2 vols. Many Turkish scholars have studied aspects of the period, but none has yet produced a full-scale consecutive history. The most important single volume is a 1000-page product by some thirty Turkish scholars, *Tanzimat, Yüzüncü Yıldönümü Münasebetile* [The Tanzimat, on the Occasion of its Hundredth Anniversary], I (Istanbul, 1940). Volume II never appeared.
11. Mustafa Reşid Paşa (1800–58); Mehmed Emin Ali Paşa (1815–71); Keçecizade Mehmed Fuad Paşa (1815–69); Ahmed Şefik Midhat Paşa (1822–84).
12. It is interesting to note that Reshid, Ali, and Fuad were all Freemasons: Ebüzziya Tevfik, *Mecmuai Ebüzziya* [Ebüzziya's Journal] (Haziran, 1911), cited in Mustafa Nihat, *Metinlerle Muasır Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi* [History of Contemporary Turkish Literature with Texts] (Istanbul, 1934), p. 27 n. I am not sure whether or not Midhat was a Freemason, but he came from a family with Bektashi affiliations and heterodox proclivities. See above, p. 120, on the Bektashi.
13. See Ali to Thouvenel, Nov. 28, 1858, in L. Thouvenel, *Trois années de la question d'Orient* (Paris, 1897), p. 316.
14. Ali to Musurus, Nov. 30, 1864, enclosed in Morris to Seward, no. 108, Mar. 29, 1865, Turkey no. 18, State, U.S. Archives.
15. Text in Andreas D. Mordtmann, *Stambul und das moderne Türkenhum* (Leipzig, 1877–78), I, 75–90. Ali recommended also new educational measures, a reformed civil law code, etc.
16. See for instance his memorandum of Aug. 12, 1839, printed in Frank E. Bailey, *British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement . . . 1826–1853* (Cambridge, Mass., 1942), pp. 271–76.
17. Holographic draft of a memorandum on reforms for the state, in private collection of Salih Keçeci, cited in Orhan F. Köprülü, "Fuad Paşa," *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, IV, 679.
18. Yıldız Palace Archives, Midhat's reply to interrogation of May 8, 1297 [1880], partly reproduced in İbnülemin Mahmud Kemal İnâl, *Osmanlı Devrinde Son Sadrazamlar* [The Last Grand Viziers in the Ottoman Period] (Istanbul, 1940–50), III, 339.
19. The Hatt-i Humayun of 1856 used all these expressions: *tebaai şahane*, *tebaai saltanati*, *tebaai Devlet-i Aliyye*. See the note on this trend in Reuben Levy, *Introduction to the Sociology of Islam* (London, c. 1930–33), II, 259.
20. The term used was *vatandaş*, which Bianchi (*Khaththy Humaïoun*, p. 4 and n.1) says was a new form. The basic word, *vatan*, had meant "native place" or "home" but was coming to be equated to *patrie*, fatherland, since the permeation of

French ideas after 1789. See the comments on the meaning of *vatan* in Bernard Lewis, "The Impact of the French Revolution on Turkey," *Journal of World History*, I (July, 1953), 107–108.

21. Text in George Young, *Corps de droit ottoman* (Oxford, 1905–1906), II, 226–29. See above, p. 122, on the abuses of the capitulations at which the law was aimed.

22. "Considérations sur l'exécution du Firman Impérial du 18 février 1856," in Grégoire Aristarchi Bey, *Législation ottomane* (Constantinople, 1873–88), II, 26.

23. Morris-Seward, no. 33, Nov. 6, 1862, Turkey no. 17, State, U.S. Archives.

24. "Zapiski Grapha N. P. Ignatyeva (1864–1874)," *Izvestiia Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Dyel*, 1915, I, 170–72.

25. Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi V: Nizam-i Cedit ve Tanzimat Devirleri* [Ottoman History V: Periods of Nizam-i Cedit and Tanzimat] (Ankara, 1947), p. 191. Engelhardt, *La Turquie*, I, 142, attributes a similar remark to the archbishop of Nicomedia at the proclamation of the Hatt-i Humayun of 1856. It should also be pointed out that the Greek hierarchy opposed a democratization of its own *millet* structure whereby lay participation in *millet* administration would increase.

26. The missionary reports are in the archives of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM), Armenian Mission, VIII, nos. 79, 88, 92, 93, all Schaffler to Anderson, of Mar. 11, Nov. 16, Dec. 12 and 27, 1859. On the Bektashi order see John Kingsley Birge, *The Bektashi Order of Dervishes* (London, 1937). It would serve no purpose to cite here a bibliography on Islam. There is a considerable and scattered literature on syncretism. Frederick W. Hasluck, *Christianity and Islam under the Sultans* (Oxford, 1929), 2 vols., is full of information.

27. *Asim Tarihi* (Istanbul, n.d.), I, 376, quoted in Bernard Lewis, "The Impact of the French Revolution on Turkey," *Jour. World Hist.*, I, 118, n.35.

28. Edouard Driault, *L'Egypte et l'Europe, la crise de 1839–1841* (Cairo, 1930–), I, letter 79, Sept. 20, 1839, and II, letter 7, Nov. 19, 1839. These Turks did not realize how much of a reformer Muhammad Ali was in Egypt.

29. Prominent among them the New Ottomans, on whom see above, pp. 125–127.

30. Clarendon to Stratford, Jan. 4, 1856, Private Stratford MSS, FO 352/44, Public Record Office (PRO), quoted in Harold Temperley, "The Last Phase of Stratford de Redcliffe, 1855–58," *English Historical Review*, XLVII (1932), 218.

31. L. Raschdau, ed. "Diplomatenleben am Bosphorus, Aus dem literarischen Nachlass . . . Dr. Busch," *Deutsche Rundschau*, CXXXVIII (1909), 384.

32. Elliot to Stanley; no. 68 conf., Dec. 17, 1867, FO 78/1965, PRO.

33. See, for example, the comments of Sir Edmund Hornby, judge of a British consular court in this period, in his *Autobiography* (London, 1928), p. 93. (Marco Antonio) Canini, *Vingt ans d'exil* (Paris, 1868), pp. 111–42, gives a good picture of the riffraff in the capital.

34. Prokesch to Buol, Jan. 10, 1856, Politisches Archiv XII/56, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv.

35. Henry Harris Jessup, *Fifty-Three Years in Syria* (New York, 1910), I, 49; II, 465.

36. Bulwer to Russell, no. 177, Sept. 27, 1859, enclosing Bulwer to C. Alison of same date, FO 78/1435, PRO.

37. Hornby, pp. 124–25.

38. See the story from Abdurrahman Şeref in Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi V*, p. 190; also Gad Franco, *Développements constitutionnels en Turquie* (Paris, 1925), p. 12.

39. Dr. K., *Erinnerungen aus dem Leben des Serdar Ekrem Omer Pascha* . . . (Sarajevo, 1885), pp. 47, 252. Ömer served on this commission. For a sample of Turkish complaints on Christian exemption see Felix Kanitz, *Donau-Bulgarien und der Balkan* (Leipzig, 1875–79), III, 151.

40. Henry J. Van Lennep, *Travels in Little-Known Parts of Asia Minor* (London, 1870), I, 118–19. Some of the *ulema* were bigoted and narrowly educated, but not all. Jevdet [Cevdet] is an outstanding example of one of the *ulema* of this period who was a staunch Muslim but no bigot.

41. Goodell to Anderson, Nov. 6, 1860, ABCFM, Vol. 284, no. 382. Much of the reported persecution was by other Christians, not Muslims.

42. The statement of a government commission investigating one of the rare cases of conversion from Islam to Christianity: Hamlin to Anderson, Sept. 5, 1857, ABCFM, Armenian Mission, V, no. 276.

43. Documentary account of this in *Das Staatsarchiv*, XXX (1877), nos. 5733–58.

44. Farnsworth to Board Secretaries, Sept. 21, 1865, ABCFM, Vol. 284, no. 331. *Râya* or *reaya* was the customary term for the tributary non-Muslim peoples of the empire, and originally meant “cattle” or “flocks.” Presumably the Hatt-i Humayun banned this term also.

45. The conspiracy is analyzed on the basis of documentary evidence, chiefly the interrogation reports, in Uluğ İğdemir, *Kuleli Vakası Hakkında bir Araştırma* [An Investigation of the Kuleli Affair] (Ankara, 1937). The *medrese* is a school for instruction in Muslim law and theology.

46. The whole reform program was of course often condemned as contrary to religious law by men whose interest was not at all in the *Şeriat* but only in their vested interests in sources of power and income. Such were numerous officials, tax-farmers, moneylenders, etc.

47. Ali Suavi, *A propos de l'Herzégovine* (Paris, 1875), p. 16.

48. Letter of Feb. 5, 1867, in *Le Nord* (Brussels), Feb. 7, 1867.

49. S. A. le Prince Mustapha-Fazyl Pacha, *Lettre adressée à S.M. le Sultan* (n.p., n.d.) [presumably March, 1867], pp. 1–11.

50. In *Hürriyet*, no. 4 (July 20, 1868), reproduced in İhsan Sungu, “Tanzimat ve Yeni Osmanlılar” [The Tanzimat and the New Ottomans], in *Tanzimat*, I, 795–96. Sungu's chapter, pp. 777–857 in this volume, is almost entirely a collection of newspaper articles by Namik Kemal and Ziya on questions of the day.

51. See, for example, the "Manifesto of the Muslim Patriots," of Mar. 9, 1876, probably written by Midhat or one of his entourage: *Le Stamboul*, June 2, 1876.

52. In their newspaper *Muhbir*, date of issue not given; translation in FO 195/893, no. 120, Mar. 25, 1868, PRO. In his poem, the "Zafer-name," Ziya uses heavy irony to attack Ali on the same issues of Crete and Belgrade. He further proclaims acidly that Ali has brought the equality of rights to perfection not only by such concessions but by appointing Greeks and Armenians to high office. English translation and Turkish text of about half the poem are in Elias J. W. Gibb, *A History of Ottoman Poetry* (London, 1900-1909), V, 96-111, and VI, 370-78.

53. In *Hürriyet*, no. 15 (Oct. 5, 1868), reproduced in Sungu, p. 797.

54. There were of course many obstacles to the realization of a doctrine of equality other than those discussed here as "attitudes." One of the most important, especially as it affected the relations of Christian and Muslim in the Balkans, was the system of land tenure, with resulting social and economic inequalities and groups which had a vested interest in maintaining them. A good analysis of this situation in a part of the Balkans in the period up to 1850 is Halil Inalcik, *Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi* [The Tanzimat and the Bulgar Question] (Ankara, 1943).

Added Note: Note 10 says that there is no scholarly history of the Tanzimat period. Since that was written, a book of mine attempted to fill the gap: *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876* (Princeton, 1863), though it is not full on the early Tanzimat years beginning in 1839. A new volume with the collaboration of many scholars is planned by a committee of scholars in Turkey to review all aspects of the Tanzimat period; it should appear sometime in 1990. Several of the contributions to Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, eds., *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society*, 2 vols. (New York, 1982), bear on the subject of this essay in one way or another. Two books help to illuminate the more general intellectual climate of the period: Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas* (Princeton, 1962), and Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal, 1964). Two others look more specifically at Ottomanism: I. L. Fadeeva, *Ofitsialnie Doktrini v Ideologii i Politike Osmanskoi Imperii: Osmanism—Panislamism, XIX-Nachalo XX v.* (Moscow, 1985), and R. A. Safrastian, *Doktrina Osmanisma v Politicheskoi Zhizni Osmanskoi Imperii* (Erevan, 1985).

8. The Advent of the Electric Telegraph in the Ottoman Empire

The electric telegraph was one of the principal technological advances adopted by the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century. It came in the 1850s, one more phase in the process of westernization. Its impact was felt in many ways in Ottoman life. The sultans, in particular, welcomed the telegraph and promoted the extension of a system that gave them an additional instrument of control over their far-flung provinces. Yet in the end the telegraph proved to be an instrument for curbing and then for ending the six-hundred-year rule of the Ottoman dynasty.

By chance the electric telegraph and the steam railway engine reached the Ottoman realms at almost exactly the same time. A telegraph line first linked Istanbul to Europe in 1855. The first railway line in the empire began operations in 1856, in the autonomous province of Egypt, between Cairo and Alexandria. In the same year the first railway in Anatolia, from Izmir inland to Aydin, was begun. By 1856, the world's first railway line, the Stockton-to-Darlington line in England, was thirty-one years old. The telegraph made the leap from West to East more quickly; in 1855 the world's first telegraph line opened to commerce—between Paddington and Drayton, also in England—was only eighteen years old. The speedier adoption of the telegraph was in large part, of course, owing to the greater ease and lesser cost of construction. Less money and less manpower were required to erect poles and string wire over hill, valley, and river than to level the ground and lay ties and steel rails.

The Ottoman government had earlier tried out a semaphore telegraph. The military in the time of Sultan Mahmud II wanted rapid communication along and across the Bosphorus and experimented with a semaphore during the early months of the Russian War of 1828–1829, which grew out of the Greek rebellion. The instrument used was described by a westerner then resident in Istanbul as “a mere pole of wood with one transverse moveable bar,” which he called “a species of telegraph.”¹ Evidently it was not very effective, although it was capable of sending messages across the Bosphorus and probably from the Black Sea down the Bosphorus to Istanbul.

The electric telegraph seems first to have appeared in the Ottoman Empire in 1839, four years after Samuel Morse had made a working model of his recording telegraph. An American named Chamberlain, who had worked with Morse, brought an instrument to Istanbul. He demonstrated it privately in the study of Cyrus Hamlin, the Congregational missionary, who had a galvanic battery that Chamberlain could use. But before the instrument could be

shown with confidence to the Ottoman government, a number of improvements seemed to be needed. Chamberlain set out for Vienna to get the necessary machine work done. Unfortunately, he was drowned when his Danube steamer capsized, and the proposed demonstration to the Sublime Porte never occurred.²

A less faltering start came in 1847, just three years after Morse had sent the first message by wire from Baltimore to Washington. Another American, Professor J. Lawrence Smith, who was in Ottoman employ as a geologist, ordered two telegraph instruments to be sent out from America. When they came, he persuaded Hamlin, who was something of a Yankee genius in mechanical matters, to help him in a demonstration for the sultan. Hamlin practised with the instruments for three days, in his seminary in Bebek, an Istanbul suburb on the Bosphorus. When he could send and receive messages, he and Smith took the instruments to the Beylerbey Palace—a wooden predecessor of the later fine stone edifice—and set them up, one in the throne room, the other in a distant corner room. Two messages, devised by Sultan Abdülmecid, were sent, one in either direction, by Hamlin and Smith. The sultan was delighted. Hamlin found Abdülmecid, then a man of twenty-four, to be a very human and highly intelligent individual. Abdülmecid asked that the demonstration be repeated the next day, again at the palace, for high officials of the Porte. This was successfully done, on August 10.³ When the demonstration was concluded, Abdülmecid proposed, the officials concurring, that a telegraph line be built from Istanbul to Edirne. The sultan also inquired what reward he might give to Smith. Smith replied that any award should properly go to Morse, the inventor.⁴ Consequently, Abdülmecid sent to Morse, in America, a decoration in diamonds, along with an imperial certificate saying that it was necessary to patronize knowledge, that the sultan had seen the electric telegraph, and that Morse was “an American, a man of science and of talents, and . . . a model of the chiefs of the nation of the Messiah—may his grade be increased.”⁵ Morse, in gratitude for the decoration, later sent to the sultan a complete telegraphic instrument, which Abdülmecid turned over to his Military Engineering School.⁶

The first telegraph line in the Ottoman Empire was not, as it turned out, the Istanbul-Edirne line that Sultan Abdülmecid had proposed. Instead, the first was an underwater cable in the Black Sea connecting the Crimean peninsula with Varna, on the Bulgarian coast. War tends to speed up the currents of change in human history. In this case the Crimean War, which started as an Ottoman-Russian war in 1853, was the immediate cause for laying the cable. The British, who with the French joined the Ottoman armies in 1854, laid the cable, a single length of 340 miles, at that time the longest submarine telegraph line in the world.⁷ Shortly thereafter the British laid another cable to connect Varna with Istanbul.⁸ At about the same time the Austrian telegraph

system was connected to Jassy, the capital of Moldavia, one of the two privileged Romanian provinces in the Ottoman Empire. By February 1855 the Ottoman ambassador in London, Kostaki Musurus, was urging Lord Clarendon, the British foreign minister, to use the telegraph to confer with the Ottoman government. Musurus pointed out that the electric telegraph had reached Jassy, so that the conferring would take only five or six days.⁹ This was less than half the time required for despatches to make the round trip from London to Istanbul and back. At that point the telegram would presumably have to be carried by horse, or by horse and ship, from Jassy to Varna.

In the spring of 1855, however, Varna and Jassy were directly connected by telegraph through Bucharest. A second line also went out from Bucharest to Vienna and on to western Europe. The connection with Bucharest was again the product of the war, hastened so that the French and British forces fighting in the Crimean peninsula could be in close touch with their governments.¹⁰ A team of French military engineers and telegraph specialists constructed the line. When it was put into service, Frenchmen manned the telegraph stations at Varna, Şumnu (Shumla), and Rusçuk, and provided constant inspection of the line and repairs when needed. Major M. A. Biddulph, British director of telegraphs in the Black Sea region during the war, rode the length of this line on horseback from Varna to Vienna in February and March of 1856; he found it efficiently maintained and operated by a staff of 133, almost all French.¹¹ Within Wallachia, the other privileged Romanian province, of which Bucharest was the capital, the lines were manned by Austrians.

In the laying of the British submarine cables, and the stringing of the French line from Varna to Bucharest, the Ottoman government had played only a minor role. It had given permissions. It had supplied the telegraph poles. But all the engineers and technicians were French or British. The wire was imported, as were the insulators and the Morse instruments.¹² Even the first connection between Europe and Asia, made at Istanbul itself across the Bosphorus to link the Beyoğlu (Pera) telegraph office with Üsküdar, was done by Biddulph.¹³ But the Sublime Porte was learning from its allies. Two of the original telegraph specialists of the Ottoman Empire were sent to work with the French inspector-general of telegraphs, who had come out from France to get the Varna-Bucharest line completed as fast as possible.¹⁴ Then Mustafa Efendi and Vuliç Efendi were brought back to Istanbul to work in the administration of the Ottoman telegraphs, for the Sublime Porte was planning to construct telegraph lines on its own account.

In the summer of 1854 the grand vezir Kıbrıslı Mehmed Emin Paşa had appointed a high-level task force of three civil officials and three generals to supervise the beginning of an Ottoman telegraph system. They chose a French proposal rather than an English one and appointed a French engineer, M. De la Rue, to head up the construction. The first Ottoman line was to run from

Istanbul to Edirne, as Sultan Abdülmecid had wished, and then to Şumnu to connect with the French line so that messages could go on to Vienna and the West. Additionally, a second line running north and west from Edirne would connect with the Austrian network via Filibe (Philippopolis), Sofya, and Niş. The agreement with the French contractor provided that his technicians should train Ottoman subjects for telegraph jobs. The necessary materials were brought from France during the winter, poles were brought over from the Ereğli forests on the Anatolian Black Sea coast, and construction began in March 1855. On August 19, 1855, De la Rue sent to the foreign minister a telegram proclaiming that Istanbul and Edirne were in communication with each other. The extension of the line to Şumnu was completed on September 6.¹⁵ Istanbul was thus connected by wire with the capitals of Europe.

On September 14, 1855, the first telegram went out from Istanbul, announcing to the Ottoman ambassadors in Paris and London that the Russian fortress of Sevastopol in the Crimea had fallen. "Our telegraph begins under happy auspices," it said.¹⁶ This victory telegram was the successor, in concise nineteenth-century style, to the traditional *zafername*, the often lengthy eulogy of a military success, and the *fetihname*, the sultan's victory announcement. On the next day the line was officially opened, to great celebrations in Edirne at the telegraph office. As a part of the opening ceremonies, an 87-word telegram was sent from Edirne to Istanbul, received there in eleven minutes, and immediately answered.¹⁷ The Sublime Porte, proud of the opening of its own line to Europe, notified the foreign embassies and legations in Istanbul that they could begin using the line at once. A schedule of tariffs was not yet completed, said the note, but a list of transmissions would be kept and charges could be settled later.¹⁸

These lines, constructed during the Crimean War, proved to be but the harbinger of an orgy of extended telegraph construction. Even during the war other lines were being contemplated. An Englishman, Lionel Gisborne, got from the Porte a concession to lay a submarine cable from the southern mouth of the Dardanelles to Alexandria in Egypt. He, as well as others, came to Istanbul to pursue his business. The wife of the British consul there noted in a letter that Gisborne was "on his way to Egypt (if he ever finishes his business here) to get permission to establish a telegraph."¹⁹ This observation also indicates the source of much of the telegraph frenzy, which lay outside the Ottoman Empire, especially in Britain. The British wanted speedy communication with India. A British group launched a proposal in 1856 for a line to India by way of the Adriatic, Crete, Alexandria, Syria, Iraq, and the Persian Gulf, traversing much of the Ottoman Empire. This was promoted as an anti-Russian measure, as well as a support for British imperial communications.²⁰ Another British company entered into negotiations with the Porte for building a line across Ottoman Asia to the Persian Gulf, but in the end the Porte refused

and declared it would build the line itself. The Porte would, however, employ Englishmen and buy materials in England.²¹ Meanwhile the British desire for speedy communication with India was intensified when news of the Sepoy rebellion there took forty days to reach London, in 1857.²²

The Sublime Porte evidently made its decision in the light of three considerations. It wanted to be on good terms with the British government and to facilitate its communication with India. It wanted also to balance the French influence on the European telegraph lines with British influence on the Asian lines. But it did not want another line on its territory—like the French one from Varna to Bucharest—built and operated by representatives of a foreign power. The Ottoman government should retain both ownership and operating control. Hence it had Musurus, its ambassador in London, secure the services of the British military engineer Biddulph, by now a lieutenant-colonel, to head a British team that would supervise construction of the telegraph across Anatolia, linking the Asian suburb of Istanbul, Üsküdar, with Baghdad, Basra, and the Persian Gulf. But Biddulph would be an Ottoman employee, in Ottoman pay.

The Ottoman director-general of telegraphs issued his instructions to Biddulph on August 11, 1858. He was to survey the whole course of the line himself and to begin building at several points at once.²³ The line was in fact built in sections under the supervision of a British team and, despite many vicissitudes, was opened to telegraph traffic between Üsküdar and Baghdad by June 1861. Sultan Abdülmecid died toward the end of that month. Before his death he had been able to witness the completion not only of the line to Baghdad on the east, and to Bucharest and Belgrade and on to Vienna on the west, but also of a line to Saloniki. In addition, the Levant Company, a British firm, had been authorized to lay a cable connecting the Dardanelles with the islands of Chios and Crete and linking the major port of Izmir to the line at Chios.²⁴ The Dardanelles-to-Alexandria submarine cable had, however, failed three times of a successful laying.²⁵

Early in the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz, who succeeded to the throne in 1861, the major Ottoman achievement was the completion of the telegraph line south from Baghdad to Basra and on to the Persian Gulf port of Fao. There the British landed a cable coming across the Indian Ocean from Karachi and brought up through the Gulf. By January 1865, therefore, telegraph traffic could move from London to India and back across Ottoman territory. An Ottoman-British convention of 1864 provided for a double office at Fao, with a British section of fifty employees, as well as one wire from Fao to Istanbul reserved entirely for Indian messages. The Porte also agreed that its offices at the major telegraph stations along this line should contain telegraphers who knew English.²⁶

Through the reign of Abdülaziz (1861–1876) and on into the reign of Sul-

tan Abdülhamid II (1876–1909), the expansion of the Ottoman telegraph network continued. Spurs and branch lines appeared in Anatolia, a major line pushed south from Anatolia through Syria to Egypt and Arabia, a Black Sea cable connection was made with the Russian system at Odessa, and new Balkan towns were added. British enterprise continued to lay submarine cables on the periphery of the Ottoman Empire, one from Malta to Alexandria, another down the Red Sea from Suez and across the ocean to India. These worked and then failed at various times. The British also established a system from India through Iran to Europe; the Ottoman system was linked to it at a frontier point east of Baghdad.²⁷ The rate of growth was greatest in the 1850s and through the 1860s. Figures on total kilometers of line are not always exactly comparable, because the area of the Ottoman Empire shrank in 1878, 1881, 1908, and 1913. They show, nevertheless, an order of magnitude: 6,490 kilometers of lines in 1863, 13,750 kilometers in 1866, 25,137 kilometers in 1869, and 36,640 kilometers in 1904.²⁸ The total kilometers of wires would be perhaps double each figure given, for the poles of one line could carry two or even three wires. By 1914 approximately 5,500,000 telegrams were being sent annually in the Empire.²⁹ The telegraph was integrated into Ottoman life. The sight of a line of telegraph poles stretching away into the distance became a not unfamiliar one. Travelers remarked on it. The niece of American secretary of state William H. Seward noted that she saw three wires as she traveled by rail in 1871 between Ismailia, on the Suez Canal, and Cairo: the Egyptian line, a Europe-to-India line, and a Suez line.³⁰ Another American traveler, a Kentucky Freemason touring the Holy Land in 1868, wrote on a visit to Jaffa's beach that "the telegraph poles, extending in a receding line southward as far as the eye can reach, gave me a homesick throb or two."³¹

Assessments of how efficiently the Ottoman telegraph operated vary greatly with the observer and the time period. A British telegraph engineer and the consul-general at Baghdad examined the whole line from that city to Istanbul in the winter of 1860–61, when it was just beginning to function, and found it "moderately efficient," though recommending improvements. Sir Henry Rawlinson, who reported this, also said that the line was "in a working and efficient state the whole way."³² But the director-general of Austrian telegraphs thought the Ottoman telegraph in "a state of anarchy" in 1860. Lieutenant-Colonel Biddulph, who reported this sentiment, added complaints of his own concerning both the expertise and devotion to duty of the Ottoman employees and the imperfect maintenance of the lines so that breaks were not always immediately repaired.³³ Breaks caused irregularity in the service, which was just as annoying as inefficiency—either slow or garbled transmission. British complaints about the service through Ottoman lines from London to India were recurrent.³⁴ One suspects that perhaps Ottoman operators gave local telegrams priority over Indian ones at times, and that their familiarity with English was

not always adequate. Yet the efficiency of the Ottoman system improved, and outsiders frequently remarked on the ability and helpfulness of Ottoman telegraph officials. In July 1875 an English traveler, waiting for a ship at the south Anatolian port of Mersin, wrote in his journal:

In the course of the morning I sent off a telegram to England. The line through Koniah was occupied in transmitting government messages; but the chief of the telegraph, a young Greek, most kindly sent my telegram to a friend at Diarbekir, with a request that he would forward it immediately. While I was still waiting in the office, a reply was received from Diarbekir that it had been safely received, and had been sent on at once to Pera [Beyoğlu].

The telegram, which was in English, was thus sent from Cilicia to the frontiers of Mesopotamia, and thence through Constantinople to England. It was duly received at its destination the same afternoon.³⁵

The Ottoman system was able to function efficiently, as well as inefficiently.

Attitudes in the Ottoman Empire toward the telegraph were mixed. The lines spread so rapidly that one must assume approval on the part of many Ottoman subjects, and probably indifference on the part of many more. But there were objectors. Some of them were government officials. When Smith and Hamlin gave their second demonstration at Beylerbey Palace, to the dignitaries, Smith sent one telegram only. "No second telegram was required," Hamlin wrote later, "and very fortunately; for we afterwards found one of the wires separated; and strongly suspected this was done by the malice of some one who did not wish the telegraph to be introduced." Hamlin's explanation for the fact that the Istanbul-Edirne telegraph line that Sultan Abdülmecid wanted was not soon built was that "the pashas united against it. They wanted no such tell-tale to report their doings every day, while in the distant interior."³⁶ Although his judgment may be the conventional wisdom of the western observer, it is probably correct. Among ordinary people there was sometimes a kind of superstitious or uninformed view of the telegraph; some thought it a kind of magic. Turkish engineers erecting lines in 1864 between Samsun and Amasya believed that the lines had to be put up on the poles wet, so they dipped the wire in mud puddles.³⁷ It was reported that inhabitants of Edirne, where the telegraph office was located outside the city, did not want the wires coming into the city for fear that they would conduct lightning.³⁸

Some conservative religious opposition to the telegraph also existed. Sir Charles Eliot, at times an overly caustic critic, said that there were members of the ulema "who seriously discuss how near to a mosque a telegraph wire can properly pass, seeing that it is a means of conveying the voice of Satan from one place to another."³⁹ A lithographed booklet or tract, published in the 1880s or 1890s by an Ottoman religious scholar who was probably not a mem-

ber of the ulema, condemned a number of modern technological innovations, including the telegraph. That invention, in his view, was a product created by God but purveyed through the agency of unbelievers to lead human sinners astray.⁴⁰

Such voices, however, all anonymous, did not represent the totality of good Muslims. Many members of the ulema in the nineteenth century were partisans of new learning and favored the spread of European science.⁴¹ Members of the ulema took a prominent part in ceremonies opening the Edirne telegraph office in 1855.⁴² They undoubtedly did so elsewhere as well. A Muslim trader from Zanzibar remarked approvingly many times, in a travel account, on the telegraph in the Ottoman Empire, and especially on its use on the Suez Canal by ships notifying others by wire of their transit to avoid collision.⁴³ An Arab of Damascus wrote toward the end of the century that the telegraph was a particular boon to Muslims making the pilgrimage to Mecca: "His Majesty, the sultan (may Allah protect him and lead him to victory), has granted a favor to all pilgrims by having a telegraph line installed between Damascus and Mecca. Thanks to this, there is no further need for branch [postal] stations on the road. The pilgrim may inform his family or they may inform him or inquire about him, in any place on the road having a telegraph branch. May Allah reward our master and sultan, the caliph, with the best of rewards. Amen!"⁴⁴ This was in the time of Sultan Abdülhamid II, who consciously used the telegraph and, soon thereafter, the Hejaz railway to bind the Arab parts of the empire to Istanbul's rule, and to boost Islamic unity as well.

One of the strongest early statements in favor of the telegraph was made in 1863 by Münif Efendi (later Paşa), a man who held many high offices in the Ottoman administration. Münif was one of the true Istanbul intellectuals of the later nineteenth century. He was thoroughly grounded in Islamic education; in addition, he had studied briefly at the University of Berlin while serving as a secretary of embassy in the Ottoman diplomatic mission there. He read widely. Much interested in western innovations, Münif was one of the founders of the Cemiyet-i İlmiye-i Osmaniye, the Ottoman Scientific Society, and of its journal, *Mecmua-i Fünun*. In that journal, in its first year, Münif published an article entitled "History of the Telegraph."⁴⁵ In it Münif traces the history of pre-electric telegraphs from Homeric times on and then describes some of the major European electrical and telegraphic inventions of the preceding hundred years. Curiously, he makes no mention of Samuel F. B. Morse, his machine, or his code. He concludes by describing somewhat dramatically the success of underwater cables in the British Isles and then the two breaks in the Atlantic cable laid in 1858, the successful third try, and the exchange of messages between President Buchanan and Queen Victoria before the cable again temporarily ceased functioning.

More than a history, Münif's article is a public relations piece—vigorous advocacy of the telegraph as a beneficent tool for mankind. Münif vaunts its

speed and convenience. Governments can get immediate news of events in their territories, he says; long speeches or documents can be transmitted quickly, and he gives examples; the telegraph can be very useful to railroads and to gendarmes, and he gives more examples; an ill person can consult a famous doctor in another city and get an instant prescription by wire! In America and England, continues Münif, aficionados of chess at fifty or sixty hours' distance have played matches by telegraph. All his examples come from Europe and America, of course; he has kept up well with the news. Münif says nothing at all about the development of the telegraph in the Ottoman Empire since its introduction nine years before, though he was certainly completely informed about it. He does, however, give a hypothetical example of an individual in Istanbul who wants to do business with some one in Paris or London or Baghdad—each of them by this time connected by wire to Istanbul. The two businessmen at distant points can confer at the rate of 120 letters of the alphabet per minute, says Münif. It may be that he was preaching to the converted, since readers of his journal tended to be people like himself. But the article gives the impression that Münif is arguing a case because there may still be important people, literate people, who need to be persuaded that the electric telegraph is a boon, not a threat.

The impact of the electric telegraph in the Ottoman Empire went far beyond attitudes of disapproval or support. This western innovation cast into Ottoman society created ripples that touched many aspects of life. The first, naturally, was government. From the beginning the telegraph was a branch of Ottoman government and a government monopoly, except for the British company allowed to operate a submarine cable service in the Aegean area. A new bureaucracy grew from a start of a few men to several thousand within two decades. First there was the task force, mentioned earlier, of six high-level military and civil officials that decided in 1854 to create an Ottoman telegraph system. This was apparently succeeded by a more permanent telegraph commission by 1856, all civil officials and most of them in the foreign ministry.⁴⁶ One of the commission's members was the director of telegraphs, for in 1855 the General Directorate of Telegraphs had been established. The first director, Billurîzade Mehmed Efendi, was appointed on March 29, 1855. He had started his government service in the Translation Bureau and then had been attached to Âli Paşa, who was many times foreign minister and grand vezir.⁴⁷ The director was, in the early years, under the supervision of the beylikçi of the imperial divan, an important functionary whose office controlled many administrative and record-keeping services. In 1871, however, the older postal service, dating from 1840, was combined with the younger telegraphic service under a minister of post and telegraph, who thereafter directed both operations.⁴⁸

Under the director of telegraphs, the number of telegraph offices increased geometrically in the earliest years. In 1863, 52 offices were functioning, by

1866 there were 135, and by 1869 there were 320. A breakdown of the latter showed 103 in Anatolia, 143 in European provinces, 50 in "Arabistan" (Syria, Iraq, and Arabia, presumably), and 5 in Tripoli of North Africa and the Aegean Islands. This left 19 for Istanbul and the region around it.⁴⁹ In 1871 the capital had three major telegraph offices, in Beyoğlu (Pera), Istanbul proper (always called the Dersaadet office, after the common name for Istanbul), and Üsküdar. At the time of the amalgamation of postal and telegraph services, the Beyoğlu office had 60 officials, all designated as "French communications officials," and 1 mechanic; the Dersaadet office had 23 officials for Turkish communications and 4 for French; Üsküdar had 27 officials for Turkish, a vacancy for a French specialist, and 1 mechanic. The staffing of the Beyoğlu office indicated not only the nature of the population of this Europeanized suburb of Istanbul but also the considerable volume of its telegraph traffic. Other offices in Istanbul were located in Galata, Kadıköy, the Princes Islands, and probably in other suburbs.⁵⁰ The whole Ottoman system had 3,607 employees in 1869, just fifteen years after the first line was opened; of these 132 were "high officials," 1,992 were telegraph station officials, and 1,483 were line guards, servants, messengers, and the like.⁵¹ The new bureaucracy generated much paper: many official forms of its own, often with headings in both Turkish and French. It also produced uniforms, which in the early days were of black broadcloth with silver stripes on the sleeve to indicate rank.⁵²

The proliferation of telegraph offices had an effect on architecture, beginning with the very first office in Istanbul. It was located close to the Sublime Porte, in the street then known as Soğuk Çeşme, which skirted the outer wall of the Topkapı Palace. Near the Alay Köşk, the imperial kiosk that still today juts out from the wall opposite the Sublime Porte, a site for the telegraph office was approved by the grand vezir and sultan. It was actually a bastion in the old wall. A European architect of some repute, Giuseppe Fossati—"Little" Fossati, the younger brother of the better known Gaspare Fossati—who was working in Istanbul, was retained. His plan for the building has recently been discovered in the family archive in Switzerland. Fossati built next to the wall a modest building in a formal European style. Later a third story was added, and the Alay Köşk itself was, with imperial permission, added to the office space. As the office expanded, it moved across the street to the former building of the military preparatory school, and finally in 1909 to the post and telegraph office building in grand late-Ottoman style, which it still occupies, near Yenıcamı and the Galata bridge.⁵³ The Istanbul buildings all housed the central administrative offices.

The Beyoğlu office started in a small rented building in the quarter known as Tepebaşı, in the street (later the Meşrutiyet Caddesi) where hotels for European travelers sprang up, the most famous of them the Pera Palas. It must

have found expanded facilities soon. Finally, but only after the Young Turk revolution of 1908, the Beyoğlu telegraph office took over a mansion built in 1874 by a Greek in what was known then as the Grand' Rue de Pera (now İstiklal Caddesi), opposite the lycée of Galatasaray. There, amid marble and costly woods and newly commissioned murals by an Italian artist the Ottoman telegraph occupied the first two floors, while the Eastern Cable Company and a German cable company occupied the top two.⁵⁴ Provincial offices occupied all kinds of structures, but when new ones were built they may have tended toward the pattern of one erected in Bursa about 1879 by the then-governor Ahmed Vefik Paşa, a well-known intellectual and vigorous public servant. The square two-story building, looking rather like a suburban French villa slightly Ottomanized, housed both the post office and the telegraph office.⁵⁵

The advent of electric telegraphy pushed the Ottoman government also into technical education, in order to train Ottoman telegraphers and avoid continued dependence on foreigners. The first step was on-the-job training under the imported French specialists. Mustafa Efendi and Vuliç Efendi, already mentioned, were the first; they came from the Translation Bureau and knew French. Others followed, many of them also from the Translation Bureau. This was in 1855–56. Then, in the years immediately following, courses in “telegraph clicking” were given in the Istanbul headquarters. In 1861 a formal school was established, the Fünun-i Telgrafiye Mektebi, with a two-year program that included classes in the morning and practical experience in the afternoon. The statute establishing the school set forth a very practical curriculum that included training in office work as well as in the scientific aspects of telegraphy and electricity. This school enjoyed an intermittent existence; it was discontinued and then resurrected at least three times, but in its final incarnation it lasted through the Great War and into the Republican period. During one of the intervals in the school's life, courses in telegraphy were inaugurated in the Imperial Lycée (which became the Galatasaray Lycée) and in the Darüşşafaka, a secondary school where poor boys and orphans could receive an education of high quality. The Galatasaray courses soon lapsed, but graduates of the Darüşşafaka for many years filled posts in the telegraph system, including posts of high level. Emile Lacoine, a French technician who headed the ministry's office of telegraphic science, taught there and wrote a text for his students.⁵⁶

For some of the students the cap to their education was further study at the higher school of telegraphy in Paris. From 1883 to 1891 one or two students a year, Darüşşafaka graduates who were already employed in the ministry, were sent there. But in 1892 all still in Paris were recalled after some had participated in a demonstration there, evidently one in which Young Turks were involved. Sultan Abdülhamid II was extraordinarily sensitive to anything that

smacked, even remotely, of political agitation or opposition. Thereafter, no more telegraphy students were sent to Paris.⁵⁷ Even without the education abroad, however, the schooling program in telegraphy succeeded in its purpose of training native officials. The number of foreigners employed in the Ottoman system was highest at its start and declined to very few after 1871.

While technical education was needed to produce new generations of telegraph operators and administrators, a repair shop was also needed for work on the telegraph instruments themselves. The Ottoman administration was thus led to another venture, which became, finally, a small factory. At first, foreign specialists did the repair and maintenance work. But so early as 1859 an employee of the telegraph office in Varna, Mikael Efendi, himself made and successfully tested a telegraph machine. A master machinist colleague of his, Besim Efendi, also in Varna, made another in 1861. But until 1869 all machines used in the Ottoman telegraph system were imported. At some uncertain date a repair shop was set up in Istanbul. Watchmakers and watchmakers' apprentices were, at first, chosen as the most apt to learn repair work. In 1869 the repair shop metamorphosed into a tiny factory, which in two months is said to have produced a hundred machines. It was located in a big wooden building across the street from the Istanbul telegraph office. In the *Terzihane*, as the building was known, Besim Bey was the factory director and two others worked with him in 1871. Two years later it had eleven employees, and by 1915 over a hundred. The factory was obliged to move three times within a decade but by 1881 was permanently established in a building behind the telegraph office, up against the palace wall. By 1918 the factory had produced over five thousand telegraph instruments and many batteries and accessories. Each machine made saved the Ottoman budget a considerable sum, compared to import costs. The production may have brought some visibility to the Ottoman Empire, as machines made in the factory were exhibited in expositions at Vienna in 1884, Chicago in 1893, and Turin in 1911 and took prizes. The factory obviously trained some good Ottoman machinists, as well.⁵⁸

Maintaining and repairing instruments in the comfort of Istanbul was one thing; maintaining and repairing the telegraph wires that stretched across the Balkans and Anatolia was something quite other. The difficulties of line maintenance were enormous, and the British complained periodically that the Ottomans had not mastered the art, that their service was interrupted by line breaks, or some other cause, far too often—as late as 1904–5, they said, the interruptions on the Istanbul-Fao line totaled 65 days.⁵⁹ The difficulties were great, even just from the weather: heat on one end near the Persian Gulf, cold on the northern ends in Anatolia and the Balkans. Major Biddulph, riding the French-built line in February of 1856 “over bleak highlands near Rustchuk,” wrote that he “passed a mile of wire broken down from the ice having formed on the wire an inch thick in diameter. It was blowing a severe gale at the time.

It was fearfully cold; but yet the French Surveillant was at work setting up the wire.”⁶⁰ Maintenance was sometimes cruel. In other places people might damage the wire. There was special fear of unruly Arab tribes in the south-east, near Diyarbekir and Mosul and farther south in Iraq. Bedouin may take down the poles for fuel in winter, reported the British consul in Mosul, or to use for tent poles.⁶¹ Tribes were actually more destructive in Iran than in the Ottoman Empire, but the potential for breaks was there. Some of the terrain made access to the lines difficult. “Turkey was the first country to introduce telegraphic lines into places where roads and railways were unknown,” wrote Lacoine.⁶² He exaggerated only slightly. The Ottoman Empire had some roads, and railways were being introduced, slowly. But most telegraph lines ran across country.

The answer to the problem of line maintenance was to assure constant, daily inspection and repair. The Ottoman telegraph administration tried to do this by using guards, watchmen, repairmen, and cavalrymen, with inspectors in charge of specific provincial stretches of line. Continuous inspection of lines and examination of telegraph instruments were mandated by regulations; a law of 1876 provided further that a line guard was to be posted every three hours’ journey in mountainous terrain, every five hours’ journey on flat land, and every eight hours’ distance along railway lines. Possibly this was achieved on some Balkan lines. On the stretch from Istanbul to Edirne to Şumnu, fifty-four sentry boxes were erected. But it seems unlikely that any such close inspection was achieved in Anatolia. However, in the Iraqi region from Mosul south, the government required Arab, Kurd, and Türkmen tribes to furnish men to patrol the lines; they would be paid if the lines in the vicinity of their camp or village were undamaged. The leading tribal chiefs were also given a “modest subsidy,” which the Porte, curiously, entrusted to the British consul-general in Baghdad to distribute.⁶³

Vandalism did exist, nevertheless, and the fact that it did led not only to some of the detailed regulations that line inspectors were to adhere to but also to the creation of new law and the thickening of legal codes. The vandalism began while the first Ottoman line was under construction, between Edirne and Şumnu, in 1855. Someone stole a quantity of wire, thereby delaying the completion and opening of the line. “The government thereupon drew up and publicized on all sides a regulation that those who tampered with the line would be severely punished,” wrote an early chronicler of the Ottoman telegraph.⁶⁴ So the telegraph entered Ottoman criminal law as soon as the first line was strung.

Within two years a three-article law to protect the telegraph was prepared by the Tanzimat Council, the new organ that in the post-Crimean period was given the function of drafting legislation. The law provided varying fines and prison terms for those who damaged telegraph poles, wire, insulators, or in-

struments, or in any way interrupted communications, or who took part in uprisings or movements that did so.⁶⁵ The law provided punishments in cases both of carelessness and of malevolence. One gets the impression that perhaps some damage to lines was due to obscurantist or superstitious opposition, and perhaps also to the aversion of people in some localities to being checked up on by a central government. The new law was incorporated almost verbatim in the Ottoman Penal Code promulgated in 1858.⁶⁶ Many, perhaps most, of the code's provisions were modeled after French penal law, for the code was one of the major steps in westernization. It seems significant that the three articles on damage to the telegraph were based on Ottoman experience rather than a French model. Curiously the telegraph was not mentioned in the new law on provincial administration, the *vilayet law*, issued in 1867, for that law contained several provisions about the obligation of caring for roads.⁶⁷ But the telegraph did appear in the next year in general regulations adopted concerning the security of railways: "Whoever wilfully destroys or damages the rail line . . . or has used any means to . . . interrupt the telegraphic communication between the railway stations shall be punished with imprisonment of one to three years."⁶⁸

The telegraph involved the Ottoman government in much new work on law and regulations that went well beyond penal law. A basic set of 79 articles on the administration of the telegraph system was promulgated on October 24, 1859. It regulated the sending of messages, priorities—government telegrams first, conduct of officials, apprentice learning, repairs, and many other things. The new system obviously generated much red tape; article 48 said that employees' clothing must always be clean. Additional rules were issued on employees, others for inspectors of lines as mentioned earlier, and by 1914 an incredibly long list specified which government employees were allowed to send telegrams. There were also rules on who could and could not use cyphers for transmitting messages.⁶⁹

The advent of the telegraph in the Ottoman Empire was reflected in international dealings and in international law as well as in domestic law. Concessions to foreign companies, or agreements with foreign contractors and suppliers, represent one aspect of these dealings, which might also get into the diplomatic sphere of government to government relations on occasion.⁷⁰ The Porte also became a member of the International Telegraph Union when it was established in 1865. Agaton Efendi, then telegraph director, represented the Porte at its first conference in Paris.⁷¹ Because the telegraph was regulated internationally by conventions negotiated among sovereign states, the Ottoman Empire became a party to many of these. The first was between the Porte and Austria, signed in Istanbul on January 21, 1857, by the Austrian ambassador and the Ottoman foreign minister. It set forth rules on transmissions, on rates to be charged, and on the permissible languages for telegrams. Official tele-

grams could be coded in numbers; every five figures would be charged as one word. Private persons would not be allowed to use number codes. This and other telegraph conventions to which the Porte was a party between 1857 and 1875, together with many addenda down to 1910 expanding and revising their provisions, fill a four-hundred page volume.⁷²

The telegraph also introduced the Porte to another aspect of international relations, the exchange of meteorological information. An international organization for the telegraphic exchange had been organized in 1863. The Porte joined in 1868. Beginning then, the Istanbul observatory, which in reality was principally a meteorological station, received daily reports from widely scattered cities in the empire. Trabzon on the Black Sea, Saloniki and Izmir on the Aegean, Beirut on the Mediterranean, Fao on the Persian Gulf, and other centers sent in information, which Istanbul summarized and telegraphed out in turn to Paris, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, St. Petersburg, and Hungarian stations. In return Istanbul received daily information on weather conditions likely to affect Ottoman territories and was able to warn port cities of approaching storms.⁷³

Probably the principal political effect of the electric telegraph was to assist the centralization of power in the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman archives are full of copies of telegrams sent from the Sublime Porte to provincial officials, and from those officials to the Porte, during the later Tanzimat period and the ensuing rule of Abdülhamid II and then of the Young Turks. Frequent checks on the situation in most localities were far easier than they had been before the telegraph. Orders to governors of vilayets and sancaks, to military units and to gendarme posts, were far easier. The electric telegraph was endowed with a unique ability to divorce communication from transportation. No longer did a message or an order depend on a horseman or a ship to carry it. "The telegraph freed communication from the constraints of geography," says one of its leading students.⁷⁴ Government was probably the principal beneficiary. Power could be projected from the center on command. Fear of this long arm of government is reflected in an account by an Ottoman lady who was trying to escape her husband, Kibrıslı Mehmed Paşa, one of the leading Ottoman statesmen. In 1866 Melek Hanım and her children took ship at Istanbul, to flee through the Dardanelles and the Aegean to Piraeus. "As we descended the 'Great Straits,'" she wrote in her memoir, "every minute drawing more and more beyond danger, further and further from the immediate reach of that terrible, silent, fiery messenger, the telegraph, our spirits rose and our courage grew."⁷⁵

The reasonably objective judgment of Henry Harris Jessup, an American missionary in Beirut, writing in 1874, confirms the impression one gets from reading the Ottoman documents: "They have a postal telegraph service, defective enough, and yet enabling the central power in Constantinople to

move the whole empire like a machine.”⁷⁶ Charles Eliot’s passage on the telegraph, written about twenty-five years later during the reign of the autocratic Abdülhamid II, exhibits the same judgment in a more acerbic form:

Little as the Turks like railways, they are great patrons of the telegraph, because it is the most powerful instrument for a despot who wishes to control his own officials. It is no longer necessary to leave a province to the discretion of a governor, and trust that he will come home to be beheaded when that operation seems desirable. With the telegraph one can order him about, find out what he is doing, reprimand him, recall him, instruct his subordinates to report against him, and generally deprive him of all real power. As the Ottoman administration reckes little of the public convenience, they frequently summon a governor to the telegraph office, and monopolise the wire for as long as they choose in communicating with him.⁷⁷

The telegraph operated further as a check on local authorities because citizens could wire their grievances to the central government. Individual and group petitions seeking remedies are not unusual among Ottoman documents. This facility had, however, one side effect deleterious to the central government, as individuals or groups could also appeal by wire to representatives of foreign powers to support them against some act of Ottoman authorities. Minority peoples were most likely to use this channel.

One section of the Ottoman government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was affected to a greater degree than others by the electric telegraph because almost all of its work depended on communication, and that over international lines. The ministry and its representatives abroad in embassies, legations, and consulates adjusted quickly to the new medium, though they had problems with messages that were lost or delayed or garbled. Part of the trouble arose from the coding and decoding of telegrams, where mistakes could easily be made on either end, as well as by the telegraph operators in between who were sending sets of incomprehensible numbers.

Although the elapsed time for messages was enormously reduced from pre-1855 years when a courier had to transport the messages, the telegraph brought with it a concomitant disadvantage. The disadvantage was that time to make decisions was greatly reduced. Other governments could demand a reply from the Porte in a short time, knowing well how speedy communication with Istanbul now was. For the Ottoman government, used to somewhat deliberate decisions arrived at by collegial discussion and agreement in the council of ministers, the demand for speed was unwelcome. During the Paris peace congress, for instance, at the end of the Crimean War in 1856, the grand vezir Âli Paşa, who was the first plenipotentiary, was several times told that he would have to get an immediate decision from the Porte. On one occasion his

allies, the British and French plenipotentiaries, pressed him to get an answer on new instructions in two days. This was approximately the normal time required for a telegram from Paris to Istanbul and another in return.⁷⁸ The Sublime Porte adjusted to the new requirement for speed as well as it could, on this and other occasions. The total effect of the telegraph, however, included unhelpful aspects like this pressure for speed, as well as helpful ones.

An interesting side effect of the telegraph was that it seemed to increase, rather than decrease, the amount of paperwork in the foreign ministry, despite the pithy nature of telegraphic communication. The additional paper accumulated because of new telegraph forms and the additional steps of encoding and decoding, and also because the content of telegrams was usually confirmed by later, longer despatches sent by courier or surface mail.⁷⁹

The telegraph had a cultural as well as a political impact. It provided a conduit for western influence in the Ottoman Empire, much of it brought by Frenchmen and Englishmen who worked side by side with Ottoman subjects and, at the beginning, as supervisors of the Ottomans. The contacts began with the construction crews—M. De la Rue and his French team on the Istanbul-Edirne-Şumnu line in 1855 and Lieutenant Colonel Biddulph and his British crew on the Üsküdar-Baghdad-Basra-Fao line in 1858 and after. In 1859, seventeen Britons were on the payroll for the latter.⁸⁰ They had an Armenian interpreter, so the direct conversation between Turks and Britons may have been limited. The technological impact of the British team was undoubtedly the most immediate. Once the line through Anatolia began operating, it appears that most of the employees were Ottomans. There were, of course, the fifty British in the joint telegraph office in Fao on the Gulf. On the European side, however, the number of French who were employed by the Ottoman administration was considerable. M. De Lusson headed the Istanbul telegraph office at the start. The first head of the Beyoğlu office was actually English (or Irish), a Mr. O'Connor; he was succeeded by a Frenchman, and thereafter all Beyoğlu directors were Ottomans. Payroll lists for men working in Istanbul and in telegraph offices in the Balkans in the years 1856–1858 show more than a dozen French names and some of other nationalities.⁸¹ Foreigners employed by the Ottomans were usually designated in these documents as “Monsieur,” while Ottomans were labeled “Efendi” or “Bey.” Salaries of the imported specialists were much higher than those of the native Ottomans; the telegraph commission at one point calculated that for the combined salaries of M. De Lusson and a colleague, M. Thierry, it could hire five Ottoman employees and raise the pay of eight others.⁸²

In the vital posts of inspector or surveillant of lines only westerners were employed, at the start, in the eight inspectorates of the empire. The chief appeared to be a Pole—M. Holeviski or Helvenski—the others French and of varied nationalities. Of thirteen early mechanics on the roster, four or five were westerners. The observatory had as director a man who was apparently

Greek, M. Aristidi Kumbari, and two assistant directors who were French; one of these was M. Emile Lacoine, also the head of the science office and teacher at the Darüşşafaka.⁸³ Poles played an important role in telegraph construction and operation. After the failure of the 1831 and 1863 nationalist risings in Russian Poland, many Poles took refuge in the Ottoman Empire, quite a few engineers among them. One helped to build the Istanbul-Şumnu line, another built the Usküdar-Ismid section, and others were employed in the Tuna vilayet in the 1860s when Midhat Paşa was the governor there.⁸⁴ Quite a few became Ottoman subjects, and many of them were culturally quite French. It is hard to estimate the cultural impact of such individuals from various European countries, but numbers of them spent their whole lives in the Ottoman Empire, often in government service, sometimes still in the telegraphic service. Today one can read in the Haydarpaşa English cemetery the inscription on the tombstone of the Istanbul agent of the British cable company that shared the Beyoğlu telegraph office with the Ottomans: "Charles James Weale—Agent General and Superintendant of the Eastern Telegraph Company at Constantinople—7 May 1856–13 December 1913."

Almost all the foreigners employed by the Ottoman telegraph system were French speaking, whether of French nationality or not. Because of this, and because French was without question the dominant international language of the nineteenth century, the first telegrams sent in the Ottoman system, whether domestic or international in destination, were in French. English never gained wide acceptance in the same way, despite the provision that the telegraphers on the Istanbul-Baghdad-Fao line should know that tongue. The telegraph must have been quite a spur to the study of French in the Ottoman Empire. Knowledge of French could open the doors to new kinds of employment, and further to many aspects of western civilization.⁸⁵ So early as November 1855 the Porte distributed to foreign embassies a printed brochure showing the French (or Latin) letters that could be used for telegraphing, along with a schedule of rate charges.⁸⁶ In the first international convention that the Porte made on the telegraph, with Austria in 1857, it was stipulated that government telegrams sent internationally must be in French, German, Italian, or English, and if by private persons in the same languages except English. In all cases they must be in Latin letters within Turkey. By 1896, the number of languages accepted by the Porte for use in sending telegrams had risen to thirty-seven, although one doubts that all were actually used in the Ottoman Empire.⁸⁷ Turkish was one of the thirty-seven. But French remained, with Turkish, the major telegraphic language until the end of the empire. It was an administrative language in some offices, as well as a medium for messages.⁸⁸

The first telegram in Turkish was sent from Edirne to Istanbul on May 3, 1856. It was the fruit of work by Mustafa Efendi and Vuliç Efendi while they were getting on-the-job training in 1855 with Le Comte Enklès, the French

inspector of the Varna-to-Bucharest line. These two alumni of the Translation Bureau knew French but wanted to send in Turkish also on the Morse instruments, and so worked out a Turkish Morse code, applying the same system of dots and dashes to letters of the Turkish alphabet. They taught their code to other Turks in the Istanbul office later that year. Soon Mustafa, then only 22 or 23 years old, was named head of the Edirne telegraph office. There he continued his work and sent the first telegram in Turkish, 128 words in all, to Billurizade Mehmed in Istanbul. After this success, the governor of Edirne began to send his telegrams to the Porte in Turkish rather than French, and the use of Turkish spread thereafter throughout the Ottoman system.⁸⁹

It developed that Mustafa's code was time consuming to send and led to increased costs. The problem was that Mustafa had copied the international Morse code too slavishly. He had simply taken the code symbols for each letter in the order of the Latin alphabet—A, B, C, and so on—and applied them in order to each letter of the Turkish alphabet—elif, be, pe. As a result, some of the lesser used Turkish letters had short code symbols, and some of the most used letters had longer sets of dots and dashes. The problem was corrected two decades later by İzzet Bey, an experienced telegraph man who had been inspector at Kastamonu, Beyoğlu station chief, and assistant minister. İzzet rearranged the dots and dashes so that the most used letters had the simplest symbols. İzzet's system, speeding up transmission 20 percent, was in use, with minor changes, until the empire's end.⁹⁰ Adaptation of the western system was proven to be better than imitative adoption. Although Turkish in İzzet's code, representing the Arabic letters of the Turkish alphabet, was widely used, the international Morse code also continued to be used in some quarters to send Turkish written in Latin letters. The letters were pronounced as if they were French. Thus the telegram could read "Bouguidje onikide chemindeferle guelib" ("Having come by train tonight at 12:00"); in modern Turkish the spelling would be "Bu gece oniki'de şimendiferle gelip."⁹¹

It is interesting to speculate whether the telegraph contributed much, or at all, to the thinking of those few nineteenth-century Ottoman writers who favored simplification of written Turkish, or improvement in spelling of Turkish words with signs to assist a more phonetic rendering. And did the succinct style of telegraphy urge on not only simplified language and improved spelling but also the thought that came to a few Ottomans of adopting the Latin alphabet? Evidence on these matters is lacking. What does seem certain is that the telegraph introduced new words into the Turkish language, taken over from French, and gave greater currency in Turkish to other French terminological imports. "Telgraf" is the most distinctive new Turkish word. "Elektrik" now became quite current. Other technical terms transferred from French that appear in the Ottoman laws and regulations are *porşelen* or *izolatör* (insulator), *pil* (battery), *servis* (service), *kablo* (cable); *makine* (machine) became much more common and so did *şifre* (cypher). One French term that appears in

by 1869, 39 were primarily for railroad communications.¹⁰⁴ The slow growth of railroads meant that they were of little help to the military when the Ottoman Empire was next confronted with a major war, against Russia, in 1877–1878. The telegraph, in contrast, was developed enough so that the military could use it to advantage. By the time of the Great War of 1914–1918 the telegraph played an essential role in Ottoman planning and in conduct of military operations on the four far-flung fronts of Eastern Anatolia, Gallipoli, Iraq, and Syria. As far as the diplomacy of war was concerned, the telegraph was of course already in use in Istanbul before the end of the Crimean War. The last major international crisis in Europe before the age of the telegraph had been the revolutions of 1848–1849 and the accompanying wars. By the time of the Balkan crisis of 1875–1877 that led to the Ottoman War of 1877 with Russia, the telegraph was central to all international negotiation.

Next to government, Ottoman businessmen were presumably the greatest users of the telegraph. It was expected that this would be so. Merchants, or “merchants and other people,” are mentioned frequently in early documents as beneficiaries of the new speedy communications.¹⁰⁵ The Beyoğlu telegraph office was planned with “ambassadors and foreigners and speculators” in mind.¹⁰⁶ Obviously, merchants looked with favor on the telegraph and did use it. A group of Muslim and non-Muslim merchants in Bursa petitioned the government in 1857 for a line to be built to their city from Istanbul and offered to pay themselves for five hundred telegraph poles.¹⁰⁷ The newspaper *Hakayik-ül-Vekayi* in 1871 published articles reviewing the progress made in building the telegraph system and envisioned it as promoting banking, commerce, and industry; if they should prosper, then the state too would prosper from increased taxes and customs duties.¹⁰⁸ It would be interesting to know in some detail how Ottoman merchants used the telegraph—whether to offer goods, check on prices in distant markets, make purchase or sale agreements, learn of weather and crop conditions, secure loans, follow foreign exchange rates, or send and receive messages from business agents and representatives elsewhere.

News, whether business news in a narrow sense or world affairs in the broadest sense, was a commodity distributed faster by telegraph than by any preceding means. In the beginning in the Ottoman Empire the greatest consumer of news brought by telegraph was undoubtedly the government itself. But private individuals were also consumers. In addition to getting news from telegrams addressed to them, individuals and communities probably got news from telegraphers in stations all about the empire who were receiving it and clicking it again to distant points. It has been pointed out that “the telegraph operator was able to monopolize knowledge, if only for a few moments.”¹⁰⁹ He also was in a position to dispense information. As an example, in Tokat early in 1877 a telegraph official, in this case inspector, told a traveler that

orders had just been sent out from Istanbul to buy up all available horses. In the days before the internal-combustion engine was put into self-propelled vehicles, this was a sign of preparation for war. "Things look warlike," said the inspector.¹¹⁰ The Russian war began shortly thereafter.

In the long run, newspapers became the most important dispensers of information sent by telegraph. The newspaper press was just beginning to grow in Istanbul in the post-Crimean period, both in Turkish and in other languages, principally French. The foreign-language papers tended to carry more news received by telegraph, but it was never a flood; the news from abroad was often scanty, and the papers themselves were slim. In July 1866 the Ottoman foreign ministry sent out a telegram to its embassies in Paris, London, and Vienna asking them to wire news of events in Europe as often as possible. "We are reduced to the telegraphic news which the newspapers of the capital publish," said the ministry, and that obviously was insufficient.¹¹¹ The telegram was sent in the tense days after Prussia had defeated Austria in the battle of Königgrätz and Napoleon III was trying to arrange a peace that Bismarck would accept. Newspapers in the capitals of the great powers of Europe began to publish a good deal of telegraphic news from the Ottoman Empire, although they did not soon abandon the older method of long despatches from their own correspondents. By the time of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877, westerners were used to news each day by telegraph. That war has been called "the breakfast war"; Englishmen at breakfast read each day the latest wire despatches from the front in their newspapers.¹¹²

So the ripples created by the advent of the electric telegraph in the Ottoman Empire spread far. The instrument developed by an American and the wires strung by the French and British were accepted by the Ottomans despite the presence of some doubters and critics, and operated by them. The telegraph system produced in its first two or three decades a new bureaucracy, many telegraph stations dotted about the empire, a telegraph school, a telegraph factory, an inspection system strung out over thousands of kilometers, many new laws and regulations, international agreements, coordinated weather reports, speed and new pressures in diplomacy and decision making, westernizing influences of individuals and techniques, an increased use of French, new words in Turkish, a Turkish Morse code, job opportunities for minority group members and for modernizing Turks, a vital adjunct to railroad operation, a boon for merchants, a tool for military planners and warriors, and a means of speedy news for newspapers. And, above all, the telegraph proved to be a powerful instrument of control in the hands of a centralizing government. The essence of the telegraph was the annihilation of distance, the divorce of communication from transportation, the emphasis on speed.

If distance was now less important, speed—that is, time—was more important. The telegraph seems to have increased awareness of time, at least

among employees of the system and probably among a rather wider user constituency. The basic telegraph law of 1859 dealt with time-awareness in three ways: it regulated the hours of service of telegraph offices, and night hours were included; it listed priorities of transmission, so that some telegrams would be sent and received earlier than others; it emphasized speed and efficiency in telegraph offices. Further, it had never happened before that hour and minute of sending or receipt had been recorded on documents; many government employees now became used to this. Awareness of time was certainly increased. But whether the concept of time was affected by the telegraph is unclear. In Europe and America the telegraph, along with the railroad, led to the adoption of standard time and the creation of time zones. What effect the telegraph may have had in this respect in the Ottoman Empire demands further study. There is also the question of whether the telegraph had an effect on the calculation of prayer time, or on the manner of counting the hours in the Ottoman Empire, so-called Turkish time. At least in the early years, it seems that it did not. When a proposal was made in 1877 that the newly elected Ottoman parliament meet at 11 A.M. western time, to avoid the shifting in Turkish hours calculated according to the time of sunset and sunrise, it was rejected on the grounds that most deputies would not understand the changed system.¹¹³ Some Ottomans, further, considered hurry to be uncivilized and ungodly. Hurry was the essence of the telegraph.

What the telegraph could give, it turned out, the telegraph could take away. Abdülhamid II's control of his empire had been much assisted by the telegraph. He ruled as an autocrat. But in 1908 he was confronted with revolution by telegraph and forced to yield. Rebellious soldiers in Macedonia in July 1908 found support among the populace, the Committee of Union and Progress, and numbers of government officials. Telegrams rained in upon Abdülhamid in his Yildiz palace—some from his officers reporting on the seething, some from the supporters of the revolt, some with many signatures demanding restoration of the constitution of 1876 and of the parliament that Abdülhamid had dismissed in 1878. After anxious consideration of the telegrams in the palace, Abdülhamid announced on July 23 that new elections would be held for deputies to the parliament. The Young Turk revolution succeeded, remarkably, with almost no bloodshed but with application of great pressure. The pressure was made manifest to the sultan by telegraph. Power, it seems, could emanate from either end of the telegraph line.¹¹⁴

There is a second coda as well to the story of the telegraph in the Ottoman Empire. By the 1908 revolution the autocracy of Abdülhamid had been brought to an end. In 1909 he was deposed. His successor reigned but did not rule like earlier members of the house of Osman. At the end of the First World War, however, in the years 1918 to 1923, there arose in Turkey a nationalist movement that brought to an end the reign of the last member of the house of

Osman. It replaced the empire with a republic. The telegraph again played a crucial role in this nationalist revolution.

The nationalist movement, fighting against the occupation of Turkish territory by Allied forces after the 1918 armistice, found a leader in 1919 in Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), the most successful and reputable of the Ottoman army commanders. Kemal proved to be a master in the use of the telegraph. Working from bases in Anatolia, he used the telegraph to keep in touch with secret partisans in Allied-occupied Istanbul, to coordinate political and military moves against the forces of occupation, and to maintain contact with the outside world (at first the only direct line to the West was a submarine cable from Antalya to Rome, but later other connections were secured).¹¹⁵ The telegraph network in Anatolia was Kemal's major weapon. The nationalists contested control of it with the Istanbul government, and won.¹¹⁶ On one occasion Kemal caused what he termed a "telegram tempest" to be loosed on Istanbul to influence the politics of the sultan's government there. By his account, it worked.¹¹⁷ This same account, Kemal's famous six-day speech of 1927 giving his story of the nationalist movement, is heavily freighted with telegram texts; if all telegrams were removed, the movement could not be understood. When the war of independence was over, Kemal was asked how he had won it. His answer was, "With telegraph wires."¹¹⁸

Two Americans had first shown the electric telegraph to the Ottoman sultan in 1847. The sultan had liked it, his government had adopted it, and the western invention became a part of Ottoman life. In 1919 another American, correspondent for the *Chicago Daily News*, came to Anatolia and lived for a time with Mustafa Kemal and the nationalist movement. Lewis Edgar Browne, reporting on the movement, described Kemal's telegraph tactics after the congress of nationalists held in Sivas in September 1919. First Kemal, with his associate Rauf Bey, used the line from Sivas to Istanbul. In Browne's words: "These leaders, acting in the name of the national congress of Sivas, gave the sultan one hour to get out of bed, proceed across Constantinople to the end of the telegraph wire in Stamboul to hear and accept the ultimatum of the Sivas congress. The grand vizier refused for the sultan. . . . Anatolia severed all relations with the sultan and his cabinet." Thereafter, Kemal sought the assured backing of local officials in Anatolia before proceeding to further action. Again Browne, telling what he saw in the telegraph office in Sivas:

I have never heard of more efficient communications than I witnessed that night. Within half an hour Erzerum, Erzingjan, Mosul, Diarbekr, Samsun, Trebizond, Angora, Malatia, Kharput, Konia and Broussa were all in communication by wire with Sivas.

Mustapha Kemal sat at one end of the wire leading to all these places and at the other end sat the military commander and civil authorities of the respective cities and vilayets.¹¹⁹

The electric telegraph, the child of Morse, Smith and Hamlin, De la Rue, Biddulph, Mehmed, Mustafa, Vuliç, Acemyan, Andonyadis, Izzet, Feyzi, and many others, was in good health as the sultanate was dying and a nation was being born.

Notes

1. Charles MacFarlane, *Constantinople in 1828*, 2d ed. (London, 1829), 2: 273–274.

2. Cyrus Hamlin, *Among the Turks* (New York, 1878), pp. 184–185.

3. Asaf Tanrikut, *Türkiye Posta ve Telgraf ve Telefon Tarihi ve Teşkilat ve Mevzuat* (Ankara, 1984), pp. 536–537.

4. Hamlin, *Among the Turks*, pp. 186–194.

5. United States National Archives (hereafter USNA), State Department Records, *Notes and Translations from the Sublime Porte, 1848–49*, translation of *berat* dated middle Safer 1264 (22 Jan. 1848). The translation is perhaps by John P. Brown, the American Legation interpreter; Brown had been present as interpreter at the telegraph demonstration.

6. USNA, State, *Notes from the Porte, 1839–51*, letter from Ferid, Beylerbey, to U.S. Minister, 13 Zilkade 1267 (1 Sept. 1851).

7. M. A. Biddulph, *Report to the Minister for War on the Telegraphic Communications from Constantinople through Vienna to England* (London, 1856), pp. 17–18.

8. Dış-İşleri Bakanlığı Hazine-i Evrak (hereafter DBHE—Archive of the Foreign Ministry, İstanbul), Siyasî, dosya 1258, has information on this cable and on other telegraph lines in the Balkan and Black Sea areas in the Crimean War period.

9. DBHE, Siyasî, dosya 1273, Musurus to Âli #365, 23 Feb. 1855.

10. “Convention between Her Majesty and the Emperor of the French relative to the establishment of a line of electric telegraph between Bucharest and Vienna,” Great Britain, House of Commons, *Sessional Papers*, 1854–55, vol. 55, Cmd. 1836, 1 Feb. 1855.

11. Tanrikut, *Türkiye Posta ve Telgraf*, pp. 551, 568–569; Biddulph, *Report*, 1856, pp. 1–4, 6–7. Tanrikut, on p. 551 and in many other places, is quoting from a telegraph history that appeared in a telegraph journal published by the Ministry of Post and Telegraph, which I have not seen: 1, nos. 10–12 (Şevval–Zilhicce 1293 = Oct.–Dec. 1876).

12. Tankrikut, *Türkiye Posta ve Telgraf*, p. 551. Frank E. Bailey, *British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement . . . 1826–1853* (Cambridge, Mass., 1942), p. 85 and p. 256, table 7, shows that in 1855 Britain's exports of telegraph wire to the Ottoman Empire amounted to 45 percent of her total exports of such wire.

13. Biddulph, *Report*, 1856, p. 1.

14. Tanrikut, *Türkiye Posta ve Telgraf*, p. 551.

15. Ibid., pp. 550–552, 567, 611; Nesimi Yazici, “Osmanlı Telgrafında Dil Konusu,” *Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 26 (1983): 763; Semavi Eyice, “İstanbul’da İlk Telgrafhane-i Amire’nin Projesi (1855),” *İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 34 (1983–84): 61–62, quoting from A. Baha Gököğlu, *Batı ve Doğuda Telgraftılık Nasıl Doğdu?* (Istanbul, 1935), pp. 46 ff. Ali Galib Paşa, the great Reşid Paşa’s son, chaired the commission. Edouard Blacque Bey, son of the editor of *Moniteur Ottomane*, was De la Rue’s associate in the proposal to the Porte. In Turkish sources, De la Rue’s name sometimes appears as Dolaro, so transliterated from the Arabic characters. Yazici, “Dil Konusu,” p. 752 gives his name as De la Rue Arolfe.

16. Text of the telegram in DBHE, Siyasî, Karton 669, dosya 1B, Foreign Minister to Ottoman ambassadors in Paris and London, 14 Sept. 1855.

17. Nesimi Yazici, “Osmanlı Telgraf Fabrikası,” *Türk Dünya Araştırmaları* 22 (Şubat 1983), 69–70; Tanrikut, *Türkiye Posta ve Telgraf*, pp. 552–555; Osman Ergin, *Türkiye Maarif Tarihi* (Istanbul, 1939–1943), 2:620.

18. USNA, Record Group 84, *Notes from the Porte No. 1*, Mehmed Fuad (Foreign Minister) to U.S. Legation, 7 Muharrem 1272/16 Sept. 1855 [sic]. One of the two days indicated must be an error. On 26 Rebiülevvel 1272 (6 Dec. 1855), the *Ceride-i Havadis* published the first rate schedule: Yazici, “Dil Konusu,” p. 764.

19. Lady Hornby (Emilia B. Maceroni H.), *In and Around Stamboul* (London, 1858), p. 101. The letter was of 10 Nov. 1855. Gisborne’s first concession was of 25 April 1855: R. S. Newall, *Observations on the Present Condition of Telegraphs in the Levant* (London, 1860), p. 7.

20. William P. Andrew, *Memoir on the Euphrates Valley Route to India* (London, 1857), pp. 229–233, for the proposal; as an anti-Russian move, pp. 140–145.

21. Tanrikut, *Türkiye Posta ve Telgraf*, pp. 559–560; Charles Issawi, *The Economic History of Turkey, 1800–1914* (Chicago, 1980), p. 151; M. A. Biddulph, *Report, Explanatory of a Map of the Telegraph Lines of the Ottoman Empire* (London, 1860), p. 30, a Treasury minute of 16 Mar. 1859.

22. Halford L. Hoskins, *British Routes to India* (New York, 1928), p. 400.

23. Biddulph, *Report*, 1860, p. 17, giving the text of the instructions.

24. Tanrikut, *Türkiye Posta ve Telgraf*, pp. 595–602, reprinting a series of telegrams celebrating the opening of stations across Anatolia and into Iraq and Syria, and in Saloniki, some later than 1861; Biddulph, *Report*, 1860, pp. 5, 7, 9, 13–14; Newall, *Observations*, p. 47 and map; J. G. Lorimer, *Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, ʿOmān, and Central Arabia* (Calcutta, 1915), 1, part 2: 2401–2402.

25. Newall, *Observations*, pp. 7–12, 31; “Correspondence Respecting the Dardanelles-Alexandria Telegraph (1859–1861),” Great Britain, House of Commons, *Sessional Papers*, 1863, vol. 73, Cmd. 3162.

26. “Convention Between Her Majesty and the Sultan, for the Establishment of Telegraphic Communications Between India and the Ottoman Territory . . . 3 September 1864,” Great Britain, House of Commons, *Sessional Papers*, 1865, vol. 57, Cmd. 3431; Lorimer, *Gazetteer*, 1, part 2: 2402–2414.

27. Lorimer, *Gazetteer*, 1, part 2: 2400–2424; *New International Encyclopaedia* (New York, 1904), vol. 19, s.v. “Telegraphy”; “Convention Between Her Majesty and the Sultan, for the Establishment of a Telegraphic Cable Between Malta and Alexandria . . . April 21, 1861,” Great Britain, House of Commons, *Sessional Papers*, 1861, vol. 62, Cmd. 2856.

28. Figures for 1863 and 1866 from a report by Agaton Efendi, cited in *Hakayik-ül-Vekayi*, #434 and #437 of 27 Ramazan and 4 Şevval 1288 (10 and 17 Dec. 1871). The same newspaper gives the 1869 figures, all of which evidently exclude Egypt. Quotation from newspaper is in Tanrikut, *Türkiye Posta ve Telgraf*, pp. 614–615. Figures for 1904 from George Young, *Corps de droit ottoman* (Oxford, 1905–1906), 4:345. Stanford and Ezel Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey* (Cambridge, 1976–1977), 2:228, give figures from official publications of 23,380 kilometers in 1882 and 49,716 kilometers in 1904, not quite congruent with the others.

29. Eliot G. Mears, *Modern Turkey* (New York, 1924), p. 232.

30. Olive Risley Seward, *William H. Seward's Travels Around the World* (New York, 1873), pp. 528, 530. All poles for Egypt, she says, had to be brought from forests on the Danube.

31. Robert Morris, *Freemasonry in the Holy Land* (LaGrange, Ky., 1868), p. 263.

32. H. C. Rawlinson, *Notes on the Direct Overland Telegraph from Constantinople to Kurrachi* (London, 1861), pp. 5–6.

33. Biddulph, *Report*, 1860, pp. 5–6; cf. also his *Report*, 1856, p. 5. Biddulph had had arguments with the Ottoman telegraph directorate and had been let go, which may have colored his views.

34. Many of these are summed up by Lorimer, *Gazetteer*, pp. 2419–2420, 2422.

35. E. J. Davis, *Life in Asiatic Turkey* (London, 1879), pp. 471–472, July 31.

36. Hamlin, *Among the Turks*, pp. 192, 194.

37. Henry J. Van Lennep, *Travels in Little-Known Parts of Asia Minor* (London, 1870), 1:85.

38. Tanrikut, *Türkiye Posta ve Telgraf*, p. 551.

39. Odysseus [Charles Eliot], *Turkey in Europe* (London, 1900), p. 99.

40. Rudolph Peters, “Religious Attitudes Toward Modernization in the Ottoman Empire: A nineteenth century pious text on steamships, factories and the telegraph,” *Die Welt des Islams* N.S. 26 (1986): 76–105.

41. Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, “Some Critical Notes on the Introduction of Modern Sciences to the Ottoman State and the Relation Between Science and Religion up to the End of the Nineteenth Century,” pp. 235–251, in J.-L. Bacqué-Grammont and Emeri van Donzel, eds., *Comité International d'Etudes pré-Ottomanes et Ottomanes, VI Symposium, Cambridge, 1rst-4th July 1984* (Istanbul, 1987); also İhsanoğlu, *Osmanlı İlmî ve Meslekî Cemiyetleri* (Istanbul, 1987), passim, esp. pp. 17–18.

42. Tanrikut, *Türkiye Posta ve Telgraf*, pp. 552–553.

43. Al-Sayyid Humud bu Ahmad ibn Sayf al-bu Saidi, *Rihhat*, trans. & ed. by

Jacob Landau in J.-L. Bacqué-Grammont and Paul Dumont, eds., *Economie et sociétés dans l'Empire ottoman* (Paris, 1983), pp. 91, 97, 101, 103.

44. Jacob Landau, *The Hejaz Railway and the Muslim Pilgrimage* (Detroit, 1971), p. 97, translating a manuscript by Muhammad Arif al-Munir.

45. Münif, "Tarih-i Telgraf," *Mecmua-i Fünun* 1, no. 11 (Zilkade 1279): 448–459.

46. Tanrikut, *Türkiye Posta ve Telgraf*, p. 578, giving a *mazbata* of 23 Ramazan 1272 (28 May 1856) signed and sealed by commission members.

47. *Ibid.*, pp. 564–566, 632, 705–706.

48. *Ibid.*, pp. 205, 632. On the *beylikçi*, see Carter V. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789–1922* (Princeton, 1980), index. Post and Telegraph was put under the supervision of the Ministry of Public Works: Shaw & Shaw, *History*, 2:74, 120.

49. Tanrikut, *Türkiye Posta ve Telgraf*, pp. 539, 614–615. The total and the breakdown derive from different sources, so that the figures may not be exactly congruent. Stations are listed by *sancak*, pp. 539–546. Egypt and Tunis are not included.

50. *Ibid.*, pp. 214–218. Antonii, *Putevoditel' po Kostantinopolu* (Odessa, 1884), p. 248, lists telegraph offices in Istanbul with street addresses.

51. Tanrikut, *Türkiye Posta ve Telgraf*, p. 615. He gives a total of 2,507 employees, which is wrong if the figures for the three categories he lists are correct. Job classifications in further detail can be derived from salary categories given on pp. 259, 267–268.

52. *Ibid.*, pp. 605–607, 639–641. Many forms turn up in the Foreign Ministry archive in Istanbul and in the Prime Ministry archive (Başbakanlık Arşivi).

53. Eyice, "İlk Telgrafhane," pp. 61–72; Tanrikut, *Türkiye Posta ve Telgraf*, pp. 551, 610, 612–613.

54. Tanrikut, *Türkiye Posta ve Telgraf*, pp. 492–493, quoting Mehmet Ali, former deputy director of the Beyoğlu office, in *Posta ve Telgraf Mecmuası* #176 (Kanunuevvel 1331).

55. Photograph shown by Beatrice St. Laurent in "Transition to Modernity: The Urban Transformation of Bursa, 1838–1908," SUNY Binghamton, 8 Oct. 1988.

56. Ergin, *Maarif Tarihi*, 2:621–625; Yazıcı, "Dil Konusu," pp. 753–754; Yazıcı, "Telgraf Fabrikası," p. 70, n. 4; Tanrikut, *Türkiye Posta ve Telgraf*, pp. 570–573. The statute, dated 19 Cemaziülahir 1277 (2 Jan. 1861), is in *Düstur*, 1st ed. (Istanbul, 1289–1290), 2:366–367; Tanrikut reprints it in new letters, p. 571. Emile Lacoine has various spellings in Turkish, sometimes emerging as Cemil Lekovan.

57. Ergin, *Maarif Tarihi*, 2:623–624; Tanrikut, *Türkiye Posta ve Telgraf*, p. 633.

58. Yazıcı, "Telgraf Fabrikası," pp. 70–81; Ergin, *Maarif Tarihi*, 2:622; Tanrikut, *Türkiye Posta ve Telgraf*, pp. 663–666.

59. Lorimer, *Gazetteer*, 1, part 2:2422.

60. Biddulph, *Report*, 1856, p. 6.

61. Biddulph, *Report*, 1860, pp. 31–32.

62. Emile Lacoine, “Elektriğin Memleketimizdeki Tatbikati,” *Tercuman-i Hakikat ve Servet-i Fünun* (Special issue, 1895), pp. 38–40, quoted in Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal, 1964), p. 257. Berkes does not give the exact page reference.

63. Tanrikut, *Türkiye Posta ve Telgraf*, pp. 266, 274, 577–578; Rawlinson, *Notes*, pp. 8–9. Detailed instructions for inspectors, undated but before 1872 in any case, are in *Düstur*, 1st ed., 2:368–373, and Tanrikut, pp. 636–638.

64. Tanrikut, *Türkiye Posta ve Telgraf*, p. 551, quoting an account of 1876.

65. *Ibid.*, p. 583; Yazici, “Telgraf Fabrikası,” p. 71. On the Tanzimat Council, see Roderic H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856–1876* (Princeton, 1963), pp. 52–53.

66. Young, *Corps de droit*, 7:28, articles 134–136.

67. Text in Grégoire Aristarchi, *Législation ottomane* (Constantinople, 1873–1888), 3:7–39.

68. Text *ibid.*, p. 228, article 4.

69. Basic regulations of 27 Rebiülevvel 1276 (24 Oct. 1859) in *Düstur*, 1st ed., 2:348–362, and in Tanrikut, *Türkiye Posta ve Telgraf*, pp. 584–591; on employees and offices, *Düstur*, 2:363–367, 19 Cemaziülahir 1277 (2 Jan. 1861), and in Tanrikut, pp. 591–593.

70. R. S. Newall, *Observations*, provides an example of acrimonious relations of the company with the Porte and the British government.

71. Tanrikut, *Türkiye Posta ve Telgraf*, pp. 666–670, 711, 714.

72. I. de Testa, *Recueil des traités de la Porte ottomane* (Paris, 1864–1911), vol. II.

73. N. Gökdoğan, “Turk Astronomi Tarihine bir Bakış,” *Tanzimat* (Istanbul, 1940), 1:473–474.

74. James Carey, “Technology and Ideology: The Case of the Telegraph,” ms., pp. 3–4, quotation on p. 4.

75. Melek Hanim, *Six Years in Europe* (London, 1873), p. 5.

76. Henry Harris Jessup, *Fifty-Three Years in Syria* (New York, 1910), 2:438, quoting a letter by him of 19 Sept. 1874.

77. Odysseus, *Turkey in Europe*, pp. 158–159. Some of this is quoted in Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 2d ed. (London, 1968), p. 187. See also Harold Innis, *Empire and Communications* (Toronto, 1972), p. 7.

78. Başbakanlık Arşivi (Istanbul), Irade, 1272, Hariciye 6592/4, lef 6, telegram Âli Paşa (Paris) to Istanbul, undated but probably 19 Mar. 1856, marked received 20 Mar. 1856.

79. For more details, see Roderic H. Davison, “The Effect of the Electric Telegraph on the Conduct of Ottoman Foreign Relations,” forthcoming in *Proceedings of*

Comité International d'Etudes Pré-Ottomanes et Ottomanes, Minneapolis, August 16–19, 1988.

80. Tanrikut, *Türkiye Posta ve Telgraf*, pp. 580–583, prints documents on the employment of Biddulph and others; Biddulph, *Report*, 1860, lists the 17 Britons.

81. Yazici, “Dil Konusu,” p. 754; Tanrikut, *Türkiye Posta ve Telgraf*, pp. 492, 556–559, 563–564.

82. Yazici, “Dil Konusu,” p. 754 n. 4.

83. Tanrikut, *Türkiye Posta ve Telgraf*, pp. 492, 572, 613, 634–635.

84. Adam Lewak, *Dzieje emigracji polskiej w Turcji (1831–1878)* (Warsaw, 1935), pp. 191, 201; Biddulph, *Report*, 1860, p. 29 note.

85. Yazici, “Dil Konusu,” pp. 752–753, attributes the use of French to the fact that Frenchmen built the first Ottoman line and that the supplies for it came from France. But, given nineteenth-century European culture, French might have been used without French builders or suppliers.

86. USNA, Record Group 84, *Notes from the Porte, 1852–58*, No. 6, 11 Rebiulevvel 1272/22 Nov. 1855, with translation.

87. Young, *Corps de droit*, 4:347–348, giving Ottoman regulations for applying the Budapest Convention of 1896.

88. Official telegraph forms show the title of the Ottoman system in French: Administration Générale des Lignes Télégraphiques (1857); Administration Impériale des Télégraphes (1867); Administration Générale des Télégraphes (1872). There may have been other name changes as well.

89. Yazici, “Dil Konusu,” pp. 755–759; Tanrikut, *Türkiye Posta ve Telgraf*, pp. 753–754. The problem of the correct date for the first telegram in Turkish is discussed and, evidently, solved by Yazici, p. 759. Ergin, *Maarif Tarihi*, 2:621, gives 1861, which seems to be quite wrong. Text of Turkish telegram no. 1 is in Yazici, p. 756.

90. Yazici, “Dil Konusu,” pp. 760–763. He gives the Morse, Mustafa, and Izzet codes in parallel columns as does Tanrikut, p. 555. Izzet became minister of post and telegraph, 1880–1888. Shaw & Shaw, *History*, 2:20, speak of an “Ottoman script machine” with 428 characters. The source for this statement and the date of the machine are unclear. The source may be archival, or may be either Aziz Akincan, *Türkiyede Posta ve Telgrafçılık* (Edirne, 1913), or Şekip Eskin, *Posta, Telgraf, ve Telefon Tarihi* (Ankara, 1942). I have been unable to see either.

91. The phrase is from a telegram of 11 Aug. 1887, Philoxenides (Orsova) to Foreign Ministry, DBHE, Siyasî, Karton 140 bis, dosya 36.

92. Examples from *Düstur*, 1st ed., 2:368–373, and Tanrikut, *Türkiye Posta ve Telgraf*, pp. 594, 636–637. Cf., for some words, O. de Schlechta-Wssehrd, *Manuel terminologique français-ottoman* . . . (Vienna, 1870).

93. Davis, *Life in Asiatic Turkey*, pp. 190, 471–472; Fred Burnaby, *On Horseback Through Asia Minor*, 2d ed. (London, 1877), 1:70, 288.

94. Yazici, “Telgraf Fabrikası,” pp. 72–73, 79; Tanrikut, *Türkiye Posta ve Telgraf*, pp. 572, 665.

95. Donald Quataert, *Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance in the Ottoman Empire, 1881–1908: Reactions to European Economic Penetration* (New York, 1983), p. 78.

96. Tanrikut, *Türkiye Posta ve Telgraf*, pp. 306, 492. Agaton was also minister of public works for part of the time. Probably, Feyzi Efendi should be added to the list of telegraph directors at the end, after Agaton: Tanrikut, p. 714.

97. DBHE, Siyasî, Karton 6, dosya 11, Ottoman Embassy, London, to Safvet Paşa #2963/124, 5 Aug. 1867.

98. Ergin, *Maarif Tarihi*, 2:621.

99. Tanrikut, *Türkiye Posta ve Telgraf*, p. 714.

100. Paul Dumont, "La Turquie dans les Archives du Grand Orient de France," in J.-L. Bacqué-Grammont and Paul Dumont, eds., *Economie et sociétés dans l'Empire ottoman (Fin du XVIII^e–Début du XX^e siècle)* (Paris, 1983), p. 180, n. 29.

101. I. A. Gövsa, *Türk Meşhurları Ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul, 1946), pp. 574–575; Tanrikut, *Türkiye Posta ve Telgraf*, pp. 729–731.

102. Carter V. Findley, "Social Dimensions of the Dervish Life as Seen in the Memoirs of Aşçı Dede Halil İbrahim," in Bacqué-Grammont and Dumont, *Economie et sociétés*, pp. 139, 141–142.

103. Tanrikut, *Türkiye Posta ve Telgraf*, p. 301. The first woman to be director of a post office appears only in 1930: pp. 303–304.

104. Ibid., p. 615. The telegraph was mentioned also in railroad regulations of 1868—see note 68 above.

105. Ibid., p. 578, a *mazbata* of 23 Ramazan 1272 (28 May 1856), and also in the basic regulations of 1859—see note 69 above.

106. Ibid., p. 492.

107. Ibid., p. 579; Yazici, "Dil Konusu," p. 757.

108. *Hakayik-ül-Vekayi*, #434 and #437, 27 Ramazan and 4 Şevval 1288 (10 and 17 Dec. 1871), quoted in Tanrikut, *Türkiye Posta ve Telgraf*, p. 615.

109. Carey, "Technology and Ideology," p. 14.

110. Burnaby, *On Horseback*, 1:268.

111. DBHE, Siyasî, Karton 49, "Divers 1859," Foreign Ministry telegram #17179/27, 26 July 1866, to Ottoman embassies in Paris, London, Vienna.

112. Rupert Furneaux, *The Breakfast War* (New York, 1960).

113. Hakki Tarık Us, *Meclis-i Meb'usan 1293:1877 Zabıt Ceridesi* (Istanbul, 1940–1954), 2:40, cited in Robert Devereux, "A Study of the First Ottoman Parliament of 1877–1878," George Washington University, M.A. thesis, 1956, p. 120.

114. Texts of some of the most important telegrams and mentions of others are in Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler* (Istanbul, 1984–), 1:61–62, and in Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türk İnkilâbı Tarihi*, 3d printing (Ankara, 1983), 1, part 1:451–479. Berkes, *Development of Secularism*, p. 328, claims that "the uniform spread of the news [by telegraph, in 1908] and its vagueness precipitated a like-mindedness that became the foundation for a nationalism."

115. Clair Price; "Mustapha Kemal and the Angora Government," *Current History* 16 (1922): 796-797.

116. Ali Fuat Cebesoy, *Millî Mücadele Hâtıraları* (Istanbul, 1953), pp. 148-149. This is cited also by Dankwart Rustow, "The Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic," *World Politics* 11, no. 4 (July 1959): 579, n. 14.

117. Kemal Atatürk, *Nutuk*, 13th printing (Istanbul, 1973), 1:399. The "telgraf fir-tinasi" was launched on the night of March 4-5, 1920.

118. Gotthard Jäschke, "Mustafa Kemal und England in Neuer Sicht," *Die Welt des Islams* N.S. 16, nos. 1-4 (1975): 184.

119. Lewis Edgar Browne in *Chicago Daily News*, 13 October 1919, despatch datelined Paris, 13 October. Part of this is quoted by Frederick P. Latimer, "The Political Philosophy of Mustapha Kemal Atatürk," Princeton, Ph.D. thesis, 1952, p. 59.

9. Westernized Education in Ottoman Turkey

In the early nineteenth century, when the reforming Sultan Mahmud II put his civil officials into Western trousers and frock coats and red fezzes, the members of the ulema retained the traditional robe and turban. This may have been due to the intercession of Keçecizade İzzet, the molla of Galata, who is said to have convinced the Sultan that, in the eyes of the people, "justice resided in the turban."¹ Later in the same century Europeans in Istanbul found that, when in the summer they wrapped white cloth around their straw hats as protection against the heat, the common Turk suddenly became deferential, and regarded them as *okumuş*—well read or well educated.² Learning also, it seemed, resided in the turban.

The facts were, however, at variance with the popular attitude. The educational system which produced the learned men of Islam had fallen on evil days. The quality of the *medrese*—the higher school of Islamic education—had declined sharply since the sixteenth century.³ No longer did the ulema have even the good classical liberal education. There were, of course, exceptions. Some members of the ulema such as Cevdet Paşa were quite well educated, but much of this was self-education. Cevdet himself, though he defended some members of the ulema for their wisdom, did not hesitate to condemn others as ignorant.⁴ In general the ulema knew little about their own empire; about the surrounding world their ignorance was vast. There was certainly nothing in Islam that enjoined ignorance. Quite to the contrary, Islamic civilization in earlier days had produced fine schools, good scholarship in various fields of learning, and had borrowed widely from other cultures. "Seek knowledge even in China" was generally considered one of the sayings of the prophet Muḥammad. But pride, suspicion, lethargy, fear of contact with the infidel, all had contributed to the stagnation of education.

The ulema were not only the judges and juriconsults of the Ottoman Empire, but its teachers as well, and their ignorance affected others. What they gave their pupils in the *mekteb*, or grammar school, could hardly pass for proper education in the world of the nineteenth century.⁵ Most Turks grew up without any sound knowledge of their Islamic past, of their Turkish past, or of the world around them. When the elder Moltke first went as military adviser to the Ottoman Empire in the 1830's he found there "educated" officials who

only out of courtesy accepted his opinion that the earth was round.⁶ The learning of Islam was forgotten, the learning of the modern West not yet acquired. (Western languages were known to almost no Turk.) It was symptomatic that when in the 1820's distrust of rebel Greeks forced the Turks to look to their own people for official interpreters, the first one was Bulgaroğlu Yahya Naci Efendi, a Bulgar converted from Greek Orthodoxy to Islam, and the second Hoca İshak Efendi, a Jew converted to Islam.

Into this Muslim Turkish society came (Western educational influences) beginning in a trickle in the later eighteenth century, and growing into a flood by the early twentieth. All parts of the Ottoman Empire were affected, Egypt and the Balkan areas in some ways more profoundly than the rest. Our concern here, however, is with the Turkish portions of the empire in particular. Turks were affected by Western educational influences which came through six channels. The most important of these is too broad to deal with in brief compass, and will have to be dismissed with only a mention of its significance. This channel is education in its truest sense—the totality of life-long individual experience, gained on the job, in travel, through private reading, and in discussions with others, often in the salons and coteries of learning that congregated about one or another of the leading statesmen, poets or writers of Istanbul. Suffice it to note here that those nineteenth-century Turks who were best educated and who best absorbed Western learning were essentially autodidacts, whatever their formal schooling—Ahmed Vefik Paşa, a voracious reader, who was nicknamed an “upset library” by his contemporaries; Âli Paşa, who learned his French under a tree in the Ottoman embassy garden in Vienna; Münif Paşa, whose private studies far eclipsed his three years at the University of Berlin; Ziya Gökalp, who studied French philosophy and sociology by himself in nine years of Anatolian exile. Each took from the Islamic past and from the West what suited his intellectual needs. Each was a decided individual, yet all realized the advantages of borrowing from Western education. These men and others like them were the first real leaders for the Westernization of education in the empire.

The other five channels through which Western educational influences flowed into the empire were (those of formal schools or school systems). The most obvious channel was the large group of schools in the Ottoman Empire which were supported and operated by Westerners. Almost all were (mission schools). Although some foreign Catholic schools, in particular French, had existed for many years in the empire, the rapid growth of mission schools came in the nineteenth and earlier twentieth centuries. These were the years of the great flowering of (Protestant oversea missions, of Catholic reaction in kind, and of the new imperialism which led governments and peoples of several European powers to support in the Near East schools purveying their own brand of culture.) By the eve of World War I an unofficial count put French Catholic schools in the Ottoman Empire at 500, American schools at 675,

British at 178. The French schools enrolled 59,414 students, the American schools 34,317, and the British 12,800.⁷ There were also German, Italian, Austro-Hungarian and Russian schools in lesser numbers. Most of these schools were elementary, though there were among them some excellent secondary schools and a few collegiate level. It looks as if, in the century before 1914, the Ottoman Empire had received a massive infusion of Western education. What impact had this on the Turks?

To the extent that the impact is measurable, it was slim. This is in part because the figures for schools are deceptive. Many of the foreign schools were located in the Arab portions of the empire, where few Turks lived; and the Arabs who attended such schools were largely Christians, of whatever communion. Many of the schools were in fact run by native Christians, with a bit of foreign support and supervision. But the major reason for the lack of influence on the Turks was that, even in the Turkish-populated areas, very few of them attended such schools. In part this was owing to suspicion of things foreign, but even more to suspicion of things Christian, coupled with the tradition that each millet, or religious community, should provide its own schools for its own communicants. Christian missionaries who, filled with evangelistic zeal, went to the Ottoman Empire in the early nineteenth century, soon found that Muslims and Jews were unlikely to apostatize or even to accept Christian education. The mission schools then concentrated their efforts on the Gregorian Armenian, Greek Orthodox, and other smaller Christian groups in the Near East. Turks were therefore more likely than ever to reject the foreign schools because they catered to Christians and brought the religion of the infidel. Sometimes the Turkish reaction was one of outright hostility. This could be expressed with vigor in local communities, as it was in the early years of Robert College, the outstanding American institution in Turkey, and one which was in fact not formally connected with any mission, though Congregational missionaries were prominent in its founding and its instructional staff. The wife of the imam of the village of Rumeli Hisarı on the Bosphorus, where the college was located, led the local opposition which sometimes advanced from rich verbal abuse to stone-throwing.⁸ The hostility could also be expressed governmentally, through harassment by official regulation and unofficial pressure, and sometimes Turkish students at the foreign institutions were forced by the sultan to leave them. Such harassment reached a peak under Sultan Abdülhamid II in the 1880's and again in the 1890's.⁹

But what of the Turks who did attend the foreign schools? Who were they, and what impact had the completely Westernized curriculum on them? This would be a rewarding study, though a difficult one, for some scholar to undertake. Only tentative answers can be attempted here. There are in existence no composite statistics on Turks who attended foreign schools in the empire. Scattered information indicates that the first to attend were probably some of the rare Muslim converts to Christianity. One Turk had by the end of the

Crimean War completed part of the theological course in Cyrus Hamlin's seminary at Bebek on the Bosphorus, operated under the Congregational mission board.¹⁰ Possibly the Turk had become a Christian. In 1857 there was one Turkish girl among the 110 pupils of a school in İzmir operated by the Kaiser-wirth Deaconesses of Prussia.¹¹ It is possible that she also was a convert. The two Turkish students in a student body of 71 at Robert College in 1869 were Christians.¹² Such converts were practically outcasts from their own Muslim Turkish community, because they had changed millets.

Yet true Muslim Turks in a trickle began to attend some foreign schools in the empire, though at what date only further research will reveal. A few Turks, including students at the Palace School who were sons of leading families, came to Cyrus Hamlin's seminary in the 1840's to see his experiments in chemistry and physics. But they were visitors only.¹³ Possibly enrollment of Turks in the foreign schools began just after the Hatt-ı Hümayun, the reform decree of 1856. At least by the 1870's small groups of Turks regularly appeared on the rolls of some foreign schools. By the time of the 1908 Young Turk revolution Turks in Robert College constituted between three and five per cent of a student body which totalled over 300.¹⁴ In some of the French schools the percentages were higher.¹⁵

Most such students seem, however, to have been in the lower or preparatory years. At least in Robert College few completed the course. By 1903, to use a Soviet-style statistic, 100 per cent of the Turkish graduates of that institution were of Bektāşi dervish background, and consequently not orthodox in Islam. This statistic was represented by one man, Hulūsi Hüseyin [Pektaş] Efendi, grandson of the sheikh of the local Bektāşi *tekke*. He was the unique Turk among 195 Bulgars, 144 Armenians, 76 Greeks, 2 Jews, and 17 Europeans or Americans who had earned the bachelor's degree over the forty-year period since the college's founding in 1863. Both of the Turkish graduates of the American School for Girls by the same date were daughters of enlightened and well-educated government officials. The first was Gülistan, daughter of a Circassian slave girl freed from Sultan Abdülaziz's harem and of General Tevfik, a man who evidently believed strongly in education for girls. Gülistan completed the high school curriculum and graduated in 1890. The second was Halide Edib [Adivar], who after graduation with an A.B. degree in 1901 was to become known as a leading author, feminist, patriot and professor.¹⁶ The first Muslim Turks to attend Catholic schools in the empire were possibly the eight sons of Marshal Fuad Paşa, a man who had had much of his education in the reasonably advanced schools of Egypt, who had been a special envoy to Austria and Russia, and who was favorably known among the populace for his outspoken opposition to policies and favorites of Abdülhamid II.¹⁷ An analysis made in 1914 of the occupations of fathers of students in the French Collège St. Joseph shows that all came from upper-class groups; and although there is no indication of religion, it is likely that the Muslim fathers were of even more

distinguished political and social standing than the non-Muslim, and probably had fairly Westernized educational backgrounds.¹⁸ A tentative conclusion, which would require further study, is that those Turks who had part of their education in the foreign schools in the empire came either from heterodox religious backgrounds or from élite families already considerably influenced by Western culture. Just how these students reacted to their education in such schools is a subject which also requires further investigation.

The foreign schools must also have had a wider, though imponderable, positive effect. As the Rumeli Hisarı imam's wife finally came to realize that the foreign teachers were, as she said, "better people than we are," so undoubtedly many Turks came to respect the Westernized education and the educators.¹⁹ Some of them felt freer to express this feeling after the 1908 revolution had curbed Abdülhamid's autocracy with the reimposition of a parliamentary régime. "Hitherto only Armenians have been able to avail themselves of the privileges of this college," said a Turkish official to the staff of the Congregationalist Euphrates College at Harput. "We Turks have been forbidden to send our children here. That is all changed now, and we will share with you in the enjoyment of what this institution offers . . ." ²⁰ After 1908 the number of Turkish students enrolled in the foreign institutions rose. The American College for Girls was besieged by Turkish applicants, many of whom had to be turned away. By 1913 Robert College had 67 Turkish students, nearly 15 per cent of the then student body of 470, and 23 non-Turk Muslims as well. The Collège St. Joseph had over 50 per cent Turks. In all the American colleges in the Turkish areas in 1913, Turkish students made up seven per cent of the total.²¹ Enver Bey even declared, though it was a considerable polite stretching of the truth, that the American schools had inspired the reform program of himself and his brother Young Turks.²² When, however, all these things are considered, the total influence among Turks of the foreign institutions in the empire must have been slim. As a leaven, it may have been of real significance.

Far more important in total impact on Turks were the specialized higher schools set up by the Ottoman government itself. These provided what was probably the major educational channel for the introduction of Western ideas into the empire. The need for such schools was felt when defeat in eighteenth century wars brought home the lesson of Ottoman military backwardness in relation to Europe. Army and navy schools for mathematics and engineering were created in the later eighteenth century, with the aid of European renegades and translated textbooks. More such special higher schools were established in the nineteenth century, including a school of military medicine and a military academy. Civil schools of public affairs, of medicine, of languages, of law, and others were added. Though designated "higher" schools, most began at quite an elementary level, or confounded in themselves all grades

from primary years to technical college. In the naval academy in the 1830's, for instance, half of the 200 students were just learning to read and write; only 30 were advanced enough to study navigation.²³

Until past mid-century these schools provided little of the leadership needed for modernizing the Ottoman Empire. Such leadership still came largely from the self-taught. Graduates of the military schools did, however, sometimes become teachers and so exercised influence in the secular lower and middle schools which the government began to institute in the 1860's.²⁴ And from about 1875 on the higher schools were producing a significant portion of the leadership of the empire. The great advantage of these schools was to teach French, which opened up a new world of ideas, and to bring Western concepts of mathematics, science, geography, history, politics. It was the (military medical school which produced the first Young Turks.) The education in the higher schools was not purely Western, but it was Westernized. The curriculum of the Mektebi Mülkiye, a higher school established in 1859 to train civil officials, would be described in modern terms as "public and international affairs." The present-day Faculty of Political Science of the University of Ankara proudly traces its lineage back to that school.²⁵ The quality of the higher schools improved with time, and by the twentieth century the impact on Turkish history of their training of individuals was great. The results are seen in the revolution of 1908, in the subsequent Young Turk era, and in the republican period under Mustafa Kemal [Atatürk].

These higher special schools helped also to widen a significant gap in the Turkish ruling élite. (The gap was between those with a somewhat Westernized education—of which the knowledge of French was the usual though rather superficial test—and those with the traditional *medrese* education.) Among civil officials the split was observable even by mid-century, since self-education or service in the (Translation Bureau of the foreign ministry had brought a knowledge of French to an increasing number of officials.) Some of the ministerial shifts of the 1840's can, for instance, be related to the competition of traditionalists against Westernizers. Cevdet Paşa's daughter speculates as to whether he was saved from dismissal in one such shift simply because he did not speak French, and because it was not known that he was secretly studying it.²⁶ By the 1870's the élite of the French-knowers was even more distinct.²⁷ The split was also observable in the officer corps of the army, where at least by the 1870's (the graduates of the military schools were beginning to form a caste apart from the officers risen from the ranks.)²⁸ The (military school-) men were those who made the revolutions of 1876 and 1908 that aimed at the introduction of a Western-style parliamentarism.²⁹ In the counter-revolution of 1909 the object of hatred on the part of the conservative common soldier was (the *mektebli*, the military school product.)³⁰ An extended series of biographical studies of civil and military officials between 1789 and 1914, comparing their

educational backgrounds and the posts they attained, might be quite enlightening on this social and political cleavage as well as on the general progress toward Westernization in the Ottoman Empire.

Another method by which Westernized schooling was introduced into the Ottoman Empire was the creation of a whole system of elementary and secondary education and of a university, all under government auspices. A proclamation made in the mosques by Sultan Abdülmecid on March 7, 1845, started this development off with the assertion that "the Will of the Padishah is that ignorance, the source of much evil, should vanish from among the people."³¹ A commission of able men was appointed to work out educational reform, and shortly a ministry of education was created. Kemal Efendi, inspector-general of schools, was sent to study the systems of England, France and Germany.³² The very fact of government initiative, of governmental assumption of responsibility for education, was a step toward Westernization. Sultans and officials had long supported educational institutions with their personal gifts, but the government as such had not heretofore planned or financed a school system. Except for the higher special schools, state-supported because they were directly training officials, education had been left to private charity and religious foundations.

While governmental responsibility for education was an accepted fact after the 1840's, the start toward creating the new system was fitful, and characteristic of the reform from the top down that has so often taken place in the Near East. A university was thrice still-born—in 1846, 1870 and 1879—and did not become firmly established until 1900. Some grammar schools on a higher level (*rüşdiyye*) were created, but owing to ulema opposition the primary schools (*sıbyan* or *iptidai*) were at first little changed from their traditional character. There ignorant hojas continued to teach a bit of reading and writing, and to have the children shout in unison the (to them) incomprehensible Arabic of the Qur'ān. Meanwhile Midhat Paşa, governor of the Danube province in the 1860's, experimented with modernized primary schools, the writer Namık Kemal assisted him somewhat by consulting references on French provincial school organization, and Tunuslu Hayreddin Paşa urged the French school system on his Muslim contemporaries.³³ Some progress in reforming the primary schools was achieved after 1870, but it was painfully slow. Until the end of the Ottoman Empire there remained many examples of the traditional primary school in which "the main duty of the teacher was to see that each child shouted, and that the accent and enunciation were passable."³⁴ Ömer Seyfeddin, a writer who had his primary education in the 1890's, describes his experience in "Falaka," one of his popular short stories: "We were forty youngsters in the school. . . . We had no division into grades. In chorus we learned the alphabet and texts from the Koran, in chorus we learned the multiplication table by repetition, in chorus we chanted the prayers. So all our lessons went along in an endless learning by rote of things, the meaning of

which we never were able to comprehend."³⁵ But Westernized education had at least added the chant of the multiplication table to the chorus of Quranic passages.

According to a law of 1869 the organization and curricula of Ottoman schools should have become far more Westernized than actually was the case. The law set up a rationalized hierarchy of schools from primary grades through the university, and prescribed for each stage a reasonable and quite Westernized curriculum.³⁶ This remained the basis, with some revisions over the years, for education in the empire until the empire itself came to an end. But progress under this law, even beyond the elementary level, was slow. The most Westernized of all schools in this hierarchy was in a class by itself, unduplicated in the rest of the empire. This was the lycée of Galatasaray, actually founded in 1868 under direct French influence and with the planning assistance of an expert from the French ministry of education. The curriculum was entirely Western except for inclusion of classes in Turkish and the local languages; the general language of instruction was French; the headmaster and teachers were at the start French also, and at its opening 147 of the 341 students were Muslims, most of them presumably Turks.³⁷ A study of the careers of Galatasaray graduates since its founding would be quite informative concerning the impact of Westernized education. But most schools, even under the 1869 law, were less Western.

Turkish society was slow to accept new educational methods and subjects. Osman Ergin repeats a dramatic story of a progressive teacher in Saloniki whose methods included the use of blackboards, maps, gymnastics and supervised recess play. His school was twice broken up by the invasion of a mob which cursed his *gâvur* methods—the methods of the unbeliever—and he himself was beaten and threatened with death. But because his students could read and cipher better than others, the school was finally accepted.³⁸ Other reactions were more nationalistic. They began with protests of Turkish students in Galatasaray that their own language was being slighted, and with demands of students in the military medical school that the language of instruction be changed from French to Turkish.³⁹ The same sort of reaction was voiced on a more philosophical plane in the early twentieth century by Ziya Gökalp. He complained that the French-style education imported into the empire was just as antithetical to true Turkish national culture as the early *medrese* education which had been based on civilization imported from the Arabs and Persians.⁴⁰

The other two educational channels which brought Western influence to the Turks may be mentioned briefly. One was the schooling of Turks abroad. From 1834 on the government sent, at irregular intervals, groups of young Turks to Western Europe for study. At the start, most of these were graduates of the military schools. Later more civilians went, and more Turks went to Europe as individuals to study. Some returned home quite well educated, and

fairly Westernized; other did not. Some on return became leaders in reform efforts; others became cynical or disillusioned when they compared conditions at home to those they had known in Europe. The wife of one of the empire's grand viziers said her husband got in Europe a veneer of knowledge over a mass of ignorance, like "the greater number of those who have been sent to Europe to be educated."⁴¹ Mehmed Said Paşa, educated in Britain at Edinburgh and at Woolwich, said in 1877, "I had lived abroad till I fancied I had made myself a man, and when I came back to my country I saw about me merely brutes . . ."⁴² Some acquired only expensive Western tastes and vices: in the acid jest of an Ottoman statesman, they were "syphilized, not civilized."⁴³ But by the early twentieth century those Turks who had studied abroad probably exercised, as a group, considerable influence on Ottoman development. Here again a series of biographical studies would be enlightening.

The final channel of Westernized educational influence was indirect. This influence came from the non-Turkish minorities—principally Greeks, Armenians and Jews—who in some cases were getting education abroad, but in most cases were getting a more modernized education in the schools maintained within the empire by each of these millets. Such schools grew rapidly in the later nineteenth century, and often had some significant foreign financial and educational support—from the *Alliance Israélite* for Jewish schools, from Greeks abroad and the University of Athens for Greek schools, and a little Armenian support from Russia for Armenian schools. Turks did not attend these schools, but the progress in non-Muslim education was a spur to the Turks. It led some statesmen like Midhat Paşa to want to establish desegregated schools in which students of all creeds would be educated together. Âli Paşa, grand vizier in the later 1860's, also wanted to create Turkish government schools which would have a mixed student body, hoping that such schools would attract the minority groups and help to hold their allegiance to the empire.⁴⁴ The non-Muslim schools also spurred the Turks to improve the quality of education in their own schools. Ziya Bey complained bitterly that the Turks were far behind in promoting literacy: ten-year-old boys in a Greek or Armenian school could read newspapers in their own languages, while it was rare that a Turkish boy of fifteen could do so, or could write a short letter.⁴⁵ The conservative İstanbul newspaper *Basiret* in the 1870's demanded as a remedy that the government severely control the Greek and Armenian schools.⁴⁶ But the actual result of improved Westernized schools among the non-Muslim millets seems to have been to prod the Turks to greater efforts.

By 1914 it was abundantly clear that Westernized education was winning out in the Ottoman Empire, even though the school system was neither extensive enough nor good enough to meet the needs of the times. A Turkish writer could still complain just before World War I that many schools "are built over the courtyard of a mosque or in the corner of a graveyard; and the teachers who are set to teach the children reading and writing do not know how to read

or write.”⁴⁷ Yet Westernization had gone so far as to arouse a demand for special attention to female education. This had begun just after the Crimean War. Even though in 1912 foreign and millet schools for non-Muslim girls still far outnumbered Turkish schools for girls except at the lowest level, in 1914 the first women were admitted to the University of İstanbul.⁴⁸ It was also clear that the Turks had accepted Westernized education not as brought wholesale to the empire by foreign schools, but on an eclectic basis, though the French model was largely followed. Such religious influences as accompanied the foreign schools in the empire were studiously avoided by the Turks; the Western educational patterns and curricula were accepted in their secular aspects only. There was in fact from the very beginning of the establishment of Westernized schools of whatever level an increasing secularization of instruction in the Ottoman Empire. (Although Quranic instruction was retained in the modernized lower school curricula, the quality of religious teaching in those schools declined.) The only Western religion accepted was the creed of nationalism.

Throughout the period of increasing Westernization the ulema as a group remained opposed to it. It was significant that when one of the ulema who had lived and studied in France, a certain Selim Sabit Efendi, sought to introduce into his school some Western instructional aids such as maps, he was condemned by his colleagues as “*frenk*” —European—and as acting against faith and religion. The Şeyhülislâm supported these protests, but it is important to note that the Ministry of Education sanctioned Selim’s reforms if he introduced them gradually.⁴⁹ It was the civil government, more and more filled with the self-taught Westernizers and the products of the special higher schools or of education in Europe, which was the reforming agency in education as in all else. Even the ulema did not entirely escape Western influences. Some who studied in the newer primary schools before they came to the *medrese* had their eyes opened to new concepts. A few studied abroad, others learned French or another foreign language at home. More of them discovered, as Cevdet had in the 1840’s, that with Arabic alone it was not possible to learn about the world.⁵⁰ Plenty of ignorant ulema there still were, and a typical hoja could say in the Chamber of Deputies in 1909 that a girls’ school which the Committee of Union and Progress proposed to establish was undesirable because it violated the *şariat*.⁵¹ But the tide was turning slightly, and a move for *medrese* reform, earlier unsuccessful, began again after the 1908 revolution.

There are as yet insufficient statistical, biographical, political and general cultural studies to allow a valid assessment of the total impact of Westernized education on Ottoman history and society. It is also difficult to distinguish the effect of formal schooling from the many other Westernizing influences which came into the empire after the late eighteenth century. The imponderables are hard to separate and evaluate individually. Yet some tentative conclusions are probably justified. One is that such political progress as was made from 1839

on was due largely to individuals who had some bit of Westernized education, however acquired, in their backgrounds. A second is that the trend toward a simplified Turkish language owes much to the same group of partly Westernized leaders. A third is that while a certain amount of desegregated Westernized education within the empire was achieved, it failed of its objective. The hopes of Âli Paşa and others that mixed schools containing Turks, Greeks, Armenians, Jews, Bulgars and others would act as a catalytic agent to hold the empire together were deceived. The individual millets went their nationalistic way. A fourth, and very tentative, conclusion is that some individuals became in effect Levantized, half-rooted in the East and half in the West, unsure of their intellectual home. The mixture of old attitudes and new ideas was not always successful. "The result of a half-baked Frank education is depressing," wrote Mark Sykes in 1906 after talking with a young and superficially Westernized Turkish official.⁵²

Finally, gaps in class strata were widened. The split between those with a Westernized education and those with the traditional *medrese* education was not diminished. It has recently become fashionable to speak of the dualism created by the nineteenth century Westernizing reforms, and such there undoubtedly was in the educational world. Two systems and two products existed side by side. More accurately, however, there was a trialism, since below the two differently educated groups of élite there existed a third, the product of the new and partly Westernized primary education, a bit more secular and nationalist than before, less well instructed in religion, and still relatively ignorant. And of course there remained at the bottom of society the large mass, still in 1914 uneducated and illiterate. As the writer Ahmed Midhat once said, they were "without pen and without tongue."⁵³

Notes

1. Charles Mismar, *Souvenirs du monde musulman* (Paris, 1892), p. 112. Mismar heard this from Izzet Molla's son, Fuad Paşa.

2. H. G. Dwight, *Constantinople and its Problems* (New York, 1901), p. 199.

3. H. A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West, I/2* (London, 1957), pp. 104-113, 143-154, 161-162.

4. Ebul'ulâ Mardin, *Medenî hukuk cephesinden Ahmet Cevdet Paşa* (İstanbul, 1946), p. 294; Cevdet Paşa, *Tezâkir 1-12*, ed. Cavid Baysun (Ankara, 1953), p. 68.

5. Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society I/2*, pp. 139-143; Osman Ergin, *Türkiye maarif tarihi* (İstanbul, 1939-1943), I, pp. 68-82, and II, p. 383 ff.

6. Helmuth von Moltke, *Briefe über Zustände und Begebenheiten in der Türkei* (2nd ed.; Berlin, 1876), p. 411.

⑦ Paul Monroe, "Education," in E. G. Mears, ed., *Modern Turkey* (New York, 1924), pp. 130-132, figures taken from *World's Missions for 1914*. Cf. figures for the

Asian portions of the Ottoman Empire (plus İstanbul) for the later nineteenth century in Noël Verney and George Dambmann, *Les puissances étrangères dans le Levant en Syrie et en Palestine* (Paris, 1900), pp. 38, 52–53, 57, 63–64, 85–114, 125–126, 132–133. Definitions of foreign schools in these two sources are not precise—in some cases the schools appear to be native institutions under foreign auspices and with foreign financial support, in other cases native schools maintained by local Christian churches associated with a “foreign” communion, and in other cases schools largely staffed and directly operated by foreign missionaries. See also lists of Catholic schools in Ergin, *Maarif tarihi*, II, pp. 637–648.

8. George Washburn, *Fifty Years in Constantinople* (Boston, 1909) pp. 71–72.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 180; Verney and Dambmann, *Puissances étrangères*, pp. 90, 125; W. E. Strong, *The Story of the American Board* (Boston, 1910), p. 387; *Report of the President of Robert College of Constantinople for the 38th Year, 1900–1901* (n.p., n.d.), p. 8. Other individual instances of Turks forced out of the American colleges by government pressure in Caleb F. Gates, *Not to Me Only* (Princeton, 1940), pp. 181–182; Halide Edib [Adıvar], *Memoirs* (New York, 1926), pp. 149, 153.

10. Rufus Anderson, *History of the Missions of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions to the Oriental Churches* (Boston, 1873), II, pp. 48–49.

11. Nassau W. Senior, *A Journal Kept in Turkey and Greece* (London, 1859), pp. 215–217. In the Central Turkey Girls’ College at Maraş, some years later, the native tongue of most of the students was Turkish, but they were actually Turcophone Armenians and so, of course, non-Muslims: American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, *The Higher Educational Institutions of the American Board* (Boston, [1904]), pp. 28–32.

12. Washburn, *Fifty Years*, p. 40.

13. Cyrus Hamlin, *My Life and Times* (4th ed.; Boston, 1893), pp. 228, 235.

14. Washburn, *Fifty Years*, gives figures for Turkish students among others for many years from 1874 on: pp. 91, 98, 159, 175, 180, 200, 233, 250, 256, 264, 276, 285, 299.

15. At the Collège St. Joseph in Kadıköy (İstanbul) one per cent in 1890, 15 per cent in 1900, 56 per cent in 1911: Ergin, *Maarif tarihi*, II, p. 644.

16. Mary Mills Patrick, *A Bosphorus Adventure* (Stanford, 1934), pp. 225–229; Halide Edib, *Memoirs*, pp. 190–206.

17. Ergin, *Maarif tarihi*, II, p. 644; Gates, *Not to Me Only*, pp. 181–182; I. A. Gövsa, *Türk meşhurları ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul, n.d.), p. 145.

18. Eight princes, 22 marshals and generals, 90 “high personages,” 30 bank directors, 80 civil officials, 80 bankers and commission agents, 90 physicians, 20 lawyers, 20 engineers, 300 “possessors of income”: Ergin, *Maarif tarihi*, II, p. 644.

19. Washburn, *Fifty Years*, pp. 72, 86.

20. Strong, *Story of the American Board*, p. 409.

21. Hester D. Jenkins, *An Educational Ambassador to the Near East* (New York, 1925), p. 154; “Attendance at American Colleges in Turkey, 1912–1913,” *Moslem World* III:3 (July, 1913), p. 333; Ergin, *Maarif tarihi*, II, p. 644.

22. Strong, *Story of the American Board*, p. 408.

23. Captain Du Plat, Royal Engineers, to Ponsonby, 5 September 1837, FO 78/305, Public Record Office, quoted in F. S. Rodkey, "Lord Palmerston and the Rejuvenation of Turkey, 1830-1831," *Journal of Modern History* 1:4 (December, 1929), pp. 581-582. Cf. Ergin, *Maarif tarihi*, II, pp. 298-306, on the military academy.

24. *Ibid.*, II, p. 361.

25. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 495-517; A. D. Mordtmann, *Stambul und das moderne Türkenhum* (Leipzig, 1877-1878), I, p. 137; Türkaya Ataöv, "The Faculty of Political Science of Turkey," *MEJ* 14:2 (Spring, 1960), pp. 243-245.

26. Fatma Aliye, *Ahmed Cevdet Paşa ve zamanı* (İstanbul, 1332), pp. 34-35.

27. Hermann Vambéry, *Sittenbilder aus dem Morgenlande* (Berlin, 1876), pp. 195-196.

28. Murad Effendi (Franz von Werner), *Türkische Skizzen* (Leipzig, 1877), II, p. 130.

29. In the military academy in the 1890's some of the Young Turk cadets who were eventually to help bring about the revolution of 1908 formed two conspiratorial committees named for Hüseyin Avni Paşa and Süleyman Paşa, who had been the leaders of the military academy men in the overthrow of Sultan Abdülaziz in 1876: Tarik Tunaya, *Türkiyede siyasî partiler* (İstanbul, 1952), p. 104.

30. Vicomte de La Jonquière, *Histoire de l'Empire ottoman* (Paris, 1914), II, pp. 232, 236, 240. *Mektebli* was a term also used for civil officials who were products of the schools: cf. Mark Sykes, *The Caliphs' Last Heritage* (London, 1915), p. 489.

31. Freiherr F. W. von Reden, *Die Türkei und Griechenland in ihrer Entwicklungsfähigkeit* (Frankfurt a.M., 1856), p. 307.

32. Ergin, *Maarif tarihi*, II, pp. 367-375; J. H. Abdolonyme Ubicini, *Letters on Turkey*, trans. by Lady Easthope (London, 1856), I, pp. 197-202; I. A. Gövsa, *Türk meşhurları*, p. 213, s. v. Ahmed Kemal Paşa.

33. Ergin, *Maarif tarihi*, II, pp. 389-390; A. H. Midhat, *Tabsira-yı ibret* (İstanbul, 1325), pp. 42-43; M. C. Kuntay, *Namik Kemal*, I (İstanbul, 1944), p. 24; Le Général Khéredine, *Réformes nécessaires aux états musulmans* (Paris, 1868), p. 66.

34. H. G. Dwight, *Constantinople and its Problems*, pp. 210-211.

35. Ömer Seyfeddin, *Rasskazy* (Moscow, 1957), p. 23. The *falaka* is a board with a loop of rope attached to it through two holes. By this the feet of a miscreant student were held for beating on the soles.

36. Text of law in Grégoire Aristarchi, *Législation ottomane* (Constantinople, 1873-1888). III, pp. 277-315.

37. Text of Galatasaray law *ibid.*, pp. 315-317. Cf. observations by the first headmaster: De Salve, "L'enseignement en Turquie; le lycée impérial de Galata Séraï," *Revue des deux mondes*, 3rd period, V (15 October 1874), pp. 846-849.

38. Ergin, *Maarif tarihi*, II, pp. 395-397.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 404; Osman Şevki Uludağ, "Tanzimat ve hekimler," *Tanzimat I* (İstanbul, 1940), pp. 970–975.
40. Niyazi Berkes, ed., *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization: Selected Essays of Ziya Gökalp* (New York, 1959), pp. 233–247.
41. Melek Hanum, *Thirty Years in the Harem* (London, 1872), pp. 277–278. She was the Levantine wife of Kıbrıslı Mehmed Paşa.
42. Antonio Gallenga, *Two Years of the Eastern Question* (London, 1877), I, p. 134. He was known as "İngiliz" Said. Cf. İ. H. Danişmend, *İzahlı osmanlı tarihi kronolojisi IV* (İstanbul, 1955), p. 290.
43. Hermann Vambéry, *Der Islam im neunzehnten Jahrhundert* (Leipzig, 1875), pp. 96–109. The pun sounds like one of Fuad Paşa's.
44. In his memorandum of 1867: Mordtmann, *Stambul*, I, pp. 75–88.
45. In *Hürriyet* # 5 (27 July 1868), quoted in İhsan Sungu, "Tanzimat ve Yeni Osmanlılar," *Tanzimat I*, p. 841.
46. Mordtmann, *Stambul*, I, pp. 148–149, quoting from an issue of February 1873.
47. Hamdullah Subhi in *İkdam* (exact date not given), quoted in "Turkish Womanhood," *Moslem World III*: 1 (January, 1913), pp. 83–84.
48. *Ibid.*; "The Feminist Movement in Turkey," *Moslem World IV*: 4 (October, 1914), pp. 422–423.
49. Ergin, *Maarif tarihi*, II, p. 384.
50. Mardin, *Cevdet*, p. 31.
51. Francis McCullagh, *The Fall of Abd-ul-Hamid* (London, 1910), p. 109.
52. Sykes, *Caliphs' Last Heritage*, p. 365. Cf. A. H. Hourani, *Syria and Lebanon* (New York, 1946), p. 70.
53. Ahmed Midhat, *Üss-i inkilâb* (İstanbul, 1294–1295), I, p. 122.

Added Note: From 1857 to 1874 the Ottoman government maintained a small school in Paris to which promising young men were sent. It is described in Richard L. Chambers, "Notes on the *Mekteb-i Osmani* in Paris, 1857–1874," in William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers, eds., *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East: The Nineteenth Century* (Chicago, 1968), pp. 313–329. Some of the western educational influences that came to autodidacts through learned and professional societies appear in Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, ed., *Osmanlı İlmî ve Meslekî Cemiyetleri: 1. Millî Türk Bilim Tarihi Sempozyumu 3–5 Nisan 1987* (İstanbul, 1987). Information on career training, self-education, and salons that embodied some western influences is in Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas* (Princeton, 1962), especially in chapter 7. Carter V. Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History* (Princeton, 1989), offers reflections of some of the westernizing experiences in the varied education of bureaucrats, especially in chapter 4.

10. The Armenian Crisis, 1912–1914

The eastern or “Armenian” provinces of Turkey, since 1945 again the object of Russian claims, have long been one of the sensitive spots occupying the attention of European statesmen. In the two years before Sarajevo the question of the future of this region took on the proportions of a diplomatic crisis. When the question arose in serious form at the end of 1912, the Turks had just lost almost all their European territories in disastrous defeat at the hands of the Balkan states. Statesmen and journalists began to wonder whether Asiatic Turkey would hold together. As early as December of 1912 rumors of the partition of Asiatic Turkey became frequent.¹ Such a partition threatened complications even more serious for the relationships of the powers than the settlement of the Balkan confusion.² Spheres of strategic, economic, and cultural interests were all involved, as well as questions of prestige and a possible test of strength, a year before it actually came, between the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente. What brought the crisis to the fore was a new edition of the old Armenian question, last a concern of the powers in 1897—the question of the government of the Armenian provinces by the Turks, of necessary reforms, and of possible autonomy or separation.

Both the question of reforms and the crisis threatening partition in these years have been forgotten, although at that time the European chancelleries took the whole affair very seriously. This forgetfulness is easily explained. The crisis over Armenia was sandwiched in between the more dramatic events of the Tripolitan and Balkan wars on the one hand, and the World War on the other. For a time the dispute over Liman von Sanders overshadowed it. Those who are interested especially in Armenian affairs have concentrated on the supervening massacres and deportations of 1915. Because of its importance then, and its significance now, the 1912–1914 crisis is worth reconstructing.

An edict of reforms for the Armenian *vilayets* (provinces) had been wrung from Sultan Abdul Hamid II in 1895 by European pressure.³ On paper, the scheme promised to be reasonably effective, but, like many Ottoman reforms, it remained only paper. Russia, engaged in holding down her own Armenians in Transcaucasia, did not press the issue; France, Germany, and Austria, for various reasons, did not want to risk the partition of Turkey; and the attention

of the powers was soon distracted by the Cretan problem. Abdul Hamid sent out an inspector general for reforms, who did nothing.⁴ The lot of the Armenians did not improve. The recent massacres were the one topic of conversation among them, and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation continued its activities, although in a more subdued manner.⁵

Wild rejoicing among Armenians, and great hopes for the future, arose with the Young Turk revolution of 1908. Armenians co-operated with the Turkish Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). A few steps were, in fact, made toward realizing the Armenian hopes. Their newspapers and schools could speak more freely. Less brutality accompanied tax collection. A gendarmerie reorganized by the French General Baumann and other Europeans in 1909 operated from its Trebizond headquarters to increase public order and safety in eastern Anatolia. In 1912 the Porte started to make effective a new *vilayet* law providing for greater provincial self-government.⁶ But these embryonic measures of improvement from 1908 to 1912 were far outweighed by old and new grievances. When measured against the hopes of 1908, furthermore, the situation seemed to the Armenians as black as ever.

Armenian disillusionment sprang from the massacres of 1909, the so-called "Cilician vespers" in Lesser Armenia for which the Young Turks must bear a goodly share of the responsibility.⁷ More lasting troubles came with Kurd depredations in Greater Armenia. The chief source of conflict between Kurds and Armenians was the land problem. Wandering Kurds had seized the lands of many Armenians who had been massacred, or had fled, in 1895. When some of the refugees returned after 1908, the Kurds would not restore the lands; indeed, the government was powerless to prevent further seizures of Armenian property. From 1909 on there was what the French vice-consul in Van described as real war between the two peoples.⁸

Advantage rested with the Kurds, however, for two reasons. The first was that they were armed, whereas most Armenians were not. When the Turkish government tried to disarm all troublemakers in Armenia, they were successful only among the sedentary population, which was largely Armenian; wandering Kurds were still armed. The second reason was that subordinate Turkish officials tended to favor their fellow Moslems against the Christian Armenians. The gendarmerie was handicapped since all Greater Armenia contained not a mile of railroad before 1914, and because what roads existed were poor. In 1911–1912 the situation became worse as troops were taken from eastern Anatolia to Tripoli and the Balkans. The Armenian divisions were called to the Balkan front in 1912, and the Armenian peasantry was thus left without military protection. The Young Turks, furthermore, soon turned from equality and Ottomanization to Turkification, stifling previous Armenian hopes. This policy extended even to limiting the privileges of the Armenian Patriarch Arsharouni, installed at Constantinople in 1912.⁹ In short, the constitutional regime had done little for the Armenians.

Under these conditions, Armenian voices began to make themselves heard. There was no unanimity, however, among them. Many, haunted by fears of massacre and loss of land, seem to have favored Russian protection but at the same time to have feared a possible Russian annexation as being only a change of masters.¹⁰ The peasant mass was not very vocal. Higher classes of Ottoman Armenians wished rather for a regenerated and orderly Turkey and thought that autonomy would be possible only within Turkey and not under Russian domination. By the end of 1911, through their patriarch and delegations of the assembly of the semiautonomous Gregorian *millet*, or “nation,” these Armenians were appealing to the grand vizier for protection against Kurds and for a land settlement. New depredations in the fall of 1912 led to new protests. The Ottoman council of ministers was genuinely concerned, made promises, appointed commissions, and laid plans for redemption payments to dispossessed Armenians, but results were negligible. Beset with wars and diplomatic problems and not wishing to antagonize the Kurds, the Porte was in an extremely difficult position.¹¹

Armenian political societies, constituted outside the official *millet*, also became more vocal. Because they were organized, these societies had more influence than their mere membership warranted. Aimed at improving the lot of Armenians in both Russia and Turkey, and ultimately at liberating the Turkish Armenians, the societies had since their origin at the end of the nineteenth century collected members of all hues—socialists, anarchists, and freethinkers, among others. Their ramifications extended to America, France, Switzerland, and Austria. Of the four principal groups, the Verakazmial and the Ramkavar were the more moderate and the least influential. The Hintchak and the Dashnakzouthiun were socialist and revolutionary, though their programs were subject to change. It is difficult to estimate the hold of these societies on the mass of Armenians, though it is certain that they had many enemies as well as friends; it is difficult also to distinguish the opinions of their members in Turkey from those of members elsewhere. But the position of the Dashnakzouthiun, otherwise called the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, is fairly clear. It was easily the leading society by this time, claiming for itself in 1907 a membership of 165,000.¹²

The Dashnaks had co-operated with the Young Turks in the 1908 revolution and continued to work with them until 1913. They were socialist and revolutionary and had stores of arms, but they restricted their actions for the most part to a cultural and legal plane after the revolution. Their program was essentially one of reform within the Ottoman Empire. They did not believe that Russian occupation of Armenia would bring them more freedom, though it would bring more order. Varandian, writing as a member of the Dashnakzouthiun, asked reforms and autonomy for Turkish Armenia, saying that a complete separation of Armenia from Turkey was ethnographically and geographically impossible. By the beginning of 1913, however, relations between

the Dashnaks and the Committee of Union and Progress, representing the Young Turk group now in power, were becoming strained. On February 1, 1913, all the Dashnak members of the CUP's committee on national defense stayed away from a vital session.¹³ Dashnak members also approached foreign powers. A Russian Dashnak, Dr. Zavriev, called on the Russian ambassador in Constantinople to complain about the treatment of his fellows in Turkey, and to ask advice. The ambassador reports that he cautioned him against revolutionary activities that might provoke the Turks. Armenians, he said, must be victims in the eyes of Europe.¹⁴ On the whole, the Dashnakzouthiun seems not yet to have favored separatism or Russian occupation, but to have pursued a policy of waiting and pressure for reforms and autonomy. Its representatives co-operated with conservative Armenians in the *millet* assembly of November, 1912. It constituted, however, a potential threat to the Porte, and it could present the Armenian case abroad as well as within the Ottoman Empire.¹⁵

Public opinion the world over was soon made conscious of the Armenian problem. When the Balkan wars broke out, Armenians saw both an example of a fight for freedom and an opportunity for action. Their agitation increased. The magazine *Pro Armenia* reappeared in Paris. Armenians resident in Japan and Burma sent appeals to the Hague Court. *Armenia*, printed in the United States, carried articles directed at awakening world opinion for reform. The Armenian colony in Paris petitioned the president of France for a solution to their problems in Turkey. The British embassy in Constantinople was approached by Armenians who asked for the execution of the guarantees of reform in the Treaty of Berlin.¹⁶

Thus the ground was prepared for the resurgence of the Armenian question in diplomatic circles. But it remained for Russian action to force an early consideration of the question by the powers, who, occupied with the Balkan imbroglio, did not want to be bothered with Armenia at the moment.¹⁷ The Russian action, however, forced them to pay attention to it. It was curious that Russia, for whom in 1895 the question of Armenian reforms had been distasteful, should now be the protagonist of such reform. Mandelstam, the first dragoman of the Russian embassy in Constantinople, later explained this change of heart on purely humanitarian grounds: Russia wanted to help the Armenians to secure liberty and safety in Turkey.¹⁸ The real Russian motives are more obscure, and there was apparently a conflict on policy within Russia itself. The immediate object of the tsarist government seems to have been simply the establishment of Russian control over reform administration in Turkish Armenia, perhaps separated from Turkey as an autonomous province. Military occupation was contemplated if reform efforts should fail.¹⁹ Reasons both of internal and external policy supported such an aim.

The internal reasons were connected with the attitude of the Russian government toward its own Armenian minority in Transcaucasia. Until 1905 Russian policy had been one of ruthless repression, which reached its height in

that year with a government-provoked Armeno-Tartar war, and the confiscation of all Armenian ecclesiastical property. This resulted only in increased revolutionary activity by the Armenians against the government. After 1905 a new governor of the Caucasus, Vorontzov-Dashkov, inaugurated a conciliatory policy which gave results and put an end to the Armenian separatist drive. Peace, order, and justice were given the Armenians, as well as some nationalist rights, although at the same time Vorontzov made efforts to colonize Russians in Transcaucasia. The Armenians were still, however, a thorn in the Russian side. The Armenian deputies in the Duma lined up with the left-wing parties, the Dashnaks with the revolutionaries, and the Hintchak with the Social Democrats. The Dashnaks gave particular trouble, and as late as 1912 there was a spectacular trial of five hundred of the most important Armenians, of Dashnak sympathies, for high treason; the trial served in the end only to make the government look foolish, as all but fifty were acquitted.

Since the Armenian political societies, as well as Armenian sympathies, extended across the Russo-Turkish border, a method of conciliating the Armenians in Russia was to help their brothers in Turkey. This the tsarist government promised to do. The matter became more pressing when the Balkan wars broke out. The Russian government now feared that its own Armenians might be inspired to rise, help their brethren in Turkey, and try to form a nation; or else that the Armenians in Turkey, seeing the Turkish weakness and the Balkan example, would revolt and the conflagration would spread across the Russian border, and also to the Armenians in the Russian sphere in northern Persia. Armenian demands in Turkey were championed by the Armenians in Russia and in the Duma by the Armenian deputy Papadjanov. The Russian government made renewed promises to its own Armenians that it would help those in Turkey. Many Russian Armenians demanded annexation of Turkish Armenia to Russia. Sazonov, the Russian foreign minister, was emphatic that this was not possible but promised to see to reform within Turkey.²⁰

Considerations of foreign policy added to the Russian desire to pose the Armenian question once again. In 1905 Russia had been turned back in the Far East and since then had been concentrating her efforts in the Near East. She had successfully won a sphere in Persia but had been unsuccessful in attempts to open the Straits and had not gained from the Balkan wars. A question of prestige was involved, in a sense: Russia needed a foreign success to appease public opinion after her many failures.²¹ But an active policy with regard to Armenia would have further practical value. This was true especially because of the strategic position of Turkish Armenia. The mineral and agricultural resources of that section were attractive,²² but the strategical implications far overshadowed the economic. A Russian control over Turkish Armenia would safeguard the Persian sphere of influence and the Russian Transcaucasus, and would provide a basis for future expansion either South or West. In 1912–1913 the control of Armenia would be particularly useful in

settling a Turco-Persian boundary dispute, in which Russian interests were involved. Until 1911, when Turkey became involved in the Tripolitan war, Turkish forces had been encroaching on Russia's Persian sphere near Lake Ourmiah, pushing north to Diliman, Khoi, and Makou.²³ Although since 1911 the Turks had not advanced, Russia still felt the threat.

In all these considerations of strategy, Erzurum was the key point. This city, populated largely by Armenians and situated in the center of the most pronouncedly Armenian region, dominated all the roads from Russia into Turkey: the roads to Diarbekir and Harput and the Euphrates Valley, to Bitlis and the Tigris Valley, to Trebizond and Sivas, to Ankara and Constantinople, and to Alexandretta. The campaign of 1877 had shown its importance to Russia.²⁴

When Russia was occupied in the Far East, and then with her own revolution of 1905, she depended on her treaty of 1900 with Turkey to keep other powers out of Armenia. Under this agreement no railroad concessions could be given in Turkish regions adjacent to Russia without Russian consent.²⁵ By 1912 Russia had regained some of her strength, while Turkey was weakening. Still, Russian policy in 1912–1914 was not one of immediate annexation of Armenia, nor of a drive through Armenia to Alexandretta or the Straits. Military occupation of Armenia was to be considered only if Russian reform plans failed. Russia was not yet prepared for military action against Turkey, for her own Caucasus railroads were incomplete, and she could not operate effectively within Turkey. Sazonov reported to the tsar toward the end of the crisis that territorial annexation at the moment would do Russia no good. Vorontzov-Dashkov added that it might only increase Russia's troubles by increasing her Armenian minority. Ultimate annexation was probably contemplated, and was certainly in the minds of many Russians.²⁶ The *Novoye Vremya*, opposing German penetration in Anatolia, spoke openly of "our South . . . our natural frontier, the historical conclusion of our centuries-old struggle with Turkey."²⁷

Immediate Russian policy was rather to insure a sphere of influence in Armenia in case the Ottoman Empire should fall apart, and to keep Germany out of this sphere. The Berlin-to-Bagdad railway zone was still nebulous, but German activity among Cilician Armenians was great, and was increasing to the North in Van and Bitlis. Russia wanted to forestall Germany in gaining favor among Armenians.²⁸ Wangenheim, German ambassador to the Porte, was convinced that Russia was trying to stir up Kurds and Armenians to provoke a clash leading to military intervention.²⁹ Undoubtedly Russian agitators, some consular officials among them, gave money, arms, and advice to Kurds and Armenians. Some of the agitation may be explained by the fact that many of the individual Armenian revolutionaries in Turkey had come from Russian Transcaucasia. Sazonov, though opposed to expansion, probably countenanced "incidents" as a means of pushing through a Russian-controlled reform scheme in Turkey.³⁰

Moved by these considerations of foreign and domestic policy, Sazonov was ready to sponsor the Armenian cause. He did this, in the first instance, through the Catholicos George V, head of the Gregorian Church, of which most Armenians were members. The seat of the Catholicos was at Etchmiadzin, at the foot of Mt. Ararat, in Russia; this geographical fact made Russian control of his actions easy. But since 1905 the Gregorians had adopted loyalty toward Russia, and George V was an ardent exponent of the new spirit.³¹ There was thus no difficulty in Russo-Armenian co-operation on this basis. George V appealed formally to the tsarist government to aid his Turkish brethren. He also appointed a delegation headed by Boghos Nubar Pasha, son of the Armeno-Egyptian statesman, to present the Armenian case to Europe in such a way as to prepare opinion for reform under Russia's aegis. This move was approved by the government, as was the program of the delegation, which demanded what amounted to an autonomous Armenia, under a European commissioner appointed by the Porte, and in which Christians and Moslems should share equally all military and administrative offices, as well as enjoying protection of their own languages and cultures. This was not mere subservience to Russia by the Catholicos and Nubar. They seem to have felt that in Russia lay the chief Armenian hope, and Nubar kept in touch with Iswolski while making his representations in the Western capitals. Nubar was explicit in saying that the Armenians desired neither separation from Turkey nor Russian occupation, merely reforms. All through the year 1913, Nubar was occupied in Europe with this work.³²

Sazonov also broached the problem in two other ways. Apparently on the initiative of Giers, his ambassador in Constantinople, he warned the Turks in early December, 1912, of the danger of the Armenian situation, and hinted at intervention.³³ Sazonov also sounded out the French and English cabinets as to the possibility of making effective such reforms as were contemplated in article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin. He did not want to approach all the powers "because there would be disagreements, since the Balkan crisis still existed"; obviously, the Triple Alliance would seek to check Russian initiative.³⁴ But by January 2, 1913, Wangenheim knew of the Russian *démarches*.³⁵ The Armenian question was thus raised before all Europe.

In both England and France opinion was that consideration of the Armenian question should be postponed until the Balkans were peaceful. This was perhaps the reception Sazonov wished; he might then impose upon the Porte a purely Russian reform scheme, or he might even send a few Russian troops into Armenia on pretext of keeping order there. But France added that she could countenance no unilateral action by Russia which might precipitate the partition of Anatolia.³⁶ Not only would German opposition be aroused by such a Russian move but French financial and railway interests in Turkey, which were dependent on the integrity of the country, would be jeopardized.³⁷ Sir Edward Grey did not, at this point, seem to fear any untoward Russian action.³⁸

The German reaction to the news of Russia's *démarches* was almost explosive. Zimmerman, in the foreign office, at once announced that German interests demanded that she be consulted on the matter.³⁹ The Bagdad railway zone, extending across the Anatolian peninsula, was the object of his concern; it represented a heavy investment and contained many Armenians within its borders.⁴⁰ From January of 1913 onward the German diplomats, and particularly Wangenheim at Constantinople, expressed fear of a Russian partition of Anatolia. He described the Russian policy as one of deliberate provocation of incidents to provide an excuse for intervention and annexation. At times his reports grew almost fantastic, saying at one moment that the Russians were arming the Kurds to attack the Armenians and at the next that the Russians were causing Kurds and Armenians to ally in revolt. He suspected also, and the kaiser and a good part of public opinion supported him, that the Triple Entente had arranged to partition Asiatic Turkey. The 1907 treaty between Russia and England made Germans doubt that England would oppose Russia in Armenia, although by the Cyprus treaty of 1878 she was committed to do so. "The Russian bear wants Armenian honey," said the *Deutsch-Asiatische Gesellschaft*. The situation is "not at all rosy," reported Wangenheim. Grey continually assured Germany that no partition was contemplated, and that no agreement existed among the Triple Entente powers, but German fears continued. There was, in fact, no such agreement. These fears were in part well founded, however, with regard to the Russian designs.⁴¹

In a saner vein, Wangenheim outlined the proper action for Germany. He realized that the Armenian complaints were just, and advocated German co-operation with Turkey to make reform effective. In this way Russian interference would be avoided, for which the Turks would be grateful to Germany; in addition, the Armenians would see Germany as their friend. If necessary, Germany must act in concert with all the powers to achieve reform and prevent the partition of Turkey. The main object of Germany must be to prevent partition, for the Bagdad railway sphere was too large and nebulous as yet to fall to her completely. Germany must, nevertheless, insure herself against all contingencies. Therefore in a sphere four hundred kilometres wide, reaching from the Eskişehir-Adalia line to the Persian frontier, and including Van, Aleppo, and Alexandretta, Germany should put forth every effort to increase her influence by means of more consulates, German experts and merchants, and missions and schools. Such a sphere would, Wangenheim acknowledged, clash with France in Aleppo and Russia in Van, but he maintained it nevertheless. And with his conclusions Jagow, the foreign secretary, agreed. "To go away empty-handed," said the latter, "would be a second Morocco for us."⁴² The warship *Goeben* was stationed off Mersina in early May, to prevent Armenian incidents.⁴³

German opinion found staunch support in Italy and Austria. The Austrian military attaché in London suspected partition by the Triple Entente. Berchtold

declared that neither Austria nor Italy would allow the Triple Entente to handle the reform question alone. Some in Austria suspected a Russian thrust toward Alexandretta.⁴⁴ Meanwhile, German protests against Russian action aroused in England the suspicion that Germany wanted to partition Anatolia.⁴⁵ Russian journalists now accused Germany of wanting to appropriate Anatolia entire, as compensation for having let Austria take Bosnia and Italy take Tripoli. The Russian ambassadors in Constantinople and Berlin reported new German activity among Armenians, in opposition to Russia.⁴⁶ By the end of April, 1913, suspicion was intense on all sides.

The Turks had, meanwhile, not been inactive. As soon as the initial Russian moves were known, the Turks started on the elaboration of reform plans to forestall intervention. One such was drawn up in December, 1912, for the *vilayets* of Van, Bitlis, Harput, and Diarbekir.⁴⁷ On January 10 Mahmud Shevket became grand vizier in a *coup* led by Enver, and strengthened Turkish resistance to interference, while lending a sympathetic ear to the German representations. This ministry presented in March a new reform of all *vilayet* administration, granting a considerable degree of decentralization.⁴⁸ Wangenheim wanted to support Turkey in carrying out this project.⁴⁹ It was, he observed, the most that the Turkish government could do with safety at the time. This was probably true, for the defeat in the Balkans had served only to increase Turkish nationalism and the Turks' pride in their Anatolian homeland and to breed further enmity against Christians. The CUP government was sincere in wishing reforms and order but opportunist in its methods and not too friendly to the Armenians, despite their valiant service as soldiers in the Balkans.

In April the Turks, apparently with no German prompting, hit upon a clever tactical move in a request for English officials to help carry out their new reforms in the Armenian *vilayets*. These experts would control the gendarmerie, the system of justice, agriculture and forests, public works, and the interior department work. Soon Mahmud Shevket added a request for more English officials for the South and West of Anatolia. The Turks explained this move to Wangenheim as an effort to convince England of the Turk sincerity and efficiency in reform, to show England that Turkey would not fall apart, and so to win English consent to Turkish ownership of the Aegean islands; otherwise, the Turks believed, Britain would give Greece the islands for fear that some great power might take them away from a decaying Turkey.⁵⁰ There was doubtless some truth in this explanation, especially as regards Southwest Anatolia. But the whole offer was aimed at keeping Russia and England at odds on the Armenian question.⁵¹ English officers in Armenia would be a guarantee not only of good administration but against Russian encroachment. The Turkish demand was based on the Cyprus treaty of 1878, directed against Russia.

Wangenheim was delighted with this plan, and Jagow agreed to it also. The

Germans approved partly because Shevket's plan gave Germany control of the reorganization of the Turkish army and of the educational system, and partly because they hoped to drive England and Russia farther apart. But they also saw visions of Anglo-German co-operation to protect Turkey, like another Egypt, and to prevent partition.⁵² On Wangenheim's representations to Shevket that the British officers in Southwest Anatolia might infringe on the Bagdad railway sphere, the Turkish minister changed the locations for a few but stuck to his offer. Jagow wanted Wangenheim to insist that only German officers be near that sphere, but the ambassador replied that if the Turks were forced to abandon the Cyprus treaty as a basis for requesting foreign aid, Russia would have cause for asking that she too be represented by officials.⁵³ A few French experts were contemplated for finance reform. Russia was excluded entirely. For a moment there dawned the possibility of Anglo-German co-operation to put Asiatic Turkey on its feet and guarantee its integrity.

The British viewed the proposal with favor but at once wanted to inform Russia, for fear of awakening Russian suspicion if English officers should appear without explanation on the Russian frontier. Russia was so informed, and at the same time Grey promised the Turks that some officials would be sent, although not all that had been requested.⁵⁴ At once the Russian protest came, and in strong language. It boiled down to this: that Russia could not play second fiddle in the question of Armenian reform because of her paramount interest in the region next to her frontier, and because the promises made to her own Armenians demanded that Russia herself take the lead in Armenian reform.⁵⁵ Sazonov was also under pressure from his military men, who did not want foreign military experts on their frontier and who hated above all the Anglo-Indian officers who would doubtless be appointed.⁵⁶ In the face of this firm stand, England was not prepared to risk the loss of Russian friendship. Arguments on the part of England and France that if the Turks met refusal in England they would turn to Germany had no effect on Sazonov; he considered that Russian threats at the Porte would be sufficient to prevent such a move and said he would use force if necessary.⁵⁷ Slowly Grey backed down, and in July, 1913, agreed to postpone sending any officers until a conference of the powers should have considered the question of reform.⁵⁸

The month of June, 1913, was spent in preparations for the proposed conference. Sazonov wanted to revive the 1895 Triplice and to allow the Triple Alliance no initiative concerning Armenia.⁵⁹ But neither France nor England wanted to make this a test case of the strength of the two combinations.⁶⁰ Effective reform, they saw, could come only from a united front. Grey was obdurate on this point and insisted that, in return for his concession on the question of officers, all six powers should take part.⁶¹ Germany still hoped for Anglo-German co-operation but was worried by English complaisance toward Russia.⁶² Ample justification for the German worry was the English deference to Russia on two more points: the Triple Entente should talk over reform plans

before all six powers met, and the conference of ambassadors should meet not in London but in Constantinople, where the pressure of the Armenians and Russians would be greatest.⁶³

Upon hearing on June 4 that Lichnowsky, the German ambassador in London, proposed to bring the Armenian question before the London Conference, then sitting on Balkan affairs, Grey hurried the Russians into sending out the call for a conference at Constantinople.⁶⁴ Thus Grey was able to give Russia credit for the initiative in the reform movement, but at the same time he made certain that henceforth all six powers would be included in discussions. From this time on Grey was a self-constituted mediator between the Russian and Turkish-German viewpoints, seeking to preserve Turkey and keep the friendship of both sides.

The Germans and their allies accepted the Russian invitation on condition that Turkish sovereignty and territorial integrity be upheld and that a Turk take part in the discussion. At once Sazonov objected, successfully, that the Armenians would have no confidence in the reform if a Turk participated, and that the proceedings would be dragged out without end. It was obvious that Russian diplomacy was fighting every inch of the way to have a free hand in Armenia. Nor would Sazonov allow the discussion of a Turkish scheme. Grey and Pichon were becoming more annoyed at the Russian demands on their friendship, which would bring German and Turkish enmity and jeopardize the success of railroad negotiations then being conducted with Djavid Bey. The French had growing interests in an Armenian network and encountered Russian opposition on that score also. Sazonov also rejected the French proposal of a high commissioner *ad hoc* to keep Armenia quiet while discussions were taking place. A British proposal to lend the Turks six temporary gendarmerie officers met the same fate. The *entente préalable* between the French, English, and Russian ambassadors did not in the end carry much weight, for Pichon and Grey insisted that the plan to be discussed be presented as Russia's only, not as a concerted proposal by the Triple Entente.⁶⁵

André Mandelstam, dragoman of the Russian embassy in Constantinople, was the author of this plan. It provided in essence for the creation of one province out of the six Armenian *vilayets*, under a governor general to be approved by the powers, and a mixed advisory council of Europeans, Turks, and Armenians.⁶⁶ Wangenheim at once characterized the scheme as a violation of Turkish sovereignty and the signal for the partition of Anatolia.⁶⁷ To him, such an autonomous province next to the frontier of Russia was tantamount to Russian annexation. The Russians actually intended neither annexation nor partition, although some elements within Russia desired this. Admittedly, the Mandelstam scheme tended to create Armenian autonomy.⁶⁸ But the German ambassador in St. Petersburg saw correctly that Russia had too many internal troubles to expand territorially, and that this was not Sazonov's policy.⁶⁹ And Giers ponted out that Russia was in no way prepared for the partition of Tur-

key; Armenian reform at most was the preparation of a Russian sphere in anticipation of such an eventuality.⁷⁰ Jagow and Grey both came to recognize the sincerity of Sazonov's protestations that he contemplated no territorial expansion, but they insisted also that the Mandelstam plan led inevitably to it.⁷¹ Sazonov countered with the assertion that if the Mandelstam plan were not adopted, the Armenians would revolt, Russian military intervention would be forced, and partition would then ensue.⁷²

Here was the fundamental quarrel: Russia asserted that, without her plan, partition would result; Germany asserted that partition would result directly from the plan itself.⁷³ England, supported to some extent by France, agreed with Germany that the Mandelstam plan looked too much like the beginning of partition to be allowed; the cure was worse than the disease. England feared particularly the bad effects on her Indian Moslems of the partition of Moslem Turkey.⁷⁴ Pallavicini, the Austrian ambassador, who, as dean of the diplomatic corps in Constantinople, was to preside over the conference, at first would not even consider the plan. This was natural, inasmuch as Austria was not ready for a partition of Anatolia and had only the vaguest of claims near Adalia. Wangenheim, fearing that a rejection of the Russian plan without any consideration would cause an Armenian uprising, finally changed Pallavicini's mind sufficiently so that the conference could be held.⁷⁵

This was the situation in the first week of July, 1913, before the conference. At this point the Turks, as might have been expected from their own practice, but perhaps also on German initiative, issued a new reform scheme of their own, providing for European officials but differing radically from the Mandelstam plan in that all control was to be in the hands of the Porte. Armenia was, in addition, split into two inspectorates.⁷⁶ Germany and England, although recognizing the need for some degree of European supervision if any reforms were to be effectively carried out, wanted to make this plan the basis of discussion in order to take control of the proceedings away from Russia.⁷⁷ This they were unable to do.

Under these conditions the conference of ambassadors met in the Austrian summer embassy at Yeniköy on the Bosphorus. A deadlock was expected, and a deadlock ensued.⁷⁸ Russia, fairly well supported by France, and partially supported by England, advanced her plan as the only way to prevent an Armenian rising and subsequent intervention and partition. The Triple Alliance, pleading the Turk case as well as its own, stood united against it.⁷⁹ Germany was the more determined to oppose it because the plan contemplated the inclusion of part of what Wangenheim regarded as the Bagdad railway sphere. Thus it was that Germany bore the onus of stopping the Russian plan, and in effect pulled the English chestnuts out of the fire.⁸⁰ Had the Mandelstam plan been forced on the Porte and had it brought the partition which was feared, English problems in the Mediterranean region would have been complicated, and English prestige among the Indian Moslems would have suffered.

The Yeniköy conference had failed to provide any solution to the Armenian question. Toward the end of July, when the futile sessions were just over, a new scare was thrown into diplomatic circles. Russian troops were reported concentrating on the Turkish border, near Mount Ararat.⁸¹ It appeared that Russia, worsted in the Adrianople question, was on the verge of occupying a few cities in Armenia as a means of forcing the Turks to give up the disputed stronghold. The German ambassador in St. Petersburg suspected such a move, and Said Halim, the grand vizier, remarked to Pallavicini that this would not force the Turks out of Adrianople.⁸² Had the Russian occupation occurred, the Armenian question would have been settled, and partition of Turkey would presumably have resulted. French remonstrances, which were immediate and strong, served to thwart the move; the French had at no time wanted to partition Anatolia, and were now in the process of concluding with the Bagdad railway interests an agreement which would have come to nothing if the Russian army had marched.⁸³ The extreme tension was soon over, but the powers were now spurred on to settle the Armenian problem.⁸⁴

Further incentive to find a speedy solution was furnished the powers by the growing Armenian unrest, which increased particularly after it became known that England would send no officers, and that the conference of ambassadors had reached no agreement. Conditions were as bad as ever. The Kurds were evidently preparing a rising and receiving some encouragement from unofficial Russian *agents provocateurs*.⁸⁵ Armenians were murdered near Bitlis at the rate of twenty-seven a month. "Depression among the Armenians is great," wrote a missionary on the spot. "All who are able are trying to get away. Fifty are on the point of leaving Bitlis. Those left behind are being driven to desperation; they incline either to appeal to the Russian consul for protection or flee to the mountains."⁸⁶ Although still divided in counsel, more and more Armenians tended to look to Russia as the only protector, if also a despotic one.⁸⁷ Their disgust with the concert of powers was evident. "Lots of words make no *pilaf*," they complained. The editor of the Armenian paper *Avedaper* wrote: "We have been deceived quite long enough. The *Times*, the *Temps*, the *Novoye Vremya*, and the *Berliner Tageblatt* have nothing new to say, more especially as our wound is not of those that are healed of ink." He told his people that Russia might extend her Persian sphere into Turkish Armenia.⁸⁸ The Turks poured oil on the flames when the *Tasvir-i Efkiar*, official CUP organ, chose this moment to label as a traitor the Armenian who was urging reform in the Western capitals, Boghos Nubar.⁸⁹

Although a failure, the conference had at least clarified the situation. Out of it, as well as out of the Armenian unrest, came desires for compromise. The British had early said the obvious, which needed saying: that the Russian plan was of no use because it led only to disagreement, that any effective action had to be united, and any effective reform had to be accepted voluntarily by

the Porte. The French, at the end of the conference, sought a basis to conciliate the Turk and Russian plans.⁹⁰ The Italians, starting to delimit a sphere in Adalia and to negotiate a railway concession with Turkey, wanted peace and quiet.⁹¹ The Austrians were even less prepared for an explosion or partition of Turkey.⁹²

The chief antagonists, finally, were of a similar mind. Sazonov, convinced that the Russian plan could be imposed neither by Russia nor by the Triple Entente, was irritated but realistic. "Why this name of Triple Entente if six powers have to agree?" he expostulated and approached Berlin with suggestions for a new agreement.⁹³ If he could not get the autonomous Armenia that Russian foreign policy would have liked, it was still important to appease the Russian Armenians with reforms and to stop the danger of a revolt in Turkey. The Germans astutely reasoned that to join with Russia was to prevent any individual Russian action. This policy would tone down the Russian plan and restore Germany's prestige among the Armenians. If Russia would not compromise at all, Germany could back the Porte's plan of reform, and Russia would have to join in the move if she were to gain any credit among her own Armenians.⁹⁴

There is no need to follow in detail the negotiations which occupied the autumn of 1913.⁹⁵ Giers and Wangenheim were given, in effect, a mandate by the six governments to come to an agreement which might be acceptable to the Porte. Neither ambassador conceded more than a bare minimum at each step, and neither attributed to the other any motives but those of basest self-interest. The conversations were aided by more amicable relations between the foreign offices at Berlin and St. Petersburg. For a time the French were worried that this apparently friendly co-operation meant a weakening of the Franco-Russian alliance, and Bompard was set to inquiring in Constantinople as to what was really going on.⁹⁶ There was, in reality, no ground for the French suspicions. In the middle of September, Giers and Wangenheim produced a plan which accepted the Turkish proposal of two inspectorates for Armenia, the inspectors to be recommended by the powers and to have rather extensive control over administration.⁹⁷ This plan was approved by the other powers, and the two ambassadors set out to talk the Porte into acceptance. Here they suffered a setback.

The Turks naturally wanted to institute their own reform plan and had been going through all manner of contortions to avoid foreign control. In July they had approached Sweden and Belgium for officers, but these nations circumspectly submitted the proposals to the approval of some of the great powers, and Giers and Wangenheim objected.⁹⁸ In the fall of 1913 several factors combined to stiffen the resistance of the Turkish government, now really a dictatorship of Enver, Talaat, and Djemal: they saw the failure of the powers to agree, they were encouraged by their triumph in retaining Adrianople, and

they were assured by French financiers that Russia would never use force in Armenia.⁹⁹

Said Halim appeared at first to be agreeable to the new scheme, but he deferred to the CUP, which made plain its opposition. "They want to make little Lebanons everywhere," complained Said.¹⁰⁰ Reform and order were desired by the CUP, and the *Sabah* and *Ikdam* prodded the government to action, but foreign control the Turks would not have.¹⁰¹ They reverted in October to the old measure of asking for British officials, and in particular for Sir Robert Crawford, whose work in reorganizing the customs house had been excellent. The British government naturally snuffed out these Turkish hopes.¹⁰² Another logical move was made in the direction of direct Turk-Armenian conciliation. This effort was difficult at best because of the divisions among the Armenians and was rendered nugatory by the inability of either side to make any real concessions; the Turks were proud and nationalist, the Armenians too suspicious to trust to mere bilateral agreements.¹⁰³ In the end the Turks were unable to solve their problem for themselves but succeeded in thwarting the Giers-Wangenheim plan, which could not be forced on the Porte because the powers were split on so many issues, particularly on the question of the Aegean islands.¹⁰⁴

Negotiations continued on a new line which the Turks themselves, playing for time, suggested—the creation of counselors, to be attached to inspectors in Armenia and to be named by the powers. Some progress was made in this direction by the beginning of December, 1913, and Wangenheim and Giers were slightly more hopeful.¹⁰⁵ Djemal, however, voiced absolute opposition to any foreign control, although he would welcome foreign experts under Turk direction.¹⁰⁶ The Turks seem to have feared at this point that Russia and Germany might be planning a partition of Anatolia.¹⁰⁷

In the midst of this slow process of bargaining, the Liman von Sanders affair burst on the diplomatic world, threatening to bring the corollary of a forceful solution to the Armenian problem. Sazonov contemplated the occupation of Bayazid and Erzurum as a means of forcing Turkey to give up this appointment which, in Russian eyes, meant German control of the Straits.¹⁰⁸ It is questionable whether Sazonov would actually have done this. Giers advised only concentrating troops on the Caucasus frontier, and informing the Armenians that this was not to be regarded as support of Armenian revolt.¹⁰⁹ Both before and after the crucial last two weeks of 1913, Sazonov showed clearly that Russia was not prepared for military or naval action, and that her communications in the Caucasus were not sufficient to allow of any mobility.¹¹⁰ German and French evidence supports this point.¹¹¹ And Sazonov later declared that he would not have carried out the threat, because it would have meant European war.¹¹² The episode served, nevertheless, to dim for a moment the chances of a peaceful solution to the Armenian question. Its end result, how-

ever, aided such a solution. It was apparent that Germany had made no great concession on the Liman appointment, and so to keep their advantage the Germans strongly counselled Said Halim to give in to Russia on several points in the Armenian affair.¹¹³

On Christmas day it appeared to Wangenheim that the Armenian matter was settled. Said Halim had agreed to ask the powers to recommend inspectors. The kaiser sent congratulations to his ambassador, and Sazonov asked Iswolski to let Boghos Nubar know of the happy outcome. A formula was agreed upon which saved the Turk prestige, and gave the powers some influence over the administration of reforms.¹¹⁴ Then came another halt, all the more exasperating because a solution was so near.

The cause of the new trouble is hard to determine. The Turks and the Germans claimed that Sazonov suddenly demanded concessions on some fresh points: parity of Moslems and Christians in the Armenian assemblies and military service for Armenians in their own *vilayets* were the chief of these.¹¹⁵ He had, in fact, suddenly become more demanding.¹¹⁶ It is probable that Sazonov was seeking revenge for the Liman appointment, and for the rise of the militarist Germanophil, Enver, to be minister of war. The Turkish Armenians seem also to have pressed Sazonov for greater advantages.¹¹⁷ The Turks, for their part, wanted to squeeze the last piastre out of the year-long bargaining.¹¹⁸ The Russian consul at Erzurum raised the cry of imminent massacre. This report the French and British consuls declared exaggerated, and the German consul said that nothing but a pistol match by a sport club was going on.¹¹⁹

These conditions offer at least a partial explanation of Sazonov's sudden obduracy. In view of his attitude hitherto, it is improbable that he should have wanted to perform such a quick *volte-face* as to jeopardize the results of months of negotiation; chauvinist and Armenophil elements beyond his control must bear a part of the blame. In his memoirs Sazonov states that he regarded the details as of no significance compared to European control of Armenian reform, but now he was arguing over details, not over the control.¹²⁰ Gulkevitch, the Russian chargé d'affaires in Constantinople who completed the negotiations after Giers left, urged Sazonov to close the deal.¹²¹ The other powers also pressed him to let some of the minor points go.¹²² France had up to this point refused a loan to Turkey, in order to exert pressure for the acceptance of the Russian demands. Now it appeared that a loan might come from the United States through Morgenthau and Chester, thereby destroying the pressure and the French deal at the same time.¹²³ These considerations led Sazonov to yield, after he had won a few more concessions in the haggling with Turkey which, in the best oriental fashion, was drawn out until the first week in February.¹²⁴ On February 8, 1914, Russia and Turkey signed an accord on Armenian reform which stipulated that the powers should recommend verbally to the Porte two inspectors general, who should have a rather exten-

sive control.¹²⁵ “The act of February 8 marks, without any doubt,” wrote Gulkevitch, “the dawn of a new and happier era in the history of the Armenian people!”¹²⁶

Not all factions accepted the agreement in good grace. The reality of foreign intervention rankled in the Young Turk breast.¹²⁷ Many Armenians regarded the plan as too weak to offer a real guarantee of reform, pointing out that the inspectors general, although European, were Turkish appointees.¹²⁸ Nor did unrest in Armenia subside because of the conclusion of the agreement.¹²⁹ The diplomatic crisis was, however, over. Two months of negotiation were required to find inspectors who should be agreeable to the Turks, the Armenians, and the six powers. Russia, aided by France, was able to control to some extent the choice of these officials. When the Dutch East Indies administrator, Westenenk, and the Norwegian major, Hoff, were finally chosen, Iswolski was able to write that “they understand the necessity of supporting Russia.”¹³⁰ But from these negotiations no new crisis resulted.

Various interpretations were placed on the accord of February 8. Germans saw in it a victory over Russia.¹³¹ To the Russian mind it meant a victory over Turkey and Germany—the agreement was a bilateral Russo-Turk affair, and Germany had, said the Russians, lost caste in the eyes of both Turks and Armenians by sabotaging the Mandelstam plan in an effort to gain Turk gratitude and then by urging weak reforms on the Porte to win Armenian thanks.¹³² The French view was the sanest: Turkey and the Triple Alliance had obliged Russia to accept some fundamentals of the Turkish plan, but from Russia had come the initiative and motive power that had made possible any action at all.¹³³

In point of fact, there were no losers. Turkey had a reform plan with a minimum of foreign control which might be expected to keep the Armenians quiet for a time, and she was saved from immediate partition. The Armenians had gained something which promised to be more than mere paper. Russia had not gained all the control over Armenia which she regarded as her right and necessity, but she gained some, and gained also some reforms with which to appease her own Armenians and minimize the danger of a revolt in Turkey; she had succeeded, moreover, in thwarting a purely Anglo-German reform of Anatolia, with Anglo-Indian officers in control of Armenia. Germany had not won all the influence in Anatolia that she wanted, but had averted what she regarded as a threat to the Bagdad railway sphere. France, England, Austria, and Italy had also gained by avoiding an explosion or partition of the Ottoman Empire.

This, in reality, was the chief benefit to all the powers. None wanted partition at that moment, and none wanted war at that moment over the Armenian question. Pallavicini, dean of the ambassadors in Constantinople, spoke for all as well as for Austria when he said that the time for partition was not yet ripe and that a period of consolidation of interests in Turkey was in everyone's

interest.¹³⁴ The various foreign offices echoed this opinion frequently. Both Giers and Wangenheim, however, were convinced that the nation represented by the other wanted to control Turkey and appropriate large parts of Anatolia; each was certain, too, that it was his duty to exclude the other entirely from Anatolia. Their attitudes were at times almost fanatic.¹³⁵ But each, in fighting the other, helped to prevent the partition for which no one was ready and for which everyone was preparing feverishly against the time when it should be inevitable. Hence they clashed violently over the Armenian question. The threatened partition did not occur over this issue simply because no one wanted to take the final step.

Notes

1. *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 1871–1914*, XXXIV, Pt. 1, no. 12710 and note (hereinafter cited as *Grosse Politik*); Auguste Gauvain, *L'Europe au jour le jour* (Paris, 1917–22), IV, 347.

2. *Grosse Politik*, XXXIV, Pt. 1, no. 12588.

3. For the 1895–97 diplomacy and background of the Armenian question see William L. Langer, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism* (New York, 1935), I, chaps. v, vii, x; for a convenient summary and collection of reform documents since 1878 see Marcel Léart, *La question arménienne à la lumière des documents* (Paris, 1913).

4. Sir Telford Waugh, *Turkey Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow* (London, 1930), p. 51.

5. Frédéric Macler, *Autour de l'Arménie* (Paris, 1917), pp. 149–57.

6. Noel and Harold Buxton, *Travel and Politics in Armenia* (New York, 1914), pp. 108–10; Léon Lamouche, “La réorganisation de la gendarmerie ottomane,” *Questions diplomatiques et coloniales*, XXXI (Apr. 16, 1911), 470–82; *Asie française*, XII (1912), 199–200, 346–47.

7. André Mandelstam, *Le sort de l'empire ottoman* (Paris, 1917), pp. 203–206.

8. Michel Pavlovitch, “La Russie et les arméniens,” *Revue politique internationale*, I (May, 1914), 474–75; Mandelstam, p. 30; S. Zarzecki, “La question kurdo-arménienne,” *Revue de Paris*, XXI (Apr. 15, 1914), 888; *Asie française*, XII (September, 1912), 391, notes a typical incident.

9. Buxton and Buxton, p. 28; *Near East*, V (July 11, 1913), 280; Max Schlagentweit, *Verkehrswege und Verkehrsprojekte in Vorderasien* (Berlin, 1906), pp. 32–34; American Board of Congregational Missions, *Report for 1910* (Boston, 1911), p. 119; *Echos d'Orient*, XV (November, 1912), 543; Macler, pp. 157–68.

10. Pavlovitch, in *Rev. pol. internat.*, I, 476.

11. A. Viallate et M. Caudel, *La vie politique dans les deux mondes* (Paris, 1908 ff.), VI, 377; *Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia v Epokhu Imperializma* [International Relations in the Period of Imperialism], 2d series, III, Pt. 2 (Moscow, 1940), nos. 648, 715 and n. 2, 819.

12. Fédération Arménienne Révolutionnaire, *Rapport présenté au Bureau Socialiste Internationale* (Stuttgart, 1907), pp. 22–23.

13. *Near East*, IV (Feb. 7, 1913), 379.

14. Mandelstam, *Le sort*, p. 209; Russia, Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del, *Sbornik Diplomaticeskikh Dokumentov: Reformy v Armenii*, 26 Noiabria 1912 goda–10 Maia 1914 goda [Collection of Diplomatic Documents: Reforms in Armenia, Nov. 26, 1912–May 10, 1914] (Petrograd, 1915), no. 7. This is the official Russian Orange Book on the Armenian crisis, hereinafter cited as *Orange Book*. A popular condensed edition also exists, *Budushchee Ustroistvo Armenii* [Future Organization of Armenia] (Petrograd, 1915). These are the only Russian collections covering the Armenian question of 1912–14. Thus far the great collections now being published leave a gap here. The second series of *Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia* so far goes only to October 17, 1912, and the third series begins with January 1/14, 1914. The gap can be filled to some extent from the collections published by Adamov, Marchand, Siebert, and Stieve, which will be cited below, but much is still missing. The *Orange Book* was edited to suit Russia's wartime politics in 1915, as is evident from the omissions and alterations of its no. 148 (Jan. 27/Feb. 9, 1914) as compared with the full text in *Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia*, 3d series, I (Moscow, 1931), no. 210 (German translation in *Die Internationalen Beziehungen im Zeitalter des Imperialismus*, 1st series, I [Berlin, 1931], no. 210; hereinafter cited as *Internationalen Beziehungen*). The *Orange Book* must be used with caution.

15. The foregoing two paragraphs are based on the following: Charles Vellay, "La question arménienne," *Revue de Paris*, III (June 1, 1913), 664; *Armenia*, VI (July, 1913), 368; *Near East*, V (July 11, 1913), 280; Kapriel S. Papazian, *Patriotism Perverted* (Boston, 1934), pp. 9–37; Pavlovitch, in *Rev. pol. internat.*, I, 479; Herbert A. Gibbons, *The Blackest Page of Modern History* (New York, 1916), p. 71; Fédération Arménienne Révolutionnaire, *Rapport*, *passim*; Frédéric Macler, "Les arméniens en Turquie," *Revue du Monde Musulman*, XXIV (September, 1913), 168–69; Federal Writers' Project of WPA of Massachusetts, *The Armenians in Massachusetts* (Boston, 1937), pp. 46–52; M. Vartan Malcom, *The Armenians in America* (Boston, 1919), pp. 118–24; Leon Z. Surmelian, *I Ask You, Ladies and Gentlemen* (New York, 1945), pp. 53–65; René Pinon, *Le rapport secret du Dr. Johannes Lepsius . . . sur les massacres d'Arménie* (Paris, 1918), pp. 190–200; *Orange Book*, no. 11. Much of this literature is controversial. For later Turkish charges of Armenian revolutionary activity up to 1914, and documentary support, part of it certainly true, see: *Aspirations et agissements des comités arméniens* (Constantinople, 1917), pp. 7–118; *Les turcs et les revendications arméniennes* (Paris, 1919), pp. 17–18, 25–29; also Mahmud Moukhtar, *La Turquie, l'Allemagne, et l'Europe* (Paris, 1924), pp. 94–95.

16. Mikael Varandian, *L'Arménie et la question arménienne* (Laval, 1917), p. 76; *Moslem World*, IV (January, 1914), 85; Vellay, in *Rev. de Paris*, III, 671; *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, X, Pt. 1, no. 567, enclosure (hereinafter cited as *British Documents*).

17. *Ibid.*, no. 475.

18. André Mandelstam, *Das armenische Problem im Lichte des Völker- und Menschenrechts* (Berlin, 1931), pp. 109–13.

19. *Documents diplomatiques français*, 3d series, VIII, no. 144 (hereinafter cited as *Documents diplomatiques*); Mandelstam, *Le sort*, p. 207; *Orange Book*, no. 1.

20. For a tirade against Russian policy before 1905 see E. Aknouni, *Les plaies du Caucase* (Geneva, 1905); also Varandian, pp. 65 ff. For Vorontzov's policy see Maxime Kovalevsky, "La Russie et les arméniens," *Rev. pol. internat.*, I (April, 1914), 348–52; B. A. Bor'ian, *Armenia, Mezhdunarodnaia Diplomatia i SSSR* (Moscow, 1928–29), I, 337–44; Buxton and Buxton, pp. 22–24, 52–68. Also Otto Hoetzsch, *Russland* (Berlin, 1913), pp. 493–95; Serge Sazonov, *Fateful Years* (New York, 1928), pp. 138 ff.; *Internationalen Beziehungen*, 1st series, I, no. 210; Pavlovitch, in *Rev. pol. internat.*, I, 465; Ivan Loris Melikov, *La révolution russe et les nouvelles républiques transcaucasiennes* (Paris, 1920), pp. 84–86; *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, nos. 492, 493, 494; *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, VI, no. 619; Friedrich Stieve, ed., *Der diplomatische Schriftwechsel Iswolskis* (Berlin, 1924), III, 165–66; *Orange Book*, no. 2; René Pinon, *La suppression des arméniens* (Paris, 1916), p. 7.

21. *Grosse Politik*, XXXIV, Pt. 1, no. 12734.

22. William Eleroy Curtis, *Around the Black Sea* (New York, 1911), pp. 66–69.

23. *Asie française*, XII (May, 1912), 178–79. This controversy was settled only in November, 1913, by a commission, Mandelstam, *Le sort*, p. 71; C. H. D. Ryder, "The Demarcation of the Turco-Persian Boundary in 1913–14," *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society*, LXVI (July-December, 1925), 227–42.

24. On Armenia as a strategic problem see Schlagentweit, p. 36; E. von Hoffmeister, *Durch Armenien* (Leipzig, 1911), p. 119; Paul Rohrbach, *Die russische Weltmacht in Mittel- und Westasien* (Leipzig, 1904), pp. 154–75; Max Friedrichsen, *Die Grenzmarken des Europäischen Russlands* (Hamburg, 1915), pp. 145 ff.; Pavlovitch, in *Rev. pol. internat.*, I, 464, 478; K. T. Kairallah, "La question arménienne," *Questions diplomatiques et coloniales*, XXXV (Jan. 16, 1913), 68–71; M. Phillips Price, "The Problem of Asiatic Turkey," *Contemporary Review*, CV (February, 1914), 218; E. J. Dillon, "Russia's Solution of the Armenian Problem," *ibid.*, CV (January, 1914), 126–28.

25. *Asie française*, XII (August, 1912), 347; René Marchand, ed., *Un livre noir* (Paris, 1923?), II, 363–72.

26. *Orange Book*, no. 1; Marchand, *loc. cit.*; A. Gervais, "La renaissance de l'Orient," *Nouvelle Revue*, 2d series, X (Nov. 1, 1913), 12–13; *Grosse Politik*, XXXIV, Pt. I, no. 12734, and XXXVIII, no. 15284; Viallate et Caudel, VI, 392, 404. Bor'ian, I, 277–78, writes as if immediate annexation were the Russian aim. This is exaggerated. Felix Valyi, *Political and Spiritual Revolutions in Islam* (London, 1925), misconstrues *Orange Book* no. 1 to say Giers hoped for Russian military occupation shortly.

27. Trans. in *Literary Digest*, XLVII (Aug. 16, 1913), 240.

28. Alexandre Iswolsky, *Au service de la Russie* (Paris, 1937), I, 41. The American Congregational Board Report for 1913 states, p. 69, that German missionary activity had increased in Adana, Marash, Harput, Urfa, and Van. For Wangenheim's definition of the German sphere, see *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, no. 15312, wherein

Diarbekir and Van are included. See also Harry N. Howard, *The Partition of Turkey* (Norman, Okla., 1931), *passim*.

29. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, no. 15287.

30. Walter Guinness, "Impressions of Armenia and Kurdistan," *National Review*, LXII (January, 1914), 800; Pavlovitch, in *Rev. pol. internat.*, I, 477; Valyi, pp. 198–201; Zarzecki, in *Rev. de Paris*, XXI, 893; *Grosse Politik*, XXXIV, Pt. 1, no. 12731; Mandelstam, *Armenische Problem*, pp. 113–17.

31. Etienne Taris, "L'état actuel des problèmes ethnographiques du Caucase," *Asie française*, XII (October, 1912), 427–32.

32. *Orange Book*, nos. 12, 14; Mandelstam, *Le sort*, p. 211; Pavlovitch, in *Rev. pol. internat.*, I, 472; *Echos d'Orient*, XVI (March, 1913), 174; Bor'ian, I, 281; program printed in Buxton and Buxton, pp. 270–71; Marchand, II, 47; *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, no. 15286. See Nubar's notes, reprinted in Macler, *Autour de l'Arménie*, pp. 287–99; also in Ludovic de Contenson, *Les réformes en Turquie d'Asie* (Paris, 1913), pp. 112–19.

33. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, no. 15282 n.; *Orange Book*, nos. 1, 2, 3. Giers was worried lest Russia lose the initiative in this question through Armenian appeals to all the powers.

34. *Orange Book*, no. 5; Mandelstam, *Le sort*, pp. 208–209.

35. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, no. 15282.

36. *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, no. 475. Here it is stated that Sazonov spoke of the Armenian question as premature at this time. There can be no doubt that Sazonov meant to raise the question but was trying to reserve for Russia initiative and freedom of action. See also Marchand, II, 13.

37. For these interests, see Howard, pp. 48–50; for an expression by these interests, Contenson, "La question arménienne en Turquie d'Asie," *Asie française*, XIII (January, 1913), 8–16. France was negotiating for the rights to a railroad network in Armenia: Schulthess, *Europäischer Geschichtskalender*, Neue Folge, LIV (Munich, 1915), 633.

38. *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, no. 476.

39. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, no. 15283.

40. Howard, pp. 48–50; Edward M. Earle, *Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway* (New York, 1923), pp. 1–142. See also Hugo Grothe, *Die Asiatische Türkei und die Deutschen Interessen* (Halle, 1913), treating the Armenian problem as central.

41. On the German fears of Russian and Triple Entente action see *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, nos. 15282, 15284, 15285, 15288, 15294, 15308; *Kölnische Zeitung*, Mar. 16, 1913, quoted in *Asie française*, XIII (March, 1913), 135; Ernst Jäckh, "Vorderasien nach dem Balkankrieg," *Asiatisches Jahrbuch*, 1913, pp. 13–24. Dr. Jäckh thinks that Russia, thwarted by Britain in a drive to the Persian Gulf, is now trying to drive through the Bagdad railway sphere to Alexandretta. Also *British Documents*, IX, Pt. 2, nos. 542, 546, 555, 561, 1018, 1026, and X, Pt. 1, no. 476; Br. von Siebert, ed., *Graf Benckendorffs diplomatischer Schriftwechsel* (Berlin, 1928), III, nos. 837,

840. Also Adolf Grabowsky, "Die armenische Frage," *Zeitschrift für Politik*, VII (1914), 699–715.

42. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, nos. 15287, 15299, 15312, 15317. According to Pomiankowski, the Austrian military attaché in Constantinople, Wangenheim at first wanted a reorganization of Turkey by the Triple Alliance. Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, *Aus meiner Dienstzeit* (Vienna, 1922), III, 40.

43. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, no. 15302.

44. Conrad von Hötzendorf, III, 64; *Grosse Politik*, XXXIV, Pt. 1, no. 12730; Feldmarschalleutnant Otto von Gerstner, "Das klein-asiatische Problem," *Österreichische Rundschau*, XXXIV (Mar. 15, 1913), 409–15.

45. *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, nos. 477, 478.

46. *Literary Digest*, XLVI (Mar. 15, 1913), 464, quoting the *Novoye Vremya*; *Orange Book*, nos. 13, 16.

47. Mandelstam, *Le sort*, p. 210; *Orange Book*, nos. 4, 6, 8 and annex.

48. *Orange Book*, no. 15; Mandelstam, *Le sort*, pp. 51, 211.

49. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, no. 15295.

50. *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, nos. 479, 487; *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, nos. 15303, 15305.

51. *Österreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik*, VI, no. 7417; *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, VII, no. 3.

52. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, nos. 15301, 15311, 15312, 15439, wherein the Kaiser notes marginally about English and German aid to Turkey: "No go! either or!" Also Jäckh, in *Asiatisches Jahrb.*, 1913, pp. 19–20; *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, no. 533.

53. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, nos. 15303–15311.

54. *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, nos. 479–83, 485, 489, 491, 502.

55. *Ibid.*, nos. 484, 486, 492–494; *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, VI, nos. 568, 581, 619; Stieve, III, 165–67.

56. *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, nos. 494, 541; *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, VI, no. 581, and VII, no. 293.

57. *Ibid.*, VI, nos. 599, 618, 619; *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, nos. 492, 493.

58. *Ibid.*, no. 544; Hansard's *Parliamentary Debates*, 5th series, LIV, 1458–59, 2170, and LV, 855–56, 1676. It is significant that the *Orange Book* does not take up the Anglo-Russian dispute over the British officers.

59. *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, nos. 486, 488; *Orange Book*, nos. 23, 31.

60. *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, VI, no. 618.

61. *Ibid.*, no. 641; *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, nos. 494–96.

62. *Ibid.*, no. 499; *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, no. 15314; *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, VII, no. 30.

63. *Ibid.*, VII, no. 55; Stieve, III, 172; *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, nos. 492, 498.

64. *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, VII, nos. 32, 45; *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, no. 501; *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, nos. 15320, 15321, 15325–15329; *Orange Book*, no. 32.

65. *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, VII, nos. 86, 105, 119, 120, 121, 131, 140, 171, 186, 191, 222, 227; *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, nos. 15317, 15331, 15335, 15338, 15342, 15343; *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, nos. 505–12, 516, 518–26, 528, 530, 531, 536; Stieve III, pp. 175, 180–81, 184; Mandelstam, *Le sort*, pp. 216–17; Marchand II, 114–15; *Orange Book*, nos. 35, 37, 38, 40, 43–45, 49, 51.

66. Mandelstam, *Le sort*, pp. 218–24; *Orange Book*, no. 50 annex.

67. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, nos. 15337, 15347.

68. *Asie française*, XIII (June, 1913), 251; Pokrowski, *Internationalen Beziehungen*, 1st series, I, no. 210.

69. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, nos. 15339, 15378.

70. Stieve, III, nos. 929, 951.

71. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, no. 15359; *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, nos. 546, 554.

72. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, no. 15349.

73. *Orange Book*, nos. 57, 58.

74. *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, VII, nos. 331, 345; *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, nos. 532, 535, 542.

75. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, no. 15340.

76. Mandelstam, *Le sort*, pp. 224–25; *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, nos. 533, 538; *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, VII, no. 298; *Orange Book*, nos. 42, 46, 54, and pp. 183–89.

77. *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, nos. 534, 539, 540, 546; *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, VII, no. 289; *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, no. 15359.

78. Mandelstam, *Le sort*, pp. 225–34, on the conference, and *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, no. 567; *Orange Book*, pp. 190–272, gives the *procès-verbaux*.

79. Djemal Pasha, *Memories of a Turkish Statesman* (London, 1922), p. 271, says that Turkey viewed the Mandelstam plan as establishing a Russian protectorate.

80. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, nos. 15344, 15361.

81. London *Daily Telegraph*, July 26, 1913, cited in *Armenia*, VII (September, 1913), 54–55.

82. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, no. 15366; *Aussenpolitik*, VI, nos. 8019, 8020; Stieve III, nos. 970–72. See also Giers's account of Dr. Lepsius' warnings to the Armenians on this point: *Orange Book*, no. 61. For the Adrianople question see Ernst C. Helmreich, *Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars* (Cambridge, 1938), pp. 400–406.

83. Marchand, II, 112, 114; Robert de Caix, "Les chemins de fer d'Asie Mineure," *Asie française*, XIII (August, 1913), 333–36.

84. The Russian threat is interpreted by Stieve (in *Iswolsky and the World War*, tr. by E. W. Dickes [London, 1926], p. 156) as a thrust at the Straits after failure to reach

them through the Balkans. This statement is echoed by Erich Brandenburg, *From Bismarck to the World War*, tr. by A. E. Adams (Oxford, 1933), p. 455. Stieve thinks the Armenian question was raised for the purpose of getting to the Straits after the Balkan League collapsed, whereas actually it was raised six months before the Balkan League broke up. Pourtalès (*Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, no. 15339) saw that the ultimate objective of the Straits could not be gained for some years. Baron M. de Taube, *La politique russe d'avant-guerre* (Paris, 1928), pp. 305–307, shows that the Imperial Council recognized in July, 1913, that neither the Russian army nor the navy was ready for action.

85. Guinness, in *Nat'l Rev.*, LXII, 789–801; Buxton and Buxton, pp. 32–51; Staatsrat von Hahn, "Das sterbende Armenien," *Asien*, XII (August, 1913), 186; *Near East*, V (May 16, 1913), 31.

86. *Missionary Herald*, CIX (August, 1913), 345.

87. Diana Apcar, "Russian Occupation of Armenia," *Armenia*, VII (August, 1913), 8–9.

88. Quoted in *Literary Digest*, XLVII (July 5, 1913), 10.

89. *Near East*, V (July 4, 1913), 239.

90. *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, nos. 547, 555; *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, VII, no. 515.

91. *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, nos. 152, 157; *Asie française*, XIII (August, 1913), 357–58.

92. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, no. 15376.

93. *Ibid.*, no. 15373; *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, VIII, no. 99; *Orange Book*, no. 59.

94. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, nos. 15361, n., 15369, 15375; *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, no. 567. Boghos Nubar declares that he personally persuaded the Wilhelmstrasse to co-operate further in the reform question: Boghos Nubar, *Note sur la question arménienne* (Paris, mimeographed 1916), pp. 8–10.

95. The negotiations may be followed in *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, nos. 15369–15400; *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, nos. 568–72; Marchand, II, 362; *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, VIII, nos. 135, 171, 296; *Orange Book*, nos. 62, 63, 65–69, 73–79.

96. *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, VIII, nos. 176, 179; *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, nos. 15394, 15395.

97. *Ibid.*, nos. 15386–15392; *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, VIII, nos. 191, 208, 240; Mandelstam, *Le sort*, pp. 234–36; *Orange Book*, no. 78.

98. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, no. 15356; *Aussenpolitik*, VII, no. 8183; *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, nos. 564–66.

99. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, no. 15399; *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, VIII, no. 118.

100. *Ibid.*, no. 296; *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, no. 15399. For Turkish counter-proposals, see *Orange Book*, nos. 86, 88, 91, 92.

101. *Le Temps*, Nov. 26, 1913, interview with Djavid Bey, cited *Asie française*, XIII (November, 1913), 485; *Literary Digest*, XLVII (July 26 and Aug. 16, 1913), 123, 240; *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, nos. 581, 586 n.

102. *Ibid.*, nos. 569–79; Djemal, p. 272.

103. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, no. 15381; *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, nos. 567, 586; *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, VIII, no. 124; Macler, *Autour de l'Arménie*, pp. 306–11; Djemal, p. 275; *Near East*, VI (Jan. 2, 1914), 283; *Asien*, XIII (November, 1913), 43; *Asie française*, XIII (November, 1913), 461–65.

104. *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, no. 586 n.

105. Mandelstam, *Le sort*, pp. 235–36; *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, nos. 576–86; *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, VIII, nos. 473, 514; *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, nos. 15401–15409.

106. *Ibid.*, no. 15406.

107. *Aussenpolitik*, VII, no. 9068.

108. E. Adamov, ed., *Die europäischen Mächte und die Türkei während des Weltkrieges* (Dresden, 1930), I, 81; *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, no. 440.

109. Siebert, III, no. 1002.

110. Marchand, II, 363–72; M. Pokrowski, *Drei Konferenzen* (Berlin, 1920), pp. 65–66. Professor Fay seems to interpret a sentence here which says that “in the event of a struggle for Constantinople a clash on the Turkish frontier must be regarded as unavoidable” as meaning that Armenia was to be used as a road to the Straits. Sidney B. Fay, *Origins of the World War* (New York, 1928), I, 541.

111. Freiherr von der Goltz, “Die militärische Lage der Türkei nach dem Balkankriege,” *Asiatisches Jahrbuch*, 1913, p. 7; Maurice Larcher, *La guerre turque dans la guerre mondiale* (Paris, 1926), pp. 374–79.

112. Sazonov, p. 136.

113. R. J. Kerner, “The Mission of Liman von Sanders, IV,” *Slavonic Review*, VII (June, 1928), 104; *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, no. 15411. Mutius, the German embassy counsellor, gives himself credit for persuading Talaat to agree to the plan: Gerhard von Mutius, “Die Türkei 1911–14,” *Preussische Jahrbücher* vol. 236:3 (June, 1934), p. 213.

114. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, nos. 15412, 15413; Stieve, *Diplomatische Schriftwechsel*, III, no. 1195; *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, no. 587; *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, VIII, nos. 674, 688; *Orange Book*, nos. 112–15.

115. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, nos. 15414–15418.

116. *Orange Book*, nos. 106, 109, 110, 116–19, 121, 122.

117. *Internationalen Beziehungen*, 1st series, I, no. 49.

118. *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, IX, no. 25; *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, nos. 588, 589; *Internationalen Beziehungen*, 1st series, I, no. 35.

119. *Ibid.*, I, no. 17; *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, IX, nos. 78, 107; *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, no. 15421; *Orange Book*, nos. 111, 128.

120. Sazonov, p. 145.
 121. *Internationalen Beziehungen*, 1st series, I, no. 190.
 122. *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, IX, nos. 225, 240.
 123. Stieve, *Diplomatische Schriftwechsel*, IV, nos. 1234, 1247, 1252.
 124. The last stages may be followed in *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, nos. 15422–15424; *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, nos. 588–90; *Internationalen Beziehungen*, 1st series, I, nos. 9, 35, 49, 63, 120, 123, 135, 163, 186, 190, 205; *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, IX, nos. 56, 91, 96, 108, 202, 233; *Orange Book*, nos. 125–46.
 125. *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, IX, no. 362; *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, no. 591; *Orange Book*, no. 147.
 126. *Internationalen Beziehungen*, 1st series, I, no. 210.
 127. Djemal, p. 276, says that one of the Turkish aims in 1914 was to get rid of the Russian-imposed reform.
 128. Diana A. Apcar, *The Case of the Armenians*, a pamphlet of June 8, 1914.
 129. *Missionary Herald*, CX (April, 1914), 180; *Asien*, XIII (May, 1914), 134.
 130. Stieve, *Diplomastische Schriftwechsel*, IV, no. 1326. On the negotiations for inspectors see *ibid.*, nos. 1281, 1292, 1293, 1301; *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, nos. 15426, 15428–15434; *British Documents*, X, Pt. 1, nos. 592–95; *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, IX, no. 156; *Internationalen Beziehungen*, 1st series, I, nos. 71, 177, 324, 333, 437.
 131. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, no. 15425.
 132. Stieve, *Diplomatische Schriftwechsel*, IV, no. 1261; *Internationalen Beziehungen*, 1st series, I, no. 210; Mandelstam, *Le sort*, pp. 70–71.
 133. *Documents diplomatiques*, 3d series, IX, no. 362.
 134. *Aussenpolitik*, VII, no. 8772. Mandelstam is hopelessly wrong when he says that intervention by the powers was entirely dissociated from national policy toward Turkey, and motivated only by humanitarianism. “La protection des minorités,” *Recueil des Cours*, 1923, of the Académie du Droit International, p. 379.
 135. *Grosse Politik*, XXXVIII, nos. 15361, 15368, 15372; *Aussenpolitik*, VII, no. 8772.
- Added Note:* The question of how many Armenians lived in the so-called Armenian provinces of eastern Anatolia has been the subject of much recent investigation. Richard Hovanissian, *Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918* (Berkeley, 1967), briefly considers the problem. The most detailed work has been done by Justin McCarthy, *Muslims and Minorities: The Population of Ottoman Anatolia and the End of the Empire* (New York, 1983). See also Kemal H. Karpat, *Ottoman Population, 1830–1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics* (Madison, Wis., 1985). It is evident that the Armenians were a majority in none of the provinces. Joseph Heller has examined the diplomacy of these years from the viewpoint of British policy, using documents from the Public Record Office, in “Britain and the Armenian Question, 1912–1914: A Study in Realpolitik,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 16 (1980): 3–26.

11. Turkish Diplomacy from Mudros to Lausanne

Turkey alone of the nations defeated in 1918 was able to reverse the decision within a few years and to negotiate as an equal with the Allied Powers for a new peace treaty. She was not, like Czechoslovakia, a beneficiary of the Allied victory, nor was she, like Germany or Russia, inherently a Great Power which could be expected to grow in strength. The Turkish struggle to establish a favorable international position was unique also among Muslim peoples in successfully shaking off foreign controls.

It was not the Ottoman government of Sultan Mehmet VI at Istanbul which achieved this success, but a new nationalist government which began in Anatolia as a movement of resistance to partition and foreign occupation. The Turkish nationalists, competing for position both with the Sultan's government and with foreign Powers, were organized first as the Representative Committee of the Union for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia, and then as the Government of the Grand National Assembly, before the formation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. Each change in name represented a stage in the development of the nationalist movement into an effective government, and a step forward in its international position. By the time the republic was proclaimed, the new nation-state had already created the diplomatic basis for an independent and peaceful foreign policy.

From the beginning Mustafa Kemal [Atatürk]¹ was the soul and leader of the nationalist movement. He had served with distinction as an officer in the Ottoman army on several fronts, notably in the defense of Gallipoli in 1915. His wartime experience had taught him to resent the German influence over Turkey, and to oppose the domination of any foreign Power. At the time of the 1918 armistice Kemal, as commanding general on the Syrian front, tried to oppose surrender to foreign occupation of territory he regarded as geographically and ethnographically Turkish.² He had by this time developed a Western-style national consciousness of a sort not uncommon among educated Turks, many of them of the officer class. Not yet forty years old, he had already exhibited undoubted military and organizational ability. Since Kemal had also avoided close association with the defeated Ottoman government, and had

Reprinted by permission from *The Diplomats, 1919-1939*, ed. Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, pp. 172-209. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953.

quarreled with its military leader, Enver Pasha, he was almost ideally suited for the leadership of the new nationalist movement.

To succeed in reversing the defeat and avoiding partition, Kemal had in the first place to organize military resistance and wage war against foreign occupation. But along with the fighting went a diplomatic campaign, no less successful, which is often overlooked. The fruits of military victory in the years 1919 to 1922 could never have been gathered without an astute foreign policy which paralleled the military campaigns, aided them, and won international recognition of the results. The bases of foreign policy were simple—to create an independent and sovereign Turkey for the Turks. To Kemal and his followers this meant not only territorial unity, but complete abolition of all such extraterritorial rights in matters of justice, taxation, and economic exploitation as foreigners had enjoyed, and remarkably abused, under the Ottoman empire. The emphasis on territorial integrity, and absolute Turkish sovereignty within the state, was so constant as to appear monotonous, but Kemal's diplomacy is understandable only as the pursuit of these objectives.

His diplomacy utilized every possible advantage presented by the postwar situation. As best he could, Kemal exploited the divergence of policy between Britain, France, and Italy, and the greater chasm that separated the Western Powers from Soviet Russia. Sometimes Turkish action helped to increase the differences. Kemal would negotiate alternately with Russia or the West, or simultaneously with both; whatever advantages he won on one side increased his bargaining power on the other. At times it looked as if Kemal were the most apt pupil of the nineteenth century Ottoman diplomats who tried to find salvation by playing one Power against another. There was, however, a significant difference. Ottoman diplomacy had to the end attempted to use Europe's quarrels to preserve a sprawling and heterogeneous empire. The nationalists from the start limited their aim to the preservation of control and complete sovereignty only over those areas which were predominantly Turkish in character. Nationalist diplomacy used all means possible to attain these limited but almost rigid objectives. Its workings can be understood only by following the sequence of events from the establishment of nationalist foreign policy in 1919 to the triumph of its diplomacy at Lausanne in 1923.³

I

When Husein Rauf [Orbay], Ottoman minister of marine, signed the Mudros armistice on October 30, 1918, most of the Arab portions of the empire were already under British and Arab control. The armistice terms⁴ opened the Straits to the Allies, and permitted them further to occupy any strategic points should Allied security be threatened. The Ottoman army was to be demobilized, except for units necessary to frontier surveillance and internal order. Soon thereafter Allied warships anchored off Istanbul and Allied

High Commissioners took up residence there, while British forces not only occupied Dardanelles forts, but pressed forward in the Mosul province against the vain protests of Turkish army commanders.⁵ French troops later replaced the British in Syria and Cilicia, while Allied armistice control officers and military units occupied various Anatolian cities. British forces were also in the Transcaucasus, where the Russian collapse had allowed Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia to spring up as independent states. Ottoman armies had to retire from this region, where they had at one point in 1918 advanced as far as Baku, and where the districts of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum had voted for union with Turkey.⁶

Nominal authority over the Ottoman Empire was still exercised by the cabinet of Damad Ferid Pasha at Istanbul. To nationalist Turks, however, he appeared too Anglophile, and almost completely subservient to the High Commissioners. There was as yet no organized nationalist movement, but rather a great war-weariness in the empire which had fought the Italians, the Balkan League, and the Allies since 1911. At first the Allied control officers had little trouble with Turkish demobilization. Some of the educated Turks hoped to save their country under an American mandate. A cohesive nationalist movement did not arise until the Allies themselves provided the impetus. Toward the end of April 1919, Italian troops landed at Antalya [Adalia] in an effort to secure territory in southwest Turkey promised them by the secret treaty of St. Jean de Maurienne. This provoked far less of a nationalist reaction than the landing of Greek troops at Izmir on May 15 following.

The fateful acquiescence by Lloyd George and the Supreme Council in Paris in the desires of the Greek premier Venizelos to recapture Byzantine hegemony in those fertile areas of western Anatolia which still had a large Greek Orthodox population had explosive consequences. Ostensibly an Allied occupation, in accordance with the terms of Mudros, the landing was in fact purely Greek. To the Anatolian Turk this was the supreme indignity—that a subject and minority element, fundamentally considered second-class subjects of the Sultan, should rule him or part of his land. Knots of local nationalist resistance sprang up where there were no organized elements of the Ottoman army such as still existed in eastern Anatolia. With the arrival of Mustafa Kemal in Anatolia, four days after the Greek landing, began the painful process of incorporating such groups into a nationalist movement which produced an army, a *de facto* government, and a foreign policy. Kemal had been in Istanbul in the spring of 1919, trying to reinvigorate the Ottoman government, when he was appointed inspector of the Third Army, stationed at Erzurum and Sivas. As rapidly as possible he left the Allied-controlled capital, never to return until long after the republic was established. His landing at Samsun on May 19, 1919, marks in Turkish hagiography the beginning of the nationalist movement.

Kemal's immediate aim was to organize military resistance to the partition

of Turkey. This necessitated the creation of some unified nationalist authority in Anatolia. Kemal later said that his aim already extended to the creation of a new and independent Turkish state, since continued allegiance to the Sultan's government was unacceptable to him.⁷ He could not yet announce such views publicly, but his actions soon led to a complete break with Istanbul. Disregarding an order of recall, Kemal resigned his commission. During the summer of 1919 his leadership produced the Representative Committee, the basis of a foreign policy, and the beginnings of direct though irregular contact with foreign Powers. Two nationalist congresses, one held at Erzurum in late July and the second at Sivas in early September, were the instrumentalities through which this was achieved. Though only the eastern provinces were represented at Erzurum, the Sivas congress brought together elected delegates from all Anatolia. The Union for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia was formed in consequence. Each congress chose a Representative Committee with Kemal as president. The Representative Committee after Sivas began to function as the executive authority of the national will, and in its name Kemal signed telegrams and conferred with foreign representatives.

On September 9 the Sivas congress issued a declaration elaborating resolutions already passed at Erzurum which, with slight modifications, stated the foreign policy thereafter followed by the nationalists.⁸ All Turkish territory inside the armistice frontiers was regarded as an indivisible whole within which no foreign intervention should be allowed, nor any independent Greek or Armenian state. The Muslim majority, "a veritable fraternity," would grant no special status to non-Muslim minorities such as the Ottoman system had permitted. No mandate or protectorate over Turkey would be considered. Foreign scientific or economic assistance would be accepted only if it were untainted with imperialism. The national will must control the Sultan's government, which should convoke a National Assembly. Though the Sivas declaration still considered the Sultan's government to be the lawful one, it rejected Istanbul's policy of acquiescence to Allied demands.

Most of these ideas were basically Kemal's, though he was no ardent supporter of the Caliphate and Sultanate. Defense of these institutions was mentioned in the Sivas declaration to satisfy the generally more conservative Turkish opinion, which Kemal could not afford to antagonize until his victories ended the crisis of foreign invasion. Kemal's major insistence was always on national and popular sovereignty. As early as June 3, 1919, he declared in a circular telegram to Anatolian officials that Turkey must have complete independence, and "the majority in the purely national districts of the country shall not be sacrificed in favor of the minority."⁹ In August he stated that "we prefer that our negotiations and relations with foreign countries shall be conducted in the name of the nation, founded on the proceedings of the Congress."¹⁰ Soon after, still not attacking the Sultan, he asserted that until a government with the confidence of the people should be formed, the Represen-

tative Committee would "remain in office and continue to conduct the affairs of the nation."¹¹

It is a question as to how far Kemal in the early days was willing to go in accepting foreign aid of some sort. He proposed at the Erzurum congress that help be accepted from a Great Power with no imperialist interests, presumably meaning the United States, but refused to name that country when the resentment of Anatolian Turks against American support for an independent Armenia was expressed.¹² The Sivas congress debated at length a possible American mandate over all Turkey, evidently after reports by Istanbul delegates of conversations with Wilson's King-Crane commission. Kemal apparently opposed an American mandate, but was interested in possible American support for Turkish independence.¹³ When the Harbord Commission in September passed through Sivas on its whirlwind trip to investigate a possible Armenian mandate, Kemal talked with General Harbord. Kemal says only that Harbord was convinced of the justice of the nationalist program.¹⁴ But Harbord reported that Kemal said his aim was "the preservation of the Empire under a mandatory of a single disinterested power, preferably America," and wanted "the aid of an impartial foreign country."¹⁵ Later in 1919 Kemal conferred with M. Georges Picot at Sivas, reportedly proposing to him a French economic "mandate" over Turkey if France handed back Cilicia.¹⁶ All such ideas were undoubtedly tentative, explored as possible means to combat the Greeks and their British backers, and were abandoned as the nationalists gained momentum.

Such reports make it clear that Kemal, from the very beginning, tried to establish contact, however informal and irregular, with the Allied Powers and to win their recognition for the nationalist program. He and other nationalists saw various Allied control officers and special diplomatic agents. On many occasions in 1919 he assured his countrymen that British, French, Italian and American representatives had approved the nationalist aims, or had said that they would not interfere with the nationalist movement; that their representatives at Sivas had reported favorably to their governments; that close relations were already established.¹⁷ Kemal exaggerated to impress the Turks and to win followers but such declarations prove his consciousness of the necessity for a nationalist diplomatic offensive. Kemal directly informed the Great Powers on September 11 that Damad Ferid's government was an illegal tyranny, and that the delegation which it had sent to Paris did not represent the nation.¹⁸ British and French agents in Turkey in 1919 recognized that there were already, in fact, two governments in that country.¹⁹

Kemal refused to concede that there were two governments. Maintaining that the national will was supreme, and the Representative Committee was its spokesman, he tried to capture control of the Istanbul government for the nationalists, and thus to create and guide a unified Turkish foreign policy. This was particularly important because the Allied peace treaty with Turkey was

still under discussion. Damad Ferid had led a delegation from Istanbul to Paris in June, where his carefully reasoned statement to the Supreme Council was rebuffed with biting words on the iniquities of the Turks. From Sivas Kemal reproached Damad Ferid with subservience, and set about to cause his downfall. On September 11 he cut off telegraphic communication with the Porte. "This is the last warning we shall give you," said Kemal before the Sivas congress. "The attitude that the nation will take up in the future will be explained to the representatives of the Entente through the foreign officers who are among us."²⁰ This pressure forced Damad Ferid out at the start of October. Ali Riza, more sympathetic to the nationalists, replaced him as grand vizier.

Thereupon Kemal tried to force his foreign policy upon the new Istanbul Cabinet. To Ali Riza he explained his foreign relations thus far as having "no official diplomatic character. They only consist of certain contacts with different political agents sent by the Allied Powers who, not finding themselves in the capital in the presence of a legitimate government resting on the confidence and strength of the nation, wanted to check the veracity or bad faith of the pronouncements made by the preceding cabinet against the national forces. In maintaining these relations, the aim we follow is exclusively to make known the national aspirations, the extent and power of the national organizations, so as to gain the respect and confidence of foreign countries."²¹ Now he demanded that Ali Riza recognize the nationalist movement, make no binding decisions until a genuine national assembly had met, and choose new delegates to the peace conference from among the nationalists.²² Salih Pasha, minister of marine in the new Cabinet, was authorized to confer with Kemal. Their three-day conference produced essential agreement. Salih accepted the main points of the Sivas declaration, and the demand that delegates to Paris be approved by the Representative Committee. Salih could not, however, persuade his Cabinet to agree, perhaps because of Allied pressure.²³ The chance for immediate coordination on foreign policy between Kemal and the Sultan's government was thus lost.

Elections for a new parliament were, however, authorized by Mehmet VI. A large nationalist majority was returned. Kemal thereupon gathered most of the deputies together at Ankara, to which he moved his headquarters from Sivas in late December 1919, to be able to use the railroad to Istanbul. The deputies subscribed to a National Pact, based on the Sivas declaration, which Kemal presented to them; it became for the future the fixed basis of nationalist foreign policy. Most of the deputies led by Rauf, a member of the Representative Committee since the beginning, left for Istanbul in early January, though Kemal did not go because of the danger to him. There the parliament met formally, voting on January 28, 1920, to confirm the National Pact. The Allies were thus notified of the Turkish demands which, in Kemal's view, had to serve as the basis for peace negotiations.²⁴

The National Pact emphasized complete independence—territorial, political, judicial and economic; nothing like the capitulations would be accepted. There was no mention now of foreign assistance, as there had been at Sivas. The territorial claims were extended to include Kurdish areas beyond the armistice lines, while plebiscites were demanded for Kars, Ardahan, Batum and Western Thrace. Only regions with an Arab majority were specifically excluded. Minorities in Turkey would have no special privileges beyond the rights commonly recognized in the minority treaties of the peace settlement. If Istanbul, seat of the Sultanate and Caliphate, were secure, regulations on traffic through the Bosphorus could be made jointly by Turkey and other interested Powers. These principles, said the preamble, represented “the maximum of sacrifice which can be undertaken in order to achieve a just and lasting peace.” It was Turkey for the Turks (and Kurds).

Though the pact lived on, the parliament which voted it was soon killed by Allied action. The Western Powers were alarmed not only by the Pact’s demands, but by the success of nationalist troops in driving the French from Maraş [Marash], news of which burst upon an Allied conference at London in February 1920.²⁵ The British conceived and executed an Allied military occupation of Istanbul on March 16. Two score prominent nationalist deputies, including Rauf, were deported to Malta, the parliament was dissolved, and Ali Rıza dismissed in favor of the more pliable Damad Ferid. Those deputies who could escaped to rejoin Kemal in Ankara. The nationalists jailed a few British armistice control officers as hostages. Kemal meanwhile despatched vigorous protests against the British occupation to many foreign Powers. It is significant that he did this through the Italian representative at Antalya. He was already receiving private assurances from French and Italian officials that British policy was not theirs—that Millerand and Nitti did not agree with Lloyd George.²⁶

If the Greek landing of 1919 had created the nationalist movement in Turkey, the British occupation of Istanbul converted the movement into an effective separate government. The establishment of the Ankara government occurred, ironically, at the exact time when Allied statesmen at San Remo were partitioning the Ottoman empire despite the protests of Damad Ferid, whose government declared the nationalists to be rebels. Meeting on April 23, the deputies in Ankara resolved to create the Government of the Grand National Assembly and to secure independence by an honorable peace. They did not declare the Sultan deposed, but called him an Allied prisoner whose acts were therefore invalid. Mustafa Kemal was the next day elected president of the Assembly, and presided also over a council of ministers elected by the Assembly from among its members.²⁷ This organization was confirmed and elaborated in a law of January 20, 1921, which specifically placed in the Assembly’s hands the powers of war and peace, of concluding treaties and receiving

foreign diplomats.²⁸ Though the relations of the Ankara government to Istanbul were ill-defined—inasmuch as the Sultan was not deposed, Ankara not declared the capital, and the previous constitution not abrogated—the Grand National Assembly was hereafter the real government for most of Turkey. Foreign Powers were notified that it alone represented the people, and that it would “preside over the present and future destiny of Turkey” so long as the unjustified occupation of Istanbul continued.²⁹

II

The Government of the Grand National Assembly set out to gain recognition abroad, to negotiate for foreign assistance or the cessation of hostilities, and to carry out by diplomacy wherever possible the stipulations of the National Pact. The task was finished only when the Lausanne treaty was signed in July 1923, but by early 1922 Ankara had won important victories in negotiation both with Russia and the West, and had passed through the first phase of its struggle for international position. Mustafa Kemal was inevitably the leader in this as in military operations, but he now had for the first time an embryonic Foreign Office and a Foreign Minister.

Ankara provided little for the ministries except a central location and a nationalist atmosphere. Space and facilities were scarce. The Foreign Office began life in a room in the agricultural school where Kemal made his headquarters. Here the credentials of the Grand National Assembly's first diplomatic mission were typed on a decrepit machine by Halide Edib [Adivar], the first Turkish woman college graduate. Soon the ministry moved to a larger building once occupied by the Ottoman Public Debt administration. More officials were added: an undersecretary for political affairs, who helped organize the office in the summer of 1920, a legal counselor and others. By November it was found advisable to have a diplomatic agent, Hamid Bey, to represent Ankara in Istanbul, and to deal there with the High Commissioners and other Western representatives.³⁰

The foreign service also grew from scratch. Most of the diplomatic agents sent out from Ankara in the next few years were cultured men with education along Western lines, though not trained diplomats from Ottoman days; they were usually lawyers, army officers, or other professional men. One experienced diplomat who joined Kemal in 1919, Ahmed Rustem Bey, had been ambassador in Washington before 1914, but does not appear to have been employed by Ankara for important missions.³¹ In these years much important negotiation both abroad and at home was handled by the Foreign Minister himself. Ankara's first official mission, to Moscow, was headed by Bekir Sami, elected Foreign Minister by the Assembly early in May 1920. Bekir Sami was a huge Circassian who had experience in a wide range of civil service posts from the time of Abdülhamid II on, including important provincial governor-

ships. He had been, with Kemal, a member of the original Representative Committee. In May 1920, he set out to Moscow to establish treaty relationships and seek aid in the face of the British occupation of Istanbul.

Kemal later said that the first decision of the Ankara government was to send this mission.³² He himself wrote to Chicherin, the Soviet commissar for foreign affairs, on April 26, 1920, apparently suggesting some sort of an alliance.³³ The delegation, which included Yusuf Kemal [Tengirsenk], minister of economy, spent two months in the Transcaucasus region, arriving in Moscow toward the end of July.³⁴ Despite the long history of Russo-Turkish antagonism, it was advantageous at the moment for each to seek support in the other. Each faced the same opponents, and the opponents controlled the Straits. Contact was easier to establish after Denikin's forces in the Caucasus collapsed in December 1919, and after the British took their troops out of the Transcaucasus region except for Batum.³⁵

Though the immediate opponents were the same, the ultimate aims of Moscow and Ankara were quite different. Bolshevik policy conceived of the Turks as the westernmost of a string of Muslim peoples who would be natural allies against the British, and against capitalist imperialism. In December 1917, the Council of Peoples Commissars had issued an appeal for cooperation to the Muslims of Russia, India, Persia, Turkey, and Arabia, simultaneously denouncing all secret treaties partitioning Persia and the Ottoman empire.³⁶ When the Sivas Congress was meeting Chicherin renewed the appeal directly to the "workers and peasants of Turkey," naming the British as the enemy and denouncing "pasha landlords."³⁷ Kemal was interested in a national war, not a class war. Chicherin's reply to him of June 2, 1920, was therefore chiefly in terms of cooperation against "foreign imperialism."³⁸ Chicherin did not mention alliance or military assistance, but proposed immediate establishment of diplomatic relations. He accepted the principles of the National Pact, but tried to reinterpret two of them to Russian advantage: he noted the Assembly's decision "to allow Turkish Armenia, Kurdistan, Lusistan [Lazistan?], the Batum province . . . to decide their own destiny," and introduced the now-familiar claim that the Straits question was "to be submitted to a conference of states bordering on the Black Sea." These demands Kemal eventually succeeded in avoiding. He never accepted a class war, though in reply to Chicherin he was willing to use Bolshevik terminology like "proletarian masses."³⁹

By August 24, 1920, Bekir Sami had reached sufficient agreement in Moscow to initial a draft treaty, but the formal signing was delayed for seven months by considerable friction over the Transcaucasus region. This area had for a century been the scene of Russo-Turkish conflict. Now that it was temporarily in the hands of independent Armenia (Republic of Erivan), Georgia, and Azerbaijan, both Turks and Russians sought to increase their control there, while the Transcaucasus states tried to secure their independence and

their borders. Kemal complained to Chicherin in a letter of June 20, 1920, of Armenian attacks on Turkish areas, and asked assistance and mediation.⁴⁹ But while Bekir Sami was in Moscow, Russia signed a treaty with Armenia which recognized Armenian control over territory which the Turks considered theirs, involving also Armenian domination of the land route from Turkey to Russia. Chicherin then demanded that the Turks cede territory to Armenia.⁴¹ This demand brought a suspension of Bekir Sami's negotiations. Undoubtedly Kemal was suspicious of Communist aims, and Chicherin wary of aligning Russia with a Turkish regime that still might collapse. Unofficial Bolshevik agents and propagandists had in fact appeared in Ankara and other Anatolian cities by May 1920, though their arguments and literature won few converts.⁴² Despite this friction, Chicherin sent a more formal mission to Ankara in October, and the next month the Grand National Assembly authorized diplomatic and consular representation in Russia.⁴³ Kemal himself characteristically selected Ankara's first ambassador. Removing Ali Fuat from command of troops on the western front for alleged incompetence, he sent him to Moscow. The Assembly confirmed the appointment.⁴⁴

Kemal was always ready to negotiate with the Western Powers as well as with Russia. The defeat of various French units in southern Anatolia had led in May to a twenty-day armistice concluded with French representatives sent to Ankara. Kemal tried to portray this as tacit French recognition of his government.⁴⁵ He became convinced that France would desert Britain and evacuate Adana. To put pressure on France, the Turks gave some encouragement to Arab opponents of French control in Syria.⁴⁶ But it was difficult to negotiate with the Western Powers in the spring and summer of 1920, when they were elaborating the Treaty of Sèvres that would partition the Ottoman Empire for their own benefit and leave only a section of Anatolia to complete Turkish control. On May 11, 1920, a draft of the proposed treaty was handed to the Istanbul government. A month thereafter the Allied ministers agreed, at the Hythe conference, to a Greek offensive to prevent the Turkish nationalist forces from reaching the Straits and blocking the partition of Turkey. News of the treaty, and the Greek war, naturally spurred the nationalists to renewed opposition. Though their ill-equipped troops had to retire before the Greek drives, their deputies in the Grand National Assembly took an oath to support the National Pact in the face of the treaty, and further informed the Powers that no agreements concluded by the Istanbul government since the British occupation could be valid.⁴⁷ Damad Ferid also protested the treaty, in the name of the Sultan's government, at the Spa conference in July, but he was powerless to do more, since in Istanbul his government could not escape Allied control. The Allied ministers dismissed his protests, and obliged his representatives to sign at Sèvres on August 10, 1920. On the same day Britain, France, and Italy concluded the Tripartite Treaty, giving the latter two Powers extensive zones of influence in Anatolia.⁴⁸

Since negotiations with Moscow were deadlocked because of Armenia, and since Sèvres created an independent Armenia and an autonomous Kurdistan in eastern Anatolia, the nationalists set out to secure their eastern frontier by force. During the fall and winter of 1920 Moscow and Ankara cooperated to exclude all Western Powers from the settlement of the area, but competed in extending their own control.⁴⁹ Azerbaijan was by then already Soviet-dominated, and the last British troops evacuated Batum in July. Ankara then sent an ultimatum to Armenia. General Kâzım Karabekir, at thirty-eight as outstanding in the nationalist military leadership as he was famous for his paternal care of hundreds of Turkish orphans, delivered an attack from Erzurum in late September that swept in six weeks through Kars to Alexandropol.⁵⁰ Moscow then engineered a coup to capture the Armenian government, which forthwith made peace to forestall any further Turkish advance. Kâzım Karabekir signed Ankara's first international treaty at Alexandropol [Gümrü] on December 2, 1920.⁵¹ It returned the district of Kars to Turkish control, and again made possible direct land connection to Russia. Bekir Sami and Yusuf Kemal soon thereafter started for Moscow to pick up the threads of the suspended negotiations.⁵²

The developing Russian-Turkish friendship meanwhile survived two potential threats. The first was the appearance of Enver Pasha in Moscow. There the former Ottoman war minister tried to pose as the real representative of Turkey, to discredit Kemal, and to win Soviet backing for his own schemes. The Bolsheviks, unwilling to lose Kemal's possible help against Britain, and suspicious of the effect on their own Turkish-speaking millions of Enver's pan-Turanian ideas, gave the latter little encouragement.⁵³ The second was the drive of the Comintern to dominate the Muslims of Asia, dramatically expressed in the Congress of Eastern Peoples held at Baku just as Kâzım Karabekir was about to start his offensive against Armenia, not far off. Of the nearly 2,000 delegates about a third were non-Communist, representing peoples whose anti-imperialist nationalism the Comintern hoped to exploit. Most of the 235 Turks present were of this group, many of them middle-class. Zinoviev, president of the Congress, denounced them as Calif-supporters, and criticized the "pseudo-Soviets such as are now sometimes being offered to you in Turkey." But he recognized that the Turks, like the Communists, opposed Britain. "We give patient aid," said Zinoviev, "to groups of persons who do not believe in our ideas, who are even opposed to us on some points. In the same way the Soviet government in Turkey supports Kemal. Never for one moment do we forget that the movement headed by Kemal is not a Communist movement. We know it."⁵⁴

While renewed Russo-Turkish negotiations were in prospect, opportunity came to Kemal also at the start of 1921 for conversations with the West. Turkish success against Armenia, coupled with the first victory over the Greeks at İnönü in January 1921, worried the Allied ministers, who invited the govern-

ments of Athens and Istanbul to a conference at London in February. The Ottoman delegation, they said, should include plenipotentiaries from Ankara. This was a back-handed recognition of his government which Kemal refused to accept. He asserted in a lengthy telegraphic correspondence with Tevfik, the new grand vizier in Istanbul, that only the Grand National Assembly represented Turkey, and that it demanded a direct invitation. To Tevfik's arguments that the two governments had identical aims, and that the Sultan had to maintain his government in Istanbul lest the Allies completely control the city, Kemal replied that the aims might be similar, but free Turkey could never subordinate itself to occupied Turkey.⁵⁵ In Ankara there was debate as to whether the London invitation were not merely a ruse to enable the Greeks to recover from their İnönü defeat.⁵⁶ Kemal swung the Assembly to his views, which were not those of the extremists: a delegation should set out but should not go to London unless a direct invitation was received. Italy provided a torpedo boat at Antalya to take the delegation to Brindisi. In Rome the nationalists waited until Lloyd George sent a direct invitation through Count Sforza, whose sympathy for the nationalists had frequently been expressed.⁵⁷

Bekir Sami had just returned from Moscow when he set out as head of the new mission to London. His stay in Russia had disillusioned him. He now looked upon the Soviet government as rule by an autocratic minority, insincere in its professions of international goodwill and regard for minority rights.⁵⁸ At London his consequent desire to reach agreement with the West was quite apparent, though the demands he presented to the conference were still those of the National Pact. By agreement, Bekir Sami spoke for the Istanbul delegation as well as his own—an exhibition of harmony that astounded the Allied ministers, but reflected the relative power of the two factions. The Allies offered two schemes involving modifications of Sèvres, thereby admitting that Kemal's success so far rendered the whole treaty unenforceable. Bekir Sami accepted one scheme with reservations, on instructions from Kemal, and the other *ad referendum*. The Greeks, however, refused to consider modifications of their rights under Sèvres, and launched a new offensive against Ankara at the end of March. Ankara was thereby spared the necessity of refusing proposals which did not meet all the National Pact's demands.⁵⁹

Bekir Sami's success at London was in widening the breach among the Allies by private negotiation with Lloyd George, Briand, and Sforza. His efforts to persuade Lloyd George to call off the Greeks were fruitless; so also his reported proposal that Britain support an anti-Bolshevik union of Turkey and the Caucasus peoples. He did arrange with Lloyd George a mutual exchange of prisoners.⁶⁰ With Briand and Sforza he was able to sign formal treaties providing for withdrawal of French and Italian troops from large sections of Anatolia in return for Turkish economic concessions. Briand also agreed to a Syrian-Turkish frontier south of that of Sèvres, while Sforza promised support at the peace settlement for Turkish possession of Izmir and

Thrace.⁶¹ France and Italy had deserted the British-backed Greeks for the Turks.

But Bekir Sami's success was also his failure. Things looked different to him than to Kemal and many other nationalists. On his return home Bekir Sami was attacked by Kemal and the Assembly for having made economic concessions which in effect paralleled the zones of the Tripartite Treaty. France and Italy were attacked in the nationalist press as still colonial-minded. Bekir Sami's attitude toward Russia was also questioned; it was important not to alienate this source of help. Kemal insisted that Bekir Sami resign as Foreign Minister, saying he had exceeded his instructions. The Assembly rejected the French treaty and did not even consider the one with Italy. A strong group in the Assembly professed themselves "Easterners," placing more hope in a Russian orientation than in negotiation with the West.⁶² Despite his forced resignation, however, Bekir Sami's work was not lost. The prisoner-exchange agreement was renegotiated with Britain in the fall, the Italians began in June to evacuate forces from Antalya, and the French exhibited eagerness for new conversations. After the London conference it was obvious that Ankara spoke for the Turks, while the Istanbul government represented only the Sultan. Though the Western Powers recognized Istanbul, they had to deal with Ankara to get results.

Mustafa Kemal had in the previous fall gained the legal right to nominate ministers to the Assembly for election, thereby assuring his personal control over top-level personnel. He thus hand-picked Yusuf Kemal, minister of economy, to be Bekir Sami's successor as Foreign Minister.⁶³ Yusuf Kemal had been obliged in his youth to turn from medicine to law because of severe injury to his right hand. This accident gave the nationalists a successful negotiator with a lawyer's skill in settling cases out of court. Trained at the universities of Istanbul and Paris, Yusuf Kemal was at home in both French and English. He did not have the practiced finesse of the older Bekir Sami, but his direct approach, typical of the nationalist leaders, who were, like him, all about forty years old, enabled him to drive hard bargains. He was a "shirt-sleeve" diplomat, as one of his compatriots called him.⁶⁴

When the Assembly confirmed his appointment as Foreign Minister in May 1921, Yusuf Kemal had not yet returned from Moscow, where he had successfully conducted the final negotiations for a treaty at the same time as Bekir Sami was in London. The Russo-Turkish treaty had threatened to founder on arguments over Batumi, which in early 1921 was controlled by Menshevik Georgia. As Bolshevik troops advanced against this last non-Soviet Transcaucasus state, Ankara demanded territory from Georgia by ultimatum. The Georgian ambassador in Ankara, Mdivani, agreed to Turkish occupation of Batumi, presumably to keep it out of Bolshevik hands. Kâzım Karabekir thereupon led Turkish troops into the city on March 11, preceding by a week the arrival of Red troops, with whom serious clashes were narrowly avoided.⁶⁵

This potential Fashoda was settled by compromise, which Chicherin and Yusuf Kemal agreed to make part of the treaty signed on March 16, 1921.⁶⁶

For Chicherin this treaty may have been only one of several to secure anti-British friends; the preamble noted Turkish-Russian "solidarity in the struggle against imperialism." For Ankara, the Moscow treaty was a major victory, securing a favorable and stable eastern frontier and strengthening its hand for bargaining with the West. Yusuf Kemal had to leave Batum to Soviet Georgia, but with stipulations of broad local autonomy and free transit for Turkish goods. Kars and Ardahan were included within Turkey. Chicherin agreed that "Turkey" meant the territories specified in the National Pact, and promised that Russia would recognize no international agreements concerning Turkey not recognized by the Grand National Assembly. Each agreed to recognize no treaties imposed on the other. Russia renounced all capitulatory rights. Yusuf Kemal's greatest concession was to agree that, Istanbul being secure, the Straits regime should be determined by the littoral states of the Black Sea. So long as British warships controlled the Straits and Greek troops attacked, the concession was not surprising, though at Lausanne the Turks successfully avoided implementation of this clause.

The mutual suspicion still existing was revealed by Article 8, wherein each signatory promised to permit on its soil no group aiming at the overthrow of the other government. For Moscow, this was protection against pan-Turanian agitation among Russia's millions of Turkish subjects; for Ankara, protection against Bolshevik conspiracy based in the Caucasus or elsewhere. There was no specific provision against propaganda activity. Communist propaganda was in fact attempted in Turkey, but with little success. Kemal discouraged it by prison and other means, for which he was denounced at the third Comintern Congress in 1921 and the next year at the second Congress of Communist Labor Unions.⁶⁷ This ideological friction did not seriously disturb governmental relations, and Moscow continued to provide military supplies to the Turks in amounts which, to this day, have not been disclosed.

Kemal was never lured by the early friendship with Russia into accepting the position of the "Easterners" in foreign policy. Nor was he a "Westerner," but sought constantly to gain advantages from both sides in carrying out the aims of the National Pact. Reviewing the international position of Turkey for the Assembly on March 1, 1921, he stressed his desire for peace and for good relations with both Orient and Occident. He was ready to negotiate with Britain, but reproached British statesmen for pretending not to understand his pacific aims.⁶⁸ A second Turkish victory over the Greeks at İnönü, shortly after the Moscow treaty was signed, led the High Commissioners in Istanbul to declare neutrality in the Greek-Turkish struggle, and to deny either belligerent entrance into a neutral zone around the Straits. But the only immediate move toward peace was an Allied offer of mediation in June, which the Greeks rejected, knowing that since Constantine's return to the Greek throne France and

Italy were becoming increasingly Turcophile. In July the Greeks aimed a new offensive at Ankara.⁷⁰

Until the Greeks could be defeated, or until Kemal could negotiate agreements conforming to the National Pact, his policy was simply to maintain contact with the Western Powers. Bekir Sami was sent on a roving commission to sound out the Western capitals.⁷¹ Meanwhile Kemal and General Harington, the British High Commissioner, were apparently willing to use their correspondence on prisoner exchange to develop a wider canvass of the situation, but as neither would see the other in the role of petitioner the projected meeting fell through.⁷² The Italians began to evacuate Antalya also in June, 1921, and pressed again for an agreement like that of Bekir Sami with Sforza, but Kemal was no more willing now than before to accord the economic concessions asked by the Italian agent in Ankara, Tuozzi.⁷³

It was with the French, beset by troubles enough in their Syrian mandate and at odds with Britain over many questions, that Ankara first managed to conclude a treaty on its own terms. M. Franklin-Bouillon, president of the Senate foreign relations committee, came to Ankara in June on an "unofficial" mission, and had long talks with Kemal. Franklin-Bouillon wanted to end the hostilities in Cilicia, but only in return for economic concessions and some remnant of capitulatory privileges to protect the great interests of France in Turkish finance, economic development, and French schools and missions. To achieve this, he tried to negotiate on the basis of the abortive Bekir Sami-Briand treaty. This Kemal would not allow. The National Pact, he said, which emphasized "political, economic, legal, military and cultural" independence, must be the starting point. The French envoy was impressed by Kemal's obstinacy. His government was impressed by Kemal's victory over the Greeks in the Sakarya battle at the end of August, which repulsed the most serious military threat to Ankara. The Treaty of Ankara was therefore signed on October 20, 1921, marking as great a triumph for Turkish diplomacy as the Treaty of Moscow.⁷⁴

The treaty provided that hostilities cease immediately, and that a new frontier between Turkey and Syria revise the line drawn at Sèvres to leave Cilicia and most of the Bagdad Railway track in Turkish hands. As he had been obliged to yield Batum to Georgia, so Yusuf Kemal's greatest concession here was to leave Alexandretta to Syria, but with guarantees of a special regime in which Turkish should be an official language, and with a promise by Franklin-Bouillon to try to arrange for a local flag incorporating the Turkish flag.⁷⁵ Yusuf Kemal avoided giving France any guarantees on economic concessions or minority rights which would limit Turkish sovereignty. By the Treaty of Ankara the Turks gained recognition of the Government of the Grand National Assembly by France and a bilateral revision of Sèvres which was essentially a separate peace with France behind Britain's back.⁷⁶ Many thousands of Turkish troops were now free to move against the Greeks, while the French turned

over to Ankara quantities of military supplies.⁷⁷ Turkish-French relations were henceforth close, and Franklin-Bouillon continued to shuttle back and forth until the final armistice.

Not only the British, but also the Russians were worried by Kemal's success in making peace with France. Chicherin demanded explanations, and apparently threatened to use Enver from a Transcaucasus base to weaken or upset the Ankara regime.⁷⁸ But Kemal stood firm. So long as he did not also make peace with Britain, his success in negotiation with France served to increase his prestige in Russian eyes. After the Sakarya victory, and just one week before the conclusion of the Franklin-Bouillon agreement, Kâzım Karabekir signed for Turkey the Treaty of Kars with Russia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. Modeled on the Treaty of Moscow, this was a formal confirmation by the Transcaucasus republics under Russian pressure of the new eastern boundary of Turkey, and a declaration of friendship among the signatories.⁷⁹ In December 1921, a new Soviet mission arrived in Ankara from the Ukraine, headed by General Frunze, which led to the signing on January 2, 1922, of a Turkish-Ukrainian treaty much like that of Kars.⁸⁰ Frunze also arranged for further shipments to Ankara of military supplies, for which Kemal had asked after his Sakarya victory, and he offered military advice for campaigns against the Greeks. Soon after Frunze's three-week mission was over, a new ambassador from Moscow, Comrade Aralov, arrived to receive great acclaim both in Ankara and on a tour of the front with Kemal.⁸¹

In his diplomatic dealings since the Ankara government was established, Kemal had oscillated successfully between Russia and the West. He had managed also to keep on cordial terms with the Muslim world, which could give at least moral, and sometimes diversionary support against the other two worlds with which he dealt. Bekir Sami had not yet left on his first mission to Moscow when the Grand National Assembly issued an appeal for the support of all Muslims.⁸² But Kemal was convinced that nationalist Turkey must become essentially a secular state, and keep clear of any pan-Islamic movement. To the Assembly he said that Islamic ties had done nothing for the Ottoman sultans but extend their commitments and cause them trouble.⁸³ During the war of liberation, however, Kemal accepted gracefully from influential Muslims and Muslim nations the admiration and support which they naturally accorded the Turks, who seemed to be successful in upholding the Califate against the Christian world. The new Turkey would eventually sever its ties with the house of Osman and with Islam, but the time for this step had not come.

The most important international Muslim relationship was established with Afghanistan by a treaty of March 1, 1921, negotiated in Moscow while Yusuf Kemal and the Afghan ambassador were both concluding treaties with Russia.⁸⁴ It began with the customary Muslim invocation, "In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate." In its third article Afghanistan recognized

the leadership of Turkey for services to Islam, and for bearing "the standard of the Califate." The two countries agreed to a formal alliance against attacks by an imperialistic Power, meaning Britain, and Turkey agreed to supply military instructors to Afghanistan. Sultan Ahmed Khan, the first Afghan ambassador, was a popular figure in Ankara after his arrival there in April 1921. "All of us other Muslims consider the Turkish cause as our own," he said to a Western visitor.⁸⁵ In the same year Kemal sent an ambassador to Bokhara, which enjoyed a tenuous independence, and received from the Bokharan ambassador in Ankara the gifts of a Koran and a sword. Kemal's speech of welcome referred to the common ties of religion, though his emphasis on this was less than that of his visitors.⁸⁶

The leading Muslim dignitary with whom Kemal dealt was Sheikh Ahmed esh-Sherif es-Senusi, ex-leader of the influential Senusi brotherhood of Cyrenaica. Sayyid Ahmed, after fighting with the Turks against Italian, French, and British forces, had escaped to Turkey in 1918. In 1920 Kemal received him at a banquet of honor, and apparently allowed him to organize a pan-Islamic congress in Sivas and to aid the Turkish nationalists in the early days by preaching the Holy War and rallying Arabs to oppose the British and French along with the Turks. Though accepting such support tacitly for a time, Kemal never committed himself to any pan-Islamic cause. Sayyid Ahmed later found it wise to leave for Syria when Kemal opposed his ardent support of the Califate. Kemal further refused to be dragged into any attempt to reimpose Turkish control over the Arab territories which had given the sultans so many headaches.⁸⁷

III

By the start of 1922 the Government of the Grand National Assembly was well-established. Its major task was now to drive the Greeks from western Anatolia and Thrace, and secure a peace incorporating those areas in Turkey. "We could not flatter ourselves," Kemal said later, "that there was any hope of success in a diplomatic way until we had driven the enemy out of our territory by force of arms."⁸⁸ But he was willing still to seize any chance of negotiation for a bloodless victory. For this purpose, Yusuf Kemal spent March in London and Paris, trying vainly to persuade Curzon and Poincaré that peace should be made on the basis of the National Pact.⁸⁹ The three Allied Foreign Ministers, however, met in Paris in March and proposed a further pro-Turkish modification of Sèvres, an immediate armistice, and a Greek evacuation of Anatolia after the peace.⁹⁰ The Greeks, desperate since February, accepted. Kemal was determined not to break off possible peace preliminaries but equally determined not to give the Greeks respite by an armistice to mount a new attack. The reply of April 5 which Yusuf Kemal therefore sent to the Allies, after Kemal and his ministers had conferred, accepted in principle a

four-month armistice provided the Greeks began evacuation at once and completed it during the armistice period.⁹¹ This the Greeks and Allies refused. Again on April 23 a Turkish note insisted on immediate evacuation, and tried to seize the initiative by proposing a preliminary conference on peace terms at Izmit, near Istanbul. This the Allies also rejected.⁹²

While Kemal thus refused to accept the responsibility of breaking off potential peace negotiations, he attempted also to win an invitation to the Genoa economic conference in April 1922. Chicherin alone supported his demand. The Turkish ambassadors in Paris and Rome protested the exclusion; the latter went to Genoa to observe and object in person. Ankara announced that it preserved consequently complete liberty of action in economic matters.⁹³ In July Fethi [Okyar], minister of the interior, was given leave of absence to sound Paris and London again on the chances of a negotiated peace. Poincaré twice received him, but Lloyd George and Curzon would not.⁹⁴ Meanwhile the Greek-Turkish war was coming to its climax. To improve their situation the Greeks in July proposed to occupy Istanbul themselves. The Allies refused bluntly. Then the Greek commissioner in Izmir proclaimed there the autonomous state of Ionia, occasioning bitter Turkish protests through Hamid in Istanbul to the High Commissioners. The final Turkish answer was a drive in August which broke the Greeks, captured their commander, and resulted in a victorious entry into Izmir on September 9, as the Greeks evacuated Anatolia precipitately.⁹⁵

Military victory at once placed the Turks in an advantageous bargaining position. They were now less dependent on Russian assistance. Kemal gave an interview to *Izvestiya* saying that Turkey wanted normal relations with Britain, France, and Italy, which called forth bitter Russian comments on Turkish opportunism. The Turkish ambassador in Moscow tried to assuage feelings there with a speech of thanks which referred to the solidarity of Muslim peoples and the Russian proletariat.⁹⁶ Britain alone, now suddenly deserted by the French and Italians, faced the Turks along the Straits. Demanding that the Greeks evacuate Eastern Thrace at once, Turkish forces advanced into the Straits zone at Çanak [Chanak]. Though they came with rifles butt-forward, the appalling prospect of an Anglo-Turkish war now confronted the two governments. Peace was maintained because General Harington ignored Cabinet instructions on an ultimatum to Kemal unless he withdrew, and because Kemal, so close to complete victory, chose not to provoke the British. Yusuf Kemal accepted an Allied offer of September 23 for an armistice and a peace conference on the basis of the return to Turkey of Istanbul and Eastern Thrace, including Edirne [Adrianople]. Though insisting that Thrace be evacuated at once, not after the peace, Yusuf Kemal agreed that armistice talks could begin at Mudanya. The Turks were perhaps influenced to accept the offer by Franklin-Bouillon, who saw Kemal at Izmir. That Kemal now strongly de-

sired peace was evident from the less intransigent tone of his Foreign Minister's note of October 4 to the Allies, accepting a peace conference, though asking that it be held at Izmir, on Turkish soil.⁹⁷

Armistice negotiations began at Mudanya, a small Marmara port, on October 3. Kemal sent Ismet [Inönü],⁹⁸ commander of the Western front against the Greeks, as his representative. Ismet provoked a crisis at Mudanya by again insisting on immediate Greek evacuation of Eastern Thrace. Curzon made another hurried trip to Paris, and the three Allied Foreign Ministers yielded. But as late as October 9 the British representative, General Harington, believed the Mudanya negotiations would break down over numerous other, though smaller, points. After repeated telephone calls from Ismet to Kemal the issues were narrowed to six, and finally to one, while Harington left hidden in his pocket two telegrams from London authorizing him to open hostilities against the Turks. The final point in dispute was settled by a maneuver which Ismet later duplicated at Lausanne. After Harington had stated the British position, he and Ismet paced on opposite sides of the room, each intractable. Ismet said he would not agree and then, suddenly, "J'accepte." He had held out as long as he could, but apparently had already been authorized to yield if necessary. "I was never so surprised in my life," said Harington later. Agreement was thus reached on October 10 seventy-five minutes before the British officers at Çanak were to start firing. Next day the formal armistice was signed by Ismet, Harington, and French and Italian generals, though the Greeks adhered only three days later.⁹⁹ Refet Pasha arrived in Istanbul on October 19 to be Ankara's first governor of Eastern Thrace, thereby completing nationalist control over most of the territory claimed in the National Pact. Lloyd George, his Greco-philic policy bankrupt, resigned the same day.

A formal invitation to a peace conference at Lausanne issued by the Allies on October 27 to both Turkish governments—Ankara and Istanbul—spurred the nationalists to clarify the relationship between themselves and the Sultan. This was done simply by a resolution of the Assembly on November 1 declaring the Sultanate abolished, although a Calif of the House of Osman would be chosen by the Assembly. The Istanbul cabinet resigned and Mehmet VI, declared a traitor by Ankara, fled aboard a British warship. Thereupon Abdülmecid [Medjid] was elected Calif by the Assembly. For Turkish foreign policy this meant a final break with the imperial Ottoman traditions, though for purposes of mollifying conservative sentiment at home and of retaining among Muslims abroad the prestige of the Caliphate, that shadowy institution was allowed two more years of existence. Istanbul no longer contained a government which could be influenced by Allied occupation; it was a provincial city only. Kemal, though not alone in his views, had forced the measure through the Assembly, using Bismarckian terms to a committee deliberating the bill. "Gentlemen," he said, "neither the sovereignty nor the right to govern can be transferred by one person to anybody else by an academic debate. Sovereignty

is acquired by force, by power, and by violence.”¹⁰⁰ Sovereignty lay with Kemal’s victorious nationalists, who alone were represented at Lausanne.

IV

Ismet Pasha led the Turkish delegation to Lausanne. Kemal himself, pleased with Ismet’s hard headedness at Mudanya and confident of his personal loyalty, chose him for the most important diplomatic task Ankara had yet faced. Ismet was simultaneously elected Foreign Minister by the Assembly, after Kemal had requested Yusuf Kemal’s resignation.¹⁰¹ The man thus chosen, now only thirty-eight, had had a purely military career, rising to be Under-Secretary of War before he left Istanbul in 1920 to join Kemal in Ankara. Thereafter he had served as member of the Assembly, as chief of the general staff and as commander of the Western front. Aside from his week at Mudanya he had had only slight contact with diplomacy as military adviser to the commission that negotiated peace with Bulgaria in 1913.¹⁰² His new responsibilities weighed heavily on Ismet, and at dinner on the day he became Foreign Minister he was unwontedly somber.¹⁰³ Kemal brushed aside Ismet’s plea that he was no diplomat. At Lausanne Ismet continued to have misgivings about his new role. “They have sent me, a soldier,” he said to an English journalist, “to fight a Bismarck, one of your greatest statesmen.”¹⁰⁴ Lord Curzon, who presided over most of the conference sessions, was indeed a formidable opponent, but Ismet acquitted himself well. The meetings in the Hotel du Château, where Curzon hoped to produce a treaty in a few weeks, stretched out for eight months largely because of Ismet’s obstinate negotiation. The successful issue of the conference was in part due also to Ismet’s sense of timing on compromise.

Ismet found himself in a difficult position at Lausanne. He represented a victorious nation which the Allied delegates tried to treat like a defeated nation. Curzon in particular employed “star chamber proceedings” and “steam-roller methods.”¹⁰⁵ But the Assembly in Turkey demanded complete equality and a diplomatic triumph. Curzon’s tactics tended to make Ankara more obstinate than ever, thus increasing Ismet’s difficulties in arriving at viable compromise.¹⁰⁶ It was generally thought by other diplomats at Lausanne that some of the Turkish delegation were there partly to see for the Assembly that Ismet did not make too many concessions in order to secure a treaty. Dr. Riza Nur, the second Turkish plenipotentiary, seemed to be a particularly intransigent watchdog.¹⁰⁷ During the conference Hasan [Saka], Ankara’s third delegate, went back to Turkey and returned with, presumably, instructions for greater obstinacy.¹⁰⁸ On territorial and political questions, where Ismet had special competence, he was able to accept solutions more often on his own authority, whereas in matters of economics and finance he was forced to rely on the expert advice of others in his delegation.¹⁰⁹

At the opening session on November 20 Ismet began at once to demand for

Turkey complete equality of treatment as an independent and sovereign state. Sometimes this insistence led Ismet to unnecessary extremes, but it was on most occasions his major weapon in combatting any measure of foreign control over Turkish finances, economy, justice, minorities, territory, or anything else. Ismet stood on the National Pact. Curzon grew immensely tired of Ismet's repetitious arguments, professing not to understand why Ismet insisted on undiluted sovereignty. Ismet was too sensitive on the subject, said Curzon; he should deal with realities, not phrases. The question was one of guarantees to minorities in Turkey. Thinking of Ottoman history since Kuchuk Kainarji, Ismet begged Curzon to excuse his insistence on sovereignty. "Turkey was acutely sensitive on this matter, and her fears were unfortunately well-founded, for up to the present day Turkish sovereignty had always been infringed on the plea of humanitarian considerations. The integrity of Turkey had frequently been guaranteed by means of promises from the highest authorities and also by solemn treaties, and yet Turkish sovereignty had repeatedly been violated. . . . How could Turkey help having misgivings?"¹¹⁰ Ismet likewise opposed an international commission to supervise demilitarization of the Straits. "Turkey has had experience of such systems. For a state to be exposed in any way whatever to intervention in a part of the territories subject to its sovereignty is a calamity worse than death."¹¹¹ Curzon was exasperated by the same argument on the question of capitulations. "I am tired of replying to that argument," said Curzon. "Cannot the Turks realize that theirs is not the only sovereignty in the world?"¹¹² Curzon often assumed the role of a weary schoolmaster admonishing a stupid pupil. Ismet refused to learn. In private negotiation between Curzon and Ismet the same antithesis often developed. When the American observer brought the two men together to discuss the judicial capitulations in Turkey, Curzon shouted and beat the wall with his cane. Ismet held out for complete sovereignty and said that the adjustment of such matters took time. "Curzon and Ismet had about as much in common as a lion tamer and a grower of azaleas," reported Ambassador Child.¹¹³

Whenever he stated the Turkish position, Ismet was slow and methodical, which also annoyed Curzon. Because he was deaf, Ismet had frequently to rely on the secretary at his side for the gist of other delegates' remarks. But Ismet used his deafness to gain time to think, and he was often suspected of hearing only what he wanted to. When he did reply, he spoke indistinct French, reading from prepared statements or using notes dictated in Turkish to his secretary, and in a voice so low as to be barely audible. Ismet did not have the necessary details at his fingertips, as Curzon did. He required time to confer with his experts. He was forever reserving his right to reply, or requesting a delay to prepare an answer.¹¹⁴ Curzon tried unsuccessfully to stampede Ismet into quick and injudicious statements. On the Straits question, Ismet refused to answer directly Curzon's brilliant and rather sarcastic question as to whether Chicherin's views represented the Turkish position.¹¹⁵ "It must be a terrible

experience," said Child, "for Curzon to turn his splendid flow of beautiful English upon this man and then find Ismet, with his little quizzical face, wholly untouched."¹¹⁶ Ismet was well aware that he could not match Curzon in extemporaneous debate and analysis. He patiently conducted a siege, instead of attempting brilliant assaults. Ismet was also, of course, in constant telegraphic communication with Kemal, who followed the negotiations closely and sent instructions. A courier left each day for Ankara.¹¹⁷ Even when authorized to compromise, Ismet sometimes bargained until the last possible moment. Having told Curzon point-blank one morning at 10:30 that the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate could under no circumstances remain in Istanbul, he said at 11 out of a clear sky as the two were walking together to a session, "All right, I will yield."¹¹⁸

Ismet used as best he could the differences among the Powers for Turkish advantage. Sometimes he was unsuccessful. Repeatedly he sought to strengthen his hand by suggesting to the American observers that they conclude a treaty with Turkey. They refused to do so before the Allies had completed negotiations.¹¹⁹ At other times he succeeded. Ismet had in the early stages of the conference considerable sympathy and support from the Italian and French delegations. He nevertheless made his major concessions to the British, whose warships at Istanbul and troops in Mosul offered the greatest threat. Thereafter he could oppose various French and Italian demands without fear that Britain would back them to the point of breaking up the conference and so jeopardizing her gains.

Ismet succeeded also in walking a narrow path between Russia and the Western Powers. He saw Chicherin nearly every day in the first period of the conference, and presumably received helpful advice from him.¹²⁰ After he had made concessions to Britain, he could menace the West with a return to a Russian orientation: "Turkey could look to the East and the North as well as the West."¹²¹ But though Ismet and the Turks remained friendly to Russia, they avoided becoming dependent on her. No Rapallo resulted from Lausanne as from Genoa. The test of this was the Straits question. Chicherin was more Turkish than the Turks in arguing for their complete control over the Straits in order to close the Black Sea to vessels of other Powers. Ismet passed over Chicherin's arguments in silence. Instead he negotiated privately—"clandestinely," as Chicherin complained—with the Allies, ultimately accepting the British view that the Straits be open to all. Along the way Ismet had to make concessions to the Allies on demilitarization around the Straits, and to accept a guarantee of their security less adequate than he desired. But the final result was of inestimable advantage for Turkey. Ismet had on this point carried out the basic demand of the National Pact, but avoided applying that article of the Russo-Turkish treaty which would give a Soviet-dominated coalition of Black Sea states—Russia, Georgia, and the Ukraine—control over Turkish shores in a closed sea. He placed the new Turkey in an advan-

tageous position between the West and Russia. Though the decision on the Straits is sometimes represented as Curzon's triumph in splitting Turkey from Russia, it was as much Ismet's triumph in avoiding dependence on Russia.¹²²

By the end of January 1923, essential agreement had been reached between Ismet and the Allies on the Thracian boundary, ownership of various Aegean islands, the Straits regime, the elimination of an Armenia carved out of Turkish territory, and a compulsory exchange of Greek and Turkish minorities.¹²³ The outstanding questions still in dispute concerned the Turkish-Iraq boundary in the Mosul region, the partition of the Ottoman debt, the Turkish demand for reparations from Greece, the status of foreign economic concessions in Turkey, and the possibility of some substitute regime for the capitulations which would give legal protection to Allied interests and nationals in Turkey. Ismet's strategy had been to drive a hard bargain on territorial questions, but to compromise on all of them except Mosul, whose Kurdish-Turkish majority was included in the claims of the National Pact. On all proposals tending to limit Turkish sovereignty within the boundaries thus laid down he was adamant. He successfully refused international commissions of various sorts to supervise matters as minor as the sanitary regime of the Straits. He would give no blanket validation to foreign economic concessions, nor admit any sort of foreign supervision over Turkish courts. On "Turkey for the Turks" Ismet would not compromise.¹²⁴

The Allies presented the Turkish delegation on January 31 a draft treaty including all points on which agreement had been reached, and their draft of points still in dispute. Curzon, in skillful and forceful language, urged the Turks to accept a good offer. "We are not here to go on bargaining until we all sink into the grave, but to settle and conclude." Bompard and Garroni, for France and Italy, urged on the Turks the clauses on capitulations and finance. Ismet, in the face of this pressure, recounted the concessions he had made, accused the Allies of bringing up new points, and requested eight days to prepare his "observations" on the Allied draft. Curzon, in more of a hurry than Ismet, set a final limit of February 4 for his departure from Lausanne.¹²⁵

There ensued four dramatic days of informal bargaining between the Turks and the Allies, during which more concessions were made by the latter.¹²⁶ Among these was an acknowledgment of Ismet's major premise, which eventually appeared in the preamble of the final treaty—that "relations must be based on respect for the independence and sovereignty of the States concerned." Ismet's reply to the new concessions was received by the Allied delegates at 1:45 p.m. on February 4. Ismet made a few counterconcessions, and accepted many parts of the draft treaty, but held out for the substance of sovereignty on capitulations and finance. He proposed that a treaty incorporating all agreed points be signed then, leaving the others for later negotiation.¹²⁷ Such a treaty, involving only questions on which the Turks had agreed but giving them peace, would have strengthened the Turkish position enormously.

The Allied delegates met in Curzon's hotel suite and decided to offer a few more concessions. Ismet was summoned to meet them there at 5:40. He came, obviously unhappy and embarrassed; he was essentially a pleasant and agreeable man. Dire warnings and cajolery were alternately applied to Ismet as Curzon laid down post-final concessions: he would not appeal the Mosul question to the League, as he had threatened, unless after one year it remained unsolved by direct negotiation; some economic questions could be left open for six months. Ismet raised objections, saying no in unprovocative but firm tones. He would not accept the economic and judicial clauses, since they imposed "servitudes" on Turkey. Curzon's train left just after 9 that evening. Though he hoped Ismet would agree to signing before then, he had to depart disappointed.¹²⁸

Ismet left a few days later to report to the Grand National Assembly. During a heated two weeks' debate he was both attacked for his concessions and criticized for having failed to make peace. There was general agreement that the Allied draft was unacceptable, but continued argument as to whether to resume negotiations. Mustafa Kemal defended Ismet before the Assembly, opposing the demands of some extreme nationalists that there be no resumption. Kemal's view was finally adopted on March 6, despite the opposition of the Soviet ambassador.¹²⁹ A note signed by Ismet and approved by the ministers was sent to the High Commissioners through Dr. Adnan [Adivar], now the foreign ministry's representative in Istanbul. It restated the Turkish views, with some alternative proposals, and asked that the conference be resumed at Istanbul. Along with it the Turks submitted a counterdraft of a treaty which exhibited the usual sensitivity on matters of sovereignty—as, for example, in the severe limitations with which they proposed to surround British ownership of the Anzac cemetery on Gallipoli.¹³⁰ A potential Treaty of Istanbul was no more acceptable to the Allies than a Treaty of Izmir would have been the previous September, but they were willing to meet again in Lausanne. The Turks agreed to reconvene there on April 23.¹³¹

During the break in the conference, Kemal lost no opportunity to bolster Ismet's negotiating position. The Turkish army was strengthened. The Turks followed increasingly a practice already begun—to treat the capitulatory rights of foreigners as if they no longer existed.¹³² An elaborate economic congress at Izmir produced an Economic Pact which emphasized independence, sovereignty, and the necessity that foreign business houses observe Turkish law. Kemal, addressing the congress, said that Turkey welcomed foreign capital, but refused exploitation. "We cannot permit that this country should become as a city of slaves."¹³³ Kemal's effort to consolidate his political leadership within Turkey by organizing his own Peoples' party produced also a restatement of foreign policy in the party platform: the peace must assure Turkish financial, administrative, economic, and political independence.¹³⁴ A further play for American support was made when on April 9 the Grand

National Assembly ratified the Chester concession, granted to the Ottoman-American Development Company. Though American economic aid might be welcome in developing nationalist Turkey, ratification was undoubtedly a maneuver to win American support at Lausanne against European economic claims. The concession involved railroad construction and the exploitation of oil and other mineral resources both in British-controlled Mosul and in regions of eastern Anatolia where the French had prior concessions. France objected to Ankara that this was an unfriendly act. Though the ratification was a diplomatic sensation at the moment, the final outcome at Lausanne was little affected thereby, despite Ismet's efforts to secure American backing on this basis.¹³⁵

The second session of the conference required three months rather than the two weeks Ismet had hoped for. He had strenuous arguments on the Ottoman debt, Greek reparations and foreign economic concessions. In a meeting on the concessions, Ismet was reported to be "receiving treatment which would make the third degree in a Harlem police station seem like a club dinner. He had deep circles under his eyes, his hair was standing on end, and he looked completely worn out, but was still holding his ground manfully in spite of all assaults."¹³⁶ Finally, Ismet obtained solutions satisfactory to him. He successfully refused any substitute regime for the capitulations. Only the Mosul question, on which Britain was as adamant as Turkey, was reserved for further bilateral negotiation or appeal to the League of Nations.

Ismet sometimes despaired of successful compromise and told Ankara he would resign. Rauf, still Prime Minister and acting Foreign Minister, differed with Ismet on matters of procedure and possible concessions. This was particularly true of Ismet's desire to renounce reparations from Greece if that country restored Kara Ağa, a vital suburb of Edirne, to Turkey. Ismet complained that Rauf did not allow him enough latitude and tried to go beyond giving him fundamental instructions to the point of prescribing negotiations in detail. This, said Ismet, would produce disaster, like the military collapse of 1877 when the Palace tried to direct the campaign against Russia. Kemal gave Ismet full support, forcing Rauf to withdraw his objections.¹³⁷ Ismet was then able to compromise the matter of Greek reparations, which had appeared to threaten a complete break and a renewed Greco-Turkish war in Thrace. At a dramatic meeting late in May, the two-hour tension suddenly changed to the hilarity of immense relief when the French chairman wrung from Ismet the admission that his instructions from Ankara, which he had thus far held in secret reserve, allowed him to accept the compromise.¹³⁸

When the Treaty of Lausanne was signed on July 24, 1923, together with seventeen annexes and numerous letters, Ismet could pride himself on having achieved most of the nationalist aims.¹³⁹ The contrast to Sèvres was obvious. Now there were no reparations to pay. Turkey's boundaries were substantially

those of the National Pact, except for the undefined Mosul frontier. No Armenia existed in eastern Anatolia, and no Greek state in the west. "Turkey for the Turks" was further assured by the population exchange with Greece, which excepted only the Greeks of Istanbul. The capitulations were abolished; foreign residents, businesses, economic concessions and schools were subject to Turkish law. The Turks were not completely masters of the Straits, and had accepted a demilitarized zone; their tariff rates were limited for some years; but the restrictions on complete sovereignty were so few as to leave no doubt that the Government of the Grand National Assembly represented a people victorious in diplomacy as well as in arms. Referring to the acknowledgment of sovereignty in the preamble, Ismet told the Assembly that "these are no vague words . . . (but) the result of the battles of a whole epoch."¹⁴⁰ Turkey's independence was more than technical, for with peace and the Straits open to all, Turkey was now balanced between the West and Russia.¹⁴¹

Some members of the Grand National Assembly, particularly those from the frontier regions, were not satisfied with the treaty, and criticized severely the cession of parts of Thrace to Greece and of Alexandretta (called by one deputy a "Turkish Alsace-Lorraine") to Syria. But 213 of 227 deputies voted for ratification on August 23, the Allied High Commissioners were at once notified, and the evacuation of British troops from Istanbul was shortly completed.¹⁴² Kemal was proud of the Lausanne treaty, and always regarded it as the logical and necessary outcome of his leadership in the nationalist cause from 1919 on. "I was certain," he said later to his party, "that we would achieve a positive result. . . . What we demanded from the Conference was nothing more than the confirmation in a proper manner of what we had already gained. We only claimed our well-known and natural rights. In addition, we had the power to preserve and protect these rights."¹⁴³

The conclusion of peace gave the nationalist regime the prestige and stability necessary to proclaim Ankara the capital of Turkey on October 13, and to declare formally on October 29 the existence of the Turkish Republic with Mustafa Kemal as its first President and Ismet its first Prime Minister. The peace by no means solved all Turkey's diplomatic problems, though it laid the basis for the conclusion of a host of friendship and commercial treaties in the next few years. The Califate, until its abolition in 1924, complicated Turkey's relations with Muslims outside its borders. The Mosul question brought acute tension between Turkey and Britain before its settlement in favor of Iraq in 1926 and caused the Turks to sign a nonaggression treaty with Russia in 1925. The Syrian frontier produced incidents only partly solved by a Franco-Turkish treaty of 1926; a similar situation existed on the Persian border. There was friction with Greece over the population exchange and over the status of the Greek Orthodox patriarchate in Istanbul. But the diplomatic victory of 1923 allowed Ankara to negotiate with others as an equal on such matters. It is

noteworthy that since 1923 Turkey has enjoyed a period of peace unparalleled in her previous history.

Turkish diplomacy rested, of course, on the military successes which allowed bargaining from a position of comparative strength. It made good use of the collapse of Allied solidarity after 1918, and of the antagonism between Russia and the West. But it could not have been successful without the severe limitation of territorial objectives, laid down in the National Pact and not increased thereafter. The heterogeneous Ottoman Empire could never have served as a basis for Kemal's diplomacy. This he emphasized again and again. "It is necessary that the State should pursue an exclusive national policy and that this policy should be in perfect agreement with our internal organization and based on it," he said of the situation in 1920.¹⁴⁴ These limited objectives were relentlessly pursued in the years 1919 to 1923 by comparatively able and stubborn men like Bekir Sami, Yusuf Kemal, and Ismet. Behind them stood Mustafa Kemal, who throughout the entire period kept in his own hands the control over major diplomatic appointments, the ultimate and sometimes immediate direction of all diplomatic negotiation, and the authority to make the results acceptable to the nationalists and the Grand National Assembly.

Notes

1. Personal names in modern Turkey offer a constant source of confusion. They will here be given in the modern Turkish spelling, with explanatory notes where necessary. A Turkish law of 1934 obliged all citizens to take family names, which few Turks heretofore possessed. The new names will be indicated in brackets wherever possible, but since these names were unknown during the period under discussion they will not be used in the text. Mustafa Kemal was given the surname Atatürk by the Assembly.

2. See Jean Deny, "Souvenirs du Gazi Mustafa Kemâl Pacha," *Revue des études islamiques* (1927), Cahiers 1 to 3, *passim*, on the war and early armistice periods.

3. In view of the lack of documentary material from the Turkish archives, and of the lack of important memoirs by leading diplomats, it is not yet possible to write the full story of Turkish diplomacy, particularly in the difficult and often disorganized early years. Very little information is available on the exact processes of policy formulation, or on the correspondence between the capital and the diplomats charged with executing the policy. Various books attempt to survey the development of Turkish foreign policy in general, but none is completely satisfactory. All are lacking in diplomatic detail and documentary evidence. Among the more useful are three theses: Frédéric Abelous, *L'évolution de la Turquie dans ses rapports avec les étrangers* (Toulouse, 1928), mostly on the capitulations and rather anti-Ankara; S. Reşat Sagay, *La nouvelle Turquie et la communauté internationale* (Strasbourg, 1936), a fairly good summary of foreign policy; Edward R. Vere-Hodge, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1918-1948* (Ambilly-Annemasse, 1950), concentrating on post-1923. Kurt Ziemke, *Die neue*

Türkei, 1914–1929 (Stuttgart, 1930) is perhaps the best general treatment. Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey*, 2nd ed. (London, 1923) offers a good background, though diplomacy is not its central theme. Among the most useful but most disappointing studies is Yusuf Hikmet [Bayur], *Yeni Türkiye Devletinin Harici Siyaseti* [The Foreign Policy of the New Turkish State] (Istanbul, 1934), which lists among its sources the archives of the Sublime Porte for the armistice period, and the files of the Representative Committee and of the Foreign Ministry, but cites few documents from any of these sources and gives few details on policy formulation or its execution.

4. Text in Eliot G. Mears, *Modern Turkey* (New York, 1924), pp. 624–626.

5. Here Turkish officers, like Kemal, tried to hold the armistice line, giving rise to a seven-year controversy with Britain. Turkish documents in *La question de Mossoul de la signature du traité d'armistice de Moudros . . . au 1re* [sic] *Mars 1925* (Constantinople, 1925), pp. 8–73.

6. Chicherin had already protested the Baku advance and the plebiscite: Jane Degras, ed., *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, I, 1917–24* (Oxford, 1951), 83, 102, 109–110, 120–121.

7. Mustafa Kemal [Atatürk], *A Speech delivered by Ghazi Mustapha Kemal . . . October, 1927* (Leipzig, 1929), p. 17. This speech to the Peoples' Party Congress reviews the nationalist movement from 1919 to 1924, and is Kemal's self-justification, partly against the attacks of domestic opponents. It contains important information on foreign policy and its execution, though domestic matters occupy more of its 700-odd pages. Many documents are included *in extenso*.

8. Text of Erzurum resolutions in Gotthard Jäschke, "Zur Geschichte des türkischen Nationalpakts," *Mitteilungen des Seminars für orientalischen Sprachen*, XXXVI (1933), 11, 107–116; summary in Société pour l'étude de l'histoire turque, *Histoire de la république turque* (Istanbul, 1935), p. 38. Sivas declaration in Mears, *Modern Turkey*, pp. 627–628.

9. Kemal, *Speech*, p. 29.

10. *ibid.*, pp. 91–92.

11. *ibid.*, pp. 125–126.

12. Halidé Edib [Adivar], *The Turkish Ordeal* (New York, 1928), p. 16.

13. Kemal, *Speech*, pp. 77–100. The King-Crane commission reported that the Sivas congress was expected to declare for an American mandate: "First Publication of the King-Crane Report on the Near East," *Editor and Publisher*, LV: 27, 2nd section (December 2, 1922), p. 17.

14. Kemal, *Speech*, p. 150; Gasi Mustafa Kemal Pascha, *Die neue Türkei, 1919–1927*, III, *Die Dokumente zur Rede* (Leipzig, 1927?), no. 106.

15. Maj.-Gen. James G. Harbord, "American Military Mission to Armenia," *International Conciliation*, CLI (June 1920), 294–295. It is perhaps significant that Kemal in October 1919, replied to all the written questions of a Turkish journalist of Istanbul except "What was your interview with General Harbord about?" Kemal, *Dokumente*, no. 144.

16. Comte Roger de Gontaut-Biron et L. Le Révérend, *D'Angora à Lausanne* (Paris, 1924), pp. 12, 204.

17. Kemal, *Speech*, pp. 136–137, 147–148, 151, 154, 156; Kemal, *Dokumente*, nos. 43–45, 106. A reliable account from the other side is in A. Rawlinson, *Adventures in the Near East, 1918–1922* (London, 1923), pp. 188–190, 231–232. Col. Rawlinson saw Kemal often at Erzurum in 1919, appreciated his character and aims, and reported personally to Lord Curzon on the Erzurum resolutions. Curzon naturally would accord the nationalists no recognition, but sent Rawlinson back to discover unofficially from Kemal what peace terms they might accept. Rawlinson returned ostensibly as an Allied control officer. *Ibid.*, pp. 251–252. General Harbord concluded even this early that Kemal was “no cheap political adventurer,” and that his movement had to be taken seriously: Maj.-Gen. James G. Harbord, “Mustafa Kemal Pasha and His Party,” *World's Work* XL (June 1920), 188. Harbord's official report included a long letter by Kemal explaining his aims, the Sivas declaration, and a letter from Kemal and Husein Rauf to the U.S. Senate asking that an American committee visit Turkey before the peace treaty was signed: U.S. American Military Mission to Armenia, *Conditions in the Near East. Report . . . by Maj.-Gen. James G. Harbord* (Washington, 1920, 66th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate Document no. 266), pp. 29–40.

18. Kemal, *Dokumente*, no. 97, annex 1.

19. Kemal, *Speech*, p. 262; Hikmet, *Haricî Siyaseti*, p. 38.

20. Kemal, *Speech*, p. 121.

21. Kemal, *Dokumente*, no. 132; see also no. 143.

22. *ibid.*, no. 128; Kemal, *Speech*, p. 168.

23. *Histoire*, pp. 42–43.

24. Kemal, *Speech*, p. 306. Texts of the National Pact which differ slightly in translation in *Histoire*, pp. 46–47; Mears, *Modern Turkey*, pp. 629–631; H. W. V. Temperley, *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, VI (London, 1924), 605–606.

25. David Lloyd George, *The Truth About the Peace Treaties* (London, 1938), II, 1285–1294. Lloyd George did not know who Kemal was.

26. Kemal, *Speech*, pp. 353, 360–362; Kemal, *Dokumente*, no. 229. Count Sforza, Italian High Commissioner in Istanbul early in 1919, had then offered Kemal shelter in the Italian embassy from British arrest: Carlo Sforza, *Makers of Modern Europe* (Indianapolis, 1930), p. 365.

27. In this period the nationalists used the word *vekil* for minister, which was usually translated as “commissar,” “commissary,” or “commissioner,” probably owing to the Russian example. After Lausanne the translation “minister” became usual. The Foreign Office was often called the “commissariat.”

28. Resolutions of April 23, 1920, and law of January 20, 1921, in *Histoire*, pp. 52–53 and 83–84 respectively.

29. Gotthard Jäschke und Erich Pritsch, *Die Türkei seit dem Weltkriege: Geschichtskalender, 1918–1928* (Berlin, 1929), p. 32; Gaston Gaillard, *The Turks and Europe* (London, 1921), pp. 186–187. See also Donald E. Webster, *The Turkey of Atatürk* (Philadelphia, 1939), p. 86.

30. Edib, *Turkish Ordeal*, pp. 146–147, 173–174, gives a brief account of the beginnings; she was the typist. See also Berthe Georges-Gaulis, *Angora, Constantinople, Londres* (Paris, 1922), pp. 134–135. Hamid Bey was apparently first known in Istanbul as vice-president of the Red Crescent: Hikmet, *Haricî Siyaseti*, p. 83; Jäschke, *Die Türkei*, p. 41. This anomalous Foreign Office post in Istanbul continued to exist even after Ankara became capital of the new republic.

31. Possibly because he was a Christian Pole turned Muslim. Muftıy-Zade Zia, "How the Turks Feel," *Asia*, XXII: 11 (November, 1922), p. 861, makes the obvious point that the nationalists no longer used Greeks and Armenians in their foreign service as the Sultans had done.

32. Kemal, *Speech*, p. 396.

33. Louis Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs* (London, 1930), I, 390. Gotthard Jäschke, "Urkunden I. Der Weg zur russisch-türkischen Freundschaft im Lichte Moskaus," *Die Welt des Islams*, XX (1938), 132, cites notes appended to the Russian translation of Kemal's *Speech* [E. F. Ludšuvejt, ed., *Put Novoi Turtsii 1919–1927*, III (Moscow, 1934)] to indicate that Kemal's letter proposed military cooperation with Russia against "imperialism," and exhibited willingness to see Turkish-speaking Azerbaijan become a Soviet republic.

34. Hikmet, *Haricî Siyaseti*, p. 63.

35. The first contacts between the Turkish nationalists and Soviet Russia are not yet clear from the published records. See discussion of the evidence of relations between the two while the Representative Committee guided nationalist affairs in 1919 and early 1920 in Jäschke, "Der Weg zur russisch-türkischen Freundschaft," *Die Welt des Islams*, XVI (1934), 27 and note 20; *idem.*, "Urkunden I," p. 122, note 3. Several authorities assert that by April, 1920, Ankara and Moscow had already concluded a military convention, providing supplies for the Turks. None cites documents. See, for example, Harold Armstrong, *Turkey in Travail* (London, 1925), p. 116; Toynbee, *Western Question*, p. 367; John Kingsley Birge, *A Guide to Turkish Area Studies* (Washington, 1949), p. 234. Toynbee in *Survey of International Affairs, 1920–1923* (London, 1925), p. 365, mentions even earlier agreements of December 1919, and March 1920, without citing sources or indicating content. Jäschke, "Der Weg," p. 35 and note 76 discusses some of the evidence and seems to discount the likelihood of a military convention.

36. Text in Degras, I, 15–17.

37. Text, *ibid.*, pp. 164–167.

38. Text, *ibid.*, pp. 187–188.

39. Kemal to Chicherin, November 29, 1920, in V. A. Kliuchnikov and A. Sabanin, *Mezhdunarodnaya Politika noveishovo vremeni v dogovorakh, notakh i deklaratsiakh* III (Moscow, 1928), 27–28.

40. *Hakimiyeti Milliye* (a nationalist paper in Ankara), no. 44, July 8, 1920, quoted in Jäschke, "Der Weg," p. 29.

41. Hikmet, *Haricî Siyaseti*, p. 64; Kemal, *Speech*, p. 396. Yusuf Kemal brought this demand back to Ankara, which Kemal categorically refused to grant, even in return for Soviet aid: Hikmet, p. 65; Jäschke, "Der Weg," p. 31.

42. Edib, *Turkish Ordeal*, pp. 170–182; Rawlinson, *Adventures*, p. 295. Actually a Turkish Communist organization had already been formed in Moscow, and in June of 1920 one was started in Ankara. Kemal curbed it in about a year, and undermined it by having an “official” Communist party founded, which however proclaimed the virtues of Islam and nationalism: Gotthard Jäschke, “Kommunismus und Islam im türkischen Befreiungskriege,” *Die Welt des Islams*, XX (1938), 110–117.

43. Jäschke, *Die Türkei*, pp. 39, 41.

44. Kemal, *Speech*, pp. 429–430, 436; Edib, *Turkish Ordeal*, pp. 224–225.

45. Kemal, *Speech*, pp. 390–391.

46. King Abdullah, *Memoirs*, ed. by P. P. Graves (London, 1950), pp. 190–192.

47. *Histoire*, p. 63; Webster, *Turkey of Atatürk*, p. 86. The *Hakimiyeti Milliye* of Ankara published the terms of Sèvres under the headline “How They Tear Us Apart,” and observed further that the treaty could not be constitutionally ratified because Istanbul had no parliament: Jäschke, *Die Türkei*, pp. 36, 38.

48. Text of Sèvres in Great Britain, Treaty Series, 1920, no. 11 (Cmd. 964), and of the Tripartite Agreement, no. 12 (Cmd. 963).

49. On events in this region see Toynbee, *Survey . . . 1920–1923*, pp. 361–376.

50. Presumably there were Turkish-Soviet conferences during the campaign about aims in the Transcaucasus: *ibid.*, p. 368. On Kâzım Karabekir in this period: Edib, *Turkish Ordeal*, pp. 203, 400–403; Rawlinson, *Adventures*, pp. 180–181, 282–284; Berthe Georges-Gaulis, *La nouvelle Turquie* (Paris, 1924), p. 97.

51. A. Poidebard, ed., *La Transcaucasie et la République d'Arménie dans les textes diplomatiques . . . 1919–1921* (Paris, 1924), pp. 56–58, giving the treaty text from an Armenian source. Gotthard Jäschke, “Die türkische-armenische Grenze und der Friedensvertrag von Gümrü (Alexandropol),” *Mitteilungen des Seminars für orientalischen Sprachen*, XXXV (1932), II, 167–171, 173–176, gives a partial text from a Turkish source. See also *Histoire*, p. 71; Kemal, *Speech*, p. 418.

52. Hikmet, *Haricî Siyaseti*, p. 66.

53. Fischer, *Soviets in World Affairs*, I, 384–390, on Enver in Russia. Enver was the subject of fantastic speculation and rumor, portrayed both as a Soviet tool against Kemal and a Turkish tool against Moscow. See reports in *Oriente Moderno*, I, II (1921–1923), *passim*.

54. G. Zinoviev, “Bolshevist Aims in Asia,” *Current History*, XIII, part 2, no. 3 (March 1921), 465; Michael T. Florinsky, *World Revolution and the USSR* (New York, 1933), pp. 57–62. Enver sent a message to the Congress using Communist terminology: “W,” “Les relations russo-turques depuis l’avènement du Bolchévisme,” *Revue du monde musulman*, LII (1922), 197, giving part of the text. Jäschke, “Der Weg,” pp. 29–30, says that Bekir Sami and Yusuf Kemal attended the Congress on their return trip from Moscow; also *Oriente Moderno*, I:2 (July 1921), 87–88.

55. Kemal, *Speech*, pp. 469–490.

56. Edib, *Turkish Ordeal*, p. 243.

57. Jäschke, *Die Türkei*, pp. 45–46; Kemal, *Speech*, p. 490; Count Carlo Sforza,

Diplomatic Europe Since the Treaty of Versailles (New Haven, 1928), pp. 51–66, summarizing his Turcophil views. Ankara already had diplomatic agents in Rome and Paris.

58. Edib, *Turkish Ordeal*, pp. 242–243.

59. On the London conference see *Oriente Moderno*, I:7 (December 15, 1921), 390–393, including Bekir Sami's demands; Kemal, *Speech*, pp. 490–491; Toynbee, *Western Question*, pp. 93–97; Edouard Driault et Michel Lhéritier, *Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce de 1821 à nos jours*, V (Paris, 1926), 389–395.

60. Kemal, *Speech*, pp. 497–498; Edib, *Turkish Ordeal*, pp. 254–255. A report of these conversations leaked to Krassin and Chicherin, perhaps in a British effort to block any Turkish-Russian agreement. Britain and Russia were at this time fighting for influence over Muslims from Turkey to China, and indulging in recriminations about attempts to influence the Turkish nationalists. See Degras, I, 230–233.

61. Texts in *Oriente Moderno*, I:2 (July 15, 1921), 79–81, and II:1 (June 15, 1922), 18 respectively.

62. Kemal, *Speech*, pp. 409–410, 498–499; *Oriente Moderno*, I:1 (June 15, 1921), 21–23; “W,” in *Revue du monde musulman*, LII, 201–202; Michel Paillarès, *Le Kémalisme devant les Alliés* (Constantinople, 1922), pp. 355–356. Sforza, *Diplomatic Europe*, p. 63, confirms Kemal's analysis of the significance of the economic concessions.

63. Kemal, *Speech*, pp. 427–428; Jäschke, *Die Türkei*, p. 49.

64. Muftý-Zade Zia, “How the Turks Feel,” p. 860; Ibrahim A. Gövsa, *Türk Meşhurları Ansiklopedisi* [Encyclopedia of Turkish Notables] (n.p., n.d.), p. 378; Mehmet Zeki, *Encyclopédie Biographique de la Turquie* (Istanbul, 1932), pp. 37–38; Toynbee, *Western Question*, p. 178; Clair Price, “Mustafa Kemal and the Angora Government,” *Current History*, XVI (1922), 794–795.

65. Kemal, *Speech*, pp. 418–419; Fischer, *Soviets in World Affairs*, I, 392; Edib, *Turkish Ordeal*, pp. 240–241; Jäschke, *Die Türkei*, pp. 45, 47; Toynbee, *Survey . . . 1920–1923*, pp. 369–370; Hikmet, *Haricî Siyaseti*, p. 66.

66. Text in Degras, I, 237–242, from the Russian, and in *Oriente Moderno*, I:6 (November 15, 1921), 340–343, from the Turkish.

67. *Oriente Moderno*, I:3 (August 15, 1921), 154–155 and II:8 (January 15, 1923), 472; Kemal, *Speech*, pp. 427–428; Fischer, *Soviets in World Affairs*, I, 393; “W” in *Revue du monde musulman*, LII, 193, 202; *Current History*, XV:1 (October, 1921), 144; Gotthard Jäschke, “Protest der Türkischen Volkskommunistischen Partei gegen die Regierung der Türkischen Grossen Nationalversammlung,” *Die Welt des Islams*, XX (1938), 135–136.

68. Fischer, *Soviets in World Affairs*, I, 391; Jäschke, *Die Türkei*, p. 141; *Oriente Moderno*, I:5 (October 15, 1921), 283. Kemal makes no mention of military aid, saying only that “Turkish-Russian relations developed very favorably” in 1921. *Speech*, p. 541.

69. Text in *Asie française*, XXI:193 (June 1921), 251–252.

70. *Oriente Moderno*, I:7 (December 15, 1921), 395–396.

71. Jäschke, *Die Türkei*, pp. 50–52. Kemal, *Speech*, pp. 500–501 again accuses Bekir Sami of a peace-at-any-price policy.

72. Kemal, *Speech*, pp. 541–543; Rawlinson, *Adventures*, pp. 247–248. Litvinov to Curzon, September 27, 1921, says that the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs had arranged British-Turkish conversations in Moscow: Degras, I, 260–261. Relations between the two countries in 1921 were enlivened by the public trial in Ankara of an Oxford-trained Indian Muslim accused of espionage for Britain: Edib, *Turkish Ordeal*, pp. 229–230; Georges-Gaulis, *Angora*, pp. 242–247.

73. Hikmet, *Haricî Siyaseti*, p. 100; *Oriente Moderno*, I:3 (August 15, 1921), 183, and I:8 (January 15, 1922), 469.

74. Kemal, *Speech*, pp. 523–527; *Oriente Moderno*, I:3 (August 15, 1921), 152. During this period the French were suspected of encouraging the Turks to reject any Allied mediation offers: Toynbee, *Western Question*, pp. 100–101. The Turks rebuffed British attempts to frustrate the conclusion of the treaty by hinting through the Japanese High Commissioner that they were ready to recognize the National Pact: Hikmet, *Haricî Siyaseti*, p. 100.

75. The Turks never ceased to insist that Alexandretta [the Hatay] was a special case, thus laying the basis for its eventual reincorporation into Turkey in 1939.

76. Curzon protested such recognition and separate peace, which Paris denied was true: Turkey No. 1 (1922), Cmd. 1570.

77. Gontaut-Biron, *D'Angora à Lausanne*, p. 98.

78. Ziemke, *Die neue Türkei*, pp. 366–367; “W” in *Revue du monde musulman*, LII, 201–205; Harry N. Howard, *The Partition of Turkey: A Diplomatic History, 1913–1923* (Norman, Okla., 1931), p. 268.

79. Text in Degras, I, 263–269.

80. Text in Kliuchnikov and Sabanin, *Mezhdunarodnaya Politika*, III, Pt. 1, 164–165.

81. Fischer, *Soviets in World Affairs*, I, 393–394. In 1922, the Soviet embassy was the best-appointed in Ankara, with a staff of 70. See Grace Ellison, *An English-woman in Angora* (London, 1923), p. 151.

82. In the *Hakimiyeti Milliye*, May 9, 1920. See Jäschke, *Die Türkei*, p. 33.

83. *Oriente Moderno*, I:8 (January 15, 1922), 467–468; Kemal, *Speech*, pp. 377–378.

84. Text in *British Foreign and State Papers*, CXVIII (1923), 10–11. This treaty was partly modeled on the Russo-Afghan treaty of the day before. See Degras, I, 233–235.

85. Jean Schicklin, *Angora: l'aube de la Turquie nouvelle, 1919–1922* (Paris, 1922), p. 317.

86. *Oriente Moderno*, I:9 (February 15, 1922), 545–547, and I:10 (March 15, 1922), 604–605.

87. E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *The Sanusi of Cyrenaica* (Oxford, 1949), pp. 130–133; Jäschke, *Die Türkei*, pp. 42, 45; Georges-Gaulis, *Angora*, pp. 239–240; Sforza, *Eu-*

ropean Dictatorships, pp. 202–203; *Oriente Moderno*, I:1 (June 15, 1921), 24, 32 and I:11 (April 15, 1922), 653. As late as January 1923, Rauf Bey, then prime minister, attended a banquet given by the Afghan ambassador in Ankara in honor of Sayyid Ahmed, and expressed the thanks of Turkey for help in an hour of danger. *Ibid.*, II:10 (March 15, 1923), 583. Kemal and the Assembly approved the idea of a pan-Islamic congress in March 1921, at exactly the same time as Bekir Sami was in London and Yusuf Kemal in Moscow, and the *Hakimiyeti Milliye* publicly endorsed the idea. France, Ministère des affaires étrangères, *Bulletin périodique de la presse turque*, XIII (April 22, 1921), 3.

88. Kemal, *Speech*, p. 543.

89. *ibid.*, pp. 544–545; *Oriente Moderno*, I:11 (April 15, 1922), 650.

90. Text in *Oriente Moderno*, I:11 (April 15, 1922), 641–645, and II:5 (October 15, 1922), 266–271.

91. Text in *Oriente Moderno*, I:11 (April 15, 1922), 650–651, where it is also reported that the Russian ambassador in Ankara tried to influence Kemal to reject the offer.

92. Kemal, *Speech*, pp. 545–559; *Histoire*, pp. 104–108; *Oriente Moderno*, II:5 (October 15, 1922), 271–272.

93. Degras, I, 289; *Oriente Moderno*, I:9 (February 15, 1922), 525–526, I:12 (May 15, 1922), 706, 719–721, and II:1 (June 15, 1922), 12.

94. Edib, *Turkish Ordeal*, p. 247; Jäschke, *Die Türkei*, pp. 61–65. Presumably Fethi telegraphed Kemal from London that no peace would be forthcoming until a final attack on the Greeks.

95. Jäschke, *Die Türkei*, pp. 63–64; *Oriente Moderno*, II:4 (September 15, 1922), 211–212; Driault et Lhéritier, *Histoire diplomatique*, V, 408–14.

96. Ziemke, *Die neue Türkei*, pp. 367–368; *Oriente Moderno*, II:4 (September 15, 1922), 214–215. The Russians, seeing the end of the war coming, had tried in a series of notes from July to September to seize the initiative for themselves by proposing a peace conference and insisting that, by the Russo-Turkish treaty of 1921, only the Black Sea powers could deal with the Straits regime: Degras, I, 330–333, 334–336.

97. On Chanak and the pre-armistice exchange of notes see Col. D. I. Shuttleworth, "Turkey, From the Armistice to the Peace," *Journal of the Central Asian Society*, XI:1 (1924), 61–62; Harold Nicolson, *Curzon: The Last Phase* (Boston, 1934), p. 271; *Oriente Moderno*, II:5 (October 15, 1922), 278–281, and II:6 (November 15, 1922), 338–339; Kemal, *Speech*, pp. 568–570. Kemal is said to have caused a minor crisis by declaring intemperately to the British consul-general at Izmir that the two countries were at war: Edib, *Turkish Ordeal*, pp. 385–386.

98. Ismet later took his last name from the scene of one of his victories.

99. On the Mudanya negotiations: *Oriente Moderno*, II:6 (November 15, 1922), 337–345; Sir Charles Harington, *Tim Harington Looks Back* (London, 1941), pp. 117–128.

100. Kemal, *Speech*, p. 578.

101. *ibid.*, pp. 570–572. Rauf, president of the council of ministers, was perhaps a logical choice to head the delegation, as well as Yusuf Kemal. Rauf and Kemal were divided by various arguments over domestic politics. The former, however, served as acting Foreign Minister while Ismet was at Lausanne.

102. Gövsa, *Türk Meşhurlari*, pp. 188–190.

103. Georges-Gaulis, *La nouvelle Turquie*, p. 95.

104. Ellison, *Englishwoman in Angora*, pp. 305, 308.

105. The judgments of the American observers: Richard Washburn Child, *A Diplomat Looks at Europe* (New York, 1925), p. 86, and Joseph Clark Grew, *Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years* (New York, 1952), Chapter 18, November 21, 1922, entry. Mr. Grew kindly permitted use of his book in proof.

106. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1923*, II, 901–902; Grew, *Turbulent Era*, Chapter 18, November 22, 1922, entry; Child, *Diplomat*, p. 98: “I know directly from Ismet Pasha,” says Child, “that he is harassed from Angora enough as it is.”

107. Nicolson, *Curzon*, p. 346; *Foreign Relations, 1923*, II, 910; Grew, *Turbulent Era*, Chapter 19, February 4, 1923, entry.

108. *ibid.*, January 14, 1923, entry.

109. France, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, *Documents Diplomatiques. Conférence de Lausanne* (Paris, 1923), II, 127–129.

110. Great Britain, Turkey No. 1 (1923). *Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs, 1922–1923*. Cmd. 1814, p. 219. (Hereafter cited as Cmd. 1814.)

111. *ibid.*, p. 283.

112. *ibid.*, p. 496.

113. Grew, *Turbulent Era*, Chapter 19, January 15, 1923, entry.

114. Grew, *Turbulent Era*, Chapters 18 and 19, *passim*; Child, *Diplomat*, p. 95; Nicolson, *Curzon*, pp. 298, 319, 333–334.

115. Cmd. 1814, pp. 127–135.

116. Child, *Diplomat*, p. 96.

117. Hikmet, *Haricî Siyaseti*, p. 113; Georges-Gaulis, *Nouvelle Turquie*, p. 189.

118. Grew, *Turbulent Era*, Chapter 19, January 9, 1923, entry.

119. *Foreign Relations, 1923*, II, 901, 970, 987, 997, 1042–1043.

120. Fischer, *Soviets in World Affairs*, I, 409; *Oriente Moderno*, II:8 (January 15, 1923), 471–472.

121. *Foreign Relations, 1923*, II, 935.

122. Cmd. 1814, pp. 127–135, 156–173, 230–287, 447–457. See Nicolson, *Curzon*, chapters 10 and 11 for a good interpretation of Lausanne as Curzon’s triumph.

123. A convention concerning the last question was actually signed by Venizelos and Ismet on January 30, 1923. See Stephen P. Ladas, *The Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey* (New York, 1932), pp. 335–352, 787–794.

124. On some matters Ismet was led into extreme statements which could not stand

close examination. "The present state of Turkish law is such as to meet all the requirements and necessities of modern life," he said. (Cmd. 1814, p. 489.) A few years later the Turks themselves introduced a wholesale modernization of the law Ismet had thus praised.

125. Cmd. 1814, pp. 428-447.

126. *ibid.*, pp. 832-837. Nicolson says that in this period Dr. Riza Nur, second Turkish plenipotentiary, proposed to him a separate Anglo-Turkish peace. (Curzon, pp. 345-346.) Whether Riza Nur had any such authorization is obscure.

127. Cmd. 1814, pp. 837-841.

128. *ibid.*, pp. 842-853; Nicolson, Curzon, pp. 346-348.

129. Kemal, *Speech*, pp. 599-602; Jäschke, *Die Türkei*, pp. 71-72; Rawlinson, *Adventures*, p. 248; *Oriente Moderno*, II: 10 (March 15, 1923), 589-590, 594.

130. Texts in *Oriente Moderno*, II: 11 (April 15, 1923), 643-659.

131. Note exchange in *Oriente Moderno*, II: 11 (April 15, 1923), 659-662.

132. *Foreign Relations*, 1923, II, 971, 1047-1049.

133. *Oriente Moderno*, II: 11 (April 15, 1923), 671-672; Mears, *Modern Turkey*, pp. 382-383.

134. *Oriente Moderno*, II: 12 (May 15, 1923), 707-709.

135. *Foreign Relations*, 1922, II, 966-983 and 1923, II, 1198-1252; Grew, *Turbulent Era*, Chapter 20. I am indebted to Professor John De Novo of Pennsylvania State College for information on this question. The Chester concession was canceled by Ankara late in 1923 when the company remained inactive.

136. Grew, *Turbulent Era*, Chapter 20, Speech of September 2, 1923.

137. Exchange of telegrams between Ismet and Kemal and Rauf in Kemal, *Speech*, pp. 620-641.

138. Grew, *Turbulent Era*, Chapter 20, speech of September 2, 1923.

139. Texts in League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, XXVIII (1924), 11ff. and *Oriente Moderno*, III (1923), 461-550 (collated with the Turkish text).

140. Afet [Inan], "L'indépendance turque et le traité de Lausanne," *Belleten*, II: 7-8 (1938), 300.

141. Although Russia signed the Straits convention, Chicherin protested that it was a "violation of the rights and interests of the Turkish people." Degras, I, 406-408. He was still more Turkish than Ismet.

142. *Oriente Moderno*, III: 4 (September 15, 1923), 208-209; Jäschke, *Die Türkei*, pp. 75, 148.

143. Kemal, *Speech*, pp. 586-587.

144. *ibid.*, pp. 377-378. For an incisive discussion of the internal nationalist basis for this diplomacy see Lewis V. Thomas, "The National and International Relations of Turkey," in T. Cuyler Young, ed., *Near Eastern Culture and Society* (Princeton, 1951), pp. 167-187; also Thomas and Richard N. Frye, *The United States and Turkey and Iran* (Cambridge, Mass., 1951), pp. 38-71.

Added Note: Since 1953 there has been considerable research and writing on the diplomacy of the years 1919 to 1923, mostly from the viewpoint of the Allied powers and their peacemaking and quarrels. Some of this casts peripheral light on the rise of Kemalist Turkey and on its foreign relations, but I shall not list all those works here. One scholar has produced three books specifically on Kemalist foreign relations in this period—Salahi Ramsdan Sonyel. Two volumes in Turkish are the fullest, *Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı ve Dış Politikası* (Ankara, 1973–1986). A shorter version is *Turkish Diplomacy, 1918–1923: Mustafa Kemal and the Turkish National Movement* (London, 1975). Sonyel has used a wide range of sources, including some Turkish archival documents, but his main research has been in the Foreign Office records in London. His works add a great deal of detail but do not change the main lines of the essay published here. Quite a few memoirs of participants in affairs of the period, especially Turks, have been published since 1953. Sonyel's bibliographies are a good guide to these, as also is the bibliography in Erik Jan Zürcher, *The Unionist Factor: The Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement, 1905–1926* (Leiden, 1984). Two new biographies of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk also give attention to this period: Lord Kinross [John Patrick Douglas Balfour], *Atatürk, the Rebirth of a Nation* (London, 1964), and Vamik D. Volkan and Norman Itzkowitz, *The Immortal Atatürk: A Psychobiography* (Chicago, 1984). Also most informative on this period is Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic," *World Politics* 11, no. 4 (July 1959): 513–552. George S. Harris, *The Origins of Communism in Turkey* (Stanford, Cal., 1967), sheds light on some of Kemal's early contacts with Russia.

12. Atatürk's Reforms: Back to the Roots

In his six-day speech of 1927 Gazi Mustafa Kemal Paşa, reviewing the situation of Turkey as he had found it in 1919, declared: "The Ottoman State, its independence, padishah, caliph, government, all these were without meaning and consisted of senseless words. . . . Gentlemen, in the face of this situation there existed only one possible decision. That was to establish a new Turkish State, unconditionally independent, based on national sovereignty."¹ This Kemal and the nationalist movement proceeded to do. By the time of his speech in 1927, the new state was well launched in life.

Yet the new state could not be created out of thin air. What human resources, what cultural resources, what economic resources it possessed all were inherited from the preceding Ottoman Empire. This was also in large measure true of political resources: governmental institutions, administrative practices, political concepts.

What Mustafa Kemal did was to decapitate the Ottoman Empire. The head of state was lopped off the Turkish body politic. Two strokes disposed of the Ottoman sultan, scion of a 600-year-old dynasty, and of the caliphal title which the later sultans had assumed. But much of the body remained. This immediately becomes apparent in the same six-day speech of Kemal. He pours vituperation on the Empire and especially on the last Ottoman ruler, Mehmed VI Vahideddin. He calls the sultanate "a gang of madmen with no ties of conscience or of thought to the fatherland and nation."² But he refers without any condemnation or stricture to constitution, cabinet, parliament, elections, deputies, vilayet, vali, mutasarrıf. These facts of life, these heritages of political concept and institution from the Ottoman Empire, he accepted.³

It is, I think, no derogation from Kemal's achievement to acknowledge that he built on what he found, both concept and institution.

The Republic owes much to the Empire; the Empire also owes much to the Republic, for some concepts and institutions that the Empire developed but could not make workable, the Republic took over and made workable. The immediate heritage from the Empire came obviously through the Second Constitutional Period, from 1908 on. Some things came also from the period of Abdülhamid II. But many had their origin in the half-century of reform between

1826 and 1878, between the Auspicious Event that destroyed the Janissaries and the ending of the first parliament under the Empire's first written constitution. The Tanzimat period, taken broadly, is a seed-time in which ideas and institutions which later came to fruition under the Republic first took root. It is impossible to discuss them in depth or to include them all, but some important beginnings and their connections to the Republic can be indicated under the following twelve heads. The first three are concerned with the nature of the state as a whole. The next three are concerned with the position of the individual within the state. The next five—points 7 to 11—focus on the question of who is to control the government. Point 12, finally, discusses the scope of governmental activity.

1. The concept of the state as the fatherland of its people.

In official terminology the Ottoman Empire was just that—the state of the Ottoman rulers, *Devlet-i Osmaniye* as the 1876 Constitution put it. But in the Tanzimat period the concept of fatherland, of *vatan*, was born. The term *vatan* was used twice in the *Hatt-i şerif* of *Gülhane* in 1839. It was a concept additional to and distinct from *devlet*, as shown by a phrase in the official newspaper the next year: “Din ve devlet ve vatan ve millet.”⁴ Here the old Ottoman formula of “religion and state” is juxtaposed to what would become, in time, the nationalist formula so often used under the Republic of “fatherland and nation.”

More than mere terminology is involved. Here is the beginning of a new concept that took on additional content, as much emotional as political, with the passing years. Much of the emotional content was supplied by the New Ottoman writers Namık Kemal, Ziya Paşa, and others. Namık Kemal's stirring play, *Vatan*, ended with a chorus in which the whole cast roared “Arş yiğitler, vatan imdadına”—“March, heroes, to the aid of the fatherland.”⁵ That was in 1873. By 1876 the newspaper *Sabah* averred that all patriots would weep for joy because Sultan Murad V in his accession *hat* placed *vatan* first when he spoke of preserving “fatherland, state, and nation.”⁶ When the parliament met under the constitution of 1876 each deputy took an oath of allegiance both to sultan and to fatherland.⁷

For a small but significant number of Turks the feeling grew that the fatherland was theirs, not simply the sultan's—“Our property” as Namık Kemal said.⁸ The conceptual transition was not fully complete until 1923 or after, but the idea, germinated during the Tanzimat, that the country was the people's fatherland and belonged to them, not to a ruler or dynasty, became the basis for later assertions by Mustafa Kemal and others of the right of national sovereignty.

2. The concept that sovereignty should be complete and unfringed.

This idea—that outside influences or controls were inadmissible—also was born during the Tanzimat period. The Empire had come under the tutelage of

the great powers of Europe in 1839–1841 when they rescued the sultan from Mehmed Ali's attack. In some ways that tutelage continued until the Empire's demise. Great powers often intervened in Ottoman affairs for their own advantage. But from 1856 on, when the Empire emerged from the Crimean War as a member of the victorious coalition, the Ottoman statesmen mounted a campaign to get rid of foreign encroachments on the sovereignty of their state. Though they were unable to achieve the desired goal, it is their reiteration of principle that is significant. Article 9 of the Treaty of Paris of 1856 was one of their weapons; they constantly referred to its prohibition of foreign intervention in Ottoman domestic affairs.⁹

After 1856 the same statesmen also mounted what attack they could against the capitulations which gave foreigners so many exemptions from Ottoman laws and taxes, and privileges in the courts. They were now logically able to do this since the Paris treaty formally admitted the Empire to "the public law of Europe," making it in theory the equal of other great powers in the Concert. Âli Paşa, representing the Empire at the Paris peace conference, had argued that the capitulations were "an insuperable obstacle to all improvements."¹⁰ Some of the laws he was later able to promulgate curbed foreign abuses in extending protection to Ottoman subjects, and made foreign property ownership subject to compliance with Ottoman law.¹¹ These actions amounted only to a tangential attack on the foreign infringements of Ottoman sovereignty. They did, however, initiate an effort, renewed whenever possible, and most vigorously during World War I, to curb foreign capitulatory privileges. The process came to its culmination in the national struggle and the peace negotiations at Lausanne. İsmet Paşa's stand there against allowing any capitulatory privileges to continue was successful; these international servitudes that had, as Kemal said, rendered the Ottoman Empire "helpless," were forever removed.¹² What the Empire tried in vain to accomplish the Republic did.

3. The concept of the state as an indivisible territorial unit.

The concept also grew in the Tanzimat period that this sovereign fatherland was a territorial whole, an indivisible unit to be preserved. During the nineteenth century the Porte was often obliged by great power pressures, by internal rebellion, by its own weakness, or a combination of all these, to cede territory or to grant autonomy to this province or that. The rising patriotic feeling in the 1860's and 1870's increasingly resented this nibbling away of Ottoman territory. The New Ottomans often put this sentiment into words, vehemently criticizing any weakness of the Porte in the face of European demands or minority rebellions. The feeling was crystallized into a formula in the very first article of the 1876 constitution. In its original Turkish that article is more adamant than in any of the translations: the state "*hiç bir zamanda hiç bir sebeple tefrik kabul etmez*"—"Can be divided at no time and for no cause

whatever.”¹³ It was a territorial whole, an indivisible unit. The same concept carries over into the National Pact voted by the deputies on January 28, 1920: the territory remaining within the armistice lines is a whole “which can be divided in fact or in law for no cause whatever”—“hakikaten veya hükmen hiçbir sebeple tefrik kabul etmez.”¹⁴ These phrases also have a counterpart in Article 3 of the 1961 Constitution.

The Ottoman Imperial Pact, if one may so call article one of the 1876 constitution, stated an unrealizable aim; by the treaties of San Stefano and Berlin in 1878, and by later ones too, this indivisible whole was in fact partitioned. The Turkish National Pact of 1920 stated an aim that was almost completely achieved, and become a foundation stone for the Republic. The territories involved and the success achieved differed in the two cases, but the spirit and objective of the two pacts were similar.

4. The concept of people as individual citizens of a state, not as members of a religious community from which they derive their civil status.

Within this sovereign and indivisible fatherland all the Ottoman subjects would ideally be Osmanlis, treated by the state as individuals who derived their status, their rights and duties, solely from the fact of their citizenship. The ideal of course was not achieved, either in the Tanzimat period or later, and the whole question of civil status was fraught with ambivalence. The tendency of the Tanzimat period, when the concept of Osmanlılık was formally born, was to break down the traditional millet barriers.¹⁵ The tendency was slowly translated into fact in matters of law, government service, and education. Yet at the same time, the millets—Greek Orthodox, Gregorian Armenian, Jewish—were reorganized with formal written constitutions, thus emphasizing again the traditional roots of civil status in religious community.¹⁶ The ambivalence and the millets remained to the end of the Empire.

Yet for historical continuity the frequent and formal statement of the ideal is important. It occurs not only in official documents but also in the writing of individuals. Namık Kemal said that the aim of his group, which became the Yeni Osmanlılar, was equal citizenship for Muslims and non-Muslims.¹⁷ Sometimes the ideal was expressed in terms not only of equality but of “the fusion of races” within the Empire—an expression used by two grand vezirs, Fuad Paşa and Midhat Paşa.¹⁸ The general label for the whole concept—*Osmanlılık*, Ottomanism—meant equal citizenship regardless of religious affiliation. Article 8 of the 1876 constitution stipulated that all subjects of the state be called Osmanlis, without exception. This was the essential creed of the Tanzimat.

When the constitution of the Republic was being debated in 1924, some of the old ambivalence was still present. A draft article which said “The People of Turkey, regardless of religion and race, are Turks,” aroused criticism. There were Greeks, Armenians, and Jews in the Turkish Republic. “By pass-

ing an article which states that they are Turks are we going to be able to remove the differences? and which one of us will be satisfied that they are really Turks?" asked Hamdullah Suphi, a deputy from Istanbul. But the "Osmanlılık" ideal and the example of the 1876 constitution were felt in the debate also. Celal Nuri, a deputy from Gelibolu and rapporteur of the constitutional commission, replied "We formerly used the adjective 'Ottoman,' and this adjective applied to all. Now we are deleting it. There is a Turkish Republic in place of [the Empire]. All the people in Turkey are not Turkish and Moslem. What shall we call these? If we do not apply to them the adjective 'Turk' how else can we call them?"¹⁹

The solution was essentially in the spirit of the 1876 constitution. Article 88 of the 1924 constitution as finally adopted stated that "The people of Turkey, regardless of religion and race, are Turks as regards citizenship." Article 54 of the 1961 constitution says that "Every individual bound to Turkey by a bond of citizenship is a Turk." There was no differentiation by religion, no test of citizenship by millet status. With the adoption of the new civil code in 1926 the last vestiges of separate millet organization and law were eliminated.²⁰ Of course even to the present day it is difficult for most Turks to think of a non-Muslim as a Turk. Religious distinctions are not dead. They simply do not apply in law to the concept of citizenship, wherein "Turk" now replaces the "Osmanlı" of the Tanzimat period.

5. *The concept of the equality of all citizens before the law.*

Though closely related to the concept of equal citizenship unaffected by religious distinctions, the notion of equality before the law is a separate product of the Tanzimat period. In official documents from 1839 on the old differentiation between *askeri* and *re'aya* plays no part, nor do any other considerations of official position or of social rank. The statements of ideal again do not necessarily represent the actual situation—if the ideal were already fact, why would it be necessary to repeat the ideal so often? The Gülhane hat promised a penal code which should apply to great and small alike. Official documents thereafter referred, as for instance did a memorandum by Reşid Paşa of 1849, to every one being "alike and equal" in the eyes of the law and the court.²¹ Article 17 of the 1876 constitution guaranteed that "All Ottomans are equal before the law." The statement was categorical. In the constitution of 1924, article 69, this becomes "All Turks are equal before the law." The ultimate elaboration of this Tanzimat principle comes in Article 12 of the 1961 constitution: "All individuals are equal before the law irrespective of language, race, sex, political opinion, philosophical view, or religion or religious sect. No privileges shall be granted to any individual, family, group, or class." The men of the Tanzimat might have raised their eyebrows at the inclusion of "sex", but that was, in the twentieth century, a logical extension of the other specifications for equality with which they were already familiar.

6. *The concept of guaranteed individual rights and civil liberties.*

This is again a concept closely related to but distinct from the concepts of equal status of all individuals regardless of religion, and equal legal status of all individuals regardless of religious or of any other considerations. Again, it is a concept born in the Tanzimat period—that individual liberties should be solemnly enumerated and guaranteed by the state for all persons without distinction. Of course in the traditional class arrangement of Ottoman society the rights of each member of each class had presumably been observed, so long as he stayed in his place and fulfilled his duties.²² Dispensing justice and keeping social order were traditional functions of the state. The new element in the Tanzimat period was that individual rights were guaranteed in the most solemn written form. Further, the number of rights grew greatly.

The basic individual rights specified in the Hatt-i Şerif of Gülhane in 1839 were traditional: security of life, property, and honor. Some related guaranties, more specific, were also directly or indirectly promised in that edict: taxation only according to an individual's means, the right to public trial, prohibition of torture, and guaranty against state confiscation of private property. It has been contended that Reşid Paşa sought such guaranties not for all Ottoman subjects, but primarily for bureaucrats such as himself.²³ The self-interest of the bureaucrats was, however, less important in the long run than the categorical nature of the guaranties. They were valid for all Ottoman subjects. The historical sequel was the extension and broadening of such guaranties for all on future occasions.

In the 1876 constitution many of the same guaranties reappear—for instance, security of person and property, prohibition of confiscation and of torture, taxation according to means.²⁴ Inviolability of domicile is now specifically added.²⁵ In addition, the advent of western-style institutions, new since the time of Gülhane, is recognized by the adoption of corresponding guaranties of rights: freedom of the press (within limits), right to form commercial companies (again within limits), free state education.²⁶ Furthermore, a basis in principle for individual liberties is introduced: "Every Ottoman enjoys personal liberty on condition of not interfering with the liberty of others." It is not the prerogatives of the monarch that limit the rights of the Ottoman subject—at least not in theory here—but the rights of his fellow-subjects that mark the limit.

All these rights and liberties of 1876 would naturally be familiar to the citizen of the Turkish Republic, for they reappear in the constitution of 1924. The basic rights of the Gülhane edict, as amplified in 1876, appear together in 1924 in Article 71: "The life, property, honor, and residence of each individual are inviolable." It is unnecessary to catalogue the other enumerated rights, although it might be pointed out that new institutions are reflected, this time in the guaranty of secrecy of telephonic and telegraphic communication.²⁷ The

philosophical basis of individual liberties is slightly expanded beyond that of 1876: "The limits of an individual's liberty which is his natural right, extend only to the point where they infringe on the liberties enjoyed by his fellow-citizens."²⁸ With the 1961 constitution the elaboration of individual rights is overwhelmingly detailed, and the philosophical basis for them put in the most elemental terms: "Every individual is entitled, by virtue of his existence as a human being, to fundamental rights and freedoms. . . ."²⁹ Such was the flowering of the seed sown by the Tanzimat a little over a century before.

7. The concept of the right of the people to a representative voice in government.

During the Tanzimat period the practice of including representatives of the people, sometimes appointed and sometimes elected, in the membership of various organs of government became widespread. By 1876 it can fairly be said to have developed into a principle of the right of representation.

The practice began in 1840, when Reşid Paşa inaugurated local councils in provincial and district capitals to represent both Muslim and non-Muslim inhabitants, alongside the Porte-appointed governors. In the vilayet laws of 1864 and 1871 the local councils were extended and regularized, while a representative general assembly was created for each province. The representative principle was also launched on a limited basis in some central state organs, such as the Council of State (Şura-yi devlet), and in provisions for provincial delegates to come to Istanbul to present views and grievances—once in an extraordinary assembly in 1845, and after 1868 as delegates to the Council of State. The representative and electoral system was even introduced for the hierarchy of civil and criminal courts in vilayet, sancak, and kaza. In no case was the representation statistically perfect; in almost no case were the elections uninfluenced by local notables or government officials; furthermore, most elections were indirect. The imperfections were important, but even more important is the fact that during the Tanzimat period the representative and the electoral principles become ingrained in Ottoman governmental procedure.³⁰ The makers of the constitution of 1876 and, later, of the institutions of the Republic could draw on the experience.

8. The concept of a written constitution of western model.

The concept of a written constitution providing for some sort of a national representative assembly was so familiar to Mustafa Kemal and the early nationalists, and so thoroughly accepted by them, that there was never any possibility of their not having one. The nature and provisions of a constitution were a matter for debate, but not the desirability of such an instrument. The men of the Millî Mücadele were the heirs of the men of the Tanzimat through the constitution of 1876, the revisions of 1909, and the first (and provisional) constitution of the Grand National Assembly of 1921. Mustafa Kemal, in-

forming Tevfik Paşa of the fundamentals of the 1921 constitution, included as the final point the statement that "The provisions of the Constitution [meaning that of 1876 as revised] which do not conflict with these fundamental articles remain in force as before."³¹ The ensuing constitutions of 1924 and 1961 are natural successors in the trend that began in 1876. Constitution as a concept is the child of the Tanzimat.

Some scholars would trace the development of constitutionalism still farther back in time. The 1961 constitutional commission prefaced its report with a statement that their draft was the "result of nearly two hundred years of our democratic political development in accordance with the principles of Contemporary Western Democracy."³² But I can identify no eighteenth-century development of a modern constitutional sort. Nor does the *Sened-i ittifak* of 1808 qualify as such. It was certainly a contract which limited the authority of the sultan, but only for the benefit of provincial ayans; there was nothing modern about the document.³³ One can reasonably maintain that the *Gülhane* rescript contained a number of principles which are basic to modern constitutions, including those of Turkey. But, despite the fact that it has sometimes been referred to as a constitution, it was not.³⁴

The concept really began to develop in the 1860's. In that decade the New Ottomans, first at home and then abroad, started to think about a constitution. Midhat Paşa also had such thoughts. Midhat's son says that his father's desire for a constitution "had been delineated on the page of his thinking since his Tuna province governorship. . . ."—that is, in 1864–67.³⁵ The process continued in 1872–73 as the concept of a constitution was publicly discussed by Namık Kemal, and was for the first time seriously considered by officials at the highest level of government.³⁶ The struggle with the concept of constitution was in part reflected in the search to find a proper term for it. Constitution was variously called *şartname-i esasî*, *konstitusiyon*, *konstitusiyon kanunu*, *kanun-u meşveret*, *kanun-i esasî*, *nizam serbestane*, *meşrutiyet*. In the crisis year of 1876, after Sultan Abdülaziz was deposed, the Istanbul press was full of discussions of what constitution meant.³⁷ Pamphlets on the question appeared. In the fall of the year, says Ahmed Midhat, not only the press but the common people were discussing constitution.³⁸ After intensive work during the fall by a constitutional commission, the constitution was promulgated on December 23, 1876.

By 1876 the concept of "constitution," to Turks who understood the term, included the idea of a parliament, a representative body, as a check on the arbitrary action of the sultan. On exactly how representative a body it should be there was not complete unanimity. Some leading statesmen still thought that the method of consultation, *usul-u meşveret*, of which conservatives as well as liberals approved, could be carried out by provision for a sort of traditional *meclis-i umumî* of notables and high officials. The 1876 constitution nevertheless created a western-style chamber of deputies designed to represent

all male Ottoman subjects, one deputy for every 50,000. It also stipulated that each deputy represented all Ottomans, and not only his own district.³⁹ The chambers of 1877–1878, elected under provisional rules, were reasonably representative.⁴⁰ At this point, after the promulgation and the experience of two sessions of the parliament, the concept of a written constitution was well rooted among the elite—and even those among the elite who opposed it knew what it was.

Whether the common people to whom Ahmed Midhat refers understood the concept, however, is doubtful. They may have understood vaguely that it meant a check on arbitrary rule by the sultan, but that is probably all. In that famous scene of 1908 reported by Halide Edib, a crowd of Kurdish hamals shouted at the popular speaker Rıza Tevfik, “Tell us what constitution means,” and he replied “Constitution is such a great thing that those who do not know it are donkeys.” “We are donkeys,” roared the crowd.⁴¹ Of course by that time the parliament had been suspended for thirty years and the constitution had remained confined within the covers of the imperial *salname*. But the concept was perfectly familiar to many of the elite. The Young Turks demanded restoration of the constitution in 1908, and thereafter the concept again became reality.

In 1921, as noted above, the 1876 constitution as amended was considered by the nationalists still to be valid where it did not conflict with their own fundamental constitutional provisions. But by 1924, when the sultanate no longer existed, the 1876 constitution had less repute. It was not a true constitution, said Celal Nuri, because essentially it stipulated the sultan's rights; and those rights it gave to the people could be taken away. Nevertheless, many provisions of the 1876 constitution were retained in 1924. Further, and more important, the concept of constitution was not questioned—there was no move to eliminate any written constitution, no desire to do without a national assembly. The 1961 constitutional commission recognized the constitution of that year as the fourth in a line of Turkish written constitutions descended from the great-grandfather of 1876 in the *Tanzimat* period.⁴³

One individual was himself a symbolic link between the constitution of 1876 and the Republic. When the first written constitution was promulgated on December 23, 1876, by *Hatt-ı hümayun* of Sultan Abdülhamid II, Abdurrahman Şeref was one of the rainsoaked crowd who heard the hat read. Then the grand vezir Midhat Paşa praised God and thanked the sultan. “The vibration of his voice still rings in my ears,” wrote Abdurrahman Şeref many years later, after he had become the last official historiographer.⁴⁴ When, in 1923, the Grand National Assembly was debating amendment to the constitution of 1921 the same Abdurrahman Şeref, now at age 70 a deputy from Istanbul, firmly backed the contention that the Turkish state had become a republic. “Sovereignty is unconditionally in the nation; when you've said that, ask whom you will, it's a republic. That's the name of the newborn child.”⁴⁵

It is worth noting also that the actual electoral system which the Republic later used was created in the Tanzimat period. The Chamber in 1877 passed a bill setting up a procedure of indirect election of deputies, by locally elected electors. An amendment to require direct election was defeated after ministerial warnings against it. In 1908 elections were held for the resurrected parliament under these procedures of 1877. The same provisions, somewhat amended, governed eight more elections, through 1939, the last five of them under the Grand National Assembly and the Republic.⁴⁶ The Republic inherited not only the concept of a representative chamber but the machinery by which it was elected.

9. *The concept of the right of the people to control the government.*

Having a representative voice in government does not necessarily mean exercising control over the government. Representatives can be advisory only. Obviously the people as such controlled no government organ during the Tanzimat period, except for the one at the bottom of the political scale—the *ihitiyar meclisi* in the village. The deputies in the chamber could not, under the constitution of 1876, make their will prevail if the sultan, who was non-responsible, and the senate and ministry he appointed, opposed them. The popular voice might at times be influential, but it did not control. Did the Tanzimat then furnish any basis beyond the principle of popular representation in government for genuine government by the people? specifically for republicanism? more generally for popular sovereignty?

Republicanism was of course known to some Turks since the first French experiment with it in 1792—often unfavorably known.⁴⁷ The Second Republic of 1848–1852 was likewise known. The Third Republic that arose after the Prussian defeat of France in 1870 was still better known, and Küçük Said Bey, when he was chief palace secretary in 1876, is said to have used the French constitution as a base for an elaborate Ottoman draft constitution he drew up.⁴⁸ But none of this knowledge of French experience seems to have made republicanism at all attractive to Tanzimat period reformers, despite their penchant for French models in law, in education, and in local government.

There was in the Tanzimat period some discussion of republicanism as a theoretical concept. Both Namık Kemal and Ziya wrote approvingly of it. The former defended the right to proclaim a republic, and asked, “Was not Islam a sort of republic when it first arose?”⁴⁹ Midhat Paşa also on occasion talked about the concept of republic, and once had some correspondence with the fiery French republican Léon Gambetta on the subject.⁵⁰ Yet none of these men advocated republicanism for the Ottoman Empire. It could not possibly have worked, and they knew it. Conservative prejudice against it was so deeprooted that “republicanism” became a charge used by conservatives to denigrate liberal statesmen or proposals. Thus Reşid Paşa was accused by his enemies of harboring republican sentiments.⁵¹ Midhat Paşa was later accused of the same

crime.⁵² How damaging and how divisive the concept of republicanism was, even a half century later, is revealed by Mustafa Kemal's reluctance during the National Struggle to use the word. In 1921 he said that Turkey was democratic, but could not become a republic.⁵³ Evidently he first used the word approvingly only on September 11, 1923, some seven weeks before the Republic was actually proclaimed.⁵⁴

If the Tanzimat produced no basis for the later development of republicanism, it did provide something that republicanism could build on. This was the concept of popular sovereignty. Namık Kemal in particular reiterated the virtues of *hakimiyet-i ahali*, popular sovereignty. Government belongs to the people, he said; the government should be under the supervision of all.⁵⁵ Midhat Paşa evidently tried to make the concept reality. When he was grand vezir in 1877 he spoke of "a constitutional administration . . . under popular control."⁵⁶ His actions were such as to try to subordinate the sultan to the ministers, and presumably to the chamber of deputies, soon to convene. Ziya Paşa at the same time said publicly that the sultan was the servant of all the people, and that it would be the mark of a slave people if the will of one could prevail against the will of all.⁵⁷ Sultan Abdülhamid did not agree that Midhat was responsible to his own conscience and to the nation, as he said, and dismissed him. Out of office, Midhat reiterated his belief in "national sovereignty," which he claimed was inherent in Islamic doctrine.⁵⁸ But of course Abdülhamid remained unpersuaded.

What remained after Midhat's dismissal in 1877 was only the slogan, popular sovereignty. Following the deposition of Abdülhamid in 1909 it came closer to reality. Mehmed V, his successor, declared he would follow the "will of the nation." And amendments of 1909 to the 1876 constitution considerably curbed the prerogatives of the monarch. In 1914 new regulations further restricted the political role of the sultan and members of his family.⁵⁹ The Committee of Union and Progress looked upon itself as "the agent of the general will" and helped to make the chamber of deputies, for a time after 1909, quite powerful.⁶⁰ But in the shifting struggle for control among Palace, Porte, and Parliament, the People seemed at times almost forgotten. In fact, during World War I, the Palace regained some of its former authority.⁶¹

So the slogan of popular sovereignty remained and was sporadically applied in part. Yet until the end of the Empire one has the impression that the slogan was commonly used to justify the restraint of the ruler by the people's representatives, not to justify the people's rule of themselves.—in other words, to see to it that government of the people was for the people but not necessarily by the people. It is the last element, government by the people, that suffuses the term popular sovereignty or national sovereignty as used by Mustafa Kemal from 1920 on. Yet the people still had to be taught its full meaning. Kemal, ordering elections for a new assembly to meet in Ankara in 1920, after the British occupation of Istanbul had led to the dissolution of the last Ottoman

chamber, felt that he could not use the term he wanted—*meclis-i müessisan*, constituent assembly—because it would not be understood.⁶² The people still had to learn that they could create their own government. The full meaning of popular sovereignty, the term born during the Tanzimat, still had to be inculcated. But beginning with the constitution of 1921 the doctrine of popular sovereignty was written into official documents: “Hakimiyet bilakaydüşart milletindir”—sovereignty belongs unconditionally to the nation.⁶³

10. The concept of responsible government.

Obviously the concept of responsible government is a simple extension of the concept of the control of government by a representative body. The sultan, during the Tanzimat period, was never deemed to be responsible to anyone but God and God's law. The complaints of modern political commentators that there was no machinery to enforce the sultan's compliance with his promises in the Hatt-i Şerif of Gülhane, and that there was no way to control the sultan under the constitution of 1876, are well grounded. In 1876 the constitution specifically labeled the sultan non-responsible, “gayrimesul.”⁶⁴ The New Ottomans on occasion seemed to indicate that the sultan should be responsible to the law, or to the people, but did not press the point; nor did Midhat Paşa, although his tendencies were in that direction.⁶⁵

But the concept of a responsible ministry—responsible, that is, to an elected parliament and so ultimately to the people—was born during the Tanzimat period. The New Ottomans believed in it, to varying degrees.⁶⁶ Midhat Paşa pushed the concept vigorously. When Sultan Abdülaziz was deposed in the coup of May 29–30, 1876, Midhat prepared a draft of an accession proclamation for the new sultan, Murad V, which promised “constitutional government and ministerial responsibility.”⁶⁷ But the grand vezir, Mehmed Rüşdi Paşa, was more conservative and eliminated the promise. In the fall of that same year Midhat's own draft of a constitution abolished the office of grand vezir with absolute power and put in its place a council of ministers under a prime minister, implying the collective responsibility of the council.⁶⁸ He was trying to put into the constitution what Abdülhamid had cut out of the accession proclamation prepared for him by Midhat—a prime ministry instead of a grand vezirate.⁶⁹ But the constitution as promulgated, although it allowed the chamber of deputies to interpellate ministers, established no collective ministerial responsibility to the chamber. They were still individually responsible to the sultan. So the Tanzimat period bequeathed to the future in this matter, as in many others, a concept rather than a practice. It became reality in 1909, and survived under the Republic.

11. The concept of the separation of powers.

It is possible to argue that the separation of powers is inherent in Islam. God alone is the legislator; the earthly ruler is simply the executive of the divine

law. But in the Ottoman system the sultan was actually a legislator, through his *örfî* power, as well as executive. The concept of the separation of powers, in any modern sense, developed only in the nineteenth century and was based on western political thought and example. This is true despite efforts of some—Namık Kemal and Ali Suavi for instance—to discover the doctrine in earlier Ottoman or Islamic practice.⁷⁰ Namık Kemal used the European term, *kuvvetlerin taksimi*. By 1920 Mustafa Kemal, when referring to the Ottoman government, could speak in a western sense quite naturally of “*kuvvel teşriye ve adliye ve icraiye*”—“legislative, judicial and executive powers.”⁷¹

So far as judicial power is concerned, the concept of its separate nature made sufficient headway during the Tanzimat period so that it was actively though not perfectly applied. The vilayet law of 1864, by creating a system of civil and criminal courts in the provinces and their subdivisions, separated judicial from administrative functions more clearly than had ever before been the case. At the level of central government this separation was accomplished in 1868 when the old Meclis-i vala-yi ahkâm-i adliye (Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances) was recast into two separate bodies, a Council of State for administrative and legislative matters and a Judicial Council. The latter would deal with cases under westernized law codes, it would be subject to no executive interference, and its members were irremovable except for cause and after trial.⁷² In 1869 Cevdet Paşa as minister of justice restructured the system of *nizamiye* courts, a process which culminated only in a new restructuring in 1879 that rendered the judicial function completely separate from the executive.⁷³ This carried out the provisions of the 1876 constitution for an independent judiciary.⁷⁴ Both principle and practice of a separate judiciary were inherited by the Republic and are embodied in the provisions of the Republic's constitutions.

The separation of executive and legislative powers is, in practice, a more difficult matter. Namık Kemal was clear that the two powers had to be in different hands. Those who administer the law must not be those who make it, he said; otherwise there is no escape from absolutism.⁷⁵ He was objecting to the state of things during the Tanzimat period. And the Tanzimat institutions never attained this ideal, though the separation doctrine was officially acknowledged. Sultan Abdülaziz, for instance, in his speech inaugurating the Council of State and the Judicial Council in 1868, spoke of the separation of executive authority from judicial, legislative, and religious authority.⁷⁶

If no absolute separation of powers was achieved, considerable progress was nevertheless made toward separation of legislative functions from executive functions. The true start of the process is the creation in 1838 by Sultan Mahmud II of the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances, to discuss and draft new regulations. By the Gülhane edict in 1839 it was given broader functions and the new sultan, Abdülmecid, promised to sanction all measures to

carry out the edict's principles which a majority of the Supreme Council approved. Its discussions were to be guided by new rules which were, in effect, embryonic parliamentary procedure.⁷⁷ Because the Council membership was appointed by the sultan, and because the Council had no authority beyond what he delegated to it, its independence is questionable. But here was established a separate legislative function that continued through the various permutations of the Supreme Council and the Tanzimat Council to the Council of State, and finally to the chamber of deputies of the 1876 constitution.⁷⁸ That chamber, even though elected rather than appointed, was also dependent on the sultan and on the ministers he appointed. Through the Tanzimat period, then, power actually remained with the executive although the executive and legislative functions were divided.

This somewhat confused situation may actually be the true inheritance of the Republic. The distinction between the power of the executive and the power of the legislative organs of government has been murky in Turkey, as well as in some other countries. For a time after 1909 the Ottoman chamber of deputies appeared too strong to allow an effective executive. But most of the Ottoman experience, after 1876 as well as before, seemed to teach the lesson that the executive power needed to be controlled, in order to avoid absolutism or autocracy, and that the legislature should exercise the control. Abdülhamid II had prorogued parliament, and had ruled without it for thirty years. Then a Committee of Union and Progress clique had dominated the administration and the legislature. Executive power seemed to have grown during World War I and after.

The lesson, then, was not separation but "concentration of powers" or "unity of powers"—legislative and executive combined so that the former, representing the people, could control the latter. This is the theme of much of the debate on the 1924 constitution: the Grand National Assembly must control the executive power.⁷⁹ But who would control the controllers? who would check the legislature if its majority disregarded minority rights and supported arbitrary rule by the executive? After the events of the 1950's rendered these questions acute, the 1961 constitution sought particular protection of individual rights and a check on arbitrary rule. From the Tanzimat period and into the Republic the doctrine of separation of powers had survived only to be confronted by "unity of powers" and some ensuing confusion, eventuating in a new constitution in 1961 with more checks and balances and greater attention to the separation of powers than in any constitution hitherto.⁸⁰

12. The concept of an expanded sphere of governmental activity and responsibility.

The traditional Islamic concept of government followed by the Ottoman sultans prescribed essentially the maintenance of armed forces, the collection of revenue, the dispensing of justice, and the preservation of order. Thus

would prosperity be fostered. This restricted concept of government persisted despite the fact that sultans actually became involved in other areas of activity—for example the promotion of trade and commerce through negotiation, treaty, issuance of regulations, and the building of markets and hans. In the Tanzimat era, however, the range of government activity began to increase sharply. The expansionist trend continued into the period of the Republic. Thus by 1961, the constitution specifies many areas of government activity that would, for example, have astounded Selim III—most notably social security, medical care, compulsory education, comprehensive promotion of agricultural production, and general encouragement of economic, social and cultural development.⁸¹ The end result under the Republic is at least partial acceptance of the welfare state.

It is difficult to find any formulation of official doctrine on the state's duty with regard to social welfare and economic development during the Tanzimat period in any other than the most general terms. The Hatt-ı Şerif of Gülhane sounds traditional with its phrases about the public good, the fertility of the soil, and the intelligence of Ottoman subjects; the means to prosperity are the traditional ones of justice, fair taxation, fair military service. Again in the Hatt-ı Hümayun of 1856 there appear similar phrases about the happiness of the people and the prosperity of the land, but this time there is special mention of public works, of developing land and sea communications, and of banks, and of profiting from the "knowledge, skills and capital of Europe."⁸² In various official documents and irades there was frequent mention of the need to develop agriculture, industry, and commerce, but little concerning comprehensive state activity to accomplish it.⁸³ The constitution of 1876 contained no general statement on welfare or on development.

It is not through general statement but through actual practice that the Tanzimat furnished the concept of the expanded area of state activity. The trend is illustrated by the proliferation of ministries in the nineteenth century beyond the minimal core—finance, interior, justice, foreign affairs, and war—to public works, education, commerce, posts and telegraph. It is illustrated by the increasing number of state regulations and institutions concerning sanitation and quarantine. It is illustrated by Mahmud II's establishment of the first Turkish newspaper, by Abdülmecid's interest in introducing and expanding telegraphic communications, by Abdülaziz's passion for railroad construction.

Perhaps the best example of the expanding realm of government activity is its undertaking the obligation to create an entire state-supported system of secular education. In the eighteenth century a few special schools of a secular sort had been established to further military science and reform of the armed forces, and Mahmud II had later added to these. But most of the education in the empire was left in private and religious hands. In 1846 came the turning point, with the report of the government commission advocating a state school system, quite apart from *mektep* and *medrese*, to include primary schools,

secondary schools, and a university. There were false starts, progress was sporadic, and the master plan was completely reworked in 1869.⁸⁴ But the increase in the number of schools continued. The 1876 constitution stipulated that education was free, under state supervision, and that primary education was obligatory for all Osmanlis.⁸⁵ Not even today are all Turkish children able to get the primary schooling today promised them, but the Republic has inherited both the educational goal of the Tanzimat period and the secular school system then created, and has built on them. There is no possibility that the state will again abandon all education to private or religious initiative. The expanded area of state activity begun during the Tanzimat is irreversible.

The preceding discussion has intentionally omitted some of the most important and most concrete political legacies of the Tanzimat to the Republic. They are well known, and need only be mentioned briefly. First, the Tanzimat initiated the building of a western-style central administration—centralized in principle and organized like European administrations with a council of ministers, with ministries or departments, with a regular salaried bureaucracy, and with specialized schools to train at least some of the bureaucrats. The Republic inherited system, bureaucracy, and schools. Second, the Tanzimat created a top-to-bottom provincial administration with the vilayet law of 1864 and its subsequent revisions, again on a European model, which the Republic took over.⁸⁶ Third, Mahmud II and the Tanzimat statesmen organized a western-style army which, after the reorganization of 1869, seemed to be in reasonably good shape and on which Abdülhamid II, the Unionists, and the Republic could build.⁸⁷ These institutions—central administration, provincial administration, armed forces—continued after the nineteenth century not only as institutions, but as nurseries for officialdom; they trained a bureaucratic and military elite, a personnel pool, from which the Republic could draw in its early days. Other scholars have remarked on the Republic's valuable heritage of civil and military officials from the Empire.⁸⁸

Fourth, the nineteenth century reforms—whether in administration, in education, or in law—established a process of increasing secularization of ideas and institutions. Despite the Islamic idealism of the New Ottomans the constitution of 1876, like the various preceding Tanzimat measures, was drawn on a secular and western model. The Ottoman Empire never become a secular state, but throughout the reform period it was a secularizing state. Abdülhamid II's religious emphasis did not halt the secularizing trend, which provided a base for the secularizing and secular republic.

By comparison with the solid infrastructure of army, bureaucracy, and central and provincial administrative organization that the Empire passed on to the Republic, the other legacies identified under the twelve headings often seem less substantial. All lie in the realm of concept. Some concepts were worked out during the Tanzimat period into concrete institutional form, as

was, for example, the principle of a representative voice of the people in government, even if only advisory. Some were partially put into application, as for example the doctrine of the equality of all before the law. Some, like the concept that the people should control the government, remained only in the realm of ideas. But whether institutionalized, partially applied, or never applied, the concepts continued to exist and to influence future development. Since all of them were modern European ideas it is possible to argue that later reformers, in the Unionist and Republican periods, derived their knowledge of such ideas directly from Europe and not from Tanzimat precedents. But certainly ideas flowed through both channels: from nineteenth century Europe through the Tanzimat period to twentieth century Turkey, and from twentieth century Europe to twentieth century Turkey. Furthermore, the receptivity in Turkey to ideas from twentieth century Europe was undoubtedly greater because the innovations of the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire had furnished a background of familiarity and a base on which to build.

In history there is change. There is also continuity. The new has to build on the old, the present on the past. It is not entirely a futile exercise of the imagination to try to visualize a situation in which Mustafa Kemal and the nationalists are trying to create the modern Turkish state without what the Tanzimat had contributed: without a westernized army, without the new bureaucracy, without even the concept of a written constitution, without the concept of a parliament or of representative institutions or of popular sovereignty, without press or telegraph, without the vilayet system, without a secularizing tradition, without modern schools, without many other ideas and institutions that had arisen in the nineteenth century. Obviously the Republic depended on these legacies of the past. The same exercise may be attempted in another way. Suppose that the nationalist movement were fighting the Greeks and trying to organize a government, not in 1921, as was the case, but in 1821, the year of the Greek revolt. What would be the result? Merely to pose the hypothesis is to demonstrate the importance of developments in the century between those two dates. The Republic is, in historical terms, the child of the Second Constitutional Period (1908–1918), the step-child of the era of Abdülhamid II (1878–1908), and the grandchild of the era of reforms (1826–1878).

If the Tanzimat period furnished so much of concept or precedent in the political sphere to the Republic, did the Republic do anything that was new? The answer of course must be an emphatic "yes". As observed earlier, Mustafa Kemal decapitated the Empire; he also built. First, the Ottoman dynasty was ended, and the Republic—a concept which during the Tanzimat had gained no ground—took its place. Second, the dying concept of Osmanlılık was laid to rest and in its place the new bond of Turkish nationality became the base for the undifferentiated allegiance of all individuals to the fatherland. Third, the caliphate was ended, and the old Islamic state which had in its later days become a secularizing state was replaced by one which was soon entirely

secular. As a symbol of these decapitations, as well as for practical reasons, Istanbul as the head, the capital, was succeeded by Ankara. Fuad Paşa once remarked during the Tanzimat period that the Ottoman Empire had four bases: the Islamic millet, the Turkish state, the Ottoman sultans, and Istanbul as capital.⁸⁹ With the Republic three of the four were replaced; the change was enormous.

Finally, the Republic achieved something else new—success. The Tanzimat had been a qualified success at best, or a qualified failure. The Empire itself had come to failure in 1918. But the Republic which followed it was successful, not only in maintaining and in strengthening itself, but in bringing to fruition many concepts which in the Tanzimat period had only just been born and in many cases had not yet been practically applied. The grandchild has fulfilled many of the aspirations of his ancestors, and has gone beyond them to new successes.

But even as the newness of success must be recognized, so must the continuity of aspiration. The Turkish Revolution, the change from Empire to Republic with all the concomitant changes, goes back in its origins for at least a century, at least to the Tanzimat. Furthermore, the revolution continues. Its work is not yet done. One might speak of it in terms which historians have used of the great French Revolution of 1789: The Turkish Revolution began long before it occurred, and continued long after it stopped.

The recent changes, the revolutionary reforms of the 1920's in particular, were carried through by Atatürk in the name of civilization. Civil law, head-dress, costume, for example, were to be marks of modern civilized life.⁹⁰ In his speeches and conversations Atatürk goaded and pleaded with the Turkish people so to conduct themselves as to achieve the place they were entitled to. At the end of his speech of 1927, Atatürk asserted that he had looked at all his acts from one viewpoint: "to assist the Turkish nation to take its rightful place in the civilized world."⁹¹ This is almost pure Tanzimat language—as the Hatt-ı Hümayun of 1856 put it, to achieve a situation in conformity with "the position that it (the Empire) occupies among the civilized nations."⁹² The basic political aspiration—raising the country to the highest level in the community of civilized nations—was also shared by the Republic with the Tanzimat.

Notes

1. Kemal Atatürk, *Nutuk Gazi Mustafa Kemal tarafından . . . 1927 . . .* (Istanbul, 1938), p. 9.

2. *Nutuk*, p. 10.

3. He referred also to the army, another fact of public life inherited from the Empire. Although the army was essential to the state as its bulwark and sometimes as its backbone, I shall omit it from my discussion.

4. *Takvim-i vekay-i*, 15 receb 1258/12 September 1840. This is the earliest juxtaposition of these formulas that I have seen.

5. The chorus is in Mustafa Nihat (Özön), *Metinlerle muasır Türk edebiyatı tarihi* (Istanbul, 1934), p. 240, from *Vatan yahut Silistre*. See also Roderic H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856–1876* (Princeton, 1963), pp. 56 n. 15, 298–99; Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought* (Princeton, 1962), pp. 210 n. 57, 257–58, 326–32.

6. *Sabah*, 21 Mayıs 1876 (presumably O.S.—2 June 1876 N.S.), quoted in Mithat Cemal Kuntay, *Namık Kemal* (Istanbul, 1944–58), II, Pt. 1, p. 744.

7. Article 46 of the constitution; also Hakkı Tark Us, *Meclis-i meb'usan 1293–1877 zabıt ceridesi* (Istanbul, 1940–54), I, p. 22, as cited in Robert Devereux, *The First Ottoman Constitutional Period* (Baltimore, 1963), p. 180.

8. “Mülkümüz” is his term, in *Hürriyet* #12, 27 cemaziyelevvel 1285/14 September 1868, quoted in İhsan Sungu, “Tanzimat ve Yeni Osmanlılar,” *Tanzimat I* (Istanbul, 1940), p. 847.

9. R. H. Davison, “Ottoman Diplomacy at the Paris Congress (1856) and the Question of Reforms,” in *Türk Tarih Kurumu, VII. Türk Tarih Kongresi . . . 1970 Kongreye sunulan bildiriler*, II (Ankara, 1974), pp. 580–86.

10. Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers*, 1856, vol. 61, “Protocols of Conferences held at Paris . . .” p. 54.

11. Davison, *Reform*, pp. 260–64.

12. *Nutuk*, p. 503.

13. Ahmed Midhat, *Üss-i inkılâb* (Istanbul, 1294–95), II, p. 355 gives the text.

14. T. T. T. Cemiyeti, *Tarih*, IV (Istanbul, 1934), p. 46 gives the text.

15. In the Gülhane edict of 1839 the literal statement of the Turkish text was: “The objects of our imperial favors are without exception the people of Islam and other peoples among the subjects of our imperial sultanate.” Text in Enver Ziya Karal, *Nizam-i Cedit ve Tanzimat devirleri* (Ankara, 1947), p. 265. In the Porte’s official French version Muslims receive no separate mention: “These imperial concessions are extended to all our subjects, of whatever religion or sect they may be.”

16. On millet reform in the 1860’s, see Davison, *Reform*, pp. 114–135.

17. In his answer to the *Gazette du Levant*, in Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, I, pp. 183–184.

18. See Fuad’s “Political Testament” in J. Lewis Farley, *The Decline of Turkey* (London, 1875), pp. 27–36; Midhat Pacha, “La Turquie, son passé, son avenir,” *Revue scientifique de la France*, 2nd ser., VII: 49 (8 June 1878), p. 1154.

19. Zekai Sezgin and A. Şeref Gözübüyük, *1924 Anayasası hakkındaki Meclis görüşmeleri* (Ankara, 1957), pp. 437–39, as translated by Suna Kili in *Assembly Debates on the Constitutions of 1924 and 1961* (Istanbul, 1971), pp. 59–60.

20. Geoffrey Lewis, *Turkey*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1960), p. 94.

21. Halil İnalçık, *Tanzimat ve Bulgar meselesi* (Ankara, 1943), p. 3, n. 1.

22. Halil İnalçık, “The Nature of Traditional Society: Turkey,” in Robert A. Ward

and Dankwart Rustow, eds., *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (Princeton, 1964), pp. 42–44.

23. Mardin, *Genesis*, pp. 155–62.

24. Articles 10, 21, 24, 26 and 20 respectively.

25. Art. 22.

26. Arts. 12, 13, 15, and 16.

27. Art. 81.

28. Art. 68.

29. Art. 10.

30. Roderic H. Davison, "The Advent of the Principle of Representation in the Government of the Ottoman Empire," in William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers, eds., *The Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East: The Nineteenth Century* (Chicago, 1968), pp. 93–108 (reprinted as chapter 6, above).

31. *Nutuk*, p. 403; also *Tarih*, IV, p. 86. Kili, *Assembly Debates*, who has made an independent translation of the 1921 constitution, pp. 160–62, does not include this statement.

32. Kazım Öztürk, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası* (Ankara, 1966), I, p. 597, translated by Kili, *Assembly Debates*, pp. 69–70.

33. Halil İnalcık, "Sened-i İttifak ve Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu," *Belleten* 28:112 (Ekim 1964), pp. 603–09.

34. *Ibid.*, pp. 611–12; Davison, *Reform*, pp. 38–42.

35. Ali Haydar Midhat, *Midhat Paşa: Hayat-ı siyasiyesi*, Vol. I: *Tabsıra-i İbret* (Istanbul, 1325), p. 170.

36. Namık Kemal in *İbret*, quoted in Sungu, "Yeni Osmanlılar," p. 845; Davison, *Reform*, pp. 289–90, 293–97.

37. Bekir Sıtkı Baykal, "93 Meşrutiyeti," *Belleten* 6: 21/22 (Ocak-Nisan 1942), p. 52.

38. *Üss-i inkılâb*, II, p. 178.

39. Arts. 65 and 71.

40. Devereux, *First Ottoman Constitutional Period*, pp. 123–45.

41. Halide Edib (Adıvar), *Memoirs* (New York, 1926), p. 260.

42. Kili, *Assembly Debates*, p. 32, citing Sezgin and Gözübüyük, *1924 Anayasa*, pp. 27–35.

43. Kili, *Assembly Debates*, p. 70, citing Öztürk, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası*, I, p. 597.

44. *Tarih Musahabeleri* (Istanbul, 1339), pp. 200–201.

45. *Nutuk*, pp. 583–84.

46. Devereux, *First Ottoman Constitutional Period*, pp. 200–202.

47. Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 2nd ed., (London, 1968), pp. 60–73.

48. Davison, *Reform*, p. 370. It is not certain what constitutions Said used. The Third Republic's constitution was a series of laws of 1875.

49. In *Hürriyet* #12, 27 cemaziyelevvel 1285/14 September 1868 (Namık Kemal) and #99, 14 rebiyülevvel 1287/14 June 1870 (Ziya), quoted in Sungu, "Yeni Osmanlılar," pp. 853, 855–56.

50. Ali Haydar Midhat, *Hatıralarım*, 1872–1946 (Istanbul, 1946), p. 135.

51. Cavit Baysun, "Mustafa Reşit Paşa," *Tanzimat* 1, p. 739.

52. İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, *Midhat ve Rüştü Paşaların tevkiflerine dair vesikalar* (Ankara, 1946), p. 98.

53. *Peyam-i Sabah*, 2 September 1921, quoted in *Oriente Moderno* I: 5 (15 October 1921), p. 254.

54. Gotthard Jäschke, "Mustafa Kemal et la proclamation de la République en Turquie," *Orient* 7: 27 (3^e trimestre 1963), p. 37.

55. See examples in Sungu, "Yeni Osmanlılar," p. 845 ff.; also Mardin, *Genesis*, pp. 293, 301–02.

56. A. H. Midhat, *Hatıralarım*, p. 20. The date of Midhat's telegram to Musurus here probably should be 17 January 1877, not 17 December 1876.

57. *La Turquie*, 31 January 1877, quoted in Abdolonyme Ubicini, *La constitution ottomane* (Paris, 1877), p. 15 n. 2.

58. "La Turquie, son passé, son avenir," pp. 1149–50.

59. Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks* (Oxford, 1969), pp. 57–61, 149–50.

60. *Ibid.*, p. 157.

61. B. Lewis, *Emergence*, p. 564.

62. *Nutuk*, p. 301.

63. *Tarih*, IV, p. 85.

64. Art. 5.

65. See Ziya's statement, p. 253 above; Mardin, *Genesis*, pp. 312–13; Davison, *Reform*, pp. 398–99.

66. Mardin, *Genesis*, pp. 348–50; Davison, *Reform*, p. 224.

67. Süleyman Paşa, *Hiss-i inkılâb* (Istanbul, 1326), pp. 60–61.

68. Ahmed Midhat, *Üss-i inkılâb*, II, p. 322.

69. *Ibid.*, pp. 285–91; Ali Haydar Midhat, *Life of Midhat Pasha* (London, 1903), pp. 106–09.

70. Mardin, *Genesis*, pp. 510, 367–68, 376–77.

71. *Nutuk*, p. 301.

72. Statute in I. de Testa, *Recueil des traités de la Porte ottomane* (Paris, 1864–1911), VII, pp. 114–16.

73. George Young, *Corps de droit ottoman* (Oxford, 1905–06), I, p. 159.

74. Arts. 81–95.

75. *Hürriyet* #1, 9 rebiyülevvel 1285/29 haziran 1868, and #4, 30 rebiyülevvel 1285/20 temmuz 1868, quoted in Sungu, "Yeni Osmanlılar," p. 846.

76. Testa, *Recueil*, VII, pp. 521–23.

77. Text in F. W. von Reden, *Die Türkei und Griechenland in ihrer Entwicklungsfähigkeit* (Frankfurt a. M., 1856), pp. 288–90.

78. Stanford J. Shaw, "The Central Legislative Councils in the Nineteenth Century Ottoman Reform Movement Before 1876," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* I: 1 (January, 1970), pp. 51–84, traces these councils.

79. Kili, *Assembly Debates*, pp. 30–63, esp. pp. 33–38.

80. Prof. Tarık Zafer Tunaya pointed to the moderate separation of powers: Öztürk, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası*, I, pp. 859–69, cited in Kili, *Assembly Debates*, p. 81.

81. Arts. 48, 49, 50, 52, and 41.

82. Abdolonyme Ubicini and Pavet de Courteille, *Etat présent de l'Empire ottoman* (Paris, 1876), p. 242.

83. See, for example, Fuad's note of 28 May 1867 and Abdülaziz's *irade* of 12 December 1875, both *ibid.*, pp. 254 and 259.

84. See references in Davison, *Reform*, pp. 244–50.

85. Arts. 15 and 114.

86. Siddık S. Onar, "L'administration et les finances," in H. Lévy-Ullman and B. Mirkine-Guetzévitch, eds., *La Vie Juridique des Peuples: Turquie* (Paris, 1939), p. 49.

87. H. Zboinski, *L'Armée ottomane* (Paris, 1877).

88. Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic," *World Politics* 11:4 (July 1959), pp. 513–52; Joseph A. Szyliowicz, "The Mülkiye and Elite Recruitment in Turkey," 1969 Middle East Studies Association meeting paper.

89. Cevdet Paşa, *Tezâkir* 1 . . . 12, ed. Cavid Baysun (Ankara, 1953), p. 85. There were, of course, other ways in which the Republic differed from the Empire. One of the important ones, in the political arena, was this: Atatürk and the Republic refused to yield to foreign pressures; the Tanzimat statesmen and their successors often did so.

90. Herbert Melzig, *Atatürk Dedi Ki* (Ankara, 1942), pp. 269, 274.

91. *Nutuk*, p. 645.

92. Ubicini and Pavet de Courteille, *Etat présent*, p. 235.

Index

Bold-face numbers indicate the page on which a Turkish term is first defined. Names of people and places with more than one spelling are cross-referenced or the alternative is given in parentheses, as are additional names and titles.

- Abdülaziz (Abdul Aziz), sultan, 24, 105, 115, 126, 137, 250, 255
- Abdülhamid (Abdul Hamid) I, 22
- Abdülhamid (Abdul Hamid) II, 24–25, 80, 107, 127, 168–170, 253, 256; and telegraph, 137–138, 140, 143–144, 147–148, 152, 156; and Armenians, 180–181
- Abdullah Feyzi Bey, 153
- Abdülmecid (Abdul Medjid) I, 23–24, 77–78, 99, 114, 125, 172, 255–256; and telegraph, 134–137, 139
- Abdülmecid (Abdul Medjid), calif, 224
- Abdurrahman Şeref, 251
- Acemyan Efendi, 152
- Adalia. *See* Antalya
- Adana, 152, 215
- Adnan (Adivar), 229
- Adrianople. *See* Edirne
- Adriatic Sea, 8, 136
- Aegean Islands, 7, 142, 188, 194, 228. *See also* Samos
- Aegean Sea, 8, 141, 147
- Afghan-Turkish treaty (1921), 221–222
- Agaton Efendi, Krikor, 146, 152
- agriculture, 61, 66, 69n.6
- Ahmed I, 18, 19
- Ahmed III, 20–21
- Ahmed esh-Sherif es-Senusi, Sheikh, 222
- Ahmed Midhat, 104, 176, 250–251
- Ahmed Rustem Bey, 213
- Ahmed Vefik Paşa, 85, 90, 92–93, 108, 143, 167
- Ahmet (Ahmed), Şeyh, 125
- Akçura, Yusuf, 92
- Alay Köşk, 142
- Albania, 7, 11, 22
- Aleko Efendi, 152
- Aleppo, 9, 187
- Alexandretta (Iskenderun), 185, 187, 188, 220, 231
- Alexandria, 133, 136–138
- Alexandropol (Gümrü), treaty of, 216
- Algiers, Algeria, 10, 19, 22, 77
- Ali Fuat, 215
- Âli Paşa, Mehmed Emin, 24, 76, 78–79, 83, 91, 102, 104, 122, 126–127; views on Muslim-Christian equality, 116–119; and telegraph, 148–149; and education, 167, 174, 176; opposes capitulations, 245
- Ali Rıza, 211–212
- Ali Suavi, 126, 255
- Alléon, Jacques, 67
- altılık*, 60, 67
- Amasya, 122, 139
- America, Americans, xii, 90, 120, 124, 141; post-1945 association with Turkey, 82; and telegraph, 133–134, 138–139, 155, 157; schools in Ottoman Empire, 167–170; question of mandate over Turkey, 208, 210; observers at Lausanne, 226–227. *See also* Chester concession

- Anatolia, 7–8, 11, 76, 120, 133, 154;
 Turkish penetration, 2–5; Allied occupation, 26–27; telegraph in, 136–139, 142, 144–145, 149, 157; possible partition of (1912–1913), 180, 186–188, 190–192, 194, 196–197; center for nationalist movement (1919–1923), 206–232; Greek invasion, 208, 215, 217, 219–220; partition into economic zones, 215; Greek evacuation, 223
- Andonyadis, 152
- Ankara, 27–28, 81, 157, 185; center for nationalist movement, 211–213; becomes capital, 231
- Ankara, battle (1402), 6
- Ankara, treaty of (1921), 220–221
- Antalya, 4, 157, 187, 191, 193; Italians in, 208, 212, 217, 220
- apostasy, 115, 124, 168–169. *See also* religion, conversions
- Arabia, 76, 138, 140, 142
- Arabic script, 4
- Arab revolt (1916), 26
- Arabs, 2, 9, 11, 22, 145, 168, 212, 215, 222
- Aralov, Comrade, 221, 229
- Ararat, Mt., 186, 192
- archives, Ottoman, xv, 51
- Ardahan, 208, 212, 219
- armed forces. *See* military organization
- Armenia: Lesser, 3; strategic area, 184–185, 214; independent state of (1918–1920), 208, 214–216, 221, 228, 231; question of mandate for, 210
- Armenian Church, 11, 12, 186
- Armenian crisis (1912–1914), 180–205; situation after 1908, 180–181; Armenian views and agitation, 182–183; Russian initiative, 183–186; reaction of the powers, 186–188; Ottoman reform plan, 188–189; conference preparations, 189–190; Russian plan, 190–191; new Ottoman proposal, 191; great powers' conference, 191–192; Armenians seek Russian aid, 192; negotiations for compromise, 192–195; Russian-Turkish accord, 195–196; situation in 1914, 196–197
- Armenian *millet*, 102–103, 182, 183
- Armenian periodicals, 183, 192
- Armenian Revolutionary Federation. *See* Dashnakzouthiun
- Armenians, 4, 11, 22, 62, 74–75, 80, 90–91, 104, 119, 121, 124–125; in telegraph system, 149, 152; schools, 168–169, 174; in Russia, 180, 183–184, 186
- Arsharouni, Patriarch, 181
- artisans, 7, 14
- Asim, 121
- askeriye* class, 14, 247
- Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal, 26–28, 81, 87, 171, 255; and telegraph, 157; six-day speech, 157, 243; before 1919, 206–207; aims, 207–210; as leader of nationalist movement, 208–232; becomes president, 231; orders 1920 elections, 253; echoes Tanzimat, 260
- Atif Efendi, 85
- Austria (Austria-Hungary), 19–20, 35, 39–40, 53, 57n.9, 80–81, 122; and telegraph, 134–135, 138, 146, 150; and Armenian crisis (1912–1914), 187–188, 191, 193, 196
- ayan*, 21, 97–98, 100
- Aya Sofya, 7, 123
- Aynalı Kavak, treaty, 42, 43n.2
- Azerbaijan, 208, 214, 216, 220
- Azov, 20
- Bab-ı Âli. *See* Sublime Porte
- Baghdad, 2, 3, 4, 10, 137, 138, 141, 145
- Baghdad (Bagdad) Railway, 25, 152, 220; German Baghdad Railway zone, 185, 187, 189, 191, 196
- Baku, 208, 216
- Balkan crisis (1875–1878). *See* crisis of 1875–1878

- Balkans, 8, 120; telegraph in, 144–145
- Balkan Wars (1912–1913), 22, 25, 81, 180–181, 183–184, 188
- Baltazzi, Th., 67
- Banque de Constantinople, 67–68
- Barbaros Hayreddin, 10
- Basiret*, 174
- Basra, 10, 137
- Batum, 208, 212, 214, 216, 218–219
- Baumann, General, 90, 181
- Bayazid, city, 194
- Bebek, 134
- Beirut, 147
- Bekir Sami, 213–214, 216–218, 220
- Bektaşî (Bektashi) dervishes, 15, 120, 169
- Belgrade, 9, 20, 79, 121, 127
- Berbers, 11
- Berchtold, Count Leopold, 187–188
- Berlin, treaty of (1878), 183, 186, 246
- Besim Efendi, 144
- beşlik*, 60, 67
- Beyazid (Bayezid) I, 5–6
- Beyazid (Bayezid) II, 8
- Beylerbey Palace, 134, 139
- Beyoğlu, 34–35, 37, 46 n.24, 52–55, 58 n.25; telegraph office in, 135, 142–143, 149–152
- biat* (homage), 97
- bid'at*, 121
- Biddulph, Major M. A., 135, 137, 138, 144–145, 149
- Bismarck, Otto von, 155
- Bitlis, 185, 188, 192
- Black Sea, 7, 8, 20–22, 39, 214, 219, 227; and telegraph, 133–136, 138
- Blacque Bey, Edouard, 159 n.15
- Boghos Nubar Pasha, 186, 192, 195
- Bokhara, 92, 222
- Bompard, Louis Maurice, 193, 228
- Bonneval, Count (Ahmed Paşa), 21, 90
- Bosnia, 7, 11, 22; and Herzegovina, 79–81, 88, 122, 124, 127, 188
- Bosporus, 21; bridge across, 28; telegraph across, 133, 135. *See also* Straits
- Bourée, Nicolas Prosper, 83, 122
- Briand, Aristide, 217
- Bristol, Admiral Mark, 89
- Britain. *See* Great Britain
- Browne, Louis Edgar, 157
- Bucharest, 135, 137, 151
- Bulgaria, Bulgarians, 4, 5, 11, 79–80, 82, 104, 118–119, 121–122, 124, 134, 167, 169–170, 225
- bureaucracy, 12–13, 17–18, 23, 77–80, 84–85, 92–93, 176, 258; paid in *kaime*, 62, 67
- Bursa (Brusa), 5, 143, 154, 157
- Byzantine Empire, 1–7, 208
- Cahun, Léon, 88
- Cairo, 9, 133, 138
- Çaldıran, battle, 8
- caliph (calif), 2; Ottoman sultans as, 25–27, 42, 209, 221–222; caliphate divorced from sultanate, 27, 224; caliphate abolished, 81, 231
- Çanak (Chanak) crisis, 223–224
- Canning, Stratford. *See* Redcliffe, Lord Stratford de
- capitulations, xiii, 16, 61, 122, 212, 219–220, 229, 245; at Lausanne conference, 73, 226, 228, 230–231
- Caspian Sea, 10–11
- Catherine II, 21–22, 30, 37, 53
- Catholicism, Catholics, 35, 39–40, 46 n.27, 53, 57 n.9; schools in Ottoman Empire, 167, 169–170
- Caucasus, 1, 81. *See also* Transcaucasus
- Celaleddin Rumi, 4
- celâlî* revolts, 17
- Celal Nuri, 247, 251
- Cemiyet-i İlmiye-i Osmaniye, 140
- Central Asia, 2
- Cevdet Paşa, Ahmed, 51–52, 55, 166, 171, 175, 255
- Chamberlain, Mr., 133–134
- Chester concession, 195, 230
- Chicago Daily News*, 157
- Chicherin, G. V., 214–215, 219, 220, 223; at Lausanne, 226–227

- Child, Richard W., 226
- Chios, 137
- Christians in Ottoman Empire,
112–132; in *millets*, 112; seen as
second-class, 112–113, 120; prob-
lem of equality, 113–114; equal in
official policy, 114–116; as viewed
by leading statesmen, 116–119; and
nationalism, 119; and church hier-
archies, 119; in popular Turkish
view, 120–125; in New Ottoman
view, 125–127. *See also* Arme-
nians; Catholics; Greeks
- Cilicia, 77, 208, 210, 220
- “Cilician Vespers” (1909), 181
- Circassians, 9, 11
- citizenship, individual: concept of,
246–247
- Clarendon, George W. F. V., Earl, 135
- coffee, 15–16
- Collège St. Joseph, 169–170
- Comintern, 216, 219
- commerce: Russian, 21. *See also*
economy; *kaime*; merchants
- Committee of Union and Progress
(CUP), 25–26, 156, 175, 181, 183,
188, 194, 253, 256
- Communism, in Turkey, 219, 236 n.42
- Congress of Eastern Peoples, 216
- conspiracy of 1859, 125
- Constantinople, 2, 4, 7; Russian-pro-
tected church in, 33–38, 51–59.
See also Istanbul
- Constantinople (Tersane) Conference
(1876), 83, 117
- Constantinople conference (1913): on
Armenian affairs, 190–192
- Constantine, Greek king, 219–220
- constitution: for non-Muslim *millets*,
102–103; concept of, 249–252
- constitution of 1876, 24, 25, 79–80,
86, 87, 106–107, 156, 244–246;
state as fatherland, 244; state indi-
visible, 245–246; Osmanlılık, 246;
equality, 247; individual rights, 248;
chamber of deputies, 250–252; pro-
mulgation, 251; sultan nonrespon-
sible, 254; independent judiciary,
255; legislative-executive relation-
ship, 256; education, 258; secular
model for, 258
- constitution of 1921, 27, 212–213,
249–250, 254
- constitution of 1924, 86, 247–249,
256
- constitution of 1961, 246, 247, 249,
257
- Cossacks, 19
- Council of State, 84–85, 104, 115,
249
- counter-revolution (1909), 171
- Crawford, Sir Robert, 90, 194
- Crete, 11, 20, 79, 137; 1866–1869
rebellion, 117, 119, 121, 127
- Crimea, 10, 21, 42, 134, 136
- Crimean War, 25, 30, 38, 41–42, 54,
68, 122; spurs telegraph building,
134–136
- crisis of 1839–1841, 60–61, 77–78,
101, 244–245
- crisis of 1875–1878, 79, 106–107,
122
- Croats, 11
- Crusades, 3–6
- Curzon, George N., Lord, 74,
222–229
- Cyprus, 10, 12, 22, 80
- Cyprus convention (1878), 187, 188, 189
- Cyrenaica, 222
- Damad Ferid Paşa, 208, 210, 211,
212, 215
- Damascus, 9, 25, 140
- Danişmends, 4
- Danube province. *See* Tuna vilayet
- Danube River, 5, 6, 9, 134
- Dardanelles, 5, 21, 26, 136–137, 147,
208. *See also* Gallipoli; Straits
- Darüşşafaka, 143, 150
- Dashnakzouthiun, 181–183, 184
- Davud Efendi, 152
- Dede Korkut*, 2
- defter*, 13
- De la Rue, M., 135–136, 149

- De Lusson, M., 149
 Denikin, Anton, 214
derebeyi, 76, 121
 Dersaadet telegraph office. *See* Istanbul, telegraph
 dervishes, 15. *See also* Bektaşî; Mevlevî; Nakşibendi
 De Salve, M., 90
devlet, 244
devşirme, 13, 15, 17
 Dikran Efendi, 152
din ve devlet, 88
 diplomacy: Ottoman, 83–84; of Grand National Assembly, 213–215. *See also* Turkey, foreign relations (1918–1923)
 Diyarbakır (Diarbekir), 8, 139, 145, 157, 185, 188
 Djavid (Cavid) Bey, Mehmed, 190
 Djemal (Cemal) Paşa, 193, 194
 Djemaleddin el-Afghani, 92
 Donizetti, Giuseppe, 23
 Don-Volga canal, 10
 “Dosografa” church, 51–52, 56
 Druzhinina, E. I., 35, 42
 “Easterners” in Grand National Assembly, 218, 219
 Ebussuûd Efendi, Mehmed, 14
 Eckford, Henry, 23
 economic concessions in Turkey, foreign, 217–218, 228, 230–231
 economy of Ottoman Empire, xiii, 13–14, 16. *See also* agriculture; *kaime*; merchants
 Edirne (Adrianople), 5, 15, 223, 230; and telegraph, 134–136, 139–140, 145, 150–151, 153; Adrianople question (1913), 192–193
 education, xiv–xv, 92, 257–258; ministry of, 84, 172, 175; westernized, 167–176; self-education, 167; law of 1869, 173; right to, 248. *See also* schools
 Egypt, 2, 9, 21–22, 76–78, 80, 91, 101, 105, 133, 136, 138, 169. *See also* Mehmed Ali
 electoral law, 104, 107, 252; electoral principle, 87
 electric telegraph. *See* telegraph, electric
 Eliot, Sir Charles, 139, 148
 Elliott, Sir Henry, 89
 Emin Efendi, 90
 English language, and telegraphy, 137, 138
 Enklès, Le Comte, 150–151
 Enver Bey (Paşa), 25–26, 170, 188, 193, 195, 207, 216, 220
 equality, 24, 26, 78, 85–86; of Muslims and non-Muslims, 112–132; before the law, concept of, 247. *See also* Osmanlılık
 Ereğli, 136
 Ergin, Osman Nuri, 173
 Erzincan, 153, 157
 Erzurum, 157, 185, 194, 195, 208, 216; Congress at (1919), 209, 210
esham, 60
 Eskişehir (Eskishehir), 3, 187
eşraf, 98
 Etchmiadzin, 186
 Euphrates, 185; Euphrates College, 170
 European powers, xii–xiv
 Fao, 137, 144, 147, 149
 fatherland, state as. *See* vatan
 federalism, 106, 119
ferman (imperial edict), 100, 101
 Fethi Bey (Okyar), 223
 fez, 23, 113, 166
 Filibe (Philippopolis), 136
 foreign affairs, ministry of: effect of telegraph on Ottoman ministry, 148–149, 155; created for nationalist movement, 213–214
 Fossati, Giuseppe, 142
 France: influence of, 21–24, 78–79, 84–85, 88, 89, 90–91, 103, 105, 146; and Catholics in Ottoman Empire, 35, 53; influence on Ottoman telegraph, 135–137, 149–150; influence on education, 167–170, 172–173, 175; and Armenian crisis

- (1912–1914), 186–197; occupies Cilicia and Syria, 208; Picot sees Kemal, 210; defeat by Kemalists, 212, 215; Sèvres and Tripartite treaty, 215; negotiations with Kemalists, 217–218; treaty of Ankara with Kemalists, 220–221; deserts Britain at Çanak, 223; at Lausanne conference, 228; treaty with Turkey (1926), 231
- Franklin-Bouillon, Henri, 220–221, 223
- Freemasons, 129n.12, 138, 153
- French language, 23, 24, 79, 84, 88, 92–93; and telegraph, 142–143, 150, 152–153, 154; and newspapers, 154; in education, 171, 173, 175; Ismet uses at Lausanne, 226
- frenk*, 175
- Frunze, Michael, General, 221
- Fuad Paşa, Keçecizade Mehmed, 24, 61, 78–79, 83, 92, 102–105, 122, 126–127; views on Muslim–Christian equality, 116–119, 246; on bases of Ottoman Empire, 260
- Fuad Paşa, Marshal, 169
- Fünun-i Telgrafiye Mektebi, 143
- Fuzuli, 15
- Galata, 7, 34–35, 46n.24, 51–54, 60, 142
- Galatasaray lycée, 24, 89–90, 115, 143, 173
- Gallipoli peninsula, 5, 26; battle (1915), 81, 154, 206; cemetery, 229
- Garroni, Marchese, 73–74, 228
- gâvur*, 93, 120–121, 123
- Gazali, 16
- gazi*, 3, 4, 5
- Gelibolu. *See* Gallipoli
- gendarmérie, in Anatolia (post 1909), 181; proposed for Anatolia (1913), 188, 190
- Genoa Economic Conference (1922), 223
- George V, Catholicos, 186
- Georgia, 10, 36–37, 208, 214, 218–220, 227
- Germany, and Armenian crisis (1912–1914), 187–197
- Giers, Nikolai, 183, 186, 190, 193–195, 197
- Golden Horn, 12
- Goltz, Rüdiger von der, General, 90
- government: who shall control, 249–256; concept of functions, 256–258; expansion of functions, 258. *See also* bureaucracy; constitution; provincial government; sultanate
- Grand Council of State. *See* Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances
- Grand National Assembly, 27, 81, 87, 206, 212–213, 215, 217, 221, 224, 225, 230; debates Lausanne negotiations, 229; ratifies Lausanne treaty, 231
- Grand' Rue de Pera, 143
- grand vezir. *See* *sadrazam*
- Great Britain: armistice and occupation of Turkey, 26, 208; military occupation of Istanbul, 27, 212; Ottoman commercial treaty of 1838, 61; policy in 1830s, 77; influence of, 78–80, 89–90, 105, 168; and telegraph, 134–139, 149–150; and Armenian crisis (1912–1914), 186–197; policy toward Turkish nationalist movement, 207; Sèvres and Tripartite treaty, 215; evacuates Batum, 216; London conference (1921), 217–218; contacts with Kemal, 220–223; Çanak crisis and Mudanya armistice, 223–224; at Lausanne conference, 225–230
- Great War (1914–1918), 26, 76, 81, 154, 245
- Greece, 22, 23, 80–82; occupies Izmir (1919), 26, 208; offensive in Anatolia, 27, 215, 217, 219–220; evacuation, 223; signs Mudanya armistice, 224; in Lausanne negotiations, 228, 230–231

- Greek *millet*, 102–103
 Greek Orthodox Church and people in Ottoman Empire, 4, 11–12, 29–30, 34, 50n.58, 51, 53–54, 119, 124, 168, 208; Patriarchate, 227, 231
 Greek revolt (1821), 41, 76–77
 Greeks, 4, 7–8, 11, 74–75, 90–91, 104, 119, 124, 169, 174; and telegraph, 139, 150, 152; remain in Istanbul (1923), 231
 Greek-Turkish minorities exchange, 228, 231
 Gregorian Church. *See* Armenian Church
 Grew, Joseph C., 83, 93
 Grey, Sir Edward, 187–190
 guilds (*esnaf*), 14
 Gülistan, 169
 Gulkevitch, 195–196

hâkimiyet-i ahali, 253
 Halide Edib (Adıvar), 169, 213, 251
 Halil Şerif Paşa, 105–106
 Hamdullah Suphi, 247
 Hamid Bey, 213, 223
 Hamlin, Cyrus, 133–134, 139, 158, 169
 Hammer-Purgstall, Joseph von, 31, 38, 40–41, 49n.51
 Hapsburgs. *See* Austria
 Harbord Commission, 210, 234n.17
 Harington, Sir Charles, 220, 223–224
 Harput (Kharput), 157, 170, 185, 188
 Hasan (Saka), 225
 Hasan Efendi, 152
 Hasköy, 90, 122
hat (*hatt*, imperial decree), 114, 115
 Hatt-ı Hümayun of 1856, 78, 88, 101–102, 117–118, 122, 125–126, 128nn.4 and 5, 257, 260
 Hatt-ı Şerif of Gülhane (also Hatt-ı Hümayun), 24, 61, 78, 82, 85, 87, 99, 114, 116–117, 119, 121, 125–126, 128n.4, 244, 247–248, 250, 254–255, 257, 261n.15
 Hayashi, Baron, 73–74
 Hayreddin Paşa, Tunuslu, 105, 172
 Herzegovina. *See* Bosnia
 Hijaz, 9, 15, 26; Hijaz (Hejaz) railway, 25, 140
 Hintchak, 182, 184
 Hoff, Major, 196
 Holy Places, 121
 Hormuz, 10
 Hungary, Hungarians, 5, 6, 9, 11, 15, 20, 91, 123
 Hünkâr İskelesi, treaty of, 77
 Hüseyin (Pektaş) Efendi, Hulûsi, 169

 Ibrahim, sultan, 18
 Ibrahim Müteferrika, 21
 Ibrahim Paşa, Nevşehirli, 20–21
 Ibrahim Paşa of Egypt, 101
ihtiyar meclisi, 98, 104
Ikdam, 194
imam, 98
 India, 136–138
 individual identity and rights, 246–249
 İnönü, battles of, 27, 216–217, 219
 İnönü, İsmet, 27–28; at Lausanne, 73–75, 83, 225–231, 245; at Mudanya, 224; prime minister, 231
 International Telegraph Union, 146
 Ionia, state of, 223
 Irak (Iraq), 2, 10, 21, 26, 136, 138, 145, 154; and Mosul question, 231
 Iran, 1, 2, 8, 10, 19, 138, 145, 184
 Ishak Efendi, Hoca, 167
 Islahat fermanı, 102; *See also* Hatt-ı Hümayun of 1856
 Islam, 1–2, 4, 14–15, 19, 86, 88, 98; used by Abdülhamid II, 80, 140; syncretism, 120; tolerance, 120, 124; feeling of superiority, 120–121, 125; against innovation, 121; Islamic views on telegraph, 139–140; and education, 166–167; God as legislator, 254–255
 Islamic law. *See* *şeriat*
 İsmail Efendi, 152
 İsmail Kemal Bey, 103

- Ismet Paşa. *See* İnönü
- Istanbul, 7, 11, 12–13, 15, 28; British military occupation (1920), 26, 81, 212; *kaime* used in, 65–69; endangered by war (1829–1833), 77; in Crimean War period, 78–79, 91, 122; municipality in, 84; telegraph in, 138, 142–144, 149, 151, 157; salons, 167; during 1918–1919 armistice, 207–208; Greece proposes to occupy, 223; returned to Turkish control, 223–224; British evacuate, 231
- Iswolski, Alexander, 186, 195, 196
- Italy, 81; and Armenian crisis (1912–1914), 187–188, 193, 196; occupying Antalya, 208, 212, 217, 218; negotiations with Kemalists, 217–218, 219–220, 223; at Lausanne conference, 227
- Izmir, 26–27, 62, 67, 71 n.35, 137, 147, 169, 217, 224; Greek occupation, 81, 208; Greek evacuation, 223; economic congress, 229
- Izmit (Ismid, Nicomedia), 5, 152, 223
- Iznik (Nicaea), 3, 5
- Izzet Efendi (Bey), 151–152
- Izzet Efendi, Keçecizade, 166
- Jaffa, 138
- Jagow, Gottlieb von, 187–191
- Janissaries, 6, 13, 17, 18–19, 22, 76, 97; abolition of, 23, 244
- Japan, 73–74; defeat of Russia (1905), 80
- Jassy, 135
- Jerusalem, 9
- Jessup, Henry Harris, 147
- Jewish *millet*, 102–103
- Jews, 10–12, 90–91, 104, 112–113, 120, 128 n.3, 152–153, 167, 169, 174
- Josef Efendi, 152
- journalism. *See* press
- judicial system, 17–18, 73–74, 255
- jurnal*, 152
- kadı* (judge), 100
- Kadıköy, 142
- kâfir*. *See* *gâvur*
- kaime*, 60–72; first issue (1840), 60–63; later issues and circulation (1840–1852), 63–69; counterfeiting, 64–65; abolition, 68
- kanun*, 12
- Kara Ağaç, 230
- Karaman emirs, 6, 7
- Karlowitz, peace of, 20
- Kars, 208, 212, 216, 219; treaty of Kars (1921), 221
- Kashgar, 92
- Kastamonu, 151
- kaymakam* (*kaimakam*, subgovernor), 93
- Kayseri, 3, 4
- kaza*, 103–104
- Kâzım Karabekir, 216, 218, 221
- Kemal, Mustafa. *See* Atatürk
- Kemal Efendi, 172
- Kemal Reis, Admiral, 8
- Kıbrıslı Mehmed Paşa. *See* Mehmed Emin Paşa, Kıbrıslı
- King-Crane commission, 210
- kızılbaş*, 7
- kocabaşı*, 98, 100
- Konya, 3–4, 139, 157
- Koran. *See* Kuran
- Korea, 81
- Kosovo, battle, 5
- Küçük Kaynarca (Kuchuk Kainardji), treaty of, xi–xiii, 21, 226; terms of, 29–30, 36–37, 42; interpretations of, 29–33, 38–41, 53–55; articles 7 and 14 on church, 33–36, 51–54, 56–57 n.8, 58 n.21; negotiation of, 35–36, 39–40, 42, 49 n.52, 54; texts of, 45–46 nn.21 and 22, 47 nn.30–32 and 36 and 37, 52, 54–55, 59 Added Note
- Kuleli incident, 125
- Kumbari, Aristidi, 150
- Kuran, 114, 172, 175, 222
- Kurat, Akdes Nimet, 31, 51–52

- Kurdistan, 214, 216
 Kurds, 11, 145, 181–182, 192, 212, 228
 Lacoine, Emile, 143, 145, 150
 land tenure, 132n.54, 181–182
 Latin Church, Latins. *See* Catholics
 Latin Kingdom of Constantinople, 4
 Lausanne, treaty of, 230–231
 Lausanne peace conference, xiv, 27, 73–74, 81, 93; invitations to, 224; first period, 225–228; crisis, 228–229; second period, 230–231
 law, 12, 13; codes, 24, 73–75, 83, 86, 91, 146, 247; concerning telegraph, 145–147
 Lazes, 11
 League of Nations and Mosul, 230
 Lebanon, 21, 79, 110n.27
 Lepanto, battle, 10
 Levantines, 84, 90, 152
 Lichnowsky, Prince, 190
 Liman von Sanders, Otto, 90, 180, 194–195
 Lloyd George, David, 208, 217, 223, 224
 loans, 61, 64, 68, 79–80, 193, 195.
See also Ottoman Public Debt
 London Conference (1921), 217–218
 Macedonia, 80, 119, 156
 Madelli Efendi, 152
 Mahmud II, 23, 76–78, 84–85, 90, 99, 114, 121, 133, 166
 Mahmud Shevket (Şevket) Paşa, 188–189
 Malazgirt (Manzikert), battle, 3
 Malta, 10, 212
 Mamluks, 9
 Mandelstam, André, 183, 190, 196, 205n.134
 Manifesto of the Muslim Patriots, 106
 manufacturing, telegraph instruments, 144
 Marj Dabik, battle, 9
 Marmara, 12
 Mdivani, Ambassador, 218
 Mecca, 9, 140
meclis-i idare, 103–104
meclis-i müessisan, 254
meclis-i umumî, 97, 103–104, 250
 Meclis-i vâlâ-yı ahkâm-ı adliye. *See* Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances
Mecmua-i Fünun, 140
 Medina, 9, 25
 Mediterranean Sea, 7–10
medrese, 14–15, 23, 166, 171, 173, 175. *See also* schools
 Mehmed I, 6
 Mehmed II, 7–8, 11–14
 Mehmed III, 18
 Mehmed IV, 18
 Mehmed V, 25, 253
 Mehmed VI (Vahideddin), 26–27, 81, 206, 211, 243; flees Istanbul, 224
 Mehmed (Mehmet) Ali of Egypt, 60, 76–78, 91, 101, 116, 121
 Mehmed Efendi, Billurîzade, 141, 151, 153
 Mehmed Emin Paşa, Kıbrıslı, 103, 135, 147
 Mehmed İzzet Efendi, 153
 Mehmed Paşa, Muhsinzade, 33, 52
 Mehmed Rüşdi Paşa, 254
 Mehmed Said Paşa (İngiliz), 174
mekteb, 166. *See also* schools
 Mekteb-i Maarif-i Adliye, 92
 Mekteb-i Mülkiye, 92, 171
 Mekteb-i Osmanî, 92
mektebli, 171
 Melek Hanim, 147
 Menderes, Adnan, 90
 merchants, 14, 154; European, 90
 Mevlevi dervishes, 4, 15
 Mersin (Mersina), 139, 152, 187
 meteorological station, 147, 149–150
 Metternich, Prince Klemens von, 41
 Midhat Paşa, Ahmed Şefik, 24, 76, 79, 85, 91, 104–106, 150, 153; views on Muslim-Christian equality, 116–119, 127, 246; and schools,

- 172, 174; and constitution of 1876, 250–251; on republicanism, 252; on popular sovereignty, 253; on responsible government, 254
- Mikael Efendi, 144, 152
- military organization, 6–7, 16–17, 22–23, 25, 83, 171, 258. *See also* Janissaries
- military schools, 170–172
- military service, 123–124; for Armenians, 188, 195
- Millerand, Alexandre, 212
- millets*, 12, 87, 88, 91, 102–103, 112–113, 168–169; constitutions, 246; eliminated, 247
- missionaries, Christian, 90, 120, 123–124, 133–134, 167–170
- modernization, political, 73–95, 96–97; foreign stimuli, 74, 76–83; foreign concepts and models, 83–89; channels for foreign influence, 89–93
- Mohacs, battle, 9
- Moldavia, 36–37, 42, 54, 135
- Moltke, Helmuth von, 23, 90, 166–167
- money, 16, 60, 67. *See also* *kaime*
- Mongols, 4, 6
- Moniteur Ottoman*, 23
- Montagna, Signor, 93
- Montenegro, 22, 79–80, 122
- Morea, 7, 20
- Morgenthau, Henry, 195
- Morse, Samuel F. B., 133–134, 140
- Moscow, Turkish negotiations in, 214–215, 216, 218–219
- Mosul, 145, 157, 208, 227–231
- Mudanya armistice (1922), 223–225
- Mudros armistice (1918), 207–208
- Muhammad, Prophet, 4, 166
- Muhammad Ali of Egypt. *See* Mehmed Ali
- Münif Efendi (Paşa), Mehmed Tahir, 140–141, 167
- Murad I, 5
- Murad II, 6
- Murad III, 10–11
- Murad IV, 19
- Murad V, 115, 244, 254
- Muscovy, 10
- Muslims: of India, 191; of Asia, 214, 216, 223, 237n.60; Kemalist relations with, 221–222. *See also* dervishes; Islam; *şeriat*
- Mustafa I, 18
- Mustafa Efendi, telegrapher, 135, 143, 150–151, 153
- Mustafa Fazıl Paşa, 105, 126
- Mustafa Kemal. *See* Atatürk
- Mustafa Nesimi Efendi, 152
- Mustafa Paşa, governor of Crete, 101
- Musurus, Kostaki, 135, 137
- Nakşebendi dervishes, 153
- Namık Kemal, 24, 88, 93, 103, 105, 126–127, 172, 244, 246; on constitutional questions, 250–256
- Napoleon I, 22
- Napoleon III, 105, 155
- Nasri Franko Efendi, 152
- nationalism, among Ottoman non-Muslims and Turks, xiii–xiv, 79, 87–89, 91, 119, 127–128, 175–176, 188. *See also* *vatan*
- nationalist movement, Turkish (1918–1923), 156–157, 206–232
- nationality law (1869), 118
- National Pact, 26, 211–212, 214–215, 217, 219–220, 222, 227–228, 231–232, 246
- Navarino, battle, 77
- Nedim, 20
- Nesselrode, Count, 41–42, 49–50nn.57 and 58
- New Ottomans. *See* Yeni Osmanlılar newspapers. *See* press
- Nicopolis, battle, 6
- Nicholas I, 41–42
- Niş (Nish), 5, 136
- Nitti, Francesco, 212
- nizamiye* (regular) courts, 255
- nomads, 14, 145
- Obreskov, A. M., 35–37, 39, 53–54

- O'Connor, Mr., 149
 Odian Efendi, Krikor, 91
 Ömer Seyfeddin, 172–173
örf, 12
 Orhan, sultan, 5
 Osman I, 5
 Osman II, 18, 19
 Osmanlılık, 86, 88, 106, 118–119, 124–127, 246
 Ostrorog, Léon, 90
 Ottoman dynasty, 133, 156–157; begins, 5; ends, 27, 224–225
 Ottoman Empire: historiography of, xv–xvii; modern history of, xi; rise, 5–6; height, 7–16; decline, 16–22; defeats, 19–20; Allied occupation of (1918–1922), 26–27
 Ottomanism. *See* Osmanlılık
 Ottoman patriotism, 121–122
 Ottoman Public Debt, 80, 213, 228, 230
 Ottoman Scientific Society. *See* Cemiyet-i İlmiye-i Osmaniye
 Ottoman treasury, crisis (1840), 60–64
- Palace School, 13, 169
 palaces of sultans, 12, 13, 156
 Palestine, 138
 Pallavicini, Count, 191, 192, 196
 Palmerston, Henry J. T., Lord, 77–78
 pan-Islamic congress (1921), 222, 239n.87
 pan-Slavism, 92, 105–106
 pan-Turkism, pan-Turanianism, 92, 216, 219
 Papadjanov, Duma deputy, 184
 Paris, treaty of (1856), 245
 Paris Peace Congress (1856), 78, 148–149
 parliament: 1877–1878, 24, 79–80, 107, 156, 244, 251; 1909–1914, 25; 1920, 26, 211–212
 partition of Ottoman Empire, 215. *See also* Anatolia, possible partition
 Passarowitz, treaty of, 20
 patriotism. *See* nationalism; *vatan*
 Patrona Halil revolt, 21
 peasants, 6, 8, 11, 14, 17
 Peoples' Party, 229–230
 Pera. *See* Beyoğlu
 Persia. *See* Iran
 Persian Gulf, 10, 136, 137, 144, 147
 Peter the Great, 20
 Pichon, Stephen, 190
 Picot, Georges, 210
 Piri Reis, Admiral, 8
 Poincaré, Raymond, 222, 223
 Poland, Poles, 11, 20, 91, 123, 149–150
 Ponsonby, John, Baron, 77–78
 popular sovereignty, concept of, 86–87, 253–254
 population, of Ottoman Empire, 11, 13–14, 17, 25, 28, 103, 128n.3; Armenian, 205 Added Note
 Portuguese, 9, 10
 postal service, 141, 152, 153
 press, 23–25, 174, 192, 194, 244, 250; and telegraph, 154–155; constitutional freedom of, 248
 Princes Islands, 142
 printing, 21, 22
 Protestants, 10, 35, 124–125; mission schools, 167–170
 provincial government, 24, 84, 147–148; local councils, 100–101, 109n.14; 1912–1913 proposals for, 188–191. *See also* *vilayet* system
- Qur'an. *See* Kuran
- railways, 25, 133, 145, 146, 152–154, 181, 185, 211, 220, 230; negotiations concerning (1913), 190, 192–193
 Ramkavar, 182
 Rauf (Orbay), Hussein, 207, 211–212, 230
 Rawlinson, Col. A., 234n.17
reaya (*rayahs*, population; later, non-Muslim population), 14, 125, 131n.44, 247
 Redcliffe, Lord Stratford de, 78, 83, 108, 122

- Red Sea, 9, 10, 138
- Refet Paşa (Bele), 224
- reform process, xiv–xv; periods of, 76, 82–83
- religion: conversions, 11; as key to identity, 112. *See also* apostasy
- Representative Committee of the Union for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia, 206, 209, 210, 211
- representative principle, 86–87, 96–111, 249; in Ottoman tradition, 97–98; in Islam, 98; in provincial government, 100–101, 103–104; in 1845 assembly, 101; in Supreme Council, 102; in non-Muslim *millet*s, 102–103; in Council of State, 104; as topic of public discussion, 105–106; in constitution of 1876, 106–107; in electoral law, 107
- republic: concept of, 27, 252–253; proclaimed, 28, 231
- Reşid (Reshid) Paşa, Mustafa, 23–24, 78, 82, 99, 101–102, 127, 247–249, 252; views on Muslim-Christian equality, 116–119, 127
- responsible government, concept of, 254
- Reval interview, 80
- Rhodes, 9
- Rıza Nur, Dr., 225
- Rıza Tevfik, 251
- Robert College, 90, 168–170
- Romania (Rumania), Romanians, 11, 22, 91, 105–106, 119
- Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 85
- Rum, Sultanate of, 3–4
- Rumelia, 7, 8, 11, 13, 76
- Rumeli Hisarı, 7, 168, 170
- Rumiantsov (Rumyantsov), Count Peter A., 30, 33, 52
- Ruşçuk, 135, 144
- rüşdiye*, 172. *See also* schools
- Russia, xii–xiii, 19–22, 105–106; and Orthodox in Ottoman Empire, 29–59; demands made upon Turkey, 1945, 82; and telegraph, 136, 138; supports Armenian schools, 174; raises Armenian question, 183, 186; wants influence over Armenian area, 183–185; stirs up Kurds and Armenians, 185, 187; opposes Ottoman and German proposals, 188–189; advances plan for Armenian administration, 190–192; contemplates occupying eastern Anatolia, 194; signs agreement with Porte (8 February 1914), 195–196; receives Kemalist missions (1920), 213–215; agents in Anatolia, 215; champions Armenia, 216; promotes Baku Congress, 216; signs Moscow treaty with Turkey, 218–219; Kemalist coolness toward, 223; supports Turkey at Lausanne, 227–228; 1926 treaty with Turkey, 231
- Russian Orthodox Church, 34–36, 54
- Russian-Ottoman treaty (1900), 185
- Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), 184, 185
- Russo-Turkish treaty (of Moscow; 1921), 218–219, 227
- Russo-Turkish War (1828–1829), 76–77, 133
- Russo-Turkish War (1853–1856), 78. *See also* Crimean War
- Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878), 79–80, 88, 154–155, 185, 230
- Sabah*, 194, 294
- sadrâzam*, 13, 116
- Said Bey (Paşa), Mehmet, Küçük, 252
- Said Halim Paşa, 192, 194, 195
- St. Jean de Maurienne, treaty of, 208
- St. Sophia. *See* Aya Sofya
- Sakarya, battle, 220, 221
- Salih Paşa, Hulûsi Kezrak, 211
- salname (yearbook), 251
- Saloniki (Salonica, Selanik), 11, 25, 137, 147, 173; Saloniki incident, 124
- Samos, 101
- Samsun, 26, 139, 157, 208

- sancak*, 103–104
 San Remo conference, 212
 San Stefano, treaty of, 246
sarrafi, 60–62, 67–68, 102
 Sazonov, Sergei, and Armenian crisis (1912–1914), 184–186, 189–195
 schools, 24, 75, 92; military, 22, 23, 134; telegraphy, 143–144; *medrese*, 166; *mekteb*, 166, 172–173; foreign schools in Ottoman Empire, 167–170; higher specialized schools, 170–172; state school system, 172–173; schooling abroad, 173–174; of non-Muslim minorities, 174–175
 secularism and secularization, 28, 75, 85–86, 100, 175, 258
sehim, 60; *sehim kaimesi*, 62
 Selim I, 8–9
 Selim II, 10, 18
 Selim III, 22–23, 75–76, 85, 257
 Selim Sabit Efendi, 175
 Seljuk Turks, 2–5
sened-i ittifak, 98, 250
 Senusi, 92, 222
 separation of powers, 84, 254–256
 Serbia, Serbs, 4, 5, 7, 11, 22–23, 76–77, 79–80, 91, 106, 119, 122
sergi, 60
seriat, 9, 12, 13, 98, 125, 175
 Sevastopol, 136
 Şevket Bey, 153
 Sèvres, treaty of, xiii, 26, 81, 215–216, 217, 220, 222, 230
şeyhülislâm, 14, 79, 175
 Sforza, Count Carlo, 217, 220
 Shiites, Shiism, 2, 8, 120
sibyan schools, 172
 Sinan, Mimar (architect), 15
 Sinop, 4, 19
sipahi, 13–14
 Sivas, 157, 185, 208, 210, 211, 222; Congress and Declaration of (1919), 157, 209, 211, 212, 214
 slaves, 6, 9, 13, 169
 Smith, J. Lawrence, 134, 139, 158
 Smyrna, 67. *See also* Izmir
 social strata, 176, 214
 Sofia (Sofya), 5, 136
 Soğuk Çeşme, 142
 Sokollu Mehmed Paşa, 10
 Sorel, Albert, 31–32, 38–39, 41–42, 48 n.39
 sovereignty, national, 27, 74–75, 83, 207, 209, 243–245; Ismet's emphasis on, at Lausanne, 226, 228–229; in Lausanne treaty, 231
 sovereignty of the people. *See* popular sovereignty
 Spa conference, 215
 Spain, 10
 state, nature of the, 244–246
 Straits (Bosporus and Dardanelles), 21, 30, 82, 184–185, 194, 202–203 n.84, 204 n.110, 214–215, 219; opened by Mudros armistice, 207; Çanak crisis at, 223; at Lausanne conference, 226–228; in Lausanne treaty, 231
 Stratigopoulou, Ar., 152
 Sublime Porte (building), 20, 142
 Suez, 10, 138; Suez Canal, 138, 140
 Sufism, 15
 Süleyman, Seljuk ruler, 3
 Süleyman I, 9–10, 12, 14–16
 Sultan Ahmed Khan, 222
 sultanate, 12, 14, 18, 97, 209, 212–213; abolished, 27, 81, 87, 224–225, 243; powers under 1876 constitution, 107; powers curbed (1909–1914), 253; nonresponsible, 254; *örfl* powers, 255
 Şumnu (Shumla), 135, 136, 145
 Sunni Islam, 9, 14
 Supreme Council (Allied, in Paris), 208, 211
 Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances, 86–87, 99, 102, 104, 115, 255–256
 Şûra-yı Devlet. *See* Council of State *sürgün*, 11
 Swiss, at Amasya, 90, 122–123
 Sykes, Mark, 93, 176
 Syria, 2, 9, 26, 77, 101, 136, 138,

- 142, 154; during armistice and French occupation, 206, 208, 215, 217, 220, 222, 231
 Szechenyi, Count, 90
- Tabriz, 10
Takvim-i Vekayi, 23, 62
 Talât Paşa, Mehmed, 25, 153, 193
 Tanzimat, 24, 78–79, 80, 114–128, 147; furnishes political concepts to Republic, 244–259; expands area of government activity, 257–258
tarikât, 15
Tasvir-i Efkiâr (*Efkâr*), 192
 Tatars, 10
 taxes (1840), 61, 100
 telegraph, electric, 133–165; and Revolution of 1908, 25, 156; demonstrated in Istanbul, 133–134; expands in Ottoman Empire, 134–138; reaches Istanbul, 135; operation of, 138–139; attitudes toward, 139–141, 146; bureaucracy, 141–142; offices and buildings, 142–143; education for, 143–144; repair, manufacture, maintenance, 144–145; impact on law, 145–147; and meteorology, 147; impact on government and foreign relations, 147–149; foreigners employed by, 149–150; Turkish code for, 150–151; uses French, 150–152; non-Muslim employees, 152–153; Turkish employees, 153; and railway operation, 153–154; and war and diplomacy, 154; and business, 154; and journalism, 154–155; and time consciousness, 155–156; law of 1859, 156; used by Kemal and nationalists, 157–158, 209, 217, 227
 telegraph, semaphore, 133
 territorial indivisibility, concept of, 245–246
 Tevfik, General, 169
 Tevfik Efendi, 152
 Tevfik Paşa, Ahmet, 217, 250
 Thessaly, 119
 Thrace: Eastern, 218, 222, 223, 224, 228, 230; Western, 212, 231
 Thugut, Franz, 32, 38–42, 49n.51
 Ticani order, 92
 Tigris, 185
umar, 13, 17
 time, awareness of, 155–156
 Timur the Lame (Tamerlane), 6
 tobacco, 16
 Tokat, 152, 154
 Topkapı Sarayı, 12, 13
torba, 85
 Tott, Baron de, 90
 Trabzon (Trebizond), 7, 147, 157, 181, 185
 trade. *See* economy; *kaime*; merchants
 Transcaucasus, 183–184, 208, 214, 218–220. *See also* Caucasus
 Translation Bureau (Tercüme Odası), 84, 90, 92, 141, 143, 151, 153, 171
 Tripartite Treaty (1920), 215
 Triple Alliance, 180, 186, 189, 191, 196
 Triple Entente, 180, 187, 188, 189–190, 193
 Tripoli in Africa (Trablusgarb), 10, 19, 22, 25, 142, 188; war for (1911), 185
 Truman Doctrine, 82
tuğra, 20, 65
 tulip, 16; Tulip Period, 20–21
 Tuna *vilayet*, 118, 150, 172
 Tunis, 10, 19, 22, 80, 105
 Tuoizzi, Signor, 220
 turban, 166
 Turk (term), 1, 15, 88; concept of, as citizen, 246–247
 Turkey, foreign relations (1918–1923), 206–242; bases of, 207, 232; first resistance to occupation, 207–211; National Pact adopted, 211–212; Ankara government established, 212–214; negotiations with Russia and West (1920–1921), 214–221; relations with Muslim world, 221–222; defeat of Greece and armistice (1922),

- 222–224; negotiation of Lausanne treaty, 225–231
- Turkey, official country name, 27. *See also* Ottoman Empire; Turkish Republic
- Turkification, 181
- Turkish language, 1, 4, 173, 176; and telegraph, 142, 150–151; in Latin letters, 151; new words from French, 151–152
- Turkishness, 26, 28, 88–89, 126
- Turkish Republic, 28; politics after 1945, 82; declared (1923), 231; political concepts inherited from Ottoman Empire, 243–259; achievements of, 259–260, 264 n. 89; continuity with the past, 260
- Türkmens (Turcomans), 3, 4, 8, 145
- Turks: early history, 1–5; of Russia, 92
- Ubicini, Abdolonyme, 98
- Ukraine, 221, 227
- ulema*, 9, 14, 15–16, 19, 23, 97, 100, 124, 139–140, 166, 175
- umma*, 12
- United Nations, 82
- United States. *See* America
- University of Istanbul, 172, 195
- Üsküdar, 135, 137, 142
- usul-u meşveret*, 250
- vakıf*, 14–15
- Van, 181, 187, 188
- Varandian, 182
- Varna, and telegraph, 134–135, 137, 144, 151
- vatan*, 88, 129–130 n. 20, 244
- Vatan* (drama), 24, 88, 244
- Venice, 6, 7, 8, 10, 20
- Venizelos, Eleutherios, 208
- Verakazmial, 182
- Vienna, 9, 134–137; second siege of (1683), 20
- vilayet* system, 24; laws concerning, 84, 87, 103–104, 146, 181, 249, 254. *See also* provincial administration
- Voltaire (François Marie Arouet), 85
- Vorontzov-Dashkov, 184, 185
- Vuliç Efendi, 135, 143, 150–151
- Wahhabis, 76
- Wallachia, 36–37, 42, 54, 135
- Wangenheim, Hans von, 185, 187–197
- wars, xii, 74–82
- Weale, Charles James, 150
- Westenenk, inspector, 196
- western influences on Ottoman Empire, xi–xv, 21–25, 73–94, 113, 122–123
- Wilson, Woodrow, 210
- women, 2, 19, 153, 169, 175
- World War I. *See* Great War
- World War II, 81–82
- Yahya Naci Efendi, Bulgaroğlu, 167
- Yeniköy conference (1913), 191–192
- Yeni Osmanlılar, 24, 79, 86, 103, 105, 125–127, 244
- Yıldız Palace, 156
- Yirmisekiz Çelebi Mehmed, 21, 75
- Young Ottomans. *See* Yeni Osmanlılar
- Young Turks, 126, 143, 153, 170, 171, 251; Young Turk Revolution (1908), 25, 80, 127, 156, 169; Young Turk regime, 25–26, 81, 147, 180–182
- Yusuf Kemal (Tengirşenk), 214, 216, 218–223, 225
- Zavriev, Dr., 183
- Zimmerman, Arthur, 187
- Zinoviev, Grigory, 216
- Ziya Bey (Paşa), Abdülhamid, 127, 174, 244, 252, 253
- Ziya Gökalp, 26, 167, 173
- Zohrab Efendi, 152
- Zsitvatorok, treaty of, 19